Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00175/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00175-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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 Defendants Clare Keithley, Karen Young, Butte County District Attorney, and Butte

County Probation Department filed this motion to dismiss. Defendants Federal Bureau of

Investigation and California Highway Patrol did not join the motion. It appears from the record

that both the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the California Highway Patrol were not served.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GREGORY STEVEN WITHROW,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-04-0175 FCD CMK PS

vs.

CLARE KEITHLEY, et al., ORDER AND

Defendants. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Plaintiff is proceeding pro se with an action for violation of civil rights pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983. On November 29, 2004, defendants1 filed a motion seeking dismissal of this

action asserting that: (1) defendants Clare Keithley and Karen Young are entitled to absolute

immunity; (2) defendants Clare Keithley and Karen Young are entitled to qualified immunity; (3)

defendants Butte County Probation Department and Butte County District Attorney’s Office are

not proper parties; (4) the claims against defendants Butte County Probation Department and

Butte County District Attorney’s Office are barred by Eleventh Amendment Immunity; and (5)

plaintiff’s amended complaint fails to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. On

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December 15, 2004, plaintiff responded arguing that defendants Clare Keithley (“Keithley”) and

Karen Young (“Young”) are not entitled to any type of immunity because they were motivated by

race discrimination. Plaintiff also contends that defendants Butte County Probation and Butte

County District Attorney are not immune from litigation because they wrote the laws and

conditions of plaintiff’s probation. (Pl.’s Resp. at 2.) On January 4, 2005, defendants responded

to the plaintiff’s reply arguing that plaintiff has failed to adequately rebut defendants’ claims of

immunity. 

On January 11, 2005, after hearing oral argument, this court permitted the plaintiff to

submit supplemental points and authorities in opposition to defendants’ motion to dismiss. 

Defendants were also allowed to submit a supplemental reply memorandum. Instead, the

plaintiff submitted materials nonresponsive to the court’s request. Therefore, the court will only

consider those filings relevant to opposing the defendants’ motion to dismiss. 

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff filed his original complaint on January 26, 2004. Subsequently, defendants filed

a motion to dismiss that complaint on various grounds. Rather than oppose that motion, on May

5, 2004, plaintiff filed a “Reply” which essentially requested that the court dismiss his complaint

without prejudice. On June 3, 2004, Magistrate Judge Nowinski issued Findings and

Recommendations recommending dismissal of the complaint without prejudice. On July 8,

2004, Judge Damrell adopted the Findings and Recommendations and issued on order dismissing

the original complaint. Judgment was subsequently entered. 

 Thereafter, on August, 2004, plaintiff submitted objections which did not address Judge

Nowinski’s Findings and Recommendations, but rather requested judicial assistance with various

discovery matters. Construing these new objections as evidence of plaintiff’s renewed interest to

proceed with his action, Judge Nowinski filed Amended Findings and Recommendations on

August 25, 2004, recommending that plaintiff be permitted to proceed with his action and the

filing of a lodged document entitled “Motion For Plaintiff Seeking Monetary Damages For The

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Infliction of Pain & Suffering Upon Plaintiff By Said Named Defendants” [Amended

Complaint]. On November 5, 2004, Judge Damrell adopted Judge Nowinski’s Amended

Findings and Recommendations and vacated the original judgment dismissing the action which

had been filed on July 9, 2004.

During this period of time, the action was reassigned from Magistrate Judge Nowinski to

Magistrate Judge Kellison on October 26, 2004, for all further proceedings.

On November 29, 2004, Defendants Keithley, Young, Butte County Probation

Department and Butte County District Attorney filed the present Motion to Dismiss plaintiff’s

Amended Complaint.

In hindsight, this court should have more carefully screened the Amended Complaint to

seek plaintiff’s compliance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

require “[e]ach averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct.” See Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(e). Furthermore, Rule 8(a) states:

A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief...shall contain (1) a

short plain statement of the grounds upon which the court’s

jurisdiction depends...(2) a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for

judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Moreover, defendants may move for dismissal of this action for plaintiff’s

failure to comply with these rules or any order of court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). Here, the

defendants move this court to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice. (Mot. to Dismiss at

pg. 10.) 

