Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-01076/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-01076-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Order of Dismissal

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LOUIE PANDO,

Petitioner,

 v.

EDMOND G. BROWN, 

Respondent.

 

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No. C 14-01076 EJD (PR)

ORDER REOPENING ACTION;

DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS; AND

DENYING CERTIFICATE OF

APPEALBILITY

Petitioner, a state prisoner incarcerated at Salinas Valley State Prison, has filed a pro

se petition for a writ of habeas corpus. On April 22, 2014, the Court dismissed the instant

action for failure to pay the filing fee. (Docket No. 3.) On December 4, 2014, the Court

granted Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and directed Petitioner to either file an in

forma pauperis application or pay the filing fee. (Docket No. 7.) According to the docket,

the filing fee was filed received on January 6, 2015. The Clerk is therefore ordered to vacate

the April 22, 2014 Order of Dismissal and Judgment (Docket Nos. 3 and 4), and reopen this

case.

However, after reviewing the petition, for the reasons stated below, the court DENIES

the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus.

Case 5:14-cv-01076-EJD Document 8 Filed 04/03/15 Page 1 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Order of Dismissal

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DISCUSSION

This court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a

petition if it “plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that

the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court....” Rule 4, Rules Governing Section

2254 Cases. See also O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 1990); Gutierrez v.

Griggs, 695 F.2d 1195, 1198 (9th Cir. 1983). The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 8

indicate that the court may dismiss a petition for writ of habeas corpus at several stages of a

case, including “summary dismissal under Rule 4; a dismissal pursuant to a motion by the

respondent; a dismissal after the answer and petition are considered; or a dismissal after

consideration of the pleadings and an expanded record.”

A. Background

According to the petition, Petitioner was found guilty of first degree murder and

sentenced to a term of 25 years to life. (Docket No. 1-1 at 2.) On October 31, 2011,

Petitioner appeared before the Board of Parole Hearings (“BPH”) for his seventh parole

consideration hearing. The Board found him suitable for release at that time. (Docket No. 1-

1 at 2-11.) On March 29, 2012, Governor Brown exercised his authority and reversed the

Board’s decision and found Petitioner not suitable for parole. (Docket No. 1-2 at 16-18.) 

Petitioner apparently filed an unsuccessful habeas petition in the California Supreme

Court before filing this action. (Docket No. 1 at 2 and 4.)

Petitioner filed the instant federal habeas petition on March 7, 2014. Petitioner claims

that the governor’s decision is not supported by “some evidence” as required under

California law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. 

B. Analysis

The instant petition will be dismissed because it plainly appears from the face of the

Case 5:14-cv-01076-EJD Document 8 Filed 04/03/15 Page 2 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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In Swarthout v. Cooke, the Supreme Court stated that it had “no need to

review” the Ninth Circuit’s determination that California law created a liberty

interest in parole,” but observed that “it is a reasonable application of [Supreme

Court] cases.” Swarthout, 131 S. Ct. at 861-62 (citing Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 373-81 (1987), and Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 12).

Order of Dismissal

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petition that Petitioner has failed to state a cognizable claim for federal habeas relief. 

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits state action that

deprives a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. A litigant alleging a

due process violation must first demonstrate that he was deprived of a liberty or property

interest protected by the Due Process Clause and then show that the procedures attendant

upon the deprivation were not constitutionally sufficient. Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson,

490 U.S. 454, 459–60 (1989). 

“California’s parole scheme gives rise to a cognizable liberty interest in release on

parole.” McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 902 (9th Cir. 2002), overruled on other

grounds by Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216 (2011); see also Pirtle v. California Bd. of

Prison Terms, 611 F.3d 1015, 1020 (9th Cir. 2010).1 However, the United States Supreme

Court has clearly stated that, in the parole context, a prisoner has received adequate process

when he has been allowed an opportunity to be heard and was provided a statement of the

reasons why parole was denied. Cooke, 562 U.S. at 220. 

In Cooke, the Supreme Court reviewed two cases in which California prisoners were

denied parole — one case by the Board, and the other case by the Governor after the Board

had granted parole. Cooke, 562 U.S. at 217–19. The Court specifically found that although

California had created a liberty interest in receiving parole when the California standards for

parole have been met, that federal right is a procedural right and not a substantive right. 

