Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-05329/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-05329-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Product Liability

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JAVIER BANDA, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

HERC RENTALS, INC., et al., 

Defendants. 

Case No. 18-cv-05329-JCS 

ORDER RE DAUBERT MOTIONS 

Re: Dkt. Nos. 68, 70, 71, 72 

I. INTRODUCTION 

This action arises out of an incident that occurred on August 22, 2017, when Plaintiff 

Javier Banda, a journeyman employed by Vulcan Construction & Maintenance, Inc. (“Vulcan”) 

was seriously injured by a backhoe that slid or rolled backwards into a trench, resulting in an 

above-the-knee amputation of Banda’s right leg. Javier Banda and his wife assert product liability 

claims against the company that manufactured the backhoe, John Deere (“Deere”), and the 

company that rented the backhoe to Vulcan, Herc Rentals, Inc. (“Herc”), including claims that the 

backhoe had design defects and that Defendants failed to provide adequate warnings. Presently 

before the Court are the following motions to exclude expert testimony under Rule 702 of the 

Federal Rules of Evidence: 1) Plaintiffs’ Daubert Motion to Exclude Certain Opinions of Charles 

Mahla, PhD (“Mahla Motion”); 2) Plaintiffs’ Daubert Motion to Exclude Certain Opinion 

Testimony of Carol Hyland (“Hyland Motion”); 3) Plaintiffs’ Daubert Motion to Exclude Certain 

Opinion Testimony of Sam Iler (“Iler Motion”); 4) Deere & Co.’s Daubert Motion to Exclude 

Expert Testimony of Brian Doherty, Myles Kitchen, Mark Dimas, and Gerald Fulghum (“Deere 

Motion”). A hearing on the Motions was held on January 17, 2020. The Court’s rulings are set 

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forth below.1

II. BACKGROUND 

Javier Banda was 47 years old at the time of the accident that is the subject of this case and 

had worked for Vulcan as a construction worker for more than 15 years. When the accident 

occurred, Banda and the Vulcan crew had been working for several weeks digging trenches in the 

streets of a residential neighborhood in Castro Valley, California as part of a PG&E project to 

service its underground natural gas lines. PG&E workers pre-marked the areas where the Vulcan 

crew was to dig and then the Vulcan crew would remove the asphalt with a jackhammer and use a 

backhoe to dig a trench. To reduce the risk that the backhoe bucket would strike the gas line, once 

they got close to the line, the crew would stop using the backhoe to dig and crew members would 

get in the trench and dig with shovels to expose the gas line. 

On the day of the accident the Vulcan crew was using a 2011 John Deere Model 310J 

Backhoe Loader (“the Backhoe”) it had rented from Herc Rentals. The Backhoe consists of a 

tractor fitted with a loader shovel/bucket on the front and a backhoe excavator on the back. There 

is only one seat for the operator, who selects the direction the seat is facing depending on the task 

to be performed. The seat is faced forward if the operator wants to drive the tractor or operate the 

front loader bucket. The operator rotates the seat 180 degrees so that it is facing rearward to 

operate the backhoe excavator. The Backhoe is equipped with two hydraulic outriggers that can 

be extended on each side to stabilize it by lifting the rear of the Backhoe off the ground. 

At the time of the accident, the Backhoe was being operated by Vulcan employee Bernabe 

Tovar. Tovar had positioned the Backhoe uphill from a trench and was using it with the stabilizers 

lowered to dig the trench. When Tovar finished digging, Banda immediately entered the trench to 

clear out the remaining debris with a shovel. The accident occurred when Tovar raised the 

stabilizers and started to rotate his seat from the backhoe position to the front in order to drive the 

Backhoe away from the trench. He did not have the parking brake set and the engine was on and in 

neutral. When the stabilizers were raised, the Backhoe rolled or slid backwards into the trench. As 

 

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 The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned magistrate judge pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 636(c). 

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the Backhoe moved backwards, Tovar and/or other workers yelled at Banda, who tried to get out 

of the trench. Banda was not able to get all of the way out of the trench, however, and sustained 

injuries to his leg that required amputation. 

Javier Banda now uses a prosthetic leg and is unable to return to his previous job as a 

journeyman union laborer. The parties disagree as to whether he is able to perform any work. 

III. ANALYSIS 

A. Legal Standards Under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and Daubert

Under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, a witness may offer expert testimony if 

the following requirements are met: 

(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact 

to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; 

(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; 

(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and 

(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case. 

Fed. R. Evid. 702. In determining whether expert testimony meets the requirements of Rule 702, 

courts follow the approach set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., in which the 

Supreme Court described the relevant inquiry as follows: 

Faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony, then, the trial 

judge must determine . . . whether the expert is proposing to testify to 

(1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to 

understand or determine a fact in issue. This entails a preliminary 

assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the 

testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or 

methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue. 

509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993). 

With respect to the first requirement, that an expert must testify to “scientific knowledge,” 

the Court in Daubert explained that “[t]he adjective ‘scientific’ implies a grounding in the 

methods and procedures of science . . . [while] the word ‘knowledge’ connotes more than 

subjective belief or unsupported speculation . . . [and] ‘applies to any body of known facts or to 

any body of ideas inferred from such facts or accepted as truths on good grounds.’” Id. (quoting 

Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1252 (1986)). The Court declined to set forth a 

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definitive test but offered some “general observations” about the types of factors that might be 

considered in determining whether this requirement is met. Id. at 593. These include: 1) whether 

the methodology can be or has been tested; 2) whether the theory and technique has been 

subjected to peer review; 3) if a “particular scientific technique” is involved, the known or 

potential rate of error; and 4) the degree of acceptance in the relevant scientific community. 

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-94. 

The Ninth Circuit has noted that the “scientific knowledge” requirement is usually met by 

“[e]stablishing that an expert’s proffered testimony grows out of pre-litigation research or that the 

expert’s research has been subjected to peer review.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 

Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1318 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Daubert II”). However, when such evidence is not 

available, the proponent’s experts may satisfy this requirement by “explain[ing] precisely how 

they went about reaching their conclusions and point[ing] to some objective source – a learned 

treatise, the policy statement of a professional association, a published article in a reputable 

scientific journal or the like – to show that they have followed the scientific method, as it is 

practiced by (at least) a recognized minority of scientists in their field.” Id. at 1319. 

