Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-00200/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-00200-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MANPREET SINGH BAWA,

Plaintiff,

 v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; DAVID N.

STILL, Officer in Charge of the San Francisco

Sub-Office of the United States Citizenship and

Immigration Services; NANCY ALCANTAR,

Field Office Director, Department of Homeland

Security and Immigrations and Customs

Enforcement (San Francisco); WILLIAM,

Deportation Officer, SNJ, Department of Homeland

Security (San Francisco); TIMOTHY F. PURDY,

Deportation Officer, SNJ, Department of Homeland

Security (San Francisco); MUND MOGIA, Special

Agent, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Other

Special Agents of the FBI to be Identified and

Named, and DOES 1–25,

Defendants. /

No. C 07-00200 WHA

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ PARTIAL

MOTION TO DISMISS

INTRODUCTION

In this civil-rights and tort action, defendants move to dismiss various claims and

defendants from the complaint. This order finds that defendants’ contentions have merit. 

Subject-matter jurisdiction is lacking over plaintiffs’ claims brought under the Federal Tort

Claims Act. In addition, defendant David Still must be dismissed as a defendant to plaintiff’s

Bivens claim. Accordingly, defendants’ motion for partial dismissal is GRANTED.

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STATEMENT

Plaintiff Manpreet Singh Bawa is a native of India. At some point, not clear from the

papers, plaintiff applied for asylum, adjustment of status, and withholding of removal in the

United States. By order dated July 15, 2005, he was granted withholding of removal by

Immigration Judge Miriam Hayward. The applications for asylum and adjustment of status

were denied. The United States Citizenship and Immigration Service waived appeal of that

decision (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 27–33).

In October or November 2006, Federal Bureau of Investigation Agent Mund Mogia

called plaintiff to the FBI offices in San Jose. Agents asked plaintiff about his work and asked

him why he had traveled to Austin, Texas, in July or August 2006. The complaint alleges that

the FBI agents “closely examined” plaintiff’s Indian passport and “strongly looked” at

plaintiff’s long beard and Sikh turban. The agents asked plaintiff several questions with

“terrorism undertones,” including whether anyone from Pakistan had ever contacted him. 

Plaintiff alleges that even before this incident, the same agents had come to plaintiff’s home and

asked about plaintiff “from his co-tenants and neighbors, using innuendoes and references to

terrorism and terrorists” (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 37–46).

On December 17, 2006, plaintiff was at work at Skillnet Solutions Incorporated in

Cupertino, California. Agent Mogia and Officer Williams from the Department of Homeland

Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, entered plaintiff’s workplace. They did not

present any warrant. Plaintiff voluntarily went with the agents into one of the company’s

conference rooms, where the agents asked him what his status was in the United States. 

Plaintiff told the agents that he had been granted withholding of removal. The agents, however,

responded that the “order [was] invalid.” The agents told plaintiff that he was in the United

States illegally and proceeded to search him. According to the complaint, the agents “seized

him, forced his face against the wall, and roughly patted plaintiff and then handcuffed him in

full glare of his co-workers, superiors, . . . subordinates, and his customers.” Plaintiff was told

that he was deportable on account of the fact that he had been ordered deported from the United

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 No full name is provided for this defendant. It is unclear whether “William” is a first or last name.

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States on July 15, 2005, the same date he had been granted withholding of removal (Am.

Compl. ¶¶ 53–64). 

The agents handcuffed plaintiff, put him in a car, and took him to the USCIS San Jose

detention center. Plaintiff was told to remove his wallet, jewelry, cell phone, belt, and

shoelaces. He was also told to remove his religious turban. He was subjected to a rough search. 

Plaintiff was detained for a total of five hours before he was released. He was told to report to

the USCIS office in San Francisco on the third Wednesday of each month. He was not told why

he had been detained or why this condition of release was imposed on him. Furthermore, an

“order of supervision” was issued on December 18, 2006, indicating that on July 15, 2005, he

had been ordered “removed.” According to the complaint, however, “[d]efendants have

admitted that there was no order of deportation against plaintiff contrary to defendants’

assertions and contents of [the order of supervision]” (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 70–79; Exh. C).

Plaintiff filed this action on January 10, 2007. He amended the complaint on March 20,

2007. The amended complaint names the following entities and individuals as defendants: 

(1) the United States of America; (2) David N. Still, officer in charge of the San Francisco

Sub-Office of the United States Citizenship and Immigration Service; (3) Nancy Alcantar,

officer in charge of the San Francisco Sub-Office of the Department of Homeland Security

and/or Immigration and Customs Enforcement; (4) William, a deportation officer;1

 (5) Timothy

F. Purdy, a deportation officer; (6) Mund Mogia, an FBI agent; (7) other “FBI Special Agents to

be Identified and Named”; and (8) twenty-five Doe defendants. He asserts seven claims against

the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act: intentional infliction of emotional

distress, false arrest and imprisonment, negligence, assault, battery, violation of rights

guaranteed by the California Constitution, and violation of California Civil Code Section

52.1(b). He also asserts an eighth claim for the unconstitutional use of excessive force in

violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 6–12; 87–114). 

