Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02716/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02716-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Krista Purnell,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner 

of the Social Security Administration,

Defendant.

No. CV-14-02716-PHX-ESW

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Krista Purnell’s (“Plaintiff”) appeal of the Social 

Security Administration’s (“Social Security”) decision on her application for disability 

benefits. The Court has jurisdiction to decide Plaintiff’s appeal pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 

405(g), 1383(c). Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the Court has the power to enter, based upon 

the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing 

the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the case 

for a rehearing. Both parties have consented to the exercise of U.S. Magistrate Judge 

jurisdiction. (Doc. 10). 

After reviewing the Administrative Record (“A.R.”) and the parties’ briefing 

(Docs. 21, 25, 28), the Court finds that the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) decision 

contains harmful legal error. For the reasons explained in Section II below, the decision 

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is reversed and the case is remanded to the Commissioner of Social Security for further 

administrative proceedings. 

I. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Disability Analysis: Five-Step Evaluation

The Social Security Act (the “Act”) provides for disability insurance benefits to 

those who have contributed to the Social Security program and who suffer from a 

physical or mental disability. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1). The Act also provides for 

Supplemental Security Income to certain individuals who are aged 65 or older, blind, or 

disabled and have limited income. 42 U.S.C. § 1382. To be eligible for benefits based 

on an alleged disability, the claimant must show that he or she suffers from a medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment that prohibits him or her from engaging in 

any substantial gainful activity. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(A)(3)(A). 

The claimant must also show that the impairment is expected to cause death or last for a 

continuous period of at least 12 months. Id.

To decide if a claimant is entitled to Social Security benefits, an ALJ conducts an 

analysis consisting of five questions, which are considered in sequential steps. 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a). The claimant has the burden of proof regarding the first four 

steps:1

Step One: Is the claimant engaged in “substantial gainful 

activity”? If so, the analysis ends and disability benefits are 

denied. Otherwise, the ALJ proceeds to step two.

Step Two: Does the claimant have a medically severe 

impairment or combination of impairments? A severe 

impairment is one which significantly limits the claimant’s 

physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). If the claimant does not 

have a severe impairment or combination of impairments, 

disability benefits are denied at this step. Otherwise, the ALJ 

proceeds to step three.

1 Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742,746 (9th Cir. 2007).

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Step Three: Is the impairment equivalent to one of a number 

of listed impairments that the Commissioner acknowledges 

are so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity? 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). If the impairment meets 

or equals one of the listed impairments, the claimant is 

conclusively presumed to be disabled. If the impairment is 

not one that is presumed to be disabling, the ALJ proceeds to 

the fourth step of the analysis.

Step Four: Does the impairment prevent the claimant from 

performing work which the claimant performed in the past? 

If not, the claimant is “not disabled” and disability benefits 

are denied without continuing the analysis. 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1520(f), 416.920(f). Otherwise, the ALJ proceeds to the 

last step. 

If the analysis proceeds to the final question, the burden of proof shifts to the 

Commissioner:2

Step Five: Can the claimant perform other work in the 

national economy in light of his or her age, education, and 

work experience? The claimant is entitled to disability 

benefits only if he or she is unable to perform other work. 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g). Social Security is 

responsible for providing evidence that demonstrates that 

other work exists in significant numbers in the national 

economy that the claimant can do, given the claimant’s 

residual functional capacity, age, education, and work 

experience. Id.

B. Standard of Review Applicable to ALJ’s Determination

The Court must affirm an ALJ’s decision if it is supported by substantial evidence 

and is based on correct legal standards. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 

2012); Marcia v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 172, 174 (9th Cir. 1990). Although “substantial 

evidence” is less than a preponderance, it is more than a “mere scintilla.” Richardson v. 

Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 

2 Parra, 481 F.3d at 746.

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229 (1938)). “Substantial evidence” means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind 

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id. 

In determining whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision, the 

Court considers the record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and 

detracts from the ALJ’s conclusions. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 

1998); Tylitzki v. Shalala, 999 F.2d 1411, 1413 (9th Cir. 1993). If there is sufficient

evidence to support the ALJ’s determination, the Court cannot substitute its own 

determination. See Morgan v. Comm’r of the Social Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th 

Cir. 1999) (“Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, it 

is the ALJ’s conclusion that must be upheld.”); Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 

(9th Cir. 1989). This is because the ALJ, not the Court, is responsible for resolving 

conflicts and ambiguities in the evidence and determining credibility. Magallanes, 881 

F.2d at 750; see also Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Finally, the Court considers the harmless error doctrine when reviewing an ALJ’s 

decision. This doctrine provides that an ALJ’s decision need not be remanded or 

reversed if it is clear from the record that the error is “inconsequential to the ultimate 

nondisability determination.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(citations omitted); Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115 (an error is harmless so long as there 

remains substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s decision and the error “does not 

negate the validity of the ALJ’s ultimate conclusion”) (citations omitted).

