Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00949/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00949-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANDREW A. CEJAS, 

CDCR #F-34368, Civil No. 15cv0949 WQH (MDD)

Plaintiff, ORDER:

1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTIONS TO PROCEED 

IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

[ECF Nos. 3, 7]

2) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF

TIME AS MOOT

[ECF No. 5]

AND

3) DIRECTING U.S. MARSHAL

TO EFFECT SERVICE OF

SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT

PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) AND 

FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(3)

 vs.

R. BROWN, Community Resource

Manager; W.O. BROWN, Chaplain; 

F. HADJADJ, Chaplain/Rabbi; 

K. SEIBEL, Chief Deputy Associate

Warden; G. MURPHY, Appeals

Examiner; R.L. BRIGGS, Office of

Appeals Chief,

Defendants.

HAYES, Judge:

Currently before the Court is a civil rights Complaint (“Compl.”) filed pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Andrew A. Cejas (“Plaintiff”), a prisoner proceeding pro se and

currently incarcerated at Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”), in San Diego 

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California. Also pending are Plaintiff’s Motions to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”)

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF Nos. 3, 7), and an interim Motion to Extend Time

in order to provide the prison trust account statements required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2)

(ECF No. 5). 

I. Plaintiff’s Motions to Proceed IFP 

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee. See

28 U.S.C. § 1914(a).1

 An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to prepay the

entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See

Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, if the plaintiff is a

prisoner and he is granted leave to proceed IFP, he remains obligated to pay the full entire

fee in “increments,” see Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015),

regardless of whether his action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) &

(2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act

(“PLRA”), prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP must submit a “certified copy of the

trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for the . . . six-month period

immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); Andrews v.

King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified trust account statement, the

Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits in the

account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly balance in the account for the

past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having custody of the prisoner then

collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding month’s income, in any 

/ / /

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 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative fee of $50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of

Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2014). The additional $50 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to proceed IFP. Id.

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month in which the prisoner’s account exceeds $10, and forwards those payments to the

Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

Plaintiff’s first Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 3), did not include a certified copy

of his prison trust account statements; therefore, on July 13, 2015, he submitted a Motion

requesting as extension of time in which to obtain them (ECF No. 5). Before the Court

could rule on that request, however, Plaintiff filed a second Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF

No. 7), which included the accounting required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and S.D.CAL.

CIV LR 3.2. Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119. Therefore, his request for extension of time is

now moot.

The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s trust account activity, and it shows that he has

carried no monthly balance and has had no monthly deposits to his account over the sixmonth period preceding the filing of his Complaint. Consequently, Plaintiff had an

available balance of zero in his account at the time his second Motion to Proceed IFP was

filed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be

prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment

for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay [an] initial

partial filing fee.”); Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as

a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure

to pay . . . due to the lack of funds available.”). 

Therefore, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Extension of Time as moot

(ECF No. 5), GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motions to Proceed IFP (ECF Nos. 3, 7) and assesses

no initial partial filing fee per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). However, the entire $350 balance

of the filing fee owed must be collected and forwarded to the Clerk of the Court pursuant

to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

II. Initial Screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A

A. Standard of Review

Notwithstanding Plaintiff’s IFP status or the payment of any filing fees, the PLRA

also requires the Court to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP and by

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those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused of,

sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or

conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as

practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under these

statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss any complaint, or any portion of a complaint,

which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants

who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b); Lopez v. Smith, 203

F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (describing § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v.

Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).

All complaints must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that

the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED.R.CIV.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “Determining whether

a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires

the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere

possibility of misconduct” falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.; see also

Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). 

“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their

veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000)

(“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to

the plaintiff.”); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that

§ 1915(e)(2) “parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”).

