Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00986/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00986-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SUSAN GALVAN; RAMON GALVAN, )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. )

)

MODESTO POLICE OFFICER )

LYNDON YATES; OFFICER MIRL )

MORSE; CITY OF MODESTO POLICE )

DEPARTMENT; CITY OF MODESTO; )

and DOES 1 through 50, )

)

Defendants )

____________________________________)

CV F 05-0986 AWI LJO

MEMORANDUM OPINION

AND ORDER GRANTING IN

PART AND DENYING IN

PART DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS

PURSUANT TO F.R.C.P.

12(b)(6)

This is an action for damages and injunctive relief arising from events that occurred

on August 22, 2004, that resulted in the shooting death of decedent Sammy Galvan, and the

alleged misconduct of Modesto City Police officers against plaintiff Ramon Galvin. The

complaint filed on August 1, 2005, alleges a total of eleven claims for relief against

defendants Officer Lyndon Yates, Officer Mirl Morse, the City of Modesto Police

Department, the City of Modesto, and does 1 through 50 (collectively, “Defendants”). The

first and eleventh claims for relief allege civil rights violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C., section

1983 against the individual and institutional defendants, respectively. The remaining claims

for relief are California state law claims. In the instant motion, Defendants seek to dismiss

all the state law claims, principally on the ground of failure to comply with the California

Case 1:05-cv-00986-LJO-GSA Document 23 Filed 02/08/06 Page 1 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 2

Tort Claims Act. This court has federal subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.,

section 1332, and supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C.,

section 1367. Venue is proper in this court.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The currently operative pleading in this case is the First Amended Complaint

(“FAC”), filed on September 8, 2005. In the FAC, Plaintiffs Susan Galvan and Ramon

Galvan (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) allege that on August 22, 2004, decedent Sammy Galvan

lived in a cottage behind his parents’ house in Modesto. Plaintiff Susan Galvan overheard an

argument occurring between Sammy and his girlfriend (“Yesenia”) and called 911 expecting

that police would quell the argument and remove Yesenia from the premises. Susan Galvan 

then left the home to take her granddaughter to her granddaughter’s home. By the time police

arrived, Susan Galvan had left the scene and the shouting had stopped. Plaintiff Ramon

Galvin, Sammy’s father, asked the officers to escort Yesenia from the property and let the

officers in through the gate in the fence that lead to the cottage. Ramon was directed by

police not to approach the door of the cottage and he instead went to retrieve his two dogs. 

The FAC alleges that Ramon next heard gunshots and an officer yelled at him to get

out of the back yard. An officer told Ramon to put his hands behind his back. By the time

Ramon complied there were SWAT officers at the scene who threw Ramon to the ground and

handcuffed him. Plaintiffs allege police pulled Ramon to a standing position by his hands

while they were cuffed behind his back, thereby causing injury to Ramon’s arm and 

shoulder. While Ramon was at the hospital with Susan, they were informed Sammy had been

killed.

The FAC alleges that police entered the cottage carrying flashlights that illuminated

the otherwise dark room. Yesenia, who was sitting at the foot of the bed, approached the

officers who she observed had weapons pointed at Sammy. She turned to see Sammy

holding a knife but standing at some distance from the officers. Yesenia heard the officers

Case 1:05-cv-00986-LJO-GSA Document 23 Filed 02/08/06 Page 2 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 3

say “put it down” and she also said “put it down” to Sammy. The FAC alleges that as

Yesenia ducked, the officers fired immediately at Sammy, before he had the opportunity to

move or to put his knife down. The complaint alleges that Sammy was not disorderly and

that he did not threaten the officers at any time.

The FAC alleges an administrative claim was made by Plaintiffs to the city of

Modesto, which was subsequently denied. The FAC appends a document titled “Claim for

Money or Damages” listing Susan Galvin as the claimant and citing loss of her son as the

source of the damage claim. The claim form is date stamped December 4, 2004. The FAC

also appends a letter of denial of the claim, which is dated February 3, 2005, and which

informs the claimant they must file any court action on the claim within six months of the

date of delivery of the notice of denial. 

