Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-4_03-cv-01323/USCOURTS-alnd-4_03-cv-01323-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

MIDDLE DIVISION 

GLENN WILLIAM HOLLADAY 1 

1 

Petitioner, 1 

1 

v. 1 Case No.: CV 03-PT-1323-M 

1 

DONAL CAMPBELL 1 

1 

Respondent. 1 

FINDINGS OF FACT 

AND 

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 

This cause comes on to be heard on Petitioner's Objections to Magistrate Judge's Report 

and Recommendation filed on May 13,2006 and a further evidentiary hearing conducted on 

August 17,2006. 

On August 17,2006, the court received further amplifications, explanations and evidence 

from the two expert witnesses who had previously testified before the magistrate judge. The 

parties agreed that there are no substantial disputes as to the underlying facts and that the 

substantial disputes relate to the inferences drawn and conclusions reached by the two experts 

and the magistrate judge. Except to the extent that this court either expressly or impliedly 

disagrees herein with the report of the magistrate judge his report is hereby adopted. To the 

extent that there is any conflict between these findings of fact and conclusions of law and the 

report and recommendation of the magistrate judge these findings of fact and conclusions of law 

will prevail and apply. 

FILED

 2006 Oct-12 AM 11:34

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 4:03-cv-01323-RBP-HGD Document 103 Filed 10/12/06 Page 1 of 41
Background 

On June 26, 1987, the Petitioner, Glenn Holladay ("Holladay"), was convicted in Etowah 

County, Alabama of the murders of Larry Thomas, Jr., Rebecca Ledbetter Holladay and David 

Robinson, and the jury recommended a sentence of death. On July 24,1987, Holladay was 

sentenced to death by Judge Donald W. Stewart. On September 20, 1988, the Alabama Court of 

Criminal Appeals affirmed those convictions and the sentence. Holladay v. State, 549 So. 2d 

122 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988). His convictions and sentence were affirmed by the Alabama 

Supreme Court on May 5, 1989. Exparte Holladay, 549 So. 2d 135 (Ala. 1989). The United 

States Supreme Court declined to issue a writ of certiorari, Holladay v. Alabama, 493 U.S. 1012 

(1989), and rehearing was denied shortly thereafter. Holladay v. Alabama, 493 US. 1095 

(1 990). 

Holladay filed a motion for relief fkom conviction pursuant to Alabama Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 32.2 (then Temporary Rule 20) on September 10, 1990. On December 5, 1991, after a 

hearing by the trial court, this petition was denied. The denial of this Rule 32 petition was 

affirmed by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals on December 30, 1992. Holladay v. State, 

629 So. 2d 673 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992). The Alabama Supreme Court declined to review the 

denial of that petition. On February 28, 1994 the U.S. Supreme Court denied Holladay's petition 

for a writ of certiorari. Holladay v. Alabama, 5 10 U.S. 1 17 1 (1 994). 

Holladay then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this court pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. 5 2254, with his primary claim being ineffective assistance of counsel. On May 29, 1998, 

a magistrate judge of this court filed a Report and Recommendation stating that the petition 

should be denied. On July 22, 1998, this court adopted that Report and Recommendation and 

Case 4:03-cv-01323-RBP-HGD Document 103 Filed 10/12/06 Page 2 of 41
denied Holladay's petition. This denial was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for 

the Eleventh Circuit on April 19,2000. Holladay v. Haley, 209 F. 3d 1243 (1 lth Cir. 2000). The 

Eleventh Circuit denied rehearing and rehearing en banc, Holladay v. Haley, 232 F.3d 2 17 (I 1 th 

Cir. 2000), and the United States Supreme Court again denied certiorari. Holladay v. Haley, 53 1 

U.S. 1017 (2000). Holladay was scheduled to be executed at 6:01 p.m. on May 29,2003. 

Holladay moved the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals for leave to file a second petition 

for a writ of habeas corpus. Holladay, who claims to suffer from mental retardation, filed this 

motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. $2244 based on the United States Supreme Court decision in 

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), which held that it was a violation of the Eighth 

Amendment of the U.S. Constitution's "cruel and unusual punishment" clause to execute 

mentally retarded prisoners.' On May 26,2003, the Eleventh Circuit granted both his motion for 

leave to file for a second writ of habeas corpus and his motion for a stay of execution. In re 

Holladay, 33 1 F.3d 1 169 (1 1 th Cir. 2003).2 

On June 4,2003, Holladay filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus on Atkins 

grounds. On July 18,2003, a magistrate judge of this court filed an order that the Respondent's 

answer to the petition would be treated as a motion for summary judgment. On January 9,2004, 

the magistrate judge filed a Report and Recommendation suggesting that the motion for summary 

judgment be denied. On February 12,2004, this court filed a Memorandum Opinion adopting in 

part and rejecting in part the magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation. The accompanying 

lTypically, the Supreme Court has enunciated a broad principle and left the hard work up to the lower 

courts. It is easy to state that mildly mentally retarded people should not be executed. It is not so easy to determine 

who is mildly mentally retarded. For another case where the court wrestled with this issue, see Rivera v. Dretke, 

2006 WL 870927 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 3 1,2006) (unpublished opinion). 

2The court opinion in that case also provides a history of the proceedings leading up to that opinion. 

Case 4:03-cv-01323-RBP-HGD Document 103 Filed 10/12/06 Page 3 of 41
Order denied both the Respondent's motion for summary judgment and motion to dismiss, and 

referred the matter to the magistrate judge for further proceedings on the merits. 

On April 14,2006, the magistrate judge filed a Report and Recommendation suggesting 

that Holladay's present petition for a writ of habeas corpus be denied on the merits, asserting that 

Holladay had failed to establish his mental retardation by a preponderance of the e~idence.~ On 

May 13,2006, Holladay objected to the Report and Recommendation, arguing that the magistrate 

judge had made inappropriate findings of fact and had applied incorrect legal standards. On June 

16,2006, Dona1 Campbell, the Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections, filed a 

response to Holladay's objection^.^ 

General Historical Observations 

'Two "dueling experts" testified before the magistrate judge. The magistrate judge's recommendation is 

substantially based upon his acceptance of Dr. Kimberly Ackerson's opinions and his rejection of those of Dr. 

Karen Salekin. Dr. Ackerson's specific opinions may be influenced by her early opinion that Petitioner is not 

mentally retarded and that further testing was not needed. 

4Petitioner argues that Alabama law (specifically, Ala. R. Crim. P. 32) does not allow the filing of 

successive petitions, thereby foreclosing the Petitioner &om even attempting to do so before filing an Atkins claim in 

this court. That argument is doubtful. This court does not reach that issue. 

This court earlier held that the Respondent had waived the defense of exhaustion of remedies. "Exhaustion 

of state remedies is not a state law concept; it is a defense in federal court to a federal habeas corpus petition." Hills 

v. Washington, 441 F.3d 1374, 1378-79 (1 1 th Cir. 2006). In a Memorandum Opinion filed February 12,2004, this 

court noted: 

For the record, in the answer to the petition for writ of habeas corpus respondent wrote, 

"Holladay's claim is not exhausted because it has never been raised in state court[,but] .... 

[rlespondent does not allege [that said claim is] unexhausted. .. because it 

would be futile to make this claim in state court because the claim would be 

procedurally defaulted in state court for a number of reasons (not filed within 

statute of limitations, filed in successive petition, and not raised at trial or on 

appeal). See Rule 32.2(a)(3), (a)(5),(b) and (c), Ala. R.Crim.P. 

Document #lo, at 14 n.5) 

In re Holladay, supra, clearly stated that the exhaustion issue was reserved. That opinion was dated May 

26,2003. The above-stated answer was filed on July 8,2003. The Respondent affirmatively waived the 

exhaustion defense. For a discussion with regard to whether the presentation of new evidence reopens the 

exhaustion issue see Morris v. Dretke, 4 15 F.3d 484 (5th Cir. 2005). 

Case 4:03-cv-01323-RBP-HGD Document 103 Filed 10/12/06 Page 4 of 41
The history of mental retardation has been an evolving one, as to stereotyping, definition, 

treatment, etc. As has been the case with mental illness, there has been improvement in the 

understanding of mental retardati~n.~ The diagnosis of mental retardation remains, however, 

encumbered by amorphousness comparable to clutching mercury, as illustrated by the 

contradictory opinions of the experts in this case. The ultimate decision may equate to the game 

of "Button, button, who's got the button?y6 

Both experts testified that "one size fits all" with regard to mental retardation 

determinations. The following language in American Association on Mental Retardation 

(hereinafter AAMR), Mental Retardation (10th ed. 2002) suggests to the contrary: 

The functions or reasons for applying a definition of mental 

retardation to a person are multiple and may include diagnosis, 

classification, and/or planning supports. Each function may have 

multiple purposes. For example, the diagnostic function may be 

applied to determine eligibility for services, benefits, or legal 

protections. Likewise, there are different grouping purposes for 

classification, including service reimbursement or fimding, research, 

services, communication, and so forth. Supports planning for a given 

person should relate to that individual's strengths and needs in all 

five dimensions of individual functioning: Intellectual Abilities; 

Adaptive Behavior; Participation, Interactions, and Social Roles; 

5Some progress is indicated by comparing Atkins, supra, with Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (all right to 

sterilize "feeble-minded"). Also compare Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989). It is of interest that after Justice 

O'Comor noted in Penry that only two states prohibited execution of mentally retarded offenders, sixteen additional 

states and the federal government passed legislation banning the execution of mentally retarded offenders by the time 

Atkins was decided As will be discussed hereinafter, mental retardation is not considered a mental illness. 

6"The MR construct is useful in that it allows mostly deserving individuals to get services and supports they 

often desperately need. It is fiction in that there is no justification for the idea that there is a magical line (let alone 

one determined by a test score) dividing those who have or do not have this condition." American Association on 

Mental Retardation (AAMR), Mental Retardation, inpa, at 35. The magistrate judge stated "[Tlhe seeming 

simplicity and clarity of the concept of mental retardation are deceptive." (Report and Recommendation at 7, 

footnote omitted). The magistrate judge also referred to mental retardation analysis as "convoluted" and involving a 

"tangled diagnostic template ..." (Id at 10). The magistrate judge questioned whether the "definition and 

application of mental retardation as set out in Atkins and Alabama law" meet evidentiary standards required pursuant 

to Rule 704 of the Fed. R. Ev. and the Daubert case. (Id. at n.33). 

Case 4:03-cv-01323-RBP-HGD Document 103 Filed 10/12/06 Page 5 of 41
Health; and Context. 

Id. at 37. Some determinations may be for the purpose of inclusion of mentally retarded persons; 

some for excl~sion.~ 

Indicative of the evolution is the fact that one of the most subjective essential elements of 

mental retardation, the adaptive behavior or adaptive functioning factor, was not added to the 

American Association on Mental Deficiency (AAMD)' definition until 1959. AAMR, supra, at 

24. Not only was its inclusion late, "consensus on its construct is still lacking." ... "[Tlhere is no 

universal agreement on the factor structure of adaptive behavior, the best method to assess it, the 

role that adaptive behavior or skill deficits should play in the definition and diagnosis of mental 

retardation and the relationship between the concepts of intelligence and adaptive behavior ... . 

[Tlhere have been many debates over the accuracy of measuring adaptive behavior (and adaptive 

skills) ... and whether adaptive behavior assessment should be a requirement for diagnosing 

mental retardation ..." Id. at 24.' 

'For example, see the following cases involving social security disability: Hodges v. Barnhart, 276 F.3d 

1265 (1 lth Cir. 2001); Markle v. Barnhardt, 324 F.3d 182 (3rd Cir. 2003); and Brown v. Sec'y of Health and 

Human Servs., 948 F.2d 268 (6th Cir. 199 1). For a further discussion of this issue, see Ex parte Briseno, 135 

S.W.3d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). See also Rivera, supra n. 1. 

