Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-00334/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-00334-33/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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ORDER SUSTAINING IN PART AND OVERRULING IN PART SAMSUNG'S OBJECTIONS TO IMPLIED WAIVER

ORDER—C-05-00334; C-05-02298 RMW

TSF

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

E-filed: 11/13/07 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

RAMBUS INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD.,

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA,

INC., SAMSUNG SEMICONDUCTOR, INC.,

SAMSUNG AUSTIN SEMICONDUCTOR,

L.P.,

Defendants.

No. C-05-02298 RMW

ORDER SUSTAINING IN PART AND

OVERRULING IN PART SAMSUNG'S

OBJECTIONS TO IMPLIED WAIVER

ORDER

[Re Docket No. 368]

RAMBUS INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

HYNIX SEMICONDUCTOR INC., HYNIX

SEMICONDUCTOR AMERICA INC.,

HYNIX SEMICONDUCTOR

MANUFACTURING AMERICA INC., 

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD.,

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA,

INC., SAMSUNG SEMICONDUCTOR, INC.,

SAMSUNG AUSTIN SEMICONDUCTOR,

L.P., 

NANYA TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION,

NANYA TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION

U.S.A.,

Defendants.

No. C-05-00334 RMW

[Re Docket No. 517]

Case 5:05-cv-00334-RMW Document 696 Filed 11/13/07 Page 1 of 12
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1 "Samsung" collectively refers to all of the Samsung entities sued in these cases, namely

Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., Samsung Electronics America, Inc., Samsung Semiconductor, Inc., and

Samsung Austin Semiconductor, L.P.

ORDER SUSTAINING IN PART AND OVERRULING IN PART SAMSUNG'S OBJECTIONS TO IMPLIED WAIVER

ORDER—C-05-00334; C-05-02298 RMW

TSF 2

Samsung1 objects to an order of the Special Master that granted Rambus' motion to compel

Samsung to produce privileged documents relating to Samsung's knowledge concerning Neil

Steinberg's work for Rambus and the confidential information belonging to Samsung that he

allegedly used on behalf of Rambus. Rambus opposes Samsung's objection. The court has reviewed

the papers and considered the arguments of counsel heard on November 7, 2007. For the reasons set

forth below, the court sustains Samsung's objections to the implied waiver order with regard to the

scope of production. The court overrules Samsung's objections to the remainder of the implied

waiver order.

I. BACKGROUND

On April 24, 2007, the court appointed the Honorable Read Ambler (Retired) as Special

Master to (1) hear and resolve all discovery disputes, and (2) hear and resolve all disputes regarding

protective orders and confidentiality designations. Joint Case Management Order, Case Nos. 00-

20905, 05-00334, 05-02298, 06-00244, ¶¶ 2(a)-2(b) (N.D. Cal. April 24, 2007) ("JCMO"). The

order states that the parties stipulate that the Special Master's orders will be reviewed as magistrate

judges' orders are, i.e., only if clearly erroneous or contrary to law. Id. ¶¶ 2a, 2c. Judge Ambler is

not new to this litigation; he has served admirably since being appointed in Hynix v. Rambus, Case

No. 00-20905 in April, 2001. This is the first time that a party has objected to his rulings in 05-

00334 or 05-02298.

Samsung's Second Amended Answer in these two actions (05-00334 and 05-02298) includes

the following counterclaims against Rambus: aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty by Neil

Steinberg while Steinberg worked for Samsung (count IV), aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary

duty by Neil Steinberg after he left Samsung (count V), intentional interference with Steinberg's

employment contract with Samsung (count VI), and unfair competition under Section 17200 arising

from these violations and other wrongdoing (count VII). See, e.g., Second Amended Answer,

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2 The court recently converted Rambus' motions to dismiss these four claims on statute of

limitations grounds into motions for summary judgment. See, e.g., Docket No. 655, C-05-00334 (N.D.

Cal. Nov. 2, 2007). These motions to dismiss were pending when Judge Ambler ruled on Rambus'

motion to compel.