The original complaint in this action was filed on August 1, 2005. The complaint was

amended on September 8, 2005. Defendants’ original motion to dismiss was filed on

October 10, 2005. Pursuant to the court’s order, an amended motion to dismiss was filed on

December 5, 2005. Plaintiffs’ opposition was filed on December 19, 2005. By order of the

court, the matter was taken under submission as of the date of receipt of Defendants’

opposition.

LEGAL STANDARD

A complaint may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of

the claim that would entitle him to relief. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73

(1984) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)); Balistreri v. Pacifica Police

Department, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal can be based on

the failure to allege a cognizable legal theory or the failure to allege sufficient facts under a

cognizable legal theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 533-34 (9th

Cir.1984). In considering a motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true the allegations of

Case 1:05-cv-00986-LJO-GSA Document 23 Filed 02/08/06 Page 3 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 The term “claim” as used in the context of the Tort Claims Act refers to the

document, in this case a fill-in-the-blanks form, that is submitted to the public entity to notify the

entity of the alleged loss. In order to avoid confusion, the court will refer to the pleading

submitted by Plaintiff in this case as the “complaint” and the claims for relief within the

complaint will be referred to as “Counts.”

4

the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740

(1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion,

and resolve all doubts in the pleader's favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421, reh'g

denied, 396 U.S. 869 (1969). 

DISCUSSION

California’s Tort Claims Act (“CTCA”) provides a limited waiver of governmental

immunity for actions for damages against local and state governmental entities. Williams v.

Horvath, 16 Cal.3d 834, 838 (1976). “. . . the intent of the act is not to expand the rights of

plaintiffs in suits against governmental entities, but to confine potential governmental

liability [to] rigidly delineated circumstances: immunity is waived only if the various

requirements of the act are satisfied.” Id. Primary among the requirements of the CTCA is

the requirement that a person seeking money damages against a governmental must file a

claim1 with the public entity. Cal. Gov. Code, § 905, 945.4; see Dalton v. East Bay Utility

Dist., 18 Cal.App.4th 1566, 1571 (1st Dist. 1993) (“As a general rule, California law requires

that all claims for money or damages against a local public entity must first be filed with the

entity as a ‘condition precedent to the maintenance of the action.’”) Where the damages are

due to the death of, or injury to, a person, the claim must be filed within six months of the

claim’s accrual. Ovando v. City of Los Angeles, 92 F.Supp.2d 1011, 1021 (C.D. Cal. 2000). 

As Defendants correctly point out, where two or more persons suffer separate and distinct

injuries, each person must submit a separate claim. Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, 113

Cal.App.4th 783, 796 (2nd Dist. 2003).

Defendants’ basic contention is that the claim that was presented to the City of

Modesto listed only Susan Galvan as claimant; neither Ramon Galvan or the estate of Sammy

Case 1:05-cv-00986-LJO-GSA Document 23 Filed 02/08/06 Page 4 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 5

Galvan were listed as claimants. Therefore, Defendants reason, only counts that relate to

damages suffered by Susan Galvan may be alleged because Susan Galvin is the only person

to have complied with the terms of the CTCA. 

Plaintiffs contend the first claim that is appended to the FAC alleges wrongful death

on behalf of both Susan and Ramon Galvan. Plaintiffs point to line 5a of the claim form

which asks the question: “What damages and/or injury did you suffer - describe in detail:” In

response to that question, the person filling out the form wrote in the space to the right of the

colon “(Husband/Wife Brother, Yesenia).” Plaintiffs contend this inscription indicates that

the form that was filed on the wrongful death claim was filed on behalf of Susan and Ramon

Galvin, in addition to an unnamed brother and the girlfriend, Yesenia, who are not parties to

this case. 

