Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00261/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00261-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWW)

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A court may take judicial notice of "records and reports of administrative bodies."

Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. Southern California Gas Co., 209 F.2d 380, 385 (9th Cir. 1953).

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Barbara T. Cooper, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Jo Anne Barnhart, COMMISSIONER,

SOCIAL SECURITY

ADMINISTRATION, 

Defendant. _________________________________

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No. CV-06-0261-PHX-SMM 

ORDER

Before the Court are a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiff Barbara T.

Cooper (Dkt. 18) and a Cross Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Jo Anne

Barnhart, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("SSA") (Dkt. 26). These

motions require the Court to determine (1) if substantial evidence exists to support the

Administrative Law Judge's decision, and (2) if correct legal standards were applied. For the

reasons set forth below, the Court will affirm the decision of the Administrative Law Judge. 

BACKGROUND

As a preliminary matter, the Court takes Judicial Notice of the transcript of the

administrative proceedings.1

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i. Factual History

Plaintiff Barbara T. Cooper ("Plaintiff") was born in Yugoslavia and previously worked

as a janitor and a maid. She alleges that she became disabled on March 1, 2003, due to major

depression, severe headaches, fatigue, feelings of isolation, and being easily agitated. 

 Brent B. Geary, Ph.D., a consultative evaluating psychologist, reported on July 23, 2003,

that Plaintiff had a major depressive disorder, recurrent, presently moderate. (Transcript ("Tr.")

at 135). In addition, Dr. Geary reported that Plaintiff had a mixed personality disorder with

depressive, avoidant, and dependent features, moderate to severe and probable borderline

intellectual functioning. Id. Dr. Geary reported that Plaintiff only speaks Serbian and that her

husband served as the translator during most of his evaluation. Id. Dr. Geary noted "a

somewhat suspicious air around the husband" and provided that "the confidence with which a

diagnosis can be rendered in this case must be tempered due to the husband being a source of

much of the information from which the impression [was] rendered." Id.

Daniel K. Watkins, Ph.D., a consultative evaluating psychologist, examined Plaintiff on

September 11, 2003. Dr. Watkins diagnosed Plaintiff with major depressive disorder and

adjustment reaction with mixed emotional features, but "considered this to be a highly suspcious

case with many apparent unresolved contradictions and relevant questions." (Tr. at 140-141).

After noting that "there are many elements of this case and of claimant's story that just in [his]

opinion do not add up," Dr. Watkins stated that his impression was probable malingering. (Tr.

at 141). 

Dushan Kosovich, M.D., a psychiatrist based in New York, became Plaintiff's treating

psychiatrist after she was brought to his office during a trip to New York to visit her husband's

family. (Tr. at 140). Dr. Kosovich's opinion was that the Plaintiff had been suffering from many

chronic somatic problems for years as well as from very serious, chronic psychiatric syndromes

that had caused her to develop a psychiatric disability. (Tr. at 189-191). However, Dr. Kosovich

also stated that the cause of Plaintiff's condition was "her on-the-job accident of 1/31/03" (Tr.

at 191).

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J. Bisla, M.D., reported on March 11, 2004, that psychiatric evaluation showed Plaintiff

had a major depressive disorder, recurrent, with psychotic features; and dysthymia. (Tr. at 201-

213). Dr. Bisla diagnosed Plaintiff with severe limitations, meaning extreme impairment of

ability to function. (Tr. at 211-213).

