Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00413/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00413-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT LEE QUACKENBUSH, Civil No. 07cv0413-W (WMc)

Petitioner, REPORTAND RECOMMENDATION

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE

JUDGE RE:

(1) GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART MOTION TO

DISMISS; AND

(2) DISMISSING PETITION 

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

vs.

JAMES E. TILTON, Secretary of the

California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation,

Respondent.

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge Thomas

J. Whelan pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the United States

District Court for the Southern District of California. 

I.

FEDERAL PROCEEDINGS

Robert Lee Quackenbush (hereinafter “Petitioner”), a California prisoner at the time of

initiating these proceedings but subsequently released on parole, is proceeding pro se and in

forma pauperis with a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc.

No. 1.) Petitioner challenges his 2006 parole revocation and resultant sentence of 12 months

imprisonment, contending he received ineffective assistance of counsel at the revocation hearing

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(claim one), and stating simply “see attached,” referencing numerous administrative appeals and

state court filings attached to the Petition (claim two). Respondent has filed a Motion to Dismiss

the Petition on the grounds that Petitioner has failed to exhaust state court remedies, and has

failed to present a factual basis in support of his vague and conclusory claims. (Doc No. 5.)

Petitioner has filed an Opposition in which he argues that he was denied due process and equal

protection in the parole revocation hearing as well as in the subsequent state court proceedings.

(Doc. No. 6.) As discussed below, it is unclear whether Petitioner intended his Opposition to

clarify the basis for claim two, or if he intended to present due process and equal protection

claims for the first time in his Opposition. 

For the following reasons, the Court finds that Petitioner has satisfied the technical

requirement for exhaustion of the claims presented in this action. However, the Court also finds

that the Petition, its attachments, and Petitioner’s Opposition, even when taken together and

liberally construed, present claims which are vague, conclusory and lacking in a sufficient

factual basis, and as such do not satisfied the pleading requirements of Rule 2(c) of the Rules

governing § 2254 proceedings. The Court therefore recommends granting in part and denying

in part Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss, and dismissing the Petition without prejudice and with

leave to amend.

II.

STATE PROCEEDINGS

On May 4, 2005, Petitioner was released on parole from a 2003 criminal conviction.

(Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Dismiss [“MTD Mem.”], Ex.

3.) He was arrested on February 1, 2006, and, based on a February 9, 2006 parole violation

report written by Parole Officer Joe Estrada, the Board of Parole Hearings (BPH) revoked

Petitioner’s parole on February 14, 2006, and sentenced him to 12 months in custody. (Id., Ex.

4.) A revocation hearing was held at R. J. Donovan Correctional Facility on March 6, 2006, at

which Petitioner was represented by appointed counsel. (Pet. Ex. A. at 4.) 

On June 2, 2006, Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the state superior court requesting

a transcript of the revocation hearing in order to prepare an appeal. (Pet. Ex. C. at 51-59.) That

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petition was denied in a written order filed July 31, 2006, on the basis that Petitioner had been

provided with an audio recording of the parole hearing, which was all he was entitled to under

the California Code of Regulations. (Id. at 46-48.)

Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the appellate court on September 19, 2006, in which

he sought a de novo review of the superior court petition, and argued that the failure to provide

him with a written transcript denied him his state and federal constitutional rights because it

made it impossible for him to challenge the basis for his parole revocation. (MTD Mem. Ex. 5

at 2.) That petition was denied in a written order filed January 4, 2007, on the basis that

Petitioner was not entitled to a transcript of the hearing, that he did not need a transcript in order

to initiate an appeal, and that the time to appeal had already expired. (Id., Ex. 6.) 

Petitioner filed a petition for review in the state supreme court on February 5, 2007,

contending that because he did not have access to a device which would permit him to listen to

the recording of the parole hearing, he essentially had no means to have the revocation hearing

reviewed or to present claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, resulting in a denial of state

and federal due process. (MTD Mem. Ex. 7 at 4-5.) That petition was summarily denied

without citation of authority on March 14, 2007. (Id., Ex. 8.) 

