Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00909/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00909-14/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

AMY McCONNELL and AMY

McCONNELL on behalf of her

four minor children, A.B.,

A.B. J.M. and J.M.,

NO. CIV. S-05-0909 FCD DAD

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

LASSEN COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, et

al.,

Defendants.

____________________________/

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on plaintiffs’ emergency

motion to stay this matter until the Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals issues its en banc decision in the matter of Beltran v.

Santa Clara County, — F.3d. —, 2007 WL 3010640 (9th Cir. Oct. 17,

2007) (granting petition for rehearing en banc). Defendants

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1 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. 

E.D. Cal. Local Rule 78-230(h).

2 The facts of this case are set forth in the court’s

Memorandum and Order, filed June 29, 2007. (Mem. & Order

(“Order”) [Docket # 181], filed June 29, 2007, at 2-15).

2

oppose the motion. For the reasons set forth below,1 plaintiffs’

motion is GRANTED. 

BACKGROUND2

This case arises out of the removal of plaintiff Amy

McConnell’s four minor children from her custody and their

placement in foster care, where at least one of the minor

children was sexually abused. On May 10, 2005, plaintiffs filed

a complaint in this court, alleging claims under § 1983 for

violations of their Fourteenth Amendment rights to family

integrity and due process as well as related state law claims. 

Plaintiffs brought claims against Lassen County, the Board of

Supervisors of Lassen County, the social workers assigned to

their case, the foster care agency, and the wife of the

perpetrator of the abuse. 

On June 29, 2007, the court issued a Memorandum and Order

(the “Order”), granting in part and denying in part defendants’

motions for summary judgment. (Mem. & Order (“Order”) [Docket #

181], filed June 29, 2007). The court held that there was a

triable issue of fact regarding plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims against

defendant Terry Chapman, a social worker assigned to plaintiffs’

case, arising out of the pre-hearing detention of the minor

children. (Id. at 33-41). The court granted defendants’ motions

for summary judgment with respect to the remainder of plaintiffs’

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claims. The court’s grant of summary judgment regarding

plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims against defendant Terry Chapman arising

out of the post-hearing detention of the minor children was based

in part on the applicability of absolute immunity.

On October 17, 2007, the Ninth Circuit ordered the case of

Beltran v. Santa Clara County to be reheard by an en banc court. 

Beltran v. Santa Clara County, — F.3d. —, 2007 WL 3010640. This

court relied on the three judge panel’s opinion in Beltran, 491

F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 2007) in its June 29 Order in its discussion

of whether defendant Terry Chapman was entitled to absolute

immunity. Plaintiffs now seek a stay of this action pending the

Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision in Beltran. 

STANDARD

A district court has the discretionary power to control the

disposition of the cases on its docket “in a manner which will

promote economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and

for the litigants.” CMAX, Inc. v. Hall, 300 F.2d 265, 268 (9th

Cir. 1962); see Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936). 

How these objectives can be achieved “calls for the exercise of

judgment, which must weigh competing interests and maintain an

even balance.” Landis, 299 U.S. at 254-55; see Lockyer v. Miran

Corp., 398 F.3d 1098, 111o (9th Cir. 2005) (“Where it is proposed

that a pending proceeding be stayed, the competing interests

which will be affected by the granting or refusal to grant a stay

must be weighed.”). Such competing interests include “the

possible damage which may result from the granting of a stay, the

hardship or inequity which a party may suffer in being required

to go forward, and the orderly course of justice measured in

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terms of the simplifying or complicating of issues, proof, and

questions of law which could be expected to result from a stay.” 

