Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00068/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00068-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

---

1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Erick David Morales,

Movant/Defendant

-vsUnited States of America,

Respondent/Plaintiff.

CV-14-0068-PHX-GMS (JFM)

CR-10-1706-PHX-GMS

Report & Recommendation

on Motion to Vacate, Set Aside 

or Correct Sentence

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Movant, following his conviction in the United States District Court for the 

District of Arizona, filed a Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2255 on January 13, 2014 (Doc. 1). On July 14, 2014, Respondent filed its 

Response (Doc. 9). Movant filed a Reply on September 29, 2014 (Doc. 13).

The Movant's Motion is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the 

undersigned makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation 

pursuant to Rule 10, Rules Governing Section 2255 Cases , Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

Movant’s federal conviction as a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition 

arises out of a chain of state convictions.

Original State Criminal Conviction – On December 29, 2006, Movant was 

arrested after being found to be in possession of a concealed handgun. On February 28, 

2007, Movant pled guilty in Maricopa County Superior Court case JV 544557, a juvenile 

Case 2:14-cv-00068-GMS Document 17 Filed 01/28/15 Page 1 of 16
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

delinquency proceeding, to one count of being a minor in possession of a firearm, a 

“Class 6 Undesignated Felony.” (Exhibit B, Plea Agreement and M.E. 2/28/07.)1 On 

April 4, 2007, Movant was placed on probation. (Exhibit B, M.E. 4/4/7.) 

Underlying State Criminal Conviction – On April 17, 2009, Movant was found 

to be in possession of a shotgun despite being a prohibited possessor because of his prior 

conviction. On December 28, 2009, Movant pled guilty in Maricopa County Superior 

Court case CR2009-126767-001 to one count of Solicitation to Commit Misconduct 

Involving Weapons, a “Class 6 undesignated felony.” (Exhibit E.) On January 12, 

2010, Movant was found guilty of the offense, and Movant’s sentence in that proceeding 

was suspended, and he was placed on two years’ probation. (Exhibit F, Order 1/12/10.)

Re-Designation of First State Offense – On November 18, 2009, during the 

pendency of Movant’s second state prosecution, Movant’s offense in his 2007 juvenile 

prosecution (JV 544557) was re-designated as a misdemeanor. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 

Exhibit B, M.E. 11/18/09 in JV544557.) 

Federal Offense – On June 3, 2010, Movant was found to be in possession of a 

firearm with loaded magazine, compatible ammunition, and another magazine. (Petition, 

Doc. 1 at Exhibits, M.E. 11/18/09.) 

Re-Designation of Second State Offense – On August 9, 2011, during the 

pendency of the instant federal prosecution, Movant was discharged from probation in 

the 2010 state prosecution, and the offense was designated as a misdemeanor. (Exhibit 

G). 

Federal Trial – On November 30, 2010, Movant was indicted in the underlying 

criminal case, CR-10-1706-PHX-GMS, on charges of being a felon in possession in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). The charges stemmed out of the 

conduct on June 3, 2010. 

The Government filed a Motion in Limine (CR Doc. 51) seeking to preclude

 

1

Exhibits to the Response, Doc. 9, are referenced herein as “Exhibit ___.” 

Documents in the underlying federal criminal case, CR-10-1706-PHX-GMS, are 

referenced herein as “CR___.”

Case 2:14-cv-00068-GMS Document 17 Filed 01/28/15 Page 2 of 16
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

evidence of the designation of the underlying criminal conviction as a misdemeanor. 

Movant did not object, and the motion was granted. (CR Doc. 71, Order 3/16/12.)

Movant and the Government entered into a stipulation that Movant had been 

convicted on January 12, 2010 of a crime punishable for a term exceeding one year in 

the state prosecution. (Exhibit H, Stipulation.) Based on that stipulation, the Court 

precluded evidence of the shotgun in connection with the offense. (CR Doc. 75, Order 

3/22/12 at 2.) 

