Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_03-cv-00603/USCOURTS-cand-4_03-cv-00603-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal - Employment Discrimination

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1

 The following facts are taken from this Court's April 23, 2004 Order Granting in Part and Denying

in Part Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MERCEDES NAVARRO,

Plaintiff,

 v.

GENERAL NUTRITION

CORPORATION,

Defendant.

 /

No. C 03-0603 SBA

ORDER

[Docket Nos. 293, 296, 330, 332]

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney's Fees [Docket No. 293];

DefendantGeneralNutritionCorporation's("GNC") MotionforAttorney'sFees[DocketNo. 296]; Magistrate

Judge Chen's Report and Recommendation re Plaintiff's and Defendant'sMotions for Attorney's Fees [Docket

No. 330]; and GNC's Motion for De Novo Determination of the Magistrate's Report and Recommendation

[Docket No. 332]. 

Having read and considered the arguments presented by the parties in the papers submitted to the

Court, as well as Magistrate Judge Chen's Report and Recommendation, the Court finds this matter

appropriate forresolutionwithout a hearing. The Court hereby GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART

GNC's MotionforDe Novo Determination [Docket No. 332]; GRANTS IN PART ANDDENIES IN PART

Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney's Fees [Docket No. 293]; and GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART

GNC's Motion for Attorney's Fees [Docket No. 296].

BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background1

Plaintiff Mercedes Navarro ("Navarro" or "Plaintiff"), a California resident, was hired by General

Nutrition Corporation("GNC"), a Pennsylvania corporation, in March 1999. In October 1999, she was
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promoted to manager ofthe GNC store in San Leandro, California. On May 8, 2002, Plaintiff fell off a ladder

while working at the San Leandro GNC store and suffered injuries. After returning to work, however, Plaintiff

continued to experience pain as a result of the fall. Plaintiff thereafter took off an additional three weeks using

accumulated sick days and vacation time.

On July 11, 2002, Plaintiff notified GNC's Human Relations department that she wanted to take

additionalleave under the Family Medical Leave Act of 1983 ("FMLA") and the California Family Rights Act

("CFRA"). On July 15, 2002, GNC’s Human Relations department determined that, subject to certain

conditions, Plaintiff provisionally met the eligibility requirements for leave. 

Plaintiff returned to work on July 18 and 19, 2002. On the second of the two days, Plaintiff's

supervisor, Lorainne Crisp ("Crisp"), asked her to open the Castro Valley GNC store and manage itsfirstshift

the next morning, July 20, 2002, at 10:00 a.m. That night, Plaintiff presented to the St. Rose Hospital

emergency room with complaints of "anxiety"and "chronic pain." The physician's report indicated that Plaintiff

"should be able to return to work/school" on July 22, 2002. Plaintiff was discharged at 1:45 a.m. on July 20,

2002 but did not return to work to open the Castro Valley GNC that day. 

Plaintiff was immediately suspended, but given the opportunity to provide a doctor's note relating to

her emergency room visit in order to avoid termination. Plaintiff's employment was subsequently terminated

on July 29, 2002. Plaintiff contends that she did not receive notice of her termination until August 8, 2002.

Plaintiff also contends that she provided GNC with a medical certification that was signed by Dr. Deborah

Greer on August 5, 2002. The certification, which did not address Plaintiff's July 19, 2002 emergency room

visit, indicated that Plaintiff had a "serious health condition" under the FMLA. The certification further stated

that Plaintiffsufferedfromcontinued rightshoulder and back pain; that the condition commenced May 8, 2002;

and that she would only be able to work intermittently through September 30, 2002. 

B. Procedural Background

On December 26, 2002, Plaintiff filed a complaint in Alameda County Superior Court against

Defendants GNC and Crisp alleging:(1) wrongful termination in violation of public policy (against GNC); (2)

violation of the FMLA (against GNC); (3) violation of the CFRA (against GNC); (4) unfair competition in
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2Like Plaintiff, Crisp is a California resident.

3

violationof California Business and Professions Code § 17203 (against GNC); (5) violation of the California

Fair Employment & Housing Act("FEHA") for race discrimination and discrimination on the basis of medical

condition (against GNC); and (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress (against GNC and Crisp). GNC

removed the action to this Court on February 12, 2003 based on federal question jurisdiction. GNC also

alleged in the Notice of Removal that the Court had diversity jurisdiction because Defendant Crisp2 was a

"sham" defendant. Plaintiff did not oppose removal. 

On March 18, 2003, this Court issued an Order setting the initial Case Management Conference for

July 23, 2003. On July 7, 2003, pursuant to the Court's Order, the parties filed a Joint Case Management

Conference Statement. However, on July 23, 2003, Plaintiff failed to appear for the telephonic Case

Management Conference. Accordingly, on July 29, 2003, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause why the

action should not be dismissed. Per the Court's instructions, Plaintiff's counsel, Mr. Hoffman, filed a

Declaration on August 11, 2003 explaining Plaintiff'sfailure to initiate the telephone conference call. The Court

set aside the Order to Show Cause on August 21, 2003. 

On October 16, 2003, a further Case Management Conference was held. At the Case Management

Conference, the Court set the case for a March 22, 2004 trial. The parties were ordered to attend a pretrial

conference on March 9, 2004. 

On January 7, 2004, the parties attended a mediation but were unable to reach settlement. On January

15, 2004, the parties attended a Settlement Conference with Magistrate Judge Chen but, again, were unable

to reach settlement. 

On January 16, 2004, GNC filed a motion requesting a continuance ofthe pretrialconference and trial

date [see Docket No. 35]. In the motion, GNC stated that it had been attempting for months to informally

resolve its dispute with Plaintiff and that, due to what it believed was a mutual desire between the parties to

keep the costs of litigation low, it had not served Plaintiff with formal discovery requests but, instead, had

voluntarily provided Plaintiff with a significant amount of information and documentary evidence relevant to her

claims. GNC also alleged that it had a reasonable expectation that the case would not proceed to trial and did
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not realize until the January 7, 2004 mediation that the parties would not be able to reach settlement. GNC

further alleged that Plaintiff had informed GNC that she was willing to extend the discovery deadline but was

unwilling to stipulate to a continuance ofthe trial date because she wanted to prevent GNC from being able to

file any dispositive pretrial motions. 

On January 27, 2004, Plaintiff's counsel signed a stipulation agreeing that Plaintiff's claim for race

discrimination was baseless and that Plaintiff would no longer pursue that claim. Plaintiff did not, however,

move to dismiss that claim. 

On February 10, 2004, Plaintifffiled an untimely opposition to GNC's motion for a continuance ofthe

pretrial and trial dates [see Docket No. 42]. Plaintiff's opposition did not respond substantively to any of the

arguments set forth in GNC's motion. However, in a supporting declaration, Plaintiff's counsel stated that

Plaintiff was opposed to the continuance because Plaintiff was "completely readyfortrial"[seeDocketNo. 43].

 

On February 13, 2004, GNC filed a reply brief, in which it informed the Court that Plaintiff's counsel's

representation that Plaintiff was "completely ready for trial" was patently false, as Plaintiff had propounded a

significant amount of discovery requests on GNC that had not been completed, and had noticed eleven

depositions of GNC's current and former employees, nine of which had not yet taken place [see Docket No.

46]. GNC also stated that Plaintiff had not yet responded to GNC's written discovery requests, despite the

fact that the corresponding deadlines had passed, and that Plaintiff had failed to disclose the identity of her

purported expert(s). 

On February 17, 2004, the Court grantedGNC's motion and continued the trialdate to May 17, 2004,

with the pretrial conference to take place on May 4, 2004. 

 On March 15, 2004, Defendants GNC and Crisp filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. On March

24, 2004, GNC and Crisp filed a Motion to Shorten Time on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, in

whichDefendants requested a hearing date of April 6, 2004, so that the Motion for Summary Judgment could

be heard by the Court-ordered motion cut-off deadline. On March 29, 2004, the Court granted Defendants'

Motion to ShortenTime, and ordered the parties to complete the briefing on Defendants' Motion forSummary
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3Plaintiff also filed a Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts – in violation of this Court's standing

orders – to which Defendants properly objected.

4Defendants did not move for summary judgment on Plaintiff's FEHA claims and therefore the Order

did not address those claims.

5

Judgment on or before April 13, 2004. On April 6, 2004, Plaintiff filed an Opposition to Defendants' Motion

for Summary Judgment which included an untimely cross-motion for summary adjudication.3 The Court

subsequently sustained Defendants' objectionto Plaintiff'scross-motionand ordered itstricken fromthe record

[see Docket No. 96]. 

On April 23, 2004, the Court issued an Order granting in part and denying in part Defendants' Motion

for Summary Judgment. Pursuant to the Court's April 23, 2004 Order, Plaintiff's unfair competition and

intentionalinflictionof emotionaldistress claims were dismissed. However, Defendants' Motion for Summary

Judgment was denied with respect to Plaintiff's claims for: (1) FMLA/CFRA interference, (2) FMLA/CFRA

retaliation, and (3) wrongfultermination.4 Also pursuant to the Court's April 23, 2004 Order, the parties were

referred to Magistrate Judge Chen for a further Settlement Conference. 

On April 29, 2004, the parties participated in a Settlement Conference with Magistrate Judge Chen.

During the Settlement Conference, GNC offered Plaintiff $65,000 to settle the case. Plaintiff's counsel

contends, however, that Judge Chen did not communicate the $65,000 offer to him. See Supp. Decl. of

Michael Hoffman("Supp. HoffmanDecl.") at ¶ 1. Since Plaintiff was not willing to settle for an amount below

six figures, the Settlement Conference was terminated. Id. 

Trial commenced on May 17, 2004. On May 26, 2004, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend the

Complaint [Docket No. 251]. In the Motion to Amend, Plaintiff conceded that, although her complaint alleged

thatDefendants had violated FEHA by discriminating against her on the basis of a "medicalcondition," she had

no evidence in support of that claim. Plaintiff contended, however, that the evidence at trialsupported a claim

under FEHA for discrimination on the basis of physical disability and requested leave to amend the complaint

accordingly. The Court denied Plaintiff's Motion to Amend the Complaint on May 26, 2004. 

