Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca6-07-03134/USCOURTS-ca6-07-03134-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206

File Name: 08a0091p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT _________________

AMANDA KISTNER,

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

THE LAW OFFICES OF MICHAEL P. MARGELEFSKY,

LLC and MICHAEL P. MARGELEFSKY,

 Defendants-Appellees.

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No. 07-3134

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Ohio at Toledo.

No. 05-07238—Jack Zouhary, District Judge.

Argued: January 31, 2008

Decided and Filed: February 26, 2008 

Before: MERRITT, GILMAN, and COOK, Circuit Judges.

_________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Stephen R. Felson, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellant. David P. Strup, COOPER &

WALINSKI, Toledo, Ohio, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Stephen R. Felson, Cincinnati, Ohio,

Edward A. Icove, ICOVE LEGAL GROUP, Cleveland, Ohio, Steven C. Shane, Bellevue, Kentucky,

for Appellant. David P. Strup, Brandi L. Doniere, COOPER & WALINSKI, Toledo, Ohio, for

Appellees. 

_________________

OPINION _________________

RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge. In January of 2005, Amanda Kistner received a

collection letter from The Law Offices of Michael P. Margelefsky, LLC related to her Cincinnati

Bell account. The letter, printed on The Law Offices of Michael P. Margelefsky letterhead, contains

a block signature declaring that the letter was sent by an “Account Representative.” Kistner

subsequently filed the present lawsuit as a putative class action against The Law Offices of Michael

P. Margelefsky (the Law Offices) and Michael Margelefsky individually, alleging numerous

violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1692, and the Ohio

Consumer Sales Practices Act (OCSPA), Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1345.01. 

The district court granted summary judgment both to the Law Offices and to Margelefsky

after concluding that the collection letter did not make any misrepresentations and was not

1

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deceptive. For the reasons set forth below, we REVERSE the judgment of the district court and

REMAND the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Specifically, we conclude

that Margelefsky can be held individually liable as a “debt collector” under the FDCPA and that a

genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the collection letter was deceptive.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual background

Margelefsky individually is the sole member of the Law Offices. Under that name,

Margelefsky operates both a law practice and a debt collection agency. These two businesses

maintain separate addresses, telephone numbers, and bank accounts, even though they are physically

adjacent to each other. 

The form collection letter that Kistner received was initially drafted by Margelefsky.

According to Margelefsky, the letter contains all of the language and notices required by the

FDCPA. Thousands of these form letters were mailed by the Law Offices during the two-week

period in which Kistner received her letter. 

Printed on letterhead for the “Law offices of Michael P. Margelefsky, LLC,” the letter

contains the address and telephone number for the debt collection agency that operates under that

name. (Formatting in original.) In its entirety, the text of the letter reads as follows:

This letter is to advise you that your account has been referred to this

office.

This communication is from a debt collector. This is an attempt to

collect a debt. Any information obtained will be used for that

purpose.

Unless you notify this office within 30 days after receiving this notice

that you dispute the validity of this debt or any portion thereof, this

office will assume this debt is valid. If you notify this office in

writing within 30 days from receiving this notice that you dispute the

debt or any portion thereof, this office will: obtain verification of the

debt or obtain a copy of a judgment and mail you a copy of such

judgment or verification. If you request of this office in writing

within 30 days after receiving this notice, this office will provide you

with the name and address of the original creditor, if different from

the current creditor.

The letter does not contain an individual’s signature, but contains the following signature

block:

ACCOUNT REPRESENTATIVE

The law offices of

MICHAEL P. MARGELEFSKY, LLC

(Formatting in original.) Finally, attached at the bottom of the letter is a remittance form that

instructs the debtor to make a check or money order payable to “MICHAEL P.

MARGELEFSKY,” and to mail the payment to “THE LAW OFFICES OF MICHAEL P.

MARGELEFSKY, LLC.” (Formatting in original.)

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Margelefsky acknowledged that he did not review the specific letter that was sent to Kistner

before it was mailed. In fact, Margelefsky testified in his deposition that the letter was not even

reviewed by an “Account Representative” before it was mailed. 

