Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00831/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00831-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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08cv0831 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LARRY E. BRAY,

Plaintiff,

v.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner

of Social Security,

Defendant.

 

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Civil No. 08-0831-WQH(WVG)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND

GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION 

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(Doc. Nos. 15, 21)

Plaintiff Larry E. Bray (hereafter “Plaintiff”), filed a

Complaint For Judicial Review And Remedy On Administrative Decision

Under The Social Security Act [42 U.S.C. §405(g)]. Defendant

Michael J. Astrue (hereafter “Defendant”), filed an Answer to the

Complaint and the administrative record (hereafter “Tr.”), pertaining to this case. Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.

Defendant has filed an Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment and a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.

The Court, having reviewed Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment, Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment, Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and the

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administrative record filed by Defendant, hereby finds that

Plaintiff is not entitled to the relief requested and therefore

RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment be DENIED

and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment be GRANTED. 

 I

 PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On July 30, 2005, Plaintiff filed an application for

disability insurance benefits, alleging that he was disabled since

June 20, 2004. (Tr. 99-103). The Commissioner of Social Security

denied his application initially and upon reconsideration. (Tr. 87-

98). On October 26, 2006, a hearing was held at which Plaintiff and

his wife appeared with counsel and testified before an Administrative Law Judge (hereafter “ALJ”) (Tr. 656-703). On November 6,

2006, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled given his

residual functional capacity for sedentary work. (Tr. 17-23). The

ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the Commissioner of

Social Security when the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request

for review. (Tr. 5-8). 

 II

 SUMMARY OF APPLICABLE LAW

Title II of the Social Security Act (hereinafter “Act”), as

amended, provides for the payment of insurance benefits to persons

who have contributed to the program and who suffer from a physical

or mental disability. 42 U.S.C. § 423 (a)(1)(D). Title XVI of the

Act provides for the payment of disability benefits to indigent

persons under the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program. § 1382

(a). Both titles of the Act define “disability” as the “inability

to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any

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08cv0831 3

medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be

expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12

months...” Id. The Act further provides that an individual:

shall be determined to be under a disability only if

his physical or mental impairment or impairments are

of such severity that he is not only unable to do his

previous work but cannot, considering his age,

education, and work experience, engage in any other

kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the

national economy, regardless of whether such work

exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or

whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or

whether he would be hired if he applied for work. Id.

The Secretary of the Social Security Administration has

established a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether a person is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.

Step one determines whether the claimant is engaged in “substantial

gainful activity.” If he is, disability benefits are denied. 20

C.F. R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). If he is not, the decision

maker proceeds to step two, which determines whether the claimant

has a medically severe impairment or combination of impairments.

That determination is governed by the “severity regulation” at issue

in this case. The severity regulation provides in relevant part:

If you do not have any impairment or combination of

impairments which significantly limits your physical

or mental ability to do basic work activities, we will

find that you do not have a severe impairment and are,

therefore, not disabled. We will not consider your

age, education, and work experience. §§ 404.1520(c),

416.920(c). 

The ability to do basic work activities is defined as “the

abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs.” 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1521(b), 416.921(b). Such abilities and aptitudes include

“[p]hysical functions such as walking, standing, sitting, lifting,

pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying, or handling;” “[c]apacities

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for seeing, hearing, and speaking;” “[u]nderstanding, carrying out,

and remembering simple instructions;” [u]se of judgment;”

“[r]esponding appropriately to supervision, co-workers, and usual

work situations;” and “[d]ealing with changes in a routine work

setting.” Id. 

If the claimant does not have a severe impairment or

combination of impairments, the disability claim is denied. 

If the impairment is severe, the evaluation proceeds to the

third step, which determines whether the impairment is equivalent to

one of a number of listed impairments that the Secretary acknowledges are so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity. 20

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). If the impairment meets or

equals one of the listed impairments, the claimant is conclusively

presumed to be disabled. If the impairment is not one that is

conclusively presumed to be disabling, the evaluation proceeds to

the fourth step, which determines whether the impairment prevents

the claimant from performing work he has performed in the past. If

the claimant is able to perform his previous work, he is not

disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). If the claimant

cannot perform his previous work, the fifth and final step of the

process determines whether he is able to perform other work in the

national economy in view of his age, education, and work experience.

The claimant is entitled to disability benefits only if he is not

able to perform other work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f). 

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08cv0831 5

 III

 ALJ’S FINDINGS

The ALJ made the following pertinent findings:

1. (Plaintiff) meets the insured status requirements

of the Social Security Act through the date of this

decision.

