Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-04560/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-04560-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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Order Granting Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss 

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NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE ANGEL RODRIGUEZ,

Petitioner,

 vs.

EVANS, Warden,

Respondent. 

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No. C 05-4560 JF (PR)

ORDER GRANTING

RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS 

(Docket No. 7)

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Court dismissed two of Petitioner’s claims and ordered Respondent to

show cause why the petition should not be granted as to the remaining claims. Respondent now

moves to dismiss the petition as untimely. Petitioner has filed opposition to the motion, and

Respondent has filed a reply. Based upon the papers submitted, the Court concludes that the

petition is untimely pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) and will grant Respondent’s motion. 

BACKGROUND

A Santa Clara Superior Court jury convicted Petitioner of two counts of forcible lewd

and lascivious acts upon a child under fourteen, with enhancements for multiple victims (Cal.

Penal Code § 288(b)(1)) and three counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child 

*Original filed 3/28/07

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In rare instances, not presented by the instant petition, the limitation period may run from a

date later than the date on which the judgment became final. See U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B)-(D).

Order Granting Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss 

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(Cal. Penal Code § 269). On January 7, 2003, Petitioner was sentenced to seventy-five years-tolife in state prison. Petitioner appealed his conviction. The state appellate court affirmed the

judgment on March 12, 2004. See Resp. Exh. A (Petition for Review, Attachment A). The state

supreme court denied a petition for review on June 9, 2004. See Resp. Exh. A. Petitioner signed

the instant petition on October 30, 2005, and it was filed in this Court on November 8, 2005. 

DISCUSSION

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) became 

law on April 24, 1996 and imposed for the first time a statute of limitations on petitions for a

writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners. Under AEDPA, prisoners challenging non-capital

state convictions or sentences must file petitions for relief within one year from the date on

which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time

for seeking such review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).1 

The one-year period generally will run from “the date on which the judgment became

final by conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). “Direct review” includes the period within which a petitioner can file a

petition for a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court, whether or not the

petitioner actually files such a petition. Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Accordingly, if a petitioner fails to seek a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme

Court, AEDPA’s one-year limitation period begins on the date the ninety-day period defined by

Supreme Court Rule 13 expires. Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002) (where

petitioner did not file petition for certiorari, his conviction became final ninety days after the

California Supreme Court denied review).

Here, the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for review on June 9,

2004. See Resp. Exh. A. Petitioner’s conviction became final on September 7, 2004, after the

expiration of the ninety-day period within which Petitioner could file a petition for writ of

certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. Accordingly, Petitioner had until 

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 2 See Saffold v. Newland, 250 F.3d 1262, 1268 (9th Cir. 2001) (deeming pro se federal

habeas petition filed when prisoner signs petition and presumably gives it to prison authorities

for mailing), vacated and remanded on other grounds, Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002).

Order Granting Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss 

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September 7, 2005 to file his federal habeas petition. The instant petition was deemed filed in

this Court on October 30, 2005,2

 a date outside the limitations period. Accordingly, the instant

petition is untimely absent tolling. 

The one-year statute of limitations is tolled under § 2244(d)(2) for the “time during

which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with

respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Because

Petitioner did not seek collateral review of his conviction, statutory tolling does not apply. 

Because statutory tolling does not render the petition timely, the Court must decide

whether equitable tolling saves the petition. The Supreme Court has “never squarely addressed

the question whether equitable tolling is applicable to AEDPA’s statute of limitations,” Pace v.

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 n.8 (2005), but Ninth Circuit authority holds that the one-year

limitation period may be equitably tolled because § 2244(d) is a statute of limitations and not a

jurisdictional bar. Calderon v. United States District Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th

Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1, and cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1061 (1998), overruled in part on

other grounds by Calderon v. United States District Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998)

(en banc), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1060 (1999). Equitable tolling will not be available in most

cases because extensions of time should be granted only if “extraordinary circumstances beyond

a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time.” Id. (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted). 

