Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-01585/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-01585-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JULES ANTHONY GHOLAR, 

Petitioner, 

vs. 

ROBERT HICKMAN, 

Respondent. 

No. 2:12-cv-1585-MCE-EFB P

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

 Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel with a petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He challenges a judgment of conviction entered 

against him on May 7, 2010, in the Sacramento County Superior Court on charges of second 

degree murder with a sentencing enhancement for use of a firearm. He seeks federal habeas relief 

on the grounds that the trial court’s admission into evidence of statements made by the victim 

violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him. Upon careful 

consideration of the record and the applicable law, it is recommended that the petition be denied. 

I. Background

 In its unpublished memorandum and opinion affirming petitioner’s judgment of 

conviction on appeal, the California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District provided the 

following factual summary: 

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In the early morning of Thanksgiving Day, defendant, who had 

been using methamphetamine for several days and was restless and 

“acting weird,” shot Augusta James several times. As James lay 

dying in a pool of his own blood, he identified defendant as the 

shooter. A jury convicted defendant of second degree murder 

(Pen.Code, § 187, subd. (a)) and found true the enhancement for 

personal use of a firearm (Pen.Code, § 12022.53, subds.(b), (c) & 

(d)). Defendant was sentenced to 40 years to life in prison. 

On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred in admitting 

James's statements to his sister and the police as dying declarations. 

He contends there was insufficient evidence that James believed he 

was dying and the admission of James's statement to the police 

violated defendant's right to confrontation under the Sixth 

Amendment. We disagree and shall affirm. 

FACTS 

On the night before Thanksgiving Day 2008, defendant, Daneen 

Rothchild, Marvin Singleton, Augusta James (known as AJ), and 

his girlfriend Brenda Parker were at the house Daneen shared with 

her mother and daughter.1

 They were smoking crystal 

methamphetamine and marijuana, as well as drinking. Defendant 

and Singleton had been using methamphetamine for several days. 

Defendant looked as if he had not slept; he was acting “antsy” and 

“weird.” 

At some point defendant “flashed” a gun in front of Daneen and her 

mother, Deborah, while the three were in Deborah's room. At 

another point, while in another room of the house, defendant 

indicated that he wanted to speak to AJ alone, and asked others 

present to leave the room, so that he could “holler at [his] brother.” 

Daneen then became angry and asked everyone to leave her house. 

Singleton left the house, intending to “drop everyone off,” driving 

with defendant in the front seat and Parker and AJ in the backseat. 

When Singleton stopped at AJ's house, Parker went to the house but 

AJ stayed by the car. AJ was trying to get some more 

methamphetamine. He called someone and reported “the girl” 

would bring it. Defendant wanted some drugs too and asked to 

speak to the dealer, but AJ hung up and put the phone in his pocket. 

Defendant complained, “Man, you didn't hear me. I said, let me 

talk to her.” AJ let defendant use the phone and defendant made a 

call. He acted surprised during the call and was upset. 

Defendant pulled out a gun and said, “eh.” AJ leaned down by the 

car as if to hear or respond to defendant; defendant then fired twice. 

AJ turned and began running. Defendant jumped out of the car, 

leaving the door open, and followed AJ shooting. Singleton heard 

AJ make a sound—“ah, ah”—when he was hit. 

 1

 To avoid confusion, we adopt the parties' practice of referring to members of the 

Rothchild family by their first names. 

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Parker screamed. She and AJ's sister Antoinette went looking for 

AJ. They heard him calling to them. Antoinette asked AJ where he 

was shot and he responded, “[e]verywhere.” AJ told Antoinette, 

“That bitch ass nigga Jules shot me.” Antoinette did not tell the 

police that AJ had identified the shooter, even when they asked if 

she knew who shot her brother.2

When the police arrived at the scene, AJ was on the ground in a lot 

of pain; “[h]e was moaning, having trouble breathing, and kind of 

moving around a little bit.” There was a lot of blood. An officer 

asked AJ who shot him and AJ responded, “Jules.” This exchange 

was captured on tape by a camera in the patrol car. Parts of the tape 

are unintelligible. No one can be heard asking AJ who shot him, 

but an officer does ask, “Does anybody know who that was?” A.J. 

is heard to respond, “Jules.” 

AJ was taken to the hospital. He died from gunshot wounds to his 

chest and abdomen. He had suffered multiple gunshot wounds. 

