Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-02550/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-02550-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

OAKLAND DIVISION

MYRNA ABAD,

Plaintiff,

 v.

WILLIAMS, COHEN & GRAY, INC.,

Defendant.

 

No. C 06-2550 SBA

ORDER

[Docket Nos. 3, 56, 57]

Defendant Williams, Cohen & Gray, Inc. has filed an objection to the Magistrate’s Report and

Recommendation Regarding Plaintiff’s Motion for an Award of Costs and Attorney Fees [Docket No.

56], and requests the Court to review and adjust the attorneys’ reasonable hourly rates as determined by

the report [Docket No. 57]. 

For the reasons that follow, the Court ADOPTS in part, and MODIFIES in part, the Report and

Recommendation issued by Magistrate Judge Joseph C. Spero. The Court also grants attorney O.

Randolph Bragg’s pro hac vice application [Docket No. 3]. 

BACKGROUND

On April 12, 2006, plaintiff Myrna Abad filed a complaint alleging that defendant Williams,

Cohen & Gray, Inc. (WCG) violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692

et seq. and the California Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (CA FDCPA), Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1788 et

seq. Her counsel, Irving Berg, subsequently invited attorney O. Randolph Bragg to assist him in the case,

and Bragg filed a pro hac vice application for that purpose. 

Case 4:06-cv-02550-SBA Document 60 Filed 06/26/07 Page 1 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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On September 26, 2006, WCG served Abad an offer of settlement pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 68, agreeing to pay Abad $2,000.00 and “reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs to be

determined by the Court.” Docket No. 22. Abad accepted the offer on October 3, 2006 and thereafter

requested the Court to determine reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. See Docket No. 27. 

Magistrate Judge Joseph C. Spero determined that Abad be awarded $8,458.00 in reasonable

attorneys’ fees and costs. See Docket No. 56. Judge Spero found that the attorneys’ reported time was

excessive given the case’s straightforward nature, and adjusted the hours accordingly. He also reduced

attorney Berg’s hourly rate from the requested $425.00/hour to $350.00/hour, and attorney Bragg’s

hourly rate from $450.00/hour to $435.00/hour. 

WCG has filed a memorandum specifically objecting to Judge Spero’s recommended hourly rates

for Bragg and Berg. See Docket No. 58. WCG argues that, given the weight of the evidence and the

relative simplicity of the case, the reasonable hourly rate should be set within the range of $200.00 to

$250.00/hour. 

LEGAL STANDARDS

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), a district judge may designate a magistrate judge to hear

and file a recommendation for disposition of matters dispositive of a party’s claims or defenses, and a

party objecting to the recommendation may file a timely objection. See Estate of Conners by Meredith

v. O’Connor, 6 F.3d 656, 658 (9th Cir. 1993). Under the statute, the district judge shall make a “de novo

determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which

objection is made” and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). A motion to determine a

party’s claim for attorney’s fees is a dispositive motion. See O’Connor, 6 F.3d at 659. 

The FDCPA entitles a successful plaintiff to reasonable attorneys’ fees as determined by the

Court. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3). This Circuit has adopted the “lodestar” approach for determining

reasonable attorney’s fees. See Jordan v. Multnomah County, 815 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1987)

(citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)). The Court must calculate the lodestar by

multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate. See

Jordan, 815 F.2d at 1258. While the lodestar is strongly presumed to be reasonable, it may be adjusted

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on the basis of other considerations that have not already been subsumed in the initial lodestar

calculation. Id. The Court is to provide a concise but clear explanation of how it arrived at its

calculations. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437.

A. Reasonable hourly rate

The Court must use its discretion when determining a reasonable hourly rate that is “in line with

those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill,

experience and reputation,” but it is the fee applicant’s burden to produce satisfactory evidence to assist

the Court in its assessment. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984). “Affidavits of the plaintiff’s

attorney and other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community, and rate determinations in other

cases, particularly those setting a rate for the plaintiff’s attorney, are satisfactory evidence of the

prevailing market rate.” United Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 896 F.2d 403, 407 (9th Cir.

1990). 

B. Hours reasonably expended

The fee applicant bears the burden of documenting the appropriate hours expended on the

litigation. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437. The Court may adjust the reported hours if it finds that they are

unreasonably excessive, redundant or otherwise unnecessary. Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1397

(9th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted).

