Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02837/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-02837-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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                       14‐CV‐2837

    

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ERIC G. CAMPBELL,

 Petitioner, 

v. 

MACK JENKINS, et al., 

 Respondents. 

 

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Civil No. 14-CV-2837-WVG 

 

ORDER DENYING FIRST 

AMENDED PETITON FOR WRIT 

OF HABEAS CORPUS 

[DOC. NO. 4]

I. 

INTRODUCTION

Eric G. Campbell (“Petitioner”), has filed a First Amended Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his jury conviction 

for one count of felony resisting an executive officer under California Penal Code § 69, 

and one count of misdemeanor resisting an officer under California Penal Code § 

148(a)(1)). (Doc. No. 4; Lodgment 2 at 94–95.) Petitioner asserts two grounds for relief, 

both of which were raised on direct appeal in state court. (Doc. No. 4 at 2, 6–9; 

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Lodgment 3.) Respondent’s Answer concedes that the Petition is timely and that 

Petitioner properly exhausted both of his claims in state court. (Doc. No. 14 at 2.) 

On January 8, 2016, upon consent of all parties, the Honorable Cynthia A. 

Bashant, United States District Judge, referred this case to the undersigned to conduct 

all proceedings and order entry of a final judgment. (Doc. No. 16.) This Court has 

considered the Petition, Respondent’s Answer, and all supporting documents submitted 

by the parties. Based upon the documents and evidence presented in this case, and for 

the reasons set forth below, the Court hereby DENIES the Petition. 

II. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact and presumes them to be 

correct unless Petitioner rebuts the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing 

evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 35-36 (1992) 

(holding that findings of fact, including inferences properly drawn from these facts, are 

entitled to statutory presumption of correctness). The following facts are substantially 

taken from the California Court of Appeal’s opinion on Petitioner’s direct appeal, 

affirming the judgment of the trial court. (See Lodgment No. 6 at 3–9.) 

A. Prosecution Evidence 

San Diego County Sheriff’s Deputy Frank Leyva responded to a call about a house 

party with more than 200 teenagers and underage adults drinking and smoking. Deputy 

Leyva and other deputies briefly staged nearby and then drove to the house. Parked cars 

lined the entire street. Deputy Leyva stopped in front of the house, got out of his patrol 

car, and approached the house. He heard kids yelling, screaming, and partying in the 

backyard. He flashed his flashlight in the backyard and the partygoers scattered. As 

they scattered, some of them remarked, “F-k you[]. F-k the cops.” 

About 20 to 30 minutes later, the partygoers began leaving in mass while 

continually calling out, “F--k you. F--k you pigs.” Deputy Leyva started directing traffic 

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                       14-CV-2837

in front of the house. While he was doing so, a young man shouted from the driveway, 

“F-k you, f-k the cops.” Deputy Leyva approached the young man, who ran into the 

backyard. Deputies Leyva and Dylan Haddad followed him. There they saw Petitioner 

yelling at Deputy Jessica Charles. Deputy Charles asked Petitioner if he was the 

homeowner because he appeared to be the oldest person at the party. She also asked him 

why he was the only adult at a high school party. Petitioner responded, “You are a c-t.” 

She told him he was “being worthless” and walked away with a man she had previously 

detained for throwing a beer bottle at her feet and saying, “F you. Get away from me. 

It’s my f’in house.” 

 Deputy Haddad approached Petitioner after hearing his remark to Deputy Charles. 

Petitioner said, “F--k you, pigs. Go get a donut.” Petitioner’s eyes were bloodshot, his 

speech was slurred, and Deputy Haddad could smell alcohol on him from five feet away. 

Petitioner turned and walked into his basement apartment, slamming the door shut 

behind him. He yelled something like, “F-k you guys. Kick the door in. You already 

gave me a $500 ticket.” 

 Deputy Leyva resumed directing traffic in front of the house. A short while later, a 

car drove up. Deputy Leyva stopped the car about 25 yards from the house. The driver 

said she was Petitioner’s girlfriend and was going to Petitioner’s home. About then, 

Petitioner, who was six feet tall and weighed about 180 pounds, jogged toward Deputy 

Leyva, yelling and screaming, “F-k you. That’s my f--king girlfriend. She will park 

wherever the f-k she wants.” Deputy Leyva could smell alcohol on Petitioner. 

 Petitioner pointed his right hand at Deputy Leyva who could see something white 

in it, but did not know what the object was and did not know whether Petitioner was 

armed. Deputy Leyva commanded Petitioner to stop three times. Petitioner did not 

acknowledge or comply with these commands. Instead, he continued to yell statements 

like, “[F]--k you, f--k off, that’s my f--king girlfriend. She can park wherever the f--k 

she wants. Let her go. She hasn’t done anything.” 

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                       14-CV-2837

 Deputy Leyva thought he would have to move to avoid being trampled, but 

Petitioner slowed to a walk as he neared Deputy Leyva. Intending to detain Petitioner 

for failing to listen to him and to get him out of the street, Deputy Leyva reached for 

Petitioner’s raised hand and told him to put his hands behind his back. However, before 

Deputy Leyva could get a solid grip on Petitioner’s hand, Petitioner pulled away. Deputy 

Leyva did not know whether Petitioner would try to strike, punch, or tackle him. Deputy 

Leyva stepped aside, grabbed Petitioner’s shirt or arm, and pushed Petitioner forward. 

Petitioner ended up on the hood of his girlfriend’s car. Deputy Leyva told Petitioner to 

put his hands behind his back. When Petitioner did not comply, Deputy Leyva reached 

for Petitioner’s right wrist. As Deputy Leyva did so, Petitioner tucked his arms 

underneath himself trapping Deputy Leyva’s right hand in the process. 