On May 27, 2004, the jury returned to Court with a unanimous verdictin favor ofPlaintiff on her cause

of action for FMLA interference and awarded Plaintiff past economic loss damages in the amount of $60,500.
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5Prior to the commencement of trial, Plaintiff agreed to dismiss Defendant Crisp from the case. 

6

With respect to Plaintiff's claims for FMLA retaliation, violation of CFRA rights, CFRA rights retaliation, and

wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, the jury returned a unanimous verdict for GNC.5 

On June 17, 2004, Plaintiff filed a Bill of Costs in the amount of $15,945.12 and GNC filed a Bill of

Costs in the amount of $64,400.00. Also on June 17, 2004, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Attorney's Fees,

requesting an award of attorney's fees in the total amount of $687,647.87. 

OnJune 18, 2004, GNC filed its Motion for Attorney's Fees, requesting an award offees in the amount

of $494,386.00. 

On July 7, 2004, costs were taxed in the amount of $9,374.88 against GNC and $34,300.68 against

Plaintiff. 

On September 21, 2004, this Court referred Plaintiff's and GNC's Motions for Attorney's Fees to

Magistrate Judge Chen for a report and recommendation.

OnNovember 19, 2004, Magistrate Judge Chen issued his Report and Recommendation [DocketNo.

330]. 

On December 7, 2004, GNC filed its Objections to Portions of Magistrate Judge Chen's Report and

Recommendation and the instant Motion for De Novo Determination. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 54(d)(2)(D), the Court may refer a motion for

attorneys' fees to a magistrate judge under Rule 72(b) as a dispositive pretrial matter. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

54(d)(2)(D). Rule 72(b) allows a magistrate judge to "hear a pretrial matter dispositive of a claim or defense

of a party." Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Rule 72(b) also governs the procedure for objecting to a magistrate judge's

determination of a dispositive pretrial matter:

A party objecting to the recommended disposition of the matter shall promptly arrange forthe

transcription of the record, or portions of it as all parties may agree upon or the magistrate

judge deems sufficient, unless the district judge otherwise directs. Within 10 days after being

served with a copyofthe recommended disposition, a party may serve and file specific, written

objections to the proposed findings and recommendations. A party may respond to another

party's objections within 10 days after being served with a copy thereof. The district judge to

whom the case is assigned shall make a de novo determination upon the record, or after
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additional evidence, of any portion of the magistrate judge's disposition to which specific

written objection has beenmade in accordance with this rule. The district judge may accept,

reject, or modify the recommended decision, receive further evidence, or recommit the matter

to the magistrate judge with instructions.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). 

Northern District Civil Local Rule 72-3 requires that an objection filed pursuant to Rule 72(b) “must

be accompanied by a motion for de novo determination, specifically identify the portions of the Magistrate

Judge's findings, recommendation or report to which objectionis made and the reasons and authority therefor."

N.D. Civil L.R. 72-3(a). In addition, the Court's review and determination of objections filed pursuant to Civil

LocalRule 72-3(a) shall be upon the record of the proceedings before the Magistrate, except when the Court

grants a motion for expansion or addition to the record or for an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 72-3(c).

The Court evaluating a Magistrate Judge's recommendation may adopt those portions of the

recommendation to which no specific objection is made, as long as those sections are not clearly erroneous.

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). However, "[t]he district court cannot simply 'concur' in the

magistrate's findings, . . . it must conduct its own review in order to adopt the recommendations." McCombs

v. Meijer, Inc., 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 949 *31 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Massey v. City of Ferndale, 7 F.

3d 506, 510-11 (6th Cir. 1993)). Further, in computing an award, the Court should provide a "detailed

account of how it arrives at appropriate figures for 'the number of hours reasonably expended' and 'a

reasonable hourly rate.'" Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 436 (1983). The Court must also conduct

a de novo review ofall of the Magistrate Judge's conclusions of law. See Barilla v. Ervin, 886 F.2d 1514,

1518 (9th Cir. 1989).

ANALYSIS

I. Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney's Fees

In Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney's Fees, Plaintiffrequests an award of attorney's fees in the amount of

$687,647.87, based on a lodestar value of $343,823.81 and a multiplier of2.0. Plaintiff's Motion is premised
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6The FMLA specifically provides that "[t]he court in such an action shall, in addition to any judgment

awarded to the plaintiff, allow a reasonable attorney's fee, reasonable expert witness fees, and other costs of

the action to be paid by the defendant." 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(3). 

7The sole objection thatJudge Chen recommends sustaining is GNC's objection to Plaintiff's inclusion

in the lodestar of the time her attorneys spent litigating her FEHA and unfair competition claims. Judge Chen

agrees with GNC that the FEHA and unfair competition claims are sufficiently unrelated to the successful

FMLA claim and that any time spent on such claims should be excluded. However, Judge Chen concludes

that Plaintiff does not appear to have spent any time litigating the FEHA claims and therefore does not

recommend adjusting the lodestar to account for the FEHA claims. 

8

on the fact that Plaintiff was the prevailing party on her FMLA interference claim.6

In its opposition, GNC argues that the Court should deny Plaintiff's Motion in its entirety, or,

alternatively, award fees and costs in the total amount of $6,518.50. In support of this argument, GNC sets

forth the following points: (1) Plaintiff's counsel's requested rates are not in line with those prevailing in the

community for lawyers of comparable skill and reputation; (2) Plaintiff's counsel's requested hours should be

reduced to exclude hours billed by Mr. Rosenthal, since Plaintiff did not provide the Court with any

documentation concerning Mr. Rosenthalor his background and did not provide a statement ofthe actualhours

billed by Mr. Rosenthal; (3) Plaintiff's counsel's requested hours should be reduced to exclude hours based on

uncooperative and contentious conduct; (4) Plaintiff's counsel's requested hours should be reduced to exclude

time spent pursuing frivolous claims; (5) Plaintiff's counsel's requested hours should be reduced to account for

the fact that Plaintiff rejected a settlement offer that was more favorable than the award she received fromthe

jury; (6) Plaintiff's requested paralegal hours should be reduced to exclude time spent on purely clericalwork;

(7) Plaintiff's requested 2.0 multiplier is unfounded; (8) Plaintiff's lodestar should be reduced to account for

Plaintiff's limited success; and (9) Plaintiff's total award should be reduced to exclude certain costs already

included in Plaintiff's Bill of Costs. GNC also argues that any award of attorney's fees to Plaintiff should be

offset by GNC's attorney's fees award. 

In his Report and Recommendation, Magistrate Judge Chen rejects most of GNC's arguments7 and

recommends a total lodestar of $320,031.00. In establishing the lodestar, Judge Chen finds Plaintiff's
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8Specifically, Judge Chen recommends excluding from the lodestar a time entry of 0.3 hours relating

to Plaintiff'spursuit ofher unfair competitionclaim. He also recommends reducing Plaintiff's requested paralegal

hours by approximately fifty percent to account for certain non-billable clerical work performed by Plaintiff's

legal "apprentice," Geraldine Camp. 

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requested hourly rates to be reasonable and, with a few minor modifications,8 finds Plaintiff's purported hours

to be reasonable as well. However, because Plaintiff achieved limited success in the litigation, Judge Chen

recommends a thirty-five percent (35%) reduction to the lodestar. Judge Chen also recommends an award

of costs in the gross amount of $6,550.24, reduced by thirty-five percent, for a totalcost award of$4,257.66.

The total fees and costs award recommended is therefore $212,277.80. 

GNC objects to the amount offees awarded to Plaintiffin generaland,specifically, contendsthatJudge

Chen erred by: (1) failing to reduce Plaintiff's lodestar for fees pertaining to the unsuccessful and unrelated

FEHA claims; and (2) failing to adjust Plaintiff's lodestar by a greater amount to account for Plaintiff's limited

success in the litigation. 

Having reviewed the record in its entirety, including Judge Chen's Report and Recommendation, the

Court finds that only some of Judge Chen's recommendations should be adopted by the Court. Judge Chen's

specific recommendations, and the Court's own findings and conclusions, are detailed below. 

A. Reasonable Hourly Rate

The firststep in the lodestar analysis is to establish a reasonable hourly rate for Plaintiff's attorneys and

paralegalstaff. Determining a reasonable hourly rate is a critical inquiry. Jordan v. Multnomah County, 815

F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n. 11 (1984)). The Court must

consider severalfactors, including the experience, skill and reputation ofthe applicant, and must look to the rate

prevailing in the community for similar work performed by attorneys of comparable skill, experience, and

reputation. Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1210-11 (9th Cir. 1985). The Court may not

merely refer to the rates actually charged to the prevailing party. Id. at 1210-11. Instead, the reasonable

hourly rate is based on the "market rate" for the services rendered. See People Who Care v. Rockford Bd.

of Educ., 90 F.3d 1307, 1310 (7th Cir.1996). It is the applicant's burden to produce evidence, other than

the declarations ofinterested counsel, that "the requested rates are in linewith those prevailing in the community
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for similarservices oflawyers of reasonably comparable skill and reputation." Jordan, 815 F.2d at 1263. In

addition, in figuring a reasonable fee, the Court should consider the outcome of the action, the customary fees,

and the novelty or difficulty of the issues presented. Chalmers, 796 F.2d at 1211 (citing Kerr v. Screen

Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir.1975)). Once counselhas established the reasonableness ofhis

or her rate, then the burden shiftsto the opposing party to demonstrate why the rate should be lower. Spegon

v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 175 F.3d 544, 554 (7th Cir.1999).

 Plaintiff requests that her attorneys be awarded fees at the following hourly rates: (1) $325 per hour

for attorneyMichaelHoffman; (2) $300 per hour for attorney Josh Rosenthal; (3) $285 per hour for attorney

Marilyn Minger; (4) $65 per hour for paralegal Katie Youngmark; and (5) $65 per hour for apprentice

Geraldine Camp. GNC objects to the hourly rates requested for Mr. Hoffman and Ms. Minger on the grounds

that they are unreasonable in light of Mr. Hoffman and Ms. Minger's demonstrated lack ofskill in the litigation.

