Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_08-cv-02881/USCOURTS-cand-4_08-cv-02881-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JONAH GABRIEL GARNIER,

Plaintiff,

 v.

DONALD FISHER, et al.,

Defendants. _________________________________

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No. C 08-2881 CW (PR)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff Jonah Gabriel Garnier, a state prisoner currently

incarcerated at Mule Creek State Prison, has filed the present pro

se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging a

violation of his constitutional rights while he was incarcerated at

Marin County Jail. All Defendants move for summary judgment,

arguing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that

they are entitled to the judgment as a matter of law. Although

given an opportunity, Plaintiff has not filed an opposition. For

the reasons discussed below, Defendants' motion for summary

judgment is GRANTED. 

BACKGROUND

The following facts are undisputed, except where indicated.

In October 2007, Plaintiff was placed on suicide watch after

making statements that voices were telling him to hurt himself.

(Compl. at 3; Decl. McMains, Ex. D at ¶ 6.) On October 18, 2007,

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Defendants Deputies Henry McKenzie and Donald Fisher transported

Plaintiff to the Marin General Hospital Emergency Room. (Compl. at

3.) From the time Plaintiff left his cell "to being escorted by two

deputies through the public parking lot and crowded public

emergency room, as well as during the admittance interviews and

examinations, [he] was wearing only a one piece 'Ferrgeson' safety

garment." (Id.) 

Plaintiff was not provided with any clothing, and the safety

garment he was wearing "partially exposed [his] genitals when

sitting, and only covered one third of [his] body when standing." 

(Id.) Defendants McKenzie and Fisher were with Plaintiff at all

times from leaving the jail until returning to the jail. (Decl.

McKenzie, Ex. I at ¶ 6; Decl. Fisher, Ex. H at ¶ 6.) Defendants

McKenzie and Fisher never saw any part of Plaintiff's body while

they were with him except for his lower legs and arms. (Decl.

McKenzie, Ex. I at ¶ 7; Decl. Fisher, Ex. H at ¶ 7.) 

The Marin County Jail purchases its suicide cell smocks, item

505, from The Bob Barker Company. (Decl. Augustus, Ex. B; Ex. L.) 

These smocks are made to fit adults weighing between 100 and 300

pounds with a chest size of 44 inches to 56 inches and a center

back length of 44 inches. (Ex. J.) On July 26, 2007, Plaintiff

was 5 feet 7 inches tall and 160 pounds. (Ex. A.) 

LEGAL STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Summary judgment is properly granted when no genuine and

disputed issues of material fact remain and when, viewing the

evidence most favorably to the non-moving party, the movant is

clearly entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.

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56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);

Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (9th Cir.

1987).

The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no

material factual dispute. Therefore, the Court must regard as true

the opposing party's evidence, if supported by affidavits or other

evidentiary material. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Eisenberg, 815

F.2d at 1289. The Court must draw all reasonable inferences in

favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

587 (1986); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d

1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991). A verified complaint may be used as an

opposing affidavit under Rule 56, as long as it is based on

personal knowledge and sets forth specific facts admissible in

evidence. Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 460 & nn.10-11 (9th

Cir. 1995).

Material facts which would preclude entry of summary judgment

are those which, under applicable substantive law, may affect the

outcome of the case. The substantive law will identify which facts

are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986). Where the moving party does not bear the burden of proof

on an issue at trial, the moving party may discharge its burden of

showing that no genuine issue of material fact remains by

demonstrating that “there is an absence of evidence to support the

nonmoving party's case.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. The burden

then shifts to the opposing party to produce “specific evidence,

through affidavits or admissible discovery material, to show that

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1 Defendants contend that Plaintiff was indeed a pretrial

detainee at the time of the alleged violation, as he was being

detained at Marin County Jail awaiting trial at the time of the

alleged violations. (MSJ at 2, citing Ex. A.) Plaintiff does not

dispute this. 

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the dispute exists.” Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409

(9th Cir. 1991). A complete failure of proof concerning an

essential element of the non-moving party's case necessarily

renders all other facts immaterial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

DISCUSSION

This Court found cognizable the following claims based on

Plaintiff's allegations: an Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment claim

against Defendants Fisher and McKenzie alleging that they were

deliberately indifferent and deprived Plaintiff of basic life

necessities; and a municipal liability claim against Marin County

Sheriff's Department or the Marin County Jail. Defendants move for

summary judgment on both claims. 

