Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-02342/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-02342-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 29:621 Job Discrimination (Age)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Douglas G. Scheitlin, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Freescale Semiconductor, Inc., a Delaware

corporation, 

Defendant. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV-08-02342-PHX-FJM

ORDER

The court has before it defendant Freescale Semiconductor, Inc.’s motion for

summary judgment (doc. 52), plaintiff Douglas Scheitlin’s response (doc. 61), and

defendant’s reply (doc. 77). We also have before us plaintiff’s errata (doc. 81). We granted

the motion for summary judgment at our Final Pretrial Conference on May 28, 2010 with a

written order to follow (doc. 105). This is that order.

I. Background

Plaintiff worked as a technician and an engineer for defendant and its predecessor,

Motorola, from 1978 until his termination in November 2007. He worked in a section of

defendant’s Microwave & Mixed-Signal Technology Laboratory (“MMSTL”) in Tempe,

Arizona. For the last several years of his employment, he developed and operated a

millimeter wave laboratory. His work involved high frequencies in the 60 to 100-plus

Case 2:08-cv-02342-FJM Document 106 Filed 06/03/10 Page 1 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

Gigahertz range. Plaintiff’s data supported a radar team in Munich, Germany and, to a lesser

degree, a Tempe-based radar group under Margaret Huang.

In September 2007, Saied Tehrani assumed responsibility for the MMSTL. Huang

and Colin McAndrew reported to Tehrani as members of his staff. McAndrew was in charge

of several groups, including one in Geneva, Switzerland and one managed by Ania Zlotnicka

in Tempe. Beneath Zlotnicka, Marcel Tutt managed approximately five engineers, including

plaintiff. In conjunction with the sale of a line of business to another company, Tehrani

announced a “redeployment” on October 22, 2007. About twenty-two employees were

affected, but they were not named. In the weeks leading up to the announcement, Tehrani

and his staff met about four times to plan the redeployment. The affected employees were

to be provided about one month to find another position internally, with or without

management’s assistance. Employees without new positions would be laid off. McAndrew

identified seven people who worked under him for redeployment, including plaintiff.

McAndrew says that his decisions were based on defendant’s ongoing needs and

employee ratings and performance. No one in the meetings objected to plaintiff’s inclusion

on the redeployment list. McAndrew says that he was aware of criticism of plaintiff’s

interpersonal skills from Tutt and Huang. As detailed below, Tutt made several critical

comments about plaintiff’s interaction with others in a 2006 performance review. Huang,

who apparently had issues with her scheduled access to the millimeter wave laboratory and

plaintiff’s role as the primary contact with the Munich team, says that she indicated to

McAndrew that “Mr. Scheitlin was not a team player, did not work well with the employees

under my supervision, did not listen to others’ opinions.” DSOF, Ex. N at 1. Huang was

herself difficult to work with, according to plaintiff, Tutt, and Zlotnicka. McAndrew did not

consult performance reviews or educational levels during the selection process. He also did

not receive input from Tutt or Zlotnicka concerning his selections. They considered

plaintiff’s millimeter wave experience to be important, and Tutt was shocked when he

learned that plaintiff had been selected for redeployment.

Case 2:08-cv-02342-FJM Document 106 Filed 06/03/10 Page 2 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

Cheryl Lewis, a Human Resources representative, participated in the meetings and

compiled a spreadsheet listing the affected employees. Plaintiff offers an October 3, 2007

email from Lewis to the staff-level managers asking for a brief summary of the employees’

skills in order to facilitate finding them other positions. PSOF, Ex. 28 at 4. On October 21,

Lewis distributed the spreadsheet to a human resources team to garner internal interest in the

affected employees. She noted that the employees were not yet aware of their inclusion on

the list, and reminded the recipients to keep the list confidential and restrict its distribution.

The list identified employee names, supervisors, departments, job levels, hire dates, ratings,

and skills. Plaintiff’s rating was a 3, which corresponded to “Effective” or “relative

performance including results and/or behaviors needs to improve to increase overall

contribution.” DSOF ¶ 11. His skill summary was “relationship issues. Mm wave, but need

talent upgrade.” PSOF, Ex. 28 at 2.

