Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-02106/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-02106-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America,

Plaintiff/Respondent,

v. 

Stephen Ross Raboy,

Defendant/Movant.

No. CV-16-02106-PHX-JAT (ESW)

 CR-09-00678-PHX-JAT

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

TO THE HONORABLE JAMES A. TEILBORG, SENIOR UNITED STATES 

DISTRICT JUDGE:

Pending before the Court is Stephen Ross Raboy’s (“Movant”) “Motion Under 28 

U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody” 

(the “Motion to Vacate”) (Doc. 10).1 The previously assigned Magistrate Judge stayed the 

case pending issuance of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Begay, No. 

14-10080, and the Supreme Court’s decision in Sessions v. Dimaya, No. 15-1498. (Doc. 

14). The matter was reassigned to the undersigned in April 2019. On August 26, 2019, 

the undersigned lifted the stay and directed the United States to respond to the Motion to 

Vacate. (Doc. 18). On November 6, 2019, the United States filed a Limited Response 

(Doc. 22), to which Movant has not replied. For the reasons explained herein, it is 

 

1 Citations to “Doc.” are to the docket in CV-16-02106-PHX-JAT (ESW). Citations to 

“CR Doc.” are to the docket in the underlying criminal case, CR-09-00678-PHX-JAT.

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recommended that the Court dismiss this matter with prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

On September 17, 2010, a jury found Movant guilty on (i) three counts of Armed 

Bank Robbery and Aid and Abet, Class B Felony offenses, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 

2113(a) and (d) and 2 (Counts 3, 5, and 11) and (ii) Use of a Firearm in a Crime of Violence

and Aid and Abet, a Class A Felony offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii)

and 2 (Count 12). (CR Doc. 179). The Court sentenced Movant to (i) concurrent life 

prison terms on Counts 3, 5, and 11 and (ii) a consecutive 84-month prison term on Count

12. (Id.). 

In December 2011, the Ninth Circuit affirmed Movant’s convictions and sentences. 

(CR Doc. 212). Movant thereafter filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which the Court 

denied. (CR Docs. 216, 217). The Ninth Circuit granted Movant’s application for 

authorization to file a second or successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. (Doc. 9). In his 

pending second Motion to Vacate, Movant challenges the constitutionality of his § 924(c) 

conviction (Count 12) and the Court’s imposition of life imprisonment pursuant to the 

“three-strikes” law, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c). The United States does not argue that 

the Motion to Vacate is untimely, but asserts that Movant’s claims are procedurally 

defaulted. (Doc. 22).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Convictions Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)

18 U.S.C. § 924(c) is a substantive criminal offense that sets forth mandatory 

sentences for defendants who “during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug 

trafficking crime . . . uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, 

possesses a firearm . . . .” The term “crime of violence” is defined as:

an offense that is a felony and –

(A) has as an element the use, attempted use, or 

threatened use of physical force against the person or 

property of another, or

(B) that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that 

physical force against the person or property of 

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another may be used in the course of committing the 

offense.

18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3). Subsection A above is referred to herein as the “Elements/Force

Clause.”

2 Subsection B above is referred to herein as the “Residual Clause.” 

On June 24, 2019, the Supreme Court held that the Residual Clause of § 924(c) is 

unconstitutionally vague. United States v. Davis, 139 S.Ct. 2319 (2019). Despite the 

Residual Clause’s unconstitutionality, Movant’s § 924(c) convictions would be upheld if 

his predicate felony (federal armed bank robbery) is a “crime of violence” under the 

Elements/Force Clause. 

B. Procedural Default

“A § 2255 movant procedurally defaults his claims by not raising them on direct 

appeal and not showing cause and prejudice or actual innocence in response to the default.” 

United States v. Ratigan, 351 F.3d 957, 962 (citing Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614,

622 (1998)). It is undisputed that Movant did not raise on direct appeal the claims presented 

in his Motion to Vacate. The issue is whether the procedural default should be excused 

under the cause and prejudice exception.3 

To establish the prejudice prong of the cause and prejudice exception, Movant must

“demonstrate[e] ‘not merely that the errors . . . [in the proceedings] created a possibility of

prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his

entire [proceedings] with error of constitutional dimensions.’” United States v. Braswell,

501 F.3d 1147, 1150 (9th Cir. 2007) (emphasis in original). As discussed below, the 

undersigned finds that Movant has failed to satisfy the prejudice prong as his claims are 

meritless. 

 

2 Courts and parties refer to Subsection A of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3) interchangeably 

as the “elements clause” or the “force clause.”

