Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-00621/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-00621-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 17:101 Copyright Infringement

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The following facts are undisputed, except where specifically noted.

WO

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Dan Coogan, doing business as Coogan

Photographic, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Avnet, Inc., a foreign corporation; Roy

Vallee and Jane Doe Vallee, husband and

wife; Allen Maag and Jane Doe Maag,

husband and wife, 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-04-0621-PHX-SRB

OPINION AND ORDER

This case involves Defendants' improper use of photographs taken by Plaintiff Dan

Coogan. At issue is a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by Plaintiff (Doc. 59) and a

Motion to Strike by Defendants (Doc. 64).

I. BACKGROUND1

Plaintiff is a professional photographer who was retained by Upside Magazine

("Upside") to photograph Defendant Avnet, Inc.'s ("Avnet") Chief Executive Officer,

Defendant Roy Vallee. Plaintiff's agreement with Upside Magazine granted the magazine

one-time usage rights of one photograph of Vallee with no third-party transfer rights.

Case 2:04-cv-00621-SRB Document 100 Filed 10/26/05 Page 1 of 15
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Following the April 2001 photoshoot, Plaintiff registered the photographs (the "Vallee

photographs") as an unpublished "collection" with the United States Copyright Office. 

In October 2001, Plaintiff happened to see one of the Vallee photographs in both the

July/August 2001 and September 2001 issues of Avnet Global Perspective Magazine.

Plaintiff notified Sean Fanning, an Avnet employee, of the unauthorized use of the

photographs, and Fanning contacted Defendant Allen Maag, Avnet's then-Chief

Communications Officer. Following a brief phone conversation in January 2002, Plaintiff

and Maag exchanged emails over a roughly four month period.

The first email from Plaintiff to Maag, dated January 10, 2002, adverts to the

unauthorized use of one of the Vallee photographs in Avnet's magazine, and inquires

whether, in addition to compensation for the unauthorized use, Avnet would like to purchase

the future use of some of the Vallee photographs. (Pl.'s Statement of Facts ("PSOF"), Ex.

6.) Maag responded by email on January 18, and asked Plaintiff the cost of purchasing all

of the Vallee photographs. (PSOF, Ex. 7.) Plaintiff answered that it would be more cost

effective for Avnet to license select images for a finite period of time, rather than purchasing

all of the photographs outright. (PSOF, Ex. 8.) Maag was apparently amenable to that

suggestion, and the two met in person on March 6, 2002 so that Maag could select the Vallee

photographs that Avnet wished to license. 

At that meeting, Plaintiff and Maag reached an agreement concerning the past and

future use of the Vallee photographs. That agreement was "memorialized," (Defs.' Resp. to

Pl.'s Mot. for Partial Summ. J. at 2) in an invoice (the "Invoice") dated April 9, 2002 that

Plaintiff emailed to Maag on April 10, 2002. (PSOF, Ex. 14.) The Invoice provided that

Avnet would pay Plaintiff $2,500 in exchange for: the prior use of one of the Vallee

photographs in Avnet's magazine, and the non-exclusive use, for one year, of "[a]n additional

3-5 images from the same photo shoot." (PSOF, Ex. 14.) The Invoice further provided that

the images could not be used in Avnet's annual report, nor could they be transferred to third

parties. (PSOF, Ex. 14.) 

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Despite its answer, Defendants objected to that request for admission as calling for

a legal conclusion. (PSOF, Ex. 20 at 8.)

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Maag forwarded the Invoice to Avnet's accounting department, which paid it in full.

In response to a request for admission, Defendants admit that the check was issued to

Plaintiff for payment of the Invoice, and "constitutes a writing accepting the terms set forth

in the [I]nvoice."2

 (PSOF, Ex. 20 at 5, 8.)

There is no dispute that Avnet violated Plaintiff's copyright on three of the Vallee

photographs by, among other things, using the photographs in the 2002 and 2003 Annual

Reports, distributing the photographs to third parties, and continuing to use the images on

various Avnet web pages after the license expired. Avnet maintains that the improper use

occurred because Maag simply forgot about the limitations imposed by the Invoice, and as

soon as Defendants were reminded of those limitations, they immediately discontinued use

of the photographs. (Def.'s Statement of Facts ("DSOF"), Ex. 1.) Plaintiff contends that the

improper use of his photographs by Avnet occurred because Avnet and Maag willfully

disregarded the terms of the Invoice. 