The two most serious were a shot that entered his left shoulder, 

severed a vein and artery, injured his left lung, and fractured his 

collar bone and two ribs, and a shot to his back that exited his 

abdomen injuring his right lung and causing extensive damage to 

his liver. Liver injuries are often catastrophic due to blood loss and 

AJ suffered extensive blood loss. 

Meanwhile, immediately after the shooting Singleton drove back to 

Daneen's, arriving about 10 to 15 minutes after the group had left. 

He told Daneen and Deborah that defendant had shot AJ. Singleton 

took Daneen and her daughter to his sister's. Returning to Daneen's 

in the morning, they found a shell casing in the car and Daneen 

threw it out the window. Singleton thoroughly cleaned his car. 

Later that day, a neighbor witnessed a confrontation between 

Daneen and defendant. There were varying versions of what was 

said. Defendant said either, “I didn't do it” or “I didn't mean to do 

it.” Daneen may have said Singleton had a gun in his car, a MAC 

10. A MAC 10 looks similar to a Cobray M11/9 pistol, the gun a 

criminalist opined was likely used in the shooting. 

People v. Gholar, No. C065396, 2011 WL 3806265, **1 -2 (Cal.App. 3 Dist. Aug. 30, 2011). 

 After his judgment of conviction was affirmed on appeal, petitioner filed a petition for 

review. Resp’t’s Lodg. Doc. 5. By order dated November 16, 2011, that petition was summarily 

denied. Resp’t’s Lodg. Doc. 6. 

///// 

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 Antoinette also testified that she failed to report an incident in the courtroom during an 

earlier hearing where she claimed defendant mouthed the words, “I did, so what,” while holding 

his “hand shaped like a gun.” The deputy present did not observe this and no one else reported it. 

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II. Standards of Review Applicable to Habeas Corpus Claims 

 An application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody under a judgment of a 

state court can be granted only for violations of the Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(a). A federal writ is not available for alleged error in the interpretation or 

application of state law. See Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S.___, ___, 131 S. Ct. 13, 16 (2010); 

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 

2000). 

 Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) sets forth the following standards for granting federal habeas 

corpus relief: 

 An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a 

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not 

be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the 

merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the 

claim - 

 (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved 

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

 (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the 

State court proceeding. 

 For purposes of applying § 2254(d)(1), “clearly established federal law” consists of 

holdings of the United States Supreme Court at the time of the last reasoned state court decision. 

Thompson v. Runnels, 705 F.3d 1089, 1096 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Greene v. Fisher, ___ U.S. 

___, 132 S.Ct. 38 (2011); Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 859 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Williams v. 

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)). Circuit court precedent “may be persuasive in determining 

what law is clearly established and whether a state court applied that law unreasonably.” Stanley, 

633 F.3d at 859 (quoting Maxwell v. Roe, 606 F.3d 561, 567 (9th Cir. 2010)). However, circuit 

precedent may not be “used to refine or sharpen a general principle of Supreme Court 

jurisprudence into a specific legal rule that th[e] [Supreme] Court has not announced.” Marshall 

v. Rodgers, 133 S. Ct. 1446, 1450 (2013) (citing Parker v. Matthews, 132 S. Ct. 2148, 2155 

(2012) (per curiam)). Nor may it be used to “determine whether a particular rule of law is so 

widely accepted among the Federal Circuits that it would, if presented to th[e] [Supreme] Court, 

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be accepted as correct. Id. Further, where courts of appeals have diverged in their treatment of 

an issue, it cannot be said that there is “clearly established Federal law” governing that issue. 

Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006). 

 A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if it applies a rule 

contradicting a holding of the Supreme Court or reaches a result different from Supreme Court 

precedent on “materially indistinguishable” facts. Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 640 (2003). 

Under the “unreasonable application” clause of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court may grant the 

writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s 

decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case. 3 Lockyer v. 

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003); Williams, 529 U.S. at 413; Chia v. Cambra, 360 F.3d 997, 1002 

(9th Cir. 2004). In this regard, a federal habeas court “may not issue the writ simply because that 

court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly 

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be 

unreasonable.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. See also Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 

(2007); Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75 (it is “not enough that a federal habeas court, in its independent 

review of the legal question, is left with a ‘firm conviction’ that the state court was ‘erroneous.’”). 

“A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 

‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. 

