Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-09-99018/USCOURTS-ca9-09-99018-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JAMES ERIN MCKINNEY,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

CHARLES L. RYAN,

Respondent-Appellee.

No. 09-99018

D.C. No.

2:03-cv-00774-DGC

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

David G. Campbell, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted En Banc

December 15, 2014—Pasadena, California

Filed December 29, 2015

Before: Sidney R. Thomas, Chief Judge, and Alex

Kozinski, Kim McLane Wardlaw, William A. Fletcher,

Ronald M. Gould, Marsha S. Berzon, Richard C. Tallman,

Consuelo M. Callahan, Carlos T. Bea, Morgan Christen

and Jacqueline H. Nguyen, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge W. Fletcher;

Dissent by Judge Bea

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2 MCKINNEY V. RYAN

SUMMARY*

Habeas Corpus

The en banc court reversed the district court’s judgment

denying Arizona state prisoner James McKinney’s petition

for a writ of habeas corpus, remanded with instructions to

grant the writ with respect to McKinney’s death sentence

unless the state, within a reasonable time, corrects the

constitutional error in his death sentence or vacates the

sentence and imposes a lesser sentence consistent with law.

The en banc court overruled Schad v. Ryan, 671 F.3d 708

(9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam), which prohibited an assumption

of unconstitutionality under Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S.

104 (1982), absent a clear indication in the record that the

state court applied the wrong standard.

The en banc court held that the Arizona Supreme Court

applied an unconstitutional causal nexus test to McKinney’s

post-traumatic stress disorder—refusing, as a matter of law,

to treat it as a relevant nonstatutory mitigating factor—

contrary to clearly established federal law as established in

Eddings.

The en banc court held that Eddings error is not structural

error, but that the Eddings error in this case had a substantial

and injurious effect on McKinney’s sentence within the

meaning of Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993). 

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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MCKINNEY V. RYAN 3

Judge Bea, joined by Judges Kozinski, Gould, Tallman,

and Callahan, dissented. He wrote that the majority ignores

Supreme Court precedent, implicitly overrules this court’s

precedent, replaces AEDPA’s deferential standard of review

with an impermissible de novo standard, misstates the record,

wrongly smears the Arizona Supreme Court, calls into

question every death sentence imposed in Arizona between

1989 and 2005 and this court’s cases that have denied habeas

relief as to those sentences, and brushes by the facts of

McKinney’s gruesome crimes to find that the error the

majority has manufactured was prejudicial.

COUNSEL

Ivan K. Mathew (argued) and Susan Turner Mathew, Mathew

and Associates, Phoenix, Arizona, for Petitioner-Appellant.

Jon Anderson (argued) and Jeffrey A. Zick, Assistant

Attorneys General, Terry Goddard, Attorney General, and

Kent Cattani, Chief Counsel, Arizona Attorney General’s

Office, Criminal Appeals/Capital Litigation Section, Phoenix,

Arizona, for Respondent-Appellee.

Michael L. Burke and Robin Konrad, Assistant Federal

Public Defenders, Jon M. Sands, Federal Public Defender,

Federal Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix, Arizona, for

Amicus Curiae Office of the Federal Public Defender.

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4 MCKINNEY V. RYAN

OPINION

W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge:

Petitioner James McKinney was sentenced to death, and

his sentence was affirmed by the Arizona Supreme Court on

de novo review in 1996. State v. McKinney, 917 P.2d 1214

(Ariz. 1996). A three-judge panel of this court denied

McKinney’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. McKinney

v. Ryan, 730 F.3d 903 (9th Cir. 2013). We granted rehearing

en banc and withdrew our three-judge panel opinion. 

McKinney v. Ryan, 745 F.3d 963 (9th Cir. 2014). In his

federal habeas petition, McKinney challenges both his

conviction and sentence. We agree with the decision of the

three-judge panel with respect to McKinney’s challenges to

his conviction, and to that extent we incorporate the decision

of the panel. We address in this opinion only McKinney’s

challenge to his death sentence. For the reasons that follow,

we grant the petition with respect to his sentence.

In Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114 (1982), the

Supreme Court held under the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments that a sentencer in a capital case may not

“refuse to consider, as a matter of law, any relevant

mitigating evidence” offered by the defendant. (Emphasis in

original.) Oklahoma state courts had refused, as a matter of

law, to treat as relevant mitigating evidence a capital

defendant’s background of family violence, including

beatings by his father, on the ground that “it did not tend to

provide a legal excuse from criminal responsibility.” Id. at

113. The Supreme Court reversed. Recognizing the special

character of the death penalty, the Court held that evidence of

Eddings’s background of family violence had to be treated as

relevant evidence in determining whether to put him to death. 

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MCKINNEY V. RYAN 5

The Court wrote, “The sentencer, and the Court of Criminal

Appeals on review, may determine the weight to be given

relevant mitigating evidence. But they may not give it no

weight by excluding such evidence from their consideration.”

Id. at 114–15.

At all times relevant to this case, Arizona law provided

for two kinds of mitigation factors in capital sentencing —

statutory and nonstatutory. A nonexhaustive list of five

statutory mitigating factors was provided in Ariz. Rev. Stat.

Ann. § 13-703(G). Arizona case law applied, in addition,

nonstatutory mitigating factors, such as a difficult family

background or a mental condition not severe enough to

qualify as a statutory mitigating factor.

For a period of a little over 15 years in capital cases, in

clear violation of Eddings, the Supreme Court of Arizona

articulated and applied a “causal nexus” test for nonstatutory

mitigation that forbade as a matter of law giving weight to

mitigating evidence, such as family background or mental

condition, unless the background or mental condition was

causally connected to the crime. In State v. Wallace,

773 P.2d 983, 986 (Ariz. 1989), decided seven years after

Eddings and four years before petitioner was sentenced, the

Arizona Supreme Court wrote, “A difficult family

background, in and of itself, is not a mitigating

circumstance. . . . A difficult family background is a relevant

mitigating circumstance if a defendant can show that

something in that background had an effect or impact on his

behavior that was beyond the defendant’s control.” In State

v. Ross, 886 P.2d 1354, 1363 (Ariz. 1994), decided one year

after petitioner was sentenced but before his sentence was

affirmed on appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court wrote, citing

the precise page in Wallace, “A difficult family background

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6 MCKINNEY V. RYAN

is not a relevant mitigating circumstance unless ‘a defendant

can show that something in that background had an effect or

impact on his behavior that was beyond the defendant’s

control.’ State v. Wallace, . . . 773 P.2d 983, 986 (1989).”

Two years after its decision in Ross, the Arizona Supreme

Court affirmed McKinney’s death sentence. In addressing

the potential mitigating effect of his mental condition, the

Court wrote that McKinney’s PTSD had no causal nexus to

his crimes. If anything, the Court wrote, “the effects of [his]

childhood, specifically the diagnosis of post-traumatic stress

disorder (PTSD)” would have influenced him not to commit

the crimes. McKinney, 917 P.2d at 1234. The Court

concluded its analysis of McKinney’s PTSD, citing the

precise page in Ross on which it had articulated the causal

nexus test for nonstatutory mitigation: “[A] difficult family

background, including childhood abuse, does not necessarily

have substantial mitigating weight absent a showing that it

significantly affected or impacted the defendant’s ability to

perceive, comprehend, or control his actions. See State v.

Ross, . . . 886 P.2d 1354, 1363 (1994).” State v. McKinney,

917 P.2d 1214, 1234 (Ariz. 1996).

For just over fifteen years, the Arizona Supreme Court

consistently articulated and applied its causal nexus test, in

accordance with its strong view of stare decisis. See Young

v. Beck, 251 P.3d 380, 385 (Ariz. 2011) (“[S]tare decisis

commands that ‘precedents of the court should not be lightly

overruled,’ and mere disagreement with those who preceded

us is not enough.” (quoting State v. Salazar, 173 Ariz. 399,

416 . . . (1992))); State ex re. Woods v. Cohen, 844 P.2d 1147,

1148 (Ariz. 1993) (referring to “a healthy respect for stare

decisis”); State v. Williker, 491 P.2d 465, 468 (Ariz. 1971)

(referring to “a proper respect for the theory of stare

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MCKINNEY V. RYAN 7

decisis”); White v. Bateman, 358 P.2d 712, 714 (Ariz. 1961)

(prior case law “should be adhered to unless the reasons of

the prior decisions have ceased to exist or the prior decision

was clearly erroneous or manifestly wrong”).

The case before us is unusual. In federal habeas cases

under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

(“AEDPA”), we apply a “presumption that state courts know

and follow the law” and accordingly give state-court

decisions “the benefit of the doubt.” Woodford v. Visciotti,

537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002). If the Arizona Supreme Court during

the relevant period had been inconsistent in its articulation

and application of its unconstitutional “causal nexus” test for

nonstatutory mitigation, we would give the Court the benefit

of the doubt and would accord it the presumption that it knew

and followed governing federal law. But the Arizona

Supreme Court’s consistent articulation and application of its

causal nexus test, and its citation in McKinney’s case to the

specific page of Ross on which it articulated the test, make

such a course impossible. While Visciotti’s presumption is

appropriate in the great majority of habeas cases, the

presumption is rebutted here where we know, based on its

own words, that the Arizona Supreme Court did not “know

and follow” federal law.

The precise question before us is whether the Arizona

Supreme Court applied its unconstitutional “causal nexus”

test in affirming McKinney’s death sentence on de novo

review. We must decide whether, under AEDPA, the

Arizona Supreme Court refused to give weight, as a matter of

law, to McKinney’s nonstatutory mitigation evidence of

PTSD, “contrary to . . . clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). For the reasons that follow, we

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8 MCKINNEY V. RYAN

conclude that it did. We therefore grant the writ with respect

to petitioner’s sentence.

I. McKinney’s Crimes, Conviction, and Sentence

James McKinney and his older half brother, Charles

Michael Hedlund, committed two burglaries in February and

March of 1991. One person was shot and killed during each

of the burglaries. At the time of the crimes, McKinney was

23 years old. Hedlund was 26 years old. McKinney and

Hedlund had learned about potential burglary targets from

their half brother, Christopher Morris, and a friend, Joe

Lemon, who had suggested Christine Mertens’s home as a

target. The four of them attempted to burglarize Ms.

Mertens’s home on February28, 1991, but Ms. Mertens came

home and they left to avoid detection. The three half

brothers, McKinney, Hedlund, and Morris, then committed

two burglaries at other locations the following day.

McKinney, Hedlund, and possibly Morris went back to

Ms. Mertens’s house a little over a week later, on March 9,

1991. This time, Ms. Mertens was already at home. She was

beaten and stabbed by one or more of the burglars. One of

the burglars held Ms. Mertens down on the floor and shot her

in the back of the head with a handgun, covering the gun with

a pillow. (Morris turned state’s evidence and testified against

McKinney and Hedlund. He testified that he was at work at

Burger King on the night of the Mertens murder, but Burger

King had no record of him working that night.) McKinney

and Hedlund later tried unsuccessfully to sell the gun. They

ultimately disposed of the gun by burying it in the desert. 

Not quite two weeks later, on March 22, 1991, McKinney and

Hedlund burglarized the home of Jim McClain, from whom

Hedlund had bought a car several months earlier. Mr.

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MCKINNEY V. RYAN 9

McClain was asleep in the bedroom. He was shot in the back

of the head by either McKinney or Hedlund. The bullet was

consistent with having been fired from a sawed-off rifle

owned by Hedlund.

McKinney and Hedlund were tried together before dual

juries for the burglaries and homicides. McKinney’s jury

found him guilty of two first degree murders. Hedlund’s jury

found him guilty of second degree murder of Ms. Mertens

and first degree murder of Mr. McClain. On July 23, 1993,

the trial judge sentenced McKinney to death. The Supreme

Court decision holding judge-sentencing in capital cases

unconstitutional was nine years in the future. See Ring v.

Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). In the last reasoned state court

decision, the Arizona Supreme Court, reviewing de novo,

affirmed McKinney’s conviction and sentence in 1996. 

McKinney, 917 P.2d 1214. We describe the Arizona Supreme

Court’s sentencing decision at greater length below.

McKinney filed for state post-conviction relief. His petition

was denied by the trial court without an evidentiary hearing. 

The Arizona Supreme Court then summarily denied his

petition for review.

II. McKinney’s Family Background

McKinney suffered a traumatic childhood characterized

by severe physical and psychological abuse, both by his

biological parents, James McKinney, Sr. (“James”) and

Bobbie Jean Morris, and by his stepmother, Shirley Crow

McKinney. At McKinney’s sentencing hearing, his aunt (his

father’s sister), Susan Sesate, and his younger sister, Diana

McKinney, described the abuse.

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10 MCKINNEY V. RYAN

Susan and Diana both testified about the squalid

conditions in which McKinney lived as a child. Susan

testified that while McKinney’s parents, James and Bobbie,

were still married, their house was filthy. She testified,

“[W]hen you walked through the door, it wasn’t nothing to

see, you know, diapers full of — all around. . . . Everything

stunk.” James was an alcoholic, and Bobbie left him when

McKinney was about three years old.

When Bobbie left James, she took with her their three

children, Diana, Donna, and McKinney. Susan testified, “She

ran with them. . . . She ran to a lot of different states. I know

she went to California first and Kansas twice. California

again. I know she went through Texas, New Mexico.” James

pursued and brought Bobbie and the children back to

Arizona, but “she would run again.” “As soon as he brought

her back, within a week she’d be gone again to Kansas. She

had the kids there.” James told McKinney’s presentence

investigator that Bobbie had “kidnapped” the children, and

that he took them back “after he found out they were being

physically abused and were being locked in closets, hungry

and sick.”

Bobbie eventually left James for good, and he got

remarried. James got custody of the children and brought

them to Arizona to live with him and his new wife Shirley. 

The conditions in the house with James and Shirley were

even worse than they had been with James and Bobbie. 

Susan, a teenager at the time, lived with her mother (who was

also James’s mother) in a house nearby. She was at the

McKinney house frequently. Susan testified that the house

“was gross. It was gross. I mean, the house was filthy, the

kids were filthy, they never had clean clothes that I ever saw

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MCKINNEY V. RYAN 11

them in. If they had clothes, they were ill-fitting clothes. I

mean, it was disgusting.”

McKinney, his two sisters, and his older half brother

Hedlund (Bobbie’s son by a different father) shared one small

bedroom. Shirley’s daughter had a bedroom to herself. 

Susan testified that the floor of the four children’s bedroom

was always covered with dirty clothes because there were no

bureaus and no hangers for the closet. There were no sheets

on the beds. The children had to share their room with

animals Shirley brought home, including dogs, cats, a goat,

snakes, and a monkey. The animals regularly defecated and

urinated in the bedroom. Diana testified that the adults never

cleaned the bedroom.

Diana was 18 months old when James took the children

from Bobbie and brought them to the Arizona house he

shared with his new wife Shirley. Donna was three,

McKinney was four or five, and Hedlund was seven. Diana

and Susan testified that the four children were responsible for

all general household cooking and cleaning, including

cleaning up the animal feces and urine that were “all over”

the house; feeding farm animals, including cows, pigs, and

goats; taking care of James’s hunting dogs; doing all of their

own laundry; and sometimes doing Shirley’s laundry. Diana

testified that she and the other children cleaned the house the

best they could, but “the house still smell[ed]” all the time. 

Susan testified, “It was nothing to see James [Jr.] and Michael

[Hedlund] standing on chairs at the stove cooking or having

to stand on chairs to do the dishes” because they were too

small to reach the stove and the counters. Shirley’s daughter

did not have to do any chores. Shirley kept the children from

attending school as punishment for various supposed

infractions. Susan testified that on one occasion McKinney

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12 MCKINNEY V. RYAN

sat on the porch for three days while the others went to

school. When Susan’s mother (McKinney’s grandmother)

sent Susan over to investigate, McKinney told her that Shirley

would not allow him to go to school unless Bobbie bought

him a new pair of tennis shoes. Susan’s mother bought

McKinney shoes so he could return to school.

The children never had regular baths and often had dirty

hair. When the children went to school, they wore dirty

clothes that reeked of urine from being on the bedroom floor

with the animals. The children’s school sent letters home

about their appearance and odor. They were regularly

harassed and teased by other children. McKinney was

frequently suspended for fighting on the school bus because

other children made fun of his appearance and odor.

The four children suffered regular and extensive physical,

verbal, and emotional abuse. Minor infractions of Shirley’s

rules, such as not doing the dishes properly, resulted in

beatings. Diana testified that she could not recall a time when

none of the children had a welt or bruise inflicted by Shirley. 

Susan testified, “They had bruises all the time. It was hard to

tell what were new bruises and what weren’t.” Shirley used

plastic switches, cords, belts, and a hose to hit them—

“anything she could get in her hands.” Diana estimated that

McKinney was beaten two to three times a week. Susan

testified to repeated serious beatings, including one particular

beating with

[a] water hose. It was about a yard long like

that (indicating), and she had like a pocket

knife, and she snipped the hose and she went

after him. She beat him on the back of the

head, down his back, all over his legs, his

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MCKINNEY V. RYAN 13

arms; anything that moved, she hit him. . . . 

He had bruises for weeks after that all over

him. . . . Michael Hedlund tried to stop her. 

He grabbed her arm, and so she swung back

and hit him across the side of the face and

bruised his face.

Hedlund left the house to live with his mother when he

was 14 years old. This left McKinney, approximately age 11,

as the only boy and the oldest of the three remaining children. 

McKinney was too young to protect either himself or his

younger sisters. Diana, the younger of the two girls,

described their childhood experience as “horrible. It was

scary. It seems like we were all stressed out wondering when

the next time we were getting beat; wondering when we were

going to eat next.”

Shirley’s physical abuse was accompanied by verbal and

emotional abuse. Diana testified that Shirley regularly yelled

at them, telling them that they were “[s]tupid, ugly, [and] not

worth anything.” Diana testified that Shirley showed

consistent favoritism toward her own daughter, while treating

her stepchildren as the “four bad kids.”

Shirley often locked the children out of the house for

hours without food and, sometimes, water. There was a hose

in the yard, but Susan testified that if Shirley “was really

angry at them, they couldn’t turn the water faucet on outside

and even get a drink of water, and it would be 110 degrees

outside.” Susan remembered one occasion seeing the four

children outside on a hot Arizona summer day, clustered in

the shade of an eave of the house. None of the children had

shoes; the girls were wearing only underwear, and the boys

were wearing cutoff shorts with no shirts. When Susan and

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14 MCKINNEY V. RYAN

her mother returned to their house four hours later in the

middle of the afternoon, the children were still there, their

faces “beet red.” They told her that they were not allowed to

get any water and could not come back inside until their

father got home, when he would “punish them.” On another

occasion, Susan testified, Shirley “pick[ed] James [Jr.] up by

the scruff of the neck” and put him out on the porch with no

shoes or coat during the winter, when the frozen grass “would

crunch under your feet.”

Shirley spent most of her time at home, while James was

generally absent. When he was home, James drank heavily. 

Susan testified that James’s mother confronted him about

Shirley’s physical abuse of the children, but he told her to

“keep her nose out of his business.” Susan testified to an

incident in which McKinney, who was in first or second

grade at the time, had stolen a lunch at school because Shirley

and James had not given him any lunch money. McKinney

was suspended for several days. James told his son that “he

wasn’t going to punish him for stealing lunch; he was going

to punish him for getting caught.”

