Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01056/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01056-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE TRINIDAD LARA URBINA,

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF KERN, KERN COUNTY

SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT, KERN

SHERIFF MACK WIMBISH, KERN

COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFF J.L.

ACEBEDO (#200047), CITY OF

SHAFTER, SHAFTER POLICE

DEPARTMENT, SHAFTER POLICE

CHIEF JOHN ZROFSKY, SHAFTER

POLICE OFFICERS CHRIS JACKSON,

BRIAN ENGLISH, and DOES 1

through 10, inclusive, sued in

both their individual and

official capacities,

Defendants.

1:05-CV-01056 OWW LJO

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

1. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Jose Trinidad Lara Urbina (“Urbina” or

“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Defendants for their

alleged use of excessive force during the course of arresting

him. (Doc. 1, Complaint ¶ 10, Filed August 18, 2005.) Before

the court is Defendants’ Kern County, Kern County Sheriff’s

Department, and Kern Sheriff Mack Wimbish (“Kern Defendants”)

motion for summary judgment on Urbina’s claims. (Doc. 35, Motion

for Summary Judgment, Filed September 29, 2006.) Urbina does not

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 All facts are undisputed by Plaintiff. 1

Vargas is not, and has not, been named as a defendant in 2

this litigation.

2

oppose the motion. (Doc. 38, Statement of Non Opposition, Filed

October 24, 2006.) 

2. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Urbina filed his complaint on August 18, 2005. (Doc. 1,

Complaint.) Kern Defendants filed their answer on September 27,

2005. (Doc. 2, Answer.) On September 29, 2006 Kern Defendants

filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 35, Motion for

Summary Judgment.) On October 24, 2006 Urbina filed a statement

of non opposition. (Doc. 38, Statement of Non Opposition.) 

3.FACTUAL BACKGROUND1

A. Background Facts

On August 15, 2003, Kern County Sheriff’s Deputy George

Vargas (Vargas) witnessed plaintiff cross a road and enter onto 2

an orchard road. (Depo of SD Vargas, pg.19, ln. 11 to pg. 20, ln.

25, Exhibit C.) The manager of the orchard had previously

requested that Vargas prevent unauthorized entry by those persons

who did not have legitimate business in the orchard. (Depo of SD

Vargas, pg. 9, llns. 7-14, Exhibit C.) Vargas additionally

realized that plaintiff was a person with whom he had attempted

to speak approximately one week prior to this incident, however,

plaintiff had eluded him on the prior occasion. (Depo of SD

Vargas, pg. 8, ln. 21 to pg. 9, ln. 6, Exhibit C.) (Depo of SD

Vargas, pg. 21, llns. 1-3 Exhibit C.) 

On August 15, 2003, Vargas addressed plaintiff but plaintiff

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fled, initially on his bicycle but later abandoned the bicycle to

run, on foot, through the orchards. (Depo of SD Vargas, pg. 21,

ln. 7 to pg. 22, ln. 24, Exhibit C.) Vargas requested

assistance. Sheriff’s Department Deputies (“Deputies”) and

Police Officers (“Officers”) from the City of Shafter (“Shafter”)

responded and set up a perimeter to contain plaintiff (Depo of SD

Acebedo, pg.17, llns. 4-18, Exhibit B). Kern County Deputy J.L.

Acebedo (“Acebedo”) set up a perimeter position on Burbank Street

on the south side of the orchard into which plaintiff had fled

(Depo of Acebedo, pg.18, llns. 4-10, Exhibit B).

Acebedo received a radio transmission from Vargas stating

that Officer Jackson was in pursuit of plaintiff in the orchard

(Depo of SD Acebedo, pg.18, llns. 17-23, Exhibit B). Acebedo

then noticed a police vehicle pass his location at a high rate of

speed and he believed that the vehicle was operated by Officer

English, whom plaintiff refers to as “the big guy” in his

deposition. (Depo of SD Acebedo, pg.19, llns. 3-17, Exhibit B.) 

