Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00032/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00032-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:0405wc Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LESTER ROGER DUNCAN, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v.

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

Case No.: 3:17-cv-00032-H-NLS

ORDER:

(1)DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT; and 

[Doc. No. 14]

(2)GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

CROSS-MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

 [Doc. Nos. 19, 20]

On January 9, 2017, Lester Roger Duncan, Jr., (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against 

Defendant Nancy A. Berryhill, Acting Commissioner of Social Security (“the 

Commissioner” or “Defendant”), seeking judicial review of an administrative denial of 

disability benefits under the Social Security Act (“the Act”). (Doc. No. 1.) On April 8, 

2017, Defendant filed an answer to Plaintiff’s complaint, as well as the administrative 

record soon thereafter. (Doc. Nos. 11, 12.) On May 26, 2017, Plaintiff filed a motion for 

summary judgment, requesting that the Court reverse the Commissioner’s final decision 

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and remand the case for further administrative proceedings. (Doc. No. 14.) On August 8, 

2017, Defendant cross-moved for summary judgment, requesting that the Court affirm the 

Commissioner’s final decision. (Doc. Nos. 19, 20.) For the reasons below, the Court 

denies Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, grants Defendant’s cross-motion for 

summary judgment, and affirms the Commissioner’s final decision.

BACKGROUND

On October 9, 2013, Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits, claiming a 

disability onset date of May 29, 2013. (AR 178-79.) The Social Security Administration

(“SSA”) initially denied Plaintiff’s application for benefits on February 13, 2014, and did 

so again upon reconsideration on April 25, 2014. (AR 90, 100.) On May 8, 2014, Plaintiff 

requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (AR 116-17.) On July 

20, 2015, an ALJ held a hearing where Plaintiff appeared with counsel and testified. (AR

44-81.) At the hearing, the ALJ also heard testimony from a vocational expert. (AR 72-

78) 

On September 9, 2015, the ALJ issued a written decision, analyzing Plaintiff’s claim

and determining that Plaintiff had not met his burden of proof. (AR 25-43.) SSA

regulations require ALJs to use the following five-step inquiry when determining whether 

an applicant qualifies for disability benefits: (1) has the claimant been gainfully employed 

since the time of the disability onset date; (2) “is the claimant’s impairment severe”; (3) 

“does the impairment ‘meet or equal’ one of a list of specific impairments described in the 

regulations,” and if not, what is the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”)1

; (4) 

is the claimant capable of performing past relevant work; and (5) “is the claimant able to 

do any other work.” Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 1999); see 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i-v). 

Here, the ALJ determined at step one that the Plaintiff had not been gainfully 

 

1 SSA regulations define residual functional capacity as “the most you can still do despite your 

limitations.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1).

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employed since the disability onset date of May 29, 2013. (AR 27.) At step two, the ALJ

found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: osteoarthritis of the hips, 

degenerative disc disease, high blood pressure, left shoulder impingement, and a history of 

fracture on the left side of his head. (AR 27-32.) At step three, the ALJ concluded that 

Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that amounted to one 

of the SSA regulations’ enumerated impairments. (AR 32-33.) The ALJ then determined 

that Plaintiff had an RFC to perform “light work,” as defined in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(b),

“except he can perform occasional lifting above shoulder level with the nondominant upper 

extremity.” (AR 33.) At step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff could perform past 

relevant work as a dispatcher. (AR 39.) Consequently, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff 

was not disabled from May 29, 2013, the alleged onset date, through September 9, 2015, 

the date of the ALJ’s decision. (Id.)

On November 18, 2016, the Social Security Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s 

request for review, rendering the ALJ’s decision final. (AR 1.) 

LEGAL STANDARDS

A. The Social Security Administration’s Sequential Five-Step Inquiry.

The SSA employs a sequential five-step evaluation to determine whether a claimant 

is eligible for benefits under the Act. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i-v). To qualify for 

disability benefits, a claimant must establish that he or she is “disabled,” meaning that the 

claimant is unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or 

which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 

months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); see Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1432 (9th Cir. 

1995).

Step one in the sequential evaluation considers a claimant’s “work activity, if any.” 

