Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_10-cv-00639/USCOURTS-almd-2_10-cv-00639-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (federa

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

EDWARD SCOTT CUNNINGHAM, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) Civil Action No. 2:10cv639-TMH

) (WO)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

Respondent. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Before the court is Edward Scott Cunningham’s (“Cunningham”) petition for a writ

of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

I. BACKGROUND

In November 2007, Cunningham pled guilty in the United States District Court for the

Western District of Michigan to conspiracy to defraud the United States and to harbor illegal

aliens, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii). On March 3, 2008,

he was sentenced to fifty-one months in prison to be followed by three years on supervised

release.

In September 2008, after he began serving hissentence, Cunningham wasinterviewed

by staff with the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) at the Federal Prison Camp in

Montgomery, Alabama (“FPC Montgomery”), to determine his eligibility for participation

in the BOP’s 500-hour Residential Drug Abuse Program (“RDAP”). Doc. No. 15-5 at 2-3;

Case 2:10-cv-00639-TMH-TFM Document 18 Filed 08/17/12 Page 1 of 13
Doc. No. 15-6 at 2. Although Cunningham was found to be eligible to participate in the

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RDAP at FPC Montgomery, the BOP informed him that, under its controlling regulations,

he was ineligible for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B), which provides

for up to a one-year reduction in the sentence of an offender who successfully completes the

RDAP, because of his 1982 conviction for robbery and resulting sentence under Florida’s

Youthful Offender Act. Id. Cunningham filed formal and informal grievances at the

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institutional level, asking the BOP to reconsider him for sentence-reduction eligibility

without consideration of his prior robbery conviction. See Petitioner’s Exh. 8. He then

unsuccessfully appealed the denial of those grievances to the BOP’s Regional Director and

References to document numbers are to those assigned by the Clerk in the instant civil

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action. Page references in the pleadings are to those assigned by CM/ECF

When reviewing an inmate’s prior conviction, BOP legal staff compare the elements of the 2

crime of which an inmate was previously convicted to the elements of the relevant offense listed in

the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting Program (UCR). See Doc. No. 15-6 at 3. Cunningham was

convicted of robbery in Florida in 1982 and was sentenced to three years in prison under that state’s

Youthful Offender Act. “Robbery” is defined by Florida state law as “the taking of money or other

property which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another by force,

violence, assault, or putting in fear.” See FL ST § 812.13; see also Doc. No. 15-6 at 3. Likewise,

the UCR defines “robbery” as “the taking or attempting to take anything of value from the care,

custody, or control of a person or persons by force or threat of force or violence and/or by putting

the victim in fear.” UCR, Crime in the United States, 2007, definition of “robbery”; see also Doc.

No. 15-6 at 3. Because the Florida robbery statute sufficiently matches the definition of “robbery”

as provided by the UCR, the BOP found that Cunningham’s prior conviction of robbery pursuant to

FL ST § 812.13 precluded him from receiving a § 3621(e)(2)(B)sentence reduction. Doc. No. 15-6

at 3. As part of its review, the BOP also researched Florida’s Youthful Offender Act and considered

whether is should make a difference that Cunningham was sentenced under the act. Id. The BOP

determined that Cunningham’s robbery conviction and resulting sentence under Florida’s Youthful

Offender Act was an adult conviction, precluding him from a § 3621(e)(2)(B) sentence reduction. 

Id.

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the Central Office. See Petitioner’s Exhs. 9-12.

