Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-00372/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-00372-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL TATER-ALEXANDER, ) 

 )

Plaintiff, )

)

)

v. )

)

CORPORAL LONNIE R. AMERJAN, )

et al., ) 

 )

Defendants. )

)

 )

1:08-cv-00372-OWW-SMS 

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

APPLICATION TO PROCEED IN FORMA

PAUPERIS 

ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S

COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO FILE AN

AMENDED COMPLAINT NO LATER THAN

THIRTY DAYS AFTER THE DATE OF

SERVICE OF THIS ORDER

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed on March 14, 2008, a

complaint for damages and other relief concerning alleged

violations of civil rights. On the same date, he lodged an

application to proceed in forma pauperis, which by separate order

the Court has directed be filed. The matter has been referred to

the Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local

Rules 72-302 and 72-304.

I. Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis

Plaintiff has submitted a declaration that makes the showing

required by § 1915(a). Accordingly, the request to proceed in

forma pauperis will be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).

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II. Screening the Complaint

In cases wherein the plaintiff is proceeding in forma

pauperis, the Court is required to screen cases and shall dismiss

the case at any time if the Court determines that the allegation

of poverty is untrue, or the action or appeal is frivolous or

malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,

or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from

such relief. 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2).

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) provides:

A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief,

whether an original claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim, shall contain

(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds

upon which the court’s jurisdiction depends,

unless the court already has jurisdiction and 

the claim needs no new grounds of jurisdiction

to support it, (2) a short and plain statement

of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled

to relief, and (3) a demand for judgment for

the relief the pleader seeks. Relief in the 

alternative or of several different types 

may be demanded.

A complaint must contain a short and plain statement as required

by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although the Federal Rules adopt a

flexible pleading policy, a complaint must give fair notice and

state the elements of the claim plainly and succinctly. Jones v.

Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984).

Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity

overt acts which the defendants engaged in that support

Plaintiff's claim. Id. Although a complaint need not outline all

elements of a claim, it must be possible to infer from the

allegations that all elements exist and that there is entitlement

to relief under some viable legal theory. Walker v. South Cent.

Bell Telephone Co., 904 F.2d 275, 277 (5 Cir. 1990); Lewis v. th

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ACB Business Service, Inc., 135 F.3d 389, 405-06 (6 Cir. 1998). th

In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the Court must

accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question,

Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital, 425 U.S. 738, 740

(1976), construe the pro se pleadings liberally in the light most

favorable to the Plaintiff, Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447

(9 Cir. 2000), and resolve all doubts in the Plaintiff’s favor, th

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

If the Court determines that the complaint fails to state a

claim, leave to amend should be granted to the extent that the

deficiencies of the complaint can be cured by amendment. Lopez v.

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9 Cir. 2000) (en banc). A th

complaint, or a portion thereof, should only be dismissed for

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if it

appears beyond doubt that the Plaintiff can prove no set of

facts, consistent with the allegations, in support of the claim

or claims that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King &

Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), citing Conley v. Gibson, 355

U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake Log

Owners’ Ass’n., Inc., 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9 Cir. 1981). th

Dismissal of a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim is

proper only where it is obvious that the Plaintiff cannot prevail

on the facts that he has alleged and that an opportunity to amend

would be futile. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d at 1128.

A claim is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis either in

law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989). A

frivolous claim is based on an inarguable legal conclusion or a

fanciful factual allegation. Id. A federal court may dismiss a

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claim as frivolous if it is based on an indisputably meritless

legal theory or if the factual contentions are clearly baseless.

Id. 

The test for malice is a subjective one that requires the

Court to determine whether the applicant is proceeding in good

faith. Kinney v. Plymouth Rock Squab. Co., 236 U.S. 43, 46

(1915); see Wright v. Newsome, 795 F.2d 964, 968 n. 1 (11 Cir. th

1986). A lack of good faith is most commonly found in repetitive

suits filed by plaintiffs who have used the advantage of costfree filing to file a multiplicity of suits. A complaint may be

inferred to be malicious if it suggests an intent to vex the

defendants or abuse the judicial process by relitigating claims

decided in prior cases, Crisafi v. Holland, 655 F.2d 1305, 1309

(D.C.Cir. 1981); if it threatens violence or contains

disrespectful references to the Court, id.; or if it contains

untrue material allegations of fact or false statements made with

knowledge and an intent to deceive the Court, Horsey v. Asher,

741 F.2d 209, 212 (8 Cir. 1984). th

Here, Plaintiff alleges that he visited the emergency room

of Defendant Clovis Community Medical Center, where he refused

staff requests to wear a hospital gown because he needed and

wanted to remain warm in his sweat clothes due to a physical

condition that caused extreme pain when he was cold. Plaintiff

alleges that Defendants, who are the hospital, a doctor and nurse

practitioner, two Clovis city police officers, and the city of

Clovis, deprived him of various civil, statutory, and

constitutional rights in declining or delaying treatment,

interfering with treatment, and disclosing confidential

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information. Plaintiff alleges that he was eventually treated

with medication and draining of a pancreatic cyst after twelve

hours, but the delay resulted in physical and emotional injury,

including permanent organ failure. He seeks damages and

injunctive relief.

A. EMTALA Claim

Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages from

Defendant Clovis Community Medical Center for a violation of the

Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), 42

U.S.C. § 1395dd, et seq. Section 1395dd(a) provides in part:

(a) Medical screening requirement

In the case of a hospital that has a hospital

emergency department, if any individual (whether

or not eligible for benefits under this subchapter)

comes to the emergency department and a request

is made on the individual's behalf for examination

or treatment for a medical condition, the hospital

must provide for an appropriate medical screening

examination within the capability of the hospital's

emergency department, including ancillary services

routinely available to the emergency department,

to determine whether or not an emergency medical

condition (within the meaning of subsection (e)(1)

of this section) exists.

An emergency medical condition is one that is manifested by acute

and severe symptoms, including severe pain, such that the absence

of immediate medical attention could reasonably be expected to

result in placing the health of the individual in serious

jeopardy, serious impairment to bodily functions, or serious

dysfunction of any bodily organ or part. § 1395dd(e)(1). The

screening required is a screening examination that is comparable

to that offered to other patients with similar symptoms, unless

the examination is so cursory that it is not designed to identify

acute and severe symptoms that alert the physician of the need

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for immediate medical attention to prevent serious bodily injury.

Jackson v. East Bay Hospital, 246 F.3d 1248, 1256 (9 Cir. th

2001). Evidence that a hospital did not follow its own screening

procedures can support a finding of EMTALA liability for

disparate treatment. Baker v. Adventist Health, Inc. , 260 F.3d

987, 995 (9 Cir. 2001). th

Plaintiff alleged that when he sought emergency medical

treatment from Defendant hospital, he received treatment so

cursory that it was not designed to identify acute and severe

symptoms that alert a physician to the need for immediate medical

attention to prevent serious bodily injury; the hospital failed

to provide screening to diagnose an emergency medical condition.