Movant proceeded to a jury trial. In disposing of Movant’s direct appeal, the 

Ninth Circuit summarized the evidence at trial as follows:

[A] firearm - which contained a loaded magazine - was found next 

to Morales's bed, in a room he occupied exclusively. In a bedside 

dresser, police officers found two boxes and a Ziploc bag full of 

ammunition compatible with the firearm; in his closet, they found 

another loaded magazine compatible with the firearm and a copy of 

a bill of sale matching the firearm. Morales's fingerprints were on 

the Ziploc bag and one of the boxes of ammunition.

(CRDoc. 116, Mem. Dec. at 2.) 

Movant was found guilty and was sentenced to 41 months in prison. (CR Doc. 

96, Sentence.)

B. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Movant filed a direct appeal arguing insufficient evidence based on his arguments 

that he did not have control over the weapon and ammunition because they were in a 

residence owned and jointly resided in by his parents, that his father was going to use the 

weapon recreationally, and Movant was never at the house when the gun was present. 

The Ninth Circuit found sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction, and affirmed. (CR 

Doc. 116, Mem. Dec.)

C. PRESENT MOTION TO VACATE

Motion to Vacate - Movant commenced the current case by filing his Motion to 

Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on January 13, 

Case 2:14-cv-00068-GMS Document 17 Filed 01/28/15 Page 3 of 16
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2014 (Doc. 1). Movant’s Motion asserts the following four grounds for relief:

1. Ineffective assistance of counsel for entering into the stipulation regarding the 

prior conviction, thereby denying Movant his right to a jury trial on the issue;

2. Actual innocence based on his not being a prohibited person under Arizona law;

3. Ineffective assistance of counsel for not adequately investigating the prior 

conviction; and

4. Ineffective assistance of counsel for not objecting to the Government’s Motion in 

Limine.

Response - On July 14, 2014, the Government filed its Response (Doc. 9). 

Respondent argues that Movant’s ineffective assistance claims (Grounds 1, 3, and 4) are 

without merit, and his actual innocence claim (Ground 2) is procedurally defaulted. 

Reply - On September 29, 2014, Movant filed a Reply (Doc. 13). In support of 

the merits of his claims, Movant argues the subsequent re-designation as a misdemeanor

of his underlying state conviction. He further argues that it renders him actually 

innocent, avoiding any procedural default under the “miscarriage of justice” exception.

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

The general rule is “that claims not raised on direct appeal may not be raised on 

collateral review unless the petitioner shows cause and prejudice.” Massaro v. U.S., 538 

U.S. 500, 504 (2003). Thus, a Section 2255 movant raising a claim for the first time in 

post-conviction proceedings is in procedural default, and is precluded from asserting the 

claim. Bousley v. U.S., 523 U.S. 614, 621 (1998) (finding default where petitioner 

challenging his guilty plea did not raise claim in direct appeal); United States v. Frady, 

456 U.S. 152, 165 (1982) (noting that a motion to vacate or modify a sentence under 28 

U.S.C. § 2255 cannot be used as a substitute for a direct appeal).

Conversely, in a federal prosecution, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 

need not be exhausted on direct appeal, but are properly brought in the first instance in a 

Case 2:14-cv-00068-GMS Document 17 Filed 01/28/15 Page 4 of 16
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. sec. 2255. "We do hold that failure to raise an ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel claim on direct appeal does not bar the claim from being brought 

in a later, appropriate proceeding under § 2255." Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 

509 (2003). 

Here, Movant’s Grounds 1, 3, and 4 are founded upon ineffective assistance, and 

thus are properly raised in the first instance in this Motion.

However, Ground 2 is founded upon a claim of actual innocence, and should have 

been raised on direct appeal, but was not.

“Where a defendant has procedurally defaulted a claim by failing to raise it on 

direct review, the claim may be raised in habeas only if the defendant can first 

demonstrate either ‘cause’ and actual ‘prejudice,’ or that he is ‘actually innocent’.” 

