Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01503/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01503-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HARON ONTIVEROS,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 09cv1503-JAH (CAB)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION

GRANTING RESPONDENT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS

[Doc. No. 10]

vs.

MATTHEW CATE, Secretary

Defendant.

I. INTRODUCTION

Haron Ontiveros (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (“the Petition”). Respondent Matthew Cate (“Respondent”) moves

to dismiss the Petition as barred by the applicable statute of limitations. For the reasons that

follow, the undersigned Magistrate Judge recommends that Respondent’s motion be GRANTED

and the Petition be dismissed with prejudice. 

II. FACTS

Following a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder and conspiracy to

commit murder. (Cal. Penal Code § 187(a)(1); 187, 487 (a).) (Lodgment No. 3 at 1.) The jury

also found true the special circumstance allegations that the murder was committed for financial

gain and while lying in wait. (Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a)(1), 190.2(a)(15).) (Id.) On April 2,

2004, Petitioner was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for the murder

conviction, plus a concurrent term of 25 years to life for the conspiracy conviction. (Id.)

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Respondent’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Dismiss

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. No. 10-1) represents that the California Supreme Court

denied his petition on September 12, 2006. Thus, Respondent incorrectly argued that the conviction

became final on December 12, 2006. 

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Petitioner timely appealed his conviction to the California Court of Appeal. (Lodgment 

No. 1.) On June 23, 2006, the court of appeal affirmed the judgment in an unpublished opinion. 

(Lodgment No. 3.) On July 31, 2006, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the California

Supreme Court. (Lodgment No. 4.) The court denied review on September 13, 2006.1

 (Lodgment

No. 5.) Petitioner did not file a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme

Court. (Pet. at 3.)

Petitioner then initiated habeas corpus review in the California courts. First, Petitioner

filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the state Superior Court on August 14, 2008. 

(Lodgment No. 6 at 2.) Petitioner alleged that: (1) his conviction was obtained as the result of a

police investigation conducted in violation of his right to counsel; (2) questioning continued after

Petitioner stated he wished to consult with a lawyer; (3) appellate counsel was ineffective for

failing to notify Petitioner that his petition for review was denied by the California Supreme Court;

(4) trial counsel was of ineffective assistance because his attorney failed to conduct a reasonable

pre-trial investigation and failed to argue dismissal of unfair and prejudicial evidence because of

counsel’s failure to investigate forensic and DNA evidence that would have exonerated Petitioner;

(5) the prosecution relied on illegally obtained evidence and thus made material misstatements of

fact; (6) there was insufficient evidence to support a guilty verdict; and (7) the jury was improperly

provided with additional instructions during deliberations. (Id.) On September 11, 2008, the

petition was denied on the merits. (Lodgment No. 6.) On November 3, 2008, Petitioner filed a

petition for writ of habeas corpus in the state appellate court, alleging the same grounds. 

(Lodgment No. 7.) The petition was denied November 25, 2008. (Lodgment No. 8.) On October

16, 2009, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court,

raising the same claims. (Lodgment No. 9.) The petition was denied June 10, 2009. (Lodgment

No. 10.)

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Respondent states that the petition was filed on July 10, 2009. Because Petitioner is

incarcerated and proceeding pro se, the mailbox rule applies. Under the mailbox rule, a pro se

prisoner’s filing of a federal habeas petition is deemed filed when the petition is delivered to prison

officials for mailing to the district court. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 271-72 (1988). 

3

Citations to page numbers refer to the page number assigned by the CM/ECF system.

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On July 2, 2009, Petitioner filed his federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this

Court.2 (Doc. No. 1 at 76.)3

III. DISCUSSION

The Petition is barred by the applicable statute of limitations of the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). The AEDPA applies to all § 2254 habeas corpus

petitions filed after April 24, 1996. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 268 (2000). Petitioner filed

his federal habeas Petition on July 2, 2009. Therefore the AEDPA statute of limitations applies. 

The statute provides:

(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus

by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period

shall run from the latest of--

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review

or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State

action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the

applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court

and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could

have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other

collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be

counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.

28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d). 

When a petitioner fails to seek writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court, the

AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations period begins to run ninety days from entry of the order

denying review in the state’s highest court—at the conclusion of the time allowed by the Supreme

Court for filing such a writ. Wixom v. Washington, 264 F.3d 894, 897 (9th Cir. 2001); Brown v.

Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999). Thus, Petitioner’s conviction became final so as to

commence running of the one-year limitations period for filing a federal habeas petition on

December 13, 2006. 

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The present Petition was filed July 2, 2009, thirty months after the statute of limitations

period began to run. Moreover, Petitioner is not entitled statutory tolling under 28 U.S.C. § 2244

(d)(2). Additionally, Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling. He also does not argue any

other grounds for tolling: that there were state impediments to his filing a petition in federal court;

that his claims depend on a new or recently recognized constitutional right; or that the factual

predicate of his claims was unknown before the limitations period expired. Therefore, his Petition

must be dismissed.