Richter, 562 U.S.___,___,131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 

652, 664 (2004)). Accordingly, “[a]s a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal 

court, a state prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in 

federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and 

comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Richter,131 

S. Ct. at 786-87. 

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 Under § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision based on a factual determination is not to be 

overturned on factual grounds unless it is “objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence 

presented in the state court proceeding.” Stanley, 633 F.3d at 859 (quoting Davis v. Woodford, 

384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th Cir. 2004)). 

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 If the state court’s decision does not meet the criteria set forth in § 2254(d), a reviewing 

court must conduct a de novo review of a habeas petitioner’s claims. Delgadillo v. Woodford, 

527 F.3d 919, 925 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 735 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(en banc) (“[I]t is now clear both that we may not grant habeas relief simply because of 

§ 2254(d)(1) error and that, if there is such error, we must decide the habeas petition by 

considering de novo the constitutional issues raised.”). 

 The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state court 

judgment. Stanley, 633 F.3d at 859; Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). If 

the last reasoned state court decision adopts or substantially incorporates the reasoning from a 

previous state court decision, this court may consider both decisions to ascertain the reasoning of 

the last decision. Edwards v. Lamarque, 475 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). “When 

a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it may be 

presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication 

or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.” Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784-85. This 

presumption may be overcome by a showing “there is reason to think some other explanation for 

the state court’s decision is more likely.” Id. at 785 (citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 

803 (1991)). Similarly, when a state court decision on a petitioner’s claims rejects some claims 

but does not expressly address a federal claim, a federal habeas court must presume, subject to 

rebuttal, that the federal claim was adjudicated on the merits. Johnson v. Williams, ___ U.S. ___, 

___, 133 S.Ct. 1088, 1091 (2013). 

 Where the state court reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to 

support its conclusion, a federal habeas court independently reviews the record to determine 

whether habeas corpus relief is available under § 2254(d). Stanley, 633 F.3d at 860; Himes v. 

Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). “Independent review of the record is not de novo 

review of the constitutional issue, but rather, the only method by which we can determine whether 

a silent state court decision is objectively unreasonable.” Himes, 336 F.3d at 853. Where no 

reasoned decision is available, the habeas petitioner still has the burden of “showing there was no 

reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784. 

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 A summary denial is presumed to be a denial on the merits of the petitioner’s claims. 

Stancle v. Clay, 692 F.3d 948, 957 & n. 3 (9th Cir. 2012). While the federal court cannot analyze 

just what the state court did when it issued a summary denial, the federal court must review the 

state court record to determine whether there was any “reasonable basis for the state court to deny 

relief.” Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784. This court “must determine what arguments or theories . . . 

could have supported, the state court's decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible 

fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the 

holding in a prior decision of [the Supreme] Court.” Id. at 786. The petitioner bears “the burden 

to demonstrate that ‘there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.’” Walker v. 

Martel, 709 F.3d 925, 939 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784). 

 When it is clear, however, that a state court has not reached the merits of a petitioner’s 

claim, the deferential standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) does not apply and a federal 

habeas court must review the claim de novo. Stanley, 633 F.3d at 860; Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 

F.3d 1099, 1109 (9th Cir. 2006); Nulph v. Cook, 333 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2003). 

III. Petitioner’s Claim

 Petitioner’s sole claim before this court is that the trial court’s admission into evidence of 

the victim’s statements to his sister and to the police that he was shot by petitioner violated his 

right to confrontation of the witnesses against him, as set forth in Crawford v. Washington, 541 

U.S. 36 (2004). ECF No. 20 at 7-9.4

A. State Court Decision

 On direct appeal, petitioner argued that the victim’s statements to his sister and the police 

officer failed to satisfy the hearsay exception for dying declarations contained in California 

Evidence Code § 1242 and were therefore inadmissible. Resp’t’s Lodg. Doc. 2 at 21-35. He also 

argued that the victim’s statements to the police officer violated the Sixth Amendment 

///// 

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 Page number citations such as this one are to the page numbers reflected on the court’s 

CM/ECF system and not to page numbers assigned by the parties. 

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Confrontation Clause. Id. at 35-52. Petitioner did not argue that the victim’s statements to his 

sister violated the Confrontation Clause. 

 The California Court of Appeal rejected petitioner’s arguments, reasoning as follows: 

Defendant contends the trial court erred in admitting AJ's dying 

declarations to his sister and the police in which he identified 

defendant as the shooter.5

 He contends there was insufficient 

evidence that AJ was under a sense of impending death when he 

spoke. 

