Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01693/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01693-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 625
Nature of Suit: Drug Related Seizure of Property
Cause of Action: 21:881 Forfeiture Property-Drugs

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

Evans’ request for oral argument and an evidentiary hearing is denied because the

parties have thoroughly discussed the law and evidence and neither oral argument nor an

evidentiary hearing will aid the Court’s decision. See Mahon v. Credit Bur. of Placer

County, Inc., 171 F.3d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1999).

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

$86,496.00 in U.S. Currency, 

Defendant. 

Roy E. Evans,

Claimant. __________________________________

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV-07-1693-PHX-DGC

ORDER

This case is a civil action in rem to forfeit money seized from Roy Evans. Dkt. #1.

Plaintiff has filed a motion to strike Evans’ answer to the complaint. Dkt. #22. A response

and reply have been filed. Dkt. ##30-31. The Court will grant the motion.1

I. Background.

 On January 28, 2007, the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) seized $86,496

from Evans at Phoenix Sky Harbor Airport. Dkt. #30 at 3, ¶ 1. The DEA subsequently sent

Evans a notice of administrative forfeiture action. Id. ¶ 2. Evans filed a petition for

remission or mitigation of forfeiture with the DEA on June 7, 2007. Id. ¶ 8, Ex. 2. The DEA

Case 2:07-cv-01693-DGC Document 32 Filed 05/12/08 Page 1 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

acknowledged receipt and acceptance of the petition on June 20, 2007. Id. ¶ 9, Ex. 1. The

DEA informed Evans that the matter had been referred to the United States Attorney for the

District of Arizona for judicial action. Id.

On August 6, 2007, Evans filed a petition for return of property in this Court. Dkt. #1,

CV-07-1502-PHX-ECV. The petition was dismissed following Plaintiff’s commencement

of the present action on September 4, 2007. Dkt. #18, CV-07-1502-PHX-ECV; see Dkt. #1,

CV-07-1693-PHX-DGC.

Plaintiff sent a direct notice of this action to Evans on October 18, 2007. Dkt. #5.

Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on November 19, 2007, and the Court gave Evans until

December 21, 2007 to respond to the complaint. Dkt. ##7-9.

On January 15, 2008, Plaintiff filed an application for entry of default and a motion

for default judgment based on Evans’ failure to respond to the complaint. Dkt. ##11-13.

Evans filed an answer three days later. Dkt. #14. The Court denied the motion for default

judgment on the ground that the Clerk had not entered Evans’ default. Dkt. #17.

II. Discussion.

Plaintiff requests the Court to strike Evans’ answer on the ground that he lacks

statutory standing to defend this forfeiture action because (1) he failed to file a verified claim

as required by the statutes and rules governing civil forfeiture actions and (2) his answer was

untimely. Dkt. #22. Evans contends that the administrative petition he submitted to the DEA

and the petition for return of property he filed in this Court constitute valid claims. Evans

further contends that the issue of whether he filed a timely answer is moot because the Court

denied Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment. Dkt. #30.

A. Has Evans Filed a Valid Claim?

This in rem civil forfeiture action arises from a federal statute, see 21 U.S.C. § 881,

and therefore is governed by 18 U.S.C. § 983 and the Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or

Maritime Claims and Asset Forfeiture Actions (“Supplemental Rules”). See Supp. R.

A(1)(B); 18 U.S.C. § 983 (general rules for civil forfeiture proceedings); see also United

States v. $141,932.00, No. 1:04-cv-6743 LJO TAG, 2008 WL 190878, at *2 (E.D. Cal.

Case 2:07-cv-01693-DGC Document 32 Filed 05/12/08 Page 2 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

Jan. 18, 2008). Supplemental Rule G(5) provides that a person who claims an interest in the

defendant property must file “a claim in the court where the action is pending.” Supp. R.

G(5)(a)(i). “The claim must identify the specific property claimed, identify the claimant and

state the claimant’s interest in the property.” $141,932.00, 2008 WL 190878, at *2. “The

claim must also be signed by the claimant under penalty of perjury and duly served on the

government’s attorney.” Id.; see Supp. R. G(5)(A)(i)(A)-(D).

The petition Evans filed with the DEA does not constitute a valid claim for purposes

of Rule G(5). “A petition for remission or mitigation of forfeiture is a petition for

administrative relief, not judicial relief.” United States v. $2,857.00, 754 F.2d 208, 214

(7th Cir. 1984). Moreover, Rule (G)(5) required Evans to file a verified claim before he

answered the complaint, but in this case he did not file the petition with this Court before

filing his answer. See Supp. R. G(5)(b) (an answer to the complaint must be filed “within

20 days after filing the claim”); see also 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(4)(B) (same).

The verified claim requirement in Rule G(5) “is not merely a procedural

technicality[.]” United States v. $13,970.00, No. 5:06-CV-386(CAR), 2007 WL 1231659,

at *2 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 26, 2007). Nor are administrative claims “a substitute for filing a

verified claim in the judicial forfeiture action because summary administrative forfeitures and

judicial forfeitures are distinct proceedings.” United States v. $48,000, No. 06-10952, 2007

WL 1467158, at *3 (E.D. La. May 18, 2007). This distinction is important because the party

that files an administrative claim may not be the only party with an interest in the property,

and the requirement that verified claims be “filed with the court notifies all other parties of

each claim to the property so that all interests may properly be resolved.” United States v.