A. Statutory Tolling

Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling because he did not file a habeas petition in state

court prior to expiration of the federal limitations period. The statute of limitations may be tolled

for those periods of time during which a properly filed application for state post-conviction or

other collateral review, with respect to pertinent judgment or claim, is pending in the state court. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). The statute of limitations is not tolled, however, during the interval

between the date on which a judgment becomes final and the date on which a petitioner files his

first collateral challenge. Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999).

Here, Petitioner initiated his first round of habeas corpus petitions in state court on August

14, 2008. (Lodgment 6 at 2.) The one-year limitations period expired eight months before that

date. In order to receive any statutory tolling of the federal limitations period, Petitioner needed to

properly file for state habeas relief prior to December 13, 2007. See Jimenez v. Rice, 276 F.3d

478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001). Petitioner did not seek any post-conviction relief between December 13,

2006, and December 13, 2007, thus making him ineligible for any statutory tolling. 

B. Equitable Tolling

Petitioner has not shown that he is entitled to equitable tolling. The AEDPA’s statute of

limitations period may be subject to equitable tolling. Calderon v. United States Dist. Court

(“Beeler”), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997). Equitable tolling, however, is only available

where “extraordinary circumstances” beyond the prisoner’s control make a timely filing

impossible. Id. (citing Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1996)). 

Courts must “take seriously Congress’s desire to accelerate the federal habeas process” and “only

authorize extensions when this high hurdle is surmounted.” Id. at 1289. Thus, equitable tolling

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will not be available in most cases. Id. at 1288. To receive equitable tolling, Petitioner bears the

burden of establishing: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some

extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). 

Determining whether equitable tolling is warranted requires a ‘fact-specific inquiry.’ Spitsyn v.

Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Frye v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir.

2001). 

1. Diligence

Petitioner claims that he diligently looked into the status of his petition for review with the

California Supreme Court. (Petr.’s Opp. to Deft.’s Mot. to Dismiss at 16.) Petitioner, however,

did not write to the California Supreme Court to inquire about the status of his petition until July

29, 2008, well after the one year statute of limitations expired. (Pet., Ex. 4.) The record also

shows that Petitioner first wrote to his appellate attorney regarding the status of his appeal with

the California Supreme Court on November 4, 2007. (Pet., Ex. 2 at 61.) This inquiry was not

made until more than a year after his petition for review was filed. Petitioner’s next letter to his

appellate attorney is dated January 8, 2008. (Id. at 62.) This letter did not seek information about

his case, but rather requested that in light of the fact that his appellate counsel was no longer

involved in his case, he wanted his legal materials mailed to Ms. Martha De La Torres. (Id.) On

June 16, 2008, Petitioner sent his appellate attorney one more letter inquiring into the status of his

petition for review with the California Supreme Court. (Pet., Ex. 2 at 63.) Notably, there is a

sizeable gap—over seven months—between Petitioner’s first and last letter requesting information

about the status of his case. 

In addition to the letters Petitioner sent to his appellate counsel regarding the status of his

case, Petitioner claims that he also attempted to place collect calls to the attorney. (Petr.’s Opp. to

Deft.’s Mot. to Dismiss at 14.) Petitioner does not identify the dates he made calls, reference the 

number of times he attempted to call counsel, or the phone number he placed his calls to. 

Although Petitioner never spoke to appellate counsel, he claims that his daughter spoke with her

“several times” and was informed that patience was required. (Id. at 15.) Again, Petitioner does

not identify any dates for these phone calls and none of the letters included as exhibits refer to

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 these conversations. Lastly, Petitioner claims that his mother spoke to the attorney in January,

2007, and allegedly was told that his case was still in the courts. (Id.) The lack of specificity

regarding these alleged conversations does not persuade the Court that Petitioner exercised

reasonable diligence. 

These inquires do not demonstrate the diligence necessary to warrant equitable tolling. 

Petitioner was hardly diligent in his effort to stay apprised of the status of his petition for review

because he did not make any attempts to write his appellate attorney for more than a year after his

petition for review was filed. Furthermore, Petitioner states that he “was being very patient” with

his appellate attorney. Patience, however, is not the same as diligence. Significantly, the record

shows that Petitioner was not reasonably diligent in pursuing the status of his case with the

California Supreme Court. Petitioner offers no explanation for not writing the California Supreme

Court prior to July 29, 2008; especially since he had not heard from his attorney since she filed his

petition for review in July of 2006. 

2. Extraordinary Circumstances

Even assuming arguendo that Petitioner exercised the requisite diligence during the

relevant time period, Petitioner has not established the necessary extraordinary circumstances to

permit equitable tolling. Petitioner’s primary argument for equitable tolling is that neither his

appellate attorney, nor the California Supreme Court notified him when his petition for review was

denied. The petition was filed with the California Supreme Court on July 31, 2006, and denied

review September 13, 2006. Nothing in the record suggests that counsel or the California

Supreme Court prevented Petitioner from filing his federal habeas petition on time. Although

Petitioner’s counsel did not notify him when his petition for review was denied, this does not

constitute an extraordinary circumstance that justifies equitable tolling. 

