Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_03-cv-00859/USCOURTS-alsd-1_03-cv-00859-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1

Because Petitioner filed his federal habeas petition after April 24,

1996, this case is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty

Act (AEDPA). “AEDPA expressly limits the extent to which hearings are

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

TRACY BESSELAAR :

Petitioner, :

v. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 03-00859-BH-B

RALPH HOOKS, :

Respondent. :

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Tracy Besselaar, a state prisoner currently in the custody of

respondent, has petitioned this Court for federal habeas corpus

relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges the

validity of his 1997 conviction by a jury in the Circuit Court of

Baldwin County, Alabama, for first degree burglary, for which he

received a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of

parole. (Doc. 1 at 2-3; Doc. 11, Ex. A, Vol. I at 2, 5).

This matter is now before the undersigned Magistrate Judge on

petitioner’s petition, respondent’s answer, briefs, responses, and

exhibits filed by the parties, the state court records, various

appellate briefs filed by the parties, and opinions and orders of

the state appellate courts. Following a careful review of the

petition and record, the undersigned finds that an evidentiary

hearing is not warranted on the issues.1 See 28 U.S.C. §

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permissible, not merely the extent to which they are required.” 

Kelley v. Secretary for Dep’t of Corrs., 377 F.3d 1317, 1337 (11th Cir. 2004). 

The legal standard for determining when an evidentiary hearing in a habeas

corpus case is allowed is articulated in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2), which

provides:

If the applicant has failed to develop the factual

basis of a claim in State court proceedings, the court

shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim

unless the applicant shows that–

(A) the claim relies on–

(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive

to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court,

that was previously unavailable; or

(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been

previously discovered through the exercise of due

diligence; and

(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient

to establish by clear and convincing evidence that but

for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder

would have found the applicant guilty of the

underlying offense.

Petitioner has failed to establish that an evidentiary hearing is

warranted in this case.

2

AEDPA directs that a presumption of correctness be afforded factual

findings of state courts, “which may be rebutted only by clear and convincing

evidence.” Bui v. Haley, 321 F.3d 1304, 1312 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing 28

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)). “This presumption of correctness applies equally to

factual determinations made by state trial and appellate courts.” Id. (citing

Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 547 (1981)). 

2

2254(e)(2).

FINDINGS OF FACT

The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals found the facts of

this case to be as follows:2

Harold LaCombe, a resident of Baldwin

County, Alabama, reported on October 2, 1996,

to the Daphne Police Department that someone

had entered his house by kicking in the back

door and had then ransacked his house, taking

several pieces of jewelry and several guns.

The Daphne Police Department investigated the

burglary and entered the serial numbers of the

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3

stolen weapons into the national computer

system for stolen weapons on October 2, 1996.

On the morning of October 3, 1996, Officer

Robert Duff, a police officer for the Mobile

Police Department, questioned and arrested

Charles Ernest Clark on an unrelated charge.

At the time of the arrest, Clark was in

possession of a weapon with a serial number

matching the one reported stolen by LaCombe.

When Officer Duff realized that the weapon was

evidence in a burglary in Baldwin County, he

contacted the Daphne Police Department, who

sent Officer Scott Taylor to Mobile to provide

the requested assistance. 

During questioning, Clark admitted that

he and the appellant had broken into LaCombe’s

house. According to Clark, the appellant was

wearing black gloves and carrying a weapon

resembling a 9-mm pistol when he kicked in the

back door of LaCombe’s house. They searched

the residence and took jewelry and weapons.

Clark told the officers that he and the

appellant had sold a stolen weapon to A.B.

“Cecil” Evans and had sold another stolen

weapon to Michael Reardon. The appellant and

Clark had divided the proceeds from the sales.

Clark told the officers that the last time he

saw the appellant, the rest of the stolen

weapons were in the trunk of the appellant’s

vehicle. Clark informed the officers that the

appellant had told him he would not go back to

jail. Clark also told the officers that they

could find the appellant at around 9:00 p.m.

at “Touch One,” a business where the

appellant’s girlfriend worked. While the

officers were verifying the sales of the

weapons with Evans and Reardon, Clark learned

through a telephone conversation with his

girlfriend that the appellant was aware that

Clark was in jail and that the police were

looking for him. Clark told the officers that

the appellant knew he was a suspect. Clark

accompanied Officers Duff and Taylor and Mike

Smith, another officer for the Mobile Police

Department, to Touch One to identify the

appellant. When the officers arrived at Touch

One, Clark pointed out the appellant’s

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vehicle. Officers Smith and Taylor got out of

the undercover vehicle, while Officer Duff

tried to position the car to prevent the

appellant’s escape. When Officers Smith and

Taylor approached the appellant’s vehicle and

identified themselves as police officers, the

appellant maneuvered his vehicle around the

undercover vehicle and drove out of the

parking lot. Officers Smith and Taylor got

back into the undercover vehicle and pursued

the appellant with their car’s lights and

siren engaged. The appellant did not pull

over, but continued driving, at a high rate of

speed and in a reckless manner. The officers

followed the appellant to a dead-end street,

where the appellant abandoned his vehicle and

fled on foot. Officer Taylor pursued the

appellant on foot while Officers Smith and

Duff stayed with the appellant’s vehicle and a

passenger who was in the appellant’s vehicle.

The appellant was eventually stopped by other

Mobile police officers who rendered assistance

and was arrested by Officer Taylor. 

(Doc.11, Ex. D at 1-2).

Petitioner was indicted by the Baldwin County Grand Jury on

November 15, 1996, and charged with first degree burglary. (Doc.

11, Ex. A, Vol. I at 1). On February 19, 1997, Petitioner entered

a plea of not guilty to the charge, and his jury trial commenced on

May 12, 1997, in the Circuit Court of Baldwin County, Alabama, the

Honorable John B. Bush presiding. (Id. at 1-2). Petitioner was

represented at trial by attorney J. Russell Pigott. (Id. at 117).

On May 15, 1997, the jury returned a verdict of guilty and, on

August 7, 1997, Petitioner was sentenced under the Habitual Felony

Offender Act to life imprisonment without the possibility of

parole. (Id. at 2-3, 5). 

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Petitioner filed a written notice of appeal to the Alabama

Court of Criminal Appeals on August 7, 1997. (Id. at 89).

Attorney Pigott represented Petitioner on appeal. (Id. at 90). On

September 11, 1998, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed

Petitioner’s conviction by memorandum opinion. (Doc. 11, Ex. D).

Petitioner’s petition for a writ of certiorari was denied by the

Alabama Supreme Court on July 28, 2000. (Doc. 10 at 2). 

On February 26, 2001, Petitioner filed a petition for postconviction relief, pro se, pursuant to Rule 32 of the Alabama Rules

of Criminal Procedure. (Doc. 11, Ex. H, Vol. I at 103). On June

22, 2001, the trial court denied Petitioner’s Rule 32 petition, and

Petitioner filed an appeal to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

on July 3, 2001. (Id. at 3-8). On January 25, 2002, the Alabama

Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, by memorandum opinion, the

judgment of the trial court denying Petitioner’s Rule 32 petition

for post-conviction relief. (Doc. 11, Ex. K). Petitioner filed a

petition for a writ of certiorari with the Alabama Supreme Court,

which was initially granted, and then quashed, on November 21,

2003. (Doc. 10 at 3). 

On December 18, 2003, Petitioner filed the instant petition

for a writ of habeas corpus, setting forth twelve claims in support

of his request for habeas relief. (Doc. 1, attachment at 1-62). In

his Answer, Respondent acknowledges that Petitioner has exhausted

his state court remedies with respect to all of the claims set

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3

 Although petitioner references the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth

Amendments in relation to claim 1, his sole argument in support of this claim

is that his arrest was unlawful under Alabama Code, § 15-10-1. (Doc. 1,

attachment at 1-5)

4

 This section provides:

An arrest may be made, under a warrant or without a

warrant, by any sheriff or other officer acting as

sheriff or his deputy, or by any constable, acting

within their respective counties, or by any marshal,

6

forth in his habeas petition and asserts that the state court

properly denied relief on all twelve claims on the merits. (Doc.

