Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-00540/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-00540-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LOUIE IRA MENDEZ HAMMONDS,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-02-0540 MCE DAD P

vs.

JOE McGRATH, Warden, et al.,

Respondents. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with an application for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges his 1997 conviction on

charges of attempted first degree murder with personal use of a firearm and infliction of great

bodily injury, with an enhancement for having served a prior prison term. He seeks relief on the

grounds that: (1) he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel; (2) the trial court erred in

excluding evidence of third party culpability and in failing to limit expert testimony; and (3) his

due process rights were violated by the trial court’s decision to allow the wheelchair-bound

victim to remain in the courtroom during trial. Upon careful consideration of the record and the

applicable law, the undersigned will recommend that petitioner’s application for habeas corpus

relief be denied.

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PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On April 15, 1996, a complaint was filed in the Sacramento County Superior and

Municipal Court charging petitioner with attempted murder, in violation of California Penal

Code §§ 667 and 187(a). (Clerk’s Transcript on Appeal (CT) at 7.) It was also alleged that the

offense was a serious felony, within the meaning of California Penal Code § 1192.7(c)(1); that

petitioner personally used a firearm in the commission of the felony, within the meaning of

California Penal Code § 12022.5(a); and that petitioner had suffered a prior felony conviction for

which he had served a prison term, within the meaning of California Penal Code § 667.5(b). (Id.

at 7-8.) On June 20, 1996, an amended complaint was filed which added an allegation that

petitioner personally inflicted great bodily injury (paralysis) upon the victim, in violation of

California Penal Code § 12022.7(b). (Id. at 14-15.) At the conclusion of the preliminary

hearing, the complaint was deemed an information and was amended to allege that the attempted

murder was accomplished with malice aforethought and with premeditation and deliberation. 

(Id. at 91-92.) Petitioner entered a plea of not guilty and denied all of the enhancement

allegations. (Id. at 18, 91-93.)

Jury trial commenced on July 15, 1997. (Id. at 108.) On August 5, 1997,

petitioner’s jury found him guilty of attempted first degree murder and also found that he

personally used a firearm and inflicted great bodily injury. (Id. at 186.) The trial court found true

the allegation that petitioner had served a prior prison term. (Answer, Ex. 3 at 1.) On October 3,

1997, petitioner was sentenced to an indeterminate life term of imprisonment with the possibility

of parole for the attempted first degree murder conviction, a consecutive fifteen-year term for

personal use of a firearm and infliction of great bodily injury, and a consecutive one-year term for

the prior prison term enhancement. (CT at 228.)

On October 3, 1997, petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal with the California

Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District. (Id. at 230.) The Court of Appeal affirmed

petitioner’s conviction in an unpublished opinion filed April 13, 1999. (Answer, Ex. 3.) On

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1

 Petitioner notifies the court that he also filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

California Court of Appeal on June 13, 2001, which was denied on June 14, 2001. (Traverse at

4.) 

2

 The following summary is drawn from the opinion by the California Court of Appeal

for the Third Appellate District (hereinafter Opinion), at pgs. 2-5, which is attached as Exhibit 3

to Respondents’ Answer filed in this action on August 29, 2002. 

3

approximately May 24, 1999, petitioner filed a petition for review in the California Supreme

Court. (Answer, Ex. 4.) That petition was summarily denied by order dated August 11, 1999. 

(Id.) 

On June 30, 2000, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

Sacramento County Superior Court. (Answer, Ex. 5.) That petition was denied in a reasoned

opinion dated August 24, 2000. (Id.) On September 29, 2000, petitioner filed a petition for writ

of habeas corpus in the California Court of Appeal. (Answer, Ex. 6.) That petition was

summarily denied by order dated October 12, 2000. (Id.) On November 14, 2000, petitioner

filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court. (Answer, Ex. 7.) That

petition was also summarily denied by order dated March 28, 2001. (Id.) On April 3, 2001,

petitioner filed another petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Court of Appeal. 

(Answer, Ex. 8.) That petition was dismissed at petitioner’s request on April 12, 2001. (Id.) On

April 20, 2001, petitioner filed another petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Sacramento

Superior Court. (Answer, Ex. 9.) In an opinion dated May 22, 2001, that petition was denied on

the grounds that it was untimely and successive. (Id.) On July 18, 2001, petitioner filed another

petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court. (Answer, Ex. 10.) That

petition was denied with a citation to In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750 (1993) by order dated January

29, 2002. (Id.)

1

 Petitioner filed this federal habeas action on March 14, 2002.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND2

Jesus Arturo Leyva worked as a bartender at Nicky’s Bar. He was

working the night of March 31, 1996, when four people he did not

recognize came in. They ordered drinks and went to the pool table. 

After a few minutes, one of the group handed Leyva a note and

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asked for his boss, Nicky Diaz. The note read: “Ernesto Salcedo 

$1000,000 [sic] 209-476-6447 !!!!” Leyva told him Diaz was not

in and would not be in that night.

Later a man Leyva knew came in and ordered a beer. Leyva went

to the west side of the bar. The next thing he remembered was

hearing shots. Leyva could not identify who shot him, but he

recognized defendant as one of the men who came in. He saw

defendant dump his beer before the shooting.

Leyva suffered a spinal cord injury that left him paralyzed from the

chest down. Part of a finger was also shot off. There were 15

casings found at the scene; they came from a .9 millimeter weapon. 

One gun had fired all of them.

Several customers at the bar testified to the events that evening. 

Fred Veevalu worked part-time as a bouncer at Nicky’s. He was

not working that night. He had a conversation with defendant

during which defendant asked if the bartender was the owner. 

Veevalu said no and asked why. Defendant said he had matters to

handle with the owner involving his family, his father. The owner

owed his father money. Defendant said if he had to, he would

shoot the bartender. Veevalu did not take defendant seriously.

Later defendant got irritated. He put on a red bandanna and poured

his beer on the floor. Veevalu heard about 15 shots. Defendant

was holding a gun, pointed it at Veevalu, and made eye contact. 

Veevalu identified defendant as the shooter from a photographic

lineup.

Craig Chavez also identified defendant as the shooter. When he

identified defendant’s photo for the police, he said “he looks

familiar,” but knew it was the shooter. Chavez claimed just before

the shooting defendant said, “This is for Nicky,” he fired and said,

“This is for you,” and fired again.

Rapheal Barrajas testified a guy in a red and black Chicago Bulls

shirt with number 23 on it, poured his beer on the floor. He

thought that guy had a gun. He heard the shots but did not see who

fired them. He could not identify the man in the Chicago Bulls

shirt.

Edward Ane was at Nicky’s that night playing pool. He testified

defendant said, “someone’s gonna die tonight.” At one point he

left the bar; when he returned he saw a gun cocked and took off

running. He identified defendant as the shooter, but did not see

him with the gun. He believed it was defendant.

These witnesses gave varying descriptions of the shooter. Veevalu

described him as 5'7" or 5'8" and wearing a USA basketball jersey

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with number 23 on it. He had told an officer the shooter was 5'11",

but that was wrong. Chavez said the shooter wore a vest and an

earring, and had a goatee. He recalled about a three-inch ponytail,

while defendant’s hair was 15-18 inches long. Ane testified

defendant wore a red tank top and a red bandanna.

Defendant’s fingerprints were found on a beer bottle and a shot

glass.

Seven .9 millimeter rounds of Spear ammunition were found in a

kitchen drawer at defendant’s residence. Of the 15 casings found

at the bar, 13 were Spear ammunition. A gun leaves tool marks on

the ammunition when it is fired or cycled and ejected from the gun. 

One of the 7 rounds found at defendant’s had feeder marks, but

they were insufficient to determine if the ammunition had been

cycled through the same gun that fired the 15 shots at the bar.

Nicky Diaz testified he found the note at the bar. He had heard that

Ernesto Salcedo, Sr., had died five or six years earlier. He had met

Salcedo, Jr., five years earlier. There were no threats or hostility

from him. 

Defendant testified he spent that day boating with friends, one of

whom was Ernesto Salcedo, Jr., known as Ernie or Junior. After

boating Ernie’s pager went off, he made a call, and then asked if

they wanted to go for a ride. They went to Nicky’s Bar; Ernie said

he knew the owner. Ernie asked the bartender if Nicky was

around. When the bartender said no, Ernie asked him to call Nicky

for him.

Ernie played pool and was loud and obnoxious. Defendant tried to

calm him down. Defendant noticed three men enter from the back

and nod to the bartender. They went up to Ernie and began

questioning him with hostility. Defendant tried to intervene. 

Defendant said they should leave as the men were plotting. He told

the rest of his friends they should leave and left the bar. When no

one followed, defendant returned. He got they keys to the van

from Ernie and left again. He heard shots and Ernie came out;

defendant dove into the back of the van. Ernie said, “all hell broke

loose.” They took off, stopping to pick up the others.

Someone driving by that night testified he saw someone in the van

before the shots were fired.

