Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-07093/USCOURTS-ca10-89-07093-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 

---

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS ,.,.nr

h tirr,,it 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT FEB 2 7 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

DAVID L. RUDDER, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

LOUIS W. SULLIVAN, M.D., Secretary 

of Health & Human Services, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) No. 89-7093 

) (D.C. No. 88-333-C) 

) 

) (E.D. Okla.) 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before LOGAN, MOORE, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P . 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The case is therefore ordered 

The issue in this social security case is whether the 

Secretary's invocation of the doctrine of administrative res 

judicata and his discretionary decision not to reopen an earlier 

adjudication are reviewable. Because we agree with the district 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-7093 Document: 010110028925 Date Filed: 02/27/1991 Page: 1 
court that no judicial review of this action is available, we 

affirm. 

Plaintiff-appellant David Rudder was initially found disabled 

in 1976 due to heart problems and a back injury. Supp. Rec. 

Vol. I at 126-28. In 1982, after reevaluation, Mr. Rudder's 

benefits were terminated. Id. at 136-37. This termination was 

affirmed by an administrative law judge, id. at 232-43, and the 

Appeals Council denied Mr. Rudder's request for review. Id. at 

245. Mr. Rudder did not appeal the termination of benefits 

further. Instead, he filed a second application for disability 

benefits in 1985 which was denied by an administrative law judge 

on October 31, 1985. Id. at 332-39. No appeal was taken from the 

denial of the second application. 

The third and current application, the subject of this 

appeal, was filed in 1987, again alleging disability commencing in 

September 1974. Id. at 340-43. This claim was denied initially 

and upon reconsideration. Id. 344-50. Mr. Rudder last met the 

special earning requirements for Title II disability benefits on 

September 30, 1985. To qualify for renewed benefits pursuant to 

the third application, therefore, he needed to show that he became 

disabled on or prior to that date. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.120-.132 

(1988). Because the administrative law judge reviewing his second 

application issued his decision on October 31, 1985, however, Mr. 

Rudder last met the special earnings requirements during a 

previously adjudicated period. Therefore, in order for Mr. Rudder 

to establish disability prior to September 30, 1985, the 

2 

Appellate Case: 89-7093 Document: 010110028925 Date Filed: 02/27/1991 Page: 2 
Secretary's prior decision denying Mr. Rudder's second application 

would have to be reopened. 

An administrative law judge, after reviewing the evidence 

supporting the October 1985 decision as well as the new evidence 

submitted with the third application, dismissed Mr. Rudder's 

request for a hearing and refused to reopen the October 1985 

decision. Supp. Rec. Vol. I at 8. In support of this position, 

the administrative law judge cited principles of res judicata and 

applied the regulations governing the reopening of a final 

decision, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.987-404.989 (1988). The Appeals 

Council denied Mr. Rudder's request for review of the dismissal. 

Mr. Rudder filed a complaint in the district court. That 

court held that neither a dismissal on the ground of res judicata 

nor a discretionary decision not to reopen a prior final decision 

was reviewable by that court. Rudder v. Bowen, No. 88-333-C, 

order at 9 (E.D. Okla. Aug. 29, 1989). Mr. Rudder appeals and we 

affirm. 

In addressing the general question of the scope of judicial 

review of agency action, the Supreme Court has held that the 

Administrative Procedure Act does not itself constitute an implied 

grant of subject matter jurisdiction allowing federal courts to 

review such action. Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 107 (1977). 

Specifically with regard to the Social Security Act, such 

jurisdiction is limited under§ 205(g), 42 u.s.c. § 405(g) (1988), 

to those "final decision[s] of the Secretary made after a 

hearing." Id. at 108. All circuit courts considering the issue 

after Sanders have concluded that a decision by the Secretary not 

3 

Appellate Case: 89-7093 Document: 010110028925 Date Filed: 02/27/1991 Page: 3 
to reopen is unreviewable. Dozier v. Bowen, 891 F.2d 769, 771 

(10th Cir. 1989) (quoting White v. Schweiker, 725 F.2d 91, 93 

(10th Cir. 1984)). This is true whether the Social Security 

Administration held a hearing on whether good cause for reopening 

was established. Dozier, 891 F.2d at 771; White v. Schweiker, 725 

F.2d at 93 (citing cases). 