Acebedo then left his perimeter position and followed the police

vehicle. (Depo of SD Acebedo, pg.19, ln. 3 to pg.21, ln.3,

Exhibit B.) During a portion of the time while he was driving,

Acebedo could see Jackson chasing plaintiff in the orchard. (Depo

of SD Acebedo, pg. 21, llns. 15-23, Exhibit B.) (Depo of SD

Acebedo, pg. 22, ln. 24 to pg. 23, ln. 15, Exhibit B.) Acebedo

witnessed English pull his car on to a dirt road and then exit

his vehicle. Acebedo stopped his vehicle, exited it, and began

to run toward the location where he believed plaintiff was

running. (Depo of SD Acebedo, pg. 21, ln. 7 to pg. 23, ln. 18,

Exhibit B.) 

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Acebedo first witnessed plaintiff from about 30 to 40 yards

away. (Depo of SD Acebedo, pg. 23, llns. 19-21, Exhibit B.) When

Acebedo first witnessed plaintiff, plaintiff was face down on the

ground and in physical contact with Jackson. (Depo of SD Acebedo,

pg. 23, ln. 22 to pg. 24, ln. 1, Exhibit B.) (Depo of SD Acebedo,

pg. 25, llns. 19-22, Exhibit B.) Jackson had one handcuff on

plaintiff but plaintiff was passively resisting the placement of

the second cuff. (Depo of SD Acebedo, pg. 26, llns. 2-15, Exhibit

B.) Jackson was able to place plaintiff in handcuffs. (Depo of

SD Acebedo, pg. 29, ln. 25 to pg. 30, ln. 1, Exhibit B.) Acebedo

and another officer picked plaintiff off the ground and walked

him to a patrol car. (Depo of SD Acebedo, pg. 34, ln. 9 to pg.

35, ln. 2, Exhibit B.) Vargas searched plaintiff and then

transported him from the scene. (Depo of SD Acebedo, pg. 37, ln.

23 to pg. 38, ln. 12, Exhibit B.) 

B. Undisputed Facts

Urbina was arrested on August 15, 2003 and contends that he

was struck during his arrest. (DSUF, No. 9 and No. 12) He now

brings a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim alleging that during his arrest

Acebedo used excessive force based on a policy and practice by

the Kern Sheriff’s department of “hurt a man... charge a man.” 

(Doc. 1, Complaint, ¶ 11.) According to Urbina, under this

policy, if an officer believes he has wrongly hurt a person, the

officer will seek to secure the filing of a criminal charge

against the arrestee. (Id.) Urbina claims that the officers who

arrested him sought filing of criminal charges in the belief that

a conviction will prevent him from suing for his injuries

wrongfully inflicted by the officer. (Id.) Lastly, Urbina

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argues that such a policy condones the use of excessive force. 

Acebedo has been dismissed from this action without

prejudice. (DSUF, No. 1; Doc. 35, Mot. for Summary Judgment.) 

Acebedo arrived at the scene of the arrest after Plaintiff was

detained but while he was struggling to avoid being handcuffed. 

(DSUF, No. 11) Acebedo was wearing a tan Kern Sheriff’s

Department uniform. (DSUF, No. 16) Acebedo was the only Kern

County or Department employee at the location of plaintiff’s

arrest. (DSUF, No. 10) Acebedo did not use excessive force on

plaintiff. (DSUF, No. 17) Further, no Kern County Department

employee used excessive force on plaintiff. (DSUF, No. 18) 

Sheriff Wimbish was not physically present at the scene on August

15, 2003. (DSUF, No. 20) Sheriff Wimbish did not provide any

instruction to deputies at the scene on August 15, 2003. (DSUF,

No. 21) Sheriff Wimbish was not aware of plaintiff’s arrest

until after the Complaint was served. (DSUF, No. 22) County

Defendants do not have any policy, procedure or custom of “hurt a

man - charge a man.” (DSUF, No. 7) County Defendants do not

condone or allow any policy, procedure or custom of “hurt a man -

charge a man.” (DSUF, No. 8)

