Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00518/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00518-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRIAN DICKERSON,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

DONNY YOUNGBLOOD, et al.,

 Defendants.

1:15-cv-00518-EPG-PC

ORDER DISMISSING ACTION, WITH 

PREJUDICE, FOR FAILURE TO STATE A 

CLAIM

ORDER THAT DISMISSAL IS SUBJECT TO 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)

ORDER FOR CLERK TO CLOSE CASE 

Plaintiff Brian Dickerson (“Plaintiff”) is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with 

this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed the Complaint commencing 

this action on April 3, 2015.

1

 The Court screened the Complaint and dismissed it with leave to 

amend on June 28, 2016. (ECF No. 10). Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) 

on August 22, 2016, which is now before the Court for screening (ECF No. 11). 

For the reasons described below, the Court dismisses the claims made in the FAC with 

prejudice, based on Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under §

 

1 On May 20, 2015, Plaintiff consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction in this action pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. ' 636(c) (ECF No. 8), and no other parties have made an appearance. Therefore, pursuant to 

Appendix A(k)(4) of the Local Rules of the Eastern District of California, the undersigned shall conduct any and 

all proceedings in the case until such time as reassignment to a District Judge is required. Local Rule Appendix 

A(k)(3).

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1983. This dismissal is subject to the Athree-strikes@ provision set forth in 28 U.S.C. ' 1915(g). 

Coleman v. Tollefson, 135 S. Ct. 1759, 1763 (2015).

I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 

The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are 

legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or 

that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(b)(1), (2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have 

been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that the action or 

appeal fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

A complaint is required to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing 

that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are 

not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are 

taken as true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart 

Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that 

is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. While factual allegations are accepted as true, 

legal conclusions are not. Id.

To state a viable claim for relief, Plaintiff must set forth sufficient factual allegations to 

state a plausible claim for relief. Id. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969

(9th Cir. 2009). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this plausibility 

standard. Id. 

II. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT

Plaintiff is currently unincarcerated. Plaintiff names as defendants Donny Youngblood, 

Sergeant Hinkle, Sheen Beasley, and Sergeant Jackson. 

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According to Plaintiff, “Through Revalations [sic] and personal Experances [sic] 

[Plaintiff] have [sic] seen and felt The pain, Disgrace by the hands of the Church/Authorities 

here in Bakersfield. (Kern).” 2 (ECF No. 11, p. 3). It was revealed that Plaintiff was “chosen 

by ‘God’ to Become heir to credit promise that God mad [sic] to Abraham and seed.” (Id.) 

However, “[i]nstead of Church Jesus Christ Latter day Saints imbracing [sic] God gift, Because 

of There [sic] hate and harden [sic] hearts – The kid’s [sic] of the Church Elders decided they 

will Dissquilify [sic] By using There [sic] position in power to abuse and put [Plaintiff] through 

every addbomanation [sic] knowing [sic] to man kind,” including “Sexual Assult [sic], Abuse, 

and unlawful contvin [sic].” (Id.). Further, “[t]he many self-abomination was not good 

Enough for The Church/Athorties [sic], here was not good Enough They also victimize may 

[sic] family member.... CDC Recorder will [] show that my Brother was Attacked, Beating 

[sic] and sexually assaulted – Along with mother, sister, and kids.” (Id. at p. 9).

Plaintiff states that he has made many complaints against the Church and the 

Authorities, including a “complaint with The Attorney General (FBI) The Supreme United 

State Fed 3, 2016, U.S. District Court Eastern District of California and over 30 Habeas Corpus 

with the Superior Court of California of the County of Kern.” (Id. at p. 8). Plaintiff alleges 

that “Sences [sic] 1998 the Church of Jesus Christ Latter day Saints know [sic] as The 

Mormons Have Done Every and anything human possible Rape, sexual assult [sic], studies and 

experiment of human disfonctional [sic] famies [sic], kidy [sic] porn, transgender experiment, 

Indangering [sic] of human life with test of unlawful chimical [sic] cause the citizens of Kern 

County to Disire [sic] sexual Thoughts causing one To Rape and The other to Become a victim 

that Repents abuse. Church/corporation of Jesus Christ Latter Day Saints known as The 

Mormon Sit over The Corruption of Kern County Legal System dictated under Church 

dictatementship [sic]. The Church is Responsible for Death and Destruction of 100 millions 

Thousands of Black-Africal Indians.” (Id. at p. 8-9). 

