Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_04-cv-01154/USCOURTS-casd-3_04-cv-01154-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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-1- 04cv1154

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROY C. RIVAS, Jr., Civil No. 04cv1154 J (JMA)

Petitioner,

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

RE: 

(1) DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS;

(2) DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION

TO EXPAND THE RECORD; and

(2) DENYING PETITIONER’S REQUEST

FOR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING.

vs.

STUART J. RYAN, Warden,

Respondent.

I. INTRODUCTION

Roy C. Rivas, Jr., (“Rivas”) a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus (the “Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his San Diego Superior Court

conviction in case number CRN 26227 for first degree murder, attempted robbery, and residential

burglary. (Lodgment No. 15 at 001-05.) He contends that his federal constitutional right to an impartial

jury and his Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him were

violated. He also claims that his federal due process rights were violated when the prosecutor presented

false evidence and put on a witness who was bound to a “script” as a condition of her plea agreement,

and he alleges that the cumulative effect of the errors requires reversal of his conviction. (See Pet’rs

Mem. of P. & A. at 8-37.) 

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Finally, Petitioner asks this Court to hold an evidentiary hearing and to expand the record. (See doc.

nos. 48, 51.)

The Court has considered the Petition and Exhibits, Respondent’s Answer, Petitioner’s Traverse

and all the supporting documents submitted by the parties. Based upon the documents and evidence

presented in this case, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court recommends that the Petition, the

motion for an evidentiary hearing and the motion to expand the record be DENIED. 

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact and presumes them to be correct;

Petitioner may rebut the presumption of correctness, but only by clear and convincing evidence. 28

U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)(1)(West 2006); see also Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 35-36 (1992) (holding findings

of historical fact, including inferences properly drawn from such facts, are entitled to statutory

presumption of correctness). The facts as found by the state appellate court are as follows:

FACTS

At around 10 a.m. on May 29, 1993, Rivas and four others went to the two-story

apartment of Elpidio Beltran and his wife, Sofia Partida, to rob Beltran and take his

drugs. In the process, while Rivas used a gun to hold people downstairs in the apartment

at bay, Ray Senteno went upstairs and shot and killed Beltran in the presence of Partida

and the couple’s six-year-old son, Elpidio Beltran, Jr. [footnote 2: In a separate trial,

Ray Senteno was convicted of first degree murder, attempted robbery and residential

burglary, and found to have used a gun. He was sentenced to prison for 31 years to life.]

Earlier that morning, Patsy Moreno and Gloria Rivas (Gloria), Rivas’s aunt, had

purchased heroin and cocaine from Beltran at the apartment where Gloria had been

buying drugs for over a month. In the past, when Gloria was short of money for drugs,

Beltran had given her a list of things to steal and deliver to him as payment. This time,

Gloria wanted her drugs, and she was not going to steal in order to get the drugs. Gloria

handed Beltran the money she had, only $30, for the $40 worth of drugs he furnished

her, and she and Moreno “just took off” with the drugs since they were outside the

apartment and she knew he did not want to cause a scene.

After Gloria and Moreno returned home, they used the drugs. A short time later,

Rivas arrived with Senteno and Nancy Jaime. Gloria told Senteno, then Rivas, that she

wanted to rob Beltran because he had a lot of drugs. The three of them planned to scare

Beltran, tie him up with duct tape and get his drugs. Senteno loaded a gun, and Gloria

looked for bullets to load hers, after which the five people went in Moreno’s car to

Beltran’s apartment.

When they arrived at the apartment, Gloria and Senteno were admitted, followed

shortly by Rivas who proceeded to point a gun at a male friend of Sofia Maldonado, one

of the Beltrans’ children. [footnote 3: Gloria first testified that the gun Rivas used was

an inoperable .25 caliber gun which she had placed in the back seat of the car. After

admitting she had not told the whole truth in her earlier testimony because she did not

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1

 Although Rivas did not fire the fatal shot at Beltran, he was charged with first degree murder under the

California’s felony murder doctrine. Essentially, the felony murder doctrine provides that a defendant may be

found guilty of first degree murder when he commits, among other crimes, a residential burglary or robbery, and

someone is killed during the commission of the crime. (See CALJIC Nos. 8.10 (Murder Defined), 8.27 (First

Degree Felony Murder – Aider and Abettor) 

-3- 04cv1154

want to get her nephew, Rivas, in trouble, Gloria testified she, Rivas and Senteno each

had a gun, and the “little pistol” Rivas used was not her gun.] Rivas, who held a roll of

duct tape in his hand, also pointed the gun at Maldonado. Gloria said they were the

police, unplugged a telephone in the kitchen and stopped a boy who was trying to run

out a patio door after seeing the guns. Gloria testified that Jaime also entered and

participated by closing the curtains.

While Rivas, Gloria and Jaime were holding the people at bay downstairs, sixyear-old Elpidio Beltran, Jr., ran upstairs and altered his parents about the events. With

his gun drawn, Senteno went to the upstairs bedroom where Beltran and Partida were

watching a video, and shot and killed Beltran. When the shots were fired, all the

intruders fled.

Rivas’s defense was that he went to the apartment to buy drugs, not to commit

a robbery or burglary. He presented testimony of the shooter, Senteno, to the effect the

two of them got “high” on heroin earlier on the morning of the killing, and later, when

Gloria told them she just bought drugs, they asked her to introduce them to her supplier.

Senteno had about $300. Gloria told them the name of her supplier and they went to the

apartment to buy drugs. Before leaving, Senteno put a 15-round clip in his gun and took

it with him because he did not know this dealer and was concerned about being robbed.

When Senteno and Gloria went into the apartment, Senteno had the gun in his waistband.

A young boy saw the gun and began yelling that there was a gun, after which he ran

upstairs. Senteno took the gun in his hand and ran upstairs to tell Beltran everything was

all right, he was just there to buy drugs. Senteno stated he tapped the gun on the door

and it went off two or three times. He saw he had shot Beltran, and panicked, running

downstairs and telling Rivas the gun went off, then leaving with the others.

On cross-examination the prosecutor brought out the fact Senteno had been

separately convicted of the same charges arising from the killing, that he had served four

or five years in prison for other convictions, that he knew his possession of a firearm and

use of heroin were parole violations, and that on about seven occasions in the past he

gave false names and social security numbers to the police in order to avoid parole

violations.

(Lodgment No. 3, People v. Rivas, slip op. no. D021952 at 3-6.)

III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The San Diego County District Attorney’s Office filed an information charging Roy Rivas, Jr.

with one count of first degree murder (count 1), a violation of California Penal Code (“Penal Code”)

section 187(a), one count of attempted robbery (count 2), a violation of Penal Code sections 664, 211

and 213(b) and one count of residential burglary (count 3), a violation of Penal Code section 459.

(Lodgment No. 15 at 0001-5.)1 As to counts two and three, the information also alleged that Rivas

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 The Information contained another Penal Code section 12022.5(a) allegation that was later dismissed.

(See Lodgment No. 15, Clerk’s Tr. at 0152.) The Information also charged Rivas with being an accessory after

the fact (count 4), a violation of Penal Code section 32; evading an officer with reckless driving (count 5), a

violation of Vehicle Code section 2800.2; possession of an assault weapon (count 6), a violation of Penal Code

section 12280(b); and possession of a destructive device (count 7), a violation of Penal Code section 12303.2.

