Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_12-cv-00972/USCOURTS-alnd-2_12-cv-00972-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1981 Job Discrimination (Race)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

JERMAINE WATSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

DEAN DAIRY HOLDINGS LLC,

Defendant.

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Case No.: 2:12-CV-972-RDP

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the court on Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 26). 

The matter has been fully briefed. (Docs. # 31 and 33). Plaintiff filed his Complaint initiating this

action on March 27, 2012. (Doc. # 1). Plaintiff alleges that he was discriminated against because

of his race (African-American) in terms of pay, overtime, scrutiny, and difficulty of tasks. In his

opposition to Defendant’s Motion, Plaintiff compares himself to two other Dean Dairy employees,

Matthew Hall (Caucasian) and Sergio Robles (Hispanic). (Doc. 16, ¶¶ 28, 30-53). Defendant denies

that Plaintiff was discriminated against, and in particular argues that Hall and Robles are not

appropriate comparators. (Doc. # 27).

I. Relevant Facts

Defendant operates a facility in Homewood, Alabama where milk is received and processed. 

(Doc. # 28-1 at p. 42; Doc. # 28-6 at pp. 15-21). During the relevant time period, Greg Blankenship 1

was the Plant Superintendent and Valerie Meyers was the Plant Manager. (Docs. # 28-9 and # 28-

10). Brian Ottwell, Tillman Miller, and Landon Bone, all white males, were supervisors who rotated

 When citing to depositions in the record, the court alternatively makes references either to the page number 1

of the docket entry (e.g., Doc. # 28-6 at 5-7) or the actual page number of the deposition (e.g., Doc. # 28-6 at pp. 15-21).

FILED

 2014 Mar-21 PM 12:42

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:12-cv-00972-RDP Document 34 Filed 03/21/14 Page 1 of 18
through the shifts and reported to Blankenship. (Doc. # 28-6 at pp. 28-29). Generally, Blankenship

was at the Homewood facility from 7:00 a.m. until 5:00 or 6:00 p.m., albeit mostly spending time

in his office. (Doc. # 28-6 at pp. 29-30, 169-70). 

Plaintiff was hired as a Receiver in 2006 and, after working in other positions, was again

reclassified as Receiver in 2008. (Doc. # 32-1 at 2; Doc. # 28-1 at 16-18, 21, 33-34, 72; Doc. # 28-3

at 23-35). As of July 2008, Plaintiff and Sergio Robles were both Receivers and each made $12.75

per hour. (Doc. # 28-3 at 23-35). 

Defendant had threeReceiver positions: (1)theMonday-Thursdaydayshift Receiver position

held by Plaintiff, (2) the night shift position (eventually held by Hall), and (3) the weekend position

(eventually held by Robles). (Doc. # 28-1 at pp. 53, 60-62, 65; Doc. # 28-8 at p. 64). During the

night shift, the Receiver would perform the same duties as the Receiver did on the other shifts,

including finishing the washing and cleaning of any tankers that were not cleaned on the shift before. 

(Doc. # 28-6 at pp. 24-26). However, in addition to those duties, the night shift Receiver would also

perform clean-in-place (“CIP”) and sanitation on the raw side of the plant, as therewas no processing

going on at that time. Batching, which is part of the job responsibilities performed in the processing

area, mainly occurs only on the night shift, typically starting around 3:00 a.m. (Doc. # 28-6 at p. 19;

Doc. # 31 at 7).

Plaintiff previously held a Filler Operator position, but that job was eliminated in August

2008. (Doc. # 28-3 at pp. 16, 17-18). Plaintiff was awarded the Receiver position on a Monday

through Thursday schedule of 10 hours per day, 6:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. (Id. at 17, 18, 19). Robles

was assigned the weekend shift—aFridaythrough Sunday12-hour schedule, where his overtime was

calculated after 10 (rather than 8) hours. (Doc. # 28-3 at pp. 23-35).