GNC contends that an hourly rate of $150 for Mr. Hoffman and Ms. Minger is more in line with their

demonstrated skill and experience. GNC also objects to the requested hourly rate for Mr. Rosenthal on the

grounds that documentation relating to Mr. Rosenthal's hours has not been provided. The requested rates for

Ms. Youngmark and Ms. Camp are unopposed. 

1. Mr. Hoffman's Hourly Rate

Plaintiff's "proof" ofthe reasonableness ofMr. Hoffman's$325 hourly rate is primarily premised on Mr.

Hoffman's own declaration, which establishes only that:(1)Mr. Hoffmanwas the lead attorney ofrecord during

the trial; (2) Mr. Hoffman received a degree from Golden Gate University School of Law in 1991; (3) Mr.

Hoffman was admitted to the California Bar in 1991; and (4) for the past ten years, Mr. Hoffman has spent

the "majority"ofhis time "representing employees in discrimination and other employment litigation." See June

16, 2004 Declaration of R. Michael Hoffman ("Hoffman Declaration"). Plaintiff has also submitted affidavits

fromMichaelRubin and Brad Seligman, localattorneys with roughly twenty-five years of trial experience, who

contend that the applicable marketrate for attorneys in the Bay Area with approximately ten years experience
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9 Specifically, Mr. Rubin believes Mr. Hoffman's rate to be "comparable to the billing rates for other

California attorneys with comparable experience" and Mr. Seligman believes Mr. Hoffman's rate to be "at or

below the prevailing rates for attorneys of similar experience and length of practice in such cases in this area."

Rubin Decl. at ¶ 4; Seligman Decl. at ¶ 9. 

10The Rubin Declaration and SeligmanDeclarationwere not part ofPlaintiff's moving papers, but were

filed pursuant to Judge Chen's September 30, 2004 Order requesting supplemental briefing.

11 Judge Chen does acknowledge that GNC produced evidence that its lead trial attorneys charged

rates lower than Mr. Hoffman during trial. See Opp. at 17 (noting that GNC's lead counsel, Mr. Keller and

Mr. Holland, charged an hourly rate of $275 and $225, respectively, during trial). Notably, Mr. Keller has

over twenty-five years of litigation experience and has tried over sixty cases to verdict in federal and state

courts. Decl. of G. Daniel Newland I.S.O. GNC's Motion for Attorneys' Fees ("Newland Decl.") at ¶ 11. 

 

11

is either at or above $325 per hour.9 See Decl. of Michael Rubin ("Rubin Decl.") at ¶ 4; Decl. of Brad

Seligman("SeligmanDecl.") at¶ 9.10 During the proceedings before Judge Chen, Plaintiff also provided docket

reports showing that, in the entirety ofhis career, Mr. Hoffman has served as the lead counsel of record in ten

federal cases, five of which proceeded to trial. See Pl's Req. for Jud. Not. at Ex. A at p.2. 

Based on Plaintiff's evidence, Judge Chen recommends a finding that an hourly rate of $325 for Mr.

Hoffman is reasonable. In reaching this conclusion, however, Judge Chen notes that Plaintiff's evidence is

probative of Mr. Hoffman's length of experience only, and does not actually speak to whether Mr. Hoffman's

reputation or skill warrants such a fee. Judge Chen's recommendation is also largely based on his finding that

GNC did not produce enough specific evidence to refute the reasonableness of Mr. Hoffman's fee.11 He

acknowledges, however, that "[a]n argument could be made that Mr. Hoffman's alleged misconduct [during

the litigation] might indicate a lack of skill, which would be a basis for a reduction of his reasonable market

rate." 

Having considered the same evidence, the Court finds that it does not agree with Judge Chen's

conclusion thatPlaintiff has met her initialburden ofproofwith respect to the reasonableness of Mr. Hoffman's

fee. First, it is clearly established in the Ninth Circuit that it is the applicant's burden to produce specific

evidence, other than the declarations of interested counsel, that the requested rates are in line with those

prevailing in the community for lawyers with comparable skill and reputation. Jordan, 815 F.2d at 1263.

The burden does not shift to GNC to produce rebuttal evidence unless and until Plaintiff meets her initial
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12See Docket No. 12 (Order to Show Cause). 

12

burden. Spegon, 175 F.3d at 554. 

Here, the only evidence Plaintiff has produced concerning the reasonableness of Mr. Hoffman's rate

are the affidavits of Mr. Rubin and Mr. Seligman and the docket reports that chronicle Mr. Hoffman's fairly

scant federal trial experience. As Judge Chen correctly notes, however, Mr. Rubin and Mr. Seligman's

affidavits are devoid of any evidence regarding Mr. Hoffman's skill and reputation. In fact, it is not clear

whether Mr. Rubin or Mr. Seligmanare even familiar with Mr. Hoffman, or whether they are merely expressing

generalized opinions regarding the marketrate for attorneys with ten years oflitigation experience. As for Mr.

Hoffman'strialexperience, the docketsheets actually undermine Plaintiff's assertion that a rate of$325 per hour

is a reasonable fee for Mr. Hoffman. Notably, in the most recent case Mr. Hoffman litigated in federal court

before this one, which was in 2000, Mr. Hoffman's client prevailed on summary judgment, but Mr. Hoffman,

personally, was sanctioned and ordered to reimburse the defendants' attorneys' fees and costs. See Pl's Req.

for Jud. Not. at Ex. A. at p. 51. Further, Mr. Hoffmandoes not appear to have been victorious in any of the

other federal cases he has tried to verdict, save one case that settled shortly after the verdict was rendered.

See Pl's Req. forJud. Not. at Ex. A. at pp. 2-3. Because Plaintiff's evidence does not sufficiently establish that

an hourly rate of $325 for Mr. Hoffman is reasonable, the Court must make its own determination regarding

the appropriate fee. 

Based on the Court's observation ofMr. Hoffman'sskill and experience in this litigation, the Court finds

that Mr. Hoffman's overall performance in the underlying litigationwas not commensurate with other attorneys

of his experience or length of practice who have appeared before this Court. See Ackerman v. Western

Electric Co., Inc., 643 F. Supp. 836, 867 (N. D. Cal. 1986) (finding a rate of $95 per hour to be reasonable

for an attorney whose performance was "erratic" and "below the standard for experienced lawyers.").

Specifically, the Court notes that: (1) Mr. Hoffman was ordered to show cause by this Court after failing to

appear forthe initialCase Management Conference12; (2) Mr. Hoffman waited until trial to dismiss his client's

race discrimination claim from the lawsuit even though he admits that he was aware, from the time the
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13See October 27, 2004 Tr. at 30:11-31-21 (Mr. Hoffman: "The first time I talked to [GNC's counsel]

on the phone . . . I said, race is not part of this case in any way, shape or form, whatsoever . . . . The plaintiff

felt that, as a Filipino woman, she was not givenan FMLA, and she insisted . . . thatwe put that claim therein.")

14See Supp. Decl. of Keller at ¶¶ 11-13.

15See Docket No. 43 (stating on February 10, 2004 that Plaintiff was "completely ready for trial.")

16See Docket No. 96 (noting that Plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment violated the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure and Civil Local Rule No. 7-2).

17See, e.g., May 11, 2004 Tr. at 9:4-7 (Court: "[F]irst ofall, Mr. Hoffman. . . my Order ordered you

to file your opposition to the motion by noon on May 4th, and you filed your opposition on May 4th at 6:30.")

18See Supp. Keller Decl. at ¶¶ 23-26. 

19See October 27, 2004 Tr. at 11:5-16 (Mr. Hoffman: "I mean . . . I was going through the jury verdict

and going through the instructions, and I didn't realize that an FMLA should have been incorporated into our

CFRA verdictform. . . and that's why she did not get anything above - - beyond the total amount of back pay

that she sought."). 

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Complaint was filed, that the claim was groundless13; (3) Mr. Hoffman did not dismiss Defendant Crisp from

the lawsuit even after conceding in correspondence with Defendants thatshe was not a proper defendant in the

case14; (4) Mr. Hoffman submitted a sworn declaration in opposition to Defendants' motion to continue the

pretrialand trialdates that included false statements regarding his client's readiness for trial15; (5) Mr. Hoffman

filed an untimely cross-motion for summary judgment in violation of the Civil Local Rules16; (6) Mr. Hoffman

repeatedly missed filing deadlines and was admonished during the pretrial conference for failing to file certain

papers by the Court-ordered deadline17; (7) Mr. Hoffman was admonished by this Court for speaking to a

GNC witness during a break in her testimony at trial18; and (8) Mr. Hoffman admitted during the proceedings

before Judge Chen that Plaintiff's failure to obtain all of the relief she may have been entitled to was due to

certain errors he committed while drafting the jury verdict form.19

Again, based on this Court's own observations of Mr. Hoffman's conduct during the underlying

proceedings, the Court findsthat an hourly rate of $325 per hour is too high, particularly in light ofthe fact that

Mr. Hoffman's opposing counsel in this matter, Mr. Keller – who has been litigating for over twenty-five years

and has tried over sixty cases to verdict – charged his client $275 per hour for work performed on the same
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20This fact is helpful to the Court in assessing the reasonableness of the rate in light of the novelty or

difficulty ofthe issues presented. Chalmers, 796 F.2d at 1211. The fact that GNC's counseldiscounted their

rates for this litigation suggests that this case was not particularly difficult or novel, which conclusion is further

supported by the fact that both parties repeatedly stated throughout the litigation that the case was relatively

simple and straightforward.

