Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00512/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00512-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1332ed Diversity-Employment Discrimination

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

APARNA VASHISHT-ROTA, an 

individual,

Plaintiff,

v.

HOWELL MANAGEMENT SERVICES, 

LLC, a Utah limited liability company; 

CHRIS HOWELL, an individual; and 

DOES 1 through 20, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: 19-cv-0512-L-MDD

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS [ECF No. 6]

Pending before the Court is Defendants Howell Management Services’ (“HMS”), 

Chris Howell’s, and Justin Spencer’s (collectively “Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss [ECF 

No. 6]. The Court decides the matter on the papers submitted and without oral argument. 

See Civ. L. R. 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS Defendants’

Motion. 

I. BACKGROUND

From October 2015 to March 2017, Plaintiff Aparna Vashisht-Rota (“Plaintiff”)

worked under contract for Defendants by referring foreign and domestic students to HMS 

and having those students enrolled at universities associated with HMS. During the 

contractual relationship, Plaintiff and Defendants entered four separate authorized 

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representative agreements. Defendants Howell and Spencer subjected Plaintiff to 

unwelcome and ongoing sex-based harassment and discrimination based on her gender, 

Indian race, ethnicity, and national origin during her employment with HMS. Throughout 

the employment relationship, Plaintiff raised complaints about Defendants’ unwelcome 

behavior and nonpayment for the work she performed. Around May 2017, Plaintiff ceased 

working for HMS due to nonpayment, discrimination, harassment, and retaliation from 

Defendants. 

On March 18, 2019, Plaintiff filed her Complaint against Defendants for (1) Sexual 

Harassment – Hostile Work Environment, (2) Unlawful Sexual/Gender Discrimination, (3) 

Race Discrimination, (4) National Origin Discrimination, (5) Retaliation in Violation of 

Public Policy, (6) Retaliation in Violation of California Labor Code section 1102.5, (7) 

Constructive Discharge, (8) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, (9) Failure to 

Prevent Unlawful Discrimination and harassment, (10) Failure to Correct and Remedy 

Unlawful Discrimination and Harassment, and (11) Violation of Equal Pay. The 

Complaint also alleges Plaintiff has still not been paid for her work. 

Defendants move to dismiss this case on the basis that the claims brought here are 

compulsory counterclaims to prior Utah litigation between the parties. Defendants also 

move to dismiss or transfer this case based on forum non conveniens or under 28 U.S.C. § 

1404 due to a forum selection provision in the agreement between the parties. In the 

alternative, Defendants assert that the case should be transferred to the United States 

District Court for the District of Utah under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) if their motion to dismiss 

is denied. 

Defendants contend that Plaintiff and her company, August Education Group 

(“AEG”), are involved in pending litigation (“Utah Litigation”) with HMS1 in First Judicial 

 

1 HMS is the Plaintiff in the Utah Litigation. Defendants Chris Howell and Justin 

Spencer are not party to the Utah Litigation as individuals. See Doc. 13-2 in Case No. 

3:18-cv-2010-L-AGS. Pursuant to Local Rule 40.1(f), Defendants filed a notice of related 

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District in and for Cache County, Utah. The Utah Litigation was initiated by HMS in 

November of 2017, against Plaintiff and AEG. Plaintiff and AEG have counterclaimed in 

the Utah Litigation. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion filed under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure tests the 

sufficiency of the complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). In 

reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must assume the truth of all factual allegations 

and construe them most favorably to the nonmoving party. Huynh v. Chase Manhattan 

Bank, 465 F.3d 992, 997, 999 n.3 (9th Cir. 2006). On the other hand, legal conclusions 

need not be taken as true merely because they are couched as factual allegations. Bell Atl. 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009). “Nevertheless, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement 

to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the 

elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 

265, 286 (1986)).

A forum non conveniens determination is committed to the discretion of the district 

court. Gemini Capital Group, Inc. v. YapFishing Corp., 150 F.3d 1088, 1091 (9th Cir. 

1998). “The defendant bears the burden of proving the existence of an adequate alternative 

forum.” Cheng v. Boeing Co., 708 F.2d 1406, 1411 (9th Cir. 1983). 

