Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00807/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00807-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

LAVELLA. McGARY, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

WILLIAM MUNIZ, Warden 

Respondent. 

No. 2:15-cv-0807 KJM GGH P 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

 

Introduction and Summary 

 Petitioner was found guilty of second degree murder with enhancements not relevant to 

the issue in this petition. He was sentenced to an aggregate term of 40 years to life. Several 

issues are raised: 

1. violation of right to remain silent during police interviews; 

2. exclusion of hearsay evidence which the defense desired to admit; 

3. a Brady impeachment claim—the prosecution failed to produce impeachment evidence 

which discredited its forensic expert. 

None of these claims warrant a vacating of petitioner’s conviction in this federal habeas 

proceeding. The first issue is clearly procedurally defaulted (barred), and the remaining two 

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issues fail on their merits. The petition should be denied. 

Factual Background

 The underlying facts of the case are useful for understanding the context of the issues. 

A. The Prosecution's Case. 

On June 26, 2008, the sister of co-defendant Daryl Gilmore (Daryl), 

Shaandreia Gilmore (Shy), had an argument with the victim, 

Ronelle “Nelly” Rucks (Rucks), with whom she was romantically 

involved. During this argument, which was later reported to Daryl 

and defendant, Rucks threatened to kill Shy and her children. 

Rucks was also romantically involved with Lashay Charleston 

(Shay). Rucks, Shay and their son lived in Building R at the Marina 

Apartments on Maine Street in Vallejo. Shay knew Rucks also 

dated Shy. 

On June 27, 2008 at about 11:00 a.m., Shay was outside her 

apartment with Rucks's sisters, Valerie and Tawana, when Shy 

drove up to the intersection of Marin and Pennsylvania in a 

burgundy-colored Nissan Pathfinder. With Shy in the Pathfinder 

were Maguerite (Mumu) and Marguerite's young nephew. The 

women began arguing despite Shy's initial statement that she 

wanted no trouble but simply to retrieve a pair of shoes she had 

given to Rucks. After five to ten minutes of arguing, Shy drove off 

without getting the shoes and Marguerite walked to her sister's 

nearby apartment. 

A short time later, Daryl called defendant and told him Shy was 

having trouble with Rucks. Daryl wanted to “talk” to Rucks and 

asked defendant to come along for protection. Defendant agreed, 

and Daryl picked him up in Oakland in a green 1996 Mitsubishi 

before returning to Vallejo via the Carquinez Bridge. Defendant, 

who was always armed, carried a Browning Buckmark .22 caliber 

semiautomatic pistol loaded with 11 bullets. 

At 1:03 p.m., Daryl was subject to a traffic stop for failing to pay 

the Carquinez Bridge toll. Although Daryl had no driver's license, 

he was let go with a citation. Daryl then continued to the Marina 

Apartments and parked next to Building R on Marin Street. The 

men entered the apartment complex and found Rucks, who was 

unarmed but accompanied by several men, including his brother 

Roy. Daryl and Rucks conversed briefly before Daryl and 

defendant decided to leave. 

At about 1:30 p.m., Daryl and defendant exited through the 

apartment complex gate and walked toward their car. Rucks 

followed them, passing through the gate before stepping onto the 

sidewalk. At this point, defendant turned around and shot Rucks 

several times before running away. According to an eyewitness, as 

defendant ran, he followed behind two women who were also 

running down the sidewalk. Once the two women disappeared 

around the corner, defendant returned to Rucks, who was lying on 

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the sidewalk. Standing over Rucks, defendant shot him several 

more times as Rucks tilted his head toward him and tried 

unsuccessfully to get up. 

Defendant then quickly jumped into the car with Daryl, who had 

made a U-turn and was double-parked on the west side of the street 

facing north against traffic. The car sped away, turning right onto 

Pennsylvania Street and right again onto Sonoma Boulevard. 

Rucks, meanwhile, bled to death within a few minutes despite the 

assistance offered by Shay, who had run outside upon hearing 

gunshots, and other bystanders, and despite the quick arrival of 

medical personnel. 

Daryl drove to the mobile home park in San Leandro where he 

lived in a two-story house at Unit One with his girlfriend, Jackie, 

the mobile home park manager. Daryl and defendant spent the night 

there before being located and arrested by Vallejo police officers 

the next day. Specifically, at about 5:00 p.m. on June 28, officers 

arrived at the mobile home park looking for Daryl, who ran past 

them before being arrested. The officers mistakenly had a warrant 

to search Unit Four rather than Unit One, so several officers “froze” 

Unit One while another officer left to obtain the correct warrant. At 

about midnight, the officers were able to lawfully enter Unit One, 

where they found and arrested defendant. They also found the 

murder weapon under a couch in an upstairs bedroom, as well as 

several hundred rounds of ammunition. Both Daryl's Mitsubishi and 

Shy's Pathfinder were parked outside. 

Defendant was interviewed at the Vallejo Police Department from 

about 2:00 a.m. to 3:00 a.m. on June 29, 2008, by Detectives James 

Melville and Matthew Mustard. After being advised of and waiving 

his Miranda rights, defendant, for about 45 minutes, denied being in 

Vallejo the previous day and denied any knowledge of Rucks's 

murder. In fact, defendant insisted he had been “high all day 

yesterday” on “powder” (methamphetamines), “didn't even go to 

sleep last night,” and “don't even remember how [he] got to Daryl's 

house in the first place.” However, after further conversation, 

defendant eventually admitted being at the crime scene and 

shooting Rucks. Defendant explained that he feared for his life 

because Rucks had earlier threatened Shy and her children and 

because, when meeting with defendant and Daryl, Rucks and his 

colleagues had their hands in their shirts as if holding weapons. 

