Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-02051/USCOURTS-ca10-94-02051-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

SONJA LUJAN, as Personal 

Representative of the Estate of 

KIMBERLY LUJAN, Deceased, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

V. 

REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF 

CALIFORNIA, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

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No. 94-2051 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District ofNew Mexico 

(D. Ct. No. CIV 91-1189 JC) 

Michael G. Elia, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

FILED ~ United States Court of AppealS Tenth Cirruit 

NOV 0 8 1995 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

Edward Robert Ricco (Bruce Hall and Jonathan W. Hewes with him on the brief) ofRodey, 

Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A., Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Defendant-Appellee. 

Before EBEL, Circuit Judge, McWILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge, and JENKINS, Senior 

District Judge.* 

* The Honorable Bruce S. Jenkins, Senior District Judge, United States District 

Court for the District of Utah, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 94-2051 Document: 01019279011 Date Filed: 11/08/1995 Page: 1 
JENKINS, Senior District Judge. 

The plaintiffbrought this action to recover for the death of her daughter, allegedly 

as a result of exposure to radioactive and other hazardous substances released into the 

environment from the Los Alamos National Laboratory. The district court held that the plaintiff's 

state-law claims were subsumed into her so-called public liability claim under the federal PriceAnderson Act and that the plaintiff's public liability claim was untimely. We agree that the 

plaintiff's public liability claim was untimely. We further conclude that her independent state-law 

claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. 

BACKGROUND 

On September 15, 1985, twenty-one-year-old Kimberly Lujan died as the result of 

recurrent brain cancers, from which she had suffered since she was eighteen months old. 

Over six years later, on December 9, 1991, Kimberly's mother, Sonja Lujan, filed 

this action on behalf of herself and Kimberly's estate alleging injuries and wrongful death from 

exposure to radioactive and other toxic substances released into the air, soil and water near the 

Los Alamos National Laboratory in Los Alamos, New Mexico. The laboratory has been 

researching, developing and testing nuclear weapons since 194 3. The defendants, the Regents of 

the University of California, operate the laboratory under a contract with the United States 

Department ofEnergy (DOE). Sonja's complaint alleged various state-law tort claims as well as 

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federal claims under the Price-Anderson Act as amended (Price-Anderson), see 42 U.S. C. §§ 

2014 and 2210 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 

Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The 

district court dismissed some of the state-law claims and the CERCLA claim for failure to state a 

claim for relief. The court also held that all Sonja's state-law claims premised on exposure to 

radioactive substances were preempted by Price-Anderson. Sonja has not appealed those rulings. 

The district court then granted the Regents' motion for summary judgment on all 

of Sonja's remaining claims on behalf ofKimberly's estate on the grounds that those claims were 

barred by the statute oflimitations. The district court first held that Sonja's state-law claims 

"have meaning only as 'elements' of the federal Price-Anderson Act claim and, even then, only if 

they are not inconsistent with" the act. Aplt. App. at 93. The district court then held that Sonja's 

Price-Anderson claim was barred by New Mexico's three-year statute oflimitations for wrongful 

death actions. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-2-2 (Michie Repl. Pamph. 1989). The court reasoned 

that Price-Anderson incorporates state law to the extent it is not inconsistent with the act and 

determined that New Mexico's wrongful death statute was not inconsistent with Price-Anderson. 

The New Mexico statute provides that a cause of action for wrongful death "accrues as of the 

date of death." Id. The district court concluded that New Mexico does not apply a discovery 

rule to wrongful death actions and that, because Sonja brought her representative claims more 

than three years after Kimberly's death, those claims were time-barred. 

Sonja then dismissed without prejudice her individual claims and appealed the 

district court's ruling that her representative claims were barred by the statute of limitations. 

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• • r ·. 

DISCUSSION 

We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. E.g._, Eaton v. 

Jarvis Prods. Corp., 965 F.2d 922, 925 (lOth Cir. 1992). In affirming a summary judgment, we 

are not limited to the district court's reasoning but may affirm on any ground that finds adequate 

support in the record. Cone v. Longmont United Hosp. Ass'n, 14 F.3d 526, 528 (1Oth Cir. 

1994). 

Sonja's representative claims--the only claims involved in this appeal--fall into two 

categories: a federal claim under Price-Anderson and various state-law claims. Sonja does not 

dispute the district court's ruling that all her state-law claims premised on exposure to radioactive 

substances are preempted by Price-Anderson. Therefore, the only state-law claims at issue here 

are those based on exposure to substances to which Price-Anderson does not apply. We shall 

address each category in turn. 

A The Plaintiff's Price-Anderson Claim 

The Price-Anderson Act was enacted in 1957 as an amendment to the Atomic 

Energy Act of 1954. See Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (1957). 1 As originally enacted, PriceFor a more complete history of the Price-Anderson Act and its amendments, see 

Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 249-56 (1984); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina 

Envtl. Study Group. Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 63-67 (1978); O'Connor v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 

13 F.3d 1090, 1095-97 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2711 (1994); Brannon v. Babcock & 

Wilcox Co. (In re TMI Litigation Cases Consolidated II), 940 F.2d 832, 836-37, 851-54 (3d Cir. 

1991), ~- denied, 503 U.S. 906 (1992); S. Rep. No. 70, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. 13-15 (1987), 

reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1424, 1426-28. 

