Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00941/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00941-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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WO 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Gail L. Rush-Shaw, 

 Plaintiff, 

 vs. 

USF Reddaway, Inc., a corporation, 

 Defendant. 

No. CV 12-0941-PHX-JAT 

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court are Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on 

Plaintiff’s Title VII claim (the “Motion”) (Doc. 21), Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s 

Motion for Summary Judgment and Cross-Motion for Separate Bench Trial (the “CrossMotion”) (Doc. 24), and Defendant’s Reply in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 

and Response to Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion. (Doc. 33). For the reasons set forth below, 

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is denied and Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion is also 

denied. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 Plaintiff Gail Rush-Shaw worked for Defendant USF Reddaway, Inc. as the 

Terminal Manager of Reddaway’s Phoenix trucking terminal until Reddaway terminated 

Plaintiff on March 25, 2011. (Doc. 21 at 2). On April 7, 2011, Plaintiff contacted the U.S. 

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) to obtain information regarding 

her right to file a discrimination suit. (Id.). Plaintiff asserts that during that telephone call, 

the EEOC representative told her she had 360 days to file a claim for discrimination. (Id.). 

For purposes of this motion, Defendant does not dispute Plaintiff’s claim that she was told 

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by the EEOC that she had 360 days to file her claim. (Doc. 33 at 6). It is uncontroverted 

that under the law Plaintiff had until January 19, 2012, or 300 days from the last 

discriminatory act, to file a charge of discrimination. (Doc. 24 at 2). The parties do not 

dispute that Plaintiff’s 300 days began on March 25, 2011, the date Plaintiff was 

terminated. (Doc. 24 at 3). It is further undisputed that Plaintiff did not file her charge of 

discrimination with the EEOC within the 300 day time limit. (Id. at 3). 

 On or around February 12, 2012, 313 days after the date Plaintiff was terminated, 

Plaintiff visited the EEOC’s website and located and printed a copy of the EEOC’s Intake 

Questionnaire. (Doc. 22 at ¶ 21). 

 On February 14, 2012, Plaintiff sent a six-page fax to the EEOC which contained a 

transmittal form, a cover letter to the EEOC written by Plaintiff, and a copy of the Intake 

Questionnaire filled out and signed by Plaintiff. (Doc. 22 at ¶ 26). In the cover letter, 

Plaintiff stated that she desired “to speak with an individual regarding possible gender 

discrimination” arising from her termination of employment with Defendant. (Id. at ¶ 28). 

It is undisputed that Plaintiff did not have contact with anyone at the EEOC between the 

telephone call on April 7, 2011 and her fax on February 14, 2012. (Id. at ¶ 27). 

 On or around February 29, 2012, Plaintiff received a telephone message from an 

EEOC representative. (Plaintiff’s Depo. at p. 62:3-63:54). On March 1, 2012, Plaintiff 

contacted the EEOC to set up an interview for March 2, 2012. (Id. at 63:9-63:18). On 

March 2, 2012, Plaintiff spoke with an EEOC representative over the phone for about an 

hour. (Id. at 63:19-64:17). During this telephone call, the EEOC representative informed 

Plaintiff that it would not be conducting an investigation into Plaintiff’s charge because it 

was “outside their justidiction” but the EEOC would issue Plaintiff a right to sue letter. (Id.

at 65:14-66:9). A few days after the March 2, 2012 telephone call, Plaintiff received the 

draft charge of discrimination and telephoned the EEOC a third time to make a correction 

on the draft. (Id. at 42:1-6). 

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 On March 8, 2012, Plaintiff filed charge of discrimination with the EEOC. (Doc. 24 

at 3; Plaintiff’s Depo. at p. 74:20-75:5). Plaintiff indicated on the charge that the latest date 

discrimination took place was on March 25, 2011. (Doc. 22 at ¶ 39). 

 On March 27, 2012 the EEOC issued a Dismissal and Notice of Right to Sue on 

Plaintiff’s charge because her charge was “not timely filed with the EEOC.” (Doc. 22 at ¶ 

40). Approximately one week after receiving this notice, Plaintiff sought and retained 

counsel. (Id. at ¶ 42). 

 On May 3, 2012, Plaintiff filed a complaint with this Court seeking equitable relief 

and money damages for sex discrimination pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 

1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000e, as amended. (Doc. 1). Defendant now moves for summary 

judgment on Plaintiff’s claim arguing Plaintiff’s claim is time barred because it is 

undisputed that she filed her charge with the EEOC after the 300 day time limit. (Doc. 21 

at 1). Defendant further argues that no equitable exception applies. (Id.) Plaintiff’s 

response, in addition to arguing Summary Judgment is inappropriate, moves for a Bench 

Trial on the equitable tolling issue. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed 

must support that assertion by . . . citing to particular parts of materials in the record, 

including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits, or 

declarations, stipulations . . . admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials,” or by 

“showing that materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, 

or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Id. at 

56(c)(1)(A)&(B). Thus, summary judgment is mandated “against a party who fails to 

make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s 

case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. 

