Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-98-07006/USCOURTS-caDC-98-07006-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 355
Nature of Suit: Motor Vehicle Product Liability
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 22, 1998 Decided February 5, 1999

No. 98-7006

Alexis Geier, et al.,

Appellants

v.

American Honda Motor Company, Inc., et al.,

Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 95cv00064)

Arthur Bryant argued the cause for appellants. With him

on the briefs were Robert M.N. Palmer, William Petrus and

James W. Taglieri.

Benjamin S. Boyd argued the cause and filed the brief for

appellees. Philip L. Cohan entered an appearance.

Before: Williams, Ginsburg and Rogers, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Rogers.

Rogers, Circuit Judge: The question on appeal is whether

federal law pre-empts a defective design lawsuit against the

American Honda Motor Company for damages arising from

injuries suffered by Alexis Geier1 when her 1987 Honda

Accord, which did not have an airbag, crashed into a tree.

The district court granted summary judgment for Honda on

the ground that the lawsuit was pre-empted by the National

Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, as amended, 15

U.S.C. s 1381 et seq. (Safety Act), and the Federal Motor

Vehicle Safety Standard 208, 49 C.F.R. s 571.208 (1997)

(Standard 208), which govern the passive safety restraints

that automobile manufacturers must install.2 Joining our

sister circuits, we affirm, concluding that Geier's lawsuit is

impliedly pre-empted.

I.

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Under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, the laws

of the United States "shall be the supreme Law of the Land;

... any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the

Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. In

applying this Clause, courts have identified three ways in

which a federal statute or regulation can pre-empt state law:

by express pre-emption, by "field" pre-emption (in which

Congress regulates the field "so extensively that [it] clearly

intends the subject area to be controlled only by federal

law"), and by implied or conflict pre-emption, which applies

when a state law conflicts with a federal statute or regulation.

Irving v. Mazda Motor Corp., 136 F.3d 764, 767 (11th Cir.

1998); see also Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504, 516

(1992). The Supreme Court has identified two presumptions

__________

1 Appellants are Alexis Geier, a minor at the time of the

accident, and her parents, William and Claire Geier. For ease of

reference we refer to appellants as "Geier."

2 The Safety Act is now codified at 49 U.S.C. s 30101 et seq.

Geier's complaint was filed after the recodification. The revisions,

however, were made "without substantive change" to the underlying

provisions. See Pub. L. No. 103-272, s 1(a), 108 Stat. 745, 745

(1994). Because the relevant circuit courts of appeal decisions, the

district court, and the parties all use the old designations, we will

use them as well.

that courts must consider when invoking the doctrine of preemption. First, in areas where States have exercised their

historic police powers (such as the health and safety of their

citizens), courts must start with a presumption against preemption, absent a "clear and manifest purpose of Congress."

Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (quoting

Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).

Second, in every pre-emption case, "[t]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone." Id. (quoting Retail Clerks

v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963)).

For cars manufactured between September 1, 1986, and

September 1, 1987, the inclusion of a driver-side airbag was

one of several passive restraint "options" from which car

manufacturers could choose in order to comply with Standard

208.3 See 49 C.F.R. s 571.208, S4.1.3.1.1 (1997). The effect

of Standard 208 on state law is governed by two provisions of

the Safety Act. The first, 15 U.S.C. s 1392(d),4 provides:

[w]henever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard established under this subchapter is in effect, no State or

political subdivision of a State shall have any authority

__________

3 The requirements of Standard 208 have become more stringent. After September 1, 1989, car manufacturers had to install

"either an airbag or an automatic seatbelt that would signal the

driver with a warning light if the belt became unhooked." Harris

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v. Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 1410, 1412 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing 49

C.F.R. s 571.208). Presently, passenger cars manufactured after

September 1, 1997, must have "an inflatable restraint system at the

driver's and right front passenger's position." 49 C.F.R. s 571.208,

S4.1.5.3 (1997). See generally Wood v. General Motors Corp., 865

F.2d 395, 398-99 (1st Cir. 1988).

4 Section 1392(d) is now codified at 49 U.S.C. s 30103(b)(1)

(1994), which uses similar language:

[w]hen a motor vehicle safety standard is in effect under this

chapter, a State or a political subdivision of a State may

prescribe or continue in effect a standard applicable to the

same aspect of performance of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle

equipment only if the standard is identical to the standard

prescribed under this chapter ....

either to establish, or to continue in effect, with respect

to any motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment

any safety standard applicable to the same aspect of

performance of such vehicle or item of equipment which

is not identical to the Federal standard.

