Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_05-cv-00449/USCOURTS-alsd-1_05-cv-00449-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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1 The Court is mindful of its obligation under Rule 56 to construe the record,

including all evidence and factual inferences, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 

See Lofton v. Secretary of Dept. of Children and Family Services, 358 F.3d 804, 809 (11th Cir. 

2004); Johnson v. Governor of State of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1217 (11th Cir. 2005). Thus,

plaintiff’s evidence is taken as true and all justifiable inferences are drawn in his favor.

2 Weaver had a history of significant medical problems predating his arrest. In

particular, his father testified that Weaver “had a severe case of hepatitis C,” that he “had a

sta[ph] infection in the past,” that he had had gall bladder surgery and had been hospitalized for

several days thereafter with an infection. (L. Weaver Dep., at 30-31.) Weaver’s mother

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

LOUIS G. WEAVER, )

 )

Plaintiff, )

 )

v. ) CIVIL ACTION 05-0449-WS-B

 )

JACK TILLMAN, et al., )

 )

Defendants. )

 

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on defendant Mobile County’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (doc. 89) and defendant Jack Tillman’s Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 93). 

Both Motions have been briefed and are ripe for disposition at this time.

I. Background.1

A. Weaver’s Detention, Medical Treatment and Death.

The summary judgment record is fragmentary, comprised primarily of skimpy and

sometimes cryptic jail records rather than witness testimony. Nonetheless, viewing the evidence

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the undersigned understands the relevant facts to be as

follows: At 11:30 p.m. on August 4, 2003, 31-year old James Weaver (“Weaver”) was booked at

the Mobile County Metro Jail (the “Jail”) in Mobile, Alabama on charges of Robbery Second,

Giving False Name to Officer, and Possession of Controlled Substance. (Plaintiff’s Exh. 3;

Tillman Exh. 2.)2

 A “Jail Receiving Screening Form” completed at the time of Weaver’s

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indicated that he had hepatitis C and cirrhosis of the liver, and that he had previously been

hospitalized with a bone infection and gall bladder problems. (Chestang Dep., at 19-20.)

3 This exhibit is a copy of a form, which plaintiff submitted on summary judgment

without authentication or verification. Generally, courts ruling on Rule 56 motions may consider

only admissible evidence or evidence that could be presented in an admissible form. See, e.g.,

Denney v. City of Albany, 247 F.3d 1172, 1189 n.10 (11th Cir. 2001). Documents must generally

be properly authenticated to be considered at summary judgment, unless it is apparent that they

can be reduced to admissible, authenticated form at trial. See Bozeman v. Orum, 199 F. Supp.2d

1216, 1222 (M.D. Ala. 2002). Those requirements were not followed as to this exhibit, or many

others in the record. Nonetheless, there appears to be no dispute that this exhibit is in fact a true

and accurate copy of the Jail form, and as there has been no motion to strike any exhibits, the

Court will consider this and other unauthenticated, unverified exhibits on the assumption that

they can be reduced to admissible, authenticated form at trial.

4 It is undisputed that Weaver was a drug addict at the time of his arrest, with a

longstanding history of intravenous drug abuse. (L. Weaver Dep., at 17; Tillman Exh. 10.)

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booking reflected that he was conscious; that he did not have obvious pain, bleeding or other

symptoms suggesting a need for emergency treatment; and that there were no visible signs of

trauma or illness requiring immediate medical attention. (Plaintiff’s Exh. 3.)3

 That document

also stated that Weaver displayed bruises on his forehead, cheeks and eyes. (Id.) Booking

photographs confirm the bruising to Weaver’s face, including visible swelling around his left

eye. (Plaintiff’s Exh. 4.) The intake form, which Weaver signed, stated that he had no current

illness, was taking no medication, and had no special health requirements. (Plaintiff’s Exh. 3.) 

That document also characterized Weaver as friendly, alert and cooperative. (Id.)

4

At the time of Weaver’s arrival, a Jail nurse examined him and completed a “Medical

Encounter Record” noting Weaver’s explanation for his physical appearance that a “bounty

hunter beat him up.” (Plaintiff’s Exh. 8.) The nurse observed that Weaver had a black eye, that

he was talking constantly, that he was able to stand, that he was alert and oriented, and that he

smelled of alcohol. (Id.) Based on this examination, the nurse noted on the form, “Bring to

clinic after dressed out” and “MD visit ASAP,” apparently for treatment of his facial cuts and

bruises rather than for any more serious symptoms (which Weaver had not disclosed at intake). 

(Id.) Another pre-printed Medical Encounter Record form in the record is blank except for a

solitary handwritten notation, as follows: “8/4/03 Refused to see MD R. St_____l.” That

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5 Plaintiff argues that the form signed by Nurse King is “unreliable.” In doing so,

plaintiff offers no affirmative evidence to contradict that form, but instead discounts it because

the form is not completed in its entirety, does not mention Weaver by name, and includes two

different dates. (Plaintiff’s Brief (doc. 101), at 2 n.1.) Further, plaintiff insists that Plaintiff’s

Exhibit 9 is undermined by the Jail’s clinic log book for the night of August 4 to August 5,

which makes no mention of Weaver being brought to the clinic or refusing treatment. (Id.) This

basis for circumventing Plaintiff’s Exhibit 9 is not compelling for several reasons. First, plaintiff

assumes that Weaver’s rejection of medical treatment occurred after he was brought to the Jail

clinic, but there is no indication in the record of same. If Weaver refused treatment before going

to the clinic, then one would hardly expect a clinic log book to report an event that never

occurred there. Second, even if Weaver went to the clinic before refusing treatment, plaintiff’s

argument fails because there is no evidence that a clinic log entry of an inmate refusing treatment

was required or even standard practice under Jail policies or operating procedures, particularly if

record of such refusal was made on another form. There is no indication in the record that

plaintiff queried Tillman or other jail officials as to the significance (if any) of the absence of

that kind of entry in the clinic log book. Nor is there any indication that plaintiff sought to

depose either Nurse King or the physician on duty to question them about these events or log

book practices. Nor does the record show that plaintiff has obtained the original of the form (the

lower portion of which appears to have been truncated in the copy in the record) to see if it

identifies Weaver by name. Rather than conducting discovery and presenting evidence as to the

legitimacy of the form, plaintiff decries it using speculation and innuendo. Also unavailing is

plaintiff’s contention as to Exhibit 9 that “there is just no meaning as to what this could possibly

mean.” (Plaintiff’s Brief, at 5 n.6.) The wording of Exhibit 9 is clear and unambiguous, so the

Court cannot endorse plaintiff’s attempts to minimize that document as vague or inscrutable.

6 The Amended Complaint alleges that Weaver “complained constantly of external

and internal pain to ... the booking jailers, medical personnel and each and every jailer inspector

that inspected his jail cell.” (Amended Complaint, ¶ 12.) Inasmuch as plaintiff has proffered no

record evidence to support that allegation, the Court cannot credit it on summary judgment. 

Similarly, the Court does not accept the unsupported allegation in the Amended Complaint that

Weaver told his father “that he asked to be taken to the doctor and they wouldn’t.” (Id., ¶ 13.) 

The same applies to allegations in the Amended Complaint about what Weaver’s cell mate,

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notation is signed “D. King RN 8/5/03.” (Plaintiff’s Exh. 9.)5

Weaver was housed in Pod 402. Sick call was conducted in that pod each morning from

August 5 through August 9. (Tillman Exh. 1.) Jail log books and other records do not reflect

that Weaver ever availed himself of sick call or that he otherwise requested or received medical

treatment from August 5 through August 8. Plaintiff offers no evidence that he did so, nor is

there any showing that Jail personnel obstructed or discouraged Weaver from requesting medical

treatment during daily sick call or at any other time.6

 On the morning of the 9th, however, Cpl.