When McAndrew selected plaintiff for redeployment, he expected to replace him with

Mike Majerus, another engineer under Tutt whose work was focused on the line of business

being sold. McAndrew interviewed and hired Majerus back to defendant in early 2007 based

on strong recommendations. Majerus was originally hired by Motorola in 1983, after he

completed a two-year technician program at DeVry Institute of Technology. Majerus worked

as a technician and an engineering aide until he left for Maury Microwave in 1997. He

returned to Motorola in 1999 and then left again in 2004 to work for a startup company.

When he was hired back by McAndrew, it was at the same engineering level as plaintiff.

Majerus had experience with the methodologies used in the millimeter wave laboratory, but

he did not have plaintiff’s experience working with high frequencies. Like Majerus, plaintiff

attended DeVry Institute of Technology. He completed a Bachelor of Science in Electronic

Engineering in 1978.

Before 2004, the company used a five-point performance review system that did not

involve a forced distribution. Plaintiff and Majerus apparently received a consistent rating

of 2 or “Excellent” under this system. In 2004, the company instituted a forced distribution

rating system with a strict percentage breakdown of 15/60/20/5 across four categories: 1-

Case 2:08-cv-02342-FJM Document 106 Filed 06/03/10 Page 3 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

“Outstanding,” 2-“Excellent,” 3-“Effective,” and 4-“Needs Improvement.” Plaintiff received

a 3, 2, and 3 from 2004-2006. Majerus was not evaluated under this system until year-end

2007 due to his time away from the company.

Plaintiff’s 2006 review, completed by Tutt, included multiple comments about his

interpersonal skills: “Good interaction with Munich. Need to be aware of what other

customers want and how to interact,” “When working with others, sometimes perceived as

not willing to listen to others ideas. Tends to interrupt people not letting them complete their

thoughts. This causes some people to not want to work with him,” and “Care needs to be

taken when interacting with customers. You often come across aggressively which tends to

discourage people from interacting with you.” PSOF, Ex. 11 at 65-66. The review

concluded, “I think that part of the issue is due to his self-confidence and eagerness he comes

across as having all the answers. Increased awareness of how he interacts with others will

help address this.” Id. at 66. Tutt also noted the strength of plaintiff’s millimeter wave

abilities. Plaintiff concedes that his interpersonal skills were part of his job performance and

that teamwork and working well with others were important elements of his position.

McAndrew informed plaintiff that he had been selected for redeployment on October

24, 2007. He told plaintiff that he was eligible to apply for other positions in the company

and that he was looking into available positions for plaintiff. When plaintiff asked why he

had been selected, McAndrew stated only that the decision had been made by the staff.

McAndrew confirmed for plaintiff that his job was not “going away.” DSOF ¶ 61.

According to plaintiff, McAndrew also confirmed that plaintiff was being replaced by

someone “younger with less experience.” Id. ¶ 61. Plaintiff allegedly told him that it was

a violation of his rights and that McAndrew would be dealing with his lawyer. PSOF-2 ¶ 61.

Plaintiff sent an email the following morning confirming some of these points, to which

McAndrew did not respond. At the time, plaintiff was 57, and Majerus was 44.

On Monday, October 29, plaintiff sent McAndrew another email asking for contacts

to find a new position. McAndrew responded the same day with some job descriptions and

wrote that he was not sure how close plaintiff’s background was. He also requested a

Case 2:08-cv-02342-FJM Document 106 Filed 06/03/10 Page 4 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

resume. The positions were either a poor fit with plaintiff’s skills or were already filled. On

Tuesday, plaintiff wrote back that he would put together a resume by the end of the week and

suggested that it was odd that McAndrew did not already have the information as a part of

the redeployment process. On Wednesday afternoon, McAndrew left plaintiff a telephone

message asking him to come by his office and informing him that an individual in the Radio

Frequency Division had said that he did not have any jobs available yet.

Late Wednesday afternoon, McAndrew apparently learned from Tehrani that the

names of people selected for redeployment were posted on plaintiff’s whiteboard in his

cubicle. McAndrew went to plaintiff’s cubicle and erased the whiteboard. He says that, in

his opinion, it was a “breach of confidential proprietary information” to make the names

available. PSOF, Ex. 5 at 108. He was also concerned that a Geneva employee’s name was

listed even though he had received a reprieve and had not been informed that he was

originally selected for redeployment. Id. at 111. McAndrew says that Tehrani asked him to

terminate plaintiff twice. Id. at 107. Tehrani says that he recommended removing plaintiff

from his duties based on his concern that plaintiff’s conduct was disruptive and could have

had a negative impact on employee morale. DSOF, Ex. L at 3. McAndrew and plaintiff

agree that McAndrew decided to terminate plaintiff that same day.

