Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01712/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01712-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSEPH E. RANSOM,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 09-cv-1712-WQH (WMc)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED

STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE RE:

GRANTING RESPONDENT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

vs.

MATTHEW C. KRAMER, Warden,

Respondent.

I. INTRODUCTION

Joseph E. Ransom (hereinafter “Petitioner” or “Ransom”), a state inmate proceeding pro

se, seeks habeas corpus relief from his conviction for first degree residential burglary. Matthew C.

Kramer, Warden of Folsom State Penitentiary, (hereinafter “Respondent”), filed his Motion to

Dismiss Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and moves this Court to dismiss the Petition as

untimely under 28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(1)(D). [Doc. No. 9.] Petitioner has not filed an opposition or

any other responsive pleading.

Based upon the documents presently before the Court and for the reasons stated below, the

Court RECOMMENDS Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED.

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

Petitioner is currently serving a prison term of eighteen years following his conviction of

first degree residential burglary and a finding as true that Petitioner had been previously convicted

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1

 Thus, had Petitioner filed his federal petition within the statute of limitations, his federal petition

would be unexhausted. Generally, applications for writs of habeas corpus that contain unexhausted claims must

be dismissed. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982). To exhaust state judicial remedies, a California

state prisoner must present the California Supreme Court with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of every

issue raised in his or her federal habeas petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c); Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129,

133-34 (1987). The petitioner must have raised the very same federal claims brought in the federal petition

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of two serious felony offenses. Each prior felony offense was found to constitute a strike. 

 Petitioner appealed. 

On May 9, 2005, Petitioner appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeal of California.

On October 19, 2006, the state appellate court affirmed Petitioner’s conviction.

On November 28, 2006, Petitioner filed an appeal with the California Supreme Court. On

February 7, 2007, the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s appeal. On May 8, 2007,

Petitioner’s conviction became final. 

Therefore, on May 8, 2007, Petitioner’s one-year statute of limitations under the AEDPA

began to run. 

On May 8, 2008, Petitioner’s one-year limitations period under the AEDPA expired. 

On August 6, 2009, 455 days after the statute of limitations expired, Petitioner filed

his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. [Doc. No. 1.] Petitioner also submitted a Motion to

proceed in forma pauperis, with the United States District Court for the Southern District of

California. [Doc. No. 2.] (Case No. 09-cv-1712.) 

On November 19, 2009, Respondent filed his Motion to Dismiss Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus [Doc. No. 9] and his Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion

to Dismiss Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. [Doc. No. 9.]

III. SUMMARY OF CLAIMS

Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss asserts the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is barred

by the one-year statute of limitations set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). [Doc. No. 9.] 

Petitioner’s statute of limitations expired on May 8, 2008. Respondent contends the instant

Petition is untimely because Petitioner waited over two years after completing his direct review to

file a federal petition. In addition, Respondent points out Petitioner failed to seek collateral review

in the state courts after completing his direct appeal review1

. [Doc. No. 9 at pg. 4.] 

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before the state supreme court. See Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995). 

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Respondent further contends Petitioner fails to qualify for statutory tolling because his first

Petition was filed after the statute of limitations had already expired. [Id..] Respondent also

contends Petitioner does not qualify for equitable tolling because Petitioner has failed to

demonstrate some extraordinary circumstance prevented him from filing timely. [Id.]

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-

132, 110 Stat. 1214, created a one-year statute of limitations for filing of a federal habeas petition

by a state prisoner. The applicable statute of limitations is set forth in 28 U.S.C. §2244(d) as

follows:

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of:

(A) the date on which judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review (emphasis

added);

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is

removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized

by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on

collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence (emphasis added).

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending

shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.

A. Statutory Tolling

The time during which a properly filed application for state post-conviction relief or other

collateral review is pending is not counted toward the AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations. 28

U.S.C. §2244(d)(2). Accordingly, the statute of limitations is tolled while a state prisoner is

attempting, through proper use of state court procedures, to exhaust state remedies with regard to a

particular post-conviction application. Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999)

(quoting and adopting the holding in Barnett v. Lemaster, 167 F.3d 1321, 1323 (10th Cir. 1999)).

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The limitations period is also tolled during intervals between a state court’s disposition of a state

habeas petition and the filing of an appeal or petition at the next state appellate level. Nino, 183

F.3d at 1004.

If the petitioner chooses to invoke the original habeas jurisdiction of the California courts

and files a new habeas petition at each level, the application for habeas review is pending during

the time between those filings, as long as they were filed within a “reasonable time” after denial at

the lower level, as that term is defined under California law. Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214

(2002).

A petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling between the conclusion of one round of state

collateral review and the start of a subsequent round of state collateral review unless the

subsequent round of review is “limited to an elaboration of the facts relating to the claims in the

first petition”, in which case the new round is considered part of the first full round of review. 

King v. Roe, 340 F.3d 821, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) (abrogation on other grounds recognized by Waldrip

v. Hall, 548 F.3d 729, 733 (9th Cir. 2008)).

