Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_00-cv-06602/USCOURTS-caed-1_00-cv-06602-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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28 Plaintiff filed supplements to his third amended complaint on October 3, 2002, July 1, 2003, and January 1

7, 2005. (Docs. 52, 79, 119.)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DANNY DEAN DELL’ANTONIA,

Plaintiff,

v.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:00-cv-06602-LJO-SMS PC

ORDER STRIKING SURREPLY AND

SUPPLEMENTAL OPPOSITION

(Docs. 192 and 196) 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT,

AND DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO

ENTER JUDGMENT

(Doc. 174) 

I. Order Resolving Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

A. Procedural History

Plaintiff Danny Dean Dell’Antonia (“plaintiff”) is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis

in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action is proceeding on plaintiff’s third

amended complaint, filed March 12, 2002, against defendant Edger for use of excessive force, and

defendants Grayson and Snow for acting with deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s serious medical

needs, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Docs. 43, 53.) At the time of the events at issue in 1

this action, plaintiff was a state prisoner in the custody of the California Department of Corrections

and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), and was housed at theCaliforniaSubstance Abuse Treatment Facility

and State Prison-Corcoran (“CSATF”) in Corcoran, California. 

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28 Plaintiff was provided with notice of the requirements for opposing a motion for summary judgment by the 2

Court in an order filed on January 10, 2003. Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988). (Doc. 57.)

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Defendants Edger, Grayson, and Snow (“defendants”) filed a motion for summary judgment

on April 17, 2006, plaintiff filed an opposition on May 15, 2006, and defendants filed a reply on May

17, 2006. (Docs. 174-182.) Accordingly, defendants’ motion for summary judgment was deemed 2

submitted on May 17, 2006. Local Rule 78-230(m). However, on May 30, 2006, plaintiff filed a

surreply, to which defendants filed an objection on May 30, 2006. (Docs. 191, 192.) Plaintiff filed

a response to defendants’ objection on June 19, 2006. (Doc. 194.) On December 4, 2006, more than

six months after defendants’ motion for summary judgment was deemed submitted, plaintiff filed

a supplemental opposition. (Doc. 196.) Defendants filed an objection on December 4, 2006, and

plaintiff filed a response on December 11, 2006. (Docs. 195, 197.) 

Neither the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor the Local Rules provide a right to file a

surreply. Plaintiff did not seek and was not granted permission to file a surreply and the surreply

shall be stricken from the record. Further, plaintiff may not simply file a supplemental opposition

at his discretion. Indeed, in an order issued on May 17, 2006, the Magistrate Judge denied plaintiff

leave to file a supplemental opposition at a later date. (Doc. 189.) Because plaintiff was not granted

permission to file a surreply or a supplemental opposition, they shall be stricken from the record.

B. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists no genuine issue

as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c). Under summary judgment practice, the moving party 

[A]lways bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on

file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “[W]here the nonmoving party will bear the

burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made

in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.’”

Id. Indeed, summary judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon

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motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.

Id. at 322. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s

case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment

should be granted, “so long as whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard

for entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied.” Id. at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing

party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to establish the existence

of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the denials of its pleadings, but is

required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery

material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. Rule 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586

n.11. The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that

might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 248 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630

(9th Cir. 1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party, Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436

(9th Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not

establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the claimed factual

dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at

trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the “purpose of summary judgment is to ‘pierce

the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.’”

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee’s note on 1963

amendments).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the Court examines the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. Rule 56(c).

The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, and all reasonable

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 Plaintiff neither filed his own separate statement of disputed facts nor admitted or denied the facts set forth 3

by defendants as undisputed in compliance with Local Rule 56-260(b). Further, plaintiff did not tender any

evidentiary objections in any other form. FDIC v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 953 F.2d 478, 484 (9th Cir. 1992)

(evidentiary defects waived absent objection). Therefore, defendants’ statement of undisputed facts is accepted

except where brought into dispute by plaintiff’s verified third amended complaint. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918,

923 (9th Cir. 2004) (verified complaint may be used as an opposing affidavit if it is based on pleader’s personal

knowledge of specific facts which are admissible in evidence). A verified opposition to a motion for summary

judgment may also be considered as an opposing affidavit for purposes of the summary judgment rule if it is based

on facts within the pleader’s personal knowledge. Johnson v. Meltzer, 134 F.3d 1393, 1399-1400 (9th Cir. 1998). 

However, neither plaintiff’s opposition nor plaintiff’s supplemental complaints were verified and they cannot be

treated as opposing affidavits. Moran v. Selig, 447 F.3d 948, 759-60 (9th Cir. 2006).

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inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the Court must be drawn in favor of the

opposing party, Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655

(1962) (per curiam). Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing

party's obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. Richards

v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th

Cir. 1987). 

Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than simply show

that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Where the record taken as a whole

could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for

trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

C. Undisputed Facts3

1. Medical Background Facts

1. An x-ray taken on April 27, 1999, showed that plaintiff’s heart size was within normal limits.

2. On April 30, 1999, plaintiff was discharged from San Joaquin Community Hospital

(“SJCH”). Plaintiff’s cardiac enzymes were negative, and plaintiff’s Persantine stress

thallium test was negative. Plaintiff was stable and discharged back to infirmary.

