Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_07-cv-08049/USCOURTS-azd-3_07-cv-08049-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

ANDREW J. ALLERDICE, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIV 07-8049 PCT NVW (MEA)

)

DORA B. SCHRIRO and ) SECOND

ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL, ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

) 

 Respondents. ) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE NEIL V. WAKE:

I Procedural background of federal habeas petition

Petitioner filed a pro se petition seeking a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on July 9, 2007.

Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (“Answer”) (Docket No. 10) and Petitioner filed a reply

to the answer to his petition. See Docket No. 14. 

In a Report and Recommendation filed December 20, 2007,

the undersigned concluded, inter alia, that the state courts did

not err in denying Petitioner’s claim that his right to due

process was violated by his trial counsel’s agreement to certain

stipulations regarding the admission of evidence. See Docket

No. 15. In an order filed January 29, 2008, the Court declined

to adopt that portion of the Report and Recommendation

addressing Petitioner’s due process claim. See Docket No. 20.

Case 3:07-cv-08049-NVW Document 22 Filed 04/07/08 Page 1 of 26
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1 Petitioner was charged in Mohave County in two other

criminal cases in 2001, docket numbers CR-2001-000580 and CR-2001-

000581. See Answer, Exh. A.

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The matter was re-referred to the undersigned for a new Report

and Recommendation analyzing Petitioner’s due process claim and

the effect, if any, of Petitioner’s objection to his attorney’s

stipulations in light of United States v. Plitman, 194 F.3d 59

(2d Cir. 1999), United States v. Stephens, 609 F.2d 230 (5th

Cir. 1980), Wilson v. Gray, 345 F.2d 282 (9th Cir. 1965), and

Cruzado v. Puerto Rico, 210 F.2d 789 (1st Cir. 1954). 

II Factual background

In April of 2000 Petitioner was charged by indictment

with two counts of forgery and one count of fraudulent schemes,

in Mohave County Superior Court docket number CR-2000-0412.

Answer, Exh. L. On January 5, 2001, Petitioner was charged by

indictment with one count of fraudulent schemes, six counts of

forgery, and one count of theft, in Mohave County Superior Court

docket number CR-2001-0019. Id., Exh. M. The indictment

alleged the crimes were committed from February through April of

2000 in Kingman and Lake Havasu, Arizona. Id., Exh. L & Exh. M.

In September of 2001 the trial court granted the

state’s motion to consolidate these two cases and ordered that

all of the forgery charges be encompassed in a single charge of

fraudulent schemes. Id., Exh. A.1 At that time the Mohave

County Superior Court granted the state’s motion to allege at

least two historical prior felony convictions and to allege

Petitioner had committed the charged offenses while on parole.

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Id., Exh. A. The state also charged Petitioner had committed

the charged offenses while on pretrial felony release. Id.,

Exh. T.

At trial, the prosecution asserted Petitioner had

created at least three personal bank accounts using different

Social Security Numbers and at least one other name, with the

intention of acquiring funds by illegal means. Id., Exh. J.

The state also alleged Petitioner had cashed or presented checks

drawn on business bank accounts which accounts were not held by

legitimate or operational businesses, with the intent to

defraud. Id., Exh. J. 

Respondents aver:

Following extensive review and analysis of

hundreds of pages of bank and financial

institution records, as well as examination

by a defense handwriting expert[],

Petitioner’s counsel and the prosecutor

entered into stipulations regarding the

foundation and admissibility of several

defense and State exhibits.

Answer at 3. 

On July 1, 2002, the Mohave County Superior Court

conducted a trial management and case status hearing. Id., Exh.

G. Petitioner was present at this hearing. Id., Exh. G. At

the hearing, the prosecution and defense discussed stipulations

regarding the admission of evidence, i.e., checks and financial

records. Id., Exh. G (passim). The discussion also involved,

inter alia, the prosecution’s stipulation that some of the

checks were signed in the name of a real individual other than

Petitioner, i.e., a Mr. Pisciotta. Id., Exh. G at 4-6 & Exh. HCase 3:07-cv-08049-NVW Document 22 Filed 04/07/08 Page 3 of 26
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2 at 5-7 & 11-17.

On or about July 8, 2002, the date Petitioner’s trial

began, Petitioner’s counsel formally entered into the

stipulations with regard to the admissibility of and foundation

for the introduction into evidence of at least thirty checks and

financial records. Id., Exh. H-1. The stipulations are

provided at Exhibit R to Respondents’ Answer to the Petition at

Docket No. 10. Some of the stipulations provide for the

foundation and admissibility of the fact that, on a certain

date, Petitioner had presented a certain check at a particular

bank and cashed or deposited the check. Some of the

stipulations provide for the foundation and admissibility of the

fact that, on a certain date, Petitioner had presented a certain

check at a retail or grocery store in payment for goods. The

stipulations included the fact that Petitioner had presented

checks drafted on a bank and business account which the bank

said did not exist. 

