Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_18-cv-04482/USCOURTS-cand-5_18-cv-04482-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEVEN F. MAUCK,

Plaintiff,

v.

CHARLES J. MCKEE, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.18-cv-04482-NC 

ORDER GRANTING 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 

DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO 

AMEND

Re: Dkt. No. 14

Before the Court is defendants County of Monterey, the County of Monterey Board 

of Supervisors (“Board”), and various county officials’ motion to dismiss plaintiff Steven 

F. Mauck’s first amended complaint alleging retaliation and fraud. See Dkt. No. 14. The 

Court finds that Mauck’s constitutional claims against the Board and its individual 

members are barred by legislative immunity. In addition, Mauck’s tort and contract claims 

are time-barred under California’s Government Claims Act. Accordingly, the Court 

GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss with leave to amend.

I. Background

A. Allegations in the Complaint

The Court assumes the factual allegations in Mauck’s complaint are true solely for 

the purpose of deciding this motion.

Mauck began working for the County in 2004 as its “Risk Manager,” heading the 

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County’s statutorily-mandated Risk Management Division. FAC ¶¶ 2, 26–27. Until 2012, 

the Risk Management Division was under the purview of the County’s Chief 

Administrative Officer (“CAO”). Id. ¶¶ 19, 26. Mauck’s duties included administering 

and overseeing the County’s self-insurance program, which handled claims relating to 

general liability and workers’ compensation. Id. ¶¶ 25, 28. Mauck was also responsible 

for contracting with and supervising Third Party Administrators (“TPA”) hired by the 

County to adjust, investigate, and settle claims against the County. Id. ¶ 28.

In 2011, the County conducted a job and wage study regarding Mauck’s position. 

Id. ¶ 30. That study concluded that Mauck’s position should be reclassified as Director of 

Risk Management, which would increase Mauck’s pay grade, resulting in a pay raise from 

approximately $125,000 per year to $160,000 per year. Id. ¶¶ 30, 145. In late 2011, the 

County Counsel, defendant Charles J. McKee, approached Mauck with a proposal to 

transfer the Risk Management Division to the Office of County Counsel (“OCC”) and 

reclassify Mauck as the Director of Risk Management. Id. ¶¶ 20, 31. Mauck agreed to 

McKee’s proposal. Id. ¶ 31.

In early March 2012, Mauck interviewed for a Director of Risk Management 

position with the County of Los Angeles with a base salary of $160,000 to $249,000 per 

year plus benefits. Id. ¶ 145. According to the recruiter, Mauck was the only “strong 

candidate” for the position. Id. Believing that McKee and the County would reclassify 

him as a Director, Mauck discontinued his pursuit of the Los Angeles County position. Id.

¶ 147.

On March 20, 2012, McKee presented a proposal to the Board that would transfer 

the Risk Management Division to the OCC. Id. ¶ 32. The proposal would also reclassify

Mauck’s position as the “Principal Risk and Benefits Analyst,” instead of the “Director of 

Risk Management.” Id. Under this proposal, Mauck’s pay grade would not increase to 

“Director” level. Id. ¶¶ 32, 35. The Board approved McKee’s proposal on April 10, 2012. 

Id. ¶¶ 32, 34.

From April 2012 to early 2016, Mauck pressed McKee and the County about 

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McKee’s promise to promote him to Director of Risk Management. Id. ¶ 36. McKee 

continued to reassure Mauck that the promotion would eventually happen. Id.

At the same time, McKee changed the County’s claims review process by requiring 

all insurance and litigation claims to be reviewed by OCC attorneys instead of Risk 

Management employees and the TPA. Id. ¶ 38. Under McKee’s direction, the OCC also 

stopped complying with federal and state tax reporting requirements. Id. As a result, in 

March 2015, Mauck reported McKee’s refusal to comply with federal and state reporting 

requirements to the County’s Auditor-Controller. Id. ¶ 39. The Auditor-Controller 

retained an outside Certified Public Accounting (“CPA”) firm to investigate the OCC in 

August 2015. Id.

