Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01738/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01738-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ADRIANA ROVAI, individually, and on 

behalf of the class of all others similarly 

situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

SELECT PORTFOLIO SERVICING, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No.: 14cv1738-BAS (MSB)

ORDER

Before the Court is the parties’ Joint Motion for Determination of Discovery 

Dispute, filed on January 3, 2019. (ECF NO. 129.) In the joint motion, Plaintiff Adriana 

Rovai (“Plaintiff” or “Rovai”) moves to compel further responses from Defendant Select 

Portfolio Services (“Defendant” or “SPS”) to her First Set of Requests for Admission 

(“RFAs”) and First Set of Interrogatories. (Id. at 2.) For the reasons set forth below, the 

Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Plaintiff’s motion to compel further 

responses. 

/ / /

/ / /

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I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff brings this case on behalf of herself and others similarly situated against 

Defendant, the mortgage loan servicer who administered her home mortgage beginning 

in 2011. (See ECF No. 86 at 1, 3.) Her mortgage was an option adjustable rate 

mortgage, which permitted Plaintiff to make minimum payments that did not cover her 

monthly interest due. (See id. at 4-5.) The unpaid interest in any given month was 

added to the unpaid principal balance, which in turn accrued interest—this increase in 

the unpaid principal balance is called negative amortization. (Id.) At the time 

Defendant began servicing Plaintiff’s mortgage, it had increased from $524,000 to 

$533,013.02 by this process. (Id. at 5-6.) Plaintiff’s central claim is that the amounts of 

negative amortization continued to be interest, to which SPS should have applied 

payments prior to applying payments to the original unpaid principal, and which should 

have been reported by SPS as mortgage interest paid by Plaintiff on the IRS form 1098 

that Defendant issued to Plaintiff. (Id. at 6-7.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to 

properly report the previously described payments of the negative amortization 

amounts on Form 1098 from the time they began servicing her loan in December 2011 

(see id.), and even after Plaintiff brought the issue to Defendant’s attention in in April 

2014, it failed to investigate the situation and correct the error (see id. at 8). As a result, 

Plaintiff underreported the mortgage interest she paid in her federal income taxes, 

claimed smaller tax deductions, and overpaid her taxes. (Id. at 7.) Based on these 

essential central facts, Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint alleges causes of action 

for unfair competition, declaratory relief, and negligence. 

Judge Gallo previously limited discovery in this case to Rovai’s individual claims on 

November 9, 2018, pending the parties’ anticipated additional litigation on the 

pleadings. (See ECF No. 112 at 1.) He further ordered that Plaintiff could not propound 

any further written discovery pending further order of the Court and could only proceed 

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with its Rule 30(b)(6) deposition. (Id. at 2.) These disputes appear to arise from written 

discovery propounded by Plaintiff on Defendant prior to Judge Gallo’s Order. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorize parties to obtain discovery 

regarding any unprivileged matter that is relevant to any claim or defense and

proportional to the needs of the case, “considering the importance of the issues at stake 

in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant 

information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the 

issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its 

likely benefit.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Relevant information need not be admissible at 

trial to be discoverable. Id. District courts have broad discretion to determine relevancy 

for discovery purposes. See Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Similarly, district courts have broad discretion to limit discovery where the discovery 

sought is “unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other 

source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive”; the requesting 

party has had ample opportunity to obtain discovery; or the discovery sought is beyond 

the scope of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1). Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C). 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36 permits a party to compel another party to 

admit or deny the truth of any matters within Rule 26(b)(1)’s scope “relating to (A) facts, 

the application of law to fact, or opinions about either; and (b) the genuineness of any

described documents.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(1). “The purpose of Rule 36(a) is to 

expedite trial by establishing certain material facts as true and thus narrowing the range 

of issues for trial.” Asea, Inc. v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 669 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1981). 