3. On July 26, 1999, plaintiff stated that in 1992, he had surgery wherein a small nodule was

taken out of his left shoulder.

4. On August 29, 1999, plaintiff complained of chest pain, shortness of breath, and pain

radiating to the left side of the neck and down to the left arm. Plaintiff was sent to infirmary

for evaluation and treatment.

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5. On August 29, 1999, plaintiff complained of a tearing-like pain from his left chest to his

shoulder.

6. On September 2, 1999, plaintiff stated that he had his left testicle removed for cancer in

1993. However, during examination it was noted that both of plaintiff’s testicles were

present.

7. On September 2, 1999, plaintiff was discharged from the North Kern State Prison

Correctional Treatment Center (“CTC”). Plaintiff was observed overnight at CTC following

his discharge from SJCH, where he had been admitted for chest pain. All tests including an

electrocardiogram and enzyme studies were negative, and the diagnosis was atypical chest

pain.

8. On October 26, 1999, plaintiff reported that cancer was taken from his left shoulder.

9. On November 4, 1999, plaintiff complained of sudden pain in his head, became short of

breath, and passed out. Plaintiff was taken to the Emergency Room (“ER”) by ambulance.

2. Facts Relating to Claim Against Defendant Linda Grayson

10. At all times relevant to this dispute, Linda Grayson was a duly licensed Medical Technical

Assistant (“MTA”) employed by CDCR at CSATF.

11. It is standard procedure that inmates needing to go to the CTC ER be transported by vehicle.

12. During the day, when an inmate located at CSATF requires nonemergency medical treatment

at the CTC, one of the facility correctional officers is contacted. The facility correctional

officer escorts the inmate to the CTC, and stays with the inmate during the inmate’s visit to

the CTC.

13. After the inmate’s medical appointment and/or medical treatment at the CTC, the facility

correctional officer will escort the inmate back to CSATF.

14. If an inmate is in a wheelchair and requires non-emergency medical treatment at the CTC,

a CTC transportation correctional officer is contacted. The CTC transportation correctional

officer picks up the inmate and takes the inmate via vehicle from CSATF to the CTC.

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15. After the inmate’s medical appointment and/or medical treatment at the CTC, if the inmate

is in a wheelchair, the CTC transportation correctional officer is contacted to pick up the

inmate at the CTC and transport the inmate back via vehicle to CSATF.

16. The inmate is, at all times, escorted between CSATF and the CTC by a correctional officer

for securitypurposes. Inmates are prohibited from walking or self-propelling in a wheelchair

to and from CSATF and the CTC without an escort by a correctional officer. In addition,

inmates must be “processed” (i.e., required to go through metal detectors, and undergo an

unclothed body search) through several gates between CSATF and CTC. An inmate would

not be able to be processed through these gates without being escorted by a correctional

officer.

17. If an inmate requiring nonemergency treatment at CTC wants to walk and/or self-propel in

his wheelchair, he may do so, but he must be escorted by a correctional officer at all times.

18. During the day or night, an inmate located at CSATF requiring emergency medical treatment

is transported to the CTC by medical staff via the Emergency Response Vehicle (“ERV”).

Medical staff drive the ERV and accompany the inmate to the CTC, with a correctional

officer escort.

3. Facts Relating to Claim Against Defendant Benjamin Edger

19. At all times relevant to this dispute, Benjamin Edger, Jr. was a duly licensed registered nurse

employed by CDCR at CSATF.

20. On January 23, 2000, at approximately 4:42 p.m., defendant Edger responded to plaintiff’s

dorm for an emergency medical call.

21. Upon arriving at plaintiff’s dorm, defendant Edger found plaintiff prone (face down) on the

floor, unresponsive, and with high colour (flushed).

22. Defendant Edger found an empty nitroglycerin bottle lying on the floor. Defendant Edger

then checked plaintiff. Plaintiff was unresponsive.

23. Defendant Edger followed the standard basic life support and advanced life support

guidelines, and tapped plaintiff with his hand on plaintiff’s left scapula (shoulder blade), and

asked, “Are you okay? Are you okay?”

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24. Plaintiff became responsive shortly thereafter, and stated to defendant Edger, “The last thing

I remember is this bolt of pain [in my chest].” Plaintiff was then transported to the

emergency room for treatment.

4. Additional Medical Background Facts

25. On August 11, 2000, plaintiff complained of numbness in left arm that started at his

fingertips the night before and moved to left shoulder. Plaintiff stated that he had an MI

(myocardio infarction) in 1997 with the same symptoms. Plaintiff was sent to the CTC ER

for further evaluation.

26. On August 17, 2000, plaintiff complained of numbness of left forearm on the radial aspect

from the elbow down. The shoulder was completely normal with no numbness.

27. On October 1, 2000, plaintiff complained of weakness, but denied any chest pain or shortness

of breath. Plaintiff had strong, even radial pulses and no radial edema, his blood pressure

was strong and regular, and he had equal strength on all extremities. Plaintiff returned to his

cell wheeling his wheelchair. Later in the day plaintiff was observed going around the yard

with another inmate pushing him and was able to use both arms, with no symptoms of

distress.