(Complt. at 10-11.) Plaintiff alleged specific facts supporting

this conclusion, namely, that Defendant hospital delayed for ten

or twelve hours in performing blood tests and administering an

IV, which were eventually completed via Plaintiff’s left hand,

and in otherwise proceeding to determine his condition, which

involved a pancreatic cyst that caused great pain, extreme

abdominal pressure, and inability to eat or drink. Plaintiff

alleges that his condition was made known to Defendants. The

condition required draining, but the draining was delayed, and

the delay contributed to Plaintiff’s ultimately suffering

permanent failure of the pancreas after the delayed draining of

the cyst. (Id. at 11-12, 16.) Plaintiff alleged that on that

occasion and on two other occasions, doctors and nurses of

Defendant hospital had no trouble checking his vitals or

recording pain intensity while Plaintiff was wearing street

clothes. (Id. at 16.)

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It may be inferred that Plaintiff declined to wear the hospital gown 1

because of a medical condition that qualified Plaintiff to receive Social

Security disability and that caused Plaintiff to need to keep his body

temperature regulated; it may also be inferred that Plaintiff informed the

hospital of the reason why he would not wear a hospital gown and in effect

sought them to accommodate his disability. Although the Court will indulge in

inferences in favor of a pro se Plaintiff at this stage of screening,

Plaintiff is informed that his allegations concerning these matters should be

as express as possible; Plaintiff will be given an opportunity to amend his

allegations.

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One inference that may be drawn from the complaint is that

the Defendant’s own conduct of refusing to wear a hospital gown,

as requested by hospital staff, was the reason for Defendant

hospital’s failure to provide screening. However, Plaintiff

specifically alleged that the requirement of wearing a hospital

gown was only the personal preference of Defendants, that failure

to wear a gown did not in any way hinder or prevent an

appropriate screening, and that Defendants intentionally failed

to diagnose his condition. (Id. at 11-12.) Plaintiff also 1

alleged in connection with his claim against the Clovis police

officers that the officers, in the company of hospital staff,

stated to Plaintiff that they knew who he was and that he was

“Mr. Jacoby & Meyers,” referring to Plaintiff as a well-known law

firm. (Cmplt. p. 4.) Further, he alleged in substance that the

officers and hospital staff agreed to attempt to effectuate

Plaintiff’s removal from the hospital because they did not want

to treat him. (Id. pp. 4-5.) Although many inferences are

possible, construing the complaint liberally in the light most

favorable to the pro se Plaintiff, and resolving all doubts in

the Plaintiff’s favor, the Court concludes that Plaintiff stated

a claim of refusal on the part of Defendants to screen as

distinct from a voluntary refusal on Plaintiff’s part to consent

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to treatment.

Further, although Plaintiff alleged that Defendant officers

commanded Plaintiff to leave, offered to drive Plaintiff to

another hospital or to escort him to his car, and insisted on

calling a friend to come pick Plaintiff up (Cmplt. at 5), these

allegations do not appear to amount to assertions of a transfer

within the meaning of § 1395dd(b)(3) (requirement that a hospital

that determines that the patient has an emergency medical

condition must either provide stabilizing examination and

treatment, or certify via a qualified medical person that

transfer to another medical facility is appropriate) because it

is alleged that the Defendants failed to screen Plaintiff or to

undertake any efforts upon which it could have been determined

that he had an emergency medical condition. It therefore appears

that it had not been determined that Plaintiff had an emergency

medical condition, and that therefore no certification or

transfer pursuant to the statute was alleged to have been in

progress. 

With respect to a remedy, § 1395dd(d)(2) provides:

(2) Civil enforcement

(A) Personal harm

Any individual who suffers personal harm as

a direct result of a participating hospital's

violation of a requirement of this section may,

in a civil action against the participating hospital,

obtain those damages available for personal injury

under the law of the State in which the hospital

is located, and such equitable relief as is

appropriate.

Section 1395dd(e)(2) provides that the term “participating

hospital” means a hospital that has entered into a provider

agreement under section 1395cc. Plaintiff alleged that Defendant

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 The Court notes that Plaintiff stated that screening was “not” within the capability of Defendant hospital’s 2

emergency department (id. ¶ 29), but it appears that his was inconsistent with other allegations and was thus

erroneous. Plaintiff may clarify this allegation in an amended complaint.

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hospital had an emergency department with the capacity to

dispense emergency services and other forms of health care, and

that it received federal Medicare dollars by contract. (Id. p. 2

10.) 

The Court concludes that Plaintiff sufficiently alleged a

claim for a failure to screen for an emergency medical condition

by Defendant hospital pursuant to EMTALA.

B. Discrimination Based on Disability

With respect to screening Plaintiff’s claim or claims

concerning discrimination because of disability, the precise

status of the hospital as a governmental or a private entity is

not clearly alleged. Thus, the Court cannot be certain that

Plaintiff properly proceeds pursuant to Title II of the ADA as is

alleged. Plaintiff is directed to supplement and clarify his

allegations in this respect to the extent possible.

1. Title II of the ADA

Title II, 42 U.S.C. § 12132, applies to the public sector

and states essentially that no qualified individual with a

disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from

participation in or be denied the benefits of the services,

programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to

discrimination by any such entity. To establish a violation of

Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must show that he or she 1) is a

qualified individual with a disability, 2) was excluded from

participation in or otherwise discriminated against with regard

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to a public entity’s services, programs, or activities, and 3)

such exclusion or discrimination was by reason of the disability.

Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9 Cir. 2002). th

Plaintiff alleges that he was a qualified individual with a

disability, or disabled, as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).

(Cmplt. ¶ 2.) He alleges that he was permanently disabled and

environmentally sensitive, and that cold environmental conditions

caused him great pain, further causing him to maintain and

regulate his body temperature as part of his disability pain

management treatment. (Id. ¶ 30, 33.) Plaintiff’s application for

disability entitlement benefits under Title XVI and Title XIX was

granted. (Id. ¶ 34.) He alleges that he was denied the full and

equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,

advantages, and accommodations of a place of public accommodation

by Defendant hospital without due process and in violation of the

provisions of the ADA because of his environmentally sensitive

disability condition and because Defendant Manfield did not like

Plaintiff’s personal characteristics (dislike of Plaintiff,

lifestyle, food Plaintiff ate, and Plaintiff’s smoking and

drinking) as well as Plaintiff’s failure to wear a hospital gown

based on Plaintiff’s physical disability. (Cmplt. ¶¶ 29, 33.)

Under the statute, a disability with respect to an

individual is defined as a physical or mental impairment that

substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of

such individual, a record of such an impairment, or being

regarded as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).