'The American Association on Mental Deficiency is the former name of the American Association on 

Mental Retardation. 

gF~r a full history of the evolution in the development mental retardation standards, see James W. Ellis and 

Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 414 (1984-85) and R.C. 

Scheerenberger, A History of Mental Retardation (1 983). For a fiuther history, see City of Cleburne, Texas, et al. v. 

Cleburne Living Center, et al., 473 U.S. 432,46 1-465 (1 985). ("Even so, the Court of Appeals correctly observed 

that through ignorance and prejudice the mentally retarded 'have been subjected to a history of unfair and often 

grotesque mistreatment."' Id. at 454). Among other books on mental retardation are: George S. Baroff, Mental 

Retardation, Nature Cause and Management (3rd ed. 1999) and Ronald L. Taylor, Assessment of Individuals with 

Mental Retardation (1997). See also Nava Feldrnan, Application of Constitutional Rule of Atkins v. Virginia, 536 

U.S. 304, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 153 L. Ed. 2d 335 (2002), that Execution of Mentally Retarded Persons Constitutes 

"Cruel and Unusual Punishment" in Violation of Eighth Amendment, 122 A.L.R. 5th 145 (2004). 

Case 4:03-cv-01323-RBP-HGD Document 103 Filed 10/12/06 Page 6 of 41
From 1959 to 1973 the AAMR definition of mental retardation included persons with IQ 

scores of 70-85 as "borderline retarded." "This group is no longer labeled retarded by 

professionals in the field." Ellis and Luckasson, supra n.9, at 422, n.44.1° "Mildly retarded 

people have IQ scores in the range between 50 to 55 and approximately 70 and thus have 

substantial disability." Id. at 423. 

"Many forms of mental illness are temporary, cyclical, or episodic. Mental retardation, 

by contrast is permanent. Thus, legal rules which focus upon the prospect of 'curing' mentally ill 

people may not address the condition of retarded people in an appropriate or useful way." Id. at 

424 (footnote omitted)." The authors further state, however, "The consequences of the mental 

impairment, including deficits in adaptive behavior may be ameliorated through education and 

habilitation. Therefore, it is not accurate to state categorically that mental retardation is 

'OOne reason that the I.Q. level for mental retardation was lowered was to avoid the stigma of persons 

being classified as "retarded." This may be the same reason that the adaptive behavior element was added. As an 

illustration of the confusion in this area, the following is a verbatim excerpt fiom a Federal Bureau of Prisons 

Forensic Report dated September 22,2006, with regard to a defendant whose case is pending in this court. The 

report is signed by a licensed clinical psychologist: 

The defendant was administered the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI), a 

commonly used brief screening instrument designed to assess an individual's current level of 

cognitive functioning. Mr. McCain's WASI results indicated he obtained an overall IQ score of 53 

+/-2, (less than the 1st percentile), which falls within the low borderline range of intellectual 

abilities. His verbal IQ score of 55 +I-3 (less that the 1st percentile), and Performance IQ score of 

58 +/-3 (less that the 1st percentile), also fell within the low borderline range. 

Rivera, supra n. 1, states that since 1908 the AAMR or its predecessors have used ten different definitions of "mental 

retardation." Id. at 16. 

''This court recommends a full reading of Ellis and Luckasson, supra n.9. "Professor Luckasson was an 

author of the AAMR's 1992 definition of mental retardation, the version relied upon in Atkins and Alabama" 

(Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation at 8, n.5). The court also recommends a full reading of Baroff, 

Mental Retardation, Nature, Cause, and Management (3rd ed. 1999). 

Case 4:03-cv-01323-RBP-HGD Document 103 Filed 10/12/06 Page 7 of 41
'permanent' or 'inc~rable.""~ There is no evidence that the Petitioner has ever had such 

education or habilitation. 

Petitioner's Objections 

The Petitioner's objections can be summarized as follows: 

1. "The magistrate judge incorrectly found that the IQ scoring cutoff for a finding of 

mental retardation is 70 or below ..." The cutoff as stated by the magistrate judge fails to 

recognize the well established rule that the IQ cutoff for mental retardation is 70 plus or minus 

pve points. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 309, n.5.13 

2. The magistrate judge erred in finding that the WAIS is the "most universally applied 

standardized testing instrument, in part because Stanford-Binet exams typically generate lower 

IQ scores." 

3. The Petitioner objects to the magistrate judge's conclusion "which questions the 

validity of the IQ exarnination[s] performed on the Petitioner in 1958," in which he scored 49 

and 56. 

4. The Petitioner objects to the magistrate judge's conclusion "that the opinions of Dr. 

Kimberly Ackerson are 'well reasoned and better supported by the record than Dr. Salekin's 

view' thus accepting Dr. Ackerson's assessment of the Petitioner as functioning in the borderline 

range of intelligence." 

121n Cleburne Living Center v. City of Cleburne, Tex., 726 F.2d 191, 198 (5th Cir. 1984) the court stated 

that the condition of the mentally retarded is "immutable." The Supreme Court agreed in City ofCleburne Texas, et 

a1 v. Cleburne Living Center, supra n.9. "The vast majority [of the mentally retarded] - approximately 89% - are 

classified as mildly retarded, meaning that their IQ is between 50 and 70." Id. at 443, n.9. "Mental retardation is 

caused by a variety of factors, some genetic, some environmental, and some unknown." Id. 

13As will be indicated hereinafter, this is not necessarily the Alabama law. 

Case 4:03-cv-01323-RBP-HGD Document 103 Filed 10/12/06 Page 8 of 41
5. The magistrate judge erred in discounting the import and findings of the WoodcockJohnson test administered by Dr. Salekin. 

6. The Petitioner objects to the magistrate judge's total rejection of the retroactive use of 

the Scales of Independent Behavior-Revised (SIB-R) test. 

7. The Petitioner objects to the magistrate judge's rejection of all forms of adaptive 

functioning testimony except for school, social service and prison records. 

8. The magistrate judge erred in not giving sufficient weight to the Petitioner's 

intellectual and adaptive functioning skills prior to the age of 18, including health and safety 

factors; academic difficulties; IQ scores of 49 and 56 (1958) and 54 (1963); reports of a school 

principal, a special education teacher and a physician; DHR records which refer to petitioner as 

mentally retarded; and the testimony of family members and friends. 

9. The magistrate judge did not give sufficient weight to the following IQ test scores of 

Petitioner: 

even though Dr. Ackerson viewed the four tests as being reliable and valid. 

Respondent's Response to Obiections 

1. The Respondent did not specifically respond to the "70 and 75" or lower objection of 

the Petitioner. The Respondent generally argues that the "magistrate correctly applied the proper 

legal standard ..." and that "Holladay completely fails to show how this alleged failure entitles 

him to a different outcome." 

2. The Respondent argues that the magistrate judge's finding that WAIS-I11 is the 

Case 4:03-cv-01323-RBP-HGD Document 103 Filed 10/12/06 Page 9 of 41
preferred assessment is supported by the evidence including the testimony of Dr. Salekin. 

3. The Respondent supports the magistrate judge's questioning of the validity of the IQ 

examinations in 1958. This support purportedly comes from the testimony of Dr. Ackerson 

concerning the inconsistency of the scores. 

4. Respondent agrees with the magistrate judge's conclusions that Dr. Ackerson's 

opinions are better supported than those of Dr. Salekin, even though Dr. Ackerson did not 

administer an intelligence test because she had decided that it would not be helpful. 

Further, Respondent argues, Dr. Ackerson did, in fact, contact third parties and 

considered records which contained information from third parties. 

5. Respondent argues that the Petitioner does not dispute that Woodcock-Johnson is an 

achievement test and not an intelligence test. 

6. Respondent argues that even Dr. Salekin acknowledged that her use of SIB-R was 

unorthodox in this case. 

7. Respondent says there is nothing in the record to suggest that the magistrate judge did 

not consider all the evidence concerning Holladay's adaptive fhnctioning. 

8. Respondent says that the magistrate judge carefully considered the evidence 

concerning the petitioner's intellectual and adaptive functioning before he turned 18. 

9. Respondent argues that the magistrate judge carefully considered the Petitioner's 

intellectual functioning and adaptive functioning as an adult and that the evidence supports Dr. 

Ackerson's view that Petitioner is not mentally retarded even though she believes that his adult 

IQ scores (ranging from 65 to 72) are reliable and valid. 

Standards of Review 

Case 4:03-cv-01323-RBP-HGD Document 103 Filed 10/12/06 Page 10 of 41
It is settled in the Eleventh Circuit that the district court must rule on the merits of each 

and every claim discussed in the magistrate judge's report and recommendation. Callahan v. 

Campbell, 396 F.3d 1287, 1289 (1 1 th Cir. 2005) ("When a district court does not address all 

such claims, we 'will vacate the district court's judgment without prejudice and remand the case 

for consideration of all remaining claims whenever the district court has not resolved all such 

claims."') (quoting Ciisby v. Jones, 960 F.2d 925, 938 (1 1 th Cir. 1 992)).14 "[A] district court 

judge need not rehear the testimony on which the magistrate relied in accepting the magistrate's 

findings or recommendation. Rather ... the statutory command to district court judges to 'make a 

de novo determination' of those portions of the magistrate's findings and recommendations to 

which the parties object is satisfied as long as the judge, rather than the magistrate, exercises 

'ultimate adjudicatory power."' Profltt v. Wainwright, 685 F.2d 1227, 1237 (1 1 th Cir. 1982) 

(quoting United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667,674-76 (1980)). "[Iln a situation involving the 

constitutional rights of a criminal defendant ... the district judge should not enter an order 

inconsistent with the credibility choices made by the magistrate without personally hearing the 

live testimony of the witnesses whose testimony is determinative." Louis v. Blackburn, 630 F.2d 

1 105, 1109 (5th Cir. 1980). 

Determining whether the order of the district judge is "inconsistent with the credibility 

choices made by the magistrate" is a two-step process. "First, we must review the magistrate's 

recommendation and decide whether credibility choices he made in assessing [a claim] were 

dispositive. If the answer is affirmative, we must then scrutinize the district court's order to 

14Note that the reference is to "claims," not "objections." Here, there is only one "claim." That claim is that 

Petitioner is mentally retarded. 

11 

Case 4:03-cv-01323-RBP-HGD Document 103 Filed 10/12/06 Page 11 of 41
ascertain if the judge's rejection of the magistrate's recommendation was also a rejection, 

whether express or implied, of the magistrate's credibility choices." ProfJitt, 685 F.2d at 1237. 

"The rationale for requiring district judges to rehear testimony before rejecting credibility choices 

made by a magistrate lies in the recognition that credibility choices frequently depend on the trier 

of fact's assessment of the witness's demeanor ...[ ulnless the words spoken by the witness are 

inherently ambiguous, however, the decision whether a second hearing is necessary must be left 

to the sound discretion of the district judge." Id. at 1243. 

"Findings of fact made by a United States magistrate ... and which are accepted and 

adopted by the district court without objection by any party, may be reviewed on direct appeal 

only for 'plain error or manifest injustice."' LoConte v. Dugger, 847 F.2d 745,749-50 (1 1 th Cir. 

