Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_14-cv-08204/USCOURTS-azd-3_14-cv-08204-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Allen R. Matthewson, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Carolyn W. Colvin, 

Defendant.

No. CV-14-08204-PCT-GMS

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court is the appeal of Plaintiff Allen R. Matthewson,1 which 

challenges the Social Security Administration’s decision to deny benefits. (Doc. 21.) For 

the reasons set forth below, the Court affirms that decision. 

BACKGROUND 

 On January 27, 2012, Plaintiff filed an application for supplemental security 

income, alleging a disability onset date of January 1, 2012. (Tr. 120-26.) After 

Plaintiff’s claim was denied initially and on reconsideration, he requested a hearing, 

which the ALJ, Mason D. Harrell, Jr., held on August 7, 2013. (Tr. 36.) On August 30, 

2013, the ALJ issued a decision finding Plaintiff not disabled. (Tr. 21-28.) 

 In evaluating whether Plaintiff was disabled, the ALJ undertook the five-step 

sequential evaluation for determining disability.2

 (Id.) At step one, the ALJ determined 

 

1

 Defendant Commissioner notes that Plaintiff’s brief employs a spelling of 

“Matthewson” with two t’s, whereas “the Commissioner’s records indicate that Plaintiff 

spells his name ‘Mathewson.’” (Doc. 22 at 1 n.1.) The Court does not resolve this issue. 2

 The five-step sequential evaluation of disability is set out in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 

(governing disability insurance benefits) and 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 (governing supplemental security income). Under the test: 

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that Plaintiff “has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since January 1, 2012, the 

alleged onset date.” (Tr. 23.) At step two, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff suffered 

from the severe impairments of “degenerative joint and disc disease, lumbar spine, status 

post-operative times three, with post laminectomy syndrome, left nondominant shoulder 

separation with multiple surgical repairs, and degenerative joint and disc disease, cervical 

spine.” (Id.) At step three, the ALJ determined that none of these impairments, either 

alone or in combination, met or equaled any of the Social Security Administration’s listed 

impairments. (Tr. 24.) 

 At that point, the ALJ made a determination of Plaintiff’s residual functional 

capacity (“RFC”),3

 concluding that Plaintiff could 

perform sedentary work as defined in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(a) except stand or walk thirty minutes at a time for a total between two to four hours in an 

eight-hour workday, sit one hour at a time for a total of six hours in an 

eight-hour work-day, push or pull ten pounds maximum, only occasional reaching above shoulder level with the nondominant left upper extremity, no exposure to dangerous machinery and perform routine, repetitive tasks due to medication side effects, and miss work once a month. 

(Tr. 24.) The ALJ thus determined at step four that Plaintiff could not perform his past 

relevant work as a union painter. (Tr. 26.) At step five, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff 

 

A claimant must be found disabled if she proves: (1) that she 

is not presently engaged in a substantial gainful activity[,] (2) that her disability is severe, and (3) that her impairment meets or equals one of the specific impairments described in the regulations. If the impairment does not meet or equal one of 

the specific impairments described in the regulations, the 

claimant can still establish a prima facie case of disability by 

proving at step four that in addition to the first two 

requirements, she is not able to perform any work that she has done in the past. Once the claimant establishes a prima facie 

case, the burden of proof shifts to the agency at step five to demonstrate that the claimant can perform a significant 

number of other jobs in the national economy. This step-five determination is made on the basis of four factors: the 

claimant’s residual functional capacity, age, work experience and education. 

Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal citations 

and quotations omitted). 

3

 RFC is the most a claimant can do despite the limitations caused by his impairments. See S.S.R. 96-8p (July 2, 1996). 

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could perform jobs that exist in significant number in the national economy despite his 

limitations. (Tr. 27.) Given this analysis, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not 

disabled. (Id.) 

 The Appeals Council declined to review the decision. (Tr. 1-6.) Plaintiff filed the 

complaint underlying this action on October 21, 2014, seeking this Court’s review of the 

ALJ’s denial of benefits.4

 (Doc. 1.) The matter is now fully briefed before this Court. 

(Doc. 21, 22.) 

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review 

 A reviewing federal court will only address the issues raised by the claimant in the 

appeal from the ALJ’s decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 

2001). A federal court may set aside a denial of disability benefits only if that denial is 

either unsupported by substantial evidence or based on legal error. Thomas v. Barnhart, 

278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). “Substantial” evidence amounts to “more than a 

scintilla but less than a preponderance.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Substantial evidence 

is relevant evidence which, considering the record as a whole, a reasonable person might 

accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (quotation omitted). 

