Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_15-cv-00442/USCOURTS-alsd-1_15-cv-00442-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

ERNEST BRAXTON DIGGS, JR., :

AIS 204578,

:

Petitioner,

:

vs. CA 15-0442-CG-C

:

CHRISTOPHER GORDEY, Warden of

Limestone Correctional Facility, :

Respondent.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Ernest Braxton Diggs, Jr., a state prisoner presently in the custody of the 

respondent, has petitioned this Court for federal habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 5.) In the petition, Diggs challenges convictions for burglary, rape, 

sexual abuse, kidnapping, and sodomy, and the resulting sentences, entered against 

him in (or around) April of 1999 by the Circuit Court of Mobile County. (See id. at 3.) 

This matter has been referred to the undersigned for the entry of a report and 

recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and General Local Rule 72(a)(2)(R) 

(effective August 1, 2015). It is recommended that the instant petition be dismissed 

without prejudice due to petitioner’s failure to comply with 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A).

DISCUSSION

For various reasons articulated in his habeas corpus petition, Diggs claims that 

the state trial court lacked jurisdiction to try him on the charges that resulted in his 

convictions in April 1999 for at least one count, up to numerous counts, of burglary, 

rape, sexual abuse, kidnapping, and sodomy. (Doc. 5, at 2-10.) Because Diggs attacks the 

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constitutionality of his state convictions and sentences, and he is admittedly in custody 

pursuant to the judgment of an Alabama court, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 applies to his petition 

despite his designating it as one filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (see Doc. 5, at ¶ 5). See 

Thomas v. Crosby, 371 F.3d 782, 787 (11th Cir. 2004) (“A state prisoner cannot evade the 

procedural requirements of § 2254 by filing something purporting to be a § 2241 

petition.”), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1063, 125 S.Ct. 888, 160 L.Ed.2d 793 (2005); Medberry v. 

Crosby, 351 F.3d 1049, 1054 (11th Cir. 2003) (“[W]e . . . hold that[] although Appellant’s 

petition is authorized by § 2241, it also is governed by § 2254 because Appellant is ‘in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.’”), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1032, 124 

S.Ct. 2098, 158 L.Ed.2d 714 (2004). Stated somewhat differently, “[w]hen a state prisoner 

is ‘in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court,’ his petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus is governed by both § 2241 and the restrictions set forth in § 2254.”1 Morales v. 

Florida Dept. of Corrections, 346 Fed.Appx. 539, 540 (11th Cir. Sept. 29, 2009) (emphasis 

 1 This Court need not advise Diggs of the ramifications of applying the restrictions 

set forth in § 2254 to his self-designated § 2241 petition (cf. Doc. 8, at 4 n.1 (“The [Northern 

District of Alabama] would note . . . that it has not formally advised Diggs that his application 

will be treated as one under § 2254 or warned him of the potential ramifications of any such 

recharacterization.”)) inasmuch as this is not Diggs first federal collateral attack on the aboveidentified state convictions and sentences, see Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 383, 124 S.Ct. 

786, 792, 157 L.Ed.2d 778 (2003) (“[W]hen a court recharacterizes a pro se litigant’s motion as a 

first § 2255 motion[,] . . . the district court must notify the pro se litigant that it intends to 

recharacterize the pleading, [and] warn the litigant that this recharacterization means that any 

subsequent § 2255 motion will be subject to the restrictions on ‘second or successive’ motions[.]” 

(some emphasis supplied)); Lovett v. Warden, FCC Coleman-USP I, 368 Fed.Appx. 74, 77 (11th Cir. 

Mar. 2, 2010) (“[W]hen a district court recharacterizes a motion as a first § 2255, it first is 

required to give the defendant certain warnings and the opportunity to add claims and 

arguments, including those applicable to the timeliness of a § 2255 motion.” (emphasis 

supplied)), or even his second; instead, this petition represents Diggs’ third collateral attack on 

his convictions and sentences, and petitioner is well aware of the ramifications of § 2254’s 

restrictions, his second § 2254 petition filed in this Court on or about February 1, 2013 having 

been dismissed—on September 23, 2013—due to his failure to comply with 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(b)(3)(A), see Diggs v. Estes, CA 13-0052-CG-M, Docs. 1, 25 & 27-28.