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Case 2:12-cv-00972-RDP Document 34 Filed 03/21/14 Page 2 of 18
Defendant entered into a Collective BargainingAgreement (“CBA”)with AFL-CIOAffiliate

Local No. 201-A. (Docs. # 28-2 and 28-3). The CBA was effective June 8, 2009 through June 3,

2012. (Docs. # 28-2 and 28-3). Pursuant to the CBA, as of June 7, 2009, Receivers’ pay was set 2

at $13.25 per hour. Effective that same date, pay for the Sanitation/CIP position was $13.92 per

hour. (Doc. # 28-3 at 1).

Afterthe pay increases under the CBA in 2009, Plaintiff, Hall, and Robles were each making

$13.92 ($0.67 above the rate of pay for Receiver). Plaintiff earned this rate because of his Filler

Operator classification, and Hall and Robles received that pay because they performed work in the

Sanitation/CIP job classification. (Doc. # 28-10 at ¶ 7, Ex. 4 at DF-163, 283, 372; Doc. # 28-2 at p.

222; Doc. # 28-6 at pp. 120-21, Ex. 14).

Although it speaks in terms of “Relief” employees, a term not defined in the CBA. the CBA

provides that Pasturizers, Sanitation/CIP employees and Receivers could earn an additional $0.25

per hour if they are qualified to efficiently perform one of those other positions, 50 cents per hour

if qualified to efficiently perform two of the other positions, and $0.75 per hour if qualified to

efficiently perform three of the other positions. (Doc. # 28-3 at 2). 

The CBA also provides that leadpersons “shall receive one dollar ($1.00) per hour above the

rate of the appropriate classification. Leadperson is not a bid job.” (Doc. # 28-3 at 2). That same

provision also provides that employees interested in being considered for a leadperson position will

present a written resume to the Plant or Production Manager. (Doc. # 28-3 at 2). It does not provide

that management must receive a resume before selecting a leadperson. (Doc. # 28-3 at 2).

Apparently Plaintiff attempted to file a grievance over his pay with the Union, but because he had withdrawn

2

from active status, the Union did not pursue it on his behalf. (Doc. # 28-1 at 116-18). 

3

Case 2:12-cv-00972-RDP Document 34 Filed 03/21/14 Page 3 of 18
In February 2010, Robles received a $1.00 per hour raise from $13.92 to $14.92. Meyers

testified that this increase was due to Robles serving in a leadman designation. (Doc. # 28-8 at p.

72). Robles was at the plant on the weekends by himself doing maintenance checks, making sure

everything was “okay at the facility,” and he was the contact person. (Doc. # 28-8 at pp. 74-75). 

However, on the bottom of the personnel change notice, there is a note “$1.00 CIP/Batch/Lab

Cert/Maint help.” (Doc. # 28-3 at 23-35). Plaintiff covered the shift for Robles on a particular

weekend, and Plaintiff received the same additional $1.00 per hour. (Doc. # 28-8 at p. 76). 

However, Hall and Plaintiff both previously covered the weekend shift for Robles on other occasions

without receiving the additional pay. (Doc. # 28-10 at ¶ 9). The Rule 56 record indicates that the

reason that Plaintiff subsequently received the additional $1.00 per hour while working for Robles

was that he requested this “substitute” pay, and Meyers approved that request. (Doc. # 28-1 at 45).

Also, in February 2010, Plaintiff was moved from a Sanitation/Receiver to a Receiver

position. (Doc. # 28-3 at 23-35). Pursuant to the CBA, as of June 6, 2010, Receivers’ pay was set

at $13.75 per hour. Pay for the Sanitation/CIP position was $14.42 as of that date. (Doc. # 28-3 at

1). 

At some point in 2010, Plaintiff was told by Meyers and Blankenship that he could earn 25

cents more per hour if he learned an incentive job, like batching. (Doc. # 28-1 at pp. 104-05). 