ANALYSIS

I. Standards of Review Applicable to Habeas Corpus Claims

A writ of habeas corpus is available under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 only on the basis of

some transgression of federal law binding on the state courts. See Peltier v. Wright, 15 F.3d 860,

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861 (9th Cir. 1993); Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Engle v.

Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 119 (1982)). A federal writ is not available for alleged error in the

interpretation or application of state law. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991);

Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000); Middleton, 768 F.2d at 1085. 

However, a “claim of error based upon a right not specifically guaranteed by the

Constitution may nonetheless form a ground for federal habeas corpus relief where its impact so

infects the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates the defendant’s right to due process.” 

Hines v. Enomoto, 658 F.2d 667, 673 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Quigg v. Crist, 616 F.2d 1107 (9th

Cir. 1980)). See also Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941); Henry v. Kernan, 197

F.3d 1021, 1031 (9th Cir. 1999). In order to raise such a claim in a federal habeas corpus

petition, the “error alleged must have resulted in a complete miscarriage of justice.” Hill v.

United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962). See also Henry, 197 F.3d at 1031; Crisafi v. Oliver,

396 F.2d 293, 294-95 (9th Cir. 1968). Habeas corpus cannot be utilized to try state issues de

novo. Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 377 (1972). 

Because this action was filed after April 26, 1996, the provisions of the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) are applicable. See Lindh v.

Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997); Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2003).

Section 2254(d) as amended by the AEDPA, sets forth the following standards for granting

habeas corpus relief:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall

not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on

the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the

claim -

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

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3

 For purposes of clarity, the court will address these claims before addressing

petitioner’s first claim in which he alleges that he received ineffective assistance from his trial

counsel.

7

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See also Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792-93 (2001); Williams v. 

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000); Lockhart v. Terhune, 250 F.3d 1223, 1229 (9th Cir. 2001).

II. Claims of Evidentiary Error

In his second and third claims, petitioner alleges that the state trial court

committed evidentiary error. He first claims that the trial court erred in excluding evidence

relevant to his defense theory that Ernesto Salcedo, Jr. was the actual shooter. He also claims

that the trial erred in failing to limit or exclude the testimony of the prosecution’s weapons

expert. After setting forth the applicable legal principles, the court will evaluate these claims in

turn below.3

An evidentiary ruling, based on state law, may not be set aside in a federal habeas

corpus proceeding unless it “render[ed] the state proceedings so fundamentally unfair as to

violate due process.” Spivey v. Rocha, 194 F.3d 971, 977-78 (9th Cir. 1999). See also Whelchel

v. Washington, 232 F.3d 1197, 1211 (9th Cir. 2000); Jeffries v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180, 1192 (9th

Cir. 1993). Criminal defendants have a constitutional right, implicit in the Sixth Amendment, to

present a defense; this right is “a fundamental element of due process of law.” Washington v.

Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967). See also Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (“[T]he

Constitution guarantees criminal defendants ‘a meaningful opportunity to present a complete

defense.’”) However, “that right is not unlimited.” Greene v. Lambert, 288 F.3d 1081, 1090 (9th

Cir. 2002). The right to present a defense is restricted "to assure both fairness and reliability in

the ascertainment of guilt and innocence." Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 298 (1973). 

Thus, a state law justification for exclusion of evidence does not abridge a criminal defendant’s

right to present a defense unless it is "arbitrary or disproportionate" and "infringe[s] upon a

weighty interest of the accused." United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998). See also

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 When reviewing the AEDPA standards, this court must review the “last reasoned

decision” by a state court. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002).

8

Crane, 476 U.S. at 689-91 (discussion of the tension between the discretion of state courts to 

exclude evidence at trial and the federal constitutional right to “present a complete defense”);

Greene, 288 F.3d at 1090. 

The United States Supreme Court has not articulated the specific set of

circumstances under which a criminal defendant must be permitted to introduce evidence of

third-party culpability. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has determined that where the

proffered evidence simply affords a possible ground of suspicion pointing to a third party and

does not directly connect that person with the actual commission of the offense, that evidence

may be excluded. See People of Territory of Guam v. Ignacio, 10 F.3d 608, 615 (9th Cir. 1993)

(citing Perry v. Rushen, 713 F.2d 1447, 1449 (9th Cir. 1983)). Under California law, a criminal

defendant has a right to present evidence of third party culpability if it is capable of raising a

reasonable doubt regarding his own guilt. See Spivey, 194 F.3d at 978 (citing People v. Hall, 41

Cal. 3d 826, 833 (1986)). In order for evidence pointing to another suspect to be admissible,

however, "there must be direct or circumstantial evidence linking the third person to the actual

perpetration of the crime." Hall, 41 Cal. 3d at 833. Motive or opportunity is not enough. Id.

A. Evidence of Third Party Culpability

Petitioner claims that the trial court erred in limiting his presentation of evidence

of third party culpability that was relevant to his defense theory that Ernesto Salcedo, Jr. was the

individual who shot the victim. The decision of the California Court of Appeal is the last

reasoned state court decision on petitioner’s claim in this regard.

4

 The state appellate court

rejected the claim, stating as follows:

One member of defendant’s party handed Leyva a note which read,

“Ernesto Salcedo $1000,000 209-476-6447 ! ! ! !” and asked for

Nicky Diaz. Diaz testified he knew the senior Salcedo had died

several years earlier and he had met the junior Salcedo. Defendant

testified Ernie took them to the bar, saying he knew the owner, and

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asked Leyva to call Diaz. No other evidence explaining the note

was admitted.

Defendant wanted to introduce evidence that would have cast

suspicion on Ernesto Salcedo, Jr. Most of this evidence came from

statements by Diaz to the police. Diaz had known Ernesto

Salcedo, Sr., who had been in prison with Diaz’s brother-in-law. 

After his release, Salcedo, Sr., gave Diaz seed money to start his

bar. Salcedo, Sr., came by and Diaz gave him some payments, but

did not entirely repay him. Several years before this shooting,

Salcedo, Sr., had been killed execution style; he was allegedly

involved in a scheme to purchase $1,000,000 in counterfeit money. 

The defense argued this evidence was direct evidence linking

Salcedo, Jr., to the crime. The prosecution moved to exclude the

evidence.

After a lengthy discussion of the issue, the trial court ruled the

defense could admit the fact of Salcedo, Sr.’s death, but not his

murder or the alleged $1,000,000 counterfeit scheme. The court

noted the defense had not shown how it would prove the murder,

other than perhaps by a stipulation, and there was no evidence for

the $1,000,000 loss or that the Salcedo family believed Diaz was

responsible. The murder of Salcedo, Sr., had not been solved; the

defense conceded it was speculation that the murder was over

$1,000,000.

Defendant relies on People v. Jackson, (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d

1670. In Jackson, the defendant wanted to introduce evidence that

30 minutes after the shooting, he was in a bar with several who had

been present at the shooting. He told Tolbert, “‘Greg. “You shot

that guy.”’” Tolbert said he had not hit him. When defendant

persevered that Tolbert shot him, Tolbert replied, “‘” Well, I don’t

care. He was a bully.”’” (Id. at p. 1677.) The reviewing court

found it error to exclude this probative statement against penal

interest; it provided direct evidence that Tolbert had fired shots at

the victim. (Id. at pp. 1678-1679.)

This case is distinguishable. In Jackson, supra, 235 Cal.App.3d

1670, the proffered evidence provided direct evidence that a third

party was responsible for the crime. To prove the statement was

made, the defendant offered his own testimony and that of another

witness to the statement. Here, defendant could not indicate how

he would prove his theory of Salcedo, Jr.’s involvement; he had no

evidence, only speculation. The only direct or circumstantial

evidence of Salcedo, Jr.’s involvement in the shooting was

defendant’s testimony and Salcedo’s name on the note. This

evidence was admitted. Salcedo, Sr.’s murder, his involvement in

a $1,000,000 counterfeiting scheme, and Diaz’s connection to that

scheme was pure speculation. The flaw in defendant’s offer of

proof as to evidence of Salcedo, Jr.’s culpability was that he could

not show how he would prove anything.

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In ruling to exclude evidence of Salcedo, Sr.’s murder and the

counterfeiting scheme, the trial court recognized that it was based

on speculation and lacked evidentiary support. It indicated,

however, that it was open to reconsideration if defendant could

provide evidence. “If evidence comes in that causes a

reconsideration, then the Court would reconsider it, but I just don’t

see that we are going to accomplish anything useful, other than

titillate the jurors’ suspicions, prejudices, imaginations of some

deep and million dollar conspiracy going on that definitely relates

to the Salcedo family, because it seems to me, we don’t have

evidence of that.” Defendant never offered any additional evidence

in a request for reconsideration. The trial court did not err in

excluding a speculative theory of third party culpability.

(Answer, Ex. 3 at 10-13.)

