Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00916/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00916-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THOMAS L. MASSON, JR.,

Petitioner,

v.

E. VALENZUELA,

Respondent.

Case No.: 16-cv-916 JLS (JLB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION RE: 

PETITION FOR WRIT OF 

HABEAS CORPUS

[ECF No. 1]

Before the Court is the petition for writ of habeas corpus of Thomas L. Masson, Jr., 

a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 1.) Also before the 

Court is Respondent’s answer to the petition (ECF No. 15) and Petitioner’s traverse (ECF 

No. 17). 

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United States District Judge 

Janis L. Sammartino pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the 

Local Rules of Practice of the United States District Court for the Southern District of 

California. After a thorough review of the parties’ pleadings and supporting documents 

and for the reasons set forth below, the Court RECOMMENDS the Petition be DENIED.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from the San Diego County Probation Officer’s Report 

(ECF No. 16-1), the San Diego County District Attorney’s Amended Felony Complaint 

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(ECF No. 16-9), and the San Diego Sheriff’s Department Certificate of Release that

Petitioner attached to his federal habeas petition (ECF No. 1 at 26).1 This Court does not 

presume these facts to be correct, nor does the Court rely on them for its analysis of the 

merits of Petitioner’s habeas claims. Rather, they are set forth here because they provide 

clarification of the bases of Petitioner’s claims, which are, in a vacuum, difficult to 

untangle.

On July 12, 2012, Petitioner was taken into custody on suspicion of breaking a 

window in an attempt to enter the home of Philip and Melissa Faber, who were asleep in 

their home at the time. (ECF No. 1 at 26; ECF No. 16-1 at 2.) Although Petitioner admitted 

to being in the area of the Faber’s home that night, and although some evidence of his 

possible participation in the event was recovered from his vehicle (ECF No. 16-1 at 2), he 

was released from custody and no charges were filed at that time. (ECF No. 1 at 26.) 

It was only after Petitioner was arrested and charged with four other residential 

burglaries that the San Diego County District Attorney charged Petitioner with the Faber 

burglary. (ECF No. 16-9.) On November 25, 2013, the San Diego County District 

Attorney filed an amended felony complaint charging Petitioner with five counts of first 

degree burglary in violation of California Penal Code §§ 459 and 460 for five separate 

burglaries that occurred at five separate residences in 2012 and 2013. (ECF No. 16-9.) 

The Faber burglary was charged as Count 2. (Id. at 2.) With respect to this count, the 

District Attorney included a California Penal Code § 667.5(c)(21) special allegation that a 

person other than an accomplice was present in the residence during the commission of the 

burglary. (Id.) This allegation, if found true, would qualify this particular burglary as a 

“violent felony” under California law. See California Penal Code § 667.5(c)(21). 

///

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1

 All citations to page numbers in this Report and Recommendation reference the page numbers assigned 

by the Court’s CM/ECF system. 

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II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner pleaded guilty to all five counts and the special allegations on February 

10, 2014. (ECF No. 16-2 at 1.) A sentencing hearing was held on April 22, 2014, and 

Petitioner was sentenced to a total of six years in prison. (Id.) His sentence comprised the 

upper term of six years on Count 2 and the middle term of four years on Counts 1, 3, 4, and 

5, served concurrently. (Id.) Petitioner did not appeal his sentence. 

On April 13, 2015, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the San 

Diego County Superior Court in Case No. EHC 1038. (ECF No. 16-3.) Petitioner raised 

three claims for relief. First, Petitioner claimed that he received ineffective assistance of 

counsel “during fundamental phases of the trial process” when his counsel: (1) failed to 

discuss with him the full scope of his charges until 45 days after the preliminary hearing; 

(2) gave Petitioner false and misleading information; (3) failed to file motions to suppress 

evidence or request to have Petitioner’s counts charged separately; and (4) failed to provide 

investigation or adversarial advocation. (Id. at 3.) Second, Petitioner claimed that the San 

Diego County District Attorney engaged in prosecutorial misconduct when he introduced

during Petitioner’s arraignment a pre-trial services report that contained allegedly 

erroneous and misleading information. (Id. at 4.) Third, Petitioner claimed that the trial 

court committed judicial error during Petitioner’s sentencing hearing when it allowed the 

state to consolidate Petitioner’s charges, thereby allowing the District Attorney to charge 

Petitioner with a violent felony enhancement on Count 2, which Petitioner believes

increased his sentence. (Id. at 6.) On May 12, 2015, the San Diego County Superior Court 

denied the petition in a reasoned decision on the basis that petitioner failed to state any 

prima facie claim for relief. (See ECF No. 16-4.) 

Petitioner filed a subsequent petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California 

Court of Appeal on August 7, 2015, in Case No. D068590. (ECF No. 16-5.) In this 

petition, Petitioner claimed that he suffered malicious prosecution and misconduct on the 

basis that the San Diego County District Attorney attached the § 667.5(c)(21) enhancement 

to Count 2 “with the intent to expose petitioner to greater punishment.” (Id. at 3.) 

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Specifically, Petitioner alleged that the District Attorney “willfully and successfully 

misrepresented and deceived the trial court with this enhancement allegation in concert 

with inclusion of a previously uncharged attempted burglary allegation that petitioner was 

never prosecuted for, nor found guilty of.” (Id.) In addition, Petitioner claimed that the 

trial court committed reversible error by accepting and applying the § 667.5(c)(21) 

enhancement when sentencing Petitioner “without a factual sound basis” for doing so. (Id.

at 4.) On August 17, 2015, the California Court of Appeal denied the petition in a reasoned 

decision on the basis that Petitioner failed to provide sufficient evidentiary support for his 

claims. (See ECF No. 16-6.)

Petitioner then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme 

Court on October 26, 2015, in Case No. S230159. (ECF No. 16-7.) Petitioner’s claims in 

this petition were identical to those raised in his habeas petition filed with the California 

Court of Appeal. (Id. at 3–4.) The California Supreme Court denied the petition without 

comment on January 27, 2016. (ECF No. 16-8.) 

Petitioner filed the instant petition on March 16, 2016, in the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of California, in Case No. 4:16-cv-1299 KAW. (ECF No. 

1.) Because Petitioner is challenging a conviction and sentence that were imposed by the 

San Diego County Superior Court, which lies within the venue of the Southern District of 

California, the petition was transferred to this Court on April 15, 2016. (ECF Nos. 6, 7.) 

On April 25, 2016, District Judge Janis L. Sammartino granted Petitioner’s motion for 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 9.) Respondent filed his answer to the 

Petition on June 27, 2016. (ECF No. 15.) Petitioner filed his traverse on July 21, 2016. 

(ECF No. 17.) 

III. SCOPE OF REVIEW

Section 2254 of Title 28 of the United States Code provides the scope of 

review for federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall 

entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in [sic] behalf of a person 

in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that 

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he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United 

States.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

In addition, federal habeas corpus claims are subject to the provisions of the 

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), codified at 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326–27 (1997) (holding that federal courts 

reviewing any habeas petition filed in federal court after the April 24, 1996 enactment of 

AEDPA will apply its provisions). Under the AEDPA, a petitioner must overcome a high 

threshold to obtain relief:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with 

respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court 

proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by 

the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 

proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011).

For purposes of federal habeas corpus review under § 2254(d)(1), “clearly 

established Federal law” means “the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the 

Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 

U.S. 63, 71–72 (2003). The term refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of Supreme 

Court decisions. Id. at 71 (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000)). 

A federal habeas court may grant relief under the “contrary to” clause of 

§ 2254(d)(1) if the state court applied a rule different from the governing law set forth in 

Supreme Court cases or if it decided a case differently than the Supreme Court on a set of 

materially indistinguishable facts. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). The court may 

grant relief under the “unreasonable application” clause of § 2254(d)(1) if the state court 

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correctly identified the governing legal principle from Supreme Court decisions but 

unreasonably applied those decisions to the facts of a particular case. Id. Habeas corpus 

relief cannot be granted under § 2254(d)(1) “so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’” 

on whether the state court decision is inconsistent with clearly established federal law. 

Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101 (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). 

To grant relief under § 2254(d)(2)’s “unreasonable determination of the facts” 

standard, a petitioner must demonstrate that the factual findings upon which the state 

court’s adjudication of his claims rest, assuming it rests upon a determination of the facts, 

are objectively unreasonable. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). 

Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, the federal habeas 

court “looks through” to the underlying appellate court decision and presumes it provides 

the basis for the higher court’s denial of a claim or claims. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 

U.S. 797, 804–06 (1991); see also Harrington, 562 U.S. at 99–100 (holding that an 

unexplained denial of a claim by the California Supreme Court is an adjudication on the 

merits of the claim and is entitled to deference unless “there is reason to think some other 

explanation for the state court’s decision is more likely”). 

IV. DISCUSSION

Petitioner raises the following three claims for relief in his federal habeas petition: 

(1) ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) prosecutorial misconduct; and (3) judicial error. 

(ECF No. 1 at 3–10.) In addition, Petitioner raises a Sixth Amendment right to counsel 

claim in his traverse. (ECF No. 17 at 4-5.) 

A. Overview of Underlying Premises of Petitioner’s Claims

Petitioner asserts several bases for his federal habeas claims that are built on a 

foundation of key principles that are fundamentally flawed. Because these bases appear 

repeatedly in Petitioner’s claims, and because each is without foundation or merit, the 

Court addresses each of these supporting principles before turning to the federal habeas 

claims upon which they are based. 

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First, Petitioner bases all three of his federal habeas claims on the belief that it was 

unlawful to charge him with the Faber burglary, which was Count 2 of the complaint 

against him. Petitioner believes he should not have been charged with this crime because 

it “stemmed from a previously dismissed allegation of attempted Burglaryy [sic] alleged 

15 months prior[, which] was elevated to PC 459, 460, 667.5(c)(21) . . . with no new 

evidence coming to light.” (ECF No. 1 at 7.) Petitioner’s premise that it was unlawful to 

charge him with this burglary is erroneous.

It appears Petitioner believes that jeopardy attaches upon arrest. It does not. See 

Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 38 (1978) (jeopardy attaches when the jury is empaneled and 

sworn); United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 343 (1975) (noting that the Double Jeopardy 

Clause protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after an acquittal or 

conviction). Petitioner’s prior arrest and release for the Faber burglary was not a 

prosecution and acquittal, and therefore it was lawful for Petitioner to be later be arrested

for and charged with the commission of the Faber burglary. 

To the extent that Petitioner believes no new evidence was discovered to support his 

second arrest for the Faber burglary, the record indicates that after his arrest for the

Rosendahl burglary on October 20, 2013 (Count 5), Petitioner admitted going to the 

Faber’s home and breaking the window. (See ECF No. 16-1 at 2–5.) This admission 

further linked Petitioner to the Faber burglary, and Petitioner does not dispute that he made 

this admission. Thus, Petitioner’s belief that he was charged for the Faber burglary “with 

no new evidence coming to light” is not only legally irrelevant (see, e.g. People v. 

Uhlemann, 9 Cal.3d 662 (1973) (in California, a magistrate’s order dismissing a felony 

complaint is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense), but factually incorrect. 

Second, Petitioner bases all three of his federal habeas claims on his position that it

was improper to charge him with the § 667.5(c)(21) special allegation that attached to the 

Faber burglary because Petitioner believes (incorrectly) that the enhancement was wrongly 

based upon certain prior convictions and that it served to enhance his sentence. (ECF No. 

1 at 7–9.) Contrary to Petitioner’s apparent belief that California Penal Code § 667.5(c) is 

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a sentence-enhancing provision that was triggered by a defendant’s prior violent felonies, 

it is, instead, a provision that defines which particular felonies constitute “violent felonies” 

under California law. Subpart (21) of California Penal Code § 667.5(c) makes “[a]ny 

burglary of the first degree, as defined in subdivision (a) of Section 460, wherein it is 

charged and proved that another person, other than an accomplice, was present in the 

residence during the commission of the burglary” a violent felony. Cal. Penal Code 

§ 667.5(c)(21). Thus, the basis for the application of § 667.5(c)(21) is the presence of 

bystanders within the building that was burglarized and the effect of the application of 

§ 667.5(c)(21) is that the burglary is designated a “violent felony,” the result being that, for 

the sentence for any such conviction, conduct credits are limited to fifteen percent. Cal. 

Penal Code § 2933.1. 

Here, Petitioner was charged with, and pleaded guilty to, five separate counts of first 

degree burglary of an inhabited dwelling house within the meaning of California Penal 

Code § 460(a). (See ECF No. 16-9 at 2–3.) With respect to Count 2, the Faber burglary, 

the record indicates, and Petitioner has not disputed, that the Fabers were present in the 

residence during the commission of the burglary. (See ECF No. 16-1 at 2.) Thus, 

§ 667.5(c)(21) is applicable and the Faber burglary is properly classified as a violent felony. 

Third, Petitioner bases all three of his federal habeas claims on the belief that his 

sentence was “illegally” enhanced due to the California Penal Code § 667.5(c)(21) special 

allegation that attached to the Faber burglary. (ECF No. 1 at 3, 9.) This is incorrect. As 

stated above, California Penal Code § 667.5(c) is not an enhancement statute.2 Its purpose, 

again, is to define the particular felonies that constitute violent felonies under California 

law. Thus, the result of Petitioner’s pleading guilty to the § 667.5(c)(21) special allegation 

is that the Faber burglary conviction was made a “violent felony.” Petitioner did not 

receive an “enhanced” sentence as a result of his pleading guilty to the § 667.5(c)(21) 

 

2

It appears that Petitioner may be confusing section 667.5 subsection (c) with subsections (a) and (b), 

which impose additional and consecutive prison terms for defendants with prior violent felony convictions

that resulted in imprisonment. However, subsections (a) and (b) were not applied in Petitioner’s case. 

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special allegation. A review of the trial court’s Abstract of Judgment shows that no 

enhancement of any kind was applied to Petitioner’s sentence. (See ECF No. 16-2 at 1.) 

Rather, Petitioner received a six-year sentence, which was comprised of the upper term 

(six years) for the Count 2 burglary and the middle term (4 years) for each of Counts 1, 2, 

4, and 5, served concurrently. (See id.) While it is true that this violent felony conviction 

may result in an increased punishment for future offenses,3the classification of the Faber 

burglary as a violent felony had no impact on the sentence imposed by the sentencing judge 

in this case. 

Fourth, Petitioner bases his ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial 

misconduct claims on the belief that two of his prior convictions in Massachusetts provide 

the basis for his alleged sentence enhancement. (ECF No. 1 at 3–7.) As explained above, 

Petitioner did not receive an enhanced sentence. Therefore, Petitioner’s sentence was not 

enhanced based on any prior criminal convictionsin Massachusetts, or anywhere else. Nor, 

as addressed above, was the § 667.5(c)(21) special allegation triggered, as Petitioner seems 

to believe, by any of his prior convictions. 

Finally, Petitioner bases his ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial 

misconduct claims on the belief that his 1996 Massachusetts convictions were 

misdemeanor property crime convictions and not felony convictions that could be used to 

increase his sentence under California’s prior strikes law. This belief is incorrect. The 

Massachusetts Criminal Docket that Petitioner attached to his petition shows that in 1996, 

Petitioner pleaded guilty to: (1) breaking and entering during the daytime with the intent 

to commit a felony in violation of Massachusetts General Laws chapter 266, section 18; 

and (2) larceny in a building, ship, vessel, or railroad car in violation of Massachusetts 

General Laws chapter 266, section 20. (ECF No. 1 at 21.) Chapter 274, section 1, of the 

Massachusetts General Laws states that “[a] crime punishable by death or imprisonment in 

the state prison is a felony.” Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 274, § 1. Crimes committed in 

violation of Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 266 sections 18 and 20—the crimes 

 

3

See footnote 2, supra.