Further, as he and Daryl left the apartment complex, Rucks 

followed them out the gate, telling them he “could have kilt us 

inside of the building” if he wanted to. It was at that point, 

defendant insisted, that he shot Rucks until running out of bullets. 

B. The Defense Case. 

Several women who had been romantically involved with Rucks 

were permitted to testify regarding his violent nature. For example, 

Shay testified that, on February 25, 2007, she and Rucks were 

arguing in a store parking lot in Vallejo when Rucks broke her car 

windshield and threw her keys. A police officer arrived a short time 

later, and Shay told him Rucks had choked her twice. Shay later 

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signed a statement that Rucks had threatened to shoot up her house 

and kill everyone inside, although at trial she testified that her 

statements were false. 

Makeba Fields testified that, in June 2008, Rucks hit her in the face 

after she became jealous of his involvement with another woman, 

causing her to be hospitalized. A few days later, Rucks grabbed her 

ponytail during an argument and slammed her head into a brick 

wall, causing another trip to the hospital. Nonetheless, Fields did 

not think Rucks had threatened to kill her because “[he] wasn't like 

that.” Her statement was contradicted by Police Officer John Boyd, 

who testified that he observed a lump on Field's head the size of a 

silver dollar after he was dispatched to the hospital, and that she 

told him Rucks threatened: “I'm your boss and I'll kill you, bitch.” 

Myesha Williams testified that, on January 26, 2006, after meeting 

Rucks at his cousin's house, he requested a ride to the store. She 

complied with his request however, when she thereafter refused to 

drive him to Richmond, he told her: “You're either going to take me 

or get out.” When Williams told him she was leaving, Rucks tried 

to take her keys, slapped her, and ultimately used one hand to choke 

her and the other to retrieve a gun from his pants. Rucks then put 

the gun to her head and told her to either get out or go with him, at 

which point Fields grabbed the keys, left the car and ran into the 

gas station to call the police. Rucks drove off after discovering 

Fields had mistakenly left the ignition key in the car. 

Finally, Lakisha Gauner, who used to date Rucks and had a child 

with him, testified that, on April 20, 2005, Rucks punched her in 

the face with a closed fist during an argument at their apartment. 

When she went to the bathroom to call 911, Rucks threatened to hit 

her again. Then, in September of 2005, he punched her in the eye, 

dragged her to the couch and tried to smother her with a pillow. She 

went to a friend's house and called the police. On March 28, 2006, 

Rucks choked her with a heavy metal jewelry chain and, on July 

2006, kicked her apartment door and threatened to beat her up if she 

didn't let him inside. Finally, in February 2008, Rucks became 

enraged when Gauner was late dropping off their son. He slapped 

her and pulled out some of her hair before putting the child in his 

van and driving away. 

In addition to this testimony from Rucks's former girlfriends, 

defendant offered expert testimony from Dr. Randall Solomon, the 

medical director and senior supervising psychiatrist at California 

Medical Facility, regarding his problematic personal history and 

resulting cumulative mental trauma. Specifically, Dr. Solomon 

testified that, due to defendant's unstable and stressful upbringing, 

he lacked a sense of safety and was more prone to impulsive and 

over-reactive behavior when he felt threatened. Defendant's 

behavior at the time of Rucks's death was an example of this 

tendency to overreact in hostile environments. Dr. Solomon 

acknowledged, however, that he did not perform psychological tests 

on defendant and found no evidence of psychosis. Moreover, while 

defendant had a “constellation of symptoms” and “reactions” 

similar to persons suffering from post traumatic stress disorder 

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(PTSD), including increased aggression and hyper-alertness, Dr. 

Solomon concluded that defendant did not meet the criteria for 

PTSD. 

C. Jury Deliberations, the Verdict and Sentencing. 

On September 8, 2010, a jury found defendant not guilty of first 

degree murder but guilty of second degree murder. The jury also 

found true the enhancements for personal discharge of a firearm 

and personal discharge of a firearm causing great bodily injury. 

Following a sentencing hearing on June 27, 2011, the trial court 

imprisoned defendant for an aggregate term of 40 years to life. This 

appeal followed. 

People v. McGary, 2013 WL 6713222 *1-2 (Cal. App. 2013) (footnotes omitted). 

Discussion 

 The AEDPA legal standards are contained in Appendix A to these findings. The first 

issue, however, is decided on the grounds of procedural default, and those standards are discussed 

below. 

The Miranda Right to Remain Silent Issue 

Petitioner insists here, as he did on direct review, that he several times asked the 

interrogating police detective (a Detective Mustard) to cease questioning him in his post-arrest 

interview, but the detective avoided his request by feigning confusion, followed by 

encouragement of petitioner to continue interrogation. The precise facts of the interrogation are 

not important because petitioner’s trial attorney, not only “failed to object” to admission of the 

confession, but also affirmatively told the trial court that he did not object to the statement 

coming into evidence.1

 

The Court of Appeal provided the context and procedural ruling for this issue: 

At the outset of our inquiry, we must address the People's 

contention that defendant forfeited his Miranda claims by not 

raising them in the trial court. As the People point out, the 

California Supreme Court has not hesitated to reject Miranda claims 

on appeal based upon the well-established principle of forfeiture. 

