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Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 6, 1995 Decided March 3, 1995

Nos. 93-5336 & 93-5348

PERSONAL WATERCRAFT INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION;

A. MASON KILLEBREW, JR.; DEREK COPPERSMITH,

APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS

v.

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE; NATIONAL OCEANIC

AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION,

APPELLANTS/CROSS-APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(93cv1381)

Ellen J. Durkee, Attorney, United States Department of Justice, argued the cause for appellants.

With her on the briefs were Lois J. Schiffer, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Charles R. Shockey

and David C. Shilton, Attorneys, United States Department of Justice.

Robert B. Dickson argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Michael A. Wiegard

and Randall M. Stone.

Before: BUCKLEY, RANDOLPH, and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge RANDOLPH.

RANDOLPH, Circuit Judge: These are cross-appeals from the district court's judgment setting

aside one of the regulations designed to protect and preserve the Monterey Bay National Marine

Sanctuary off the central California coast. The regulation governs the use of "motorized personal

watercraft"jet skis, wet bikes, miniature speed boats, air boats, hovercraft, and the likeon the

Sanctuary's waters. The district court thought it arbitrary to regulate this sort of small craft without

regulating other vessels. We reverse this portion of the court's judgment.

I

The Monterey Bay National Marine Sanctuary encompasses 4000 square nautical miles of

coastal and ocean waters, and the submerged lands thereunder. It is the nation's largest ocean

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sanctuary, spreading seaward as far as forty-six nautical miles, and extending along the California

coast from the Gulf of Farallones in the north to San Simeon and Cambria Rock in the south. It

encompasses the Monterey Peninsula, the "finest meeting of land and water in existence," so Robert

Louis Stevenson believed. The area is home to thirty-one species of marine mammals, including the

sea otter and twenty-one other threatened or endangered species protected under the Endangered

Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544. There are large concentrations of whales, pinnipeds (e.g.,

seals) and seabirds. Fish stocks are substantial. Varieties of crustaceans and other invertebrates

abound. Among the Sanctuary's diverse flora are forests of giant kelp growing from the seabed, with

fronds towering to the surface as much as 175 feet above. Residents and visitors use the Sanctuary

for kayaking, fishing, scuba diving, surfing, sailing, swimming, and other recreational activities.

Title III of the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act (the Act), as amended, 16

U.S.C. §§ 1431-1439, authorizes the Secretary of Commerce to designate as national marine

sanctuaries discrete areas of the marine environment that are "of special national significance." 16

U.S.C. § 1433(a). In 1988, Congress directed the Secretary to issue a "notice of designation" under

16 U.S.C. § 1434(b)(1) for the waters in the vicinity of Monterey Bay "no later than December 31,

1989." Pub. L. No. 100-627, § 205(a)(3), 102 Stat. 3213, 3217 (1988). The National Oceanic and

Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), to whomthe Secretaryhad delegated authority, complied, but

not until August 3, 1990, when it published in the FederalRegister a notice of proposed designation,

proposed implementing regulations, and a draft environmental impact statement discussing options

for managing the proposed sanctuary. 55 Fed. Reg. 31,786 (Aug. 3, 1990). The agency requested

comments within sixty days (by October 2, 1990).

In June 1992, after three public hearings and after receiving more than 1200 comments,

NOAA issued its Final Environmental Impact Statement and, on September 18, 1992, its final

regulations formalizing the designation of the Monterey Bay National Marine Sanctuary. 57 Fed.

Reg. 43,310 (Sept. 18, 1992); 15 C.F.R. pt. 944.

One of the final regulations, 15 C.F.R. § 944.5(a)(8), limits the operation of "motorized

personal water craft," also known as "thrill craft," in the Monterey Bay Sanctuary to four designated

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zones and accessroutes, an area offourteen square nauticalmiles. The regulation defines "motorized

personal watercraft" as:

anymotorized vessel that islessthan fifteen feet in length as manufactured, is capable

of exceeding a speed of fifteen knots, and has the capacity to carry not more than the

operator and one other person while in operation. The term includes, but is not

limited to, jet skis, wet bikes, surf jets, miniature speed boats, air boats and

hovercraft.

