Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-93-05009/USCOURTS-caDC-93-05009-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 441
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Voting
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 9, 1994 Decided July 29, 1994

No. 93-5009

JOHN BOEHNER,

APPELLANT

v.

DONALD K. ANDERSON, CLERK OF THE HOUSE;

MARTHA S. POPE, SECRETARY OF THE SENATE;

WILLIAM J. CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(92cv02427)

John Armor argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs was Jerry William Boykin.

Morgan J. Frankel, Deputy Senate Legal Counsel, argued the cause for appellees. With him on the

brieffor appellees President ofthe United States and Secretaryofthe Senate were Michael Davidson,

Senate Legal Counsel, Ken U. Benjamin, Jr., Deputy Senate Legal Counsel, Claire M. Sylvia,

Assistant Senate LegalCounsel, Eric H. Holder, Jr., United States Attorney, and Douglas N. Letter,

Attorney, United States Department of Justice. Stuart M. Gerson, Attorney, United States

Department of Justice, entered an appearance.

On the brief for appellee Clerk of the House were Charles Tiefer, Acting General Counsel, Michael

L. Murry, Senior Assistant Counsel, Richard P. Stanton, Assistant Counsel. Steven R. Ross entered

an appearance.

On the brief for amicus curiae Common Cause were Ronald J. Greene, Roger M. Witten, and Laura

B. Ahearn.

Before EDWARDS, GINSBURG, and HENDERSON, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GINSBURG.

GINSBURG, Circuit Judge: John Boehner and 27 other Members of Congress, 108 defeated

congressional candidates, and 14 other individuals and organizations filed this suit against the

Secretary of the Senate, the Clerk of the House of Representatives, and the President of the United

States. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief on the ground that the provisions of the

Ethics Reform Act that set up a mechanism for an annual cost of living adjustment (COLA) for

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Members of Congress and that establish the quadrennial pay raise system violate the newly ratified

Twenty-seventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The district court granted

summary judgment to the defendants; the plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal but only Mr. Boehner's

appeal was perfected. See Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 318 (1988) (Rule 3(c)

ofthe FederalRules of Appellate Procedure requires notice ofspecific individualsseeking to appeal);

Adkins v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 968 F.2d 1317, 1318-19 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (appeal perfected only as

to person whose name appears preceding "et al.").

On appealMr. Boehnerrenews his challenge to the Ethics ReformAct and adds an alternative

challenge to the constitutionality of the law cancelling the congressional COLA scheduled for 1994.

For the reasons stated below, we hold that the COLA provision of the Act does not violate the

twenty-seventh amendment; that Mr. Boehner may not challenge the law eliminating the 1994 COLA

for the first time on appeal; and that his challenge to the quadrennial pay mechanism is not ripe.

I. BACKGROUND

The Ethics Reform Act of 1989 substantially revised the pay system for high-ranking

government officials. Most relevant for the purpose of this appeal, the Act provided that each

Representative would receive an immediate one-time salary increase and in subsequent years an

annual COLA to his or her salary and pension. See Pub. L. No. 101-194, 103 Stat. 1716 (1989)

(codified at 2 U.S.C. § 31(2) and 5 U.S.C. § 5318 note). Two years later the Congress enacted

similar provisions for Senators. See Legislative Branch Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 102-90, §

6(a), 105 Stat. 447 (1991) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 5318 note) (amending Ethics Reform Act of 1989

to remove exception for Senators).

The congressionalCOLA in any given yearis one-half percent lessthan the annual percentage

increase (if any) in the employment cost index (ECI) for the period ending December 31 of the

previous year. Ethics Reform Act, § 704(a)(1)(B); 5 U.S.C. § 5318 note. (The ECI measures the

change in wages and salaries paid to private sector employees. See BLS HANDBOOK OF METHODS

56 (1992).) The congressional COLA, however, is limited to a maximum of five percent per year,

regardless of the change in the ECI. By automatic operation of the COLA provision, congressional

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salaries have been increased on the first day of January 1991, 1992, and 1993. In March 1993 the

Congress voted to cancel the COLA scheduled to take effect on January 1, 1994. Pub. L. No. 103-6,

§ 7, 107 Stat. 35 (1993) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 31 note).