1988) (quoting Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982)). "Whenever any 

party files a timely and specific objection to a finding of fact by a magistrate, the district court 

has an obligation to conduct a de novo review of the record with respect to that factual issue ... To 

the extent that the magistrate has made findings of fact based upon the testimony of the witnesses 

heard before the magistrate, the district court is obligated to review the transcript or listen to the 

tape-recording of those proceedings." LoConte, 847 F.2d at 750. "If the district court's account of 

the evidence is plausible in light of the record reviewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may 

not reverse it even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have 

weighed the evidence differently." Id. "There is little practical distinction between the 'plain 

error' standard of review applicable to unchallenged findings of fact by a magistrate and the 

'clearly erroneous' standard of review relevant to fact findings by the district judge." Id. "[Aln 

appellate court must be satisfied that a district judge has exercised his non-delegable authority by 

Case 4:03-cv-01323-RBP-HGD Document 103 Filed 10/12/06 Page 12 of 41
considering the actual testimony, and not merely by reviewing the magistrate's report and 

recommendations." Stokes v. Singletary, 952 F.2d 1567, 1576 (1 1 th Cir. 1992) (quoting United 

States v. Elsoffer, 644 F.2d 357,359 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981))." 

Advice from Atkins v. Virginia. 536 U.S. 304 (2002) 

"Those mentally retarded persons who meet the law's requirements 

for criminal responsibility should be tried and punished when they 

commit crimes. Because of their disabilities in areas of reasoning, 

judgment, and control oftheir impulses, however, they do not act with 

the level of moral culpability that characterizes the most serious adult 

criminal conduct. Moreover, their impairments can jeopardize the 

reliability and fairness of capital proceedings against mentally 

retarded defendants." Atkins, 536 U. S. at 306-307 (emphasis added). 

"The American Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR) defines 

mental retardation as follows: "Mental retardation refers to 

substantial limitations in present functioning. It is characterized by 

significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, existing 

concurrently with related limitations in two or more of the following 

applicable adaptive skill areas: communication, self-care, home 

living, social skills, community use, self-direction, health and safety, 

functional academics, leisure, and work. Mental retardation manifests 

before age 18." Mental Retardation: Definition, Classification, and 

Systems of Supports 5 (9th ed. 1992). 

The American Psychiatric Association's definition is similar: "The 

essential feature of Mental Retardation is significantly subaverage 

general intellectual functioning (Criterion A) that is accompanied by 

significant limitations in adaptive functioning in at least two of the 

following skill areas: communication, self-care, home living, 

sociaVinterpersona1 skills, use of community resources, self-direction, 

functional academic skills, work, leisure, health, and safety (Criterion 

B). The onset must occur before age 18 years (Criterion C). Mental 

Retardation has many different etiologies and may be seen as a final 

''This court has considered the fiuther testimony of the two expert witnesses and has hlly read and 

considered the transcript of the hearing before the magistrate judge. This court has considered all issues, factual and 

legal, de novo. 

Case 4:03-cv-01323-RBP-HGD Document 103 Filed 10/12/06 Page 13 of 41
common pathway of various pathological processes that affect the 

functioning of the central nervous system." Diagnostic and Statistical 

Manual of Mental Disorders 41 (4fi ed.2000). "Mild" mental 

retardation is typically used to describe people with an IQ level of 

50-55 to approximately 70. Id. at 42-43." Id. at 308, n.3 (emphasis 

in original). 

. . . . 

"Dr. Nelson administered the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scales test 

(WAIS-III), the standard instrument in the United States for assessing 

intellectual functioning. AAMR, Mental Retardation, supra, 

(Emphasis added). The WAIS-I11 is scored by adding together the 

number of points earned on different subtests, and using a 

mathematical formula to convert this raw score into a scaled score. 

The test measures an intelligence range from 45 to 155. The mean 

score of the test is 100, which means that a person receiving a score 

of 100 is considered to have an average level of cognitive 

functioning. A. Kaufinan & E. Lichtenberger, Essentials of WAISIII 

Assessment 60 (1 999). It is estimated that between 1 and 3 percent 

of the population has an IQ between 70 and 75 or lower, which is 

typically considered the cutoffIQ score for the intellectual function 

prong of the mental retardation depnition. 2 Kaplan & Sadock's 

Comprehensive Textbook of Psychiatry 2952 (B. Sadock & V. 

Sadock eds. 7th ed.2000)." Id. at 309, n.5 (emphasis added). 

"Not all people who claim to be mentally retarded will be so impaired 

as to fall within the range of mentally retarded offenders about whom 

there is a national consensus. As was our approach in Ford v. 

Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 106 S.Ct. 2595,91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986), 

with regard to insanity, "we leave to the Staters] the task of 

developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction 

upon [their] execution of sentences." Id. at 405,416-41 7, 106 S.Ct. 

2595." Atkins, 536 U.S. at 3 17. 

"As discussed above, clinical definitions of mental retardation require 

not only subaverage intellectual functioning, but also significant 

limitations in adaptive skills such as communication, self-care, and 

self-direction that became manifest before age 18." Id. at 3 18. 

Evidence 

Case 4:03-cv-01323-RBP-HGD Document 103 Filed 10/12/06 Page 14 of 41
The following is underlying evidence which this court divides into these categories:16 

(1) May Tend to Support that the Petitioner's IQ is 70 or Below; 

(2) May Tend to Support that the Petitioner's IQ is not 70 or Below; 

(3) May Tend to Show Limitation(s) in Adaptive Functional Behavior; 

(4) May Tend to Show the Absence of Limitations in Adaptive Functional Behavior. 

The court also includes the results of Scales of Independent Behavior Revised (SIB-R) as 

administered by Dr. Salekin. This judge gives greater weight to the SIB-R than did the 

magistrate judge. The magistrate judge questioned the credibility of some witnesses whose 

testimony is referenced herein. Dr. Salekin, in arriving at her expert opinion, gave credence to 

the same statements. This court concludes that she was allowed to do so. 

The following abbreviations are employed for oft-used terms and persons: 

Scales of Independent Behavior Revised (SIB-R) 

Glenn Holladay (Holladay) 

Raymond Fuqua (RF) 

Mental Retardation (MR) 

Helen Bryan (HB) 

State of Alabama Department of Human Resources (DHR) 

Social Skills (SS) 

Communication (COMM) 

Self-Direction (SD) 

Work (WORK) 

Self-care (SC) 

Home Living (HL) 

Health and Safety (HS) 

Community Use (CU) 

Except as noted, parenthetical citations are to the transcript of the hearing held before the 

magistrate judge. 

16The court's listing of evidence in this section does not constitute findings of fact. 

Case 4:03-cv-01323-RBP-HGD Document 103 Filed 10/12/06 Page 15 of 41
1) Mav Tend to Support that the Petitioner's IQ is 70 or below 

Holladay's mother drank frequently while pregnant with all of her children, including 

Holladay. (Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation at 45, citing DHR records). 

DHR records are "replete" with reports of Holladay's father verbally and physically 

abusing his wife and children throughout the time they all lived together (Magistrate 

Judge's Report and Recommendation at 46, citing DHR records). 

Holladay failed the 1" and ndnd grades (Salekin, 15 1 :7-10). His formal education ended 

when he quit school at age 16 (Salekin, 15 1 :21). While in school, Holladay received one 

C-minus, one D-minus, one D, and the rest were all Fs. In the lower elementary school 

years, when no letter grades were assigned, he received all "unsatisfactory" marks 

(Salekin, 152:l-10). 

Holladay's principal stated that Holladay is "definitely" MR (Salekin, 152: 1 1 - 16). 

Holladay met all criteria for special education but the class was too full to accommodate 

his admission (Salekin, 152: 17-23). 

Holladay once attended special education classes in an Etowah County school. There, a 

teacher assessment stated that he "did not have the ability to learn on the level of an 

average child" (Salekin, 1 53 :3-9). 

1958 IQ tests: at age 9, Holladay scored a 49 and a 56, respectively, on two 

administrations of the Wechsler test (Salekin, 167:3-4). 

Holladay's mother reports to DHR workers that Holladay is her "slow child or retarded 

child" in May 1959 (Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation at 45, n.41, citing 

DHR records). 

September 1962: Holladay's mother tells DHR that Holladay's teacher was going to seek 

"special help" for Holladay so that he could learn to read (Magistrate Judge's Report and 

Recommendation at 50, n.43, citing DHR records). 

1963: noting Holladay's IQ score of 54, a DHR report calls Holladay "barely educable" 

(In re Holladay, 33 1 F.3d at 1 175). 

1969 IQ test: Holladay scored a 66 (Salekin, 169:20-21). This score was two standard 

deviations below the mean (Salekin, 170: 1-7). 

1969: A Dr. Wileman concludes that Holladay is MR (Ackerson, 45 1 : 19-22). 

Other IQ tests: 69 (1978), 68 (1979), 65 (1991). (In re Holladay, 33 1 F.3d at 1174). 

Average of all IQ test scores, 1958-1 991 : 64 (Id at 1 175). 

Both the trial judge and the prosecutor in Holladay's criminal trial characterized Holladay 

as "slightly mentally retarded" (Id,). 

2005 Stanford-Binet test: scored a 59 (verbal)/58 (full scale)/61(nonverbal) (Salekin, 

179: 16). 

2) Mav Tend to Support that the Petitioner's IQ is not 70 or below 

Holladay's IQ test scores fluctuate, an indicator of unreliability (Ackerson, 348: 19-25). 

Holladay's verbal/perforrnance splits have "flip-flopped" over the years, which casts 

doubt upon their veracity because consistency in these splits is a hallmark of true MR 

Case 4:03-cv-01323-RBP-HGD Document 103 Filed 10/12/06 Page 16 of 41
(Salekin, 237:4-8). 

A special education teacher in Etowah felt that Holladay's limitations were 

"environmentally based" and not intellectually based (Salekin, 153 : 19-23). 

Social Worker's observation of Holladay in 1962: "I believe though it has been Glen's 

school background, family situation and lack of interest that has thrown him behind more 

so than a lack of intelligence" (Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation at 50, 

citing DHR records)." 

Mrs. F.D. Walton (Holladay's teacher) told the DHR social worker in May 1964 that she 

was "encouraged by Glenn's progress in the remedial class work at Etowah High," that he 

seemed "more emotionally disturbed because of his family situation than anything else," 

and that she "did not believe [Glenn's] IQ was too low to enable him to learn" 

(Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation at 53, citing DHR records). 

1979 IQ test: 72 (Salekin, 171:3-4). Others include 73 (1969) and 71 (1987) (In re 

Holladay, 33 1 F.3d at 1 174). 

1986-87: doctors at Taylor-Hardin opine that Holladay is functioning above the 

"borderline" intellectual range due to his "level of speech, history of autonomous living, 

and his streetwise intelligence" (Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation at 67). 

3) Mav Tend to Show Limitatiods) in Adaptive Functional Behavior Factors 

Holladay could not cook anything substantial, such as a meal for a family (D. Holladay, 

255-7). [HL\SC] 

Holladay did not assist in taking care of his younger siblings (D. Holladay, 25:8-40). 

[HLI 

The Holladay household was not a place where a developmentally challenged individual 

would have grown up with a great deal of support (Salekin, 14 1-1 43). [HL] 

Holladay risked serious injury or death by playing frivolously around train tracks while 

growing up (Salekin, 144:9- 15). When asked about this by DHR, Holladay "apparently 

didn't think there was any danger in it and seemed surprised that the [DHR] worker felt 

that me might have lost an arm or leg or his life" (Magistrate Judge's Report and 

Recommendation at 48, citing DHR records). [HS] 

There is evidence that Holladay might have suffered head injuries as a child. Biomedical 

factors, such as head injuries, can contribute to MR (Salekin, 145: 13-14; 146: 15-25; 

147: 1-1 4). [HL] 

Holladay was seen running away fiom law enforcement following his sundry illegal 

conduct. His demeanor was such that he didn't appear to realize the seriousness of it - he 

would be smiling, as if it were "like a game" to him (Bryan, 53: 13-17). [HS] 

Holladay attempted to give himself an enema, made a large mess, did not seem 

embarrassed, and was unable to adequately clean it up (Fuqua, 66: 12-25; 67: 1-1 8). [HS] 

Holladay can use a standard telephone, but the prison telephones, which require input of 

numerical codes within a limited time frame, are difficult for him to use because they 

l7 Some of the DHR records refer to Glenn Holladay as "Glen Holladay." 

