Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01437/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01437-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 355
Nature of Suit: Motor Vehicle Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Tort/Motor Vehicle (P.I.)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

I. Background

This case was removed to this Court on September 9, 2013. (Doc. 1.) On November 15, 2013, 

on motion by Plaintiff, the Court ordered this case be remanded to Stanislaus Superior Court. (Doc. 

17.) The Court’s order remanding this case also found that Defendants lacked an objectively 

reasonable basis for removal, and invited Plaintiff to apply for the attorney’s fees and costs incurred as 

a result of Defendants’ removal. 

Pursuant to the Court’s direction, on November 15, 2013, Plaintiff filed an application for 

attorneys’ fees and costs. (Doc. 18.) Defendants did not file an opposition. On April 24, 2014, the 

Court denied Plaintiff’s application for attorneys’ fees and costs without prejudice. The Court’s order 

found that Plaintiff’s application lacked sufficient information to determine if the hourly rates 

requested were reasonable. The Court directed that any further application should be filed within 15 

IRVING VERDUZCO,

 Plaintiff,

v.

FORD MOTOR COMPANY, et al.,

Defendants.

/

Case No. 1:13-cv-01437-LJO-BAM

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

REGARDING PLAINTIFF’S 

APPLICATION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES 

AND COSTS 

FOURTEEN-DAY DEADLINE

Case 1:13-cv-01437-LJO-BAM Document 25 Filed 07/09/15 Page 1 of 7
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days of service. Currently before the Court is Plaintiff’s renewed application for attorneys’ fees and 

costs filed on May 9, 2014. (Doc. 24.) Defendants did not file an opposition. For the reasons 

explained below, Plaintiff’s application is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

II. Discussion

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), “[a]n order remanding the case may require payment of just costs 

and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal.” The District 

Court has already determined that Plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees and costs. (Doc. 

17.) As such, the Court need only determine the appropriate amount of the attorneys’ fees requested 

by Plaintiff.

District courts calculate awards for attorneys’ fees utilizing the “lodestar” method. Camacho 

v. Bridgeport Financial, Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 978 (9th Cir. 2008). The “lodestar” is calculated by 

multiplying the number of hours the prevailing party reasonably expended on the litigation by a 

reasonable hourly rate. Id. (quotation and citation omitted). The “lodestar figure is presumptively a 

reasonable fee award,” but “the district court may, if circumstances warrant, adjust the lodestar to 

account for other factors which are not subsumed in it.” Id.; see also Morales v. City of San Rafael, 96 

F.3d 359, 363–64 & nn. 8–9 (9th Cir. 1996) (after making lodestar computation, district court assesses 

whether it is necessary to adjust the lodestar figure on the basis of the Kerr factors not already 

subsumed in the initial calculation). The “lodestar” method is approved for calculating the award 

associated with improper removal. See Albion Pacific Property Resources, LLC v. Seligman, 329 

F.Supp.2d 1163, 1166 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 

A. Number of Hours Reasonably Expended

“The number of hours to be compensated is calculated by considering whether, in light of the 

circumstances, the time could reasonably have been billed to a private client.” Moreno v. City of 

Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1111 (9th Cir.2008). Applying this standard, “a district court should 

exclude from the lodestar amount hours that are not reasonably expended because they are excessive, 

redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” Van Gerwen v. Guarantee Mutual Life Co., 214 F.3d 1041, 

1045 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Tahara v. Matson 

Terminals, Inc., 511 F.3d 950, 955 (9th Cir. 2007).

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Here, Plaintiff has not submitted any billing or time entries from counsel. Rather, Plaintiff has 

submitted the declaration of attorney Aaron B. Markowitz. In his declaration, Mr. Aaron Markowitz 

reports that he spent “in excess of nineteen (19) hours reviewing Defendant’s Notice of Removal and 

attachments and preparing the Motion for Remand,” “in excess of seven (7) hours preparing the 

Reply” and “another six (6) hours preparing Plaintiff’s Response to the Objection to the Findings and 

Recommendations of the Magistrate.” (Doc. 24, Decl. of Markowitz at ¶ 3.) Counsel also declares, 

upon information and belief, that Joshua Markowitz, Esq., spent “in excess of five (5) hours assisting [ 

] in researching and writing the Motion for Remand, and an additional three (3) hours assisting [ ] in 

researching and writing the Reply.” (Id. at ¶ 4.) Counsel further declares, upon information and 

belief, that Joseph W. Carcione, Jr., Esq., “spent three (3) hours reviewing and editing the Motion for 

Remand, and an additional one (1) hour reviewing and editing the Reply.” (Id. at ¶ 5.) 