According to plaintiff, he did not write all of the names on his whiteboard, which was

only partially visible from outside his cubicle. He apparently had a habit of allowing affected

employees to list their names on his whiteboard for informational purposes during past

layoffs. He allowed people to list names based on speculation, which was common during

periods of reorganization. See PSOF, Ex. 1 at 135. Zlotnicka was told that she could find

out that the names of the affected employees by going to plaintiff’s cubicle. She did not

think it was a major problem. PSOF, Ex. 7 at 161. According to Tutt, plaintiff put lists of

names on the board in the past and it had never bothered him because it seemed that it was

public knowledge. PSOF, Ex. 8 at 140.

On Thursday, November 1, plaintiff attended a human resources meeting on

redeployment conducted by Lewis. He made an audio recording of the meeting, which he

Case 2:08-cv-02342-FJM Document 106 Filed 06/03/10 Page 5 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

offers as evidence. PSOF, Ex. 29. Because “redeployment” was a new process within the

company, a number of employees had questions for Lewis. Plaintiff asked a series of

questions about whether and how employees would be provided with the reasons for their

selection. Lewis said that he would have to talk to his supervisor about it. Plaintiff said he

was not given an answer, which is why he was asking Lewis. She suggested going above his

direct manager until he received a good reason, all the way to Tehrani. Plaintiff asked where

he should go if he does not get an answer at that point. Lewis encouraged him to read

defendant’s open door policy. Plaintiff said that he had read it. Later, plaintiff asked

whether employees would receive offers in writing if they found a new position. He also

asked whether Lewis would be emailing the slides she was using during the presentation.

According to plaintiff, Lewis did not like his questions. Afterward, Lewis told

McAndrew, who was not in attendance, that plaintiff had been disruptive during the meeting.

PSOF ¶ 95. McAndrew says that Lewis’s report supported his decision to terminate him.

Tutt and Zlotnicka were at the meeting, and neither thought plaintiff’s behavior was

disruptive. Lewis says that she separately discussed terminating plaintiff with McAndrew,

Tehrani, and legal counsel, and then gave the go ahead to terminate plaintiff. PSOF, Ex. 4

at 129-30. Around 3:00 P.M., McAndrew told plaintiff that he was being let go and walked

him to the parking lot. Defendant continued to pay plaintiff through November 16, 2007,

which was several weeks short of the end of the contemplated redeployment period.

Plaintiff alleges age discrimination and retaliation in connection with his selection for

redeployment and subsequent termination in violation of the Age Discrimination in

Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1), (d). Defendant moves for

summary judgment on both claims.

II. Age Discrimination

The ADEA prohibits the use of age as the “but-for” cause of an adverse employment

action. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1); Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., __ U.S. __, __, 129 S. Ct.

2343, 2352 (2009). Plaintiff contends that McAndrew selected him for redeployment

because of his age. He may defeat summary judgment on this claim with sufficient direct

Case 2:08-cv-02342-FJM Document 106 Filed 06/03/10 Page 6 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

and circumstantial evidence of age discrimination or through the burden-shifting framework

of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973). See Enlow v.

Salem-Keizer Yellow Cab Co., 389 F.3d 802, 812 (9th Cir. 2004). Under the latter approach,

plaintiff must first show that he was at least 40, performing his job satisfactorily, subjected

to an adverse employment action, and replaced by a substantially younger employee with

equal or inferior qualifications. Diaz v. Eagle Produce Ltd. P’ship, 521 F.3d 1201, 1207 (9th

Cir. 2008). If plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to

defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its adverse employment

action. Id. If it does so, plaintiff must then show that this reason is pretext for

discrimination, either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more

likely motivated defendant or indirectly by showing that defendant’s proffered explanation

is unworthy of credence. Id. at 1212. Specific, substantial indirect evidence of pretext raises

a triable issue. Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1282 (9th Cir. 2000).

Plaintiff argues that his evidence is sufficient to withstand summary judgment with

or without the McDonnell Douglas framework. Unless plaintiff cannot establish a prima

facie case under McDonnell Douglas, we need not consider his evidence separately.