17 

Case 4:03-cv-01323-RBP-HGD Document 103 Filed 10/12/06 Page 17 of 41
require "speed, as well as memory," and Holladay has trouble in both areas (Salekin, 

l57:3-ll). [SC] 

Holladay, who casually notes his propensity to engage in sexual acts with animals, reports 

that he does not understand why such conduct with animals would be considered strange, 

since animals are his "best friend[s]" (Salekin, 1785-7). [HS] 

Holladay was "unaccepted" as a child; "mocked, ridiculed, and teased" by older 

teenagers; would get into fights; was called "dummy, idiot, crazy." (D. Holladay, 13 : 19- 

25) [SSI 

Holladay had poor vocabulary. He also had difficulty in understanding conversations and 

in following set patterns of conduct/behavior (D. Holladay, 14: 3- 10). [COMM] 

Holladay as a teenager would isolate himself or associate with younger children (D. 

Holladay, 16:9-25). [COMM/SS] 

Holladay could drive but had trouble identifying where he was, and could not relay his 

whereabouts to others except by landmarks (D. Holladay, 19:4-8). [SD\COMM] 

Holladay could not function well at painting job with father and brother; didn't know the 

difference b/w a scraper and a screwdriver (D. Holladay, 20: 1-6). He would not 

understand what to do, and would grow frustrated and run away (D. Holladay, 20: 14-1 8). 

Set up a ladder upside down (D. Holladay, 20:23-25; 2 1 : 1-9); couldn't be depended on to 

buy paint for the job (D. Holladay, 2 1 : 1 1 - 12). [WORK] 

Holladay was unable to work the machines at a the Kelly's Tire store where he worked; 

relegated to manual labor only (D. Holladay, 22: 2 1-25). [WORK] 

Holladay never had a bank account, paid household bills, or rent. All of this would be 

done by his wives. Holladay did not handle money well (D. Holladay, 23: 1 1 -24), but 

over time he could marginally do so with assistance from his brother (D. Holladay, 24: 1- 

4). [SC\SD\HL] 

Holladay's communications skills have not improved since he was a teenager (D. 

Holladay, 25: 19-25; 26: 1). [COMM] 

Holladay played with Helen Bryan and others her age (10 years younger than Holladay) 

(Bryan, 50:6-25; 5 1 : 1-3); he behaved more like someone of a younger age group (Bryan, 

5 1 :6- 15), even "childlike" (Bryan, 52:20-2 1). [COMM/SS] 

Holladay told HBYs mother that he felt more comfortable in incarceration (Bryan, 54:22- 

24). [SSIHL] 

Holladay sends HB and her mother letters and cards and such; someone else always 

writes it for Holladay, but Holladay will draw little smiley faces or crosses or something 

on them (Bryan, 55:7-2 1). [COMM] 

Holladay does not have many friends on death row (Fuqua, 62: 12- 17). [SS] 

Considers Holladay to be "a slow or special needs individual" (Fuqua, 62:19-21); has to 

talk to him slowly and succinctly for Holladay to understand him (Fuqua, 63: 1-5). 

[COMMISS] 

Holladay has fellow inmates assist him in readindwriting letters, and in filling out "store 

slips." He cannot perform these tasks himself (canteen order) (Fuqua, 64:3-14). 

[SC\SD\COMM] 

Holladay quit his job as a "runnery' on the cellblock because of inmate complaints that he 

Case 4:03-cv-01323-RBP-HGD Document 103 Filed 10/12/06 Page 18 of 41
was not doing the menial jobs satisfactorily (Fuqua, 65:l-19). However, RF later said 

that this was more of a case of the inmates having personal dislike for Holladay, not that 

he could not do the job (Fuqua, 75:6-25; 76:l-4). [WORK] 

Holladay's jobs were menial, and did not require significant intellectual ability. These 

are the types of jobs that could be performed by someone with MR (Salekin, 147: 18-25; 

148:l-8). [WORK] 

Even when Holladay did work, it was not on his own initiative. Someone else helped him 

find work (Salekin, 196:8-10). [WOK] 

Someone with mild MR would do well in a prison setting because it is so structured. Dr. 

Salekin opines that this explains why Holladay does so well there (Salekin, 159: 1 1-25; 

1 60: 1 - 1 0). [HL\SS\CU\SD\COMM] 

Holladay is very tangential in conversations. At times it is very difficult to keep him on 

track (Salekin, 176:3-17). [COMM] 

4) Mav Tend to Show the absence of Limitationls) In Adaptive Functional Behavior 

Factors 

DHR worker interviewing Holladay during his boyhood states, "Glen ... talked with a fair 

amount of common sense" (Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation at 48, citing 

DHR records). [COMM/SS] 

Holladay was able to move among foster homes "with no difficulty" (Ackeron, 366: 12- 

22). [SSICU] 

Holladay would get up and get ready for school @. Holladay, 3 1 :2-4). [HWSD] 

Holladay was very clean; observed better hygiene habits than his siblings (D. Holladay, 

24: 1 1-25); capable of cleaning his room (D. Holladay, 25: 1). [HS] 

Holladay could cook eggs (D. Holladay, 25:2-5). [HL] 

Holladay could buy a Coke at a convenience store without assistance (D. Holladay, 24:5- 

7). Although Holladay had to have the menu read to him, he was able to choose what he 

wanted and knew enough to ask that the price specials be read to him (D. Holladay, 34:s20). [SCICUICOMM] 

Holladay is able to make small purchases for himself, such as buying a hamburger at a 

fast food restaurant; works well with paper currency, not as well with change (Salekin, 

148: 15-24). [CU] 

Holladay could drive a car around town as a young teenager even though illiterate (D. 

Holladay, 18:20-23). Later in life, he was able to drive himself back and forth from 

Atlanta to Gadsden (D. Holladay, 34:22-25; 35: 1-4). [CUISD] 

Holladay can drive a car safely and with navigational accuracy in a familiar place 

(Salekin, 148:25, 149: 1-3). In unfamiliar places, he picks up hitchhikes and gets 

information from them (Salekin, 150: 1-1 1). [SC/SD/COMM/SS] 

Holladay did not have trouble following directions at his manual labor job at Kelly Tire in 

the early 1980s (D. Holladay, 39:4- 15). [WORKICOMM] 

Holladay, a diabetic, has learned how to check his insulin level with the blood machine 

Case 4:03-cv-01323-RBP-HGD Document 103 Filed 10/12/06 Page 19 of 41
(Salekin, 1 56:6- 1 7). [SCIHSISD] 

Holladay is capable of carrying on a conversation; does not have a focus problem 

(Morgan, 86: 13-20). [COMM] 

Holladay knew how to use the telephone, cook, and to dress himself (Morgan, 85:6-25). 

[HLISCISD] 

Holladay knew how to write (Morgan, 84:22-25; 85: 1-3). [PA] 

Holladay once worked at a chicken plant (Morgan, 83: 10- 12), and at a tire store (Morgan, 

83:14-15). [WORK] 

While a fugitive from the law, Holladay did not call his father because he suspected that 

the telephone would be bugged (Ackeron, 387:23-25, 388:l). [SC] 

In his deposition, Holladay's vocabularly is suspiciously learned (uses words like 

"approximately") (Ackeron, 3 85 :6-9). [COMMISS] 

While on the run, Holladay knew enough to trade in his car occasionally, sometimes 

making extra money from the transaction (Ackeron, 3 83 : 15-2 1). [CUISDISCISS] 

Holladay consciously pursued women who he wanted to "peep" on (Ackeron, 372:2-10). 

[SDI 

2 of the 3 members of a psychological reviewing commission found Holladay to be 

"socially appropriate" (Ackeron, 357: 11 -1 8). [SS] 

Former psychologist said that Holladay was a "streetwise" individual with the adaptive 

skills to survive (Ackeron, 355:21-23). [CU/SDlSS/COMM/SC] 

Holladay was able to invoke the Fifth Amendment on his own during his deposition, and 

was able to withstand cross-examination at trial (Salekin, 260-61). [COMM] 

Holladay can copy information from one prison form (visitor, telephone) to another 

(Salekin, 25 1 : 1-23). [COMM] 

Holladay used an alias to avoid being identified while he was a fugitive (Salekin, 244: 1 - 

lo). [SCISD] 

Holladay had enough soundness of mind to seek out the cheapest hotels while a fugitive 

from the law. (Salekin, 242:20-25; 243: 1-2) This is seen during his 1986 escape from the 

Cherokee County Jail and from the three murders later that year (Salekin, 247:s-19). 

[SCISD] 

Following his escape from Cherokee County Jail in 1986, Holladay managed to elude 

capture for seven months, driving himself to cities all over the Southeast and Midwest 

(Salekin, 240: 16-22). [SCISD] 

Holladay called his brother after the murders and asked him to come and bring money and 

to help him (D. Holladay, 19: 1 1 - 18). [SCISD] 

Holladay knows how to use the telephone (Fuqua, 765-9). [HL] 

RF says it's possible that Holladay might have been "putting on" at times by pretending 

not to understand, but could not recall any incidences of this (Fuqua, 72:7-13). [SD] 

Holladay stays on topic "for the most part" during conversations (Fuqua, 72: 14-1 7). 

[COMM/SS] 

Holladay initiates assistance from other inmates; it isn't a matter of them going and 

offering their help, he asks for it (Fuqua, 71 :3-6). [SDISC] 

Holladay displays good hygiene and keeps his cell clean, though the guards have to 

Case 4:03-cv-01323-RBP-HGD Document 103 Filed 10/12/06 Page 20 of 41
remind him to clean his cell (Fuqua, 65:20-25; 66: 1-5). [HS] 

Holladay would be able to respond in his cards and letters to things that HB wrote in 

cards and letters (Bryan, 59:7-9). [COMM] 

Holladay could carry on a conversation w/HB when she visited him in prison (Bryan, 

58: 1-2). [COMM/SS] 

No indication that Holladay has a problem differentiating right from wrong (Salekin, 

206: 14-24). Holladay's former wife, Jackie Morgan, also testified to this (Morgan, 86:l). 

Furthermore, the nature of Holladay's crime is such that shows premeditation and 

strategic planning (Ackerson, 245 : 16-25-247: 1-7). 

5) Results of Scales of Independent Behavior Revised taken bv Bobbv & David Holladav 

Holladay's personal living skills (i.e., personal hygiene) at age 13 were age-appropriate 

(D. Holladay SIB-R) 

Holladay's community living skills at age 17 were on the level of 11 years, 3 months (B. 

Holladay, SIB-R). 

Holladay's overall functional independence at age 13 was on the level of age 7 years, 8 

months (D. Holladay SIB-R) 

Holladay's motor skills at age 13 were on the level of age 7 years, 1 month (D. Holladay 

SIB-R) 

Holladay's social interaction/cornrnunication skills at age 13 were on the level of age 5 

years, 9 months (D. Holladay SIB-R) 

Holladay's community living skills (e.g., time and punctuality; money and value; work 

skills; and home/community orientation) at age 13 were on the level of age 7 years, 5 

months (D. Holladay SIB-R). 

Holladay's functional dependence at age 17 was on the level of age 9 years and 9 months 

(B. Holladay, SIB-R). 

Holladay's motor skills at age 17 were on the level of age 5 years, 8 months (B. Holladay, 

SIB-R). 

Holladay's social interaction~communication skills at age 17 were on the level of age 8 

years, 8 months (B. Holladay, SIB-R). 

In the inevitable appeal, the parties may wish to state additional evidence and how the 

evidence should be categorized. 

