Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01503/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01503-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DANIEL ACEDO,

CDCR #AT-5893,

Civil No. 14-cv-01503-BAS(NLS)

Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING FIRST

AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM 

PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) & 

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)

vs.

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, et al.,

Defendants.

Daniel Acedo (“Plaintiff”), a former state prisoner incarcerated at Wasco State

Prison (“WSP”) in Wasco, California, proceeding pro se, bringsthis case pursuant to the

Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 11, 2014, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma

pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), but simultaneously dismissed his

Complaint sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1) for

failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. (See Oct. 11, 2014 Order

(ECF No. 4).) The Court further provided Plaintiff with notice of his Complaint’s

pleading deficiencies and granted him leave to amend. (Id. at pp. 5-10.)

-1- 14cv1503 BAS (NLS)

Case 3:14-cv-01503-BAS-NLS Document 7 Filed 02/02/15 Page 1 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

On October 31, 2014, and while he was still incarcerated at WSP, Plaintiff filed

an Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 5 (“FAC”).) On December 4, 2014, Plaintiff also

filed a Notice of Change of Address which indicates he has since been released from

custody. (ECF No. 6.)

II. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS

In his original Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that while he wasin custody at the San

Diego Central Jail (“SDCJ”) and George Bailey Detention Facility (“GBDF”) from

December 2013, through May 2014, the County ofSan Diego’s Sheriff’s Department and

several Sheriff’s Department officials violated his right to access to the courts by

refusing to provide him with 28-lined pleading paper and other “forms” for filing legal

actions in both state and federal courts. (See Compl. (ECF No. 1) at 1, 3-5.) Plaintiff

further argued that Sheriff’s Department policies allowing inmates to “obtain 50-page

print outs once a month” are unconstitutional because they are “very limited in its

nature.” (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff sought injunctive relief as well as general and punitive

damages. (Id. at 7.) 1

In its October 11, 2014 Order, the Court first dismissed the San Diego Sheriff’s

Department as an improper defendant under § 1983. (See Oct. 11, 2014 Order (ECF No.

4) at pp. 5-6 (citing Vance v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 928 F. Supp. 993, 996 (N.D. Cal.

1996))). Second, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against Captain Pena on

respondeat superior grounds. (Id. at pp. 6-7 (citing Palmer v. Sanderson, 9 F.3d 1433,

1437-38 (9th Cir. 1993); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009))). Third, the Court

dismissed Plaintiff’s accessto courts claims against all SDCJ officials(Vickery, Brown,

and Avalos), finding both that he had failed to allege an “actual injury,” id. at p. 8 (citing

Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351-53 (1996)), and that he failed to describe the “nonBecause Plaintiff had been transferred from County custody to WSP at the time

1

of filing, the Court found his request for injunctive relief prohibiting San Diego County

officials “fromdenying forms and copies” and “imposing policiesthat deny accessto the

state and federal courts”to be moot. (See Oct. 11, 2014 Order (ECF No. 4) at p. 2, n.1;

Compl. at 7; Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U .S. 395 (1975) (inmate’s request for declaratory

judgment rendered moot by his transfer to another prison).) 

-2- 14cv1503 BAS (NLS)

Case 3:14-cv-01503-BAS-NLS Document 7 Filed 02/02/15 Page 2 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

frivolous nature of the underlying cause of action or claim that was either frustrated or

lost as a result of their actions, id. at pp. 8-9 (citing Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S.

403, 413-14 (2002)). Finally, the Court noted that an exhibit attached to Plaintiff’s

Complaint indicated that his access to courts claims appeared precluded by a prior state

habeas corpus proceeding filed while he was still in County custody. (Id. at p. 9 (citing

Gonzales v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 739 F.3d 1226, 1231-34 (9th Cir. 2014))). 

On October 31, 2014, Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint (ECF No. 5), this

time naming three different Defendants: the County of San Diego, its Sheriff, William

D. Gore, and Legal Research Associates. He no longer names the Sheriff’s Department,

Captain Pena, Christina Vickery, Christine Brown, or Francis Avalos as parties, and his

Amended Complaint alleges no causes of action against them. See S.D. CAL. CIVLR

15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th

Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading supersedesthe original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty.,

693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that claims previously dismissed with leave

to amend may be “considered waived if not repled.”).

III. SCREENING OF PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED COMPLAINT

A. Standard of Review

As Plaintiff knows, the Court is obligated by the Prison Litigation Reform Act

(“PLRA”) to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP and by those, like

Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused of, convicted

of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms

or conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” at the time

of filing “as soon as practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(a) & (c). 

Under the PLRA, the Court must sua sponte dismiss complaints, or any portions thereof,

which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which seek damages from

defendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Lopez v.

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2));

-3- 14cv1503 BAS (NLS)

Case 3:14-cv-01503-BAS-NLS Document 7 Filed 02/02/15 Page 3 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. §

1915A(b)).

Every complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing

that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations

are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported

by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “When there are

well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine

whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 679. “Determining

whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] ... a context-specific task that

requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.

