Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-4_13-cv-00466/USCOURTS-alnd-4_13-cv-00466-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 480
Nature of Suit: Consumer Credit
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

MIDDLE DIVISION

PASCHAL PAUL BROTHERS, and

SHARON J. STARGELL

BROTHERS,

Plaintiffs,

v.

ANDY SAAG,

Defendant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Case No.: 4:13-CV-466-VEH

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This is a civil action file by the pro se plaintiffs, Paschal Paul Brothers and 

Sharon J. Stargell Brothers, against the defendant, Andy Saag. (Doc. 1 at 1). The

case comes before the court on the following motions:

– the defendant’s “Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended

Complaint and to Strike the Affidavit of William McCaffrey”

(doc. 13);

– the plaintiffs’ petition to “Quash the Motion to Strike the

Affidavit of William McCaffrey” (doc. 16 at 8-10); 

– the plaintiffs’ petition to strike Exhibit F attached to the

defendant’s motion to dismiss (doc. 16 at 10-13);

FILED

 2014 Mar-04 PM 01:16

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 4:13-cv-00466-VEH Document 23 Filed 03/04/14 Page 1 of 30
– the plaintiffs’ “Petition for Judicial Notice of Undisputed Facts

and Plaintiff[s’] Petition to Strike the Defendant’s Latest Reply

Brief and the Attached Exhibits A, B, C, and D” (doc. 18); and

– the plaintiffs’ “Petition to Strike the Defendant’s Latest Pleading

Entitled ‘Notice of Additional Service of Exhibits to Defendant’s

Reply to Plaintiff[s’]Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

and Response to the Plaintiff[s’] Petition to Strike’” (doc. 21).

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The original complaint was filed by the plaintiffs on March 8, 2013. (Doc. 1).

It alleged that the defendant violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act,

(“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq., in his communications with the plaintiffs.

While the complaint contained separate “counts,” some counts contained many

different and inconsistent claims for violation of the FDCPA including:

overshadowing; failure to include validation notice requirements in letters to the

plaintiffs; the failure to validate the debt owed; the failure to cease collection

attempts after the debt was disputed; false and misleading representation; unfair

practices; and mental and physical aggravation. 

On April 8, 2013, Saag filed a Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative for

Summary Judgment. (Doc. 7). On May 20, 2013, the plaintiffs filed their own

2

Case 4:13-cv-00466-VEH Document 23 Filed 03/04/14 Page 2 of 30
Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 9). On August 23, 2013, the court entered a

memorandum opinion and order which struck the plaintiffs’ motion for summary

judgment. (Doc. 11 at 3). In that same opinion, the court treated the defendant’s

motion as a motion to dismiss only, denied the motion “to the extent that it attacks the

plaintiffs’ overshadowing claims,” and granted the motion in all other respects. (Doc. 

11 at 19). The court allowed the plaintiffs 30 days to amend their complaint to

reallege “the False and Misleading Representation claims and Unfair Practices claims

which are based upon communications regarding the foreclosure.” (Doc. 11 at 19-

20). 

On September 23, 2013, the plaintiffs filed their amended complaint. (Doc.

12). The Amended Complaint alleges overshadowing (Count One), false and

misleading misrepresentations “in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e” (Count Two), and

unfair practices in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692f (Count Three). 

1

Attached to the Amended Complaint are several exhibits, one of which is the

Affidavit of William McCaffrey. (Doc. 12 at 14-19). On October 7, 2013, the

defendant filed a “Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint and to Strike

 The plaintiffs state that the defendant “violated 1592f Section 808(6).” (Doc. 12 at 8) 1

(emphasis added). However, they clearly meant 1692f, as that is the section which addresses 

“unfair practices.”

3

Case 4:13-cv-00466-VEH Document 23 Filed 03/04/14 Page 3 of 30
the Affidavit of William McCaffrey.” (Doc. 13). Attached to that motion were six

2

exhibits labeled A, B, C, D, E, and F. (Doc. 13-1).

On October 29, 2013, the plaintiffs filed a document entitled “Answer to the

Motion to Dismiss, Petition to Quash and Petition to Strike.” (Doc. 16). Although

not designated as a motion in the court’s CM/ECF system, document 16 actually

“petitions” the court to “quash” the Motion to Strike the Affidavit of William

McCaffrey. (Doc. 16 at 8-10). It also petitions the court to strike Exhibit F attached

to the defendant’s motion to dismiss. (Doc. 16 at 10-13). 

On November 8, 2013, the defendantfiled a reply brief in support of his motion

to dismiss with five exhibits, designated A, B, C, D, and E, attached. (Doc. 17; doc

17-1). Exhibits A, B, C, and D (doc. 17-1 at 2-21) are the same exhibits contained

in Exhibit F to document 13 (doc. 13-1 at 16-31). 

On November 15, 2013, the plaintiffs filed a “Petition for Judicial Notice of

Undisputed Facts and Plaintiff[s’] Petition to Strike the Defendant’s Latest Reply

Brief and the Attached Exhibits A, B, C, and D.” (Doc. 18). On January 2, 2014, the

defendant filed a “Notice of Additional Service of Exhibits to Defendant’s Reply to

 On October 14, 2013, the defendant filed an “Amended Certificate of Service” for 2

document 13, and stated that “the Certificate of Service [for document 13] only indicated that the

Motion would be served electronically via the CM/ECF system [and since] [t]he [p]laintiffs’ are

pro se [they] likely would not receive service only through CM/ECF.” (Doc. 14 at 1). Document

14 stated that the defendant would send a copy of document 13 to the plaintiffs via overnight

mail. 

