Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02017/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02017-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Daniel F. Garduno, Jr., 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora B. Schriro, et al., 

Respondents. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV 06-2017-PHX-SRB (MHB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter arises on Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by Person

in State Custody Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (docket#1). Respondents have filed an

Answer (docket # 9). Petitioner has filed a Reply (docket#10).

I. Background

Petitioner raises three grounds for relief in his petition: (1) a violation of the 6th

Amendment in that he was denied the right to have a jury find the determinate facts to

support an aggravated sentence, (2) a violation of the 14th Amendment in that he was

sentenced pursuant to A.R.S. §13-604, which was not the sentencing guideline for which he

was found guilty by a jury, and (3) a violation of the 14th Amendment in that he was

sentenced erroneously under the wrong A.R.S. sentencing statute, Title 13, rather than Title

28.

On June 18, 2003, Petitioner was charged by an Information in state court with two counts

of Aggravated Driving or Actual Physical Control While Under the Influence of Intoxicating

Case 2:06-cv-02017-SRB Document 12 Filed 06/07/07 Page 1 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

Liquor or Drugs, both class four felonies. (docket #9, Exh. B.) An allegation of three

historical Aggravated DUI felonies was filed by the state on July 15, 2003. (Id.) Those

convictions are alleged to have occurred in 1998 and 2001. Petitioner entered a plea

agreement on September 22, 2003, pleading guilty to count one of the Information, and

admitting one prior Aggravated DUI conviction. (Id., Exh. C.) The plea agreement indicated

that the presumptive sentence for the offense was 4.5 years, and that the maximum sentence

was six years. The sentencing statutes referenced in the plea agreement were A.R.S. §13-701

and -702. The parties stipulated in the plea agreement that the defendant would serve an

aggravated six year sentence in the Department of Corrections. (Id.) Petitioner was

sentenced to serve this six year sentence on September 22, 2003. (Id., Exh. E.) The

sentencing minute entry indicates that the court made a finding, pursuant to A.R.S. §13-604,

that the defendant had previously been convicted of felony Aggravated DUI. (Id.)

On April 6, 2005, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief with the trial court,

claiming that he was entitled to resentencing, based upon the United States Supreme Court

decisions in Blakely v. Washington and its progeny, United States v. Booker/Fanfan, that held

that the Sixth Amendment requires that a jury make findings of fact necessary to the

imposition of a sentence beyond the statutory maximum. (Id., Exh. F.) The trial court denied

the petition on procedural grounds, ruling that it was untimely filed:

"A conviction becomes final when the time for filing the Rule 32 of-right

proceeding has passed. Towery, 204 Ariz. at 390. The defendant was sentenced on

September 22, 3003 following his guilty plea, and did not timely file a Rule 32 of-right

notice. His conviction is therefore final and he is not entitled to relief under Rule

32.1(g)."

(Id., Exh. G.)

Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review of the trial court's decision finding his petition

time-barred to the Arizona Court of Appeals on June 1, 2005. (Id., Exh. H.) The appellate

court denied review. (Id., Exh. I.) Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Arizona

Supreme Court, and newly included a claim that he had been denied his Sixth Amendment

right to a jury trial on the aggravating factors found by the trial judge. (Id., Exh. J.) The

Court denied review on July 7, 2006. (Id., Exh. K.) 

Case 2:06-cv-02017-SRB Document 12 Filed 06/07/07 Page 2 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 1Rule 32.1(g), Ariz.R.Crim.P., permits the filing of a petition for post-conviction relief

when "(t)here has been a significant change in the law that if determined to apply to

- 3 -

II. Analysis

Respondents assert that Petitioner's Writ of Habeas Corpus is untimely under The AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), and that in any event, his

claims are procedurally barred. The Court agrees.

A. Timeliness under the AEDPA

 The AEDPA imposes a statute of limitations on federal petitions for writ of habeas

corpus filed by state prisoners. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). A state prisoner must file a

federal petition within one year from "the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review." 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(1)(A); see also Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 2002). "[T]he period

of 'direct review' in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) includes the period within which a petitioner

can file a petition for a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court, whether or

not the petitioner actually files such a petition." Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1158-59 (9th

Cir. 1999). 

"The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other

collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be

counted toward" the limitations period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see also Lott, 304 F.3d at

921. However, a state petition that is not filed within the state's required time limit is not

"properly filed" and, therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling. Pace v.

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 413 (2005). "When a post-conviction petition is untimely under

state law, 'that [is] the end of the matter' for purposes of § 2244(d)(2)." Id. at 414.