Defendants contend the form that was submitted clearly indicates the claimant is

Susan Galvan and no other person. Defendants point to the answer to Question 5a on the

form which states that the loss suffered was the “loss of my son (my son was murdered by

MPD officers).” Defendants contend that the wording in this response indicates the claim is

on behalf of Susan Galvan only; otherwise, the response to Question 5a would have been our

son, instead of my son. 

While the issue is close, the court must reject Plaintiffs’ contention. The purpose of

the CTCA is to “provide sufficient information to enable the [public] entity adequately

investigate claims and to [settle] if appropriate, without the expense of litigation.” Nelson,

113 Cal.App.4th at 797. The response on the claim form does not adequately indicate there is

more than one claim; that is, the claim for wrongful death on behalf of Susan Galvan. At

most, the response “Husband/Wife, Brother, Yesenia” provides some hint that there could

potentially be other claimants, but not that the claim form being submitted is a claim form on

behalf of those other persons. The court is aware Plaintiffs have submitted declarations

indicating discussions were conducted between Susan Galvan and the person receiving the

Case 1:05-cv-00986-LJO-GSA Document 23 Filed 02/08/06 Page 5 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 6

claim forms on behalf of the City of Modesto. Because Defendants’ motion to dismiss is

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court may not consider

the contents of the declarations for the facts alleged therein. See Bonilla v. Oakland

Scavanger Co., 697 F.2d 1297, 1301 (( Cir. 1983) (reversible error occurs were a court

considers evidence extraneous to the pleadings prior to deciding a motion pursuant to

F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6)). The court does note, however that the declarations raise the possibility

that additional conversations may have transpired between Susan Galvan and the person

receiving the claim form on behalf of the City of Modesto, the content of which may have

relevance to the issue of whether the person receiving the claim form was made aware the

intent of the form was to claim damages on behalf of both Ramon and Susan Galvin. 

In their opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs allege Susan Galvan

filled out a second claim form on behalf of her husband, Ramon, to claim damages for the

injuries he suffered as a result of his arrest. Plaintiffs have submitted a declaration from

Susan Galvan that indicates she filled out the claim form for Ramon’s injuries because he

was being medicated at the time because of injuries suffered as a result of the arrest. Two

additional declarations of witnesses were submitted pertinent to the issue of whether an

additional claim for was submitted, but not separately filed. As discussed above, the court

may not consider such declarations in the context of a motion pursuant to F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). 

A copy of the non-stamped claim form that was allegedly submitted does not appear in FAC

nor does the FAC directly mention or allude to any such claim form.

In addition, Defendants contend that no claim form was filed that requested damages

on behalf of the estate of the decedent, Sammy Galvan. Defendants contend that, as a

consequence of the failure to file any claim of behalf of Sammy Galvan’s estate, all state law

claims on behalf of that estate are barred. Plaintiffs do not directly address this contention.

The court has examined the claim form that was appended to the FAC as well as the

slightly more legible copy that was appended to Plaintiffs’ opposition to the motion to

Case 1:05-cv-00986-LJO-GSA Document 23 Filed 02/08/06 Page 6 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 7

dismiss. The court has also examined the FAC. Two facts appear undisputed. First, no

claim form was submitted on behalf of the estate of Sammy Galvan for injuries suffered by

him. The copy of the claim form in the court’s possession clearly sets forth a claim for

wrongful death on behalf of Susan Galvan, but not for survivorship claims on behalf of the

decedent’s estate. Second, whether or not a second claim form was submitted on behalf of

Ramon Galvan, asserting claims for the injuries he suffered, it is undeniably true that the

FAC does not mention the submission of any such claim form or otherwise allege compliance

with the procedural requirements of the CTCA as to Ramon Galvan’s claims. See Complaint

at 6 (alleging the claim form attached to the complaint was filed, but making no allegation as

to any other claim form). 