By age nine or 10, McKinney had become distant, quiet

and withdrawn. He avoided other children. He began using

alcohol and marijuana at age 11. He dropped out of school in

the seventh grade. At about this time, he began running away

from home. Diana testified that McKinney ran away four or

five times. Susan remembered one incident in which, at age

11, McKinney showed up unannounced at her house in

Gilbert, Arizona after traveling alone from Oklahoma, where

the family had moved. McKinney had taken a bus as far as

Flagstaff, but did not have enough money to go farther. He

spent the next two days hitchhiking the rest of the way to

Susan’s house. McKinney’s arm, shoulder, and face were

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MCKINNEY V. RYAN 15

bruised; he told Susan he had gotten into a fight with Shirley. 

Susan called his mother Bobbie on the telephone to tell her

that McKinney was at her house and that he was dirty and

tired, and hadn’t eaten in days. Bobbie did not come over to

pick him up. She called the sheriff instead, who picked up

McKinney and put him in juvenile detention.

III. McKinney’s Post-traumatic Stress Disorder

Dr. Mickey McMahon, a psychologist, made a formal

diagnosis of PTSD resulting from the horrific childhood

McKinney had suffered. Before arriving at his diagnosis, Dr.

McMahon had spent eight and a half hours with McKinney,

talking to him and administering a battery of tests. He had

also spoken with Susan for an hour and with Diana for half an

hour. Finally, Dr. McMahon had listened to Susan and

Diana’s testimony in court before providing his own

testimony. When asked, “[D]o you have any doubts about

your diagnosis of James McKinney having Post-traumatic

Stress Disorder?” Dr. McMahon answered, “No. None.”

Dr. McMahon testified that his diagnosis of PTSD rested

not only on the abuse that McKinney himself had suffered. 

He testified, “We know in research that witnessing can be

even more damaging than actually being the recipient of

abuse. . . . [T]here is a helplessness that is involved when

you’re witnessing . . . violence and you’re too small to do

anything about it.” When asked whether “violence upon his

sisters and brother would be . . . more traumatic to him

possibly than himself,” Dr. McMahon answered, “Yes.” Dr.

McMahon testified that his interview with McKinney “had

gone into great depth about him witnessing Dian[]a being

abused and beaten by her stepmother.”

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16 MCKINNEY V. RYAN

Dr. McMahon testified that McKinney’s PTSD was

characterized by “flashbacks,” by “some sort of voidness,

numbing, withdrawing,” and by “substance abuse.” The

substances were “generally downers, opiates in prison,

alcohol, marijuana.” Dr. McMahon characterized McKinney

as “basically passive,” “quite submissive,” and “susceptible

to manipulation, exploitation.” “He can be emotionally

overwhelmed by environmental stress and act in poorlyjudged ways just to [re]duce the internal emotional turmoil.”

“He does not present [i]n the testing [as someone] who is . . .

manipulative, sensation- or thrill-seeking, and we know often

that people that get involved with violent kinds of crime are

thrill-seeking sociopaths. These results do not look like that. 

It looks the opposite of that, since these tests are pretty much

consistent. He is a lo[]ner; depressed.”

When asked whether someone with PTSD would “suffer

. . . constantly” from it, or whether it “may rear its head under

certain situations,” Dr. McMahon responded thatfor someone

with PTSD “there is the potential for the trauma to be retriggered, if things happen that are similar to what happened

when you’re originally traumatized.” When asked about the

Mertens burglary and murder, Dr. McMahon testified that if

an altercation had taken place between Ms. Mertens and

another person (not necessarily McKinney), it could “very

possib[ly]” have “re-triggered”McKinney’s trauma and could

have produced “diminished capacity.”

When asked about the McClain burglary and murder, Dr.

McMahon testified that it would have been very

uncharacteristic of McKinney to have shot a sleeping person. 

“Mr. McKinney’s test[] results, in the more than eight hours

I spent with him, did not indicate that he was that thrillseeking kind of, execution-kind of person. He’d rather

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MCKINNEY V. RYAN 17

withdraw from the situation.” Shooting a sleeping person

“would be the exact opposite of what I would expect from

Mr. McKinney.”

Dr. Steven Gray, also a psychologist, testified for the

prosecution. In preparation for his testimony, Dr. Gray had

reviewed two presentence reports, a report prepared by Dr.

McMahon, the raw data and results of tests performed by Dr.

McMahon, and McKinney’s school records. He had also

interviewed McKinney in jail, in the company of one of his

lawyers, for “an hour, hour-and-a-half.” Dr. Gray had not

spoken with Susan, Diana, or other family members. Dr.

Gray testified, “I don’t think there’s enough evidence or

diagnostic materials or work that’s been done to conclusively

diagnose [McKinney] as having Post-traumatic Stress

Disorder.” Dr. Gray’s “tentative or provisional diagnosis”

was “Antisocial Personality Disorder.”

IV. Sentencing

The verdict forms submitted to McKinney’s and

Hedlund’s juries asked only for general verdicts. The

prosecutor had argued to the juries that they could find

McKinney and Hedlund guilty of first degree murder either

because they were guilty of actually killing Ms. Mertens or

Mr. McClain, or because they were guilty of felony murder. 

At McKinney’s sentencing hearing, the judge indicated that

he believed that McKinney had shot Ms. Mertens and that

Hedlund had shot Mr. McClain. But the judge recognized

that the jury had not specifically found that McKinney had

shot Ms. Mertens. The judge therefore relied on Enmund v.

Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982), and Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S.

137 (1987), to conclude that even if McKinney had not killed

either Ms. Mertens or Mr. McClain, his involvement in the

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18 MCKINNEY V. RYAN

crimes leading up their murders nevertheless made him

death-eligible. He said with respect to the murder of Ms.

Mertens, “[E]ven if [Helund] had committed the homicide of

Mrs. Mertens, [McKinney] knew that [Hedlund] at the time

of entering the McClain residence was capable of killing.”

When McKinney was sentenced, Arizona provided by

statute a nonexhaustive list of five specific mitigating factors. 

See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703(G) (1993). Among the

statutory mitigators was a modified form of diminished

capacity, contained in § 13-703(G)(1): “The defendant’s

capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to

conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was

significantly impaired, but not so impaired as to constitute a

defense to prosecution.”

Arizona law also provided for nonstatutory mitigating

factors, such as family background or mental conditions that

did not rise to the level of impairment specified in § 13-

703(G)(1). For a little over fifteen years, from the late 1980s

until 2006, Arizona Supreme Court applied a “causal nexus”

test to nonstatutory mitigation factors. Under this test,

evidence of a difficult family background or mental disorder

was not in and of itself a relevant nonstatutory mitigating

factor. As a matter of Arizona law, such evidence was

relevant for nonstatutory mitigation only if it had a causal

effect on the defendant’s behavior in the commission of the

crime at issue. Application of the causal nexus test to

nonstatutory mitigation factors violated Eddings, for it

resulted in Arizona courts being entirely forbidden, as a

matter of state law, to treat as a mitigating factor a family

background or a mental condition that was not causally

connected to a defendant’s crime.

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MCKINNEY V. RYAN 19

The trial judge sentenced McKinney to death. The judge

weighed what he concluded were legally relevant aggravating

and mitigating circumstances. He stated that “with respect to

mitigation” he “considered” the exhibits that were admitted

into evidence, and that he “did take . . . into consideration”

the testimony of Susan Sestate, Diana McKinney, and Dr.

McMahon. He stated as to McKinney’s family history, “I

agree that there was evidence of a difficult family history by

the defendant. However, as I’ve indicated, I do not find that

[it] is a substantial mitigating factor . . . .”

The judge accepted Dr. McMahon’s PTSD diagnosis, but

concluded that it was not causally connected to McKinney’s

criminal behavior. Twice the judge specifically addressed the

relevance of McKinney’s PTSD as a potential mitigating

factor. Although the judge did not expressly so state, it

appears (and we are willing to assume) that he was speaking

both times in the context of statutory mitigation under § 13-

703(G)(1). The judge gave McKinney’s PTSD no weight as

a mitigating factor.

The judge stated:

But I think more importantly than that,

certainly not trying to dispute him as an

expert on what all that meant, it appeared to

me that Dr. McMahon did not at any time

suggest in his testimony nor did I find any

credible evidence to suggest that, even if the

diagnosis of Post-traumatic Stress Syndrome

were accurate in Mr. McKinney’s case, that

[it] in any way significantly impaired Mr.

McKinney’s conduct.

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20 MCKINNEY V. RYAN

(Emphasis added.) He stated a short time (two transcript

paragraphs) later:

[I]t appeared to me that based upon all these

circumstances that there simply was no

substantial reason to believe that even if the

trauma that Mr. McKinney had suffered in

childhood had contributed to an appropriate

diagnosis of Post-traumatic Stress Syndrome

that it in any way affected his conduct in this

case.

(Emphasis added.) Nowhere else in his sentencing colloquy

did the judge specifically refer to McKinney’s PTSD and its

possible mitigating effect.

The italicized language in two paragraphs just quoted

echoes the causal nexus test of the statutory mitigating factor

in § 13-703(G)(1). When applied solely in the context of

statutory mitigation under § 13-703(G)(1), the causal nexus

test does not violate Eddings. However, the italicized

language also echoes the restrictive language of Arizona’s

causal nexus test applicable to nonstatutorymitigation. When

applied in the context of nonstatutory mitigation, the causal

nexus test clearly violates Eddings.

The Arizona Supreme Court reviews capital sentences de

novo, making its own determination of what constitute legally

relevant aggravating and mitigating factors, and then

independently weighing those factors. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.

§ 13-755;see also McKinney, 917 P.2d at 1225. The Arizona

Supreme Court affirmed McKinney’s death sentence. The

Court addressed “the effects of [McKinney’s] childhood,

specifically the diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder

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MCKINNEY V. RYAN 21

(PTSD).” Id. at 1234. The Court agreed with the trial judge

that there was no causal nexus between McKinney’s PTSD

and his crimes. Indeed, the Court went further, finding that

McKinney’s PTSD would have influenced him not to commit

his crimes.

In sentencing McKinney to death, the Arizona Supreme

Court gave no weight to McKinney’s PTSD. It made no

reference to statutory mitigation under § 13-703(G)(1). 

Instead, the Court recited its unconstitutional causal nexus

test applicable to nonstatutory mitigation, citing the specific

page of Ross on which it had articulated that test two years

earlier. The Court wrote:

[T]he record shows that the judge gave

full consideration to McKinney’s childhood

and the expert testimony regarding the effects

of that childhood, specifically the diagnosis of

post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). 

Assuming the diagnoses were correct, the

judge found that none of the experts testified

to, and none of the evidence showed, that such

conditions in any way impaired McKinney’s

ability to conform his conduct to the law. The

judge noted that McKinney was competent

enough to have engaged in extensive and

detailed preplanning of the crimes. 

McKinney’s expert testified that persons with

PTSD tended to avoid engaging in stressful

situations, such as these burglaries and

murders, which are likely to trigger symptoms

of the syndrome. The judge observed that

McKinney’s conduct in engaging in the

crimes was counter to the behavior

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McKinney’s expert described as expected for

people with PTSD. . . . [A] difficult family

background, including childhood abuse, does

not necessarily have substantial mitigating

weight absent a showing that it significantly

affected or impacted the defendant’s ability to

perceive, comprehend, or control his actions. 

See State v. Ross, 180 Ariz. 598, 607,

886 P.2d 1354, 1363 (1994)[.]

McKinney, 917 P.2d at 1234 (emphasis added).

V. Deference under AEDPA

McKinney’s appeal is governed by AEDPA. 

Accordingly, we will not grant his petition for a writ of

habeas corpus unless the state’s adjudication of his claim

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to,

or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined

by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). We review de novo the district court’s

decision whether to grant McKinney’s habeas petition. Dyer

v. Hornbeck, 706 F.3d 1134, 1137 (9th Cir. 2013).

Under the “contrary to” prong of § 2254(d)(1), a federal

court may grant habeas relief only “if the state court arrives

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MCKINNEY V. RYAN 23

at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme]

Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case

differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of

materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000). Under the “unreasonable

application” prong, a federal court may grant relief only if

“the state court’s application of clearly established federal

law was objectively unreasonable,” id. at 409, such that

“fairminded jurists could [not] disagree that” the arguments

or theories that supported the state court’s decision were

“inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of [the

Supreme] Court,” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102

(2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).

For purposes of habeas review, we review the state

court’s “last reasoned decision.” Dyer, 706 F.3d at 1137. We

apply a “presumption that state courts know and follow the

law.” Visciotti, 537 U.S. at 24. “[Section] 2254(d)’s ‘highly

deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings’ . . .

demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the

doubt.” Id. We “are not free to presume that a state court did

not comply with constitutional dictates on the basis of

nothing more than a lack of citation.” Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S.

447, 455 (2005); see also Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8

(2002) (“[AEDPA] does not require citation of our

cases—indeed, it does not even require awareness of our

cases, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the

state-court decision contradicts them.”). We should neither

engage in hyper-technical analysis nor require “formulary

statement[s]” that ignore “the fair import of the [state court’s]

opinion.” Packer, 537 U.S. at 9. Our task is to determine

what standard the state court actually applied to resolve the

petitioner’s claim. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376,

1390 (2012).

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VI. Clearly Established Law as Determined by the

Supreme Court

The Supreme Court in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586

(1978), and in Eddings established a clear rule governing the

role of mitigating evidence in capital sentencing. In Lockett,

Chief Justice Burger wrote a pluralityopinion concluding that

Ohio’s death penalty statute was invalid because it restricted

the mitigating circumstances that could be considered by the

sentencer. The plurality concluded that under the Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendments, “the sentencer . . . [must] not be

precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, anyaspect

of a defendant’s character or record and any of the

circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a

basis for a sentence less than death” because a rule preventing

“the sentencer in all capital cases from giving independent

mitigating weight to aspects of the defendant’s character and

to circumstances of the offense proffered in mitigation creates

the risk that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of

factors which may call for a less severe penalty.” 438 U.S. at

604–05 (emphasis in original).

Four years later, in Eddings, the Court applied the

principle articulated in Chief Justice Burger’s opinion in

Lockett. In Eddings, the sentencing judge had refused to

consider evidence that Eddings had been raised in turbulent

homes without supervision, had witnessed his mother’s

substance abuse, and had been beaten by his father. After

“weigh[ing] the evidence of aggravating and mitigating

circumstances,” the sentencing judge concluded that he could

not, “in following the law . . . consider the fact of this young

man’s violent background.” 455 U.S. at 108–09. Although

the state appeals court acknowledged Eddings’s family

history and psychological and emotional disorders, it upheld

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MCKINNEY V. RYAN 25

his conviction because “all the evidence tends to show that

[Eddings] knew the difference between right and wrong at the

time he pulled the trigger, and that is the test of criminal

responsibility in this State.” Id. at 109–10. The Supreme

Court endorsed the plurality opinion in Lockett and held that

[j]ust as the State may not by statute preclude

the sentencer from considering any mitigating

factor, neither may the sentencer refuse to

consider, as a matter of law, any relevant

mitigating evidence. . . . The sentencer, and

the Court of Criminal Appeals on review, may

determine the weight to be given relevant

mitigating evidence. But they may not give it

no weight by excluding such evidence from

their consideration.

Id. at 113–15 (emphasis in original).

The United States Supreme Court interpreted and applied

the Lockett/Eddings rule in several other decisions prior to

McKinney’s sentencing in 1993 and the Arizona Supreme

Court’s affirmance in 1996. In those decisions, the Court

reiterated its holding that the admission of relevant evidence

is not enough to satisfy the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments if the sentencer is prevented by state law from

giving effect to that evidence. Because “full consideration of

evidence that mitigates against the death penalty is essential

if the [sentencer] is to give a ‘reasoned moral response to the

defendant’s background, character, and crime,’” Eddings

requires that “[t]he sentencer must also be able to consider

and give effect to that evidence in imposing sentence.” Penry

v. Lynaugh (Penry I), 492 U.S. 302, 319, 328 (1989),

abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.

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26 MCKINNEY V. RYAN

304 (2002) (quoting Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 184

(1988) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment)). “[T]he

State cannot channel the sentencer’s discretion, but must

allow it to consider any relevant information offered by the

defendant.” McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 306 (1987);

see also Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1986)

(holding that even where mitigating evidence does “not relate

specifically to . . . [the defendant’s] culpability for the crime

he committed,” the defendant is entitled to offer any evidence

that “would be ‘mitigating’ in the sense that they might serve

‘as a basis for a sentence less than death’” (quoting Lockett,

438 U.S. at 604)).

VII. The Causal Nexus Test and Its Application Here

A. Arizona’s Test

The trial judge sentenced McKinney to death in 1993.

The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed Kinney’s conviction

and sentence in 1996.

As briefly described above, Arizona capital sentencing

law included a statutorily specified nonexhaustive list of five

mitigating factors. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703(G)

(1993). Among the statutory mitigating factors was a

modified form of diminished capacity, contained in § 13-

703(G)(1): “The defendant’s capacity to appreciate the

wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the

requirements of the law was significantly impaired, but not so

impaired as to constitute a defense to prosecution.”

Arizona capital sentencing law also included nonstatutory

mitigating factors, such as family background or mental

conditions that did not rise to the level of impairment

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MCKINNEY V. RYAN 27

specified in § 13-703(G)(1). Beginning in the late 1980s,

Arizona Supreme Court developed a “causal nexus” test for

nonstatutory mitigation. Under this test, as we noted above,

evidence of a difficult family background or a mental

condition was not in and of itself relevant mitigating

evidence. As a matter of Arizona law, such evidence was

relevant for mitigation purposes only if it had some causal

effect contributing to the defendant’s behavior in the

commission of the crime at issue. Thus, while the defendant

could submit evidence of his difficult family background or

mental condition, the sentencing court was prohibited from

treating it as legally relevant mitigation evidence unless the

defendant proved a causal connection between his

background or disorder and the crime. In capital cases from

the late 1980s to the mid-2000s, the Arizona Supreme Court

repeatedly articulated this causal nexus test for nonstatutory

mitigation. The test was “contrary to . . . clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States” in Eddings.

In the immediate aftermath of Eddings, the Arizona

Supreme Court had not yet developed its causal nexus test for

nonstatutory mitigation. One year after Eddings, the Arizona

Supreme Court understood and applied Eddings and Lockett

correctly. In State v. McMurtrey, a capital case, the Court

wrote:

[T]he sentencer may not refuse to consider, as

a matter of law, relevant evidence presented in

mitigation. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S.

104, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982). . . .

. . . If after considering the offered

evidence, the court concludes that with

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respect to the defendant’s mental condition, it

merely establishes a character or personality

disorder then the court may under [State v.]

Richmond, [560 P.2d 41 (Ariz. 1976),]

conclude that the mitigating circumstance in

[Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.] § 13-703(G)(1) does

not exist. In order to remain faithful to

Lockett and [State v.] Watson, [586 P.2d 1253

(Ariz. 1978),] however, the court’s inquiry

may not end there. The court must consider

the offered evidence further to determine

whether it in some other way suggests that the

defendant should be treated with leniency.

664 P.2d 637, 646 (Ariz. 1983); see also State v. Gretzler,

659 P.2d 1, 14 (Ariz. 1983).

By the late 1980s, however, the Arizona Supreme Court

had begun to articulate and apply its causal nexus test to

nonstatutory mitigation. In Wallace, decided three years

before the trial judge sentenced McKinney, the Arizona

Supreme Court wrote in a capital case:

A difficult family background, in and of

itself, is not a mitigating circumstance. If it

were, nearly every defendant could point to

some circumstance in his or her background

that would call for mitigation. A difficult

family background is a relevant mitigating

circumstance if a defendant can show that

something in that background had an effect or

impact on his behavior that was beyond the

defendant’s control. . . . [Appellant’s] entire

family background was before the court in the

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MCKINNEY V. RYAN 29

pre-sentence report. Appellant, however,

made no claim that his family background had

anything to do with the murders he committed.

