Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-02097/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-02097-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 

pauperis with a first amended petition for writ of habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The matter has been referred to the 

Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Rules 

302 through 304. Pending before the Court is Respondent’s motion to 

dismiss the first amended petition (FAP) as untimely filed and for

Petitioner’s failure to exhaust state court remedies, which was 

filed on March 4, 2014. Petitioner filed opposition on July 10, 

2014, and Respondent filed a reply with leave of Court on July 30, 

2014.

JOSHUA ANDREW SOTO,

 Petitioner,

v.

R.T.C. GROUNDS, Warden,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:13-cv-02097-AWI-BAM-HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

TO GRANT RESPONDENT’S MOTION 

TO DISMISS THE FIRST AMENDED 

PETITION (DOC. 11), DISMISS 

THE FIRST AMENDED PETITION 

WITH PREJUDICE AS UNTIMELY FILED 

(DOC. 8), ENTER JUDGMENT FOR 

RESPONDENT, AND DECLINE TO ISSUE A 

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

OBJECTIONS DEADLINE:

THIRTY (30) DAYS AFTER SERVICE

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I. Proceeding by a Motion to Dismiss

Respondent has filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the 

ground that Petitioner filed his petition outside of the one-year 

limitation period provided for by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).1

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United 

States District Courts (Habeas Rules) allows a district court to 

dismiss a petition if it “plainly appears from the face of the 

petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not 

entitled to relief in the district court....” 

The Ninth Circuit has allowed respondents to file motions to 

dismiss pursuant to Rule 4 instead of answers if the motion to 

dismiss attacks the pleadings by claiming that the petitioner has 

failed to exhaust state remedies or has violated the state’s 

procedural rules. See, e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 

(9th Cir. 1990) (using Rule 4 to evaluate a motion to dismiss a 

petition for failure to exhaust state remedies); White v. Lewis, 874 

F.2d 599, 602-03 (9th Cir. 1989) (using Rule 4 to review a motion to 

dismiss for state procedural default); Hillery v. Pulley, 533 

F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12 (E.D.Cal. 1982) (same). Thus, a 

respondent may file a motion to dismiss after the Court orders the 

respondent to respond, and the Court should use Rule 4 standards to 

review a motion to dismiss filed before a formal answer. See, 

Hillery, 533 F. Supp. at 1194 & n.12.

In this case, Respondent’s motion to dismiss addresses the

untimeliness of the petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

 

1 Because the Court concludes that the petition should be dismissed with prejudice 

because it was untimely filed, the Court has not considered Respondent’s 

additional contention concerning Petitioner’s failure to exhaust state court 

remedies. 

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The facts pertinent to the motion are found in state records that 

have been provided by the parties and which present no material

factual dispute. 

Because Respondent has not filed a formal answer, and because 

Respondent's motion to dismiss is similar in procedural standing to 

a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust state remedies or for 

state procedural default, the Court will review Respondent’s motion 

to dismiss pursuant to its authority under Habeas Rule 4.

II. Procedural Summary

On April 23, 2008, Petitioner was convicted in the Superior 

Court of the State of California, County of Kings (KCSC) of 

conspiracy to commit robbery, attempted robbery, assault with a 

firearm, resisting a peace officer, misdemeanor hit and run, and 

assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury. 

The jury found that each count was committed for the benefit of a 

criminal street gang and that Petitioner had suffered two prior

prison terms. Petitioner was sentenced to a determinate state 

prison term of twenty-nine years. (LD 1, LD 2 at 2-3.)2 However, in 

March 2010, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth 

Appellate District (CCA) affirmed the judgment on appeal but vacated 

the sentence and remanded the matter for resentencing. (LD 2 at 2-

3.) The California Supreme Court (CSC) denied review on June 30, 

2010 (LD 3-4), and the United States Supreme Court denied a petition 

for writ of certiorari on November 15, 2010 (LD 5).

On October 14, 2010, Petitioner was resentenced pursuant to the 

direction of the CCA. (LD 6.)

Petitioner subsequently filed two pro se state post-conviction 

 

2

“LD” refers to documents lodged in connection with the motion to dismiss.

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collateral challenges with respect to the pertinent judgment or 

claim:

The First Petition:

March 14, 2011: petition for writ of habeas corpus filed

in the KCSC (LD 7);

June 6, 2011: petition denied (LD 8);

The Second Petition:

November 1, 2011: petition for writ of habeas corpus filed

in the CCA (LD 9);

May 24, 2012: petition denied (LD 10).

Petitioner constructively filed the initial petition in this 

proceeding on December 5, 2013, challenging his convictions. (Doc.

1, doc. 1-2 at 12.)3 The first amended petition was filed on January 

16, 2014. (Doc. 8.)

