Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-02061/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-02061-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JULIO R. AYALA and MIRNA AYALA,

individually and as Administrators of the

Estate of Julio A. Ayala,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

CITY OF SOUTH SAN FRANCISCO,

SOUTH SAN FRANCISCO POLICE

DEPARTMENT, CHIEF MARK

RAFFAELLI, OFFICER MIKE KUCHAC,

OFFICER JANELLE PEREZ, CORPORAL

BRUCE McPHILLIPS, OFFICER DAVID

BERRY, CORPORAL DANNY GIL,

OFFICER MELINDA LOPEZ, CORPORAL

KEN CHETCUTI, SERGEANT RON

CARLINO, CORPORAL DAVE KENNAN,

OFFICER CHRIS DEVAN, OFFICER MATT

McNICHOL, OFFICER ADAM PLANK,

OFFICER ROBBY CHON, and DOES 1 to 50,

inclusive,

Defendants. /

No. C 06-02061 WHA

ORDER GRANTING IN PART

AND DENYING IN PART

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS; DENYING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR A

MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT;

AND VACATING HEARING

INTRODUCTION

In this civil-rights action against the City of South San Francisco and numerous officers

in its police department, the parents of Julio A. Ayala seek relief for violations stemming from

the alleged beating death of their son. Defendants now move to dismiss certain claims under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and move for a more definite statement Federal Civil

Case 3:06-cv-02061-WHA Document 48 Filed 08/28/06 Page 1 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 The other defendants include the City of South San Francisco, the South San Francisco Police

Department and the Chief of the South San Francisco Police Department, Mark Raffaelli. Defendants argue that

the South San Francisco Police Department is not properly a separate defendant from the city, a point that

plaintiffs apparently concede. This order thus treats plaintiffs as having named only the City of South San

Francisco, not its police department.

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Procedure 12(e). While some of plaintiffs’ claims are improperly framed, plaintiffs may go

forward on their claims to vindicate the Fourth Amendment rights of their son, on their claims

to vindicate their own rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, and on their common-law tort

claims. Plaintiffs need not add any further detail to their complaint to go forward on these

claims. Accordingly, defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part, and

their motion for a more definite statement is denied.

STATEMENT

The following facts are drawn from plaintiffs’ complaint and are viewed in the light

most favorable to plaintiffs for purposes of these motions.

Plaintiffs Julio R. Ayala and Mirna Ayala were the parents of decedent Julio A. Ayala

and the administrator of their son’s estate. On April 3, 2005, the younger Ayala was in a hotel

room he had rented in the City of South San Francisco, California. Plaintiffs alleged that a

group of officers from the South San Francisco Police Department entered the hotel room

without probable cause or exigent circumstances, according to the complaint. These officers

included defendants Mike Kuchac, Janelle Perez, Bruce McPhillips, David Berry, Danny Gil,

Melinda Lopez, Ken Chetcuti, Ron Carlino, Dave Kennan, Chris Devan, Matt McNichol, Adam

Plank, and Robby Chon.1

After entering the hotel room, these officers purportedly subjected Julio A. Ayala to

“unnecessary blows, kicks, bending of his legs, arching of his body, the application of full body

weight by the officer-defendants on his back, legs, ankles and body, and other acts of violence

while decedent lay helplessly handcuffed on his stomach gasping for air” (Compl. ¶ 18). 

Decedent was then allegedly placed in a choke hold by Officer Keenan and Sergeant Carlino. 

This choke hold purportedly caused injuries to decedent’s neck, larynx, and thyroid. Decedent

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 A “body wrap” is a police tool apparently consisting of a shoulder harness, a binding for the ankles,

and a blanket with straps that encircles and restrains the legs. The harness and the ankle strap attach to loops on

the blanket with carabiners, which helps to keep captives from moving.

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 Defendants initially moved to strike plaintiffs’ request for punitive damages but dropped this request

on reply after recognizing that punitive damages may be appropriate against individual officers.

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Ayala was then placed in a body wrap.2 Plaintiffs further alleged that none of the officer

defendants rendered medical aid or summoned medical assistance in a timely fashion. Julio A.

Ayala was declared dead by paramedics in the hotel room.

