Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca6-17-06340/USCOURTS-ca6-17-06340-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 

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NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

File Name: 19a0527n.06

Case Nos. 17-6340/6343

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

ROBBIE BATEMAN,

Respondent-Appellee.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED 

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 

THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF 

TENNESSEE

OPINION 

BEFORE: BOGGS, BATCHELDER, and DONALD, Circuit Judges.

BERNICE BOUIE DONALD, Circuit Judge. Robbie Bateman (“Bateman”) pleaded 

guilty to and was convicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm. Based on Bateman’s prior 

convictions, the Government sought and obtained an enhanced sentence under the Armed Career 

Criminal Act (“ACCA”). He was sentenced to 188 months’ imprisonment. Following the 

Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (striking down the 

ACCA’s residual clause), Bateman filed for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, challenging his 

sentence enhancement. Bateman contended that his seven prior convictions for Tennesseeaggravated burglary no longer qualified as violent felonies under the ACCA. The district court 

stayed his petition pending the resolution of the same claim before this Court in United States v. 

Stitt. 860 F.3d 854 (6th Cir. 2017) (en banc) [hereinafter Stitt I]. In Stitt I, we held that Tennessee’s 

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aggravated-burglary statute does not qualify as an enumerated offense under the ACCA. Id. at 

857. Following Stitt I, the district court granted Bateman’s petition, vacated his original sentence,

and ordered resentencing. The Supreme Court, however, reversed the decision of the en banc

court. United States v. Stitt, 139 S. Ct. 399, 408 (2018) [hereinafter Stitt II]. The government now 

appeals the district court’s granting of Bateman’s habeas petition in light of Stitt II and seeks 

reinstatement of Bateman’s original sentence.

Bateman advances two grounds opposing reversal. First, Bateman claims that Tennessee’s 

definition of “entry” is broader than the ACCA’s, such that it considers attempted burglary as 

completed burglary. Bateman contends that because an attempted burglary does not qualify as a 

generic burglary, it does not qualify as a violent felony under the ACCA. Bateman’s position has 

already been before this Court, and we are bound by our prior decisions that a violation of the 

Tennessee-aggravated burglary statute qualifies as a violent felony. Brumbach v. United States, 

929 F.3d 791, 795 (6th Cir. 2019); see United States v. Nance, 481 F.3d 882, 888 (6th Cir. 2007).

Second, Bateman asserts that the approved evidence available to the government cannot 

conclusively establish that his predicate offenses under the ACCA were committed on three 

separate occasions, as required by 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). This argument was not before the district 

court in Bateman’s original petition or supplement to his petition and is raised here for the first 

time. Ordinarily, “‘issues not presented to the district court but raised for the first time on appeal 

are not properly before the court.’” Foster v. Barilow, 6 F.3d 405, 407 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoting 

J.C. Wyckoff & Assocs., Inc. v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 936 F.2d 1474, 1488 (6th Cir. 1991)). 

There are, to be sure, some exceptions, such as when faced with “exceptional cases,” “particular 

circumstances,” or times when the rule would produce “a plain miscarriage of justice.” Pinney 

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Dock & Transp. Co. v. Penn Cent. Corp., 838 F.2d 1445, 1461 (6th Cir. 1988) (quoting Hormel v. 

Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 558 (1941)). 

Even if Bateman’s claim was within the bounds of these narrow exceptions, it nevertheless 

fails as untimely. Section 2255(f) places a one-year period of limitations on all § 2255 petitions 

for relief, running from the latest of any of the following:

(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final;

(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by governmental 

action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, 

if the movant was prevented from making a motion by such governmental 

action;

(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme 

Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made 

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have 

been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). Unlike Bateman’s original petition which, by relying on Johnson, satisfied 

category three, Bateman’s new claim that he does not have three qualifying ACCA predicates does 

not rely on any newly recognized right. Instead, Bateman bases his assertion on United States v. 

King, 853 F.3d 267 (6th Cir. 2017), where this Court applied the standards approved in Shepard 

v. United States, decided over nine years before his petition. 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005) (limiting the 

class of documents used by a court to determine of what crime and elements a defendant was 

convicted). 

Because Bateman’s claim for relief on these new grounds does not meet any of the 

alternative limitations periods,1he was required to file it within one year of his conviction 

 

1 Bateman does not offer any reason why his § 2255 petition satisfies the second or fourth oneyear limitations categories.

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becoming final. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1). Bateman’s conviction became final on February 29, 

2012. Bateman’s § 2255 motion was not filed until June 18, 2014, over two years after his 

conviction became final. Therefore, Bateman’s alternative argument is untimely. 

For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the district court’s grant of habeas relief, and 

REMAND with instructions to reinstate the original sentence. 

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