Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00551/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00551-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

 

Before the Court are Petitioner Adam Arthur Borja’s Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) and Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 22). The 

Honorable Bridget S. Bade, United States Magistrate Judge, has issued a Report and 

Recommendation (“R&R”) (Doc. 27), recommending that the petition and motion be 

denied. Petitioner has objected the R&R. (Doc. 28). For the reasons that follow, the Court 

accepts and adopts the R&R, and denies the petition and motion. 

I. Background 

On August 7, 2006, Petitioner was indicted on one count of first-degree murder, 

one count of first-degree burglary, and one count of arson of an occupied structure in the 

Maricopa County Superior Court, Case No. CR2006-145356. (Doc. 9-1, Exh. A.) 

Petitioner was found guilty by a jury on all charges. (Doc. 9-1, Exh. C.) On April 9, 2008, 

Petitioner was sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment, the longest of which was 

life without the possibility of parole until Petitioner has served twenty-five years. (Doc. 

9-1, Exhs. B, D.) 

Adam Arthur Borja, 

 

Petitioner, 

vs. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV-15-00551-PHX-SPL

ORDER 

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 Petitioner timely filed a notice of appeal (Doc. 9-1, Exh. E), and appellate counsel 

filed an opening brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that 

she had searched the record on appeal and found no question of law that was not 

frivolous (Doc. 9-1, Exh. F). Petitioner was permitted to file a supplemental brief in 

propria persona, but he did not do so. (Doc. 9-1, Exhs. B, G.) The Arizona Court of 

Appeals then searched the record for fundamental error, and affirmed Petitioner’s 

convictions and sentences. (Doc. 9-1, Exh. B); State v. Borja, 2009 WL 1563491, at *2 

(Ariz. Ct. App. 2009). 

 Petitioner timely initiated post-conviction relief proceedings pursuant to Rule 32 

of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. Appointed counsel filed a notice with the 

trial court stating that he was unable to find any colorable issue or claim to raise in the 

proceeding. Petitioner filed a pro se petition in which he raised several claims, which 

were denied. Petitioner sought appellate review, asking the court to review the brief he 

previously filed with the trial court in its entirety. (Doc. 9-5, Exhs. M, N.) The appellate 

court denied relief on January 28, 2014. (Doc. 9-5, Ex. N); State v. Borja, 2014 WL 

325315, at *1 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014). On May 21, 2014, the Arizona Supreme Court 

summarily denied review. (Doc. 9-5, Exh. O.) 

 On March 27, 2015, Petitioner filed a timely federal habeas petition in this Court, 

raising forty-six grounds for relief.1

 (Docs. 1, 1-1.) Respondents filed a limited answer 

(Doc. 9) arguing that Petitioner’s claims are procedurally barred from review. Petitioner 

did not file a reply, and instead filed a motion to dismiss his petition without prejudice, or 

to stay this proceeding and hold his petition in abeyance while he presents his claims in 

state court. (Doc. 22.) Respondents filed a response opposing the motion (Doc. 24), to 

which Petitioner filed a reply and a “supplemental exhibit” (Docs. 25, 26). Following 

review, the Magistrate Judge found Petitioner’s claims to be procedurally barred, and 

recommended that the petition and the motion be denied. (Doc. 27.) 

 1

 Petitioner does not object to the R&R’s recitation of the forty-six claims raised in the petition, which the Court adopts and incorporates here by reference. (See Doc. 27 at 

4-8.) 

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II. Standard of Review 

 A district judge “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). When a party files 

a timely objection to an R&R, the district judge reviews de novo those portions of the 

R&R that have been “properly objected to.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). A proper objection 

requires specific written objections to the findings and recommendations in the R&R. See 

United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003); 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1). It follows that the Court need not conduct any review of portions to which no 

specific objection has been made. See Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d at 1121; see also Thomas 

v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985) (discussing the inherent purpose of limited review is 

judicial economy). Further, a petitioner is not entitled as of right to de novo review of 

evidence or arguments which are raised for the first time in an objection to the R&R, and 

the Court’s decision to consider them is discretionary. United States v. Howell, 231 F.3d 

615, 621-622 (9th Cir. 2000). 

III. Discussion 

 A. Petition 

Petitioner objects to the R&R’s finding that his claims are procedurally barred on 

the basis that, despite having properly presented his claims, the state court erroneously 

rejected his claims on procedural grounds. (Doc. 28 at 28.) This objection is without 

merit.2

 First, Petitioner’s trial error claims are procedurally defaulted. As addressed in the 

R&R, Petitioner did not present any claim on direct review. On direct appeal, appellate 

counsel filed an Anders brief, and although Petitioner had the opportunity to file a 

supplemental brief, he did not do so. (Doc. 9-1, Exh. B.) Petitioner subsequently 

presented a series of claims to the trial court in his post-conviction relief proceeding. 