Bousley, 523 U.S at 622 (citations omitted). Movant does not assert any basis for a 

finding of cause, and thus must show his actual innocence to excuse his procedural 

default. 

For the reasons discussed hereinafter in connection with the merits of Grounds 1 

and 2, Movant has failed to show his actual innocence, and thus Ground 2 should be 

dismissed with prejudice.

B. GROUND ONE – INEFFECTIVENESS RE STIPULATION

In his Ground One, Movant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for entering 

into the stipulation regarding his prior conviction, thereby denying Movant his right to a 

jury trial on the issue.

Generally, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are analyzed pursuant to 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In order to prevail on such a claim, 

petitioner must show: (1) deficient performance - counsel’s representation fell below the 

objective standard for reasonableness; and (2) prejudice - there is a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 694; see also United States v. 

Case 2:14-cv-00068-GMS Document 17 Filed 01/28/15 Page 5 of 16
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Thornton, 23 F.3d 1532, 1533 (9th Cir. 1994)(per curiam); United States v. Solomon, 

795 F.2d 747, 749 (9th Cir. 1986). Although the defendant must prove both elements, a 

court may reject his claim upon finding either that counsel's performance was reasonable 

or that the claimed error was not prejudicial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.

Prejudice – To establish prejudice, a petitioner "must show that there is a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability 

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

Movant complains that as a result of counsel’s conduct, he was denied his right to 

a jury trial on this issue. Movant fails to show that he was prejudiced by counsel 

entering into the stipulation to admit his prior conviction, because he fails to show that 

the conviction would not, without the stipulation, have been admitted into evidence, and 

the jury would not have nonetheless convicted. 

To the extent that Movant relies upon the re-designation of his 2010 state 

conviction as a misdemeanor, he is mistaken. For purposes of the federal felon in 

possession statutes, the character of a conviction is determined as of the date of the 

offense of possession, not at the time of trial. In U.S. v. Johnson, 988 F.2d 941 (9ith Cir. 

1993), the Ninth Circuit held that the re-designation as a misdemeanor of a state 

conviction after “the date he was apprehended with a firearm” was irrelevant to a 

conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). “Congress clearly intended that the defendant 

clear his status before obtaining a firearm, thereby fulfilling Congress' purpose ‘broadly 

to keep firearms away from the persons Congress classified as potentially irresponsible 

and dangerous.’ ” Lewis v. U.S., 445 U.S. 55, 64-65 (1980) (quoting Barrett v. U.S., 423 

U.S. 212, 218 (1976)) (emphasis added). Thus, the courts have found no defense where 

subsequent to being found in possession of a firearm the defendant’s underlying 

conviction: (1) had been not just re-designated a misdemeanor, but “expunged ab initio” 

prior to trial, U.S. v. Lee, 72 F.3d 55, 58 (7th Cir. 1995); (2) was constitutionally infirm 

as a result of the denial of counsel, Lewis, 445 U.S. 55; or (3) was expunged on 

Case 2:14-cv-00068-GMS Document 17 Filed 01/28/15 Page 6 of 16
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

completion of probation, U.S. v. McCroskey, 681 F>2d 1152 (9th Cir. 1982). 

Here, Movant was found to be in possession of a firearm on June 3, 2010. His 

underlying, 2010 state conviction was not re-designated until August 9, 2011. (Exhibit 

G.) Thus, his conviction was nonetheless applicable, and admissible, to prove his 

offense of being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition.

To the extent that Movant relies upon the re-designation of his original, 2007 

conviction, he fails to show that such re-designation would preclude the admission of his 

2010 conviction. As determined in Lewis, even constitutional infirmities in an 

underlying conviction will not avoid prosecution as a felon in possession. That Movant 

might have had a state law ground to invalidate his 2010 conviction would not have 

rendered him anything other than a felon in possession on June 3, 2010, because Movant 

had not moved to invalidate the 2010 conviction prior to possessing the firearm and 

ammunition, and Movant proffers no authority for a finding that such invalidation was 

automatic. Cf. U.S. v. Varela, 993 F.2d 686 (1993) (honorable discharge by juvenile 

parole board automatically expunged record, but did not restore right to possess firearms 

under definition of felon in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20).) 