28. On January 16, 2001, plaintiff was seen at SJCH, where he complained of chest pain over

the anterior chest area with numbness of the left arm. A SJCH Radiology Report stated heart

size top normal, no definite focal infiltrate identified, no vascular congestion noted, and no

acute cardiopulmonary process identified. A radionuclide myocardial perfusion scan was

performed. On both the stress and resting images, the myocardium was found to be intact

throughout, without photopenic defect to suggest an infarct or ischemia. There was no

stress-induced left ventricular dilation. The impression was no scintigraphic evidence of an

infarct or ischemia. It was noted on the SJCH discharge summary that during plaintiff’s

admission to SJCH between January 16, 2001 and January 20, 2001, he initially refused the

stress thallium tests. However, the test had to be performed the next day, and the results of

the stress thallium test were negative.

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29. On November 9, 2001, plaintiff was sent to SJCH ER complaining of chest pain. Upon

exam, the electrocardiogram was unremarkable, and the chest x-ray revealed no acute

inflammatory process, but left ventricular enlargement was noted. The Persantine thallium

stress test and angiography earlier in the year were normal.

30. On January 17, 2002, Dr. Deering noted that there was no evidence of significant structural

heart disease.

31. On March 24, 2002, plaintiff was sent to SJCH because of his complaint of chest pains. The

discharge diagnosis was noncardiac chest pain. Dr. Brijesh Bhambi recommended no

additional cardiac work-up for plaintiff in the near future unless there was an objective

change in his clinical status.

5. Facts Relating to Claims Against Defendant Sharon Snow

32. At all times relevant to this dispute, defendant Snow was a duly licensed medical doctor

employed by CDCR at CSATF.

33. As a staff physician at CSATF, defendant Snow’s duties were to evaluate the health care

concerns of inmates/patients, and provide or request appropriate medical treatment to them

while applying CDCR approved criteria for the provision of health care. Defendant Snow

also directed other institutional medical staff, such as nurses and MTAs, in the provision of

medical care to inmates/patients.

34. Plaintiff was on A yard for about 6 months and defendant Snow was responsible for his

medical care.

35. During a seven month time period in 1999, plaintiff made thirty three visits to medical

clinics, emergency rooms and hospitals mostly for symptoms of heart attack. No heart attack

and no positive tests for heart disease were ever found.

36. The 1999 blood pressure and pulse abnormalities are similar to ones found in 2001 for all

hospital and emergency rooms visits (e.g., show the same pattern of abnormalities).

37. In 1999 - 2000, plaintiff claimed he had cancer of the testicles, and metastatic bone lesions

in leftshoulder and right thigh, that were removed by a Navy surgeon (1991-1992). An MRI

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showed a mild shoulder separation due to joint surface thickening (i.e., “old age” changes)

in 2002.

38. Bone metastasis are neverremoved surgically, and multiple examiners have noted “2 normal

testicles present,” as well as an ultra-sound exam showing normal testicles. The testicular

cancer and bone metastasis are related issues. Plaintiff did not have testicular cancer,

therefore he would not have any resultant “bone metastasis” from a cancer that did not exist.

39. Between 1999 and 2004, no electrocardiogram, chest x-ray, angiogram, and/or, most

tellingly, any echocardiograph or Persantine-thallium stress test ever showed congestive

heart failure, a heart attack (old or new), cardiomyopathy, or indeed any heart defect

whatsoever. 

40. Plaintiff claimed that he got his congestive heart failure from a heart attack in 1997, exposure

to plutonium, and alcoholic cardiomyopathy, and denied ever drinking or smoking.

41. The only common feature of all of plaintiff’s hundreds of complaints of heart disease is chest

pain.

42. Upon examination, plaintiff is found with low blood pressure and fast heart beat, which

correct within thirty to forty-five minutes and without any additional nitroglycerin or nitrate

paste.

43. Plaintiff had always had a personal supply of (1) nitroglycerin, (2) a strong vasodilator to

lower blood pressure (isosorbide), and (3) Digoxin, which slows heart rate if taken daily to

achieve a “therapeutic” blood level (0.8-1.2 nanograms /milliliter). Plaintiff’s blood Digoxin

levels were sub-therapeutic on every admission to hospital.

44. Plaintiff’s medication use accounts for plaintiff’s fast heart beat. If nitroglycerin tabs were

taken, the blood pressure would decrease. As the nitroglycerin wore off, generally in twenty

to thirty minutes, the blood pressure would normalize (head toward 120/70 to 130/80) and

the pulse rate, caused by the low blood pressure returning to normal, would decrease - the

exact pattern defendant Snow observed in all of plaintiff’s medical records.

45. In 2000, prior to defendant Snow’s arrival, plaintiff was charged with hoarding medications

by storing them in his locker. Correctional officers found empty medicine bags as well as

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several partly full bags. The different types of pills included captopril, a blood pressure

medication to lower blood pressure, and pseudoephedine, which speeds up heart rate while

causing a racing pulse.

46. Defendant Snow believed that plaintiff was creating these abnormal low blood pressures and

fast heart beat by not taking his Digoxin and taking three or more nitroglycerin tablets

immediately prior to presenting with chest pain. When a normal person has a heart attack

it is common for blood pressure to decrease and/or the pulse rate to fall.

47. On January 3, 2001, defendant Snow renewed plaintiff’s pain medication, Indocin. No

doctor visit was needed for simple medication renewals.