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Anderson had a dual purpose: "to protect the public and to encourage the development of the 

atomic energy industry." Pub. L. No. 85-256, § 1, 71 Stat. at 576 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 

2012(i)). It protected the public by "assur[ing] adequate public compensation in the case of a 

nuclear accident," and it encouraged private participation in the development of nuclear energy by 

limiting the liability of private industry for nuclear accidents. SeeS. Rep. No. 70, supra note 1, at 

13, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1426. 

The original Price-Anderson Act assured adequate compensation for the victims of 

nuclear accidents by authorizing the federal government to indemnify its licensees and contractors 

for any liability they might incur as a result of their activities, thus increasing the funds that might 

otherwise be available for compensating victims. See Pub. L. No. 85-256, § 4, 71 Stat. at 576-77. 

However, absent an independent basis for federal jurisdiction, any action against a licensee or 

contractor had to be brought in state court and was governed by state substantive and procedural 

law. See Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 251-53; Brannon, 940 F.2d at 857, and cases cited therein. 

In 1966 Congress amended the Price-Anderson Act to provide extra protection for 

victims of certain major nuclear accidents, called "extraordinary nuclear occurrences" (ENOs). 2 

2 The statute defined "extraordinary nuclear occurrence" as 

any event causing a discharge or dispersal of source, special 

nuclear, or byproduct material from its intended place of 

confinement in amounts offsite, or causing radiation levels offsite, 

which the Commission determines to be substantial, and which the 

Commission determines has resulted or will probably result in 

substantial damages to persons offsite or property offsite. 

Pub. L. No. 89-645, 80 Stat. 891, 891 (1966) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 20140)). The 

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The 1966 amendments gave federal district courts original jurisdiction over "any public liability 

action arising out of or resulting from" an ENO, "without regard to the citizenship of any party or 

the amount in controversy" and provided for the removal of such actions brought in state court or 

the transfer of such actions brought in a federal district court where venue was improper. See 

Pub. L. No. 89-645, 80 Stat. at 892 (codified as amended at 42 U.S. C. § 2210(n)(2)). The 

statute did not define "public liability action." 

Under the 1966 amendments, the Commission was authorized to require 

contractors to waive certain defenses as a condition to being indemnified for any liability arising 

out of certain ENOs. Among the defenses contractors were required to waive was 

any issue or defense based on any statute of limitations if suit is 

instituted within three years from the date on which the claimant 

first knew, or reasonably could have known, of his injury or damage 

and the cause thereof, but in no event more than ten years after the 

date of the nuclear incident. 

terms "source material," "special nuclear material" and "byproduct material" refer to certain 

specified nuclear or radioactive materials. See 42 U.S. C. § 2014(e), (z) & (aa). The term 

"Commission" referred to the Atomic Energy Commission. See id. § 2014(£). The Atomic 

Energy Commission was abolished and its functions transferred to the Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission in 1974. See Pub. L. No. 93-438, tit. I, § 104(a), & tit. II, § 201(£), 88 Stat. 1233, 

1237, 1243 (1974) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5814(a) & 5841(£)). The 1988 amendments to 

Price-Anderson substituted "Nuclear Regulatory Commission or the Secretary of Energy, as 

appropriate," for "Commission" in the statutory definition of an ENO. See Pub. L. No. 100-408, 

§ 16(b)(1), 102 Stat. 1069, 1079 (1988). 

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Id., 80 Stat. at 892 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)). 3 Although the statutory 

language appeared to make it discretionary with the Commission whether to require this limited 

waiver of any statute of limitations defense, Congress and the courts have construed the act and 

its amendments as establishing a statute of limitations, at least for actions arising out of an ENO. 

SeeS. Rep. No. 70, supra note 1, at 15, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1427 ("The 1966 

renewal ... set a minimum statute oflimitations ... for the filing of claims after an accident"); 

O'Conner, 13 F.3d at 1096 (the amendments to Price-Anderson dictate "the limitations period for 

a public liability cause of action"); Brannon, 940 F.2d at 854 (the amendments to Price-Anderson 

created a new federal cause of action and "set a limitations period to govern the newly-created 

cause of action"); O'Conner v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 770 F. Supp. 448, 455 (C. D. Ill. 

1991) (Price-Anderson "not only creates a cause of action" but "also provides a period of 

limitations for that cause of action"), aff'd, 13 F.3d 1090 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2711 

(1994). But~ Day v. NLO. Inc., 3 F.3d 153, 154 n.1 (6th Cir. 1993) (Price-Anderson 

"provides no statute of limitations"). The statute did not displace less restrictive state statutes of 

limitations. SeeS. Rep. No. 70, supra note 1, at 15, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1427. 

In 1988 Congress amended Price-Anderson again. The 1988 amendments 

extended the federal district courts' jurisdiction over "public liability" actions to those arising out 

of any "nuclear incident," not just to those arising out of an ENO, and provided for their removal 

3 In 197 5 Congress extended the outside time for bringing an action arising out of an 

ENO from ten years to twenty years. See Pub. L. No. 94-197, § 12, 89 Stat. 1111, 1114 (1975). 

Congress eliminated the twenty-year statute of repose in 1988. See Pub. L. No. 100-408, § 

10(a), 102 Stat. at 1075 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(1)). 