In the interests of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action “to any other 

district or division where it might have been brought” for the convenience of the parties 

and of the witnesses. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Courts generally apply a two-part analysis to 

 

cases identifying the following cases as related: (1) Howell Mgmt. Servs., LLC v. August 

Education Group et al., Case No. 170100325 in Cache County, Utah and (2) Aparna 

Vashist-Rota v. Howell Mgmt. Servs., LLC, et al., Case No. 3:18-cv-2010-L-AGS in this 

Court. The Court dismissed Plaintiff’s Complaint in the related federal civil case after 

finding that Plaintiff’s claims were compulsory counterclaims that must be included in the 

Utah litigation. See Vashist-Rota, Case No. 3:18-cv-2010-L-AGS at Doc. 22. 

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determine whether a transfer of venue is appropriate under § 1404(a)—(1) whether the 

action could have been commenced in the transferee court and (2) whether the case should 

be moved “for convenience of parties and witnesses [and] in the interests of justice. See 

Hatch v. Reliance Ins. Co., 758 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Ctr. For Biological 

Diversity v. McCarthy, 2015 WL 1535594, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2015).

In determining the interest of justice under traditional § 1404(a) analysis, the Ninth 

Circuit instructs that courts may consider: (1) the location where the relevant agreements 

were negotiated and executed, (2) the state that is most familiar with the governing law, 

(3) the plaintiff’s choice of forum, (4) the respective parties’ contacts with the forum, (5) 

the contacts relating to the plaintiff’s cause of action in the chosen forum, the differences 

in the costs of the litigation in the two forums, (7) the availability of compulsory process 

to compel attendance of un-willing party witnesses, and (8) the ease of access to sources 

of proof. See Jones v. GNC Franchising, Inc., 211 F.3d 495, 498 (9th Cir. 2000). 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Compulsory Counterclaims

Defendants contend Plaintiff’s causes of action are compulsory counterclaims 

because a logical relationship demonstrates her claims arise out of the same integral 

transaction or occurrence disputed in the Utah litigation. In opposition, Plaintiff contends 

her harassment, discrimination, and retaliation claims do not arise under the facts being 

litigated in the Utah litigation and assert that none of these issues have been litigated in the 

Utah case. 

“Federal courts will not permit an action to be maintained where the claims asserted 

should have been brought as a compulsory counterclaim in an earlier action.” In re Crown 

Vantage, Inc., 421 F.3d 963, 973 n.7 (9th Cir. 2005). “The question whether the 

[Plaintiff’s] claims are compulsory counterclaims which should have been pleaded in the 

earlier. . . state court action is a question of state law.” Pochiro v. Prudential Ins. Co. of 

America, 827 F.2d 1246, 1249 (9th Cir. 1987). Since the earlier action was filed in Utah 

state court, Utah law applies. See Just in Time Supplier, Inc. v. Sioux Honey Ass’n Coop., 

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2018 WL 2981179, at *3 (S.D. Cal. June 14, 2018). Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a)(1) 

states, “A pleading must state as a counterclaim any claim that –at the time of its service—

the pleader has against an opposing party if the claim: (a)(1)(A) arises out of the transaction 

or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim; and (a)(1)(B) does 

not require adding another party over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.” Rule 

13(a) furthers the purpose of ensuring that “all relevant claims arising out of a given 

transaction are litigated in the same action.” Raile Family Tr. ex. rel. Raile v. Proma Dev. 

Corp., 24 P.3d 980, 983 (2001). Utah courts interpreting the Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 

draw from federal courts interpreting the Federal Rules. See Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State 

Tax Comm’n, 814 P.2d 1099, 1102 (1991). Federal courts apply the liberal “logical 

relationship” test to determine whether two claims arise out of the same “transaction or 

occurrence” under Rule 13(a). Pochiro, 827 F.2d at 1249. This approach evaluates 

“whether the essential facts of the various claims are so logically connected that 

considerations of judicial economy and fairness dictate that all the issues be resolved in 

one lawsuit.” Id. The Ninth Circuit instructs that the pertinent inquiry in these matters is

not the legal theory but the facts underlying both cases. See Mattel, Inc. v. MGA 

Entertainment, Inc., 705 F. 3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 2013). 