The Ninth Circuit has held that the petitioner bears the burden of showing that this

“extraordinary exclusion” should apply to him. Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1065 (9th

Cir. 2002). The petitioner must establish two elements in order to be granted equitable tolling:

“(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance

stood in his way.” Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Pace, 544

U.S. at 419); see Pace, 544 U.S. at 419 (petitioner’s lack of diligence in filing timely state and

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Order Granting Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss 

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federal petitions precluded equitable tolling); Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir.

1999) (“When external forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure

to file a timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may be appropriate.”). The

prisoner also must show that “the ‘extraordinary circumstances’ were the cause of his

untimeliness.” Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). Where a

prisoner fails to show “any causal connection” between the grounds upon which he asserts a

right to equitable tolling and his inability to timely file a federal habeas application, the equitable

tolling claim will be denied. Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034-35 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding

that where prisoner fails to show causal connection between self-representation on direct appeal

or physical and mental disabilities and inability to timely file petition, district court’s finding that

he was not entitled to equitable tolling where he had earlier filed a state habeas petition was not

clear error).

Whether equitable tolling is in order turns on an examination of detailed facts. Lott v.

Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 923 (9th Cir. 2002). See, e.g., Stillman v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199,

1202 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding equitable tolling warranted where prison litigation coordinator

promises the prisoner’s lawyer to obtain the prisoner’s signature in time for filing a petition, but

then breaks his promise, causing the petition to be late). The prisoner must demonstrate

reasonable diligence to have the benefit of equitable tolling in these circumstances. See Guillory

v. Roe, 329 F.3d 1015, 1018 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that petitioner was not reasonably diligent

where he waited twenty-seven months to present unexhausted claims to California Supreme

Court and seven months after that court’s decision to return to federal court). 

In his opposition to the instant motion, Petitioner contends that he was the victim of

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel because counsel did not inform him that there was any

judicial remedy beyond his automatic appeal. In particular, Petitioner claims that his appellate

counsel failed to investigate Petitioner’s right to file a federal habeas petition and advised him

not to pursue his appeal beyond the state supreme court. See Pet.’s Opp. at 1-2. 

Because this is a non-capital case, Petitioner was not entitled to counsel in connection

with his federal habeas petition. See Lawrence v. Florida, 127 S. Ct. 1079, 1085 (2007). 

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Order Granting Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss 

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The Supreme Court has held that in non-capital cases, an attorney’s miscalculation of the

limitations period and negligence in general do not constitute extraordinary circumstances

sufficient to warrant equitable tolling. Lawrence, 127 S. Ct. at 1085 (assuming without deciding

that equitable tolling applies to § 2244(d)(2); in case where prisoner has no constitutional right to

counsel, attorney miscalculation of limitations period not sufficient). “[T]he right to appointed

counsel extends to the first appeal of right, and no further.” Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S.

551, 555 (1987). The Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel does not apply in habeas corpus

actions. See Knaubert, 791 F.2d at 728. Where no constitutional right to counsel exists, there

can be no constitutional claim for ineffective assistance. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S.

722, 757 (1991); see also Bonin v. Calderon, 77 F.3d 1155, 1159-60 (9th Cir. 1996) (claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel in state habeas proceedings does not present violation of Sixth

Amendment right to counsel or Fourteenth Amendment right to due process where no

constitutional right to counsel in such proceedings). 

Because he has alleged no facts from which it may be inferred that his appellate attorney

in any way impeded or prevented him from filing a timely federal petition or lulled him into

believing that such a petition would be filed, Petitioner’s case is distinguishable from Spitsyn v.

Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 800-01 (9th Cir. 2003) (equitable tolling appropriate where attorney was

retained to file and prepare petition, failed to do so, and disregarded requests to return files

pertaining to petitioner’s case until well after the date the petition was due). Accordingly,

Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling for the alleged ineffective assistance of his appellate

counsel. 

Petitioner has filed a supporting statement of due diligence with his petition. In his

statement, Petitioner alleges that he was waiting for his appellate attorney to turn over his

transcripts and files. He states that after several requests, he received his file on March 20, 2005. 