Attached as Exhibit "A" is a form prepared by Dr. Salekin referencing Petitioner's work 

history. 

Expert Witnesses 

No issue of qualifications of the expert witnesses has been raised by the parties. Mental 

Case 4:03-cv-01323-RBP-HGD Document 103 Filed 10/12/06 Page 21 of 41
retardation is not a mental illness. Ellis and Luckasson, supra n.9, at 41 5, n.6 ("[allthough some 

psychiatrists and a somewhat larger number of psychologists work with people who are mentally 

retarded, most members of these professions have no experience and little training in the area of 

retardation"). "Judgments represent both the best and worst of assessment data. Judgments 

made by conscientious, capable, and objective individuals can be an invaluable aid in the 

assessment process. Inaccurate, biased, subjective judgment can be misleading at best and 

harmhl at worst." AAMR, supra at 94. The curriculum vitae of the two experts here do not 

reflect substantial training or experience in the mental retardation area. The single reference to 

mental retardation in Dr. Ackerson's vitae is that she was once employed by the Alabama 

Department of Mental HealthIRetardation Regional Outpatient Examiner for Jefferson County 

courts as a certified forensic examiner. There is no statement that any of her work there related 

to mental retardation. 

Dr. Salekin's vitae references to retardation include: 

(1) Site Coordinator, National Standardization of the Stanford-Binet Intelligence May 

2001 through June 2002. This included fairly extensive work involving SB5.18 

(2) A presentation in March 2004 on Mental Retardation.. Implications for Forensic 

Psychologists to the American Psychology Law Society. 

Although not specifically related to mental retardation, Dr. Salekin's vitae reflects 

substantial experience and writings in the area of mental health malingering.19 At least "on 

paper," Dr. Salekin's experience and prolific publications are more extensive and impressive 

lBThis creates a reasonable inference that the IQ test administered by Dr. Salekin was properly done. 

IgThis creates a reasonable inference that she would have recognized malingering by the Petitioner. The 

Respondent has criticized Dr. Salekin for not administering a malingering test. Dr. Ackerson did not test at all. 

Case 4:03-cv-01323-RBP-HGD Document 103 Filed 10/12/06 Page 22 of 41
than those of Dr. Ackerson, who has had but one publication. Dr. Salekin's witness experience 

regarding mental retardation is more extensive ("[a]pproximately 20 of her prior assessments 

involved only the question of mental retardation") than that of Dr. Ackerson who "could not nail 

. . . down how many involved the specific question of mental retardation ..." There is certainly 

reason to believe that Dr. Salekin's qualifications in the mental retardation field are at least equal 

to, if not greater, than those of Dr. Ackerson. This court deems them to be greater.20 

Conclusions of the Court2' 

Alabama Law 

Notwithstanding the quote from Atkins as to "70 to 75," Alabama case law suggests that 

the IQ for mentally retarded is 70 or below. See Ex Parte Perkins, 851 So.2d 453,456 (Ala. 

2002). Also see Ex Parte Smith, 2003 WL 1145475 (Ala. Mar. 14,2003); Stallworth v. Alabama, 

868 So.2d 1128 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003). The Atkins and AAMR standards are otherwise 

applicable to Alabama. This court is of the opinion that particular Alabama cases which discuss 

the sufficiency of evidence with regard to adaptive behavior and functioning in those cases are 

not controlling here. For example, this case is entirely different fiom that in Ex Parte Perkins, 

''By virtue of her regularly giving reports regarding competency and capacity of criminal defendants to this 

court, Dr. Ackerson may be better known to the court. She was appointed in this case by the magistrate judge. 

The magistrate judge stated, " [Mleasurements of particular levels of adaptive functioning have always been 

and continue to be largely a matter of clinical judgment." (Report and Recommendation at 32). This court deems 

Dr. Salekin's judgment in this area to be better than that of Dr. Ackerson. 

'IThe court assumes and decides that the Petitioner has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the 

evidence not only with regard to IQ (intellectual functioning) and onset age, but also as to related limitations in the 

adaptive skill areas. A good argument could perhaps be made that proof of sub-average intellectual functioning 

should shift the burden to the Respondent to prove absence of limitations in the adaptive skill areas. At the state 

court trial, the court instructed the jury that, "When the factual existence is offered mitigating circumstances are in 

dispute (sic), the state shall have the burden of disproving the factual existence by a preponderance of the evidence." 

(R-1762). The Afkins majority noted that "reliance on mental retardation as a mitigating factor can be a two-edged 

sword that may enhance the likelihood that the aggravating factor of future dangerousness will be found by the jury." 

536 U.S. at 321. 

Case 4:03-cv-01323-RBP-HGD Document 103 Filed 10/12/06 Page 23 of 41
supra, where the defendant, while imprisoned, had earned a GED certificate and completed 

community college courses, and tested at a full score IQ of 76. Perkins worked for a short time 

as an electrician. In considering Alabama cases, it should be determined whether there were any 

substantially disputed expert opinions and if there is other distinguishing evidence. 

Origination Before Age 18 

There is no real question that, whatever mental deficiencies the Petitioner has, they are 

significant and began before he was 18. That is substantiated by his early significant academic 

problems, his IQ testing, the observations of school officials, etc. This court concludes that 

Petitioner has proved that element by more than a preponderance of the evidence. 

Significant Limitations 

(Sub-Average) in Intellectual Functioning (IQ) 

Notwithstanding Dr. Ackerson's rejection, without further testing, of a number of IQ tests 

beginning with the Petitioner's early school years, this court concludes that the Petitioner has 

proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he has had, since before age 18, significantly subaverage intellectual functioning as established by a series of tests reflecting an IQ of 70 or below, 

and other evidence. In In re Holladay, 33 1 F.3d at 1 174-75, the court noted that Petitioner "has 

scored as follows: 49 (1958); 56 (1958); 54 (1963); 66 (1968); 73 (1969); 69 (1978); 68 (1979); 

72 (1979); 71 (1987); 65 (1991). The mean of these ten scores is 64." After this Eleventh 

Circuit opinion, Dr. Salekin tested Petitioner at 58. The overwhelming substantial evidence is 

that he has had since before age 18 an IQ of less than 70. This was apparently rejected by Dr. 

Ackerson and the magistrate judge based primarily on their perception of inconsistency in the test 

scores. 

Dr. Ackerson's dismissal of the earlier IQ tests based upon inconsistencies is not 

24 

Case 4:03-cv-01323-RBP-HGD Document 103 Filed 10/12/06 Page 24 of 41
supported by any citation of independent authority by her or by the magistrate judge. Dr. 

Ackerson acknowledged that "I don 't how how they [the tests] were administered. I don 't know 

how much effort Mr. Holladay put forth on the particular test, which is the main concern that I 

have ..." (emphasis added). This would suggest that further testing by Dr. Ackerson was called 

for. There is substantial preponderant evidence of an IQ of 70 or below. The test administered 

by Dr. Salekin is the latest s~bstantiation.~~ It issignificant that, prior to Atkins, both the 

prosecutor and the sentencing judge acknowledged that the Petitioner was "slightly" mentally 

retarded. His mother referred to him as "retarded."23 This court notes that the term "slightly" is 

not a term of art in the mental retardation area. Since the term "borderline retarded" is no longer 

22While both Dr. Ackerson and the magistrate judge somewhat demean the Stanford Binet test, 

administered by Dr. Salekin, Code of Ala. (2005) 9 12-15-90 (i) (2) states: "A borderline retarded person is an 

individual who is functioning between one and two standard deviations below the mean, and the mildly retarded 

person is an individual who is functioning between two and three standard deviations below the mean on a 

standardized intelligence test such as the Stanford Binet scale and measures of adaptive behavior such as the 

American Adaptive Behavior scale." Again, Dr. Salekin's resume indicates special experience in this area. 

During the ten times that Petitioner has been tested over the years, all of the tests, except the recent one by 

Dr. Salekin, have been by a version of the WAIS (the test favored by the magistrate judge.) There is no evidence 

that the SB-5 test was not appropriately administered and scored by Dr. Salekin. Neither Dr. Ackerson nor the 

magistrate judge purport to suggest how the tests at issue were improperly administered nor how the Petitioner, 

particularly at age nine, malingered. In Hodges v. Barnhart, 276 F.2d at 1268-69, the court stated: 

Acknowledging the lack of IQ evidence before age twenty-two, Hodges asserts 

that absent evidence of sudden trauma that can cause retardation, the IQ tests 

create a rebuttable presumption of a fairly consistent IQ throughout her life. We 

agree. Other appellate courts have recognized this presumption finding that IQ's 

remain fairly cosntant throughout life. See Muncy v. Apfel, 247 F.3d 728, 734 

(8th Cir. 2001) ("Mental retardation is not normally a condition that improves as 

an affected person ages ... Rather, a person's IQ is presumed to remain stable over 

time in the absence of any evidence of a change in a claimant's intellectual 

fucntioning."); Luckey v. UsS. Dept. Of Health and Human Servs., 890 F.2d 

666,668 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding absence of IQ test in developmental years did 

not preclude finding of mental retardation predating age twenty-two and courts 

should assume an IQ remained constant absent evidence indicating change in 

intellectual functioning). 

23'cDuring his school years (which lasted until the sixth grade), Holladay was .frequently referred to as 

slightly mentally retarded or a 'slow learner."' In re Holladay, 33 1 F.2d at 1 175. 

Case 4:03-cv-01323-RBP-HGD Document 103 Filed 10/12/06 Page 25 of 41
appropriate, a person is either "mildly" retarded or more severely retarded, if retarded at all. The 

fact that the Petitioner has been examined for cognitive intellectual purposes ten times during a 

period mostly exclusive of his last incarceration suggests a continuing concern in this area by 

school officials and others. 

Adaptive Behavior Functioning 

The two experts agreed that the Petitioner has substantial adaptive deficiencies with 

regard to academics. Thus, a remaining question is whether the Petitioner has substantial 

adaptive deficiencies with regard to any of the other ten factors. This court is satisfied that the 

defendant has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he has such deficiencies in several 

areas. 

The evidence is overwhelming that the Petitioner has never done and has never been 

capable of doing any more than menial work tasks. His "work" has been infrequent, requiring 

little or no skills. The mere fact that a mildly mentally retarded person is "capable of regular 

(competitive) employment, typically in unskilled jobs," does not create a reasonable inference 

that the person is not mildly mentally retarded. That is considered to be the norm for mentally 

retarded persons. Baroff, supra n.9, at 42. The type "work" performed by the Petitioner is 

entirely consistent with the type work which can be performed by the mentally retarded as 

described by Professor Baroff. Even that "work" of the Petitioner was almost non-existent. 

It is important, in determining whether a person is or is not mentally retarded, not to pick 

and choose so as to over-emphasize certain characteristics. 

Assumption 3: 'Within an individual, limitations often coexist with strengths.' 

This means that people with mental retardation are complex human beings who 

likely have certain gifts as well as limitations. Like all people, they often do some 

things better than other things. Individuals may have capabilities and strengths 

Case 4:03-cv-01323-RBP-HGD Document 103 Filed 10/12/06 Page 26 of 41
that are independent of their mental retardation. These may include strengths in 

social or physical capabilities, strengths in some adaptive skill areas, or strengths 

in one aspect of an adaptive skill in which they otherwise show an overall 

limitation. AAMR, supra at 8. 

AAMR at 104 states: "F70 Mild mental retardation. Approximate IQ range of 50 to 69 (in adults 

mental age from 9 to under 12 years). Likely to result in some learning difficulties in school. 

Many adults will be able to work and maintain good social relationships and contribute to 

society." While even these characteristics do not foreclose a mental retardation determination, 

Petitioner has not adapted in any of these ways. 

