Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-00307/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-00307-19/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHELDON RAY NEWSOME,

Plaintiff,

v.

LOTERZSTAIN, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 2:19-cv-00307-DAD-JDP (PC) 

ORDER THAT PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS TO 

APPOINT COUNSEL AND TO BE PRESENT 

AT PRELIMINARY PROCEEDING BE 

DENIED 

ECF Nos. 75 & 78 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

THAT DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR 

PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT BE 

GRANTED AND THAT PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTIONS FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF BE 

DENIED 

ECF Nos. 61, 65, & 70 

OBJECTIONS DUE WITHIN 14 DAYS 

Plaintiff Sheldon Newsome, a state prisoner proceeding without counsel in this action 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleges that defendants Loterzstain and Dirisu violated his First and 

Eighth Amendment rights by retaliating against him and denying him adequate medical care.1

1 The parties’ filings are inconsistent with respect to the spelling of defendant 

Loterzstain—at times, she is referred to as Lotersztain. See, e.g., ECF No. 61-2 at 1. For the sake 

of consistency, I will spell her name Loterzstain.

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ECF No. 18. Defendants move for partial summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff failed to 

exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to both his First Amendment retaliation claim 

against defendant Dirisu and part of his Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against 

defendant Loterzstain. ECF No. 61. I recommend granting defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment.2 Plaintiff has also filed two motions for injunctive relief, ECF Nos. 65 and 70, which I 

recommend be denied, and a motion to appoint counsel, ECF No. 75, which I will deny.

First Motion for Injunctive Relief

To obtain preliminary injunctive relief, a claimant must show that he is likely to succeed 

on the merits of his case, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive 

relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that the injunction is in the public’s 

interest. See Winter v. NRDC, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). The bar is always high, and it is

particularly so in this case, where the requested relief impinges on questions of prison 

administration. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1970). Plaintiff’s motion does not 

address the Winter factors; instead, plaintiff contends without elaboration that his mail was 

subjected to tampering and that the facility withheld an unspecified portion of his legal property 

or “never sent it to ad-seg.” ECF No. 65. He does not identify the missing legal property, how 

the property relates to this case, or how the alleged withholding has or will cause him irreparable 

harm. See id. 

More fundamentally, because his motion does not identify actions that have been or could 

be taken by parties to this case, plaintiff has not shown that this court has jurisdiction to order the 

injunctive relief that he requests. See Zepeda v. U.S. I.N.S., 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1983)

(“A federal court may issue an injunction if it has personal jurisdiction over the parties and 

subject matter jurisdiction over the claim; it may not attempt to determine the rights of persons 

not before the court.”). Although courts have a limited authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1651 to issue 

injunctive relief “where non-party correctional officials are impeding the prisoner-plaintiff’s 

2 Because I do not identify genuine disputes of material fact, defendants’ request for a 

preliminary hearing, ECF No. 61-2 at 14, and plaintiff’s motion to be present at any such hearing, 

ECF No. 78, are denied as moot.

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ability to litigate his pending action,” this authority is “‘to be used sparingly[,] only in the most 

critical and exigent circumstances,’ and only ‘if the legal rights at issue are indisputably clear.’” 

Cunningham v. Martinez, No. 1:19-cv-1508-AWI-EPG (PC), 2021 WL 2549454, at *1 (E.D. Cal. 

June 22, 2021) (quoting Brown v. Gilmore, 533 U.S. 1301, 1303 (2001)). Plaintiff has not met 

this standard, and so I recommend that his motion for injunctive relief, ECF No. 65, be denied.

Motion for Appointment of Counsel

Plaintiff has filed a motion asking that counsel be appointed to aid him both in obtaining 

his lost legal documents and in securing access to the law library. ECF No. 75. Plaintiff does not 

have a constitutional right to appointed counsel, see Rand v. Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th 

Cir. 1997), and I lack the authority to require an attorney to represent plaintiff, see Mallard v. 