The Ethics ReformAct also modified the quadrennial pay raise system first established by the

1967 Salary Act. A commission appointed every fourth year proposes to the President, for

recommendation to the Congress, salary levels for certain Government officials, including Members

of Congress. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 351-364. Prior to 1989 the President's recommendation was effective

unless disapproved by the Congress. As modified by the Ethics Reform Act, such quadrennial pay

adjustments will not take effect unless enacted into law by the Congress, and then not until after a

congressional election has been held. 2 U.S.C. § 359(2)(A) & (4)(A). The Congress cancelled the

first quadrennial commission scheduled to operate under the modified scheme, see Treasury, Postal

Service, and General Government Appropriations Act, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-123, 107 Stat. 1226

(1993) (rescinding the commission's appropriation),so that in fact no quadrennial adjustment has yet

been proposed, let alone implemented, under the new system.

Meanwhile, in May 1992 the twenty-seventh amendment to the Constitution was ratified by

the concurrence of a thirty-eighth State. Known as the "Madison amendment," it was proposed to

the Congressin 1789 by James Madisonalong with eleven other amendments of which ten became

the Bill of Rightsand provides in its entirety:

No law, varying the compensation for services of the Senators and Representatives,

shall take effect until an election of Representatives shall have intervened.

Six of the original thirteen Statesratified the Madison amendment at the same time asthe Bill

of Rights; of the thirty-two other States that eventually ratified it, all but one did so after 1978,

apparently in response to legislation affecting congressional compensation, including the 1977 salary

increase, the elimination of recorded votes approving recommended COLAs, and the Ethics Reform

Act. (Ohio, which ratified the amendment in 1873, did so in response to the "Salary Grab" Act of

that year.) See generally Richard R. Bernstein, The Sleeper Wakes: The History and Legacy of the

Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 61 FORDHAM L. REVIEW 518 (1992). According to Madison, and to

all the ratifying states that stated their understanding, the purpose of the amendment isto ensure that

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a congressional pay increase "cannot be for the particular benefit of those who are concerned with

determining the value ofthe service." James Madison, Speech in the House of Representatives (June

8, 1789), in The Congressional Register, June 8, 1789, reprinted in CREATING THEBILL OFRIGHTS:

THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 84 (Helen E. Veit et al., eds.,

1991). See also 138 Cong. Rec. S6836 (May 19, 1992) (documents supplementing remarks of

Senator Byrd) (text of state resolutions concerning Madison amendment).

Shortly after the Madison amendment became part of the Constitution, Mr. Boehner et al.

brought this action to challenge the constitutionality of the Ethics ReformAct. They claimed that the

automatic operation of the COLA provision violates the amendment because it increases

congressional pay without the necessity of an annual legislative act by the Congress and without an

intervening election; and that the January 1 effective dates of both the COLA and any quadrennial

pay adjustment violate the amendment because the Members who vote for them may benefit from

themi.e., because they are on the payroll until the new Congressisseated, which issome time later

in January. The district court upheld the statute in all respects. On appeal Mr. Boehner presses all

his original claims and additionally argues in the alternative that if the COLA provision of the Ethics

Reform Act is constitutional, then the elimination in March 1993 of the COLA scheduled to take

effect on January 1, 1994 violates the intervening election requirement of the twenty-seventh

amendment.

II. ANALYSIS

This appears to be the first case in which a court has been called upon to interpret the

twenty-seventh amendment and its effect upon the pre-existing system for adjusting congressional

pay. Before we can reach the merits of the case, however, we must attend to the argument of the

President and the Secretary of the Senate that Mr. Boehner does not have standing to challenge the

COLA and the quadrennial commission provisions of the Ethics Reform Act.

A. Standing

A Member of Congress is, of course, like any plaintiff, subject to the standing requirements

of Article III. See, e.g., Reuss v. Balles, 584 F.2d 461, 466 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ("a legislator receives

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no special consideration in the standing inquiry"). Therefore, Congressman Boehner must show that

he has suffered a distinct and palpable injury; that the injury is fairly traceable to the act of which he

complains; and that the court may give a remedy that is likely to redress the injury. Valley Forge

Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 472

(1982).

The President and the Secretary argue that Mr. Boehner lacksstanding because his claim that

the COLA and quadrennial pay adjustment provisions are unconstitutional, on the ground that they

take effect before a new Congress convenes, states "no concrete and individualized injury" but is

rather a generalized grievance about the conduct of government. They also argue that even if Mr.