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whose testimony is not part of the record, may have said to anyone at any time regarding these

events. (Id., ¶ 17.)

7 Although it is undisputed that Jail personnel took Weaver to the clinic after sick

call on August 9, this event is recorded in the clinic log book but not in the pod log book. (See

Tillman Exh. 1.) The absence of such an entry from the pod log book underscores the fact that

Jail personnel did not slavishly record every happening for every inmate in redundant records. 

This omission further undermines plaintiff’s contention that the absence of an entry on Weaver

in the clinic log book for the night of August 4 must mean that he never refused medical

treatment at that time, notwithstanding the existence of written Jail records to the contrary.

8 Amongst the documents in the record is a report referencing a Medical Encounter

Record dated August 9, 2006 at 8:30 a.m. and purportedly including a statement from Weaver

that “I feel real bad.” (Tillman Exh. 2.) However, that Medical Encounter Record was omitted

from the summary judgment record and therefore cannot be considered.

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Henderson (who conducted sick call) brought Weaver to the Jail clinic at 8:22 a.m., shortly after

sick call. (Id.)

7

 Ten minutes later, a nurse examined Weaver and reported that he was

“complaining of chills, fever, dizziness and weakness.” (Id.)

8

 He was promptly transported to

the USA Medical Center (“USA”) in Mobile for treatment. (Id.) Weaver never returned to the

Jail.

USA records show that Weaver was admitted to the hospital at 3:00 p.m. on August 9,

2003, with fever and thrombocytopenia. (Plaintiff’s Exh. 1.) Dimitris K. Kyriazis, MD FACS,

one of his attending physicians, opined that “Weaver had a serious medical condition” at the

time of his admission because “he was septic,” meaning that “his entire body system was

infected.” (Dr. Kyriazis Aff., at 2.) According to Dr. Kyriazis, this condition was pre-existing

when Weaver arrived at the Jail on August 4, 2003. (Id.) At USA, Weaver was diagnosed with

septic endocarditis and a staph infection in his bloodstream. (Tillman Exh. 10.) He received

antibiotic therapy from August 9 through August 15, and underwent open-heart surgery for a

mitral valve replacement on August 15. (Id.) After that surgery, Weaver developed

complications. He went into cardiac arrest and was pronounced dead at 8:10 a.m. on August 16,

2003. (Id.) The Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences performed an autopsy that same

morning, identifying the cause of death as “hemothorax due to post-operative hemorrhage,” with

“liver cirrhosis” as a contributory cause. (Tillman Exh. 8.)

Dr. Kyriazis, who attended Weaver’s mitral valve replacement surgery, has submitted an

Case 1:05-cv-00449-WS-B Document 115 Filed 07/10/06 Page 4 of 25
9 Louis Weaver testified that he received this telephone call “Monday morning of

the 4th at 1:20 in the morning, a.m.” (L. Weaver Dep., at 13-14.) There is apparently no dispute,

however, that Weaver was not arrested until the night of August 4, 2003, meaning that the call to

his father must have been placed at 1:20 a.m. on August 5, not August 4. (See Plaintiff’s Brief

(doc. 101), at 1.) Likewise obviously incorrect is plaintiff’s counsel’s repeated assertion that

August 4, 2003 fell on a Sunday. (Id. at 1 and 2 n.2.) It was actually a Monday, although that

distinction is not material for purposes of this Order.

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affidavit offering the following expert opinions: (a) Weaver had a serious medical condition on

August 4, 2003, when he was admitted to the Jail; (b) “it is very likely” that prompt treatment

after Weaver’s admission to the Jail “would have lessened [his] serious medical condition”; and

(c) “it is most likely” that prompt medical treatment would have lessened the serious medical

condition that Weaver displayed on August 6 and 7 at the Jail. (Plaintiff Exh. 1.) This evidence

reflects that Weaver died not because of a health condition that he contracted at the Jail, but

because of a condition he already had when he first arrived at the Jail.

B. Weaver’s Parents’ Interactions with Weaver and Jail Staff.

Having reconstructed this chronology largely from documents in the record, the Court

now turns to the testimony of Weaver’s parents as to their interactions with him during the last

12 days of his life, as well as their efforts to intercede with Jail officials on his behalf.

At 1:20 a.m. on August 5, 2003, plaintiff Louis G. Weaver was sitting home watching

television when the telephone rang. The caller was plaintiff’s son, Weaver, who indicated that

he had been arrested and was at the Jail. (L. Weaver Dep., at 13-14.)9

 He was apparently calling

from the Jail’s docket room. Weaver told his father that he was very sick because he had been

beaten by bounty hunters, and that he needed a doctor. (Id. at 15.) There is no evidence that

Weaver complained of any health problems in that call other than the scrapes and bruises

inflicted by the bounty hunters. Weaver asked his father to bring money so that he could visit

the doctor. (Id. at 16.) Louis Weaver knew that his son had been in jail several times before,

and had been informed by his son in the past of a Jail policy that there was a $10 charge for

inmates to see a doctor. (Id. at 16, 18-19.) The next morning, plaintiff brought $10 to the Jail

and gave it to a “sheriff’s representative,” non-party Shandura LeDaux, so that Weaver could

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10 Louis Weaver was familiar with this procedure because he had previously

engaged in similar activities on his son’s behalf. Specifically, in connection with Weaver’s

arrests prior to August 2003, plaintiff had had occasion to bring $10 to the Jail administration

office and tell them that his son was sick and needed a doctor. (L. Weaver Dep., at 21-23.) 

Louis Weaver testified that he had not asked Jail personnel whether his son would be allowed to

see a doctor without that $10 payment, and that he did not know whether a $10 payment was a

necessary precondition to any doctor visit. (Id. at 23-24.)

11 In her deposition, LeDaux testified that she did just that. In particular, she

indicated that after Louis Weaver came to the administration office with concerns about

Weaver’s health, she passed along the message to the warden and also contacted the Jail clinic. 

(LeDaux Dep., at 10-12.) LeDaux has no knowledge of what, if anything, was done in response

to these concerns. (Id. at 12.)

12 It is undisputed, however, that Weaver had $10 in his inmate account at the time

of Chestang’s visit, and that the maximum co-pay for a doctor visit at the Jail was also $10.

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have medical treatment. (Id. at 19, 36.)10 At that time, plaintiff informed LeDaux that (a)

Weaver was very sick, (b) Weaver had hepatitis C, (c) Weaver had previously suffered from

staph infection, and (d) plaintiff “would like to see the sheriff or somebody and see about getting

him some help.” (Id. at 36.) LeDaux responded that “she would talk to her supervisor and make

sure that he got some help.” (Id. at 37.)11 The $10 was promptly credited to Weaver’s inmate

account.

On Thursday, August 7, 2003, Louis Weaver received a tearful telephone call from his

ex-wife, Nancy Chestang, who had just visited Weaver at the Jail. (L. Weaver Dep., at 41.) 

When Weaver walked into the room, Chastang “almost didn’t know who he was, because he

looked so bad. ... His color was gray. He just had no color in his face or in his arms or

anything.” (Chestang Dep., at 13.) She testified that he had ruptured blood vessels in both eyes,

that the side of his face “was all red and purple,” that his eyes “were all black and green,” and

that one hand was swollen. (Id.) Weaver terminated his visit with his mother after just 10

minutes because he said he needed to lie down. (Id. at 14.) According to Chestang, Weaver told

her that he was sick and said, “I can’t see the doctor because I don’t have enough money in my

account.” (Id.)