15 C.F.R. § 944.3. NOAA's final regulations did not restrict the use of other types of vessels in the

Monterey Bay Sanctuary. The agency stated that it was then working with the Coast Guard to

determine whether such measures were needed. 57 Fed. Reg. at 43,311-12.

In July 1992, the Personal Watercraft Industry Association, an organization consisting of

manufacturers and distributors, submitted comments to NOAA opposing the restrictions placed on

personalwatercraft. Thereafter the agency denied the Association's petition for rulemaking to rescind

the "thrill craft" regulation. 58 Fed. Reg. 15,271 (Mar. 22, 1993).

The Association and two individuals then brought this action for judicial review of the

regulation in the district court. Their complaint contained four claims for relief. The first three were

of a piece: the regulation was not supported by adequate evidence; the agency had no basis for

regulating personal watercraft but not regulating other vessels; the record does not contain evidence

to showthat restricting the use of personalwatercraft was "necessaryor reasonable." Complaint WW

25-34. The fourth claim was that NOAA failed to respond to the Association's comments that the

restrictions were unreasonable and unnecessary. Complaint ¶ 36.

On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court held that the restriction on

personal watercraft was arbitrary and capricious because NOAA had treated personal watercraft

differently from all other vessels without providing a sufficient explanation. Personal Watercraft

Indus. Ass'n v. Department of Commerce, No. 93-1381, at 3 (D.D.C. Aug. 24, 1993). The court

rejected the Association's claim that NOAA should have replied to its comments. Id. at 2-3 n.1.

II

A

We begin with the Association's argument that NOAA did not adequately respond to its

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1When NOAA issued its "Final Environmental Impact Statement/Management Plan" on June

12, 1992, its cover letter stated that any "questions or comments" about it should be submitted by

July 20, 1992. While this enabled interested parties to have their say about the document, the

cover letter did notnor did it purport toreopen the period set forth in the Federal Register (as

5 U.S.C. § 553 required) for commenting on proposed regulations, a period that had closed more

than a year earlier. 

comments. There is little to this. The comment period closed on October 2, 1990. 55 Fed. Reg. at

31,786. The Association submitted its comments in July 1992.1 Agencies are free to ignore such late

filings, as for the most part NOAA did here. Tex Tin Corp. v. EPA, 935 F.2d 1321, 1323 (D.C. Cir.

1991). The Association's tardiness cannot be excused. The 1990 notice of proposed rulemaking

sufficiently alerted it to the possibility of NOAA'sregulating personal watercraft. It is true that in the

notice NOAA did not propose to regulate personal watercraft. But the distinct prospect of the

agency's doing so was plain for all to see. Under the heading "Activities Subject to Regulation," the

1990 notice listed numerous activities "subject to regulation, including prohibition, to the extent

necessary and reasonable" to ensure the successful implementation of the Sanctuary designation. 55

Fed. Reg. at 31,788. One of the activities was operating "thrill craft" in the Sanctuary. Id. To

indicate what the agency had in mind, the proposed regulations included a definition of "thrill craft,"

a definition matching the final regulation's description of "motorized personal watercraft." Id. at

31,794. When NOAA announced the schedule for public hearings, it mentioned that "[t]wo other

activities are potentially subject to regulations: commercial vessel traffic (other than fishing) and

operation of "thrill craft.' " 55 Fed. Reg. 31,798 (Aug. 3, 1990). The 1990 notice of proposed

rulemaking also referred to the Draft EnvironmentalImpact Statement; this document discussed "the

serious threat" to the Sanctuary posed by personal watercraft. The 1990 notice thus "adequately

frame[d] the subjectsfor discussion ...," Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. NRC, 673 F.2d 525, 533

(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 835 (1982). Nothing more was necessary.