Moreover, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3102(a)(4), the foundation of Movant’s 2010 

conviction, precluded possession by a “prohibited possessor.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-

3101(7)(b) described a “prohibited possessor” as a person “[w]ho has been convicted 

within or without this state of a felony or who has been adjudicated delinquent for a 

felony and whose civil right to possess or carry a gun or firearm has not been restored.”

Like the federal courts, the Arizona courts have determined that the nature of a prior 

offense is determined as of the time a convict is found in possession of a firearm. In 

State v. Magnum, 214 Ariz. 165, 150 P.3d 252 (App. 2007), the Arizona Court of 

Appeals rejected a contention that § 13-3102(a)(4) was avoided where the underlying 

conviction was arguably infirm, because the statute was “essentially a status offense” 

and determined by the status of the underlying conviction at the time of being found in 

possession. Here, Movant’s 2010 state conviction was based upon his being found in 

Case 2:14-cv-00068-GMS Document 17 Filed 01/28/15 Page 7 of 16
8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

possession of a weapon in April, 2009, and his first conviction was not re-designated 

until seven months later in November, 2009. Accordingly, at the time of his offense 

underlying his 2010 conviction, he was still a “prohibited possessor” under Arizona law, 

despite the eventual re-designation of his 2007 offense.

Thus, had counsel not stipulated to admission of the conviction, the conviction 

would have nonetheless been admissible. Even had the intervening re-designation of his 

offenses been admitted, Movant proffers nothing to suggest that the jury, properly 

instructed on the applicable law, would not have nonetheless convicted him of being a 

felon in possession.

Deficient Performance - A deficient performance is one in which counsel’s 

errors were so great he or she was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed by the Sixth 

Amendment. Iaea v. Sunn, 800 F.2d 861, 864 (9th Cir. 1986). An objective standard 

applies to proving such ineffectiveness, and requires a petitioner to demonstrate that 

counsel’s actions were “outside the wide range of professionally competent.” United 

States v. Houtcens, 926 F.2d 824, 828 (9th Cir. 1991)(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

687-90). The reasonableness of counsel’s actions is judged from counsel’s perspective 

at the time of the alleged error in light of all the circumstances. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 

477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986). 

Here, given the lack of a basis to object to admission of the 2010 conviction, and 

the relative ease of proving the conviction, counsel was not deficient in stipulating to its 

admission. The court hearing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim must consider 

the totality of the evidence with an eye toward the ultimate issue of whether counsel’s 

conduct so undermined the functioning of the adversarial process that the proceeding 

lacked fundamental fairness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686; Card v. Dugger, 911 F.2d 

1494 (11th Cir. 1990)(observing that counsel cannot be labeled ineffective for failing to 

raise issues which have no merit); Boag v. Raines, 769 F.2d 1341, 1344 (9th Cir.1985) 

(failing to raise meritless argument on appeal does not constitute ineffective assistance of 

counsel); Morrison v. Estelle, 981 F.2d 425, 429 (9th Cir.1992) (finding that a claim of 

Case 2:14-cv-00068-GMS Document 17 Filed 01/28/15 Page 8 of 16
9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel on the ground that counsel failed to argue 

inadequate notice of the charge must fail because counsel "would not have been 

successful"), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 920 (1993); United States v. Zazzara, 626 F.2d 135, 

138 (9th Cir.1980) (finding that a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on the 

ground that counsel failed to move to suppress an indictment must fail because such a 

motion would have been futile).