In the absence of detailed billing entries, Plaintiff renders the Court’s assessment of whether 

the hours were reasonably expended extraordinarily trying. Nonetheless, given the straightforward 

issues that were addressed in the motion to remand, namely that the notice of removal was defective 

on its face and untimely and that Defendant Ford was not fraudulently joined, the amount of time 

spent by experienced counsel in preparing the motion to remand and reply is excessive. According to 

the declaration of Mr. Aaron Markowitz, an attorney with more than 10 years of experience, he spent 

26 hours preparing the motion and reply, which was in addition to the hours spent by both Mr. Joshua 

Markowitz and Mr. Joseph Carcione in preparing the same documents. See, e.g., Lopez v. Pfeffer, 

2013 WL 5367723, at * 5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2013) (12.5 hours reasonable for motion to remand); 

Done Deal, Inc. v. Wilbert, 2013 WL 3994442, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2013) (17 hours reasonable for 

motion to remand); Beauford v. E.W.H. Group, Inc., 2009 WL 3162249, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 29,

2009) (11.87 hours reasonable for motion to remand). Based upon the issues addressed in the motion 

to remand and the experience of counsel, the Court finds that 19 hours for preparation of the motion to 

remand and reply expended by Mr. Aaron Markowitz are reasonable, not the original 26 hours 

requested. The Court also finds the additional 6 hours to respond to Defendant’s objections spent by 

Mr. Aaron Markowitz alone to be reasonable. 

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With regard to the 8 hours reportedly expended by Mr. Joshua Markowitz in researching and 

preparing the motion to remand and the reply, these hours appear to be duplicative or redundant of the 

time spent by Mr. Aaron Markowitz in preparing the motion for remand and reply. The Court will 

therefore reduce the hours spent by Mr. Joshua Markowitz to 6 hours. 

With regard to the 4 hours reportedly expended by Mr. Joseph Carcione in reviewing and 

editing the motion and reply, the Court finds this time to be duplicative or excessive based on the 

hours spent by Mssrs. Markowitz in preparing the motion and reply, and the Court will reduce them to 

2 hours of attorney time. 

B. Reasonable Hourly Rate

In determining a reasonable hourly rate, the fee applicant has the burden “to produce 

satisfactory evidence—in addition to the attorney’s own affidavits—that the requested rates are in line 

with those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, 

experience and reputation.” Dang v. Cross, 422 F.3d 800, 814 (9th Cir. 2005) (quotation and citation 

omitted). The Ninth Circuit has elaborated that:

This determination “is not made by reference to rates actually charged by the prevailing 

party.” [ ] The court should use the prevailing market rate in the community for similar 

services of lawyers “of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation.” [ ]

D'Emanuele v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 904 F.2d 1379, 1384 (9th Cir. 1990), overruled on 

other grounds by Burlington v. Dague, 505 U.S. 557, 112 S.Ct. 2638, 120 L.Ed.2d 449 (1992). The 

“relevant community” in the lodestar calculation is generally the forum in which the district court sits. 

Barjon v. Dalton, 132 F.3d 496 (9th Cir. 1997) (applying the prevailing rate for Sacramento to an 

attorney whose practice was based in San Francisco when the case was litigated in the Eastern District, 

Sacramento Division); Jadwin v. County of Kern, 767 F.Supp.2d 1069, 1129 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (where 

a case is tried in the Eastern District of California, Fresno Division, “[t]he Eastern District of 

California, Fresno Division, is the appropriate forum to establish the lodestar hourly rate . . .”).