Defendant only challenges plaintiff’s prima facie case based on an alternate test for reduction

in force cases whereby an employee who is not replaced can still proceed if his discharge

otherwise gives rise to an inference of age discrimination. Diaz, 521 F.3d at 1207-08.

Plaintiff contends that he can meet the general test for replaced employees, however, and

defendant does not renew its challenge in its reply. Because plaintiff presents a prima facie

case, we will consider his evidence within the McDonnell Douglas framework.

At the second stage, defendant contends that McAndrew selected plaintiff for

redeployment based on his assessment that Majerus had similar engineering skills and

superior job performance and interpersonal skills. Defendant’s proffered reasons are

legitimate and non-discriminatory.

With the burden shifted back to plaintiff, he maintains that the age disparity, his

subsequent termination, McAndrew’s conduct, and comments allegedly made by defendant’s

Case 2:08-cv-02342-FJM Document 106 Filed 06/03/10 Page 7 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 -

former Chief Executive Officer constitute direct evidence that age discrimination more likely

motivated defendant. We disagree. In the ADEA context, direct evidence is “evidence of

conduct or statements by persons involved in the decision-making process that may be

viewed as directly reflecting the alleged discriminatory attitude.” Enlow, 389 F.3d at 812.

Plaintiff contends that the thirteen-year age difference between himself and Majerus

and the fact that he was the only redeployed employee under McAndrew to be terminated

amount to direct evidence of age discrimination. One of the employees in question chose to

retire, while the others obtained new positions. Were plaintiff to provide a relevant analysis

of the ages of the affected employees, which he does not, it would constitute indirect

evidence. This information does not show clear discriminatory animus.

Plaintiff also offers McAndrew’s alleged comments confirming that plaintiff’s job was

not going away, but was instead going to someone younger with less experience. Plaintiff

claims that these comments show animus in conjunction with McAndrew’s refusal to provide

a reason for plaintiff’s selection during their meeting and his failure to respond to plaintiff’s

follow-up email. According to McAndrew, he had been instructed by human resources not

to provide specific reasons for redeployment decisions. Under the circumstances, in which

it was clear that McAndrew was not offering the relative age of plaintiff’s replacement as a

reason for his selection, these statements do support a showing of animus.

Next, plaintiff points to comments allegedly made during a “town hall” question and

answer session with defendant’s former CEO Michel Mayer on February 22, 2007. Plaintiff,

who was not able to attend, offers emails, a summary, and employee survey results to

establish Mayer’s comments. Defendant objects to this evidence as inadmissible hearsay.

Mayer apparently said something to the effect that defendant’s Arizona employees were

older with higher expectations and had a reputation for whining. Even if this evidence were

admissible, these “stray remarks” were not directly related to McAndrew’s redeployment

decisions, and they constitute weak indirect evidence of discrimination at best. See Nesbit

v. Pepsico, Inc., 994 F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir. 1993). We conclude that plaintiff does not

Case 2:08-cv-02342-FJM Document 106 Filed 06/03/10 Page 8 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 -

present a triable issue with respect to a discriminatory reason more likely motivating

defendant.

Plaintiff also maintains that the process McAndrew used to select him for

redeployment and plaintiff’s superior qualifications, education, job performance, and

experience render defendant’s articulated reasons unworthy of credence. Plaintiff criticizes

McAndrew’s process due to his reliance on employee ratings instead of full performance

reviews. He points to positive remarks in his past reviews and contends that his recent

ratings were negatively impacted by the forced distribution policy, which prevented

supervisors from giving high marks to everyone that they might have believed deserved

them. He does not believe that his performance merited a bottom 25% rating. He also

believes that McAndrew should have considered his Bachelor of Science degree and

subsequent college course work in comparison with Majerus’s two-year technician program

and subsequent community college course work.

Moreover, plaintiff claims that McAndrew’s process was faulty because he did not

receive input from plaintiff’s immediate supervisors, Tutt and Zlotnicka. Despite their lack

of input, however, McAndrew says that he was aware of Tutt’s assessment of plaintiff’s

interpersonal skills, which was highly critical by any measure. To be sure, Huang’s criticism

of plaintiff’s interpersonal skills might have been tainted by her conflicts with plaintiff, Tutt,

and Zlotnicka, but there is no indication that McAndrew did not honestly believe Huang’s

assessment or that it was otherwise influenced by age discrimination. Plaintiff might have

deserved a more thorough vetting before he was selected for redeployment, but the ADEA

does not mandate best practices, and the process McAndrew used does not suggest that

defendant’s proffered reasons are pretext for age discrimination.

