Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02469/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02469-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

 

 Petitioner Victor Valenzuela, who is confined in the Arizona State Prison 

Complex- Kingman, Arizona, has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1). The Honorable David K. Duncan, United States Magistrate 

Judge, issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) (Doc. 11), recommending that the 

petition be denied as untimely. Petitioner has objected to the R&R. (Docs. 12, 13.) For 

the following reasons, the Court accepts and adopts the R&R, and denies the petition. 

I. Background 

 Following a jury trial in the Pinal County Superior Court, Case No. 2008-01519, 

Petitioner was found guilty of possession of a dangerous drug for sale, possession of drug 

paraphernalia, and possession of marijuana. (Doc. 8-1, Exh. C.) 1 On September 8, 2010, 

Petitioner was sentenced to concurrent terms of incarceration, the longest of which was a 

10-year term of imprisonment. (Doc. 8-1, Exh. D.) 

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 The Court assumes the parties’ familiarity with underlying facts of conviction 

which, for the reasons below, need not be reached on habeas review. 

Victor Valenzuela, 

 

Petitioner, 

vs. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV-14-02469-PHX-SPL (DKD)

ORDER 

Case 2:14-cv-02469-SPL Document 14 Filed 08/31/16 Page 1 of 6
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 On November 6, 2014, Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus raising four claims for relief. (Doc. 1.) Respondents filed a limited answer, in 

which they argue that the petition should be dismissed because the petition is untimely, 

and as procedurally defaulted and barred in the alternative. (Doc. 8.) 

II. Standard of Review

 The Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 

recommendations made by a magistrate judge in a habeas case. See 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1). The Court must undertake a de novo review of those portions of the R&R to 

which specific objections are made. See id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); United States v. 

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). However, a party is not entitled as of 

right to de novo review of evidence and arguments raised for the first time in an objection 

to the R&R, and whether the Court considers the new facts and arguments presented is 

discretionary. United States v. Howell, 231 F.3d 615, 621-622 (9th Cir. 2000). 

III. Discussion 

 Having reviewed the objected to recommendations de novo, the Court finds that 

the Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that Petitioner’s claims are time-barred. 

 The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a State court in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 

States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a). Such petitions are governed by the 

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”).2

 28 U.S.C. § 2244.

The AEDPA imposes a 1-year statute of limitations in which “a person in custody 

pursuant to the judgment of a State court” can file a federal petition for writ of habeas 

corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

A. Commencement of Limitations Period 

 Here, the 1-year limitations period began to run when the time for seeking direct 

review expired. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) (the 1-year limitations period runs from 

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 The AEDPA applies to federal habeas petitions filed after its effective date, April 24, 1996. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326-27 (1997). 

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the date on which judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the 

expiration of the time for seeking such review). Following a timely direct appeal, the 

Arizona Court of Appeals issued its decision affirming Petitioner’s convictions on March 

23, 2011. (Doc. 8-2, Exh. H.) Petitioner did not file a timely petition for review to the 

Arizona Supreme Court. (Doc. 8-2, Exh. I.) Therefore, judgment became final on April 

23, 2011, when the time for filing a petition for review by the Arizona Supreme Court 

expired. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.19(a) (“Within 30 days after the Court of Appeals 

issues its decision, any party may file a petition for review with the clerk of the Supreme 

Court”); White v. Klitzkie, 281 F.3d 920, 924, fnt. 4 (9th Cir. 2002) (“it is the decision of 

the state appellate court, rather than the ministerial act of entry of the mandate, that 

signals the conclusion of review”). It follows that, absent any tolling, the one-year 

limitations period would have commenced the following day. 

B. Statutory Tolling of Limitations Period 

 Petitioner properly filed a notice of post-conviction relief on April 15, 2011. (Doc. 