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), 416.920(a)(4)(i). An ALJ will deny a claimant disability 

benefits if the claimant is engaged in “substantial gainful activity.” Id. §§ 404.1520(b),

416.920(b).

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If a claimant cannot provide proof of gainful work activity, the ALJ proceeds to 

step two to ascertain whether the claimant has a medically severe impairment or 

combination of impairments. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). The so-called 

“severity regulation” dictates the ALJ’s step-two analysis. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 

137, 140-41 (1987). Specifically, an ALJ will deny a claimant’s disability claim if the 

ALJ does not find that a claimant suffers from a severe impairment, or combination of 

impairments, which significantly limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to do 

“basic work activities.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c).

If the impairment is severe, however, the evaluation proceeds to step three. At step 

three, the ALJ determines whether the impairment is equivalent to one of several 

enumerated impairments that the SSA deems so severe as to preclude substantial gainful 

activity. Id. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). An ALJ conclusively presumes a claimant is 

disabled if the impairment meets or equals one of the enumerated impairments. Id.

If the ALJ concludes that a claimant does not suffer from one of the SSA

regulations’ enumerated severe impairments, the ALJ must determine the claimant’s RFC

before proceeding to step four of the inquiry. Id. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). An 

individual’s RFC is his or her ability to do physical and mental work activities on a 

sustained basis despite limitations from his or her impairments. See id. §§ 404.1545(a)(1), 

416.945(a)(1). The RFC analysis considers whether the claimant’s “impairment(s), and 

any related symptoms, such as pain, may cause physical and mental limitations that affect 

what [the claimant] can do in a work setting.” Id. In establishing a claimant’s RFC, the 

ALJ must assess relevant medical and other evidence, as well as consider all of the 

claimant’s impairments, including impairments categorized as non-severe. Id.

§§ 404.1545(a)(3-4), (e), 416.945(a)(3-4), (e).

Given the claimant’s RFC, the ALJ determines at step four whether the claimant 

has the RFC to perform the requirements of his or her past relevant work. Id. §§ 

404.1520(f), 416.920(f). If a claimant has the RFC to carry out his or her past relevant 

work, the claimant is not disabled. Id. Conversely, if the claimant does not have the RFC 

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to perform his or her past relevant work, or does not have any past relevant work, the 

analysis presses onward.

At the fifth and final step of the SSA’s inquiry, the ALJ must determine whether 

the claimant is able to do any other work in light of his or her RFC, age, education, and 

work experience. Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), (g)(1), 416.920(a)(4)(v), (g)(1). If the 

claimant is able to do other work, the claimant is not disabled. Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), 

416.920(a)(4)(v). However, if the claimant is not able to do other work and meets the 

duration requirement of twelve months, the claimant is disabled. Id. Although the 

claimant generally continues to have the burden of proving disability at step five, a limited 

burden shifts to the SSA, such that the SSA must present evidence demonstrating that 

other jobs the claimant can perform—allowing for RFC, age, education, and work 

experience—exist in significant numbers in the national economy. Tackett, 190 F.3d at 

1099.

B. Standard of Review. 

Unsuccessful applicants for social security disability benefits may seek judicial 

review of a Commissioner’s final decision in a federal district court. See 42 U.S.C. §

405(g). “As with other agency decisions, federal court review of social security 

determinations is limited.” Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1098 

(9th Cir. 2014). The court will “disturb the Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits ‘only 

if it is not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error.’” Id. (quoting 

Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995)). “Substantial evidence means 

more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Bray v. Comm’r of 

Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1222 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1039). 

The Court must consider the record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports 

and the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner’s determination. Garrison v. Colvin, 

759 F.3d 995, 1009 (9th Cir. 2014). “Where the evidence as a whole can support either a 

grant or a denial, [a court] may not substitute [its] judgment for the ALJ’s.” Bray, 554 F.3d 

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at 1222 (quoting Massachi v. Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 2007)). “The ALJ is 

responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and for 

resolving ambiguities.” Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1010 (quoting Shalala, 53 F.3d at 1039).

