Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00014/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-00014-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jeremy Keith Barrientes,

Petitioner,

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, Attorney General of the 

State of Arizona,

Respondents.

No. CV 15-00014 PHX DGC (MEA)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE DAVID G. CAMPBELL:

Petitioner, who is pro se in this matter, docketed a motion seeking a writ of habeas 

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on January 5, 2015. Respondents docketed a 

limited answer to the petition for habeas corpus relief on February 25, 2015. See Doc. 10 

(“Answer”). On March 16, 2015, Petitioner docketed a reply to the answer to the 

petition. See Doc. 11.

I Procedural background

A Maricopa County grand jury indictment returned June 30, 2003, charged 

Petitioner with one count of armed robbery in case number CR2003–036001. See

Answer, Exh. B. According to the presentence report: “On November 11, 2002, 

[Petitioner] entered a Wells Fargo Bank branch, pointed a gun at a customer..., and stole 

the $1,260.00 in cash [that the customer] was attempting to deposit for his employer, 

Sonic.” Id., Exh. C at 1. On January 20, 2009, Petitioner pled guilty to this charge. Id., 

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Exh. D & Exh. E. In exchange for Petitioner’s guilty plea the state withdrew its 

allegation that Petitioner’s crime was dangerous. Id., Exh. D & Exh. E. Pursuant to his 

conviction on this charge, the state trial court sentenced Petitioner to a term of four years 

of probation. Id., Exh. F. Petitioner did not challenge this conviction or sentence in any 

post-conviction proceeding. Id., Exh. A at 3.

A grand jury indictment returned August 11, 2010, charged Petitioner with 

kidnapping, first-degree burglary, theft of a means of transportation, trafficking in stolen 

property, two counts of misconduct involving weapons, and three counts of armed 

robbery in CR2010–138881. Id., Exh. L. The following day the state moved to revoke 

Petitioner’s probation in CR2003–036001. Id., Exh. G. 

On September 28, 2010, Petitioner moved to represent himself in his criminal 

proceedings, which motion was denied. Petitioner’s counsel then moved for a Rule 11 

evaluation, which motion was granted. On January 18, 2011, the parties entered into a 

stipulation that Petitioner was competent to stand trial, based on the written reports of 

two doctors who had evaluated Petitioner in 2010. See id., Exh. EE.

On February 18, 2011, Petitioner pled guilty to two counts of armed robbery and 

one count of misconduct involving weapons in CR2010-138881. See id., Exh. N & Exh. 

O. In exchange for Petitioner’s guilty plea the state dismissed the remaining counts of 

the indictment. Id., Exh. N & Exh. O. The state trial court sentenced Petitioner in case 

number CR2010–138881 to concurrent sentences of 21 years imprisonment for each of 

the armed robberies and a concurrent sentence of 2.5 years imprisonment for his 

conviction on the charge of misconduct involving involving weapons. Id., Exh. P & 

Exh. Q. At that time, in case number CR2003–03600, because Petitioner had violated the 

terms of his probation, the state trial court imposed a sentence of five years imprisonment 

to be served concurrently with the sentences imposed in the 2010 matter. Id., Exh. I at 1–

2.

On March 25, 2011, Petitioner filed a notice of state post-conviction relief 

pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, challenging his guilty plea in 

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the 2010 matter and the revocation of his probation in the 2003 matter. Id., Exh. R & 

Exh. S. The trial court appointed counsel to represent Petitioner in his Rule 32 

proceedings. Id., Exh. T. Counsel filed notice that he could find no colorable claims to 

raise on Petitioner’s behalf. Petitioner filed a pro se petition raising various arguments 

regarding his guilty plea and his sentences. Id., Exh. V & Exh. W. The state’s response 

conceded that Petitioner was entitled to resentencing because the trial court failed to 

make certain required findings on the record, but otherwise opposed relief. Id., Exh. X at 

1–14. 

In a decision entered October 16, 2012, the state trial court ordered that Petitioner 

be resentenced and rejected all the other claims stated in his Rule 32 action as either 

meritless or precluded by his guilty plea. Id., Exh. Z. The state trial court characterized

Petitioner’s claims, other than his claim regarding his sentence, as asserting

1. His rights to a speedy trial were violated. The Court rejected pro per 

motions filed by Defendant as defendant was represented by counsel.

2. The trial court’s determination of Defendant’s competency violated due 

process.

3. The guilty pleas were induced by the State by the prosecutor threatening 

the defendant and coercing his plea.