Dr. Ackerson agreed that Holladay showed limitations in adaptive functioning as an 

adult, but believed that ".... some of these limitations, all of these limitations, can also be 

explained in terms of illiteracy, poor experience at school, and also the fact that he was 

incarcerated for so much in his early adulthood." (Tr-369). The real issue is whether a person 

with an IQ of below 70 has adapted. It is apparent that Petitioner did not. The key to adaptive 

behavior is the type support that the individual has received. Where, as here, the individual has 

had little or no support, the likelihood of adapting is slight, if existent. Dr. Ackerson tends to 

look upon inappropriate conduct as something separate from mental retardation, rather than as 

indicating a lack of support which has impeded adaptation. Attached as Exhibit B is Richard J. 

Bonnie, The American Psychiatric Association 's Resource Document on Capital Sentencing: 

Implementing Atkins v. Virginia, Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law 

32: 304-8 (2004). This court has highlighted particularly pertinent statements which suggest that 

emphasis by the State on Petitioner's criminal record is misplaced. 

There are several areas where this court believes Dr. Ackerson's analysis has proved to be 

highly questionable. The first, as has been mentioned, is her decision to rely on a somewhat 

Case 4:03-cv-01323-RBP-HGD Document 103 Filed 10/12/06 Page 27 of 41
conclusory determination of no mental retardation rather than to administer further testing. 

When Dr. Ackerson was asked what professional publication she could refer to for her method of 

examination, she replied, "It's standard practice. If somebody comes to me and it's obvious 

they're not mentally retarded, it is not necessary for me to give an IQ test." (Tr. 467).24 TO the 

contrary, see Ellis and Luckasson, supra n.9, at 484-489. ("In all cases where the defendant is 

suspected of being mentally an individual intelligence test should be administered in 

order to formulate an estimate of the defendant's general intellectual functions. Even if a 

defendant has had IQ tests in the past, a new examination should almost always be conducted in 

order to provide a comparison to the older test results." Id. at 488.) Since the issue is whether 

the Petitioner is presently mentally retarded, it would appear that a contemporary IQ test provides 

the most significant proof of sub-average intellectual functioning. 

Dr. Ackerson's adaptive functioning analysis raises further questions. Dr. Ackerson 

somewhat suggests that the Petitioner's condition is explained by his home environment and 

treatment rather than mental retardation. The two are not mutually exclusive. "With appropriate 

personalized supports over a sustained period, the life functioning of the person with mental 

retardation will generally improve.. .[i]mprovement in functioning should be expectedfiom 

appropriate supports, except in rare cases." AAMR, supra, at 9 (emphasis added) . The failure 

of the Petitioner to improve in the adaptive behavior area may well be explained by the lack of 

24Dr. Salekin met with and interviewed the Petitioner for two full days plus two additional hours on a third 

day. Dr. Ackerson interviewed him for "four to five hours." 

25The Eleventh Circuit observed in In re Holladay that "[iln this case, we already have held that there is a 

reasonable likelihood that Holladay is mentally retarded ..." 33 1 F.3d at 1177. This statement apparently applies to 

all three elements of the definition of mental retardation. This court recognizes, of course, that this was not a ruling 

on the merits. 

Case 4:03-cv-01323-RBP-HGD Document 103 Filed 10/12/06 Page 28 of 41
support, home support or otherwise. There is no evidence that the Petitioner ever had any of the 

"supports" deemed so important in the AAMR publication Mental Retardation (1 0th ed.).26 The 

need for supports as a positive influence is recognized in this text at page 25: 

The 1992 definition placed an added emphasis on assessing a 

person's current functioning given the impact of changing 

environmental demands and supports. The definition's assumptions 

stated that improvements in environmental conditions or the presence 

of needed supports could positively impact an individual's ability to 

meet the routine demands of life, thereby improving his or her 

performance on adaptive skill measures; as a result, the life 

functioning of the person might improve and, in rare cases, the 

diagnosis of mental retardation might no longer apply. 

It is obvious that negative influences such as parental physical abuse, excessive drinking 

of alcohol, etc. can have a negative effect. It may be that the Petitioner's condition was 

contributed to by his mother drinking alcohol during pregnancy and was exacerbated by his home 

life, including his mother's conduct and abuse from his father. "[Sltrong evidence exists that a 

person who was abused as a child is at risk of suffering long-term effects that may contribute to 

his violent behavior as an adult." Phyllis L. Crocker, Child Abuse and Adult Murder, 77 N.C. L. 

Rev. 1 143,1158 (1999). There is no reason to believe that such abuse would not have an adverse 

impact on a mentally retarded person. It may be even more significant as to a mentally retarded 

person because it could affect his adaptive functioning in general.27 

26The magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation has discussion regarding the supports or lack of 

supports received by the Petitioner. At one place Dr. Ackerson even seems to suggest that a finding of lack of 

support is an alternative to a finding of mental retardation rather than an explanation of lack of adaptation. See quote 

in Report and Recommendation at 42. 

"At the trial, Petitioner's father testified that the Petitioner was beaten at foster homes (R 1692); that his 

mother was a chronic alcoholic (R 1690); that he was a slow learner (R 1696); that he was married three times (each 

for a short period) (R1700-01); that he broke both legs trying to escape fiom jail (R 1703); and that he crawled in his 

own "dung" while in jail (R 1704-05). David Holladay confirmed the foster home abuses (R 17 16). Both the father 

and David Holladay testified that Petitioner became mean and violent. Holladay's mother drank fi-equently when she 

believed she was pregnant. (Report and Recommendation page 45). "The record is replete with reports of Mr. 

Case 4:03-cv-01323-RBP-HGD Document 103 Filed 10/12/06 Page 29 of 41
The magistrate judge at least partially summed up his acceptance of Dr. Ackerson's 

opinion and his rejection of Dr. Salekin's as follows: 

With regard to the major disagreements between the experts as to adaptive 

functioning, Dr. Salekin asserted that Holladay's deficits were indicative of 

mental retardation, and Dr. Ackerson opined that Holladay's deficits were 

indicative of willful and anti-social behavior. As will be discussed later herein, 

the court finds that Dr. Ackerson's explanations are well-reasoned and better 

supported by the record than Dr. Salekin's view. Thus, the court credits Dr. 

Ackerson's assessment of Holladay's functioning as borderline intellectual, 'given 

all of the information ..., including the IQ results, [and] his functioning overall ... (Tr. 354). (Report and Recommendation at 35). 

This court rejects the argument that willful andlanti-social behavior excludes a mental retardation 

determination. To the contrary, it suggests that a person whose IQ tests strongly indicate mental 

retardation has not adapted. 

Atkins recognizes that "mentally retarded persons frequently know the difference between 

right and wrong and are competent to stand trial. Because of their impairments, however, by 

definition they have diminished capacities to understand and process information, to 

communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from experience, to engage in logical 

reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the reactions of others." Atkins, 536 U.S. at 

3 18. The magistrate judge, in a somewhat conclusory manner, stated, "Other indications that 

Holladay, as an adult, possessed adaptive function skills beyond the merely retarded range were 

documentary evidence of the events leading up to the 1986 murder ..." (Report and 

Recommendation at 76-77). This court is at a loss to see which of the ten factors this bears on. 

It would appear that such criminal conduct would indicate at least social limitations. It is 

Holladay beating the children." Id. at 46. The trial court found "that as a child the Defendant was abused and 

neglected." (State record at 128). Testimonial references are to the state trial transcript. 

Case 4:03-cv-01323-RBP-HGD Document 103 Filed 10/12/06 Page 30 of 41
doubtful that it bolsters any other factor. The main legallmedical issue in this case may be 

whether the ability to commit a crime and temporarily avoid capture forecloses a determination 

of mental retardati~n.~~ 

It would appear that a person who has attained adaptive behavior or functioning would 

have to adjust to society in some positive way. The Petitioner has not. He has never exhibited 

any significant skills in the areas of communication, social skills, community use, functional 

academics or work. To the contrary, he has significant and substantial deficits in adaptive 

behavior in all these areas and, arguably, in other areas as well.29 The Petitioner's attitude toward 

women and animals regarding sex, his "peeping," and his general criminal conduct do not reflect 

social adaptation. At the state court trial, the prosecutor continually made a point of the fact that 

the Petitioner's home life was no worse than that of his siblings and others in his neighborhood. 

This may serve to show that the Petitioner, who has been determined to have sub-average 

intelligence, did not "adapt." 

It has been suggested that the Petitioner's long term of imprisonment would somehow 

interfere with the determination of whether he is presently mentally retarded. It seems clear, 

however, that the incarceration would not have improved his condition in any way. See 

discussion in Ellis and Luckasson, supra n.9, at 479-484. There is no evidence of any 

"The State has repeatedly referred to Petitioner's crimes as "complicated." Apparently he came to harm, 

even kill, his ex-wife and killed all who were present. It was not "complicated." It was, perhaps, at least partly 

impulsive. The Respondent refers to Petitioner's "criminal acumen." He always got caught. 

"The 2002 AAMR apparently changed the adaptive skill areas to "conceptual, social, and practical." This 

court finds that the Petitioner has not "adapted" in any of these areas. He does not seem to have any positive skills. 

The evidence may suggest that the Petitioner has some practical skills. Even these "skills" are based on pick and 

choose evidence. It does not suggest that he has conceptual or social skills. Further, there is no reasonable inference 

that he has ever had the type of supports required to develop adaptive skills. 

Case 4:03-cv-01323-RBP-HGD Document 103 Filed 10/12/06 Page 31 of 41
habilitation. 

Dr. Ackerson, again somewhat in a conclusory manner, attributes the Petitioner's history 

of working only the most menial of jobs, his poor academic performance, and his anti-social 

behavior to an anti-social personality disorder. She acknowledged, however, that anti-social 

behaviors and mental retardation are not mutually exclusive and that such disorders could be a 

function of mental retardation. 

In deciding an issue such as this, a judge has to avoid any consideration of personal 

attitude about the death penalty, any personal attitude about the Atkins case and any undue 

personal attitude about the heinous nature of the offenses c~rnrnitted.~~ In this case, there seems 

little doubt that if the Petitioner and his history had been examined before the date of his subject 

offenses, a finding of mental retardation would have been made. The only basis for a different 

conclusion now would be if the Petitioner's extremely violent conduct and his later temporary 

avoidance of capture forecloses a determination of mental retardation. This court does not 

conclude that it does.31 

301n their Atkins dissents, both Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia decried the majority's subjectivity. 

It would be rank hypocrisy for any court to subjectively evade the majority holding. Justice Scalia's dissent provides 

a good insight to the majority holding. He condemns the majority opinion because it allows those who commit 

heinous and depraved crimes to avoid the death penalty. He protested that Atkins, who had sixteen prior violent 

felony convictions and then shot his latest victim eight times could escape the death penalty. This court is bound by 

the majority opinion, no matter how evil the Petitioner's crime was. Disputes are likely to continue to arise 

regarding whether state law holdings that the ability to plan and commit crimes avoids findings of mental retardation. 

Such holdings may be a circular evasion of the Atkins majority opinion. See Clemons v. State, 2003 WL 22047260 

(Ala. Crim. App. June 24,2005), where the pertinent part of the court's opinion primarily quotes the trial court's 

order and then adopts its findings without discussion of the legal issues. If such defendants have "adapted," query, to 

what? See Exhibit B. It is likely that any defendant who is convicted of capital murder has committed a heinous 

crime. Neither Atkins nor In re Holladay suggest that such crimes render a defendant ineligible for exemption from 

the death penalty based on mental retardation. 