48. On January 16, 2001, plaintiff came to A yard medical clinic complaining of fast heart beat,

chest “heaviness” and tingling fingers. He told defendant Snow he had congestive heart

failure from radiation injury. Defendant Snow rendered immediate and prompt medical

treatment with oxygen, did a physical, and called the prison emergency room with further

orders and treatment. Defendant Snow told the nurse to make hospital contact so plaintiff

could get definitive care and treatment without delay. At the time, defendant Snow believed

plaintiff might be having a heart attack.

49. At the prison emergency room, which is ten minutes from A yard, plaintiff received oxygen,

nitroglycerin tabs, cardiac monitoring, and intra-venous morphine sulfate, and then quick

ambulance transport to SJCH in Bakersfield.

50. Plaintiff’s electrocardiogram showed no signs of heart attack (Myocardial Infarction) or even

ST-T wave changes that accompany heart pain called Angina (or “coronary artery disease”).

51. Plaintiff returned from SJCH on January 20, 2001. After a few hours, he again complained

of severe chest pain and said that he could not breathe. He was promptly sent by ambulance

to Corcoran District Hospital (“CDH”). Plaintiff was observed at CDH for forty-eight hours

without any evidence of heart failure or heart attack, and the physician charged with finding

a reason for the forty-eight hour admission and observation stated plaintiff had (1) asthma

and (2) a “flash” of congestive heart failure.

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52. However, on January 22, 2001, an examination showed a clear chest and the CDH doctor

finally released plaintiff back to the prison stating he could find no cause of plaintiff’s

symptoms. 

53. Defendant Snow saw plaintiff at the prison clinic for the second time on January 24, 2001.

54. Defendant Snow noted plaintiff’s vital signs to be quite normal (blood pressure 118/86, pulse

68, and respiratory rate 16). He had been in hospital(s) continuously for the past seven days

and could only take medication he was given at the hospital. He could not possess his own

nitroglycerin, and the nurse would stand by him and watch to insure that he did take the

Digoxin.

55. On January 29, 2001, defendant Snow saw plaintiff in the medical clinic and found his lungs

to be very congested with a respiratory infection, but he had no chest pain or signs of

congestive heart failure. Defendant Snow treated him with Keflex antibodies and Cepacol

cough/sore throat preparation, and ordered him to return in one week.

56. Defendant Snow re-ordered plaintiff’s cold and cough medications (Cepacol) plus comfort

items Guaifenosin (cough syrup) and Tylenol on February 12, 2001. Plaintiff did not return

to the clinic for his scheduled follow-up exam.

57. On February 22, 2001 plaintiff showed up at medical clinic telling defendant Snow he had

to go to the “hospital” last night with chest pain and shortness of breath. His exam revealed

normal chest sounds and heart sounds (i.e., no congestive heart failure).

58. On February 22, 2001, plaintiff went to the prison ER and was promptly sent back to the yard

when his oxygen saturations were 95-98%. Defendant Snow believed that plaintiff was

feigning the shortness of breath because an oxygen saturation of between 95% and 98%

indicates that the patient’s heart and lungs are working correctly.

59. By the beginning of March 2001, defendant Snow had reviewed all of plaintiff’s medical

records from the prison files.

60. Defendant Snow suspected he was using his heart medications to create his abnormal vital

signs (low blood pressure and fast heart beat). Defendant Snow believed plaintiff would not

take his Digoxin. Plaintiff’s blood levels were always low when he went to a hospital, but

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normal when he came back. His abnormal blood pressures and pulses would also be normal

with observation time and immediately after hospital discharge.

61. Defendant Snow did not believe plaintiff required a wheelchair or braces, and that he sat in

wheelchairs when he could get them, until his muscles atrophied. Sitting was causing

deconditioning of plaintiff’s lungs and heart, as he had chronic obstructive lung disease and

very high cholesterol.

62. Defendant Snow requested that plaintiff’s wheelchair be removed from his use through

Sergeant Aiken, who recorded a 128B (informational chrono)for that date. Defendant Snow

did not speak to plaintiff on March 7, 2001.

63. Defendant Snow saw plaintiff on March 8, 2001, by appointment. Defendant Snow had

apprized Captain Frazier that plaintiff had a medical psychiatric problem that caused him to

fabricate a lot. Captain Frazier accompanied defendant Snow to clinic and plaintiff was

confronted by defendant with some of the realities from his medical records at the time (no

testicle cancer, no radiation for cancer, no surgery for cancer, no non-functioning knees

requiring a wheelchair or braces, no heart disease, heart attacks). Defendant Snow advised

that plaintiff needed to begin that day to give only factual medical history.

64. Defendant Snow wrote the content of the conversation, put his wheelchair and leg brace

removal of March 7, 2001, in writing, and told plaintiff he would not be allowed to take his

Digoxin on his own but would have to go to pill line to take it in front of a nurse/MTA, who

would make sure he swallowed it.

65. Defendant Snow urged plaintiff to walk as often as possible to improve his muscles, heart

and lungs, as she felt this would much improve his overall physical conditions, including his

weight and cholesterol issues.

66. On April 17th and 18th of 2001, the MTA recorded plaintiff’s angry claim that he filed a

“restraining order,” which he had no copy of. Plaintiff then missed his April 18, 2001,

appointment with defendant Snow and did not receive his pulmonary (COPD) referral which

defendant had arranged to treat his real diseases (lung and lipid).

