Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02638/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02638-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO MDR

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jonathan McAllister, Sr., 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Arizona Department of Corrections, et al.,

Defendants. 

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No. CV 10-2638-PHX-JAT (ECV)

ORDER

On December 9, 2010, Plaintiff Jonathan McAllister, Sr., who is confined in the

Arizona State Prison Complex-Tucson in Tucson, Arizona, filed a pro se civil rights

Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis.

In a December 14, 2010 Order, the Court granted Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed and

dismissed the Complaint, without prejudice, for failure to comply with Local Rule of Civil

Procedure 3.4(a). The Court gave Plaintiff 30 days to file an amended complaint that

complied with Local Rule 3.4(a).

On December 23, 2010, Plaintiff filed a “Motion to Exceed Page Limit for Amended

Civil Rights Complaint.” On January 6, 2011, he filed a “Motion for Enlargement of Time

to File (First) Amended Civil Rights Complaint.” In a January 25, 2011 Order, the Court

denied Plaintiff’s Motion to Exceed and granted his Motion for Enlargement of Time. The

Court gave Plaintiff an additional 15 days within which to file his first amended complaint.

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On February 15, 2011, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint (Doc. 10). The

Court will require Defendant Preston to answer Count Two of the First Amended Complaint

and will dismiss the remaining claims and Defendants.

I. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against

a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised

claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does not

demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).

“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice.” Id.

“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for

relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial

experience and common sense.” Id. at 1950. Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific factual

allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there

are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 1951.

But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, courts

must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th

Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less stringent standards

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than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,

94 (2007) (per curiam)).

II. First Amended Complaint

Plaintiff should take note that all causes of action alleged in his original Complaint

that are not alleged in his First Amended Complaint are waived. Hal Roach Studios v.

Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1990) (“an amended pleading

supersedes the original”); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565 (9th Cir. 1987). Accordingly, the

Court will consider only those claims and facts specifically asserted in Plaintiff’s First

Amended Complaint with respect to only those Defendants specifically named in the First

Amended Complaint.

In his six-count First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff sues the following Defendants:

the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADOC); ADOC Director Charles L. Ryan, ADOC

Inspector General Rita Frigo; Arizona State Prison Complex (ASPC)-Eyman Facility Health

Administrator Dennis Kendall, Nurse Practitioner Preston, Deputy Warden K. Curran,

Librarian T. Hernandez, Disciplinary Hearing Officer Captain Kurtz, and Counselor/Case

Manager Correctional Officer (CO) III Penney; ASPC-Lewis Mailroom Supervisor

G. Coranado and Deputy Warden Anne Reeder; ASPC-Alhambra Primary Care Provider Dr.

Baird; ASPC-Tucson Assistant Deputy Warden D. Lunberg, Librarian Jon Meade, Paralegal

French, Grievance Coordinator CO IV Mackenzie, Mail and Property Room CO IIs Talley

and Carrillo, Registered Nurse/Supervisor Brenda McMullen, Counselor/Case Manager

CO III Merrifield, Grievance Coordinator CO IVs Johnson and R. Schmidt, and Housing

Unit CO II Villa; and Corrections Corporation of America’s Huerfano County Correctional

Center “Arizona Liason” Betty Barnes, Paralegal/Notary Public Pattie Rowe, and Security

Threat Group Supervisor Sergeant Montoya. In his Request for Relief, Plaintiff seeks

declaratory and injunctive relief, monetary damages, and his costs.

III. Discussion of First Amended Complaint

Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,

520-21 (1972), conclusory and vague allegations will not support a cause of action. Ivey v.

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Board of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Further,

a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the

claim that were not initially pled. Id. 

A. Improper Defendant

The Arizona Department of Corrections is not a proper Defendant. Under the

Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, a state or state agency may not

be sued in federal court without its consent. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465

U.S. 89, 100 (1984); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Furthermore, “a

state is not a ‘person’ for purposes of section 1983. Likewise ‘arms of the State’ such as the

Arizona Department of Corrections are not ‘persons’ under section 1983.” Gilbreath v.

Cutter Biological, Inc., 931 F.2d 1320, 1327 (9th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted). Therefore,

the Court will dismiss Defendant Arizona Department of Corrections.

B. Failure to Link Defendant with Injuries

To state a valid claim under § 1983, plaintiffs must allege that they suffered a specific

injury as a result of specific conduct of a defendant and show an affirmative link between the

injury and the conduct of that defendant. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377

(1976). There is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, and therefore, a defendant’s

position as the supervisor of persons who allegedly violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights

does not impose liability. Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S.