Avnet's Code of Conduct for North American Employees states that it is "Avnet's

policy to respect the copyrights, patents and licenses of others, including their competitors

and suppliers. . . . Do not make photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material

. . . without first consulting with Avnet's legal department." (PSOF, Ex. 17, Tab 1 at 2.) 

On March 29, 2004, Plaintiff filed a complaint in United States District Court, which

he amended on November 10, 2004. The Amended Complaint included causes of action for

copyright infringement, declaratory relief, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment. On

April 25, 2005, the Court dismissed the latter cause of action for failure to state a claim

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). On May 27, 2005, Plaintiff filed the

instant Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

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In particular, Defendant wishes to strike the following paragraphs from Plaintiff's

Statement of Facts, and the corresponding exhibits: 12-22, 25-27 and 40.

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II. LEGAL STANDARDS AND ANALYSIS

A. Motion to Strike

Defendants move to strike the portions of Plaintiff's motion for partial summary

judgment containing what Defendants believe to be evidence of offers to compromise and

settlement negotiations between Plaintiff and Defendants.3

 Such evidence, according to

Defendants, is inadmissible pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 408 ("Rule 408"), and

therefore cannot be offered in support of a motion for summary judgment. See Beyene v.

Coleman Sec. Servs., Inc., 854 F.2d 1179, 1181 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e))

(other citations omitted).

Rule 408 provides that:

[E]vidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2)

accepting or offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in

compromising or attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed

as to either validity or amount, is not admissible to prove liability for or

invalidity of the claim or its amount. Evidence of conduct or statements

made in compromise negotiations is likewise not admissible. . . . This

rule . . . does not require exclusion when the evidence is offered for

another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness,

negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct

a criminal investigation or prosecution.

Put simply, "statements made during the course of settlement negotiations are

inadmissible." In Re Golden Plan of Cal., 39 B.R. 551, 554 (Bkrtcy. E. D. Cal. 1984). To

determine whether parties are in fact engaged in settlement negotiations, courts look to the

intent of the parties. If the statement is intended to be part of the negotiations toward

compromise or settlement, it should be excluded. Kritikos v. Palmer Johnson, Inc., 821 F.2d

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Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment further elucidates Plaintiff's intent

in conversing with Maag. Plaintiff states that, after noticing that Avnet had used the Vallee

photographs without permission, he "refrained from suing Avnet for infringement [] and

instead, made attempts to negotiate an enlarged scope of the license." (Pl.'s Mot. for Partial

Summ. J. at 11.) 

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418, 423 (7th Cir. 1987) (citing 2 J. Weinstein and M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence ¶ 408

[03], at 408-20 to -21 (1980)). This exclusion advances the purpose of Rule 408, which is

to "encourage settlements. The fear is that settlement negotiations will be inhibited if the

parties know that their statements may be later used as admissions of liability." Kritikos, 821

F.2d at 423 (citing Central Soya Co., Inc., v. Epstein Fisheries, Inc., 676 F.2d 939, 944 (7th

Cir. 1982)). 

The first piece of evidence that Defendants wish to exclude is a paragraph from

Plaintiff's affidavit (PSOF, Ex. 1, ¶ 17) where Plaintiff describes a meeting with an Avnet

employee, Sean Fanning, at which Plaintiff informed Fanning that Avnet had improperly

used one of the Vallee photographs in an Avnet publication. Simply informing Fanning of

Avnet's copyright infringement falls outside the scope of Rule 408, as it was not part of a

settlement negotiation.