Counts six and seven were severed and later dismissed. (See id. at 0156.) Although there is no indication in the

record, counts four and five were apparently dismissed at some point during the proceedings. 

-4- 04cv1154

personally used a firearm, within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022.5(a). Finally, the

information alleged that Rivas had suffered four prior prison commitments within the meaning of Penal

Code section 667.5(b).2

 (See id.) A jury found Rivas guilty of all counts and found the Penal Code

section 12022.5(a) allegations to be true. (Id. at 0111-3.) Rivas later admitted the four prior convictions

alleged and was sentenced to thirty-three years to life. (Id. at 0156.) 

Rivas filed a direct appeal and a habeas corpus petition challenging his conviction and sentence

in the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One. (Lodgment Nos. 1, 7, 8, 9,

11, 12, 13.) On April 26, 1996, the state appellate court issued an Order directing the San Diego

Superior Court to conduct an evidentiary hearing into Rivas’ allegation that he was denied a fair trial

because of juror misconduct by the foreman, Rudy Medina, who did not disclose during voir dire a

romantic relationship with Rivas’ mother 25 years prior. (Lodgment No. 2(a).) The Order directed the

court to answer five questions and stayed the appeal pending resolution of the issues argued in the

habeas corpus petition. (Id.) 

 The Superior Court held an evidentiary hearing, during which several witnesses testified, on

July 9, 1996. (See Lodgment No. 2(b).) Following the hearing, the court issued an opinion which

contained both legal and factual findings and concluded that Rivas was not denied a fair trial. (See

Lodgment No. 5 at Ex. F.) In an unpublished opinion, the state appellate court upheld Rivas’ conviction

but found that imposition of a sentence enhancement for one of Rivas’ prior convictions was improper

and reduced his sentence to twenty-nine years to life. (Lodgment No. 3.) 

Rivas next filed a habeas corpus petition in the California Supreme Court, which he later

withdrew. (Lodgment No. 4.) He filed a second habeas corpus petition in the California Supreme Court

which was denied without citation of authority. (Lodgment Nos. 5.) 

Rivas filed a habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (West 2006) in this Court on

June 9, 2004 [doc. no. 1]. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on November 3, 2004, which was

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denied on September 29, 2005 [doc. nos. 26 (Report and Recommendation), 33 (Order Adopting Report

and Recommendation)]. Respondent filed an Answer on March 15, 2006, and Rivas filed a Traverse

and a Motion to Expand the Record on June 6, 2006 [doc. nos. 49, 50, 51].

IV. DISCUSSION

 A. Scope of Review

Title 28, United States Code, § 2254(a), sets forth the following scope of review for federal

habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall

entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(a) (West 1994) (emphasis added).

The current Petition is governed by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(“AEDPA”). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). As amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) reads:

 (d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim

that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of

the claim – 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(1)-(2) (West 2006) (emphasis added). 

To obtain federal habeas relief, Rivas must satisfy either § 2254(d)(1) or § 2254(d)(2). See

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 403 (2000). The Supreme Court interprets § 2254(d)(1) as follows:

Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state

court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law

or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts. Under the “unreasonable application” clause, a federal habeas

court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle

from this Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the

prisoner’s case.

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 Although Rivas’ Memorandum in Support of his Petition lists six claims, the Court concludes that

claims one and two are essentially two aspects of the same claim.

-6- 04cv1154

Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73-74 (2003). 

/ / /

Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, the Court “looks through”

to the underlying appellate court decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991). If the

dispositive state court order does not “furnish a basis for its reasoning,” federal habeas courts must

conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the state court’s decision is contrary

to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223

F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000) (overruled on other grounds by Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75-76); accord Himes

v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). However, a state court need not cite Supreme Court

precedent when resolving a habeas corpus claim. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). “[S]o long as

neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts [Supreme Court precedent,]”

id., the state court decision will not be “contrary to” clearly established federal law. Id.

B. Analysis

Rivas raises five claims3

 in his Petition: (1) his federal constitutional right to a fair trial was

violated due to juror misconduct when the jury foreman failed to inform the trial judge of his prior

relationship with Rivas’ mother; (2) his Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine witnesses

was violated when the trial court admitted hearsay statements by Patsy Moreno; (3) his Sixth

Amendment due process and fair trial rights were violated when the prosecution’s star witness, Gloria

Rivas, testified pursuant to a “script” provided by the prosecution; (4) his federal constitutional right

to a fair trial was violated when the prosecutor introduced false evidence; and (5) the cumulative effect

of all the errors requires reversal. (See Pet’rs Mem. of P. & A. at 8-37.) 

Respondent argues, as he did in the Motion to Dismiss, that the Petition is time-barred. (Answer

at 5-8.) As to the merits of the Petition, Respondent argues that the state court’s rejection of Rivas’

claims was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court

law. (Id. at 8-25.) 

1. Timeliness of the Petition

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Respondent contends that intervening case laws renders this Court’s previous determination that

the Petition is timely incorrect. Specifically, Respondent argues that in Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189

(2006), the Supreme Court ruled against the rationale used by this Court when it concluded the Petition

was timely. (Answer at 5-8.) However, because this Court has already determined that the Petition is

timely, and because the Court recommends denying the Petition on the merits, the Court declines to

exercise its discretion to reexamine the timeliness question in light of Evans. See Jeffries v. Wood, 114

F.3d 1484, 1488, overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997) (stating that the

law of the case is a discretionary doctrine which describes the general practice of courts refusing to

reopen what has been decided); see also Thomas v. Bible, 983 F.2d 152, 155 (9th Cir. 1993).

2. Juror Misconduct

Rivas argues that he was denied a fair trial because the jury foreman, Rudy Medina, deceived

the court by failing to disclose during voir dire that he had a romantic relationship with Rivas’ mother,

Rita Reith, about twenty-five years before Rivas’ trial which, according to Reith, had ended

acrimoniously. At the beginning of jury selection, the panel was asked whether they knew any of the

participants in the case. Medina did not respond. (Lodgment No. 14 (July 18, 1994 Rep’s Tr.) at 11-

13.) Later, Medina told the bailiff during a break in the proceedings that he thought he knew Rivas’

mother twenty-five years ago. (Lodgement No. 14 (July 19, 1994 Rep’s Tr.) at 80.) When Medina was

in the jury box being questioned by the judge, he was asked how he knew Rivas’ mother:

THE COURT: Let’s talk about that at the beginning here. How did you know

her at that time?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 9: We worked for the same company.

THE COURT: What company?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO.: Deutch Company in Oceanside. 

THE COURT: What kind of work?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 9: Electronic components. 

THE COURT: How long did you know her at that company?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 9: Two or three years.

THE COURT: Were there events in your life that cause you to know her and her

family socially during that time.

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PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 9: Not really.

THE COURT: Company picnics?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 9: Yeah.

THE COURT: Any clear memory or recollection of you meeting with, speaking

with, or having any relationship with any of her family members?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 9: I believe I saw him when he was a small child,

five, six or seven years old.