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 

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III. ANALYSIS 

 Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claim is time-barred because she failed to file her 

Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC within the 300-day limit, and Plaintiff’s claim is 

not entitled to equitable tolling. (Doc. 21 at 1). For purposes of the Motion for Summary 

Judgment, Defendant does not dispute Plaintiff’s claim that she was misinformed by the 

EEOC. (Doc. 33 at 6). Rather, Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot meet her burden of 

showing that she exercised “all due diligence” in pursuing her legal rights, and therefore 

equitable tolling does not apply to save Plaintiff’s claim. (Id.). In response, Plaintiff argues 

that the Court should deny Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment because there is a 

genuine issue of material fact as to whether Plaintiff is entitled to equitable tolling. (Doc. 

24 at 1). Plaintiff also moves for a separate Bench Trial on the issue of equitable tolling. 

(Id.). 

 A. Equitable Tolling 

 Before a plaintiff may bring an Title VII suit in federal court, the plaintiff must first 

exhaust his or her administrative remedies by filing a timely charge with the EEOC. 

Josephs v. Pac. Bell, 443 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 2005). In Arizona, a “deferral” state, a 

plaintiff must file his or her charge with the EEOC no later than 300 days after the last date 

of discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2003e-5(e); see Lewis v. Arizona, CV 10-2387-PHX-JAT, 

2011 WL 3665367, at *6 (D. Ariz. Aug. 22, 2011) (dismissing plaintiff’s claim because 

plaintiff failed to file her charge with the EEOC within 300 days). However, the 300-day 

filing deadline is “an administrative requirement that, like the statute of limitations, is 

subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling.” Santa Maria v. Pac. Bell, 202 F.3d 

1170,1176 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted); see Holland v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 

2549, 2560 (2010) (“We have made it previously clear that a nonjurisdictional federal 

statute of limitations is normally subject to a rebuttable presumption in favor of equitable 

tolling.”). Equitable tolling may be available to a plaintiff who: 

(1) diligently pursued his claim; (2) was misinformed or misled 

by the administrative agency responsible for processing his 

charge; (3) relied in fact on the misinformation or 

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misrepresentation of that agency, causing him to fail to exhaust 

his administrative remedies; and (4) was acting pro se at the 

time. 

Josephs, 443 F.3d at 1054. 

 As discussed above, the parties do not dispute that Plaintiff was required to file her 

charge with the EEOC within 300 days and failed to do so. (Doc. 24 at 3). Further, for 

purposes of this motion, Defendant does not dispute that the Plaintiff was misinformed by 

the EEOC and told she had 360 days to file her claim with the EEOC. (Doc. 33 at 6). 

Rather, Defendant argues that: (1) equitable tolling does not apply in this case because 

EEOC’s misstatements cannot be attributed to Defendant, and (2) Plaintiff is not entitled to 

equitable tolling because Plaintiff cannot meet her burden that she exercised “all due 

diligence” in pursing her claim. (Doc. 21 at 8; Doc. 33 at 6).1

 1. Equitable Tolling Applies in this Case 

 As an initial matter, Defendant argues that equitable tolling does not apply in this 

case because Defendant never misled Plaintiff about her rights and EEOC’s misleading 

statement cannot be attributed to Defendant. (Doc. 21 at 8). To support this argument, 

Defendant cites a case from the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. (Id.). Specifically, 

Defendant cites Vernon v. Cassadaga Valley Central School District, 49 F.3d 886, 891 (2d 

Cir. 1995), to argue it is ‘questionable’ whether acts of the EEOC can trigger equitable 

tolling in a case where the federal government is not a party. (Doc. 21 at 8). However, in 

Vernon, the court did not explicitly hold that equitable tolling cannot be used in cases 

 

1 The Court notes that Defendant argues in its Motion that “Plaintiff cannot offer any 

evidence (other than her own self-serving testimony) to support her allegations that the 

EEOC misinformed her” and absent any corroborating evidence equitable tolling is 

unavailable to Plaintiff. (Doc 21 at 10-11). However, Defendant explicitly states that for 

purposes of this motion Defendant does not dispute Plaintiff’s testimony that she was 

misinformed by the EEOC. (Doc. 33 at 6). Defendant cannot base its motion for summary 

judgment on the premise that it does not dispute Plaintiff’s testimony, and nonetheless 

argue that its motion should be granted because Plaintiff’s testimony is an “unsupported 

allegation.” (Doc. 21 at 10). 

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between non-government parties, but rather equitable tolling in cases involving nongovernment parties is generally more difficult to prove. 49 F.3d at 891. 

