Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-00010/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-00010-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans w/ Disabilities Act (ADA)

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 Plaintiff brings this action under the name “Hollynn Delil.” See Delil Declaration. However, plaintiff

also uses the name “HolLynn D’Lil.” See Delil Decl., Ex. 1 (providing copy ofplaintiff’sresume). Defendants

also present evidence that plaintiff has filed lawsuits under both names. See Brown Decl., Exs. D, E. Plaintiff

provides no explanation for the variety of names used, even within her own declaration. 

2 The Point Reyes Seashore Lodge is a 23 room lodge in Olema, California. Construction began on

the lodge in 1987. 

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HOLLYNN DELIL,

Plaintiff,

 v.

POINT REYES SEASHORE LODGE; JEFFREY

F. HARRIMAN; and THOMAS R. HARRIMAN,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 03-00010 SI

ORDER AWARDING ATTORNEYS’ FEES

AND COSTS

Currently pending is plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs. Having carefully considered the

arguments of counsel and the papers submitted, the Court hereby GRANTS IN PART plaintiff’s motion and

awards fees and costs as set out below.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Hollynn Delil1is physically disabled and requires the use of a wheelchair. Plaintiff visited the

Point Reyes Seashore Lodge in Fall 2001.2 After this visit, plaintiff wrote a letter to defendants detailing

allegeddisabilityaccess barriers. Defendants responded to the letter, and made some of the changes suggested

by plaintiff. Plaintiff returned to the lodge on August 20, 2002. Plaintiff was not satisfied by the disability

access provided by defendants and the parties again exchanged letters. Plaintiff then filed suit in this Court in

January 2003, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the various California codes.

Case 3:03-cv-00010-SI Document 86 Filed 08/09/05 Page 1 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

Plaintiff requested injunctive relief, damages, and fees and costs. 

The parties conducted some discovery and extensive settlement negotiations. No dispositive motions

were filed by the parties and the Court dismissed the case on March 24, 2004, after the parties reached a

settlement. The parties were unable to agree on the issue of attorneys’ fees and costs, leaving plaintiff to file

the current motion.

DISCUSSION

1. Attorneys’ fees

Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs is brought under both federal and state law. The federal

authority to award attorneys' fees is derived in part fromSection 505 ofthe ADA, which provides that "in any

action or administrative proceeding commenced pursuant to [the ADA], the court or agency, in its discretion,

may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee, including litigation expenses, and costs." 42

U.S.C. § 12205. Plaintiffs are entitled to fees under the ADA using the "lodestar" measure of fees, which is

obtained bymultiplyingthe number ofhours reasonably expended on litigationby a reasonable hourly rate. See

Jordan v. Multnomah County, 815 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S.

424, 103 S. Ct. 1933 (1983)). In evaluating what is a reasonable number of hours, the Court must review

detailed time records to determine whether the hours claimed by the applicant were unnecessary, duplicative

or excessive. Chalmers v. City ofLos Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1210 (9th Cir. 1986), reh'g denied, amended

on other grounds, 808 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1987).

Plaintiffis also entitled to attorneys’ fees as the prevailing party under California law. Under California

Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5, plaintiff is entitled to attorneys’ fees for enforcing “an important right

affecting the public interest,” if a “significant benefit . . . has been conferred on the generalpublic or a large class

ofpersons.” Providing access to disabled individuals constitutes an important right affecting the public interest.

California Government Code § 19230. State law also establishes the lodestar method as the proper method

of calculation. Crommie v. State of California , 840 F.Supp. 719, 724-25 (N.D. Cal. 1994). 

Plaintiff requests an award of fees in the amount of $186,800 and costs of $14,300. Plaintiff also

requests an 2.0 multiplier to the lodestar amount, creating a totalrequested award for attorneys’ fees and costs

Case 3:03-cv-00010-SI Document 86 Filed 08/09/05 Page 2 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

of $387,500.

A. Plaintiff is entitled to attorneys’ fees as the prevailing party

Defendants dispute plaintiff’s entitlement to attorneys’ fees under the ADA and the California “private

attorney general” statute, claiming that plaintiff did not file her motion for fees in a timely fashion. Defendants

argue that the Court’s July 19, 2004 Order dismissing the case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

41(a)(1)(ii) was a final judgment or order. Defendants assert that plaintiff then had 14 days after the Court’s

July 2004 Order to file her motion for attorneys’ fees under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2).

However, plaintiff’s motion was not filed until November 23, 2004. Therefore, defendants argue that plaintiff

failed to comply with the timeliness requirements of Rule 54(d) and should not receive an award of fees.