A complaint which fails to comply with rules 8(a) and 8(e) may be dismissed with

prejudice according to rule 41(b). Nevijel v. North Coast Life Insurance Co., 651 F.2d 671, 674

(9th Cir. 1981). However, dismissal of a complaint under rule 41(b) is a harsh remedy. 

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For purposes of this action, the two conditions of probation having bearing on the Defendants’ conduct included a

“Fourth Waiver” which required the plaintiff to:

“3. Submit to search of your person, property, residence, vehicle, or any container under your control or in which you have an

interest at any time, night or day, by any peace officer with or without a warrant of arrest, search warrant, reasonable or probable

cause, your then presence or your then consent, for the purpose of determining compliance with the conditions of probation.

22. The defendant is not to be involved in or associate with anyone known to be a gang member. The defendant may not wear or

possess any item of gang clothing known to be such by the defendant including any gang insignia, moniker, or pattern, jewelry

with gang insignia, nor may the defendant display any gang insignia, moniker, or other markings of gang insignias known to be

such by the defendant on his person or property as my be identified by law enforcement or the Probation Officer, except the he

shall not be required to remove the tattoos on his body that existed at the time of the sentencing. For purposes of this paragraph,

the word “gang” means a “criminal street gang” as defined in Penal Code § 186.22(e) and (f).

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McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 1996). Thus, the district court should first

consider less drastic alternatives. Id. The court may consider the strength of the plaintiff’s case

in determining whether to dismiss it with prejudice. Id. However, “this court has long sought to

ensure that pro se litigants do not unwittingly fall victim to procedural requirements, that they

may with some assistance from the court be able to satisfy.” Waters v. Young, 100 F.3d 1437,

1441 (9th Cir. 1996). 

As a result, the court is now faced with construing plaintiff’s lengthy narrative alleging

violations of his constitutional rights associated with, and following a search of his premises, and

the seizure of various documents and items which resulted in his incarceration and subsequent

unsuccessful prosecution for a violation of probation. 

The plaintiff had been convicted in state court for felony domestic violence. As a

condition of his probation, the Butte County Superior Court imposed various conditions.2

On January 8, 2003, Defendant Young (a Butte County probation officer), along with

other law enforcement officers, conducted a search of plaintiff’s home pursuant to the abovereferenced conditions. During the search, numerous documents and items were seized. 

Construing the possession of the items seized as a violation of his probation, the plaintiff was

incarcerated pending trial and subsequently prosecuted. Following his probation revocation

hearing, the Superior Court Judge for Butte County ruled that possession of those documents was

not a violation of plaintiff’s probation.

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Although the Amended Complaint is not a model of clarity, plaintiff’s alleged claims can

be summarized as follows:

1. That the search and seizure of plaintiff’s premises was unreasonable under the

Fourth Amendment;

2. That the seized writings and materials were protected items of speech and

exceeded the parameters of condition No. 22 of the terms of his probation; and

3. That the actions of the defendants were motivated by plaintiff’s Aryan beliefs.

Whether these claims have constitutional implications will be discussed below. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467

U.S. 69, 73 (1984) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)); Palmer v. Roosevelt

Lake Log Owners Ass'n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing a complaint under

this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital

Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor, Jenkins v.

McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). 

 As plaintiff in this action is pro se, the court must also construe his complaint more

liberally than it would those drafted by a lawyer. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972);

see also Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980); Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir.

2002); Ortez v. Washington County, State of Or., 88 F.3d 804, 810 (9th Cir. 1996).

III. DISCUSSION

Before considering the defendants’ various claimed immunity defenses, the court must

determine first whether plaintiff’s allegations, if true, establish a constitutional violation. See

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Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001); Boyd v. Benton County, 374 F.3d 773, 778 (9th Cir.

2004); see also Tremblay v. McClellan, 350 F.3d 195, 199 (1st Cir. 2003)(explaining that

addressing the alleged constitutional violation first helps the development of the law on what

constitutes a meritorious constitutional claim). Here, plaintiff claims that defendants’ seizure of 

his writings and journals, during a probation search, violated his constitutional rights. The court

must determine if the plaintiff’s allegations establish a Fourth Amendment violation. Although

the plaintiff makes mention in his Amended Complaint that the search was “legal”, this court

simply construes such a reference to plaintiff’s understanding of his “Fourth Waiver” under the

conditions of his probation. Whether the search was “legal” can only be determined after full

development of the facts surrounding the entry and seizure.