B. Procedural background

Kistner filed her complaint in June of 2005. In September of 2005, she filed an amended

complaint, alleging that Margelefsky violated six provisions of the FDCPA. Following discovery,

both sides moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the joint motion of the Law

Offices and Margelefsky and denied Kistner’s. This timely appeal followed, with the only issues

being Margelefsky’s individual liability and Kistner’s allegation that the collection letter was

deceptive under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(3).

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of review

We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment. Int’l Union v. Cummins, 434 F.3d 478, 483 (6th Cir. 2006). Summary judgment is proper where no genuine issue of material

fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

In considering a motion for summary judgment, the district court must construe all reasonable

inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475

U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The central issue is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement

to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter

of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). 

B. Margelefsky’s individual liability

We will first address Margelefsky’s argument that he should not be held individually liable

because either (1) he did not have any involvement with the collection notice that was sent to

Kistner, or (2) he is not individually liable for the actions of his law firm, which is established as a

limited liability company (LLC). Margelefsky argues that, notwithstanding any liability that his

debt-collection business might face, he is entitled to be dismissed from the case as an individually

named defendant. 

The question of whether an individual member of an LLC that is engaged in debt collection

may be held liable under the FDCPA without piercing the corporate veil is an issue of first

impression in this circuit. Liability under the FDCPA attaches only to a “debt collector,” a term

defined by the Act as

any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any

business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who

regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or

asserted to be owed or due another.

15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). Ohio law precludes personal liability for members of an LLC on the basis

of the LLC’s liability. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1705.48.

Margelefsky cites only one case in support of his argument that his lack of involvement with

the specific notice at issue precludes his individual liability under the FDCPA. In that case, United

States v. ACB Sales & Service, Inc., 590 F. Supp 561 (D. Ariz. 1984), the district court concluded

that the director of a corporate entity “may be held liable only for [FDCPA] violations in which he

materially participates.” Id. at 575. In more recent years, however, the law surrounding this issue

has been developed more fully and a split of authority has emerged.

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On one side of the split, the Seventh Circuit and a few district courts have ruled that a

shareholder, officer, or employee of a corporate debt collector may not be held personally liable

without meeting the requirements necessary to pierce the corporate veil. The leading case for this

proposition is White v. Goodman, 200 F.3d 1016 (7th Cir. 2000), where the Seventh Circuit

concluded that “[t]he Fair Debt Collection Practices Act is not aimed at the shareholders of debt

collectors operating in the corporate form unless some basis is shown for piercing the corporate

veil.” Id. at 1019. Later, in Pettit v. Retrieval Masters Creditors Bureau, Inc., 211 F.3d 1057 (7th

Cir. 2000), the Seventh Circuit clarified that “under our holding in White v. Goodman, the extent of

control exercised by an officer or shareholder is irrelevant to determining his liability under the

FDCPA.” Id. at 1059. According to the court in Pettit, officers and shareholders “do not become

‘debt collectors’ simply by working for or owning stock in debt collection companies.” Id. The

Seventh Circuit explained that “the FDCPA has utilized the principle of vicarious liability” and,

“[j]ust as in the Title VII context, the debt collection company answers for its employees’ violations

of the statute.” Id.

On the other side of the split are a series of district court decisions concluding that “where

a shareholder, officer, or employee of a corporation is personally involved in the debt collection at

issue, he may be held personally liable as a debt collector without piercing the corporate veil.”

Brumbelow v. Law Offices of Bennett and Deloney, P.C., 372 F. Supp. 2d 615, 618 (D. Utah 2005).

For example, the Eastern District of California has concluded that

[b]y being directly involved in the day-to-day operation of Lundgren & Associates,

including training and managing employees, and reviewing or supervising the review

of all accounts, Lundgren was both directly and indirectly involved in Lundgren &

Associates’ collection of debts. Given the plain language of the FDCPA, defendant

Lundgren is a debt collector within the meaning of the FDCPA and can be held liable

for any acts in which he directly or indirectly attempted to collect debts in violation

of the FDCPA.

