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Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

8 JAVONLAMAR TORBERT, Case No.: 3:14-cv-02911-BEN-NLS 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT 

9 Plaintiff, 

10 V. 

11 WILLIAM GORE, et al., 

12 Defendants. [Doc No. 214] 

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14 Plaintiff Javon Lamar Torbert ("Plaintiff'), formerly a state prisoner, brings the 

15 instant pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that he was subjected to excessive 

16 force by San Diego County Sheriff's Deputy James Dailly ("Defendant") on October 2, 

17 2014. 

18 Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment to which no response was filed 

19 by Plaintiff. After review of this Motion, the Court finds that the Motion for Summary 

20 Judgment should be granted. 

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PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

Initially, this action involved multiple incidents, numerous theories, and multiple 

23 Defendants. (Doc. No. 214 at 1.) However, Defendants brought a motion for summary 

24 judgment which was partially granted by dismissing all the claims, with the exception of 

25 the § 1983 excessive force claim against Defendant. Id. The excessive force claim was 

26 later dismissed, only to be reinstated by the Ninth Circuit after Plaintiff appealed the 

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I. 

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1 dismissal of his claims. 1 Id. Following Defendant's initial motion for summary 

2 judgment, the Supreme Court issued a series of decisions in 201 7, 2018, and 2019, 

3 addressing and clarifying the doctrine of qualified immunity in the context of excessive 

4 force by law enforcement. 2 

5 FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

6 Plaintiff's remaining claim for excessive force arises out of an incident occurring 

7 on October 2, 2014, at the Vista Detention Center when Defendant closed a cell door that 

8 allegedly hit Plaintiff's left forearm. Video footage captured the incident. 

9 On the day of the incident, Plaintiff was causing tension in Medical Ward 2, where 

10 he was being housed with other inmates. Specifically, Plaintiff was yelling and 

11 disturbing the other inmates while he paced back and forth on the ward without the use of 

12 his cane. In response to Plaintiffs actions, Deputy Estrada told Plaintiff to gather his 

13 belongings so that he could be moved to a different cell. When Plaintiff refused to 

14 submit to handcuffing through the cell door, Deputies Dailly and McMahon entered 

15 Medical Ward 2 in order to calm and escort Plaintiff to the medical isolation cell. Due to 

16 Plaintiffs threats and unpredictable behavior, Deputy Dailly picked up Plaintiffs cane 

17 (which had been hanging on his bunk bed) as a safety precaution to ensure Plaintiff did 

18 not use it as a weapon. As the Plaintiff gathered his belongings, he continued to threaten 

19 the deputies causing additional deputies being summoned to assist with the Plaintiffs 

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23 The Ninth Circuit held that when "[v]iewing the evidence in Torbert's favor, a fact 

question remains as to whether defendant Dailly's use of force was excessive even if 

24 Torbert's injuries were not lasting and significant. See Kinglsey, 135 S. Ct. at 2473; 

25 Martinez, 323 F.3d at 1184; see also Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010) (per 

curiam) (reversing a dismissal based on 'the supposedly de minimis nature of [the 

inmate's] injuries'). We reverse the judgment in part and remand for further proceedings 

27 on the excessive force claim against defendant Dailly only." (See Doc. No. 212) 

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2 These cases included: White v. Pauly, 13 7 S. Ct. 548 (20 i 7), Kise la v. Hughes, 13 8 28 S. Ct. 1148 (2018), and City of Escondido, Cal. v. Emmons, 139 S. Ct. 500 (2019). 

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1 transfer. 3 A couple minutes later, several other deputies arrived in Medical Ward 2. 

2 With the other deputies present, Defendant returned Plaintiff's cane so he could use it to 

3 walk to the medical isolation cell. 

4 When they reached the medical isolation cell, Plaintiff faced the wall opposing the 

5 door while Defendant unlocked the door. With the door open, Plaintiff turned and began 

6 to walk into the cell. The video footage shows that as Plaintiff entered the new cell, his 

7 arm remained outstretched-either maintaining a grasp on the cane or trying to reach for 

8 the cane that Defendant had in his own grasp-when Defendant closed the cell door. 

9 Defendant declares that he sought to take the cane as he was concerned Plaintiff might 

10 use it as a weapon. It appears the door hit the cane handle or part of Plaintiff's 

11 appendage prior to latching. The door moved forward to close, slightly retreated 

12 backward upon coming into contact with something, and then resumed its forward travel 

13 and latched. Defendant appeared to use average force to close the cell door. The incident 

14 took place over three seconds. 

15 Plaintiff states that, as a result of the door hitting him, his forearm was swollen and 

16 his fingers could not squeeze anything. He pushed the emergency button for help. 

17 Deputy McMahon and Dr. Alfred Joshua, Chief Medical Officer of the San Diego 

18 Sherriff' s Department, declare that medical staff was unable to treat Plaintiff that night 

19 because he was acting unpredictably. However, Defendant provided Plaintiff with three 

20 Tylenol that evening. 

21 The next morning, on October 3, 2014, Dr. Martinez examined Plaintiff's forearm 

22 and ordered an X-ray to rule out a fracture. On October 4, 2014, Plaintiff complained of 

23 chest pain and was taken to Tri-City Medical Center. Cardiac tests were negative, and X24 ray images of his left wrist and forearm were negative for fractures. At the time, Plaintiff 

25 was taking three pain medications. He received a sling for his arm. 

