Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-01166/USCOURTS-azd-4_13-cv-01166-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 29:623 Job Discrimination (Age)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Pamela C. Sullivan, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Bank of America, National Association, 

Defendant. 

No. CV-13-01166-TUC-BGM (BGM) 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

 Currently pending before the Court is Defendant Bank of America, N.A.’s Motion 

for Summary Judgment (Doc. 75). Defendant has also filed a Statement of Facts in 

Support of Its Motion for Summary Judgment (“SOF”) (Doc. 76). Plaintiff has 

responded (Doc. 87) and filed her separate Statement of Facts in Support of Response to 

Motion for Summary Judgment (“SSOF”) (Doc. 88), and Defendant replied (Doc. 91). 

Additionally, Plaintiff filed a Citation of Supplemental Legal Authorities (Doc. 92). As 

such, the motion is fully briefed and ripe for adjudication. 

 Pursuant to Rules 72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure, this matter 

was referred to Magistrate Judge Macdonald for Report and Recommendation. On 

August 27, 2016, Judge Macdonald heard oral argument. Minute Entry 8/27/2016 (Doc. 

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93). The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court grant Defendant’s motion 

for summary judgment (Doc. 75). 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

A. Plaintiff’s Employment at Defendant Bank of America, N.A. 

 Plaintiff Pamela C. Sullivan began employment with Defendant Bank of America, 

N.A. (“BANA”) in October, 1992 as a teller in Tucson, Arizona. Def.’s SOF (Doc. 76), 

Sullivan Depo 9/30/2014 (Exh. “1”) at 15:10–12, 16:13–22. Subsequently, Ms. Sullivan 

worked at BANA as a senior teller, personal banker, a banking center manager without 

the title, promoted to a banking center manager (“BCM”), consumer market manager 

(“CMM”), and finally consumer marketing executive (“CME”) for the Southern Arizona 

Region. Pl.’s SSOF (Doc. 88), Sullivan Depo. 9/30/2014 (Exh. “6”) at 17:1–27:18. In 

late 2008, Dwain Moss became Ms. Sullivan’s direct supervisor, and remained so 

through 2010. Def.’s SOF (Doc. 76), Exh. “1” at 27:7–11, 30:9–13, 75:17–20, 76:9–13. 

 Mr. Moss was born in 1946, and as such was sixty-four (64) years old in 2010. 

Def.’s SOF (Doc. 76), May Aff. (Exh. “2”) at ¶ 7. Walter Elcock was Moss’s supervisor. 

Id., Exh. “1” at 49:4–5. Mr. Elcock was born in 1947, and twenty-three (23) years older 

than Ms. Sullivan. Id., Exh. “1” at 50:8–11 & Exh. “2” at ¶ 7. Accordingly, both Mr. 

Moss and Mr. Elcock were more than twenty (20) years older than Ms. Sullivan. Id., 

Exh. “1” 50:12–15. In addition to Ms. Sullivan, Mr. Moss supervised six (6) other 

CMEs, three of whom were older than Plaintiff. Pl.’s SSOF (Doc. 88) Sullivan Decl. at ¶ 

10; see also Def.’s SOF (Doc. 76), Exh. “2” at ¶ 7. 

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 Plaintiff was born on November 22, 1970. Def.’s SOF (Doc. 76), Exh. “1” at 7:7–

8. At the time Plaintiff was relieved of her CME duties on October 1, 2010, she was 

thirty-nine (39) years old. Def.’s SOF (Doc. 76), Exh. “1” at 161:7–10. After being 

relieved of her CME duties, Plaintiff continued her employment with BANA until 

November 30, 2010. Pl.’s SSOF (Doc. 88), Sullivan Decl. at ¶ 12. Plaintiff turned forty 

(40) years old on November 22, 2010. Def.’s SOF (Doc. 76), Exh. “1” at 161: 9–10. 

