Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_01-cv-20018/USCOURTS-cand-5_01-cv-20018-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Order Denying Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARLON PUCKETT,

Petitioner,

 vs.

ANTHONY NEWLAND, Warden,

Respondent.

 

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No. C 01-20018 JW (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner, a California prisoner proceeding pro so, seeks a writ of habeas corpus

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner was granted leave to file an amended petition, which

he filed on April 14, 2004. After reviewing the amended petition, the Court dismissed

one of the claims as not cognizable, and ordered respondent to show cause why a writ of

habeas corpus should not be granted based on petitioner’s eight other claims. Respondent

has filed an answer, along with a supporting memorandum and exhibits. Petitioner did

not file a traverse. 

BACKGROUND

In 1996, a jury in San Mateo County found petitioner guilty of two counts of first

degree burglary, and found allegations that petitioner had suffered three prior “strike”

convictions and served six prior prison terms to be true. Thereafter, the trial court

sentenced petitioner to a term of 65 years to life in state prison under California’s “Three

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Strikes” law. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction and sentence, and

the California Supreme Court denied review. Petitioner’s subsequent petitions for a writ

of habeas corpus filed in the state courts were unsuccessful.

The California Court of Appeal set forth the following summary of the evidence

adduced at trial:

The jury found that Puckett had entered the home of Victor Hill and

pried the screens from the windows of Patrisha Scott’s apartment with the

intention in each case of committing a felony inside the dwelling. Hill

testified that he had surprised Puckett and his companion when they came

into Hill’s kitchen from the adjoining garage. Hill grabbed a hammer and

chased the men back into the garage, where they remained trapped,

allowing Hill to watch them through a window from outside. Eventually,

while Hill waited by the front door of the garage, the men escaped out a

side door. Hill picked Puckett out of two separate lineups within a week

after the burglary. At trial, he testified, “[I recognized t]he grayness in the

beard, . . . the thinness in the cheeks . . . . He was the same person.” During

a consensual search of Puckett’s father’s house, police found a broken weed

eater, identical to one Hill had noticed missing from his garage, in a

bedroom clothes closet.

 Alma Lopez testified that, from the second-story window of her

duplex apartment, she had seen a man she did not recognize attempting to

pry open the window to Scott’s apartment next door. She called the police,

who found Puckett on the scene. When they asked his name, Puckett told

them it was Marlon Johnson. Police brought Lopez outside, and she

identified him as the man she had seen in her neighbor’s patio trying to pry

open the windows. Lopez said she recognized both his clothing and his

face.

(Resp. Ex. 7 at 2.) 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

This court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is

in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(a).

The writ may not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the

merits in state court unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

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established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2)

resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” Id. § 2254(d).

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the

state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a

question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set

of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). 

“Under the ‘reasonable application clause,’ a federal habeas court may grant the writ if

the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions

but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413.

 “[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because the court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied

clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must

also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. A federal habeas court making the “unreasonable

application” inquiry should ask whether the state court’s application of clearly established

federal law was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409. 

The only definitive source of clearly established federal law under 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d) is in the holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of the Supreme Court as of the time of

the state court decision. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412; Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062,

1069 (9th Cir. 2003). While circuit law may be “persuasive authority” for purposes of

determining whether a state court decision is an unreasonable application of Supreme

Court precedent, only the Supreme Court’s holdings are binding on the state courts and

only those holdings need be “reasonably” applied. Id.

Even if the state court decision was either contrary to or an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law, within the meaning of AEDPA, habeas

relief is still only warranted if the constitutional error at issue had a “‘substantial and

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The Court of Appeal found a state law error, but that such error was

harmless because of the strength of the other evidence against petitioner. (Resp. Ex.

7 at 2-3.) 

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injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’” Penry v. Johnson, 532

U.S. 782, 796 (2001) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993)).

Lastly, a federal habeas court may grant the writ it if concludes that the state

court’s adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). The court must presume correct any

determination of a factual issue made by a state court unless the petitioner rebuts the

presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. §2254(e)(1). 

B. Claims and Analysis

1. Admission of Evidence

Petitioner claims that the trial court violated his right to due process by admitting

evidence that he used crack cocaine as relevant to show his motive for committing the

burglaries. The due process inquiry on federal habeas review is whether the admission of

evidence was arbitrary or so prejudicial that it rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. 

Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1994). Only if there are no permissible

inferences that the jury may draw from the evidence can its admission violate due

process. Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 1991). 

