Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cv-00926/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cv-00926-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TYRONE JOHNSTON,

Plaintiff,

v.

MERCED DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S 

OFFICE, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:19-cv-00926-AWI-EPG

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

RECOMMENDING THAT THIS ACTION 

BE DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE AS TO 

THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY AND 

INVESTIGATING OFFICERS, AND 

WITHOUT PREJUDICE AS TO 

ATTORNEY FOSTER

(ECF No. 6)

OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, DUE WITHIN 

TWENTY-ONE (21) DAYS 

Plaintiff, Tyrone Johnston, appearing pro se and in forma pauperis, commenced this 

action on July 8, 2019, by filing a complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging law enforcement 

misconduct in connection with a murder charge against him. (ECF No. 1.) On November 25, 

2019, the Court issued a screening order finding that Plaintiff’s complaint stated no cognizable 

claims, and giving Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint. (ECF No. 5) Plaintiff filed a First 

Amended Complaint on December 19, 2019, which is before the Court for screening. (ECF 

No. 6).

For the reasons described below, the Court recommends that Plaintiff’s claim for 

malicious prosecution against the District Attorney, Nicole Silvera, be dismissed based on 

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absolute prosecutorial immunity. The Court recommends that Plaintiff’s claim against 

Detectives Brum and Vierra be dismissed because the prosecutor’s independent decision to 

charge Plaintiff immunizes them from claims arising from their investigation. The Court 

recommends that Plaintiff’s claim against his attorney, Douglas Foster, be dismissed without 

prejudice because the Court lacks jurisdiction over this solely state law claim.

Plaintiff has twenty-one days to file objections to these findings and recommendations.

I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), in any case in which a plaintiff is proceeding in forma 

pauperis, the Court must conduct a review of the complaint to determine whether it “state[s] a 

claim on which relief may be granted,” is “frivolous or malicious,” or “seek[s] monetary relief 

against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” If the Court determines that the 

complaint fails to state a claim, it must be dismissed. Id. An action is frivolous if it is “of little 

weight or importance: having no basis in law or fact” and malicious if it was filed with the 

“intention or desire to harm another.” Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Leave to amend may be granted to the extent that the deficiencies of the complaint can be cured 

by amendment. Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995). 

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient 

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

at 663 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal 

conclusions are not. Id. at 678.

In determining whether a complaint states an actionable claim, the Court must accept 

the allegations in the complaint as true, Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of Rex Hospital, 425 U.S. 738, 

740 (1976), construe pro se pleadings liberally in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, 

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Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000), and resolve all doubts in the Plaintiff’s 

favor, Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). Pleadings of pro se plaintiffs “must be

held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 

F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that pro se complaints should continue to be liberally 

construed after Iqbal).

II. ALLEGATIONS IN THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

Plaintiff alleges as follows in his First Amended Complaint:

Plaintiff titles the First Amended Complaint “Atwater Police Department and Detective 

Brum and Vierra.” 

Plaintiff alleges that on July 2, 2018, there was an incident involving himself that 

resulted in the loss of life of Arthur Hudson of Merced CA, and that the loss of life was due to 

self-defense. 

During the investigation into Arthur Hudson’s loss of life, Plaintiff alleges that Atwater 

Police Department Detectives Brum and Vierra violated Plaintiff’s civil rights. Plaintiff claims 

he was falsely arrested.

Plaintiff does not have access to discovery in the case due to a current ruling, so 

Plaintiff alleges the following by memory.

One female witness called 911 and gave eye-witness information about a crime being 

committed. Based on her explanation, it was self-defense. The investigating officers are heard 

laughing at the end of the call. They disregarded this important information. 

Rondell Hudson was interviewed by Detectives Brum and Vierra. He was also 

interviewed by Merced Law Enforcement Agent James Rochester on three occasions. During 

the first interview, Mr. Hudson gives Detective Brum the same information, with the exception 

of a few minor details, as the female 911 witness. Rondell Hudson is released.