658, 691-92 (1978); Hamilton v. Endell, 981 F.2d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 1992); Taylor v. List,

880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). “Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens

and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the

official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948.

Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendants Frigo, Kurtz, Coranado, Reeder, Lunberg,

Meade, French, Mackenzie, Talley, Carrillo, McMullen, Schmidt, Barnes, Rowe, and

Montoya personally participated in a deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, was

aware of a deprivation and failed to act, or formed policies that resulted in Plaintiff’s injuries.

Plaintiff has alleged no conduct at all by these Defendants. Thus, the Court will dismiss

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without prejudice Defendants Frigo, Kurtz, Coranado, Reeder, Lunberg, Meade, French,

Mackenzie, Talley, Carrillo, McMullen, Schmidt, Barnes, Rowe, and Montoya.

C. Medical Claims–Counts One, Two, and Four

In Counts One, Two, and Four, Plaintiff alleges violations of the Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendments relating to his medical and mental health care. 

Not every claim by a prisoner relating to inadequate medical treatment states a

violation of the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment. To state a § 1983 medical claim, a

plaintiff must show that the defendants acted with “deliberate indifference to serious medical

needs.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429

U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). A plaintiff must show (1) a “serious medical need” by demonstrating

that failure to treat the condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary

and wanton infliction of pain and (2) the defendant’s response was deliberately indifferent.

Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (quotations omitted).

 “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051,

1060 (9th Cir. 2004). To act with deliberate indifference, a prison official must both know

of and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health; “the official must both be aware of facts

from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and

he must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Deliberate

indifference in the medical context may be shown by a purposeful act or failure to respond

to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and harm caused by the indifference. Jett, 439

F.3d at 1096. Deliberate indifference may also be shown when a prison official intentionally

denies, delays, or interferes with medical treatment or by the way prison doctors respond to

the prisoner’s medical needs. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05; Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. 

Deliberate indifference is a higher standard than negligence or lack of ordinary due

care for the prisoner’s safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. “Neither negligence nor gross

negligence will constitute deliberate indifference.” Clement v. California Dep’t of

Corrections, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1105 (N.D. Cal. 2002); see also Broughton v. Cutter

Labs., 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980) (mere claims of “indifference,” “negligence,” or

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“medical malpractice” do not support a claim under § 1983). “A difference of opinion does

not amount to deliberate indifference to [a plaintiff’s] serious medical needs.” Sanchez v.

Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). A mere delay in medical care, without more, is

insufficient to state a claim against prison officials for deliberate indifference. See Shapley

v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). The indifference

must be substantial. The action must rise to a level of “unnecessary and wanton infliction

of pain.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105.

In Count One, Plaintiff contends that he received an inadequate health screening

when he was transferred to ASPC-Alhambra because Defendant Baird only asked Plaintiff

health questions, prescribed pain medication, and issued a shaving waiver. Plaintiff alleges

that Defendant Baird did not conduct a physical examination of Plaintiff, but falsified

medical records by writing that he did. Plaintiff alleges that, when he was later transferred

to ASPC-Eyman, he filed an inmate letter with Defendant Penney about Defendant Baird’s

inadequate medical screening. He claims that Defendant Penney stated that Plaintiff had

received a physical examination and “failed to advise the medical unit to conduct a full

physical examination.” Plaintiff contends that Defendant Kendall responded to a formal

grievance Plaintiff filed, concluding that Plaintiff had received a physical examination and

advising Plaintiff to submit health needs request forms for his medical issues. Plaintiff

claims that Defendant Ryan responded to the Plaintiff’s inmate grievance appeal of

Defendant Kendall’s response, stating that there was no documentation to support Plaintiff’s

allegations.

Plaintiff’s allegations in Count One suggest, at best, that Defendant Baird acted

negligently or committed medical malpractice. This is insufficient to state a

deliberate-indifference claim against him. Plaintiff’s allegations do not support a claim that

Defendants Penney, Kendall, or Ryan acted with deliberate indifference. Thus, the Court

will dismiss without prejudice Count One.