10 at 3). 

DISCUSSION

For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that

Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on the basis of any of

these claims. The Court will now address each of those claims in

turn.

 I. Claim 1. 

Petitioner argues first in his petition that he is entitled to

relief under § 2254 on the ground that his conviction was obtained

by evidence unlawfully seized pursuant to an illegal arrest in

violation of Alabama Code, § 15-10-1.3 (Doc. 1, attachment at 1-

5). According to petitioner, he was arrested, and certain evidence

was obtained, within the confines of the City of Mobile, in Mobile

County, Alabama, by a police officer employed by the City of

Daphne, a municipality in Baldwin County, Alabama. (Id.).

Petitioner argues that the City of Daphne police officer lacked the

statutory authority under § 15-10-14 to make the arrest and seizure

Case 1:03-cv-00859-BH-B Document 36 Filed 08/10/07 Page 6 of 47
deputy marshal or policeman of any incorporated city

or town within the limits of the county.

7

in the City of Mobile and that “Alabama law [namely, Alabama Code,

§ 15-10-1] expressly forbids arrests such as the one made here.”

(Id. at 1-2). 

The Court begins its analysis of claim1 with the principle

that federal habeas relief for state prisoners attacking their

conviction is limited in scope:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a

circuit judge, or a district court shall

entertain an application for a writ of habeas

corpus in behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only

on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or

treaties of the United States.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added). “Federal courts hold no

supervisory authority over state judicial proceedings and may

intervene only to correct wrongs of a constitutional dimension.”

Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 221 (1982). Questions of state

law rarely have federal constitutional significance because “[a]

state’s interpretation of its own laws or rules provides no basis

for federal habeas corpus relief, since no question of a

constitutional nature is involved.” Carrizales v. Wainwright, 699

F.2d 1053, 1055 (11th Cir. 1983). Such questions are reviewed in

federal habeas proceedings only to determine whether the alleged

errors rendered “the entire trial fundamentally unfair.” Id. at

1055. 

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Petitioner raised this claim in the state court on direct

appeal and in his Rule 32 proceedings. On appeal of the denial of

petitioner’s Rule 32 petition on this issue, the Alabama Court of

Criminal Appeals held:

Besselaar also contends that his arrest

was illegal because a Daphne police officer

arrested him in Mobile, outside the officer’s

jurisdiction. It appears that three police

officers apprehended Besselaar in Mobile; two

of the officers were Mobile police officers,

and the third was the aforementioned Daphne

police officer. We note that this claim was

raised and addressed on direct appeal.

Because this claim was raised on direct

appeal, Besselaar is precluded from

reasserting this claim in a Rule 32 petition.

See Rule 32.2(a)(4), Ala. R. Crim. P.

Furthermore, Besselaar’s claim that the

Alabama Supreme Court’s decision in Ex parte

Borden, 769 So. 2d 950 (Ala. 2000), entitles

him to relief is incorrect. Although Borden

held that § 15-10-10, Ala. Code 1975, required

a Lawrence County warrant be endorsed by a

judge or a magistrate of Morgan County before

the warrant could be executed in Morgan

County, the court, nevertheless, upheld the

defendant’s arrest, noting that “exigent

circumstances justified Borden’s arrest by the

local officers – who did, in fact, participate

in the arrest – even without a warrant.” 769

So. 2d at 959-60. Accordingly, the circuit

court correctly concluded that Besselaar’s

claims concerning his illegal arrest did not

warrant relief. 

(Doc. 11, Ex. K at 2-3). 

Petitioner argues that the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

erred in upholding his arrest under § 15-10-1 because it misapplied

Ex parte Borden, 769 So. 2d 950 (Ala. 2000). (Doc. 1, attachment

at 4). In Ex parte Borden, the defendant was arrested in Morgan

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County, Alabama, on an arrest warrant issued in Lawrence County,

Alabama. Because the warrant had not been endorsed by a judge or

magistrate in Morgan County, as required by Alabama Code § 15-10-

10, it was not properly “domesticated” and could not support

defendant’s arrest. The court held, however, that “exigent

circumstances justified Borden’s arrest,” even without a warrant,

“by the local officers - who did, in fact, participate in the

arrest.” Id. at 959-60. 

In the present case, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

held that, although Petitioner was arrested in Mobile County by

Officer Taylor, a City of Daphne police officer, the arrest was

lawful because “other Mobile police officers . . . rendered

assistance. . . .” (Doc.11, Ex. D at 2). The record supports this

finding. (Doc. 11, Ex. A, Vol. III at 302-03). 

In order to obtain federal habeas relief on the basis of claim

1, Petitioner must show not only that the state court erred in

denying his petition for relief on the basis that his arrest was

illegal under Alabama law, but also that the state court’ s error

rendered his entire trial fundamentally unfair. For the precise

reasons found by the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals in its

memorandum opinion, this Court agrees that Petitioner’s arrest was

lawful. There being no error in the state court’s decision to deny

relief on this claim, the state court’s ruling did not deprive

Petitioner of fundamental fairness. Thus, claim 1 fails to state

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a cognizable federal habeas claim and is due to be denied. 

 II. Claim 2.

Petitioner next argues in his petition that he is entitled to

relief under § 2254 on the ground that the trial court erroneously

allowed evidence of flight, which rendered his trial unfair, in

violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Doc. 1,

attachment at 5). As with claim 1, Petitioner’s challenge to the

trial court’s actions related to the admission of evidence of

flight “involve[s] the interpretation and application of state law

by the state courts.” Lindsey v. Bullard, 2006 WL 1669807, *15

(M.D. Ala. 2006) (rejecting petitioner’s habeas challenge to trial

court’s admission of evidence of flight, stating, “[a] federal

court has no authority to re-examine state court determinations on

questions of state law.”). See also Bundy v. Dugger, 850 F.2d

1402, 1422 n.29 (11th Cir. 1988) (petitioner’s habeas claim related

to evidence of flight raised state law issues and, thus, was not a

basis for federal habeas corpus relief absent a showing that the

improperly admitted evidence deprived petitioner of fundamental

fairness).

In reviewing an evidentiary determination of a state trial

court, the federal court will “not sit as a ‘super’ state supreme

court.” Shaw v. Boney, 695 F.2d 528, 530 (11th Cir. 1983)

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11

(citations omitted). In Shaw, the Eleventh Circuit explained:

Unlike a state appellate court, we are

not free to grant the petitioner relief simply

because we believe the trial judge has erred.

The scope of our review is severely

restricted. Indeed, the general rule is that

a federal court will not review a trial

court’s actions with respect to the admission

of evidence. [Citations omitted]. A state

evidentiary violation in and of itself does

not support habeas corpus relief. [Citations

omitted]. Before such relief may be granted,

the violation must rise to the level of a

denial of “fundamental fairness.” [Citations

omitted]. 

 In the context of state evidentiary

rulings, the established standard of

fundamental fairness is that habeas relief

will be granted only if the state trial error

was “material in the sense of a crucial,

critical, highly significant factor.”

[Citations omitted]. Moreover, application of

this standard has been notably one-sided,

consistent with the reluctance of federal

courts to second-guess state evidentiary

rulings. This court has established a

well-documented resistance to granting relief

when a habeas petition alleges a federal claim

based merely on a state evidentiary ruling. 

Id. Thus, as with claim 1, this claim will be reviewed only to

determine whether the alleged error “render[ed] the entire trial

fundamentally unfair.” Carrizales, 699 F.2d at 1055. 

The record shows that Petitioner raised this claim on direct

appeal of his conviction, and the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

rejected the claim, stating:

The appellant contends that the trial

court erred in admitting evidence of the

appellant’s chase and capture by the police

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and in instructing the jury on the issue of

flight. Specifically, the appellant argues

that his flight was irrelevant because, he

says, it was unconnected with the offense

charged and because, he says, any probative

value of the evidence was substantially

outweighed by its prejudicial effect. 