Each matter which a party is asked to admit must be separately set forth. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

36(a)(2). “Requests for admissions may not contain compound, conjunctive, or 

disjunctive (e.g., “and/or”) statements.” U.S. ex rel Englund v. Los Angeles Cty, 235 

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F.R.D. 675, 684 (E.D. Cal. May 12, 2006) (citation omitted). Nevertheless, parties should 

focus on the “full and efficient discovery” goal of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 

and not engage in “evasion and word play.” Marchand v. Mercy Med. Ctr., 22 F.3d 933, 

936 (9th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). The rule sets forth detailed requirements for the 

party responding to an RFA: 

Answer: If a matter is not admitted, the answer must specifically 

deny it or state in detail why the answering party cannot 

truthfully admit or deny it. A denial must fairly respond to the 

substance of the matter; and when good faith requires that a 

party qualify an answer or deny only a part of a matter, the 

answer must specify the part admitted and qualify or deny the 

rest. The answering party may assert lack of knowledge or 

information as a reason for failing to admit or deny only if the 

party states that it has made reasonable inquiry and that the 

information it knows or can readily obtain is insufficient to 

enable it to admit or deny.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 36 (a)(4). 

An interrogatory may relate to any matter that may be inquired of under Rule 

26(b). Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a)(2). The responding party must answer each interrogatory by 

stating the appropriate objection(s) with specificity or, to the extent the interrogatory is 

not objected to, by “answer[ing] separately and fully in writing under oath.” Id. at 33(b). 

The responding party has the option in certain circumstances to answer an interrogatory 

by specifying responsive records and making those records available to the interrogating 

party. Id. at 33(d). 

III. DISCUSSION

A. RFA No. 10

Plaintiff’s RFA No. 10 asks Defendant to “[a]dmit that there were deferred 

amounts or negative amortization on ROVAI’S MORTGAGE for the period of time that 

SPS has been the servicer of the LOAN.” (ECF No. 129 at 7.) Defendant objected to this 

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Request in its initial responses as vague and unintelligible, stating that the phrase 

“deferred amounts or negative amortization on ROVAI’S MORTGAGE” was unclear. (Id.) 

Nevertheless, Defendant admitted that “at the time it began servicing Rovai’s loan, her

total principal balance exceeded her original principal balance.” (Id.) In the instant 

motion, Plaintiff objects to this response, stating that it does not respond to the 

request, which it states is proper and simple. (Id. at 8.) Defendant elaborates on its 

objection, by explaining that the phrase is unintelligible because the two terms—

“deferred amounts” and “negative amortization” mean different things. (Id.) It further 

argues that it cannot simply admit or deny the request, which asks it to admit two 

different things simultaneously. (Id.) 

The Court finds that the term “deferred amounts” is vague. Nevertheless, in the 

context of this case and the parties’ meet and confer and arguments, Plaintiff’s intent 

with this interrogatory is simple and straightforward. The Court finds that without the 

term “deferred amounts,” the RFA seeks relevant information, and neither vague nor 

compound. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to compel is GRANTED in part, and 

Defendant is ordered to respond to Plaintiff’s request as follows: admit that there was 

negative amortization on ROVAI’S MORTGAGE for the period of time that SPS has been 

the servicer of the LOAN. The answer previously provided by Defendant is not 

responsive to the request, and is therefore insufficient. 

B. RFA No. 16

This request asks Defendant to “[a]dmit that at no time prior to ACQUIRING any 

OPTION ARM LOANS from BANA did YOU ever attempt to determine if any portion of 

the LOAN BALANCES that you would ACQUIRE included unpaid DEFERRED INTEREST.” 

(Id. at 9.) Defendant initially objected that the request is “overbroad, unduly 

burdensome, not limited to a relevant time period, and not relevant to a party’s claim or 

defense in this case or proportional to the needs of this case.” (Id.) It also claimed that 

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the RFA was vague and unintelligible. (Id.) In its supplemental responses, Defendant 

added a new argument that the RFA assumes that Defendant had a legal duty to verify 

whether the loans had unpaid deferred interest. (Id.) 