Plaintiff's disability claim was referred to the Cooperative Disability Investigations Unit

of Phoenix, Arizona ("CDI"), after a complaint was filed by the Phoenix Disability

Determination Service regarding her application for Social Security Disability and

Supplemental Security Income benefits. (Tr. at 30). CDI's findings included that Plaintiff is

capable of performing household chores, such as taking out the trash, and that Plaintiff is

capable of effectively communicating in English despite her presentation at the SSA Field

Office and consultative examination with Dr. Geary. (Tr. at 28-36).

ii. Procedural History

On March 5, 2003, Plaintiff filed applications for Disability Insurance Benefits and

Supplemental Security Income payments. (Tr. at 16). After the claims were denied, Plaintiff

requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). (Tr. at 16). A hearing was

held on April 14, 2005. On June 20, 2005, the Administrative Law Judge issued a decision

denying Plaintiff to a Period of Disability and Disability Insurance Benefits. (Tr. at 22). The

ALJ's decision became final when the Appeals Council declined Plaintiff's request for review

on November 23, 2005. (Tr. at 7-9). Plaintiff brought this action for judicial review pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). (Dkt. 1).

Plaintiff filed the instant motion for summary judgment on August 31, 2006. (Dkt. 18).

Defendant filed a Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and a Cross-Motion

for Summary Judgment on October 3, 2006. (Dkt. 22). In turn, Plaintiff filed a Response to

Defendant's Cross Motion for Summary Judgement and Reply in Support of Plaintiff's Motion

for Summary Judgment on December 1, 2006. (Dkt. 30). The motions are now fully briefed and

ripe for disposition by this Court. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

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Within the District of Arizona, Social Security appeals are resolved using the

summary judgment process. Summary judgment is appropriate if there are no genuine issues

as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(c). The decision of the Commissioner must be affirmed if it is supported by

substantial evidence and the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards. See Batson

v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004); Benton v. Barnhart,

331 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 2003). When reviewing factual determinations by the

Commissioner, acting through the Administrative Law Judge, this Court affirms if

substantial evidence supports the determinations. See Celaya v. Halter, 332 F.3d 1177, 1180

(9th Cir. 2003); Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 521 (9th Cir. 1996). Substantial evidence is

more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. See Howard ex rel. Wolff v.

Barnhart, 341 F.3d 1006, 1011 (9th Cir. 2003); Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 459 (9th

Cir. 2001). Substantial evidence, considering the entire record, is relevant evidence which a

reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Howard, 341 F.3d at

1011; Morgan v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999). If the

evidence can reasonably support either affirming or reversing the Commissioner's

conclusion, the Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. See

Batson, 359 F.3d at 1193; McCartey v. Massanari, 298 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 2002). 

The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony,

and for resolving ambiguities. See Benton, 331 F.3d at 1040; Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d

1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001). The ALJ's determinations of law are reviewed de novo,

although deference is owed to a reasonable construction of the applicable statutes. See

Edlund, 253 F.3d at 1156; McNatt v. Apfel, 201 F.3d 1084, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000).

DISCUSSION

I. The ALJ's Determination Regarding Plaintiff's Mental Impairment

The ALJ determined that Plaintiff "has no medically determinable mental

impairment" (Tr. 18) or "combination of impairments, which caused limitations in her ability

to function sufficient enough to prevent substantial gainful activity for 12 consecutive

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months" (Tr. 20). Plaintiff challenges the ALJ's determinations regarding her mental

impairment, arguing: (1) "[t]here is not an iota of evidence to support the ALJ's finding that

her psychological impairment is not severe" (Dkt. 20 at 4); (2) the ALJ failed to set forth

sufficient reasons to reject the opinions of the treating and consulting physicians (Id. at 9-

14); and (3) the ALJ erred by stopping the sequential analysis at the second step (Id. at 6). 

In concluding that Plaintiff had no medically determinable mental impairment, the

ALJ considered the evaluations and reports of two consultative evaluating psychologists,

Brent B. Geary, Ph.D., and Daniel K. Watkins, Ph.D., and two psychiatrists, Dushan

Kosovich, M.D. and J. Bisla, M.D. Dr. Geary reported that Plaintiff had a major depressive

disorder and a mixed personality disorder with depressive, avoidant and dependent features.