B

The Association complains about a "study" NOAA used in determining where personal

watercraft would be allowed within the Sanctuary, but it is hard to tell exactly what the complaint is.

Only two paragraphs of the Association's fifty-page brief are devoted to this topic; the summary of

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2There is part of a footnote in the Association's reply brief that talks about "the regulation's

irrational effect of banishing affected recreational vessel users to four discrete, off-shore areas Dr.

Rote devised by drawing lines on a map...." Cross-Appellants' Reply Brief at 9 n.5. We

emphatically refuse to construe this statement in the reply brief, which the author merely asks us

to "consider," as expressing some new argument about the study, distinct from the Association's

argument ignores it entirely. The two paragraphs are under the following heading, which does not

talk directly about the study: the "personal watercraft restrictions were developed after the comment

period closed and never made available for public scrutiny and comment." Appellees' Brief at 47.

That of course is true with respect to NOAA's final regulations, and indeed would be true in any

rulemaking proceeding in which an agency formulated its final rules in response to comments. If the

heading is supposed to capture a colorable argument, we fail to see it. "Rulemaking proceedings

would never end if the agency'sresponse to comments must always be made the subject of additional

comments." Community Nutrition Inst. v. Block, 749 F.2d 50, 58 (D.C. Cir. 1984).

Perhaps a bit of background will clear things up. After the comment period on the proposed

regulations closed in October 1990, NOAA retained Dr. James W. Rote, a marine biologist and

former Director of the Office of Habitat Protection at NOAA. Dr. Rote was to "gather information

about current restrictions and current areas of motorized personal watercraft use in the proposed

Monterey Bay National Marine Sanctuary area" and "to develop recommended zones to which

motorized personal watercraft use might be restricted." In June and October 1991, Dr. Rote

delivered hisrecommendations. The four zones he suggested were designed to encompass the areas

with the highest amount of personal watercraft use. The results of Dr. Rote's study were included

in the final rulemaking. 57 Fed. Reg. at 43,328-29.

The Association statesthe obvious when it mentionsthat it did not have a chance to comment

on the study because Dr. Rote did his work after the comment period closed. Given the cases the

Association citesPortland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert.

denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974); and United States v. Nova Scotia Food Products Corp., 568 F.2d 240,

252 (2d Cir. 1977)it seems to be saying that NOAA had a duty to put the study out for comment.

As best we can make out, that is the extent of the Association's argument and it is one we readily

reject.2 Portland Cement and Nova Scotia can be put to one side. See also Association of Data

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apparent complaint about not having a chance to comment on it. See Rollins Envtl. Servs. (NJ)

Inc. v. EPA, 937 F.2d 649, 653 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 

Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Board of Governors, 745 F.2d 677, 684 (D.C. Cir. 1984). While those

decisions say that material critical to an agency's decision whether to regulate an activity must be

revealed, the study here was not of that sort. NOAA's decision was the product, not of Dr. Rote's

study, but of its concern about the threat to the Sanctuary and the concern expressed in hundreds of

comments urging the agency to ban personal watercraft altogether. 57 Fed. Reg. at 43,314.

Agencies may develop additional information in response to public comments and rely on that

information without starting anew "unless prejudice isshown." Community Nutrition Inst., 749 F.2d

at 58. The party objecting has the burden of "indicat[ing] with "reasonable specificity' what portions

of the documents it objects to and how it might have responded if given the opportunity." Small

Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 540-41 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The

Association has not even come close to shouldering that burden. It does not point to anything in Dr.

Rote's findings that might be considered erroneous. It does not suggest that his methodology was

in any wise defective. And it does not tell us what it might have told NOAA if the study had been

conducted and released before the comment period closed.