In his deposition Urbina identifies “the tall officer” as

the first one to touch him and who allegedly struck him during

his arrest. (DSUF, No. 13) The “tall officer” was wearing

street clothes (DSUF, No. 14) Officer Jackson with the Shafter

police, handcuffed plaintiff. (DSUF, No. 15) The City of

Shafter and its peace officers are not the agents, servants or

employees of the County or Department. (DSUF, No. 19) 

//

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4. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. General Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is warranted only “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) ;

California v. Campbell, 138 F.3d 772, 780 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Therefore, to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must show (1) that a genuine factual issue exists

and (2) that this factual issue is material. Id. A genuine

issue of fact exists when the non-moving party produces evidence

on which a reasonable trier of fact could find in its favor

viewing the record as a whole in light of the evidentiary burden

the law places on that party. See Triton Energy Corp. v. Square

D Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252-56 (1986). Facts are

“material” if they “might affect the outcome of the suit under

the governing law.” Campbell, 138 F.3d at 782 (quoting Anderson,

477 U.S. at 248). 

The nonmoving party cannot simply rest on its allegations

without any significant probative evidence tending to support the

complaint. Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir.

2001).

[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the

entry of summary judgment, after adequate time

for discovery and upon motion, against a party

who fails to make a showing sufficient to

establish the existence of an element essential

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to the party's case, and on which that party

will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such

a situation, there can be “no genuine issue as

to any material fact,” since a complete failure

of proof concerning an essential element of the

nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all

other facts immaterial.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrell, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The more

implausible the claim or defense asserted by the nonmoving party,

the more persuasive its evidence must be to avoid summary

judgment. See United States ex rel. Anderson v. N. Telecom,

Inc., 52 F.3d 810, 815 (9th Cir. 1996). Nevertheless, the

evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to the

nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. A court’s role on

summary judgment is not to weigh evidence or resolve issues;

rather, it is to determine whether there is a genuine issue for

trial. See Abdul-Jabbar v. G.M. Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 410 (9th

Cir. 1996).

B. Summary Judgment in a Qualified Immunity Case

Qualified immunity entails a two-step analysis. First, a

court must ask whether a constitutional violation occurred at

all. If the answer to this question is yes, the court must then

inquire whether the right violated was “clearly established” by

asking whether a reasonable officer could believe that the

defendant’s actions were lawful. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S.

194, 201 (2001). 

The traditional summary judgment approach should be used in

analyzing the first step of the Saucier analysis: 

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A court required to rule upon the qualified immunity

issue must consider, then, this threshold question:

Taken in the light most favorable to the party

asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the

officer's conduct violated a constitutional right?

Where the facts are disputed, their resolution and

determinations of credibility are manifestly the

province of a jury.

Wall v. County of Orange, 364 F.3d 1107, 1110-1111 (9th Cir.

2004) (internal citations and quotations omitted). In the second

step, the court must ask whether it would be clear to a

reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation

confronted. Although this inquiry is primarily a legal one,

where the reasonableness of the officer’s belief that his conduct

was lawful “depends on the resolution of disputed issues of

fact...summary judgment is not appropriate.” Wilkins v. City of

Oakland, 364 F.3d 949, 1110-11 (9th. Cir. 2003) (citing Saucier,

533 U.S. at 216 (Ginsburg J., concurring)). 

5. DISCUSSION

A. Civil Rights Claims Under 42 U.S.C. section 1983

“Section 1983 provides for liability against any person

acting under color of law who deprives another ‘of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws’

of the United States.” S. Cal. Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336

F.3d 885, 887 (9th Cir. 2003)(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). “The

rights guaranteed by section 1983 are ‘liberally and beneficently

construed.’” Id. (quoting Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 443

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(1991). Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff may bring a

civil action for deprivation of rights under the following

circumstances: 

Every person who, under color of any statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State

or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or

causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United

States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof

to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall

be liable to the party injured in an action at law,

suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for

redress, except that in any action brought against a

judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such

officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall

not be granted unless a declaratory decree was

violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For

the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress

applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia

shall be considered to be a statute of the District of

Columbia. 