Defendants also wish to exclude all evidence of the email, phone and in-person

conversations between Maag and Plaintiff which culminated in the Invoice. The first

question under Rule 408 is whether this exchange constitutes evidence of settlement

negotiations within the meaning of Rule 408. Plaintiff's own affidavit provides a clear

answer to this question. Plaintiff describes his interaction with Maag as "negotiating over

Avnet's unauthorized use of my photography," one purpose of which was to "settle the

infringement that has occurred." (PSOF, Ex. 1, ¶¶ 20, 22.)4

 In other words, Plaintiff

contacted Maag with the intent to initiate settlement talks stemming from Defendants'

violation of Plaintiff's copyright. The "claim" was "disputed," as Maag informed Plaintiff

in an email that, "I really feel I owe you nothing regarding the usage of Roy [Vallee]'s photo

in the newsletter." (PSOF, Ex. 9.) Plaintiff was "offering" to "accept" "valuable

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consideration," in the form of money and future licensing of the Vallee photographs to

Avnet.

The next issue under Rule 408 is Plaintiff's purpose in offering this evidence. If a

party offers evidence from settlement negotiations "to prove liability for . . . the claim," that

evidence must be excluded. Fed. R. Evid. 408. Here, there can be no doubt that Plaintiff is

offering this evidence to establish Defendant's liability for willfully infringing upon

Plaintiff's copyrighted images. Through this evidence, Plaintiff seeks to prove that because

Maag was so intimately familiar with the terms of the Invoice, Maag either knew, or should

have known, when he and Avnet were violating those terms. Accordingly, with the

exception of Plaintiff's initial contact with Fanning, Defendants' motion to strike is granted.

B. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriately granted when there are no genuine issues of

material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(c). The initial burden is on the moving party to show an absence of genuine issues of

material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2556 (1986).

If the moving party meets its initial burden, then the non-moving party must set forth specific

facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

247-48, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the

Court views the evidence of the non-movant in the light most favorable to that party, and all

justifiable inferences are to be drawn in its favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S. Ct. at

2518.

Plaintiff seeks summary judgment on his copyright infringement claim and on his

breach of contract claim. 

1. Copyright Infringement

Plaintiff's copyright infringement claim breaks down into four subparts, each of which

will be addressed in turn: whether Defendants violated Plaintiff's copyrighted photographs

of Vallee; whether that violation was "willful"; whether the three copyrighted photographs

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All citations to the Copyright Act of 1976 throughout this Order are to the 1999

version of the statute.

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constitute one work or three separate works; and whether Maag, in his personal capacity, can

be held jointly and severally liable for Avnet's copyright violations.

a. Whether Defendants Violated Plaintiff's Copyright

"To prove copyright infringement, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) ownership of the

allegedly infringed work, and (2) copying of the protected elements of the work by the

defendant." Pasillas v. McDonald's Corp., 927 F.2d 440, 442 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Narell

v. Freeman, 872 F.2d 907, 910 (9th Cir. 1989)).

Defendants do not contest that they violated Plaintiff's copyrighted photographs by

using the Vallee photographs in a manner inconsistent with the terms of the Invoice.

Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment on this point.

b. Whether Defendants' Copyright Violation Was "Willful"

Section 504(c)(1) of the Copyright Act of 1976, as amended, provides that the

copyright owner may elect to recover, instead of "actual damages and profits, an award of

statutory damages . . . in a sum of not less than $750 or more than $30,000" for each

infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (1976) (amended 1999).5

If however, the copyright infringement is willful,

the court in its discretion may increase the award of statutory damages

to a sum of not more than $150,000. In a case where the infringer

sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds, that such infringer

was not aware and had no reason to believe that his or her acts

constituted an infringement of copyright, the court [in] its discretion

may reduce the award of statutory damages to a sum of not less than

$200.

17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2). 

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A defendant willfully infringes on the copyright of another by acting "with knowledge

that the defendant's conduct constitutes copyright infringement." Peer Int'l Corp. v. Pausa

Records, Inc., 909 F.2d 1332, 1336 n.3 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting 3 M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer,

Nimmer on Copyright ("Nimmer") § 14.04[B], at 14-40.2-.3 (1989)). This "knowledge

standard" does not require that a defendant act with the "specific intent" to violate the

copyright protection. Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Chin, 94 Fed. Appx. 531, 533 (9th Cir.

2004) (citing Peer Int'l Corp., 909 F.2d at 1335-36). 

Here, according to Defendants, the copyright violation was the product of a good faith

mistake as to the terms of the Invoice, and was therefore not "willful" within the meaning of

the Copyright Act. 