The second requirement under Rule 702, that expert testimony must “assist the trier of fact 

to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,” “goes primarily to relevance.” Id. at 

591. This is a question of “fit,” and “is not always obvious.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591. The 

Court cautioned that “scientific validity for one purpose is not necessarily scientific validity for 

other, unrelated purposes.” Id. To meet this requirement there must be “a valid scientific 

connection to the pertinent inquiry.” Id. In other words, the expert testimony must “logically 

advance[ ] a material aspect of the proposing party’s case.” Daubert II, 43 F.3d at 1315. This 

requirement is more stringent than the relevancy requirement of Rule 402 of the Federal Rules of 

Evidence, “reflecting the special dangers inherent in scientific expert testimony.” Jones v. U.S., 

933 F. Supp. 894, 900 (N.D. Cal., 1996) (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591; Daubert II, 43 F.3d at 

1321 n. 17). In particular, expert testimony “‘can be both powerful and quite misleading because 

of the difficulty in evaluating it.’” Id. (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595 (citation omitted)). 

“Therefore, a federal judge should exclude scientific expert testimony under the second prong of 

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the Daubert standard unless he is ‘convinced that it speaks clearly and directly to an issue in 

dispute in the case.’” Id. (quoting Daubert II, 43 F.3d at 1321 n. 17). 

B. Plaintiffs’ Daubert Motions 

1. Mahla Motion 

a. Background 

Defendants disclosed Dr. Mahla as a rebuttal expert. Declaration of Kevin M. Osborne in 

Support of Plaintiffs’ Daubert Motion to Exclude Certain Opinion Testimony of Charles Mahla, 

PhD (“Osborne Decl. (Mahla)”), Exs. 2, 3. Dr. Mahla was asked to provide estimates of: 1) Javier 

Banda’s past and future economic loss of earnings and benefits resulting from his injury; and 2) 

the present value of the cost of future medical care using data from the life care plan of Plaintiffs’ 

expert Dr. Diana Bubanja but assuming that Javier Banda could continue to use his current 

prosthetic rather than the more expensive one recommended by his prosthetist. Id., Ex. 4 (Mahla 

Report) at 2; Ex. 5 (Mahla Dep.) at 28. 

In his analysis of future loss of earnings, Dr. Mahla assumed that Banda would have 

worked until age 61 if he had not been injured (his “worklife expectancy”). Id., Ex. 4 (Mahla 

Report) at 3. He relied on statistics reflecting worklife expectancy for a 45-year-old Hispanic 

male who is actively employed and has less than a high school education. Id. At his deposition, 

he testified that if the “Hispanic part” were “pull[ed] out” and everything else were the same, the 

worklife expectancy for Banda would be “slightly higher,” though he initially testified that he did 

not know how this would affect worklife expectancy. Id., Ex. 5 (Mahla Dep.) at 27-28. In 

contrast, Plaintiffs’ retained economist, Richard Barnes, assumed that Javier Banda would have 

worked until he was 65 but for his accident. Declaration of Rebekka R. Martorano in Support of 

Defendant Deere & Company’s Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Daubert Motions to Limit Testimony of 

Charles Mahla and Carol Hyland (“Martorano Opposition Decl.”), Ex. C (Barnes Dep.) at 16. Mr. 

Barnes testified at his deposition that he was asked to assume that Banda intended to work at least 

until he was 65 and that in any event, this was when Banda “would be eligible for Medicare to the 

extent that his health insurance is tied to his job.” Id. 

 With respect to the present value of the cost of future medical care, Dr. Mahla originally 

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assumed that the cost of Banda’s prosthetic used in Dr. Bubanja’s report of $100,000 was accurate 

but he was asked to revise this cost after Defendants deposed Banda’s prosthetist, Jason Schott, 

and learned that the cost of Banda’s current prosthetic was only $55,076.93 and that the higher 

figure was for a prosthetic that he might upgrade to in the future. In particular, Mr. Schott testified 

that Banda “has the potential to use a higher-end prosthetic knee” and that he would “do a trial” 

with Banda. Martorano Opposition Decl., Ex. G (Schott Dep.) at 35. Based on Schott’s 

testimony, Defendants’ counsel asked Dr. Mahla to recalculate Banda’s future medical costs using 

the assumption that he would not upgrade to the more expensive prosthetic. 

 In their Daubert Motion, Plaintiffs object to Dr. Mahla’s reliance on Javier Banda’s 

Hispanic ethnicity as a basis for reducing his worklife expectancy to 61 years of age, citing cases 

in which courts have found that reliance on race to reduce future earnings is discriminatory and 

potentially unconstitutional. Mahla Motion at 4-5. They further assert that there is no evidence to 

support the assumption that Javier Banda can continue to use his current prosthetic and therefore, 

that Dr. Mahla should not be allowed to offer his opinion based on that assumption with respect to 

the present value of Banda’s future medical costs. Id. at 5. 

Defendants oppose Plaintiffs’ Daubert Motion with respect to Dr. Mahla’s opinions. They 

argue that it was proper for Dr. Mahla to rely on statistics for the worklife expectancy of Hispanic 

males with Banda’s level of education, pointing out that Mr. Barnes did not rely on any statistical 

evidence to support his assumption that Mr. Banda would have worked until he was 65. 

Defendants’ Opposition (Mahla and Hyland) at 2. Defendants also assert that by factoring race in, 

Dr. Mahla actually increased the worklife expectancy as “the statistical worklife expectancy of 

Hispanic males is higher than that of males generally.” Id. at 2. With respect to Dr. Mahla’s 

calculation of Mr. Banda’s future medical costs, Defendants contend it was proper to use the lower 

cost prosthetic because that is what Banda is using now. 

b. Discussion 

i. Consideration of Race in Determining Worklife Expectancy 

In support of their argument that consideration of race to reduce worklife expectancy is not 

permissible, Plaintiffs cite McMillan v. City of New York, in which the court addressed whether it 

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is proper to use statistics that factor in race as a basis for reducing damages. 253 F.R.D. 247 

(E.D.N.Y. 2008). In a thoughtful opinion, the court concluded that race-based statistics are 

unreliable and further, that use of race-based statistics (including statistics for worklife 

expectancy) to reduce damages is a violation of both equal protection and due process. 