4. The Court modified the plea agreement.

5. The sentence was illegal as the plea was not knowingly, intelligently and 

voluntarily made.

6. The sentence was not legally imposed as the court did not set forth the 

aggravating factors on the record when the imposing the stipulated 

sentence. (sic)

7. The Maricopa County jail subjected him to mental torture due to the 

environment, food and restraints.

Id., Exh. Z. 

The trial court found Petitioner had waived “all non-jurisdictional defects and 

defects occurring prior to the plea.” The court determined Petitioner had been “advised 

in writing” with regard to the rights he was waiving. The court noted Petitioner had 

entered a guilty plea waiving “all claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, other than 

the claim of ineffective assistance related to the validity of the plea upon which the 

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conviction rests.” The court found Petitioner was “foreclosed from arguing that his 

speedy trial rights were violated; that the court improperly failed to consider his pro per 

motions; that the trial court’s determination that he was competent to stand trial violated 

due process, and that the jail subjected him to mental torture due to various reasons.” Id., 

Exh. Z. The court concluded “Defendant’s claim that he did not fully understand the 

sentence potential sentence (sic) is without merit or substantiation in the record.” Id., 

Exh. Z. The court also found Petitioner’s claim that counsel did not object to the 

aggravated sentence “is not supported by the record.” Id., Exh. Z. Similarly, the state 

trial court found the record did not support Petitioner’s claim that he was under duress 

when he entered into the plea agreement. 

Petitioner did not, apparently, appeal this decision to the Arizona Court of Appeals 

and Petitioner was resentenced on November 12, 2012, receiving the same sentence 

previously imposed. Id., Exh. AA & Exh. BB.

Petitioner took a second Rule 32 action subsequent to his resentencing. 

Petitioner’s appointed counsel informed the trial court that she had “reviewed the relevant 

transcripts and court record” and was “unable to find a tenable issue to submit” in a Rule 

32 petition. Id., Exh. CC at 1. Petitioner filed a pro se petition comprised of more than 

190 pages of memoranda and exhibits. Id., Exh. DD. 

The state trial court denied relief in Petitioner’s second Rule 32 action on January

15, 2014. Id., Exh. JJ. Petitioner sought review of this decision by the Arizona Court of 

Appeals. Id., Exh. HH. On February 25, 2014, the Arizona Court of Appeals granted 

discretionary review but denied relief, stating:

We deny relief. Rather than identify specific claims for relief supported 

with fully and independently developed arguments, citation to legal 

authority and the record, [Petitioner] attempts to present issues for review 

by incorporating by reference the petition for postconviction relief filed in 

the trial court. His petition for review does nothing more than provide 

supplemental argument to support his petition for postconviction relief and 

is entirely dependent on incorporation of the petition. A petition for review 

may not incorporate by reference any issue or argument. The petition must 

set forth specific claims, present sufficient argument supported by legal

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authority, and include citation to the record. State v. Bortz, 169 Ariz. 575, 

577, 821 P.2d 236, 238 (App. 1991); Rule 32.9(c).

[C]ompliance with Rule 32 is not a mere formality.” Canion v. Cole, 210 

Ariz. 598, 600 ¶ 11, 115 P.3d 1261, 1263 (2005). A petitioner must “strictly 

comply” with Rule 32 in order to be entitled to relief. Id. [Petitioner] has 

failed to comply with Rule 32. Further, [Petitioner’s] attempt to rectify 

these deficiencies in his reply is not sufficient. This Court will not consider 

arguments or issues first raised in a reply. See State v. Watson, 198 Ariz. 

48, 51 ¶ 4, 6 P.3d 752, 755 (App. 2000). Finally, the petition for review 

presents additional issues [Petitioner] did not raise in the petition for 

postconviction relief he filed in the trial court. A petition for review may

not present issues not first presented to the trial court. Bortz, 169 Ariz. at 

577, 821 P.2d at 238; Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(c)(1)(ii). For the above 

reasons, we grant review and deny relief.

Id., Exh. KK at 2–3. 

Petitioner sought review by the Arizona Supreme Court, which was denied on 

August 28, 2014. Id., Exh. MM. 

In his federal habeas action Petitioner contends he was denied his right to due 

process of law because the trial judge “made a claim as to what were or were not in her

interests,” which interests were “in conflict” to Petitioner’s interests. Petitioner asserts he 

was denied his right to self-representation. Petitioner further alleges that the state trial 

court violated his right to due process by determining that Petitioner was competent to 

stand trial. Petitioner also contends the trial court improperly “rejected all motions filed 

by [Petitioner] on his own behalf” because Petitioner was represented by counsel. 

