Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-00167/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-00167-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 443
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Accommodations
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilities Act

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARILYN HOOPER, 

Plaintiff,

v.

CALNY, INC. dba TACO BELL;

LENTZ FAMILY TRUST and DOES 1-

20,

Defendants. 

CIV-S-03-0167 DFL/GGH

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

AND ORDER

Plaintiff Marilyn Hooper brought suit against defendant

Calny, Inc., alleging disability access violations at the Taco

Bell restaurant at 25th Street and Broadway in Sacramento,

California (“the Taco Bell”). Following a one-day bench trial,

the court ruled that the one of the restaurant’s curb ramps

violated the California Building Code and ordered Calny to

correct this access violation. (01/26/2005 Order.) Hooper now

moves for attorneys’ fees and costs. 

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I. 

In her complaint, Hooper alleged that the Taco Bell failed

to conform to the accessibility requirements of the Americans

with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the California Building Code

(“CBC”). (Compl. ¶ 2.) Hooper initially identified twenty-four

alleged access violations at the Taco Bell, and sought

compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive and declaratory

relief, and attorneys’ fees and costs. (Id.; Opp’n at 2.) 

Calny moved for summary judgment on each of these

twenty-four alleged violations. In an order filed May 7, 2004,

the court granted summary judgment in favor of Calny on sixteen

of the alleged violations, denied summary judgment on another six

violations, and found two of the alleged violations to be moot

because Calny had corrected them prior to the summary judgment

hearing. (05/07/2004 Order.)

In the wake of the summary judgment ruling, Calny

voluntarily modified three of the six remaining alleged access

violations. (Opp’n at 3.) Specifically, it (1) increased the

length of an access aisle, (2) lowered the height of an ordering

counter, and (3) increased the turn-around space near the

ordering counter. (Id. at 9.) A one-day bench trial was held on

the three remaining alleged access violations: (1) the lack of

adequate signs directing patrons to accessible entrances; (2) the

steepness of the cross-slope and running slope of the public

sidewalks; and (3) the steepness of the cross-slope and running

slope of the curb ramp on Broadway. 

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 Hooper originally requested $71,322.80 in attorneys’ fees 1

and costs. (Mot. at 2.) However, in her reply, she admitted

that she had already received $5,340.60 of her requested

litigation expenses as part of her Bill of Costs. (Reply at 2.) 

3

The court ruled in favor of Calny on the adequate signage

and sidewalk issues, but in favor of Hooper on her claim that the

slope of the curb ramp violated the CBC, but not the ADA. 

(11/10/2004 Order.) However, because Hooper failed to show that

the slope of the ramp made it more difficult for her to gain

access to the restaurant on any of her visits or deters her from

visiting the restaurant again, the court limited Hooper’s

potential remedies to injunctive relief and attorneys’ fees. 

(Id. at 14.) After additional briefing by the parties regarding

the appropriate remedy, the court ordered Calny to reduce the

slope of the curb ramp from 9.3% to 8.3% percent by August 1,

2005. (01/26/2005 Order.)

On February 1, 2005, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d) and 28

U.S.C. § 1920, Hooper filed a “Bill of Costs” with the court,

requesting $5,340.60. Having received no opposition from Calny,

the court granted Hooper’s “Bill of Costs” on February 18, 2005.

Hooper now moves, pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code § 52(a), for

attorneys’ fees and additional litigation expenses. 

Specifically, she requests $55,105.50 in attorney, paralegal, and

legal assistant fees, and $10,876.70 in additional litigation

expenses and costs, for a combined total of $65,982.20. (Mot. 1

at 8; Reply at 2.) Calny does not challenge Hooper’s right to

recover attorneys’ fees and litigation expenses as the

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26 Some of the factors recognized under California law are: 2

(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved and the

skill displayed in presenting them; (2) the extent to which the

4

“prevailing party” under § 52(a). Rather, it challenges the

amount of the requested attorneys’ fees and expenses on a number

of grounds, arguing that Hooper is only entitled to $15,559.83. 