Further, by stipulating to the prior conviction counsel obtained the tactical 

advantage of sterilizing the conviction of its particulars. Had the prosecution been 

required to prove the conviction, there was the potential that the nature of the prior 

would have been admitted. Because it involved essentially the same sort of offense as 

that in this case, the jury could have been swayed into believing that Movant was guilty 

simply on the basis that he had twice before engaged in weapons misconduct. See 

Hensley v. Crist, 67 F.3d 181, 185 (9th Cir.1995) (“Considering the sheer weight of the 

evidence against Hensley, his counsel's advice to submit the case on stipulated facts, in 

the hopes of a reversal, is not objectively unreasonable.”).

Obviously, Movant now takes exception to that tactical choice. However, tactical 

decisions with which a defendant disagrees cannot form the basis for a claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel. Morris v. California, 966 F.2d 448, 456 (9th Cir. 

1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 96 (1992). "Mere criticism of a tactic or strategy is not in 

itself sufficient to support a charge of inadequate representation." Gustave v. United 

States, 627 F.2d 901, 904 (9th Cir. 1980). Moreover, the court need not determine the 

actual reason for an attorney's actions, as long as the act falls within the range of 

reasonable representation. Morris, 966 F.2d at 456-457. 

Accordingly, Movant fails to show deficient performance and fails to show 

prejudice with regard to the stipulation to his prior conviction. Accordingly, Ground 

One is without merit and must be denied.

/ /

/ /

Case 2:14-cv-00068-GMS Document 17 Filed 01/28/15 Page 9 of 16
10

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

C. GROUND TWO – ACTUAL INNOCENCE

In his Ground Two, Movant argues that he is actually innocent based on his not 

being a prohibited person under Arizona law. Movant asserts that but for an “error in the 

state court records management” (i.e. “the loss, misplacement of the fingerprint record 

that had been properly and timely submitted”), his 2007 conviction would have been redesignated prior to his 2009 possession leading to his 2010 state conviction. In support 

of that contention, Movant submits a recommendation from his juvenile probation officer 

for re-designation of his 2007 felony to a misdemeanor, which arguably asserts that the 

re-designation should have occurred on 4/11/08, but had not been done because of an 

apparent “failure to give a complete set of fingerprints by his 18th Birthday.” However, 

that occurred during a transition in computer systems, and the fingerprints had 

subsequently been discovered. 

Respondent argues, and the undersigned has concluded, that Movant procedurally 

defaulted on this claim. 

Because Movant proposes his actual innocence as a basis for avoiding that 

procedural default, and the facts alleged in Ground Two are not addressed in connection 

with the other grounds, the undersigned addresses the merits of Ground Two. In 

addition, the merits of Ground Two are addressed in the alternative to dismissal with 

prejudice.

Ground Two is without merit for three reasons: (1) Movant made a binding 

stipulation to the very fact on which he now bases his claim of actual innocence; (2) he 

has failed to establish his actual innocence; and (3) free-standing claims of actual 

innocence have not been determined cognizable in a § 2255 proceeding.

Stipulation - Movant stipulated at trial that he “was convicted on or about 

January 12, 2010 of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year 

in the Superior Court of Arizona, Maricopa County, case number CR2009-126767-001.” 

(Exhibit H.) “When a stipulation to a crucial fact is entered into the record in open court 

in the presence of the defendant, and is agreed to by defendant's acknowledged counsel, 

Case 2:14-cv-00068-GMS Document 17 Filed 01/28/15 Page 10 of 16
11

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the trial court may reasonably assume that the defendant is aware of the content of the 

stipulation and agrees to it through his or her attorney. Unless a criminal defendant 

indicates objection at the time the stipulation is made, he or she is ordinarily bound by 

such stipulation.” United States v. Ferreboeuf, 632 F.2d 832, 836 (9th Cir. 1980).

Here, the stipulation was not only executed in writing (Exhibit G), but was read to 

the jury in Movant’s presence without his objection. (See CR Doc. 109, R.T. 3/27/12 at 

356-358.)

No Innocence Shown - Moreover, Movant fails to show that he was not a 

convicted felon at the time he was found in possession of a firearm on June 3, 2011. 

