Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-02170/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-02170-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Richard L. O’Neil, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV 11-2170-PHX-ROS (DKD)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE ROSLYN O. SILVER, CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE:

Richard L. O’Neil filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

2254 on November 4, 2011, challenging his convictions in Pinal County Superior Court for

fraudulent schemes and artificies, theft and forgery, and the trial court’s imposition of

concurrent prison terms, the longest being 15.75 years. In his habeas petition, he raises four

grounds for habeas relief. He contends that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to conduct

a sufficient pre-trial investigation and for deficient performance during trial. He also

contends that the evidence was insufficient to convict him, and that he is actually innocent

of all charges because he did not have the requisite intent. Respondents contend that

O’Neil’s petition is untimely, and that his claims are unexhausted and procedurally

exhausted. The Court concludes that the petition is untimely, that O’Neil is not entitled to

any statutory or equitable tolling, and recommends that the petition be denied and dismissed

with prejudice.

Case 2:11-cv-02170-ROS Document 14 Filed 11/20/12 Page 1 of 6
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BACKGROUND

The facts surrounding the offenses are stated in the court of appeals memorandum

decision:

On July 29, 2004, a teller at a bank in Casa Grande brought O’Neil to

the desk of Donna V., because O’Neil apparently sought a loan to buy a house.

When O’Neil told her his name was “Richard L. O’Neil, Jr.,” Donna asked

O’Neil if he had been in Tucson the day before trying to locate his account,

and he responded that he had. The previous day Donna had received a

telephone call from a teller at a Tucson branch trying to locate an account for

“Richard O’Neil,” but Donna had not been able to find the account. While

speaking with O’Neil, Donna noticed he had a document containing several

pages in his hands. Taking it from him to inspect, she determined it showed

a transaction history for a checking account that belonged to O’Neil’s uncle

“Rick” and brother “Jimmy.” Donna did not give the document back to

O’Neil, and it was later admitted at trial. The account-holder’s name listed on

the document was “Richard P. O’Neil,” the name of O’Neil’s uncle.

After Donna reviewed the document, O’Neil told her he was “supposed

to be on the account” so he could assist Jimmy in paying bills. Upon looking

up the account electronically, Donna told O’Neil his name was not on it. She

informed him that, to add him to the account, all three “signers” – his brother

Jimmy, his uncle Rick, and his father James – would have to come into the

bank. During their interaction, O’Neil never referred to the possible existence

of a second bank account. After O’Neil left the bank, Donna called Rick and

asked if O’Neil was supposed to be on the account with Jimmy, to which Rick

replied, “No. Hell[,] no,” and came immediately to the bank. Donna also

discovered that, before her interaction with O’Neil, the teller had given him

$600 from the account.

The bank’s custodian of records, Michelle Johnston, testified “Richard

O’Neil” had made three cash withdrawals from this account in the last weeks

of July 2004. On July 23, he withdrew $550; three days later, he withdrew

$1,900; and finally, on July 29, he withdrew $600. The number of a state

identification card issued to “Richard Learned O’Neil” is written on all three

withdrawal slips. Johnston also testified she could distinguish the letter “L”

in the middle of the signature on each slip.

O’Neil’s brother Jimmy testified that O’Neil came and spoke to him at

work and asked him to “get things straightened out” with the bank. When

Jimmy replied that he would have to call Rick, O’Neil got “an intimidating

look on his face and ...just took off.” Jimmy did not see O’Neil after that day.

Rick, who is a certified public accountant, testified he had been helping Jimmy

with “financial guidance” since Jimmy began living on his own at age

nineteen. He testified Jimmy has “congenital brain damage,” which causes

him to read at a kindergarten level and renders him unable to work with

numbers above thirty. Thus, Jimmy, his father, and his uncle Rick had opened

the account in 1991 so Rick could deposit Jimmy’s paychecks and monitor his

spending. Rick stated that Jimmy had been “duped a couple of times” into

buying things for more than they were worth.

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O’Neil called Rick several days after Rick had learned of the

withdrawals. O’Neil admitted the bank had wrongfully given him money from

Jimmy’s account but blamed it on the bank’s error. Then O’Neil stated he had

an account at the same bank into which he regularly deposited money. When

Rick suggested the two go to the bank the next day and fix the mistake by

simply transferring money from O’Neil’s account back into Jimmy’s, O’Neil

responded that there was actually no money in his account. O’Neil told Rick

he thought his father had put money into an account for him. When Rick

pressed him further, O’Neil stated his father had not given him permission to

withdraw any money but had been planning to give it to him and, in any event,

he believed he would inherit the money eventually. Finally, when Rick told

O’Neil he had informed the police about the withdrawals, O’Neil “became

very upset” and threatened his uncle before hanging up the telephone.

