Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00206/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00206-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilities Act

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Because oral argument will not be of material 1

assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. 

E.D. Cal. L.R. 78-230(h).

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

SHERIE WHITE,

NO. CIV. S-04-0206 FCD/DAD

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DIVINE INVESTMENTS, INC.;

WALTER B. RICHEY; CAROLYN

D. RICHEY;

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on defendants Walter and

Carolyn Richey’s (“defendants”) motion for attorney’s fees. In 1

its order of October 7, 2005, the court granted defendants’

motion for summary judgment and denied plaintiff’s cross-motion,

finding that “plaintiff lack[ed] standing to challenge a majority

of the alleged [architectural] barriers [at defendants’

facility], and with respect to the barriers properly raised by

plaintiff, defendants have shown that the so-called ‘barriers’ do

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Defendants seek an award of $61,662.50 in fees and 2

$12,870.83 in costs.

To succeed on a claim of discrimination due to an 3

architectural barrier, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) she is

disabled; (2) the subject facility is a place of “public

accommodation;” (3) the existing facility contains an

architectural barrier prohibited by the ADA; and (4) removal of

the barrier is readily achievable. Parr v. L & L Drive-Inn

Rest., 96 F. Supp. 1065, 1085 (D. Haw. 2000). 

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not constitute substantive violations of the [Americans with

Disabilities Act (“ADA”)] and/or have been remedied [by

defendants].” (Mem. & Order, filed Oct. 7, 2005, at 2:10-14.)

As the prevailing party on the motion, defendants now move

for an award of attorney’s fees and litigation costs. 42 U.S.C. 2

§ 12205. For the reasons set forth below, defendants’ motion is

DENIED. The court cannot find based on the facts of this case

that plaintiff’s action was “frivolous, unreasonable, or without

foundation.” Summers v. Teichert & Son, Inc., 127 F.3d 1150,

1154 (9 Cir. 1997). th

BACKGROUND

The parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment presented

one disputed issue: whether defendants’ gas station and

convenience store, the River Mart, had “architectural barriers”

with the meaning of the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. As to

all other issues under the ADA, the parties agreed plaintiff

could sustain her burden of proof. Id. at § 12182(a), 3

(b)(2)(A)(iv). 

Regarding barriers, plaintiff alleged 42 architectural

barriers in her first amended complaint. (FAC, filed April 12,

2005, Ex. A.) Said complaint was filed in response to the

court’s directive to plaintiff’s counsel in an unrelated case,

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Rule 12(h) provides: “Whenever it appears by suggestion 4

of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of

the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action.”

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Pickern v. Pier 1 Imports, et al., Civ. 03-121 FCD/JFM, ordering

counsel to amend all of his existing complaints in this district

because they contained generic, hypothetical allegations which

did not tie the relevant plaintiff’s disability to the alleged

barriers present at a subject facility. (Pickern Mem. & Order,

filed Sept. 30, 2004, at 18:25-19:6.) In responding to

defendants’ motion to dismiss the instant action under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h), filed February 10, 2005,

plaintiff’s counsel sought relief to file the amended complaint

ordered in Pickern; counsel inadvertently had not done so

previously. The court granted plaintiff’s request. (Mem. &

Order, filed April 8, 2005, at 4:4-15.)

In the Rule 12(h) motion, defendants moved to dismiss the 4

action arguing that they had brought the premises into compliance

with the ADA, thereby depriving the court of further jurisdiction

over the case because plaintiff was not entitled to any

injunctive relief. In support, defendants offered the expert

opinion of Kim R. Blackseth who opined: “the defects identified

in the plaintiff’s [original] complaint are no longer present,

and the premises are in compliance with the applicable portions

of [the] ADA and the applicable portions of the California

Building Codes [“CBC”].” (Id. at 2:16-20.) In response,

plaintiff filed the declaration of Joe Card, plaintiff’s ADA

expert, who opined, to the contrary, that his inspection of the

premises revealed numerous violations of the ADA and the CBC. As

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a result of this dispute between the parties’ experts, the court

held that it “cannot find, as requested by defendants, that there

is no ‘live controversy’ [for purposes of Rule 12(h)] over

whether the subject premises is in compliance with the ADA. As

evidenced by the conflicting declarations submitted on this

motion, the compliance issue is heavily contested.” Id. at 3:19-

4:1.

