Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01459/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01459-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DARRYL W. COLLINS, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 

SECURITY,

Defendant.

Case No. 1:15-cv-01459-SAB

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT‟S 

MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF 

JURISDICTION

(ECF Nos. 9, 10)

Currently before the Court is Defendant‟s motion to dismiss this action for lack of 

jurisdiction. The matter is currently before the Court on the parties‟ briefs, which were 

submitted, without oral argument, to Magistrate Judge Stanley A. Boone.1

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff protectively filed an application for a period of disability and disability insurance 

benefits on June 21, 2013. (ECF No. 4.) Plaintiff‟s application was granted in part and denied in 

part on December 9, 2013. (ECF No. 5.) On July 21, 2014, Plaintiff filed a request for hearing 

and submitted a statement of untimely filing. (ECF No. 9-1 at 6.

2

) On October 10, 2014, the 

 

1 The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge. (See ECF Nos. 5, 6.)

2 All references to pagination of specific documents pertain to those as indicated on the upper right corners via the 

CM/ECF electronic court docketing system.

Case 1:15-cv-01459-SAB Document 11 Filed 05/20/16 Page 1 of 9
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Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) dismissed the request for a hearing because Plaintiff did not 

file the request for the hearing within the required period and had not shown good cause for the 

late filing. (ECF No. 9-1 at 11-13, 14-15.) On November 21, 2014, Plaintiff requested review 

by the Appeal‟s Counsel. (ECF No. 9-1 at 17-19.) On July 24, 2015, the Appeal‟s Counsel 

denied Plaintiff‟s request for review. (ECF No. 9-1 at 21-22.) 

On September 27, 2014, Plaintiff filed the instant action seeking judicial review of a final 

decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner” or “Defendant”). (ECF No. 

1.) On March 11, 2016, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. (ECF No. 

9.) On March 25, 2016, Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 10.) 

II.

LEGAL STANDARD

A claimant may seek judicial review “after any final decision of the Commissioner of 

Social Security made after a hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in 

controversy, . . . by a civil action commenced within sixty days after the mailing to him of notice 

of such decision or within such further time as the Commissioner of Social Security may allow.” 

42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Supreme Court has interpreted this to mean there are two elements 

required to obtain judicial review under section 405(g): 1) a waivable requirement that the 

administrative remedies required by the Social Security Act be exhausted; and 2) a non-waivable 

requirement that there be a final decision by the Secretary. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 

328 (1976); Kildare v. Saenz, 325 F.3d 1078, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003) (“A final decision has two 

elements: (1) presentment of the claim to the Commissioner, and (2) complete exhaustion of 

administrative remedies.”). Section 405(g) “clearly limits judicial review to a particular type of 

agency action, a „final decision of the Secretary made after a hearing.‟ ” Subia v. Comm‟r of 

Soc. Sec., 264 F.3d 899, 902 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 108 

(1977)). 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

Case 1:15-cv-01459-SAB Document 11 Filed 05/20/16 Page 2 of 9
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III.

DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not received a final Agency decision subject to 

judicial review, and therefore this Court lacks jurisdiction over this action. Plaintiff does not 

dispute that he did not receive a final agency decision, but argues that jurisdiction exists because 

he has a colorable constitutional claim for a due process violation. Plaintiff contends that he is 

seeking a hearing solely on the issue of the date of commencement of benefits and due process 

requires that he be provided with a hearing. 

The Supreme Court has recognized that “the doctrine of administrative exhaustion should 

be applied with a regard for the particular administrative scheme at issue.” Weinberger v. Salfi, 

422 U.S. 749, 765 (1975). The requirement that a claimant may only appeal a final decision of 

the Commissioner is a statutory specified jurisdictional requirement. Salfi, 422 U.S. at 766. 