Plaintiff began training in the batching area. (Doc. # 28-1 at pp. 104-05). This training also allowed

Plaintiff to earn additional overtime. (Doc. # 28-9 at ¶ 4). Plaintiff trained for approximately two

months and eventuallywas able to fill in for one of the batching employees on his own. (Doc. # 28-1

at pp. 105-06). Nevertheless, Plaintiff never followed up with Blankenship to inform him that he

felt he was fully trained and deserving of the additional 25 cents per hour. (Doc. # 28-1 at pp. 106-

4

Case 2:12-cv-00972-RDP Document 34 Filed 03/21/14 Page 4 of 18
08). Instead, Plaintiff spoke with one of the supervisors, Ottwell. Ottwell told Plaintiff he would

e-mail Blankenship about the increase. (Doc. # 28-1 at pp. 107-08). Ottwell reported to Plaintiff

that he had sent the e-mail and told Plaintiff to follow up with Blankenship or Meyers; however,

Plaintiff did not do so. (Doc. # 28-1 at pp. 108-09). 

In October 2010, Hall received a $0.25 increase from $14.42 per hour to $14.67 per hour. 

Hall was earning 25 cents more than Plaintiff because he was performing Sanitation/CIP job duties

in addition to Receiver job duties and had requested the additional pay. (Doc. # 28-10 at ¶ 8). He

performed Sanitation/CIP duties on the raw side of the plant and on other lines that are cleaned only

at night after production had ended for the day. (Doc. # 28-10 at ¶ 8). At the time, Hall’s

classification was changed from Sanitation/CIP to Sanitation/CIP/Receiver. (Doc. # 28-3 at 23-35). 

In March 2011, Robles received an increase from $15.42 to $15.67 per hour. On the bottom

of the personnel change notice, there is a note: “This is a pay increase for learning how to run the

batch room.” (Doc. # 28-3 at 23-35). And in July 2011, Hall was making $15.12 per hour, Plaintiff

was making $14.87 per hour, and Robles was making 16.12 per hour. (Doc. # 28-3 at 23-35). 

Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC on July 27, 2011. (Doc. # 28-4 at

39). Thereafter, on October 31, 2011, Plaintiff’s hourly rate was increased from $14.87 to $15.12

per hour. (Doc. # 28-3 at 23-35). Meyers testified that she made this unconditional change because

she knew “he was unhappy, and the [EEOC] charge came through, wanted – he’s a good employee,

wanted to make him as happy as possible, so gave him the quarter an hour raise.” (Doc. # 28-8 at

20). She had some discretion on her part to make this decision and she took into consideration that

he performed some CIP duties. (Id.). 

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Case 2:12-cv-00972-RDP Document 34 Filed 03/21/14 Page 5 of 18
As Receivers, Plaintiff, Robles, and Hall performed substantially the same job duties and

would substitute for each other on the different shifts. (Doc. # 28-1 at pp. 94-98). Plaintiff testified

that, in comparison, the volume of trucks might have been one or two less on the weekends, but for

the most part the volume was pretty much the same. (Doc. # 28-1 at pp. 95-96). When Plaintiff

filled in for Robles on his weekend shift, Plaintiff performed all the same duties as Robles. (Doc.

# 28-1 at pp. 95-98).

Plaintiff asserts that, on one occasion when Blankenship sought him out to vent a truck,

Blankenship told him “I’m so sick of you and your kind.” (Doc. # 28-1 at pp. 171-75). Plaintiff also

believed that Blankenship only spoke to white employees when they addressed him, but not black

employees. (Doc. # 28-1 at pp. 171-75). Blankenship also testified that, when he was in a

management training program, he was called in to speak with Meyers and Human Resources after

two black employees complained that he had said something to the effect of “you people are killing

me.” (Doc. # 28-6 at pp. 187-91). At the meeting the employees wanted to know if Blankenship

meant anything racially discriminatory by that, and Blankenship assured them he did not. (Doc. #

28-6 at p. 189).

When Plaintiff was first in training with Defendant, he was told by Tommy Morgan that he

had received an extra $1.00 per hour for being a leadman in the receiving bay. (Doc. # 28-1 at pp.

113-14). At some point in time, Plaintiff went to Meyers regarding leadman qualifications, and

Meyers told him the receiving bay did not need a leadman and there was no leadman title for the

receiving bay. (Doc. # 28-1 at p. 114). There is no documentation indicating that Robles was a

3

There is no indication in the record when this conversation took place, and, in particular, the record does not 3

indicate whether it occurred was while the CBA was in effect (or before that time). (Doc. # 28-1 at pp. 113-15). 