B. Plaintiff’s Performance 2008–2009 

 BANA assessed Ms. Sullivan’s performance, in part via quarterly performance 

assessments. Def.’s SOF (Doc. 76) ¶ 12. A score in the range of 0–3.99 indicated the 

employee was not meeting performance expectations; a score of 4–6.99 was meeting 

expectations; and 7–10 resulted in an exceeding expectations rating. Id.; see also Def.’s 

SOF (Doc. 76), Exh. “1” at 53:16–54:5. Plaintiff asserts that although she was shown 

certain documents at the time of her deposition, “[t]he ratings and scores on them were 

not shown or given to [her] during [her] BOA employment so [she] could not protest or 

appeal them at the time; . . . [t]hey do not bear [her] signature or acknowledgement and 

could have been created after [she] filed [her] EEOC charge; . . . [t]hey are inaccurate and 

not reflective of [her] actual performance; [and] . . . [her] BOA job performance at all 

times was satisfactory or better.” Pl.’s SSOF, Sullivan Decl. at ¶ 7. Plaintiff did, 

however, recall receiving a score corresponding to whether she exceeded, met, or did not 

meet expectations. Def.’s SOF (Doc. 76), Exh. “1” at 53:16–19. 

 In 2008, according to two of her quarterly assessments, Plaintiff failed to meet 

Bank expectations. Def.’s SOF (Doc. 76), Exh. “1” at 56:12–57:18, 64:11–14. 

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Plaintiff’s performance assessment for January 1, 2009 through March 31, 2009 indicated 

that she was not meeting expectations in the “Consumer and Small Business Core Sales 

Units to Goal” category. Id., Exh. “1” at 59:9–60:22. This performance quantification 

was based on objective criteria. Id., Exh. “1” at 60:1–19. During this same quarter, 

Plaintiff did not meet expectations in the “Credit Booked” goal and the “Relationship 

Deepening Variability” goal.1

 Id., Exh. “1” at 60:23–61:23. 

C. Plaintiff’s 2010 Performance 

 Regarding her leadership abilities in 2010, Plaintiff testified that she “knew [she] 

needed to perform better in certain areas[.]” Def.’s SOF (Doc. 76), Exh. “1” at 156:2–16. 

On or about June 14, 2010, Plaintiff met in person with Dwain Moss. Id., Exh. “1” at 

113:6–11. During this meeting, Mr. Moss discussed some of his concerns about Ms. 

Sullivan’s performance. Id., Exh. “1” at 113:21–25. Plaintiff testified that Mr. Moss told 

her that “he wanted more visibility [of her] in the [Green Valley market,]” and wanted 

her “to turn around” her performance numbers related to consumer small business 

checking since she had “dropped a little bit.” Id., Exh. “1” at 115:6–116:5. Plaintiff 

further testified that her “market wasn’t doing as well as [Mr. Moss] wanted it to in 

consumer and small business[.]” Id., Exh. “1” at 115:21–116:5. During the same 

meeting, Mr. Moss asked Ms. Sullivan to develop a personal action plan to improve her 

 1

 For the reasons discussed in the previous paragraph, Plaintiff continues to object to the 

metrics discussed. Additionally, she states that BANA “set impossible goals and metrics for its 

CMEs, including [her]self, as a means of motivating employees and having a basis to terminate 

employees it might wish to terminate for non-performance reasons. This was common 

knowledge among BOA employees and supported by the BOA performance statistics.” Pl.’s 

SSOF, Sullivan Decl. ¶ 7(E). The Court notes that beyond this bare assertion, Plaintiff has not 

provided evidence to support her statements. 

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performance. Def.’s SOF (Doc. 76), Exh. “1” at 113:21–25, 115:6–20, 117:4–9, 151:12–

15 & Sullivan Personal Plan E-mail 6/29/2010 (Exh. “3”). Plaintiff summarized Mr. 

Moss’s request as follows: “you’re not doing well in this area, I need you to improve it 

and come up with a plan on how you’re going to do it.” Def.’s SOF (Doc. 76), Exh. “1” 

at 123:14–18. On June 29, 2010, Plaintiff e-mailed her personal performance plan to Mr. 