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to federal court. See Pub. L. No. 100-408, § 11(a), 102 Stat. at 1076 (codified at 42 U.S. C. § 

2210(n)(2)). The amendments also added a definition of"public liability action": 

The term "public liability action" as used in section 170 [ 42 U.S. C. 

§ 2210] means any suit asserting public liability.[4

] A public liability 

action shall be deemed to be an action arising under section 170, 

and the substantive rules for decision in such [an] action shall be 

derived from the law of the State in which the nuclear incident 

involved occurs. unless such law is inconsistent with the provisions 

of such section. 

Pub. L. No. 100-408, § ll(b), 102 Stat. at 1076 (emphasis added) (codified at 42 U.S. C. § 

2014(hh)). 

Whether the statute of limitations for a public liability claim under Price-Anderson 

is governed by state or federal law therefore depends on whether the statute of limitations is 

considered a "substantive" rule for decision within the meaning of 42 U.S. C. § 2014(hh). Neither 

the parties nor the district court analyzed the issue. All assumed the statute oflimitations is 

substantive and therefore governed by state law, as have most courts that have considered the 

issue. See Day, 3 F.3d at 154 n.1 (noting that, because Price-Anderson "provides no statute of 

limitations, the district court held, and neither party contests on appeal, that the limitations period 

and accrual and tolling rules must be borrowed from the State law"); In re Cincinnati Radiation 

Litigation, 874 F. Supp. 796, 832 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (restating plaintiffs' assertion that the federal 

4 With certain exceptions that do not apply here, the statute defines "public liability" 

as "any legal liability arising out of or resulting from a nuclear incident or precautionary 

evacuation." See 42 U.S.C. § 2014(w). The statute defines a "nuclear incident" to include "any 

occurrence, including an extraordinary nuclear occurrence, ... causing ... bodily injury, sickness, 

disease, or death ... arising out of or resulting from the radioactive, toxic, explosive, or other 

hazardous properties of' certain nuclear materials. I d. § 20 14( q). 

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court must apply the state statute of limitations to their Price-Anderson claim); Cook v. Rockwell 

Int'l Cor,p., 755 F. Supp. 1468, 1482 (D. Colo. 1991) (holding that Price-Anderson claims are 

governed by state statutes of limitations because statutes of limitations are substantive). The 

issue, however, is not so easily resolved. 

The terms "substantive" and "procedural" do not have a fixed content. "The line 

between 'substance' and 'procedure' shifts as the legal context changes." Hanna v. Plumer, 380 

U.S. 460, 471 (1965). See also, u._, Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 726 (1988); 

Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945). Statute oflimitations are neither 

substantive nor procedural per se but have "mixed substantive and procedural aspects." Sun Oil, 

486 U.S. at 736 (Brennan, J., concurring). Depending on the context, courts have reached 

different conclusions about whether a statute oflimitations is substantive or procedural. 

Compare, u.., Sun Oil, 4~6 U.S. at 722-29 (statutes of limitations are procedural for choice-oflaw purposes under the Full Faith and Credit Clause); FDIC v. Petersen, 770 F.2d 141, 142-43 

(1Oth Cir. 1985) (statutes of limitations are procedural for purposes of a contractual choice-oflaw provision); and FDIC v. Belli, 981 F.2d 838, 842 (5th Cir. 1993) (statutes oflimitations are 

procedural for purposes of determining whether they apply retroactively), with Guaranty Trust, 

3 26 U.S. at 110-12 (statutes of limitations are substantive for purposes of applying the Erie 

doctrine). Traditionally, however, statutes of limitations were generally treated as procedural. 

See, u., Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 454 (1904) ("ordinary limitations of actions are treated as 

laws of procedure"); FDIC v. Petersen, 770 F.2d at 142-43 (statutes of limitations "are generally 

considered to be procedural rather than substantive law") (citations omitted); Schreiber v. Allis9 

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Chalmers Corp., 448 F. Supp. 1079, 1092 (D. Kan. 1978) ("the common law recognized statutes 

of limitations as 'procedural"'), rev'd on other grounds, 611 F.2d 790 (lOth Cir. 1979). See also 

Sierra Life Ins. Co. v. First Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 512 P.2d 1245, 1249 (N.M. 1973) (under New 

Mexico law statutes of limitations are generally considered procedural and not substantive in 

nature). Thus, one could argue that federal law--not state law--should provide the statute of 

limitations for a public liability claim under Price-Anderson. 5 

Regardless of how statutes oflimitations are treated generally, however, where a 

statute of limitations does not merely bar the remedy for the violation of a right but limits or 

conditions the right itself, courts have treated the statute as substantive. See,~' Sarfati v. 

Wood Holly Assocs., 874 F.2d 1523, 1525 (I lth Cir. 1989); Wayne v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 

730 F.2d 392, 400-02 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1159 (1985); Myers v. AlveySuch a conclusion would not end the inquiry, however, since federal law contains 

no statute of limitations for public liability actions generally. Even the limitations provision for 

ENOs does not provide a limitations period as such but merely applies a discovery rule to public 

liability actions arising out of an ENO if the action would otherwise be barred by a state statute of 

limitations. See 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n). Where, as here, Congress has not provided an express 

limitations period for actions involving federal rights, courts generally borrow state limitations 

periods. See Lamp£ Pleva. Lipkind. Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 355 (1991); 

Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67 (1985); DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 

462 U.S. 151, 158-61 & n.13 (1983); Bowdzy v. United Air Lines. Inc., 956 F.2d 999, 1004-05 

(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 97 (1992). Ordinarily, when federal law borrows a state 

statute of limitations, it also borrows state law governing when the statute begins to run and when 

it is tolled. See,~' Johnson v. Railway Express Agency. Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 463-64 (1975). 

