Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-97-05150/USCOURTS-caDC-97-05150-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 895
Nature of Suit: Freedom of Information Act of 1974
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 6, 1998 Decided May 8, 1998

No. 97-5150

Robert A. Burka,

Appellant

v.

United States Department of Health and

Human Services, et al.,

Appellees

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 92cv02636)

Robert A. Burka, appearing pro se, argued the cause for

appellant, with whom Lawrence M. Sung, was on the briefs.

Michael J. Ryan, Assistant United States Attorney, argued

the cause for appellees, with whom Wilma A. Lewis, United

States Attorney, Mark E. Nagle and R. Craig Lawrence,

Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the briefs.

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Before: Wald, Sentelle and Randolph, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Wald.

Opinion concurring specially filed by Circuit Judge Wald.

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge Randolph.

Wald, Circuit Judge: In 1992, Robert A. Burka, a pro se

attorney-litigant, filed suit against the U.S. Department of

Health and Human Services ("HHS") under the Freedom of

Information Act ("FOIA") seeking release of survey responses from the Community Intervention Trial for Smoking Cessation, a research project supported by the National Cancer

Institute. After nearly five years of litigation that culminated

in a reversal by this court of a district court holding in favor

of HHS and a remand to the district court for further

proceedings, HHS disclosed the information to Burka pursuant to a consent order and judgment. Burka then moved for

attorney's fees. The district court denied the motion on the

grounds that Burka was a pro se attorney-litigant and therefore was not eligible for attorney's fees under FOIA. Burka

now appeals from the judgment of the district court. We

affirm.

I. Background

In November 1992, Burka commenced this action under the

Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. s 552, to compel HHS

to disclose paper questionnaires and electromagnetic data

tapes containing survey responses from the National Cancer

Institute's Community Intervention Trial for Smoking Cessation. The parties cross-moved for summary judgment. On

December 13, 1993, the district court held that the information sought by Burka was exempt from disclosure under

FOIA Exemption 5 and therefore granted HHS's motion for

summary judgment.

Burka appealed. He then sought to supplement the record. The case was remanded to the district court to consider

the request. See Burka v. United States Dep't of Health &

Human Services, No. 94-5003, 1994 WL 315403 (D.C. Cir.

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June 15, 1994) (per curiam). The district court granted the

motion but reaffirmed its earlier decision that the material

could be withheld by HHS under FOIA Exemption 5. Burka

again appealed. On July 2, 1996, this court reversed the

district court's grant of summary judgment for HHS on the

grounds that the material sought by Burka did not fall under

the protection of Exemption 5, and the case was remanded

for further proceedings. See Burka v. United States Dep't of

Health & Human Services, 87 F.3d 508 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

After this court denied a motion for rehearing in banc filed on

January 6, 1997, HHS disclosed to Burka the information he

sought pursuant to a consent order and judgment.

Burka then moved for an award of attorney's fees under

FOIA, 5 U.S.C. s 552(a)(4)(E). On March 21, 1997, the

district court issued an order denying Burka's motion. See

Burka v. United States Dep't of Health & Human Services,

No. 92-2636 (D.D.C. Mar. 20, 1997). Burka appealed.

II. Analysis

A. Pro Se Attorneys Are Not Entitled to Attorney's Fees

Under the Fee-Shifting Provisions of FOIA

Burka is seeking an award of attorney's fees for his work in

this case. He argues that his pro se status should not be a

bar to such an award under FOIA because controlling precedent in this circuit provides that pro se attorney-litigants who

substantially prevail in their actions may recover attorney's

fees. HHS responds that Burka is not eligible for an award

because the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Kay v.

Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432 (1991), precluded awards of fees to

persons who appear pro se in FOIA cases, whether or not

they are attorneys.

The Freedom of Information Act provides that "[t]he court

may assess against the United States reasonable attorney

fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred in any case

under this section in which the complainant has substantially

prevailed." See 5 U.S.C. s 552(a)(4)(E)(1994). To be entitled

to such an award, a litigant must first establish eligibility by

showing that the lawsuit was reasonably necessary and the

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litigation substantially caused the requested records to be

released. See Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. v. United

States Dep't of Agriculture, 11 F.3d 211, 215-16 (D.C. Cir.