3 Movant does not assert the actual innocence exception.

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1. Movant’s Challenge to Count 12 (Section 924(c) Conviction 

Predicated on Federal Armed Bank Robbery in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d))

Movant cites Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (“Johnson 2010”) in 

arguing that federal armed bank robbery is not a crime of violence under the 

Elements/Force Clause. (Doc. 10 at 5, ¶¶ 18, 19). Section 924(c) was not at issue in 

Johnson 2010, but rather the “force” clause set forth in the Armed Career Criminal Act 

(“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). Section 924(e)(2)(B)(i) defines “violent felony” 

in part as an offense that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of 

physical force against the person of another.” The Supreme Court in Johnson 2010

clarified that “physical force,” as used in § 924(e)(2), “means violent force—that is, force

capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person.” Id. at 140. In United States 

v. Gutierrez, 876 F.3d 1254, 1256 (9th Cir. 2017), the Ninth Circuit concluded that Johnson 

2010’s definition of “physical force” applies to the Elements/Force Clause of § 

926(c)(3)(A). Therefore, in order to qualify as a crime of violence under the 

Elements/Force Clause, federal armed bank robbery must require the use, attempted use, 

or threatened use of violent physical force. 

In arguing that federal armed bank robbery does not qualify as a crime of violence 

under the Elements/Force Clause, Movant asserts that it “does not have as an element the 

use, attempted use, or threatened use of violent force as defined in Johnson 2010[.]” (Doc. 

10 at 5, ¶ 19). After Movant filed the Motion to Vacate, the Ninth Circuit issued a decision 

concluding that federal armed bank robbery in violation of § 2113 “qualifies as a crime of 

violence [within the meaning of § 924(c)] because even its least violent form ‘requires at 

least an implicit threat to use the type of violent physical force necessary to meet the 

Johnson standard.’” United States v. Watson, 881 F.3d 782, 785 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting 

Gutierrez, 876 F.3d at 1257). The undersigned finds that Movant’s federal armed bank 

robbery conviction constitutes a crime of violence under the Elements/Force Clause. 

Accordingly, Movant has failed to establish the prejudice prong of the cause and prejudice 

exception. The undersigned recommends that the Court dismiss Movant’s claim 

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challenging his § 924(c) conviction (Count 12) as it is both procedurally defaulted and 

meritless.

2. Movant’s Challenge to the Court’s Application of the Three-Strikes 

Law, 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c) 

In its “Information Filed Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3559” (Doc. 58) docketed on 

February 2, 2010, the United States invoked application of the three-strikes law, codified 

at 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c), based on Movant’s prior convictions in Arizona state court that the 

United States asserted qualified as serious violent felonies. Under the three-strikes law, 

the Court must sentence to life in prison any defendant who (i) is convicted in federal court 

of a “serious violent felony”; and (ii) has two or more prior “serious violent felony” 

convictions in federal or state courts. 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(1)(A)(i); United States v. 

Morrison, 113 F.3d 1020, 1020 (9th Cir. 1997). 

18 U.S.C. § 3359(c)(2)(F) provides that a prior conviction constitutes a “serious 

violent felony” if it satisfies at least one of three clauses that are generally referred to as (i) 

the “enumerated offense clause”; (ii) the “force/elements clause”; and (iii) the “residual 

clause.” The “enumerated offense clause,” lists specific crimes that qualify as a serious 

violent felony, such as “robbery (as described in section 2111, 2113, or 2118).” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3559(c)(2)(F)(i). The “force clause” provides that a serious violent felony is “any other 

offense punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of 10 years or more that has as 

an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of 

another[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(2)(F)(ii). Finally, the “residual clause” provides that a 

serious violent felony is “any other offense punishable by a maximum term of 

imprisonment of 10 years or more . . . that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that 

physical force against the person of another may be used in the course of committing the 

offense[.]”

4

 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(2)(F)(ii).

 

4 The residual clause of § 3559(c) is nearly identical to the residual clause of the 

ACCA, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B), which the Supreme Court found unconstitutional in 

Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 2556 (2015). Although not settled, at least one 

court has held that the residual clause of § 3559(c) is unconstitutionally vague. See United 

States v. Minjarez, 374 F. Supp. 3d 977, 992-93 (E.D. Cal. 2019) (“The residual clause in 

§ 3559(c)(2)(F)(ii) is unconstitutionally vague and can no longer mandate or authorize any 

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Here, the Court found that Movant’s federal armed bank robbery conviction 

qualified as a serious violent felony within the meaning of the three-strikes law. In 

addition, the Court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Movant’s prior Arizona 

robbery conviction and two Arizona armed robbery convictions qualify as serious violent 

felonies. (Doc. 204 at 6).

i. Movant’s Federal Armed Bank Robbery in Violation of 18 U.S.C. § 

2113(a) and (d)

In his Motion to Vacate, Movant asserts that conviction for federal armed bank 

robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d) is not a serious violent felony within 

the meaning of the three-strikes law. (Doc. 10 at 6, ¶ 25). However, as the United States 

correctly explains (Doc. 22 at 11), federal armed bank robbery is one of the crimes listed 

in the “enumerated offenses clause” of § 3559(c)(F)(i). See United States v. Johnson, 915 

F.3d 223, 227-28 (4th Cir. 2019) (“There is no question that Johnson’s two federal bank 

robbery convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 2113—the 1983 conviction and the 2002 conviction 

in the instant case—count as two strikes against him. 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(2)(F)(i) (listing 

‘robbery [ ]as described in’ 18 U.S.C. § 2113).”). Therefore, Movant’s claim should be 

dismissed as procedurally defaulted and meritless. 

ii. Movant’s Prior Arizona Armed Robbery Convictions

The Motion to Vacate also asserts that Movant’s three prior Arizona armed robbery 

convictions do not count as “strikes” for purposes of § 3599(c) because they are not serious 

violent felonies.