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 Other arguments by the government raised in its initial motion were explicitly abandoned in its reply. 

First, the government does not contend anymore that any claims need to be dismissed on sovereign immunity

grounds. The government originally moved to dismiss the sixth and seventh claims under the theory that it had

not waived sovereign immunity as to those claims. Plaintiff’s opposition clarified that those claims are being

brought under the FTCA, rather than as independent claims under state law. Second, the government withdraws

its motion to strike the Doe defendants. The case management scheduling order, issued while the instant motion

was pending, gave plaintiff a deadline of May 4, 2007, to name any Doe defendants. None was named by that

deadline, so defendant’s motion to strike is moot.

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The government moves to dismiss the seven claims under the FTCA for failure to

properly exhaust administrative remedies. Defendant Still also alleges that he should be

dismissed because plaintiff cannot state a Bivens claim against him.2

ANALYSIS

1. STANDARDS OF REVIEW.

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a court should dismiss a complaint

where there is no subject-matter jurisdiction, including cases where the federal government is a

defendant and there is no explicit waiver of sovereign immunity. In determining whether it has

subject-matter jurisdiction, a court may consider facts outside the pleadings. See St. Clair v.

City of Chico, 880 F.2d 199, 201–02 (9th Cir. 1989). 

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the claims alleged

in the complaint. All material allegations of the complaint are taken as true and construed in the

light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336,

340 (9th Cir. 1996). A complaint should not be dismissed “unless it appears beyond doubt that

the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” 

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957). However, “conclusory allegations of law and

unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to state a

claim.” Epstein v. Wash. Energy Co., 83 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 1996).

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2. EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL TORT

CLAIMS ACT.

A district court has no subject-matter jurisdiction over a tort action against the United

States unless the plaintiff first presented a claim to the appropriate agency, and either (1) the

claim was “finally denied” in writing, or (2) six months have passed since the claim was

submitted. The FTCA expressly provides:

An action shall not be instituted upon a claim against the United

States for money damages for injury or loss of property or

personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act

or omission of any employee of the Government while acting

within the scope of his office or employment, unless the claimant

shall have first presented the claim to the appropriate federal

agency and his claim shall have been finally denied by the agency

in writing and sent by certified or registered mail. The failure of

an agency to make final disposition of a claim within six months

after it is filed shall, at the option of the claimant any time

thereafter, be deemed a final denial of the claim for purposes of

this section.

28 U.S.C. 2675(a). 

Here, plaintiff alleges that he sent a claim, through counsel, to USCIS on December 19,

2006. The seven-page letter explains: “I am informed that your goons arrested Mr. Bawa from

his office and in front of his employers for NO genuine reason. This is unwarranted and

uncalled for. You victimized him and humiliated him in front of his business associates and

customers. You RUINED his business reputation and his business relationships that he had

built over the years.” According to the letter, however, these actions were unjustified because

plaintiff had been granted withholding of removal. The letter also states, in bold print, “[w]e

are suing for $10,000,000 damages for your recklessness and injury inflicted on him before the

United States District Court for the Northern District of California.” Finally, the letter details

nine claims plaintiff apparently intended to assert against the government, including various

alleged violations of his civil rights and many of the same tort claims asserted in this action

(Am. Compl. Exh. A). 

The December 19 letter, though not a model of clarity or brevity, is sufficient to meet

the requirements of a “claim” under the FTCA. “[T]he prevailing view and the view held by the

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 The government points out that although the letter was filed with USCIS, neither the FBI nor ICE

ever received an administrative FTCA claim from plaintiff. The government submitted two declarations

asserting that neither the FBI nor ICE have any record of an administrative FTCA claim by plaintiff (Whitted

Decl. ¶ 4; Wilson Decl. ¶ 4). Plaintiff’s declaration in opposition only states that he “filed” the administrative

claim on December 19 and “personally deposited a hard copy of the Claim for Relief” at USCIS’s San Francisco

office on December 20, 2006 (Bawa Decl. ¶ 3). Plaintiff also sent two reminders to USCIS on February 12 and

19, 2007. Plaintiff attached to his declaration a copy of the acknowledgment of receipt of the February 19

reminder (Bawa Decl. ¶ 3, Exh. A). Plaintiff’s declaration does not establish, nor is it alleged in the papers, that

an administrative FTCA claim was ever filed with the FBI or ICE. Whether the administrative-claim

requirement is satisfied by filing a claim with one agency where the conduct of multiple agencies is in question

is not addressed in the papers. This order assumes without deciding that filing a claim with one agency is

sufficient.