Thereafter, the parties filed the cross-motions for summary

judgment. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that of

the 42 alleged barriers identified in Exhibit A to the first

amended complaint, only eight such barriers were at issue on the

motion as they were the only barriers identified by plaintiff’s

expert (Card) as remaining in violation of the ADA. Plaintiff

counter-moved, arguing that the motion was not limited to only

those barriers identified in Exhibit A and discussed by Card on

the motion, but rather the relevant barriers were those

identified in Card’s expert report and declaration prepared

subsequent to the filing of the amended complaint.

Ultimately, the court agreed with defendants, finding that

plaintiff had standing to sue: 

only for those barriers identified in Exhibit A to the

first amended complaint because it is only those 

barriers which she actually encountered and/or had 

reason to know of at the time of the filing of the

complaint. The alleged barriers later discovered by 

her expert were not known by her at the time of the

filing of the complaint, nor are they sufficiently

similar or related to barriers identified in Exhibit A,

and therefore she lacks standing to sue for them.

(Mem. & Order, filed Oct. 7, 2005, at 8:6-14.) As such, the

court addressed on the motion only those barriers raised by the

parties which were identified by plaintiff in Exhibit A to the

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first amended complaint. In that regard, eight such barriers

were considered. (Id. at 9:1-9.) 

STANDARD

While attorney’s fees generally are not recoverable, such

fees may be awarded if authorized by enforceable contract or by

applicable statute. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness

Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 257 (1975). The ADA provides that “the

court in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a

reasonable attorney’s fee, including litigation expenses and

costs.” 42 U.S.C. § 12205. 

In the context of the ADA and other civil rights statutes,

strong policy considerations support awarding attorney’s fees to

prevailing plaintiffs. Plaintiffs play an integral role in

enforcement of the statute through private litigation, and the

award of attorneys fees provides an incentive to file such suits. 

See Christianburg Garment Co. V. Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission, 434 U.S. 412, 418 (1978). 

However, the “policy considerations which support the award

of attorneys fees to a prevailing plaintiff are not present in

the case of a prevailing defendant.” Id. at 418-19. To the

contrary, awards to prevailing defendants could have a chilling

effect on the filing of ADA lawsuits by plaintiffs. For this

reason, fees are not awarded as a matter of course to prevailing

defendants, and should only be awarded under exceptional

circumstances, “upon a finding that the plaintiff’s action was

frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.” Summers, 127

F.3d at 1154 (adopting Christianburg standard for Title I ADA

cases). An action is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in

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Defendants alternatively seek an award of fees and 5

costs against plaintiff’s counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927

which provides: “Any attorney . . . who so multiplies the

proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be

required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs,

expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such

conduct.” To make an award under Section 1927, the court must

find that the attorney acted in bad faith. West Coast Theater

Corp. v. City of Portland, 897 F.2d 1519, 1528 (9 Cir. 1990). th

Bad faith is present when an attorney knowingly or recklessly

raises a frivolous argument, or argues a meritorious claim for

the purpose of harassing an opponent. Id. As set forth below,

because the court does not award fees and costs under the ADA,

which contains a lower standard than Section 1927, it likewise

does not award fees and costs under this statute which requires

in addition to a finding of “frivolousness,” a finding that the

action was maintained in bad faith. 

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law or in fact, though it need not be brought in bad faith. 

Peters v. Winco Foods, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1037 (E.D.

Cal. 2004)(citing Schutts v. Bently Nevada Corp., 966 F. Supp.

1549, 1557 (D. Nev. 1997)). Even where a plaintiff is unaware at

the commencement of the suit that the claim is frivolous, he may

be liable for attorney’s fees if he continues to litigate after

it becomes clear that the action lacks factual substance. Id.5

ANALYSIS

Defendants argue for an award of fees and costs under the

ADA on two primary grounds: (1) the majority of plaintiff’s

claims raised in Exhibit A to the first amended complaint were

“frivolous;” and (2) plaintiff maintained this action

“unreasonably” on the basis of alleged barriers which she had no

standing to raise. 