On February 16, 2016, the CPA firm sent a draft report regarding its investigation to 

McKee for comment or correction. Id. ¶ 41. The report concluded that the County’s 

claims review process failed to comply with County ordinances, the terms of County’s 

TPA contract, and tax reporting requirements. Id. On February 24, 2016, Mauck was 

ordered to meet with McKee’s chief assistant county counsel and senior deputy regarding 

the OCC’s response to the CPA’s draft report. Id. ¶ 42. Mauck was told to “get on the 

same page” with the OCC’s response to the report. Id.

On April 15, 2016, the Auditor-Controller sent the CPA firm’s final report to the 

Chairman of the Board, defendant Jane Parker. Id. ¶ 43. The OCC contacted Mauck on 

May 6, 2016, asking Mauck to “fight back” against the CPA’s final report. Id. ¶ 44. On 

May 12, 2016, Mauck emailed McKee explaining that he agreed with the majority of the 

CPA’s report. Id. On May 16, 2016, McKee demanded that Mauck change his position 

and retract his May 12, 2016 email. Id. ¶ 45. Mauck refused. Id.

Despite the CPA’s report, over the next year, the OCC continued to misappropriate 

County funds, allow excessive billing for legal services by outside and in-house counsel, 

and violate best practices for claims processing. See id. ¶¶ 46–58.

On March 22, 2017, Mauck emailed the Auditor-Controller complaining about the 

OCC’s claim handling practices, conflicts of interest within the OCC, and argued that the 

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Risk Management Division should be removed from the purview of the OCC. Id. ¶ 60. 

Mauck emailed the Auditor-Controller again on April 28, 2017, complaining that the OCC 

was still not properly handling claims and that McKee was pressuring him to sign off on 

claims settlements. Id. ¶ 61. On April 10, 2017, Mauck met with the County’s District 

Attorney Office to report misconduct by the OCC and McKee including non-compliance 

with tax law, interference with TPA contracts, excessive legal billing, misappropriation of 

funds, and entering into non-standard contracts. Id. ¶¶ 62. Mauck delivered letters to each 

Board member—defendants Parker, Luis Alejo, John M. Phillips, Simon Salinas, and 

Mary Adams—detailing the issues he reported to the District Attorney. Id. ¶ 63.

On December 13, 2017, the Auditor-Controller submitted the CPA firm’s report and 

recommendations to the Board. Id. ¶ 64. The Auditor-Controller explained that the long 

delay between the report’s finalization and its presentation to the Board was due to the

Auditor-Controller’s unsuccessful attempts to reach an agreement with the OCC on how to 

proceed and its difficulty in getting the matter scheduled with the Board. Id. In its 

presentation, the Auditor-Controller recommended that the Board adopt corrective actions 

outlined in the report, which included separating the Risk Management Division from the 

OCC. Id.

The Board met again on January 23, 2018, regarding the CPA firm’s report. Id.

¶ 65. At this meeting, the Board largely declined to adopt the recommendations made in 

the CPA report. Id. Instead, the Board decided to keep the Risk Management Division 

under the purview of the OCC and ordered the OCC to draft amendments to the County 

Code addressing the issues highlighted by the report. Id. On January 30, 2018, and 

February 13, 2018, the Board adopted resolutions submitted by the OCC that amended the 

County Code. Id. ¶ 71. These amendments broadened the scope of the OCC’s risk 

management authority and eliminated Mauck’s risk management position. Id.

At McKee’s direction, on March 15, 2018, Mauck’s duties were “reorganized” to 

include only supervision of the County’s Safety Program and Ergonomics program, which 

takes less than 5% of Mauck’s time. Id. ¶ 69.

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Mauck filed government claims with the County and Board on January 30, 2018. 

Id. ¶ 73. Those claims were denied by the County Clerk on February 7, 2018, and 

February 8, 2018. Id. Mauck also filed discrimination and harassment claims with 

California’s Department of Fair Employment and Housing (“DFEH”) under the Fair 

Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), Cal.Gov. Code § 12900 et seq., on July 23, 

2018. DFEH closed Mauck’s case and issued a “Right to Sue” letter on July 23, 2018. Id.

¶ 74.

