Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00877/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00877-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MAURICE SIMEON KING, Civil No. 13cv0877-GPC (NLS)

Petitioner,

ORDER DISMISSING CASE 

v. WITHOUT PREJUDICE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

Respondent.

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Petition is subject to dismissal because Petitioner has

failed to name a proper Respondent and failed to allege exhaustion of state court remedies. 

FAILURE TO NAME PROPER RESPONDENT

Review of the Petition reveals that Petitioner has failed to name a proper respondent. On

federal habeas, a state prisoner must name the state officer having custody of him as the

respondent. Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 894 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Rule 2(a), 28

U.S.C. foll. § 2254). “Typically, that person is the warden of the facility in which the petitioner

is incarcerated.” Id. Federal courts lack personal jurisdiction when a habeas petition fails to

name a proper respondent. See id.

The warden is the typical respondent. However, “the rules following section 2254 do not

specify the warden.” Id. “[T]he ‘state officer having custody’ may be ‘either the warden of the

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institution in which the petitioner is incarcerated . . . or the chief officer in charge of state penal

institutions.’” Id. (quoting Rule 2(a), 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254 advisory committee’s note). If “a

petitioner is in custody due to the state action he is challenging, ‘[t]he named respondent shall

be the state officer who has official custody of the petitioner (for example, the warden of the

prison).’” Id. (quoting Rule 2, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254 advisory committee’s note).

Petitioner has named the State of California as Respondent in this case. A long standing

rule in the Ninth Circuit holds “that a petitioner may not seek [a writ of] habeas corpus against

the State under . . . [whose] authority . . . the petitioner is in custody. The actual person who is

[the] custodian [ofthe petitioner] must be the respondent.” Ashley v. Washington, 394 F.2d 125,

126 (9th Cir. 1968). This requirement exists because a writ of habeas corpus acts upon the

custodian of the state prisoner, the person who will produce “the body” if directed to do so by

the Court. “Both the warden of a California prison and the Director of Corrections for California

have the power to produce the prisoner.” Ortiz-Sandoval, 81 F.3d at 895. In order for this Court

to entertain the Petition filed in this action, Petitioner must name the warden in charge of the

state correctional facility in which Petitioner is presently confined or the Director of the

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Brittinghamv. United States, 982 F.2d

378, 379 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam).

FAILURE TO ALLEGE EXHAUSTION OF STATE JUDICIAL REMEDIES

Further, habeas petitioners who wish to challenge either their state court conviction or the

length of their confinement in state prison, must first exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(b), (c); Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 133-34 (1987). To exhaust state judicial

remedies, a California state prisoner must present the California Supreme Court with a fair

opportunity to rule on the merits of every issue raised in his or her federal habeas petition. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c); Granberry, 481 U.S. at 133-34. Moreover, to properly exhaust state court

remedies a petitioner must allege, in state court, how one or more of his or her federal rights

have been violated. The Supreme Court in Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364 (1995) reasoned: 

“If state courts are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations of prisoners’ federal

rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting claims under the

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United States Constitution.” Id. at 365-66 (emphasis added). For example, “[i]f a habeas

petitioner wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him [or her] the

due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he [or she] must say so, not only

in federal court, but in state court.” Id. at 366 (emphasis added).

Petitioner indicates that he has not presented his claims to the California Supreme Court. 

(See Pet. at 6-7.) The reason he gives for not exhausting his claims is: “I do not have any trust

and confidence in the state judicial system after my federal & state constitutional rights have

been flagrantly violated.” (Id. at 8.) The burden of proving that a claim has been exhausted lies

with the petitioner. Cartwright v. Cupp, 650 F.2d 1103, 1104 (9th Cir. 1981). Petitioner’s lack

of trust and confidence in the state judicial system is not a sufficient reason to excuse the

exhaustion requirement. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999) (holding that the

exhaustion doctrine is designed to give state court the first opportunity to pass upon alleged

violations of state prisoner’s federal rights); Hendricks v. Zenon, 993 F.2d 664, 672 (9th Cir.

1993) (recognizing that the exhaustion doctrine is essentially a matter of federalism and comity

which can be excused only “in rare cases where exceptional circumstances of peculiar urgency

are shown to exist.”), quoting Granberry, 481 U.S. at 134; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (“An

application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment

of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that - (A) the applicant has exhausted the

remedies available in the courts of the State; or (B)(i) there is an absence of available State

corrective process; or (ii) circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the

rights of the applicant.”) 

Further, the Court cautions Petitioner that under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) a one-year period of limitation shall apply to a petition for a writ

of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation

period shall run from the latest of:

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking

such review;

/ / /

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(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application

created byState action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the

United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing

by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been

newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or

claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise

of due diligence.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D) (West 2006).

The statute of limitations does not run while a properly filed state habeas corpus petition

is pending. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999). 

But see Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000) (holding that “an application is ‘properly filed’

when its delivery and acceptance [by the appropriate court officer for placement into the record]

are in compliance with the applicable laws and rules governing filings.”). However, absent some

other basis for tolling, the statute of limitations does run while a federal habeas petition is

pending. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 181-82 (2001).

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases provides for summary dismissal of a

habeas petition “[i]f it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any attached exhibits that

the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court . . .” Rule 4, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254. 

Here, it appears plain from the Petition that Petitioner is not presently entitled to federal habeas

relief because he has failed to name a proper respondent and has not alleged exhaustion of state

court remedies.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court DISMISSES this action without prejudice because

Petitioner has failed to name a proper respondent and failed to allege exhaustion of state judicial

remedies. To have this case reopened, Petitioner must, no later than June 17, 2012, file a First

Amended Petition that cures the pleading deficiencies set forth above.

Petitioner is advised that if he has not submitted a First Amended Petition alleging

exhaustion of his state court remedies by June 17, 2012, he will have to start over by filing a

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completely new habeas petition in this Court which will be given a new civil case number. The

Clerk of Court shall send a blank Southern District of California amended petition form to

Petitioner along with a copy of this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 12, 2013

HON. GONZALO P. CURIEL

United States District Judge

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