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In this instance, the Court initially denied Plaintiff’s request for attorneys’ fees because 

Plaintiff did not meet the burden of producing satisfactory evidence that the requested rates were in 

line with those prevailing in the Eastern District of California, Fresno Division. By the renewed 

application, Plaintiff requests reimbursement of legal fees of $16,000.00 for fees incurred by three 

separate attorneys: (1) Aaron B. Markowitz, an attorney with approximately 11 1⁄2 years of 

experience, at an hourly rate of $350.00 for 32 hours ($11,200); (2) Joshua Markowitz, an attorney 

also with approximately 11 1⁄2 years of experience, at an hourly rate of $350.00 for 8 hours ($2,800); 

and (3) Joseph W. Carcione, Jr., an attorney with more than 40 years of experience, at an hourly rate

of $500.00 for 4 hours ($2,000.00).1 In support of the prevailing rate, Plaintiff provided his affidavit 

and an order issued in the matter of Rodriguez v. County of Stanislaus, Case No. 1:08-cv-00856-LJOGSA, issued on October 26, 2010, in which the court held that Mr. Aaron Markowitz’s reasonable 

hourly rate, with eight years of experience, was $275 per hour and that Mr. Carcione’s reasonable 

hourly rate, with 38 years of experience, was $400.00 per hour. (Doc. 24-1, Ex. A, pp. 2-3.) 

“Affidavits of the plaintiffs’ attorney and other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the community, 

and rate determinations in other cases, particularly those setting a rate for the plaintiffs’ attorney, are 

satisfactory evidence of the prevailing market rate.” United Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge 

Corp., 896 F.2d 403, 407 (9th Cir.1990). 

Although Plaintiff has submitted evidence of a rate determination for Mr. Aaron Markowitz 

and Mr. Carcione in a case from 2010, Plaintiff has not provided evidence of rates generally accepted 

in the community based on relevant years of experience at or near the time of this action. Based on a 

recent examination of cases, hourly rates “generally accepted in the Fresno Division for competent

experienced attorneys is between $250 and $380, with the highest rates generally reserved for those 

attorneys who are regarded as competent and reputable and who possess in excess of 20 years of 

experience.” Torchia v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 304 F.R.D. 256, 276 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (citation and 

quotation omitted), (generally accepted rate in Fresno Division for competent experienced attorneys is 

between $250 and $380; awarding $300 per hour for an attorney with 8 years of experience and $380 

 

1 At the time of removal and motion for remand, all counsel were employed by Carcione, Cattermole, Dolinski, Stucky, 

Markowitz & Carcione, L.L.P. (Docs. 10, 13, 24.) 

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per hour for an attorney with more than 25 years of experience); Silvester v. Harris, 2014 WL 

7239371, *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2014) (awarding $350 hour for an attorney with 11 years of 

experience with extensive experience in new and developing area of jurisprudence, including 

litigation, legislative analysis, regulatory compliance and consultation and awarding $285 per hour for 

an attorney with 10 years of experience with limited involvement researching issues related to judicial 

notice); Willis v. City of Fresno, 2014 WL 3563310, *11 (E.D. Cal. Jul. 17, 2014) (awarding $380 per 

hour to attorneys with 40 years of experience and $300 per hour to attorney with 19 years of 

experience). 

Having considered counsels’ experience and involvement in this case, the Court’s own 

knowledge, the rates generally accepted in the community and the relatively established nature of the 

law regarding removal and remand, the Court finds that an hourly rate of $300.00 is reasonable for Mr. 

Aaron Markowitz and Mr. Joshua Markowitz and an hourly rate of $380.00 is reasonable for Mr. 

Carcione. 

Based on the reasonable attorney rates and reasonable hours calculated above, the lodestar 

figure in this matter is reduced from $16,000 to $10,060.00. It is not necessary to adjust this figure 

based on any additional factors. 

III. Conclusion and Recommendation

For the reasons discussed above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that

1. Plaintiff’s request for attorneys’ fees be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART; 

and 

2. Attorneys’ fees in the amount of $10,060.00 be awarded to Plaintiff.

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen (14) 

days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, the parties may file written 

objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s 

Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the 

specified time may result in the waiver of the “right to challenge the magistrate’s factual findings” on 

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appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 

1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 9, 2015 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:13-cv-01437-LJO-BAM Document 25 Filed 07/09/15 Page 7 of 7