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Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 15, 2004 Decided July 16, 2004

No. 03-7074

FRANK SUMMERS, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

v.

HOWARD UNIVERSITY,

APPELLANT

Consolidated with

03–7096

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 98cv02692)

Ronald A. Lindsay argued the cause for appellant. With

him on the briefs was Peter Chatilovicz.

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

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Kathleen A. Dolan argued the cause and filed the brief for

appellees.

Before: SENTELLE, ROGERS, and GARLAND, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.

GARLAND, Circuit Judge: This case arises out of a wage

dispute between Howard University and its campus security

personnel. Current and former Howard security officers

filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the

District of Columbia alleging that the University had failed to

compensate them for work performed during their meal

breaks and before and after their scheduled shifts. Howard

and the plaintiffs ultimately entered into a settlement agreement, and a magistrate judge issued a consent decree enforcing that agreement.

After entering into the settlement, Howard learned that

the plaintiffs had previously filed a complaint in the Superior

Court of the District of Columbia arising out of the same

facts, and that they had failed to advise Howard of that

second suit. Following this discovery, Howard moved to

vacate the consent decree and underlying settlement agreement. The magistrate denied Howard’s motion and subsequently issued orders adopting the damages and fees calculations made by a special master who had been appointed

pursuant to the agreement. The Superior Court complaint

was later dismissed.

Howard now appeals from, inter alia, the denial of its

motion to vacate and the adoption of the special master’s

calculations. We conclude that the magistrate judge did not

abuse his discretion with respect to the former and that there

was no clear error with respect to the latter.

I

The plaintiffs’ original district court complaint, filed November 3, 1998, alleged that Howard had failed to pay them

for work performed during their meal breaks, in violation of

the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et

seq., and in breach of the collective bargaining agreement

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(CBA) between Howard and the plaintiffs’ union. The complaint was amended in May 1999 to add additional claims

under the FLSA and the CBA for work performed by the

plaintiffs without compensation both before and after their

scheduled shifts, and was amended again in May 2001 to add

a claim under the D.C. Minimum Wage Act, D.C. Code § 32–

1001 et seq., for Howard’s failure to compensate the plaintiffs

for the same work alleged in the original and amended

complaints. Hereinafter, we refer to this amended action as

Summers I.

1

In March 1999, Howard submitted the following interrogatory — denominated Interrogatory 14 — to the plaintiffs:

State whether plaintiffs have ever filed a civil, administrative or other complaint or charge. For each such

complaint or charge describe the facts, the date of the

complaint or charge, where it was filed, the persons or

entities against whom you filed or asserted a claim, and

the outcome of the matter.

Def. Howard Univ.’s First Set of Interrogs. to Pls. at 8 (App.

25). Of the 69 plaintiffs who responded, the majority answered that they had not filed any complaints or charges at

all; several responded by reporting grievances or court actions unrelated to the instant litigation; a small group referred Howard back to its own records; and a few objected

on grounds of relevance and provided no answer. Appellant’s

Br. at 6; see also App. 27–39 (sample responses).

Howard moved to dismiss the complaint or, alternatively,

for partial summary judgment. On December 22, 2000, the

district judge granted judgment for Howard on the CBA

claims, finding that the employees had failed to exhaust

grievance and arbitration procedures required by the CBA.

Summers v. Howard Univ., No. 98–2692, Mem. Op. & Order

at 7 (D.D.C. Dec. 22, 2000) [hereinafter Dec. 2000 Mem. Op.].

At the same time, the court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for

1 Our descriptions of the plaintiffs’ FLSA claims, as well as of the

setoff claimed by Howard and discussed in Part III, are simplified

for ease of presentation.

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summary judgment on the FLSA claims. Id. at 8. In May

2001, the parties consented to refer the case to a magistrate

judge for all purposes, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1).

On June 14, 2001, the plaintiffs filed a second complaint

against Howard for failing to compensate them for work

performed during meal breaks and before and after their

shifts. Plaintiffs filed this complaint, which we hereinafter

refer to as Summers II, in the Superior Court of the District

of Columbia. The complaint alleged a breach of the CBA, a

claim facially identical to one the U.S. District Court had

dismissed in December 2000, and also alleged that Howard’s

failure to compensate the plaintiffs violated the University’s

employee handbook and thus constituted a breach of contract.

