Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00339/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00339-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICKEY O’ROY,

Plaintiff,

v.

MARES, et. al.,

Defendants.

 /

CV F 05 00339 OWW LJO P

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND (DOC. 1)

ORDER DIRECTING THE CLERK OF COURT

TO SEND PLAINTIFF BLANK CIVIL RIGHTS

FORM

Rickey O’Roy (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in

this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff initiated this action on March

11, 2005. Plaintiff names as defendants, Correctional Officer Mares and 10 Doe Defendants. 

A. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon

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1Complaint at pg. 3 of 17.

2Complaint at pg 3 of 17.

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which relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding,

467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also Palmer v.

Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass'n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing a

complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in

question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the

pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor. 

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). 

B. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT

Plaintiff claims that in the dining hall during the morning meal, on January 19, 2004, there

was a fist fight between two other inmates. He claims he was not involved in the disturbance in

any way and after the combatants were subdued by use of pepper spray, and Plaintiff had

positioned himself in a prone position on the floor, Defendant Mares intentionally shot him with a

state issued 37mm launcher. Plaintiff alleges that the shooting was in retaliation for “Plaintiff’s

affidavit as a witness of Defendant Mares physical assault” on another inmate in the prison.1

Plaintiff claims that he suffered severe impact pain, swelling, bruising, a 6" contusion on his

thigh, soreness, stiffness and discomfort walking. Plaintiff also claims that 10 correctional officers

were present in the dining hall during the incident and “failed to act within the course and scope

of their employment under color of law.”2

C. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

1. Linkage Requirement

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

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Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between

the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

(1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a

constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates

in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that

causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th

Cir. 1978). In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, plaintiff must link each named

defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of plaintiff’s

federal rights.

2. Retaliation

An allegation of retaliation against a prisoner’s First Amendment right to file a prison

grievance is sufficient to support a claim under Section 1983. Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1288

(9th Cir. 2003. "Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails

five elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2)

because of (3) that prisoner's protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate's

exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate

correctional goal." Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567 (9th Cir.2005) (citations omitted). 

In assessing the fourth requirement, the court at the pleading stage should ask " 'whether

an official's acts would chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness from future First Amendment

activities." ' Id. at 568, quoting Mendocino Environmental Center v. Mendocino County, 192 F.3d

1283, 1300 (9th Cir.1999). "The 'government' to which the First Amendment guarantees a right of

redress of grievances includes prison authorities, as it includes other administrative arms and units

of government." Bradley v. Hall, 64 F.3d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir.1995), citing Soranno's Gasco, Inc.

v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir.1989). An allegation that a defendant subjected a

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prisoner to "[v]erbal harassment or abuse ... is not sufficient to state a constitutional deprivation

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 138 (9th Cir.1987) (internal

quotations omitted). However, in the context of a prisoner's retaliation claim, threats of discipline

or transfer for the plaintiff's exercise of his First Amendment rights are sufficiently adverse action

to state a claim. See Gomez v. Vernon, 255 F.3d 1118, 1123 (9th Cir.2001); Valandingham v.

Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1141 (9th Cir.1989).

Plaintiff alleges he was shot by Defendant Mares because he filed an affidavit as a witness

to an assault on another inmate by the Defendant. Accepting the allegations as true, Hospital Bldg.

Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), it is possible that the action taken by

Defendant Mares might chill or silence an ordinary person’s First Amendment rights. If, as

Plaintiff claims, the incident in the dining hall had been contained at the time Plaintiff was shot,

then the action by Defendant would not have reasonably advanced a legitimate correctional goal.

Accordingly, Plaintiff alleges sufficient facts to state a cognizable claim for relief for retaliation. 

3. Excessive Force

The use of excessive force by a prison official violates the eighth amendment. Hudson v.

McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 995 (1992). Determining whether there has been an eighth

amendment violation turns upon " 'whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or

restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.' " See id. at

6 (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21, 106 S.Ct. 1078 (1986)).

To prevail on an excessive force claim, an inmate must show the official applied force

"maliciously and sadistically" for the purpose of inflicting pain, rather than in a "good faith effort

to maintain or restore discipline." Id. at 4-5, 7, 112 S.Ct. at 999. Such factors as the need for the

application of the force, the relationship between the need for the application of force and the

amount of force used, and the extent of injury inflicted are relevant to the ultimate determination.

Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319, 106 S.Ct. 1078 (1986). An inmate, however, does not

need to have suffered an injury to establish an Eighth Amendment violation. Hudson, 503 U.S. at

7.

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The Supreme Court has further held that not “every malevolent touch by a prison guard

gives rise to a federal cause of action. Id. at 9. “Not every push or shove, even if it may later

seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers, violates a prisoner’s constitutional rights.” 