III.

PETITIONER’S CLAIMS

In claim one, Petitioner alleges that his right to the effective assistance of counsel at the

parole revocation hearing was violated because his appointed counsel: (a) failed to bring out

facts demonstrating that the parole revocation was motivated by retaliation against Petitioner by

Parole Officer Estrada based on Petitioner’s exercise of his First Amendment rights while

previously incarcerated, and that the imposition of inappropriate special conditions of parole

unrelated to his commitment offense resulted in his parole revocation; (b) failed to prevent

introduction of evidence relating to the inappropriately imposed special conditions of parole;

and, (c) failed to ensure that the totality of the circumstances of the alleged crime were brought

to light, including perjury by Parole Officer Estrada and Petitioner’s status as a registered sex

offender, which contributed to most of the facts relied upon by the BPH. (Pet. at 6.) 

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In claim two, Petitioner simply states “see attached.” (Pet. at 7.) The attachments to the

petition consist of: (a) administrative appeals filed while Petitioner was incarcerated requesting

removal of special conditions of parole, and regarding denial of access to the courts, loss of

property, and conditions of confinement; (b) Petitioner’s state habeas petitions and the orders

denying those petitions; and (c) a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, apparently

filed in the District Court for the Eastern District of California, complaining of denial of access

to the courts and other conditions of confinement. (See Pet. Exs. A-C.)

IV.

DISCUSSION

For the following reasons, the Court finds that Petitioner has satisfied the technical

requirements for exhaustion of his claims because no state court remedies remain available. The

Court therefore recommends that Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss be denied in part to the extent

it seeks dismissal of the Petition on the basis it contains unexhausted claims, but that the denial

be without prejudice to Respondent to argue that the claims are procedurally defaulted. The

Court also finds that the claims as presented are vague, conclusory, and lack a sufficient factual

basis to provide Respondent an opportunity to respond, but that Petitioner has the right to file

an amended petition in an attempt to cure these pleading defects. The Court therefore

recommends that Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss be granted in part on this basis, and the

Petition be dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend.

A. Petitioner’s Claims are Exhausted.

Respondent first contends that Petitioner’s claims are unexhausted because they have not

been presented to the state courts. (MTD Mem. at 3.) Respondent argues that the only claim

Petitioner presented to the state courts is a claim that he is entitled to a written transcript of the

parole hearing, a claim which is not presented in this action. (Id. at 3-4.) Respondent contends

that although Petitioner argued in the habeas petition filed in the state supreme court that he

needed the transcript in order to pursue a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, he did not

present any facts whatsoever in support of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in that

petition. (Id.) Finally, Respondent contends that the allegation in the Petition that the claims

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were exhausted through direct review of the original commitment offense is insufficient to

demonstrate exhaustion of claims related to the subsequent parole revocation. (Id. at 4.)

The exhaustion of available state judicial remedies is generally a prerequisite to a federal

court’s consideration of claims presented in habeas corpus proceedings, and a petition containing

unexhausted claims may be subject to dismissal. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b); see Rose v. Lundy, 455

U.S. 509, 522 (1982); McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 833 (9th Cir. 1991). The exhaustion

requirement is satisfied when a petitioner provides the state courts with a “fair opportunity to

apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon his [or her] constitutional claim.”

Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982). The state courts are thus assured of the “initial

‘opportunity to pass upon and correct’ alleged violations of its prisoners’ federal rights.” Picard

v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971) (quoting Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 250

(1971)).

Petitioner claimed in the state appellate court that the failure to provide him with a written

transcript of the revocation hearing made it impossible for him to challenge the basis for his

parole revocation “through the judicial process, thereby denying him the rights guaranteed by

the Constitution, both State and Federal.” (MTD Mem. Ex. 5 at 2.) He argued in the state

supreme court that because he was unable to listen to the recording of the hearing while

incarcerated, he essentially had no means to have the revocation hearing reviewed, resulting in

a denial “of my Constitutional rights (i.e., Due Process, ‘IAC’ Misrepresentation, etc.) both of

the Federal and State nature.” (MTD Mem. Ex. 7 at 4-5.) Although Petitioner mentioned in

passing in the state supreme court petition that he needed a transcript in order to present a claim

of ineffective assistance of counsel (id. at 4.), he did not provide any factual basis whatsoever

in support of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. (Id., Ex. 7.) 