Defendants do not challenge the reasoning in McMillan or make any meaningful argument 

that it is permissible to reduce damages based on race. Instead, they point out that the statistics for 

males generally with the same level of education as Banda, as reflected in the publication upon 

which Dr. Mahla relied, show a shorter worklife expectancy than for Hispanic males with that 

level of education. See Martorano Opposition Decl., Ex. E (Life and Worklife Expectancies, 

Hugh Richards and Michael Donaldson, Second Ed.) at 154, 160. In other words, Dr. Mahla was 

mistaken when he testified that if consideration of race were removed and everything else stayed 

the same the statistical worklife expectancy would be higher. In light of this evidence, Plaintiffs 

withdrew their objection to Dr. Mahla’s consideration of Banda’s race in determining his 

statistical worklife expectancy at the motion hearing. Therefore, the Court need not rule on this 

objection. 

ii. Use of Lower Prosthetic Cost for Calculation of Future Medical Costs 

Plaintiffs challenge Dr. Mahla’s estimate of future medical costs based on the assumption 

that Banda will continue to use the same prosthetic he is using now rather than the more expensive 

prosthetic that his prosthetist opines is appropriate. According to Plaintiffs, there is no evidence at 

all to support this opinion. Yet Schott’s testimony – and the fact that Schott initially 

recommended the less expensive prosthetic for Banda, who is wearing it now – is at least some 

evidence that the more expensive prosthetic may not be required. The Court concludes that this 

challenge goes to the weight of Dr. Mahla’s testimony and does not warrant exclusion of his 

opinions under Rule 702. Therefore, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ request that Dr. Mahla be 

precluded from offering opinions about Mr. Banda’s future medical costs that are based on the 

assumption that Mr. Banda will continue to use the prosthetic that he uses now. 

 

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2. Hyland Motion 

a. Background 

Defendants disclosed Carol Hyland as a rebuttal expert to provide a vocational evaluation 

of Banda. Declaration of Kevin M. Osborne in Support of Plaintiffs’ Daubert Motion to Exclude 

Certain Opinion Testimony of Carol Hyland (“Osborne Decl. (Hyland)”), Exs. 2, 3. In her expert 

report, Hyland addresses the opinions of Maria Brady, a rehabilitation counselor who Plaintiffs 

have designated as an expert. Id., Ex. 4 (Hyland Report) at 1; see also Martorano Opposition 

Decl., Ex. H (Brady Report). Brady concluded that Javier Banda has “no employment options” 

following his accident, relying in part on the results of vocational testing that she conducted, 

including IQ testing. Martorano Opposition Decl., Ex. H (Brady Report) at 6-7, 10. Hyland, on 

the other hand, opined that Banda was not “necessarily totally precluded from the labor market” 

and that “[p]ositions that would be worth of consideration would be selective security positions 

such as alarm monitoring, selective motel clerk positions or selective counter clerk or cashiering 

position[s].” Osborne Decl. (Hyland), Ex. 4 (Hyland Report) at 4. 

At her deposition, Hyland testified that she reached the conclusion that Banda was not 

precluded from all work despite Brady’s testing that revealed an IQ of 71 – which would have 

been too low to perform the jobs listed in Hyland’s report – because of Banda’s work history. Id., 

Ex. 1 (Hyland Dep.) at 19-21. In particular, she testified that she “would totally agree that if you 

just look at his testing, he’s not employable” but that Banda’s test results are “inconsistent with his 

work history,” suggesting that the analysis of his future ability to work is “incomplete” without 

“some type of situational assessment.” Id. Hyland did not identify any flaws in the testing 

methodology, testifying that she did not know enough about how the test was administered to be 

able to comment and that she was not “suggesting that the test didn’t show what either evaluator is 

saying it showed.” Id. at 26-27. 

Plaintiffs contends there is no evidentiary basis for Hyland’s opinions that Banda can 

perform jobs that are inconsistent with the results of his educational testing and that rather than 

pointing to any scientific basis for challenging the test results, Hyland is simply speculating about 

Banda’s ability to work. Therefore, Plaintiffs ask the Court to preclude Hyland from testifying 

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that the test results are wrong or that Banda can work. 

b. Discussion 

Plaintiffs’ challenge goes to the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility. 

Although Hyland may not testify that the test results are “wrong” (an opinion that she does not 

offer in her report or in her deposition), she is qualified to testify that Banda’s work history 

suggests that the test results may not provide a complete picture of his ability to work. The Court 

DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion. 

3. Iler Motion 

a. Background 

Herc has disclosed Sam Iler as a workplace safety expert witness. Declaration of Kevin M. 

Osborne in Support of Plaintiffs’ Daubert Motion to Exclude Certain Opinion Testimony of Sam 

Iler (“Osborne Decl. (Iler)”), Exs. 1, 3. Herc’s disclosure of Iler states that Iler was retained to 

address Vulcan and its employees’ “negligence and compliance with applicable industry safety 

standards” in connection with the accident that led to Banda’s injury. Id., Ex. 3. He was also 

disclosed as a rebuttal expert witness to address the opinions of Plaintiffs’ safety expert, Gerald 

Fulghum. Id., Ex. 5. 

In his report, Iler opined that the Backhoe operator, Tovar, had failed to meet the “Standard 

of Care” with respect to operating the Backhoe, defining “Standard of Care” as “include[ing] the 

applicable industry standards, applicable Cal-OSHA regulations, applicable federal OSHA 

regulations, and best practices concerning workplace safety and reasonable actions by the party.” 

Id., Ex. 4 (Iler Report) at 2. Among other things, Iler opined that “Tovar’s positioning of the 

machine lacked the utilization of safe practices for excavating on inclines” and that Tovar “failed 

to meet the Standard of Care by storing multiple unsecured items in and around the cab area of the 

Backhoe.” Id. at 2-3. Similarly, Iler opined that “Mr. Banda entered the zone of danger near the 

rear of the Backhoe in violation of company policy, OSHA and Manufacturer requirements.” Id. 

at 4. Iler concluded that Tovar, Banda and Vulcan failed to meet the Standard of Care by, among 

other things, “failing to properly train or follow training while operating or working near a 

backhoe per OSHA and manufacturer requirements.” Id. at 5. 