Petitioner alleges that he does not speak English and needed someone to help him understand his

transcripts and explain the procedure for filing a petition in this Court. When Petitioner found a

legal assistant inmate to help him, the prison went on lockdown and law library access was

limited to “virtually none.” Petitioner states he was about to conclude his research when he was

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 The Court notes that there is no indication that an assistant prepared the petition or any

pleadings in this action, as only Petitioner’s name and signature appears on any of the pleadings. 

Order Granting Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss 

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placed in administrative segregation on March “12-05” and his property was taken away from

him pending an investigation. Petitioner was returned to the general population on June 30,

2005 and received his property on July 3, 2005. However, July 12, 2005 the prison again went

on lockdown, again limiting Petitioner’s access to the law library and ability to speak with his

inmate assistant on the progress of his writ. As noted above, Petitioner did not sign the instant

petition until October 30, 2005. See Petition, Pet.’s Statement of Due Diligence at 1-2. 

The Court concludes that these alleged circumstances even viewed in the light most

favorable to Petitioner, do not establish that Petitioner was unable to file a timely petition. If in

fact he received a copy of his file on March 20, 2005, Petitioner had over six months to prepare a

petition. Petitioner does not identify any facts at issue in the underlying criminal case that were

not already known to him after his trial or following the conclusion of his direct appeal. See,

e.g., United States v. Battles, 362 F.3d 1195, 1198 (9th Cir. 2004) (§ 2255 petition) (even though

petitioner did not have access to trial transcripts, the facts supporting claims which occurred at

the time of his conviction could have been discovered if he “at least consult[ed] his own memory

of the trial proceedings;” because he did not do so, he did not exercise due diligence and was not

entitled to a delayed start of the limitations period under § 2255(4)). Because Petitioner did not

pursue collateral review of his conviction, he could have presented the claims as set forth in his

direct appeal, as indeed he has done in the instant petition. 

Nor are Petitioner’s allegations that he does not speak English and sought the assistance

of another inmate in preparing his petition an adequate basis for tolling.3 In Mendoza v. Carey,

449 F.3d 1065, 1070 (9th Cir. 2006), the Ninth Circuit held that “a non-English-speaking

petitioner seeking equitable tolling [of the AEDPA limitations period] must, at a minimum,

demonstrate that during the running of the AEDPA time limitation, he was unable, despite

diligent efforts, to procure either legal materials in his own language or translation assistance

from an inmate, library personnel, or other source.” 

\\\ 

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Order Granting Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss 

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The petitioner in Mendoza made a much more detailed showing then Petitioner does

here. The record in that case established that when the petitioner was first incarcerated, he

requested Spanish legal materials, id. at 1069, but was told he had to wait until he arrived at his

assigned prison. After being transferred to Solano State Prison, he made several visits to the

library and found only English legal materials and English-speaking librarians. It was not until

he found a newly-arrived, bilingual inmate willing to offer assistance that he was able to file his

habeas petition; by which time the AEDPA deadline had already passed. Id. Under these

circumstances, the Ninth Circuit determined the petitioner had alleged facts that, if found to be

true, would entitle him to equitable tolling. Accordingly, it remanded so that the district court

could hold an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 1071. 

In the instant case, Petitioner alleges only that he does not speak English and had to get

someone to help him prepare his petition. He does not allege that, despite his “diligent efforts,”

he was unable to secure “legal materials in his own language,” or to procure translation help

from other “inmates, library personnel or other source.” Nor does he explain how his reliance on

his inmate assistant made it impossible for him to file a timely petition. 

Petitioner claims that prison lockdowns that limited his access to the law library and his

placement in administrative segregation, during which he was deprived of his property from

March 2005 to July 2005, also prevented him from filing his petition on time. Petitioner alleges

that he returned to the general population on June 30, 2005 and received his property on July 3,

2005, and that a second prison lockdown occurred between July 12, 2005 and October 13, 2005. 

See Petition, Pet.’s Statement of Due Diligence at 2. 