The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly stated that “ordinary attorney negligence will not justify

equitable tolling.” See Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 800 (9th Cir. 2003). Even in cases where

counsel miscalculates the date for filing a petition for review, courts have not tolled the limitations

period. See Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336-337 (2007) (holding attorney miscalculation

does not warrant equitable tolling, “particularly in the postconviction context where prisoners have

no constitutional right to counsel”); see also Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir.

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2002); Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325, 329-331 (4th Cir. 2000). Moreover, the record in this

case indicates that Petitioner knew that Ms. Grove would “no longer be involved in [his] case”

after she filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court. (Pet., Ex. 2 at 62.) Finally,

there are no allegations of affirmative attorney misconduct. Petitioner’s allegations are limited to

Ms. Grove’s failure to communicate with him. Assuming counsel’s failure to communicate

constitutes negligence, it does not rise to the level of egregious attorney misconduct that might

entitle Petitioner to equitable tolling. 

Similarly, the Court is not persuaded that the California Supreme Court’s failure to notify

Petitioner that his petition for review was denied warrants equitable tolling. Although there are

instances where a state court’s failure to notify a litigant of its decision on a petition for review

will warrant equitable tolling, the facts of this case do not meet the necessary threshold. See

Woodward v. Williams, 263 F.3d 1135 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that lack of knowledge of state

court decision may provide basis for equitable tolling when prisoner acts diligently); Phillips v.

Donnelly, 216 F.3d 508, 511 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that when prisoner diligently seeks

information about the status of his case, the limitations period may be equitably tolled until he

receives notice of its denial); Knight v. Schofield, 292 F.3d 709, 711 (11th Cir. 2002). 

Here, Petitioner presents no evidence that he asked the California Supreme Court—before

the limitation period for filing his federal habeas petition had run—to directly provide him with

notice of the decision on his appeal. When Petitioner finally asked the California Supreme Court

to provide him with information about the status of his appeal, the court promptly responded. 

(Pet., Ex. 4 at 72-74.) Unfortunately, Petitioner waited until well after the limitations period

expired before he initiated any communication with the California Supreme Court. Furthermore, 

there is no evidence that the California Supreme Court assured Petitioner that he would be directly

notified as soon as a decision was made. See Knight, 292 F.3d at 711. Far from indicating

diligence, Petitioner merely mailed one letter to the California Supreme Court and that one letter

was not mailed until July 30, 2008—two years after his petition for review was initially filed. 

(Pet. Ex. 1.) Based on the facts of this case and the record before the Court, equitable tolling is not

warranted based on the California Supreme Court’s failure to notify Petitioner.

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Petitioner further argues that he was “hampered in the filing of his writ of habeas corpus”

due to his lack of [E]nglish proficiency and the fact that his prison law library does not provide

AEDPA rules and regulations in Spanish. (Petr.’s Opp. to Deft.’s Mot. to Dismiss at 8.) He also

claims that he did not have access to translation assistance until he received a bilingual cell-mate

in July, 2008. (Petr.’s Opp. to Deft.’s Mot. to Dismiss at 13.)

The record, however, shows that on November 4, 2007, Petitioner sent a letter to his

appellate attorney in English. (Pet., Ex. 2 at 61.) On January 1, 2008, Petitioner authored another

letter to his appellate attorney in English. (Id. at 62.) In this letter Petitioner specifically

acknowledges that following filing the request for review with the California Supreme Court, his

appellate attorney will “no longer be involved in [the] case.” (Id.) Additionally, on June 16, 2008,

Petitioner composed another letter to his appellate attorney. (Id. at 63.) The Court finds

Petitioner’s argument that he was unable to seek timely habeas relief due to his lack of proficiency

in English unpersuasive because Petitioner’s own evidence indicates that Petitioner was capable of

and did communicate in English. Moreover, all of the letters were dated prior to when Petitioner

claims he received a bilingual cell-mate. See Mendoza v. Carey, 449 F.3d 1065, 1070 (9th Cir.

2006) (reasoning “that a petitioner who demonstrates proficiency in English or who has the

assistance of a translator would be barred from equitable relief”) (citing Cobas v. Burgess, 306

F.3d 441, 444 (6th Cir. 2002)). The record does not support Petitioner’s argument that a language

barrier hampered him from communicating with the California Supreme Court prior to July 29,

2008, or filing a timely federal habeas petition. Accordingly, the Court finds that equitable tolling

is not warranted. 

For the reasons stated above, the Petition is untimely and must be dismissed. The Petition

is dismissed with prejudice. See Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 483 (9th Cir. 2001) (dismissal with

prejudice appropriate where the petition is barred by the AEDPA statute of limitations).

IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Having reviewed the matter, the undersigned Magistrate Judge recommends that

Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED and the Petition be dismissed with prejudice. 

This Report and Recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate Judge is submitted to the United

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 States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1). 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than May 3, 2010, any party to this action may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.” 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court

and served on all parties within 10 days of being served with the objections. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 2, 2010

CATHY ANN BENCIVENGO

United States Magistrate Judge

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