Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00643/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00643-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION - 1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

 

GEORGE T. McLAUGHLIN, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

R. SUBIA, Warden, 

Respondent. 

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CASE NO. 2:07-cv-00643-RSM-JLW 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

 

I. INTRODUCTION 

 Petitioner George McLaughlin is currently incarcerated at the California State Prison 

in Ione, California. Petitioner pled guilty to one count of possession of an illegal substance in 

a state prison in Amador County Superior Court on September 15, 2005. He was sentenced to 

four years of incarceration, to be served consecutive to his then-current prison sentence. 

Petitioner has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in which he 

claims his plea was not knowing and voluntary, the prosecution withheld material evidence, 

his defense counsel was ineffective, and his conviction was obtained in violation of his Eighth 

Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. (See Docket 1 at 5-6.) 

Respondent has filed an answer to the petition, together with relevant portions of the 

state court record, and petitioner has filed a reply to the answer. (See Dkts. 22 and 27.) The 

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION - 2 

briefing is now complete and this matter is ripe for review. The Court, having thoroughly 

considered the record and both parties’ briefs, recommends the Court deny the petition, and 

dismiss this action with prejudice. 

 II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

 The prosecutor summarized the facts of this offense during the plea and sentencing 

hearing as follows: 

On or about April 3rd, 2004, while at Mule Creek State Prison, 

the defendant’s wife was visiting him in the visiting room. At 

that time, they kissed, and it is believed that she passed one 

bindle of marijuana to the defendant. He produced a bowel 

movement. There was one bundle of marijuana found with a 

weight, total gross weight 2.7 grams 

(Dkt. 22, Lodged Document 10 at 5.) 

 Petitioner was charged with one count of bringing a controlled substance into a state 

prison and one count of possession of an illegal substance in a state prison, both felonies. 

(See id., LD 11 at 1-2.) He was charged with both counts while serving time for two prior 

felony convictions. (See id. at 2.) Pursuant to a plea bargain, petitioner pled guilty to the 

possession charge and admitted one prior “strike” under California’s Three Strikes Law. (See 

id., LD 3 at 1 & LD 10 at 6-7.) The prosecutor also agreed not to prosecute petitioner’s wife 

for her role in the above offense. (See id., LD 3 at 1 & LD 10 at 5.) Petitioner was sentenced 

at the low end of the sentencing range -- two years, doubled, for a total of four years to be 

served consecutively to his current sentence. (See id., LD 10 at 3.) 

 Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Amador County Superior 

Court and the California Court of Appeal and Supreme Court. (See id., LD 1, 2, 6 & 8.) All 

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION - 3 

three courts denied his claims. (See id., LD 5, 7, and 9.) The trial court provided a reasoned 

decision for the denial, clearly addressing a portion of petitioner’s plea agreement claim and 

his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. (See id., LD at 5.) The appellate courts denied the 

petition without comment. (See id., LD 7 & 9.) Respondent admits in the answer that 

petitioner has properly exhausted all four claims for relief. (See Dkt. 22 at 2.) 

 III. FEDERAL CLAIMS FOR RELIEF 

 Petitioner presents the following claims in his petition: 

1. Conviction obtained by plea of guilty which was unlawfully 

induced coerced, and not made voluntary with the 

understanding of the charge . . . or of the intelligent nature 

of the charge; 

2. Conviction obtained by the unconstitutional [sic] of the 

prosecution to disclose to the defendant evidence favorable 

to the defendant; 

3. Denial of effective assistance of counsel; and 

4. Conviction obtained by violation of defendant[’s] right to be 

free from cruel and unusual punishment. 

(Dkt. 1 at 5-6.) 

Respondent asserts that the state courts’ rejection of petitioner’s claims was neither 

contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law and, in the 

alternative, that petitioner’s claims are without merit. (See Dkt. 22 at 8-16.) 

 IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) governs this 

petition as it was filed after the enactment of AEDPA. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 

326-27 (1997). Because petitioner is in the custody of the California Department of 

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION - 4 

Corrections pursuant to a state court judgment, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 provides the exclusive 

vehicle for his habeas petition. See White v. Lambert, 370 F.3d 1002, 1009-10 (9th Cir. 

2004). Under AEDPA, a habeas petition may not be granted with respect to any claim 

adjudicated on the merits in state court unless petitioner demonstrates that the highest state 

court decision rejecting his petition was either “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the 

United States,” or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and (2). 