In Count Two, Plaintiff alleges that he received a mental health screening when he

was transferred to ASPC-Eyman, was found to have a serious mental illness, and was

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prescribed psychotropic medications. Plaintiff alleges that the following month, Defendant

Preston violated his right to adequate mental health care and acted “without medical

authority” when she discontinued his psychotropic medications, and did not provide Plaintiff

with alternate medications. Plaintiff contends that Defendant Preston claimed that the

medications had been banned pursuant to ADOC policy, but refused to provide Plaintiff with

the policy. Plaintiff also states that the medical staff continued to distribute these

medications to other inmates. Plaintiff asserts that he submitted an inmate letter to Defendant

Penney, informing Defendant Penney that his medications had been discontinued and

requesting a copy of the policy.

Plaintiff’s allegation against Defendant Penney does not state a deliberate-indifference

claim. Thus, the Court will dismiss without prejudice Plaintiff’s claim in Count Two against

Defendant Penney. However, liberally construed, Plaintiff has stated a

deliberate-indifference claim against Defendant Preston in Count Two. The Court will

require Defendant Preston to answer Count Two.

In Count Four, Plaintiff alleges that he was examined by a doctor while at ASPCTucson and the doctor instructed him to submit an inmate letter to his counselor so Plaintiff

could get approval for his family to send him orthopedic or tennis shoes. Plaintiff asserts that

he submitted an inmate letter and his counselor responded by stating that Plaintiff should

send a “kite” to the doctor that requested that the doctor send a memorandum to the deputy

warden explaining that Plaintiff had been medically approved to receive tennis shoes from

family members. Plaintiff claims he filed an formal grievance and the facility health

administrator provided Plaintiff with an untimely response to the grievance, stating that

Plaintiff “does not have a medical condition that the doctor feels you need shoes for.”

Plaintiff alleges that the doctor had, in fact, initiated a special needs order for medical shoes

for Plaintiff, but Plaintiff has not received any medical shoes. Plaintiff contends that

Defendant Ryan denied Plaintiff’s grievance appeal, affirming the facility health

administrator’s response.

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Plaintiff’s allegation against Defendant Ryan does not state a claim against Defendant

Ryan. See Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999) (defendants did not commit

constitutional violations when they denied administrative grievances, failed to intervene on

plaintiff’s behalf, and failed to remedy allegedly unconstitutional behavior). The remainder

of Plaintiff’s allegations concern conduct by individuals who are not Defendants. Plaintiff,

therefore, has failed to link his injury in Count Four to the specific conduct of a named

Defendant. Thus, the Court will dismiss without prejudice Count Four.

D. Access to the Courts–Count Three

In Count Three, Plaintiff alleges a violation of his First and Eighth Amendment

rights of access to the courts. Plaintiff claims that Defendant Hernandez denied Plaintiff

access to the library for legal copies and notary services for the “preparation of court filings

of several cases which were pending,” refused to acknowledge court deadlines, and refused

to provide Plaintiff with copies of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure that he needed to

“properly litigate a civil action case” that was pending in a state superior court. Plaintiff also

claims he was only “allowed 10 pages a week,” despite his requests for additional pages.

Plaintiff contends that a case was dismissed by the trial judge because Plaintiff did not

comply with court rules and did not provide copies to the court.

Plaintiff also alleges that he filed an inmate letter with Defendant Penney regarding

this issue, but received “no relief”; that Defendant Hernandez, in violation of ADOC policy,

responded to his formal grievance and provided no relief; that Defendant Curran “condoned”

Defendant Hernandez’s actions; and that Defendant Ryan affirmed the “unit levels[’]

decisions.”

The right of meaningful access to the courts prohibits officials from actively

interfering with inmates’ attempts to prepare or file legal documents. Lewis v. Casey, 518

U.S. 343, 350 (1996). The right of access to the courts is only a right to bring petitions or

complaints to federal court and not a right to discover such claims or even to ligate them

effectively once filed with a court. Id. at 354. The right “guarantees no particular

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methodology but rather the conferral of a capability–the capability of bringing contemplated

challenges to sentences or conditions of confinement before the courts.” Id. at 356. 

As a matter of standing, for an access-to-courts claim, a plaintiff must show that he

suffered an “actual injury” with respect to contemplated litigation. Id. at 349. To show

actual injury with respect to contemplated litigation, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the

defendants’ conduct frustrated or impeded him from bringing to court a nonfrivolous claim

that he wished to present. Id. at 352-53.

“[T]he injury requirement is not satisfied by just any type of frustrated legal claim.”