B. Official Capacity and Individual Capacity Suits

“1983 claims against government officials in their official

capacities are really suits against the governmental employer

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because the employer must pay any damages awarded.” Butler v.

Elle, 281 F.3d 1014, 1023 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Ky. v. Graham,

473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985)); see also Doe v. Lawrence Livermore

Nat’l Lab., 131 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that “a

suit against a state official in his official capacity is no

different from a suit against the [official’s office or the]

State itself”)(citing Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491

U.S. 58, 70-71 (1989). In such suits, the real party in interest

is the entity for which the official works. Hafer v. Melo, 502

U.S. 21, 25 (1991). A federal action for monetary damages

against an individual state official acting in his official

capacity is barred by the Eleventh Amendment in the same way that

an action against a State is barred. Doe v. Lawrence Livermore

Nat’l Lab., 131 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1997). “As the Supreme

Court has stated, ‘official-capacity suits...generally represent

only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which

an officer is an agent.’” Ruvalcaba v. City of Los Angeles, 167

F.3d 514, 524 n.3 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Graham, 473 U.S. at

165). “‘As long as the government entity receives notice and an

opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all

respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the

entity.’” Ruvalcaba, 167 F.3d at 524 n.3 (quoting Graham, 473

U.S. at 166.)

By contrast, “[p]ersonal-capacity suits seek to impose

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personal liability upon a government official for actions [taken]

under color of state law.” Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020,

1027 (9th Cir. 1999)(citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165

(1985))(internal quotations omitted). To establish personal

liability in a §1983 or §1985 action, it is enough to show that

the official, “acting under color of state law, caused the

deprivation of a federal right.” Hafer, 502 U.S. at 25 (internal

quotations omitted). Public officials sued in their personal

capacity may assert personal liability defenses, such as

qualified immunity. Dittman, 191 F.3d at 1027. 

Plaintiff appears to be suing Sheriff Wimbash only in his

official capacity. Plaintiff names Sheriff Wimbash as a

Defendant in this case even though there is nothing in the record

to indicate that he was present during Plaintiff’s arrest on

August 15, 2003. 

C. Fourth Amendment 

Under the Fourth Amendment the right of the people to be

secure in their persons, houses, and effects, against

unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. U.S.

Const. amend. IV.; Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F. 3d 1113,

1152 (9th Cir. 2005). The Supreme Court has held that “in the

ordinary case, seizures of personal property are unreasonable

within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, without more, unless

accomplished pursuant to a judicial warrant issued by a neutral

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 Although Monell dealt with a municipal government’s 3

liability under § 1983, the standard there announced was

more broadly framed in terms of “a local government.” Brass

v. County of L.A., 328 F.3d 1192, 1198 (9th Cir. 2003). 

 “There is certainly no constitutional impediment to 4

municipal liability. ‘The Tenth Amendment’s reservation of

nondelegated powers to the States is not implicated by a

federal-court judgment enforcing the express prohibitions of

unlawful state conduct enacted by the Fourteenth

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and detached magistrate after finding probable cause. Id. 

However, when faced with special law enforcement needs, the

Supreme Court has found that certain general, or individual,

circumstances may render a warrantless search or seizure

reasonable. Id. 

The initial question under Saucier is whether there was any

type or amount of force inflicted by Kern Defendants on Urbina

during his arrest on August 15, 2003. 

It is undisputed that Sheriff Wimbish was not present during

Urbina’s arrest. Sheriff Wimbish did not provide any instruction

to deputies at the scene on August 15, 2003. Sheriff Wimbish was

not aware of plaintiff’s arrest until after the Complaint was

served. Sheriff Wimbash, therefore, could not have inflicted

excessive force on Plaintiff or have ratified it. 

Defendants motion for summary judgment as to Sheriff Wimbash

is GRANTED. 

D. The Monell Doctrine 

Local governments are “persons” subject to suit for 3

“constitutional tort[s]” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Haugen v. 4

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Amendment.’” Monell, 436 U.S. 691 (quoting Milliken v.

Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 291 (1977)). There is no “basis for

concluding that the Eleventh Amendment is a bar to municipal

liability.” Id. (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S.

445, 456 (1976); Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530

(1890)).

 In Brass v. County of Los Angeles, the Ninth Circuit 5

followed evolution of municipal liability from Monroe to

Monell: 

In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 [](1961), the

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Brosseau, 339 F.3d 857, 874 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Monell v.

Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 n.55 (1978)) (also

finding the fact that “local governments can be sued under § 1983

necessarily decides that local government officials sued in their

official capacities are “persons” under § 1983 in those cases in

which, as here, a local government would be suable in its own

name”). “[T]he legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of

1871 compels the conclusion that Congress did intend

municipalities and other local government units to be included

among those persons to whom § 1983 applies.” Id. at 690. “Local

governing bodies, therefore, can be sued directly under § 1983

for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where, as here,

the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or

executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision

officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers...[or

for] deprivations visited pursuant to governmental ‘custom’ even

though such a custom has not received formal approval through the

body’s official decision making channels.” Id. 690-91. 5

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Supreme Court held that municipal corporations

were not subject to liability under § 1983. In

Monell, 436 U.S. at 665, the Court, based upon

its “fresh” review of the legislative history of

the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (the statutory

predecessor to § 1983), “overrule[d] Monroe v.

Pape...insofar as it holds that local

governments are wholly immune from suit under §

1983.” Id. at 663 (footnote omitted). The

Court, however, upheld Monroe “insofar as it

holds that the doctrine of respondeat superior

is not a basis for rendering municipalities

liable under § 1983 for the constitutional torts

of their employees.” Id. at 663 n.7. It stated

that “the language of § 1983, read against the

background of the same legislative history,

compels the conclusion that Congress did not

intend municipalities to be held liable unless

action pursuant to official municipal policy of

some nature caused a constitutional tort.” Id.

at 691.

328 F.3d at 1198. 

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A local government’s liability is limited. Although a local

government can be held liable for its official policies or

customs, it will not be held liable for an employee’s actions

outside of the scope of these policies or customs. “[T]he

language of § 1983, read against the background of the same

legislative history, compels the conclusion that Congress did not

intend municipalities to be held liable unless action pursuant to

official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional

tort. In particular,...a municipality cannot be held liable

solely because it employs a tortfeasor, in other words, a

municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat

superior theory.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. The statute’s

“language plainly imposes liability on a government that, under

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color of some official policy, [that] ‘causes’ an employee to

violate another’s constitutional rights.” Id. at 692. 

Therefore, “a local government may not be sued under § 1983 for

an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead,

it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether

made by its law-makers or by those whose edicts or acts may

fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury

that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” 

Id. at 694.

Plaintiff does not dispute that Acebedo was the only Kern

County or Department employee at the location of plaintiff’s

arrest. Acebedo arrived at the scene of the arrest after

Plaintiff was detained but while he was struggling to avoid being

handcuffed. Acebedo was wearing a tan Kern Sheriff’s Department

uniform. Plaintiff also concedes that Acebedo did not use

excessive force on plaintiff. Further, Acebedo has been

dismissed from this action without prejudice. 

Plaintiff also does not dispute that no Kern County

Department employee used excessive force on plaintiff. Sheriff

Wimbish was not physically present at the scene nor did he

provide instruction to any deputies at the scene of the arrest. 

Plaintiff fails to dispute that Kern County Defendants do not

have any policy, procedure or custom of “hurt a man - charge a

man.” Plaintiff concedes that County Defendants would not

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condone or allow any policy, procedure or custom of “hurt a man -

charge a man.” Lastly, the City of Shafter employees identified

by Plaintiff as those who conducted the arrest are not employed

by nor are they agents, servants or employees of the Kern County

or Department. 

Defendants motion for summary judgment on the civil rights

claim as to Kern County and Kern County Sheriff’s Department is

GRANTED. 

