Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01170/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01170-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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16cv1170-MMA (DHB) 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SCOTT F. FIALHO, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

G. HERRERA, et al., 

Defendant.

 Case No.: 16cv1170-MMA (DHB) 

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION FOR 

RECONSIDERATION 

[Doc. No. 28] 

Plaintiff Scott Fialho, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights 

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Doc. No. 1. Defendant G. Herrera previously 

moved for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, arguing 

that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing this lawsuit, as 

required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). See 

Doc. No. 20. The Court denied Defendant’s motion. See Doc. No. 26. Defendant moves 

for reconsideration. See Doc. No. 28. Defendant argues that the Court erred in applying

the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 2005), to find that 

Defendant failed to meet her burden to show that Plaintiff did not fully exhaust his 

administrative remedies. To date, Plaintiff has not filed an opposition to Defendant’s 

motion. For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion. 

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DISCUSSION

1. Legal Standard 

 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), district courts have the power 

to reconsider a previous ruling or entry of judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). A motion 

under Rule 59(e) seeks “a substantive change of mind by the court.” Tripati v. Henman, 

845 F.2d 205, 205 (9th Cir. 1988). Rule 59(e) is an extraordinary remedy and, in the 

interest of finality and conservation of judicial resources, should not be granted absent 

highly unusual circumstances. Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934, 945 (9th Cir. 2003); 

McDowell v. Calderon, 197 F.3d 1253, 1255 (9th Cir. 1999). Rule 59 may not be used to 

re-litigate old matters, raise new arguments, or present evidence that could have been 

raised prior to entry of the judgment. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 544 U.S. 471, 486-87 

(2008). 

Under Rule 59(e), it is appropriate to alter or amend a previous ruling if “(1) the 

district court is presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) the district court 

committed clear error or made an initial decision that was manifestly unjust, or (3) there 

is an intervening change in controlling law.” United Nat. Ins. Co. v. Spectrum 

Worldwide, Inc., 555 F.3d 772, 780 (9th Cir. 2009). To carry the burden of proof, a 

moving party seeking reconsideration must show more than a disagreement with the 

Court’s decision or a recapitulation of the cases and arguments previously considered by 

the court. See United States v. Westlands Water Dist., 134 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1131 (E.D. 

Cal. 2001). 

2. Analysis 

The Court previously found that Defendant Herrera did not met her burden of 

proving that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies prior to filing 

this lawsuit. Defendant now argues that because Plaintiff “did not raise the issue of 

available remedies, there was no reason for Defendant to have addressed the issue in 

reply.” Doc. No. 28 at 2. However, it is well-settled in this circuit that the “failure to 

exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense that the defendant must plead 

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and prove in a PLRA case.” Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1176 (9th Cir. 2014) 

(emphasis added). This includes demonstrating “that there was an available 

administrative remedy, and that the prisoner did not exhaust that available remedy.” Id. 

at 1172. Therefore, Defendant should have addressed the availability of remedies in her 

moving papers. She did not, and a motion for reconsideration “is not a vehicle for . . . 

taking a ‘second bite at the apple.’” Sequa Corp. v. GBJ Corp., 156 F.3d 136, 144 (2d 

Cir. 1998). 

Defendant further contends that the Court erred in relying upon the Ninth Circuit’s 

decision in Brown v. Valoff, supra, to reach its conclusion in this case. Defendant asserts 

that the Court instead should have relied upon the district court’s ruling in Cunningham v. 

Ramos, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85997 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2011), to find that Plaintiff did 

not exhaust his available remedies. Defendant’s argument is unavailing. The Ninth 

Circuit’s statement of the law in Brown is controlling, whereas an unpublished district 

court decision applying that law is, at best, instructive. Moreover, the district court’s 

reasoning in Cunningham has been rejected explicitly by several courts. See Willard v. 

Sebok, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58180, at *17 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2016) (citing Branch v. 

Umphenour, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118633 (E.D. Cal. Sep. 4, 2015) and Graham v. 

Runnels, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103249 (S.D. Cal. July 24, 2012)). 

Finally, Defendant submits the declaration of R. Robinson, the Chief of the Inmate 

Correspondence and Appeals Branch, as evidence of the remedies which remained 

available to Plaintiff and required further exhaustion. However, this evidence should 

have been submitted in support of Defendant’s motion in the first instance, and does not 

provide grounds for reconsideration at this juncture. See Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of 

Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that a motion for reconsideration 

“may not be used to raise arguments or present evidence for the first time when they 

could reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation.”). 

/// 

/// 

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CONCLUSION

 Having reviewed its previous ruling, the Court is satisfied that it committed no 

error. Plaintiff has not provided any newly discovered evidence. Additionally, there has 

been no intervening change in controlling law. Accordingly, the Court DENIES 

Defendant’s motion for reconsideration. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATE: July 3, 2017 _______________________________________ 

 HON. MICHAEL M. ANELLO 

 United States District Judge 

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