Defendants' argument relies on a faulty premise - that copyright infringement cannot

be willful if it occurred as a result of a mistaken belief about the terms of a license, even if

that mistaken belief was held in good faith. A defendant seeking to establish the innocence

of its infringement "must not only establish its good faith belief in the innocence of its

conduct, it must also show that it was reasonable in holding such a belief." Peer Int'l Corp.,

909 F.2d at 1335-36 (citing 3 Nimmer § 14.04[B], at 14-40.3). See Frank Music Corp. v.

Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 772 F.2d 505, 515 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that the defendants'

conduct was not willful because their good faith mistake as to the terms of their license was

"not implausible"); Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942, 959 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding

that the making of various James Bond films did not constitute willful copyright infringement

in light of the "complexity of the chain of title to the various elements of the Bond stories"

and the fact that the movies were produced "under color of title") (citations omitted); Dolman

v. Agee, 157 F.3d 708, 715 (9th Cir. 1998); Allen-Myland, Inc. v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp.,

770 F. Supp. 1014, 1027 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (holding that the defendants did not willfully

infringe on the plaintiff's copyright because the defendant held a reasonable, good faith belief

that it were not infringing, based on the fact that the terms of the license were "not easily

interpreted") (citing Frank Music Corp., 772 F. 2d at 515; 3 Nimmer § 14.04[B], at 14-40.3).

In Frank Music Corp., the plaintiffs licensed to a predecessor of Metro-GoldwynCase 2:04-cv-00621-SRB Document 100 Filed 10/26/05 Page 8 of 15
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Mayer, Inc.'s ("MGM") the right to produce a musical motion picture based on a play,

Kismet, that the plaintiffs had written. 772 F.2d at 510. In addition to producing the movie,

MGM also created, about twenty years later, a musical paying tribute to ten classic MGM

films, including Kismet. Id. The plaintiffs sued, alleging that the making of the musical

violated the terms of the license, and constituted willful infringement of the plaintiff's

copyright by MGM. Id. The Ninth Circuit held that the infringement was not willful, as

"Defendants reasonably could have believed that their production was not infringing

plaintiffs' copyrights." Id. at 515.

Here, even assuming that Defendants' mistaken belief as to the terms of the license

was held in good faith, it was not reasonable. Unlike the license at issue in Frank Music

Corp., the terms of Invoice were crystal clear: Defendants were not permitted to use

Plaintiff's photographs for more than one year; Defendants were not permitted to use

Plaintiff's photographs in the annual report; and Defendants were not permitted to transfer

their rights to a third party. (PSOF, Ex. 14 at 2.) In spite of these unmistakable terms,

Defendants violated the license. Because no jury could find that this violation was the

product of a reasonable belief as to the terms of the license, Plaintiff is entitled to summary

judgment on the issue of willfulness.

c. One Work or Three Separate Works

The Copyright Act of 1976, as amended, provides that a copyright owner is entitled

to damages "for all infringements involved in the action, with respect to any one work." 17

U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (emphasis added). The Act, however, does not provide a definition for

the term "work." The issue is whether the three copyrighted photographs that Defendants

used unlawfully constitute one "work" or three separate "works."

Separate copyrights do not constitute distinct "works" unless they can "live their own

copyright life." Columbia Pictures Tel., Inc. v. Krypton Broad. of Birmingham, Inc., 259

F.3d 1186, 1193 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Walt Disney Co. v. Powell, 897 F.2d 565, 569 (D.C.

Cir. 1990)). In other words, each separately copyrighted element - here, each photograph -

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"would have to be in itself . . . viable." Walt Disney Co., 897 F.2d at 569 (citing 3 Nimmer

§ 14.04[E], at 14-40.13).

In Walt Disney, the defendant, a wholesale souvenir seller, was accused of copyright

infringement for selling shirts with mouse faces resembling Mickie and Minnie Mouse. Walt

Disney Co., 897 F.2d at 567. One of the issues before the court was, for purposes of

assessing statutory damages, the number of "works" that had been infringed. Disney

succeeded in convincing the trial court that six different infringements had occurred, based

on the six different depictions of Mickey and Minnie on the shirts. The D.C. Circuit

disagreed, holding that:

While Mickey and Minnie are certainly distinct, viable works with

separate economic value and copyright lives of their own, we cannot

say the same is true for all six of the Disney copyrights of Mickey and

Minnie in various poses which the district court found to be infringed

in this case. Mickey is still Mickey whether he is smiling or frowning,

running or walking, waving his left hand or his right. Thus, we find that

[the defendant's] mouse-face shirts infringed only two of Disney's

works.