(Tr. 19). However, the ALJ found Dr. Geary's diagnoses "unreliable" because Plaintiff's

husband was "the source of much of the information from which the diagnostic impression

was rendered." (Tr. 19). Dr. Watkins stated that his impression was probable malingering

due to the "many apparent unresolved contradictions." (Tr. 141). Dr. Kosovich, Plaintiff's

treating psychiatrist, opined that Plaintiff had been suffering from "many chronic somatic

problems for years as well as from very serious, chronic psychiatric syndromes that caused

her to develop a psychiatric disability." (Tr. 18). The ALJ gave Dr. Kosovich's opinion

"little weight" because Dr. Kosovich's reports give "inconsistent statements and the

psychological reports show unreliable statements by [Plaintiff's] husband and evidence of

malingering." (Tr. 19). For example, the ALJ pointed out that Dr. Kosovich's February 27,

2003 report is inconsistent with his May 26, 2003 report because the former states that

Plaintiff had been suffering from serious psychiatric syndromes for years while the latter

states that her psyciatric disability was promoted by her on-the-job accident in January,

2003. (Tr. 19). Dr. Bisla reported that Plaintiff had a major depressive disorder with

psychotic features and dsthymia. Like Dr. Kosovich's opinion, the ALJ decided to give

"little weight" to the opinion of Dr. Bisla because "such extreme limitations are not

supported by the information in the progress notes." (Tr. 19). The progress notes, according

to the ALJ, show that Plaintiff had taken medications in the past without any psychiatric

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hospitalizations or suicide attempts. (Tr. 20). The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff had no

history of hypomanic or manic episodes or self-mutilation and that medication had improved

her mood and behavior to the point that she "felt better more often than she felt bad." (Tr.

20). After considering the psychiatric and psychological reports, the ALJ determined that

Plaintiff failed to establish a medically determinable mental impairment and that she did not

have an impairment or combination of impairments limiting her ability to function enough to

prevent substantial gainful activity for 12 consecutive months. (Tr. 20). 

The Court finds that there is substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's finding that

Plaintiff has no medically determinable mental impairment. The record indicates that the

ALJ considered all of the medical opinions and made reasonable findings about what the

evidence showed. First, while all of the physicians in the case at bar did opine that Plaintiff

was depressed or suffering from a major depressive disorder, there was substantial evidence

to raise doubts about their diagnoses. For example, Dr. Geary stated that he was told that

Plaintiff only speaks Serbian and that her husband served as the translator during most of his

evaluation. (Tr. at 135). However, the investigator for the CDI indicated that Plaintiff

speaks English fluently. (Tr. at 29). Sensing "a somewhat suspicious air around the

husband," Dr. Geary stated that "the confidence with which a diagnosis can be rendered in

this case must be tempered due to the husband being a source of much of the information

from which the impression [was] rendered." (Tr. at 135). In addition, Dr. Watkins

considered this a "highly suspicious case" and stated that he "strongly suspect[ed]

malingering." (Tr. at 141). Therefore, there is substantial factual evidence to support the

ALJ's conclusion that Plaintiff has no medically determinable mental impairment.

In addition, the Court finds substantial evidence supports the ALJ's determination that

the opinions of Dr. Kosovich, Dr. Geary and Dr. Bisla were unreliable and inconsistent with

the record as a whole. As noted by the ALJ, Dr. Kosovich offered inconsistent opinions

about the cause of Plaintiff's psychiatric impairments. (Tr. at 19). Dr. Kosovich stated that

the cause of her condition was " her on-the-job accident of 1/31/03" (Tr. at 191), yet he also

stated that "she has been suffering from multiple somatic problems for years [and] very

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serious chronic psychiatric syndromes that have caused her to develop a psychiatric

disability" (Tr. at 189). Moveover, certain aspects of Plaintiff's professional relationship

with Dr. Kosovich aroused the suspicion of Dr. Watkins, a consultative evaluating

psychologist. Dr. Watkins noted that Plaintiff was unable to explain why her husband was

willing to pay "out of pockets" for a visit to Kosovich during a visit to New York, but he

was unwilling to pay for a psychiatrist in Arizona, her place of residence. (Tr. at 140). Dr.