Plaintiff has not alleged any specific facts concerning the

identity of his condition or as to the nature of his condition as

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a mental or physical impairment; he states only that he had a

“medical condition” (Cmplt. at ¶¶ 11, 12, 15, 22, 28), “medical

illness” (id. ¶ 37), had an “enviornmentally (sic) sensitive

disability condition” (id. at ¶ 33), and he refers in passing to

his “physical disability” and “medical illness” (id. at ¶ 37). 

Further, he has failed to allege any specific facts

concerning his condition or activities that would warrant an

inference that he was impaired in a manner that substantially

limited any specific or ascertainable major life activity.

However, he has alleged that he was entitled to disability

insurance benefits and is receiving Supplemental Security Income

benefits; accordingly, it may be inferred that Plaintiff suffers

from a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits

the major life activity of working in a way that disqualifies

Plaintiff from a broad class or range of jobs. Sutton v. United

air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999); 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A);

20 C.F.R. § 416.905 (defining disability under Title XVI as an

inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity existing

in the national economy due to a medically determinable mental or

physical impairment).

It is a reasonable inference that Plaintiff was otherwise

qualified to participate in or receive the benefit of the

hospital’s services, programs, or activities; Plaintiff alleged

that it was possible for him to receive care without donning a

hospital gown because such care had been administered on two

prior occasions at the hospital. 

Plaintiff has not alleged a claim against the hospital

because it is not alleged that Defendant hospital was a public

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entity within the meaning of the statute. In the complaint it is

alleged that Defendant hospital was an institution in which sick

or injured persons were given medical or surgical treatment,

including emergency medicine. (Cmplt. ¶ 6.) Plaintiff alleges

that it is “essentially a ‘county hospital’ by definition”

(Cmplt. ¶ 27) in that it receives county, state, and federal

Medicare dollars via a contract with the County of Fresno. (Id.)

The ADA defines “public entity” in pertinent part as “any

State or local government” or “any department, agency, special

purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States

or local government.” 42 U.S.C. § 12131(a)(A)-(B). 

It has been held that a private hospital is not an

instrumentality of a state or local government as required for

liability on an ADA claim, even if the hospital performed

services pursuant to a contract with the public entity, if the

hospital is not a creature of the state or the local government,

such as an agency, department, or special purpose district as

specified by § 12131. Green v. City of New York, 465 F.3d 65, 78-

79 (2d Cr. 2006); see also, Schiavo ex rel.Schindler v. Schiavo,

403 F.3d 1289, 1293 (11 Cir. 2005). th

Further, a “public entity,” as defined in Title II, does not

include individuals in their individual capacities, and a

plaintiff may not pursue an ADA claim against individual

defendants named in the complaint. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1); Vinson

v. Thomas, 288 F.3d 1145, 1156 (9 Cir. 2002) (holding that a th

public official may not be sued in his or her individual capacity

under § 1983 for violations of the ADA or § 504 of the

Rehabilitation Act because by defining claims as claims against

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public entities under those statutes, Congress intended to limit

enforcement to claim against public entities, and thus the more

generalized recovery mechanism of § 1983 was not available).

Under Title II of the ADA (§ 12132), it is not required that

the sole reason for the exclusion, denial of benefits, or

discrimination be the disability. Head v. Glacier Northwest,

Incorporated, 413 F.3d 1053, 1063-65 (9 Cir. 2005). In Head, th

the court considered language from Title I ( 42 U.S.C. §

12112(a), “because of”), Title II (42 U.S.C. § 12132, “by reason

of”), and Title IV (42 U.S.C. § 12203(a), “because of”). The

court noted the contrast presented between the quoted language of

the ADA and the language of the Rehabilitation Act (“solely”),

and it concluded that the appropriate causal standard under the

ADA is that the disability must be a motivating factor. Head, 413

F.3d at 1063-65. Thus, the fact that Plaintiff alleges that he

was denied treatment for the additional reasons that he and his

lifestyle were not liked is not fatal to a claim under the ADA. 

Finally, it has been held that neither an ADA nor a RA claim

is stated where the gist of the claim concerns medical treatment

decisions involving alleged substandard treatment or medical

malpractice. See, Burger v.Bloomberg, 418 F.2d 882, 883 (8 Cir. th

2005); Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1289, 1294

(11 Cir. 2005); Fitzgerald v. Corr. Corp. of America, 403 F.3d th

1134, 1144 (10 Cir. 2005); Bryant v. Madigan, 84 F.3d 246, 249 th

(7 Cir. 1996). At this pleading stage of the proceedings, it th

appears that Plaintiff is not simply challenging carelessness or

the precise decisions made concerning the treatment to be

selected by persons who treated him, but rather is addressing the

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deliberate and total failure to treat him because of his medical

condition. However, to the extent that Plaintiff alleges

negligent treatment, Plaintiff fails to state an ADA or RA claim. 

2. Title III of the ADA

With respect to Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (a)

provides that no individual shall be discriminated against on the

basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods,

services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations

of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns,

leases (or leases to) or operates a place of public

accommodation. Section 12181(7)(F) expressly provides that

specified private entities, including hospitals, are considered

public accommodations for purposes of the subchapter if the

operations of the entity affect commerce. 

Discrimination by denying participation, affording an

unequal benefit, or providing a separate but unequally effective

benefit are all prohibited by the statute. Section

12182(b)(1)(A)(i) specifies that it shall be discriminatory to

subject an individual or class of individuals on the basis of a

disability directly or through other arrangements to a denial of

the opportunity of the individual to participate in or benefit

from the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or

accommodations of an entity. Section 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii)

identifies as discriminatory affording an individual or class of

individuals on the basis of a disability with the opportunity to

participate in or benefit from a good, service, facility,

privilege, or advantage or accommodation that is not equal to

that afforded to other individuals. Section 12182(b)(I)(A)(iii)

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provides that it shall be discriminatory to provide an individual

a good, service, facility, privilege, or advantage or

accommodation that is different or separate from that provided to

other individuals unless such action is necessary to provide the

individual or class of individuals with a good, service,

facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation, or other

opportunity that is as effective as that provided to others.

Further, § 12182(b)(1)(D) provides that an individual or entity

shall not utilize standards or criteria or methods of

administration that may have the effect of discriminating on the

basis of disability. Section 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) specifies that

discrimination includes the failure to make reasonable

modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such

modifications are necessary to afford services, facilities,

privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals with

disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that

modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of such goods,

services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations.

Indulging all inferences in favor of Plaintiff, it may be

concluded that Plaintiff has alleged a denial of service on the

basis of his disability. However, Plaintiff may desire to specify

the form of discrimination suffered. In any event, Plaintiff has

not alleged any facts demonstrating that the operations of

Defendant hospital affected commerce. Thus, Plaintiff has not

stated a claim against Defendant hospital.

