Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-08026/USCOURTS-ca10-89-08026-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

DONALD W. BRALEY, } 

} 

Plaintiff-Appellant, } 

} 

FI LED 

United State$ Coun of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

APR 3 0 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. } 

} 

DUANE SHILLINGER, and ATTORNEY GENERAL, } 

STATE OF WYOMING, } 

} 

No. 89-8026 

Defendant-Appellee. } 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF WYOMING 

(D.C. No. Misc. 89-004} 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Donald w. Braley, Rawlins, Wyoming, pro se. 

No appearance for appellee. 

Before McKAY, ANDERSON, and TACHA, Circuit Judges. 

TACHA, Circuit Judge. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a}; 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 89-8026 Document: 01019627240 Date Filed: 04/30/1990 Page: 1 
Donald w. Braley appeals the district court's denial of his 

petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Braley contends that the 

court erred in holding that his Sixth Amendment right to a fair 

and impartial jury was not infringed by the Wyoming state courts' 

refusal to permit inquiry into alleged improper influence over the 

jury. We affirm. 

Braley was tried for first degree murder. During the trial 

an anonymous caller telephoned the secretary of the defense 

counsel and said two jurors knew the father of the victim. The 

caller described two women on the jury. The trial judge allowed 

one of the jurors, Ms. Giles, to be questioned. After the evening 

recess, the court swore in the defense counsel's secretary and 

questioned her about the phone call. The court declined to take 

any action because the phone caller had not revealed his identity. 

The next day, the caller telephoned again. This time the call was 

recorded. The substance of the call was that the father of the 

victim had two of the jurors in his pocket. After the trial was 

concluded, the court allowed the defense counsel to approach 

jurors for voluntary statements. 

On February 4, 1986, defense counsel filed a motion for new 

trial based on the telephone incident and a juror affidavit 

detailing the actions of the two jurors accused by the telephone 

caller. The affidavit reported that the two jurors initially 

refused to vote for anything less than first degree murder, 

despite the rest of jury's leaning in favor of manslaughter, and 

that the jurors eventually swayed the jury to a verdict of ·second 

degree murder. The Wyoming Supreme Court remanded the case back 

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Appellate Case: 89-8026 Document: 01019627240 Date Filed: 04/30/1990 Page: 2 
to the district court for the purpose of considering the new trial 

motion. 

The district court held two hearings on the new trial motion. 

At the second hearing the district court permitted the two 

questioned jurors, Giles and Kardong, the jury foreman (who had 

provided the affidavit), and the victim's father to testify. The 

questions posed to the jurors were limited to whether or not any 

of them had been approached by any outside source during the trial 

and whether they had been influenced by any outside source. The 

victim's father was questioned as to whether or not he had had any 

contact with the jurors. Each witness denied any contact or 

influence. Defense counsel were not permitted to inquire any 

further into the deliberations of the jury. The district court 

then denied the motion for the new trial, and the Wyoming Supreme 

Court affirmed. See Braley~ State, 741 P.2d 1061 (Wyo. 1987). 

The U.S. district court denied Braley's petition without a 

hearing, and Braley appealed. 

In our view this case is governed by Smith ~ Phillips, 455 

U.S. 209 (1982). Smith holds that the state court's finding that 

there was no juror bias controls unless one of the eight factors 

set forth in 28 U.S.C. section 2254(d) is met. Id. at 218. 

Braley must thus be contending that one of the following 

exceptions applies: 

(2) that the 

state court 

hearing; 

factf inding procedure employed by the 

was not adequate to afford a full and fair 

(3) that the material facts were 

developed at the state court_hearing; 

3 

not adequately 

Appellate Case: 89-8026 Document: 01019627240 Date Filed: 04/30/1990 Page: 3 
(6) that the applicant 

and adequate hearing in 

did not receive a full, fair, 

the State court proceedings 

28 u.s.c. § 2254(d)(2), (3) & (6). In essence, Braley contends 

that W.R.E. 606(b), 1 which prohibits interrogation of jurors over 

their mental processes, prevented him from having a full and fair 

hearing. We find no such defect in the state hearing procedure. 

The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that inquiry may not be made 

into the "internal" thoughts and reasoning of jurors. See Tanner 

Y.!... United States, 483 U.S. 107, 107 s. Ct. 2739 (1987). The Court 

has thus upheld application of the Rule 606(b) standards of 

exclusion of juror testimony even in the face of Sixth Amendment 

fair jury arguments. See id. at ---, 107 s. Ct. at 2751; Smith, 

455 U.S. at 944-47. In Smith, the Court suggested that the proper 

remedy for possible problems with juror implied bias was a 

hearing. See Smith, 455 U.S. at 946-47. The state trial judge 

afforded such a hearing and an opportunity for Braley to 

investigate, through extrinsic evidence (in this case the 

testimony of the victim's father, and the possibility of 

introducing the caller), the possible existence of juror bias. 

Because we find no error of constitutional magnitude in the 

state court's handling of the jury tampering allegation that would 

render the state hearing unfair under section 2254(d), the state 

court's finding of no bias or prejudice is conclusive. See 28 

u.s.c. § 2245(d). We also find that the district court did not 

abuse its discretion in holding that Braley was not entitled to an 

'-

1 W.R.E. 606(b) and Fed. R. Evid. 606(b) are substantively 

identical. 

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Appellate Case: 89-8026 Document: 01019627240 Date Filed: 04/30/1990 Page: 4 
evidentiary hearing given the state.of the record. See Brofford 

~Marshall, 751 F.2d 845, 853 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 

U.S. 872 (1985); cf. United States v. Wilson, 534 F.2d 375, 379 

(D.C. Dir. 1976). 

We GRANT the certificate of probable cause and the motion to 

proceed in forma pauperis and AFFIRM the decision of the district 

court. 

5 

J 

Appellate Case: 89-8026 Document: 01019627240 Date Filed: 04/30/1990 Page: 5