ORDER SUSTAINING IN PART AND OVERRULING IN PART SAMSUNG'S OBJECTIONS TO IMPLIED WAIVER

ORDER—C-05-00334; C-05-02298 RMW

TSF 3

Docket No. 144, C-05-00334-RMW (N.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2007) ("SAA").2 Rambus' third requests for

production of documents included a number of requests for documents relating to these four

counterclaims. See Order Granting Rambus Inc.'s Motion to Compel Regarding Samsung's Privilege

Waiver By Claim Assertion, Docket No. 473, C-05-00334-RMW, at 6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2007)

("Waiver Order"). Samsung agreed to produce all non-privileged documents responsive to the

requests, and appears to have done so. Id. Samsung also produced a third revised privilege log of

documents responsive to the requests. Id. at 7; see Gross Decl., Ex. G ("Samsung's Log of Steinberg

Privileged Documents – 10/19/2007"). The current version of the privilege log contains hundreds of

entries, including some identifying documents created after Steinberg had left Samsung that include

mental impressions regarding litigation. See Gross Decl., Ex. G at 55; compare with Waiver Order

at 8. Rambus believes that Samsung had impliedly waived its privileges with respect to these

documents by (1) claiming that Steinberg possessed confidential information that Rambus later used,

i.e., Counts IV-VII, and (2) alleging that the statutes of limitations for counts IV-VII were tolled. Id.

at 6-8. When attempts to meet and confer failed, Rambus filed a motion to compel on September 4,

2007. Id. at 8.

The Special Master held a hearing on September 20, 2007 and issued a 17-page order on

September 26. The order considered the various legal tests for implied waiver, and applied the

Hearn test to Rambus' motion. Id. at 13 (citing Hearn v. Rhay, 68 F.R.D. 574, 581 (E.D. Wash.

1975)). The Special Master then held that:

By affirmative [sic] asserting both the discovery rule and equitable tolling in its

counterclaims and in its briefing and oral argument on Rambus's motion to dismiss,

Samsung has placed the issue of what it knew about Steinberg's work at Rambus at

issue in this litigation. Samsung has also placed the timing and scope of its

investigation of these claims at issue by alleging that it did not and could not

investigate potential claims until 2005.

Id. at 14-15. This information was deemed both relevant and "vital" to Rambus's defense. Id. at 15. 

Accordingly, the Special Master found that Samsung has waived its attorney-client and workCase 5:05-cv-00334-RMW Document 696 Filed 11/13/07 Page 3 of 12
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ORDER SUSTAINING IN PART AND OVERRULING IN PART SAMSUNG'S OBJECTIONS TO IMPLIED WAIVER

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product privileges "as to the facts, circumstances and documents in Samsung's possession, custody,

or control that discuss, refer or relate to Samsung's knowledge of Steinberg's work for Rambus." Id.

The Special Master similarly found that Samsung has waived various privileges with respect

to Steinberg's access to confidential information:

By affirmative [sic] asserting that Steinberg's legal work at Samsung gave him

confidential Samsung information he purportedly misused at Rambus, and relying

upon Steinberg's work (and knowledge) at Samsung as a basis for its breach of

fiduciary and contractual duty claims against Steinberg and Rambus, Samsung has

placed at issue of the specific nature of Steinberg's work at Samsung, and whether

it gave Steinberg access to confidential Samsung information that was useful to

Rambus.

Id. at 16. This information was also deemed both relevant and "vital" to Rambus' defense. Id. The

Special Master therefore found that Samsung has waived its privileges "as to the facts,

circumstances and documents in Samsung's possession, custody or control that discuss, refer or

relate to the work Steinberg performed for Samsung that purportedly gave him access to the

information Samsung claims he later misused at Rambus." Id.

The Special Master therefore granted Rambus' motion to compel and ordered Samsung to

produce "any and all documents in its possession, custody or control that discuss, refer, or relate to:

(a) Mr. Steinberg's work for Rambus; and (b) the work Mr. Steinberg performed for Samsung that

purportedly gave him access to the information Samsung claims he later misused at Rambus." Id. at

17. The order did not make any provision for in camera review, though Samsung did not raise the

issue in its opposition briefing. See generally Docket No. 402, C-05-00334-RMW (N.D. Cal. Sept.