On the date the trial began, defense counsel stated:

“And ... I would put on the record Mr. Allerdice is not in

agreement with these stipulations, but it’s not a decision he

gets to make as it’s a tactical strategic decision.” Id., Exh.

H-1 at 13. Petitioner then stated: “these stipulations are

admission to guilt. These aren’t just stipulating to minor

facts. It’s saying that I was at the location of the crime,

that I actually committed the crime. ... it puts me there and it

says that I did it.” Id., Exh. H-1 at 13-14. 

Case 3:07-cv-08049-NVW Document 22 Filed 04/07/08 Page 4 of 26
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2

 Arizona’s fraudulent schemes statute requires the

prosecution to prove “not only (1) a scheme or artifice to defraud,

but also that (2) defendant knowingly and intentionally participated

in it and that (3) it was a scheme for obtaining money or property by

means of ‘false or fraudulent pretenses, representations or

promises.’” Arizona v. Johnson, 179 Ariz. 375, 377, 880 P.2d 132, 134

(1994), quoting Arizona v. Haas, 138 Ariz. 413, 419, 675 P.2d 673, 679

(1983). See also Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-2310(A) (2001 & Supp.

2007) (“Any person who, pursuant to a scheme or artifice to defraud,

knowingly obtains any benefit by means of false or fraudulent

pretenses, representations, promises or material omissions is guilty

of a class 2 felony.” (emphasis added)). 

Additionally, Arizona’s statutory scheme provides:

A person commits forgery if, with intent to

defraud, the person:

1. Falsely makes, completes or alters a written

instrument; or

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The trial court stated: 

Well, that may be how you interpret them, but

I don’t think that the stipulation actually

reaches that far because there are more

elements to what the offenses would be. So

I would suspect that it is in the nature of

a tactical strategic decision that may have

been made by your attorney. Attorneys get to

decide how to formulate evidence decisions.

Id., Exh. H-1 at 14. Petitioner then stated:

All right. I respect that. But it goes down

to nobody said that I was at this location.

... And by saying that I passed the check

without even being I.D.ed or the police

department even bothering to interview the

people that accepted the check is the whole

reason why I never accepted a plea bargain

from the government.

And by me admitting to being in these places

and committing these, I’m saying that I’m

waiving any constitutional right to

consultation (sic) with my accusers.

Id., Exh. H-1 at 14. 

The Mohave County Superior Court then reiterated that

“what this stipulation is there still is a missing element.”

Id., Exh. H-1 at 15.2 Petitioner then stated that the

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2. Knowingly possesses a forged instrument; or

3. Offers or presents, whether accepted or not,

a forged instrument or one that contains false

information.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-2002(A)(2001 & Supp. 2007). The intent to

defraud may be presumed from the possession of five or more forged

instruments. See id. § 13-2002(B). The intent to defraud may not be

inferred “from the unauthorized use of another’s name alone and the

obtaining of money by the use of the same.” Arizona v. Maxwell, 95

Ariz. 396, 399, 391 P.2d 560, 562 (1964).

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stipulations narrowed the issues for the jury “too far.” Id.,

Exh. H-1 at 15. The trial court then asked Petitioner if he was

certain he wanted to have a jury trial rather than “enter into

an agreement with the State.” Id., Exh. H-1 at 15. Petitioner

then stated: “No, you’re right. And I wouldn’t accept a plea

agreement because I entered a not guilty plea because I’m not

guilty.” Id., Exh. H-1 at 15. Petitioner also stated that he

had only been belatedly informed of the stipulations, on July 3,

2002. Id., Exh. H-1 at 17.

The defense asserted at trial by Petitioner’s counsel

was that Petitioner was attempting to begin a legitimate

business and that he had written and presented the checks in

good faith, not knowing there were insufficient funds in the

accounts. Id., Exh. H-2, 37-42 & Exh. J. Petitioner also

argued that he had been victimized by others, including Mr.

Pisciotta, with regard to the insufficient funds to cover the

checks. Id., Exh. H-2, 37-42 & Exh. J. 

Petitioner did not testify at his trial. Petitioner’s

counsel moved for a directed verdict at the close of the

prosecution’s case, arguing there was insufficient evidence of

intent with regard to the forgery and fraudulent schemes

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charges, which motion was denied. Id., Exh. H-2 at 79-84.