311n Rivera, supra n. I, the court stated, "[tlhe underlying crime for which Rivera was given the death 

penalty is one of the most senseless and brutal crimes that this Court has ever encountered." Id. at 47. The 

Respondent has made substantial reference to Texas law that is not applicable here. Texas law appears to be more 

restrictive than Alabama law. Regardless, Rivera found that Rivera was mentally retarded on evidence less 

Case 4:03-cv-01323-RBP-HGD Document 103 Filed 10/12/06 Page 32 of 41
This court's ultimate decision in this case should indicate its responses to the Petitioner's 

objections. The court specifically notes the following: 

(1) This court agrees that more weight should have been given to the 1958 IQ scores of 

49 and 56 (as well as other scores); 

(2) This court does not agree that the opinion of Dr. Ackerson that the Petitioner is not 

mentally retarded is better supported than Dr. Salekin's opinion that he is mentally retarded. 

The court ultimately concludes that the Petitioner has proved by a preponderance of the 

evidence that he is, and has been since before age eighteen, mentally retarded as determined 

under Alabama law. This conclusion is based on, at least, findings of fact that: 

(1) Petitioner has an IQ level of below 70 and has significantly sub-average intellectual 

functioning. 

(2) Said sub-average intellectual functioning has and does exist concurrently with related 

limitations in the following adaptive skill areas: communication, social skills, community use, 

self-direction, health and safety, functional academics, conceptual skills, and work; and, 

(3) The onset of the aforesaid conditions occurred before Petitioner was 18 years of age. 

As earlier indicated, the court in In re Holladay stated, "In this case, we already have held 

that there is a reasonable likelihood that Holladay is mentally retarded ..." 33 1 F.3d at 1177. 

This court takes that holding one step further and finds based on a preponderance of the evidence 

that the Petitioner has been prior to age 18, and is now, mentally retarded. 

This court has made an effort to consider the evidence objectively. One could reasonably 

convincing than that in this case. This court recommends a full reading of Rivera. A comparison of some of the 

arguments made by the state in Rivera with those of the State in this case suggest expediency. 

33 

Case 4:03-cv-01323-RBP-HGD Document 103 Filed 10/12/06 Page 33 of 41
argue that decisions as to whether a person is or is not mentally retarded should be left to the 

consensus of a group of independent experts rather than by judges weighing expert opinions and 

considering other evidence. Maybe such a process could be available at the appellate level. 

Within ten (10) days the Petitioner will file and serve a proposed final judgment.32 The 

Respondent will have ten (1 0) days thereafter to object as to matters of remedy and form. 

This the 12th day of October, 2006. 

ROBERT B. PROPST 

SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

32See remand directions at the conclusion of Borden v. State, 2005 Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS 1 1, at *7 (Ala. 

Crim. App. Jan. 7,2005). 

Case 4:03-cv-01323-RBP-HGD Document 103 Filed 10/12/06 Page 34 of 41
~~ - 

US. DISTRICT COURT 

N.D. OF ALABAMA 

Emdovment History 

The following chronology of employment is created solely on the basis of statements 

made to this examiner by Mr. Holladay, and statements made by Mr. Holladay to other 

individuals as documented in the records reviewed for this case (e.g., see exhibit 16). 

There were no employment records available nor, with the exception of Mr. Bobby 

Holladay, were individuals available to discuss the respondent' ability to function in the 

work place. 

Though listed in order fiom first to last job, the list should not be taken as an exact 

chronology or a complete listing of work experiences. In between jobs Mr. Holladay was 

often incarmated or unemployed, and was taken care of by his wife or other members of 

his family. Accord'ig to both the respondent and Mr. Bobby Holladay, the jobs listed 

below were not obtained independently, but instead were obtained with assistance of 

friends or family members. 

Job 

Service 

Station 

Chicken 

Plant 

"A 

warehouse" 

Responsibilities 

stoP&d fill on the 

even dollar 

Appro& 

length of 

PumpedGasLoaded boxes on I 4 months 

employment 

3 months 

Place of 

Loaded trucks 

employment (if 

9 months 

known) 

-en, AL 

Atlanta, GA 

Atlanta, GA 

Reason for 

leaving 

Couldn't do the 

job because 

could not work 

the cash 

register and 

wuld not read 

or write - all 

were reported 

to be necessary 

for the iob. 

To earn more 

money at 

Owens. 

Left without 

telling them - 

just didn't 

show up. 

Unclear (laid 

off &lor due to 

divorce and 

need to return 

home). 

Case 4:03-cv-01323-RBP-HGD Document 103 Filed 10/12/06 Page 35 of 41
L - 

Case 4:03-cv-01323-RBP-HGD Document 63-2 *SEALED* Filed 03/23/2005 Page 2 of 3 

Respondent Name: Glenn William Holladay 

Case#: 03-PT-1323-M 

page 8 of 38 

Job 

Chicken 

Plant 

Assistant to 

a roofer 

Service 

Stations 

Sawmill 

(part of 

work 

release 

program) 

"I call it a 

self-job" 

Assisting 

father with 

painting 

Stacked boxes in a 

cooler 

Toted shingles and 

tore shingles off 

roofs. 

Could only pump gas 

- ended the fill on the 

even dollar 

Stacked lumber 

Picked up cans, 

bottles, and other 

junk with another 

personThe other person 

"knew what to get" 

and sold the goods 

Only the "big stuff" 

(meaning painting things that required 

only gross motor 

movements). 

Could not do detailed 

work. 

Could not buy paint 

or materials because 

he did not know how 

and believed that he 

couldn't do it (above 

statements supported 

by both brothers' 

interviewed). 

length of 

employment 

3 or 4 months 

"Off and on" 

"Never lasted 

too long" 

'Wet even a 

month" 

"Off and on" 

Place of 

employment (if 

known) 

Gadsden, AL 

Gadsden, AL 

"Off and on" Gadsden, AL 

Reason for 

leaving 

Quit because 

felt that he was 

being overworked. 

N/A 

Lack of 

education & 

impaired 

ability to do 

the work. 

The company 

went out of 

business 

NIA 

NI A 

Case 4:03-cv-01323-RBP-HGD Document 103 Filed 10/12/06 Page 36 of 41
ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY 

The American Psychiatric Association's 

Resource Document on Mental 

Retardation and Capital Sentencing: 

Implementing Atkins v. Virginia 

Richard J. Bonnie, LLB 

Soto lcgislaruras nccd guidance In Implcmcnrhg thc Unlted States Suprcmc Court's dccision In Arkins v. Vlrginio 

barring cnccueion of mentnlly ratardcd offondcrs. In this Rcsourcc Documcnr, he Arncrlcan Psychinerle Associ. 

aclon's Council on Psychlatry and Law, tho cornponanc chnrgad with dcvalaping pollcics and posiclons ralaring to 

fovcnsic psychlacry, roco~nmcnds stirtucoty llanguagc nddrassing the dafinition of mentnl rcmrdacion, procaduros 

rolntlng to its asscssmant, and qunllficarlons of tcsclfylng expem. 

In its recent decision in Atkins v. virfink,' the 

Uniced Sn.tcs Si~premc Court ruled. that ;he Eighth 

Amcndmcnt's prohibition ngainsr "cnd and u~i- 

~lsual pu~~ishnzents'' bars cxccution of n~cntally retarded ol.l.;.tlders. At the rime of the Atkins decision, 

1.8 stares and. thc IGderal gc~vernment had. aheady 

:rd.opted. laws ertegori~illy cxcltlding dckndants with 

mental retardation from the class OF ofknders convictccl. of c~piral ctrmcs who can be scntcnced to 

clcath. Several ad.ditiot~al states, inclucling Virginia, 

have adopred siich statuta in the wakc of the Suprcrnc Cou rt's dccision. However, these statutes vary 

wid.ely, and the Court's opinion in Atkh gave rhe 

st;tccs littlc guidance a.bout how I:O implement the 

ruling or ;hour the feat~trcs of the exisdj~g statutci 

rhat arc eithcr constitutionally requid or c,onsrirutionally pemissible. .Legislatures in the 38 states 1:hat 

enkwce the death penalty are now ~:cvicwing heir 

c:~pitd sentcncingsc;lti~tcs in light ofAxkit.n'nsa~~doohe~- 

reccnc Suprcme Court n.rlings pertining to capit;al 

sen trr-~cing; pr-ocedi~res.~ 

trarned In the language-01 a clinical diagnosis- 

~~rdaticm"-an.d. not in terms ot n tradi- _ tional le a.1 concept, such as compecencc or respon- 

$&r this reason, stare lcgisla,tors can bc 

e<pec~:ed to scck he guiclarrcc of psychiatrists and 

wher i~len cal health prof'siords in thc drafting of 

y osc-Arkimp statutes. 'This Resolwe Document is being published. to assisr ~nenibcrs of thc district 

h~xnches of thc American Psychintti.~ Association 

(APA) and other professional groups as they ~*esponcl. 

to legislative eflbrts to implement the Atkzns decision 

in ;L way that is ground.ed in scientific know led^ and 

c1inic;zl exptricnce and is consistcn~: with the Suprcmc Court's ruling. 

Many of the issucs that n11.1st be resolved in drafting a. post-hkim stati~ tcare purely lcgd in nature n nci. 

do INN req~tirc or i~ilply :L. need for psychiatric exper:- 

tise. "Thc rwo m;r.in legal questions are: who sho~dcl 

hew rhc burden ofpersi~uion on the matter of rtwn304 The journal of tha Amorlean Acrrdorny of Pqchl~ty and the low 

Case 4:03-cv-01323-RBP-HGD Document 103 Filed 10/12/06 Page 37 of 41
pal rctarda.tion. and should AII initial deterniinarion 

of nic~ieal retardation be rr~ade in a pretrial hcaring by 

the judge before the capital sen trnci ng proceed.- 

ing, Alrernntive qp-wches co these questions n.rc: 

reflected in the scatures of Virginii13 and New 

York." Ell~s" provides a Full revlew ot tn.ese procecluri~l issues. 

This docunicm addresses thi:ce topics ofparcicuI1.r 

concel:n to psychiatrists and other n~ental health 

pvofessivn~.ls; 

1.. the definition of r1ic11ti1.1 retardation and 

Bonnie 

whcthcr A.rXritls bars dcarh setirrtxes in a broader catcgory (3F cases: 

2. prt~cc.d.ilres to be followed by professionals whv 

arc ch:~rged wi t1i assessing whether capital c1cfc11da.n w 

have n?encd retardatic:~~~: 

3, q~idifications of experts sclectcd ro conduct 

thew cvduations and to of'ter expert opinion on the 

pertinent issues. 

