Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-01639/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-01639-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHAROME DAVIS,

Petitioner,

v.

M. E. SPEARMAN, Warden,

Respondent.

Case No. 18-cv-01639-JST (PR)

ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS; DENYING 

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Re: ECF No. 9

Petitioner, an inmate at High Desert State Prison, has filed this pro se action for a writ of 

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent has moved to dismiss the petition as 

untimely and as procedurally defaulted. Petitioner has filed an opposition, and respondent has 

filed a reply. 

I. BACKGROUND

In 2010, in Alameda County Superior Court, Petitioner was convicted by plea of voluntary 

manslaughter and admitted that he personally used a firearm in the commission of the offense. 

ECF No 1 at 1, 65. On August 2, 2010, he was sentenced to 11 years for the manslaughter 

conviction and an additional 10 years for the firearm enhancement. Id. Petitioner did not appeal. 

Id. at 3. 

On May 24, 2017, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the Alameda

County Superior Court. On June 7, 2017, the Superior Court denied his petition as untimely and

on the merits. ECF No. 1 at 66-67. Petitioner then filed a habeas petition with the state appellate

court, which was denied on August 28, 2017 “for the reasons set forth in the superior court’s June

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7, 2017, order.” Id. at 69. On October 25, 2017, the California Supreme Court denied review. Id.

at 71. On November 13, 2017, Petitioner filed a second habeas petition in the California Supreme

Court. ECF No. 9 at 8. On January 31, 2018, the California Supreme Court denied the petition as

untimely and repetitive. Id. at 84.

Petitioner then filed this action, seeking a writ of habeas corpus. The petition has a 

signature date of March 8, 2018 and was stamped “filed” at the Court on March 18, 2018. As a 

pro se prisoner, Petitioner receives the benefit of the prisoner mailbox rule, which deems most 

documents filed when the prisoner gives them to prison officials to mail to the court. See Stillman 

v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199, 1201 (9th Cir. 2003). The Court will assume he gave the petition to

prison officials for mailing on the date he signed it, i.e., March 8, 2018, and deem the federal 

petition filed as of that date. 

On May 9, 2018, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause, finding that the petition raised 

three claims: “(1) Petitioner’s sentence violates Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007); 

(2) Petitioner’s sentence was unauthorized; and (3) counsel rendered ineffective assistance.” ECF 

No. 5.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Statute of Limitations

As a general rule, petitions filed by prisoners challenging noncapital state convictions or 

sentences must be filed within one year of the latest of the date on which the judgment became 

final after the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review. 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). If a petitioner could have sought review by the state court of appeal or 

the state supreme court, but did not, the limitations period will begin running against him the day 

after the date on which the time to seek such review expired. Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 

150 (2012). Here, Petitionerʼs conviction became final on October 1, 2010, sixty days after his 

sentencing on August 2, 2010. See Mendoza v. Carey, 449 F.3d 1065, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006) 

(because California prisoner did not appeal his conviction, process of direct review became final 

60 days after conviction); Cal. Rule of Court 8.104(a)(1). Thus, petitioner had until October 3, 

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20111to file his federal habeas petition. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 

2001). Petitionerʼs instant petition, filed over six years later on March 8, 2018, is therefore 

untimely, absent tolling. 

1. Statutory Tolling

Section 2244(d)(2) provides for tolling of the one-year statute of limitations for the “time 

during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with 

respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Here, Petitioner 

has filed habeas petitions in state court. 

However, a state habeas petition filed after AEDPA’s statute of limitations ended cannot 

toll the limitations period. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(“[S]ection 2244(d) does not permit the reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended before 

the state petition was filed,” even if the state petition was timely filed); Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 

478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001) (same). In other words, Section 2244(d)(2) cannot “revive” the 

limitations period once it has run (i.e., restart the clock to zero); it can only serve to pause a clock 

that has not yet fully run. See, e.g., Rashid v. Khulmann, 991 F. Supp. 254, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) 

(“Once the limitations period is expired, collateral petitions can no longer serve to avoid the 

statute of limitations.”). 

Petitioner’s first state habeas petition was filed on May 24, 2017, over five years after the 

limitations period expired. Petitioner is therefore not entitled to statutory tolling of the limitations 

period under Section 2244(d)(2).

2. Equitable Tolling

The Supreme Court has determined that AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations is subject 

to equitable tolling in appropriate circumstances. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010). 

“[A] petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling only if he shows (1) that he has been pursuing his 

rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented 

timely filing.” Id. at 649 (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 

 

1 Because October 2, 2011 fell on a Sunday, the Court uses October 3, 2011 as the statute of 

limitations deadline.

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1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999) (“When external forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, 

account for the failure to file a timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may be 

appropriate.”). The diligence required to establish entitlement to equitable tolling is “reasonable 

diligence.” Holland, 560 U.S. at 653.