U.S. Dist. Ct. for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989). I can request the voluntary 

assistance of counsel, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) (“The court may request an attorney to represent 

any person unable to afford counsel”); Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525; however, without a means to 

compensate counsel, I will seek volunteer counsel only in exceptional circumstances. In 

determining whether such circumstances exist, “the district court must evaluate both the 

likelihood of success on the merits [and] the ability of the [plaintiff] to articulate his claims pro se 

in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted). As discussed above, plaintiff has neither shown that he is likely to succeed on the 

merits of his legal property allegations nor identified exceptional circumstances warranting the 

appointment of counsel. Accordingly, I find that appointment of counsel is not appropriate at this 

time. ECF No. 75.

Second Motion for Injunctive Relief

Plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction ordering his transfer to either the California Health 

Care Facility (“CHCF”) or the California Medical Facility (“CMF”) on the grounds that the 

Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”) cannot provide him with adequate medical 

care. ECF No. 70. Defendants argue that plaintiff’s motion is moot because he “is no longer 

housed at RJD and is receiving proper treatment for his medical conditions while housed at 

California State Prison, Sacramento” (“CSP-Sac”). ECF No. 73 at 1. “[W]hen a prisoner is 

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moved from a prison, his action will usually become moot as to conditions at that particular 

facility.” Nelson v. Heiss, 271 F.3d 891, 897 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal citations omitted). In 

plaintiff’s subsequent motion to appoint counsel, he attests that—since filing his earlier motion 

for injunctive relief—he has been “relocated from CSP-Sac to CHCF Stockton,” ECF No. 75,

corroborating defendants’ claim that plaintiff is no longer housed at RJD and indicating that he is 

presently housed at one of his preferred medical facilities. Thus, I find that plaintiff’s motion for 

injunctive relief is moot, and I recommend that it be denied. 

Motion for Summary Judgment

A. Background

In his second amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that defendants Loterzstain and 

Dirisu—a physician and certified nursing assistant at CMF, respectively—retaliated against him 

by effecting his transfer from the CMF Outpatient Housing Unit (“OHU”) to RJD in September 

2017. See ECF No. 18 at 3-10. He alleges that the transfer caused him mental and physical harm 

and impaired his access to treatment for certain chronic medical conditions.

3

 Id. at 6-8. He 

further alleges that Loterzstain declined to treat his swollen hands, discontinued his pain 

medication, discontinued his physical therapy, and removed him from the care of specialists in 

the University of California San Francisco (“UCSF”) neurology department. Id. at 10-11. The 

court’s screening order found that plaintiff stated a First Amendment retaliation claim against 

both Dirisu and Loterzstain and an Eighth Amendment claim against Loterzstain. See ECF 

No. 20 at 3.

Plaintiff filed several grievances before filing suit, but the parties’ arguments focus on 

one: CMF Health Care Grievance tracking number 17000066 (“CMF HC 17000066”), received 

on September 13, 2017. See ECF No. 61-4 at 199-217; ECF No. 76 at 12-22. In this grievance, 

plaintiff complained that, in being transferred or discharged, he was “being shown a form of 

reprisal by Dr. Loterzstain for filling [sic] 602’s on CNA F. Dirisu, and SRN II Croll.” ECF

3 Plaintiff has a “complicated medical history including an Arnold Chiari malformation 

and syringomyclia,” and he describes his symptoms as including pain in his shoulders and neck, 

difficulty moving and exercising, atrophy of his lower extremities, and swelling in his hands. 

ECF No. 18 at 10-12. 

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No. 61-4 at 203. He explained that other medical personnel had not told him that he was ready to 

be discharged, that he had not yet been evaluated by specialists at UCSF, and that he was

experiencing swelling and atrophy in his legs. Id. at 205. More generally, he stated, “I feel that 

I’m getting worse, but Dr. Loterzstain keeps telling me I’m doing better,” and added that he 

believed the transfer was “impacting [his] physical recovery.” Id. In support of his grievance, 

plaintiff attached both an earlier grievance that alleged verbal abuse by Dirisu and a letter 

addressed to the warden in which he objected to the transfer and explained that defendant 

Loterzstain had removed him from the care of UCSF’s neurology department. Id. at 203, 207, 

211-12. 