Sever-;tl pl-oblen~s must he resolved in clcfining 

mental retardation, a.nd state statutes rcflecc some 

var:ia.rion on them: 

I/ .~ast qucsriun is whethcr menu11 retardation in chis context should be defined in cerms of a clinicnl Y . .. ~ - -.- ~ - 

-s or in tecm.s of dim~nished capacity to 

tl-toueli t to be es~ccia.llv relevant 

" 

Gr~bcs iis hold~ng as banning execution 

ottenders,.' and th,e excluded cmgory is &- 

linid - d.ia~~tical1.v (II~JC in terms ot climinisKed LI- 

'pac~ryl*./ of the 1% state sta~;ces (as well as thc I - 

fe8cmi statute) to wh~ch theGl,lrt refers in conclucc 

il;g that a nacmnal c- has emergecl 

c-~~ientaly 

juacice'Stevcns nored chat "[tlo thc 

extent that ch& 1s serious disaKteeknt - about the 

c~cciition ot mentally retarded oknders. it 1s in clcternlining which oh C:, 

~wnewhr dckndmrr who arc* 

tcrardtd%ould%e exccured. 1r.r short, if a state were 

person - with GI undisjwted diagnosis of mentarre-- - - 

scntcnccci to dlcl. -d, th 

,woul&ici rhr exeoutjon, :,.nd 

the stature would be unconsrirutionnl as appiicdi 

t& t cast- - 

-suming chat a diagnosl:ic i~plmmh is takcn, 

D 

rhc manual of the hlerican Association of Mental 

lietardntion (MMK) nnd the A.I?AXs Diagnostic ancl 

Statisticid Manual, Altlwugh these cwo ma.~.l,u~ls we 

SQI.IICWI.IH.T; di ITc'crcni: langu'ic, chcy arc conccl~cu;tlly 

cq~~iva.)erit, Each d.ei?t~cs mental rctardacion 3s c:~.using sigriitic:i.nr lirnii~hns in itit:eIlecrual Functioning 

and in dclaptivc behavior and as having clevelcrptnc~irid onsct befbrc t.hc ag of 18 ycirs, 

,111 DSM-IV, mental rera.rd.arion is clef ned as a 

disorder, with an onsct bdbrc .I. 8 yews, characterized. by "sign.ificnn tly suba,verage i ntellecrual 

functioning" and "cc)ncutren t deficits or impairments in p,rcscn t ada.ptive (;Lnceioning in at 

le:w rwo of thc followink' skill areas: cat17munication, self-cnrc, h.omr living, socia.l/inter:personal skills, irsc uE corntnuliily wsourxes, selfdirxcrion. hnctirmal aadrtnic skills, work, 

leisure, health and, safety" (Ref. 6, p 39). 

l'n rhe 2002 AAMR Mvlud, m.encd rctard.a.tion 

is d.efined a.5 a disisability or:iginating bcforc :~c 

'1 8. "characterized by significant limitations 

lmdi in intellcctud f;~.n.ct.ioning:rnd in adaptive 

behavior ;IS exprcsscd in conceptual, social, and 

practi.cal ~daptivc slcills" (ReK "I p 13). 

The AAM.R M:an~d was reviscd. in 2002 and provides th.e niare recent oC* the two d.efinitions. A state 

statute woi~ld be on sa.k ground. in using either of 

clirse definitions or irr itittrtningling the wo. 'The 

Council. has proposcd alternatives,' using the opcracive language of each oI:chrse wo definitions in this 

Kesou rcr I~OCLI men c. 

;3. A. kcy clifFculr:y in legislative d.~:afting tias hecn 

whethcr "signifiamc lilnication in intcllcctual hnctioning" sho~lld LC defined in terms of perhrt~~ancc 

otr so-called "IQ" tests and, if so, wlwcher the dctinitiori should include specific rcfcrence co a curoff 

score, a.5 so~ne state laws do, :In tl~c Council's view, 

incvrporacion ofa specific cutoff score is inappmpriate, not only because cl.i.ffcrent tests have cli ffcrenc 

scoring nocms, hut also because designatitlg :I specilic 

score ignores rhr: scand:ird error ofmcmuretnenc and 

attributes gtcnrer precision to these niasurrs thnn 

Volumc 32, Number 3,2004 30.7 

Case 4:03-cv-01323-RBP-HGD Document 103 Filed 10/12/06 Page 38 of 41
Monhl Retardation and Capital Sclrtcncing 

they can support. Tlic Council Las clci:ned a "significant li.rnitation in intcllcctual ti.lntltioningn na performance at Icm two standnrd deviations bclow the 

mean on an ILPP~OVC~. CME rather that1 iL5 n specitic 

cut0tT ssc01.e. 

'The USM-1V d.iap~tic critcl-i:~ def ne significantly subaverage intellectual f~tnccioning as "an :IQ 

ol. qq~ruxinrately 70 or below on an individually idministered 'LQ test" (KeF. G, y 46; er~~plinsis nddcd). 

The accompanying text ~liaks it clear chat the score 

1:,F70 is mAnt to hc an xpproxiniii~:ion of a score rwo 

se:lndd deviations lxlow the rnen.n, taking into account the standatd error measurcrnenc. for the parricular in.strurnent being used. 

4. T11c greatest clralleng is tc) define a "signifcant 

limi cation in achy tivc behavior" because die 

DSM.-:IV wd AAMR definitions use ditTcrcnt Iangu:lge to operationalize the comccpt ol-adaptive Functioning in terms oF specif c adaDtivc tala;. Because 

the conccpl: is still being elaborated by expcrts in the 

.field, standardized instruments are in a continuing 

process c~fdeve.loprnent. It shc.~uld be notcd rhat the 

AAMR definition retlects the most rccent scicntitk 

ut~dcrsta.r~din~ oF the conccyt of' daprive behavior. 

U~~dor his concept~ialimt'ion. expinined in the 

AAMR Manual, the various slcill mas ~nentioncd in 

the previous AAMR ddinition and ir~ the DSM-:IV 

dcfirlitioo cxernpli~ three basic clomains of ;rd.apti,ve 

functioning (conceptual, social, id 'The 

manid iticludes tdda that sort vaious skills into 

thcsc three domains and explains how currently 

irvailable i nsrriirnenfs opcrario~ialize and memure 

nilap rive behavior. 

5. Follvwing the diagnostic a.pproach rt~dorsed, in 

Atkins, thc Co~~nc.il includcs ~levelo~rncntal origin in 

the definition (thereby excluding conditions involving dclicits ill intrllectu:~I and adaptive functiuning 

acquired ciuc CQ trauma or d.ismsc after age % 8) on the 

basis thr the Supremc Court's decision to bar death 

sentences For persons with mcnca.l retacdgtion is 

gro~mclctd in presumed deficits in niord reasoning 

arisinu horn d~sordered dwelaprrtenc. Nonc of LIK 

statc.ires on which, the Suprcnw Court relied in Atkins 

includes conditions acquired during adulthood, and 

sirch cnscs do nor often arise. For an ycme concerned 

tha.t requ.i ri ng cf cvelop~ncr~eal onsct could Icacl to I,LI.Ihir treatment OF defendants with adidr-onsct intrllecrud arid adaptive deficits, it must be remcmhered 

rhat an itidivid.ualized clcrermination of diminished 

capaciry at the time of rhe offcnse is still, required in 

eves in which prnons with subaverage i~~tel.lecttral 

functioning have not heen catcgvrical1.y excluded unci c I' Achvrr. 

'l'hr Atkitu rationale also cxtcnds. it? rhc Council's 

view, to some conditions in the category of "pcrvasive dcvelopmcnrd disorders," especially autisrri. lilcaSly,, an cxcl usionilly provision slm~~lcl. i t~clu.slr 1:hcsc 

disorders, ;rncl eventually d~e Council will ;Itternpi. to 

devclop appropriate stntutory language. However, 

hcc;~use these disorders are usually accompanied by 

mrnr3.I retardation, none of die exclusionary sratu.tcs 

covers them, mil no prosecutior~s appear to have 

been brou.ght i.11 such cases, the Comcil concluded 

that proposit~g additional language at his time 

would rrnnecess~ril~ cornplia.re legislative ethrts to 

respond to the Atkins decision in an cxpeJ.itious 

manner. 

Stncnco~y Language for the wo dtctnarive dcfinltious follows, 

The AAMR Oeflnltlon 

The DSM Definltlon 

3H The Journal of tha Arn~denn Academy of Psychiatry and tha Law 

Case 4:03-cv-01323-RBP-HGD Document 103 Filed 10/12/06 Page 39 of 41
Bonnie 

tives te~idcd to draw on the language in each definition that sccrncci more ccrngei~i:r.l to their point of 

vitw. 'In the end. the Virginia scatute adopted the 

AAMR definition with the ,colt cxccptiun of using 

thc .DSM-TV language "significantly subaverage" intellectual ftrnctic~ning rather than "significant limitation in" such functioning, xi used in theAM4R (see 

ReF. 3). 

Assessment 

In light of the lieightcncd "need for reliability" in 

capid sentencing,' it is particularly important to 

promote the highest qidity of ilssrssmt.nt an.4 to 

minil~~izc unnecessary variation frorn accegccd. 

ptofcssi.onill ssancli~.rch, Thc dt;~gt~o.uls oftncncol 

retardation lends itself cc, greater specification OF 

ynrcticc standards than other forensic assessments, 

a.nd the Council has embraced tlic approach taken 

in the Vitginic statutc. Sper;.ifically, statc laws 

sw 

0 require use of at lcrrst one swndatdinxJ test I:&- 

n,zlcing inrtllectual I;unccioning, administered in contornlance with acce~ted groks- * - 

siond practice by a pcrsorr skilled in the adminis'tration, sruII 

standardized me3- 

ile recoanizina thc 

~mords ad to conduct interviews with !=oxwho have inrcracced wirli the defendant; .md 

0 permje, but not require, the assessnlent of menid retardaticm co b; combined with other men- - 

'I'hc cxptrt selccad or appointed to concl.u.ct mcn- td hc;rj.di assewmcnts conducted in rhc case and c;J rr.ci~.rda:tion evaluations in capital cases should be a all the ptoceciural yrotcction applic;iblc p~chiatrist or psychologist who is qualified by trainto ocher: forcnsic men cal hralrh msessrnencs in ing and cxperieiiZc to make a diagnosis of tiie~& capital cases. The testing of incelleccual Functioning 

Asscssmenu uJmental rctnthtiorr under th .rtctl:on and a ~ptivc behavior should be cu-ried out by clinijhnll confirm to the filiuruir~ reyuitemenrs; cians who I~avc the necessary skill md expericn.cc. 

1. As.cesment ofitldc~~cctu~i frmcti~ning~h~~ll includ~ Finally, if the expert appoi.nted or sclectod lacks 

&m=-tid~rdrj~d rrumm , training and rxptricncc in conducting Forensic ASttcc$teu! by the Jekd of )ncnd he& mses.r- swrmena and testieing in criminal adjudicarions, he 

eftration tow or she should obtain a consuitation with a psycbinulrr.rpersf)~ being nssessed, &king into urcount cr~.lmrttl. tris t or o thcr qud i.ticd p roI:c:essional with such 

lingui~*tir, sevtloty, motor, kclluvmrlnl, and utber in&- cx pc rience. 

t~i&lJtcton. Tedng rftntclhcturzl&nctiuning.rhotlbi An cxpcrt appointed by the cou~to assess whether cl 

be curicd out jn confirmity with accepted profcssiond cc(l)ituld~fin,dd.n.t has rnetzt~iretu&zti~n or wba.ve opinpmacticc by .rprrron ;killed in the admini.rtrution, icor- ion ti addtcd into rvidmcr on tbir weer sbuid he u 

Volume 32, Number 3, 2004 307 

Case 4:03-cv-01323-RBP-HGD Document 103 Filed 10/12/06 Page 40 of 41
Mental Rotardntion and Capital Sentanclng 

Refarences 

1 Atkinr v. Virginia, 536 US. 304 (2002) 

2. King v. Arizolx~, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) 

3 V:t. Chh. Ann. 5 I!) 2-264.3:l.. I, 1.2 (Michic Supp. 2003) 

4. N.Y Crim. Prw. 1st~ 5 400.27 (12)-(14) (McKinncy S~rpp 

2004) 

4, Mia JW: Menrnl rceiitckltinn and the Jcatl~ penalty il to 

JWLC I~gisla~iv~ JSF~ICS Mcnr Phys L)is:tbil Luw Rcp L.7;11-24, 

2003 

6. A.rncriun I'sycliiatric Assoc~~tiot~. Diugnnmr: and Statiscicnl 

Manuel OF Mental Disorders (cd 4). Wnshiiryon. BC: Aincrwm 

I'rych~acric A~6ociarion. 1994 

7. American kw~cirriu~r un Mcntiil Rctardariun: Mencal Rctardrtion (cd 10). 'Wwhingcutr, DC: .MR, ZOO2 

8. Wm~dso11 v. Nutth Ckrohu, 428 U.S. 280. 305 (1976) I' 

Case 4:03-cv-01323-RBP-HGD Document 103 Filed 10/12/06 Page 41 of 41