Petitioner argues that his sentence was “illegal” because he was “sentenced in accordance 

to a statute he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily agree to plead guilty to,” 

and because the trial court “modified the plea agreement without making sure [Petitioner] 

understood that modification.” Petitioner maintains he is entitled to habeas relief because 

he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel. Petitioner alleges his trial 

counsel’s performance was deficient because counsel did not honor Petitioner’s request 

for a speedy trial, because counsel “refused” to take Petitioner’s case to trial “and said he 

would only discuss plea bargains,” and because counsel failed to object when Petitioner 

received an aggravated sentence.

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II Analysis

A. Exhaustion and procedural default

Absent specific circumstances, the District Court may only grant federal habeas 

relief on the merits of a claim which has been “properly” exhausted in the state courts. 

See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842, 119 S. Ct. 1728, 1731 (1999); Coleman 

v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729–30, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2554–55 (1991). To properly 

exhaust a federal habeas claim, the petitioner must afford the state courts the opportunity 

to rule upon the merits of the claim by “fairly presenting” the claim to the state’s 

“highest” court in a procedurally correct manner. See, e.g., Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 

346, 351, 109 S. Ct. 1056, 1060 (1989); Rose v. Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 

2005). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that, in non-capital cases 

arising in Arizona, the “highest court” test of the exhaustion requirement is satisfied if the 

habeas petitioner presented his claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals, either in a direct 

appeal or in a petition for post-conviction relief. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 

1010 (9th Cir. 1999). See also Date v. Schriro, 619 F. Supp. 2d 736, 762-63 (D. Ariz. 

2008); Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F. Supp. 2d 925, 932 (D. Ariz. 2007).

To satisfy the “fair presentment” prong of the exhaustion requirement, the 

petitioner must present “both the operative facts and the legal principles that control each 

claim to the state judiciary.” Wilson v. Briley, 243 F.3d 325, 327 (7th Cir. 2001). See

also Woods v. Sinclair, 764 F.3d 1109, 1129 (9th Cir. 2014), petition for cert. filed No. 

14-931 (Jan. 28, 2015). In Baldwin v. Reese, the Supreme Court reiterated that the 

purpose of exhaustion is to give the states the opportunity to pass upon and correct 

alleged constitutional errors. See 541 U.S. 27, 29, 124 S. Ct. 1347, 1349 (2004). 

Therefore, if the petitioner did not present the federal habeas claim to the state court as 

asserting the violation of a specific federal constitutional right, as opposed to violation of 

a state law or a state procedural rule, the federal habeas claim was not “fairly presented” 

to the state court. See, e.g., id., 541 U.S. at 33, 124 S. Ct. at 1351. See also Arrendondo 

v. Neven, 763 F.3d 1122, 1138 (9th Cir. 2014). 

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However,

[The] AEDPA “leav[es] ‘primary responsibility’ for adjudicating federal 

claims to the States.” Johnson v. Williams, [] 133 S.Ct. 1088, 1097, 185 

L.Ed.2d 105 (2013) (citing Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 27, 123 

S.Ct. 357, [] (2002)). It follows that absent “evidence lead[ing] very clearly 

to the conclusion that a federal claim was inadvertently overlooked in state 

court,” a federal habeas court presumes that the state court reached a 

petitioner’s fairly presented federal claim. Id.

Williams v. Swarthout, 771 F.3d 501, 506 (9th Cir. 2014).

In order to fulfill exhaustion requirements, a petitioner must present to the state 

courts the “substantial equivalent” of the claim presented in federal court. Picard v. 

Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 278, 92 S. Ct. 509, 513–14 (1971); Dickens v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 

1302, 1318-19 (9th Cir. 2014); Libberton v. Ryan, 583 F.3d 1147, 1164 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Full and fair presentation requires a petitioner to present the substance of his claim to the 

state courts, including a reference to a federal constitutional guarantee and a statement of 

facts that entitle the petitioner to relief. See Arrendondo, 763 F.3d at 1138; Gulbrandson 

v. Ryan, 738 F.3d 976, 992 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S.Ct. 2823 (2013); Scott v. 