On October 23, 2017, the institutional-level review disposed of CMF HC 17000066 with 

“[n]o intervention,” id. at 210, and on February 28, 2018, that disposition was affirmed at the 

headquarters level, id. at 199. The chief of the Health Care Correspondence and Appeals Branch 

(“HCCAB”) wrote that plaintiff’s “health care grievance with attachment(s), health care record, 

and all pertinent department policies and procedures were reviewed.” Id. at 200. Finding that no

intervention was required, the response continued, “[t]hese records indicate that [plaintiff has] 

been evaluated by the primary care provider to determine [his] medical needs and the type of 

facility that is best suited for [his] continued health care.” Id. 

The record contains several other potentially relevant documents. First, plaintiff includes 

with his opposition a letter that he wrote to Federal Receiver Clark Kelso, dated September 7, 

2017, complaining that defendant Loterzstain had discontinued both his pain medication and 

physical therapy and had disregarded instructions given him by UCSF specialists. See ECF 

No. 76 at 10. He also includes a form CDCR 1824 Reasonable Accommodation Request CMFM-17-03070 (“CMF-M-17-03070”), filed on September 7, 2017, in which he objected to the 

transfer and explained that his “body is too fragile, and subjected to constant swelling, and pain to 

be housed anywhere else.” Id. at 24. Finally, he includes two CDC 7362 Health Care Services 

Request Forms, in which he objected to the cancellation of his physical therapy, id. at 28 (dated 

September 6, 2017), and to the change to his pain medication, id. at 29 (dated September 8, 

2017); his filings do not indicate whether these forms were attached to his grievances. 

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Legal Standards

A. Summary Judgment 

A motion for summary judgment will be granted only when “the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a

judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); see Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56. The moving party bears the burden of establishing that there is no genuine issue of 

material fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. If the moving party meets that burden by 

“presenting evidence which, if uncontradicted, would entitle it to a directed verdict at trial, [Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2)] shifts to [the nonmoving party] the burden of presenting specific facts 

showing that such contradiction is possible.” British Airways Bd. v. Boeing Co., 585 F.2d 946, 

950-52 (9th Cir. 1978).

Each party’s position must be supported by (1) citations to particular portions of materials 

in the record, including but not limited to depositions, documents, declarations, or discovery; or 

(2) argument showing that the materials cited do not establish the presence or absence of a 

genuine factual dispute or that the opposing party cannot produce admissible evidence to support 

its position. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). The court can consider other materials in the record not 

cited by the parties, but it is not required to do so. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); Carmen v. San 

Francisco Unified School Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Simmons v. Navajo 

Cnty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2010).

The court must apply standards consistent with Rule 56 to determine whether the moving 

party has demonstrated there to be no genuine issue of material fact and that judgment is 

appropriate as a matter of law. See Henry v. Gill Indus., Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 1993). 

“[A] court ruling on a motion for summary judgment may not engage in credibility 

determinations or the weighing of evidence.” Manley v. Rowley, 847 F.3d 705, 711 (9th Cir. 

2017) (citation omitted). The evidence must be viewed “in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party” and “all justifiable inferences” must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. 

Orr v. Bank of America, NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 772 (9th Cir. 2002); Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 

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198 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 2000).

B. PLRA Exhaustion 

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), “[n]o action shall be brought with 

respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner 

confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are 

available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). This statutory exhaustion requirement “applies 

to all inmate suits about prison life,” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002), regardless of the 

relief sought by the prisoner or the relief offered by the process, Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 

741 (2001). Unexhausted claims require dismissal. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007). 

