Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-02322/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-02322-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

TERMPSREF 

JL 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Michael Price, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Defendants. 

 No. CV 18-02322-PHX-DGC (DMF) 

ORDER 

On July 23, 2018, Plaintiff Michael Price, who is confined in the Arizona State 

Prison Complex-Yuma, filed a pro se civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 (Doc. 1) and an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. In a July 27, 2018 

order, the Court denied the deficient Application to Proceed and gave Plaintiff 30 days 

either to pay the filing and administrative fees or file a complete Application to Proceed 

and a certified six-month inmate trust account statement. On August 20, 2018, Plaintiff 

filed a new Application to Proceed (Doc. 5). The Court will order Defendant Banning to 

answer Count One of the Complaint and will dismiss Defendants Ryan and Corizon and 

Count Two without prejudice. 

I. Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Filing Fee 

 The Court will grant Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(a). Plaintiff must pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(1). The Court will assess an initial partial filing fee of $16. The remainder of 

the fee will be collected monthly in payments of 20% of the previous month’s income 

Case 2:18-cv-02322-DGC-DMF Document 7 Filed 09/18/18 Page 1 of 8
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

TERMPSREF 

credited to Plaintiff’s trust account each time the amount in the account exceeds $10.00. 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The Court will enter a separate order requiring the appropriate 

government agency to collect and forward the fees according to the statutory formula. 

II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff 

has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is 

immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–(2). 

 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 

does not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 

 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible 

claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw 

on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s 

specific factual allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must 

assess whether there are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id.

at 681. 

 But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, 

courts must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 

Case 2:18-cv-02322-DGC-DMF Document 7 Filed 09/18/18 Page 2 of 8
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

TERMPSREF 

342 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less 

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. 

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). 

III. Complaint 

 In his two-count complaint, Plaintiff sues Arizona Department of Corrections 

Director Charles L. Ryan, Corizon Medical (“Corizon”), and Correctional Officer 

Banning. Plaintiff asserts two claims of Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference and 

seeks injunctive and monetary relief. 

 In Count One, Plaintiff alleges that during a quarterly search of his unit, he was 

patted down and then directed to go through “the magneto polls.” Plaintiff asserts that he 

informed the officer that he had a pacemaker and was told to go to Defendant Banning, 

who had the handheld metal detector. Plaintiff claims that when he approached Banning, 

Plaintiff told him that he had a pacemaker and that was the reason Plaintiff was sent to 

him. Plaintiff alleges that he had his hand over his pacemaker while Banning repeatedly 

waved the metal detector over Plaintiff’s chest area. Plaintiff asserts that he told Banning 

again that he had a pacemaker, and Banning “kept asking [Plaintiff] what was this.” 

Plaintiff claims that he asked Banning “why did he keep doing that but he offered no 

response.” Plaintiff alleges that since then, he has had extreme chest pain and his 

pacemaker has not been functioning properly. Plaintiff asserts that Banning’s actions 

have subjected him to “an unwarranted great degree of pain and suffering” and this was 

“a deliberate form of cruel and unusual punishment” and a “form of excessive force by 

way of a metal detector.” As his injury, Plaintiff claims that his health has deteriorated, 

he has suffered continuous chest pain, and his pacemaker is not functioning correctly. 

 In Count Two, Plaintiff alleges that shortly after he started experiencing chest pain 

as a result of Defendant Banning’s actions, Plaintiff submitted “a couple” of Health 

Needs Requests to Defendant Corizon. Plaintiff asserts that Corizon denied him the right 

to see a cardiologist, but “perseverance by way of one of the nurses eventually got 

[Plaintiff] an appointment” with a doctor. Plaintiff claims that the doctor informed him 

Case 2:18-cv-02322-DGC-DMF Document 7 Filed 09/18/18 Page 3 of 8
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

TERMPSREF 

that as a result of the metal detector being waved over Plaintiff’s pacemaker, the 

pacemaker was damaged, which resulted in the chest pain. As his injury, Plaintiff alleges 

that Corizon’s failure to get Plaintiff medical attention in a timely manner caused 

unwarranted pain and suffering. 

IV. Failure to State a Claim

 To prevail in a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show that (1) acts by the defendants 

(2) under color of state law (3) deprived him of federal rights, privileges or immunities 

and (4) caused him damage. Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1163-64 (9th 

Cir. 2005) (quoting Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Idaho Fish & Game Comm’n, 42 F.3d 

1278, 1284 (9th Cir. 1994)). In addition, a plaintiff must allege that he suffered a specific 

injury as a result of the conduct of a particular defendant and he must allege an 

affirmative link between the injury and the conduct of that defendant. Rizzo v. Goode, 

423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976). 

A. Defendant Ryan 

There is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, and therefore a defendant’s 

position as a supervisor of persons who allegedly violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights 

does not impose liability. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658 

(1978); Hamilton v. Endell, 981 F.2d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 1992); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 

1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). “Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and 

§ 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the 

official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. 

 Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendant Ryan personally participated in a 

deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, was aware of a deprivation and failed to 

act, or formed policies that resulted in Plaintiff’s injuries. Plaintiff makes no allegations 

at all against Ryan. Thus, the Court will dismiss without prejudice Defendant Ryan. 

B. Defendant Corizon 

 To state a claim under § 1983 against a private entity performing a traditional 

public function, such as providing medical care to prisoners, a plaintiff must allege facts 

Case 2:18-cv-02322-DGC-DMF Document 7 Filed 09/18/18 Page 4 of 8
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

TERMPSREF 

to support that his constitutional rights were violated as a result of a policy, decision, or 

custom promulgated or endorsed by the private entity. See Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 

698 F.3d 1128, 1138-39 (9th Cir. 2012); Buckner v. Toro, 116 F.3d 450, 452 (11th Cir. 

1997). A plaintiff must allege the specific policy or custom and how it violated his 

constitutional rights. A private entity is not liable merely because it employs persons 

who allegedly violated a plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Tsao, 698 F.3d at 1138-39; 

Buckner, 116 F.3d at 452. 