In his Opposition, Petitioner requests that this Court conduct a de novo review of the state

court habeas petitions in order to determine whether a federal due process violation occurred in

connection to his parole revocation proceedings and the subsequent state review process. (Opp.

at 1.) In particular, Petitioner contends that the denial of review of his petitions by the state

courts, and the failure of the state courts to conduct an evidentiary hearing on his allegations,

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resulted in a denial of a state-created liberty interest, thereby violating his rights to due process

and equal protection as protected by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Memorandum

of Points and Authorities in Support of Opposition [“Opp. Mem.”] at 1.) Petitioner goes on to

list the alleged deficiencies in the revocation hearing and subsequent state court proceedings.

(Id. at 2-9.) These claims and their supporting facts are not presented in the Petition, and there

is no indication whatsoever that they have been presented to any state court. 

 Respondent is correct that the federal habeas exhaustion requirement is ordinarily

satisfied when a petitioner provides “the state courts with a ‘fair opportunity’ to apply

controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon his [or her] constitutional claim.” Anderson

v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982) (quoting Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276-77 (1971)).

However, the exhaustion requirement may be satisfied notwithstanding a failure to present a

claim to the state supreme court, “if it is clear that (the habeas petitioner’s) claims are now

procedurally barred under (state) law.” Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 161 (1996) (quoting

Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989)); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 125-26 n.28 (1982)

(noting that the exhaustion requirement applies “only to remedies still available at the time of

the federal petition.”); Valerio v. Crawford, 306 F.3d 742, 770 (9th Cir. 2002) (same) (citing

Phillips v. Woodford, 267 F.3d 966, 974 (9th Cir. 2001) (“the district court correctly concluded

that [petitioner’s] claims were nonetheless exhausted because ‘a return to state court for

exhaustion would be futile.’”). “A habeas petitioner who has defaulted his federal claims in state

court meets the technical requirements for exhaustion; there are no state remedies any longer

‘available’ to him.” Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 621 n.5 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Coleman

v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 732 (1991)). 

Here, it is clear that Petitioner no longer has state court remedies remaining available with

respect to any federal claims which have not been presented to the state courts. As the appellate

court noted in its denial of Petitioner’s habeas petition, Petitioner allowed the time to appeal the

parole revocation to expire without filing an appeal. (MTD Mem., Ex. 5.) Petitioner has already

completed one complete round of state habeas proceedings in which he presented state and

federal claims arising from his inability to challenge his parole revocation proceedings, including

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unspecified due process and ineffective assistance of counsel claims, and requesting review of

the denial by the lower state courts of his claims. It is clear that any further attempts to file state

habeas petitions presenting those same claims, with the addition of the factual basis for the

claims, would be met with procedural bars on untimely and successive petitions, as would any

attempt to present his new equal protection claim. See In re Robbins, 18 Cal.4th 770, 788 n.9

(1998) (In re Clark “serves to notify habeas corpus litigants that we shall apply the

successiveness rule when we are faced with a petitioner whose prior petition was filed after the

date of finality of Clark.”), see also In re Clark, 5 Cal.4th 750, 797-98 (1993) (“the general rule

is still that, absent justification for the failure to present all known claims in a single, timely

petition for writ of habeas corpus, successive and/or untimely petitions will be summarily

denied,” and describing the “fundamental miscarriage of justice” exception to that rule). 

