Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00272/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00272-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:0206 Surgeon General - Assignment of Officers

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GILBERTO PAREDES MARTINEZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

Case No.: 13-CV-272 JLS (JLB)

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 

COUNSEL’S MOTION FOR 

ATTORNEY FEES PURSUANT TO 

42 U.S.C. § 406(b)

(ECF No. 28)

Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Gilberto Paredes Martinez’s Counsel Brian C. 

Shapiro’s (“Counsel”) Motion for Attorney Fees Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). (“Pl.’s 

Mot. for Att’y Fees,” ECF No. 28.) Also before the Court is Defendant’s Statement of 

Non-Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees. (ECF No. 29.) Plaintiff has not 

filed a response. Having considered the parties’ arguments and the law, the Court

GRANTS Counsel’s Motion for Fees.

BACKGROUND

On February 4, 2013, Plaintiff filed a complaint pursuant to Section 405(g) of the 

Social Security Act. (Report & Recommendation (“R. & R.”) at 2, ECF No. 21.) Plaintiff 

asked the Court to review the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security 

Administration denying Plaintiff’s claim for social security disability insurance (“SSDI”)

benefits. Id. at 3. Counsel filed the complaint on Plaintiff’s behalf pursuant to a signed 

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contingency-fee agreement providing that Counsel, if successful, would receive 25% of the 

final back pay award. (Pl.’s Mot. for Att’y Fees, Shapiro Decl. ¶ 2; id., Ex. 1, at 1.) On 

September 10, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment regarding his Section 

405(g) claim and on October 1, 2013, Defendant filed a Cross Motion for Summary 

Judgment and Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. & R. at 3.) 

On November 2, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Reply and an Opposition to Defendant’s Cross 

Motion. (Id.)

On August 7, 2014, Magistrate Judge Jill L. Burkhardt issued a Report &

Recommendation finding that the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) committed legal 

error by failing to provide clear and convincing reasons for discrediting Plaintiff’s 

testimony about his pain and limitation symptoms. (Id. at 11.) Magistrate Judge Burkhardt

recommended that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment be denied, Plaintiff’s 

Motion for Summary Judgment be granted in part and denied in part, and the case to be 

remanded for further proceedings. (Id. at 13.) Defendant objected to the R. & R., but on 

September 4, 2014, the Court adopted Magistrate Judge Burkhardt’s R. & R. in its entirety. 

(ECF No. 24.) 

Prior to remand, the parties jointly moved for attorney’s fees pursuant to the Equal 

Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d), in the amount of $4,900, “subject to 

any offset allowed under the United States Department of Treasury’s Offset Program.” 

(ECF No. 25.) The Court granted the Motion. (ECF No. 27.)

On remand, ALJ Robert Iafe issued a decision fully favorable to Plaintiff. (Pl.’s 

Mot. for Att’y Fees, Ex. 2, at 1) On August 27, 2017, the Social Security Administration

(“SSA”) issued a Notice of Award letter to Mr. Paredes Martinez, noting that $42,818 of 

the award had been set aside for potential payment to Mr. Paredes Martinez’s 

representative as attorney’s fees, which constituted 25% of Plaintiff’s past-due benefits. 

(Id. at 4.) Counsel now moves, under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), for attorney’s fees in the amount 

of $25,000 with a credit to Plaintiff for EAJA fees previously paid in the amount of $4,900.

(Pl.’s Mot. for Att’y Fees 1.) 

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LEGAL STANDARD

Section 406(b) governs an attorney’s right to recover fees in a successful Social 

Security case.1 The U.S. Supreme Court has held that,

[m]ost plausibly read, . . . § 406(b) does not displace contingentfee agreements as the primary means by which fees are set for 

successfully representing Social Security benefits claimants in 

court. Rather, § 406(b) calls for court review of such 

arrangements as an independent check, to assure that they yield 

reasonable results in particular cases. Congress has provided one 

boundary line: Agreements are unenforceable to the extent that 

they provide for fees exceeding 25 percent of the past due 

benefits. Within the 25 percent boundary, . . . the attorney for 

the successful claimant must show that the fee sought is 

reasonable for the services rendered.

Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 807 (2002) (footnotes and citations omitted). Thus, 

a district court should first look to the contingency-fee agreement and then test it for 

reasonableness. Id. at 808. 

The Supreme Court has instructed that a reduction of the fee award may be 

appropriate “based on the character of the representation and the results the representative 

achieved.” Id. The Ninth Circuit subsequently explained that when analyzing the 

reasonableness of a fee award a Court “may properly reduce the fee for substandard 

performance, delay, or benefits that are not in proportion to the time spent on the case.” 

 

1 Section 406(b)(1)(A) of title 42 of the United States Code provides:

Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under this 

subchapter who was represented before the court by an attorney, the court 

may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such 

representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the total past-due benefits to 

which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment, and the 

Commissioner of Social Security may, notwithstanding the provisions of 

section 405(i) of this title, but subject to subsection (d) of this section, 

certify the amount of such fee for payment to such attorney out of, and not 

in addition to, the amount of such past-due benefits. In case of any such 

judgment, no other fee may be payable or certified for payment for such 

representation except as provided in this paragraph.

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Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1151 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (citing Gisbrecht, 535 

U.S. at 808). Further, the Supreme Court has explicitly provided that,

[i]n this regard, the court may require the claimant’s attorney to 

submit, not as a basis for satellite litigation, but as an aid to the 

court’s assessment of the reasonableness of the fee yielded by the 

fee agreement, a record of the hours spent representing the 

claimant and a statement of the lawyer’s normal hourly billing 

charge for noncontingent-fee cases. 

Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808; see also Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1151. A district court may 

consider the lodestar calculation, but only as an aid in assessing the reasonableness of the 

fee. Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1151. It is important that the Court assess the reasonableness 

of the requested fees because, “while the attorney’s compensation must be sufficient to 

encourage members of the bar to undertake representation of disability claimants, the 

disability award, from which the attorney’s fee is paid, is normally an already-inadequate 

stipend for the support and maintenance of the claimant and his dependents.” Starr v. 

Bowen, 831 F.2d 872, 873 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting MacDonald v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 

144, 146–47 (9th Cir. 1975)).

The EAJA also permits an attorney to receive fees for successful Social Security 

representations.2 See Parrish v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 698 F.3d 1215, 1216–17 (9th 

Cir. 2012). Fees awarded pursuant to the EAJA are paid by the government rather than the 

claimant. Id. at 1218. Accordingly, while “[f]ee awards may be made under both 

prescriptions, . . . the claimant’s attorney must ‘refun[d] to the claimant the amount of the 

 

2 Pursuant to the EAJA: 

[A] court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees 

and other expenses . . . incurred by that party in any civil action (other than 

cases sounding in tort), including proceedings for judicial review of agency 

action, brought by or against the United States in any court having 

jurisdiction of that action, unless the court finds that the position of the 

United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make 

an award unjust.

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).

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smaller fee.’” Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796 (second alteration in original) (quoting Act of 

Aug. 5, 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-80, § 3, 99 Stat. 186).

ANALYSIS

The Court begins its analysis of the § 406(b) award at issue by examining the 

contingency-fee agreement. Counsel’s requested § 406(b) award is less than the original 

25% contingency-fee agreement between the parties. Plaintiff was awarded $171,272 in 

past-due benefits by SSA. (Pl.’s Mot. for Att’y Fees 2.) The SSA withheld 25% of 

Plaintiff’s past-due benefits—$42,818—and Counsel requests only $25,000 of the 

withholding. At a minimum, the requested award is well within the 25% statutory 

boundary. 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A); Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807. Further, the Court 

concludes that none of the reasons for reducing a fee award identified by the Crawford 

court are applicable in the present case. Counsel obtained a favorable judgment for 

Plaintiff and the record presents no indication of delay. The only remaining consideration 

is whether the benefits secured by Counsel are in proportion to the time spent on the case.

