Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_19-cv-00016/USCOURTS-alsd-1_19-cv-00016-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 445
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Employment
Cause of Action: Disability Act of 1990

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

JAN CLINTON CHILSON, *

 *

Plaintiff, *

 *

vs. * CIVIL ACTION NO. 19-00016-TFM-B

 * 

THOMAS B. MODLY, * 

Acting Secretary, *

Department of the Navy, *

*

Defendant. *

 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Thomas B. Modly, 

Acting Secretary, Department of the Navy’s1 (“Agency” or “Navy”) 

motion to dismiss. (Doc. 8). The motion, which has been fully 

briefed, has been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for 

entry of a report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1)(B) and S.D. Ala. CivLR 72(a)(2)(S). Upon consideration 

of all matters presented, the undersigned recommends, for the 

reasons stated herein, that the Agency’s motion be DENIED without 

prejudice, and that Plaintiff be ordered to properly serve the 

Navy within twenty (20) days. 

1 The Court takes judicial notice that Thomas B. Modly is the 

current Acting Secretary of the Navy. Accordingly, pursuant to 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d), the Clerk is DIRECTED to substitute Thomas 

B. Modly, Acting Secretary, Department of the Navy, as the 

Defendant in this case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d); (see also Doc. 

1 at 2 (naming then-Secretary Richard V. Spencer as Defendant)). 

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I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Jan Clinton Chilson (“Chilson”) was formerly 

employed as a GS-0343-12 Program Analyst for the Navy’s Strategic 

Weapons Facility, Atlantic (“SWFLANT”), located in Kings Bay, 

Georgia.2 (Doc. 1 at 3; Doc. 8-1 at 13). He retired from federal 

service effective May 31, 2015. (Doc. 1 at 5; Doc. 8-2). 

Proceeding pro se, Chilson filed the instant action against 

the Navy on January 15, 2019. (Doc. 1). In count one of his 

complaint, Chilson alleges that, from September 2014 to May 2015, 

the Agency discriminated against him based on his disability (ADHD 

and dyscalculia) by terminating his employment and through the

“[u]nauthorized release of disabled-medical information.” (Id. at 

3-5). Chilson contends that as a result of the Agency’s 

discriminatory actions, he had to retire four years ahead of 

schedule.3 (Id. at 5). In count two, Chilson alleges that the 

2 According to the Agency, “SWFLANT is a field activity of, and 

reports to the Strategic Systems Programs (SSP), which is 

headquartered at the Washington Navy Yard, DC.” (Doc. 8 at 2).

3 In his complaint, Chilson alleges that the facts of his case are 

as follows:

The Agency violated the Privacy Act and the ADA in their 

recruitment process for the Plaintiff (“No agency shall 

disclose any record which is contained in a system of 

records by any means of communication to any person, or 

to another agency, except pursuant to a written request 

by or with the prior written consent of the individual 

to whom the records pertain”. 5 USC 552a(b). The 

information that the Agency released to Department of 

the Navy recruiters included the following: “difficulty 

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Agency violated the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, by releasing his 

medical information, which mischaracterized his limitations, to 

Department of the Navy recruiters during the reasonable 

accommodation reassignment process in October 2014, and by sharing 

his reasonable accommodation request and all associated 

documentation, including medical information, with a Navy doctor

without authorization in May 2015. (Id.). In the third count, 

in arithmetic and diminished performance in activities 

requiring mathematical calculations and manipulation; 

inability to perform budgetary duties; inability to 

focus in order to accomplish tasks; and inability to 

function in a high stress position”. At the time of 

this specific information being released by the Agency 

(October 2014), the Plaintiff had received a Successful 

in his annual performance evaluation (September 2014). 

This evaluation successfully rated him as carrying out 

his budgetary responsibilities for a seven million 

dollar annual budget. These discriminatory actions 

resulted in the Plantiff [sic] retiring four years ahead 

of schedule. The Agency also shared the Plaintiff’s 

reasonable accommodation request and all associated 

documentaiton [sic], including medical information, that 

was one year old, to a Navy doctor the month the 

Plaintiff retired – May 2015. The Plaintiff did not 

authorize the Agency to do so. The Agency did not adhere 

the guidance of the Merit System Principles since its 

recruitment process for the Plaintiff was not a fair and 

open competetion [sic] which assured equal opporutnity 

[sic]. The selection should have been determined soley 

[sic] on the basis of relative ability, knoweldge [sic] 

and skills of the individual. Instead the Agency 

utilized not accurate nor current medical information 

which tainted the Plaintiff’s oppporunities [sic] to 

obtain other employment in the Department of the Navy 

since disabled medical information had been shared by 

the Agency to other commands recruiters in the area.