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At his deposition, Iler was asked to identify the specific OSHA regulation that was 

purportedly violated by Banda when he entered the “zone of danger” and more generally, by 

Banda, Tovar and Vulcan with respect to operating or working near a backhoe. Id., Ex. 2 (Iler 

Dep.) at 54, 61-62. Iler testified that he had “just read it” before his deposition but he 

acknowledged that he had not included it in the materials he had produced and did not know it “off 

the top of his head.” Id. 

Iler also testified at his deposition that it was possible to move the Backhoe along a trench 

while the seat is in the backwards position. Id. at 11-14. Iler testified that his understanding of 

how this feature works was based on an operator’s manual for John Deere tractors that he found 

online, but he was unable to download the manual and produced only screen-shots of specific 

pages. Id. at 14-15. He also testified that moving a backhoe in this manner was a “common 

practice.” Id. at 14. 

Finally, in his rebuttal report Iler responded to Plaintiffs’ expert’s opinion that the lack of a 

backup alarm when the Backhoe was moving backwards in neutral put workers at risk by stating: 

It is well known that trade workers that are consistently exposed to 

equipment alarms can become unaware of the presence of a hazard 

associated with a backup alarm as they become desensitized and fail 

to respond after a period of time. 

Osborne Decl. (Iler), Ex. 5 (Iler Rebuttal Report) at 2. At his deposition, Iler testified that in 

connection with this opinion he had produced an article that he found online entitled “Human 

Probability Matching Behavior in Response to Alarms of Varying Reliability.” Osborne Decl. 

(Iler), Ex. E (Iler Dep.) at 29. Iler testified that he used this article for “reference” and that he did 

not know where the article was published or if it appeared in a peer-reviewed journal. Id. He also 

testified that although he has never done any survey of his own regarding “alarm fatigue” it is a 

phenomenon he is familiar with from his “experience in the industry” and a subject on which he 

has provided safety training. Id. at 73-74. 

 Plaintiffs ask the Court to preclude Iler from testifying that Banda and his employer did not 

adhere to OSHA standards or to offer opinions based on the operator’s manual or the article about 

alarm fatigue that he found online, arguing that all of these opinions lack a proper foundation and 

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are therefore unreliable under Rule 702. To the extent that Iler relies on his own experience in 

support of his opinions about alarm fatigue, Plaintiffs argue that he is not qualified to offer expert 

opinions on that subject. 

b. Discussion 

With respect to Iler’s opinions that Vulcan and its employees (including Banda) did not 

adhere to the Standard of Care, the failure to identify a specific OSHA regulation that was 

regulated does not render Iler’s opinions unreliable as the Standard of Care as defined by Iler takes 

into consideration not only OSHA regulations but also encompasses best practices in the industry 

and manufacturer requirements. Nonetheless, to the extent that Iler has offered testimony that 

certain opinions in his report were based on an OSHA regulation that has not been disclosed (and 

the time for such disclosures has now passed) Iler may offer opinions based on that regulation 

only if he discloses to Plaintiffs, within one week of the date of this Order, the specific OSHA 

regulation to which he was referring at his deposition. Iler may also offer opinions addressing 

OSHA § 1592, which he addressed in his rebuttal report and in his deposition. Apart from these 

two OSHA regulations, Iler will not be permitted to offer opinions about any other OSHA 

regulations. 

With respect to manufacturer guidelines, Iler will not be permitted to offer testimony that 

is based on the operator’s manual that he found online as he has not established that this document 

applies to the Backhoe in this case. Iler could have requested that Deere provide him with the 

operator’s manual for the specific Backhoe involved in the accident. He did not do so. The mere 

fact that the document appears to be a Deere publication (Herc points to a 2013 Deere copyright 

on one of the screenshot pages in its opposition brief) does not provide a sufficient foundation to 

establish that the publication he relied upon was applicable to the 310J Backhoe or that the select 

screenshots he produced are an accurate statement of Deer’s guidelines for operating that 

particular backhoe. 

With respect to the publication about alarm fatigue that Iler produced, Herc does not 

attempt to establish that this article was “peer-reviewed”; nor does it address whether the 

methodology used by the authors was reliable. Therefore, if this article were the only basis for 

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Iler’s opinions about alarm fatigue, those opinions would not be admissible under Rule 702. 

However, Iler has testified that he has an independent basis for his opinions about alarm fatigue, 

namely, his own experience in the industry, which includes providing safety training to address 

the phenomenon. This is a sufficient foundation for Iler to opine that the existence of alarm 

fatigue is a well-known problem and therefore, Iler may offer that opinion at trial. On the other 

hand, Iler will not be permitted to go beyond this limited opinion to address the magnitude of the 

problem or the specific circumstances under which the problem is more or less salient as no such 

opinions were offered by Iler in his reports or deposition testimony and Defendants have not 

demonstrated that Iler is qualified to offer such opinions. Nor will he be permitted to testify as to 

the contents of the article about alarm fatigue that he found online and produced at his deposition. 

For these reasons, the Iler Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. 

C. Defendants’ Daubert Motion 

1. Brian Doherty 

a. Background 

Brian Doherty was disclosed by Plaintiffs as an expert and was asked to “reconstruct the 

accident . . . to determine the effect of timing of warnings on Mr. Banda’s ability to . . . get out of 

the hole in time to avoid [injury].” Declaration of Rebekka R. Martorano in Support of Defendant 

Deere & Company’s Daubert Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony of Brian Doherty, Myles 

Kitchen, Mark Dimas, and Gerald Fulghum (“Martorano Motion Decl.”), Ex. 8 (Doherty Dep.) at 

3. According to Doherty’s curriculum vitae (“CV”), he has a PhD in biomedical engineering and 

has worked as a biomedical engineer for over twenty years, specializing in accident 

reconstruction, among other things. Id., Ex. 1 (Doherty CV). 

In his expert report, Doherty opined, inter alia, that: 1) the Deere 310J should have had a 

backup alarm that sounded if the tractor was rolling backward in neutral, id., Ex. 2 (Doherty 

Report) at 5; and 2) had there been a backup alarm that sounded as soon as the Backhoe began to 

roll backwards, Banda would have been able to react 1.5 seconds sooner, which would have 

allowed him to climb completely out of the hole and avoid injury instead of climbing only part of 

the way out of the hole, id. at 16-18. 