“Evidence of a statement made by a dying person respecting the 

cause and circumstances of his death is not made inadmissible by 

the hearsay rule if the statement was made upon his personal 

knowledge and under a sense of immediately impending death.” 

(Evid.Code, § 1242.) 

“The chief condition and characteristic of a ‘dying declaration’ is 

the ‘sense of immediately impending death’ (Evid.Code, § 1242), 

which may be shown by the declarant's own statements to that 

effect, or inferred from circumstances such as the declarant's 

physical condition, the extent of his injuries, his knowledge of his 

condition, and other types of statements made by the declarant. 

[Citations.]” (People v. Sims (1993) 5 Cal.4th 405, 458.) An 

express statement indicating knowledge of near death is not 

required; the declarant's mental state may be determined from the 

circumstances. (People v. Wilson (1942) 54 Cal.App.2d 434, 442.) 

Here, there was sufficient circumstantial evidence that AJ sensed 

his impending death. His condition was grave; he had been shot 

several times, severing a vein and artery, damaging internal organs, 

and fracturing bones. He had lost a considerable amount of blood. 

AJ was in extreme pain, moaning, and trying to move about. Due 

to injuries to both lungs, he was having trouble breathing. He knew 

the severity of his condition, telling his sister that he had been shot 

“[e]verywhere.” Courts have upheld admission of statements as 

dying declarations in similar circumstances. (People v. Mayo

(2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 535, 553–554 [circumstantial evidence of 

sense of impending death where declarant suffered 11 gunshot 

wounds, felt hot and wanted fan to cool himself, and asked if he had 

been shot in the head]; People v. Jones (1961) 197 Cal.App.2d 503, 

508 [declarant received two shotgun blasts from 30 feet, was shot 

four or five times with a revolver and was near death].) 

 5

 Defendant recognizes that he objected only to the admission of AJ's statement to the 

police, not to AJ's statement as reported by Antoinette. The People first indicated their intention 

to introduce AJ's statement to Antoinette when defendant renewed his objection to admission of 

AJ's statement to the police. Defendant argues that any objection to the second statement would 

have been futile, since the trial court denied both defendant's original motion and the motion to 

reconsider. The People do not argue that defendant has forfeited his Crawford (Crawford v. 

Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36) challenge to Antoinette's testimony of AJ's statement by his 

failure to object in the trial court. 

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We find the cases relied upon by defendant distinguishable. In 

People v. Keelin (1955) 136 Cal.App.2d 860, 873–874, the only 

evidence offered to show the declarant's sense of impending death 

was the testimony of a doctor about the declarant's condition. In 

People v. Westcott (1927) 86 Cal.App. 298, 307, the declarant's 

only recognition of his condition was his statement, “I am sick.” In 

People v. Smith (1913) 164 Cal. 451, 457, the declarant, despite 

mortal injuries, expressed hope he would live. 

The trial court did not err in admitting AJ's statements to his sister 

and to the police identifying defendant as the shooter as dying 

declarations. 

II 

Confrontation 

Defendant contends AJ's statement to the police was testimonial 

and its admission violated his confrontation rights under the Sixth 

Amendment. This contention was rejected in People v. Monterroso

(2004) 34 Cal.4th 743. 

In Crawford v. Washington, supra, 541 U.S. 36 [158 L.Ed.2d 177], 

the United States Supreme Court held use of an out-of-court 

statement that is testimonial in nature is prohibited by the Sixth 

Amendment's Confrontation Clause whether or not the statement is 

inherently reliable or meets an established exception to the hearsay 

rule unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant has had a 

prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness. “Where testimonial 

statements are at issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to 

satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually 

prescribes: confrontation.” (Id. at pp. 68–69 [158 L .Ed.2d at p. 

203].) 

The court left open the possibility that testimonial dying 

declarations, which were admissible at common law, could be 

admissible without violating the confrontation clause: “The one 

deviation we have found involves dying declarations. The 

existence of that exception as a general rule of criminal hearsay law 

cannot be disputed. [Citations.] Although many dying declarations 

may not be testimonial, there is authority for admitting even those 

that clearly are. [Citations.] We need not decide in this case 

whether the Sixth Amendment incorporates an exception for 

testimonial dying declarations. If this exception must be accepted 

on historical grounds, it is sui generis.” (Crawford v. Washington, 

supra, 541 U.S. at p. 56, fn. 6 [158 L.Ed.2d at p. 195].) 