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case.20 However, the Court also finds that GNC's suggested rate of $150 is too low and is not supported by

any evidence or statistics. In the absence of any specific guidance fromthe parties, the Court relies on its own

judgment and experience in determining fees, as well as a recent order issued by Judge Walker in Yahoo!Inc.

v. Net Games, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1189 (N. D. Cal. 2004), which sets forth a comprehensive

examinationofthe relevantstatistical data and finds thatthe average marketrate for attorneys practicing in San

Francisco is $190 per hour. See id. at 1189 (analyzing statistics from the United States Census Bureau and

the Bureau ofLaborStatistics). Based on this Court's observations, and its assessment of Mr. Hoffman's skills,

the Court finds that a rate of$190 per hour for Mr. Hoffman is appropriate. Accordingly, Mr. Hoffman shall

be compensated at a rate of $190 per hour. 

2. Mr. Rosenthal's Hourly Rate

With respect to Mr. Rosenthal's purported hourly rate, the Court notes that Plaintiff did not file any

supporting documentation concerning Mr. Rosenthal in support of her Motion forAttorney's Fees. Although

Plaintiff submitted the Supplemental Declaration of Michael Hoffman in response to GNC's opposition, this

document merely provides that: (1) Mr. Rosenthal was admitted to the California State Bar in 1997; and (2)

Mr. Rosenthalis employed with Medlin RealEstate Law Group in Oakland. The Court finds that this evidence

falls substantially short of Plaintiff's requisite burden ofproof. Jordan, 815 F.2d at 1263 (applicant's burden

is to produce evidence, other than the declarations of interested counsel, that the requested rates are

reasonable). Notably, not only has Plaintiff failed to provide a declaration from Mr. Rosenthal himself, but

Plaintiff does not provide a curriculum vitae for Mr. Rosenthal or any other information regarding Mr.

Rosenthal's education, litigation experience, skill, or reputation. In fact, it is not even clear from Mr. Hoffman's

Supplemental Declaration whether Mr. Rosenthal actually practices civil litigation or has any experience with

employment litigation in particular. Accordingly, the Court does not agree with Judge Chen's conclusion that

$275 per hour is a reasonable rate for Mr. Rosenthal. Since it is clear that Mr. Rosenthal has less experience
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thanMr. Hoffmanand had a very limited role in the underlying proceedings, and since there is no basis forthe

Court to conclude thatMr. Rosenthalhas the requisite experience to support an hourly rate of$275, the Court

finds that Mr. Rosenthal shall be compensated at an hourly rate of $150.

3. Ms. Minger's Hourly Rate

With respect to Ms. Minger, Plaintiff has established: (1) that Ms. Minger earned a Bachelor of Arts

in applied mathematicsin 1998; (2)thatMs. Mingergraduated fromthe University ofCalifornia at Davis Martin

Luther King Junior School of Law in 1991; (3) that Ms. Minger was admitted to the California bar in 1991;

(4) that Ms. Minger is a member of all of the courts of the State of California and the United States District

Court for the Northern District of California; (5) that Ms. Minger has spent about fifty percent of her time in

civil litigation since 1991, but only a year in discrimination and employment litigation; and (5) that Mr. Rubin

believes that Ms. Minger's rate is an accurate market rate for lawyers with her experience and qualifications.

Based on this evidence, Judge Chen concludes that an hourly rate of $285 is reasonable. However, Judge

Chen expresses some reservation with regard to whether Plaintiff has sufficiently established that Ms. Minger

actually has the same level of "skill" and "experience" as other attorneys typically compensated at this hourly

rate.

Again, the fact that Plaintiff's evidence is silent with respect to Ms. Minger's skill and reputation does

not suffice to meet Plaintiff's burden of proof. Accordingly, the Court must make its own determination

regarding the appropriate rate forMs. Minger's services. Based on the evidence the Court has been provided,

the Court findsthatMs. Minger is less experienced thanMr. Hoffman. However, it is not clear that she is more

experienced or skilled than Mr. Rosenthal. Accordingly, the Court finds that an hourly rate of $150 for Ms.

Minger is reasonable and appropriate.

4. The Paralegal's Hourly Rates

With respect to Ms. Camp, Plaintiff has provided the following information: (1) that Ms. Camp is

certified by the California State Commissioner of Bar Examiners to study law as an apprentice; (2) that Ms.

Camp attended St. John Fisher College in Rochester, New York from 1990 to 1994; (3) that Ms. Camp

worked fortwo years as an executive assistant for a realestate development firmin San Francisco; and (4) that
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Ms. Camp has worked for Mr. Hoffman since January 2001. With respect to Ms. Youngmark, Plaintiff

provides no relevant information, other than a statement from Mr. Hoffman that Ms. Youngmark is an

"experienced paralegal." This evidence is also insufficient to meet Plaintiff's burden of proof. However, as

Judge Chen correctly notes, Plaintiff's requested rate of $65 per hour is unopposed by GNC. Further, as

Judge Chen notes, $65 per hour is actually belowthe prevailingmarketrate. See Report and Recommendation

("R&R") at 8. Accordingly, the Court hereby adopts Judge Chen's recommendation and finds that Ms. Camp

and Ms. Youngmark shall be compensated at a rate of $65 per hour. 

B. Reasonable Hours

The next step in calculating the lodestar is for the Court to determine the number ofhours reasonably

expended in the litigation. Chalmers, 796 F.2d at 1210. The applicant must justify her claim by submitting

detailed time records. U.S. v. City and County of San Francisco, 699 F. Supp. 762 (N.D. Cal. 1988). The

documentation submitted should be sufficient to satisfy the Court that the hours expended were actual,

non-duplicative and reasonable, and to apprise the Court of the nature of the activity and the claim on which

the hours were spent. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437; Wehr v. Burroughs Corp., 477 F.Supp. 1012,

1016-18 (E.D.Pa.1979). Further, a fee applicant must show that she exercised "billing judgment" in the

preparation of the attorney's fee application. Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 891 (1980) (en banc).

"Hours not properly billed to one's client are not properly billed to one's adversary . . . ." Copeland, 641 F.2d

at 891. Only hours found to have been reasonably expended may be allowed. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434

(holding that a plaintiff is not entitled to an award of attorney's fees for hours which were duplicative,

unproductive, excessive or otherwise unnecessary). After reviewing the applicant's records, the Court may

adjust the hours downward if it believes the documentation to be inadequate, if it finds that the hours are

duplicative, or ifit findsthat the hours are excessive or unnecessary. Copeland, 641 F.2d at 891, 891 n. 18.

Additionally, the Court should not include time spent litigating claims upon which the party seeking the fee did

not ultimately prevail if the Court is able to determine that the unsuccessful claims are truly "fractionable" from

the successful claims. Id. 

When anattorneyis notable to provide the Court with contemporaneous billing records, reconstruction
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21In her affidavit, Ms. Youngmark states that she worked 9.1 hours on this case. However, Mr.

Hoffman's affidavit states that Ms. Youngmark only worked 8.8 hours. Mr. Hoffman's erroneous statement

appears to have led Magistrate Chen to conclude that Plaintiff is only requesting compensation for 8.8 hours.

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may be used as a basis for an award of attorney's fees. See City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 560 F.2d

1093, 1102-1103 (2d Cir.1977); United States v. State of Washington, 626 F.Supp. 1405, 1446, 1516

(W.D.Wash.1985). However, the Court must "subject the retrospectively created record to a more exacting

scrutiny than [it] would bring to contemporaneous and detailed records."Grendel's Den, Inc. v. Larkin, 749

F.2d 945, 952 (1st Cir.1984). Further, courts "frow[n] on block billing where discrete and unrelated tasks

are lumped into one entry, as the practice can make it impossible . . . to determine the reasonableness of the

hours spent on each task." See Defenbaugh v. JBC & Associates, Inc., 2004 WL 1874978, at *9 (N.D.

Cal. Aug. 10, 2004) (reducing hours billed for separate tasks billed as one entry). 

Here, Plaintiff requests that her attorneys be compensated as follows: (1) 772.5 total hours for Mr.

Hoffman(comprised of684.5 hours for pretrial and trial work and 88 hours fortime spent on the fees motion);

(2) 9.5 hours forJoshRosenthal; (3) 207.25 hours forMs. Minger (comprised of202.75 hours for pretrialand

trialwork and 4.5 hoursfortime spent on the fees motion); (4) 9.1 hours21 forMs. Youngmark; and (4) 272.60

hours for Ms. Camp. In support of the requested hours, Plaintiff has provided the Court with statements –

purportedly based on contemporaneous records – that show the hours billed over the course of the litigation.

See HoffmanDecl. at Ex. 3, 4; Minger Decl. at Ex. A; Youngmark Decl. at p. 2. The actualcontemporaneous

records, however, have not been provided. Plaintiff has also failed to provide the Court with any

documentation regarding Mr. Rosenthal's hours. Instead, in the Hoffman Declaration, Mr. Hoffman avers that

Mr. Rosenthal billed 9.5 hours on the case in relation to his attendance of the depositions of Dr. Lan Lui and

Dr. Greer. See Hoffman Decl. at ¶ 8. 

Judge Chen recommends the following calculation of hours: (1) 772.2 hours for Mr. Hoffman; (2)

207.25 hours for Ms. Minger; (3) 9.5 hours for Mr. Rosenthal; (4) 8.8 hours for Ms. Youngmark; and (5)

104.85 hours forMs. Camp. Although Judge Chen agrees with GNC that time relating to Plaintiff's FEHA and

unfair competition claims should be excluded due to the fact that such claims are sufficiently unrelated to

Plaintiff's successful FMLA claim, Judge Chen concludes that GNC has not demonstrated that Plaintiff spent
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22Because Judge Chen concludes that Plaintiff's preliminary burden ofproofhas been met, the majority

ofJudge Chen's report focuses on whether GNC has met its burden of proof with respect to its contention that

Plaintiff'srequested hours are unreasonable. However, the Court finds that Judge Chen should not have shifted

the burden to GNC without first assessing the quality of Plaintiff's records and making the appropriate

deductions. 

23Although Mr. Hoffman states in his declaration that he did not bill for all of his trial time, Plaintiff

provides no specific evidence that any hours have been deducted from the overall total. In fact, as set forth

below, it is startlingly clear from even a cursory review of Plaintiff's billing statements that Plaintiff's attorneys

have not exercised billing judgment. 