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In his report, Doherty pointed to the comments of Plaintiffs’ safety engineer, Gerald 

Fulghum, in support of his conclusion that the Backhoe should have had a backup alarm. Id. at 5. 

In his deposition, he testified that this opinion was based on his conclusion that a backup alarm 

would have prevented Banda from being injured. Martorano Motion Decl., Ex. 8 (Doherty Dep.) 

at 17. 

With respect to his opinion that Banda would have escaped injury if the Backhoe had been 

equipped with a backup alarm, Doherty compared the perception-reaction time (“P-R time”) 

associated with the shouted warning Banda actually received to the P-R time if there had been a 

backup alarm. Id., Ex. 2 at 16. In his comparison, he took into account not only the amount of 

time that elapsed before the alarms were given (whether the yell from a coworker or the sound of a 

backup alarm) but also the time it would take to interpret these two different types of warnings. 

Id. at 17. Doherty reasoned that the time it would take to interpret the backup alarm would be less 

than the time it took Banda to interpret his coworker’s yell because he “would not have to 

determine the meaning of a shout, but would know immediately what the sound of a back-up 

alarm meant.” Id. Doherty concluded that because of the shorter P-R time with a backup alarm, 

Banda would have had an extra 1.5 seconds to get out of the trench. Id. He went on to conclude 

that the extra 1.5 second would have been enough to escape injury based on the location of 

Banda’s injury. Id. at 18. In particular, because the injury was at the “distal 1/3” of Banda’s body 

length, and the weight of his leg below the point of injury was about 1/8 of his body weight, 

Doherty concluded that Banda was almost all the way out of the hole when he was struck, making 

it likely that the extra time would have been enough to get his body completely out of the hole. Id. 

At his deposition, Doherty testified that his conclusion was based on his own knowledge obtained 

from research studies in which he participated that it takes a person approximately one second to 

jump straight up in the air. Id., Ex. 8 (Doherty Dep.) at 32. Doherty further testified that he had 

seen articles in peer-reviewed journals stating that it takes one second for a person to jump straight 

off the ground but that he could not identify any specific articles. Id. 

In their Motion, Defendants argue that Doherty is not qualified to opine as to whether the 

Backhoe should have had a backup alarm as he is not an industrial designer. They further argue 

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that his conclusion that Banda would have escaped injury if there had been a backup alarm 

involves speculation or ignores actual evidence about how the accident occurred, such as the 

distance the Backhoe was from the trench, the speed it was moving, when the coworker shouted 

his warning, Banda’s state of mind and whether he was confused by the coworker’s warning, and 

the fact that Banda suffered injuries on his face as well as his leg. They argue that this problem is 

compounded by the fact that Doherty did not conduct any testing to establish the actual speed the 

Backhoe was moving, the time it would take for a person to climb out of a trench from different 

positions and the reaction time for different types of warnings. Defendants also contend Doherty’s 

opinion is unreliable because he was not able to identify any of the articles he said he had seen 

where it was found that it takes one second for a person to jump straight off the ground. 

Defendants ask the Court to preclude Doherty from opining that Banda would have escaped injury 

because of additional P-R time had the Backhoe been equipped with a backup alarm. They also 

ask the Court to exclude a Powerpoint presentation offered by Doherty that includes two 

animations, one of which shows Banda getting out of the trench without injury in response to a 

backup alarm and another purportedly showing the accident. See Martorano Motion Decl., Ex. 13. 

Defendants contend the Powerpoint presentation includes many inaccuracies and 

misrepresentations of evidence. 

b. Discussion 

The Court finds that that Doherty is not qualified as an expert with respect to the design of 

the Backhoe and therefore, that he may not testify that the Backhoe should have had a backup 

alarm. On the other hand, Defendants’ challenges to Doherty’s opinions about what likely would 

have occurred if the Backhoe had been equipped with such an alarm – including whether Banda 

would have escaped injury – go to their weight and not admissibility. Therefore, Doherty will be 

permitted to offer such opinions. Nor is the Court persuaded that Doherty’s opinions are rendered 

unreliable because he did not determine the precise speed the Backhoe moved backward, how far 

it was from the trench or how long it would take for a person to climb out of a trench (among other 

things). Doherty’s opinion was based on a consideration of P-R times and Defendants concede 

that they are not challenging the general principles of P-R time analysis. Reply at 5. Further, his 

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opinion does not rely on the absolute amount of time it took for the Backhoe to roll into the trench 

but rather, addresses the reduction in time for Banda to escape injury as a result of being warned 

by yells from his coworkers instead of a backup alarm. 

The Court therefore GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the Doherty Motion.2 

2. Myles Kitchen 

a. Background 

Plaintiffs retained as an expert Myles Kitchen, an automotive electronics engineer, who 

was asked to provide information and opinions related to various vehicle safety features and 

systems of the 310J Backhoe that was involved in this case. Martorano Motion Decl., Ex. 4 

(Kitchen Report). In his report, he addressed the feasibility of adding three specific safety features 

to the Backhoe: 1) a backup alarm that sounds when the 310J Backhoe is in neutral and moving 

backwards; 2) a parking brake that is automatically set when the operator moves the seat from 

forward and will not release until the seat is fully forward and the operator releases it; and 3) a 

“hill assist” feature that will prevent the Backhoe from rolling backwards when it is in neutral. Id. 

He opined that it would be feasible to add all three features to the 310J Backhoe. Id. At his 

deposition, Kitchen testified that he intends to offer the opinions that the absence of these features 

on the 310J Backhoe are “operational deficiencies.” Id., Ex. 9 (Kitchen Dep.) at 30-32. He also 

testified that he intends to offer an opinion that these devices could have prevented Banda from 

being injured, though he acknowledged that he himself did not have the expertise to evaluate 

whether Banda would have been able to get out of the hole if there had been a backup alarm. Id. 

at 37-41. Rather, Kitchen relied on the opinions of Doherty in support of this opinion. Id. at 38-

39. 