Even if the ALJ commits legal error, a reviewing court will uphold the decision 

where that error is harmless—that is, where the error is “inconsequential to the ultimate 

nondisability determination.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(citation omitted). “[T]he burden of showing that an error is harmful normally falls upon 

the party attacking the agency’s determination.” Id. at 1111 (quoting Shinseki v. Sanders, 

556 U.S. 396, 409 (2009)). 

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on three grounds, arguing that: (1) the ALJ 

improperly evaluated Plaintiff’s alleged mental impairment by failing to apply the de 

minimis standard; (2) substantial evidence did not support the ALJ’s RFC determination 

because the ALJ omitted consideration of Plaintiff’s alleged mental impairment and did 

not accept state agency experts’ opinions regarding Plaintiff’s alleged limitations related 

to his mental impairment; and (3) the ALJ improperly made an adverse credibility 

determination against Plaintiff. (Doc. No. 14.) Defendant cross-moves for summary 

judgment on three grounds, namely that: (1) the ALJ appropriately evaluated Plaintiff’s 

mental impairment by applying the “special technique”; (2) the ALJ was not required to 

include Plaintiff’s alleged mental impairment in the RFC assessment and properly 

evaluated the experts’ opinions; and (3) substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s 

credibility determination. (Doc. No. 19.) For the following reasons, the Court denies 

Plaintiff’s summary judgment motion and grants Defendant’s cross-motion.

A. The ALJ Properly Evaluated Plaintiff’s Mental Impairment as NonSevere Pursuant to the Special Technique.

Plaintiff claims that the ALJ erred by failing to apply the de minimis standard when 

evaluating Plaintiff’s alleged mental impairment. (Doc. No. 14-1 at 5-6.) Defendant 

argues that the ALJ correctly applied the “special technique.” (Doc. No. 19-1 at 7.)

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The ALJ determines whether the claimant has any severe physical or mental 

impairments at step two of the disability evaluation. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098-99; see also

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.920(a)(4)(ii). In evaluating the severity of mental 

impairments, specifically, the ALJ must follow the special technique—not simply the de 

minimis test. See id. § 404.1520a(a); Keyser v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 648 F.3d 721, 

725 (9th Cir. 2011). The special technique is used to: (1) “Identify the need for additional 

evidence to determine impairment severity; (2) Consider and evaluate functional 

consequences of the mental disorders relevant to [the claimant’s] ability to work; and (3) 

Organize and present [the SSA’s] findings in a clear, concise, and consistent manner.” 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520a(a)(1)-(3).

Under the special technique, the ALJ first evaluates the objective medical evidence 

to determine whether the claimant has a medically determinable mental impairment. Id. § 

404.1520a(b)(1). If the ALJ determines that there is a medically determinable mental 

impairment, the next step is to rate the degree of functional limitation resulting from that

impairment. Id. § 404.1520a(b)(2). In assessing the degree of functional limitation caused 

by the mental impairment, the ALJ considers how the impairment interferes with the 

following functional areas: (1) activities of daily living; (2) social functioning; (3)

concentration, persistence or pace; and (4) episodes of decompensation. See id. § 

404.1520a(b)(2), (c)(3); 20 C.F.R., pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1 § 12.00; Keyser, 648 F.3d at 

725. The ALJ rates the degree of limitation in each of these areas as either none, mild, 

moderate, marked, or extreme. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(c)(4). If the ALJ rates all of these 

areas with a limitation of either none or mild, then the ALJ may conclude that the mental 

impairment is not severe. See id. § 404.1520a(d)(1).

The ALJ must document the application of the special technique in his or her written 

decision. Id. § 404.1520a(e). This includes incorporating into the decision the pertinent 

findings and medical evidence that support the ALJ’s conclusion about the functional 

limitations resulting from each mental impairment. Id. § 404.1520a(e)(3). Additionally, 

the ALJ must specify his or her findings as to the degree of limitation in each of the 

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functional areas described above. Id. § 404.1520a(e)(4).

Here, in his written decision, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s mood disorder and 

determined that it did not cause more than a minimal limitation. (AR 28-29.) In making 

this finding, the ALJ evaluated the four functional areas detailed in the special technique 

for evaluating mental impairments. (Id.) In each of these functional areas, the ALJ 

assigned no more than a “mild” limitation. (Id.)

