Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01176/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01176-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL BARAKA MASON,

Petitioner, 

v.

DANIEL PARAMO, et al.,

Respondents. 

Case No.: 16cv1176-JLS-MDD

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED 

STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

RE: RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO 

DISMISS PETITION FOR WRIT 

OF HABEAS CORPUS

[ECF No. 18]

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States 

District Judge Janis L. Sammartino pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and 

Local Civil Rule 72.1(c) of the United States District Court for the Southern 

District of California.

For the reasons set forth herein, the Court RECOMMENDS that 

Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED IN PART.

//

//

//

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I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Federal Proceedings

On May 11, 2016, Michael Baraka Mason (“Petitioner”), a state 

prisoner, constructively filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in this district. (ECF No. 1). Petitioner challenges his 

conviction on two grounds: (1) the trial court erred in admitting the 

preliminary hearing testimony of Hana Jabbar at trial; and (2) Petitioner 

received ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to 

challenge the trial court’s decision to permit the guilty verdict to stand and 

the case to proceed to sentencing when Juror 4 expressed she had reasonable 

doubt after the verdict was given. (Id. at 12-13). 1

On October 25, 2016, Respondent Paramo (“Respondent”)

2 filed a 

Motion to Dismiss the Petition, a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 

support and lodgments. (ECF Nos. 18, 19). Petitioner filed an opposition on 

January 13, 2017. (ECF No. 25). In his opposition, Petitioner requests that 

the Court stay the case pending exhaustion of ground two of the Petition, or 

in the alternative, to dismiss only ground two. (Id. at 8).

B. State Court Proceedings 

On November 7, 2012, a jury convicted Petitioner of: (1) three counts of 

first degree murder and found true the special circumstances of robberymurder and multiple murders as to each; (2) one count of attempted murder; 

(3) two counts of attempted robbery; (4) one count of burglary; (5) five counts 

 

1 All pincite page references refer to the automatically generated ECF page 

number, not the page number in the original document.

2 Respondent Kamala Harris has not yet appeared in this action. (See 

Docket). For purposes of this Report and Recommendation “Respondent” will 

refer to Respondent Paramo only.

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of false imprisonment by violence; (6) one count of assault with a firearm; (7) 

two counts of shooting at an inhabited dwelling; and (8) four counts of 

possession of a firearm by a felon. (Lodg. No. 2-6 at 1465-502). The jury also 

found true several gang and firearms-related sentencing enhancements and 

Petitioner admitted two prior serious felony convictions and three “strike 

priors.” (Id.). On April 4, 2013, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to nine 

consecutive terms of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, an 

indeterminate term of 337 years and six months to life imprisonment, plus an 

additional 110 years. (Lodg. Nos. 2-7 at 1777-85; 1-49 at 7969-70).

On April 11, 2013, Petitioner constructively filed a Notice of Appeal. 

(Lodg. No. 2-7 at 1785). Petitioner argued: (1) the trial court erroneously 

admitted the prior testimony of Hana Jabbar; (2) the trial court erroneously 

admitted the out-of-court statements of informant Marquis Veal recounting 

statements made by Petitioner’s accomplice; (3) the evidence does not support 

Petitioner’s multiple convictions for possession of the same firearm on 

different days because that crime is a single, continuous offense; and (4) the 

life imprisonment without parole sentences should not have been tripled 

under the Three Strikes law. (Lodg. Nos. 3 at 32-79; 6 at 3). The state 

appellate court reversed all but one of Petitioner’s possession of a firearm 

convictions, modified the judgment to reflect a total of three life sentences 

without the possibility of parole and affirmed the judgment in all other 

respects. (Lodg. No. 6 at 13-30).

On January 14, 2015, Petitioner filed a Petition for Review in the 

California Supreme Court, arguing the trial court erroneously: (1) admitted 

the prior testimony of Hana Jabbar; and (2) admitted the out-of-court 

statements of informant Marquis Veal recounting statements made by

Petitioner’s accomplice. (Lodg. No. 7 at 3-23). On March 11, 2015, the 

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California Supreme Court denied the Petition for Review. (Lodg. No. 8).

II. SCOPE OF REVIEW

This Petition is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), which provides the 

scope of review for federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district 

court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in 

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State 

court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the 

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2006 & Supp. 2016).