A jury found Petitioner guilty on all of the counts

charged. Id., Exh. J. On August 28, 2002, Petitioner was

sentenced to, inter alia, a presumptive term of 17.75 years

imprisonment for fraudulent schemes and a presumptive term of

13.25 years pursuant to his conviction for theft. Id., Exh. K.

All of the sentences were to be served concurrently to each

other. Accordingly, Petitioner challenges his convictions and

sentences resulting in an aggregate sentence of 17.75 years

imprisonment.

Petitioner took a direct appeal of his convictions and

sentences. Id., Exh. S. Petitioner was represented by

appointed counsel in his direct appeal; appellate counsel was a

different person than trial counsel. Id., Exh. S. Petitioner

argued the sentencing court erred by finding a specific federal

conviction was a prior felony conviction pursuant to Arizona

law, and also asserted the trial court erred in instructing the

jury. Id., Exh. S. In a decision issued August 12, 2003, the

Arizona Court of Appeals rejected Petitioner’s claims and

affirmed his convictions and sentences. Id., Exh. T.

Petitioner did not seek review of this decision by the Arizona

Supreme Court.

Petitioner filed a timely state action for postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure, in the Mohave County Superior Court in October of

2003 and was appointed counsel to represent him in those

proceedings. Id., Exh. U. Petitioner asserted in his Rule 32

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proceedings that his trial counsel’s performance was

unconstitutionally ineffective. Id., Exh. V. Petitioner argued

trial counsel did not adequately subject the case against

Petitioner to “adversarial testing,” i.e., that counsel erred by

entering into the stipulations. Id., Exh. V. Petitioner’s

post-conviction counsel presented this as a claim to the state

courts as one raised pursuant to United States v. Cronic, 466

U.S. 648, 659, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 2047 (1984). 

In a decision issued June 9, 2004, the Arizona trial

court denied Petitioner’s claims for post-conviction relief.

Id., Exh. X. The court concluded counsel’s decisions regarding

the stipulations comprised trial strategy and did not,

accordingly, present a colorable claim for relief. Id., Exh. X.

Petitioner sought review of this decision by the Arizona Court

of Appeals. Id., Exh. Y. The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed

the trial court’s decision in a decision issued July 13, 2005.

Id., Exh. Z.

In his federal habeas petition filed July 9, 2007,

Petitioner alleged he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment rights

to a fair trial and the effective assistance of counsel and that

he was deprived of his right to due process of law pursuant to

the Fourteenth Amendment and that his Fifth Amendment Miranda

rights were violated during his criminal proceedings.

Respondents countered that the only claim which was properly

exhausted, the Arizona state court’s decision that trial

counsel’s performance was not deficient, was not contrary to nor

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3

 Petitioner had a second, ultimately successful, second

action for post-conviction relief pending in the Arizona state courts

from August 30, 2005, until May 31, 2007, regarding his presentence

incarceration credit. Accordingly, Respondents allow that the statute

of limitations was tolled during this period and the habeas petition

was timely filed.

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an unreasonable application of federal law.3 

In the first Report and Recommendation the undersigned

concluded the Arizona state courts, acting in Petitioner’s Rule

32 proceedings, did not err by concluding Petitioner’s

constitutional rights were not violated by his trial counsel’s

stipulation as to the admissibility of evidence. However, the

undersigned erred in stating Petitioner had not objected to the

stipulations.

Petitioner objected to the undersigned’s Report and

Recommendation, emphasizing he had objected to the stipulations

at the time of his trial. See Docket No. 16 at 2. In his

objections Petitioner avers: “he did not know of the full

stipulations to the day of trial. Even if the petitioner wanted

to enter into a last minute plea, trial counsel prevented this

by the stipulations.” Id. In his objections to the Report and

Recommendation Petitioner cites Clemmons v. Delo, 124 F.3d 944,

956 (8th Cir. 1997), for the proposition that his right to due

process was violated because his counsel entered into the

stipulations. Id. at 3. Petitioner reiterates his claim that

his counsel was ineffective and that he was “stripped of his

rights and left defenseless...” Id. at 4. Petitioner contends

the stipulations were the functional equivalent of a guilty plea

because the stipulations prevented him from testifying at his

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4

 In Nixon the United States Supreme Court granted

certiorari “to resolve an important question of constitutional law,

i.e., whether counsel’s failure to obtain the defendant’s express

consent to a strategy of conceding guilt in a capital trial

automatically renders counsel’s performance deficient, and whether

counsel’s effectiveness should be evaluated under Cronic or

Strickland.” Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 186-87, 125 S. Ct. 551,

560 (2004).

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trial. Id. at 5-6.

In response to the Report and Recommendation and

Petitioner’s objections thereto, Respondents contend the fact

Petitioner objected to the stipulations is not dispositive of

his habeas claim because the stipulations entered into by

counsel were not the functional equivalent of a guilty plea, a

necessary prerequisite to relief based on this type of claim.