“In a criminal prosecution the state

may prove that the accused engaged

in flight to avoid prosecution . . .

as tending to show the accused’s

consciousness of guilt. . . .

“The prosecution is generally given

wide latitude in proving things that

occurred during the accused’s

flight.

“The primary question is whether the

incriminating actions of the accused

were, as judged under the prevailing

facts, relevant as a basis from

which to infer that they were

prompted by a consciousness of guilt

for the now charged crime. It has

been held that the following fourstep inference should be satisfied

as a condition precedent to

concluding that such relevancy does

indeed exist: (1) from the

defendant’s behavior to flight; (2)

from flight to consciousness of

guilt; (3) from consciousness of

guilt to consciousness of guilt

concerning the crime charged; and

(4) from consciousness of guilt

concerning the crime charged to

actual guilt of the crime charged.”

C. Gamble, McElroy’s Alabama Evidence,

 § 190.01 (5th ed. 1996) (footnotes omitted).

“‘Evidence of flight is admissible

even though it is weak or

inconclusive or if several days

have passed since the commission of

the crime. . . . Evidence of

flight is admissible even though

that evidence involves the

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commission of other crimes by the

accused.’”

Rogers v. State, 630 So. 2d 88, 91 (Ala. 1992)

(citations omitted), aff’d, Ex parte Musgrove,

638 So. 2d 1360 (Ala. 1993), cert. denied, 513

U.S. 845, 115 S. Ct. 136, 130 L. Ed. 2d 78

(1994), citing Beaver v. State, 455 So. 2d

253, 257 (Ala. Cr. App. 1984). 

Here, Officers Duff, Smith, and Taylor

testified that, with the assistance of Clark,

they identified the appellant and his vehicle

in a parking lot at approximately 8:30 p.m. on

October 3, 1996. Officers Smith and Taylor

testified that when they approached the

appellant’s parked vehicle and identified

themselves as police officers, the appellant

drove away. Officers Smith and Taylor got

back in the undercover vehicle that Officer

Duff was driving, and they pursued the

appellant. Although their car was not marked,

the officers engaged their siren and lights to

signal the appellant to pull over. The

appellant, however, did not stop, but led the

officers on a high-speed chase, which ended on

a dead-end road where the appellant fled on

foot. Additionally, Richard Norman, a friend

of Clark’s, testified that he had informed the

appellant earlier on October 3, 1996, prior to

the appellant’s flight from the police, that

the police were looking for the appellant in

connection with the stolen weapons. The chase

of the appellant in his vehicle occurred one

day after the burglary. 

Initially, the appellant argues that the

evidence indicated that he was not aware when

he fled the parking lot that the men

approaching his vehicle were police officers.

This argument, however, is weakened by the

testimony indicating that even if the

appellant may not have initially recognized

the men as law enforcement officers, the

officers engaged the lights and siren on their

undercover vehicle in pursuit of the appellant

once the high-speed chase began.

Additionally, the appellant’s flight occurred

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the day after the burglary, and the appellant

was aware that the police were looking for

him. In this case, the evidence concerning

the appellant’s flight was sufficiently

connected with the offense charged to show the

accused’s consciousness of guilt and was such

that the jury could infer from it that the

appellant was attempting to evade law

enforcement officers in connection with the

offense charged. 

We also find that the prejudicial impact

of the evidence did not substantially outweigh

its probative value. “The trial court’s

decision [in balancing the evidence of

flight’s probative value against its

prejudicial impact] stands on appeal under an

abuse of discretion standard.” C. Gamble,

McElroy’s Alabama Evidence, § 190.01(6) (5th

ed. 1996). The facts in this case indicate

that the appellant was aware that the police

were looking for him with regard to the

burglary in Baldwin County. Moreover, the

evidence indicates that because of this

knowledge, the appellant attempted to elude

the police by engaging the officers, who

identified themselves by their blue light and

siren, in a high-speed chase followed by an

on-foot pursuit. Clearly, the appellant’s

conduct in fleeing by both vehicle and foot

was closely connected to the offense charged

and valuable to the state’s case. The

evidence was not of such prejudicial nature

that it should have been excluded; therefore,

the trial court did not abuse its discretion

in admitting the evidence and instructing the

jury on the issue of flight.

(Doc. 11, Ex. D at 11-12).

The Court has reviewed the trial court record, and it supports

the state court’s finding that Petitioner knew that he was being

pursued by the police for the burglary committed the previous day.

(Doc. 11, Ex. A, Vol. III at 242-43, 294-95, 300-02; Vol. IV at

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15

423-24). For the precise reasons found by the Alabama Court of

Criminal Appeals in its memorandum opinion, this Court agrees that

the evidence of flight was properly admitted. There being no error

in the state court’s admission of the evidence, petitioner was not

deprived of fundamental fairness. Thus, claim 2 fails to state a

cognizable federal habeas claim and is due to be denied.

III. Claim 3. 

Petitioner next argues in his petition that he is entitled to

relief under § 2254 on nine separate grounds of ineffective

assistance of counsel, in violation of his rights under the Sixth

Amendment. (Doc. 1, attachment at 14-61). Respondent answers that

each of these claims was considered by the state courts and denied

on the merits. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) provides that: 

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus

on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to

the judgment of a State court shall not be

granted with respect to any claim that was

adjudicated on the merits in State court

proceedings unless the adjudication of the

claim– 

(1) resulted in a decision that was

contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of

the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was

based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light

of the evidence presented in the

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State court proceeding.

Id. In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000), Justice

O’Connor, writing for a majority of the Court, recognized that “§

2254(d)(1) places a new constraint on the power of a federal habeas

court to grant a state prisoner’s application for a writ of habeas

corpus with respect to claims adjudicated on the merits in state

court.” 

A state-court decision is contrary to the

Supreme Court’s clearly established precedent

(1) if the state court applies a rule that

contradicts the governing law as set forth in

Supreme Court case law, or (2) if the state

court confronts a set of facts that are

materially indistinguishable from those in a

decision of the Supreme Court and nevertheless

arrives at a result different from Supreme

Court precedent. See Williams v. Taylor, 529

U.S. 362, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1519-20, 146 L. Ed.

2d 389 (2000).

A state court decision involves an

unreasonable application of Supreme Court

precedent “if the state court identifies the

correct governing legal rule from [Supreme

Court] cases but unreasonably applies it to

the facts of the particular state prisoner’s

case.” Williams, 120 S. Ct. at 1520. In

addition, a state court decision involves an

unreasonable application of Supreme Court

precedent “if the state court either

unreasonably extends a legal principle from

[Supreme Court] precedent to a new context

where it should not apply or unreasonably

refuses to extend that principle to a new

context where it should apply.” Id.

Bottoson v. Moore, 234 F.3d 526, 531 (11th Cir. 2000). Moreover,

as discussed above, the Act, as amended, presumes as correct all

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determinations of factual issues made by a state court and places

the burden upon the Petitioner of rebutting such a presumption of

correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(e).

To prevail on any of his claims of ineffective assistance of

counsel, Petitioner bears the additional burden of establishing by

a preponderance of the evidence that his trial counsel’s

performance was deficient and that he was actually prejudiced by

the inadequate performance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668

(1984). The elements to be considered are as follows: 

First, the defendant must show that counsel’s

performance was deficient. This requires

showing that counsel made errors so serious

that counsel was not functioning as the

“counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the

Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must

show that the deficient performance prejudiced

the defense. This requires showing that

counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive

the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose

result is reliable.

Id., 466 U.S. at 687. Thus, Petitioner must demonstrate that his

counsel’s performance “fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, and that “there is

a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”

Id. at 694. “Establishing these two elements is not easy: ‘the

cases in which habeas petitioners can properly prevail on the

ground of ineffective assistance of counsel are few and far

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between.’” Van Poyck v. Florida Dep’t of Corrections, 290 F.3d

1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Waters v. Thomas, 46 F.3d 1506,

1511 (11th Cir. 1995)). 