 

2 The “Church” refers to the Church of Jesus Christ Latter Day Saints. It is difficult to determine 

who is included in the term “Authorities,” but at the very least it refers to Kern County, the Kern County District 

Attorney, and the Kern County Public Defender’s Office.

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Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that “[t]he citizens are been [sic] ilgally [sic] video and 

auto [sic] trap then blackmailed. Family [sic] are losing there [sic] homes, families and kids to 

the Dictatementship [sic] of the Church of Jesus Christ Latter Day Saints – Mormons. The 

legal system here in Kern County (B.P.D.) (Kcsc) Districtied [sic] Attorney and public 

defender office operates in a wide range of crimal [sic] activited [sic] with other officers and 

Imformants [sic]. The Imformant [sic] are allowed to rape, kill, conduct, while beting [sic] the 

fear into them into submission.” (Id. at p. 10).

Finally, Plaintiff alleges that because of the Kern County Sheriff’s Office’s negligence, 

Plaintiff was sexually assaulted. (Id. at p. 5). According to Plaintiff, “while In custody 

[Plaintiff] was Raped Repeatlly [sic]. Officers allowed Imformants [sic] from the streets come 

into a one man holding cell and was refuse rape kit, and Treatment.”

3

(Id. at p. 10-11). Plaintiff 

also alleges that the Kern County Sheriff’s Office “use[d] there [sic] Authorzize [sic] Authority

To Harass and abuse [Plaintiff] and family.” (Id. at p. 5).

Plaintiff requests that the Court to investigate the matter and that those that played a 

part be held accountable.

III. PRIOR SCREENING ORDER

In Plaintiff’s original Complaint, Plaintiff claimed that he was sexually assaulted by 

three deputies employed by the Kern County Sheriff’s Office. (ECF No. 1, p. 3). In his request 

for relief, Plaintiff asked the Court to investigate the charges filed against the deputies. (Id.).

After screening the Complaint, the Court found that it did not provide sufficient details 

to state a claim as to any defendants. (ECF No. 10). Plaintiff failed to describe who did what 

to him in a way that would state a claim for violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. 

Moreover, the Court found that it was unable to provide the relief requested by Plaintiff, which 

was an investigation into charges filed against the deputies. The Court provided the applicable 

legal standards for Plaintiff’s asserted claims under § 1983, and dismissed the Complaint with 

leave to amend. The Court advised Plaintiff that if he was going to amend his complaint he 

 

3

Plaintiff appears to use “officers” and “deputies” interchangeably.

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needed to “describe all of the circumstances of the assault against him, i.e., when it happened, 

where it happened, and how each defendant personally acted against him.” (Id. at 7). Plaintiff 

was further advised that “Plaintiff should note that although he has been given the opportunity 

to amend, it is not for the purpose of changing the nature of this suit or adding unrelated 

claims.” Id. at 8. 

IV. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS

A. Legal Standards

1. Section 1983

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 

usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes 

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the 

jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 

secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 

action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983

“[Section] 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a 

method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 

393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)); see also Chapman 

v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 618 (1979); Hall v. City of Los Angeles, 697

F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2012); Crowley v. Nevada, 678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 2012); 

Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006). 

To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant acted 

under color of state law and (2) the defendant deprived him of rights secured by the 

Constitution or federal law. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 

2006); see also Marsh v. Cnty. of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing 

“under color of state law”). A person deprives another of a constitutional right, “within the 

meaning of § 1983, ‘if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative act, or 

omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which 

complaint is made.’” Preschooler II v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th 

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Cir. 2007) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). “The requisite 

causal connection may be established when an official sets in motion a ‘series of acts by others 

which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict’ constitutional 

harms.” Preschooler II, 479 F.3d at 1183 (quoting Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743). This standard of 

causation “closely resembles the standard ‘foreseeability’ formulation of proximate cause.” 

Arnold v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Harper v. City 

of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008).

2. Eighth Amendment

Plaintiff has not informed the Court whether he was a pretrial detainee or a prisoner 

serving a sentence at the time the events at issue occurred. This distinction affects how 

Plaintiff’s rights are determined.