Watkins further stated, "I strongly suspect malingering and/or other effort to deceive me and

other examiners." (Tr. at 141). Finally, an investigative report prepared by the Cooperative

Disability Investigations Unit notes that there is conflicting information regarding Dr.

Kosovich's opinion that Plaintiff's condition was caused by her alleged on-the-job injury. 

The report points out that Plaintiff did not report any work-related accident on her disability

application and that she never mentioned this injury to a field investigator or Dr. Geary. 

The Court also finds that substantial evidence supported the ALJ's decision to

conclude that Dr. Geary's opinion was unreliable and give little weight to the opinion of Dr.

Bisla. Dr. Geary, himself, questioned the reliability of his diagnosis, stating, "the confidence

with which a diagnosis can be rendered in this case must be tempered somewhat due to the

husband being a source of much of the information from which the impression was

rendered." (Tr. at 135). As noted by Dr. Geary, Plaintiff's husband served as translator

during the evaluation because Plaintiff "reportedly speaks only Serbian." (Tr. at 135). Yet,

the investigator for the Cooperative Disability Investigations Unit indicated that Plaintiff

speaks English fluently. (Tr. at 29). Dr. Bisla's opinion was also undermined by substantial

evidence in the record. While Dr. Bisla diagnosed Plaintiff with extreme limitations the ALJ

correctly noted that such extreme limitations were not supported by the information in the

progress notes. Moreover, the report prepared by CDI further suggests that Plaintiff is not

severely limited as she speaks English fluently, performs housework and is involved in the

family's finances. (Tr. at 33-36). In short, the ALJ did not err by concluding that Plaintiff

did not have a mental impairment for disability purposes because there were many

inconsistencies in the record and substantial evidence of malingering. 

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In addition to finding that the ALJ's determinations regarding Plaintiff's psychological

impairment were supported by substantial evidence, the Court finds that the ALJ applied the

correct legal standards in evaluating Plaintiff's disability claim. The ALJ properly

performed a sequential evaluation pursuant to 20 C.F.R.§§ 404.1520 and 416.920 (2003). 

After finding that Plaintiff satisfied the first step of the sequential evaluation by determining

that she was not currently engaged in "substantial gainful activity," the ALJ proceeded to the

second step. (Tr. 18). At the second step of the sequential evaluation, the ALJ considered all

of the medical evidence before ultimately determining that Plaintiff did not have an

impairment or combination of impairments limiting her ability to function enough to prevent

substantial gainful activity for 12 consecutive months. (Tr. 20). Accordingly, the ALJ did

commit legal error by stopping his analysis as to the effect of the psychiatric impairment at

this point because a finding of disabled or not disabled at any step in the sequential

evaluation is conclusive and terminates the analysis. 20 CFR 416.920(a)(4).

Moreover, Plaintiff's argument that the opinions of the treating physicians should

have been given controlling weight pursuant to SSR 96-2 is incorrect. Social Security

regulations require that the ALJ give "controlling weight" to the medical opinion of an

applicant's treating physician so long as that opinion is "well-supported by medically

acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the

other substantial evidence in [the] case record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). Generally, the

more consistent an opinion is with the record as a whole, the more weight the SSA will give

to that opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(4). As previously indicated, there were numerous

inconsistencies between the medical opinions and the evidence in the record and the ALJ

appropriately decided against giving controlling weight to any of these opinions.

Therefore, the Court finds that there was substantial evidence of malingering

surrounding Plaintiff's complaints regarding her mental illness and the ALJ reasonably

concluded that Plaintiff had no medically determinable mental impairment to support a

finding of disability. In addition, the Court finds that the ALJ set forth sufficient reasons for

rejecting the opinions of Dr. Kosovich, Dr. Geary and Dr. Bisla. Finally, because the ALJ

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properly determined that Plaintiff had no medically determinable mental impairment at the

second step of the sequential analysis, the Court finds that he did not err by ending the

analysis at this step.