Wallace, 773 P.2d at 986 (1989) (emphasis added). The

Court could not have been clearer that, as a matter of law,

nonstatutory mitigation evidence not satisfying the causal

nexus test was irrelevant. This test was in direct

contravention of Eddings and Lockett.

In Ross, decided two years after the trial judge sentenced

McKinney, the Arizona Supreme Court wrote in another

capital case, with a pin citation to the precise page in

Wallace:

A difficult family background is not a

relevant mitigating circumstance unless “a

defendant can show that something in that

background had an effect or impact on his

behavior that was beyond the defendant’s

control.” State v. Wallace, 773 P.2d 983, 986

(Ariz. 1989).

886 P.2d at 1363 (1994) (citation shortened) (emphasis

added). Again, the Court could not have been clearer that, as

a matter of law, nonstatutory mitigation evidence not

satisfying the causal nexus test was irrelevant. In affirming

McKinney’s death sentence in 1996, the Arizona Supreme

Court cited Ross, with a pin citation to this precise page. 

McKinney, 917 P.2d at 1234.

Two years after affirmingMcKinney’s death sentence, the

Arizona Supreme Court mentioned Eddings by name, in a

passage manifesting its continued misreading of Eddings and

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30 MCKINNEY V. RYAN

Lockett. In State v. Djerf, 959 P.2d 1274, 1289 (Ariz. 1998),

the Arizona Supreme Court explained that it read Eddings

and Lockett to require a sentencer to “consider” evidence

offered in mitigation. In the usage of the Arizona Court,

however, “considering” such evidence did not mean weighing

it to determine how much mitigating effect to give it. Rather,

it meant “considering” such evidence to determine whether it

satisfied the causal nexus test for nonstatutory mitigation. If

it satisfied the test, the sentencer was required to determine

how much weight, if any, to give it. If did not satisfy the test,

the sentencer was required, as a matter of law, to treat it as

irrelevant and to give it no weight. As the Court wrote in

Djerf:

This court has held that Lockett and Eddings

require only that the sentencer consider

evidence proffered for mitigation. The

sentencer, however, is entitled to give it the

weight it deserves. Arizona law states that a

difficult family background is not relevant

unless the defendant can establish that his

family experience is linked to his criminal

behavior. Ross, 886 P.2d at 1362. The trial

court considered the evidence but found it

irrelevant and declined to give it weight

because proof was lacking that his family

background had any effect on the crimes.

Id. (emphasis added and some citations omitted).

Two years later, in State v. Hoskins, the Arizona Supreme

Court reiterated what it had written in Djerf and explained the

Arizona causal nexus test and its two-step process for

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MCKINNEY V. RYAN 31

“consideration” of mitigating evidence. The Court wrote at

length:

The trial court found that defendant had

shown by a preponderance of the evidence

that he suffered from antisocial or borderline

personality disorder. But proof that such

disorder exists does not of itself establish

mitigation. For our purposes on review, it is

essential not only that a personality disorder

be shown to exist but that it be causally linked

to the crime at the time the crime is

committed.

. . .

A dysfunctional family background or

difficult childhood can be mitigating only if

the defendant can establish that early

experiences, however negative, affected later

criminal behavior in ways that were beyond

his control. Thus, family dysfunction, as with

mental impairment under the (G)(1) statute,

can be mitigating only when actual causation

is demonstrated between earlyabuses suffered

and the defendant’s subsequent acts. We

reaffirm that doctrine here. . . .

. . . If the defendant fails to prove

causation, the circumstance will not be

considered mitigating. However, if the

defendant proves the causal link, the court

will then determine what, if any, weight to

accord the circumstance in mitigation.

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32 MCKINNEY V. RYAN

. . . .

The dissenting opinion expresses an

impassioned description of the defendant’s

“horrific” childhood. We are aware of the

circumstances of defendant’s upbringing and

have reviewed all aspects in minute detail. 

. . . Yet, it is clear that credible evidence in

this record does not establish actual nexus

with the crime, and our jurisprudence requires

the nexus be proven. Wallace (II), 773 P.2d at

985–86. Importantly, were we to hold

otherwise, the family dysfunction factor and

the impairment factor would become

meaningless because virtually everyhomicide

defendant can point to background

dysfunction, abuse, or neglect as a basis for

mitigation and leniency.

14 P.3d 997, 1021–22 (Ariz. 2000) (emphasis added and

some citations omitted).

The decisions of the Arizona Supreme Court make clear

that family background or a mental condition could be given

weight as a nonstatutory mitigating factor, but only if

defendant established a causal connection between the

background or condition and his criminal behavior. For a

little over fifteen years, the Arizona Supreme Court routinely

articulated and insisted on its unconstitutional causal nexus

test, as seen in Wallace (1989), Ross (1994), Djerf (1998),

and Hoskins (2000), as just described, and in many other

cases. See, e.g., State v. White, 815 P.2d 869, 881 (Ariz.

1991) (“‘A difficult family background, in and of itself, is not

a mitigating circumstance.’” (quoting Wallace, 773 P.2d at

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MCKINNEY V. RYAN 33

986)); State v. Brewer, 826 P.2d 783, 802 (Ariz. 1992) (“The

evidence of defendant’s troubled background establishes only

that a personality disorder exists. It does not prove that, at

the time of the crime, the disorder controlled defendant’s

conduct or impaired his mental capacity to such a degree that

leniency is required.”); State v. Bible, 858 P.2d 1152, 1209

(Ariz. 1993) (holding that the defendant’s family history was

not mitigating in part because “Defendant made no showing

that any difficult family history had anything to do with the

murder” (citing Wallace, 773 P.2d at 986)); State v. Bolton,

896 P.2d 830, 854 (Ariz. 1995) (“A difficult family

background, however, is not always a mitigating

circumstance. If it were, many homicide defendants could

point to some circumstance in their background that would

call for mitigation. A difficult family background is a

mitigating circumstance if a defendant can show that

something in that background had an effect or impact on his

behavior that was beyond his control.” (citing Wallace,

773 P.2d at 986)); State v. Stokley, 898 P.2d 454, 473 (Ariz.

1995) (“A difficult family background alone is not a

mitigating circumstance.” (citing Wallace, 773 P.2d at 986));

State v. Jones, 917 P.2d 200, 219–20 (Ariz. 1996)

(defendant’s “chaotic and abusive childhood [was] not a

mitigating circumstance” because there was no causal nexus

to the crime); State v. Towery, 920 P.2d 290, 311 (Ariz. 1996)

(“We have held that a difficult family background is not

always entitled to great weight as a mitigating circumstance. 

State v. Wallace, [773 P.2d at 985–86] (‘A difficult family

background is a relevant mitigating circumstance if a

defendant can show that something in that background had an

effect or impact on his behavior that was beyond the

defendant’s control.’)”); State v. Rienhardt, 951 P.2d 454,

467 (Ariz. 1997) (“[T]his court has rejected past drug and

alcohol use as a mitigating circumstance calling for leniency

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34 MCKINNEY V. RYAN

when there is no evidence of a causal connection between the

substance abuse and the crime.”); State v. Greene, 967 P.2d

106, 117 (Ariz. 1998) (“Greene’s mother may have

introduced him to drugs, but Greene failed to show how this

influenced his behavior on the night of the murder. Thus, we

do not find Greene’s dysfunctional family history to be a

mitigating circumstance.” (internal citation omitted)); State

v. Sharp, 973 P.2d 1171, 1182 (Ariz. 1999) (“[W]e require a

causal connection to justify considering evidence of a

defendant’s background as a mitigating circumstance.”); State

v. Kayer, 984 P.2d 31, 46 (Ariz. 1999) (holding that the

defendant’s mental impairment “was not established as a

nonstatutory mitigating factor” in part because “defendant

offered no evidence to show the requisite causal nexus that

mental impairment affected his judgment or his actions at the

time of the murder”); State v. Martinez, 999 P.2d 795, 809

(Ariz. 2000) (“There is simply no nexus between Martinez’

family history and his actions on the Beeline Highway. His

family history, though regrettable, is not entitled to weight as

a non-statutory mitigating factor.”); State v. Canez, 42 P.3d

564, 594 (Ariz. 2002) (“[A] causal nexus between the

intoxication and the offense is required to establish nonstatutory impairment mitigation.”); id. at 595 (“A defendant’s

difficult childhood is mitigating only where causally

connected to his offense.”).

The Arizona Supreme Court articulated the causal nexus

test in various ways but always to the same effect: As a

matter of law, a difficult family background or mental

condition did not qualify as a nonstatutory mitigating factor

unless it had a causal effect on the defendant’s behavior in

committing the crime at issue. The Arizona Court frequently

stated categorically that, absent a causal nexus, would-be

nonstatutory mitigation was simply “not a mitigating

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MCKINNEY V. RYAN 35

circumstance.” Wallace, 773 P.2d at 986. Sometimes, the

court stated that evidence offered as nonstatutory mitigation

that did not have a causal connection to the crime should be

given no “weight.” For example, as it wrote in Djerf:

Arizona law states that a difficult family

background is not relevant unless the

defendant can establish that his family

experience is linked to his criminal behavior. 

The trial court considered the evidence but

found it irrelevant and declined to give it

weight because proof was lacking that his

family background had any effect on the

crimes.

Djerf, 959 P.2d at 1289 (citation omitted). Similarly, the

court wrote in Martinez, “There is simply no nexus between

Martinez’ family history and his actions on the Beeline

Highway. His family history, though regrettable, is not

entitled to weight as a non-statutory mitigating factor.” 

Martinez, 999 P.2d at 809.

Sometimes, the Arizona Supreme Court stated that

evidence of a difficult family background or mental illness

was “not necessarily” or not “usually” mitigating, and then

(often in the same paragraph) held as a matter of law that the

evidence in the specific case before the Court was not

mitigating because it had no causal connection to the crime. 

For example, the Court wrote in Jones,

A difficult family background is not

necessarily a mitigating circumstance unless

defendant can show that something in his

background had an effect on his behavior that

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36 MCKINNEY V. RYAN

was beyond his control. . . . [H]owever, the

trial court did not find any connection

between defendant’s family background and

his conduct on the night of the murders, and

our review of the record does not reveal any

such connection. Thus, we find that

defendant’s chaotic and abusive childhood is

not a mitigating circumstance.

Jones, 917 P.2d at 219–20 (emphasis added).

Similarly, the Court wrote in Hoskins, quoting an earlier

case, “‘An abusive family background is usually given

significant weight as a mitigating factor only when the abuse

affected the defendant’s behavior at the time of the crime.’” 

Hoskins, 14 P.3d at 1021 (emphasis added) (quoting State v.

Mann, 934 P.2d 784, 795 (Ariz. 1997)). The court in Hoskins

then went to state and apply the unconstitutional causal nexus

test as a matter of law to the evidence in the case before it,

writing,

[I]t is essential not only that a personality

disorder be shown to exist but that it be

causally linked to the crime at the time the

crime is committed. . . .

. . . Because defendant has not connected

his anti-social or personality disorder to the

car-jacking and murder, it cannot be

considered a relevant mitigating

circumstance. . . .

. . . .

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MCKINNEY V. RYAN 37

. . . If the defendant fails to prove

causation, the circumstance will not be

considered mitigating. However, if the

defendant proves the causal link, the court

then will determine what, if any, weight to

accord the circumstance in mitigation.

Id. at 1021–22 (emphasis added).

In the mid-2000s, after the United States Supreme Court

emphaticallyreiterated the Eddings rule in Tennard v. Dretke,

542 U.S. 274 (2004), the Arizona Supreme Court finally

abandoned its unconstitutional causal nexus test for

nonstatutory mitigation. In its first post-Tennard case

addressing Eddings, the Arizona Supreme Court properly

stated the rule in a jury sentencing case:

While Eddings and various other Supreme

Court decisions dictate a liberal rule of

admissibility for mitigating evidence, they

still leave it to the sentencer to “determine the

weight to be given to relevant mitigating

evidence.” Eddings, 455 U.S. at 114–15, 102

S.Ct. 869. Once the jury has heard all the

defendant’s mitigation evidence, there is no

constitutional prohibition against the State

arguing that the evidence is not particularly

relevant or that it is entitled to little weight.

State v. Anderson, 111 P.3d 369, 392 (Ariz. 2005). A year

later, in a judge-sentencing case, the Arizona Supreme Court,

relying on Anderson, again properly stated the rule:

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38 MCKINNEY V. RYAN

We do not require that a nexus between the

mitigating factors and the crime be

established before we consider the mitigation

evidence. See Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S.

274, 287, 124 S.Ct. 2562, 159 L.Ed.2d 384

(2004). But the failure to establish such a

causal connection may be considered in

assessing the quality and strength of the

mitigation evidence.

State v. Newell, 132 P.3d 833, 849 (Ariz. 2006).

B. Our “Clear Indication” Test

Not counting the case now before us, we have decided

nine Arizona capital cases in which petitioners have alleged

that the Arizona Supreme Court, as a matter of law, treated

would-be mitigation evidence as legally irrelevant in

violation of Eddings. In two of these cases, we held that the

Arizona Supreme Court committed Eddings error. See

Williams v. Ryan, 623 F.3d 1258 (9th Cir. 2010); Styers v.

Schriro, 547 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). In the

other seven, we held that the Arizona Court had not

committed Eddings error. In six of these, we applied a test

first articulated in Schad v. Ryan, 581 F.3d 1019, 1037 (9th

Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (unamended opinion), under which

we could not find Eddings error unless there was a “clear

indication in the record” that the Arizona Court had refused,

as a matter of law, to treat nonstatutory mitigation evidence

as relevant unless it had some effect on the petitioner’s

criminal behavior. See Hedlund v. Ryan, 750 F.3d 793, 818

(9th Cir. 2014); Murray v. Schriro, 746 F.3d 418, 455 (9th

Cir. 2014); Clabourne v. Ryan, 745 F.3d 362, 373 (9th Cir.

2014) (petition for panel rehearing and for rehearing en banc

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MCKINNEY V. RYAN 39

pending); Poyson v. Ryan, 743 F.3d 1185, 1188 (9th Cir.

2013); Lopez v. Ryan, 630 F.3d 1198, 1203 (9th Cir. 2011);

Schad v. Ryan, 671 F.3d 708, 724 (9th Cir. 2011) (per

curiam) (amended opinion). In the seventh, we did not apply

the “clear indication” test. See Towery v. Ryan, 673 F.3d 933

(9th Cir. 2012). In none of the cases in which we held that

there had been no Eddings error did we hold that the Arizona

Supreme Court had renounced its causal nexus test. Rather,

we held only that petitioners had not shown that the Court

had applied the test in such a way as to treat nonstatutory

mitigation evidence irrelevant as a matter of law.

In our amended opinion in Schad, we stated the “clear

indication” test as follows:

Absent a clear indication in the record

that the state court applied the wrong

standard, we cannot assume the courts

violated Edding’s constitutional mandates. 

See Bell v. Cone, [543 U.S. 447, 455] (2005)

(“Federal courts are not free to presume that a

state court did not comply with constitutional

dictates on the basis of nothing more than a

lack of citation.”).

Schad, 671 F.3d at 724 (emphasis added). The language from

Bell, quoted in Schad in support of its “clear indication” rule,

states only that we may not presume that a state court failed

to follow federal constitutional law based on “nothing more

than a lack of citation.” But in Schad we broadened the

language from Bell and transformed it into a prohibition

against an “assumption” of unconstitutionality in the absence

of a “clear indication” to the contrary.

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When used in Bell, the quoted language stated a rule that

is applicable in a narrow circumstance: a federal habeas court

should not presume, merely because a state court has failed

to cite a federal case, that the state court was unaware of or

failed to follow the rule established in that case. The Bell rule

is eminently sensible. A presumption of ignorance or

disregard of federal law based merely on a failure of citation

by a busy state court is both unrealistic and disrespectful. But

the Bell rule, as stated by the Supreme Court, has a relatively

narrow application. It is not a broad rule requiring federal

habeas courts to assume in all circumstances, including

Eddings cases, that absent a “clear indication” to the contrary,

a state understood and properly applied federal law.

Congress knows how to limit federal collateral review by

requiring deference to state court decisions, and it has done

so in AEDPA. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), federal courts

shall not issue writs of habeas corpus on any claim

adjudicated in state court unless the adjudication “resulted in

a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law” or “that was

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light

of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 

Section 2254(d) is already a form of a clear statement or a

clear indication rule, which all federal courts are required to

follow. The “clear indication” rule stated by our circuit for

the first time in Schad, and applicable in our circuit only in

Eddings cases, is an inappropriate and unnecessary gloss on

the deference already required under § 2254(d). We therefore

overrule Schad, and the cases that have followed it, with

respect to the “clear indication” test.

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MCKINNEY V. RYAN 41

C. Application of the Causal Nexus Test in This Case

For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the Arizona

Supreme Court applied its unconstitutional causal nexus test

to McKinney’s PTSD, refusing, as a matter of law, to treat it

as a relevant nonstatutory mitigating factor. This was

contrary to clearly established federal law as established in

Eddings.

We review the decision of the highest state court to have

provided a reasoned decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S.

797, 804–06 (1991). The Arizona Supreme Court reviews

capital sentences de novo, making its own determination of

what constitute legally relevant aggravating and mitigating

factors, and then weighing those factors independently. Ariz.

Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-755. The Arizona Supreme Court

“conducts a thorough and independent review of the record

and of the aggravating and mitigating evidence to determine

whether the sentence is justified.” McKinney, 917 P.2d at

1225. The Court “considers the quality and strength, not

simply the number, of aggravating or mitigating factors.” Id.

In reviewing the de novo sentencing decision of the

Arizona Supreme Court, we look only to the decision of that

Court. We look to the decision of the sentencing judge only

to the degree it was adopted or substantially incorporated by

the Arizona Supreme Court. See Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d

1085, 1903 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that when “the last

reasoned decision adopted or substantially incorporated the

reasoning from a previous decision,” it is “reasonable for the

reviewing court to look at both decisions to fully ascertain the

reasoning of the last decision”). The sentencing judge

accepted the factual accuracy of Dr. McMahon’s diagnosis of

PTSD, saying that he was “certainly not trying to dispute him

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as an expert on what all that meant.” The judge then went on

to say that “Dr. McMahon did not at any time suggest in his

testimony nor did I find any credible evidence to suggest that,

even if the diagnosis of Post-traumatic Stress Syndrome were

accurate in Mr. McKinney’s case, that it in any way

significantly impaired Mr. McKinney’s conduct.” (Emphasis

added.) He further stated:

[I]t appeared to me that based upon all these

circumstances that there simply was no

substantial reason to believe that even if the

trauma that Mr. McKinney had suffered in

childhood had contributed to an appropriate

diagnosis of Post-traumatic Stress Syndrome

that it in any way affected his conduct in this

case.

(Emphasis added.) The italicized language echoes the

language of Arizona’s statutory mitigator under Ariz. Rev.

Stat. § 13-703(G)(1). It also echoes the language used by the

Arizona Supreme Court to articulate the unconstitutional

causal nexus test applied to nonstatutorymitigation. See, e.g.,

Wallace, 773 P.2d at 986 (“A difficult family background is

a relevant mitigating circumstance if a defendant can show

that something in that back ground had an effect or impact on

his behavior that was beyond his control.”) (emphasis added).