 Deputy Leyva felt vulnerable because he did not know Petitioner or his girlfriend 

and his girlfriend’s car was running. Deputy Leyva grabbed Petitioner with his left hand, 

pulled Petitioner off the hood, and tossed him into the street. Their feet became 

entangled and Deputy Leyva, who was 5 feet 10 inches tall and weighed approximately 

275 pounds with his vest, belt, and other equipment on, fell on top of Petitioner on the 

asphalt. Deputy Leyva’s right hand remained trapped underneath Petitioner. Although 

Deputy Leyva was eventually able to free his right hand, Petitioner continued to ignore 

Deputy Leyva’s verbal commands to stop resisting and to put his arms behind his back. 

 Deputy Haddad saw Deputy Leyva struggling with Petitioner and ran to assist. 

Petitioner was lying face down with his hands under his body, swinging his arms in a 

forceful manner and thrashing his body. Deputy Haddad, who was 5 feet 6 inches tall 

and weighed about 160 pounds, kneeled on Petitioner’s left side and delivered two knee 

strikes. Petitioner continued moving his head from left to right and attempted to stand 

up. Deputy Haddad pushed him back to the ground. Petitioner ignored the deputies’ 

commands to stop resisting and show his hands, and they still did not know then whether 

he had any weapons. 

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                       14-CV-2837

 At some point, Deputy Leyva punched Petitioner in the shoulder and was able to 

get Petitioner’s left hand behind his back. Deputy Leyva removed an object from 

Petitioner’s hand and tossed it to the side. A third deputy struck Petitioner’s shoulder 

blade with a flashlight to get Petitioner to move his right hand from under his stomach 

to behind his back. When the flashlight strikes were unsuccessful, the deputy stunned 

Petitioner with an electroshock weapon. 

 After the deputies handcuffed Petitioner and rolled him over, Deputy Leyva noticed 

Petitioner’s forehead was bleeding. Deputies Leyva and Haddad walked Petitioner to 

the patrol car and, when they reached it, Petitioner tensed up, pushed off the back of the 

car, and slammed his body into Deputy Haddad. Deputy Haddad gave Petitioner’s left 

thigh two knee strikes and Petitioner got into the car. 

 Deputy Haddad drove Petitioner to the hospital, where hospital staff used staples to 

close an approximately one-inch laceration on Petitioner’s forehead. Deputy Leyva only 

sustained a minor cut on one of his fingers. Deputy Leyva described Petitioner’s level 

of resistance that night as an eight on a scale of one to ten, with ten being the highest. 

 A neighbor saw Petitioner handcuffed in the driveway, heard the deputies 

repeatedly ask him to stay on the ground, and saw him repeatedly trying to get up. The 

neighbor also heard Petitioner yelling for his girlfriend to “videotape this.” Nothing 

about the deputies’ behavior caused the neighbor to want to complain about them. 

 The teenage party hostess saw Petitioner running toward his girlfriend’s car with a 

red camcorder and throw it in the car. The hostess did not see overly forceful conduct 

by the deputies toward the partygoers. 

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                       14-CV-2837

 When Petitioner returned home the next day, he told the hostess he was going to 

sue her and her parents and asked her to pay his bail. He also asked her to provide a 

statement and to find three friends who would write statements indicating the deputies 

attacked him and he did not assault a deputy. He told her it would be better if her friends 

did not know him, it did not matter whether they attended the party, and they would not 

have to testify in court. 

 A sheriff’s lieutenant testified as an expert in the use of force. He explained what 

the phrase “use of force” meant and some of the force options available to deputies, 

depending on the circumstances. In response to hypothetical questions mirroring the 

facts of this case, he opined the deputies’ escalating use of force was reasonable. 

B. Defense Evidence 

 Petitioner testified that he spoke with two deputies at the party and told them he 

lived at the home. When one of the deputies commented that he looked too old for the 

party, Petitioner responded that he was not part of the party and went back to his 

apartment, which was on the lower level in the rear of the house. As he was entering the 

apartment, he encountered Deputy Leyva, who asked him who he was and what he was 

doing. He ignored Deputy Leyva because he had already spoken with another deputy 

and did not feel he could be of further assistance. After entering his apartment, he shut, 

not slammed, the door behind him. He then talked on the phone with his girlfriend. 

When his girlfriend told him she was coming up the street, Petitioner told her he 

would meet her. He walked to a neighbor’s driveway and saw her in her car answering 

Deputy Leyva’s questions. Because her English was not “real good,” Petitioner put his 

hand up, pointed to the car, and said, “Officer, that’s my girlfriend.” “Can I help her 

park her car?” Deputy Leyva asked him, “Who are you?” Petitioner replied, “I’m the 

guy who lives down in the back of the house.” Deputy Leyva responded, “Oh. Come 

out here. I can’t see you.” 

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                       14-CV-2837

 Petitioner walked toward his girlfriend’s car. He did not have anything in his hands. 

Petitioner met Deputy Leyva in front of the car and Deputy Leyva grabbed his right 

wrist, twisted him around, and pushed him onto the hood. Petitioner asked Deputy 

Leyva, “Why are you doing this to me? I didn’t do anything wrong?” As Deputy Leyva 

elbowed Petitioner in the back and started handcuffing Petitioner, Deputy Leyva 

responded, “I’ll teach you to slam the door in my face.” Petitioner denied spitting, 

swearing, or trying to kick Deputy Leyva, but acknowledged that he probably squirmed 

to readjust the handcuffs. 

 Deputy Leyva moved Petitioner from the hood of the car to the ground. Deputy 

Leyva then sat on Petitioner, and hit Petitioner’s back and shoulders with his fist. Deputy 

Leyva or a second officer hit Petitioner’s head and shoulders with a flashlight. Petitioner 

then received 15 seconds of electric shock to his side. Petitioner screamed, “I’m still,” 

four times before the deputies stopped. He felt like he had almost been killed. 

 Two of the deputies picked him up and carried him to a patrol car because he could 

not stand up. When they got to the car, they hit his knees a few times and then threw 

him into the back of the car. 

 Petitioner said he had had a couple of beers that evening, but he was not drunk. He 

denied asking the teenage party hostess to find people to fabricate statements, but he 

admitted asking her for bail money. He believed she was responsible for what had 

happened to him because she hosted the party. 