Two legal conclusions flow from these undisputed facts. First, it is clear that the

requirements of the California Tort Claims Act bar Plaintiffs from asserting any causes of

action under state law on behalf of the estate of the decedent, Sammy Galvin. A wrongful

death claim – the claim asserted by Susan Galvin when she filled out the form she submitted

to the City of Modesto – is strictly limited to the losses suffered directly by the heirs as a

result of the death. ” Willis v. Gordon, 20 Cal.3d 629, 637 (1978). “It is unrelated to the

damages that were suffered by the decedent prior to his death. Id at 638. Because, as

previously discussed, each person must submit a claim where separate injuries are alleged,

Plaintiffs may not rely on the claims for wrongful death they filed on behalf of themselves to

support claims they now wish to file on behalf of their son, Sammy Galvan. See Nelson, 113

Cal.App.4th at 796; City of San Jose v. Superior Court(Lands Unlimited), 12 Cal.3d 447, 454

(filing of a proper claim is a condition precedent to the maintenance of an action); Garcia v.

Santa Clara County, 2004 WL 2203560 at *10 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (district court following

Nelson dismisses parents claims for relief where no claim was filed under CTCA on behalf of

estate of deceased son).

The second general conclusion the court reaches is that, notwithstanding Plaintiffs’

Case 1:05-cv-00986-LJO-GSA Document 23 Filed 02/08/06 Page 7 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 8

allegations set forth in their opposition to the motion to dismiss, the state law causes of action

alleged in the FAC with respect to Ramon Galvan are insufficiently pled because the FAC

does not allege any claim on behalf of Ramon Galvin was submitted to the City of Modesto

pursuant to the CTCA. See Ovando v. City of Los Angeles, 92 F.Supp.2d 1011, 1021 (C.D.

Cal. 2000) (conformity with procedural elements of CTCA is an element of any subsequent

tort cause of action). 

The court also notes in passing it has examined the FAC and finds it ambiguous and

at times confusing. However, there is no motion before the court pursuant to Rule 8 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the court is therefore hesitant to raise the issue of

whether the complaint meets the minimal requirements of a pleading under Rule 8 sua

sponte. See Kittay v. Kornstein, 230 F.3d 531, 541-542 (2nd Cir. 2000) (court abuses its

discretion under Rule 8 to dismiss complaint sua sponte were court understood allegations

sufficiently to determine they could state a claim for relief and defendant has not objected

under Rule 8). The court will, however note ambiguity or lack of clarity in the discussion

that follow where such ambiguity or lack of clarity is relevant to the court’s determination.

With the foregoing general discussion in mind, the court now examines each of the

causes of action alleged in the complaint.

A. Count One (42 U.S.C. § 1983)

Federal civil rights claims are not subject to the restrictions imposed by the CTCA. 

Williams v. Horvath, 16 Cal.3d 834, 838 (1976); Lacey v. C.S.P Solano Medical Staff, 990

F.Supp. 1199, 1206-1207 (E.D. Cal. 1997). Perhaps as a consequence, Defendants have

made no motions with respect to Count One. The court will therefore make no determination

as to the viability of count one but notes that the count may be subject to attack at a later time

for failure to conform to the requirements of Rule 8, which requires only “a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). 

Although the issue is not presently before the court, the court takes this opportunity to warn

Case 1:05-cv-00986-LJO-GSA Document 23 Filed 02/08/06 Page 8 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 9

Plaintiffs that the conclusory statement that comprises Count One as currently pled is

probably not sufficient. Count One alleges no damages on behalf of the decedent. Thus to

the extent Plaintiffs may be expecting they may recover on behalf of decedent, those claims

may be subject to exclusion as being insufficiently pled. Further, the facts that are generally

alleged in the complaint could conceivably support claims for violation of various

constitutional rights suffered by different plaintiffs. However, Count One, as pled, offers

Defendants no indication of who is claiming damages and what underlying constitutional

violations are being alleged. Plaintiffs are cautioned that, although leave will be granted to

amend the FAC, the court will be more reluctant to grant leave to further amend in the face of

future challenges to the sufficiency of the pleading. In short, Plaintiffs are advised to take the

opportunity that will be afforded to clarify Count One and to and to plead separate counts as

to separate claimants where the claims are based on different facts and different alleged

constitutional violations.