III. Summary of the Circumstances pertinent to Timeliness

Petitioner alleges that after his transfer to Kern Valley State 

Prison (KVSP) on November 15, 2010, and after KVSP failed to satisfy 

 

3

Dates of filing are calculated pursuant to the “mailbox rule.” Habeas Rule 3(d) 

provides that a paper filed by a prisoner is timely if deposited in the 

institution’s internal mailing system on or before the last day for filing. The 

rule requires the inmate to use the custodial institution’s system designed for 

legal mail; further, timely filing may be shown by a declaration in compliance 

with 28 U.S.C. § 1746 or by a notarized statement setting forth the date of 

deposit and verifying prepayment of first-class postage. Id. Habeas Rule 3(d) 

reflects the “mailbox rule,” initially developed in case law, pursuant to which a 

prisoner's pro se habeas petition is "deemed filed when he hands it over to prison 

authorities for mailing to the relevant court.” Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 

276 (1988); Huizar v. Carey, 273 F.3d 1220, 1222 (9th Cir. 2001). The mailbox 

rule applies to federal and state petitions alike. Campbell v. Henry, 614 F.3d 

1056, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Stillman v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199, 1201 

(9th. Cir. 2003), and Smith v. Ratelle, 323 F.3d 813, 816 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003)). 

The mailbox rule, liberally applied, in effect assumes that absent evidence to the 

contrary, a legal document is filed on the date it was delivered to prison 

authorities, and a petition was delivered on the day it was signed. Houston v. 

Lack, 487 U.S. at 275-76; Roberts v. Marshall, 627 F.3d 768, 770 n.1 (9th Cir. 

2010); Campbell v. Henry, 614 F.3d 1056, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2010); Lewis v. 

Mitchell, 173 F.Supp.2d 1057, 1058 n.1 (C.D.Cal. 2001). 

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many unspecified requests, Petitioner finally was permitted access 

to the prison law library once a week in October 2012, when his year 

to file a federal habeas petition was up. It is generally alleged, 

without specification or supporting documentation, that paging 

requests were not answered, and neither staff nor inmates knew how 

to use a computer. Petitioner attributes the obstruction of his 

access to the law library to what he characterizes as illegal 

segregation of northern Hispanic prisoners, who were not allowed to 

visit the KVSP library before October 25, 2012. He did not know 

about extraordinary circumstances until he reached Salinas Valley 

State Prison, and it was still difficult to access the law library 

without a deadline that would support priority legal user status. 

(Doc. 20, 1-3.) 

Documentation attached to his opposition reflects that in 

September 2011, Petitioner requested from the law library a form for 

a federal habeas corpus petition; he indicated that his statute of 

limitations was running out. (Doc. 20, 20.) On November 3, 2011, 

Petitioner requested access to the law library, stating that he had 

been ducated only twice but had not been allowed to go since 

November 2010 because he was classified as a Northern Hispanic, and 

he had not received a requested habeas form. (Id. at 21.) 

On March 26, 2012, Petitioner stated that although he had been 

ducated for law library access several times, he had not had 

sufficient law library access to meet his deadlines, and he had to 

rely on Black inmates to acquire forms and copies. (Id. at 24.) On 

September 19 and 28 and October 29, 2012, Petitioner requested law

library access again. (Id. at 22-23, 25.) On October 16, 2012, 

Petitioner initiated a complaint about access and hours of access to 

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the prison law library that was returned for formal and substantive 

defects but was ultimately granted in part at the first level of 

appellate review. In the course of the administrative process, 

Petitioner alleged that he was not allowed on the computer or that 

he had had access once but staff did not know how to operate it; 

paging had never been available; and he could not actually 

physically go to the law library until October 25, 2012, which was 

confirmed by librarian Martinez. (Id. at 13-19.) In granting 

Petitioner’s request for law library access at the first appellate 

level, the prison administration indicated that the reason for the 

lack of an opportunity for physical access to the law library for 

Northern Hispanic inmates was security; however, paging services had 

been available during the time that actual physical access was 

restricted; beginning October 2012, the Northern Hispanic inmates 

were scheduled for law library once a week, and Petitioner had 

visited the law library on November 1 and 8, 2012. 

Documentation also establishes that Petitioner had a reading 

level below 4.0. (Id. at 14-15.)

IV. Timeliness of the Petition

Because the petition was filed after April 24, 1996, the 

effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 

of 1996 (AEDPA), the AEDPA applies to the petition. Lindh v. 

Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 

1499 (9th Cir. 1997). 

The AEDPA provides a one-year period of limitation in which a 

petitioner must file a petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, subdivision (d) reads:

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an

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application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in 

 custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.

The limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final

 by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of

the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an

application created by State action in violation of the

Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State 

action; 

(C) the date on which the constitutional right 

asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court,

if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court

and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral

review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim 

or claims presented could have been discovered through the 

exercise of due diligence.

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for 

State post-conviction or other collateral review with 

respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending

shall not be counted toward any period of limitation

under this subsection.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

A. Commencement and Running of the Limitation Period

Under § 2244(d)(1)(A), the “judgment” refers to the sentence 

imposed on the petitioner. Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 156-57 

(2007). The last sentence was imposed on Petitioner on October 14, 

2010, when the KCSC resentenced Petitioner. 