As explained above, habeas relief is available only if the trial court’s decision to

exclude some of the more speculative evidence regarding possible ties between Nicky Diaz and

the Salcedos rendered the proceedings so fundamentally unfair as to violate federal due process

guarantees. As described by the state appellate court, petitioner sought to raise doubt about the

identity of the shooter by introducing evidence that Ernesto Salcedo, Jr. (Salcedo, Jr.) may have

had a motive to shoot Leyva because Nicky Diaz had something to do with the murder of his

father, Ernesto Salcedo, Sr. (Salcedo, Sr.). However, as discussed by the appellate court,

petitioner had no direct evidence to support this theory. For instance, he could not prove the

actual circumstances of the death of Salcedo, Sr., such as the motive for the killing or the identity

of the perpetrators, nor was he able to show that the Salcedo family blamed Diaz for the killing

or had any other reason to retaliate against him. Any possible connection between Nicky Diaz

and the alleged murder of Ernesto Salcedo, Sr. was based on pure speculation and was therefore

insufficient to directly connect Salcedo, Jr. to the shooting of Leyva. The trial judge’s decision

to exclude this speculative evidence was certainly not arbitrary or disproportionate. 

In any event, the trial court did allow the introduction of evidence in petitioner’s

possession of any link between Diaz and the Salcedo family. Thus, Diaz was allowed to testify

that he knew Salcedo Sr. had died and that he had a meeting with Salcedo Jr. after the death of

his father. (RT at 1330-31.) Veevalu testified that petitioner told him the owner of the bar owed

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his father money. (Id. at 540-41.) The note left at the bar was also admitted into evidence. All

of this evidence was used by defense counsel to support his argument that Ernesto Salcedo Jr.

had a motive to commit the shooting and that the eyewitnesses, whose descriptions of the shooter

were widely divergent, were simply mistaken in their identification of petitioner as the shooter. 

(Id. at 1650, 1661-62, 1681-82.) The evidence in question was also used by defense counsel to

support his argument that the prosecutor’s theory that the shooting was unprovoked and

“pointless” did not make sense in light of a possible motive on the part of Salcedo, Jr. to obtain

revenge against Nicky Diaz because of a debt owed to his father. (Id. at 1599, 1610.) Under

these circumstances, the trial court's decision to exclude additional but speculative evidence

about a possible link between Nicky Diaz and the murder of Ernesto Salcedo, Sr. did not prevent

petitioner from presenting his defense of actual innocence, nor did it render his trial

fundamentally unfair. Speculative rumors of the reason for Salcedo, Sr.’s murder and the

seemingly unconnected fact that Salcedo, Sr. had loaned Nicky Diaz seed money to open his bar

would not have been sufficient to change the outcome of petitioner’s trial. The decision of the

California Court of Appeal rejecting petitioner’s claim in this regard is neither contrary to nor an

unreasonable application of federal law and should not be set aside.

B. Failure to Limit the Testimony of an Expert Witness

Petitioner also claims that the trial court erred when it failed to “sufficiently limit”

the testimony of the prosecution’s weapons expert. (Pet. at 6.) He argues that “permitting the

prosecution’s criminalist to testify concerning his opinions on the similarities between the

expended casings found at the scene of the shooting and the unexpended cartridges found at

petitioner’s home, the trial court committed error.” (Id. at 80.) Petitioner contends that the

testimony of the prosecution’s expert, which suggested that there might be a similarity between

the casings found at the scene and the cartridges found at petitioner’s residence, allowed the jury

to overlook the conflicting eyewitness testimony as to the description of the shooter. (Id. at 82.) 

/////

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Petitioner also argues that the prosecutor violated state discovery laws by his untimely disclosure

to the defense of the weapons expert’s opinion. (Id. at 80-81.) 

This claim was rejected by the California Court of Appeal in its decision on

petitioner’s direct appeal and by the California Supreme Court, without comment, in response to

the petition for review. (See Answer, Exs. 3, 4.) The California Court of Appeal described the

background to this claim and the reasoning behind its decision as follows:

During in limine motions before trial, the prosecutor disclosed that

he had just recently provided to the defense a criminalist’s report,

prepared months earlier, comparing the 15 casings found at the bar

to ammunition seized at defendant’s residence. The report

indicated the 15 shots at the bar were fired by the same gun. The

ammunition from defendant’s residence was of the same type, but

it could not be determined to have been cycled through the same

weapon at the bar. The prosecutor wanted to introduce evidence of

the ammunition found at defendant’s residence and the defense

objected on the basis of late discovery. The prosecutor argued the

late disclosure was not prejudicial because there was no evidence

connecting the ammunition to the gun used in the crime; the

comparison was inconclusive. The court ruled the ammunition

found at defendant’s residence was admissible.

During trial a police officer testified he seized some Spear .9

millimeter ammunition from defendant’s residence.

Before he testified, it became apparent that the criminalist, Gerald

Arase, had more definite opinions about the similarity of the

ammunition found at defendant’s residence and that from the bar

than was in his report. It was his opinion that it was “highly likely”

that the feeder marks on a bullet found at defendant’s residence

had been cycled through the same gun as used at the bar. 

Defendant objected to the admission of any evidence of the

ammunition found at defendant’s residence.

After considerable discussion, the court permitted Arase to testify

about the ammunition found at defendant’s residence, but he was

not allowed to indicate he believed it had been cycled through the

weapon used at the bar. Arase testified he examined the seven

rounds found at defendant’s residence. They were Spear

ammunition, with the same manufacturer’s stampings as those on

13 of the casings found at the bar. One of the rounds seized from

defendant’s residence had feeder marks, but they were insufficient

to determine if it had been cycled through the same gun as that

used at the bar. Arase could not say the feeder marks came from a

different weapon. The trial court later referred to this evidence as

“not of itself very powerful.”

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Defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to limit or

exclude Arase’s testimony. The prosecution failed in its duty to

provide timely discovery by failing to turn over Arase’s report for

many months. (Pen. Code, § 1054.1, subd. (f); § 1054.7.) “It is

defendant’s burden to show that the failure to timely comply with

any discovery order is prejudicial, and that a continuance would

not have cured the harm. [Citation.]” (People v. Pinholster (1992)

1 Cal.4th 865, 941.) Defendant did not request a continuance.

Nor can he show prejudice. Defendant contends he was prejudiced

by Arase’s testimony as to the similarity of the feeder marks on

ammunition from his home to that found at the shooting scene. 

Arase did not testify, however, that the feeder marks were similar. 

The trial court excluded that testimony. Instead, he only testified

one of the bullets found had feeder marks and no comparison could

be made. Like the trial court, we do not view Arase’s testimony as

damaging as does defendant. Arase simply indicated that the same

type of ammunition was found at defendant’s as some of that used

in the shooting; he did not tie that ammunition to the gun used in

the shooting. On cross-examination, Arase testified Spear was a

common brand of .9 millimeter ammunition. There was no

prejudicial error in admitting Arase’s testimony.

(Opinion at 13-15.)

The decision of the California Court of Appeal rejecting petitioner’s evidentiary

ruling claim is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of the federal due process standards

set forth above. The testimony of prosecution criminalist was curtailed by the trial court to

eliminate any affirmative connection between the ammunition found at petitioner’s residence and

the specific gun used in the bar shooting. The criminalist’s trial testimony was inconclusive on

the issue of whether any of the ammunition found petitioner’s residence had been cycled through

the same gun that was used in the shooting. The admission of such testimony did not render

petitioner’s trial fundamentally unfair. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief on this

claim. 

III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner claims that he received constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel

through numerous errors of counsel. After setting forth the applicable legal principles, the court

will evaluate each of these claims below.

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A. Legal Standards

The Sixth Amendment guarantees the effective assistance of counsel. The United

States Supreme Court set forth the test for demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel in

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To support a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel, a petitioner must first show that, considering all the circumstances, counsel’s

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. at 687-88. After a

petitioner identifies the acts or omissions that are alleged not to have been the result of

reasonable professional judgment, the court must determine whether, in light of all the

circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally,

competent assistance. Id. at 690; Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003). In assessing an

ineffective assistance of counsel claim “[t]here is a strong presumption that counsel’s

performance falls within the ‘wide range of professional assistance.’” Kimmelman v. Morrison,

477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). There is in addition a strong

presumption that counsel “exercised acceptable professional judgment in all significant decisions

made.” Hughes v. Borg, 898 F.2d 695, 702 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). 

Second, a petitioner must establish that he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient

performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-94. Prejudice is found where “there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have

been different.” Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is “a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome.” Id. See also Williams, 529 U.S. at 391-92; Laboa v. Calderon, 224

F.3d 972, 981 (9th Cir. 2000). A reviewing court “need not determine whether counsel’s

performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of

the alleged deficiencies . . . . If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of

lack of sufficient prejudice . . . that course should be followed.” Pizzuto v. Arave, 280 F.3d 949,

955 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697).

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Defense counsel has a “duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a

reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at

691. “This includes a duty to . . . investigate and introduce into evidence records that

demonstrate factual innocence, or that raise sufficient doubt on that question to undermine

confidence in the verdict.” Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082, 1088 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Hart v.

Gomez, 174 F.3d 1067, 1070 (9th Cir. 1999)). In this regard, it has been recognized that “the

adversarial process will not function normally unless the defense team has done a proper

investigation.” Siripongs v. Calderon (Siripongs II), 133 F.3d 732, 734 (9th Cir. 1998)(citing

Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 384). Therefore, counsel must, “at a minimum, conduct a reasonable

investigation enabling him to make informed decisions about how best to represent his client.” 

Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1035 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d

1446, 1456 (9th Cir. 1994) (internal citation and quotations omitted). On the other hand, where

an attorney has consciously decided not to conduct further investigation because of reasonable

tactical evaluations, his or her performance is not constitutionally deficient. See Siripongs II,

133 F.3d at 734; Babbitt v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir. 1998); Hensley v. Crist, 67

F.3d 181, 185 (9th Cir. 1995). “A decision not to investigate thus ‘must be directly assessed for

reasonableness in all the circumstances.’” Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 533 (quoting Strickland, 466

U.S. at 691). See also Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 385 (counsel “neither investigated, nor made a

reasonable decision not to investigate”); Babbitt, 151 F.3d at 1173-74. A reviewing court must

“examine the reasonableness of counsel’s conduct ‘as of the time of counsel’s conduct.’” United

States v. Chambers, 918 F.2d 1455, 1461 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). 

Furthermore, “‘ineffective assistance claims based on a duty to investigate must be considered in

light of the strength of the government’s case.’” Bragg, 242 F.3d at 1088 (quoting Eggleston v.

United States, 798 F.2d 374, 376 (9th Cir. 1986)). See also Hayes v. Woodford, 301 F.3d 1054,

1070 (9th Cir. 2002).

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B. Petitioner’s Claims

1. Third Party Culpability

Petitioner first claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance because

of his failure to investigate and present evidence of the culpability of a third party, Ernesto

Salcedo, Jr., for the shooting of the bartender. Specifically, he contends that counsel’s failure to

investigate the “double homicide” of Salcedo, Sr., described in connection with the claim above,

resulted in the withdrawal of a “meritorious” defense that Salcedo, Jr., and not petitioner, shot

Leyva. Petitioner contends the evidence would have established that Salcedo, Jr., who was also

present at the scene of the crime, had a motive and the opportunity to commit the crime. 

Petitioner also contends that further investigation into Salcedo, Sr.’s murder would have

“raise[d] the possibility” that Veevalu’s testimony identifying petitioner as the shooter was

“mistaken.” (Pet. at 5, Traverse at 16.) Petitioner argues that counsel’s failure to conduct such 

investigation foreclosed the opportunity to present a meritorious defense of third party

culpability. (Pet. at 5.) 

This claim was rejected by the California Superior Court in its decision denying

petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. (Answer, Ex. 5.) This decision is the basis for the

state court judgment on petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Avila, 297 F.3d at 

918. The Superior Court explained as follows:

Petitioner states that [attorney] Cingcon did not adequately

investigate the double homicide of Ernesto Salcedo Sr., and his

companion, an event that was essential to a proper understanding

of the case. The prosecution pursued the case against petitioner on

the theory that he shot bartender Leyva while trying to collect a

debt from bar owner Nicky Diaz associated with the death of

Ernesto Salcedo, Jr. [sic] (See pp. 10-11 of the Third District Court

of Appeal decision.) Cingcon also failed to speak with Carmen

Salcedo. She may have been able to impeach information about

her husband’s death provided by Diaz. His failure to speak with

her resulted in the trial court’s denial of the introduction of

evidence for the purpose of establishing the third party culpability

of Ernesto Salcedo, Jr. (Pp. 2-3 of the attached pleading paper

petition.)

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Third party culpability need only be capable of raising a reasonable

doubt as to the defendant’s guilt. (People v. Cudjo (1993) 6

Cal.4th 585, 609; People v. Hill (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826, 833.) 

Evidence of mere motive or opportunity to commit the crime

without more will not suffice to raise a reasonable doubt. There

must be direct or circumstantial evidence linking a third party to

the commission of the crime. (People v. Hill, supra.) In this

instance, petitioner has not established that Carmen Salcedo would,

in fact, impeach the testimony of Nicky Diaz. Even if she would

have done so, he has not explained how such evidence would tend

to raise a reasonable doubt as to his guilt by linking Ernesto

Salcedo, Jr. to the crime.

(Answer, Ex. 5 at 4.)

The state court record reflects that the trial court held a lengthy hearing on the

prosecution’s motion to exclude additional evidence relating to the murder of Ernesto Salcedo,

Sr. which petitioner sought to introduce in support of his third party culpability defense. (CT at

100; RT at 2-110.) At that hearing, petitioner’s trial counsel argued that evidence of Salcedo,

Sr.’s murder was relevant to petitioner’s defense that he did not commit the shooting. 

Petitioner’s counsel argued, in effect, that Salcedo, Jr. may have felt animosity toward Nicky

Diaz, the owner of the bar, because Diaz owed Salcedo, Sr. money and/or may have been

connected to Salcedo, Sr.’s murder. In other words, counsel argued that Salcedo, Jr. may have

killed Leyva out of revenge. As described above, in connection with petitioner’s claim that the

trial court erred in its evidentiary ruling, the trial court excluded some, but not all, of this

evidence on the grounds that it was unduly speculative. 

The gist of this aspect of petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim is that

had his trial counsel conducted a more thorough investigation of these events, he may have

discovered additional evidence in support of the defense theory of third party culpability. 

However, petitioner does not describe any additional evidence that would have surfaced if

counsel had conducted further investigation into the death of Salcedo, Sr. Indeed, it is not clear

that there was any additional evidence to be found. The murder of Salcedo, Sr. was still

unsolved at the time of petitioner’s trial. Accordingly, there was no concrete evidence linking

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Nicky Diaz or anyone else to Salcedo, Sr.’s death. In the petition before this court, as in the trial

court, petitioner provides no specific evidence linking Salcedo, Sr.’s murder five or six years

earlier to the identity of the shooter at the bar and does not explain why Salcedo Sr.’s son would

have attempted to murder Leyva (or Nicky Diaz) so many years after his father’s death. 

Petitioner appears to be simply guessing that an investigation might have turned up exculpatory

evidence. However, as noted above, speculation is insufficient to establish an ineffective

assistance claim. Petitioner has failed to identify any improper acts or omissions of counsel 

demonstrating that counsel’s investigation of this issue was insufficient or otherwise outside the

wide range of professional, competent assistance. In the absence of such specificity, there is a

strong presumption that counsel’s performance was adequate. Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 381. 

2. Failure to Further Investigate Bar Patrons

Petitioner next claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance because

of his failure to investigate and show a photo lineup to the other bar patrons on the night of the

shooting. Some of these persons gave descriptions of the shooter which differed from the

description offered by prosecution witness Veevalu. Others were unable to identify petitioner

from a police photo lineup. Petitioner argues this information should have been presented to the

jury because it would have cast doubt on Veevalu’s testimony that petitioner was the shooter. 

He also notes that his counsel informed the jury during opening argument that he would present

eyewitnesses who failed to select petitioner as the shooter during the photo lineup and then failed

to do so. 

Bar patron Kenneth Rowe identified the shooter as “Asian” whereas petitioner is

Mexican and Caucasian. Two bar patrons, Juanita Parraz and Connie Parraz, informed police

that they could identify the shooter, but failed to pick petitioner out of a photo lineup. In fact,

petitioner suggests that Juanita Parraz at different times identified both Salcedo, Jr. and another

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5

 It appears from attachments to petitioner’s state court habeas petitions that Juanita

Parraz reported to police that she had been in the bar with her sister on the day in question for

about one and half hours and had consumed approximately 4 or 5 12 ounce beers during that

period when she heard 4 or 5 shots ring out and saw a man behind her pointing a handgun at

people playing pool. She told police that the shooter then walked to the bar, fired several shots at

the bartender on the ground and then walked out of the bar with a friend. She described the

shooter at that time as a 5'8", 220 lb. male Samoan with black hair combed back in a 3 inch

ponytail and wearing dark clothing. 

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person as the shooter.5 According to petitioner, if his trial counsel had interviewed these

potential witnesses, he may have obtained evidence to bolster the defense theory that it was

Ernesto Salcedo, Jr. who committed the crime. Petitioner argues that Juanita Parraz’s selection

of Salcedo Jr. from the photo lineup was crucial evidence supporting his defense of third party

culpability and that counsel’s failure to present such evidence to the jury allowed the prosecutor

to “cover up” the fact that petitioner was not the shooter. (Pet. at 18.) 

The California Superior Court rejected these claims, explaining its reasoning as

follows:

Petitioner further argues that Cingcon did not bring forward

numerous witnesses who could have impeached the [sic] Fred

Veevalu’s photo lineup identification of him as the shooter. Such

witnesses included Kenneth Rowe, Michael Chavez (apparently

“Martin Jose Chavez Garcia”), Raphael Barrajas, Connie Perez and

Juanita Perez (apparently “Parraz”). They would have

corroborated his defense. (Pp. 4, 27-28 of the attached pleading

paper petition.)

