Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04788/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04788-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DEJA MARIE J, a minor, by and

through her guardian ad litem, JERRY J,

Plaintiff,

v

SAN FRANCISCO UNIFIED SCHOOL

DISTRICT, et al,

Defendants. /

No C-05-4788 VRW

ORDER

Jerry J, guardian ad litem for his daughter Deja Marie J,

petitioned the court for an order approving the compromise of

Deja’s claims in this case. Doc #8. Because plaintiff did not

demonstrate that the proposed recovery or attorney fees were

reasonable, the court permitted plaintiff “to serve and file an

application for approval of the fee contract and further memorandum

in support of the reasonableness of the settlement.” Doc #12

(6/21/06 order) at 7. On June 26, 2006, plaintiff filed a

memorandum in support of the reasonableness of the settlement

agreement (Doc #13), a declaration from Jerry J (Doc #14) and a

declaration from Matthew Kumin (Doc #15).

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Case 3:05-cv-04788-VRW Document 17 Filed 08/11/06 Page 1 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Based on these filings, the court concludes that the

proposed settlement of $10,000, of which Deja would receive $6,500

and Kumin would receive $3,250 in attorney fees and $250 for the

filing fee, is reasonable. Doc #9 at 2; Id, Ex 2, ¶¶ 7, 9; Doc #13

at 3. But with Deja’s interest in mind, the court requires Jerry J

or Kumin to file documentation indicating that Deja’s settlement

payment has been, as promised, placed into a trust for Deja’s use

upon reaching age eighteen.

I

“[A] court must independently investigate and evaluate

any compromise or settlement of a minor’s claims to assure itself

that the minor’s interests are protected, even if the settlement

has been recommended or negotiated by the minor’s parent or

guardian ad litem.” Salmeron v United States, 724 F2d 1357, 1363

(9th Cir 1983) (citation omitted). As noted in the court’s prior

order, the court applies California law when evaluating the

proposed settlement and attorney fees. See 6/21/06 order at 2-3.

A

Addressing the decision to settle for $10,000, California

law requires the court to “assure that whatever is done is in the

minor’s best interest” and that “the compromise is sufficient to

provide for the minor’s injuries, care and treatment.” Goldberg v

Superior Court, 23 Cal App 4th 1378, 28 Cal Rptr 2d 613, 615

(1994).

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Case 3:05-cv-04788-VRW Document 17 Filed 08/11/06 Page 2 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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3

The present settlement appears to be in the minor’s best

interest. Kumin states in his declaration that “given the age of

the minor, the difficulties of deposing a six year old (and her six

and seven year old classmates) and the re-traumatizing effect for

her of re-living the events, I decided, in consultation with the

Guardian, that the settlement was reasonable and more importantly,

settling would avoid requiring testimony from [Deja] and her

classmates.” Doc #15, ¶3. Moreover, Jerry J unsuccessfully

searched for “some time to find an attorney willing to represent

[him] and [his] daughter” before finding Kumin (Doc #14, ¶2); this

bolsters Kumin’s assertion that “[c]ases such as this one are

difficult to litigate” and involve “major hurdles” (Doc #15, ¶5). 

For these reasons, settlement of this case appears to have been

entirely reasonable.

The settlement also appears sufficient to provide for

Deja’s injuries, care and treatment. Kumin represents that while

“only long term counseling will help [Deja] root out the emotional

problems [the alleged assault] has cause[d] * * * this counseling

is available to her so long as her father keeps her with him and

arranges for sessions through the state’s medical programs for the

needy and indigent.” Doc #13 at 4. Given the availability of free

medical care, Jerry J states that it is his intention to place the

$6,500 that Deja would receive from this settlement into a “blocked

account for the minor’s benefit until she turns eighteen,” Doc #8

at 2, at which time “the funds should have at least doubled and

will assist the minor in pursuing higher education.” Doc #13 at 3.

This court agrees that Deja’s potential medical and other

expenses appear to have been addressed by this settlement. 

