Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_10-cv-00235/USCOURTS-almd-2_10-cv-00235-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

---

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

BRENDA J. PENN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) CIVIL ACTION NO.

v. ) 2:10cv235-MHT

) (WO) 

ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF )

CORRECTIONS, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION

Plaintiff Brenda J. Penn filed this lawsuit against

defendants State of Alabama and Alabama Department of

Corrections (ADOC), as well as the following ADOC

employees in both their individual and official

capacities: ADOC Commissioner Richard F. Allen, Warden

John Cummins, II, Captain Janet Hicks, Captain Victor

Napier, Lieutenant Mark Loman, and Sergeant Franetta

Riley. Penn claims that these defendants violated her

rights under the Age Discrimination Act of 1975, 42

U.S.C. §§ 6101-6107; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a, 2000e to 2000e-17;

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42 U.S.C. § 1981; 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and the First, Fifth,

and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution. Penn also asserts state-law claims against

all defendants for libel and slander, intentional

infliction of emotional distress, and tortious

interference with a contractual relationship.

Jurisdiction over her federal claims is proper pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (federal question) and 1343 (civil

rights) as well as 2000e-5(f)(3) (Title VII);

supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims is proper

under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Now before the court is the defendants’ motion for

summary judgment as to all claims. For the reasons that

follow, the motion will be granted. 

I. BACKGROUND

Penn has been employed as a correctional officer at

Kilby Correctional Facility since 1976. Her claims in

this case arise out of three separate incidents,

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described below. Penn alleges that these incidents have

caused her to feel embarrassed and physically ill, and,

as a result, she has decided to retire from her position.

A. Disagreement with Sergeant Riley

In October 2009, Penn voiced concerns to Sergeant

Riley about the lack of a second key for Kilby’s

visitation restroom. In addition, she reported an

inmate’s request for a coat. According to Penn, this led

Riley to call her a “lazy ass officer.” Penn “wrote up”

Riley the following day by filing a complaint with her

supervisors; she subsequently filed a formal grievance.

Warden Cummins later corrected the issue regarding the

visitation restroom key, though Penn does not know

whether Riley was subjected to any employee discipline

for the alleged incident. Penn herself was never written

up or subjected to any discipline for the alleged

incident. 

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B. Disagreement with Lieutenant Loman

In December 2009, Penn encountered a problem with a

segregation inmate. The inmate called for Penn to come

to his cell. Once she was there, he looked at her while

masturbating. This prompted Penn to call for Lieutenant

Loman, who was a segregation-unit supervisor. According

to Penn, when Loman arrived, he got in Penn’s face and

shouted at her. Because this embarrassed her, Penn

reported Loman to her supervisor, Lieutenant Cash, and

she subsequently made a written complaint to Captain

Napier. A day or two later, Penn discussed the incident

with Captains Napier and Hicks. Napier stated that Loman

had been wrong and that he had already been counseled

about the incident. Penn was never written up or

subjected to any discipline for this incident. 

C. Disagreement Regarding Handicapped Parking

In December 2009, Penn was having problems with her

knee and was waiting to have surgery. For this reason,

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she decided to park in handicapped-parking spaces at

Kilby, using a handicapped sticker that belonged to her

daughter. After doing this for three weeks, Captain

Napier asked her about it, and she admitted to using her

daughter’s handicapped sticker. Penn received a

“counseling session,” the mildest form of employee

discipline. She subsequently went to her doctor and

obtained her own handicapped-parking sticker. She had no

further problems with parking after that point.

II. SUMMARY-JUDGMENT STANDARD 

“A party may move for summary judgment, identifying

each claim or defense--or the part of each claim or

defense--on which summary judgment is sought. The court

shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and

the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The court must view the

admissible evidence in the light most favorable to the

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non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in

favor of that party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd. v.

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Failure to Comply With Rule 56

With just a few exceptions, Penn does not support her

factual allegations with specific references to the

evidentiary record. Rule 56(c)(1) of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure states as follows:

“(1) Supporting Factual Positions. A

party asserting that a fact cannot be

or is genuinely disputed must support

the assertion by:

(A) citing to particular parts of

materials in the record, including

depositions, documents, electronically

stored information, affidavits or

declarations, stipulations (including

those made for purposes of the motion

only), admissions, interrogatory

answers, or other materials; or

(B) showing that the materials cited do

not establish the absence or presence

of a genuine dispute, or that an

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adverse party cannot produce admissible

evidence to support the fact.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). 