 

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 The undersigned has not investigated the strategy of defense counsel not to object to the very 

damaging admissions as no assertion of ineffective assistance of counsel has been brought 

forward by petitioner. However, since the murder weapon was found in petitioner’s residence, 

along with eyewitnesses documenting petitioner’s involvement in the murder, defense counsel 

may well have been focusing upon the asserted lack of intent required for murder, and not 

petitioner’s factual involvement in the murder per se. 

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Specifically, “‘Evidence Code section 353, subdivision (a) allows a 

judgment to be reversed because of erroneous admission of 

evidence only if an objection to the evidence or a motion to strike it 

was “timely made and so stated as to make clear the specific ground 

of the objection.” Pursuant to this statute, “‘we have consistently 

held that the “defendant's failure to make a timely and specific 

objection” on the ground asserted on appeal makes that ground not 

cognizable.”’ [Citation.] [Citation.] ‘To satisfy Evidence Code 

section 353, subdivision (a), the objection or motion to strike must 

be both timely and specific as to its ground. An objection to 

evidence must generally be preserved by specific objection at the 

time the evidence is introduced; the opponent cannot make a 

“placeholder” objection stating general or incorrect grounds (e.g., 

“relevance”) and revise the objection later in a motion to strike 

stating specific or different grounds.’ [Citation.]” (See People v. 

Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.4th 76, 116, disapproved on other grounds in 

People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22.) 

Here, the record reflects that, while the trial court did conduct a 

hearing to determine the admissibility of defendant's statements 

during his custodial interrogation, this hearing was held on the 

People's written motion rather than on defendant's motion. Defense 

counsel, while filing several motions in limine regarding the 

admissibility of specific items of evidence, filed nothing in reply to 

the People's motion, and filed nothing otherwise related to the 

admissibility of his extra-judicial statements to detectives. In 

addition, at the hearing on the People's motion, defense counsel 

raised no argument that the detectives violated defendant's Miranda

rights. Quite to the contrary, defense counsel advised the court, “I'm 

not objecting to the introduction of his statement.” Further, defense 

counsel stated, “Yes, Your Honor,” when the court then confirmed, 

“neither defendant is expressing any objection to the admission of 

the statements that were attributed to Mr. McGary as stated in the 

[prosecution's] Miranda motion filed July 6, 2010, is that a correct 

statement?” Based on defense counsel's confirmation, the trial court 

ruled that an evidentiary hearing with respect to defendant's 

statements would not be necessary. 

The trial court thereafter sought additional confirmation from 

counsel when considering the People's request to grant with 

prejudice its motion to admit defendant's extra-judicial statements: 

“[COURT:] There's no indication that I can see of any coercion on 

Mr. McGary's part. There's no indication that he unequivocally 

stood on his right to remain silent or unequivocally at any point in 

the interview withdrew, if you will, his consent to carry on with the 

interviews. [¶] And, as a result, it appears the court should rule that 

all of the statements that are represented in the Miranda motion 

itself will be admissible in Mr. McGary's trial; and that that order ... 

if another Judge is hearing the case, the ruling needs to be made 

such that it's binding now on the trial. Is there any objection to the 

Court specifying that that's the duration of the ruling, [defense 

counsel], regardless of whether the case is heard by this Judge or 

another Judge? 

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“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Well, Your Honor, I can tell the Court 

this morning that I do not object on Miranda grounds to the 

introduction of my client's statement. I received [the prosecutor's] 

motion to admit the statement and citations to authority regarding 

Miranda. And I have not filed any written objection, and I am not 

objecting this morning on Miranda grounds. So as to that issue, I 

have no objection. [¶¶] 

“[COURT]: All Right. So the question is: Do we have this order 

crystallized, and ruling, such that the People can depend on it 

without further concerns at the time of trial, regardless of who tries 

the case? And I'm expecting that to be me, but things could happen. 

Is that agreeable, [defense counsel]? 

“[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] Yes, it is, Your Honor.” (Italics added.) 

Thus, based at least in part on defense counsel's acquiescence, the 

trial court ruled defendant's statements admissible “with prejudice 

to all parties at trial.” 

Given this record, we agree with the prosecution that defendant has 

forfeited the right to challenge on Miranda grounds the admission 

of his extra-judicial statements to investigators. While our 

reasoning should already be well-understood by counsel, we 

nonetheless take time to reiterate it: “The objection requirement is 

necessary in criminal cases because a ‘contrary rule would deprive 

the People of the opportunity to cure the defect at trial and would 

“permit the defendant to gamble on an acquittal at his trial secure in 

the knowledge that a conviction would be reversed on appeal.”’ 

[Citation.] ‘The reason for the requirement is manifest: a 

specifically grounded objection to a defined body of evidence 

serves to prevent error. It allows the trial judge to consider 

excluding the evidence or limiting its admission to avoid possible 

prejudice. It also allows the proponent of the evidence to lay 

additional foundation, modify the offer of proof, or take other steps 

designed to minimize the prospect of reversal.’ [Citation.] [¶] ... 

