Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01068/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01068-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Sergio Amaro Perez,

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Glenn Bell, et al.,

Defendants. 

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No. CV 11-1068-PHX-RCB (SPL)

ORDER

Plaintiff Sergio Amaro Perez brought this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

against two Mesa police officers, Glenn Bell and Ryan Park (Doc. 9). Before the Court is

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss on statute-of-limitations grounds (Doc. 15). Plaintiff did not

respond to the motion.

The Court will grant the motion and dismiss the action.

I. Background

Plaintiff’s claim stems from his arrest on February 24, 2009 (Doc. 9). He alleged that

Defendants ordered him to get on the ground and, as Plaintiff was complying with the order,

Defendants threw him to the ground very hard, and Bell slammed his knee into Plaintiff’s

back (id.). Plaintiff averred that after he was handcuffed and picked up, he was unable to

walk due to pain, and Park again threw Plaintiff to the ground. Plaintiff stated that

Defendants took him to the jail, but at some point, he was taken to the Maricopa County

Case 2:11-cv-01068-RCB Document 22 Filed 05/01/12 Page 1 of 4
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Hospital where his injuries were confirmed (id.). Plaintiff asserted that he at no time

struggled or resisted Defendants and that they used objectively unreasonable force against

him. According to Plaintiff, he suffered severe nerve damage, lower lumbar separation, and

back pain as a result (id.).

Defendants now move to dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint on the ground

that the claim against them is barred by the statute of limitations (Doc. 20). Defendants

contend that Plaintiff’s claim accrued the date of his arrest—February 24, 2009—because

he was immediately aware of his injury and who caused it (id. at 2). They submit that

because he did not file his initial complaint until May 27, 2011, more than two years later,

his claim is time-barred (id. at 1-2).

The Court issued an Order notifying Plaintiff of his obligation to respond to

Defendants’ motion and of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure governing motion practice

(Doc. 17). In lieu of a response, Plaintiff filed a motion seeking appointment of counsel and

a three-month continuance so that he could obtain counsel to help him through the legal

process (Doc. 18). On April 9, 2012, the Court denied Plaintiff’s motion, finding no

exceptional circumstances for appointment of counsel and no good cause for an extension

(Doc. 20).

To date, Plaintiff has not filed a response to Defendants’ motion. The time for

responding has expired, and the motion is ready for ruling. 

II. Statute of Limitations 

A. Legal Standard 

A statute-of-limitations defense may be raised in a motion under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6) if the running of the statute is apparent on the face of the complaint.

Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 1980). When considering a motion

to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), courts must “accept as true the facts alleged in the

complaint,” Zimmerman v. Or. Dep’t of Justice, 170 F.3d 1169, 1171 (9th Cir. 1999), and

“must draw inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Barker v. Riverside

County Office of Ed., 584 F.3d 821, 824 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). 

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Federal courts borrow state statutes of limitations for personal injury actions in § 1983

suits. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007); Lukovsky v. City of S.F., 535 F.3d

1044, 1048 (9th Cir. 2008). Under Arizona law, a claimant has two years to raise a personal

injury claim before the statute of limitations runs. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-542. Federal law

determines when a cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run for a

§ 1983 claim. Lukovsky, 353 F.3d at 1048. Under federal law, a claim accrues “when the

plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.” Id.

(quotation omitted).

The Court must also apply any state rule for tolling to actions brought under § 1983.

See Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 544 (1989); Johnson v. State of Cal., 207 F.3d 650, 653

(9th Cir. 2000); TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 992 (9th Cir. 1999). Under Arizona law,

the limitation period is tolled during mandatory exhaustion of administrative remedies. See

Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue v. Dougherty, 29 P.3d 862, 869 (Ariz. 2001); see also Brown v.

Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 243 (9th Cir. 2005) (“the applicable statute of limitations must be

tolled while a prisoner completes the mandatory exhaustion process”).

B. Analysis

Plaintiff’s excessive-force claim accrued on February 24, 2009—the date he was

allegedly assaulted and injured by Defendants (Doc. 9 at 3). See Cabrera v. City of

Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 380-81 (9th Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (finding that excessive

force claim accrued on the date of the arrest and assault). As Plaintiff averred in his First

Amended Complaint, because the alleged excessive force occurred during his arrest and prior

to any incarceration, there was no requirement to exhaust remedies (Doc. 9 at 3). Thus, there

is no tolling of the statute of limitations, and it expired two years after Plaintiff’s arrest on

February 24, 2011. The docket reflects that Plaintiff did not file this lawsuit until May 25,

2011 (Doc. 1 at 6). See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270-72 (1988) (pro se prisoner filing

is dated from the date a prisoner hands it to a prison official for mailing); Douglas v. Noelle,

567 F.3d 1103, 1109 (9th Cir. 2009) (the Houston mailbox rule applies to pro se prisoner

§ 1983 complaints). 

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Although Plaintiff acknowledges in his motion for appointment of counsel that he

received a copy of the motion to dismiss, he failed to file a response to the statute-oflimitations argument. Plaintiff was specifically notified that failure to respond “may in the

discretion of the Court be deemed a consent to the granting of that Motion” (Doc. 17 at 2).

See LRCiv 7.2(i).

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s excessive-force claim is time-barred, and

Defendants’ motion will be granted. See Cervantes v. City of San Diego, 5 F.3d 1273, 1276-

77 (9th Cir. 1993) (where the running of the statute of limitation is apparent on the face of

the complaint, dismissal for failure to state a claim is proper). 

IT IS ORDERED:

(1) The reference to the Magistrate Judge is withdrawn as to Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss (Doc. 15), and the Motion is granted.

(2) The Clerk of Court must enter judgment of dismissal accordingly.

(3) For the reasons set forth herein, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), an appeal

from the judgment in this action would not be taken in good faith.

DATED this 1st day of May, 2012.

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