Further, the court’s scheduling order in this case

states as follows, in pertinent part:

“In all briefs filed by any party

relating to the motion, the discussion

of the evidence in the brief must be

accompanied by a specific reference, by

page and line, to where the evidence can

be found in a supporting deposition or

document. Failure to make such specific

reference will result in the evidence

not being considered by the court.”

Scheduling order at § 2 (Doc. No. 37).

Because Penn has not complied with Rule 56(c)(1) or

the court’s scheduling order, the court will grant

summary judgment against Penn on all of her claims.

However, as an independent ground for granting summary

judgment, the court will also separately review each of

Penn’s claims based on its understanding of the factual

record in this case. 

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B. Age Discrimination Act Claims

Penn claims that the defendants violated her rights

under the Age Discrimination Act by singling her out for

ill treatment. (The court notes that Penn has not

asserted any claims under the Age Discrimination in

Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634.)

The Age Discrimination Act applies to only federally

funded “programs” or “activities,” 42 U.S.C. § 6102; the

act does not apply to any “employment practice of any

employer.” 42 U.S.C. § 6103(c)(1). Therefore, because

Penn correlates her allegations of age discrimination

with her ADOC employment, she has no claim for relief

under the Age Discrimination Act. See Tyrrell v. City of

Scranton, 134 F.Supp.2d 373, 381-84 (M.D. Pa. 2001)

(Caputo, J.) (holding that the Age Discrimination Act

does not allow a plaintiff to seek relief based on

allegations of employment discrimination). Further, even

if the act could be applied to employment discrimination,

the statute does not create a private right of action for

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damages. See id. at 384 (holding that “the [Age

Discrimination Act] cannot support an action for

damages”).

For these reasons, summary judgment will be granted

against Penn on her Age Discrimination Act claims as to

all defendants.

C. Title VII Claims

The defendants argue that summary judgment should be

granted on Penn's Title VII claims because she has not

filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), nor has she

received a “right-to-sue” letter from the EEOC regarding

these claims. “Before a potential plaintiff may sue for

discrimination under Title VII, she must first exhaust

her administrative remedies.” Wilkerson v. Grinnell

Corp., 270 F.3d 1314, 1317 (11th Cir. 2001). To exhaust

her remedies, the plaintiff must file a timely charge of

discrimination with the EEOC. Id. For a charge to be

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timely in a non-deferral State such as Alabama, the EEOC

charge must be filed within 180 days of the last

discriminatory act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1).

Generally, in order to exhaust administrative remedies,

a plaintiff must receive a “right-to-sue” letter before

a judicial complaint may be filed. See Forehand v.

Florida State Hosp. at Chattahoochee, 89 F.3d 1562, 1567

(11th Cir. 1996) (explaining that receipt of a right-tosue letter is a condition precedent to bringing suit in

district court that is subject to equitable

modification).

In this case, although Penn sent copies of internal

grievances to the EEOC, which she had filed with the

ADOC, she admitted that she has not filed a formal charge

of discrimination with the EEOC. Further, although Penn

claims to have received a “right-to-sue” letter, a closer

examination of this document shows that it merely

acknowledges the EEOC’s receipt of Penn’s internal

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grievances and explains the procedure for filing an

actual charge of discrimination. 

For these reasons, summary judgment will be granted

against Penn on her Title VII claims as to all

defendants.

D. § 1981 Claims

Penn presents many of her civil-rights claims as

causes of action under both § 1981 and § 1983. The

defendants argue that, to the extent the actions against

the individual defendants are made under § 1981, the

defendants are entitled to summary judgment because the

individual defendants are state actors.

“[Section] 1981 does not provide an implicit cause of

action against state actors; therefore, § 1983

constitutes the exclusive federal remedy for violation by

state actors of the rights guaranteed under § 1981.”

Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281, 1288 n.1 (11th Cir. 2009)

(citing Butts v. County of Volusia, 222 F.3d 891, 894-95

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(11th Cir. 2000)). Thus, summary judgment must be

granted against Penn on her § 1981 claims (to the extent

they are not based on § 1983) against the individual

defendants.

Further, Penn’s § 1981 claims against the State of

Alabama and ADOC are barred by Eleventh Amendment

immunity. Alyshah v. Georgia, 239 Fed. Appx. 473, 474

(11th Cir. 2007) (affirming dismissal of § 1981 claims on

Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds, finding no

abrogation of state immunity); Abusaid v. Hillsborough

County Bd. Of County Com’rs, 405 F.3d 1298, 1303 (11th

Cir. 2005) (internal quotations omitted) (“[T]he law is

well-settled that Eleventh Amendment immunity bars suits

brought in federal court when an ‘arm of the State’ is

sued.”).