See Docket No. 19 at 2. Respondents argue that defense

counsel’s “tactical decision to stipulate to factual matters the

State would easily prove, while aggressively maintaining

Petitioner’s innocence and challenging the only element at

issue, [Petitioner’s intent], is a far cry from the ‘“prima

facie” bench trial’ that amounted to a guilty plea in

Brookhart.” Id. at 4, citing Nixon v. Florida, 543 U.S. 175,

182-83, 125 S. Ct. 551, 557-58 (2004).4 Respondents assert that,

even if a petitioner’s trial counsel had conceded “guilt” with

regard to an element of a crime, that act did not rise to the

level of a constitutional violation because it did not relieve

the state from persuading a jury of Petitioner’s guilt of the

crime itself beyond a reasonable doubt.

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III Analysis

Standard of review

Respondents allow that Petitioner’s claim was exhausted

in the state courts as a claim his Sixth Amendment rights were

violated. The Court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus to a

state prisoner on a claim adjudicated on the merits in state

court proceedings unless the state court reached a decision

contrary to clearly established federal law or the state court’s

decision was an unreasonable application of clearly established

federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1994 & Supp. 2007);

Panetti v. Quarterman, 127 S. Ct. 2842, 2858 (2007); Carey v.

Musladin, 127 S. Ct. 649, 653 (2006); Rompilla v. Beard, 545

U.S. 374, 390, 125 S. Ct. 2456, 2467-68 (2005); Cook v. Schriro,

516 F.3d 802, 816 (9th Cir. 2008).

United States Supreme Court holdings at the time of the

state court’s decision are the source of “clearly established

federal law” for the purpose of federal habeas review. Williams

v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000);

Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1093 (9th Cir. 2005), cert.

denied, 547 U.S. 1138 (2006). The Court must decide whether the

United States Supreme Court has “clearly established” the point

of law Petitioner relies upon as a basis for habeas relief by

examining the holdings of the Supreme Court, rather than the

opinions of the lower courts or the Supreme Court’s dicta. See

Carey, 127 S. Ct. at 653. 

Unless United States Supreme Court precedent has

clearly established a rule of law, the writ will not issue based

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on a claimed violation of that rule, see Alvarado v. Hill, 252

F.3d 1066, 1069 (9th Cir. 2001), because federal courts are

“without the power” to extend the law beyond Supreme Court

precedent. See Dows v. Wood, 211 F.3d 480, 485 (9th Cir. 2000).

Accordingly, if the United States Supreme Court has not

addressed the issue raised by Petitioner in its holdings, the

state court’s adjudication of the issue cannot be contrary to,

or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal

law. See Stenson v. Lambert, 504 F.3d 873, 881, citing Kane v.

Espitia, 546 U.S. 9, 10, 126 S. Ct. 407, 408 (2006). If the

issue raised by the petitioner “is an open question in the

Supreme Court’s jurisprudence,” the Court may not issue a writ

of habeas corpus on the basis that the state court unreasonably

applied clearly established federal law by rejecting the precise

claim presented by the petitioner. Cook, 516 F.3d at 818,

quoting Carey, 127 S. Ct. at 654; Crater v. Galaza, 491 F.3d

1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2007), petition for cert. filed (Feb. 11,

2008) (No. 07-9375).

If the Court determines that the state court’s decision

was contrary to clearly established law, the Court must review

whether Petitioner’s constitutional rights were violated, i.e.,

the state’s ultimate denial of relief, without the deference to

the state court’s decision that the Anti-Terrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) otherwise requires. See Frantz v.

Hazey, 513 F.3d 1002, 113-15 (9th Cir. 2008). See also Larson

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5

Under AEDPA, a federal court is permitted to

grant habeas relief only if the state court

adjudication “resulted in a decision that was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law,

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). ... If the state

court reaches the merits without providing

reasoning for us to review, however, “we

independently review the record to determine

whether the state court clearly erred in its

application of Supreme Court law.” Brazzel v.

Washington, 491 F.3d 976, 981 (9th Cir. 2007)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

Larson v. Palmateer, 515 F.3d 1057, 1061-62 (9th Cir. 2008).

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v. Palmateer, 515 F.3d 1057, 1061-62 (9th Cir. 2008).5

Additionally, with regard to his right to federal habeas relief,

Petitioner bears the burden of proving his constitutional rights

were violated. See, e.g., Cook, 516 F.3d at 816. 