The second provision, 15 U.S.C. s 1397(k),5 a so-called savings clause, provides that "[c]ompliance with any Federal

motor vehicle safety standard issued under this subchapter

does not exempt any person from any liability under common

law." Without stating whether it was adopting a theory of

express or implied pre-emption, the district court reasoned

that s 1392(d) pre-empted Geier's claim because recovery

under her common law tort theory might establish a safety

standard that was not identical to Standard 208. Adopting an

approach articulated by the First Circuit in Wood v. General

Motors Corp., 865 F.2d 395, 408 (1st Cir. 1988), and developed

by the Ninth Circuit in Harris v. Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d

1410, 1415 (9th Cir. 1997), the district court ruled that although ss 1397(k) and 1392(d) might appear to be in "direct

conflict[,] ... it is clear that both sections can be given effect

if the court finds that 'compliance with Federal standards

does not exempt anyone from any liability that the States

have authority to impose.' " Geier v. American Honda Motor

Co., CA. No. 95-64, at 3 (D.D.C. Dec. 10, 1997) (quoting

Harris, 110 F.3d at 1415). In the district court's view, a

State lacks authority to require airbags because s 1392(d)

and Standard 208 pre-empt such a requirement, and therefore no common law design defect claim remained for

s 1397(k) to preserve.

On appeal, Geier contends that the district court erred in

granting summary judgment because s 1392(d) expressly

preserved all common law claims against pre-emption and the

term "standards" in s 1392(d) applies only to state legislation

or regulations. Honda maintains that summary judgment

__________

5 Section 1397(k) is now codified, with some changes, at 49

U.S.C. s 30103(e) (1994): "Compliance with a motor vehicle safety

standard prescribed under this chapter does not exempt a person

from liability at common law."

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was appropriate because the Safety Act either expressly preempts Geier's lawsuit, or impliedly pre-empts it because a

verdict in her favor would conflict with Standard 208.6

II.

The Supreme Court has considered pre-emption under

s 1392(d), although it did not directly address the issues

presented in the instant appeal. Freightliner Corp. v.

Myrick, 514 U.S. 280 (1995), involved Standard 121, which

was promulgated by the National Highway Traffic Safety

Administration acting pursuant to the Safety Act, and required that tractor trailers stop within a certain distance.

For all practical purposes, Standard 121 required the installation of antilock braking systems ("ABS"). Following the

decision of the Ninth Circuit that Standard 121 was unsupported by substantial evidence, see id. at 285 (citing Paccar,

Inc. v. NHTSA, 573 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1978)), a driver

seriously injured in a collision with an 18-wheel tractor-trailer

sued a truck manufacturer under a common-law state tort

theory, alleging that the absence of ABS on the truck was a

design defect that caused it to jackknife when the truck

driver attempted to make a sudden stop. See id. at 282-83.

In response, the manufacturer asserted that s 1392(d) expressly pre-empted such claims. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, observing that in view of the Ninth Circuit's suspension of Standard 121,7 "[t]here is no express

federal standard addressing stopping distances or vehicle

stability for trucks and trailers" and that "States remain free

to 'establish, or to continue in effect,' their own safety standards concerning those 'aspect[s] of performance.' " Id. at

286 (quoting s 1392(d)) (alteration in original). The Court

__________

6 Honda does not maintain that field pre-emption applies.

7 The Ninth Circuit, in rejecting Standard 121, recognized that

further refinement of the ABS system might lead to greater public

safety. It thus held that the agency could enforce an ABS requirement if it could produce "more probative and convincing data

evidencing the reliability and safety" of vehicles with ABS. Paccar,

573 F.2d at 643.

further concluded that the claims were not impliedly preempted because the absence of any federal regulation governing ABS meant that private parties would not face a conflict

between complying "with both federal and state law." Id. at

289. The Court also concluded that a finding of liability

against tractor-trailer manufacturers "would undermine no

federal objectives or purposes with respect to ABS devices."

Id. at 289-90. The Court explicitly left open the question

whether "the term 'standard' in 15 U.S.C. s 1392(d) preempts only state statutes and regulations, but not common

law." Id. at 287 n.3. Although it referred to s 1397(k), see

id. at 284, the Court did not consider the relationship between

the pre-emption and savings clauses.