 Petitioner’s girlfriend also testified and essentially corroborated Petitioner’s version 

of events. She estimated that the deputies hit Petitioner between 25 and 30 times. She 

did not see Petitioner spit at, punch, hit, or kick the deputies at any time. 

(Lodgment No. 6 at 2–8.) 

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                       14-CV-2837

III. 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner is currently serving three years of formal probation after a jury convicted 

him of one count of felony resisting an executive officer (count 1, Cal. Penal Code § 69), 

and one count of misdemeanor resisting an officer (count 2, Cal. Penal Code § 

148(a)(1)). (Lodgment 2 at 94-95, 144.) 

On December 4, 2013, Petitioner filed a direct appeal in the California Court of 

Appeal, Fourth District, Division One claiming that (1) there was insufficient evidence 

to convict him of the felony charge, (2) the trial court committed instructional error under 

state law, and (3) the trial court abused its discretion in denying Petitioner’s motion to 

reduce his felony conviction to a misdemeanor. (Lodgments 3, 4, 5.) On August 5, 

2014, the appellate court affirmed the superior court’s judgment in a written decision. 

(Lodgment 6.) 

Petitioner sought review from the California Supreme Court raising the same 

claims. (Lodgment 7.) On October 15, 2014, the state supreme court denied review. 

(Lodgment 8.) In his instant Petition, Petitioner again raises the first two claims 

described above. 

IV. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

This Petition is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 

1996 (“AEDPA”) because it was filed after April 24, 1996, and Petitioner is in custody 

pursuant to the judgment of a state court. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 

(1997). Under AEDPA, a court may not grant a habeas petition “with respect to any 

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings,” 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(d), unless the state court’s judgment “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, 

or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” § 2254(d)(1), or “was based on 

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an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State 

court proceeding,” § 2254(d)(2). 

A federal habeas court may grant relief under the “contrary to” clause “if ‘the state 

court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases.’” 

Andrews v. Davis, 798 F.3d 759, 774 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 

U.S. 362, 405, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000)). The court may grant relief 

under the “unreasonable application” clause if the state court correctly identified the 

governing legal principle from Supreme Court decisions but unreasonably applied those 

decisions to the facts of a particular case. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694, 122 S.Ct. 

1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002). However, “an unreasonable application of Supreme 

Court precedent is not one that is merely ‘incorrect or erroneous’ [citation omitted], 

rather, ‘the pivotal question is whether the state court’s application of the relevant 

Supreme Court precedent was unreasonable.’” Andrews, 798 F.3d at 774 (quoting 

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003) and 

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101, 131 S.Ct. 770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011)) 

(emphasis in original). Precedent is not “clearly established” law under section 

2254(d)(1) “unless it ‘squarely addresses the issue’ in the case before the state court 

[citation omitted] or ‘establishes a legal principal that clearly extends’ to the case before 

the state court.” Id. at 773 (quoting Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 125-26, 128 

S.Ct. 743, 169 L.Ed.2d 583 (2008); Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 754 (9th Cir. 2008)). 

In deciding a habeas petition, a federal court is not called upon to decide whether 

it agrees with the state court’s determination. Rather, Section 2254(d) “sets forth a 

‘highly deferential standard, which demands that state-court decisions be given the 

benefit of the doubt.’” Id. at 774 (quoting Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 1398, 131 

S.Ct. 1388, 179 L.Ed.2d 557 (2011)). While not a complete bar on the relitigation of 

claims already rejected in state court proceedings, Section 2254(d) merely ‘“preserves 

authority to issue the writ in cases where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could 

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disagree that the state court’s decision conflicts with [Supreme Court precedent]’ and 

‘goes no further.’” Id. (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 102). 

Where there is no reasoned decision from the highest state court to which the 

claim was presented, the court “looks through” to the last reasoned state court decision 

and presumes it provides the basis for the higher court’s denial of a claim or claims. See 

Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 805-06, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d 706 (1991); 

Cannedy v. Adams, 706 F.3d 1148, 1156 (9th Cir. 2013), as amended on denial of 

rehearing, 733 F.3d 794 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, − U.S. −, 134 S.Ct. 1001, 187 

L.Ed.2d 863 (2014). If the dispositive state court does not furnish an explanation for its 

decision, a federal habeas court must “engage in an independent review of the record 

and ascertain whether the state court’s decision was objectively unreasonable.” Murray 

v. Schriro, 745 F.3d 984, 996 (9th Cir. 2014). However, a state court need not cite 

Supreme Court precedent when resolving a habeas corpus claim. See Early v. Packer, 

537 U.S. 3, 8, 123 S.Ct. 362, 154 L.Ed.2d 263 (2002). “[S]o long as neither the reasoning 

nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts [Supreme Court precedent,]” the 

state court decision will not be “contrary to” clearly established federal law. Id. Clearly 

established federal law, for purposes of Section 2254(d), means “the governing principle 

or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its 

decision.” Andrade, 538 U.S. at 72. Ninth Circuit cases may be persuasive authority for 

purposes of determining whether a particular state court decision is an unreasonable 

application of Supreme Court law and may be relevant to determining what Supreme 

Court law is clearly established. See Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600 (9th Cir. 

2000). 

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V. 

DISCUSSION

Petitioner’s two grounds for relief are as follows: (1) the trial court prejudicially 

erred by failing to sua sponte instruct the jury on what constitutes a lawful detention and 

arrest; and (2) his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process was violated because 

there was insufficient evidence to convict him of the felony offense of resisting an 

executive officer. (Doc. No. 4 at 6-7.) 

Respondents argue that the California Court of Appeal reasonably rejected both 

of Petitioner’s claims. (Doc. No. 14 at 2.) They argue that Petitioner’s instructional 

error claim involves a state court’s application of state law and, therefore, does not 

present an issue for federal review. (Doc. No. 14 at 2; citing Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 

U.S. 74, 76 (2005).) Respondents also contend that, even assuming that the trial court 

erred, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on the instructional error claim because 

his trial and resulting sentence were fair. (Doc. No. 14 at 2.) As for his insufficient 

evidence claim, Respondents assert that Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief because 

the state court’s decision was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, 

clearly established United States Supreme Court precedent. (Doc. No. 14-1 at 19.) 