13, 2007).

Samsung now objects to the order on a variety of grounds. The order was stayed pending the

resolution of Samsung's objections.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

This court's review of the Special Master's orders is highly deferential. The court will only

"modify or set aside" an order by a magistrate judge if it is "clearly erroneous or contrary to law." 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). As discussed, the Joint Case Management

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ORDER SUSTAINING IN PART AND OVERRULING IN PART SAMSUNG'S OBJECTIONS TO IMPLIED WAIVER

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Order provides that Judge Ambler's orders will be reviewed pursuant to this standard. JCMO ¶¶ 2a,

2c; Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(g)(3)(A); Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(g)(4). The parties argue considerably about the

proper standard of review, but they do not actually disagree. The Special Master's factual findings

are reviewed for clear error, while the Special Master's legal determinations are reviewed de novo.

B. Conduct Constituting "Assertion"

Samsung argues that the Special Master erred in finding that merely pleading equitable

tolling and the discovery rule in connection with its counterclaims constituted an affirmative act that

can permit finding an implied waiver. Waiver Objections at 7-11. Samsung suggests that the "factintensive, implied-waiver analysis is simply impossible" on the basis of pleadings alone, and that the

case is still too "premature" for determining whether Samsung has taken an affirmative step to place

the privileged material at issue in these cases.

The Hearn test for finding an implied waiver requires that:

(1) assertion of the privilege was a result of some affirmative act, such as filing suit,

by the asserting party; (2) through this affirmative act, the asserting party put the

protected information at issue by making it relevant to the case; and (3) application

of the privilege would have denied the opposing party access to information vital to

his defense.

68 F.R.D. at 581; see also Home Indem. Co. v. Lane Powell Moss and Miller, 43 F.3d 1322, 1326

(9th Cir. 1995) (adopting the Hearn test for the Ninth Circuit); United States v. Amlani, 169 F.3d

1189, 1195 (9th Cir. 1999) (same). By allowing "filing suit" to constitute an affirmative act, the

Hearn test explicitly contemplates allowing a party's pleadings to raise an issue giving rise to an

implied privilege waiver. Similarly, alleging a basis for avoiding a statute of limitations constitutes

an affirmative act under the Hearn test. In re Imperial Corp. of Am., 179 F.R.D. 286, 289-90 (S.D.

Cal. 1998); Aloe Vera of Am., Inc. v. United States, 2003 WL 22429082, at *3 (D. Ariz. 2003)

("Plaintiffs have asserted privilege as the result of an affirmative act-by filing a suit in which a

statute of limitations defense is available."). Respected treatises agree. See PAUL R. RICE, 2

ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN AMERICA § 9:53 (2d. ed. 1999, rev. 2007); EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN,

THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE, at 544 (5th ed. 2007)

("[E]ach time a plaintiff brings a suit, he tacitly puts into issue the question of whether the statute of

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ORDER SUSTAINING IN PART AND OVERRULING IN PART SAMSUNG'S OBJECTIONS TO IMPLIED WAIVER

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limitations [has] run.").

Samsung cites case law suggesting that pleading alone is not enough, but that a party must

attempt to utilize privileged material to advance a claim or defense before the privilege can be found

impliedly waived. See, e.g., Beneficial Franchise Co., Inc. v. Bank One, N.A., 205 F.R.D. 212, 216-

17 (N.D. Ill. 2001). The Beneficial Franchise case is readily distinguished, as it relies on another

jurisdiction's implied waiver test, not the Hearn test. Id. at 216 (citing Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc. v.

Home Indemnity Co., 32 F.3d 851, 863 (3d Cir.1994)). In addition to requiring assertion of a claim

or defense, the Rhone-Poulenc analysis requires the party impliedly waiving privilege to try "to

prove that claim or defense by disclosing or describing an attorney-client communication." 32 F.3d

at 863. This is not an element of the Hearn test. Samsung's reliance on Beneficial Franchise is also

misplaced because the court there explicitly recognized that pleading "asserts" an issue before

deciding that Rhone-Poulenc requires affirmative conduct in addition to "assertion" to waive the

privilege. Samsung's argument that pleading alone is insufficient to "assert" an issue for the first

element of the Hearn test therefore fails. The Special Master did not err in finding that Samsung

had asserted the privilege as a result of affirmatively pleading that it was entitled to tolling and that

Steinberg had taken confidential information.