The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed McKinney’s death

sentence in 1996, roughly in the middle of the fifteen-yearplus period during which it insisted on its unconstitutional

nexus test for nonstatutory mitigation. The Court reviewed

in its opinion the death sentences of both Hedlund and

McKinney. The Court first affirmed Hedlund’s death

sentence, writing, “A difficult family background, including

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MCKINNEY V. RYAN 43

childhood abuse, does not necessarily have substantial

mitigating weight absent a showing that it significantly

affected or impacted a defendant’s ability to perceive, to

comprehend, or to control his actions. See State v. Ross, . . .

886 P.2d 1354, 1363 (1994).” McKinney, 917 P.2d at 1226. 

As we pointed out above, the pin citation to Ross is a citation

to the precise page on which the Arizona Supreme Court had

two years earlier articulated its unconstitutional “causal

nexus” test for non-statutory mitigation.

When the Arizona Supreme Court reviewed McKinney’s

death sentence, it again relied on Ross. The Court wrote that

the sentencing judge had given “full consideration” to

McKinney’s childhood and resulting PTSD, using the word

“consideration” in the sense of considering whether the

evidence was, or was not mitigating. See Djerf, 959 P.2d at

1289 (“This court has held that Lockett and Eddings require

only that the sentencer consider evidence proffered for

mitigation. The sentencer, however, is entitled to give it the

weight it deserves. Arizona law states that a difficult family

background is not relevant unless the defendant can establish

that his family experience is linked to his criminal behavior.”)

(emphasis added).

Reviewing McKinney’s sentence de novo, the Arizona

Supreme Court addressed “the effects of [McKinney’s]

childhood, specifically the diagnosis of post-traumatic stress

disorder (PTSD).” McKinney, 917 P.2d at 1234. The Court

accepted the conclusion of the sentencing judge that, as a

factual matter, McKinney had not shown that his PTSD had

causally contributed to the murders of Mertens and McClain. 

Indeed, the Arizona Supreme Court went further, pointing out

that McKinney’s PTSD, if anything, would have had the

opposite effect, influencing him not to have committed the

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murders. Because the Court concluded that McKinney’s

PTSD was not causally connected to his crimes, it refused, as

a matter of law, to treat his PTSD as a mitigating factor. 

After describing McKinney’s PTSD evidence and assessing

de novo the effect of his PTSD on his behavior, the Court

recited its causal nexus test. The Court concluded with a pin

citation to the precise page in Ross on which, two years

earlier, it had articulated the causal nexus test for

nonstatutory mitigation.

We quote in full the relevant paragraph:

Here again, the record shows that the

judge gave full consideration to McKinney’s

childhood and the expert testimony regarding

the effects of that childhood, specifically the

diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder

(PTSD). Assuming the diagnoses were

correct, the judge found that none of the

experts testified to, and none of the evidence

showed, that such conditions in any way

impaired McKinney’s ability to conform his

conduct to the law. The judge noted that

McKinney was competent enough to have

engaged in extensive and detailed preplanning

of the crimes. McKinney’s expert testified

that persons with PTSD tended to avoid

engaging in stressful situations, such as these

burglaries and murders, which are likely to

trigger symptoms of the syndrome. The judge

observed that McKinney’s conduct in

engaging in the crimes was counter to the

behavior McKinney’s expert described as

expected for people with PTSD. As we noted

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MCKINNEY V. RYAN 45

in discussing Hedlund’s claim on this same

issue, a difficult family background, including

childhood abuse, does not necessarily have

substantial mitigating weight absent a

showing that it significantly affected or

impacted the defendant’s ability to perceive,

comprehend, or control his actions. See State

v. Ross, . . . 886 P.2d 1354, 1363 (1994)[.]

Id. at 1234 (emphasis added).

Based on (1) the factual conclusion by the sentencing

judge, which the Arizona Supreme Court accepted, that

McKinney’s PTSD did not “in any way affect[] his conduct

in this case,” (2) the Arizona Supreme Court’s additional

factual conclusion that, if anything,McKinney’s PTSDwould

have influenced him not to commit the crimes, and (3) the

Arizona Supreme Court’s recital of the causal nexus test for

nonstatutorymitigation and its pin citation to the precise page

in Ross where it had previously articulated that test, we

conclude that the Arizona Supreme Court held, as a matter of

law, that McKinney’s PTSD was not a nonstatutory

mitigating factor, and that it therefore gave it no weight. This

holding was contrary to Eddings. We therefore hold that the

decision of the Arizona Supreme Court applied a rule that

was “contrary to . . . clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

D. Structural or Harmless Error

We have not heretofore decided whether an Eddings error

is structural error. We do so now and conclude that it is not.

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The Supreme Court has consistently characterized

structural errors as “structural defects in the constitution of

the trial mechanism.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619,

629 (1993). Because such errors go to the framework within

which judicial proceedings are conducted, they “infect the

entire trial process” and accordingly require “automatic

reversal of the conviction.” Id. at 629–30; see also Arizona

v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991) (noting that

structural errors “affect[] the framework within which the

trial proceeds”). Some structural errors produce a

fundamentally flawed record, so “any inquiry into [their]

effect[s] on the outcome of the case would be purely

speculative.” Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 256 (1988);

see also Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579 & n.7 (1986)

(holding that harmless-error analysis was appropriate because

“[u]nlike errors such as judicial bias or denial of counsel, the

error in this case did not affect the composition of the record. 

Evaluation of whether the error prejudiced respondent thus

does not require any difficult inquiries concerning matters

that might have been, but were not, placed in evidence”).

By contrast, harmless-error analysis applies to trial errors,

“which may . . . be quantitatively assessed in the context of

other evidence presented in order to determine whether its

admission was harmless.” Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 307–08. 

Because “the error occurs at trial and its scope is readily

identifiable[,] . . . the reviewing court can undertake with

some confidence its relatively narrow task of assessing the

likelihood that the error materially affected the deliberations

of the jury.” Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 490

(1978). For example, in Satterwhite, the Court applied

harmless-error analysis to a Sixth Amendment error resulting

in the improper admission of testimony from a psychiatrist

who had examined Satterwhite without notifying his attorney. 

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486 U.S. at 258. The Court noted that “the evaluation of the

consequences of an error in the sentencing phase of a capital

case may be more difficult because of the discretion that is

given to the sentencer.” Id. However, it held that the error at

issue was subject to harmless-error analysis because the

admission of testimony was an error of limited scope that was

ready identifiable and whose impact could be assessed by a

reviewing court. Id. at 257–58.

E. Harmless Error

The harmless-error standard on habeas review provides

that “relief must be granted” if the error “‘had substantial and

injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s

verdict.’” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623 (quoting Kotteakos v.

United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)). “Under this

standard, habeas petitioners may obtain plenary review of

their constitutional claims, but they are not entitled to habeas

relief based on trial error unless they can establish that it

resulted in actual prejudice.” Id. at 637 (internal quotation

marks omitted). But, as with the stricter Chapman standard,

the “risk of doubt” is placed “on the State.” O’Neal v.

McAninich, 513 U.S. 432, 439 (1995). On federal habeas, in

the absence of structural error that requires automatic

reversal, “relief is appropriate only if the prosecutor cannot

demonstrate harmless error.” Ayala v. Davis, 135 S. Ct.

2187, 2197 (2015).

The Court explained in Kotteakos,

[I]f one cannot say, with fair assurance, after

pondering all that happened without stripping

the erroneous action from the whole, that the

judgment was not substantially swayed by the

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error, it is impossible to conclude that

substantial rights were not affected. The

inquiry cannot be merely whether there was

enough to support the result, apart from the

phase affected by the error. It is rather, even

so, whether the error itself had substantial

influence. If so, or if one is left in grave

doubt, the conviction cannot stand.

328 U.S. at 765. Accordingly, “[w]hen a federal judge in a

habeas proceeding is in grave doubt about whether a trial

error of federal law had ‘substantial and injurious effect or

influence in determining the jury’s verdict,’ that error is not

harmless. And, the petitioner must win.” O’Neal, 513 U.S.

at 436.

We hold that the Eddings error committed by the Arizona

Supreme Court in this case had a “substantial and injurious

effect” on McKinney’s sentence within the meaning of

Brecht. McKinney presented evidence of severe, prolonged

childhood abuse that, in the words of the sentencing judge,

was “beyond the comprehension and understanding of most

people.” Dr. McMahon diagnosed McKinney as suffering

from PTSD as a result of his horrific childhood. McKinney’s

PTSD was important mitigating evidence, central to his plea

for leniency, but the Arizona Supreme Court, as a matter of

law, gave it no weight. See Coleman v. Calderon, 210 F.3d

1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2000) (constitutionally infirm jury

instruction was not harmless because “it undermined the very

core of Coleman’s plea for life”). We hold here, as we did in

Styers, that PTSD is mitigating evidence under Eddings. 

Styers, 547 F.3d at 1035–36 (granting the writ based on

Eddings error by the Arizona Supreme Court in treating

PTSD mitigation evidence irrelevant as a matter of law). We

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MCKINNEY V. RYAN 49

hold, further, as we also did in Styers, that the Arizona

Supreme Court’s refusal, as matter of law, to give weight to

petitioner’s PTSD, requires resentencing. Id.

“[I]n capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity

underlying the Eighth Amendment . . . requires consideration

of the character and record of the individual offender and the

circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally

indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of

death.” Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304

(1976); see also Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605 (“Given that the

imposition of death by public authority is so profoundly

different from all other penalties, we cannot avoid the

conclusion that an individualized decision is essential in

capital cases.”). When a defendant’s life is at stake, the

Supreme Court has consistently emphasized the importance

of a properly informed, individualized sentencing

determination. See, e.g., Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman,

550 U.S. 233, 264 (2007) (noting that Lockett and its progeny

“have made clear that when the jury is not permitted to give

meaningful effect or a ‘reasoned moral response’ to a

defendant’s mitigating evidence . . . the sentencing process is

fatally flawed”); Satterwhite, 486 U.S. at 258 (“It is important

to avoid error in capital sentencing proceedings.”);

McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 304; Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 (“We

are satisfied that this qualitative difference between death and

other penalties calls for a greater degree of reliability when

the death sentence is imposed.”).

We recognize that there were important aggravating

factors in this case. Although the jury had not found that

McKinney had himself killed either Ms. Mertens or Mr.

McClain, the sentencing judge concluded, based on

substantial evidence, that McKinney had killed Ms. Mertens,

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50 MCKINNEY V. RYAN

though not Mr. McClain. Further, McKinney had been

involved, as either the actual killer or as an accessory, in two

murders; the murders had been done for pecuniary gain; and

there had been cruelty to Mertens in the struggle preceding

her death. We do not give “short shrift” to, or minimize the

importance of, these aggravating factors. Bobby v. Van Hook,

558 U.S. 4, 13 (2009) (per curiam). But we conclude that

McKinney’s evidence of PTSD resulting from sustained,

severe childhood abuse would have had a substantial impact

on a capital sentencer who was permitted to evaluate and give

appropriate weight to it as a nonstatutory mitigating factor. 

We conclude in this case that the Arizona Supreme Court’s

application of its causal nexus test to exclude, as a matter or

law, evidence of McKinney’s PTSD was “contrary to . . .

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States,” and that its application

of the test had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence”

on its decision to sentence McKinney to death. Brecht,

507 U.S. at 623 (internal quotation marks omitted).

VIII. Response to Dissent

The foregoing opinion speaks for itself, but we add a few

words to respond directly to two contentions in the dissent

with which we particularly disagree.

A. Consistent Articulation and Application of the Causal

Nexus Test

First, the dissent contends that during the relevant period

the Arizona SupremeCourtwas inconsistent in its articulation

and application of its unconstitutional causal nexus test for

nonstatutory mitigation. We disagree. As we discuss in the

body of our opinion, the Arizona Supreme Court, during a

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MCKINNEY V. RYAN 51

period of just over fifteen years, consistently insisted upon

and applied its causal nexus test to nonstatutory mitigation. 

In no case during this period did the Court give any indication

that the causal nexus test was not the law in Arizona, or any

indication that it had the slightest doubt about the

constitutionality of the test.

The dissent particularly relies on four Arizona Supreme

Court cases. Dissent at 89–96. Those cases are State v.

Towery, 920 P.2d 290 (Ariz. 1996), State v. Thornton,

929 P.2d 676 (Ariz. 1996), State v. Gonzales, 892 P.2d 838

(Ariz. 1995), and State v. Trostle, 951 P.2d 869 (Ariz. 1997). 

None of the four cases even remotely supports the dissent’s

contention.

Of the four cases, the dissent emphasizes Towery. 

Dissent at 89–90. In Towery, however, the Arizona Supreme

Court clearly articulated and applied its causal nexus test. 

The defendant in Towery had introduced, as a would-be

mitigating factor, evidence of his difficult familybackground.

The sentencing judge “rejected the evidence as a mitigating

factor because [Towery] failed to establish a nexus between

his family background and his crime.” Towery, 920 P.2d at

310. The Arizona Supreme Court, on de novo review,

affirmed the death sentence. It wrote:

We have held that a difficult family

background is not always entitled to great

weight as a mitigating circumstance. State v.

Wallace, . . . 773 P.2d 983, 985–86 (1989)

(“A difficult family background is a relevant

mitigating circumstance if a defendant can

show that something in that background had

an effect or impact on his behavior that was

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beyond the defendant’s control.”)[.] We have

since reaffirmed that family background may

be a substantial mitigating circumstance when

it is shown to have some connection with the

defendant’s offense-related conduct. White,

. . . 815 P.2d at 881–82.

Defendant has failed to connect his family

background to his criminal conduct.

Id. at 311 (citations shortened). The Court in Towery could

hardly have been clearer. It both articulated and applied its

unconstitutional causal nexus test to treat as irrelevant, as a

matter of law, nonstatutory mitigation evidence of the

defendant’s family background because he had “failed to

connect his family background to his criminal conduct.” Our

three-judge panel decision, reviewing Towery’s conviction

and sentence on federal habeas, held to the contrary, but it

was mistaken in so holding. See Towery v. Ryan, 673 F.3d

933 (9th Cir. 2012).

The other three cases are of no greater help to the dissent. 

In Thornton, the sentencing judge had given mitigating

weight to defendant’s “traumatic childhood, dysfunctional

family, and antisocial personality disorder,” as it was

permitted to do under Arizona law provided there was a

causal nexus to the crime. The Arizona Supreme Court

affirmed the judge on this point. It did not recite whether the

judge had found a causal nexus; it simply affirmed without

comment. The defendant contended that the sentencing judge

should also have given weight to four other nonstatutory

mitigating factors — mental illness, remorse, cooperation,

and character. The Arizona Supreme Court rejected the

contention that any of these factors were mitigating. It

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rejected three of them on the ground that they did not exist as

a factual matter. It rejected the fourth with a citation to the

precise page in Ross in which it had articulated its

unconstitutional causal nexus test. In Gonzales, defendant

contended his good character should have been given

mitigating weight. The Arizona Supreme Court rejected the

contention, holding as a factual matter that Gonzales did not

have good character. In Trostle, the Arizona Supreme Court

gave mitigating weight to the defendant’s mental impairment

because the causal nexus test was satisfied. The Court wrote,

[W]eight to be given to mental impairment

should be proportional to a defendant’s ability

to conform or appreciate the wrongfulness of

his conduct.

The defendant here established . . . that he

was affected in no small measure by an

impaired ability to conform his conduct to the

law’s requirements. . . . The trial court,

therefore, should have given serious

consideration to this evidence, either as

statutory or nonstatutory mitigation.

951 P.2d at 886.

The dissent also relies on two cases cited in Lopez v.

Ryan, 630 F.3d 1198, 1204 n.4 (9th Cir. 2011) — State v.

Mann, 934 P.2d 784 (Ariz. 1997); and State v. Medrano,

914 P.2d 225 (Ariz. 1996). Neither case supports the

dissent’s contention.

In State v. Mann, the defendant had advanced four

proposed nonstatutory mitigators: (1) the possibility of

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54 MCKINNEY V. RYAN

consecutive life sentences rather than the death penalty;

(2) defendant’s relationship to his children; (3) a change in

defendant’s “lifestyle” after he committed the murders; and

(4) defendant’s difficult family background. 934 P.2d at 795. 

The Arizona Supreme Court held as a matter of law that the

possibility of consecutive life sentences was “a sentencing

option” rather than a mitigating factor. Id. With respect to

defendant’s relationship with his children and his change in

lifestyle, the Court held that the defendant had not

“established mitigation of sufficient weight to call for

leniency.” Id. Finally, the Court held that defendant’s

difficult family background was irrelevant as a matter of law. 

It recited its causal nexus test, citing the precise page in its

Wallace opinion on which it had articulated and applied the

test. The Court then wrote, “Defendant did not show any

connection.” Id.

In State v. Medrano, the defendant contended that his

cocaine intoxication was both a statutory and nonstatutory

mitigating factor. The sentencing judge had found as a

factual matter that defendant’s cocaine intoxication had not

affected his behavior in committing the crime. The Arizona

Supreme Court applied the causal nexus test, writing that the

sentencing judge had found that the defendant had “not

proven by a preponderance of the evidence, either as a

statutory or nonstatutory mitigating factor, that cocaine

intoxication had contributed to his conduct on the night of the

murder.” 914 P.2d at 227. The Arizona Supreme Court

accepted the factual finding of the sentencing judge that there

had been no causal nexus. The Court wrote that defendant’s

evidence was “unpersuasive” and that his cocaine use

therefore “fail[ed] as a non-statutory mitigating

circumstance.” Id. at 229.

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As we noted at the beginning of our opinion, the Arizona

Supreme Court has a strong view of stare decisis. The Court

wrote in White v. Bateman, 358 P.2d 712, 714 (Ariz. 1961),

for example, that its prior case law “should be adhered to

unless the reasons of the prior decisions have ceased to exist

or the prior decision was clearly erroneous or manifestly

wrong.” See also Young v. Beck, 251 P.3d 380, 385 (Ariz.

2011) (“[S]tare decisis commands that ‘precedents of the

court should not be lightly overruled,’ and mere disagreement

with those who preceded us is not enough.” (quoting State v.

Salazar, 173 Ariz. 399, 416 . . . (1992))); State ex re. Woods

v. Cohen, 844 P.2d 1147, 1148 (Ariz. 1993) (referring to “a

healthy respect for stare decisis”); State v. Williker, 491 P.2d

465, 468 (Ariz. 1971) (referring to “a proper respect for the

theory of stare decisis”).

Consistent with its view of stare decisis, the Arizona

Supreme Court applied its unconstitutional causal nexus test

consistently throughout during the relevant period. We

would hardly expect the Court have done otherwise, given its

view of stare decisis and the causal nexus test. The test was,

of course, premised on a mistaken understanding of Eddings. 

The Court corrected its mistake, consistent with its view of

stare decisis under Bateman (“the prior decision was clearly

erroneous or manifestly wrong”), after the United States

Supreme Court emphatically reiterated the Eddings rule in

2004 in Tennard v. Dretke. See State v. Anderson, 111 P.3d

369 (Ariz. 2005). But a mistake is only a mistake. All

courts, even very good courts, make mistakes. A good court,

however, does not apply an established rule erratically,

enforcing it arbitrarily in some cases but not in others. We

have great respect for the Supreme Court of Arizona, whose

institutional integrity is demonstrated, inter alia, by the

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56 MCKINNEY V. RYAN

consistent application of the causal nexus test during the

fifteen-year period it was in effect.