Accordingly, summary judgment will be granted against

Penn on her civil-rights claims to the extent that they

are brought under § 1981. 

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E. § 1983 Claims

Penn brings several § 1983 claims. First, she

alleges that she has suffered a violation of her civil

rights by being subjected to sex discrimination, in that

she was singled out for ill treatment because she is

female and also because she is not in a sexual

relationship with any of her supervisors. Second, she

alleges that she has suffered from retaliation and a

hostile-work environment. Third, she alleges violations

of her due-process and equal-protection rights, charging

that she has been mistreated because she is a female over

the age of 40. Fourth and finally, she alleges that her

First Amendment rights have been violated.

1. Claims Against State of Alabama, ADOC, and

Individual Defendants in Their Official Capacities

Penn’s claims against the State of Alabama and ADOC

are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity. Alyshah, 239

Fed. Appx. at 474 (affirming dismissal of § 1983 claims

on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds, finding no

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abrogation of state immunity); Abusaid, 405 F.3d at 1303.

Therefore, summary judgment will be granted against Penn

on her § 1983 claims as to these defendants.

Penn’s claims against the individual defendants in

their official capacities are also barred by Eleventh

Amendment to the extent that Penn is seeking damages, but

not to the extent that Penn seeks prospective-injunctive

relief. Welch v. Laney, 57 F.3d 1004, 1008 (11th Cir.

1995) (explaining that the Eleventh Amendment does not

bar suit against state employees in their official

capacities to the extent that a plaintiff seeks

prospective-injunctive relief, as opposed to damages).

In this case, the individual defendants argue that Penn

is merely seeking damages, not injunctive relief.

However, it appears from Penn’s amended complaint that

she is also seeking prospective-injunctive relief.

Therefore, summary judgment is inappropriate on Penn’s §

1983 claims as to the individual defendants in their

official capacities on the basis of sovereign immunity.

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However, as stated below, summary judgment is appropriate

on Penn’s § 1983 claims as to these defendants for other

reasons. 

2. Claims Against Commissioner Allen, 

Warden Cummins, Captain Napier, and Captain Hicks 

Penn’s § 1983 claims against Commissioner Allen,

Warden Cummins, Captain Napier, and Captain Hicks are

predicated on actions by them as ADOC supervisors. She

asserts that these defendants, as supervisors, should

have done more to remedy her grievances at ADOC.

“‘Supervisory officials are not liable under section 1983

on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious

liability.’” Belcher v. City of Foley, Ala., 30 F.3d

1390, 1396 (11th Cir. 1994) (quoting Hardin v. Hayes, 957

F.2d 845, 849 (11th Cir. 1992)). Supervisors may be held

liable under § 1983 “‘either when the supervisor

personally participates in the alleged constitutional

violation or when there is a causal connection between

actions of the supervising official and the alleged

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constitutional violation.’” Braddy v. Fla. Dep’t of

Labor & Employment Sec., 133 F.3d 797, 802 (11th Cir.

1998) (quoting Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 671 (11th

Cir. 1990)). Because Penn has not proffered the

necessary evidence to establish a supervisory claim,

summary judgment will be granted against Penn on her §

1983 claim as to these defendants in their individual and

official capacities.

3. Sex Discrimination Claims 

Against Sergeant Riley and Lieutenant Loman

As stated, Penn claims sex discrimination, charging

that she was singled out for ill treatment because she is

female and also because she is not in a sexual

relationship with any of her supervisors. The defendants

argue that Penn cannot prove that she was subjected to

disparate treatment. 

In an action alleging disparate treatment, a

plaintiff must prove an intentional discriminatory motive

by presenting either direct or circumstantial evidence.

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See Lee v. Russell County Bd. Of Educ., 684 F.2d 769,

773-74 (11th Cir. 1982). “Direct evidence” is evidence

which, “if believed, proves the existence of a fact in

issue without inference or presumption.” Burns v.