Regardless whether there was a delay in granting Movant a re-designation of his 2007 

offense, that re-designation was not granted until after his arrest on the 2010 conviction. 

Indeed, the recommendation of the juvenile probation officer observed that Movant 

“recently purchases a Shotgun and was transporting it home, when he was pulled over. 

He has been charged as a Prohibitive [sic] Prossessor [sic].” (Petition, Doc. 1, Exhibit B, 

Recommendation 11/16/09.) As discussed hereinabove with regard to Ground 1, a postoffense re-designation of an underlying conviction does not, under Arizona law, prohibit 

conviction as a prohibited possessor. And, Movant proffers nothing to show that the 

mere delay in processing the re-designation because of a records mishap somehow made 

the re-designation automatic. The juvenile court’s order made no determination that the 

re-designation was made nunc pro tunc. Further, even if somehow Movant’s 2007 

conviction was somehow re-designated nunc pro tunc, such that his 2010 conviction was 

subject to attack, the fact remains that Movant had not acted to have the 2010 conviction 

vacated at the time that he possessed in June, 2010. 

Not Recognized Claim - Finally, Ground Two is without merit because there is 

no recognized claim of actual innocence on newly discovery evidence, absent some 

claim of Constitutional or other error. See 16 Fed.Proc.L.Ed. § 41:430 (2002).

Claims of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence have 

never been held to state a ground for federal habeas relief absent an 

independent constitutional violation occurring in the underlying state 

Case 2:14-cv-00068-GMS Document 17 Filed 01/28/15 Page 11 of 16
12

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

criminal proceeding...This rule is grounded in the principle that federal 

habeas courts sit to ensure that individuals are not imprisoned in violation 

of the Constitution-not to correct errors of fact.

Herrera v. Collins,506 U.S. 390, 400-401 (1993). Indeed, the courts have to date only 

assumed that such a claim existed. See House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 554–55 (2006); 

Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417 (1993); Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 476–77 (9th 

Cir.1997) (en banc).

For each of the foregoing reasons, Ground Two is without merit, and if not 

dismissed as procedurally defaulted, it should be denied.

D. GROUND THREE – INEFFECTIVNESS RE INVESTIGATION OF PRIOR

In his Ground Three, Movant argues that counsel was ineffective for not 

adequately investigating his prior conviction before advising Movant to make the 

stipulation to his conviction. Movant argues that had counsel adequately investigated, he 

would have determined that the re-designation of his two state convictions precluded him 

from being prohibited under the federal statute of being in possession of the firearm and 

ammunition.

Respondent contends that Movant’s entire criminal record was disclosed and 

known to counsel, and the state had not conceded error in his 2010 conviction.

This claim is without merit. 

A failure to investigate a meritorious defense may constitute ineffective assistance 

of counsel. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985); Morris v. California, 966 F.2d 

448 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 96 (1992); United States v. Tucker, 716 F.2d 

576, 583 n.16 (9th Cir. 1983). “[C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or 

to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. In any 

ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for 

reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to 

counsel's judgments.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691

It does not appear from the record that counsel investigated or was otherwise 

Case 2:14-cv-00068-GMS Document 17 Filed 01/28/15 Page 12 of 16
13

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

aware of the re-designation of Movant’s offenses prior to entering into the stipulation. 

Respondent points to CR Docs. 24, 28, 34, 51 & 53. (Response, Doc. 9 at 25.) While 

the Government’s Motion in Limine (CR Doc. 51) details the re-designations, that 

motion was not filed and served until December 7, 2011. The Stipulation was received 

by the U.S. Attorneys Office on December 1, 2011. (Exhibit H, Envelope.) It was filed 

on December 6, 2011 (CR Doc. 49.) The earlier filings (CR Doc. 24, 28, 34) disclose

the convictions, and suggest arguments about their invalidity, but do not disclose the redesignations.