(Doc. 1 at 5).

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Chilson alleges that during the reasonable accommodation 

reassignment process, the Agency violated Merit System Principles, 

5 U.S.C. § 2301, by utilizing inaccurate and outdated medical 

information, and that this tainted his opportunities to obtain 

other employment within the Department of the Navy. (Id.).

In the instant motion, the Agency seeks the dismissal of

Chilson’s complaint for failure to properly serve the Navy in 

accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(i)(2). (Doc. 8 

at 11-12). In addition, the Agency moves for dismissal of count 

one for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted 

on the basis of untimeliness, dismissal of count two on the basis 

of untimeliness, and dismissal of count three for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction based on failure to exhaust administrative 

remedies. (Id. at 12-19). The motion has been fully briefed and 

is now ready for resolution. 

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. Service of Process.

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs the 

sufficiency of process, and Rule 4(i) governs service of process 

against the United States and its agencies, corporations, 

officers, and employees. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4. A defendant may 

seek dismissal under Rule 12(b)(2) for lack of personal 

jurisdiction and under Rule 12(b)(5) for insufficient service of 

process if the plaintiff fails to properly effectuate service under 

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Rule 4. See, e.g., Reed v. Potter, 2006 WL 8433069, at *2 (N.D. 

Ga. May 16, 2006), report and recommendation adopted, 2006 WL 

8433112 (N.D. Ga. July 19, 2006). It is the defendant’s burden to 

establish that service was insufficient, and a defendant’s

“challenge of sufficiency of process must describe with 

specificity how the service of process failed to meet the 

procedural requirements of [Rule 4].” Hollander v. Wolf, 2009 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101446, at *7, 2009 WL 3336012, at *3 (S.D. Fla. 

Oct. 14, 2009). “Once a defendant challenges service of process, 

plaintiff has the burden to demonstrate sufficient service of 

process by making a prima facie case of proper service.” Id.; 

Familia de Boom v. Arosa Mercantil, S.A., 629 F.2d 1134, 1139 (5th 

Cir. 1980)4 (“[W]hen service of process is challenged, the party 

on whose behalf service is made has the burden of establishing its 

validity.”), overruled on other grounds by Ins. Corp. of Ireland, 

Ltd. v. Compagnie Des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982). If 

the plaintiff can make such a showing, the burden then shifts back 

to the defendant to “bring strong and convincing evidence of 

insufficient process.” Hollander, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101446, 

at *8, 2009 WL 3336012, at *3. “The Court may look to affidavits, 

4 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 

1981) (en banc), the Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding precedent 

the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit rendered prior to October 

1, 1981.

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depositions and oral testimony to resolve disputed questions of 

fact.” Id.

“Service of process is a jurisdictional requirement: a court 

lacks jurisdiction over the person of a defendant when the 

defendant has not been served.” Pardazi v. Cullman Med. Ctr., 896 

F.2d 1313, 1317 (11th Cir. 1990). Therefore, where a court finds 

insufficient service, it is improper for the court to reach the 

merits of the case and to issue a dismissal with prejudice. 

Jackson v. Warden, FCC Coleman-USP, 259 F. App’x 181, 182-83 (11th 

Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (citing Pardazi, 896 F.2d at 1317).5

B. Rule 12(b)(1).

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a defendant 

may seek dismissal of a case claiming that the court lacks subject 

matter jurisdiction over the suit. A challenge to a district 

court’s exercise of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 

12(b)(1) may take one of two forms: a facial or factual attack. 

Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1528-29 (11th Cir. 1990). In 

a facial attack, a court simply must examine the pleading and 

determine whether the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a basis 

5 Federal Appendix cases are unpublished Eleventh Circuit opinions 

and are not considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as 

persuasive authority. 11th Cir. R. 36-2; Henry v. Comm’r of Soc. 

Sec., 802 F.3d 1264, 1267 n.1 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (“Cases 

printed in the Federal Appendix are cited as persuasive 

authority.”).