III

The district court agreed with the Association that the regulation treated "personalwatercraft

(which are narrowly defined) differently from all other vessels, and that this disparate treatment is

arbitrary and unsupported by the factualrecord." Personal Watercraft Industry Ass'n, No. 93-1381,

at 2. It is worth keeping in mind that we are dealing with a marine sanctuary and measures an agency

thought were needed to protect and preserve it. The regulations did indeed single out personal

watercraft fromother kinds of vessels. Maybe the presence of other vessels was a cause for concern;

as we shall see, NOAA thought it might be. This scarcely means that NOAA had to regulate them

if it wasto do anything about thrill craft. An agency does not have to "make progress on every front

before it can make progress on any front." United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S. Ct. 2696,

2707 (1993). Agencies often must contend with matters of degree. Regulations, in other words, are

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3Besides, it is far from clear how the court's "rule" applies to this case. The court must have

thought NOAA's rulemaking addressed "several aspects of the problem itself". Which problem

and which aspects? The court did not say. So far as we can tell the regulation dealt only with one

aspectthe mischief associated with vessels of the thrill craft variety, and that is what doomed it

in the district court's eyes. 

not arbitrary just because they fail to regulate everything that could be thought to pose any sort of

problem. Las Vegas v. Lujan, 891 F.2d 927, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Louisiana v. Verity, 853 F.2d

322, 332 (5th Cir. 1988). This is a common principle, well known not only in administrative law

cases but also in constitutional casesraising equal protection challengesto economic regulation. See

Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955). To it, the district court here added a

wrinklewhen an agency decides "to address several aspects of the problem itself in a single

rulemaking, it must provide a reasoned basis for differential treatment of the various causes of the

perceived problem." Personal Watercraft Industry Ass'n, No. 93-1381, at 4 n.2. This suggests that

if an agency did a little, that would be permissible, but if it did more than a little, it had better have

a good reason for not going all the way. We fail to see why it should matter whether the agency

takes two steps instead of one, so long as it is heading in a proper direction.3 The patient has a

headache, a sore throat and a hangnail. Are we to suppose that it would be arbitrary to treat only the

headache and the sore throat in a single session, yet not be arbitrary to treat only the hangnail?

Before discussing this further, we ought to examine what made jet skis and other thrill craft

the headache. The record is full of evidence that machines of this sort threatened the Monterey Bay

NationalMarineSanctuary. NOAA received written comments and testimony from marine scientists,

researchers, federal agencies,state agencies,state and localgovernments, business organizations, and

more than a hundred citizens on the issue of regulating these machines. Everyone agreedpersonal

watercraft interfered with the public's recreationalsafety and enjoyment of the Sanctuary and posed

a serious threat to the Sanctuary's flora and fauna. The concept of a "sanctuary" entails elements of

serenity, peace, and tranquility. Yet the commenters described instances of personal watercraft

operators harassing sea otters and other marine mammals, disturbing harbor seals, damaging the

Sanctuary's kelp forests, menacing swimmers, divers, kayakers, and other recreational users, and

generally disrupting the esthetic enjoyment of the Sanctuary. All concerned recommended either

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prohibiting personalwatercraft outright or restricting themto specific areasin the Sanctuary. No one

urged NOAA to do nothing about the problem.

When NOAA acted, did it satisfactorily explain itself? The Administrative Procedure Act

required it to give a "concise generalstatement" of the regulation's "basis and purpose." 5 U.S.C. §

553(c). Here is part of what NOAA said:

The small size, maneuverability and high speed of these craft is what causes these

craft to pose a threat to resources. Resources such as sea otters and seabirds are

either unable to avoid these craft or are frequently alarmed enough to significantly

modify their behavior such as cessation of feeding or abandonment of young. Also

other, more benign, uses ofthe Sanctuary such assailing, kayaking,surfing and diving

are interfered with during the operation of [personal watercraft].

* * * *

This regulation is intended to provide enhanced resource protection by prohibiting

operation of motorized personal watercraft in areas of high marine mammal and

seabird concentrations, kelp forest areas, river mouths, estuaries, lagoons and other

similar areas where sensitive marine resources are concentrated and most vulnerable

to disturbance and other injury from personal watercraft.