II. 

A. Attorneys’ Fees

Hooper requests attorneys’ fees only under Cal. Civ. Code §

52(a), the remedies provision of the Unruh Act. (Mot. at 2.) 

Accordingly, the award of attorneys’ fees is governed by state

law. See Champion Produce, Inc. v. Ruby Robinson Co., Inc., 342

F.3d 1016, 1024-25 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that award of

attorneys’ fees is governed by state law where request for

attorneys’ fees is based on state substantive law); Crommie v.

State of Cal., Pub. Util. Comm’n, 840 F.Supp. 719, 723-24

(N.D.Cal. 1994)(same). 

As in the federal courts, the lodestar method is used in

California to calculate attorneys’ fees. Serrano v. Priest, 20

Cal.3d 25, 48-49, 141 Cal.Rptr. 315 (1977). Under this approach,

the court must first determine a “lodestar” or “touchstone”

figure, which is the reasonable hourly fee multiplied by

reasonable hours. Greene v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 101

Cal.App.4th 418, 422, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 250 (2002). The court then

has the discretion to increase or reduce the lodestar figure by

applying a positive or negative “multiplier” based on a variety

of factors. Id. at 422. 2

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nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the

attorneys; (3) the contingent nature of the fee award; (4)

whether the fee award will fall ultimately on taxpayers because

it is against the state; (5) whether the attorneys receive public

or foundational funding to bring lawsuits of the type at issue;

and (6) whether the fees would inure to the benefit of the

organizations employing the attorneys rather than to the

attorneys themselves. Serrano, 20 Cal.3d at 48-49.

5

Hooper requests $55,105.50 in attorneys’ fees, based on the

following hours and rates. 

Attorneys/Assistants Hours Rate Total

Lynn Hubbard (attorney) 143.10 $265 $37,921.50

Lynn Hubbard (travel time) 28.00 $175 $4,900

Scott Hubbard (associate) 49.80 $175 $8,715

Paralegals 23.71 $75 $1,778.25

Legal Assistants 27.55 $65 $1,790.75

(Hubbard Decl. ¶ 6.) 

1. Reasonable Hourly Rates

The reasonable hourly rate for a lawyer’s services is the

rate prevailing in the community for similar work. Shaffer v.

Superior Court, 33 Cal.App.4th 993, 1002, 39 Cal.Rptr. 506, 512

(1995). Such a rate “reflects the skill and experience of the

lawyer, including any relevant areas of particular expertise, and

the nature of the work performed.” Ackerman v. W. Elec. Co.,

Inc., 643 F.Supp. 836, 866-67 (N.D.Cal. 1986) (applying

California law). The court “may consider the applicant’s

customary billing rates and the prevailing rates charged by

attorneys of similar skill and experience for comparable legal

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services in the community.” Id. at 867. The relevant community

is generally the forum in which the district court sits. Barjon

v. Dalton, 132 F.3d 496, 500 (9th Cir. 1997). 

As noted in the chart above, Hooper’s lead counsel, Lynn

Hubbard, requests rates of $265 per hour for himself, $175 per

hour for his associate, and $75 per hour for his paralegals. 

However, judges in this district have repeatedly found that

reasonable rates for these types of cases are $250 per hour for

an experienced attorney, $150 per hour for associates, and $75

per hour for paralegals. See, e.g., Loskot v. USA Gas Corp.,

CIV-S-01-2125 WBS KJM (E.D.Cal. Apr. 26, 2004); Loskot v. Pine

St. Sch., CIV. S-00-2405 DFL JFM (E.D.Cal. Nov. 7, 2002). Hooper

provides no rationale for departing from these traditional rates. 

Hooper’s attorneys will be compensated according to district

practice at these traditional rates. 

Mr. Hubbard also requests a rate of $175 per hour for his

travel time. Reasonable travel time by an attorney during the

course of litigation may be compensable. See Davis v. City of

San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1543 (9th Cir. 1992), modified on

other grounds, 984 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1993). Defendants have not

challenged the rate requested, and the court finds the rate to be

reasonable.