The Court agrees that the RFA, as written, is overbroad insofar as it asks about 

“any OPTION ARM LOANS from BANA” and is seemingly unlimited in time, particularly in 

light of the parties’ stipulation and Judge Gallo’s order bifurcating discovery, such that 

the parties may only engage in discovery regarding Rovai’s claims at this time. (See ECF 

No. 111 at 3; ECF No. 112 at 1.) However, the Court finds it appropriate to limit this RFA 

to Plaintiff’s mortgage loan, which would overcome this objection. When narrowed to 

Rovai’s loan, the Court finds that RFA seeks information relevant to Plaintiff’s claims and 

is not overbroad or unduly burdensome. It is limited in time as it refers only to what 

Defendant did prior to acquiring Rovai’s loan, and limited to actions taken or not taken 

in relation thereto. Defendant’s argument that the interrogatory assumes facts not in 

evidence is simply incorrect. Admitting whether one attempted to determine whether 

the loan balance included unpaid deferred interest in no way assumes or admits that 

the party had a duty to do so. The Court therefore GRANTS in part Plaintiff’s motion to 

compel further responses to this RFA. Defendant is ORDERED to respond to the 

following modified request: Admit that at no time prior to ACQUIRING ROVAI’S LOAN 

from BANA did YOU ever attempt to determine if any portion of ROVAI’S LOAN 

BALANCE that you would ACQUIRE included unpaid DEFERRED INTEREST. 

C. RFA Nos. 17, 18, 19, 20, 22 and 23

In RFA Nos. 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, and 23, Plaintiff asks Defendant to admit various 

definitions or relationships between terms. RFA No. 17 asks Defendant to “[a]dmit that 

INTEREST, in the context of a MORTGAGE or LOAN is the money charged to and paid by 

BORROWERS for the use of the money,” where evidently several terms have been 

defined previously by Plaintiff. (ECF No. 129 at 11.) RFA No. 18 asks Defendant to 

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“[a]dmit that DEFERRED INTEREST is INTEREST.” (Id. at 14.) Without reciting each of the 

RFAs verbatim, RFA Nos. 19 and 20 are substantially similar in form and nature. RFA

Nos. 22 and 23 asks Defendant to admit the propriety or impropriety of different acts. 

For instance in RFA No, 22: “[a]dmit that it is proper under 26 U.S.C. [s]ection 6050H for 

a lender to report payments of previously DEFERRED INTEREST in Box 1 of a 

BORROWER’s FORM 1098 in the tax year in which the previously DEFERRED INTEREST is 

actually paid.” (Id. at 22.) 

In its original responses, Defendant objected to these requests on the grounds 

that they ask for a legal conclusion. (Id. at 11, 14, 17, 20, 22, and 24.) In supplemental 

responses, to RFA Nos. 17, 18, and 19, Defendant objected that terms in the request 

have different meanings in different contexts (see id. at 12, 14, and 17) , which the 

Court understands to be an objection for vagueness. 

The Court SUSTAINS Defendant’s objections to RFA Nos. 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, and 

23. The Plaintiff’s requests do not reference specific facts of this case but rather are 

seeking admissions of a purely legal issue. The central issue in this case is whether 

Defendant failed to properly report the correct amount of Plaintiff’s mortgage interest 

on tax forms and what Defendant was required by law to do is at-issue. Plaintiff is 

seeking to have Defendant admit to definitions of terms that are central to the case and 

would be determinative of legal issues without any application to the facts of this case. 

This is not the proper purpose for an RFA. See Hupp v. San Diego Cty., Civil No. 

12cv0492 GPC(RBB), at *31 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2014) (finding that RFA asked for legal 

conclusion where “requests do not reference any specific facts of his case.”). That 

Plaintiff is looking for a legal conclusion divorced from the facts of this case is 

demonstrated by her arguments claiming insufficiency some of Defendant’s 

supplemental responses. For instance, in supplemental responses to RFA Nos. 17, 18, 

and 19, Defendant attempts to provide a substantive response by grounding the purely 

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legal requests in the facts of the case (see ECF No. 129 at 12, 14, and 17), Plaintiff 

objects to what it characterizes as Defendant’s rewriting of the question, noting for 

instance in response to RFA No. 17 that “[t]he request does not ask SPS anything about 

its contract or how its contract treats interest.” (Id. at 12.) While Plaintiff claims that 

RFA Nos. 17 and 18 seek Defendant’s understanding of these different issues (see id. at 

48 (“The requests do not seek conclusion. They seek SPS’ understanding of the terms 

used daily in the performance in the performance of its mortgage servicing 

responsibilities.”); see also e.g., id. at 12, 15 (“Therefore, this request seeks to have SPS 

admit or deny its understanding of what is ‘interest’ in the context of a mortgage 

loan.”)), that is not what the RFAs do at all. The RFAs do not ask how Defendant has 

interpreted the word interest for a certain purpose, but ask about the definitions of 

words, which the Court finds in these circumstances to be purely legal conclusion, and a 

vague one at that since the context for the definitions is not clearly identified in each 

RFA. 

