Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_05-cv-00925/USCOURTS-almd-2_05-cv-00925-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Sex)

---

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

ADWOWA JACOBS, )

)

Plaintiff )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 

) 2:05cv925-MHT

ELECTRONIC DATA SYSTEMS ) (WO)

CORPORATION and JEFF )

WILLIAMS, )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Adwowa Jacobs has filed a motion to vacate

the summary judgment entered in favor of defendants

Electronic Data Systems Corporation (EDS) and Jeff

Williams on her federal claim of sexual harassment and

all but one of her supplemental state-law claims. Jacobs

v. Electronic Data Systems Corp., 2006 WL 3742202 (M.D.

Ala. 2006) (Thompson, J.). For the reasons that follow,

Jacobs’s motion will be denied.

Case 2:05-cv-00925-MHT-SRW Document 62 Filed 01/22/07 Page 1 of 22
1. The Title VII, outrage, and invasion-of-privacy

claims were directed at both defendants. The assaultand-battery claim was directed at Williams only, and the

claims for negligent and wanton hiring, training, and

supervision were directed at EDS only.

2

I. BACKGROUND

Jacobs, represented by an attorney, filed suit

against the defendants on September 27, 2005, alleging

violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a, 2000e to 2000e-17, and

additionally asserting state-law claims for outrage,

assault and battery, invasion of privacy, and negligent

and wanton hiring, training, and supervision.1

 On

December 18, 2006, this court granted summary judgment on

all but the assault-and-battery claim.

There were essentially two bases for the court’s

decision. First, in Jacobs’s response to the defendants’

motions for summary judgment, Jacobs opposed summary

judgment on only two claims: her Title VII claim against

EDS and her assault-and-battery claim against Williams.

On all of her other claims, Jacobs “acquiesce[d] to the

Case 2:05-cv-00925-MHT-SRW Document 62 Filed 01/22/07 Page 2 of 22
3

positions of the Defendants....” Pl. Br. Opposing Def.

Mot. Summ. J. at 4. The court therefore treated those

claims as abandoned and granted summary judgment thereon.

Second, Jacobs’s Title VII claim for sexual

harassment could not survive summary judgment because she

failed to respond to EDS’s request for admissions. More

than five months earlier, the magistrate judge had

ordered the admissions deemed admitted by operation of

Rule 36(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and

Jacobs had never moved to withdraw the admissions as

permitted by Rule 36(b). The admissions negated

essential elements of a Title VII claim, thereby

precluding recovery under that statute as a matter of

law. Accordingly, the court granted summary judgment on

the Title VII claim against EDS. The only claim

remaining was a supplemental state-law claim for assault

and battery, which the court dismissed without prejudice

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Case 2:05-cv-00925-MHT-SRW Document 62 Filed 01/22/07 Page 3 of 22
4

Jacobs, proceeding pro se, files this motion to

vacate, alleging serious deficiencies in the

representation she received from her attorney. According

to Jacobs, this court’s judgment against her stems from

two instances of inadequate legal representation. First,

Jacobs states that when she “acquiesce[d] to the

positions of the Defendants” on all but her Title VII

claim against EDS and her assault-and-battery claim

against Williams, Pl. Br. at 4, her attorney abandoned

those claims without consulting her and without her

authorization or consent. Second, Jacobs alleges that

her failure to respond to EDS’s request for admissions,

which resulted in summary judgment against her on the

remaining Title VII claim, was entirely the result of her

attorney’s failure to respond to the request for

admissions, since Jacobs herself provided her lawyer with

responses to the admissions before they were due and long

before the magistrate judge entered an order deeming them

admitted.

Case 2:05-cv-00925-MHT-SRW Document 62 Filed 01/22/07 Page 4 of 22
5

As a result of these alleged incidents of inadequate

legal representation, Jacobs seeks relief under Rule

59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which

permits a party to file a motion to alter or amend a

judgment. In the alternative, Jacobs seeks relief under

Rule 60(b), which provides for relief from a final

judgment.

II. STANDARDS

Rule 59(e) authorizes a motion to alter or amend a

judgment after its entry. Rule 59(e) provides no

specific grounds for relief, and “the decision to alter

or amend judgment is committed to the sound discretion of

the district judge.” American Home Assur. Co. v. Glenn

Estess & Assocs., Inc., 763 F.2d 1237, 1238-39 (11th Cir.