B. Procedural Background

On August 24, 2018, Mauck filed his first amended complaint alleging (1) violation 

of his First Amendment rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) violation of his Fourteenth 

Amendment Due Process rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (3) unlawful retaliation 

under Cal. Lab. Code § 1102.5; (4) age discrimination under Cal. Gov. Code §§ 12940(a), 

12941; (5) hostile work environment and age-related harassment under Cal. Gov. Code 

§ 12940(j); (6) intentional misrepresentation; (7) promise without intent to perform; and 

(8) unpaid salary and retirement benefits. See Dkt. No. 9. Defendants moved to dismiss 

Mauck’s amended complaint on September 13, 2018. See Dkt. No. 14. The motion is now 

fully briefed and the Court held a hearing on the motion on October 24, 2018. See Dkt. 

Nos. 17, 18, 26. All parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge. See

Dkt. Nos. 4, 16.

II. Legal Standard

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal 

sufficiency of a complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). On a 

motion to dismiss, all allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the 

light most favorable to the non-movant. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337–

38 (9th Cir. 1996). The Court, however, need not accept as true “allegations that are 

merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re 

Gilead Scis. Secs. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008). Although a complaint need 

not allege detailed factual allegations, it must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as 

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true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible when it “allows the court to draw 

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft 

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 

If a court grants a motion to dismiss, leave to amend should be granted unless the 

pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts. Lopez v. Smith, 203 

F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) (“The court should freely 

give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.”).

III. Discussion

A. First and Fourteenth Amendment Claims

Mauck’s first and second claims allege constitutional violations pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants contend that these claims must be dismissed as to the Board 

Defendants.

1

 Specifically, Defendants argue that the Board Defendants cannot be sued in 

their individual capacity because the only allegations in Mauck’s first amended complaint 

relating to the Board Defendants are (1) their January 23, 2018, order; (2) the January 30, 

2018, resolutions; and (3) the February 13, 2018, resolutions. See FAC ¶¶ 65, 71. 

Defendants contend that these allegations relate to legislative acts and the Board 

Defendants have absolute immunity for legislative acts. Defendants also argue that 

Mauck’s claims against the Board Defendants in their official capacity are duplicative of 

his claims against the County. The Court considers each argument separately.

1. Whether Board Defendants Have Legislative Immunity

“[L]egislators are absolutely immune from liability under § 1983 for their 

legislative acts.” Kaahumanu v. County of Maui, 315 F.3d 1215, 1219 (9th Cir. 2003). 

The Ninth Circuit applies a four-factor test to determine whether an act is legislative: “(1) 

whether the act involves ad hoc decisionmaking, or the formulation of policy; (2) whether 

the act applies to a few individuals, or to the public at large; (3) whether the act is formally 

 

1 The Board Defendants are the County of Monterey Board of Supervisors, Luis Alejo, 

John M. Phillips, Simon Salinas, Jane Parker, and Mary Adams. See FAC ¶ 16. 

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legislative in character; and (4) whether it bears all the hallmarks of traditional legislation.” 

Id. at 1220 (internal quotation marks omitted). “The first two factors are largely related, as 

are the last two factors, and they are not mutually exclusive.” Cmty. House v. City of 

Boise, 623 F.3d 945, 960 (citing Kaahumanu, 315 F.3d at 1220). In addition, “the inquiry 

into whether the officials’ actions were legislative must be ‘stripped of all considerations 

of intent and motive.’” Id. (quoting Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 55 (1998)).

a. Ad Hoc Decisionmaking or Formulation of Policy

A decision is ad hoc if it is “taken based on the circumstances of [a] particular case” 

and “does not effectuate policy or create a binding rule of conduct.” Kaahumanu, 315 

F.3d at 1220. It “is made with a particular end or purpose, as distinguished from a 

coordinated policy.” Cmty. House, 623 F.3d at 961 (internal citations and quotation marks 

omitted).