Further, no claim is stated against the Defendant doctor or

nurse because the governing law indicates that individuals may be

liable under the ADA if they own, lease, lease to, or operate a

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place of public accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a); Aikins v.St.

Helena Hospital, 843 F.Supp. 1329 (N.D.Cal. 1994). There is no

allegation that the individuals named as defendants had any

control with respect to the place providing the services. It is

alleged that Defendants Dr. Thomas E. Mansfield, who was sued in

his individual and “official” capacities, was a licensed medical

doctor who practiced as an emergency room physician via an

independent contractor agreement with Defendant Hospital. (Cmplt.

¶ 7.) It was alleged that Defendant nurse Marilyn Jo Greene, who

was sued in her individual and “official” capacities, was a

registered nurse practitioner and furnisher employed by Defendant

hospital, and she provided general nursing duties and care and

was responsible for carrying out the instructions of independent

contractor physicians. Plaintiff did not allege any facts

warranting an inference that the two practitioners were on the

hospital’s board of directors or had any authority to enact or

amend hospital policy. See, Aikins v. St. Helena Hospital, 843 F.

Supp. 1329, 1335 (N.D.Cal. 1994).

Accordingly, Dr. Mansfield and nurse Greene are not proper

Defendants under § 12182(a).

3. Retaliation Claim under Title IV

Title 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) provides that no person shall

discriminate against any individual because such individual has

opposed any act or practice made unlawful by the chapter or

because such individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or

participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or

hearing under the chapter. Section 12203(b) provides that it

shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere

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with any individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on

account of his or her having exercised or enjoyed any right

granted or protected by the chapter, or on account of his or her

having aided or encouraged any other individual in the exercise

or enjoyment of any right granted or protected by the chapter.

Section 12203(c) states that the remedies and procedures

available under sections 12117, 12133, and 121887 of the title

shall be available to aggrieved persons for violations of

subsections (a) and (b) of the section with respect to subchapter

I, subchapter II, and subchapter II of the chapter, respectively.

In order to state a claim for retaliation in violation of

the ADA, a plaintiff must show 1) plaintiff’s involvement in a

protected activity, 2) defendant’s subjecting plaintiff to an

adverse action, and 3) a causal link between the protected

activity and the defendant’s action. Munir v. Thomas, 2008 WL

64110, *6 (E.D.Cal. March 5, 2008) (citing Brown v. City of

Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181, 1186-87 (9 Cir. 2003) (outlining the th

elements of a prima facie case of ADA retaliation under a burdenshifting analysis)). Pursuing one’s rights under the ADA

constitutes protected activity. Pardi v. Kaiser Foundation

Hospitals, 389 F.3d 840, 850 (9 Cir. 2004). In the context of th

employment cases, an adverse action is any action reasonably

likely to deter employees from engaging in protected activity.

Pardi v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 389 F.3d at 850. Requesting

a reasonable accommodation is protected activity. See, Head v.

Glacier Northwest Inc., 413 F.3d 1053, 1066 (9 Cir. 2005). It th

has been held that complaining in good faith of disparate

treatment, failure to accommodate a plaintiff’s medical

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condition, or of retaliatory conduct that could constitute

discrimination under the ADA is protected activity because the

statute prohibits discrimination due to an individual’s

opposition to any conduct or practice made unlawful, or due to

one’s having made a charge. Angelone v. Seyfarth Shaw, LLP, 2007

WL 1033458, *12 (E.D.Cal. April 3, 2007).

It is unclear whether a claim for retaliation under 42

U.S.C. § 12203 may be brought against an individual in an

individual capacity. In Ostrach v. Regents of University of

California, 957 F. Supp. 196, 200 (E.D.Cal. 1997), it was held

that individual defendants can be liable for retaliation, as

distinct from non-retaliatory discrimination, under § 12203 of

the ADA, which expressly states that no “person” shall

discriminate; further, not only injunctive relief, but also

general and punitive damages were held to be available for a

wilful violation of the anti-retaliation provisions. However, it

has been held to the contrary. See, e.g., Stern v. California

State Archives, 982 F.Supp. 690, 693 (E.D.Cal. 1997), which

emphasizes that only the remedies provided under Title VII are

available for retaliation claims. In another circuit, it has been

held that a plaintiff asserting rights to public accommodation

can bring suit against individual defendants. Shotz v. City of

Plantation, Fla., 344 F.3d 1161, 1164-80 (11 Cir. 2003). In the th

absence of a binding opinion from the Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals, it will be assumed that such a claim exists. Cf., Munir

v. Thomas, 2008 WL 641110, *9 (E.D.Cal. March 5, 2008).

It is unclear whether Plaintiff is attempting to state such

a claim. Plaintiff alleged that he told the police officers that

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Defendant hospital, doctor, and nurse were denying him emergency

medical services and were punishing Plaintiff for exercising the

enjoyment of his legal rights, (Cmplt. ¶ 14); care such as an IV,

blood tests, and pain medication were eventually given but were

withheld as punishment for ten hours because Plaintiff would not

bow to the preference of Defendant hospital, doctor, and nurse

concerning wearing a gown, (id. at ¶ 30); and Defendants doctor,

nurse, and officers knew that Plaintiff had a severely painful

medical condition and purposefully intimidated and coerced him in

an attempt to cause him to leave the hospital in order to avoid

recordation of the intentional denial of treatment, (id. at ¶

36). It appears that Plaintiff may be attempting to state a claim

that he exercised his rights under the ADA by requesting from

Defendants an accommodation in the form of not having to wear a

hospital gown, and he complained about the lack of care that was

based in turn on his disability, and in retaliation, Defendants

took adverse action, such as denial of pain medication and other

treatment, etc. 

It does not appear that Plaintiff has stated such a claim,

but Plaintiff will have an opportunity to amend the complaint to

attempt to state such a claim.

4. Rehabilitation Act 

The Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, applies to entities

that receive federal financial assistance. Section 794(a)

provides that no otherwise qualified individual with a disability

in the United States, as defined by section 705(20) of the title,

shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded

from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be

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subjected to discrimination under, any program or activity

receiving federal financial assistance.

To establish a violation of the Rehabilitation Act, 29

U.S.C. § 794 (section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act), a plaintiff

must show that he or she 1) is handicapped within the meaning of

the Rehabilitation Act, 2) is otherwise qualified for the benefit

or services sought, 3) was denied the benefit or services solely

by reason of her handicap, and 4) the program providing the

benefit or services receives federal financial assistance. 

Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1052 (9 Cir. 2002). th

The same standards with respect to rights, remedies, and

procedures apply to Rehabilitation Act claims as are applied

under § 12132 (Title II) of the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12133. Thus, the

same remedies are available for violations of Title II of the ADA

and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 42 U.S.C. § 12133. The

remedies, in turn, are the same as those set forth in Title VI of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq. 29 U.S.C.