A prison’s own grievance process, not the PLRA, determines how detailed a grievance 

must be to satisfy the PLRA exhaustion requirement. Id. at 218. A plaintiff’s administrative 

appeal must “provide enough information . . . to allow prison officials to take appropriate 

responsive measures.” Griffin v. Arpaio, 557 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Johnson 

v. Testman, 380 F.3d 691, 697 (2nd Cir. 2004)); see also Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813, 824 

(9th Cir. 2010) (“A grievance suffices to exhaust a claim if it puts the prison on adequate notice 

of the problem for which the prisoner seeks redress.”). The California prison system’s grievance 

regulations “define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.” Marella v. Terhune, 568 F.3d 1024, 

1027 (9th Cir. 2009). The regulations at the time of plaintiff’s claim required prisoners to list all 

staff members involved in the event, and to describe their involvement. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, 

§ 3087.2(g)(1).

4

 But if a prisoner “does not have information to identify involved staff 

member(s), the grievant shall provide any other available information that may assist in 

processing the health care grievance.” Id. at § 3087.2(g)(2).

The PLRA recognizes no exception to the exhaustion requirement, and the court may not 

recognize a new exception, even in “special circumstances.” Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 648

(2016). The one significant qualifier is that “the remedies must indeed be ‘available’ to the 

4 Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, chapter 1, article 8.6 (§§ 3087-3087.12) became operative on 

September 1, 2017—before plaintiff filed the relevant grievance—and it was renumbered without 

regulatory effect on August 8, 2019, at chapter 2, subchapter 2, article 5 (§§ 3999.225-3999.237).

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prisoner.” Id. at 1856. The Supreme Court has explained when an administrative procedure is 

unavailable:

[A]n administrative procedure is unavailable when (despite what 

regulations or guidance materials may promise) it operates as a 

simple dead end—with officers unable or consistently unwilling to 

provide any relief to aggrieved inmates . . . . Next, an 

administrative scheme might be so opaque that it becomes, 

practically speaking, incapable of use . . . . And finally, the same is 

true when prison administrators thwart inmates from taking 

advantage of a grievance process through machination, 

misrepresentation, or intimidation . . . . [S]uch interference with an 

inmate’s pursuit of relief renders the administrative process 

unavailable. And then, once again, § 1997e(a) poses no bar.

Id. at 643-44 (citations omitted); see also Andres v. Marshall, 867 F.3d 1076, 1079 (9th Cir. 

2017) (“When prison officials improperly fail to process a prisoner’s grievance, the prisoner is 

deemed to have exhausted available administrative remedies.”). If the court concludes that 

plaintiff has failed to exhaust available remedies, the proper remedy is dismissal without 

prejudice of the portions of the complaint barred by § 1997e(a). See Jones, 549 U.S. at 223-24; 

Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1175-76 (9th Cir. 2005).

Discussion

Defendants move for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff failed to exhaust available 

administrative remedies for a portion of his allegations. ECF No. 61-2. The screening order 

found that plaintiff stated potentially cognizable (1) retaliation claims against both defendants 

Dirisu and Loterzstain and (2) a deliberate indifference claim against defendant Loterzstain, 

insofar as he effected plaintiff’s transfer out of the OHU, removed him from the care of the UCSF 

neurology department, discontinued his pain medication, failed to treat his swollen hands, and 

discontinued his physical therapy. ECF No. 20 at 2-3. Defendants acknowledge that plaintiff 

filed and fully appealed a grievance that complained that defendant Loterzstain both retaliated 

against him by effecting his transfer from CMF OHU and removing him from the care of the 

UCSF neurology department. See ECF No. 61-2 at 5 (discussing CMF HC 1700066). However, 

they argue that neither CMF HC 17000066 nor any other grievance provided sufficient notice of 

plaintiff’s allegations (1) that defendant Dirisu acted in retaliation against him or (2) that 

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defendant Loterzstain discontinued his pain medication, failed to treat his swollen hands, and

discontinued his physical therapy. Id. at 10-11. For the following reasons, I agree with 

defendants and recommend granting them partial summary judgment.