1985). There are four basic grounds for granting a Rule

59(e) motion: (1) manifest errors of law or fact upon

which the judgment was based; (2) newly discovered or

previously unavailable evidence; (3) manifest injustice

Case 2:05-cv-00925-MHT-SRW Document 62 Filed 01/22/07 Page 5 of 22
6

in the judgment; and (4) an intervening change in the

controlling law. 11 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R.

Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure

§ 2810.1, at 124-27 (2d ed. 1995). Rule 59(e) may not be

used to relitigate old matters or to present arguments or

evidence that could have been raised prior to judgment.

O’Neal v. Kennamer, 958 F.2d 1044, 1047 (11th Cir. 1992).

Furthermore, a judgment will not be amended or altered if

to do so would serve no useful purpose. 11 Wright,

Miller & Kane, supra, § 2810.1, at 128.

Rule 60(b) is another procedural vehicle for

obtaining relief from a final judgment. The Rule

provides six specific grounds for relief, two of which

are relevant here: “(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise,

or excusable neglect; ... or (6) any other reason

justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Relief under Rule 60(b)(1) is

warranted when a party “should not be deprived of the

opportunity to present the merits of the claim because of

Case 2:05-cv-00925-MHT-SRW Document 62 Filed 01/22/07 Page 6 of 22
7

a technical error or slight mistake by the party’s

attorney.” 11 Wright, Miller & Kane, supra, § 2858, at

272-73. Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is an extraordinary

remedy, is warranted only under exceptional

circumstances, and is left to the sound discretion of the

district court. Toole v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 235

F.3d 1307, 1317 (11th Cir. 2000); Griffin v. Swim-Tech

Corp., 722 F.2d 677, 680 (11th Cir. 1984).

III. DISCUSSION

The court’s consideration of Jacobs’s motion will

proceed as follows. First, the court must ensure that

the motion is timely. Next, assuming the motion is

timely, the court will consider whether Jacobs has

asserted legally proper grounds for relief. Finally, if

proper grounds have been asserted, the court will

determine whether the court’s equitable discretion to

afford such relief should be exercised in this case.

Case 2:05-cv-00925-MHT-SRW Document 62 Filed 01/22/07 Page 7 of 22
8

A. Timeliness

Jacobs’s motion is timely under both Rules. Motions

under Rule 59(e) must be filed no later than 10 days

after entry of the judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). The

court entered its judgment on December 18, 2006, and

Jacobs filed her motion on January 3, 2007. Since the

10-day limitation excludes weekends and legal holidays,

Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), Jacobs’s motion is timely under

Rule 59(e).

A motion under Rule 60(b)(1) must be made within a

reasonable time, and not more than one year after entry

of the judgment. A motion under Rule 60(b)(6) must also

be made within a reasonable time, but there is no oneyear limit. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Jacobs’s motion,

filed weeks after the entry of judgment, is undeniably

timely under Rule 60(b). That Jacobs’s motion was also

timely under Rule 59(e) does not preclude the court from

considering its merits under Rule 60(b). See 12 James

Wm. Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice § 59.05[7][b] (3d ed.

Case 2:05-cv-00925-MHT-SRW Document 62 Filed 01/22/07 Page 8 of 22
9

2006); Jennings v. Rivers, 394 F.3d 850, 854-56 (10th

Cir. 2005).

B. Grounds for Relief

Having found that Jacobs’s motion was timely, the

court proceeds to the next inquiry: whether attorney

error is a legally cognizable ground for relief under

either Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b). The court concludes

that, under certain circumstances, it is.

The defendants’ arguments against Jacobs’s motion to

vacate focus on Jacobs’s use of the term “ineffective

assistance of counsel.” That has become a term of art in

constitutional law that refers to the right of a criminal

defendant under the Sixth Amendment to adequate

representation. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668

(1984). As the defendants correctly point out, there is

no constitutional or statutory right to effective

assistance of counsel in a civil case. Mekdeci v.

Merrell Nat’l Labs., 711 F.2d 1510, 1522 (11th Cir.

Case 2:05-cv-00925-MHT-SRW Document 62 Filed 01/22/07 Page 9 of 22
10

1983). Accordingly, the poor representation Jacobs

allegedly received did not violate any constitutional

right.

