Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-00952/USCOURTS-caed-1_10-cv-00952-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LONNIE WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff,

v.

J. LOPEZ, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:10-CV-00952-LJO-DLB PC

ORDER REQUIRING PLAINTIFF EITHER

TO FILE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

OR NOTIFY COURT OF WILLINGNESS TO

PROCEED ONLY ON CLAIMS FOUND TO

BE COGNIZABLE

(ECF NO. 1)

RESPONSE DUE WITHIN THIRTY DAYS

Findings and Recommendations

I. Background

Plaintiff Lonnie Williams (“Plaintiff”) is a prisoner in the custody of the California

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”). Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and in

forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff initiated this

action by filing a complaint on May 27, 2010.

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are

legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or

that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(b)(1),(2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been

paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or

appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. §

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1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal

conclusions are not. Id.

II. Summary Of Complaint and Analysis

Plaintiff was previously incarcerated at North Kern State Prison (“NKSP”) in Delano,

California, where the events giving rise to this action occurred. Plaintiff names as Defendants

correctional officer J. Lopez, captain K. Da Viega, sergeant Taylor Swaim, sergeant F. Martinez,

Jr., correctional officer Sergio Castrejon, lieutenant George Becerra, acting wardenMaurice

Junious, licensed psychiatric technician Elizabeth Brewer, and litigation coordinator Laura M.

Williams. Plaintiff also names CC I P. Horn, Dunlop, Longacre, Cunningham, Tindle, Kyle,

Vetterick, and D. Harban in the body of the complaint. Plaintiff alleges violations of the First,

Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.1

Plaintiff makes several disparate allegations which the Court will analyze separately.

A. Prison Transfer

Plaintiff alleges the following. Plaintiff is HIV-positive and a transsexual. (Compl. 3.)2

Plaintiff wrote inmate grievances regarding a potential transfer to California Correctional

Institution or Corcoran State Prison, because Plaintiff contends Plaintiff cannot be placed in

valley fever areas, or to Pelican Bay State Prison because Plaintiff cannot be isolated. (Compl.

3.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Williams conspired with P. Horn, Maurice Junious, George

Plaintiff alleges a violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendment. It is unclear what part of the Fifth or Sixth

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Amendment was allegedly violated. Plaintiff thus fails to state a claim for violation of either.

Page references are to the court docket numbering.

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Becerra, Castrejon, Taylor Swaim, and F. Martinez to retaliate against Plaintiff for filing prison

grievances. (Compl. 3.) Plaintiff also alleges deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth

Amendment if transferred to any of the above locations.

Allegations of retaliation against a prisoner’s First Amendment rights to speech or to

petition the government may support a § 1983 claim. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th

Cir. 1985); see also Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1989); Pratt v.

Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995). “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First

Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some

adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that

such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did

not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-

68 (9th Cir. 2005).

As of the date of this Findings and Recommendations, Plaintiff is incarcerated at

California State Prison, Sacramento (“CSP-SAC”). (Notice of Change of Address, filed June 28,

2010, ECF No. 9.) Plaintiff does state a claim for retaliatory prison transfer. However, Plaintiff

has not sufficiently linked which Defendants threatened Plaintiff with transfer in retaliation for

filing of inmate grievances. To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the

defendant acted under color of state law and (2) the defendant deprived him of rights secured by

the Constitution or federal law. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir.

2006). Plaintiff bare allegations of conspiracy are insufficient to state a claim.3

A conspiracy claim brought under § 1983 requires proof of “‘an agreement or meeting of the minds to

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violate constitutional rights,’” Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 441 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting United Steel Workers of

Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 865 F.2d 1539, 1540-41 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted)), and an actual deprivation of

constitutional rights, Hart v. Parks, 450 F.3d 1059, 1071 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Woodrum v. Woodward County,

Oklahoma, 866 F.2d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1989)). “‘To be liable, each participant in the conspiracy need not know

the exact details of the plan, but each participant must at least share the common objective of the conspiracy.’”

Franklin, 312 F.3d at 441 (quoting United Steel Workers, 865 F.2d at 1541).

