Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00454/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00454-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

PROTECT LAKE PLEASANT, LLC, )

an Arizona limited liability )

company, et al., ) No. CIV 07-454 PHX RCB

)

Plaintiffs, ) O R D E R

)

vs. ) 

) 

ROBERT W. JOHNSON, in his )

official capacity as )

Commissioner, United States )

Bureau of Reclamation, et al.,)

)

Defendants. ) )

In this action for declaratory and injunctive relief,

Plaintiffs allege that the United States Bureau of Reclamation

("BOR"), by authorizing Maricopa County (the "County") to proceed

with the development and construction of the proposed Scorpion Bay

Marina & Yacht Club ("Scorpion Bay Marina") at Lake Pleasant

Regional Park ("LPRP"), violated the Federal Property and

Administrative Services Act ("FPASA"), 40 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq.,

the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321

et seq., and the Clean Air Act ("CAA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 et seq.

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1

 Intervention may also be permitted when a federal statute

confers a conditional or unconditional right to intervene on the

party seeking intervention. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(1) (statutory

intervention of right), 24(b)(1) (statutory permissive intervention).

However, Marina Partners does not cite to, nor is the Court aware of,

any federal statutory authority that would require or allow the Court

to permit Marina Partners' intervention in this matter.

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Am. Compl. (doc. # 4) ¶¶ 57-117. Plaintiffs have filed a motion

for preliminary injunction (doc. # 12) seeking to enjoin BOR from

issuing a Finding of No Significant Impact ("FONSI") that would

authorize the County's construction of Scorpion Bay Marina until

such time as BOR has complied with its obligations under NEPA. 

That motion has been set for hearing on May 8, 2007. (doc. # 17). 

Currently before the Court is a motion to intervene (doc. 

# 15) filed on March 8, 2007 by Lake Pleasant Marina Partners, LLC

("Marina Partners"), the awardee of the County's contract for the

development and operation of the proposed Scorpion Bay Marina. The

matter has been fully briefed. See Resp. (doc. # 16); Reply (doc.

# 20). Having carefully considered the arguments raised, the Court

now rules.

I. DISCUSSION

Marina Partners has moved to intervene as a defendant in this

matter pursuant to Rule 24(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, or, in the alternative, pursuant to Rule 24(b). Mot.

(doc. # 15) at 1-2.1

A. Intervention of Right

To intervene as a matter of right, an applicant must satisfy

the following four part test:

(1) the motion must be timely; (2) the

applicant must assert a "significantly

protectable" interest relating to property or a

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transaction that is the subject matter of

litigation; (3) the applicant must be situated

so that disposition of [the] action may as a

practical matter impair or impede the interest;

and (4) the applicant's interest must be

inadequately represented by the parties.

Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, 313 F.3d 1094, 1107-08 (9th

Cir. 2002) (citing Wetlands Action Network v. United States Army

Corps of Eng'rs, 222 F.3d 1105, 1113-14 (9th Cir. 2000)); Fed. R.

Civ. P. 24(a)(2).

Under Ninth Circuit law, private intervenor-defendants in NEPA

actions generally "may not intervene as of right pursuant to Rule

24(a)," on the rationale that "the federal government is the only

proper defendant in an action to compel compliance with NEPA," and

"on the premise that private parties do not have a significant

protectable interest in NEPA compliance actions." Kootenai Tribe

of Idaho, 313 F.3d at 1108 (internal quotations and citation

omitted); see also id. at 1126 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring in part)

(concurring with the majority's rejection of the private

intervenor-defendants' intervention of right under Rule 24(a)).

Both Plaintiffs and Marina Partners misconstrue the Ninth

Circuit's rationale for denying Rule 24(a) intervention in Wetlands

Action Network as relying on the adequacy of the government's

representation in NEPA actions. See Resp. (doc. # 16) at 2-3;

Reply (doc. # 20) at 3-4. However, in denying intervention of

right in both Wetlands Action Network and Kootenai Tribe, the Ninth

Circuit has unambiguously held that private parties do not have a

significant protectable interest to intervene as defendants in NEPA

actions. See Kootenai Tribe of Idaho, 313 F.3d at 1108 (quoting

Wetlands Action Network, 222 F.3d at 1114).

