Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-05092/USCOURTS-ca10-89-05092-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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C 

FI LED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

Lklicod Scares Court of Appeah 

Tenth Cirruit 

JUL 11 1990 

VERNON 0. HOLLAND, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

V • ) 

) 

CITY OF BROKEN ARROW; DANNY CLYMER, in ) 

his capacity as a police officer for ) 

the City of Broken Arrow, and ) 

individually; CHUCK DAY, in his ) 

capacity as a police officer for the ) 

City of Broken Arrow, and individually; ) 

M. MARTIN, in his capacity as a police ) 

officer for the City of Broken Arrow, ) 

and individually; ROBERT PERUGINO, in ) 

his capacity as Assistant City Attorney) 

for the City of Broken Arrow, and ) 

individually; NICK HOOD, JR., in his ) 

capacity as Mayor of the City of ) 

Broken Arrow, and individually; ) 

CHARLES WILLIAMS, doing business as ) 

Williams Wrecker Service, as agent for ) 

the City of Broken Arrow, and ) 

individually, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

&OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 89-5092 

(D.C. No. 89-C-145-B) 

( N. D. Ok la . ) 

Befor e ANDERSON, BARRETT, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-5092 Document: 010110038258 Date Filed: 07/11/1990 Page: 1 
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a} ; 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submi tted wi t hout oral argument. 

Plaintiff appeals from a district court judgment dismissing 

his civil rights action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

Plaintiff brought this action initially for declaratory relief and 

damages with 

his 1979 GMC 

process of 

respect to defendants' impoundment and retention of 

van, which plaintiff contends was taken without due 

law. After learning of an impending sale of the 

vehic le for substantial wrecker and storage fees, plaintiff moved 

for preventative injunctive relief. Following a hearing on his 

motion, the district court concluded that "[a]s the Plaintiff had 

failed to exhaust the available state procedure to reclaim h i s 

van, t here are no issues of constitutional dimension under 

42 U. S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985," and accordingly denied injunctive 

relie f and dismissed the action. The van has since been sold. 

By way of clarification, we note that the principle upon 

which this case turns is not exhaustion of state remedies, which 

is no t a prerequisite to the maintenance of an action under 

§ 19 83, Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982); J & J 

Anderson, Inc. v. Town of Erie, 767 F.2d 1469, 1475 (10th Cir. 

1985 }(recognizing that the "[Patsy] Court specifically held that a 

party need not exhaust available state administrative remedies 

prior to bringing a§ 1983 action"), but rather the constitutional 

adequacy o f whatever remedies, if any, were available, whether 

2 

Appellate Case: 89-5092 Document: 010110038258 Date Filed: 07/11/1990 Page: 2 
pursued by plaintiff or not. See generally Hudson v. Palmer, 468 

U.S. 517, 533 (1984); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 537-44 

(1981), overruled in part on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 

47 4 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986). This court has on several occasions 

a ddressed the same due process issue under circumstances similar 

to those presented here, see, e.g., Goichman v. City of Aspen, 859 

F . 2d 1466 (10th Cir. 1988); Weinrauch v. Park City, 751 F.2d 357 

( 10th Cir. 1984); Coleman v. Turpen, 697 F.2d 1341 (10th Cir. 

1 982 ), and we adhere to the guidance provided by this precedent. 

The core of plaintiff's claim is that he was never provided 

with notice of the specific violation leading to impoundment of 

his van or, more importantly, of the existence of any procedures 

fo r challenging either the impoundment or the underlying 

violation. See Goichman, 859 F.2d at 1467-68 and nn.3-5 (no due 

pr o cess violation despite lack of predeprivation hearing where 

impounded vehicle's owner apprised, by both citation and direct 

communication, of reasonable post-deprivation opportunity to 

co ntest underlying violation and, thereby, to challenge 

impoundment and attendant charges); Weinrauch, 751 F.2d at 359-60 

(same). Defendants maintain that plaintiff's due process rights 

were preserved by virtue of his right to contest the validity of 

his van's impoundment and storage by requesting, in writing, an 

administrative hearing under Okla. Stat. tit. 47, § 903A(A) and/or 

fil ing a petition in state district court under section 903A(C), 

both of which are applicable when a vehicle has been removed from 

the highway as abandoned under Okla. Stat. tit. 47, § 901. Since 

plaintiff was told, albeit informally and 

3 

without further 

Appellate Case: 89-5092 Document: 010110038258 Date Filed: 07/11/1990 Page: 3 
"'· 

explanation, that his van had been impounded as an abandoned 

vehi cle, defendants argue that adequate notice of these statutory 

procedural rights was provided. 

Defendants' position is unacceptable for several reasons. 

First of all, plaintiff was never cited for a section 901 

violat ion. Indeed, despite plaintiff's requests, it was not until 

thes e proceedings that plaintiff was even shown a copy of the 

citation, which referred only to the city ordinance section 

rela ting to abandoned vehicles. 1 Second, there is no evidence of 

any communication, formal or informal, oral or written, from the 

city designed to apprise plaintiff in some other fashion of his 

potential rights under section 903A. Third, the city never 

established that it had followed the procedures mandated by 

s ections 902-903, further undercutting its present reliance on the 

statutory scheme. Finally, defendants' position ultimately rests 

on t he tacit premise that plaintiff's thorough and closely argued 

"Not ice and Demand f o r Return of 1979 Van and Notification of 

Const itutional Violations," hand delivered to the city on the same 

day his vehicle was impounded, did not constitute the requisite 

"writt en request for a hearing with the public agency" under 

s ec t ion 903A. We cannot agree. This timely challenge to 

de f endants' action on procedural due process grounds was clearly 

sufficient to requi r e, if not a prompt section 903A hearing, then 

at the very least some notice to plaintiff of defendants' intent 

to invoke and r e ly on the statutory scheme. Instead, the city 

1 There is nothing in the record to indicate that the ordinance 

inc o rporates any procedural remedy available to persons in 

pl a int iff's circumstances. 

4 

Appellate Case: 89-5092 Document: 010110038258 Date Filed: 07/11/1990 Page: 4 
retained plaintiff's vehicle and said nothing of all this until 

asserting section 903A in its defense below. 

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the existence of the 

remed y provided in section 903A does not preclude plaintiff's 

assertion of a due process claim for the removal, retention, and 

loss of his vehicle under the particular circumstances of this 

case. We leave the remaining issues raised by the parties to 

further factual development and resolution by the district court 

on remand. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Oklahoma dismissing this action for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction is REVERSED, and the cause is REMANDED 

for further proceedings. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

PER CURIAM 

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Appellate Case: 89-5092 Document: 010110038258 Date Filed: 07/11/1990 Page: 5