Finally, Mr. Hubbard seeks a rate of $65 per hour for the

27.55 hours his legal assistants spent working on the case. 

Hooper contends that courts have traditionally awarded costs of

legal staff in fee motions to the extent that costs can be traced

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to a particular client. (Reply at 8.) Calny objects to such

fees on the ground that secretarial and clerical work falls under

the category of non-recoverable overhead. (Opp’n at 11.) 

The court declines to grant any such fees here because

Hooper has failed to provide any basis from which to determine a

reasonable fee for such services. The prevailing party bears the

burden of producing satisfactory evidence of the appropriate

market rate. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11, 104 S.Ct.

1541 (1984). Here, Mr. Hubbard requests a rate for his legal

assistants that is essentially equivalent to the reasonable

paralegal rate. This rate is not reasonable, and Hooper has

provided the court with no other information from which a

reasonable rate can be determined. Accordingly, the court

declines to award fees for Mr. Hubbard’s legal assistants. 

2. Reasonable Hours Expended

Mr. Hubbard submits documentation showing that his firm

spent 272.16 hours on this litigation. (Hubbard Decl. ¶ 6.) 

This figure includes time spent by Mr. Hubbard, his associate

Scott Hubbard, the paralegals, and the legal assistants. Calny

does not object to the reasonableness of the hours spent by Mr.

Hubbard and his associate. However, Calny argues that Mr.

Hubbard should not be compensated at all for the 51.26 hours that

Mr. Hubbard’s paralegals and legal assistants worked on this

case. (Opp’n at 11.) Calny asserts that these documented hours

were for clerical and secretarial tasks such as updating files,

updating calendars, serving documents, sending rote

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correspondence, and making routine phone calls, and thus should

be deemed non-recoverable overhead costs. (Id.) 

For the reasons discussed above, the court declines to

compensate Hooper for the 27.55 hours spent on this case by Mr.

Hubbard’s legal assistants. However, the 23.71 hours Mr.

Hubbard’s paralegals spent on this litigation are compensable. 

California courts allow compensation for time spent by paralegals

and law clerks where the local practice is to bill clients for

their services. See Salton Bay Marina, Inc. v. Imperial Irrig.

Dist., 172 Cal.App.3d 914, 951, 218 Cal.Rptr. 839 (1985);

Sundance v. Mun. Court, 192 Cal.App.3d 268, 274, 237 Cal.Rptr.

269 (1987). The paralegals’ work on this case consisted

primarily of communicating with Hooper, the court, and defense

counsel and serving documents on various parties. These are

reasonable time entries for a paralegal, and the court finds them

compensable. 

3. Reduction for Limited or Partial Success

Calny asks the court to reduce the amount of the attorneys’

fee award by seventy to eighty percent based on Hooper’s limited

success. Aetna Life & Cas. Co v. City of L.A., 170 Cal.App.3d

865, 881, 216 Cal.Rptr. 831 (1985); Beatty v. BET Holdings, Inc.,

222 F.3d 607, 612 (9th Cir. 2000) (applying California law). 

Calny contends that Hooper only prevailed on one of the

twenty-four alleged violations that she initially identified, and

that her fees should be reduced accordingly. (Opp’n at 6.) 

Calny further argues that the insignificance of the overall

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relief warrants a significant reduction in the award of

attorneys’ fees. (Id. at 7-8.) 

In response, Hooper argues that no reduction should be

applied because her ADA and state-law claims are factually and

substantively intertwined. (Mot. at 6.) Moreover, Hooper

contends that, under the catalyst theory, she prevailed on more

than just the one curb-ramp violation, given that her lawsuit

caused Calny to fix voluntarily several of the other alleged

access barriers. (Id. at 3-4.)

California courts have held that an attorneys’ fees award

should not be reduced where a plaintiff achieved her actual

objectives, but failed on several of the legal theories. 