As a threshold matter, this Court must ascertain whether relevant federal law was 

“clearly established” at the time of the state court’s decision. To make this determination, the 

Court may only consider the holdings, as opposed to dicta, of the United States Supreme 

Court. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). It is also appropriate to look to 

lower federal court decisions to determine what law has been “clearly established” by the 

Supreme Court and the reasonableness of a particular application of that law. See Duhaime v. 

Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 598 (9th Cir. 1999). In this context, Ninth Circuit precedent 

remains persuasive but not binding authority. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13; Clark v. 

Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003). 

The Court must then determine whether the state court’s decision was “contrary to, or 

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law.” See Lockyer v. 

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003). “Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may 

grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the 

Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] 

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Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. 

“Under the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the 

state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but 

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. At all 

times, a federal habeas court must keep in mind that it “may not issue the writ simply because 

[it] concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly 

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather that application must also be 

[objectively] unreasonable.” Id. at 411. 

 In each case, the petitioner has the burden of establishing that the state court decision 

was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 2254; Baylor v. Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996). To determine 

whether the petitioner has met this burden, a federal habeas court normally looks to the last 

reasoned state court decision, which in this case is the Amador County Superior Court 

decision. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991); Medley v. Runnels, 506 F.3d 

857, 862 (9th Cir. 2007). (See Dkt. 22, LD 5.) 

 Finally, AEDPA requires federal courts to give considerable deference to state court 

decisions, and state courts’ factual findings are presumed correct. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 

Federal courts are also bound by a state’s interpretation of its own laws. See Murtishaw v. 

Woodford, 255 F.3d 926, 964 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Powell v. Ducharme, 998 F.2d 710, 713 

(9th Cir. 1993)). 

 When a state court reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to 

support its conclusion, we must independently review the record to determine whether the 

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state court erred in its application of Supreme Court law. Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 

982 (9th Cir. 2000). See also Greene v. Lambert, 288 F.3d 1081, 1089 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(holding that when there is an adjudication on the merits but no reason for the decision, the 

court must review the complete record to determine whether resolution of the case constitutes 

an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law). Thus, while our review of the 

record will be conducted independently in this case with regard to two of petitioner’s four 

claims, we continue to show deference to the state court’s ultimate decision. See Pirtle v. 

Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002). 

 V. DISCUSSION 

 A. Unknowing and Involuntary Guilty Plea Claim

 Petitioner claims his plea was not made knowingly or voluntarily. (See Dkt. 1 at 5.) 

Specifically, he asserts that he would not have pled guilty if he had known the results of his 

prior California Department of Corrections (“CDC”) disciplinary hearing in which he was 

found “not guilty” of an illegal drug possession violation while in prison. (See id.) In 

addition, he contends that his plea was involuntary because a CDC Officer continually 

harassed and threatened him and his family, which forced him to plead guilty in the criminal 

prosecution. (See id.) 

 Respondent contends petitioner has failed to demonstrate how his plea was 

unintelligent or involuntary and, thus, fails to show how the decision of the California courts 

was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, or based on 

an unreasonable determination of the facts. (See Dkt. 22 at 8-10.) 

 

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 Federal due process requires that a defendant’s guilty plea be both knowing and 

voluntary. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 747-48 (1970). In general, a defendant’s 

admission in open court is accorded a strong presumption of verity that the defendant’s plea 

was made in accordance with due process. Id. Reviewing courts must therefore give great 

weight to a defendant’s in-court declarations, as demonstrated by the plea colloquy transcript, 

when determining whether a guilty plea was intelligent and voluntary. See Blackledge v. 

Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977) (“[T]he representations of the defendant, his lawyer, and 

the prosecutor at [a guilty plea] hearing, as well as any findings made by the judge accepting 

the plea, constitute a formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings. Solemn 

declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity.”) 

 A review of the transcript of the plea hearing establishes that petitioner knew the 

nature of the charge to which he pleaded guilty, knew the constitutional rights he was 

waiving, and knew the sentence he would receive. (See Dkt. 22, LD 10.) Moreover, 

petitioner read, acknowledged, and signed a comprehensive “Felony Waiver & Plea Form,” 

verifying the same. (See id. at 3 & LD 11 at 5-14.) Thus, based on the superior court’s 

record, there is no evidence that petitioner’s plea was either unknowing or involuntary. 