In the Utah litigation, HMS asserts several causes of action Plaintiff and AEG, 

including defamation and injurious falsehood. HMS also seeks injunctive relief to prevent 

Plaintiff from initiating emails to HMS personnel. The facts upon which that litigation is 

premised centers around conduct Plaintiff pursued after the contractual relationship

between HMS and AEG ended. For example, the complaint in the Utah litigation alleges

numerous occasions in which Plaintiff threatened to or in fact attempted to interfere with 

HMS’ commercial partnerships by email. Plaintiff’s behavior, as alleged in the Utah 

complaint, primarily focuses on her behavior after the contractual relationship ended 

between HMS and AEG. In the instant complaint, Plaintiff alleges instances where she

was subjected to unwanted and unwelcomed sexual harassment, offensive behavior, and 

discrimination by Defendants Howell and Spencer during the business relationship 

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between the parties. Moreover, the Court is not persuaded by HMS’ contention that the 

allegations here are at issue in the HMS’ interference, defamation, and injurious falsehood 

claims in Utah. As such, the facts of this case and the Utah litigation are distinct in that 

the instant litigation focuses on the Defendants’ behavior during the contract relationship 

and the Utah litigation focuses on Plaintiff’s behavior after the contract relationship ended. 

Thus, the claims do not arise under the same facts. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims are not 

compulsory counterclaims that must be included in the Utah Litigation. 

B. 28 U.S.C. § 1404/Forum Non Conveniens

In the Third Authorized Representative Agreement signed April 24, 2017, the parties 

agreed as follows:

“With respect to any claim or action arising under this Agreement each 

party to the Agreement hereby (a) irrevocably submits to the exclusive 

Jurisdiction of the Courts of the State of Utah, and (b) irrevocably waives any 

objection which such party may have at any time to the laying of venue of any 

suit, action or proceeding arising out of or relating to this agreement brought 

in any such court, irrevocably waives any claim that any such suit, action or 

proceeding brought in any such court has been brought in an inconvenient 

forum and further irrevocably waives the right to object, with respect to such 

claim, suit, action or proceeding brought in any such court, that such court 

does not have jurisdiction over such party[.]” 

Plaintiff contends the forum selection provision unenforceable. Federal courts apply 

federal law to determine the enforceability of a forum selection clause. Doe 1 v. AOL LLC, 

552 F.3d 1077, 1083 (9th Cir. 2009). Forum selection clauses are “prima facie valid and 

should be enforced unless enforcement is shown by the resisting party to be ‘unreasonable’ 

under the circumstances.” M/S Bremen v. Zapta Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10 (1971). 

Once the forum selection clause is determined to be enforceable, the appropriate way to 

enforce a forum selection clause is through 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) or the doctrine of forum 

non conveniens. Atlantic Marine Const. Co., Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court for Western Dist. Of 

Texas ̧ 571 U.S. 49, 60-61 (2013). Both 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) and the forum non conveniens 

doctrine entail the same balancing-of-interests standard. Id. 

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“[T]he forum selection clause should control absent a strong showing that it should 

be set aside.” Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15 (emphasis added). A forum selection clause could 

be found unreasonable for any one of the following reasons: (1) if the inclusion of the 

clause in the agreement was the product of fraud or overreaching; (2) if the party attempting 

to repudiate the clause would effectively be deprived of his day in court were the clause 

enforced; or (3) if enforcement would contravene a strong public policy of the forum in 

which suit is brought. Richards v. Lloyd’s of London, 135 F.3d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1998) 

(citations omitted); see Spradlin v. Lear Siegler Mgmt. Servs.Co., 926 F.2d 865, 867-68 

(9th Cir. 1991) (noting that the Bremen takes into account “the factual circumstances of 

the initial employment agreement and the underlying dispute . . . including any power 

differentials”).

When a valid forum selection clause preselects a different forum than the one 

selected by the plaintiff, courts modify § 1404(a) analysis in three ways: (1) the plaintiff’s 

choice of forum “merits no weight,” and it is plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate why the 

action should not be transferred to the preselected forum; (2) the court “must deem the 

private-interest factors to weigh entirely in favor of the preselected forum”; and (3) a § 

1404(a) transfer of venue “will not carry with it the original venue’s choice-of-law rules.” 

Atlantic Marine, 571 U.S. at 63-64. Plaintiff must show either that the forum selection 

clause is not valid or that the public interest factors to be considered under § 1404(a) make 

transfer inappropriate. Id. 