Petitioner’s claim

Petitioner’s claim was exhausted in the state courts as

one asserting Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to the

effective assistance of counsel and a fair trial was violated

because his counsel failed to subject the prosecution’s case to

“adversarial testing”. See Answer, Exh. V. Post-conviction

counsel argued that Petitioner had been “constructively” denied

counsel, citing Haynes v. Cain, 298 F.3d 375 (5th Cir. 2002).

Petitioner’s post-conviction counsel argued that the United

States Supreme Court had created “an exception to the Strickland

rubric” in cases where “counsel utterly fails” to subject the

state’s case to adversarial testing, citing United States v.

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6 Ordinarily a claim that the defendant was deprived of his

Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel would be

analyzed pursuant to the two-part test stated in Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984), requiring a showing

of deficient performance by counsel which was prejudicial to the

defendant. The Supreme Court held in Cronic that when the

“surrounding circumstances” justified a “presumption of

ineffectiveness”, a habeas petitioner had made a showing of

entitlement to relief “without inquiry into counsel’s actual

performance at trial”. 466 U.S. 648, 662, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 2048

(1984).

[T]he right to the effective assistance of

counsel is recognized not for its own sake, but

because of the effect it has on the ability of

the accused to receive a fair trial. Absent some

effect of challenged conduct on the reliability

of the trial process, the Sixth Amendment

guarantee is generally not implicated...

Id., 466 U.S. at 658, 104 S. Ct. at 2046.

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Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S. Ct. 2039 (1984).6 

Post-conviction counsel argued the Cronic test was

satisfied because Petitioner’s trial counsel had effectively

conceded Petitioner’s guilt by entering into the stipulations.

Post-conviction counsel maintained that, where trial counsel

“does not put the state to their burden,” prejudice in the

proceedings to the defendant’s detriment is presumed, satisfying

the second prong of the Strickland ineffective assistance of

counsel test. Counsel alleged Petitioner’s trial counsel had

“assented to the basis of the state’s accusations; while in

hopes that the jury would believe that his client [was]

implausibly obtuse.” Id., Exh. V. 

In the first Report and Recommendation, the undersigned

concluded the claim was not properly construed as one alleging

a violation of Petitioner’s rights pursuant to the Cronic

doctrine because the Supreme Court has clarified that Cronic

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7

[T]he adversarial process protected by the Sixth

Amendment requires that the accused have counsel

acting in the role of an advocate. []. The right

to the effective assistance of counsel is thus

the right of the accused to require the

prosecution’s case to survive the crucible of

meaningful adversarial testing. When a true

adversarial criminal trial has been

conducted-even if defense counsel may have made

demonstrable errors-the kind of testing

envisioned by the Sixth Amendment has occurred.

But if the process loses its character as a

confrontation between adversaries, the

constitutional guarantee is violated

United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656-57, 104 S. Ct. 2039,

2045-46 (1984) (internal citations and quotations omitted)..

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applies only where defense counsel’s failure to test the

prosecution’s case was complete, rather than where counsel was

alleged to have made “isolated missteps” during the proceeding.

See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 696-97, 122 S. Ct. 1843, 1850-51

(2002); Barrow v. Uchtman, 398 F.3d 597, 603 n.4 (7th Cir.

2005).7 When assessing whether the state court had erred in

concluding Petitioner’s constitutional rights were not violated

by counsel’s entering into the stipulations, the undersigned

analyzed Petitioner’s claim as one brought pursuant to the

doctrine of Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 86 S. Ct. 1245

(1966). 

Because the undersigned found that the state court had,

in effect, applied the wrong governing principle to Petitioner’s

claim that his counsel had improperly waived his rights by

entering into the stipulations by applying Cronic instead of

Brookhart, the undersigned impliedly concluded the state’s

decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of

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federal law. See Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir.

2002) (“A state court decision is ‘contrary to’ federal law if

it ‘failed to apply the correct controlling authority from the

Supreme Court.’”, quoting Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072,

1077 (9th Cir. 2000), citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

405-07, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1519-20 (2000)). See also Frantz, 513

F.3d at 1010-11 & n.12. However, such a conclusion does not

ipso facto warrant granting of the writ. See Frantz, 513 F.3d

at 1016. Even if the state court’s decision was contrary to

federal law, Petitioner’s constitutional rights were not

violated because his counsel’s act in entering into the

stipulations did not deprive him of an “adversarial” proceeding.

Accordingly, Petitioner was not deprived of his right to the

effective assistance of counsel because his counsel’s

performance was not deficient as alleged.