C. Relevance of Samsung's Subjective Knowledge

Samsung next objects to the production of privileged documents regarding its knowledge of

Steinberg's work at Rambus by arguing that "an objective standard governs resolution of Samsung's

equitable tolling and discovery-rule assertions, making Samsung's subjective knowledge . . .

irrelevant." Waiver Objections at 11-12. Samsung is simply wrong to the extent it says subjective

knowledge is irrelevant. Samsung's Second Amended Answer alleges fraudulent concealment to

support its argument that equitable tolling should apply to Counts IV-VII. See SAA, ¶¶ 246-49,

264-67, 281-84, 293-95. California law clearly considers a plaintiff's subjective knowledge relevant

to the fraudulent concealment inquiry. Snapp & Associates Ins. Services, Inc. v. Malcolm Bruce

Burlingame Robertson, 96 Cal. App. 4th 884, 890-91 (2002). Similarly, the discovery rule can be

triggered by subjective knowledge of a claim. Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co., 44 Cal. 3d 1103, 1110 (1988)

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("Under the discovery rule, the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff suspects or

should suspect that her injury was caused by wrongdoing, that someone has done something wrong

to her."). To be sure, an objective test can also trigger the start of the limitations period; however,

the objective test is not the only test for determining when the limitations period began. Because

Samsung's subjective knowledge regarding Steinberg's work for Rambus is relevant to both its

discovery rule and equitable tolling defenses to the statute of limitations, the protected information

is relevant to this case and satisfies the second prong of the Hearn test. The Special Master's ruling

with respect to relevance is correct.

D. Requested Documents are "Vital"

Samsung's third argument attacks the third prong of the Hearn test, arguing that the Special

Master misapplied the test. The third Hearn factor is that "application of the privilege [must] den[y]

the opposing party access to information vital to his defense." 68 F.R.D. at 581. Samsung first

argues that the Special Master erred by applying a "relevance" standard, instead of the "vital to the

defense" standard. Waiver Objections at 13. In shaping its objections to portray the Special

Master's order as legally erroneous, Samsung quotes the Special Master's order, which stated, "[t]he

information is clearly relevant to Samsung's claims." Waiver Order at 16. Samsung neglects to

quote the next line of the Special Master's order, which stated, "Allowing Samsung to assert the

attorney-client [sic] would deny Rambus access to information vital to its defense." Id. Samsung

only acknowledges the Special Master's finding that the information is vital much later in its

briefing. Waiver Objections at 14. Even a cursory review of Judge Ambler's order reveals that he

applied the Hearn test. The only question on review then is whether his application of the test to the

facts was clearly erroneous. Samsung cannot selectively quote and twist the Special Master's order

to generate a de novo review where a deferential review is appropriate.

Once finally conceding that the Special Master found the privileged documents "vital" to

Rambus' case, Samsung criticizes the order for "fail[ing] to provide any demonstrative analysis" of

why the information is vital. Samsung's objections fail to suggest why the information is not vital,

however, merely echoing its prior argument that it is too early in this litigation to tell. Samsung's

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only other suggestion is that depositions of Joel Karp and Neil Steinberg could supply this

information. As neither worked at Samsung during the time Samsung claims to have been unaware

of its potential claims against Steinberg and Rambus, the court fails to see how they could be an

alternative source for that information. The other category of privileged information is "the work

Mr. Steinberg performed for Samsung that purportedly gave him access to information Samsung

claims he later misused at Rambus." Only Samsung knows what information it claims Steinberg

misused; it cannot conceal what allegedly "confidential" information Steinberg misappropriated

while simultaneously accusing Rambus of misusing it. The Special Master's findings that both

categories of information are vital to Rambus' case was not clearly erroneous; far from it, the Special

Master's findings were correct.

E. Scope of Production

Samsung's final grounds for objection relate to the scope of the ordered production. 