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any time pursuing her FEHA claims. Accordingly, the only time Judge Chen recommends excluding fromthe

lodestar for Plaintiff's unsuccessful claims is a 0.3 hour time entry included in Mr. Hoffman's billing statement

relating to Plaintiff's unfair competition claim. 

GNC specifically objects to Judge Chen's recommendation and argues that the total hours must be

reduced to account for time spent pursuing Plaintiff'sfrivolous FEHA and unfair competition claims. Because

this is a specific objection to the report, the Court must review this portion of the report de novo. See Fed.

R. Civ. P. 72(b). 

Having reviewed Plaintiff's billing statements, the Court declines to adopt this portion ofJudge Chen's

report. Significantly, although Judge Chen concludes that, with respect to the hours billed by Mr. Hoffman and

Ms. Minger, Plaintiff's documentation is sufficient to meet her preliminary burden ofproof,22 he also points out

that Plaintiff:(1) has failed to address whether her attorneys have exercised "billing judgment"; and (2) has failed

to offer evidence that her attorneys reduced specific hoursforinefficiency.23 Given the substantially poor detail

provided by Mr. Hoffman, Ms. Minger, and Ms. Youngmark's billing statements, which consist ofthe type of

"block billing" that is typically scorned by the courts, the Court finds that an "exacting" scrutiny of Plaintiff's

requested hours is warranted. Further, Judge Chen's conclusion that Plaintiff's billing statements do not "reveal

any overbilling or duplication in effort" is not supported by the record. The Court's analysis of Plaintiff's billing

records is set forth below. 

1. Mr. Hoffman's Hours

With respect to Mr. Hoffman, Judge Chen recommends a finding that 684.5 hours forMr. Hoffman's

trial and pretrialwork is reasonable. However, having reviewed the same records, the Court finds that many
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24All ofPlaintiff'stime entriesrelating to the initialCase Management Conference, whichwas cancelled

due to Plaintiff's counsel's failure to appear for the Conference, necessitating a further Case Management

Conference and the draftingof a second Case Management Conference Statement, are unreasonable. Further,

such time entries have nothing to do with Plaintiff's success on her FMLA claim. 

25Billing for time spent learning the Court's e-filing procedures is questionable at best. It is manifestly

unreasonable, however, in light of the fact that between Mr. Hoffman and Ms. Camp alone more than 6.6

hours were billed forthis task, and Plaintiff's attorneys stillfailed to master the proper procedures. See Docket

Nos. 14, 16, 23, 41, 341 (notices from the Court regarding Plaintiff's failure to e-file). 

26It is notreasonable to bill GNC fortime spent on sanction proceedings initiated by the Court against

Plaintiff's counsel due to Plaintiff's counsel's failure to appear for the Case Management Conference.

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of Mr. Hoffman's time entries involve purely clerical work, are excessive for the work performed, are

unnecessarily duplicative, or relate to inexcusable procedural errors that would not have been performed by

"reasonably competent counsel" and should not be billed to one's client, much less one's opposing counsel.

Thus,the Court findsthat only 561.96 hours are reasonable and compensable. Specifically, the following hours

must be eliminated:

Date Hours Description

3/18/03 0.1 "Review Case Management Scheduling Order For Reassigned Case: CMC

changed to 7/23/2003, update calendar"24

7/1/03 0.4 "Review letter from Cooper regarding meet and confer to file for filing of a

joint case management conference statement"

7/3/03 1.6 "Answer letter to Cooper regarding joint casemanagementstatement,meeting

with Marilyn to discuss answer priorto her drafting correspondence, work on

CMC issues" 

7/7/03 0.2 "Review Joint Case Management Statement filed by GNC."

7/11/03 0.4 "Review Clerk's Notice re: Failure to E-File and/or Failure to Register as an

E-Filer"

7/14/03 2.1 "Investigate and review E-Filing and Registration procedures and system"25

7/15/03 0.3 "Discuss with Minger CMC letter to Steve Danz advising him of our

unavailability to attend case management conference, and request for court

coverage from Danz and Gerber, call to client"

7/29/03 3.5 "Review Order to Show Cause, work on Declaration of R. Michael Hoffman

in Response to Order to Show Cause re missed case management conference

by Mercedes Navarro, continue work on case management statement"26
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27On the actual exhibit, this entry is erroneously stated as August 10, 2004 but it appears to actually

be referring to August 10, 2003.

28Although there is one entry that appears to be non-clerical – i.e. "discussion with client" – Mr.

Hoffmanmakes no effort to identify the amount of time thatwas allotted to this task. The rest of the entries are

either clerical, duplicative, or unnecessary, and therefore unreasonable. 

29That Mr. Hoffman spent one hour confirming a settlement conference date and placing it on his

calendar defies credibility. Accordingly, this time entry is unreasonable and is excluded.

30The declaration thatMr. Hoffman is referring to in this time entry states in its entirety: "I, R. Michael

Hoffman, am an attorney of record in this action. Plaintiff is completely ready for trial. Her expert has been

scheduled. This is a simple 3-4 case [sic]. Discovery is proceeding along based upon the agreement of the

parties. No judicial intervention is required. Plaintiff does not agree to a continuance. I declare under penalty

ofperjury under the laws ofthe United States that the foregoing is true and correct an that this declarationwas

executed at San Francisco, California, on February 1, 2004." Taking one hour to draft an eight-sentence

declaration is unreasonable. Further, the Court notes that the date of the sworn declaration is February 1,

2004, but, curiously, Mr. Hoffman is claiming that he drafted this declaration on February 8, 2004.

31This time entry was appropriately excluded by Magistrate Judge Chen as relating to Plaintiff's

unsuccessful unfair competition claim. 

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8/10/0327 1.3 "Prepare Declaration in Response to Order to Show Cause re missed case

management conference by Mercedes Navarro"

8/11/03 1.1 "File Declaration re missed case management conference

Review Clerk's notice re:Failure to E-File regarding manually filed document

OSC set aside. Calendar Further Case Management Conference to be held

on 10/16/2003 3:00 p.m. via telephone before Judge Armstrong. Review and

calendar new deadlines." 

10/17/03 1.8 "Review and calendar notice ofScheduling Conference on 10/16/2003 before

Judge Jury Trial set for 5 days on 3/22/2004 08:30 AM. Motion cut-off

deadline set for 2/3/2004. Case management scheduled order of Discovery

due by 1/16/2004 and Motions due by 2/3/2004 calendared. Review notice

of case referral to Magistrate Judge Edward M. Chen for Settlement,

calendar, discussion with client 10/20/2003 

Review notice of case referred to Mediation and calendar. Final Pretrial

Conference set for 3/9/2004 01:00 PM. Calendar

Review notice of clerk's re: Plaintiff's Failure to E-File and/or Failure to

Register as an E-Filer. Perform E-Filing procedures, and Registration

Training"28 

10/28/03 1.0 "Review and calendar Court order re- Notice of Settlement Conference and

Settlement Conference Order. Confirm Settlement Conference set for

1/15/2004 at 09:30 AM"29

2/8/04 1.0 "Prepare Declaration of R. Michael Hoffman Motion to continue trial date"30

4/4/4 0.3 "Review email and attachment from Marilyn regarding Unfair Competition."31
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32That Mr. Hoffman has billed thirty (30) hours in one day is shocking and completely unreasonable.

33This time entry is not reasonable in light of the fact that Mr. Hoffman has admitted to the Court that

he committed an error in drafting the verdict form that substantially curtailed the amount of relief Plaintiff

purportedly could have recovered for her claims. 

34The following examples are provided by way ofillustration, only, and are notmeant to be exhaustive.

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5/24/04 15 "Jury Trial. Review Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law filed by GNC,

work on opposition. Review Proposed Jury Instructions by GNC, 

15 Jury Trial. Review Brief re GNC's Further Citations in Support of GNC's

Proposed Jury Instruction No. 34."32 

5/25/04 15 "Review of Proposed Form of Verdict by GNC Joint Verdict Form - - Both

Parties"33

TOTAL 60.1 Hours

In addition to the specific time entries noted above, Mr. Hoffman's billing statement contains several

block entries that include non-billable clerical or duplicative work, work performed on the FEHA and unfair

competition claims, or work that served no legitimate purpose and unnecessarily prolonged the proceedings.

For example,34 on January 26, 2004, Mr. Hoffman spent 0.5 hours scheduling depositions, but also billed time

for a "review[ing] letter and proposed order fromLeverett regarding stipulationto an order dismissing Lorraine

Crisp from lawsuit." Inexplicably, Mr. Hoffman never filed the stipulation, despite the fact that Defendants

understood that he had agreed to do so. Additionally, on April 13, 2004, Mr. Hoffman billed 4.5 hours for

work relating to reviewing Defendants' objections to Plaintiff'ssummary judgment evidence, but also included

in this entry is the time Mr. Hoffman spent reviewing Defendants' objection to Plaintiff's Separate Statement

ofUndisputed MaterialFacts, whichwas filed in violationofthis Court's standing orders. Mr. Hoffman's April

27, 2004 time entry also suggests that he billed time relating to Defendants' motion in limine to preclude

evidence about discrimination based upon race and/or religion filed by GNC. 

Since Mr. Hoffman has "block billed," it is impossible for the Court to parse out a specific amount of

hours that should be excluded fromthese time entries. Accordingly, the Court hereby reduces Mr. Hoffman's

remaining hours by ten percent to further eliminate any unbillable hoursthat have been inappropriately included

in Mr. Hoffman's block billing. This results in a total of 561.96 hours for pretrial and trial work. 

With respect to Mr. Hoffman'srequested hours relating to the fees motion, Judge Chen recommends
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35See October 27, 2004 Tr. at 7:13-14 (The Court: "Frankly the briefing on all sides of this has been

pretty poor, I'll tell you that right now.")

36Again, Plaintiff'stime entriesrelatingto the initialCase Management Conference, whichwas cancelled

due to Plaintiff's counsel's failure to appear for the Conference, are unreasonable and are therefore excluded.

37This is yet another unreasonable entry relating to Plaintiff's counsel's attempt to learn the e-filing

system.