Gadsden State Community College, 908 F.2d 1512, 1518

(11th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). “Direct evidence

relates to actions or statements of an employer

reflecting a discriminatory or retaliatory attitude

correlating to the discrimination or retaliation

complained of by the employee.” Carter v. Three Springs

Residential Treatment, 132 F.3d 635, 641 (11th Cir. 1998)

(internal quotations omitted). “Only the most blatant

remarks, whose intent could be nothing other than to

discriminate,” will constitute direct evidence of

discrimination. Earley v. Champion Int’l. Corp., 907

F.2d 1077, 1081 (11th Cir. 1990) (internal quotations

omitted).

While Penn has made allegations of harassment and

described interpersonal disagreements with supervisors

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and co-workers, she has not provided any direct evidence

of unlawful discrimination. In fact, in her deposition,

she admitted that she either did not believe the

defendants’ actions were motivated by discriminatory

motives or that she simply did not know.

Absent direct evidence, Penn may attempt to establish

intentional discrimination through circumstantial

evidence. When a plaintiff offers circumstantial

evidence of discriminatory intent, the court applies the

“familiar burden-shifting framework established in

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973),

and subsequent cases.” E.E.O.C. v. Joe's Stone Crabs,

Inc., 296 F.3d 1265, 1272 (11th Cir. 2002). “Under this

framework, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie

case of discrimination.” Id. “By establishing a prima

facie case, the plaintiff creates a rebuttable

presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated

against [her].” Id. “The burden then shifts to the

employer to rebut this presumption by producing evidence

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that its action was taken for some legitimate,

non-discriminatory reason.” Id. “Should the employer

meet its burden of production, the presumption of

discrimination is rebutted, and the inquiry ‘proceeds to

a new level of specificity,’ in which the plaintiff must

show that the proffered reason really is a pretext for

unlawful discrimination.” Id. at 1272-73. “Although the

intermediate burdens of production shift back and forth,

the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that

the employer intentionally discriminated against the

employee remains at all times with the plaintiff.” Id.

at 1273.

Penn may establish a prima-face case of disparate

treatment on the basis of sex by showing that: “(1) she

is a member of a protected class; (2) she was subjected

to an adverse employment action; (3) her employer treated

similarly situated employees outside of her protected

class more favorably than she was treated; and (4) she

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was qualified to do the job.” Burke-Fowler v. Orange

County, 447 F.3d 1319, 1323 (11th Cir. 2006). 

As to what constitutes an adverse-employment action,

the Eleventh Circuit has explained:

“Whatever the benchmark, it is clear

that ... the employer's action must

impact the ‘terms, conditions, or

privileges’ of the plaintiff's job in

a real and demonstrable way. Although

[this] does not require proof of direct

economic consequences in all cases, the

asserted impact cannot be speculative

and must at least have a tangible

adverse effect on the plaintiff's

employment. We therefore hold that, to

prove adverse employment action ..., an

employee must show a serious and

material change in the terms,

conditions, or privileges of

employment.” 

Davis v. Town of Lake Park, Fla., 245 F.3d 1232, 1239

(11th Cir. 2001). Moreover, “[c]riticisms, negative

evaluations, and temporary and non-substantial changes in

work assignments are not actions that have a ‘serious and

material effect’ on the terms and conditions of

employment.” White v. Hall, 389 Fed. Appx. 956, 960

(11th Cir. 2010) (citing Davis, 245 F.3d. at 1241-44).

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Here, Penn alleges that she has been criticized and

embarrassed. She further alleges that, as a result of

this criticism and embarrassment, she was constructively

dismissed, that is, that she felt compelled to retire.

Notwithstanding these allegations, though, Penn has not

shown that she suffered an adverse-employment action.

For example, she has not been terminated, demoted,

suspended, or even officially reprimanded or warned; nor

does the evidence support a constructive discharge.

Thus, even if Penn’s allegations are accepted as true,

she has not made a prima facie showing of discrimination.

Further, even if the court found that Penn had

suffered an adverse-employment action, she has not shown

that “her employer treated similarly situated employees

outside of her protected class more favorably than she

was treated.” Burke-Fowler, 447 F.3d at 1323. 

For both of these reasons, therefore, summary

judgment will be granted in favor of Riley and Loman on

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Penn’s § 1983 sex-discrimination claims against them in

their individual and official capacities.

4. Hostile-Work-Environment Claims

Penn claims that the incidents involving her and

Riley and Loman, as well as the disagreement about her

use of handicapped parking, all created a hostile-work

environment. She admitted that she has never been

subjected to unwanted sexual advances by any of the

defendants in this case. In addition, although her

complaint alleges discrimination based on the fact that

she was not in a sexual relationship with her

supervisors, she admitted that she has no knowledge about

any of her supervisors’ sexual relationships.