The California Court of Appeal found the admission of the evidence did not

violate petitioner’s federal right to due process,1

 as follows:

At trial, the prosecutor was permitted to present evidence that

Puckett used crack cocaine. The evidence was relevant, she explained, to

show Puckett’s motive for burglary. With the court’s permission, an expert

described to the jury at some length how, on the streets of East Palo Alto,

stolen property of all descriptions was traded for crack. . . . 

Puckett [] contends that the admission of the contested evidence

violated his federal constitutional right to due process and was not harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt. (See Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S.

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18, 24.) We reject this claim.

The case Puckett cites to support his theory, McKinney v. Rees (9th

Cir. 1993) 993 F.2d 1378, holds that “‘[o]nly if there are no permissible

inferences the jury may draw from the evidence can its admission violate

due process.’” (Id., at p. 1384, original italics, quoting Jammal v. Van de

Kamp (9th Cir. 1991) 926 F.2d 918, 920.) In that case, the court concluded

the other act evidence was probative only of character, and was thus

irrelevant to any legitimate issue. By contrast, the evidence in this case is

probative of motive; it is excluded because of its sever prejudicial effect. 

(People v. Cardenas, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 906-07; People v. Bartlett

(1967) 256 Cal.App.2d 787, 794 [evidence excluded because its “probative

value to show motive [is] far outweighed by its tendency to incite a jury to

resolve the issue of guilt or innocence on [evidence of] character rather than

on proof of the essential elements of the crime.”].) Because the evidence of

Puckett’s use of narcotics gave rise to a “permissible inference,” its

admission did not deprive him of due process. Moreover, we note that our

Supreme Court has consistently measured the prejudicial effect of this type

of error under the Watson standard. 

(Resp. Ex. 7 at 2-4.) 

As described above, the standard from Jammal, applied by the California Court of

Appeal to evaluate petitioner’s claim, is the correct federal standard for evaluating

whether the admission of evidence violates due process. As a result, the California Court

of Appeal’s decision was not “contrary to” federal law within the meaning of §

2254(d)(1). See Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. The Court of Appeal’s denial of

petitioner’s claim was also “objectively reasonable” within the meaning of § 2254(d)(1). 

As explained by the Court of Appeal, there was a “permissible inference” that could be

drawn from the evidence of petitioner’s crack cocaine use, namely that it supplied the

motive for his burglaries. The Ninth Circuit has held that a defendant’s drug use was

admissible to show the defendant’s motive in committing robbery. See United States v.

Miranda, 986 F.2d 1283, 1285 (9th Cir. 1993). As the jury could draw a “permissible

inference” from the evidence, its admission did not violated petitioner’s right to due

process.

Furthermore, even if the admission of the evidence of petitioner’s drug use did

violate due process, any such error was harmless in this case. As discussed above, habeas

relief is available only if the error had a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict. 

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397 U.S. 358 (1970).

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Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. As the state court described, even absent the crack cocaine

evidence, petitioner was very likely to have been convicted. There were eyewitnesses to

both burglaries who positively identified Puckett as the burglar, both in person and in

photographs, within a short time of the burglaries. An item stolen from Hill was found in

petitioner’s father’s house. The police found petitioner leaving the alleyway where the

window screens had been removed from the Scott residence shortly after the burglary had

been reported. Not only was there strong evidence of petitioner’s guilt, the trial court

instructed the jury that the drug evidence was limited to explaining petitioner’s motive,

and could not be used as evidence of his bad character; such instructions ameliorated any

potential prejudice from the evidence. Under these circumstances, even if admission of

the crack cocaine evidence had been constitutional error, such error was harmless. 

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim. 

2. Sufficiency of Evidence of Prior Convictions

Petitioner claims that there was insufficient evidence to prove his prior convictions

beyond a reasonable doubt. As set forth above, in order to warrant habeas relief under §

2254(d)(1), the state court decision must have been contrary to or an unreasonable

application of a holding of the United States Supreme Court in existence at the time of the

decision. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. Petitioner cites no Supreme Court holding, and

this Court is aware of none, that the constitution requires a state to prove a prior

conviction enhancement beyond a reasonable doubt. Indeed, in Dretke v. Haley, the

Supreme Court stated that it has not ever imposed such a requirement: “We have not

extended [In re] Winship’s2

 protections [of proof beyond a reasonable doubt] to proof of

prior convictions used to support recidivist enhancements.” 541 U.S. 386, 395 (2004). In

the absence of Supreme Court authority requiring proof of prior convictions beyond a

reasonable doubt, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief his claim that there was

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insufficient evidence to prove his prior convictions. 