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a finding that 88 hours for work performed on the fees motion is reasonable. However, due to the fact that the

documentationMr. Hoffmanhas submitted to the Court is inadequate in many regards, and the fact thatJudge

Chen noted at the fee petition hearing that the briefing submitted by both parties was fairly poor,35the Court

does not agree that 88 hours is reasonable. Accordingly, the Court hereby adjusts the hours downward to 40,

which the Court finds to be a fair estimate of the amount of time it would have taken reasonably competent

counsel to adequately research and brief the fees motion. 

2. Ms. Minger's Hours

With respect to Ms. Minger, Judge Chen recommends a finding that 207.25 hours for Ms. Minger's

trialand pretrialwork is reasonable. However, in many regards, Ms. Minger's billing statements lack the type

ofspecificity that is typically required of fee applicants. For example, all ofMs. Minger's entriesrelating to the

trial merely state "Attendance at trial." It is also apparent that Ms. Minger billed for time spent on tasks that

are purely clerical in nature. Having reviewed Ms. Minger's billing statement closely, the Court finds that the

following hours must be eliminated:

Date Hours Description

07/02/03 0.25 "Telephone conference with Allison Lane Cooper re joint case management

statement"36

7/03/03 1.50 "Telephone conference with Allison Lane Cooper re joint case management

statement; meeting with M. Hoffmanre case management statement; email to

Allison Cooper re same"

7/15/03 0.50 "Letter to S. Danz re case management conference"

10/06/03 0.83 "Prepare case management statement"

4/20/04 0.75 "Receive training on filing electronically with court."37
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38As this entry relates to purely clerical work and is excessive, it is unreasonable and therefore

excluded.

39Again, the Court notes that Ms. Youngmark's billing statement actually reflects a total of 9.1 hours

worked. Judge Chen appears to be referring to Mr. Hoffman's affidavit, which states that Ms. Youngmark only

billed 8.8 hours. 

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4/20/04 1.50 "Convert documents to PDF and file with court"38

TOTAL: 5.33

Additionally, like Mr. Hoffman, it appears that Ms. Minger performed some work on frivolous or

unmeritorious claims and also performed work that served no legitimate purpose and unnecessarily prolonged

the proceedings. For example, on April 4, 2004, Ms. Minger billed 16.42 hours for work that included a

"conference with Mr. Hoffman re infair [sic] competition and document production." Ms. Minger also billed

a substantial amount of time in early April 2004 relating to Plaintiff's opposition to Defendants' Motion for

Summary Judgment. While the majority of this time is compensable, some ofit likely included work spent on

Plaintiff's untimely "cross-motion"whichwas ultimately stricken by the Court. The vagueness ofMs. Minger's

billing statement limitsthe Court's ability to parse out specific hours relating to this type of work. Accordingly,

Ms. Minger's totalhours are hereby reduced by ten percent. Thus, the total amount of hours for Ms. Minger's

pretrial and trial work is 177.67. 

With respect to the work spent on the fees motion, Ms. Minger claims to have billed 4.5 hours. This

is reasonable and is therefore included in the total amount of hours for Ms. Minger.

3. Mr. Rosenthal's Hours

With respect to Mr. Rosenthal, Judge Chen recommends a finding that 9.5 hours is reasonable.

However, the Court findsthat allofMr.Rosenthal's hoursmustbe excluded, since absolutely no documentation

relating to these hours has been submitted to the Court. Stewart v. Gates, 987 F.2d 1450, 1453 (9th Cir.

1993) (holding that it is an abuse of discretion to award fees for hours not properly documented).

4. Ms. Youngmark's Hours

With respect to Ms. Youngmark, Judge Chen recommends a finding that 8.8 hours is reasonable.39

Ms. Youngmark's billing statement, however, is so generaland vague that it provides the Court with almost no
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40As far as the Court can ascertain, no such motion was ever filed in this case. Further, the hours

expended on this motion have nothing to do with Plaintiff's success on her FMLA claim. 

41An amended complaint was never filed. As such, these hours do not appear to relate, in any way,

to Plaintiff's success on her FMLA claim and are therefore unreasonable.

42Although the statement provided by Ms. Youngmark refers to this date as February 13, 2003, it

appears to actually be referring to work performed in 2004.

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guidance whatsoever. Having examined Ms. Youngmark's billing statement closely, the Court finds that the

following hours must be excluded:

Date Hours Description

2/14/03 0.50 "Prepare Motion to Withdraw and Proposed Order"40

2/22/03 0.30 "Revisions to Complaint"41

2/27/03 0.20 "Additional revisions to Complaint"

2/13/0442 0.30 "Prepare Stipulation / Order re Dismissal of Action Without Prejudice"

TOTAL: 1.3 Hours

Further, for the most part, the remainder of Ms. Youngmark's time entries merely state that Ms.

Youngmark performed "legal research" generally, or "legal research re opposition to alleged unlawful

employment practices and retaliation." Again, because these descriptions are so nebulous, the Court is limited

in its ability to exclude specific time spent on unrelated, unmeritorious claims. Accordingly, Ms. Youngmark's

time is hereby reduced by ten percent. The remaining amount of compensable hours is 7.02.

5. Ms. Camp's Hours

With respect to Ms. Camp's billing statement, Judge Chen recommends a finding that only 104.85 out

ofthe total272.6 hours requested is compensable. Judge Chen appears to have appropriately scrutinized Ms.

Camp's billing records and excluded hoursspent on purely clericaltasks, such as saving PDF files(a task which

has purportedly consumed roughly 60 hours of Ms. Camp's time). The Court therefore concurs with Judge

Chen that the following hours are not reasonable:

Date Hours Description
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43As noted above, hours relating to Plaintiff's counsel's effortsto learn the Court's e-filing procedures

are not reasonable, especially since these efforts do not appear to have improved Plaintiff's compliance with

the Court's rules regarding e-filing. Further, these hours are excessive and duplicative of hours purportedly

billed by Mr. Hoffman and Ms. Minger.

44This amount includes the 8.0 hours Ms. Camp billed for work on the fees motion.

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7/11/03 1.5 "Investigate and review E-Filing and Registration procedures and system"43

10/20/03 3.0 "Introduce E-filing procedures to Hoffman and Minger."

1/04 20 "File maintenance for month of January"

2/04 20 "File maintenance for month of February"

3/04 20 "File maintenance for month of March"

4/04 20 "File maintenance for month of April"

5/04 20 "File maintenance for month of May"

TOTAL: 104.5

In addition, the majority ofMs. Camp's billing statement consists of "block"entriesthat inappropriately

include both billable and non-billable hours. Because the Court is unable to separate the billable from the nonbillable, and because the amount of non-billable work Ms. Camp performed appears to be quite substantial,

Judge Chen's recommendation that the total amount of hours requested be reduced by fifty percent is

appropriate. Accordingly, the Court finds that only 104.85 hours for Ms. Camp shall be included in the

lodestar.44 

C. Final Lodestar

In conclusion, the Court partially rejects Judge Chen's recommended lodestar calculation and adopts,

instead, the following lodestar calculation:
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NAME APPROVED

HOURLY RATE

REQUESTED

HOURS

APPROVED

HOURS

AMOUNT

Michael Hoffman $190 772.20 601.96 $114,372.40

Josh Rosenthal $150 9.50 0

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properly

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$0

Marilyn Minger $150 207.25 182.17 $27,325.50

Geraldine Camp $65 272.60 104.85 $6,815.25

Katie Youngmark $65 9.10 7.02 $456.30

TOTAL

LODESTAR

$148,969.45

D. Adjustments to the Lodestar 

In computing an award of fees under Hensley, the Court must perform a two-part analysis. Hensley,

461 U.S. at 434. Under the first part of the analysis, the Court must ask whether the claims upon which the

plaintifffailed to prevail were related to the plaintiff'ssuccessful claims. Id. If unrelated, the finalfee award may

not include time expended on the unsuccessful claims. Id. This Court has already excluded the time spent on

Plaintiff's unsuccessful FEHA and unfair competition claims, which are the only claims that GNC argues are

unrelated to Plaintiff's FMLA cause of action. See Hensely, 461 U.S. at 434 (unsuccessful claims are

"unrelated" if they involve "distinctly different claims for relief that are based on different facts and legal

theories."). Accordingly, the Court proceeds to the next step in the analysis, which is whether an adjustment

to the lodestar is warranted. 

If there are unsuccessful and successful claims that are related, under the second part of the analysis,

the Court must evaluate the "significance of the overall relief obtained by the plaintiff in relation to the hours

reasonably expended on the litigation." Id. at 435. If the plaintiff obtained "excellent results," full compensation

may be appropriate, but if only "partialor limited success" was obtained, full compensation may be excessive

and the lodestar should be reduced. However, when an adjustment is made on the basis of either the

exceptional or limited nature of the relief obtained by the plaintiff, the Court must make clear that it has
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considered the relationship between the amount of the fees awarded and the results obtained. Hensley, 461

U.S. at 437. Additionally, the Court must not hesitate to reduce the lodestar computed when the result

obtained is the product of an unnecessarily extended proceeding. See Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. of

Philadelphia v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 540 F.2d 102, 118 (3rd. Cir. 1976); In

re Equity Funding Corp. of America Securities Litigation, 438 F. Supp. 1303, 1328 (C.D. Cal. 1977).

 

In her Motion for Attorney's Fees, Plaintiff contends that her lodestar should be enhanced by a

multiplier of2.0 (or two hundred percent) because "it was apparent to Plaintiffs [sic] counsel[when he decided

to take this case] that this case would be more difficult than other employment discrimination matters he had

handled for several reasons." See Mot. at 14:1-2. Plaintiff alleges that the following factors made the case

"more difficult": (1) it was a lawsuit against a large corporation; (2) Plaintiff would have to prove that GNC's

FMLA policies and procedures towards Plaintiff were unfair; and (3) the effect of the application of the

disability laws, and whether Plaintiff was qualified under the FMLA, were "novel" issues. GNC, on the other

hand, argues that Plaintiff'slodestar should be reduced by fifty percent in order to account for Plaintiff's limited

success. 