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Petitioner pleaded guilty to in 1996—are punishable by imprisonment in the state prison. 

Mass. Gen. Laws. Ann. ch. 266, §§ 18, 20. Thus, Petitioner’s 1996 Massachusetts 

convictions were felony convictions and not “misdemeanor property crime” convictions, 

as Petitioner believes. 

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim

Petitioner raises a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in his federal habeas 

petition. It is somewhat challenging to distinguish the basis for this claim, but it appears 

to be two-fold. First, it appears that Petitioner believes he received ineffective assistance 

of counsel on the basis that his attorney failed to challenge the Count 2 and § 667.5(c)(21)

special allegation charges filed against him. (See ECF No. 1 at 7–9.) As discussed above, 

Petitioner takes issue with the fact that the charge filed as Count 2 “stemmed from a 

previously dismissed allegation of attempted Burglaryy [sic] alleged 15 months prior 

[which] was elevated to PC 459, 460, 667.5(c)(21) . . . with no new evidence coming to 

light.” (Id. at 7.) He also takes issue with the fact that this charge “includ[ed] an illegal 

enhancement.” (Id. at 9.)

Second, it appears that Petitioner believes he received ineffective assistance of 

counsel on the basis that his attorney, while allegedly acting “in collaboration” with the 

prosecution, forced Petitioner to plead guilty under duress. (Id. at 7–9.) Petitioner asserts 

that “considering the totality and greater punishment that [he] was exposed to” due to the 

allegedly erroneous Count 2 charge and illegal § 667.5(c)(21) enhancement, his counsel 

“essentially forced a first time felon into signing a plea agreement with a sentencing judge, 

under extreme duress.” (Id. at 7.)

Petitioner expands upon this particular ineffective assistance of counsel claim in his

traverse.4 (ECF No. 17.) He asserts that when he was visited by his attorney sometime in 

 

4 The Court notes that Petitioner’s assertion of federal habeas claims for the first time in his traverse is 

inappropriate and prejudicial, as it unfairly deprives Respondent of the opportunity to respond to 

arguments that should have been presented in the petition. Rodriguez v. Holland, C 11-00935 SBA, 2014 

WL 4954775, at * (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2014). While it would be appropriate for this Court to deem these 

arguments waived, see Delgadillo v. Woodford, 527 F.3d 919, 929–30 n.4 (9th Cir. 2008), the Court 

nonetheless addresses the merits of Petitioner’s arguments. 

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or around December 2013, his counsel “informed him, in no uncertain terms, that the San 

Diego District Attorney said if [Petitioner] attempted to take these cases to trial, they would 

have the prior 1996 ‘burglary’ made into a prior ‘strike’ at Petitioner’s sentencing, thus 

‘doubling up’ whatever years in state prison [Petitioner] was sentenced to.” (Id. at 

6.) Petitioner states that “24 years in state prison was the number given.” (Id.) Petitioner 

asserts that after arguing with his counsel at a subsequent visit that the prosecution and the 

trial court could not legally turn a prior misdemeanor property crime conviction from 1996 

into a felony strike, his counsel told him that the prosecutor will “do it anyways” and that 

Petitioner would be “forced to ‘take it up on appeal.’” (Id.) Petitioner asserts that “this 

was the coersion [sic] that eventually caused Petitioner to sign [the] plea agreement, while 

under extreme duress.” (Id.) 

In his answer, Respondent argues that Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim “is unexhausted, but [because] it lacks merit . . . [it] may be denied by this Court.” 

(ECF No. 15-1 at 13.) Specifically, Respondent argues that while Petitioner “vaguely 

contends that . . . he was coerced” in part due to his counsel’s allegedly deficient 

performance,

5 Petitioner “has not demonstrated any deficient performance, nor does such 

seem likely.” (Id. at 16–17.) Respondent argues further that “[a]s far as can be seen, there 

was no defense that was likely to be successful” and Petitioner “was unlikely to present a 

sympathetic picture at sentencing.” (Id. at 17.) Therefore, Respondent argues, Petitioner’s 

“[c]ounsel’s obvious strategy, to get the most he could from pleading guilty while 

portraying a semblance of remorse, was eminently reasonable.” (Id.) 

 1. Exhaustion of State Court Remedies 

Generally, a habeas petition brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 may “not be granted 

unless it appears that . . . the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts 

of the State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). This exhaustion requirement exists as a matter of 

 

5 Respondent acknowledges that Petitioner also attributes this alleged coercion to plead guilty to 

prosecutorial overreach. (ECF No. 15-1 at 16–17.) The parties’ arguments with respect to Petitioner’s 

prosecutorial coercion claim are addressed in section IV.C.2.iii. of this Report and Recommendation. 

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federal-state comity and assures the state courts of the “initial ‘opportunity to pass upon 

and correct’ alleged violations of its prisoners’ federal rights.” Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 

270, 275 (1971) (quoting Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 250 (1971)). To exhaust 

his state judicial remedies, a federal habeas petitioner must present the highest state court 

available with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of every issue raised in his federal 

habeas petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c); O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 854 

(1999). Thus, in California, a petitioner is required to exhaust his habeas claims in a 

petition to the California Supreme Court. See Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 888 (9th 

Cir. 1999) (applying O’Sullivan to California). 

Here, Petitioner failed to exhaust his state court remedies with respect to his

ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Petitioner raised this claim only in the habeas

petition he filed with the San Diego County Superior Court, (see ECF No. 16-3), and not 

in the habeas petitions he filed with the California Court of Appeal (see ECF No. 16-5) and

the California Supreme Court (see ECF No. 16-7). Thus, the claim is unexhausted because 

it was not raised through the highest state court. See O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 854.

Previously, prior to passage of the AEDPA, the United States Supreme Court 

interpreted the exhaustion requirement to require district courts to dismiss federal habeas 

petitions that contained even one unexhausted claim. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 

510 (1982). However, section 2254(b)(2) of the AEDPA provides that “[a]n application 

for writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the 

applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(b)(2). Because the exhaustion doctrine exists as a matter of comity, a district court

may deny an unexhausted claim on the merits, but only when “it is perfectly clear that the 

applicant does not raise even a colorable federal claim” and “has no hope of prevailing” 

before the state courts. Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 623–24 (9th Cir. 2005). “A 

contrary rule would deprive state courts of the opportunity to address a colorable federal 

claim in the first instance and grant relief if they believe it is warranted.” Id. at 624. For 

the reasons discussed below, this Court may address the merits of Petitioner’s unexhausted

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ineffective assistance of counsel claim because Petitioner does not raise a colorable federal 

claim. 

2. Merits of Petitioner’s Claims

Under clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, a 

defendant is entitled to “the effective assistance of competent counsel” before deciding 

whether to plead guilty. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 364 (2010) (quoting McMann 

v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)). “[C]laims of ineffective assistance of counsel 

in the plea bargain context are governed by the two-part test set forth in Strickland.” 

Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 140 (2012) (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 

(1985)). Under the Strickland test, to succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, 

Petitioner first must show that his “counsel’s representation fell below an objective 

standard of reasonableness.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). This 

requires showing that the petitioner’s counsel committed errors that were objectively 

deficient, unreasonable, and “so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ 

guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 687. 

Petitioner must then show that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced

Petitioner’s defense during the state trial court proceedings. Id. To prevail on this prong, 

Petitioner must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different.” Id. at 694. 