E. State Law Claims

i. Supplemental Jurisdiction 

Title 28 U.S.C. section 1367(a) provides in pertinent part:

“In any civil action of which the district courts have

original jurisdiction, the district court shall have

supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that

are so related to the claims in the action within such

original jurisdiction that they form part of the same

case or controversy under Article III of the United

States Constitution.” 

Plaintiff alleges a § 1983 claim for Fourth Amendment

violations. Plaintiff’s state law claims invoke supplemental

jurisdiction and arise from the same controversy as his §1983

claim. 

ii. California Tort Claims Act

In California, a person making a claim against a public

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entity or a public employee must present such a claim in writing

to the clerk, auditor or secretary of the local public entity

within six months after the accrual of the cause of action. Cal.

Gov. Code § 911.2.; see also Javor v. Taggart, 98 Cal. App. 4th

795, 804 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (submission of a claim to a public

entity pursuant to the California Tort Claims Act is a condition

precedent to a civil action against the state or its employees

and failure to present the claim bars the action.) A person may

not maintain a cause of action against a public entity or public

employee without having first presented a claim as required by

California Statute. Cal. Gov. Code 945.4. Cal. Gov. Code

section 954.6 requires that a claimant file a civil action within

six months after the public agency issues its decision. Javor,

98 Cal. App. 4th at 804. 

iii. California Constitution, Article 1 § 7

Article I, § 7 of the California Constitution provides: “A

person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without

due process of law or denied equal protection of the laws.” 

Plaintiff’s claims involve allegations of excessive force. 

However, it is undisputed that Kern Defendants did not use

excessive force on Plaintiff during his arrest. It is also

undisputed that there is no policy of “hurt a man... charge a

man” implemented by Kern County or Kern County Sheriff’s

Department. It is undisputed that Kern Defendants did not

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deprive Plaintiff of his constitutional rights under Article 1 §

7 of the California Constitution. 

Summary judgment is GRANTED.

iv. California Constitution, Article 1 § 13

Article I, § 13 of the California Constitution provides:

“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,

papers, and effects against unreasonable seizures and searches

may not be violated; and a warrant may not issue except on

probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly

describing the place to be searched and the persons and things to

be seized.” 

Plaintiff does not make an unreasonable search and seizure

claim against the Kern County Defendants in his complaint. 

Further, it is undisputed that Kern County Defendants did not

deprive Plaintiff of his constitutional rights under Article 1 §

7 of the California Constitution. 

Summary judgment on the state constitution claims is GRANTED

as to the moving defendants.

v. California Government Code § 815.2

California Government Code § 815.2 provides: 

(a) A public entity is liable for injury proximately

caused by an act or omission of an employee of the

public entity within the scope of his employment

if the act or omissions would, apart from this

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section have given rise to a cause of action

against that employee or his personal

representative.

(b) Except as otherwise provided by statute, a public

entity is not liable for an injury resulting from

an act or omission of an employee of the public

entity where the employee is immune from

liability. 

The undisputed facts show that there was no injury caused to

Plaintiff by Kern County, Kern County Sheriff’s Department, or

Sheriff Wimbish. Acebedo, the only Kern County employee present

during Plaintiff’s arrest, had no physical contact with Plaintiff

and has been dismissed from this case without prejudice. There

are no facts to indicate any liability under California

Government Code § 815.2.

Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to the claims under Cal.Gov.

Code § 815.2. 

6. CONCLUSION

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Sheriff

Wimbash is GRANTED. 

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Kern County

and Kern County Sheriff’s Department is GRANTED. 

Said Defendants’ motion for summary judgment of Plaintiff’s

claim under The Constitution of the State of California, Article

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1 § 7 is GRANTED. 

Said Defendants’ motion for summary judgment of Plaintiff’s

claim under The Constitution of the State of California, Article

1 § 13 is GRANTED. 

Said Defendants’ motion for summary judgment of Plaintiff’s

California Government Code § 815.2 claim is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 3, 2006 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

dd0l0 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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