However, state law is not controlling in such a case; "considerations of state law may be displaced 

where their application would be inconsistent with the federal policy underlying the cause of 

action under consideration." I d. at 465. Thus, if the statute of limitations were considered 

procedural, federal law would determine when the cause of action accrued, even if federal law 

would look to state law to provide the limitations period. 

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Ferguson Co., 331 F.2d 223, 224 (6th Cir. 1964); Schreiber, 448 F. Supp. at 1092; Chartener v. 

Kice, 270 F. Supp. 432,436 (E.D.N.Y. 1967); Hiskett v. Wells, 351 P.2d 300, 303-04 (Okla. 

1959). 

Limitations provisions contained in wrongful death statutes are generally held to be 

of the latter variety. See,~' Continental Casualty Co. v. The Benny Skou, 200 F.2d 246, 248 

(4th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 992 (1953); Anastasio v. Holiday Inns. Inc., 93 F.R.D. 

560, 562 (D.N.J. 1982); Johnson v. Kotu?ers Co., 524 F. Supp. 1182, 1188 (N.D. Ohio 1981), 

appeal dismissed, 705 F.2d 451, 454 (6th Cir. 1982); Chartener, 270 F. Supp. at 436; Huang v. 

D' Albora, 644 A.2d 1, 3-4 (D.C. 1994); Crenshaw v. Great Central Ins. Co., 527 S.W.2d 1, 4-5 

(Mo. Ct. App. 1975); Franco v. Allstate Ins. Co., 505 S.W.2d 789, 792 (Tex. 1974). There was 

no right to sue for wrongful death at common law. See,~' Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 

U.S. 233, 240 (1921); Ickes v. Brimhall, 79 P.2d 942, 943 (N.M. 1938). A wrongful death 

statute creates and defines the right of action. Where the statute includes a limitations provision, 

"[t]he time within which the suit must be brought operates as a limitation of the liability itself as 

created, and not of the remedy alone. It is a condition attached to the right to sue at all." The 

Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199, 214 (1886), overruled on other grounds by Moragne v. States Marine 

Lines. Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 409 (1970). 

New Mexico's statute of limitations for wrongful death actions is no exception. 

The New Mexico Supreme Court has held that the statute "is not only a limitation on the remedy 

but also on the right to institute such an action." Wall v. Gillett, 298 P.2d 939, 940 (N.M. 1956) 

(citations omitted). See ru..s.u Peny v. Staver, 473 P .2d 3 80, 3 83 (N.M. Ct. App. 1970) 

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(suggesting that New Mexico follows "the general rule applicable to wrongful death actions," 

namely, that limitations provisions in wrongful death statutes "'are not properly statutes of 

limitations as that term is generally understood, but they are qualifications and conditions 

restricting the rights granted by the statutes, and must be strictly complied with"') (quoting 

Annot., 67 A.L.R. 1070 (1930)). As such, New Mexico's wrongful death statute oflimitations is 

part of the state's substantive law, and the district court correctly concluded that it governed 

Sonja's public liability claim on behalfofK.imberly's estate. 6 Cf Levinson v. Deupree, 345 U.S. 

648, 651 (1953) ("a time limitation deemed attached to the right of action created by the State is 

binding in the federal forum") (citing Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 25 7 U.S. at 24 2, and The 

Harrisburg, 119 U.S. at 214) (all admiralty cases). 

Sonja argues that Price-Anderson only adopts state substantive law to the extent it 

is not inconsistent with 42 U.S.C. § 2210 and that it is inconsistent with section 2210 not to apply 

a discovery rule to her public liability claim. 

As we have seen, section 221 0 provides for a discovery rule in public liability 

actions but only if the action arises out of an ENO (and then only indirectly, by authorizing the 

DOE to require its contractors to waive any limitations defense if suit is brought within three 

years of discovery). See 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(I). It is undisputed that Sonja's claim does not 

6 Our holding is limited to claims based on New Mexico's wrongful death statute 

and does not necessarily mean that other state-law claims would be governed by state statutes of 

limitations. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 

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arise out of an ENO. Therefore, the statute does not require application of a discovery rule, and 

the district court's refusal to apply such a rule was not inconsistent with the terms of the statute. 

Sonja suggests that the 1988 amendments to Price-Anderson show Congress's 

intent to expand coverage under the act and that the failure to apply a discovery rule to her claim 

would be inconsistent with this federal policy embodied in the act. Our task, however, is to 

effectuate the terms of the statute as written, not to give effect to some broad, amorphous federal 

policy. See,~' National Tax Credit Partners. L.P. v. Havlik, 20 F.3d 705, 707 (7th Cir. 1994) 

(courts do not enforce legislative purposes in the abstract but enforce rules embedded in statutory 

language, which may track those purposes only imperfectly). Statutes may have multiple 

purposes, id., and may represent a compromise between competing considerations. The difficult 

policy choices reflected in a statute are for the legislature to make, "and it frustrates rather than 

effectuates legislative intent simplistically to assume that whatever furthers the statute's primary 

objective must be the law." Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 526 (1987). Policy 

arguments are simply irrelevant where the statutory language is unambiguous. Id.; Zolg v. Kelly 