The federal system is one of notice pleading, and the court may not apply a heightened pleading standard to

plaintiff’s allegations of conspiracy. Empress LLC v. City and County of San Francisco, 419 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th

Cir. 2005); Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1126 (2002). However, although accepted as true,

the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). A plaintiff must set forth “the grounds of his

entitlement to relief[,]” which “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements

of a cause of action . . . .” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). As such, a bare allegation that Defendants

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Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim. The Eighth Amendment

protects prisoners from inhumane methods of punishment and from inhumane conditions of

confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006). Extreme deprivations

are required to make out a conditions of confinement claim, and only those deprivations denying

the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an

Eighth Amendment violation. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (citations and

quotations omitted). In order to state a claim for violation of the Eighth Amendment, Plaintiff

must allege facts sufficient to support a claim that officials knew of and disregarded a substantial

risk of serious harm to him. E.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994); Frost v. Agnos,

152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998). Mere negligence on the part of the official is not sufficient

to establish liability, but rather, the official’s conduct must have been wanton. Farmer, 511 U.S.

at 835; Frost, 152 F.3d at 1128.

The pleadings fail to indicate that any Defendants knew of and disregarded an excessive

risk to Plaintiff’s health. Considering a transfer and actual transfer are two separate acts. 

Plaintiff’s concerns of possible serious harm from the prison transfer are at best speculative. 

Plaintiff thus fails to state a cognizable deliberate indifference claim here.

B. April 18, 2010 Incident - False RVR

Plaintiff alleges that on April 18, 2010, Defendant F. Martinez attempted to bribe

Plaintiff with extra food if Plaintiff assaulted fellow cell mate Gordon with a loose razor blade,

provided by Defendant Martinez. (Compl. 4.) Plaintiff refused, and notified Defendant Junious

of the incident. In retaliation, Defendants F. Martinez, Junious, Castrejon, Becerra, and Swaim

conspired against Plaintiff and aided in the filing of a false rules violation report against Plaintiff

for possession of a weapon. Defendants allegedly coached other staff to write false statements,

and deprived Plaintiff a fair and impartial hearing by denying the right to call witnesses or to

attend the hearing. Defendant J. Lopez also assaulted Plaintiff by slamming Plaintiff against a

metal box, bruising Plaintiff’s left breast, and scratching Plaintiff’s neck.

conspired to violate Plaintiff's constitutional rights will not suffice to give rise to a conspiracy claim under § 1983.

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Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable retaliation claim against any Defendants regarding this

incident. First, Plaintiff fails to plead Defendants took adverse action against Plaintiff because of

Plaintiff’s protected First Amendment activity. Furthermore, a conspiracy claim brought under §

1983 requires proof of “‘an agreement or meeting of the minds to violate constitutional rights,’”

Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 441 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting United Steel Workers of Am. v.

Phelps Dodge Corp., 865 F.2d 1539, 1540-41 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted)), and an actual

deprivation of constitutional rights, Hart v. Parks, 450 F.3d 1059, 1071 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting

Woodrum v. Woodward County, Oklahoma, 866 F.2d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1989)). “‘To be

liable, each participant in the conspiracy need not know the exact details of the plan, but each

participant must at least share the common objective of the conspiracy.’” Franklin, 312 F.3d at

441 (quoting United Steel Workers, 865 F.2d at 1541).

The federal system is one of notice pleading, and the court may not apply a heightened

pleading standard to plaintiff’s allegations of conspiracy. Empress LLC v. City and County of

San Francisco, 419 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2005); Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307

F.3d 1119, 1126 (2002). However, although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be

[sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). A plaintiff must set forth “the grounds of his

entitlement to relief[,]” which “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action . . . .” Id. (internal quotations and citations

omitted). As such, a bare allegation that Defendants conspired to violate Plaintiff's constitutional

rights will not suffice to give rise to a conspiracy claim under § 1983.

