Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-5_18-cv-00302/USCOURTS-ared-5_18-cv-00302-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS 

CENTRAL DIVISION

DAVID ANDREW CARTER PLAINTIFF 

ADC #551314 

V. No. 5:18CV00302-DPM-JTR 

DARRYL GOLDEN, Warden, 

Delta Regional Unit, ADC, et al. DEFENDANTS 

RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION 

 The following Recommended Disposition has been sent to Chief United 

States District Judge D.P. Marshall Jr. You may file written objections to all or part 

of this Recommendation. If you do so, those objections must: (1) specifically explain 

the factual and/or legal basis for your objection; and (2) be received by the Clerk of 

this Court within fourteen (14) days of the date of this Recommendation. If you do 

not file objections, Judge Marshall can adopt this Recommendation without 

independently reviewing all of the evidence in the record. By not objecting, you may 

waive the right to appeal questions of fact.

I. Introduction 

 On November 29, 2018, Plaintiff David Andrew Carter (“Carter”) initiated 

this pro se § 1983 action. Doc. 2. On December 11, 2018, the Court struck Carter’s 

Complaint because it contained improperly joined claims, and instructed him to file 

a Substituted Complaint. Doc. 4. 

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 On December 18, 2018, Carter filed a Substituted Complaint. Doc. 5. After 

screening that pleading, the Court dismissed Carter’s claims against Defendants 

Warden Darryl Golden (“Golden”), Deputy Warden Linda Dykes (“Dykes”) and 

Major Percy Arnold (“Arnold”) in their official capacity, and his claim against 

Arkansas Division of Correction (“ADC”) Director Wendy Kelley. Docs. 7 & 8. 

 The surviving claims in the Substituted Complaint allege that, while Carter 

was a prisoner in the Delta Regional Unit, Defendants Golden, Dykes and Arnold 

violated his constitutional rights by: (1) refusing to move him from a cell where he 

was exposed to black mold and a toilet and sink that were leaking feces and urine; 

and (2) refusing to provide him with cleaning supplies to remedy his exposure to 

those unsanitary conditions.1

 

 Defendants have filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, a Brief in Support, 

and a Statement of Material Facts Not in Dispute, arguing that all of Carter’s claims 

should be dismissed because he failed to exhaust his available administrative 

remedies before initiating this action. Docs. 17-19. Although notified of his right to 

file a Response, Carter has not done so. See Doc. 20. Thus, the issues are joined and 

ready for disposition.2

 1

Carter alleges that he was only exposed to those unconstitutional conditions of 

confinement for five days, in November 2018. 

2

Summary judgment is appropriate when the record, viewed in a light most favorable to 

the nonmoving party, demonstrates that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. 

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II. Discussion 

 A. ADC Procedures Governing the Exhaustion of Administrative 

Remedies 

 The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires prisoners to exhaust all 

available administrative remedies before filing a § 1983 action: “No action shall be 

brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other 

Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility 

until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 

1997e(a). The purposes of the exhaustion requirement include “allowing a prison to 

address complaints about the program it administers before being subjected to suit, 

reducing litigation to the extent complaints are satisfactorily resolved, and 

improving litigation that does occur by leading to the preparation of a useful record.” 

Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 219 (2007). In Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85 

(2006), the Court held that the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement is “mandatory.” See 

also Muhammad v. Mayfield, 933 F.3d 993, 1000 (8th Cir. 2019). 

 The PLRA requires prisoners to: (1) fully and properly exhaust their available 

administrative remedies as to each claim in the complaint; and (2) complete the 

 

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 

(1986). The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine 

dispute of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Thereafter, the nonmoving party must present 

specific facts demonstrating that there is a material dispute for trial. See Fed R. Civ. P. 56(c); 

Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011). 

