Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cv-00518/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cv-00518-14/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTHONY PENTON,

Plaintiff,

v.

HUBARD, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:11-cv-0518 GEB KJN P

ORDER AND FINDINGS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS

I. Introduction

Plaintiff is a state prisoner, proceeding without counsel. On February 27, 2015, the 

undersigned recommended that this action be dismissed based on plaintiff’s failure to timely file a 

proposed third amended complaint. Subsequently, plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration and 

later submitted his proposed third amended complaint. Good cause appearing, the February 27, 

2015 findings and recommendations are vacated. Because the recommendations are vacated, 

plaintiff’s request for extension of time to file objections and his second request for 

reconsideration of such recommendations are denied as moot. 

On August 26, 2014, plaintiff was ordered to show cause why this action should not be 

dismissed based on his failure to serve process on defendant Nunez, the sole remaining defendant 

herein. Plaintiff filed a response to the order to show cause and a request for equitable 

reconsideration in which he sought leave to amend. On March 13, 2015, plaintiff submitted his 

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proposed third amended complaint. As set forth more fully below, the undersigned recommends 

that plaintiff’s request for equitable reconsideration and to file a third amended complaint be 

denied, and that this action be dismissed based on plaintiff’s failure to timely serve process on 

defendant Nunez.

II. Plaintiff’s Request for Equitable Reconsideration

On November 10, 2014, plaintiff filed a request for “equitable reconsideration” in which 

he contends that, inter alia, he discovered new evidence indicating that a previously-dismissed 

party, defendant Johnson, the mail room supervisor, was responsible for any and all mail held in 

the mail room (ECF No. 64 at 4), and sought a court order allowing him to file an amended 

complaint. On November 25, 2014, the court noted that plaintiff failed to provide a proposed 

third amended complaint with his request for reconsideration, so the court was unable to evaluate 

plaintiff’s request to amend, and directed plaintiff to submit the proposed third amended 

complaint. (ECF No. 65.) Defendants filed an opposition to plaintiff’s request for

reconsideration. (ECF No. 66.) As discussed below, plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration should 

be denied.

A. Procedural History

Plaintiff’s original complaint was filed on February 24, 2011. The complaint was 

dismissed, and on August 12, 2011, plaintiff filed an amended complaint. Defendants filed a 

motion to dismiss, which was granted on September 13, 2012, and plaintiff was granted leave to 

file a second amended complaint. (ECF No. 40.) Subsequently, on November 15, 2012, plaintiff 

filed a second amended complaint naming only Nunez as a defendant. 

B. Rule 60(b)

Rule 60(b) provides, in pertinent part, 

(b) Grounds for Relief from a Final Judgment, Order, or 

Proceeding. On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a 

party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or 

proceeding for the following reasons:

. . . 

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(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable 

diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a 

new trial under Rule 59(b);

Fed. Rule 60(b)(2).1 However, “[a] motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable 

time -- and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) no more than a year after the entry of the judgment or 

order or the date of the proceeding. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c).

C. Discussion

Here, plaintiff’s amended complaint was dismissed on September 13, 2012, and plaintiff 

filed his request for reconsideration on November 10, 2014. As set forth above, motions for 

reconsideration under Rule 60(b)(2) must be filed within a reasonable time and no more than one 

year after entry of the order challenged. Thus, plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of the order 

dismissing plaintiff’s claims is untimely, because it was filed over two years after the order was 

entered. 

Moreover, as pointed out by defendants, the alleged “new” evidence submitted by plaintiff 

is not new to him; plaintiff discussed the materials in his August 12, 2011 amended complaint. 

(ECF No. 16 at 4.) 

Further, plaintiff provided no additional factual allegations to support a cognizable claim 

against defendant Johnson. Rather, plaintiff points to the Department Operations Manual which 

states that “[t]he Mailroom supervisor shall have direct supervision of the Mailroom (DOM) and 

all employees assigned to the Mailroom.” (ECF No. 64 at 23.) Plaintiff’s proposed claims 

against defendant Johnson are also based on his supervisorial role. (ECF No. 73 at 2.) As 

plaintiff was previously informed, supervisory personnel are not liable under § 1983 absent causal 

links between the individual and the alleged violation. (ECF No. 32 at 28.)