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Relying on two decisions entered by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Cunningham

contends that the BOP regulation that categorically excludes offenders with a prior robbery

conviction from being eligible for a § 3621(e)(2)(B) sentence reduction was promulgated in

violation of the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”) and is an arbitrary and capricious

exercise of the BOP’s statutory authority. In addition, Cunningham contends that because

his prior robbery conviction was pursuant to Florida’s Youthful Offender Act, it did not

constitute an “adult conviction” that rendered him ineligible for a sentence reduction. After

reviewing Cunningham’s petition, the supporting and opposing submissions, and the

pertinent case law, this court concludes that Cunningham’s petition is due to be denied.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Validity of Agency Exercise of Statutory Authority

As part of the 1994 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, the BOP is

charged with “mak[ing] available appropriate substance abuse treatment for each prisoner

the Bureau determines has a treatable condition of substance addiction or abuse.” See 18

U.S.C. § 3621(b). As an incentive for enrollment and successful participation in a substance

abuse program, § 3621(e)(2)(B) permits the BOP to reduce the sentence of an inmate by up

Respondents concede that Cunningham exhausted his administrative remedies concerning 3

the issues raised in his habeas petition. The record also reflects that Cunningham participated in, and

completed, the RDAP at FPC Montgomery. When he filed the instant petition, his projected release

date, assuming he received all good conduct time available, was January 8, 2012. Doc. No. 15-1 at

2.

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to twelve months if the inmate was convicted of a nonviolent offense and completes the

treatment program (the “RDAP”) during his current confinement. See 18 U.S.C. §

3621(e)(2)(B). Section 3621(e)(2)(B) gives the BOP broad discretion to grant or deny a

sentence reduction. Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 233-36 (2001). The BOP “may exclude

inmates either categorically or on a case-by-case basis, subject of course to its obligation to

interpret the statute reasonably in a manner that is not arbitrary or capricious. Id. at 240.

To implement § 3621(e)(2)(B), the BOP promulgated regulations and issued policy

statements governing substance abuse treatment programs and inmate eligibility forsentence

reductions. Pursuant to one of those regulations, 28 C.F.R. § 550.58, federal inmates with

certain prior convictions, including prior convictions for robbery, are not eligible for a §

3621(e)(2)(B) sentence reduction. See C.F.R. § 550.58(a)(1)(iv). Cunningham contends

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that § 550.58 – the regulation the BOP applied to deny him eligibility for a sentence

reduction – was promulgated in violation of the APA and represents an arbitrary and

capricious exercise of the BOP’s statutory authority. Doc. No. 1 at 8-17. In so arguing, he

relies on Arrington v. Daniels, 516 F.3d 1106 (9 Cir. 2008), and Crickon v. Thomas, 579

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F.3d 978 (9 Cir. 2009). In Arrington, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the

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BOP’s alleged failure to articulate a rationale in the administrative record for promulgating

§ 550.58 rendered the regulation “arbitrary and capricious,” in violation 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)

of the APA. Arrington, 516 F.3d at 1116. In Crickon, the Ninth Circuit Court extended

 This regulation is implemented in BOP Program Statements 5330.10 & 5331.10. 4

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Arrington to the BOP’s categorical exclusion of inmates with specific prior convictions.

Crickon, 579 F.3d at 987.

Section 706(2)(A) of the APA provides, in pertinent part, that a reviewing court “shall

hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be arbitrary,

capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law[.]” See 5 U.S.C.

§ 706(2)(A). The Ninth Circuit in Arrington held that § 550.58 was an arbitrary and

capricious exercise of the BOP’s authority because it was enacted without providing any

reason for excluding inmates with convictions involving firearms from § 3621(e)(2)(B)

sentence-reduction eligibility. Arrington, 516 F.3d at 1112-14. In Crickon, the Ninth Circuit

held that § 550.58 was “invalid because the BOP failed to provide any rationale for the

categorical exclusion generally, and because the rationale provided for considering any prior

conviction, regardless of its age, is premised upon a mistake of law, i.e., that [section]

3621(e)(2)(B) limits the early release incentive to inmates who have no prior convictions for

violent offenses.” Crickon, 579 F.3d at 983.

