Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-05039/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-05039-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 720
Nature of Suit: Labor Management Relations Act
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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 This disposition is not designated for publication and may not be cited.

Case No. C 05-5039 JF (PVT)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

(JFLC2)

NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

EVAGELIA LISA VORGIAS,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, ROBERT

HAWLEY, LAWRENCE J. DAL CERRO, and

SEIU LOCAL 535,

 Defendants.

Case Number C 05-5039 JF (PVT) 

ORDER1 GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTIONS TO DISMISS WITHOUT

LEAVE TO AMEND AS TO THE

CALIFORNIA STATE BAR AND

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND AS TO

HAWLEY, DAL CERRO AND SEIU

[re doc. nos. 9 and 11]

Defendants move to dismiss the complaint of Plaintiff Evagelia Lisa Vorgias (“Vorgias”). 

The Court has considered the parties’ papers as well as the oral arguments presented at the

hearing on July 21, 2006. For the reasons discussed below, the motions will be granted without

leave to amend as to the California State Bar and with leave to amend as to the remaining

defendants.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Evagelia Lisa Vorgias (“Vorgias”) alleges the following facts, which appear to

be undisputed for purposes of this motion: she was employed as a prosecutor in the Office of the

Case 5:05-cv-05039-JF Document 16 Filed 07/25/06 Page 1 of 6
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2

 A Skelly hearing is a pretermination opportunity for the employee to respond to the

charges against him or her. See Skelly v. State Personnel Bd., 15 Cal.3d 194, 215 (1975).

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Case No. C 05-5039 JF (PVT)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

(JFLC2)

Chief Trial Counsel of the California State Bar from November 1987 until she was placed on

investigatory suspension for alleged misconduct in May 2003. Among other things, Vorgias was

alleged to have been incompetent, negligent, dishonest and absent without leave. The California

State Bar conducted an investigation and scheduled a Skelly hearing for August 2003.2 The

California State Bar terminated Vorgias’ employment in October 2003. Shortly thereafter

Vorgias filed a grievance through her Union, Service Employees International Union Local 535

(“SEIU”). In June 2003 the California State Bar notified Vorgias that it would not reinstate her. 

SEIU advised Vorgias that it would review her case. Almost two years later, in March 2005,

SEIU notified Vorgias that it had decided not to pursue arbitration in her case. In June 2005

SEIU notified Vorgias that the local’s decision would be upheld.

Vorgias filed the instant action on December 6, 2005 against the California State Bar, its

deputy executive director, Robert Hawley (“Hawley”), its assistant chief trial counsel, Lawrence

Dal Cerro (“Dal Cerro”), and SEIU. The complaint asserts two claims under section 301 of the

Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185: (1) a claim for breach of

duty of fair representation against SEIU and (2) a claim of breach of the collective bargaining

agreement against the California State Bar. Although Hawley and Dal Cerro are named as

defendants, the complaint does not allege any claims against them. The prayer requests money

damages. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

For purposes of a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true, and the

Court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jenkins v.

McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). Leave to amend must be granted unless it is clear that the

complaint’s deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment. Lucas v. Department of Corrections,

66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995). When amendment would be futile, however, dismissal may be

ordered with prejudice. Dumas v. Kipp, 90 F.3d 386, 393 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Case 5:05-cv-05039-JF Document 16 Filed 07/25/06 Page 2 of 6
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Case No. C 05-5039 JF (PVT)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

(JFLC2)

III. DISCUSSION

A. State Bar Of California

Under the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution, a state and its agencies are immune

from federal court actions seeking money damages or injunctive relief absent a waiver of

immunity by the state or a valid congressional override of the immunity. Dittman v. California,

191 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 2717 (2000). This immunity

generally extends to a state official acting in his or her official capacity, although it does not

extend to suits seeking prospective declaratory or injunctive relief from a state official sued in his

or her official capacity to enjoin an alleged ongoing violation of federal law. Agua Calienta

Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Hardin, 223 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2000). The Eleventh

Amendment likewise does not bar suits for money damages brought against a state official in his

or her individual capacity based upon unconstitutional or wrongful conduct so long as the relief

is sought not from the state treasury but from the official personally. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S.

706, 756 (1999).

The Ninth Circuit expressly has held that the California State Bar is a state agency for

purposes of the Eleventh Amendment. Hirsh v. Justices of the Supreme Court of California, 67

F.3d 708, 715 (9th Cir. 1995). Because it is immune from suit, the California State Bar will be

dismissed from this action without leave to amend.

