Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00708/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00708-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Deborah K. Sheiman, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Carolyn W. Colvin, 

Acting Commissioner of Social Security

Administration, 

Defendant.

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No. CV-12-708-TUC-CKJ-DTF

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Deborah Sheiman brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and

1383(c)(3), seeking judicial review of a final decision by the Commissioner of Social

Security (Commissioner). Plaintiff filed her opening brief. (Doc. 17.) In response, the

Commissioner moved to remand the case to the ALJ. (Doc. 25.) Plaintiff opposes the remand

because she contends she is entitled to an immediate award of benefits. (Doc. 26.) Based on

the pleadings and the administrative record submitted to the Court, the Magistrate Judge

recommends the District Court, after its independent review, remand for further

consideration.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff filed an application for Social Security disability insurance benefits (DIB)

on March 5, 1999. (Administrative Record (AR) 115.) In an October 2001 decision, the ALJ

concluded Sheiman could not perform her past relevant work as a therapist, social worker,

car sales person or dual diagnosis coordinator, but was not disabled because she could

perform other work such as cashier, information clerk and assembly. (AR 123-24.) After

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being denied benefits, Sheiman continued to work in a variety of jobs including as a

therapist. (AR 55-56, 60, 63, 72.)

Sheiman again filed applications for DIB and supplemental security income (SSI) on

September 26, 2007. (AR 328, 336.) Plaintiff alleged disability from June 28, 2006, and June

28, 2007, respectively. (AR 328, 336.) After initial administrative denials (AR 133, 141),

Sheiman requested a hearing before an ALJ. After being re-set twice (AR 32-35, 36-48), a

hearing was held on July 15, 2010 (AR 49-95), and a supplemental hearing was held on

November 10, 2010 (AR 96-111). During one of the hearings, Sheiman amended her

disability onset date to March 31, 2008, because it was determined she had worked up until

that time. (AR 66.) ALJ George W. Reyes found that Sheiman was not disabled because she

could perform her past relevant work. (AR 14-22.) The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s

request to review the ALJ’s decision. (AR 1.)

FACTUAL HISTORY

Plaintiff was born on August 31, 1950, making her 57 years of age at the onset date

of her alleged disability. (AR 328.) In the last fifteen years, her jobs which qualify as past

relevant work were as a marriage counselor/therapist and furniture sales consultant. (AR

401.) In March 2008, she quit her position as a therapist due to a conflict with her supervisor.

(AR 64-65.)

The ALJ found Plaintiff had several severe impairments: degenerative disc disease

of the cervical and lumbar spine; affective disorder and anxiety disorder. (AR 17.) The ALJ

concluded Plaintiff had not rebutted the presumption of non-disability that arose from the

2001 decision finding her not disabled. (AR 16-17.) More specifically, the ALJ found

Sheiman had not proven changed circumstances establishing a greater disability. (AR 17.)

The ALJ found Sheiman had the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform light work,

but could only occasionally balance and must avoid concentrated exposure to hazards. (AR

19.) Further, the ALJ stated that Sheiman is able to respond to changes in a routine work

setting. (Id.) Based on this RFC, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff was not disabled because she

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could do her past relevant work as a marriage counselor/therapist and as a furniture sales

consultant. (AR 21.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Commissioner employs a five-step sequential process to evaluate DIB and SSI

claims. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; see also Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 460-

462 (1983). To establish disability the claimant bears the burden of showing she (1) is not

working; (2) has a severe physical or mental impairment; (3) the impairment meets or equals

the requirements of a listed impairment; and (4) claimant’s RFC precludes her from

performing her past work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). At Step Five, the

burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant has the RFC to perform other

work that exists in substantial numbers in the national economy. Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d

1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2007). If the Commissioner conclusively finds the claimant “disabled”

or “not disabled” at any point in the five-step process, he does not proceed to the next step.

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4).

“The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical

testimony, and for resolving ambiguities.” Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir.

1995) (citing Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989)). The findings of the

Commissioner are meant to be conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C.

§ 405(g). Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance.”

Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d

1016, 1018 (9th Cir. 1992)). The court may overturn the decision to deny benefits only

“when the ALJ’s findings are based on legal error or are not supported by substantial

evidence in the record as a whole.” Aukland v. Massanari, 257 F.3d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 

2001). This is so because the ALJ “and not the reviewing court must resolve conflicts in the

evidence, and if the evidence can support either outcome, the court may not substitute its

judgment for that of the ALJ.” Matney, 981 F.2d at 1019 (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402

U.S. 389, 400 (1971)); Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1198 (9th Cir.

2004). The Commissioner’s decision, however, “cannot be affirmed simply by isolating a

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specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Sousa v. Callahan, 143 F.3d 1240, 1243 (9th Cir.

1998) (citing Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989)). Reviewing courts must

consider the evidence that supports as well as detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusion.