In the first functional area, daily living, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had no 

limitations. (AR 28.) Highlighting evidence that Plaintiff was involved in a ten-month 

religious education program, participated in his church community, and had several 

hobbies, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s mental impairment did not restrict his daily 

activities. (Id.) In the second functional area, social functioning, the ALJ determined that

Plaintiff had no limitations. (Id.) Despite Plaintiff’s allegations that he did not function 

generally or leave his apartment, the ALJ determined that the record reflected normal social 

function. (Id.) Plaintiff was heavily involved in his religious community, went on a 

camping trip, and played in a local band. (Id.) The ALJ concluded that, contrary to 

Plaintiff’s testimony, Plaintiff’s mental impairment did not restrict his ability to maintain 

social function. (Id.)

Similarly, in the third functional area—concentration, persistence, or pace—the ALJ 

determined that Plaintiff had no limitations. (AR 28-29.) Although Plaintiff claimed that 

he loses track of time easily, cannot stay focused, and cannot read or check his computer

for more than 10 to 15 minutes at a time, Plaintiff had participated in a ten-month religious 

education program where he was required to attend class five days a week for four hours a 

day, which necessitated reading and preparing for class. (AR 28.) Plaintiff also testified 

that he uses his computer to check emails and do online shopping. (Id.) Based on this 

evidence, as well as on an “unremarkable” mental health examination in March 2015, the 

ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s mental impairment did not restrict his ability to maintain

concentration, persistence, or pace. (AR 28-29.)

In the fourth functional area, decompensation (defined as “temporary increases in 

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symptoms . . . accompanied . . . by difficulties in performing activities of daily living, 

maintaining social relationships, or maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace”), the 

ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s mental impairment had not caused extended episodes of 

decompensation. (AR 29.) 20 C.F.R., pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 12.00. There are no 

indications in the record of hospitalization due to psychiatric or psychological issues. (Id.)

In sum, the ALJ properly evaluated Plaintiff’s alleged mental impairment according 

to the special technique procedure. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a; 20 C.F.R., pt. 404, subpt. 

P, app. 1, § 12.00; Keyser, 648 F.3d at 725. In his written decision, the ALJ evaluated each 

of the four broad functional areas and assigned no limitation to each area. (AR 28-29.) 

Further, the ALJ supported each determination with pertinent evidence from the record.

(Id.) Having determined that Plaintiff’s mood disorder caused no more than a mild 

limitation to each functional area, the ALJ properly concluded that the mental impairment 

was non-severe. (AR 28.) Additionally, in making his determination, the ALJ reviewed

Plaintiff’s treatment history concerning his mood disorder and the opinions of state agency 

medical experts Dr. Sandip Sen and Dr. J. Flock, both of whom considered the impairment 

non-severe. (AR 29-32.) Accordingly, the ALJ correctly applied the appropriate analytical 

framework to evaluate Plaintiff’s mental impairment.

B. Substantial Evidence Supports the ALJ’s Residual Functional Capacity

Determination.

Plaintiff claims that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s RFC 

determination for two reasons: (1) the ALJ erred by failing to incorporate Plaintiff’s mental 

impairment in the RFC, and (2) the ALJ improperly evaluated the medical opinions of the 

state agency psychological experts. (Doc. No. 14-1 at 15-22.) The Court addresses each 

argument in turn.

1. The ALJ Properly Incorporated Plaintiff’s Mental Impairment 

into the RFC and, in the Alternative, Any Error from the ALJ’s 

Failure to Do So Was Harmless.

In determining a claimant’s RFC, the ALJ must assess all relevant medical and nonCase 3:17-cv-00032-H-NLS Document 22 Filed 12/07/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 9 of 16
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medical evidence in addition to any limitations from the claimant’s impairments, including 

impairments categorized as non-severe. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3), (e). Although a nonsevere impairment “standing alone may not significantly limit an individual’s ability to do

basic work activities, it may—when considered with limitations or restrictions due to other 

impairments—be critical to the outcome of a claim. SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *5

(Jul. 2, 1996). 