1. “Exhibit A” Barriers

As to the first issue, defendants concede that 7 of the 42

barriers identified in Exhibit A violated the ADA and needed to

be remediated; defendants voluntarily did so with the advice of

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These barriers included (as listed in Exhibit A): (1) 6

Item 7 – “Accessible parking space not located the shortest

accessible route of travel to the entrance;” (2) Item 8 –

“Incorrect parking space/access aisle dimensions;” (3) Item 10 –

“No accessible route of travel from parking [lot to the store];”

(4) Item 13 – “Public telephone not accessible height;” (5) Item

18 – “Check out counter does not have a section 28 to 34 inches

high and 36 inches wide and 24 inches deep maximum to accommodate

a wheelchair occupant;” (6) Item 19 – “Self serve/condiment

counter out of required reach range limits;” and (7) Item 20 –

“Not a 30X48 inch clear floor space in front of the check stand.”

Without making the calculation for the court, 7

defendants alternatively ask the court to grant them a

proportionate award based on the fees and costs incurred in

defending the 35 barriers alleged in Exhibit A which defendants

did not voluntarily remediate and contend are frivolous claims. 

While this court previously held in Peters that such a

proportionate award is permitted under Ninth Circuit authority,

it is not warranted under the facts of this case for the reasons

set forth below.

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their expert, Kim Blackseth. This remediation formed the basis 6

of defendants’ Rule 12(h) motion, wherein they argued that their

facility was ADA-compliant, and as such, the court should dismiss

the action. Significant to this motion, defendants acknowledged

in that matter, that at least in some respects, their facility

had violated the ADA. Defendants now argue because the

violations were small in number, representing only approximately

one-sixth of the total barriers alleged by plaintiff, they should

be entitled to an award of fees and costs because the majority of

the alleged barriers in Exhibit A “had no factual basis under the

ADA.” 

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The court disagrees. First, an award of fees and costs is

not merited here where defendants concede their facility was not,

in significant respects, ADA-compliant (see footnote 6 above) at

the time this action was filed; the facility had “architectural

barriers” within the meaning of the ADA, including inaccessible

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In an unpublished opinion, the Ninth Circuit affirmed 8

this decision. Peters v. Winco Foods, Inc., 2005 WL 2673539 (9th

Cir. Oct. 20, 2005).

Plaintiff Peters was also represented by the Law 9

Offices of Lynn Hubbard, plaintiff’s counsel in this case.

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access routes, parking spaces, public telephones, and store

counters. This fact distinguishes this case from the court’s

decision in Peters v. Winco Foods, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 2d 1035

(E.D. Cal. 2004), heavily relied upon by defendants. In Peters, 8

the court awarded fees and costs to the prevailing defendant on

summary judgment, finding that the plaintiff’s action stated 9

“only one legally and factually tenable claim regarding the

height of a produce scale.” Id. at 1040 (emphasis added). In so

ruling, however, the court recognized that:

such awards of fees will rarely be appropriate where

the plaintiff has asserted significant meritorious 

claims.

Id. In Peters, the court found an award of fees justified

because the “action viewed as a whole lack[ed] merit despite the

presence of one . . . legally tenable clai[m].” Id. Here,

plaintiff asserted significant meritorious claims relating to a

number of serious ADA requirements (including accessible routes

of travel and counter space), and thus this case does not fall

within the “exceptional circumstances” meriting an award of fees

to a prevailing ADA-defendant.

Second, the court cannot find that the remaining alleged

barriers in Exhibit A were “factually unsupported.” Unlike in

Peters, plaintiff only sought relief through the first amended

complaint for those barriers related to her disability which she

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Defendants also argue for fees on the basis of 10

plaintiff’s “form” complaint filed in this case; the court

considered that issue in Pickern and will not do so again here,

particularly because plaintiff complied, albeit belatedly, with

the court’s order to amend all form-ADA pleadings in this

district. As such, the original complaint in this action is not

considered in ruling on defendants’ motion for fees. 

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encountered at the facility. (FAC, ¶s 10, 12.) To the extent 10

defendants ultimately succeeded in proving that certain barriers

alleged by plaintiff did not constitute substantive violations of

the ADA, that success does not entitle them to an award of fees. 

Defeating a claim on summary judgment, by itself, does not

entitle an ADA-defendant to an award of fees. Peters, 320 F.

Supp. 2d at 1038. Defendants have not shown herein that

plaintiff lacked factual support for the claimed barriers. 