Finally, plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration should be denied based on the doctrine of 

law of the case. 

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 Plaintiff also sought reconsideration under Rule 59. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59. However, as noted by 

defendants, Rule 59 applies to motions for a new trial or motions to alter or amend a judgment. 

Id. This case has not gone to trial and no judgment has been entered. Thus, Rule 59 is not 

applicable.

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Under the doctrine of the law of the case, “a court will not reexamine an issue previously 

decided by the same or higher court in the same case.” Lucas Auto Eng’g, Inc. v. Bridgestone/ 

Firestone, Inc., 275 F.3d 762, 766 (9th Cir. 2001). The court may exercise its discretion to depart 

from the law of the case only if one of these five circumstances is present: (1) the first decision 

was clearly erroneous; (2) there has been an intervening change of law; (3) the evidence is 

substantially different; (4) other changed circumstances exist; or (5) a manifest injustice would 

otherwise result. United States v. Alexander, 106 F.3d 874, 876 (9th Cir. 1997). It is an abuse of 

discretion for a court to depart from the law of the case without one of these five requisite 

conditions. Thomas v. Bible, 983 F.2d 152, 155 (9th Cir. 1993).

Pursuant to the September 13, 2012 order, the court found that plaintiff failed to identify 

an actual injury to support his access to the courts claim, and dismissed his claims against 

defendants. (ECF No. 40, adopting in full ECF No. 33.) Contrary to plaintiff’s argument, the 

alleged “new” evidence as to defendant Johnson’s supervisory liability is not new to plaintiff, as 

pointed out by defendants, and is not substantially different to warrant revisiting the court’s prior 

ruling. To the extent plaintiff contends that Butler v. Curry, 528 F.3d 624 (9th Cir. 2008), was an 

intervening change of law requiring this court to depart from its prior ruling on the access to court 

claim, plaintiff is mistaken. On December 26, 2007, judgment was entered in plaintiff’s habeas 

action filed in the Southern District of California (ECF No. 33 at 20), but Butler did not issue 

until June 9, 2008. Thus, Butler cannot be fairly described as an intervening change in the law. 

Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that any circumstances require the court to depart from its prior 

ruling. 

D. Conclusion

For all of the above reasons, plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration should be denied.

III. Newly-Named Defendant

Plaintiff seeks leave to amend the complaint to add J.R. Bradford, a “Legal Technical 

Assistant,” as a defendant herein. (ECF No. 64 at 8.) Plaintiff claims that Bradford limited 

plaintiff’s priority legal user (“PLU”) access to the law library on August 13, 2008, which 

allegedly prevented plaintiff from filing a motion for reconsideration of the judgment in his 

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habeas action filed in the Southern District of California. (ECF Nos. 64 at 8; 73 at 13.) Plaintiff 

also claims that Bradford had a duty to provide plaintiff access to the law library prior to

plaintiff’s deadline for filing objections to the findings and recommendations in the Southern 

District of California habeas action. (ECF No. 73 at 13.) 

The Federal Rules provide that leave to amend pleadings “shall be freely given when 

justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). “[T]his policy is to be applied with extreme liberality.” 

Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Rose, 893 F.2d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing DCD 

Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1987)). Where, as here, a responsive 

pleading has been filed, the following factors are relevant in determining whether to permit a 

party to amend a pleading: (1) whether amendment would be futile; (2) bad faith; (3) undue 

delay; and (4) undue prejudice to the opposing party resulting from permitting the amendment.

AmericourceBergen Corp. v. Dialysist West, Inc., 465 F.3d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 2006). Futility 

alone can justify the denial of leave to amend. Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 

1995).