ANALYSIS

WCG specifically objects to the hourly rate recommended by Magistrate Judge Spero, but does

not object to his calculation of Berg’s and Bragg’s expended hours. Therefore, under 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1)(B), the Court shall only make a de novo determination of the hourly rate assessment, and

accept, reject or modify it if necessary. 

WCG argues that the recommended hourly rates of $350.00/hour (Berg) and $435.00/hour

(Bragg) are excessive because: 1) the recommended rates are not the prevailing market rates; 2) this

case’s relative simplicity does not call for such rates; and 3) neither Berg nor Bragg provided adequate

support for their requested hourly rates. 

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A. Prevailing market rates in the community

As evidence of the community’s prevailing market rates, Berg and Bragg each cite to recently

litigated FDCPA cases in the Northern District of California. Judge Spero found that Bragg’s cited case

of Defenbaugh v. JBC & Assoc., 2004 WL 1874978 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2004) was the most persuasive

because it was the most recent case cited, and the court in that case had actually awarded Bragg

$435.00/hour. For Berg, Judge Spero was persuaded by Irwin v. Mascott, because the attorney in that

FDCPA case had been awarded $350.00/hour. Case No. C-97-4737 JL (N.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2002).

WCG argues that Defenbaugh is not persuasive because it bears no similarity to this case. In

Defenbaugh, the court relied on Irwin v. Mascott, Case No. C-97-4737 JL (N.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2002), to

make its determination of reasonable hourly rates, but WCG also contends that Irwin is not relevant

because the fees awarded were based on an uncontested motion subject to the terms of a settlement

agreement. 

WCG also introduces other cases to substantiate its argument that the prevailing market rate is

in the range of $200.00 to $250.00/hour. WCG cites two cases from the Southern District of New York

which are somewhat persuasive because that district has a comparable cost of living to this district, and

so its prevailing market rates are likely to be similar to this district. See Dowling v. Kucker Kraus &

Bruh, LLP, 2005 WL 1337442 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 2005); Cooper v. Sunshine Recoveries, Inc., 2001 WL

740765 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 2001). Another cited case, Yahoo!Inc. v. Net Games, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d

1179 (N.D. Cal. 2004), is also somewhat persuasive. While it is a trademark infringement case and not

a FDCPA case, it was heard in this district, and the court found that a reasonable hourly rate for San

Francisco area attorneys was $190.00/hour. See Yahoo!Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d at 1192. However, several

of WCG’s cited cases are not persuasive because they were heard in jurisdictions such as Florida,

Oregon, and Ohio, where the costs of living are likely to be lower than this jurisdiction, and

correspondingly the prevailing market rates are likely to be lower. 

WCG does cite a recent FDCPA case in this district, Camacho v. Bridgeport Financial, 2007 WL

196681 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2007), which did not persuade Judge Spero because that court did not

consider the prevailing market rates nor the individual attorneys’ qualifications. Although Camacho on

its own may not be sufficiently persuasive, it is part of a recent trend of cases in this district awarding

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hourly rates of $250.00/hour to attorneys in FDCPA actions. For instance, as recently as April 2007,

Bragg was awarded the hourly rate of $250.00/hour in Lea v. Cypress Collections, 2007 WL 988184

(N.D. Cal. April 2, 2007). In Lea, a FDCPA case similar to this case, the court based its reasonable

hourly rate assessment on the complexity of the case, other decisions within the district, and prevailing

rates in the marketplace. And while Berg has not been awarded attorney fees in comparably recent cases,

other similarly experienced attorneys in recent FDCPA cases have generally been receiving hourly rates

of $250.00/hour. See, e.g., Antiel v. G.C.S. Credit Systems, Inc., et al., Case No. C-05-04604 RMW

(N.D. Cal. March 17, 2006) (holding that $250/hour was a reasonable rate for experienced FDCPA

attorney Ronald Wilcox); Johnson v. Credit Int’l, Inc., et al., 2005 WL 2401890 (N.D. Cal. July 28,

2005) (holding that $250/hour was a reasonable rate for experienced FDCPA attorneys Paul Arons and

Bragg). 

