Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_16-cv-00922/USCOURTS-almd-2_16-cv-00922-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

MATTHEW BAILEY, #290472, )

 )

 Plaintiff, )

)

 v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:16-CV-922-WKW

)

TRUMAN M. HOBBS, JR., et al., )

 )

 Defendants. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

This 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action is pending before the court on a complaint filed by 

Matthew Bailey (“Bailey”), a state inmate. In this complaint, Bailey challenges the 

constitutionality of a sentence imposed upon him by the Circuit Court of Montgomery 

County, Alabama on March 28, 2016. Bailey names Truman M. Hobbs, Jr., the sentencing 

judge, and Sherri Mazur, the Assistant District Attorney assigned to his case, as defendants 

in this cause of action. Bailey seeks a declaratory judgment, preliminary and permanent 

injunctive relief and monetary damages.

 Upon review of the complaint, the court concludes that this case is due to be 

summarily dismissed prior to service of process in accordance with the provisions of 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii) and (iii).

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Bailey sought leave to proceed in forma pauperis in this case. The court granted Bailey in forma pauperis status 

except to the extent he was required to pay an initial partial filing fee. Bailey filed the requisite initial partial filing

fee on February 1, 2017. “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court 

shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails 

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II. DISCUSSION

A. Judge Truman M. Hobbs, Jr.

Bailey alleges that Judge Hobbs violated his constitutional rights with respect to the 

sentence imposed upon him on March 28, 2016. The claims against Judge Hobbs entitle 

Bailey to no relief in this cause of action. 

1. The Request for Monetary Damages. All of the allegations made by Bailey

against Judge Hobbs emanate from actions taken by this defendant in his judicial capacity 

during state court proceedings over which he had jurisdiction. The law is well settled that 

a state judge is absolutely immune from civil liability for acts taken pursuant to his judicial 

authority. Forrester v. White, 484 U. S. 219, 227-229 (1988); Paisey v. Vitale in and for 

Broward County, 807 F.2d 889 (11th Cir. 1986); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978). 

In light of the foregoing, Bailey’s claims for monetary damages against Judge Hobbs are 

“based on an indisputably meritless legal theory” and are therefore due to be summarily 

dismissed in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii). Neitzke v. 

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). 

2. Request for Declaratory/Injunctive Relief from State Court Action. To the extent 

that Bailey seeks declaratory and/or injunctive relief from a final sentencing order issued 

by Judge Hobbs, this court lacks jurisdiction to render such judgment in an action filed 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents ... lower federal 

courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by ‘state-court losers’ challenging 

 

to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from 

such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

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‘state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced.’ Exxon 

Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 

L.Ed.2d 454 (2005).” Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 460, 126 S.Ct. 1198, 1199 (2006). 

Although “Rooker-Feldman is a narrow doctrine,” it remains applicable to bar Bailey from 

proceeding before the court as this case, with respect to any claims challenging a final order 

issued by a state court, is “‘brought by [a] state-court loser[] complaining of injuries caused 

by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and 

inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.’ 544 U.S. at 284, 125 S.Ct. 

[at] 1517.” Lance, 546 U.S. at 464, 125 S.Ct. at 1201. Moreover, a § 1983 action is 

inappropriate either to compel or to appeal a particular course of action by a state court. 

Datz v. Kilgore, 51 F.3d 252, 254 (11th Cir. 1995) (§ 1983 suit arising from alleged 

erroneous decisions of a state court is merely a prohibited appeal of the state court 

judgment); see also Rolleston v. Eldridge, 848 F.2d 163 (11th Cir. 1988).

In light of the foregoing, the court concludes that summary dismissal of any requests 

seeking declaratory or injunctive relief from the 2016 sentencing order issued by Judge 

Hobbs in Bailey’s state criminal case is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). 

See Clark v. State of Georgia Pardons and Paroles Board, 915 F.2d 636 (11th Cir. 1990); 

see also Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. 

B. Assistant District Attorney Sherri Mazur

The law is well settled that “a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity for all 

actions [she] takes while performing [her] function as an advocate for the government.” 

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Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993); Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1281 

(11th Cir. 1999) (“A prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity from allegations stemming from 

the prosecutor’s function as advocate.”); Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 342 

(2009) (In a § 1983 action, “the immunity that the law grants prosecutors [for actions 

intimately associated with initiation, prosecution and punishment in a criminal case] is 

‘absolute.’”); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 420 (1976) (“[A] prosecutor enjoys 

absolute immunity from § 1983 suits for damages when [she] acts within the scope of [her]

prosecutorial duties.”); Rowe v. Fort Lauderdale, 279 F.3d 1271, 1279 (11th Cir. 2002) 

(“A prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity for all actions [she] takes while performing 

[her] function as an advocate for the government.”). The absolute immunity afforded 

prosecutors protects against “impair[ing] the performance of a central actor in the judicial 

process.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 343 (1986). Absolute immunity from § 1983 

liability is afforded to all conduct of a prosecutor that is “intimately associated with the 

judicial phase of the criminal process,” which includes representing the State’s interests 

during the sentencing phase of the process. Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991) 

(quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430-431). 

The claims presented by Bailey relate solely to actions undertaken by the Assistant 

District Attorney while she engaged in activities intimately associated with the judicial 

phase of the criminal process, conduct for which Ms. Mazur is entitled to absolute 

immunity. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273; Burns, 500 U.S. at 493. Thus, Bailey’s claims against 

Assistant District Attorney Mazur are due to be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

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1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (iii). In addition, Bailey is entitled to no declaratory or injunctive 

relief against defendant Mazur for any alleged adverse action related to the sentence 

imposed upon him by the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Alabama. See supra at 2-

3; see also infra at 5-7. 