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In March 2009, after the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Arrington, the BOP replaced § 550.58 5

with 28 C.F.R. § 550.55(b)(4). Like § 550.58, § 550.55(b)(4) categorically excludes those inmates

with prior convictions for robbery from eligibilityfor a § 3621(e)(2)(B)sentence reduction. The two

regulations are nearly identical, but § 550.55(b)(4) contains a “detailed rationale as to why certain

inmates ... are ineligible for early release.” Cockerham v. Johns, No. 5:09-HC-2125-FL, 2011

WL2669260, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Jul. 7, 2011). In a public document related to § 550.55(b)(4)’s

enactment, the BOP set forth its rationale for denying early release eligibility for certain offenders

pursuant to this regulation, stating, in pertinent part, as follows:

In exercising the Director’s statutory discretion [under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e) ], [the

BOP] considered the crimes of homicide, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault,

(continued...)

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Cunningham’s reliance on Arrington and Crickon is misplaced. First, a circuit court’s

decision binds only the district courts sitting within its jurisdiction. See Thomas v.

Middlebrooks, No. 5:06cv249/RS, 2007 WL 2083616, at *3 (N.D.Fla. Jul. 20, 2007).

Significantly, moreover, no court outside the Ninth Circuit has followed Arrington or

Crickon, and most courts have rejected Arrington and Crickon as contrary to Lopez v. Davis,

531 U.S. 230, 240-44 (2001), where the Supreme Court upheld the BOP’s authority to

preclude early release based on § 550.58. See Newsome v. Keller, No. 2:08cv390-MEF,

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(...continued) 5

arson, and kidnaping, as identified in the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting Program

(UCR), which is a collective effort of city, county, state, tribal, and federal law

enforcement agencies to present a nationwide view on crime.... The Director of the

Bureau exercises discretion to deny early release eligibility to inmates who have a

prior felony or misdemeanor conviction for these offenses because commission of

such offenses rationally reflects the view that such inmates displayed readiness to

endanger the public.

Drug Abuse Treatment Program, 74 Fed.Reg. 1892, 1895 (Jan. 14, 2009). Although § 550.55(b)(4)

replaced § 550.58, the parties do not appear to dispute that Cunningham’s request for §3621(e)(2)(B)

sentence-reduction consideration was reviewed under § 550.58, in September 2008. See, e.g., Doc.

No. 15-6 at 2; Doc. No. 1 at 10; see also, e.g., Mora-Merz v. Thomas, 601 F.3d 933, 935 n.1 (9 Cir. th

2010) (BOP Program Statement in effect at time of Bureau’s evaluation of petitioner for RDAP

sentence-reduction eligibility is relevant program statement for purposes of review of BOP’s

decison).

In Lopez, the Supreme Court held § 550.58 to be a reasonable exercise of the BOP’s 6

discretion under § 3621(e)(2)(B). See 531 U.S. at 233. Section 3621(e)(2)(B) gives the BOP

discretion to grant or deny a sentence reduction, but leaves open the manner in which the discretion

is to be exercised. Id. at 233-36. In addressing the issue, the Supreme Court stated: “The BOP need

not blind itself to pre-conviction conduct that the agency reasonably views as jeopardizing life and

limb.” Id. at 231. “[T]he statute’s restriction of early release eligibility to nonviolent offenders does

not cut short the considerations that may guide the BOP in implementing § 3621(e)(2)(B).” Id. at

231-32. Lopez also makes clear that “[w]hen an eligible prisoner successfully completes drug

treatment, the [BOP] thus has the authority, but not the duty, both to alter the prisoner’s conditions

of confinement and to reduce his prison term.” Id. at 241.

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2010 WL 2197677, at *2-3 (M.D.Ala. May 27, 2010); Ables v. Eichenlaub, No.

5:08cv204/RH/EMT, 2009 WL 722287, at *7 (N.D.Fla. Mar. 18, 2009) (collecting cases

rejecting Arrington); Snipe v. Dept. of Justice, No. 3:08-CV-22, 2008 WL 5412868

(N.D.W.Va. Dec. 23, 2008) (collecting cases); see also Jenkins v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons,

No. 0:08–3776–CMC–PJG, 2010 WL 412542, at *1, *4 (D.S.C. Jan. 28, 2010) (“Many

courts considering challenges to 28 C.F.R. § 550.58 based on Arrington have rejected or

declined to follow the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in that case.” (collecting cases)); Cockerham

v. Johns, No. 5:09-HC-2125-FL, 2011 WL2669260, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Jul. 7, 2011); Gale v.

