Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_17-cv-02640/USCOURTS-cand-3_17-cv-02640-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EUREKA DIVISON

JEWEL E. DYER,

Plaintiff,

v.

TIMOTHY PEARCE, et. al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 17-cv-2640-NJV (PR) 

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE 

TO AMEND

Dkt. No. 8

Plaintiff, a detainee, has filed a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The 

court granted plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 9.)

DISCUSSION

Standard of Review

Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek 

redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 

1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any claims 

which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. at 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se 

pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th 

Cir. 1990).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the 

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” “Specific facts are not necessary; the 

statement need only “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . . claim is and the grounds 

upon which it rests.’”” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations omitted). Although 

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in order to state a claim a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff's 

obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and 

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. . . . 

Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). A complaint must 

proffer “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. The United 

States Supreme Court has recently explained the “plausible on its face” standard of Twombly: 

“While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by 

factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their 

veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Ashcroft 

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must 

allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United 

States was violated, and (2) that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under 

the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 

Legal Claims 

Plaintiff alleges that he is receiving inadequate medical care, the water in the jail is giving 

him a rash and adversely affecting his health and he is being denied access to the courts.

Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment’s 

proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); 

McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX 

Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). A determination of 

“deliberate indifference” involves an examination of two elements: the seriousness of the 

prisoner's medical need and the nature of the defendant's response to that need. Id. at 1059. 1

 1 It appears that plaintiff is a pretrial detainee. Even though pretrial detainees’ claims arise under 

the Due Process Clause, the Eighth Amendment serves as a benchmark for evaluating those 

claims. See Carnell v. Grimm, 74 F.3d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 1996) (8th Amendment guarantees 

provide minimum standard of care for pretrial detainees). The Ninth Circuit has determined that 

the appropriate standard for evaluating constitutional claims brought by pretrial detainees is the 

same one used to evaluate convicted prisoners’ claims under the Eighth Amendment. “The 

requirement of conduct that amounts to ‘deliberate indifference’ provides an appropriate balance 

of the pretrial detainees’ right to not be punished with the deference given to prison officials to 

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A “serious” medical need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in 

further significant injury or the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Id. The existence of 

an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or 

treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual's daily 

activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain are examples of indications that a 

prisoner has a “serious” need for medical treatment. Id. at 1059-60. 

A prison official is deliberately indifferent if he or she knows that a prisoner faces a 

substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable steps to abate 

it. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). The prison official must not only “be aware of 

facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,” but 

he “must also draw the inference.” Id. If a prison official should have been aware of the risk, but 

was not, then the official has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk. 

Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002). “A difference of opinion 

between a prisoner-patient and prison medical authorities regarding treatment does not give rise to 

a § 1983 claim.” Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981).

Inmates who sue prison officials for injuries suffered while in custody may do so under the 

Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause or, if not yet convicted, under the 

Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979); 

Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1067-68 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). But under both 

clauses, the inmate must show that the prison official acted with deliberate indifference. Id. at 

1068.

Prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 

343, 350 (1996); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977). To establish a claim for any 

violation of the right of access to the courts, the prisoner must prove that there was an inadequacy 

in the prison’s legal access program that caused him an actual injury. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 350-

55. To prove an actual injury, the prisoner must show that the inadequacy in the prison's program 

 

manage the prisons.” Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1443 (9th Cir. 1991) (en 

banc) (citation omitted).

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hindered his efforts to pursue a non-frivolous claim concerning his conviction or conditions of 

confinement. See id. at 354-55.

Plaintiff states that he has been refused treatment, however he fails to discuss what 

treatment was refused and the underlying medical problems. He has also failed to identify the 

actions of any specific defendants. Similarly, plaintiff states that he was denied access to the 

courts, but fails to provide any details. Nor has he provided specific allegations regarding how the 

facility water is harming him and what if any steps he has taken in discussing this with jail 

officials. The complaint is dismissed with leave to amend. Plaintiff must provide more details 

and describe who specific individuals violated his constitutional rights. Conclusory allegations 

with no support are insufficient.

CONCLUSION

1. The complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend in accordance with the standards set 

forth above. The amended complaint must be filed within twenty-eight (28) days of the date this 

order is filed and must include the caption and civil case number used in this order and the words 

AMENDED COMPLAINT on the first page. Because an amended complaint completely replaces 

the original complaint, plaintiff must include in it all the claims he wishes to present. See Ferdik 

v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). He may not incorporate material from the 

original complaint by reference. Failure to amend within the designated time will result in the 

dismissal of this case.

2. It is the plaintiff’s responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the court 

informed of any change of address by filing a separate paper with the clerk headed “Notice of 

Change of Address,” and must comply with the court's orders in a timely fashion. Failure to do so 

may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 41(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 27, 2017

________________________

NANDOR J. VADAS

United States Magistrate Judge

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