Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01985/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01985-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983cv Civil Rights Act - Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights

---

1

15-cv-1985-BEN (BLM)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICKAIL MYLES,

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, by and 

through the SAN DIEGO COUNTY 

SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, a public 

entity; and DEPUTY J. BANKS, an 

individual,

Defendants.

Case No.: 15-cv-1985-BEN (BLM)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO SEAL DOCUMENTS 

SUBMITTED BY PLAINTIFF IN HIS 

OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT OR ALTERNATIVELY 

PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

Defendants have moved to seal certain exhibits submitted in support of Plaintiff’s 

Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. (Docket No. 81.) For the 

reasons explained below, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART

Defendants’ motion.

/ / /

Case 3:15-cv-01985-JAH-BLM Document 83 Filed 01/19/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 5
2

15-cv-1985-BEN (BLM)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

I. LAW REGARDING THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO JUDICIAL RECORDS

In Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978), the Supreme 

Court recognized “a general right to inspect and copy public records and documents, 

including judicial records and documents.” Id. at 597. The main reason for this general 

right is to accommodate “the citizen’s desire to keep a watchful eye on the workings of . . 

. government.” Id. at 598. However, the Supreme Court also stated that “the right to 

inspect and copy judicial records is not absolute.” Id. at 589. “Every court has 

supervisory power over its own records and files, and access has been denied where court 

files might have become a vehicle for improper purposes,” such as “to gratify private 

spite or promote public scandal,” or to serve as a source of “business information that 

might harm a litigant’s competitive standing.” Id. (internal citations omitted). 

Except for certain documents “traditionally kept secret,” federal courts begin a 

sealing analysis with “a strong presumption in favor of access to court records.” Foltz v. 

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003). A party seeking to 

seal a judicial record then bears the burden of overcoming this strong presumption by 

meeting the “compelling reasons” standard. Id. That is, the party must “articulate[ ] 

compelling reasons supported by specific factual findings,” id., that outweigh the general 

history of access and the public policies favoring disclosure, such as the “public interest 

in understanding the judicial process,” Hagestad v. Tragesser, 49 F.3d 1430, 1434 (9th 

Cir. 1995). “The mere fact that the production of records may lead to a litigant’s 

embarrassment, incrimination, or exposure to further litigation will not, without more, 

compel the court to seal its records.” Kamakana v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 

1172, 1179 (9th Cir. 2006). “Simply mentioning a general category of privilege, without 

further elaboration or any specific linkage with the documents, [also] does not satisfy the 

burden.” Id. at 1184. A party’s failure to meet the burden of articulating specific facts 

showing a “compelling reason” means that the “default posture of public access 

prevails.” Id. at 1182.

Case 3:15-cv-01985-JAH-BLM Document 83 Filed 01/19/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 5
3

15-cv-1985-BEN (BLM)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The “compelling reasons” standard applies fully to dispositive motions, such as the 

one at issue here. Id. at 1179. The “compelling reasons” standard is invoked even if the 

dispositive motion, or its attachments, were previously filed under seal or protective 

order. Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1136 (“[T]he presumption of access is not rebutted where . . . 

documents subject to a protective order are filed under seal as attachments to a 

dispositive motion. The . . . ‘compelling reasons’ standard continues to apply.”).

In turn, the court must “conscientiously balance[ ] the competing interests” of the 

public and the party who seeks to keep certain judicial records secret. Foltz, 331 F.3d at 

1135. After considering these interests, if the court decides to seal certain judicial 

records, it must “base its decision on a compelling reason and articulate the factual basis 

for its ruling, without relying on hypothesis or conjecture.” Hagestad, 49 F.3d at 1434 

(citing Valley Broadcasting Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 798 F.2d 1289, 1295 (9th Cir.1986)).

II. DISCUSSION

Defendants explain that the submitted exhibits are part of or related to internal 

affairs investigations by the County of San Diego’s Sheriff’s Department. The 

documents concern two investigations that occurred before the incident at issue in this 

lawsuit, and two investigations that occurred after the incident at issue here. These four 

investigations involved Defendant Deputy Banks, but none resulted in a finding of any 

wrongdoing by Banks. One document is a complaint filed against a non-party officer. 

Certain personal identifying information has been redacted in some of the documents. 