An ineffective assistance of counsel claim is examined under

the “totality of the circumstances.” House v. Balkcom, 725 F.2d

608, 615 (11th Cir. 1984). An attorney’s performance is presumed

to have been reasonable and must not be examined with the aid of

judicial hindsight. Messer v. Kemp, 760 F.2d 1080, 1088 (11th Cir.

1985). A federal court must apply a “heavy measure of deference to

counsel’s judgments.” Singleton v. Thigpen, 847 F.2d 668, 670 (11th

Cir. 1988) (quoting Strickland, 446 U.S. at 691).

The test has nothing to do with what the best

lawyers would have done. Nor is the test even

what most good lawyers would have done. We

ask only whether some reasonable lawyer at the

trial could have acted, in the circumstances,

as defense counsel acted at trial. . . . We

are not interested in grading lawyers’

performances; we are interested in whether the

adversarial process at trial, in fact, worked

adequately. 

Grayson v. Thompson, 257 F.3d 1194, 1216 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting

White v. Singletary, 972 F.2d 1218, 1220-21 (11th Cir. 1992)). The

Court will consider each of Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of

counsel claims in turn.

With respect to habeas claims 3A and 3B, Petitioner claims

that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to or

otherwise challenge the State’s knowing use of perjured testimony

by witness Charles Clark (claim 3A) and for failing to introduce

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19

evidence of Clark’s deal with the prosecution (claim 3B).

Petitioner claims that Clark committed perjury when he testified

that the State had not offered him a “leniency deal” in exchange

for his agreement to testify against petitioner at trial.

Petitioner complains that his trial counsel failed to adequately

challenge Clark’s testimony and introduce evidence of the leniency

deal. (Doc. 1, attachment at 15-24). Petitioner presented this

same argument to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals on appeal of

the denial of his petition for Rule 32 relief, and, in its

memorandum opinion affirming the denial of relief, the court

stated:

Besselaar contends in part IV of his

brief that his trial counsel was ineffective

because he failed to challenge the testimony

of Charles Clark, a State’s witness. Clark

allegedly testified that he had received

nothing in exchange for his agreement to

testify against Besselaar. Besselaar contends

that the circuit court erred in concluding

that he had failed to meet his burden of

proving that he was prejudiced by counsel’s

conduct. We have reviewed the record of

Besselaar’s evidentiary hearing, and we

concluded that the circuit court correctly

determined that Besselaar failed to

demonstrate how he was prejudiced by counsel’s

conduct. At the evidentiary hearing, counsel

testified that the witness’s testimony was

somewhat ambiguous regarding whether he had

been promised anything in exchange for his

testimony. Counsel further testified that, in

his opinion, the jury could have been misled

by the witness’s testimony that he received

nothing in exchange for his testimony, and

thus, the jury might have been more inclined

to believe Clark’s version of what happened.

However, counsel testified that he did crossCase 1:03-cv-00859-BH-B Document 36 Filed 08/10/07 Page 19 of 47
20

examine the witness regarding the truthfulness

of his testimony that he had received no

promises of favorable treatment by the State

in exchange for his testimony. Counsel

admitted that in hindsight, he believed that

he could have attacked the witness’s testimony

more vigorously.

Based on our review of counsel’s

testimony, we agree with the circuit court’s

conclusion that Besselaar failed to meet the

two-prong Strickland test. Given that counsel

did, indeed, challenge the credibility of the

witness’s testimony, his representation cannot

[be] said to be deficient. Moreover,

Besselaar has failed to show how he was

prejudiced by counsel’s performance. Nothing

counsel could have done would have prevented

Clark from testifying. Moreover, counsel

presented testimony from several defense

witnesses that directly refuted Clark’s

testimony. The credibility of the witnesses

was a question for the jury to determine.

Counsel’s performance was not ineffective with

regard to this claim. 

(Doc. 11, Ex. K at 4-5). 

Having reviewed the record in this matter, the Court agrees

with the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals that Petitioner failed

to establish that he was entitled to relief on these claims.

Assuming arguendo that Petitioner’s trial counsel was deficient for

failing to challenge more vigorously Clark’s testimony that he

received no promise of leniency from the State in exchange for his

testimony against Petitioner, Petitioner has failed to show that

counsel’s error was “so serious as to deprive the defendant of a

fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable” and that “there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional

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21

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 694. 

The record in this case shows that, although Petitioner’s

trial counsel did not vigorously challenge Clark’s testimony that

he received no promise of leniency from the State in exchange for

his testimony against Petitioner, or present evidence of a leniency

deal between Clark and the prosecution in exchange for Clark

testifying against petitioner, Petitioner’s trial counsel did

cross-examine Clark at length about inconsistencies in his trial

testimony implicating petitioner as his accomplice. (Doc. 11, Ex.

A, Vol. I at 166-87). In addition, Clark admitted on direct and

cross examination that he told Petitioner’s mother and Petitioner’s

girlfriend that Petitioner had nothing to do with the burglary,

although he claimed at trial that he merely lied to them. (Id. at

153-54, 184-85). Petitioner’s trial counsel also secured

admissions from Clark that he lied more than once to the police

about his own involvement in the burglary. (Id. at 169-70, 185).

Moreover, in addition to Clark’s testimony implicating the

Petitioner, the record contains testimony from A.B. Evans, a

witness who testified that, on the day of the LaCombe burglary,

Petitioner and Clark sold him a gun that was stolen from the

LaCombe house. (Id., Vol. III at 222-25, 227). Another witness,

Richard Norman, testified that, on the day of the LaCombe burglary,

he saw the stolen guns in Petitioner’s car, and he accompanied

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22

Petitioner and Clark to sell one of the stolen guns to a friend of

his. (Id., Vol. III at 235-40). There was also testimony from the

arresting officer that, the day following the burglary, the police

found gun manuals stolen from the LaCombe residence in Petitioner’s

car. (Id., Vol. III at 303-09). Given the totality of this

evidence, Petitioner cannot establish that but for his counsel’s

failure to vigorously challenge Clark about the leniency from the

state, the outcome of this case would have been different.

Therefore, Petitioner has failed to establish ineffective

assistance of trial counsel with respect to habeas claims 3A and

3B.

With respect to habeas claim 3C, Petitioner claims that his

trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge false

statements by the prosecutor that effectively nullified his alibi

defense. (Doc. 1, attachment at 25). Petitioner argues that the

prosecutor’s theory that the burglary took place between noon and

1:00 p.m. on October 2, 1996, during which time petitioner had no

alibi, was not supported by the evidence. (Id. at 29). Petitioner

presented this same argument to the Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals on appeal of the denial of his petition for Rule 32 relief,

and, in its memorandum opinion affirming the denial of relief, the

court stated:

Besselaar contends in part V of his brief

that his trial counsel was ineffective because

he failed to object when the prosecutor argued

facts not in evidence during closing argument.

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23

He claims that the circuit court erred in

concluding that Besselaar had failed to

establish how he was prejudiced by counsel’s

performance. 

We have reviewed the transcript of the

evidentiary hearing and conclude that the

circuit court’s finding is supported by the

record. Although counsel admitted that he did

not object to the prosecutor’s argument, this

omission does not establish that counsel was

ineffective. A defendant is not entitled to

an error-free trial, and the fact that counsel

made a mistake is not enough to show that his

performance was ineffective. See Saffold v.

State, 570 So. 2d 727 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990).

In any event, this Court has held that

“‘[d]uring closing argument, the prosecutor,

as well as defense counsel, has a right to

present his impressions from the evidence, if

reasonable, and may argue every legitimate

inference.’” Coral v. State, 628 So. 2d 954,

985 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992), aff’d, 628 So. 2d

1104 (Ala. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1012

(1994) (quoting Rutledge v. State, 523 So. 2d

1087, 1100 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987), rev’d on

other grounds, 523 So. 2d 1118 (Ala. 1988)).