First, defendants argue that CMF HC 17000066 alleges only that Loterzstain retaliated 

because of grievances submitted against Dirisu but does not allege that Dirisu personally acted in 

retaliation. ECF No. 77 at 4. Although “[a] grievance need not include legal terminology or legal 

theories,” it must at least provide enough factual detail to “alert[] the prison to the nature of the 

wrong for which redress is sought.” Griffin, 557 F.3d at 1120. In Griffin, the prisoner-plaintiff

filed a grievance stating that, due to his medical conditions, he had experienced difficulty 

accessing his top bunk; the plaintiff requested a ladder “as some sort of permanent step.” Id. at 

1118. Although he received an order for a lower bunk assignment, prison staff allegedly 

disregarded it, forcing him to remain on a top bunk. Id. at 1118-19. The Ninth Circuit held that 

neither the initial grievance nor his subsequent appeals—which continued to request a ladder—

“‘provide[d] enough information . . . to allow prison officials to take appropriate responsive 

measures’ . . .[, since t]he officials responding to his grievance reasonably concluded that the 

nurse’s order for a lower bunk assignment solved [his] problem.” Id. at 1121. 

In CMF HC 17000066, plaintiff complained that he was “being shown a form of reprisal 

by Dr. Loterzstain for filling [out] 602’s on CNA F. Dirisu, and SRN II Croll.” ECF No. 61-4 at 

203. Plaintiff’s complaint identified his earlier grievance against Dirisu as a precipitating cause 

of the reprisal, but it identified only Loterzstain as having taken action against him; nowhere does 

it allege Dirisu’s participation. See id. at 203-12. In a letter to the CMF warden that plaintiff 

attached to his grievance, he stated that “[t]he instigator of this [transfer from OHU housing] was 

Dr. Lotersztain [sic] . . . .” Id. at 211. Neither this grievance nor any of the filings in the record 

contain the factual allegations of Dirisu’s participation in the retaliation—for instance, that he had 

a “‘wish list’ of inmate/patients he wanted out of the [OHU],” ECF No. 18 at 3, that he told 

plaintiff “I am gonna get Dr. Loterzstain to downgrade your level of care and get you 

transferred,” id. at 3-4, or that he and Loterzstain verbally abused plaintiff in Loterzstain’s office, 

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id. at 4. CMF HC 17000066 therefore did not provide sufficient notice to prison administrators of 

plaintiff’s claim that Dirisu participated in the alleged retaliation.

Second, defendants argue that plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with 

respect to a portion of his Eighth Amendment allegations against defendant Loterzstain. ECF 

No. 61-2 at 1-2. They do not dispute that CMF HC 17000066 exhausted his allegations that 

Loterzstain transferred him from CMF OHU and removed him from the care of the UCSF 

neurology department, but they argue that his grievance failed to provide notice that she refused 

to treat his swollen hands and discontinued both his pain medication and his physical therapy. Id.

at 1 & 5. This argument is similarly persuasive.

Although CMF HC 1700066 mentioned that plaintiff “[hadn’t] been evaluated by UCSF” 

and indicated that Loterzstain’s decision to transfer him was premature and inconsistent with 

sound medical judgment, it said nothing about her alleged refusal to treat his swollen hands or her 

alleged denial of both pain medication and physical therapy. ECF No. 61-4 at 203-205. The 

closest it comes to discussing any of these harms was a brief mention that plaintiff had been 

experiencing swelling and atrophy in his legs. See id. at 205. The institutional-level response to 

this grievance identified two issues: (1) “Requesting to remain in C.M.F G-3 OHU” and (2) 

“Requesting not be threatened or reprised against for appealing what is wrong.” Id. at 209. 

Nowhere in HCCAB’s response do they address the treatment for plaintiff’s hands or the denial 

of his pain medication and physical therapy. 