Boehner does have standing, thenthis court's doctrine of equitable discretion counsels against hearing

his claim because the Congress could cure any legal defect in the operation of the COLA by enacting

additional legislation. See Humphrey v. Baker, 848 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir. 1988). We do not agree with

either point.

Mr. Boehner is not only a Member of Congress; by virtue of that office he is also an

employee of the United States Government. As such, he clearly has standing to challenge the

operation of a law that directly determines his rate of pay. His claim that his pay for 1993 was

unconstitutionally increased (or alternatively that his pay for 1994 was unconstitutionally decreased)

alleges a "distinct and palpable injury" to him in his capacity as an employee.

The Secretary ofthe Senate (alone) arguesfurther that an increase in pay is not an injury. Mr.

Boehner, however, says that in the context of his constituency it is. We do not think it the office of

a court to insist that getting additional monetary compensation is a good when the recipient, a

congressman, says that in his political position it is a bad.

Even when a Member of Congress meets all the requirementsfor standing to sue, as a matter

of equitable discretion, the court will not entertain his or her complaint about a matter that is more

properly addressed to the plaintiff's colleagues in the legislature. See Humphrey, 848 F.2d at 214

(quoting Melcher v. Federal Open Market Committee, 836 F.2d 561, 563 (D.C. Cir. 1987)) (court

will not hear "what amounts to a dispute properly within the domain of the legislative branch");

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Reigle v. Federal Open Market Committee, 656 F.2d 873, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("Where a

congressional plaintiff could obtain substantial relief from his fellow legislators through the

enactment, repeal, or amendment of a statute, this court should exercise its equitable discretion to

dismiss the legislator's action"); cf. Carl McGowan, Congressmen in Court: The New Plaintiffs, 15

GA.L.REV. 241 (1981) (laying out the approach later adopted in Reigle and followed in subsequent

cases). We do not exercise our discretion to dismiss a case, therefore, when a congressman suffers

an effective nullification of his vote, see Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 702-03 (D.C. Cir.) (en

banc), vacated on other grounds, 444 U.S. 996 (1983) (the Congress had no way to block the

President's action terminating a treaty without Senate consent); Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430

(D.C. Cir. 1974), or if his influence is substantially diminished. See Moore v. United States House

of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946, 951-52 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (where Senate originated revenue bill,

Representative deprived of constitutionally guaranteed opportunity to debate and vote on same prior

to Senate action); Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (minority party

congressmen have standing to challenge dilution of influence when assigned less than proportionate

number of committee seats).

Mr. Boehner's claimthat the Ethics ReformAct unconstitutionally interferes with the amount

and timing of his pay is a straightforward challenge to the constitutionalityof a public law that directly

affects his private interest as a government employee. He raises no "dispute properly within the

domain of the legislative branch," cf., e.g., Melcher, 836 F.2d 561 (making FOMC members subject

to Senate confirmation properlydone bylegislation rather than byjudicialremedy); Gregg v. Barrett,

771 F.2d 539, 543-46 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (congressman could persuade other members to insist upon

enforcement of proceduralrules), but a case or controversy quintessentiallywithin the judicial power

of the United States. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 87, 111 (1803) ("It is,

emphatically, the province and duty of the judicial department, to say what the law is"). Indeed, Mr.

Boehner asserts an individualized injury no different in kind from the injury that an unelected

employee of the House might assert, and we surely would not remit such a plaintiff to the legislative

process for redress. Compare Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) (judicial review of

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unconstitutional discharge of congressman's administrative assistant) and Walker v. Jones, 733 F.2d

923 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (judicial review of unconstitutional discharge of congressional food service

employee) with Browning v. Clerk of the United States House of Representatives, 789 F.2d 923

(D.C. Cir. 1986) (judicial review of personnel actions barred where duties of employee implicate

speech or debate clause concerns). Accordingly, it would be an abuse of our equitable discretion not

to hear Mr. Boehner's case.