57 Fed. Reg. at 43,314, 43,321. The first paragraph is the "basis," the second the "purpose." The

statement is "concise" and it is "general."

Despite NOAA's evident compliance with the Administrative Procedure Act, the Association

rails against "NOAA's unsupported and unexplained distinction between personal watercraft and other

similar and larger vessels," Appellees' Brief at 32. The Association is very much mistaken and its

citation of, for example, National Wildlife Federation v. Costle, 629 F.2d 118, 133-35 (D.C. Cir.

1980), istherefore offthe mark. NOAA did explain and support the distinction. It said that personal

watercraft were small, highly maneuverable, and fast, and it indicated that they operated close to

shore, in areas of high concentrations of kelp forests, marine mammals and sea birds. That

differentiated alllarger craft, allslower craft, all less maneuverable craft, and all craft that did not tend

to use the same areas in the same manner. As if this were not enough, NOAA also stated why it had

decided not to regulate vessels other than personal watercraft at this time. NOAA said that it was

working with the United StatesCoast Guard "to determine the need for additionalmeasuresto ensure

protection of Sanctuary resources and qualities from vessel traffic," adding that:

These consultations aim to determine which resources are most at risk, which vessel

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4

In its cross-appeal, the Association contends that we should not uphold NOAA's regulation

because the agency did not file the entire administrative record in the district court. The district

court did not think much of this contention and neither do we. NOAA filed all of the material it

relied on in promulgating the personal watercraft regulation. This material has been condensed

into five thick volumes of an appendix. The Association wanted the agency to add still more

material dealing with other vessels such as oil tankers. We neither need nor want that material. 

The "whole record" (5 U.S.C. § 706) pertaining to the regulation the Association challenges is

before us. And we have seen more than enough to know that the agency's decision not to

regulate other vessels at this time does not render its decision to regulate personal watercraft

arbitrary or capricious. 

traffic practices are most threatening and which regulations or restrictions would be

most appropriate to alleviate potential threats, including those, if any, from foreign

vessels.

57 Fed. Reg. at 43,311. 

There for all who read the Federal Register are the reasons for NOAA's regulating personal

watercraft and for not then regulating other vesselsthe first categoryposed a clear problem, the rest

needed further study, which the agency had undertaken.4

The Act authorized NOAA to set down rules for the Sanctuary that it determined "may be

necessary and reasonable." 16 U.S.C. § 1434(a)(1)(A). The record amply supports NOAA's

judgment of September 1992, that restricting thrill craft was then necessary and reasonable. It may

turn out that regulating other vessels will be also be necessary and reasonable. NOAA has yet to

make that determination. But nothing in Title III of the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries

Act, or in the Administrative Procedure Act, or in any judicial decision, forces an agency to refrain

from solving one problem while it ponders what to do about others.

In concluding, we should say a few words about the district court's remark that before

regulating, NOAA should have considered the sufficiency of existing restrictions. Personal

Watercraft Indus. Ass'n, No. 93-1381, at 3. There is no need to worry over the legal principle the

court's statement embodies. The record shows that NOAA in fact did what the court thought it

should have done. As NOAA pointed out in its Final Environmental Impact Statement, personal

watercraft use was a relatively new phenomenon and local governments had only just begun issuing

laws to minimize conflicts between this form of water sport, and other uses of marine resources.

Many local officials urged NOAA to restrict jet skis; the towns of Capitola and Pacifica, and the

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County of Santa Cruz had their own restrictions, but these of course applied only within their

jurisdictions. NOAA's regulatory jurisdictionover 4000 square nautical mileswas considerably

more comprehensive. As one would expect, the agency therefore determined that regulating personal

watercraft throughout the Sanctuarywas needed to fillwhat would otherwise have been a "major gap

in the regulatory regime governing activities in the area." 

* * * *

NOAA's personal watercraft regulation, 15 C.F.R. § 944.5(a)(8), is not arbitrary and

capricious, and the district court's judgment is therefore

Reversed.

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