Minor, No. 5:10-HC-2215-D, 2012 WL 1185020, *4 (E.D.N.C. Apr. 9, 2012) (rejecting

Crickon); Thornton v. Ledezma, No. CIV-11-39-HE, 2011 WL 2551033, *1 (W.D.Okla. May

24, 2011) (same); cf. Austin v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 6:09485MBS, 2010 WL 412815,

at *5 (D.S.C. Jan. 27, 2010) (§ 550.55 “is a valid exercise of the BOP’s discretion under

[section] 3621(e)(2)(B)”), aff’d, 382 Fed.App’x 275 (4 Cir. Jun. 9, 2010). This court

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follows suit and declines to follow Arrington and Crickon, finding the Ninth Circuit’s

reasoning in those decisions to be unpersuasive.

In its comments in the Federal Register, the BOP explained that its promulgation of

§ 550.58, as then amended, was intended to address the legal issues raised by the courts of

appeals in the litigation that followed the original enactment of that regulation and BOP

Program Statement 5162.02, so that the BOP could uniformly apply its policies throughout

the country. See 65 Fed.Reg. 80747-48 (Dec. 22, 2000). “That rationale is not ‘arbitrary,

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Case 2:10-cv-00639-TMH-TFM Document 18 Filed 08/17/12 Page 7 of 13
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law[.]’ See 5 U.S.C.

§ 706(2)(A).” Ables, supra, at *7. Moreover, § 550.58’s statutory and regulatory

background – which includes a history of interim rules and various amendments in the wake

of litigation regarding the validity of the regulation – reflects a clear and consistent policy

by the BOP to seek to implement a public safety rationale by excluding firearm offenders

from early release eligibility because of the increased risk such offenders might pose to the

public. See Mack v. Eichenlaub, No. 5:08cv132/SPM/EMT, 2009 WL 1849961, at *2-4

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(N.D. Fla. Jun. 26, 2009); Gatewood v. Outlaw, 560 F.3d 843, 847 (8 Cir. 2009).

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“This case involves agency rulemaking under 5 U.S.C. § 553, which provides only

that the agency shall publish notice of the proposed rulemaking, afford interested persons an

opportunity to participate, and ‘incorporate in the rules adopted a concise general statement

of their basis and purpose.’ 5 U.S.C. § 553(c).” Mack, at *6. Generally speaking, § 553

“established the maximum procedural requirements which Congress was willing to impose

upon agencies in conducting rulemaking procedures. Id. (citing Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power

Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978)).

Under Section 553, an agency determination need not be made “on the record”

unless the statute being applied so requires. United States v.

Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742, 756-57, 92 S.Ct. 1941, 32

L.Ed.2d 453 (1972). Thus, the Ninth Circuit panel in Arrington erred when it

 Numerous decisions discuss the statutory and regulatory background, the various interim 7

rules, and the history of amendments leading to the promulgation of § 550.58(a)(1)(B) in 2000. See,

e.g., Mack v. Eichenlaub, No. 5:08cv132/SPM/EMT, 2009 WL 1849961, at *2-4 (N.D. Fla. Jun. 26,

2009); Ables, at *2-4; Muolo v. Quintana, 593 F.Supp.2d 776, 778-81 (W.D.Pa. Jan. 8, 2009). The

instant Recommendation does not contain a recitation of that background.

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disregarded the BOP’s public safety rationale simply because the court could

not find that rationale in an “administrative record,” which, as the Eighth

Circuit noted in Gatewood v. Outlaw, 560 F.3d 843, 847 (8 Cir. 2009), the

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Arrington court never defined but seemed to limit to the BOP’s Federal

Register notice in 2000 finalizing the previously interim rule.

....