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for subject matter jurisdiction, while accepting the plaintiff’s 

allegations as true and construing them most favorably to the 

plaintiff. Id. at 1529. A factual attack challenges the existence 

of subject matter jurisdiction in fact, irrespective of the 

pleadings, and the court may consider matters outside the pleadings 

and weigh conflicting evidence. Id. On a facial attack, a 

plaintiff is afforded safeguards similar to those provided in 

opposing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, meaning that the court must 

consider the allegations of the complaint to be true. Id. But 

when the attack is factual, the trial court may weigh the evidence, 

and there is no presumption of truthfulness that attaches to the 

plaintiff’s allegations. Id. When a party challenges subject 

matter jurisdiction, the court has authority to resolve factual 

disputes and is given “discretion to devise a method for making a 

determination with regard to the jurisdictional issue.” Odyssey 

Marine Expl., Inc. v. Unidentified Shipwrecked Vessel, 657 F.3d 

1159, 1170 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted).

C. Rule 12(b)(6).

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

authorizes a motion to dismiss an action on the ground that the 

allegations in the complaint fail to state a claim upon which 

relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). On such a 

motion, the “issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately 

prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to 

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support the claims.” Little v. City of N. Miami, 805 F.2d 962, 

965 (11th Cir. 1986) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 

(1974)). “When considering a motion to dismiss, all facts set 

forth in the plaintiff’s complaint ‘are to be accepted as true and

the court limits its consideration to the pleadings and exhibits 

attached thereto.’” Grossman v. Nationsbank, N.A., 225 F.3d 1228, 

1231 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (quoting GSW, Inc. v. Long 

Cnty., 999 F.2d 1508, 1510 (11th Cir. 1993)). The court must draw

“all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.” St. George 

v. Pinellas Cnty., 285 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2002). However, 

the court is not required to accept as true a plaintiff’s legal 

conclusions. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must state on its 

face a plausible claim for relief, and “[a] claim has facial 

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows 

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Unless a plaintiff has 

“nudged [his] claims across the line from conceivable to 

plausible,” the complaint “must be dismissed.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “The plausibility standard is 

not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than 

a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 

556 U.S at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S at 556).

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D. Pro Se Litigation.

When considering a pro se litigant’s allegations, a court 

gives them a liberal construction, holding them to a less stringent 

standard than those of an attorney. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 

519, 520 (1972). However, a court does not have “license . . . to 

rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading [by a pro se litigant] in 

order to sustain an action.” GJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. of Escambia, 

Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998), overruled on other 

grounds by Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); see Randall v. Scott, 610 

F.3d 701, 709-10 (11th Cir. 2010) (observing Iqbal’s overruling of 

GJR Investments’ heightened pleading standard for civil rights 

complaints). Furthermore, a pro se litigant “is subject to the 

relevant law and rules of court including the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure.” Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir.

1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 863 (1989).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Proper Service of Process.

The Agency first argues that Chilson’s complaint should be 

dismissed because there is no evidence that he properly served the 

Navy. (Doc. 8 at 11-12). The Agency attaches to its motion the 

affidavit of Timothy J. Cothrel, Senior Associate Counsel, Command 

Liaison and Training, at the Naval Litigation Office, who states 

that his duties include “supervising the litigation support staff 

and overseeing the management of subpoenas, requests for 

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information, and service of process in general.” (Doc. 8-4 at 1). 

Mr. Cothrel cites 32 C.F.R. § 257.5(c), which states that the 

“Secretary of the Navy, or his designee, the General Counsel, shall 

accept service of process for the Department of the Navy.” 32 

C.F.R. § 257.5(c). Mr. Cothrel states that it is Navy policy and 

practice that all process pertaining to the Department must be 

served via the Naval Litigation Office, and that any summons sent 

to the Secretary of the Navy or the General Counsel is immediately 

forwarded to the Naval Litigation Office, at which point it is 

formally accepted using specific procedures outlined in his 

affidavit. (Doc. 8-4 at 1). According to Mr. Cothrel, service of 

the Navy may be accomplished in one of three ways: use of a process 

server, certified mail going through the mail room at the Pentagon, 

or express delivery (such as Federal Express, UPS, or Express Mail) 

directly to the Naval Litigation Office at the Washington Navy 

Yard. (Id.). Mr. Cothrel avers that he has twice asked support 

staff members to search the Department’s official electronic 

records repository to ascertain whether a summons has been received 

for a “Chilson” case, most recently on April 17, 2019, and that on 

both occasions, a staff member verified that no document associated 

with that name has been served on the Navy. (Id.).

