Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-02497/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-02497-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

DAVID PICKUP, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

EDMUND G. BROWN JR., Governor of 

the State of California, in his official 

capacity, et al., 

Defendants, 

___________________________________ 

and EQUALITY CALIFORNIA, 

 Intervenor-Defendant. 

No. 2:12-cv-02497-KJM-EFB 

ORDER 

This matter is before the court on defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ first 

amended complaint. Mot., ECF No. 129. Equality California (EQCA) joined the motion. ECF 

No. 130. Plaintiffs oppose, Opp’n, ECF No. 131, and defendants have replied, Reply, ECF No. 

132. The matter was submitted as provided by Local Rule 230(g). As explained below, the court 

GRANTS defendants’ motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) without 

leave to amend. 

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I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

Plaintiffs filed the original complaint and a motion for a preliminary injunction on 

October 4, 2012, seeking to enjoin Senate Bill 1172 (SB 1172), enacted as California Business 

and Professions Code §§ 865, 865.1 and 865.2. Compl., ECF No. 1; Mot. for Prelim. Inj., ECF 

No. 3. SB 1172 prohibits licensed mental health professionals1 in California from engaging in 

“sexual orientation change efforts” (SOCE) with persons under the age of eighteen. Order 

Granting Mot. to Dismiss at 3. SOCE includes aversion and nonaversion treatment intended to 

“change gay men’s and lesbians’ thought patterns by reframing desires, redirecting thoughts, or 

using hypnosis, with the goal of changing sexual arousal, behavior, and orientation.” ECF 

No. 123 (citations omitted). The court denied plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction, 

because plaintiffs had not established a likelihood of success on the merits of any claim. See 

Order Denying Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 80. The court also granted EQCA’s request to intervene. 

ECF No. 81. 

Plaintiffs appealed. ECF No. 89. The Ninth Circuit affirmed this court’s decision 

denying plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction in a decision consolidated with review of 

another case from this court. Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1236 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 

134 S. Ct. 2871 (2014), and cert. denied sub nom. Welch v. Brown, 134 S. Ct. 2881 (2014). 

Confirming the application of rational basis review, the Ninth Circuit held that SB 1172 did not 

“violate the free speech rights of SOCE practitioners or minor patients, is neither vague nor 

overbroad, and does not violate parents’ fundamental rights.” Id. 

Following the Ninth Circuit’s decision, this court granted defendants’ first motion 

to dismiss, which also was joined by EQCA. ECF Nos. 112, 113, 123. The court granted 

plaintiffs leave to amend as to their as-applied challenges under claim one, violation of plaintiffs’ 

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 A mental health professional is defined as a physician and surgeon specializing in the 

practice of psychiatry, a psychologist, a psychological assistant, intern, or trainee, a licensed 

marriage and family therapist, a registered marriage and family therapist, intern, or trainee, a 

licensed educational psychologist, a credentialed school psychologist, a licensed clinical social 

worker, an associate clinical social worker, a licensed professional clinical counselor, a registered 

clinical counselor, intern, or trainee, or any other person designated as a mental health 

professional under California law or regulation. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 865(a). 

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First Amendment right to free speech and plaintiff minors’ right to receive information, and claim 

three, plaintiff parents’ and minors’ First Amendment right to free exercise of religion. Order 

Granting Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 123. 

Plaintiffs filed the first amended complaint on October 28, 2015. First Am. 

Compl. (FAC), ECF No. 126. Defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss on November 25, 

2015. 

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

The court previously has reviewed the factual background of this case in detail in 

past orders. The Ninth Circuit’s opinion affirming the denial of a preliminary injunction also 

reviews the facts. See ECF Nos. 80, 100, 123. The court briefly reviews the facts as pled in the 

amended complaint and relevant to the instant motion. 

The first amended complaint alleges that SB 1172 violates plaintiffs’ rights to free 

speech and free exercise of religion under the First Amendment. Specifically, plaintiffs allege 

defendant Governor Brown signed SB 1172 into law on September 29, 2012. FAC ¶ 19. The 

Governor responsible for executing California law, and is directly responsible for appointing, 

directing and supervising his cabinet secretaries. FAC ¶ 16. 

With respect to the free speech claim, plaintiffs allege SB 1172 is 

unconstitutionally vague and does not survive strict scrutiny or even rational basis review. FAC 

¶¶ 197–209. Under the second claim of right to free exercise of religion, plaintiffs allege SB 

1172 places a substantial burden on plaintiffs’ religious beliefs and does not survive strict 

scrutiny review. FAC ¶¶ 212–227. Specifically, defendants’ application of SB 1172 has a 

chilling effect on plaintiff Pickup’s counseling in California, FAC ¶ 93, and as applied and 

enforced, SB 1172 prohibits plaintiffs, from exercising their religious beliefs to help others by 

making SOCE counseling illegal. See, e.g., FAC ¶¶ 93, 114, 134, 146, 158, 172. 