Thus, while the State’s argument may have

undercut Besselaar’s alibi, the prosecutor

was, nevertheless, entitled to present his

impressions from the evidence. Accordingly,

the[r]e was no [basis] for any objection by

trial counsel. Therefore, counsel’s

performance was not ineffective with regard to

this claim.

(Doc. 11, Ex. K at 5-6). 

Having reviewed the record in this matter, the Court agrees

with the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals that Petitioner has

failed to establish that he is entitled to relief on this claim.

Given the equivocal nature of Clark’s testimony about the time of

Case 1:03-cv-00859-BH-B Document 36 Filed 08/10/07 Page 23 of 47
5

When asked what time petitioner picked him up and took him to the LaCombe

residence, Clark testified: “probably about one o’clock, I believe.” (Doc. 11,

Ex. A, Vol. I at 123-24). Clark further testified that he could not remember the

time exactly and stated that he “believe[d]” it was “around one.” (Id.). 

24

the burglary,5 this Court agrees with the Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals that the prosecutor was free to argue that the burglary may

have occurred earlier than Clark had testified. Moreover, even

assuming that the prosecutor’s argument about the time of the

burglary was improper and that counsel was deficient for not

interposing an objection, given the evidence in this case

implicating Petitioner in the burglary, Petitioner has failed to

show that the alleged error was “so serious as to deprive the

defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable” and

that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 694. Therefore,

Petitioner has failed to establish ineffective assistance of trial

counsel with respect to habeas claim 3C.

With respect to habeas claim 3D, Petitioner claims that his

trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call him to testify at

the pretrial suppression hearing regarding the circumstances

surrounding his “flight” from police when he was arrested. (Doc.

1, attachment at 32). Petitioner claims that he should have been

allowed to testify that he did not realize that the people chasing

him were police, and, therefore, his flight was justified and

Case 1:03-cv-00859-BH-B Document 36 Filed 08/10/07 Page 24 of 47
25

should be suppressed. (Id. at 33-34). Petitioner presented this

same argument to the state trial court in his Rule 32 petition, and

the court denied his petition for Rule 32 relief, stating that,

after reviewing all of the evidence incriminating Petitioner, even

if trial counsel “had done all that Defendant complains was

omitted,” it was not more likely than not that the result would

have been any different. (Doc. 11, Ex. H, Vol. I at 5-6). The

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial

of Petitioner’s Rule 32 relief without specifically writing to this

claim. (Doc. 11, Ex. K at 6-7). 

Having reviewed the record in this matter, the Court agrees

with the state trial court that Petitioner has failed to establish

that he is entitled to relief on this claim. The record shows

that, at the suppression hearing, Petitioner’s trial counsel

secured admissions from the arresting officers through crossexamination that, when they first began pursuing Petitioner, they

were driving an unmarked police vehicle, and they were not wearing

police uniforms. (Doc. 11, Ex. A, Vol. IV at R.35-36; R.65-66).

Thus, even without Petitioner testifying, the trial court was aware

of the circumstances relied upon by Petitioner to justify his

flight. Moreover, given the other evidence linking Petitioner to

this crime, as outlined above, even assuming that trial counsel was

deficient for not calling Petitioner to testify at the suppression

hearing regarding the circumstances of his flight, Petitioner has

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26

failed to show that this error was “so serious as to deprive the

defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable” and

that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 694. Therefore,

Petitioner has failed to establish ineffective assistance of trial

counsel with respect to habeas claim 3D.

With respect to habeas claim 3E, Petitioner claims that his

trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him of the full

nature and scope of his right to testify at trial in his own

behalf. (Doc. 1, attachment at 36). Petitioner presented this

same argument to the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals on appeal of

the denial of his petition for Rule 32 relief, and, in its

memorandum opinion affirming the denial of relief, the court

stated:

Besselaar contends in part VI of his

brief that his trial counsel was ineffective

because, he claims, counsel failed to fully

apprise him of his right to testify at trial.

Alternatively, Besselaar argues that his

counsel refused to allow him to testify at

trial. The circuit court concluded that

counsel did not prevent Besselaar from

testifying; rather, the court determined that

counsel merely advised Besselaar that he

believed it would not be a good idea to

testify in light of his prior convictions, and

that Besselaar followed counsel’s advice. 

The court’s finding is supported by the

record. It appears that Besselaar was, in

fact, apprised of his right to testify.

However, counsel stated that he advised

Case 1:03-cv-00859-BH-B Document 36 Filed 08/10/07 Page 26 of 47
27

Besselaar that he should not testify because

if he did so, the State would be able to

impeach him with evidence of his prior felony

convictions. When reviewing a claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court

indulges a strong presumption that counsel’s

conduct was appropriate and reasonable.

Hallford v. State, 629 So. 2d 6 (Ala. Crim.

App. 1992), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1100

(1994); Luke v. State, 484 So. 2d 531 (Ala.

Crim. App. 1985). Moreover, this Court should

avoid using “hindsight” to evaluate the

performance of counsel. Instead, we must

consider the circumstances surrounding the

case at the time of counsel’s actions before

determining whether counsel rendered

ineffective assistance. Hallford, 629 So. 2d

at 9; see also, e.g., Cartwright v. State, 645

So. 2d 326 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994). Given

Besselaar’s criminal history, counsel was not

ineffective when he advised Besselaar that he

should not testify at trial. 

Doc. 11, Ex. K at 6-7).

Having reviewed the record in this matter, the Court agrees

with the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals that Petitioner has

failed to establish that he is entitled to relief on this claim.

Petitioner acknowledged at his Rule 32 hearing that his trial

counsel explained to him that, if he testified, the State was going

to bring up Petitioner’s past felony convictions and “what we’d

like to do is avoid that because that could be prejudicial to you.”

(Doc. 11, Ex. H, Vol. III at R-70-71, R-191). Petitioner’s trial

counsel testified at the Rule 32 hearing that the only reason that

he did not want Petitioner to testify was the fact that he had five

prior felony convictions, and he would be impeached with those

convictions. (Id., Vol. III at R-191; Vol. IV at R-328). Thus,

Case 1:03-cv-00859-BH-B Document 36 Filed 08/10/07 Page 27 of 47
28

the state court’s finding that Petitioner’s trial counsel advised

him not to testify at trial is clearly supported by the record.

 Petitioner argues in his habeas petition, however, that he

wanted to testify against advice of counsel so that he could

establish his alibi. (Doc. 1, attachment at 37-38). The record

shows that, although trial counsel did not call Petitioner to

testify about his alibi, trial counsel presented evidence of

Petitioner’s alibi through various witnesses who testified that

they had seen Petitioner around the time of the burglary, thus

supporting Petitioner’s theory that he could not have committed the

burglary. Petitioner argues that he also wanted to make the jury

aware that, at the time of the alleged burglary, he was working a

full time job, taking college classes, and engaged to be married.

(Doc. 1, attachment at 36-37). The record shows that Petitioner’s

girlfriend testified that she and Petitioner were engaged to be

married, and Petitioner’s mother testified that he was doing

construction work at the time of the burglary, although she did not

know Petitioner’s work schedule. (Doc. 11, Ex. A, Vol. IV at 477,

487). Given all of the circumstances of this case, particularly

Petitioner’s five prior felony convictions, including multiple

convictions for burglary and theft of property (id., Vol. I at 35),

counsel’s advice to Petitioner not to testify at trial was

reasonable. Moreover, assuming that trial counsel failed to

explain to Petitioner that he had the right to testify against the

Case 1:03-cv-00859-BH-B Document 36 Filed 08/10/07 Page 28 of 47
29

advice of counsel, Petitioner has failed to show, under the

circumstances of this case, that this error was “so serious as to

deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is

reliable” and that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would

have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 694.

Therefore, Petitioner has failed to establish ineffective

assistance of trial counsel with respect to habeas claim 3E.