Moss. Id., Exh. “1” at 117:4–9 & Exh. “3.” In July of 2010, Mr. Moss and his Business 

Support Executive, Mike Rogers, again met with Ms. Sullivan to discuss her performance 

issues.2

 Id., Exh. “1” at 113:6–20 & Rogers Aff. (Exh. “4”) at ¶¶ 4–5. As of August 23, 

2010, Plaintiff was not meeting Bank performance expectations in several areas.3

 Id., 

Exh. “1” at 142:19–143:1, 157:4–12, Southwest Region Heat Maps—Exhibit “9” to 

Sullivan Depo. (Exh. “5”). 

D. Transitional Assignment Agreement 

 On October 1, 2010, Mr. Moss and Mr. Rogers again met with Ms. Sullivan. 

Def.’s SOF (Doc. 76), Exh. “1” at 157:13–158:14 & Exh. “4” at ¶ 6. Mr. Moss took the 

lead during this meeting. Id., Exh. “1” at 159:6–8 & Exh. “4” at ¶ 6. Mr. Moss informed 

Ms. Sullivan that she was being relieved of her CME duties and placed on a sixty (60) 

day transition period to find another job either within BANA or outside. Id., Exh. “1” at 

 2

 Ms. Sullivan objects to Defendant’s characterization of her performance issues as 

“continuing,” maintaining that her “BOA job performance at all times was satisfactory or better.” 

Pl.’s SSOF, Sullivan Decl. at ¶ 7. 

3

 Ms. Sullivan denies this allegation maintaining that she had not seen the documents 

presented at her deposition prior to discovery in this litigation. Pl.’s SSOF (Doc. 88) at ¶ 30. In 

her deposition testimony, however, she acknowledges that “as of 8-23, I was not meeting 

expectations in more than two categories. I was red, yes.” Def.’s SOF (Doc. 76), Exh. “1” at 

142:24–143:1. 

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159:1–5. Neither Mr. Moss nor Mr. Rogers made any comments to Plaintiff that she 

found to be inappropriate or offensive.4

 Id., Exh. “1” at 160:5–7. 

 On October 1, 2010, Ms. Sullivan was given a Transitional Assignment 

Agreement (“TAA”).5

 Def.’s SOF (Doc. 76), Exh. “1” at 161:19–25 & Transitional 

Assignment Agreement (Exh. “6”). The TAA states “effective October 1, 2010, you will 

be relieved of the regular, day-to-day responsibilities and duties of your position as 

Consumer Market Executive[.]”6

 Def.’s SOF (Doc. 76), Exh. “6” at 1. Plaintiff applied 

for other jobs at the Bank, but was unable to find another job internally because of her 

prior poor performance ratings. Id., Exh. “1” at 176:6–10. Plaintiff considered applying 

for a teller position.7

 Id., Exh. “1” at 171:10–172:22. Plaintiff claims that Mr. Rogers 

and Human Resources Executive Brad Kimball told her that she was overqualified for the 

teller position. Id., Exh. “1” at 171:10–172:22. Plaintiff believes this statement was an 

ageist remark. Id., Exh. “1” at 171:10–172:22, 186:11–187:1. On November 30, 2013, 

 4

 Ms. Sullivan admits this allegation, but asserts that the testimony was incomplete in 

capturing her shock and upset. See Pl.’s SSOF (Doc. 88) at ¶ 33. Ms. Sullivan’s emotional 

upset, however, is not material to the fact that neither Mr. Moss nor Mr. Rogers said anything 

inappropriate during their meeting. 

5

 Ms. Sullivan denies that she “entered into” a Transitional Assignment Agreement 

(“TAA”). See Pl.’s SSOF (Doc. 88) at ¶ 34 & Sullivan Depo.9/30/2014 at 184:20–185:22. 

Irrespective of whether Ms. Sullivan signed or agreed to the TAA, the agreement states that it 

reflects “understandings regarding the terms of conditions of [Ms. Sullivan’s] continued 

employment with Bank of America[.]” Def.’s SOF (Doc. 76), Exh. “6” at 1. 