6

Case 2:12-cv-00972-RDP Document 34 Filed 03/21/14 Page 6 of 18
leadman and he was never told he was a leadman. The documentation for his $1.00 pay increase

states “$1.00 CIP/Batch/Lab Cert/Maint help.” (Doc. # 28-3 at pp. 23-35). 

II. Summary Judgment Standard

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,

show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The party asking

for summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for

its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings or filings which it believes demonstrate

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once the moving party

has met its burden, Rule 56(e) requires the non-moving party to go beyond the pleadings and by her

own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See id. at 324.

The substantive law will identify which facts are material and which are irrelevant. See

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). All reasonable doubts about the facts

and all justifiable inferences are resolved in favor of the non-movant. See Fitzpatrick v. City of

Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993). A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. If the

evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.

See id. 249.

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Case 2:12-cv-00972-RDP Document 34 Filed 03/21/14 Page 7 of 18
III. Analysis

After careful review and for the reasons stated below, the court concludes that there are no

material issues of fact in this case and that Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56.

A. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint 

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint asserts the following claims under both Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. Section 1981:

1. Count I - Racial Discrimination - Wages

2. Count II - Racial Discrimination - Heightened Scrutiny

3. Count III - Racial Discrimination - Harder Tasks

4. Count IV - Racial Discrimination - Denial of Overtime 4

(Doc. # 16).

As the Eleventh Circuit has explained, “[b]oth § 1981 and Title VII ‘are subject to the same

standards of proof and employ the same analytical framework.’” Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281,

1296, n. 20 (11th Cir. 2009); see also Sims v. Coosa County Bd. of Educ., 2008 WL 4080769, at *4

(M.D. Ala. 2008) (“The elements of § 1981 race discrimination claim in the employment context are

the same as a Title VII disparate treatment claim.”) (citing Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491

U.S. 164 (1989)). Thus, as the substantive analysis for these claims is the same, it is appropriate to

discuss contemporaneously whether Plaintiff has met this standard with respect to both his Title VII

and § 1981 claims. 

Where, as here, a plaintiff relies upon circumstantial evidence of discrimination and

retaliation under Title VII and § 1981, courts apply the burden-shifting analysis of McDonnell

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint contains two counts labeled “Count III,” but the court will refer to the second 4

of these as Count IV. (Doc. # 16 at 8). 

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Case 2:12-cv-00972-RDP Document 34 Filed 03/21/14 Page 8 of 18
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 975-76 (11th

Cir. 2008). Under this analysis, once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discrimination

or retaliation, “the burden shifts to the employer to ‘articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason’” for the challenged action. Crawford, 529 F.3d at 976 (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411

U.S. at 802). If the employer does so, “the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the

employer’s stated reason was a pretext for discrimination.” Id. (citations omitted). 

To prevail under Title VII or § 1981, evidence must be presented that is “sufficient to create

an inference of discrimination.” Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1564 (11th Cir. 1997). A plaintiff

can establish that inference by showing: “(1) he was a member of a protected class; (2) he was

qualified for the job; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) his employer treated

similarlysituated employees outside the protected classmore favorably.” Crawford, 529 F.3d at 970. 

1. Count I - Wages

There are two aspects to Plaintiff’s disparate pay claim. Plaintiff asserts that he (1) was paid

a lower hourly rate than other employees, and (2) did not receive Robles’s pay rate when he worked

Robles’s weekend shift for him. 

a. Plaintiff’s Claim He Received a Lower Hourly Rate than Robles

and Hall

In order to establish a prima facie case of disparate pay, a plaintiff must show that he

occupies a position similar to that of a higher paid employee who is not a member of his protected

class. Crawford, 529 F.3d at 974-75; Meeks v. Computer Assocs. Int.l, 15 F.3d 1013, 1019 (11th Cir.

1994). The employee whom the plaintiff identifies as a comparator must be similarly situated in all

relevant respects. Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079, 1091 (11th Cir. 2004) (emphasis

9

Case 2:12-cv-00972-RDP Document 34 Filed 03/21/14 Page 9 of 18
in original); Holifield, 115 F.3d at 1562. The Eleventh Circuit has held this to mean that “[t]he

comparator must be nearly identical to the plaintiff.” Wilson, 376 F.3d at 1091; Mannicia v. Brown,

171 F.3d 1364, 1368 (11 th Cir. 1999). Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of disparate

pay because neither of the asserted comparators he has identified is similarly situated to him in all

relevant respects. 

