Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-03727/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-03727-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHAWNCEY BLAKE, 

Plaintiff, 

 v.

SANTA CLARA DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS; SERGEANT

GILETTE; LIEUTENANT TAYLOR;

CAPTAIN SEPULVEDA,

Defendants. __________________________________

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No. C 14-3727 JSW (PR)

ORDER OF SERVICE

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, an inmate at the Santa Clara County Jail, filed this pro se civil rights

complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that he was disciplined in retaliation for

pursuing complaints. The complaint was dismissed with leave to amend, and he filed a

timely amended complaint. For the reasons discussed below, certain claims in the

amended complaint are dismissed because they are not cognizable, while other claims are

cognizable and the amended complaint is ordered served on certain defendants.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners

seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 

28 U.S.C. 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and

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dismiss any claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such

relief. Id. at 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v.

Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and plain statement

of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." "Specific facts are not

necessary; the statement need only '"give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . . claim

is and the grounds upon which it rests."'" Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200

(2007) (citations omitted). Although in order to state a claim a complaint “does not need

detailed factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds of his

'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. . . . Factual allegations must

be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007) (citations omitted). A complaint must proffer

"enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 1974. Pro se

pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696,

699 (9th Cir. 1990).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: 

(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and

(2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state

law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

LEGAL CLAIMS

Plaintiff alleges in the amended complaint that he filed an administrative

grievance with jail officials requesting his medical records and a doctor’s appointment. 

He also contacted Defendant Linda Kowellis, an official in the Internal Affairs

Department of the Santa Clara County Sheriff’s Department, about these issues. 

Defendant Sergeant Gillotte, a jail official, ordered him not to contact the Internal Affairs

Department about these issues anymore, but he continued to do so. He was then

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disciplined by Gillotte and Defendants Lieutenant Taylor and Captain Sepulveda for

disobeying an order from a jail official. He then wrote letters to Chief of Corrections

John Hirokawa and Sheriff Laurie Smith about these problems but they did nothing to

remedy them. He claims that by punishing him for complaining about his prison

conditions, or by acquiescing in this punishment, these Defendants violated his right to

access the courts and retaliated him for exercising his First Amendment rights. When

liberally construed, these claims are cognizable. 

Plaintiff also alleges that in an unrelated incident he was disciplined in retaliation

for helping another inmate pursue a complaint about medical care. He claims that this

violates state law, the state constitution and jail policy. Such claims are not cognizable

under Section 1983, which only provides a remedy for violations of federal law. See

West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). These allegations do not state a cognizable

retaliation claim either, which requires retaliation for the exercise of a federal

constitutional right. See Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 283-84

(1977). There is no federal constitutional right to assist another inmate in pursue a

complaint. Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 231 (2001). Accordingly, there is no

cognizable retaliation claim stemming from this alleged incident. 

Plaintiff also alleges that in another incident, Defendants Davis and Borgzinner

verbally harassed and threatened him and other inmates on a bus. Allegations of verbal

harassment and threats do not state a claim under Section 1983. See Rutledge v. Arizona

Bd. of Regents, 660 F.2d 1345, 1353 (9th Cir. 1981). He also alleges that Lieutenant

Borgzinner disciplined him for asking other jail officials a question. He claims that the

disciplinary proceeding was “biased” because Plaintiff had previously complained about

Borgzinner’s conduct in an administrative grievance, and because two witnesses to the

disciplinary proceeding had also been present during the bus incident. Allegations of

“bias” in a jail disciplinary proceeding do not, without more, implicate an inmate’s

constitutional right to due process. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). 

Accordingly, these allegations do not state a cognizable claim either. 

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Plaintiff has not cured the deficiencies that were present in his original complaint

with respect to suing the municipal defendant Santa Clara County. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set out above, the Court orders as follows:

1. The claims against Defendants Santa Clara County, Borgzinner, Davis, and

Conner are DISMISSED. 

2. The Clerk of the Court shall issue summons and the United States Marshal

shall serve, without prepayment of fees, a copy of the complaint and all attachments

thereto, and a copy of this order upon Defendants Sheriff Laurie Smith, Chief of

Corrections John Hirokawa, Captain D. Sepulveda, Lieutenant Taylor, Sergeant Gillotte,

and Internal Affairs official Linda Kowellis, all in the Santa Clara County Sheriff’s

Department.

The Clerk shall also mail a courtesy copy of the complaint with all attachments

thereto, and this order to the Santa Clara County Counsel’s Office. 

The Clerk shall also serve a copy of this order on Plaintiff. 

2. Defendants shall file an answer to the complaint in accordance with the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

3. In order to expedite the resolution of this case:

a. No later than 91 days from the date this order is filed, defendants shall

file a motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion. If defendants are of the

opinion that this case cannot be resolved by summary judgment, they shall so inform the

court prior to the date the summary judgment motion is due. All papers filed with the

court shall be promptly served on the plaintiff.

b. Plaintiff's opposition to the dispositive motion, if any, shall be filed with

the court and served upon defendants no later than 28 days from the date of service of

the motion. Plaintiff must read the attached page headed “NOTICE -- WARNING,”

which is provided to him pursuant to Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 953-954 (9th Cir.

1998) (en banc), and Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409, 411-12 (9th Cir. 1988).

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c. Defendants shall file a reply brief no later than 14 days after the date of

service of the opposition. 

d. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is

due. No hearing will be held on the motion unless the court so orders at a later date. 

e. Along with his motion, defendant shall proof that they served plaintiff

the Rand warning at the same time they served him with their motion. Failure to do so

will result in the summary dismissal of their motion. 

4. All communications by the plaintiff with the court must be served on

defendant, or defendant’s counsel once counsel has been designated, by mailing a true

copy of the document to defendant or defendant’s counsel.

5. Discovery may be taken in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. No further court order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(a)(2) or

Local Rule 16-1 is required before the parties may conduct discovery.

6. It is the plaintiff's responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the

court informed of any change of address and must comply with the court's orders in a

timely fashion. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to

prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 3, 2015 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

United States District Judge

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NOTICE -- WARNING (SUMMARY JUDGMENT)

If defendants move for summary judgment, they are seeking to have your case

dismissed. A motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure will, if granted, end your case.

Rule 56 tells you what you must do in order to oppose a motion for summary

judgment. Generally, summary judgment must be granted when there is no genuine issue

of material fact--that is, if there is no real dispute about any fact that would affect the

result of your case, the party who asked for summary judgment is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law, which will end your case. When a party you are suing makes a motion

for summary judgment that is properly supported by declarations (or other sworn

testimony), you cannot simply rely on what your complaint says. Instead, you must set

out specific facts in declarations, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or authenticated

documents, as provided in [current Rule 56(c)], that contradict the facts shown in the

defendant's declarations and documents and show that there is a genuine issue of material

fact for trial. If you do not submit your own evidence in opposition, summary judgment,

if appropriate, may be entered against you. If summary judgment is granted, your case

will be dismissed and there will be no trial.

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