1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 927 (1994). Second, a litigant

must show that it is entitled to fees under four criteria that

the court weighs in determining whether attorney's fees are

appropriate: "(1) the public benefit derived from the case; (2)

the commercial benefit to the plaintiff; (3) the nature of the

plaintiff's interest in the records; and (4) whether the Government had a reasonable basis for withholding requested

information." 11 F.3d at 216 (citations omitted).

For many years, it was settled law in this circuit that

attorneys who prevailed in FOIA actions brought on their

own behalf were eligible to obtain attorney's fees. Indeed, in

Cuneo v. Rumsfeld, 553 F.2d 1360 (D.C. Cir. 1977), this court

specifically declared that "[i]n light of the legislative history

of section 552(a)(4)(E), a complainant, who is otherwise eligible under that section for an award of attorney fees, should

not be denied those fees simply because he happens to be an

attorney." Id. at 1366. The court thus held that an attorney

representing herself pro se in a FOIA case could obtain an

award of attorney's fees as long as she met the requirements

of eligibility and entitlement.

In 1991, however, the Supreme Court ruled that an attorney who represented himself in a successful civil rights case

could not recover attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. s 1988.

See Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432 (1991). The Court noted that

the petitioner in that case had handled his professional responsibilities competently. Nonetheless, the Court found

that the word "attorney" in the fee provision "assumes an

agency relationship, and it seems likely that Congress contemplated an attorney-client relationship as the predicate for

an award under s 1988." Id. at 435-36 (footnotes omitted).

The Court explained that the specific purpose of the fee

provision was to "enable potential plaintiffs to obtain the

assistance of competent counsel in vindicating their rights."

Id. (footnote omitted). Allowing an attorney who represents

himself to obtain attorney's fees, the Court explained, does

not further this goal. Indeed, an attorney who appears pro

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se "is deprived of the judgment of an independent third party

in framing the theory of the case, evaluating alternative

methods of presenting the evidence, cross-examining hostile

witnesses, formulating legal arguments, and in making sure

that reason, rather than emotion, dictates the proper tactical

response to unforeseen developments in the courtroom." Id.

at 437. Therefore, the Court concluded, "[t]he statutory

policy of furthering the successful prosecution of meritorious

claims is better served by a rule that creates an incentive to

retain counsel in every such case." Id. at 438.

In the wake of the Court's decision in Kay, lower courts

have held that several different fee-shifting statutes, including

FOIA, preclude awards of fees to all persons who appear pro

se. Most notably, in 1993, this court held that based on Kay,

a pro se non-attorney plaintiff who prevailed in a FOIA action

could not obtain attorney's fees under section 552(a)(4)(E).

See Benavides v. Bureau of Prisons, 993 F.2d 257 (D.C. Cir.),

cert. denied, 510 U.S. 996 (1993). In Benavides v. Bureau of

Prisons, we noted that "[t]he law in this circuit, until today,

has been that pro se non-attorney litigants are eligible for

reasonable attorney fees under FOIA in cases in which they

have substantially prevailed in claims against the Government." Id. at 258-59 (citation omitted). Nonetheless, we

explained, "[i]n light of the Supreme Court's decision in Kay

v. Ehrler ... we are now constrained to change our position."

Id. at 259. While recognizing that Kay arose in the context

of a claim for fees under 42 U.S.C. s 1988 rather than under

FOIA, we held that Kay was binding on the issue of attorney's fees because the Supreme Court had implicitly rejected

a distinction between fee claims arising under section 1988

and FOIA. Id. at 259; see 499 U.S. at 435 n.4.