The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from being deprived of liberty without due

process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). In order to state a cause of

action for deprivation of procedural due process, a plaintiff must first establish the existence of a

liberty interest for which the protection is sought. Id. Liberty interests may arise from the Due

Process Clause itself or from state law. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466-68 (1983). The Due

Process Clause itself does not confer on inmates a liberty interest in being confined in the general

prison population instead of administrative segregation. See id. With respect to liberty interests

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arising from state law, the existence of a liberty interest created by prison regulations is

determined by focusing on the nature of the deprivation. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481-

84 (1995). Liberty interests created by prison regulations are limited to freedom from restraint

which “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary

incidents of prison life.” Id. at 484. Here, Plaintiff fails to allege a liberty interest, and thus fails

to state a cognizable due process claim.

“What is necessary to show sufficient harm for purposes of the Cruel and Unusual

Punishments Clause [of the Eighth Amendment] depends upon the claim at issue . . . .” Hudson

v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992). “The objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim is

. . . contextual and responsive to contemporary standards of decency.” Id. (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted). The malicious and sadistic use of force to cause harm always

violates contemporary standards of decency, regardless of whether or not significant injury is

evident. Id. at 9; see also Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 628 (9th Cir. 2002) (Eighth

Amendment excessive force standard examines de minimis uses of force, not de minimis

injuries)). Plaintiff states a cognizable claim for use of excessive force against Defendant J.

Lopez.

C. May 20, 2010 - Taunting

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Brewer taunted Plaintiff in retaliation for Plaintiff filing a

complaint against Defendant Brewer. (Compl. 5.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Brewer

conspired with Defendant Swaim, Castrajon, Dunlap, Becerra, Longacre and others to deprive

Plaintiff consultations with Plaintiff’s psychologist or to attend any medical appointments. 

Verbal harassment is not enough to state an adverse action for purposes of retaliation. 

Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir. 1987) (citation and internal quotation

omitted). Denial of access to medical or psychological treatment may be sufficient for a

retaliation claim. Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a claim against Defendant Brewer for

retaliation. Again, Plaintiff’s bare allegations of conspiracy are insufficient to state a claim

against any other Defendants.

///

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D. May 10, 2010 Incident - Food Poisoning

Plaintiff alleges Defendants F. Martinez, Taylor Swaim, Becerra, J. Lopez, Castrejon, and

Brewer conspired with officers Dunlop, Longacre, Cunningham, Tindle, Kyle, Vetterick, and D.

Harban to poison Plaintiff’s food with arsenic or some other unknown substance. (Compl. 6.)

Again, Plaintiff’s allegations of conspiracy, without more, are insufficient to state a claim

for conspiracy. Poisoning a prisoner’s food would violate the Eighth Amendment, and would be

sufficient to state a retaliation claim. However, Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently link which

Defendants committed the alleged violation. Bare allegations of conspiracy by Defendants are

not enough.

Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Junious and Williams refused to file Plaintiff’s

emergency staff complaints regarding this incident. (Compl. 6.) Adjudications in the inmate

grievance process, without more, fails to state a cognizable claim because Plaintiff is not entitled

under due process to a specific form of grievance procedure. Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850,

860 (9th Cir. 2003). Furthermore, supervisory personnel are only liable for their own

misconduct, not that of their subordinates. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. There is no respondeat

superior liability under § 1983. Id.

E. April 29, 2010 to May 20, 2010 - Cell Search

Plaintiff alleges that Plaintiff’s cell was searched in retaliation, presumably for the filing

of prison grievances. (Compl. 7.) Plaintiff has not sufficiently identified which Defendants

searched Plaintiff’s cell. Furthermore, prisoners have no Fourth Amendment right of privacy in

their cells. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525-26 (1984). Plaintiff also fails to allege why the

searching of Plaintiff’s cell did not advance any penological goals. Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567-68.

F. February 27, 2010 Incident

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant K. DaViega conspired with D. Harban and S. Pineda to

break into Plaintiff’s legal mail that Plaintiff sent to the courts. (Compl. 7.) Prisoners have “a

First Amendment right to send and receive mail.” Witherow v. Paff, 52 F.3d 264, 265 (9th Cir.