Thus far, five circuit courts of appeal have analyzed the

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issue of pre-emption under the Safety Act when plaintiffs

have brought design defect claims based on the absence of

airbags. In each case, Section 208 did not require airbags for

the model-year cars in question, but presented them as one of

several options from which manufacturers could choose.

Four of the five circuit courts of appeal held that such claims

were impliedly pre-empted, while the Ninth Circuit held that

the claims were expressly pre-empted. See, e.g., Harris, 110

F.3d at 1416 (9th Cir.); Montag v. Honda Motor Co., 75 F.3d

1414, 1417 (10th Cir. 1996); Pokorny v. Ford Motor Co., 902

F.2d 1116, 1126 (3d Cir. 1990); Taylor v. General Motors

Corp., 875 F.2d 816, 827 (11th Cir. 1989);8 Wood, 865 F.2d at

412 (1st Cir.). Contemporaneously, however, a number of

state supreme courts have reached the opposite conclusion,

holding that the Safety Act does not preclude these types of

claims, relying heavily on the broad sweep of the savings

clause. See, e.g., Drattel v. Toyota Motor Corp., 699 N.E.2d

376, 382, 383-86 (N.Y. 1998); Munroe v. Galati, 938 P.2d

__________

8 The Eleventh Circuit recently reaffirmed Taylor. In Irving,

the court noted that although its decision in Myrick v. Fruehauf

Corp. stated that Taylor had been abrogated in part, see 136 F.3d

at 767 n.1 (citing Myrick, 13 F.3d 1516, 1521-22 (11th Cir. 1994)),

subsequent Supreme Court precedent made clear that "Taylor is

correct and can be used for evaluating preemption of state law."

Id.

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1114, 1119-20 (Ariz. 1997); Tebbetts v. Ford Motor Co., 665

A.2d 345, 347-48 (N.H. 1995).

As noted, Geier contends that s 1392(k) expressly preserved "all common law claims" against pre-emption and that

the term "standards" in s 1392(d) applies only to state legislation or regulations. This contention obviously cannot be

rejected out of hand, yet nor can Honda's contention that

"s 1392(d) expressly preempts state safety standards not

'identical' to applicable federal standards." In Honda's view,

because Standard 208 allowed car manufacturers the option

of choosing an airbag, a jury verdict in favor of Geier on her

design defect claim would require car manufactures to comply

with a different standard.9

The language of s 1392(d) is fairly sweeping, providing that

when a federal motor vehicle safety standard is in effect, "no

State or political subdivision of a State shall have any authority either to establish, or to continue in effect, with respect to

any motor vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment any

safety standard applicable to the same aspect of performance

of such vehicle or item of equipment which is not identical to

the Federal standard." 15 U.S.C. s 1392(d) (emphasis added). At a minimum, this language restricts a State's authority to enact legislation or regulations that affirmatively require

car manufacturers to adopt standards not identical to Standard 208. See Wood, 865 F.2d at 408. In other words, a

State could not require, by statute or regulation, that a car

manufacturer install airbags in models for which Standard

208 makes them only an option.

On its face, moreover, the term "standard" in s 1392(d)

could apply to the requirements imposed by common law tort

__________

9 However, Geier's contention that the term "safety standard"

in s 1392(d) applies to aspects of performance, while her lawsuit

involves a design defect, gets her nowhere for reasons noted by the

First Circuit in Wood, 865 F.2d at 416-17, including that although

design and performance standards are "analytically distinct, in

practice the line is not so clear," as here where "[b]y requiring seat

belts or passive restraints, [Standard] 208 has elements of a design

standard."

verdicts. As the Supreme Court has observed, state "regulation can be as effectively exerted through an award of damages as through some form of preventive relief. The obligation to pay compensation can be, indeed is designed to be, a

potent method of governing conduct and controlling policy."

Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 521 (plurality opinion) (quoting San

Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247

(1959)); see also Harris, 110 F.3d at 1414; Wood, 865 F.2d at

410. So understood, the term "standard" in s 1392(d) is

broad enough to include duties established by state tort law.

