Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01054/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01054-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983cv Civil Rights Act - Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANDREW McKERCHER,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 18cv1054 JM(BLM)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO

v. DISMISS

RON MORRISON,

Defendant.

DefendantRon Morrison, Mayor of NationalCity (“Morrison”), movesthe court

to dismiss Plaintiff Andrew McKercher’s federal civil rights claim, to decline to

exercise jurisdiction over the state law claim, and to dismiss the action under qualified

immunity principles. Plaintiff opposes the motion. Pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(d)(1),

the court finds the matters appropriate for decision without oral argument. For the

reasons set forth below, the court grantsthe motion to dismiss the claims for injunctive

and declaratory relief as moot, grants Morrison’s motion for qualified immunity on the

federal constitutional claim(the First Cause of Action), declinesto exercise jurisdiction

over the state constitutional claim(the SecondCause of Action), and instructs the Clerk

of Court to close the file. 

BACKGROUND

Filed on November 26, 2018, the Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) alleges

two claims for relief: (1) violation of the First Amendment of the United States

Constitution and (2) violation of the right to free expression guaranteed by the

- 1 - 18cv1054

Case 3:18-cv-01054-JM-MSB Document 25 Filed 03/08/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

California Constitution. In broad brush, Plaintiff alleges that Morrison, sued in his

individual capacity while acting under color of state law, violated federal and state

constitutional rights when he blocked Plaintiff from accessing Morrison’s personal

Facebook website in retaliation for, among other things, “criticizing him as an elected

official.” (SAC ¶10(K)). 

1

Plaintiff, a resident of NationalCity, California, alleges that he has been blocked

from accessing Morrison’s personal Facebook page because he has “consistently

spoken his mind whenever it appeared that the best interests of his fellow residents and

taxpayers were being subordinated to the whims of capricious, corrupt City officials.” 

(SAC ¶1). By way of example, Plaintiff has commented on what he perceives to be

Morrison’s preferential treatment of a National City councilman, the City’s perceived

pursuit of anti-immigrant policies, and the City providing preferential treatment to

business interests. Id. 

Plaintiff alleges that Morrison maintains his personal Facebook page “in order

to communicate with the public about official City matters.” (SAC ¶2). Morrison

allegedly “uses the social-media platform to promote his mayoral feats and to bask in

the glory of his fans’ friendly feedback.” (SAC ¶1). Morrison allegedly blocked

Plaintiff as “‘pay back’ for past criticism and to prevent him from publicizing his

concerns in the future.” Id. Plaintiffseeks compensatory damages, punitive damages,

injunctive and declaratory relief, and attorney’s fees and costs.

As of December 18, 2018, Morrison completed his term as mayor. However,

Facebook, Inc. is an online social media and social networking service

1

company. In general, the “Facebook service can be accessed from devices with

Internet connectivity, such as personal computers, tablets and smartphones. After

registering, users can create a customized profile revealing information about

themselves. Users can post text, photos and multimedia of their own devising and

share it with other users as‘friends’. Users can use various embedded apps, and receive

notifications of their friends' activities.” Wikipedia, Facebook,

http:www.wikipedia.org (last visited February 21, 2019). The Facebook account

holder determines whether to allow a “friend” request, thus permitting the “friend” to

access the account, or denying the “friend” request thereby blocking access to the

Facebook account. See Facebook HelpCenter, http://www.facebook.com/help/privacy

(last visited February 21, 2019).

- 2 - 18cv1054

Case 3:18-cv-01054-JM-MSB Document 25 Filed 03/08/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Morrison was elected to the position of vice mayor and continues to serve in that

capacity. In late May or early June 2018, Morrison unblocked Plaintiff, and all other

individuals, who he had blocked from accessing his personal Facebook page. 

(Morrison Decl. ¶3). The official National City Facebook page, distinct from

2

Morrison’s personal Facebook page, identifies Morrison as vice mayor and states at the

bottom of the page, “For the latest updates on National City send Ron Morrison a

‘friend’ request on Facebook.” (SAC ¶10N). 