In Bogan, the Supreme Court recognized that “the termination of a position . . .

unlike the hiring or firing of a particular employee, may have prospective implications that 

reach well beyond the particular occupant of the office.” Bogan, 523 U.S. at 56. Thus, 

official acts that eliminate employment positions are “undoubtedly legislative.” Id. Ninth 

Circuit law is in accord. “Budgetary decisions, such as a decision to eliminate an 

employment position, typically involve the formulation of policy.” Cmty. House, 623 F.3d 

at 961 (citing Bechard v. Rappold, 287 F.3d 827, 830 (9th Cir. 2002)). “[D]ecisions 

directed toward specific individuals, such as a decision to indemnify a government 

employee, are normally considered to be ad hoc.” Id. (citing Trevino v. Gates, 23 F.3d 

1480, 1482 (9th Cir. 1994)).

Board Defendants’ actions in this case were not ad hoc. The January 23, 2018, 

board meeting directed the OCC to conduct quintessentially policy-making actions: 

drafting amendments to the local Code. Similarly, the January 30 and February 13, 2018, 

resolutions involve the formulation of policy because those resolutions eliminated the risk 

management position entirely.

The fact that the targeted positions were held only by Mauck does not help him. 

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Kaahumanu and Kuznich v. County of Santa Clara, 689 F.2d 1345 (9th Cir. 1982) are 

instructive. In Kuznich, the Ninth Circuit held that the enactment of a county zoning 

ordinance was not ad hoc even though it had the practical effect of shutting down a 

plaintiff’s adult businesses because the zoning ordinance was generally applicable. 

Kuznich, 689 F.2d at 1348. By contrast, the court held in Kaahumanu that a conditional 

use permit was ad hoc because granting or denying a use permit was required an 

individualized, case-by-case determination. Kaahumanu,315 F.3d at 1221–22. Here, the 

Board Defendants’ actions had the practical effect of eliminating Mauck’s position. But 

the Board Defendants’ actions were generally applicable and had broader policy 

implications, such as expanding the scope of the OCC and preventing future applicants

from being employed as a “Risk Manager.”

Mauck counters that the Board’s actions had the singular goal of stripping him of all 

risk management job duties. He argues that the Board made these decisions in retaliation 

for his reporting of McKee and the OCC’s misconduct and, as a result, were specifically 

directed against him. However, the Supreme Court specifically instructed in Bogan that 

the legislative act analysis must be “stripped of all considerations of intent and motive.” 

Bogan, 523 U.S. at 55. Therefore, it is immaterial that the Board may have acted in 

retaliation for Mauck’s reporting. Accordingly, this factor supports a finding that the 

Board Defendants’ acts were legislative.

b. Application to a Few Individuals or to the Public at Large

Legislative immunity is disfavored for acts that apply to a few individuals rather 

than the public at large. Kaahumanu, 315 F.3d at 1222. However, “[a]n act need not 

affect a city’s entire population in order to be considered legislative. It is sufficient that 

the act affects a discrete group of people or places. Cmty. House, 623 F.3d at 960 (citing 

Kaahumanu, 315 F.3d at 1220).

This factor also supports a finding that the Board Defendants’ acts were legislative. 

The Board Defendants’ acts reached beyond Mauck; they affected every party involved in 

with the County’s risk management procedures. For example, the FAC alleged that the 

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Board Defendants’ February 13, 2018, resolution “[e]liminated a Risk Manager or ThirdParty Administrator in the claims process.” FAC ¶ 71(f)(3). The FAC also alleged that 

the County Counsel and the OCC was given increased duties and responsibilities regarding 

risk management. Id. ¶ 71(f)(1)–(2). These allegations demonstrate that the Board 

Defendants’ acts “affects a discrete group of people.” Cmty. House, 623 F.3d at 960. Put 

differently, these acts changed the way the County approaches risk management, which 

will impact more than just a few individuals. This factor supports a finding that the Board 

Defendants’ acts were legislative.

c. Whether the Act is Formally Legislative in Character

“The ‘formally legislative character’ of an act—i.e., the fact that a decision was 

made by voting or through an equivalent legislative procedure—‘weighs in favor of 

legislative immunity, [but] it does not itself decide the issue.’ Schmidt v. Contra Costa 