B. Count Two (Wrongful Death)

As discussed above, the court concludes the claim form that was submitted by Susan

Galvin that is attached to the FAC sets forth a claim for wrongful death on behalf of Susan

Galvin and not on behalf of any other person. Consequently, any claims for wrongful death

on behalf of Ramon Galvin are barred for failure to comply with the procedural requirements

of the Tort Claims Act. Conversely, Susan Galvan’s action for wrongful death is not barred. 

Since Ramon and Susan Galvin are married, Susan may claim those losses suffered by the

marital community such as burial costs, loss of future financial contributions to the

community and the like. Susan, not Ramon, may recover for loss of consortium and other

losses that may be peculiar to her. Thus, Defendants motion to dismiss Count Two will be

granted to the extent Count might contain claims for wrongful death that are particular to

Ramon Galvin. The motion to dismiss will otherwise be denied. Because Plaintiffs allege

the existence of another claim form filed with the City of Modesto, and because proof of

Case 1:05-cv-00986-LJO-GSA Document 23 Filed 02/08/06 Page 9 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 10

submission of the additional form along with proper pleading of its submission could

possibly cure the defect in Count Two as to Ramon Galvin, the cause of action as to Ramon

Galvin will be dismissed without prejudice.

C. Count Three (Unlawful Arrest)

Count Three is a claim by Ramon Galvin, apparently pursuant to California common

law, for unlawful arrest. As discussed above, Ramon Galvin has failed to state a claim for

which relief can be granted because he has failed to properly plead that he has complied with

the procedural requirements of the CTCA, a necessary element and precondition of any tort

action under California law. As also discussed above, the court finds the defect could

possibly be cured by proper pleading, and the court will therefore dismiss the count without

prejudice with the understanding that proof of submission of a claim form on behalf of

Ramon Galvan must be sufficiently substantial to withstand a subsequent motion for

summary judgment.

D. Count Four (Assault)

Count IV alleges assault both on behalf of Sammy Galvin and Ramon Galvin. The

count will be dismissed without prejudice as to Ramon Galvin for the reason discussed above

with respect to Count Three. As to Sammy Galvin the damage alleged is personal to him and

is therefore before the court as a survivorship claim on behalf of Sammy Galvin’s estate. 

Pursuant to the foregoing discussion, any tort action by the estate of Sammy Galvin based on

California law is barred because a claim form on behalf of Sammy Galvin was not submitted

timely to the governmental entity in conformity with the CTCA. Because Plaintiffs cannot

overcome the lack of timely filing, Count Four will be dismissed with prejudice as to any

action on behalf of the estate of Sammy Galvin.

E. Count Five (Battery)

Count Five mirrors Count Four. That is, the count alleges damages on behalf of both

Sammy and Ramon Galvin under California common law. For reasons identical to those

Case 1:05-cv-00986-LJO-GSA Document 23 Filed 02/08/06 Page 10 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 11

discussed in Count Four and elsewhere above, Count Five will be dismissed without

prejudice as to Ramon Galvin and will be dismissed with prejudice as to Sammy Galvin.

F. Count Six (Negligent Hiring, Supervision and Training)

Plaintiffs’ Count Six alleges, in pertinent part, that “Defendants City of Modesto and

the Modesto Police Department knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have

known, of the likelihood that its officers would engage in the complained-of conduct . . .” and

that “Defendants City of Modesto and the Modesto Police Department retained, and failed to

properly train and supervise, said police officers in conscious disregard of the rights and

safety of others.” FAC at 8. From this it is clear Plaintiffs are alleging that the entity

defendants are directly liable for their negligent hiring, retention and supervision of the

individual officers, rather than alleging vicariously liability for the acts of the individual

officers. 