A. Jury Instruction 

Instructional error warrants federal habeas relief only if the “ailing instruction by 

itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.” 

Waddington v. Sarausad, 555 U.S. 179, 191 (2009); Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 

437 (2004) (per curiam). The instruction must be more than merely erroneous; rather, a 

petitioner must show there was a “reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the 

challenged instruction in a way that violates the Constitution.” McNeil, 541 U.S. at 437 

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Sarausad, 555 U.S. at 190–91; see also 

Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146 (1973) (“Before a federal court may overturn a 

conviction resulting from a state trial in which [an allegedly faulty] instruction was used, 

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it must be established not merely that the instruction is undesirable, erroneous or even 

‘universally condemned,’ but that it violated some right which was guaranteed to the 

defendant by the Fourteenth Amendment.”). Further, “[i]t is well established that the 

instruction ‘may not be judged in artificial isolation,’ but must be considered in the 

context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 

62, 72 (1991) (citation omitted); Sarausad, 555 U.S. at 191. Moreover, if a constitutional 

error occurred, federal habeas relief remains unwarranted unless the error caused 

prejudice, i.e., unless it had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining 

the jury’s verdict. Hedgpeth v. Pulido, 555 U.S. 57, 58 (2008) (per curiam) (citing Brecht 

v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993)). 

In his first claim, Petitioner alleges that the trial court prejudicially erred when it 

failed to sua sponte instruct the jury with two specific sections of CALCRIM No. 2670, 

“Lawful Performance: Peace Officer.” (Doc. No. 4 at 6.) Those two specific sections 

of CALCRIM No. 2670 elaborate on what constitutes a lawful detention and arrest. 

Respondents contend that alleged state law error does not provide a basis for habeas 

relief, and that the jury was instructed in a manner consistent with Constitutional 

requirements. (Doc. No. 14-1 at 12–13.) 

1. California Court of Appeal’s Opinion 

 The California Court of Appeal rejected Petitioner’s instructional error claim, 

concluding: 

 While there were allusions during the trial to Deputy Leyva’s 

actions possibly amounting to an unlawful detention and/or arrest, the 

indisputable focus of the trial was on whether Deputy Leyva and the 

other deputies used excessive force against Petitioner. Assuming, 

without deciding, the court should have nonetheless instructed the jury 

with the sections of CALCRIM No. 2670 addressing unlawful 

detention and arrest, we conclude any error was harmless under both 

the state miscarriage of justice standard (People v. Watson (1956) 46 

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Cal.2d 818, 836-837) and the federal harmless beyond a reasonable 

doubt standard (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24). 

The jury knew from the instructions given it had to find Petitioner 

not guilty if Deputy Leyva had unlawfully detained or arrested 

Petitioner. Although the court did not elaborate on what constituted an 

unlawful detention or arrest, the parties’ presentation of diametrically 

opposing versions of events precluded the jury from finding for 

Petitioner under either theory unless the jury credited Petitioner’s 

version of events. The jury necessarily rejected Petitioner’s version of 

events when the jury rejected the theory the deputies acted with 

excessive force. Accordingly, we conclude both that it is not 

reasonably probable Petitioner would have obtained a more favorable 

result absent the claimed error and that the record establishes beyond a 

reasonable doubt the claimed error did not contribute to the guilty 

verdict. (See People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 505.) 

(Lodgment 6 at 15–16.) 

2. Analysis 

Petitioner was convicted of felony resisting an executive officer pursuant to 

California Penal Code Section 69. Section 69 sets forth two separate ways in which an 

offense can be committed. Cal. Penal Code § 69. The first way of violating Section 69 

encompasses attempts to deter either an officer’s immediate performance of a duty 

imposed by law or the officer’s performance of such a duty at some time in the future. 

People v. Smith, 57 Cal.4th 232, 240 (2013). The second way of violating Section 69 

expressly requires that the defendant resist the officer “by the use of force or violence,” 

and it further requires that the officer was acting lawfully at the time of the offense. 

Smith, 57 Cal.4th at 241. Here, both parties agree that the jury convicted Petitioner 

under the second theory, resisting an officer by force. (Lodgment 6 at 11.) 

At Petitioner’s trial, the court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 2652, 

“Resisting an Executive Officer in Performance of Duty,” and stated that the crime of 

felony resisting an executive officer required proof that “[w]hen the defendant acted, the 

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officer was performing his lawful duty.” (Doc. No. 15-3 at 192, 3 RT 454.) The court 

elaborated by instructing1

 that: 

[a] peace officer is not lawfully performing his or her duties if he 

or she is unlawfully arresting or detaining someone or using 

unreasonable or excessive force in his or her duties. Instruction 2670 

explains when an arrest or detention is unlawful and when force is 

unreasonable or excessive. 

 (Doc. No. 15-3 at 193, 3 RT 455, citing CALCRIM No. 2652.) 

The court used a modified version of CALCRIM No. 2670 to instruct the jury on 

excessive force, stating: 

The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable 

doubt that Leyva, Haddad and Boisseranc were lawfully performing 

their duties as peace officers. If the People have not met this burden, 

you must find the defendant not guilty of resisting an executive officer 

or resisting a peace officer. 

A peace officer is not lawfully performing his or her duties if he 

or she is unlawfully arresting or detaining someone or using 

unreasonable or excessive force when making or attempting to make an 

otherwise lawful arrest or detention. 

Special rules control the use of force. 

A peace officer may use reasonable force to arrest or detain 

someone, to prevent escape, to overcome resistance, or in self-defense. 

If a person knows, or reasonably should know, that a peace 

officer is arresting or detaining him or her, the person must not use force 

or any weapon to resist an officer’s use of reasonable force. However, 

you may not find the defendant guilty of resisting arrest if the arrest was 

                                                            

1

  The trial court provided substantially similar instructions on the misdemeanor crime of 

resisting an officer, using CALCRIM No. 2656. (Doc. No. 15-3 at 193–94, 3 RT 455–

56.) 

