Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_06-cv-01301/USCOURTS-azd-3_06-cv-01301-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 17:501 Copyright Infringement

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Dalton-Ross Homes, Inc., 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Daryl J. Williams, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-06-1301-PCT-FJM

ORDER

The court has before it defendants’ motions for attorney’s fees and non-taxable costs

(docs. 103, 105) and supplemental motion for attorney’s fees (doc. 116), plaintiff’s responses

(docs. 111, 119), and defendants’ replies (docs. 114, 121).

Defendants seek attorney’s fees pursuant to section 505 of the Copyright Act, 17

U.S.C. § 505, and pursuant to the terms of the parties’ 2003 license agreement. A court has

wide discretion to allow the recovery of full costs, including attorney’s fees, to any party in

an action brought under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 505. In exercising this discretion,

courts generally consider factors such as the non-prevailing party’s “frivolousness,

motivation, objective unreasonableness (both in the factual and legal components of the

case), and the need in particular circumstances to advance considerations of compensation

and deterrence.” Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 n.19, 114 S. Ct. 1023, 1033

n.19 (1994) (citation omitted). The “imposition of a fee award against a copyright holder

Case 3:06-cv-01301-FJM Document 128 Filed 02/05/08 Page 1 of 2
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with an objectively reasonable litigation position will generally not promote the purposes of

the Copyright Act.” Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ’g Co., 240 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir.

2001). 

Here, equitable factors weigh in favor of a denial of fees. Plaintiff’s copyright

infringement claim was neither frivolous nor devoid of a legal or factual basis. There is no

credible suggestion that it was motivated by spite or ill will, made in bad faith, or otherwise

meant to vex or harass. Indeed, we noted in our order granting defendants’ motion for

summary judgment that the central issue–whether a separate registration of a derivative work

is a prerequisite to an action for infringement of that work–is a question of first impression

in this circuit (doc. 101 at 4). Plaintiff’s position on this issue was not objectively

unreasonable. Therefore, we deny defendants’ motion for attorneys’ fees under 17 U.S.C.

§ 505. 

Defendants also seek fees pursuant to an attorney’s fee provision in the parties’ 2003

license agreement, notwithstanding our conclusion that plaintiff’s state law breach of contract

claim was preempted. Our order granting summary judgment to defendants was premised

entirely upon the federal Copyright Act, which itself provides for attorney’s fees. We reject

defendants’ suggestion that our discretion to award fees pursuant to the Act is negated by

virtue of a fee provision in a contract that was irrelevant to the outcome of this case. 

IT IS ORDERED DENYING defendants’ motions for attorney’s fees (docs. 103,

105) and DENYING defendants’ supplemental motion for attorney’s fees (doc. 116).

DATED this 5th day of February, 2008.

 

Case 3:06-cv-01301-FJM Document 128 Filed 02/05/08 Page 2 of 2