B. Appellate Review and “Unreasonable Determination of

Fact”

Second, the dissent contends that the critical question

before us is whether the Arizona Supreme Court properly

concluded that the sentencing judge “fully considered

McKinney’s PTSD.” Dissent at 82. It further contends that

we must review whether the Court properly so concluded

under the “unreasonable determination of fact” standard of

AEDPA. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). According to the dissent,

the Arizona Supreme Court did not unreasonably make the

factual determination that the sentencing judge had “fully

considered McKinney’s PTSD.” Therefore, according to the

dissent, we must uphold the sentencing decision of the

Arizona Supreme Court. The dissent misunderstands both the

significance of the Arizona Supreme Court’s de novo review

in capital cases, and the “unreasonable determination of fact”

standard of review under AEDPA.

Contrary to the view of the dissent, the Arizona Supreme

Court in reviewing capital sentences does not base its

decision on whether the sentencing judge fully considered

aggravating and mitigating factors. Rather, as we indicated

above, the Arizona Supreme Court reviews capital sentences

de novo, making its own independent determination of what

constitute legally relevant aggravating and mitigating factors,

and then performing an independent weighing of those

factors. In its own words, the Arizona Supreme Court

“conducts a thorough and independent review of the record

and of the aggravating and mitigating evidence to determine

whether the sentence is justified, . . . consider[ing] the quality

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and strength, not simply the number, of aggravating or

mitigating factors.” McKinney, 917 P.2d at 1225.

Further, and also contrary to the view of the dissent, the

question whether the sentencing judge “fully considered

McKinney’s PTSD” is not a question of “fact” under

§ 2254(d)(2). A “fact” under § 2254(d)(2) is an evidentiary

fact, such as whether a defendant had PTSD or whether a

defendant’s PTSD had a causal nexus to the crime. See, e.g.,

Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 850 (2010) (analyzing

evidentiary facts under § 2254(d)(2)). Whether a sentencing

judge fully considered an evidentiary fact is not a “fact”

within the meaning of § 2254(d)(2).

Conclusion

We review the decision of the Arizona Supreme Court, as

the last reasoned state court decision. The Arizona Supreme

Court reviewed McKinney’s death sentence de novo. That

Court accepted the factual conclusion of the trial judge that,

as an evidentiary matter, there was no causal nexus between

McKinney’s PTSD and his crimes. After accepting the

conclusion of the trial judge on this factual point, the Court

went further, noting that, far from contributing to his crimes,

McKinney’s PTSD would have influenced him not to commit

them. The Arizona Supreme Court then recited its

unconstitutional causal nexus test for nonstatutorymitigation,

followed by a pin citation to the page of Ross on which it had

articulated that test two years earlier, making clear that, as

matter of Arizona law, McKinney’s PTSD was not relevant

as a nonstatutory mitigating factor.

We reverse the district court’s judgment denying the writ

of habeas corpus. We remand with instructions to grant the

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58 MCKINNEY V. RYAN

writ with respect to McKinney’s sentence unless the state,

within a reasonable period, either corrects the constitutional

error in his death sentence or vacates the sentence and

imposes a lesser sentence consistent with law.

BEA, Circuit Judge, dissenting, with whom KOZINSKI,

GOULD, TALLMAN, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges,

join:

A state cannot impose the death penalty unless the

sentencer has considered all evidence submitted as to the

defendant’s condition, character, and background. Eddings v.

Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113–15 (1982) (explaining that a

sentencer may not “refuse to consider, as a matter of law, any

relevant mitigating evidence”). As a result, defendants so

sentenced usually and legitimately proffer mitigation

evidence provoking sympathy in the hope it will persuade the

sentencer to grant leniency and impose a life sentence instead

of the death penalty. Here, James McKinney submitted

evidence of his squalid, horrid childhood and expert

testimony that, as a result of that childhood, he developed

Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”). He urged his

PTSD called for mercy for two reasons. First, he argued his

PTSD affected his mental capacity “to appreciate the

wrongfulness of his conduct” at the time of the murders. This

is a statutory mitigation factor under Arizona law.1 Second,

he argued his childhood and childhood-caused PTSD justified

leniency, separate from any effect it may have had on his

mental state at the time of the murders. That second argument

 

1

 Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-751(G)(1).

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fits under Arizona’s nonstatutory catchall that requires

sentencers to consider all proffered mitigation evidence.2

McKinney admits the sentencing judge, Judge Sheldon,

considered his first argument. But McKinney contends Judge

Sheldon did not consider the mitigating value of his PTSD for

leniency purposes regardless its effect on him at the time of

the murders.

McKinney pressed this same claim before the Arizona

Supreme Court on direct appeal from the sentence Judge

Sheldon imposed. That court correctly stated what Eddings

requires: “[T]he trial judge must consider any aspect of [a

defendant’s] character or record and any circumstance of the

offense relevant to determining whether a sentence less

severe than the death penalty is appropriate.”3It then rejected

McKinney’s argument that Judge Sheldon had failed to

consider his PTSD separate from its effect on McKinney’s

mental capacity during the murders: “[T]he record shows that

the judge gave full consideration to McKinney’s childhood

and the expert testimony regarding the effects of that

childhood, specifically the diagnosis of post-traumatic stress

disorder.”

4 That conclusion makessense given Judge Sheldon

expressly stated at McKinney’s sentencing:

2 Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-751(G) (“The trier of fact shall consider as

mitigating circumstances any factors proffered by the defendant or the

state that are relevant in determining whether to impose a sentence less

than death, including any aspect of the defendant’s character, propensities

or record and any of the circumstances of the offense.”).

 

3

State v. McKinney, 917 P.2d 1214, 1226 (Ariz. 1996).

 

4

Id. at 1234 (emphasis added).

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I have considered [McKinney’s arguments] at

length, and after considering all of the

mitigating circumstances, the mitigating

evidence that was presented by the defense in

this case as against the aggravating

circumstances, and other matters which

clearly are not set forth in the statute which

should be considered by a court, I have

determined . . . that the mitigating

circumstances simply are not sufficiently

substantial to call for leniency under all of the

facts of this case.

(Emphasis added.)

Our review of McKinney’s claim must proceed

differently than it did in the Arizona courts on direct appeal.

The Supreme Court has told us we must presume “state courts

know and follow the law.”5 And, in the Eddings context,

“[w]e must assume that the trial judge considered all [the]

evidence before passing sentence.”6 This appeal could be

resolved against McKinney, without the benefit of those

presumptions, simply based on the above quotations from the

record. This appeal presents even fewer problems to decide

under the standard provided by the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which

prescribes “‘a difficult to meet’ and ‘highly deferential

standard for evaluating state-court rulings, [and] which

demands state-court decisions be given the benefit of the

 

5 Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002).

 

6 Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308, 314 (1991).

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doubt.’”7 Yet the majority still somehow concludes that,

under the standard of review prescribed by AEDPA, there

was Eddings error in this case.

The majority starts by incorrectly summarizing the

Arizona Supreme Court’s Eddings jurisprudence between

1989 and 2005 as constituting continuous and recurrent

Eddings error.8 Not so at all, as our own decisions have

repeatedlyrecognized.9 Based on its incorrect summary of the

Arizona decisions10and a paean to stare decisis, the majority

then rejects our precedent11

and concludes that we should

never afford the Arizona Supreme Court the presumption that

“state courts know and follow the law” with respect to any of

7 Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011) (citation omitted).

 

8

 Slip op. at 5–7, 26–38.

9

See Lopez v. Ryan, 630 F.3d 1198, 1203–04 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Some

cases decided prior to Tennard applied a causal nexus requirement in an

impermissible manner. Other cases, however, properly looked to causal

nexus only as a factor in determining the weight or significance of

mitigating evidence.”); Poyson v. Ryan, 743 F.3d 1185, 1198 (9th Cir.

2013); Towery v. Ryan, 673 F.3d 933, 946 (9th Cir. 2012) (per curiam).

10 For a more accurate relation of the relevant Arizona Supreme Court

cases, see infra Section III.B.1.

11 See Lopez, 630 F.3d at 1203–04 (“In light of this backdrop, which

highlights a range of treatment of the nexus issue, there is no reason to

infer unconstitutional reasoning from judicial silence. Rather, we must

look to what the record actually says.”); Clabourne v. Ryan, 745 F.3d 362,

372–73 (9th Cir. 2014), petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc

pending, No. 09-99022 (9thCir. Mar. 18, 2014); Poyson, 743 F.3d at 1198

n.7; Schad v. Ryan, 671 F.3d 708, 723–24 (9th Cir. 2011); Greenway v.

Schriro, 653 F.3d 790, 807–08 (9th Cir. 2011).

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that court’s Eddings cases.12 Rather, the majority creates a

new and contrary presumption—that the Arizona courts did

not know or follow Eddings between 1989 and 2005—and

finds this presumption is not rebutted even where the Arizona

courts have clearly complied with Eddings’s mandate.13 Of

course, this process is quite contrary to the deferential

standard of review the Supreme Court has told us to use.

But the majority does not stop there. When the majority

turns to the record in this case, it misreads it. The majority

first suggests that when Judge Sheldon stated there was no

evidence that McKinney’s PTSD “in any way affected his

conduct in this case,” he applied an unconstitutional nexus

test to exclude the PTSD from consideration altogether.14 Not

so. At that portion of the hearing, Judge Sheldon was dealing

with, and rejecting, McKinney’s own argument that his PTSD

impaired his ability “to appreciate the wrongfulness of his

conduct” at the time of the murders. Next, the majority states

the Arizona Supreme Court “recited its unconstitutional

causal nexus test” when it decided McKinney’s appeal.15 The

court did no such thing; if it did state an unconstitutional

nexus test, this case would be simple. Finally, the majority

ignores the Arizona Supreme Court’s careful articulation of

Eddings’s requirements and focuses instead on a single case

 

12 Slip op. at 7.

 

13 See id.

 

14 Id. at 19–21, 42.

 

15 Id. at 21, 44–45, 57.

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citation in the Arizona opinion.16 None of this is permissible

under AEDPA.

In short, the majority ignores Supreme Court precedent,17

implicitly overrules our own precedent,18replaces AEDPA’s

deferential standard of review of state-court decisions with an

impermissible de novo standard, and misstates the record

when applying that standard. Also quite troubling, the

majority wrongly smears the Arizona Supreme Court and

calls into question every single death sentence imposed in

Arizona between 1989 and 2005 and our cases which have

denied habeas relief as to those sentences. Finally, the

majority brushes by the facts of McKinney’s gruesome

crimes to find that the error the majority has manufactured

was indeed prejudicial to the outcome of the sentencing,

rather than harmless, in contravention of the prejudice

standard stated in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619

(1993).

I respectfully dissent.

I.

This case should come down to a review of only a few

pages of the transcript from McKinney’s sentencing, and a

few pages from the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision

 

16 Id.

 

17 Visciotti, 537 U.S. at 22–24; Parker, 498 U.S. at 314–16.

18 See Clabourne, 745 F.3d at 372–73, petition for rehearing and

rehearing en banc pending, No. 09-99022 (9th Cir. Mar. 18, 2014);

Poyson, 743 F.3d at 1198 & n.7; Schad, 671 F.3d at 723–24; Greenway,

653 F.3d at 807–08; Lopez, 630 F.3d at 1203–04.

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affirming his sentence. State v. McKinney, 917 P.2d 1214,

1225–27, 1233–34 (Ariz. 1996). A brief discussion of the

sentencing proceeding and Arizona’s statute governing the

application of the death penalty may help analyze these few

pages.

A. The Statutory Scheme and McKinney’s Sentencing

Arguments

Arizona law separates mitigating evidence into two

categories, statutoryand nonstatutory. There are five statutory

mitigating factors under Arizona’s sentencing statute: mental

capacity, duress, minor participation, reasonable

foreseeability, and age. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-751(G)(1)–(5).19

The nonstatutory category is a catchall that requires the

sentencer to consider “any factors proffered by the defendant

or the state that are relevant in determining whether to impose

a sentence less than death,” id. § 13-751(G), “including any

aspect of the defendant’s character or any circumstances of

the offense relevant to determining whether a capital sentence

is too severe.” State v. White, 982 P.2d 819, 824 (Ariz. 1999).

McKinney’s sentencing memorandum included 11

separate parts; each argued for leniency for different reasons.

McKinney’s two primary arguments in support of leniency

were based on his troubled childhood and his claimed

resulting PTSD diagnosis. McKinney relied on his PTSD to

make two arguments in support of leniency. First, in Part VIII

of his sentencing memorandum, McKinney argued his PTSD

19 Arizona renumbered the statute in 2009, and it is now codified without

any changes at Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-751. See, e.g., Robinson v. Schriro,

595 F.3d 1086, 1111 (9th Cir. 2010). This dissent cites to the new location

of the statute.

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warranted leniency based on the statutory mitigation factor

§ 13-751(G)(1) (“Mental Capacity Factor”). The Mental

Capacity Factor requires the court to consider whether “[t]he

defendant’s capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his

conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law

was significantly impaired, but not so impaired as to

constitute a defense to prosecution.” Ariz. Rev. Stat.

§ 13-751(G)(1). McKinney argued his PTSD diminished his

capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct during

the murders of Christene Mertens and Jim McClain. It must

be kept in mind that it was McKinney who claimed a causal

nexus between his PTSD and his commission of the murders.

So the sentencing judge can hardly be faulted for considering

this as “nexus” evidence.

Second, in Parts I and VII of his sentencing

memorandum, McKinney argued his PTSD warranted

leniency separate from any effect that PTSD may have had on

him at the time of the murders. This argument did not assert

McKinney’s PTSD played a role in the two murders. Thus, it

did not fall under the statutoryMental CapacityFactor, or any

other specific statutory mitigation factor. See id. § 13-751(G)

(duress, minor participation, reasonable foreseeability, and

age). Instead, it fit under the nonstatutory catchall, quoted

above.

B. The PTSD Testimony

McKinney called Diana McKinney, his sister, Susan

Sesate, his aunt, and Dr. Mickey McMahon, a psychologist,

to testify. The state called Dr. Steven Gray in rebuttal to Dr.

McMahon’s testimony. McKinney’s sister and aunt testified

to the conditions of McKinney’s squalid, harsh childhood. Dr.

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McMahon opined McKinney’s childhood caused McKinney

to develop PTSD.

Dr. McMahon testified that McKinney was a “loner” and

not the type of criminal who would engage in “thrill-seeking

behavior,” such as committing a crime for the sake of the

excitement the crime provided. Instead, McKinney’s PTSD

would lead him to avoid confrontations and stressful

situations; and McKinney “tries to respond to [stress] by

withdrawing.” Dr. McMahon agreed that McKinney would

leave a stressful situation to avoid a confrontation if he could

do so.

Dr. McMahon testified there was a “high likelihood” that

McKinney’s PTSD was triggered during his confrontation

with his first victim, Christene Mertens, and McKinney’s

mental capacity was diminished as a result. With respect to

the McClain robbery and murder, Dr. McMahon admitted, “I

don’t have enough facts to say that [McKinney] was suffering

from diminished capacity.” Dr. McMahon testified that the

murder of McClain in his sleep “would be the exact opposite

of what I would expect from Mr. McKinney.” Those acts

were consistent with someone who seeks out stressful

situations rather than avoids them; it was a contra-indication

to the presence of PTSD.

The prosecution’s expert, Dr. Gray, did not diagnose

McKinney with PTSD. He did not “think there’s enough

evidence or diagnostic materials or work that’s been done to

conclusively diagnose him as having [PTSD].” His tentative

diagnosis was that McKinney has antisocial personality

disorder. He explained that “[m]ost antisocial people have [a]

major disturbance in thinking, not to be confused with

schizophrenia or psychosis. They tend to, for example blame

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others for their situation.” Dr. Gray noted antisocial people

typically avoid being a victim. Instead, “they want to be an

offender, be in control, be in charge, be powerful even though

the manner in which they do that is self-defeating, unhealthy

and is abusive, harmful to others.” Which is why “people

with antisocial personalityhave a long history of conflict with

the law.”

At the conclusion of the evidence, trial judge Sheldon

credited defense expert Dr. McMahon’s testimony that

McKinney had PTSD over Dr. Gray’s contrary opinion. He

found that Dr. McMahon’s opinion was entitled “to more

weight” than Dr. Gray’s testimony. He then adjourned for

three days to consider the evidence before ruling on

McKinney’s sentence.

C. Judge Sheldon Considers McKinney’s PTSD Evidence

Judge Sheldon imposed his sentence on July 23, 1993. At

the outset of that hearing, he found the prosecution proved

two aggravating factors for the Mertens murder: In the

language of the statute, McKinney(1) “committed the offense

as consideration for the receipt, or in expectation of the

receipt, of anything of pecuniary value”; and (2) “committed

the offense in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved

manner.” See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-751(F)(5)–(6). No one

disputes the solid footing in the record evidence for finding

both of these aggravating factors. McKinney and Hedlund

killed to get Mertens’s money. And before dispatching

Mertens with a bullet to her head, McKinney and Hedlund

savagely injured her. Judge Sheldon also found the

government proved two aggravating factors for the murder of

Jim McClain: (1) the pecuniary-gain aggravating factor; and

(2) that McKinney was “convicted of another offense in the

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United States for which under Arizona law a sentence of life

imprisonment or death was imposable,” i.e., the earlier

Mertens murder. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-751(F)(1), (5).

Again, no one disputes the basis for these findings.

McKinney and Hedlund killed McClain to get McClain’s

money, and McKinney was convicted for the earlier murder

of Mertens.

Judge Sheldon then addressed McKinney’s mitigation

evidence. Judge Sheldon started by crediting Dr. McMahon’s

testimony twice and accepting Dr. McMahon’s PTSD

diagnosis as true. Judge Sheldon then addressed McKinney’s

nexus argument for leniency under the statutory Mental

Capacity Factor, id. § 13-751(G)(1), which McKinney had

cited in his sentencing memorandum. Judge Sheldon stated

there was no evidence McKinney’s PTSD “in any way

significantly impaired Mr. McKinney’s conduct.” He

repeated that conclusion a second time moments later, where

he concluded there was no evidence that McKinney’s PTSD

“in any way affected his conduct in this case.”20Judge

Sheldon reached that conclusion based on McKinney’s

planning of the burglaries and statements McKinney made to

witnesses before the burglaries that he would shoot a resident

if he encountered one during the burglaries. Judge Sheldon

noted Dr. McMahon testified that a person suffering from

PTSD would be withdrawn and would “avoid contacts which

would either exacerbate or recreate the trauma that would

20 Early in its opinion, the majority admits that this language is directed

to McKinney’s argument for leniency under the statutory Mental Capacity

Factor. Slip op. at 19. The majority nonetheless suggests these statements

also show Judge Sheldon applied an unconstitutional nexus test. Id. at 20,

42. As I discuss in detail below, at this point in the sentencing colloquy,

Judge Sheldon is addressing the statutory mitigating factors and only the

statutory mitigating factors. See infra Section III.A.2.

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bring on this type of stress from childhood.” But McKinney

sought out stressful situations by planning and executing the

burglaries that led to the two murders. Judge Sheldon

concluded leniency was not available based upon the

statutory Mental Capacity Factor, and repeated a third time

his belief that the PTSD did not “significantly impair[]”

McKinney’s conduct.

This analysis of PTSD under the statutory mitigation

factors did not end Judge Sheldon’s consideration of

McKinney’s PTSD for purposes of mitigation. Judge Sheldon

next transitioned to address “the other mitigating factors

raised by the defense in their memorandum.”21 Those other

mitigation factors included, among others, McKinney’s Part

VII argument for leniency due to his difficult childhood and

his psychological history, including his PTSD. After finding

McKinney’s childhood did not support leniency, Judge

Sheldon concluded: “With respect to the other matters set out

in the [defendant’s sentencing] memorandum, I have

considered them at length, and after considering all of the

mitigating circumstances . . . I have determined that . . . the

mitigating circumstances simply are not sufficiently

substantial to call for a leniency under all of the facts of this

case.” (Emphasis added.) The court then sentenced

McKinney to death for both first-degree murder convictions.