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2

 Marina Partners characterizes Count Four as a due process

claim, Reply (doc. # 20) at 1-2, 4-5, ostensibly because the words

"due process" appear in the complaint, see Am. Compl. (doc. # 4) ¶

115. However, it is clear that Count Four raises a NEPA claim

relating to BOR's alleged failure to prepare a supplement after there

had been changes to the information it had originally made available

for public review and comment. Id. ¶¶ 114-17. Therefore, under

Kootenai Tribe, Marina Partners' intervention of right fails with

respect to Count Four as it does with respect to Count Two, because

both are NEPA claims.

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Marina Partners contends that the aforementioned authorities,

dealing only with NEPA claims, do not require the rejection of

their intervention of right with respect to Plaintiffs' other

claims. Reply (doc. # 20) at 1-5. The Court disagrees. As the

Ninth Circuit explained in Kootenai Tribe, private parties may not

intervene as defendants in NEPA actions under Rule 24(a), "'because

NEPA requires action only by the government, [and] only the

government can be liable under NEPA.'" Kootenai Tribe of Idaho,

313 F.3d at 1108 (quoting Wetlands Action Network, 222 F.3d at

1114). In other words, "[b]ecause a private party can not violate

NEPA, it can not be a defendant in a NEPA compliance action,'" and,

therefore, does not have a significant protectable interest

required to intervene as a matter of right. Id. The Court finds

this rationale, which supports the rejection of Marina Partners'

intervention of right with respect to Plaintiffs' NEPA claims

(Counts Two and Four2), to be equally applicable to Plaintiffs'

FPASA and CAA claims (Counts One and Three).

In their FPASA claim, Plaintiffs allege that BOR violated

federal procurement laws, their implementing regulations, and BOR

policies by (1) failing to ensure that the County's 2005 Request

For Proposal ("RFP") complied with the same, and (2) approving the

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Proposed Use Management Agreement ("Proposed UMA") entered into

between the County and Marina Partners for the development of

Scorpion Bay Marina. Am. Compl. (doc. # 4) ¶¶ 57-84. Because

Marina Partners cannot be liable for BOR's alleged noncompliance

with federal procurement laws, it does not have a significant

protectable interest required for intervention of right as a

private defendant. See Kootenai Tribe of Idaho, 313 F.3d at 1108;

5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); 40 U.S.C. § 121(c); 41 C.F.R. § 105-71.136;

43 C.F.R. § 12.76.

Similarly, Plaintiffs' CAA claim, which alleges that BOR

failed to accurately and thoroughly quantify all emission sources

in its FONSI and Final Environmental Assessment, involves conduct

for which BOR, not Marina Partners, is liable. See Am. Compl.

(doc. # 4) ¶¶ 105-13; 42 U.S.C. § 7506(c)(1); 40 C.F.R. §§ 51.853,

93.153. Because Marina Partners, as a private party, is not a

proper defendant with respect to any of Plaintiffs' claims, it does

not have a significant protectable interest to warrant intervention

of right under Rule 24(a). See Kootenai Tribe of Idaho, 313 F.3d

at 1108. Therefore, its request for intervention pursuant to Rule

24(a) will be denied.

B. Permissive Intervention

A court may grant permissive intervention pursuant to Rule

24(b) when an applicant for intervention shows "(1) independent

grounds for jurisdiction; (2) the motion is timely; and (3) the

applicant's claim or defense, and the main action, have a question

of law or a question of fact in common." S. Cal. Edison Co. v.

Lynch, 307 F.3d 794, 803 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotations and

citation omitted); Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(2). Even when these

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requirements are met, the court has discretion to deny permissive

intervention. S. Cal. Edison Co., 307 F.3d at 803. In exercising

its discretion, the court must consider "whether the intervention

will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of

the original parties." Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(2).