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Ninth Circuit is that the jurisdictional requirement of minimum notice is satisfied by (1) a

written statement sufficiently describing the injury to enable the agency to begin its own

investigation, and (2) a sum certain damages claim.” Burns, 764 F.2d at 724 (quotations

omitted). There were sufficient allegations in the letter to apprise the Service “of an imminent

lawsuit to enable them to initiate their own investigation.” Ibid. It also claims $10 million in

damages several times. It meets both Ninth Circuit requirements for a pre-litigation “claim.”3

The government contends that even in light of the December 19 letter to USCIS, there is

no subject-matter jurisdiction because there was no final decision on the claim, nor have six

months passed since the December 2006 claim was filed. The government’s argument has

merit. If plaintiff did indeed file his claim on December 19, as he alleges, he should have

waited until June 20, 2007, to file this action, assuming USCIS did not issue a final denial of his

claim before the six-month period expired. “The claim requirement of section 2675 is

jurisdictional in nature and may not be waived.” Burns v. United States, 764 F.2d 722, 724 (9th

Cir. 1985). A plaintiff is required to present the administrative claim and receive the final

decision before this Court may have jurisdiction. A plaintiff may not satisfy the requirement by

presenting the administrative claim after filing suit or by filing suit while his administrative

claim is still pending. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 111–12 (1993) (“The most

natural reading of the statute indicates that Congress intended to require complete exhaustion of

Executive remedies before invocation of the judicial process. . . . The interest in orderly

administration of this body of litigation is best served by adherence to the straightforward

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statutory command.”). Subject-matter jurisdiction is lacking over this action because the claim

has not been denied, nor have six months passed since the December 2006 claim was filed.

In addition, plaintiff has not justified excusing the exhaustion requirement altogether. 

The Ninth Circuit has explained that “[e]xhaustion is not required if: (1) administrative

remedies would be futile; (2) the actions of the agency clearly and unambiguously violate

statutory or constitutional rights; or (3) the administrative procedure is clearly shown to be

inadequate to prevent irreparable injury.” Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1019 (9th Cir.

1991). Plaintiff here contends that certain extenuating circumstances justify excusing the

six-month requirement. His argument lacks merit. This order holds that even if the six-month

period could be excused for any such extenuating reasons, those reasons do not exist here. 

Plaintiff contends that the six-month statutory period should be excused because he is

soon to be deported. This contention, however, is unsupported by the record. There is no order

of removal in this record. The only immigration documents before the Court are: (1) the

immigration judge’s order dated July 15, 2005, granting plaintiff withholding of removal, and

(2) the order of supervision dated December 18, 2006, indicating (possibly erroneously) that on

July 15, 2005, plaintiff was ordered removed (Am. Compl. Exhs. A, B). It is true, as plaintiff

points out, that one of the conditions of his supervision is that he “appear in person at the time

and place specified, upon each and every request of the Service, for identification and for

deportation and removal” (May 7 Bawa Decl. ¶ 4). Plaintiff cites no authority, however,

establishing that the order of supervision is a final order of removal. Indeed, plaintiff himself

states in the complaint that “[d]efendants have admitted that there was no order of deportation

against plaintiff contrary to defendants’ assertions and contents of [the order of supervision]”

(Am. Compl. ¶ 80). Based on the record, it appears that plaintiff is still under the protection of

the 2005 administrative relief. 

Furthermore, the government submitted a declaration by defendant Nancy Alcantar, the

Field Office Director of the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Office of Detention

and Removal Operations. Defendant Alcantar’s declaration states:

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I am aware that Mr. Bawa’s lawyer has filed a document with the

court in which he states the federal government is about to

remove Mr. Bawa. That statement is incorrect. ICE presently is

not making any arrangements to remove Mr. Bawa. If it were, my

office would be making the travel arrangements. No one in this

office is doing so.

Mr. Bawa has been reporting monthly to the DRO office, as per

the conditions of his Order of Supervision. He last reported on

April 18, 2007, at which time we revised the terms of the Order of

Supervision to require him to report every six months. His next

reporting date is October 17, 2007. 

(Alcantar Decl. ¶¶ 3–4). The factual record rebuts plaintiff’s allegation that he is soon to be

deported. Because plaintiff has not established any reason to excuse the six-month requirement,

this order finds subject-matter jurisdiction lacking over the seven claims asserted under the

FTCA. Those claims must be dismissed without prejudice to moving to amend them back into

the action after the six-month period has elapsed or USCIS issues a final denial of his claim,

whichever happens first.