6

 Ms. Sullivan admits that this statement is accurately derived from the TAA, but renews 

her objections for the reasons stated in FN 5. 

7

 Ms. Sullivan reiterates that she applied for several positions within the Bank to no avail, 

as encapsulated in the previous sentence. 

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Plaintiff had not yet found another job and the TAA expired. Def.’s SOF (Doc. 76), Exh. 

“1” 176:18–177:2, 185:5–14; see also, Pl.’s SSOF (Doc. 88), Sullivan Decl. at ¶ 19. 

E. Plaintiff’s Replacement 

 In March 2011, Plaintiff was replaced by Susan Farmer. Def.’s SOF (Doc. 76), 

Exh. “4” at ¶ 7. Ms. Farmer’s date of birth is December 19, 1961, and as such, she is 

nine (9) years older than Ms. Sullivan.8

 Id., Exh. “2” at ¶ 7. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Summary judgment is appropriate when, viewing the facts in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 

106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986), “there is no genuine issue as to any 

material fact and [] the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 56(c). A fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the 

governing law,” and a dispute is “genuine” if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury 

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 

2510. Thus, factual disputes that have no bearing on the outcome of a suit are irrelevant 

to the consideration of a motion for summary judgment. Id. In order to withstand a 

motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must show “specific facts showing 

that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 

S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Moreover, a “mere scintilla of evidence” does 

not preclude the entry of summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 

 8

 Plaintiff’s objection to this statement is purely legal argument. 

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2512. The United States Supreme Court also recognized that “[w]hen opposing parties 

tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no 

reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for 

purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 

380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 1776, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007). 

III. ANALYSIS 

 A. Disparate Treatment 

 The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) makes it “unlawful for an 

employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual [who is at least 40 

years old] . . . because of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1); see also 29 

U.S.C. § 631(a). Plaintiff’s sole claim is that her termination was “because of” her age. 

See Complaint (Doc. 1). Plaintiff’s claim that BANA “treats some people less favorably 

than others because of their [age]” is a “disparate treatment” claim. Hazen Paper Co. v. 

Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609, 113 S.Ct. 1701, 1704, 123 L.Ed.2d 338 (1993). “Under a 

‘disparate treatment’ theory of discrimination, a plaintiff in an ADEA case can establish 

age discrimination based on: (1) ‘circumstantial evidence’ of age discrimination; or (2) 

‘direct evidence of age discrimination.” Sheppard v. David Evans and Assoc., 694 F.3d 

1045, 1049 (9th Cir. 2012). “Direct Evidence, in the context of an ADEA claim, is 

defined as evidence of conduct or statements by persons involved in the decision –

making process that may be viewed as directly reflecting the alleged discriminatory 

attitude . . . sufficient to permit the fact finder to infer that that attitude was more likely 

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than not a motivating factor in the employer’s decision.” Frances v. Johnson, 795 F.3d 

1170, 1173 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Enlow v. Salem-Keizer Yellow Cab Co., 389 F.3d 

802, 812 (9th Cir. 2004)) (alterations and emphasis in original). Ms. Sullivan has not 

presented any direct evidence of discrimination.9

 “ADEA claims that are based on circumstantial evidence of discrimination [are 

evaluated] by using the three-stage burden-shifting framework laid out in McDonnell 

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).” Diaz v. 

Eagle Produce Ltd. P’ship, 521 F.3d 1201, 1207 (9th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). 

Plaintiff “must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination[;] [i]f [she does], the 

burden then shifts to [Defendant] to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for 

its employment decision[;] [t]hen, in order to prevail, [she] must demonstrate that 

[Defendant’s] alleged reason for the adverse employment decision is a pretext for another 

motive which is discriminatory.” Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271 (9th Cir. 

2000) (quoting Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889 (9th Cir. 1994)). 