The only exception to this bar to judicial review occurs when 

the plaintiff challenges the Secretary's refusal to reopen on 

constitutional grounds. Sanders, 430 U.S. at 109; Dozier, 

891 F.2d at 771. We agree with the district court that this case 

presents no colorable constitutional claim. 

Initially, we note that Mr. Rudder's complaint does not 

allege any constitutional violation but simply asks the district 

court to assess whether the Social Security Administration 

properly applied the doctrine of res judicata to the case. Rec. 

Vol. 1, Doc. 1 at 2. The district court, however, did examine Mr. 

Rudder's contention that the agency's failure to apply the 

provisions of the Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act 

of 19841 (1984 Reform Act), which changed the standard of review 

for termination of benefits, may have implicitly resulted in a 

constitutional deprivation. 2 We agree with the district court 

that, because Mr. Rudder's 1982 case challenging the termination 

of his benefits was final in 1983, approximately eighteen months 

1 See Pub. L. 98-460, 98 Stat. 1794, 1797, § 2(d) (1984). 

2 Neither the complaint nor the order of the district court 

specifically defines which constitutional protection was at issue. 

Counsel for Mr. Rudder, however, in his brief on appeal states, 

without more, that "the Appellant has been denied due process by 

the last A.L.J." Brief for Appellant at 13. 

4 

Appellate Case: 89-7093 Document: 010110028925 Date Filed: 02/27/1991 Page: 4 
• 

before the passage of the 1984 Reform Act, that the standards of 

that Act do not apply to his case and that, therefore, no 

constitutional rights have been infringed. 3 

Mr. Rudder argues that courts have refused to accept the bar 

of res judicata in cases of manifest error on the face of the 

record. See Woodrum v. Richardson, 321 F. Supp. 1278, 1281 (S.D. 

w. Va. 1971); cf. Harrah v. Richardson, 446 F.2d 1, 2 (4th Cir. 

1971) (recognizing manifest error exception but refusing to apply 

it). Mr. Rudder, however, does not identify any error rising to 

the magnitude of that in Woodrum, that would remove him from the 

strictures of res judicata. 

This case is controlled by our recent decision in Brown v. 

Sullivan, 912 F.2d 1194 (10th Cir. 1990), in which we stated: 

Neither the district court nor this court has 

jurisdiction to review the Secretary's refusal to reopen 

a claim for disability benefits or determination [that) 

such claim is res judicata. The Secretary's decision 

not to reopen a previously adjudicated claim for 

benefits is discretionary and, therefore, is not a final 

decision reviewable under 42 u.s.c. § 40S(g). 

Claimant may not use these later applications for 

benefits as an attempt to circumvent the appeal 

requirements for a termination of benefits. 

Id. at 1196 (citations omitted). 

The fact that the administrative law judge held a hearing 

regarding Mr. Rudder's third claim does not indicate that the case 

was implicitly reopened, thus allowing judicial review. "Because 

3 Mr. Rudder's 1982 termination proceeding is the only one to 

which the 1984 Reform Act could potentially apply. "The medical 

improvement standard [of the Act) applies only in termination 

cases, not in later applications for benefits." Brown v. 

Sullivan, 912 F.2d 1194, 1196 (10th Cir. 1990). 

5 

Appellate Case: 89-7093 Document: 010110028925 Date Filed: 02/27/1991 Page: 5 
the Secretary expressly refused to reopen by invoking the doctrine 

of res judicata, there was no reopening in fact." Id. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

Eastern District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

John P. Moore 

Circuit Judge 

6 

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