Defendants challenge all of Kitchen’s opinions about feasibility, asserting that while 

Kitchen has described various ways to implement these safety measures, he has not pointed to any 

heavy construction equipment that incorporates these safety features3

 and also has not conducted 

 

2

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to the Court until the day of the motion hearing and therefore, the Court declines to address its 

admissibility. The Court will address that issue at the pretrial conference. 3

 Although Defendants make this argument as to all three of Kitchen’s proposed safety measures, 

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any testing to determine if the adaptations he describes would actually work. Based on Kitchen’s 

CV, Defendants argue further that Kitchen’s experience with heavy construction equipment is 

limited, casting further doubt on the reliability of his feasibility opinions. See Martorano Motion 

Decl., Ex. 3 (Kitchen CV). Defendants also argue that Kitchen should not be permitted to offer 

opinions about operational deficiencies of the 310 J Backhoe because he has no experience in the 

design of backhoes and therefore is no qualified to offer opinions as to whether the absence of 

certain features renders it defective. Finally, Defendants argue that Kitchens is not qualified to 

offer opinions about whether Banda would have escaped injury if the Backhoe had the three safety 

features Kitchen addressed. 

b. Discussion 

Defendants’ challenges to Kitchen’s opinions about feasibility of implementing the three 

proposed safety features go to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. Courts have 

recognized that “industry custom and practice sometimes does shed light not just on the 

reasonableness of the manufacturer’s conduct in designing a product, but on the adequacy of the 

design itself.” Kim v. Toyota Motor Corp., 6 Cal. 5th 21, 34 (2018). Thus, in Kim v. Toyota, the 

California Supreme Court held that the jury “may, in appropriate cases, consider such evidence” in 

design defect cases. Id. at 39. However, the Ninth Circuit has made clear that plaintiffs in product 

defect cases need not point to examples of similar products that contain enhanced safety features 

in order to show that adding such safety features is feasible, noting that if such an approach were 

adopted, “there could be no first case demanding improvement of an unsafe (but widely accepted) 

product design.” Oswalt v. Resolute Indus., Inc., 642 F.3d 856, 863 (9th Cir. 2011).4

Consequently, the opinion of Plaintiffs’ expert that certain safety features are feasible may not be 

excluded simply because he has not offered evidence that these features have actually been 

 

the deposition testimony that Defendants cite addresses only whether Kitchen was aware of any 

heavy construction equipment that has a backup alarm that sounds when the machine rolls 

backward in neutral. See Defendants’ Motion at 15; Martorana Motion Decl., Ex. 9 (Kitchen 

Dep.) at 34-35. 

4

 In an unpublished case, the Ninth Circuit relied on Oswalte to squarely hold, “[g]iven that a 

plaintiff need not show an alternative, safer design is already used in similar products, it follows 

that her expert is not required to have experience with that safer design in such products.” 

Ramirez v. ITW Food Equip. Grp., LLC, 686 F. App'x 435, 440 (9th Cir. 2017) 

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adopted in similar equipment. 

Likewise, the proposed design features that Kitchen described were clear and detailed and 

were capable of being tested. That is all that is required under Rule 702. See Ramirez, 686 F. 

App’x at 440 (holding that district court erred in excluding expert testimony on the basis that 

expert had not tested alternative design and noting that “the reliability of an expert’s theory turns 

on whether it ‘can be tested,’ . . . not whether he has tested it himself and that expert’s design was 

“capable of being tested; [defendant] simply chose not to do so, despite bearing the burden under 

the risk-benefit test to prove” that a safer design was not feasible) (citation omitted). Therefore, 

Kitchen will be permitted to offer opinions about how the Backhoe could be modified to add a 

backup alarm, automatic brake and hillside assist, and to describe how these features would work. 

On the other hand, the Court agrees with Defendants that Kitchen is not qualified to opine 

as to whether the absence of the proposed safety features constitute “operational deficiencies.” 

Likewise, Kitchen does not have the expertise to opine that Banda would have had time to get out 

of the hole if the Backhoe had contained his proposed safety features. Therefore, Kitchen may not 

offer such an opinion at trial. In all other respects, Defendants’ requests to preclude Kitchen’s 

opinions are denied for the reasons stated above. 

3. Mark Dimas 

a. Background 

Mark Dimas worked for 37 years operating heavy equipment, including backhoes. 

Martorano Motion Decl., Ex. 5 (Dimas Report) at 1. According to his expert report, he spent 40% 

of his time working underground construction projects. Id. At his deposition, he testified that 

40% to 50% of his heavy construction career was spent operating backhoes. Id., Ex. 10 (Dimas 

Dep.). Plaintiffs designated him as an expert to testify about his experiences as an operator. In 

his report, Dimas offered the following opinions: 

Opinion 1: The Deere 310J should have had a backup alarm that 

sounded in neutral if the backhoe was rolling backwards. Id. at 4. 

Opinion 2: Dimas agrees with the statements of Fulghum regarding 

the testimony of Deere’s expert, Steve Wienkes. Id. at 4-14. 

Opinion 3: Dimas is not an expert in perception-reaction time but if 

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the backhoe alarm had sounded when the backhoe rolled backwards 

in neutral, Banda would have had a much better chance to get out of 

the excavation. Id. at 14. 

Opinion 4: The backhoe rolled backwards (as opposed to sliding). Id. 

Opinion 5: The backhoe operator left the backhoe in neutral and the 

parking brake off. Id. 

Opinion 6: Banda did “what every laborer does working with an 

operator” when he entered the trench as soon as the operator was done 

digging, before the backhoe had moved away from the trench. Id. at 

15. 

Opinion 7: The backhoe should have had hillside assist. Id. at 16. 

Opinion 8: The parking brake should have been set automatically and 

kept applied until the operator’s seat was in the “dead forward” 

position. Id. at 8. 

Opinion 9: 

a. The backhoe contained a design defect. 

b. The backhoe was being used or misused in a reasonably 

foreseeable way at the time of the incident. 

c. It is feasible to include the features addressed in Opinions 1, 7 

and 8. 

d. The backhoe did not meet the consumer expectation test 

because it did not perform as safely as an ordinary consumer 

would have expected it to perform when used or misused in an 

intended or reasonably foreseeable way. Id. at 17. 

Opinion 10: It is feasible to have mechanical backup alarms. Id. at 18. 