III. DISCUSSION

Respondent contends that the entire Petition should be dismissed 

because ground two of the Petition is unexhausted and untimely. (See ECF 

No. 18). Respondent acknowledges that ground one of the Petition is both 

exhausted and timely, but asserts that petitions with both exhausted and 

unexhausted claims must be dismissed. (Id. at 9).

Petitioner concedes that ground two of the Petition is unexhausted, but 

argues that the Court should stay the Petition and allow Petitioner to return 

to state court to exhaust ground two, or in the alternative, allow Petitioner to 

amend the Petition to proceed only on the first ground. (ECF No. 25 at 1, 8). 

Petitioner also asserts that the Petition is timely. (Id. at 6-8). 

A. Statute of Limitations

The AEDPA imposes a one-year statute of limitations on federal 

petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners after April 24, 

1996. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (2006 & Supp. 2016). The one-year statute of 

limitations period applies to all habeas petitions filed by persons “in custody 

pursuant to the judgment of a State court.” Id. at § 2244(d)(1). The one-year 

limitation period begins to run from the latest of:

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(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion 

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such 

review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application 

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of 

the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from 

filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially 

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly 

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable 

to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due 

diligence.

Id. at § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D). The period of direct review in § 2244(d)(1)(A) 

includes the ninety-day period within which a petitioner can file a petition for 

a writ of certiorari regardless of whether the petitioner seeks such review. 

Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 1999). “AEDPA’s one-year 

statute of limitations begins to run on the date the ninety-day period . . . 

expires.” Id. at 1159. 

On March 11, 2015, the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s 

petition for review. (Lodg. No. 8). Petitioner did not file a writ of certiorari. 

Thus, the statute of limitations under AEDPA began to run on June 9, 2015 

(ninety-days after the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition 

for review), and expired on June 9, 2016. The instant action was 

constructively filed on May 11, 2016 – just under one month before the 

statute of limitations expired. Thus, the Petition is timely.

B. Exhaustion and the Stay and Abeyance Procedure

Habeas petitioners who wish to challenge their state court conviction or 

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the length of their confinement in state prison must first exhaust state 

judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)-(c); Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 

133-34 (1987) (“[A]s a matter of [federal-state] comity, federal courts should 

not consider a claim in a habeas corpus petition until after the state courts 

have had an opportunity to act.”) (citing Ex Parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 251 

(1886)). Petitioner and Respondents agree that ground two of the federal 

petition is unexhausted and that the Petition is “mixed.” See Rose v. Lundy, 

455 U.S. 509, 510 (1982); (See also ECF Nos. 1, 18, 25). The Court cannot 

adjudicate the merits of a habeas petition containing any claim as to which 

state remedies have not been exhausted. See id. at 522; 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(b)(2) (petition may be denied, but not granted, notwithstanding failure 

to exhaust). The Court can either dismiss a mixed petition in its entirety or 

grant a stay. Rose, 455 U.S. at 510; Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277-78 

(2005); Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2002). A stay may be 

appropriate under either Kelly or Rhines. See Rhines, 544 U.S. 269; see also 

Kelly, 315 F.3d 1063.

1. Stay Pursuant to Kelly

Kelly permits a district court to dismiss unexhausted claims and stay 

the remaining claims pending exhaustion of the dismissed claims. Kelly, 315 

F.3d at 1070-71. The petitioner must seek to add the dismissed claims back 

in through amendment after exhausting them in state court before the 

AEDPA statute of limitations expires. King v. Ryan, 564 F.3d 1133, 1138-41 

(9th Cir. 2009).

As discussed above, the statute of limitations expired on June 9, 2016 –

about eight months ago. Because a federal habeas petition does not toll the 

limitations period, a stay pursuant to Kelly would preclude Petitioner from 

seeking habeas review for ground two in this Court as being untimely, unless

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Petitioner is entitled to statutory or equitable tolling, or ground two “relates 

back” to ground one. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 181-82 (2001); 

Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 659 (2005).

a. Tolling

Respondent argues that while the Petition itself is timely, ground two is 

not and Petitioner is neither entitled to statutory nor equitable tolling. (ECF 

No. 18 at 10-13). Petitioner does not address the issue of tolling the statute 

of limitations. (See ECF No. 25).