Newman v. Checkrite Cal., Inc., 912 F. Supp. 1354, 1372 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (referring to 15 U.S.C.

§ 1692a(6)). In another case, the Eastern District of New York found personal liability in part

because “each employee is himself a ‘debt collector’ within the statutory definition, namely each

is a ‘person’ in a business, ‘the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts or who

regularly collects or attempts to collect . . . debts owed or due . . . another.’” Teng v. Metro. Retail

Recovery Inc., 851 F. Supp. 61, 67 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)).

The district court in Arizona, subsequent to the ACB Sales & Service, Inc. case from that

district relied on by Margelefsky, has held that personal liability may be found where individual

corporate officers “materially participated in the activities of [a debt collection agency] alleged to

be collection activities.” Brink v. First Credit Res., 57 F. Supp. 2d 848, 862 (D. Ariz. 1999). In

other words, contrary to Margelefsky’s argument that he cannot be personally liable because he did

not participate in sending the specific letter to Kistner, he may be personally liable on the basis of

his participation in the debt collection activities of the LLC more generally.

Most similar to the instant action is the case of Ditty v. CheckRite, Ltd., 973 F. Supp. 1320

(D. Utah 1997), in which the district court premised a finding of personal liability on the part of the

sole member of a law firm LLC on the grounds that

as the firm’s sole attorney, developer of the “covenant not to sue” practice, author

of the generic letters utilized by the firm, and supervisor of all of the firm’s

collection activities, Mr. DeLoney was regularly engaged, directly and indirectly, in

the collection of debts.

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Id. at 1336-37. The court in Ditty concluded that the defendant satisfied the FDCPA definition of

“debt collector” and could therefore be held liable without “pierc[ing] the protective veil afforded

[LLCs] under Utah law.” Id. at 1337. 

In discussing the Ditty holding, the court in Brumbelow explained that “[t]here is no doubt

that in a generic sense a person who authors collection letters, supervises collection activities, and

is the sole attorney in a debt collection firm is a ‘debt collector’ as defined by the FDCPA.”

Brumbelow, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 618. The court in Brumbelow also articulated a compelling argument

against the Seventh Circuit’s conclusion that the FDCPA employs the same vicarious-liability

principles found in Title VII:

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment

Act both forbid discrimination by “an employer,” “employment agency,” or “labor

organization.” The Tenth Circuit has squarely held that “[t]he relief granted under

Title VII is against the employer, not individual employees whose actions would

constitute a violation of the Act.” In other words, where the employer under Title

VII is a corporation, it is the corporate entity which is liable for reinstatement, or

backpay, or any other relief awarded, and not the individual decision-maker who

actually engaged in the discriminatory conduct. By contrast, the FDCPA does not

limit liability to business entities or employers. Rather, under the FDCPA, liability

extends to all “debt collectors,” defined as “ any person . . . in any business the

principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts . . . .” The point of this is

simply that it is much easier to read the language of Title VII and conclude that it is

based upon the respondeat superior liability of the employer, especially given the

remedies available under Title VII, than it is to conclude the same thing with the

FDCPA.

372 F. Supp. 2d at 621-22 (citations omitted). 

We find the analysis in Brumbelow persuasive. Accordingly, we adopt that analysis and hold

that subjecting the sole member of an LLC to individual liability for violations of the FDCPA will

require proof that the individual is a “debt collector,” but does not require piercing of the corporate

veil.

In the instant action, Margelefsky’s alleged liability is not premised solely on the fact that

he works for, and is the sole member of, the Law Offices. Rather, Margelefsky, like the defendants

in Ditty, was “regularly engaged, directly and indirectly, in the collection of debts.” See Ditty, 973

F. Supp. at 1337. Margelefsky admitted in his deposition that he drafted the form letter that was sent

to Kistner, is one of only two attorneys at the law firm, is the only member of the LLC, and is the

one who negotiates terms with the mailing service provider used in the debt-collection practice. He

also states in his brief that he is involved in the debt collection practice “to oversee compliance with

applicable collection laws and when the intervention by a lawyer becomes necessary.” And while

Margelefsky’s signature does not appear on the collection notice that was sent to Kistner, the

remittance voucher directed Kistner to make her check or money order payable to Margelefsky

individually. 

