Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-01953/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-01953-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MYRAH MARTINEZ, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

COUNTY OF SONOMA, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-01953-JST 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS AND DENYING 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO STRIKE

Re: ECF No. 37

Plaintiffs Myrah Martinez, Kitara McCray, Madison Marlene Marvel, and R.M., a minor 

(collectively, “Plaintiffs”), 1have filed this section 1983 putative class action against Defendants 

County of Sonoma (“the County”), Sonoma County Human Services Department (“HSD”), 

Sonoma County Family, Youth, and Children’s Services (“FYCS”), Jerry Dunn (the Director of 

Human Services for Defendant HSD), Nick Honey (the Director of Defendant FYCS), Stacie 

Kabour (the Administrator and Manager of the Valley of the Moon Children’s Home), and 

Defendant Does 1 to 100, “who are and/or were officers, agents, employees, contractors, 

subcontractors, or other persons and or entities who . . . ordered, participated in and or condoned 

the abuses of plaintiffs” and the putative class members. ECF No. 36 ¶¶ 6–16. Defendants now 

move to dismiss the state law claims in Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Class Action Complaint 

(“SAC”). ECF No. 37. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will deny in part and grant in 

part Defendants’ motion to dismiss, and will deny Defendants’ motion to strike.

///

///

///

 

1

Star Smith, originally named as a plaintiff in the Complaint and First Amended Complaint, is no 

longer identified as a plaintiff in the Second Amended Complaint. ECF No. 36.

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I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual and Procedural Background2

Valley of the Moon Children’s Home (“VMCH”) is a temporary housing facility for 

juveniles who have been removed from their homes while they await placement in foster care. 

ECF No. 36 ¶ 19. Sonoma County operates this emergency shelter for abused and neglected 

children who have been removed from their homes. Id. ¶¶ 18–19. Defendant Kabour manages 

VMCH under the direction of Defendants HDS, FYCS, and its administrators, Defendants Dunn 

and Honey. Id. ¶ 18. Plaintiffs were juveniles placed in VMCH for various periods between 1995 

and 2014. Id. ¶¶ 6–9. Plaintiffs claim that employees of VMCH violated the putative class 

members’ federal and state rights pursuant to customs and policies promulgated by Defendants. 

Id. ¶¶ 21–31. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that all female class members were subject to regular 

strip searches, and that Defendant Does regularly searched the belongings of all class members, 

restricted access to their cell phones, physically restrained them, locked them in rooms, prevented 

them from talking to family and friends, and denied them access to private telephone 

conversations. Id. ¶ 28–29.

Plaintiff Myrah Martinez is 20 years old and was housed in VMCH several times from 

1995 through 2005. Id. ¶ 6. Plaintiff Martinez was strip searched over twenty times while she 

was housed at VMCH. Id. ¶ 21. These strip searches, which sometimes occurred by force, 

required her to strip naked and have private parts of her body inspected. Id. Her personal 

possessions were also searched daily after she returned to VMCH from school or other outside 

activities. Id.

Plaintiff Kitara McCray is 18 years old and was housed in VMCH for approximately three 

months beginning in September 2012. Id. ¶ 7. “[W]henever she returned [to VMCH] from school 

or other outside activity,” Plaintiff McCray was required to submit to bodily searches, including a 

search of her bra whereby she was required to “pull [her bra] away from her body and expose her 

 

2

For the purposes of this order, the Court accepts as true all of the well-pled factual allegations 

contained in Plaintiffs’ SAC. ECF No. 36.

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breasts.” Id. ¶ 22. Plaintiff McCray was also required to submit to searches of her backpack and 

personal possessions upon returning to VMCH. Id.

Plaintiff Madison Marlene Marvel is 19 years old and was housed in VMCH during 2011. 

Id. ¶ 8. Plaintiff Marvel was strip searched upon entry to VMCH and required “to expose private 

areas of her body for inspection.” Id. ¶ 23. In addition to having her personal possessions 

searched daily, staff members confiscated Marvel’s cell phone while she was at VMCH, and 

Marvel was only permitted to use a phone with the staff’s prior approval of the number she sought 

to dial. Id.