THE COURT: Do you feel that particular association you [sic] find yourself

having some feelings of loyalty, allegiance, partiality of any sort that would affect you

here?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 9: That was 25 years ago.

THE COURT: What made you realize you probably knew the parties?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 9: We sat up here, I just heard the charges and the

name kind of rang a bell and I started thinking back.

THE COURT: When you started thinking back, did you recall in May ‘93 having

read a newspaper article thinking you might have known –

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 9: I don’t remember reading anything in the paper.

THE COURT: The reason I say that, it might be part of the reason why it rang

a bell. Sometimes we pick up a newspaper and say I know that person or know that

family. It may be someone you don’t see in 20 years. You don’t recognize that event?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 9: No.

THE COURT: There is enough similarities you think that is the case here?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 9: Yes.

THE COURT: Other than that, the association didn’t continue over the years?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 9: No.

(Id. at 80-81.)

Medina was later questioned by Rivas’ attorney, Richard Boesen. Boesen asked Medina some

follow-up questions regarding his relationship with Rivas’ mother:

MR. BOESEN: Mr. Medina, you talked to the judge about knowing Ms. Rivas

[Reith] at some point in time, a long time ago. What was your relationship with her at

that time?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 9: I was her supervisor at work.

MR. BOESEN: Any opportunity to share family secrets or family history?

Anything about her personal life during the course of that relationship?

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PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 9: Not a whole lot, some.

MR. BOESEN: I’m sorry?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 9: Some.

MR. BOESEN: Anything in a personal nature you feel you could share with us?

PROSPECTIVE JUROR NO. 9: No.

(Id. at 146.)

In support of this claim, Rivas submitted to the state appellate court a declaration executed by

Reith in which she stated that she did not discover Medina was on Rivas’ jury until after Rivas was

convicted and that she was involved in a “serious romantic relationship” with Medina about twenty-two

years before which “ended very badly because Mr. Medina refused to divorce his wife and marry me.”

(Lodgement No. 7, Ex. A.) Reith also alleged that Medina’s wife Socorro threatened Reith after Socorro

found out about the relationship between Medina and Reith. (Id.) 

As previously noted, in response to Rivas’ claim, the state appellate court directed the state

superior court to hold an evidentiary hearing and directed the court to answer five questions: 

(1) Whether Juror Rudy Medina in fact had a romantic relationship with [Rivas’]

mother. If so, 

(2) What were the circumstances of the relationship and its termination, including

whether there was any lasting influence on Medina?

(3) Did Medina tell the whole truth in answering the court’s and Rivas’s

counsel’s questions of him during the voir dire?

(4) What, if any, justification was there for Medina’s nondisclosure of the

relationship with [Rivas’] mother in response to the questions asked during voir dire by

the court and Rivas’s counsel?

(5) Did Medina’s nondisclosure operate to deprive Rivas of his rights to

challenge a prospective juror for cause or to exercise a peremptory challenge (see In re

Hitchings (1993) 6 Cal.4th 97, 111-112)?

(See Lodgment No. 2(a).) 

Six witnesses testified at the hearing: Reith, Medina, Medina’s wife Socorro, Reith’s friend

Eufemia Sainz, Reith’s aunt Mary Gonzales, and Reith’s current husband Kenneth. (Lodgment No.

2(b).) Reith stated that Medina was her supervisor at Deusch Electronics and that she began dating him

in 1967. (Id. at 55.) Medina told her he was divorced and they saw each other a few times a week. (Id.

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 This was in contradiction to her declaration, in which she stated that the relationship ended badly

because Medina refused to marry her. (Lodgment No. 7, Ex. A.)

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at 59.) The relationship was intimate and lasted about four months. (Id. 59-60.) Reith also testified that

Medina asked her to marry him and have children with him, but that she declined because she had been

through a bad marriage and she did not believe Medina could be faithful. (Id. at 61-62.)4

 After about

four months, Reith received a phone call from a woman identifying herself as Socorro Medina. (Id. at

67.) The woman told Reith to tell Medina to come home. (Id. at 70.) Reith received a second phone

call from the woman during which the woman told Reith she should not be dating her husband, that he

was married with children, and that she should leave Medina alone “or else.” (Id. at 70-72.) Reith also

received a card on her birthday which she attributed to Socorro which contained bad language. (Id. at

72-74.) Reith and Medina subsequently broke up. (Id. at 70.) Reith claimed Medina spoke roughly to

her and that he was angry over the breakup. (Id. 85-86.) Sainz, Gonzalez and Kenneth Reith all testified

they believed that Reith and Medina were involved in a serious relationship. (Id. at 6-45, 165.) 

Medina’s testimony contradicted Reith’s with regard to the nature of their relationship.

Although Medina admitted he had an intimate relationship which lasted five or six months with Reith

about twenty-five years before, he testified that the relationship was not serious and that he had never

asked Reith to marry him or have his children. (Id. at 187-89.) He also testified that he was not angry

as a result of their breakup, that it was not traumatic and that there were no hard feelings on either side.

(Id. at 193-97.) Socorro Medina contradicted Reith as well, denying having had any contact with Reith.

(Id. at 180.)

Following the hearing, the trial court issued a detailed opinion. Answering the court of appeal’s

first and second questions, the court concluded that Medina had been in a romantic relationship with

Reith which lasted four to six months. (Lodgment No. 5, Ex. F at 1.) The court concluded, however,

that Reith’s testimony regarding the nature of the relationship was not credible “in light of Mr. Medina’s

statements” and because “Mrs. Reith herself admitted that she was not serious about the relationship and

would not have married Mr. Medina because she did not trust him to be faithful.” (Id. at 1-2.) The court

characterized the relationship as “a casual dating relationship” and a “physical/sexual relationship” (Id.

at 1-2.) The court also found that the relationship did not end acrimoniously, pointing out that Reith

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admitted it did not. Further, the court found that Reith’s claim that Socorro Medina threatened her was

incredible, and, because Reith did not tell Medina about the alleged threats, did not have any effect on

Medina. (Id. at 2-3.) Considering these findings, the court concluded that his relationship with Reith

did not have a lasting influence on Medina. (Id. at 3.) 

As to the appellate court’s third question, the superior court concluded that Medina had been

truthful in his answers regarding his relationship with Reith. (Lodgment No. 5, Ex. F at 3.) The

superior court found that “[w]hile Medina did not reveal all the facts which he could have revealed on

voir dire, he did not lie in response to any voir dire question.” (Id.) The court reasoned that although

Medina was not “wholly truthful” when he responded to the court’s question, “Were there events in your

life that caused you [to] know her and her family socially during that time?” by stating “Not really,”

Medina could have “misunderstood the question or its focus” because “the questions were very oriented

toward the work relationship.” (Id. at 3-4.) The court also pointed to defense counsel’s failure to ask

appropriately pointed questions:

Petitioner’s attorney, Mr. Boesen, asked only three questions about the

relationship. “You talked to the judge about knowing Mrs. Rivas at some point in time,

a long time ago. What was your relationship at that time?” Mr. Medina responded “I

was her supervisor at work.” Since the question referred back to the court’s questions,

it is likely that Mr. Medina was focused back into the work related aspects of the

relationship. As such, this response was truthful.

Mr. Boesen th[en] asked “Any opportunity to share family secrets or family

history? Anything about her personal life during the course of that relationship?” Mr.