[Moreover,] ‘the objection must be made in such a way as to alert 

the trial court to the nature of the anticipated evidence and the basis 

on which exclusion is sought, and to afford the People an 

opportunity to establish its admissibility.’ [Citation.] What is 

important is that the objection fairly inform the trial court, as well 

as the party offering the evidence, of the specific reason or reasons 

the objecting party believes the evidence should be excluded, so the 

party offering the evidence can respond appropriately and the court 

can make a fully informed ruling. If the court overrules the 

objection, the objecting party may argue on appeal that the evidence 

should have been excluded for the reason asserted at trial, but it 

may not argue on appeal that the court should have excluded the 

evidence for a reason different from the one stated at trial. A party 

cannot argue the court erred in failing to conduct an analysis it was 

not asked to conduct.” (People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 

434–435 [italics added].) 

Here, despite his counsel's clear and repeated insistence in open 

court that no Miranda challenge was being made, defendant 

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contends the forfeiture rule should not apply because, based on the 

People's motion, the trial court had reason to, and did, consider 

whether any Miranda violation had occurred. In doing so, 

defendant relies on a California Supreme Court case, People v. 

Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 424, wherein the court declined to 

base its decision on the forfeiture rule, despite the defense counsel's 

failure to raise a Miranda objection below, because the People's 

motion to admit the defendant's extra-judicial statements “brought 

certain elements of the Miranda claim before the court, including 

the possibility that defendant had invoked his right to counsel at the 

outset of the first interrogation, and that his waiver of rights on that 

occasion was involuntary because of the officers' mention of the 

death penalty.” (Id. at pp. 424-425.) 

We do not find defendant's authority helpful in our case. First, 

contrary to defendant's suggestion, the high court in People v. 

Williams did not actually rely on the forfeiture principle when 

ruling; rather, it “[a]ssum [ed], without deciding, that defendant's 

claims were preserved” before concluding his claims lacked merit. 

(Id. at pp. 424–425.) Moreover, contrary to our defendant, the 

defendant in People v. Williams, did in fact testify at the lower 

court hearing that “he ‘continually’ invoked his right to counsel 

during several days of interrogation, but that his invocation was 

disregarded.” (Id. at p. 425.) As the record set forth above 

demonstrates, neither defendant nor his counsel took any position 

contrary to the People's motion in this case, much less offered 

evidence or testimony suggesting a Miranda violation. As such, we 

stand by our conclusion that defendant has forfeited this issue. 

[footnote 11] 

[Indeed, on this record, it appears defense counsel may have 

actually invited the purported error: “‘The doctrine of invited error 

is designed to prevent an accused from gaining a reversal on appeal 

because of an error made by the trial court at his behest. If defense 

counsel intentionally caused the trial court to err, the appellant 

cannot be heard to complain on appeal.... [I]t also must be clear that 

counsel acted for tactical reasons and not out of ignorance or 

mistake.’ In cases involving an action affirmatively taken by 

defense counsel, we have found a clearly implied tactical purpose to 

be sufficient to invoke the invited error rule. (See [citations].)” 

(People v. Coffman & Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 49, quoting 

People v. Wickersham (1982) 32 Cal.3d 307, 330, disapproved on 

other grounds in People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 201.)” 

Here, defendant's counsel did more than acquiesce to the trial 

court's Miranda ruling, he “affirmatively joined” in it, and thus 

should not now be permitted to claim the court erred. (People v. 

Coffman & Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 49.)] 

People v. McGary, 2013 WL 6713222, at *5-6. 

 Beyond peradventure of a doubt in this case, counsel did not object to the statement, and 

affirmatively told the trial court that he had no objection. As respondent argues, the 

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contemporaneous objection requirement precludes petitioner’s argument on the merits of his 

alleged Miranda violation. 

 This claim is procedurally defaulted. Petitioner makes no challenge to the adequacy of the 

contemporaneous objection rule, as well he could not, given the decades long case history 

upholding the adequacy of this particular procedural default. The Ninth Circuit has recognized 

and applied California's contemporaneous objection rule, section 353 of the California Evidence 

Code, which provides that a criminal defendant must make a timely objection to the admission of 

evidence at trial in order to preserve a claim challenging that evidence on appeal, as grounds for 

denying a federal habeas corpus claim under the doctrine of procedural default where there was a 

failure to object at trial. See, e.g., Fairbanks v. Alaska, 650 F.3d 1243, 1256 (9th Cir. 2011); 

Inthavong v. Lamarque, 420 F.3d 1055, 1058 (9th Cir.2005); Paulino v. Castro, 371 F.3d 1083, 

1092–1093 (9th Cir.2004); Melendez v. Pliler, 288 F.3d 1120, 1125 (9th Cir.2002) (citing 

Garrison v. McCarthy, 653 F.2d 374, 377 (9th Cir.1981)); Vansickel v. White, 166 F.3d 953, 957 

(9th Cir.1999); Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 842–843 (9th Cir.1995). See also MacDonald v. 

Paramo, 2016 WL 1670524 (E.D. Cal. 2016). Under the contemporaneous objection rule, 

California courts construe broadly the sufficiency of objection that preserves issues for appellate 

review, focusing on whether the trial court had a reasonable opportunity to rule on the merits of 

the objection. Melendez, 288 F.3d at 1125. 

 Even assuming that the Bennet v. Mueller----- paradigm survives recent Supreme Court 

cases reviewing and reversing Ninth Circuit refusals to apply the bar,2 see e.g. Johnson v. Lee, 

__U.S.__, 136 S.Ct. 1802 (2016), (not utilizing the three part burden/consistency analysis, but 

simply relying on explicative state case authority), petitioner here had the burden here to produce 

some evidence that the bar is not consistently applied. He has not done so. 