4

Case 4:13-cv-00466-VEH Document 23 Filed 03/04/14 Page 4 of 30
the Plaintiff[s’] Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and Response to the

Plaintiffs’ Petition to Strike.” (Doc. 19). On January 24, 2014, the plaintiffs moved

to strike document 19. (Doc. 21).

II. MATTERS OUTSIDE THE PLEADINGS

A. The Exhibits Attached to the Defendant’s Motion To Dismiss Do Not

Convert It to a Motion for Summary Judgment

The defendant attaches exhibits to his motion. “If, on a motion under Rule

12(b)(6) . . . matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the

court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(d); see also, Day v. Taylor, 400 F.3d 1272, 1275-76 (11th Cir. 2005)

(“The district court generally must convert a motion to dismiss into a motion for

summary judgment if it considers materials outside the complaint.”). However,

the court may consider a document attached to a motion to dismiss

without converting the motion into one for summary judgment if the

attached document is (1) central to the plaintiff's claim and (2)

undisputed. In this context, “undisputed” means that the authenticity of

the document is not challenged. Id. Our prior decisions also make clear

that a document need not be physically attached to a pleading to be

incorporated by reference into it; if the document's contents are alleged

in a complaint and no party questions those contents, we may consider

such a document provided it meets the centrality requirement[.]

Day v. Taylor, 400 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2005). 

Attached to the defendant’s motion to dismiss are six (6) exhibits labeled A,

5

Case 4:13-cv-00466-VEH Document 23 Filed 03/04/14 Page 5 of 30
B, C, D, E, and F. (Doc. 13-1). The court will address each in turn,

1. Exhibits A, B, C, and E

Exhibits A, B, C, and E are also attached to the Amended Complaint. (Doc. 12

at 10-12). They are referenced in the Amended Complaint (doc. 12 at 1, 2, 3), and

3

are the basis for some of the plaintiffs’ claims. The documents are therefore central

to those claims. No party disputes the authenticity of these documents. They may be

considered without converting the motion. 

2. Exhibit D

Exhibit D to the motion to dismiss is a February 1, 2013, letter from Bank of

America, which is a non-party. It is provided as evidence that the debt was verified

by Bank of America. (Doc. 13 at 4). As no claims for failure to verify remain, this 

document is not central to any of the plaintiffs’ current claims, and it is not relevant

to the instant motion. Exhibit D will be EXCLUDED, and the motion will not be

converted to a motion for summary judgment as a result of that document being

attached.

3. Exhibit F; the Plaintiffs’ Petition to Strike Exhibit F Attached

to the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 16 at 10-13); and

the Plaintiffs’ Petition for Judicial Notice of Undisputed Facts

and Plaintiffs’ Petition to Strike the Defendant’s Latest Reply

Brief and the Attached Exhibits A, B, C, and D (Doc. 18)

 The Amended Complaint only attaches the first page of Exhibit B. 3

6

Case 4:13-cv-00466-VEH Document 23 Filed 03/04/14 Page 6 of 30
Exhibit F to the motion purports to be a Mortgage, executed on December 20,

2004, by: 1) the plaintiffs; 2) Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.

(“MERS”), the mortgagee; and 3) Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (“Countrywide”),

the lender. (Doc. 13-1 at 16-27). Also attached is a document which purports to be

a Note, also executed by the plaintiffs on December 20, 2004. (Doc. 13-1 at 30-31). 

Exhibit F also includes a document dated March 2, 2010, which purports to be an

“Assignment of Mortgage” by MERS, “acting solely as nominee for Lender,” of the

plaintiffs’ mortgage to BAC Home Loans Servicing, Inc. (Doc. 13-1 at 28). Finally,

Exhibit F includes a purported “Corrective Assignment of Mortgage,” dated

November 14, 2012, which changes the name of the assignee to Bank of America,

N.A. (Doc. 13-1 at 29). As noted above, these same documents comprise Exhibit A,

B, C, and D to the defendant’s reply to the motion to dismiss. (Doc. 17; doc. 17-1 at

2-21).

The plaintiff movesto strike Exhibit F stating that it “contain[s] an uncertified,

un-sworn[,] and un-authenticated copy of a purported note, mortgage[,] and

assignment. These alleged copies were not properly introduced into the record by

affirmation as true and correct copies.” (Doc. 16 at 11). Further, the plaintiffs state

that these documents are “inadmissible hearsay.” (Doc. 16 at 13). In support of their

7

Case 4:13-cv-00466-VEH Document 23 Filed 03/04/14 Page 7 of 30
argument, the plaintiffs include a block quote from Coleman v. BAC Servicing, 104

So. 3d 195, 202-03 (Ala. Civ. App. 2012), cert. denied (Sept. 7, 2012), which deals

whether evidence submitted on a summary judgment motion complied with Rule

56(e) of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure. That rule states:

Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal

knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in

evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to

testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of all

papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached

thereto or served therewith.

ALA. R. CIV. P. 56(e). The plaintiffs’ also provide similar block quotes from Allred

v. Shirley, 598 So. 2d 1347, 1348 (Ala. 1992) (appeal from a summary judgment in

favor of the defendant), and Alabama Power Co. v. Tatum, 293 Ala. 500, 508, 306 So.

2d 251, 258 (1975) (whether trial Court erred in admitting documents at trial). 

Of course, the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply in federal court. 

However, Rule 56(c)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contains the

following similar provision: “An affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose

a motion must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible

in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the

matters stated.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4). The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has

held: 

8

Case 4:13-cv-00466-VEH Document 23 Filed 03/04/14 Page 8 of 30
To be admissible in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary

judgment, a document must be authenticated by and attached to an

affidavit that meets the requirements of Rule 56(e) and the affiant must

be a person through whom the exhibits could be admitted into evidence. 