There is an exception to this judicial exhaustion requirement where the Secretary‟s decision is 

challenged on constitutional grounds. Califano, 430 U.S. at 109. The court can waive the 

administrative exhaustion requirement and grant judicial review where the claimant asserts 

colorable constitutional claims. Subia, 264 F.3d at 902; Hoye v. Sullivan, 985 F.2d 990, 991 

(9th Cir. 1992) (failure to exhaust administrative remedies may be waived where a claimant

“demonstrates that his constitutional claim is (1) collateral to a substantive claim of entitlement, 

(2) colorable, and (3) one whose resolution would not serve the purposes of exhaustion.). 

The Ninth Circuit has adopted a three-part test to determine whether a case merits judicial 

waiver of the exhaustion requirement: the claim must be (1) collateral to a substantive claim of 

entitlement (collaterality), (2) colorable in its showing that denial of relief will cause irreparable 

harm (irreparability), and (3) one whose resolution would not serve the purposes of exhaustion 

(futility). Johnson v. Shalala, 2 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 1993). Waiver is not appropriate where 

the claimant has not satisfied all three elements. See Kaiser v. Blue Cross of Ca., 347 F.3d 1107, 

1115-16 (9th Cir.2003) (finding collaterality but denying waiver because irreparability and 

futility were not met). 

/ / /

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A. Whether Plaintiff Has Stated a Colorable Constitutional Claim

First, the Court considers whether Plaintiff has stated a colorable constitutional claim. 

Plaintiff argues that he has a property interest in disability benefits and his due process rights 

were violated because he appealed only the issue of the date of commencement of benefits. 

Plaintiff contends that since he requested review only on whether any rational basis existed for 

the selection of September 1, 2013 as the commencement date of disability he is not seeking 

payment of benefits and therefore he is not precluded from pursing this action based on the lack 

of a final decision by the Commissioner.

Plaintiff does not contend that the Commissioner did not consider the reasons he set forth 

to excuse his untimely filing,

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see Dexter v. Colvin, 731 F.3d 977 (9th Cir. 2013), but argues that 

his due process rights are violated because he is being denied the opportunity to address the 

correctness of the date his disability was determined to commence and the arguments set forth in 

his request for a hearing. “A constitutional claim is not colorable if it clearly appears to be 

immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or ... is wholly insubstantial 

or frivolous.” Subia, 264 F.3d at 902. “A „mere allegation of a due process violation‟ is not a 

colorable constitutional claim. Klemm v. Astrue, 543 F.3d 1139, 1144 (9th Cir. 2008). “Rather, 

the claim must be supported by facts sufficient to state a violation of substantive or procedural 

due process.” Klemm, 543 F.3d at 1144. Determining whether a constitutional claim is 

colorable requires involves some review of the merits, but a determination that a claim lacks 

merit does not necessarily mean that it is not colorable. Boettcher v. Sec‟y of Health & Human 

Servs., 759 F.2d 719, 722 (9th Cir. 1985).

Initially, the Court considers, Mathews in which the Supreme Court distinguished 

disability benefits from other types of government aid because eligibility is not based upon 

 

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As Plaintiff concedes, generally the Commissioner‟s decision that he did not establish good cause for the late 

filing of his request for a hearing is not a final decision subject to appeal. Burbage v. Schweiker, 559 F. Supp. 1371, 

1374 (N.D. Cal. 1983). There is a distinction between an argument that the ALJ improperly decided that the 

claimant did not show good cause and a claim that the ALJ did not consider all reasons set forth to show good cause 

exists for the untimely filing. A claimant is not entitled to review of the merits of the good-cause decision. Dexter, 

731 F.3d 977.

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financial need. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 341. Considering the interests at stake, “substantial weight 

must be given to the good-faith judgments of the individuals charged by Congress with the 

administration of social welfare programs that the procedures they have provided assure fair 

consideration of the entitlement claims of individuals. Id. at 340-49. The court found it to be 

especially true in Social Security cases where “the prescribed procedures not only provide the 

claimant with an effective process for asserting his claim prior to any administrative action, but 

also assure a right to an evidentiary hearing, as well as to subsequent judicial review, before the 

denial of his claim becomes final.” Id. at 349.