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unlawful, even if the defendant knew or reasonably should have known 

that the officer was arresting him. 

If a peace officer uses unreasonable or excessive force while 

arresting or attempting to arrest or detaining or attempting to detain a 

person, that person may lawfully use reasonable force to defend himself 

or herself. 

A person being arrested uses reasonable force when he or she: (1) 

uses that degree of force that he or she actually believes is reasonably 

necessary to protect himself or herself from the officer’s use of 

unreasonable or excessive force; and (2) uses no more force than a 

reasonable person in the same situation would believe is necessary for 

his or her protection. 

(Doc. No. 15-3 at 195–96, 3 RT 457-458.) 

 The court also instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 2672, “Lawful Performance: 

Unlawful Arrest With Force,” stating: 

 The defendant is not guilty of the crime of resisting an executive 

officer or resisting a peace officer if the officer was not lawfully 

performing his duties because he was unlawfully arresting someone. 

 

 However, even if the arrest was unlawful, as long as the officer 

used only reasonable force to accomplish the arrest, the defendant may 

be guilty of the lesser crime of battery or assault. 

 

 On the other hand, if the officer used unreasonable or excessive 

force, and the defendant used only reasonable force in self-defense, 

then the defendant is not guilty of the lesser crimes of battery or assault. 

 

 The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable 

doubt that the officer was lawfully performing his duties. If the People 

have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of 

resisting an executive officer or resisting a peace officer. 

(Doc. No. 15-3 at 196–97, 3 RT 458-459.) 

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 The court also instructed the jury that, “[t]he duties of a peace officer include 

responding to dispatch calls regarding noise complaints, crowd control, and keeping the 

peace.” CALCRIM No. 2656, “Resisting a Peace Officer; Doc. No. 15-3 at 193, 3 RT 

455. 

At issue in this Petition is the trial court’s adaptation of CALCRIM No. 2670, which 

omitted Section A, “Unlawful Detention,” and Section B, “Unlawful Arrest.” Section 

A states: “A peace officer may legally detain someone if [the person consents to the 

detention or if]: 1. Specific facts known or apparent to the officer lead him or her to 

suspect that the person to be detained has been, is, or is about to be involved in activity 

relating to crime; AND 2. A reasonable officer who knew the same facts would have the 

same suspicion. Any other detention is unlawful. In deciding whether the detention was 

lawful, consider evidence of the officer’s training and experience and all the 

circumstances known by the officer when he or she detained the person.” CALCRIM 

No. 2670. 

Section B states: “A peace officer may legally arrest someone [either] (on the basis 

of an arrest warrant/ [or] if he or she has probable cause to make the arrest). Any other 

arrest is unlawful. Probable cause exists when the facts known to the arresting officer 

at the time of the arrest would persuade someone of reasonable caution that the person 

to be arrested has committed a crime. In deciding whether the arrest was lawful, consider 

evidence of the officer’s training and experience and all the circumstances known by the 

officer when he or she arrested the person.” CALCRIM No. 2670. 

The bench notes for CALCRIM No. 2670 state that a court should include Section 

A in its jury instructions “if there is an issue as to whether the officer had a legal basis 

to detain someone,” and Section B should be included “if there is an issue as to whether 

the officer had a legal basis to arrest someone.” CALCRIM No. 2670, Bench Notes. 

 Although neither party specifically requested that the court instruct the jury with 

Sections A and B of CALCRIM No. 2670, Petitioner contends that the court 

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prejudicially erred by failing to do so sua sponte.

2

 (Doc. No. 4 at 6.) “ ‘It is settled that 

in criminal cases, even in the absence of a request, the trial court must instruct on the 

general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence...The general 

principles of law governing the case are those principles closely and openly connected 

with the facts before the court, and which are necessary for the jury’s understanding of 

the case.’ ” People v. Smith, 57 Cal.4th at 239, quoting People v. St. Martin, 1 Cal.3d 

524, 531 (1970). 

Under California law, “ ‘when a statute makes it a crime to commit any act against 

a peace officer engaged in the performance of his or her duties, part of the corpus delicti 

of the offense is that the officer was acting lawfully at the time the offense was 

committed.’ ” People v. Cruz, 44 Cal.4th 636, 673 (2008), quoting People v. Jenkins,

22 Cal.4th 900, 1020 (2000). A trial court is required to sua sponte instruct the jury on 

this issue if there is sufficient evidence that the officer was not lawfully performing his 

or her duties. People v. Olguin, 119 Cal.App.3d 39, 46 (1981); White, 101 Cal.App.3d 

at 167; see also CALCRIM No. 2670, Bench Notes (“The court has a sua sponte duty to 

give this instruction if there is sufficient evidence that the officer was not lawfully 

performing his or her duties and lawful performance is an element of the offense.”). 

The state appellate court chose not to decide whether the trial court erred by failing 

to instruct the jury with Sections A and B of CALCRIM No. 2670. However, the 

appellate court concluded that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 

because the jury knew from the instructions given that it must find Petitioner not guilty 

if Deputy Leyva had unlawfully detained or arrested him. (Lodgment 6 at 16.) The 

appellate court also noted that there were “allusions” during the trial to Deputy Leyva’s 

                                                            

2 Petitioner does not use the phrase “sua sponte” when stating his claim in his Petition, 

but the state appellate court framed Petitioner’s claim as, “the court prejudicially erred 

by failing to sua sponte instruct the jury on what constitutes a lawful detention and 

arrest” (Lodgment 6 at 3), and Respondents frame Petitioner’s claim in their Answer as 

the trial court’s failure to sua sponte instruct. (Doc. No. 14-1 at 12.) 

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actions possibly amounting to an unlawful detention or arrest, but that the “indisputable 

focus” of the trial was whether or not the deputies used excessive force against 

Petitioner. 

