Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05645/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05645-16/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Bivens Act

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 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES KEEN,

Plaintiff,

vs.

AMY NOBLE, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CV F 04-5645 AWI WMW P

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(Document #56)

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a federal inmate and is proceeding in this action against United States Bureau

of Prisons (“BOP”) officials for conduct that occurred while Plaintiff was housed at the United

States Penitentiary at Atwater (“Atwater”). Plaintiff claims that Defendants prohibited him

from the free exercise of his religious beliefs in violation of the First Amendment, the Land Use

and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act

(“RFRA”). Specifically, Plaintiff contends that Defendants violated the First Amendment,

RLUIPA, and RFRA by denying him personal possession of runestones (a collection of 24 stones

made from wood, which have the Celtic alphabet painted on them) and permission to construct a

hof (a type of wooden enclosed shelter). Plaintiff also claims that Defendants’ conduct

violated his equal protection rights under the Fifth Amendment. Finally, Plaintiff claims that

Defendants’ actions violated the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).

On December 26, 2006, Plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment. 

Plaintiff’s motion concerns Defendants’ denial of runestones. Plaintiff contends that the

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undisputed facts show that Defendants violated his First Amendment rights, RLUIPA rights,

RFRA rights, and Fifth Amendment rights by refusing to allow Plaintiff to possess runestones

when other prisoners are allowed similar instruments to practice their religious beliefs. 

Defendants have never filed an opposition to Plaintiff’s motion. 

The Magistrate Judge has never filed Findings and Recommendations that addressed this

motion.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists no genuine

issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970); Poller v.

Columbia Broadcast System, 368 U.S. 464, 467 (1962); Jung v. FMC Corp., 755 F.2d 708, 710

(9th Cir. 1985); Loehr v. Ventura County Community College Dist., 743 F.2d 1310, 1313 (9th

Cir. 1984).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party 

[A]lways bears the initial responsibility of informing the district

court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of

"the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any," which it

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material

fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). When the moving party has the burden of

proof at trial, that party must carry its initial burden at summary judgment by presenting evidence

affirmatively showing, for all essential elements of its case, that no reasonable jury could find for

the non-moving party. United States v. Four Parcels of Real Property, 941 F.2d 1428, 1438 (11th

Cir.1991) (en banc); Calderone v. United States, 799 F.2d 254, 259 (6 Cir. 1986); see also th

E.E.O.C. v. Union Independiente De La Autoridad De Acueductos Y Alcantarillados De Puerto

Rico, 279 F.3d 49, 55 (1 Cir. 2002) (stating that if “party moving for summary judgment bears

st

the burden of proof on an issue, he cannot prevail unless the evidence that he provides on that

issue is conclusive.”) If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts

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to the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); Nissan Fire &

Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Companies, Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9 Cir. 2000). th

DISCUSSION

While Defendants have failed to oppose Plaintiff’s motion, the court cannot review

Plaintiff’s motion in isolation without reference to this court’s knowledge of other pleadings. In

this case, Defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint and/or for summary judgment. An

order addressing this motion is being entered along with this order. Thus, the court will consider

the evidence of which this court is aware that Defendants provided in support of their motion in

determining whether a disputed issue of material fact exists.

As explained in more detail in the court’s order resolving Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff’s

First Amendment claim requires him to show that Defendants burdened the practice of his

religion by preventing him from engaging in conduct mandated by his faith, without any

justification reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. See Freeman v. Arpaio,125

F.3d 732, 736 (9 Cir. 1997). RLUIPA requires Plaintiff to show that Defendants substantially th

burdened the exercise of his religious beliefs, and, if he does so, Defendants must demonstrate

that any substantial burden is both in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and the

least restrictive means that furthers the compelling governmental interest. See 42 U.S.C. §

2000cc-1; Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 994-95 (9 Cir. 2005). Similarly, RFRA th

requires Plaintiff to show that his religious beliefs are substantially burdened, and RFRA

prohibits such a burden unless the government demonstrates a compelling governmental interest

and uses the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a), (b);

Guam v. Guerrero, 290 F.3d 1210, 1220-21 (9 Cir. 2002). th

Plaintiff provides evidence that both the Asatru religion and Plaintiff’s own personal

beliefs require him to personally possess runestones. Plaintiff provides evidence that allowing

him to have rune cards or runestones made of plastic is not sufficient. Along with their motion

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for summary judgment, Defendants provide evidence that their research of the Asatru religion

revealed that personal possession of runestones is not required. Defendants provide evidence

that possession of rune cards, along with access to runestones during ceremonies, is sufficient. 

Based on this conflicting evidence there is a disputed issue of fact on the burden to Plaintiff’s

religion of not being allowed to personally possess runestones made from wood. Because there

is a disputed issue of material fact on the burden imposed to Plaintiff’s religious beliefs by not

allowing Plaintiff to personally possess runestones, Plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment

on Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim, RLUIPA claim, and RFRA claim concerning the

possession of runestones.

Plaintiff also moves for summary judgment on his equal protection claim. The Equal

Protection Clause requires that persons who are similarly situated be treated alike. City of

Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). The complaint alleges that

Defendants’ denial of runestones violated Plaintiff’s equal protection rights because Plaintiff

“was denied privileges similar to those accorded to inmates of other religious faiths.” As

explained in more detail in the order addressing Defendants’ motion, this allegation is

insufficient to state an equal protection violation. The complaint fails to allege how inmates of

other religious were similarly situated to Plaintiff. Accordingly, Plaintiff is not entitled to

summary judgment on this claim.

ORDER

Accordingly, the court ORDERS that Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment is

DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 18, 2007 /s/ Anthony W. Ishii 

0m8i78 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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