An examination of the exhibits provided by petitioner fail to

substantiate his claim. In a police report, Rowe described the

shooting, and said that, “The man with the gun was Asian. I could

not tell how old he was or what type of clothing that he was

wearing . . . I cannot describe him very well.” (P. 38 of the

exhibits.) He has also provided witness statements from Juanita

Parraz, Martin Jose Chavez Garcia, and Raphael Barrajas. Juanita

Parraz and Connie Parraz told the police that they could identify

the shooter. (Pp. 29, 42 of the exhibits.)

But petitioner has only alleged that Connie Parraz was unable to

pick anyone out of the lineup, while Juanita Parraz made two

identifications. Neither of them was petitioner, while one of them

was Ernesto Salcedo, Jr. (Pp. 5, 10, 16 of the attached pleading

paper petition.) Barrajas described the suspect as having the

outline of a gun in his waistband, but neither Barrajas, nor his

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companion, apparently Martin Chavez Garcia, were able to identify

the shooter. (Pp. 17, 26 of the attached pleading paper petition.)

Petitioner contends that such evidence would have enabled him to

present evidence that Ernesto Salcedo, Jr. shot Leyva. Cingcon’s

ineffectiveness was magnified by the fact that Cingcon informed

the jury during opening argument that he would bring forward

witnesses who identified someone other than petitioner as the

shooter. (Pp. 10-16 of the attached pleading paper petition.) 

Admittedly, Juanita Parraz selected Salcedo, Jr. in the photo

lineup, but she also picked out someone else as well. None of the

other witnesses identified Salcedo, Jr., or anyone other than

petitioner, as the shooter. Accordingly, such evidence would not

have established a link between Salcedo, Jr., and the shooting of

Leyva as required. Cingcon did not render ineffective assistance of

counsel as alleged. (Strickland v. United States, supra.)

(Answer, Ex. 5 at 5.)

Even assuming arguendo that counsel’s failure to investigate all of the persons at

the bar on the night of the shooting was outside "the wide range of professionally competent

assistance" that the Sixth Amendment requires, petitioner has failed to demonstrate how a more

thorough investigation of these potential witnesses would have led to a different outcome. 

Petitioner’s contention that further investigation by counsel may have uncovered exculpatory

evidence is insufficient to establish prejudice. See United States v. Berry, 814 F.2d 1406, 1409

(9th Cir. 1987) (appellant failed to meet prejudice prong of ineffectiveness claim because he

offered no indication of what potential witnesses would have testified to or how their testimony

might have changed the outcome of the hearing); United States v. Harden, 846 F.2d 1229, 1231-

32 (9th Cir. 1988) (no ineffective assistance because of counsel’s failure to call a witness where,

among other things, there was no evidence in the record that the witness would testify);

Villafuerte v. Stewart, 111 F.3d 616, 632 (9th Cir. 1997) (petitioner’s ineffective assistance claim

denied where he presented no evidence concerning what counsel would have found had he

investigated further, or what lengthier preparation would have accomplished). As noted by the

California Superior Court, none of the witnesses, including Juanita Parraz, could have

definitively or persuasively testified that it was Ernesto Salcedo, Jr. who shot the bartender, Mr.

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6

 As noted above, police reports submitted by petitioner in state court in support of this

claim indicate that Ms. Perez had been drinking, identified more than one individual as the

shooter in photo lineups and described the shooter as a male Samoan - a description that fit

neither petitioner nor Salcedo, Jr. Moreover, her description of the shooter as approximately 5'8"

with a 3 inch ponytail otherwise closely matched the description given by prosecution witness

Mr. Veevalu.

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Leyva.6 Finally, there was, in fact, evidence presented at trial that petitioner may not have been

the shooter and that Salcedo, Jr. might have had a motive to commit the crime. The jurors chose

to reject this defense theory and to believe, instead, the testimony of the prosecution witnesses

who positively identified petitioner as the person who fired the shots. 

As noted above, “‘ineffective assistance claims based on a duty to investigate

must be considered in light of the strength of the government’s case.’” Bragg, 242 F.3d at 1088

(quoting Eggleston v. United States, 798 F.2d 374, 376 (9th Cir. 1986)). Here, the prosecution’s

case against petitioner was strong. Several eyewitnesses testified that petitioner was the shooter

and incriminating evidence was found at petitioner’s apartment and at the scene of the shooting. 

Prosecution witness Veevalu testified that he had two separate and lengthy conversations with

petitioner on the night of the shooting during which petitioner identified himself as “Lou.” (RT

at 536-47.) Veevalu further testified that he watched petitioner shoot Leyva. (Id.) He stated that

petitioner pointed the gun at him after he fired several shots at Leyva, then turned back to the bar

and fired more shots behind the bar, and then turned again and pointed the gun while making eye

contact. (Id. at 554-58, 560.) Veevalu was about sixteen feet from petitioner while this was

happening. (Id. at 556-57.) Veevalu was “keep[ing] a visual” on petitioner the whole time the

shooting was taking place. (Id. at 559.) Veevalu also identified petitioner from a photo lineup as

the person who shot Leyva. (Id. at 537-38.) From this court’s review of the record, it appears

that Veevalu testified clearly and without hesitation to the events at the bar and did not appear to

have any difficulties with his memory of the events nor did he express any doubt as to what

occurred. He testified there was “no doubt in [his] mind” that petitioner was the shooter. (Id. at

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633.) Craig Chavez, another eyewitness, also identified petitioner as the shooter at trial and had

previously identified petitioner as the shooter from a photo lineup. (RT at 665, 670.)

The potential importance of Juanita Parraz’s identification of Salcedo, Jr. from a

photo lineup is diminished by the fact that she also selected another person as the possible

shooter. In addition, she had been drinking, described the shooter to police as a Samoan male

and otherwise provided a description that arguably matched those provided by witnesses who

identified petitioner as the shooter. Similarly, although Kenneth Rowe described the shooter as

“Asian,” this was again a description that matched neither petitioner nor Salcedo, Jr., who

petitioner identified as the shooter. The fact that witnesses Martin Chavez, Raphael Barrajas and

Connie Perez were unable to identify anyone as the shooter from photo lineups containing

petitioner’s photograph is also not significant. These bar patrons did not have the extensive

contact with petitioner as witness Veevalu, who observed petitioner at close range and for an

extended period of time. Moreover, there is no evidence suggesting that these potential

witnesses watched the shooting with the same focus and interest as Veevalu did. Thus, there has

been no showing by petitioner that testimony from these other bar patrons would have impeached

Veevalu’s credibility. 

Other alleged omissions by petitioner’s trial counsel do not stand up to close

scrutiny. For instance, Raphael Barrajas provided trial testimony favorable to petitioner. He

testified on direct examination that he did not see who shot the victim. (RT at 733-34.) He also

testified that the person who wore the Chicago Bulls shirt, appeared to have a gun and poured his

beer on the floor was not in the courtroom. (Id. at 733-34.) Additional favorable testimony to

the effect that Barrajas was unable to identify petitioner from a photo lineup would have been

cumulative and unnecessary. Although Ed Ane testified at trial that he did not actually see the

shooter, he had previously picked petitioner out of a photo lineup and told the police officer

conducting the lineup that petitioner was the “guy that pulled the gun.” (Id. at 786.) Further 

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investigation of this witness by petitioner’s counsel would, in all likelihood, simply have

uncovered this additional evidence incriminating petitioner. 

3. In limine Ruling

In a related argument, petitioner argues that towards the end of trial when his trial

counsel became aware that Juanita Parraz’ had identified Salcedo, Jr. in a photo lineup, counsel

should have requested reconsideration of the trial court’s in limine ruling prohibiting the

introduction of evidence of third party culpability. Petitioner notes that during the hearing on the

in limine motion, the trial judge indicated that he might reconsider his ruling if there was

evidence that any witness had identified Salcedo, Jr. from a photo lineup as the shooter. 

Petitioner argues that this is just such evidence. The California Superior Court rejected this

claim as follows:

During closing argument, petitioner states that Cingcon failed to

request that the court reconsider its ruling prohibiting him from

introducing evidence of his third party culpability defense. If

Cingcon had done so, he could have persuaded the court to permit

him to introduce evidence of Juanita Parraz’s identification of

Ernesto Salcedo, Jr. He believes that the prosecution may have

provided Cingcon with a police report of her identification of

Salcedo, Jr. near the end of trial. (Pp. 18-20 of the attached

pleading paper petition.) This claim is rejected for the same reason

as earlier ones associated with his stymied third party culpability

defense. Parraz identified Salcedo, Jr. and another person as the

shooter. Her confused inability to clearly identify the shooter

would not have persuaded the trial court to reconsider its earlier

adverse decision.

(Answer, Ex. 5 at 7.)

This court concludes that petitioner has failed to demonstrate prejudice with

respect to this claim. As described above, the trial court excluded certain speculative evidence of

a link between Salcedo, Jr. and Nicky Diaz, but allowed other, more concrete evidence to the

same effect. Evidence that one of the bar patrons identified Salcedo, Jr. and one other person

from a photo lineup as the possible shooter, while significant, was similarly inconclusive and

would probably not have led to a different ruling on the in limine motion. This is particularly

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true in light of the nature and character of the witnesses’ statements to police. See supra p. 21, n.