The Court therefore DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to compel further responses to RFA 

Nos. 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, and 23 as each calls for a legal conclusion.

D. RFA Nos. 31 and 37

Initially, the Court notes that Defendant objected to both of these RFAs because 

they were served in violation of Local Rule No. 36.1, which limits each party to serving 

no more than twenty-five (25) RFAs unless the party obtains leave of court. (See id. at 

27, 37.) While the Court does not know when this objection was initially made, 

Defendant continues to argue in the instant joint motion, filed on January 3, 2019, that 

Plaintiff has not responded to this objection and therefore the Court must deny 

Plaintiff’s motion to compel further responses to these requests. (Id. at 28, 38.) 

Defendant is correct that Plaintiff has not addressed this objection anywhere in the 

instant motion. That neither party has referenced Judge Gallo’s October 31, 2018 Order 

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Following Discovery Conference, which specifically ordered that “each party shall be 

limited to propounding 40 RFAs,” causes this Court concern. (See ECF No. 108 at 2.) 

Based on the information before the Court, it is not clear whether there was a good 

faith basis for this objection or why Plaintiff did not believe the Judge Gallo’s order was 

pertinent to include in its response. Nevertheless, on the record before the Court, the 

objection is hereby OVERRULED. The Court will therefore address the substantive 

arguments raised by the parties. 

1. RFA No. 31 

This RFA asks Defendant to “[a]dmit that at the time SPS ACQUIRED the 

MORTGAGE portfolio from BANA, including Plaintiff’s MORTGAGE, BANA did not give 

YOU any specific instructions as to how YOU were to allocate the monthly payments 

YOU would receive from BORROWERS on the BANA MORTGAGES that were transferred 

to YOU for SERVICING.” (ECF No. 129 at 27.) In its supplemental response, Defendant 

objected to this RFA because it was not limited to Rovai’s loan, and Defendant claimed 

that “it assumes that BANA had a contractual right or obligation to give SPS instructions 

as to how to service the Rovai loan, which is not the case because BANA was not the 

owner or investor of the Rovai loan.” (Id. at 27.) 

Plaintiff’s objections are unavailing. Given the allegation in this case that 

Defendant was negligent in failing to identify the amount of negative amortization when 

it took over the servicing of Rovai’s loan by BANA, and Defendant’s claims that it lacked 

the information necessary to ascertain those amounts, the existence or absence of 

instructions for payment allocation conveyed from BANA to Defendant is undeniably 

relevant. Though discovery at this point is limited to the named Plaintiff, the Court 

believes that this question, because it deals with the transition of the mortgage 

portfolio that included Plaintiff’s loan, is not overbroad. 

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Finally, there is simply no truth in Defendant’s argument that the RFA assumes a 

duty. It makes no statement regarding a duty, and an admission leaves completely open 

the question of whether a duty exists at all. For these reasons, the Court GRANTS

Plaintiff’s motion to compel further response to this RFA. 

2. RFA No. 37

This RFA asks Defendant to “[a]dmit that YOU did not seek guidance from the IRS 

prior to implementing YOUR policy relating to whether or not to include BORROWER 

payments of previously DEFERRED INTEREST on OPTION ARM LOANS in the amount of 

reported INTEREST to be put on YOUR BORROWERS FORMS 1098.” (Id. at 29.) 