As GNC correctly notes in its Motion forDe Novo Determination, it is beyond dispute that Plaintiff's

"success" in the litigation was, in fact, quite limited. Specifically:

• Plaintiff prevailed only on her FMLA interference claim and not on any of her other related

claims, including FMLA retaliation, CFRA interference, and CFRA retaliation;

• Plaintiffrequested an award of$665,500 fromthe jury, but only received anaward of$60,500

in back pay.

• Plaintiff did not recover front pay or future wages;

• Plaintiff did not recover emotional distress damages; 

• Plaintiff did not obtain reinstatement or other injunctive relief; and

• Plaintiff did not recover punitive damages.

Based on these undisputed facts, Plaintiff's request for an upward adjustment to the lodestar is

unwarranted. Indeed, the factors that Plaintiff identifies in support of the requested multiplier are the type of
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general, vague statements that apply to virtually every employment case. Accordingly, the appropriate focus

of this inquiry is whether the lodestar should be reduced and, if so, by how much. 

Judge Chen recommends a thirty-five percent reduction to the lodestar, given the fact that the relief

Plaintiff obtained was short, both quantitatively and qualitatively, of what she sought in the litigation. In its

Motion forDeNovoDetermination, GNC requeststhat the Court reject the Magistrate's recommendation and,

instead, reduce Plaintiff's lodestar by at least fifty percent. GNC does not, however, provide the Court with

any relevant or analogous authorities in support of its contention that a fifty percent reduction is appropriate.

For example, in Williams v. Mensey, 785 F.2d 631, 640 (8th Cir. 1986), the plaintiff prevailed on one claim

and was awarded nominaldamages of$1.00. Id. Accordingly, the court awarded the plaintiff only ten percent

of the fees requested. Id. In contrast, here, although the damages that Plaintiff received were not significant

in light of her expectations and settlement demands, she receive more thanmere "nominal" damages. Also, in

Harris v. Marhoefer, 24 F.3d 16, 17-18 (9th Cir. 1994), where the lodestar was reduced by fifty percent,

the plaintiff obtained a judgment of $25,000 against one defendant out of the $5 million requested. Id.

Plaintiff's success in this case was not nearly as limited as the plaintiff's success in Harris. 

However, under Hensley, the Court is required to consider the relationship between the amount ofthe

fees awarded and the results obtained, and whether the fees incurred resulted from proceedings which were

unnecessarily protracted. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437. Here, given that Plaintiff received $60,500 in damages,

and considering thatsome ofthe fees incurred were the result ofunnecessarily extended proceedings, including

the fact that the case was initially scheduled to go to trial in March 2004, the Court finds that a forty percent

reduction is appropriate. See Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc., 540 F.2d at 118; In re Equity Funding Corp. of

America Securities Litigation, 438 F. Supp. at 1328. Reducing the lodestar by forty percent results in a final

lodestar of$89,831.67. Accordingly, the Court modifies the Magistrate's recommended fee reduction of thirtyfive percent to forty percent and hereby awards Plaintiff fees in the amount of $89,381.67. 
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45The FMLA statute expressly provides that, "in addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff, .

. . a reasonable attorney's fee, reasonable expert witness fees, and other costs ofthe action to be paid by the

defendant." 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a). 

4628 U.S.C. § 1927 provides that: "[a]ny attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any

court ofthe United States or any Territory thereofwho so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably

and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys'

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E. Award of Costs

Finally, with respect to Plaintiff's requested costs, Judge Chen notes that Plaintiff has improperly

requested $9,374.88 in statutory costs that have already been taxed by the Clerk of Court pursuant to 28

U.S.C.§ 1920. However, Judge Chen concludes that Plaintiff may properly be awarded certain expert witness

fees and travel costs under the fee shifting provision of the FMLA.45

After considering Plaintiff's evidence in support of her request, Judge Chen concludes that Plaintiff is

entitled to recover $4,350 as reimbursement for certain expert witnesses, and $2,200.24 as reimbursement for

certain travelcosts. However, Judge Chen also concludes that, due to Plaintiff's limited success in the litigation,

a thirty-five percent reduction of these costs is warranted as well. Accordingly, Judge Chen recommends an

award of $4,257.66 in costs.

Neither party has objected to Judge Chen's recommended award ofcosts, althoughGNC has objected

to the overall lodestar reduction recommended by Judge Chen. Since the Court has modified Judge Chen's

recommended thirty-five percent reduction to a forty percent reduction, the awarded costs must be reduced

accordingly. Thus, Plaintiff is awarded costs in the amount of $3,930.14

F. Total Fee and Cost Award to Plaintiff.

In sum, having made certain modifications to Judge Chen'srecommendations,the Court herebyawards

Plaintiff attorney's fees and costs in the total amount of $93,311.81.

II. GNC's Motion for Attorney's Fees

In GNC's Motion for Attorney's Fees, GNC requests an award of attorney's fees in the total amount

of$494,386.00. GNC contends that it is entitled to an award of fees on the following grounds: (1) GNC was

the prevailing party on Plaintiff's FEHA claims; (2) an award of fees is an appropriate sanction pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 192746 because Plaintiff's attorneys unreasonably and vexatiously multiplied the proceedings by
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fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct."

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pursuing frivolous claims and engaging in misconduct during trial; and (3) an award of fees is an appropriate

sanction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 because Plaintiff's attorneys violated Rule 11 by

including meritless FEHA and unfair competition claims in Plaintiff's Complaint. Alternatively, GNC requests

that the Court award it, at a minimum, attorney's feesin the amount of$186,454.00 (one-third ofits purported

lodestar amount), pursuant to the Court's inherent powers, to compensate GNC for the fees it incurred

responding to Plaintiff's allegedly sanctionable conduct. Plaintiff opposes GNC's Motion on the grounds that

GNC is requesting an extreme sanction that should only be granted in particularly egregious cases of

misconduct. Plaintiff does not object, however, to GNC's lodestar calculation. 

In his Report and Recommendation, Judge Chen does not perform a lodestar calculation for GNC.

Instead, he recommends denying GNC's Motion in its entirety. Since GNC has objected to this portion of the

report, however, the Court must conduct a de novo review in order to determine whether GNC is entitled to

an award of fees under any of its theories of recovery. 

A. The Prevailing Party on Plaintiff's FEHA Claims

GNC first asserts that it is entitled to attorney's fees as the prevailing party on Plaintiff's FEHA race

discriminationand medicalcondition claims. Under FEHA, GNC may recover attorney's fees as the prevailing

party if the Court finds thatPlaintiff's FEHA claims were frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even

if the claim was not brought in subjective bad faith. See Cal. Gov. Code § 12965(b); Moss v. Associated

Press, 956 F. Supp. 891, 893 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (citing Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S.

412, 420-22 (1978)). An award of attorney's fees to the prevailing defendant is particularly appropriate where

a plaintiff continuesto litigate a FEHA claim after the plaintiff knew, or should have known, that the claim was

unreasonable or without foundation. See Moss, 956 F. Supp. at 895. 

Here, Plaintiffinitially asserted in her Complaint thatGNC violated FEHA by discriminating against her

based on her race and "medical condition." However, Plaintiff's counsel, Mr. Hoffman, admits that he knew,

from the outset ofthe litigation, that her race discriminationwas baseless. Nevertheless, Mr. Hoffman refused

to acknowledge that the FEHA race discrimination claim should be dropped until January 27, 2004, when he
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47Mr. Newland is a partner at Seyfarth Shaw LLP, and thus is a disinterested party.

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signed a stipulationindicating that Plaintiffwould no longer pursue the claim. Despite the fact that this stipulation

was signed, however, Mr. Hoffman did not immediately dismiss the claim from the Complaint, causing GNC

to have to file a motion in limine during the pretrialconference aimed atPlaintiff'srace discriminationallegations.

Additionally, there was no foundation for Plaintiff's "medical condition" claim, since Plaintiff – and Plaintiff's

counsel– were both aware ofthe fact thatPlaintiff was notsuffering fromcancer or a genetic defect. This issue

also unnecessarily consumed time during the litigation. For example, during trial, GNC was forced to respond

to Plaintiff's belated, and ultimately unsuccessful, motion to amend the Complaint to substitute the meritless

"medical condition" claim for a "physical disability" claim. Based on this history, it is beyond dispute that

Plaintiff's FEHA claims were frivolous and without foundation. Accordingly, the Court agrees with Judge Chen

that GNC has made a preliminary showing that fees are warranted under FEHA. The Court does not,

however, concur with Judge Chen's conclusion that GNC is not entitled to attorney's fees merely because it

cannot specifically identify every time entry that relates to GNC's defense of the FEHA claims. 

To the contrary, the Court finds that GNC has complied with Hensley by providing very detailed,

contemporaneous time records reflecting all of the attorney hours spent on the litigation. GNC has also

provided the Court with background information concerning the two lead attorneys, including their curricula

vitae, as well as biographical information relating to the associates staffed on the matter. Based on the

information provided by Defendants, including the Declaration of Kenneth E. Keller, the Supplemental

Declaration of Kenneth E. Keller, and the Declaration ofG. DanielNewland47, and based on the Court's own

observation ofGNC's counsel's conduct throughout the pretrialproceedings and trial, the CourtfindsthatGNC

has established its preliminary burden ofproofwith respect to the applicable billing rates. Moreover, Plaintiff

does not object to GNC's requested billing rates. Accordingly, the Court finds the following hourly rates to

be reasonable:(1) $225 per hour for all trialwork performed by Mr. Holland and $275 per hour forthe pretrial

work; (2) $275 per hour for Mr. Keller; (3) $200 per hour for Ms. Kearns; and (4) $200 per hour for Ms.
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48The CourtfindsthatcompensatingGNC's counselat higher rates thanPlaintiff's counselis appropriate

and supported by the Court's own observations and assessment ofall ofthe attorneys performing work on this

case. 

49Given the timing of this entry, the Court concludes that the entry relates to GNC's efforts to have

Plaintiff dismiss her race discrimination claim from the lawsuit. 