Finally, plaintiff offers a comparison between his 29-year career in the industry and

Majerus’s 24-year career, and highlights his experience working with high frequencies.

Plaintiff’s career compares favorably, and there is no doubt that he had more experience

operating the millimeter wave laboratory that he had personally developed. But the record

does not suggest that Majerus was unqualified to assume plaintiff’s responsibilities. Given

Case 2:08-cv-02342-FJM Document 106 Filed 06/03/10 Page 9 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 10 -

McAndrew’s assessment of plaintiff’s interpersonal skills, and considering all of the above

evidence together, plaintiff does not present specific, substantial evidence of pretext. We

grant defendant’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s age discrimination claim.

III. Retaliation

The ADEA also prohibits retaliation against employees for opposing unlawful age

discrimination. 29 U.S.C. § 623(d). Plaintiff contends that McAndrew terminated him

because he complained of age discrimination. To establish a retaliation claim, plaintiff must

prove that he engaged in protected activity, suffered an adverse employment action, and there

was a causal link between the two events. Poland v. Chertoff, 494 F.3d 1174, 1179-80 (9th

Cir. 2007). As above, plaintiff may rely on the McDonnell Douglas framework at the

summary judgment stage with the same three elements constituting the prima facie case.

Defendant must then articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the challenged action.

Plaintiff has the ultimate burden of directly or indirectly demonstrating that this reason is

pretext for retaliation.

First, defendant challenges plaintiff’s ability to show that he engaged in activity

protected under the ADEA. An employee complaining of age discrimination in violation of

the ADEA must reasonably put his employer on notice that he is engaging in protected

activity, but he need not utter magic words. See Kitchen v. WSCO Petroleum Corp., 481 F.

Supp. 2d 1136, 1145 (D. Or. 2007).

Plaintiff contends that he engaged in protected activity when he told McAndrew that

his rights were being violated and that McAndrew would be dealing with plaintiff’s lawyer.

Plaintiff allegedly made these comments in the context of McAndrew confirming that a

younger employee with less experience would be replacing plaintiff. Plaintiff also offers his

follow-up email to McAndrew, which asks for acknowledgment of the comments about age

and experience, but does not mention a violation of plaintiff’s rights or a lawyer. Defendant

initially disputes that these comments were specific enough to place McAndrew on notice

that plaintiff was opposing age discrimination, in part because he did not mention “age

Case 2:08-cv-02342-FJM Document 106 Filed 06/03/10 Page 10 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 11 -

discrimination.” These alleged comments are sufficient to qualify as protected opposition

at the prima facie stage.

Plaintiff also argues that his use of his whiteboard to investigate and collect the names

of other employees selected for redeployment was protected activity. Defendant correctly

points out that this explanation for the names on the whiteboard contradicts plaintiff’s

deposition testimony that the names were posted merely for informational purposes during

times of organizational change. PSOF, Ex. 1 at 137-38. It also contradicts plaintiff’s

position that he facilitated the list of names on his whiteboard, but did not take an active role

in writing the names or soliciting people to generate a list of redeployment employees. See

PSOF, Ex. 10 at 3. Because there is no support in the record, plaintiff may not characterize

his use of his whiteboard as protected activity.

Finally, plaintiff maintains that his questions for Lewis during the November 1, 2007

redeployment meeting qualify as protected activity. His questions concerned whom he

should ask about the reasons for his selection for redeployment. Defendant objects on the

grounds that plaintiff did not offer this theory when asked about his retaliation claim during

his deposition. It also contends that Lewis could not have reasonably construed plaintiff’s

questions as opposing age discrimination. However, the parties agree that Lewis recounted

plaintiff’s questions to McAndrew along with her complaints about plaintiff’s behavior

during the meeting, and McAndrew might reasonably have understood plaintiff’s questions

as a continuation of his earlier comments. Of course, plaintiff agrees with McAndrew that

he had made the decision to terminate plaintiff the day before the redeployment meeting took

place, but that goes to the issue of causation. In any case, plaintiff can establish the first

element of his prima facie case.