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exhaustion process before filing an action in federal court. Jones, 549 U.S. at 211, 

219-20, 223-24; Woodford,, 548 U.S. at 93-95; Burns v. Eaton, 752 F.3d 1136, 1141-

42 (8th Cir. 2014); Johnson v. Jones, 340 F.3d 624, 626-28 (8th Cir. 2003). 

Importantly, “it is the prison’s requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the 

boundaries of proper exhaustion.” Jones, 549 U.S. at 218; see also Woodford, 548 

U.S. at 90 (explaining that administrative exhaustion “means using all steps that the 

agency holds out, and doing so properly so that the agency addresses the issues on 

the merits”). Thus, to satisfy the PLRA, a prisoner must comply with the exhaustion 

requirements of the incarcerating facility before he can properly file a § 1983 action. 

 The ADC provides a three-step administrative grievance process. ADC Adm. 

Dir. 14-16 §§ IV(E)-(G) (“AD 14-16”).3

 “If no one responds at Steps One and Two 

– or if the responses at those steps are dissatisfactory – an inmate may appeal to the 

level of ADC’s ‘Chief Deputy/Deputy/Assistant Director’ at Step Three.” 

Muhammad, 933 F.3d at 997-98. 

 The ADC administrative grievance policy requires that, in connection with 

each claim, a prisoner must “specifically name each individual involved,” and 

include a “brief statement that is specific as to the substance of the issue or complaint

to include the date, place [and] personnel involved or witnesses.” AD 14-16 § 

 3

Defendants submitted a copy of AD 14-16 with their summary judgment papers. Doc. 17, 

Ex. A-1. 

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IV(C)(4) & (E)(2) (emphasis added). The grievance forms themselves contain these 

instructions to ensure prisoners are aware of them. AD 14-16, Att. 1 (“[B]e specific 

as to the complaint, date and place, name of personnel involved and how you were 

affected.”). Finally, the ADC’s policy cautions prisoners that, if they fail to “exhaust 

their administrative remedies as to all defendants at all levels of the grievance 

procedure ... their lawsuits or claims may be dismissed immediately” under the 

PLRA. AD 14-16 § IV(N); see also § IV(C)(4) & (D)(2) (both advising inmates to 

fully exhaust a grievance prior to filing a lawsuit). 

B. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment 

 Carter has not contested any of the facts contained in Defendants’ Statement 

of Material Facts Not in Dispute (Doc. 19). Accordingly, all of those facts are 

deemed to be undisputed. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (“If a party ... fails to properly 

address another party’s assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may ... 

consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion.”); Jackson v. Ark. Dep't of 

Educ. Vocational & Technical Div., 272 F.3d 1020, 1027 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing 

Local Rule 56.1(c) in concluding that the plaintiff “forfeited her ability to contest 

the facts presented” by defendant by failing to respond to defendant’s summary 

judgment motion). 

 In their summary judgment papers, Defendants contend that, before initiating 

this lawsuit, on November 29, 2018, Carter did not fully exhaust any grievances 

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naming them in connection with allegedly unsanitary or unsafe conditions in his cell. 

Docs. 17-18. In support of their Motion, Defendants submit: (1) an Affidavit, dated 

August 7, 2019, from Terri Grigsby-Brown, the ADC’s Inmate Grievance 

Coordinator, Doc. 17, Ex. A; (2) Carter’s Grievance No. DR-18-00724, id., Ex. A-2; 

and (3) a list of grievances that Carter filed between 2012 and June 2019, id., Ex. A3. 

 Carter filed only one grievance that is relevant to his remaining claims: DR18-00724. Doc. 17, Ex. A ¶¶ 9-10; Doc. 19 ¶ 11. On November 9, 2018, Carter filed 

a Step One informal resolution complaining of “bad leaking sewage from under [his] 

toilet/sink” and “black mold and mold from the moisture.” Doc. 17, Ex. A-2 at 1. 

The grievance did not specifically name anyone. On November 11, 2018, a nonparty officer responded: “Maint[enance] Request submitted about leaking toilet.” 