The California Supreme Court has determined that individual public employees are

liable for their acts or omissions to the same extent as private persons pursuant to California

Government Code, section 820. Eastburn v. Reg’l Fire Prot. Auth., 31 Cal.4th 1175, 111179-

1180 (2003). However, “direct tort liability of public entities must be based on a specific

statute declaring them to be liable, or at least creating some specific duty of care, . . . .” Id. at

1183 (emphasis added). In Eastburn, the California Supreme Court examined the issue of

direct tort liability for the hiring, training and supervision of 911 responders by a municipal

entity. The court concluded the general tort provisions of Civil Code section 1714, imposes a

general duty of care on all individual persons. With respect to public entities, however, the

court concluded the CTCA as codified at section 815(a) of the California Government Code

requires that entity liability be based on specific statutory authority. The Court found neither

statutes providing for general tort liability or state common law are sufficient to impose direct

entity liability. Id. In Munoz v. City of Union City, 120 Cal.App.4th 1077 (1st Dist. 2004),

the court applied the decision in Eastburn to facts very similar to the one at bar. The

Case 1:05-cv-00986-LJO-GSA Document 23 Filed 02/08/06 Page 11 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 12

appellate court concluded that where, as here, a tort claim is alleged directly against a city and

police department for negligent training, supervision and retention of police officers who

were alleged to have used excessive force in fatally shooting a person during a confrontation,

the direct tort cause of action against the entity defendants cannot be maintained because no

statute provides for direct liability against such defendants. Munoz, 120 Cal.App.4th at 1113.

Here, the court notes Plaintiffs have cited no statutory authority that supports their

sixth cause of action for negligent hiring against the entity defendants, for negligent retention,

supervision and training of the individual officer defendants. As a consequence the court will

follow the authority established by Eastburn and grant Defendants motion to dismiss the

count with prejudice.

G. Count Seven (Infliction of Emotional Distress)

Although Count Seven is somewhat ambiguous in its wording, it appears to allege

emotional distress under California common law on behalf of both Susan and Ramon Galvin. 

As previously discussed, Ramon Galvin has failed to adequately plead compliance with the

requirements of the CTCA and is therefore barred from asserting causes of action to recover

damages to him. 

As to Susan Galvin, the facts set forth in the complaint indicate the emotional distress

she suffered was the result of hearing of her son’s death. The court can discern no other

source of emotional injury to Susan Galvan in the FAC. Under California common law, in

order for a plaintiff to recover damages for emotional distress from an incident producing

harm to a close relative, the plaintiff must be “present at the scene of the injury producing

event at the time it occurs and is then aware that it is causing injury to the victim. . . .” In re

Air Crash Disaster Near Cerritos, California, 967 F.2d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting

Thing v. LaChusa, 48 Cal.3d 644 (1989)). The facts set forth in the FAC indicate Susan

Galvan was not at the scene of the incident where Sammy Galvan was shot and did not hear

about the shooting or learn that her son had been killed until a time significantly after the

Case 1:05-cv-00986-LJO-GSA Document 23 Filed 02/08/06 Page 12 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 13

shooting occurred. Given the fact any claim for emotional damage would fail because Susan

Galvan was not a percipient witness to her son’s shooting, it appears to the court that Susan

Galvan’s action for emotional damages is actually a part of her action for wrongful death. 

“California cases have uniformly held that damages for mental and emotional distress,

including grief and sorrow, are not recoverable in a wrongful death action. [Citations.]” 

Krouse v. Graham, 19 Cal.3d 59, 72 (1977). Thus, assuming Susan Galvan’s action is for

damages as a part of her wrongful death action, those damages may not be recovered. Count

Seven will therefore be dismissed without prejudice.

H. Count Eight (Negligence)

Count Eight alleges negligence on behalf of Sammy Galvin and Ramon Galvin. As

previously discussed, any action for negligence on behalf of either Sammy or Ramon galvin

is barred. Any action on behalf of Sammy Galvin is barred because no claim form was

submitted on his behalf to the City of Modesto. Any action by Ramon Galvin for damages he

suffered is barred because Ramon Galvin failed to plead compliance with the CTCA. As

above, Count Eight will dismissed as to the estate of Sammy Galvin with prejudice. Count

Eight will be dismissed without prejudice as to Ramon Galvin.