Since Crawford, the United States Supreme Court has again 

recognized that dying declarations are a historical exception to the 

requirement of confrontation for testimonial statements. (Giles v.. 

California (2008) 554 U.S. 353, 358 [171 L.Ed.2d 488, 495].) The 

high court has not, however, addressed whether the historical 

exception remains valid. (See Michigan v. Bryant (2011) 562 U.S. -

--, --- [179 L.Ed.2d 93, 131], diss. opn. of Ginsburg, J. [“Were the 

issue properly tendered here, I would take up the question whether 

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the exception for dying declarations survives our recent 

Confrontation Clause decisions”].) 

The California Supreme Court, however, has directly answered the 

question left open in Crawford. In People v. Monterroso, supra, 34 

Cal.4th 743, the court held the admission into evidence of dying 

declarations, even if testimonial in nature, does not violate a 

criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. “[I]f, 

as Crawford teaches, the confrontation clause ‘is most naturally 

read as a reference to the right of confrontation at common law, 

admitting only those exceptions established at the time of the 

founding’ [citations], it follows that the common law pedigree of 

the exception for dying declarations poses no conflict with the Sixth 

Amendment. We therefore conclude the admission of [the victim's] 

dying declaration was not error.” (Monterroso, supra, 34 Cal.4th at 

p. 765.) 

We are bound by the decisions of the California Supreme Court. 

(Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 

455.) Accordingly, we reject defendant's contention that the 

admission of AJ's dying declaration violated his Sixth Amendment 

right to confrontation.6

Gholar, 2011 WL 3806265, at **2 -4. 

B. Applicable Law 

 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution grants a criminal defendant the 

right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. “The ‘main 

and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the opponent the opportunity of crossexamination.’” Fenenbock v. Director of Corrections for California, 692 F.3d 910, 919 (9th Cir. 

2012) (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678 (1986)). The Confrontation Clause 

applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 

(1965). 

 In Crawford, the United States Supreme Court held that the Confrontation Clause bars the 

state from introducing into evidence out-of-court statements which are “testimonial” in nature 

unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the 

witness, regardless of whether such statements are deemed reliable. Crawford v. Washington, 

541 U.S. 36 (2004). The Crawford rule applies only to hearsay statements that are “testimonial” 

 6

 As in Monterroso, we need not decide whether AJ's dying declaration was testimonial 

in nature. (People v. Monterroso, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 765, fn. 5.) 

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and does not bar the admission of non-testimonial hearsay statements. Id. at 42, 51, 68. See also 

Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 420 (2007) (“the Confrontation Clause has no application to” 

an “out-of-court nontestimonial statement.”) 

 Although the Crawford court declined to provide a comprehensive definition of the term 

“testimonial,” it stated that “[s]tatements taken by police officers in the course of interrogations 

are . . . testimonial under even a narrow standard.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52. The court also 

provided the following “formulations” of a “core class” of testimonial statements: (1) “ex parte 

in-court testimony or its functional equivalent – that is, material such as affidavits, custodial 

examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial 

statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially;” (2) “extrajudicial 

statements . . . contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior 

testimony, or confessions;” and (3) “statements that were made under circumstances which would 

lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a 

later trial.” Id. at 51-52. The court in Crawford also pointed out that the Sixth Amendment 

Confrontation Clause “does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than 

establishing the truth of the matter asserted.” Id. at 59, n. 9. However, “state evidence rules do 

not trump a defendant’s constitutional right to confrontation,” and a reviewing court “ensures that 

an out-of-court statement was introduced for a ‘legitimate, nonhearsay purpose’ before relying on 

the not-for-its-truth rationale to dismiss the Confrontation Clause’s application.” (citation 

omitted). Williams v. Illinois, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 2221, 2226 (2012). 

C. Analysis 

 1. The Victim’s Statement to his Sister

 In the petition before this court, petitioner claims that the trial court’s admission into 

evidence of the victim’s statement to his sister violated the Sixth Amendment Confrontation 

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 Respondent argues that this claim was not exhausted in state court and should be denied 

on that basis. ECF No. 25 at 9-11. 