Plaintiff R.M. is 17 years old and was housed in VMCH “at various times from the age of 

6 until 2014.” Id. ¶ 9. Plaintiff R.M. had his person and possessions searched every time he 

returned to VMCH. Id. ¶ 24. He was also “placed in restraints, locked in rooms, denied access to 

his twin brother who was also housed at VMCH while R.M. was there, and [] was subjected to 

extreme psychological abuse.” Id.

Plaintiffs assert that these individual experiences represent the customs, policies, and 

practices promulgated by Defendants. Id. ¶¶ 29–30. Plaintiffs allege Community Care Licensing, 

a division of the California Department of Social Services, has investigated and cited VMCH for 

“seizures of residents’ cell phones, unreasonable searches of personal possessions, denial of 

opportunity to make confidential telephone calls, locking of bedrooms thereby denying residents 

the opportunity to enter their own rooms, and other deficiencies.” Id. ¶ 30. Additionally, 

Plaintiffs allege that “incident reports establish the use of unjustifiable restraints (610 within the 

last five years, 41 resulting in injuries), and sexual abuse and assault.” Id.

In response to the harm he suffered at VMCH, Plaintiff R.M. presented a “Group/Class 

Claim” to the Board of Supervisors for the County of Sonoma on April 27, 2015. Id. ¶ 2. On 

April 30, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a Class Action Complaint against Defendants. ECF No. 1. 

Plaintiffs then filed a First Amended Class Action Complaint (“FAC”) on May 8, 2015. ECF No. 

10. On June 15, 2015, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the FAC, ECF No. 19, which motion

the Court granted in part and denied in part on September 14, 2015, ECF No. 35. 

Plaintiffs filed the SAC on September 30, 2015. ECF No. 36. The SAC raises the 

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following eight claims:

3

(1) Unlawful Search (Violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth 

Amendments; 42 U.S.C. § 1983); (2) Unlawful Seizure of Property (Violation of the Fourth and 

Fourteenth Amendments; 42 U.S.C. § 1983); (3) Special Relationship (Substantive Due Process; 

Violation of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments; 42 U.S.C. § 1983); (4) Unlawful 

Policy, Custom, and/or Practice (Violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments; 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983); (5) Failure to Train and/or Supervise (Violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth 

Amendments; 42 U.S.C. § 1983); (6) Unlawful Search (California Welfare and Institutions Code 

section 16001.9, et seq.; California Government Code sections 815.2(a) and 820); (7) Unlawful 

Seizure of Property (California Welfare and Institutions Code section 16001.9, et seq.; California 

Government Code sections 815.2(a) and 820); and (8) violation of California’s Bane Act 

(California Civil Code section 52.1, et seq.; California Government Code sections 815.2(a) and 

820). ECF No. 36 at 11–17. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief, compensatory, 

general, and special damages, punitive damages, attorneys’ fees, and recovery for the cost of the 

suit. Id. at 18. 

On October 14, 2015, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss all of the state law claims

brought by all of the Plaintiffs, except R.M., because these Plaintiffs allegedly failed to timely 

submit their claims under the California Government Claims Act. ECF No. 37 at 2. Defendants 

also seek to dismiss the state law claims as to Plaintiff R.M. based on R.M.’s alleged failure to 

include sufficient facts regarding the timing of the underlying events in his claim submitted to the 

Board of Supervisors of the County of Sonoma. Id. Defendants also move to strike portions of 

the SAC that refer to Plaintiffs’ being physically restrained by Defendants. Id. Defendants do not, 

however, challenge Plaintiffs’ federal claims.

