Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_96-cv-01486/USCOURTS-cand-3_96-cv-01486-16/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DERRICK CLARK, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al.,

Defendants. /

No. C 96-1486 CRB

ORDER REGARDING BURDEN OF

PROOF

This Court is in receipt of the parties’ trial briefs, which reflect each party’s belief that

it does not bear the burden of proof at the upcoming April 26, 2010, evidentiary hearing. For

the reasons that follow, this Court concludes that, pursuant to Gilmore v. California, 220 F.3d

987 (9th Cir. 2000), Defendants shall bear the burden of proof.

Gilmore, like this case, concerned the State of California’s effort to terminate the

order of prospective relief in a prison case. The order of relief in that case concerned the

conditions of confinement for condemned prisoners, and the State argued that the order could

no longer stand under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). The district court agreed

and terminated the prospective relief provisions of the consent decree. The Ninth Circuit

affirmed the decision. The full breadth of the Gilmore opinion is not necessary to resolve the

question currently before this Court. Instead, it is sufficient to quote from one passage:

“[N]othing in the termination provisions [of the PLRA] can be said to shift the burden of 

Case 3:96-cv-01486-CRB Document 382 Filed 04/02/10 Page 1 of 3
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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proof from the party seeking to terminate the prospective relief.” Id. at 1007. Just as in

Gilmore, this case involves the State’s motion to terminate prospective relief. Therefore, the

burden rests on Defendants.

Defendants disagree and point this Court to two subsequent Ninth Circuit cases:

Mayweathers v. Newland, 258 F.3d 930 (9th Cir. 2001), and Hallet v. Morgan, 296 F.3d (9th

Cir. 2002). At the outset, it must be noted that even if Mayweathers and Hallet were on all

fours with this case, neither case was decided by the Circuit sitting en banc. Therefore,

neither subsequent case could have overruled Gilmore. In any event, neither case dealt with

a state’s attempt to terminate relief under the PRLA. Mayweathers, for instance, concerned

the direct appeal of the issuance of a preliminary injunction. The Circuit observed that the

plaintiffs bore the burden in obtaining a preliminary injunction, and indeed there is nothing

surprising about this. But a motion for a preliminary injunction is not the same thing as a

motion to terminate prospective relief. While Mayweathers did opine in dicta that such a

burden “conforms with how the PLRA governs the termination of final prospective relief,”

the latter issue was clearly not before the court. 

Similarly, Hallet concerned a distinct procedural vehicle, and hence involved a

different burden analysis. The decree in Hallet was scheduled to expire on January 12, 1999,

unless it was timely extended. 296 F.3d at 738. In 1998, Plaintiffs moved “to extend

jurisdiction over the consent decree for an additional period of time.” Id. The district judge

denied the motion, granted the Defendants’ motion to terminate, and Plaintiffs appealed. The

State in this case argues that Hallet reflects the Circuit’s conclusion that “the burden of proof

to show a current and ongoing violation of federal rights on the party seeking to continue the

prospective relief.” Br. at 10. This is not so. Hallet’s reference to the burden of proof

referred specifically to the plaintiffs’ motion to extend jurisdiction, not the defendants’

motion to terminate relief. The Court simply did not address the burden applicable to the

motion to terminate. This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that, in discussing the different

standards applicable to granting prospective relief and terminating prospective relief, the

Hallett court quoted extensively from Gilmore. 

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G:\CRBALL\1996\1486\Evidentiary Hearing\Burden of Proof Order.wpd 3

While Defendants also cite to a number of cases outside this circuit, this Court

remains bound by Gilmore. The burden of proof relating to the motion to terminate shall rest

on Defendants. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 2, 2010 

CHARLES R. BREYER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:96-cv-01486-CRB Document 382 Filed 04/02/10 Page 3 of 3