8-2, Exh. J.) Petitioner’s first post-conviction relief proceeding remained pending and 

statutorily tolled the limitations period until August 14, 2013, when the Superior Court 

dismissed the petition. (Doc. 8-2, Exh. P.) See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (one-year 

limitations period is tolled during the time that a “properly filed application for State 

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim 

is pending”). Because Petitioner did not timely seek review of the petition (see Doc. 8-3, 

Exh. R), no application for post-conviction relief was pending following the Superior 

Court’s denial and the limitations period began to run again the following day on August 

15, 2013. See Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 191 (2006) (an application for state postconviction review is “pending” during the period between a lower court’s adverse 

determination and the filing of a timely appeal); Robinson v. Lewis, 795 F.3d 926, 928-29 

(9th Cir. 2015); Stewart v. Cate, 757 F.3d 929, 935 (9th Cir. 2014) (“The time between 

the denial of a petition in a lower... court and the filing of a subsequent petition in the 

next higher state court does not toll the statute of limitations pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

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2244(d)(2) if the latter petition is not timely filed”) (citing Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 

225 (2002)).3

 Because Petitioner’s second post-conviction relief petition was dismissed as 

untimely, it was not properly filed and did not toll the limitations period. (Doc. 8-3, Exhs. 

V, Y); State v. Valenzuela, 2014 WL 4629065, at *1 (Ariz. Ct. App. Sept. 16, 2014.4 See 

Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 417 (2005) (“Because the state court rejected 

petitioner’s PCRA petition as untimely, it was not ‘properly filed,’ and he is not entitled 

to statutory tolling under § 2244(d)(2)”). Thus, unless equitable tolling or an exception 

applies, the one-year limitations period ran until it expired just short of three months prior 

to the filing of his federal habeas petition on November 6, 2014. 

C. Equitable Tolling of Limitations Period 

 The Court finds that the Magistrate Judge also correctly found that Petitioner is 

not entitled to equitable tolling of the limitations period. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 

631, 649 (2010) (“a petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling only if he shows (1) that he 

has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance 

stood in his way and prevented timely filing” his federal habeas petition (internal 

quotations omitted)). 

 Petitioner objects to the R&R on the basis that he received ineffective assistance 

of counsel and is therefore entitled to equitable tolling pursuant to Martinez v. Ryan, 132 

S. Ct. 1309 (2012). (Doc. 12, 13.) This argument is without merit. The equitable rule in 

Martinez “applies only to the issue of cause to excuse the procedural default of an 

ineffective assistance of ...counsel claim that occurred in a state collateral proceeding” 

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 In the R&R, the Magistrate Judge found that the post-conviction petition remained pending until September 18, 2013, the last day on which Petitioner could timely petition review of the Superior Court’s dismissal of his post-conviction relief proceeding. However, the Court need not address this difference in calculation as Petitioner has not 

objected to this finding and the difference between the dates are immaterial to the 

outcome of this decision. 

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 In dismissing Petitioner’s second post-conviction proceedings, both the Superior Court and the Arizona Court of Appeals found that Petitioner had not identified a ground that could be raised in an untimely proceeding. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(g); 32.4(a). 

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and “has no application to the operation or tolling of the § 2244(d) statute of limitations” 

for filing federal habeas petitions. Chavez v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 742 F.3d 940, 

943 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Arthur v. Thomas, 739 F.3d 611, 629-631 (11th Cir. 2014)). 

See Manning v. Epps, 688 F.3d 177, 189 (5th Cir. 2012) (Martinez does not extend to the 

statute of limitations period under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B)); Madueno v. Ryan, 2014 

WL 2094189, at *7 (D. Ariz. May 20, 2014) (“Martinez has no application to the statute 

of limitations in the AEDPA which governs Petitioner’s filing in federal court”). 

D. Exception to the Limitations Period

 Lastly, Petitioner does not argue, nor does the record show, that the “fundamental 

miscarriage of justice exception” is applicable and compels review of his time-barred 

claims. McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1928 (2013) (“an actual-innocence 

gateway claim” may serve as an exception to AEDPA’s limitations period) (adopting 

Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 314-15 (1995)). 

IV. Conclusion 

 Having reviewed the record as a whole, Petitioner’s federal habeas claims are 

time-barred, and his objections are without merit. The R&R will therefore be adopted in 

full. Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED:

1. That the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation (Doc. 11) is 

accepted and adopted by the Court; 

2. That the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 

(Doc. 1) is denied and dismissed with prejudice; 

3. That a Certificate of Appealability and leave to proceed in forma pauperis 

on appeal are denied because the dismissal of the Petition is justified by a plain 

procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the procedural ruling debatable; and

/ / / 

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/ / / 

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4. That the Clerk of Court shall terminate this action. 

 Dated this 31st day of August, 2016.

Honorable Steven P. Logan

United States District Judge

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