Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01332/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01332-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:205 Denial Social Security Benefits

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

THERESA IRWIN, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security, 

Defendant. 

No. 2:14-cv-01332-AC 

ORDER 

Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

(“Commissioner”) denying the application for period of disability and disability insurance 

benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act of her late husband, Mr. Steven L. Irwin 

(“claimant” or “Mr. Irwin”). Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and the Commissioner’s 

motion to remand are pending. For the reasons discussed below, the court will remand this matter 

for the determination of benefits. 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

Mr. Irwin filed his application for DIB on January 29, 2009. Administrative Record 

(“AR”) 119. Mr. Irwin’s application was denied initially on March 13, 2009, and again upon 

reconsideration on July 25, 2009. Id. On September 13, 2010, a hearing was held before 

administrative law judge (“ALJ”) Carol A. Eckersen. AR 119, 128. Mr. Irwin appeared with an 

Case 2:14-cv-01332-AC Document 26 Filed 09/25/15 Page 1 of 9
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attorney, Paul M. Ryan, at the hearing, where he and a vocational expert testified. AR 119. In a 

decision dated November 23, 2010, the ALJ found Mr. Irwin was not disabled at any time prior to 

his date last insured. AR 128. 

On December 20, 2010, Mr. Irwin filed a request for review of the ALJ’s decision by the 

Appeals Council. AR 201. Mr. Irwin died on October 27, 2011, while his appeal was pending 

and his wife, Ms. Theresa Irwin, was substituted for him. AR 18, 201. The Appeals Council 

remanded Ms. Irwin’s (hereinafter “plaintiff”) claim for further consideration, directing the ALJ 

to obtain evidence from a vocational expert to determine whether the claimant had acquired any 

skills that were transferable to other occupations under the guidelines in Social Security Ruling 

82-41. AR 18. The Appeals Council further instructed the ALJ to resolve any conflicts between 

the occupational evidence provided by the vocational expert and information in the Dictionary of 

Occupational Titles (“DOT”) and its companion publication, the Selected Characteristics of 

Occupations. Id. In an opinion dated May 10, 2013, the ALJ again found Mr. Irwin was not 

disabled at any time prior to his date last insured. AR 28. 

The ALJ made the following findings (citations to 20 C.F.R. and Exhibits omitted): 

1. The claimant last met the insured status requirements of the 

Social Security Act on September 30, 2007. 

2. The claimant did not engage in substantial gainful activity 

(SGA) during the period from his alleged onset date of November 

30, 2004 through his date last insured of September 30, 2007.

3. Through the date last insured, the claimant had the following 

severe impairments: history of a 1995 pelvic fracture, lumbar 

radiculopathy, hepatitis C, bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome status 

post 2003 bilateral carpal tunnel releases, depression and alcohol 

dependence. 

4. Through the date last insured, the claimant did not have an 

impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically 

equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 

404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 

5. After careful consideration of the entire record, I find that, 

through the date last insured, the claimant had the residual 

functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 

404.1567(b) except in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except that the claimant 

requires the ability to change position every two hours but does not 

require more than the standard scheduled breaks. He is precluded 

from climbing ropes, ladders, and scaffolds. The claimant is able to 

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frequently stoop, crouch, crawl, handle, finger, and feel. 

6. Through the date last insured, the claimant was unable to 

perform any past relevant work. 

7. The claimant was born on January 16, 1951 and was 56 years 

old, which is defined as an individual closely approaching advanced 

age, on the date last insured. The claimant subsequently changed 

age category to advanced age. 

8. The claimant has at least a high school education and is able to 

communicate in English. 

9. The claimant has acquired work skills from past relevant work. 

10. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, 

and residual functional capacity, the claimant had acquired work 

skills from past relevant work that were transferable to other 

occupations with jobs existing in significant numbers in the 

national economy. 

11. The claimant was not under a disability, as defined in the 

Social Security Act, at any time from November 30, 2004, the 

alleged onset date, through September 30, 2007, the date last 

insured. 

AR 18–28.1

 Plaintiff requested review of the ALJ’s decision by the Appeals Council, but it denied 

review on April 1, 2014, leaving the ALJ’s decision as the final decision of the Commissioner of 

Social Security. AR 1–3. Plaintiff filed her complaint in this matter on May 30, 2014. ECF No. 

1. The Commissioner filed her answer on September 22, 2015, followed by a notice of lodging 

the administrative record the next day. ECF Nos. 8, 9. Plaintiff filed her motion for summary 

judgment on December 8, 2014, and the Commissioner filed her cross-motion on February 5, 

2015. ECF Nos. 13, 16. 

On June 9, 2015, plaintiff filed a motion seeking to amend her motion for summary 

judgment. ECF No. 19. Specifically, plaintiff sought to include an argument concerning Social 

 

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 The ALJ’s finding that claimant was a person closely approaching advanced age on the date last 

insured is legal error. The regulations categorize claimants that are 55 or older as people “of 

advanced age.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(e). People “closely approaching advanced age” are defined 

as being between the ages of 50 and 54. Id. § 404.1563(d). Claimant was 56 years old on 

September 30, 2007, his date last insured. 