DISCUSSION

Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper only in

"extraordinary" cases. United States v. Redwood City, 640 F.2d 963, 966 (9th Cir.

1981). Courts should grant 12(b)(6) relief only where a plaintiff's complaint lacks a

"cognizable legal theory" or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory. 

Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). Courts should

dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim when the factual allegations are

insufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (the complaint’s allegations must “plausibly

suggest[]” that the pleader is entitled to relief); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)

(under Rule 8(a), well-pleaded facts must do more than permit the court to infer the

mere possibility of misconduct). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability

requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted

unlawfully.” Id. at 678. Thus, “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. The defect must appear

on the face of the complaint itself. Thus, courts may not consider extraneous material

in testing its legal adequacy. Levine v. Diamanthuset, Inc., 950 F.2d 1478, 1482 (9th

Plaintiff acknowledges that he is no longer blocked from posting comments on 2

Morrison’s facebook page. (Oppo. at p. 10:12-17). To the extent Plaintiff argues that

Morrison retains control over who is “friended,” a feature of Facebook, he lacks

standing, as more fully discussed herein, to assert claims on behalf of individuals who

are not present before the court. 

- 3 - 18cv1054

Case 3:18-cv-01054-JM-MSB Document 25 Filed 03/08/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Cir. 1991). The courts may, however, consider material properly submitted as part of

the complaint. Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner and Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555

n.19 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Finally, courts must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff. Concha v. London, 62 F.3d 1493, 1500 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. dismissed, 116

S. Ct. 1710 (1996). Accordingly, courts must accept as true all material allegations in

the complaint, as well as reasonable inferences to be drawn from them. Holden v.

Hagopian, 978 F.2d 1115, 1118 (9th Cir. 1992). However, conclusory allegations of

law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. In

Re Syntex Corp. Sec. Litig., 95 F.3d 922, 926 (9th Cir. 1996).

Mootness

The Supreme Court has noted that the doctrine of mootness requires that the

“requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation

(standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness).” Arizonans for Official

English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 68, n.22 (1997). Here, Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive

and declaratory relief are moot. Since just after the filing of the original complaint, and

before service of the complaint and summons, Plaintiff “unblocked everyone on

[Morrison’s] Facebook page.” (Morrison Decl. ¶3). Plaintiff does not dispute that he

is free to post comments on Morrison’s web site. Rather, Plaintiff contends that

individuals who desire to access Morrison’s Facebook page must first send Morrison

a “friend” request and second, Morrison must approve the new “friend” request to gain

access to his Facebook page. According to Plaintiff, this “shows not only that it would

be easy enough for Defendant to keep people from commenting on his Facebook page

but that he is doing so at this very moment.” (Oppo. at p.5:21-22). 

Plaintiff’s arguments run afoul of both the mootness and standing doctrines. 

Plaintiff no longer has a personal interest in his claims for injunctive or declaratory

relief because he obtained the relief requested - the ability to access and comment on

Morrison’s Facebook page. Similarly, Plaintiff has no personal stake in whether

- 4 - 18cv1054

Case 3:18-cv-01054-JM-MSB Document 25 Filed 03/08/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

unidentified individuals may or may not have been blocked from accessing Morrison’s

Facebook page. Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief are, therefore,

moot.

In sum, the court dismisses the injunctive and declaratory relief claims as moot.

Qualified Immunity

The defense of qualified immunity protects “government officials . . . from

liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The rule of qualified immunity

protects “ ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’ ”

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202,(2001) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335,

341 (1986)). A defendant may have a reasonable, but mistaken, belief about the facts

or about what the law requires in any given situation. Id. “Therefore, regardless of

whether the constitutional violation occurred, the [official] should prevail if the right

asserted by the plaintiff was not ‘clearly established’ or the [official] could have

reasonably believed that his particular conduct waslawful.” Romero v. Kitsap County,

931 F.2d 624, 627 (9th Cir.1991).

The defense of qualified immunity balances “the need to hold public officials

accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials

from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their dutiesreasonably.”