Petitioner contends, however, that if he had been informed of the results of his prison 

disciplinary hearing before his criminal proceeding he would not have pled guilty.1

 Nothing 

 1 Respondent also claims that petitioner was aware of the results of the prior disciplinary 

proceeding when he entered his guilty plea. (See Dkt. 22 at 10.) He does so because petitioner wrote 

in his federal habeas petition that he “could not understand the charges as he was already adjudged not 

guilty fourteen months prior.” (Dkt. 1 at 5.) This statement is subject to several interpretations and 

respondent’s version is inconsistent with petitioner’s state and federal court briefings. I therefore 

recommend this Court conclude that this statement in petitioner’s brief does not compel the conclusion 

that petitioner was aware of the results of the prison disciplinary hearing when he pled guilty in the 

state prosecution. 

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in the record supports this contention. First, petitioner does not claim nor does he present any 

evidence that he was actually innocent of these charges; and, in fact, one document in the 

records suggests petitioner admitted to a state investigator that he possessed the marijuana and 

wanted to plead so that his wife would not be implicated. (See Dkt. 27, Exh. L at 2.) Second, 

petitioner does not claim he was falsely informed that the prison disciplinary hearing found 

him “guilty.” Instead, he simply claims not to have known the results. Third, even if 

petitioner had known the results of that hearing, there is no reasonable probability that he 

would have plead “not guilty” and proceeded to trial. Petitioner had two prior felony 

convictions on his record and was charged with two more. By accepting the plea offer, 

petitioner only received two strikes (one for possessing illegal drugs in state prison and one 

for his prior first degree burglary conviction), instead of four, thereby avoiding a life sentence 

under California’s Three Strikes Law. (See Dkt. 22, LD 10 at 3, 5 & 7.) He was also 

sentenced at the low end of the sentencing range, and his wife was not prosecuted. (See id.) 

Finally, under California law, the prison disciplinary hearing did not carry any legal 

weight in the subsequent state court proceeding. As the Amador Superior Court explained, 

prison disciplinary proceedings do not bar subsequent criminal prosecutions. See People v. 

O’Daniel, 194 Cal.App.3d 715, 721 (1987) (“[P]rison disciplinary measures are no bar to a 

subsequent prosecution for violation of a penal statute prohibiting the same act which was the 

basis of the prison discipline.”). (See Dkt. 22, LD at 2.) Because prison disciplinary hearings 

are held by prison officials, not judicial officers, and designed to allow officers to act quickly 

when confronted with possible rule violations, they are not legally equivalent to subsequent 

state prosecutions. See id. at 721. Because the outcome of a prison disciplinary hearing has 

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no binding effect on a subsequent criminal prosecution, petitioner’s contention that his 

criminal prosecution should have been collaterally estopped also fails. (See Dkt. 27 at 10.) 

 In sum, petitioner is unable to overcome the “formidable” presumption that he entered 

his plea with full knowledge of the nature and consequences of his decision. Based upon the 

record, even if petitioner had known the results of the prison disciplinary hearing, it is 

unreasonable to think he would have entered a different plea. 

The second portion of petitioner’s challenge to his guilty plea asserts that his plea was 

involuntary because it was coerced by a CDC Officer’s harassing and threatening behavior. 

(See Dkt. 1 at 5.) If a plea is actually “induced by promises or threats which deprive it of the 

nature of a voluntary act” it will be deemed void. Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 

493 (1972). See also Brady, 397 U.S. at 750 (“[T]he agents of the state may not produce a 

plea by actual or threatened physical harm or by mental coercion overbearing the will of the 

defendant.”) To determine whether a plea was entered voluntarily, this Court must look at the 

totality of the circumstances. See Brady, 397 U.S. at 749; Iaea v. Sunn, 800 F.2d 861, 866-68 

(9th Cir. 1986). 

In this case, petitioner contends the CDC Officer appeared at his family’s home when 

petitioner’s wife was under investigation and threatened petitioner so that he would become a 

prison informant in another prison drug case. (See Dkt. 27 at 6.) These allegations, without 

more, do not rise to the level required to invalidate a guilty plea under Brady. Although the 

Amador County Superior Court did not address this specific portion of petitioner’s claim, 

after independently examining the record, I recommend this Court find that petitioner fails to 

show how the CDC Officer’s behavior overcame petitioner’s will. (See Dkt. 22, LD 5 at 1-2.) 

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 Accordingly, I recommend the Court conclude based upon the totality of the 

circumstances that petitioner fails to overcome the “formidable” presumption of verity 

accorded to plea proceedings, that the Amador County Superior Court’s decision denying the 

“collateral estoppel” portion of petitioner’s claim was correct, and that the state courts’ 

decision denying petitioner’s plea agreement claim was neither contrary to nor an 

unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent under Brady. 

