Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-04079/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-04079-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIAM ANTHONY BOND, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

LAKE COUNTY, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-04079-KAW (PR)

ORDER DISMISSING WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE ALL PLAINTIFFS WITH 

EXCEPTION OF LEAD PLAINTIFF 

BOND AND DISMISSING CERTAIN 

CLAIMS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

Plaintiffs, state prisoners incarcerated at Lake County Jail (“LCJ”), have filed a pro se civil 

rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging the violation of their constitutional rights by 

Lake County and Lake County Sheriff Brian Martin. Lead Plaintiff William Anthony Bond, the 

only Plaintiff who signed the complaint, has consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned 

United States Magistrate Judge over this action and has filed a motion for leave to proceed in 

forma pauperis (“IFP”) with a completed IFP application. This motion is granted in a separate 

order. 

DISCUSSION

I. Multiple Plaintiffs 

An action brought by multiple plaintiffs proceeding pro se presents procedural problems 

that cause delay and confusion. Moore v. California, 2015 WL 5737197, *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 

2015); Mizerak v. Kendricks, 2008 WL 4809866, *1 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2008). Delay often occurs 

from the frequent transfer of inmates to other facilities, changes in address when inmates are 

released to parole and difficulties faced by inmates who must communicate with each other and 

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with unincarcerated individuals. Mizerak, 2008 WL 4809886, at *1. The failure of any Plaintiff 

other than Plaintiff Bond to sign the complaint, submit a motion for leave to proceed in forma 

pauperis and to submit a consent to the jurisdiction of the undersigned Magistrate Judge are 

examples of the delay and confusion that arise when multiple pro se prisoner plaintiffs file one 

complaint. The interests of justice are not served by joinder of Plaintiffs in this action. Avoidance 

of possible prejudice to individual Plaintiffs, delay reduction and avoidance of confusion call for 

Plaintiffs’ claims to proceed separately. Therefore, with the exception of lead Plaintiff Bond, all 

other Plaintiffs are dismissed from this complaint without prejudice to filing separate complaints. 

The Court now addresses the claims asserted in Plaintiff’s complaint. 

II. Standard of Review of Pro Se Complaint

A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner seeks 

redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims 

that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seek 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se

pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th 

Cir. 1988).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: 

(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that 

the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. 

Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 

Liability may be imposed on an individual defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if the 

plaintiff can show that the defendant’s actions both actually and proximately caused the 

deprivation of a federally protected right. Lemire v. Caifornia Dep’t of Corrections & 

Rehabilitation, 726 F.3d 1062, 1074 (9th Cir. 2013); Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 

1988). A person deprives another of a constitutional right within the meaning of § 1983 if he does 

an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative act or omits to perform an act which he is 

legally required to do, that causes the deprivation of which the plaintiff complains. Id. at 633. 

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And, there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983. Lemire, 726 F.3d at 1074. 

That is, a supervisor is not liable merely because the supervisor is responsible, in general terms, 

for the actions of another. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); Ybarra v. Reno 

Thunderbird Mobile Home Village, 723 F.2d 675, 680-81 (9th Cir. 1984). A supervisor may be 

liable only on a showing of (1) personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation or (2) a 

sufficient causal connection between the supervisor's wrongful conduct and the constitutional 

violation. Henry A. v. Willden, 678 F.3d 991, 1003-04 (9th Cir. 2012). It is insufficient for a 

plaintiff to allege generally that supervisors knew about the constitutional violation or that they 

generally created policies and procedures that led to the violation, without alleging “a specific 

policy” or “a specific event” instigated by the supervisors that led to the constitutional violation. 

Hydrick v. Hunter, 669 F.3d 937, 942 (9th Cir. 2012).

Local governments are "persons" subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 where official 

policy or custom causes a constitutional tort, see Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 

690 (1978); however, a city or county may not be held vicariously liable for the unconstitutional 

acts of its employees under the theory of respondeat superior, see Board of Cty. Comm'rs of Bryan 

Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997); Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. To impose municipal liability 

under § 1983 for a violation of constitutional rights, a plaintiff must show: (1) that the plaintiff 

possessed a constitutional right of which he or she was deprived; (2) that the municipality had a 

policy; (3) that this policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's constitutional rights; 

and (4) that the policy is the moving force behind the constitutional violation. Plumeau v. School 

Dist. #40 County of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997). 