Although in Benavides we explicitly reserved the issue of

whether pro se plaintiffs who are attorneys must suffer a

similar fate, see 993 F.2d at 260, Kay itself militates against

any distinction between fee claims under section 1988 and

under FOIA and overwhelmingly argues in favor of a conclusion that fees are not available to pro se attorneys for claims

filed under FOIA. As we noted in Benavides, Kay implicitly

rejected a distinction between fee claims arising under section

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1988 and FOIA by referring with approval to Falcone v. IRS,

714 F.2d 646 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 908 (1984).

In Falcone, the Sixth Circuit refused to award attorney's fees

to a pro se attorney in a successful action under FOIA. The

Falcone court had concluded that attorney's fees were not

appropriate because the award was intended " 'to relieve

plaintiffs with legitimate claims of the burden of legal costs'

and 'to encourage potential claimants to seek legal advice

before commencing litigation.' " Kay, 499 U.S. at 435 n.4

(quoting Falcone, 714 F.2d at 647). As the Kay Court noted,

the Sixth Circuit in Falcone relied on the fact that although a

pro se attorney possesses legal expertise, he is unlikely to

have the " 'detached and objective perspective' necessary to

fulfill the aims of the Act." Id. (quoting Falcone, 714 F.2d at

647 (citations omitted)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

It is obvious from the lengthy discussion of Falcone in Kay

that the Supreme Court intended its ruling to apply beyond

section 1988 cases to other similar fee-shifting statutes, particularly the one in FOIA. It is, in short, impossible to

conclude otherwise than that pro se litigants who are attorneys are not entitled to attorney's fees under FOIA.

Virtually all other courts that have considered this issue

since Kay have reached a similar conclusion. In Ray v.

United States Department of Justice, the Eleventh Circuit

concluded that because the policies behind section 1988 and

FOIA are the same, "the principles announced in Kay apply

with equal force in this case to preclude the award of attorney's fees Ray seeks for his own work." 87 F.3d 1250, 1252

(11th Cir. 1996).

Similarly, Manos v. United States Department of the Air

Force, 829 F. Supp. 1191 (N.D. Cal. 1993), held that an

attorney who is a pro se plaintiff and who has substantially

prevailed on a FOIA claim cannot be awarded attorney's fees

under FOIA. The court noted that "[b]ecause substantially

similar policies underlie the attorneys' fees provisions of

FOIA and section 1988, Kay strongly supports a denial of

fees under FOIA to pro se attorney plaintiffs." Id. at 1193.

The court further reasoned that "it does not advance the

goals of FOIA's fee provision to allow a litigant to recover for

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a non-performed service or to be compensated where no fee

has been paid." Id. (citations omitted). An award of attorney's fees was intended to relieve plaintiffs of the burden of

legal costs, not reward successful claimants or penalize the

government. The court also noted that granting a pro se

attorney fees "when a lay pro se FOIA litigant who also

substantially prevailed in her action would be denied fees

does not in any discernable way advance the policy behind the

FOIA attorneys' fees provision." Id. at 1194. Thus, the

court concluded, "fairness and sound policy resist a finding

that an attorney representing herself is more entitled to a fee

under FOIA than a lay person representing herself." Id.

The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois

arrived at the same conclusion in Whalen v. Internal Revenue

Service, 1993 WL 532506 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 20, 1993). There, the

court held that there was "no satisfactory distinction between

pro se FOIA litigants who are lawyers and those who are not

for the purpose of awarding fees." Id. at *11. Thus, it

concluded that "[a]pplying the rationale of the Court in Kay

... [the attorney-litigant] is not entitled to recover fees for

his own efforts in litigating his FOIA complaint." Id.

There is only one post-Kay case in which a court has held

that pro se litigants who are attorneys are entitled to attorney's fees under FOIA.1 In State of Texas v. Interstate

Commerce Commission, 935 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1991), which

was decided three months after Kay, the Fifth Circuit held

that "if a FOIA plaintiff has actually and reasonably incurred

legal fees--that is, a lawyer has handled his case, even if the

lawyer is the plaintiff himself--and if the plaintiff substantially prevailed, he may recover reasonable attorneys fees from

the federal government, provided that the court finds that the

four discretionary criteria are satisfied." Id. at 731-32 (foot-

__________

1 The D.C. district court awarded attorney's fees in a FOIA suit

to a law firm litigating in its own name in Wiley, Rein & Fielding v.