§ 794a(a)(2); Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d at 1055. Pursuant to

case law under Title VI, compensatory damages are not available

under Title II or § 504 absent a showing of discriminatory intent

that constitutes deliberate indifference, which requires both

knowledge that a harm to a federally protected right is

substantially likely, and a failure to act upon that likelihood.

Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d at 1055. 

Here, Plaintiff has alleged that the Defendant hospital

received federal financial assistance in the form of federal

Medicare dollars. (Cmplt. ¶ 27.)

However, Plaintiff has not alleged facts warranting an

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inference of the discriminatory intent required. Further, the

same defects or limitations noted above with respect to

Plaintiff’s claim under Title II apply to his claim under the

Rehabilitation Act. Plaintiff cannot state a claim under the

Rehabilitation Act with respect to the individual Defendants.

However, the Court additionally notes that under the

Rehabilitation Act, Plaintiff must allege that the discrimination

was due solely to his disability. Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d

1039, 1052 (9 Cir. 2002); compare, Head v. Glacier Northwest, th

Incorporated, 413 F.3d 1053, 1063-65 (9 Cir. 2005). Here, th

Plaintiff has alleged that he was denied service in part because

Defendant doctor did not like his personal characteristics or

behavior. (Cmplt. at ¶¶ 32, 33.) Thus, in this respect, Plaintiff

has failed to state a claim under the Rehabilitation Act against

Defendant hospital.

C. Claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

The Civil Rights Act provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law]...

subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the

United States... to the deprivation of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution... shall be liable to the party injured in

an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper

proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim pursuant to § 1983, a

plaintiff must plead that defendants acted under color of state

law at the time the act complained of was committed and that the

defendants deprived the plaintiff of rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United

States. Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9 Cir. th

1986). The statute plainly requires that there be an actual

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connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the

deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, (1978);

Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held

that "[a] person 'subjects' another to the deprivation of a

constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he

does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative

acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to

do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made."

Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

1. Color of Law and Conspiracy

Further, to state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff

must plead (1) that the defendant acted under color of state law

and (2) that the defendant deprived him of rights secured by the

Constitution or federal statutes. Gibson v. United States, 781

F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986). Generally, private parties are

not acting under color of state law. See Price v. Hawaii, 939

F.2d 702, 707-08 (9th Cir. 1991). 

However, “[a]ction taken by private individuals may be

‘under color of state law’ where there is ‘significant’ state

involvement in the action.” Howerton v. Gabica, 708 F.2d 380, 382

(9th Cir. 1983). 

A conspiracy between a private party and a state official to

deprive others of constitutional rights may result in action by a

private party under color of state law. A conspiracy claim

brought under section 1983 requires proof of “‘an agreement or

meeting of the minds to violate constitutional rights,’” Franklin

v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 441 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting United Steel

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Workers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 865 F.2d 1539, 1540-41 (9th

Cir. 1989) (citation omitted)), and an actual deprivation of

constitutional rights, Hart v. Parks, 450 F.3d 1059, 1071 (9th

Cir. 2006) (quoting Woodrum v. Woodward County, Oklahoma, 866

F.2d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1989)). “‘To be liable, each

participant in the conspiracy need not know the exact details of

the plan, but each participant must at least share the common

objective of the conspiracy.’” Franklin, 312 F.3d at 441 (quoting

United Steel Workers, 865 F.2d at 1541).

Here, Defendants doctor, nurse, and hospital are private

actors and thus cannot be said to have been acting individually

or in combination with each other under color of law.

However, Plaintiff alleges that Clovis Police officers Tina

Stirling and Lonnie R. Amerjan contacted Plaintiff at 10:25 p.m.

about Plaintiff’s declining to wear a hospital gown and trying to

resolve an issue concerning Plaintiff’s being an uncooperative

patient; after conferring with Defendant nurse Greene, the

officers directed Plaintiff to leave the hospital, employed

schemes, intimidation and coercion tactics verbally and with

physical gestures in an attempt to impede Plaintiff’s goal of

reasonable medical treatment and services; and with Defendants

doctor, nurse, and hospital, the officers intentionally and with

deliberate indifference and reckless disregard for Plaintiff’s

rights, interfered with and delayed Plaintiff’s right to obtain

reasonable medical emergency treatment, and denied Plaintiff his

liberty interest in receiving medical assistance and services 

(Cmplt. ¶¶ 11, 14, 16, 25, 34.) The hospital’s calling in the

police, the individuals’ sharing of allegedly confidential

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medical information, their conversing together and forming a plan

to get Plaintiff to leave the hospital without care, engaging in

specified conduct to get Plaintiff to leave, and denying care and

treatment was done pursuant to a plan by all Defendants to harm

Plaintiff on the basis of his physical disability. (Id. ¶¶ 35-

38.) Further, by not stopping the other Defendants’ abuse and

neglect of Plaintiff, the officers enabled the other defendants

to continue to deny Plaintiff his rights. (Id. ¶ 38.)

Drawing all inferences in favor of Plaintiff, it appears

that Plaintiff has alleged some of the elements a conspiracy,

such that it could be concluded that in their actions, the

private individual Defendants acted under color of law. However,

as the following discussion shows, Plaintiff has failed to

identify a right subject to being redressed under § 1983. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff has not stated a claim for conspiracy

and has not alleged specific facts to warrant the private

Defendants as proceeding under color of law.

2. Liability of Hospital and City of Clovis

a. The Hospital

Plaintiff has not stated a claim under § 1983 with respect

to the Defendant hospital. The governing principle of liability

is that in order for a person acting under color of state law to

be liable under § 1983, the person must be shown to have

personally participated in the alleged deprivation of rights;

there is no respondeat superior liability. Bell v. Clackamas

County, 341 F.3d 858, 867 (9 Cir. 2003); Jones v. Williams, 297 th

F.3d 930, 934 (9 Cir. 2002). th

Assuming without deciding that the Defendant hospital was

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acting as a private actor, the law concerning the liability of

corporate entities has not been definitively stated. See, Traver

v.Meshriy, 627 F.2d 934, 939 (9 Cir. 1980). However, courts th

which have considered the question have concluded that the

principles of liability articulated in Monell v. Department of

Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), apply to private

corporations acting under color of law; thus, a private

corporation is not vicariously liable under a theory of

respondeat superior for the constitutional torts of its

employees, but is liable only when an official policy or custom

of the corporation causes the deprivation of constitutional

rights. Robinson v. City of San Bernardino Police Dept., 992

F.Supp. 1198, 1204 (C.D.Cal. 1998); See, Nash v. Lewis, 2007 WL

2027283, *1 (D.Or. July 6, 2007) (citing Iskander v. Village of

Forest Park, 690 F.2d 126, 128-29 (7th Cir.1982); Sanders v.

