Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01411/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01411-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 

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NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

VEHICLE INTELLIGENCE AND SAFETY LLC,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC, DAIMLER AG,

Defendants-Appellees

______________________ 

2015-1411

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois in No. 1:13-cv-04417, Senior 

Judge William T. Hart.

______________________ 

Decided: December 28, 2015

______________________ 

KEVIN ROE, Vehicle Intelligence and Safety LLC, 

Campbell, CA, for plaintiff-appellant.

SCOTT W. DOYLE, Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP, Washington, DC, for defendants-appellees. 

Also represented by JONATHAN RICHARD DEFOSSE. 

______________________ 

Before MOORE, CLEVENGER, and REYNA, Circuit 

Judges.

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2 VEHICLE INTELLIGENCE v. MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC

PER CURIAM. 

Vehicle Intelligence and Safety LLC appeals from the 

Northern District of Illinois’s judgment declaring claims 

8, 9, and 11–18 of U.S. Patent No. 7,394,392 (“disputed 

claims”) invalid as drawn to patent-ineligible subject 

matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.1 Because the disputed

claims cover only abstract ideas coupled with routine 

data-gathering steps and conventional computer activity, 

we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

The ’392 patent claims methods and systems that 

screen equipment operators for impairment, selectively 

test those operators, and control the equipment if an 

impairment is detected. ’392 patent at Abstract. The ’392 

specification lists examples of equipment within the scope 

of its claims, including “automobiles, trucks, industrial 

vehicles, public transportation vehicles, such as buses, 

subways, trains, planes, and ships, and dangerous machinery in general.” Id. at 3:55–57. It also provides 

examples of the types of impairments its claimed methods 

and systems may screen for and test: intoxication (from 

alcohol or chemicals); physical impairments (injuries from 

accidents or “violence against” the operator, blindness, 

lack of air, or poisonous or disabling gases or dust); medical impairments (stroke, heart attack, diabetic coma, 

exhaustion, or infectious disease); or emotional impairment (grief, anger, psychosis, anxiety, or euphoria). Id. at 

5:25–38. It provides similarly broad lists of examples of 

1 We note that despite the district court’s general 

statement in its dismissal opinion and order that the ’392 

patent is invalid, the district court only analyzed claims 8, 

9, and 11–18 in its opinion and the parties only discuss 

these claims on appeal. We interpret the order as limited 

to these claims. 

 

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the characteristics its claimed methods and systems can 

screen for, id. at 6:11–31, other factors that can be selectively tested for, id. at 7:60–8:3, and how the equipment 

can be controlled, id. at 8:14–31. According to Vehicle 

Intelligence, the “most important” claims are 8 and 16, 

Appellant’s Br. 5–6, which recite:

8. A method to screen an equipment operator for 

impairment, comprising:

screening an equipment operator by one or 

more expert systems to detect potential 

impairment of said equipment operator;

selectively testing said equipment operator when said screening of said equipment 

operator detects potential impairment of 

said equipment operator; and

controlling operation of said equipment if 

said selective testing of said equipment 

operator indicates said impairment of said 

equipment operator, wherein said screening of said equipment operator includes a 

time-sharing allocation of at least one processor executing at least one expert system.

16. A system to screen an equipment operator, 

comprising:

a screening module to screen and selectively test an equipment operator when 

said screening indicates potential impairment of said equipment operator, wherein 

said screening module utilizes one or more 

expert system modules in screening said 

equipment operator; and

a control module to control operation of 

said equipment if said selective testing of 

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4 VEHICLE INTELLIGENCE v. MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC

said equipment operator indicates said 

impairment of said equipment operator, 

wherein said screening module includes 

one or more expert system modules that 

utilize at least a portion of one or more 

equipment modules selected from the 

group of equipment modules consisting of: 

an operations module, an audio module, a 

navigation module, an anti-theft module, 

and a climate control module.

In June 2013, Vehicle Intelligence brought suit 

against Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC and Daimler AG (“Defendants”), alleging infringement of the ’392 patent. 

Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), which the district 

court denied without prejudice to renewal after claim 

construction. Following claim construction, the district 

court granted Defendants’ second Rule 12(c) motion, 

declaring the disputed claims invalid as drawn to patentineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and dismissing the case with prejudice. Vehicle Intelligence 

appeals. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. 

§ 1295(a)(1). 

DISCUSSION

We review judgments arising from motions to dismiss 

under the law of the regional circuit. OIP Techs., Inc. v. 

Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 

The Seventh Circuit reviews appeals of dismissals pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) de novo, 

applying the same standard used for dismissals for failure 

to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Buchanan-Moore v. 

Cty. of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009). 

Because patent eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is an 

issue of law, we review it de novo. OIP Techs., 788 F.3d 

at 1362.