Saunders v. Emory Healthcare, Inc., 360 F. App'x 110, 113 (11th Cir. 2010)

(emphasis added) (citing 10 A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay

Kane, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2722, at 382-84 (3d ed.1998))

(“Because the exhibits were not properly authenticated, the district court was not

required to consider them in opposition to Emory's motion for summary judgment.”). 

In this case, the documents in Exhibit F to document 13 (doc. 13-1 at 16-31) and

Exhibits A, B, C, and D to document 17 (doc. 17-1 at 2-21) are not authenticated. 

Accordingly, if the motion is converted to a motion for summary judgment, they

cannot be considered. 

Of course, the instant motion is not a motion for summary judgment governed

by Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It is a motion to dismiss

governed by Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. However, the

plaintiffs’ motions to strike are challenges to the authenticity of these documents.

4

They therefore are not “undisputed.” If the motion remains a motion to dismiss, the

 The motions do not state that the documents are not authentic. They take no position 4

on their authenticity. Still, the motions are fairly construed to be a challenge to the authenticity

of the documents, especially as the plaintiffs are proceeding pro se. 

9

Case 4:13-cv-00466-VEH Document 23 Filed 03/04/14 Page 9 of 30
documents must be excluded. If the court converts the motion to a motion for

summary judgment, they must be stricken because they are not authenticated. Either

way, the documents will not be considered at this time. The plaintiffs’ petition to

strike Exhibit F (doc. 16 at 10-13) will be GRANTED. The plaintiffs’ “Petition for

Judicial Notice of Undisputed Facts and Plaintiff[s’] Petition to Strike the

Defendant’s Latest Reply Brief and the Attached Exhibits A, B, C, and D” (doc. 18),

will be GRANTED to the extent it seeks to strike exhibits A, B, C, and D to

document 17. It will be DENIED in all other respects.5

B. The Defendant’s Motion To Strike the McCaffrey Affidavit (Doc.

13); The Plaintiffs’ Petition To Quash the Motion To Strike the

Affidavit of William McCaffrey (Doc. 16 at 8-10)

The McCaffrey affidavit poses a different problem which the parties have not

6

 The motion also asks the court to take judicial notice of all “undisputed facts presented 5

herein.” (Doc. 18 at 13). To the extent that facts stated therein are indeed “undisputed,” they

will be considered by this court as such. There is no need to “judicially notice” them. Further,

the motion provides no valid grounds for its request that the court strike the defendant’s reply

brief.

 The affidavit was not attached to the original complaint. It made its appearance as an

6

attachment to the amended complaint after the court’s order of August 23, 2014, which stated in

part:

[E]ven though not contained in the [False and Misleading Representation]

count itself, the complaint alleges elsewhere that the defendant “falsely represented

to the [plaintiffs] that his client had standing to foreclose therefore using false and

misleading practices in an attempt to collect a purported debt.” (Doc. 1 at 3). Such

actions might fall under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e which specifically prohibits “[t]he threat

to take any action that cannot legally be taken,” and “[t]he use of any false

representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to

10

Case 4:13-cv-00466-VEH Document 23 Filed 03/04/14 Page 10 of 30
addressed–whether consideration of the affidavit, attached to the complaint, requires

the court to convert the motion. “A copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit

7

to a pleading is a part of the pleading for all purposes.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c). That

“necessarily includes Rule 12(b)(6) motions.” Thaeter v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff's

Office, 449 F.3d 1342, 1352 n. 7 (11th Cir. 2006). However, affidavits are not

typically the types of written instruments considered to be part of the complaint. As

has been noted:

obtain information concerning a consumer.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5), (10). However,

the plaintiffs provide no factual support in their complaint for why the defendant

could not legally foreclose. Any claim based on this conduct is due to be dismissed.

However, the court will allow the plaintiffs to amend their complaint to state, if they

can, facts which support this claim. 

(Doc. 11 at 16-17). The court also wrote: 

The complaint alleges a violation of [the Act’s prohibition against unfair practices]

by the defendant . . . threatening foreclosure when the defendant had no standing to

do so. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 41-43). Again, however, no facts are alleged which support such

a claim. Any claim based upon this portion of the Act will be dismissed with leave

to amend.

(Doc. 11 at 18). 

 The defendant’s motion to strike attacks the affidavit only on the issue of whether it is 7

“admissible.” (Doc. 13 at 6). The parties do not discuss whether the affidavit may be considered

as part of a motion to dismiss, as opposed to part of a converted motion for summary judgment. 

While this may seem to be a distinction without a difference, it is not. Rule 56 of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs affidavits submitted on motions for summary judgment,

requires that “[a]n affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a motion must . . . set out

facts that would be admissible in evidence [.]” Rule 12(b)(6), which governs motions to

dismiss, has no such requirement. Accordingly, the issue of conversion bears on the motion to

strike. Further, if the motion is not converted, and the affidavit is still considered, the facts stated

in the affidavit should be taken as true.

11

Case 4:13-cv-00466-VEH Document 23 Filed 03/04/14 Page 11 of 30
[a] “written instrument” within the meaning of Rule 10(c) “is a

document evidencing legal rights or duties or giving formal expression

to a legal act or agreement, such as a deed, will, bond, lease, insurance

policy or security agreement.” Murphy v. Cadillac Rubber & Plastics,

Inc., 946 F.Supp. 1108, 1115 (W.D.N.Y.1996) (citing Black's Law

Dictionary 801, 1612 (6th ed.1990)). The documents that satisfy this

definition “consist largely of documentary evidence, specifically,

contracts, notes, and other writings on which a party's action or defense

is based[.]” Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 339 n. 3 (3d Cir.1989)

(internal quotations and alteration omitted). 