II. PLAINTIFF’S APPEAL

A. Procedural Background

Plaintiff, who was born in 1984, has been employed as an office clerical worker, 

warehouse worker, hostess, and caregiver. (A.R. 702, 724). In February 2013, Plaintiff 

filed an application for disability insurance benefits. (A.R. 137-38). Plaintiff’s 

application alleged that on September 28, 2012, she became unable to work due to 

ependymoma. (A.R. 40). Social Security denied the application on May 2, 2013. (A.R. 

79-82). Social Security also denied Plaintiff supplemental security income. (A.R. 83-

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86). On December 6, 2013, upon Plaintiff’s request for reconsideration, Social Security

affirmed the denial of disability benefits. (A.R. 88-89). Plaintiff then requested a hearing 

before an ALJ. (A.R. 91-92). An ALJ conducted a hearing in July 2014. (A.R. 697-

728). In her August 18, 2014 decision, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was disabled from 

September 28, 2012 through October 26, 2013. (A.R. 22-23). The ALJ found that 

Plaintiff’s disability ended on October 27, 2013 due to medical improvement. (A.R. 23). 

Plaintiff appealed the ALJ’s ruling that Plaintiff’s disability ended. The Appeals 

Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, making the ALJ’s decision the final 

decision of the Social Security Commissioner. (A.R. 1-6). On December 18, 2014, 

Plaintiff filed a Complaint (Doc. 1) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) requesting judicial 

review and reversal of the ALJ’s decision.

B. The ALJ’s Application of the Five-Step Disability Analysis

1. Step One: Engagement in “Substantial Gainful Activity”

The ALJ determined that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity 

since September 28, 2012. (A.R. 17). Neither party disputes this determination.

2. Step Two: Presence of Medically Severe Impairment/Combination 

of Impairments 

The ALJ found that Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: (i) 

degenerative disc disease; (ii) status post C5-C7 laminectomy and resection of cervical 

spinal cord tumor; and (iii) obesity. (A.R. 18). This determination is undisputed.

3. Step Three: Presence of Listed Impairment(s) 

The ALJ determined that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of 

impairments that meets or medically equals an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, 

Subpart P, Appendix 1 of the Social Security regulations. (A.R. 19). Neither party 

disputes the ALJ’s determination at this step.

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4. Step Four: Capacity to Perform Past Relevant Work 

i. September 28, 2012 Through October 26, 2013

The ALJ found that Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) 

from September 28, 2012 through October 26, 2013 to perform light exertional work as 

defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b), except that:

[Plaintiff] was unable to climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds. 

She could occasionally reach overhead bilaterally and could 

frequently use her hands bilaterally for fingering and 

handling. She was restricted from working around hazards 

such as moving machinery and unprotected heights. 

Furthermore, [Plaintiff] required the option to lie down for 

several minutes after one hour intermittently during the 

workday.

(A.R. 19). After considering the testimony of a vocational expert (“VE”) and Plaintiff’s 

RFC, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was unable to perform her past relevant work 

from September 28, 2012 through October 26, 2013. (A.R. 22). The parties do not 

dispute this determination. 

ii. October 27, 2013 Through Present

The ALJ found that beginning on October 27, 2013, there was medical 

improvement in Plaintiff’s ability to function. (A.R. 23). The ALJ adjusted Plaintiff’s 

RFC by removing the condition that there be the option to lie down throughout the 

workday. The ALJ wrote:

[B]eginning on October 27, 2013, [Plaintiff] has had the 

residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined 

in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(b). In addition, [Plaintiff] is unable to 

climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds. She can occasionally 

reach overhead bilaterally and can frequently use her hands 

bilaterally for fingering and handling. [Plaintiff] is restricted 

from working around hazards such as moving machinery and 

unprotected heights.

(A.R. 23). After considering the testimony of the VE and Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ 

determined that beginning on October 27, 2013, Plaintiff is able to perform her past 

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relevant work as an office clerical worker. (A.R. 26-27). Plaintiff appeals this 

determination.