The Ninth Circuit has considered a claim similar to that raised here. In Boettcher, after

originally being denied benefits, the claimant was awarded benefits but challenged the onset 

date. Boettcher, 759 F.2d at 720. The onset date of disability was set back on reconsideration, 

but claimant again requested reconsideration. Id. The Appeal‟s Counsel construed the request as 

a request for a hearing. Id. A hearing was set and the notice stated that the hearing would be de 

novo. Id. Claimant objected to a de novo hearing and when he refused to proceed with the 

hearing, the ALJ dismissed the request for a hearing. Id. The claimant filed an action in federal 

court and the Commissioner moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. The 

district court dismissed claimant‟ Social Security appeal concluding he had not exhausted his 

administrative remedies. Id. 

As Plaintiff is claiming here, the claimant in Boettcher argued on appeal that he was 

excused from the requirement to administratively exhaust his claim because he raised a colorable 

constitutional claim. Id. at 721. The Ninth Circuit found that claimant had raised a colorable 

claim, but ultimately found the claim was incorrect. Id. Claimant argued that requiring a de 

novo hearing rather than a hearing solely on the issue determined unfavorably to him, the 

disability onset date, denied him of due process. Id. In determining what process was due, the 

court considered:

[1] the private interest that will be affected by the official action; [2] the risk of an 

erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the 

probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and [3] 

the Government‟s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and 

administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement 

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would entail.

Id. at 722 (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335). 

The court found that the balance of interests at stake include the Government‟s interest to 

avoid erroneous deprivation of benefits which is shared by the claimant. Boettcher, 759 F.2d at 

722. The statutory scheme empowered the Secretary to conduct hearings on her own motion as 

necessary, conduct de novo review of disability determinations made by state agencies, and 

compels such review in a specified percentage of cases. Id. The court found that claimant‟s 

argument would require a separate hearing for the onset date from the determination of 

disability. Id. This would be “nonsensical and wasteful.” Id. The court found the due process 

claim meritless. Id. at 724. 

In Cox v. Mathews, 421 F. Supp. 721 (N.D. Cal. 1976), rev‟d on other grounds Cox v. 

Califano, 587 F.2d 988 (9th Cir. 1978), the claimant argued that the Commissioner violated his 

due process rights by determining both eligibility for insurance benefits and the date of cessation 

of such benefits in the same hearing. 421 F.Supp. at 724. Relying on a decision out of the Sixth 

Circuit, Myers v. Richardson, 471 F.2d 1265 (6th Cir. 1972), the district court found that “[i]t is 

most reasonable to have a single hearing to decide the fact of disability, the extent of disability, 

the duration of disability, as well as to determine whether such disability has terminated. 

Multiple hearings would create a waste of time and effort.” Cox v. Matthews, 421 F.Supp. at 

724.

Similar to those cases discussed herein, Plaintiff is ultimately arguing that due process 

requires him to be provided with a separate hearing on the date his disability commenced. 

Requiring separate hearings to review essentially the same evidence would increase the amount

of time required to make a decision as to disability. As previous courts have found, it is more 

reasonable and efficient to have a single hearing to consider the evidence of disability and the 

onset date. This procedure benefits both the claimant and the government. 

Plaintiff was provided with the opportunity to file his claim for disability benefits and 

benefits were granted. Plaintiff disagrees with the disability onset date found by the 

Commissioner and the regulations provide a process by which to challenge that decision. 20 

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C.F.R. §§ 404.907-404.922. Plaintiff did not comply with that process. If Plaintiff is correct that 

his due process rights have been violated in this action, then “[e]very disappointed claimant 

could raise such a due process claim, thereby undermining a statutory scheme designed to limit 

judicial review.” Hoye, 985 F.2d at 992 (quoting Holloway v. Schweiker, 724 F.2d 1102, 1105 

(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1217 (1984)). 