Second, defendant disputes plaintiff’s proffered adverse employment action. Plaintiff

contends that he was terminated on November 1, 2007, the day McAndrew walked him to

the parking lot. Defendant claims that plaintiff remained eligible for internal job openings,

and it points out that it continued to pay him until November 16, 2007. Plaintiff maintains

that this was not the case, and he disputes his eligibility for a severance package that

Case 2:08-cv-02342-FJM Document 106 Filed 06/03/10 Page 11 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 12 -

defendant offered him. It is undisputed that plaintiff was terminated at least several weeks

before he otherwise would have been if he had not secured another position, which is

sufficient to show an adverse employment action at the prima facie stage.

Third, defendant argues that plaintiff cannot show a causal link between his protected

activity and his termination. At the prima facie stage, the causal link element is construed

broadly, Poland, 494 F.3d at 1181 n.2, and, in some cases, causation may be inferred “from

timing alone where an adverse employment action follows on the heels of protected activity.”

Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002). Notwithstanding

the short duration involved in this case, defendant contends that plaintiff’s use of his

whiteboard and his conduct at the redeployment meeting are intervening events that break

the causal chain. In addition, defendant suggests that McAndrew’s efforts to locate a

position for plaintiff, as shown through their exchange of email and a telephone message,

belie any inference of retaliation. Defendant submits these reasons, as well as McAndrew’s

reliance on complaints from Tehrani and Lewis, as legitimate and non-retaliatory for

purposes of the second stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework, should we conclude that

plaintiff can establish a prima face case.

In addition to timing, plaintiff asserts that the events were causally linked because

defendant’s reasons are pretext for retaliation. Plaintiff points out that no one asked him

about his whiteboard or confirmed that he was responsible for the list of names that appeared

on it before he was terminated. He also points out that Zlotnicka did not have a major

problem with his use of his whiteboard, and Tutt had not been bothered by it in the past.

Moreover, plaintiff argues that defendant should have used progressive discipline under its

“Corrective Action” policy, which allows for counseling, documented warnings, final

documented warnings, and termination, all within the discretion of management. PSOF, Ex.

40 at 1. Although plaintiff concedes that Lewis did not seem receptive to his questions at the

redeployment meeting, he contends that the complaint she made to McAndrew was

overblown in light of the audio recording of the meeting and Tutt’s and Zlotnicka’s

testimony that plaintiff’s conduct was not disruptive. Plaintiff submits the same analysis of

Case 2:08-cv-02342-FJM Document 106 Filed 06/03/10 Page 12 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 13 -

pretext for purposes of the third stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework, along with all

of the evidence discussed above.

In light of the low evidentiary threshold required, and the similarity of the arguments

made at all three stages of the burden-shifting framework, we will assume, without deciding,

that plaintiff can show a causal link, and thus establish a prima facie case. Plaintiff’s

evidence of pretext, however, is insufficient to defeat summary judgment. Plaintiff concedes

that he allowed the speculative listing of employees on his whiteboard with the connotation

that they had been redeployed. Moreover, he envisioned other employees coming to his

cubicle to view the list and add to it. McAndrew’s condemnation of such inappropriate

behavior in the workplace is unremarkable. There is no indication that he harbored any

discriminatory or retaliatory animus toward plaintiff. Indeed, he was helping plaintiff find

a new position until he found out about plaintiff’s whiteboard, apparently from his new

supervisor, Tehrani. Under the circumstances, McAndrew’s decision to forgo intermediate

discipline and terminate plaintiff short of the end of the redeployment period does not

suggest pretext. Plaintiff’s exhaustive, if not confrontational, questioning of Lewis the

following day may have been understandable given the subject matter of the meeting. But

plaintiff concedes that the decision to terminate him had already been made the day before,

and he cannot show that defendant’s reasons are pretext for retaliation. We grant defendant’s

motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s retaliation claim.

Pursuant to our Order of May 28, 2010 (doc. 105), IT IS ORDERED GRANTING

defendant’s motion for summary judgment on all of plaintiff’s claims (doc. 52).

The clerk shall enter judgment in favor of defendant and against plaintiff.

DATED this 2nd day of June, 2010.

Case 2:08-cv-02342-FJM Document 106 Filed 06/03/10 Page 13 of 13