Under § 2244(d)(1)(A), a judgment becomes final either upon the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for 

seeking such review in the highest court from which review could be 

sought. Wixom v. Washington, 264 F.3d 894, 897 (9th Cir. 2001). 

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Here, Petitioner filed no direct appeal from the resentencing. The

judgment became final pursuant to governing California law sixty 

days later on December 13, 2010, pursuant to Cal. Rules of Court, 

Rule 8.308.4 The judgment thus became final then because the time 

for seeking state court review expired. Cf. Gonzalez v. Thaler, -

U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 641, 653-54 (2012). 

Therefore, the limitation period began to run on the following 

day, December 14, 2010. Absent any grounds for tolling or an 

exception to the statute, the limitation period concluded one year 

later on December 13, 2011. 

B. Statutory Tolling

It must be determined whether Petitioner is entitled to 

statutory tolling of the limitation period.

1. Pendency of State Habeas Petitions

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which 

a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other 

collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is 

pending shall not be counted toward” the one-year limitation period. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

An application for collateral review is Apending@ in state court 

Aas long as the ordinary state collateral review process is >in 

continuance=--i.e., >until the completion of= that process.@ Carey v. 

Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 219-20 (2002). In California, this generally 

means that the statute of limitations is tolled from the time the 

first state habeas petition is filed until the California Supreme 

 

4

 Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 8.308(a) provides, “Except as... otherwise provided by 

law, a notice of appeal and any statement required by Penal Code section 1237.5 

must be filed within 60 days after the rendition of the judgment or the making of 

the order being appealed.

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Court rejects the petitioner’s final collateral challenge, as long 

as the petitioner did not “unreasonably delay” in seeking review. 

Id. at 221-23; accord, Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 

1999). Thus, absent unreasonable delay, the statute is tolled 

during the gaps between denial of a petition and the filing of the 

next petition in a higher state court because the collateral review 

process is deemed “pending” within the meaning of 

§ 2244)(d)(2). However, the statute of limitations is not tolled 

from the time a final decision is issued on direct state appeal and 

the time the first state collateral challenge is filed because there 

is no case “pending” during that interval. Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 

at 1006; see, Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 330-33 (2007) 

(holding that the time period after a state court’s denial of state 

post-conviction relief and while a petition for certiorari is 

pending in the United States Supreme Court is not tolled because no 

application for state post-conviction or other state collateral 

review is pending).

Here, the limitation period commenced on December 14, 2010. 

The statute ran for ninety days until the first state petition was 

filed in the KCSC on March 14, 2011, which initiated an eighty-fiveday period of tolling that endured until the denial of the petition 

on June 6, 2011.

Respondent contends that Petitioner is not entitled to 

statutory “gap” tolling between the KCSC’s denial on June 6, 2011, 

and the filing of the second state petition in the CCA on November 

1, 2011, because the delay of 148 days was unreasonable.

Absent a clear direction or explanation from the California

Supreme Court about the meaning of the term “reasonable time” in

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a specific factual context, or a clear indication that a filing

was timely or untimely, a federal court hearing a subsequent

federal habeas petition must examine all relevant circumstances

concerning the delay in each case and determine independently

whether the California courts would have considered any delay

reasonable so as to render the state collateral review petition

“pending” within the meaning of § 2244(d)(2). Evans v. Chavis,

546 U.S. 189, 197-98 (2006). 

A delay of six months has been found to be unreasonable because 

it is longer than the relatively short periods of thirty or sixty 

days provided by most states for filing appeals. Evans v. Chavis, 

546 U.S. at 201. In this circuit, a period of thirty to sixty days 

is applied as a benchmark for California's “reasonable time” 

requirement, to be exceeded in appropriate circumstances. Stewart 

v. Cate, 734 F.3d 995, 1001 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Velasquez v. 

Kirkland, 639 F.3d 964, 968 (9th Cir. 2011)). Various periods of 

delay have been found to be unreasonable, including intervals of 

eighty-one (81) and ninety-two (92) days between the disposition of 

a writ at one level and the filing of the next writ at a higher 

level, Velasquez v. Kirkland, 639 F.3d 964, 968 (9th Cir. 2011), 

cert. den., 132 S.Ct. 554 (2011); unexplained, unjustified periods 

of ninety-seven (97) and seventy-one (71) days, Culver v. Director 

of Corrections, 450 F.Supp.2d 1135, 1140 (C.D.Cal. 2006); one 

hundred (100) days between the denial of a petition by the 

California Court of Appeal and the filing of a petition in the 

California Supreme Court, which was held to be unreasonable because 

there was no showing of good cause for the delay where the two 

petitions involved the same claims, evidence, and research, and the 

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petitioner had at least thirty days to file the petition despite 

being under prisoner emergency status and being unable to research 

his petition, Stewart v. Cate, 734 F.3d at 1002-03; unjustified 

delays of one hundred fifteen (115) and one hundred one (101) days 

between denial of one petition and the filing of a subsequent 

petition, Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d. 1046, 1048 (9th Cir. 2010); 

and one hundred forty-six (146) days between the filing of two trial 

court petitions, Banjo v. Ayers, 614 F.3d 964, 968-69 (9th Cir. 