Plaintiffs further allege they requested clarification from the California Board of 

Behavior Sciences (BBS), a division of defendant Secretary Cabellero’s Business, Consumer 

Affairs, and Housing Agency, regarding the specific application and enforcement of SB 1172. 

FAC ¶ 174. Specifically, plaintiffs allege they wrote to inquire how they can “provide such 

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acceptance and support to clients who come to us with a desire to reduce their unwanted same-sex 

attractions and increase opposite-sex attractions when we are at the same time being required by 

law to tell them we cannot assist them in their goals?” FAC ¶ 176. In its response letter, BBS 

stated, in relevant part, that SB 1172 “prohibits a California mental health provider from engaging 

in sexual orientation change efforts with any patient under the age of 18 years old.” FAC, Ex. C, 

ECF No. 126-3 at 2. The letter further stated that courts have “upheld the provisions of [SB] 

1172. Therefore, the law is now in effect and applicable to all California mental health 

providers.” Id.

III. LEGAL STANDARD 

A complaint need contain only a “short and plain statement of the claim showing 

that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), not “detailed factual allegations,” 

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). But this rule demands more than 

unadorned accusations; “sufficient factual matter” must make the claim at least plausible. 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Conclusory or formulaic recitations of a claim’s 

elements do not alone suffice. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 

A party may thus move to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief 

can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The motion may be granted only if the complaint lacks 

a “cognizable legal theory” or if its factual allegations do not support a cognizable legal theory. 

Hartmann v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1122 (9th Cir. 2013). In making this 

context-specific evaluation, this court “must presume all factual allegations of the complaint to be 

true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Usher v. City of 

Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). This rule does not apply to “‘a legal conclusion 

couched as a factual allegation,’” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986) quoted in

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, nor to “allegations that contradict matters properly subject to judicial 

notice” or to material attached to or incorporated by reference into the complaint. Sprewell v. 

Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988–89 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, leave to amend “shall be 

freely given when justice so requires,” bearing in mind “the underlying purpose of Rule 15 to 

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facilitate decision on the merits, rather than on the pleadings or technicalities.” Lopez v. Smith, 

203 F.3d 1122, 1127, 1140 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and alterations 

omitted). 

IV. DISCUSSION 

Defendants’ motion raises two issues: (1) whether defendant Governor Brown is 

immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment, and (2) whether plaintiffs have stated viable 

“as-applied” challenges seeking to vindicate their First Amendment free speech and free exercise 

rights. 

A. The Eleventh Amendment (All Claims) 

Defendants argue Governor Brown is immune from suit under the Eleventh 

Amendment, because the first amended complaint alleges insufficient facts to establish a specific 

and direct connection between the Governor and the enforcement of SB 1172. Mot. at 8. In other 

words, the case falls outside the exception to government official immunity established by 

Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). See Los Angeles Cty. Bar Ass’n v. Eu, 979 F.2d 697, 704 

(9th Cir. 1992) (“this connection must be fairly direct; a generalized duty to enforce state law or 

general supervisory power over the persons responsible for enforcing the challenged provision 

will not subject an official to suit.”). 

Plaintiffs argue Governor Brown is responsible for executing California law. 

Although plaintiffs rely heavily on Eu, Opp’n at 4–5, this case is distinguishable. In Eu, the 

Ninth Circuit found the defendant officials there not immune under the Eleventh Amendment, 

because they had specific connections to the challenged statute. 979 F.2d at 704. One official 

had a duty to appoint judges to any judicial positions newly created under the challenged statute, 

while the other had a duty to certify subsequent elections for those positions. Id. Here, in 

contrast, Governor Brown has a general overarching duty to execute California law. The first 

amended complaint is devoid of any factual allegations that Governor Brown has a specific duty 

to enforce or implement SB 1172 in particular. See Assoc. des Eleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du 

Quebec v. Harris, 729 F.3d 937, 943 (9th Cir. 2013) (Eleventh Amendment immunity applies to 

Governor where his only connection to statute at issue was general duty to enforce California 

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law); Bolbol v. Brown, 120 F. Supp. 3d 1010, 1019 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (Eleventh Amendment bars 

plaintiffs’ claims against Attorney General because his general duty to enforce California law is 

insufficient to invoke Ex parte Young). 