Even if Rule 54 applies to the circumstances of this case, the Court finds that plaintiff’s motion was

timely. The rule provides that the motion for fees must be filed within 14 days of entry of judgment, “unless

otherwise provided by statute or order of the court.” The Court’s Order of July 19, 2004 stated that it would

retain jurisdiction over rendering a decision on any fees motion. The Order also stated that the parties were

to resolve the fees issue by negotiation if possible. Finally, the Court’s August 25, 2004 Order stated that

plaintiff could seek fees and costs through “a regularly scheduled motion.” 

The Court finds that the August 25, 2004 Order provided that plaintiff was not required to file her

motion for attorneys’ fees and costs within 14 days of the stipulated dismissal, given that the Order was issued

more than one month after the dismissal order. 

Defendants also argue thatplaintiffis notentitled to fees because she did notmake a reasonable attempt

to settle the dispute prior to litigation. Defendants assert that plaintiff must engage in a reasonable attempt to

settle her dispute prior to litigation, under Graham v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 34 Cal.4th 553 (2004).

However, Graham establishes this requirement only for plaintiffs asserting the “catalyst” theory forrecovery of

fees under CCP § 1021.5. The catalyst theory allows for the recovery of attorney fees “even when the

litigation does not result in a judicial resolution if the defendant changes its behavior substantially because of,

and in the manner sought by, the litigation.” Id. at 560.

The catalyst theory does not apply in this case, as plaintiff obtained a judicially enforceable settlement

Case 3:03-cv-00010-SI Document 86 Filed 08/09/05 Page 3 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3 This rate applies to work performed by Cohen in 2003-2005. Cohen’s hourly rate in 2002 was

$390, and he requests fees based on that rate for work performed in 2002.

4

that included monetary damages and injunctive relief against defendants. Therefore, plaintiff has a basis for

claiming to be the “prevailing party” other than “[her] being the catalyst ofpolicy change.” Barrios v. California

Interscholastic Federation, 277 F.3d 1128, 1134 n. 5 (9th Cir. 2002). Instead, the settlement agreement

establishes a “legally enforceable instrument” that makes her the “prevailing party.” Id.; see also Richard S.

v. Department ofDevelopmentalServices, 317 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2003). Therefore, the Court finds

that plaintiff is entitled to attorneys’ fees as the prevailing party in this action.

B. Hourly rate

Plaintiff requests the following hourly rates for counsel: $4203 for SidneyCohen; $395 for Paul Rein;

and $345 for Patricia Barbosa. Plaintiff also requests $125 an hour for paralegal Scott Holmes. In support

of her motion, plaintiff submits substantial evidence that the claimed fees are reasonable given the education,

skill and experience of counsel, the amount they normally charge fortheir legalservices and the marketrate for

attorneys of comparable skill and experience. See Cohen Decl. at ¶ 29; Rein Decl. at ¶ 38; Barbosa Decl. at

¶ 6-11; Pearl Decl. at 11. Defendants present no evidence that counsel’s rates are unreasonable. Therefore,

the Court finds that the hourly rates are reasonable. 

C. Reasonable hours expended

Plaintiffrequest an award compensating counsel for over 450 hours of attorney and paralegaltime and

assert that this time was reasonably spent on litigation. Defendants argue that the results could have been

achieved with significantly less work and request a drastic reduction in the number of hours factored into the

lodestar. 

i. Rein and Barbosa

Plaintiff seeks payment for over 80 hours of time spent by attorneys Rein and Barbosa. Defendants

argue that it was excessive for three lawyers to represent plaintiff in this matter. The Court agrees. The case

Case 3:03-cv-00010-SI Document 86 Filed 08/09/05 Page 4 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 4

 Most of Barbosa’s time entries also consist of “conferences” with co-counsel. 

5

was a typical ADA case that did not involve unique factual or legal issues. Plaintiff is well-versed in the state

and federal disability provisions and identified a number of violations in her multiple visits to the premises.

Therefore, liability was not in question during the litigation. Instead, the litigation consisted of a prolonged

settlement negotiation. This is demonstrated by the fact thatthe parties did notfile a single substantive motion

with the Court. 

Given this set of circumstances, it was unnecessary for Cohen to include additional attorneys in the

case. Cohen justifies his high hourly rate by citing his skills and experience in ADA cases. If Cohen is an

attorney worthy of such an hourly rate, then he should not require the assistance of additional attorneys to

handle such a straightforward case. In reviewing the time sheets submitted by Paul Rein, the Court finds that

many ofthe entries consist oftelephone calls with co-counselCohen. In other entries, Rein reviews documents

created by Cohen. Many of the tasks listed by Rein in his declaration demonstrate the repetitive nature of his

involvement. These tasks include countless references to “reviewing” the various documents in the case. Rein

Decl. at ¶ 6. Rein also gives a various descriptions to essentially the same activity – talking with Cohen – such

as: “meetings, braintrusting, [and] consulting with co-counsel”; “consultation” re: various topics; and “calls. .

. with co-counsel.” 