C. The Challenge to Plaintiff’s Sentence 

Bailey alleges that the trial court sentenced him in violation of his constitutional 

rights by imposing a sentence above the range recommended in the state guidelines. Doc. 

No. 1 at 2. The improper sentence claim goes to the fundamental legality of Bailey’s 

sentence and his current incarceration on such sentence. Consequently, Bailey is entitled 

to no relief on this claim. Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 646 (1997); Heck v. 

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973).

In Heck, the Supreme Court held that claims challenging the legality of a prisoner’s 

confinement are not cognizable in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action “unless and until the 

conviction or sentence is reversed, expunged, invalidated, or impugned by the grant of a 

writ of habeas corpus” and complaints containing such claims must therefore be dismissed. 

Heck, 512 U.S. at 489. The relevant inquiry is “whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff 

would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence[.]” Heck, 512 U. S. at 

487; Balisok, 520 U.S. at 648 (inmate’s claims for declaratory relief, injunctive relief or 

monetary damages which “necessarily imply the invalidity of the punishment imposed, 

[are] not cognizable under § 1983.”). The rule of Heck is therefore not limited to a request 

for damages but is equally applicable to an inmate’s request for declaratory judgment or 

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injunctive relief. Balisok, supra. “It is irrelevant that [the plaintiff] disclaims any intention 

of challenging his conviction [or sentence]; if he makes allegations that are inconsistent 

with the [action] having been valid, Heck kicks in and bars his civil suit.” Okoro v. 

Callaghan, 324 F.3d 488, 490 (7th Cir. 2003), citing Balisok, 520 U.S. at 646-648.

The law is well settled that “habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state

prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or 

speedier release, even though such a claim may come within the literal terms of § 1983.” 

Heck, 512 U.S. at 481; Balisok, 520 U.S. at 645 (The “sole remedy in federal court” for a 

prisoner challenging the constitutionality of incarceration on a sentence of a state court is 

a petition for writ of habeas corpus.); Okoro, 324 F.3d at 490 (Heck directs that a state 

inmate “making a collateral attack on [the basis for his incarceration] ... may not do that 

in a civil suit, other than a suit under the habeas corpus statute.”). An inmate “cannot seek 

to accomplish by a section 1983 declaratory judgment what he must accomplish solely 

through a writ of habeas corpus.” Jones v. Watkins, 945 F.Supp. 1143, 1151 (N.D. Ill. 

1996); Bailey v. Indiana Dept. of Corrections, 75 F.3d 330, 331 (7th Cir. 1996) (Under 

Heck, “[t]he [determinative] issue ... is not the relief sought, but the ground of the 

challenge.”); Cook v. Baker, et al., 139 F. App’x 167, 169 (11th Cir. 2005) (The “exclusive 

remedy” for a state inmate’s claim challenging the basis for or validity of his incarceration 

“is to file a habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254[.]”). In Balisok, the 

Supreme Court emphasized “that a claim either is cognizable under § 1983 and should 

immediately go forward, or is not cognizable and should be dismissed.” 520 U.S. at 649.

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Under the circumstances of this case, Heck and its progeny bar Bailey’s use of any 

federal civil action, other than a petition for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, 

to mount a collateral attack on the validity of his sentence. 512 U.S. at 489 (“We do not 

engraft an exhaustion requirement upon § 1983, but rather deny the existence of a cause of 

action. Even a prisoner who has fully exhausted [all] available state remedies has no cause 

of action under § 1983 unless and until the conviction or sentence is reversed, expunged, 

invalidated, or impugned by the grant of a writ of habeas corpus.”); Abella v. Rubino, 63 

F.3d 1063, 1066 n. 4 (11th Cir. 1995) (“Heck clarifies that Preiser is a rule of cognizability, 

not exhaustion.”). Consequently, the claim presented by Bailey challenging the 

constitutionality of his state sentence is not cognizable in this cause of action at this time

and is therefore subject to summary dismissal in accordance with the provisions of 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:

1. The plaintiff’s claims against Judge Truman M. Hobbs, Jr. and Assistant District 

Attorney Sherri Mazur seeking declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to a 

sentencing order issued in a criminal proceeding before the Circuit Court of Montgomery

County, Alabama be DISMISSED with prejudice in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2)(B)(i).

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2. The plaintiff’s claims against Judge Truman M. Hobbs, Jr. and Assistant District 

Attorney Sherri Mazur for monetary damages be DISMISSED with prejudice pursuant to 

the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).

3. The plaintiff’s challenge to the constitutionality of the sentence imposed upon 

him by the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Alabama on March 28, 2016 be 

dismissed without prejudice pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) as 

such claim is not properly before the court in this cause of action. 

4. The plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction (Doc. No. 1 at 3) be DENIED 

as he has failed to show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. 

5. This case be dismissed prior to service of process in accordance with the 

directives of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii) and (iii).

It is further

ORDERED that on or before February 20, 2017 the plaintiff may file objections to 

the Recommendation. The plaintiff must specifically identify the factual findings and legal 

conclusions in the Recommendation to which objection is made; frivolous, conclusive, or 

general objections will not be considered. Failure to file written objections to the 

Magistrate Judge’s findings and recommendations in accordance with the provisions of 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) shall bar a de novo determination by the District Court of legal and 

factual issues covered in the Recommendation and waives the right of the plaintiff to 

challenge on appeal the District Court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal 

conclusions accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of plain error 

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or manifest injustice. 11TH Cir. R. 3-1; see Resolution Trust Co. v. Hallmark Builders, 

Inc., 996 F.2d 1144, 1149 (11th Cir. 1993); Henley v. Johnson, 885 F.2d 790, 794 (11th 

Cir. 1989). 

DONE, on this the 6th day of February, 2017.

/s/ Susan Russ Walker

Susan Russ Walker

Chief United States Magistrate Judge

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