The Court notes, in any event, that there was ample evidence of his prior

convictions. "Evidence of the prior conviction is sufficient if, viewing the evidence in the

light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the fact

of the prior conviction beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Okafor, 

285 F.3d 842, 847-48 (9th Cir. 2002). Petitioner was charged with having three prior

residential burglary convictions. Abstracts of judgment and verdict forms showed two

such convictions, from 1985 and 1991, and a preliminary hearing transcript and certified

prison records showed such a conviction from 1982. In addition, a photograph and

fingerprints of petitioner were introduced to prove that he was the person who suffered

the prior convictions. Petitioner does not explain how such evidence was wanting, if at

all. Consequently, there was sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to find beyond

a reasonable doubt that petitioner had three prior residential burglary convictions. See,

e.g., id. at 847-48 (prior conviction adequately established by evidence that included a

certified copy of the conviction of a person with the same unusual name, on which the

birthdate matched that on defendant's passport and state identification card, and on which

the social security number matched the one on defendant's social security card, as well as

testimony by the agent that defendant admitted a prior narcotics arrest and that he had a

probation officer).

Accordingly, habeas relief is not warranted on this claim.

3. Sentence

a. Cruel and unusual punishment

Petitioner claims his sentence of 65 years to life violates his Eighth Amendment

right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. In Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63

(2003), the Supreme Court rejected the contention that Supreme Court case law in this

area was of sufficient clarity to constitute “clearly established” federal law within the

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meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), with the exception of “one governing legal principle,”

specifically: “A gross disproportionality principle is applicable to sentences for terms of

years.” See id. at 72. The Supreme Court further noted that the precise contours of that

principle are “unclear” and “applicable only in the ‘exceedingly rare’ and ‘extreme’

case.” See id. at 73 (citation omitted). 

In Andrade, the petitioner was accused of stealing a total of $153 worth of

videotapes from two different stores. See id. at 66. The jury found the petitioner guilty

of two counts of petty theft with a prior conviction and further found the petitioner had

suffered three prior felony convictions that qualified under California’s “three strikes”

law, specifically, three counts of first degree residential burglary. See id. at 68. The

Supreme Court, observing that “[t]he gross disproportionality principle reserves a

constitutional violation for only the extraordinary case,” held the California Court of

Appeal’s affirmance of the petitioner’s sentence of two consecutive terms of 25 years to

life was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See id. at 77. 

In Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003), the petitioner was accused of stealing

three golf clubs, priced at $399 each; he was convicted of one count of felony grand theft,

and allegations that he had been convicted previously of four felonies qualifying under

California’s three strikes law, specifically, one robbery and three burglaries, were found

true. See id. at 18-19. The Supreme Court affirmed the California Court of Appeal’s

holding that a sentence of 25 years to life under such circumstances was not grossly

disproportionate and thus did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the

Eighth Amendment. 538 U.S. 11, 30-31 (2003). Looking beyond the petitioner’s most

recent offense, Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion observed:

When the California Legislature enacted the three strikes law, it made a

judgment that protecting the public safety requires incapacitating criminals who

have already been convicted of at least one serious or violent crime. Nothing in

the Eighth Amendment prohibits California from making that choice. To the

contrary, our cases establish that “States have a valid interest in deterring and

segregating habitual criminals”. [citations omitted]

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Id. at 25. 

In light of the reasoning set forth in Ewing and Andrade, petitioner’s sentence of

65 years to life is not grossly disproportionate to the crimes for which he stands

convicted. The sentences in both Ewing and Andrade were life sentences like

petitioner’s, although petitioner’s sentence, insofar as he will not become eligible for

longer (65 years) than Andrade (50 years) or Ewing (25 years), is harsher. Petitioner’s

crimes, however, were considerably more serious than the shoplifting offenses at issue

Ewing and Andrade. Petitioner committed two separate residential burglaries,

approximately a week apart, and in one of them the resident was home and had to chase

petitioner away with a hammer. Moreover, as noted, a court may properly consider a

petitioner’s criminal history in determining the proportionality of a sentence under the

Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., Ewing, 538 U.S. at 29 (“[W]e must place on the scales not

only [the petitioner’s] current felony, but also his long history of felony recidivism.”). 