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Security Rule (“SSR”) 202.00(c)’s application to the ALJ’s disability determination based on 

Lounsburry v. Barnhart, 468 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2006).2 Id. On August 17, 2015, the court 

ordered the Commissioner to file an opposition limited to the applicability of Lounsburry to the 

ALJ’s disability determination. ECF No. 20. On September 2, 2015, the Commissioner filed a 

motion to remand conceding that the ALJ erred in light of SSR 202.00(c), while arguing that 

remand for further proceedings is appropriate. ECF Nos. 21, 22. On the same day, the court 

ordered plaintiff to file an opposition or notice of non-opposition to the Commissioner’s motion 

to remand. ECF No. 23. The court also ordered the Commissioner to file a notice within five 

days of whether she intended to withdraw her cross-motion for summary judgment in light of her 

motion to remand. Id. On September 4, 2015, the Commissioner filed a notice of withdrawal of 

her cross-motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 24. Plaintiff filed her opposition to the 

Commissioner’s motion to remand on September 6, 2015. ECF No. 25. 

LEGAL STANDARDS 

The decision whether to remand for further proceedings or for immediate payment of 

benefits is within the discretion of the court. Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 

2000). Whether a court will remand for the determination of benefits or further proceedings 

generally depends on the likely utility of such proceedings. Barman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 

1179 (9th Cir. 2000). Remand for an award of benefits is appropriate when the ALJ has failed to 

provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, no outstanding issue remains that must 

be resolved before a determination of disability can be made, and it is clear from the record that 

the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled were the rejected evidence credited as 

true. Varney v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 859 F.2d 1396, 1400 (9th Cir. 1988). 

“Administrative proceedings are generally useful where the record ‘has [not] been fully 

developed,’ there is a need to resolve conflicts and ambiguities, or the ‘presentation of further 

 

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 “SSRs do not carry the ‘force of law,’ but they are binding on ALJs nonetheless.” Bray v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1224 (9th Cir. 2009). The Ninth Circuit gives them 

deference so long as they do not produce “a result inconsistent with the statute and regulations.” 

Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 346 n.3. 

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evidence . . . may well prove enlightening’ in light of the passage of time.” Treichler v. Comm'r 

of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1101 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal citations omitted). 

DISCUSSION 

Because the Commissioner agrees that remand is appropriate based on the application of 

SSR 202.00(c), the only issue remaining to be decided is whether remand should be for the 

determination of benefits or for further proceedings. Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion for summary 

judgment is moot, except to the extent that it includes arguments in favor of remand for the 

determination of benefits. The Commissioner argues that further proceedings are necessary 

because issues remain to be decided, while plaintiff argues that Mr. Irwin’s claim should be 

remanded for the determination of benefits in light of Lounsburry. 

In Lounsburry, the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision of a district court and remanded for 

the determination of benefits based on the ALJ’s misapplication of SSR 202.00(c). The claimant 

in Lounsburry had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work, was of 

advanced age, and was a high school graduate or more. 468 F.3d at 1116. Pursuant to the 

Medical–Vocational Guidelines, 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart 4, Appendix 2 (“the Grids”), a 

claimant with the aforementioned RFC, age, and education is designated as disabled if she has no 

transferable skills, and not disabled if she has transferable skills. Compare Rule 202.06 

(disabled), with Rule 202.07 (not disabled). The ALJ had determined that the claimant had 

transferrable skills and accordingly found her not disabled. 468 F.3d at 1113. However, the 

Ninth Circuit noted that the ALJ’s decision overlooked footnote 2 to Rule 202.07. Id. at 1116. 

Footnote 2 requires a claimant to be capable of performing a “significant rage of work” in order 

to be considered not disabled.3 468 F.3d at 1116–17. The ALJ’s decision had found the claimant 

 

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 Specifically, footnote 2 references Rule 202.00(c), which states the following (emphasis 

added): 

(c) However, for individuals of advanced age who can no longer 

perform vocationally relevant past work and who have a history of 

unskilled work experience, or who have only skills that are not 

readily transferable to a significant range of semi-skilled or skilled 

work that is within the individual's functional capacity, or who have 

no work experience, the limitations in vocational adaptability 

(continued...) 

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to be not disabled based on the vocational expert’s (“VE”) testimony that she was capable of 

performing only one occupation. Id. at 1117. The claimant argued that this was error and the 

Ninth Circuit agreed, reversing the district court’s decision for the determination of benefits. Id. 

The Commissioner argues that remand is appropriate in this case because further factfinding is necessary to evaluate the Mr. Irwin’s claim. The court finds; however, that further factfinding would not serve any purpose in this matter because the Grids mandate Mr. Irwin be found 

disabled. 

Although plaintiff’s opposition to the Commissioner’s motion to remand is somewhat 

light on the specifics, she correctly asserts that this matter is strikingly similar to Lounsburry. In 

summarizing the claimant’s hearing before the ALJ, the Ninth Circuit in Lounsburry noted that 

the VE initially opined the claimant was capable of four occupations. 468 F.3d at 1113. 