The “mere possibility of misconduct” falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. 

Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).

While a plaintiff’s factual allegations are taken as true, courts “are not required to

indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th

Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Indeed, while courts have

an obligation “where the petitioner is pro se, particularly in civil rights cases, to construe

the pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v.

Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026,

1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)), it may not “supply essential elements of the claim that were

not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th

Cir. 1982). Even before Iqbal, “[v]ague and conclusory allegations of official

participation in civil rights violations [were] not sufficient to withstand a motion to

dismiss.” Id.

B. Allegations in First Amended Complaint

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint consists of only three pages. On the first, in its

caption, he lists the County of San Diego, William D. Gore, and Legal Research

Associates as Defendants. (See FAC at 1.) On the second page, Plaintiff again alleges

-4- 14cv1503 BAS (NLS)

Case 3:14-cv-01503-BAS-NLS Document 7 Filed 02/02/15 Page 4 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

that while he was in County custody at GBDF “on or about 12-03-1[3] until 1-18-14,”

“the County of San Diego through William D. Gore and through Legal Research

Associates as persons acting under color oflaw[,] deprive[d] [him] of[his] constitutional

right to access the court and in fact interfered with [his] right to obtain effective counsel

and [his] right to a fair trial,” by “hav[ing] a ‘policy’ which limit[ed] [his] ability to 50

pages of caselaw.” (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff alleges to have “suffer[ed] prejudice because [he]

was ‘force[d]’ to go pro per because of [his] inability to access adequate case law.” (Id.) 

While he offers no further detail, Plaintiff continues to seek injunctive relief requiring

2

“Defendants (collectively) ... [to] change the[ir] limitation on legal research,” costs and

fees, as well as $675,000 in compensatory and $375,000 in punitive damages. (Id. at 3.)

C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

“Section 1983 creates a private right of action against individuals who, acting

under color of state law, violate federal constitutional or statutory rights.” Devereaux v.

Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). Section 1983 “is not itself a source of

substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federalrights elsewhere

conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted). “To establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both (1)

deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2)

that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Tsao

v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012) (quotations and citation

omitted).

D. Liability

While it is not at all clear, it appears Plaintiff seeks to hold the County of San

Diego, William D. Gore, its Sheriff, and Legal Research Associates, a company the

While Plaintiff does attach approximately 20 pages of exhibits, these are 2

comprised of blank forms provided to inmates by the San Diego County Sheriff’s

Department for their use in requesting “legal research/assistance information.” (See FAC

at 4-5, 23-27.) In addition to these forms, Plaintiff also attaches a photocopy of a chapter

from B.E. Witkin & Norman L. Epstein, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW: Pretrial

Proceedings §§ 259-273 (4th ed. 2012). (Id. at 6-20.)

-5- 14cv1503 BAS (NLS)

Case 3:14-cv-01503-BAS-NLS Document 7 Filed 02/02/15 Page 5 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

County Sheriff’s Department “contract[s] with . . . to provide [] legal research assistance”

to inmates within its custody, see FAC at 4, liable for “hav[ing] a policy” which limited

and/or interfered with his right to access to the court, id. at 2. However, he makes no

allegations of any individual or personal wrongdoing on the part of either Sheriff Gore

or Legal Research Associates. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (under § 1983 a plaintiff 3

“must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own

individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”); Jones v. Cmty. Redevelopment

Agency of City of Los Angeles, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984) (noting that even a pro

se plaintiff must “allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which

defendants engaged in” in order to state a § 1983 claim against them) (citation omitted). 

Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a § 1983 claim against Sheriff Gore or Legal

Research Associates. 

Although § 1983 refers only to “person[s],” Plaintiff may sue the County of San

Diego as a local governing body directly under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, and

injunctive relief for violations of his constitutional rights. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.

of City. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). To state a claim for relief against a

municipality, however, Plaintiff’s pleading must “contain sufficient allegations of

underlying facts . . . that . . . plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief” against the

municipality. Hernandez v. Cnty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing

Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011)). 

To establish a municipality’s liability under § 1983, Plaintiff must allege that: (1)

he was deprived of a constitutional right; (2) the County had a policy; (3) the policy

The Court assumes without deciding, and for purposes of screening only, that 3

Legal Research Associates, a private entity which contracts with the San Diego Sheriff’s

Department to “provide [inmates] with legal research assistance,” see FAC at 4, acts

“under color of state law” for purposes of § 1983. See, e.g., West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42,

54 (1988) (concluding that a physician who was under contract with state to provide

medical services to state prison inmates, acted under color of state law for purposes of

§ 1983 when undertaking his duties in treating the prisoner’s injury because “[s]uch

conduct is fairly attributable to the State.”).

-6- 14cv1503 BAS (NLS)

Case 3:14-cv-01503-BAS-NLS Document 7 Filed 02/02/15 Page 6 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

amounted to a deliberate indifference to his constitutional right; and (4) the policy was

the “moving force behind the constitutional violation.” Mabe v. San Bernardino Cnty.,

Dep’t of Pub. Soc. Servs., 237 F.3d 1101, 1110-11 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Van Ort v.