Schriro, 567 F.3d 573, 582 (9th Cir. 2009); Lopez v. Schriro, 491 F.3d 1029, 1040 (9th 

Cir. 2007). Although a habeas petitioner need not recite “book and verse on the federal 

constitution” to fairly present a claim to the state courts, Picard, 404 U.S. at 277–78, 92 

S. Ct. at 512–13, they must do more than present the facts necessary to support the 

federal claim. See Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 366, 115 S.Ct. 887, 888 (1995) (“If a 

habeas petitioner wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied 

him the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must say so, 

not only in federal court, but in state court.”); Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6, 103 S. 

Ct. 276, 277 (1982).

A federal habeas petitioner has not exhausted a federal habeas claim if he still has 

the right to raise the claim “by any available procedure” in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(c). Because the exhaustion requirement refers only to remedies still available to the 

petitioner at the time they file their action for federal habeas relief, it is satisfied if the 

petitioner is procedurally barred from pursuing their claim in the state courts. See, e.g., 

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Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 92–93, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2387 (2006). If it is clear the 

habeas petitioner’s claim is procedurally barred pursuant to state law, the claim is 

exhausted by virtue of the petitioner’s “procedural default” of the claim. See, e.g., id., 

548 U.S. at 92, 126 S. Ct. at 2387.

Procedural default occurs when a petitioner has never presented a federal habeas 

claim in state court and is now barred from doing so by the state’s procedural rules, 

including rules regarding waiver and the preclusion of claims. See Castille, 489 U.S. at 

351–52, 109 S. Ct. at 1060. Procedural default also occurs when a petitioner did present 

a claim to the state courts, but the state courts did not address the merits of the claim 

because the petitioner failed to follow a state procedural rule. See, e.g., Ylst v. 

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 802, 111 S. Ct. 2590, 2594–95 (1991); Coleman v. 

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 727–28, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2553–57(1991); Szabo v. Walls, 313 

F.3d 392, 395 (7th Cir. 2002). “If a prisoner has defaulted a state claim by ‘violating a 

state procedural rule which would constitute adequate and independent grounds to bar 

direct review ... he may not raise the claim in federal habeas, absent a showing of cause 

and prejudice or actual innocence.’” Ellis v. Armenakis, 222 F.3d 627, 632 (9th Cir. 

2000), quoting Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d 1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 1994).

In Arizona, claims not previously presented to the state courts in either a direct 

appeal or on collateral review in an action for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, 

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, are generally barred from federal review because 

an attempt to return to state court to present them is futile unless the claims fit in a narrow 

category of claims for which a successive Rule 32 action is permitted. See Ariz. R. Crim. 

P. 32.1(d)–(h), 32.2(a) & (b) (successive petitions are limited to claims of being held in 

custody beyond sentence expiration, newly-discovered material facts, requests for 

delayed appeal, significant change in the law retroactively applicable that would probably 

overturn conviction or sentence, and actual innocence); Spreitz v. Ryan, 617 F. Supp. 2d 

887, 899–900 (D. Ariz. 2009).

For the procedural default rule to apply, “the application of the state 

procedural rule must provide an adequate and independent state law basis 

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on which the state court can deny relief.” Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 

580 (9th Cir. 2003) (amended) (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted). Arizona’s waiver rules are independent and adequate bases for 

denying relief. Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 859–60, 122 S.Ct. 2578, [] 

(2002) [] (holding denials pursuant to Arizona waiver rules are independent 

of federal law); Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 931–32 (9th Cir. 1998) 

(finding Arizona waiver rule consistently and regularly applied).

Hurles v. Ryan, 752 F.3d 768, 780 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 710 (2014).

To constitute an adequate and independent state procedural ground sufficient to 

support a state court’s finding of procedural default, “a state rule must be clear, 

consistently applied, and well-established at the time of [the] petitioner’s purported 

default.” Lambright v. Stewart, 241 F.3d 1201, 1203 (9th Cir. 2001). See also Murray v. 

Schriro, 745 F.3d 984, 1015-16 (9th Cir. 2014). A state rule is considered consistently 

applied and well-established if the state courts follow it in the “vast majority of cases.” 

Scott, 567 F.3d at 580, quoting Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 417 n.6, 109 S. Ct. 

1211, 1221 n.6 (1989). Additionally, for the proffered state procedural bar to preclude 

the consideration of a habeas claim “the state court must actually have relied on the 

procedural bar as an independent basis for its disposition of the case.” Caldwell v. 

Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 327, 105 S. Ct. 2633, 2638–39 (1985). See also Harris v. 

Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 261–62, 109 S. Ct. 1038, 1042 (1989).

