Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cv-01807/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cv-01807-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ROBERT “BOSTON” WOODARD, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

JOHN W. HAVILAND, et al., 

Defendant. 

No. CIV. S-11-1807 LKK JFM P 

ORDER 

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding through counsel, has 

filed this civil rights action seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983. The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate 

Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302. 

On February 26, 2013, the magistrate judge filed findings 

and recommendations herein which were served on all parties and 

which contained notice to all parties that any objections to the 

findings and recommendations were to be filed within fourteen 

days. (ECF No. 44.) Plaintiff has filed objections to the 

findings and recommendations. (ECF No. 47.) 

In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1)(C) and Local Rule 304, this court has conducted a de

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novo review of this case. Having carefully reviewed the entire 

file, the court finds the findings and recommendations to be 

partially supported by the record and by proper analysis, as set 

forth herein. 

I. Applicable standard 

Despite plaintiff’s objections to the contrary, the court 

finds that the magistrate judge correctly applied the following 

standard in deciding plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation 

claim: 

Within the prison context, a viable claim of 

First Amendment retaliation entails five 

basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state 

actor took some adverse action against an 

inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner's 

protected conduct, and that such action (4) 

chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First 

Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not 

reasonably advance a legitimate correctional 

goal. 

Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Plaintiff contends that the fifth Rhodes element was 

modified by a later Ninth Circuit decision, Barrett v. Belleque, 

544 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2008).1 In so arguing, plaintiff 

misconstrues Barrett, which addresses the applicable standard for 

evaluating prisoners’ First Amendment claims when prison 

officials censor their outgoing mail. After considering the 

question, the Ninth Circuit held as follows: “[C]ensorship of 

prisoner mail is justified only if the regulation or practice in 

 

1 Plaintiff himself applied the Rhodes standard in his moving 

papers. However, at oral argument, plaintiff argued that the 

less-restrictive Barrett standard should apply, and renewed this 

argument in his objections. (Transcript 2, 5, 24, ECF No. 42; 

Objections 5-7.)

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question furthers an important or substantial governmental 

interest unrelated to the suppression of expression and the 

limitation of First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is 

necessary or essential to the protection of the particular 

governmental interest involved.” Barrett, 544 F.3d at 1062 

(internal quotations and citation omitted). In other words, 

Barrett concerns the circumstances under which prison officials 

may justifiably censor outgoing prisoner mail, while Rhodes 

concerns the circumstances under which prison officials may take 

justifiably take adverse action in response to such mail. As 

plaintiff herein is not arguing that prison officials censored 

his mail, but that they retaliated against him for sending mail, 

Rhodes is controlling. 

Plaintiff’s position is also unsupported by precedent, as 

the Ninth Circuit has applied the Rhodes standard in at least two 

post-Barrett decisions considering First Amendment retaliation 

claims in the prison context. See Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262 

(9th Cir. 2009) (applying Rhodes standard on summary judgment); 

Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2012) (applying Rhodes 

standard on dismissal for failure to state a claim). While the 

facts of Barrett are closer to the situation presented here (both 

Brodheim and Watison involve inmates’ exercise of their First 

Amendment rights to file grievances, while Barrett concerns 

censorship of an inmate’s outgoing mail), this similarity is an 

insufficient basis for applying Barrett as plaintiff wishes. 

In sum, the magistrate judge applied the proper standard in 

making his findings and recommendations regarding plaintiff’s 

retaliation claim. 

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II. Appropriateness of denying partial summary judgment to 

plaintiff 

In deciding plaintiff’s motion, the magistrate judge held — 

correctly, in this court’s view – that writing and mailing an 

article critical of prison staff, which identified certain staff 

members by their first initials and last names, was protected 

activity under the First Amendment. (Findings & Recommendations 

14.) In other words, the third element above (that plaintiff 

engaged in protected conduct) was satisfied. 

According to the findings and recommendations, plaintiff’s 

motion for partial summary judgment raised three remaining, 

interrelated questions: whether plaintiff’s writing activity was 

a “substantial” or “motivating” factor behind defendants’ conduct 

(second element); whether defendants’ actions in placing 

plaintiff in administrative segregation (hereinafter, “Ad-Seg”), 

retaining him in Ad-Seg, and transferring him to a new facility 

were “adverse,” which includes the question of whether the 

exercise of his First Amendment rights was chilled or silenced 

(first and third elements); and whether these actions reasonably 

advanced legitimate correctional goals (fifth element). (Findings 

and Recommendations 12-15.) 