(In re Kelly), 841 F.2d 908, 913 (9th Cir. 1988). Here, the statutory language is clear. Congress 

specified that state law should provide the substantive rules for decision in public liability actions 

unless it is "inconsistent with the provisions of' section 2210. 42 U.S. C. § 2014(hh) (emphasis 

added). There is nothing inconsistent with the provisions of section 221 0 to apply a discovery 

rule to public liability actions arising out of an ENO and not to those arising out of less serious 

nuclear incidents. As the district court noted, Congress may have concluded that the problems of 

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proof associated with lesser nuclear accidents, which are not always easily identified, outweigh a 

plaintiff's right to full compensation. See Aplt. App. at 97. 

We recognize, as did the district court, that exposure to radiation "can occur 

without the slightest indication of its presence and the effects of such exposure may lie dormant 

for years." Id. at 96-97. Congress was not unaware of the potential for injustice in cases such as 

this. SeeH.R.Rep.No.l04, lOOthCong., lstSess.,pt.l,atl7(1987). Yetitchosenotto 

extend the three-years-from-discovery rule to all public liability actions when it extended federal 

jurisdiction to cover all such actions. It is not for us to correct Congress's alleged oversight. 

Congress is always free to enact a federal statute of limitations to cover a federal claim or to 

engraft a federal discovery rule onto borrowed state statutes of limitations, as it has done with 

claims arising out of ENOs and with state-law claims arising out of exposure to hazardous 

substances under CERCLA. See 42 U.S. C. §§ 2210(n)(l) & 9658.7 However, until Congress 

7 CERCLA provides that, in any action 

brought under State law for personal injury, or property damages, 

which are caused or contributed to by exposure to any hazardous 

substance, ... if the applicable limitations period for such action (as 

specified in the State statute of limitations or under common law) 

provides a commencement date which is earlier than the federal 

required commencement date, such period shall commence at the 

federally required commencement date in lieu of the date specified 

in such State statute. 

42 U.S. C. § 9658(a)(l). The statute defines "federally required commencement date" as "the date 

the plaintiff knew (or reasonably should have known) that the personal injury or property damages 

... were caused or contributed to by the hazardous substance ... concerned." Id. § 

9658(b)(4)(A). Sonja has not argued and we do not reach the question ofCERCLA's effect, if 

any, on a public liability claim under Price-Anderson. 

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sees fit to do so, we must apply the statute as written, and the statute as written does not mandate 

application of a discovery rule in a case such as this but requires us to look to state law. 

I 

Sonja next argues that New Mexico law requires application of a discovery rule. 

She concedes that the New Mexico Supreme Court has never applied a discovery rule to the 

wrongful death statute of limitations but claims that, if faced with the issue, it would apply a 

discovery rule to wrongful death claims such as hers, involving latent injuries. 8 

Although there are no New Mexico decisions directly on point, we can anticipate 

how the New Mexico Supreme Court would resolve the issue by examining decisions from New 

Mexico and other jurisdictions that have considered similar issues. See Sawtell v. E.I. duPont de 

Nemours & Co., 22 F.3d 248, 250 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 295 (1994). Our task is to 

determine what New Mexico law is, "not what it ought to be." See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. 

Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 497 (1941). 

Historically, the New Mexico Supreme Court has construed the wrongful death act 

restrictively. See, u,., Romero v. Atchison. T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 72 P. 37, 38 (N.M. 1903) (the 

wrongful death statute, being in derogation of the common law, must be strictly construed). The 

statute originally provided that a wrongful death action had to be brought within one year "after 

As a back-up position, Sonja has asked that we certify the issue to the New 

Mexico Supreme Court under N.M. Stat. Ann.§ 34-2-8 and N.M. R. App. P. 12-607. Because 

we conclude that the issue can be decided based on existing New Mexico precedent, we deny the 

motion to certify. 

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the cause of action shall have accrued."9 See 1882 N.M. Laws ch. 61, § 9. The New Mexico 

Supreme Court held that the statute was a survival statute and did not create a new cause of 

action in favor of the beneficiaries of the decedent. Therefore, a cause of action under the statute 

accrued when the decedent was injured, not when he or she died. An action for wrongful death 

could thus be barred if brought within one year of the date of death but more than one year after 

the fatal injury was inflicted. See Natseway, 251 P.2d at 276-68; State ex rel. De Moss v. District 

Court, 227 P.2d 937, 938 (N.M. 1951). Under the court's construction of the statute, a wrongful 

death action could be barred before the wrongful death even occurred, as was the case in 

Natseway."10 

In the wake ofNatseway, the New Mexico legislature amended the statute in 1953 

to extend the limitations period from one year to three years. 11 However, the amended statute still 

ran from the date of injury, so where death did not result until almost three years after the injury, a 

9 New Mexico adopted its wrongful death statute from Missouri. The Missouri and 

New Mexico statutes were based on the English Fatal Accidents Act of 1846, known as Lord 

Campbell's Act. Lord Campbell's Act, however, allowed an action to be brought within one year 

after death. Missouri and New Mexico changed the limitation period to a year "after the cause of 

action shall have accrued." The New Mexico Supreme Court found this change purposeful and 

refused to extend a limitations period to a year from death where death did not immediately 

follow the fatal injury. See Natseway v. Jojola, 251 P.2d 274, 278 (N.M. 1952). 