Robles was a Receiver on the weekend shift and was considered the Leadman because he was

at the plant on the weekends by himself doing additional tasks. Moreover, on one occasion when

Plaintiff covered the weekend shift for Robles, and after speaking with Meyers about the matter

(Doc. # 28-1 at 45), Plaintiff received the additional $1.00 per hour. (Doc. # 28-8 at p. 76). 

There are a number of deficiencies in Plaintiff’s arguments regarding his pay claims. One

of the principle ones is that Plaintiff argues out of both sides of his mouth as to Robles. First,

Plaintiff claims (in support of his claim that Robles should not have been paid more than him) that

Robles and he performed the same tasks. Yet at the same time, Plaintiff complains that he did not

receive the same rate of pay as Robles when he filled in for him because he had to perform those

additional tasks which Robles usually performed on the weekends. Either Robles had additional

duties which justified Plaintiff seeking the additional pay on the weekend shifts he worked when he

filled in for Robles (in which case Robles properly received a higher pay rate than Plaintiff taking

into account their differing job responsibilities in their regular jobs), or Plaintiff was not entitled to

that additional pay when he covered for Robles on a weekend shift. Plaintiff cannot have it both

ways. After careful review, the court concludes that the Rule 56 evidence establishes that, in their

respective (i.e., regular) jobs, Robles and Plaintiff were not similarly situated because Robles

approximated aLeadman on weekends and performed additional tasks on those weekend shifts. This

10

Case 2:12-cv-00972-RDP Document 34 Filed 03/21/14 Page 10 of 18
justified his higher pay. Indeed, Plaintiff received that additional pay on a particular weekend shift

that he covered for Robles. 

Moreover, in anyevent, the Rule 56 record evidence indicates that the reason Robles received

the additional pay and Plaintiff did not is simply not related to any allegation of race discrimination.5

Properly understood, the key issue does not revolve around the fact that these two employees were

not paid extra for doing that weekend work in a substitute capacity. Rather, the question is whether

there is evidence of disparate treatment related to Robles’s receipt of higher pay for his weekend job

duties in comparison with the job duties performed by Plaintiff in his job during the week. In that

respect, the evidence is undisputed—Robles had additional duties and responsibilities, and worked

unsupervised in his job. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to raise an inference of race discrimination based

on Robles’s receipt of this additional pay. 

Plaintiff also attempts to compare himself with Hall. As to that comparison, it is undisputed

that Hall earned 25 cents more per hour than Plaintiff. However, again Plaintiff cannot establish that

he was similarly situated to Hall during that time period because Hall (1) was qualified to perform

Sanitation/CIP work, (2) actually was performing that work in addition to his Receiver job duties,

and (3) had actually requested the additional pay for that work. (Doc. # 28-10 at ¶ 8). Although

Plaintiff performed some CIP duties as part of his Receiver position, Hall performed additional

Sanitation/CIP duties on the raw side of the plant and on other lines that are cleaned only at night,

As it relates to a comparison of the different pay that Plaintiff and Robles received for working in their 5

respective jobs, the weekend fill in work performed by Plaintiff is a red herring, at best. Indeed, the fact that Plaintiff

even claims he was due additional pay for the weekend work supports Defendant’s position that the weekend job

involved more work and responsibility. Moreover, Hall (who is a Caucasian and works as a Receiver on the night shift)

was treated similarly to Plaintiff when he did not receive the additional $1.00 per hour given to Robles for being a

leadperson when he covered the weekend shift for Robles. Indeed, prior to the time Meyers approved the receipt of the

additional $1.00 per hour for covering for Robles on the weekend, there were times when both Hall and Plaintiff had

covered the weekend shift for Robles without receiving that additional pay. (Doc. # 28-10 at ¶ 9). 