In the present case, there is no dispute as to the timeliness

of Marina Partners' motion. However, the arguments raised and the

circumstances of this case demand closer inquiry into (1) the

existence of independent grounds for jurisdiction over Marina

Partners' proposed intervention, and (2) the commonality

requirement for permissive intervention.

1. Standing

Plaintiffs argue that Marina Partners cannot intervene in this

matter, because it lacks standing. Resp. (doc. # 16) at 3. 

Article III standing is a jurisdictional question, and the Ninth

Circuit has required applicants seeking to intervene as defendants

in NEPA actions to demonstrate their standing in order to establish

the "independent grounds for jurisdiction" required for Rule 24(b)

intervention. See Kootenai Tribe of Idaho, 313 F.3d at 1109. In

order to satisfy Article III's standing requirements, a party must

show that

(1) it has suffered an injury in fact that is

(a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual

and imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical;

(2) the injury is fairly traceable to the

challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it

is likely, as opposed to merely speculative,

that the injury will be redressed by a

favorable decision.

Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S.

167, 180-81 (2000) (internal quotation omitted). "Intervenors in

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environmental litigation satisfy the injury in fact requirement by

showing that group members have direct contact with the

environmental subject matter threatened by an adverse decision." 

Idaho Farm Bureau Fed'n v. Babbitt, 58 F.3d 1392, 1398 (9th Cir.

1995). In addition to these constitutional requirements, standing

to bring suit for judicial review of federal agency action under

the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 500 et seq., requires

a showing that the interest to be vindicated is arguably within the

"zone of interests" to be protected or regulated by the statute in

question. Cantrell v. City of Long Beach, 241 F.3d 674, 679 (9th

Cir. 2001). "[T]he relevant statute . . . is the statute whose

violation is the gravamen of the complaint." Lujan v. Nat'l

Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 886 (1990).

In support of its standing, Marina Partners describes the

nature of its anticipated injury as follows:

The impact and injury to BOR of granting the

Plaintiffs [sic] requested relief does not at

any level duplicate the effect such relief

would have on [Marina Partners]-- the business

that will depend on the proposed Scorpion Bay

Marina. The effects of the requested relief on

[Marina Partners] include lay-offs, significant

losses of business, impacts on existing

contracts, and threatens the very existence of

Lake Pleasant Marina itself.

Reply (doc. # 20) at 4; see also Mot. (doc. # 15) at 2

("Plaintiffs' requested relief will impair or impede [Marina

Partners'] ability to protect its interest in the Scorpion Bay

Facility . . . ."). The Court is satisfied that Marina Partners

has sufficiently demonstrated its standing to intervene as a

defendant in this matter. As the awardee under the County's RFP

process for the development and operation of the proposed Scorpion

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Bay Marina, Marina Partners has established an injury in fact by

virtue of its direct contact with LPRP. See Idaho Farm Bureau

Fed'n, 58 F.3d at 1398. It is beyond reasonable dispute that the

economic injury to Marina Partners contemplated by Plaintiffs'

requested injunctive relief is concrete and imminent, that it is

fairly traceable to the challenged BOR action in this case, and

that the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision

in this action.

Moreover, for purposes of Plaintiff's NEPA, CAA, and FPASA

claims, the Court is satisfied that Marina Partners' economic

interest in the development and operation of the proposed Scorpion

Bay Marina qualifies as a legal interest within the zone of

interests to be regulated or protected by those statutes. See,

e.g., Pac. Northwest Generating Coop. v. Brown, 38 F.3d 1058, 1065-

66 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that plaintiffs, purchasers of hydropower, had standing to sue under the Endangered Species Act to

challenge flow restrictions imposed to protect salmon, which

resulted in higher power costs to plaintiffs); Cent. Ariz. Water

Conservation Dist. v. EPA, 990 F.2d 1531, 1537-38 (9th Cir. 1993)

(finding that water district had standing to challenge EPA

regulation under the Clean Air Act requiring installation of

emission controls that would cost $430 million initially and $89.6

million annually thereafter). Accordingly, the Court finds that

Marina Partners has standing to intervene, and that there exist

independent grounds for jurisdiction over its proposed intervention

under Rule 24(b).