Samsung first argues that the Special Master's order fails to "closely tailor" the production. 

Samsung also argues that the Special Master erred by ordering production without conducting an in

camera review.

As a preliminary matter, Rambus argues that Samsung waived any objection to the scope of

the ordered production by not raising the issue before the Special Master. See Waiver Opposition at

fn. 8 & 23; compare with Samsung's Opposition to Rambus' Motion to Compel Regarding

Samsung's Privilege Waiver, Docket No. 402, C-05-00334-RMW (N.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2007). 

Samsung's original opposition made no mention of the need to narrowly tailor an implied privilege

waiver, nor did it suggest submitting the materials for in camera review. In a footnote to its "reply

in support," Samsung argues that it did not waive the issue because "[t]he Special Master failed in

his duty" to tailor the production order as narrowly as possible. Waiver Reply at 6 & fn. 7. 

Samsung improperly blames the Special Master for Samsung's failure to raise the issue of the proper

scope of relief. Nonetheless, the district court has discretion to decide whether to deem an argument

waived. See Greenhow v. Secretary of Health & Human Serv., 863 F.2d 633, 638-39 (9th Cir.1988),

overruled on other grounds, United States v. Hardesty, 977 F.2d 1347, 1348 (9th Cir.1992);

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Stephens v. Tolbert, 471 F.3d 1173, 1175-76 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding district court did not abuse its

discretion in deciding to hear issue not raised before magistrate judge). As the scope of the Special

Master's order does raise some concerns, the court considers the merits of Samsung's objection.

The Ninth Circuit has established guidelines regarding the implied waiver doctrine. Courts

that find an implied waiver "[do] not order disclosure of the materials categorically; rather, the court

directs the party holding the privilege to produce the privileged materials if it wishes to go forward

with its claims implicating them." Bittaker v. Woodford, 331 F.3d 715, 720-21 (9th Cir. 2003) (en

banc) (emphasis in original). The Special Master's order states that Samsung "shall produce" the

documents. Waiver Order at 17. While it is unlikely Samsung will choose to retract its claims

implicating the waiver, i.e., Counts IV through VII of its Second Amended Answer, Samsung is

entitled to the option to do so to avoid producing the privileged materials. Bittaker, 331 F.3d at 721.

Furthermore, the court "must impose a waiver no broader than needed to ensure the fairness

of the proceedings before it." Bittaker, 331 F.3d at 720. To be clear, the implied waiver doctrine

requires, "closely tailor[ing] the scope of the waiver to the needs of the opposing party." Id. Here,

the Special Master ordered Samsung to produce "any and all documents in its possession, custody or

control that discuss, refer, or relate to: (a) Mr. Steinberg's work for Rambus; and (b) the work Mr.

Steinberg performed for Samsung that purportedly gave him access to the information Samsung

claims he later misused at Rambus." Waiver Order at 17. The "any and all documents . . . that

discuss, refer, or relate to" language does not demonstrate narrow tailoring. Such an order produces

all relevant materials, but fairness, not relevance, is the touchstone of the scope of the implied

waiver doctrine. 

Finally, a court finding an implied waiver and ordering production must define the contours

of the production and the privilege waiver. Bittaker, 331 F.3d at 721; see also Transamerica

Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 573 F.2d 646-652-53 (9th Cir. 1978) (approving district order ordering

disclosure while preserving privilege claims). "It follows that the court imposing the waiver must be

able to bind the party receiving the privileged materials to the court's limitations and conditions." 

Bittaker, 331 F.3d at 721. The court may therefore order the party receiving the privileged materials

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to protect their confidentiality. Id.; cf. Aronson v. McKesson HBOC, Inc., 2005 WL 934331 (N.D.

Cal. 2005) (preserving confidentiality of privileged materials produced pursuant to a confidentiality

agreement). The Special Master's order does not clearly state that Samsung's production is subject

to a protective order, and therefore raises concerns that the order could result in a broader waiver

than intended. 

As Samsung belatedly suggests, an in camera review of the documents would have permitted

the court to find the privilege waived, yet limit production to the extent fairness (not relevance)

requires. See, e.g., Starsight Telecast, Inc. v. Gemstar Dev. Corp., 158 F.R.D. 650, 654-55 (N.D.