III. Plaintiff’s Claims

The complaint alleges the following: LCJ has used all of Plaintiff’s money to pay for

copies of his legal documents. Because “they” took all of his money, Plaintiff cannot buy 

shampoo, toothpaste, soap, envelopes and other personal items. This forces him to go “without 

basic human needs for weeks at a time.” The lights in the jail cells are turned off at 11:30 p.m. 

and are turned on at 4:30 a.m. Plaintiff is sleep-deprived because he can only sleep five hours 

each night when the lights are out. Plaintiff is confined to his cell for more than sixty consecutive 

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hours and is given insufficient time to shave, shower, and exercise in the sunlight. 

Plaintiff has been retaliated against because he has filed grievances and a federal action 

against LCJ employees. In particular, he was threatened by Correctional Officer Philippi.

The County has denied Plaintiff access to legal research. 

A. Eighth Amendment Claim

A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment when two requirements are met: (1) the 

deprivation alleged must be, objectively, sufficiently serious, and (2) the prison official possesses 

a sufficiently culpable state of mind, that is, the official must be deliberately indifferent to the 

inmate’s health or safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). In determining whether 

a deprivation of a basic necessity is sufficiently serious to satisfy the objective component of an 

Eighth Amendment claim, a court must consider the circumstances, nature, and duration of the 

deprivation. The more basic the need, the shorter the time it can be withheld. Johnson v. Lewis, 

217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Liberally construed, the allegations in the first paragraph may meet the objective 

component of a claim for deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s health or safety. However, even 

liberally construed, the allegations fail to meet the second component, which requires that the 

deprivations were caused with deliberate indifference. In fact, Plaintiff fails to name the 

individual or individuals who caused the alleged deprivations. And, as discussed above, there is 

no vicarious liability under § 1983. Therefore, unless Plaintiff can truthfully allege that the 

Sheriff was personally involved in the deprivations or allege a causal connection between the 

Sheriff’s actions and the constitutional deprivations, the allegations fail to state a claim against the 

Sheriff. Plaintiff also fails to state a claim against Lake County because he fails to allege that the 

County had a policy which was the moving force behind his deprivations and that the policy 

amounted to deliberate indifference to his constitutional rights.

If Plaintiff wishes to, he is granted leave to file an amended complaint to correct these 

deficiencies.

II. First Amendment Claims

Plaintiff’s allegation that Correctional Officer Philippi threatened Plaintiff for filing 

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grievances against LCJ employees states a First Amendment retaliation claim against Officer 

Philippi. However, Plaintiff fail to state a cognizable First Amendment retaliation claim against 

any other defendant for the same reasons described above for the Eighth Amendment claim— he 

fails to name any other individuals responsible for the retaliation and the allegations fail to state a 

claim against the County or the Sheriff. If Plaintiff wishes to, he is granted leave to file an 

amended complaint to correct these deficiencies.

For the same reason, the allegation that the County denied Plaintiff legal research fails to 

state a First Amendment claim for lack of access to the courts against the County.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows:

1. With the exception of lead Plaintiff Bond, all Plaintiffs are dismissed from this action 

without prejudice to filing separate complaints.

2. The allegations in the complaint appear to state a cognizable First Amendment 

retaliation claim against Officer Philippi.

3. All other claims are DISMISSED with leave to amend in accordance with the standards 

set forth above. If Plaintiff wishes to file an amended complaint, it must be filed within twentyeight (28) days of the date this Order and must include the caption and civil case number used in 

this Order and the words AMENDED COMPLAINT on the first page. Because an amended 

complaint completely replaces the original complaint, Plaintiff must include in it all the claims he 

wishes to present. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Plaintiff may not 

incorporate material from the original complaint by reference. Failure to amend within the 

designated time will result in the dismissal of all claims except the retaliation claim against Officer 

Philippi. If Plaintiff does not file an amended complaint within twenty-eight days, his cognizable 

claim against Officer Philippi will go forward at the time.

3. It is Plaintiff's responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the Court 

informed of any change of address by filing a separate paper with the clerk headed “Notice of 

Change of Address,” and must comply with the Court's orders in a timely fashion. Failure to do so 

may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

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Procedure 41(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 20, 2015

______________________________________

KANDIS A. WESTMORE

United States Magistrate Judge

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