I. Deliberate Indifference Claim

As pretrial detainees have not yet been convicted of an

offense, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

prohibits holding them in conditions that "'amount to

punishment.'"1 Byrd v. Maricopa County Sheriff's Dep't., 565 F.3d

1205, 1216 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,

536-37 (1979)). Treatment of prisoners, who have already been

convicted of an offense, is subject to scrutiny under the Eighth

Amendment, which bans cruel and unusual punishment. See Helling v.

McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993). “'Because pretrial detainees'

rights under the Fourteenth Amendment are comparable to prisoners'

rights under the Eighth Amendment, however, [a reviewing court]

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appl[ies] the same standards.'” Byrd, 565 F.3d at 1216 (quoting

Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998)).

A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment when two

requirements are met: (1)"the deprivation alleged must be,

objectively, 'sufficiently serious,'" see Farmer v. Brennan, 511

U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298

(1991)), and (2) the prison official must have acted with "a

sufficiently culpable state of mind," see Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834

(quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297).

In determining whether a deprivation satisfies the objective

component of an Eighth Amendment claim, a court must consider

"[t]he circumstances, nature, and duration of the deprivation." 

Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000). 

As to the question of intent, in the pretrial context, whether

a detainee was punished "turns on whether the action taken, or

condition imposed, was accompanied by punitive intent." Byrd, 565

F.3d at 1217. 

Here, even assuming that Plaintiff has suffered a sufficiently

serious deprivation, see Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, Plaintiff cannot

show that Defendants acted with a culpable state of mind. See id.

Because Plaintiff has not indicated that Defendants expressed an

intent to punish him, in order to survive summary judgment,

Plaintiff must proffer some material fact demonstrating that

Defendants did something from which it can be inferred that they

had a punitive intent. See Byrd, 565 F.3d at 1217. For example,

punitive intent can be inferred if the challenged condition "is not

reasonably related to a legitimate goal," Bell, 441 U.S. at 539, or

if a defendant "knows that [the] inmate[] face[s] a substantial

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risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take

reasonable measure to abate it," Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847.

Plaintiff has not proffered any evidence demonstrating that

the wearing of the suicide smock was not reasonably related to a

legitimate goal. In their motion for summary judgment, Defendants

argue that requiring Plaintiff to wear the suicide smock was an

appropriate response to Plaintiff's suicidal behavior and resulting

safety concerns. (Safety Cell Use, Ex. E at 2.) Defendants

explain, and Plaintiff does not dispute, that Plaintiff was on

suicide watch and pursuant to jail policy, then placed in a safety

cell wearing a suicide smock after Plaintiff had refused to eat or

drink for two days and continued to make statements that he was

going to harm himself. (Decl. McMains, Ex. D at ¶¶ 6, 8.) Because

Plaintiff had refused food and drink, and was further threatening

to harm himself, transporting him to the hospital safely

necessitated the use of the suicide smock pursuant to jail policy. 

(Decl. McMains, Ex. D at ¶ 9.)

 Thus, in light of safety concerns underlying the use of the

suicide smock, its use was reasonably related to a legitimate goal. 

See Bell, 441 U.S. at 539; cf. Anderson, 45 F.3d at 1315 ("Prison

officials have to have some means of controlling violent or selfdestructive inmates temporarily until the episode passes . . . . 

[P]rison officials are not culpable when they put an inmate who

imminently threatens or attempts suicide temporarily in a place

where he cannot hurt himself.").

Finally, Plaintiff has not shown that Defendants knew

Plaintiff faced a substantial harm or deprivation and failed to

take reasonable measures to address it. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847. 

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Plaintiff's complaint alleges that he suffered both mental and

psychological anguish from wearing the suicide smock while being

transported to the hospital and during his examination at the

hospital because the smock "partially exposed my genitals when

sitting, and only covered one third of my body when standing." 