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 In making this argument, Petitioner relies on James v. Ryan, 679 F.3d 780, 802 

(9th Cir. 2012). Although it is distinguishable from this case, the Court need not address 

it here because it was vacated by the Supreme Court in Ryan v. James, 133 S.Ct. 1579 

(2013). 

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(Docs. 9-2, 9-3, 9-4.) However, because the claims of trial error could have been raised 

on direct appeal but were not, both the trial and appellate court found them to be 

precluded from review by Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3) - an adequate and independent 

state procedural ground. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991); Jones v. 

Ryan, 691 F.3d 1093, 1101 (9th Cir. 2012); Hurles v. Ryan, 752 F.3d 768, 780 (9th Cir. 

2014) (“Arizona’s waiver rules are independent and adequate bases for denying relief”). 

 Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel are also procedurally 

defaulted. (See Docs. 1 and 1-1, Claims 2, 3, 10, 12, 18, 20, 24, 30, 33, 36, 37, 39.) As 

addressed in the R&R, the appellate court found that because Petitioner could not have 

presented any claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal, the trial court 

had incorrectly ruled that his ineffective assistance of counsel claim was also precluded 

from post-conviction review. (Doc. 27 at 11, fn. 5; Doc. 9-5, Exh. N.) The appellate court 

found however, that Petitioner had not specifically raised a claim of ineffective assistance 

of trial counsel in his petition for review. Instead, Petitioner had simply asked the 

appellate court to consider “all the issues presented in the Rule 32 pro se brief.” (Doc. 9-

5, Exhs. M,N.) Consequently, it concluded that Petitioner had waived review of any 

claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel because he did not sufficiently raise it on 

appeal in accordance with Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(c)(1). (Doc. 9-5, Exh. N.) Therefore, 

while Petitioner may have properly presented his ineffective assistance of trial counsel 

claim(s) to the trial court, those claims are procedurally defaulted because they were 

precluded from review by the appellate court on an adequate and independent state 

procedural ground under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(a)(3) and 32.9(c). 

 The Court further agrees with the R&R’s conclusion that Petitioner’s ineffective 

assistance of appellate counsel claim (Doc. 1-1, Claim 45) was not presented to the state 

court and is barred from review. Although the facts presented in state court bare 

similarity to those contained in his habeas petition, Petitioner did not fairly present a 

Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim in state court. See 

Gulbrandson v. Ryan, 738 F.3d 976, 992 (9th Cir. 2013); Tamalini v. Stewart, 249 F.3d 

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895, 898 (9th Cir. 2001). Contrary to his objection (Doc. 28 at 28-29), Petitioner did not 

raise his federal claim in his reply brief during his post-conviction relief proceeding. In 

response to the state’s argument to the trial court that his claims were precluded from 

review, Petitioner replied that “[a]ny failure to raise [his] claims during the 2008 trial on 

the 2009 direct appeal is a result of the attorney mishandling Mr. Borja’s case at those 

times. Mr. Borja has the right to competent legal representation.” (Doc. 9-5, Exh. K.) He 

did not point to any federal constitutional guarantee underlying his claim, give any 

application to his facts under federal law, nor did he even specifically claim “ineffective 

assistance of appellate counsel.” Similarly, on appeal, Petitioner only argued that he “did 

not knowingly []or willingly waive the issues presented in the Rule 32 pro se brief” 

because his appellate attorney had informed him he was not required to file a 

supplemental brief after she had filed an Anders brief.” (Doc. 9-5, Exh. M.) See also State 

v. Borja, 2014 WL 325315, at *1 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014) (“On review, Borja contends he 

was not to blame for his failure to raise on appeal the issues presented in his Rule 32 

proceeding, asserting the failure arose from appellate counsel’s communications with 

him”); (Doc. 9-5, Exh. N). In presenting this argument, Petitioner did not cite any legal 

authority or specific constitutional guarantee, or otherwise alerted the appellate court to 

the fact that he was asserting a federal claim. Petitioner’s recharacterization of his claim 

in his federal habeas petition does not transform the claim that was presented in state 

court. 

 As addressed in the R&R, a return to further pursue his claims would be futile and 

as a result, his claims are procedurally defaulted and barred from federal habeas review. 