Defendant objects on the ground that this request is excessively burdensome, in that its 

practices regarding the reporting of payments of capitalized interest on option arm 

loans predates this case. (Id.) In this instant motion, however, Defendant has failed to 

support its objection as it has not put forth any facts in support of its undue burden 

objection. See Oakes v. Halvorsen Marine Ltd., 179 F.R.D. 281, 283 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 2, 

1998) (citation omitted) (“The party who resists discovery has the burden to show that 

discovery should not be allowed, and has the burden of clarifying, explaining, and 

supporting its objections.”). Instead, as best this Court can ascertain, Defendant argues 

that this RFA seeks irrelevant information, because Defendant’s policies are the ones 

advocated by the Plaintiff. (See ECF No. 129 at 30-31.) The parties in this case clearly 

disagree regarding what Defendant’s duties are with regard to Form 1098 reporting of 

capitalized interest on a loan such as Rovai’s. One of Plaintiff’s causes of action is that 

Defendant has been negligent in its 1098 reporting. (See ECF No. 86 at 18.) Whether 

Defendant made inquiries to the IRS regarding potentially ambiguous provisions of law 

when implementing policies, regardless of whether they were ultimately followed, is 

relevant to the claims of this case as it may demonstrate that Defendant found the law 

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ambiguous or used extraordinary care. For these reasons, Plaintiff’s motion to compel 

further responses to this RFP is GRANTED. 

E. Interrogatory No. 3

In this Interrogatory, Plaintiff asks Defendant to “[s]tate all facts upon which YOU 

calculated the amount of INTEREST reported on ROVAI’S Form 1098 that YOU have 

prepared each year since YOU serviced ROVAI’S LOAN.” (ECF No. 129 at 31.) Defendant 

objected that the interrogatory was “vague, ambiguous, and unintelligible,” due to the 

phrase “state all facts upon which you calculated.” (Id.) In spite of this objection, 

Defendant stated that it “will produce copies of Rovai’s loan history and Form 1098s for 

the period SPS serviced her loan.” (Id.) In supplemental responses, Defendant 

responded to this Interrogatory with a formula: “The amount of interest reported on 

Rovai’s Form 1098 for any given year is equal to the payments applied to her 

CAPITALIZED INTEREST balance during that year.” (Id.) In the instant motion, Defendant 

revises its answer a second time, and states “[t]he amount of mortgage interest paid 

reported in Box 1 on Rovai’s Form 1098 for any given year was equal to the amount of 

monthly interest Rovai paid during the year plus any payments applied to Rovai’s 

Capitalized interest balance, plus any other amounts that SPS’s third-party Form 1098 

reporting program deems reportable in that field. (e.g., late fees).” Plaintiff maintains 

that these responses are insufficient, as Rovai’s interrogatory requires the underlying 

figures, in dollars, that SPS used to produce its Form 1098, Box 1 number, for Rovai each 

year that it serviced her loan. (Id. at 32.)

While other language may have been more precise, the Court finds that the 

information Plaintiff seeks is discernable from the interrogatory, and relevant to 

Plaintiff’s claims. Defendant’s response is not responsive. Plaintiff specifically asked 

Defendant to state “facts” upon which the interest was calculated. The Court agrees 

that a reasonable response will provide the specific figures from Plaintiff’s mortgage 

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payments, and how they were used to calculate the number entered in Box 1 of Form 

1098 for each year that Defendant serviced her loan. Plaintiff’s request to compel a 

further response is GRANTED.

F. Interrogatory No. 4

Plaintiff seeks the identity of “person(s) who are primarily responsible for assuring 

[Defendant’s] compliance with the IRS’s requirements for providing informational tax 

returns (such as FORM 1098).” (Id. at 32.) After failing to respond initially, Defendant 

objected in supplementary responses on the grounds that the interrogatory is vague 

and ambiguous. (Id.) Further, Defendant responds that the forms are generated 

electronically in the normal course of business, and Plaintiff has not established that the 

manner in which Defendant generates these forms is at issue. (Id. at 33.) Finally, 

Defendant responded that there is no single person who has the primary job function to 

ensure compliance with IRS reporting requirements. (Id.)