2. Commonality Requirement

An applicant seeking permissive intervention must show that

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its "claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or

fact in common." Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(2). Marina Partners

contends that, as an intervenor, it "need not directly assert a

'claim or defense' in the classical sense of the term" to satisfy

this commonality requirement. Reply (doc. # 20) at 8. Plaintiffs

have not raised any argument on this point, because they have

erroneously assumed that Marina Partners did not seek permissive

intervention under Rule 24(b)(2). See Resp. (doc. # 16) at 3. The

Court, on its own review, concludes that Marina Partners' defenses

raise legal and factual questions common to the main action.

Rule 24(b)(2) "'does not specify any particular interest that

will suffice for permissive intervention,'" and "'it plainly

dispenses with any requirement that the intervenor shall have a

direct personal or pecuniary interest in the subject of the

litigation.'" Kootenai Tribe of Idaho, 313 F.3d at 1108 (quoting

7C Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1911,

357-63 (2d ed. 1986)). In Kootenai Tribe, the Ninth Circuit held

that private intervenor-defendants in a NEPA action satisfied the

literal requirements of Rule 24(b)'s commonality standard by

"assert[ing] defenses of the [challenged agency action] directly

responsive to the claims of injunction asserted by plaintiffs." 

Id. at 1110. The court acknowledged that the intervenor-defendants

had not demonstrated a significant protectable interest warranting

intervention of right under Wetlands Action Network, but emphasized

that the Rule 24(a) issue "does not control application of Rule

24(b)." Id.

Although it is not required to do so under Rule 24(b), Marina

Partners has shown a direct personal and pecuniary interest in the

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proposed Scorpion Bay Marina at LPRP that is the subject of this

litigation. As discussed above at Part I.A, supra, this is not a

significant protectable interest warranting intervention of right

under Rule 24(a), but that argument does not control the outcome

under Rule 24(b). See id. at 1109-10. Like the intervenordefendants in Kootenai-Tribe, Marina Partners "seeks to squarely

address the relief sought by Plaintiffs in their Complaint and

request for Preliminary Injunction," because "[t]he issues of law

and fact presented are of great interest to Lake Pleasant Marina." 

Reply (doc. # 20) at 7-8. While the Kootenai-Tribe intervenordefendants had asserted environmental injury, see Kootenai-Tribe of

Idaho, 313 F.3d at 1110-11, the economic injury faced by Marina

Partners is also a sufficient interest to confer standing under the

environmental and federal procurement statutes at issue in this

case. In sum, the Court finds that Marina Partners' asserted

defenses raise legal and factual questions common to the main

action. See Answer (doc. # 14); Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(2).

Finally, in exercising its discretion, the Court considers

whether Marina Partners' "intervention will unduly delay or

prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties." 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(2). Marina Partners has agreed to be bound

by the same deadlines and briefing schedules as the original

parties, and so the Court finds that its intervention will not

occasion any undue delay or prejudice in the resolution of this

matter. Because Marina Partners has timely moved for intervention,

established independent grounds for jurisdiction, and asserted

defenses sharing legal and factual issues common to the main

action, its request for intervention under Rule 24(b) will be

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granted.

II. CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing analysis,

IT IS ORDERED that Lake Pleasant Marina Partners, LLC's motion

to intervene (doc. # 15) is GRANTED. Pursuant to Rule 24(b)(2) of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Lake Pleasant Marina

Partners, LLC is permitted to intervene as a defendant in this

matter.

DATED this 13th day of April, 2007.

Copies to counsel of record

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