$23,000, 356 F.3d 157, 166 (1st Cir. 2004); see $2,857.00, 754 F.2d at 213 (an administrative

claim submitted to the DEA “does not fulfill an important function of the claim requirement

of [Rule G(5)] – notifying the court that the claimant is entitled, by virtue of his sworn claim

to the property, to join the action and be heard”); United States v. $50,200, 76 F. Supp. 2d

1247, 1252 (D. Wyo. 1999) (“The administrative claim serves a purpose separate and apart

from the claim filed in a judicial proceeding.”).

Case 2:07-cv-01693-DGC Document 32 Filed 05/12/08 Page 3 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

Evans filed his petition for remission or mitigation of forfeiture “(1) prior to the

execution of process, (2) more than twenty days before the filing of an answer in [this Court],

and (3) with the DEA, not with the [C]ourt.” $2,857.00, 754 F.2d at 214 (emphasis in

original). The Court therefore concludes that the “filing of [Evans’] administrative claim

with the DEA does not satisfy the verified claim obligation of [Rule G(5)].” United States

v. $1,437.00, 242 F. Supp. 2d 193, 196 (W.D.N.Y. 2002); see $2,857.00, 754 F.2d at 213

(“Raymer’s DEA claim cannot be deemed to fulfill the claim requirement of [Rule G(5)].”);

$50,200.00, 76 F. Supp. 2d at 1250 (DEA claim did not satisfy verified claim requirement

where the claim “preceded the execution of process”); $48,000, 2007 WL 1467158, at *3

(“Martin’s filing of his Answer . . . before the filing of his Verified Claim is not in

accordance with [the] Supplemental Rule[s].”) (emphasis in original); United States v. One

1990 Mercedes Benz, 926 F. Supp. 1, 4 (D.D.C. 1996) (“[A] claim submitted during the

course of the administrative forfeiture proceedings does not satisfy the verified claim

obligation of [Rule G(5)].”).

The Court further concludes that Evans’ petition for return of property does not satisfy

the requirements of Rule G(5) because Evans did not sign the petition. See Supp. R.

G(5)(a)(i)(C) (the claim must “be signed by the claimant under penalty of perjury”); $50,200,

76 F. Supp. 2d at 1250 (claim was insufficient where it “was not verified on oath or solemn

affirmation”); United States v. 1991 Dodge Stealth, No. 93 C 4056, 1993 WL 433630, at *3

(N.D. Ill. Oct. 21, 1993) (same).

B. Is the Issue of Evans’ Untimely Answer Moot?

Evans does not dispute that he filed his answer nearly a month after it was due. See

Dkt. ##7, 14. Nor has he shown good cause for the delay. See Dkt. #30. Rather, Evans

contends that the issue is moot in light of the Court’s denial of Plaintiff’s motion for default

judgment. Id. at 5-6. But the default judgment motion did not raise, and the Court therefore

did not address, the issue of Evans’ untimely answer. See Dkt. #13. The Court denied the

motion because the Clerk had not entered Evans’ default. Dkt. #17 at 1 (citing Fed. R. Civ.

P. 55). While the Court noted that an answer had been filed (see id.), the Court did not find

Case 2:07-cv-01693-DGC Document 32 Filed 05/12/08 Page 4 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

that the late filing was justified or otherwise excusable. 

As Plaintiff notes in its reply, the fact that Evans’ default had not been entered when

the answer was filed does not render the answer timely. Dkt. #31 at 4. In granting Evans’

request for an extension of time, the Court specifically ordered Evans to file his answer by

December 21, 2007. Dkt. #7. Neither Evans nor his counsel has offered any explanation for

the failure to meet this deadline. Contrary to Evans’ assertion, the issue of his untimely

answer is not moot.

C. Should the Court Strike the Answer?

Supplemental Rule G(5) requires the verified claim to be “timely filed in the forfeiture

action, and followed by the filing of a timely answer[.]” $141,932.00, 2008 WL 190878,

at *2 (citing Supp. R. G(5)(a)(i), (b)); see 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(4)(A)-(B). Pursuant to

Supplemental Rule G(8), the Government may, at any time before trial, “move to strike a

claim or answer[] for failing to comply with Rule G(5)[.]” Supp. R. G(8)(c)(i)(A). Plaintiff

argues that Evans’ answer should be stricken as untimely and because Evans lacks statutory

standing to file an answer given his failure to file the verified claim required by Rule G(5).

Dkt. #22. The Court agrees.

This Circuit requires “proper standing to contest a forfeiture both as a statutory matter

and as an Article III and prudential requirement.” United States v. One 1985 Cadillac

Seville, 866 F.2d 1142, 1148 (9th Cir. 1989); see also United States v. $165,580, 502 F.

