Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02592/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02592-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 17:0101 Copyright Infringement (definitions)

---

1

3:16-CV-02592-CAB (KSC)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JUAN AND NELSON PUBLISHING, 

RAUL ACOSTA d/b/a THIS NEW AGE 

PUBLISHING, DOSE ROCKS MUSIC 

and RICE BOY MUSIC,

Plaintiffs,

v.

SHOW PALACE. INC., and JUAN M. 

CORTES,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:16-CV-02592-CAB (KSC)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 

DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND 

ENTERING JUDGMENT IN FAVOR 

OF PLAINTIFFS

[Doc. No. 10]

Currently before the Court is Plaintiffs Juan and Nelson Publishing, Raul Acosta

d/b/a This New Age Publishing, Dose Rocks Music, and Rice Boy Music’s (collectively 

“Plaintiffs”) motion for default judgment against Defendants Show Palace Inc. (“SPI”) and 

Juan M. Cortes (“Cortes’) (collectively “Defendants”) pursuant to Rule 55(b)(2) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. [Doc. No. 10.] No responsive pleading was filed, but 

Mr. Cortes showed up in person at the undersigned’s courtroom on May 25, 2017. For the 

reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs’ motion is GRANTED. 

Plaintiffs’ requests for injunctive relief, statutory damages and attorneys’ fees are 

also granted.

Case 3:16-cv-02592-CAB-KSC Document 11 Filed 05/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 11
2

3:16-CV-02592-CAB (KSC)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

I. BACKGROUND

On October 18, 2016, Plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking to enjoin Defendants from 

publicly performing the copyrighted musical compositions of members of the American 

Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers (“ASCAP”) at The New Show Palace. 

[Doc. No. 1.] Plaintiffs allege Defendants infringed on four copyrights for the musical 

compositions “El Baile De La Ducha” (certificate of registration number PA 922-758), 

“Cepillo” (certificate of registration number PA 934-615), “Abusadora” (certificate of

registration number PA 885-307) and “Maria Se Fue” (certificate of registration number 

PA 885-307). [Doc. No. 1 ¶ 15, Schedule A at 7.] 

During the relevant time period Defendant Show Palace, Inc. (“SPI”) was a 

corporation organized under the laws of California, with a principal place of business 

located Oceanside, California. [Doc No. 1 ¶ 5.] SPI owned, controlled, managed, operated 

and maintained a place of business for public entertainment, accommodation, amusement, 

and refreshment, known as The New Show Palace located in Oceanside, California. [Id. ¶ 

6.] SPI was properly served on December 22, 2016. [Doc. No. 4.]

Defendant Cortes is an individual who resides in this District, was a principal 

director and/or officer of SPI who was responsible for the control, management, operation 

and maintenance of the affairs of SPI. [Id. ¶¶ 8-10.] Cortes was properly served on 

December 22, 2016. [Doc. No. 5.]

On March 6, 2017, Plaintiffs requested entry of default and on March 7, 2017, the 

clerk entered default against Defendants. [Doc. Nos. 7, 8.] On April 14, 2017, the Court 

ordered Plaintiffs to show cause why this matter should not be dismissed for failure to 

move for default judgment. [Doc. No. 9.] Plaintiffs responded by filing their motion for 

default judgment. [Doc. No. 10.] Plaintiffs seek a permanent injunction prohibiting further 

unauthorized public performances by Defendant Cortes of any and all copyrighted musical 

compositions in the repertory of ASCAP, statutory damages totaling $90,000, and 

reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs totaling $3,568.45. [Id. at 7.]

Case 3:16-cv-02592-CAB-KSC Document 11 Filed 05/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 11
3

3:16-CV-02592-CAB (KSC)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standards for Entry of Default Judgment.

In light of Defendants failure to respond to the Complaint, all of the allegations 

contained within it, aside from the amount of damages, are deemed admitted. Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 8(b)(6); Geddes v. United Fin. Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977) (“The general 

rule of law is that upon default the factual allegations of the complaint, except those relating 

to the amount of damages, will be taken as true.”) “However, necessary facts not contained 

in the pleadings, and claims which are legally insufficient, are not established by default.” 

Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 980 F.2d 1261, 1267 (9th Cir. 1992).

It is within the Court’s discretion to enter default judgment following entry of default 

by the clerk. Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471 (9th Cir. 1986). The Ninth Circuit has 

identified seven factors for district courts to consider before entering default judgment:

(1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff; (2) the merits of plaintiff’s 

substantive claim; (3) the sufficiency of the complaint; (4) the sum of money 

at stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; 

(6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect; and (7) the strong policy 

underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the 

merits.

Id. at 1471-72.

B. Application of Default Judgment Factors Under Eitel 

In this action, all factors weigh in favor of entering default judgment against 

Defendants.

1. Possibility of prejudice to Plaintiffs

If denial of default judgment will likely leave Plaintiff without recourse for recovery, 

such potential prejudice to Plaintiff favors granting default. PepsiCo, Inc. v. California 

Sec. Cans, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2002); Landstar Ranger, Inc. v. Parth 

Enters., 725 F. Supp. 2d 916, 920 (C.D. Cal. 2010). Here, Defendants have not appeared 

and have repeatedly refused to obtain an ASCAP license. [Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 14, 15.] Plaintiffs 

Case 3:16-cv-02592-CAB-KSC Document 11 Filed 05/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 11
4

3:16-CV-02592-CAB (KSC)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

have no other means to obtain relief and Plaintiffs will likely suffer prejudice without the 

grant of default judgment. 

2. Merits of Plaintiffs’ substantive claim and sufficiency of the 

complaint

“[U]pon default the factual allegations of the complaint, except those relating to the 

amount of damages will be taken as true.” Geddes, 559 F.2d at 560. The court must 

examine the complaint to determine whether plaintiff adequately pled a claim for relief. 

Danny v. Lavine, 572 F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir. 1978). An adequately pled complaint 

“must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. 

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

In order to establish a prima facie case for copyright infringement Plaintiffs “must 

demonstrate ‘(1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements 

of the work that are original.’” Range Road Music, Inc., v. East Coast Foods, Inc., 668 

F.3d 1148, 1153-54 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Funky Films, Inc. v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 

462 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Taking the 

allegations of the Complaint as true, Plaintiffs have shown that both elements have been 

met.

Here, the complaint alleges that Plaintiffs are all members of ASCAP, a membership 

association that represents, licenses, and protects the public performance rights of its more 

than 585,000 songwriter, composer, and music publisher members. [Doc. No. 1 ¶ 13.] It 

also alleges that Plaintiffs granted to ASCAP a non-exclusive right to license the 

performing rights of their copyrighted musical compositions. [Id. ¶ 14.] In turn, ASCAP 

collects the license fees associated with the public performances of its members’ musical 

works and distributes royalties to its members. [Id ¶ 14.]

Additionally, Plaintiffs allege that they are the owners of the copyrights at issue and 

have complied in all respects with Title 17 of the United States Code and secured the 

exclusive rights and privileges of the musical compositions in question. [Id. ¶ 19-21, 26.] 

Case 3:16-cv-02592-CAB-KSC Document 11 Filed 05/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 11
5

3:16-CV-02592-CAB (KSC)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The Schedule attached to the complaint provides information concerning the four 

compositions. [Doc. No. 1 at 7, Schedule A]. The Schedule states that Plaintiffs Juan and 

Nelson Publishing and Raul Acosta are the owners of “El Baile de la Ducha”; Plaintiffs 

Dose Rock Music and Rice Boy Music are the owners of “Cepillo”; and Plaintiff Raul 

Acosta is the owner of “Abusadora” and “Maria Se Fue.” [Id.] The Schedule also lists 

each copyright registration number and date of registration. [Id.]

The complaint alleges that since May 3, 2016 (the date of the first known 

infringement) Defendants have presented public performances of the copyrighted musical 

compositions of ASCAP members at The New Show Palace without permission. [Doc. 