 The district court did not analyze Margelefsky’s status as a “debt collector,” but the facts

relating to his involvement in the debt-collection business are undisputed—originating in

Margelefsky’s own deposition testimony. Accordingly, because the determination of whether

Margelefsky is a “debt collector” under the statutory definition is reduced to a pure question of law,

it is unnecessary to remand the issue to the district court. See United Food & Commercial Workers

Union, Local 1099 v. SW Ohio Reg’l Transit Auth., 163 F.3d 341, 361 n.9 (6th Cir. 1998)

(“Although we will generally decline to consider in the first instance issues not considered by the

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district court, we will make an exception ‘where . . . the issue presents only a question of law.’”

(quoting City Mgmt. Corp. v. U.S. Chem. Co., 43 F.3d 244, 255 (6th Cir. 1994))). Based on the

foregoing, we conclude that Margelefsky is a “debt collector” as a matter of law and thus subject

to individual liability. See Ditty, 973 F. Supp. at 1336-37. 

C. The LLC’s collection letter

This court has not previously had occasion to decide an “attorney letterhead” case under the

FDCPA. Debt collectors are prohibited by the FDCPA from using “any false, deceptive, or

misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.” 15 U.S.C.

§ 1692e. Specifically at issue in this appeal is 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(3), which prohibits debt collectors

from creating “[t]he false representation or implication that any individual is an attorney or that any

communication is from an attorney.” The statute imposes strict liability for violations. 15 U.S.C.

§ 1692k(a). An exception to strict liability exists only where a debt collector commits a violation

resulting from a “bona fide error.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c). 

This court has previously adopted the “least-sophisticated-consumer” test for determining

whether a debt collector’s practice is deceptive. Lewis v. ACB Bus. Servs., Inc., 135 F.3d 389, 400

(6th Cir. 1998) (analyzing an alleged violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10) under the leastsophisticated-consumer test). The least-sophisticated-consumer test is objective and is designed “to

ensure that the FDCPA protects all consumers, the gullible as well as the shrewd.” Fed. Home Loan

Mortgage Corp. v. Lamar, 503 F.3d 504, 509 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d

1314, 1318 (2d Cir. 1993)). “[A]lthough this standard protects naive consumers, it also prevents

liability for bizarre or idiosyncratic interpretations of collection notices by preserving a quotient of

reasonableness and presuming a basic level of understanding and willingness to read with care.”

Id. at 509-10 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Margelefsky contends that he personally had no involvement in sending the letter to Kistner.

But Kistner asserts that six aspects of the letter objectively signal to the least sophisticated consumer

that the letter is from an attorney, despite Margelefsky’s lack of personal involvement with it: (1) the

letterhead reads “Law offices of Michael P. Margelefsky, LLC,” (2) the letter informs the consumer

that the account “has been referred to this office,” (3) the letter includes a detachable payment

voucher with instructions to “MAKE CHECK OR MONEY ORDER PAYABLE TO MICHAEL

P. MARGELEFSKY,” (4) the payment voucher is to be returned to “THE LAW OFFICES OF

MICHAEL P. MARGELEFSKY, LLC,” (5) there is no disclaimer of attorney involvement in the

letter, and (6) the signature block states “ACCOUNT REPRESENTATIVE, the law offices of

MICHAEL P. MARGELEFSKY, LLC.”

In granting summary judgment to Margelefsky on Kistner’s § 1692e(3) claim, the district

court relied exclusively on the case of Rumpler v. Phillips & Cohen Associates, Ltd., 219 F. Supp.

2d 251 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). The form collection notice in Rumpler was on the company letterhead of

Phillips & Cohen Associates (P & C) and bore a signature line reading “Adam S. Cohen, Esq.,

Executive Vice President.” Id. at 253. Utilizing the least-sophisticated-consumer test, the court

concluded that such a consumer “could not reasonably interpret the Letter as having been issued by

an attorney” because “the Letter in this case is on P & C’s letterhead, which nowhere states either

‘Attorney at Law’ or ‘General Counsel,’ or gives any other indication that it came from an attorney

or a law firm.” Id. at 257. Rather, “[t]he Letter simply recites the name of a debt collection

business.” Id. 