Sundance, 192 Cal.App.3d at 272-73. However, this rule does not

prevent the reduction of the lodestar figure where a prevailing

party is unsuccessful with regard to certain objectives of the

lawsuit. Sokolow v. County of San Mateo, 213 Cal.App.3d 231,

249-50, 261 Cal.Rptr. 520 (1989). 

In distinguishing between legal “theories” and “objectives,”

California courts have looked to the approach adopted by the

United States Supreme Court in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S.

424, 103 S.Ct. 1933 (1983). E.g., ComputerXpress, Inc. v.

Jackson, 93 Cal.App.4th 993, 1018-19, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 625 (2001). 

In Hensley, the Supreme Court ruled that where the plaintiff

presents “distinctly different claims for relief that are based

on different facts and legal theories,” she cannot recover fees

incurred in pursuing the unsuccessful claims. Hensley, 461 U.S.

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at 434-35. In contrast, if the plaintiff’s successful and

unsuccessful claims involve a common core of facts or related

legal theories, the court should determine “the significance of

the overall relief obtained by plaintiff in relation to the hours

reasonably expended in the litigation.” Id. at 435. 

Similarly, California courts look at whether the

unsuccessful portions of the suit were factually or legally

interrelated to the successful portion of the suit, or

alternatively, whether the unsuccessful claims represent separate

and unrelated objectives. See Green, 101 Cal.App.4th at 423-24

(finding harassment and retaliation claim in employment

discrimination suit to be sufficiently interrelated given that

they were based on the same set of facts and course of conduct);

Sokolow, 213 Cal.App.3d at 249-50 (distinguishing between legal

theories and different objectives sought by the complaint). 

Applying the above analysis to the present case, the court

finds it appropriate to reduce the lodestar figure based on

Hooper’s limited success in this litigation. Each of Hooper’s

twenty-four alleged violations represent different and unrelated

“objectives” or “claims.” The alleged violations are premised on

different facts and require the application of different sections

of the ADA Accessibility Guidelines and the CBC to determine

liability. 

The court disagrees with Calny, however, that Hooper was

successful on only one of her twenty-four claims. Rather, the

court finds that, based on the catalyst theory, Hooper was also

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successful on the five violations that Calny voluntarily fixed. 

To be considered a “prevailing party” under the catalyst theory,

a plaintiff must establish that 

(1) the lawsuit was a catalyst motivating the defendants

to provide the primary relief sought; (2) that the

lawsuit had merit and achieved its catalytic effect by

threat of victory, not by dint of nuisance and threat of

expense, . . . and, (3) that the plaintiffs reasonably

attempted to settle the litigation prior to filing the

lawsuit. 

Tipton-Whittingham v. City of L.A., 34 Cal.4th 604, 608, 21

Cal.Rptr.3d 371 (2004). While the catalyst theory is no longer a

part of federal law, it remains a part of California state law. 

Id. 

 Calny does not deny that Hooper’s lawsuit motivated it to

fix these alleged violations. Nor does it challenge Hooper’s

assertion that she tried to settle this case prior to filing the

lawsuit. Rather, Calny contends that the catalyst theory is

inappropriate here because the fixing of these alleged violations

was not the “primary relief sought” by Hooper in her lawsuit,

given that these were just a few of the twenty-four alleged

violations Hooper had identified. (Opp’n at 9.) 

The court finds that Calny provided Hooper with the “primary

relief sought” for these alleged violations when it corrected

them because that was the primary relief Hooper was seeking for

those specific violations; it is irrelevant that Hooper also

sought the correction of several other alleged violations. To

adopt Calny’s interpretation of the “primary relief sought”

requirement would run counter to the purpose of the catalyst

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 Calny suggests that the court reduce Hooper’s award by 3

different amounts for the different stages of the litigation

based upon the relative success Hooper achieved at each stage of

the litigation. (Opp’n at 6.) Given the difficulty of dividing

the costs in such a fashion, the court finds it more appropriate

to apply a single negative multiplier to the entire lodestar

figure. 