12 He also requested that Chestang call plaintiff to bring “some more money” to

enable him to see a doctor and obtain medicine. (Id. at 13.) Chestang conveyed this request to

Louis Weaver. (Id. at 14-15.) In response, plaintiff brought a money order for $25 to the Jail

Case 1:05-cv-00449-WS-B Document 115 Filed 07/10/06 Page 6 of 25
13 At plaintiff’s request, Jail staff eventually returned the $25 to him. (L. Weaver

Dep., at 46.) Louis Weaver never inquired as to whether any of those funds were used for

Weaver’s medical needs. (Id.) Also, there is a non-material discrepancy as to the exact dates

and amounts of funds brought to the Jail by Louis Weaver. Jail records reflect that plaintiff

brought $10 to the Jail on his son’s behalf on August 6, and $15 on August 8 (Plaintiff’s Exh.

11); meanwhile, plaintiff testified that he had brought $10 to the Jail on August 4, and $25 on

August 7. These inconsistencies are not germane to the summary judgment analysis.

14 According to plaintiff, Jail staff never informed him that Weaver had been sent to

USA until August 14, when Louis Weaver went to the Jail for a visit. (L. Weaver Dep., at 50-

51.) At that time, LeDaux arranged for plaintiff to visit Weaver in the hospital that day, which

he did. (Id. at 51-52.) Chestang saw Weaver at the hospital on the morning of his surgery. 

(Chestang Dep., at 15.)

15 This testimony is corroborated by the Affidavit of John Pafenbach (doc. 92),

County Administrator for Mobile County, which states that the Sheriff of Mobile County sets

policies for and operates the Jail, and that the Mobile County Commission does not in any way

oversee, direct or control the Jail or the Sheriff’s operation or policies of same. (Pafenbach Aff.,

¶¶ 2-3.)

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administration office that very day and presented it to LeDaux. (L. Weaver Dep., at 42;

Chestang Dep., at 11-12.)13 At that time, plaintiff asked LeDaux why his son had not seen a

doctor and indicated that “the sheriff or somebody” needed to get Weaver to a doctor. (L.

Weaver Dep., at 42.) LeDaux’s response was, “I’ll handle it, I’ll handle it.” (Id.) Weaver’s

parents had no further substantive contact with Jail officials prior to his death.14

Plaintiff seeks to hold defendant Tillman responsible for Weaver’s death because Tillman

“didn’t carry him to the doctor.” (L. Weaver Dep., at 79.) At all relevant times, Tillman was the

Sheriff of Mobile County. (Tillman Dep., at 6.) Among Tillman’s duties as Sheriff was the

responsibility to maintain and operate the Mobile Metro Jail. (Id.)

15 It is undisputed that

Tillman was not personally familiar with, and had no personal participation in, Weaver’s

booking, intake and treatment at the Jail from August 4, 2003 through August 9, 2003. (Id. at 7.)

C. Jail Policies Regarding Medical Treatment.

In operating the Jail, Tillman implemented Standing Operating Procedures (“SOPs”) for

both sheriff’s deputies and jail corrections officers. (Tillman Dep., at 6-7.) As of 2003, he

testified, there was a SOP concerning the provision of medical attention for prisoners at the Jail. 

(Id. at 9-10.) Tillman testified that Jail intake employees “do the best they can” to screen

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inmates to determine if “there’s something wrong with the prisoner” at the time of intake, but

that such efforts are hampered by the practical reality that 4,000 people per month are booked at

the Jail. (Id. at 10-11.)

As of August 2003, the Jail had several SOPs bearing on inmate medical treatment. The

first was entitled “Admission and Booking” and concerned screening of inmates at intake. 

(Tillman Exh. 3.) That SOP required Intake Receiving Officers to inspect arrestees for apparent

injuries or impairments and, if injuries are observed, notify Jail medical staff. (Id.) If medical

staff determined that immediate medical treatment was needed, then the arrestee would not be

admitted to the Jail, but would instead be returned to the arresting officer pending receipt of a

medical clearance certificate from off-site medical providers. (Id.) A second SOP, labeled

“Receiving Screening / Health Assessments,” required that if an arrestee showed visible signs of

injury or complained of pain at intake, a Jail nurse would assess the inmate’s condition at the

intake area to determine whether booking should proceed or whether the inmate should be taken

to a hospital for treatment and returned to the Jail upon receipt of written medical clearance. 

(Tillman Exh. 4.) That same SOP required nurses to collect and review all Jail Receiving

Screening Forms twice during each shift for arrestees who may need immediate medical care,

and to ensure that such care is provided. (Id.) That SOP further required that a “health

assessment” for each inmate be completed by a nurse within 14 days after arrival at the Jail. 

(Id.) This health assessment includes checking the inmate’s vital signs, listening to the inmate’s

chest and back via stethoscope, completing a medical questionnaire, and answering any

questions that the inmate might have. (Id.) The SOP allowed inmates to refuse medical

evaluation. (Id.)

The third SOP set forth the Jail procedures for sick calls. Each morning a medical officer

distributes Health Services Request forms to inmates who request to see a nurse. Those forms

are collected and delivered to the Director of Nursing for evaluation and prioritization. Inmates

who request medical attention are sent to the nurse’s station, where they are examined and

receive appropriate treatment. (Tillman Exh. 5.) If the nurse determines that an inmate requires

a physician’s care, the inmate will be scheduled to be seen during the next scheduled physician’s

visit. (Id.) By the terms of the SOP, inmates are charged a fee of $10 for non-emergency sick

call visits. (Id.) Nonetheless, the SOP clearly provided that “Medical care for inmates shall

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16 Defendant James Bonding Company (“James”) has not filed a Rule 56 motion,

but instead attempted to proceed pro se. When the Court became aware of James’ pro se status,

an Order (doc. 107) was entered on June 13, 2006, explaining that business entities are not

eligible to represent themselves in federal court. In response to that Order, attorney Thomas

Brian Walsh appeared as counsel of record for James on June 22, 2006. (See doc. 109.) At the

final pretrial conference, the Court will explore with counsel for plaintiff and James whether the

claims against that entity are properly litigated in this forum. Specifically, plaintiff’s claims

against James (all of which concern the alleged beating of Weaver preceding his booking at the

Jail) rest on an entirely different factual predicate than those against Tillman and the County (all

of which concern Weaver’s medical treatment, or lack thereof, at the Jail, for health conditions

unrelated to the alleged beating). And plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against James are problematic,

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never be refused. Inmates without funds to cover medical charges will have a negative balance

entered into their account.” (Id.) Moreover, under no circumstances are inmates charged for

sick call visits relating to a medical emergency. (Id.)

Fourth and finally, a Jail SOP designated “Emergency Medical Response” stated that if

either an inmate notifies an officer of an illness or an officer observes a perceived medical

problem for an inmate, Jail medical staff will be notified. (Tillman Exh. 6.) The Jail medical

staff has the option of requesting to see the inmate right away or arranging for the inmate to be

seen at the next sick call. (Id.) “If the inmate refuses medical treatment, the Security Supervisor

will be notified and the incident will be noted in the Pod Log.” (Id.)

There is no suggestion in the record that the Jail did not adhere to any of these SOPs as of

August 2003, or that its actual practices and procedures deviated materially from those specified

in the SOPs. All record evidence is consistent with these SOPs.

D. Procedural Posture.

In an Amended Complaint (doc. 78), plaintiff Louis Weaver, as father and administrator

of the estate of James Weaver, brought claims against Tillman, Mobile County, James Bonding

Company, and 52 other defendants (most of whom were present or former Jail employees). On

April 13, 2006, after the close of discovery, plaintiff moved to dismiss without prejudice his

claims against the 52 other defendants pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2), Fed.R.Civ.P. (Doc. 85.) That

motion was granted via Order (doc. 100) dated April 24, 2006, leaving Tillman, Mobile County,

and James Bonding Company as the only remaining defendants. Tillman and Mobile County

have moved for entry of summary judgment.16

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as it seems improbable that James was “a willful participant in joint action with the State or its

agents” as is necessary for that entity to be acting under color of state law under § 1983. See

Harvey v. Harvey, 949 F.2d 1127, 1133 (11th Cir. 1992). Thus, it may be that plaintiff’s claims

against James sound exclusively in state law and involve facts that are disconnected from

plaintiff’s claims against Tillman and the County, such that federal jurisdiction is questionable. 