Decedent’s parents commenced this action on March 6, 2006. In their complaint, the

Ayalas listed three federal claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. First, plaintiffs claimed that the

officer defendants violated decedent’s Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force, and

violated the parents’ Fourteenth Amendment rights “to be free from unwarranted state

interference in their familial relationship with JULIO A. AYALA” (Compl. ¶¶ 27–28). Second,

plaintiffs claimed that the City of South San Francisco violated the Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights of decedent and of “Latinos, African-Americans and members of other

minority groups” by engaging in a practice of using excessive force (id. at ¶ 35). Third,

plaintiffs claimed that the city, Chief of Police Raffaelli, and Sergeant Carlino were liable for

violations of decedent’s and other minorities’ Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights on a

theory that these defendants failed to adequately supervise the city’s officers. Despite the fact

these latter two claims refer to the rights minorities generally, plaintiffs’ complaint contains no

class-action allegations and these allegations do not purport to render this a representative

action.

In addition, plaintiffs listed four state-law claims in their complaint. They claimed that

all defendants were liable for wrongful death, a survival action, and negligence. Finally, they

claimed the city and Chief of Police Raffaelli were liable under a theory of negligent hiring,

supervision, and retention. Plaintiffs requested damages including punitive damages as to the

individual defendants.3

ANALYSIS

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For the Northern District of California

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 Defendants initially argued that plaintiffs improperly pled their claim for familial rights under the

Fourteenth Amendment, but dropped that argument on reply.

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Defendants raise four arguments in support of dismissal under FRCP 12(b)(6). First,

defendants argue that plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claims unrelated to the parents rights to

be free from familial interference must be dismissed, as they are controlled by the more specific

Fourth Amendment principles.4 Second, defendants argue that plaintiffs lack standing to assert

injuries on behalf of various minority groups. Third, defendants contend that plaintiffs failed to

adequately plead a claim for supervisory liability under Section 1983. Fourth, defendants argue

that plaintiffs’ state-law claims against the city failed to satisfy the higher pleadings standards

imposed by the California Torts Claims Act, California Government Code § 810 et. seq. 

Defendants also move for a more definite statement under FRCP 12(e).

1. MOTION TO DISMISS.

A motion to dismiss under FRCP 12(b)(6) tests for legal sufficiency of the claims

alleged in the complaint. A complaint should not be dismissed “unless it appears beyond doubt

that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to

relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957). On the other hand, “conclusory

allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for

failure to state a claim.” Epstein v. Wash. Energy Co., 83 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 1996).

A. Applicable Amendment to Claims of Excessive Force.

“Where a particular Amendment ‘provides an explicit textual source of constitutional

protection’ against a particular sort of government behavior, ‘that Amendment, not the more

generalized notion of substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing these claims.’” 

Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395

(1989)). “[A]ll claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force — deadly or

not — in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of a free citizen should be

analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its ‘reasonableness’ standard, rather than under a

‘substantive due process’ approach.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 (emphasis in original).

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This rule is controlling here. Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claims for excessive force under

the Fourteenth Amendment must be dismissed. Going forward, plaintiffs claims of excessive

force must be analyzed exclusively under the Fourth Amendment.

B. Group Injuries.

Defendants argue that plaintiffs lack standing to assert claims on behalf of various

minority groups that were purportedly impacted by the South San Francisco Police

Department’s use of excessive force against these groups. Defendants note that in the context

of a civil-rights action, a plaintiff cannot ordinarily seek to assert the rights of third parties. 

Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44, 46 (1943). Defendants misconstrue the nature of plaintiffs’

complaint.

Plaintiffs have not made any class-action allegations. Nor is their complaint framed as

representative of all minorities’ rights. The only suggestion of a representative action is the

allegation that the city and its police department “use violence against individuals being

detained, specifically Latinos, African-Americans and members of other minority groups”

(Compl. ¶ 35). These allegations simply appear to provide support for plaintiffs’ claims that

there was a pattern and practice of abuse by the South San Francisco Police Department. 

Evidence of a pattern of excessive force by the police department, particularly exacted against

racial minorities, will be pertinent to plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claims. Allegations of a pattern

and practice are the very type of allegations required to impose municipal liability under

Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Of course,

trustees’ claims may go forward to the extent they are seeking to vindicate the individual rights

of a decedent, as they are here. See, e.g., Estate of Amos v. City of Page, 257 F.3d 1086, 1094

(9th Cir. 2001).

C. Supervisory Liability.

Defendants also argue that plaintiffs’ supervisory-liability claim against the city, Chief

Raffaelli, and Sergeant Carlino must be dismissed because plaintiff failed to make sufficient

allegations of inadequate training. This argument lacks merit.

