Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00469/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00469-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

STEPHEN BOYLE, 

Petitioner,

v. 

SCOTT KERNAN, Secretary, 

Respondent.

 Case No.: 16cv469 DMS (PCL) 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION DENYING 

PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR 

STAY [Doc. 2] 

I. INTRODUCTION 

 Petitioner Stephen Boyle (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in 

forma pauperis, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on February 19, 2016. (Doc. 1.) 

On the same day, Petitioner filed this Motion to Stay federal proceedings. (Doc. 2.) 

Petitioner filed a brief for his motion on April 18, 2016. (Doc. 6.) Scott Kernan, Secretary 

of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, and Attorney General 

Kamala Harris (“Respondents”) filed a response in opposition to the Motion to Stay on 

June 8, 2016. (Doc. 10.) Plaintiff replied on July 8, 2016. (Doc. 15.) 

 The Honorable Dana M. Sabraw has referred the matter to the undersigned Judge 

for Report and Recommendation pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §63(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 

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72.1(c)(1)(d). After a thorough review of the pleadings and supporting documents, this 

Court recommends the Motion to Stay be DENIED. 

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1

 On November 1, 2012, in the Superior Court of California, County of San Diego, a 

jury convicted Petitioner of three counts of forcible oral copulation and one count each of 

assault with intent to commit a specific felony, rape by a foreign object with force, and 

forcible rape. (Doc. 2 at 3.) On January 22, 2013, Petitioner was sentenced to an aggregate 

term of 263 years to life in prison. (Id.) 

 Petitioner appealed the convictions raising a Brady violation and a joinder/severance 

issue as grounds for the appeal. (Doc. 1 at 2.) The conviction was affirmed by Division 

One of the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, on September 17, 2014. 

(Id.) Petitioner then petitioned the California Supreme Court for review on the same 

grounds, which was denied in November 25, 2014. (Id.) Petitioner filed for collateral 

review in state court on January 26, 2016, which is still pending. (Id. at 3.) Petitioner’s 

collateral review appeal again asserts the Brady violation and the joinder/severance issue, 

and adds both prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel claims. (Id.) 

Additionally, Petitioner motioned for post-conviction DNA testing, which was granted on 

July 15, 2015. 

III. LEGAL STANDARD 

 A federal court may not consider a petition for habeas corpus unless the petitioner 

first has presented his claims to the state courts, thereby “exhausting” them. 28 U.S.C.S. § 

2254(b)(1)(A); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982). The exhaustion requirement is 

founded on federal-state comity, as only when the state court has been presented with the 

claim may it “pass upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners’ federal rights.” 

Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995) (per curiam) (quotes and citations omitted). 

                                               

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 Lodgments have not been filed in support of Petitioner’s writ of habeas corpus. 

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Thus, exhaustion of a habeas petitioner’s federal claims requires that they have been “fairly 

present[ed] in each appropriate state court, including a state supreme court with powers of 

discretionary review. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004). In California, this 

generally entails direct or collateral presentation to both the lower courts of appeal and the 

state supreme court, though presentation to the state supreme court alone may suffice. 

Reiger v. Christensen, 789 F.2d 1425, 1427 (9th Cir. 1986); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 

828, 829 (9th Cir. 1996). 

 Pursuant to the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), all 

federal habeas petitions are subject to a one-year statute of limitations, and claims not 

exhausted and presented to the court within the one-year period are forfeited. 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d). Generally a court will not consider a petition that contains or seeks to present both 

exhausted and unexhausted claims, commonly referred to as a “mixed” petition. Rose, 455 

U.S. at 522. If a petitioner presents a mixed petition, the petitioner may seek to stay the 

exhausted claims while he pursues the unexhausted claims in state court. Rhines, 544 U.S. 

at 278. 

 Under Rhines, a district court has discretion to stay a mixed petition to allow a 

petitioner time to return to state court to present the unexhausted claims. Id. at 276. This 

stay and abeyance is available only in limited circumstances, and only when: (1) there is 

“good cause” for the failure to exhaust; (2) the unexhausted claims are potentially 

meritorious; and (3) the petitioner did not intentionally engage in dilatory litigation tactics. 

Id. at 277-78. 