Counsel for James and plaintiff should be prepared to discuss these issues at the pretrial

conference.

17 The Amended Complaint also contains a multi-faceted cause of action (the Third

Claim for Relief) against defendant James Bonding Company citing use of excessive force in

violation of the Fourth Amendment, assault and battery, and wrongful death. (Amended

Complaint, ¶ 29.) Setting aside the propriety of a plaintiff packing multiple legal theories and

causes of action into a single claim for relief, the Court need not address the Third Claim for

Relief, inasmuch as it does not state a claim against Tillman or Mobile County, and James

Bonding Company has not filed a Rule 56 motion.

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The Amended Complaint alleges that Tillman and the Jail staff “had a Constitutional duty

under the Fourteenth Amendment to provide necessary medical treatment for the injuries of

James Weaver that he presented to the jail upon his arrival after his beating” by bounty hunters,

and that they further had a Fourteenth Amendment duty not to delay such treatment. (Amended

Complaint, ¶ 11.) The crux of plaintiff’s claims is that “defendants violated [Weaver’s]

constitutional right to be given for [sic] free health care while a prisoner at the metro jail,”

proximately causing his death. (Id., ¶ 19.) The Amended Complaint includes three claims for

relief against the movants, as follows: (i) a claim that Tillman directly participated in a pattern of

neglect, mistreatment and abuse of Weaver by showing deliberate indifference to his medical

needs and failing to arrange for treatment (First Claim for Relief); (ii) a claim that Tillman and

Mobile County had a policy that inmates would not receive medical treatment if they arrived at

the Jail with serious injuries, if they complained of severe injury, or if they failed to pay money

toward the cost of their medical treatment (Second Claim for Relief); and (iii) a claim that

Tillman failed to properly train, manage, supervise and instruct Jail staff and that he also failed

to operate the Jail in accordance with the SOPs relating to the provision of necessary medical

treatment for serious medical needs (Fourth Claim for Relief).17

II. Summary Judgment Standard.

Summary judgment should be granted only if “there is no issue as to any material fact

Case 1:05-cv-00449-WS-B Document 115 Filed 07/10/06 Page 10 of 25
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and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The

party seeking summary judgment bears “the initial burden to show the district court, by reference

to materials on file, that there are no genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at

trial.” Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). Once the moving party

has satisfied its responsibility, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to show the existence of a

genuine issue of material fact. Id. “If the nonmoving party fails to make 'a sufficient showing

on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof,' the

moving party is entitled to summary judgment.” Id. (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317 (1986)) (footnote omitted). “In reviewing whether the nonmoving party has met its burden,

the court must stop short of weighing the evidence and making credibility determinations of the

truth of the matter. Instead, the evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable

inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Tipton v. Bergrohr GMBH-Siegen, 965 F.2d 994, 999

(11th Cir. 1992) (internal citations and quotations omitted). However, the mere existence of any

factual dispute will not automatically necessitate denial of a motion for summary judgment;

rather, only factual disputes that are material preclude entry of summary judgment. Lofton v.

Secretary of Dept. of Children and Family Services, 358 F.3d 804, 809 (11th Cir. 2004).

III. Analysis.

As mentioned supra, both Mobile County and Tillman have moved for summary

judgment. Because their motions rest on different legal grounds, each will be addressed

separately.

A. Mobile County’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

Mobile County’s Motion relies on a straightforward premise that it cannot be responsible

under § 1983 for any constitutional violation relating to Tillman’s operation and administration

of the Jail. Case law vindicates Mobile County’s position. In Turquitt v. Jefferson County, Ala.,

137 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 1998), the administratrix of an inmate who was fatally injured in a fight

at the Jefferson County Jail filed suit against the county under § 1983, alleging violations of the

decedent’s constitutional rights in the operation and management of the jail. After a searching

review of Alabama statutory and case law, the Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, held that an

Alabama county cannot be held liable under § 1983 for injuries befalling a county jail inmate

arising from the sheriff’s management of the jail. Id. at 1286-90. As the Turquitt Court

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explained, Alabama law imposes no duties on counties with respect to daily operation of county

jails or supervision of inmates; rather, Alabama counties’ duties regarding their jails “are limited

to funding the operations of the jail and to providing facilities to house the jail.” Id. at 1289

(citation omitted); see also Marsh v. Butler County, Ala., 268 F.3d 1014, 1027 (11th Cir. 2001)

(“Alabama counties have no responsibility for daily operation of county jails and no authority to

dictate how jails are run”). Alabama law requires the sheriff to ensure that inmates do not come

to harm (Ala. Code § 14-6-1), and “an Alabama sheriff acts exclusively for the state rather than

for the county in operating a county jail.” Turquitt, 137 F.3d at 1288.

In the wake of Turquitt, federal courts have uniformly rejected claims against Alabama

counties alleging that an inmate sustained harm because of jail operations, management, policies

or procedures. See, e.g., Marsh, 268 F.3d at 1026 n.6 (declaring that Alabama county is not

liable for deliberate indifference to inmate’s medical needs because “under Alabama law the

County is not responsible for assuring procedures are in place for inmates to get medical care”);

Gaines v. Choctaw County Com’n, 242 F. Supp.2d 1153, 1162 (S.D. Ala. 2003) (“While the

County does have a duty to maintain its jail, that duty does not extend to the medical care of

prisoners.”); Vinson v. Clarke County, Ala., 10 F. Supp.2d 1282, 1295-96 (S.D. Ala. 1998)

(county could not be liable for sheriff’s failure to train jailer, inasmuch as sheriffs possess only

state policymaking authority in running day-to-day affairs of jail).

Faced with this daunting wall of precedent, plaintiff criticizes the reasoning of the

Turquitt line of authorities as immunizing counties from liability for the actions of their sheriffs

because “the county sheriff is not the county sheriff, even though it is the county sheriff.” 

(Plaintiff’s Brief (doc. 104), at 2-3.) Nonetheless, plaintiff concedes that Turquitt is controlling

precedent and that “[t]he current state of the law is against the plaintiff.” (Id. at 1, 3.)

The Court finds, pursuant to Turquitt and its progeny, that Mobile County cannot be held

liable under § 1983 for plaintiff’s Second Claim for Relief, which alleges that the Jail had an

inadequate policy for providing necessary medical treatment to inmates. As plaintiff

acknowledges, binding precedent holds that an Alabama county is not responsible for ensuring

that suitable procedures are in place for jail detainees to receive medical care. Accordingly,

plaintiff cannot pursue his Second Claim for Relief against Mobile County. Because the

Amended Complaint does not purport to assert any other causes of action against the County,

Case 1:05-cv-00449-WS-B Document 115 Filed 07/10/06 Page 12 of 25
18 As a technical matter, government officials’ treatment of pretrial detainees is

governed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, while treatment of convicted

prisoners is governed by the Eighth Amendment. See Lancaster v. Monroe County, Ala., 116

F.3d 1419, 1425 n.6 (11th Cir. 1997). The appropriate legal standards for provision of medical

care are the same under both amendments; therefore, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment cases

can be used interchangeably in the “deliberate indifference” analysis. See id.; Cottone v. Jenne,

326 F.3d 1352, 356 n.4 (11th Cir. 2003) (“the standard for providing basic human needs to those

incarcerated or in detention is the same under both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments”)

(citation omitted).