II. Analysis 

 Plaintiff’s sole argument is that the ALJ erred by relying on the testimony of the 

vocational expert without resolving a purported inconsistency between the jobs the 

vocational expert testified that a person could perform with Plaintiff’s limitations and the 

descriptions of those jobs in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT). (Doc. 21 at 7-

8.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff can perform sedentary work, subject to certain 

additional limitations, one of which was “only occasional reaching above shoulder level 

with the nondominant left upper extremity.” (Tr. 24.) At the hearing, the ALJ 

 

4

 Plaintiff has authority to file this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“Any individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security made after a hearing to which he was a party . . . may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action . . . .”). 

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questioned the vocational expert about jobs a person could perform with the Plaintiff’s 

characteristics and limitations. (Tr. 27, 56-58.) The vocational expert testified that such 

a person could work as an assembler or a table worker. (Id.) The ALJ asked the 

vocational expert whether his testimony was consistent with the DOT, and the vocational 

expert testified, “Yes, Your Honor, with the exception [of] sitting and standing for one 

hour. For example, sitting and then standing and walking 30 minutes, I do not believe 

that’s specifically addressed in the DOT code, but my response is based on my education 

and experience in this field.” (Tr. 58). The ALJ “determined that the vocational expert’s 

testimony is consistent with the information contained in the Dictionary of Occupational 

Titles (DOT)” and concluded that Plaintiff is capable of performing such work and is thus 

not disabled. (Id.) Plaintiff argues that the vocational expert’s testimony was not 

consistent with the DOT because “[t]he DOT describes the two identified alternative 

occupations as requiring frequent use of both upper extremities to reach overhead” and 

therefore those occupations “are incompatible with the limitation . . . by the ALJ from all 

overhead reaching.” (Doc. 21 at 7.) 

 In fact, the ALJ did not limit Plaintiff from “all overhead reaching.” (Id.) The 

ALJ’s limitation stated that Plaintiff could “only occasionally” reach overhead with his 

left arm. (Tr. 24.) This limitation allows for unlimited reaching with the left arm in any 

direction except up above shoulder level. Moreover, it allows for unlimited reaching in 

any direction with the right arm. And even the limited activity—reaching overhead with 

the left arm—can be performed occasionally. 

 Moreover, the DOT does not describe the identified occupations as requiring 

“frequent use of both upper extremities to reach overhead.” (Doc. 21 at 7.) Both 

occupations, “compact assembler” and “table worker,” designate that the job involves 

“Reaching: Frequently - Exists from 1/3 to 2/3 of the time.” 739.687-066 COMPACT 

ASSEMBLER, DICOT 739.687-066; 739.687-182 TABLE WORKER, DICOT 739.687-

182. SSR 85-15 defines “reaching” as “extending the hands and arms in any direction.” 

There is nothing in this generalized description to indicate that it is necessary for a 

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compact assembler or a table worker to reach with both arms. Carey v. Apfel, 230 F.3d 

131, 146 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that job requirements in the DOT are not “bilateral” 

and therefore do not conflict with vocational expert testimony that a person with one arm 

can perform the given job requirements); Palomares v. Astrue, 887 F. Supp. 2d 906, 920 

(N.D. Cal. 2012) (no conflict between limitation of only occasional left side overhead 

reaching and the occupation of truck driver, which requires “constant” reaching, 

“[b]ecause the DOT does not require constant reaching with both arms”); Feibusch v. 

Astrue, No. 07–00244 BMK, 2008 WL 583554, at *5 (D. Haw. Mar. 4, 2008) (citations 

omitted) (“[T]he use of two arms is not necessarily required for jobs that require reaching 

and handling.”). Nor is there anything in the DOT description to indicate that these jobs 

require overhead reaching. Segovia v. Astrue, 226 F. App’x 801, 804 (10th Cir. 2007) 

(“[E]ven a job requiring frequent reaching does not necessarily require more than 

occasional overhead reaching.”). There is certainly nothing in either job description to 

indicate that Plaintiff must frequently do overhead reaching and must use both arms to do 

it. 