The court first determines whether the plaintiff has standing to assert a violation of the

Fourth Amendment. In the present case, it is undisputed that the seized writings and the home in

which they were found belonged to the plaintiff. Therefore, the plaintiff has standing. U.S. v.

Davis, 932 F.2d 752 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Next, the court will address the scope of plaintiff’s probation search and seizure. Under

some circumstances, parolees and probationers possess fewer constitutional rights than other

citizens because they have been convicted of a crime. U.S. v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259,

275 (9th Cir. 1975). “ A State’s operation of a probation system , like its operation of a school,

government office or prison, or its supervision of a regulated industry, likewise presents ‘special

needs’ beyond normal law enforcement that may justify departures from the usual warrant and

probable-cause requirements.” Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-74 (1987). Thus, the

United States Constitution allows for probation searches based on no more than reasonable

suspicion. United. States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 825 (9th Cir. 2004). The permissible

bounds of a probation search are controlled by the reasonable suspicion standard. R. Moreno v.

Baca, 400 F.3d 1152, 1163 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Davis, 932 F.2d 752, 758 (9th Cir.

1991). 

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A search does not infringe the Fourth Amendment if it is “reasonable” which is measured

in objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S.

33, 39 (1996). Following the Supreme Court’s recent decision in United States v. Knights, 534

U.S. 112 (2001), in order to determine whether the search of plaintiff’s residence is objectively

reasonable, the court is required to balance the privacy interests of the plaintiff against the state’s

interest in the search. Knights, supra at 118. The plaintiff’s personal connection to his home is

more than sufficient to afford him Fourth Amendment protection against an uninvited search. 

Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). Under federal law, the plaintiff’s expectation of

privacy in his own home is not wholly defeated by virtue of his probationary status. Griffin v.

Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987).

For purposes of a motion to dismiss, this court is unable to conclude whether defendant

Young’s search was unreasonable. As much as can be gleaned from plaintiff’s Amended

Complaint is that the seized items included his “journals and accumulated writings”. (Amended

Complaint, 4:20). Although this court will not consider defendant Young’s declaration for

purposes of this motion to dismiss, she apparently maintains that some or all of the items seized

contained numerous symbols including swastikas and other insignia associated with the Aryan

Brotherhood. A determination of whether the search was unreasonable would first require this

court to determine that the items seized clearly fall outside the proscriptions set forth in condition 

no. 22. Of course, this court is unable to make such a finding on a motion to dismiss.

 If there is a constitutional violation the court’s next step is to determine whether the

constitutional right was clearly established. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). In

deciding this issue, the court will determine: 1) whether the law governing the state official’s

conduct was clearly established, and 2) under that law, could a reasonable state official have

believed his conduct was lawful? Marquez v. Gutierrez, 322 F.3d 689, 692 (9th Cir. 2003);

Saucier, supra, at 201-02. As stated above, the law is clearly established that warrantless,

probation searches and seizures require reasonable suspicion that probation has been violated. 

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U.S. v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 825 (9th Cir. 2004); U.S. v. Davis, 932 F.2d 752, 758 (9th Cir.

1991). Furthermore, an otherwise valid probation search may become otherwise invalid or

unreasonable if the seizure exceeds the parameters of the conditions of probation. 

Assuming a constitutional violation, the next question that must be asked is whether the

right was clearly established. “[T]he relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right

is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was

unlawful in the situation he confronted. Saucier, supra at 2156.

This court is not in a position to define Defendant Young’s conduct in her search of

plaintiff’s premises. For purposes of a motion to dismiss, we will assume that a constitutional

deprivation has occurred, and discuss the immunity status of the parties.

IV. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

A public official performing a discretionary function enjoys qualified immunity in a civil

action for damages, provided his or her conduct does not violate clearly established federal

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow, v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The immunity is “immunity from suit rather than a mere

defense to liability.” Mitchell. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).