The magistrate judge resolved these questions as follows: 

Defendants contend that they placed plaintiff 

in Ad-Seg and transferred him because the 

article posed a threat to the “safety and 

security” of the institution. In support of 

their motion, they present evidence that 

defendants Ferguson and Bradley were both 

concerned for their safety and the safety of 

their families after they read the article. 

See Ferguson Decl. at ¶ 9; Bradley Decl. at 

¶¶ 10-11. Both defendant Ferguson and 

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defendant Bradley averred that contents of 

the article written about them by plaintiff 

were false. See Ferguson Decl. at ¶ 7; 

Bradley Decl. at ¶ 11. In addition, defendant 

Ferguson averred that “[a]fter reading the 

article, it was apparent to [Ferguson] that 

it would be difficult for me and other staff 

to effectively carry out our duties without 

being accused of retaliation with each 

possible contact with Woodard. Woodard’s 

pattern was to label even routine activities 

of peace officers as retaliation against him 

for his writings.” Ferguson Decl. at ¶ 9. As 

set forth above, these concerns were 

communicated to defendants Brown, Arthur, and 

Haviland. Whether those concerns motivated 

the actions of defendants Ferguson, Bradley, 

Brown, Arthur, and/or Haviland, and whether 

the actions they took served a legitimate 

correctional goal, are disputed by plaintiff 

and not susceptible to resolution at summary 

judgment. (Findings and Recommendations 15.) 

The court is skeptical of defendants’ position. It is 

doubtful whether the safety of prison staff would have been 

reduced in any way if plaintiff had remained in the general 

population at CSP-Solano, as the article in question was publicly 

available, regardless of where, and how, plaintiff was 

incarcerated. It is also doubtful that a fear of “being accused 

of retaliation with each possible contact with Woodard” justifies 

removal to Ad-Seg and/or institutional transfer, as inmates have 

a First Amendment right to file grievances, Brodheim, 584 F.3d at 

1269, and California has procedures for addressing inmates’ abuse 

of the grievance system that are far less extreme than 

administrative segregation or transfer. See, e.g., Cal. Code 

Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.4 (“Appeal System Abuse”). 

Nevertheless, defendants cite to the deposition transcript 

of Associate Warden Brown (a named defendant), who testified that 

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he took the measures in question in part because, “I was 

concerned with [plaintiff’s] safety as I wasn’t sure if there was 

another inmate in the institution who may like these individuals 

[i.e., the prison staff named in plaintiff’s article] and may 

feel it was – take it upon themselves to something to him in 

their own defense.” (Brown Depo. 94:6-10, ECF No. 25-6.) Brown 

also testified that when he met with CSP-Solano’s Institutional 

Classification Committee, he expressed a belief “that there was a 

possibility that either the staff, the inmates or Mr. Woodard 

himself may be – that their security or safety may be compromised 

based on things that came out of this article.” (Brown Depo. 

140:2-7.) These statements are sufficient to create a triable 

issue of material fact as to each of the three questions raised 

by the magistrate judge: specifically, whether plaintiff was sent 

to Ad-Seg and transferred to another prison for his own safety. 

At summary judgment, “the judge does not weigh conflicting 

evidence with respect to a disputed material fact [or] make 

credibility determinations with respect to statements made in 

affidavits . . . or depositions. These determinations are within 

the province of the factfinder at trial . . . . If direct 

evidence produced by the moving party conflicts with direct 

evidence produced by the nonmoving party, the judge must assume 

the truth of the evidence set forth by the nonmoving party with 

respect to that fact.” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc., 809 F.2d at 630-

31. 

Consequently, as defendants have demonstrated a genuine 

dispute as to their motivations in placing plaintiff in Ad-Seg 

and then transferring him to another prison, whether these 

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actions were adverse, and whether these actions reasonably 

advanced a legitimate correctional goal, summary judgment in 

plaintiff’s favor was properly denied. 