AEDPA tolls its limitations period for the “time during which a properly 

filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review . . . is 

pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1005 (9th 

Cir. 1999) (overruled on other grounds by Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 

1053 (9th Cir. 2008)). Petitioner did not seek state post-conviction relief or 

other collateral review. (ECF No. 18 at 11; Lodg. No. 10). As such, Petitioner 

is not entitled to statutory tolling. (ECF No. 18 at 11; Lodg. No. 10).

AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations is also subject to equitable 

tolling in appropriate cases. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010). 

Equitable tolling is appropriate where a habeas petitioner demonstrates: “(1) 

that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some 

extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Id. at 649. In this case, 

Petitioner did not argue that he is entitled to equitable tolling, and nothing in 

the record indicates that he is entitled to equitable tolling. (See ECF No. 25 

at 5). Accordingly, the Court finds that the statute of limitations expired on 

June 9, 2016 and is not subject to statutory or equitable tolling. Under a 

Kelly stay, ground two of the Petition would be time-barred unless Petitioner 

can show that ground two relates back to his only other ground for relief.

//

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b. Relation Back

“An amended habeas petition does not relate back (and thereby escape 

AEDPA’s one-year time-limit) when it asserts a new ground for relief 

supported by facts that differ in both time and type from those the original 

pleading set forth.” Mayle, 545 U.S. at 650. A claim relates back when it 

shares a “common core of operative facts” with a timely claim. Id. at 659. A 

claim does not relate back to an existing claim simply because it arises from 

“the same trial, conviction or sentence.” Id. at 663-64. 

Here, Petitioner’s first ground for relief concerns the trial court’s 

admission of the prior testimony of a victim and ground two concerns 

counsel’s ineffective assistance in failing to challenge the trial court’s decision 

to permit the guilty verdict to stand where a juror expressed reasonable 

doubt after conviction. (ECF No. 1 at 12-13). Ground two of the petition does 

not relate back to ground one because the claims do not share a “common core 

of operative facts.” See Mayle, 545 U.S. at 659.

c. Conclusion

As discussed herein, while the Petition itself is timely, ground two of 

the Petition is unexhausted. Dismissing ground two and staying ground one 

of the Petition under Kelly would be futile because the statute of limitations 

already expired and Petitioner is not entitled to toll the limitations period or 

to relate his unexhausted claim back to ground one of the Petition. Thus, this 

Court declines to permit a stay pursuant to Kelly.

2. Stay Pursuant to Rhines

Rhines permits a district court to stay a mixed petition in its entirety. 

King, 564 F.3d at 1139-40. To stay the entire mixed petition without 

dismissing unexhausted claims, the petitioner must show good cause for 

failing to exhaust the claims in state court before filing the federal petition 

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and that the unexhausted claims are not “plainly meritless.” Rhines, 544 

U.S. at 277-78. A stay under Rhines is inappropriate where the petitioner 

has engaged in “abusive litigation tactics or intentional delay.” Id.

a. Good Cause

The first factor in the Rhines analysis is whether Petitioner has 

demonstrated good cause for failing to raise his unexhausted claim in state 

court. Petitioner argues that he has good cause because his post-conviction 

counsel provided ineffective assistance when he failed to raise ground two of 

the federal Petition at trial, on appeal, or in a state habeas petition even 

though the claim was apparent from the record and is potentially 

meritorious. (ECF No. 25 at 5) Petitioner also argues he was “reasonably 

confused” and “was unaware of his counsel’s failure to exhaust” ground two. 

(Id.).

The Supreme Court has not precisely articulated what constitutes “good 

cause” for purposes of granting a stay under Rhines. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 

544 U.S. 408, 416 (2005). The Ninth Circuit has held that ineffective 

assistance “by post-conviction counsel can be good cause for a Rhines stay,” 

where a petitioner’s showing of good cause is not a bare allegation of 

ineffective assistance of counsel, but a concrete and reasonable excuse, which 

is supported by evidence that his state post-conviction counsel failed to 

discover, investigate and present to the state courts. Blake v. Baker, 745 

F.3d 977, 983 (9th Cir. 2014). In Blake, the Ninth Circuit held:

The good cause element is the equitable component of the Rhines

test. It ensures that a stay and abeyance is available only to those 

petitioners who have a legitimate reason for failing to exhaust a 

claim in state court. As such, good cause turns on whether the 

petitioner can set forth a reasonable excuse, supported by sufficient 

evidence, to justify that failure. An assertion of good cause without 

evidentiary support will not typically amount to a reasonable 

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excuse justifying a petitioner’s failure to exhaust.