United States Department of Commerce, 793 F. Supp. 360 (D.D.C.

1992). However, it appears that the issues raised here were not

raised by the parties in Wiley, Rein & Fielding, for the court

simply awarded fees without discussion.

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note omitted). In arriving at this conclusion, however, the

Fifth Circuit did not discuss the impact of the Supreme

Court's decision in Kay; indeed, it did not mention the case.

Given that in Benavides, 933 F.2d at 259-60, we acknowledged that Kay is controlling on issues relating to the feeshifting provisions of FOIA, the Fifth Circuit decision is

unpersuasive. Thus, we conclude that the district court was

correct to decide that pro se attorney-litigants are not entitled

to attorney's fees under the fee-shifting provisions of FOIA.

B. Burka's Representation of an Undisclosed Client Does

Not Render Him Eligible for Attorney's Fees

Burka claims that the reasons for denying attorney's fees

to a pro se attorney are not applicable to him because "[h]is

formal status as a pro se litigant ... was merely technical."

Brief of Appellant at 21. At all times during the litigation,

Burka explains, he was representing an undisclosed client, a

fact of which the district judge and the government were

aware. He further claims that he has been compensated by

the undisclosed client for his services pursuant to a retention

agreement and that any award of attorney's fees or costs in

this case will be turned over to his undisclosed client. See id.

at 8. He therefore argues that he was not the real party-ininterest in this litigation but rather an attorney for an unnamed plaintiff and thus the court is not bound by the case

law governing awards of attorney's fees to pro se attorneys.

Presented with these arguments, the district court held that

since every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real

party-in-interest and "[s]ince Burka brought this lawsuit in

his own name, he should be estopped from arguing now that

the real party-in-interest was someone else." Burka, No.

92-11 2636, at 4 [J.A. 15]. We affirm the district court's

holding.

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that "[e]very

action shall be prosecuted in name of the real party in

interest." Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a) (1997). Burka chose to bring

the case in his own name and to maintain the case in his own

name throughout the litigation. Indeed, Burka has at all

times been the only named party in this case. A FOIA

request can be made by "any person." 5 U.S.C. s 552(a)(3).

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As a result, Burka had standing to bring this suit when his

FOIA request was denied; he was not required to demonstrate that he had any particular need for the information.

Therefore Burka, not his undisclosed client, is the real partyin-interest to this suit. Any arrangements Burka had with a

third party are legally irrelevant for the purposes of his

FOIA request. They are equally irrelevant here. It is

similarly of no consequence that Burka "could have" brought

this suit on behalf of another third party; Burka has not done

so.

Even absent the clear dictates of Rule 17, we would arrive

at the same place. The dangers inherent in recognizing an

"undisclosed" client as the real plaintiff are obvious. For

instance, if the court cannot ascertain who is the real partyin-interest to a case, how can it apply claim preclusion to that

party in any future litigation? How can a court apply sanctions to a party whose identity is undisclosed? How would a

court determine for purposes of deciding if attorney's fees are

merited whether a plaintiff is acting on behalf of the public

interest, or whether the plaintiff will obtain commercial benefit from the disclosed information, or anything about the

nature of the plaintiff's interest in the records if her identity

is undisclosed?

Burka is not just the plaintiff in this case; he is also the

only attorney to enter an appearance. He directed the

litigation, argued on his own behalf in district court, and filed

the briefs in district court as well as here. Thus, it appears

incontrovertible that Burka has been both claimant and counsel. Accordingly, Burka is, by definition, a pro se attorneylitigant and thus is not eligible for attorney's fees. Burka's

status as both attorney and litigant may be a "technicality,"

but it is a legally meaningful one and not to be ignored.