Medina responded “Not a whole lot. Some.” Given the casual nature of their

relationship, this response was truthful. Mr. Boesen then asked “Anything in a personal

nature you feel you could share with us?” Mr. Medina responded “No.” Mr. Boesen

phrased the question in such as way that Mr. Medina did not feel he needed to give any

further response. The question does not ask whether Mr. Medina should share the

personal nature of the relationship with the attorneys and court only whether he felt he

could share matters of a personal nature. Mr. Boesen asked no more questions about the

relationship. He did not ask whether the “no” response reflected that there was nothing

in a personal nature about the relationship or whether the “no” response reflected that he

did not feel he could share those matters with the Court. As such this response to this

inartfully worded question was truthful.

(Id.) (emphasis in original).

As to the appellate court’s fourth question, the court concluded that “Mr. Medina had some

justification for his nondisclosure of the full relationship because none of the questions asked on voir

dire focused him on the personal or intimate aspects of the relationship.” (Id.) Rather, Medina may

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5

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involved in a romantic relationship, and thus the Court accepts and defers to that factual finding. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254 d(2), e(1).

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have believed the court was only interested in the work relationship between Medina and Reith. Lastly,

the court pointed to the fact that Medina seemed genuinely surprised when he reviewed the transcript

and discovered that he did not tell the court and counsel about his personal relationship with Reith,

contrary to his belief. (Id. at 5.) 

Finally, the court answered the fifth question in the negative, finding that Medina’s nondisclosure of the relationship did not deprive Rivas of his right to exercise either a challenge for cause

or a peremptory challenge against him. (Id. at 5.) The court noted that the information about his

relationship with Rivas was not related to potential juror bias, and defense counsel should have asked

further questions if he was concerned about Medina’s relationship. (Id. at 6-7.)

Rejecting Medina’s challenge to the superior court’s findings, the state appellate court agreed

that there was substantial evidence to support the superior court’s conclusion that Medina did not lie:

We find substantial evidentiary support for the court’s conclusion on reference.

Medina’s initial, vague response of “Not really” (in response to the court’s inquiry),

followed by his equally vague answer to the effect there was “Not a whole lot” but

“Some” sharing of Rita Reith’s personal life (in response to counsel’s second question)

demanded further detailed inquiry about the relationship. Leaving it to Medina to decide

what he could share of a personal nature, then dropping the subject, simply was not

enough questioning to elicit the realities of the relationship. Otherwise, given the workrelated nature of most of the questions about the relationship, it was reasonable for

Medina to construe these questions as pertaining to his knowing Rita Reith at work.

(Lodgment No. 3, In re Rivas, slip op. D025022 at 11-12.)

The appellate court also found that substantial evidence supported the lower court’s conclusion

that Medina did not attempt to deceive the court when he failed to disclose his relationship with Reith.

(Id. at 12-13.) Finally, the appellate court agreed that Medina was not deprived of his right to challenge

a prospective juror, either for cause, because there was no basis for a cause challenge, or via a

peremptory challenge, because the information Medina failed to reveal was “‘not directly related to

potential for juror bias.’” (Id. at 15.) 

a. Unreasonable Determination of the Facts (ground one)

Rivas first challenges the state court’s denial of his juror misconduct claim on the ground that

it was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.5

 (Pet’rs Mem. of P. & A. 8-17.). As to the

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state court’s factual determinations that Medina did not lie and that there was sufficient justification for

his nondisclosure of his relationship with Reith, it is difficult for this Court to believe, as the state courts

did, that Medina did not reveal his relationship with Rivas’ mother during voir dire because he thought

the questions were focused on his work relationship with her. When the judge asked Medina, “Were

there events in your life that caused you to know her and her family socially during that time?,” Medina

said, “Not really.” (Id. at 80.) Rivas’ attorney noted that Medina knew Rivas’ mother some time before

and asked, “What was your relationship with her at that time?,” to which Medina replied, “I was her

supervisor at work.” These two answers were, quite simply, not the whole truth. Moreover, Medina

had been a juror on six or eight juries before Rivas’ case. (Lodgment No. 14 at 82.) His experience as

a juror undoubtedly educated him that the purpose of voir dire is to determine whether a prospective

juror has any preconceived notions or biases with respect to the charges, the defendant or the witnesses

who are going to testify. Indeed, the trial judge told all the juror just that before Medina was questioned.

(Id. at 8-9.) 

The state courts also faulted Rivas’ attorney, Mr. Boesen, for failing to properly question Medina

about the relationship and for failing to pursue Medina’s answers enough to discover the relationship.

(Lodgment No. 3 at 10-13; Lodgment No. 6, Ex. F at 3-4.) But that is because Medina repeatedly

answered Boesen’s questions by referring only to his work relationship with Reith and gave no

indication that he had more than a working relationship with Reith. In this Court’s view, pointing to

Boesen’s examination rather than Medina’s misleading answers as the source of the problem is

questionable.

In this Court’s view, Medina’s answers to these two questions were, at a minimum, misleading.

However, “a state court factual determination is unreasonable [only] if it is so clearly incorrect that it

would not be debatable among reasonable jurists.” Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1500 (9th Cir.

1997), overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). Given this highly

deferential standard of review, the state courts’ factual determination was not unreasonable because it

is at least plausible that Medina believed the court and counsel were only interested in his work

relationship with Reith. Moreover, the state court was able to observe Medina’s demeanor, both during

voir dire and during the evidentiary hearing, and concluded that he was “genuinely surprised that he had

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6

 Even if this Court were to conclude that the state court’s factual findings regarding Medina’s

truthfulness were unreasonable, for the reasons discussed in Section IV(B)(2)(b) infra, Rivas has not established

that he is entitled to relief. Under clearly established Supreme Court law, Rivas must show Medina was actually

biased against him. See Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215 (1954). As discussed below, there is ample support

for the state court factual findings that Medina and Reith’s relationship did not end acrimoniously and that there

was no lasting influence on Medina. Thus, even if Medina’s testimony was misleading or untruthful, Rivas has

not established that Medina was actually biased against him. See id.

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not informed the court of the intimate nature of the relationship on voir dire.” (Lodgment No. 6, Ex. F

at 5.) Given these two facts, the state courts’ factual determinations were not “so clearly incorrect that

[they] would not be debatable among reasonable jurists. See Jeffries, 114 F.3d at 1500. Accordingly,

the Court must defer to the state courts’ factual findings that Medina did not lie and that he had adequate

justification for failing to reveal his past relationship with Reith.6

Rivas challenges the state courts’ other factual findings as well. As to the state courts’

conclusion that the relationship ended acrimoniously, Reith’s credibility was severely undercut by her

contradictory versions of the demise of her relationship with Medina. (See Lodgment No. 6, Ex. F at

2-3; Lodgment No. 3 at 10-13.) In her declaration submitted in support of Rivas’ state habeas petition,

Reith claimed that she and Medina broke up because he “refused to divorce his wife and marry me.”