In the context of a guilty plea challenge based on ineffective assistance of counsel, a 

petitioner must show that there is “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, 

he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Lee v. United 

States, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 1965 (2017) (quoting Hill, 474 U.S. at 59). A reasonable 

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 694. 

Courts need not address both the deficient performance and prejudice components 

of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim if the petitioner fails to make a sufficient 

showing of either one. Id. at 697. 

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In the context of federal habeas review, “[t]he standards created by Strickland and 

§ 2254(d) are both ‘highly deferential.’” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105 (citing Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 689). There is a “strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the 

wide range of reasonable professional assistance” and “might be considered sound trial 

strategy.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. “Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an 

easy task.” Padilla, 559 U.S. at 371.

i. Failure to Challenge Count 2 and § 667.5(c)(21) Special 

Allegation Charges

As noted above, Petitioner believes that he was erroneously charged with Count 2 

and its alleged illegal enhancement, and he attributes these allegedly erroneous charges, in 

part, to his counsel’s deficient performance.6 (See ECF No. 1 at 7–9.) Specifically, 

Petitioner contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed 

to challenge the Count 2 charge and § 667.5(c)(21) special allegation brought against him. 

(See id. at 7.) 

Petitioner’s first ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails to satisfy the first prong 

of the Strickland test. Petitioner believes his counsel should have challenged the Faber 

burglary charges on the basis that Petitioner could not later be arrested and charged with a 

crime for which he was previously detained and released with no new evidence coming to 

light. As discussed in section IV.A. of this Report and Recommendation, Petitioner is 

mistaken. Jeopardy does not attach upon arrest, and therefore it was not illegal or improper 

for Petitioner to be charged with the commission of the Faber burglary several months after 

he was initially detained and released in connection with that crime. With respect to the 

new evidence, Petitioner does not dispute that he admitted going to the Faber home and 

breaking the window, and he does not argue that he had a defense to this charge that was 

likely to be successful at trial. Thus, based upon Petitioner’s exposure to potential 

conviction of the Faber burglary with which he was properly charged, it was objectively 

 

6 Petitioner believes the prosecution and trial court also played a part in these erroneous charges being 

filed against him. (See ECF No. 1 at 3–9.) The parties’ arguments with respect to these claims are 

addressed in sections IV.C.2.i. and IV.D. of this Report and Recommendation.

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reasonable for Petitioner’s counsel to advise Petitioner to plead guilty to, rather than 

dispute, the charge that he faced.7 

For the reasons above, Petitioner’s unexhausted ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim fails to raise even a colorable federal claim. Accordingly, under the strict standards 

of the AEDPA, the Court recommends that the District Court DENY this claim on the 

merits, despite Petitioner’s failure to fully exhaust his state judicial remedies with respect 

to this claim. 

ii. Coercion to Plead Guilty 

Petitioner alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel on the basis that

his attorney forced him to enter into a plea agreement “under extreme duress.” (ECF No. 

1 at 7.) As discussed above, Petitioner asserts that he was coerced to plead guilty due to

“the totality and greater punishment that [he] was exposed to” due to the Count 2 charge 

and illegal § 667.5(c)(21) enhancement, which Petitioner contends were unlawfully 

brought against him as a result of his counsel’s alleged deficient performance. (ECF No. 

1 at 7.) 

Under clearly established federal law, “[t]he longstanding test for determining the 

validity of a guilty plea is ‘whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice 

among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.’” Hill, 474 U.S. at 56 

(quoting North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970)). Where, as here, a criminal 

defendant pleads guilty on the advice of his counsel, the defendant may only attack the 

voluntary and intelligent nature of his guilty plea by demonstrating that the advice he 

received from his counsel was not “within the range of competence demanded of attorneys 

in criminal cases.” Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 265–67 (1973). In the context of 

guilty pleas, the standard for determining whether an attorney’s advice fell within this

range is the same standard used to determine whether an attorney’s performance “fell 

below an objective standard of reasonableness” under Strickland v. Washington. Hill, 474 

 

7 Because Petitioner fails to satisfy the first prong of the Strickland test, the Court need not consider the 

second prong. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.

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U.S. at 58–59 (“[T]he first half of the Strickland v. Washington test is nothing more than a 

restatement of the standard of attorney competence already set forth in Tollett v. 

Henderson.”). A guilty plea entered by a defendant “fully aware of the direct 

consequences, including the actual value of any commitments made to him by the court, 

prosecutor, or his own counsel, must stand unless induced by threats (or promises to 

discontinue improper harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable 

promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper as having no proper 

relationship to the prosecutor’s business (e. g. bribes).” Brady, 397 U.S. at 755 (citation 

omitted).

Here, Petitioner fails to demonstrate that his counsel’s advice fell below an objective 

standard of reasonableness. Absent this plea, Petitioner could have faced a sentence of up 

to twenty-two years and eight months if convicted of the five first degree burglary charges

filed against him. The trial court had the discretion to impose a sentence of up to eleven 

years and four months,8and because Petitioner’s 1996 Massachusetts convictions were

felony convictions, the prosecution could have used these priors to attempt to double 

Petitioner’s sentence under California’s prior strikes law. Thus, if unsuccessful at trial, 

Petitioner could have faced a sentence nearly four times the length of the six-year sentence

he received as a result of his plea. Petitioner makes no argument that he was likely to 

succeed at trial. Thus, in light of these facts, Petitioner fails to overcome the strong 

presumption that his counsel’s urging him to plead guilty in light of the sentencing judge’s 

 

8 The sentencing choices available to the trial court for each count of first degree burglary with which 

Petitioner was charged are two years, four years, or six years. Cal. Penal Code § 461(a). When a defendant

is convicted of two or more felonies, as Petitioner was here, the aggregate term of imprisonment for the

multiple convictions is the sum of the principal term, the subordinate term, and any additional applicable 

term. Cal. Penal Code § 1170.1(a). The principal term is the greatest term of imprisonment imposed by 

the court for any one of the felony convictions. Id. At trial, the San Diego County Superior Court could 

have imposed the upper limit of six years as the principal term for any one of Petitioner’s first degree 

burglary convictions. The subordinate term for each consecutive offense is one-third of the middle term 

of imprisonment prescribed for each other felony conviction. Id. At trial, the court could have imposed 

a total subordinate term of five years and four months for the other four first degree burglary convictions. 

Thus, Petitioner could have faced up to eleven years and four months imprisonment had he failed to prevail 

at trial.

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agreement to grant a significant reduction “might be considered sound trial strategy” that 

is “well within the range of reasonable professional assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

689. 

The Court does not doubt that under the circumstances presented, Petitioner felt 

pressure to choose between two undesirable options: plead guilty and serve a certain, 

substantial sentence or proceed to trial and risk the imposition of a prison sentence almost 

four times that length. However, Petitioner’s counsel’s informed advice to choose the more 

favorable of the two undesirable options does not amount to an improper threat intended 

to induce Petitioner to plead guilty. 

In sum, Petitioner fails to raise even a colorable claim that he is entitled to federal 

habeas relief with respect to this ineffective assistance of counsel claim. He fails to show 

that his counsel’s advice “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” and any 

such claim is plainly meritless. Therefore, under the strict standards of the AEDPA, the 

Court recommends that Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim be DENIED.