Prisoner

“The Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment protects 

prisoners not only from inhumane methods of punishment but also from inhumane conditions 

of confinement.” Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006). “[W]hile 

conditions of confinement may be, and often are, restrictive and harsh, they ‘must not involve 

the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.’” Id. (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 

337, 347 (1981)). “What is necessary to show sufficient harm for purposes of the Cruel and 

Unusual Punishment Clause depends upon the claim at issue....” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 

U.S. 1, 8 (1992). “[E]xtreme deprivations are required to make out a[n] [Eighth Amendment] 

conditions-of-confinement claim.” Id. at 9 (citation omitted). “Because routine discomfort is 

part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society, only those 

deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are sufficiently grave 

to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation.” Id. (quotations and citations omitted). 

Prison officials may be held liable for violations under the Eighth Amendment only if they 

acted with “deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm.” Frost, 152 F.3d at

1128.

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The deliberate indifference standard involves an objective and a subjective prong. First, 

the alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms, “sufficiently serious . . . .” Farmer v. 

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). 

Second, the prison official must “know [ ] of and disregard[ ] an excessive risk to inmate health 

or safety . . . .” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Thus, a prison official may be held liable under the 

Eighth Amendment for denying humane conditions of confinement if he knows that inmates 

face a substantial risk of harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to 

abate it. Id. at 837–45. Prison officials may avoid liability by presenting evidence that they 

lacked knowledge of the risk, or by presenting evidence of a reasonable, albeit unsuccessful, 

response to the risk. Id. at 844–45. Mere negligence on the part of the prison official is not 

sufficient to establish liability, but rather, the official’s conduct must have been wanton. Id. at 

835; Frost, 152 F.3d at 1128.

“Sexual harassment or abuse of an inmate by a corrections officer is a violation of the 

Eighth Amendment.” Wood v. Beauclair, 692 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations 

omitted). However, “not ‘every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal 

cause of action.’” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1113 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Hudson,

503 U.S. at 9). “In evaluating a prisoner’s claim, courts consider whether the officials acted 

with a sufficiently culpable state of mind and if the alleged wrongdoing was objectively 

harmful enough to establish a constitutional violation.” Wood, 692 F.3d at 1046 (internal 

quotation marks and alterations omitted). Watison found no sexual harassment in violation of 

the Eighth Amendment where a plaintiff alleged a correctional officer entered the plaintiff’s 

cell while the plaintiff was on the toilet, began to search the cell, ignored the plaintiff's request 

that he leave, rubbed his thigh against the plaintiff’s thigh while sexually smiling, and left the 

cell laughing. Watison, 668 F.3d at 1112. Watison reasoned the officer’s “alleged wrongdoing 

was [not] objectively ‘harmful enough’ to establish a constitutional violation.” Id. at 1114 

(internal quotation marks omitted); see Palmer v. O'Connor, No. 2:11–CV–2927–KJN (P), 

2013 WL 1326207, at *4 (E.D.Cal. Mar. 29, 2013) (“Inmate sexual harassment claims that 

allege brief inappropriate touching by a correctional official are generally found to be 

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noncognizable, particularly if the alleged touching occurred pursuant to an authorized search. 

‘Even if plaintiff believed that there was a sexual aspect to the search, more is needed.’”).

Pretrial Detainee

“[P]retrial detainees . . . possess greater constitutional rights than prisoners.” Stone v. 

City of San Francisco, 968 F.2d 850, 857 n.10 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Gary H. v. Hegstrom, 

831 F.2d 1430, 1432 (9th Cir. 1987). A pretrial detainee’s right to be free from punishment is 

grounded in the Due Process Clause, but Courts borrow from Eighth Amendment jurisprudence 

when analyzing the rights of pretrial detainees. See Pierce v. Cnty. of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190, 

1205 (9th Cir. 2008); Lolli v. Cnty. of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 418-19 (9th Cir. 2003); Or. 