On the second day of interview of Mr. Hudson, Detectives Brum, Vierra, and Agent 

Rochester all interview Mr. Hudson. Hudson provides the same information. He is released.

Hudson is summoned for a third interview. This time, he is shown drone footage and 

asked to explain the information in detail. Rondell Hudson does this in vivid detail from 

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memory. Afterwards, Detective Vierra starts to provide details to Hudson that contradict 

Hudson’s statement but omit details from the female 911 caller’s statement. Although the 

female 911 caller said that a weapon was removed from the scene, the Detectives omitted this 

information and told Rondell Hudson that they never found a weapon without giving 

information about why they did not find a weapon. Similarly, although the female 911 caller

said that a second suspect ran away from the scene, the Detectives withheld this information 

although it would also explain why no weapon was found at the scene. Rondell Hudson’s first 

statement indicated that there was a mutual incident involving two people with weapons. This 

was consistent with the female 911 caller’s statement. 

Rondell Hudson changed his statement after this questioning. Rondell Hudson’s change 

of statement led to Plaintiff’s false arrest.

The Detectives told Rondell Hudson that he was a suspected accomplice and could be 

charged as such. They also told Rondell Hudson that he had two strikes and if he was charged, 

he would spend his life in prison. At this time, Rondell Hudson was on an ankle bracelet and 

could be tracked by law enforcement. The police strong-armed him into agreeing with at least 

two false police statements. 

Also, the Assistant District Attorney, Nicole Silvera wrongly decided to prosecute 

Plaintiff. The criteria for the charge of Malicious Premeditated Homicide are “very high. Once 

charged, prosecutors pursue convictions for life in prison or the death penalty. So, there should 

be a higher standard than usual for pursuing such a charge, and scrutiny of their discovery must 

be impeccable. If there is exculpatory evidence that may put in dispute any of the officers’ 

conduct or the investigation of any information that calls into question the charge, then the DA 

must exercise caution in proceeding or “Not Charge” based on this information or request a full 

dismissal in the interest of justice.

D.A. Nicole Silvera knew of the 911 call that explained the situation as self-defense 

from day 1. She also knew that the officers threatened the only witness for the prosecution of 

being an accomplice if he didn’t change his statement. The manner in which the changed 

statement came about should have concerned the DA. There is no reason why the DA ignored 

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these relevant elements of evidence, which violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights not to be 

arrested or subjected to false prosecution. Furthermore, Ms. Silvera knew the statements from 

two totally unrelated witnesses amounted to the same general information. Once the officers 

coerced the individual they had subjective control over, the DA held a preliminary hearing to 

cement the false allegations against Plaintiff. 

Also, Douglas Foster was Plaintiff’s attorney. He constantly misled Plaintiff. He 

ignored Plaintiff’s pleading to send an investigator to collect information. He wanted a month 

to send an investigator. He told Plaintiff he was on vacation during this time. Mr. Foster came 

to Plaintiff with an offer he made, under the guise of it being from the DA. There was never an 

offer from the DA. Mr. Foster asked Plaintiff if he would accept 9 years. Plaintiff refused. 

Mr. Foster dragged the case out for six months. Plaintiff believes Mr. Foster was working with 

the DA toward Plaintiff’s conviction.

Mr. Foster failed to use any relevant information or introduce the 911 call in Plaintiff’s 

favor at the preliminary hearing. He told Plaintiff as his lawyer that Plaintiff would not be able 

to use the 911 call as evidence at trial. This is the reason Plaintiff hired a private attorney. The 

private attorney saw that Mr. Foster had been purposefully negligent in Plaintiff’s case. Mr. 

Loethen, Plaintiff’s private attorney, secured Plaintiff’s release within 45 days of accepting 

Plaintiff’s case. 