 Plaintiff has not alleged that his injuries resulted from a policy, decision, or 

custom promulgated or endorsed by Corizon. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a 

claim against Corizon, and this Defendant will be dismissed. 

V. Claims for Which an Answer Will be Required 

Liberally construed, Plaintiff has stated a threat-to-safety claim against Defendant 

Banning in Count One. The Court will require Defendant Banning to answer Count One. 

VI. Warnings

A. Release

 If Plaintiff is released while this case remains pending, and the filing fee has not 

been paid in full, Plaintiff must, within 30 days of his release, either (1) notify the Court 

that he intends to pay the unpaid balance of his filing fee within 120 days of his release or 

(2) file a non-prisoner application to proceed in forma pauperis. Failure to comply may 

result in dismissal of this action. 

B. Address Changes

 Plaintiff must file and serve a notice of a change of address in accordance with 

Rule 83.3(d) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff must not include a motion 

for other relief with a notice of change of address. Failure to comply may result in 

dismissal of this action. 

C. Copies

 Plaintiff must serve Defendant, or counsel if an appearance has been entered, a 

copy of every document that he files. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a). Each filing must include a 

Case 2:18-cv-02322-DGC-DMF Document 7 Filed 09/18/18 Page 5 of 8
- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

TERMPSREF 

certificate stating that a copy of the filing was served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d). Also, 

Plaintiff must submit an additional copy of every filing for use by the Court. See LRCiv 

5.4. Failure to comply may result in the filing being stricken without further notice to 

Plaintiff. 

D. Possible Dismissal

 If Plaintiff fails to timely comply with every provision of this Order, including 

these warnings, the Court may dismiss this action without further notice. See Ferdik v. 

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (a district court may dismiss an action 

for failure to comply with any order of the Court). 

IT IS ORDERED: 

 (1) Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 5) is granted. 

 (2) As required by the accompanying Order to the appropriate government 

agency, Plaintiff must pay the $350.00 filing fee and is assessed an initial partial filing 

fee of $16. 

(3) Count Two is dismissed without prejudice. 

 (4) Defendants Ryan and Corizon are dismissed without prejudice. 

 (5) Defendant Banning must answer Count One. 

(6) The Clerk of Court must send Plaintiff a service packet including the 

Complaint (Doc. 1), this Order, and both summons and request for waiver forms for 

Defendant Banning. 

 (7) Plaintiff must complete1

 and return the service packet to the Clerk of Court 

within 21 days of the date of filing of this Order. The United States Marshal will not 

provide service of process if Plaintiff fails to comply with this Order. 

 (8) If Plaintiff does not either obtain a waiver of service of the summons or 

complete service of the Summons and Complaint on Defendant within 90 days of the 

 

1

 If a Defendant is an officer or employee of the Arizona Department of Corrections, Plaintiff must list the address of the specific institution where the officer or 

employee works. Service cannot be effected on an officer or employee at the Central Office of the Arizona Department of Corrections unless the officer or employee works there. 

Case 2:18-cv-02322-DGC-DMF Document 7 Filed 09/18/18 Page 6 of 8
- 7 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

TERMPSREF 

filing of the Complaint or within 60 days of the filing of this Order, whichever is later, 

the action may be dismissed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m); LRCiv 16.2(b)(2)(B)(ii). 

 (9) The United States Marshal must retain the Summons, a copy of the 

Complaint, and a copy of this Order for future use. 

 (10) The United States Marshal must notify Defendant of the commencement of 

this action and request waiver of service of the summons pursuant to Rule 4(d) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The notice to Defendant must include a copy of this 

Order. The Marshal must immediately file signed waivers of service of the 

summons. If a waiver of service of summons is returned as undeliverable or is not 

returned by Defendant within 30 days from the date the request for waiver was sent 

by the Marshal, the Marshal must: 

(a) personally serve copies of the Summons, Complaint, and this Order 

upon Defendant pursuant to Rule 4(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; 

and 

(b) within 10 days after personal service is effected, file the return of 

service for Defendant, along with evidence of the attempt to secure a waiver of 

service of the summons and of the costs subsequently incurred in effecting service 

upon Defendant. The costs of service must be enumerated on the return of service 

form (USM-285) and must include the costs incurred by the Marshal for 

photocopying additional copies of the Summons, Complaint, or this Order and for 

preparing new process receipt and return forms (USM-285), if required. Costs of 

service will be taxed against the personally served Defendant pursuant to Rule 

4(d)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise ordered by the 

Court. 

 (11) If Defendant agrees to waive service of the Summons and Complaint, 

Defendant must return the signed waiver forms to the United States Marshal, not 

the Plaintiff.

Case 2:18-cv-02322-DGC-DMF Document 7 Filed 09/18/18 Page 7 of 8
- 8 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

TERMPSREF 

 (12) Defendant Banning must answer the Complaint or otherwise respond by 

appropriate motion within the time provided by the applicable provisions of Rule 12(a) of 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

 (13) This matter is referred to Magistrate Judge Deborah M. Fine pursuant to 

Rules 72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure for all pretrial proceedings as 

authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

 Dated this 17th day of September, 2018. 

Case 2:18-cv-02322-DGC-DMF Document 7 Filed 09/18/18 Page 8 of 8