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67. Between March 5, 2001, and May 10, 2001, plaintiff did not get admitted to any treatment

center (ER, clinic, hospital) for chest pain. On May 10, 2001, plaintiff claimed that he

fainted. Defendant Snow continued all his cardiac medications and added two medications -

lopid and pravachol to lower his blood lipids.

68. Defendant Snow discontinued Isordil which she believed caused the fainting episode, and

ordered six blood pressure measurements on the yard. Plaintiff did not show up for the blood

pressure checks and requested transfer to another yard. 

69. Plaintiff was sent to another yard on July 30, 2001. Defendant Snow last dealt with plaintiff

on December 2, 2001, and ordered a laxative (magnesium sulfate) for him.

70. After plaintiff left A yard, he began going out to hospitals and emergency rooms with chest

pain.

71. An echocardiographic consultation and more cardiac consults were negative, and his

echocardiographic ejection fraction of 60% was again normal. The cardiac consultant

diagnosed (1) a probable borderline personality disorder and (2) no evidence of any heart

disease.

72. Plaintiff was examined and treated numerous times for his complaints of his heart, shoulder,

and other health issues, and he was further seen by doctors and specialists on several

occasions between 1999 and 2004. During 1999 and 2004, plaintiff’s medical condition and

various health issues were carefully monitored and treated by several physicians, including

defendant Snow, both inside and outside the institution. In six years of intensive

investigation by multiple specialists, no heart disease was found up to 2004.

///

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 Plaintiff’s third amended complaint is verified and shall be treated as an affidavit for purposes of the 4

summary judgment rule where it is based on facts within plaintiff’s personal knowledge of admissible evidence, and

not merely on plaintiff’s belief. Lew v. Kona Hospital, 754 F.2d 1420, 1423 (9th Cir. 1985); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). 

Plaintiff’s supplemental complaints and opposition are not verified and may not be treated as opposing affidavits.

14

D. Discussion4

1. Medical Care Claim Against Defendant Grayson - 1999

In his third amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that on November 12 or 13, 1999, defendant

Grayson, an MTA, ordered him to self-propel his wheelchair over 3/4 of a mile to the CTC ER for

an appointment, despite knowing about plaintiff’s cardiac condition of congestive heart failure, in

violation of the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff alleges he suffered chest pains en route and fell out

of his wheelchair to the asphalt road. Plaintiff alleges he was then taken to the emergency room in

a van, where Dr. Jakes ordered a large dose of morphine for plaintiff’s chest pains.

To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prison

conditions must involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452

U.S. 337, 347 (1981). A prisoner’s claim of inadequate medical care does not rise to the level of an

Eighth Amendment violation unless (1) “the prison official deprived the prisoner of the ‘minimal

civilized measure of life’s necessities,’” and (2) “the prison official ‘acted with deliberate

indifference in doing so.’” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Hallett

v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted)). A prison official does not act in

a deliberately indifferent manner unless the official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to

inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). 

Defendant Grayson contends that she is entitled to summary adjudication on plaintiff’s claim

against her because she at no time ordered plaintiff to self-propel to the CTC. (Doc. 180, Grayson

Dec., ¶12.) It is standard procedure that inmates needing to go to the CTC Emergency Rroom be

transported by vehicle. (Undisputed Fact 11.) During the day, when an inmate located at CSATF

requires nonemergency medical treatment at the CTC, one of the facility correctional officers is

contacted. (U.F. 12.) The facility correctional officer escorts the inmate to the CTC, and stays with

the inmate during the inmate’s visit to the CTC. (Id.) After the inmate’s medical appointment

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and/or medical treatment at the CTC, the facility correctional officer will escort the inmate back to

CSATF. (U.F. 13.) If an inmate is in a wheelchair and requires non-emergency medical treatment

at the CTC, a CTC transportation correctional officer is contacted. (U.F. 14.) The CTC

transportation correctional officer picks up the inmate and takes the inmate via vehicle from CSATF

to the CTC. (Id.) After the inmate’s medical appointment and/or medical treatment at the CTC, if

the inmate is in a wheelchair, the CTC transportation correctional officer is contacted to pick up the

inmate at the CTC and transport the inmate back via vehicle to CSATF. (U.F. 15.)

Inmates are at all times escorted between CSATF and the CTC by a correctional officer for

security purposes, and are prohibited from walking or self-propelling in a wheelchair to and from

CSATF and the CTC without an escort by a correctional officer. (U.F. 16.) In addition, inmates

must be “processed” (i.e., required to go through metal detectors, and undergo an unclothed body

search) through several gates between CSATF and the CTC. (Id.) An inmate would not be able to

be processed through these gates without being escorted by a correctional officer. (Id.) If an inmate

requiring nonemergency treatment at the CTC wants to walk and/or self-propel in his wheelchair,

he may do so, but he must be escorted by a correctional officer at all times. (U.F. 17.) Defendant

Grayson argues that plaintiff would not have been allowed to self-propel to the CTC by himself, and

she could not and would not have instructed him to do so.