See Wood, 865 F.2d at 410. As the Supreme Court's decision

in Medtronic, 518 U.S. 470, analyzing the Medical Device

Amendments of 1976 suggests, the use of the term "standard"

in the Safety Act and "requirements" in the Medical Device

Amendments appear to be for the same purpose, namely, to

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establish that a State cannot impose a duty on manufacturers

that differs from those imposed by the federal government.10

Common law liability in this specific context, therefore, can

reasonably be viewed as constituting a "standard" that might

conflict with Standard 208.

Section 1392(d), however, cannot be viewed in isolation, see

American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490,

513 (1981), but must be interpreted in light of the savings

clause in s 1397(k), which provides that "[c]ompliance with

any Federal motor vehicle safety standard issued under this

subchapter does not exempt any person from any liability

__________

10 In Medtronic, five justices agreed that "state common-law

damages actions do impose 'requirements' and are therefore preempted where such requirements would differ from those imposed"

by the statute. 518 U.S. at 509 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part

and dissenting in part); id. at 504 (Breyer, J., concurring in

judgment). The Medtronic plurality, in contrast, concluded the

term "requirements" was "linked with language suggesting that its

focus is device-specific enactments of positive law by legislative or

administrative bodies, not the application of general rules of common law by judges and juries," id. at 489, although it recognized

that the Court "on prior occasions concluded that a statute preempting certain state 'requirements' could also pre-empt commonlaw damages claims." Id. at 487-88.

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under common law." Honda interprets this language as

preventing car manufacturers from using compliance with

federal safety standards as a defense to common law liability,

in cases where the State retains authority to impose such

liability, and there is legislative history to support this view.11

For example, Honda maintains that even with s 1392(d),

plaintiffs could still pursue design defect claims when federal

standards do not address the component at issue. The Ninth

Circuit in Harris reached a similar conclusion, noting that

"s 1392(d) removes the States' authority to subject anyone to

liability for the breach of non-identical safety standards. The

most reasonable and plausible reading of s 1397(k), therefore,

is that compliance with Federal standards does not exempt

anyone from any liability that the States have authority to

impose." 110 F.3d at 1415 (emphasis added). Cf. Wood, 865

F.2d at 412.

The conclusion that Geier's lawsuit is expressly pre-empted

by the Safety Act is problematic, however, for two reasons.

First, the interpretation of the two provisions adopted by

Harris is not the only one available. For example, the broad

language of the savings clause raises doubts that Congress

intended to preserve State authority to impose standards only

to the extent that the pre-emption clause did not take that

power away. As the Court of Appeals of New York observed,

"[i]t strains reason and common sense to suggest that Congress used sweeping language to create a constricted universe." Drattel, 699 N.E.2d at 382. The inclusion of a

broadly worded savings clause such as s 1397(k) indicates

that Congress did not wish to deprive plaintiffs of all their

remedies at common law. To read s 1397(k) too narrowly

__________

11 H.R. Rep. No. 1776, at 24 (1966) ("It is intended, and this

subsection [s 1397(k)] specifically establishes, that compliance with

safety standards is not to be a defense or otherwise to affect the

rights of parties under common law...."); S. Rep. No. 1301, at 12

(1966) (noting that "the Federal minimum safety standards need not

be interpreted as restricting State common law standards of care.

Compliance with such standards would thus not necessarily shield

any person from product liability at common law").

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would undermine the section's express language preserving

common law liability. Pokorny, 902 F.2d at 1121.

Second, the presumption against pre-emption counsels

against finding express pre-emption when the purpose of

Congress is not clear from the statute's language. In light of

the apparent tension between ss 1392(d) and 1397(k), it

would be difficult to discern from the Act a "clear and

manifest purpose of Congress" to pre-empt a design defect

claim based on the absence of an airbag. See Medtronic, 518

U.S. at 485. Four other circuits agree. See Pokorny, 902

F.2d at 1121 (3d Cir.); Taylor, 875 F.2d at 823-25 (11th

Cir. ); Kitts v. General Motors Corp., 875 F.2d 787, 789 (10th

Cir. 1989); Wood, 865 F.2d at 401 (1st Cir.).12

Ultimately, we need not resolve whether Geier's claim is

expressly pre-empted, however, because we conclude that a

verdict in her favor would stand as an obstacle to the federal

government's chosen method of achieving the Act's safety

objectives, and consequently, the Act impliedly pre-empts her

lawsuit. The conclusion arises largely from the position

__________

12 Although these circuits reject express pre-emption of noairbag claims, their analysis differs. The First Circuit, for example,

suggested that Congress in 1966 did not contemplate the development within state tort law of design defect claims that might

conflict with federal safety standards. Wood, 865 F.2d at 403-04.