5. Step Five: Capacity to Perform Other Work 

At the final step, the ALJ found that from September 28, 2012 through October 

26, 2013, there were no jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy 

that Plaintiff could have performed. (A.R. 22-23). Accordingly, the ALJ found that 

Plaintiff was disabled from September 28, 2012 through October 26, 2013. (A.R. 23). 

The ALJ’s finding at Step Five is undisputed.

C. The ALJ’s Determination that Medical Improvement Occurred on 

October 27, 2013

Because the ALJ found that Plaintiff was disabled for a finite period of time, this 

is a “closed period” case. See Shepherd v. Apfel, 184 F.3d 1196, 1199 n.2 (10th Cir.

1999) (“In a ‘closed period’ case, the decision maker determines that a new applicant for 

disability benefits was disabled for a finite period of time which started and stopped prior 

to the date of his decision.”) (quoting Pickett v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 288, 289 n.1 (11th Cir. 

1987). 

Under Ninth Circuit law, “once a claimant has been found disabled, a presumption 

of continuing disability arises in [the claimant’s] favor.” 3 Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 

748 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bellamy v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 755 F.2d 1380, 

1381 (9th Cir. 1985)); see Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 500 (9th Cir. 1983). 

However, Social Security may terminate disability benefits when medical improvement 

restores a claimant’s ability to engage in substantial gainful activity. See 42 U.S.C. § 

423(f)(1); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1594, 416.994. “Medical improvement” means “any 

3 Respondents argue that Plaintiff incorrectly asserts that the Commissioner must rebut a presumption of continuing disability. (Doc. 25 at 5). The Court concurs with the 

reasoning in Medina v. Colvin, No. 14-cv-01967-DMR, 2015 WL 5448498 (N.D. Cal. 

Aug. 21, 2015) that a presumption of continuing disability applies despite the 1984 

Amendments to the Social Security Act. “[T]he 1984 amendments do not clearly 

overturn the presumption of continuing disability. Rather, the amendments prohibit “any initial inference as to the presence or absence of disability being drawn from the fact that 

the individual has previously been determined to be disabled.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(f); 42 

U.S.C. § 1382(a)(5). An inference is not the same as a presumption.” Id., at * 10.

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decrease in the medical severity of [the claimant’s] impairment(s) which was present at 

the time of the most recent favorable medical decision that [the claimant was] disabled or 

continued to be disabled.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1594(b)(1), 416.994(b)(1)(i). “A 

determination that there has been a decrease in medical severity must be based on 

changes (improvement) in the symptoms, signs and/or laboratory findings associated with 

[the claimant’s] impairment(s) (see § 404.1528)

4

.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1594(b)(1),

416.994(b)(1)(i). To determine whether medical improvement has occurred, Social 

Security compares the “current medical severity of th[e] impairment [ ] . . . to the medical 

severity of that impairment[] at th[e] time” of the most recent favorable decision. 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1594(b)(7), 416.994(b)(1)(vii).

Pursuant to Social Security regulations, an ALJ must use an eight-step sequential 

analysis in determining whether to terminate a claimant’s disability insurance benefits

due to medical improvement.

5

 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(f). The sequential analysis applies 

to “closed period” cases such as Plaintiff’s case.6 The analysis is to assure that “any 

4 “Symptoms,” “signs,” and “laboratory findings” are defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1528, 416.928. “Symptoms” are the claimant’s own description of his or her physical or mental impairment. “Signs” are anatomical, physiological, or psychological 

abnormalities which can be observed, apart from the claimant’s symptoms. “Laboratory findings” are anatomical, physiological, or psychological phenomena which can be 

shown by the use of medically acceptable laboratory diagnostic techniques.

5 For supplemental security benefits, a seven-step sequential analysis applies. 20 C.F.R. § 416.994(b)(5). Those steps are the same as Steps 2 through 8 under 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1594(f). Thus, the primary difference in analyzing continued eligibility for supplemental security benefits versus disability insurance benefits is that where disability insurance benefits are concerned, an ALJ first determines whether the claimant is 

engaging in substantial gainful activity. 

6 See Tumminaro v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 629, 633 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Before limiting benefits to a closed period, an ALJ must conclude either that a claimant experienced ‘medical improvement’ as evidenced by changes in the symptoms, signs, or test results 

associated with her impairments, or else that an exception to this rule applies. . . . That 

determination is informed by an eight-step evaluation . . . .”) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(f)); Newbold v. Colvin, 718 F.3d 1257 (10th Cir. 2013) (medical improvement standard and sequential analysis set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594 applies to closed period cases); Mendoza v. Apfel, 88 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1113 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (concluding that the medical improvement standard applies to cases involving a closed period of 

disability); Dolbow v. Astrue, 799 F. Supp. 2d 319, 326 (D. Del. 2011) (in determining whether disability is limited to a closed period, “the ALJ must follow an eight-step evaluation process codified in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594”).