The Court finds that defendant Grayson has met her initial burden of informing the Court of

the basis for her motion, and identifying those portions of the record which she believes demonstrate

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. The burden therefore shifts to plaintiff to establish

that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). As stated above, in attempting to establish the

existence of this factual dispute, plaintiff may not rely upon the mere allegations or denials of his

pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or

admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. Rule 56(e);

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11; First Nat'l Bank, 391 U.S. at 289; Strong v. France, 474 F.2d 747,

749 (9th Cir. 1973).

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 Plaintiff offers Exhibit H to establish that he was seen at the CTC on November 12, 1999, and that on 5

November 16, 1999, Dr. Jakes made a note in his medical file documenting that plaintiff had been told to wheel

himself to and from the CTC, and directing that he be transported to the CTC. (Doc. 186, pg. 74.) Defendants

object to this exhibit for lack of foundation and lack of authenticity, and as containing hearsay. Exhibit H is a page

from plaintiff’s CDCR medical record and was also offered by defendants in support of their motion. (Doc. 182-6,

pg. 19.) As such, defendants’ objection to the record itself for lack of authenticity is rejected. The Court finds the

objection simply not to be based in good faith. However, the specific entry in the record plaintiff would have the

Court rely upon is hearsay. To the extent that the statement was purportedly made by defendant Grayson and would

be an admission, nothing in the record attributes the statement to Grayson. As such, the entry is not admissible. 

Nevertheless, even if the Court did consider the entry made by Dr. Jakes as an admission, while it is evidence that

defendant made plaintiff self-propel to the CTC, it is not evidence that defendant possessed the requisite mental state

of deliberate indifference. 

16

“Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060

(9th Cir. 2004). “Under this standard, the prison official must not only ‘be aware of the facts from

which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,’ but that person

‘must also draw the inference.’” Id. at 1057 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). “‘If a prison official

should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the official has not violated the Eighth

Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.’” Id. (quoting Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nevada,

290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002)).

Plaintiff’s unverified opposition is accompanied by documentary evidence, most of which

are medical records, and the declaration of his wife, Barbara Dell’Antonia. Although plaintiff argues

that defendant Grayson acted with deliberate indifference, plaintiff has not submitted any admissible

evidence that in November of 1999 he suffered from congestive heart failure or that in telling him

to self-propel 3/4 of a mile, defendant Grayson “[knew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to

[plaintiff’s] health . . . .” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Even if the Court assumes for the sake of 5

argument that plaintiff had congestive heart failure, that defendant knew plaintiff had congestive

heart failure, and that defendant told plaintiff to self-propel himself to the CTC three-quarters of a

mile away, plaintiff has not submitted any evidence that wheeling himself three-quarters of a mile

constituted an excessive risk to his health or that defendant was aware it constituted an excessive risk

to his health but ordered him to do it anyway. As such, there is simply no evidence that defendant

Grayson violated plaintiff’s rights under the Eighth Amendment by acting with deliberate

indifference to his medical condition, and defendant is entitled to summary adjudication on the claim

against her.

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2. Excessive Force Claim Against Defendant Edger - 2000

Plaintiff alleges that on January 23, 2000, an emergency alarm was sounded because he was

unconscious on the floor. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Edger, an MTA and registered nurse,

responded to the alarm and repeatedly struck plaintiff in the left arm with his fist. Plaintiff was

subsequently admitted to the infirmary, and alleges that he could not raise or use his left arm without

great pain and was informed by numerous other inmates about defendant Edger’s actions. Plaintiff

further alleges that the force used against him by defendant Edger caused him to need surgery on his

left collar bone. 

“What is necessary to show sufficient harm for purposes of the Cruel and Unusual

Punishments Clause [of the Eighth Amendment] depends upon the claim at issue . . . .” Hudson v.

McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992). “The objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim is . .

. contextual and responsive to contemporary standards of decency.” Id. (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted). The malicious and sadistic use of force to cause harm always violates

contemporary standards of decency, regardless of whether or not significant injury is evident. Id.

at 9; see also Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 628 (9th Cir. 2002) (Eighth Amendment excessive force

standard examines de minimis uses of force, not de minimis injuries)). However, not “every

malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action.” Id. at 9. “The Eighth

Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments necessarily excludes from constitutional

recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort

repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” Id. at 9-10 (internal quotations marks and citations

omitted). 

“[W]henever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force in violation of

the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the core judicial inquiry is . . . whether force was applied

in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciouslyand sadisticallyto cause harm.”

Id. at 7. “In determining whetherthe use of force was wanton and unnecessary, it may also be proper

to evaluate the need for application of force, the relationship between that need and the amount of

force used, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials, and any efforts made to

temper the severity of a forceful response.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

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“The absence of serious injury is . . . relevant to the Eighth Amendment inquiry, but does not end

it.” Id. 

On January 23, 2000, at approximately 4:42 p.m., defendant Edger responded to plaintiff’s

dorm for an emergency medical call. (U.F. 20.) Upon arriving at plaintiff’s dorm, defendant found

plaintiff face down on the floor, unresponsive, and flushed. (U.F. 21.) Defendant found an empty

nitroglycerin bottle lying on the floor, and then checked plaintiff, who was unresponsive. (U.F. 22.)