11

Case 2:12-cv-00972-RDP Document 34 Filed 03/21/14 Page 11 of 18
after production has ended for the day. (Doc. # 28-10 at ¶ 8). Plaintiff worked the day shift when

these duties were not performed (and were not required). Thus, he and Hall are not similarly situated

in all relevant respects, and are not proper comparators. 

In addition, even if Plaintiff could establish a prima facie case based upon comparator

evidence (and, to be clear, he has not) Defendant has stated legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons

for the pay differences between Plaintiff on the one hand, and Robles and Hall on the other. Robles

had additional duties and was the equivalent of a Leadperson; Hall was qualified to and did perform

additional Sanitation/CIP tasks. Plaintiff is required to meet this non-discriminatory explanation

head on by showing that these reasons are a pretext for discrimination. He has failed to do so.

To establish pretext, Plaintiff must show both (1) that the employer’s reason was false and

(2) that it was a pretext for race discrimination. Brooks v. County Comm’n of Jefferson County, 446

F.3d 1160, 1163 (11th Cir. 2006); Vessels v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 408 F.3d 763, 768 (11th Cir.

2005). That is, even if a plaintiff shows that his employer’s reasons are false, he must still show that

race discrimination was the real reason for the decision. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S.

502, 515 (1993); Brooks v. County v. Comm’n, 446 F.3d 1160, 1163 (11th Cir. 2006). A plaintiff

cannot successfully show pretext “by simply quarreling with the wisdom of that reason.” Chapman

v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1030 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 

As Plaintiff has pointed out, Defendant could certainly have documented its pay decision in

a more precise manner. However, Plaintiff has presented no evidence (much less substantial

evidence) to suggest that the real reason for those decisions was race discrimination. Even the

meager “evidence of racial animus” discussed in Plaintiff’s brief does not even necessarily suggest

12

Case 2:12-cv-00972-RDP Document 34 Filed 03/21/14 Page 12 of 18
racial bias with respect to any decision at issue here. Moreover, the instances where Blankenship 6

used these terms were in no way related to the pay decisions at issue and there is no evidence even

suggesting they were proximate in time.

Courts are not concerned with whether an employment decision is prudent or fair, only with

whetherit was motivated by unlawful animus. An employer may fire an employee for a reason based

on erroneous facts or for no reason at all, so long as it is not done for a discriminatory reason. Nix

v. WLCY Radio/Rahall Communications, 738 F.2d 1181, 1187 (11th Cir. 1984). “Federal courts do

not sit as super-personnel departments that reexamine an entity’s business decisions ... .” Chapman

v. Al Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1034 (11th Cir. 2000). Even if Plaintiff had presented evidence

sufficient to establish a prima facie case of disparate pay, he has failed to present pretext evidence—

i.e., Rule 56 evidence suggesting that race discrimination was the real reason for Defendant’s

decisions. 

Plaintiff has also argued that Hall was treated more favorably because he was paid an

additional 25 cents per hour for the night shift Receiver position. Plaintiff notes that when he

worked as a Receiver on the night shift, he did not receive that additional pay. This claim

necessarily fails for at least two reasons. First, the situations are simply not comparable. The CBA

was in effect when Hall worked in that position but it was not in effect at the time that Plaintiff

worked the night shift. Second, and perhaps even more importantly, this claim is time-barred. The

longest statute of limitations applicable to § 1981 claims is four years. Jones v. R.R. Donnelley &

 To be sure, “you people” and “your kind” are phrases that can be uttered with discriminatory intent. On the

6

other hand, these same phrases may also be used without any such intent. But the key point here is not how a trier of fact

would view the motive behind these statements, but rather that the statements—even viewed in the light most favorable

to Plaintiff—are wholly unrelated to any employment decision at issue affecting Plaintiff. 

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Case 2:12-cv-00972-RDP Document 34 Filed 03/21/14 Page 13 of 18
Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 382 (2004). Plaintiff’s Complaint was filed March 27, 2012. (Doc. # 1). 