10 The Natseways' son was shot by a neighbor boy on December 28, 1949, but did 

not die until March 28, 1951. The court held that the Natseways' wrongful death action, which 

was filed seven months after the death but nearly two years after the shooting, was barred by the 

one-year statute of limitations. 

11 Because the statute affected substantive rights and not just remedies, the New 

Mexico Supreme Court refused to give the amendment retroactive effect. See Wall v. Gillett, 298 

P.2d 939, 940 (N.M. 1956). 

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wrongful death claim could still be barred unless brought immediately. The court so held in 

Kilkenny v. Kenney, 361 P.2d 149, 151 (N.M. 1961). Shortly thereafter, the legislature again 

amended the statute to specify that a cause of action for wrongful death "accrues as of the date of 

death," see 1961 N .M. Laws ch. 202, § 1, thus giving plaintiffs three years from the date of death 

to bring a wrongful death action. 

Sonja argues that the 1961 amendment was only meant to do away with earlier 

accrual dates, thus preventing a wrongful death claim from being barred before the decedent even 

died, and was not meant to preclude a later accrual date. The only evidence she cites to support 

her argument is the timing of the amendment, which appears to have been passed in response to 

Kilkenny. She cites no legislative history to support her interpretation of the statute, and the 

court has found none. 12 If the legislature had intended only to foreclose an earlier accrual date--

not a later date--it could have said so, but it did not. It did not say that a cause of action for 

wrongful death accrues "no earlier than" the date of death or when the plaintiff discovers or 

should have discovered her cause of action. It said that a cause of action accrues "as of the date 

of death" --that is, "at" or "on" the date of death, neither earlier nor later than. See WEBS1ER' s 

12 The New Mexico Supreme Court has opined that the 1961 amendment was meant 

to remedy a logical inconsistency in the court's prior interpretations of the statute. See Stang v. 

Hertz Corp., 467 P.2d 14, 18 (N.M. 1970). The court had held that a cause of action under the 

statute is in the personal representative. See Kilkenny, 361 P.2d at 150-51. However, the court 

had also held that the limitation period began to run as of the date of injury, which could be before 

the injured person died. Since a "personal representative" could not bring an action until the 

death of the injured person, the statute could run before an action could even be filed. The 1961 

amendment merely set "a more logical time" for the commencement of the limitations period. 

Stang, 467 P.2d at 18. 

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THIRDNEWlNTERNATIONALDICTIONARY 129 (1971); PQ Cor_p. v. United States, 652 F. Supp. 

724, 738 & n.18 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987). "As of' denotes a date certain. See PO Cor_p., 652 F. 

Supp. at 738 & n.18; City of Twin Falls ex rel. Cannon v. Koehler, 123 P.2d 715, 717 (Idaho 

1942). Courts have found similar language unambiguous. ~~'Stiles v. Union Carbide 

Corp., 520 F. Supp. 865, 868 (S.D. Tex. 1981); Morano v. St. Francis Hosp., 420 N.Y.S.2d 92, 

95 (Sup. Ct. 1979); Shover v. Cordis Corp., 574 N.E.2d 457, 461 (Ohio 1991); Moreno v. 

Sterling Drug. Inc., 787 S.W.2d 348, 350-52 (Tex. 1990). 

As the Regents point out, the legislature may have had good reason not to provide 

for a later, more flexible accrual date. A definite accrual date promotes "basic fairness" by 

"encouraging promptness in instituting a claim, suppressing stale or fraudulent claims, ... 

avoiding inconvenience" and encouraging plaintiffs "to bring their actions while the evidence is 

still available and fresh." See Roberts v. Southwest Community Health Servs., 837 P.2d 442, 450 

(N.M. 1992). Cf Moncor Trust Co. v. Feil, 733 P.2d 1327, 1329 (N.M. Ct. App.) (in providing 

that a medical malpractice claim runs from the date of the act of malpractice, the New Mexico 

legislature "sought to require" such claims "to be brought within such time as to enable the parties 

to prove the material facts while they were reasonably fresh and before such proof has become 

stale, memories have dimmed, or material evidence has been entirely lost"),~. denied, 733 P.2d 

869 (N.M. 1987). The legislature may also have rejected a later accrual date for wrongful death 

actions to provide for "the prompt settlement ofthe economic and legal affairs of the deceased." 

See Ciccarelli v. Carey Canadian Mines. Ltd., 757 F.2d 548, 556 (3d Cir. 1985). Or the 

legislature may have concluded that death is such a significant injury (the "ultimate" harm, as the 

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plaintiff says) that a reasonable person would be led to investigate the cause of death and 

generally could, with reasonable diligence, discover the cause within three years. See Shover, 574 

N.E.2d at 461; Pastierik v. Duquesne Light Co., 526 A.2d 323, 326 (Pa. 1987); Moreno, 787 

S.W.2d at 354 n.6. See generally Moreno, 787 S.W.2d at 353 (listing rationales for not applying 

a discovery rule to wrongful death actions). 

We can only speculate about the legislature's motives in amending the statute. 