 Additionally, there is nothing in the description of the occupational tasks to 

indicate that the job entails frequent two-handed overhead reaching. A compact 

assembler “[j]oins upper and lower halves of vanity compacts [by inserting] pins in 

hinges to join halves, using fingers or tweezers[,] [a]ttaches spring catch lock by pressing 

it into place with pinching tool[,] [and] [f]its mirror on inside of cover.” DICOT 

739.687-066. A table worker “[e]xamines squares (tiles) of felt-based linoleum material 

passing along on conveyor and replaces missing and substandard tiles.” DICOT 739.687-

182. Where “the tasks listed in each position’s DOT description don’t necessarily require 

above-shoulder reaching or reaching with both arms . . . the ALJ’s left-arm restriction 

was not necessarily inconsistent with the frequent—or constant-reaching demands of the 

jobs identified in his step-five finding.” Brown v. Colvin, No. CV 14-4420-JPR, 2015 

WL 3823938, at *7-8 (C.D. Cal. June 19, 2015) (finding a left-arm overhead reaching 

limitation consistent with the enumerated tasks of vehicle cleaners, sewing-machine 

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operators, and mail clerks). 

An ALJ must identify conflicts between a vocational expert’s testimony and the 

DOT:

When a [vocational expert] provides evidence about the requirements of a 

job or occupation, the adjudicator has an affirmative responsibility to ask about any possible conflict between that [vocational expert’s] evidence and information provided in the DOT. In these situations, the adjudicator will:

Ask the [vocational expert] if the evidence he or she has provided conflicts with information provided in the DOT; and

If the [vocational expert’s] evidence appears to conflict with the DOT, the 

adjudicator will obtain a reasonable explanation for the apparent conflict. 

SSR 00-04P. In other words, the ALJ must “determine whether the expert’s testimony 

deviates from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles and whether there is a reasonable 

explanation for any deviation.” Massachi v. Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Manifestly, a “reasonable explanation for any deviation” is necessary only where the ALJ 

determines that a deviation exists: “[T]he ALJ must first determine whether a conflict 

exists. If it does, the ALJ must then determine whether the vocational expert’s 

explanation for the conflict is reasonable and whether a basis exists for relying on the 

expert rather than the Dictionary of Occupational Titles.” Id. (emphasis added). 

 In determining whether the evidence provided by a vocational expert “appears to 

conflict with the DOT,” id., an ALJ may exercise his or her common sense. As Plaintiff 

acknowledges, (Doc. 21 at 7,) reaching is an activity “required in almost all jobs.” SSR 

85-15. “Significant limitations of reaching or handling, therefore, may eliminate a large 

number of occupations a person could otherwise do.” (Id.) Limitations that are not

significant—such as those affecting only one arm in only one position5

—will not 

eliminate the vast majority of jobs that call for “reaching.” “Varying degrees of 

limitations would have different effects, and the assistance of a [vocational expert] may

be needed to determine the effects of the limitations.” (Id.) (emphasis added). Where an 

 

5

 The ALJ asked Plaintiff, “[D]o you still have some limitation of motion in your left shoulder, left arm?” Plaintiff replied, “Yes, sir.” The ALJ asked, “It looks like the most 

you can lift it to is about your head level? [ . . . ] Is that right?” Plaintiff replied, “Yes, sir. I can shampoo my mop.” (Tr. 39-40.) 

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ALJ easily perceives that a limitation is relatively minor and would not interfere with the 

performance of the tasks indicated in the DOT, the ALJ can properly determine that a 

conflict does not exist. 

 Plaintiff relies heavily on a Seventh Circuit case, Prochaska v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 

731, 736 (7th Cir. 2006). In Prochaska, “the ALJ asked the [vocational] expert for work 

that could be done by someone who could only ‘occasionally reach above shoulder 

level,’” and the vocational expert testified that a cashier is such a job, although “a 

cashier’s requirements, under the DOT, include ‘reaching’ frequently.” Id. The Seventh 

Circuit considered this an “unresolved potential inconsistency”: 

It is not clear to us whether the DOT’s requirements include reaching above shoulder level, and this is exactly the sort of inconsistency the ALJ should have resolved with the expert’s help. We cannot determine, based on the 

record, whether the expert’s testimony regarding . . . reaching was actually inconsistent with the DOT. That determination should have been made by the ALJ in the first instance, and his failure to do so should have been 

identified and corrected by the Appeals Council. We will defer to an ALJ’s 

decision if it is supported by substantial evidence, but here there is an 

unresolved potential inconsistency in the evidence that should have been 

resolved. 