Id. at 982. To show good cause based on ineffective assistance of appellate 

counsel, therefore, Petitioner must provide a “concrete and reasonable” 

excuse and make more than a bare allegation that counsel acted 

unreasonably and that those actions prejudiced him. Id. at 983; see 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (providing the standard 

for ineffective assistance of counsel).

Petitioner focuses on circumstantial evidence showing that “counsel

[failed] to raise any issues regarding Juror 4 [which shows] counsel’s 

ineffective assistance [and] demonstrates good cause for failing to exhaust his 

claim.” (ECF No. 25 at 5). In his Petition, Petitioner attaches a Reporter’s 

Transcript where Juror 4 expressed she had “reasonable doubt . . . on certain 

accounts” after the guilt phase and during the penalty phase of the trial. 

(ECF No. 1 at 104). The record reflects that the trial judge asked Juror 4 

why she did not express her reasonable doubt when he polled the jury. (ECF 

No. 1 at 104-05). Juror 4 stated she had “basically overcome the doubt that 

[she] had. And it continued to come up in [her] mind [after the verdicts were 

returned and during the intervening time.]” (Id. at 105). Juror 4 then stated 

that at the time the verdict was given, she supported the verdict and it was 

her verdict, but that she still wanted to speak privately with the judge to 

discuss “very specific” allegations or charges. (Id. at 106). The trial judge 

asked whether Juror 4 understood what reasonable doubt means and

whether she had done outside research. (Id. at 105-06). Juror 4 explained 

she understood what reasonable doubt means and that she had not done 

outside research. (Id.). The trial judge then explained that speaking 

privately with Juror 4 would be inappropriate and indicated that nothing 

Juror 4 said raised issues regarding juror misconduct. (Id.). 

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In response to Juror 4’s statement, Petitioner’s trial counsel requested 

“the jury be directed to return to the jury room and reopen their deliberations 

concerning issues in the guilt phase,” or in the alternative, requested a 

mistrial. (Id. at 157). The People requested the court determine whether 

Juror 4 should be excused for cause. (Id. at 169). On November 16, 2012, 

the court permitted oral argument on the issues and ultimately concluded

that “[t]here is nothing to correct at the present time. Those verdicts were 

polled and recorded. The fact she has now had some buyer’s remorse, as 

suggested, that opens a pandora’s box for incredible mischief.” (Id. at 170). 

The court did not reopen jury deliberations, did not grant a mistrial and did 

not excuse Juror 4 for cause. (Id. at 127-176). Contrary to Petitioner’s 

argument, the record shows that trial counsel did address the issue regarding 

Juror 4 by moving for a mistrial and moving to reopen jury deliberations. 

(Id.; see ECF No. 25 at 5).

The record supports Petitioner’s argument that appellate counsel failed 

to raise any issues regarding Juror 4. (ECF No. 25 at 5; Lodg. Nos. 3, 5, 7). 

Appellate counsel did not include this claim in the appellate brief, reply brief 

or the petition for review in the California Supreme Court, despite the fact 

that the Reporter’s Transcript includes approximately 65 pages on the issue. 

(Lodg. Nos. 3, 7; ECF No. 1 at 99-122, 127-152, 157-176). Petitioner has also 

shown that he relied upon the assurances of his trial and appellate counsel 

that they would raise any necessary claims for him. (See ECF No. 1 at 13) 

(indicating that Petitioner thought his attorney raised this issue in his 

Petition for Review).3 Petitioner has made a sufficient showing that his 

 

3 Any argument that good cause cannot be predicated on Petitioner’s 

mistaken belief that counsel raised the issues is inapplicable. While Wooten 

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appellate attorney may have acted unreasonably because he had notice of the 

juror claim and failed to exhaust the claim by presenting it to the state’s 

highest court. 