Plaintiff began working for Defendant as a Receiver in 2006 and worked in that position until May

2007, when Plaintiff was classified as either a Filler Operator or a Pasturizer. He remained in that

classification from May 2007 until the summer of 2008, when the position was eliminated and he

was re-classified as a Receiver and chose to work the day shift. (Doc. # 28-1 at pp. 16-18, 21, 33-34,

Exs. 1-2, 7). Any claim based on Plaintiff’s previous assignment as a Receiver on the night shift

arose prior to May 2007, more than four years before the Complaint was filed, and is therefore timebarred. 

2. Plaintiff’s Claim That He Was Not Paid the Same Pay Rate as Robles

When Plaintiff Was Filling in for Robles Doing Weekend Work

Plaintiff claims he should have received overtime pay at the rate of the person for whom he

filled in (i.e., Robles). This claim is without merit. 

First, Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of race discrimination. Although Plaintiff

claims that Robles is a proper comparator, he is mistaken for the same reasons already discussed

above. Actually, to the extent Plaintiff can point to a proper comparator here, it is Hall. Hall also

filled in for Robles on weekends. That is, Plaintiff, who is African-American, and Hall, who is

Caucasian, both substituted for Robles and on each occasion (with the exception of when Plaintiff

actually received extra pay after the issue was raised with management) neither Plaintiff or Hall

received Robles’s rate of pay when doing so. Because Plaintiff and Hall were similarly situated in

this limited respect and were treated the same (except, again, in a manner favoring Plaintiff) when

performing this fill in work, a prima facie case of disparate racial treatment cannot be shown on these

facts. 

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Second, and again for the same reasons discussed above, Plaintiff has not raised substantial

evidence that Defendant’s articulated reasons are a pretext. Plaintiff has done nothing to call into

question Defendant’s reasons for paying him differently than Robles while doing substitute work. 

And, more importantly, he has not presented any evidence of disparate treatment due to race. Once

he raised the issue, he received the additional pay. Before he raised the issue, neither he nor Hall

received the additional pay. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to establish that Defendant’s reasons for

failing to pay him at Robles’s rate for working the latter’s shift are a pretext for race discrimination.7

And, he has also failed to raise any actionable issue regarding Hall. While Hall may be a proper

comparator in this context—because both he and Plaintiff filled in for Robles—Hall was treated the

same as Plaintiff. Even if there were an inference of discriminatory intent (and, to be sure, there is

not) this would negate it. Thus, the evidence does not show that race discrimination was the real

reason for this decision. 

Finally, to the extent that Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s pay decisions were inconsistent

with the CBA and that this inconsistency constitutes evidence of pretext, this argument, too, fails as

a matter of law. Violations of a CBA or a breach of internal policies alone does not amount to a

showing of pretext. See Springer v. Convergys Customer Mgmt. Group, Inc., 509 F.3d 1344, 1350

(11th Cir. 2007) (even where an employment decision violates corporate personnel policies, it does

not necessarily indicate racial discrimination); Johnson v. Secretary, U.S. Dept. of Veterans Affairs,

517 Fed.Appx. 933, 936 (11th Cir. 2013) (“[A] breach of internal policies alone does not amount

To the extent that the hours spent by Plaintiff covering for Robles were overtime hours, the Fair Labor

7

Standards Act provides that employees are generally entitled to receive overtime pay at one and one-half times their

“regular rate” for all hours worked in excess of forty per week. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (emphasis added). Thus, to

the extent that Plaintiff worked overtime hours filling in for Robles, it was proper to pay him at one and one half times

his regular hourly rate. Of course, no FLSA claim has been asserted in this case.

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to a showing of pretext”); Randle v. City of Aurora, 69 F.3d 441, 454 (10th Cir. 1995) (“The mere

fact that an employer failed to follow its own internal procedures does not necessarily suggest that

the employer was motivated by illegal discriminatory intent or that the substantive reasons given by

the employer for its employment decision were pretextual.”). Plaintiff has failed to raise an inference

of race discrimination as to his not receiving Robles’s rate of pay when he covered for him.