Petitioner’s federal habeas claim is stated as one that

his right to a fair trial was violated because his counsel

waived his right to challenge evidence, i.e., to “confront his

accusers,” over his objections. This type of Sixth Amendment

claim, as compared to one asserting that counsel was ineffective

for making prejudicial blunders, is one generally characterized

by the federal courts as a “Brookhart” claim. See, e.g., United

States v. Plitman, 194 F.3d 59, 63 n.2 (2d Cir. 1999), citing

Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 86 S. Ct. 1245 (1966) (holding

a criminal defendant has a right to plead not guilty which may

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8

 In the context of a direct appeal, at least one federal

Circuit Court of Appeals concluded the reasoning of federal habeas

cases analyzing defense counsel’s waiver of rights to confrontation

are distinguishable from the right established by Brookhart, i.e.,

that of a defendant to challenge the states’ case against him, the

specific right Petitioner asserts. See United States v. Stephens, 609

F.2d 230, 232-33 & n.2 (5th Cir. 1980) (distinguishing the

constitutional right “of the defendant in a criminal case to plead not

guilty” from the rule that counsel in a criminal case may waive his

client’s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation by stipulating to the

admission of evidence, so long as the defendant does not dissent from

his attorney’s decision, in the direct appeal of a case wherein

defense counsel, with his clients’ consent to the stipulations, waived

his client’s confrontation rights).

9

In Brookhart, the defendant’s counsel agreed not to contest

the state’s case or cross-examine its witnesses, but only demanded

that the prosecution provide sufficient evidence to make out a prima

facie case on the elements of each crime. See 384 U.S. at 2, 86 S.

Ct. at 1246. Concluding the concession was essentially a plea of nolo

contendere, the Supreme Court framed the issue as “whether counsel has

power to enter a plea which is inconsistent with his client’s

expressed desire and thereby waive his client’s constitutional right

to plead not guilty and have a trial in which he can confront and

cross-examine the witnesses against him.” 384 U.S. at 7, 86 S. Ct.

at 1246. The Supreme Court held that “counsel for defendant can[not]

override his client’s desire expressed in open court to plead not

guilty and enter in the name of his client another plea-whatever the

label-which would shut off the defendant’s constitutional right to

confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him which he would

have an opportunity to do under a plea of not guilty.” 384 U.S. at

7-8, 86 S. Ct. at 1248-49. Because the Brookhart petitioner “neither

personally waived his right nor acquiesced in his lawyer’s attempted

waiver,” the Supreme Court reversed the judgment. 384 U.S. at 8, 86

S. Ct. at 1249.

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not be waived by his counsel). 8 

 The Supreme Court concluded in Brookhart that the

petitioner’s trial counsel’s stipulation not to challenge the

prosecution’s prima facie case of guilt with the defense’s own

evidence was “not merely a matter of trial tactics or strategy,

but implicated fundamental due process concerns.” Id.9

Criminal defendants possess two types of

constitutional rights, and a different waiver

standard applies to each. [] The first

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category involves rights that defense counsel

may waive on behalf of defendant because they

concern strategic and tactical matters such

as selective introduction of evidence,

stipulations, objections, and pre-trial

motions. [] The second category involves

rights that only defendant himself may waive

because they are “personal” and include

matters like pleading guilty, waiving a jury

trial, pursuing an appeal, and deciding to

testify. []

Plitman, 194 F.3d at 63 (joining the majority of circuit courts

and holding defense counsel may waive a defendant’s right to

confront witnesses where the decision is one of trial tactics or

sound trial strategy). See also Brown v. Artuz, 124 F.3d 73, 77

(2d Cir. 1997) (holding defense counsel may waive the

defendant’s rights if a stipulation involves trial strategy and

tactics). 

Decisions that may be made without the defendant’s

consent, without violating the defendant’s right to due process,

“primarily involve trial strategy and tactics,” such as “what

evidence should be introduced, what stipulations should be made,

what objections should be raised, and what pre-trial motions

should be filed.” United States v. Teague, 953 F.2d 1525, 1531

(11th Cir. 1992). However, “an attorney may not stipulate to

facts which amount to the ‘functional equivalent’ of a guilty

plea.” Wiley v. Sowders, 647 F.2d 642, 649 (6th Cir. 1981).

The undersigned concludes the stipulations at issue in

this matter were not the functional equivalent of a guilty plea.

After reviewing the record in this matter, the

undersigned concludes that Petitioner’s constitutional rights

were not violated because the subject stipulations were not the

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functional equivalent of a guilty plea.

In Florida v. Nixon, a state habeas case involving an

ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the Supreme Court

concluded the petitioner’s counsel had not entered the

functional equivalent of a guilty plea because, although counsel

had admitted the defendant had killed the victim, counsel

proceeded to trial on his client’s culpability and crossexamined witnesses and challenged evidence. See 543 U.S. at

188, 125 S. Ct. at 561. The Supreme Court further noted that

counsel’s admissions did not waive his client’s right to an

appeal, as distinguished from the entry of a guilty plea. Id.