With respect to habeas claim 3F, Petitioner claims that his

trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence

proving that the jury was exposed to extraneous evidence of

Petitioner’s pending collateral criminal charges. (Doc. 1,

attachment at 45). Petitioner presented this same argument to the

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals on appeal of the denial of his

petition for Rule 32 relief, and, in its memorandum opinion

affirming the denial of relief, the court stated:

Likewise, in Part VIII of Besselaar’s

brief, he contends that his counsel was

ineffective because, he claims, counsel failed

to prevent the jury from being exposed to

“prejudicial extraneous evidence.” Again, this

claim was presented as a substantive claim on

direct appeal and rejected by this Court. The

substantive claim did not constitute

reversible error; therefore, the circuit court

did not err in finding that Besselaar had

failed to establish that he was prejudiced by

counsel’s conduct. 

(Doc. 11, Ex. K at 7).

The substantive claim referred to by the Alabama Court of

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30

Criminal Appeals in the Rule 32 proceedings was Petitioner’s claim

on direct appeal that the trial court erred in denying his motion

to dismiss the indictment because the jury was prejudiced by

evidence of collateral criminal charges pending against Petitioner.

Specifically, Petitioner argued that the posting of a court docket

sheet in an area where the jury congregated during breaks, which

listed several other cases against Petitioner, improperly presented

unfair, prejudicial evidence to the jury. (Doc. 11, Ex. D at 7).

The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s

denial of Petitioner’s motion to dismiss on this ground, stating:

The morning of the third day of trial,

the appellant informed the trial court, on the

record, that one of his witnesses had observed

a juror during a break the prior afternoon

looking at the bulletin board that posted a

court docket sheet listing several of the

appellant’s pending criminal cases. The

appellant argued that the presence of the

court docket sheet in an area frequented by

the jurors may have presented extraneous

evidence of his collateral bad acts and

unfairly prejudiced the jury against him.

When the trial court was informed of the

posted court docket sheet, it [made] the

following findings:

“It is my memory that the

docket was placed or found located

on a bulletin board outside the

courtroom but it was inside the

metal detector as best I recall

where it was not easily seen. As a

matter of fact, I wasn’t aware a

bulletin board was there at all

myself and I walked by this door

numerous times during the course of

this week until it was pointed out

Case 1:03-cv-00859-BH-B Document 36 Filed 08/10/07 Page 30 of 47
31

yesterday afternoon after we took a

break by defense counsel. 

“To the extent that it matters,

maybe the document might ought to be

made a part of the record. I’m not

sure how to do that but

nevertheless. This document on the

front page is styled Motion for

Amended Trial Priority indicates

that there are three dockets. At

the top of the heading it says State

of Alabama v. Tracy Besselaar, et

al., Criminal Docket Number 1. And

the case number and it lists five

case numbers and then says et al.

“Immediately below that it has

William F. Powell, II, et al.

Criminal Docket 2, six case numbers

and then et al. Then under that it

has Webb McCarty, et al, Criminal

Docket 3, and list[s] three case

numbers and then et al.

“Second page is much the same

in heading. You have to go to the

fourth page of the document to be

any indication that Mr. Besselaar

may have more than one case. And

(sic) the average lay person I don’t

think that this document would mean

much of anything much less suggest

that the defendant in this case has

got a whole bunch of cases pending

against him.

“If defense wishes to press the

issue at the conclusion of this

trial I will do individual voir dire

on each and every juror and find out

if they read it and knew what it

meant. I think that’s silly but if

you wanted to – I’m not going to

stop the trial. . . . 

“Y’all can think about it if

you want me to do individual voir

Case 1:03-cv-00859-BH-B Document 36 Filed 08/10/07 Page 31 of 47
32

dire upon the conclusion of the

trial I will be happy to stay here

another week and do it if you want

to.

“Let me say this. I don’t

remember that any of the prospective

jurors indicated they have any legal

training or they are familiar with

court dockets or know how to read

them or even know what the heck this

means.

“But any way I will deal with

it in that manner. If you want to

y’all can make the call.” ®. 468-

70).

The record reflects that the appellant

did not raise this issue again or request that

the trial court conduct individual voir dire

at the conclusion of the trial. 

The trial court is in the best position

to observe the alleged prejudicial act, to

determine its effect upon the jury, and to

determine an appropriate remedy. Dixon v.

State, 476 So. 2d 1236 (Ala. Cr. App. 1985).

The granting of “[a] motion for a mistrial

[and other extreme remedies, like dismissal of

the charges,] implies a miscarriage of justice

and should only be granted where it is

apparent that justice cannot be afforded.”

Dixon, 476 So. 2d at 1240.

Here the appellant merely raises the

possibility that jurors may have observed the

posted court docket sheet and has failed to

prove that the jury was “tainted with

prejudice.” There was no showing that any

juror had actually read the docket sheet. The

appellant, in his objection, stated that a

juror had been observed standing at the

bulletin board, where in addition to the

docket sheet, an article from Reader’s Digest

magazine was posted. There is nothing in the

record to support the appellant’s claim of

prejudice, and we will not speculate as to

these matters based on the evidence before us.

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33

We find no clear abuse of the trial court’s

discretion.

“‘[D]ue process means a jury capable and

willing to decide the case solely on the

evidence before it, and a trial judge ever

watchful to prevent prejudicial occurrences

and to determine the effect of such

occurrences when they happen.’” Robinson v.

State, 621 So. 2d 389, 393 (Ala. Cr. App.

1993), quoting, Samuels v. State, 584 So. 2d

958, 961 (Ala. Cr. App. 1991), cert. denied,

584 So. 2d 963 (Ala. 1991). The appellant has

failed to make a showing that his right to a

fair, unbiased jury was violated. We are

satisfied, based on the record before us, that

the trial court’s findings and actions in this

situation were sufficient to the court to

determine that the jury was not prejudiced. 

With regard to the appellant’s argument

that the trial court erred in failing to

conduct a reasonable investigation into these

alleged instances of prejudice, we note that

the appellant did not request or encourage

voir dire of the jury, because he feared

further “ringing the bell” and that, if the

jurors were unaware of his other pending

cases, questioning would inform them of the

existence of these cases. ®. 465). The trial

court offered to conduct individual voir dire

of the jurors at the close of the trial, but

the appellant did not avail himself of the

opportunity to pursue this matter. “[A] party

cannot allege as error proceedings in the

trial court that were invited by him or were a

natural consequence of his own action. . . .

A defendant cannot invite error by his conduct

and later profit by the error. Fountain v.

State, 586 So. 2d 277, 282 (Ala. Cr. App.

1981). Here, the appellant had ample

opportunity to request that the trial court

individually voir dire the jury to determine

any prejudice, but did not do so. He cannot

now profit from his own silence.

(Doc. 11, Ex. D at 9-11).

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34

Having reviewed the record in this matter, the Court agrees

with the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals in the Rule 32

proceedings that Petitioner has failed to establish that he is

entitled to relief on this claim. The record shows that, after

discussing the matter of the docket sheet with the judge,

Petitioner’s trial counsel chose not to voir dire the jurors at

that time because of the risk of calling further attention to the

fact that Petitioner had other cases pending against him. (Doc.

11, Ex. A, Vol. IV at 465). Under the circumstances, trial

counsel’s decision was reasonable. Although trial counsel could

have asked the trial court to voir dire the jury on this issue at

the conclusion of the trial, the evidence showed, and the trial

judge found, that the docket sheet was not likely to have been

seen, or if seen understood, by any of the jurors. Therefore, even

if the Court were to assume error in failing to make this request,

Petitioner has failed to show that this alleged error was “so

serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose

result is reliable” and that “there is a reasonable probability

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at

687, 694. Therefore, Petitioner has failed to establish

ineffective assistance of trial counsel with respect to habeas

claim 3F.

With respect to habeas claim 3G, Petitioner claims that his

Case 1:03-cv-00859-BH-B Document 36 Filed 08/10/07 Page 34 of 47
35

trial counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce exculpatory

evidence at trial in the form of written transcripts of two

recorded telephone conversations with Charles Clark, the State’s

key witness, in which Clark stated that he lied about Petitioner

being his accomplice. (Doc. 1, attachment at 49-50). Petitioner

presented this same argument to the Alabama Court of Criminal

Appeals on appeal of the denial of his petition for Rule 32 relief,

and, in its memorandum opinion affirming the denial of relief, the

court stated:

Besselaar contends in part IX of his

brief that his trial counsel was ineffective

because, he claims, “counsel failed to

introduce exculpatory evidence at trial. “

Besselaar argues that the trial court erred

when it determined that counsel’s performance

with regard to this claim did not prejudice

his case. 