DeMarco v. DepoTechCorp., 149 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1220 (S.D. Cal. 2001) (emphasis

added). 

Complicating the matter further is the fact that the McCaffrey affidavit is not

made by a party or fact witness to the case. It is an expert affidavit. On its face, the

affidavit states that McCaffrey offers his “observations, analysis, opinions, and

testimony.” (Doc. 12 at 14) (emphasis added). He states that he has “personal

knowledge and experience in the topic area,” and discusses his “personal experience.” 

(Doc. 12 at 14-15). He also states where he has been “qualified to testify,” and where

he has “served as an Expert Witness.” (Doc. 12 at 15). He identifies the property

which was the subject of the foreclosure, identifies facts which pertain to the

disposition of the mortgage and note after its execution, and then states that his

“research” reveals, among other things: that Bank of America cannot foreclose on the

property (doc. 12 at 16-17); that Bank of America is not a holder in due course on the

12

Case 4:13-cv-00466-VEH Document 23 Filed 03/04/14 Page 12 of 30
loan (doc. 12 at 17); that Bank of America has suffered no financial loss because of

the loan (doc. 12 at 17); and that Bank of America does not possess legal standing to

foreclose (doc. 12 at 18). 

The court has found no case where the Eleventh Circuit has addressed whether

an affidavit, attached to the complaint, and containing facts and expert conclusions,

meets the definition of a “written instrument” under Rule 10(c). However, this very

issue has been addressed very persuasively by the Fifth Circuit in Fin. Acquisition

Partners LP v. Blackwell (“Blackwell”), 440 F.3d 278, 285-86 (5th Cir. 2006), a

securities fraud case. The facts of that case, as set out by the district court, are as

follows:

Deloitte filed a motion to strike the affidavit of Mr. Victor C.

Moore, whom Plaintiffs have retained as an expert in connection with

thislitigation. Plaintiffs attached [to their Second Amended Complaint]

an affidavit authored by Mr. Moore in which he gives his opinion that

Deloitte violated generally accepted accounting principles(“GAAP”) by

failing to represent that AMRESCO's 10-K for the year ending

December 31, 2000 misrepresented the value of its assets and by failing

to issue a “going concern” qualification regarding AMRESCO's viability

as a corporation in its audit opinion of AMRESCO's financial

statements. Deloitte argues that Mr. Moore's affidavit improperly brings

in matters outside the four corners of Plaintiffs' Second Amended

Complaint, while Plaintiffs argue that the affidavit is properly included

with the pleading under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10c), which

allows a party to attach a “written instrument” to a pleading.

FED.R.CIV.P. 10c).

Fin. Acquisition Partners, LP v. Blackwell, CIV.A.3:02-CV-1586-K, 2004 WL

13

Case 4:13-cv-00466-VEH Document 23 Filed 03/04/14 Page 13 of 30
2203253 at *4 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2004) aff'd, 440 F.3d 278 (5th Cir. 2006)

(Kinkeade, J.). The district court wrote:

In another securities fraud case, DeMarco v. Depotech

Corporation, 149 F.Supp.2d 1212 (S.D.Cal.2001), the court held that it

had to disregard the affidavit of an expert in considering the defendant's

motion to dismiss because considering the opinion of an expert included

in an affidavit on a motion to dismiss forces a district court to confront

a “myriad of complex evidentiary issues not generally capable of

resolution at the summary judgment stage.” Id. at 1221. That court stated

that considering the expert affidavit would put the court in the position

of essentially considering a motion for summary judgment, which is

improper at the motion to dismiss stage of a securities fraud case. Id.

However, despite striking the affidavit, the court did say that a plaintiff

could include an expert's “nonconclusory assertions within specific

paragraphs in the complaint.” Id. at 1222.

Blackwell, 2004 WL 2203253 at * 4. The district court found the DeMarco rationale

persuasive, and granted the motion to strike only

insofar as the Court will not consider any conclusions reached by Mr.

Moore in making its decision on the Defendants' motions to dismiss.

However, the Court DENIES Deloitte's motion to the extent it seeks an

order striking those nonconclusory, factual portions of Mr. Moore's

affidavit found in Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint.

Id. at *5. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, citing with approval the above quoted language

from the DeMarco opinion. Blackwell, 440 F.3d 278, 286 (5th Cir. 2006). 

8

 In a later unpublished opinion, the Fifth Circuit, in Malik v. Cont'l Airlines Inc., 305 F. 8

App'x 165, 166 n. 2 (5th Cir. 2008) stated that “[w]e properly consider the [plaintiff’s] affidavit

[attached to the complaint] in ruling on [the] motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.” In

doing so, it took as true the facts alleged therein. Malik, 305 Fed. Appx. at 166 (“In her second

amended complaint and attached affidavit, Malik alleges the following facts which we must take

as true in ruling on Continental's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.”) (footnote

14

Case 4:13-cv-00466-VEH Document 23 Filed 03/04/14 Page 14 of 30
The court is persuaded by these district court and Fifth Circuit opinions. 

Although Blackwell and DeMarco were securities fraud cases, the rationale for the

decisions in each was not based upon that fact. Indeed, in nearly all cases, including

this one, considering expert opinions at the pleading stage is inappropriate. 

The motion to strike will be GRANTED as to all opinions stated in the

affidavit. It will be DENIED as to factual statements contained therein. In

accordance with, and subject to the guidelines set out by Twombly and Iqbal, non- 9

conclusory factual averments in the affidavit will be taken as true for purposes of the

court’s ruling on the motion to dismiss. The plaintiff’s Petition to Quash the Motion

to Strike the Affidavit of William McCaffrey (doc. 16 at 8-10) will be DENIED.