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supplied; citing Medberry, supra, 351 F.3d at 1062), cert. denied sub nom. Morales v. McNeil, 

562 U.S. 866, 131 S.Ct. 156, 178 L.Ed.2d 94 (2010).

2

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254 and 2244(b)(3)(A), as amended by §§ 105 and 106 of 

the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), “‘[b]efore a 

second or successive application [for a writ of habeas corpus] is filed in the district 

court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order 

authorizing the district court to consider the application.’” Guenther v. Holt, 173 F.3d 

1328, 1330 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A)), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1085, 

120 S.Ct. 811, 145 L.Ed.2d 683 (2000). “[T]he petitioner first must obtain an order from 

the court of appeals authorizing the district court to consider” a second or successive 

petition because “[w]ithout authorization, the district court lacks jurisdiction to 

consider [such] second or successive petition.” United States v. Holt, 417 F.3d 1172, 1175 

(11th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted); see also Tompkins v. Secretary, Department of 

Corrections, 557 F.3d 1257, 1259 (11th Cir.) (“Section 2244(b)(3)(A) requires a district 

court to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction a second or successive petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus unless the petitioner has obtained an order authorizing the district court 

to consider it.”), cert. denied sub nom. Tompkins v. McNeil, 555 U.S. 1161, 129 S.Ct. 1305, 

 2 A district court has the power under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 

Cases “to examine and dismiss frivolous habeas petitions prior to any answer or other pleading 

by the state.” Kiser v. Johnson, 163 F.3d 326, 328 (5th Cir. 1999); see Jackson v. Secretary for the 

Department of Corrections, 292 F.3d 1347, 1349 (11th Cir. 2002) (“[W]e hold that the district court 

possessed the discretion to raise sua sponte the timeliness issue.”); Hill v. Braxton, 277 F.3d 701, 

705 (4th Cir. 2002) (“Even though the limitations period is an affirmative defense, a federal 

habeas court has the power to raise affirmative defenses sua sponte, as the district court did in 

this case.”). Rule 4 provides, in pertinent part, that “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and 

any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge 

must dismiss the petition and direct the clerk to notify the petitioner.” 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, 

Rule 4.

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173 L.Ed.2d 483 (2009); Morales, supra, 346 Fed.Appx. at 540 (“In order to file a second or 

successive § 2254 petition, the petitioner must first obtain an order from the court of 

appeals authorizing the district court to consider it. . . . Absent authorization, the 

district court lacks jurisdiction to consider a second or successive petition.”).

The records retained by this Court indicate that Diggs has filed two previous 

habeas petitions, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging the same 

convictions and sentences he challenges in the instant petition. Compare Diggs v. 

Mitchem, CA 03-0104-BH-M with Diggs v. Estes, CA 13-0052-CG-M. In the first of those 

actions, filed in early 2003, this Court determined that Diggs’ § 2254 petition was due to 

be denied because he procedurally defaulted on each of his claims for relief and failed 

to establish cause and prejudice (or a fundamental miscarriage of justice) excusing his 

procedural default(s).3 See Diggs v. Mitchem, supra, at Docs. 12 & 14-15; cf. id., at Docs. 

23-24. Diggs’ second habeas corpus petition, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on or 

about February 1, 2013, was properly viewed as a successive habeas petition and 

 3 A district court’s dismissal of a petitioner’s first habeas petition based on 

procedural default, as here, constitutes an adjudication on the merits for purposes of invoking 

the second or successive requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3). See Henderson v. Lampert, 396 

F.3d 1049, 1053 (9th Cir.) (“We . . . join the Second Circuit in holding that ‘a denial on grounds 

of procedural default constitutes a disposition on the merits and thus renders a subsequent § 

2254 petition . . . “second or successive” for purposes of the AEDPA.’”), cert. denied sub nom. 

Henderson v. Hill, 546 U.S. 884, 126 S.Ct. 199, 163 L.Ed.2d 189 (2005); Turner v. Artuz, 262 F.3d 

118, 123 (2d Cir.) (“The determination that claims . . . were procedurally defaulted qualifies as 

an adjudication on the merits. . . . We therefore conclude that Turner’s subsequent § 2254 

petition was ‘”second or successive” for purposes of the AEDPA’ and ‘require[s] authorization 

pursuant to . . . [§] 2244(b)(3)(A).’”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1031, 122 S.Ct. 569, 151 L.Ed.2d 442 

(2001); In re Cook, 215 F.3d 606, 608 (6th Cir. 2000) (“[B]ecause [petitioner’s] initial § 2254 

application was dismissed for unexcused procedural default and was therefore ‘on the merits,’ 

Cook’s current application is a ‘second or successive habeas corpus application’ under § 

22[4]4(b).”); Johnson v. State of Alabama, 2013 WL 776251, *1 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 16, 2013) 

(“[D]ismissal of a habeas corpus petition as procedurally defaulted constitutes, as a matter of 

law, an adjudication on the merits for the purposes of § 2244(b)(3)(A)’s second or successive 

petition requirements.”).