Rumpler argued, however, that the inclusion of “Esq.” after Cohen’s name indicated that the

letter had been sent by an attorney. Id. The district court rejected Rumpler’s argument because “any

effect in the reader’s mind caused by including ‘Esq.’ after Cohen’s name is blunted by the inclusion

of the phrase ‘Executive Vice President’ immediately below.” Id. In the present case, the district

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court likewise concluded that “any effect in the reader’s mind caused by the letterhead ‘Law Offices

of Michael P. Margelefsky, LLC,’ or any of the other arguments put forth by Plaintiff, is similarly

‘blunted’ by the specific language used in the notice and the fact that it was signed ‘ACCOUNT

REPRESENTATIVE.’” 

We respectfully disagree. Contrary to the statement by the district court that the letter in

Rumpler “was on law firm letterhead,” the Rumpler court explicitly said that the letter was “on

P & C’s letterhead, which nowhere states either ‘Attorney at Law’ or ‘General Counsel,’ or gives

any other indication that it came from an attorney or a law firm.” 219 F. Supp. 2d at 257 (emphasis

added). In other words, the least sophisticated consumer looking at the letterhead in Rumpler would

see no indication that the letter had been sent from a law firm. The letter from the LLC, in contrast,

gives repeated indications that it came from a law firm. Specifically, the words “law offices” appear

in the letterhead, the signature block, and on the remittance voucher. 

The purpose of the Rumpler court’s discussion of the letterhead was to distinguish the case

from Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314 (2d Cir. 1993). In Clomon, the attorney in question sent

a series of letters to Clomon on a letterhead that said “P.D. Jackson, G.C., Attorney-at-Law, Offices

of General Counsel.” The letters were also signed, albeit with a “mechanically reproduced facsimile

of the signature,” by “P.D. Jackson, Attorney at Law, General Counsel, NCB Collection Services.”

Jackson was employed part-time as the general counsel for NCB Collection Services, and he was,

in fact, a licensed attorney. 

The Clomon court found that, on the basis of Jackson’s letterhead and signature, the letters

would give the least sophisticated consumer “the impression that the letters were communications

from an attorney.” Id. at 1320. In concluding that summary judgment was properly granted to the

plaintiff, the court explained that this impression was false and misleading because the fact that

“Jackson played virtually no day-to-day role in the debt collection process supports the conclusion

that the collection letters were not ‘from’ Jackson in any meaningful sense of that word.” Id.

Jackson in fact admitted that 

[he] did not review each debtor’s file; he did not determine when particular letters

should be sent; he did not approve the sending of particular letters based upon the

recommendations of others; and he did not see particular letters before they were

sent—indeed, he did not even know the identities of the persons to whom the letters

were issued.

Id. 

Margelefsky, likewise, admitted in his deposition that he did not review Kistner’s file, did

not determine whether particular letters should be sent, and did not know the identities of the

persons to whom the letters were sent. So if the letter sent to Kistner would give the least

sophisticated consumer “the impression that the letter[] [was a] communication[] from an attorney,”

then that impression was false. See Clomon, 988 F.2d at 1320.

We conclude that Margelefsky and the district court have ascribed too much significance to

the inclusion in the Kistner letter of the phrase “ACCOUNT REPRESENTATIVE.” Unlike the use

of the title “Executive Vice President” in Rumpler, the inclusion of “Account Representative” does

not necessarily blunt “any effect in the reader’s mind caused by” the repeated references to “The

Law Offices of Michael P. Margelefsky” and the payment voucher directing remittance to “Michael

P. Margelefsky.” See Rumpler, 219 F. Supp. 2d at 257. This last fact is especially troubling despite

Margelefsky’s attempt to explain it away in a footnote in his brief as follows:

The notice directs Kistner to return payment to “THE LAW OFFICES OF

MICHAEL P. MARGELEFSKY, LLC” on the return receipt, and shortens the debt

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collection agency’s name in the payment instructions and, for simplification,

instructs Kistner to make checks payable to Michael P. Margelefsky.