“[T]he relevant inquiry is what process [the habeas petitioner has] received, not whether the

state court decided the case correctly.” Id. at 222. The Court concluded that, in the parole

context, “the procedures required are minimal” and that the “Constitution does not require

more” than “an opportunity to be heard” and being “provided a statement of the reasons why

parole was denied.” Id. (citing Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Corr. Complex, 442

Case 5:14-cv-01076-EJD Document 8 Filed 04/03/15 Page 3 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Order of Dismissal

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U.S. 1, 16 (1979)). The Supreme Court therefore rejected Ninth Circuit decisions that went

beyond these minimal procedural requirements and “reviewed the state courts’ decisions on

the merits and concluded that they had unreasonably determined the facts in light of the

evidence.” Id. at 220. In particular, the Supreme Court rejected the application of the “some

evidence” standard to parole decisions by the California courts as a component of the federal

due process standard. Id. at 220-21. 

In this case, Petitioner seeks federal habeas relief on the grounds that Governor

Brown’s reversal of the Board’s determination of his suitability for release; Governor

Brown’s denying him parole; and the findings upon which the Governor’'s denial was based,

were not supported by sufficient evidence in violation of the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment. However, under the Supreme Court’s decision in Cooke, this court

may not review whether California’s “some evidence” standard was correctly applied in

Petitioner’s case. Id. at 221–22; see also Miller v. Oregon Bd. of Parole and Post–Prison

Supervision, 642 F.3d 711, 716 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The Supreme Court held in [Swarthout v.]

Cooke that in the context of parole eligibility decisions the due process right is procedural,

and entitles a prisoner to nothing more than a fair hearing and a statement of reasons for a

parole board's decision[.]”); Roberts v. Hartley, 640 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 2011) (under

the decision in Cooke, California’s parole scheme creates no substantive due process rights

and any procedural due process requirement is met as long as the state provides an inmate

seeking parole with an opportunity to be heard and a statement of the reasons why parole was

denied); Pearson, 639 F.3d at 1191 (“While the Court did not define the minimum process

required by the Due Process Clause for denial parole under the California system, it made

clear that the Clause’s requirements were satisfied where the inmates ‘were allowed to speak

at their parole hearings and to contest the evidence against them, were afforded access to

their records in advance, and were notified as to the reasons why parole was denied.’”).

Because it appears plainly from the face of this petition that Petitioner is not entitled

to federal habeas relief, this petition is DENIED.

//

Case 5:14-cv-01076-EJD Document 8 Filed 04/03/15 Page 4 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Order of Dismissal

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CONCLUSION 

The Clerk is directed to RE-OPEN this action. For the reasons stated above, the

Court concludes that the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus must be DENIED.

Further, a Certificate of Appealability is DENIED. See Rule 11(a) of the Rules

Governing Section 2254 Cases. Petitioner has not made “a substantial showing of the denial

of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Nor has Petitioner demonstrated that

“reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims

debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Petitioner may not

appeal the denial of a Certificate of Appealability in this Court but may seek a certificate

from the Court of Appeals under Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. See

Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. 

The Clerk shall terminate any pending motions, enter judgment in favor of

Respondent, and close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: 

EDWARD J. DAVILA

United States District Judge 

4/2/2015

Case 5:14-cv-01076-EJD Document 8 Filed 04/03/15 Page 5 of 6
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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LOUIE PANDO,

Plaintiff,

v.

EDMOND G. BROWN,

Defendant.

Case No. 5:14-cv-01076-EJD 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. 

District Court, Northern District of California.

That on 4/3/2015, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said 

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing 

said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle 

located in the Clerk's office.

Louie Pando ID: C-29932

Salinas Valley State Prison

P. O. Box 689

Soledad, CA 93960 

Dated: 4/3/2015

Richard W. Wieking

Clerk, United States District Court

By:________________________

Elizabeth Garcia, Deputy Clerk to the 

Honorable EDWARD J. DAVILA

Case 5:14-cv-01076-EJD Document 8 Filed 04/03/15 Page 6 of 6