-13-

and because plaintiff does not suggest in his opposition brief that he has any other claims against

the County that might survive a Turquitt analysis, the Court finds that Mobile County’s Motion

for Summary Judgment is due to be, and the same hereby is, granted.

B. Tillman’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

While the Amended Complaint purports to bring several § 1983 claims against Tillman,

all are predicated on the notion that Weaver’s constitutional rights were violated by the provision

of inadequate medical care while he was at the Jail. This basic argument is packaged in three

different ways, to-wit: (i) that Tillman and Jail staff were deliberately indifferent to Weaver’s

medical needs, (ii) that Tillman had a policy of failing or refusing to provide necessary medical

treatment to inmates in Weaver’s condition, and (iii) that Tillman failed to provide proper

training to Jail staff and failed to enforce the Jail’s SOPs concerning the provision of medical

treatment to inmates.

1. Deliberate Indifference Standard.

All of plaintiff’s constitutional claims against Tillman may be assessed under the Eighth

Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.18 The law is clear that “deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton

infliction of pain’ ... proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.” Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344,

1351 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted); see also Campbell v. Sikes, 169 F.3d 1353, 1363 (11th

Cir. 1999) (“The Eighth Amendment’s proscription of cruel and unusual punishments prohibits

prison officials from exhibiting deliberate indifference to prisoners’ serious medical needs.”). 

But not every claim that a prisoner has received inadequate medical treatment automatically

vaults to the level of a constitutional deprivation actionable under § 1983. See, e.g., Farrow v.

Case 1:05-cv-00449-WS-B Document 115 Filed 07/10/06 Page 13 of 25
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West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003). To demonstrate that a prison official acted with

deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, a plaintiff must satisfy both an objective

standard and a subjective standard. The objective showing contemplates that a plaintiff must

establish an “objectively serious medical need,” which is defined as “one that is so obvious that

even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention” and one which

“if left unattended, poses a substantial risk of serious harm.” Brown, 387 F.3d at 1351 (citations

omitted).

The presence of an objectively serious medical need, without more, is not sufficient to

create a constitutional violation; rather, the plaintiff must also prove the subjective element “that

the prison official acted with deliberate indifference to that need.” Brown, 387 F.3d at 1351

(citation omitted). A prison official cannot be deemed deliberately indifferent under the Eighth

Amendment “unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or

safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a

substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). That requirement has

been construed by the Eleventh Circuit as mandating proof of each of the following three facts:

“(1) subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2) disregard of that risk; and (3) by conduct

that is more than mere negligence.” Brown, 387 F.3d at 1351; see also McElligott v. Foley, 182

F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 1999). The “subjective knowledge” prong means that “liability may

be imposed for deliberate indifference only if the plaintiff proves the defendant actually knew of

an excessive risk to inmate health or safety .... Proof that the defendant should have perceived

the risk, but did not, is insufficient.” Campbell, 169 F.3d at 1364 (citation omitted). That said, a

plaintiff need not prove knowledge by direct evidence, but may rely on circumstantial evidence. 

See Lancaster v. Monroe County, Ala., 116 F.3d 1419, 1426 (11th Cir. 1997) (opining that

defendants’ knowledge of plaintiff’s medical needs “is a question of fact subject to

demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence”). In the

absence of at least circumstantial evidence of a government official’s actual, subjective

awareness of the medical need, summary judgment must be granted for that official on the

deliberate indifference claim. See Campbell, 169 F.3d at 1364.

The “more than mere negligence” component has been deemed satisfied in the following

Case 1:05-cv-00449-WS-B Document 115 Filed 07/10/06 Page 14 of 25
19 Defendant’s position on this point is somewhat schizophrenic. In his principal

brief, Tillman argues that “[t]here is no evidence that Weaver exhibited serious medical needs

prior to August 9, 2003.” (Tillman Brief (doc. 95), at 10.) This argument confounds the

objective and subjective elements by attempting to compress them into a single factor. If he had

serious medical needs while at the Jail, then Weaver satisfies the objective prong of the

deliberate indifference query, irrespective of whether and when he “exhibited” them. In his

reply brief, however, Tillman prudently concedes that “it is apparent that Mr. Weaver ha[d] a

serious medical condition, even prior to his admission to the ... Jail.” (Reply Brief (doc. 105), at

7.) Thus, Tillman does not appear to contest that the objective portion of the deliberate

indifference test is satisfied.

-15-

categories of circumstances: (a) where an official knows that an inmate is in serious need of

medical care, but fails or refuses to obtain treatment for that inmate; (b) where an official

unreasonably delays treatment of known serious medical needs; (c) where an official provides

grossly inadequate care or selects an easier but less efficacious course of treatment; or (d) where

an official provides medical care which is so cursory as to amount to no treatment at all, despite

an obvious need for treatment. See McElligott, 182 F.3d at 1255 (collecting cases).

2. Plaintiff’s Evidence Does Not Establish a Constitutional Deprivation.

Upon reviewing the summary judgment record in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the

Court readily concludes that Weaver had an objectively serious medical need when he was

admitted to the Jail on August 4, 2003. Plaintiff’s evidence, including specifically the Dr.

Kyriazis Affidavit, is that as of August 4, he was suffering from hepatitis C, a septic condition

and a staph infection that infected his entire body. It cannot reasonably be disputed that these

conditions satisfy the objective standard for a “serious medical need,” inasmuch as the need for a

doctor’s attention for such conditions, if known, is obvious and such conditions may pose a

substantial risk of serious harm if left unattended. See, e.g., Brown, 387 F.3d at 1351 (finding

objective prong of test satisfied because hepatitis and HIV plainly meet definitions for

objectively serious medical need); Lancaster, 116 F.3d at 1425 (finding that alcohol withdrawal

is a serious medical need for purposes of deliberate indifference analysis).19

Notwithstanding plaintiff’s showing of an objectively serious health need, his § 1983

claims against Tillman cannot survive summary judgment because the subjective prong of the

deliberate indifference test is insurmountable on these facts. Viewing the record in the light

most favorable to plaintiff, there is no evidence that Weaver ever requested medical attention

Case 1:05-cv-00449-WS-B Document 115 Filed 07/10/06 Page 15 of 25
20 Plaintiff’s Brief unleashes a second salvo of arguments that Exhibit 9 should not

be credited for Rule 56 purposes. (Plaintiff’s Brief (doc. 101), at 9-10.) For example, he states

that it “hardly seems plausible” that Weaver would reject medical treatment after being admitted

to the Jail in the middle of the night and in an apparently intoxicated condition. The Court finds

nothing implausible about it, and declines plaintiff’s invitation to speculate about facts outside

the record. Plaintiff also argues that the Exhibit is not credible because if “he was told that he

mayo [sic] die if he didn’t see the doctor, would he really have said no?” (Id. at 10.) There is

zero evidence that at the time of Weaver’s intake, Jail officials had any reason to believe that he

“may die if he didn’t see the doctor,” so the premise of this argument is faulty. Similarly,

plaintiff’s criticism of Exhibit 9 because it “does not list how acutely serious his past medical

problems were” (id.) is unavailing because there is no evidence that Weaver ever apprised Jail

officials of his past medical problems, much less any legal authority requiring Jail officials to

investigate an inmate’s denial of current medical problems as a prerequisite to intake. Perhaps

realizing the futility of these arguments and the total lack of record evidence to counter

Plaintiff’s Exhibit 9, plaintiff allows that Weaver “was brought in to the jail in a drunken

condition” and that “in a drunken condition, the decedent may have said he didn’t need to see the

doctor.” (Id.) Plaintiff having offered no evidence to rebut the statement that Weaver refused

treatment on the evening of August 4, the Court will consider that evidence on summary

judgment. Plaintiff cannot create genuine issues of material fact sufficient to defeat Tillman’s

Rule 56 Motion simply by arguing that he does not believe Plaintiff’s Exhibit 9.