3. MOTION TO DISMISS DAVID STILL.

Defendant Still moves to be dismissed as a defendant from plaintiff’s eighth claim, a

Bivens claim for excessive force. Defendants may be dismissed from a civil-rights action if the

complaint lacks “specific factual allegations showing the defendants’ participation in the

alleged discriminatory practice.” Richards v. Harper, 864 F.2d 85, 88 (9th Cir. 1988). “Vague

and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to

withstand a motion to dismiss.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Al., 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th

Cir. 1982). 

The complaint alleges that defendant Still “may have played a substantial role and was

in a position to exercise command responsibility in acting with Defendants’ agents.” It also

alleges that defendant Still “planned the law enforcement actions complained of herein,

targeting plaintiff and others based on his race, ethnicity, ancestral origin, religious belief,

political ideology and/or his association with other immigrants.” Finally, it is alleged that he

“authorized, ratified and condoned the conduct challenged herein” (Am. Compl. ¶ 7). 

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These allegations are insufficient to demonstrate Still’s participation in the alleged

actions. The complaint is devoid of facts connecting Still to the complained-of civil-rights

violations. Still must be dismissed because the allegations of his liability under the Bivens

claim are vague and conclusory.

Plaintiff relies on the Second Circuit’s decision in Thomas v. Ashcroft, 470 F.3d 491,

496–97 (2d Cir. 2006), which held that “[b]ecause the doctrine of respondeat superior does not

apply in Bivens actions, a plaintiff must allege that the individual defendant was personally

involved in the constitutional violation.” Thomas held that “[t]he personal involvement of a

supervisory defendant may be shown by evidence that the defendant: (1) directly participated

in the constitutional violation; (2) failed to remedy the violation after learning of it through a

report or appeal; (3) created a custom or policy fostering the violation or allowed the custom or

policy to continue after learning of it; (4) was grossly negligent in supervising subordinates who

caused the violation; or (5) failed to act on information indicating that unconstitutional acts

were occurring.” 

Plaintiff appears to concede that as to Still, the first factor — direct participation in the

constitutional violation — is inapplicable (Opp. 18). Plaintiff contends, however, that the four

other Thomas factors are present. Specifically, plaintiff points out that the complaint references

four other detention-related lawsuits that have been filed in this district in the past eight years. 

In those actions, it was alleged that various unnamed immigration officers discriminated against

immigrants from Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Nicaragua, and Kenya, and violated their civil rights. 

According to plaintiff, this demonstrates that Still had knowledge that his subordinates were

grossly undertrained and that they were violating immigrants’ constitutional rights.

Assuming Thomas applies here, plaintiff’s argument lacks merit. The complaint does

not allege that Still had any role in or ratified the conduct of the agents in the four earlier cases. 

That fact is somewhat obliquely alleged in plaintiff’s opposition to the instant motion, but not in

the complaint. In addition, knowledge of the previous lawsuits cannot be imputed to Still where

it is not alleged that Still ever knew of those lawsuits or of the underlying alleged detentions. 

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Furthermore, the complaint does not allege that Still failed to remedy any alleged

violation of plaintiff’s rights. Nor is any gross negligence by Still alleged in the complaint. 

Nor is it alleged that Still knew of any alleged improper, unconstitutional conduct being

inflicted on plaintiff and that Still acted failed to act on that information. Moreover, according

to the complaint, the alleged principal violators of plaintiff’s civil rights were FBI agent Mugia

and ICE agent Williams. Defendant Still is in charge of USCIS, which does not handle

detentions or immigration-enforcement matters. Those matters are generally within the purview

of ICE. See Lopez v. Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. 625, 628 n.1 (2006) (“The INS’s

immigration-enforcement functions are now handled by the Bureau of Immigration and

Customs Enforcement in the Department of Homeland Security.”).

In sum, the complaint here lacks “specific factual allegations showing [Still’s]

participation in the alleged discriminatory practice.” Richards, 864 F.2d at 88. Still must be

dismissed. This order holds, however, that allowing a pleading amendment as to Still may not

be futile because additional facts may be sufficient to allege Still’s personal involvement in the

alleged activities, at least at the pleading stage. Thus, plaintiff will be allowed to amend the

allegations as to Still. See Saul v. United States, 928 F.2d 829, 843 (9th Cir. 1991).

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, claims one through seven, asserted under the Federal Tort Claims Act, are

hereby DISMISSED without prejudice. Defendant Still is DISMISSED without prejudice. Plaintiff

may file an amended complaint, amending the allegations as to defendant Still. The amended

complaint must be filed by FRIDAY, JUNE 1, 2007. Counsel are reminded of their duty under

Rule 11 to make only good-faith allegations.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 7, 2007. WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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