(Lodgment No. 5, Ex. A at 1; Lodgment No. 7, Ex. A. at 1.) However, at the superior court evidentiary

hearing, Reith testified that Medina asked her to marry him but that she refused because she did not

believe he would be faithful. (Lodgment No. 2(b) at 61-64.) In addition, although Reith claimed in her

declaration that her relationship with Medina ended acrimoniously, her testimony regarding Medina’s

reaction to their breakup was vague. (Id. at 84-88.) And, as the state court noted, Reith testified on

cross-examination that the relationship did not end acrimoniously. (Id. at 107-08.) Accordingly, the

state courts’ factual finding in this regard was reasonable. See Jeffries, 114 F.3d at 1500.

The record also supports the state courts’ factual finding that the relationship did not have a

lasting influence on Medina. (Lodgment No. 6, Ex. F at 3-4.) According to both Medina and Reith,

their relationship ended approximately twenty-five years ago and lasted only four to six months.

(Lodgment No. 2(b) at 56-60, 184-85.) Medina credibly testified that the relationship was not serious,

that he was dating other women at the same time as Reith, he did not ask Reith to marry him, he was

not in love with Reith and that it was not a traumatic break up. (Id. at 187-88, 193.) He also testified

that there were no hard feelings on his or Reith’s part. (Id. at 197, 201.) Given the superior court’s

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7

 California Code of Civil Procedure § 203 also permits a general challenge for cause as to the following

categories of persons, none of which applies to Medina: 

(1) Persons who are not citizens of the United States. 

(2) Persons who are less than 18 years of age.

(3) Persons who are not domiciliaries of the State of California, as determined pursuant to Article

2 (commencing with Section 2020) of Chapter 1 of Division 2 of the Elections Code. (4) Persons

who are not residents of the jurisdiction wherein they are summoned to serve. 

(5) Persons who have been convicted of malfeasance in office or a felony, and whose civil rights

have not been restored. 

(6) Persons who are not possessed of sufficient knowledge of the English language, provided that

no person shall be deemed incompetent solely because of the loss of sight or hearing in any

degree or other disability which impedes the person's ability to communicate or which impairs

or interferes with the person's mobility.

(7) Persons who are serving as grand or trial jurors in any court of this state.

(8) Persons who are the subject of conservatorship.

(Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 203) (West 2006). 

8

 Actual bias exists if: (1) the juror says it would be difficult to keep an open mind; (2) the juror admits

bias for or against a group involved in the case; (3) the juror admits having settled opinions about the case; or (4)

the juror cannot assure the court s/he would decide the case based exclusively on the law and the evidence.

(See Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 225(b)(1)(c).)

Implied bias exists if the juror:(1) is related to a party, witness or victim; (2) is a guardian or ward,

conservator or conservatee, master or servant, employer or clerk, landlord or tenant, principal or agent, or debtor

or creditor of a party; (3) is the parent, spouse, or child of any of the individuals named in (2); (4) is a member

of the family of any party; (5) holds bonds or shares of stock in a corporation which is a party; (6) had an

attorney-client relationship with a party or attorney for a party within the preceding year; (7) has been a trial or

grand juror or witness in a previous or pending trial involving the same parties or the same offense; (8) has been

a trial or grand juror, within the preceding year, in any proceeding in which any party in the current action was

a party; (9) has any interest in the action other than an interest as a citizen or taxpayer; (10) has an unqualified

opinion as to the merits of the action based on knowledge of the facts; (11) is biased for or against any party; (12)

is a party to an action pending in the court that is set for trial before the panel of which the juror is a member; or

(13) in a death penalty case, has conscientious objections to finding a defendant guilty. (See Cal. Code Civ. Pro.

§ 229.)

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observation that Medina was a credible witness and the lack of credibility demonstrated by Reith, the

state court’s factual conclusion is amply supported by the record. See Jeffries, 114 F.3d at 1500.

Finally, the state courts’ factual finding that Medina’s failure to disclose the relationship did not

deprive Rivas of his right to challenge a prospective juror for cause or to exercise a peremptory

challenge is also supported by the record. (Lodgment No. 6, Ex. F. at 5-7; Lodgment No. 3 at 13-15.)

In California, challenges for cause are governed by the California Code of Civil Procedure. Actual or

implied bias must be shown.7 As the state court correctly noted, there was no basis upon which Medina

could have been stricken for cause.8 The record establishes that Medina’s brief relationship with Reith

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twenty-five years before did not bias him against Rivas. In response to the court’s question, “Do you

feel that particular association [with Reith] you find yourself having some feelings of loyalty, allegiance,

partiality of any sort that would affect you here?” Medina replied, “That was twenty-five years ago.”

(Lodgment No. 14 at 81.) Although not precise, Medina’s response can logically be taken to mean, as

the state courts did, that the relationship occurred a long time ago and had no affect on him in the

present. Moreover, Medina testified at the evidentiary hearing that the break up was not acrimonious

and that he had no hard feelings toward Reith. (Lodgment No. 2(b) at 193, 197, 201.) 

As the state court also noted, the question whether Rivas would have exercised a peremptory

challenge against Medina had he known about his previous relationship with Reith is a closer call.

There is no federal constitutional right to peremptory challenges, and thus they are governed by state

law. See Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 89 (1988). In California, a peremptory challenge to a juror

may be exercised for no reason at all. (See Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 231; but see Batson v. Kentucky, 476

U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that jurors may not be challenged on the basis of their race). The state courts

found that Rivas had not been denied his right to exercise a peremptory challenge to Medina for two

reasons. First, the information Medina failed to disclose was not directly related to potential bias.

Second, had counsel known of Medina’s relationship with Reith during voir dire, “he would have had

no greater reason to use a peremptory challenge than he did even without such information.”

(Lodgement No. 6, Ex. F at 7; Lodgment No. 3 at 14-15.) It is true that Rivas may have exercised a

peremptory challenge to Medina had he known of his relationship with Reith. But this does not render

the state courts’ factual finding unreasonable. Rather, given the length of time which had passed since

the relationship, Medina’s perception of the relationship as casual, and Medina’s testimony at the

superior court hearing that he did not have any hard feelings toward Reith, the state courts’ factual

finding in this regard is reasonable.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that the state courts’ factual findings were not

an unreasonable determination of the facts. See Jeffries, 114 F.3d at 1500. Accordingly, the Court will

address the merits of Rivas’ claim while deferring to the facts as found by the state court. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(e)(1).

b. Application of Clearly Established Supreme Court Law (ground two)

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Rivas contends he was denied his federal right to a fair and impartial jury when Medina was

permitted to sit on the jury that convicted him. (See Pet’rs Mem. of P & A. at 17-22.) Respondent

argues the state court’s resolution of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application

of, clearly established Supreme Court law. (Answer at 14-19.)

As previously noted, in Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215 (1982), the Supreme Court stated

that “the remedy for allegations of juror partiality is a hearing in which the defendant has the

opportunity to prove actual bias,” id., citing Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954), and that

“due process does not require a new trial every time a juror has been placed in a potentially

compromising position.” Smith, 455 U.S. at 215, 217. The court further noted:

The safeguards of juror impartiality, such as voir dire, and protective instructions

from the trial judge, are not infallible; it is virtually impossible to shield jurors from

every contact or influence that might theoretically influence their vote. Due process

merely means a jury capable and willing to decide the case solely on the evidence before

it, and a trial judge ever watchful to prevent prejudicial occurrences and to determine the

effect of such occurrences when they happen. 