C. Prosecutorial Misconduct Claim

The second claim that Petitioner raises in his federal habeas petition is one of 

prosecutorial misconduct. There are three bases to Petitioner’s challenge based up 

prosecutorial misconduct. First, Petitioner asserts that he “suffered malicious prosecution 

and misconduct” when the prosecution charged him with violating California Penal Code 

§ 667.5(c)(21) “with the intent to expose petitioner to greater punishment.” (ECF No. 1 at 

3.) Petitioner contends that “[t]he San Diego County District Attorney willfully and 

successfully misrepresented and deceived the trial court with this enhancement allegation 

in concert with inclusion of a previously uncharged attempted Burglary allegation that 

Petitioner was never prosecuted for, nor found guilty of.” (Id.) Construing Petitioner’s 

claim loosely, Petitioner seems to allege that it was misconduct for the prosecutor to charge 

Petitioner with the Faber burglary (Count 2) after he had previously been detained and 

released for this crime and, because the Faber burglary should not have been included in 

the District Attorney’s complaint, it was also improper to include the § 667.5(c)(21) 

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enhancement associated with it. 

 Second, Petitioner contends that the prosecution “willfully and intentionally 

altered” the pretrial services report introduced during Petitioner’s trial court proceedings

“in order to aggravate Petitioner[’]s prior criminal history (or lack thereof) at his 

arraignment.” (ECF No. 17 at 4–5, 7.) While Petitioner does not explain in his traverse 

the ways in which the prosecution altered the pretrial services report, it appears this 

information can be gleaned from the Petition. Petitioner asserts that the pretrial services 

report referenced a “1996 burglary arrest in Massachusetts” but that this arrest was “in fact 

a misdemeanor Breaking and Entering . . . and not a felonious burglary as the report 

suggests.” (ECF No. 1 at 5.) Petitioner argues that the prosecution’s alleged alteration of 

the pretrial services report caused the trial court to raise his bail and “placed a shroud of 

prejudice upon Petitioner.” (ECF No. 17 at 5.) 

Finally, Petitioner claims that the prosecutor played a role in creating a situation by 

which Petitioner felt coerced to plead guilty. Petitioner asserts that the prosecutor’s threat 

to “have [Petitioner’s] prior 1996 ‘burglary’ made into a prior ‘strike’” if Petitioner 

proceeded to trial was part of “the coersion [sic] that eventually caused Petitioner to sign 

[the] plea agreement, while under extreme duress.” (Id. at 6.)

Respondent, in his answer, argues that Petitioner’s prosecutorial misconduct claims

should be dismissed for three reasons. First, as to the claims based on the filing of the 

Farber burglary charge and the § 667.5(c)(21) special allegation, and the characterization 

of Petitioner’s criminal history in his pretrial services report, Respondent argues that under 

the standard established in Tollett v. Henderson, Petitioner is precluded from raising a preplea claim of prosecutorial misconduct. (ECF No. 15-1 at 12.) Under Tollett, Respondent 

argues, “[f]or a petitioner who pleads guilty in state court, the only challenges [to pre-plea 

proceedings] available to be presented in federal habeas petitions are with respect to the 

voluntary and intelligent character of the plea and the advice of counsel to enter such a 

plea.” (Id.)

Second, again as to the claims based on the filing of the Farber burglary charge and 

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the § 667.5(c)(21) special allegation, and the characterization of Petitioner’s criminal 

history in his pretrial services report, Respondent argues that, to the extent they are not 

precluded, they should still be dismissed because Petitioner “seems simply to be mistaken 

about the facts” and the state courts’ denials of Petitioner’s prosecutorial misconduct claim 

were not in violation of clearly established federal law. (Id. at 10, 12–13.) 

Third, specifically with respect to the prosecutorial coercion claim, Respondent 

argues that Petitioner’s claim that the prosecution coerced him to plead guilty is both 

unexhausted and lacking in merit. (Id. at 13–17.) Specifically, Respondent argues that 

Petitioner “has presented no evidence of improper motivation in the choice to prosecute 

him for the Faber burglary or in the allegation that the crime was committed while the 

residents were present.” (Id. at 17.) 

1. Claim Preclusion

The Court agrees with Respondent that Petitioner’s prosecutorial misconduct claims 

based on everything but prosecutorial coercion are precluded by Tollett v. Henderson. It 

is clearly established federal law that when a criminal defendant pleads guilty on the advice 

of counsel, he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of his 

constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea. Tollett, 411 U.S. at 

267. “Under these circumstances, a prisoner may attack only the voluntary and intelligent 

character of his guilty plea in habeas proceedings.” Erb v. Yates, No. 2:07-CV2601LKKKJNP, 2010 WL 3341650, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2010) (citing Ortberg v. 

Moody, 961 F.2d 135, 137 (9th Cir. 1992)).

Here, Petitioner pleaded guilty on the advice of his counsel. Thus, Petitioner is 

precluded from bringing any pre-plea prosecutorial misconduct claims which do not go to 

the knowing and voluntary nature of his guilty plea. On this basis alone, the Court 

recommends that the District Court DENY Petitioner’s prosecutorial misconduct claims 

based upon on the filing of the Farber burglary charge and the § 667.5(c)(21) special 

allegation, and the characterization of Petitioner’s criminal history in his pretrial services 

report. 

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2. Merits of Petitioner’s Claims

Even if Petitioner were not precluded from raising some of his prosecutorial 

misconduct claim, for the reasons discussed below, the claims should still be denied.

i. Count 2 and the Section 667.5(c)(21) Special Allegation Charges

As noted above, Petitioner appears to allege that the prosecution improperly charged 

him with Count 2 and the attached § 667.5(c)(21) special allegation “with the intent to 

expose petitioner to greater punishment.” (ECF No. 1 at 3.) Petitioner raised this claim in 

the habeas petitions that he filed with the California Court of Appeal (ECF No. 16-5 at 3–

4) and the California Supreme Court (ECF No. 16-7 at 3–4). The California Supreme Court 

denied the petition without comment (ECF No. 16-8) and, thus, there is no reasoned 

decision from the state’s highest court. Therefore, this Court “looks through” to the last 

reasoned state court decision to address Petitioner’s claim and presumes that it provides 

the basis for the higher court’s denial of Petitioner’s claim. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805–06. 

The California Court of Appeal, denying the petition in its entirety and without specific 

reference to Petitioner’s prosecutorial misconduct claims, stated: 

The petition for a writ of habeas corpus has been read and considered 

by Justices Haller, McDonald, and Aaron.

In April 2014, petitioner Thomas Masson pleaded guilty to multiple 

counts of burglary and was sentenced to six years in prison. In his petition, 

Masson claims the court applied a prison prior enhancement pursuant to Penal 

Code section 667.5, subdivision (c)(21). He contends he never suffered a 

prior felony conviction or served a prior prison term. 

In support of his petition, Masson provides no evidence regarding his 

sentence other than a superior court order denying his petition for writ of 

habeas corpus. According to that order, the trial court did not impose any 

sentence enhancement. Without any evidence concerning Masson’s sentence, 

it is impossible for this court to find any error.

The discussion in the superior court’s order suggests Masson may 

instead be challenging the court’s imposition of the upper term of six years 

for one of the first degree burglary charges. Masson appears to contend that 

the court improperly relied on a misconception of his criminal history in 

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Massachusetts as an aggravating factor warranting the imposition of the upper 

term. Viewing Masson’s argument in this light, he still does not state a prima 

facie case for relief. Without evidence of the trial court’s reasoning, we 

cannot determine whether the court erred in imposing the upper term.

A petitioner seeking a writ of habeas corpus “bears a heavy burden 

initially to plead sufficient grounds for relief, and then to prove them.” 

(People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 474.) To satisfy the threshold 

pleading burden, “[t]he petition should both (i) state fully and with 

particularity the facts on which relief is sought [citations], as well as 

(ii) include copies of reasonably available documentary evidence supporting 

the claim . . . .” (Ibid.) By failing to provide sufficient documentary evidence 

to support his claim, Masson does not meet his burden.

The petition is denied.

(ECF No. 16-6.)

Accordingly, there is no reasoned decision from any state court regarding this claim.

