Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-99-05311/USCOURTS-caDC-99-05311-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 320
Nature of Suit: Assault, Libel, and Slander
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 21, 2000 Decided May 5, 2000

No. 99-5311

Roy W. Krieger,

Appellant

v.

Kathlynn G. Fadely, et al.,

Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(98cv01703)

Roy W. Krieger, appearing pro se, argued the cause and

filed the briefs for appellant.

Mark B. Stern, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were

David W. Ogden, Acting Assistant Attorney General, and

Wilma A. Lewis, U.S. Attorney.

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Before: Edwards, Chief Judge, Ginsburg and Randolph,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Randolph.

Randolph, Circuit Judge: After working for four years as a

trial attorney in the Civil Division of the Department of

Justice, Roy W. Krieger returned to private practice. The

first law firm he joined went bankrupt. Six months later,

Krieger found work at a second firm and remained there for

a year before leaving to join a third. The third firm fired him

after he had been there a little more than a year. Krieger

believes Kathlynn Fadely, his immediate supervisor at Justice

and his co-counsel in a lengthy trial still ongoing when he

resigned, instigated his firing. His complaint named Fadely,

the Justice Department and the United States as defendants.

The Attorney General certified that Fadely was acting

within the scope of her employment with respect to local law

counts 1 through 6 and moved to substitute the United States

for Fadely as a defendant under 28 U.S.C. s 2679(d)(1). Two

days later, the district court issued an order directing the

substitution.

Krieger objects that the district court acted too precipitously, that the local rule entitled him to eleven days to respond,

and that he was therefore improperly denied an "opportunity

to be heard." Brief for Appellant at 10. He has a point.

Krieger should have been heard, particularly since the effect

of the substitution was to render the defendant--now the

United States--completely immune on three counts (for defamation--count 1--and interference with contract--counts 5 &

6). See Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417,

427-29 (1995); Williams v. United States, 71 F.3d 502, 505-06

(5th Cir. 1995). The trouble for Krieger is that in the eleven

months between the substitution and the dismissal of his

complaint, he voiced not a word of protest to the district

court. His objection to the substitution order appeared for

the first time on appeal. Had he made his objection known to

the district court, the problem could easily have been cured.

The court could have vacated its order and treated the matter

de novo, in light of whatever evidence and arguments Krieger

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then mustered. That Krieger had not objected immediately

to the certification would not have been held against him.

Rule 46 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that

"if a party has no opportunity to object to a ruling or order at

the time it is made, the absence of an objection does not

thereafter prejudice the party." See Insurance Servs. of

Beaufort, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 966 F.2d 847, 852

(4th Cir. 1992). In any event, Krieger had a duty to speak

out and make his objection known--if, in fact, he had an

objection. We add the qualification because Krieger's silence

may have been for tactical reasons: although the United

States had immunity on some of the counts, it had a deeper

pocket than Fadely on others. See Gutierrez de Martinez,

515 U.S. at 427. Krieger's failure to object, for whatever

reason, cannot be excused. To use the terminology of United

States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993), his neglect in the

district court at least "forfeited" his right to raise the issue in

this court. Id. at 732; see also, e.g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428

U.S. 106, 120 (1976); Doe v. DiGenova, 779 F.2d 74, 89 (D.C.

Cir. 1985). We may go further and say, again in the Olano

phrasing, that he "waived" the issue. 507 U.S. at 733. When

the government moved to dismiss counts 1, 5 and 6 on the

basis of its immunity, Krieger--rather than opposing on the

ground that the United States was improperly substituted for

Fadely--stated to the district court that he could "not in good

faith oppose" the motion. Plaintiff's Response in Opposition

to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 2.

One of Krieger's other contentions relates to the district

court's dismissal, for failure to state a cause of action, of

count 8, which alleged that "[t]hrough the acts and omissions

of Defendant Fadely within the scope of her employment,

Defendant DOJ wrongfully disclosed to unauthorized persons

records concerning Plaintiff subject to protection under the

Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. s 552a(b)." Earlier paragraphs, incorporated by reference, alleged that Fadely had precipitated

Krieger's firing by "secretly" calling the senior partner in

Krieger's firm and telling him that Krieger's performance at

the Justice Department "had been deficient." The district

court dismissed count 8 on the basis that Krieger failed to

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"identify any 'records' or arguably confidential information

that has been wrongly disclosed." Krieger v. Fadely, Civ.

No. 98-1703, mem. op. at 15 (D.D.C. Aug. 9, 1999) ("mem.

op.").

Among the elements of a civil action for damages under the

Privacy Act are that the agency disclosed "any record which

is contained in a system of records by any means of communication to any person, or to another agency, except pursuant to

a written request by, or with the prior written consent of, the

individual to whom the record pertains...." 5 U.S.C.

s 552a(b); see Pilon v. United States Dep't of Justice, 73

F.3d 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Tomasello v. Rubin, 167 F.3d 612

(D.C. Cir. 1999). If his lawsuit went forward, there would

come a time when Krieger would have to identify the particular records Fadely unlawfully disclosed. But that point surely was not as early as the pleading stage. Rule 8(a)(2) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires only a "short and

plain" statement of the claim for relief. Factual detail is

unnecessary. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics

Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993);

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). The district court

observed that it did not have to take as true legal conclusions

cast as factual allegations when deciding a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion. Mem. op. at 15 (citing Kowal v. MCI Communications Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). What legal

conclusions the court had in mind is uncertain. The district

court agreed with the legal proposition that if Fadely's statements revealed the contents of protected records this would

be actionable, despite the fact that Fadely's statements were

not themselves records. See Bartel v. FAA, 725 F.2d 1403,

1408 (D.C. Cir. 1984). But according to the court, Krieger

had not "alleged that Fadely's statements revealed any"

information in a protected record. This is not accurate. The

complaint claimed that "records" concerning Krieger were

wrongfully disclosed, which necessarily means that information in records had been revealed. True, this does not give

much detail, but complaints "need not plead law or match

facts to every element of a legal theory," Bennett v. Schmidt,

153 F.3d 516, 518 (7th Cir. 1998). We agree with Judge

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Easterbrook, writing for the court in Bennett, that using Rule

12(b)(6) rather than summary judgment under Rule 56 to

weed out what appear to be factually-deficient cases may be

incompatible with Rule 8. See 153 F.3d at 518-19.

In short, Krieger's Privacy Act count alleged the essential

elements of his claim and put the government on notice.

Nothing more was required to survive a motion to dismiss for

failure to state a claim. Count 8 therefore should be reinstated.

We have considered Krieger's other arguments and reject

them substantially for the reasons given in the district court's

memorandum opinion and order dismissing the complaint

under Rule 12(b)(1) and (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure.

* * *

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the district court

dismissing Krieger's complaint is

Affirmed in part and reversed in 

part.

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