 Generally, a state prisoner must exhaust all available state court remedies, either on direct 

appeal or through collateral proceedings, before a federal court may consider granting habeas 

corpus relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). However, a federal court considering a habeas petition 

may deny an unexhausted claim on the merits when it is perfectly clear that the claim is not 

“colorable.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (“An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied 

on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the 

courts of the State”); Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 624 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that “a 

federal court may deny an unexhausted petition on the merits only when it is perfectly clear that 

the applicant does not raise even a colorable federal claim”). Assuming arguendo that this claim 

was not exhausted in state court, for the reasons that follow, this court will recommend that it be 

denied on the merits. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) 

 The victim’s statement to his sister that he was shot by petitioner is not “testimonial” and 

therefore is not prohibited by the Confrontation Clause. The statement was not made under 

circumstances which would lead an objective witness to believe it would be available for later use 

at a trial, nor was it made to a government officer, as was the case in Crawford. Finally, the 

statement does not fall within the “per se” examples of testimonial evidence offered by the 

Crawford court, all of which involve out-of-court statements elicited by a government officer 

with a view to prosecution. Rather, the victim made the statement to his sister with no 

expectation it would be used by a prosecutor at a later trial. Under these circumstances, the 

statement is not inadmissible under the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause. See Jensen v. 

Pliler, 439 F.3d 1086 (9th Cir. 2006) (statements made by declarant to his attorney were nontestimonial and therefore not barred by the Confrontation Clause); Doan v. Carter, 548 F.3d 449, 

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 Any claim that the victim’s statements to the police and/or to his sister were improperly 

admitted under California law or statute is not cognizable in this federal habeas corpus 

proceeding. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67. As explained above, a federal writ is not available for 

alleged error in the interpretation or application of state law. Wilson v. Corcoran, 131 S. Ct. at 

16. 

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458 (6th Cir. 2008) (victim’s statements to friends and neighbors not testimonial); United States 

v. Manfre, 368 F.3d 832, 838 n.1 (8th Cir. 2004) (statements made by declarant to family 

members were not “testimonial” because they were “not the kind of memorialized, judicialprocess-created evidence of which Crawford speaks”); Gonzales v. Clark, No. CV 08-02251-AG 

(VBK), 2009 WL 3233906, *8 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2009) (petitioner’s private statements to his 

aunt not testimonial in nature). Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on 

this Sixth Amendment claim. 

 2. Victim’s Statement to Police Officer

 Petitioner also claims that the trial court’s admission into evidence of the victim’s 

statement to police officers that petitioner shot him violated the Confrontation Clause. Assuming 

arguendo that petitioner’s statement to the police was “testimonial,” as that term has been defined 

by the United States Supreme Court, this claim should also be denied. 

 As explained above, a federal habeas court must deny habeas relief with respect to any 

claim adjudicated on the merits in a state court proceeding unless the proceeding “resulted in a 

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established 

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or “resulted in a decision 

that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in 

the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2). “Clearly established Federal law” 

under § 2254(d)(1) is the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at 

the time the state court renders its decision.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72 (2003). 

The victim’s statement to the police that petitioner shot him was admitted into evidence at 

petitioner’s trial as a dying declaration. As noted by the California Court of Appeal, at the time 

the state court rendered its decision on this Sixth Amendment claim, the United States Supreme 

Court had expressly declined to decide whether dying declarations constitute an exception to the 

rule announced in Crawford. Accordingly, there is no clearly established United States Supreme 

Court case which “squarely addresses” this issue. Under these circumstances, the state court did 

not unreasonably apply federal law in concluding that petitioner was not entitled to relief with 

respect to his claim that the victim’s testimonial statement to police violated the dictates of 

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Crawford. See Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 754 (9th Cir. 2009) (“we conclude that when a 

Supreme Court decision does not ‘squarely address[ ] the issue in th[e] case . . . it cannot be said, 

under AEDPA, there is ‘clearly established’ Supreme Court precedent addressing the issue before 

us, and so we must defer to the state court's decision”); Earp v. Ornoski, 431 F.3d 1158, 1185 

(9th Cir. 2005) (petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim failed under AEDPA because 

the issue was an “open question” in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court). In the absence of 

an on point decision by the United States Supreme Court, the state court’s decision with respect to 

this Sixth Amendment claim is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court 

authority. 

IV. Conclusion 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s application for a writ of 

habeas corpus be denied. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections 

shall be served and filed within fourteen days after service of the objections. Failure to file 

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 

Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 

1991). In his objections petitioner may address whether a certificate of appealability should issue 

in the event he files an appeal of the judgment in this case. See Rule 11, Rules Governing Section 

2254 Cases (the district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a 

final order adverse to the applicant). 

DATED: June 23, 2015. 

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