This Court agrees with the California Court of Appeal that, if the trial court did 

err by failing to instruct the jury with Sections A and B of CALCRIM No. 2670, any 

error was harmless. Considering, as it must, the omission of the two jury instruction 

sections in the context of the instructions as a whole, the Court finds that any error did 

not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72; see also 

Sarausad, 555 U.S. at 191. The instructions given were clear that the prosecution had 

the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the deputies were lawfully 

performing their duties as peace officers, and if the prosecution failed to meet that 

burden, Petitioner must be found not guilty of both the felony and misdemeanor offenses. 

CALCRIM Nos. 2652, 2670; Doc. No. 15-3 at 192–193, 195, 3 RT 454–455, 457. The 

jury was explicitly instructed that a peace officer is not lawfully performing his or her 

duties if he or she is unlawfully arresting or detaining someone. CALCRIM No. 2670; 

Doc. No. 15-3 at 195, 3 RT 457. Further, if the jury had rejected Petitioner’s claim that 

the officers used excessive force, but still found the detention or arrest to be unlawful, 

the jury was instructed that it may find Petitioner guilty of the lesser crimes of battery or 

assault. CALCRIM No. 2672; Doc. No. 15-3 at 196, 3 RT 458. The jury found 

Petitioner guilty of both the felony and misdemeanor offenses involving resisting an 

officer, thereby rejecting Petitioner’s version of events regarding the officer’s use of 

force and any theories about an unlawful detention or arrest. 

The parties’ two versions of events could not be more conflicting. At trial, 

Petitioner presented evidence that he approached Deputy Leyva and asked if he could 

assist his girlfriend in parking her car and, with nothing in his hand, he was suddenly 

grabbed, twisted, and pushed by Deputy Leyva in response to ignoring the deputy during 

an earlier encounter. The prosecution presented evidence that Petitioner was drunk and 

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hysterical, and moved quickly toward Deputy Leyva with an unidentified object in his 

hand, then resisted the deputies and ignored their commands as they tried to restrain him. 

Evidence was presented at trial that Petitioner ran toward Deputy Leyva yelling 

obscenities, and that Petitioner pulled away from Deputy Leyva when the deputy reached 

for Petitioner’s hand after ignoring the deputy’s commands. 2 RT 77, 81, 85. The jury 

heard testimony that, while Deputy Leyva and Petitioner were struggling on the ground, 

Petitioner continued to ignore the deputy’s verbal commands to stop resisting. 2 RT 88. 

The jury heard testimony from Deputy Leyva that Petitioner’s resistance level was an 8 

out of 10, with 10 being the highest. 2 RT 92. The prosecution presented evidence that 

when the deputies told Petitioner to turn around, he instead pushed off the back of the 

patrol car and pushed himself into Deputy Haddad. 2 RT 95. 

Instructional error warrants federal habeas relief only if the instruction by itself so 

infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process. Sarausad, 555 

U.S. at 191; McNeil, 541 U.S. at 437. The court of appeal noted that, although the trial 

court did not elaborate on what constituted an unlawful detention or arrest, the parties’ 

presentation of diametrically opposing versions of events precluded the jury from 

finding in Petitioner’s favor unless the jury credited Petitioner’s version of events. 

(Lodgment 6 at 16.) This Court agrees that the evidence at trial focused on Petitioner’s 

actions and the deputies’ use of force, and that the jury was instructed about the 

prosecution’s burden of proof. The Court finds that Petitioner has failed to show that 

there was a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the modified version of 

CALCRIM No. 2670 in violation of the Constitution. McNeil, 541 U.S. at 437. 

Therefore, the California Supreme Court’s rejection of this claim was neither contrary 

to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. 

B. Insufficient Evidence 

To review the sufficiency of the evidence in a habeas corpus proceeding, the Court 

must determine “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

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prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) 

(emphasis in original); Parker v. Matthews, 132 S.Ct. 2148, 2152 (2012) (per curiam); 

see also Coleman v. Johnson, 132 S.Ct. 2060, 2065 (2012) (per curiam) (“[T]he only 

question under Jackson is whether [the jury’s] finding was so insupportable as to fall 

below the threshold of bare rationality.”). All evidence must be considered in the light 

most favorable to the prosecution, Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 782 (1990); Jackson, 

443 U.S. at 319, and if the facts support conflicting inferences, reviewing courts “must 

presume—even if it does not affirmatively appear in the record—that the trier of fact 

resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.” 

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S.Ct. 2, 6 (2011) (per curiam). 

Furthermore, under AEDPA, federal courts must “apply the standards of [Jackson] 

with an additional layer of deference.” Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1274 (9th 

Cir.2005); Boyer v. Belleque, 659 F.3d 957, 964–65 (9th Cir.2011). These standards are 

applied to the substantive elements of the criminal offense under state law. Jackson, 443 

U.S. at 324 n.16; Boyer, 659 F.3d at 964; see also Johnson, 132 S.Ct. at 2064 (“Under 

Jackson, federal courts must look to state law for the substantive elements of the criminal 

offense, but the minimum amount of evidence that the Due Process Clause requires to 

prove the offense is purely a matter of federal law.” (citation and quotation marks 

omitted)). 

 In his second claim, Petitioner asserts that there was insufficient evidence to convict 

him of the crime of felony resisting an executive officer because there was “no sufficient 

evidence that there was ‘intent’ or ‘state of mind’ to confront [Deputy] Leyva in a 

negative way.” (Doc. No. 4 at 7.) Respondents assert that there was ample evidence 

that Petitioner repeatedly shouted expletives at Deputy Leyva and ran at him in defiance 

of the deputy’s repeated commands to stop. (Doc. No. 14-1 at 21; citing Lodgment 6 at 

10.) Further, Respondents argue that intending to confront an executive officer in a 

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negative way is not an element of Section 69. (Doc. No. 14-1 at 21.) Finally, 

Respondents contend that the state appellate court reasonably applied the standard set 

forth in Jackson and correctly determined that the evidence was sufficient to support 

Petitioner’s felony conviction. (Doc. No. 14-1 at 21.) 