In his supplemental opposition, plaintiff contends that his additional filings—his letter to 

Clark Kelso, his reasonable accommodation request CMF-M-17-03070, and his CDC 7362 health 

care request forms—supply the more-particularized notice to prison administrators required to 

exhaust these additional claims. See ECF No. 80. Defendants contend that these filings were 

neither formal health care grievances nor properly submitted as attachments to a fully appealed

health care grievance. ECF No. 77 at 3-4. Plaintiff disputes these characterizations, claiming that 

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the documents were properly attached to one or more of his grievances and that the letter to Clark

Kelso was forwarded to HCCAB for review. See ECF No. 80 at 2-4.5

As an initial matter, there is no dispute that these documents are not formal health care

grievances and are not independently sufficient to exhaust plaintiff’s remedies. The California 

prison system’s grievance regulations “define the boundaries of proper exhaustion,” Marella, 

1027, and neither informal letters nor other request forms satisfy the requirement that prisoners 

use a “CDCR 602 HC to describe the specific complaint that relates to their health care.” Cal. 

Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3087.2(a) (renumbered at § 3999.277(a)); see Wilson v. Wann, No. CIV S06-1629 GEB KJM P, 2008 WL 4166886, *2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2008) (holding that letters to the 

warden and internal affairs do not exhaust administrative remedies under analogous regulations). 

Although the parties’ dispute whether the attachments were properly included with

plaintiff’s grievances, that disagreement should not drive the court’s evaluation of defendants’

motion for partial summary judgment. A grievance package can include only “supporting 

documents necessary for the clarification and/or resolution of the issue(s)” described in the 

grievance itself. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3087.2(j) (renumbered at § 3999.277(j)); see § 3087

(“Supporting documents do not include documents that . . . introduce new issues not identified in 

the current health care grievance.”). Attachments will not result in an exhaustion of remedies 

with respect to an issue not identified in the grievance itself. See Dixon v. LaRosa, No. 2:10-CV1441-GEB-KJN, 2011 WL 3875806, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2011) (holding that supplemental 

declaration with additional claims did not provide proper notice since analogous general 

grievance regulations “only permit[] the attachment of supporting documents which are 

‘necessary to clarify the appeal’”). Here, since neither of the grievances say anything about 

Loterzstain’s failure to treat his hands or her discontinuation of his pain medications or physical 

therapy, see ECF No. 61-4 at 183-86, 203-205, the allegedly attached documents are insufficient 

5 Plaintiff also references RJD HC 17000230, which alleged that he had been wrongly 

transferred and requested to return to an OHU setting, and which was denied at the headquarters 

level as “a duplicate issue to that in . . . CMF HC 17000066.” ECF No. 61-4 at 182-88; See ECF 

No. 80 at 4 (claiming that plaintiff properly attached the CDCR 1824 reasonable accommodation 

request to RJD HC 17000230). 

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to preserve any claims related to these issues.

Accordingly, I find that defendants have met their burden of showing that plaintiff failed 

to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing suit, and I recommend that their motion for 

partial summary judgment be granted. I recommend the dismissal of plaintiff’s retaliation claim 

against Dirisu and the parts of his deliberate indifference claim against Loterzstain stemming 

from his allegations that she denied him treatment for his hands, discontinued his pain 

medication, and discontinued his physical therapy. If these recommendations are adopted, the 

case will proceed on plaintiff’s claims against Loterzstain for retaliation and for deliberate 

indifference related to the transfer from CMF OHU and the deprivation of his access to UCSF 

specialists.

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that: 

1. Plaintiff’s motion to appoint counsel, ECF No. 75, be denied; and

2. plaintiff’s motion to be present at a possible preliminary proceeding, ECF No. 78, be 

denied. 

Further, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that:

1. Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment, ECF No. 61, be granted;

2. defendant Dirisu be dismissed from the case; 

3. plaintiff’s motion for injunctive relief, ECF No. 65, be denied; and

4. plaintiff’s second motion for injunctive relief, ECF No. 70, be denied. 

I submit these findings and recommendations to the district judge under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, 

Eastern District of California. Within 14 days of the service of the findings and 

recommendations, any party may file written objections to the findings and recommendations 

with the court and serve a copy on all parties. That document should be captioned “Objections to 

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The district judge will review the findings 

and recommendations under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). 

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 25, 2022 

JEREMY D. PETERSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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