Id. at 217.

As required by Smith, Rivas was afforded an evidentiary hearing during which he was provided

a thorough and fair opportunity to show that Medina was biased against him. He has not done so. Even

when viewed in the light most favorable to Rivas, the testimony at the hearing did not establish that

Medina was biased against Rivas, but rather only that he failed to disclose that he had a brief

relationship with Rivas’ mother, Rita Reith, twenty-five-years before. Reith’s testimony was the only

evidence even arguably supporting Rivas’ claim of bias. However, as previously noted in Section

IV(B)(2)(a) of this Report and Recommendation, Reith’s testimony was equivocal. She stated in her

declaration in support of the state habeas petition that she and Medina broke up because he refused to

divorce his wife and marry her, but at the evidentiary hearing she testified that she would not have

married Medina because she did not trust him to be faithful. (Lodgment No. 5, Ex. A at 1; Lodgment

No. 7, Ex. A at 1; Lodgment No. 2(b) at 61-64.) On the question whether Medina was angry or upset

at the breakup, she first testified that Medina may have been angry or upset at their break-up, then later

testified that he was not angry. (Lodgment No. 2(b) at 85-86, 107-08.) At bottom, Rivas simply

speculates that Medina’s relationship with Reith resulted in Medina being biased against him. This is

insufficient to establish that Rivas was denied a fair trial.

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For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that the state courts’ denial of this claim was

neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. See

Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. He is therefore not entitled to relief as to this claim.

3. Sixth Amendment Violations (grounds three and four)

Rivas contends his Sixth Amendment rights were violated in two separate ways. First, he claims

that the admission of Patsy Moreno’s statement that she was the “getaway driver” for the robbery

violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him. Second,

he argues that the admission of Gloria Rivas’ testimony violated his Sixth Amendment right to a fair

trial and to cross examine the witnesses against him because Rivas was bound to testify in accordance

with a “script” provided by the prosecution. (Pet’rs Mem. of P. & A. at 22-35.) Respondent argues that

even if the admission of Moreno’s statement was error, the state court’s denial of the claims was correct

because any error was harmless under Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993). Further,

Respondent argues that the denial of Rivas’ claim regarding the admission of Gloria Rivas’ testimony

was correct because it did not violate any of Rivas’ federal constitutional rights. (Answer at 19-23.)

Rivas raised these claims in a habeas corpus petition filed in the California Supreme Court,

which that court denied without citation of authority. (See Lodgment No. 5 at 22-35; Pet’rs Notice of

Lodgment at 2.) Accordingly, this Court must conduct an independent review of the record to determine

whether the state court’s denial of this claim was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Supreme Court law. See Delgado, 223 F.3d at 982.

a. Admission of Patsy Moreno’s Statements

In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), the Supreme Court outlined the parameters of

the Sixth Amendment’s confrontation clause:

Where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with the Framers’ design

to afford the States flexibility in their development of hearsay law – as does [Ohio v.]

Roberts[, 448 U.S. 56 (1980)], and as would an approach that exempted such statements

from Confrontation Clause scrutiny altogether. Where testimonial evidence is at issue,

however, the Sixth Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability

and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.

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Crawford court did not specifically define what “testimonial” hearsay is, but did state that

“[w]hatever else the term covers, it applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing,

before a grand jury or at a former trial; and to police interrogations.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68

(emphasis added.) Because Moreno made her statement that she was the “getaway driver” during her

interrogation by Detective Silva, see Lodgment No. 14, Vol. 3 at 344, it is testimonial and it would not

be admissible under Crawford unless Moreno was unavailable and Rivas had a prior opportunity to

cross-examine her. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.

The Supreme Court, however, recently determined, contrary to prior Ninth Circuit authority, that

Crawford may only be applied to cases which were on direct review at the time it was decided and that

it is not retroactive to cases on collateral review. See Whorton v. Bockting, No. 05-595, 2007 WL

597530 at *7 (U.S. Feb. 28, 2007) Rivas’ direct appeal was decided in 1996; Crawford was decided in

2004. Accordingly, Crawford does not apply to Rivas’ case. Rather, the admissibility of Moreno’s

testimony is governed by the test set forth in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980): the prosecution

must demonstrate: (1) the declarant is unavailable, and (2) the statement either falls within a firmly

rooted hearsay exception or bears adequate indicia of reliability. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. Moreno was

unavailable because she exercised her Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination. Her

statement was admitted as a statement against penal interest, which the Supreme Court has suggested

is not a firmly rooted hearsay exception. See Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 199 (1999) (plurality

opinion). However, her statement does bear an indicia of reliability because Moreno implicated herself

when she admitted that she was the “getaway driver” for the robbery attempt, but did not attempt to shift

blame or implicate Rivas. 

In any event, Rivas has not shown he was prejudiced by the admission of Moreno’s statement.

Confrontation clause errors are subject to harmless error review under Brecht, i.e., whether the error had

a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” See Forn v. Hornung,

343 F.3d 990, 999 (9th Cir. 2003), quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637-38 and Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475

U.S. 673, 680 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). Rivas has not met the Brecht standard. Even

without Moreno’s statement that she was the “getaway driver,” Gloria Rivas’ testimony provided ample

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support for Rivas’ conviction. Gloria Rivas testified that she told Rivas that she wanted to go to

Beltran’s house and steal his drugs. (Lodgment No. 14, Vol. 4 at 395-96, 399, 421-22.) They were

going to use a gun to scare Beltran. (Id. at 422, 424.) Gloria, Roy Senteno and Rivas all had guns and

Rivas also had duct tape which he was going to use to tie Beltran up. (Id. at 422-23.) After they entered

Beltran’s apartment, Gloria saw Rivas, holding a gun and the tape, standing at the bottom of the stairs

that led to Beltran’s bedroom. (Id. at 428.) Gloria heard gunshots and a loud thud and everyone ran out

of the apartment. (Id. at 410-11.) Given the strength of Gloria’s testimony, Moreno’s improperly

admitted statement that she was the “getaway driver” for the robbery did not add much to the picture

painted by the prosecution. It was certainly was not so important as to constitute a “substantial and

injurious effect” on the jury’s decision. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637-38. Moreover, Moreno’s status as

the “getaway driver” was established by other, properly admitted evidence. Gloria testified that Moreno

drove her, Rivas, Senteno and Nancy Jaime in Moreno’s car to Beltran’s apartment as part of the plan.

(Lodgment No. 14, Vol. 4 at 398-99.) She also testified that Moreno was waiting with the car running

while the robbery and murder took place and that she, Rivas, Senteno and Jaime ran out of the

apartment, jumped into Moreno’s car and drove off after the crimes were committed. (Id. at 417.)

For the foregoing reasons, the state court’s denial of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13.

Rivas is not entitled to relief.

b. Gloria Rivas’ Testimony

Rivas also complains that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to cross-examine Gloria

Rivas because she was “bound to a script” provided by the prosecution. (Pet’rs Mem. of P. & A. at 29-

35.) He argues this denied him due process and a fair trial. (Id.) Respondent contends the state court

properly rejected this claim because Gloria’s plea agreement merely required her to testify truthfully.

(Answer at 21-23.) 