On cross-examination, Rick testified about a conversation with O’Neil’s

father, in which James stated he had opened a joint account with O’Neil at one

time, but “then he had [O’Neil]’s name taken off of that account.” Rick

believed James had done so “fairly recently,” but did not know exactly when.

When James and O’Neil had gone into the bank to have O’Neil’s name

removed, the bank had erroneously “called up” Jimmy’s account first, thus

alerting O’Neil to the existence of Jimmy’s account.

At the noon recess on the first day of trial, O’Neil’s counsel alerted the

court that she had received “a faxed copy of a bank statement” that morning

from O’Neil’s father. She moved to admit the document as proof of an

account in James’s and O’Neil’s names, but the court denied her motion. She

also moved the court to allow James to testify telephonically or for a recess so

James could testify in person about the existence of that account. The court

also denied these motions, admonishing her for not subpoenaing all potential

witnesses. But the court allowed her to mark the exhibit so that, if O’Neil

testified, defense counsel could use it, if necessary, to refresh O’Neil’s

recollection about the account.

After the close of the state’s evidence, O’Neil moved for a judgment of

acquittal pursuant to Rule 20, Ariz. R. Crim. P., arguing the state had not

proven he had intended to take money out of Jimmy’s account. The court

denied the motion. On the second day of trial, in O’Neil’s absence, the jury

convicted him of all charges.

(Doc. 11, Exh A at 3-6).

In O’Neil’s appeal, consolidated with his petition for post-conviction relief, the court

of appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences, and denied his post-conviction petition

(Id.). On June 30, 2008, the Arizona Supreme Court denied review (Doc. 11, Exh N).

O’Neil did not seek review of that decision in the United States Supreme Court (Doc. 1 at

3). On May 3, 2010, O’Neil filed a second notice of post-conviction relief (Doc. 11, Exh O).

In the July 24, 2010 memorandum in support of his second post-conviction petition, he

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argued that his uncle’s desire that he be sentenced to a short prison term constituted newly

discovered evidence that would have impacted his sentence (Id., Exh P). On October 27,

2010, the trial court denied relief, ruling that O’Neil had failed to identify an exception to the

rule requiring him to raise all grounds for relief in the first post-conviction petition (Id., Exh

Q at 2). The trial court also determined that O’Neil’s evidence was not newly discovered

because it had been known and discussed at the sentencing hearing. The trial court also

noted that O’Neil’s uncle’s wishes for a reduced term had been considered by the trial court,

and adopted as a mitigating factor, resulting in the imposition of a presumptive rather than

aggravated term (Id. at 2-3). O’Neil did not seek review of the trial court’s October 27, 2010

decision (Doc. 1 at 5). O’Neil filed his federal petition on November 4, 2011.

DISCUSSION

O’Neil was required to file his federal petition within one year of the “date on which

the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time

for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A); Jimenez v. Quarterman, 129 S.Ct.

681, 685 (2009). O’Neil’s conviction became final on September 28, 2008, following the

expiration of the ninety-day period in which he could have filed a petition for writ of

certiorari from the United State Supreme Court for review of the Arizona Supreme Court’s

order denying review. See Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 1999). He was

required to file his petition by September 28, 2009. Absent any statutory or equitable tolling,

his petition, filed two years after the expiration of the limitations period, is untimely.

O’Neil has not established any grounds for statutory tolling. He filed nothing in state

court for almost two years. O’Neil’s post-conviction petition filed in 2010 did not toll the

limitations period. “[A] properly and timely filed petition in state court only tolls the time

remaining in the federal limitation period.” See Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir.

2001). There can be no tolling following the expiration of the limitations period because

“there is no period remaining to be tolled.” Webster v. Moore, 199 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir.

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2000). In addition, his 2010 post-conviction petition does not revive the expired limitations

period. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003).

O’Neil has not demonstrated that he is entitled to equitable tolling. He has not

established that he had been “pursuing his rights diligently,” and that “some extraordinary

circumstance stood in his way.” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. , 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2562

(2010) (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418-19 and n. 8 (2005)). The Ninth

Circuit has recognized an actual innocence exception to the limitations bar. Lee v. Lampert,

653 F.3d 929, 933 (9th Cir. 2011). To the extent that O’Neil is claiming actual innocence

because he lacked the requisite intent, the Court finds the claim is without merit and does not

justify equitable tolling. With the same evidence he now proffers, he made the identical

argument in state court: before the trial court as part of a Motion for Judgment of Acquittal,

before the jury during closing arguments, and before the court of appeals. In each instance,

the claim was rejected as without merit. Under such circumstances, such evidence cannot

constitute sufficient evidence of actual innocence to avoid the limitations bar.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Richard L. O’Neil’s Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with prejudice (Doc. 1).

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because dismissal of the Petition is

justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the ruling debatable.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen

days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure timely to file objections to the

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report

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and Recommendation by the district court without further review. See United States v.

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file objections to any

factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right

to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 19th day of November, 2012.

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