Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_13-cv-00532/USCOURTS-almd-2_13-cv-00532-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1 

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

NORTHERN DIVISION 

FREDRICK BENARD MOSLEY, ) 

AIS #233819, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

 v. ) CASE NO. 2:13-CV-532-WHA 

 ) (WO) 

 ) 

KENNETH SCONYERS, et al., ) 

) 

 Defendants. ) 

 

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

I. INTRODUCTION 

 This case is before the court on a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint filed by Fredrick 

Benard Mosley (“Mosley”), a state inmate. On September 12, 2013, the court dismissed 

various claims and defendants from this case. Doc. No. 22. With respect to the claims 

currently before the court, Mosley challenges the constitutionality of force used against 

him on July 10, 2013, by officers at the Easterling Correctional Facility (“Easterling”), 

while obtaining his fingerprints, and the failure of other officers to protect him from this 

alleged unconstitutional use of force. Compl. - Doc. No. 1 at 3 (The defendants “twisted 

my neck back to the side, trying [to] pull [out] my eyes and ears by submissional moves. . 

. [and] my [ankle] was hurt.”). Mosley also alleges that the nurse who examined him on 

this date acted with deliberate indifference to his injuries. Finally, Mosley challenges the 

constitutionality of the taking of his fingerprints. The defendants remaining in this cause 

of action are Warden Kenneth Sconyers, Capt. Michael Strickland, Capt. Nathaniel 

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Lawson, Lt. Phelix Woods, Officer Patricia Liptrot, Officer Ken Brook, Officer Rodney 

Wilson and Nurse Dianne Bowman.1

 Mosley seeks a declaratory judgment and monetary 

damages for the alleged violations of his constitutional rights. 

The defendants filed answers, special reports and supporting evidentiary materials, 

including affidavits, certified prison records, a verified DVD and certified medical records, 

addressing Mosley’s claims for relief. In these documents, the defendants deny they acted 

in violation of Mosley’s constitutional rights. After receipt of the defendants’ special 

reports, the court issued an order directing Mosley to file a response to the reports, 

including affidavits or statements made under penalty of perjury and other evidentiary 

materials. Doc. No. 35 at 2. The order specifically cautioned Mosley that “unless within 

fifteen (15) days form the date of this order a party . . . presents sufficient legal cause 

why such action should not be undertaken . . . the court may at any time [after expiration 

of the time for his response] and without further notice to the parties (1) treat the special 

reports and any supporting evidentiary materials as a motion for summary judgment and 

(2) after considering any response as allowed by this order, rule on the motion for summary 

judgment in accordance with the law.” Id. 2-3. Pursuant to this order, the court deems it 

appropriate to treat the defendants’ reports as motions for summary judgment. Thus, this 

case is now pending on the defendants’ motions for summary judgment. 

 

1Mosley initially identifies Nurse Bowman as “Nurse Bowen” but thereafter does not dispute that this defendant’s 

true last name is Bowman. For purposes of this Recommendation, the court will utilize the correct name for this 

defendant. Any reference herein to Nurse Bowman is therefore a reference to Nurse Bowen. 

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Upon consideration of these motions, the evidentiary materials filed in support 

thereof, including the DVD, the sworn complaint and the plaintiff’s response to the reports, 

the court concludes that the defendants’ motions for summary judgment are due to be 

granted. 

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 

 “Summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no 

genuine [dispute] as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment 

as a matter of law.’” Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th 

Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (citation to former rule omitted); Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 56(a) (“The 

court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute 

as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”).1 The 

party moving for summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility of informing 

the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the [record, 

including pleadings, discovery materials and affidavits], which it believes demonstrate the 

absence of a genuine issue [- now dispute -] of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 

477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590, 593 (11th Cir. 

 

 1Effective December 1, 2010, Rule 56 was “revised to improve the procedures for presenting and deciding 

summary-judgment motions.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 Advisory Committee Notes. Under this revision, “[s]ubdivision (a) 

carries forward the summary-judgment standard expressed in former subdivision (c), changing only one word -- 

genuine ‘issue’ becomes genuine ‘dispute.’ ‘Dispute’ better reflects the focus of a summary-judgment determination.” 

Id. “‘Shall’ is also restored to express the direction to grant summary judgment.” Id. Despite these stylistic changes, 

the substance of Rule 56 remains the same and, therefore, all cases citing prior versions of the rule remain equally 

applicable to the current rule. 

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1995) (moving party has initial burden of showing there is no genuine dispute of material 

fact for trial). The movant may meet this burden by presenting evidence indicating there 

is no dispute of material fact or by showing that the nonmoving party has failed to present 

appropriate evidence in support of some element of its case on which it bears the ultimate 

burden of proof. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-324. 

 The defendants have met their evidentiary burden and demonstrated the absence of 

any genuine dispute of material fact with respect to the claims presented by the plaintiff. 

Based on the foregoing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish, with appropriate 

evidence beyond the pleadings, that a genuine dispute material to his case exists. Clark v. 

Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(3) (“If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to 

properly address another party’s assertion of fact by [citing to materials in the record 

including affidavits, relevant documents or other materials] the court may . . . grant 

summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials -- including the facts considered 

undisputed -- show that the movant is entitled to it.”); Jeffery, 64 F.3d at 593-594 (internal 

quotation marks omitted) (Once the moving party meets its burden, “the non-moving party 

must then go beyond the pleadings, and by its own affidavits [or statements made under 

penalty of perjury], or by depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,” 

demonstrate that there is a genuine dispute of material fact.). This court will also consider 

“specific facts” pled in a plaintiff’s sworn complaint when considering his opposition to 

summary judgment. Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1098 (11th Cir. 

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2014). A genuine dispute of material fact exists when the nonmoving party produces 

evidence that would allow a reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in its favor. 

Greenberg, 498 F.3d at 1263; Allen v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. for Bibb Cty., 495 F.3d 1306, 1313 

(11th Cir. 2007). 

 In civil actions filed by inmates, federal courts 

must distinguish between evidence of disputed facts and disputed matters of 

professional judgment. In respect to the latter, our inferences must accord 

deference to the views of prison authorities [and medical personnel]. Unless 

a prisoner can point to sufficient evidence regarding such issues of judgment 

to allow him to prevail on the merits, he cannot prevail at the summary 

judgment stage. 

Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 530, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 2578, 165 L.Ed.2d 697 (2006) (internal 

citation omitted). To proceed beyond the summary judgment stage, an inmate-plaintiff is 

required to produce “sufficient [favorable] evidence” which would be admissible at trial 

supporting his claims of constitutional violations. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 

U.S. 242, 249 (1986); Fed R. Civ. P. 56(e). “If the evidence [on which the nonmoving 

party relies] is merely colorable . . . or is not significantly probative . . . summary judgment 

may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-250. “A mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence 

supporting the opposing party’s position will not suffice; there must be enough of a 

showing that the [trier of fact] could reasonably find for that party. Anderson v. Liberty 

Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).” Walker v. Darby, 

911 F.2d 1573, 1576-1577 (11th Cir. 1990). Conclusory allegations based on subjective 

beliefs are likewise insufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact and, therefore, 

do not suffice to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 

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1555, 1564 n.6 (11th Cir. 1997) (A plaintiff’s “conclusory assertions . . ., in the absence of 

[admissible] supporting evidence, are insufficient to withstand summary judgment.”); 

Harris v. Ostrout, 65 F.3d 912, 916 (11th Cir. 1995) (grant of summary judgment 

appropriate where inmate produces nothing beyond “his own conclusory allegations” 

challenging actions of the defendants); Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 557 (11th Cir. 

1984) (“Mere verification of party’s own conclusory allegations is not sufficient to oppose 

summary judgment.”); Evers v. Gen. Motors Corp., 770 F.2d 984, 986 (11th Cir. 1985) 

(“[C]onclusory allegations without specific supporting facts have no probative value.”). 

Hence, when a plaintiff fails to set forth specific facts supported by requisite evidence 

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to his case and on which the 

plaintiff will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is due to be granted in 

favor of the moving party. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322 (“[F]ailure of proof concerning an 

essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts 

immaterial.”); Barnes v. Sw. Forest Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 607, 609 (11th Cir. 1987) (If on 

any part of the prima facie case the plaintiff presents insufficient evidence to require 

submission of the case to the trier of fact, granting of summary judgment is appropriate.); 

Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (summary 

judgment appropriate where no genuine dispute of material fact exists). At the summary 

judgment stage, this court must “consider all evidence in the record . . . [including] 

pleadings, depositions, interrogatories, affidavits, etc. -- and can only grant summary 

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judgment if everything in the record demonstrates that no genuine [dispute] of material fact 

exists.” Strickland v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 692 F.3d 1151, 1154 (11th Cir. 2012). 

 For summary judgment purposes, only disputes involving material facts are 

relevant. United States v. One Piece of Real Prop. Located at 5800 SW 74th Ave., Miami, 

Florida, 363 F.3d 1099, 1101 (11th Cir. 2004). What is material is determined by the 

substantive law applicable to the case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Lofton v. Sec’y of the 

Dep’t of Children and Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 809 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Only factual 

disputes that are material under the substantive law governing the case will preclude entry 

of summary judgment.”). “The mere existence of some factual dispute will not defeat 

summary judgment unless that factual dispute is material to an issue affecting the outcome 

of the case.” McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003) 

(citation omitted). To demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact, the party opposing 

summary judgment “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt 

as to the material facts. . . . Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational 

trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine [dispute] for trial.’” 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. ZenithRadio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). In cases 

where the evidence before the court which is admissible on its face or which can be reduced 

to admissible form indicates there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the party 

moving for summary judgment is entitled to it as a matter of law, summary judgment is 

proper. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-324 (summary judgment appropriate where pleadings, 

evidentiary materials and affidavits before the court show no genuine dispute as to a 

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requisite material fact); Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Assocs., Inc., 276 F.3d 1275, 1279 

(11th Cir. 2001) (To establish a genuine dispute of material fact, the nonmoving party must 

produce evidence such that a reasonable trier of fact could return a verdict in his favor.). 

 Although factual inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party and pro se complaints are entitled to liberal interpretation, a pro se litigant 

does not escape the burden of establishing by sufficient evidence a genuine dispute of 

material fact. Beard, 548 U.S. at 525, 126 S.Ct. at 2576; Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 

667, 670 (11th Cir. 1990). Thus, the plaintiff’s pro se status alone does not mandate this 

court’s disregard of elementary principles of production and proof in a civil case. 