The same day, Carter proceed to Step Two and filed Grievance DR-18-00724, which 

only stated the following: “That [repairing the sink and toilet] did not take care of 

the mold issue which is hazardous and not a healthy environment.” Id. 

Because Carter did not name anyone in DR-18-00724, it was procedurally 

flawed and subject to dismissal on that ground. However, on November 19, 2018, 

Defendant Dykes, as Deputy Warden, denied the grievance on the merits: 

You were advised in Step One of this grievance that the Maintenance 

Department was notified. Information received indicates that this 

matter was checked by the Maintenance Department on 11-14-18, and 

it was found to be an issue with the sink. In addition, records show that 

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you were reassigned to another cell on 11-13-18. Therefore, your 

grievance is without merit. Also, you should address one complaint for 

each grievance. 

Id. at 2. By “declin[ing] to enforce [the ADC’s] own procedural requirements [about 

naming specific individuals] and opt[ing] to consider [Carter’s] otherwise-defaulted 

claims on the merits,” the procedural flaw was waived, thereby satisfying the 

exhaustion requirement. Burns, 752 F.3d at 1141; see Hammett v. Cofield, 681 F.3d 

945, 947-48 (8th Cir. 2012) (exhaustion requirement is satisfied if prison officials 

decide a procedurally flawed grievance on the merits). 

 On November 20, 2018, Carter proceeded to Step Three and appealed the 

grievance to the ADC Deputy Director. In his appeal, Carter claimed he was “in an 

unsafe and unhealthy environment after notify[ing] staff for over 5 days before being 

placed in a different cell finally.” Doc. 17, Ex. A-2 at 2. 

On November 29, 2018, before he obtained a Step Three decision from the 

ADC Deputy Director, Carter initiated this action. Over five weeks later, on January 

8, 2019, the ADC Deputy Director entered his Step Three decision affirming 

Defendant Dykes’s decision denying Carter’s grievance. Id. at 3, & Ex. A-3. 

 Because Carter did not complete “exhaustion ... at the time of filing, dismissal 

is mandatory.” Johnson, 340 F.3d at 627 (emphasis added); see also Mosley v. 

Correctional Care Solutions, 671 F. App’x 401, 402 (8th Cir. 2016) (dismissal for 

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failure to exhaust was proper where prisoner “filed a pertinent grievance that was 

ultimately exhausted after he initiated this [§ 1983] action”).4

 

 It is undisputed that Carter did not complete the exhaustion of DR-18-00724 

until five weeks after he initiated this action. Thus, dismissal of Carter’s claims is 

“mandatory” based on his failure to fully exhaust DR-18-00724 before he initiated 

this action. See Jones, 549 U.S. at 211 (“There is no question that exhaustion is 

mandatory under the PLRA and that unexhausted claims cannot be brought in 

court.”); Johnson, 340 F.3d at 626-28. Accordingly, this action should be dismissed 

in its entirety, without prejudice. 

III. Conclusion

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT Defendants’ Motion for 

Summary Judgment (Doc. 17) be GRANTED, and Carter’s § 1983 claims against 

all Defendants be DISMISSED, without prejudice. 

DATED this 10th day of February, 2020. 

 ___________________________________ 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

 4

In his initial Complaint, Carter asserted that, in his first attempts to mail his Step Three 

appeal to the ADC Deputy Director, the mail room “rejected it and kept sending it back,” which 

required him to resubmit it. Doc. 2 at 4-6. By the time he filed his Substituted Complaint, on 

December 18, 2018, Carter acknowledged that he had successfully mailed his Step Three appeal 

“to the Director for the final step.” Doc. 5 at 5. Regardless of when the ADC Deputy Director 

received Carter’s Step Three appeal of his grievance, it is undisputed that he reached and decided 

the appeal on the merits on January 8, 2019, without questioning whether Carter’s appeal was 

timely. Doc. 17, Ex. A-2 at 3.

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