Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_10-cv-00941/USCOURTS-cand-3_10-cv-00941-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

COLLEEN O’DONNELL,

Plaintiff,

v.

U.S. BANCORP EQUIPMENT

FINANCE, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

NO. C10-0941 TEH

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS

This matter comes before the Court on a motion to dismiss or, the alternative, motion

for a more definite statement filed by Defendant U.S. Bancorp Equipment Finance, Inc.

(“USBEF”). After carefully reviewing the parties’ written arguments, the Court finds oral

argument to be unnecessary and hereby VACATES the hearing scheduled for June 7, 2010. 

For the reasons discussed below, USBEF’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Colleen O’Donnell alleges that she began working for USBEF as a sales

representative and was so successful that she was eventually given responsibility to lead her

own sales team. She also developed a new line of business “dedicated to the lease of medical

technology products, to hospitals, physicians and other medical customers . . . and achieved

outstanding results, taking this new group from nothing to approximately $20 million in lease

deals in its first year, which made it one of the most successful business units within

USBEF’s Technology Finance Group.” Compl. ¶ 7.

Case 3:10-cv-00941-TEH Document 27 Filed 05/28/10 Page 1 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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USBEF “encouraged plaintiff to devote herself further to growing this business, and

assured her that she would continue to lead and manage this group, including appropriate

promotions and compensation adjustments, that she had done such an acclaimed job in

creating and developing.” Id. ¶ 8.

However, within a short time after these accolades and

assurances, defendant USBEF, through its General Manager,

Jamie Gioia, repudiated them by instead hiring a male “crony”

whom he had reportedly known from a former common

employer, from outside of USBEF to take over plaintiff’s role as

manager of this new medical technology leasing unit that she had

built, and effectively demoting plaintiff from a leadership

position, even though this new male manager was objectively less

knowledgeable, experienced and qualified to run this business

unit than plaintiff. After complaining of her unfair and disparate

treatment to the General Manager, and with no corrective action

taken, plaintiff was pressured to resign from defendant USBEF.

Id. ¶ 9. The revenues of the new group dropped to “virtually zero within approximately a

year of [O’Donnell’s] departure from USBEF,” which O’Donnell attributes to “the lack of

qualifications and capabilities” of the male manager who replaced her. Id. ¶ 10.

O’Donnell alleges that she “satisfactorily performed her duties and responsibilities as

expected by defendant,” id. ¶ 13, and that her “gender was a factor in defendants’ actions

toward and against” her, id. ¶ 14. After filing a complaint with the California Department of

Fair Employment and Housing and receiving a right-to-sue letter, O’Donnell filed this case

alleging three causes of action under state law: employment discrimination based on gender,

retaliation, and failure to prevent discrimination and/or retaliation..

USBEF now moves to dismiss all three causes of action for failure to state a claim or,

in the alternative, moves for a more definite statement.

LEGAL STANDARD

Dismissal is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) when a

plaintiff’s allegations fail “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” In ruling on a

motion to dismiss, courts may consider only “the complaint, materials incorporated into the

complaint by reference, and matters of which the court may take judicial notice.” Metzler

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Inv. GMBH v. Corinthian Colleges, Inc., 540 F.3d 1049, 1061 (9th Cir. 2008). Courts must

generally “accept all material allegations of fact as true and construe the complaint in a light

most favorable to the non-moving party,” Vasquez v. Los Angeles County, 487 F.3d 1246,

1249 (9th Cir. 2007), but “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a

factual allegation,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009) (citation omitted). 

A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal “can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or

the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica

Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff

must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Plausibility does not equate to probability, but

it requires “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 129

S. Ct. at 1949. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Id. Dismissal of claims that fail to meet this standard should be with

leave to amend unless it is clear that amendment could not possibly cure the complaint’s

deficiencies. Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1296 (9th Cir. 1998).

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e), “[a] party may move for a more definite

statement of a pleading to which a responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or

ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response.” A court will generally

“require a more definite statement only when the pleading is so vague or ambiguous that the

opposing party cannot respond, even with a simple denial, in good faith or without prejudice

to himself.” Cellars v. Pacific Coast Packaging, Inc., 189 F.R.D. 575, 578 (N.D. Cal. 1999)

(internal quotations and citations omitted). A motion for a more definite statement should be

denied “where the information sought by the moving party is available and/or properly

sought through discovery.” Famolare, Inc. v. Edison Bros. Stores, Inc., 525 F. Supp. 940,

949 (E.D. Cal. 1981).

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United States District Court

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DISCUSSION

USBEF argues that O’Donnell has failed to allege facts that would establish a prima

facie case for either unlawful discrimination or unlawful retaliation. To establish a prima

facie case for discrimination, a plaintiff must generally show that:

(1) he was a member of a protected class, (2) he was qualified for

the position he sought or was performing competently in the

position he held, (3) he suffered an adverse employment action,

such as termination, demotion, or denial of an available job, and

(4) some other circumstance suggests discriminatory motive.

Guz v. Bechtel Nat’l, Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 317, 355 (2000). A prima facie case for retaliation

requires a plaintiff to demonstrate “that she engaged in protected activity, that she was

thereafter subjected to adverse employment action by her employer, and there was a causal

link between the two.” Morgan v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 88 Cal. App. 4th 52, 69

(2000) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

Although O’Donnell failed to make this argument, a plaintiff is not required to

establish a prima facie case in the complaint. The Supreme Court has explicitly held that the

prima facie case in the discrimination context “is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading

requirement.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002). Thus, “an

employment discrimination plaintiff need not plead a prima facie case of discrimination,” id.

at 515; instead, “the ordinary rules for assessing the sufficiency of a complaint apply,” id. at

511. The Court held that the plaintiff sufficiently stated a claim for relief under Title VII and

the Age Discrimination in Employment Act where the “complaint detailed the events leading

to his termination, provided relevant dates, and included the ages and nationalities of at least

some of the relevant persons involved with his termination.” Id. at 514.