The plaintiffs did not serve Howard with this complaint and

took steps to ensure that the University would not receive

notice of the lawsuit through the usual Superior Court procedures. In addition, the plaintiffs did not supplement their

1999 responses to Interrogatory 14 to account for the filing of

Summers II.

On December 11, 2001, Howard and the plaintiffs reached a

settlement in Summers I. Howard agreed to pay the FLSA

claims in full, the amount of the payment (including back pay

and liquidated damages) to be resolved by a court-appointed

special master ‘‘pursuant to Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure.’’ Settlement Agreement at 1 (App. 72).

Howard also agreed to pay reasonable attorneys’ fees as

determined by the special master. The settlement agreement

provided that its terms would be embodied in a consent

decree and entered by the court. On February 8, 2002, the

magistrate judge issued an order (‘‘consent decree’’) that

referenced the terms of the Summers I settlement agreement, appointed a special master to make the findings required by that agreement, and directed Howard to pay the

special master’s fees and costs pursuant to Rule 53(a). Summers v. Howard Univ., No. 98–2692, Order (D.D.C. Feb. 8,

2002).

Two weeks later, Howard moved to vacate the consent

decree and the underlying agreement, pursuant to Federal

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Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3), for fraud, misrepresentation,

and/or misconduct on the part of the plaintiffs in failing to

inform Howard of the filing of Summers II — which Howard

had learned of by happenstance in early January 2002. The

magistrate denied the motion, finding that Howard had

‘‘failed to meet its burden of proving fraud or misrepresentation on the part of Plaintiffs’’ and that Howard had suffered

no prejudice. Summers v. Howard Univ., No. 98–2692,

Mem. Op. & Order at 6 (D.D.C. May 20, 2002) [hereinafter

May 2002 Mem. Op.]. Howard filed an interlocutory appeal

of the magistrate’s denial with this court, which we dismissed

for lack of appellate jurisdiction. Summers v. Howard Univ.,

No. 02–7069, 2003 WL 21186051 (D.C. Cir. May 16, 2003).

Meanwhile, proceedings to enforce the consent decree

moved forward. The special master issued his Back Wage

Report on January 6, 2003, and his Fees and Costs Report on

February 19. On May 7, 2003, after hearing oral argument

on Howard’s objections to the Back Wage Report, the magistrate adopted that Report and directed Howard to pay back

wages and liquidated damages in the amount of $318,080.99.

Summers v. Howard Univ., No. 98–2692, Mem. Op. & Order

(D.D.C. May 7, 2003) [hereinafter Wage Report Op.]. Thereafter, the magistrate also adopted the special master’s Fees

and Costs Report, and directed Howard to pay attorneys’ fees

and costs in the amount of $220,906.00. Summers v. Howard

Univ., No. 98–2692, Mem. & Op. (D.D.C. June 16, 2003).

Howard now appeals from the magistrate’s order denying

the University’s motion to vacate the consent decree (and the

underlying settlement agreement), as well as from his order

adopting the findings of the special master.2

 We address

these appeals in Parts II and III below.

2 In addition, Howard appeals an August 2001 order of the

magistrate judge, which denied Howard’s motion for partial summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ FLSA meal-break claim. Summers v. Howard Univ., No. 98–2692, Mem. Order at 2–3 (D.D.C.

Aug. 1, 2001). This is one of the claims that Howard subsequently

settled in December 2001 and as to which the magistrate entered

the consent decree in February 2002. Because the merits of that

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II

We begin with the magistrate’s order denying Howard’s

motion to vacate the consent decree pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3). An appellate court may overturn

such an order only for abuse of discretion. See Computer

Prof’ls for Social Responsibility v. United States Secret Serv.,

72 F.3d 897, 903 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Twelve John Does v.

District of Columbia, 841 F.2d 1133, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1988).

Rule 60(b)(3) permits a court to relieve a party from a final

judgment because of ‘‘fraud (whether heretofore denominated

intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct

of an adverse party.’’ FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(3). Howard

argues that the plaintiffs’ conduct comes within the scope of

the rule, and that the magistrate abused his discretion in

denying Howard relief.

The magistrate judge denied Howard’s motion on the

ground that the University had failed to prove either fraud or

affirmative misrepresentation. Although Howard disputes

that conclusion, it correctly notes that Rule 60(b)(3) provides

a third ground for vacatur that the magistrate failed to

consider — namely, ‘‘other misconduct of an adverse party.’’

See Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 862 F.2d 910, 923 (1st Cir.

1988) (holding that, for the term ‘‘misconduct’’ to ‘‘have

meaning in the Rule 60(b)(3) context, it must differ from both

‘fraud’ and ‘misrepresentation’ ’’). And it contends that the

plaintiffs’ failure to supplement their interrogatory responses

to disclose the existence of Summers II, coupled with their

affirmative efforts to prevent notice of the suit from being

given in Superior Court, constituted such misconduct.

claim cannot be reexamined unless the consent decree is vacated,

and because we decline to vacate that decree for the reasons set

forth in Part II, we deny this aspect of Howard’s appeal without

further discussion. Cf. Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 673 (D.C.

Cir. 2004). Similarly, Howard also appeals the magistrate’s order

adopting the special master’s Fees and Costs Report — not on its

merits, but because it is ‘‘predicated’’ on the December 2001 settlement agreement that Howard contends should be vacated. Appellant’s Br. at 43–44. Our refusal to vacate that agreement likewise

dooms this aspect of Howard’s appeal.

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We agree. As several circuits have held, ‘‘[f]ailure to

disclose or produce materials requested in discovery can

constitute ‘misconduct’ within the purview of’’ Rule 60(b)(3).

Anderson, 862 F.2d at 923.3

 Plaintiffs’ explanation for failing

to supplement4

 is that they believed Summers II was ‘‘not

relevant’’ to Summers I. Oral Arg. Tr. at 23 (D.C. Cir. May 8,

2003) (App. 220). At best, however, this would have justified

a relevance objection to the interrogatory; it did not justify

complete silence.

Moreover, the plaintiffs engaged in repeated, affirmative

efforts to keep the filing of Summers II a secret from

Howard, efforts that included failing to serve the University

with the complaint, requesting repeated extensions of time for

service while representing that an extension was unopposed,

and omitting Howard’s name from the list of parties to be

served with orders by the court. The plaintiffs concede that

these acts were intentional. Their only ‘‘excuse’’ is that they

wanted to keep Howard from learning of Summers II, so that

they could exhaust their administrative remedies before Howard could move to dismiss for failure to exhaust — the

strategy the University had used successfully in Summers I.

Oral Arg. Tr. at 21–22 (D.C. Cir. May 8, 2003); Motions Hr’g

Tr. at 11 (D.D.C. Apr. 26, 2002). This, of course, is no excuse

at all.

Misconduct alone, however, is not sufficient to justify the

setting aside of a final judgment. Under Rule 60(b), a court

must balance the interest in justice with the interest in

protecting the finality of judgments. See Schultz, 24 F.3d at

3 See Cummings v. General Motors Corp., 365 F.3d 944, 955 (10th

Cir. 2004); Abrahamsen v. Trans–State Express, Inc., 92 F.3d 425,

428 (6th Cir. 1996); Schultz v. Butcher, 24 F.3d 626, 630 (4th Cir.

1994); Stridiron v. Stridiron, 698 F.2d 204, 207 (3d Cir. 1983);

Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d 1332, 1339 (5th Cir. 1978).

4 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(e) (‘‘A party who has TTT responded to a

request for discovery TTT is under a duty to supplement or correct

the TTT response to include information thereafter acquired TTT (2)

TTT if the party learns that the response is in some material respect

incomplete or incorrectTTTT’’); see also Rozier, 573 F.2d at 1342 &

n.10.

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630; Anderson, 862 F.2d at 926; Randall v. Merrill Lynch,

820 F.2d 1317, 1321 (D.C. Cir. 1987). That balance is effectuated in part by the requirement that the victim of misconduct

(or of fraud or misrepresentation) demonstrate actual prejudice. See Anderson, 862 F.2d at 924 (holding that, ‘‘as with

other defects in the course of litigation,’’ misconduct, ‘‘to

warrant relief, must have been harmful — it must have

‘affect[ed] the substantial rights’ of the movant’’ (quoting FED.