Cnty., 693 F.3d 1122, 1137 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Kaahumanu, 315 F.3d at 1223.) “The 

act of voting on and passing ordinances and resolutions pursuant to correct legislative 

procedures is ‘formally and indisputably legislative.’” Id. (quoting Cmty. House, 623 F.3d

at 960). Here, the FAC alleged that the Board Defendants conducted their acts at official 

board meetings and adopted resolutions at those meetings. See FAC ¶¶ 65, 71. Mauck 

does not allege that the Board Defendants skirted “correct legislative procedure.” Schmidt, 

693 F.3d at 1137. Accordingly, this factor supports a finding that the Board Defendants’ 

acts were legislative in character.

d. Hallmarks of Traditional Legislation

“The hallmarks of traditional legislation include the use of discretion, the making of 

policy that implicates budgetary priorities and the provision of services, and prospective 

implications that reach beyond the particular persons immediately impacted.” Id.

In this case, all three hallmarks are present. First, Mauck’s complaint contained no 

allegations suggesting that the Board Defendants’ acts were not discretionary. See id. 

Second, the resolutions adopted by the Board Defendants also implicates the County’s 

provision of services. In particular, the resolutions eliminated the Risk Manager position 

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(see id. ¶ 71(f)(1)), granted the OCC greater discretion to hire outside counsel where the 

cost was less than $100,000 (see FAC ¶ 71(f)(2)), and eliminated the TPA from the claims 

process (see id. ¶ 71(f)(3)). All three of these actions alter the manner which the County 

conducts risk management, which has the potential to affect the County’s ability to handle 

claims. Finally, the Board Defendants’ acts have “prospective implications that reach 

beyond” Mauck. Schmidt, 693 F.3d at 1137. Most obviously, the elimination of the risk 

manager position impacts not only Mauck, but all future applicants for the position as well. 

See id. at 1138 (citing Bogan, 523 U.S. at 56). Therefore, the Board Defendants’ acts bore 

the hallmarks of traditional legislation and this factor also supports a finding that the Board 

Defendants’ acts were legislative in character.

All four Kaahumanu factors support a finding that the Board Defendants’ acts were 

legislative in character. Accordingly, the Board Defendants are entitled to legislative 

immunity and the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss Mauck’s first and 

second claim against the Board Defendants in their individual capacity.

2. Whether the First and Second Claims are Duplicative

Official-capacity suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against government officials 

“generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an 

officer is an agent.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 426 U.S. 658, 690 

n.55; see also Fisher v. Kealoha, 869 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1215 (D. Haw. 2012). Thus, “an 

official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against that 

entity . . . for the real party in interest is the entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 

166 (1985). As a result, courts have routinely dismissed suits against municipal officials 

sued in their official capacity as duplicative when the municipal entity itself is also being 

sued. See Fisher, 869 F. Supp. 2d at 1215; Vance v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 928 F. Supp. 

993, 996 (N.D. Cal. 1996).

Here, Mauck is also suing the County for the same First and Fourteenth 

Amendment violations under § 1983. Thus, his claims against the Board Defendants in 

their official capacity are duplicative. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ 

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motion to dismiss Mauck’s first and second claim against the Board Defendants in their 

official capacity. 

B. Tort and Contract Claims

1. Whether the Government Claims Act Bars Mauck’s Tort Claims

California’s Government Claims Act (“GCA”) requires plaintiffs to “present[] . . . 

all claims for money or damages against local public entities” before filing suit. Cal. Gov. 

Code § 905. California courts have interpreted the GCA broadly, applying it to claims for 

personal injury, property damage, and contract. See City of Stockton v. Super. Ct., 42 Cal. 

4th 730, 738 (2007). The GCA also applies to claims “against a public employee or 

former public employee for injury resulting from an act or omission in the scope of his 

employment as a public employee . . . .” Cal. Gov. Code § 950.2. Depending on the type 

of claim, a plaintiff must present his claim to the local public entity “not later than six 

months after the accrual of the cause of action [or] not later than one year after the accrual 

of the cause of action.” Cal. Gov. Code § 911.2.