B. Hawley And Dal Cerro

As noted above, while Hawley and Dal Cerro are named defendants, the complaint does

not allege any claims against them. Even assuming that Vorgias’ damages claims were asserted

against Hawley and Dal Cerro, any such claims would arise from actions within their official

capacity and thus would be barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Based upon the facts thus far

alleged, the Court cannot discern how Vorgias could assert claims against Hawley and Dal Cerro

that would fall outside the Eleventh Amendment bar, i.e., claims for prospective declaratory or

injunctive relief or claims seeking damages based upon actions outside these individuals’ official

capacities. However, the Court will afford Vorgias an opportunity to attempt to plead around the

Eleventh Amendment before dismissing the claims against Hawley and Dal Cerro without leave

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28 3 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).

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Case No. C 05-5039 JF (PVT)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

(JFLC2)

to amend.

B. SEIU

The complaint alleges a single claim against SEIU under section 301 of the LMRA,

governing “[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization

representing employees in an industry affecting commerce.” 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). SEIU argues

that the collective bargaining agreement at issue is not governed by § 301 because the California

State Bar is not an “employer” within the meaning of that provision. 

The definition of “employer” for purposes of § 301 expressly excludes state governments

and their subdivisions. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2). There do not appear to be any decisions directly

addressing the question of whether the California State Bar is a state agency for purposes of the

LMRA. As noted above, the California State Bar is considered a state agency for purposes of

Eleventh Amendment analysis. See Hirsh, 67 F.3d at 715. A number of decisions have held that

the California State Bar is a state agency in other contexts as well. See, e.g., Middlesex County

Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Association, 457 U.S. 423, 433-34 (1982) (holding that

state bar disciplinary proceedings constituted state judicial proceedings for purposes of Younger3

analysis); In Re Rose, 22 Cal.4th 430, 438 (2000) (stating that “[t]he State Bar is a constitutional

entity, placed within the judicial article of the California Constitution, and thus expressly

acknowledged as an integral part of the judicial function”). 

Plaintiff relies heavily on Keller v. State Bar of California, 496 U.S. 1 (1990), for her

position that the California State Bar is not a state agency for purposes of the LMRA, and thus is

not exempt from § 301. In Keller case, members brought suit in state court to enjoin the

California State Bar from expending mandatory dues on political and ideological causes to which

they did not subscribe. The California Supreme Court held that the California State Bar is a

government agency and thus may use mandatory dues for any purpose within the scope of its

statutory authority. Id. at 7. The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that “[t]he State

Bar of California is a good deal different from most other entities that would be regarded in

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Case No. C 05-5039 JF (PVT)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

(JFLC2)

common parlance as ‘governmental agencies,’” and concluding that it functioned much more like

a union. Id. at 11-12. Based on this reasoning, the court held that the California State Bar should

be subject to the same constitutional rule with respect to the use of compulsory dues as are labor

unions representing public and private employees. Id. at 13. The California State Bar thus may

constitutionally fund actions germane to its goals out of the mandatory funds of its members, but

may not so fund “activities of an ideological nature which fall outside those areas of activity.” 

Id. at 14.

While Keller contains some broad language that arguably supports Vorgias’ position on

the LMRA question, that decision resolved a unique issue that has no bearing on the instant case. 

Based upon Hirsh and the other cases holding that the California State Bar is a state agency, the

Court that the California State Bar is a state agency for purposes of the LMRA, and thus that §

301 does not apply. Vorgias has indicated that she wishes to reframe her § 301 claim as a civil

rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It is unclear whether a § 1983 claim could be asserted

against SEIU, because it does not appear that SEIU is a state actor. However, Vorgias will be

granted leave to reframe her claim against SEIU under § 1983 or other theory.

Defendants argue that any proposed amendment to Vorgias’ complaint would be futile. 

Defendants may well be correct. However, the Court declines to speculate on the nature of any

amended claims Vorgias might assert, or the viability of such claims. Defendants may challenge

any amended claims by appropriate motion. 

IV. ORDER

(1) The motions to dismiss are GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND as to

the California State Bar, and GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND as to

Hawley, Dal Cerro and SEIU; and

(2) Any amended complaint shall be filed and served on or before August 31, 2006. 

Dated: 7/25/06

___________________________

JEREMY FOGEL

United States District Court

 

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Case No. C 05-5039 JF (PVT)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

(JFLC2)

This Order has been served upon the following persons:

Plaintiff pro se:

Evagelia Lisa Vorgias

3378 Cropley Avenue

San Jose, CA 95132

Counsel for State Defendants:

Michael John von Loewenfeldt

Kerr & Wagstaffe LLP

100 Spear Street, Suite 1800

San Francisco, CA 94105 

Lawrence C. Yee

Colin Wong

State Bar of California

Office of General Counsel

180 Howard Street

San Francisco, CA 94105-1639 

Counsel for SEIU:

Stewart Weinberg

Weinberg Roger & Rosenfeld

A Professional Corporation

1001 Marina Village Parkway

Suite 200

Alameda, CA 94501-1091

Case 5:05-cv-05039-JF Document 16 Filed 07/25/06 Page 6 of 6