Plaintiff first asserts that transferring this case to the Cache County Utah state court 

would deprive her of her day in court due to the lack of diversity of the jury pool. A party 

must show the following to challenge the makeup of a jury pool: (1) that the group alleged 

to be excluded is a “distinctive” group in the community; (2) that the representation of this 

group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the 

number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to 

systematic exclusion of the group from the jury-selection process. See Duren v. Missouri, 

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439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979). Plaintiff has not made any showing under any of the prongs. 

As such, Plaintiff’s contention fails.

Plaintiff next contends that enforcement of the forum selection clause would 

contravene public policy of this forum. Plaintiff argues California Government Code § 

12940 et. seq. evidences that California has a strong public policy in protecting employees 

from sexual harassment and retaliation. This argument falls short as it does not address 

whether the forum selection clause itself violates California’s public policy. Run Them 

Sweet, LLC v. CPA Glob. Ltd., 2016 WL 6216874, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2016) (finding

that plaintiff failed to identify a public policy that relates “to venue”); East Bay Women’s 

Health, Inc. v. gloStream, Inc., 2014 WL 1618382, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2014) (same). 

Moreover, as other courts have noted, determining whether a forum-selection clause is 

enforceable is “separate and distinct from choice of law provisions that are not before the 

court.” See Run Them Sweet, 2016 WL 6216874, at * 3 (citing gloStream, 2014 WL 161 

8382, at * 3). The California statute Plaintiff relies upon does not relate to venue. Plaintiff 

may assert that California law should apply to protect Plaintiff’s interests in the transferee 

court. Nonethless, Plaintiff’s contention that the forum selection clause violates public 

policy because California has a policy that protects employees from the conduct alleged 

here is unavailing. As such, the Court finds that the forum selection clause at issue does 

not contravene public policy. Accordingly, the Court finds the forum selection is valid and 

enforceable.

The Court also finds that the forum selection clause covers the claims raised in 

Plaintiff’s Complaint. The forum selection clause is clearly broad enough to encompass 

the claims that arose during the contractual relationship between the parties. Although the 

Court recognizes that the allegations here pertain to conduct during the contractual 

relationship and the allegations in the Utah litigation pertain to post-contractual 

relationship conduct, both claims stem from a common experience contemplated under the 

Agreement—Plaintiff’s contracted employment. Notwithstanding, the Court questions 

whether the Utah state court’s ruling that the Third Authorized Representative Agreement 

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controls in this litigation since the challenged conduct here occurred before that contract 

was signed. Nonetheless, it was Plaintiff’s burden to bring forth such an argument and it 

was not raised here. Thus, the Court finds that the forum selection clause controls this 

litigation.

In light of the presence of a valid forum selection clause, the Court undertakes a 

modified §1404(a) analysis. Defendants do not challenge Plaintiff’s contention that the 

negotiations for the four contract agreements occurred in California, favoring this forum. 

The Utah state court is most familiar with the governing law under the choice of law 

provision in the forum selection clause—Utah state law. Plaintiff’s choice of venue “merits 

no weight[]” under Atlantic Marine. Likewise, the respective parties’ contacts with the 

forum and the contacts relating to Plaintiff’s cause of action in the chosen forum are not to 

be considered because the Court “must deem the private-interest factors to weigh entirely 

in favor of the preselected forum.” See Atlantic Marine, 571 U.S. at 63-64. Plaintiff asserts 

that it would be financially burdensome to transfer this litigation to the Utah state court, 

but she does not clarify why litigating this case in Utah state court would be any more 

onerous than the costs she is already incurring in defending the Utah litigation currently. 

As such, this factor weighs in favor of transfer. The Atlantic Marine analysis also dictates 

that the Court not consider private-interest factors like the availability of compulsory 

process to compel attendance of unwilling non-party witnesses and the ease of access to 

sources of proof because a valid forum selection clause exists. See Atlantic Marine, 571 

U.S. at 63-64. Accordingly, the Court finds that these factors weigh in favor of transfer. 

Since the forum selection clause demands the case be brought in a nonfederal forum, the 

Court must dismiss this case under the forum non conveniens doctrine. Id. at 61 (citations 

omitted). 

IV. CONCLUSION & ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART 

Defendants’ motion. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to dismiss 

under the doctrine of forum non conveniens is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHERED 

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ORDERED that Defendants motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is DENIED. The 

Clerk’s Office shall close this case upon entry of this order.

Dated: March 2, 2020

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