Id. at 570.

In Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Sanfilippo, 1998 WL 207856 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 25,

1998), Playboy sued the owners of a website which, without authorization from Playboy,

posted thousands of copyrighted images that had appeared in Playboy magazine. The

defendant argued that because the images had first appeared as part of compilations - i.e. in

Playboy magazine - the images within those compilations should not be counted as individual

infringements. 

The district court sided with Playboy, reasoning that:

[A]lthough each of these images may have appeared in a singular issue

of one of plaintiff's copyrighted publications, these images are subject

to re-use and redistribution in accordance with various licensing

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arrangements. Furthermore, each image represents a singular and

copyrightable effort concerning a particular model, photographer, and

location. The fact that many of these images appeared together should

not detract from the protection afforded to each individual effort.

Furthermore, defendant marketed each one of thee images separately.

Id. Accordingly, the court held the defendant liable for the infringement of each individual

image. Id. See also Lee Middleton Original Dolls, Inc. v. Seymour Mann, Inc., 299 F. Supp.

2d 892, 897-98 (E.D. Wis. 2004) (applying economic viability test and Playboy factors and

finding that the separate parts of a doll do not have their own independent economic life).

The considerations that guided the Playboy court's analysis are useful in the present

case. Unlike the photographs at issue in Playboy, the Vallee photographs were the subject

of a single license agreement. Unlike the photographs at issue in Playboy, the Vallee

photographs involved a single subject, a single photographer and a single location. Unlike

the photographs at issue in Playboy, there is no evidence in the record that Plaintiff marketed

the images to the public separately. Rather, the photographs were taken at a single session,

by a single photographer, for a single purpose.

The Walt Disney Co. decision also counsels in favor of considering the Vallee

photographs a single work. As Defendants' brief points out, just as "Mickey is still Mickey

whether he is smiling or frowning, running or walking, waving his left hand or his right,"

"Roy Vallee is still Roy Vallee whether he is sitting, standing or looking out the window."

(Defs.' Resp. to Pl.'s Mot. for Partial Summ. J. at 10.) As such, the Court concludes that all

of the Vallee photographs constitute a single "work" within the meaning of 17 U.S.C. §

504(c)(1).

In his motion, Plaintiff argues that because he registered the photographs as part of

an unpublished "collection" within the meaning of 37 C.F.R. § 202.3, each photograph within

that collection constitutes a separate "work." Plaintiff is mistaken. While the registration of

photographs as part of a "collection" may entitle each photograph to copyright protection,

each photograph is not automatically deemed a separate "work" within the meaning of 17

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17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) provides that, "[f]or purposes of this subsection, all the parts

of a compilation . . . constitute one work."

7

The Copyright Act defines "compilation" as "a work formed by the collection and

assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in

such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship."

17 U.S.C. § 101.

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U.S.C. § 504(c)(1). None of the cases Plaintiff cites in support of his argument actually

support, or even address, his argument.

Plaintiff's understanding of the law evolves considerably between his motion and his

reply in support of that motion. Plaintiff devotes his reply to the argument that because the

Vallee photographs are not a "compilation" within the meaning of 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1),6

each photograph must therefore be a separate "work." Plaintiff is once again mistaken. The

alleged failure of separately copyrighted elements to meet the definition of a "compilation"

has no impact on whether those separately copyrighted elements should be considered one

"work" or "separate works."7

 Accordingly, Plaintiff's proposed construction of the statute

is rejected.

d. Maag's Individual Liability

Plaintiff's motion contends that Maag, in his personal capacity, should be held jointly

and severally liable for Avnet's copyright infringements. Curiously, while the Amended

Complaint also names Vallee in his personal capacity (as well as his wife), Plaintiff does not

make the same motion with respect to Vallee. To the Court's chagrin, Defendants (who are

all represented by the same law firm) do not address this contention in their response.