Mauck’s sixth and seventh claims were based on McKee’s allegedly fraudulent 

representations made between April 10, 2012 through February 2016. See FAC ¶¶ 153, 

171. Mauck alleged that he did not discover the falsity of McKee’s representations until 

September 2016 at the latest. See id. However, Mauck did not present his sixth and 

seventh claims to the County Clerk until January 30, 2018. See FAC ¶ 73. By his own 

allegations, Mauck plainly failed to timely present his government claims regardless 

whether the six month or one year limitations period applies.

Mauck argues that the GCA does not apply because his sixth and seventh claims are 

asserted against McKee in his individual capacity. See Dkt. No. 17 at 16. However, 

whether Mauck asserts his claim against McKee in his individual or official capacity is 

irrelevant; the GCA covers all claims “resulting from an act or omission in the scope of 

McKee’s employment as a public employee.” Cal. Gov. Code § 950.2. An individual acts 

within the scope of his employment if “in the context of the particular enterprise an 

employee's conduct is not so unusual or startling that it would seem unfair to include the 

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loss resulting from it among other costs of the employer's business.” Mary M. v. City of 

Los Angeles, 54 Cal. 3d 202, 209 (1991) (quoting Perez v. Van Groningen & Sons, Inc., 41 

Cal. 3d 962, 968 (1986)). “Tortious conduct that violates an employee’s official duties or 

disregards an employer’s express orders may nonetheless be within the scope of 

employment.” Id.

Here, McKee’s actions are well within his scope of employment. In related 

contexts, California courts have recognized that hiring, firing, demotion or failure to 

promote are employment actions. See Jones v. Dep’t of Corrs. & Rehab., 152 Cal. App. 

4th 1367, 1381 (2007) (discussing employment actions in the context of employment 

discrimination claims). McKee’s promise to “take care of [the pay raise]” and “talk[] to 

Human Resources” about Mauck’s promotion to Director are classic employment actions 

well within McKee’s scope of employment as County Counsel and Mauck’s superior. 

FAC ¶ 36.

Because Mauck failed to timely present his tort claims to the County in accordance 

with the GCA, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss Mauck’s sixth and 

seventh claims against McKee.

2. Whether the Government Claims Act Bars Mauck’s Unpaid Wages 

and Retirement Benefits Claim

Defendants argue that Mauck’s eighth claim is a breach of oral contract claim based 

on McKee’s promise to promote him to Director and give him a corresponding pay raise. 

See Dkt. No. 14 at 8. Thus, Defendants reason that Mauck’s eighth claim is time-barred 

along with his sixth and seventh claims. Mauck does not challenge Defendants’ 

characterization of his eighth claim as a breach of oral contract claim. See Dkt. No. 17 at 

17. Rather, Mauck argues that the GCA does not apply because his unpaid wages/breach 

of oral contract claim is specifically exempted from the GCA.

California Government Code § 905(c) exempts “[c]laims by public employees for 

fees, salaries, wages, mileage, or other expenses or allowances” from the GCA’s claim 

presentation requirements. Similarly, § 905(f) exempts “[a]pplications or claims for 

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money or benefits under any public retirement or pension system.” Loehr v. Ventura 

County Community College District, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1071 (1983) is instructive.

In Loehr, a plaintiff sued the Ventura County Community College District for 

wrongful termination of his employment contract three years before its expiration. Id. at 

1077. The plaintiff’s claims, including a claim for breach of contract, were dismissed for 

failure to comply with the GCA’s reporting requirements. Id. at 1078. After concluding 

that the GCA applied to contract claims generally, the Court of Appeal recognized that 

California courts have narrowly construed the exemptions in §§ 905(c) and (f) to apply 

only to “salaries and wages [and benefits] which have been earned but not paid.” Id. at 

1080. Because the plaintiff’s breach of contract claim sought “to obtain monetary 

damages for defendants’ alleged misconduct in preventing him from rendering services 

through which he might have acquired a vested right to additional amounts in salary and 

benefits[,]” the court concluded that the exemptions did not apply. Id. at 1081.