 The court has undertaken a thorough and exhaustive review of all the evidence 

contained in the record. After such review, the court finds that Mosley has failed to 

demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact in order to preclude entry of summary 

judgment in favor of the defendants. 

III. DISCUSSION 

A. Absolute Immunity

With respect to those claims lodged against the correctional defendants in their 

official capacities, they are immune from monetary damages. Official capacity lawsuits 

are “in all respects other than name, . . . treated as a suit against the entity.” Kentucky v. 

Graham, 473 U. S. 159, 166 (1985). “A state official may not be sued in his official 

capacity unless the state has waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Pennhurst 

State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100, 104 S.Ct. 900, 908, 79 L.Ed.2d 

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67 (1984), or Congress has abrogated the state’s immunity, see Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 

[517 U.S. 44, 59], 116 S.Ct. 1114, 1125, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996). Alabama has not waived 

its Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Carr v. City of Florence, 916 F.2d 1521, 1525 

(11th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted), and Congress has not abrogated Alabama’s immunity. 

Therefore, Alabama state officials are immune from claims brought against them in their 

official capacities.” Lancaster v. Monroe County, 116 F.3d 1419, 1429 (11th Cir. 1997). 

 In light of the foregoing, defendants Sconyers, Strickland, Lawson, Woods, Liptrot, 

Brooks and Wilson are entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment for 

claims seeking monetary damages from them in their official capacities. Lancaster, 116 

F.3d at 1429; Jackson v. Georgia Dep’t of Transp., 16 F.3d 1573, 1575 (11th Cir. 1994); 

Parker v. Mosley, 862 F.2d 1471 (11th Cir. 1989). 

B. Relevant Facts 

 On July 10, 2013, the defendants attempted to obtain Mosley’s fingerprints pursuant 

to a directive issued by the Central Records Office of the Alabama Department of 

Corrections. See Exh. 2 to the Correctional Defs.’ Special Report - Doc. No. 32-2 at 21. 

Mosley refused to provide his fingerprints despite being repeatedly ordered to do so by 

several correctional officials, including defendants Sonyers, Strickland, Woods, Logan, 

and Liptrot. The officers then counseled Mosely on the need to voluntarily submit to 

providing his fingerprints and continued to order him to do so, but these efforts did not 

persuade Mosley to comply with their orders. Warden Sconyers therefore advised 

defendants Strickland, Lawson, Logan, Woods, Liptrot, Wilson, and Brook “to restrain 

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Inmate Mosley to obtain his fingerprints. Lieutenant Logan retrieved the video camera to 

record the Use of Force concerning Inmate Mosley. Lieutenant Logan turned on the video 

camera [and recorded the fingerprint process].” Id. at 2. At the beginning of the video 

recording, Warden Sconyers once more ordered Mosley to submit to providing his 

fingerprints and Mosley again refused this order. The Use of Force Investigative Report 

details the force used against Mosley and the recitation of facts contained in this report are 

fully corroborated by the DVD. The relevant portion of this report reads as follows: 

 Inmate Mosley was restrained with leg irons and was handcuffed to 

the front in order to facilitate the collection of his prints. Inmate Mosley was 

escorted to the Segregation Conference room and assisted to a kneeling 

position by Captain Lawson and Lt. Phelix Woods attempted to position 

Mosley’s hands so that Officer Patricia Liptrot could collect his prints. 

Captain Strickland held inmate Mosley’s feet. Inmate Mosley refused to 

cooperate and clinched his fists. Officer Kenneth Brook then assumed 

control of Inmate Mosley’s feet. Captain Strickland applied touch pressure 

to inmate Mosley’s mandibular nerve while giving Inmate Mosley loud 

verbal commands to open his fists. Inmate Mosley opened his clinched fists, 

and Officer Strickland ceased the touch pressure. Officer Liptrot, with the 

assistance of Officer Rodney Wilson, [eventually] collected the needed 

fingerprints. All use of force ceased. Inmate Mosley was released, assisted 

to his feet by Captain Lawson and Lt. Woods, and escorted to the Health 

Care Unit for a medical examination. No additional force was used.2

 

Id. at 21. 

 The DVD recording followed Mosley as officers escorted him to the health care unit 

for examination. During his walk across the yard at Easterling, Mosley did not exhibit a 

discernible limp nor injury to his ankle. Despite being in ankle chains, the DVD shows 

 

2As evidenced by the DVD, the initial set of fingerprints obtained from Mosley were unusable due to the fact that 

Mosley refused to fully open his hands and continued to resist the officers while being fingerprinted. It was only after 

officers sought a second set of fingerprints that Mosley was somewhat compliant in the taking of his fingerprints. 

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that Mosley’s gait is normal and he voices no complaints of ankle pain while making the 

walk to the health care unit. In addition, the photographs taken of Mosley immediately 

after the incident do not show any noticeable swelling to either of his ankles. Id. at 11. 

Finally, the only injuries noted by Nurse Bowman upon her examination of Mosley were 

“a very small spot on lower lip almost at crease . . . and a very small red spot inside [his] 

lower lip.” Id. at 7. She observed “no other marks or bruises on [his] body.” Id. Nurse 

Bowman thoroughly assessed Mosley’s condition, cleaned his injuries, determined no 

further treatment was necessary, and released him to the custody of correctional officers. 