"The test for finding a corporate officer jointly and severally liable with his

corporation for copyright infringement is whether the officer 'has the right and ability to

supervise the infringing activity and also has a direct financial interest in such activities.'"

Chi-Boy Music v. Towne Tavern, Inc., 779 F. Supp. 537, 530 (N.D. Ala. 1991) (quoting

Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963); Broad.

Music, Inc. v. Blueberry Hill Family Rests., Inc., 899 F. Supp. 474, 481 (D. Nev. 1995)

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(quoting Chi-Boy Music, 779 F. Supp. at 530). See Comm. for Idaho's High Desert, Inc. v.

Yost, 92 F.3d 814, 823-24 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that a corporate officer or director is, in

general, personally liable for all torts which he authorizes or directs or in which he

participates, notwithstanding that he acted as an agent of the corporation and not on his own

behalf). 

Here, the evidence is undisputed that Maag possessed at all relevant times the right

and the power to supervise the infringing activity. In response to an interrogatory,

Defendants stated that "Maag is the individual responsible for keeping track of Avnet's right

to use the photographs at issue." (PSOF, Ex. 24, Tab 3 at 4.) Also, Maag admitted in an

affidavit that he had the authority to stop the infringing activity. (DSOF, Ex. 1, ¶ 6.) See

Playboy Enters. v. Starware Publ'g Corp., 900 F. Supp. 438, 440-41 (S.D. Fla. 1995)

(granting the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the issue of the liability of one of

the defendant's corporate officers, where the officer admitted that he had the ability to

supervise the infringing activity and where the officer admitted that had the authority to

terminate the infringing activity).

The evidence about whether Maag has a financial interest in the copyright

infringement is less clear. On one hand, there is no dispute that, at all relevant times, Maag

was an Avnet corporate officer and a member of the Avnet Executive Committee. (PSOF,

¶ 40.) However, Plaintiff has offered no evidence concerning Maag's pay structure or stock

ownership, and therefore, it cannot be said as a matter of law that Maag had a financial

interest in encouraging the infringement. Accordingly, summary judgment on this issue is

inappropriate.

2. Breach of Contract

In this portion of Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment, Plaintiff argues that

his acceptance of $2,500 from Avnet does not constitute an abrogation of his right to sue

Defendants for the copyright infringement that occurred when Defendants improperly used

one of the Vallee photographs in two issues of their magazine. Any argument to this effect,

however, is precluded by the Court's ruling on Defendants' Motion to Strike. That Plaintiff

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may have accepted the $2,500 "to avoid litigation" is an allegation lacking evidentiary

support in the record, as the evidence that was offered in that regard is inadmissible pursuant

to Rule 408. 

The issue of whether Defendants, as a matter of law, materially breached their contract

with Plaintiff, does not require that the Court look to the stricken evidence. The evidence is

undisputed that an agreement existed between Plaintiff and Defendants concerning the terms

under which Defendants were entitled to use the Vallee photographs, and those terms are set

forth in plain, clear language. The evidence is undisputed that Defendants violated those

terms by using the photographs after the license expired, using the photographs in Avnet's

Annual Reports, and transferring the photographs to third parties. The evidence is further

undisputed that the license agreement allowed the use of the photographs already published

in Upside Magazine and Global Perspectives in 2001. Therefore, Plaintiff is not entitled to

summary judgment declaring that the $2,500 payment is only an "offset" against damages

for the 2001 infringements.

III. CONCLUSION

As a matter of law, the Vallee photographs constitute one "work" within the meaning

of 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1), and Defendants willfully violated the copyright that Plaintiff holds

in those photographs. Also, Defendants' use of the Vallee photographs in a manner

inconsistent with the terms of the Invoice compels summary judgment in Plaintiff's favor on

his breach of contract claim. Material questions of fact remain as to whether Maag is jointly

and severally liable for the damages stemming from the copyright violation. Plaintiff's

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is therefore granted in part and denied in part. As

Plaintiff's motion does not address the issue of damages, or remedies more generally, the

Court will not initiate that discussion sua sponte. 

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IT IS ORDERED granting Defendants' Motion to Strike (Doc. 64).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting in part and denying in part Plaintiff's Motion

for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 59).

DATED this 24th day of October, 2005.

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