CMAX, 300 F.2d at 268. If there exists even a fair possibility

that the stay requested by a litigant will work damage to someone

else, the party seeking the stay “must make out a clear case of

hardship or inequity in being required to go forward.” Landis,

299 U.S. at 255; Lockyer, 398 F.3d at 1110-11.

“A trial court may, with propriety, find it is efficient for

its own docket and the fairest course for the parties to enter a

stay of an action before it, pending resolution of independent

proceedings which bear upon the case.” Lockyer, 398 F.3d at 1111

(quoting Levya v. Certified Grocers of Cal., Ltd., 593 F.2d 857,

863-64 (9th Cir. 1979); see Landis, 299 U.S. at 255 (rejecting as

“too mechanical and narrow” the view that there is no power to

stay a proceeding upon the outcome of a controversy to which the

litigant is a stranger). These separate proceedings may be

judicial, administrative, or arbitral in nature, and proper

imposition of a stay does not require that the issues in such

separate proceedings are necessarily controlling of the action

before the court. Id. (quoting Levya, 593 F.2d at 863-64). 

However, “[a] stay should not be granted unless it appears likely

the other proceedings will be concluded within a reasonable time

in relation to the urgency of the claims presented to the court.” 

Id. (quoting Levya, 593 F.2d at 864). 

ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs request a stay of this pending action in light of

the Ninth Circuit’s grant of a petition to rehear the Beltran

case en banc. Plaintiffs contend that this pending decision is

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material to their case because the court relied on Beltran in its

Order granting in part and denying in part defendants’ motion for

summary judgment. Defendants oppose the stay, arguing that the

issues raised by Beltran are narrow and irrelevant to both this

court’s prior holdings and this case in general.

The issues raised by the parties in Beltran, both in the

Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc and the Response to

Petition for Rehearing En Banc, are broad in scope and material

to aspects of the court’s prior holdings in this case. (See Ex. A

to Def.’s Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot. to Stay (“Def.’s Opp’n”), filed

Nov. 13, 2007). Contrary to defendants’ assertions, the Beltran

parties present arguments not only relating to the specific

functions performed by the social workers in that case, but also

concerning the propriety of the scope of absolute immunity

afforded social workers under current Ninth Circuit law. 

Specifically, the appellants in Beltran contend that the en banc

court should not only reverse the three-judge panel’s decision in

Beltran, but should also overturn the holdings in Doe v. Lebbos,

348 F.3d 820 (9th Cir. 2003), Meyers v. Contra Costa County

Department of Social Services, 812 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1987), and

Coverdell v. Department of Social and Health Services, 834 F.2d

758 (9th Cir. 1987). (Petition for Rehearing, Ex. A to Def.’s

Opp’n, at 3, 7 n.6). The appellants assert that these cases

improperly expand the scope of judicial immunity and are at odds

with both Supreme Court precedent and the Ninth Circuit’s

decision in Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Conversely, the appellees contend that the three judge panel

properly applied absolute immunity to the social workers in their

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prior decisions and in the Beltran case. (Response to Petition,

Ex. A to Def.’s Opp’n, at 6-12).

In its June 29 Order, the court relied, inter alia, on the

Ninth Circuit’s decisions in Beltran and Lebbos in holding that

defendant Terry Chapman was absolutely immune from liability for

his actions taken during and after the juvenile court hearing. 

(Order at 41-42). As such, the en banc decision in Beltran is

likely to materially affect the court’s summary judgment order

with respect to defendant Terry Chapman. Even if the en banc

decision affirms the three judge panel’s decision, it will likely

give additional clarification and guidance on the scope and

applicability of absolute immunity to social workers. Such

further explanation may inform the potential liability of

defendant Terry Chapman. 

Based upon this court’s June 29 Order, the only triable

issues of fact relate to the liability of defendant Terry Chapman

for detaining the children prior to the juvenile court hearing. 

If the stay is not granted and the en banc decision in Beltran

changes or clarifies the scope of absolute immunity, the parties

could be faced with the prospect of another jury trial by the

same plaintiffs against the same defendant based upon a common,

or at least overlapping, set of facts. This would not only

create inefficiencies for the court, but would also result in the

needless expenditure of time and resources by the parties.

