Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01110/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01110-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ANDREW MARKIS ALLEN, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

WILLIAM MUNIZ, 

Respondent. 

No. 2:15-cv-1110-JAM-EFB P 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

 Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent moves to dismiss the petition as barred by the statute of limitations. 

ECF No. 10. Petitioner opposes the motion and respondent has filed a reply. See ECF No. 13 

(entitled “Motion for Equitable Tolling”); ECF No. 16. For the reasons that follow, respondent’s 

motion to dismiss must be granted. 

I. Background 

Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder and second degree robbery. ECF No. 11 

(“Lodg. Docs.”) 1-2. The trial court sentenced him to a state prison term of life without the 

possibility of parole and imposed a parole revocation restitution fine. Id. Petitioner appealed, 

and on July 24, 2008, the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, struck the fine but 

otherwise affirmed the judgment. Lodg. Doc. 2. Petitioner sought review in the California 

Supreme Court, which was denied on October 28, 2008. Lodg. Docs. 3-4. 

///// 

Case 2:15-cv-01110-JAM-EFB Document 17 Filed 01/07/16 Page 1 of 5
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

2

Petitioner subsequently filed seven pro se state habeas corpus petitions.1 The first was 

filed in the Sacramento County Superior Court on September 20, 2010, and denied on November 

5, 2010. ECF No. 13 at 6. The second was filed in the California Court of Appeal, Third 

Appellate District on January 25, 2011, and denied on February 4, 2011. Lodg. Docs. 5-6. The 

third was filed in the California Supreme Court on May 17, 2011 and denied on November 22, 

2011. Lodg. Docs. 7-8. On July 5, 2011, while the third petition was pending, petitioner filed a 

fourth petition in the Sacramento County Superior Court. ECF No. 13 at 7. That petition was 

denied on August 24, 2011. Id. The fifth petition was filed in the California Court of Appeal, 

Third Appellate District on June 8, 2012 and denied on July 5, 2012. Lodg. Docs. 9-10. The 

sixth petition was filed in the California Supreme Court on October 8, 2012 and denied on 

December 19, 2012. Lodg. Docs 11-12. The seventh petition was filed in the California Supreme 

Court on September 23, 2013 and denied on December 11, 2013. Lodg. Docs. 13-14. 

Petitioner filed the pending federal habeas petition on May 12, 2015. ECF No. 1. 

II. The Limitations Period 

The Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) provides, in pertinent 

part: 

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas 

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The 

limitation period shall run from the latest of — 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct 

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review . . . . 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). 

The running of limitations period is “statutorily tolled” while a “properly filed application 

for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim 

is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In California, a properly filed post-conviction application is 

 1

 Where supported by the record, the petitions listed herein were given the benefit of the 

mailbox rule. See Rule 3, Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 

276 (1988) (prisoner’s notice of appeal deemed timely filed on the date it was delivered to prison 

staff for delivery to the court); Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809, 814 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying 

mailbox rule to petitions filed in state court), overruled on other grounds by Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 

544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). 

Case 2:15-cv-01110-JAM-EFB Document 17 Filed 01/07/16 Page 2 of 5
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

3

“pending” during the intervals between a lower court decision and the filing of a new petition in a 

higher court if the second petition was filed within a “reasonable time” after the denial of the first. 

Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 221 (2002); Stancle v. Clay, 692 F.3d 948, 956 (9th Cir. 2012). 

The statute is not tolled between the time the start of the limitations period is triggered and the 

time the first state collateral challenge is filed, because there is no case “pending” during that 

time. See Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999). 

The limitations period may also be equitably tolled where a habeas petitioner establishes 

two elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary 

circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 

(2010). Petitioner has the burden of showing facts entitling him to equitable tolling. Miranda v. 

Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002). The threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling 

is very high, “lest the exceptions swallow the rule.” Waldron–Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 

1008, 1011 (9th Cir. 2009). Equitable tolling may be applied only where a petitioner shows that 

some external force caused the untimeliness. Id. 

III. Discussion 

Following the California Supreme Court’s denial of direct review on October 28, 2008, 

petitioner had ninety days, or until January 26, 2009, to file a petition for writ of certiorari in the 

United States Supreme Court. See Rule 13, Supreme Court Rules. Because petitioner did not 

pursue this option, AEDPA’s limitations period commenced the next day, on January 27, 2009. 

See Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 1999) (“period of ‘direct review’ in 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2244(d)(1)(A) includes the period within which a petitioner can file a petition for a writ of 

certiorari from the United States Supreme Court, whether or not the petitioner actually files such 

a petition”); Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001) (commencement of 

limitations period excludes last day of period for seeking direct review, by application of Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 6(a)). Therefore, absent statutory or equitable tolling, the federal limitations period 

expired one year later, on January 27, 2010. 

As noted, the proper filing of a state post-conviction application with respect to the 

pertinent judgment or claim tolls the one-year limitations period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Here, 

Case 2:15-cv-01110-JAM-EFB Document 17 Filed 01/07/16 Page 3 of 5
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

4

petitioner did not file his first state habeas petition until September 20, 2010, over seven months 

after the limitations period had ended. Therefore, petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling. 

Petitioner argues he is entitled to equitable tolling on various grounds. First, petitioner 

claims he did not receive the Supreme Court’s October 28, 2008 order of denial until January 25, 

2010, and that he did not receive necessary trial transcripts from his appellate attorney until May 

13, 2010. ECF No. 13 at 2-3. Petitioner claims that from this point until February 11, 2011, he 

was “mainly” on lockdown, which limited his library access to once or twice a month. Id. at 3-4. 

Petitioner also claims that he was confined to administrative segregation without any of his legal 

materials from January 2012 through March 2012. Id. at 4, 8. He claims it was not until April 

11, 2012, after being transferred to Salinas Valley State Prison and receiving his property, that he 

was finally able to work diligently on his case. Id. at 8. He claims that from this point forward he 

worked to exhaust all of his claims in state court. Id. 

Petitioner’s arguments are unavailing. His seventh and last state court petition was denied 

on December 11, 2013. Lodg. Doc. 14. Even if the limitations period was tolled through 

December 11, 2013, the instant petition, filed May 12, 2015, would still be nearly one and onehalf years late. 

 Petitioner also suggests that the limitations period should be tolled because he is 

untrained in the law. Id. at 4, 8. However, ignorance of the law does not warrant equitable 

tolling. Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding ignorance of the law 

does not constitute extraordinary circumstances). 

IV. Recommendation 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that respondent’s motion to dismiss 

(ECF No. 10) be granted and the Clerk of the Court be directed to terminate docket number 13 

(petitioner’s opposition brief) and close the case. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

Case 2:15-cv-01110-JAM-EFB Document 17 Filed 01/07/16 Page 4 of 5
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

5

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections 

within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. 

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). In 

his objections petitioner may address whether a certificate of appealability should issue in the 

event he files an appeal of the judgment in this case. See Rule 11, Federal Rules Governing 

§ 2254 Cases (the district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a 

final order adverse to the applicant). 

DATED: January 7, 2016. 

Case 2:15-cv-01110-JAM-EFB Document 17 Filed 01/07/16 Page 5 of 5