The holding of Nixon supports the conclusion that Petitioner’s

rights were not violated, as Petitioner’s counsel proceeded to

trial asserting his client’s lack of criminal intent.

Additionally, Petitioner’s counsel did not waive his right to an

appeal, as distinguished from the entry of a guilty plea.

In Boykin v. Alabama, the United States Supreme Court

stated that a guilty plea is functionally entered when “nothing

remains but to give judgment and determine the punishment.” 395

U.S. 238, 242, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 1711-12 (1969). Applying this

statement, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded in Cox

v. Hutto that the state trial court had violated the

petitioner’s constitutional rights by failing to ascertain that

the petitioner had voluntarily entered into a stipulation

concerning his prior convictions. See 589 F.2d 394, 396 (1979).

Unlike the defendant in Cox, Petitioner’s counsel did not waive

his right to have the state prove the fact of his prior offenses

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or to rebut the state’s evidence. 

In Adams v. Peterson, 968 F.2d 835, 839 (9th Cir.

1992), the defendant had stipulated that certain facts were

supported beyond a reasonable doubt by the evidence that the

state possessed and would present at trial. The Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals concluded:

A stipulation to facts from which a judge or

jury may infer guilt is simply not the same

as a stipulation to guilt, or a guilty plea.

“A plea of guilty is more than a confession

which admits that the accused did various

acts; it is itself a conviction; nothing

remains but to give judgment and determine

punishment.”

Id., quoting Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242, 89 S. Ct. at 1711. In

Petitioner’s case, subsequent to the stipulations there were

more elements to the charged crime which proceeded to resolution

by the fact-finder. 

In Armontrout, a decision issued by the Eighth Circuit

Court of Appeals, the court rejected the petitioner’s contention

that his right to due process was violated by his counsel’s

stipulation as to evidence without his consent. See Smith v.

Armontrout, 888 F.2d 530, 536 n.6 (1989) (noting, inter alia,

the record was unclear as to whether the petitioner had

consented and that it was not “necessary for this consent to

appear explicitly in the record. The letter was extremely

damaging, but the stipulation was not the equivalent of a plea

of guilty....”). As in this matter, rather than contest the

admissibility and existence of the document at issue, counsel in

Armontrout focused on his client’s intent in creating the

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document. See 888 F.2d at 536. The decision in Armontrout

supports the conclusion that the stipulations at issue in this

matter were not the equivalent of a guilty plea.

The precise issue presented in this case has not been

addressed by the United States Supreme Court. In Nixon, a 2004

ineffective assistance of counsel case, the Supreme Court

expressly reserved the question of whether a concession of guilt

in a noncapital trial is a strategic decision requiring the

defendant’s consent. 543 U.S. at 190, 125 S. Ct. at 562. There

is no United States Supreme Court opinion which states that

counsel may not waive his client’s right to confront witnesses

by entering into a stipulation with regard to evidence, over his

client’s objections, when the stipulations are not an admission

of guilt. 

The federal Circuit Courts of Appeal have held that

criminal trial counsel may waive their client’s Sixth Amendment

right of confrontation by stipulating to the admission of

evidence, stating in dicta in these opinions that counsel may do

so provided the defendant does not dissent from his attorney’s

decision and it can be said that the decision was a legitimate

trial tactic or part of a prudent trial strategy. See Wilson,

345 F.2d at 287-88 (holding counsel could waive his client’s

confrontation rights in the face of his client’s silence);

Almanzar v. Maloney, 281 F.3d 300, 305 (1st Cir. 2002) (making

this statement in the context of a case wherein counsel and the

defendant agreed regarding the stipulations); Hawkins v.

Hannigan, 185 F.3d 1146, 1154-56 (10th Cir. 1999) (same);

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10 In Plitman, the Second Circuit stated:

The Eighth Circuit in Clemmons faced an entirely

different set of facts in which neither defendant

nor his counsel agreed to waive defendant’s right

to confrontation. See Clemmons, 124 F.3d at 956.

We decline to follow the court’s statement in

dicta that counsel’s waiver nonetheless would

have been ineffective...

194 F.3d at 63.

11 The undersigned notes the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals

reached the same conclusion using a different approach in the context

of a direct appeal in United States v. Aptt, 354 F.3d 1269, 1284 (10th

Cir. 2004), citing Bullock v. Carver, 297 F.3d 1036, 1058 (10th Cir.

2002) (“[B]ecause [the] ineffective assistance of counsel claims fail,

his Confrontation Clause argument [based on hearsay to which counsel

did not object] also fails.”); Wilson v. Gray, 345 F.2d 282, 287 n.7

(9th Cir. 1965) (concluding “a reviewing court can not find a denial

of the constitutional right to cross-examination merely on the basis

of an error in trial tactics unless the error is so gross as to

constitute a denial of adequate and effective assistance of counsel”).