With respect to hostile-work-environment claims, the

Eleventh Circuit has stated:

“To establish a hostile work

environment claim ... an employee (or

former employee) must show harassing

behavior ‘sufficiently severe or

pervasive to alter the conditions of

[his or her] employment.’ Pa. State

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Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 133,

124 S.Ct. 2342, 2347, 159 L.Ed.2d 204

(2004). This requires that the

employee prove the following: ‘(1) that

he [or she] belongs to a protected

group; (2) that he [or she] has been

subject to unwelcome harassment; (3)

that the harassment [was] based on a

protected characteristic of the

employee, such as national origin; (4)

that the harassment was sufficiently

severe or pervasive to alter the terms

and conditions of employment and create

a discriminatorily abusive working

environment; and (5) that the employer

is responsible for such environment

under either a theory of vicarious or

of direct liability.’”

Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281, 1296 (11th Cir. 2009)

(quoting Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan, Inc., 277 F.3d

1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2002)). As to the fourth element

of this test, “this element contains both subjective and

objective components; that is, ‘to be actionable, [the

harassment] must result in both an environment that a

reasonable person would find hostile or abusive and an

environment that the victim subjectively perceive[s] to

be abusive.’” Id. at 1297 (quoting Miller, 277 F.3d at

1276).

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Penn has presented no evidence to support a hostilework-environment claim. Thus, summary judgment will be

granted against Penn on her § 1983 hostile-workenvironment claims. 

5. Retaliation Claims

Penn also claims that she has suffered from

retaliation. “[A] plaintiff alleging retaliation must

first establish a prima facie case by showing that: (1)

[s]he engaged in a statutorily protected activity; (2)

[s]he suffered an adverse employment action; and (3)

[s]he established a causal link between the protected

activity and the adverse action.” Id. at 1307-08. 

Penn has not presented any evidence to show that she

has satisfied any of these elements. Also, the mere fact

that she filed complaints and grievances does not

demonstrate that she engaged in “statutorily protected

activity.” See Ross v. City of Perry, Ga., 396 Fed.

Appx. 668, 671 (11th Cir. 2010). 

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1. The Eleventh Circuit has adopted as precedent all

decisions of the former Fifth Circuit rendered prior to

October 1, 1981. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d

1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).

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Therefore, summary judgment will also be granted

against Penn on her § 1983 retaliation claims. 

6. Other Constitutional Claims

Finally, Penn claims violations of her due-process

and equal-protection rights under the Fifth and

Fourteenth amendments, as well as violations of her First

Amendment rights.

Because the Fifth Amendment constrains only federal

action, it cannot serve as a basis of Penn’s claims. See

Knoetze v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 634 F.2d 207, 211 (5th

Cir. Jan. 12, 1981) (citing Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S.

593 (1972)).1

 With respect to Penn’s rights under the

Fourteenth amendment, the court has already explained

that Penn has not been subjected to any unlawful

discrimination. Because Penn also has not suffered an

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adverse-employment action, she could not have been

deprived of a liberty or property interest that would

support a § 1983 claim based on an alleged violation of

her due-process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.

See Wu v. Thomas, 847 F.2d 1480, 1485 (11th Cir. 1988).

To establish a First Amendment retaliation claim,

“the commonly accepted formulation requires that a

plaintiff must establish first, that his speech or act

was constitutionally protected; second, that the

defendant's retaliatory conduct adversely affected the

protected speech; and third, that there is a causal

connection between the retaliatory actions and the

adverse effect on speech.” Bennett v. Hendrix, 423 F.3d

1247, 1250 (11th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). As to

the second prong, “[a] plaintiff suffers adverse action

if the defendant's allegedly retaliatory conduct would

likely deter a person of ordinary firmness from the

exercise of First Amendment rights.” Id. at 1254. Penn

alleges that, after filing grievances against Riley and

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Loman, the two defendants went to her supervisors in an

attempt to get her in trouble without any cause. Penn

does not, however, provide any details about what Riley

and Loman said to Penn’s supervisors, nor has she

described any actions taken against her as a result of

their efforts. Thus, because Penn has not demonstrated

any adverse consequences for filing her complaints and

grievances, she is not able to establish her First

Amendment retaliation claims.

Accordingly, summary judgment will also be granted

against Penn on her § 1983 claims under the First, Fifth,

and Fourteenth amendments. 