A week later, Judge Sheldon sentenced McKinney’s

co-defendant, Michael Hedlund, to death.

21 This was the 27-page, 11-part sentencing memorandum, which Judge

Sheldon specifically cited by date during his sentencing colloquy.

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D. McKinney’s Direct Appeal to the Arizona Supreme

Court

McKinney appealed his sentence. See McKinney,

917 P.2d at 1232–34. The Arizona Supreme Court addressed

both McKinney’s and Hedlund’s sentences together in the

same opinion, taking Hedlund’s first. As is common practice

when a court addresses similar claims in the same opinion,

the Arizona Supreme Court more fully articulated the legal

standard applicable to both when it first addressed Hedlund’s

arguments. Id. at 1225–27. For Hedlund’s Eddings error

argument, the court detailed what Eddings requires:

Hedlund correctly observes that the trial judge

must consider any aspect of his character or

record and any circumstances of the offense

relevant to determining whether a sentence

less severe than death is appropriate. In

considering such material, however, the judge

has broad discretion to evaluate expert mental

health evidence and to determine the weight

and credibility given to it.

Id. at 1226. The court then rejected Hedlund’s argument that

Judge Sheldon failed to consider his mitigation evidence. Id.

at 1226–27.

The court reached the same conclusion for McKinney’s

Eddings argument: “Here again, the record shows that the

judge gave full consideration to McKinney’s childhood and

the expert testimony regarding the effects of that childhood,

specifically the diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder.”

Id. at 1234. The court concluded: “The record clearly shows

that the judge considered McKinney’s abusive childhood and

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MCKINNEY V. RYAN 71

its impact on his behavior and ability to conform his conduct

and found it insufficiently mitigating to call for leniency.” Id.

The court held Judge Sheldon did not err and affirmed

McKinney’s sentence. Id.

II.

A. What Eddings v. Oklahoma Requires and What It

Prohibits

Eddings’s command is simple. In Eddings, the trial judge

stated that “in following the law” he could not “consider the

fact of this young man’s violent background” in determining

whether to sentence him to death. Eddings, 455 U.S. at

112–13. The Supreme Court held the trial judge’s refusal to

consider the evidence was unconstitutional under the Eighth

Amendment. Id. at 113–15. “Just as the State may not by

statute preclude the sentencer from considering any

mitigating factor, neither may the sentencer refuse to

consider, as a matter of law, any relevant mitigating

evidence.” Id. at 113–14. Yet the Court made clear that the

sentencer “may determine the weight to be given relevant

mitigating evidence. But [it] may not give it no weight by

excluding such evidence from [its] consideration.” Id. at

114–15. In later cases, the Supreme Court clarified that the

sentencer cannot refuse to consider evidence because that

evidence does not bear a causal nexus to the crime. See, e.g.,

Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 287 (2004). We have

recognized that the sentencer may consider a “causal

nexus . . . as a factor in determining the weight or

significance of mitigating evidence.” Lopez v. Ryan, 630 F.3d

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1198, 1204 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Eddings, 455 U.S. at

114–15).22

B. The “Last Reasoned Decision”

AEDPA governs when we review a state’s determination

whether a prisoner’s rights under the federal Constitution

have been violated. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Under AEDPA,

our review is confined to the “last reasoned decision” of the

state courts. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803–04

(1991); Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir.

2005). The “last reasoned decision” is the most recent

“adjudication on the merits” that “finally resolve[s] the rights

of the parties on the substance of the claim, rather than on the

basis of a procedural or other rule precluding state review of

the merits.” Barker, 423 F.3d at 1092.

I agree with the majority that the Arizona Supreme

Court’s opinion on direct review is the “last reasoned

decision.” Slip op. at 41. I do not agree with the majority’s

22 A sentencer is free to assign whatever weight, including no weight,

that mitigating evidence deserves under the facts ofthe case, as long as the

sentencer does not exclude from his consideration relevant mitigating

evidence as a matter of law. See, e.g., Towery, 673 F.3d at 945 (“One

could question the wisdom of the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision to

accord Towery’s evidence little or no weight. . . . However, the court’s

reasoned and individualized decision to give Towery’s evidence little or

no weight was not contrary to Supreme Court precedent.”); Allen v. Buss,

558 F.3d 657, 667 (7th Cir. 2009) (“The rule of Eddings is that a

sentencing court may not exclude relevant mitigating evidence. But of

course, a court may choose to give mitigating evidence little or no

weight.” (citation omitted)); United States v. Johnson, 495 F.3d 951, 965

(8th Cir. 2007) (“[J]urors are obliged to consider relevant mitigating

evidence, but are permitted to accord that evidence whatever weight they

choose, including no weight at all.”).

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understanding of that opinion. The majority repeatedly refers

to the Arizona Supreme Court’s review of McKinney’s

sentence as a “de novo review.” See, e.g., id. at 4, 7, 9, 20, 41,

43, 56–57. The Arizona Supreme Court does independently

review each death sentence. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-755.

But the way it does its “independent review” is first to

conduct a normal appellate review to determine whether the

trial court made any legal errors when it imposed the death

sentence. See id. § 13-755(a)–(b). We owe this finding double

deference under AEDPA. See, e.g., Lopez v. Schriro,

491 F.3d 1029, 1037–38 & n.2 (9th Cir. 2007). After the

Arizona Supreme Court reviews for legal errors, it then

decides whether the death sentence is justified. See Ariz. Rev.

Stat. § 13-755(a)–(b); State v. Roseberry, 353 P.3d 847,

849–50 (Ariz. 2015) (“[T]his Court reviews the entire record

and independently considers whether a capital sentence is not

only legally correct, but also appropriate.”). Based on its own

incorrect notion of what “independent review” means in

Arizona practice, the majority converts this appellate review

of death sentences into a new sentencing determination and

treats McKinney’s trial-court sentencing hearing as irrelevant,

except insofar as the Arizona Supreme Court accepted Judge

Sheldon’s factual findings as its own. Slip op. at 21, 41–45.

Although at times we construe an appellate court’s

decision and a trial court’s decision together as the “last

reasoned decision,” we do so only when the appellate court

adopts the trial court’s decision. See, e.g., Barker, 423 F.3d

at 1093. That is not what occurred here. The Arizona

Supreme Court did not, as the majority posits, accept any of

Judge Sheldon’s factual findings as its own. See slip op. at 21,

41–45; McKinney, 917 P.2d at 1233–34. The court merely

reviewed McKinney’s argument that Judge Sheldon failed to

consider McKinney’s mitigation evidence and concluded,

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“On this record there was no error.” McKinney, 917 P.2d at

1234. It also “independently reviewed the record,” as it was

required to do under Arizona law, and affirmed McKinney’s

death sentence. Id.; see also id. at 1225 (explaining the

Arizona procedure for reviewing death sentences on direct

appeal). For that reason, the Arizona Supreme Court’s

opinion is the “last reasoned decision.” See Towery v. Ryan,

673 F.3d 933, 944 n.3 (9th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (refusing

the petitioner’s suggestion to “review the decisions of the

sentencing court and the [Arizona Supreme Court]

together”).23

C. AEDPA’s Deferential Review

The standard by which federal courts must review

state-court decisions under AEDPA is well known, if not

always well followed. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Under

§ 2254(d)(1), a federal court can issue a writ of habeas corpus

only if the state court’s decision “was contrary to, or involved

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States.” Id. § 2254(d)(1). Under § 2254(d)(2), a federal court

can issue the writ only if the state court’s decision “was based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” Id.

§ 2254(d)(2).

23 The majority’s error in reviewing Judge Sheldon’s colloquy as part of

the “last reasoned decision” makes no difference. To dispel any doubts,

as I explain below, the record shows both the Arizona Supreme Court and

Judge Sheldon complied with Eddings even under a de novo

review—which is the wrong standard under AEDPA. See infra Section III.

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We apply the “contrary to” prong of § 2254(d)(1) where,

as here, the parties dispute whether a state appellate court

applied the correct standard. See Woodford v. Visciotti,

537 U.S. 19, 22–24 (2002) (applying § 2254(d)(1) where the

parties disputed whether the California Supreme Court

applied the correct standard under Strickland). In this case, I

apply § 2254(d)(1) when analyzing whether the Arizona

Supreme Court used an unconstitutional nexus test in its

review of McKinney’s sentence.

The question whether a trial judge has considered all the

proffered mitigation evidence is a factual question, not a legal

one. See Lopez, 491 F.3d at 1037–38 & n.2. And a state

appellate court’s finding that the trial judge considered all the

proffered mitigation evidence is itself a factual finding. See

id.; see also Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308, 320 (1991). As

a result, I apply § 2254(d)(2) to the Arizona Supreme Court’s

finding that Judge Sheldon considered all of McKinney’s

mitigation evidence, which can be overturned only if it was

“unreasonable.” See Towery, 673 F.3d at 945 n.4; Lopez,

491 F.3d at 1037–38 & n.2. Judge Sheldon’s sentencing

colloquy is relevant only for making that determination.24

24 The majority’s faulty understanding of the Arizona Supreme Court’s

opinion leads it to conclude that I am wrong to apply § 2254(d)(2) in this

case. Slip op. at 56–57. We previously used § 2254(d)(2) in habeas review

of Arizona death sentences, see Towery, 673 F.3d at 945 n.4; Lopez,

491 F.3d at 1037–38 & n.2, as did Judge Wardlaw—who joins the

majority opinion—in her partial dissent to the original panel opinion in

this case, see McKinney v. Ryan, 730 F.3d 903, 925–27 (9th Cir. 2013)

(Wardlaw, J., dissenting in part). The majority’s disagreement on this

point creates a circuit split with at least two other circuits. See Corcoran

v. Neal, 783 F.3d 676, 685–87 (7thCir. 2015); Quince v. Crosby, 360 F.3d

1259, 1267 (11th Cir. 2004).

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III.

I begin by evaluating McKinney’s appeal under the

correct standard.25 That standard requires that we first

determine whether the Arizona Supreme Court’s decisionwas

“contrary to . . . clearly established Federal law” under

§ 2254(d)(1). Applied here, we must determine whether the

Arizona Supreme Court treated McKinney’s PTSD as

irrelevant to consider whether leniencywas justified, because

McKinney did not show the PTSD affected his conduct at the

time of the murders. If the Arizona Supreme Court treated the

PTSD as mitigation evidence relevant to whether leniency

was justified, we must then determine whether the Arizona

Supreme Court’s conclusion that Judge Sheldon fully

considered McKinney’s PTSD was an “unreasonable

determination of fact” under § 2254(d)(2).

A. The Correct Analysis of the Arizona Supreme Court’s

Decision

1.

This case primarily boils down to what standard the

ArizonaSupreme Court applied when addressingMcKinney’s

Eddings claim. “A decision is contrary to clearly established

law if the state court ‘applies a rule that contradicts the

governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases.’” Lafler v.

Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1390 (2012) (citation omitted);

Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 734 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc)

(“[U]se of the wrong legal rule or framework . . . constitute[s]

error under the ‘contrary to’ prong of § 2254(d)(1).”). The

25 The majority’s incorrect standard is dealt with later. See infra Section

III.B.

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state argues the Arizona Supreme Court correctly applied

Eddings; McKinney argues the Arizona Supreme Court

applied a “nexus” standard to exclude his PTSD from

consideration contrary to Eddings.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Visciotti governs our

analysis under the “contrary to” prong of § 2254(d)(1). See

Visciotti, 537 U.S. at 22–24. In Visciotti, the petitioner argued

the California Supreme Court applied the wrong standard for

what constitutes prejudicial error under Strickland. Id. To

prove such prejudice under Strickland, “the defendant must

establish a ‘reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedingwould have

been different.’” Id. at 22 (quoting Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)). In its opinion, the California

Supreme Court began its Strickland analysis by twice stating

the correct standard: “reasonable probability.” Id. at 22–23.

The opinion then misstated the “prejudice” standard four

times in other portions of the opinion because it used the term

“probable” instead of “reasonably probable.” Id. at 23.26

Relying on the misstatements, we found the California

Supreme Court applied the incorrect standard. Id. at 23–24.

The decision was therefore “contrary to” Strickland under

§ 2254(d)(1). Id.

In a per curiam opinion, and without the benefit of merits

briefing or oral argument, the Supreme Court reversed our

judgment. Id. at 22–24. The Court chided us for

mischaracterizing the California Supreme Court’s decision,

26 Petitioner Visciotti made the point that the “reasonably probable”

standard was an easier standard of proof for him to meet than the plain

“probable.” Visciotti v. Woodford, 288 F.3d 1097, 1108–09 (9th Cir.

2002).

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“which expressed and applied the proper standard for

evaluating prejudice.” Id. at 22. Our “readiness to attribute

error [was]inconsistent with the presumption that state courts

know and follow the law.” Id. at 24 (citing Parker, 498 U.S.

at 314–16 (1991)). Our “readiness to attribute error” was

“also incompatible with § 2254(d)’s ‘highly deferential

standard for evaluating state-court rulings,’ which demands

that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.”

Id. (quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 n.7 (1997)).

Visciotti’s teaching is not complicated. When we review

a state-appellate-court decision under the “contrary to” prong

of § 2254(d)(1), we must presume the state court knew and

followed federal constitutional law. Id. And we must give the

court the “benefit of the doubt.” Id. For that reason, we must

construe any ambiguity in language in the state court’s favor.

As applied to Eddings cases, when the state court identifies

and articulates the correct Eddings standard, we must

presume it applied that standard. That presumption can be

rebutted by any action by the state court that shows the state

court excluded the defendant’s mitigation evidence as a

matter of law. The easiest way to rebut the presumption

would be an express statement from the state court that it was

excluding evidence from consideration as a matter of law,

such as the trial judge’s statements in Eddings itself. See

Eddings, 455 U.S. at 112–13. However, that is not the only

way to rebut the presumption. If the state court’s reasoning

shows, without any ambiguity, that it did not consider

relevant mitigation evidence at all, that would suffice to rebut

the presumption. Any less deferential review rejects the

presumption that Visciotti requires. This is the analysis that

should replace our “clear indication” test for Eddings cases.

See, e.g., Schad v. Ryan, 671 F.3d 708, 724 (9th Cir. 2011)

(“Absent a clear indication in the record that the state court

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applied the wrong standard, we cannot assume the courts

violated Eddings’s constitutional mandates.”).

Applying Visciotti to this case is quick work. At no point

did the Arizona Supreme Court state either that Judge

Sheldon had excluded McKinney’s PTSD evidence as a

matter of law, or that it would have been permissible to do so,

under Arizona’s nonstatutory catchall because the PTSD bore

no nexus to the crime. Nor did the Arizona Supreme Court

treat that evidence as if it had no weight as a matter of law.

That should be the end of the matter and of McKinney’s

appeal. All the majority and McKinney do is speculate that,

regardless what it stated, the Arizona Supreme Court applied

a nexus test to conclude the PTSD evidence was irrelevant

under the nonstatutory catchall. Visciotti prohibits such

speculation.

But let us make a closer inquiry anyway to quell any

doubts raised by the majority’s flank attack on the Arizona

Supreme Court’s decision. That court first outlined the

Eddings standard when, in its combined review of Hedlund’s

and McKinney’s sentences, it stated:

Hedlund correctly observes that the trial judge

must consider any aspect of his character or

record and any circumstance of the offense

relevant to determining whether a sentence

less severe than the death penalty is

appropriate. In considering such material,

however, the judge has broad discretion to

evaluate expert mental health evidence and to

determine the weight and credibility given to

it.

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McKinney, 917 P.2d at 1226 (emphasis added). This is what

Eddings requires and all that it requires. See Harris v.

Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 512 (1995)(“[T]he Constitution does

not require a State to ascribe any specific weight to particular

factors, either in aggravation or mitigation, to be considered

by the sentencer.”). The Arizona Supreme Court then

confirmed it knew the difference between excluding

mitigation evidence altogether as a matter of law (Eddings

error) and giving mitigation evidence little or no weight as a

matter of fact (permissible under Eddings and Harris). See

McKinney, 917 P.2d at 1231 (noting that Judge Sheldon “did

not improperly exclude mitigating evidence at sentencing and

the mitigating evidence is not of great weight”).

The Arizona Supreme Court then found Judge Sheldon

complied with Eddings in McKinney’s case:

Here again, the record shows that the

judge gave full consideration to McKinney’s

childhood and the expert testimony regarding

the effects of that childhood, specifically the

diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder

(PTSD).

Id. at 1234 (emphasis added). The court continued:

[A] difficult family background, including

childhood abuse, does not necessarily have

substantial mitigating weight absent a

showing that it significantly affected or

impacted the defendant’s ability to perceive,

comprehend, or control his actions.

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Id. (emphasis added). In other words, when a difficult

background does affect the “defendant’s ability to perceive,

comprehend, or control his actions,” it has “substantial

mitigating weight.” When there is no such effect, the

evidence does not necessarily have substantial mitigating

weight, but it can have such weight. That is up to the

sentencer’s discretion.

The best McKinney can do is point to the Arizona

Supreme Court’s citation to State v. Ross, 886 P.2d 1354

(Ariz. 1994), which is a case where that court did indeed

misapply Eddings. But that single citation is insufficient to

rebut the presumption that the court knew and followed

Eddings. In Visciotti, the California Supreme Court misstated

the Strickland prejudice standard four times after stating it

correctly. Visciotti, 537 U.S. at 22–24. If actually misstating

the standard four times is insufficient to rebut the

presumption that the state court applied the correct standard

(Visciotti), then the lesser sin of citing a suspect case cannot

overcome the court’s correct statement of the law and the

presumption it applied that law (McKinney). That is why we

have previously held a single citation cannot be a basis for

finding Eddings error on AEDPA review. See Towery,

673 F.3d at 946. Indeed, a prior en banc panel of this court

rejected this exact argument in the less deferential,

pre-AEDPA context. See Jeffers v. Lewis, 38 F.3d 411, 415

(9th Cir. 1994) (en banc). As a result, we must conclude the

Arizona Supreme Court’s decision was not “contrary to . . .

clearly established Federal law.”

2.

I turn to the Arizona Supreme Court’s conclusion that

Judge Sheldon fully considered McKinney’s PTSD. That is

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a conclusion we review to determine whether it was an

“unreasonable determination of fact” under § 2254(d)(2). See

Lopez, 491 F.3d at 1037–38 & n.2. We are barred from

characterizing the Arizona Supreme Court’s “factual

determination[] as unreasonable ‘merely because we would

have reached a different conclusion in the first instance.’”

Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2277 (2015) (citation

omitted). “Instead, § 2254(d)(2) requires that we accord the

state . . . court substantial deference.” Id. “State-court factual

findings . . . are presumed correct; the petitioner has the

burden of rebutting the presumption by ‘clear and convincing

evidence.’” Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2199–2200

(2015) (citation omitted). If “‘reasonable minds reviewing the

record might disagree’ about the finding in question, ‘on

habeas review that does not suffice to supersede the [state

court’s] determination.’” Brumfield, 135 S. Ct. at 2277

(citation omitted).

It requires no strenuous effort to conclude that Judge

Sheldon fullyconsidered McKinney’s PTSD. First, unlike the

trial court judge in Eddings, at no point did Judge Sheldon

state he was excluding the PTSD from consideration under

the nonstatutory catchall as a matter of law because the PTSD

had no effect on McKinney’s criminal conduct. Quite the

opposite. Before sentencingMcKinney, Judge Sheldon stated

he “consider[ed] all of the mitigating circumstances.” That

alone should preclude us from concluding the Arizona

Supreme Court’s findingwas an “unreasonable determination

of fact.”