2010), cert. den., 131 S.Ct. 3023 (2011). 

Here, the CCA summarily denied the petition “without prejudice”

and did not expressly determine that the petition was timely or 

untimely. (LD 10.) This Court thus proceeds to examine all 

relevant circumstances concerning the delay and to determine 

independently whether the California courts would have considered 

any delay reasonable. 

The delay of 148 days was a substantial delay that would be 

unreasonable if unsupported by a showing of good cause. To benefit 

from statutory tolling, a petitioner must adequately justify a

substantial delay. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); Evans v. Chavis, 546

U.S. at 192-93; Waldrip v. Hall, 548 F.3d at 734.

In In re Reno, 55 Cal.4th 428, 460-61 (2012), the California

Supreme Court summarized the applicable California law as

follows:

Our rules establish a three-level analysis for

assessing whether claims in a petition for a writ of

habeas corpus have been timely filed. First, a claim

must be presented without substantial delay. Second, if

a petitioner raises a claim after a substantial delay,

we will nevertheless consider it on its merits if the

petitioner can demonstrate good cause for the delay.

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Third, we will consider the merits of a claim presented

after a substantial delay without good cause if it

falls under one of four narrow exceptions: “(i) that

error of constitutional magnitude led to a trial that

was so fundamentally unfair that absent the error no

reasonable judge or jury would have convicted the

petitioner; (ii) that the petitioner is actually

innocent of the crime or crimes of which he or she was

convicted; (iii) that the death penalty was imposed by

a sentencing authority that had such a grossly

misleading profile of the petitioner before it that,

absent the trial error or omission, no reasonable judge

or jury would have imposed a sentence of death; or (iv)

that the petitioner was convicted or sentenced under an

invalid statute.” (In re Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th at

pp. 780–781, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 153, 959 P.2d 311.) The

petitioner bears the burden to plead and then prove all

of the relevant allegations. (Ibid.)

The United States Supreme Court recently, and

accurately, described the law applicable to habeas

corpus petitions in California: “While most States set

determinate time limits for collateral relief

applications, in California, neither statute nor rule

of court does so. Instead, California courts ‘appl[y] a

general “reasonableness” standard’ to judge whether a

habeas petition is timely filed. Carey v. Saffold, 536

U.S. 214, 222 [122 S.Ct. 2134, 153 L.Ed.2d 260] (2002).

The basic instruction provided by the California

Supreme Court is simply that ‘a [habeas] petition

should be filed as promptly as the circumstances

allow....’” (Walker v. Martin, supra, 562 U.S. at p.

––––, 131 S.Ct. at p. 1125.) “A prisoner must seek

habeas relief without ‘substantial delay,’ [citations],

as ‘measured from the time the petitioner or counsel

knew, or reasonably should have known, of the

information offered in support of the claim and the

legal basis for the claim,’ [citation].” (Ibid.; see

also In re Robbins, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 780, 77

Cal.Rptr.2d 153, 959 P.2d 311 [“Substantial delay is

measured from the time the petitioner or his or her

counsel knew, or reasonably should have known, of the

information offered in support of the claim and the

legal basis for the claim.”].)

In re Reno, 55 Cal.4th at 460-61. A petitioner must show

particular circumstances, based on allegations of specific facts,

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sufficient to justify the delay; allegations made in general

terms are insufficient. In re Robbins, 18 Cal.4th at 787-88, 805

(1998) (citing In re Walker, 10 Cal.3d 764, 774 (1974)). The Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals has noted that there are no California 

standards for determining what period of time or factors constitute

“substantial delay” in noncapital cases or for determining what 

factors justify any particular length of delay. King v. LaMarque, 

464 F.3d 963, 966 (9th Cir. 2006). Nonetheless, California’s time 

limit for filing a habeas petition in a noncapital case is more 

“forgiving and flexible than that employed by most states.” Chavis, 

546 U.S. at 202 (Stevens, J., concurring).

Here, with respect to Petitioner’s delay from June 6, 2011, 

through November 1, 2011, in filing his second state petition, the 

documentation reflects that Petitioner requested a federal habeas 

form in September 2011, but it is not clear whether he received the 

form from any source. Although physical access to the law library 

was foreclosed, there is no specification or documentation of other 

efforts during that time to seek alternative legal resources for the 

purpose of exhausting state court remedies. However, Petitioner was 

able to file a habeas petition in the trial court in March 2011 that 

raised essentially the same factual and legal bases that were the 

subject of the later petition filed in the CCA. (LD 7, LD 9.) 

Petitioner has not shown that during the pertinent time he 

diligently sought access to legal resources or that a lack of access 

explained or justified his delay. 