C. Burka's Co-Counsel Are Not Entitled to Attorney's Fees

Burka contends that even if he is ineligible for attorney's

fees for his own work on this case, he is nonetheless eligible

to recover fees for the services of his lawyer colleagues who

worked on the lawsuit. HHS argues, in turn, that Burka is

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not eligible for attorney's fees for any work performed by

colleagues at his law firm because there was no attorneyclient relationship between them, his colleagues never entered

an appearance in the case, and they worked under Burka's

direction and control. The district court found that Burka

was not entitled to attorney's fees for his colleagues' work.

We agree.

Burka cites three cases in support of his argument that he

is eligible to recover for the professional services rendered by

his colleagues at his law firm, Ray, 87 F.3d 1250; Lawrence

v. Bowsher, 931 F.2d 1579 (D.C. Cir. 1991); and Aronson v.

United States Dep't of Housing & Urban Dev., 866 F.2d 1

(1st Cir. 1989). In all three cases, the court awarded attorney's fees to a pro se attorney-litigant for the work of cocounsel. Yet, as the district court noted below, all three

cases involved attorneys who were not affiliated with the

litigant's law practice. As a result, these outside counsel,

unlike the colleagues employed by Burka, enjoyed a genuine

attorney-client relationship with the litigants, were situated to

offer "independent" legal advice and assistance, and were

presumably paid for their services by the attorney-litigants

involved. This was not true here. Instead, Burka controlled

the legal strategy and presentation, he was the only attorney

to enter an appearance in the case, and his colleagues worked

under his direction. These are material differences. As the

Supreme Court noted in Kay, 499 U.S. 432, "the word 'attorney' assumes an agency relationship." Id. at 435-36 (footnote

omitted). Such a relationship exists when an attorneylitigant's co-counsel are independent counsel hired by him to

assist him in the case; it does not exist, however, where the

counsel are simply colleagues at the litigant's law firm working under the litigant's direction. "Outside" counsel can

serve as an "independent third party in framing the theory of

the case, evaluating alternative methods of presenting the

evidence, cross-examining hostile witnesses, formulating legal

arguments, and in making sure that reason, rather than

emotion, dictates the proper tactical response to unforeseen

developments in the courtroom." Id. at 437. Again, this is

not true when the co-counsel work in the same firm and

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under the direction of the attorney-litigant. Burka's claim

that his co-counsel were in fact working for an undisclosed

client with whom they shared an attorney-client relationship

is not relevant here for the same reasons it was irrelevant

with regard to Burka's claim for attorney's fees for his own

work in this case.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that a pro se attorneylitigant is not entitled to attorney's fees under FOIA, 5 U.S.C.

s 552. We also hold that this rule applies even if the pro se

attorney-litigant claims to in fact represent an undisclosed

client. Finally, we hold that a pro se attorney-litigant is not

entitled to an award of attorney's fees for work performed by

other attorneys on the case where the other attorneys worked

in the attorney-litigant's firm under the attorney-litigant's

direction. The district court's decision denying Burka's motion for an award of attorney's fees is therefore

Affirmed.

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Wald, Circuit Judge, concurring specially: Judge Randolph raises questions in his concurrence about the legitimacy

of considering "the public benefit derived from the case" in

deciding when to award attorneys' fees in a FOIA case. I

write briefly in reply.

It is reasonable for the court to consider the public benefit

arising from the plaintiff's FOIA request in deciding whether

to grant attorney's fees precisely because under the statute a

plaintiff need not demonstrate any public benefit to obtain

information through FOIA. In LaSalle Extension University v. FTC, 627 F.2d 481 (D.C. Cir. 1980), we explained that

"parties ... who have a sufficient private interest in the

requested information do not need the additional incentive of

recovering their fees and costs to induce them to pursue their

request in the courts." Id. at 484. That, of course, includes

those who have commercial interests in the information

sought. On the other hand, someone seeking information

from the government may need at least the potential to cover

costs if he acts as, in effect, "a private attorney general." See

S. Rep. No. 93-854 (1974).

Judge Randolph asserts that judges cannot evaluate public

benefit "objectively." But we make this kind of determination under other fee-shifting statutes all the time. See, e.g.,