“[A] procedural default does not bar consideration of a federal claim on 

either direct or habeas review unless the last state court rendering a 

judgment in the case clearly and expressly states that its judgment rests on a 

state procedural bar.” Harris, 489 U.S. at 263, 109 S.Ct. 1038, [ ].... Sanders 

v. Cotton, 398 F.3d 572, 580 (7th Cir. 2005) (where the state appellate 

court’s discussion of waiver is intertwined with its merits analysis, the state 

court’s decision does not rest on an independent and adequate state law 

ground)...

Pole v. Randolph, 570 F.3d 922, 937 (7th Cir. 2009) (some internal citations and 

quotations omitted). See also Scott, 567 F.3d at 581–82.

Because the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure regarding timeliness, waiver, 

and the preclusion of claims, which have been found to be consistently applied and wellCase 2:15-cv-00014-DGC Document 12 Filed 03/24/15 Page 9 of 14
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established, bar Petitioner from now returning to the state courts to exhaust any 

unexhausted federal habeas claims, Petitioner has exhausted, but procedurally defaulted, 

any claim not fairly presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals in his direct appeal or in 

his Rule 32 action. See Hurles, 752 F.3d at 780; Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 

665 (9th Cir. 2005); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002). See also

Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860, 122 S. Ct. 2578, 2581 (2002) (holding Arizona’s 

state rules regarding the waiver and procedural default of claims raised in attacks on 

criminal convictions are adequate and independent state grounds for affirming a 

conviction and denying federal habeas relief on the grounds of a procedural bar).

B. Cause and prejudice

The Court may consider the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if the 

petitioner establishes cause for their procedural default and prejudice arising from that 

default. “Cause” is a legitimate excuse for the petitioner’s procedural default of the claim 

and “prejudice” is actual harm resulting from the alleged constitutional violation. See 

Clabourne v. Ryan, 745 F.3d 362, 375 (9th Cir. 2014); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 

1123 (9th Cir. 1991). Under the “cause” prong of this test, Petitioner bears the burden of 

establishing that some objective factor external to the defense impeded his compliance 

with Arizona’s procedural rules. See Detrich v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1237, 1243-44 (9th Cir. 

2013); Ha Van Nguyen v. Curry, 736 F.3d 1287, 1292 (9th Cir. 2013). To establish 

prejudice, the petitioner must show that the alleged error “worked to his actual and 

substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional 

dimensions.” Detrich, 740 F.3d at 1243-44 (internal quotations omitted). 

Although both cause and prejudice must be shown to excuse a procedural default, 

the Court need not examine the existence of prejudice if the petitioner fails to establish 

cause. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n.43, 102 S. Ct. 1558, 1575 n.43 (1982); 

Thomas, 945 F.2d at 1123 n.10. Generally, a petitioner’s lack of legal expertise is not 

cause to excuse procedural default. See, e.g., Hughes v. Idaho State Bd. of Corr., 800 

F.2d 905, 908 (9th Cir. 1986). A state criminal defendant does not have a federal 

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constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel during state post-conviction 

proceedings. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555, 107 S. Ct. 1990, 

1993 (1987); Graves v. McEwen, 731 F.3d 876, 878 (9th Cir. 2013). Accordingly, the 

general rule is that errors of counsel during a state post-conviction action cannot 

constitute “cause” to excuse the procedural default of a federal habeas claim. See, e.g., 

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752, 111 S. Ct. at 2565; Clabourne, 745 F.3d at 374. However, the 

Supreme Court’s opinion in Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012), established a 

limited exception to this general rule, which exception applies only to Sixth Amendment 

ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Martinez held that inadequate assistance of 

post-conviction counsel or lack of counsel “at initial-review collateral review proceedings 

may establish cause for a prisoner’s procedural default of a claim of ineffective assistance 

at trial.” Id. at 1315. In Ha Van Nguyen v. Curry, 736 F.3d 1287 (9th Cir. 2013), the 

Ninth Circuit expanded Martinez, holding that this doctrine can also apply to excuse the 

procedural default of claims asserting ineffective assistance of direct appeal counsel.

Petitioner does not raise a claim that his Rule 32 attorneys’ performances were 

unconstitutionally ineffective, resulting in his procedural default of legitimate claims 

regarding his trial counsel’s performance. 

C. Fundamental miscarriage of justice

Review of the merits of a procedurally defaulted habeas claim is required if the 

petitioner demonstrates review of the merits of the claim is necessary to prevent a 

fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393, 124 S. Ct. 