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It is well-established that “a city can be liable under § 1983 for inadequate training of its

employees.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989); see also Hudson v. Michigan,

126 S. Ct. 2159, 2168 (June 15, 2006) (“modern police forces are staffed with professionals; it

is not credible to assert that internal discipline, which can limit successful careers, will not have

a deterrent effect”). Likewise, “[s]upervisory liability is imposed against a supervisory official

in his individual capacity for his ‘own culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or

control of his subordinates.’” Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir. 1991)

(internal citation omitted).

At this point, plaintiffs need only have pleaded their Canton claim by “a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 8(a). 

They have done so. They have made allegations of purportedly reprehensible actions by a

group of officers in the South San Francisco Police Department. They have alleged that the

city, Chief Raffaelli, and Sergeant Carlino were responsible for training and supervising these

officers and that they failed to do so. These allegations are sufficient to survive dismissal at this

juncture.

D. State-Law Claims.

Finally, defendants argue that the plaintiff’s state-law claims, as alleged against the city,

must be dismissed because they were not pled with the requisite particularity under the

California Tort Claims Act. This order finds defendants’ argument untenable.

The scope of municipal liability for common-law torts under California laws is

controlled by two code sections. First, California Government Code § 815.2(a) provides:

A public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or

omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of

his employment if the act or omission would, apart from this

section, have given rise to a cause of action against that employee

or his personal representative.

Second, California Government Code § 820(a) provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by

statute . . . a public employee is liable for injury caused by his act or omission to the same

extent as a private person.” Accordingly, the California Court of Appeal has explained that this

statutory framework establishes two principles:

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(1) unless they are granted specific statutory immunity, a public

entity and its employees are liable in tort for the same causes of

action that could be brought against a private person; and (2) 

absent a statute specifically imposing liability, a public entity and

its employees are not liable for causes of action in tort that could

not be pursued against a private party.

Lueter v. California, 94 Cal. App. 4th 1285, 1300 (2002).

Defendants argue that under California law, a heightened pleading standard applies to

claims against a municipality for liability resulting from the conduct of its employees. Under

California law “[e]very fact essential to the existence of statutory liability must be pleaded.” 

Susman v. City of Los Angeles, 269 Cal. App. 2d 803, 809 (1969). Furthermore, “the plaintiff

must plead facts sufficient to show his cause of action lies outside the breadth of any applicable

statutory immunity.” Keyes v. Santa Clara Valley Water District, 128 Cal. App. 3d 882, 886

(1982).

This heightened pleading standard, however, is inapplicable to claims brought in federal

court. “The manner and details of pleading in the federal courts are governed by the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure regardless of the source of substantive law to be applied in the

particular action.” WRIGHT AND MILLER, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1203 (3d ed.

2004) (emphasis added). Accordingly, plaintiffs here only needed to plead their state-law

claims against the city with “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief” as required by FRCP 8(a). See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965).

Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that the individual officers acted in a potentially

tortious manner, and have likewise sufficiently alleged that the city was responsible for these

officers but potentially failed to train the officers properly. Plaintiffs’ allegations are sufficient

at this juncture.

2. MOTION FOR MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT.

Under FRCP 12(e), “[i]f a pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted is so

vague or ambiguous that party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading the

party may move for a more definite statement before interposing a responsive pleading.” This

rule must be read in light of FRCP 8(a). Given the limited pleading requirements under that

rule, it has been noted that “[m]otions for a more definite statement are viewed with disfavor,

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For the Northern District of California

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and are rarely granted.” Cellars v. Pac. Coast Packaging, Inc., 189 F.R.D. 575, 578 (N.D. Cal.

1999).

Plaintiffs have sufficiently put defendants on notice as to the incident and individuals

involved in this action. Plaintiffs have also sufficiently identified the claims against which the

city and its officers will have to mount a defense. At this juncture, nothing more is required.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART AND

DENIED IN PART. Defendants’ motion for a more definite statement is DENIED. Finding no

further argument necessary, the hearing on this motion is hereby VACATED.

As the Court stated at the case management conference, this action will go to trial on

September 17, 2007, unless summary judgment intervenes. The Court is concerned that counsel

are preoccupied with motion practice and are not diligently pursuing discovery. Note well

again that trial continuances are rarely granted by the Court. Counsel should be working on

discovery at least as hard as they have been working on motion practice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 28, 2006. WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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