Id. (citing Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2nd Cir. 1973) (cert. denied sub nom. Johnson,

414 U.S. 1033 (1973)). “The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of ‘cruel and unusual’

punishments necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of physical

force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort ‘repugnant to the conscience of mankind.’” Id.

at 9-10.

Plaintiff has also succeeded in stating sufficient facts to establish a cognizable claim of

excessive force against Defendant Mares. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Mares shot him while

he was lying in a prone position on the dining hall floor. Plaintiff’s Complaint also alleges that the

shooting was unnecessary because Plaintiff was not involved in the disturbance and was

submitting to all requests by the officers. 

4. Failure to Protect

Prison officials have a duty to take reasonable steps to protect inmates from physical

abuse. Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237 at 1250-51; Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833

(1994). To establish a violation of this duty, the prisoner must establish that prison officials were

“deliberately indifferent to a serious threat to the inmates’s safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.

at 834. The deliberate indifference standard involves an objective and a subjective prong. First,

the alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms, “sufficiently serious.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511

U.S. at 834 (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second, the prison official must

“know of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. at 837.

Plaintiff has failed to give any facts that show that the 10 officers (Doe Defendants) knew

of and disregarded an excessive risk to his health or safety. The facts fail to give any indication of

how these Defendants could have intervened in the situation. Also, Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges

that 6 officers were engaged in an effort to contain the incident that occurred between the two

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28 3Complaint at pg 11, of 17.

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other inmates at the time the shooting took place.3 Therefore, Plaintiff does not state a claim

against the 10 Doe Defendants for failure to protect.

5. Due Process

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects prisoners from being

deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.

539, 556 (1974). 

Plaintiff cites to the Due Process clause in his Complaint, but has not alleged any facts that

would support a due process claim. Thus, he fails to state a claim for relief. 

6. State Law Claim - Negligence

 A public employee is liable for injury to a prisoner “proximately caused by his negligent

or wrongful act or omission.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 844.6(d) (West 2001). “To establish negligence,

a party must prove the following: (a) a legal duty to use due care; (b) a breach of such legal duty;

(c) the breach as the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury.” Hair v. State, 2 Cal. Rptr.

2nd 871, 875 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (citations omitted).

I. Defendant Mares

Plaintiff has failed to state a claim of negligence against Defendant Mares. Plaintiff

generally alleges that the Defendant breaches his duty but does not state what that duty entails. 

ii. 10 Doe Defendants

Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim for negligence against the 10 correctional

officers in the dining hall at the time of the shooting. Plaintiff does not give sufficient facts to

establish that the officers breached their duty of care and also fails to state what the officers duty

actually was. Plaintiff also fails to link the actions of the 10 Doe Defendants with the deprivation

alleged to have been suffered. 

7. Supplemental Jurisdiction

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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), in any civil action in which the district court has original

jurisdiction, the district court “shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims in the

action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under

Article III,” except as provided in subsections (b) and (c). “[O]nce judicial power exists under

§ 1367(a), retention of supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims under 1367(c) is

discretionary.” Acri v. Varian Assoc., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1997). “The district

court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if . . .

the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367(c)(3). The Supreme Court has cautioned that “if the federal claims are dismissed before

trial, . . . the state claims should be dismissed as well.” United Mine Workers of America v.

Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). 

D. CONCLUSION

The Court finds Plaintiff’s Complaint states a cognizable claim against Defendant Mares

for retaliation and excessive force. However, Plaintiff’s Complaint does not contain any other

cognizable claims for relief. As such, the Court will grant Plaintiff the opportunity to file an

Amended Complaint to cure the deficiencies, or, in the alternative, notify the Court in writing

whether Plaintiff intends to proceed directly with those claims found to be cognizable. Plaintiff

should note that Local Rule 15-220 requires that an Amended Complaint be complete in itself

without reference to prior pleadings. 

In the event Plaintiff wishes to proceed on the cognizable claims, the Court will issue

Findings and Recommendations to dismiss those claims not cognizable. The Court will then

forward Plaintiff a summons and USM-285 form to fill out and return to the Court in order to

effect service on the Defendants. Upon the return of these forms, the Court will direct the US

Marshal to initiate service of process on Defendants. 

E. ORDER

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

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1. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to SEND Plaintiff a blank civil rights complaint

form;

2. The Complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend. Within THIRTY (30) days

from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff SHALL:

a. File an Amended Complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court

in this Order, or

b. Notify the Court in writing that he does not wish to file an Amended

Complaint and instead wishes to proceed on the cognizable claims for relief

set forth in this Order.

Plaintiff is forewarned that his failure to comply with this Order may result in a

Recommendation that the Complaint be dismissed pursuant to Local Rule 11-110.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 13, 2006 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

b9ed48 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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