Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01558/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01558-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN WESELEYE WALKER,

CDCR #D-44672,

CASE NO. 14CV1558 BEN (PCL)

Plaintiff, ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION TO PROCEED 

IN FORMA PAUPERIS

[Docket No. 2]; and 

(2) SUA SPONTE DISMISSING

COMPLAINT FOR FAILING TO

STATE A CLAIM PURSUANT

TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) 

AND 1915A(b)

vs.

M. BECCERA, Correctional Officer;

M.D. CARYIO, Correctional Lieutenant;

J. HATFIELD, Correctional Lieutenant;

S. ANDERSON, Associate Warden, 

Defendants.

John Weseleye Walker, (“Plaintiff”), currently incarcerated at Calipatria State

Prison located in Calipatria, California, and proceeding pro se, has initiated a civil rights

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has not prepaid the civil filing fee; instead

he has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a) (Docket No. 2).

I. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO PROCEED IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of

-1- 1 14cv1558

Case 3:14-cv-01558-BEN-PCL Document 3 Filed 07/22/14 Page 1 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

$350. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to

prepay the entire fee only if the plaintiff is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). 

However, “[u]nlike other indigent litigants, prisoners proceeding IFP must pay the full

amount offiling feesin civil actions and appeals pursuant to the PLRA [Prison Litigation

Reform Act].” Agyeman v. INS, 296 F.3d 871, 886 (9th Cir. 2002). As defined by the

PLRA, a “prisoner” is “any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is

accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of

criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or

diversionary program.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h). Because Plaintiffis currently incarcerated,

he is a prisoner as defined by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h), and therefore subject to the PLRA’s

requirements and limitations. Ageyman, 296 F.3d at 886. 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the PLRA, a prisoner seeking leave to

proceed IFP must submit a “certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or

institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for the six-month period immediately preceding

the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113,

1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account statement, the Court must assess

an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits in the account for the past

six months, or (b) the average monthly balance in the account for the past six months,

whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having custody of the prisoner must collect

subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding month’s income, in any month

in which the prisoner’s account exceeds $10, and forward those payments to the Court

until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

Plaintiff has submitted a certified copy of his trust account statement pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D.CAL.CIVLR 3.2. Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119. The trust

account statement shows that Plaintiff has insufficient funds to pay an initial partial

filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be

-2- 2 14cv1558

Case 3:14-cv-01558-BEN-PCL Document 3 Filed 07/22/14 Page 2 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment

for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay [an] initial

partial filing fee.”); Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as

a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure

to pay ... due to the lack of funds available.”). 

Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP [Docket No. 2],

and assesses no initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). However, the entire

$350 balance of the filing fees mandated shall be collected and forwarded to the Clerk

of the Court pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. §

1915(b)(1).

II. INITIAL SCREENING PER 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii) AND 1915A(b)(1)

A. Standard of Review

Notwithstanding IFP status or the payment of any partial filing fees, the PLRA

also obligates the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP and by

those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused of,

sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or

conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as

practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under these

provisions of the PLRA, the Court must sua sponte dismiss complaints, or any portions

thereof, which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which seek damagesfrom

defendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Lopez v.

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v.

Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).

All complaints must contain “a short and plain statement of the claimshowing that

the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED.R.CIV.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are

not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “Determining

-3- 3 14cv1558

Case 3:14-cv-01558-BEN-PCL Document 3 Filed 07/22/14 Page 3 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] ... a context-specific task that

requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.

The “mere possibility of misconduct” falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. 

Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).

“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their

veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000)

(“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to

the plaintiff.”); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that

§ 1915(e)(2) “parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). 

However, while the court “ha[s] an obligation where the petitioner is pro se,

particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the

petitioner the benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir.

2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)), it may not, in

so doing, “supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd.

of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “Vague and

conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient

to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Id.

B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

“Section 1983 creates a private right of action against individuals who, acting

under color of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.” Devereaux v.

Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). Section 1983 “is not itself a source of

substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere

conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393–94 (1989) (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted). “To establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both (1)

deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2)

that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Tsao

-4- 4 14cv1558

Case 3:14-cv-01558-BEN-PCL Document 3 Filed 07/22/14 Page 4 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012).

C. Due Process

Plaintiff claims that he was denied a “fair and impartial” disciplinary hearing when

he was accused of attacking another inmate and the hearing resulted in a “SHU” term.

(Compl. at 3.) The Due Process Clause protects Plaintiff against the deprivation of

liberty without the procedural protections to which he is entitled. Wilkinson v. Austin,

545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005). To state a due process claim, Plaintiff must first identify the

interest at stake. Id. at 221. Liberty interests may arise from the Due Process Clause

itself or from state law. Id. 