II. The ALJ's Determination Regarding Plaintiff's Credibility

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to set forth sufficient reasons to reject Ms.

Cooper's subjective complaint testimony and, therefore, Plaintiff's subjective complaint

testimony should result in a finding that her testimony is accepted as true. (Dkt. 20 at 14-17). 

The Court disagrees.

"[O]nce a claimant produces objective medical evidence of an underlying

impairment, an [ALJ] may not reject a claimant's subjective complaints based solely on a

lack of objective medical evidence to fully corroborate the alleged severity of the

[complaint]." Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 345 (9th Cir. 1991)(en banc). If the ALJ

finds the claimant's [subjective] testimony not to be credible, the ALJ must "specifically

make findings that support this conclusion," and the findings "must be sufficiently specific

to allow a reviewing court to conclude the [ALJ] rejected the claimant's testimony on

permissible grounds and did not arbitrarily discredit [the] claimant's testimony." Id. at 345

(internal quotation marks omitted). If there is no affirmative evidence that the claimant is

malingering, the ALJ must provide convincing reasons for rejecting the claimant's testimony

regarding the severity of symptoms. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Here, the Court finds that the ALJ gave clear and convincing reasons for rejecting the

extent of Plaintiff's mental impairments and those reasons were supported by substantial

evidence. The ALJ gave six specific reasons for rejecting Plaintiff's credibility: (1) Dr.

Cunningham stated that her subjective complaints far outweighed the objective findings; (2)

the observations of the investigator for the Cooperative Disability Investigations Unit

revealed that Plaintiff had no difficult or discomfort taking the trash out of her apartment;

(3) the treating psychiatrist's reports contained inconsistent statements and the psychological

consultative evaluations were found to be unreliable; (4) the reports of her ability to speak

English were inconsistent; (5) Plaintiff offered inconsistent statements about her handling of

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the family finances; and (6) the objective medical evidence contradicted Plaintiff and her

husband's statements regarding her ability to perform normal daily activities. (Tr. at 20). 

While Plaintiff attacks each of these specific findings on various grounds, the Court

finds that the ALJ's findings were reasonable and supported by substantial evidence in the

record. First, Plaintiff claims that Dr. Cunningham's assessment is essentially irrelevant

because her disability claim is premised on a psychological impairment and he only

examined her physical impairments. However, Dr. Cunningham's opinion that Plaintiff's 

"suggestive complaints far outweigh objective findings" are relevant to Plaintiff's credibility,

which was the context in which the ALJ discussed his opinion. Plaintiff also argues that the 

reports about her carrying trash out to a dumpster, speaking English and handling finances

are irrelevant to the credibility determination for various reasons. However, this evidence

was directly relevant to the ALJ's credibility determination because it showed

inconsistencies in the information that either Plaintiff or her husband had provided to

individuals involved in the disability determination. Finally, Plaintiff claims that "the ALJ

writes that the treating psychiatrists' reports contain inconsistent statements when compared

to consultative evaluations." (Dkt. 20 at 16). However, Plaintiff misstates the ALJ's actual

statement. The ALJ stated that "the reports of the treating psychiatrist contains inconsistent

statements and the psychological evaluations are found to be unreliable because in the first

evaluation her husband provided the information on which the diagnosis was based and in

the second evaluation the doctor determined the claimant was malingering." (Tr. at 20). 

Therefore, the Court finds that the ALJ did not commit legal error in rejecting Plaintiff's

credibility. See Batson, 359 F.3d at 1193. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the ALJ is supported by substantial

evidence. See Celaya v. Halter, 332 F.3d 1177, 1180 (9th Cir. 2003); Saelee v. Chater, 94

F.3d 520, 521 (9th Cir. 1996). Therefore, summary judgment in favor of Defendant is

appropriate as a matter of law. Accordingly, 

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 18),

is hereby DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt.

26), is hereby GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall enter judgment accordingly.

DATED this 8th day of January, 2007.

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