Nothing about this interrogatory is vague or ambiguous. It is straightforward in 

that it seeks the name or names of the person or people Defendant employs with 

primary responsibility to assure compliance when issuing IRS forms. Plaintiff need not 

demonstrate that the manner of generation of the forms is at-issue to identify the 

person responsible for compliance, when a central issue in this case is whether 

compliance with the law required Defendant to report capitalized interest as mortgage 

interest paid on form 1098. It is not sufficient that Defendant produced a witness who 

testified that he oversees the business unit that is responsible for generating IRS 1098 

forms (see id.), as that testimony is not directly responsive to the interrogatory and does 

not necessarily identify whom Defendant considers primarily responsible for such 

compliance. Defendant SPS must identify the person or people it considers primarily 

responsible for generating these forms as required by law. If Defendant does not have 

an individual responsible for assuring compliance with IRS requirements, Defendant is to 

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state so under penalty of perjury. If there is a person(s) in charge, that person(s) must 

be named. Plaintiff’s request to compel a further response is GRANTED.

G. Interrogatory No. 6

Interrogatory No. 6 states: 

IDENTIFY and DESCRIBE all policies, guidelines, manuals,

instructional documents, directives or writings of any kind, and 

any additions, modifications or amendments thereto, that 

existed at SPS since January 1, 2010, that set forth YOUR policies 

and practices regarding the issuance of FORM 1098 to 

BORROWERS that previously deferred the payment of INTEREST 

on an OPTION ARM LOAN and subsequently repaid the 

DEFERRED INTEREST. Please include in this description and 

identification any documents that YOU created as well as any 

documents from any third parties such as the IRS, counsel, or 

prior SERVICERS.

(Id. at 33-34.) 

Defendant objects to the interrogatory as being overbroad, unduly burdensome 

and seeking irrelevant information. (Id. at 34.) It argues that the Plaintiff has only taken 

issue with the Form 1098s from 2011 and 2012, and that such policies, if they exist, are 

not relevant to the reporting in this case, since the reporting on Rovai’s 1098s omitted 

the capitalized interest payments not because of policy, but because the prior servicer 

did not include her capitalized interest balance when it transferred her loan data. (Id.) 

In a supplemental response, Defendant asserts that it is not aware of any policies, etc., 

“specifically regarding the issuance of FORM 1098 to [such borrowers].” (Id. (emphasis 

added).) It further states that SPS’s practice was to report all payments applied to 

capitalized interest on the Form 1098 for the year in which it was paid. (Id.) Finally, in 

the instant motion, Defendant explains that it has already “produced copies of all 

policies and procedures regarding payment application and provided Rule 30(b)(6) 

testimony explaining that SPS’s third-party vendor develops the programs that generate 

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Form 1098s and that SPS has not changed the vendor’s programs, which reside on SPS’s 

servicing platform.” (Id. at 35.) Plaintiff maintains that SPS must identify the writings 

that set forth the practice it alleges to employ, which is central to its negligence claim. 

(Id. at 34-35.) 

In light of the facts that (1) Defendant states that it is not aware of any responsive 

documents specifically regarding the issuance of Form 1098 in these circumstances, (2) 

Defendant states it has produced all policies regarding payment application, and (3) 

Defendant’s explanation that a third party vendor develops the programs that generate 

Form 1098s, the Court finds that this interrogatory is not proportional to the needs of

the case. The proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). 

Plaintiff’s request to compel a further response is DENIED.

H. Interrogatory No. 8

Plaintiff seeks to have Defendant “DESCRIBE ANY INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS

that YOU have relating to whether YOU have in the past or are currently reporting the 

amounts of mortgage INTEREST on FORMS 1098 that you provide to BORROWERS with 

OPTION ARM LOANS who have paid YOU previously DEFERRED INTEREST.” (Id. at 35.) 

Defendant objects as to the interrogatory being overbroad, unduly burdensome and 

seeking irrelevant information not proportional to Rovai’s claims, versus those of the 

class. (Id. at 35-36.) Plaintiff maintains that internal communications regarding the 1098 

reporting of capitalized interest and mortgage interest for option arm loans is relevant to 

Plaintiff’s negligence claim because she is entitled to know if there is any different 

treatment between Plaintiff and other borrowers in this regard. (Id. at 36.) 

