Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00084/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00084-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1125 Trademark Infringement (Lanham Act)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

PUPARAZZI INDUSTRIES OF )

AMERICA, LLC, )) Plaintiff, ) 2:12-cv-00084 JWS ) vs. ) ORDER AND OPINION ) PUPARAZZI PET SPA, LLC, ) [Re: Motion at Docket 16] ) Defendant. ))

I. MOTION PRESENTED

At docket 16, defendant Puparazzi Pet Spa, LLC (“defendant” or “PPS”) moves

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss the complaint for failure

to state a claim. Plaintiff Puparazzi Industries of America, LLC (“plaintiff” or “PIA”)

opposes the motion at docket 18. Defendant’s reply is at docket 20. Oral argument

was requested but would not assist the court.

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1

All background information is taken from the Complaint at docket 1.

2

Vignolo v. Miller, 120 F.3d 1075, 1077 (9th Cir. 1997).

3

Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

4

Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 679 (9th Cir. 2001).

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II. BACKGROUND1

PIA provides pet grooming services via a mobile pet grooming van in the Phoenix

metropolitan area. PPS is a pet grooming salon in Phoenix. The word “Puparazzi” is

used in both companies’ names.

The marks PUPARAZZI MOBILE PET SPAW and WHERE YOUR PET’S THE

STAR are affixed to PIA’s van. PIA alleges that it has used the PUPARAZZI mark since

May 10, 2010. PIA applied for federal trademark registration on November 21, 2011; its

application is pending. PIA is attempting to register PUPARAZZI MOBILE PET SPAW

for animal grooming services.

PIA maintains that PPS uses the marks PUPARAZZI PET SPA and EVERY DOG

IS A STAR! in its pet grooming service. PIA maintains that PPS did not offer pet

grooming services until September 2011.

PIA filed this lawsuit in federal court on January 13, 2012. PIA has asserted a

claim for trademark infringement, in violation of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act and one

common law claim for unfair competition.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6), tests the legal sufficiency of a plaintiff’s claims. In reviewing such a

motion, “[a]ll allegations of material fact in the complaint are taken as true and

construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”2

 Dismissal for failure to

state a claim can be based on either “the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the

absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.”3

 “Conclusory

allegations of law . . . are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.”4

 

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5

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).

6

Id.

7

Id. (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)).

8

Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

9

Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).

10Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).

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To avoid dismissal, a plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to “state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.”5

 “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant

is liable for the misconduct alleged.”6

 “The plausibility standard is not akin to a

‘probability requirement’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant

has acted unlawfully.”7 “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent’

with a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of

entitlement to relief.’”8 “In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the nonconclusory ‘factual content,’ and reasonable inferences from that content, must be

plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.”9

IV. DISCUSSION

A. The Court Will Not Consider Items Outside the Complaint

Defendant’s first argument is that eleven other dog or animal-related services

throughout the country use the term “puparazzi.” Defendant argues that such use of the

term indicates that PIA’s attempt to register the mark will fail. Federal Rule 12(d)

provides that “[i]f, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) . . . matters outside the pleadings are

presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for

summary judgment under Rule 56.”10 The court declines to treat the present motion as

a motion for summary judgment and therefore will not consider matters outside plaintiff’s

complaint, including evidence that eleven other business use the term “puparazzi.”

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11Zobmondo Entertainment, LLC v. Falls Media, LLC, 602 F.3d 1108, 1113 (9th Cir.

2010) (internal quotations omitted).

12Id.

13See id. (“Merely descriptive marks are . . . not inherently distinctive and are therefore

not entitled to automatic trademark protection” but can become protectable if they have acquired

secondary meaning).

14Id.

15Sengoku Works Ltd. v. RMC Int’l, Ltd., 96 F.3d 1217, 1219 (9th Cir. 1996).

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B. Whether Plaintiff Has Alleged that “Puparazzi” Is Protectable

“To claim trademark infringement, a plaintiff must have a valid, protectable

trademark.”11 “The plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of proof in a trademarkinfringement action that the trademark is valid and protectable.”12 Defendant argues

that the term “puparazzi” merely describes dog-related services and has no secondary

meaning, and therefore plaintiff’s mark is unprotectable.13

“[F]ederal registration provides prima facie evidence of [a] mark’s validity and

entitles the plaintiff to a strong presumption that the mark is a protectable mark.”14

Plaintiff alleges that it has applied to register PUPARAZZI MOBILE PET SPAW, but

without action from the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”), plaintiff

is not entitled to that presumption. The question, therefore, is whether plaintiff has pled

facts plausibly suggesting that PUPARAZZI MOBILE PET SPAW is protectable.

Plaintiff cites district court authority for the proposition that it need only plead

facts establishing the date of its first use of the mark, that it is the senior user of the

mark in the Phoenix area, and that defendant’s use is likely to confuse the public. 

Although ownership of the mark may be established by proof that “the party claiming

ownership must have been the first to actually use the mark in the sale of goods or

services,”15 such a showing does not establish protectability. Because the only facts in

plaintiff’s complaint that could be construed to support its mark’s validity are those

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16See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992).

17Fairway Constructors, Inc. v. Ahern, 970 P.2d 954, 956 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998). 

18Doc. 1 at 4.

19See, e.g., Lee, 250 F.3d at 679.

20See A.R.S. § 44-1451 (providing remedies for infringement of registered marks).

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concerning its application for registration with the USPTO, plaintiff’s complaint falls short

of the federal pleading standard.

The parties devote considerable briefing to whether PUPARAZZI MOBILE PET

SPAW is descriptive, suggestive, arbitrary, or fanciful.16 Because the category to which

a mark belongs is a factual issue, it is not properly resolved on a 12(b)(6) motion, which

by nature focuses on the allegations in the complaint.

C. Unfair Competition Claim

Defendant argues that plaintiff’s unfair competition claim fails for the same

reason its federal claim fails. In Arizona, the common law doctrine of unfair competition

“encompasses several tort theories, such as trademark infringement, false advertising,

palming off, and misappropriation.”17 Plaintiff’s complaint states only that “PIA and PPS

are competitors,” that “PPS is unfairly competing with PIA” by using the PUPARAZZI

PET SPA and EVERY DOG IS A STAR! marks, and that “PPS’ actions . . . constitute

unfair competition.”18 Plaintiff’s allegations are conclusory and therefore do not comport

with the federal pleading standard.19 Plaintiff’s allegations do not include facts plausibly

suggestive of either a common law claim or a claim under Arizona’s statutory scheme.20

D. Leave to Amend

“[I]n dismissing for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), a district court

should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made,

unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of

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28 21Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000).

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other facts.”21 Plaintiff has requested leave to amend and the defects in the complaint

could be cured by allegation of additional facts.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, defendant’s motion at docket 16 to dismiss the complaint

pursuant to Federal Rule 12(b)(6) is GRANTED without prejudice to an amended

complaint. Plaintiff’s amended complaint shall be filed within 14 days from the date of

this order. 

DATED this 23rd day of May 2012.

 /s/ 

JOHN W. SEDWICK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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