III. THE PLAINTIFFS' "PETITION TO STRIKE THE DEFENDANT'S

LATEST PLEADING ENTITLED ‘NOTICE OF ADDITIONAL

SERVICE OF EXHIBITS TO DEFENDANT'S REPLY TO

PLAINTIFF[S']RESPONSETODEFENDANT'S MOTIONTODISMISS

AND RESPONSE TO THE PLAINTIFF[S'] PETITION TO STRIKE'"

(DOC. 21)

omitted). Malik does not overrule Blackwell. First, in the Fifth Circuit, “[u]npublished opinions

issued on or after January 1, 1996, are not precedent.” 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4. Further, Malik’s later

panel could not overrule the prior panel decision in Blackwell. See, F.D.I.C. v. Abraham, 137

F.3d 264, 268 (5th Cir. 1998) (“[O]ne panel of this court cannot disregard, much less overrule,

the decision of a prior panel.”). Further, Malik is distinguishable as the affidavit in Malik was a

fact affidavit, not an expert affidavit filled with opinions and conclusions like the one in

Blackwell. Both cases actually agree that the proper procedure is always to adopt facts stated in

affidavits attached to the complaint.

 Discussed at section IV, infra.

9

15

Case 4:13-cv-00466-VEH Document 23 Filed 03/04/14 Page 15 of 30
In this motion, the plaintiffs seek to strike document 19, which is the

defendant’s “Notice of Additional Service of Exhibits to Defendant’s Reply to the

Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and Response to the Plaintiffs’

Petition to Strike.” In document 19, the defendantstatesthat when he filed document

17, his reply to the motion to dismiss, he attached five exhibits labeled A, B, C, D,

and E. (Doc. 19 at 1). The defendant notes that the plaintiffs, in their motion to strike

exhibits A, B, C, and D (doc. 18), state that “Mr. Saag failed to attach a copy of the

purported documents that he is referencing as Exhibit[s] A, B, C, or D to his Reply

Pleading.” (Doc. 19 at 2) (quoting doc. 18 at 11). Saag states that although he

believes that he served the documents on the plaintiffs with the copy of the reply

brief, he sent them again after they said that they did not receive them. (Doc. 19 at

2). He also argues that the plaintiffs suffered no prejudice as a result of the alleged

omission. (Doc. 19 at 2-3).

The plaintiffs argue that this document should be stricken because it mistakenly

states that the reason the plaintiffs have tried to strike the documents is because they

were not initially served on them. (Doc. 21 at 1). They also reargue their other

reasons that the documents should be stricken. (Doc. 21 at 1-7). This motion will be

DENIED. The court seesthe defendant’s filing as merely a notice that the documents

were sent to the plaintiffs at some point. Further, whether the document states the

16

Case 4:13-cv-00466-VEH Document 23 Filed 03/04/14 Page 16 of 30
correct grounds for the motions to strike or not, the court can, and has, discerned for

itself the basis for, and legitimacy of, the motions.

IV. THE MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED COMPLAINT

(DOC. 13)

A. Standard of Review

The defendant moves to dismiss this case pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. “[A] court should only grant a motion to dismiss

[under Rule 12(b)(6)] where the defendant demonstrates that the plaintiff cannot

prove any set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Am.

United Life Ins. Co. v. Martinez, 480 F.3d 1043, 1057 (11th Cir. 2007). “Moreover,

when ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court must view the complaint in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff and accept all of the plaintiff's well-pleaded facts [and

reasonable inferences drawn from those facts] as true.” Id. (emphasis added). A

court looks to the facts alleged in the plaintiff's complaint, and not its merely

conclusory statements, when ruling on a motion to dismiss. Thus, to survive a motion

to dismiss for failure to state a claim, “a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds

of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964–65, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007)

17

Case 4:13-cv-00466-VEH Document 23 Filed 03/04/14 Page 17 of 30
(quotations omitted). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief

above the speculative level.” Id. at 1965. Mere conclusory statements in support of

a threadbare recital of the elements of a cause of action will not suffice. Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009).

B. Allegations in the Complaint

On January 24, 2013, the defendant sent the plaintiffs a letter, the full text of

which reads:

RE: NOTICEOF ACCELERATIONOF PROMISSORYNOTEAND

MORTGAGE

YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that the terms of the Promissory Note

and Mortgage for the above referenced loan dated the 20th day of

December, 2004, are in default. By virtue of default in the terms of said

Note and Mortgage, Bank of America, N.A., hereby accelerates to

maturity the entire remaining unpaid balance of the debt, including

attorney’s fees, accrued interest, and other lawful charges. The amount

due and payable as of the date of this letter is $43,533.46. This payoff

amount will change on a daily basis. If you wish to pay off your

mortgage, please call our office at (205) 930-5200 to obtain an updated

figure. Additionally, if you are interested in foreclosure alternatives,

please contact your servicer, Bank of America at 1-800-699-6650.

We are at this time commencing foreclosure under the terms of the

Mortgage, and enclosed is a copy of the foreclosure notice. Please note

that the foreclosure sale is scheduled for February 28, 2013. For further

information regarding this matter, please call (205) 930-5200.

If you have received a discharge of this debt in bankruptcy or are

currently in a bankruptcy case, this notice is not intended as an attempt

to collect a debt. Our client has a security interest in the property and

18

Case 4:13-cv-00466-VEH Document 23 Filed 03/04/14 Page 18 of 30
will only exercise its rights as against the property.