6. The state court’s conclusion that admission of this evidence at trial would not have led to a

different verdict is not “objectively unreasonable.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). 

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim. 

4. Evidence Found at Petitioner’s Apartment

Petitioner next claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance because

of his failure to introduce exculpatory evidence found at petitioner’s apartment by police eleven

days after the shooting. The California Superior Court rejected this claim, stating as follows:

Petitioner maintains that Cingcon did not address key issues that

pointed to petitioner’s innocence. On April 11, 1996, federal

agents and Sacramento police officers raided his home. They

confiscated a red sweater with a letter “S” for Stanford. They did

not find a Chicago Bulls shirt. Nor did they find a red bandanna or

a pager. Furthermore, the officers called the number on the note

given to Leyva, and the pager did not ring. Cingcon never brought

any of this evidence to the attention of the jury. (Pp. 3, 23 of the

attached pleading paper petition.) Cingcon’s failure to emphasize

such evidence does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. 

(Strickland v. United States, supra.) Law enforcement raided his

home 11 days after the commission of the offense. Accordingly, it 

was possible that he wore a different shirt, and utilized a different

pager at the time of the offense.

(Answer, Ex. 5 at 4-5.)

This court agrees that the passage of time between the shooting and the search of

petitioner’s home neutralized the impact of the police officers’ failure to find a Chicago Bulls

shirt or the pager referenced in the note given to the victim. Trial counsel’s decision not to

introduce this evidence was not outside the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. 

5. Bail Review Hearing

Petitioner next claims that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance when

he failed to challenge the prosecutor’s statements at a bail review hearing that the victim was

shot seven to twelve times, when police reports suggested that he was shot only twice. Petitioner

argues that the prosecutor’s unchallenged misstatements caused the trial judge to become biased

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against him and resulted in a failure to obtain release on bail, so that he was forced to face trial as

an inmate and not as an “innocent man.” (Pet. at 12.) Petitioner also argues that evidence

regarding the number of shots actually fired was relevant to show “one’s deliberate intent to

murder or assault and/or deliberate attempt to miss the victim and get out of a hostile bar.” (Id. at

13.) 

The California Superior Court rejected this claim with the following reasoning:

Finally, petitioner has alleged other instances of ineffective

assistance by Cingcon prior to trial unrelated to the substance of

his defense. He states that, during a bail hearing, Cingcon

permitted the prosecution to argue against his bail by claiming that

he had shot Leyva 7 to 12 times. In fact, police reports indicated

that Leyva had only been shot two or three times at most. Cingcon

permitted the prosecution to prejudice him during this hearing, and,

if Cingcon had objected, a more favorable result was probable. (P.

6 of the attached pleading paper petition.) Such a claim is dubious,

as it is doubtful that the court would have been more inclined to

release him on bail on the basis that he only shot Leyva twice

instead of 7 to 12 times. Furthermore, the issue is now moot as he 

is currently incarcerated in the Department of Corrections as a

result of his criminal conviction. (citation omitted).

(Answer, Ex. 5 at 8.)

The Superior Court’s determination in this regard was not contrary to or an

unreasonable application of federal law and should not be set aside. As explained by the

Superior Court, petitioner’s challenge to the trial court’s failure to release him on bail pending

trial is now moot. In addition, petitioner’s vague and unsupported claim that his status as a pretrial detainee instead of a criminal defendant released on bail caused the jury and/or the trial

judge to be biased against him does not warrant the granting of habeas relief. See Jones v.

Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 204 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994))

(“‘[c]onclusory allegations which are not supported by a statement of specific facts do not

warrant habeas relief’”). Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim. 

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6. Testimony from Family Members

Petitioner next claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by

failing to produce members of petitioner’s family as character witnesses at trial to testify as to

petitioner’s “good character, high morals, family ties and strong religious beliefs.” (Pet. at 22.) 

Petitioner argues that his character and credibility were key issues because of his defense of

actual innocence. The California Superior Court rejected this claim based upon the following

reasoning:

Petitioner also contends that Cingcon also failed to produce

character witnesses who would have testified to his good character

and strong family ties. Such witnesses would have bolstered his

credibility when he testified in his own defense. (P. 21 of the

attached pleading paper petition.) Given that none of these

witnesses would have been able to corroborate his version of the

incident, a more favorable result was not probable. Cingcon’s

failure to produce character witnesses also falls within the bounds

of an acceptable tactical decision by trial counsel. (Strickland v.

Washington, supra; People v. Ledesma, supra.) 

(Answer, Ex. 5 at 6.) 

The decision of the Superior Court in this regard is neither contrary to nor an

unreasonable application of federal law. Evidence that petitioner was regarded as a good person

by his family would not have changed the outcome of this trial in light of the significant

eyewitness testimony describing petitioner’s shooting of the bartender. Petitioner has failed to

show prejudice with respect to this claim and relief should be denied.

7. Evidence of Ammunition and Guns

Petitioner also claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance when

he failed to introduce evidence that the nine-millimeter ammunition found at petitioner’s

residence came from a handgun owned by his mother. He states that his mother, who is in the

military, took her handguns with her when she moved out of the residence in question but left

some of the bullets behind. Petitioner also contends that ballistic tests would have demonstrated

that the bullets found at the scene of the crime did not come from his mother’s guns.

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The California Superior Court rejected this claim, stating as follows:

Petitioner asserts that Cingcon did not investigate and rebut the

prejudicial evidence of the .9 millimeter rounds of ammunition

found at his home. He told Cingcon that his mother owned two

registered .9 millimeter Glock handguns. She had lived there, and

left the weapons behind when she moved to Galt. (P. 22 of the

attached pleading paper petition.) Even if Cingcon had introduced

this evidence, it would not have tended to establish his innocence

as he had access to the weapons and the ammunition by virtue of

living at the residence. Furthermore, the jury may not have

believed his mother’s testimony about it because of the parental

relationship.

(Answer, Ex. 5 at 6.) 

Petitioner argues that the Superior Court’s rejection of this claim was based on the

incorrect factual assumption that petitioner’s mother left her handguns behind, as well as her

bullets, when she moved to Galt. Even assuming arguendo that the Superior Court decision rests,

in part, on an incorrect factual assumption, that court’s ultimate conclusion that petitioner failed

to show prejudice with respect to this claim was not erroneous. The evidence regarding the .9

millimeter bullets found at petitioner’s residence was relevant to show that petitioner had access

to the type of bullets used in the shooting, not that any particular gun was the assault weapon. 

Evidence that petitioner’s mother owned a gun or that she may have originally been the owner of

the bullets found in petitioner’s residence was largely irrelevant. In any event, petitioner fails to

establish demonstrate what ballistic tests on the guns and/or ammunition owned by his mother

would have revealed. For these reasons, petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim.

8. Possible Exculpatory Evidence

Petitioner next argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in

failing to: (1) obtain an expert in handwriting analysis to corroborate petitioner’s testimony that

he did not write the note left at the scene of the crime; (2) ascertain the owner of the pager

number listed in the note or provide evidence that the telephone number did not match

petitioner’s pager; (3) investigate the telephone records of the bar to challenge the victim’s

testimony that he did not make any telephone calls from the bar; (4) request a continuance of the

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trial in order to locate two persons who drove by the bar at the time of the shooting because these

persons may have been able to identify the shooter and/or could have corroborated petitioner’s

trial testimony that two “aggressors” arrived at the bar in response to a telephone call from

Leyva; (5) investigate percipient witnesses Teresa Ybarro and Anita Ybarro, who may have been

able to testify to the tense atmosphere in the bar and the events leading up to the shooting; (6)

seek out and investigate a percipient witness named “Mejia,” who was sitting near petitioner at

the bar and might have seen something to aid petitioner’s defense; (7) locate and investigate a

“potential defense witness” named Martin Jose Chavez Garcia, who provided a description of the

shooter as approximately 5'6” tall; and (8) locate and interview possible defense witness Sergio

Brieto who was at the bar at the time of the shooting and may have been able to provide

exculpatory evidence. 

The Superior Court rejected all of the claims described above based upon the

following analysis:

All of these claims must be rejected as petitioner has not alleged

that Cingcon’s alleged failure to investigate actually resulted in the

loss of exculpatory evidence. In regard to the fourth one,

petitioner’s height is listed as 5'8", so Martin Jose Chavez Garcia’s

description of his height was close to his actual measured height. 

Accordingly, he has not alleged that he was prejudiced as a result

of Cingcon’s alleged ineffectiveness. (Strickland v. United States,

supra.)

(Answer, Ex. 5 at 7.) This court also concludes that petitioner has failed to establish prejudice

with respect to these claims. Petitioner’s speculation that further investigation into these various

areas of inquiry may have provided exculpatory evidence is insufficient to establish a Sixth

Amendment violation. Villafuerte, 111 F.3d at 632 (“[Petitioner] presented no evidence

concerning what [his attorney] would have found had he investigated further, nor what lengthier

preparation would have accomplished.”); Harden, 846 F.2d at 1231-32; Berry, 814 F.2d at 1409.