 Indeed, as observed by the Court of Appeal, see footnote 11 to the Court of Appeal 

opinion, supra, counsel’s strategic determination has all the earmarks of invited error. See, e.g., 

Leavitt v. Arave, 383 F.3d 809, 832 (9th Cir. 2004) (recognizing that invited error doctrine may 

 

2

 Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 585 (9th Cir. 2003). 

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be a valid basis for procedural default under habeas review where the state court clearly and 

expressly invoked the invited error doctrine). 

 The finding that procedural bar can be applied does not end the analysis, as petitioner 

might demonstrate cause and prejudice for the default. This exception to procedural default 

requires permissible “cause,” i.e., a fact external to petitioner's defense which caused the default. 

High v. Ignacio, 408 F.3d 585, 590 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 

(1986)). Objective factors that exemplify cause include interference by officials that makes 

compliance with the state's procedural rule impracticable, a showing that the factual or legal basis 

for a claim was not reasonably available to counsel, or constitutionally ineffective assistance of 

counsel. Murray, 477 U.S. at 488. Prejudice requires a finding of actual harm resulting from the 

alleged constitutional violation. Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991). If 

petitioner cannot demonstrate cause and prejudice, his claim must be one which would cause a 

fundamental miscarriage of justice if not reviewed on the merits, i.e., petitioner is actually 

innocent of the conviction offense. See Majoy v. Roe, 296 F.3d 770, 775–76 (9th Cir. 2002). 

 Petitioner does not argue cause and prejudice in the petition or traverse. Nor is the 

Miranda issue here one that implicates actual innocence. That is, there is no justification for 

finding here that petitioner gave incriminating statements which were not true and which were the 

result of undue coercion. 

Accordingly, this claim should be denied as being procedurally defaulted. 

Exclusion of Defense Requested Hearsay Evidence 

The Court of Appeal again thoroughly explicated the basis of this claim and its adverseto-petitioner ruling: 

Defendant contends the trial court erred by excluding from 

evidence Shy's hearsay statement to Detective Mustard that Rucks's 

sisters shattered her apartment windows just before his murder. 

This purported error was, according to defendant, prejudicial 

because “if the jury found [he] believed, based on his knowledge of 

Rucks's and his sisters' behavior that they were violent towards Shy, 

Daryl and [defendant], that would have been a basis for acquittal of 

second degree murder....” 

“A trial court has broad discretion in determining relevancy, but it 

cannot admit evidence that is irrelevant or inadmissible under 

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constitutional or state law. [Citation.] ‘The proponent of proffered 

testimony has the burden of establishing its relevance, and if the 

testimony is comprised of hearsay, the foundational requirements 

for its admissibility under an exception to the hearsay rule. 

[Citations.] Evidence is properly excluded when the proponent 

fails to make an adequate offer of proof regarding the relevance or 

admissibility of the evidence. [Citations.]’ (Ibid.; see Evid.Code, § 

1200, subd. (b).)” (People v. Blacksher (2011) 52 Cal.4th 769, 

819– 820.) Such rulings will be overturned on appeal only upon a 

showing of abuse of that discretion. (People v. Minifie (1996) 13 

Cal.4th 1055, 1070; People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 609.) 

The record reflects that, at trial, Detective Mustard testified 

regarding his interview with Shy shortly after the murder. Relevant 

here, Detective Mustard testified over defense objections that Shy 

did not mention being scared of Rucks or being threatened by him. 

On cross examination, defense counsel asked Detective Mustard 

whether Shy told him “that the night before the shooting, Ronelle 

Rucks's sisters came over to her apartment and smashed out all her 

windows.” [footnote 12: According to defendant, Shy's hearsay 

statement regarding the actions of Rucks's sisters was disclosed by 

the prosecution during discovery.] The prosecutor objected on 

hearsay and relevance grounds, and the trial court sustained the 

objection, barring any questions related to Rucks's sisters. 

On appeal, defendant acknowledges that Shy's statement regarding 

the actions of Rucks's sisters is hearsay given that Shy did not 

appear for trial. However, defendant insists her statement is 

nonetheless admissible pursuant to Evidence Code section 356 and 

relevant to prove his state of mind for purposes of his self-defense 

theory. We disagree. 

Evidence Code section 356 provides in relevant part: “Where part 

of an act, declaration, conversation, or writing is given in evidence 

by one party, the whole on the same subject may be inquired into 

by an adverse party....” (Evid.Code, § 356.) “However, this 

provision ‘“is necessarily subject to the qualification that the court 

may exclude those portions of the conversation not relevant to the 

items thereof which have been introduced.”’ (Citation; Legislative 

Committee Comment to Evid.Code, § 356.) ‘The rule is not 

applied mechanically to permit the whole of a transaction to come 

in without regard to its competency or relevancy....’ (Witkin, Cal. 

Evidence ... § 320, p. 283.)” (People v. Perry (1972) 7 Cal.3d 756, 

787 [fn. omitted].) In this case, defendant theorizes the evidence is 

relevant to prove his state of mind, and specifically the legitimacy 

of his belief in the need to defend himself against Rucks, a theory 

the trial court rejected when sustaining the prosecutor's objections. 

We conclude the trial court's ruling was within the broad scope of 

its discretion, notwithstanding Evidence Code section 356. 