In such a situation, the silent denial of the state supreme court is considered to be a decision 

“on the merits of the claim[],” Hunter v. Aispuro, 982 F.2d 344, 347-48 (9th Cir. 1992), 

and the decision is entitled to AEDPA deference unless “there is reason to think some other 

explanation for the state court’s decision is likely,” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 100; see 

Johnson v. Williams, 133 S.Ct. 1088 (2013). Here, there is no reason to think some other 

explanation for the state court’s decision is likely. 

Thus, this Court must conduct an independent review of the record to determine 

whether the state court clearly erred in its application of Supreme Court law. Pirtle v. 

Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 

(9th Cir. 2000) (“Federal habeas review is not de novo when the state court does not supply 

reasoning for its decision, but an independent review of the record is required to determine 

whether the state court clearly erred in its application of controlling federal law.”)). In the 

context of a silent denial of a claim by the California Supreme Court, a petitioner “can 

satisfy the ‘unreasonable application’ prong of § 2254(d)(1) only by showing that ‘there 

was no reasonable basis’ for the California Supreme Court’s decision.” Cullen v. 

Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 187–88 (2011) (quoting Harrington, 562 U.S. at 98). 

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Petitioner fails to show that the California Supreme Court’s silent denial of his claim

that the prosecution improperly charged him with Count 2 and the § 667.5(c)(21) special 

allegation was based on an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law. 

The Supreme Court has held that the government retains “broad discretion” as to whom it 

prosecutes. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985). “[S]o long as the prosecutor 

has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the 

decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file . . . generally rests entirely in 

his discretion.” Id. (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978)). This is 

because factors such as the strength of the prosecutor’s case, the government’s enforcement 

priorities, and the case’s relationship to those priorities are “not readily susceptible to the 

kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake” and are therefore “particularly illsuited to judicial review.” Id. 

This does not mean, though, that there are no limits on prosecutorial discretion. The 

decision to prosecute is still subject to constitutional constraints, and a decision to 

prosecute “may not be ‘deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, 

religion, or other arbitrary classification’ . . . including the exercise of protected statutory 

and constitutional rights.” Id. at 608 (quoting Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 364). 

Here, as discussed in section IV.A., it was not illegal or improper for the prosecution 

to charge Petitioner with the Faber burglary in light of the evidence in the record, including

Petitioner’s confession that he went to the Faber’s home and broke their window, which 

Petitioner does not dispute. Thus, to prevail on this claim, Petitioner must show that the 

prosecution’s decision to bring the Faber burglary charges against him was deliberately 

based on an unjustifiable discriminatory standard. Petitioner fails to make this showing. 

Petitioner does not argue, and the record does not otherwise reflect, that the prosecutor’s 

decision to charge him with the Faber burglary and to include the special allegation that

the Fabers were present during the commission of the crime was motivated by a 

discriminatory intent. Thus, Petitioner fails to show that the prosecution’s decision to 

charge him with Count 2 and the § 667.5(c)(21) special allegation exceeded the broad 

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discretion afforded to the prosecution under clearly established federal law. For this 

reason, the Court concludes that the California Supreme Court did not err in its application 

of controlling federal law when it denied Petitioner’s prosecutorial misconduct claim with 

the respect to the Farber charge and the special allegation filed against him. Accordingly,

the Court recommends that the District Court DENY this claim. 

ii. Pretrial Services Report

Petitioner additionally alleges that the prosecution “willfully and intentionally 

altered” the pretrial services report introduced during Petitioner’s trial court proceedings

“in order to aggravate Petitioner[’]s prior criminal history (or lack thereof) at his 

arraignment.” (ECF No. 17 at 4–5, 7.) Petitioner raised this claim in the habeas petitions 

that he filed with the San Diego County Superior Court (ECF No. 16-3 at 4), the California 

Court of Appeal (ECF No. 16-5 at 4), and the California Supreme Court (ECF No. 16-7 at 

4). The California Supreme Court denied the petition without comment (ECF No. 16-8) 

and, therefore, this Court “looks through” to the last reasoned state court decision to 

address Petitioner’s claim. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805–06. Although the California Court 

of Appeal issued a reasoned decision denying the petition, it did not specifically address 

his claims of prosecutorial misconduct. (See ECF No. 16-6.) Thus, this Court looks 

through to the San Diego County Superior Court’s decision denying Petitioner’s habeas 

petition. The Superior Court, which directly addressed this aspect of Petitioner’s

prosecutorial misconduct claim, stated: 

According to petitioner: “San Diego County District Attorney’s office 

introduced an erroneous document to judge at court proceedings (see attached 

pre-trial services report).” “At my arraignment on October 23, 2013 a SD 

County prosecutor submitted a pre-trial services report to Judge Ervin that 

contained erroneous, misleading information. In the prior arrest section of the 

report, there is a listing that I was arrested for a prior Burglary charge in 1996 

in the state of [M]assachusetts. The arrest was actually for misdemeanor 

Breaking and Entering in the daytime, not Felony Burglary as the report 

suggest. The distinction is not made clear, however the prosecutor is on 

record stating that I was a ‘serial burglar’ based on this false information. [¶] 

This report caused the judge to raise my bail significantly, and prejudiced my 

case throughout the entire process.”

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“It is a fundamental principle that reversal for prosecutorial misconduct 

is not required unless the defendant can show that he has suffered prejudice.” 

(People v. Uribe (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 836, 872.)

“[Penal Code] Section 1473, subdivision (b)(1) provides that a writ of 

habeas corpus may be prosecuted if ‘[f]alse evidence that is substantially 

material or probative on the issue of guilt or punishment was introduced 

against a person at any hearing or trial relating to his incarceration....” False 

evidence is ‘substantially material or probative’ (ibid.) ‘if there is a 

“reasonable probability that, had it not been introduced, the result would have 

been different. [Citation.]’ [Case citation.] The requisite ‘reasonable 

probability is a chance great enough, under the totality of the circumstances, 

to undermine our confidence in the outcome. [Case citation.] The petitioner 

is not required to show that the prosecution knew or should have known that 

the testimony was false. (§ 1473, subd. (c); [case citation].)” (In re Roberts, 

supra, at pp. 741-742.)

The pretrial services report attached to the petition includes: 

“RECORDS REFLECT THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS ARRESTED FOR 

THE FOLLOWING: . . . [¶] 1996 – BURGLARY; NO DISPOSITION IS 

LISTED (MA).” Petitioner does not submit documentary evidence in support 

of his allegation that this is inaccurate. To the contrary, Attachments A and 

B to the People’s Statement in Aggravation (in the case file) are copies of 

complaints filed against petitioner in Massachusetts alleging petitioner, on 

July 16 and 17, 1996, “did break and enter in the day time the building, ship 

or motor vehicle or vessel of [a victim] with intent to commit a felony therein 

. . . .” 

Even if the pretrial services report were inaccurate, petitioner also does 

not adequately allege he would not have pleaded guilty and/or been sentenced 

to six years if not for the report of a 1996 “burglary” on the pre-trial services 

report.

(ECF No. 16-4 at 2-3.) 

Under clearly established federal law, the appropriate standard of review for a claim 

of prosecutorial misconduct is “the narrow one of due process, and not the broad exercise 

of supervisory power.” Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (quoting 

Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 642 (1974)). “[T]he touchstone of due process 

analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the 

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culpability of the prosecutor.” Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982). This is because 

“the aim of due process ‘is not punishment of society for the misdeeds of the prosecutor 

but avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused.’” Id. (quoting Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 

83, 87 (1963)). Thus, where the prosecution’s conduct is immaterial to either guilt or 

punishment, even if the prosecution acted in bad faith, there is no violation of a petitioner’s 

federal due process rights. Id. 

Here, Petitioner fails to demonstrate that the prosecution’s alleged 

mischaracterization of the pretrial services report amounted to a constitutional violation.