1. California Court of Appeal’s Opinion

The California Court of Appeal rejected Petitioner’s insufficient evidence claim, 

concluding: 

 [T]he evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the 

judgment, showed Deputy Leyva and the other deputies went to the 

home where [Petitioner] was living to break up an out-of-control party. 

While Leyva was attempting to direct traffic, which [Petitioner] does 

not dispute was a lawful duty, [Petitioner] jogged toward him shouting 

expletives. [Petitioner] carried an unknown object in his right hand, 

which he had pointed at Leyva, and he ignored Leyva’s repeated 

commands to stop. When [Petitioner] neared Leyva, Leyva attempted 

to detain [Petitioner] and commanded [Petitioner] to put his hands 

behind his back. Instead of complying with Leyva’s command, 

[Petitioner] put his hands underneath his torso and trapped one of 

Deputy Leyva’s hands on the hood of a running vehicle. [Petitioner] 

thrashed about and continued resisting Leyva’s commands despite 

receiving fist strikes, flashlight strikes, and knee strikes. He did not 

initially stop resisting until a deputy administered electric shocks. He 

then resumed resisting when deputies tried to place him in a patrol car 

until he received two knee strikes. Collectively, this evidence supports 

his conviction for violating [S]ection 69. (See People v. Bernal (2013) 

222 Cal.App.4th 512, 518-519; People v. Carrasco (2008) 163 

Cal.App.4th 978, 985-986.) 

The existence of conflicting evidence favorable to [Petitioner] 

does not alter our conclusion. “ ‘ “Conflicts and even testimony [that] 

is subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a 

judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to 

determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts 

upon which a determination depends. [Citation.] We resolve neither 

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credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts; we look for substantial 

evidence.” ’ ” (People v. Manibusan, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 87.) As 

there is substantial evidence to support [Petitioner’s] felony conviction 

in the record before us, we conclude he has not established the 

conviction should be reversed on this ground. 

2. Analysis 

Section 69 makes it a felony for any person (1) to attempt, by means of any threat 

or violence, to deter or prevent an executive officer from performing any duty imposed 

upon such officer by law, or (2) to knowingly resist, by the use of force or violence, such 

officer, in the performance of his duty. Cal. Penal Code § 69. “The statute sets forth 

two separate ways in which an offense can be committed. The first is attempting by 

threats or violence to deter or prevent an officer from performing a duty imposed by law; 

the second is resisting by force or violence an officer in the performance of his or her 

duty.” In re Manuel G., 16 Cal.4th 805, 814 (1997). These two types of offenses have 

different elements. People v. Lopez, 129 Cal.App.4th 1508, 1530 (2005). Notably, 

although the first type of offense—attempt—requires a specific intent to deter or prevent 

the officer from performing a lawful duty, the second type of offense—resistance—only 

requires that the defendant knowingly perform an act of resistance. Id; People v. 

Rasmussen, 189 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1419 (2010) (“The resistance prong of section 69 

involves a defendant who ‘knowingly’ resists an executive officer. ‘The word 

“knowingly” imports only a knowledge that the facts exist which bring the act or 

omission within the provisions of this code. It does not require any knowledge of the 

unlawfulness of such act or omission.”) (internal citations omitted). Thus, because the 

definition of the resistance type of offense in Section 69 describes only the act of 

resisting an executive officer and does not require an intent to do a further act or achieve 

a future consequence, it is a general intent crime. Rasmussen, 189 Cal.App.4th at 1419–

20. 

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As previously stated, both parties agree that the jury convicted Petitioner under the 

second theory of Section 69. The trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 

2652, stating that the offense of violating Section 69 requires proof of the following three 

elements: (1) the defendant unlawfully used force or violence to resist an executive 

officer; (2) when the defendant acted, the officer was performing his lawful duty; and 

(3) when the defendant acted, he knew the executive officer was performing his duty. 

(3 RT 454; CALCRIM No. 2652.) 

Petitioner contends that there was insufficient evidence to support his felony 

conviction under Section 69 because the prosecution did not prove that he intended to 

confront Deputy Leyva in a negative way. (Doc. No. 4 at 7.) To support his argument, 

Petitioner cites the prosecution’s statement during trial that Petitioner attacked the 

deputies “for whatever reason.” (Doc. No. 4 at 7.) Petitioner asserts that he was trying 

to assist Deputy Leyva in identifying his girlfriend and asked if he could help park her 

car. (Doc. No. 4 at 7.) He claims that Deputy Leyva already knew that he was going to 

arrest Petitioner when he saw him, as Deputy Leyva was upset that Petitioner had 

avoided him earlier that evening. (Doc. No. 4 at 7.) 

This Court agrees with the California Court of Appeal that the jury was presented 

with sufficient evidence to convict Petitioner of resisting an executive officer. As to the 

first element of Section 69, that Petitioner unlawfully used force or violence to resist an 

executive officer, the jury heard evidence that Petitioner ran toward Deputy Leyva 

yelling obscenities with an unidentified object in his hand, and that he did not respond 

to the deputy’s repeated commands to stop. (2 RT 77, 81.) Petitioner pulled away from 

Deputy Leyva when the deputy reached for Petitioner’s hand after ignoring the deputy’s 

commands. (2 RT 85–86.) When Deputy Leyva grabbed Petitioner, pushed him onto 

the hood of his girlfriend’s car, and reached for Petitioner’s wrist, Petitioner tucked his 

arms underneath himself, pinching the deputy’s hand between Petitioner’s bicep and rib 

cage. (2 RT 86–88.) While Deputy Leyva and Petitioner were struggling on the ground, 

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Petitioner continued to ignore the deputy’s verbal commands to stop resisting. (2 RT 

88.) When Deputy Haddad came to assist, Petitioner, with his hands still tucked under 

his body, swung his arms in a forceful manner, thrashing his body from left to right on 

the ground. (2 RT 89–90, 113–115, 165–166.) Deputy Haddad kneeled on Petitioner’s 

left side and Petitioner continued to move his arms towards Deputy Leyva. (2 RT 165–

167.) Deputy Haddad delivered two knee strikes to Petitioner’s left side, and Petitioner 

continued to resist. (2 RT 165–167.) Petitioner moved his head from left to right and 

attempted to stand by pushing back. (2 RT 167–168.) When trying to get Petitioner into 

the patrol car, the deputies told him to turn around and he pushed off the back of the 

patrol car and pushed himself into Deputy Haddad. (2 RT 95.) Deputy Leyva testified 

that he considered Petitioner’s resistance level to be an 8 out of 10, with 10 being the 

highest. (2 RT 92.) This evidence is sufficient to establish that Petitioner forcefully 

resisted the deputies’ attempts to restrain him. 