12

theory, which is to allow the award of attorneys’ fees “even when

litigation does not result in a judicial resolution if the

defendant changes its behavior substantially because of, and in

the manner sought by, the litigation.” Graham v. DaimlerChrysler

Corp., 34 Cal.4th 553, 560, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 331 (2005). Such a

reading also runs counter to the rule in California that a

plaintiff does not need to prevail on all of her claims to be

considered a “prevailing party.” Sokolow, 213 Cal.App.3d at 243. 

Accordingly, the court finds that Hooper was successful on

six of her twenty-four claims, and that it is appropriate to

reduce her lodestar figure accordingly. Given that much of Mr.

Hubbard’s time entries cannot be easily divided between Hooper’s

successful and unsuccessful claims, the best approach is to

reduce the lodestar amount by some percentage. See Californians 3

for Responsible Toxics Mgmt. v. Kizer, 211 Cal.App.3d 961, 974-

75, 259 Cal.Rptr. 599 (1989)(endorsing such an approach). 

Considering the limited number of claims Hooper prevailed on, as

well as the fact that many of Mr. Hubbard’s time entries -- for

example, travel time -- would have been necessary even if Hooper

had brought suit on only the six successful claims, the court

finds that a fifty-percent reduction of the lodestar figure is

reasonable. 

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26 Because Calny does not object to Hooper’s other requested 4

litigation expenses, the court has not independently considered

them. 

13

B. Litigation Expenses and Costs

In addition to attorneys’ fees, Hooper also seeks $10,876.70

in litigation expenses and costs. (Reply at 2.) Calny objects

only to the following expenses.4

1. Expert Witness Expenses

Hooper requests $8,599.10 for fees paid to three experts

retained by her. (Hubbard Decl. Ex. C.) Calny challenges this

request, contending that, under federal law, Hooper is limited to

recovering expert witness fees in the amount of $40 per day for

each day the witness attended a deposition or trial. (Opp’n at

10.) Under Calny’s theory, Hooper would be limited to recovering

only $80 for the cost of her experts -- $40 for Ms. D’lil’s

deposition testimony, and $40 for Ms. D’lil’s trial testimony. 

(Id.) 

Unlike the calculation of attorneys’ fees, federal law

controls the assessment of costs, even in diversity cases. 

Aceves v. Allstate Ins. Co., 68 F.3d 1160, 1167-68 (9th Cir.

1995); Chaparral Res., Inc., v. Monsanto Co., 849 F.2d 1286,

1291-92 (10th Cir. 1988). Under federal law, except where

express provision of costs and litigation expenses is made in

another federal statute, a prevailing party is limited to

recovering costs as explicitly enumerated under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1821

and 1920. See Aceves, 68 F.3d at 1167-68 (refusing to allow

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award of expert witness fees in excess of that allowed by §

1821(b)). 

Because Hooper did not prevail on her ADA claim, she is

limited to recovering the amount of expert witness fees allowed

by §§ 1821 and 1920. Section 1920(6) provides for the

compensation of court-appointed experts. Because Hooper’s

experts were not court appointed, she can only receive basic

witness fees for her expert witnesses under 28 U.S.C. § 1821. 28

U.S.C. § 1920(3). Section 1821(b) limits witness fees to “an

attendance fee of $40 per day” at a deposition or a trial, plus

other travel expenses where applicable. Accordingly, Hooper can

only receive as costs $40 for each day that the expert witness

appeared at a trial or deposition, which in this case is $80. 

Hooper maintains that she is entitled to all of her expert

witness expenses because the fee-shifting provisions of Cal. Civ.

Code § 52 supersede the limits of §§ 1821 and 1920. (Reply at

10.) This argument is not persuasive. The Ninth Circuit has

noted some situations in which a state law that allows for the

award of certain costs may supersede federal law restrictions on

the awarding of such costs. Clausen v. M/V New Carissa, 339 F.3d

1049, 1064-65 (9th Cir. 2003). However, for the state provision

to supersede federal law, the state law must contain an “express

indication” that these costs were intended to be provided as

damages for violation of the state law. Id. at 1065-66 (finding

that plaintiff’s expert witness expenses were not limited by §

1821 because a state statute, the Oil Spill Act, specifically

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provided for “costs . . . of any kind” to prevailing plaintiffs). 