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.223, 230 (2009). Determining whether an official is

entitled to qualified immunity requires a two-part analysis. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201;

Ramirez v. City of Buena Park, 560 F.3d 1012, 1020 (9th Cir.2009). First, a court must

decide whether the factual record, viewing the record in the light most favorable to

Plaintiff, establishes that Morrison violated a constitutional right. Id. Second, the

court must decide whether the statutory or constitutional right at issue was “clearly

established.” Id. A right is “clearly established” for the purpose of qualified immunity

if “ ‘it would be clear to a reasonable [official] that his conduct was unlawful in the

- 5 - 18cv1054

Case 3:18-cv-01054-JM-MSB Document 25 Filed 03/08/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

situation he confronted’ ... or whether the state of the law [at the time of the alleged

violation] gave ‘fair warning’ to [him] that [his] conduct was unconstitutional.” 

Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 906 (9th Cir.2002) (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at

202). This inquiry “ must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not

as a broad general proposition.” Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004) (per

curium).

Because qualified immunity is an affirmative defense, the initial burden of proof

lies with the official asserting the defense. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 812; Houghton v.

South, 965 F.2d 1532, 1536 (9th Cir.1992). Finally, while often beneficial to approach

the two-part inquiry in the sequence prescribed above, it is not mandatory. Pearson,

129 S.Ct. at 818. A court has “discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the

qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first.” Id.; Ramirez, 560 F.3d at 1020.

A court may grant defendants qualified immunity and dismiss plaintiff's claim if at any

point the court answers either prong in the negative. See e.g., Tibbetts, 567 F.3d at

536-39 (bypassing the first prong and granting the defendants qualified immunity

because the plaintiff's due process claim was not a “clearly established right” at the

time of the alleged violation). See Mullenix v. Luna, – U.S. – , 136 S.Ct. 305, 308, 193

L.Ed.2d 255 (2015).

At the outset, the court highlights that there is a paucity of binding authority

addressing the First Amendment as applied to social media platforms in the context of

access to a state actor’s personally owned and operated Facebook page. The parties

primarily rely on contradictory District Court cases. For example, Morrison cites

several district court opinionsfinding that the law regarding private Facebook accounts

maintained by public officials “is less than settled.” Davison v. Rose, 2017 WL

3251293 (E.D. Vir. July 28, 2017). In Davison, the plaintiff alleged that the deletion

of a comment left on the official Loudoun County Facebook page, and blocking further

posts, violated his First Amendment rights. Without discussing the nature of the forum

at issue, the district court concluded that the defendants were entitled to qualified

- 6 - 18cv1054

Case 3:18-cv-01054-JM-MSB Document 25 Filed 03/08/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

immunity because of the unsettled nature of the law regarding a Facebook account

maintained by a public official. In other words, the court concluded that the right was

not clearly established. 

In Morgan v. Bevin, 286 F.Supp.3d 1003 (E.D. Ky 2018), the Governor of

Kentucky maintained Facebook and Twitter accounts “in order to communicate [the

Governor’s] vision, policies, and activities to constituents and receive feedback from

them on the specific topics that he chooses to address in his posts.” Id. at 1006). 

Plaintiffs in that case had criticized the Governor for his failure to timely pay his

property taxes and for his right-to-work policies. Plaintiffs were blocked from

accessing the Governor’s Facebook and Twitter accounts. The Governor also

established automatic filters to block posts that are obscene, abusive, or spam. On the

evidentiary record before the court, the court was “convinced that GovernorBevin's use

of privately owned Facebook Page and Twitter pages is personal speech, and, because

he is speaking on his own behalf, even on his own behalf as a public official, “the First

Amendment strictures that attend the various types of government-established forums

do not apply.” 