7. Qualified Immunity

The individual defendants also argue that they are

entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Penn’s

§ 1983 claims. To the extent the defendants have been

sued in their individual capacities, they are permitted

to raise this defense. Under the qualified-immunity

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rule, “government officials performing discretionary

functions generally are shielded from liability for civil

damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which

a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see also Holmes v.

Kucynda, 321 F.3d 1069, 1077-78 (11th Cir. 2003). 

For the reasons already given earlier in this

opinion, Penn has not shown that the individual

defendants violated clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would

have known. Therefore, because of qualified immunity,

summary judgment will be entered against Penn on her §

1983 claims for damages against the defendants in their

individual capacities. 

F. State Claims

As stated, Penn also brings several state claims

against all defendants, including claims for libel and

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2. In count IV of her complaint, Penn purports to

assert 15 separate state claims. It appears, however,

that Penn has confusingly mixed both federal and state

claims in this count, with the majority being federal

claims. Penn has not clarified this confusion in her

pleadings and the court addresses Penn’s federal claims

elsewhere in this opinion. As stated, the court has

identified that the only unique state claims presented in

this count are those for libel and slander, intentional

infliction of emotional distress, and tortious

interference with a contractual relationship. Finally,

although Penn also purports to bring a state claim of

harassment against all defendants, the court is not aware

of any authorities establishing harassment as a civil

tort in Alabama, nor has Penn provided any such

authorities. To be clear, Penn does argue that certain

defendants violated Alabama’s criminal harassment

statute, but she does not show that harassment

constitutes a civil tort in Alabama. 

29

slander, intentional infliction of emotional distress,

and tortious interference with a contractual

relationship.2

 

As a preliminary issue, the court must determine

whether it should reach the merits of these claims, given

that summary judgment will granted against Penn on all

her federal claims. A district court has discretion to

decline supplemental jurisdiction over a claim when it

“has dismissed all claims over which it has original

Case 2:10-cv-00235-MHT-TFM Document 54 Filed 09/19/11 Page 29 of 42
3. Carnegie-Mellon was decided before the passage in

1990 of 28 U.S.C. § 1367, which expressly authorized

district courts to decline exercise of supplemental

jurisdiction over state-law claims if all claims within

the court’s original jurisdiction had been dismissed.

Nevertheless, Carnegie-Mellon remains useful in analyzing

when district courts should decline to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction.

30

jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Factors to be

taken into account include “the values of judicial

economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.”

Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350

(1988).3

 Courts are strongly encouraged to dismiss state

claims when the federal claims have been resolved prior

to trial. See id. (concluding that “federal court[s]

should decline the exercise of [supplemental]

jurisdiction by dismissing the case without prejudice”

when the federal law claims have been dismissed prior to

trial).

Ordinarily, dismissing state claims without prejudice

will not prejudice a plaintiff, due to the fact that the

period of limitations for filing a state law claim in

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31

state court is tolled “for a period of 30 days after it

is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer

tolling period.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d). In this case,

however, Penn could lose her claims against the state

defendants because “the tolling prevision does not apply

to claims filed in federal court against nonconsenting

States.” Raygor v. Regents of the University of

Minnesota, 534 U.S. 533, 536 (2002). Further, the state

defendants are unwilling to waive the statute of

limitations defense for these claims. Therefore, in the

interest of fairness, the court will maintain its

supplemental jurisdiction and reach the merits of Penn’s

state claims. 

1. Libel and Slander

Penn has brought claims of libel and slander against

all defendants. As to each defendant, to establish a

defamation claim, Penn must show “‘[1] that the defendant

was at least negligent [2] in publishing [3] a false and

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32

defamatory statement to another [4] concerning the

plaintiff, [5] which is either actionable without having

to prove special harm (actionable per se) or actionable

upon allegations and proof of special harm (actionable

per quod).’” Ex Parte Crawford Broadcasting, 904 So.2d

221, 225 (Ala. 2004) (quoting Delta Health Group, Inc. v.

Stafford, 887 So.2d 887, 891 (Ala. 2004)).

Defamation claims consist of libel actions and

slander actions. Libel actions are “‘predicated on

written or printed aspersions of character,’” whereas

slander actions are predicated on “‘oral defamation.’”

Butler v. Town of Argo, 871 So.2d 1, 16 (Ala. 2003)

(quoting Ceravolo v. Brown, 364 So.2d 1155, 1157 (Ala.

1978)). “‘This distinction, however, is merely in

respect to the question as to whether the imputed

language or words are actionable per se.’” Id. (quoting

Ceravolo, 364 So.2d at 1157). 