... The Supreme Court discerned that public safety was the basis for the BOP’s

exclusion of firearm offenders and concluded that the BOP’s rule was

substantively reasonable in Lopez, 531 U.S. at 244. Therefore, 28 C.F.R. §

550.58 is valid under Sections 553(c) and 706(2)(A) of the APA. See

Gatewood, 560 F.3d at 847-48; accord Harrison v. Lamanna, 19 Fed. Appx.

342 (6 Cir. 2001) (unpublished).

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Mack, at *6-7. See also, e.g., Gatewood, 560 F.3d at 848 (“[W]e have no difficulty

concluding, as the Court obviously did in Lopez, that public safety was the contemporaneous

rationale for the interim and final rules, and not [as the Arrington court concluded] merely

a post hoc rationalization by appellate counsel.... Given the [BOP’s] primary public safety

mission, there is simply no reason to suspect that public safety was not the actual basis for

its interim and final rules.”); Licon v. Ledezma, 638 F.3d 1303, 1309-10 (10 Cir. 2011)

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(BOP has “consistently attempted to implement a policy denying early release eligibility to

firearm possession offenders” and BOP’s public safety rationale provided a legitimate

purpose for both § 550.58 and its successor, § 550.55(b)(4)); Handley v. Chapman, 587 F.3d

273 (5 Cir. 2009) (“[The BOP’s] prior interim rules, Program Statements, and consistent

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litigation position .... are not the sort of post hoc rationalizations of appellate counsel that

Burlington [Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156 (1962)] forbids usto consider.”);

Gardner v. Grandolsky, 585 F.3d 786, 792 (3 Cir. 2009) (BOP articulated a sufficient

rd

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rationale for § 550.58 to satisfy the “arbitrary and capricious” standard set forth in the APA

and that “the rationale may ‘reasonably be discerned’ from the regulatory history and

attendant litigation”).

For these reasons, this court finds that the BOP’s rationale for promulgating § 550.58

withstands the APA’s highly deferential standard of review. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n

of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (explaining narrow

scope of judicial review of agency decisions); Sierra Club v. Johnson, 541 F.3d 1257, 1264

(11 Cir. 2008) (“[W]e give deference to a final agency decision by reviewing for clear error,

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and we cannot substitute our own judgment for that of the agency.”). See also Ables, at *7.

The court therefore rejects Cunningham’s claim that § 550.58 was promulgated in violation

of the APA and is an arbitrary and capricious exercise of the BOP’s statutory authority

B. Was Prior Robbery Conviction under Florida’s Youthful Offender Act an

“Adult Conviction”?

Cunningham also maintainsthat his prior robbery conviction under Florida’s Youthful

Offender Act did not constitute an “adult conviction” that rendered him ineligible for a

sentence reduction under § 3621(e)(2)(B). Doc. No. 1 at 17.

The record reflects that on May 14, 1982, when he was eighteen years old,

Cunningham was convicted of robbery in the Palm Beach, Florida, Circuit Court. Doc. No.

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Neither § 3621(e)(2)(B) nor § 550.58 contains a “staleness” component prohibiting the 8

BOP’s use of an inmate’s prior conviction to deny sentence-reduction eligibility based on the age 

of the prior conviction. There is no time limit connected to a prior conviction for robbery under §

550.58. “Common sense dictates that convictions more than ten years old may be considered to deny

(continued...)

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15-6 at 2. The court sentenced him under Florida’s Youthful Offender Act to three years in

prison followed by three years on probation. Id. With regard to Florida’s Youthful Offender

Act, the Eleventh Circuit has stated:

[T]he Florida Youthful Offender Act, Florida Statutes § 958.04, does not

negate a juvenile’s adult conviction in the criminal division of a Florida Circuit

Court. See United States v. Wilks, 464 F.3d 1240, 1242–43 (11 Cir. 2006)