The courts have extended absolute judicial immunity to include officers whose functions

are closely related to the judicial process. Demoran v. F.A. Witt, 781 F.2d 155, 156 (9th Cir.

1986). In determining whether a probation officer is included in this protected group, the court

applies the “functional approach” described above. Id.;(citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.

800, 810-811 (1982).) As a result, a probation officer who prepares a presentence report is

entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity. Id. at 158. 

However, Young is not entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity relating to her search

of the plaintiff’s home. Young’s search and seizure of plaintiff’s home, writings and journals

was not within the ambit of her judicial function. The Ninth Circuit has held that search and

seizure is an activity which is investigatory in nature and entitled to only qualified immunity. 

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Swift v. California, 384 F.3d 1184, 1188 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Although the plaintiff should not be subject to an unreasonable or excessive search of his

premises, he has not brought to this court’s attention any cases of controlling authority in this

jurisdiction at the time of the incident which clearly establishes his right as a probationer, nor has

he identified a consensus of cases of persuasive authority such that a reasonable officer could not

have believed that his or her actions were unlawful. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999).

Here, the search of plaintiff’s home was conducted in reliance of a facially valid court probation

order, containing a provision that the plaintiff submit to a search of his person or property at any

time. In light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987), it

may prove very difficult for plaintiff to establish that his rights as a probationer were clearly

violated at the time of the search, but again, that issue cannot be resolved without knowing more

about the items seized.

V. ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY

District Attorney Keithley (“Keithley”) is entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity. 

Keithley is also entitled to the privilege of qualified immunity for any conduct “not intimately

associate[d ] with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Imbler v. Patchman, 424 U.S. 409,

430 (1976). The plaintiff fails to allege that defendant Keithley did anything outside of her role

as a prosecutor. Therefore, the court need not reach the issue of qualified immunity with regard

to defendant Keithley.

A prosecutor is “absolutely immune from liability under section 1983 for his or her 

conduct in ‘initiating a prosecution and in presenting the state’s case.’” Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S.

478 (1991); Imbler v. Patchman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976). Absolute immunity protects a

prosecutor whose conduct can be associated with the “judicial phase of the criminal process.” Id. 

As a result, prosecutors have absolute immunity from liability in their individual capacities for

their decisions to prosecute or for any acts which are within the scope of their authority and

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performed in a prosecutorial capacity. Id. “The immunity of a prosecutor is based upon the

same purpose; that underlies the immunity of judges and grand jurors acting within the scope of

their duties: to protect the judicial process.” Milstein v. Cooley, 257 F.3d 1004, 1007 (9th Cir.

2001). 

The court determines whether a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity by examining

“the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it.” Id. at 1008

(quoting Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988)). The prosecutor’s intent plays no role in

the immunity inquiry. Id. Also, the official seeking absolute immunity bears the burden of

demonstrating that such immunity is justified for the function in question. Id. The presumption

is that qualified rather than absolute immunity applies. Id. 

In the present case, plaintiff alleges that defendant Keithley violated his rights by

attempting to revoke his probation because he is an Aryan. Specifically, plaintiff highlights the

fact that Keithley was the Deputy District Attorney who prosecuted him for violating conditions

of his probation. (Am. Compl. at 5.) In addition, plaintiff points to Keithley’s recommendations

to the state court regarding enlargement of his probation conditions. (Am. Compl., Ex. L.) 

Keithley is entitled to absolute immunity because she is a prosecutor who was acting

within her prosecutorial function. Genzler v. J. Loganbach, 384 F.3d 1092, 1097 (9th Cir. 2004). 

 Defendant Keithley’s alleged racism is irrelevant under absolute immunity analysis.

VI. ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IMMUNITY

Next, defendants Butte County Probation Department and Butte County District

Attorney’s Office argue that the claims against them are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. 

This court agrees.

Neither a state or its officials acting in their official capacity are “persons” under section

1983. Will v. Michigan Dep’t. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58. 71 (1989); Thompson v. City of Los

Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9th Cir. 1989). A local government, however, can be liable under

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 Defendants also argue that if the court construes plaintiff’ claims as against Butte County, that Butte

County is not a proper party. (Mot. at pg. 8.) The Court need not decide this issue at the present time because

plaintiff’s claims against Butte County were dismissed on November 8, 2004. The court will not construe plaintiff’s

complaint as including Butte County. 