“‘In cases of libel, if the language used exposes the

plaintiff to public ridicule or contempt, though it does

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33

not embody an accusation of crime, the law presumes

damage to the reputation, and pronounces it actionable

per se.’” Id. (quoting Ceravolo, 364 So.2d at 1157). In

contrast, “to constitute slander actionable per se, there

must be an imputation of an indictable offense involving

infamy or moral turpitude[.]’” Id. at 17 (quoting

Ceravolo, 364 So.2d at 1157). Slander is also actionable

per quod where the action is “founded on oral malicious

defamation subjecting the plaintiff to disgrace,

ridicule, odium, or contempt, though it falls short of

imputing the commission of such crime or misdemeanor.”

Id. (quoting Ceravolo, 364 So.2d at 1157). However,

where slander is actionable per quod, “‘the plaintiff

must allege and prove special damages as an element of

the cause of action.’” Id. (quoting Ceravolo, 364 So.2d

at 1157). “‘Special damages are the material harms that

are the intended result or natural consequence of the

slanderous statement ... and the general rule is that

they are limited to material loss capable of being

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34

measured in money.’” Id. at 18 (quoting Shook v. St.

Bede School, 74 F.Supp.2d 1172, 1180 (M.D. Ala. 1999)

(Thompson, J.)).

“Truth is an absolute defense to a defamation claim.”

S.B. v. Saint James School, 959 So.2d 72, 100 (Ala. 2006)

(citing Foley v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 491

So.2d 934 (Ala. 1986)). In addition, “[i]n libel and

slander actions, a showing that the alleged defamation

was made on a privileged occasion or under circumstances

and conditions which made it privileged in law

constitutes a complete defense.” Nelson v. Lapeyrouse

Grain Corp., 534 So.2d 1085, 1092 (internal quotations

omitted)). 

Although Penn does not provide any explanation in her

filings as to what evidence supports her defamation

claims, the court assumes, based on her deposition, that

these claims are based on her disagreements with Riley

and Napier. The court notes, though, that Penn’s

allegations as to Riley are not entirely clear from the

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35

deposition. With respect to Riley, Penn appears to

allege that Riley lied about her when she stated,

verbally and in writing, that (1) Penn herself lied about

Riley’s having cursed at her; and (2) that Penn was

reading a newspaper during her shift, in violation of

workplace rules. With respect to Napier, Penn alleges

that Napier somehow defamed her by writing her up for

improperly using handicapped-parking spaces at Kilby. 

As a preliminary matter, Penn has made allegations

against only Riley and Napier, and thus there are no

allegations at all to support her defamation claims

against the other defendants. Further, Penn’s defamation

claims against Napier must fail since “[t]ruth is an

absolute defense to a defamation claim.” Saint James

School, 959 So.2d at 100. Penn admitted, in her

deposition, that she had improperly used her daughter’s

handicapped-parking sticker. Thus, because the substance

of what Napier said or wrote about Penn regarding that

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36

incident was true, these statements cannot support a

claim for defamation. Id.

However, even assuming that Riley and Napier’s

statements about Penn were false, Penn has not shown that

the outcomes of these situations exposed her “to public

ridicule or contempt,” nor has she shown that they

attributed to her “an indictable offense involving infamy

or moral turpitude.” Butler, 871 So.2d at 16-17.

Therefore, she has not established claims for defamation

per se. See id. Further, any slander per quod claim

must also fail because Penn has not pled or proven

“special damages.” See id. at 18. 

Finally, the defendants also argue that Riley and

Napier’s statements about Penn were protected by

conditional or qualified privilege, given that these

statements concerned the performance and discipline of a

subordinate employee. See id. at 26; Montgomery v. Big

B, Inc., 460 So.2d 1286, 1287 (Ala. 1984). Because the

court finds that Penn has not established defamation

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37

claims against Riley nor Napier regardless of any

privileges these defendants may have, it need not reach

this issue.

Accordingly, summary judgment will be granted against

Penn on her libel and slander claims as to all

defendants. 

2. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

 Penn brings claims of intentional infliction of

emotional distress against all defendants. The Alabama

tort of outrage “is essentially equivalent to what many

states refer to as ‘intentional infliction of emotion

distress.’” K.M. v. Ala. Dep't of Youth Servs., 360

F.Supp.2d 1253, 1259 n.4 (M.D. Ala. 2005) (Thompson, J.).