Id. at 354. The right of access to the courts “does not guarantee inmates the wherewithal to

transform themselves into litigating engines capable of filing everything from shareholder

derivative actions to slip-and-fall claims.” Id. at 355. The nonfrivolous claim must be a

direct or collateral attack on the inmate’s sentence or a challenge to the conditions of his

confinement. Id. “Impairment of any other litigating capacity is simply one of the incidental

(and perfectly constitutional) consequences of conviction and incarceration.” Id. (emphasis

in original).

Plaintiff claims he was unable to properly litigate his claim, not that he was precluded

from bringing it. This is insufficient to state an access-to-the-courts claim. Moreover,

Plaintiff has failed to show an actual injury. Although Plaintiff’s state-court lawsuit may

have been dismissed, Plaintiff does not allege that it was a nonfrivolous claim or that it was

a direct or collateral attack on his sentence or a challenge to his conditions of confinement.

Plaintiff has failed to state an access-to-the-courts claim in Count Three and, therefore, the

Court will dismiss without prejudice Count Three.

E. Retaliation Claims–Counts Five and Six

In Counts Five and Six, Plaintiff alleges that he was retaliated against in violation of

his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. 

A viable claim of First Amendment retaliation contains five basic elements: (1) an

assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that

prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First

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Amendment rights (or that the inmate suffered more than minimal harm) and (5) did not

reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-

68 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 267 (9th Cir. 1997) (retaliation

claims requires an inmate to show (1) that the prison official acted in retaliation for the

exercise of a constitutionally protected right, and (2) that the action “advanced no legitimate

penological interest”). The plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating that his exercise of his

First Amendment rights was a substantial or motivating factor behind the defendants’

conduct. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977);

Soranno’s Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989).

In Count Five, Plaintiff claims he filed a grievance because Defendant Merrifield

refused to copy legal documents for Plaintiff and refused to contact the paralegal. Plaintiff

asserts that he was transferred to a different unit approximately nine days later, “for

absolutely no justifiable cause.” Plaintiff asserts that the transfer was “an act of retaliation

by prison staff administrative person[n]el directed at [Plaintiff] for exercising his right to file

a grievance.” 

Plaintiff has failed to link his transfer to the conduct of any Defendant named in this

lawsuit. In addition, he does not allege that the transfer chilled his First Amendment rights

or that he suffered more than minimal harm. Moreover, Plaintiff makes only conclusory

allegations that his grievance was the motivating factor behind the transfer. Thus, Plaintiff

has failed to state a claim in Count Five, and the Court will dismiss it, without prejudice.

In Count Six, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Villa instructed Plaintiff to move to a

different pod, that Plaintiff moved, and that, thereafter, he requested Defendant Villa’s full

name and badge number so that Plaintiff could initiate the grievance process regarding the

move. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Villa refused to provide her badge number, told

Plaintiff not to put her name in his grievance, and instructed Plaintiff to contact a superior

officer if he was dissatisfied with her response. Plaintiff claims that he would be recording

her response to his inquiry for her name and badge number and that, thereafter, Defendant

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Villa informed Plaintiff that he was “on report.” Plaintiff alleges that this constitutes

retaliation “by threat of a disciplinary ticket.”

 Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Villa falsely accused Plaintiff of threatening her,

“in an elaborate scheme to have [Plaintiff] removed off the yard and placed in detention.” 

Plaintiff asserts that the day after his move, Defendant Villa directed Plaintiff to pack up his

belongings, Defendant Villa and another corrections officer took Plaintiff’s property to the

administration building, and Plaintiff was told that his property would be searched. Plaintiff

claims that he was questioned, he informed superior officers that he had never threatened

anyone, and he was returned to his housing unit.

Plaintiff asserts that later in the day, Defendant Villa “pushed” Plaintiff’s property out

of the administrative office and gave it to another inmate to return to Plaintiff. Plaintiff

claims that Defendant Villa violated his rights, “conspiring with [Defendant] Johnson and

[another correctional officer] to do the same.” Plaintiff claims that property was taken from

him without giving him a receipt or contraband disposition form, but that the items were

returned to him. Plaintiff also states that after the items were returned, several inmates told

Plaintiff that he would have to leave the yard. Plaintiff contends that Defendant Villa talked

with those inmates and “informed or suggested that these inmates force [Plaintiff] to leave

the yard.”

Plaintiff has failed to allege that Defendant Villa’s conduct chilled his First

Amendment rights or that he suffered more than minimal harm. Plaintiff’s allegations

against Defendant Johnson are vague and conclusory. Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to state

a conspiracy claim. See Woodrum v. Woodward County, 866 F.2d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir.