 Defendants challenge all of Dimas’s opinions except for Opinion 2 and Opinions 9(b) and 

(d). First, Defendants contend Opinions 1, 7, 8, 9(a) and (c) and 10 should be excluded because 

they relate to the design of the Backhoe and Dimas is not qualified to offer opinions criticizing the 

design of the Backhoe or possible alternative designs because he has no expertise in the field of 

heavy equipment design. Second, Defendants assert that Dimas’s Opinion 3, relating to 

causation, should be excluded because he concedes he is not an expert on perception-reaction 

time. Third, Defendants argue that Opinion 4 – that the Backhoe rolled rather than slid backwards 

– should be excluded because Dimas is not qualified to reconstruct the accident and also does not 

have a sufficient evidentiary basis to do so because his review of the record was limited. Fourth, 

Defendants argue that Opinion 6 should be excluded because Dimas’s experience as a heavy 

equipment operator does not qualify him offer opinions about whether Banda met the standard of 

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care among laborers such as Banda. 

b. Discussion 

i. Opinions 1, 7, 8, 9(a) and (c), and 10 

The Court finds that Dimas does not have the expertise to offer Opinions 1, 7, 8, and 9(a) 

because he does not have expertise in designing heavy equipment and therefore is not qualified to 

testify about whether the Backhoe should have had the safety features described in these opinions 

or whether the lack of these features constitutes a design defect. Similarly, because he is not an 

engineering expert, Dimas is not qualified to offer Opinions 9(c) and10, that implementation of 

these features is feasible. On the other hand, he will be permitted to testify about what laborers 

expect with respect to how equipment operates, and how equipment is actually used at worksites 

as this is his area of expertise. See Primiano v. Cook, 598 F.3d 558, 567 (9th Cir. 2010), as 

amended (Apr. 27, 2010) (holding that doctor was qualified to testify that prosthetic did not 

perform in the manner reasonably to be expected even though he did not know why it failed). 

These opinions may be helpful to the jury to the extent that Plaintiffs intend to rely on the 

consumer expectations test for establishing that the product is defective, which asks whether the 

product “failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an 

intended or reasonably foreseeable manner.” Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 20 Cal.3d 413, 418 

(1978). The California Supreme Court has explained that “if the expectations of the product’s 

limited group of ordinary consumers are beyond the lay experience common to all jurors, expert 

testimony on the limited subject of what the product’s actual consumers do expect may be proper.” 

Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp., 8 Cal. 4th 548, 567 (1994).5

 

5

 In their Reply brief, Defendants argue that the consumer expectation test does not apply in this 

case and therefore that these opinions are not relevant. Under California law, “a product is 

defective in design either (1) if the product has failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer 

would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner, or (2) if, in light of the 

relevant factors ..., the benefits of the challenged design do not outweigh the risk of danger 

inherent in such design.” Barker, 20 Cal.3d at 418. However, the consumer expectation test under 

prong one applies only where the “product, in the context of the facts and circumstances of its 

failure, is one about which the ordinary consumers can form minimum safety expectation.” 

Pannu v. Land Rover N. Am., Inc., 191 Cal. App. 4th 1298, 1311–12 (2011) (citation and internal 

quotation omitted). Therefore, a jury may be instructed to apply the consumer expectation test 

rather than the risk benefit test only where the court has made a determined that the “facts actually 

permit an inference that the product’s performance did not meet the minimum safety expectations 

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ii. Opinions 3 and 4 

Plaintiffs do not appear to challenge Defendants’ assertion that Dimas is not qualified to 

offer Opinion 3 because he admits he is not an expert as to perception-reaction time. Therefore, 

the motion is GRANTED as to that opinion, which Dimas may not offer. On the other hand, the 

Court finds that Dimas has sufficient experience to offer Opinion 4, the Backhoe rolled rather than 

slid and therefore the motion is DENIED as to that opinion. 

iii. Opinion 6 

The Court rejects Defendants’ assertion that Dimas does not have the expertise to offer 

opinions as to the standard of care related to working around backhoes. As the Ninth Circuit has 

emphasized, “Rule 702 is broadly phrased and intended to embrace more than a narrow definition 

of qualified expert.” Thomas v. Newton Int’l Enterprises, 42 F.3d 1266, 1269 (9th Cir. 1994) 

(citing Advisory Committee note). As a heavy equipment operator who spent decades working on 

underground construction projects and using backhoes, Dimas is qualified to offer opinions about 

the standard of care of construction workers working around backhoes based on his experience. 

See id. 

iv. Opinion 9(d) 

In Opinion 9(d), Dimas offers opinions related to the consumer expectations test. Dimas 

will be permitted to offer opinions about whether the elements of this test is met but will not be 

permitted to opine on the ultimate question of whether the Backhoe was defective.6

4. Gerald Fulghum 

a. Background 

Gerald Fulghum is a safety engineer and a Certified Safety Professional “with over 42 

years’ experience in mining, tunneling and heavy civil construction safety, including 16 years with 

 

of its ordinary users.” Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp., 8 Cal. 4th 548, 568 (1994); see also Saller v. 

Crown Cork & Seal Co., 187 Cal. App. 4th 1220, 1233 (2010) (“In a jury case, the trial court must 

initially determine as a question of foundation, within the context of the facts and circumstances of 

the particular case, whether the product is one about which the ordinary consumer can form 

reasonable minimum safety expectations.”). It is premature to make this determination in this 

case and therefore the Court declines Defendants’ invitation to preclude Dimas’s opinions on the 

basis that the consumer expectation test does not apply. 6

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Cal-OSHA’s Mining and Tunneling Unit.” Martorano Motion Decl., Ex. 6 (Fulghum CV) at 1. 

He was designated by Plaintiffs as an expert to address “the cause of the accident, the equipment 

being used, the process that was in place, the respective parties, any dangerous conditions that 

existed, any unsafe work practices and any unsafe equipment, and to evaluate the adequacy of the 

backup alarm on the John Deere 310J.” Id., Ex. 11 (Fulghum Dep.) at 9. In his report, he offers 

the following opinions: 

Opinion 1: The Deere 310J should have had a backup alarm that 

sounded in neutral if the tractor was rolling backwards. Id., Ex. 7 

(Fulghum Report) at 5. 

Opinion 2: The Deere corporate positions provided by Deere 

representative Thomas Weinkes are contrary to safe practices. Id. at 

6. 

Opinion 3: The relevant OSHA rule in this case is 8 C.C.R. §1592(b) 

entitled “Warning Methods” and it applies to the facts of this case 

because the Backhoe operator had an obstructed view to the rear when 

the accident occurred. Id. at 15-16. 