Day v. Weinberger, 522 F.2d 1154, 1156 (9th Cir. 1975).

DISCUSSION

Sheiman argues the ALJ committed three errors: (1) the ALJ’s Step Four finding that

Plaintiff could perform her past relevant work, which was semi-skilled and skilled, was not

based on substantial evidence because the ALJ restricted Sheiman to unskilled work; (2) the

ALJ failed to properly apply Chavez v. Bowen, under which Sheiman would be found

disabled; and (3) the ALJ erroneously evaluated examining psychologist Dr. Cohn’s opinion.

Plaintiff asks for an immediate award of benefits based on arguments 1 and 2 or,

alternatively, remand for further proceedings.

Defendant requests that the Court remand this matter to the Commissioner for further

proceedings because the Commissioner concedes the ALJ committed several errors in

evaluating Plaintiff’s case. In particular, Defendant concedes Plaintiff’s errors 2 and 3;

however, she does not agree that an immediate award of benefits is warranted.

Step Four

Plaintiff requests that the Court deny the motion to remand for further proceedings

because she contends she is entitled to an award of benefits based on the ALJ’s Step Four

error. The premise of Sheiman’s argument is that the ALJ concluded Plaintiff was restricted

to a “routine work setting,” which limits her to unskilled work. Therefore, she could not do

her past relevant work, which was semi-skilled and skilled. Further, at Step Five, with a

limitation to unskilled work and being of advanced age, Plaintiff would be found disabled

under the grid. The Court, however, disagrees with the underlying premise of her argument.

The ALJ set forth the following RFC for Sheiman:

[T]he claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as

defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except the claimant may only

occasionally balance. The claimant must avoid concentrated exposure to

hazards such as dangerous machinery or unprotected heights. The claimant is

able to respond to changes in a routine work setting.

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28 1 Available at: https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf.Inx/0425020010.

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(AR 19.) The ALJ’s language did not limit the claimant to a routine work setting, rather, he

stated only that changes in a routine work setting were within her abilities. Further, none of

the sources upon which Sheiman relies tie routine work setting solely to unskilled work.

Rather, under the governing regulations and rules, all competitive work requires the ability

to deal with changes in a routine work setting not solely unskilled work. See 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1521(b); SSR 85-15; Program Operations Manual System (POMS) § 25020.010

(providing that ability to respond to changes in a routine work setting is a basic mental ability

needed for any job).1

 It is not clear why the ALJ singled out this one basic work activity to

include in Sheiman’s RFC but taken in context of the remainder of his decision it was not

intended to restrict her to unskilled work. This is clear because he found she could do her

past relevant work, which he classified as semi-skilled and skilled. (AR 21.)

Because the Court does not interpret the ALJ’s ruling as limiting Sheiman to unskilled

work, it does not find that she is entitled to an immediate award of benefits based on an error

at Step Four.

Chavez v. Bowen

Sheiman argues that if the ALJ had properly applied Chavez v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 691

(9th Cir. 1988), she should have been found disabled. Sheiman’s case is subject to Social

Security Acquiescence Ruling AR 97-4(9), which implemented Chavez v. Bowen. Pursuant

to those decisions, when an ALJ is evaluating a subsequent disability application he must

apply a presumption that the claimant is not disabled unless the claimant rebuts the

presumption with changed circumstances. AR 97-4(9). One example of a changed

circumstance is a change in the claimant’s age category under 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1563,

416.963. (Id.) If the presumption is rebutted, the ALJ must give effect to certain of the ALJ’s

findings on the prior claim, including a determination of the claimant’s RFC, unless there is

new and material evidence related to the finding. (Id.)

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Here, the ALJ acknowledged Chavez but found Sheiman had not proven a change in

circumstances. (AR 16-17.) This was error. Sheiman, in fact, rebutted the presumption of

non-disability because she had moved into the category of advanced age, which begins at age

55. 20 C.F.R. §§ 1563(e), 416.963(e). The ALJ also erred because he failed either to adopt

the RFC finding from the prior proceeding or to assess whether new evidence allowed him

to re-determine Sheiman’s RFC.