1995). Prison regulations relating to the regulation of incoming mail are analyzed under the

reasonableness standard set forth in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91 (1987). Thornburgh v.

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Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413-14 (1989). The regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to

legitimate penological interests. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. Destruction of mail because Plaintiff is

a transsexual would not serve any penological interest and gives rise to a cognizable First

Amendment claim against Defendant K. DaViega.

Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant K. DaViega threatened Plaintiff with management

cell status if Plaintiff continued to file complaints regarding food poisoning. (Compl. 7.) 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant K. DaViega conspired with C. Lugo, R. Perez, I. Quintero,

Criada, F. Martinez, George Becerra, and Taylor Swaim to deprive Plaintiff of a compatible cell

mate. Plaintiff was subsequently placed in the administrative segregation unit (“ASU”).

Plaintiff does state a cognizable claim for retaliation against Defendant K. DaViega for

placing Plaintiff in ASU because Plaintiff filed grievances against prison officials. Plaintiff’s

bare allegation of conspiracy fails to state a claim against any other Defendants.

H. Unrelated Claims

Plaintiff appears to be alleging different, unrelated claims in the same action. The Court

will require Plaintiff to pursue unrelated claims in a different action. The Court finds the

following claims unrelated to each other: (1) retaliatory prison transfer; (2) false RVR and

excessive force incident; (3) retaliatory denial of medical treatment; (4) food poisoning; (5)

retaliatory cell search; (6) and opening of legal mail and ASU cell placement. Plaintiff’s

allegations of conspiracy are insufficient, and thus Plaintiff does not link these unrelated claims

together. 

“The controlling principle appears in Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a): ‘A party asserting a claim to

relief as an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, may join, either as

independent or as alternate claims, as many claims, legal, equitable, or maritime, as the party has

against an opposing party.’ Thus multiple claims against a single party are fine, but Claim A

against Defendant 1 should not be joined with unrelated Claim B against Defendant 2. Unrelated

claims against different defendants belong in different suits, not only to prevent the sort of

morass [a multiple claim, multiple defendant] suit produce[s], but also to ensure that prisoners

pay the required filing fees-for the Prison Litigation Reform Act limits to 3 the number of

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frivolous suits or appeals that any prisoner may file without prepayment of the required fees. 28

U.S.C. § 1915(g).” George v. Smith, 507 F.3d, 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007).

Plaintiff will be granted leave to file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies

identified herein. If Plaintiff decides to not file an amended complaint, Plaintiff may so notify

the Court in writing. Plaintiff should examine which claims Plaintiff will retain in this action,

and which unrelated claims will be filed in a separate action. Plaintiff is not prevented from

pursuing those claims if Plaintiff wishes; however, Plaintiff may not litigate all these claims in

this action. Failure to comply with this order may result in the Court choosing which claims will

proceed in this action.

III. Conclusion And Order

Plaintiff states a cognizable claim for excessive force against Defendant Lopez,

retaliation against Defendant Brewer, and violation of the First Amendment against Defendant

DaViega. Plaintiff fails to state any other cognizable claims. The Court will provide Plaintiff

with an opportunity to file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court

in this order. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff may not change

the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his amended complaint. George v.

Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no “buckshot” complaints).

Plaintiff’s amended complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but must state what

each named defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional or other federal

rights. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). Although accepted as true, the

“[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . .

.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). 

Finally, Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supercedes the original complaint,

Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567

(9th Cir. 1987), and must be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or superceded

pleading,” L. R. 220. Plaintiff is warned that “[a]ll causes of action alleged in an original

complaint which are not alleged in an amended complaint are waived.” King, 814 F.2d at 567

(citing to London v. Coopers & Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 1981)); accord Forsyth,

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114 F.3d at 1474.

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a complaint form;

2. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall

either:

(a) file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified herein; or

(b) notify the Court of willingness to proceed only on claims found to be

cognizable as stated herein;

3. Plaintiff may not add any new, unrelated claims to this action via the amended

complaint and any attempt to do so will result in an order striking the amended

complaint; and 

4. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, the Court will dismiss this action for

failure to obey a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: July 14, 2010 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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