Cal. 1994) (Infante, Mag. J.). Of particular concern, the court notes that some of the documents

ordered to be produced may contain Samsung's attorneys' mental impressions of the pending

litigation against Rambus. See Gross Decl. Ex. G, pp. 56-57 (for example, Privilege Document No.

SSP 1713, dated 6/7/2005 contains legal advice regarding litigation; SSP 1675, dated 1/28/2003

contains legal advice regarding litigation and was cc'ed to David Healey, one of Samsung's attorneys

in this action). At the hearing on this objection, Samsung's counsel suggested that one document

contains Samsung's attorneys' mental impressions of the Infineon litigation. These mental

impressions most likely should not be disclosed to Rambus. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495,

510-11 (1947). An in camera review will allow them to be redacted while still allowing Rambus

access to the vital information it is entitled to know to defend against Samsung's claims.

Based on these concerns, the court sustains Samsung's objections to the implied waiver order

as to scope alone. The Special Master should first give Samsung the option of declining to proceed

with its claims. If Samsung chooses to proceed, the Special Master should conduct an in camera

review of the documents affected by the implied waiver. The eventual production should be closely

tailored to produce only (1) documents demonstrating Samsung's subjective knowledge of

Steinberg's work for Rambus, or the objective circumstances relating to Steinberg's work for

Rambus, prior to the critical date(s) for Samsung's tolling allegations. and (2) documents

demonstrating the confidential information that Steinberg knew which Samsung now alleges

Steinberg and Rambus misused in breach of Steinberg's fiduciary duties. Only documents vital to

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Rambus' ability to fairly present its case should be produced. Finally, these documents should be

produced under a protective order to otherwise preserve Samsung's attorney-client and work-product

privileges.

III. ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the court sustains Samsung's objections to the implied waiver

order with regard to the scope of production. The court overrules Samsung's objections to the

remainder of the implied waiver order.

DATED: 11/13/07 

RONALD M. WHYTE

United States District Judge

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ORDER SUSTAINING IN PART AND OVERRULING IN PART SAMSUNG'S OBJECTIONS TO IMPLIED WAIVER

ORDER—C-05-00334; C-05-02298 RMW

TSF 12

Notice of this document has been electronically sent to:

Counsel for Plaintiff(s):

Craig N. Tolliver ctolliver@mckoolsmith.com 

Pierre J. Hubert phubert@mckoolsmith.com 

Brian K. Erickson berickson@dbllp.com, 

David C. Vondle dvondle@akingump.com 

Gregory P. Stone gregory.stone@mto.com 

Carolyn Hoecker Luedtke luedtkech@mto.com 

Peter A. Detre detrepa@mto.com 

Burton Alexander Gross burton.gross@mto.com, 

Steven McCall Perry steven.perry@mto.com

Jeannine Y. Sano sanoj@howrey.com 

Counsel for Defendant(s):

Matthew D. Powers matthew.powers@weil.com 

David J. Healey david.healey@weil.com 

Edward R. Reines Edward.Reines@weil.com

John D Beynon john.beynon@weil.com

Jared Bobrow jared.bobrow@weil.com

Leeron Kalay leeron.kalay@weil.com

Theodore G. Brown, III tgbrown@townsend.com

Daniel J. Furniss djfurniss@townsend.com

Jordan Trent Jones jtjones@townsend.com

Kenneth L. Nissly kennissly@thelenreid.com 

Geoffrey H. Yost gyost@thelenreid.com 

Susan Gregory van Keulen svankeulen@thelenreid.com

Patrick Lynch plynch@omm.com 

Jason Sheffield Angell jangell@orrick.com

Vickie L. Feeman vfeeman@orrick.com

Mark Shean mshean@orrick.com 

Kai Tseng hlee@orrick.com

Counsel are responsible for distributing copies of this document to co-counsel that have not registered

for e-filing under the court's CM/ECF program.

Dated: 11/13/07 TSF

Chambers of Judge Whyte

Case 5:05-cv-00334-RMW Document 696 Filed 11/13/07 Page 12 of 12