We will assume this debt to be valid unless it is disputed within thirty

days after you receive this letter. If you do dispute this debt or any

portion thereof, we will obtain and mail you a verification of the debt or

a copy of any judgment if you send us a written request within this

thirty-day period. Also, upon written request within this thirty-day

period, we will provide you with the name and address of the original

creditor, if different from the current creditor. This communication is an

attempt to collect a debt and any information obtained will be used for

that purpose.

(Doc. 12 at 10) (emphasis in original). The amended complaint alleges that the letter

violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g by “overshadowing” the plaintiffs’ “right to dispute the

debt or request the name and address of the original creditor.” (Doc. 12 at 2). The

plaintiffs state that after they received this letter they “were left confused as to

whether they actually had 30 days in which to dispute the debt. [They] were left with

the impression that they [sic] would be of no avail to dispute the purported debt as

foreclosure had already begun.” (Doc. 12 at 2).

Upon receipt ofthe defendant’s letter, the plaintiffs mailed an undated “Notice

of Impending Injury From Andy Sagg Notice of Liability” to the defendant. (Doc.

12 at 2, 11; doc. 13-1 at 4-7). In that notice, the plaintiffs requested verification of

the debt owed. (Doc. 12 at 2). In a January 31, 2013, letter responding to the

plaintiffs, the defendant wrote:

Re: Property Address: 370 Gamble Road, Horton, AL 35980

19

Case 4:13-cv-00466-VEH Document 23 Filed 03/04/14 Page 19 of 30
Our Client: Bank of America, N.A.

Loan Number: 83658532

This letter is to acknowledge receipt of your letter received in my office

on January 29, 2013, disputing the above-referenced debt. I have

forwarded a copy of your letter to Bank of America for its review. Please

note that we have ceased foreclosure proceedings until written debt

verification is provided to you.

Please do not hesitate to contact my office at (205) 930-5200 should you

have any questions.

This communication is from a debt collector.

(Doc. 12 at 12). On February 25, 2013, the defendant again wrote the plaintiffs

stating:

The terms of the Promissory Note and Mortgage loan with Bank of

America, N.A. are currently in default. Due to the default in the terms of

the Note and Mortgage, we have been instructed to foreclose the

property described in the enclosed revised publication notice.

The foreclosure sale is scheduled for March 28, 2013. If you are

interested in foreclosure alternatives, please contact your servicer, Bank

of America at 1-800-669-6650.

For further information regarding this matter, please contact our office

at (205) 930-5200. 

If you have received a discharge of this debt in bankruptcy or are

currently in a bankruptcy case, this notice is not intended as an attempt

to collect a debt. Our client has a security interest in the property and

will only exercise its rights as against the property.

This communication is from a debt collector.

20

Case 4:13-cv-00466-VEH Document 23 Filed 03/04/14 Page 20 of 30
(Doc. 12 at 13). 

The amended complaint states that the defendant “falsely represented to the

Brothers [sic] that his client had standing to foreclose therefore using false and

misleading practices in an attempt to collect a purported debt.” (Doc. 12 at 3). The

plaintiffs also claim that the defendant “has not produced proper documentation

demonstrating that his client possessed an original obligation at the time of

foreclosure and therefore did not have authority to claim a security interest in the

[plaintiffs’] property.” (Doc. 12 at 5). 

The plaintiffs allege that the defendant “was attempting to take an action based

upon a false security interest in the [plaintiffs’] property therefore [the defendant] has

threatened to take action that ‘legally cannot be taken’ by his client.” (Doc. 12 at 6). 

The amended complaint also alleges that the defendant “represented to the [plaintiffs]

that [Bank of America] held a security interest in [the plaintiffs’] property when in

fact no such agreement was possessed by his client.” (Doc. 12 at 6).

The following facts appear in the McCaffrey affidavit and are taken astrue for

the purposes of this motion:

The subject property: 370 GAMBLEROADHORTON,AL35980

was secured in favor of COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS INC.

DECEMBER 20, 2004. The corresponding Mortgage has a Mortgage

Identification Number (“MIN”) of 1001337-0000256507-8.

21

Case 4:13-cv-00466-VEH Document 23 Filed 03/04/14 Page 21 of 30
[T]he loan has been securitized which is the process of

aggregating a large number of Notes in what is called a mortgage pool

and then selling security interestsin that pool of mortgages to investors. 

These sales have fractionalized possession of the Note over many

different investors.

The subject NOTE or Loan of said property was bundled with

many other loans, sold to investors and ultimately placed into a

COUNTRYWIDE RESECURITIZATIONS COUNTRYWIDETRUST

(“CWT08034") referred to as the ISSUING ENTITY and formed

pursuant to the Trust Agreement among the Seller, Depositor, Servicer,

the Trust Oversight Manager and the Trustee. HERE, the Depositor is

CWALT SECURITIES and the Trust has a closing date of March 25,

2008.

TheTrust is also a REALESTATEMORTGAGE INVESTMENT

CONDUIT (REMIC) within the meaning of 860D of the Internal

Revenue Code as amended in 1986 (The Code), which governs the rules

of the subject trust. BANK OF AMERICA Acts as current servicer of

the mortgage loans and BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON acts as

Trustee of the Trust on behalf of the investors.

(Doc. 12 at 16) (capitalization in original). 

C. Analysis

1. Count One – Overshadowing

The plaintiffs argue that the defendant committed a violation of the FDCPA’s

provisions against “overshadowing” in his January 24, 2013, letter. (Doc. 12 at 7). 