Defendant Edger, following the standard basic life support and advanced life support guidelines,

tapped plaintiff with his hand on plaintiff’s left shoulder blade and asked, “Are you okay? Are you

okay?” (U.F. 23.) Plaintiff became responsive shortly thereafter, and stated to defendant , “The last

thing I remember is this bolt of pain [in my chest].” Plaintiff was then transported to the emergency

room for treatment. (U.F. 24.) Defendant Edger contends that at no time did he hit plaintiff on his

shoulder or other body part with a closed or open fist, or hit plaintiff over and over again on his

shoulder, and is therefore entitled to summary adjudication as to plaintiff’s claim against him. (Doc.

179, Edger Dec., ¶11.) 

Defendant Edger has met his initial burden of informing the Court of the basis for his motion,

and identifying those portions of the record which he believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine

issue of material fact. The burden therefore shifts to plaintiff to establish that a genuine issue as to

anymaterial fact actuallydoes exist. SeeMatsushitaElec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.

574, 586 (1986). 

Plaintiff has not submitted any admissible evidence in support of his claim that defendant

used excessive force against him by striking him repeatedly with an open and closed fist. Plaintiff

was unconscious at the time and did not witness defendant striking him, and his assertion in his

complaint that he was told by other inmates that defendant Edger struck him repeatedly does not

itself constitute admissible evidence and is not supported by any admissible evidence. Because the

record is devoid of evidence that defendant Edger repeatedly struck plaintiff in the shoulder,

defendant is entitled to summary adjudication on plaintiff’s claim that defendant used excessive

force against him.

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 Plaintiff points to what he asserts are discrepancies in the records cited to by defendant in support of her

6

motion. (Doc. 186, Opp., 3:22-4:7.) The two records at issue are different records. One is “Physician’s Orders”

notes and the other is “Physician’s Progress Notes.” The fact that defendant made the two entries on the same day

but at different times does not cast suspicion on the records. Finally, plaintiff’s contention that defendant attested

she made the entry on March 7, 2001, but the entry is dated March 8, 2001, is incorrect. Defendant attested that on

March 8, 2001, she recorded the March 7, 2001, decision to confiscate plaintiff’s wheelchair. (Doc. 182-1, Snow

Dec., ¶24.) 

19

 3. Medical Care Claims Against Defendant Snow - 2001

Finally, plaintiff alleges that defendant Snow, a physician, acted with deliberate indifference

to his serious medical needs in 2001. Plaintiff alleges that on March 7, 2001, defendant Snow told

him that the Veterans’ Administration Hospital had helped him far too much already, that there was

no therapy available so he had better learn to live with the pain, and that she was taking away his

wheelchair. In addition, defendant Snow allegedly stopped most of plaintiff’s cardiac medications.

On March 14, 2001, plaintiff alleges he saw defendant Snow again but she did not re-order his

cardiac medications. On June 21, 2001, plaintiff was allegedly taken to the CTC ER, where Dr.

Nguyen s re-ordered plaintiff’s cardiac medications and told plaintiff that he never should never have

been taken off his medications. 

“Mere negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical condition, without more, does not

violate a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment rights.” Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1057 (internal quotations and

citation omitted). Further, “[a] difference of opinion between a prisoner-patient and prison medical

authorities regarding treatment does not give rise to a s 1983 claim,” Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d

1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981) (internal citation omitted), and a difference of opinion between medical

personnel regarding treatment does not amount to deliberate indifference, Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d

240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). To prevail, plaintiff “must show that the course of treatment the doctors

chose was medically unacceptable under the circumstances . . . and . . . that they chose this course

in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to plaintiff’s health.” Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330,

332 (9th Cir. 1986) (internal citations omitted).

Turning first to the confiscation of the wheelchair, defendant Snow concedes that she

requested the wheelchair be removed from plaintiff’s use on March 7, 2001. (U.F. 62.) Defendant 6

did not believe plaintiff required a wheelchair or braces, and believed that he sat in wheelchairs

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28 Although plaintiff quibbles with whether or not defendant could have reviewed all of his files, plaintiff 7

submitted no evidence bringing this fact into dispute.

20

when he could get them, until his muscles atrophied. (U.F. 61.) Defendant believed sitting was

causing the deconditioning of plaintiff’s lungs and heart, as plaintiff had chronic obstructive lung

disease and very high cholesterol. (Id.) On March 8, 2001, when she saw plaintiff, defendant urged

plaintiff to walk as often as possible to improve his muscles, heart and lungs, as she felt that this 

would much improve his overall physical conditions, including his weight and cholesterol issues.

(U.F. 65.)

Plaintiff, as a lay witness, is not competent to testify as to the medical diagnoses of his

problems or the appropriate treatment, although plaintiff is qualified to testify to general symptoms,

etc. Likewise, plaintiff’s wife, declarant Barbara Dell’Antonia, is not qualified to testify as to

plaintiff’s medical diagnoses or medical needs. In this instance, plaintiff has not tendered any

admissible evidence that he had a medical need for a wheelchair and the removal of his wheelchair

was therefore an act of deliberate indifference. To the extent that other health care providers may

have provided plaintiff with a wheelchair, plaintiff’s disagreement with defendant Snow’s decision

amounts to nothing more than a disagreement with her chosen course of treatment, which is

insufficient to support an Eighth Amendment claim. Further, plaintiff has not tendered any

admissible evidence that defendant Snow, in having his wheelchair removed, “[knew] of and

disregard[ed] an excessive risk to [plaintiff’s] health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.