Further, the Ninth Circuit has calendared the Beltran matter

for oral argument on December 11, 2007 at 11:30 a.m. (Status of

Pending En Banc Cases, Nov. 13, 2007, at

http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/Documents.nsf/174376a6245fda78882

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3 Defendants appear to argue that this action could be

stayed indefinitely if the Beltran matter is appealed to the

Supreme Court. This issue is not presently before the court, and

as such, will not be addressed. See Landis, 299 U.S. at 257 (“If

a second stay is necessary during the course of an appeal, the

petitioners must bear the burden, when that stage shall have

arrived, of making obvious the need.”).

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56ce5007d5470/a59aac6c107bc187882572c2005d1b26?OpenDocument). 

While noting that there is no time limit, the Ninth Circuit

estimates that most cases are decided within three months to a

year from oral argument. (The Most Frequently Asked Questions of

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Updated March 5,

2007, available at http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov). As such, a

decision from the en banc court is expected within a reasonable

period of time. See Landis, 299 U.S. at 259 (finding that a

decision may be expected within a reasonable time and a stay was

warranted where, in the separate proceeding the briefs had been

prepared and the case had been argued on the merits).

Moreover, defendants have failed to identify a significant

hardship that would be brought about by the stay of this action. 

Defendants argue that they have had this case “hanging over their

heads since December 2004 when the tort claim was filed.” 

(Def.’s Opp’n at 5).3 While the court is not unsympathetic to

the strain of litigation, this burden is not sufficient to

outweigh the cost and inefficiency of potentially holding two

trials in this matter. Therefore, after weighing the competing

interests and hardships, the court in its sound discretion orders

this action STAYED in its entirety pending the Ninth Circuit’s en

banc decision in the matter of Beltran v. Santa Clara County. 

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4 In their reply brief, plaintiffs also assert that

Beltran may affect their ability to press a claim based upon an

alleged policy of Lassen County to play a “shell game with its

social workers” by assigning different social workers to each

different aspect of a case. This theory was not alleged against

Lassen County in plaintiffs’ complaint, nor was it argued in

their opposition to defendants’ motions for summary judgment. 

This stay does not by itself justify amendment to the complaint. 

Moreover, as set forth infra, the extent of absolute immunity

afforded social workers does not affect the court’s determination

that plaintiffs failed to proffer admissible evidence of a

pattern or practice of non-compliance by Lassen County. 

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The court notes, however, that the impact of Beltran is not

so far reaching as asserted by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs contend

that the en banc decision in Beltran would also affect the

liability of defendant Loel Griffith and defendant Lassen County. 

Plaintiffs are incorrect. The court’s grant of summary judgment

in favor of defendant Loel Griffith was not based upon the

application of absolute immunity. While the court noted in a

footnote that such defendant Griffith would also be entitled to

absolute immunity for her conduct, the basis for the court’s

holding was that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that Griffith

had the authority to reunite the plaintiffs and that plaintiffs

failed to substantiate any of their claims against Griffith with

admissible evidence. (Order at 22-29). This stay does not

afford plaintiffs a second bite at the apple to meet that burden.

Similarly, the court granted summary judgment in favor of

defendant Lassen County because plaintiffs failed to adduce any

admissible evidence that defendant Lassen County had a policy of

non-compliance. (Order at 45-50).4 The court’s analysis did not

hinge on an application of absolute immunity to Lassen County

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5 In fact, there is no mention of absolute immunity in

the court’s discussion of the viability of plaintiffs’ claims

against defendant Lassen County.

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social workers.5 Plaintiffs appear to argue that if defendant

Terry Chapman is no longer immune for his actions, defendant

Lassen County is also liable for his actions under § 1983. This

argument is implicitly premised upon a theory of respondeat

superior liability. However, the law is well settled that “a

municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat

superior theory.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658,

691 (1978). Rather, municipal liability must be premised upon a

showing that the municipality had a policy that amounts to

deliberate indifference to a constitutional right and that the

policy was the moving force behind the violation of that right. 

See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989). 

Plaintiffs failed to substantiate their claims against the County

with any admissible evidence; again, this stay does operate to

give plaintiffs a second chance to correct their prior

insufficiencies. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs’ motion for a stay of

this action pending the Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision in

Beltran v. Santa Clara County is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 20, 2007 

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