The ALJ’s RFC assessment is adequate if it captures all of the claimant’s

restrictions that are consistent with the medical record. See Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 

539 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2008). An omission of a non-severe impairment will not

require reversal of the ALJ’s RFC assessment if that omission was harmless, i.e., “where 

the mistake was nonprejudicial to the claimant or irrelevant to the ALJ’s ultimate disability 

conclusion.” See Stout v.Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 2006); 

see also Hurter v. Astrue, 465 F. App’x. 648, 652-53 (9th Cir. 2012) (mem.).

Here, Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred by excluding Plaintiff’s non-severe mental 

impairment from the RFC assessment. In making the RFC determination, the ALJ found 

that Plaintiff has an underlying mental impairment that could reasonably cause the alleged 

symptoms (an inability to concentrate, anxiety, and depression). (AR 36.) But after 

reviewing the evidence, the ALJ found that the record did not support Plaintiff’s statements 

regarding the alleged severity of his symptoms. (AR 34-36.) The ALJ ultimately 

concluded that Plaintiff’s statements were “not fully credible.” (AR 34.) In support of this

credibility determination, the ALJ cited inconsistencies between the alleged severity of 

Plaintiff’s symptoms and Plaintiff’s reported daily activities. (Id.) The ALJ, however, then 

failed to consider explicitly Plaintiff’s non-severe mental impairment in the RFC

determination. (AR 38-39.)

Nevertheless, the Court concludes that the ALJ’s omission of the non-severe mental 

impairment does not require reversal of the RFC assessment because any error was 

harmless. See Hurter, 465 F. App’x. 648 at 652 (citing Stout, 454 F.3d at 1054-55). First, 

the ALJ did discuss Plaintiff’s alleged mental impairment immediately before determining 

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the RFC, (see AR 33-36), all of which appears under a single, RFC-specific heading, (see

AR 33). It is thus reasonable to infer that the ALJ considered, albeit implicitly, Plaintiff’s 

non-severe mental impairment at the time he determined the RFC. Furthermore, earlier in 

his decision, at step two, the ALJ took pains to contrast the “special technique” analysis

(see Section A, supra) with the “more detailed assessment” of mental impairment required 

for the RFC. (See AR 29.) The recognition of this distinction indicates that the ALJ’s later 

analysis of Plaintiff’s mental impairment was designed to address the RFC. (See AR 33-

36.)

Moreover, Plaintiff’s testimony and the medical evidence did not bear out the 

alleged severity of Plaintiff’s symptoms related to the alleged mental impairment. (See

AR 28, 34.) Plaintiff claimed that he suffered from poor concentration, anxiety, and 

depression, (AR 28-29), but he had attended an intensive 10-month religious education 

program and was heavily involved in his religious community. (AR 28.) The evidence 

further indicated that Plaintiff had hobbies, including camping and playing guitar in a local 

band, and that he had been exercising. (AR 28.) The ALJ discussed this evidence in detail 

at step two when classifying Plaintiff’s mental impairment as non-severe, (AR 27-32), and 

did so again at step five, (see AR 35 (“I find the claimant’s ability to participate in the 

aforementioned activities diminishes the credibility of the claimant’s allegations of 

functional limitations.”)). In short, the record did not suggest that Plaintiff’s alleged mental 

impairment limits him beyond the exertional limitations of light work contemplated in the 

RFC. Accordingly, the RFC adequately captures all of Plaintiff’s restrictions that are 

consistent with the medical record. See Stubbs-Danielson, 539 F.3d at 1174. 

Thus, considering the meager evidentiary support for the severity of Plaintiff’s 

symptoms, any error related to the ALJ’s failure to explicitly consider Plaintiff’s mental 

impairment in the RFC determination was harmless, because it was irrelevant to the 

ultimate disability determination. See Stout, 545 F.3d at 1055; Hurter, 465 F. App’x. at 

652-53.

//

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2. The ALJ Properly Evaluated the State Agency Experts’ Medical 

Opinions.

