Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00258/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00258-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 370
Nature of Suit: Other Fraud
Cause of Action: 28:1332pr Diversity-Petition for Removal

---

1

3:15-CV-00258-BAS-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STACY LUCAS, an individual, TAREK 

ALBABA, an individual, RIGOBERTO 

VINDIOLA, and individual, DAVID 

GAMMA, an individual, SARAH 

FISHER, an individual, on behalf of 

themselves and all other similarly situated 

consumers,

Plaintiffs,

v.

BREG, INC., a California corporation; 

GARY LOSSE, an individual; MARK 

HOWARD, an individual; and DOES 1 

through 50, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:15-CV-00258-BAS-NLS

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION FOR SANCTIONS

(Dkt. No. 57)

Before the Court is Defendants Breg, Inc.’s and Mark Howard’s (“Defendants”) 

Motion for Sanctions. Defendants seek sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

30(d) due to Plaintiffs’ counsels’ alleged improper conduct during depositions. 

Plaintiffs’ counsel oppose the motion and contend their conduct does not warrant 

imposing sanctions. (Dkt. No. 67 at 9.) For the reasons explained below, the Court 

GRANTS Defendants’ motion for sanctions.

Case 3:15-cv-00258-BAS-NLS Document 87 Filed 05/13/16 Page 1 of 9
2

3:15-CV-00258-BAS-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

I. Background

This is a putative economic injury class action. Plaintiffs and the putative class 

allege Defendants engaged in a “false, misleading, deceptive, fraudulent, and unlawful 

advertising campaign” regarding the sale of Breg’s Polar Care 500. (Third Amend. 

Compl. (Dkt. No. 1-24 at p.1).) The Polar Care 500 is a motorized cold therapy device. 

(Dkt. No. 1-24 at p.1.) Plaintiffs contend they overpaid for the device because it was 

unreasonably dangerous, ineffective, and slowed their recovery from orthopedic surgery. 

(Dkt. No. 57 at 4, citing Dkt. No. 1-24 at p.5.)

While the parties were engaged in class discovery, Defendants deposed the named 

Plaintiffs. Defendants contend that at those depositions, Plaintiffs’ counsel Marc Stern 

and Chase Stern “engaged in a pattern of obstructionist conduct that impeded and 

prevented the fair examination of the plaintiffs on matters relevant to these claims.” 

(Dkt. No. 57 at 4.) Defendants contend the conduct included instructing the deponents

not to answer based on improper grounds, coaching the deponents’ responses, taking over 

defense counsel’s line of questioning to shape the testimony, and disruptive and timewasting commentary directed at defense counsel. (Id.) 

Defendants move for sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(d). They 

ask the Court to issue sanctions it deems appropriate, and in particular that (1) if the case 

continues following a ruling on class certification, that Defendants be allowed to redepose the four plaintiffs for a limited period of time, with an admonishment to 

Plaintiffs’ counsel that further rule violations will result in additional sanctions; and (2) 

that Plaintiffs be required to pay the defense’s fees and costs associated with those redepositions. (Dkt. No. 57 at 6.)

 Plaintiffs’ counsel responds that although some of their objections and 

commentary were “verbose,” they did not impede the fair examination of witnesses. 

(Dkt. No. 67 at 2.) Rather, they contend their objections were made “out of frustration 

and irritation” over the way defense counsel conducted the depositions. (Id.) Plaintiffs’ 

counsel assert their conduct does not justify imposing sanctions. They ask the Court to 

Case 3:15-cv-00258-BAS-NLS Document 87 Filed 05/13/16 Page 2 of 9
3

3:15-CV-00258-BAS-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

continue this motion until after Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification is ruled on 

because if the Court denies certification then no further testimony will be needed, but if 

the motion is granted then Defendants’ counsel can explain what further information they 

require that would justify re-deposing each plaintiff. (Id. at 3.)

Plaintiffs filed their motion for class certification, but the briefing by the parties on

that motion will not be fully submitted until June 3, 2016 and the briefing on the Daubert

motions will not be completed until June 27, 2016. (Dkt. No. 65.) The Court nonetheless 

finds this dispute ripe for determination at this time.