In reaching this conclusion, we do not disagree with defendant's 

point that, in some cases, “one's fear of another may come from a 

threat either by that person, or a close associate.” However, the 

threat, whether made by the victim or, as here, the victim's family 

member, still must be directed toward the defendant such that the 

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defendant's state of mind, rather than someone else's, is impacted: 

“A person claiming self-defense is required to ‘prove his own frame 

of mind,’ and in so doing is ‘entitled to corroborate his testimony 

that he was in fear for his life by proving the reasonableness of such 

fear.’ [Citation.] The defendant's perceptions are at issue, and 

threats from a family and its friends may color a person's 

perceptions of that group no less than threats from an individual 

may color a person's perceptions of that individual. A defendant 

who testifies that he acted from fear of a clan united against him is 

entitled to corroborate that testimony with evidence ‘tend[ing] in 

reason to prove’ that the fear was reasonable. (Evid.Code, § 210 

[defining relevant evidence].) Threats from the group on the 

defendant's life would certainly tend in reason to make the 

defendant fearful. This is especially true where the group has a 

reputation for violence, and that reputation is known to the 

defendant. Such threats are relevant to the defendant's state of 

mind—a matter ‘of consequence to the determination of the action’ 

(ibid.)—and the trier of fact is entitled to consider those threats 

along with other relevant circumstances in deciding whether the 

defendant's actions were justified.” (People v. Minifie, supra, 13 

Cal.4th, at p. 1066 [italics added]. See also People v. McKinnon

(2011) 52 Cal.4th 610, 666.) 

Here, there is no evidence defendant was told about, or otherwise 

knew about, the alleged threatening acts by Rucks's sisters toward 

Shy. And, as defendant's own authority explains, “‘a defendant's 

evidence of self defense is subject to all the normal evidentiary 

rules, including Evidence Code sections 350 [only relevant 

evidence is admissible] and 352.’ [Citation.] Evidence of third party 

threats is relevant only if other evidence shows [the defendant's] 

fear of imminent harm. (Ibid.) Even then its probative value may be 

slight.... The more vague the threats, and the weaker the logical link 

between them and the defendant's actions, the more the court may 

be justified in excluding them.” (People v. Minifie, supra, 13 

Cal.4th at p. 1070.) 

Based on these principles, the trial court could properly find this 

evidence irrelevant to defendant's state of mind and, thus, not 

admissible. Simply put, for purposes of proving self defense, 

“[r]easonableness is judged by how the situation appeared to the 

defendant,” not a third party such as Shy. (People v. Minifie, supra, 

13 Cal.4th at p. 1068.) The trial court's ruling to exclude this 

evidence thus stands. 

People v. McGary, 2013 WL 6713222, at * 7-9. 

The only case that need be cited to set forth clearly established federal law as enunciated 

by the Supreme Court is Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 (2006): 

“[S]tate and federal rulemakers have broad latitude under the 

Constitution to establish rules excluding evidence from criminal 

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trials.” United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308, 118 S.Ct. 

1261, 140 L.Ed.2d 413 (1998); see also Crane v. Kentucky, 476 

U.S. 683, 689–690, 106 S.Ct. 2142, 90 L.Ed.2d 636 (1986); 

Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 438, n. 6, 103 S.Ct. 843, 74 

L.Ed.2d 646 (1983); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302–

303, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973); Spencer v. Texas, 385 

U.S. 554, 564, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967). This latitude, 

however, has limits. “Whether rooted directly in the Due Process 

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or in the Compulsory Process 

or Confrontation Clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution 

guarantees criminal defendants ‘a meaningful opportunity to 

present a complete defense.’“ Crane, supra, at 690, 476 U.S. 683, 

106 S.Ct. 2142, 90 L.Ed.2d 636 (quoting California v. Trombetta, 

467 U.S. 479, 485, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984); 

citations omitted). This right is abridged by evidence rules that 

“infring[e] upon a weighty interest of the accused” and are 

“‘arbitrary’ or ‘disproportionate to the purposes they are designed 

to serve.’“ Scheffer, supra, at 308, 523 U.S. 303, 118 S.Ct. 1261, 

140 L.Ed.2d 413 (quoting Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 58, 56, 

107 S.Ct. 2704, 97 L.Ed.2d 37 (1987)). 

* * * 

While the Constitution thus prohibits the exclusion of defense 

evidence under rules that serve no legitimate purpose or that are 

disproportionate to the ends that they are asserted to promote, wellestablished rules of evidence permit trial judges to exclude evidence 

if its probative value is outweighed by certain other factors such as 

unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or potential to mislead the 

jury. See, e.g., Fed. Rule Evid. 403; Uniform Rule of Evid. 45 

(1953); ALI, Model Code of Evidence Rule 303 (1942); 3 J. 

Wigmore, Evidence §§ 1863, 1904 (1904). Plainly referring to rules 

of this type, we have stated that the Constitution permits judges “to 

exclude evidence that is ‘repetitive ..., only marginally relevant’ or 

poses an undue risk of ‘harassment, prejudice, [or] confusion of the 

issues.’“ Crane, 476 U.S., at 689–690, 106 S.Ct. 2142, 90 L.Ed.2d 

636 (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 

S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986); ellipsis and brackets in 

original). See also Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 42, 116 S.Ct. 

2013, 135 L.Ed.2d 361 (1996) (plurality opinion) (terming such 

rules “familiar and unquestionably constitutional”). 

Holmes, 547 U.S. at 324, 326–27 (emphasis and bold added). 

 Here, petitioner focuses somewhat on the perceived unfairness in the trial court’s 

allowance of the prosecution’s hearsay statement and the refusal to allow his hearsay statement. 