This interrogatory is overly broad in so far as it includes all option arm loans, 

based on Judge Gallo’s order previously limiting discovery in this case. Judge Gallo 

limited discovery to Rovai’s individual claims on November 9, 2018, pending the parties’ 

anticipated additional litigation on the pleadings. (See ECF No. 112 at 1.) However, 

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limiting this interrogatory to internal communications with regard to Rovai’s mortgage

only is not overbroad, unduly burdensome or irrelevant. Therefore, the Court GRANTS 

in part Plaintiff’s motion to compel further responses to this interrogatory, modified as 

follows: Fully DESCRIBE ANY INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS that YOU have relating to 

whether YOU have in the past or are currently reporting the amounts of mortgage 

INTEREST on FORMS 1098 on Rovai’s mortgage.

I. Interrogatory No. 22

Plaintiff seeks to have Defendant answer the following: “Did YOU ever make any 

inquiry of BANA as to whether Plaintiffs’ [sic] LOAN BALANCE included unpaid DEFERRED 

INTEREST?” (ECF No. 129 at 37.) Defendant objects on the grounds that this 

interrogatory is vague and ambiguous because the terms “Loan Balance” and “unpaid 

Deferred Interest” are not defined. (Id.) Further, Defendant claims that that the 

interrogatory is duplicative of RFP Nos. 31 and 32, and claims that communications with 

third parties are not relevant to Plaintiff’s claims. (Id.) In its supplementary response, 

Defendant states that “BANA was required to deliver to [sic] accurate and complete loan 

data to SPS in connection with the transfer of Plaintiff’s loan data to SPS.” (Id.) In the 

instant motion, Defendant’s arguments appear to address a different Interrogatory (see, 

e.g., id. at 38 (arguing that this interrogatory “asks about every Option Arm Loan that 

Defendant ever acquired from BANA,” which the Court notes this interrogatory does not 

do).) 

This interrogatory is neither vague nor ambiguous. It is straightforward and

relevant to Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant was negligent regarding its reporting of 

mortgage interest paid by Rovai on Form 1098. It is neither overly broad nor overly 

burdensome, as it is limited to Plaintiff’s mortgage loan and is a yes or no question. 

Defendant indicates that this interrogatory has already been answered through a Rule 

30(b)(6) witness. (Id. at 39.) However, the described deposition testimony regarding 

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some unsuccessful attempts to contact BANA regarding capitalized interest balances is 

not a substitute for a clear and complete answer to this interrogatory. Therefore, the 

Plaintiff’s request to compel a further response is GRANTED.

J. Interrogatory No. 23

Plaintiff seeks to have Defendant describe in detail all steps taken “to determine 

whether Plaintiffs’ [sic] LOAN BALANCE included unpaid DEFERRED INTEREST, including 

but not limited to the dates of each step, the names of all persons taking the steps, the 

names of all persons to whom inquiry was made, the request and receipt of any 

documents, the content of any conversations, and the conclusions reached after 

inquiry.” (Id. at 39.) The Defendant objects as to this interrogatory being vague and 

ambiguous, and overbroad. (Id. at 39-40.) In its supplemental response, Defendant 

responded that “its loan servicing platform checks for a Capitalized Interest balance at 

the time payments are applied and applies principal payments to that balance, if one 

exists.” (Id. at 40.) 

The Court finds that this inquiry is relevant to Plaintiff’s negligence claim, and it is 

proportional insofar as it deals only with Plaintiff’s mortgage loan serviced by 

Defendant. Plaintiff claims that Defendant was negligent in its reporting of Plaintiff’s 

mortgage interest paid on Form 1098. Defendant claims that it reported the interest 

the way it did because BANA did not provide the correct information regarding 

capitalized interest. In these circumstances, Defendant’s efforts or lack thereof to 

ascertain the characteristics of Plaintiff’s loan balance are relevant and central to this 

case. Therefore, the Plaintiff’s request to compel a further response is GRANTED. If 

Defendant has not already provided a complete answer to this interrogatory, it is to do 

so. 

/ / /

/ / /

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K. Interrogatory No. 25

Plaintiff seeks to have Defendant respond to the following interrogatory: “For the 

period January 1, 2015 through the present date, IDENTIFY all policies, procedures, 

manuals, guidelines and internal writings and INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS that 

evidence, state, and describe how you allocate monthly payments received from 

BORROWERS with OPTION ARM LOANS between PRINCIPAL, current INTEREST, 

DEFERRED INTEREST and any other charges which may be payable through the 

BORROWERS [sic] monthly payment.” (Id. at 41.) Defendant objects to this 

interrogatory as compound, overbroad, unduly burdensome, seeking irrelevant

information, and class discovery, rather than discovery into Rovai’s individual claims. 