///

 

3 After the Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ motion to dismiss the FAC, ECF 

No. 35, Plaintiffs dropped the following claims: (1) Unlawful Restraint (Violation of the Fourth 

and Fourteenth Amendment; 42 U.S.C. § 1983); (2) Denial of Association (Violation of the First 

and Fourteenth Amendment; 42 U.S.C. § 1983); (3) Unlawful Restraint (California Welfare and 

Institutions Code section 16001.9, et seq.; California Government Code sections 815.2(a) and 

820); (4) Denial of Association (California Welfare and Institutions Code section 16001.9, et seq.; 

California Government Code sections 815.2(a) and 820); and (5) Intentional Infliction of 

Emotional Distress (California Government Code sections 815.2(a) and 820).

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B. Jurisdiction 

As several of Plaintiffs’ claims arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, this Court has subject matter 

jurisdiction over those claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The Court has supplemental 

jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law causes of action under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

II. MOTION TO DISMISS 

A. Legal Standard 

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief” to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the 

grounds upon which it rests.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 

555 (2007). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the 

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The Court must “accept all factual allegations 

in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 

party.” Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2005). Dismissal can be based on the 

lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal 

theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 533–34 (9th Cir. 1984). “The 

tenet that a court must accept a complaint’s allegations as true is inapplicable to threadbare recitals 

of a cause of action’s elements, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 663 (2009). District courts “should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend 

the pleading was made, unless [the court] determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured 

by the allegation of other facts.” Henry A. v. Willden, 678 F.3d 991, 1005 (9th Cir. 2012).

B. Plaintiffs’ State Law Claims

Plaintiffs allege three claims against Defendants under California state law. Defendants

assert that none of the Plaintiffs have adequately pleaded compliance with the California 

Government Claims Act, which requires that personal injury claims for money damages against a 

public employee must be filed with the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims 

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Board within six month of accrual of the cause of action that forms the basis of the claim. Cal. 

Gov’t Code § 911.2(a); see also Ashker v. Cate, No. 09-cv-2948-CW, 2012 WL 1094436, *7 

(N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2012) (“Pursuant to . . . Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 900 et seq., a personal injury 

claim against a public employee must be filed with the Board within six months after the date of 

the event that gave rise to the claim.”). As a result, Defendants argue that all Plaintiffs are barred 

from bringing their state law claims for money damages. 

i. Plaintiff R.M. 

Plaintiff R.M. presented a “Group/Class Claim” to the Board of Supervisors for the County 

of Sonoma on April 27, 2015. ECF No. 36 ¶ 2, Exhibit A. R.M.’s claim stated, in part:

R.M. has been housed in [VMCH] several times since he was six 

years old, most recently for a period of four months ending in 

December, 2014. During those periods he was housed at [VMCH], 

pursuant to policy and practice of the institution, he was regularly 

denied the right to make confidential telephone calls and his 

personal cell phone was taken from him when he returned from 

school and only returned to him when he left for school the next 

day. He was not permitted access to his own cell phone during 

weekends or other days when he did not attend school.

R.M. was physically restrained, resulting in injury. His personal 

belongings, including his backpack, were searched daily upon return 

from school, as was his room which was searched without prior 

notification. He was verbally abused and staff used their access to a 

log of items known to trigger emotional responses to taunt and 

provoke him.

While experiencing the above-mentioned abuses, in violation of the 

designated California Welfare and Institutions Code sections, R.M. 

observed similar abuse of other juveniles also housed at [VMCH]. 

On occasion juveniles were locked in rooms or portions of [VMCH]. 

Juveniles were regularly and repeatedly strip searched and observed 

while showering in violation of the state and federal constitutional 

prohibitions [against] unreasonable searches.

ECF No. 36, Exhibit A. Defendants argue that R.M.’s claim presented to the Board of Supervisors 

for the County of Sonoma was deficient because it is “silent as to any information on the date, 

time of loss, injury or damage.” ECF No. 37 at 7.

The Court finds Defendants’ argument unconvincing. California Government Code 

section 910 provides that a “claim shall be presented by the claimant and . . . shall show all of the 

following: . . . (c) The date, place and other circumstances of the occurrence or transaction which 

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gave rise to the claim asserted.” Under California law, however, “a claim need not strictly comply 

with § 910 in order to be considered a claim.” Santos v. Merritt College, No. 07-cv-5227-EMC, 

2008 WL 4570708, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2008) (citing State v. Superior Court (Bodde), 32 

Cal. 4th 1234, 1245 (2004)). Rather, “[s]ubstantial compliance is sufficient.” Id. (citing Ditts v. 