III. ANALYSIS OF PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS

A. Malicious Prosecution

“Federal courts rely on state common law for elements of malicious prosecution.” Mills 

v. City of Covina, 921 F.3d 1161, 1169 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. denied sub nom. Mills v. Covina, 

CA, No. 19-321, 2019 WL 5150535 (U.S. Oct. 15, 2019). “California law requires a plaintiff 

claiming malicious prosecution to establish ‘that the prior action (1) was commenced by or at 

the direction of the defendant and was pursued to a legal termination in his, plaintiff’s, favor; 

(2) was brought without probable cause; and (3) was initiated with malice.’” Id. (citations 

omitted). “Additionally, to maintain a § 1983 action for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must 

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show that the defendants prosecuted [him] ... for the purpose of denying [him] equal protection 

or another specific constitutional right.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).1

Construing all facts in favor of Plaintiff, as the Court must at the screening stage, 

Plaintiff has set forth a claim for malicious prosecution, however subject to the immunities 

discussed below. Plaintiff has claimed that a charge of Malicious Premeditated Homicide was 

commenced at the direction of the District Attorney, based on the investigation of the 

Detectives, without probable cause. He also alleges that he was released after being charged.2

B. Prosecutorial Immunity

Prosecutors acting in their official capacities are immune from Section 1983 lawsuits. 

The Ninth Circuit explained this immunity as follows:

Absolute immunity is generally accorded to judges and prosecutors functioning 

in their official capacities. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 364, 98 S.Ct. 

1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978) (holding that state circuit judge is immune from 

suit for all actions within his jurisdiction); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 

430–31, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976) (holding that state prosecutor had 

absolute immunity for initiation and pursuit of criminal prosecutions, including 

presentation of case at trial). This immunity reflects the long-standing “general 

principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice that a 

judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free to act 

upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to 

himself.” Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 347, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871).

Recognizing these considerations, courts have extended the protections of 

absolute immunity to qualifying state officials sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 895–96 (9th Cir.2003) (explaining that though 

§ 1983 does not include a defense of immunity, “the Supreme Court has 

recognized that when Congress enacted § 1983, it was aware of a wellestablished and well-understood common-law tradition that extended absolute 

immunity to individuals performing functions necessary to the judicial process” 

 

1 Although Plaintiff claims he was “falsely arrested,” the allegations he 

describes concerns his criminal charge as a result of the investigation, rather than a false arrest. 

Plaintiff does not describe his arrest. He does not claim there was an arrest without probable 

cause. The arrest took place ten days after the death of Mr. Arthur Hudson, after investigation 

described. Thus, the Court believes that the standards for malicious prosecution are the 

relevant standards in this case.

2 Plaintiff’s allegations may not be sufficient to establish malice. Given the 

Court’s analysis below regarding immunities, the Court need not reach this issue.

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(citing Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 225–26 (1988) (superseded by 

statute))); Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 268–69, 113 S.Ct. 2606, 125 

L.Ed.2d 209 (1993). Indeed, judicial immunity from § 1983 suits is “viewed as 

necessary to protect the judicial process.” Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 485, 111 

S.Ct. 1934, 114 L.Ed.2d 547 (1991). Likewise, the protections of absolute 

immunity accorded prosecutors reflect the “‘concern that harassment by 

unfounded litigation would cause a deflection of the prosecutor's energies from 

his public duties, and the possibility that he would shade his decisions instead of 

exercising the independence of judgment required by his public trust.’ ” Id.

(quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 423, 96 S.Ct. 984).

Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Medicine, 363 F.3d 916, 922–923 (9th Cir. 2004). See also Broam 

v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1028 (9th Cir. 2003) (“A state prosecutor is entitled to absolute 

immunity from liability under § 1983 for violating a person's federal constitutional rights when 

he or she engages in activities ‘intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal 

process.’”); Heinemann v. Satterberg, 731 F.3d 914, 916 (9th Cir. 2013) (upholding district

court’s finding on summary judgment that the decision to file a criminal complaint against the 

defendant in state court was protected by absolute prosecutorial immunity.)