The Morgan court noted that there is “no constitutional right as members of the

public to a government audience for their policy views, Minn. State Bd. for Cmty.

Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 286 (1984),” and concluded that “Governor Bevin's

Twitter and Facebook accounts are privately owned channels of communication and

are not converted to public property by the use of a public official. Simply put, this is

unlike any type of property typically protected by First Amendment forum analysis

law.” 298 F.Supp.3d at 1012. The court denied the motion for preliminary injunction

because plaintiffs failed to demonstrate the requisite likelihood of success on the

merits, noting that “Governor Bevin is not suppressing speech, but is merely culling

his Facebook and Twitter accounts to present a public image that he desires.” 

298 F.Supp.3d at 1013.

Plaintiff contends that qualified immunity principles do not apply in this case

- 7 - 18cv1054

Case 3:18-cv-01054-JM-MSB Document 25 Filed 03/08/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

because the First Amendment clearly protects an individual’s right to criticize public

officials and any “retaliation for the exercise of one’s First Amendment right amounts

to a constitutional violation.” (Oppo. at p.6). The Supreme Court has repeatedly

rejected defining the constitutional right at issue at a such a high level of generality as

Plaintiff does here. The qualified immunity issue is “whether the violative nature of

particular conduct is clearly established.” This inquiry “ ‘must be undertaken in light

of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.’ ” Brosseau,

543 U.S. at 198; City of Escondido v. Emmons, 139 S.Ct. 500 (2019) (“the clearly

established right must be defined with specificity”). The authorities relied upon by

Plaintiff simply fail to address the First Amendment in the specific context of a state

actor using private social media to communicate with, among others, members of the

public. 

Here, the constitutional limitations and the current state of the law, as applied to

state actors using social media forums, are in flux, significantly impacted by rapid

technological developments and a lagging legal framework to address those

technological changes. The court concludes that the issue of a public official’s private

use of social media platforms like Facebook to communicate with, among others,

constituents is not well-settled, to say nothing of “clearly established.” The district

court authorities cited by the parties take contrasting views on the applicability of the

First Amendment to social media websites like Facebook. As instructed by the

Supreme Court, “a defendant cannot be said to have violated a clearly established right

unless the right’s contours were sufficiently definite that any reasonable official in the

defendant’s shoes would have understood that he was violating it.” Plumoff v.

Rickard, 134 S.Ct. 2012, 2023 (2014). There should exist “a body of relevant law . . .

to clearly establish” the unlawfulness of an official’s conduct before civil rights

liability may attach. See Emmons, 139 S.Ct. at 503. Plaintiff has cited neither

Supreme Court authority nor any other binding authority to buttress his argument.

Plaintiff simply fails to meet his burden to show that the contours of the right were

- 8 - 18cv1054

Case 3:18-cv-01054-JM-MSB Document 25 Filed 03/08/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 8 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

clearly established. See Sharp v. County of Orange, 871 F.3d 901, 901 (9th Cir. 2017). 

In sum, the court finds that qualified immunity principles apply under the

circumstances of this case to bar Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim.

The State Law Claim

Morrison also moves to dismiss the Second Cause of Action for violation of the

state constitution. In light of the dismissal of the federal claim, the court declines to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim. See Herman Family

Revocable Trust v. Teddy Bear, 254 F.3d 82, 806 (9th Cir. 2001). This claim is

dismissed without prejudice.

In sum, the court grants the motion to dismiss the claim for injunctive and

declaratory relief as moot, grants Morrison’s motion for qualified immunity on the

federal constitutional claim(the First Cause of Action), declinesto exercise jurisdiction

over the state constitutional claim(the SecondCause of Action), and instructs the Clerk

of Court to close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 8, 2019

 Hon. Jeffrey T. Miller

 United States District Judge

cc: All parties

- 9 - 18cv1054

Case 3:18-cv-01054-JM-MSB Document 25 Filed 03/08/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 9 of 9