Cantua Elementary School District, 189 Cal. App. 3d 27, 33 (1987)). 

Here, R.M.’s claim stated he “was housed in [VMCH] several times since he was six years 

old, most recently for a period of four months ending in December, 2014.” ECF No. 36, Exhibit A 

(emphasis added). Based on this narrowly-defined timeframe, combined with the allegation that 

the injuries occurred “during those periods[,]” “daily[,]” and “regularly[,]” the Court concludes 

that R.M. complied with section 910(c)’s requirement that the claim “show . . [t]he date, place, 

and other circumstances of the occurrence or transaction which gave rise to the claim asserted.” 

Defendants cite no authority which would support a finding that the level of specificity provided 

by R.M.’s claim did not substantially comply with section 910(c). ECF No. 37 at 7–8. 

Moreover, even if the timing information in R.M.’s claim were found to be insufficient, 

Defendants have waived any defense regarding the sufficiency of R.M.’s claim because 

Defendants did not send a notice of insufficiency to R.M. Cal. Gov’t Code § 910.8 (“If . . . a 

claim as presented fails to comply substantially with the requirements of Sections 910 and 910.2, . 

. . the board . . . may, at any time within 20 days after the claim is presented, give written notice of 

its insufficiency, stating with particularity the defects or omissions therein); Cal. Gov’t Code § 

911 (“Any defense as to the sufficiency of the claim based upon a defect or omission in the claim 

as presented is waived by failure to give notice of insufficiency with respect to the defect or 

omission as provided in Section 910.8 . . . .”); see also Green v. State Center Community College 

District, 34 Cal. App. 4th 1348, 1354 (1995) (“If the public entity fails to send this notice, it 

waives any defenses as to the sufficiency of the claim based upon a defect or omission.”)

(emphasis in original). Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss the state law 

claims brought by Plaintiff R.M.4

 

4

In their reply brief, Defendants argue that R.M.’s claim does not substantially comply with the 

Government Claims Act because R.M. failed to wait until Defendants took any action on R.M.’s 

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ii. Plaintiffs Martinez, Marvel, and McCray

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs Martinez, Marvel, and McCray failed to file a claim with 

the California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board within six months of the 

accrual of their personal injury claim, as required by California Government Code section 

911.2(a). ECF No. 37 at 5–7. Plaintiffs Martinez, Marvel, and McCray respond that although 

they did not file a claim within six months of the events underlying their state law claims, the 

requirement that they file a claim pursuant to the Government Claims Act was tolled by the 

“delayed discovery doctrine.” ECF No. 43 at 5–7.

Under the delayed discovery doctrine, “a cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff 

discovers, or has reason to discover, the cause of action,” which occurs “when he or she has reason 

to at least suspect a factual basis for its elements.” S.M. v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 184 

Cal. App. 4th 712, 717 (2010). “Suspicion of one or more of the elements, coupled with 

knowledge of any remaining elements, will generally trigger the applicable limitations period.” 

Id. In conducting this analysis, California courts do not take a “hypertechnical approach.” Id. 

Rather, California courts “look to whether the plaintiffs have reason to at least suspect that a type 

of wrongdoing has injured them.” Id.

In the SAC, Plaintiffs Martinez, Marvel, and McCray allege that they:

did not discover, or have reason to discover, due to their youth, 

ignorance, vulnerability, and inexperience, their causes of action 

available under state law, asserted herein, until they received the 

opportunity to discuss their experiences in the Valley of the Moon 

Children’s Home with an independent, unbiased, and non-COUNTY 

OF SONOMA-affiliated adult. These discussions occurred from 

December 2014 to March 2015, and it was during that time period 

that Plaintiff[s’] . . . state law causes of action accrued.

