Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03729/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03729-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition For Removal--Other Contract

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KEVIN JANDA, et al.

Plaintiffs,

 v.

T-MOBILE, USA, INC.,

Defendant.

 /

No. C 05-03729 JSW

NOTICE OF TENTATIVE

RULING AND QUESTIONS

TO ALL PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, PLEASE TAKE

NOTICE OF THE FOLLOWING TENTATIVE RULING AND QUESTIONS FOR THE

HEARING SCHEDULED ON JANUARY 20, 2006:

The Court has reviewed the parties’ memoranda of points and authorities and, thus, does

not wish to hear the parties reargue matters addressed in those pleadings. If the parties intend to

rely on authorities not cited in their briefs, they are ORDERED to notify the Court and opposing

counsel of these authorities reasonably in advance of the hearing and to make copies available at

the hearing. If the parties submit such additional authorities, they are ORDERED to submit the

citations to the authorities only, without argument or additional briefing. See N.D. Civil Local

Rule 7-3(d). The parties will be given the opportunity at oral argument to explain their reliance

on such authority. The parties shall not file written responses to the questions posed in this

notice.

The Court tentatively GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendant’s

motion. As to Plaintiff Janda, the Court tentatively DENIES the motion on the ground that the

class waiver provision is not enforceable and, thus, by the terms of the arbitration provision the

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matter shall not be arbitrated. As to Plaintiff Singh, the Court tentatively DENIES the motion

to dismiss and tentatively GRANTS the motion to compel, but will tentatively strike the class

waiver provision from the arbitration clause. The Court further tentatively DENIES AS

MOOT Plaintiffs’ motion to strike.

The parties each shall have 20 minutes to address the following questions:

1. Is there any question as to this Court’s jurisdiction?

2. Would Plaintiffs agree that any ruling on the motion to compel essentially

renders the motion to strike moot?

3. If, as to Janda, the Court finds the arbitration clause enforceable but only on the

condition that the waiver against class treatment is stricken, is the Court correct

in its understanding that T-Mobile’s position is that the arbitration clause is to be

stricken in its entirety? 

4. Is Chang Exhibit 5 the version of T-Mobile’s terms and conditions applicable to

Singh? For the Court’s benefit, when did the version of T-Mobile’s terms and

conditions that are attached as Chang Exhibit 2 become effective? 

5. This case does not involve stand-alone arbitration agreements. Rather, the

arbitration clauses are contained within T-Mobile’s terms and conditions. How

do Plaintiffs distinguish Nagrampa v. Mailcoups, Inc., 401 F.3d 1024, 1028 (9th

Cir. 2005), in which the Ninth Circuit held that a court’s inquiry into whether

parties have entered into an enforceable arbitration agreement “must ... be

confined to those issues that pertain specifically to the arbitration clause’s

validity. Any issues that relate to the making of the [contract] as a whole must

be referred to an arbitrator.” 

6. T-Mobile argues that because Plaintiffs could choose from a number of wireless

or mobile services, they cannot prove oppression with respect to the arbitration

clause, citing Wayne v. Staples, Inc., 2006 Cal. App. LEXIS 2, * 27 (quoting

Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Superior Court, 211 Cal. App. 3d 758, 768

(1989)). T-Mobile, however, omits the last part of the court’s statement in Dean

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Witter, namely that a “claim of ‘oppression’ may be defeated if the complaining

party has reasonably available sources of supply from which to obtain desired

goods or services free of the terms claimed to be unconscionable.” Apart from

Virgin Mobile, what other wireless services do not have arbitration agreements

that contain a class action waiver clause? 

7. In Discover Bank, the California Supreme Court considered and rejected the

argument that the FAA would preempt a rule against class action waivers

(concluding that “that class action waivers are, under certain circumstances,

unconscionable, as unlawfully exculpatory is a principle of California law that

does not specifically apply to arbitration agreements, but to contracts generally”).

Discover Bank, 30 Cal. 4th at 1112. 

a. Why is the holding of Discover Bank simply not an application of the law

of unconscionability to a particular set of facts rather than the

announcement of a “three part test” applicable only to certain types of

contracts as T-Mobile argues? 

b. What is T-Mobile’s best argument that the principle announced in

Discover Bank “discriminate[s] against arbitration clauses”? See id. at

1113. 

Dated: January 18, 2006 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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