A court is justified in relying on a requesting counsel’s recently awarded fees when setting that

counsel’s reasonable hourly rate. See Widrig v. Apfel, 140 F.3d 1207, 1210 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that

the district court had not abused its discretion by awarding a lower hourly rate to the requesting counsel,

despite the counsel’s submitted declarations, because the counsel had recently been awarded the lower

rate). Therefore, the Court is more persuaded by more recently litigated FDCPA cases in this district than

the cases cited by Berg and Bragg, given that the most recent case actually awarded Bragg a rate of

$250.00/hour. The prevailing market rate is thus set at $250.00/hour. 

B. Complexity of litigation

WCG additionally argues that this case’s lack of complexity should factor into the reasonable

hourly rates for Berg and Bragg. In his report, Judge Spero takes this factor into consideration when he

assesses the attorneys’ reasonable time spent preparing for litigation, and reduced the reported hours

accordingly. 

Because the complexity factor is one that is subsumed in Judge Spero’s uncontested reasonable

time calculation, the Court will not reevaluate it in terms of the reasonable hourly rate assessment.

Furthermore, the prevailing market rate of $250.00/hour has already been set in light of recently litigated

FDCPA cases of similar complexity. 

C. Berg and Bragg’s submitted declarations

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Berg and Bragg submitted their own declarations in support of their requested hourly rates. Berg

also included past declarations from two other attorneys, Mark A. Chavez and James C. Sturdevant.

WCG argues that the declarations provide inadequate support for the requested hourly rates. 

Bragg’s declaration does not reference his most recently awarded hourly rate of $250.00/hour in

Lea v. Cypress Collections. As discussed above, the most recent case he refers to, Defenbaugh v. JBC

& Assoc., was heard in 2004. Moreover, he has not submitted any declarations by other attorneys which

attest that his requested hourly rates are in line with those prevailing in the community. Therefore, the

Court finds that Bragg’s own declaration does not sufficiently support his requested hourly rates. 

Because Berg has not been awarded any fees as recently as Bragg, it is reasonable that he has only

submitted his own declaration and the other two declarations as evidence. However, in the original case

for which the Chavez and Sturdevant declarations had been submitted, the court reduced the requested

attorney’s fees for Berg and Bragg. See Bracamonte v. Eskanos & Adler, P.C., et al., 2004 WL 1146624

(N.D. Cal. May 27, 2004). In Bracamonte, Berg and Bragg had initially requested $106,839.97 in

attorney’s fees and costs, which was reduced through the parties’ settlement to $85,000, and again

reduced by the court to $77,941.34. Id. While the court did not provide a detailed explanation for the

reduction, in doing so it implied that the Chavez and Sturdevant declarations were not sufficiently

persuasive for it to uphold the attorneys’ requested rates. Furthermore, the declarations were written in

the context of 2004 market rates, and as discussed above, as recently as April 2007, this Court has

deemed $250/hour to be a reasonable and prevailing hourly rate. 

Parenthetically, the Court notes that the declarations submitted by WCG’s own counsel in

opposition to Berg and Bragg’s requested rates are likewise insufficient evidence of the prevailing market

rates. WCG’s counsel has not submitted other attorneys’ declarations regarding the prevailing market

rates; such declarations would have provided the Court with a more well-rounded perspective of the

marketplace. Nevertheless, based on the reasons stated above, the Court agrees with WCG’s primary

argument that Berg and Bragg’s submitted declarations are insufficient evidence of the prevailing market

rates. 

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CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the Court modifies Judge Spero’s recommended hourly rates of $435.00/hour and

$350.00/hour to $250.00/hour. In light of recently awarded hourly rates in this jurisdiction, the Court

finds that $250.00/hour is a reasonable and prevailing market rate for FDCPA cases of similar

complexity. 

For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that Williams, Cohen & Gray, Inc. should pay the

following fees and costs to Myrna Abad:

Berg Bragg Carter Shapiro

Hours 13.25 hours 6.5 hours .3 hours 2 hours

Hourly rate $250.00 $250.00 $110.00 $200.00

Total $3,312.50 $1,625.00 $33.00 $400.00

Total Attorney’s Fees: $5,370.50

Total Costs: $560.00 

Total: $5,930.50 

 

The Court ADOPTS in part, MODIFIES in part, the Report and Recommendation issued by

Magistrate Judge Spero [Docket No. 56]. The court also grants Bragg’s pro hac vice application

[Docket No. 3]. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 June 25, 2007 

Saundra Brown Armstrong 

United States District Judge

Case 4:06-cv-02550-SBA Document 60 Filed 06/26/07 Page 7 of 7