Accordingly, the Court concludes that the running of the 

statute of limitations was not tolled between June 6, 2011, and 

November 1, 2011. Accordingly, 148 days of the statute ran during 

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that period of time.

The statute was tolled from the filing of the second petition 

in the CCA on November 1, 2011, until its denial on May 24, 2012, 

for a total of 206 days. The statute of limitations ran for 127 

more days through September 28, 2012. Thus, the constructive filing 

of his petition here on December 5, 2013, was untimely absent an 

additional basis of statutory tolling, equitable tolling, or an 

exception to the statute of limitations. 

2. State-Created Impediment

Respondent interprets Petitioner’s opposition as a claim that 

Petitioner suffered a state-created impediment to filing within the 

meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B). It is also possible that 

Petitioner is claiming relief from the statute based on equitable 

tolling, which provides for tolling of the statute if extraordinary 

circumstances prevent the filing of a timely federal petition. 

Respondent did not address equitable tolling. In an abundance of 

caution, the Court will address both bases of relief from the 

statute. 

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B) provides that the statute of 

limitations shall run from the latest of:

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an 

application created by State action in violation of

the Constitution or laws of the United States is

removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing

by such State action.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B). 

In Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 995 (9th Cir. 2009), the court

rejected a claim that the petitioner had suffered a state-created 

impediment to filing based on administrative segregation that 

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limited the prisoner’s access to the law library and a copy machine. 

The court reasoned that there was no basis for statutory tolling due 

to a state-created impediment pursuant to § 2244(d)(1)(B) based on 

the prisoner’s placement in administrative segregation and 

associated limitations on access to the law library and his legal 

files. The Court held that the claim under § 2244(d)(1)(B) had to 

satisfy a higher bar than that for equitable tolling. The court

stated:

He may be entitled to equitable tolling during the period 

he was without his legal materials if the deprivation of 

his legal materials made it impossible for him to file a 

timely § 2254 petition in federal court. There is no 

constitutional right to file a timely § 2254 petition, 

however--Ramirez is entitled to the commencement of a new 

limitations period under § 2244(d)(1)(B) only if his 

placement in administrative segregation altogether 

prevented him from presenting his claims in any form, to 

any court. See generally Lewis, 518 U.S. at 350-51, 116 

S.Ct. 2174.

Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d at 1000-1001. The court concluded that 

the petitioner could not make the required showing because during 

the requisite period, he filed three state petitions presenting his 

constitutional claims in various forms to competent state courts as 

well as an extensive and well-researched motion in federal court 

requesting that the AEDPA's limitations period be tolled and a 

successful discovery motion in the California Superior Court. 

Accordingly, the restriction on access to the law library and copier 

did not deny the petitioner his constitutional right of access to 

the courts. 

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The holding of Ramirez v. Yates is consistent with the 

decisions of the United States Supreme Court, which recognize that 

the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts 

requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and 

filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with 

adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained 

in the law. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977). However, 

there is no abstract, freestanding constitutional right to have 

access to a law library or legal assistance unfettered from the 

right of meaningful access to the courts. One constitutionally 

acceptable method of insuring meaningful access is to make law 

library facilities available to inmates, but such a method does not 

foreclose alternative means to achieve the goal of access. Lewis v. 

Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350-51 (1996). The right of meaningful access 

to the courts prohibits state officials from actively interfering 

with an inmate’s attempt to prepare or file legal documents. Lewis 

v. Casey, 518 U.S. at 350. The right requires a reasonably adequate 

opportunity to present claimed violations of fundamental

constitutional rights to the courts. Id. at 351. However, a state 

is not required to enable a prisoner to discover grievances and to 

litigate effectively once he is in court; rather, inmates must be 

provided the tools they need in order to bring to the courts direct 

or collateral attacks upon their sentences, and challenges to their 

conditions of confinement. Id. at 354-55.

Here, Petitioner twice requested to use the law library and 

once requested a form during the running of the statutory period. 

Even assuming that these attempts were totally unsuccessful, the 

nature and extent of Petitioner’s efforts does not support a 

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conclusion that Petitioner’s filing was impeded. This is 

particularly so in light of Petitioner’s having filed two state 

court petitions that raised essentially the same grounds. 

Petitioner has not made a specific and legally sufficient showing of 

a violation of his right of access to the courts or other violation 

of the Constitution. Petitioner has not shown entitlement to 

statutory tolling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B).

C. Equitable Tolling

The one-year limitation period of § 2244 is subject to 

equitable tolling where the petitioner shows that he or she has been 

diligent, and extraordinary circumstances have prevented the 

petitioner from filing a timely petition. Holland v. Florida, –

U.S. –, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2560, 2562 (2010). Petitioner bears the 

burden of showing the requisite extraordinary circumstances and 

diligence. Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 1048 (9th Cir. 2010). 

A petitioner must provide specific facts regarding what was done to 

pursue the petitioner’s claims to demonstrate that equitable tolling 

is warranted. Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 973 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Conclusional allegations are generally inadequate. Williams v. 