5

(Doc. 10 at 7, ¶ 26). Under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1902(A), “[a] person 

commits robbery if in the course of taking any property of another from his person or 

immediate presence and against his will, such person threatens or uses force against any 

person with intent either to coerce surrender of property or to prevent resistance to such 

 

sentence.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

5 The Motion to Vacate does not explicitly challenge the Court’s determination that 

Movant’s prior Arizona robbery conviction qualifies as a serious violent felony. To the 

extent Movant intended to make such a challenge, the undersigned finds that Movant’s 

Arizona robbery conviction is a serious violent felony for the same reason that Movant’s 

Arizona armed robbery convictions are serious violent felonies. Moreover, Movant’s two 

Arizona armed robbery convictions are sufficient for application of the three-strikes law.

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person taking or retaining property.” The term “force” as used in Arizona’s robbery statute 

is defined as “any physical act directed against a person as a means of gaining control of 

property.” ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1901(1). A person commits armed robbery by 

committing robbery under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1902 while either “armed with a deadly 

weapon or a simulated deadly weapon” or while using or threatening to use “a deadly 

weapon or dangerous instrument or a simulated deadly weapon.” ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-

1904. “The weapon . . . need not be displayed by the accused nor seen by the victim to 

satisfy . . . the armed robbery statute.” State v. Garza Rodriguez, 791 P.2d 633, 637 (1990). 

 In contending that Arizona armed robbery is not a serious violent felony, Movant 

argues that it does not require the use of “violent force” as defined in Johnson 2010. (Doc. 

10 at 8, ¶ 30).

6

 In Stokeling v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 544, 555 (2019), the Supreme 

Court concluded that the “physical force” element can be satisfied by the “amount of force 

necessary to overcome a victim’s resistance.” The Supreme Court explained that this 

understanding of “physical force” comports with Johnson 2010, as the “force necessary to 

overcome a victim’s physical resistance is inherently ‘violent’ in the sense contemplated 

by Johnson [(2010)], and suggests a degree of power that would not be satisfied by the 

merest touching.” Id. at 553 (citing Johnson 2010, 559 U.S. at 139) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). “This is true because robbery that must overpower a victim’s will—even 

a feeble or weak-willed victim—necessarily involves a physical confrontation and 

struggle.” Id.

The undersigned finds that the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Stokeling applies to 

the analysis in this case as the Florida robbery statute at issue in Stokeling is similar to 

Arizona’s robbery statute. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit recently concluded that Stokeling 

“effectively overruled” previous Ninth Circuit precedent holding that certain state 

robberies are not crimes of violence within the meaning of the ACCA, which contains a 

 

6 Movant also contends that Arizona armed robbery does not require the 

“intentional” use of force. The United States correctly explains (Doc. 22 at 12 n.8) that 

this contention is without merit as ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1902(A) plainly requires “force 

against any person with intent either to coerce surrender of property or to prevent resistance 

to such person taking or retaining property.” (emphasis added).

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“force clause” that is nearly identical to the “force clause” of § 3559(c)(F)(ii). Ward v. 

United States, 936 F.3d 914, 919 (9th Cir. 2019) (“Our prior distinction between 

‘substantial’ and ‘minimal’ force in the ACCA robbery context . . . cannot be reconciled 

with the Supreme Court’s clear holding in Stokeling.”). The Arizona Supreme Court has 

held that robbery requires “force or a threat of imminent physical injury sufficient to 

overpower the party robbed.” State v. Garza Rodriquez, 791 P.2d 633, 637 (Ariz. 1990) 

(en banc) (citing State v. Bishop, 698 P.2d 1240, 1243 (Ariz. 1985) (“‘Force’ sufficient to 

constitute robbery may either be before, or at the time of the taking, and it must be of such 

a nature as to show that it was intended to overpower the party robbed.”). Therefore, under 

Stokeling, the undersigned finds that Arizona armed robbery is a serious violent felony

under § 3559(c)(2)(F)’s “force clause” because it requires the use of force to overcome the 

victim’s resistance. The undersigned finds that Movant’s third claim for relief is 

procedurally defaulted and without merit. 

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Court dismiss the Motion to Vacate (Doc. 10) 

with prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Court decline to issue a certificate 

of appealability because reasonable jurists would not find the Court’s procedural ruling 

debatable. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).

This Report and Recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to 

the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 

4(a)(1) should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The parties shall 

have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this Report and Recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 6, 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within which to file a 

response to the objections. Failure to file timely objections to the Magistrate Judge’s 

Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and 

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Recommendation by the District Court without further review. Failure to file timely 

objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a 

waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment 

entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See United States v. ReynaTapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003); Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 

(9th Cir. 2007).

Dated this 20th day of December, 2019.

Honorable Eileen S. Willett

United States Magistrate Judge

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