Because petitioner fails to satisfy his burden of showing he is entitled to the issuance of the 

writ as to this claim, his claim must be denied. See Silva v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 825, 835 (9th 

Cir. 2002) (petitioner’s burden to show he is in custody in violation of the Constitution). 

 B. Brady Violation Claim

Petitioner claims that his conviction was unconstitutional because the prosecution 

failed to disclose favorable evidence that, if shown, would have established his innocence and 

convinced him not to enter a guilty plea. (See Dkt. 1 at 5 and Dkt. 27 at 8-12.) Specifically, 

petitioner claims he was not told the result of his prison disciplinary hearing. Respondent 

argues that petitioner presented this claim to the state courts, which denied his claim, and that 

petitioner fails to show that the decision of the California courts was contrary to or an 

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, or based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts. (See Dkt. 22 at 10-12.) 

As a general rule, a defendant who voluntarily and intelligently pleads guilty to a 

criminal charge may not subsequently seek federal habeas corpus relief on the basis of preplea constitutional violations; he may only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the 

plea. Moran v. Godinez, 40 F.3d 1567, 1577 (9th Cir. 1994). In this case, however, 

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petitioner’s Brady claim challenges his plea, thus the alleged “antecedent constitutional 

infirmity” should be considered. See Ortberg v. Moody, 961 F.2d 135, 137 (9th Cir. 1992) 

(quoting Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266 (1973)). 

A criminal defendant’s due process rights are violated when a prosecutor fails to 

disclose exculpatory or material evidence to the accused before trial. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. 

Since Brady, the Supreme Court has held that this duty applies even when the accused has not 

requested such information. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976). To 

determine whether the prosecution committed a Brady violation, we must consider whether 

the suppressed evidence was: (1) favorable to the accused, (2) suppressed by the government, 

either willfully or inadvertently, and (3) “material to the guilt or innocence of the defendant.” 

United States v. Jernigan, 492 F.3d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc); Strickler v. Greene,

527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999). A Brady violation is material when “there is a reasonable 

probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different. A ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine 

confidence in the outcome.” Brady, 373 U.S. at 682. See also Harris v. Vasquez, 949 F.2d 

1497, 1528 (9th Cir. 1990). 

 Even assuming that the result of the prison disciplinary hearing was withheld by the 

prosecution, petitioner cannot demonstrate that this information was favorable to him or that it 

was material. As discussed above, the results of the prison disciplinary hearing had no 

bearing on the subsequent criminal prosecution. (See Dkt. 22, LD 5 at 2.) Moreover, there 

was no reasonable probability that had such evidence been presented, petitioner would have 

pled “not guilty.” Accordingly, I recommend the Court find that the California courts’ 

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decisions were neither contrary to nor involved an unreasonable application of clearly 

established federal law, nor were they based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts. 

Petitioner’s claim should therefore be denied. 

 C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim

 Petitioner claims his defense counsel was ineffective when she failed to discover the 

alleged Brady material. (See Dkt. 1 at 6.) Respondent contends petitioner fails to show that 

the decision of the California courts denying this claim was contrary to or involved an 

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, or was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts. (See Dkt. 22 at 12-14.) 

 In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, petitioner must demonstrate that 

counsel’s representation fell below the objective standard of reasonableness and that the 

deficient performance affected the result of the proceeding. Strickland v. Washington, 466 

U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). This two-part test “applies to challenges to guilty pleas based on 

ineffective assistance of counsel.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985). In all cases, a strong 

presumption exists that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide-range of reasonable 

professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. To demonstrate prejudice, “[t]he 

defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. 

The United States Supreme Court defines “reasonable probability” as a “probability sufficient 

to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. 

 When a state court has rejected an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, as it has in 

this case, a federal court may only grant habeas relief if the decision was contrary to, or 

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involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. This Court’s review 

of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is therefore “doubly deferential” under AEDPA. 

Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 6 (2003). 

 Here, the Amador County Superior Court considered petitioner’s ineffective assistance 

of counsel claim and found that petitioner failed to set forth a prima facie case for relief. (See

Dkt. 22, LD 5 at 2-3.) While the superior court’s decision relied entirely upon state case law 

in its analysis, both of the state court cases cited relied upon Strickland. See People v. Cox, 

53 Cal.3d 618, 656 (1991); and In re Marquez, 1 Cal.4th 584, 602 (1992). Moreover, the 

superior court’s decision is consistent with this Court’s analysis of materiality and prejudice 

under Brady, which renders petitioner unable to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by 

defense counsel’s alleged failure to investigate and discover the results of the prison 

disciplinary hearing. I therefore recommend the Court find that the state courts’ decisions 

denying petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim were not contrary to or an 

unreasonable application of Strickland. Again, petitioner’s claim must be denied. 