Id. 

 Mosley received a disciplinary for his failure to obey the orders issued to him 

regarding the collection of his fingerprints. Exh. 2 to the Correctional Defs.’ Special 

Report - Doc. No. 32-2 at 13-16. Mosley was found guilty of the charged offense. Id. at 

15. He challenged the constitutionality of this disciplinary on several grounds in Mosley 

v. Borders, et al., 2:14-CV-549-MHT-GMB (M.D. Ala. 2016), and this court decided those 

claims adversely to Mosley. 

C. Excessive Force 

Mosley alleges that the defendants used excessive force to gain his fingerprints. The 

defendants maintain that they used only the force necessary to maintain control of Mosley 

and protect everyone involved. The defendants assert that due to Mosley’s refusal of 

several orders to voluntarily provide his fingerprints, the only option remaining to them 

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was a calculated use of force to obtain the fingerprints. They further argue that the amount 

of force used was reasonable under the circumstances with which they were presented. 

 Claims of excessive force by prison officials against convicted inmates are governed 

by the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. Campbell 

v. Sikes, 169 F.3d 1353, 1374 (11th Cir. 1999). “The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of 

cruel and unusual punishments necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de 

minimis uses of physical force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort repugnant to 

the conscience of mankind.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1992) (internal 

quotations and citations omitted). “‘Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem 

unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers, violates a prisoner’s constitutional 

rights.’” Sims v. Artuz, 230 F.3d 14, 22 (2nd Cir. 2000) (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 

F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973)). 

 The standard applied to an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim contains both 

a subjective and objective component. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8. The subjective component 

requires that prison “officials act[ed] with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Id. 

(internal quotations omitted). To establish the subjective element, a plaintiff must 

demonstrate the “necessary level of culpability, shown by actions characterized by 

wantonness.” Sims, 230 F.3d at 21. With respect to the objective component, a plaintiff 

must show that “the alleged wrongdoing was objectively harmful enough to establish a 

constitutional violation.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8. In addition, “the use of excessive physical 

force against a prisoner may constitute cruel and unusual punishment [even] when the 

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inmate does not suffer serious injury.” Id. at 4. “Injury and force . . . are only imperfectly 

correlated, and it is the latter that ultimately counts. An inmate who is gratuitously beaten 

by guards does not lose his ability to pursue an excessive force claim merely because he 

has the good fortune to escape without serious injury.” Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 38 

(2010). 

Under the Eighth Amendment, force is deemed legitimate in a custodial 

setting as long as it is applied “in a good faith effort to maintain or restore 

discipline [and not] maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Whitley v. 

Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986) 

(quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2nd Cir.1973)); see also 

Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8, 112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992). 

To determine if an application of force was applied maliciously and 

sadistically to cause harm, a variety of factors are considered including: “the 

need for the application of force, the relationship between that need and the 

amount of force used, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible 

officials, and any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.” 

Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7-8, 112 S.Ct. 995; see also Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321, 

106 S.Ct. 1078; Harris v. Chapman, 97 F.3d 499, 505 (11th Cir. 1996). From 

consideration of such factors, “inferences may be drawn as to whether the 

use of force could plausibly have been thought necessary, or instead evinced 

such wantonness with respect to the unjustified infliction of harm as is 

tantamount to a knowing willingness that it occur.” Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321, 

106 S.Ct. 1078 (quoting Johnson, 481 F.2d at 1033). 

Skrtich v. Thornton, 280 F.3d 1295, 1300-1301 (11th Cir. 2002). 

 “‘When prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm,’ the 

Court recognized, ‘contemporary standards of decency always are violated . . . whether or 

not significant injury is evident. Otherwise, the Eighth Amendment would permit any 

physical punishment, no matter how diabolic or inhuman, inflicting less than some 

arbitrary quantity of injury.’ Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9, 112 S.Ct. at 995[.]” Wilkins, 559 U.S. 

at 38. Thus, in an excessive force case such as the one at hand, “the ‘core judicial inquiry’ 

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is ‘not whether a certain quantum of injury was sustained, but rather whether force was 

applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and 

sadistically to cause harm.’ Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37, 130 S.Ct.1175, 1178, 175 

L.Ed.2d 995 (2010) (per curiam) (quotation marks omitted) (concluding that a gratuitous 

beating by prison guards, even without injuries requiring medical attention, violated a 

prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights).” Bowden, 576 F. App’x at 953. 

 Mosley concedes that he repeatedly denied orders to voluntarily provide his 

fingerprints to correctional officials. In the beginning of the DVD recording, Warden 

Sconyers advises Mosley that he is required by law to obtain his fingerprints and provides 

Mosley one last opportunity to voluntarily comply with his orders, an opportunity which 

Mosley refuses. When officers attempted to obtain his fingerprints by the use of force, 

Mosley claims that his neck was pulled and twisted to the side in an effort to cause his 

death and alleges that the officers attempted to pull out his eyes and ears. Compl. Doc. No. 