This does not end the court’s inquiry, however,

because it does not answer the question of whether Rules

59(e) or 60(b) recognize attorney error as a basis for

relief. Under Rule 59(e), the district court “enjoys

considerable discretion in granting or denying the

motion.” 11 Wright, Miller & Kane, supra, § 2810.1, at

124. Among the grounds for relief under Rule 59(e) is

that it is necessary to prevent manifest injustice. Id.

at 126. “Serious misconduct of counsel” may justify

relief under this theory. Id. at 126-27; 12 Moore,

supra, § 59.30[5][a][v]; see also Adams v. James, 526

F.Supp. 80, 86 (M.D. Ala. 1981) (Hobbs, J.); Dale & Selby

Superette & Deli v. U.S. Dep’t of Agriculture, 838

F.Supp. 1346, 1347-48 (D. Minn. 1993) (Doty, J.).

Under Rule 60(b), the court also has discretion to

grant relief due to attorney error, but that discretion

Case 2:05-cv-00925-MHT-SRW Document 62 Filed 01/22/07 Page 10 of 22
11

is more limited. Under Rule 60(b)(1), the court is

authorized to grant relief when deadlines are missed due

to “excusable neglect.” In determining whether neglect

is “excusable,” the court must take into account

equitable considerations such as the “danger of prejudice

to the [parties], the length of the delay and its

potential impact on judicial proceedings, the reason for

the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable

control of the movant, and whether the movant acted in

good faith.” Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick

Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993). The

Supreme Court has emphasized that in weighing these

factors, the court must hold clients accountable for the

errors of their attorneys. Id. at 396 (citing Link v.

Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 633-34 (1962)). Thus, in

determining whether the neglect was excusable, the focus

of the court’s inquiry must be on whether the attorney’s

error was excusable, not on whether the client was

Case 2:05-cv-00925-MHT-SRW Document 62 Filed 01/22/07 Page 11 of 22
12

diligent in selecting, monitoring, and cooperating with

counsel. Id. at 397.

Some courts have also granted relief under Rule

60(b)(6). See, e.g., Boughner v. Sec’y of Health, Educ.

& Welfare, 572 F.2d 976 (3d Cir. 1978); L.P. Steuart,

Inc. v. Matthews, 329 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1964); see also

Solaroll Shade & Shutter Corp. v. Bio-Energy Sys., Inc.,

803 F.2d 1130, 1133 (11th Cir. 1986) (recognizing such

cases). In those cases, attorney error is effectively so

gross as to constitute abandonment. When this occurs,

some courts have refused to hold clients accountable for

their attorneys’ dereliction.

In sum, attorney error occasionally forms the legal

basis for relief under Rules 59(e) and 60(b). Therefore,

Jacobs has stated legally adequate grounds for relief.

C. Exercise of Discretion

The final question is whether, under the

circumstances of this case, such relief should be granted

Case 2:05-cv-00925-MHT-SRW Document 62 Filed 01/22/07 Page 12 of 22
13

to Jacobs. Even when a movant has stated legally

cognizable grounds for relief from a final judgment, such

relief is granted rarely and only in extraordinary

circumstances. The court must carefully weigh several

competing interests, including the interest in finality,

the interest in conservation of judicial resources, the

interest in adjudication on the merits, and the interest

that justice be done. See 12 Moore, supra, §§ 59.30[4],

60.22[2]; 11 Wright, Miller & Kane, supra, §§ 2810.1 at

124, 2857 at 255-57 & 259-62; Edward H. Bohlin Co. v.

Banning Co., 6 F.3d 350, 355-56 (5th Cir. 1993).

With these limitations in mind, the court concludes

that the relief Jacobs seeks is not warranted in this

case. Two considerations animate the court’s conclusion:

first, whether the specific instances of inadequate

representation Jacobs complains of warrant relief; and,

second, whether Jacobs would have a meritorious legal

claim if this case were to proceed.