Given the straightforward nature of this case, the Court finds it was unnecessary for a well-qualified,

highly compensated lawyer such as Cohen to need another attorney to “consult” or “brainstorm” with. Cohen

is requesting compensation for over 350 hours of his own time on this case, which the Court findsis more than

sufficient to obtain the resultsin this case. Therefore, the Court will not award fees based on the time submitted

for Paul Rein, which the Court finds was unnecessary. 

For the same reasons, the Court will not award attorneys’ fees for the time of Patricia Barbosa.4 

ii. Cohen

Sidney Cohen served as lead counsel and requests an award for over 350 hours of his time spent

litigating the case. Defendants argue that plaintiff should not receive an award for fees after July 22, 2003

because “all legitimate issues were resolved” on that date. However, this statement is incorrect. As of July

Case 3:03-cv-00010-SI Document 86 Filed 08/09/05 Page 5 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

2003, several issues remained that were not resolved until the Settlement Agreement, including a lift for the

breakfast area, handrails, and a pathway to the Casa Olema Area. Compare Brown Decl., Ex. O with Cohen

Decl., Ex. 2. Therefore, the Court finds that it is proper to award fees for work performed after July 22, 2003.

Plaintiff produced the handwritten time sheets compiled by Cohen during the course of the litigation.,

which the Court has reviewed. See Cohen Decl., Ex. 3; Cohen Reply Decl., Ex. 1; and Supp. Cohen Decl.,

Ex. 1. The Court finds that the hours documented by Cohen are, although generous, not unreasonable.

Defendants presented a thorough, painstaking and often contentious defense, which required the parties to

engage in multiple mediations and other settlement negotiations and substantially extended the time required to

complete the case. Therefore, the Court will award attorneys’ fees for Cohen based on 367 hours reasonably

expended on litigation. 

2. Multiplier

Plaintiff also requests a multiplier of 2.0 to the lodestar amount because of the results obtained, the

importance of the case, and the contingent nature of plaintiff’s fees. Although federal law does not permit an

enhancement to the lodestar based on contingent risk, California law, by contrast, permitssuch enhancements

under state fee-shifting statutes. See, Ketchumv. Moses, 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1136-37 (2001); Serrano v. Priest,

20 Cal.3d 25 (1977). The Ninth Circuit has held that where plaintiffs succeed on both federal and state

statutory grounds, it is appropriate to enhance the lodestar fee with a multiple based on state law. Mangold

v. California Public Utilities Commission, 67 F.3d 1470, 1478 (9th Cir. 1995). In addition to contingent risk,

California law also allows courts to consider the results obtained and the importance ofthe case to plaintiff and

the public when determining if an enhancement to the lodestar amount is appropriate. Serrano, 20 Cal.3d at

48-49. 

The Court finds that an enhancement to the lodestar amount is not appropriate in this instance. As

described above, this was a straightforward disability case that did not require exceptional work on the part

of plaintiff’s counsel to obtain the Settlement Agreement reached by the parties. Liability was not in question

Case 3:03-cv-00010-SI Document 86 Filed 08/09/05 Page 6 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5 Plaintiff does not identify any contingent risk involved in the case, aside from stating that “[a]ll cases,

no matter how strong on the merits, run the risk of losing.” Pl.’s Mot. at 22. The Court finds that this is not

sufficient to warrant an enhancement.

7

in this case.5 Plaintiff and her counselare well-versed in disability law and repeat players in disability litigation.

There were no substantive motions filed, nor were there any novel legal issues. Therefore, the Court finds that

plaintiff should not receive an enhancement on the lodestar amount. 

3. Costs

Plaintiffrequests an award of$13,904 forcostsincurred byattorneyCohenduringlitigation(see Cohen

Decl., Ex. 5), and $396 for costs incurred by attorney Rein. The Court will not award costs for Rein, as he

presents no documentation in support of them. Defendants challenge the fees paid by Cohen for plaintiff’s

expert, claiming that all work after July 2003 was unnecessary. As described above, the Court finds that

plaintiff should receive compensation for fees and costs incurred after July 2003. Defendants also challenge

plaintiff’s use of a courier service to deliver documents to defense counsel. The Court finds that the use of a

courier service is appropriate and compensable. Therefore, the Court awards $13,904 in Cohen’s costs.

///

Case 3:03-cv-00010-SI Document 86 Filed 08/09/05 Page 7 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown, the Court hereby GRANTS IN PART plaintiff’s

motion for attorneys’ fees and costs:

1) Attorneys’ Fees for Sidney Cohen in the amount of $154,975:

• 2002: 14.1667 hours x $390/hour = $5,525

• 2003-05: 352 hours x $420/hour = $149,450

2) Costs in the amount of $13,904

[Docket # 58]

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 9, 2005 

 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

Case 3:03-cv-00010-SI Document 86 Filed 08/09/05 Page 8 of 8