The statutory language, however, is clear. A cause of action for wrongful death accrues "as of 

the date of death." New Mexico courts have consistently "refused to extend the period of 

limitations" under the wrongful death statute, see Molinar v. City of Carlsbad, 735 P.2d 1134, 

1137 (N.M. 1987), or to "provide a saving clause or create an exception where the statute 

contains none," Natseway, 251 P.2d at 277. 

We recognize that the New Mexico Supreme Court has recently applied a 

discovery rule in some cases, even where it had previously been reluctant to do so. See Sharts v. 

Natelson, 885 P.2d 642, 645 (N.M. 1994) (adopting a discovery rule in legal malpractice actions); 

Roberts, 837 P.2d at 451 (adopting a discovery rule for medical malpractice actions against 

nonqualified health care providers, overruling Roybal v. White, 383 P.2d 250 (N.M. 1963)). In 

each ofthose cases, however, the court was required to decide when the cause of action accrued. 

The court was quick to point out that determining when a cause of action accrues is a judicial 

function only "[i]n the absence of explicit instructions from the legislature." Roberts, 837 P.2d at 

446. Where, as here, the legislature has specified when a cause of action accrues, the court is not 

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free to extend the period by application of a discovery rule. See id. at 446-47. 13 See also Kern ex 

rel. Kern v. St. Joseph Hasp .. Inc., 697 P.2d 135, 138 (N.M. 1985) (where a statute provides that 

the time for bringing a claim runs from the date of the act giving rise to the claim, the court could 

not construe it to run from discovery of the injury); Irvine v. St. Joseph Hasp .. Inc., 698 P.2d 

442,444-45 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984) (accord), cert. quashed, 698 P.2d 434 (N.M. 1985). 14 

Our conclusion that New Mexico would not apply a discovery rule in wrongful 

death actions is consistent with the majority of decisions from other jurisdictions construing 

similar statutes, see, SLg.., Pobieglo v. Monsanto Co., 521 N.E.2d 728,731-32 (Mass. 1988); 

Shover, 574 N.E.2d at 461-62; Pastierik, 526 A.2d at 325; Moreno, 787 S.W.2d at 353-55, 

although there is also contrary authority. See generally Moreno, 787 S.W.2d at 353 n.4; Judy E. 

Zelin, Annotation, Time of Discovery as Affecting Running of Statute of Limitations in Wrongful 

Death Action, 49 A.L.R.4th 972, § 8 (1986), and cases cited therein. 

13 Roberts involved New Mexico's Medical Malpractice Act, which provides that a 

claim against a qualified health care provider must be brought "within three years after the date 

that the act of malpractice occurred." See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-5-13. The court noted that, if 

the act's statute oflimitations applied to Roberts's claim against a nonqualified health care 

provider, her claim would be barred "because it was filed more than three years after the negligent 

act even though [Roberts] may not have discovered her injury" until later. 837 P.2d at 446-47 

(emphasis added). 

14 New Mexico law recognizes that a defendant who prevents a plaintiff from 

learning of her cause of action may be barred from relying on the statute of limitations under the 

doctrine of fraudulent concealment or the principle of equitable estoppel. See Kern, 697 P.2d at 

138-39. Sonja does not argue her and offered no evidence below that the Regents somehow 

prevented her from discovering her claim and bringing suit within the statutory period. 

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.. 

We acknowledge that our conclusion that New Mexico would not apply a 

discovery rule to wrongful death claims may lead to harsh or unjust results in cases such as this 

involving latent injuries. "But the fact that hardship may result can furnish no warrant for the 

courts to supply what the Legislature has omitted or to omit what it has inserted." Natseway. 251 

P.2d at 277 (quoting Vukovich v. St. Louis. Rocky Mountain & Pac. Co., 60 P.2d 356, 359 

(N.M. 1936)). Statutes of limitations do "not discriminate between the just and the unjust claim." 

Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945). They are always arbitrary to some 

extent, see id., and to that extent unjust. "Statutes of limitations are not directed to the merits of 

any individual case, they are a result of the legislative assessment of the merits of cases in general. 

The fact that a meritorious claim might thereby be rendered nonassertible is an unfortunate, 

occasional by-product of the operation oflimitations." Robinson v. Weaver, 550 S.W.2d 18, 20 

(Tex. 1977). Statutes of limitations represent a policy judgment about the proper balance to be 

struck between competing considerations--the plaintiff's interest in vindicating her rights and the 

defendant's interest in repose and in not having to defend stale claims. That judgment is 

peculiarly within the competence of the legislature, and any arguments about the harshness or 

unjustness of the legislative judgment are best addressed to that body. See Natseway, 251 P .2d at 

277; Kern, 697 P.2d at 138; Irvine, 698 P.2d at 446. The district court did not err in holding that 

Sonja's public liability claim was barred by New Mexico's three-year statute oflimitations on 

wrongful death actions, as incorporated by Price-Anderson, 42 U.S. C. § 2014(hh). 

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.. 

. 