 B. The Prima Facie Case 

 Plaintiff can establish “a prima facie case of disparate treatment by demonstrating 

that [s]he was: (1) at least forty years old, (2) performing [her] job satisfactorily, (3) 

discharged, and (4) replaced by a substantially younger employee or discharged under 

 9

 Ms. Sullivan does allege that Mr. Rogers and Mr. Kimball stated that she was 

“overqualified” for a teller position, but this single remark is not direct evidence of 

discrimination. See Coleman v. Quaker Oats, Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1284 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(analyzing use of the term “promotable” as circumstantial evidence of discrimination). 

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circumstances otherwise giving rise to an inference of age discrimination.” Diaz v. Eagle 

Produce Ltd. P’ship, 521 F.3d 1201, 1207 (9th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). 

 1. Plaintiff’s Age

 The Parties disagree what constitutes the adverse employment action in this case. 

Plaintiff urges that it was her termination, which occurred eight (8) days after her fortieth 

birthday. Pl.’s Response (Doc. 87) at 6–10. Defendant asserts that it was the 

Transitional Assignment Agreement, which occurred when Plaintiff was thirty-nine (39). 

Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. (Doc. 75) at 8–9; see also Def.’s Reply (Doc. 91). For purposes 

of this motion only, and without deciding, the Court will accept that Plaintiff was forty 

(40) for purposes of establishing her prima facie case. 

 2. Job Performance

 Subjectively, Plaintiff believes that her “BOA job performance at all times was 

satisfactory or better.” Pl.’s SSOF, Sullivan Decl. at ¶ 7. The metrics and testimony 

submitted by BANA suggest otherwise. Def.’s SOF (Doc. 76), Exh. “1” at 56:12–57:18, 

59:9–61:23, 64:11–14, 115:6–116:5, 117:4–9, 151:12–15, 156:2–16; see also Def’s SOF 

(Doc. 76), Sullivan Personal Plan (Exh. “3”) & Southwest Region Heat Maps (Exh. “5”) 

& Transitional Assignment Agreement (Exh. “6”). The evidence demonstrates that Ms. 

Sullivan had performance issues at various times during 2008, 2009, and 2010. Id. For 

purposes of establishing her prima facie case, the Court will again accept that Ms. 

Sullivan was performing adequately. 

 3. Termination

 It is undisputed that Plaintiff was terminated on November 30, 2010. 

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 4. Replacement

 It is also undisputed that Ms. Sullivan was not replaced by a substantially younger 

employee, but rather an individual nine (9) years her senior. Ms. Farmer stayed with the 

bank three (3) years after replacing Ms. Sullivan until she retired in 2014. 

 Ms. Sullivan asserts that five (5) of the six (6) CMEs who were worked with her 

and were over forty (40) are no longer with the bank. Pl.’s Response (Doc. 87) at 14–15. 

BANA corrects this allegation, stating that of these six (6) CMEs, two (2) are still 

employed with BANA, two (2) retired, and one (1) resigned. Def.’s Reply (Doc. 91) at 5. 

Only one was terminated. Id. The Court finds that this statistical evidence does not 

support Plaintiff’s claim of age discrimination. 

 Plaintiff further asserts that her personal belief that she performed in a satisfactory 

manner is enough to create a question of fact sufficient to defeat summary judgment. 

Pl.’s Response (Doc. 87) at 11. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, has 

explicitly stated that a Plaintiff’s “subjective personal judgments of [her] competence 

alone do not raise a genuine issue of material fact.” Coleman, 232 F.3d at 1285 (quoting 

Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace and Co., 104 F.3d 267, 270 (9th Cir. 1996)). 

 As previously mentioned, Plaintiff asserts that Mr. Rogers and Mr. Kimball stated 

that she was “overqualified” as evidence of age discrimination. Although the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals has “recognized that ‘overqualification’ as a reason for firing an 

employee may be a mask for age discrimination, an employer may choose not to hire an 

employee because he is overqualified for a position without violating the ADEA.” 

Coleman, 232 F.3d at 1290 (citations omitted). There is no argument that Ms. Sullivan is 

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overqualified to be a teller—the position that she started in eighteen years prior. As such, 

this comment does not suggest ageism. 