(Id. at 41-42.) In the instant motion, Defendant states that it has “produced copies of all 

policies and procedures regarding payment application and provided Rule 30(b)(6) 

testimony on this topic,” and therefore, “[n]o further response is possible.” (Id. at 43.) 

The Court notes that Defendant’s policies and internal communications regarding 

the allocation of mortgage payments is relevant to the claims and defenses in this case. 

Furthermore, the writings that identify how Defendant determines the allocation of 

payments on option are loans is relevant to Rovai’s individual claims, not only to issues 

regarding the class. Considering the fact that Defendant has asserted its policy is 

responses to previous interrogatories, and Defendant claims it has already produced 

copies of the same, it should not be excessively burdensome for it to identify such 

policies and writings for Plaintiff as they applied during this limited period of time. For 

these reasons, Plaintiff’s motion to compel a further response to this Interrogatory is 

GRANTED. 

L. Interrogatory No. 26

Interrogatory No. 26 asks Defendant, if it relied on contract language when 

allocating monthly payments from borrowers, to “specify the precise contractual 

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language” it was relying upon and identify the associated contract. (Id. at 43.) 

Defendant objects that the request is unintelligibly vague and ambiguous, overbroad 

and unduly burdensome, and it goes beyond Rovai’s individual claim. (Id. at 43-44.) In 

its supplemental response, Defendant describes how it applies payments on Rovai’s 

mortgage agreement. (Id. at 44.) 

Contrary to Defendant’s assertion, this Interrogatory clearly sets out what Plaintiff 

seeks. In light of Judge Gallo’s order limiting discovery to Plaintiff’s individual claims 

pending the resolution of litigation on the pleadings, this Interrogatory is overbroad 

insofar as it pertains to any mortgage other than Plaintiff’s. However, the Court believes 

that this Interrogatory, once limited to Rovai’s mortgage, is relevant and proportional. 

Plaintiff’s motion to compel a further response to this interrogatory is therefore 

GRANTED.

M. Interrogatory No. 40

This Interrogatory asks Defendant to “[d]escribe in detail how YOU process YOUR 

receipt of monthly MORTGAGE payments from BORROWERS, including receipt of the 

money, and any process by which the aggregate payment is broken down, separated, or 

allocated to different components of LOAN BALANCE.” (Id. at 45.) It further asks 

Defendant to identify and describe the documents that set forth this process. (Id.) 

Defendant objects that the Interrogatory is vague, ambiguous, and unintelligible; 

overbroad and unduly burdensome; and irrelevant to Rovai’s individual claims. (Id. at 

45-46.) Plaintiff offers to narrow this interrogatory by limiting it to Rovai’s monthly 

billing statements from 2010 to the present. (Id. at 46.)

The Court agrees with Defendant that this Interrogatory is vague and ambiguous. 

It is unclear what would be included within “processing the receipt of monthly mortgage 

payments.” The Court would not know if this includes opening an envelope or receiving 

an electronic funds transfer? Does the process include only the steps or the rules 

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applied at each step? Furthermore, though the interrogatory is phrased in the present 

tense and only applies to the process presently in place, Plaintiff seeks to change the 

scope of the interrogatory to apply from 2010 to present, and asks Defendant to explain 

how the mortgage statements issued to Rovai during SPS serving of her loan were 

calculated (see id.). The information now requested by Plaintiff bears little resemblance 

to the interrogatory originally served. Because answering this interrogatory would 

require Defendant to guess at the information requested, and the Court is doubtful that 

an answer which described a “process” would have any relevance to the claims and 

defenses in this case, Plaintiff’s motion to compel further response to this interrogatory 

is DENIED. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion to compel as presented in the 

parties’ joint motion for determination of discovery dispute is GRANTED in part and 

DENIED in part. Defendant is ORDERED to provide the further responses ordered no 

later than April 5, 2019. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: March 22, 2019

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