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The district court determined, and the parties do not 

dispute, that the claims at issue fall within the broad 

categories identified in 35 U.S.C. § 101 (i.e., “any new and 

useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of 

matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof”). 

The question on appeal is whether these claims fall into 

the judicially created exception of patent-ineligible abstract ideas. To answer this question, we apply the twostep test introduced in Mayo Collaborative Services v. 

Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1296–98

(2012), and further explained in Alice Corp. Party v. CLS 

Bank International, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014). First, 

we “determine whether the claims at issue are directed to 

a patent-ineligible concept.” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355. 

Second, we “examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient 

to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patenteligible application.” Id. at 2357. This step requires 

examining the elements of each claim both individually 

and as an ordered combination. Id. at 2355. As the 

Supreme Court has explained, “transformation into a 

patent-eligible application requires more than simply 

stating the abstract idea while adding the words ‘apply 

it.’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294) (internal 

quotation marks and alterations omitted). 

We agree with the district court that Mayo/Alice step 

one is met here. The claims at issue are drawn to a 

patent-ineligible concept, specifically the abstract idea of 

testing operators of any kind of moving equipment for any 

kind of physical or mental impairment. None of the 

claims at issue are limited to a particular kind of impairment, explain how to perform either screening or testing 

for any impairment, specify how to program the “expert 

system” to perform any screening or testing, or explain 

the nature of control to be exercised on the vehicle in 

response to the test results. 

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Much of Vehicle Intelligence’s briefing centers on the 

use of an “expert system” that improves over the prior art 

by providing faster, more accurate and reliable impairment testing. But neither the claims at issue nor the 

specification provide any details as to how this “expert 

system” works or how it produces faster, more accurate 

and reliable results. The most detailed description of the 

“expert system” is in Figure 8 of the ’392 patent:

See also ’392 patent at 10:65–67 (“FIG. 8 illustrates an 

expert system implementation of the screening module 

104 shown in FIG. 1 to screen an equipment operator. . . 

.”). The description for Figure 8 states that the “decision 

module 1002 makes the actual determination of whether 

or not the equipment operator is impaired and decides 

which control response to make if there is an impairment.” Id. at 11:5–9. It then lists equipment operator 

characteristics that may be measured and states that this 

information is used to determine if the equipment operator has a “true impairment.” Id. at 11:9–33; see also id. at 

11:44–60. But critically absent from the entire patent is 

how the existing vehicle equipment can be used to measure these characteristics; assuming these measurements 

can be made, how the decision module determines if an 

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operator is impaired based on these measurements; 

assuming this determination can be made, how the decision module decides which control response to make; and 

assuming the control response decision can be made, how 

the “expert system” effectuates the chosen control response. At best, the ’392 patent answers the question of 

how to provide faster, more accurate and reliable impairment testing by simply stating “use an expert system.” 

Thus, in the absence of any details about how the “expert 

system” works, the claims at issue are drawn to a patentineligible abstract idea, satisfying Mayo/Alice step one. 

Vehicle Intelligence challenges the district court’s application of Mayo/Alice step one, arguing that the district 

court erred in finding this step satisfied because the 

claims at issue do not preempt all equipment operator 

testing. It argues that the existence of prior art methods 

of equipment operator testing, evidenced by the eleven

prior art references identified in the ’392 specification, 

prove that the claims at issue do not preempt the abstract 

idea of performing equipment operator testing because 

these references describe non-infringing methods for 

doing so. This argument is meritless. As the Supreme 

Court has explained, the preemption concern is the basis 

for the creation of the three judicial exceptions to statutory patent eligibility. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2354–55. And 

while assessing the preemptive effect of a claim helps to 

inform the Mayo/Alice two-step analysis, the mere existence of a non-preempted use of an abstract idea does not 

prove that a claim is drawn to patent-eligible subject 

matter. If we adopt Vehicle Intelligence’s argument, all a 

patentee would need do to insulate itself from a § 101 

challenge would be to identify a single prior art reference 

in the specification and state that its invention improves 

upon that reference. Vehicle Intelligence’s additional 

arguments regarding Mayo/Alice step one do not remove 

the claims from being drawn to patent-ineligible abstract 

ideas. Moreover, many of these arguments are more 

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8 VEHICLE INTELLIGENCE v. MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC

properly considered in Mayo/Alice step two, and are 

addressed below.

We also agree with the district court that the claims 

at issue fail Mayo/Alice step two. Nothing in these 

claims—considered as individual elements or an ordered 

combination—disclose an inventive concept sufficient to 

transform the abstract idea of testing operators of any 

kind of moving equipment for any kind of physical or 

mental impairment into a patent-eligible application of 

that idea. 