Plaintiffs’ other allegation, that Governor Brown is directly responsible for 

appointing, directing and supervising his cabinet secretaries including Secretary Caballero, who 

interprets, applies, and enforces SB 1172, is similarly insufficient. Governor Brown has a general 

duty to appoint, direct, and supervise all of his cabinet secretaries. Plaintiffs present no factual 

allegations that show Governor Brown’s general duty rises to the level of direct enforcement or 

supervision. See, e.g., Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, Inc. v. Davis, 307 F.3d 835, 846–47 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(suit barred against Governor and state Secretary of Resources, because they did not have 

requisite connection to Proposition 4 banning the use of certain traps and poisons to capture or 

kill wildlife in California; however, the court held Eleventh Amendment did not bar suit against 

Director of California Department of Fish and Game, who has direct authority over and principal 

responsibility for enforcing Proposition 4); cf. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action v. Brown, 

674 F.3d 1128, 1132–35 (9th Cir. 2012) (affirming denial of Eleventh Amendment immunity to 

President of University of California because he had fairly direct connection to enforcement of 

challenged statute in that as President he is “duty-bound” to enforce statute as oppose to simply 

implementing it . . .“the buck stops with” him). 

Accordingly, the court GRANTS the motion as to defendant Governor Brown. 

B. Free Speech and Free Exercise (As-Applied) 

The court next looks at whether plaintiffs have stated an as-applied challenge 

under their free speech and free exercise claims, the sole claims advanced in the first amended 

complaint. After granting defendants’ previous motion to dismiss because plaintiffs provided 

insufficient factual allegations to state a claim, the court allowed plaintiffs to amend the “asapplied” challenges based on plaintiffs’ free speech and free exercise claims to include additional 

factual allegations. The court is unpersuaded that the factual allegations in the first amended 

complaint are sufficient to state a claim. 

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Defendants argue plaintiffs have not pled an “as-applied” challenge under the free 

speech or free exercise clauses of the First Amendment, because the first amended complaint 

“contains no allegations that SB 1172 has been applied or enforced against plaintiffs at all, let 

alone in an impermissible or selective manner.” Mot. at 10. Defendants further argue that 

plaintiffs have not alleged any facts to show they intended to continue their practice, and thereby 

violate the statute. Id. Plaintiffs contend defendants’ argument ignores plaintiffs’ allegation that 

they wish to engage in certain practices that are prohibited by SB 1172. Plaintiffs also argue that 

“[a] professional need not engage in the prohibited practice and subject himself to the punishment 

of the challenged law for it to be considered applied against him.” Opp’n at 7. Plaintiffs argue 

their allegation further reveals defendants’ application of SB 1172 “displays hostility towards 

[p]laintiffs’ religious conviction.” Opp’n at 10. 

An as-applied First Amendment challenge contends that a given statute or 

regulation is unconstitutional as it has been applied to a plaintiff’s particular activity. Foti v. City 

of Menlo Park, 146 F.3d 629, 635 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Members of City Council v. Taxpayers 

for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 803 & n.22 (1984)); see also Legal Aid Servs. of Oregon v. Legal 

Servs. Corp., 608 F.3d 1084, 1096 (9th Cir. 2010). Here, plaintiffs provide no factual allegations 

to demonstrate SB 1172’s unconstitutionality as applied to their activities. In other words, 

plaintiffs have not pointed to any action by defendants and alleged that defendants applied SB 

1172 differently to plaintiffs than to others. See, e.g., Hoye v. City of Oakland, 653 F.3d 835, 852 

(9th Cir. 2011) (an enforcement policy is not neutral where the city’s policy of enforcement 

distinguishes between speech that facilitates access and speech that discourages access to clinics).

Simply alleging in conclusory fashion that defendants’ application of SB 1172 to plaintiffs is 

hostile is insufficient. Though plaintiffs allege that they sought clarification with respect to the 

scope of the statute from defendants but were ignored, unanswered requests for clarification do 

not amount to unequal enforcement, enforcement at all or differential application by defendants, 

especially in light of the Ninth Circuit’s decision on the scope and application of SB 1172. 

Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1223–24. Furthermore, defendants did respond to plaintiffs’ request, 

informing them that it would be unlawful to provide SOCE to children under eighteen years old. 

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Plaintiffs otherwise provide only broad allegations that echo the facial challenges 

rejected by the Ninth Circuit. See id at 1236 (SB 1172 did not “violate the free speech rights of 

SOCE practitioners or minor patients, is neither vague nor overbroad, and does not violate 

parents’ fundamental rights.”). 

The court previously has allowed plaintiffs leave to amend to include additional 

factual allegations in support of their “as-applied” challenges. Nothing before the court suggests 

plaintiffs could further amend to state a claim. Accordingly, defendants’ motion to dismiss is 

GRANTED without leave to amend. 

V. CONCLUSION 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. 

This order resolves ECF No. 129. CASE CLOSED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: August 8, 2016. 

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