The time has passed to seek post-conviction relief in state court under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

32.4(a), and his claims would be precluded from review under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2 

because they could have been raised on direct appeal or in Petitioner’s prior postconviction proceeding. The R&R discussed that Petitioner has not shown that he satisfies 

any of the exceptions to the timeliness or preclusion rules. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) 

and 32.2(b) (citing the exceptions listed in Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1). Petitioner does not 

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seek to present any new evidence or law, nor does he raise a claim of actual innocence. 

See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(e), (g), (h). The appellate court has already determined that 

review of an untimely or successive petition for post-conviction review would not be 

permitted due to Petitioner’s allegation that his failure to previously raise his claims on 

direct appeal was due to the fault of appellate counsel. (Doc. 9-5, Exh. N); see Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 32.1(f). Appellate counsel explained to Petitioner that she found no arguable 

issue to present on appeal and filed an Anders brief, and that Petitioner was permitted to 

file a supplemental brief should he wish to do so. (Id.) Petitioner objects by contending 

that his previously filed brief “states the specific exception to each and every ground... 

which satisfies the requirements under Arizona law which allow Borja to file a successive 

untimely petition for P.C.R.” (Doc. 28 at 30.) However, Petitioner does not point to any 

specific flaw in the R&R’s analysis or findings, and instead, offers only a general 

objection by referencing his prior filing. This objection is therefore rejected. 

 Further, the Court agrees with the R&R that Petitioner does not establish “cause 

and prejudice” to excuse the procedural default of his claims, nor does he argue that 

failure to consider his claims would result in a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” See 

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991) (discussing “cause” and “prejudice”) 

overruled on other grounds by Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012); Schlup v. Delo, 

513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995) (discussing “fundamental miscarriage of justice”). Petitioner 

does not object to the R&R on this basis. Rather, Petitioner specifically responds that 

“[i]n regards to presenting arguments to overcome any procedural bar, Borja’s position 

and arguments are that there is no bar to the federal review of his habeas claims at this 

time so it would [be] inappropriate to present argument to overcome [the] procedural bar 

because he would be conceding that his habeas claims are in fact procedurally barred and 

contradicting the arguments contained in his briefs thus far.” (Doc. 28 at 31.) Petitioner’s 

belief that his claims are not procedurally barred does not relieve him of his burden to 

show, even in the alternative, that the procedural default of his claims should be excused. 

Therefore, having failed to establish a basis to excuse the procedural default of his 

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claims, the Court finds that they are procedurally barred from federal habeas review. 

 B. Motion 

Lastly, Petitioner requests that his petition be dismissed without prejudice, or in 

the alternative, that this action be stayed so that his timely habeas petition can be held in 

abeyance while he attempts to present his unexhausted federal claims in state court. (Doc. 

22.) The Court agrees with R&R’s recommendation that this request should be denied, 

and overrules Petitioner’s objection arguing the contrary. 

Here, dismissing the petition without prejudice would be futile. As previously 

discussed, Arizona law would preclude a successive petition for post-conviction review. 

For the same reason, the stay and abeyance procedure is not appropriate under these 

circumstances. A district court has limited discretion to stay and hold in abeyance a 

federal habeas petition containing an unexhausted claim so that the petitioner may return 

to state court to exhaust it. See Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 276-77 (2005); Mena v. 

Long, 813 F.3d 907, 912 (9th Cir. 2016). Here, all of Petitioner’s claims are procedurally 

barred from review and Petitioner no longer has state remedies available to consider his 

claims. See Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 621, n.5 (9th Cir. 2001). The Court will 

therefore adopt the R&R’s recommendation and deny the motion. 

IV. Conclusion 

 Having reviewed the record as a whole, and finding none of Petitioner’s objections 

have merit, the R&R will be adopted in full. For the reasons addressed above, Petitioner’s 

claims are procedurally barred from federal habeas review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(a) 

(“An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to 

the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that... the applicant 

has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State.”). Dismissal of the 

petition with prejudice is warranted. Accordingly, 

 IT IS ORDERED: 

1. That Magistrate Judge Bade’s Report and Recommendation (Doc. 27) is 

accepted and adopted by the Court; 

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2. That the Motion to Dismiss/Stay (Doc. 22) is denied; 

3. That the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 

(Doc. 1) is denied and this action is dismissed with prejudice; 

4. That a certificate of appealability and leave to proceed in forma pauperis on 

appeal are denied because the dismissal of the Petition is justified by a plain procedural 

bar and jurists of reason would not find the procedural ruling debatable; and 

5. That the Clerk of Court shall terminate this action. 

 Dated this 19th day of September, 2016.

Honorable Steven P. Logan

United States District Judge

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