First, the prosecution did not prepare the pretrial services report. The report was compiled 

by the Pretrial Services Department of the San Diego County Superior Court. (See ECF 

No. 1 at 19.) Thus, to the extent that the pretrial services report contained erroneous 

information regarding Petitioner’s prior criminal history, the inclusion of this information 

is not attributable to the prosecution. 

Second, the information contained in the pretrial services report had no bearing on 

either Petitioner’s guilt or his punishment. Petitioner pleaded guilty to the charges filed 

against him. He was not convicted by a court or a jury that relied on the allegedly erroneous 

pretrial services report in determining Petitioner’s guilt. Furthermore, Petitioner’s prior 

criminal history, whether correctly or incorrectly classified in the pretrial services report, 

was not taken into account for purposes of calculating Petitioner’s sentence. As discussed 

earlier, Petitioner did not receive an enhanced sentence based on his prior criminal history 

in Massachusetts. His sentence was calculated solely with respect to the five counts of first 

degree burglary to which he pleaded guilty and nothing more. Thus, even if the pretrial 

services report was in error,

9

even if the prosecution played a hand in altering the pretrial 

 

9 The Court is not persuaded that using the word “burglary” to describe the offense of “breaking and 

entering during the daytime with the intent to commit a felony” is erroneous, or even misleading. See, 

Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 598 (1990) (“Although the exact formulations vary, the generic, 

contemporary meaning of burglary contains at least the following elements: an unlawful or unprivileged 

entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime.”) Furthermore, 

as was addressed above, the 1996 Massachusetts arrest was for a felony offense, not a misdemeanor, as 

Petitioner asserts. 

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services report, and even if the prosecution acted in bad faith in doing so, this misconduct 

was not material to Petitioner’s guilt or punishment, and therefore the prosecution’s alleged 

conduct did not result in a violation of Petitioner’s federal due process rights. See Smith, 

455 U.S. at 219. 

Petitioner fails to demonstrate a violation of his federal due process rights as a result 

of prosecutorial misconduct related to the contents of the pretrial services report. 

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief as to this claim because the

San Diego County Superior Court’s denial of this claim was neither contrary to, nor 

involved an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent, and it was not based 

on an objectively unreasonable determination of the facts. The Court recommends that the 

District Court DENY this claim. 

iii. Coercion to Plead Guilty 

Petitioner additionally alleges that the prosecution played a role in coercing him to 

plead guilty. (See ECF No. 1 at 7; ECF No. 17 at 6.) Specifically, Petitioner alleges that 

the prosecution’s threat to double his sentence if he proceeded to trial “was the coersion 

[sic] that eventually caused Petitioner to sign a plea agreement, while under extreme 

duress.” (ECF No. 17 at 6.) 

As Respondent correctly points out in his answer (ECF No. 15-1 at 13), this claim is 

unexhausted. For a federal district court to consider a petitioner’s habeas claims, the 

petitioner must first exhaust all of his available state judicial remedies. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(b)(1)(A). In California, a petitioner fully exhausts his state judicial remedies by 

fairly presenting his habeas claims in a petition to the California Supreme Court. See 

Gatlin, 189 F.3d at 888. Here, Petitioner failed to present his prosecutorial coercion claim

to any of the California state courts. Instead, he raised it for the first time in the habeas 

petition filed with this Court. (See ECF No. 1 at 7.) Thus, the claim is unexhausted. See 

O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 854; Gatlin, 189 F.3d at 888.

As discussed previously, because the AEDPA’s exhaustion doctrine exists as a 

matter of comity, district courts may deny unexhausted claims in a mixed petition only 

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when it is perfectly clear that the claims presented do not raise even a colorable federal 

claim. Cassett, 406 F.3d at 623–24. For the reasons set forth below, this Court may address 

the merits of Petitioner’s unexhausted prosecutorial coercion claim because it is perfectly 

clear that Petitioner does not raise a colorable federal claim. 

The federal due process clause requires that a guilty plea be knowing, intelligent, 

and voluntary. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969); Boykin v. Alabama, 

395 U.S. 238, 244 (1969). A guilty plea is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary when the 

defendant has notice of the nature of the charges against him, and he understands the nature 

of the three critical constitutional rights that will be waived by his guilty plea—the right to 

a trial by jury, the right to confront his accuser, and the privilege against selfincrimination—as well as the consequences of his plea, including the range of allowable 

punishment that will result from his plea. Tanner v. McDaniel, 493 F.3d 1135, 1146–47 

(9th Cir. 2007) (citing Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243–44; Little v. Crawford, 449 F.3d 1075, 1080 

(9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 551 U.S. 1118 (2007)). A guilty plea “entered by one fully 

aware of the direct consequences, including the actual value of any commitments made to 

him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel, must stand unless induced by threats (or 

promises to discontinue improper harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or 

unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper as having 

no proper relationship to the prosecutor’s business (e. g. bribes).” Brady, 397 U.S. at 755

(citation omitted). For the reasons, discussed in detail below, Petitioner fails to show that 

his guilty plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.

First, Petitioner does not allege that he was unaware of the nature of the charges 

against him; that he did not understand that by pleading guilty, he would waive his rights 

to a trial by jury, to confront his accuser, and to protect himself from self-incrimination; or 

that he did not understand the consequences of his plea. In fact, Petitioner acknowledges 

in the Petition that he understood that his entering a “plea agreement with the sentencing 

judge” . . . “effectively prohibited [him] . . . [from] challeng[ing] the penal code 

667.5(c)(21) allegation before a jury, thus waiving the petitioner’s 6th Amendment liberty 

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interest which provides for trial by jury and effective assistance of counsel.” (ECF No. 1 

at 9.) 

While Petitioner, in hindsight, states that he “would not have agreed to [plead guilty] 

knowing [the § 667.5(c)(21)] enhancement was illegal,” this assertion does not support a 

finding that Petitioner’s guilty plea was entered unintelligently or unknowingly. It can be 

inferred from Petitioner’s statement that at the time Petitioner pleaded guilty, he believed 

that he was charged legally with the § 667.5(c)(21) special allegation. And he was. As 

discussed throughout this Report and Recommendation, there is no meritorious argument 

to be made that Petitioner was illegally or improperly charged with the Faber burglary, and 

Petitioner does not contest the fact that the Fabers were home at the time he committed the 

crime. 

Second, Petitioner fails to establish that the prosecution made any threat, 

misrepresentation, or promise that, by its nature, had no proper relationship to the 

prosecutor’s business. See Brady, 397 U.S. at 755. While Petitioner may have felt 

pressured to plead guilty based on the prosecution’s threat to “double up” his sentence if 

the case proceeded to trial, under the circumstances of this case, any such threat by the 

prosecution would not have been improper. As discussed in section IV.A., above, 

Petitioner’s prior Massachusetts convictions were in fact felonies and not “misdemeanor 

proper crimes,” as Petitioner asserts. Thus, under California’s prior strikes law, it was not 

improper for the prosecution to attempt to use these prior felony convictions to enhance 

Petitioner’s sentence, if he opted against pleading guilty. The Court does not doubt that 

this placed Petitioner in a difficult position—plead to a substantial, but certain, prison term 

or risk the imposition of a prison sentence almost four times that length—but it was within 

the prosecutor’s authority to exercise this discretion. Any statement by the prosecutor that 

he would seek to double Petitioner’s sentence would not amount to improper threats, 

misrepresentations, or promises having no proper relationship to the prosecution’s 

business. 

For the reasons discussed above, the prosecutor’s conduct in this case did not amount 

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to coercion. Petitioner fails to demonstrate that the prosecutor made any threat or promise, 

or exerted any improper influence, that deprived Petitioner of his ability to knowingly, 

intelligently, and voluntarily enter a guilty plea. Accordingly, Petitioner fails to 

demonstrate that he is entitled to federal habeas relief with respect to this prosecutorial 

misconduct claim, and the Court recommends that this claim be DENIED. 