2. (Plaintiff) has not engaged in substantial gainful

activity since February 3, 2005. He did engage in

substantial gainful activity from September 20, 2004,

until February 3, 2005. In that regard, (Plaintiff’s)

testimony and record evidence indicates that (his)

work activity was both substantial and gainful, his

earnings based upon successful competitive employment

with no special workplace conditions. There is no

record evidence of frequent absences, a period of

temporary work remission, or special conditions; nor

does the record support (Plaintiff’s) alleged unsatisfactory performance.

3. (Plaintiff) has the following severe impairments:

coronary artery disease post bypass surgery, hypertension, degenerative joint disease, status post

arthroscopy and meniscectomy, and peripheral neuropathy. His alleged depression, anxiety and cognitive

dysfunction are not associated with more than minimal

limitations, and thus, are not severe. Further, his

alleged arrhythmia is controlled and did not satisfy

the durational requirements of the Act.

4. (Plaintiff) does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals one

of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404,

Subpart P, Appendix 1.

5. After careful consideration of the entire record,

the undersigned finds that (Plaintiff) has the

residual functional capacity to perform sedentary

work. He is able to lift and/or carry up to 10 pounds

occasionally, less than 10 pounds frequently; stand

and/or walk for 2 to 4 hours; sit for 6 hours; with no

climbing of ladders, ropes or scaffolds and otherwise

occasional postural activities; and with no concentrated exposure to extremes of temperature, vibration,

or lung irritants. He exhibits mild restrictions of

activities of daily living, social functioning, or

concentration/persistence/pace, and no episodes of

decompensation; nor do the “C” criteria of the

listings apply.

The residual functional capacity found herein comports

with the findings of the state agency and consultive

examiners, who noted no severe mental impairments and

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08cv0831 6

found (Plaintiff) able to perform at least sedentary

work. The record supports the conclusions reached and

reflects stable impairments, controlled with treatment

and medication with regard to any continuous period of

not less than 12 months. For example, the record

reflects objective findings consistent with

osteoarthritis and coronary artery disease. (Plaintiff) underwent bypass surgery in July 2005, reporting

only three months of symptoms, and by August 2005 was

walking downhill without difficulty and exhibited

unremarkable examination signs. Indeed, exercise

tolerance was improved. Moreover, Dr. Charlat

reported that (Plaintiff) was doing well with cardiac

rehabilitation... and his examinations unremarkable.

Acute episodes of arrhythmia were controlled by

medication, and (his) clinical status was stable and

benign. Further, (Plaintiff) was alert and oriented

and neuropsychiatrically intact.

In that regard, Dr. Magy, a psychologist, found no

objective evidence of an organic impairment, noting

instead only mild depression and merely recommending

antidepressant medication and therapy; (Plaintiff)

denied significant depression or anxiety. (Plaintiff)

had been referred to Dr. Magy by Dr. Schim, who was

uncertain as to the etiology of (Plaintiff’s) complaints. (Plaintiff’s) physical and neurological

signs were unremarkable aside from reports of decreased sensation in the feet. (Plaintiff) reported

improvement with Cymbalta and denied significant side

effects.

Progress notes from (Plaintiff’s) primary physician,

Linda Falconio, M.D., reflect medical management of

(Plaintiff’s) symptoms, his condition generally stable

and symptom exacerbations acute. He exhibited shortterm and variable exacerbations of hypertension and

low-grade depression, the former controlled with

medications and the latter controlled with and without

medications, (Plaintiff) was taking Cymbalta only for

a short time. Dr. Falconio conceded that (Plaintiff’s) cardiac impairment level was slight, but

opined on February 17, 2005, that (Plaintiff) was

severely limited in his functional capacity and was

moderately limited on a psychiatric basis. On

February 10, 2005, Dr. Falconio opined that (Plaintiff’s) physical impairments allowed for medium work,

but his mental impairments were markedly impairing.

On May 16, 2005, Dr. Falconio conceded that (Plaintiff) could perform sedentary work in the competitive

workplace, but on May 6, 2006, opined that he would

miss work more than three times per month secondary to

organic brain syndrome and could no longer sit, stand;

and walk for a total of 8 hours per day.

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I have considered the opinions of Dr. Falconio, but

accord those opinions limited weight. Indeed, those

opinions are internally inconsistent and are not

supported by Dr. Falconio’s progress notes, reflecting

generally stable and benign signs and no sustained

mental status abnormalities.

Dr. Rodriguez, consultive examining psychiatrist,

found only minimal impairment, (Plaintiff’s) complete

mental status examination unremarkable aside from mild

depression. Similarly, Dr. Lee, a board-certified

internist, reported signs and findings consistent with

sedentary work during his consultive examination.

