Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_08-cv-03845/USCOURTS-cand-5_08-cv-03845-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Personal Injury

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United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California 

**E-filed 5/24/10** 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SAN JOSE DIVISION 

SEAN LANE, et al., 

 Plaintiffs, 

 v. 

FACEBOOK, INC., et al, 

 Defendants. 

____________________________________/

No. C 08-3845 RS 

ORDER RE ATTORNEY FEES 

I. INTRODUCTION 

 The parties negotiated a settlement of this class action, which has received final approval 

after notice to the class. Remaining to be decided is the application for attorney fees brought by 

plaintiffs’ counsel. The fee motion is unusual, because not only does it seek fees for the efforts 

made by plaintiffs’ counsel in this action, it also seeks fees for work done by plaintiffs’ counsel in 

Harris v. Blockbuster, a proceeding in the Northern District of Texas arising from the same events. 

The motion fails to establish any legitimate grounds for awarding fees for efforts undertaken by 

other attorneys in another case, particularly given that those attorneys attempted to derail the 

settlement of this action at the preliminary approval stage, before later coming to support it. 

Because the fee request is otherwise reasonable, the motion will be granted, but with that portion of 

the fee claim attributable to the Harris counsel excised. 

Case 5:08-cv-03845-RS Document 127 Filed 05/24/10 Page 1 of 4
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II. DISCUSSION1

 The parties’ settlement agreement provided that plaintiffs’ counsel could apply for, and 

Facebook would not oppose, attorney fees and costs of up to one-third of the dollar amount being 

paid by Facebook under the settlement—or roughly $3.17 million dollars. Counsel has in fact 

applied for an award of fees in the amount of $2.828 million, plus costs of $42,210.58. 

 Plaintiffs contend that California law governs the fee award because their claims sounded in 

state law. See Champion Produce, Inc. v. Ruby Robinson Co. Inc., 342 F.3d 1016, 1024 (9th Cir. 

2003) (“An award of attorneys’ fees incurred in a suit based on state substantive law is generally 

governed by state law.”); Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 290 F.3d 1043, 1047 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(“[b]ecause Washington law governed the claim, it also governs the award of fees.”). Here, 

however, plaintiffs asserted both state and federal claims, so it is not entirely clear that the fee award 

should be evaluated under state law. As plaintiffs acknowledge, however, the approach taken by 

California courts is virtually identical to that taken by the Ninth Circuit; under either jurisprudence 

the starting point is calculating a “lodestar,” by multiplying the number of hours reasonably spent in 

achieving the results obtained by a reasonable hourly rate. Friend v. Kolodzieczak, 72 F.3d 1386, 

1389 (9th Cir. 1995); Lealao v. Beneficial Cal., Inc., 82 Cal.App.4th 19, 26 (2000).2

 Plaintiffs seek a lodestar of $1,161,381.50, representing approximately 2500 hours of work, 

distributed among three law firms. Although the motion originally was not supported by sufficient 

detail regarding the tasks performed to permit an analysis of its reasonableness, plaintiffs 

subsequently submitted an additional declaration as well as detailed time records, provided in 

camera. Upon review of the record, the Court finds that the total time and expenses incurred by 

plaintiffs’ counsel were reasonable in light of the work undertaken and the results achieved. The 

Court has further considered the geographic location and experience of the attorneys who worked on 

this matter and finds that the hourly rates charged by counsel and reflected in the fee application are 

reasonable. Accordingly, the proposed lodestar of $1,161,381.50 will be adopted. 

 

1

 The factual background of this action has been described in prior orders and will not be repeated 

here. 

2

 Plaintiffs assert that there is greater latitude in applying a multiplier to the lodestar under state 

law than federal, but they argue their request here is proper under either. 

Case 5:08-cv-03845-RS Document 127 Filed 05/24/10 Page 2 of 4
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 As noted above, the fee application proposes adding to this lodestar an amount based on the 

efforts undertaken by the Harris plaintiffs’ counsel in that action. Specifically, plaintiffs assert that 

Harris counsel incurred a lodestar of approximately $825,000, and they advocate allocating 30% of 

that as a basis to increase the lodestar in this action to a little over $1.4 million. Plaintiffs offer no 

authority to support this novel suggestion. Even assuming that Harris counsel’s efforts resulted in 

benefits to persons who are class members here as well as in that case, counsel must seek 

compensation for those efforts in the action in which they took place. Indeed, the only efforts 

Harris counsel undertook in this case were directed at preventing preliminary approval of the 

settlement. While Harris counsel may have believed at the time that those efforts were in the 

interests of the class, they cannot expect to be paid from the settlement funds for opposing the 

settlement, particularly since they ultimately supported the settlement, with no material changes in 

its terms. 

 The final issue is what multiplier, if any, should be applied to the lodestar. With the 

inclusion of the Harris counsel’s hours in the lodestar, plaintiffs argue for a multiplier of 2, which 

they describe as “reasonable and warranted.” Plaintiffs suggest, however, that if the Court is not 

inclined to include the Harris hours in the lodestar, then it should apply a multiplier of 2.4, to reach 

the same total fee award. 

 The Court is satisfied that application of a multiplier is warranted under the circumstances 

here. See In re Washington Public Power Supply System Securities Litigation, 19 F.3d 1291, 1299-

1300 (9th Cir. 1994). Plaintiffs’ suggestion, however, to apply a 2.4 multiplier as a means to ensure 

the same result as if the Harris hours were included in the lodestar is disturbingly cynical. Having 

concluded that those hours should not be compensated in this action as part of the lodestar, the 

Court will not provide compensation for those hours by labeling it as something else. Accordingly, 

a multiplier of 2 will be applied. 

 

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III. CONCLUSION 

 The motion for an award of attorney fees and costs is granted in part. Plaintiffs’ counsel 

shall recover from the settlement funds attorney fees of $2,322,763.00 and costs of $42,210.58, for a 

total award of $2,364,973.58. 

Dated: May 24, 2010 

RICHARD SEEBORG 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Case 5:08-cv-03845-RS Document 127 Filed 05/24/10 Page 4 of 4