Gloria struck a plea agreement with the prosecution in which, in exchange for her testimony

against Senteno, Rivas and any other defendants, she would plead guilty to second degree murder and

attempted robbery and receive a sentence of fifteen years to life. (Lodgment No. 14, Vol. 4 at 380-81.)

If she did not testify truthfully, she would be prosecuted for first degree murder. (Id. at 414.) During

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the first part of Gloria’s testimony, the prosecutor became concerned that she was not testifying in

compliance with her plea agreement. After she was equivocal about what Rivas knew about the robbery

plot and whether Rivas had a gun, the prosecutor asked whether it was difficult for her to testify because

so many of her family members were in the audience watching her testify against her nephew.

(Lodgment No. 14, Vol. 4 at 410.) She stated that it was not, because she was “doing what was best for

me . . . [e]verybody is out for themselves right now.” (Id.) A few pages later, the prosecutor and Gloria

had this exchange:

Q. You saw [Rivas] had a gun in his hand, didn’t you?

A. Yes.

Q. And where did he have the tape in his hand at that time?

A. Just holding it. Just in his hand.

Q. What was the taping to be used for, Gloria?

A. I don’t know what he was going to use it for. Or – I don’t know what was

going – I don’t know, nobody talked about nothing, what we were going to use it, I

don’t know.

Q. Gloria, you know that if you don’t tell the truth I will prosecute you for first

degree murder, don’t you?

A. Yes, I do.

Q. And?

A. Yes, I know that.

(Id. at 414.)

Following a break in testimony, the prosecutor resumed his questioning with the following

exchange:

Q. Gloria did you have a good cry during the break?

MR. BOESEN: Objection, your Honor.

THE COURT: It is irrelevant, sustained.

BY MR. WALDEN:

Q. Gloria, did you think it would be this hard to testify?

MR. BOESEN: Objection, irrelevant.

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THE COURT: Overruled. She can answer that.

THE WITNESS: No, I didn’t.

BY MR. WALDEN: 

Q. Why is it hard for you to testify?

A. He is my nephew.

Q. How long have you known him?

A. All my life.

Q. Now, Gloria, before we broke, you hadn’t been telling the whole truth to this

jury, had you, before we broke?

A. No.

Q. Why?

A. Because I don’t want him in trouble.

Q. Why is that, Gloria?

A. Because he is my nephew, I guess, and I don’t know, I just feel bad.

Q. Are you ready to tell the truth?

A. Yes.

(Id. at 420-21.)

On cross-examination, Rivas’ attorney brought out the fact that the prosecutor had a conversation

with Gloria during the break during which he told her she was close to losing the plea deal she had made

because she was not testifying truthfully:

Q. In fact, Mr. Walden during direct examination, would you say, appeared to

get a little upset with you?

A. Today?

Q. Yes.

A. Yes.

Q. Told you you might not get your deal, right?

A. Yes.

Q. Scared you, didn’t it?

A. Of course.

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Q. Badly?

A. Yes.

Q. That is when you came back in here and changed your testimony, correct?

A. Yes.

Q. He talked to you during the break in the hallway or in the cell?

A. Yes.

Q. Told you he was pretty upset with you, right?

A. Yes.

Q. Told you if you don’t get your act together and say what you were supposed

to say you would be in big trouble.

A. Not what I’m supposed to say, the truth is what he said.

(Lodgment No. 14, Vol. 4 at 490-91.)

Clearly established Supreme Court law requires the disclosure of a plea agreement which bears

on the credibility of a prosecution witness. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-54 (1972).

Additionally, as Respondent notes, the Ninth Circuit has held that “[a]n agreement that requires a

witness to testify truthfully in exchange for a plea is proper so long as ‘the jury is informed of the exact

nature of the agreement, defense counsel is permitted to cross-examine the accomplice about the

agreement, and the jury is instructed to weigh the accomplice’s testimony with care.’” Allen v.

Woodford, 395 F.3d 979, 995 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 134, 163 (2005) (quoting United States

v. Yarbrough, 852 F.2d 1522, 1537 (9th Cir. 1988).); accord Morris v. Woodford, 273 F.3d 826, 836

(9th Cir. 2001). Allen’s requirements were satisfied in Rivas’ case. Contrary to Rivas’ claim, Gloria’s

testimony does not support an inference that she was bound to a “script” provided by the prosecution.

Indeed, Gloria testified repeatedly that she was told by the prosecutor and law enforcement that she must

only tell the truth. (See id. at 414, 420-21, 447, 490-93, 498, 501.) In addition, the jury was informed

of the details of Gloria’s plea agreement and she was thoroughly cross-examined about the agreement,

the benefits she would receive and her motivations for taking the deal (Id. at 380-81, 414, 447-48, 457,

462-64, 483-88, 490-96, 500-01, 510, 515, 517-19, 525, 527.) Finally, the jury was instructed to take

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9

 CALJIC No. 2.20 states, in pertinent part:

Every person who testifies under oath [or affirmation] is a witness. You are the sole

judges of the believability of a witness and the weight to be given the testimony of each witness.

In determining the believability of a witness you may consider anything that has a

tendency in reason to prove or disprove the truthfulness of the testimony of the witness,

including but not limited to the following:

. . . .

The existence or nonexistence of a bias, interest, or other motive; or any plea bargain

agreement.

. . . .

The attitude of the witness toward this action or toward the giving of testimony; or the

giving of false testimony.

. . . .

Whether the witnesses were coached or directed to testify in a certain manner.

10 CALJIC No. 3.16 states:

If the crimes of Residential Burglary and/or Attempted Robbery were committed by

anyone, the witnesses Gloria Rivera and Patsy Moreno are accomplices as a matter of law and

their testimony is subject to the rule requiring corroboration.

11 CALJIC No. 3.11 states:

A defendant cannot be found guilty based upon the testimony of an accomplice unless

such testiomony is corroborated by other evidence which tends to connect such defendant with

the commission of the offense.

12 CALJIC No. 3.13 states:

The required corroboration of the testimony of an accomplice may not be supplied by

the testimony of any or all of [his] accomplices, but must come from other evidence.

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Gloria’s plea agreement into account when determining her credibility (CALJIC No. 2.209), that Gloria

was an accomplice as a matter of law (CALJIC No. 3.1610), that the testimony of an accomplice must

be corroborated by other evidence, not including the testimony of another accomplice (CALJIC Nos.

3.1111, 3.1312), and that Gloria’s testimony was to be viewed with distrust (CALJIC No. 3.18). (See

Lodgment No. 15 at 0058, 0077-79.)

/ / /

/ / /

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13 California Penal Code section 1473(b)(1) states, in pertinent part:

(b) A writ of habeas corpus may be prosecuted for, but not limited to, the following

reasons:

(1) False evidence that is substantially material or probative on the issue of guilt or

punishment was introduced against a person at any hearing or trial relating to his incarceration;

or 

(2) False physical evidence, believed by a person to be factual, probative, or material on

the issue of guilt, which was known by the person at the time of entering a plea of guilty, which

was a material factor directly related to the plea of guilty by the person.

(Cal. Penal Code § 1473(b) (West 2007.)

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For the foregoing reasons, the state court’s denial of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13.

Rivas is not entitled to relief.