(Compl. at 3.) Taking all of the facts alleged by Plaintiff to be

true, there is no suggestion that Defendants knew that the suicide

smock caused Plaintiff to suffer because it lacked full coverage,

nor is there any evidence that either Defendant disregarded such

harm by failing to "take reasonable measures to abate it." Byrd,

565 F.3d at 1218 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847).

Plaintiff has submitted no evidence showing that Defendants

knew of a substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiff in placing

him in the safety garment and disregarded that risk. Farmer, 511

U.S. at 837. In their motion for summary judgment, Defendants

submit evidence showing that a person of Plaintiff's size should

have been adequately covered with the suicide smock. (Suicide

Smock description, Ex. J; Decl. Hanline, Ex. K. at ¶ 7.). 

Defendants also submit, and Plaintiff does not dispute, that they

believed Plaintiff was fully covered by the suicide smock, which

suggests that they did not intend to punish him. (Decl. Fisher,

Ex. H at ¶¶ 7, 9; Decl. McKenzie, Ex. I at ¶ 7.) Moreover,

Defendants state they were acting in accordance with county safety

procedures prescribed for situations where a detainee was suicidal, 

(Decl. Fisher, Ex. H at ¶ 12; Decl. McMains, Ex. D at ¶¶ 7, 9),

rather than seeking to punish Plaintiff. Plaintiff does not

contest that he was suicidal at the time. In fact, Plaintiff

actually agrees that Defendants were acting in accordance with

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county policies. (Compl. at 2.) 

Accordingly, because the record does not provide any material

fact in dispute as to whether Defendants acted with punitive

intent, Plaintiff's claim cannot survive summary judgment. 

II. Municipal Liability Claim

Plaintiff alleges that the use of the suicide smock and the

failure to provide him with sufficient clothing in a public place

was sanctioned by the policies and practices of the Marin County

Sheriff's Department or the Marin County Jail. Plaintiff contends

that Defendant Fisher informed him that the use of the "safety

garment" was "per our policy." (Compl. at 2.) Plaintiff also

alleges that the second level review of his inmate grievance

stated, "All Marin County Jail policies were followed." (Id.) 

Local governments are "persons" subject to liability under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 where official policy or custom causes a

constitutional tort, see Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S.

658, 690 (1978); however, a city or county may not be held

vicariously liable for the unconstitutional acts of its employees

under the theory of respondeat superior, see Board of County

Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997); Monell, 436 U.S. at

691. To impose municipal liability under § 1983 for a violation of

constitutional rights, a plaintiff must show: (1) that there was a

violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights; (2) "that the

municipality had a policy"; (3) that the policy constitutes

"'deliberate indifference’ to the plaintiff's constitutional

right"; and, (4) that the policy was the reason for the

constitutional violation. Plumeau v. School Dist. No. 40 County of

Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal citations

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G:\PRO-SE\CW\CR.08\Garnier2881.GrantMFSJ.frm 9

omitted).

However, where as here, the conduct of individual employees is

found reasonable and proper, the municipality or county cannot

generally be held liable, because no constitutional violation

occurred. See Gregory v. County of Maui, 523 F.3d 1101, 1109 (9th

Cir. 2008) (where officers did not use excessive force in violation

of 4th Amendment, claims against the county also fail); Orin v.

Barclay, 272 F.3d 1207, 1216-17 (9th Cir. 2001) (city not liable

for 1st Amendment infringement when police officers had probable

cause to arrest an anti-abortion protester for trespass and failure

to disperse); Jackson v. City of Bremerton, 268 F.3d 646, 653-54

(9th Cir. 2001) (no supervisory or municipal liability existed

where it was determined that plaintiff was not subjected to

excessive force during her arrest).

Thus, Plaintiff's claim of municipal liability also cannot

survive summary judgment.

CONCLUSION

Defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. The clerk

shall terminate any pending motions and close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: 7/26/2010 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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G:\PRO-SE\CW\CR.08\Garnier2881.GrantMFSJ.frm 10

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JONAH GABRIEL GARNIER,

Plaintiff,

 v.

DONALD FISHER et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV08-02881 CW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District

Court, Northern District of California.

That on July 26, 2010, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said

envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle

located in the Clerk's office.

Jonah Gabriel Garnier G 29257

Mule Creek State Prison

P.O. Box 409040

Ione, CA 95640

Dated: July 26, 2010

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Nikki Riley, Deputy Clerk

Case 4:08-cv-02881-CW Document 27 Filed 07/26/10 Page 10 of 10