Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00352/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00352-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAFAEL PEREZ,

CDC #V-55072,

Civil

No. 07-0352 JM (NLS)

Plaintiff, ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA

PAUPERIS, IMPOSING NO INITIAL PARTIAL FILING FEE,

GARNISHING $350 FROM

PRISONER’S TRUST ACCOUNT

[Doc. No. 2]; 

(2) SUA SPONTE DISMISSING

COMPLAINT FOR FAILING TO

STATE A CLAIM PURSUANT

TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and

1915A(b)

vs.

K. LOPEZ, et al.

Defendants.

Plaintiff, Rafael Perez, a state prisoner currently incarcerated at California State

Prison-Los Angeles County in Lancaster, California and proceeding pro se, has filed a

civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has not prepaid the $350

filing fee mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); instead, he has filed a Motion to Proceed In

Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [Doc. No. 2]. 

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I. Motion to Proceed IFP [Doc. No. 2]

Effective April 9, 2006, all parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding

in a district court of the United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus,

must pay a filing fee of $350. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite

a plaintiff’s failure to prepay the entire fee only if the plaintiff is granted leave to proceed

IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th

Cir. 1999). However, prisoners granted leave to proceed IFP remain obligated to pay the

entire fee in installments, regardless of whether their action is ultimately dismissed. See

28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Section 1915, as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), further

requires that each prisoner seeking leave to proceed IFP submit a “certified copy of [his]

trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) ... for the six-month period

immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). Using these

certified trust account statements, the Court must assess an initial payment of 20% of (a)

the average monthly deposit, or (b) the average monthly balance in the account for the

past six months, whichever is greater, and collect that amount as the prisoner’s initial

partial filing fee, unless he has no current assets with which to pay. See 28 U.S.C. §

1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4); Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850. Thereafter, the institution

having custody of the prisoner must collect subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the

preceding month’s income, in any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forward

those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2);

Taylor, 281 F.3d at 847.

The Court finds that Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit that complies with 28

U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) [Doc. No. 2] as well as a certified copy of his prison trust account

statement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) and Civil Local Rule 3.2. Plaintiff’s trust

account statement shows an average monthly balance of zero, and an average monthly

deposit of zero for the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of his Complaint.

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Accordingly, the Court hereby GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP [Doc.

No. 2], and assesses no initial partial filing fee at this time. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)

(court shall assess initial partial filing fee only “when funds exist”); 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(4) (“In no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil

action . . . for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the

initial partial filing fee.”); Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4)

acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a

“failure to pay . . . due to the lack of funds available to him when payment is ordered.”).

However, Plaintiff is required to pay the full $350 filing fee mandated by 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1914(a) and 1915(b)(1), by subjecting any future funds credited to his prison trust

account to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

II. Sua Sponte Screening per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A

The PLRA also obligates the Court to review complaints filed by all persons

proceeding IFP and by those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any

facility [and] accused of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of

criminal law or the terms or conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or

diversionary program,” “as soon as practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§

1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under these provisions, the Court must sua sponte dismiss any

IFP or prisoner complaint, or any portion thereof, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to

state a claim, or which seeks damages from defendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en

banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 446 (9th Cir. 2000) (§ 1915A).

Before amendment by the PLRA, the former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) permitted sua

sponte dismissal of only frivolous and malicious claims. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126, 1130.

An action is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact. Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989). However 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A now

mandate that the court reviewing an IFP or prisoner’s suit make and rule on its own

motion to dismiss before effecting service of the Complaint by the U.S. Marshal pursuant

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to FED.R.CIV.P. 4(c)(2). Id. at 1127 (“[S]ection 1915(e) not only permits, but requires

a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a claim.”); see

also Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (discussing 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A).

“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as

true all allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff.” Resnick, 213 F.3d at 447; Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194 (noting

that § 1915(e)(2) “parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”).

In addition, the Court’s duty to liberally construe a pro se’s pleadings, see Karim-Panahi

v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988), is “particularly important

in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992).

A. Constitutional Claims

Section 1983 imposes two essential proof requirements upon a claimant: (1) that

a person acting under color of state law committed the conduct at issue, and (2) that the

conduct deprived the claimant of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the

Constitution or laws of the United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Parratt v. Taylor, 451

U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327,

328 (1986); Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc).

1. Rule 8

In Plaintiff’s Complaint, he makes a vague and general allegation that since he has

been incarcerated at Centinela State Prison he has been “singled out, narrowed out and

discriminated against, lied to, maliciously with criminal intent.” (Compl. at 7.)

Moreover, Plaintiff claims that he has been “beaten, assaulted, attacked and even shot

and almost killed several times” by the named Defendants. (Id.) While these are serious

allegations, Plaintiff must set forth more detailed factual allegations regarding the claims

against each individual Defendant. Based on the failure to provide any specific factual

allegation, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to comply with FED. R. CIV.

P. 8(a), which provides that a complaint “shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of

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the grounds upon which the court’s jurisdiction depends . . . (2) a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for

judgment for the relief the pleader seeks.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). Rule 8 is designed to

provide defendants with fair notice of the claims against them and the grounds on which

those claims rest. McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991). 

2. Personal Liability & Causation

In addition, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to identify with specificity what

these Defendants did to violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. A person may be said to

deprive another “of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, [only] if

he does an affirmative acts, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform

an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which [the plaintiff

complains].” Johnson v. Duff, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). “Causation is, of

course, a required element of a § 1983 claim.” Estate of Brooks v. United States, 197

F.3d 1245, 1248 (9th. Cir. 1999). “The inquiry into causation must be individualized and

focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or

omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844

F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976)); Berg

v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 460 (9th Cir. 1986). Section 1983 provides for relief only

against those who, through their personal involvement as evidenced by affirmative acts,

participation in another’s affirmative acts, or failure to perform legally required duties,

cause the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutionally protected rights. Johnson, 588 F.2d

at 743.

Thus, to the extent that Plaintiff wishes to state any constitutional claim against any

of the individual persons he lists in his Complaint, he must amend his pleading to allege

facts which explain what each of these individuals did, or failed to do, and why he

believes those acts or omissions amounted to a violation of the specific constitutional

rights. Id., see also Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002)(“In order for

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a person acting under color of state law to be liable under § 1983, there must be a

showing of personal participation in the alleged rights deprivation.”).

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a section 1983

claim upon which relief may be granted, and is therefore subject to dismissal pursuant to

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b) & 1915A(b). The Court will provide Plaintiff with an

opportunity to amend his pleading to cure the defects set forth above. 

III. Conclusion and Order

 Good cause appearing therefor, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) [Doc. No.

2] is GRANTED. 

2. The Secretary of California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation,

or his designee, shall collect from Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 balance of the

filing fee owed in this case by collecting monthly payments from the account in an

amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income and forward

payments to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 in

accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY

IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this Order on James

Tilton, Acting Secretary, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, 1515

S Street, Suite 502, Sacramento, California 95814.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

4. Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii) and (iii) and 1915A(b)(1) and (2). However, Plaintiff is

GRANTED forty five (45) days leave from the date this Order is stamped “Filed” in

which to file a First Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading

noted above. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete in itself without

reference to the superseded pleading. See S.D. Cal. Civ. L. R. 15.1. Defendants not

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named and all claims not re-alleged in the Amended Complaint will be deemed to have

been waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Further, if Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted, it may be dismissed without further leave to amend and may hereafter

be counted as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d

1172, 1177-79 (9th Cir. 1996). 

5. The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a form § 1983 complaint to Plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 27, 2007

 Hon. Jeffrey T. Miller

 United States District Judge

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