But the argument that Margelefsky’s name appears for “simplification” purposes rings hollow

because it is contradicted by Margelefsky’s own deposition testimony, where he states that the

appearance of his name on the payment voucher is a misprint that he did not notice until the

deposition. 

We conclude that the impression left by the collection letter in this case falls somewhere in

between the letter in Clomon and the letter in Rumpler. The LLC’s letter is printed on law firm

letterhead, it makes repeated reference to a law firm, and it directs remittance to an individually

named lawyer. But it also explicitly states that it is from a debt collector and is “signed” by an

unnamed “Account Representative.” Based on these conflicting aspects of the letter, we conclude

that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Margelefsky, but we will not go to the

other extreme either by granting summary judgment to Kistner. Instead, a jury should determine

whether the letter is deceptive and misleading—specifically, whether the letter gives the impression

that it is from an attorney even though it is not.

Further support for remanding the case for trial can be found in another approach for

analyzing claims under the FDCPA. In Clomon, the court noted that “courts have held that

collection notices can be deceptive if they are open to more than one reasonable interpretation, at

least one of which is inaccurate.” 988 F.2d at 1319. In Russell v. Equifax A.R.S., 74 F.3d 30, 34-35

(2d Cir. 1996), the collection notice presented the debtor “with two different and conflicting

statements,” and the court concluded that “[b]ecause the initial collection notice . . . was reasonably

susceptible to an inaccurate reading, it was also deceptive within the meaning of the Act.” The

Third Circuit has also reversed the grant of a motion to dismiss because the plaintiff properly stated

a claim for “false, deceptive, or misleading representation” under 15 U.S.C. § 1692e and because

further proceedings were needed to determine if the inaccurate reading was “‘reasonable’ in light

of the facts of this case.” Brown v. Card Serv. Ctr., 464 F.3d 450, 455 (3d Cir. 2006).

Margelefsky argues that because no court has applied the “more than one reasonable

interpretation” standard to claimed violations of § 1692e(3), the standard is somehow inapplicable

as a matter of law. But there is nothing in Clomon or in any of the cases that have applied the

standard to suggest that it is not equally applicable to subsection three of § 1692e. In fact, § 1692e

prohibits debt collectors from using “any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in

connection with the collection of any debt,” and lays out specific violations of the section, including

subsection three, related to attorney communications. 

We therefore believe that the “more than one reasonable interpretation” standard is

applicable to the entirety of § 1692e as a useful tool in analyzing the “least-sophisticated-consumer”

test. See Clomon, 988 F.2d at 1319 (discussing the “more than one reasonable interpretation” test

as one of the “variety of ways” in which courts attempt to protect consumers under the leastsophisticated-consumer standard). Accordingly, the question for the jury becomes whether one can

reasonably conclude that the letter sent to Kistner is susceptible to a reading by the least

sophisticated consumer that it is from an attorney, even though Margelefsky has admitted that he

had no direct role in sending the letter.

D. Kistner’s OCSPA claims

The district court also granted summary judgment to Margelefsky on Kistner’s OCSPA

claims. Judgment on these claims was predicated on the court’s conclusion that the collection letter

“did not make any misrepresentations, nor was it deceptive in any way,” and therefore did not

violate the FDCPA. Kistner presented no independent evidence for her OCSPA claims, and the

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district court therefore saw no reason not to grant summary judgment to Margelefsky on those

claims. Because we have concluded that summary judgment on the FDCPA claims was improperly

granted, Kistner’s OCSPA claims—specifically her claim for injunctive relief under the

statute—must be remanded to the district court for reconsideration. 

III. CONCLUSION

In sum, we have determined that Margelefsky is a “debt collector” who may be held

individually liable for any violations of the FDCPA. A genuine issue of material fact, however,

exists as to whether one can reasonably conclude, under the “least-sophisticated-consumer” test, that

the collection letter addressed to Kistner is susceptible to a belief that it is from an attorney. We

therefore REVERSE the judgment of the district court and REMAND the case for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

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