21 The intake form (Plaintiff’s Exh. 3) signed by Weaver and reflecting that he

answered “no” when asked about current illnesses, medications and special health needs belies

plaintiff’s assertion that Weaver “was not screened” at the Jail. (Plaintiff’s Brief, at 17.) The

only evidence before the Court is that he was screened at intake, just as the Jail’s SOP requires.

-16-

from anyone at the Jail. Despite access to the full panoply of discovery tools, plaintiff has

proffered no affidavit or deposition transcript from a jailer or fellow inmate to suggest that

Weaver ever asked to be seen by a doctor or nurse. In fact, the only evidence in the record is to

the contrary. A document completed by a Jail nurse shortly after Weaver was admitted states

that he refused medical care for the cuts and bruises on his face. (See Plaintiff’s Exh. 9.)20 At

the time of intake, Jail officials observed Weaver to be alert, cooperative and friendly; and

indicated that Weaver was not in obvious pain, bleeding or showing other symptoms evincing a

need for emergency treatment. (Plaintiff’s Exh. 3.) Moreover, an intake document signed by

Weaver suggests that he misled Jail officials at intake by telling them that he had no current

illnesses, that he was taking no medication, and that he had no special health requirements, all of

which are inconsistent with plaintiff’s arguments herein that Weaver was suffering from hepatitis

C and staph infection at that time. (Id.)

21 It is undisputed that sick call was held each morning in

Case 1:05-cv-00449-WS-B Document 115 Filed 07/10/06 Page 16 of 25
-17-

Weaver’s pod. Despite the lack of evidence that Jail staff imposed any obstacles or restrictions

on Weaver’s ability to participate, there is no indication that Weaver ever signed up for sick call,

that he was ever refused permission to go to sick call, or that he otherwise asked any Jail

representative to see a doctor at any time during his detention. Simply put, the record is legally

insufficient to support a finding that Jail personnel possessed subjective knowledge that Weaver

had a medical condition that placed him at risk of serious harm. The uncontroverted evidence is

that, far from alerting Jail personnel to his serious health needs, Weaver failed to disclose his

medical needs to them, denied the existence of such needs when asked, and then refused medical

care and failed to sign up for sick call that was made available to him every morning.

At most, plaintiff proffers two bits of evidence that he claims demonstrate the Jail’s

subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm. First, plaintiff points to Louis Weaver’s two

conversations with LeDoux in the Jail administrator’s office on approximately August 5 and

August 7. Louis Weaver testified that he informed LeDoux on both occasions that he believed

his son needed to see a doctor. But Louis Weaver had not seen Weaver following his

incarceration on August 4, and had not spoken with Weaver since the latter went to intake. 

Plaintiff cites no authority that would require a Jail to initiate an investigation whenever the

parent of an adult inmate states a belief (based exclusively on second- or third-hand information)

that the inmate needs medical attention, particularly when the inmate himself has denied the

existence of medical problems, refused treatment at intake, failed to sign up for daily sick call,

and declined to use funds in his inmate account for a doctor’s visit. Thus, Louis Weaver’s

statements to LeDoux do not provide even circumstantial evidence that Jail staff had subjective

knowledge that Weaver had a health problem placing him at risk of serious harm. Second,

plaintiff points to Chestang’s testimony about the physical appearance of her son during her brief

visit with him on August 7, 2003, which consisted of statements that he was bruised, that his

color was gray, that he appeared weak, and that he excused himself after several minutes to lie

down. Again, however, such evidence does not create a genuine issue of fact that Jail personnel

had subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm. The bruises on Weaver’s face, while

perhaps unsightly, do not appear to have constituted a serious medical need, and the fact that

Weaver’s color was off and he wanted to lie down is simply insufficient to provide his jailers

with actual knowledge that he had a serious medical condition, particularly when Weaver had

Case 1:05-cv-00449-WS-B Document 115 Filed 07/10/06 Page 17 of 25
22 As the Court has already noted, there is no testimony from Weaver’s fellow

inmates or from any correctional officers at the Jail as to what they saw, how he looked, what he

said, or what indications they might have been given that Weaver was in need of medical care. 

In that regard, plaintiff’s evidence of deliberate indifference contrasts sharply with that found

sufficient to create a jury question in Lancaster, 116 F.3d at 1419, wherein there was extensive

record evidence from jailers and other inmates regarding the decedent’s physical state and

actions in the jail during the time period in which the plaintiff maintained that jailers should have

been providing medical treatment. Here, however, Weaver’s time at the Jail is virtually an

evidentiary black hole, save for the very limited insight of his mother’s testimony during the few

minutes she spent with him on August 7. There is not one iota of testimony or other evidence

from anyone as to how Weaver was conducting himself in the jail between August 5 and August

9, and whether cellmates or jailers in his pod had knowledge or reason to believe that he was

suffering from a serious medical need.

23 The Eleventh Circuit has explained that the genesis of the governmental

obligation not to be deliberately indifferent to inmates’ serious medical needs lies in the “critical

fact” that “the prisoner cannot get his own care, nor can anyone from outside the jail get to him

to help him.” Marsh, 268 F.3d at 1038. Here, however, Jail medical care was made available to

Weaver, but he at turns rejected and otherwise failed to avail himself of such care.

-18-

declined medical care on August 4, had informed Jail staff at intake that he had no current illness

and no special health requirements, and had failed to sign up for sick call.22

The Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference test does not transform jailers into mind

readers or medical experts. See generally Cagle v. Sutherland, 334 F.3d 980, 989 (11th Cir.

2003) (“A prison custodian is not the guarantor of a prisoner’s safety.”) (citation omitted). It

does not compel jailers to second-guess an inmate’s refusal to accept medical treatment where no

serious medical need is known or evident to them.23 And it does not require jailers to force an

inmate to sign up for sick call when he declines to do so for days on end and when they do not

know that he is at risk of serious harm. On the record as presently constituted, no reasonable

finder of fact could conclude that Jail officials were aware prior to August 9 that Weaver

possessed a serious health need that created a substantial risk of serious harm. An inevitable

corollary to that determination is that no reasonable finder of fact could find that Jail officials

were deliberately indifferent to Weaver’s serious medical needs, and no reasonable finder of fact

could therefore find a violation of Weaver’s Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment rights to medical

Case 1:05-cv-00449-WS-B Document 115 Filed 07/10/06 Page 18 of 25
24 Compare Farrow, 320 F.3d at 1246-48 (finding issue of fact on deliberate

indifference claim where jail doctor knew of plaintiff’s pain, weight loss, bleeding gums and soft

diet caused by fact that he had only two teeth, and where doctor was aware that without dentures

plaintiff would continue to suffer from pain, bleeding gums, weight loss and malnutrition; but

affirming grant of summary judgment to nurse where plaintiff submitted no evidence that nurse

was subjectively aware of serious risk of harm to inmate); McElligott, 182 F.3d at 1256 (actual

knowledge threshold satisfied where jury could find that defendants were aware of inmate’s

tremendous pain and illness at the time of incarceration, based on medical examination of inmate

and inmate’s “nearly constant complaints about the pain he was having”); Lancaster, 116 F.3d at

1426-28 (actual knowledge prong of deliberate indifference analysis was satisfied where jail

defendants had been personally advised that inmate was an alcoholic, that he was prone to

potentially fatal alcohol withdrawal seizures, that inmate’s medical condition was urgent, and

that inmate had almost died from previous seizure).