However, other personal identifying information remains, such as the names of officers 

involved and identifying information of the victims.

Defendants argue that these documents satisfy the compelling reasons standard for 

several reasons. First, the documents “contain sensitive information subject to the 

privacy rights of third parties and several juveniles.” (Mot. at 5). Second, the documents 

are subject to the official information and related privileges. Id. Third, the “public 

release of these limited number of reports could give a member of the public a false 

impression of Deputy Banks [and] . . . potential[ly] harm [his] reputation.” Id. 

Case 3:15-cv-01985-JAH-BLM Document 83 Filed 01/19/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 5
4

15-cv-1985-BEN (BLM)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The Court agrees that information about third parties’ personal identifying

information should not be disclosed to the public. However, the Court disagrees that 

Defendants’ second and third reasons justify sealing. Plaintiffs rely on California Penal 

Code section 832.7, California Government Code section 6254, and California Evidence 

Code section 1043 for the proposition that these statutes exempt the documents from 

disclosure. This action seeks damages for violations of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights 

and is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In a federal question case, “federal common law 

applies and a state statute, without more, does not shield disclosure in federal court or 

rebut the strong presumption in favor of public access to judicial records.” Gregory v. 

City of Vallejo, No. 2:13-cv-00320, 2014 WL 4187365, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2014) 

(holding that internal investigation documents should not be sealed entirely but 

permitting redaction of the names of third parties) (citing Garrett v. City & Cnty. of San 

Francisco, 818 F.2d 1515, 1519 n.6 (9th Cir. 1987)). The County still must show 

compelling reasons to seal the documents. See Doe v. City of San Diego, No. 12-cv-689-

MMA, 2014 WL 1921742, at *2-3 (S.D. Cal. May 14, 2014) (rejecting argument that 

state privileges automatically justify sealing). Furthermore, Kamakana explicitly rejected 

reputational harm as a basis to seal records. Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179.

Defendants have failed to demonstrate a compelling reason to shield the exhibits 

from disclosure in their entirety. Plaintiffs bring a Monell claim and allege that the 

County has a practice of ignoring serious use of force incidents by its deputies. The 

exhibits are relevant to this allegation. “Here, where the case involves allegations of 

police misconduct, the public has a vested interest ‘in assessing the truthfulness of 

allegations of official misconduct, and whether agencies that are responsible for 

investigating and adjudicating complaints of misconduct have acted properly and 

wisely.’” Macias v. Cleaver, No. 1:13-CV-01819-BAM, 2016 WL 3549257, at *4 (E.D. 

Cal. June 30, 2016) (quoting Welsh v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 887 F. Supp. 1293, 

1302 (N.D. Cal. 1995)). 

/ / /

Case 3:15-cv-01985-JAH-BLM Document 83 Filed 01/19/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 5
5

15-cv-1985-BEN (BLM)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The Court nevertheless concludes that certain information should be protected 

from public disclosure. Weighing the public interest involved against the individual 

privacy concerns, the Court finds that limited redactions will sufficiently protect the 

privacy interests of all involved. The redactions should include third parties’ names and 

personal identifying information, such as addresses, social security numbers, and driver’s 

license numbers. Redactions should include the names of victims, suspects, and 

witnesses, and where applicable, the names of their family members. However, the 

names of the law enforcement personnel involved in the incidents, either as alleged 

wrongdoers or investigators, should not be redacted. “An officer who is being 

interviewed during an internal investigation, or who is conducting such a probe, knows 

that what he says or writes could lead to criminal prosecution of other officers or to their 

termination from the force.” Macias, 2016 WL 3549257, at *6 n.6. However, for safety 

considerations, an officer’s home address, date of birth, social security number, and 

driver’s license number should be redacted. Furthermore, for privacy reasons, the Court 

will allow the redaction of medical and treatment information of Deputy Banks, including 

the medical provider’s identifying information, for the injuries he sustained in the 

incident described in Exhibit 19.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained, the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants’ 

motion to seal. Defendants should file the redacted exhibits within seven (7) days of the 

signature date of this Order. Defendants should file the redacted documents as a new 

entry under the civil event “redacted documents.”

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 19, 2017

Case 3:15-cv-01985-JAH-BLM Document 83 Filed 01/19/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 5