Sheiman argues these errors entitle her to a finding of disability at Step Five and an

immediate award of benefits. Sheiman contends that the ALJ’s finding that there was no

change with respect to her impairments required him to adopt the RFC finding from the prior

proceeding. The prior RFC was more restrictive than that found by ALJ Reyes and provided

Sheiman could: perform a limited range of light work, limited to a supervised, low stress

environment requiring few decisions with the ability to alternately sit or stand, and only

occasionally bend, stoop, twist, squat, kneel, crawl, climb and balance. (AR 122-23.) If ALJ

Reyes had adopted this RFC Plaintiff argues she would have been found unable to perform

her past relevant work at Step Four because working as a therapist or a furniture sales

consultant does not qualify as supervised, low-stress and requiring few decisions. This

comports with the findings of the prior ALJ who concluded Sheiman could not perform past

work as a therapist or car sales person. (AR 123.) Sheiman argues further that she should

have been found disabled at Step Five based on the grids due to her shift into the category

of advanced age. This argument assumes Sheiman has no transferable skills to perform work

within her functional capacity range. However, Sheiman points to no record evidence that

she has no transferable skills nor any law clarifying that, in her circumstances, her skills are

necessarily not transferable. At one of the hearings, a vocational expert testified that Sheiman

might have transferable skills to a sedentary position. (AR 68-69.) If the more restrictive

RFC was applied it might be that Sheiman has no skills transferable to a position she is

capable of performing, but she has not clearly supported that argument and this Court is not

in a position to make that decision.

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As an additional matter, what Sheiman is asking the Court to do is to reverse the

ALJ’s erroneous finding that there was no change in circumstances, with respect to her age

category but then, without consideration of the record, hold the ALJ to his finding that there

was no change in circumstances, with respect to her impairments. The Court declines to do

so. The Court finds the ALJ erred in his initial application of Chavez by finding that Sheiman

had not rebutted the presumption of non-disability in light of her increased age. He erred

again in failing to apply Chavez’s requirement that he adopt the prior RFC or explain what

new, material evidence exists that allows him to make a new RFC finding.

Dr. Cohn

The Commissioner acknowledges the ALJ relied upon misstated evidence from Dr.

Marjorie Cohn. In her evaluation, the doctor stated, “[i]t is not anticipated that the patient

will be easily able to tolerate the stressors generic to the workplace such as job-specific

decision-making, effective interfacing with supervision, peers and subordinates, regular

punctuality/attendance and recurring deadlines.” (AR 585.) The ALJ ignored the negative

in this sentence and instead stated that Dr. Cohn found Sheiman could “easily tolerate”

workplace stress, decision-making, interactions, attendance and punctuality. (AR 20.) The

ALJ relied on this misstated evidence in evaluating Sheiman’s RFC and her credibility. (AR

19-21.)

Sheiman also argues the ALJ failed to explain his rejection of the specific limitations

found by Dr. Cohn, including her finding that Sheiman had slight to moderate limitations in

performing simple and repetitive tasks, maintaining a work pace appropriate to a given work

load, performing complex or varied tasks and relating to others beyond giving and receiving

instructions. (AR 584.) Although there is contradictory evidence in the record (AR 469, 479),

the ALJ still was required to provide “specific and legitimate reasons,” supported by

substantial evidence, to reject the opinion of examining psychologist Cohn. Lester v. Chater,

81 F.3d 821, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1995). He erred in failing to do so. The Court notes that, in

addition to the ALJ not discussing the entirety of Dr. Cohn’s opinion, the ALJ did not

address any of the other psychological evidence in the record. 

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CONCLUSION

The Court finds the ALJ erred in his application of Chavez v. Bowen and AR 97-4(9),

both in applying a presumption of non-disability and in assessing Sheiman’s RFC. The Court

also finds the ALJ erred in his treatment of Dr. Cohn’s opinion.

A federal court may affirm, modify, reverse, or remand a social security case. 42

U.S.C. § 405(g). When a court finds that an administrative decision is flawed, the remedy

should generally be remand for “additional investigation or explanation.” INS v. Ventura, 537

U.S. 12, 16 (2006) (quoting Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985));

see also Moisa v. Barnhart, 367 F.3d 882, 886 (9th Cir. 2004). However, if there are no

outstanding issues because “the record has been developed fully and further administrative

proceedings would serve no useful purpose, the . . . court should remand for an immediate

award of benefits.” Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 593 (9th Cir. 2004). Here, the Court

has concluded Plaintiff is not entitled to an immediate award of benefits based on the

arguments she presented. Outstanding issues remain because the ALJ must reevaluate

Sheiman’s RFC in light of AR 97-4(9), Dr. Cohn’s opinion and the entirety of the medical

evidence. He also must re-evaluate Sheiman’s credibility. Further, if he concludes Sheiman

is unable to do her past relevant work based on her re-evaluated RFC he must assess Step

Five and obtain additional vocational evidence as warranted.

RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends the District Court, after

its independent review, enter an order granting Plaintiff’s request to reverse the

Commissioner’s final decision and granting Defendant’s Motion to Remand for the ALJ to

conduct further proceedings.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2), any party may serve and file

written objections within fourteen days of being served with a copy of the Report and

Recommendation. A party may respond to the other party’s objections within fourteen days.

No reply brief shall be filed on objections unless leave is granted by the district court. If

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objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. If objections are filed, the

parties should use the following case number: CV 12-708-TUC-CKJ.

DATED this 9th day of July, 2013.

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