Petitioner’s assertion that the prosecution had to prove his intent or motive in order 

to convict him of the felony offense, is misplaced. Respondents are correct that 

intending to confront an officer in a negative way is not an element of Section 69, and 

thus, the prosecution was not required to present any evidence to demonstrate 

Petitioner’s state of mind or motive. The prosecution was only required to prove that 

Petitioner knowingly resisted the deputies, as this is a general intent crime. Cal. Penal 

Code § 69; Rasmussen, 189 Ca.App.4th at 1419-20; Flores-Lopez v. Holder, 685 F.3d 

857, 864 (9th Cir. 2012); People v. Davis, 10 Cal.4th 463, 518–519, fn. 15 (1995) (“A 

crime is characterized as a ‘general intent’ crime when the required mental state entails 

only an intent to do the act that causes the harm...”) 

In preliminary instructions and again in the instructions given before closing 

arguments, the trial court told the jury that both direct and circumstantial evidence are 

acceptable types of evidence to prove or disprove the elements of a charge, including 

intent and mental state, and acts necessary to a conviction, and neither is necessarily 

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more reliable than the other. (2 RT 25, 31; 3 RT 443, 448.) The trial court instructed 

the jury that neither type of evidence is entitled to any greater weight than the other. (2 

RT 25, 31; 3 RT 443, 448.) 

The circumstantial evidence was sufficient to show that Petitioner knowingly 

resisted the deputies. Moreover, even though the prosecution was not required to prove 

intent, Petitioner’s intent to resist Deputies Leyva and Haddad, and his intent to confront 

Deputy Leyva in a negative way, may be inferred from the evidence that Petitioner ran 

toward Deputy Leyva yelling obscenities with an unidentified object in his hand, failed 

to respond to repeated commands to stop, pulled away from Deputy Leyva and tucked 

the deputy’s arms underneath himself, swung his arms in a forceful manner, and thrashed 

his body around while the deputies were trying to restrain him, all while continuing to 

ignore their repeated commands to stop resisting. (2 RT 77, 81, 85–90, 113–115, 165–

166.) The jury also heard that Petitioner pushed off the back of the patrol car and pushed 

himself into Deputy Haddad when the deputies were trying to get him into the car. (2 

RT 95.) The jury was presented with sufficient evidence to infer that Petitioner’s 

behavior was not accidental, unintended, or inadvertent. Not only does this evidence 

support the unnecessary determination that Petitioner intended to confront Deputy Leyva 

in a negative way, but more importantly, it also supports a determination that Petitioner 

knowingly resisted the officers, one of the elements of the convicted offense. 

As to the second element of Section 69, that when Petitioner acted, the officer was 

performing his lawful duty, the trial court instructed the jury that the duties of a peace 

officer include responding to dispatch calls regarding noise complaints, crowd control, 

and keeping the peace. (3 RT 455.) The court also instructed the jury that a peace officer 

is not lawfully performing his or her duties if he or she is unlawfully arresting or 

detaining someone or using unreasonable or excessive force in his or her duties. (3 RT 

456.) The prosecution presented evidence that the deputies were responding to a 

dispatch call about a party at Petitioner’s residence with about 200 students in 

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attendance. (2 RT 53.) Deputies Leyva, Haddad, and Charles testified as to their duties 

when responding to that noise complaint, and explained how they approached the 

residence and contacted individuals at the party. (2 RT 53–71, 154–155, 187–190.) 

Deputy Leyva was directing traffic at the time that Petitioner came running toward him. 

(2 RT 77.) Petitioner ran down the hill toward Deputy Leyva, pointing at the deputy and 

yelling obscenities. (2 RT 77, 80, 226.) Deputy Leyva saw something white in 

Petitioner’s hand as he approached, and did not know if Petitioner was armed. (2 RT 

80.) Deputy Leyva repeatedly ordered Petitioner to stop, but Petitioner ignored the 

deputy’s commands and instead continued to curse at Deputy Leyva. (2 RT 81–82.) 

Petitioner slowed to a walk when he came within arms’ reach of Deputy Leyva, but 

pulled his arm away from the deputy before he could get a solid grip on it. (2 RT 83–

85.) This evidence is sufficient to establish that when Petitioner acted, Deputy Leyva 

was performing his lawful duty. 

Finally, as to the third element of Section 69, that when Petitioner acted, he knew 

the executive officer was performing his duty, the prosecution put forth evidence that 

there was a large party at Petitioner’s residence and Petitioner had an interaction with 

Deputy Charles in the backyard of the residence. (2 RT 53, 73–75, 155–157, 191–194.) 

The deputies were managing the crowd and directing traffic. (2 RT 66, 68–69, 71, 77.) 

Deputy Leyva was directing traffic at the time that Petitioner came running toward him, 

and Petitioner was yelling, “Fuck you. That’s my girlfriend. She will park wherever 

she wants.” (2 RT 77, 80, 108–109, 226.) This evidence is sufficient to establish that 

when Petitioner acted, he knew that Deputy Leyva was performing his duty. 

Accordingly, the California Supreme Court’s rejection of this claim was neither 

contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. 

// 

// 

// 

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                       14-CV-2837

VI. 

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, this Court ORDERS that the First Amended Petition for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus be DENIED. The Court directs the Clerk of Court to enter 

Judgment dismissing this action with prejudice. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 Dated: April 21, 2016 

Case 3:14-cv-02837-WVG Document 17 Filed 04/21/16 Page 27 of 27