4. Admission of False Evidence

Rivas next contends that the prosecutor presented false evidence in the form of Gloria’s

testimony. Specifically, Rivas contends that Gloria lied about his involvement in the crimes in order

to preserve her plea agreement with the prosecution. (Pet’rs Mem. of P. & A. at 35-37.) This, he

argues, deprived him of a state created liberty interest, which was created by California Penal Code

section 1473(b)(1), and violated his federal due process and fair trial rights. (Id.) Respondent states

that, even assuming that California Penal Code section 1473(b)(1) creates a liberty interest, Rivas was

not arbitrarily denied a state law entitlement because Rivas’ claim was heard and resolved by the

California Supreme Court. Respondent also states that, in any event, the prosecutor did not present false

evidence. (See Answer at 24-25.)13

Clearly established Supreme Court law holds that “[t]he knowing use of perjured testimony by

a prosecutor generally requires that the conviction be set aside.” Killian v. Poole, 282 F.3d 1204, 1208

(9th Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).) “The same result obtains when

the State, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it appears.” Napue

v. People of the State of Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959). However, the presentation of conflicting

versions of events, without more, does not constitute knowing presentation of false evidence. United

States v. Geston, 299 F.3d 1130, 1135 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. Sherlock, 962 F.2d 1349,

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1364 (9th Cir. 1989).) Rather, “[i]t [i]s within the province of the jury to resolve the disputed

testimony.” Id. 

As discussed above in Section IV(B)(3)(b), although Gloria admitted she lied during the first part

of her testimony, she did so to protect Rivas, not to further secure his conviction. (Lodgment No. 14,

Vol. 4 at 420-21.) Further, she testified after her admission that she was now telling the truth and had

been instructed only to tell the truth. (Id. at 414, 420-21, 447, 490-93, 498, 501.) There is simply no

evidence in the record to support Rivas’ claim that the prosecutor presented false evidence in the form

of Gloria’s testimony. Accordingly, the state court’s denial of this claim is neither contrary to, nor an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13.

5. Cumulative Error

Finally, Rivas claims that the cumulative effect of all the errors committed at his trial requires

reversal of his conviction. (Pet’rs Mem. of P. & A. at 37.) The Ninth Circuit has held that while any

single error may not have deprived a defendant of due process when considered alone, a series of errors

may have the cumulative effect of denying a defendant due process when considered together. See

Whelchel v. Washington, 232 F.3d 1197, 1212 (9th Cir. 2000). This Court has determined that no

constitutional errors occurred at Rivas’ trial, and thus there is no cumulative effect. He is not entitled

to relief as to this claim.

6. Motion to Expand the Record

Petitioner has filed a Motion to Expand the Record to include a declaration by fellow prisoner

Dale R. Hurd and twelve other exhibits. (See doc. nos. 48, 51.) The declaration and accompanying

exhibits address the timeliness of Rivas’ Petition. Because this Court has recommended declining to

revisit its previous determination that the Petition is timely, the Court also recommends that the Motion

to Expand the Record be DENIED without prejudice.

7. Motion for an Evidentiary Hearing

Rivas also moves this Court for an evidentiary hearing. (See Pet. at 1.) However, the Court has

been unable to locate anywhere in the Petition, the Memorandum of Points and Authorities submitted

in support of the Petition or the Traverse upon what ground Petitioner seeks a hearing. The Court

/ / /

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assumes, however, that Rivas seeks a new hearing on the question whether Medina committed

misconduct, as that is the only claim which appears to refer to facts outside the trial record.

Evidentiary hearings in 28 U.S.C. § 2254 cases are governed by the AEDPA, which

“substantially restricts the district court’s discretion to grant an evidentiary hearing.” Baja v. Ducharme,

187 F.3d 1075, 1077 (9th Cir. 1999). The provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) control this decision:

(2) If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court

proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the

applicant shows that – 

(A) the claim relies on – 

(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on

collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable;

or

(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously

discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and 

(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and

convincing evidence that but for the constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would

have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.

(See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2).)

The Ninth Circuit has outlined the procedure for district courts to follow in determining whether

to grant a request for an evidentiary hearing. First, the Court must “determine whether a factual basis

exists in the record to support the petitioner’s claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 669-70

(9th Cir. 2005) (citing Baja, 187 F.3d at 1078). If not, the Court must “ascertain whether the petitioner

has ‘failed to develop the factual basis of the claim in State court.’” Id. A failure to develop the factual

basis of a claim in state court implies “some lack of diligence, or some greater fault, attributable to the

prisoner or the prisoner’s counsel.” See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 432 (2000). The Supreme

Court has said that “[d]iligence will require in the usual case that the prisoner, at a minimum, seek an

evidentiary hearing in state court in the manner prescribed by state law.” Id . at 437. If the Petitioner

has failed to develop the factual basis for his claim in state court, “the court must deny a hearing unless

the applicant establishes one of the two narrow exceptions set forth in section 2254(e)(2)(A) & (B).”

Insyxiengmay, 403 F.3d at 669-70. 

/ / /

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If, however, the Petitioner “has not ‘failed to develop’ the facts in state court, the district court

may proceed to consider whether a hearing is appropriate, or required under Townsend.” Id. (citing

Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).) Townsend identified six situations in which a habeas Petitioner

would be entitled to an evidentiary hearing: 

(1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state hearing; (2) the

state factual determination is not fairly supported by the record; (3) the fact-finding

procedure employed by the state court was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing;

(4) there is a substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence; (5) the material facts

were not adequately developed at the state-court hearing; or (6) for any reason it appears

that state trier of fact did not afford the habeas applicant a full and fair hearing. 

Townsend, 372 U.S. at 313.

The Court concludes that, given the thorough evidentiary hearing held in state court regarding

Medina’s involvement with Rivas’ mother, a sufficient factual basis exists in the record to resolve

Rivas’ claim without an additional evidentiary hearing. See Insyxiengmay, 403 F.3d at 669-70.

Moreover, because Rivas did not “fail to develop” the facts of his claim in state court, he must satisfy

one of the Townsend factors in order to warrant an evidentiary hearing. He does not satisfy any of them.

The state court’s evidentiary hearing resolved the merits of the factual dispute, albeit against Rivas’

claim of juror misconduct. See Townsend, 372 U.S. at 313. As this Court has determined, the factual

determination made by the state court was fairly supported by the record. Id.; see also Section

IV(B)(2)(a) of this Report and Recommendation. Rivas was afforded a full and fair hearing by the state

court, and he has made no allegation of newly discovered evidence. See Townsend, 372 U.S. at 313.

Finally, the material facts were fully and fairly developed by the state court. Id. 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court recommends Rivas’ motion for an evidentiary hearing be

DENIED.

IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United States District Judge Napoleon

A. Jones, Jr. under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California. For the reasons outlined above, IT IS HEREBY

RECOMMENDED that the Court issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and

/ / /

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Recommendation, and (2) directing that Judgment be entered denying the Petition, denying the motion

to expand the record and denying the motion for an evidentiary hearing.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than April 11, 2007, any party to this action may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court and

served on all parties no later than May 11, 2007. The parties are advised that failure to file objections

within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the

Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 6, 2007

Jan M. Adler

U.S. Magistrate Judge

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