However, while the court “ha[s] an obligation where the petitioner is pro se, particularly

in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the

benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing

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Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)), it may not “supply essential

elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board of Regents of the University

of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

B. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff contends that he is a “sincere practitioner of the Buddhist faith,” and that

RJD’s Chief Deputy Associate Warden Seibel, Community Resource Manager R. Brown,

Chaplain W.O. Brown, and Chaplain/Rabbi F. Hadjaj, have violated his First Amendment

right to free exercise of religion, his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection, and

his rights pursuant to the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act

(“RLUIPA”) 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc, by failing to provide him “adequate accommodations”

necessary to properly practice his faith, including access to a chaplain. See Compl. (ECF

No. 1) at 8, 21 ¶¶ 1, 33. Plaintiff further contends Defendants Murphy and Briggs, who

denied his administrative appeal at the third level of review regarding the lack of religious

accommodation at RJD, were responsible for “enforcement of policies,” and in “a

position to correct the prison[’s] decisions,” but failed to “prevent the ongoing ...

violations.” Id. at 12 ¶ 7. Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as

nominal, presumed, and punitive damages. Id. at 33-34.

As currently pled, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Complaint contains claims sufficient

to survive the “low threshold” for proceeding past the sua sponte screening required by

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b).2 See Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1123

(9th Cir. 2012); Hartmann v. Cal. Dept. of Corr. and Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1122-25

(9th Cir. 2013) (discussing pleading required for prisoner’s RLUIPA, First, and

Fourteenth Amendment claims).

Accordingly, the Court will direct the U.S. Marshal to effect service upon the

Defendants on Plaintiff’s behalf. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“The officers of the court shall

2

 Plaintiff is cautioned that “the sua sponte screening and dismissal procedure is cumulative of, and not a substitute for, any subsequent Rule 12(b)(6) motion that [a defendant] may choose to bring.” Teahan v. Wilhelm, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1119 (S.D. Cal. 2007).

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issue and serve all process, and perform all duties in [IFP] cases.”); FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(3)

(“[T]he court may order that service be made by a United States marshal or deputy

marshal . . . if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915.”).

III. Conclusion and Orders

 Good cause appearing, the Court: 

1. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motions to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a) (ECF Nos. 3, 7).

2. DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Extension of Time (ECF No. 5) as moot; 

3. DIRECTS the Secretary of the CDCR, or his designee, to collect from

Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 filing fee owed in this case by garnishing

monthly payments from his account in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the

preceding month’s income and forwarding those payments to the Clerk of the Court each

time the amount in the account exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL

PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER

ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

4. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on Jeffrey

A. Beard, Secretary, CDCR, P.O. Box 942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-0001.

5. ORDERS the U.S. Marshal to serve a copy of the Complaint and summons

upon Defendants as directed by Plaintiff on the USM Form 285s provided to him. All

costs of that service will be advanced by the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d);

FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(3).

 6. DIRECTS the Clerk to issue a summons as to Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF

No. 1) upon Defendants and forward it to Plaintiff along with a blank U.S. Marshal Form

285 for each Defendant. In addition, the Clerk will provide Plaintiff with a certified copy

of this Order, a certified copy of his Complaint (ECF No. 1), and the summons so that he

may serve the Defendants. Upon receipt of this “IFP Package,” Plaintiff must complete

the Form 285s as completely and accurately as possible, and return them to the United

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States Marshal according to the instructions the Clerk provides in the letter accompanying

his IFP package. 

7. ORDERS Defendants to reply to Plaintiff’s Complaint within the time

provided by the applicable provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(a). See 42

U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(2) (while a defendant may occasionally be permitted to “waive the

right to reply to any action brought by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other

correctional facility under section 1983,” once the Court has conducted its sua sponte

screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b), and thus, has made a

preliminary determination based on the face on the pleading alone that Plaintiff has a

“reasonable opportunity to prevail on the merits,” the defendant is required to respond).

8. ORDERS Plaintiff to serve upon Defendants or, if an appearance has been

entered by counsel, upon Defendants’ counsel, a copy of every further pleading or other

document he wishes the Court to consider. Plaintiff must include with the original paper

to be filed with the Clerk of the Court, a certificate stating the manner in which a true and

correct copy of the document was served on Defendants, or counsel for Defendants, and

the date of that service. Any paper received by the Court which has not been properly

filed with the Clerk, or which fails to include a Certificate of Service, may be disregarded.

DATED: October 30, 2015

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

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