Sears, Roebuck & Co., 984 F.2d 972, 975-76 (8th Cir.1993); Powell

v. Shopco Laurel Co., 678 F.2d 504, 506 (4th Cir.1982); Dubbs v.

Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1216 (10th Cir.2003); and Austin

v. Paramount Parks, Inc., 195 F.3d 715, 727-28 (4th Cir.1999)).

Under Monell, a local government unit may not be held

responsible for the acts of its employees under a respondeat

superior theory of liability. Monell v. Department of Social

Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); Webb v. Sloan, 330 F.3d 1158,

1163-64 (9th Cir. 2003); Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d

1175, 1185 (9th Cir. 2002). A local government unit may only be

held liable if it inflicts the injury of which the plaintiff

complains. Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1185.

Generally, a claim against a local government unit for

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municipal or county liability requires an allegation that "a

deliberate policy, custom, or practice... was the ‘moving force'

behind the constitutional violation... suffered." Galen v. County

of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 667 (9th Cir. 2007); City of

Canton, Ohio, v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989). 

Alternatively, and more difficult to prove, municipal

liability may be imposed where the local government unit's

omission led to the constitutional violation by its employee.

Gibson at 1186. Under this route to municipal liability, the

"plaintiff must show that the municipality's deliberate

indifference led to its omission and that the omission caused the

employee to commit the constitutional violation." Id. Deliberate

indifference requires a showing "that the municipality was on

actual or constructive notice that its omissions would likely

result in a constitutional violation." Id. 

Here, the complaint contained conclusional allegations of

the hospital’s participation or knowledge with respect to the

events in question (e.g., that the hospital summoned the police,

failed to diagnose, failed to afford Plaintiff with reasonable

procedural safeguards, was informed of Plaintiff’s disability,

etc.). Plaintiff states that the hospital was grossly negligent

in its oversight responsibilities of the individuals with whom

they had contractor agreements (Cmplt. § 33), and asserts:

A sufficient causal connection exists between

defendant Hospital, Mansfield and Green that in 

their supervisory, training, and teaching role on behalf

on (sic) defendant Hospital amounts to proliferating

unlawful conduct and the constitutional violations

associated therewith making them liable under § 1983

because they were personally involved in the constitutional

deprivations.

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(Cmplt. ¶ 33.) These are not allegations of fact. While detailed

allegations are not required, a plaintiff must set forth “the

grounds of his entitlement to relief[,]” which “requires more

than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action....” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007) (internal quotations and

citations omitted).

Accordingly, it is concluded that Plaintiff has not stated a

claim under § 1983 against the hospital with respect to medical

treatment.

b. City of Clovis

Plaintiff alleged that he was treated differently by

Defendant Officer Stirling because of a lack of training (Cmplt.

¶ 18); Officer Amerjan trained Officer Stirling (id. ¶ 20).

Corporal Amerjan was a veteran police officer with many years of

field experience and extensive legal training. (Id. ¶¶ 19, 20.)

The training was part of the custom, policy, and practice of the

city of Clovis, and because of a failure adequately to train

Officer Stirling, multiple violations of Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights proximately resulted (¶¶ 20, 26); Defendant

Amerjan’s training or failure to train adequately amounted to and

reflected deliberate indifference towards Plaintiff’s seeking

emergency medical treatment and public services, and represented

official policy and custom of the city because Defendant Corporal

Amerjan trained Defendant Stirling to use the same acts in the

future, and the city chose that method over other methods of

training. He further alleged:

...a sufficient causal connection exists between his

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supervisory, training, and teaching role on behalf

on (sic) defendant city in proliferating unlawful

conduct and the constitutional rights violations

associated therewith.

(Cmplt. ¶ 26.)

The Court concludes that Plaintiff has adequately pled the

liability of Defendant City, as distinct from any other

participants in the events in question, based on custom or

failure to train. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics

Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 165-68 (1993)

(allegation of failure to train and custom or policy, involving

only a single instance of misconduct, was held sufficient).

However, as the discussion which follows will show,

Plaintiff has not alleged facts showing that a right subject to

being redressed under § 1983 was violated, and thus he has not

stated a claim pursuant to § 1983.

3. Right that May Be Redressed under § 1983

With respect to all Defendants, the precise right or rights

concerning which Plaintiff seeks redress is unclear. The Court

will not attempt to discern claims where none are intended. See,

O’Guinn v. Lovelock Correctional Center, 502 F.3d 1056 (9 Cir. th

2007). However, it appears that Plaintiff relies on rights

relating to his Social Security disability and to constitutional

privacy. The Court must determine whether or not the right or

rights Plaintiff alleges were violated were federally protected

rights giving rise to a private action on the part of Plaintiff

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

a. Medical Treatment 

It is established that the remedy afforded by § 1983 can be

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used to bring actions against state actors for violations of

federal statutory as well as constitutional law. Maine v.

Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980).

Plaintiff alleged that his application for disability

benefits under Title XVI and for medical entitlement benefits

under Title XIX of the Social Security law was granted;

thereafter, Defendants denied him his benefits, and his liberty

interest therein, without due process of law by denying him

medical assistance. (Cmplt. at ¶¶ 34, 35.)

Plaintiff appears to rely on a right to procedural due

process. The Fourteenth Amendment protects persons against the

deprivation of liberty or property by the government without due

process. Portman v.County of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 904 (9th

Cir. 1993). A claim pursuant to § 1983 based on the deprivation

of procedural due process has three elements: 1) a liberty or

property interest, 2) a deprivation of the interest by the

government, and 3) lack of process. Id. 

Plaintiff cites to his right to disability insurance

benefits under Title XVI, and he cites to 42 U.S.C. § 1381a

(providing that every disabled person who is determined to be

eligible on the basis of his income and resources shall be paid

benefits by the Commissioner of Social Security), but Plaintiff

has alleged no facts indicating that Plaintiff’s receipt of

monetary benefits has been inhibited or denied. 

Plaintiff also cites to Title XIX, which is understood as a

reference to subchapter XIX, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396 through 1396v.

These multiple, complex statutes concern grants to states for

medical assistance programs. 

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With respect to federal statutes enacted pursuant to

Congress’s spending clause powers, a § 1983 remedy applies only

when Congress manifests an unambiguous intent to confer

individual rights. Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 280

(2002). Further, when the remedial devices provided in a

particular Act are sufficiently comprehensive, they may suffice

to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the remedy of

suits under § 1983. Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v.

National Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 20 (1981).

The test to be applied to determine whether a particular

statutory provision gives rise to a federal right that may be

redressed under § 1983 requires the Court to consider whether or

not 1) Congress intended that the provision in question benefit

the plaintiff, 2) the plaintiff has demonstrated that the right

assertedly protected by the statute is not so vague and amorphous

that its enforcement would strain judicial competence, and 3) the

statute unambiguously imposes a binding obligation on the states

such that the provision giving rise to the asserted right is

couched in mandatory, rather than precatory terms. Blessing v.

Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340-41 (1997); Ball v. Rodgers, 492 F.3d

1094, 1104-1105 (9 Cir. 2007). th

Plaintiff has failed to identify sufficiently the right he

alleges was denied in order to permit the Court to undertake

analysis of whether or not a claim for denial of the right may be

redressed under § 1983. Generally a plaintiff is not required to

expressly identify the constitutional or statutory basis for his

claim, but rather must only state the facts underlying the claim.

McCalden v. California Library Association, 955 F.2d 1214, 1224

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(9 Cir. 1990). However, in this instance, Plaintiff’s statement th

of facts is inadequate to permit screening of the complaint. See,

McColm v. Abner, 2006 WL 3645308, *8 (N.D.Cal. December 12,

2006).

With respect to Plaintiff’s claim concerning rights

conferred under statutes relating to Social Security, Plaintiff

will be given an opportunity to amend his complaint to specify

further facts, including but not limited to the precise statutory

section or sections that provide the basis of the particular

right Plaintiff seeks to redress under § 1983, in order to

provide appropriate notice and to permit screening of the

complaint.

b. Constitutional Privacy

Plaintiff alleges that he informed the Defendant police

officers, who inquired “specifically into plaintiff’s personal

confidential medical business and declining to wear a hospital

gown,” (Cmplt. ¶ 11), that he had a medical condition that was

confidential; Defendant officers continued to try to obtain

information and/or to obtain a waiver of confidentiality, (id. ¶¶

11-14); Defendant officers conversed with Defendant nurse Greene;

Defendant officers returned and stated that the hospital wanted

to perform specific tests and other related specific procedures

relating to Plaintiff’s specific illness that an ordinary person

would not know, (id. ¶ 15); and Defendant officers thus had “in

some manner or fashion” obtained Plaintiff’s personal, private,

and confidential medical information, (id.). Thereafter the

officers returned, attempted to effectuate Plaintiff’s departure

from the hospital, acknowledged that the matter was a civil

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matter between Plaintiff and the hospital, and left and did not

return. (Id. ¶¶ 15-18.) 

Plaintiff alleges that the officers conducted a warrantless

search and seizure and obtained confidential information

protected by the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments in

violation of Plaintiff’s right to privacy; Plaintiff believes

that “the possibility exists” that he was either being

investigated, detained, or in custody unlawfully and thus had a

constitutional right to assert his protection equivalent to his

right against self-incrimination. (Id. ¶¶ 21-22.) Plaintiff does

not state specifically what the information was, but it is fairly

inferred that Plaintiff refers to medical records, test results,

diagnosis, and prognosis. (Id. ¶ 22.)

It is established that there is a constitutionally protected

interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, including

medical information. Nelson v. National Aeronautics and Space

Administration, 512 F.3d 1134, 1144 (9 Cir. 2008) (quoting th

Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, 135 F.3d 1260,

1269 (9 Cir. 1998)). In Yin v. State of California,95 F.3d 864, th

871 n. 12 (9 Cir. 1996), the court recognized a privacy th

interest in medical information, including diagnosis and medical

records, that was protected under the Fourth Amendment and the

Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments. The

right to informational privacy is not absolute, but is

conditional and may be infringed upon a showing of a proper

governmental interest. In re Crawford, 194 F.3d 954, 959 (9th

Cir. 1999). Relevant factors to be considered are case-specific,

but generally include the type of record requested, the

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information contained therein, the potential for harm in any

subsequent nonconsensual disclosure, the injury from disclosure

to the relationship in which the record was generated, the

adequacy of safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure, the

degree of need for access, and whether there is an express

statutory mandate, articulated public policy, or other

recognizable public interest militating toward access. Id. In

each case in which governmental action compels disclosure of

private information, the government has the burden of showing

that is use of the information would advance a legitimate state

interest and that its actions are narrowly tailored to meet the

legitimate interest. Id. 

Here, the information was not disclosed to the officers in

response to questioning of Plaintiff by the government; rather,

the information was disclosed by a third party to the officers.

There is no basis for an inference that the third party, Nurse

Greene, was compelled to divulge the information by the

government. It is alleged that the nurse divulged, and the

officers obtained, the information as part of a conspiracy with

the purpose of harming Plaintiff because of his disability. 

With respect to the Fourth Amendment, governmental action to

uncover information is considered a search if the target thereof

has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information being

sought. Nelson, 512 F.3d at 1146. Nevertheless, there is no

search if the government obtains from a third party information

revealed to the third party. Id. Further, the Fourth Amendment is

generally not applied to direct questioning; instead, if

acquiring testimonial, as distinct from physical, evidence is the

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objective, then the Fifth Amendment is the relevant

constitutional amendment. Nelson, 512 F.3d at 1146 (citing

Greenawalt v. Indiana Dept. of Corrections, 397 F.3d 587, 591

(7 Cir. 2005), which in turn characterized questioning of a th

person already in custody as in the realm of the Fifth Amendment.

The Fifth Amendment refers to questioning of a person in a

criminal case, and the cited portion of Greenawalt specifically

referred to questioning of a person who was detained, and

compelled applicatin of a lie detector test. Id. 

With respect to any Fifth Amendment claim, Plaintiff alleges

only that it was possible that he was being detained or

investigated, but the clear allegations of the complaint were

that Plaintiff desired to stay at the hospital, and that he

declined to give the private information to the government

officers.

One aspect of a privacy right under the Fourteenth Amendment

relates to intrusion into a zone of privacy or the interest in

independence in making certain kinds of important decisions. In

re Crawford, 194 F.3d 954, 957 (9 Cir. 1999). Plaintiff has not th

alleged facts warranting an inference that any of his decision

making was interfered with or obstructed by Defendants. Plaintiff

will have an opportunity to file an amended complaint in which he 

alleges specific facts that would support a claim. 

It is therefore concluded that Plaintiff has not stated a

claim regarding a Fourth, Fifth, or Fourteenth Amendment

violation of privacy based on the disclosure of information to

the Defendant officers or the interference of any Defendant with

Plaintiff’s zone of privacy.

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In conclusion, although Plaintiff has not stated a right

subject to being redressed under § 1983, and thus has not stated

a claim under § 1983, Plaintiff will have an opportunity to file

an amended complaint.

D. Section 1985

Plaintiff refers to 42 U.S.C. § 1985. (Cmplt. p. 1.) 

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1985 covers the conspiratorial prevention

of an officer from performing his duties. § 1985(1). This does

not appear to be the basis of Plaintiff’s claim.

Section 1985 also covers conspiratorial deterrence of

witnesses by force, intimidation, or threat, and the obstruction

of justice with intent to deny any citizen the equal protection

of the laws. § 1985(2). Section 1985(3) provides for a claim for

damages for a conspiracy to deprive another of equal protection

of the laws.