R. CIV. P. 61)). This is often worded as a requirement that

the movant show that the misconduct ‘‘foreclosed full and fair

preparation or presentation of its case.’’ Id. at 923.5

Howard contends that the plaintiffs’ failure to advise it of

the filing of Summers II in advance of the settlement prejudiced the University by depriving it of ‘‘the benefit of its

bargain — resolution of all then-extant claims.’’ Reply Br. at

4. The implication of this contention is that, had Howard

known of Summers II, it would have insisted that the Summers I settlement agreement include a provision resolving

Summers II as well. Despite this, the magistrate judge

concluded that Howard was not prejudiced because, at the

time of the settlement, Howard knew that the union had filed

an administrative grievance under the CBA that raised issues

similar to those in Summers II. May 2002 Mem. Op. at 5.

Presumably the magistrate’s inference is that, armed with

knowledge of that grievance, Howard should (or could) have

included a global settlement provision resolving all present

and future related claims. We share the magistrate’s mystification as to why Howard did not insist on such a provision.

See id. at 5–6. But we agree with the University that,

because the CBA grievance differed in certain substantive

and remedial respects from the Superior Court lawsuit,

knowledge of the former did not necessarily eliminate the

potential for prejudice arising from the latter.

5 See Anderson, 862 F.2d at 923–24 (collecting cases); see also

Cummings, 365 F.3d at 955; Sellers v. Mineta, 350 F.3d 706, 715

(8th Cir. 2003); Tobel v. City of Hammond, 94 F.3d 360, 362 (7th

Cir. 1996); Schultz, 24 F.3d at 630; GAF Corp. v. Transamerica

Ins. Co., 665 F.2d 364, 371 (D.C. Cir. 1981).

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Nonetheless, we conclude that the plaintiffs’ failure to

inform Howard of the existence of Summers II did not result

in prejudice to the defendant. Howard concedes that, once it

learned of the complaint, it regarded the suit as meritless

because the plaintiffs had again failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. Oral Arg. Tape at 9:55 (D.C. Cir. March

15, 2004). The subsequent history of Summers II proved

Howard right. The University removed the case to federal

court, and, with the consent of both parties, the complaint

was referred to the same magistrate who was presiding over

Summers I. Howard then moved to dismiss for failure to

exhaust. On June 17, 2003, noting that the plaintiffs had not

even filed a response to Howard’s motion and that there had

been no additional activity in the case, the magistrate dismissed the action. Summers v. Howard Univ., No. 02–239,

Order (D.D.C. June 17, 2003). Hence, despite the plaintiffs’

failure to advise Howard of the filing of Summers II, the

University fully achieved its aim of resolving all ‘‘then-extant

claims.’’

In its reply brief, Howard insists that it was at least

prejudiced by the litigation expenses it incurred in obtaining

the dismissal of Summers II. We do not doubt that Howard

did incur some costs, although the University does not quantify them and the fact that its motion to dismiss was unopposed

suggests that the costs could not have been great. But as we

pointed out during Howard’s last visit to this court, the

University had a considerably more direct way of recouping

those costs than overturning the settlement: ‘‘Any costs and

fees incurred because of plaintiffs’ alleged misconduct and

violation of the discovery rules,’’ we said, ‘‘can be redressed

through an appropriate motion for sanctions under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1).’’ Summers, 2003 WL

21186051, at *1. But despite our suggestion, Howard did not

request fees or sanctions in its motion to dismiss Summers

II. And while Howard did request sanctions in its motion to

vacate the consent decree, the magistrate expressly deferred

consideration of that portion of Howard’s motion, May 2002

Mem. Op. at 1 n.1, and Howard failed to pursue the matter

further, Oral Arg. Tape at 5:18 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 15, 2004).

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Under these circumstances, the Rule 60(b) balance tilts decisively in favor of preserving the finality of the judgment.

We conclude that Howard did not suffer prejudice sufficient to justify vacating the consent decree. Although the

magistrate judge reached the same conclusion, because our

analysis is not quite the same as his was, we ordinarily would

remand rather than affirm in order to give him the opportunity to exercise his discretion in light of the considerations we

have outlined. See United States v. Haynes, 158 F.3d 1327,

1331–32 (D.C. Cir. 1998). In this case, however, the absence

of sufficient prejudice is so plain that a grant of Howard’s

Rule 60(b)(3) motion would constitute an abuse of discretion.

Under such circumstances, a remand would be inappropriate,

and we therefore affirm the magistrate’s denial of Howard’s

motion to vacate the judgment. See Al–Fayed v. CIA, 254

F.3d 300, 309 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Haynes, 158 F.3d at 1331.