(Plaintiff)exhibited mild lumbar disc degeneration,

facet joint arthritis, mild to moderate knee

osteoarthritis, and normal sinus rhythm. (Plaintiff)

never required nitroglycerin, his blood pressure was

140/76 and his examination was positive for grade I/VI

systolic murmur, slight loss of lumbar motion with

tenderness, 1+ pitting edema, and knee tenderness and

crepitus, with loss of motion and instability.

(Plaintiff) was neurologically intact, with a slight

limp, but required no assistive device for ambulation.

The state agency agreed that (Plaintiff’s) mental

impairments are not severe and that (Plaintiff) can

perform at least sedentary work. Nor did Drs. Skyhar

or Bried, (Plaintiff’s) orthopedists, opine greater

limitations. Indeed, strength was normal, sensation

was intact, ligaments were stable, and there was no

effusion following surgery.

Further, Dr. Steiner, who is board-certified in

internal medicine and cardiovascular disease, did not

consider (Plaintiff’s) cardiac status impairing to the

degree alleged, but rather, opined limitations that

would allow for the performance of the claimant’s past

work. (Plaintiff) has recovered from his July 2005

bypass surgery, which as noted by the medical expert

was not incapacitating for more than three months, and

Dr. Steiner noted that (Plaintiff) is on cardiac

maintenance, including using the treadmill and biking.

Further, the medical expert opined that (Plaintiff’s)

mental impairments are mild and controllable with

medications, his cardiovascular status is controlled

and his musculoskeletal status is controlled without

narcotic pain medications. The medical expert concluded that (Plaintiff’s) impairments do not meet or

equal any medical listings, including the cardiac

musculoskeletal, or mental listings, and in fact allow

for the performance of medium work. In that regard I

find (Plaintiff) more limited than did the medical

expert, in light of (Plaintiff’s) musculoskeletal

impairments, which, combined with his cardiac impairments, limit him to work activities within the

parameters identified by the state agency and

consultive examiners. The medical expert noted that

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08cv0831 8

(Plaintiff’s) cardiac status is stable, with no end

organ damage. His arrhythmia is controlled with

medication, his hypertension is controlled with

medication, and he exhibits no impairments, physical

or mental, that preclude the performance of successful

competitive remunerative work.

After considering the evidence of record, the undersigned finds that (Plaintiff’s) medically determinable

impairments could reasonably be expected to produce

the alleged symptoms, but that (Plaintiff’s) statements concerning the intensity, duration and limiting

effects of these symptoms are not entirely credible.

I have also considered the third-party statements of

record from (Plaintiff’s) spouse, but accord greater

weight to the objective medical evidence and statements of disinterested parties. The record reveals

that (Plaintiff’s) problems are generally longstanding, and did not interfere with his conceded ability

to work until at least the alleged onset date. In

fact, (Plaintiff) admittedly returned to work until

February 2005, but argues that his physical condition

cannot survive the stress of working. He was nevertheless able to travel to Hawaii during the period at

issue, and activities of daily living admittedly

include golfing, some yardwork, some housework, some

shopping, driving, Tai Chi classes, working on the

computer/internet, and cardiac maintenance such as

biking and using treadmill... (Plaintiff) requires

no... assistive device for ambulation... Indeed,

(Plaintiff) undergoes no regular mental health

treatment, his cardiovascular status is controlled,

his musculoskeletal impairments are controlled without

narcotic pain medications, and there is no evidence of

end organ damage. (Plaintiff) is taking no antidepressant medications; he took Cymbalta only for a short

time, which improved his symptoms... (Plaintiff) has

recovered from his July 2005 bypass surgery which as

noted by the medical expert was not incapacitating for

more than three months, and both he and his wife focus

on (Plaintiff’s) cognitive dysfunction when arguing

that he can no longer work. In that regard, objective

findings are not compatible with more than minimal

limitations, and as noted by the medical expert are

only mildly abnormal and represent only mild depression. Further, the medical expert, who is boardcertified in internal medicine and cardiovascular

disease, did not consider (Plaintiff’s) cardiac status

impairing to the degree alleged, but rather, opined

limitations that would allow for the performance of

(Plaintiff’s) past work... (Plaintiff) is

neuropsychiatrically intact and exhibits no impairments, physical or mental, that would reasonably

preclude the performance of successful competitive

remunerative work. 