Supp. 2d 114, 122 (D. Me. 2007) (“Article III standing aside, the Claimants must also

demonstrate that they have statutory standing to contest the forfeiture action.”); $13,970.00,

2007 WL 1231659, at *2 (“[S]tatutory standing is a ‘threshold issue’ that the claimant must

establish to contest the forfeiture of the defendant property.”) (citation omitted). If a

claimant fails to file a verified claim pursuant to Rule G(5), he “will have no standing as a

party to the action.” $141,932.00, 2008 WL 190878, at 2 (citing United States v. Real Prop.

Located in Fresno County, 135 F.3d 1312, 1316-17 (9th Cir. 1998)); see United States v.

Real Prop. Located at 22 Santa Barbara Dr., 264 F.3d 860, 870 (9th Cir. 2001) (claimants

were not parties to the civil forfeiture action because they did not file their claims in a timely

Case 2:07-cv-01693-DGC Document 32 Filed 05/12/08 Page 5 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

fashion); United States v. Real Prop. Located at 5208 Los Franciscos Way, 385 F.3d 1187,

1190 n.1 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that the claimant’s request for a continuance of the

government’s summary judgment motion was denied because the claimant “had failed to file

a timely claim to the property and thus was precluded from appearing in the action pursuant

to . . . the Supplemental Rules[.]”); see also United States v. Lot 65 Pine Meadow, 976 F.2d

1155, 1157 (8th Cir. 1992) (“Because appellant did not file a timely claim, he lacked

standing to contest the forfeiture.”); $50,200, 76 F. Supp. 2d at 1251 (“A verified claim in

a forfeiture action in rem must be filed by the claimant in order for the claimant to acquire

‘statutory standing.’”) (citation omitted); $13,970.00, 2007 WL 1231659, at 3 (“Filing a

verified claim is ‘a prerequisite to the right to file an answer and defend on the merits.’”)

(citation omitted). 

As explained above, Evans did not file a verified claim as required by Rule G(5). He

therefore “had no standing to file [his] answer or otherwise appear in [this] proceeding[.]”

$2,857.00, 754 F.3d at 214; see United States v. $261,480, No. 00-CV-3028 (FB), 2002 WL

827420, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. May 2, 2002) (“Claimant’s filing of the administrative claim did

not relieve him of the [Rule G(5)] requirement that he file a claim with the Court because

the administrative claim ‘does not notify the court of the existence of a claim and therefore

does not establish the requisite standing.”) (emphasis added). Moreover, Evans filed his

answer nearly a month late without having sought or obtained a further extension of the filing

deadline.

Evans contends that any failure on his part to file a timely claim or answer would

constitute excusable neglect because he “was litigating the matter in court when [Plaintiff]

filed another claim for the same matter under a new case number ultimately leading to

confusion in the matter.” Dkt. #30 at 6. But Evans does not dispute that, through his

counsel, he was properly served with direct notice of this action pursuant to Supplemental

Rule G(4). See Dkt. #5. Nor does he dispute that he received the Court’s order granting his

request for an extension of time and directing that his answer be filed by December 21, 2007.

See Dkt. #7. In these circumstances, the Court simply cannot conclude that any “confusion”

Case 2:07-cv-01693-DGC Document 32 Filed 05/12/08 Page 6 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

on the part of Evans or his counsel constitutes excusable neglect. See Real Prop. Located

in Fresno County, 135 F.3d at 1317 (“So long as the Government takes the steps mandated

by due process to notify the record owner of an impending forfeiture, it is the owner’s

responsibility to comply with the procedural requirements for opposing the forfeiture.”);

$1,437.00, 242 F. Supp. 2d at 195-96 (holding that counsel’s inability to manage his caseload

or preoccupation with other matters did not constitute excusable neglect for failing to file a

verified claim and a timely answer); United States v. One Piece of Real Prop. Located at

15010 S.W. 168th St., No. 07-20613-CIV, 2008 WL 659472, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 6, 2008)

(the claimant’s “actual knowledge of the case prevents a finding that there was good cause

for his failure to submit a claim”).

In summary, Evans lacked standing to file his answer because he had not filed a

verified claim as required by Supplemental Rule G(5). Evans has not demonstrated good

cause or excusable neglect for his failure to timely file his answer. The Court accordingly

will grant Plaintiff’s motion to strike the answer. See $48,000, 2007 WL 1467158, at 3

(granting motion to strike where the claimants had “failed to show any mitigating factors that

would excuse them from filing verified claims and answers in a timely manner”); One 1990

Mercedes Benz, 926 F. Supp. at 5 (granting motion to strike where there were “no mitigating

factors which could have affected [the] claimant’s ability to strictly comply with the [Rule

G(5)] requirements”).

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s motion to strike answer (Dkt. #22) is granted.

2. The Clerk is directed to strike from the record the answer filed by Claimant

Roy Evans (Dkt. #14). 

DATED this 9th day of May, 2008.

Case 2:07-cv-01693-DGC Document 32 Filed 05/12/08 Page 7 of 7