Here, Plaintiff has alleged that Assistant District Attorney Nicole Silvera improperly 

charged him for Malicious Premeditated Homicide despite being aware of certain exculpatory 

information, including a 911 call and initial witness statement indicating that the person was 

killed in self-defense. Because Plaintiff’s allegations stem from her actions in her official 

capacity as prosecutor in his case, Silvera is entitled to absolute immunity from this claim 

based on the legal standards above. 

C. Officer Immunity

“It is a well-settled principle that the “[f]iling of a criminal complaint immunizes 

investigating officers ... from damages suffered thereafter because it is presumed that the 

prosecutor filing the complaint exercised independent judgment in determining that probable 

cause for an accused's arrest exists at that time. A § 1983 plaintiff may rebut this presumption, 

however, by showing that the district attorney was pressured or caused by the investigating 

officers to act contrary to his independent judgment. Such evidence must be substantial.” 

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Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1027 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal citations and 

quotations omitted). 

Here, Plaintiff alleges that Detectives Brum and Vierra are liable for improperly 

investigating the death of Arthur Hudson by ignoring relevant information in a 911 call that 

indicated self-defense, and by improperly pressuring a witness to change his account of events, 

leading to a false charge against Plaintiff. Under the legal standards above, the investigating 

officers are immune from this charge because it is presumed that the prosecutor made the 

determination to charge Plaintiff. 

Moreover, the facts even construed in favor of Plaintiff do not establish that the District 

Attorney was improperly pressured or caused by the officers to act contrary to her independent 

judgment On the contrary, Plaintiff alleges that “D.A. Nicole Silvera had the discovery from 

the onset of the case, she knew of the 911 call that explained the self-defense from day 1. She 

also knew the officer’s threatened the only witness for the prosecution with being an 

accomplice if he didn’t change his statement.” (ECF No. 6, at p. 3-4). 

D. Professional Negligence

Plaintiff also alleges that his attorney, Douglas Foster, was purposefully negligent in his 

defense. 

Under California common law, the elements of a claim for professional negligence are: 

“(1) the duty of the professional to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as other members of 

his profession commonly possess and exercise; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a proximate causal 

connection between the negligent conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or 

damage resulting from the professional’s negligence.” Osornio v. Weingarten, 124 Cal.App.4th 

304, 319 (2004).

Plaintiff’s allegations may state a cause of action under California law for professional 

negligence under these legal standards, but the Court does not reach this question because any 

claim would be under state law, and without a viable federal claim, this Court lacks jurisdiction 

over purely state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The Court recommends that this claim be 

dismissed without prejudice to Plaintiff refiling his claim in state court.

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IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

For the reasons described above, the Court recommends that Plaintiff’s claim for 

malicious prosecution against the District Attorney, Nicole Silvera, be dismissed based on 

absolute prosecutorial immunity. The Court recommends that Plaintiff’s claim against 

Detectives Brum and Vierra be dismissed because the prosecutor’s independent decision to 

charge Plaintiff immunizes them from claims arising from their investigation. The Court 

recommends that Plaintiff’s claim against his attorney, Douglas Foster, be dismissed without 

prejudice because the Court lacks jurisdiction over this solely state law claim.

The Court does not recommend granting further leave to amend because the Court 

previously provided Plaintiff with applicable legal standards and an opportunity to amend his 

complaint, and further amendment would be futile.

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that: 

1. Plaintiff’s claim for malicious prosecution against the District Attorney, 

Nicole Silvera, be dismissed with prejudice based on absolute 

prosecutorial immunity;

2. Plaintiff’s claim against Detectives Brum and Vierra be dismissed with 

prejudice because the prosecutor’s independent decision to charge 

Plaintiff immunizes them from claims arising from their investigation;

3. Plaintiff’s claim against his attorney, Douglas Foster, be dismissed 

without prejudice because the Court lacks jurisdiction over this solely 

state law claim

4. The Clerk of the Court be directed to close this case.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the district judge assigned to the 

case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty-one (21) days after 

being served with these findings and recommendations, Plaintiff may file written objections 

with the court. Such a document should be captioned, “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s 

Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the 

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specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 

834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 6, 2020 /s/

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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