The Due Process Clause by itself does not confer on inmates a liberty interest in

avoiding more adverse conditions of confinement, and under state law, the existence of

a liberty interest created by prison regulations is determined by focusing on the nature

of the condition of confinement at issue. Id. at 221-23 (citing Sandin v. Conner, 515

U.S. 472, 481-84 (1995)) (quotation marks omitted). Liberty interests created by prison

regulations are generally limited to freedom from restraint which imposes “atypical and

significant hardship” on the inmate “in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” 

Id. at 221 (citing Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484); Myron v. Terhune, 476 F.3d 716, 718 (9th

Cir. 2007).

In this case, Plaintiff has failed to establish a liberty interest protected by the

Constitution because he has not alleged, as he must under Sandin, sufficient facts related

to the conditionsin the “SHU” which show “the type of atypical, significant deprivation

[that] might conceivably create a liberty interest.” 515 U.S. at 486. For example, in

Sandin, the Supreme Court considered three factors in determining whether the plaintiff

possessed a liberty interest in avoiding disciplinary segregation: (1) the disciplinary

versus discretionary nature of the segregation; (2) the restricted conditions of the

prisoner’s confinement and whether they amounted to a “major disruption in his

environment” when compared to those shared by prisonersin the general population; and

(3) the possibility of whether the prisoner’s sentence was lengthened by his restricted

-5- 5 14cv1558

Case 3:14-cv-01558-BEN-PCL Document 3 Filed 07/22/14 Page 5 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

custody. Id. at 486-87. 

Therefore, to allege a due process violation, Plaintiff’s Complaint must contain

sufficient “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference” that his

undefined stay in administrative segregation imposed an atypical and significant

hardship on him in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

678; Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483-84. Plaintiff’s Complaint, however, fails to include any

“further factual enhancement” which might suggest any major disruption in his

environment, any comparison to the conditions of his previous confinement in the

general population, or any mention whatsoever as to its potential effect on the length of

his sentence. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556); Sandin, 515

U.S. at 486-87. Plaintiff must offer more that “naked assertions devoid of further factual

enhancement” in order to state a due process claim; and instead must include “sufficient

factual matter,” id., which demonstrates “a dramatic departure fromthe basic conditions”

of his confinement that would give rise to a liberty interest before he can claim a

violation of due process. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485; see also Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d

1083, 1088-89 (9th Cir. 1996), amended by 135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998). This he has

failed to do; therefore the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to allege a liberty interest

in remaining free of administrative segregation, and thus, has failed to state a due process

claim. See May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 565 (9th Cir. 1997) (concluding that prisoners

have no liberty interest in remaining free from administrative segregation or solitary

confinement); Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1091 (9th Cir.1985) (finding that

administrative segregation is the type of confinement that should be reasonably

anticipated by inmates at some point in their incarceration), abrogated in part on other

grounds by Sandin, 515 U.S. 472; see also Myron, 476 F.3d at 718 (finding no “atypical

and significant deprivation” where prisoner failed to allege conditions at level IV prison

differed significantly from those at a level III prison). 

/ / /

/ / /

-6- 6 14cv1558

Case 3:14-cv-01558-BEN-PCL Document 3 Filed 07/22/14 Page 6 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Complaint also failsto state a due process

claim asto any named Defendant upon which relief can be granted. See Lopez, 203 F.3d

at 1126-27; Resnick, 213 F.3d at 446.

III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF

Doc. No. 2) is GRANTED. 

2. The Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation, or his designee, shall collect from Plaintiff’s prison trust account the

$350 balance of the filing fee owed in this case by collecting monthly paymentsfrom the

account in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income

and forward payments to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in the account

exceeds $10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS SHALL BE

CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER ASSIGNED TO THIS

ACTION.

3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this Order on Jeffrey

Beard, Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 1515 S

Street, Suite 502, Sacramento, California 95814.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

4. Plaintiff’sComplaint is DISMISSEDfor failing to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b). However,

Plaintiff is GRANTED forty five (45) days leave from the date this Order is “Filed” in

which to file a First Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading

noted above. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete in itself without

reference to the superseded pleading. See S.D. Cal. Civ. L. R. 15.1. Defendants not

named and all claims not re-alleged in the Amended Complaint will be deemed to have

been waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). 

/ / /

-7- 7 14cv1558

Case 3:14-cv-01558-BEN-PCL Document 3 Filed 07/22/14 Page 7 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

If Plaintiff fails to file an Amended Complaint within the time provided, this civil

action shall remain dismissed without prejudice and without further Order of the Court

based on Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b).

5. The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a court approved civil rights

complaint form to Plaintiff.

DATED: July 21, 2014

Hon. Roger T. Benitez

United States District Judge

-8- 8 14cv1558

Case 3:14-cv-01558-BEN-PCL Document 3 Filed 07/22/14 Page 8 of 8