Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00571/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00571-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KENNETH HERNANDEZ,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-05-0571 GEB EFB P

vs.

HIGH DESERT STATE PRISON,

et al.,

Defendants. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Plaintiff is a prisoner without counsel seeking relief for alleged civil rights violations. 

See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action proceeds on the May 11, 2005, amended complaint in which

plaintiff alleges defendants used excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment by prison

officials at High Desert State Prison (HDSP). The matter is now before the court on defendants’

October 17, 2006, motion to dismiss on the ground that plaintiff failed to exhaust the available

administrative remedies. 

I. Facts

Plaintiff is a state prisoner incarcerated at High Desert State Prison. Amended Complaint

(“Compl.”), at 1. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Officer Sharpe used excessive force against

him on May 26, 2004. Compl., at 5. He further claims that defendants Brackett and Mendoza

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 Wyatt is clear that regardless of nomenclature, a motion attacking failure to exhaust is

not a challenge to the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint. It is a motion in which

defendant must raise and prove by evidence the absence of exhaustion. Id. In this regard, the

Ninth Circuit in Wyatt provides further guidance. It recognizes that when the district court looks

beyond the pleadings to a factual record in deciding the exhaustion motion it necessarily does so

under “a procedure closely analogous to summary judgment.” Id., n.14

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observed what happened and failed to intervene, that defendants Crandall and Priolo used

excessive force while escorting him for medical treatment following the incident with Sharpe,

that defendants St. Andre and Stovall observed what Crandall and Priolo did and failed to

intervene, and that defendants Felker, Martin, Kirsh, and Dumondon conducted an internal

affairs investigation that exonerated Sharpe and resulted in criminal charges for battery against

plaintiff. Compl., at 5-19.

Plaintiff exhausted the grievance (Log No. HDSP 04-1795) as to his excessive force

claims against Officer Sharpe on April 12, 2005. Compl., Part 2, at 34; Defs.’ Mot. to Dism.,

Ex. A, Attach. 1; Ex. B, Grannis Decl., at ¶ 6. The operative complaint was filed previous to

plaintiff’s exhaustion, on March 24, 2005. 

The other two grievances plaintiff filed concern claims that plaintiff was denied a fair

hearing, disciplined, and assessed a SHU term based on false charges that he had assaulted

defendant Sharpe. Ex. A, Attach. 2-3. Those grievances were exhausted at the Director’s Level,

but do not concern the claims against the other defendants in this action. Ex. B, at ¶ 7. 

II. Standards Applicable to This Motion

Defendants seek dismissal under Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

While the Ninth Circuit has stated that Rule 12(b) is the proper mechanism for resolving

questions arising under 42 U.S.C.§ 1997e(a), Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2003),

the reason underlying that decision has been undermined. The Ninth Circuit found that failure to

exhaust was a matter in abatement which should be raised in a motion made under 

“unenumerated Rule 12(b).”1

 Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119. However, the United States Supreme

Court recently clarified that failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense which defendant has the

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 On July 31, 2006, the court expressly informed plaintiff of the requirements for

opposing a motion pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rand v.

Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1035 (1999), and

Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409, 411-12 (9th Cir. 1988). Pursuant to Wyatt, 315 F.3d at

1120, n.4, that order also expressly informed plaintiff of the requirements for opposing a failure

to exhaust motion that is supported by affidavits or declarations and exhibits.

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burden of pleading and proving. Jones v. Bock, U.S. , 127 S.Ct. 910, 921 (2007). Federal

courts appropriately consider affirmative defenses on summary judgment. Here, defendant’s

motion necessarily requires the court to consider the affidavits and exhibits presented for the

purpose of proving the absence of exhaustion. Accordingly, the court finds that a motion for

summary judgment is the proper mechanism for resolving the question of whether plaintiff

satisfied the exhaustion requirement. 

III. Rule 56 Standards

Summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 avoids unnecessary trials in cases with

no disputed material facts. 2 See Northwest Motorcycle Ass’n v. United States Dep’t of Agric.,

18 F.3d 1468, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994). At issue is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient

disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must

prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). 