The alleged exculpatory evidence referred

to by Besselaar consists of transcripts of two

recorded telephone conversations. ©. 199-200

and 201-212). We have reviewed the record of

Besselaar’s direct appeal. These two

transcripts were presented to the trial court

as exhibits in support of Besselaar’s motion

for a new trial. The new-trial motion stated

that the two conversations were “newly

discovered evidence” that were supplied to

counsel by witnesses after Besselaar’s trial.

Therefore, because the evidence did not exist

until after Besselaar’s trial, trial counsel

cannot be said to have been ineffective by

failing to offer the evidence for admission at

trial. Accordingly, the circuit court

correctly concluded that Besselaar had failed

to meet his burden of proof under Strickland.

(Doc. 11, Ex. K at 8) (footnotes omitted).

Case 1:03-cv-00859-BH-B Document 36 Filed 08/10/07 Page 35 of 47
36

Having reviewed the record in this matter, the Court agrees

with the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals that Petitioner has

failed to establish that he is entitled to relief on this claim.

Assuming that the transcripts were “newly discovered” evidence that

surfaced after the trial, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals was

correct in finding that trial counsel could not have erred in

failing to offer the transcripts into evidence. However, in his

habeas petition, Petitioner argues that the transcripts were in the

hands of Petitioner’s trial counsel during the trial. Petitioner

acknowledges that his trial counsel did not want to introduce the

transcripts because they contained references to Petitioner having

been on parole at the time of the burglary. (Doc. 1, attachment at

52). 

Although Petitioner’s trial counsel did not introduce

transcripts of the telephone conversations between Clark and

Petitioner’s mother and girlfriend into the record, the record

shows that Clark testified at trial that he had told Petitioner’s

mother and girlfriend that Petitioner was not involved in the

burglary. (Doc. 11, Ex. A, Vol. II at 106-08, 128-129). In

addition, Petitioner’s mother and girlfriend testified to the

substance of their telephone conversations with Clark, including

the fact that Clark told them that he felt pressured by the police

to implicate Petitioner in the burglary and that Clark, not

Petitioner, had left incriminating evidence from the burglary in

Case 1:03-cv-00859-BH-B Document 36 Filed 08/10/07 Page 36 of 47
37

Petitioner’s car. (Id., Vol. IV at 475-76, 483, 492-95).

Therefore, this information was before the jury, even if the

transcripts were not. Assuming, arguendo, that trial counsel erred

in not seeking to have a redacted transcript of the telephone

conversations admitted into evidence, Petitioner has failed to show

that this error was “so serious as to deprive the defendant of a

fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable” and that “there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 694. Therefore, Petitioner has failed

to establish ineffective assistance of trial counsel with respect

to habeas claim 3G.

With respect to habeas claims 3H and 3I, Petitioner claims

that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request jury

instructions addressing his failure to testify and the proper

evaluation of accomplice testimony. (Doc. 1, attachment at 56-58).

Petitioner presented these arguments to the Alabama Court of

Criminal Appeals on appeal of the denial of his petition for Rule

32 relief, and, in its memorandum opinion affirming the denial of

relief, the court stated:

Besselaar contends in part X of his brief

that his trial counsel was ineffective

because, he claims, counsel “failed to request

proper jury instructions and/or failed to

object to “improper jury instructions given by

the court.” Specifically, Besselaar claims

that his trial counsel did not file requested

jury instructions on the following principles

Case 1:03-cv-00859-BH-B Document 36 Filed 08/10/07 Page 37 of 47
38

of law: (1) that the jury could make no

adverse inference from Besselaar’s failure to

testify; (2) that accomplice testimony should

be weighed with caution; and (3) that

accomplice testimony required independent

corroboration. Besselaar further contends

that because the trial court’s instructions

were “vague” with regard to these principles,

trial counsel’s failure to request specific

instructions prejudiced his defense. 

The trial court has broad discretion in

formulating its jury instructions, provided

those instructions are accurate reflections of

the law and facts of the case. Knotts v.

State, 686 So. 2d 431, 456 (Ala. Crim. App.

1995), aff’d, 686 So. 2d 486 (Ala. 1996);

Clark v. State, 621 So. 2d 309, 324 (Ala.

Crim. App. 1992). Moreover, the trial court’s

oral charge to the jury cannot be viewed in

bits and pieces, but must be viewed in its

entirety. Jones v. State, 644 So. 2d 1336,

1338 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994). 

Besselaar has failed to meet his burden

of proving that he was prejudiced by counsel’s

performance, given that these principles of

law were adequately covered in the court’s

oral charge. Even if counsel had filed

written requested jury instructions on these

issues, there was no guarantee that the trial

court would have given the proposed

instruction. “The refusal of a requested

written instruction, although a correct

statement of the law, shall not be cause for

reversal on appeal if it appears that the same

rule of law was substantially and fairly given

to the jury in the court’s oral charge. . . .”

Rule 21.1, Ala. R. Crim. P. See also Weaver

v. State, 682 So. 2d 488, 491 (Ala. Crim.

App.), cert. denied, 682 So. 2d 493 (Ala.

1993). Accordingly, the circuit court

correctly concluded that Besselaar was not

prejudiced by counsel’s performance in this

regard.

(Doc. 11, Ex. K at 8-9).

Case 1:03-cv-00859-BH-B Document 36 Filed 08/10/07 Page 38 of 47
39

Having reviewed the record in this matter, the Court agrees

with the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals that Petitioner has

failed to establish that he is entitled to relief on these claims.

Petitioner argues that his trial counsel should have requested a

charge instructing the jury that it could draw no adverse inference

from his failure to testify. Although such a charge was not

requested, the record shows that the trial court did instruct the

jury that: 

Something that is evidence and is to be

considered by you as such is the presumption

of innocence. As I have told you, you know in

our country a person doesn’t have to come in

here and prove to you that they are innocent.

The law says that for them. And that

presumption goes with everybody, Mr. Besselaar

here included, unless and until the State

proves to you beyond a reasonable doubt each

and every element necessary to constitute

guilt.

(Doc. 11, Ex. A, Vol. IV at 517-18). Likewise, with regard to

accomplice testimony, the trial court instructed the jury that:

In this case you have been presented with

testimony of a person who is alleged to have

also been involved in the commission of this

crime. The law of Alabama provides that a

person accused of an offense cannot be

convicted solely on the uncorroborated

testimony of a codefendant. That is in

addition to the testimony of a codefendant,

the State must present other evidence proving

that the defendant committed the offense

charged. 

(Doc. 11, Ex. A, Vol. IV at 525-26).

Under the circumstances, trial counsel’s conduct in not

Case 1:03-cv-00859-BH-B Document 36 Filed 08/10/07 Page 39 of 47
40

requesting further charges on these issues was not unreasonable.

However, even assuming, arguendo, that trial counsel did err in

failing to request further, more specific jury charges on the

issues of Petitioner’s failure to testify and the evaluation of

accomplice testimony, Petitioner has failed to show that this error

was “so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a

trial whose result is reliable” and that “there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the

result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland,

466 U.S. at 687, 694. Therefore, Petitioner has failed to

establish ineffective assistance of trial counsel with respect to

habeas claims 3H and 3I.

Accordingly, on each of Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of

counsel claims, the Court finds that Petitioner has failed to

establish under the “contrary to” clause of § 2254(d)(1) that the

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals applied a rule that contradicts

the governing law a set forth in Supreme Court case law or that the

court decided the case differently than the Supreme Court did in a

previous case presenting a set of materially indistinguishable

facts. 