B. Counts II and III - Heightened Scrutiny and Harder Tasks

The Eleventh Circuit has held, with respect to a disparate treatment claim, that “an ‘adverse

employment action’ includes ‘termination, failure to hire, or demotion.’” Blue v. Dunn Const. Co.,

Inc., 453 Fed.Appx. 881, 884 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Crawford, 529 F.3d at 970). In order to be

actionable, “[a]n employer’s conduct falling short of those actions ‘must, in some substantial way,

alter the employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, deprive him or

her of employment opportunities, or adversely affect his or her status as an employee.’” Blue, 453

Fed.Appx. at 884 (citing Crawford, 529 F.3d at 970). “With regard to the level of substantiality

required, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he ‘suffered a serious and material change in the terms,

conditions, or privileges of employment.’” Blue, 453 Fed.Appx. at 884 (citing Crawford, 529 F.3d

at 970-71) (emphasis in original).

“[N]ot all conduct by an employer negatively affecting an employee constitutes adverse

employment action.” Davis v. Town of Lake Park, Fla., 245 F.3d 1232, 1238 (11th Cir. 2001). The

issues of heightened scrutiny, harder tasks, and additional minor tasks such as picking up cigarette

butts and removing cobwebs do not rise to the level of an actionable adverse employment action as

a matter of law. See, e.g., Dominguez v. Lake Como Club, 520 Fed.Appx. 937, 941 (11th Cir. 2013)

(more difficult assignments not adverse); White v. Hall, 389 Fed.Appx. 956 (11th Cir. 2010) (same);

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Gossard v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 612 F.Supp.2d 1242, 1249-50 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (heightened

scrutiny of the plaintiff is not an actionable adverse employment action); Belt v. Alabama Historical

Comm’n, 181 Fed.Appx. 763 (11th Cir. 2006) (minor changes in job duties including suspending

authority to order inventory and requiring reports to go through supervisor were not adverse

employment actions). Therefore, Plaintiff cannot establish disparate treatment claims based on

these issues. 

Moreover, as to the fact issue of whether he was required to perform harder tasks, Plaintiff

testified that the volume of trucks might have been one or two less on the weekends, but for the most

part the volume was pretty much the same. (Doc. # 28-1 at 26). Thus, neither the Eleventh Circuit’s

well-settled law nor the Rule 56 evidence supports Plaintiff’s allegations of harder tasks. This claim

fails as a matter of fact, law, and logic.

C. Count IV - Racial Discrimination - Denial of Overtime

In his Amended Complaint Plaintiff alleged that Blankenship “would offer overtime to white

employees, and only when those white employees declined the available overtime did Blankenship

offer it to African-American employees.” (Doc. # 16 at ¶ 13). Although a denial of overtime does

constitute an adverse employment action, the evidence shows that, under Blankenship, Plaintiff

worked overtime on sixteen (16) occasions, while Hall only worked overtime on two (2) occasions. 

(Doc. # 28-1 at 37, Ex. 17 and 18). Therefore, Plaintiff cannot use Hall as a comparator to establish

a prima facie case because Plaintiff was treated more favorably than Hall in overtime assignments. 

Plaintiff also complains that, after working his weekend shift that involved overtime, Robles

worked overtime during the week when Plaintiff asserts that he was available to work late. 

Assuming without deciding that Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue

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of fact regarding a prima facie case of denial of overtime in comparison to Robles, Defendant’s

reason for offering overtime during the week to Robles was that he was the logical choice because

he had added skills and he was available since he only worked weekends on his regular shift. (Doc.

# 28-6 at p. 150; Doc. # 28-8 at p. 90). 

Plaintiff has not come forward with substantial evidence which shows this reason is false. 

Moreover, as discussed in more detail above, even if Plaintiff could show that Defendant’s reasons

were false, he must also show that race discrimination was the real reason for the challenged

decision. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 515; Brooks, 446 F.3d at 1163. Plaintiff has missed

the mark on this score because he has done nothing more than quarrel with Defendant’s reason by

asserting that it would have been less expensive for Plaintiff to work overtime instead of Robles. 

A plaintiff cannot successfully show pretext by second guessing his employer’s business judgment

or “simply quarreling with the wisdom of that reason.” Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1030. Because

Plaintiff has done nothing more than that, his denial of overtime claim fails as a matter of law. 

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all of the

claims asserted in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

is due to be granted. A separate order will be entered. 

DONE and ORDERED this 21st day of March, 2014.

___________________________________

R. DAVID PROCTOR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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