But even were we to indulge in de novo review of the

record, that review confirms that Judge Sheldon fully

considered McKinney’s PTSD. Judge Sheldon’s discussion

of McKinney’s mitigation arguments proceeded in three

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steps. First, at pages 26 to 28 of the sentencing transcript,

Judge Sheldon discussed the mitigation evidence McKinney

proffered, specifically citing McKinney’s sentencing

memorandum by date. Second, at pages 28 to 31, Judge

Sheldon addressed four statutory mitigating factors in Ariz.

Rev. Stat. § 13-751(G), including McKinney’s argument,

under § 13-751(G)(1), that his PTSD affected his mental state

at the time of the murders. Third, at pages 31 to 32, Judge

Sheldon addressed the nonstatutory mitigating factors

McKinney raised in his sentencing memorandum, including

McKinney’s argument for leniency under the nonstatutory

catchall due to his PTSD separate from its effect on his

mental state at the time of the murders.

That chronology proceeded as follows:

• At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, Judge

Sheldon credited Dr. McMahon’s testimony: “I do

believe that for purposes of this hearing that some

evidence of [McKinney’s] possible manifestations of

Post-traumatic Stress Syndrome were demonstrated

by the testimony of Dr. McMahon. And I’ll just—I

don’t know that I find it an overwhelmingly

persuasive mitigating factor, but I will tell you that

I’m, more inclined to believe that than Dr. Gray’s

determination that there is not enough evidence to

assume that there is Post-traumatic Stress Syndrome.”

Judge Sheldon later stated Dr. McMahon’s PTSD

diagnosis was entitled “to more weight under the

circumstances of this case.”

• Judge Sheldon began his discussion of McKinney’s

mitigation evidence at the sentencing hearing by

stating, “I have considered all the exhibits admitted

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into evidence, Numbers 1 through 8.” At least one of

those exhibits dealt with PTSD and its effects.27

• Judge Sheldon again credited defense witness Dr.

McMahon’s testimony: “[I]t appears, and I believe

that the statements made [about McKinney’s

childhood], both by Dr. McMahon and made by the

witnesses at the time they were testifying, were

truthful, and I did take them into consideration in this

case.” (Emphasis added.)

• Judge Sheldon then credited Dr. McMahon’s

testimony that McKinney’s childhood led him to

develop PTSD: “Forwhatever reasons, some of which

I believe were due to the traumatic circumstances that

he grew up in and the circumstances which were

testified to by the witnesses during the mitigation

hearing, the circumstances of child abuse, which I

accept as true for purposes of this hearing, I think

manifest the causal factors linked to Post-traumatic

Stress Syndrome as testified to by Dr. McMahon.”

After discussing an exhibit the defense proffered, Judge

Sheldon turned to the statutory mitigation factors under Ariz.

Rev. Stat. § 13-751(G). He first addressed McKinney’s

primary argument, contained in Part VIII of his sentencing

memorandum, that McKinney was entitled to leniency under

the statutoryMental CapacityFactor, § 13-751(G)(1) because

his PTSD affected him at the time of the murders:

27 The exhibits are not in the parties’ excerpts of record, but they are

discussed during the sentencing hearing.

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• Judge Sheldon began: “[I]t appeared to me that Dr.

McMahon did not at any time suggest in his

testimony nor did I find any credible evidence to

suggest that, even if the diagnosis of Post-traumatic

Stress Syndrome were accurate in Mr. McKinney’s

case, that in any way significantly impaired Mr.

McKinney’s conduct.” Judge Sheldon repeated that

conclusion a page later: “[A]nd it appeared to me that

based upon all these circumstances that there simply

was no substantial reason to believe that even if the

trauma that Mr. McKinney had suffered in childhood

had contributed to an appropriate diagnosis of

Post-traumatic Stress Syndrome that it in any way

affected his conduct in this case.”

• Judge Sheldon explained why he believed the PTSD

did not affect McKinney’s state of mind at the time of

the murders. Namely, McKinney’s pre-planning of

the burglaries and homicides was inconsistent with

Dr. McMahon’s testimony that PTSD would cause

McKinney to avoid confrontation rather than seek it

out.

• Judge Sheldon then concluded leniency was not

available under the Mental Capacity Factor,

§ 13-751(G)(1), again repeating his belief that the

PTSD did not “significantly impair[]” McKinney at

the time of the murders.

Judge Sheldon then addressed, and rejected, the other

statutory mitigation factors.

Finally, Judge Sheldon turned to McKinney’s

nonstatutory mitigation factors. McKinney’s sentencing

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memorandum argued in two separate parts (Parts I and VII)

that McKinneywas entitled to leniency for his PTSD separate

from any effect the PTSD had on his state of mind during the

murders. Part I of the memorandum was titled: “Evidence of

a Difficult Family History: Eddings v. Oklahoma, supra.” In

Part I, McKinney mentioned the childhood-caused PTSD as

a mitigating factor along with his difficult childhood. The

title’s citation to Eddings v. Oklahoma brought front and

center the constitutional requirement that the PTSD diagnosis

be considered without restriction. Part VII of the

memorandum was titled: “Psychological History.” There,

McKinney explained Dr. McMahon’s PTSD diagnosis and

stated: “Defendantsubmitsthat his psychological background

is mitigating.” Judge Sheldon made clear he considered both

of these sections:

• Judge Sheldon started: “With respect to the other

mitigating factors raised by the defense in their

memorandum, defendant’s mitigating memorandum

received by this Court July 15th, 1993, I have had an

opportunity to review that memorandum.” Judge

Sheldon then rejected the Part I argument that

McKinney’s childhood warranted leniency.

• Judge Sheldon then addressed the remaining

arguments McKinney made, which included Part

VII’s argument that McKinney’s PTSD warranted

leniency: “With respect to the other matters set out in

the memorandum, I have considered them at length,

and after considering all of the mitigating

circumstances, the mitigating evidence that was

presented by the defense in this case as against the

aggravating circumstances, and other matters which

clearly are not set forth in the statute which should be

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MCKINNEY V. RYAN 87

considered by the court, I have determined that . . .

the mitigating circumstances simply are not

sufficiently substantial to call for leniency under all of

the facts of this case.” (Emphasis added.)28

As the sentencing transcript shows, Judge Sheldon

considered “at length” McKinney’s sentencing

memorandum’s argumentsthat his PTSD diagnosis warranted

leniency without any reference to PTSD’s possible effect on

his mental capacity during the murders. And Judge Sheldon

found the PTSD did not carry enough mitigating weight “to

call for leniency.” When combined with Judge Sheldon’s

prior crediting of Dr. McMahon’s testimony as to the PTSD

diagnosis, the only conclusion to reach is that Judge Sheldon

complied with Eddings. Even were there an ambiguity in

Judge Sheldon’s statements (there isn’t), the Supreme Court

has admonished that “[w]e must assume that the trial judge

considered all this evidence before passing sentence. For one

thing, he said he did.” Parker, 498 U.S. at 314.29

28 It was only in Part VIII of the sentencing memorandum that

McKinney argued the causal relationship—“nexus”—between his PTSD

and his criminal conduct.

29 Nor was McKinney entitled to a “specific listing and discussion of

each piece of mitigating evidence under federal constitutional law.” See

Jeffers, 38 F.3d at 418 (“While ‘it is important that the record on appeal

disclose to the reviewing court the considerations which motivated the

death sentence,’ ‘due process does not require that the sentencer

exhaustively document its analysis of each mitigating factor as long as a

reviewing federal court can discern from the record that the state court did

indeed consider all mitigating evidence offered by the defendant.’”

(citation omitted) (quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 361 (1977)

(plurality opinion); Jeffries v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180, 1197 (9th Cir.

1993))).

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In short, the Arizona Supreme Court’s conclusion that

Judge Sheldon properly considered all of McKinney’s

mitigation evidence was not an “unreasonable determination

of fact.” In fact, it was the correct conclusion.30

B. The Majority’s Flawed Analysis

Perhaps because the Arizona Supreme Court was explicit

in its compliance with Eddings, the majority takes a very

different course to conclude McKinney’s death sentence is

invalid. The majority opinion proceeds in essentially two

steps. First, it falsely paints the Arizona Supreme Court as a

habitual violator of Eddings between 1989 and 2005. Based

on that false assertion, the majority concludes the Visciotti

presumption is automatically rebutted in this case and every

other Eddings case coming out of Arizona within that time

period. Slip op. at 7. In its place, the majority suggests the

presumption is flipped and engages in a sort of de novo

30 McKinney also argues the Arizona Supreme Court and Judge Sheldon

failed to consider his horrific childhood in violation of Eddings. The

majority does not address that claim, but the record makes clear that Judge

Sheldon considered that evidence too. He listened to lengthy testimony

about it; he mentioned it several times in his colloquy; and he expressly

stated: “I agree that there was evidence of a difficult family history by the

defendant. However, as I’ve indicated, I do not find that is a substantial

mitigating factor or that there was any evidence that linked that in any

way to demonstrate that . . . somehow significantly impaired the

defendant’s capacity to understand the wrongfulness of his conduct.”

(Emphasis added.) Just like the PTSD evidence, Judge Sheldon considered

McKinney’s childhood both as to its effect on McKinney at the time of the

crimes and independently from any effect it may have had. The Arizona

Supreme Court confirmed Judge Sheldon properly considered that

evidence: “[T]he record shows that the judge gave full consideration to

McKinney’s childhood and the expert testimony regarding the effects of

that childhood.” McKinney, 917 P.2d at 1234.

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MCKINNEY V. RYAN 89

review to see if Arizona has rebutted the presumption it

violated Eddings, with the burden of proof as to Eddings

compliance on the Arizona courts. Id. at 41–45, 50–54.

Second, the majority relies on a misreading of Judge

Sheldon’s sentencing colloquy and the Arizona Supreme

Court opinion to conclude the Arizona Supreme Court

violated Eddings despite that court’s correct articulation of

Eddings’s requirements. Id. I take each mistake in turn.

1.

The majority begins by acknowledging we are required to

presume state courts know and follow the law. Id. at 7. But it

concludes we should not afford the presumption in any

Arizona Eddings case because the Arizona Supreme

Court—like common-law courts generally—adheres to the

principle of stare decisis and “applied its unconstitutional

causal nexus test consistently throughout . . . the relevant

period.” Id. at 6–7, 55–56. Though such a presumption is

“appropriate in the great majority of habeas cases,” the

majority posits, “the presumption is rebutted here where we

know, based on its own words, that the Arizona Supreme

Court did not ‘know and follow’ federal law.” Id. at 7. In

other words, the majority relies on other Arizona Supreme

Court cases to conclude the Arizona Supreme Court in this

case is afforded no deference under AEDPA. Even if AEDPA

permitted this type of analysis (it doesn’t, and the majority

cites no case in support of it), the analysis is based on a false

premise. The Arizona courts did not consistently misapply

Eddings.

The majority asserts that Arizona cases show a uniform

error between 1989 and 2005. Id. at 26–38, 50–56. To see that

assertion is wrong, one need look no further than a case the

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Arizona Supreme Court decided a mere six weeks after it

decided McKinney’s appeal and squarely within that time

period. See State v. Towery, 920 P.2d 290 (Ariz. 1996).

There, the court cited to Eddings and its progeny for the

proposition that “[t]he sentencer . . . must consider the

defendant’s upbringing if proffered but is not required to give

it significant mitigating weight. How much weight should be

given proffered mitigating factors is a matter within the sound

discretion of the sentencing judge.” Id. at 311 (applying

Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989) (emphasis

added)). The Arizona Supreme Court rejected defendant

Towery’s argument that the trial judge failed to comply with

Eddings when he considered Towery’s background and “gave

it little or no mitigating value.” Id. And, on habeas review of

Towery, we concluded the Arizona Supreme Court complied

with Eddings when it affirmed Towery’s sentence. Towery,

673 F.3d at 944–46. In another case decided the same year as

McKinney’s appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court found the

defendant’s diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder to be

a mitigating circumstance even though it did not find a nexus

between that mental illness and the defendant’s crime. State

v. Thornton, 929 P.2d 676, 685–86 (Ariz. 1996) (“We agree

with the trial court that Thornton’s childhood, dysfunctional

family, and personality disorder are mitigating factors.”).

But Towery and Thornton are no outliers. A case decided

a year before McKinney’s appeal was decided, see State v.

Gonzales, 892 P.2d 838, 851 (Ariz. 1995) (applyingEddings),

and a case decided a year after it, see State v. Trostle,

951 P.2d 869, 885–86 (Ariz. 1997) (applying Lockett,

Eddings’s precursor), confirm the Arizona Supreme Court

knew how to apply Eddings correctly. Moreover, the Arizona

Supreme Court relied on non-nexus mitigation evidence to

vacate death sentences during the majority’s chosen time

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period, a fact our court has already recognized. See Lopez,

630 F.3d at 1203–04 (collecting cases for the proposition that

“the Arizona Supreme Court expressly took mitigating

evidence into consideration when reducing a death sentence

to life, regardless of any causal nexus to the crime”

(emphasis added)).

Still, the majority would have us believe the Arizona

SupremeCourt usually applied an unconstitutional nexus test.

It provides a long string citation in an attempt to prove its

point. Slip op. at 32–34. But the Arizona Supreme Court did

not even apply an invalid nexus test in many of the cases the

majority cites. The majority cites two cases where we have

already held on habeas review that the Arizona Supreme

Court did not commit Eddings error.31Indeed, as the majority

recognizes, we have found there was no Eddings error in six

additional cases during the relevant time period.32Id. at

38–39. The majority cites other cases where a federal district

court has held there was no Eddings error and appeal is

31 See State v. Towery, 920 P.2d 290, 310–11 (Ariz. 1996), habeasrelief

denied in Towery, 673 F.3d at 944–47; State v. Stokley, 898 P.2d 454, 473

(Ariz. 1995), habeas relief denied in part in Stokley v. Ryan, 705 F.3d 401,

404 (9th Cir. 2012) (explaining that “on balance, the Arizona Supreme

Court’s opinion suggests that the court did weigh and consider all the

evidence presented in mitigation at sentencing”).

32 Hedlund v. Ryan, 750 F.3d 793, 818 (9th Cir. 2014); Murray v.

Schriro, 746 F.3d 418, 455 (9th Cir. 2014); Clabourne, 745 F.3d at

371–74, petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc pending, No. 09-

99022 (9th Cir. Mar. 18, 2014); Poyson, 743 F.3d at 1196–1200; Schad,

671 F.3d at 722–26; Lopez, 630 F.3d at 1203–04.

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pending.

33

Id. at 33–34. The majority also cites cases as

examples of Eddings error where the Arizona Supreme Court

gave little weight to mitigation evidence because there was no

nexus between that evidence and the murder.34Id. at 33. But

giving little or no weight to such evidence as a factual matter

is perfectly permissible under Eddings. See, e.g., Lopez, 630

F.3d at 1204. Finally, the two cases upon which the majority

most heavily relies, State v. Djerf, 959 P.2d 1274 (Ariz.

1998), and State v. Hoskins, 14 P.3d 997 (Ariz. 2000), came

years after the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed McKinney’s

sentence. See slip op. at 29–32.

A close review of the majority’s string cite shows that, at

worst, the Arizona Supreme Court sometimes misapplied

Eddings in the years before that court affirmed McKinney’s

sentence. See, e.g., Ross, 886 P.2d at 1363; State v. Wallace,

773 P.2d 983, 986 (Ariz. 1989). It is for that reason that we

have always rejected the majority’s conclusion that the

Arizona Supreme Court consistently applied an

33 See State v. Martinez, 999 P.2d 795 (Ariz. 2000), habeas relief denied

in Martinez v. Schriro, No. CV-05-1561-PHX-EHC, 2008 WL783355, at

*33 (D. Ariz. Mar. 20, 2008), appeal pending sub nom. Martinez v. Ryan,

No. 08-99009 (9th Cir. May 29, 2008); State v. Rienhardt, 951 P.2d 454

(Ariz. 1997), habeas relief denied in Rienhardt v. Ryan, 669 F. Supp. 2d

1038, 1059–60 (D. Ariz. 2009), appeal pending, No. 10-99000 (9th Cir.

Jan. 8, 2010).

34 State v. Jones, 917 P.2d 200, 219 (Ariz. 1996) (“A difficult family

background is not necessarily a mitigating circumstance unless defendant

can show that something in his background had an effect on his behavior

that was beyond his control.” (emphasis added)); State v. Bible, 858 P.2d

1152, 1209 (Ariz. 1993) (“In sum, our independent review of the record

shows no significant mitigating evidence.” (emphasis added)).

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unconstitutional nexus test during this time period.35 As a

result, we have alwaysrejected the argument that the Arizona

Supreme Court’s prior mistakes in this area are relevant to the

decision before us.36In fact, we have specifically rejected the

argument that the Arizona Supreme Court is not entitled to

the Visciotti presumption in Eddings cases. See Poyson v.

Ryan, 743 F.3d 1185, 1198 (9th Cir. 2013). The majority

today overrules these precedents sub silentio, and concludes

Arizona is not entitled to the Visciotti presumption because

Arizona has on occasion misapplied Eddings before.

The majority’s response to the cases involving Eddings

compliance reveals its view of the Arizona courts: No matter

what the Arizona courts say, they never really considered all

of the mitigation evidence. See slip op. at 50–56. For

example, we previously held in Lopez that Arizona complied

with Eddings during this time period and relied in part on

three cases for that conclusion. See Lopez, 630 F.3d at 1204

n.4 (citing State v. Trostle, 951 P.2d 869 (Ariz. 1997); State

v. Mann, 934 P.2d 784 (Ariz. 1997); State v. Medrano,

914 P.2d 225 (Ariz. 1996)). The majority gets around those

cases by disregarding the parts of the cases that show the

Arizona Supreme Court quite understood and applied

35 See Poyson, 743 F.3d at 1198; Towery, 673 F.3d at 946; Lopez,

630 F.3d at 1203–04.

36

See Poyson, 743 F.3d at 1198 n.7 (“We reject the suggestion that

because other Arizona cases may have involved causal nexus error we

should presume that this case did as well.”); see also Clabourne, 745 F.3d

at 372–73, petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc pending, No. 09-

99022 (9th Cir. Mar. 18, 2014); Schad, 671 F.3d at 723–24 (finding the

Arizona Supreme Court did not apply an unconstitutional nexus test in an

opinion filed eight months after the court’s Wallace decision); Greenway,

653 F.3d at 807–08; Lopez, 630 F.3d at 1203–04.

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Eddings’s mandate.37 Slip op. at 53–54. The majority

37 These cases show the Arizona Supreme Court understood that Eddings

requires consideration of non-nexus mitigation evidence but that the

sentencing court retains discretion over howmuch weight, if any, to afford

such evidence. In Trostle, the Arizona Supreme Court explicitly discussed

Eddings’s mandate and concluded, “In considering evidence of mental

impairment, our primary task is to determine its mitigating weight, if any.”

951 P.2d at 885–86. The court expressly considered numerous pieces of

non-nexus mitigating evidence: Trostle’s cooperation with the police, past

drug and alcohol abuse, good conduct during trial, loving family

relationships, ability to function well in a structured environment, lack of

a prior felony conviction, and remorse. Id. at 887. The Arizona Supreme

Court noted that the trial court should have considered such evidence and

factored the evidence into its independent reweighing of the aggravating

and mitigating factors. Id. at 887–88. The court reduced Trostle’s death

sentence to life imprisonment. Id. at 888.