The ALJ will evaluate all received medical opinions in determining the claimant’s 

RFC. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). A medical opinion is a statement from an acceptable

medical source about, inter alia, “what [claimants] can still do despite [their] 

impairment(s).” Id. § 404.1527(a)(1). Generally, the ALJ gives more weight to opinions 

from treating sources than from non-treating sources. Id. § 404.1527(c)(1)-(2). If the 

treating source’s opinion is well supported “by medically acceptable clinical and 

laboratory diagnostic techniques” and is not inconsistent with other evidence in the record, 

then the ALJ may give it controlling weight. Id. § 404.1527(c)(2). In cases where the 

ALJ does not give a treating source controlling weight, non-treating, non-examining 

physicians may provide substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s findings. See Thomas, 

278 F.3d at 957. In determining how much weight to give non-controlling medical 

opinions, the ALJ considers: (1) the extent of the medical examination; (2) how much the 

opinion is supported and explained by evidence in the record; (3) how consistent the 

medical opinion is with the record as a whole; (4) whether the opinion comes from a 

specialist; and (5) other factors that support or contradict the medical opinion. See 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1527 (c)(1)-(6). The ALJ must consider evidence from prior state agency

medical consultants as appropriate and give weight according to the standards stated 

above. Id. § 404.1513a(b)(1). State agency medical consultants are considered to be 

“highly qualified and experts in Social Security disability evaluation.” Id.

Here, the ALJ gave significant, but not full, weight to the medical opinions of two 

state agency experts: Dr. Sen and Dr. Flocks. (AR 32.) Dr. Sen and Dr. Flocks were the

state agency mental medical consultants in Plaintiff’s case on initial review and on 

reconsideration, respectively. (Id.) Both experts opined that Plaintiff’s mental impairment

imposed mild restrictions on his activities of daily living, ability to maintain social 

functioning, and ability to concentrate, persist, and pace himself. (AR 32, 87, 97.) 

Ultimately, however, both experts opined that the mental impairment was not severe. (AR 

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32, 89, 98.)

The ALJ assigned significant, but not full, weight to the state agency experts’ 

opinions because the experts based their opinions on an incomplete record. (AR 32.) 

Specifically, Plaintiff’s testimony about his daily activities (e.g., Plaintiff’s testimony that 

he was involved in his Church community, attended religious classes, and played in a band)

and additional medical evidence were unavailable at the time the experts opined on 

Plaintiff’s functional limitations. (Id.) This additional evidence was inconsistent with the 

experts’ opinions that Plaintiff had minimal limitations. (Id.) The consistency of a medical 

opinion with the record as a whole is one of the factors that an ALJ considers when 

assigning weight to that opinion. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(3) (“[The ALJ] will evaluate 

the degree to which [non-controlling] medical opinions consider all of the pertinent 

evidence in [the disability] claim.”); id. § 404.1527(c)(4) (“Generally, the more consistent 

a medical opinion is with the record as a whole, the more weight [the ALJ] will give to that 

medical opinion.”). Because the state agency experts’ medical opinions were inconsistent 

with the later-obtained evidence of Plaintiff’s level of functioning and daily activities, the

ALJ properly assigned significant, but not full weight, to the experts’ opinions.

Nevertheless, Plaintiff claims that, because the ALJ assigned significant weight to 

the state agency experts’ opinions, the ALJ cannot exclude from the RFC the experts’

opinions that Plaintiff had mild limitations. (AR 19.) This argument is without merit.

It is the ALJ’s task to sort through “conflicting clinical evidence, stat[e] his 

interpretation thereof, and mak[e] findings,” which the ALJ did here. Reddick v. Chater, 

157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir.1998). The ALJ clearly explained that certain portions of the 

state agency experts’ opinions were consistent with the record as a whole, including 

Plaintiff’s “limited mental health treatment and lack of objective findings to corroborate 

his alleged mental symptoms and limitations,” while other portions were not—to wit, the 

experts’ conclusions regarding Plaintiff’s alleged functional limitations. (AR 32.) It was 

proper to award less than full weight to the inconsistent portions of the experts’ opinions.

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(3), (4). And to the extent that portions of the state agency 

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experts’ opinions conflict with the RFC assessment, the ALJ adequately explained why the 

conflicting portions were not adopted. See SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *7; Reddick 

v. Chater, 157 F.3d at 725. 