D. Judicial Error Claim

The third claim that Petitioner raises in his federal habeas petition is one of judicial 

error. Specifically, Petitioner asserts that “[t]he trial court[’]s acceptance and application 

of penal code 667.5(c)(21) is . . . a reversible error upon which petitioner is entitled to relief 

and legal remedy.” (ECF No. 1 at 9.) Petitioner further asserts that the court’s erroneous 

application of § 667.5(c)(21) forced Petitioner, “a formerly law-abiding non-violent 

citizen, into a violent felon.” (Id. at 7.) Lastly, it appears that Petitioner believes the trial 

court’s allegedly erroneous application of the § 667.5(c)(21) special allegation resulted in 

the imposition of a greater sentence in connection with the previous felony conviction.10 

(Id. at 5.) Although Petitioner does not raise his claim in the context of any specific 

constitutional violation, this Court interprets it as an alleged due process violation. 

Petitioner raised his claim of judicial error in the habeas petitions he filed with the 

San Diego County Superior Court (ECF No. 16-3 at 6), the California Court of Appeal 

(ECF No. 16-5 at 4) and the California Supreme Court (ECF No. 16-7 at 6-7). The 

California Supreme Court denied the petition without comment (ECF No. 16-8) and, thus, 

there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court. Therefore, this Court “looks 

through” to the last reasoned state court decision to address Petitioner’s claim and presumes 

that it provides the basis for the higher court’s denial of Petitioner’s claim. See Ylst, 501 

U.S. at 805–06. Although the California Court of Appeal issued a reasoned decision 

denying the petition, it did not specifically address Petitioner’s claim of judicial error. (See

 

10 Although Petitioner raises this claim of judicial error, Respondent neglected to address this issue in his 

answer. (See ECF No. 15.) 

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ECF No. 16-6.) The San Diego County Superior Court, denying the petition in its entirety 

and with specific reference to Petitioner’s judicial error claim, stated:

According to petitioner: “The Court erred in failing to recognize the 

mitigating circumstances; allowing state to consolidate charges; prejudiced

defendant in allowing a violent felony enhancement in controlling case (count 

2) implementing sentence for first term [sic] defendant.” “Never did the court 

take in to consideration the defendant’s cooperation in resolving these matters 

quickly.” 

Petitioner does not adequately allege in what manner the court abused 

its discretion by taking the above-alleged actions. 

(ECF No. 16-4 at 3.) 

The Supreme Court has held that the “Fourteenth Amendment does not, in 

guaranteeing due process, assure immunity from judicial error.” Stein v. New York, 346 

U.S. 156, 181 (1953). “It is only miscarriages of such gravity and magnitude that they 

cannot be expected to happen in an enlightened system of justice, or be tolerated by it if 

they do, that cause [federal courts] to intervene to review, in the name of the Federal 

Constitution, the weight of conflicting evidence to support a decision by a state court.” Id.

Here, it was certainly not a miscarriage of justice “of such gravity and magnitude 

that [it could not] be expected to happen in an enlightened system of justice” for the trial 

court to allow the prosecution to add a § 667.5(c)(21) special allegation to the Faber 

burglary. As previously discussed, it is generally not in the purview of the courts to 

determine what charges the prosecution may or not bring against a criminal defendant. See

Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607 (“[S]o long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the 

accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, 

and what charge to file . . . generally rests entirely in his discretion.” (quoting 

Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 364)). Petitioner does not argue that the prosecution did not 

have probable cause to charge him with the Faber burglary or to allege that the house was 

occupied at the time of the burglary. Thus, Petitioner fails to show that the trial court had 

any basis to preclude the prosecution from charging him with the Faber burglary and the 

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§ 667.5(c)(21) special allegation that attached to it. 

Furthermore, to the extent that Petitioner claims his sentence was erroneously

increased based on the court’s “application” of § 667.5(c)(21) in connection with one of 

his prior felony convictions, this claim is baseless. As discussed above: (1) the 

§ 667.5(c)(21) special allegation was applied in Petitioner’s case because the Faber home 

was occupied by the Fabers at the time of the burglary, not because of any of Petitioner’s 

prior convictions; and (2) § 667.5(c)(21) is not an enhancement statute, and Petitioner did 

not receive a longer sentence because of its application. Rather, the result of the application 

of § 667.5(c)(21) is two-fold: it makes the Faber burglary conviction a “violent felony,” 

which may result in an increased punishment for future offenses, and it limits Petitioner’s 

good conduct credits. Thus, the court did not impose a longer sentence as a result of the 

application of § 667.5(c)(21). 

For the reasons discussed above, Petitioner fails to establish that the trial court 

committed any error during Petitioner’s trial court proceedings, let alone one that amounted 

to a violation of Petitioner’s constitutional rights. While Petitioner may believe that he is 

a “law-abiding non-violent citizen” (ECF No. 1 at 7), it was his own actions, not any error 

by the trial court, that turned him “into a violent felon.” 

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief as to his judicial error 

claim because the San Diego County Superior Court’s denial of this claim was neither

contrary to, nor involved an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent, and it 

was not based on an objectively unreasonable determination of the facts. The Court 

therefore recommends that the District Court DENY this claim. 

E. Right to Counsel During Arraignment Hearing Claim

Lastly, in his traverse, Petitioner asserts, for the first time, that he “was never 

assigned counsel during his arraignment process.” (ECF No. 17 at 5.) He claims that he 

“was only represented by an unidentified woman claiming to be ‘an intern for the San 

Diego County Public Defenders Office.’” (Id.) He asserts that because of this, he was 

denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel during a critical stage of his proceedings and 

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was thus denied fairness during his arraignment hearing. (Id.) 

The Court recommends that this claim be denied because it is both unexhausted and 

meritless. As discussed above, a habeas petition brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 generally 

may “not be granted unless it appears that . . . the applicant has exhausted the remedies 

available in the courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). Petitioner failed to present 

this Sixth Amendment claim in the habeas petition that he filed with the California

Supreme Court. Thus, this claim is unexhausted. See O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 854 (holding 

that a state prisoner must present his habeas claims in a petition to a state supreme court to 

satisfy the AEDPA’s exhaustion requirement). 

Irrespective of the AEDPA’s exhaustion requirement, a district court may deny an 

unexhausted claim on the merits “where it is perfectly clear that the applicant does not raise 

even a colorable federal claim.” Cassett, 406 F.3d at 623-24; see also 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(b)(2). Here, Petitioner falls short of raising a “colorable federal claim,” therefore 

allowing this Court to claim on the merits. While the Supreme Court has made clear that 

federal habeas relief should be granted when constitutional errors render a trial court 

proceeding fundamentally unfair, see Williams, 529 U.S. at 375, the Supreme Court has 

not held that a supervised intern of an agency such as a Public Defenders Office does not 

constitute competent counsel. Absent such a holding from the Supreme Court, this Court 

cannot conclude that it was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law for a supervised intern to represent Petitioner at his arraignment 

hearing. See Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 125–26 (2008) (holding that the state 

court could not have unreasonably applied federal law if no clear Supreme Court precedent 

exists). 

Petitioner fails to set forth a colorable federal claim. Accordingly, under the strict 

standards of AEDPA, this Court cannot grant federal habeas relief on the basis of 

Petitioner’s claim, and the Court therefore recommends that the District Court DENY this

claim. 

///

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V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons outlined above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court 

issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation; and 

(2) directing that Judgment be entered DENYING the Petition. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any party to this action may file written objections 

with the Court and serve a copy on all parties no later than November 24, 2017. The 

document should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Reply to the Objections shall be filed with 

the Court and served on all parties no later than December 8, 2017. 

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may 

waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s Order. See Turner v. 

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 

1991).

Dated: October 27, 2017

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