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decisions to stop disability benefits are made objectively, neutrally and are fully 

documented.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(f). The eight steps are as follows: 

Step 1. Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful activity? If so, 

the ALJ will find that disability has ended. 

Step 2. Does the claimant have an impairment or combination of 

impairments which meets or equals the severity of an impairment 

listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1? If so, the ALJ 

will find that the claimant’s disability is continuing. Otherwise, the 

ALJ proceeds to Step 3.

Step 3. Has there been medical improvement as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1594(b)(1)? If so, the ALJ proceeds to Step 4. If not, the ALJ 

proceeds to Step 5. 

Step 4. In accordance with 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(b)(1)-(4), does the 

medical improvement relate to the claimant’s ability to do work? 

That is, has there been an increase in the claimant’s RFC based on the 

impairment(s) that was present at the time of the most recent 

favorable medical determination? If there has not been such an 

increase, the ALJ proceeds to Step 5. Otherwise, the ALJ proceeds to 

Step 6.

Step 5. Do any of the exceptions in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(d) and (e) 

apply? If not, the claimant’s disability will be found to continue. If 

one of the exceptions in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(d) applies,7 the ALJ

proceeds to Step 6. If an exception from 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(e) 

applies,8 the claimant’s disability will be found to have ended. 

7 These exceptions include (i) substantial evidence shows that the claimant is a 

beneficiary of medical/vocational/technological advances that have increased the 

claimant’s ability to do basic work activities; (ii) substantial evidence shows that the 

claimant has undergone vocational therapy that improves the claimant’s ability to meet 

the vocational requirements of more jobs; (iii) substantial evidence shows that based on 

new or improved diagnostic or evaluative techniques the claimant’s impairment(s) is not 

as disabling as it was considered to be at the time of the most recent favorable decision; 

(iv) substantial evidence shows that any prior disability decision was in error; and (v) the 

claimant is engaging in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(d).

8 These exceptions include (i) a prior determination or decision was fraudulently obtained; (ii) the claimant is uncooperative; (iii) Social Security is unable to find the 

claimant; and (iv) the claimant fails to follow prescribed treatment which would be 

expected to restore the claimant’s ability to engage in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(e). The exceptions in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(e) may be considered at any point in this process.

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Step 6. Are all of the claimant’s current impairments in combination 

severe? In making this determination, the ALJ considers all of the 

claimant’s current impairments and the impact of the combination of 

those impairments on the claimant’s ability to function. If the RFC 

assessment in Step 4 shows significant limitation of the claimant’s 

ability to do basic work activities and the claimant’s current 

impairments in combination are severe, the ALJ proceeds to Step 7. 

If all of the claimant’s current impairments in combination do not 

significantly limit the claimant’s physical or mental abilities to do 

basic work activities, the claimant will no longer be considered to be 

disabled.

Step 7. Is the claimant able to perform past work? To answer this 

question, the ALJ will assess the claimant’s RFC based on the 

claimant’s current impairments. If the claimant can perform past 

work, disability will be found to have ended. Otherwise, the ALJ

proceeds to the final step.

Step 8. Can the claimant perform other work? This determination 

requires the ALJ to consider the RFC assessment made in Step 7 and 

the claimant’s age, education, and past work experience. If the 

claimant can perform other work, the ALJ will find that the claimant’s

disability has ended. If the claimant cannot perform other work, the 

ALJ will find that the claimant’s disability continues.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(f)(1)-(8).

In making the above sequential analysis, Step 3 must not be given short shrift. 

“[A]n ALJ may not move to the evaluation of a claimant’s RFC without first finding 

medical improvement, and the Act does not authorize an ALJ to find medical 

improvement without making the comparison of prior and current medical evidence.” 

Medina v. Colvin, No. 14-cv-01967-DMR, 2015 WL 5448498, at * 12 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 

21, 2015); Osborn v. Barnhart, No. 03M–2529, 2004 WL 2091480, at *2 (D. Colo. Aug. 

6, 2004) (“While earlier medical records are in the file and the ALJ said that he gave 

careful consideration to all the evidence, he did not say how he compared the symptoms, 

signs and laboratory findings, in those earlier records with the later reports. . . . [Thus] 

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[t]he ALJ’s analysis was improper under the law and the decision therefore must be 

reversed for legal error.”).