However, petitioner’s perception is misplaced. As the Court of Appeal clearly found, the 

statement about the alleged breaking of windows, or threats to do so, at the time Rucks shooting 

took place, was not known to petitioner. There was no evidence submitted concerning 

petitioner’s awareness of the Shy statement to the detective at the time of Rucks’ murder. Indeed, 

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the Court of Appeal found that it was only through the process of criminal discovery that the 

defense became aware of the alleged Shy statement. Because it was petitioner’s state of mind at 

the time of the killing which was at issue with respect to whether the hearsay statement should be 

permitted, the statement sought to be admitted had no bearing whatsoever on that critical state of 

mind. No Holmes/Chambers error took place. 

The Brady Claim 

Petitioner believes that the prosecution’s failure to release impeachment evidence 

pertinent to its forensic expert requires a vacating of the conviction. While there may well have 

been significant evidence with which to impeach the state’s expert,3 pertinent to the expert’s 

credibility in general, this is a case where the expert evidence was technical surplusage. 

The undersigned need not perform an entire Brady [v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)] 

analysis in that the materiality of the impeachment in this case was very inconsequential. The 

undersigned assumes that the on-its face, significant impeachment evidence should have been 

disclosed. However, petitioner must show: that under Brady, “evidence is material ‘if there is a 

reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different.’” Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280 (1999) (quoting 

United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)). 

In this case, the multiple bullet wounds that caused the death of the victim were absolutely 

undisputed. The witness statements describing the aftermath of the shooting, including the death 

agony of the decedent were undisputed. The fact that the murder weapon was found in 

petitioner’s residence was undisputed. Petitioner admitted that he shot the victim. Yet, petitioner 

argues that the misdeeds of the prosecution’s experts in other cases would have turned the tide 

against the prosecution case. 

Rather, the forensic expert testimony in this case was only marginally necessary, 

 

3

 According to the Court of Appeal, the expert had been shown to have: (1) a 

history of alcohol abuse and arrest; (2) provided false and misleading testimony several times in 

the past;(3) been dismissed from previous forensic pathology positions for poor work quality; and 

(4) was involved in a Sonoma County case, People v. Pelfini (No. SCR30250), that was 

ultimately dismissed due, according to defendant, to Dr. Gill's incompetence and dishonesty. 

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establishing that indeed the victim died on account of the shooting. This was not a case where, 

for example, the forensic testimony on the angle of the bullet wound told the difference between 

murder and accidental death. This was a multiple bullet wound death where the assailant had 

emptied his .22 caliber weapon into the victim. While the testimony of the expert may have been 

required as a formality to place into the record a scientific cause of death, it was hardly material 

in the Brady sense vis-à-vis the shooter.4

 

4

 As the Court of Appeal found: 

Here, the record makes clear Dr. Gill's testimony was far from the 

only evidence linking defendant to the murder. In fact, Dr. Gill's 

opinions regarding the cause and medical details of Rucks's nonaccidental death were not challenged by the defense at trial or on 

appeal and are, in any event, corroborated by testimony from 

eyewitnesses at the scene who described hearing two to three 

gunshots, a pause, follow[ed] by several more gunshots (for a total 

of eight to 10 bullets). For example, several witnesses, including 

Matias Santini and Stephen Allen, who were working in an office 

building across the street from the Marina Apartments, testified that 

they first heard two or three gunshots and then, looking in the 

direction of those shots, saw the shooter, who was identified by two 

people as defendant (Shay and Lazzarotto), fire several more shots 

into another man lying just steps away on the sidewalk. Consistent 

with their testimony, Shay, who was in another apartment on the 

second floor of the same complex, heard several gunshots, ran 

outside, and saw Rucks lying on the side while defendant, holding a 

gun, was standing on the passenger side of a car parked on the 

street about 25 feet away. [footnote omitted.] In addition, Shay 

described watching as Rucks took his last few breaths just moments 

later. And police clerk Angela Cunha, who was present for the 

autopsy, observed about eight to 10 bullets being removed from 

Rucks's body. Finally, defendant's own lawfully-obtained 

admissions to police detectives of having fired at least five shots 

into Rucks were consistent with the testimony of these witnesses, 

and essentially put to rest any doubt as to his guilt. To the extent 

defendant's role in Rucks's death was a matter of dispute, it was his 

intent, not his manner of inflicting death, that was put to the jury. 

Under these circumstances, even assuming Dr. Gill's credibility as a 

witness would have been undermined by admission of the identified 

newly-discovered evidence, we nonetheless have no trouble 

concluding the jury's assessment of defendant's guilt would not 

have been materially affected. (See People v. Delgado, supra, 5 

Cal.4th at p. 328.) Thus, we conclude the trial court acted well 

within the scope of its discretion in denying defendant's motion for 

new trial. 

People v. McGary, 2013 WL 6713222, at *13. 

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The Court of Appeal was not AEDPA unreasonable in rejecting this claim. 

Conclusion

 Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, this court must 

issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant. A 

certificate of appealability may issue only “if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the 

denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). For the reasons set forth in these 

findings and recommendations, a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right has 

not been made in this case. 

 Petitioner’s claims in this habeas action have no ultimate merit. Accordingly, IT IS 

HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 

 1. The petition be denied; and 

 2. The District Court decline to issue a certificate of appealability. 

 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, petitioner may file written 

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge's 

Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the objections shall be filed and served within 

fourteen days after service of the objections. Petitioner is advised that failure to file objections 

within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court's order. Martinez v. 

Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Dated: October 2, 2016 

 /s/ Gregory G. Hollows 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

/McGary-Final 

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Appendix A 

AEDPA Standards 

The statutory limitations of federal courts' power to issue habeas corpus relief for persons 

in state custody is provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective 

Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). The text of § 2254(d) states: 

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on 

the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim– 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of 

the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 

 For purposes of applying § 2254(d)(1), clearly established federal law consists of holdings 

of the United States Supreme Court at the time of the last reasoned state court decision. 

Thompson v. Runnels, 705 F.3d 1089, 1096 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Greene v. Fisher, ___ U.S. 

____, ____, 132 S.Ct. 38, 44 (2011); Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 859 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing 

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405–06, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (2000)). Circuit precedent may not be 

“used to refine or sharpen a general principle of Supreme Court jurisprudence into a specific legal 

rule that th[e] [Supreme] Court has not announced.” Marshall v. Rodgers, ___ U.S. ____, ____, 

133 S.Ct. 1446, 1450 (2013) (citing Parker v. Matthews, ___ U.S. ____, ____, 132 S.Ct. 2148, 

2155 (2012)). Nor may it be used to “determine whether a particular rule of law is so widely 

accepted among the Federal Circuits that it would, if presented to th[e] [Supreme] Court, be 

accepted as correct. Id. 

A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if it applies a rule 

contradicting a holding of the Supreme Court or reaches a result different from Supreme Court 

precedent on “materially indistinguishable” facts. Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 640, 123 S.Ct. 

1848 (2003). Under the “unreasonable application” clause of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court 

may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from the 

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Supreme Court's decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's 

case. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75, 123 S.Ct. 1166 (2003); Williams, 529 U.S. at 413; 

Chia v. Cambra, 360 F.3d 997, 1002 (9th Cir. 2004). In this regard, a federal habeas court “may 

not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the 

relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. 

Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. See also Schriro 

v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473, 127 S.Ct. 1933 (2007); Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75 (it is “not 

enough that a federal habeas court, in its independent review of the legal question, is left with a 

‘firm conviction’ that the state court was ‘erroneous.’ ”). “A state court's determination that a 

claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on 

the correctness of the state court's decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101, 131 S.Ct. 

770 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664, 124 S.Ct. 2140 (2004)). 

Accordingly, “[a]s a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner 

must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so 

lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law 

beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103. 

The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state court 

judgment. Stanley, 633 F.3d at 859; Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). 

If the last reasoned state court decision adopts or substantially incorporates the reasoning from a 

previous state court decision, this court may consider both decisions to ascertain the reasoning of 

the last decision. Edwards v. Lamarque, 475 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). 

“[Section] 2254(d) does not require a state court to give reasons before its decision can be 

deemed to have been ‘adjudicated on the merits.’” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 100. Rather, “[w]hen 

a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it may be 

presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication 

or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.” Id. at 784-85. This presumption may be 

overcome by a showing “there is reason to think some other explanation for the state court's 

decision is more likely.” Id. at 785 (citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803, 111 S.Ct. 

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2590 (1991)). Similarly, when a state court decision on a petitioner's claims rejects some claims 

but does not expressly address a federal claim, a federal habeas court must presume, subject to 

rebuttal, that the federal claim was adjudicated on the merits. Johnson v. Williams, ___ U.S. 

____, ____, 133 S.Ct. 1088, 1091 (2013). 

When it is clear, however, that a state court has not reached the merits of a petitioner's 

claim, the deferential standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) does not apply and a federal 

habeas court must review the claim de novo. Stanley, 633 F.3d at 860. 

 The state courts need not have cited to federal authority, or even have indicated awareness 

of federal authority in arriving at their decision. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8, 123 S.Ct. 362, 

365 (2002). Where the state court reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to 

support its conclusion, a federal habeas court independently reviews the record to determine 

whether habeas corpus relief is available under § 2254(d). Stanley, 633 F.3d at 860; Himes v. 

Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). “Independent review of the record is not de novo 

review of the constitutional issue, but rather, the only method by which we can determine whether 

a silent state court decision is objectively unreasonable.” Himes, 336 F.3d at 853. Where no 

reasoned decision is available, the habeas petitioner still has the burden of “showing there was no 

reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 98. A summary 

denial is presumed to be a denial on the merits of the petitioner's claims. Stancle v. Clay, 692 

F.3d 948, 957 & n. 3 (9th Cir. 2012). While the federal court cannot analyze just what the state 

court did when it issued a summary denial, the federal court must review the state court record to 

determine whether there was any “reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” Harrington, 

562 U.S. at 98. This court “must determine what arguments or theories...could have supported, 

the state court's decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could 

disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of 

[the Supreme] Court.” Id. at 786. “Evaluating whether a rule application was unreasonable 

requires considering the rule's specificity. The more general the rule, the more leeway courts 

have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations.’” Id. Emphasizing the stringency of 

this standard, which “stops short of imposing a complete bar of federal court relitigation of claims 

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already rejected in state court proceedings[,]” the Supreme Court has cautioned that “even a 

strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable.” Id. 

The petitioner bears “the burden to demonstrate that ‘there was no reasonable basis for the state 

court to deny relief.’” Walker v. Martel, 709 F.3d 925, 939 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Harrington, 

562 U.S. at 98). 

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