In response, Chilson asserts that the summons “was sent to 

the Navy Department located in Washington Navy Yard, DC. This was 

the same address that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 

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(EEOC) used for mailing purposes throughout the Plaintiff’s EEOC 

appeals’ [sic] process . . . .” (Doc. 11 at 1). Chilson maintains 

that “[t]his address is also the correct address where the Navy 

Department has stipulated where Summons should be sent which 

concerns Navy personnel.” (Id. at 1-2).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(i)(1) provides that service 

upon the United States shall be executed: (A) by delivering a copy 

of the summons and complaint to the United States attorney for the 

district where the action is brought or to an assistant United 

States attorney or clerical employee designated by the United 

States attorney in a writing filed with the clerk of the court, or 

by sending a copy of the summons and complaint by registered or 

certified mail addressed to the civil process clerk at the United 

States attorney’s office; and (B) by also sending a copy of the 

summons and complaint by registered or certified mail to the 

Attorney General of the United States at Washington, D.C. Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 4(i)(1)(A)-(B). In addition, to serve a United States 

agency or corporation, or a United States officer or employee sued 

only in an official capacity, a party must serve the United States 

as set forth in Rule 4(i)(1) and also send a copy of the summons 

and complaint by registered or certified mail to the agency, 

corporation, officer, or employee. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(2).

On March 27, 2019, Chilson filed three proofs of service in 

this case (one each for the United States attorney, Attorney 

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General, and the Navy), which included certified mail receipts 

showing that Plaintiff served the United States attorney and 

Attorney General.6 (Doc. 7 at 3, 9). In his proof of service for

the Navy, Chilson stated that the summons was “[d]elivered via 

USPS via certified mail on March 8, 2019.” (Id. at 5). He did 

not attach a certified mail receipt to the proof of service for 

the Navy, but rather what appears to be a United States Postal 

Service tracking receipt7 which listed only a tracking number and 

the following delivery status: 

Delivered

March 8, 2019 at 11:38 am

Delivered, Front Desk/Reception/Mail Room

NAVAL ANACOST ANNEX, DC 20373

(Id. at 6).

By submitting the affidavit of Mr. Cothrel, along with 

supporting documents, Defendant has met its responsibility of

specifically describing how Chilson’s service of process on the 

Navy failed to meet the procedural requirements of Rule 4(i)(2). 

Thus, Chilson bears the burden to establish a prima facie case of 

6 The Agency does not appear to dispute that the United States 

attorney and the Attorney General of the United States were

properly served; thus, the relevant question is whether Plaintiff 

complied with Rule 4(i)(2) by properly serving the Navy.

7 The tracking receipt appears to have been printed from the 

Internet, although there is no URL on the page, and the tracking 

receipt does not specifically indicate that it is from the United 

States Postal Service or bear any official markings. (See Doc. 7 

at 6).

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valid service. This he fails to do. Neither Chilson’s proof of 

service nor the attached tracking receipt lists the name of the 

individual or the specific Navy office to which the summons and 

complaint were sent. Chilson’s contention that he sent the summons 

to the same Washington Navy Yard address that was used for mailing 

purposes throughout his EEOC appeals process does nothing to 

establish that he served a copy of the summons and complaint on 

the appropriate Navy official or the appropriate office – the Naval 

Litigation Office. In fact, it suggests the opposite. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that Chilson has not met his burden 

of establishing that he complied with Rule 4(i)’s requirements for 

service on the Navy. 

Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides 

the time limit for effecting service:

If a defendant is not served within 90 days after the 

complaint is filed, the court—on motion or its own after 

notice to the plaintiff—must dismiss the action without 

prejudice against that defendant or order that service 

be made within a specified time. But if the plaintiff 

shows good cause for the failure, the court must extend 

the time for service for an appropriate period.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). Chilson’s complaint was filed on January 

15, 2019; thus, he has failed to properly serve the Navy within

the ninety days provided by Rule 4(m). However, Rule 4(i) has a 

savings clause, which provides in relevant part that “[t]he court 

must allow a party a reasonable time to cure its failure to: (A) 

serve a person required to be served under Rule 4(i)(2), if the 

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party has served either the United States attorney or the Attorney 

General of the United States[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(4)(A). As

there is no dispute that Chilson served both the United States 

attorney and the Attorney General, the Court must allow Chilson a 

reasonable time to cure the failure to properly serve the Navy 

under Rule 4(i)(2). See Reed, 2006 WL 8433069, at *2.

Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that the Agency’s

motion to dismiss for insufficient service of process be denied

without prejudice, that Chilson be given twenty (20) days upon 

entry of the order of the District Judge to properly serve the 

Navy, and that the Agency be permitted to re-file its motion to 

dismiss for insufficient service of process if Chilson fails to 

serve process properly within this Court’s deadline.

In addition to seeking dismissal of Chilson’s complaint 

pursuant to Rules 12(b)(2) (lack of personal jurisdiction) and 

12(b)(5) (insufficient service of process) based on failure to 

properly serve the Navy, Defendant’s motion seeks dismissal of 

count one under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, 

dismissal of Chilson’s Privacy Act claim as time-barred,8 and 

8 See Gonzalez v. United States, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 224454, at 

*10-11 & n.5, 2018 WL 7825025, at *4-5 & n.5 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 11, 

2018) (noting that “the Eleventh Circuit has not spoken to whether 

the Privacy Act’s two-year statute of limitations is 

jurisdictional in nature” and that there “is currently a split 

among the circuits that have considered the issue” and construing 

the Government’s argument that the plaintiff’s complaint 

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dismissal of Chilson’s claim under 5 U.S.C. § 2301 for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction based on failure to exhaust 

administrative remedies. (See Doc. 8). While “a defendant may 

join objections to jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2) with a motion 

to dismiss for failure to state a claim or any other defenses that 

are assertable by motion without waiving the jurisdictional 

defense[,] . . . [a]s a general rule, when the court is confronted 

by a motion raising a combination of Rule 12(b) defenses, it will 

pass on the jurisdictional issues before considering whether a 

claim was stated by the complaint.” Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 

1514 & n.1 (11th Cir. 1990) (stating that a defendant that is not 

subject to the jurisdiction of the court cannot be bound by its 

rulings). In light of the undersigned’s finding that Chilson has 

failed to perfect service on the Navy and should be afforded the 

opportunity to cure said defect, it would be premature for this 

Court to reach the merits of Defendant’s other arguments for 

dismissal. See Cuyler v. Fed. IRS, Dep’t of the Treasury, 2016 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182800, at *10-11, 2016 WL 11581655, at *4 (N.D. 

Ga. July 14, 2016) (declining to reach alternative arguments for 

dismissal on grounds of sovereign immunity, failure to exhaust 

administrative remedies, and failure to state a claim after 

concluding that the complaint should be dismissed for insufficient 

established that the Privacy Act claims were time-barred as a 

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim).

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service of process), report and recommendation adopted, 2016 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 182796, 2016 WL 7888021 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 16, 2016).

Thus, under the circumstances, it is recommended that the Agency’s 

motion to dismiss count one for failure to state a claim, motion 

to dismiss count two as time-barred, and motion to dismiss count 

three for failure to exhaust administrative remedies be denied 

without prejudice as premature at this time.9

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned recommends

that the Agency’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 8) be DENIED without 

prejudice, and that Plaintiff be ordered to properly serve the 

Navy within twenty (20) days. 

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO FILE OBJECTIONS

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on 

all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects 

to this recommendation or anything in it must, within fourteen (14) 

days of the date of service of this document, file specific written 

objections with the Clerk of this Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); S.D. Ala. GenLR 72(c). The parties should 

note that under Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, “[a] party failing to 

9 If Chilson timely effects proper service of process, the Agency 

can re-file its motion to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(1) 

within the time limits set forth by the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure. 

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object to a magistrate judge’s findings or recommendations 

contained in a report and recommendation in accordance with the 

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge 

on appeal the district court’s order based on unobjected-to factual 

and legal conclusions if the party was informed of the time period 

for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to object. 

In the absence of a proper objection, however, the court may review 

on appeal for plain error if necessary in the interests of justice.” 

11th Cir. R. 3-1. 

In order to be specific, an objection must identify the 

specific place in the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation 

where the disputed determination is found. An objection that 

merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before 

the Magistrate Judge is not specific. 

DONE this 12th day of February, 2020.

 /s/ SONJA F. BIVINS 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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