 Finally, Plaintiff asserts that the temporal proximity of her termination to her 

fortieth birthday is evidence of age discrimination. Plaintiff further suggests that her 

termination was motivated by Defendant’s wish to save on her retirement. Defendant has 

presented evidence that Ms. Sullivan’s performance needed work in 2008, 2009, and 

2010. She was asked and did submit a personal action plan to help improve that 

performance. Approximately fifty-two (52) days prior to her fortieth birthday, Ms. 

Sullivan was given a Transitional Assignment Agreement modifying the terms of her 

employment. Def.’s SOF (Doc. 76), Exh. “1” 161:19–25 & Exh. “6.” There is no 

evidence before the Court to suggest that Ms. Sullivan’s termination was related to her 

age. Moreover, two of Ms. Sullivan’s CME co-workers retired from BANA. 

 Ms. Sullivan has failed to present any evidence that would suggest age was a 

motivating reason for her termination. As such, Ms. Sullivan cannot establish a prima 

facie case for discrimination. 

C. Pretext

 Even if the Court were inclined to accept that Ms. Sullivan could establish a prima 

facie case for age discrimination, she cannot show that BANA’s reasons for her 

termination were pretextual. 

 Defendant has presented evidence that Ms. Sullivan was not meeting its 

performance expectations. Def.’s SOF (Doc. 76), Exh. “1” at 56:12–57:18, 59:9–61:23, 

64:11–14, 115:6–116:5, 117:4–9, 151:12–15, 156:2–16; see also Def’s SOF (Doc. 76), 

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Sullivan Personal Plan (Exh. “3”) & Southwest Region Heat Maps (Exh. “5”) & 

Transitional Assignment Agreement (Exh. “6”). Ms. Sullivan was asked to create a 

performance plan, and ultimately given a sixty-day transitional agreement. Id. As such, 

Defendant has put forth legitimately, non-discriminatory explanations for Ms. Sullivan’s 

termination. 

 “To survive summary judgment, the burden is on [Ms. Sullivan] to ‘produce 

enough evidence to allow a reasonable factfinder to conclude either: (a) that the alleged 

reason for [her] discharge was false, or (b) that the true reason for [her] discharge was a 

discriminatory one.’” Coleman, 232 F.3d at 1291 (quoting Nidds v. Schindler Elevator 

Corp., 113 F.3d 912, 918 (9th Cir. 1996)). “To show pretext using circumstantial 

evidence a plaintiff must put forward specific and substantial evidence challenging the 

credibility of the employer’s motives.” Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 

642 (9th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff cannot meet her burden. As discussed in Section IV.B.4, 

supra, the circumstantial evidence relied upon by Plaintiff, does not evidence 

discrimination based on age. See Hawn v. Executive Jet Mgmt., Inc., 615 F.3d 1151, 

1159 (analyzing fourth prima facie element in context of assessing pretext). Accordingly, 

Defendant is entitled to summary judgment. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons discussed, supra, Defendant Bank of America, N.A.’s Motion for 

Summary Judgment (Doc. 75) should be granted. 

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V. RECOMMENDATION 

 For the reasons delineated above, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the 

District Judge enter an order GRANTING Defendant Bank of America NA’s Motion for 

Summary Judgment (Doc. 75). 

 Any written objections to this Report and Recommendation shall be filed and 

served on or before September 7, 2016. Any response to another party=s objections 

shall be filed and served on or before September 14, 2016. No replies shall be filed 

unless leave is granted from the District Judge. If objections are filed, the parties should 

use the following case number: CV-13-01166-TUC-JGZ. 

 Failure to file timely objections to any factual or legal determination of the 

Magistrate Judge may result in waiver of the right of review. 

 Dated this 29th day of August, 2016. 

Honorable Bruce G. Macdonald 

United States Magistrate Judge 

Case 4:13-cv-01166-JGZ-BGM Document 94 Filed 08/29/16 Page 14 of 14