II. Legal Standard

“The court may impose an appropriate sanction—including the reasonable 

expenses and attorney’s fees incurred by any party—on a person who impedes, delays, or 

frustrates the fair examination of the deponent.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(2). “[I]f the 

deponent or another person impedes or delays the examination, the court must authorize 

extra time.” Adv. Comm. Note, 2000 Amendm’ts.

To determine if sanctions are warranted under Rule 30, the court’s inquiry is 

twofold. “First, the court must determine whether a person’s behavior has impeded, 

delayed, or frustrated the fair examination of the deponent.” Dunn v. Wal-Mart Stores, 

Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157554, *3 (D. Nev. Nov. 1, 2013), citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 

30(d)(2). When undertaking this portion of the inquiry, some courts look to “(1) the 

specific language used (e.g., use of offensive words or inappropriate tones); the conduct 

of the parties (e.g., excessive objections or speaking objections); and (3) the length of the 

deposition.” See e.g., Thomas v. Alcoholic Rehab. Servs. of Haw., Inc., 2016 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 10083 (D. Haw. Jan. 28, 2016).

“Second, the court must ‘impose an appropriate sanction.’ [] The Ninth Circuit 

provides District Courts with wide discretion to fashion ‘an appropriate sanction.’” 

Dunn, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157554 at *3, quoting Yeti by Molly, Ltd. v. Deckers, 259 

F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2001). Courts have imposed re-deposition costs where 

“counsel was unjustified in instructing a deponent not to answer.” Doe v. City of San 

Case 3:15-cv-00258-BAS-NLS Document 87 Filed 05/13/16 Page 3 of 9
4

3:15-CV-00258-BAS-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Diego, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179077, *21 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2013); Humphreys v. 

Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20151,*6-7 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2006)

(awarding costs for additional half day of deposition where the counsel improperly 

instructed deponent not to answer and because of other disruptive conduct).

III. Discussion

The Court begins by addressing the assertions that Plaintiffs’ counsel engaged in 

time-wasting and disruptive commentary directed toward defense counsel. This Court is

committed to the highest standards of professionalism and expects those standards to be 

observed by lawyers who practice before it. Civ. L.R. 83.4.a. Counsel who practice 

before this Court are expected to “[b]e courteous and civil in all communications, oral 

and written, and in all proceedings conduct herself/himself with dignity and respect. Id. 

83.4.a.1.a. Counsel must not “[d]isparage the intelligence, ethics, morals, integrity or 

behavior of opposing parties or counsel unless such characteristics are at issue.” Id. 

83.4.2.2.a. “Conduct unbecoming a member of the bar is a serious concern.” Dunn v. 

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157554 (D. Nev. Nov. 1, 2013) (citation 

omitted). 

Here, Plaintiffs’ counsel plainly did not demonstrate the level of civility and 

professionalism that is expected during these depositions. Plaintiffs’ counsels’ 

commentary toward defense counsel included phrases such as: “Shame on you,” and 

“You know, someone apparently didn’t fill you in on who you’re dealing with here,” and 

“it appears you might be hallucinating by positing the possibility that the defendants are 

going to win this lawsuit.”

1

 (Fisher Depo., 231:17-20; Lucas Depo., 154:25-155:1; 

 

1 Defendants also cite another example of alleged offensive commentary, wherein 

Plaintiffs’ counsel stated “I said I see a wedding ring. He’s staring at me and it’s making 

me uncomfortable.” (Dkt. No. 57, citing Albaba Depo. 86:18-20.) However, the Court is 

unable to discern from the record the context of this comment because it followed an offthe-record discussion between and among counsel. The Court thus makes no findings 

with regard to this commentary.

Case 3:15-cv-00258-BAS-NLS Document 87 Filed 05/13/16 Page 4 of 9
5

3:15-CV-00258-BAS-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

154:4-6.) Plaintiffs’ counsels’ retort to defense counsel, who cited Rule 30(d)(2) to state 

that counsels’ argumentative or suggestive objections are prohibited, was likewise an 

unnecessary snarky remark: “[I]f you want to read the rest of the code, do so on your own 

time. If you want to read The Cat in the Hat, do it on your own time. We’re here to 

answer your questions....” (Fisher Depo. 94:21-94:24.)