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(concluding that prior Florida convictions supported U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 career

offender enhancement and application of the Armed Career Criminal Act

(“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), despite sentencing as a youthful offender

because defendant was sentenced in adult court and was otherwise treated as

an adult criminal). Section 958.04 gives the criminal division of the Florida

Circuit Court the discretion to sentence eligible defendants who are under 21

years of age as “youthful offenders].” Fla. Stat. § 958.04(1). If the Florida

Circuit Court decides to sentence a defendant as a youthful offender, “[i]n lieu

of other criminal penalties authorized by law,” the court is given an array of

(...continued) 8

early release under the RDAP, because the Bureau of Prisons has ‘substantial discretion in its

decision making,’ Orr v. Hawk, 156 F.3d 651, 653 (6 Cir. 1998), and ‘broad discretion to grant or th

deny the one-yearreduction’ in sentence under § 3621, Jacks v. Crabtree, 114 F.3d 983, 984 (9 Cir. th

1997).” Lee v. Eichenlaub, No. 2:06-15545, 2007 WL 1041257, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 5, 2007);

see also Somerset v. Fondren, No. 09–788, 2009 WL 3461410, at *3-4 (D.Minn. Oct. 20, 2009)

(BOP’s decision to take 30-year-old robbery conviction into account when determining inmate’s

eligibility for § 3621(e)(2)(B)sentence-reduction incentive was proper and in accordance with BOP

Program Statements); Caputo v. Clark, 132 F.3d 36 (7th Cir. 1997) (twenty-year-old conviction

properly considered).

[T]he BOP specifically considered the issue of prior convictions for violent offenses

older than 15 years in the notice-and-comment period for 28 C.F.R. § 550.58. The

BOP concluded that where such prior conviction for a violent offense was included

in the PSIR, as was in [the petitioner’s] case, it would be in accordance with

Congressional intent to use the prior conviction as a disqualifying criterion. 65

Fed.Reg. 80746 (2000).

Forsberg v. Fort Dix, No. 09–4244-JBS, 2010 WL 1881083 (D.N.J. May 11, 2010). Cunningham’s

1982 conviction for robbery was included in his PSI. See Doc. No. 15-6 at 3.

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alternative sentencing options, such as probation, placement in a community

control program, incarceration in county facilities, restitution centers or public

or private community residential facilities, and to split sentences between

options. Id. § 958.04(2)(a)-(c); see also id. § 958.021 (stating that the purpose

of the Florida Youthful Offender Act is “to provide an additional sentencing

alternative to be used in the discretion of the court when dealing with

offenders who have demonstrated that they can no longer be handled safely as

juveniles and who require more substantial limitations upon their liberty to

ensure the protection of society” while at the same time encouraging their

rehabilitation “by preventing their association with older and more experienced

criminals during the terms of their confinement”). Nothing in Florida’s

youthful offender statute suggests that a youthful offender’s conviction in the

criminal division of the Florida Circuit Court is not an adult conviction under

Florida law.

United States v. Cortes, 427 Fed.App’x 803, 806 (11 Cir. 2011) (footnotes omitted;

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emphasis added).

Here, the fact that the Florida circuit court sentenced Cunningham as a youthful

offender did not change the fact that, under Florida law, it first convicted him as an adult.

See Cortes, 427 Fed.App’x at 807. Therefore, Cunningham’s prior robbery conviction was

properly considered to be an adult conviction for purposes of § 550.58 and his eligibility for

a § 3621(e)(2)(B) sentence reduction. In the end, the BOP properly excluded Cunningham

from sentence-reduction eligibility.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that the 28

U.S.C. § 2241 petition for habeas corpus relief be DISMISSED with prejudice.

It is further

ORDERED that the parties shall file any objections to this Recommendation on or

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before September 1, 2012. A party must specifically identify the findings in the

Recommendation to which objection is made; frivolous, conclusive, or general objections

will not be considered. Failure to file written objections to the Magistrate Judge’s proposed

findings and recommendations shall bar a party from a de novo determination by the District

Court of issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from attacking on

appeal factual findings accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of

plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5 Cir. 1982). See

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Stein v. Boyington Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11 Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of

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Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11 Cir. 1981) (en banc).

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Done this 17 day of August, 2012.

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/s/ Terry F. Moorer

TERRY F. MOORER

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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