1989) (conclusory allegations of conspiracy did not support a § 1983 claim); Karim-Panahi

v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988) (“A mere allegation of

conspiracy without factual specificity is insufficient.”). Thus, the Court will dismiss without

prejudice Count Six.

. . . .

. . . .

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IV. Warnings

A. Release

Plaintiff must pay the unpaid balance of the filing fee within 120 days of his release.

Also, within 30 days of his release, he must either (1) notify the Court that he intends to pay

the balance or (2) show good cause, in writing, why he cannot. Failure to comply may result

in dismissal of this action.

B. Address Changes

Plaintiff must file and serve a notice of a change of address in accordance with Rule

83.3(d) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff must not include a motion for other

relief with a notice of change of address. Failure to comply may result in dismissal of this

action.

C. Copies

Plaintiff must serve Defendant, or counsel if an appearance has been entered, a copy

of every document that he files. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a). Each filing must include a certificate

stating that a copy of the filing was served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d). Also, Plaintiff must submit

an additional copy of every filing for use by the Court. See LRCiv 5.4. Failure to comply

may result in the filing being stricken without further notice to Plaintiff.

D. Possible Dismissal

If Plaintiff fails to timely comply with every provision of this Order, including these

warnings, the Court may dismiss this action without further notice. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet,

963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (a district court may dismiss an action for failure to

comply with any order of the Court).

IT IS ORDERED: 

(1) Counts One, Three, Four, Five, and Six are dismissed without prejudice.

(2) Defendants Arizona Department of Corrections, Ryan, Frigo, Kendall, Curran,

Hernandez, Kurtz, Penney, Coranado, Reeder, Baird, Lunberg, Meade, French, Mackenzie,

Talley, Carrillo, McMullen, Merrifield, Johnson, Schmidt, Villa, Barnes, Rowe, and Montoya

are dismissed without prejudice.

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(3) Defendant Preston must answer Count Two.

(4) The Clerk of Court must send Plaintiff a service packet including the First

Amended Complaint (Doc. 10), this Order, and both summons and request for waiver forms

for Defendant Preston.

(5) Plaintiff must complete and return the service packet to the Clerk of Court

within 21 days of the date of filing of this Order. The United States Marshal will not provide

service of process if Plaintiff fails to comply with this Order.

(6) If Plaintiff does not either obtain a waiver of service of the summons or

complete service of the Summons and First Amended Complaint on Defendant within 120

days of the filing of the Complaint or within 60 days of the filing of this Order, whichever

is later, the action may be dismissed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m); LRCiv 16.2(b)(2)(B)(i).

(7) The United States Marshal must retain the Summons, a copy of the First

Amended Complaint, and a copy of this Order for future use.

(8) The United States Marshal must notify Defendant Preston of the

commencement of this action and request waiver of service of the summons pursuant to Rule

4(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The notice to Defendant must include a copy

of this Order. The Marshal must immediately file requests for waivers that were returned as

undeliverable and waivers of service of the summons. If a waiver of service of summons is

not returned by Defendant within 30 days from the date the request for waiver was sent by

the Marshal, the Marshal must:

(a) personally serve copies of the Summons, First Amended Complaint, and

this Order upon Defendant pursuant to Rule 4(h)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure; and

(b) within 10 days after personal service is effected, file the return of service

for Defendant, along with evidence of the attempt to secure a waiver of service of the

summons and of the costs subsequently incurred in effecting service upon Defendant.

The costs of service must be enumerated on the return of service form (USM-285) and

must include the costs incurred by the Marshal for photocopying additional copies of

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the Summons, First Amended Complaint, or this Order and for preparing new process

receipt and return forms (USM-285), if required. Costs of service will be taxed against

the personally served Defendant pursuant to Rule 4(d)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, unless otherwise ordered by the Court.

(9) If Defendant agrees to waive service of the Summons and First Amended

Complaint, she must return the signed waiver forms to the United States Marshal, not

the Plaintiff.

(10) Defendant Preston must answer Count Two of the First Amended Complaint

or otherwise respond by appropriate motion within the time provided by the applicable

provisions of Rule 12(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

(11) This matter is referred to Magistrate Judge Edward C. Voss pursuant to Rules

72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure for all pretrial proceedings as authorized

under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

DATED this 24th day of February, 2011.

Case 2:10-cv-02638-JAT Document 12 Filed 02/24/11 Page 14 of 14