2

 

Such commentary most certainly does not exhibit the level of courteous and civil 

communications the Court expects from counsel who practice before it. Plaintiffs’ 

counsel assert an unavailing argument that their comments were made in their frustrated 

and feeble attempts to expedite and timely complete these depositions. (Dkt. No. 67 at 3-

4.) Such an excuse falls flat, as surely more civil and courteous methods exist to achieve

their stated aims of efficiency. Indeed, rather than expediting the proceedings, the record 

indicates Plaintiffs’ counsels’ conduct created an unwelcome environment in the practice 

of law. As one Judge recently observed, “[d]iscovery is hard enough, even without 

conduct like that outlined [above].” Claypole v. Cnty. of Monterey, 2016 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 4389, *2-3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2016). The Court is disappointed with the lack of 

civility and professionalism that Plaintiffs’ counsel exhibited in these proceedings.

Plaintiffs’ counsel shall be admonished that they are expected to adhere to the highest 

standards of professional decorum.

Defendants also contend Plaintiffs’ counsel engaged in conduct warranting 

sanctions by improperly instructing the deponents not to answer, interpreting the 

questions posed and suggesting answers, and engaging in speaking objections. (Dkt. No. 

57 at 6-22.) Plaintiffs respond the questions to which they instructed the deponent not to 

answer were “so impermissibly broad and vacuous that no trial judge would have ever 

permitted the questions to be asked in the first place,” and which were “highly improper, 

objectionable, and would never be heard by a jury.” (Dkt. No. 67 at 4-5.) Plaintiffs’ 

 

2 The record reflects that the comments described in this paragraph were made by 

Plaintiffs’ counsel Marc Stern, and not Chase Stern.

Case 3:15-cv-00258-BAS-NLS Document 87 Filed 05/13/16 Page 5 of 9
6

3:15-CV-00258-BAS-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

counsel also argue that they did not impede the examinations; rather, they were stating

their objections on the record, and the deponent thereafter properly answered. (Id. at 6.) 

“An objection ... must be noted on the record, but the examination still proceeds; 

the testimony is taken subject to any objection. An objection must be stated concisely in a 

nonargumentative and nonsuggestive manner. A person may instruct a deponent not to

answer only when necessary to preserve a privilege, to enforce a limitation ordered by 

the court, or to present a motion under Rule 30(d)(3).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(c)(2)

(emphasis added). Likewise, “[a] party may object to an irrelevant line of question, but 

instructing a witness not to answer a question because it calls for inadmissible facts is 

sanctionable.” BNSF Ry. Co. v. San Joaquin Valley R. Co., 2009 WL 3872043, *2 (E.D. 

Cal. Nov. 17, 2009) (citations omitted). 

The record demonstrates Plaintiffs’ counsels’ behavior impeded, delayed, and

frustrated the fair examination of the deponents. The Court reviewed the pertinent 

portions of the transcripts and finds that on multiple occasions, Plaintiffs’ counsel 

improperly instructed the witness not to answer on unfounded grounds.

3 To expound 

upon just one of these examples, counsel for Plaintiffs instructed his client not to answer

on grounds that the question calls for speculation and is an incomplete hypothetical. 

When defense counsel asked if Plaintiffs’ counsel had legal authority to instruct his client 

not answer, he responded that “whether we be in state or federal court, your question 

would be objectionable on so many grounds that the judge would strike your question.” 

 

3 See e.g., Lucas Depo., 75:1-76:6 (Plaintiffs’ counsel instructing Lucas not to answer on 

grounds the question was vague, ambiguous and an incomplete hypothetical); Gamma 

Depo., 94:20-95:25; 96:2-97:20 (instructing Gamma not to answer on grounds the 

question calls for speculation, is an incomplete hypothetical and seeks irrelevant 

information); Albaba Depo., 78:7-79:3; 78:10-80:22 (instructing Albaba not to answer 

via speaking objections and on grounds the question called for expert testimony); Fisher 

Depo., 204:7-205:7; 208:10-12 (instructing Fisher not to answer questions on grounds he 

believed the questions sought irrelevant information and based on Plaintiffs’ theory of the 

case).

