Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_08-cv-08042/USCOURTS-azd-3_08-cv-08042-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Nancy Termini, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Frontier Communications of America, Inc.

(a/k/a Citizen’s Communications

Company); Marilyn Figueroa; Geraldine

Miller; Dianna Thornton; Gail Tarson;

Kelli Brice-Donlea; Denise Baumbach;

Mohave County; City of Kingman; Lee F.

Jantzen; Kenneth Upton, 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 08-8042-PCT-JAT

ORDER

Of the eleven defendants in this case, ten have moved to dismiss the complaint and

one has answered. In the motion to dismiss filed by City of Kingman and Kenneth Upton

(“City defendants”), those defendants alternatively move for a more definite statement.

Without deciding the issues raised in the motions to dismiss, the Court finds the motion for

more definite statement to be well taken.

Specifically, by way of example, the City defendants note that in the complaint in

Counts I-VI and X, all defendants are alleged to have “wrongfully discharged” Plaintiff from

employment. However, it is undisputed that Plaintiff was employed by only Frontier

Communication of America. Therefore, the City defendants argue that it seems unlikely that

Plaintiff is truly asserting a wrongful discharge claim against all defendants. See Doc. #46

Case 3:08-cv-08042-JAT Document 53 Filed 07/16/08 Page 1 of 4
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1

 The Court should not give a party advice because advice, “would undermine district

judges’ role as impartial decision makers.” See Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004).

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at 2. The Court agrees. Moreover, even if the Court is mistaken, and Plaintiff indeed intends

to claim that all defendants wrongfully discharged her, the lack of an obvious connection

between each defendant and the claim only highlights why Plaintiff must put forth some

factual basis to support her wrongful discharge claim as to each defendant.

By way of further example, the Mohave defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to

plead facts that would overcome prosecutorial immunity, and instead pleads a legal

conclusion, claiming that Mr. Jantzen “engaged in investigative functions normally

performed by police officers.” Doc. #44 at 2. The Court agrees that this particular quote is

a legal conclusion, and as discussed below, legal conclusions standing alone are not

sufficient facts to state a claim.

Based on the foregoing, the Court will grant the motion for more definite statement.

As stated above, the Court makes this decision without reaching the merits of any of the

motions to dismiss because the Court finds the motion for more definite statement to be well

taken. In granting this motion and ordering Plaintiff to file an amended complaint, the Court

will not tell Plaintiff how to plead or what to plead to state a claim.1

 However, the Court will

remind Plaintiff of the standard set forth by the Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007):

While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need

detailed factual allegations, ibid.; Sanjuan v. American Bd. of Psychiatry and

Neurology, Inc., 40 F.3d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 1994), a plaintiff's obligation to

provide the “grounds” of his “entitle[ment] to relief” requires more than labels

and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action

will not do, see Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986) (on a motion to

dismiss, courts “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as

a factual allegation”).

Id. at 1964-65.

The Court went on to say:

While, for most types of cases, the Federal Rules eliminated the cumbersome

requirement that a claimant “set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his

claim,” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)

Case 3:08-cv-08042-JAT Document 53 Filed 07/16/08 Page 2 of 4
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2

 In other words, Plaintiff should not plead on the assumption that if she states

sufficient facts to support a particular claim against any one defendant that such a pleading

will be sufficient for that claim to survive against the other 10 defendants.

3

 The Mohave defendants never actually pick which provision of Rule 12 they are

moving under, but in their standard of review they discuss the failure to state a claim legal

standard.

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(emphasis added), Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a “showing,” rather than a blanket

assertion, of entitlement to relief. Without some factual allegation in the

complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant could satisfy the requirement of

providing not only “fair notice” of the nature of the claim, but also “grounds”

on which the claim rests. See 5 Wright & Miller § 1202, at 94, 95 (Rule 8(a)

“contemplate[s] the statement of circumstances, occurrences, and events in

support of the claim presented” and does not authorize a pleader’s “bare

averment that he wants relief and is entitled to it”).

Id. at 1965 n.3.

Thus, Plaintiff must allege sufficient facts (and not legal conclusions) to state a claim

against each defendant (not all defendants as a whole) as to each cause of action.2 Further,

to the extent Plaintiff has, for example, no facts to support a wrongful discharge claim against

defendant Upton, defendant Upton should not be included as a defendant in the wrongful

discharge claim.

Finally, the Court will deny the pending motions to dismiss as moot because an

amended complaint will be filed based on the Court’s granting of the motion for more

definite statement. The Court deems this to be the most expeditious course because, had the

Court reviewed and granted any of the motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim,3

 such

an order would have been, de facto, nothing more that an order granting a more definite

statement. This result occurs because, when Plaintiff has never amended her complaint once

as a matter of right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), this Court must sua sponte

give her such an opportunity before the Court can enter judgment of dismissal. Specifically,

the Court of Appeals has held: 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a) provides, inter alia, that “a party may amend his pleading

once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served

. . . .” We have stated that “‘[a] motion to dismiss is not a “responsive

pleading” within the meaning of the Rule. Neither the filing nor granting of

such a motion before answer terminates the right to amend; an order of

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 The Court notes that one defendant has answered, thus cutting off Plaintiff’s ability

to amend once as a matter of right with respect to that defendant. However, the Court cannot

have multiple versions of the complaint operative against different defendants. Therefore,

the to-be-filed amended complaint will be the sole controlling pleading, and the one

answering defendant will be required to answer or otherwise respond to the amended

complaint within the time lines set forth below, the same as all the other defendants.

5

 Although the Citizen Defendants claim to be moving in part under 12(b)(1) for lack

of jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals has made clear that failure to file with the EEOC is not

a jurisdictional bar. Surrell v. California Water Service Co., 518 F.3d 1097, 1104-05 (9th Cir.

2008). However, Plaintiff is reminded in filing her amended complaint that the Court of

Appeals has indicated that, if this is an employment case, Plaintiff must allege receipt of a

right-to-sue letter absent some equitable consideration. See Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles

Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 626-627 (9th Cir. 1988).

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dismissal denying leave to amend at that state is improper . . . .’” Mayes, 729

F.2d at 607 (quoting Breier v. Northern California Bowling Proprietors’

Association, 316 F.2d 787, 789 (9th Cir. 1963)). If a complaint is dismissed

for failure to state a claim, leave to amend should be granted unless the court

determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged

pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency. Bonanno v. Thomas, 309 F.2d

320, 322 (9th Cir. 1962).

Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986).4

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the portion of Doc. #20 that is a motion for more definite

statement is granted.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that by August 5, 2008, Plaintiff shall file an amended

complaint with the specificity discussed herein.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all defendants shall answer or otherwise respond

to the to-be-filed amended complaint by August 26, 2008.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the other pending motions to dismiss for failure to

state a claim (Doc. #21, Doc. #47 and part of Doc. #20) are denied as moot.5

DATED this 16th day of July, 2008.

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