Further, an application for post-conviction review made after the expiration of the one-year

statute of limitations period do not revive the filing period and statutory tolling does not apply.

Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 417 (2005); Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 480-81 (9th Cir.

2002.)

B. Equitable Tolling

The Ninth Circuit has held the AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations is subject to

equitable tolling “only if extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner's control make it

impossible to file a petition on time.” Stillman v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199, 1202 (9th Cir. 2003)

(citing Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999)). Generally, a litigant seeking

equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two elements: (1) he has been pursuing his rights

diligently, and (2) some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544

U.S. 408, 418 (2005) (citing Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990)).

The burden is on the Petitioner to prove whether any “extraordinary circumstances” were

the cause of any untimeliness, rather than merely a lack of diligence on Petitioner’s part. Spitsyn

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28 2 Petitioner signed the Petition on August 3, 2009. In accordance with the prisoner mailbox rule, the

Petition was effectively filed on this date.

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v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003); Stillman, 319 F.3d at 1203. Further, “‘the threshold

necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] is very high,’” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d

1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir. 2000)),

with the result that equitable tolling is “unavailable in most cases.” Miles, 187 F.3d at 1107. 

V. DISCUSSION

A. The Petition is Untimely

The AEDPA places a one-year statute of limitations on a habeas corpus petition filed “by a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.” 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1). 

On February 7, 2007, the California Supreme Court of issued a decision in Petitioner’s

criminal case. Because Petitioner did not seek a further review, his conviction became final 90

days after the issuance of that decision, i.e. May 8, 2007. The one-year limitations period

began to run the following day. Petitioner failed to make a collateral attack until August 3,

20092

, 452 days after the statute of limitaitons had already expired. Absent sufficient tolling

of the limitations period, the Petition is untimely. 

B. Statutory Tolling

The statute of limitations applied to an application for a writ of habeas corpus in federal

courts is tolled while a “properly filed” state habeas corpus petition is “pending” in the state court. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Specifically, the “statute of limitations is tolled from the time the first

state habeas petition is filed until the California Supreme Court rejects the petitioner’s final

collateral challenge,” provided the petitions were properly filed and pending. Nino v. Galaza, 183

F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999). The time between a lower state court’s determination and the

filing of a notice of appeal to a higher state court is considered to be “pending,” provided filing of

notice to appeal is timely under state law. Carey v. Staffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002). An application

for state post-conviction relief or collateral review is “properly filed” (as is required in order to toll

the period for filing a federal habeas petition) “when its delivery and acceptance are in compliance

with the applicable laws and rules governing filings”. Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000). A

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state post-conviction petition that cannot be “initiated or considered due to the failure to include a

timely claim is not ‘properly filed.’” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 417 (2005) (citing Artuz,

531 U.S. at 10)). Further, “[a] federal habeas [corpus] petition is not an ‘application for State postconviction or other collateral review’ within the meaning” of the tolling provision of the AEDPA.

Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 167 (2001) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)). 

Petitioner does not contend he is entitled to statutory tolling. Therefore, the Court should

not entertain the possibility of statutory tolling.

C. Equitable Tolling

In order to trigger equitable tolling of the statute of limitations for the purpose of filing a

habeas petition, Petitioner must demonstrate extraordinary circumstances beyond his control made

it impossible to file a petition on time. Allen v. Lewis, 255 F.3d 798, 799-800 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Further, Petitioner must demonstrate the extraordinary circumstances were the proximate cause of

his untimeliness, rather than merely a lack of diligence on his part. Spitsyn, 345 F.3d at 799;

Stillman, 319 F.3d at 1203. Petitioner bears the burden of proof to show that this “extraordinary

exclusion” should apply in his case. Miranda, 292 F.3d at 1065. Finally, a pro se prisoner’s

ignorance of the law does not generally warrant equitable tolling. See Raspberry v. Garcia, 448

F.3d 1150, at 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (a pro se petitioner’s lack of legal sophistication or ability to

calculate the statute of limitations is not, by itself, an extraordinary circumstance warranting

equitable tolling). 

Petitioner has not submitted an opposition or other responsive pleading in response to

Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss. 

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds the statute of limitations began to run on May 8,

2007 and expired on May 9, 2007. According to a review of the court’s electronic docket,

Petitioner filed an unexhausted Petition with this court on August 3, 2009, 452 days after the

statute of limitations began running. Accordingly, the Court recommends Respondent’s Motion to

Dismiss be GRANTED, and the Petition dismissed as untimely. 

VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

For all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court issue

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an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation; (2) GRANTING

Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss as set forth herein; and (3) directing that judgment be entered

dismissing the Petition for failure to file within the one-year statute of limitations set forth in 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than July 12, 2010, any party to this action may file

written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court 

and served on all parties no later than August 2, 2010 . The parties are advised that failure to

file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of

the Court’s order. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 9, 2010

Hon. William McCurine, Jr.

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

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