Plaintiff alleges that his due process rights have been violated. In this instance, Plaintiff 

had the opportunity to seek review of the decision awarding benefits, but a review hearing was 

not provided because he did not file a timely request for a hearing. Essentially, Plaintiff is 

complaining that he is being denied the opportunity for a review hearing because he did not 

comply with the remedies provided by the Commissioner. The Court finds that Plaintiff has not 

set forth a colorable constitutional claim. 

B. Whether the Administrative Exhaustion Requirement Should Be Waived

The Court shall next consider whether the administrative exhaustion requirement should 

be waived in this instance. This requires consideration of whether the claim is (1) collateral to a 

substantive claim of entitlement (collaterality), (2) colorable in its showing that denial of relief 

will cause irreparable harm (irreparability), and (3) one whose resolution would not serve the 

purposes of exhaustion (futility). Johnson, 2 F.3d at 921.

1. Collaterality

“A plaintiff‟s claim is collateral if it is not essentially a claim for benefits.” Johnson, 2 

F.3d at 921. Plaintiff here argues that he is not seeking benefits. However, the Court disagrees. 

Plaintiff is seeking a determination that the ALJ improperly decided the onset date of his 

disability. Plaintiff is seeking such a determination in order to obtain additional benefits. 

Plaintiff is essentially seeking a review of the onset date for the purpose of obtaining benefits. 

Plaintiff is challenging the ALJ‟s finding that his disability began on September 1, 2013. 

(ECF No. 9-1 at 5.) Plaintiff‟s claim is not collateral because it is bound up with the merits so 

closely that a decision by this court would constitute interference with agency process. Johnson, 

2 F.3d at 922; see also Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 614 (1984) (claim is “inextricably 

intertwined” with claim for benefits). 

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2. Irreparability

A plaintiff “must raise „at least a colorable claim‟ that exhaustion will cause [him]

irreparable injury.” Johnson, 2 F.3d at 922. The Ninth Circuit has held that “a „colorable‟ 

showing of irreparable injury is one that is not „wholly insubstantial, immaterial, or frivolous.‟ ” 

Id. (citations omitted). 

Plaintiff argues that he will suffer irreparable economic harm because he will be unable 

to raise the onset date of his disability in a subsequent claim for benefits or through the 

commencement of another action. The Court will assume for the purposes of this motion that the 

denial of the ability to challenge the date of onset of disability is an irreparable injury due to the 

loss of some amount of benefits. 

3. Futility

The Supreme Court has held that the decision to waive exhaustion should not be made 

solely by mechanical application of the factors of collaterality and irreparable harm but should be 

guided by the policies underlying the exhaustion requirement. Johnson, 2 F.3d at 922. The 

exhaustion requirement allows the agency to compile a detailed factual record and apply agency 

expertise to administering its own regulations, conserves judicial resources, and allows the 

agency to correct its own error through administrative review. Id. 

Here, waiving the exhaustion requirement would not serve the policies underlying 

exhaustion. By filing an administrative appeal of an adverse decision the Appellate Counsel can 

consider the underlying decision and correct any error. Administrative proceedings would not be 

futile but would be necessary for the Commissioner to establish a detailed factual record and 

permit the agency to apply its expertise. Bass v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 872 F.2d 832, 833 (9th Cir. 

1989). Further, allowing a claimant to avoid the timely exhaustion of remedies requirement

would allow any claimant to “belatedly appeal his claim at any time and always obtain district 

court review of an ALJ's decision.” Burbage v. Schweiker, 559 F.Supp. 1371, 1373 (N.D. Cal. 

1983). 

The Court determines that waiver of section 405(g)‟s exhaustion requirement is not 

appropriate in this instance because Plaintiff‟s claims are not collateral to his claim for benefits 

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and because the purposes of exhaustion would not be served by waiver. 

IV.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant‟s motion to dismiss 

this action for lack of jurisdiction is GRANTED. The Clerk of the Court is directed to CLOSE 

this action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 19, 2016 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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