In Mann, the Arizona Supreme Court reviewed four pieces of nonnexus mitigating evidence and found Mann did not “establish[] mitigation

of sufficient weight to call for leniency.” 934 P.2d at 795. The majority

concedes that the Arizona Supreme Court considered, but gave little

weight to, two pieces of non-nexus mitigating evidence: Mann’s

relationship with his children and a change in Mann’s lifestyle post-dating

his crimes. Slip op. at 53–54. The majority contends, however, that the

court “held that defendant’s difficult family background was irrelevant as

a matter of law.” Id. at 54. The Arizona Supreme Court did no such thing.

It stated “[a]n abusive family background is usually given significant

weight as a mitigating factor only when the abuse affected the defendant’s

behavior at the time of the crime.” Mann, 934 P.2d at 795 (emphasis

added). This statement is entirely consistent with Eddings: It shows the

court understood it could ascribe Mann’s family background the

mitigating weight it deserves. Cf. supra Section III.A.1. The majority also

contends Mann’s citation to Wallace shows the Arizona Supreme Court

applied an unconstitutional causal-nexus test to Mann’s evidence of a

troubled family background. Slip op. at 54. However, the court also cited

a case in which it did not ascribe “much weight” to the defendant’s

“difficult family background,” which is entirely consistent with Eddings.

See Mann, 934 P.2d at 795 (citing State v. West, 862 P.2d 192, 211–12

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similarly gives short shrift to State v. Thornton, 929 P.2d 676

(Ariz. 1996), and State v. Gonzales, 892 P.2d 838 (Ariz.

1995).38 Slip op. at 52–53.

The majority is grasping at straws. First, the majority has

flipped the presumption to require us to presume the Arizona

courts violated Eddings. No law or case is cited for this

proposition. Second, those cases demonstrate compliance

(Ariz. 1993), overruled on other grounds by State v. Rodriguez, 961 P.2d

1006 (Ariz. 1998)).

In Medrano,the Arizona Supreme Court reviewed Medrano’s cocaine

use both as a statutory mitigating factor and as a nonstatutory mitigating

factor. 914 P.2d at 227–29. The court found Medrano’s cocaine use did

not qualify as a statutory mitigating factor under Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-

751(G)(1) because Medrano failed to prove his cocaine use significantly

impaired his ability to conform his conduct to the law or appreciate the

wrongfulness of his actions. Id. at 228. The Arizona Supreme Court

acknowledged it was required to consider Medrano’s cocaine use

regardless any causal connection, but found Medrano’s cocaine use

unpersuasive as mitigating evidence. Id. at 229 (citing State v. Ramirez,

871 P.2d 237, 252 (Ariz. 1994) (“[A]lthough [courts] must consider all

evidence offered in mitigation, they are not bound to accept such evidence

as mitigating.” (alterationsin original))). The court then noted that the trial

court, consistent with Eddings, rejected Medrano’s “claim that cocaine

intoxication, under these facts, is sufficiently mitigating to call for

leniency.” Id.; see also id. (“Judges are presumed to know and follow the

law and to consider all relevant sentencing information before them.”).

 

38 The majority takes issue with Thornton’s citation to Ross, slip op. at

53, but ignores that the citation to Ross is for a point that is irrelevant to

the majority’s analysis. See Thornton, 929 P.2d at 686 (“Thornton argues

that his cooperation with law enforcement is a mitigating factor.

Thornton’s admission of guilt after he was stopped and his offer to admit

guilt in exchange for the state withdrawing the request for the death

penalty furthered his own interest. Cooperation that is in the best interest

of the accused is not a mitigating circumstance. State v. Ross . . . .”).

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with Eddings sufficient to rebut this newly created flipped

presumption. Look at Gonzales. There, the Arizona Supreme

Court explained that “[i]n capital sentencing proceedings, the

trial court must consider the mitigating factors in [Ariz. Rev.

Stat.] § 13-703(G) as well as any aspect of the defendant’s

background or the offense relevant to determining whether

the death penalty is appropriate.” Gonzales, 892 P.2d at 850

(emphasis added). The court later noted:

From the detailed special verdict, it is

clear that the trial court considered all

evidence offered in mitigation. He was

required to do no more. See Eddings v.

Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982)

(applying the rule in Lockett v. Ohio that the

“sentencer in capital punishment cases must

be permitted to consider any relevant

mitigating factor”).

Id. at 851. Does that not show the Arizona Supreme Court

here complied with Eddings? What else could the court have

done to overcome the majority’s flipped presumption?

In short, the majority’s response to those cases showing

compliance with Eddings is nothing short of an act of

contortion. See slip op. at 50–56. It cannot escape the fact that

the Arizona Supreme Court applied Eddings correctly during

the relevant time period. As a result, there is no reason to

invert the presumption that the Arizona courts knew and

followed the law into a presumption they did not.

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2.

After freeing itself from the presumption that state courts

know and follow the law, the majority engages in de novo

review and concludes the Arizona courts here applied an

unconstitutional nexus test. Id. at 41–45. As I have shown,

even a de novo review shows there was no Eddings error. The

majority reaches the opposite conclusion largely by

selectively reading—better said, misreading—the record.

To start, the majority states that the Arizona Supreme

Court accepted Judge Sheldon’s conclusions, at pages 28 and

29 of the sentencing transcript, that McKinney’s PTSD did

not affect his state of mind at the time of the murders and, in

any event, would have influenced him not to commit the

murders. Id. at 41–45. The majority suggests this part of the

sentencing colloquy “echoes” the Arizona Supreme Court’s

nexus test and implies these statements show the court

applied a nexus test to exclude McKinney’s PTSD evidence

from consideration under the nonstatutory mitigation factor.

Id. at 19–22, 41–45. But the majority admits these statements

are directed to Judge Sheldon’s analysis of the statutory

mitigating factors, which, as I have explained, is the correct

understanding. Id. at 19–20. So, even if the Arizona Supreme

Court accepted Judge Sheldon’s conclusion that there was no

causal connection between McKinney’s PTSD and the

murders, there was no error.

Moreover, the majority’s analysis rests on an assumption

that the Arizona Supreme Court accepted a single factual

finding by Judge Sheldon and ignored the rest of Judge

Sheldon’s sentencing colloquy. As I have already explained,

the Arizona Supreme Court did not rely on any of Judge

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Sheldon’s factual conclusions.39 But if the Arizona Supreme

Court did accept any of Judge Sheldon’s findings regarding

McKinney’s mitigation evidence, it accepted all of them. See

McKinney, 917 P.2d at 1234 (“[T]he record shows that the

judge gave full consideration to McKinney’s childhood and

the expert testimony regarding the effects of that childhood,

specifically the diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder.”

(emphasis added)); id. (“The record clearly shows that the

judge considered McKinney’s abusive childhood and its

impact on his behavior and ability to conform his conduct.”

(emphasis added)).40 The majority’s selective reading of

39 The Arizona Supreme Court merely reviewed whether Judge Sheldon

considered all of McKinney’s mitigation evidence, found “[t]he record

clearly shows that the judge considered McKinney’s” mitigation evidence,

and concluded, “On this record there was no error.” McKinney, 917 P.2d

at 1234. It did not accept Judge Sheldon’s factual findings as part of its

own review of McKinney’s sentence.

40 During Hedlund’s sentencing colloquy, Judge Sheldon specifically

cited to Eddings and Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), and explained

those cases required him to “weigh carefully, fairly, objectively, all of the

evidence offered at sentencing, recognizing that not everyone who

commits murder should be put to death.” Hedlund v. Ryan, 750 F.3d 793,

816 (9th Cir. 2014). Judge Sheldon then considered Hedlund’s alcohol

abuse: “The Court has concluded that although evidence of alcohol use [is

not] a mitigating circumstance under (G)(1), [it] nevertheless should be

considered as mitigating evidence.” (Emphasis added.) Judge Sheldon

later reiterated that point: “The defendant’s dependent personality traits,

his past drug and alcohol abuse, and child abuse have been considered by

the Court. If not demonstrating the existence of the mitigating factors

under (G)(1), they have nevertheless been given consideration by the

Court.” (Emphasis added.) He then concluded with a discussion of

Hedlund’s childhood evidence: “I have considered [that evidence]. I think

it is the court’s obligation to consider, whether or not it complies with the

requirements in (G)(1).” (Emphasis added.) The majority fails to explain

why the Arizona Supreme Court ignored this discussion even though the

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Judge Sheldon’s analysis is therefore wrong on multiple

levels. It is also irrelevant to the outcome of the case. That the

Arizona Supreme Court may have accepted Judge Sheldon’s

conclusion that the evidence showed McKinney’s PTSD did

not affect his conduct does not show Eddings error. To

violate Eddings the court must have excluded the evidence

from consideration altogether because of the lack of a nexus.

The rest of the majority’s evaluation of the Arizona

Supreme Court’s decision is just as flawed. The majority first

asserts, citing Djerf for support, that the Arizona Supreme

Court did not really consider McKinney’s PTSD evidence

even though it used the word “considering.” Slip op. at

43–43. That is nonsense. The referenced case, Djerf, came

two years after McKinney’s appeal. See Djerf, 959 P.2d at

1274. It is irrelevant to the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision

in this case.

Next, the majority conclusorily asserts that the Arizona

Supreme Court “recited its unconstitutional causal nexus

test.” Slip op. at 21, 44, 57. It did? If the Arizona Supreme

Court recited a causal-nexus test, then why would the

majority need so many pages to reach the conclusion that the

court did, in fact, apply a causal-nexus test? It appears the

majority believes the following to be an unconstitutional

nexus test:

[A] difficult family background, including

childhood abuse, does not necessarily have

substantial mitigating weight absent a

showing that it significantly affected or

court reviewed Hedlund’s and McKinney’s death sentences in the same

opinion.

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impacted the defendant’s ability to perceive,

comprehend, or control his actions.

McKinney, 917 P.2d at 1234 (emphasis added). Not so. As I

have noted, this statement means that when a difficult

background does affect the “defendant’s ability to perceive,

comprehend, or control his actions,” it has “substantial

mitigating weight.” But when there is no such effect, the

evidence does not necessarily have substantial mitigating

weight, but it can have such weight. For that reason, I am at

a loss to understand the majority’s conclusion that the

Arizona Supreme Court recited an unconstitutional nexustest.

Finally, the majority relies on the Arizona Supreme

Court’s citation to Ross. See slip op. at 42–45; Ross, 886 P.2d

at 1363. Visciotti forecloses any reliance on the citation to

Ross to find Eddings error.41 But even if we looked at the

Arizona Supreme Court’s citation to Ross without the

Visciotti presumption, we should conclude that court applied

Eddings correctly. The court correctly stated Eddings’s

requirements several times. See McKinney, 917 P.2d at

1226–27, 1234. The majority’s reliance on that citation,

rather than the words the Arizona Supreme Court actually

used, demonstrates the majority is applying the flipped

41 To that end, the majority implicitly overrules our prior en banc

decision where we held a citation to a suspect case does not show the

Arizona court misapplied Eddings. See Jeffers, 38 F.3d at 415.

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presumption it references elsewhere in its opinion.42See slip

op. at 7, 50–56.

In short, none of the reasons the majority relies on support

its conclusion that the Arizona Supreme Court misapplied

Eddings.

IV. The Harmless-Error Analysis

The majority’s final mistake comes in its harmless-error

analysis.43 Habeas petitioners “are not entitled to habeas relief

42 The majority claims that a single citation to Ross in the Arizona

Supreme Court’s opinion renders the court’s treatment of McKinney’s

mitigating evidence suspect. Slip op. at 42–45. By that logic, a citation to

Eddings, Lockett, Eddings’s precursor, or State v. McMurtrey, 664 P.2d

637 (Ariz. 1983), an Arizona Supreme Court case the majority

acknowledges applies Eddings correctly, should demonstrate compliance

with Eddings. See, e.g., State v. Canez, 42 P.3d 564, 593 (Ariz. 2002)

(citing Lockett and McMurtrey); State v. Sharp, 973 P.2d 1171, 1183

(Ariz. 1999) (citing Lockett); Trostle, 951 P.2d at 885–86 (citing Lockett

and McMurtrey); Towery, 920 P.2d at 311 n.2 (citing Eddings and

Lockett); Gonzales, 892 P.2d at 851 (citing Eddings, Lockett, and

McMurtrey); Bible, 858 P.2d at 1209 (citing McMurtrey); State v. Brewer,

826 P.2d 783, 802 (Ariz. 1992) (citing McMurtrey); State v. White,

815 P.2d 869, 889 (Ariz. 1991) (citing Lockett); State v. Walton, 769 P.2d

1017, 1034 (Ariz. 1989) (citing Lockett).

43 I agree that Eddings error is not structural and is instead subject to

harmless-error analysis, as we have already recognized. Henry v. Ryan,

720 F.3d 1073, 1089 (9th Cir. 2013). Indeed, most circuits have held

Eddings error is not structural. See Campbell v. Bradshaw, 674 F.3d 578,

596 (6th Cir. 2012); McGehee v. Norris, 588 F.3d 1185, 1197 (8th Cir.

2009); Ferguson v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Corr., 580 F.3d 1183, 1201 (11th

Cir. 2009); Martini v. Hendricks, 348 F.3d 360, 371 (3d Cir. 2003);

Bryson v. Ward, 187 F.3d 1193, 1205–06 (10th Cir. 1999); Boyd v.

French, 147 F.3d 319, 327–28 (4th Cir. 1998); Williams v. Chrans,

945 F.2d 926, 949 (7th Cir. 1991). But see Nelson v. Quarterman,

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based on trial error unless they can establish that it resulted in

‘actual prejudice.’” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637 (citation omitted).

We can grant habeas relief only if we have “grave doubt

about whether a trial error of federal law had ‘substantial and

injurious effect or influence in determining the [sentencer’s]

verdict.’” O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 436 (1995)

(citation omitted). There must be more than a “reasonable

possibility” that an error was harmful. Brecht, 507 U.S. at

637. Anything less puts the state to the “arduous task [of

retrying a defendant] based on mere speculation that the

defendant was prejudiced by trial error.” Calderon v.

Coleman, 525 U.S. 141, 146 (1998) (per curiam). Here,

would lack of consideration of McKinney’s PTSD cause us

to have “grave doubt” that Judge Sheldon would have

imposed the death sentence? No.

Judge Sheldon found the prosecution established four

aggravating factors, two as to each of the murders. See Ariz.

Rev. Stat. § 13-751(F)(1), (5)–(6). First, Judge Sheldon found

McKinney committed not one, but two murders, i.e., the

murders of Mertens and McClain. Second, he found Mertens

was murdered “in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved

manner.” For that finding, Judge Sheldon credited testimony

that McKinney admitted to his father that he shot Mertens.

Judge Sheldon then explained the evidence at trial “showed

that [Mertens] struggled violently to survive before being

killed by a shot to the head.” There were numerous “non-fatal

wounds” and a “substantial amount of blood over large areas

of [Mertens’s] body, and the house, the bottom of her shoes,

her slippers, which suggests that a struggle occurred while

she was conscious.” He concluded it was reasonable to

472 F.3d 287, 314 (5th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (finding Eddings error to be

structural).

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assume Mertens “suffered tremendous physical torment prior

to her death.” The murder was therefore “cruel.” At the very

least, Judge Sheldon found the “violence was gratuitous” and

“clearly” unnecessary, which supported a finding that

McKinney’s state of mind was “heinous and depraved.”

Finally, Judge Sheldon found McKinney committed both

murders with the expectation that they would lead to

pecuniary gain. The Arizona Supreme Court did not disturb

any of these findings on direct appeal. McKinney, 917 P.2d at

1233–34.

The majority opinion treats these aggravating factors as

an afterthought. See slip op. at 49–50. It daintily elides a

description of the facts by which the murders were

committed. Yet the majority claims to have conducted a

harmless-error analysis without giving the aggravating factors

“short shrift.” See id. Properly considered, these factors show

the alleged failure to consider McKinney’s PTSD, had it

occurred, would have been harmless. As McKinney’s expert

admitted, there was no evidence that McKinney’s PTSD

affected McKinney’s state of mind at the time of the murders.

And Judge Sheldon found there was no link. Had Judge

Sheldon not considered the PTSD diagnosis, forcing him to

do so would not have altered the result. He would have given

the PTSD diagnosis little weight (indeed, he did give it little

weight).

The evidence of McKinney’s childhood was much more

compelling than his PTSD. As the majority thoroughly

outlines, the evidence showed McKinney’s childhood was

horrible. Id. at 9–15. But that only bolsters the conclusion that

the Arizona courts’ alleged failure to consider McKinney’s

PTSD was harmless. If McKinney’s horrific childhood was

not enough to justify leniency, then why would McKinney’s

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resulting PTSD, which had no effect on McKinney at the time

of the murders, have changed anything? I suppose it is

possible that McKinney’s PTSD would have nudged Judge

Sheldon across the line to leniency on the supposition that

“anything is possible”; but that is not the test for harmless

error. “Possibility” does not mean “grave doubt” that the

failure to consider the PTSD had a “substantial and injurious

effect or influence in determining [his] verdict.” O’Neal,

513 U.S. at 436. The brutal nature of the Mertens murder, the

finding that McKinney committed the two murders for

pecuniary gain, and the fact that McKinney had committed

multiple murders all weigh heavily in favor of the death

penalty. The failure to consider the marginal mitigating

weight of McKinney’s PTSD could not have affected the

outcome. McKinney has not shown “actual prejudice,” and

thus any error in McKinney’s sentencing was harmless.

* * *

The majority’s application of § 2254(d)(1) will have

far-reaching effects beyond this case. Most immediately, the

opinion potentially undermines everyArizona death sentence

between 1989 and 2005. If we cannot find the Arizona

Supreme Court complied with Eddings in this case, where it

stated the Eddings standard correctly and made explicit

findings that illustrate it observed Eddings to avoid error,

then I don’t quite see how future cases could come out

differently. The ineluctable effect from today’s majority is

that, no matter what they said or did during this time period,

Arizona courts violated Eddings. This is not idle speculation.

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The majoritymay have already passed judgment on two cases

that are currently pending appeal before our court.44

Most importantly, the majority’s reliance on other

Arizona Supreme Court cases will spread to all § 2254(d)(1)

cases. Before today, we applied the correct standard under

§ 2254(d)(1). See, e.g., Elmore v. Sinclair, 781 F.3d 1160,

1168 (9th Cir. 2015). After today, three-judge panels must

abandon the correct standard and apply not the deference the

Supreme Court instructs, but the majority’s analysis. See

generally Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2003) (en

banc). We will be flooded with string citations claiming to

show how state appellate courts have misapplied the federal

Constitution in past cases. And petitioners will rely on those

cases to argue we cannot presume those courts applied the

law correctly. This cannot be how AEDPA operates, which

this court recognized when it previously rejected the

arguments the majority revives today.

I conclude by noting that, today, we once again misapply

AEDPA. But we do so only in this case. In our future cases,

the Supreme Court should not presume we always misapply

AEDPA because of today’s decision or because of prior

reversals in this area. That is, one hopes the Supreme Court

will not apply a past performance test to us similar to that

which the majority opinion applies to the Arizona Supreme

Court.

I respectfully dissent.

44 See Martinez, 2008 WL 783355, at *33, appeal pending sub nom.

Martinez v. Ryan, No. 08-99009 (9th Cir. May 29, 2008); Rienhardt,

669 F. Supp. 2d at 1059–60, appeal pending, No. 10-99000 (9th Cir. Jan.

8, 2010).

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