Likewise, Petitioner has failed to establish under the

“unreasonable application” clause that the state court, though

recognizing the correct governing principles from the Supreme

Court’s decisions, unreasonably applied those principles to the

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41

facts in this case. To the contrary, the decision of the Alabama

Court of Criminal Appeals regarding Petitioner’s ineffective

assistance of counsel claims is completely consistent with the

principles outlined in Strickland. Thus, Petitioner has not

established that he is entitled to relief under § 2254(d)(1). 

In addition, Petitioner has failed to establish entitlement to

relief under § 2254(d)(2) by showing that the decision of the

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the state court proceeding. This Court must presume as correct the

determinations of all factual issues made by the state court. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(e). Petitioner has not rebutted that presumption of

correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on

the basis of claims 3A through 3I, and those claims are, therefore,

due to be denied.

IV. Claim 4. 

Petitioner next argues in his petition that he is entitled to

relief under § 2254 based on the cumulative effect of all of the

errors committed at his trial, which, he alleges, deprived him of

a fair trial. (Doc. 1, attachment at 61). The Court disagrees.

Petitioner presented a similar argument to the Alabama Court

of Criminal Appeals on appeal of the denial of his petition for

Rule 32 relief, and, in its memorandum opinion affirming the denial

Case 1:03-cv-00859-BH-B Document 36 Filed 08/10/07 Page 41 of 47
6 In its answer, respondent did not raise the issue of

Petitioner’s failure to exhaust with respect to the expanded

portion of claim 4. Therefore, the Court will consider the new,

expanded claim on the merits. See Moon v. Head, 285 F.3d 1301,

1315 n.17 (11th Cir. 2002) (where respondent failed to raise

Petitioner’s failure to exhaust as a defense, the court would

42

of relief, the court stated:

Finally, Besselaar contends in part XV of

his brief that the cumulative effect of his

counsel’s errors “operated collectively and

cumulatively to deny him a fair trial.” We

[have] previously held that when no single

instance of alleged improper conduct

constituted reversible error, “this Court will

not consider the cumulative effect to be

greater error.” Crymes v. State, 630 So. 2d

120, 123-24 (Ala. Crim. App.), aff’d 630 So.

2d 125 (Ala. 1993). Therefore, the circuit

court correctly rejected Besselaar’s claim

that the cumulative effect of his counsel’s

conduct warranted relief.

(Doc. 11, Ex. K at 11). 

Petitioner’s claim in his habeas petition is that all of the

errors committed at his trial, not just those of trial counsel,

operated collectively to deny him a fair trial in violation of his

constitutional rights. (Doc. 1, attachment at 61). Because

Petitioner did not present this claim to the state court, only the

portion of the claim devoted to the cumulative effect of trial

counsel’s errors has been exhausted. Therefore, the Court will

review the exhausted portion of Petitioner’s claim, i.e., the

cumulative effect of trial counsel’s errors, under § 2254(d)(1) and

(2), and the unexhausted portion of Petitioner’s claim, i.e., the

cumulative effect of all of the alleged trial errors, de novo.6

Case 1:03-cv-00859-BH-B Document 36 Filed 08/10/07 Page 42 of 47
consider the claim on the merits). In any event, even if

respondent had raised Petitioner’s failure to exhaust with

respect to this claim, the Court would consider the new claim on

the merits under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2), which provides that

“[a]n application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on

the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to

exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State.” See

also Lafitte v. Johnson, 2000 WL 724159, *2 n.2 (S.D. Ala. May

17, 2000). 

43

Turning, first, to Petitioner’s claim that his trial counsel’s

errors combined to deny him a fair trial, the Court agrees with the

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals that Petitioner has failed to

establish that he is entitled to relief on this claim. As

discussed above, Petitioner has failed to meet the Strickland

standard of ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to any

of his challenges to his trial counsel’s conduct. Where a

petitioner “fail[s] to establish that the violations he alleges

were indeed errors, they cannot support a cumulative error claim.”

U.S. v. Murray, 154 Fed. Appx. 740, 746 (11th Cir. 2005)

(unpublished). Moreover, even if the Court were to assume that

trial counsel’s performance was deficient as alleged by Petitioner,

Petitioner has failed to show that “there is a reasonable

probability that, but for [the cumulative effect of] counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Therefore, the state

court’s rejection of Petitioner’s cumulative error claim was

neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, federal

law as determined by the Supreme Court, nor was it an unreasonable

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44

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. 

Likewise, Petitioner’s claim that all of the errors committed

at his trial operated collectively to deny him a fair trial is

without merit. “To establish cumulative error, each alleged

incident must constitute error in itself, though not necessarily so

great as to warrant reversal.” Murray, 154 Fed. Appx. at 745

(citing United States v. Preciado-Cordobas, 981 F.2d 1206, 1215 n.8

(11th Cir. 1993)). Stated differently, “[c]umulative error

necessarily depends upon the finding that constitutional errors

occurred during trial and that, although each individual error

considered in isolation was no more than harmless error,

collectively the errors are so prejudicial that the outcome of the

penalty phase is not reliable. A cumulative error argument is

actually no more than an extended harmless error analysis.” Mann

v. Moore, 2006 WL 1151865, *3 (M.D. Fla. 2006) (unpublished).

Having reviewed the record in this case at length, the Court finds

that neither alone nor combined do Petitioner’s allegations of

trial errors establish that he was denied a fair trial. 

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on

the basis of claim 4, and that claim is, therefore, due to be

denied.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned Magistrate Judge is of

the opinion that Petitioner’s rights were not violated and that his

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45

request for habeas corpus relief should be denied. It is so

recommended.

The attached sheet contains important information regarding

objections to the report and recommendation of the Magistrate

Judge.

DONE this 7th day of August 2007.

 /s/SONJA F. BIVINS 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:03-cv-00859-BH-B Document 36 Filed 08/10/07 Page 45 of 47
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S EXPLANATION OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS

AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION

AND FINDINGS CONCERNING NEED FOR TRANSCRIPT

1. Objection. Any party who objects to this recommendation or

anything in it must, within ten days of the date of service of this

document, file specific written objections with the clerk of court.

Failure to do so will bar a de novo determination by the district

judge of anything in the recommendation and will bar an attack, on

appeal, of the factual findings of the magistrate judge. See 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c); Lewis v. Smith, 855 F.2d 736, 738 (11th Cir.

1988). The procedure for challenging the findings and

recommendations of the magistrate judge is set out in more detail

in SD ALA LR 72.4 (June 1, 1997), which provides, in part, that:

A party may object to a recommendation entered by a magistrate

judge in a dispositive matter, that is, a matter excepted by 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), by filing a "Statement of Objection to

Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation" within ten days after being

served with a copy of the recommendation, unless a different time

is established by order. The statement of objection shall specify

those portions of the recommendation to which objection is made and

the basis for the objection. The objecting party shall submit to

the district judge, at the time of filing the objection, a brief

setting forth the party’s arguments that the magistrate judge’s

recommendation should be reviewed de novo and a different

disposition made. It is insufficient to submit only a copy of the

original brief submitted to the magistrate judge, although a copy

of the original brief may be submitted or referred to and

incorporated into the brief in support of the objection. Failure

to submit a brief in support of the objection may be deemed an

abandonment of the objection.

A magistrate judge’s recommendation cannot be appealed to a

Court of Appeals; only the district judge’s order or judgment can

be appealed.

2. Opposing party’s response to the objection. Any opposing

party may submit a brief opposing the objection within ten (10)

days of being served with a copy of the statement of objection.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72; SD ALA LR 72.4(b). 

Case 1:03-cv-00859-BH-B Document 36 Filed 08/10/07 Page 46 of 47
3. Transcript (applicable where proceedings tape recorded).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), the

magistrate judge finds that the tapes and original records in this

action are adequate for purposes of review. Any party planning to

object to this recommendation, but unable to pay the fee for a

transcript, is advised that a judicial determination that

transcription is necessary is required before the United States

will pay the cost of the transcript.

Case 1:03-cv-00859-BH-B Document 36 Filed 08/10/07 Page 47 of 47