Although Petitioner appears to contend that it was only after he was released from

custody that he had the ability to listen to the recording of the revocation hearing and thereby

become aware of the factual basis for his claims, he argued to the state supreme court that his

inability to listen to the recording while incarcerated prevented him from presenting the factual

basis for his claims. (MTD Mem., Ex. 7 at 3.) The state supreme court has already rejected

Petitioner’s alleged justification for failing to present his claims in a single, timely petition, and

has summarily denied relief. (Id., Ex. 8.) It is therefore clear that state court remedies do not

remain available to Petitioner with respect to his claims. Thus, irrespective of whether the

claims were properly presented to the state courts, the claims meet the technical requirements

for exhaustion. Phillips, 267 F.3d at 974; Cassett, 406 F.3d at 621 n.5.

The Court recommends that Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss be DENIED in part to the

extent it seeks dismissal of the Petition on the basis it contains unexhausted claims. The Court

recommends that the denial be without prejudice to Respondent to argue that Petitioner’s claims

are procedurally defaulted. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n.* (1991) (holding

that a procedural default arises when a petitioner has “failed to exhaust state remedies and the

court to which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the

exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred.”). 

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B. Petitioner’s Claims are Vague and Conclusory.

Respondent next moves to dismiss the Petition pursuant to Rule 2(c) of the Rules

governing section 2254 cases, on the basis that Petitioner has failed to sufficiently allege facts

in support of his vague and conclusory claims. (MTD. Mem. at 4.) Respondent contends that

Petitioner does not present specific facts supporting his allegations of retaliation, perjury by

Estrada, misconduct in the revocation proceedings, and does not identify which special parole

conditions were inappropriate or why. (Id. at 5.) 

While courts should liberally interpret pro se pleadings with leniency and understanding,

this should not place on the reviewing court the entire onus of ferreting out grounds for relief.

Cf. Burkey v. Deeds, 824 F. Supp. 190, 193 (D. Nev. 1993) (finding that courts do not have

entire onus of creating federal claim for petitioner). In order to satisfy Rule 2(c), Petitioner must

point to a “real possibility of constitutional error.” Cf. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 75

n.7 (1977) (internal quotation marks omitted). Facts must be stated, in the petition, with

sufficient detail to enable the Court to determine, from the face of the petition, whether further

habeas corpus review is warranted. Adams v. Armontrout, 897 F.2d 332, 334 (8th Cir. 1990).

Moreover, the allegations should be sufficiently specific to permit the respondent to assert

appropriate objections and defenses. Harris v. Allen, 739 F. Supp. 564, 565 (W.D. Okla. 1989).

Claim one in the Petition presents a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel which, as

Respondent correctly points out, contains vague allegations regarding counsel’s deficient

performance, and merely a conclusory allegation of prejudice. (Pet. at 6.) Specifically,

Petitioner alleges counsel failed to bring out facts demonstrating that the parole revocation was

motivated by retaliation, and involved or was based on inappropriate conditions of parole, failed

to prevent introduction of evidence relating to those conditions, and failed to ensure that the

totality of the circumstances of the alleged crime were brought to light, including perjury by

Parole Officer Estrada and Petitioner’s status as a registered sex offender, which in turn

contributed to most of the facts relied upon by the BPH. (Pet. at 6.) Petitioner does not provide

a factual basis in support of any of these allegations. He does not identify what statements by

Estrada were perjured, does not identify which parole conditions were inappropriate or why they

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should not have been imposed, and does not allege how or why the revocation was affected by

retaliatory motives or his status as a sex offender. Although the documents attached to the

Petition appear to bear on some of these issues, in that they relate to attempts by Petitioner while

incarcerated to have ceratin of his special parole conditions removed and to redress conditions

of confinement restricting his access to the courts, the onus should not be placed on the Court

to discover the factual basis for Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. In any

case, Petitioner does not identify what actions he contends his appointed counsel should have

taken or failed to take with respect to these allegations, or why he was prejudiced by counsel’s

actions. Because this claim lacks a factual basis in support of the allegations, it does not permit

Respondent to assert appropriate objections and defenses. Harris, 739 F.Supp. at 565. 