Case 3:15-cv-00258-BAS-NLS Document 87 Filed 05/13/16 Page 6 of 9
7

3:15-CV-00258-BAS-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(Dkt. No. 57 at 11, quoting Gamma Depo. 94:20-97:20.) Defendants’ counsel responded: 

“My question may be objectionable, but that doesn’t mean the witness doesn’t need to 

answer it.” Plaintiffs’ counsel replied: “Well, I disagree with you on that because, for the 

life of me, I can’t understand why you think this question is reasonably calculated to lead 

to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Id.) The problem with Plaintiffs’ counsels’ 

position is that it is not supported, as neither objections based on relevance nor an 

incomplete hypothetical serve as appropriate grounds to refuse to answer a question. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(c)(2). Particularly unpersuasive is Plaintiffs’ counsels’ argument that 

their conduct was innocuous because, in their view, no judge would allow the questions 

they instructed not to be answered to be heard by a jury. As defense counsel aptly 

observed:

Plaintiffs essentially argue that their counsel may unilaterally rule on what 

legal theories are relevant, judge whether a question seeks information 

relevant to those theories, and instruct witnesses not to answer a question that 

does not.... [¶] The Court, not the parties’ counsel, rules on the law. And the 

Court, not the parties’ counsel, rules on what questions “lack foundation” or 

are otherwise improper. 

(Dkt. No. 69 at 4.)

Regardless of whether a judge would have permitted such questions, Plaintiffs’ counsels’

role during a deposition does not include the authority to essentially rule on their own 

objections and determine whether such questions need to be answered. 

Plaintiffs’ additional argument that their conduct was harmless and did not 

prejudice Defendants also fails. As Defendants further aptly noted, and this Court agrees, 

Plaintiffs’ counsels’ improper instructions to the deponents not to answer certain 

questions prevented them from obtaining the evidence sought. In sum, Plaintiffs’

counsels’ tactics of improperly instructing deponents not to answer questions impeded, 

delayed and frustrated the examinations of these deponents. Accordingly, the Court finds 

Plaintiffs’ conduct justifies imposing sanctions. 

Sanctions also can be warranted where counsel improperly engages in speaking 

objections or coaches the deponents. Claypole, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4389, at *13

Case 3:15-cv-00258-BAS-NLS Document 87 Filed 05/13/16 Page 7 of 9
8

3:15-CV-00258-BAS-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(citing Lund v. Matthews, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15863, at *4-6 (D. Neb. Feb. 7, 2014) 

(awarding sanctions where counsel made objections with commentary that coached the 

deponent’s answers and instructed the witness not to answer on the basis of an “asked 

and answered” objection); Cordova v. United States, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98226, at *2 

(D.N.M. July 31, 2006) (awarding sanctions where counsel coached the witness through 

speaking objections, and instructed the witness not to answer). “There is no proper need 

for the witness’s own lawyer to act as an intermediary, interpreting questions, deciding 

what questions the witness should answer.” Plaisted v. Geisinger Med. Ctr., 210 F.R.D. 

527, 534 (M.D. Pa. 2002) (internal citations omitted). If the deponent is confused about a 

question, “the witness may ask deposing counsel to clarify the question; securing 

clarification is not the job of the witness’ counsel.” Cordova, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

98226 at *2.

The Court does not need to deeply delve into a discussion about Plaintiffs’ 

counsels’ speaking objections, coaching, or suggested answers because the 

aforementioned problems with Plaintiffs’ conduct already serves to justify imposing

sanctions. It suffices to say the Court reviewed a number of the portions of the 

transcripts, and finds Plaintiffs’ counsel asserted improper speaking objections and 

improperly interrupted defense counsels’ lines of questioning with their own re-phrased 

questions to elicit testimony. 

IV. Conclusion

Defendants are entitled to depositions where counsel adhere to the rules. For the 

aforementioned reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for sanctions. 

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED:

1. If the case continues following a ruling on class certification, Defendants 

will be permitted to re-depose the four plaintiffs, Stacy Lucas, Tarek 

Albaba, David Gamma, and Sarah Fisher, for no more than three hours 

each;

2. Plaintiffs’ counsel must pay the defense’s reasonable fees and costs incurred 

Case 3:15-cv-00258-BAS-NLS Document 87 Filed 05/13/16 Page 8 of 9
9

3:15-CV-00258-BAS-NLS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

that are associated with those re-depositions; and

3. The Court admonishes Plaintiffs’ counsel that they are expected to adhere to 

the highest standards of professional decorum, and further admonishes that

additional rule violations of this sort may result in additional specific and 

more severe sanctions.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 13, 2016

Case 3:15-cv-00258-BAS-NLS Document 87 Filed 05/13/16 Page 9 of 9