In order to prove a claim of outrage, a plaintiff must

establish that, “(1) the defendant ... intended to

inflict emotional distress, or should have known that his

or her acts would result in emotional distress; (2) the

act [was] extreme and outrageous; (3) the act ... caused

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38

plaintiff['s] distress; and (4) plaintiff['s] emotional

distress [was] so severe that no reasonable person could

be expected to endure it.” Id. at 1259 (citing Harrelson

v. R.J., 882 So.2d 317, 322 (Ala. 2003)). The Alabama

Supreme Court has emphasized “that this tort does not

recognize recovery for ‘mere insults, indignities,

threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other

trivialities.’” American Rd. Serv. Co. v. Inmon, 394

So.2d 361, 364-65 (Ala. 1980) (citation omitted).

Rather, recovery is appropriate for only “conduct so

outrageous in character and so extreme in degree as to go

beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded

as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized

society.” Id. at 365. The court is aware of “only three

limited circumstances” where the Alabama Supreme Court

has recognized this tort: “(1) wrongful conduct within

the context of family burials; (2) an insurance agent's

coercing an insured into settling an insurance claim; and

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39

(3) egregious sexual harassment.” Carraway Methodist

Health Systems v. Wise, 986 So.2d 387, 401 (Ala. 2007).

In this case, Penn articulates no specific basis for

these claims in her pleadings. Her deposition shows,

however, that these claims are based on the previously

discussed interactions with Riley, Loman, and Napier.

Because the alleged conduct of these defendants cannot be

viewed as “beyond all possible bounds of decency,” so

that it must “be regarded as atrocious and utterly

intolerable in a civilized society,” summary judgment

will be granted against Penn on her intentionalinfliction-of-emotional-distress claims. Inmon, 394

So.2d at 365. 

3. Tortious Interference with a Contractual

Relationship

 Penn also brings claims of tortious interference

with a contractual relationship against all defendants.

The elements of a claim for tortious interference with a

contract are “‘(1) the existence of a contract or

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40

business relation, (2) the defendant's knowledge of the

contract or business relation, (3) intentional

interference by the defendant with the contract or

business, and (4) damage to the plaintiff as a result of

the defendant's interference.’” Serra Chevrolet, Inc. v.

Edwards Chevrolet, Inc., 850 So.2d 259, 265 (Ala. 2002)

(quoting Bama Budweiser of Montgomery, Inc. v. AnheuserBusch, Inc., 611 So.2d 238, 246-47 (Ala. 1992)).

In this case, as with her other state claims, Penn

articulates no specific basis for these claims in her

pleadings. In her deposition, Penn testified that her

interactions with Riley, Loman, and Napier could have

impacted her participation in her deferred retirement

option plan (DROP). However, she admitted that she was

not compelled to quit her job and that she would begin

reaping the full benefits of her retirement and DROP

starting in January 2011. Thus, because Penn has not

proven the elements of these claims and because she

admits that her ability to use DROP has not been impeded,

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41

summary judgment will be granted against Penn as to all

defendants.

4. Sovereign Immunity and State-Agent Immunity

The State of Alabama, ADOC, and official-capacity

defendants also argue that they are entitled to sovereign

immunity under state law, and the individual-capacity

defendants argue that they are entitled to state-agent

immunity. See Ala. Dep’t of Corrections v. Montgomery

Co. Comm’n, 11 So.3d 189, 191-92 (Ala. 2008) (explaining

that sovereign immunity is a jurisdictional bar that

prohibits actions against the State of Alabama and its

agencies); Ex parte Cranman, 792 So.2d 392, 405 (Ala.

2000) (“A State agent shall be immune from civil

liability in his or her personal capacity when the

conduct made the basis of the claim against the agent is

based upon the agent's ... exercising his or her judgment

in the administration of a department or agency of

government, including, but not limited to ... hiring,

Case 2:10-cv-00235-MHT-TFM Document 54 Filed 09/19/11 Page 41 of 42
firing, transferring, assigning, or supervising

personnel[.]”). 

However, because the court has already determined

that all defendants are entitled to summary judgment on

Penn’s state claims, it need not consider whether

sovereign or state-agent immunity applies in this case.

* * *

Thus, for the foregoing reasons, the court concludes

that summary judgment should be granted in favor of the

defendants and against Penn on each of her claims.

An appropriate judgment will be entered.

DONE, this the 19th day of September, 2011.

 /s/ Myron H. Thompson 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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