Petitioner bears the burden of showing that “extraordinary circumstances were the cause of 

his untimeliness.” Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Where a petitioner fails to show “any causal connection” between the grounds upon 

which he asserts a right to equitable tolling and his inability to timely file a federal habeas 

application, the equitable tolling claim will be denied. Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034-35 

(9th Cir. 2005). Further, such petitioner must show “his untimeliness was caused by an external 

impediment and not by his own lack of diligence.” Bryant v. Arizona Attorney General, 499 F.3d 

1056, 1061 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 973 (9th Cir. 2006)).

Petitioner claims that he “did not become aware of [the] legal and factual bases for his 

claims until 2017, after 7 years of diligent researching.” ECF No. 10 at 3. This bare assertion, 

without more, falls far short of showing either diligence or extraordinary circumstances.

Petitioner presents no evidence that anything stood in the way of his filing a timely petition. 

Given Petitioner’s lack of specificity and his failure to come forward with evidence in support of 

his contention, the Court cannot conclude that Petitioner has carried his burden of establishing that 

“extraordinary circumstances” existed which might justify equitable tolling of the AEDPA statute 

of limitations for over six years in this case. See Spitsyn, 345 F.3d at 799. Petitioner is therefore 

not entitled to equitable tolling of the limitations period. 

3. Miscarriage of Justice

Finally, Petitioner argues that failure to consider the claims will result in “a fundamental 

miscarriage of justice.” ECF No. 10 at 4. The United States Supreme Court has held that a federal 

court may hear untimely claims if the failure to hear the claims would constitute a “miscarriage of 

justice.” See McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 392-93 (2013) (holding that miscarriage of 

justice (actual innocence) showing applies to claims filed after the AEDPA statute of limitations 

has run, as well as to successive, abusive and procedurally defaulted claims); Lee v. Lampert, 653 

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F.3d 929, 931 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc). By the traditional understanding of habeas corpus, a 

“miscarriage of justice” occurs whenever a conviction or sentence is secured in violation of a 

constitutional right. See Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 543-44 (1986). However, the Supreme 

Court limits the miscarriage of justice exception to habeas petitioners who can show that “a 

constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.” 

Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995) (citing Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986)); 

see Johnson v. Knowles, 541 F.3d 933, 937 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[t]he miscarriage of justice exception 

is limited to those extraordinary cases where the petitioner asserts his innocence and establishes 

that the court cannot have confidence in the contrary finding of guilt”) (emphasis in original).

Under this “equitable exception,” a petitioner “may pass through the Schlup gateway and 

have his otherwise time-barred claims heard on the merits.” Lee, 653 F.3d at 932. In order to do 

so, “a petitioner must produce sufficient proof of his actual innocence to bring him “within the 

‘narrow class of cases . . . implicating a fundamental miscarriage of justice.’” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 

314-15 (omission in original) (quoting McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494 (1991)). The 

evidence of innocence must be “so strong that a court cannot have confidence in the outcome of 

the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was free of nonharmless constitutional 

error.” Id. at 316. A petitioner “must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror 

would have convicted him in the light of the new evidence.” Id. at 327. This exacting standard 

“permits review only in the ‘extraordinary’ case,” but it “does not require absolute certainty about 

the petitioner’s guilt or innocence.” House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 538 (2006) (quoting Schlup, 513 

U.S. at 327). A petitioner must support his claims “with new reliable evidence—whether it be 

exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence—

that was not presented at trial.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. 

Petitioner is not entitled to the “actual innocence” exception set forth in Schlup because he 

has failed to provide any evidence of actual innocence. Indeed, as noted above, petitioner pled no 

contest to the charges in state court and challenges only the legality of his sentence. See Knowles, 

541 F.3d at 936-37 (holding miscarriage of justice exception did not apply where petitioner 

conceded his guilt but argued evidence of state’s and attorney’s misconduct resulted in his being 

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held in prison longer than he should have been).

In sum, petitioner has failed to show that the claims in his federal petition are timely, or 

that he qualifies under any exception to AEDPA’s statute of limitations. Accordingly, the petition 

will be dismissed as untimely.2 

B. Certificate of Appealability

Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases now requires a district court to rule 

on whether a petitioner is entitled to a certificate of appealability in the same order in which the 

petition is denied. Petitioner has failed to make a substantial showing that a reasonable jurist 

would find the dismissal of his petition debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 

(2000). Consequently, no certificate of appealability is warranted in this case. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition as untimely is 

GRANTED and the petition is DISMISSED. A certificate of appealability is DENIED.

The Clerk shall enter judgment and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 28, 2019

______________________________________

JON S. TIGAR

United States District Judge

 

2 Because the Court dismisses the petition as untimely, it need not address Respondent’s 

alternative argument that the petition is also procedurally defaulted.

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