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3 · Deputies McMahon and Estrada declared that Plaintiff had said they would need 

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more deputies to assist with Plaintiff's transfer, which they perceived to be a threat. 

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1 On October 7, 2014, a jail nurse examined Plaintiff and noted that he was able to 

2 move his left fingers and that he remained on pain medications. Fifteen days after the 

3 incident, on October 17, 2014, Dr. Serra examined Plaintiff and noted that he was no 

4 longer taking two of the three pain medications. That same day, Deputy Brown observed 

5 Plaintiff doing pull-ups and push-ups in the medical housing unit. He warned Plaintiff 

6 that working out is not permitted in the medical ward. Deputy Brown prepared a report 

7 detailing the incident. 

8 On October 21, 2014, Dr. Sadler examined Plaintiff, the fourth physician to 

9 examine his forearm. Plaintiff requested a referral to a neurologist for nerve damage to 

10 his arm, which Dr. Sadler thought unwarranted given her exam of him. Medical records 

11 indicate that Plaintiff complained that his left elbow had been hurting since he started 

12 doing push-ups. Plaintiff sought pain medication but refused Motrin. Dr. Sadler noted 

13 that Plaintiff showed decreased strength in his left arm but suspected it was due to poor 

14 effort on Plaintiffs part. The records also indicate that Plaintiff had been using his left 

15 hand spontaneously and was using his arm without difficulty when not being examined. 

16 LEGAL STANDARD 

17 A. Summary Judgment. 

18 Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery, and affidavits show 

19 that there is "no genuine dispute as to any material fact and [that] the moving party is 

20 entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A court will grant 

21 summary judgment "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish 

22 the existence of an element essential to that party's case necessarily renders all of their 

23 facts immaterial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). A fact is 

24 material if it might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law, and a dispute 

25 about a material fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could 

26 return a verdict for the nonrnoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 

27 242, 248 (1986). 

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1 Generally, the moving party bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of 

2 the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. The burden 

3 then shifts to the nonmoving party to "go beyond the pleadings and by [his or her] own 

4 affidavits, or by the 'depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' 

5 designate 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."' Celotex, 4 77 

6 U.S. at 324 (citations omitted). 

7 A verified complaint may be used as an opposing affidavit under Rule 56, as long 

8 as it is based on personal knowledge and sets forth specific facts admissible in evidence. 

9 See Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454,460 & nn.10-11 (9th Cir. 1995) (treating 

10 plaintiffs verified complaint as opposing affidavit where, even though verification not in 

11 conformity with 28 U.S.C. § 1746, plaintiff stated under penalty of perjury that contents 

· 12 were true and correct, and allegations were not based purely on his belief but on his 

13 personal knowledge). Here, Plaintiffs Complaint was signed "under penalty of perjury" 

14 and therefore is considered as evidence for purposes of deciding the motion. 

15 The court's function on a summary judgment motion is not to make credibility 

16 determinations nor to weigh conflicting evidence with respect to a disputed material fact. 

17 See T. W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass 'n, 809 F .2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 

18 1987). The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, 

19 and the inferences to be drawn from the facts must be viewed in a light most favorable to 

20 the nonmoving party. Id. at 631. 

21 B. Qualified Immunity. 

22 The defense of qualified immunity protects "government officials ... from liability 

23 for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or 

24 constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. 

25 Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The doctrine of qualified immunity attempts to 

26 balance two important and sometimes competing interests: "the need to hold public 

27 officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield 

28 officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties 

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1 reasonably." Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). The doctrine thus intends 

2 to take into account the real-world demands on officials in order to allow them to act 

3 "swiftly and firmly" in situations where the rules governing their.actions are often 

4 "voluminous, ambiguous, and contradictory." Mueller v. Auker, 576 F.3d 979, 993 (9th 

5 Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). "The purpose of this doctrine is to recognize that holding 

6 officials liable for reasonable mistakes might unnecessarily paralyze their ability to make 

7 difficult decisions in challenging situations, thus disrupting the effective performance of 

8 their public duties." Id. 

9 To determine whether a government official is entitled to qualified immunity, 

10 courts must consider (1) whether the official's conduct violated a constitutional right, and 

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11 (2) whether that right was "clearly established" at the time of the alleged misconduct. 

12 Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232. 

13 "An officer cannot be said to have violated a clearly established right unless the 

14 right's contours were sufficiently definite that any reasonable official in [his] shoes 

15 would have understood that he was violating it, meaning that existing precedent ... 

16 placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate." City and County of San 

17 Francisco, Calv. Sheehan, - U.S.-, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1774 (2015) (alteration and 

18 omission in original; citation omitted). This is an "exacting standard" which "gives 

19 government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments by 

20 protect[ing] all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Id. 