Dexter, 649 F.Supp.2d 1055, 1061-62 (C.D.Cal. 2009). Cases suggest 

that the untimeliness must result from an external force and not 

mere oversight, miscalculation, or negligence on the petitioner's 

part. See Velasquez v. Kirkland, 639 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2011); 

Waldron–Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1011 (9th Cir. 2009).

The petitioner must show that the extraordinary circumstances 

were the cause of his untimeliness and that the extraordinary 

circumstances made it impossible to file a petition on time. 

Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d at 997. Where a prisoner fails to show 

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any causal connection between the grounds upon which he asserts a 

right to equitable tolling and his inability to file a timely 

federal habeas application, the equitable tolling claim will be 

denied. Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034-35 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Where there are multiple extraordinary circumstances alleged to have 

prevented a prisoner from filing a timely petition, the petitioner 

need not show that each circumstance independently prevented a 

timely filing; rather, it is sufficient to show that the two 

circumstances together rendered a timely filing impossible. Ramirez 

v. Yates, 571 F.3d at 1000. 

Petitioner’s pro se status is not an extraordinary

circumstance. Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 U.S. 1046, 1049 (9th Cir.

2010). A pro se petitioner's confusion or ignorance of the law

is not alone a circumstance warranting equitable tolling. Rasberry 

v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006).

Likewise, limitations on law library access and research

materials are not extraordinary, but rather are normal conditions

of prison life. Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d at 1049. 

Here, Petitioner makes conclusional allegations that he 

repeatedly sought access to the law library, but the record shows 

only minimal and sporadic attempts. Likewise, Petitioner’s 

allegations concerning his lack of success with other efforts are 

conclusional. It appears that Petitioner relied in some respects on 

other inmates, but Petitioner does not address any specific efforts 

or give any details concerning the success or failure of that route 

to information. Although there is a general statement that paging 

was not available, this is contradicted by the administrative 

record, which reflects that the prison authorities addressed 

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Petitioner’s grievance and indicated that paging had been available 

during the period that actual law library access was limited. 

Further, there is no documentation of any specific attempt on the 

part of Petitioner to use the paging service or any basis for a 

conclusion that paging would have been inadequate. There is no 

specification of attempts to use the computer available to 

Petitioner in his housing unit. This is not a situation where the 

record documents a petitioner’s diligent efforts to obtain law 

library access or legal resources through alternate channels. 

Further, Petitioner has not shown how the absence of access to 

the law library prevented him from filing a timely federal petition

or delayed him in the exhaustion of state court remedies. 

Petitioner’s last state petition raised numerous issues including 

inaccurate gang expert testimony; ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel for failing to communicate regarding deals and sentences as 

well as omitting to investigate and present alibi witnesses and 

permit Petitioner to hear the tape of the defense interview of the 

victim; newly discovered evidence that the persons who helped the 

victim were both documented members of Petitioner’s gang; and

prosecutorial misconduct in the form of referring to Petitioner’s 

failure to take the stand and erroneously stating that the evidence 

showed that Petitioner was the perpetrator with the firearm. (LD 

9.) These grounds were essentially the same as those stated in the 

previous state petition. (LD 7.) Likewise, Petitioner’s federal 

petition did not expand his earlier grounds. Further, during the 

very period during which the statute was running and Petitioner now 

claims inability to visit the law library excused his delay, 

Petitioner has not shown that he diligently pursued available 

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channels for obtaining materials by either use of the library or by 

alternate means such as paging or use of the computer or other 

inmates. Petitioner has not shown with particularity that any 

extraordinary circumstances were the cause of his delay. 

The present case is analogous with Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 

995, where the court rejected a claim of entitlement to equitable 

tolling based on administrative segregation that limited the 

prisoner’s access to the law library and a copy machine because 

security restrictions were common circumstances in prison that did 

not render filing impossible, and further because during the 

pertinent time the petitioner had been able to file motions in two 

courts. Id. at 998.

Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing on the matter 

of equitable tolling due to a failure of law library access is 

likewise foreclosed by the absence of a causal link between 

Petitioner’s conditions of confinement and delay in filing his 

claims. Compare Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 925–26 (9th Cir.

2002) (remanding for further proceedings where “Lott's allegations, 

if uncontroverted, require an application of equitable tolling”).

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s claim of 

equitable tolling should be denied.

C. Actual Innocence

In his opposition, Petitioner argues that newly discovered 

evidence demonstrates that he is innocent. Petitioner points to new 

evidence that undercuts his convictions.

1. Evidence Relied on by Petitioner

At trial, Petitioner was identified as a person wearing a white 

tank top who held the victim down during an attack by multiple 

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persons. (FAP, doc. 8 at 11.) Before trial, Petitioner did not 

know the identity of someone who was vaguely identified in a report

as “Chaos,” a good Samaritan who had facilitated the victim’s being 

taken to the hospital after the attack. Petitioner’s counsel and 

investigator failed to follow up on the matter. After his trial,

Petitioner was told by Tomas Jacob Aguilar that Aguilar was the 

person named “Chaos” who had flagged down a friend, Renee Anthony 

Moya, and had asked Moya to take the victim to the hospital. 