However, in response to interrogatories propounded by the ALJ, the VE reduced that number to 

one. Id. Such a whittling down strongly implies that the VE’s testimony was conclusive, and that 

further administrative proceedings would not be useful. During Mr. Irwin’s hearing before the 

ALJ, the VE engaged in a similar narrowing of the available occupations upon further 

questioning. The following exchange between the ALJ and the VE is illustrative: 

Q [ALJ] All right. I think backing up to, to where we started with 

this was, are there transferable skills to light work? 

A [VE] Into light work, Your Honor, if we are taking into 

consideration the self-employment – and there’s also going to be 

transferable skills such as customer service. So that’d be one job 

title, Your Honor, and the second job title, Your Honor, would be 

against based on self-employment is he’s doing some of his own 

administrative work as far as keeping track of his expenses and 

making phone calls and, you know, the day to day, the scheduling 

of, of work, so again job title such as administrative clerk would 

also appear to be appropriate as well. The transferable skills of just 

heating, air conditioning installer, servicer, I mean those are – you 

know, that has a medium exertional for things like electrical and 

 

represented by functional restriction to light work warrant a finding 

of disabled. Ordinarily, even a high school education or more which 

was completed in the remote past will have little positive impact on 

effecting a vocational adjustment unless relevant work experience 

reflects use of such education. 

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mechanical fabrication, installing and repairs. So those would be 

transferable, but as his other skills along the lines of administrative 

and customer service would be transferable, Your Honor, into the 

light exertional. 

Q Those would transfer readily without any special vocational 

preparation or additional training? 

A The customer service definitely would, Your Honor. 

Q Can you give me some examples of the type of job or jobs that 

that would transfer to? Would it be just that one title job of 

customer service? 

A Yes, let me give you that DOT, Your Honor. That’s DOT code 

number 299.367-010, the exertional is light and SVP: 4, for 

semiskilled. 

Q How many jobs exist? 

A In the Sacramento surrounding area, 1,660, state of California, 

25,380, the national numbers are 172,850. 

Q All right. Is that the only title that there would be skills that 

transfer to is the one job? 

A Let me give you the administrative clerk, because again that’s, 

you know, a lot of, you know, office, and when I say office it’s 

since you’re dealing with the paperwork end of your business. 

That’s DOT code number 219.362-010, the exertional is light and 

again SVP: 4, for semiskilled. Our Sacramento regional numbers 

are 27,420, state of California, 318,100, and nationally 2,828,140. 

Q And again he would have transferable skills to go to that without 

any training or additional education? 

A Yes, if he’s taking care of his own business, Your Honor, yes. 

Q Okay. If you assume that his wife was gathering up his expense 

receipts and, and dealing with his income taxes, if he was getting 

help with that end of it would those skills exist? 

A You know, Your Honor, if you approach it from that perspective 

the remaining job title would be the customer service, since the 

claimant would be the person that’s dealing with potential 

customers or customers or, you know, customer complaints. 

Q Okay. So if we’re assuming that he was doing minimal 

paperwork, that he may not have acquired that skill for – 

A Correct. 

Q -- the time that he was self-employed? 

A Correct, Your Honor. 

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AR 107–09 (emphasis added). 

Clearly, the VE concluded that given the ALJ’s hypothetical claimant was only capable of 

performing a job in customer service. Because claimant was a person limited to performing light 

work, of advanced age, with at least a high school education, and transferrable skills his disability 

determination is controlled by Rule 202.07. Accordingly, the Grids mandate a finding that Mr. 

Irwin was disabled because the VE opined and the ALJ found he was only capable of performing 

only one occupation. See Lounsburry, 468 F.3d at 1115-17 (“‘[W]here application of the grids 

directs a finding of disability, that finding must be accepted by the Secretary . . . whether the 

impairment is exertional or results from a combination of exertional and non-exertional 

limitations.’” (citing Cooper v. Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 1989)). 

The Commissioner’s assertion that remand is necessary in order to allow the ALJ to 

“evaluate Plaintiff’s mental impairments, reassess his RFC, and reassess the vocational impact of 

those limitations” does not explain why the Grids do not mandate this outcome. ECF No. 21 at 4. 

The purpose of remand for further proceedings is not to allow the ALJ the opportunity to 

“reassess” the entire case. Moisa v. Barnhart, 367 F.3d 882, 887 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The 

Commissioner, having lost this appeal, should not have another opportunity to show that Moisa is 

not credible any more than Moisa, had he lost, should have an opportunity for remand and further 

proceedings to establish his credibility.”) Rather, remand is appropriate only where further 

development of the record would serve a purpose. See Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1101. In light of 

Rule 202.07 and Lounsburry’s application to this matter, the court finds that remand for further 

adjudication would serve no such purpose. 

CONCLUSION 

In accordance with the foregoing, THE COURT HEREBY ORDERS that: 

1. The Commissioner’s motion to remand, ECF No. 21, is DENIED; 

2. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 13, is GRANTED; and 

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3. This matter is remanded for the determination of benefits. 

DATED: September 25, 2015 

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