1 at 3. In the video, as officers initially place Mosley on the floor to obtain his fingerprints 

at a makeshift stand, Mosley repeatedly states “he choking me” when an officer merely 

places his hand against the side of Mosley’s head/neck to stem his resistance. The video 

evidence demonstrates that Mosely initially continues to resist the officers by balling up 

his fists and refusing to open his hands, despite several orders to do so. The officers then 

apply the amount of force necessary to overcome Mosley’s resistance and open his hands 

for the purpose of obtaining his finger prints. The officers are positioned in a manner to 

secure Mosley and ensure their safety. At no time does any officer attempt to pull out 

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Mosley’s eyes or remove his ears, nor is Mosley choked. Mosley’s version of events is 

simply untenable given the video evidence. 

 The Supreme Court has held that “[w]hen opposing parties tell two different stories, 

one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury [or trier of 

fact] could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of 

ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 

1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007); Feliciano v. City of Miami Beach, 707 F.3d 1244, 1253-54 

(11th Cir. 2013) (same). Where, as here, a plaintiff’s “version of events is so utterly 

discredited by the record that no reasonable jury [or trier of fact] could . . . believe[] him[,]” 

the Supreme Court admonished that the lower court addressing the claims “should not 

[rely] on such visible fiction [but] should . . . view[] the facts in the light depicted by the 

videotape.” Id. at 380-381. 

 Upon review of the DVD and after examining the circumstances of this case in 

accordance with the relevant factors, it is clear that the defendants did not subject Mosley 

to the use of excessive force as prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Instead, the credible 

and objective evidence demonstrates that there was a need for the exercise of force due to 

Mosley’s refusal to comply with several orders to voluntarily provide his fingerprints. This 

evidence also shows that the officers used a reasonable amount of force against Mosley to 

obtain his fingerprints. Specifically, the DVD clearly shows that the force utilized 

throughout the incident to restrain Mosely and gain his compliance was minimal and 

applied in a good-faith effort to maintain control of the inmate and secure the safety of the 

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officers involved. Finally, the evidence establishes that the defendants did not apply force 

in a sadistic or malicious manner. The defendants are therefore entitled to summary 

judgment on the excessive force claim. 

D. Failure to Protect 

Insofar as Mosley alleges that Warden Sconyers and/or other officers failed to 

intervene to protect him from the use of excessive force, he is likewise entitled to no relief. 

The Eleventh Circuit has recognized that “an officer who is present at the scene and who 

fails to take reasonable steps to protect the victim of another officer’s use of excessive force 

can be held personally liable for his nonfeasance.” Skrtich, 280 F.3d at 1300-1301. 

However, for liability to attach regarding the failure of a correctional official to intervene 

in another officer’s use of force, “there must exist an underlying constitutional violation.” 

Harper v. Albert, 400 F.3d 1052, 1064 (7th Cir. 2005); see also Sanders v. City of Union 

Springs, 207 F. App’x 960, 965 (11th Cir. 2006). In this case, there was no duty to 

intervene because there was no unconstitutional use of force. As such, summary judgment 

is due to be granted in favor of the defendants. 

E. Taking of Fingerprints 

Mosley complains that the defendants took his fingerprints without a court order. 

Attachment to Compl. - Doc. No. 1-1 at 5. “It is . . . considered ‘elementary that a person 

in lawful custody may be required to submit to . . . fingerprinting[.]’” United States v. 

Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d 1104, 1113 (10th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted); United States v. 

Farias-Gonzalez, 556 F.3d 1181, 1188-1189 (11th Cir. 2009) (Law enforcement officials 

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“can obtain both photographs and fingerprints without conducting a search under the 

Fourth Amendment[,]” and, thus, in so doing do not violate the rights secured under such 

Amendment.). Consequently, the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable 

searches and seizures does not protect a convicted inmate from collection of his 

fingerprints. See Wilson v. Collins, 517 F.3d 421, 426-427 (6th Cir. 2008) (Inmate’s Fourth 

Amendment challenge to Ohio law requiring convicted felons to provide DNA samples, a 

somewhat more intrusive procedure than obtaining fingerprints, entitled him to no relief 

because considering the minimal intrusion of swabbing saliva, the government’s 

compelling interest in collecting the DNA sample outweighed the plaintiff’s “greatly 

diminished privacy interests as a convicted felon.”); United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 

175, 184 (3d Cir. 2005) (“After . . . conviction of a felony, [an offender’s] identity became 

a matter of compelling interest to the government, and [the] marks of identification [taken 

while in custody], the fingerprints and the photographs, bec[o]me a permanent record. 

[The offender] can no longer assert a privacy interest in these means of identification.”); 

United States v. Kincaid, 379 F.3d 813, 837 n.32 (9th 2004) (“Those who have suffered a 

lawful conviction lose an interest in their identity to a degree well-recognized as sufficient 

to entitle the government permanently to maintain a verifiable record of their identity.”);

Groceman v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 354 F.3d 411, 413-414 (2004) (“[P]ersons 

incarcerated after conviction retain no constitutional privacy interest against their correct 

identification.”); Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 306 (4th Cir. 1992) (Fourth Amendment 

protection from fingerprinting does not apply to “those lawfully confined to the custody of 

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the state.”). Similarly, it has long been held that fingerprints are not protected by the Fifth 

Amendment right against self-incrimination. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 6-7, 93 

S.Ct. 764, 767-768 (1973). This claim therefore provides no basis for relief to Mosley. 