Petitioner argues that because Petitioner, Aguilar, and Moya were 

all identified by gang experts as members of the Lemoore Brown Pride 

Norteno Gang, this evidence would contradict the testimony of gang 

experts regarding gang motivation and participation. Further, the 

victim never identified his attackers as actual Nortenos, as 

distinct from associates of Nortenos. Petitioner contends that this 

evidence shows that Petitioner is innocent of the gang allegations. 

(Id. at 4-6.) 

A copy of the police report regarding the offenses indicates 

that the victim reported that after the attack he encountered a 

person known only to him as “Chaos” from Kettleman City, who in turn 

had a friend take the victim to the hospital. (Doc. 20, 26-27.) A 

declaration of Thomas Aguilar dated May 5, 2008, indicates that 

after Aguilar had smoked marijuana with the victim and the victim 

had departed, Aguilar later encountered the victim, who in a 

bloodied condition said he was not sure what happened but it was 

people who looked like Scraps; Aguilar then waved down Moya and had 

him take the victim to the hospital. (Id. at 35.) An affidavit of 

Renee Mora dated June 7, 2014, indicates that on August 13 at about 

1:00 a.m., he and his companion, Rocio Arias, were flagged down by 

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his friend, Anthony Aguilar, and in response to Aguilar’s request 

took the victim to the emergency room. (Doc. 20, 30.) A 

declaration of Petitioner’s substitute counsel indicates that she 

presented the witnesses she believed were helpful at the new trial 

motion; although she did not recall the data regarding Chaos, she 

believed that establishing the gang affiliation of Chaos and his 

friend would have undercut the victim’s post-offense statement made 

when Chaos and his friend encountered the victim right after the 

attack. When asked what had happened, the victim told them that he 

had been attacked by some “Scraps,” a derogatory term for Surenos. 

Thus, the victim’s statement tended to impeach the victim’s trial 

testimony that Petitioner and other Nortenos were the perpetrators. 

Establishing that Chaos and his companion were Nortenos would have 

provided a motive for the victim to identify his attackers 

incorrectly as Surenos in order to protect himself during his 

conversation with Norteno gang members. (Id. at 28-29.) 

Petitioner alleges that there was a tape of an interview 

apparently conducted by the defense investigator with the victim, 

Sebastian Gonzales, in which Gonzales represented that he pointed 

out Petitioner because Gonzales’ father had identified Petitioner. 

Petitioner was not allowed to see the tape. (Id. at 6-7.) However, 

the interview was never transcribed or provided in discovery, and 

that omission was used to impeach the testimony of the investigator 

at trial concerning the interview. (Id. at 7-8.)

The prosecutor destroyed exculpatory evidence in the form of a

broken beer bottle, which could have been tested for DNA. (Id. at 

6.)

Petitioner had a very noticeable tattoo of “BPN” on his right 

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shoulder that would have been visible when Petitioner wore a “wife 

beater.” (Id.)

Petitioner alleges that he told his counsel about his alibi 

witnesses, Cecelia and Susan Maldonado, who had provided notarized 

affidavits that Petitioner presented to the trial court with his 

motion for a new trial. Cecelia declared on August 14, 2008, that 

from the afternoon of August 12 until 11:00 a.m. of August 13, 2007, 

she and Petitioner were together the entire time in Visalia, 

California. (Doc. 20 at 31.) She declared on May 6, 2008, that she 

was never contacted by or on behalf of Petitioner’s trial counsel. 

(Id. at 32.) Susan Maldonado declared that a Thunderbird vehicle, a 

type of car that the victim saw carrying the perpetrators, was in 

her possession and control on August 13, 2007; she mentioned this 

repeatedly to Petitioner’s trial counsel. (Id. at 33.) Petitioner 

states that substitute counsel appointed to cover the new trial 

motion failed to tell Petitioner that on the day of the new trial 

motion, Cecelia suddenly was unable to remember anything, and none 

of the investigator’s reports recorded the failure of memory; 

Cecelia subsequently informed Petitioner that counsel had directed 

her to depart. Had the defense investigator met with Petitioner, 

Petitioner would have revealed his witnesses. Trial counsel and 

appointed substitute counsel rendered ineffective assistance in 

failing to pursue an alibi defense and to failing to provide 

evidence to impeach the victim. (Id. at 10-12.)

2. Analysis

In McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1924, 1931-34 

(2013), the Court held that a petitioner who had not shown 

extraordinary circumstances and reasonable diligence to warrant 

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equitable tolling could nevertheless attempt to qualify for an 

equitable exception to the statute of limitations set forth in 28 

U.S.C. ' 2244(d) based on actual innocence as a form of miscarriage 

of justice. A petitioner does not meet the threshold requirement of 

showing actual innocence as an equitable exception to the statute of 

limitations unless he persuades the district court that new evidence 

shows that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would 

have convicted the petitioner, that is, no juror, acting reasonably, 

would have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

at 1935. 