Case 2:05-cv-00925-MHT-SRW Document 62 Filed 01/22/07 Page 13 of 22
14

1. Jacobs’s Legal Representation

The court will first eliminate from consideration

those aspects of Jacobs’s motion arising from allegations

of inadequate legal representation that fall short of the

requirements for Rules 59(e) and 60(b). As stated,

Jacobs argues that when she “acquiesce[d] to the

positions of the Defendants” on all but her Title VII

claim against EDS and her assault-and-battery claim

against Williams, Pl. Br. at 4, her attorney abandoned

those claims without consulting Jacobs and without her

authorization or consent. When a party expressly states

that she is abandoning a claim, this is not “excusable

neglect” under Rule 60(b)(1), which is designed to

relieve parties from missed deadlines, computer glitches,

and similar oversights. As the Supreme Court made clear

in Pioneer Investment Services, 507 U.S. at 396-97,

clients are held accountable for the mistakes of their

attorneys, such that motions for relief due to excusable

neglect focus on whether the attorney’s mistake was

Case 2:05-cv-00925-MHT-SRW Document 62 Filed 01/22/07 Page 14 of 22
2. The attorney-client relationship is widely

recognized as an agency relationship: the client is the

principal and the attorney is her agent. See Link v.

Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 634 (1962); Baldayaque v.

United States, 338 F.3d 145, 154 (2d Cir. 2003) (Jacobs,

J., concurring); Restatement 2d Agency § 14 cmt. b

(1958); DeMott, The Lawyer As Agent, 67 Fordham L. Rev.

301 (1998); Note, The Agency Theory of the AttorneyClient Relationship, 1988 Duke L.J. 733. Liability for

(continued...)

15

excusable as if the party had made the error, not whether

the attorney acted against the wishes of his client.

Accordingly, even if Jacobs’s attorney never obtained her

consent to drop the claims, she cannot obtain relief

under Rule 60(b)(1).

Nor does the express abandonment of claims rise to

the severity of attorney misconduct required for relief

under Rules 59(e) and 60(b)(6). When a litigant retains

counsel, the client entrusts the attorney with the

fiduciary duty of making certain strategic and tactical

decisions about the case, decisions for which the client

is accountable even when made without express

authorization or approval--and, needless to say, even

when they are bad decisions.2

 Decisions to concede

Case 2:05-cv-00925-MHT-SRW Document 62 Filed 01/22/07 Page 15 of 22
(...continued)

agents’ actions undertaken within the scope of their

agency is imputed to the principal, as opposed to actions

undertaken outside the scope of the agency or once the

agency relationship no longer exists.

16

certain parts of a case in order to focus on others, or

not to pursue every possible claim cognizable under the

law, are examples of strategic or tactical choices well

within the scope of the attorney’s authority, decisions

that bind the client. See Haynes v. Cain, 298 F.3d 375,

381 (5th Cir. 2002). By contrast, the kinds of attorney

misconduct justifying relief under Rule 60(b)(6) indicate

a complete failure of an attorney to provide any

meaningful representation at all--in essence, a collapse

of the attorney-client relationship altogether. See

Boughner, 572 F.2d at 978; L.P. Steuart, 329 F.2d at 235.

The court believes that, in order to warrant relief under

the “manifest injustice” provision of Rule 59(e),

attorney misconduct must be of a similar magnitude.

Accordingly, the court finds that relief is not

warranted on Jacobs’s motion with respect to the claims

Case 2:05-cv-00925-MHT-SRW Document 62 Filed 01/22/07 Page 16 of 22
17

she abandoned in her brief opposing the defendants’

motions for summary judgment. These were decisions

regarding litigation strategy, and the consequences of

any error made by Jacobs’s attorney in abandoning those

claims must be borne by Jacobs herself.

2. The Merits of Jacobs’s Title VII Claim Against EDS

With respect to Jacobs’s failure to respond to EDS’s

request for admissions, however, the court recognizes

that Jacobs’s attorney was not making a strategic or

tactical decision on behalf of his client. In fact, it

is fairly obvious that Jacobs’s attorney made no decision

at all--he simply did not respond to the requests for

admission, nor did he move to withdraw the admissions

once they were deemed admitted by an order of the

magistrate judge. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(b). This

failure to meet deadlines and file motions might fall

within the excusable neglect category of Rule 60(b)(1),

or, since it could reflect a complete lack of lawyering

Case 2:05-cv-00925-MHT-SRW Document 62 Filed 01/22/07 Page 17 of 22
18

altogether, it might fall within the provisions for

attorney misconduct recognized under Rules 59(e) and

60(b)(6).