Here, none of the state law provisions under which Hooper

sued, including the Unruh Act, explicitly provide for the award

of “costs.” For example, § 52(a) of the Unruh Act, upon which

Hooper relies, only provides for an award of attorneys’ fees. 

Accordingly, Clausen is not applicable here. 

The only way, therefore, for Hooper to receive these expert

witness expenses is if California law allowed the award of such

litigation expenses as part of the award of attorneys’ fees. 

However, Hooper has not asserted this argument, nor could she, as

California courts have held that out-of-pocket expenses of the

type ordinarily billed to fee-paying clients, but not recoverable

as statutory costs, may not be awarded as part of a reasonable

attorney fee absent some express statutory language found in

another California statute. E.g., Hsu v. Semiconductor Sys.,

Inc., 126 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1342, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 82 (2005);

Benson v. Kwikset Corp., 126 Cal.App.4th 887, 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 683

(2005); First Nationwide Bank v. Mountain Cascade, Inc., 77

Cal.App.4th 871, 877-78, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 145 (2000); Ripley v.

Pappadopoulos, 23 Cal.App.4th 1616, 1622-27 (1994). For the

above reasons, Hooper is therefore limited to $80 in expert

witness expenses. 

2. Asset Search

Hooper seeks $550.00 for an asset report conducted on Calny. 

(Hubbard Decl. Ex. C.) Calny does not challenge Hooper’s

entitlement to this expense as a matter of law. Rather, Calny

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 Calny also objects to two entries for reporter’s 5

transcript fees, arguing that these expenses should be excluded

because they appear to be unrelated to the instant case. (Opp’n

at 13-14.) However, these expenses were already awarded to

Hooper as part of her Bill of Costs, to which Calny did not

object, and Hooper makes clear in her reply that she is not

requesting them again here. (Reply at 1.) Therefore, these

costs are not before the court on this motion. Furthermore, the

invoices for these transcripts show that they were related to

this case. (Id. at 9.) 

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argues that this search was unnecessary, and that Hooper should

not be reimbursed for this expense, given the number of times

that Mr. Hubbard has acted as counsel in actions against Calny. 

(Opp’n at 13.) The court finds that this expense was reasonable. 

Hooper was entitled to research whether removal of barriers at

the Taco Bell was readily achievable, given that Calny’s general

denials and affirmative defenses put its financial status at

issue. (Reply at 7.) Furthermore, although Mr. Hubbard has

participated in litigation against Calny on prior occasions, a

company’s financial status can change significantly in short

periods of time. Accordingly, the court allows compensation for

this expense.5

III. 

Based on the foregoing discussion, Hooper is awarded

$24,961.63 for attorneys’ fees, calculated in the following

manner: 

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Case 2:03-cv-00167-DFL-GGH Document 95 Filed 04/25/05 Page 16 of 17
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Attorney Hours Rate Total

Lynn Hubbard 143.10 $250 $35,775

Lynn Hubbard 28.00 $175 $4,900

(Travel time)

 

Scott Hubbard 49.80 $150 $7,470

 (Associate)

Paralegals 23.71 $75 $1,778.25

Sub-Total: $49,923.25

Negative Multiplier (.5) $24,961.63

Additionally, the court awards Hooper $2,397.60 in litigation

expenses, which represents the amount Hooper requested minus all

but eighty dollars of her requested expert witness fees. In sum,

the court awards Hooper $27,359.23 in attorneys’ fees and

litigation expenses. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 4/22/2005

DAVID F. LEVI

United States District Judge

Case 2:03-cv-00167-DFL-GGH Document 95 Filed 04/25/05 Page 17 of 17