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summarily dismissed for lack of jurisdiction due to Diggs’ failure to obtain a 

precertification from the Eleventh Circuit authorizing this Court to consider a 

successive § 2254 petition for habeas relief. See Diggs v. Estes, supra, at Docs. 25 & 27-28. 

In light of the foregoing, it is clear that the instant petition, initially filed in the 

United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama on or about July 15, 

2015 (see Doc. 1), is a successive petition, yet there is nothing to indicate that Diggs filed 

an application with the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals seeking an order authorizing 

this Court to consider this petition or that he received such an order from a three judge 

panel of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals authorizing this Court to consider a 

successive application for habeas relief. Compare Farris v. United States, 333 F.3d 1211, 

1216 (11th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he movant must first file an application with the appropriate 

court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider it.”) with 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(B) & (C) (“A motion in the court of appeals for an order authorizing 

the district court to consider a second or successive application shall be determined by a 

three-judge panel of the court of appeals. [] The court of appeals may authorize the 

filing of a second or successive application only if it determines that the application 

makes a prima facie showing that the application satisfies the requirements of this 

subsection.”). Because petitioner has not applied to the Eleventh Circuit Court of 

Appeals for permission to file this his third federal habeas petition, nor been granted 

leave of that court to file another habeas corpus petition, this Court lacks jurisdiction to 

consider Diggs’ request for relief, compare Farris, supra, 333 F.3d at 1216 (“Without 

authorization, the district court lacks jurisdiction to consider a second or successive 

petition.”) with Hill v. Hopper, 112 F.3d 1088, 1089 (11th Cir.) (“Under 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(b)(3)(A), the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider Appellant Hill’s request 

for relief because Hill had not applied to this Court for permission to file a second 

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habeas petition.”), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1203, 117 S.Ct. 1571, 137 L.Ed.2d 714 (1997); see 

Gilreath v. State Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 273 F.3d 932, 933 (11th Cir. 2001) (“Because this

undertaking would be [petitioner’s] second habeas corpus petition and because he had 

no permission from us to file a second habeas petition, we conclude that the district 

court lacked jurisdiction to grant the requested relief.”). Accordingly, this cause is due 

to be dismissed, without prejudice, for want of jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(b)(3)(A). Compare Tompkins, supra, 557 F.3d at 1259 (“Section 2244(b)(3)(A) requires 

a district court to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction a second or successive petition for a 

writ of habeas corpus unless the petitioner has obtained an order authorizing the 

district court to consider it.”) with United States v. Holt, supra, 417 F.3d at 1175 (“Without 

authorization, the district court lacks jurisdiction to consider a second or successive 

petition.”) and Simmons v. Cummins, 2010 WL 582091, *2 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 15, 2010) (“It is 

clear from the pleadings filed herein that Simmons has not received an order from a 

three-judge panel of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals authorizing this court to 

consider a successive application for habeas relief. ‘Because this undertaking [is 

Simmons’] second habeas corpus petition and because he had no permission from [the 

Eleventh Circuit] to file a second habeas petition, . . . the district court lack[s] 

jurisdiction to grant the requested relief.’”), report and recommendation adopted, 2010 WL 

653691 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 17, 2010).4

 4 The undersigned recommends that this Court dismiss without prejudice Diggs’ 

present petition due to his failure to comply with § 2244(b)(3)(A), rather than transfer this 

matter to the Eleventh Circuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631, see Guenther, supra, 173 F.3d at 1330-

1331, n.4 (“We note that the cases from the Second, Sixth and Tenth Circuits cited in the 

preceding paragraphs did not analyze § 1631 or explain why it was appropriate authority for 

the transfer. Significant arguments can be made on either side as to the viability of § 1631, and a 

different result may occur depending upon whether the matter to be transferred is viewed as a 

§ 2254 application or as a motion under § 2244(b)(3)(A) or as a motion to treat the § 2254 

application as a motion under § 2244(b)(3)(A). Also, we note that there are concerns relating to 

(Continued)