A claim under § 1985(2) requires either a conspiracy among

two or more persons to injure a party or witness in his person or

property because of attending federal court or testifying in any

manner pending in federal court, and injury or damages to the

claimant; or, with respect to state justice, a conspiracy with

respect to obstruct justice in a state with the intent to deny to

any citizen the equal protection of the laws. Portman v. County

of Santa Clara, 995 F.2d 898, 909 (9 Cir. 1993). Further, with th

respect to protection against obstruction of state justice, it is

established that the “equal protection” language requires an

allegation of animus that is based on membership in a protected

class. Id. 

A required element for a violation of § 1985(3) is a

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conspiracy. Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 198 F.3d 1130, 1140 (9th

Cir.2000) The United States Supreme Court has held that in a §

1985(3) action, a claimant must show “some racial, or perhaps

otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind

the conspirators' action. The conspiracy, in other words, must

aim at a deprivation of the equal enjoyment of rights secured by

the law to all.” Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102, 91

S.Ct. 1790, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971). Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit

has held that “ § 1985(3) extends ‘beyond race only when the

class in question can show that there has been a governmental

determination that its members require and warrant special

federal assistance in protecting their civil rights.’” Orin v.

Barclay, 272 F.3d 1207, 1217 n. 4 (9th Cir.2001).

Plaintiff’s complaint, construed liberally, does not allege

facts showing a conspiracy or any class-based or invidiously

discriminatory animus. The Court concludes that Plaintiff fails

to state a claim under § 1985.

E. Miscellaneous Federal Claims

Plaintiff’s complaint refers to 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2, 2000a3, and 2000a-6. (Cmplt. p. 1.) Those sections in turn refer to

interference with rights secured by §§ 2000a or 2000a-1, which

refer to discrimination of various types on the ground of race,

color, religion, or national origin. Plaintiff has alleged no

facts concerning discrimination on the basis of race, color,

religion, or national origin. Accordingly, Plaintiff has not

stated a claim pertinent to these sections. 

F. State Law Tort Claims 

With respect to any possible state law claims against the

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officers (Cmplt. at pages 8-9, 19-20), Plaintiff has failed to

allege compliance with the California Tort Claims Act, which

requires that a tort claim against a public entity or its

employees be presented to the California Victim Compensation and

Government Claims Board, formerly known as the State Board of

Control, no more than six months after the cause of action

accrues. Cal. Govt. Code §§ 905.2, 910, 911.2, 945.4, 950-950.2

(West 2008). Presentation of a written claim and action on, or

rejection of, the claim are conditions precedent to suit;

compliance with the claims presentation requirement is an element

of the cause of action, or claim, and failure to allege facts

demonstrating or excusing compliance with the requirement

subjects a claim against a public entity to a demurrer for

failure to state a claim. State v. Superior Court of Kings County

(Bodde), 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1239, 1243 (2004); Mangold v.

California Pub. Utils. Comm’n., 67 F.3d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir.

1995). This means that a plaintiff must allege that he has

presented a timely claim to the State Board of Control. City of

San Jose v. Superior Court, 12 Cal.3d 447, 454 (1974). Because no

such allegations are present in the complaint before the Court,

any such claims would be subject to dismissal.

With respect to Plaintiff’s allegations regarding emotional

distress, Plaintiff entitles his claim as one for intentional

infliction of emotional distress, but in the body of the claim,

he refers to negligence of the Defendants. (Cmplt. pages 19-20.)

Under California law, the elements of intentional infliction

of emotional distress are: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by

the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless

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disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2)

the plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme emotional distress;

and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress

by defendant's outrageous conduct. Sabow v. United States, 93

F.3d 1445, 1454 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing to Christensen v.

Superior Court, 54 Cal.3d 868 (1991)) (quotations omitted).

Further, "the negligent causing of emotional distress is not

an independent tort, but the tort of negligence," Burgess v.

Superior Court, 831 P.2d 1197, 1200 (Ct. App. 1992), and

"contains the traditional elements of duty, breach of duty,

causation and damages." Jacoves v. United Merchandising Corp., 9

Cal.App.4th 88, 106 (Ct. App. 1992). 

Here, Plaintiff’s allegations of negligence are generally

conclusional. (Id. at ¶¶ 28, 31, 33.) It is unclear which type of

conduct resulting in emotional distress Plaintiff is alleging, or

whether he is in fact alleging either or both claims. The nature

of Plaintiff’s claim in this case is too uncertain to give any

defendant notice of the gravamen of his compliant. However,

Plaintiff will be given an opportunity to clarify his allegations

in an amended complaint.

III. Leave to Amend

In summary, with the exception of a claim under EMTALA

against the Defendant hospital, Plaintiff has not stated a claim

and has not stated a basis for jurisdiction in this Court. The

complaint must be dismissed with leave to amend.

Should Plaintiff desire to proceed on the basis of only a

claim pursuant to the EMTALA, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd, against

Defendant Hospital only, Plaintiff should inform the Court in a

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writing without delay, and the undersigned Magistrate Judge will

prepare findings and recommendations to dismiss the other claims,

and will permit Plaintiff to proceed on the one claim.

However, should Plaintiff desire to state amended claims,

the Court finds that it is possible that Plaintiff can allege a

set of facts, consistent with the allegations, in support of the

claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. Thus, the Court

will grant Plaintiff an opportunity to amend the complaint to

cure the deficiencies of this complaint. Failure to cure the

deficiencies will result in dismissal of this action without

leave to amend.

A complaint must contain a short and plain statement as

required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although the Federal Rules

adopt a flexible pleading policy, a complaint must give fair

notice and state the elements of the claim plainly and

succinctly. Jones v. Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649

(9th Cir. 1984). Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree

of particularity overt acts which the defendants engaged in that

support Plaintiff's claim. Id. 

An amended complaint supercedes the original complaint,

Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997);

King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987), and must be

“complete in itself without reference to the prior or superceded

pleading,” Local Rule 15-220. Plaintiff is warned that “[a]ll

causes of action alleged in an original complaint which are not

alleged in an amended complaint are waived.” King, 814 F.2d at

567 (citing to London v. Coopers & Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811, 814

(9th Cir. 1981)); accord Forsyth, 114 F.3d at 1474.

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IV. Disposition

Accordingly, it IS ORDERED that:

1) Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis IS

GRANTED; and

2) Plaintiff’s Plaintiff's complaint IS DISMISSED with leave

to amend; and

3) Plaintiff IS GRANTED thirty days from the date of service

of this order to file an amended complaint that complies with the

requirements of the pertinent substantive law, the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice; the amended

complaint must bear the docket number assigned this case and must

be labeled "First Amended Complaint"; failure to file an amended

complaint in accordance with this order will be considered to be

a failure to comply with an order of the Court pursuant to Local

Rule 11-110 and will result in dismissal of this action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 4, 2008 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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