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08cv0831 9

7. (Plaintiff) is capable of performing his past

relevant work as a claims examiner or sales manager,

although not as a claims adjuster. So opined the

vocational expert in response to a hypothetical

question assuming the residual functioning capacity

found herein, and I concur and so find. Either as

actually or generally performed, those jobs do not

require the performance of work-related activities

precluded by (Plaintiff’s) residual functional

capacity.

8. (Plaintiff) has not been under a “disability,” as

defined in the Social Security Act, from July 23, 2004

through the date of this decision.

(Tr. 19-23)(citations omitted)(emphasis in original).

 IV

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court may only disturb the Commissioner's final

decision "if it is based on legal error or if the fact findings are

not supported by substantial evidence." Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d

1226, 1229 (9th Cir. 1987); see Villa v. Heckler, 797 F.2d 794, 796

(9th Cir. 1986). The court cannot affirm the Commissioner's final

decision simply by isolating a certain amount of supporting

evidence. Rather, the court must examine the administrative record

as a whole. Gonzalez v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir.

1990). Yet, the Commissioner's findings are not subject to reversal

because substantial evidence exists in the record to support a

different conclusion. See, e.g., Mullen v. Brown, 800 F.2d 535, 545

(6th Cir. 1986). "Substantial evidence, considering the entire

record, is relevant evidence which a reasonable person might accept

as adequate to support a conclusion." Matthews v. Shalala, 10 F.3d

678, 679 (9th Cir. 1993); see Thompson v. Schweiker, 665 F.2d 936,

939 (9th Cir. 1982). The Commissioner's decision must be set aside,

even if supported by substantial evidence, if improper legal 

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08cv0831 10

standards were applied in reaching that decision. See, e.g.,

Benitez v. Califano, 573 F.2d 653, 655 (9th Cir. 1978).

 V

THE ALJ DID NOT ERR IN NOT MENTIONING PLAINTIFF’S WIFE’S TESTIMONY

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by not addressing

Plaintiff’s wife’s testimony given at the administrative hearing.

Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s assertion is without merit

because the information provided in Plaintiff’s wife’s testimony did

not differ significantly from the information provided in her

written statement, which the ALJ addressed.

“Although eyewitnesses have to rely on some extent on

communications with the claimant in ascertaining whether (h)e is

disabled or malingering,” the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has

held that “family members in a position to observe a claimant’s

symptoms and daily activities are competent to testify as to (his)

condition.” Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 918-919 (9th Cir. 1993);

Sprague, 812 F.2d at 1232.

Social Security rulings require that the ALJ consider lay

witness testimony in certain cases.

Social Security Ruling 88-13 states that where a

claimant alleges pain or other symptoms that are not

supported by medical evidence in the file, the

adjudicator shall obtain detailed descriptions of

daily activities by directing specific inquiries about

the pain and its effects to... third parties who would

be likely to have such knowledge... The ruling

requires the ALJ to give ‘full consideration’ to such

evidence. Having been directed to consider the

testimony of lay witnesses in determining a claimant’s

disability, the ALJ can reject the testimony of lay

witnesses only if he gives reasons germane to each

witness whose testimony he rejects. 

Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1288 (9th Cir. 1996)(emphasis in 

original), citing Dodrill, 12 F.3d at 919.

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One reason for which an ALJ may discount lay witness

testimony is that it conflicts with medical evidence. Lewis v.

Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 511 (9th Cir. 2001), citing Vincent v. Heckler,

739 F.2d 1393, 1395 (9th Cir. 1984).

1. Plaintiff’s Wife’s Statement

Plaintiff’s wife’s statement lists Plaintiff’s activities and

her observations of Plaintiff’s limitations. She states that

Plaintiff engages in cardiac rehabilitation three times per week,

attends Tai Chi classes two times per week, plays golf two times per

month, might complete household errands, might make the bed and

takes out the garbage. (Tr. 132-136). Additionally, she states that

Plaintiff attends church two to three times per week and acts as a

greeter on two Sundays each month. (Tr. 136). However, she also

states that Plaintiff has problems starting and completing tasks,

delays paying bills, has poor decision making ability, poor money

spending control, needs reminders regarding personal hygiene and

taking his medications, does not have energy, has lost upper body

strength, can not perform yardwork or heavy work because his legs

hurt all the time and has numbness in his feet, does not lift

greater than 20 pounds, can not squat or bend, can not walk more

than four to five blocks and can not climb stairs. (Tr. 134-139).

Further, Plaintiff’s wife indicated that Plaintiff can not

focus, prioritize or organize tasks, can not problem solve, requires

sleeping pills to sleep, is easily agitated, short tempered and

nervous, and has problems with memory and concentration. (Tr. 133,

137-138).