Id. (internal citation omitted). 

 The facts here are distinguishable from Prochaska in that the claimant in 

Prochaska could not reach above the shoulder level more than occasionally with either 

arm, whereas here Plaintiff has no limitation to reaching above shoulder level with his 

right arm. Cf. Carey, 230 F.3d at 146 (holding that job requirements in the DOT are not 

“bilateral” and therefore can be performed with one arm). 

 Moreover, Prochaska is not binding on this Court. The issue of whether a 

designation in the DOT that an occupation involves frequent “reaching” necessarily 

raises a potential conflict that must be explored when a claimant is limited to only 

occasionally reaching overhead with the non-dominant arm has not come before the 

Ninth Circuit.6

 This Court does not find the reasoning in Prochaska persuasive. 

 

6

 The Ninth Circuit cited Prochaska in a footnote for its holding “that an ALJ’s failure to 

make the relevant inquiries under SSR 00–4p leaves ‘unresolved potential inconsistenc[ies] in the evidence.’” Massachi, 486 F.3d at 1154 n.20. Massachi did not 

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 This Court is more persuaded by the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in Carey, which 

held that “an alleged conflict between the vocational expert’s specific testimony that 

[claimant] could perform the jobs of cashier and ticket seller with one hand, and a DOT 

description stating that the person in those jobs will be required to have some ability to 

finger and handle things” does not “present any actual conflict between the vocational 

expert’s testimony and the DOT.” 230 F.3d at 146. The Fifth Circuit noted that the case 

before it, with facts analogous to the case at hand before this Court,7

 did “not involve the 

type of direct and obvious conflict at issue when the vocational expert’s characterization 

of the exertional or skill level required for a particular job is facially different from the 

exertional or skill level provided for that job in the DOT.” Id. at 145-46. Nor did it 

involve “the less obvious conflict created when the vocational expert’s testimony creates 

a conflict or discrepancy between the ALJ’s determination of the claimant’s residual 

functional capacity and the DOT job descriptions.” Id. at 146. Rather, “[g]iven the 

tangential nature of the conflict alleged,” the Fifth Circuit concluded that the argument 

“actually reduces to a factual disagreement” and the vocational expert’s uncontroverted8

testimony provided the substantial evidence necessary to support the ALJ’s 

determination. Id.

 The Tenth Circuit reached the same conclusion in Segovia. 226 F. App’x at 804. 

The Tenth Circuit concluded determined that although “reaching” can encompass 

 apply this general principle of law to facts relevant to those in the present case. Here, the ALJ made the relevant inquiries under SSR 00–4p by asking the vocational expert if there were inconsistencies between his testimony and the DOT and eliciting a reasonable explanation for the only apparent conflict—the sitting, standing, and walking limitations that were not specifically addressed by the DOT. (Tr. 58.) 

7

 The reaching limitations in Carey were more extreme than those in the present case, as Carey had no left forearm and therefore could not ever use it to reach in any direction. 

Id. at 134 (“[C]atastrophic electrical shock . . . led to the amputation of Carey’s left forearm and hand.”). 

8

 The Fifth Circuit noted that “Carey’s counsel did not raise the issue or challenge the vocational expert’s testimony that the jobs of cashier and ticket seller could be performed with only one arm and hand. Carey basically contends that the vocational expert’s testimony . . . should have been explored further, when Carey himself failed to do so in the administrative hearing.” Id. The same is true here; Plaintiff’s counsel declined the 

opportunity to cross-examine the vocational expert. (Tr. 58.) 

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“extending hands and arms in any direction,” it does not follow that a job involving 

reaching necessary involves extending hands and arms in every direction: “In these 

circumstances, the [vocational expert’s] testimony does not conflict with the DOT and 

SCO so much as it clarifies how their broad categorizations apply to this specific case.” 

Id. (citing Carey, 230 F.3d at 146). This Court agrees with that assessment. 

CONCLUSION 

 Having determined that the facts of this case do not present an actual conflict 

between the vocational expert’s testimony and the DOT, the Court holds that the ALJ’s 

determination that “there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national 

economy that the claimant can perform” is supported by substantial evidence. (Tr. 27.) 

 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the ALJ’s decision is AFFIRMED. The 

Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly. 

 Dated this 22nd day of December, 2015. 

Honorable G. Murray Snow

United States District Judge

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