III. Summary judgment in favor of defendants Brooks, 

Blackwell, and Rivas 

The magistrate judge recommended that summary judgment be 

entered in favor of defendants Blackwell, Brooks, and Rivas 

because of an absence of evidence showing that each individual’s 

role in effecting plaintiff’s assignment to Ad-Seg and/or 

transferring him to CCC-Susanville was motivated by plaintiff’s 

protected First Amendment conduct. (Findings and Recommendations 

15-16.) 

Motivation is an element of a retaliation claim under 

Section 1983: a plaintiff must show that the adverse action 

occurred “because of” his protected activity. Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 

567-68. According to the Ninth Circuit, “To prevail on a 

retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show that his protected 

conduct was the substantial or motivating factor behind the 

defendant’s conduct. To show the presence of this element on a 

motion for summary judgment, [plaintiff] need only put forth 

evidence of retaliatory motive, that, taken in the light most 

favorable to him, presents a genuine issue of material fact as 

to . . . [defendant’s] intent . . . .” Brodheim, 584 F.3d at 1271 

(internal quotations and citations omitted). 

A. Blackwell 

Defendant Blackwell, a correctional lieutenant at CSPSolano, wrote the Form 114-D order placing plaintiff in Ad-Seg. 

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It provides: 

On July 9, 2009, you, Inmate Woodard, B88207, are being removed from Facility IV 

General Population pending investigation into 

you [sic] publishing information on the 

internet that identifies CSP-Solano staff 

members by name. Therefore, you are being 

removed from Facility IV General Population 

(GP) and placed in Administrative Segregation 

(Ad-Seg). (Decl. Haviland, Attachment 2, ECF 

No. 23-1). 

At deposition, Blackwell testified that, on July 9, 2009, he 

received a phone call from a supervisor who told him to put 

plaintiff in Ad-Seg. (Blackwell Depo. 29:8-13, ECF No. 25-4.) 

Blackwell testified that “[i]f a superior tells you to put an 

inmate in ad seg, you don’t question them.” (Id. 36:5-6.) He 

later added, “I would follow the order of the superior because I 

may not have all the facts.” (Id. 37:22-3.) Despite these 

statements, Blackwell cannot credibly claim that he lacked any 

authority over whether to order plaintiff to Ad-Seg, as the 

applicable regulation provides: 

Authority to order an inmate to be placed in 

administrative segregation, before such 

action is considered and ordered by a 

classification hearing, may not be delegated 

below the staff level of correctional 

lieutenant except when a lower level staff 

member is the highest ranking official on 

duty. 

(a) The reason for ordering an inmate's 

placement in administrative segregation will 

be clearly documented on a CDC Form 114-D 

(Order and Hearing on Segregated Housing) by 

the official ordering the action at the time 

the action is taken. 

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3336 (2012). As section 1336 gave 

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Blackwell the authority to order plaintiff to Ad-Seg, he was not 

acting in a ministerial capacity when he completed the Form 114-

D. In fact, Blackwell conceded that he was “the one with the 

authority to place [plaintiff] in [Ad-Seg].” (Blackwell Depo. 

26:12-13.) Finally, the text of the order makes clear that 

Blackwell was aware that the Ad-Seg order was due to plaintiff’s 

“publishing information on the internet,” i.e., protected 

activity. When taken in the light most favorable to plaintiff 

(the non-moving party), these facts, and the cited regulation, 

are sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to 

whether the protected First Amendment activity was the 

substantial or motivating factor for Blackwell to issue the AdSeg order. 

It is also well-settled that, where inmates engage in 

activities protected under the First Amendment, “the prohibition 

against retaliatory punishment is ‘clearly established law’ in 

the Ninth Circuit, for qualified immunity purposes.” Pratt v. 

Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Schroeder v. 

McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 461 (9th Cir. 1995)); accord Rhodes, 408 

F.3d at 569. In sum, it does not appear that Blackwell can claim 

qualified immunity for ordering plaintiff to Ad-Seg. See Pearson 

v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (“The judges of the 

district court [are] permitted to exercise their sound discretion 

in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity 

analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances 

in the particular case at hand.”) 

Accordingly, the court must respectfully disagree with the 

magistrate judge’s finding that “[t]he undisputed evidence shows 

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that complying with that order, rather than plaintiff’s protected 

First Amendment conduct, was the motivating factor for defendant 

Blackwell’s action.” (Findings & Recommendations 16.) Summary 

judgment in Blackwell’s favor is denied. 