F. Medical Treatment 

Mosley challenges the medical treatment provided to him by Nurse Bowman 

immediately after the challenged use of force. Nurse Bowman avers that she did not act 

with deliberate indifference to any serious medical need suffered by Mosley. 

 To prevail on a claim concerning an alleged denial of medical treatment, an inmate 

must, at a minimum, show that the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to a serious 

medical need. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Taylor v. Adams, 221 F.3d 1254 

(11th Cir. 2000); McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 1999); Waldrop v. Evans, 

871 F.2d 1030, 1033 (11th Cir. 1989); Rogers v. Evans, 792 F.2d 1052, 1058 (11th 

Cir.1986).3

 Specifically, medical personnel may not subject an inmate to “acts or 

omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical 

needs.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106, 97 S.Ct. at 292; Adams v. Poag, 61 F.3d 1537, 1546 (11th 

Cir. 1995) (citation and internal quotations omitted) (As directed by Estelle, a plaintiff must 

establish “not merely the knowledge of a condition, but the knowledge of necessary 

 

3Mosley was a convicted inmate incarcerated at the Easterling Correctional Facility during the period of time relevant 

to this complaint. Thus, this case is not affected by the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Kingsley v. 

Hendrickson, --- U.S. ---, ---, 135 S.Ct. 2466, 2473, 192 L.Ed.2d 416 (2015) (holding that “objectively reasonable” 

standard of review is applicable to pretrial detainee’s excessive force claim brought under the Fourteenth 

Amendment). 

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treatment coupled with a refusal to treat or a delay in [the acknowledged necessary] 

treatment.” 

That medical malpractice - negligence by a physician [or nurse] - is 

insufficient to form the basis of a claim for deliberate indifference is well 

settled. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-07, 97 S.Ct. 285, 292, 50 

L.Ed.2d 251 (1976); Adams v. Poag, 61 F.3d 1537, 1543 (11th Cir. 1995). 

Instead, something more must be shown. Evidence must support a 

conclusion that a prison [medical care provider’s] harmful acts were 

intentional or reckless. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833-38, 114 

S.Ct. 1970, 1977-79, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994); Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 

1480, 1491 (11th Cir. 1996) (stating that deliberate indifference is equivalent 

of recklessly disregarding substantial risk of serious harm to inmate); Adams,

61 F.3d at 1543 (stating that plaintiff must show more than mere negligence 

to assert an Eighth Amendment violation); Hill v. DeKalb Regional Youth 

Detention Ctr., 40 F.3d 1176, 1191 n. 28 (11th Cir. 1994) (recognizing that 

Supreme Court has defined “deliberate indifference” as requiring more than 

mere negligence and has adopted a “subjective recklessness” standard from 

criminal law); Qian v. Kautz, 168 F.3d 949, 955 (7th Cir. 1999) (stating 

“deliberate indifference” is synonym for intentional or reckless conduct, and 

that “reckless” conduct describes conduct so dangerous that deliberate nature 

can be inferred). 

Hinson v. Edmond, 192 F.3d 1342, 1345 (11th Cir. 1999). 

 In order to establish “deliberate indifference to [a] serious medical need . . ., 

Plaintiff[] must show: (1) a serious medical need; (2) the defendant[’s] deliberate 

indifference to that need; and (3) causation between that indifference and the plaintiff’s 

injury.” Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1306-1307 (11th Cir. 2009). When 

seeking relief based on deliberate indifference, an inmate is required to establish “an 

objectively serious need, an objectively insufficient response to that need, subjective 

awareness of facts signaling the need and an actual inference of required action from those 

facts.” Taylor, 221 F.3d at 1258; McElligott, 182 F.3d at 1255 (for liability to attach, the 

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official must know of and then disregard an excessive risk to the prisoner). Regarding the 

objective component of a deliberate indifference claim, the plaintiff must first show “an 

objectively ‘serious medical need[]’ . . . and second, that the response made by [the 

defendant] to that need was poor enough to constitute ‘an unnecessary and wanton 

infliction of pain,’ and not merely accidental inadequacy, ‘negligen[ce] in diagnos[is] or 

treat[ment],’ or even ‘[m]edical malpractice’ actionable under state law.” Taylor, 221 F.3d 

at 1258 (internal citations omitted). A medical need is serious if it “‘has been diagnosed 

by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person 

would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.’” Goebert v. Lee Cty., 510 

F.3d 1312, 1325 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Hill, 40 F.3d at 1187, abrogated on other 

grounds by Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002)). In addition, “to show the required 

subjective intent . . ., a plaintiff must demonstrate that the public official acted with an 

attitude of ‘deliberate indifference’ . . . which is in turn defined as requiring two separate 

things ‘awareness of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk 

of serious harm exists [] and . . . draw[ing] of the inference[.]’” Taylor, 221 F.3d at 1258 

(internal citations omitted). Thus, deliberate indifference occurs only when a defendant 

“knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the [defendant] must 

both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of 

serious harm exists and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; 

Johnson v. Quinones, 145 F.3d 164, 168 (4th Cir. 1998) (defendant must have actual 

knowledge of a serious condition, not just knowledge of symptoms, and ignore known risk 

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21 

to serious condition to warrant finding of deliberate indifference). Furthermore, “an 

official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not, 

while no cause for commendation, cannot under our cases be condemned as the infliction 

of punishment.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838. 