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Pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, the undersigned 

recommends that a certificate of appealability in this case be denied. 28 U.S.C. foll. §

2254, Rule 11(a) (“The district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability 

when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.”). The habeas corpus statute makes 

clear that an applicant is entitled to appeal a district court’s denial of his habeas corpus 

petition only where a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). A certificate of appealability may issue only where “the applicant 

has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. §

2243(c)(2). Where, as here, a habeas petition is being denied on procedural grounds 

without reaching the merits of the underlying constitutional claims, “a COA should 

issue [only] when the prisoner shows . . . that jurists of reason would find it debatable 

whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that 

jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its 

procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 1604, 146 L.Ed.2d 

542 (2000); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 1039, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 

(2003) (“Under the controlling standard, a petitioner must ‘sho[w] that reasonable 

jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have 

been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were “adequate to 

deserve encouragement to proceed further.”’”). Inasmuch as the instant petition is 

 

the application of the plain language in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A) requiring an applicant to 

move in the court of appeals ‘[b]efore a second or successive application [for a writ of habeas 

corpus] is filed in the district court.’”); Dunn v. Singletary, 168 F.3d 440, 441 n.1 (11th Cir. 1999) 

(“Immediately after the instant habeas corpus petition was filed, the district court dismissed it 

without prejudice on May 30, 1997, to allow Dunn to seek authorization from this court to 

proceed with this successive petition as required by § 2244(b)(3)(A).”), because his petition “in 

addition to being second or successive, [is] indisputably time-barred.” Guenther, 173 F.3d at 

1331.

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unquestionably a successive pleading and Diggs’ first federal habeas petition was 

dismissed on the merits based on unexcused procedural defaults, while his second 

federal habeas petition was dismissed due to his failure to comply with 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(b)(3)(A), a reasonable jurist could not conclude either that this Court is in error in 

dismissing the instant third petition, without prejudice, for want of jurisdiction or that 

Diggs should be allowed to proceed further, Slack, supra, 529 U.S. at 484, 120 S.Ct. at 

1604 (“Where a plain procedural bar is present and the district court is correct to invoke 

it to dispose of the case, a reasonable jurist could not conclude either that the district 

court erred in dismissing the petition or that the petitioner should be allowed to 

proceed further.”). 

Rule 11(a) further provides: “Before entering the final order, the court may direct 

the parties to submit arguments on whether a certificate should issue.” If there is an 

objection to this recommendation by petitioner, he may bring this argument to the 

attention of the district judge in the objections permitted to this report and 

recommendation. Brightwell v. Patterson, CA 11-0165-WS-C, Doc. 14 (Eleventh Circuit 

order denying petitioner’s motions for a COA and to appeal IFP in a case in which this 

Court set out the foregoing procedure); see also Castrejon v. United States, 2011 WL 

3241817, *20 (S.D. Ala. Jun. 28, 2011) (providing for the same procedure), report and

recommendation adopted, 2011 WL 3241580 (S.D. Ala. Jul. 29, 2011); Griffin v. DeRosa, 2010 

WL 3943702, at *4 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 20, 2010) (providing for same procedure), report and

recommendation adopted sub nom. Griffin v. Butterworth, 2010 WL 3943699 (N.D.Fla. Oct. 5, 

2010). 

CONCLUSION

The Magistrate Judge recommends that Ernest Braxton Diggs, Jr.’s petition for

writ of habeas corpus, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 but clearly subject to the 

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restrictions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254, be dismissed without prejudice due to 

petitioner’s failure to comply with 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). Petitioner is not entitled to 

a certificate of appealability and, therefore, he is not entitled to appeal in forma pauperis.

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO FILE OBJECTIONS

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all parties in the 

manner provided by law. Any party who objects to this recommendation or anything in 

it must, within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this document, file specific 

written objections with the Clerk of this Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED.R.CIV.P. 

72(b); S.D. Ala. GenLR 72(c)(1) & (2). The parties should note that under Eleventh 

Circuit Rule 3-1, “[a] party failing to object to a magistrate judge’s findings or 

recommendations contained in a report and recommendation in accordance with the 

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district 

court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party was 

informed of the time period for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to 

object. In the absence of a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal 

for plain error if necessary in the interests of justice.” 11th Cir. R. 3-1. In order to be 

specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which 

objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the 

Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed determination is 

found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing 

before the Magistrate Judge is not specific.

DONE this the 9th day of September, 2015.

s/WILLIAM E. CASSADY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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