In his opposition, Petitioner argues that Juror 4’s statement indicates 

that the jury’s verdict was not unanimous and appellate counsel provided

ineffective assistance by failing to raise that issue on appeal or through a 

state habeas petition. (ECF No. 25 at 5; see ECF No. 1 at 13). Petitioner 

asserts that the juror issue is clear from the record and there was no reason 

for counsel’s failure to raise these claims in the appeal, in the petition for 

review before the California Supreme Court, or in a state habeas petition. 

(See ECF No. 25).

The Court finds Petitioner has not adequately shown ineffective 

assistance of counsel for purposes of a Rhines stay because Petitioner has not 

made a well-argued claim of unanimous jury infringement or juror 

misconduct. Petitioner’s case might be the type of “capital” case requiring a 

unanimous jury verdict – even though he was tried in bifurcated guilt and 

penalty proceedings and was ultimately not sentenced to death. Cf. People v. 

Collins, 17 Cal. 3d 687, 693 (1976) (California law requires unanimous jury 

verdict in criminal cases) with Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 634 n.5 (“a 

state criminal defendant, at least in noncapital cases, has no federal right to 

 

v. Kirkland held that the petitioner did not show good cause by arguing he 

was “under the impression” that his counsel raised all claims before the state 

court of appeal, the Court specifically noted that the petitioner did not 

attempt to establish ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Wooten v. 

Kirkland, 540 F.3d 1019, 1024 n.2. As a result, Petitioner’s “reasonable 

confusion” as to whether ground two was exhausted does not preclude a stay 

under Rhines. (See ECF No. 25 at 5).

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a unanimous jury verdict”); (See Lodg. No. 2-7 at 1701; Lodg. No. 1-49 at 

7966-70). Even if a unanimous jury is constitutionally required, there was a 

unanimous jury verdict and, when individually polled, no juror expressed any 

equivocation or hesitation regarding the verdict. (Lodg. No. 1-48 at 7915-30). 

Specifically, the Court asked “Juror No. 4, were these and are these your 

personal verdicts as read by the court?” (Id. at 7929). Juror 4 responded 

“yes.” (Id.). Additionally, Juror 4 told the court that she overcame her 

reasonable doubt before giving the verdict. (ECF No. 1 at 105). Accordingly, 

no right to a unanimous jury verdict was infringed in this case. Leon v. Cate, 

617 Fed. App’x 783, 783 (9th Cir. 2015) (“The jury returned a verdict, the 

clerk read it in open court, the jury collectively affirmed it without dissent, 

and it was recorded. . . . [T]he validity of the verdict was not subject to attack 

at that point unless [the petitioner] established that the jury committed prior 

misconduct in reaching the verdict.”); see Fuentes v. Adams, No. SA CV 06-

182-GW (CW), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180156, at *47-48 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 

2015) (A Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, which found no 

infringement of a unanimous jury verdict where the record showed that all 

jurors had been pooled and supported the verdict); see also Fuentes v. Adams, 

No. SA CV 06-182-GW (CW), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98346 (adopting the 

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation). 

A unanimous verdict may still be attacked if the verdict was subject to 

juror misconduct prior to reaching the verdict. Leon, 617 Fed. App’x at 783. 

Thus, the Court must consider whether the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of

the right to a “fair trial by a panel of impartial, ‘indifferent’ jurors” to 

criminal defendants was infringed when Juror 4 expressed reasonable doubt 

after conviction. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961); see Dyer v. 

Calderon, 151 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 1998). 

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“If only one juror is unduly biased or prejudiced or improperly 

influenced, the criminal defendant is denied his Sixth Amendment right to an 

impartial panel.” United States v. Hendrix, 549 F.2d 1225, 1227 (9th Cir. 

1997). In the event of a jury misconduct or juror bias allegation, the court 

should hold a hearing with all interested parties. See Remmer v. United 

States, 347 U.S. 227, 229-30 (1954); see also Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 

216-17 (1982). However, the “near-universal and firmly established commonlaw rule in the United States flatly prohibit[s]” the admission of juror 

testimony to impeach a verdict except where “an extraneous influence” 

affected the verdict. Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 117 (1983) 

(citations omitted); see also McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 269 (1915) 

(generally, jurors may not impeach their own verdict). Both the Federal 

Rules of Evidence and the California Evidence Code prohibit the use of juror 

testimony to impeach a verdict when testimony relates to the internal mental 

process of the verdict. See FED. R. EVID. 606(b); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1150(a).