Petitioner’s criminal history is significantly more serious than that of the petitioners in

Ewing and Andrade. Petitioner had sustained three prior serious felony “strike”

convictions for residential burglary, in two of which the victims were at home at the time

of the burglary. In addition, petitioner’s probation report indicated that he had four other

prior felony convictions, including two more for residential burglary, one for possession

of a concealed firearm, and one for receiving stolen property. Petitioner had also violated

his parole, and had served six different terms in state prison. Petitioner’s propensity to

reoffend, and in particular to continue burglarize residences, is apparent from this

criminal history. 

Petitioner’s circumstances are readily distinguishable from those presented in

Ramirez v. Castro, 365 F.3d 755 (9th Cir. 2004), in which the Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals held a sentence of 26 years to life for one count of petty theft was grossly

disproportionate. See id. at 768. There, the petitioner’s prior criminal history “[was]

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comprised solely of two 1991 convictions for second-degree robbery obtained through a

guilty plea, for which his total sentence was one year in county jail and three years of

probation,” and the prior offenses were “more accurately described as ‘confrontation

petty theft.’” Id. As noted, petitioner here had a much more serious and extensive

criminal history -- seven prior felony convictions, in addition to parole violations. His

prior convictions involved repeatedly breaking into homes, in some cases while people

were at home, and led to terms in state prison. Unlike the petitioner in Ramirez,

petitioner does not present the “extremely rare case that gives rise to an inference of

disproportionality.” See id. at 770.

Accordingly, the California Court of Appeal’s determination that petitioner’s

sentence was not grossly disproportionate to his crime was not an unreasonable

application of or contrary to clearly established federal law within the meaning of 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

b. Vagueness

Petitioner claims that his sentence in unconstitutional because California’s “Three

Strikes” law is vague. To avoid constitutional vagueness, a state criminal statute must (1)

define the offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what

conduct is prohibited; and (2) establish standards to permit police to enforce the law in a

non-arbitrary, non-discriminatory manner. See Vlasak v. Superior Court of California,

329 F.3d 683, 688-90 (9th Cir. 2003) (rejecting vagueness challenge because Supreme

Court has rejected vagueness challenges to statutes and court orders that contain same, or

similar, terms and, taken as a whole, ordinance defines “‘the criminal offense with

sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and

in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement’”) (quoting

Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983)).

California’s Three Strikes law, Cal. Pen. Code § 1170.12(c) in particular, as added

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by Proposition 184 in 1994, provides in relevant part:

(c)(2)(A) If a defendant has two or more prior felony convictions, as

defined in paragraph (1) of subdivision (b), that have been pled and proved,

the term from the current felony conviction shall be an indeterminate term

of life imprisonment.

 Subdivision (b) of Cal. Pen. Code § 1170.12, referenced above, provides in relevant part:

a prior conviction of a felony shall be defined as: (1) Any offense defined in

subdivision (c) of Section 667.5 as a violent felony or any offense defined

in subdivision (c) of Section 1192.7 as a serious felony in this state. The

determination of whether a prior conviction is a prior felony conviction for

purposes of this section, shall be made upon the date of that prior conviction

and is not affected by the sentence imposed unless the sentence

automatically, upon the initial sentencing, converts the felony to a

misdemeanor. 

At the time petitioner committed the offenses, in 1996, residential burglary was

listed as a “serious” felony under Cal. Penal Code § 1192.7(c)(18), and petitioner had

three prior convictions for residential burglary. Any ordinary person could understand

from the language quoted above from Cal. Pen. Code § 1170.12(b)(1) that any felonies

listed in Cal. Penal Code § 1192.7(c) qualify as “strikes” under the Three Strikes law. 

Consequently, an ordinary person in petitioner’s shoes would understand, and would thus

be on notice, that in 1996, when he committed the charged offenses, that he had at least

three prior felony convictions that qualified as “strikes” under the Three Strikes law. To

the extent § 1170.12(b)(1) stated, in part, that the determination of whether it was a strike

would “be made upon the date of that prior conviction” does not render ambiguous the

statute’s clearly providing that petitioner’s prior residential burglary convictions qualified

as “strikes” within the meaning of the Three Strikes law. 

Accordingly, the state court’s denial of petitioner’s vagueness claim was neither

contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal law, and habeas relief is not

warranted on this claim.

4. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Petitioner claims there was insufficient evidence to support the convictions for the

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These are the sixth and seventh claims in the petition.

