Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02391/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02391-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Brandon Smith, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

City of Chandler, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV-12-02391-PHX-FJM

ORDER 

 The Court has before it Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial (Doc. 189), and 

Defendants' Response (Doc. 190), to which no Reply has been filed. Also before the 

Court is Defendants' Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Non-Taxable costs (Doc. 188), 

Plaintiff's Response (Doc. 191), and Defendants' Reply (Doc. 192). 

 I. 

 Plaintiff's motion for new trial is much the same as his response to Defendants' 

Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law. Plaintiff contends that his attempted 

suicide was foreseeable and therefore could not have been a supervening cause of his 

injuries. But while foreseeability is a necessary condition for proximate causation, it is 

not a sufficient condition. As we carefully outlined in our Order of April 27, 2017 (Doc. 

179), there was neither contention nor evidence that Defendants' conduct caused the preexisting, underlying mental condition that itself caused the suicide attempt. This is a 

requirement of Arizona law. Although Plaintiff contends that we are incorrect that he 

failed to address the relevant Arizona cases, Motion at 2, it is painfully plain that we were 

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quite correct in asserting that he failed to address the three relevant cases. Order of April 

27, 2017 at 2. At all events, Plaintiff's failure to file a Reply to the Defendants' Response 

speaks volumes. The motion will be denied for all the reasons stated in our Order of 

April 27, 2017 (Doc. 179). 

 II. 

 Defendants contend that they are entitled to fees and costs under A.R.S. §13-420 

for having prevailed on the state law negligence claim. Defendants concede that they are 

not entitled to fees and costs for having prevailed on the federal claim. At an earlier stage 

of this proceeding, we granted fees on the state claim and rejected the arguments Plaintiff 

makes here. Order of November 25, 2014 (Doc. 68). Plaintiff does not contest the 

amount of fees and costs sought but does contend that justification within the meaning of 

the statute is not present, that §13-420 does not apply to this case, that it nevertheless 

conflicts with another Arizona statute, and that federal preemption precludes a fee award 

here. We need not repeat what we said the last time. It is sufficient to state that 

justification is established by the jury's finding against Plaintiff on the federal claim of 

excessive force, that §13-420 does apply, that it does not conflict with another Arizona 

statute and that while federal preemption would bar a state from adopting a fee award 

regime on the federal claim that differed from that imposed by 42 U.S.C. §1988, it does 

not bar a state from adopting its own fee regime on state claims. Indeed, a state could 

choose to not create a state cause of action, let alone set forth its own conditions for fee 

shifting on the state claim it does create. 

 Plaintiff makes no attempt to separate fees incurred on the federal claim from 

those incurred on the state claim. This would be difficult but not impossible. A rough 

approximation would be reasonable. We know, for example, that the state negligence 

claim is broader than the federal excessive force claim. It extends to conduct other than 

the use of the bean bag. We know, also, that Defendants could have, but did not, assert 

as a basis for summary judgment on the state claim that the attempted suicide was a 

supervening cause that broke the chain of proximate causation. See Motion for Summary 

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Judgment at 15 (Doc. 35); Motion in Limine No. 4 (Doc. 88). This would have removed 

the state claim early in the proceedings so that it would not become the tail that wags the 

dog. At bottom, this was always predominantly a federal excessive force claim. 

 Plaintiff, too, could have avoided the risk of fees by asserting only the federal 

claim. He may have asserted the state negligence claim simply because negligence is 

easier to prove than a violation of a federal Constitutional right. Or, he may have 

concluded that being impecunious, a fee award would constitute no practical risk. 

 Nevertheless, at this stage of the proceedings, we are not comfortable awarding 

fees under state law for the entire case where, as here, the federal claim (for which fees 

are not awarded) predominates. Based upon our involvement in this case, including the 

trial, we think a fair and reasonable allocation of fees is 75% federal and 25% state. The 

motion will be granted in part in the amount of $95,258.00 in attorneys’ fees and 

$17,975.00 in non-taxable costs, which constitute 25% of the fees and costs sought. 

 III. 

 Accordingly, it is ORDERED as follows: 

 1. Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial is DENIED (Doc. 189). 

 2. Defendants' Motion for Attorneys' Fees and Non-Taxable Costs is 

GRANTED IN PART, in the amount of $95,258.00 in attorneys’ fees and $17,975.00 in 

non-taxable costs (Doc. 188). 

 Dated this 9th day of August, 2017. 

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