B. Rivas 

Under Cal.Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3336, after an inmate is 

initially placed in Ad-Seg, the relevant Form 114-D order is 

“submitted to the . . . designated staff for review and possible 

further action as described in section 3337.” Section 3337, in 

turn, provides that “[o]n the first work day following an 

inmate’s placement in administrative segregation, designated 

staff at not less than the level of correctional captain will 

review the order portion of the CDC Form 114-D. If retention in 

administrative segregation is approved at this review, the 

following determinations will be made . . . .” Cal. Code Regs. 

tit. 15, § 3337 (2012). 

It appears that defendant Rivas, a Correction Counselor II 

Supervisor at CSP-Solano, was responsible for reviewing 

plaintiff’s placement in Ad-Seg. (Rivas Depo. 14:13-22, ECF 

No. 33-7.) Under section 1337, Rivas had the authority to decide 

whether to retain plaintiff in Ad-Seg. This is not a ministerial 

function. 

There is no question that, upon review of the Form 114-D 

order, Rivas would have become aware of plaintiff’s protected 

activity.2

 

 

2 Rivas also testified at deposition that he was aware of 

plaintiff’s protected activity, stating, “So we had kind of heard 

that Boston had used proper names. I don’t know if there’s any 

truth or validity. [...] I just heard that he used proper names.” 

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Accordingly, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to 

whether plaintiff’s protected First Amendment activity was the 

substantial or motivating factor for Rivas to retain him in AdSeg. Per the Ninth Circuit precedents discussed above, Rivas 

cannot assert qualified immunity as a defense to liability for 

this decision. Accordingly, summary judgment in Rivas’s favor is 

denied. 

C. Brooks 

Under California law, “[a]ny inmate transfer from a facility 

other than a reception center shall require a classification 

committee action and endorsement by a classification staff 

representative (CSR).” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3379 (2012). 

Defendant Brooks was the CSR who endorsed plaintiff’s 

transfer from CSP-Solano to CCC-Susanville. (Plaintiff’s Response 

to Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Facts (“PR-DSUF”) 1, 7, 

ECF No. 39.) It is undisputed that Brooks reviewed files to 

ensure that actions taken by classification committees were in 

compliance with CDCR policies and regulations, and that she made 

her decision to endorse plaintiff’s transfer based on his file 

information and the recommendations of the classification 

committee. (PR-DSUF 5, 9.) The classification committee’s 

recommendation provided: “Based on the nature of the article 

written and that the fact that it appears to specifically target 

a staff member at Solano for slander or written retaliation, the 

recommendation is to transfer [plaintiff] to an alternate 

facility.” (Decl. Haviland, Attachment 3, ECF No. 23-1). 

Brooks testified that she could decide not to endorse a 

 

(Rivas Depo. 31:21-24.)

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transfer if the recommendations were not proper. (Brooks Depo. 

12:6-8, 19-23, ECF No. 33-5.) The court concludes that she was 

not performing a ministerial function. 

Accordingly, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to 

whether plaintiff’s protected First Amendment activity was the 

substantial or motivating factor for Brooks to endorse his 

transfer to CCC-Susanville. Per the Ninth Circuit precedents 

discussed above, Brooks cannot assert qualified immunity as a 

defense to liability for this decision. Accordingly, summary 

judgment in Brooks’s favor is denied. 

IV. Conclusion 

Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that: 

[1] The findings and recommendations filed February 26, 

2013, are ADOPTED in part and REJECTED in part, as set forth 

above; 

[2] Plaintiff’s April 27, 2012 motion for partial summary 

judgment is GRANTED in that it is deemed established that 

plaintiff’s acts of writing the article and mailing it for 

publication are protected by the First Amendment, and DENIED 

in all other respects; 

[3] Defendants’ July 26, 2012 cross-motion for summary 

judgment is GRANTED in that judgment is entered for 

defendant Warden Barnes on plaintiff’s due process claim, 

and DENIED in in all other respects; 

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[4] Plaintiff is GRANTED leave to amend his complaint to 

name CDCR Secretary Jeffrey Beard as a defendant; and 

[5] This matter is REFERRED back to Magistrate Judge John F. 

Moulds for further pretrial proceedings. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: September 18, 2013. 

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