Of the factors the district court must consider, prejudice to the opposing party carries the 

greatest weight. DCD Programs, 833 F.2d at 186-87. Undue delay, without more, is insufficient 

to justify denying a motion to amend. DCD Programs, 833 F.3d at 186. The futility of 

amendment, on the other hand, can justify denial of leave to amend even in the absence of 

prejudice. Bonin, 59 F.3d at 845 (citing Outdoor Systems, Inc. v. City of Mesa, 997 F.2d 604, 

614 (9th Cir. 1993)); Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1298 (9th Cir. 1998) 

(“Although there is a general rule that parties are allowed to amend their pleadings, it does not 

extend to cases in which any amendment would be an exercise in futility, or where the amended 

complaint would also be subject to dismissal . . .”) (citations omitted). 

Here, plaintiff provided a copy of the PLU request signed by plaintiff on August 11, 2008, 

and denied by Bradford on August 13, 2008. (ECF Nos. 64 at 83.) Thus, plaintiff was aware of 

this denial in 2008, yet failed to name Bradford as a defendant in any of his prior complaints. 

Similarly, plaintiff was aware of Bradford’s actions prior to the deadline for filing objections in 

the Southern District of California. The instant action has been pending for over four years. 

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Thus, plaintiff has unduly delayed naming Bradford as a defendant herein, and such delay would 

prejudice Bradford, who to date has no notice of an alleged claim against her. 

Importantly, allowing plaintiff to amend the complaint to include a claim against Bradford 

is also futile because such claim is intertwined with plaintiff’s access to the court claim which this 

court previously dismissed based on plaintiff’s failure to demonstrate actual injury. Thus, such 

claim is barred by the doctrine of law of the case, and any amendment would be futile. 

Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint to add Bradford as a defendant 

should be denied.

IV. Resolution of this Action

As set forth above, the operative second amended complaint, plaintiff named only S. 

Nunez as a defendant. (ECF No. 44.) On August 16, 2014, plaintiff was directed to show cause 

why this action should not be dismissed based on plaintiff’s failure to timely accomplish service 

of process on defendant Nunez. (ECF No. 61.) In his 109 page response to the order to show 

cause, plaintiff sought the equitable reconsideration addressed above, but failed to address the 

issue of service of process on defendant Nunez. Rather, plaintiff asked the court to hold the show 

cause order in abeyance pending resolution of his request for reconsideration. However, because 

of the numerous delays in connection with service of process on defendant Nunez, the 

undersigned declines to hold the show cause order in abeyance. Of course, plaintiff may file 

objections to the findings and recommendations.

Because service of process on the sole remaining defendant S. Nunez has been 

unreasonably delayed, in violation of Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the 

undersigned recommends that this action be dismissed without prejudice. 

A. Background

The Marshal’s first attempt at service of process was returned unexecuted on October 10, 

2013. (ECF No. 51.) By order filed November 27, 2013, plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery 

of defendant Nunez’s address was partially granted, and the Supervising Deputy Attorney 

General was asked to take all steps necessary to enlist the assistance from the California 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) to obtain defendant Nunez’s current 

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address, and to provide such information to the U.S. Marshal. (ECF No. 53.) On December 17, 

2013, the Supervising Deputy Attorney General filed a notice of compliance. (ECF No. 54.) On 

January 17, 2014, service of process on defendant Nunez was again returned unexecuted. (ECF 

No. 55.) The returned service was marked return to sender, wrong address. (ECF No. 55.) On 

February 13, 2014, the court again asked the Supervising Deputy Attorney General to take all 

steps necessary to locate defendant Nunez’s current address and notify the U.S. Marshal. (ECF 

No. 56.) The Marshal’s office confirmed that service of process at three different addresses was 

ineffective. 

Plaintiff was cautioned that if such address could not be located through the CDCR, this 

action must be dismissed based on a failure to comply with Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure. (ECF No. 56 at 2 n.1.) Plaintiff was reminded that he could seek such 

information through the California Public Records Act, Calif. Gov’t. Code §§ 6250, et seq., or 

other means available to plaintiff. (ECF No. 56 at 2 n.1.) 