B. The Plaintiff's State-Law Claims 

The district court granted the Regents summary judgment on all of Sonja's 

remaining representative claims, including her state-law claims. Sonja argues that, to the extent 

Price-Anderson does not apply to substances to which Kimberly was exposed, CERCLA applies a 

discovery rule to her state-law claims, making them timely. We do not reach that issue, however, 

because we agree with the Regents that, to the extent Price-Anderson does not control Sonja's 

state-law claims, those claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. 15 

The Eleventh Amendment prevents a federal court from taking jurisdiction over an 

action against one state by citizens of another state. U.S. Const. amend. XI. A state's immunity 

from suit in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment extends to instrumentalities of the state 

as well. Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1525 (lOth Cir. 1988). We recently held that the 

Regents were an arm of the State of California and that the Eleventh Amendment therefore barred 

state-law claims against the Regents arising out of their dismissal of an employee at the Los 

Alamos National Laboratory. See Mascheroni v. Board ofRegents, 28 F.3d 1554, 1557-60 (lOth 

Cir. 1994). Sonja argues that Mascheroni is not controlling for two reasons. 

First, Sonja suggests that Eleventh Amendment immunity depends on sovereign 

immunity and that sovereign immunity does not apply here because the Regents acted tortiously 

and in a proprietary capacity in a commercial endeavor outside the sovereign territory of 

15 The Regents concede that Congress has abrogated their Eleventh Amendment 

immunity with respect to public liability claims under Price-Anderson and therefore do not 

challenge the courts' jurisdiction over such claims. 

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. 

California. Sonja further suggests that this court must treat the Regents as a New Mexico court 

would with respect to state-law issues and that New Mexico would not recognize the Regents' 

sovereign immunity but would exercise jurisdiction over her state-law claims against the Regents. 

Eleventh Amendment immunity is based on principles of federalism as well as 

principles of sovereign immunity. It is separate from sovereign immunity and can exist even 

where sovereign immunity does not. Griess v. Colorado, 841 F.2d 1042, 1044 (lOth Cir. 1988); 

American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Madison Parish Police Jmy, 465 F. Supp. 168, 170 (W.D. La. 1977); 

Aguilar v. Kleppe, 424 F. Supp. 433, 436 (D. Alaska 1976). If the Eleventh Amendment only 

applied where the state was immune from suit, it would be superfluous. The fact that the Regents 

may not be immune from suit in state court under principles of sovereign immunity does not mean 

that federal courts can exercise jurisdiction over Sonja's state-law claims consistent with the 

Eleventh Amendment. 

Second, Sonja argues that the Eleventh Amendment does not apply because the 

United States, not the Regents or the State of California, is the real party in interest since, under 

Price-Anderson, the federal government must indemnify the Regents for any liability they incur. 

See 42 U.S. C. § 2210(d). 

Some courts have suggested that, where any recovery would come from the 

federal government and not the state, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the claim. Municipal 

Auth. v. Pennsylvania, 496 F. Supp. 686, 692 (M.D. Pa. 1980) (where the plaintiffs could show 

that they were seeking money that the federal government had paid the state to be passed on to 

the plaintiffs and that the money had been maintained in a segregated account and had not been 

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,, 

. 

used for other purposes, an order directing payment of the money would have no true effect on 

the state treasury, and therefore a claim for the money would not be barred by the Eleventh 

Amendment); Harrington v. Blum, 483 F. Supp. 1015, 1021-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (where the state 

could seek reimbursement from the Department of Agriculture for retroactive benefits paid to 

food stamp recipients, a claim for such benefits was not barred by the Eleventh Amendment), 

aff'd without opinion, 639 F.2d 768 (2d Cir. 1980). Other courts, however, have suggested that 

the fact that the state or its agency may be covered for any loss it may sustain does not abrogate 

its Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85, 90 (1982) (Eleventh 

Amendment can apply to cases that do not seek a money judgment payable from the state 

treasury); Kroll v. Board of Trustees, 934 F.2d 904, 908 (7th Cir.) (that a money judgment will 

not be payable from the state treasury is irrelevant to a state agency's Eleventh Amendment 

immunity), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 941 (1991); Cannon v. University ofHealth Sciences/Chicago 

Medical Sch., 710 F.2d 351, 357 (7th Cir. 1983) (an action against state universities was barred 

by the Eleventh Amendment regardless of"the possibility that a damage award would be met ... 

from federal funds"); Dunlop v. Minnesota, 626 F. Supp. 1127, 1130 (D. Minn._1986) (the fact· 

that the state might properly seek reimbursement from the United States does not deprive it of its 

Eleventh Amendment immunity). 

We need not reach the question ofwhether the Eleventh Amendment applies to a 

claim that would ultimately be paid from federal--not state--funds. The United States' obligation 

to indemnify the Regents under Price-Anderson is limited to claims governed by Price-Anderson. 

See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2210(d) & 2014; 10 C.P.R.§ 8.2(a); 48 C.P.R.§§ 950.7006 & 952.250-70(d). 

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Sonja has not shown that the United States has any obligation to indemnify the Regents for her 

independent state-law claims that fall outside the scope of Price-Anderson--the only claims at 

issue here. As to those claims, any recovery would have to come from "public funds in the state 

treasury," making the claims claims against the state and thus barred by the Eleventh Amendment. 

See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974). 

Because Sonja's attempts to distinguish Mascheroni are unavailing, Mascheroni is 

dispositive of Sonja's remaining state-law claims. Neither the district court nor this court has 

jurisdiction to consider those claims. 

CONCLUSION 

We AFFIRM the district court's grant of summary judgment on Sonja's PriceAnderson claim on behalf of Kimberly's estate. We DISMISS Sonja's state-law claims and 

REMAND them to the district court with instructions to VACATE its judgment on those claims 

and DISMISS them for lack of jurisdiction. 

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