ECF No. 36 ¶ 3. Plaintiffs Martinez, Marvel, and McCray argue that, as a result, they can rely on 

the “Group/Class Claim” presented by Plaintiff R.M. on April 27, 2015 to satisfy the six month 

 

claim before filing suit. ECF No. 49 at 4. While “California Government Code § 945.4 requires 

as a prerequisite to maintenance of an action against a public entity for damages arising out of an 

alleged tort the timely filing of a claim and its rejection by such entity,” Garber v. City of Clovis, 

698 F. Supp. 2d 1204, 1211 (E.D. Cal. 2010), the Court declines to address this argument because 

“[i]t is inappropriate to consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief.” Ass’n of 

Irritated Residents v. C & R Vanderham Dairy, 435 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1089 (E.D. Cal. 2006).

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requirement of California Government Code section 911.2(a). Id.

The Court previously rejected this argument, noting that “[if] Plaintiffs’ wish to plead 

compliance with the presentation requirement in an amended complaint, they must allege facts 

regarding the dates by which each Plaintiff became aware of the existence of their claims and the 

reasons why each Plaintiff could not have learned the existence of the claims at a prior date.” ECF 

No. 35 at 7. The SAC fails to do so. Instead, the SAC continues to provide a conclusory, blanket 

statement as to the reason why all three Plaintiffs allegedly could not have learned of the existence 

of their claims earlier. ECF No. 36 ¶ 3.

Moreover, the reason suggested by Plaintiffs in the SAC is not plausible. Plaintiffs claim 

that due to their youth, they could not have discovered their causes of action until “they received 

the opportunity to discuss their experiences in the [VMCH] with an independent, unbiased, and 

non-COUNTY OF SONOMA-affiliated adult.” ECF No. 36 ¶ 3. Plaintiffs do not suggest any 

reason why they could not have discovered their causes of action once they reached adulthood. 

However, Plaintiffs Martinez and Marvel became adults more than six months before Plaintiff 

R.M.’s claim was filed on April 27, 2015.5 While it is unclear whether Plaintiff McCray reached 

adulthood more than six months before Plaintiff R.M. filed his claim,6the SAC simply does not 

provide the Court with sufficient detail from which the Court could conclude that the delayed 

discovery doctrine should apply to Plaintiff McCray. Indeed, Plaintiff McCray has not lived at 

VMCH since 2012, ECF No. 36 ¶ 7, and the SAC provides no detail why Plaintiff McCray did not 

have the opportunity to discuss her experience at VMCH with “an independent, unbiased, and 

non-COUNTY OF SONOMA-affiliated adult” between 2012 and December 2014. ECF No. 36 ¶ 

3. 

The Court concludes that Plaintiffs Martinez, Marvel, and McCray have still not shown 

that the delayed discovery doctrine applies to their state law claims. Accordingly, Defendants’ 

 

5

Plaintiff Martinez was 20 years old, and Plaintiff Marvel was 19 years old, as of September 30, 

2015. ECF No. 36 ¶ 6. Accordingly, Plaintiff Martinez achieved adulthood on September 30, 

2013 at the latest. Plaintiff Marvel achieved adulthood on September 30, 2014 at the latest. Both 

of these dates are more than six months prior to the filing of R.M.’s claim on April 27, 2015.

6

Plaintiff McCray was 18 years old at least as of April 30, 2015. ECF No. 1 ¶ 6.

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motion to dismiss the state law claims for money damages7of Plaintiffs Martinez, Marvel, and 

McCray is granted.

8

 Because Plaintiffs Martinez, Marvel, and McCray have previously been 

given the opportunity to amend these claims and have failed to remedy the previous deficiencies 

noted by the Court, the Court determines that further amendment would be futile. 

III. MOTION TO STRIKE 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) authorizes the Court to “strike from a pleading . . . 

any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). “The Ninth 

Circuit has defined ‘immaterial’ matter as ‘that which has no essential or important relationship to 

the claim for relief or the defenses being pleaded.’” Peterson v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 44 F. 