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08cv0831 12

2. Plaintiff’s Wife’s Testimony

At the hearing, Plaintiff’s wife testified about Plaintiff’s

activities and her observations of his limitations. She stated that

she does 90% of the shopping for the household, that “anything

around the house is mine, and he used to be a co-partner in that,

and ... he ... no longer thinks about it,” Plaintiff does a

minuscule amount of yardwork and has numb feet and bad knees.

Additionally, she testified that he can not start or complete tasks,

has memory problems and is less tolerant and impatient. (Tr. 688-

689). 

3. The ALJ Fully Considered The Information Provided 

 in Plaintiff’s Wife’s Testimony

The Court finds that the ALJ gave full consideration to the

information provided in Plaintiff’s wife’s statement. However, the

Court’s review of her testimony shows that either her testimony

conflicts with her statement in one minor regard, and that the

remainder of the information contained in her testimony was

consistent with her statement. 

a. Conflict Between Statement and Testimony

Plaintiff’s wife’s statement notes that Plaintiff might

complete household errands and shops for groceries and household

supplies two to three times per week. (Tr. 132, 134-136). However

she testified that she does 90% of the shopping. (Tr. 688). In this

regard, her testimony conflicts with her statement. The Court finds

that this conflict is minor, at best. Therefore, the ALJ reasonably

noted that Plaintiff was able to do some shopping. (Tr. 22).

b. Consistencies Between Statement and Testimony

Plaintiff’s wife’s testimony and statement are consistent in

every other respect. Plaintiff’s wife testified that Plaintiff is

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08cv0831 13

less tolerant and impatient. (Tr. 688). These observations are

included in her statement. (Tr. 137). She testified that Plaintiff

has memory problems regarding taking his medications. (Tr. 688).

This observation is included in her statement. (Tr. 134). She

testified that Plaintiff does a minuscule amount of yard work. (Tr.

689). This observation is included in her statement. (Tr. 135-136).

She testified that Plaintiff has numb feet and bad knees. (Tr. 689).

These observations are in her statement. (Tr. 135, 139). She

testified that Plaintiff can not start or complete tasks and has

memory problems. (Tr. 688-689). These observations are included in

her statement. (Tr. 134). Therefore, the Court concludes that

Plaintiff’s wife’s statement and her testimony are essentially

consistent. Consequently, the ALJ did not need to mention her

testimony in his decision because the statement and testimony

contain the same information. In fact, the Court observes that her

statement is more expansive than her testimony because her statement

provides more information about Plaintiff’s activities and her

observations of his limitations than does her testimony.

c. The ALJ Fully Considered the Presented

 Medical Evidence

Social Security Ruling 88-13 requires that where a claimant’s

allegations of symptoms are not supported by medical evidence in the

file, the ALJ must fully consider the evidence offered by lay

witnesses. But, the ALJ may discount such evidence if it conflicts

with the presented medical evidence. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1288; Lewis,

236 F.3d at 511. 

Here, it is clear that the record is replete with medical

evidence detailing Plaintiff’s conditions and limitations. The ALJ

accorded greater weight to the objective medical evidence because it

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08cv0831 14

conflicted with Plaintiff’s wife’s statement and testimony. In so

doing, the ALJ specifically noted Plaintiff’s own reported activities during the time he claimed he was disabled, his medical records

regarding his cardiovascular and psychological conditions, and his

musculoskeletal impairments. Further, he reviewed the reports of

Dr. Rodriguez, a consultive examining psychiatrist, Dr. Lee, a board

certified internist, and Dr. Steiner, a consultive examining

internist, who is certified in cardiovascular disease. (Tr. 21-22).

The records and reports noted above do not indicate that Plaintiff’s

conditions and limitations are as severe as the information

contained in Plaintiff’s wife’s statement and testimony. 

Therefore, the Court concludes that the ALJ did not err in

not mentioning Plaintiff’s wife’s testimony, but instead accorded

greater weight to the objective medical evidence presented to him.

As a result, the Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Motion for

Summary Judgment be DENIED and Defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment be GRANTED.

 VI

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

After a review of the record in this matter, the undersigned

Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment be DENIED and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment be

GRANTED. 

This report and recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate

Judge is submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to

this case, pursuant to the provision of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than August 20, 2010, any party

to this action may file written objections with the Court and serve

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a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections

to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall

be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than

September 7, 2010. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise

those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst,

951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

 

DATED: July 29, 2010

 Hon. William V. Gallo

 U.S. Magistrate Judge

Case 3:08-cv-00831-WQH-WVG Document 23 Filed 07/29/10 Page 15 of 15