Advocacy Ctr. v. Mink, 322 F.3d 1101, 1120 (9th Cir. 2003); Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 

1128 (9th Cir. 1998); Carnell v. Grimm, 74 F.3d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 1996); Anderson v. Cnty. of 

Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1312-13 (9th Cir. 1995); Maddox v. City of Los Angeles, 792 F.2d 1408, 

1414-15 (9th Cir. 1986). However, the legal standard for deliberate indifference is somewhat 

different for pretrial detainees. “[U]nder the Eighth Amendment, a prison official cannot be 

found liable under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause Unusual Punishment Clause for 

denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement ‘unless the official knows of and 

disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts 

from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he 

must also draw the inference.’” Castro v. Cty. of Los Angeles, No. 12-56829, 2016 WL 

4268955, at *4 (9th Cir. Aug. 15, 2016) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 

(1994)). Under the Fourteenth Amendment, courts look to see whether the defendant’s conduct 

is “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at *7.

B. Analysis of Plaintiff’s Claims

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s FAC fails to state a claim for a constitutional violation. 

As discussed above and noted in the Court’s prior order dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint with 

leave to amend, “[i]t is not sufficient to allege that ‘the defendants’ sexually abused Plaintiff, 

without explaining what each defendant did, or failed to do, which resulted in the violation of 

Plaintiff’s rights.” (ECF No. 10 at 7). The Court advised Plaintiff that if he was going to 

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amend his complaint he needed to “describe all of the circumstances of the assault against him, 

i.e., when it happened, where it happened, and how each defendant personally acted against 

him.” (Id.). Despite this warning, Plaintiff failed to provide the necessary details. While 

Plaintiff does state where he was raped (in a holding cell), he does not state when he was raped, 

gives no details of the alleged rapes, fails to state who raped him, and fails to state the names of 

the deputies who allowed it to happen. The Court takes allegations of sexual abuse in prisons 

and jails very seriously. But in order to state a claim, Plaintiff must allege what happened in a 

way that the Court can determine if there has been a constitutional violation. 

Moreover, taken as a whole, Plaintiff’s allegations suggest that Plaintiff is alleging a 

conspiracy by the Church and the Authorities against people generally, rather than a specific 

sexual assault against Plaintiff while he was in custody. For example, Plaintiff alleges “Sences 

[sic] 1998 the Church of Jesus Christ Latter day Saints know [sic] as The Mormons Have Done 

Every and anything human possible Rape, sexual assult [sic], studies and experiment of human 

disfonctional [sic] famies [sic], kidy [sic] porn, transgender experiment, Indangering [sic] of 

human life with test of unlawful chimical [sic] cause the citizens of Kern County to Disire [sic]

sexual Thoughts....” (ECF No. 11, p. 8). Plaintiff also alleges that “[t]he citizens are been 

[sic] ilgally [sic] video and auto [sic] trap then blackmailed. Family [sic] are losing there [sic] 

homes, families and kids to the Dictatementship [sic] of the Church of Jesus Christ Latter Day 

Saints – Mormons. The legal system here in Kern County (B.P.D.) (Kcsc) Districtied [sic] 

Attorney and public defender office operates in a wide range of crimal [sic] activited [sic] with 

other officers and Imformants [sic]. The Imformant [sic] are allowed to rape, kill, conduct, 

while beting [sic] the fear into them into submission.” (Id. at p. 10). These broad allegations of 

inappropriate actions toward humanity are not actionable under § 1983, which provides relief 

for specific constitutional violations against a plaintiff.

Plaintiff has failed to provide the Court with facts which, if true, demonstrate that the

defendants deprived Plaintiff of rights secured by the Constitution. Therefore, Plaintiff’s FAC 

fails to state a claim.

\\\

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V. CONCLUSION

The Court finds that Plaintiff=s First Amended Complaint fails to state any cognizable 

claim upon which relief may be granted under § 1983. The Court will not provide further leave 

to amend because it believes amendment will be futile. The Court already screened one 

complaint and provided guidance to Plaintiff regarding pleading a cognizable claim. Plaintiff’s 

FAC nevertheless failed to plead sufficient facts under the relevant case law. Moreover, it 

appears that Plaintiff is seeking redress for a broader conspiracy, which is not actionable under 

§ 1983. The Court will dismiss the First Amended Complaint with prejudice.

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 1915A and 28 U.S.C. ' 1915(e), this action is

DISMISSED, with prejudice, based on Plaintiff=s failure to state a claim upon which relief may 

be granted under § 1983;

2. This dismissal is subject to the Athree-strikes@ provision set forth in 28 U.S.C. '

1915(g). Coleman v. Tollefson, 135 S. Ct. 1759, 1763 (2015); and

3. The Clerk is directed to close this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 12, 2016 /s/

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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