As a result, the Wood court found no congressional intent either to

pre-empt this type of action under section 1392(d) or to preserve it

under the savings clause. Id. at 407. Cf. Kitts, 875 F.2d at 789

(adopting Wood's implied pre-emption analysis without discussing in

detail the express pre-emption issue). The Third and Eleventh

Circuits have criticized the Wood court's express pre-emption analysis, concluding that the savings clause covers design defect claims.

Pokorny, 902 F.2d at 1121 n.6; Taylor, 875 F.2d at 825. The

Eleventh Circuit agreed with the First Circuit, however, that

express pre-emption did not apply in view of the conflict between

the pre-emption and savings clauses and "the failure of Congress

explicitly to include reference to state common law in the Act's

preemption clause." Id. The Third Circuit also noted that Congress in other statutes had explicitly referred to common law

actions when it sought to pre-empt them. 902 F.2d at 1121.

advanced by Honda, in the alternative, that state jury verdicts that hold manufacturers liable for not installing airbags

will create a conflict with Standard 208.

As a threshold matter, we are unpersuaded by Geier's

contention, relying on Cipollone, that the court cannot reach

the implied pre-emption argument because congressional intent is expressly stated in s 1397(k), which saves all common

law claims from pre-emption, and therefore only express preemption analysis is applicable. It is true that the Supreme

Court in Cipollone observed that when Congress has included

a provision explicitly addressing the issue of pre-emption, and

when that provision provides a reliable indicium of congressional intent with respect to state authority, there is

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no need to infer congressional intent to pre-empt state

laws from substantive provisions of the legislation....

Congress' enactment of a provision defining the preemptive reach of a statute implies that matters beyond

that reach are not pre-empted.

505 U.S. at 517 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). But the Supreme Court has also rejected Geier's

interpretation. In Myrick, the Court noted that some circuit

courts of appeal had read Cipollone to mean that "implied

pre-emption cannot exist when Congress has chosen to include an express pre-emption clause in a statute. This argument is without merit." Myrick, 514 U.S. at 287. The Court

instructed that the presence of "an express definition of the

pre-emptive reach of a statute" only creates a reasonable

inference "that Congress did not intend to pre-empt other

matters." Id. at 288. Such a clause does not "entirely

foreclose[ ] any possibility of implied pre-emption." Id.

The tension between ss 1392(d) and 1397(k) prevents the

identification of any "express definition" of the reach of preemption in the Safety Act. Furthermore, in Myrick the

Supreme Court engaged in implied pre-emption analysis of

the Safety Act after concluding that s 1392(d) did not "expressly extinguish state tort law" for no-ABS claims. Id. at

287; see also Montag, 75 F.3d at 1417. Rejecting the arguUSCA Case #98-7006 Document #414261 Filed: 02/05/1999 Page 11 of 14
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ment that Cipollone barred consideration of implied preemption in all cases involving express pre-emption language,

the Supreme Court concluded that no implied pre-emption

existed on the facts before it because "there is simply no

federal standard for a private party to comply with."

Myrick, 514 U.S. at 289. Therefore, Cipollone does not bar

this court from considering Honda's implied pre-emption

argument.

Implied conflict pre-emption occurs "where it is impossible

for a private party to comply with both state and federal

requirements, ... or where state law stands as an obstacle to

the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and

objectives of Congress." Id. at 287 (internal quotation marks

omitted). Federal regulations, as well as federal statutes, can

pre-empt conflicting state law. Pokorny, 902 F.2d at 1122;

see also Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458

U.S. 141, 153 (1982). Unlike Myrick, in which the Supreme

Court found no implied pre-emption, see 514 U.S. at 288, the

instant case involves a federal safety standard that governs

the use of airbags in 1987 model-year cars. Although the

standard does not mandate or forbid the use of airbags, it

presents them as one of several options from which manufacturers may choose. While Geier maintains not unpersuasively that a design defect lawsuit based on the absence of an

airbag does not conflict with Standard 208 because Honda can

be held accountable under state law for failing to do more

than the minimum required by the option it chose (i.e.

installing a manual seat belt with a warning light), her

argument fails to surmount the obstacle that a favorable

verdict would present to achieving congressional objectives in

the chosen manner. As the First Circuit observed in Wood,

allowing liability for the absence of airbags would "interfere[ ]

with the method by which Congress intended to meet" its

goal of increasing automobile safety. Wood, 865 F.2d at 408.