III

We turn next to Howard’s contention that the magistrate

judge erred in adopting the special master’s Back Wage

Report. At the time, the magistrate, sitting by consent as a

district court, was under a duty to review the special master’s

factual findings for clear error. See FED. R. CIV. P. 53(e)(2)

(2003); Wallace v. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom,

LLP, 362 F.3d 810, 816–17 (D.C. Cir. 2004). We, in turn, also

review a special master’s findings, to the extent they were

adopted by a district court (in this case, by a magistrate

judge), for clear error. Berger v. Iron Workers Reinforced

Rodmen, Local 201, 170 F.3d 1111, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 1999); see

Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a).6

 We review conclusions of law de

6 We note that in 2003, Rule 53 was amended to provide de novo

review of a special master’s factfindings by the district court. See

FED. R. CIV. P. 53(g)(3) (2004) & advisory committee’s note to 2003

amendments. Those changes did not take effect until December 1,

2003, several months after the magistrate’s adoption of the Wage

Report. Neither side disputes that the former version of Rule 53

was applicable here, or that the standard for our review is clear

error.

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novo. Cuddy v. Carmen, 762 F.2d 119, 123 (D.C. Cir. 1985).

The special master awarded the plaintiffs $318,080.99 in

back wages and liquidated damages. Howard’s appeal centers on a provision of the settlement agreement that entitled

the University to a setoff for certain premium pay that was

paid to plaintiffs for hours they worked in excess of eight in

any given day. To determine the amount of the setoff, the

special master examined a random sample of 20% of the

payroll data for each plaintiff from June 1998 to July 1999.

Wage Report Op. at 10. The master found that the setoff

applied only rarely, affecting total back pay by at most 1–2%.

Id. Moreover, the master found that any such setoff was

itself generally offset by overtime Howard owed the plaintiffs

for weeks in which, although they were scheduled to work 38

or 39 hours, their work before and after scheduled shifts and

during meal breaks brought their weekly total to more than

40 hours. Id. at 7, 10. Because the result was a ‘‘wash,’’ the

master concluded that recalculation of the data to include a

setoff would not materially affect the result, and hence was

unwarranted. Id. at 11 (quoting April 1, 2003 Letter from

Special Master to Def.’s Counsel).

The magistrate held that the special master’s findings were

not clearly erroneous, and we agree. Howard argues that, by

the terms of the settlement agreement, the special master

was obligated to calculate the total amount of the available

setoff by examining 100% of the payroll data — rather than

by extrapolating from a smaller sample. But there was

nothing in the agreement that specified the manner in which

the master had to calculate the setoff, and there was nothing

unreasonable in his decision to use a random sample of the

data to determine whether a setoff would be material. Nor

was there anything facially unreasonable about sampling 20%

of the data.

Moreover, despite Howard’s claim that a review of 100% of

the payroll data was required and would yield a materially

different result from that produced by the special master’s

20% study, Howard never conducted such a review or offered

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one into evidence. Although the University had an opportunity to do so between the time the master filed the Back

Wage Report on January 6, 2003, and the time the magistrate

held a hearing on Howard’s objections to the Report on

March 20, 2003,7

 it never conducted the full review that it said

was required. Instead, the University countered with its own

sampling study, examining 100% of the payroll data — but for

only 16 out of the total of 71 employees during the June 1998

to July 1999 period.

Howard offers nothing to support the proposition that its

sampling methodology was statistically preferable to that

used by the special master. Nor was there anything clearly

erroneous about the special master’s conclusion that any

setoff would constitute at most a ‘‘de minimus’’ proportion of

the damages award — a result confirmed by Howard’s own

study, which yielded a total setoff for the 16 employees it

examined of only $2306.08. See Wage Report Op. at 11–12.

In the absence of evidence that a full review would yield a

contrary conclusion, we cannot say that the special master’s

determination of back wages and liquidated damages was

clearly erroneous.

IV

For the foregoing reasons, the orders of the magistrate

judge, sitting by consent as a district judge for all purposes,

are

Affirmed.

7 Indeed, the magistrate found that Howard was on notice that

the special master did not intend to include a setoff as early as July

15, 2002, the date the special master asked the parties to comment

on his preliminary review of the issue. Wage Report Op. at 14.

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