Metropolitan Washington Coalition for Clean Air v. District

of Columbia, 639 F.2d 802, 804 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (explaining

that under the citizen-suit provision of the Clean Air Act,

courts are empowered to award fees "whenever such an

award was deemed to be 'in the public interest' "); Covington

v. District of Columbia, 57 F.3d 1101, 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1995),

cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1115 (1996) (explaining that under the

fee-shifting provision of 42 U.S.C. s 1988(b), when an attorney requests rates that are greater than those they normally

charge, "the attorney must show that his or her custom of

charging reduced rates is in fact attributable to 'public spiritedness' "); see also Chambers v. Nasco Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45

(1991) (explaining that an exception to the so-called "American Rule" prohibiting fee-shifting in most cases is the "common fund exception," which "allows a court to award attorney's fees to a party whose litigation efforts directly benefit

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others"). In fact, the public interest inquiry is usually relatively simple. See, e.g., LaSalle Extension University v.

FTC, 627 F.2d 481, 484 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("One goal [of the

FOIA fee-shifting provision] ... is to encourage Freedom of

Information Act suits that benefit the public interest. This

objective is not furthered here ...."); see also Summers v.

DOJ, No. 97-5002 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Siberman, J., concurring)

("There can be no doubt that these documents as a group are

of the very highest public interest.") (emphasis added). Indeed, it is not so readily apparent that the "substantial

justification" test of EAJA that Judge Randolph espouses is

that much more "objective" than the "public interest" test of

FOIA.1

Judge Randolph also claims that "making the eligibility for

a fee award turn on 'public benefit' ... is not tied to any

language or policy of FOIA." Congress and every circuit to

consider the issue would disagree. The requirement that the

petitioner show some public benefit to obtain attorney's fees

is deeply rooted in the legislative history of FOIA. The

"multi-factor, no weights assigned, test" appeared in the

original Senate version of FOIA. See S. 2543, 93d Cong.

(1974); S. Rep. No. 93-854 (1974). Although the conference

committee later eliminated the test's four criteria from the

statute, the conference report indicates that Congress intended courts to consider such factors in exercising their discretion to award attorney's fees. See S. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1200

(1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6285, 6288; Majority

Opinion at 4. Consistent with this congressional intent, we

__________

1 Moreover, the purposes of the fee-shifting provisions of EAJA

and of FOIA are different; "[s]imply put, the EAJA is not a

broadly written fee-shifting statute which encourages meritorious

litigation." Synar v. United States, 670 F. Supp. 410, 416 (D.D.C.

1987). As we noted in Battles Farm Co. v. Pierce, 806 F.2d 1098

(D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1046 (1987), "unlike other

fee-shifting statutes that are designed solely to encourage private

'attorneys general' to bring meritorious litigation in the public

interest ... the EAJA's purpose is somewhat different. It is

designed to encourage small private plaintiffs and defendants to

persevere against or resist the U.S. government if the government

takes an unjustified litigating position." Id. at 1101.

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have for decades used them as guides to determining when

attorney's fees are warranted. See, e.g., Chesapeake Bay

Foundation, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 11

F.3d 211, 216 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 927

(1994); Tax Analysts v. United States Dep't of Justice, 965

F.2d 1092, 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Weisberg v. United States

Dep't of Justice, 745 F.2d 1476, 1498 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Other

circuits have done the same. See, e.g., Detroit Free Press,

Inc. v. Dep't of Justice, 73 F.3d 93 (6th Cir. 1996); Cazalas v.

U.S. Dep't of Justice, 709 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1983); Aviation

Data Serv. v. FAA, 687 F.2d 1319 (10th Cir. 1982); Vermont

Low Income Advocacy Council, Inc. v. Usery, 546 F.2d 509

(2d Cir. 1976). Absent some affirmative change of heart on

the part of Congress or directive from the Supreme Court, I

see no authority or reason for us to change course.