 “An assertion of good cause without evidentiary support will not typically amount 

to a reasonable excuse justifying a petitioner's failure to exhaust." Blake v. Baker, 745 F.3d 

977, 982 (9th Cir. 2014). The Supreme Court, however, did not define the good cause 

standard in Rhines. In the Ninth Circuit good cause is, without further clarification, a 

standard less stringent than the “extraordinary circumstances” standard for equitable tolling 

of the statute of limitations. See Jackson v. Roe, 425 F.3d 654, 656 (9th Cir. 2005). District 

courts within the Ninth Circuit have more narrowly defined the standard. Some have 

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required the showing of “some objective factor external to the petitioner” that prevented 

timely exhaustion. Hernandez v. Sullivan, 397 F. Supp.2d 1205, 1207 (C.D. Cal. 2005). 

Others have held that the Rhines good cause standard "requires the petitioner to show that 

he was prevented from raising the claim, either by his own ignorance or confusion about 

the law or the status of his case, by circumstances over which he had no control, such as 

actions by counsel, either in contravention of the petitioner's clearly expressed desire to 

raise the claim, or when petitioner had no knowledge of the claim's existence." Riner v. 

Crawford, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1211 (D. Nev. 2006). 

 The paramount concern in considering a motion to stay is adherence to the AEDPA’s 

twin objectives of encouraging petitioners to “seek relief from state courts in the first 

instance” and “reduc[ing] delays in the execution of state and federal criminal sentences.” 

Rhines, 544 U.S. at 276; Wooten v. Kirkland, 540 F.3d 1019, 1024 (9th Cir. 2008). An 

interpretation of good cause that allows for routine mixed petitions undermines the express 

goals of the AEDPA. (Id.) 

IV. DISCUSSION 

 In support of a stay and abeyance, Petitioner cites delay in his motion for DNA 

testing and confusion about and subsequent delay in obtaining appointed counsel to help 

him interpret those results. In opposition, Respondent argues Petitioner has neither shown 

good cause or that his claims are potentially meritorious. 

 The bulk of Petitioner’s brief in support of a stay and abeyance is spent arguing the 

merit of his claims. Petitioner is not entitled to a stay, however, because he has not 

demonstrated good cause for his failure to exhaust under either of the above standards. 

 The California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for review on November 

25, 2014. Petitioner did not begin to exhaust the unexhausted claims in state court until 

January 26, 2016 or file his federal habeas corpus petition until February 19, 2016, over a 

year after his conviction became final. Petitioner explains that the delay in exhausting his 

claims is due to the delay in submitting his pro se motion for post-conviction DNA testing 

and the pending results of that testing. What is absent from Petitioner’s argument, however, 

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is any explanation as to how this motion for DNA testing and the results were a prerequisite 

to pursuing Petitioner’s unexhausted claims of prosecutorial misconduct or ineffective 

assistance of counsel. 

 Additionally, Petitioner fails to explain the roughly six month gap between the DNA 

testing motion being granted and filing a pro se federal writ of habeas corpus. If the fact 

that Petitioner had not yet received the results of the DNA testing did not preclude him 

from filing for collateral review in the state court, the same lack of preclusion exists for his 

federal habeas petition. 

 These facts do not rise to the level of “good cause” under any standard enunciated 

by the Ninth Circuit. Petitioner is not entitled to counsel on collateral review and there is 

no constitutional right to counsel in federal habeas corpus proceedings. See McCleskey v. 

Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 495 (1991); Chaney v. Lewis, 801 F.2d 1191, 1196 (9th Cir. 1986). To 

allow the argument that a delayed motion for DNA testing or appointment of counsel 

satisfactorily establishes good cause for a stay could encourage the tactic as a routine 

method to stall federal habeas petitions rather than timely pursuing all state court claims. 

 Respondent contends that this case does not fall within the limited circumstances set 

forth in Rhines, as the Petitioner has not demonstrated good cause for not previously 

exhausting the claims he now seeks to exhaust at this late juncture. The Court agrees. 

Because Petitioner fails to show good cause for his failure to exhaust his claims, the Court 

need not consider whether his arguments are plainly meritless or whether Petitioner 

engaged in intentionally dilatory litigation tactics. 

V. CONCLUSION 

 For the foregoing reasons, the court finds the stay and abeyance procedure 

inappropriate and RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s motion to stay be DENIED. 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than August 25, 2016, any party to this action may 

file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should 

be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” 

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with 

the Court and served on all parties no later than September 8, 2016. The parties are advised 

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those 

objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th 

Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: August 11, 2016 

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