No. 1, ¶¶ 17, 18, 22, Schedule A at 7.] Further, Plaintiffs assert that at the times of these 

unauthorized public performances Defendants were knowingly and intentionally violating 

their rights. [Id. ¶ 24.]

Relatedly, the complaint contains general allegations that since June 2011, ASCAP 

representatives have made more than fifty attempts to contact Defendants to offer them an 

ASCAP license for The New Show Palace and that Defendants have refused the licensing 

offer. [Id. ¶ 15-16.] Plaintiffs have provided documentation in support of their allegations

including a declaration from Walter Busse that he attended The New Show Palace on the 

evenings of March 4-6, 2016 and heard the musical compositions “El Baile de la Ducha,”

“Cepillo,” “Abusadora,” and “Maria Se Fue being performed. [Doc. No. 10-2.] A 

declaration, along with supporting exhibits, from R. Douglas Jones1, attests to ASCAP’s 

attempts to educate Defendants regarding their obligations under the Copyright Act and to 

offer an ASCAP license for The New Show Palace was also submitted to the Court. [Doc. 

No. 10-1.]

 

1 Mr. Jones is a Manager, Business and Legal Affairs for the American Society of Composers, Authors 

and Publishers, responsible for supervision of ASCAP’s efforts to license commercial establishments 

that furnish musical entertainment for their customers. [Doc. No. 10-1 ¶¶ 1, 5.]

Case 3:16-cv-02592-CAB-KSC Document 11 Filed 05/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 11
6

3:16-CV-02592-CAB (KSC)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

In light of the above, the Court concludes that the allegations in the complaint 

sufficiently allege that Defendants violated the copyright laws of the United States. 

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have adequately pled claims for relief and 

finds this favor weighs in favor of entering default judgment against Defendants.

3. The sum of money at stake

Courts “consider the amount of money at stake in relation to the seriousness of 

Defendant’s conduct.” PepsiCo, Inc. v. Cal. Sec. Cans, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1176 (C.D. Cal. 

2002). Here, Plaintiffs are seeking statutory damages totaling $90,000, and reasonable 

attorneys’ fees and costs totaling $3,568.45. As discussed in more detail below, Plaintiffs 

have limited the remedies they seek and the sum of money at stake is not large. 

Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of entry of default.

4. The possibility of a dispute concerning material facts

Upon entry of default, all well-pleaded facts in the complaint are taken as true, 

except those relating to damages. Televideo v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917-918 (9th Cir. 

1987); Geddes, 559 F.2d at 560. Since Plaintiffs have supported their factual allegations 

with ample evidence, and “defendant[s] ha[ve] made no attempt to challenge the accuracy 

of the allegations in the complaint,” no factual dispute precludes entry of default judgment. 

Landstar, 725 F. Supp. 2d at 921-22 (C.D. Cal. 2010). Therefore, this factor weighs in 

favor of entry of default.

5. Whether the default was due to excusable neglect

Defendants were properly served with the summons and complaint. [Doc. Nos. 4, 

5.] Therefore, the default is not due to excusable neglect. See e.g.,, Craigslist, Inc. v. 

Kerbel, No. 11-3309, 2012 WL 3166798 (N.D. Cal. Aug 2, 2012) (defendant’s default was 

unlikely due to excusable neglect considering fact that “Plaintiffs served not only the 

summons and complaint but also the request for entry of default on Defendant but still 

received no response”). Accordingly, this factor ways favors default judgment.

//

Case 3:16-cv-02592-CAB-KSC Document 11 Filed 05/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 11
7

3:16-CV-02592-CAB (KSC)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6. The strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

“Defendant[s’] failure to answer Plaintiff[s’] Complaint makes a decision on the 

merits impractical, if not impossible.” PepsiCo, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 177. Here, Defendants 

have failed to file or answer or otherwise respond to the Complaint, but this does not 

preclude the Court from entering default judgment against them. Id.

In light of the above, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment.

C. Defendants are Jointly and Severally Liable

Plaintiffs assert that Defendants should be held jointly and severally liable, and 

vicariously liable, for their acts of infringement. 