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Randolph, Circuit Judge, concurring: I join the court's

opinion in its application of Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432

(1991), to deny this attorney-plaintiff attorney's fees. I do so

without endorsing the "criteria" we have devised for determining whether, in FOIA cases generally, attorney's fees

should be awarded. Maj. op. at 4. Judge Wald thinks it

significant that the four criteria are "deeply rooted" in the

legislative history of FOIA. Concur. op. at 2. I find it far

more telling that those criteria were weeded out of the

original Senate version of FOIA--where they would have had

the binding force of law--and transplanted to the conference

report--where they do not. Although we have applied these

criteria in the past, they deserve another look. For instance,

one of the factors is "the public benefit derived from the

case." Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. United States Dep't

of Agric., 11 F.3d 211, 216 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Courts deciding

an attorney's fees dispute are not in a position to make that

sort of judgment objectively. One person's public good is

often another person's public harm. Besides, FOIA plaintiffs

do not sue in the public interest; if anyone represents "the

public" in these cases it is the United States or the agency

defending the action. Making eligibility for a fee award turn

on "public benefit" has a nice ring, but it is not tied to any

language or policy of FOIA. Once a FOIA plaintiff receives

the information sought from the government, he has no

obligation to share it with "the public," or with anyone else.

What he plans to do with the documents has no bearing

whatever on his right to receive them. I therefore cannot see

why such a consideration should be relevant to whether he

should recover attorney's fees. If the "public good" did

matter, the fact that the plaintiff plans to use the information

for his "commercial benefit," id., should be a mark in favor of

attorney's fees. Competition and better products and services promote the public good. But our precedents count

commercial benefit as a strike against an award--unless,

perhaps, the plaintiff happens to be a "news organization."

See, e.g., Tax Analysts v. Department of Justice, 965 F.2d

1092, 1095, 1096 (D.C. Cir. 1992). We have also said that

when a litigant seeks disclosure "for personal motives, an

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award of attorney's fees is generally inappropriate." Id. at

1095. This too is baffling. I suppose that any individual

bringing a lawsuit has "personal motives." On the other

hand, it seems odd to attribute "personal motives" to a

foundation or some other artificial entity. And so our law on

attorney's fees in FOIA cases is skewed against real people

and in favor of organizations. This makes no sense. See

Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 n.19 (1994). What

also makes no sense is our continued use of this multi-factor,

no weights assigned, test in the face of the different (and far

simpler) standard supplied in the Equal Access to Justice Act,

28 U.S.C. s 2412. EAJA fits FOIA perfectly. It applies to

cases in which the United States or an agency is a party and

every FOIA case will be in that category. Compare Gray v.

New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 792 F.2d 251, 259 (1st Cir.

1986), refusing to borrow the EAJA standard in cases with

private litigants on both sides of the dispute.

Judge Wald believes that "the purposes of the fee-shifting

provisions of EAJA and of FOIA are different." Concur. op.

at 2 n.1. She distinguishes between the two on the ground

that EAJA is narrower and not designed to encourage litigation. See concur. op. at 2 n.1. Yet she would require FOIA

plaintiffs to fulfill three additional criteria that do not apply to

plaintiffs seeking fees under EAJA,1 frequently making it

harder to qualify for an attorney's fees award under FOIA

than under EAJA. I find it more logical to join the First

Circuit, which has concluded that there is "no fundamental

difference" between the policies underlying EAJA's and

FOIA's attorney's fees provisions. Crooker v. EPA, 763 F.2d

16, 17 (1st Cir. 1985).

_____________

1 Under both EAJA and FOIA, courts look to the merit of the

Government's litigating position in determining whether to award

attorney's fees. Compare 28 U.S.C. s 2412(d)(1)(A) (A court shall

award fees unless the "position of the United States was substantially justified.") with maj. op. at 4 (The fourth factor to be weighed

in determining whether fees should be awarded under FOIA is

"whether the Government had a reasonable basis for withholding

requested information.").

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