B. The COLA

Mr. Boehner contendsthat the annualCOLA provision ofthe Ethics Reform Act violatesthe

twenty-seventh amendment for two (not entirely distinct) reasons: (1) it establishes a procedure that

changes his salary as a congressman without a vote of the Congress; and (2) viewing each COLA

as in effect a new law, each such law varies his compensation, in violation both of the constitutional

requirements for lawmaking in general and of the requirements of the twenty-seventh amendment in

particular. Specifically, Mr. Boehner argues that each COLA is a law subject to the requirements of

Article I, namely bicameral passage and presentment to the President; and that the COLA provision

of the Act circumvents the intention underlying the twenty-seventh amendment because half of all

annual COLAs (i.e., those in odd-numbered years) will take effect without an intervening election

and, even when an election doesintervene (i.e., in even-numbered years), the electorate cannot know

what the compensation of its Representatives will be in the second year of the Congress for which

it votes because the second year's COLA will be based upon the ECI for the period ending on the last

day of the election year. See 5 U.S.C. § 5318 note.

Neither of Mr. Boehner's arguments that the COLA provision is unconstitutional draws any

support from either the original Constitution or from the twenty-seventh amendment. The

Constitution does not define a law except to say (at least implicitly) that it is the product of the

legislative process:

EveryBill which shall have passed the House ofRepresentatives and the Senate shall,

before it becomes a Law, be presented to the President of the United States; If he

approve he shallsign it.... If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten

Days ..., the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it,....

U.S. CONST., Art. 1, § 7, cl. 2. The Ethics Reform Act became a law on November 30, 1989 when,

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the bill having passed both Houses and been presented to President Bush, he signed it into law. See

Gardner v. The Collector, 79 U.S. 499, 504, 506 (1867). The provision calling for an annual COLA

is part of that 1989 law. Cf. Pressler v. Simon, 428 F. Supp. 302 (D.D.C. 1976) (three-judge court),

aff'd sub nom Pressler v. Blumenthal, 434 U.S. 1028 (1976) (automatic increases under the

Executive SalaryCost-of-Living Adjustment Act of 1975 "fix congressional compensation by law").

Mr. Boehner, recognizing that in order to comply with the twenty-seventh amendment a law

varying congressional compensation must be passed before an election yet the compensation may not

be adjusted until after the election, argues that the phrase "shall take effect" in the Madison

amendment must refer to the date upon which the "payment of the [COLA or quadrennial] raise" first

occurs, not the effective date of the statute. From this Mr. Boehner would have the court infer that

each COLA must be a separate "law varying the compensation" of the Members of Congress. Our

understanding of the Madison amendment is a bit different, however; in essence it conditions the

operation of a law varying congressional compensation upon an election of Representatives and the

expiration of the Congress that voted for it. The law may be enacted at any time; when an election

has been held the first condition is fulfilled; when the new Congress is seated the second condition

is fulfilled. Therefore, the law, although duly enacted pursuant to Article I, does not "take effect" at

the earliest until the new Congress has been seated. The minimum period between enactment and

effect is from the first Monday in November of an even-numbered year (i.e., the Monday before an

election) until the new Congress is seated the following January; but the interim could be greater,

as long as it brackets an election. Accordingly, the present Congress could specify the salary of the

next Congress or of anyCongress after that. For example, the COLA provision became law in 1989

but the first COLA would not be made until more than a year later, on January 1, 1991pursuant

to the Congress's decision, prior to but in the spirit of the Madison amendment, to defer

implementation of the COLA until after the 1990 congressional election. See Ethics Reform Act, §

704(b) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 5318 note) (COLA provisions "shall take effect on January 1, 1991").

We see no reason whatsoever why the Congress cannot, for convenience, instead specify an index

or formula with the same effect.

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In sum, it has been the law since 1989 that a COLA would be made on January 1, 1991 and

each year thereafter pursuant to a specified formula. Therefore, assuming with the plaintiffs (for the

defendants do not dispute it) that the twenty-seventh amendment applies to a law passed before the

amendment was ratified, the COLA provision of the Ethics Reform Act of 1989 is constitutional

because it did not cause anyadjustment to congressional compensation until after the election of 1990

and the seating of the new Congress.

C. The Act of March 4, 1993

Mr. Boehner argues that if, as we hold, the COLA provision is constitutional, then the Act

of March 4, 1993, the Emergency Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1993, Pub. L. No.

103-6, § 7(a) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 31 note), cancelling the 1994 COLA violates the Madison

amendment because it varies his compensation without an intervening election of Representatives.

In other words, prior to March 4 the law was that Members would receive a COLA the following

January 1. The new law varied their compensation as of January 1, 1994 without an election of

Representatives having intervened.

