Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00190/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00190-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Joseph C. Holmes, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Russell Barker, a Police Officer for the

City of Clinton, Tennessee; Vaughn

Becker, a Police Officer for the City of

Clinton, Tennessee; Don Layton, Judge

for the Sessions Court in Anderson

County, Tennessee; Pam Beck,

Supervisor of the Sex Offender

Registration Office for the Tennessee

Bureau of Investigation; Phillip Harber,

an attorney licensed to practice law in the

State of Tennessee, and John Doe and

Jane Doe, Deputy District Attorneys for

the District Attorney’s Office of

Anderson County, Tennessee,

Defendants. 

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No. CV-08-190-PHX-DGC

ORDER

Defendant Philip Harber has filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Dkt. #25. The motion has been fully briefed. Dkt.

##27-29. For reasons stated below, the Court will transfer this action to the United States

District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee.

I. Background.

In 1986, Plaintiff Joseph Holmes was convicted in Arizona state court of child

molestation and dangerous crime against children. Dkt. #21 at 20-21; see State v. Engle, CRCase 2:08-cv-00190-DGC Document 34 Filed 11/26/08 Page 1 of 5
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1

Plaintiff changed his name from Joseph Carlton Engle to Joseph Carlton Holmes in

December 1998. Dkt. #21 at 14.

2

See http://test.azcorrections.gov/isearch/inmate_datasearch/ index.aspx (enter inmate

number 041692 in the ADC Inmate Datasearch “Inmate Number” box and click “GO”).

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154769 (Ariz. Super. Ct.).1 Plaintiff was sentenced to a prison term of seventeen years in the

Arizona Department of Corrections. Id. at 20. Plaintiff was released from custody in July

2003.2

Plaintiff moved to Clinton, Tennessee in July 2006. Dkt. #1 at 7. In January 2007,

Plaintiff was arrested in Anderson County for an alleged sex offender registration violation.

Dkt. #29-2 at 6-7; see T.C.A. § 40-39-204. Plaintiff was found guilty and was given a

suspended sentence of 364 days in jail on the condition that he relocate and not return to

Tennessee. Dkt. #29-2 at 8-9. Plaintiff currently is incarcerated in Cherokee County,

Georgia, on a charge of failing to register as a sex offender. Dkt. #21 at 12-13; see O.C.G.A.

§ 42-1-12.

II. This Suit.

Plaintiff filed a complaint in this Court against various Tennessee officials and a

private attorney, Philip Harber. Dkt. #1. Plaintiff alleges that he moved to the small town

of Clinton to work as Harber’s legal assistant, but ended up investigating various townsfolk

to acquire information that could be used by Harber to slander or blackmail the individuals.

Id. at 7. Plaintiff claims that Harber may have sought to run him out of town given his

knowledge of Harber’s alleged unlawful activities. Id. Plaintiff further claims that in

retaliation for investigating prominent Clinton residents, the other defendants conspired to

bring false criminal charges against him, banish him from Tennessee, and have him listed on

the National Sex Offender Public Website. Id. at 11-13. The complaint asserts civil rights

claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. Id. at 1-2. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief

and $10 million dollars from each defendant. Id. at 13.

Defendant Harber seeks dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction, for improper

Case 2:08-cv-00190-DGC Document 34 Filed 11/26/08 Page 2 of 5
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venue, and for failure to state a claim for relief. Dkt. #25. Alternatively, he seeks a more

definite statement of the claims asserted against him. Id.

III. Discussion.

Because federal question jurisdiction exists, the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1391(b), applies to this action. See King v. Russell, 963 F.2d 1301, 1303 (9th Cir. 1992).

That statute provides that a civil action may be brought only in “a judicial district where any

defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same State, [or] a judicial district in which

a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred[.]” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1391(b)(1)-(2).

Harber argues that this Court is an improper venue because he resides in Tennessee

and nothing in the complaint connects this action to Arizona. Dkt. #25 at 2. Although

Harber is the only defendant who has moved to dismiss on the ground of improper venue, the

Court has authority to raise the issue of defective venue on its own motion because the other

defendants have not been served with process and therefore have not waived the defense.

Costlow v. Weeks, 790 F.2d 1486, 1488 (9th Cir. 1986); see Ruiz v. Jolicover, No. CV 07-

743-PHX-DGC (JJM), 2007 WL 1159594, at *1 (D. Ariz. Apr. 18, 2007) (“The Court may

raise sua sponte the issue of venue when the defendants have not yet filed a responsive

pleading and the time for doing so has not yet run.”) (citing Costlow).

A review of the complaint makes clear that the District of Arizona is not the proper

venue for this action. The alleged civil rights violations occurred in Anderson County,

Tennessee (see Dkt. #1 at 3-11), and all Defendants reside in Tennessee (id. at 3). This

action therefore should have been filed in the Eastern District of Tennessee. See Costlow,

790 F.2d at 1488 (complaint should have been filed in Alaska rather than Washington

because all defendants resided in Alaska and “virtually all of the activity providing the basis

of the complaint took place in Alaska”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 123 (defining Tennessee’s

judicial districts).

When venue is improper, the Court has discretion to dismiss the action or, “in the

interest of justice, transfer [the] case to any district or division in which it could have been

Case 2:08-cv-00190-DGC Document 34 Filed 11/26/08 Page 3 of 5
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brought.” 28 U.S.C. 1406(a); see Cook v. Fox, 537 F.2d 370, 371 (9th Cir. 1976). The

Supreme Court has made clear that “when dismissal of an action for improper venue would

terminate rights without a hearing on the merits because [the] plaintiff’s action would be

barred by a statute of limitations, ‘the interest of justice’ requires that the cause be

transferred.” Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 430 n.7 (1965). If the Court were

to dismiss this action without prejudice, a newly filed complaint may be barred by the statute

of limitations. See Anrig v. Ringsby United, 603 F.2d 1319, 1326 (9th Cir. 1978) (noting that

the dismissal of the action for improper venue would deprive the plaintiffs of an available

remedy “due to the passage of time and the running of the statute of limitations”). The Court

therefore concludes that “it is in the interest of justice and ‘particularly appropriate’ to

transfer” this action to the Eastern District of Tennessee. United States v. Miller-Stauch

Constr. Co., 904 F. Supp. 1209, (D. Kan. 1995) (citation omitted).

Given this ruling, the Court will deny as moot Harber’s motion to dismiss for lack of

personal jurisdiction. The Court will defer to the Eastern District of Tennessee on the

resolution of Harber’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and alternative motion

for a more definite statement. See Malbco Holdings, LLC. v. AMCO Ins. Co., No. CV-07-

389-RHW, 2008 WL 2035522, at *4 (E.D. Wash. May 12, 2008) (granting motion to transfer

and declining to resolve remaining substantive issues). 

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Defendant Philip Harber’s motion (Dkt. #25) is denied to the extent it seeks

dismissal for improper venue, is denied as moot to the extent it seeks

dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction, and remains pending in all other

respects.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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2. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), the Clerk is directed to transfer the case to the

United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee (Northern

Division) for all further proceedings.

DATED this 26th day of November, 2008.

Case 2:08-cv-00190-DGC Document 34 Filed 11/26/08 Page 5 of 5