Under the Copyright Act, two or more infringers may be held liable “jointly and 

severally.” 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1). “To impose vicarious liability on a defendant for 

copyright infringement, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant exercises the requisite 

control over the direct infringer and that the defendant derives a financial benefit from the 

direct infringement.” Range Road 668 F.3d at 1155. 

Here, the uncontroverted allegations of the Complaint and Declaration of R. Douglas 

Jones establish Defendants jointly had the right and ability to supervise and control the 

activities that took place at The New Show Palace and each Defendant derived a direct and 

financial benefit from the public performance of musical compositions at The New Show 

Palace. [Doc. No. 1 at ¶¶ 5-12; Doc. No. 10-1 at ¶¶ 8-16.] Accordingly, the Court finds 

that Defendants are jointly and severally liable for the infringement.

III. REMEDIES

Plaintiffs ask that the default judgment include a permanent injunction, statutory 

damages and an award of attorneys’ fees. 

A. Injunctive Relief

The Copyright Act gives courts the authority to “grant temporary and final 

injunctions on such terms as it may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of 

a copyright.” 17 U.S.C. § 502. A plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must 

demonstrate: “(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at 

Case 3:16-cv-02592-CAB-KSC Document 11 Filed 05/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 11
8

3:16-CV-02592-CAB (KSC)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, 

considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in 

equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent 

injunction.” eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).

Here, Plaintiffs have established that all four factors have been met and that a 

permanent injunction is warranted. First, Plaintiffs have established that they have suffered 

an irreparable injury because Defendants publicly performed the copyrights musical 

compositions of ASCAP’s members at The New Show Palace despite being warned of the 

need for a license and repeatedly refusing to get an ASCAP license. [Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 13-17, 

Doc. No. 10-1 ¶¶ 13-20, Doc. No. 10-2 ¶¶ 5-9.] See Apple Inc. v. Psystar Corp., 673 F. 

Supp. 2d 943, 948 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (“In run -of-the -mill copyright litigation . . . proof of 

such [irreparable] harm stemming from infringement – such as hard to business reputation 

and market share – should not be difficult to establish.”)

Monetary damages are insufficient because, absent an injunction, Plaintiffs would 

be forced to bring repeated lawsuits against Defendants to recover from future 

infringements and expend an undue amount of time and resources in order to enforce their 

rights. Although The New Show Palace closed in August 2016, Cortes continues to operate 

other nightclubs that are unlicensed by ASCAP within this District. [Doc. No. 10-1 ¶¶ 21-

22.] See Apple, Inc., 673 F. Supp. 2d at 950 (money damages are insufficient where they 

would not prevent defendant from continuing to infringe on copyrights). The balance of 

hardships also weights in favor of issuance of an injunction because without one, 

Defendants may continue their infringement and Plaintiffs will be irreparably harmed, 

whereas if Defendants wish to perform Plaintiffs' musical compositions they can simply 

obtain a license from ASCAP to do so. Finally, the public interest is best served “when 

the legitimate rights of copyright holders are vindicated. Id.

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief.

//

Case 3:16-cv-02592-CAB-KSC Document 11 Filed 05/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 8 of 11
9

3:16-CV-02592-CAB (KSC)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

B. Statutory Damages

Plaintiffs seeks $90,000 in statutory damages pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 504(c). The 

statute provides that copyright owners may elect to recover an award of statutory damages

“for all infringements involved in the action, with respect to any one work, for which any 

one infringer is liable individually, or for which any two or more infringers are liable jointly 

and severally, in a sum of not less than $750 or more than $30,000 as the court considers 

just.” 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1). 

Where the infringement was committed willfully, “the court may increase the award 

of statutory damages to a sum of not more than $150,000.” Id. § 504(c)(2). District courts 

have “wide discretion in determining the amount of statutory damages to be awarded, 

constrained only by the specified maxima and minima.” See Harris v. Emus Records 

Corp., 734 F.2d 1329, 1335 (9th Cir. 1984). The general rule of thumb is that courts 

typically award three times the amount of a properly purchased license for each 

infringement. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. JMN Restaurant Mgmt. Corp., Case No. 14-

cv-01190-JD, 2014 WL 5106421, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2014). 