The ALJ’s decision in this case discussed and followed the five-step sequential 

analysis set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4) when finding that Plaintiff was disabled 

from September 28, 2012 through October 26, 2013. Although the ALJ’s decision recites

the eight-step analysis set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(f), the Court cannot conclude 

that the ALJ applied correct legal standards in determining that Plaintiff was no longer 

disabled as of October 27, 2013. 

The ALJ’s finding that medical improvement occurred rests entirely on Dr. Mark 

Binette’s October 26, 2013 examination of Plaintiff.

9 (A.R. 23). Dr. Binette is a 

consulting physician who did not review any of Plaintiff’s medical records. (A.R. 582). 

The ALJ’s reference to Dr. Binette’s report does not satisfy the ALJ’s obligation under

20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(b)(7) to compare Plaintiff’s prior and current medical evidence in 

determining whether medical improvement has occurred.10 The ALJ has not met her 

burden of showing that Plaintiff has experienced medical improvement that would allow 

Plaintiff to engage in substantial gainful activity. See McCalmon v. Astrue, 319 F. App’x 

658, 659 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The Commissioner bears the burden of establishing that a 

claimant has experienced medical improvement that would allow him to engage in 

substantial gainful activity.”). The ALJ’s failure to comply with 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594 in 

determining that Plaintiff is no longer disabled as of October 27, 2013 is not 

9 Dr. Binette’s October 26, 2013 report is labeled “Exhibit 14F.” (A.R. 582-85). 

In the section of the ALJ’s decision finding medical improvement, the Court presumes the ALJ was referring to Dr. Binette when the ALJ stated the “examining physician 

observed . . .” and cited Exhibit 14F. (A.R. 23).

10 This conclusion would not change even if Dr. Binette did review Plaintiff’s 

medical records. See Newmiller v. Colvin, No. EDCV 15-0139 FFM, 2016 WL 3034670, at *4 (C.D. Cal. May 27, 2016) (“[T]he ALJ was not permitted to simply adopt the findings of Dr. Kamal and Dr. Ruiz, as their examinations of the medical records “cannot 

substitute for the ALJ's own obligation . . . that the ALJ compare prior to current medical evidence.”) (quoting Medina v. Colvin, No. 14-cv-01967-DMR, 2015 WL 5448498, at * 

11 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2015).

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inconsequential.

11 Reversal is required. Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th 

Cir. 2001) (court may reverse Social Security Commissioner’s decision only if it is not 

supported by substantial evidence or if it is based on legal error); Thompson v. Sullivan, 

987 F.2d 1482, 1487 (10th Cir. 1993) (“[I]f the ALJ failed to apply the correct legal test, 

there is a ground for reversal apart from a lack of substantial evidence.”). 

In addition, the ALJ’s decision contains many inconsistencies and errors that cause 

the Court to question the ALJ’s decision. For example, the ALJ found that beginning on 

October 27, 2013, Plaintiff’s statements regarding her symptoms were not credible. 

(A.R. 24). The ALJ stated that Plaintiff’s trip to Las Vegas in June 2013 “at least raises 

the question whether she was as limited as alleged.” (A.R. 25). This conflicts with the 

conclusion reached earlier in the decision that Plaintiff’s statements regarding her 

symptoms were “generally credible” from September 28, 2012 through October 26, 2013. 

(A.R. 21). The decision also contains a large number of incorrect references. For 

example, the decision states that “great weight is given to Dr. Paul Bendheim, a 

consultative physician.” (A.R. 25). However, the record reflects that Plaintiff was not 

examined by Dr. Bendheim. In another paragraph, Plaintiff’s mother (Ms. Purnell) is 

referred to as a “he” and as “Mr. Bradley.” (A.R. 21). No individual named Mr. Bradley 

is referenced in the record.

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, 

IT IS ORDERED reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

and remanding the case to the Commissioner for further administrative proceedings 

pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The ALJ shall issue a new decision that 

is consistent with the applicable law as set forth in this Order. The ALJ, however, is not 

11 It does not appear that Plaintiff filed a formal application for supplemental security income. However, Social Security denied Plaintiff supplemental security 

income. (A.R. 83-86). The ALJ’s decision addresses only disability insurance benefits. 

To the extent the decision was intended to encompass a denial of supplemental security income, the Court finds that the ALJ’s decision fails to comply with 20 C.F.R. § 416.994 

and that the error is not inconsequential. 

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precluded from reopening the hearing to receive additional evidence if deemed 

appropriate. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly. 

Dated this 17th day of June, 2016. 

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