Rule 56 serves to screen the latter cases from those which actually require resolution of genuine

disputes over facts material to the outcome of the case; e.g., issues that can only be determined

through presentation of testimony and evidence at trial such as credibility determinations of

conflicting testimony over dispositive facts.

In three recent cases, the Supreme Court, by clarifying what the

non-moving party must do to withstand a motion for summary

judgment, has increased the utility of summary judgment. First, the

Court has made clear that if the non-moving party will bear the

burden of proof at trial as to an element essential to its case, and

that party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish a genuine

dispute of fact with respect to the existence of that element, then

summary judgment is appropriate. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317 (1986). Second, to withstand a motion for summary

judgment, the non-moving party must show that there are “genuine

factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact

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because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (emphasis

added). Finally, if the factual context makes the non-moving

party's claim implausible, that party must come forward with more

persuasive evidence than would otherwise be necessary to show

that there is a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). No longer can it be

argued that any disagreement about a material issue of fact

precludes the use of summary judgment.

California Arch. Bldg. Prod. v. Franciscan Ceramics, 818 F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th Cir.), cert.

denied, 484 U.S. 1006 (1988) (parallel citations omitted) (emphasis added). In short, there is no

"genuine issue as to material fact," if the non-moving party "fails to make a showing sufficient to

establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will

bear the burden of proof at trial." Grimes v. City and Country of San Francisco, 951 F.2d 236,

239 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322).

IV. Failure to Exhaust

The applicable statute is 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), which provides in relevant part:

No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of

this title, or any other federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison or

other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are

exhausted.

This requirement is mandatory and unequivocal. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001);

McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1200 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Congress could have written a statute

making exhaustion a precondition to judgment, but it did not. The actual statute makes

exhaustion a precondition to suit.” (citation omitted)). A prisoner seeking leave to proceed in

forma pauperis in an action challenging the conditions of his confinement brings an action for

purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e when he submits his complaint to the court. Vaden v.

Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 2006). Therefore, a prisoner must exhaust available

administrative remedies before filing any papers in federal court and is not entitled to a stay of

judicial proceedings in order to exhaust. Id. at 1051; McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1200

(9th Cir. 2002). Defendant has the burden of proving that plaintiff did not exhaust. Brown v.

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Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 936 (9th Cir. 2005); Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119.

California prisoners may appeal “any departmental decision, action, condition, or policy

which they can demonstrate as having an adverse effect upon their welfare.” Cal. Code Regs. tit.

15, § 3084.1(a). The regulations require the use of specific forms but contain no guidelines for

grievance content. Id., at §§ 3084.2, 3085. Prisoners ordinarily must present their allegations on

one informal and three formal levels of review, although the informal and the first formal levels

may be bypassed. Id., at § 3084.5. A division head reviews appeals on the first formal level, see

Id., at § 3084.5(b)(3) (authorizing bypass of the first formal level when the division head cannot

resolve it), and the warden or a designee thereof reviews appeals on the second formal level. See

Id., at § 3084.5(e)(1). Generally, completion of the third level, the Director’s Level of Review,

exhausts the remedy. Id., at § 3084.1(a).

Here, defendants have demonstrated that the plaintiff did not complete exhaustion prior

to filing his complaint. Appended to his amended complaint is a copy of a Director’s Level

decision dated April 12, 2005, regarding an alleged attack on plaintiff by defendant Sharpe. 

Plaintiff filed his original complaint in this action on March 24, 2005, predating exhaustion of

his administrative remedies. As noted, a prisoner must exhaust available administrative

remedies before filing any papers in federal court and is not entitled to a stay of judicial

proceedings in order to exhaust. Vaden, 449 F.3d at 1051; McKinney, 311 F.3d at 1200. 

Accordingly, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that defendants’ October 17, 2006, motion

to dismiss be granted for plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies and that the Clerk

be directed to close the case. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections

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within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v.

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: February 8, 2008.

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