1847, 1852 (2004); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316, 115 S. Ct. 851, 861 (1995); 

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485–86, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2649 (1986). A fundamental 

miscarriage of justice occurs only when a constitutional violation has probably resulted in 

the conviction of one who is factually innocent. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 485–86, 106 S. 

Ct. at 2649; Thomas v. Goldsmith, 979 F.2d 746, 749 (9th Cir. 1992) (showing of factual 

innocence is necessary to trigger manifest injustice relief). To satisfy the “fundamental 

miscarriage of justice” standard, a petitioner must establish by clear and convincing 

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evidence that no reasonable fact-finder could have found him guilty of the offenses 

charged. See Dretke, 541 U.S. at 393, 124 S. Ct. at 1852; Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 

832, 842–43 (9th Cir. 2001).

In his first Rule 32 action, Petitioner raised numerous claims, all of which were 

denied by the state trial court, other than his claim regarding the imposition of his 

sentences. Petitioner did not seek review of the state trial court’s denial of relief on his 

other claims by the Arizona Court of Appeals. Accordingly, none of the claims stated in 

Petitioner’s first Rule 32 action were “fairly presented” to the state’s “highest court” in a 

procedurally correct fashion. Additionally, with regard to Petitioner’s second Rule 32 

action, the state’s “highest court” found Petitioner’s claims were all precluded by a state 

procedural rule, i.e., the failure to present the claims themselves and supporting evidence 

and law in a single pleading before the appellate court, without referencing prior 

pleadings by incorporation. Therefore, Petitioner did not properly exhaust any actual or 

potential federal habeas claims in the state courts by fairly presenting them to the Arizona 

Court of Appeals in a procedurally correct manner. 

In reply to the answer to his petition, Petitioner asserts that he moved to represent 

himself in his criminal proceedings because counsel refused Petitioner’s demand to take 

his case to trial. Petitioner asserts that, although he was competent to stand trial, he was 

denied his right to self-representation, citing Faretta v. California. Petitioner further 

asserts that the trial judge was biased against Petitioner, in violation of his right to due 

process of law. Petitioner alleges that, in his second Rule 32 proceeding, the state did not 

challenge “Claim B” although this claim was denied by the state court. Petitioner 

contends that, because the state did not challenge this claim the state court could not 

properly deny the claim without explanation. Petitioner alleges that he established an 

“abuse of discretion and fraud by State Prosecutor” when seeking review by the Arizona 

Court of Appeals in his second Rule 32 action.

Petitioner notes that the Arizona Court of Appeals denied relief in his second Rule 

32 action and that the Arizona Supreme Court denied review in this matter on August 28, 

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2014, “exhausting all available state court remedies.” Petitioner maintains that, when he 

raised his claims in the state courts these claims were “ignored” and that the Arizona 

Court of Appeals held him to “an unreasonable standard” when denying his claims for 

relief. Petitioner asserts he “brought his claims to [the] Arizona courts in the manner 

prescribed by law,” and that he “was diligent and presented his claims to the best of his 

ability.” Petitioner argues that “state remedies available are ineffective.” Attached to the 

reply to the answer is one page of a transcript of proceedings conducted in the Maricopa 

County Superior Court on September 28, 2010, which states “...your motion to represent 

yourself is denied.” 

Petitioner has not shown cause for, nor prejudice arising from his procedural 

default of his habeas claims. Nor has Petitioner established his actual innocence of the 

crimes of conviction. Petitioner has not shown that a fundamental miscarriage of justice 

will occur absent consideration of the merits of his habeas claims. 

III Conclusion

Petitioner did not exhaust any of his federal habeas claims in the Arizona state 

courts by fairly presenting them as federal constitutional claims to the Arizona Court of 

Appeals in a procedurally correct manner. Petitioner has not shown cause for, nor 

prejudice arising from his procedural default of these claims. Therefore,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Mr. Barrientes’ petition seeking a writ of habeas 

corpus be denied and dismissed.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment.

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall have 

fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within 

which to file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the parties have 

fourteen (14) days within which to file a response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, 

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Local Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the District of 

Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not exceed seventeen (17) 

pages in length.

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate 

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna–Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal 

determinations of the Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to 

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law in an order or judgment 

entered pursuant to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, R. 11, the District Court must “issue or deny a 

certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” The 

undersigned recommends that, should the Report and Recommendation be adopted and, 

should Petitioner seek a certificate of appealability, a certificate of appealability should 

be denied because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.

 

Dated this 23rd day of March, 2015.

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