On March 13, 2014, the Supervising Deputy Attorney General confirmed that the address 

previously provided to the U.S. Marshal was the last known address for defendant Nunez. (ECF 

No. 57.) 

On March 26, 2014, the court informed plaintiff that the last known address for defendant 

Nunez had been provided to the U.S. Marshal, but that such service was returned unexecuted. 

(ECF No. 58.) Accordingly, it was incumbent upon plaintiff to provide additional information to 

serve defendant Nunez, and plaintiff was cautioned that failure to provide such information would 

result in the dismissal of this action. (ECF No. 58 at 2.)

On August 16, 2014, plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery from the CSP-Sac litigation 

coordinator was denied. (ECF No. 61 at 4.) 

B. Legal Standards 

Because plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, he is responsible for providing the court 

with current addresses for all defendants so that service can be accomplished. See Walker v.

Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1422 (9th Cir. 1994), abrogated on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 

515 U.S. 472 (1995). Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that:

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[i]f a defendant is not served within 120 days after the complaint is 

filed, the court -- on motion or on its own after notice to the 

plaintiff -- must dismiss the action without prejudice against that 

defendant or order that service be made within a specified time. But

if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the court must 

extend the time for service for an appropriate period.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m).

In cases involving a plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis, a United States Marshal, upon 

order of the court, shall serve the summons and the complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3); 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(d). “‘[A]n incarcerated pro se plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis is entitled to rely on 

the U.S. Marshal for service of the summons and complaint and . . . should not be penalized by 

having his action dismissed for failure to effect service where the U.S. Marshal or the court clerk 

has failed to perform his duties.’” Walker, 14 F.3d at 1422 (quoting Puett v. Blandford, 912 F.2d 

270, 275 (9th Cir. 1990). “So long as the prisoner has furnished the information necessary to 

identify the defendant, the marshal’s failure to effect service is ‘automatically good cause. . . .’” 

Walker, 14 F.3d at 1422 (quoting Sellers v. United States, 902 F.2d 598, 603 (7th Cir. 1990)). 

Thus, while an incarcerated pro se litigant proceeding in forma pauperis is entitled to rely on the 

service of the summons and complaint by the U.S. Marshal, the U.S. Marshal can attempt service

only after being provided with the necessary information to effectuate service. Puett, 912 F.2d at

275. However, where a pro se plaintiff fails to provide the Marshal with accurate and sufficient 

information to effect service of the summons and complaint, the court’s sua sponte dismissal of 

the unserved defendants is appropriate. Walker, 14 F.3d at 1421-22.

C. Discussion

Plaintiff was required to serve defendant Nunez within 120 days after the second amended 

complaint was filed on November 15, 2012. On June 25, 2013, the court issued its screening 

order. The U.S. Marshal was first directed to serve process on defendant Nunez on August 2, 

2013. (ECF No. 48.) On two separate occasions, November 27, 2013, and February 13, 2014, 

plaintiff was granted ninety day extensions of time in which to serve defendant Nunez. It has 

now been over a year since the court issued its screening order, and plaintiff has not accomplished 

service of process on defendant Nunez, despite the court’s efforts to assist him. In light of the 

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foregoing, the undersigned recommends that this action should be dismissed without prejudice

based on plaintiff’s failure to serve process on sole remaining defendant Nunez pursuant to Rule 

4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

V. Conclusion

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The February 27, 2015 findings and recommendations (ECF No. 71) are vacated; 

2. Plaintiff’s request for extension of time (ECF No. 74) is denied as moot; 

3. Plaintiff’s second request for reconsideration (ECF No. 72) is denied as moot; and

IT IS RECOMMENDED that:

1. Plaintiff’s request for reconsideration (ECF No. 64) be denied;

2. Plaintiff’s motion to amend (ECF No. 64) be denied; and

3. This action be dismissed without prejudice based on plaintiff’s failure to serve 

defendant S. Nunez pursuant to Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the 

objections shall be filed and served within fourteen days after service of the objections. The 

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to 

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Dated: May 12, 2015

/pent0518.57

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