 In articulating the scope of inmates’ right to be free from deliberate 

indifference, . . . the Supreme Court has . . . emphasized that not ‘every claim 

by a prisoner that he has not received adequate medical treatment states a 

violation of the Eighth Amendment.’ Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105, 97 S.Ct. at 

291; Mandel, 888 F.2d at 787. Medical treatment violates the eighth 

amendment only when it is ‘so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive 

as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness.’ 

Rogers, 792 F.2d at 1058 (citation omitted). Mere incidents of negligence or 

malpractice do not rise to the level of constitutional violations. See Estelle,

429 U.S. at 106, 97 S.Ct. at 292 (‘Medical malpractice does not become a 

constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.’); Mandel, 

888 F.2d at 787-88 (mere negligence or medical malpractice ‘not sufficient’ 

to constitute deliberate indifference); Waldrop, 871 F.2d at 1033 (mere 

medical malpractice does not constitute deliberate indifference). Nor does a 

simple difference in medical opinion between the prison’s medical staff and 

the inmate as to the latter’s diagnosis or course of treatment support a claim 

of cruel and unusual punishment. See Waldrop, 871 F.2d at 1033 (citing 

Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 48 (4th Cir. 1977)). 

Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1505 (11th Cir. 1991); Taylor, 221 F.3d at 1258 (citation 

and internal quotations omitted) (To show deliberate indifference, the plaintiff must 

demonstrate a serious medical need and then must establish that the defendant’s response 

to the need was more than “merely accidental inadequacy, negligence in diagnosis or 

treatment, or even medical malpractice actionable under state law.”). Moreover, “as Estelle

teaches, whether government actors should have employed additional diagnostic 

techniques or forms of treatment ‘is a classic example of a matter for medical judgment’ 

and therefore not an appropriate basis for grounding liability under the Eighth 

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Amendment.” Adams, 61 F.3d at 1545; Garvin v. Armstrong, 236 F.3d 896, 898 (7th Cir. 

2001) (“A difference of opinion as to how a condition should be treated does not give rise 

to a constitutional violation.”); Hamm v. DeKalb Cty., 774 F.2d 1567, 1575 (11th Cir. 

1985) (mere fact inmate desires a different mode of medical treatment does not amount to 

deliberate indifference violative of the Constitution); Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 

1344 (9th Cir. 1981) (prison medical personnel do not violate the Eighth Amendment 

simply because their opinions concerning medical treatment conflict with that of the 

inmate-patient). “Self-serving statements by a plaintiff do not create a question of fact in 

the face of contradictory, contemporaneously created medical records.” Whitehead v. 

Burnside, 403 F. App’x. 401, 403 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Bennett v. Parker, 898 F.2d 1530 

(11th Cir. 1990)). 

An official also acts with deliberate indifference when she intentionally delays 

providing an inmate with access to medical treatment, knowing the inmate has a lifethreatening or urgent medical condition that would be exacerbated by delay. See Hill, 40 

F.3d at 1186-87, abrogated on other grounds by Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002); see 

also Harris v. Coweta Cty., 21 F.3d 388, 394 (11th Cir. 1994). “In contrast, delay or even 

denial of medical treatment for superficial, non-serious physical conditions does not 

constitute an Eighth Amendment violation.” Hill, 40 F.3d at 1186–87. A medical need is 

considered serious when delay in treatment results in an inmate suffering “a lifelong 

handicap or permanent loss.” Monmouth Cty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lorenzo, 834 F.2d 

326, 347 (3rd Cir. 1987). An inmate claiming an unconstitutional delay in medical 

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treatment “must place verifying medical evidence in the record to establish the detrimental 

effect of the delay in medical treatment to succeed.” Hill, 40 F.3d at 1188. 

Mosley complains that Nurse Bowman violated his constitutional right to medical 

treatment when he appeared at the Easterling Health Care Unit on July 10, 2013 for 

treatment after officers used force against him to obtain his fingerprints. Mosley, however, 

has presented no medical evidence establishing any detrimental effect suffered due to the 

actions of the defendant. 

Nurse Bowman asserts that Mosley fails to identify any serious medical need he 

suffered on the date at issue for which he did not receive treatment. Def. Bowman’s Special 

Report - Doc. No. 23 at 7. Moreover, she adamantly denies acting with deliberate 

indifference to a serious medical need suffered by Mosley. In support of this assertion, 

Nurse Bowman maintains and the medical records demonstrate that she provided treatment 

to Mosley for the minor injuries she observed on July 10, 2013. Exh. 1 to Def. Bowman’s 

Special Report - Doc. No. 23-1 at 2; Exh. A to Def. Bowman’s Special Report - Doc. No. 

23-3 at 5. It is likewise clear that Nurse Bowman did not at any time thereafter preclude 

Mosley from filing a medical request form seeking additional treatment or prevent him 

from receiving treatment upon completion of a medical request form. 

As an initial matter, it is highly questionable whether Mosley suffered a serious 

medical need on the date he alleges a denial of medical treatment. Nevertheless, even 

assuming the existence of a serious medical need, there is no evidence that defendant 

Bowman acted with deliberate indifference to that need. 