Accordingly, there was no error in excluding from the RFC determination the state 

agency experts’ opinion regarding Plaintiff’s mild functional limitations. The Court 

concludes that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination of Plaintiff’s RFC.

C. Substantial Evidence Supports the ALJ’s Credibility Determination.

Plaintiff claims that, in determining the credibility of Plaintiff’s testimony, the ALJ 

improperly failed to consider Plaintiff’s “stellar” work history. (Doc. No. 14-1 at 22.) 

The Court concludes, however, that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s credibility 

determination. (AR 31, 34-36.)

“In assessing the credibility of a claimant’s testimony regarding subjective pain or 

the intensity of symptoms, the ALJ engages in a two-step analysis.” Molina v. Astrue, 

674 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). The ALJ must initially determine whether there is 

“objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment which could reasonably be 

expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.” Id. (citation omitted).

When an [ALJ] determines that a claimant for Social Security benefits is not 

malingering and has provided objective medical evidence of an underlying 

impairment which might reasonably produce the pain or other symptoms [he 

or] she alleges, the ALJ may reject the claimant’s testimony about the severity 

of those symptoms only by providing specific, clear, and convincing reasons 

for doing so.

Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 488-89 (9th Cir. 2015). The ALJ may consider 

the factors listed in Social Security Ruling 88-13, which include:

1. The nature, location, onset, duration, frequency, radiation, and intensity of 

any pain; 2. Precipitating and aggravating factors (e.g., movement, activity, 

environmental conditions); 3. Type, dosage, effectiveness, and adverse sideeffects of any pain medication; 4. Treatment, other than medication, for relief 

of pain; 5. Functional restrictions; and 6. The claimant’s daily activities.

Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 2005).

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To permit meaningful judicial review of a credibility determination, the ALJ must 

“specify which testimony [he or she] finds not credible, and then provide clear and 

convincing reasons supported by evidence in the record to support that credibility 

determination.” Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 488-89. If the ALJ provides some valid 

reasons, the court will uphold the ALJ’s credibility determination. See Carmickle v. 

Comm’r, SSA, 533 F.3d 1155, 1162 (9th Cir. 2008) (explaining ALJ’s citation to 

erroneous reasons is harmless if the “ALJ’s remaining reasoning and ultimate credibility 

determination were adequately supported by substantial evidence in the record”)

(emphasis omitted).

Here, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s testimony about the severity of his 

symptoms was not credible because it was inconsistent with Plaintiff’s reported daily 

activities and treatment history. (AR 34.) Plaintiff testified that he rarely leaves his 

apartment and has trouble concentrating and keeping track of time. (AR 28, 62-63.) But

Plaintiff also testified that he attended religious classes, plays in a band, and is actively 

involved in his church community. (AR 28-29, 66, 69-71, 471.) The ALJ properly 

considered Plaintiff’s reported daily activities when evaluating the credibility of Plaintiff’s 

testimony. See Burch, 400 F.3d at 680. Additionally, the medical records show that, after 

being prescribed medication for his mood disorder, Plaintiff began feeling better. (AR 

272-74, 295-96, 321-22.) Medication, treatments, and other methods of alleviating 

symptoms are factors the ALJ may take into account when evaluating Plaintiff’s credibility 

regarding his symptoms’ severity. 20 C.F.R § 404.1529(c)(3)(iv), (v). The ALJ also 

discussed Plaintiff’s inconsistent statements regarding the reason why he claimed he was 

unable to work. (AR 31.)

Accordingly, because the ALJ stated specific, valid reasons for discrediting 

Plaintiff’s testimony, the Court affirms the ALJ’s credibility determination. See

Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1162. The fact that the ALJ did not consider Plaintiff’s work history 

does not disturb that conclusion.

//

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that (1) the ALJ properly evaluated 

Plaintiff’s mental impairment as non-severe pursuant to the special technique, (2)

substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC determination, and (3) substantial evidence 

supports the ALJ’s credibility determination. Therefore, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s 

motion for summary judgment, GRANTS Defendant’s cross-motion for summary 

judgment, and AFFIRMS the ALJ’s order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 7, 2017

 

MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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