Petitioner argues that his petition is timely because his 1-year limitations period did not

commence until January 12, 2005, when the United States Supreme Court decided United

States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), and that the limitation period was tolled from the

timely filing of his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief1

, based upon Booker, until the denial

Case 2:06-cv-02017-SRB Document 12 Filed 06/07/07 Page 3 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

defendant's case would probably overturn the defendant's conviction or sentence."

 2

Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004)

- 4 -

of review by the Arizona Supreme Court on July 7, 2006. The Supreme Court in Booker,

however, merely applied its previous decision in Blakely2

 to the United States Sentencing

Guidelines. The trial court made this clear in its denial of the Petition: "Booker addressed

only the federal sentencing guidelines and is not applicable to defendant's case." (docket#9,

Exh. G.) To the extent Petitioner argues that his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief was

based upon Blakely, his petition for post-conviction relief would still have been untimely,

because Blakely was decided on June 24, 2004. 

Petitioner's conviction became final on September 22, 2003. He was required, under the

AEDPA, to file his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on or before September 21, 2004. His

state petition for post-conviction relief wasn't filed until April 6, 2005, and was denied as

untimely by the trial judge. Because Petitioner did not file his state petition timely, his

statute of limitations period was not tolled, and his Petition For Writ Of Habeas Corpus,

filed with this court on January 22, 2007, is untimely.

Even if his Petition was filed timely, his claims are unexhausted and procedurally

defaulted.

B. Exhaustion and Procedural Default

Before a federal court may grant habeas corpus relief to a state prisoner, the prisoner must

exhaust remedies available in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); O'Sullivan v.

Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). The

federal court will not entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus unless each and every

issue has been exhausted. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 521-22 (1982). A petitioner has the

burden of alleging exhaustion. Wood v. Gomez, 94 F.3d 654 (9th Cir. 1996). To properly

exhaust state remedies, the prisoner must have afforded the state courts the opportunity to

rule upon the merits of his federal constitutional claims by "fairly presenting" them to the

state courts in a procedurally appropriate manner. Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004)

Case 2:06-cv-02017-SRB Document 12 Filed 06/07/07 Page 4 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

(stating that "[t]o provide the State with the necessary 'opportunity,' the prisoner must 'fairly

present' her claim in each appropriate state court . . . thereby alerting the court to the federal

nature of the claim."). A petitioner must describe both the operative facts and the federal

legal theory so that the state courts have a "fair opportunity" to apply controlling legal

principles to the facts bearing on his constitutional claim. Id. In cases not carrying a life

sentence or the death penalty, claims are exhausted once the Arizona Court of Appeals has

ruled on them. Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Where a prisoner fails to "fairly present" a claim to the state courts in a procedurally

appropriate manner, his claims are procedurally defaulted. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S.

797, 802-05 (1991); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 731-32. There are two types of procedural default.

In the first procedural default scenario, a state court may have applied a procedural bar

when the prisoner attempted to raise the claim in state court. For example, a habeas

petitioner may be barred from raising federal claims that he failed to preserve in state court

by raising the claim on direct appeal or post-conviction review. Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d

1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 1991)(finding procedural default where the Arizona Court of Appeals

held that petitioner had waived his claims by failing to raise them on direct appeal or in his

first petition for post-conviction review.) A higher court's subsequent summary denial of

review affirms the lower court's application of a procedural bar. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. at

803. 

 In order to "constitute adequate and independent grounds sufficient to support a finding

of procedural default, a state rule must be clear, consistently applied, and well-established

at the time of the petitioner's default." Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d 1005, 1010 (9th Cir. 1994).

Arizona courts have consistently applied their procedural default rules. Stewart v. Smith, 536

U.S. 856, 860 (2002)(holding that Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a) is an adequate

and independent procedural bar); Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 931-32 (9th Cir.

1998)(rejecting the argument that Arizona courts have not "strictly or regularly followed"

Rule 32); Carriger v. Lewis, 971 F.2d 329, 333 (9th Cir. 1992)(rejecting the assertion that

Case 2:06-cv-02017-SRB Document 12 Filed 06/07/07 Page 5 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

Arizona courts' application of procedural default rules had been "unpredictable and

irregular."). 

In the second procedural default scenario, the state prisoner may not have presented the

claim to the state courts, but pursuant to the state courts' procedural rules, a return to state

court would be "futile." Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-99 (1989). Generally, any claim

not previously presented to the Arizona courts is procedurally barred from federal review

because any attempt to return to state court to properly exhaust a current habeas claim would

be "futile." Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1, 32.2(a) & (b); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th

Cir. 2002); State v. Mata, 185 Ariz. 319, 322-27 (1996); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(a)(3) (relief

is precluded for claims waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral proceeding);

32.4(a); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9 (stating that petition for review must be filed within thirty

days of trial court's decision). A state post-conviction action is futile where it is time barred.