50This time entry relates to Plaintiff's motion to amend the Complaint, which is directly related to

Plaintiff's "medical condition" FEHA claim.

51The Court concludes that this time entry also relates to Plaintiff's "medical condition" FEHA claim.

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Kang.48 

Withrespectto the hours spent on Plaintiff's FEHA claims, the Court does not agree with Judge Chen's

conclusion that no time was spent on these claims. To the contrary, it is apparent that time was spent defending

against these claims, particularly in light of the fact thatGNC has shown that it worked quite diligently toward

getting the claims dismissed from the lawsuit. However, the Court finds that GNC's contention that it is entitled

to a fee award of $60,161.22 (consisting of 2/9 of the fees incurred up through January 27, 2004 and 1/9 of

the fees incurred from January 27, 2004 through May 27, 2004) is unwarranted and is not supported by any

directreferences to any actualtime entriesin GNC's billing statements. Having reviewed GNC's billing records,

the Court has identified the following time entries as being related to Plaintiff's FEHA claims:

Date Hours Timekeeper Description

1/27/04 3.8 Holland ". . . Extended telephone conference with opposing counsel

Hoffman regarding upcoming depositions, other discovery

issues, stipulation regarding grounds forNavarro claims, and

related matters. Correspond with G. Kelly regarding same .

. . Correspond with opposing counsel Hoffman regarding

stipulationeliminating groundsforNavarro claims, and related

matters . . . "49

4/22/04 5.50 Kearns ". . . continue drafting motion in limine regarding excluding

evidence about race discrimination . . ."

5/26/04 15.50 Kearns ". . . begin drafting oppositions to plaintiff's motions (to

amend, for judgment, objection to request forjudicialnotice)

. . ."50

5/26/04 12.20 Keller "Prepare for closing, sixth day of trial. Argue motions and

jury instructions . . . "51

Additionally, it appears that Ms. Kang spent a total of 14.2 hours conducting research regarding the
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legalsufficiencyof all ofthe causes of action in Plaintiff's Complaint and preparing a memorandum summarizing

her conclusions. Quite obviously, part of this analysis necessarily included Plaintiff's FEHA claims. Since some

of the time entries noted above include work that is unrelated to Plaintiff's FEHA claims, however, not all of

the time is appropriately includedinthe lodestar calculation, and therefore a downward adjustment is necessary.

The Courtfindsthat a reasonable estimate is that:(a) Mr. Holland spent approximately 2.5 hours corresponding

with Mr. Hoffmanto reach a stipulationregardingthe race discriminationclaim; (b) Ms. Kearns spent 4.0 hours

drafting a motion in limine excluding Plaintiff's race discriminationclaims and 4.0 hours responding to Plaintiff's

motion to amend her complaint to add physical disability claims under FEHA; (c) Mr. Keller spent 0.5 hours

responding to Plaintiff's motion in Court; and (d) Ms. Kang spent 1.5 hours analyzing Plaintiff'sfrivolous FEHA

claims. 

 The total lodestar for GNC is therefore:

Attorney Hours Rate Fees

Mr. Keller 0.5 $275 $137.50

Mr. Holland 2.5 $275 $687.50

Ms. Kearns 8.0 $200 $1,600.00

Ms. Kang 1.5 $200 $350.00

TOTAL: $2,775.00

Accordingly, GNC is awarded attorney's fees in the amountof$2,775.00, whichamountshall be offset

from Plaintiff's award of attorney's fees. 

B. Sanctions Under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 

GNC also contends that it should be awarded fees in the amount of at least $110,497.30 (1/3 of the

purported lodestar amount) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Section 1927 provides in relevant part that "[a]ny

attorney . . . who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by

the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of

such conduct." 28 U.S.C. § 1927. To be sanctioned pursuant to § 1927 in the Ninth Circuit, the attorney must
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52The statute, by its terms, applies exclusively to attorneys. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. St. Jude

Medical Office Bldg., 154 F.R.D. 143, 144 (E.D. La. 1994).

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have acted recklessly or in bad faith. See United States v.Blodgett, 709 F.2d 608, 610 (9th Cir. 1983).52

The frivolousness of a claim or argument does not by itself justify an award of sanctions under § 1927; the

additional element of wrongful purpose is required. See Cinquini v. Donahoe, 1996 WL 79822 *8 (N. D.

Cal. 1996). Ignorance, negligence, incompetence, or even a basic lack of professional courtesy do not

constitute "bad faith." Cruz v. Savage, 896 F.2d 626, 630 (1st Cir. 1990). 

GNC argues that it is entitled to fees under § 1927 because Plaintiff's counselengaged in the following

acts of litigation misconduct: (1) failing to appear for the initial Case Management Conference; (2) refusing to

provide the required damage and witness disclosures pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26; (3)

refusing to supplement the damage and witness disclosures pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26

and 33; (4) refusing to identify Plaintiff'sprevious medicaland psychologicalcare providers despite Defendants'

multiple discovery requests; (5) improperly withdrawing Plaintiff's consentto the release ofmedicalfilesrelating

to the litigation; (6) terminating Plaintiff's deposition only seventeendays before trialwas set to commence;(7)

consistently arriving late to Plaintiff's March 30, 2004 and April 30, 2004 depositions; and (8) withdrawing or

refusing to acknowledge numerous stipulations reached between the parties that were intended to eliminate

frivolous claims and to streamline the case. Defendants also contend that Plaintiff's counsel vexatiously

multiplied the proceedings by pursuing frivolous claims and byfilingfrivolous discovery motions relating to those

claims. 

Despite GNC's litany of complaints about Plaintiff's counsel, and Mr. Hoffmanin particular, GNC has

only demonstrated – at best – that Plaintiff's counsel acted negligently or incompetently. There is no evidence,

however, that Plaintiff's counsel acted with an improper purpose or with bad faith. Indeed, although it is

disappointing thatMr. Hoffman failed to dismiss the patently frivolous race discrimination claim fromthe case,

it is relevant to this analysis that Mr. Hoffman did not make any effort to oppose Defendants' dismissal of the

claim during the pretrial conference. Similarly, with respect to the frivolous medical condition FEHA claim, it

appears that Mr. Hoffman's inclusion of this claim in the lawsuit resulted from a misreading of the relevant
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statute, and not from malice. While the Court does not condone this type of carelessness, the Court also finds

that Mr. Hoffman's actions do notrise to the level of sanctionable conduct that § 1927 contemplates. Finally,

with respect to any discovery disputes that were serious enough to have been brought to the Court's attention

during the underlying proceedings, the Court has already considered, and denied, GNC'srequestforsanctions.

Accordingly, the Court hereby denies GNC's current motion for sanctions under § 1927. 

C. Rule 11 Sanctions

GNC also argues that it should be awarded attorney's fees as a sanction pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 11. Rule 11(b) provides in pertinent part that:

[b]y presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later

advocating) a pleading, writtenmotion, or other paper, an attorney or unrepresented

party is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief,

formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances, -- 

(1) it is not being presented by any improper purpose . . .

(2) the claims, defenses and other legal contentions therein are warranted by

existinglaw or by a nonfrivolous argument forthe extension, modification, or reversal

of existing law or the establishment of new law; 

(3) the allegations and other factualcontentions have evidentiary support or,

if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable

opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and

(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted or, if specifically so

identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or belief.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). Further, Rule 11(c) provides that a Court may sanction an attorney and/or a party for

violating subdivision(b). Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c). "Courts must apply an objective test in assessing whether the

rule has been violated." Yagman v. Republic Ins., 987 F.2d 622, 628 (9th Cir. 1993). However, "[a]

violation of the rule does not require subjective bad faith." Id.

GNC contends that Plaintiff and her attorneys violated Rule 11(b) by including frivolous FEHA and

unfair competition claims in her Complaint and by filing a frivolous motionto compel. In his report, Judge Chen

finds that sanctions under Rule 11 are not warranted because GNC failed to comply with the procedural

requirements of the "safe harbor" provision of the rule. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c) (providing that a motion for

sanctions may not be presented to the Court unless, within 21 days after service of the motion, the challenged

pleading is not withdrawn or corrected). While it is apparent that Plaintiff's counsel and Defendants' counsel

engaged in several conversations concerning Plaintiff's FEHA and unfair competition claims, Defendants'
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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counsel never filed a Rule 11 motion with the Court. Accordingly, Judge Chen reached the appropriate

conclusionthatRule 11 sanctions are inappropriate. Further, with respect to Plaintiff's motion to compel, GNC

has not effectively shown that the motionwas frivolous or presented for an improper purpose. See R&R at pp.

38-40. Accordingly, the Court declines to exercise its discretion to award fees pursuant to Rule 11. 

D. Sanctions Pursuant to the Court's Inherent Powers

Last, GNC requests that the Court award sanctions under its inherent powers. The Ninth Circuit

provides that sanctions pursuant to a Court's inherent powers "are available if the court specifically finds bad

faith or conduct tantamountto bad faith." B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dep't, 276 F.3d 1091, 1108 (9th Cir. 2002).

"[A] finding of bad faith does not require that the legal and factual basis for the action prove totally frivolous;

where a litigant is substantially motivated by vindictiveness, obduracy, or mala fides,the assertion of a colorable

claim will not bar the assessment of attorney's fees." Id. at 992. Here, however, GNC has not provided any

evidence that Plaintiff's counsel's actions were motivated by vindictiveness or bad faith. Accordingly, the Court

declines to exercise its discretion to sanction Plaintiffs' counsel.

CONCLUSION

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Defendant's Motion for a De Novo Determination [Docket No.

332] is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT GNC's Motion for Attorney's Fees [Docket No. 296] is

GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. GNC is hereby AWARDED attorney's fees award in the

amount of $2,775.00. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney's Fees [Docket No. 293] is

GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Plaintiff is hereby AWARDED attorney's fees and costs

in the amount of $93,311.81, which shall be offset by GNC's award of attorney's fees.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 9-20-05 _______________________________

SAUNDRA BROWN ARMSTRONG

United States District Judge