Case 3:05-cv-04788-VRW Document 17 Filed 08/11/06 Page 3 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Accordingly, the court approves the settlement but requires Jerry J

or Kumin to file documentation demonstrating that Deja’s settlement

payment has been, as promised, placed into a trust for Deja’s use

upon reaching age eighteen.

B

The court now considers Kumin’s fees and expenses

totaling $3,500. California law requires the court to make an

“order authorizing and directing that such reasonable expenses * *

*, costs, and attorney fees, as the court shall approve and allow

therein” be paid out of the settlement proceeds. Cal Prob Code §

3601(a); Curtis v Fagan, 82 Cal App 4th 270, 98 Cal Rptr 2d 84, 90-

91 (2000). The statute “bestows broad power on the court to

authorize payment from the settlement —– to say who and what will

be paid from the minor’s money.” Goldberg, 28 Cal Rptr 2d at 614-

15.

“The determination of reasonable attorney fees is

committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, which is in

the best position to judge the value of professional services

rendered in its court.” Olson v Cohen, 106 Cal App 1209, 131 Cal

Rptr 2d 620, 627 (2003) (construing agreement between parties for

recovery of reasonable attorney fees). Among the factors the court

may consider are “the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the

amount involved in the litigation, the skill employed in handling

the litigation, the attention given, the success of the attorney’s

efforts, the attorney’s learning and experience, the intricacies

and importance of the litigation, the labor necessary, and the time

consumed.” Id.

Case 3:05-cv-04788-VRW Document 17 Filed 08/11/06 Page 4 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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As the California supreme court has observed, this

inquiry “ordinarily begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i e, the number of

hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly

rate.” PLCM Grp v Drexler, 22 Cal 4th 1084, 95 Cal Rptr 2d 198,

206 (2000). “The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the

community for similar work. The lodestar figure may then be

adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case,

in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal

services provided.” Id (internal citations omitted). The Ninth

Circuit also permits the lodestar test for determining a reasonable

attorney fee award in common fund cases. See, e g, In re

Washington Public Power Supply Systems Sec Lit, 19 F3d 1291, 1296

(9th Cir 1994).

First, the court finds that Kumin’s assertion that he

“spent approximately 56 hours” working on this case is reasonable. 

Doc #15, ¶2. Kumin appears to have taken a strong interest in the

case and resolved the matter in mediation despite defendants’

initial rejection of Deja’s claims. Doc #13 at 2. Kumin’s actions

in this case included, inter alia, interviewing witnesses, drafting

the complaint and mediation statement, conducting legal research

and attending the mediation. Doc #9 at 2. Fifty-six hours for

this work is not out-of-bounds.

Kumin’s asserted hourly rate is also reasonable. Kumin

has been licensed to practice in California for over 10 years and

has successfully completed “over 50 civil rights cases filed in

numerous California state and federal courts.” Doc #15, ¶ 7. He

contends that his standard rate is $300 per hour. Doc #13 at 5. 

Dividing the proposed $3,250 in attorney fees here by 56 hours

Case 3:05-cv-04788-VRW Document 17 Filed 08/11/06 Page 5 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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yields an hourly rate of just $58.03. Given Kumin’s experience and

the relatively modest rate that Kumin requests here, the court

concludes that the requested hourly rate is reasonable.

Because Kumin worked a reasonable number of hours on this

case and his proposed hourly rate is reasonable, the court

concludes that the proposed attorney fees are reasonable.

II

Accordingly, the court GRANTS Jerry J’s petition for

compromise of Deja J’s claims and APPROVES the $10,000 settlement

agreement, $6,500 of which goes to Deja and $3,500 of which goes to

Matthew Kumin for attorney and filing fees. Once the $6,500

settlement payment has been distributed to Deja, the court ORDERS

Jerry J or Kumin to file documentation with the court indicating

that the money was deposited, as promised, into a “blocked account

for the minor’s benefit until she turns eighteen.” Doc #8 at 2.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

Case 3:05-cv-04788-VRW Document 17 Filed 08/11/06 Page 6 of 6