Beaty, 303 F.3d at 987; Moreno v. Gonzalez, 116 F.3d 409, 410 (9th Cir. 1997) (recognizing

untimeliness under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) as a basis for dismissal of an Arizona petition

for post-conviction relief, distinct from preclusion under Rule 32.2(a)). 

In either case of procedural default, federal review of the claim is barred absent a showing

of “cause and prejudice” or a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Dretke v. Haley, 541

U.S. 386, 393-94 (2004).

C. Application of Law to Petitioner's Claims

Ground I. Petitioner claims that he is entitled to a new sentencing based upon the United

States Supreme Court decision in Booker/Fanfan. He raised this claim in his first-post

conviction relief proceeding, but the trial court imposed a procedural bar by denying his

petition as untimely. The Arizona Court of Appeals and the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed

the denial. This Court must defer to the trial court's conclusion that Petitioner did not satisfy

an exception to Rule 32's timeliness requirement, because this is a legal issue involving state

law. See, e.g., Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 384 (9th Cir. 1999) ("Poland further argues

that the trial court improperly applied Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure 32.2 in holding

these claims defaulted, since the conditions for inferring waiver under the rule were not

Case 2:06-cv-02017-SRB Document 12 Filed 06/07/07 Page 6 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

satisfied. Federal habeas courts lack jurisdiction, however, to review state court applications

of state procedural rules."). Petitioner's claim is, therefore, procedurally defaulted.

Ground II. Petitioner claims that his rights under the 14th Amendment were violated when

he was sentenced under sentencing statute A.R.S. § 13-604, which provides enhanced

penalties for repetitive offenders, instead of A.R.S. § 13-701, and -702, which establish

sentencing penalties for first time offenders. (docket#9, Exh. C.) Petitioner did not raise this

claim in his petition for post-conviction relief, or in his Petition for Review to the Arizona

Court of Appeals. In his Petition for Review by the Arizona Supreme Court, he made a

passing reference to having been unlawfully sentenced pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-604, instead

of § 13-701. This original presentation of this issue to the Arizona Supreme Court is not

sufficient to satisfy the exhaustion requirement. See, e.g., Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346,

351-52 (1989) (submission of new claim to state's highest court on discretionary review does

not constitute fair presentation of claim); Gunter v. Maloney, 291 F.3d 74, 81-82 ("Raising

a claim for the first time to the state's highest court on discretionary review is not fair

presentation for purposes of exhaustion."). Petitioner's ground II is therefore unexhausted,

and any attempt to return to state court to exhaust this claim would be futile, as it would be

time-barred pursuant to Rules 32.1 and 32.4, Ariz. R. Crim. P.

Ground III. Petitioner contends in Ground III that he was denied his rights under the

Fourteenth Amendment and Booker when the trial court sentenced him under Title 13 of he

Arizona Revised Statutes rather than Title 28. Petitioner concedes that he did not exhaust this

claim (docket#1 at 7), and states the following, as his reason for not presenting this issue to

the state court: 

"I wanted to resolve this issue on a state level and the state had ruled on this issue on

June 27, 1991 in a Arizona Supreme Court ruling, State v. Campa (No. CR-90-0156-

PR). I do believe the United State Supreme Court decision on Booker, Fanfan changes

this, but as above, I wanted to resolve this on a state level; so I only argued being

sentenced out of A.R.S. 13-701(C) by a judges applying aggravating factors that where

not determined by a jury or that I would not have admitted to."

(Id.)

Case 2:06-cv-02017-SRB Document 12 Filed 06/07/07 Page 7 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 -

Petitioner's ground III is therefore unexhausted, and any attempt to return to state court

to exhaust this claim would be futile, as it would be time-barred pursuant to Rules 32.1 and

32.4, Ariz. R. Crim. P.

Cause and Prejudice/Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice

A federal court may not review the merits of procedurally defaulted claims unless the

petitioner either demonstrates cause and prejudice, or a fundamental miscarriage of justice.

"Cause" requires a showing that an external, objective factor impeded a petitioner's

compliance with state procedural rules. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986).

Petitioner makes no such showing. To prove a "fundamental miscarriage of justice",

petitioner must show by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable jury could have

found the petitioner guilty of the offense. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). 

Petitioner pled guilty to his offense of conviction, and does not now suggest that no

reasonable jury could have found him guilty of the offense. 

/ / / 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

Case 2:06-cv-02017-SRB Document 12 Filed 06/07/07 Page 8 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 -

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED:

That the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (docket #1)

be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. The

parties shall have ten days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R.

Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have ten days within which to file a response

to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121

(9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to appellate review of the

findings of fact in an order of judgement entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge's

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

DATED this 6th day of June, 2007.

 

Case 2:06-cv-02017-SRB Document 12 Filed 06/07/07 Page 9 of 9