Supp. 3d 965, 968 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (quoting Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th 

Cir.1993)). “The function of a 12(f) motion to strike is to avoid the expenditure of time and 

money that must arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those issues prior to trial . 

. . .” Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted). Motions to strike are generally disfavored, and should typically be 

denied “unless it is clear that the matter sought to be stricken could have no possible bearing on 

the subject matter of the litigation.” Rosales v. Citibank, Fed. Sav. Bank, 133 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 

1180 (N.D. Cal. 2001). “Any doubt concerning the import of the allegations to be stricken weighs 

in favor of denying the motion to strike.” In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Wage & Hour Litig., 505 F. 

Supp. 2d 609, 614 (N.D. Cal. 2007).

The Court previously dismissed Plaintiffs’ unlawful restraint claims with leave to amend. 

ECF No. 35 at 9–10. Rather than amending these claims, Plaintiffs have entirely removed them 

from the SAC. ECF No. 36. Defendants argue that because Plaintiffs no longer bring causes of 

action for unlawful restraint, the Court should strike any reference to “unlawful restraints” or

individuals being “locked in rooms” at VMCH as immaterial. ECF No. 37 at 8–9. Defendants 

 

7

The California Government Claims Act only applies to claims for money damages. Hightower 

v. Tilton, No. 08-cv-1129, 2012 WL 1194720, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2012) (stating that the 

Government Claims Act “is inapplicable to claims for declaratory or injunctive relief”).

8 Because the Court finds that the delayed discovery doctrine does not apply to the claims of 

Plaintiffs Martinez, Marvel, and McCray, the Court will not address whether R.M.’s 

“Group/Class” claim is sufficient to act as a representative claim for these Plaintiffs. 

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further argue that the “conclusory allegations of psychological abuse or physical abuse do not 

support a factual basis for any claim, but are inflammatory.” ECF No. 49 at 6.

Plaintiffs oppose Defendants’ motion to strike, arguing that the allegations at issue provide 

relevant context and background for Plaintiffs’ other claims. ECF No. 43 at 8–11. In particular, 

Plaintiffs argue that the challenged language provides background related to their supervisory 

liability, Monell liability, and special relationship claims that Plaintiffs have properly pleaded. Id.

at 10–11.

Allegations relating to a claim no longer pleaded can still provide useful information for a 

Plaintiff’s remaining claims. See Peterson, 44 F. Supp. 3d at 969 (“Although [plaintiff] is no 

longer pursuing relief based specifically on [defendant’s] warranties or representations, the 

allegations and exhibits still provide useful background information about [defendant’s] express 

warranties. Those warranties, in turn, are related to [plaintiff’s] UCL claims . . .”). The Court 

concludes that the portions of the SAC that Defendants seek to strike provide additional context 

related to Plaintiffs’ living conditions at VMCH and therefore may provide useful background 

information relevant to Plaintiffs’ remaining claims, including Plaintiffs’ unlawful search, 

unlawful seizure, and special relationship claims. Moreover, the Court finds that Defendants will 

not be overly prejudiced by allowing the contested content to remain in the SAC. See Boyd v. 

Avanquest North Am. Inc, No. 12-cv-04391-WHO, 2014 WL 7183988, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 

2014) (“Since the SAC will not be presented to the jury and these provisions are potentially 

relevant to the allegations, [Defendant’s] argument of prejudice falls short.”). Accordingly, the 

Court denies Defendants’ motion to strike.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss as to Plaintiff 

R.M.’s state law claims. The Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss as to the state law 

claims for money damages of Plaintiffs Martinez, Marvel, and McCray. Because Plaintiffs 

Martinez, Marvel, and McCray have previously been given the opportunity to amend these claims 

and have failed to remedy the previous deficiencies noted by the Court, the Court determines that 

further amendment would be futile. Accordingly, these claims are dismissed without leave to 

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amend. Finally, the Court denies Defendants’ motion to strike.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 4, 2016

______________________________________

JON S. TIGAR

United States District Judge

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