Opinion 4: If a backup alarm had sounded immediately upon backing, 

then “there would have been only one perception/reaction time” 

because Mr. Banda would have been able to react to the sound of the 

backup alarm and not first have to be warned by the operator or 

bystander (who also had to perceive that the Backhoe was rolling 

backwards and then react). Further, “[s]ince Mr. Banda got himself 

out of the excavation except for his right leg with the delay in the 

perception /reaction times, it stands to reason he would have been able 

to avoid injury altogether if he had the other half second that was lost 

in having a coworker vocally sound an alert rather than him hearing 

the backup alarm sound when the backhoe started rolling back.” Id. 

at 16. 

Opinion 5: The Deere 310J rolled backwards, it did not slide 

backwards. Id. at 17. 

Opinion 6: When the accident occurred, the Vulcan employee who 

was operating the Backhoe left it in neutral and the parking brake was 

not on. From a safety standpoint, this was foreseeable misuse. Id. at 

17. 

Opinion 7: The Backhoe was rented from Herc, which probably did 

not know that it lacked a backup alarm that would sound when it 

rolled backwards in neutral, or that the brake did not automatically set 

when the operator seat was not in the forward position. 

Opinion 8: Other than the foreseeable misuse of Vulcan’s employee 

Barnabee Tovar in not having the parking brake on (the 310J had to 

be in neutral to operate the backhoe), Vulcan did nothing wrong in 

this case. Id. at 17-18. 

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Opinion 9: Javier Banda did what he was supposed to do by getting 

back into the excavation and clean the dirt off of the gas pipe. He did 

not have to wait for the Deere 310J to move out of the way after it 

was done excavating. 

Opinion 10: A statement by Vulcan’s owner that Mr. Banda should 

have waited to enter the excavation until the Backhoe had moved 

away was an effort to shift blame away from Vulcan. Id. at 18-19. 

Opinion 11: The Backhoe should have had hillside assist. Id. at 19. 

Fulghum testified at his deposition that he is withdrawing this opinion 

“to keep it simple” because the hillside assist feature would not be 

necessary if the Backhoe had either the backup alarm or the automatic 

brake set safety features addressed in his other opinions. Martorano 

Decl., Ex. 11 (Fulghum Dep.) at 58-59. 

Opinion 12: The parking brake should have been set if the operator’s 

seat was in any position other than dead forward. Id., Ex. 7 (Fulghum 

Report) at 19. 

Opinion 13: Under both the risk-benefit test and the consumer 

expectation test, the Backhoe had a design defect because it did not 

have a backup alarm that sounded when it rolled backwards in neutral 

and it did not automatically engage the parking brake when the 

operator’s seat was not in the forward position. Id. at 20-21. 

Opinion 14: What conclusions Fulghum would have reached if he 

were the OSHA investigator of the accident. Id. at 21. 

Opinion 15: Based on Fulghum’s experience as a Cal/OSHA 

Compliance Officer, statements blaming Banda for the accident and 

saying the Backhoe may have slid rather than rolled are an attempt by 

Vulcan to avoid being issued citations for safety violations. Id. at 22. 

Opinion 16: The Backhoe should have had mechanical backup 

alarms. Id. at 23. 

 Defendants ask the Court to exclude Opinions 1, 11, 12, 13 and 16 on the grounds that they 

involve criticisms of the design of the 310J Backhoe and propose alternative designs even though 

Fulghum has no experience that would qualify him to offer opinions on the design of a backhoe. 

Defendants further assert that Fulghum’s opinions as to the alternate designs are supported by no 

drawings of the proposed modifications, no testing of the modified designs and no examples of 

any heavy construction equipment that has incorporated these features. Defendants also ask the 

Court to exclude Opinion 4, that it “stands to reason” Banda would have escaped injury if the 

Backhoe had had a backup alarm, on the basis that Fulghum admitted in his deposition that he is 

not an expert on perception-reaction time. See id., Ex. 11 (Fulghum Dep.) at 108. 

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b. Discussion 

i. Opinions 1, 11, 12, 13 and 16 

The Court rejects Defendants’ argument that Fulghum may not offer opinions about the 

design of the Backhoe based on his experience as a safety engineer. Experts who are qualified as 

safety engineers may offer opinions as to whether certain safety features are required at the 

conceptual level even if they do not offer specific designs for the proposed safety features. See 

Furry v. Bielomatik, Inc., 32 F. App’x 882, 884 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[W]hile a safety engineer 

determines conceptually whether a safety feature is required . . . a mechanical or electrical 

engineer actually designs and implements the feature” and therefore expert who was a safety 

engineer could offer opinions about the need for certain safety features, even though he did not 

offer “specific designs for proposed safety features, did not render inadmissible his conclusions 

that such features were necessary to render the machine safe.”). To the extent that Plaintiffs will 

be required to demonstrate that the proposed modifications can be implemented by offering the 

testimony of a design expert, they will also be offering the testimony of expert Myles Kitchen, an 

automotive electronics engineer. As discussed above, the Court finds that the opinions offered by 

Kitchens as to the feasibility of implementing the proposed safety features is admissible. 

ii. Opinion 4 

The Court agrees with Defendants that Fulghum’s Opinion 4 should be excluded. 

Fulghum concedes that he is not an expert on perception-reaction time. And while he testified at 

his deposition that a one-second perception reaction time is used as a rule of thumb, he also 

testified that perception-reaction time depends on a “lot of . . . factors.” Martorano Decl., Ex. 11 

(Fulghum Dep.) at 108. As it is not apparent that Fulghum considered these factors – or is 

qualified to do so – the Court concludes that Opinion 4 must be excluded under Rule 702. 

iii. Opinion 13 

In Opinion 13, Fulghum offers opinions related to the risk-benefit test and the consumer 

expectations test. Fulghum will be permitted to offer opinions about whether the elements of the 

two tests are met but will not be permitted to opine on the ultimate question of whether the 

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United States District Court 

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a

Backhoe was defective.7

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons stated above, the Mahla and Hyland Motions are DENIED. The Iler 

Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The Deere Motion is GRANTED in part and 

DENIED in part. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: January 21, 2020 

______________________________________ 

JOSEPH C. SPERO 

Chief Magistrate Judge 

 

7

 Although this issue was not raised in Defendants’ motion, it was addressed at the hearing. 

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