Here, Mauck’s eighth claim for unpaid wages is premised on a theory that 

Defendants owed him additional wages because they promised to promote him to Director 

of Risk Management. See FAC ¶ 180. In reliance on this promise, Mauck performed 

duties equivalent to that of a Director and “earned” those wages. Id. Thus, according to 

Mauck, he is entitled to the difference between the minimum salary of $160,000 for 

Director-level positions and the $125,000 salary that he was actually paid. See id. ¶ 192. 

Assuming, arguendo, that Defendants’ promise to promote him is enforceable, the 

§§ 905(c) and (f) exemptions only apply if Mauck “earned” the difference in salary. On 

the other hand, if the $35,000 difference in annual salary was not earned by Mauck, the 

§§ 905(c) and (f) exemptions do not apply and Mauck’s eighth claim is time-barred.

Mauck has not alleged facts showing that he earned the difference between the 

minimum salary of $160,000 and his actual salary of $125,000. In the context of overtime 

pay, the California Supreme Court stated that “[a] public employee is entitled only to such 

compensation as is expressly and specifically provided by law.” Longshore v. Cnty. of 

Ventura, 25 Cal. 3d 14, 22–23 (1979) (citing Van Riessen v. City of Santa Monica, 63 Cal. 

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App. 3d 193, 199–201 (1976)). “The statutory compensation rights of public employees 

are strictly limited and cannot be altered or enlarged by conflicting agreements between 

the public agency and its employee.” Id. at 23 (citing Miller v. State of California, 18 Cal. 

3d 808, 814 (1977)).

In his first amended complaint and opposition, Mauck points to no law “expressly 

and specifically provid[ing]” that he was entitled to the Director position or that he was 

owed a salary of $160,000. Indeed, it is not clear how he could do so. The crux of 

Mauck’s sixth through eighth claims is that the County and McKee promised to create a 

Director of Risk Management position with an appropriate salary, but failed to do so. 

Mauck cannot recover wages for a non-existent position.

The only fact Mauck alleges in support of his claim that he “earned” a $160,000 

salary is the 2011 job and wage study, which concluded that Mauck’s position “should be 

reclassified as Director, Risk Management.” FAC ¶ 30. But the County did not act on that 

study (see id.) and Mauck offers no authority for the proposition that an unadopted job and 

wage study recommending that a county create a position is sufficient to “expressly and 

specifically provide” increased compensation to an employee. Longshore, 25 Cal. 3d at 

23. Nor did Mauck allege that he gained increased responsibilities any time during his 

employment with the County. On the contrary, Mauck’s first amended complaint suggests 

that the scope of his duties was well established when he was hired as the “Principle Risk 

and Benefits Analyst” in 2004. See FAC ¶ 28.

Rather, Mauck’s claim is more accurately characterized as a claim for damages 

arising from Defendants’ breach of contract. Cf. Loehr, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1080–81 

(claim arising from alleged breach of contract preventing a public employee from 

“rendering services through which he might have acquired a vested right to additional 

amounts in salary or benefits” are not exempted). Because the §§ 905(c) and (f) 

exemptions do not apply, Mauck’s eighth claim is time-barred. Accordingly, the Court 

GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss Mauck’s eighth claim.

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IV. Conclusion

The Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss with leave to amend. 

Accordingly, Mauck’s first and second claim against defendants County of Monterey 

Board of Supervisors, Luis Alejo, John M. Phillips, Simon Salinas, Jane Parker, and Mary 

Adams is dismissed with leave to amend. Mauck’s sixth and seventh claims against 

McKee is dismissed with leave to amend. And Mauck’s eighth claim against the County is 

also dismissed with leave to amend.

Mauck’s amended complaint, if any, must be filed within 14 days of this order. The 

amended complaint may not add any claims or parties without leave of the Court.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 9, 2018 _____________________________________

NATHANAEL M. COUSINS

United States Magistrate Judge

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