Indeed, plaintiff even acknowledged in her first amended

complaint that to the extent she described in Exhibit A barriers

“unrelated to her disability,” she described them “as a courtesy

to the defendants, so the defendants can avoid inadvertent acts

of discrimination against the disabled. Nothing within the

complaint, however, should be construed as an allegation that

[plaintiff] is seeking to remove barriers unrelated to [her]

disability.” (FAC, ¶ 12.)

Finally, defendants argue they are entitled to fees because

plaintiff continued to maintain this action despite the findings

of defendants’ expert presented on the Rule 12(h) motion. 

Defendants are incorrect. Their expert’s findings were strongly

disputed by plaintiff’s expert, and the court accordingly denied

defendants’ motion. Therefore, plaintiff’s opposition to the

Rule 12(h) motion and maintenance of this action thereafter

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cannot serve as a basis for an award of fees to defendants.

Plaintiff proffered admissible evidence in rebuttal to

defendants’ showing on the motion; what remained were legal

issues for the court to resolve on summary judgment. (Mem. &

Order, filed April 8, 2005, at 4 n. 6.)

2. “Barriers” Identified by Plaintiff’s Expert

As to defendants’ second basis for an award of fees,

defendants argue that plaintiff pursued “frivolous” barriers on

the cross-motions for summary judgment in that she had no

standing to raise barriers not described in her complaint and

identified for the first time by her expert in his report and

declaration. Applying Judge Levi’s recent decision in Martinez

v. Longs Drug Stores, 2005 WL 2072013 (E.D. Cal., August 25,

2005), the court found in favor of defendants, concluding that

plaintiff lacked standing to raise any barriers not identified in

Exhibit A to the first amended complaint. (Mem. & Order, filed

October 7, 2005.) However, that conclusion does not dictate a

finding that plaintiff’s claims as to other barriers identified

by her expert were “frivolous.” Rather, to the contrary,

plaintiff pressed a standing argument which under existing Ninth

Circuit law was reasonable. While the court did not accept

plaintiff’s argument, her contentions were well-grounded in

existing law. (Id. at 6-8.) Namely, plaintiff argued that the

Ninth Circuit in Pickern v. Holiday Quality Foods, Inc., 293 F.3d

1133, 1138 (9 Cir. 2002) adopted the Eighth Circuit’s decision th

in Steger v. Franco, 228 F.3d 889, 893-94 (8 Cir. 2000), th

permitting an ADA-plaintiff to seek relief for barriers he or she

did not actually encounter or know of at the time the complaint

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was filed. (Id. at 6-7 n. 7.) Considering this same argument in

Martinez, Judge Levi found that while the plaintiff, who also

sought to recover for barriers later-identified by his expert,

may have prevailed under Steger, Steger was not the law of this

circuit. The Ninth Circuit did not adopt Steger in Pickern. 

Reviewing the issue anew, Judge Levi rejected Steger as

“fundamentally incompatible with . . . constitutional standing

principles.” 2005 WL 2072013, *4. Although not bound by the

Martinez decision, this court found Judge Levi’s “analysis and

holding persuasive” and therefore applied Martinez to this case. 

(Mem. & Order, filed Oct. 7, 2005 at 7:19-20.) Thus, while

plaintiff did not ultimately prevail in asserting standing to

raise those barriers identified for the first time by her expert,

her argument was reasonable and supported by case law. See also

Parr v. L&L Drive Inn Restaurant, 96 F. Supp. 2d 1065 (D. Haw.

2000); Independent Living Resources v. Oregon Arena Corp., 982 F.

Supp. 698 (D. Or. 1997). As such, the court cannot find her

claims as to these other barriers “frivolous.”

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion for attorney’s

fees and costs is DENIED. Defendants have not demonstrated that

plaintiff’s action was “frivolous, unreasonable, or without

foundation,” thereby entitling them to such an award. Indeed, by

this action, plaintiff pressed claims against defendants which

resulted in defendants’ voluntary remediation of various aspects

of its facility which were in violation of the ADA, and to the

extent plaintiff maintained claims against defendants which

ultimately the court denied on standing grounds, said claims were 

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supported by a reasonable interpretation of existing law. 

DATED: January 3, 2006

 

/s/ Frank C. Damrell Jr. 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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