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9. Voluntary Intoxication

Petitioner also claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance when

he failed to obtain expert testimony on the effects of voluntary intoxication on petitioner’s mental

state. Petitioner contends that he drank “substantial amounts of alcohol” prior to the shooting,

which rendered him incapable of forming “reasonable premeditation.” (Pet. at 31.) The

California Superior Court rejected this claim as follows:

Petitioner states that Cingcon should have produced evidence of

voluntary intoxication to establish that he did not form the requisite

mental state for attempted murder. (Pp. 24-25 of the attached

pleading paper petition.) A defendant may introduce evidence of

intoxication to establish his lack of the required mental state for

this offense. (Pen. Code, § 22(b).) But, in this instance, it is

impossible to imagine how a jury could have concluded that he did

not shoot Leyva with the deliberate, premeditated intention of

killing him. He entered the bar, inquired about the owner, gave

Leyva a note demanding money, dumped his beer and then started

shooting Leyva.

(Answer, Ex. 5 at 7.) 

Petitioner points out that the evidence introduced at trial did not show petitioner

gave Leyva a note or demanded money but rather that another member of petitioner’s group

handed Leyva a note referencing a dollar amount. Notwithstanding the Superior Court’s mistake

of fact in this regard, petitioner has failed to establish that his trial counsel’s failure to introduce

evidence of voluntary intoxication fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. 

Petitioner’s defense at trial was that he was not the shooter. A defense of diminished capacity

would have been inconsistent with that defense in that it would have required petitioner to admit

that he was the shooter, but lacked the ability to form premeditation. Trial counsel’s reasonable,

strategic tactical decision to forego investigation into a viable defense in favor of a conflicting

defense does not constitute ineffective assistance. Bean v. Calderon, 163 F.3d 1073, 1082 (9th

Cir. 1998). Once petitioner’s trial counsel reasonably chose to present a defense of actual

innocence, his duty to investigate the directly conflicting defense of diminished capacity was “at

an end.” Id. See also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 (“the reasonableness of counsel’s actions may

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7

 Under California law the imposition of a restitution fine is "at the discretion of the court

and commensurate with the seriousness of the offense" and requires no statement of formal

reasons on the record. Cal. Penal Code § 1202.4 (b)(1); People v. Romero 167 Cal. App. 3d

1148, 1156 (1985). Unless there are "compelling and extraordinary reasons," the defendant's

"lack of assets" and "limited employment potential" are "not germane" to his or her ability to pay

the fine. People v. McGhee, 197 Cal. App. 3d 710, 715 (1988). In the absence of a contrary

showing, the court is entitled to presume the defendant will pay the restitution fine out of future

earnings. People v. Frye, 21 Cal. App. 4th 1483, 1486-1487 (1994); Cal. Penal Code § 1202.4(d).

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be determined or substantially influenced by the defendant’s own statements or actions”); Turk v.

White, 116 F.3d 1264, 1267 (9th Cir. 1997) (“when the facts that support a certain potential line

of defense are generally known to counsel because of what the defendant has said, the need for

further investigation may be considerably diminished or eliminated altogether”).

10. Restitution Fine

Petitioner next claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by

failing to object to the $330,486.74 restitution fine that petitioner was assessed as part of his

sentence. Petitioner argues that he will not be able to pay this fine. In light of the severe injuries

suffered by the victim of the offense, petitioner has failed to show that an objection to the amount

of the restitution fine would have resulted in a different sentence, notwithstanding his inability to

pay.7 Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim.

11. Challenge to the Jury Verdict

In his next claim, petitioner argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective

assistance because of his failure to challenge the jury’s verdict. Petitioner states that evidence

relevant to this claim was lost by his trial counsel and is no longer available. The California

Superior Court explained the background to this claim and its ruling thereon as follows:

After the verdict, petitioner states that Cingcon received

information from jurors after the trial that four jurors did not

believe him to be guilty, but convicted him because he did not

prove his innocence. He asserts that Cingcon should have

challenged the jury’s verdict. (Pp. 31-32 of the attached pleading

paper petition.) The court rejects this claim because he has not

established that there was any admissible evidence as required by

Evidence Code section 1150 to challenge the jury’s verdict and

thereby obtain a new trial. (See also People v. Von Villas (1992)

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8

 The Federal Rules of Evidence apply to federal habeas corpus proceedings to the extent

that the habeas statutes themselves provide no different rule of evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 1101(e). 

There is no habeas evidentiary rule on the subject. See also Bibbins v. Dalsheim, 21 F.3d 13, 16-

17 (2d Cir. 1994) (applying Fed. R. Evid. 606(b) rather than state law in determining whether

evidence was admissible to impeach a state court verdict); Silagy v. Peters, 905 F.2d 986, 1008-

09 (7th Cir. 1990) (same); Stockton v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 852 F.2d 740, 743-44 (4th

Cir. 1988) (same); Bloom v. Vasquez, 840 F. Supp. 1362, 1377 n.23 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (holding

that pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 1101(e), the Federal Rules of Evidence apply to federal

habeas cases), rev’d on other grounds by Bloom v. Calderon, 132 F.3d 1267 (9th Cir. 1997). 

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10 Cal.App.4th 201, 250-253 [unsworn statement of jury

foreperson inadmissible to support claim of jury misconduct].) He

has not provided any direct evidence from a jury [sic] in the form

of either an affidavit or declaration in support of his allegations. 

Furthermore, it is doubtful that such evidence would be admissible

as it would constitute an attempt to challenge the mental processes

that led to the verdict. (People v. Grant (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d

496, 501.)

(Answer, Ex. 5 at 8.) 

Evidence concerning the mental processes by which a juror arrived at his/her

verdict is inadmissible to test the validity of a verdict. Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107,

117 (1987) (“[L]ong-recognized and very substantial concerns support the protection of jury

deliberations from intrusive inquiry.”). On the other hand, jurors may testify regarding any

extraneous influence on their verdict. Id. at 117; Traver v. Meshriy, 627 F.2d 934, 941 (9th Cir.

1980). This distinction is embodied in Rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which

provides:

Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror

may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the

course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon

his or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing him to

assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning

his mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror

may testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial

information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or

whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear

upon any juror. Nor may his affidavit or evidence of any statement

by him concerning a matter about which he would be precluded

from testifying be received for these purposes.8

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This rule is intended to protect the jury’s deliberative process by preventing challenges to a

verdict based on arguments, statements, discussions, mental and emotional reactions, votes, or

methods used in reaching a verdict. See Fed. R. Evid. 606 Advisory Committee Notes; In re

U.S. Financial Securities Litigation, 609 F.2d 411, 430 n.68 (9th Cir. 1979). The values sought

to be promoted by Rule 606(b) include freedom of deliberation, stability and finality of verdicts,

and protection of jurors against annoyance and embarrassment. McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S.

264, 267-68 (1915). 

Rule 606(b) creates two exceptions to the general rule prohibiting the use of juror

testimony to challenge a verdict: cases where the jury may have considered extraneous

information or may have been affected by outside influences. See United States v. NavarroGarcia, 926 F.2d 818, 821 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Evidence not presented at trial, acquired through outof-court experiments or otherwise, is deemed ‘extrinsic.’”); Marino v. Vasquez, 812 F.2d 499,

505-06 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding admissible as an “outside influence” information that a juror

consulted a dictionary to define the word “malice”); Gibson v. Clanon, 633 F.2d 851, 855 (9th

Cir. 1980). In addition, some courts have allowed juror testimony to explain a clerical error in

the verdict. See, e.g., Plummer v. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co., 5 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1993). 

In support of his claim in this regard, petitioner states that the defense investigator

asked four jurors why they voted to convict petitioner and they responded that petitioner had

failed to prove his innocence. These statements may not be considered for the purpose of

challenging the jury verdict in this case because they do not fall within the stated exceptions to

Rule 606(b). Such post-verdict statements do not demonstrate that the jury in petitioner’s case

was exposed to extraneous evidence or outside information. Neither do the statements concern

the issue of whether the verdict contains a clerical error. Rather, the juror statements reflect

merely the discussions, reactions, or mental thought processes of the jurors. The only use that

the testimony could serve would be to demonstrate that these discussions affected the

deliberative process. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), such evidence is inadmissible

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to impeach a verdict. Accordingly, even if petitioner had been able to obtain juror affidavits

from his trial counsel, he would not be entitled to relief on this claim. In short, petitioner’s

counsel did not render ineffective assistance in failing to challenge the jury verdict on the basis of

the jurors’ alleged post-verdict statements regarding their deliberative process.

12. Overheard Conversation

Petitioner also claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance because

of his failure to locate a potential witness who told police that she overheard two employees at a

Toys R Us store “talking about the incident/shooting at Nicky’s Bar, she said that one female

(stated) that her boyfriends friend had shot the bartender at Nicky’s.” (Pet. at 50.) This claim,

based on triple hearsay, is far too speculative to warrant habeas relief. Jones, 66 F.3d at 204.