4

In section B.1, above, the Court explained that the evidence of petitioner’s

guilt was too strong for him to have been prejudiced the admission of the cocaine

evidence. For the same reasons, the Court finds there was more than sufficient

evidence for a rational trier of fact to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of

both residential burglary charges. 

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two charged residential burglaries of Hill and Scott.3 The California Supreme Court

rejected these claims with a citation to In re Lindley, 29 Cal. 2d 109 (1947), which

provides that sufficiency of the evidence claims cannot be raised in a state habeas

petition. The Ninth Circuit has recognized and applied the rule from Lindley as grounds

for denying, under the doctrine of procedural default, federal habeas claims that the

petitioner’s conviction is not supported by sufficient evidence. Carter v. Giurbino, 385

F.3d 1194, 1197-98 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding procedural rule from Lindley constitutes an

independent and adequate state ground barring federal habeas review). Because

petitioner raised his sufficiency of the evidence claims in his state habeas petition, and the

claims were rejected by the California Supreme Court with a citation to Lindley, the

claims are procedurally defaulted from federal habeas review.4

 See id. Although a

petitioner may avoid procedural default by showing the requisite “cause and prejudice,”

see id., petitioner here has made no such showing, or even an effort to do so. 

5. Disclosure of Discovery Material

Petitioner claims the prosecution withheld exculpatory evidence by failing to turn

over the arrest, convictions, and probation and prison files of Tony Griffin. Under Brady

v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the prosecution must surrender to the defendant

favorable evidence that is "material either to guilt or to punishment." Id. at 87. Evidence

is material "if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the

defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A 'reasonable

probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." United

States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). “There are three components of a true Brady

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violation: [t]he evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is

exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the

State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.” Strickler v.

Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999).

Petitioner’s brother and father testified that they bought the weed eater from

Griffin three years earlier when he came to their door offering to sell it. In addition, at a

pretrial hearing, petitioner’s mother indicated that she believed Griffin was the perpetrator

of the crimes.5

 Griffin was not a witness at trial, however, and as a result the evidence of

his criminal and prison records could not have been used to impeach him. Petitioner does

not explain how the evidence was otherwise material. In addition, a defendant cannot

claim a Brady violation if he was "aware of the essential facts enabling him to take

advantage of any exculpatory evidence." United States v. Shaffer, 789 F.2d 682, 690 (9th

Cir. 1986). As petitioner’s mother indicated prior to trial that she believed Tony Griffin

was the perpetrator, the defense was clearly aware of sufficient facts to investigate and

obtain Griffin’s criminal or prison records. Petitioner does not offer any reason the

defense could not have obtained such records on its own. 

Finally, petitioner cannot demonstrate any prejudice from not receiving the

evidence. For the reasons discussed above, the evidence against petitioner, including two

eyewitness identifications, stolen goods at his father’s house, and petitioner’s getting

caught at the scene of one of the burglaries, was very strong. As Griffin was not a

witness, and did not offer any evidence against petitioner at trial, impeachment evidence

against Griffin would not have helped mitigate against such evidence. Consequently,

there is no reasonable probability that the materials regarding Griffin would have

produced a different outcome at trial. 

Accordingly, the state court’s rejection of petitioner’s Brady claim is neither

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contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal law, and petitioner is not entitled to

relief based thereon.

6. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel 

Petitioner claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel did

not raise the claims discussed above concerning his sentence, the sufficiency of the

evidence to prove his prior convictions and the charges against him, and the prosecution’s

failure to turn over discovery material. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the effective assistance of counsel on his

first appeal. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985). In evaluating such a claim, the federal

court applies the standard set forth in Strickland. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285

(2000). In the instant case, appellate counsel raised the Due Process claim petitioner

raises herein with respect to the admission of evidence of petitioner’s drug use. Although

appellate counsel did not raise the other claims petitioner raises herein, those claims, as

explained above, are without merit. An appellate lawyer’s failure to raise a meritless

claim is neither unreasonable nor prejudicial. Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1434 (9th

Cir. 1989) (noting that one of “hallmarks of effective appellate advocacy” is weeding out

weaker issues); see also Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) (holding appellate

counsel has no duty to raise every nonfrivolous claim requested by appellant). 

Accordingly, petitioner did not receive ineffective assistance of appellate counsel nor was

he prejudiced by the manner in which his appeal was conducted.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. 

The Clerk shall close the file.

DATED: 

JAMES WARE

United States District Judge 

November 16, 2007

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