The Court finds that there was no evidence of juror misconduct in this 

case. Juror 4’s expression of reasonable doubt about specific allegations or 

charges after the verdict was given concerns her thought process and the 

jury’s internal deliberations, as opposed to testimony regarding extrinsic 

influence or juror bias, which is “flatly prohibited” to impeach the jury’s 

verdict. See Tanner, 483 U.S. at 117. Thus, Juror 4’s statement does not 

constitute grounds for reversal of the verdict. See Panella v. Marshall, 434 

Fed. App’x 603, 605 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Franklin v. McEwen, No. SACV 

12-1514-DDP (OP), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180861, at *46-50 (C.D. Cal Sept. 

26, 2013) (finding a juror’s post-verdict statement apologizing for voting to 

convict the petitioner and explaining “that ‘most of the jurors wanted to give 

defendant not guilty”’ insufficient to reverse the verdict).

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Because Petitioner’s right to a unanimous jury was not infringed and 

there was no juror misconduct, any deficiency in failing to raise these issues 

on appeal or in state post-conviction applications for collateral relief were not 

prejudicial under Strickland v. Washington. This is inadequate to show 

ineffective assistance of counsel for purposes of a Rhines stay. 

b. Merit of Petitioner’s Claim

For the reasons set forth in the previous section, this Court finds that 

Petitioner’s claim is not potentially meritorious. See Rhines, 544 U.S. at 278 

(stating that petitioner is entitled to a stay if “his unexhausted claims are 

potentially meritorious”). Petitioner cannot succeed on an ineffective 

assistance claim if the alleged deficiency – failing to raise any issue regarding 

Juror 4 – would not have prejudiced him. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692 

(stating that counsel’s alleged deficiencies must have prejudiced the client to 

prove ineffective assistance of counsel). Petitioner was not prejudiced 

because, as discussed above, the right to a unanimous jury was not infringed 

and there was no juror misconduct.

c. Abusive Litigation Tactics or Intentional Delay

The final consideration under Rhines is whether Petitioner’s failure to 

exhaust is a result of intentionally dilatory litigation tactics. Rhines, 544 

U.S. at 278. Respondent does not argue that Petitioner engaged in abusive 

litigation tactics or intentional delay and there is no indication in the record 

before this Court that Petitioner failed to exhaust for the purpose of delaying 

these proceedings. (See ECF No. 18). Accordingly, Petitioner satisfies the 

third Rhines consideration.

d. Conclusion

Petitioner has not adequately shown good cause for failing to exhaust 

ground two of his Petition nor that ground two is potentially meritorious. 

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Thus, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court find Petitioner has not 

demonstrated the good cause required under Rhines to warrant a stay of 

Petitioner’s only exhausted claim while Petitioner returns to state court to 

exhaust ground two of his Petition.4 However, the Court finds it 

inappropriate to dismiss the entire Petition. Accordingly, IT IS FURTHER 

RECOMMENDED that the Court GRANT IN PART Respondents’ motion 

to dismiss by dismissing only ground two of the Petition.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the 

District Court issue an Order: (1) Approving and Adopting this Report and 

Recommendation; (2) GRANTING IN PART Respondents’ Motion to 

Dismiss; and (3) DISMISSING ground two of the Petition with prejudice.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any written objections to this Report 

must be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than 

February 28, 2017. The document should be captioned “Objections to 

Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be 

filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than March 7, 2017. 

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time 

 

4 The Court recognizes the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Dixon v. Baker, -

F.3d -, No. 14-1664 (9th Cir. Feb. 2, 2017), which found that a state prisoner 

who did not have post-conviction counsel has shown “good cause” for a failure 

to exhaust state court remedies in connection to an unexhausted ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel claim due to his pro se status. Dixon is 

inapplicable to the instant case because Petitioner was represented by 

counsel in all post-conviction proceedings, with exception to the filing of the

instant federal Petition. Petitioner obtained representation in this case on

December 7, 2016. (ECF No. 20).

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may result in a waiver of the right to raise those objections on appeal of the 

Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); see 

also Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 6, 2017

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