-19-

care in the Jail.24

3. Plaintiff Has Offered No Basis for Holding Tillman Liable for Any

Constitutional Deprivation that May Have Occurred.

Even if plaintiff had come forward with evidence that Weaver suffered a deprivation of

his constitutional right to medical care during his incarceration, defendant Tillman would remain

entitled to summary judgment because there is no valid basis for assigning liability for any such

constitutional deprivation to him.

As Sheriff of Mobile County, Tillman was vested with legal custody and charge of the

Jail and its prisoners. See Ala. Code § 14-6-1; see also Turquitt, 137 F.3d at 1289 (“Under the

Alabama Code, the sheriff has control over the inmates of the jail, the employees of the jail, and

the jail itself.”). However, plaintiff readily acknowledges that Tillman “had no personal

knowledge of the medical condition of [Weaver].” (Plaintiff’s Brief, at 7 n.8.). The law is

crystal clear that a “Sheriff can have no respondeat superior liability for a section 1983 claim.” 

Marsh, 268 F.3d at 1035; see also Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003) (“It is

well established in this Circuit that supervisory officials are not liable under § 1983 for the

unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious

liability.”); Carswell v. Bay County, 854 F.2d 454, 457 n.3 (11th Cir. 1988) (“Section 1983 will

not support a claim based on a respondeat superior theory of liability.”) (citation omitted). 

Nonetheless, personal participation is not an ironclad prerequisite for § 1983 liability; rather, a

supervisor can be liable in the absence of personal participation “when there is a causal

Case 1:05-cv-00449-WS-B Document 115 Filed 07/10/06 Page 19 of 25
25 Plaintiff seeks to hold Tillman responsible for the alleged deliberate indifference

of Jail staff on the following rationales: “constructive knowledge, widespread abuse case and

policy case – a faulty screening policy; a faulty pre-payment policy; a faulty working medical

delivery service system in place; actual knowledge that the medical delivery system was not

working properly.” (Plaintiff’s Brief, at 7 n.8.) 

-20-

connection between the actions of [the] supervising official and the alleged constitutional

deprivation.” Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1360; see also Wilson v. Attaway, 757 F.2d 1227, 1241 (11th

Cir. 1985). The requisite “causal connection” exists where either (a) “a history of widespread

abuse puts the responsible supervisor on notice of the need to correct the alleged deprivation,

and he fails to do so” or (b) “a supervisor’s custom or policy results in deliberate indifference to

constitutional rights or when facts support an inference that the supervisor directed the

subordinates to act unlawfully or knew that the subordinates would act unlawfully and failed to

stop them from doing so.” Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1360 (citations omitted); see also Ancata v.

Prison Health Services, Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 706 (11th Cir. 1985) (sheriff may be held liable for

deliberate indifference to inmate’s medical needs if sheriff established policy or custom

requiring inmates to seek court orders to obtain medical services, and if such policy or custom

played a role in such deprivation). Plaintiff invokes both of these theories in seeking to impute

liability to Tillman.25

First, plaintiff maintains that Tillman had a “custom or policy” that resulted in deliberate

indifference to Weaver’s constitutional rights. According to plaintiff, the Jail SOP that inmates

must pay $10 before they can be seen by a doctor unfairly, improperly and unlawfully delayed

Weaver’s medical treatment, thereby creating the requisite causal connection to support § 1983

liability against Tillman. (Plaintiff’s Brief, at 12-14.) This argument fails for five reasons. 

First, it misstates and overlooks the plain language of the SOP, which provides that (a) there is

never any charge for emergency doctor visits; and (b) no inmate is ever denied non-emergency

medical care for lack of funds, but will instead be given a negative balance in his inmate

account. Second, there is no record evidence that Jail personnel have ever deviated from this

SOP since its inception in June 2002, or that they ever denied Weaver (or any other inmate)

medical treatment for lack of funds. Third, the timing of Weaver’s medical care appeared

wholly unrelated to his inmate account balance; indeed, Weaver’s father had placed $10 in his

Case 1:05-cv-00449-WS-B Document 115 Filed 07/10/06 Page 20 of 25
26 In that respect, this case is readily distinguishable from Ancata v. Prison Health

Services, Inc., 769 F.2d 700 (11th Cir. 1985), on which plaintiff relies. In Ancata, the plaintiff

alleged that a county jail had refused to refer an inmate to a medical specialist absent either a

court order or a promise by the inmate (who was indigent) to bear the costs of that evaluation. 

Id. at 702. The facts in the case at bar have no discernable resemblance to those in Ancata. 

Incidentally, plaintiff in no way advances his cause on page 13 of his brief by ascribing a

quotation (which he presents in all italics and characterizes as having been “emphasized” by that

court) to the Ancata court that appears nowhere in that opinion. The Court cannot determine the

true origin of the language that plaintiff mis-attributes to Ancata.

-21-

account as early as August 5, yet Weaver did not obtain medical care until August 9. Whatever

the reason for the delay in Weaver’s medical care was, there is no evidence that the $10 policy

had anything to do with it. Fourth, the irrelevance of the policy is underscored by the fact that a

nurse examined Weaver at intake on August 4, and referred him to a doctor immediately. There

is no evidence that anyone at the Jail ever informed Weaver that medical care/treatment would

be delayed until he mustered the requisite $10 or that his scheduled doctor’s visit (which he

declined) was conditional on his first paying $10. Fifth, there is no evidence that Weaver ever

requested medical treatment at any time while housed at the Jail, so as to trigger the $10 SOP. 

Given the dearth of evidence that the Jail’s $10 doctor visit SOP played a role in the lack of

medical care for Weaver, this policy cannot serve as a basis for imputing liability to Tillman.26

Second, plaintiff argues that Tillman may be held liable because of a custom or

widespread practice of deliberate indifference to the medical needs of Jail inmates. (Plaintiffs’

Brief, at 14-17.) Case authorities cited by plaintiff establish that § 1983 liability based on

custom requires a showing of “a widespread practice that, although not authorized by written law

or express municipal policy, is so permanent and well settled as to constitute a ‘custom or usage’

with the force of law.” Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka, 261 F.3d 1295,1308 (11th Cir. 2001)

(citation omitted); see also Cooper v. Dillon, 403 F.3d 1208, 1221 (11th Cir. 2005) (for purposes

of § 1983 supervisory liability, a “custom is a practice that is so settled and permanent that it

takes on the force of law”). If the express written policy is not itself unconstitutional (as the

Jail’s SOPs on medical care clearly are not), then considerably more proof than a single incident

of unconstitutional activity is sufficient to establish fault on the part of the policy maker and the

requisite causal connection between policy maker and deprivation. See City of Oklahoma City v.

Case 1:05-cv-00449-WS-B Document 115 Filed 07/10/06 Page 21 of 25
27 See also Grech v. Clayton County, Ga., 335 F.3d 1326, 1330 n.6 (11th Cir. 2003)

(“A single incident would not be so pervasive as to be a custom or practice.”); Young v. City of

Augusta, Ga. Through DeVaney, 59 F.3d 1160, 1169 (11th Cir. 1995) (claim that custom, practice

or policy regarding medical care of inmates caused plaintiff’s damages “necessarily will mandate

proof that the alleged violations were not isolated instances”); Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667,

671 (11th Cir. 1990) (“deprivations that constitute widespread abuse sufficient to notify the

supervising official must be obvious, flagrant, rampant and of continued duration, rather than

isolated occurrences”).

-22-

Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 824, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985).27

In an effort to meet this burden of establishing a “widespread practice,” plaintiff relies

solely on the death of another inmate, James Carpenter, at the Jail in July 2000, fully three years

before the events at issue here took place. (Plaintiff’s Brief, at 6, 15-17.) Plaintiff’s evidence is

that Carpenter’s need for psychiatric care was readily apparent to both guards and other inmates,

that he never received medical or psychiatric care, that Jail SOPs were not followed, that

Carpenter spent much of his 15 days in the Jail naked and shackled, and that he died from fastacting infectious complications associated with the restraint injuries to his wrists and ankles. 