For all of the reasons set forth above, petitioner is not entitled to relief on his

claim that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. 

C. Evidentiary Hearing

Petitioner requests an evidentiary hearing on his ineffective assistance of counsel

claim. He represents that he requested an evidentiary hearing before the state courts but failed to

receive one. He also states that, despite numerous requests from himself and his appellate

counsel, his trial counsel failed to turn over petitioner’s case file which contained evidence of

counsel’s trial strategy, the four juror interviews described above, and evidence of Juanita

Perez’s identification of Salcedo, Jr. from the photo lineup. Petitioner also recounts his

numerous efforts to obtain documentation from state agencies and the state courts of the photo

lineups utilized in this case, Juanita Perez’s identification of Salcedo, Jr. at the photo lineup, and

the four juror affidavits. (Pet. at 51-57.) 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2):

(e)(2) If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a

claim in State court proceedings, the court shall not hold an

evidentiary hearing on the claim unless the applicant shows that-

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(I) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on

collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously

unavailable; or

(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously

discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and

(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish

by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error,

no reasonable fact finder would have found the applicant guilty of

the underlying offense;

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2).

Under this statutory scheme, a district court presented with a request for an

evidentiary hearing must first determine whether a factual basis exists in the record to support a

petitioner’s claims and, if not, whether an evidentiary hearing “might be appropriate.” Baja v.

Ducharme, 187 F.3d 1075, 1078 (9th Cir. 1999). See also Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d

657, 669-70 (9th Cir. 2005). Petitioner has not demonstrated that any additional facts need be

determined for a fair resolution of the merits of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Thus, 

petitioner has failed to overcome the initial hurdle identified above. 

Even assuming arguendo that additional facts need be determined and that

petitioner did not receive a full hearing in state court despite his best efforts, petitioner has not

demonstrated that an evidentiary hearing is required. A state habeas petitioner is entitled to an

evidentiary hearing on a claim only if he alleges “facts that, if proven, would entitled him to

relief.” Turner v. Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 890 (2002) (quoting Tapia v. Roe, 189 F.3d 1052,

1056 (9th Cir. 1999)) (“[e]ntitlement to an evidentiary hearing based on alleged ineffective

assistance, for example, requires a showing that if his allegations were proven at the evidentiary

hearing, deficient performance and prejudice would be established”). See also Townsend v.

Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963) (a defendant is entitled to a federal evidentiary hearing on his factual

allegations only if the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state hearing, the state

factual determination is not fairly supported by the record as a whole, the fact-finding procedure

employed by the state court was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing, there is a

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substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence, the material facts were not adequately

developed at the state-court hearing, or for any reason it appears that the state trier of fact did not

afford the habeas applicant a full and fair fact hearing). As discussed above, petitioner has failed

to demonstrate that he is entitled to relief on his claims in this court. Further, this court has

determined that relief as to petitioner’s claims should be denied on the merits because the state

court’s decision was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal

law. Accordingly, an evidentiary hearing is not warranted. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 445.

IV. Due Process Right to a Fair Trial

Petitioner’s final claim is that his due process right to a fair trial was violated

when the trial judge allowed the wheelchair-bound victim to remain in the courtroom during

portions of petitioner’s trial. This argument was rejected by the California Court of Appeal in a

written decision on petitioner’s direct appeal, and by the California Supreme Court without

comment in response to the petition for review. (See Answer, Exs. 3, 4.) The California Court

of Appeal described the background to this claim and the reasoning behind its decision as

follows:

The victim, Leyva, was the first witness to testify. Afterwards he

wanted to remain in the courtroom. Defendant objected, noting

Leyva was friends with the other witnesses and his presence would

make it harder for them to be neutral. Leyva told the court he had

not seen any of the other witnesses since the shooting. In response

to the concern that Leyva’s presence in his condition would create

sympathy, the district attorney noted Leyva had already testified for

two hours, including testimony about the nature of his injuries. A

doctor would also testify to Leyva’s injuries. The trial court ruled

Leyva could stay for part of the trial, the decision would be made

day-to-day, but Leyva would be excluded at the end when his

presence would have a greater impact. Leyva was present

throughout the case-in-chief, but not towards the end as

deliberations neared.

Defendant contends the trial court erred in allowing the paralyzed

Leyva in his wheelchair to remain the courtroom. Under Penal

Code section 1102.6 a crime victim has a right to be present during

criminal proceedings. (footnote omitted). The victim will be

excluded only if there is a substantial probability that overriding

interests will be prejudiced. (Pen. Code, § 1102.6, subd. (b).) 

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Defendant contends his right to a fair trial was prejudiced. He

claims Leyva’s condition engendered sympathy and his presence

may have influenced other witnesses.

There is nothing inherently inflammatory about the presence of a

man in a wheelchair. While Leyva’s injuries and resulting

paralysis were serious, the jury was well aware of these facts apart

from his presence. Both Leyva and a physician testified to his

injuries. Further, one of the issues the jury had to decide was the

enhancement for great bodily injury causing paralysis. Leyva’s

condition was thus an inescapable part of the case. The trial court

took steps to reduce the emotional impact of Leyva’s presence by

excluding him at the end of the trial, well before the jury began

deliberations.

As to whether Leyva’s presence would influence other witnesses,

defendant failed to show a close association that would give rise to

such influence. Leyva knew many of the witnesses and considered

some friends, but none was close enough to have seen him since

the shooting. Defendant failed to show Leyva’s presence could

sway their testimony. Further, Leyva was unable to identify the

shooter, so he had no crucial testimony to be corroborated. Nor did

it appear Leyva had any campaign against defendant. . . As a crime

victim, Leyva had a statutory right to be present, absent a showing

of prejudice to overriding interests. Defendant has failed to make

that showing. The trial court was correct in allowing him to stay

through part of the trial.

(Opinion at 5-8.)

Petitioner argues that the jurors may have based their verdict on their “feelings of

pity or sympathy for the victim” and not on the evidence at trial. (Pet. at 75.) He also argues that

the victim’s presence may have influenced the trial testimony of some of the witnesses. For

instance, he contends that witness Ed Ane, who originally identified petitioner as the shooter

from a photo lineup but then told the defense investigator that he chose petitioner only because

he knew petitioner had been in the bar, testified at trial that he saw petitioner with a weapon. 

(Id.) Petitioner claims that the victim’s presence in the courtroom directly influenced Ane’s

testimony in this regard. Petitioner contends that the trial court should have permitted Leyva to

watch the proceedings “by means of closed circuit television, videotape, or other means, so as to

vindicate the victim’s right to be present without imperiling petitioner’s due process right to a

fair trial.” (Id. at 77.)

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 Respondents’ argument may miss the mark. A defendant’s courtroom demeanor is

evidence that a jury may properly consider. Williams v. Calderon, 52 F.3d 1465, 1483 (9th Cir.

1995); United States v. Schuler, 813 F.2d 978, 981 n.3 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Bates v. Lee, 308

F.3d 411, 421 (4th Cir. 2002) (defendant’s demeanor at trial was before the jury at all times and

it was not improper for the prosecutor to comment on it in closing argument), cert. denied, ___

U.S. ___, 123 S. Ct. 2223 (2003). It is not clear, however, that a crime victim’s presence in the

gallery during parts of a trial, as opposed to the victim’s appearance on the witness stand, is

evidence. 

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Respondents argue that the state court’s decision with respect to this claim is not

contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law as determined by the United States

Supreme Court in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991). In Payne, the United States

Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment did not prohibit a capital sentencing jury from

considering “victim impact” evidence relating to the personal characteristics of the victim and the

emotional impact of the crime on the victim's family. Id. at 817. Specifically, the Supreme

Court concluded that "evidence and argument relating to the victim and the impact of the victim's

death on the victim's family” were admissible at a capital sentencing hearing (id. at 830 & n.2)

but that “information concerning a victim's family members' characterization of and opinions

about the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate sentence" could not be considered. Id. at 835

n.1. The Court also explained that victim impact evidence is subject to the constraints of the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which would prohibit evidence that "is so unduly

prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair." See id. at 825. See also Greer v.

Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765 (1987).9

The conclusion of the California Court of Appeal that the presence of victim

Leyva in the courtroom for part of petitioner’s trial was not unduly prejudicial is not contrary to

federal law. As noted by the trial court, the jurors were already familiar with Leyva’s extensive

injuries. Moreover, petitioner does not challenge any portion of Leyva’s trial testimony during

which jurors were exposed to his physical condition resulting from the shooting. The mere fact

that he was allowed to sit in the courtroom during parts of the trial was not so inflammatory that

it rendered petitioner’s trial fundamentally unfair. Finally, the trial court instructed the jury not

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to be swayed by any passion, prejudice, or undue sympathy for either side. (CT at 121.) 

Petitioner’s jurors are presumed to have followed this instruction. Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S.

782, 799 (2001). Petitioner has failed to show that his due process rights were violated by virtue

of the victim’s presence in the courtroom. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief on this

claim. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s application for a writ

of habeas corpus be denied. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: July 14, 2005.

DAD:8:hammo540.hc

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