For their part, the defendants object that Mr. Boehnershould not be allowed to raise thisissue

for the first time on appeal. The President and the Secretary of the Senate argue further that Mr.

Boehner could not prevail on the merits in any case because legislation foregoing a COLA is not a

"law varying compensation" of the Members of Congress, but rather a law extending the period

during which their compensation remains unchanged. (The defendants do not argue that a law

decreasing congressional compensation is outside the intended reach ofthe Madison amendment,see

Madison's statement quoted above, and we express no opinion upon that possibility.)

Although we have the authority to rule upon a question of law not considered by the district

court, see Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 557 (1941), this court has consistently refused to hear

any claim upon which the district court has not had an opportunity to rule. See District of Columbia

v. Air Florida, Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1084-85 (D.C. Cir. 1984). In this case, Mr. Boehner presents

no issue warranting a departure from our normal practice.

When the Act of March 4, 1993 became law Mr. Boehner had already noted his appeal in this

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case. There was no obstacle, however, to his filing another case in district court challenging the new

law (and if appropriate, seeking expedition of that case in the district court or moving to have the

present case held in abeyance in the court of appeals until the later-filed case was appealed). Perhaps

he believed that we would consider his after-arising claim merely because it involves a change in the

law relating to the subject of his pending appeal. See United States v. Reyes-Alvarado, 963 F.2d

1184, 1189 (9th Cir. 1992). In this case, however, the new claim is premised upon a debatable

factual assertion more properly considered in the first instance by the trier of fact.

In particular, Mr. Boehner's claim that the 1993 law cancelling the 1994 COLA is

unconstitutional implicitly rests upon a theory of standing diametrically opposed to the theory

underlying his challenge to the Ethics Reform Act of 1989. His challenge to that Act depends upon

his representation to the court that a pay increase is, in his particular circumstance, an injury. Can

a pay decrease also be an injury to him, then? Perhaps, but we will not simultaneously entertain

seemingly contradictory factual claims ofinjurywithout allowing the appellees an opportunity to test

the afterthought that creates the contradictionand that can be done only in district court.

D. The Quadrennial Pay Adjustment

The Congress also provided in the Ethics Reform Act that a presidential recommendation

arising froma quadrennial pay adjustment commission shall not take effect until it has been approved

by an Act of Congress signed by the President (or otherwise become law) and an election of

Representatives has thereafter been held, 2 U.S.C. § 359(2)(A) & (4)(A), but not before January 1

of the year following that election. 2 U.S.C. § 362(2) ("proposed effective date of a pay adjustment

may occur no earlier than January 1 of the second fiscal year" following the year in which the

Commission makes its proposal). Mr. Boehner challenges this system as a violation of the

twenty-seventh amendment because it would permit a pay adjustment to take effect before the

Congress that approved it has expired, so that a member of that Congress may benefit from it.

We decline to rule upon the merits of this challenge, which is far from ripe. No quadrennial

adjustment has been proposed or enacted; indeed, because the Congress cancelled the first

quadrennial pay adjustment commission under the Ethics Reform Act, no such adjustment is

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scheduled to occur under the Act until 1999. See 2 U.S.C. § 352(8)(B). Even then this claim will

not be ripe until a Congress votes in an election year (i.e., in 1998 or an even-numbered year

thereafter) to make a recommended pay adjustment effective prior to the seating of a new Congress,

when the members of the enacting Congress could no longer benefit from the adjustment. The Act

provides only that the pay adjustment may not occur earlier than the first day of January after an

election, see 2 U.S.C. § 362(2); nothing in the Act or elsewhere prevents the Congress from making

the quadrennial adjustment effective upon the seating of the new Congress later that month, thereby

avoiding altogether the constitutional question Mr. Boehner would have usrush to resolve right now.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that Congressman Boehner has standing to challenge the

congressional COLA provision of the Ethics Reform Act of 1989, and is not barred from doing so

by this court's doctrine of equitable discretion; that because the annual COLA provision took effect

after the 1990 election ofRepresentativesit does not violate the twenty-seventh amendment; and that

Mr. Boehner's challenge to the quadrennial pay raise provision is not yet ripe. We do not consider

Mr. Boehner's claim, raised for the first time on appeal, that the 1993 legislation eliminating the 1994

COLA for the Congress violates the twenty-seventh amendment. The judgment of the district court

is therefore in all respects

Affirmed.

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