Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_11-cv-08206/USCOURTS-azd-3_11-cv-08206-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Petition to Quiet Title

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Patrick Liewer and Violet R. Liewer,

Husband and Wife, 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

Bank of America, N.A., et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-11-8206-PHX-GMS

ORDER

Pending before the Court are Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiffs’ Motion

to Amend Complaint. (Docs. 12, 19). For the reasons stated below, Defendants’ motion is

granted and Plaintiffs’ motion is denied.

BACKGROUND

On November 15, 2011, Plaintiffs, proceeding pro se, filed a complaint in Mohave

County Superior Court. (Doc. 1-1). Although the complaint was titled “Quiet Title” in its

caption, it contained only one count, for Breach of Contract. (Id.). On December 19, 2011,

Defendants removed the case to the District Court of Arizona pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332

(2006). (Doc. 1). Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on January 9, 2012, and Plaintiffs

responded by moving to amend the complaint. (Docs. 12, 19). Defendants responded that the

Court should deny the motion to amend and dismiss the complaint because amendment

would be futile. (Doc. 21). Plaintiffs did not file a timely reply to Defendants’ response to

the motion to amend.

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DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard

To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain more than “labels and conclusions” or a

“formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action”; it must contain factual allegations

sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). While “a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations

. . . it must plead ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Clemens v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 534 F.3d 1017, 1022 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly,

550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550

U.S. at 556). The plausibility standard “asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant

has acted unlawfully.” When a complaint does not “permit the court to infer more than the

mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not shown—that the

pleader is entitled to relief.”Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (internal quotation omitted).

A plaintiff may amend a complaint once as a matter of course within 21 days of

serving it. FED.R.CIV.P. 15(a)(1)(A). After 21 days, a plaintiff may only amend a complaint

with the court’s permission. Although the court “should freely give leave when justice so

requires,” leave to amend may be denied if amendment is futile. FED.R.CIV.P. 15(a)(2); see

Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[W]e affirmed the district court’s

denial of a motion for leave to amend because the proffered amendments would be nothing

more than an exercise in futility.”).

II. Analysis

As detailed in their proposed Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs borrowed $245,000 from

Countrywide in exchange for a Promissory Note (the “Note”) secured by a Deed of Trust (the

“DOT”), which named Recontrust as trustee and MERS as the beneficiary. (Doc. 19-1, ¶¶

3–6). At some point, Defendants received communications first from Defendant Bank of

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America and later from Defendant Seterus, Inc. (“Seterus”) that each was entitled to payment

on the loan; Seterus wrote that it was not in possession of any agreements between Bank of

America and Fannie Mae, which Seterus described as the current beneficiary. (Doc. 19-1, ¶¶

9–14). Plaintiffs state that “no named defendant has produced written or verbal proof

clarifying who is the rightful beneficiary and recipient of payments of the September 2007

deed of trust.” (Doc. 19-1 ¶ 15).

Despite the prohibition set forth in LRCiv. 15.1, the Amended Complaint attempts to

incorporate the Breach of Contract claim from the original complaint, which reads, in its

entirety, “The parties entered into a contract for the services of a home modification, which

the Defendant’s has [sic] materially breached.” (Doc. 1-1 ¶ 24). Plaintiffs do not state what

terms of the Note—if the Note is indeed the contract to which this phrase refers—any

Defendant breached, and do not state which Defendant breached them. It does not provide

or reference any contract which requires any of the named Defendants to “produce[ ] written

or verbal proof clarifying who is the rightful beneficiary and recipient of payments of the

September 2007 deed of trust.” (Doc. 19-1 ¶ 15). “To bring an action for the breach of the

contract, the plaintiff has the burden of proving the existence of the contract, its breach and

the resulting damages.” Graham v. Asbury, 112 Ariz. 184, 185, 540 P.2d 656, 657 (1975).

Even taking all of the allegations in the Amended Complaint as true, Plaintiffs have not pled

any facts suggesting that a term of a contract was breached or that they were damaged

thereby. Count One is dismissed.

Plaintiffs ask the Court to quiet title “as to the correct, current beneficiary under the

deed of trust as alleged.” (Doc. 19-1 at 3). They do not claim an interest in the property

themselves, and in fact claim that Recontrust was “the undisputed trustee under the

September 2007 deed of trust.” (Doc. 19-1 at 3). A quiet title claim may only be brought “by

any one having or claiming an interest therein, whether in or out of possession, against any

person or the state when such person or the state claims an estate or interest in the real

property which is adverse to the party bringing the action.” Arizona Revised Statutes

(“A.R.S.”) § 12-1101(A). Plaintiffs have not alleged that they have an interest in the

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property, have not alleged that any person is claiming an interest adverse to theirs, and have

produced no theory by which they could bring suit to quiet title on behalf of a third party.

The Quiet Title claim is dismissed.

Even as amended, Plaintiffs’ complaint does not plead “enough facts to state a claim

to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Since granting leave to

amend “would be nothing more than an exercise in futility,” Plaintiffs’ motion to amend is

denied and Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted. Bonin, 59 F.3d at 845.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 12) is granted.

2. Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend (Doc. 19) is denied.

3. The Clerk of Court shall terminate this lawsuit.

DATED this 17th day of May, 2012.

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