A successful no-airbag claim would mean that an automobile

without an airbag was defectively designed. Congress, however, delegated authority to prescribe specific motor vehicle

safety standards to the Secretary of Transportation, see 49

U.S.C. s 30111(a) (1994), who in turn explicitly rejected reUSCA Case #98-7006 Document #414261 Filed: 02/05/1999 Page 12 of 14
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quiring airbags in all cars on the ground that a more flexible

approach would better serve public safety. 49 Fed. Reg.

28,962, 29,000-02 (1984).

The tortured history of Section 208 demonstrates that

federal regulators have vacillated on the relative merits of

requiring or including airbags in passenger vehicles. See

Wood, 865 F.2d at 398-99. It also reveals how far public

acceptance of air bags has come and, concomitantly, the

success of the Secretary's decision on how to implement the

Act. When the Secretary promulgated the regulations at

issue in this case, she rejected an all-airbag rule out of

concern that notwithstanding the safety benefits of airbags,

the public might respond negatively to the unfamiliar technology if it was required in all cars. 49 Fed. Reg. at 28,989. In

the Secretary's view, gradually phasing in airbags could potentially address "unfounded" fears among members of the

public that airbags were unsafe because affording consumers

a choice among passive restraint systems would expose them

to the benefits of the airbag technology. Id. at 28,988, 29,001.

Cf. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Dole, 802 F.2d 474,

488-89 (D.C. Cir. 1986). At the same time, the Secretary was

concerned that not affording manufacturers discretion to

install an automatic occupant restraint system ran the risk of

impeding the development of more effective protective systems. 49 Fed. Reg. at 29,001. Thus, a performance standard

making airbags one of several options car manufacturers

could choose to comply with the passive restraint requirements of Standard 208, rather than mandating specific use of

one safety device, would advance public safety in two respects, by allowing consumers to adjust to the new technology

and by permitting experimentation with designs for even

safer systems. 49 Fed. Reg. at 28,988, 28,997.

With this history in mind, and consistent with the policy

decision made by the Secretary, we conclude that allowing

design defect claims based on the absence of an airbag for the

model-year car at issue would frustrate the Department's

policy of encouraging both public acceptance of the airbag

technology and experimentation with better passive restraint

systems. Even if the Secretary's gradual adoption of an

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airbag requirement has increased public acceptance of the

technology over time, concerns about public reaction still

existed when Geier's 1987 Honda was manufactured. Furthermore, regardless of possible fluctuations in public acceptance of airbags at that time, the concern about fostering the

most effective passive restraint systems through experimentation remained. Therefore, "[b]ecause potential common law

liability interferes with the regulatory methods chosen by the

federal government to achieve the Safety Act's stated goals,"

Pokorny, 902 F.2d at 1123, Geier's lawsuit claiming that the

car she was driving was defectively designed because it

lacked airbags is implicitly pre-empted.13 Accordingly, we

affirm the grant of summary judgment to Honda.

__________

13 Contrary to Geier's contention, our conclusion is not at odds

with the position taken by the United States in prior Safety Act

cases. The United States has previously contended that s 1392(d)

"does not expressly or impliedly preempt design defect tort actions

based on the claim that a vehicle was defective simply because it did

not contain an airbag." Brief of the United States as Amicus

Curiae, on Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 7, Wood v. General

Motors Corp., 494 U.S. 1065 (1990) (No. 89-46). But, the United

States ultimately concluded that a no-airbag claim was pre-empted

in Wood because the Department of Transportation specifically

determined that "an all airbag rule would disserve the safety

purposes of the Act" and that this policy "would be disrupted by

tort liability, which therefore would be preempted." Id. at 15

(emphasis in original). "If manufacturers are held liable for not

installing airbags, ... [a sizeable damage award against them] is

likely to lead auto makers to install airbags in all cars. That

outcome would obviously eliminate the diversity that the Secretary

[of Transportation] found necessary to promote motor vehicle safety." Id. at 13-14; see also Brief of the United States as Amicus

Curiae, on Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 28, Freightliner Corp.

v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280 (1995) (No. 94-286).

USCA Case #98-7006 Document #414261 Filed: 02/05/1999 Page 14 of 14