In claim two, Petitioner simply states “see attached.” (Pet. at 7.) The attachments to the

Petition consist of: (1) administrative appeals requesting removal of special conditions of parole,

and regarding denial of access to the courts, loss of property, and conditions of confinement;

(2) Petitioner’s state habeas petitions and the orders denying those petitions; and (3) a civil rights

complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the District Court for the Eastern District of

California complaining of a denial of access to the courts and other conditions of confinement.

(See Pet. Exs. A-C.) It is unclear whether Petitioner intended to incorporate all of the claims

presented in these documents as independent claims in this action, whether the documents were

intended as support for claim one in the Petition, or whether the materials are intended to provide

support for a separate claim that he did not receive due process or equal protection in the parole

revocation proceedings and/or subsequent state court proceedings. This Court would have to

engage in a tenuous analysis in order to attempt to identify and make sense of claim two. This

claim does not satisfy Rule 2(c) because it does not point to a “real possibility of constitutional

error” in connection to Petitioner’s confinement, i.e., his parole revocation. Blackledge, 431

U.S. at 75 n.7; see also Rule 2(c), foll. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (“The petition must . . . state the facts

supporting each ground [for relief] . . . [and] state the relief requested.”). Petitioner has failed

to state facts, in the petition, with sufficient detail to enable the Court to determine, from the face

of the petition, whether further habeas corpus review is warranted as to this claim. Adams, 897

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F.2d at 334. In addition, as with the first claim, the allegations are insufficiently specific to

permit Respondent to assert appropriate objections and defenses. Harris, 739 F. Supp. at 565.

It is unclear from reading Petitioner’s Opposition whether he is attempting to present

additional claims regarding denial of due process and equal protection in relation to his inability

to challenge his parole revocation in the state courts, or is attempting to clarify the basis for

claim two in the Petition. (Opp. Mem. at 1-2.) Petitioner alleges that he was prevented from

challenging his parole revocation in the state courts due to unethical and inappropriate conduct

by state judicial officers, unspecified incidents of ineffective assistance of counsel in connection

to the parole revocation proceedings, and based on various conditions of his confinement. (Id.

at 2-3.) He contends that he does not have the expertise of an attorney and should not be held

to a stringent pleading requirement, and provides caselaw and legal argument in support of his

federal due process and equal protection claims. (Id. at 3-9.)

The claims presented in the Opposition are not presented in the Petition. Moreover, they

do not contain a factual basis supporting the allegations of unethical and inappropriate conduct

by the judicial officers. These claims are therefore vague and conclusory and suffer from the

same pleading defects as the claims presented in the Petition. Even assuming that some of the

allegations in the Opposition are sufficiently specific, such as the allegation that the failure to

conduct an evidentiary hearing in the state court was a violation of due process, etc., the claims

presented in the Opposition are not presented in the Petition as required by Rule 2(c). 

The Court therefore finds that the Petition does not satisfy the requirements of Rule 2(c),

and recommends that Respondent’s motion to dismiss be GRANTED in part on this basis.

Because Petitioner has a right to amend his Petition before a responsive pleading has been filed

(see Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)), and a motion to dismiss does not constitute a responsive pleading under

Rule 15(a), the Court recommends that the Petition be dismissed without prejudice to Petitioner

to file an amended petition. However, the Court recommends that Petitioner receive a warning

that the failure to include a factual basis for his claims in an amended petition, or to otherwise

satisfy the requirements of Rule 2(c), may result in a dismissal of an amended petition without

further leave to amend. 

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V.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

For all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court

issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation; (2) granting in

part and denying part Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss as set forth herein; and (3) directing that

judgement be entered dismissing the Petition without prejudice and with leave to file an

amended petition within forty-five (45) days of the date of the dismissal Order.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than October 22, 2007 any party to this action may file

written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the

Court and served on all parties no later than November 1, 2007. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections with the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections

on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998);

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: September 18, 2007

Hon. William McCurine, Jr.

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

CC: HON. THOMAS J. WHELAN

ALL PARTIES

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