“Since Gisbrecht was handed down by the Supreme Court, the district courts 

generally have been deferential to the terms of contingency fee contracts in § 406(b) cases, 

accepting that the resulting de facto hourly rates may exceed those for non contingencyfee arrangements.” Hearn v. Barnhart, 262 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2003)

(collecting cases). Further, contingency-fee arrangements expose an attorney to the 

inherent “risk of receiving nothing for his time and effort” if the plaintiff is unsuccessful. 

Id.

In the present case, Counsel spent 28.2 hours3litigating the district court appeal, 

(Pl.’s Mot. for Att’y Fees, Shapiro Decl. ¶ 5); assessed against the proposed fee award, this 

amounts to a de facto hourly rate of $886.52 per hour ($25,000 / 28.2 hours) for both 

attorney and paralegal work. While such an hourly rate is on the higher end charged for 

 

3

3.7 hours were billed by Counsel’s paralegal and 24.5 hours were billed by Counsel. (Pl.’s Mot. for Att’y 

Fees, Ex. 4, at 1–2.) 

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social security appeals, the Court nonetheless concludes that the fee is reasonable in the 

present case. Counsel had sixteen years of experience in the field of social security law at 

the time Plaintiff filed his Complaint. (Id. ¶ 7.) Counsel secured a favorable outcome in 

Plaintiff’s district court appeal, ultimately resulting in a fully favorable judgment by the 

SSA ALJ. 

Further, fees within this general range have been previously awarded and upheld by

the Ninth Circuit. See, e.g., Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1153 (Clifton, J., concurring in part and 

dissenting in part) (noting that majority ordered payments in underlying cases that equated 

to $519, $875, and $902 hourly rates). Indeed, Counsel was a party-in-interest to the 

Crawford decision and his requested award was one of those upheld by the Ninth Circuit. 

Id. at 1145 (majority opinion). Next, the benefits are in proportion to the time spent on the 

case. While every case is different, the amount of time spent on this case (24.5 hours by 

Counsel and 3.7 hours by Counsel’s Paralegal) are similar to the underlying cases approved 

in Crawford.

4

 See id. Counsel’s requested attorney’s fee is 14.5% of benefits awarded 

($25,000 requested attorney’s fee / $171,272 back pay awarded). This fee percentage is 

within the range approved in Crawford, see id., as well as less than fee percentages 

previously approved by this Court, see Macewen v. Colvin, No. 10-CV-1263-JLS (MDD), 

2016 WL 6082308, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2016) (approving 25% fee award), and other 

courts in this District. See, e.g., Richardson v. Colvin, No. 15-CV-1456-MMA-BLM, 2017 

WL 1683062, at *2 (S.D. Cal. May 2, 2017) (approving 25% attorney’s fee).

Finally, Counsel took a non-negligible risk in accepting the present case. Plaintiff 

had previously been denied benefits. (R. & R. 1.) There were cross-motions for summary 

judgment during the district court appeal, resulting in a fourteen-page Report and 

Recommendation by Magistrate Judge Burkhardt, (ECF No. 21), and, upon remand, further 

argument before ALJ Iafe. (See Pl.’s Mot. for Att’y Fees, Ex. 3). In sum, this was not a 

 

4 The time spent in the three underlying cases was: 19.5 hours by counsel and 4.5 hours by paralegal in 

Crawford; 17.45 hours by counsel and 4.7 hours by paralegal in Washington; and 26.9 hours by counsel 

and 2.6 hours by paralegal in Trejo. Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1145.

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formulaic case and Counsel’s representation was adequate under the circumstances.

Finally, Counsel requests the Court to order Counsel to reimburse Plaintiff the 

amount of $4,900 previously paid by the SSA under EAJA. This satisfies the requirement 

that counsel refunds its plaintiff an EAJA award that is smaller than the related § 406(b) 

award. See Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796. Counsel’s request meets this requirement. 

Accordingly, the Court concludes that the EAJA award will be deducted from the § 406(b) 

award.

CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that Counsel’s fee request is reasonable 

and therefore GRANTS Counsel’s Motion for Attorney Fees. The Court awards fees in 

the amount of $25,000. Counsel SHALL reimburse Mr. Gilberto Paredes Martinez the 

amount of $4,900 in EAJA fees previously paid by the Government.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 19, 2017

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