Vehicle Intelligence argues that its methods are embedded in “specialized existing equipment modules,” as 

opposed to generic computers, which renders them patenteligible. Appellant’s Br. 15. The ’392 specification explains that the “specialized existing equipment modules” 

are things such as the gas and brake pedals and the

steering wheel of a car (i.e., “equipment operations module allowing the equipment operator to control . . . speed 

of operation and direction of movement”), and stereo, 

navigation, anti-theft, and climate-control systems. ’392 

patent at 6:32–49, 12:10–15. But markedly absent from 

the ’392 patent is any explanation of how the methods at 

issue can be embedded into these existing modules. The 

only details related to this point provided in the claims at 

issue is that the methods involve using “at least a portion 

of” these existing equipment modules (claims 9, 12, and 

16–18) and “a time-sharing allocation of at least one 

processor executing at least one expert system” (claims 8, 

9, and 11–15). The specification does not provide any 

more detail and, in fact, explains that the processors used 

in the methods may be “based on any commercially available microprocessor of any word bit width and clock 

speed, a control Read-Only-Memory, or a data processing 

equivalent.” Id. at 7:9–22. As Vehicle Intelligence admits, executing its expert systems using existing equipment modules “would entail hardware and software 

differences compared to execution in a larger generic 

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computer.” Appellant’s Br. 23. Yet the ’392 patent is 

completely devoid of any explanation of what these hardware and software differences are, let alone any explanation how to implement them using the existing equipment 

modules. We note the district court’s claim construction 

of the term “expert system(s).” Vehicle Intelligence & 

Safety LLC v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, No. 13 C 4417, 

2014 WL 4652563, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 18, 2014). This 

construction does not affect our conclusion regarding 

patentability because Vehicle Intelligence does not argue, 

and it is not apparent from the record, that the construction requires anything beyond a purely conventional 

computer implementation. See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358. 

Vehicle Intelligence’s argument harkens back to our preAlice machine-or-transformation test in arguing that the 

claimed methods are tied to particular machines and that 

alone is sufficient to confer eligibility. But, postMayo/Alice, this is no longer sufficient to render a claim 

patent-eligible. DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 

773 F.3d 1245, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Merely stating that 

the methods at issue are performed on already existing 

vehicle equipment, without more, does not save the disputed claims from abstraction. 

Vehicle Intelligence argues that there are at least four 

inventive concepts in the claims at issue: 1) screening by 

one or more expert systems; 2) selectively testing; 3) a 

time-sharing allocation of at least one processor; and 4) a 

screening module that includes one or more expert systems that use at least a portion of one or more equipment 

modules. But the claims do not specify what screening 

should be done or how the expert system would perform 

such screening. They do not explain how to select the

tests to run or even what tests to select from. They do not 

explain how the “time-sharing allocation” on a processor 

should be done. And they do not explain how the expert 

system works to screen for impairments or how such 

systems can be portioned out over one or more equipment 

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modules. The claims merely state the abstract idea of 

testing an equipment operator for impairments using an 

unspecified “expert system” running on equipment that 

already exists in various vehicles. This is not sufficient to 

pass Mayo/Alice step two. See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355.

Finally, Vehicle Intelligence argues that our analysis 

in DDR Holdings applies to the claims at issue here. 

Appellant’s Br. 19. It argues that its claims are necessarily rooted in computer technology in order to satisfy a need 

for faster, more accurate and reliable impairment testing 

of vehicle operators, a problem it characterizes as “truly 

life or death.” Id. There are two problems with this 

argument. The claims at issue are not “necessarily rooted 

in computer technology in order to overcome a problem 

specifically arising in the realm of computer networks” as 

in DDR Holdings. 773 F.3d at 1257. The claims do not 

address a problem arising in the realm of computer networks—they are broadly drafted to cover testing a vehicle 

operator for impairments, similar to a police officer fieldtesting a driver for sobriety. Second, the claims at issue 

do not recite faster, more accurate and reliable impairment testing than what was known in the prior art. As 

explained above, they merely recite using an undefined

“expert system” to screen and test for impairments. The 

specification does not explain how this “expert system” 

achieves any improvements over the prior art. Rather, 

the specification lists “at least ten major advantages to 

using expert system screening in conjunction with already 

existing modules in equipment to detect impairment in an 

equipment operator” without explaining how the expert 

system achieves these advantages. ’392 patent at 6:50–

7:8. Such bald assertions made at such a high level of 

generality and not tied to any claim language do not 

provide an “inventive concept” sufficient to save these 

claims from patent-ineligibility. We have considered 

Vehicle Intelligence’s remaining arguments and they are 

without merit. 

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district 

court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED

COSTS

Costs to Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC and Daimler AG.

 

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