In this case, however, the court declines to exercise

its discretion to set aside the judgment against Jacobs

for another reason: even should the case proceed with her

admissions withdrawn, it appears unlikely that she will

prevail.

Under Rule 59(e), “amendment of the judgment will be

denied if it would serve no useful purpose.” 11 Wright,

Miller & Kane, supra, § 2810.1 at 128; see Taylor v.

First North Am. Nat’l Bank, 331 F.Supp.2d 1354, 1355

(M.D. Ala. 2004) (Thompson, J.). And, under Rule 60(b),

a “precondition of relief ... is that the movant show

that he or she has a meritorious claim or defense.” 12

Moore, supra, § 60.24. Jacobs obviously does not have to

prove her case in the motion to vacate, but it is within

the court’s discretion to consider whether there is a

realistic possibility that she will prevail.

Case 2:05-cv-00925-MHT-SRW Document 62 Filed 01/22/07 Page 18 of 22
19

Because the court is unwilling to revisit the claims

Jacobs abandoned, and because her assault-and-battery

claim was dismissed without prejudice, the real question

is whether her Title VII claim against EDS is

meritorious. In her motion to vacate, Jacobs notes that

EDS investigated Jacobs’s allegation of harassment by

Williams and found that her allegation was substantiated.

Therefore, Jacobs argues, EDS has admitted that her

sexual harassment claim has merit.

Unfortunately for Jacobs, these facts are not enough

to establish a case of sexual harassment under Title VII.

“To prove sexual harassment under Title VII, a plaintiff

must show (1) that she belongs to a protected group; (2)

that she has been subjected to unwelcome sexual

harassment; (3) that the harassment was based on her sex;

(4) that the harassment was sufficiently severe or

pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of employment

and create a discriminatorily abusive working

environment; and (5) that a basis for holding the

Case 2:05-cv-00925-MHT-SRW Document 62 Filed 01/22/07 Page 19 of 22
20

employer liable exists.” Hulsey v. Pride Rests., LLC,

367 F.3d 1238, 1244 (11th Cir. 2004). If the court were

to consider the evidence presented at the summaryjudgment stage of the case and assume that Jacobs’s

admissions were withdrawn, Jacobs would still fall short

in establishing the fifth element, that a basis for

holding EDS liable for Williams’s conduct exists.

In a Title VII suit based on co-worker harassment,

“the employer will be held directly liable if it knew or

should have known of the alleged sexual harassment but

failed to take prompt remedial action.” Miller v.

Kenworth of Dothan, Inc., 277 F.3d 1269, 1278 (11th Cir.

2002). Here, the evidence reflects that EDS promptly

investigated Williams but was able to substantiate

Jacobs’s allegation only to the extent that he admitted

to having ‘hugged’ her. There were no other complaints

against Williams. EDS took corrective action by

reprimanding Williams for the ‘hugging’ and requiring him

to take an online sexual harassment course. Based on the

Case 2:05-cv-00925-MHT-SRW Document 62 Filed 01/22/07 Page 20 of 22
21

evidence, it appears that EDS took prompt remedial action

once it received Jacobs’s complaint. The question, of

course, is not whether the remedial action was adequate

in light of what Jacobs contends actually happened to her

in the elevator, but whether EDS’s overall response--the

investigation plus its discipline of Williams based on

the investigation’s results--was adequate in light of

Jacobs’s complaint. The evidence reflects that it most

arguably was.

Although the court is not prepared to re-litigate

Jacobs’s summary-judgment motion within her motion to

vacate, the court is confident that denying her motion to

vacate with respect to her Title VII claim against EDS

will not work a manifest injustice. Even if Jacobs

received such woefully inadequate legal representation

that the court would consider a motion to vacate on that

basis, the court declines to exercise its discretion to

do so here because Jacobs’s case, on the merits, is so

weak.

Case 2:05-cv-00925-MHT-SRW Document 62 Filed 01/22/07 Page 21 of 22
* * *

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that defendant Adwowa

Jacobs’s motion to vacate (doc. no. 58) is denied.

DONE, this the 22nd day of January, 2007.

 /s/ Myron H. Thompson 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Case 2:05-cv-00925-MHT-SRW Document 62 Filed 01/22/07 Page 22 of 22