To understand “overshadowing,” one must understand the FDCPA’s validation

notice requirements. The FDCPA statute provides, in pertinent part:

Within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in

22

Case 4:13-cv-00466-VEH Document 23 Filed 03/04/14 Page 22 of 30
connection with the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall, unless

the following information is contained in the initial communication or

the consumer has paid the debt, send the consumer a written notice

containing–

(1) the amount of the debt;

(2) the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed;

(3) a statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt

of the notice, disputesthe validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the

debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt collector;

(4) a statement that if the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing

within the thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is

disputed, the debt collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy

of a judgment against the consumer and a copy of such verification or

judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the debt collector; and

(5) a statement that, upon the consumer's written request within the

thirty-day period, the debt collector will provide the consumer with the

name and address of the original creditor, if different from the current

creditor.

28 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) (emphasis in original). “Paragraphs 3 through 5 of section

1692g(a) contain the validation notice—the statementsthat informthe consumer how

to obtain verification of the debt and that he has thirty days in which to do so.” 

Wilson v. Quadramed Corp., 225 F.3d 350, 353-54 (3d Cir. 2000). Collection

activities and communications may continue during the 30-day period referenced

above, but such activities “may not overshadow or be inconsistent with the disclosure

of the consumer’s right to dispute the debt or request the name and address of the

23

Case 4:13-cv-00466-VEH Document 23 Filed 03/04/14 Page 23 of 30
original creditor.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) (emphasis added).

“Courtsin the Eleventh Circuit use the ‘least sophisticated consumer’ standard

when analyzing overshadowing claims. As a general matter, language is

overshadowing if it would make the least sophisticated consumer uncertain as to his

or her rights.” Shimek v. Weissman, Nowack, Curry & Wilco, P.C., 323 F. Supp. 2d

1344, 1349 (N.D. Ga. 2003) aff'd, 374 F.3d 1011 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Jeter v.

Credit Bureau, Inc., 760 F.2d 1168, 1175–76 (11th Cir.1985), and Russell v. Equifax

A.R.S., 74 F.3d 30, 35 (2d Cir.1996)); see also, Russell v. Equifax A.R.S., 74 F.3d

10

30, 35 (2d Cir. 1996) (“A notice is overshadowing or contradictory if it would make

the least sophisticated consumer uncertain as to her rights.”). “[T]he determination

of whether language overshadows the validation notice is a question oflaw.” Shimek,

323 F. Supp. 2d at 1349.

The amended complaint states that the letter “confused [the plaintiffs] and

overshadowed their right to dispute the debt.” (Doc. 12 at 7). Importantly, however, 11

 The Eleventh Circuit stated held the district court’s decision was “affirmed based on 10

the well-reasoned order of the district court.” Shimek v. Weissman, Nowack, Curry & Wilco,

P.C., 374 F.3d 1011, 1013 (11th Cir. 2004).

 Attached to the plaintiff’s response to the motion to dismiss are the affidavits of the 11

plaintiffs. (Doc. 16 at 21-24). In the affidavits, each plaintiff states that they “concluded that if

we dispute the debt, we will be required to make full and immediate payment, be forced out of

our home, and in order to regain possession bring suit. This conclusion, in my opinion, makes as

much sense as Mr. Saag’s letter.” (Doc. 16 at 22, 24). Because this is a motion to dismiss, these

documents have been EXCLUDED, and have not been considered by the court.

24

Case 4:13-cv-00466-VEH Document 23 Filed 03/04/14 Page 24 of 30
“ ‘The least sophisticated consumer’ can be presumed to possess a

rudimentary amount of information about the world and a willingness

to read a collection notice with some care.” Clomon, 988 F.2d at 1319.

However, the test has an objective component in that “[w]hile protecting

naive consumers, the standard also prevents liability for bizarre or

idiosyncratic interpretations of collection notices by preserving a

quotient of reasonableness ....” Nat'l Fin. Servs., Inc., 98 F.3d at 136

(citing Clomon, 988 F.2d at 1319); Barany–Snyder v. Weiner, 539 F.3d

327, 333 (6th Cir.2008) (“least-sophisticated consumer” standard is an

objective test); Jacobson v. Healthcare Fin. Servs., Inc., 516 F.3d 85

(2nd Cir.2008) (same).

LeBlanc v. Unifund CCR Partners, 601 F.3d 1185, 1193-94 (11th Cir. 2010). 

Everything required by 28 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) appears in the letter of January

24, 2013. (Doc. 13-1 at 2). The language is set off in its own paragraph at the end

of the letter. Nothing anywhere else in the letter expressly conflicts with the 

information required to be provided by paragraphs 3 through 5 of section 1692g(a). 

Still, in the amended complaint, the plaintiffs set out the following language

of the letter in their overshadowing claim:

Bank of America, N.A., hereby accelerates to maturity the entire

remaining unpaid balance of the debt, including attorney’s fees, accrued

interest, and other lawful charges.

We are at this time commencing foreclosure under the terms of the

Mortgage, and enclosed is a copy of the foreclosure notice.

We will assume this debt to be valid unless it is disputed within thirty

days after you receive this letter. 

(Doc. 12 at 7) (quoting doc. 12 at 10). The court assumes that the plaintiffs are

25

Case 4:13-cv-00466-VEH Document 23 Filed 03/04/14 Page 25 of 30
claiming that the first two sentences somehow overshadow the third, since the last

sentence is required by the statute to appear in the letter. 28 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(3). 

The first two sentences merely give the plaintiffs notice that collection

procedures will continue. This is not a violation of the statute, nor is it inconsistent

with the plaintiffs’ rights. See, Durkin v. Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 406 F.3d 410,

416 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting that the validation period “is not a grace period: a debt

collector is ‘perfectly free’ to demand payment and pursue collection efforts,

including an appropriate lawsuit against the debtor, within the validation period.”).