 D. Cruel and Unusual Punishment Claim

 Petitioner contends that his conviction was obtained in violation of the Eighth 

Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment because a CDC Officer 

continually threatened him and his family until he pled guilty. (See Dkt. 1 at 6.) In support of 

his claim, he asserts that the CDC Officer visited his home, threatened his family, contacted 

child protective services, tried to get him to provide information about another drug case in 

prison and subsequently filed false charges against him. (See id. & Dkt. 27 at 15-16.) 

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Respondent argues that petitioner is unable to demonstrate that the alleged verbal 

harassment rose to the level of a constitutional violation and that pursuing false charges does 

not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. (See Dkt. 22 at 15-16.) In addition, respondent 

asserts that petitioner fails to demonstrate how the decisions of the California courts were 

contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law or were based 

upon an unreasonable determination of the facts. (See id.) Because there was no reasoned 

decision by the state courts with regard to this claim, this Court must analyze this issue 

independently. 

 The only cognizable Eighth Amendment claim in a habeas corpus petition is a 

challenge to a defendant’s sentence on the grounds that it is grossly disproportionate to the 

crime. See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73 (2003) (holding that the “only relevant 

clearly established law amenable to the ‘contrary to’ or ‘unreasonable application of’ 

framework is the gross disproportionality principle, the precise contours of which are unclear 

and applicable only in the ‘exceedingly rare’ and ‘extreme’ case”) (citing Harmelin v. 

Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983); and Rummel 

v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980)). See also Ramirez v. Castro, 365 F.3d 755, 775 (9th Cir. 

2004). The “cruel and unusual punishment” prohibition relates to a sentence imposed for an 

established criminal violation. It is not a sweeping constitutional prohibition against 

aggressive prosecution tactics or other allegedly improper conduct by law enforcement 

officers, prosecutors, or the courts. Thus, to the extent that petitioner contends the CDC 

Officer’s threats and verbal harassment violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from 

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cruel and unusual punishment, or that he subsequently brought false charges against him, such 

claims are not cognizable in this proceeding and must therefore be denied.VI.

 CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 

The federal rules governing habeas cases brought by state prisoners have recently been 

amended to require a district court that denies a habeas petition to grant or deny a certificate 

of appealability in the ruling. See Rule 11(a), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254 (effective December 1, 2009). 

A petitioner seeking post-conviction relief under § 2254 may appeal a district court’s 

dismissal of his federal habeas petition only after obtaining a certificate of appealability from 

a district or circuit judge. A judge shall grant a certificate of appealability only where a 

petitioner has made “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” See 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(3). The certificate must indicate which issues satisfy this standard. See id. 

§ 2253(c)(3). “Where a district court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits, the 

showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is straightforward: the petitioner must demonstrate that 

reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims 

debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 474 (2000). 

For the reasons set out in the discussion of the merits, above, jurists of reason would 

not find the result debatable. Accordingly, I recommend that the Court decline to issue a 

certificate of appealability. Petitioner is advised that, if this Court denies a certificate of 

appealability, he may not appeal that denial in this Court. Rather, he may seek a certificate 

from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals under Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Appellate 

Procedure. 

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION - 16 

JOHN L. WEINBERG 

United States Magistrate Judge 

VII. CONCLUSION 

For all of these reasons, I recommend the Court find petitioner entered his guilty plea 

knowingly and voluntarily, that the prosecution did not violate his rights under Brady, that he 

received effective assistance of counsel, and that his Eighth Amendment claim is not 

cognizable in this proceeding. I further recommend the Court find that the Amador County 

Superior Court’s decision was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law, or based on an unreasonable determination of facts. Finally, I 

recommend the Court decline to issue a certificate of appealability and enter an Order 

accepting and adopting this Report and Recommendation, denying the petition, and directing 

that judgment be entered dismissing this action with prejudice. 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty (20) 

days of being served with this Report and Recommendation, any party may file written 

objections with this Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be 

captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation.” Either party may 

then respond to the other party’s objections with fourteen (14) days of being served a copy of 

such written objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the 

right to appeal the District Court’s Order. See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 

1991). A proposed Order accompanies this Report and Recommendation. 

DATED this 22nd day of February, 2010. 

A 

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