I. Counts Nine and Ten (Violation of Unruh Civil Rights Act, California Civil

Code §§ 51.7 and 52.1)

Counts Nine alleges violation of California civil rights statutes prohibiting racially

motivated discrimination pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code § 51.7, and Count Ten requests damages

pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1. The counts are alleged on behalf of both Ramon Galvan

and Sammy Galvan. Although structure and function of California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act

is closely analogous to the function of 28 U.S.C., section 1983, which is not restricted by the

CTCA, causes of action pursuant to the Unruh Civil Rights act must conform to the

requirements of the CTCA where governmental actors or entities are being sued. Gatto v.

County of Sonoma, 98 Cal.App.4th 744, 763-765 (1st Dist. 2002). Although the CTCA

Case 1:05-cv-00986-LJO-GSA Document 23 Filed 02/08/06 Page 13 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 14

exempts certain statutory causes of action from its requirements, claims under sections 51

and 52.1 of the California Civil code are not among those statutes exempted. Thus, as above,

the California civil rights claims of Sammy Galvin must be dismissed because no claim was

filed in conformity with the CTCA, and the claims on behalf of Ramon Galvin must be

dismissed for failure to properly plead conformity with the CTCA. Again, because the

deficiency in Ramon Galvin’s cause of action could possibly be cured by proper pleading,

that cause of action will be dismissed without prejudice.

ORDER

Therefore, in consideration of the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED that:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count Two is GRANTED without prejudice as to

claims for wrongful death that are particular to plaintiff Ramon Galvin. Defendants’

motion to dismiss Count Two is DENIED as to the wrongful death claims of Susan

Galvin.

2. Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff Ramon Galvin’s Count Three is hereby

GRANTED. Plaintiffs’s Count Three for unlawful arrest is DISMISSED without

prejudice.

3. Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Count Four is HEREBY granted. Plaintiffs’

Count Four for assault is DISMISSED as to any action by the estate of Sammy Galvin

with prejudice and Count Four is DISMISSED without prejudice as to plaintiff

Ramon Galvin’s action.

4. Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Count Five is HEREBY granted. Plaintiffs’

Count Five for battery is DISMISSED as to any action by the estate of Sammy Galvin

with prejudice and Count Five is DISMISSED without prejudice as to plaintiff

Ramon Galvin’s action.

5. Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Count Six for negligent hiring, supervision

and training is hereby GRANTED. Plaintiffs’ Count Six is DISMISSED with

Case 1:05-cv-00986-LJO-GSA Document 23 Filed 02/08/06 Page 14 of 15
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 15

prejudice.

6. Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Count Seven for infliction of emotional

distress is hereby GRANTED. Plaintiffs’ Count Seven is hereby DISMISSED

without prejudice as to both Susan and Ramon Galvin.

7. Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Count Eight for negligence is HEREBY

granted. Plaintiffs’ Count Eight for assault is DISMISSED as to any action by the

estate of Sammy Galvin with prejudice and Count Eight is DISMISSED without

prejudice as to plaintiff Ramon Galvin’s action.

9. Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count Nine for civil rights violation under California’s

Unruh Civil Rights Act is HEREBY granted. Plaintiffs’ Count Nine is DISMISSED

as to any action by the estate of Sammy Galvin with prejudice and Count Nine is

DISMISSED without prejudice as to plaintiff Ramon Galvin’s action.

10. Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count Ten for civil rights violation under California’s

Unruh Civil Rights Act is HEREBY granted. Plaintiffs’ Count Ten is DISMISSED as

to any action by the estate of Sammy Galvin with prejudice and Count Ten is

DISMISSED without prejudice as to plaintiff Ramon Galvin’s action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 7, 2006 /s/ Anthony W. Ishii 

h2ehf UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:05-cv-00986-LJO-GSA Document 23 Filed 02/08/06 Page 15 of 15