“The mere fact, then, that the collection letter mentions actions that will be taken

within those 30 days does not mean the letter is necessarily confusing.” Omaraie v.

A. Alliance Collection Agency, Inc., 06 C 1727, 2007 WL 2409794 at *4 (N.D. Ill.

Aug. 21, 2007). Instead, “[c]ourts have generally found contradiction or apparent

contradiction of the printed § 1692g notice where payment is demanded in a concrete

period shorter than the 30–day statutory contest period.” Peter v. GC Servs. L.P., 310

F.3d 344, 349 (5th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added). There is nothing in defendant’s

statementsindicating the necessity of, orrequiring action by, the plaintiffs earlier than

30 days. There is no overshadowing. Count One will be DISMISSED. 

2. Counts Two and Three – False and Misleading

Misrepresentation; Unfair Practices

26

Case 4:13-cv-00466-VEH Document 23 Filed 03/04/14 Page 26 of 30
In these counts the plaintiffs allege that the defendant falsely and unfairly

alleged that his client had a security interest in the property and standing to foreclose. 

(Doc. 12 at 7-8). The defendant moves to dismiss these counts stating:

BANA is the owner and holder of a mortgage and note with regard to

the Plaintiffs’ property. A copy of the Mortgage, Assignment of

Mortgage, and Promissory Note are attached as Exhibit F.

30. As BANA’s attorney, Mr. Saag had a right to seek possession

of the property claimed as collateral through an enforceable security

interest represented by the Mortgage and Promissory Note, both of

which were provided to the Plaintiffs when they received the debt

verification letter of February 1, 2013 from BANA. See Speleos v. BAC

Home Loans Servicing, L.P., 824 F. Supp. 2d 226, 233 (D. Mass. 2011)

(holding that where BAC Home Loan Servicing’s right to foreclose was

established by the original loan documents, its attorney did not violate

the FDCPA by filing a foreclosure action against the homeowners after

a default). Moreover, Mr. Saag did not make any misrepresentations

regarding BANA’s security interest in the Plaintiffs’ property because

BANA in fact holds a security interest in the Plaintiffs’ property. It is

axiomatic that a representation cannot be a misrepresentation if it istrue.

31. More importantly, the Plaintiffs have not alleged any admissible

facts that support the notion that BANA did not have an enforceable

security interest. Both Count 2 and Count 3 rely heavily on the

information contained in the Affidavit of William McCaffrey, but none

of the information contained in McCaffrey’s affidavit is admissible.

Even if the Affidavit were admissible, McCaffrey’s conclusory and

unsupported statements do not change the fact that BANA holds an

enforceable Promissory Note and Mortgage. For those reasons, the

Plaintiffs’ Counts 1 and 2 are due to be dismissed.

(Doc. 13 at 11-12).

As noted above, the documents contained in Exhibit F to the motion to dismiss

27

Case 4:13-cv-00466-VEH Document 23 Filed 03/04/14 Page 27 of 30
will be stricken. Despite the defendant’s claim that the same documents were

attached to the original letter found on page 11 of document 13-1 (the February 1,

2013, validation letter from Bank of America), they are not attached to that document

in the record. Accordingly, there is no document which the court may consider at 12

this stage which shows that the defendant was accurately representing his client’s

right to enforce a security interest against the plaintiff’s property.

As to the argument that McCaffrey’s affidavit is “inadmissible,” the court has

already noted that it will strike the conclusions therein, while allowing the factual

statements. The defendant makes no further attack on the plausibility of the counts

except to state that McCaffrey’s affidavit “do[es] not change the fact that BANA

holds an enforceable Promissory Note and Mortgage.” (Doc. 13 at 12). However, 

since the proof of that argument will be excluded, it also fails. 

V. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and

DECREED as follows:

1. The defendant’s “Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint

(doc. 13) is GRANTED as to Count One, and DENIED in all other

 Further, the court has already held that the letter will be excluded. See supra section 12

II.A.2.

28

Case 4:13-cv-00466-VEH Document 23 Filed 03/04/14 Page 28 of 30
respects. Count One of the Amended Complaint is DISMISSED;

2. The defendant’s Motion to Strike the Affidavit of William McCaffrey

(doc. 13) is GRANTED as to all conclusions stated in the affidavit. 

Those statements are STRICKEN. The motion is otherwise DENIED;

3. The plaintiffs’ petition to “Quash the Motion to Strike the Affidavit of

William McCaffrey” (doc. 16 at 8-10) is DENIED;

4. The plaintiffs’ petition to strike Exhibit F attached to the defendant’s

motion to dismiss (doc. 16 at 10-13) is GRANTED. Exhibit F is

STRICKEN;

5. The plaintiffs’ “Petition for Judicial Notice of Undisputed Facts and

Plaintiff[s’] Petition to Strike the Defendant’s LatestReply Brief and the

Attached Exhibits A, B, C, and D” (doc. 18) is GRANTED to the extent

that it seeks to strike Exhibits A, B, C, and D to document 17 (doc. 17-1

at 2-21). Those Exhibits are STRICKEN. The motion is DENIED in

all other respects; and

6. The plaintiffs’ “Petition to Strike the Defendant’s Latest Pleading

Entitled ‘Notice of Additional Service of Exhibits to Defendant’s Reply

to Plaintiff[s’] Response to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and

Response to the Plaintiff[s’] Petition to Strike’” (doc. 21) is DENIED.

29

Case 4:13-cv-00466-VEH Document 23 Filed 03/04/14 Page 29 of 30
DONE and ORDERED this 4th day of March, 2014.

 

 VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS

United States District Judge

30

Case 4:13-cv-00466-VEH Document 23 Filed 03/04/14 Page 30 of 30