Here, Plaintiffs claim that The New Show Palace would have paid more than 

$50,000 in licensing fees if it had purchased a license from ASCAP to perform its 

members’ copyrighted music between June 2011 and August 2016. [Doc. No. 10-1 ¶ 23.] 

The statutory award Plaintiffs seek, $90,000, or $22,500 per infringement, represents an 

amount that is slightly less than two times the amount of licensing fees that Defendants 

would have been required to pay had they obtained an ASCAP license and paid the 

associated fees. The Court concludes that $90,000 in statutory damages is reasonable.

C. Attorneys’ Fees

Plaintiffs seek attorneys’ fees and costs in this action. 

The Copyright Act provides that “[i]n any civil action under this title, the court in its 

discretion may allow the recovery of full costs by or against any party . . . [T]he court may 

also award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing part as part of the costs.” 17 U.S.C. 

§ 505. Factors considered by district courts include: “(1) the degree of success obtained; 

Case 3:16-cv-02592-CAB-KSC Document 11 Filed 05/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 9 of 11
10

3:16-CV-02592-CAB (KSC)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(2) frivolousness; (3) motivation; (4) the objective unreasonableness of the losing party’s 

factual and legal arguments; and (5) the need in particular circumstances, to advance 

considerations of compensation and deterrence.” Entm’t Research Grp., Inc. v. Genesis 

Creative Grp., Inc., 122 F.3d 1211, 1229 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 

510 U.S. 517, 534 n. 19 (1994)). 

Here, Defendants repeatedly refused to obtain an ASCAP license and have failed to 

appear in this action. [Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 15-18; Doc No. 10-1 ¶¶ 8, 13-15.] Moreover, 

Defendants “could have avoided liability by purchasing a valid license at any point” during 

June 2011 and August 2016. Range Road, 668 F.3d at 1155. Therefore, the Court 

concludes that considerations of compensation and deterrence support an award of 

attorneys’ fees and costs. 

So finding, the Court has review the declaration from Plaintiffs’ counsel of record 

and the attorneys’ invoices offered in support of their request. [Doc. No. 10-3.] Based on 

the supporting evidence and amount of work performed by Plaintiffs’ counsel, the Court 

finds that fees of $3,168.45 and costs of $400 fees are reasonable. 

IV. DISPOSITION

Consistent with the foregoing discussion Plaintiffs’ motion for default is 

GRANTED. In consideration of the fact that Mr. Cortes showed up in person at the 

undersigned’s courtroom on the noticed hearing date, the Court will delay entry of 

judgment for thirty (30) days. Defendants have until June 29, 2017, to file an appropriate 

motion to set aside this order. If Defendants do not file an appropriate motion, it is hereby 

ORDERED that, on June 30, 2017:

1. The Clerk of the Court shall enter JUDGMENT in favor of Plaintiff and against 

Defendants, jointly and severally, for $90,000 in statutory damages for copyright 

infringement; and attorneys’ fees of $3,168.45, and costs of $400; and

2. The Clerk shall enter an injunction restraining Juan M. Cortes and his respective 

agents, servants, employees, attorneys, and those persons or entities in active 

participation and concert with him, from publicly performing, or causing or 

Case 3:16-cv-02592-CAB-KSC Document 11 Filed 05/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 10 of

 11
11

3:16-CV-02592-CAB (KSC)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

permitting to be publicly performed, in the business establishment known as El 

Gran Patron Nightclub, located at 2638 Main Street, Suites A-C, in Chula Vista, 

California, or in any other place owned, controlled, managed, or operated by Mr. 

Cortes, any copyrighted musical composition in the repertory of Plaintiffs’ 

performing rights licensing organization, the American Society of Composers, 

Authors and Publishers (“ASCAP”), without first obtaining proper authorization 

to do so.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 30, 2017

Case 3:16-cv-02592-CAB-KSC Document 11 Filed 05/30/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 11 of

 11