(Plaintiff’s Exh. 15.)

In the undersigned’s opinion, however, the Carpenter incident cannot sustain a finding

that a “widespread practice” of deliberate indifference to the medical needs of inmates existed at

the Jail in August 2003. The Weaver and Carpenter episodes bear little similarity. Unlike

Carpenter, Weaver was offered medical care on the night of his admission to the Jail. Unlike

Carpenter, sick call was made available to Weaver every morning at the Jail. Unlike Carpenter,

there is no evidence that guards or other inmates were aware of Weaver’s serious medical needs

prior to August 9. Unlike Carpenter, Weaver was never shackled at the Jail and left bound hand

and foot, lying naked in excrement for hours on end. Furthermore, whatever tenuous, superficial

parallels might exist between the fact patterns of Carpenter and Weaver are eradicated by the

intervening passage of time. Three years elapsed between Carpenter’s arrest and Weaver’s

arrival at the Jail. There is no evidence that any Jail staff member was deliberately indifferent to

the medical needs of any inmate at the Jail at any time during that three-year interlude. More

importantly, there is substantial evidence that the Jail’s operations were revamped and

overhauled between July 2000 and August 2003. Among the modifications to Jail operations

Case 1:05-cv-00449-WS-B Document 115 Filed 07/10/06 Page 22 of 25
28 In pointing out that Tillman contracted with a third-party provider for medical

services, the Court is not suggesting that such an arrangement insulates Tillman from

responsibility for providing adequate medical care to inmates. It plainly does not. See, e.g.,

Ancata, 769 F.2d at 705 (the duty to provide medical care to incarcerated individuals is not

absolved by contracting with a third party to provide such services, and the government remains

liable for constitutional deprivations caused by policies or customs of that third party). What the

Court is saying, however, is that this development is one of many that vitiates plaintiff’s reliance

on circumstances pertaining to Carpenter in 2000 to argue a widespread practice of deliberate

indifference at the Jail as of 2003.

29 A supervisor cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a deliberate indifference

standard for risks of harm to inmates that were not reasonably known or knowable to him. See

generally Cagle, 334 F.3d at 988 (Alabama sheriff’s policies of having only one on-duty

nighttime jailer were not deliberately indifferent to risk of suicide at jail where sheriff had no

reason to believe there was strong likelihood of prisoner suicides and jail had no history of

suicide).

-23-

implemented by Tillman were the following: (a) new SOPs for medical screening and sick call

were issued in 2002; (b) a new warden and chief deputy were assigned to the Jail; and (c)

beginning in July 2002, Tillman contracted with a third party for provision of professional health

care services at the Jail, including a licensed medical doctor to provide medical treatment on-site

five days per week for at least four hours per day.28 (Tillman’s Supplemental Exhibit (doc.

106).) Under Eleventh Circuit authority, the existence of past constitutional violations at a jail is

not a scarlet letter condemning a jail supervisor to automatic § 1983 exposure forevermore on a

“widespread practice” theory, when substantial, effective remedial actions have been taken in the

interim. See Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1361 (no § 1983 liability for jail supervisors for death of

inmate, despite history of widespread unconstitutional conduct at Broward County Jail, where

previously-entered consent decree addressed those deficiencies and supervisors had implemented

necessary procedures to conform to such consent decree).29

If the Carpenter facts are as shown by plaintiff’s evidence, then the Jail’s treatment of

Carpenter in July 2000 was both deplorable and unconstitutional. But uncontroverted evidence

establishes that Tillman substantially modified the Jail’s operations, both in general and

specifically with respect to medical care, in the wake of the Carpenter tragedy. There is not a

scrap of evidence of any inmate receiving inadequate medical care at the Jail between July 2000

and August 2003, as these improvements to the Jail’s operating procedures were implemented. 

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Taken in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the record on summary judgment demonstrates that

the Jail’s SOPs in August 2003 provided for an integrated system of medical screening and

availability of on-site medical care for inmates, including questioning incoming inmates about

their medical issues or needs, having nurses examine incoming inmates with potential health

concerns, conducting sick call every morning, arranging for on-site doctor visits and nurse

staffing, and allowing inmates to have doctor visits even if they lacked funds in their inmate

account. There is no indication that these SOPs were not successfully implemented, or that they

were not followed in any instances between July 2000 and August 2003. These circumstances

do not evince a policy, custom or widespread practice of deliberate indifference to inmates’

medical needs at the Jail as of August 2003, as is necessary to create the requisite causal

connection between Tillman and Weaver’s purported deprivation.

In short, then, even if plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence to show a deprivation of

Weaver’s constitutional right to adequate medical care in the Jail, he has proffered no viable

factual or legal basis for holding Tillman liable for that deficiency or for finding the violation to

be anything other than in isolated incident. Accordingly, even if it could be concluded that

Weaver’s constitutional rights were violated, the summary judgment record would not permit a

finding that Tillman is legally responsible for such violations. Summary judgment is appropriate

for Tillman on this basis as well.

4. Other Claims Against Tillman.

The foregoing analysis addresses exclusively plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against Tillman in

his individual capacity. The Amended Complaint does not identify any state law claims against

Tillman. Even if such claims were brought, plaintiff correctly admits that Tillman “is absolutely

immune against state law claims.” (Plaintiff’s Brief, at 18.) See Sheth v. Webster, 145 F.3d

1231, 1236-39 (11th Cir. 1998) (recognizing that “absolute sovereign immunity” is afforded to

sheriffs and deputy sheriffs under Alabama law, while lesser state officials are not immune for

actions taken in bad faith, maliciously or willfully); Tinney v. Shores, 77 F.3d 378, 383 (11th Cir.

1996) (“Under Alabama law, sheriffs and deputy sheriffs, in their official capacities and

individually, are absolutely immune from suit when the action is, in effect, one against the

state.”). And to the extent that plaintiff purports to bring official-capacity claims against Tillman

under § 1983, those claims are not cognizable, as a matter of law, either. See, e.g., Robinson v.

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Georgia Dept. of Transp., 966 F.2d 637, 640 (11th Cir. 1992) (“Congress, in passing § 1983, did

not intend to override the immunity guaranteed to the states by the Eleventh Amendment”);

Lancaster, 116 F.3d at 1429 (finding that district court correctly granted sheriff summary

judgment on § 1983 official capacity claims because Alabama sheriff is state official protected

by Eleventh Amendment immunity); Browning v. City of Wedowee, Ala., 883 F. Supp. 618, 621

(M.D. Ala. 1995) (dismissing § 1983 claims for money damages against sheriff in official

capacity pursuant to Eleventh Amendment immunity); Boshell v. Walker County Sheriff, 598

So.2d 843, 844 n.2 (Ala. 1992) (explaining that any claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

against a sheriff in his official capacity is barred by the Eleventh Amendment).

IV. Conclusion.

For all of the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ordered that the Motions for Summary

Judgment (docs. 89, 93) are granted. All of plaintiff’s claims against defendants Mobile County

and Jack Tillman are dismissed with prejudice. A separate Judgment will enter.

The only remaining defendant in this action is James Bonding Company. This action is

presently set for a Final Pretrial Conference on July 17, 2006, with jury trial to follow in August

2006. As mentioned in footnote 16, supra, counsel for plaintiff and James Bonding Company

should be prepared to discuss at the pretrial conference whether a federal forum is appropriate

for the claims as between those parties, and how this case should proceed, in light of the

dismissal of all claims against the County and Tillman.

DONE and ORDERED this 7th day of July, 2006.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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