21 (alteration in original; internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, a district court 

22 may address these questions in the order most appropriate to "the circumstances in the 

23 particular case at hand." Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236, 242 (2009). Thus, if a 

24 court determines that Plaintiffs allegations do not support a statutory or constitutional 

25 violation, "there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity." 

26 Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194,201 (2001). 

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DISCUSSION 

Defendant moves for summary judgment in his favor on Plaintiffs section § 1983 

3 excessive force claim on the ground that he is entitled to qualified immunity. Because 

4 Plaintiff cannot identify any case law or other authority in existence at the time of the 

5 incident that would have alerted Defendant to the illegality of his actions, Defendant 

6 Dailly is entitled to qualified immunity. 

7 A. Fails to Identify Clearly Established Law Before October 2, 2014. 

8 "A clearly established right is one that is sufficiently clear that every reasonable 

9 official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right." Jsayeva v. 

10 Sacramento Sheriff's Dep 't, 872 F.3d 938, 946 (9th Cir. 2017) ( quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 

11 - U.S.-, 136 S. Ct. 305,308 (2015)). "This is not to say that an official action is 

12 protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question has previously been 

13 held unlawful[.]" Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (quoting Anderson v. 

14 Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 {1987)) ( denying qualified immunity to prison guards who 

15 handcuffed an inmate to a hitching post as punishment, even though no earlier cases had 

16 materially similar facts). 

1 7 Plaintiff has not identified any clearly established Supreme Court or Ninth Circuit 

18 case law prior to the October 2, 2014 incident. No cases held or suggested that deputies 

19 in a correctional setting dealing with a threatening and agitated inmate cannot remove a 

20 cane and confine that inmate by quickly closing a cell door. No cases held that closing a 

21 cell door would result in a violation of a detainee' s constitutional rights, even if the 

22 inmate's hand were to get struck by the door. 

23 The Court finds Defendant's argument to be sound. Defendant found no factually 

24 analogous precedent in the Ninth Circuit either. However, Defendant cites decisions 

25 from several other circuits that addressed similar force in similar situations, finding the 

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1 force used in those situations did not violate the Eighth Amendment.4 Id. at 9-10. For 

2 example, in Outlaw v. Newkirk, 259 F.3d 833 (2001), the Seventh Circuit found that a 

3 similar incident, involving the closing of a door on a prisoner's hand, was not a violation 

4 of the Eighth Amendment and the officer was entitled to summary judgment.5 Id. at 9. 

5 This shows that a reasonable officer in Deputy Dailly's position, with an absence of 

6 precedent in the Ninth Circuit, would reasonably believe that similar force used in this 

7 case was constitutionally permissible. Id. at 10. Third, "generic arguments such as those 

8 based on the general proposition that a prison official who uses force against an inmate 

9 without provocation may violate the Eighth Amendment or that Defendant Dailly 

10 violated Plaintiffs right under the Eighth Amendment as established in Hudson, 503 U.S. 

11 at 6-7, are wholly insufficient and should be disregarded."6 Id. at 8. Thus, it is clear that 

12 "there was, and is, no clearly established law that would have put Defendant on notice 

13 that closing a door against an unrestrained and agitated inmate who is attempting to 

14 maintain hold of a weapon would violate the Eighth Amendment." Id. at 11. Therefore, 

15 Defendant's assertion of qualified immunity is valid since he was not "on notice" that 

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19 4 Several decisions that involved allegations that correctional officer improperly 

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crushed a hand or foot in a door have resulted in dismissals on the grounds that no 

constitutional violation occurred. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Wiegel, No. 13-cv-285-jdp, 2014 

WL 4265838 (W.D. Wis. 2014); Robinson v. Karnes, No. 2:02-CV-0246, 2003 WL 

22137176 (N.D. Tex. 2003). (Doc. No. 214 at 10.) 

5 "The court found that the closing of the door was warranted by the security 

concerns presented by prior instances of inmaters occasionally throwing harmful objects 

through the door, and prior attempts by prisoners to grab guards through the cuff ports, 24 both which present a hazard to the guards. Further, the court found that the injuries of 

swelling, tenderness, and discoloration and an inability to move two fingers was a minor 

injury indicating the force used was de minimus and did not rise to the level of an Eighth 26 Amendment violation." (Doc. No. 214 at 10.) 

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27 6 "These types of arguments are exactly the type of 'high level of generality' 

rejected by the Supreme Court in 'White v. Pauly, 13 7 S. Ct. 548 (2017). "' (Doc. No. 28 214 at 8.) 

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1 closing the cell door, forcefull or not, was "clearly unlawful." Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 

2 194, 202 (2001 ). 

3 B. Violation of a Constitutional Right. 

4 As discussed above, the Plaintiffs allegation does not support a finding of a 

5 statutory violation by identifying clearly established law prior to October 2, 2014, which 

6 demonstrates the Defendant's actions were constitutionally impermissible. Accordingly, 

7 there is no necessity for further inquiry concerning qualified immunity. 

8 CONCLUSION 

9 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. The Plaintiffs claim 

10 against the Defendant is hereby dismissed. 

11 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

12 DATED: Janua6.Q, 2020 

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