Twombly and Iqbal clarified “the ordinary rules for assessing the sufficiency of a

complaint,” but these cases did not reject Swierkiewicz’s holding that a prima facie case need

not be pleaded in a complaint alleging discrimination. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 569-70

(reaffirming Swierkiewicz’s holding that “heightened fact pleading of specifics” is not

required and that it would be improper to dismiss a complaint “for failing to allege certain

additional facts that Swierkiewicz would need at the trial stage to support his claim in the

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absence of direct evidence of discrimination”). Under Twombly and Iqbal, a complaint “does

not require detailed factual allegations” to survive a motion to dismiss, but a plaintiff must

allege “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal,

129 S. Ct. at 1949 (internal quotations and citations omitted). This does not require that a

plaintiff state a claim for relief with probability; “it simply calls for enough fact to raise a

reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal [conduct].” Twombly,

550 U.S. at 556.

USBEF does not dispute that, for purposes of her discrimination claim, O’Donnell has

sufficiently alleged that she was a member of a protected class, was performing competently

in her position, and suffered an adverse employment action by being “effectively demot[ed].” 

Compl. ¶ 9. Although USBEF argues that O’Donnell has failed to allege any facts to support

a conclusion that the adverse employment action was the result of discrimination, the Court

concludes that O’Donnell’s allegation that she was replaced by a less qualified male crony of

the general manager is sufficient “to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal

evidence of illegal [discrimination].” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. However, the Court finds

that O’Donnell has nonetheless failed to satisfy the pleading requirements of Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 8 because she has not alleged any dates in her complaint. See, e.g.,

Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514 (finding complaint to be sufficient in part because it “provided

relevant dates”). Without any reference to when the alleged misconduct occurred,

O’Donnell’s allegations fail to state a plausible claim for relief. Accordingly, her first cause

of action for gender discrimination is dismissed with leave to amend to state relevant dates.

In her opposition, O’Donnell explained that her second cause of action, for retaliation,

was based on the allegations contained in paragraphs 9 and 19 through 23 of the complaint. 

Paragraph 9 alleges that “[a]fter complaining of her unfair and disparate treatment to the

General Manager, and with no corrective action taken, plaintiff was pressured to resign from

defendant USBEF.” Compl. ¶ 9. USBEF does not dispute that this paragraph sufficiently

alleges that O’Donnell was engaged in protective activity. However, USBEF contends – and

this Court agrees – that being “pressured to resign” is too conclusory an allegation to assume

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For example, paragraph 19 alleges that, “[a]t relevant times herein, plaintiff engaged

in one or more protected activities by reporting and objecting to an appropriate manager

and/or other personnel of defendant USBEF acts of discriminatory conduct and disparate

treatment directed against or toward her by one or more managers at defendant USBEF.” 

Compl. ¶ 19. The following paragraph alleges that, “[t]hereafter, and as a proximate result of

plaintiff’s above stated protected activities and conduct, defendants subjected plaintiff to

adverse employment actions, including, without limitation, denial of advancement

opportunities and reduction of responsibilities and/or compensation.” Id. ¶ 20.

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as true. Moreover, paragraphs 19 through 23 contain only “a formulaic recitation” of the

elements that “will not do.”1

 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. In addition, there are no facts

alleged to support an inference that O’Donnell was “pressured to resign” as a result of her

complaints about discriminatory treatment. In light of these deficiencies, dismissal of

O’Donnell’s retaliation claim is proper. Dismissal is with leave to amend because it is not

clear that O’Donnell could not cure the deficiencies by amendment.

Finally, O’Donnell’s cause of action for failure to prevent discrimination and/or

retaliation rests on two paragraphs of the complaint:

Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that

defendant USBEF was on notice of instances and/or complaints

or discriminatory conduct, disparate treatment, and/or retaliation

within USBEF by one or more of its manages [sic], including,

without limitation, the general manager, Jamie Gioia, and that

defendant USBEF permitted and condoned the continuation of

such unlawful conduct against plaintiff and other female

employees of USBEF.

As a direct and proximate result of defendant USBEF’s failure to

prevent such discriminatory and/or retaliatory conduct, plaintiff

has suffered and continues to suffer damage, including substantial

losses in earning and other employment benefits, along with

severe mental anguish and emotional distress. Plaintiff is thereby

entitled to general and compensatory damages in an amount to be

proved at trial, but not less than $700,000, as well as an award of

attorney’s fees as provided by statute.

Compl. ¶¶ 26-27. These formulaic and conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a claim

under the governing pleading standards. Consequently, O’Donnell’s third cause of action is

also dismissed. Leave to amend is granted because it is not clear that amendment would be

futile.

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United States District Court

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In the amended complaint, O’Donnell shall also correct the mistaken reference to

“defendant HP.” See Compl. ¶ 16.

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CONCLUSION

In short, all three causes of action alleged in the complaint are deficient. Accordingly,

USBEF’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED, and the Court therefore does not reach USBEF’s

motion for a more definite statement. Dismissal of all three claims is with leave to amend

because O’Donnell may be able to amend her complaint to add sufficient allegations to state

plausible claims to relief. The amended complaint shall be filed on or before June 28, 2010.2

Failure to file a timely amended complaint shall result in dismissal of this case with

prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the initial case management conference currently

scheduled for June 21, 2010, shall be continued to August 2, 2010, at 1:30 PM. The parties

shall meet and confer and file a joint case management conference statement on or before

July 26, 2010.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 05/28/10 

THELTON E. HENDERSON, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Case 3:10-cv-00941-TEH Document 27 Filed 05/28/10 Page 7 of 7