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section 1983 for constitutional torts committed by its officials acting according to municipal

policy, practice, or custom. Weiner v. San Diego County, 210 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2000)

(citing Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691-91 (1978).) To hold a local

government liable for its officer’s conduct, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the official (1) had

final policymaking authority regarding the action which caused the constitutional violation and

(2) was the local government’s policy maker concerning that particular action. Id.; McMillian v.

Monroe County Alabama, 520 U.S. 781, 785 (1997). 

 In California, a district attorney is considered a state official when deciding whether to

prosecute an individual. Weiner v. San Diego County, 210 F.3d 1025, 1028 (2000). As a result,

district attorneys in the State of California are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity

because their actions are actions performed on behalf of the state. See Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361

F.3d 1168, 1182-1183 (9th Cir. 2004).

Similarly, the Butte County Probation Department acted on behalf of the State of

California and is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. The California Superior Courts and

its employees are arms of the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes. Simmons v. Sacramento

County Superior Court, 318 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 2003); Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police,

491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). A probation officer is a superior court employee because a probation

officer is appointed by the judge of the superior court. See Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 270. 

Therefore, because probation officers are employees of the superior court, and the superior court

is an arm of the state, plaintiff’s claims against defendant Butte County Probation Department are

barred by the Eleventh Amendment.3

Plaintiff’s claims against defendants Butte County District Attorney’s Office and Butte

County Probation Department should also be dismissed because both of these defendants are not

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proper parties to this lawsuit. The term “persons” under section 1983 does not include municipal

departments. Vance v. County of Santa Clara, 928 F.Supp. 993, 996 (CD Cal. 1996). “Naming a

municipal department as a defendant is not an appropriate means of pleading a § 1983 action

against a municipality.” Id. (quoting Stump v. Gates, 777 F.Supp. 808, 816 (D. Colo. 1991). 

Therefore, plaintiff’s claims against Butte County Probation Department and Butte County

District Attorney’s Office should be dismissed from this action on this basis as well.

///

VII. DEFENDANTS FBI AND CHP.

Defendants FBI and CHP have not been served with a copy of plaintiff’s Amended

Complaint. As a result, the FBI and CHP did not join in the present motion to dismiss. 

Nevertheless, the court will also recommend dismissal of plaintiff’s claims against the FBI and

CHP for the following reasons.

In the present case, the court finds the claims against defendants FBI and CHP vague and

conclusory. Although the Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, a complaint must give

fair notice and state the elements of the claim plainly and succinctly. 

There is a recognized right of actions against federal officers that is analogous to the right

of action one would have against a state official under § 1983. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named

Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971). A Bivens action, however, cannot

be maintained against a federal agency. FDIC v. Meyer, 114 S.Ct. 996, 1006 (1994) Since

plaintiff has failed to effectuate service upon the FBI and has made no effort to seek permission

to file an amended pleading to allege a Bivens violation, the undersigned also recommends the

dismissal of this action against the FBI, with prejudice.

Similarly, dismissal is also recommended against Defendant CHP with prejudice. 

The CHP, or California Highway Patrol is a “state agency” for purpose of the Eleventh

Amendment. See, Freeman v. Oakland Unified School District, 179 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 1999).

VIII. CONCLUSION 

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It bears mention that the defendants have requested that the court take judicial notice of

several filings, including those filed just prior to these findings and recommendations. This court

will deny such request because the defendants have not supplied the court with the necessary

information. (See Fed. R. Evid. 201.) 

Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant’s request for judicial notice filed

February 11, 2005, is denied. 

 In accordance with the above, and for the reasons herein stated, IT IS HEREBY

RECOMMENDED that:

 1. Defendants’ November 29, 2004 motion to dismiss be granted as to Defendants

Keithley, Butte County District Attorney’s Office, and Butte County Probation Department.

2. Defendant’s motion to dismiss be denied as to Defendant Young. 

3. This action be dismissed with prejudice as to defendants FBI and CHP.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fifteen

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within fifteen days after service of the objections. The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the

District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: June 6, 2005.

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______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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