 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit has explicitly stated that equitable tolling may be 

available when “an EEOC representative misleads the plaintiff concerning his claim. See 

Rodriguez v. Airborne Express, 265 F.3d 890, 901-02 (9th Cir. 2001).” Josephs, 443 F.3d 

at 1054. As a result, this Court holds that Plaintiff may be entitled to equitable tolling 

notwithstanding the fact that the EEOC is not a party to this case. 

 2. Due Dilligence (First Requirement under Josephs) 

 Defendant argues that because Plaintiff took no action between the telephone call 

on April 7, 2011, when Plaintiff was misinformed she had 360 days to file her claim, and 

Plaintiff’s fax to the EEOC on February 14, 2012, Plaintiff has failed to show she 

exercised “all due diligence” in preserving her legal rights. (Doc. 21 at 9). In response, 

Plaintiff states it is uncontroverted that Plaintiff filed her charge with the EEOC within the 

360 days she believed to be the time limit, and as a result is entitled to equitable tolling. 

(Doc. 24 at 3). 

 Defendant relies on Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 151 

(1984) which holds that “one who fails to act diligently cannot invoke equitable principles 

to excuse lack of diligence.” (Doc. 33 at 3). However, in Baldwin, the plaintiff was told 

three separate times what she needed to do to preserve her claim, yet plaintiff failed to do 

so. 466 U.S. at 151. The plaintiff in Baldwin was not misled or given incorrect 

information, but instead simply did not file her claim within the time frame explicitly 

stated by the District Court. Id. at 148. In contrast, in the present case, Plaintiff filed her 

claim within what she believed was the correct time frame based on her telephone call with 

the EEOC. Additionally, Plaintiff retained counsel within one week of receiving a 

Dismissal and Notice of Right to Sue from the EEOC based on the notice. (Doc. 22 at ¶ 

42). 

 As Defendant notes, the Supreme Court has previously held that a parties’ lack of 

diligence may prohibit equitable remedies. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 419 (2005) 

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(finding petitioner did not exercise due diligence because he waited almost ten years 

without any valid justification to assert his claims). (Doc. 21 at 9). However, the Supreme 

Court has also acknowledged the need for courts of equity recognize the “flexiblility 

inherent in equitable procedure[s]” which allows “courts to meet new situations that 

demand equitable intervention, and to accord all the relief necessary to correct particular 

injustices.” Holland, 130 S.Ct. at 2563. 

 3. Other Josephs Factors

 As indicated above, Josephs’ requires three other factors for equitable tolling to 

apply. 443 F.3d at 1054. In addition to showing due diligence, a plaintiff must show that 

he or she was misinformed or misled by the administrative agency responsible for 

processing his or her charge, plaintiff relied in fact on the misinformation of that agency, 

and plaintiff was acting pro se at the time. Defendant has not disputed that Plaintiff has 

satisfied these three factors in this case. Accordingly, because the Court has found Plaintiff 

satisfies the first factor of due diligence and because the additional three factors are not in 

dispute, the Court finds Plaintiff has satisfied all four factors under the Josephs test. 

Considering the facts undisputed for purposes of this Order, the Court finds Plaintiff’s 

filing qualifies for equitable tolling and is not time-barred. Thus, Defendant’s Motion for 

Summary Judgment is denied. 

 B. Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for a Bench Trial 

 In her response, Plaintiff moves to bifurcate this action and hold a separate bench 

trial on the issue of equitable tolling. (Doc. 24 at 8). Having taken Plaintiff’s facts as true, 

which Defendant did not dispute for purposes of Defendant’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment (Doc. 33 at 6), the Court has found that Plaintiff is entitled to equitable tolling. 

Because the Court has held that on this undisputed record Plaintiff is entitled to equitable 

tolling, the Court need not conduct a bench trial on this issue. In other words, the Court 

finds that Plaintiff’s request for an expedited bench trial for her to affirmatively prove that 

she is within the statute of limitations would amount to an advisory opinion at this time 

because Defendant is not currently disputing any facts, and this Court has concluded on 

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the undisputed facts that Plaintiff is entitled to equitable tolling. Thus, Plaintiff’s motion 

for bench trial will be denied as moot without prejudice. 

 If Defendant again seeks to raise a statute of limitations defense by disputing the 

facts that the Court has taken as true for purposes of this Order, Defendant may raise such 

issue at the time of trial, and shall include briefing on whether Defenant argues that statute 

of limitations issues, and equitable tolling, are to be either: 1) decided by the Court 

(following either an evidentiary hearing or a bench trial), 2) decided by the Court after 

sending special interrogatories to the jury on the disputed facts, or 3) decided by the jury. 

However, Defendant later claiming a disputed issue of fact is not any opportunity for 

Defendant to seek reconsideration of the Court’s ruling in this Order that accepting 

Plaintiff’s statements as true, Plaintiff is entitled to equitable tolling. 

III. CONCLUSION 

 Based on the foregoing, 

 IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 21) is 

denied. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for a Bench Trial 

(Doc. 24) is denied as moot. 

 Dated this 9th day of July, 2013. 

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