Defendant, as a medical doctor, has offered evidence that in her medical opinion, the use of the

wheelchair was detrimental to plaintiff’s health and that she did not believe he required the use of

one. Plaintiff’s disagreement with her assessment does not support a claim for violation of the

Eighth Amendment, and defendant is entitled to summary adjudication.

Plaintiff next alleges that defendant failed to reorder his cardiac medications on March 14,

2001, resulting in his transport to the CTC on June 21, 2001, where Dr. Nguyen stated he should not

have been taken off the medications. 

By the beginning of March 2001, defendant Snow had reviewed all of plaintiff’s medical

records from the prison files. (U.F. 59.) Defendant Snow suspected he was using his heart 7

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medications to create his abnormal vital signs of low blood pressure and fast heart beat. (U.F. 60.)

Defendant Snow believed plaintiff would not take his Digoxin. (Id.) Plaintiff’s blood levels were

always low when he went to a hospital, but normal when he came back. (Id.) His abnormal blood

pressures and pulses would also be normal with observation time and immediately after hospital

discharge. (Id.)

Defendant Snow saw plaintiff on March 8, 2001, by appointment. (U.F. 63.) Defendant

Snow had apprized Captain Frazier that plaintiff had a medical psychiatric problem that caused him

to fabricate a lot. (Id.) Captain Frazier accompanied defendant Snow to clinic and plaintiff was

confronted by defendant with some of the realities from his medical records at the time (no testicle

cancer, no radiation for cancer, no surgery for cancer, no non-functioning knees requiring a

wheelchair or braces, no heart disease, heart attacks). (Id.) Defendant Snow advised that plaintiff

needed to begin that day to give only factual medical history. (Id.) Defendant Snow told plaintiff

he would not be allowed to take his Digoxin on his own but would have to go to pill line to take it

in front of a nurse/MTA, who would make sure he swallowed it. (Id.) 

On April 17th and 18th of 2001, the MTA recorded plaintiff’s angry claim that he filed a

“restraining order,” which he had no copy of. (U.F. 66.) Plaintiff then missed his April 18, 2001,

appointment with defendant Snow and did not receive his pulmonary (COPD) referral which

defendant had arranged to treat his real diseases (lung and lipid). (Id.) Between March 5, 2001, and

May 10, 2001, plaintiff did not get admitted to any treatment center (ER, clinic, hospital) for chest

pain. (U.F. 67.) On May 10, 2001, plaintiff claimed that he fainted. (Id.) Defendant Snow

continued all his cardiac medications and added two medications - lopid and pravachol to lower his

blood lipids. (Id.) Defendant Snow discontinued Isordil which she believed caused the fainting

episode, and ordered six blood pressure measurements on the yard. (U.F. 68.) Plaintiff did not show

up for the blood pressure checks and requested transfer to another yard, which occurred on July 30,

2001. (U.F. 68, 69.) 

Plaintiff was examined and treated numerous times for his complaints of his heart, shoulder,

and other health issues, and he was further seen by doctors and specialists on several occasions

between 1999 and 2004. (U.F. 72.) During 1999 and 2004, plaintiff’s medical condition and various

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health issues were carefullymonitored and treated by several physicians, including defendant Snow,

both inside and outside the institution. (Id.) In six years of intensive investigation by multiple

specialists, no heart disease was found up to 2004. (Id.)

Defendant Snow has met her initial burden of informing the Court of the basis for her

motion, and identifying those portions of the record which she believes demonstrate the absence of

a genuine issue of material fact. The burden therefore shifts to plaintiff to establish that a genuine

issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Plaintiff must do more than attack the credibility of defendants’

evidence. See National Union Fire. Ins. Co. v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 701 F.2d 95, 97 (9th Cir. 1983)

(“[N]either a desire to cross-examine an affiant nor an unspecified hope of undermining his or her

credibility suffices to avert . . . judgment.”). 

Plaintiff has not submitted any admissible evidence that between March and June of 2001

he suffered from a serious medical condition for which he required certain medications, and those

medications were not provided for him by defendant, leading to injury to plaintiff. Plaintiff is not

qualified to opine that he suffered from a condition which required cardiac medications, or that

medications discontinued by defendant Snow were cardiac medications and were necessary to treat

his cardiac condition. Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations in his complaint, while sufficient to state

a claim under federal notice pleading standards, are not sufficient to raise a triable issue of material

fact at this stage in the litigation. Plaintiff has submitted no evidence that defendant Snow acted with

deliberate indifference to a serious medical need (cardiac condition) and that plaintiff suffered an

injury as a result. Defendant Snow is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law on plaintiff’s

Eighth Amendment claims against her.

E. Conclusion

Forthe foregoing reasons, the Court finds that plaintiff has not met his burden of setting forth

sufficient admissible evidence to raise triable issues of material fact, and defendants are entitled to

judgment as a matter of law on the claims against them. Because the Court finds defendants are

entitled to summary judgment on the merits of plaintiff’s claims, the Court does not reach

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defendants’ qualified immunity arguments. Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY

ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s surreply, filed May 30, 2006, and plaintiff’s supplemental opposition, filed

December 4, 2006, are STRICKEN from the record; 

2. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, filed April 17, 2006, is GRANTED, thus

concluding this action in its entirety; and

3. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment for defendants and against plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 14, 2007 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

b9ed48 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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