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Cruzado v. Puerto Rico, 210 F.2d 789, 791 (1st Cir. 1954)

(holding the defendant had waived any objection by agreeing to

the stipulations). But see Clemmons v. Delo, 124 F.3d 944, 956

(8th Cir. 1997) (stating that “the law seems to be clear that

the right of confrontation is personal and fundamental and

cannot be waived by counsel”).10

Although the language in these cases regarding the

defendant’s consent to the stipulations may provide support for

the proposition that defense counsel’s waiver of the defendant’s

right to confrontation over the defendant’s objections violates

their constitutional rights, none of these cases, singly or

taken as a whole, are “clearly established federal law” for the

purposes of section 2254.11

In Wilson, a 1965 Ninth Circuit pre-AEDPA case, the

court concluded the right of the accused to cross-examine and

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confront prosecution witnesses in a state criminal trial was an

essential ingredient of a fair trial, but the court did not

agree that in all cases the waiver of this right must be made

by the accused personally rather than by his counsel, stating:

“It has been consistently held that the accused may waive his

right to cross examination and confrontation and that the waiver

of this right may be accomplished by the accused’s counsel as a

matter of trial tactics or strategy.” 345 F.2d at 287.

However, the Wilson court did not confront a situation similar

to the instant matter wherein Petitioner objected to the

stipulation.

In Plitman, the defendant challenged his counsel’s

waiver of his confrontation rights. The “waiver” involved was

the defendant’s stipulation to evidence through counsel. The

court stated:

We have not decided specifically whether and

under what circumstances defense counsel may

waive a defendant’s right to confrontation.

Our opinion in Brown v. Artuz suggests that

defense counsel may make the waiver where a

stipulation involves trial strategy and

tactics, even though the stipulation impacts

on a defendant’s constitutional rights. []

Other circuit courts of appeals have held

that “counsel in a criminal case may waive

his client’s Sixth Amendment right of

confrontation by stipulating to the admission

of evidence, so long as the defendant does

not dissent from his attorney’s decision, and

so long as it can be said that the attorney’s

decision was a legitimate trial tactic or

part of a prudent trial strategy.” United

States v. Stephens, 609 F.2d 230, 232-33 (5th

Cir. 1980)...

194 F.3d at 63 (emphasis added).

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The Plitman court cited the Tenth Circuit Court of

Appeals’ decision in Hawkins v. Hannigan, 185 F.3d 1146, 1154-56

(10th Cir. 1999), holding defense counsel could stipulate to the

admission of hearsay evidence. The situation presented to the

Tenth Circuit was similar to Wilson, i.e., in Hawkins there was

no indication that the defendant disagreed with or objected to

his counsel’s decision. See 185 F.3d at 1154-55. However, the

holding in Plitman, subsequent to Hawkins and Wilson, indicates

that the waiver may be made by counsel for the defendant as a

matter of trial strategy. Accordingly, because a defendant does

not have a right to dictate trial strategy, Petitioner’s

objection to counsel’s waiver does not take the matter outside

the realm of firmly established federal law. 

Petitioner’s constitutional rights were not violated by

his counsel’s entry into stipulations because the stipulations

were not the equivalent of Petitioner’s personal right to plead

not guilty and confront the witnesses against him.

Additionally, to the extent the undersigned has improperly read

the “murky” waters regarding the appropriate analysis, see

Frantz, 513 F.3d at 1011, the undersigned also concludes the

state courts’ resolution of Petitioner’s claims with regard to

the stipulations were not an objectively unreasonable

application of federal law in light of the facts presented. It

was not unreasonable for the state courts to determine the

stipulations were not an admission of guilt and, accordingly,

that Petitioner’s counsel’s performance was not deficient

because he entered into the stipulations. 

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IV Conclusion

The stipulations entered into by Petitioner’s trial

counsel were not the “functional equivalent” of a guilty plea,

and represented trial strategy by counsel. Petitioner’s

constitutional rights to an adversarial proceeding and to the

effective assistance of counsel were not violated and,

accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas

relief. Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has not

addressed whether counsel’s entry of stipulations over his

client’s objection violates the client’s constitutional rights.

Accordingly, the Arizona Superior Court’s adjudication of the

issue cannot be contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,

clearly established federal law. 

IT IS THEREFORE AGAIN RECOMMENDED that this claim in

Mr. Allerdice’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to

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the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any

factual or legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be

considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia,

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to

timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations of

the Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right

to appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of

law in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. 

DATED this 7th day of April, 2008.

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