The gateway should open only when a petition presents evidence 

of innocence so strong that a court cannot have confidence in the 

outcome of the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the 

trial was free of non-harmless constitutional error. Id. at 1936. 

This is consistent with the rationale underlying the miscarriage of 

justice exception, namely, ensuring that federal constitutional 

errors do not result in the incarceration of innocent persons. Id.

The timing of the petition is a factor bearing on the 

reliability of the evidence purporting to show actual innocence. 

Id. at 1934-36. Where a federal habeas court is faced with a claim 

of actual innocence as a gateway, unjustifiable delay does not 

absolutely bar relief, but rather is a factor in determining whether 

the petitioner has made the requisite showing of actual innocence. 

A court may consider how the timing of the submission and the likely 

credibility of a petitioner=s affiants bear on the probable 

reliability of the evidence of actual innocence. Id.

Here, the probative value of the evidence that fellow gang 

members transported the victim to the hospital is undercut by the 

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fact that they did so only after the victim in effect informed them 

that although he was not sure, his attackers looked like Surenos. 

Thus, in helping the victim, the Norteno gang members could well 

have been acting to further Norteno gang interests. Further, the 

victim testified at trial, identifying Petitioner as one of the 

perpetrators. However, the jury already had before it testimony 

that the victim had identified his attackers as looking like 

Surenos; thus, the jury already considered significant impeachment 

evidence with respect to the victim’s identification of Petitioner, 

yet it determined to accept that the victim’s identifications of 

Petitioner. The presence of a “BPN” tattoo on Petitioner tended to 

connect Petitioner to the gang, and thus it is understandable why it 

would not be accentuated by the defense. 

Petitioner’s alibi witnesses gave only the most general 

statements in their declarations. The declaration of Susan

Maldonado actually tended to connect Petitioner, through Susan, to a 

type of car in which the perpetrators were observed riding. Counsel 

explained that the helpful witnesses were presented at the motion 

for a new trial, and that Cecelia expressed a complete failure of 

recollection just before she was to testify at the motion for new 

trial. Considering these circumstances, even if Petitioner’s 

evidence were considered to be new evidence, it was not of a sort 

that shows that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror 

would have voted to find Petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable 

doubt. The evidence was not so strong that the Court cannot have 

confidence in the outcome of the trial.

The Court concludes that Petitioner has not established actual 

innocence as an equitable exception to the statute of limitations.

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In summary, the Court concludes that the petition was untimely 

filed, and it should be dismissed with prejudice. 

V. Certificate of Appealability

Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of 

appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the Court of Appeals 

from the final order in a habeas proceeding in which the detention 

complained of arises out of process issued by a state court. 28 

U.S.C. ' 2253(c)(1)(A); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 

(2003). A district court must issue or deny a certificate of 

appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant. 

Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. 

A certificate of appealability may issue only if the applicant 

makes a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 

' 2253(c)(2). Under this standard, a petitioner must show that 

reasonable jurists could debate whether the petition should have 

been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented 

were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. MillerEl v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. at 336 (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 

473, 484 (2000)). A certificate should issue if the Petitioner 

shows that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether: (1) 

the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional 

right, and (2) the district court was correct in any procedural 

ruling. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483-84 (2000). 

In determining this issue, a court conducts an overview of the 

claims in the habeas petition, generally assesses their merits, and 

determines whether the resolution was debatable among jurists of 

reason or wrong. Id. An applicant must show more than an absence 

of frivolity or the existence of mere good faith; however, the 

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applicant need not show that the appeal will succeed. Miller-El v. 

Cockrell, 537 U.S. at 338.

Here, it does not appear that reasonable jurists could debate 

whether the motion should have been resolved in a different manner. 

Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right. 

Accordingly, the Court should decline to issue a certificate of 

appealability.

VI. Recommendations

In accordance with the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that:

1) Respondent’s motion to dismiss the first amended petition be 

GRANTED; and

2) The first amended petition for writ of habeas corpus be 

DISMISSED with prejudice; and

3) Judgment be ENTERED for Respondent; and

4) The Court DECLINE to issue a certificate of appealabilty.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United 

States District Court Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the 

provisions of 28 U.S.C. ' 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local 

Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern 

District of California. Within thirty (30) days after being served 

with a copy, any party may file written objections with the Court 

and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be 

captioned AObjections to Magistrate Judge=s Findings and 

Recommendations.@ Replies to the objections shall be served and 

filed within fourteen (14) days (plus three (3) days if served by 

mail) after service of the objections. The Court will then review 

the Magistrate Judge=s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 636 (b)(1)(C). 

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The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the 

specified time may “waive their right to challenge the magistrate’s 

factual findings” on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 

838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 

1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 27, 2015 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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