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The evidentiary materials filed by Nurse Bowman address the claims made by 

Mosley alleging a lack of adequate medical treatment. A thorough review of these 

documents demonstrates that the affidavit submitted by Nurse Bowan with respect to the 

material facts are corroborated by the contemporaneously compiled objective medical 

records. In her affidavit, Nurse Bowman addresses the claims lodged against her as 

follows: 

It is my understanding from reading Mr. Mosley’s Complaint that he 

is dissatisfied with the level of care afforded [to] him at Easterling by me on 

July 10, 2013. Specifically, Mr. Mosley claims I did not provide him with 

adequate care following an alleged altercation with the correctional staff on 

July 10, 2013. 

Correctional officers escorted Mr. Mosley to the health care unit for a 

physical evaluation following an alleged altercation on July 10, 2013. During 

this evaluation, I conducted a physical examination of Mr. Mosley. Mr. 

Mosley appeared ambulatory and alert and oriented to person, place and time. 

Mr. Mosley suffered a very small abrasion to his lower lip and another very 

small abrasion to the inside of his lower lip. I cleaned these two abrasions 

and instructed him to submit a sick call request form if he required any further 

medical attention. Mr. Mosley did not exhibit any other marks, bruises or 

injuries on his body. Moreover, Mr. Mosley did not voice any complaints 

regarding his eyes or ankles. Following this evaluation, Mr. Mosley did not 

voice any additional complaints and the correctional officers escorted him 

out of the health care unit. 

Mr. Mosley did not return to the health care unit until August 6, 2013, 

when, again, correctional officers escorted Mr. Mosley to the health care unit 

for a physical evaluation. During this evaluation, Mr. Mosley did not seek 

any additional care regarding his small lower lip abrasions, voice any 

complaints or request any specific medical care for any injury [related to the 

July 10, 2013 incident]. Notably, Mr. Mosley did not exhibit any injuries to 

his body and he denied experiencing any pain at this evaluation. 

Since the August 6, 2013, evaluation, Mr. Mosley has not submitted 

a sick call request form, voiced a medical complaint or otherwise sought 

medical care or treatment. 

During Mr. Mosley’s incarceration at Easterling, I did not and have 

not at any time ignored any request by him for medical care or treatment. I 

did not and have not deliberately ignored any requests [or] complaints made 

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by Mr. Mosley or interfere[d] in any way with the provision of medical care 

to Mr. Mosley at any time. If Mr. Mosley voiced a medical complaint to me, 

I would have evaluated his condition under the nursing protocols and 

provided the necessary medical care at that time or referred Mr. Mosley to 

an advanced level medical provider. I did not take any action which caused 

Mr. Mosley to experience any unnecessary pain and/or suffering. 

Exh. 1 to the Def. Bowman’s Special Report - Doc. No. 23-1 at 2-3 (paragraph numbering 

and parenthetical references to medical records omitted). 

 Under the circumstances of this case, the court concludes that the actions of 

defendant Bowman did not violate Mosley’s constitutional rights. Specifically, Nurse 

Bowman did not act in a manner which was “so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or 

excessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to the fundamental fairness.” 

Harris, 941 F.2d at 1505. It is likewise clear that the allegations presented by Mosley 

simply fail to establish deliberate indifference to any serious medical need. Adams, 61 

F.3d at 1545-1546 (Whether medical personnel “should have employed additional 

diagnostic techniques or forms of treatment ‘is a classic example of a matter for medical 

judgment’ and therefore not an appropriate basis” on which to ground constitutional 

liability.); Hamm, 774 F.2d at 1505 (inmate’s desire for some other form of medical 

treatment does not constitute deliberate indifference violative of the Constitution); 

Franklin, 662 F.2d at 1344 (simple divergence of opinions between medical personnel and 

inmate-patient do not violate the Eighth Amendment). 

 The objective evidence indicates that Mosley received medical care for his injuries 

and it is likewise evident that Nurse Bowman rendered treatment to Mosley in accordance 

with her professional judgment. In addition, Mosley has failed to present any evidence 

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which indicates Nurse Bowman knew that the manner in which she provided treatment to 

him created a substantial risk to his health and that with this knowledge consciously 

disregarded such risk. The record is therefore devoid of evidence, significantly probative 

or otherwise, showing that Nurse Bowman acted with deliberate indifference to any serious 

medical need experienced by Mosley. Consequently, summary judgment is due to be 

granted in favor of Nurse Bowman. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

 Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that: 

 1. The defendants’ motions for summary judgment be GRANTED. 

 2. Judgment be GRANTED in favor of the defendants. 

 3. This case be dismissed with prejudice. 

 4. Costs be taxed against the plaintiff. 

 It is further 

 ORDERED that on or before August 24, 2016 the parties may file objections to this 

Recommendation. A party must specifically identify the factual findings and legal 

conclusions in the Recommendation to which the objection is made; frivolous, conclusive, 

or general objections will not be considered. Failure to file written objections to the 

Magistrate Judge’s findings and recommendations in accordance with the provisions of 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) shall bar a party from a de novo determination by the District Court of 

legal and factual issues covered in the Recommendation and waives the right of the party 

to challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal 

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conclusions accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of plain error 

or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982); 11TH CIR. R. 3-

1. See Stein v. Lanning Sec., Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City 

of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc). 

 DONE this 10th day of August, 2016. 

 /s/ Wallace Capel, Jr. 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

 

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