Prisoners must be allowed a reasonable amount of time to use the prison law library. See

Lindquist v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections, 776 F.2d 851, 858 (9th Cir. 1985). However, the

Constitution does not require that such access be unlimited. Prison officials of necessity must

regulate the time, manner and place in which library facilities are used. Id. The fact that a

prisoner must wait for a turn to use the library does not necessarily mean that he has been denied

meaningful access to the courts. Id. Moreover, prisoners on lockdown or in the segregated

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Order Granting Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss 

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housing unit (“SHU”) may face delays in accessing the law library, but so long as the delays are

the product of prison regulations reasonably related to legitimate penological interests, such

delays are not of constitutional significance, even where they result in actual injury. Casey v.

Lewis, 518 U.S. 343, 361-62 (1996).

With respect to Petitioner’s claim that he was denied his property while housed in

administrative segregation, Respondent concedes that Petitioner was housed in “ad seg” during

this time period. However, Respondent points out that according to prison regulations, Petitioner

was allowed two cubic feet of legal materials while he was in administrative segregation. See

Resp. Reply, Exh. B (Decl. of William Sanford) at 2; Exh. 2 (SVSP Administrative Segregation

Inmate Personal Property Procedures). Petitioner does not allege that he was denied access to

his legal materials despite his requests, or even that his legal materials were taken from him

during this time period. 

 In Espinoza-Matthews v California, 432 F3d 1021, 1027-28 (9th Cir 2005), the Ninth

Circuit held that a habeas petitioner was entitled to equitable tolling for the eleven-month period

he was denied access to his legal materials despite his repeated requests for them. 

Espinoza-Matthews was denied access to his legal materials while in administrative segregation,

and the materials were returned to him only shortly before AEDPA’s limitation period was to

expire. See id.; see also Lott, 304 F. 3d at 921-24 ( granting habeas petitioner equitable tolling

for eighty-two days that he was deprived of his legal materials due to two temporary transfers,

despite fact that petitioner received materials shortly before the limitation period was to expire). 

In contrast to Espinoza-Matthews and Lott, Petitioner by his own admission had access to his

legal materials not later than July 3, 2005, approximately two months before AEDPA’s one-year

limitation period was to expire on September 7, 2005. 

Respondent concedes that the prison was on lockdown between July 12, 2005 and

October 13, 2005, but points out that Petitioner has not demonstrated how the lockdown

prevented him from filing a timely petition. Petitioner states that during the lockdown he had

limited law library access and could not speak with his “inmate assistant on the progress of his

writ.” See Petition, Pet.’s Statement of Due Diligence at 2-3. However, Petitioner was not

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Order Granting Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss 

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denied all access to the law library during the lockdown. See Resp. Reply, Exh B at Exh. 1.

(SVSP Operational Procedure # 21 concerning Administrative Segregation Law Library

Services, Lockdown Library Services). Even during lockdown, prisoners are not prohibited

from working on legal matters or from keeping any legal materials in their cells. Emergency

library services are provided via paging if a lockdown or other situation curtails inmate

movement for more than ten days. See id. at 21. 

Petitioner also fails to explain why he needed access to the law library to present the

claims set forth in his petition, which are virtually identical to the claims in his state appellate

brief, which he had in his possession. Moreover, assuming that Petitioner’s assistant was taking

an active role in preparing the petition, there is no factual showing as to any obstacles to the

assistant’s efforts during the relevant time period. While Petitioner did not have immediate

access to his assistant, he fails to show why such access was necessary merely to restate the same

claims set forth in his state appellate brief. Petitioner does not assert that he made any

unsuccessful requests to use the law library or provide dates on which he was denied access to

the law library during this lockdown period. 

Under all of the circumstances, the Court concludes that Petitioner has not established

facts demonstrating he is entitled to statutory or equitable tolling. Accordingly, the instant

petition is barred as untimely pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

CONCLUSION

Respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition as untimely (docket no. 7) is GRANTED. 

The instant petition is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The Clerk shall

terminate all pending motions and close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: 3/27/07 

JEREMY FOGEL

United States District Judge

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Order Granting Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss 

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A copy of this order was mailed to the following:

Jose Angel Rodriguez

T-79503

Salinas Valley State Prison

P.O. Box 1050

Soledad, CA 93960-1050

Gregory A. Ott

California State Attorney General’s Office

455 Golden Gate Avenue

Suite 11000

San Francisco, CA 94102-7004

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