Nonetheless, Movant fails to show that any prejudice resulted from any failure to 

investigate. The determination whether a failure to investigate prejudiced the petitioner 

depends on the likelihood that discovery of the evidence would have changed the 

outcome of a trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. at 59. “[W]e must compare the evidence 

that actually was presented to the jury with that which could have been presented had 

counsel acted appropriately.” Vega v. Ryan, 757 F.3d 960 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal 

quotations and citations omitted). As discussed hereinabove, the only matters presented 

by Movant which further investigation would have revealed, i.e. the re-designations, 

would not have been relevant and would not have altered the outcome of the proceeding. 

Accordingly, Ground Three is without merit and must be denied. 

E. GROUND FOUR – INEFECTIVENESS RE MOTION IN LIMINE

For his Ground 4, Movant argues that counsel was ineffective for not objecting to 

the Government’s Motion in Limine, resulting in his loss of his only viable defense.

The Government’s Motion in Limine (CR Doc. 51) was founded upon the 

irrelevance and prejudicial effect of the re-designation of Movant’s offense because the 

re-designation of the predicate underlying offense, the 2010 conviction, did not occur 

until after the offense in this case.

 The only basis asserted by Movant for counsel to have opposed this motion is his 

theory that the re-designation rendered Movant actually innocent. For the reasons 

Case 2:14-cv-00068-GMS Document 17 Filed 01/28/15 Page 13 of 16
14

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

discussed hereinabove, that argument is without merit.

Consequently, any challenge to the motion by counsel would have been futile. 

Accordingly, this claims is without merit and must be denied.

F. SUMMARY

Ground 2 (Actual Innocence) is procedurally defaulted and must be dismissed 

with prejudice. If not procedurally defaulted, it is without merit. Grounds 1, 3 and 4 are 

without merit and must be denied. 

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2255 Cases, requires 

that in habeas cases the Adistrict court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability 

when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.@ Such certificates are required in 

cases concerning detention arising Aout of process issued by a State court@, or in a 

proceeding under 28 U.S.C. ' 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 

U.S.C. ' 2253(c)(1). 

Here, the Motion to Vacate is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 2255. The 

recommendations if accepted will result in Movant=s Motion to Vacate being resolved 

adversely to Movant. Accordingly, a decision on a certificate of Appealability is 

required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability 

(ACOA@) is whether the applicant has Amade a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.@ 28 U.S.C. ' 2253(c)(2). AWhere a district court has rejected the 

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy ' 2253(c) is 

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.@ Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). AWhen the district court denies a habeas petition 

on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner=s underlying constitutional claim, a 

Case 2:14-cv-00068-GMS Document 17 Filed 01/28/15 Page 14 of 16
15

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right 

and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in 

its procedural ruling.@ Id.

Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the 

district court=s judgment, that decision will be in part on procedural grounds, and in part 

on the merits. 

To the extent that Movant=s claims are rejected on procedural grounds, under the 

reasoning set forth herein, the undersigned finds that Ajurists of reason@ would not Afind it 

debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.@

To the extent that Movant=s claims are rejected on the merits, under the reasoning 

set forth herein, the claims are plainly without merit and jurist of reason would not find it 

debatable whether the Motion states a valid claim.

Accordingly, to the extent that the Court adopts this Report & Recommendation 

as to the Motion, a certificate of appealability should be denied.

V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Ground Two of Movant's Motion 

to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, filed January 13, 

2014 (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the remainder of Movant's Motion to Vacate, 

Set Aside or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, filed January 13, 2014 

(Doc. 1) be DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that, to the extent the foregoing findings 

and recommendations are adopted in the District Court’s order, a Certificate of 

Appealability be DENIED.

/ /

/ /

Case 2:14-cv-00068-GMS Document 17 Filed 01/28/15 Page 15 of 16
16

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

VI. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties 

shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 10, Rules 

Governing Section 2255 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any 

findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a 

party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's 

right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant 

to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-

47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Dated: January 28, 2015

14-0068r RR 15 01 23 re MotVacate.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 2:14-cv-00068-GMS Document 17 Filed 01/28/15 Page 16 of 16