Estate of Stanewich, 92 F.3d 831, 835 (9th Cir. 1996)).

“The existence of a policy, without more, is insufficient to trigger local

government liability under section 1983.” Oviatt By & Through Waugh v. Pearce, 954

F.2d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388-89

(1989)). Like his original Complaint, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint still fails to plead

the factual content required to show that the County’s alleged “policy” limiting him to

“50 pages of caselaw,” see FAC at 2, caused him any actual injury. See Connick v.

Thompson, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1359 (2011) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 691). 

As the Court explained in its October 11, 2014 Order, in the context of an asserted

constitutional right to access to the court, “actual injury” is defined as “actual prejudice

with respect to contemplated or existing litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing

deadline or to present a claim.” See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 348; see also Jones v. Blanas,

393 F.3d 918, 936 (9th Cir. 2004) (describing actual injury as the “inability to file a

complaint or defend against a charge.”). 

While Plaintiff was granted an opportunity to amend his pleading in order to

explain how or why the County’s legal research page limitations were the “moving

force” which caused himto miss any court deadlines or prevented himfrompursuing any

“nonfrivolous” or “arguable” claim related to a direct appeal, habeas petition, or civil

rights action, see Harbury, 536 U.S. at 413-14; Lewis, 518 U.S. at 355 (noting that a

constitutional right to access to the courts requires only that inmates be provided the

tools “need[ed] in order to attack their sentences, directly or collaterally, and in order to

challenge the conditions of their confinement,”); Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d

892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011) (“A government entity may not be held liable under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, unless a policy, practice, or custom of the entity can be shown to be a moving

-7- 14cv1503 BAS (NLS)

Case 3:14-cv-01503-BAS-NLS Document 7 Filed 02/02/15 Page 7 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

force behind a violation of constitutional rights.”), his Amended Complaint contains

even less factual detail than his originally deficient pleading. 

For example, while Plaintiff does allege the County’s policy limiting the number

of pages of “caselaw” “force[d] [him] to go pro per,” see FAC at 2, he does not further

explain how “going pro per” actually injured him, or how that “injury would have been

avoided had proper policies been implemented.” Long v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d

1178, 1190 (9th Cir. 2006) (“For a policy to be the moving force behind the deprivation

of a constitutional right, the identified deficiency in the policy must be ‘closely related

to the ultimate injury.’”) (citations omitted). 

Thus, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint only “tenders ‘naked

assertions’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement’” which are plainly insufficient to

state a plausible access to courts violation. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,

550 U.S. at 557); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), 1915A(b)(1). Without a sufficiently

pleaded constitutional violation, no claim of municipal liability against the County of

San Diego may be maintained. See Orin v. Barclay, 272 F.3d 1207, 1217 (9th Cir. 2001)

(“A § 1983 action against a [municipality] fails as a matter of law unless a [municipal]

employee’s conduct violates one of the plaintiff’s federal rights.”). 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, like his original Complaint, must

also be dismissed in its entirety pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and

1915A(b)(1). See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; Rhodes, 621 F.3d at 1004. And because

Plaintiff has already been provided an opportunity to amend his claims to no avail, the

Court finds further leave to amend would be futile. See Gonzalez v. Planned 4

The Court’s conclusion that further amendment would be futile is further 4

premised on the fact that Plaintiff’s original complaint also included exhibits which

suggested that even if he could plead an access to courts claim related to the County’s 

alleged policies limiting the number of pages of legal research to 50, those claims

appeared precluded by a state court habeas proceeding he filed while he was still in

County custody. (See Compl. (Doc. No. 1) at 17-30; Oct. 11, 2014 Order at 9 (citing In

the Matter of the Application of Daniel Acedo, San Diego Superior Court Case No.

HC21560, SCS268470 (May 12, 2014 Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus); Gonzales, 739 F.3d at 1231-34 (holding that California’s rules regarding issue

and claim preclusion apply to prior state habeas decisions, and concluding that plaintiff

was precluded fromre-litigating under § 1983 claims that had been litigated and decided

-8- 14cv1503 BAS (NLS)

Case 3:14-cv-01503-BAS-NLS Document 7 Filed 02/02/15 Page 8 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Parenthood, 759 F.3d 1112, 1116 (9thCir. 2014) (“‘Futility of amendment can, by itself,

justify the denial of . . . leave to amend.’”) (quoting Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845

(9th Cir. 1995)).

IV. CONCLUSION & ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Court ORDERS that:

(1) Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint(ECFNo. 5)is DISMISSEDwithoutfurther

leave to amend for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). 

(2) An IFP appeal from this Order of dismissal would not be taken “in good

faith” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438,

445 (1962); Gardner v. Pogue, 558 F.2d 548, 550 (9th Cir. 1977) (indigent appellant is

permitted to proceed IFP on appeal only if appeal would not be frivolous).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 2, 2015

on the merits in a prior state habeas petition). While Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint

omits all reference to his state habeas petition, the Court “‘may take notice of

proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those

proceedings have a directrelation tomatters at issue.’” Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212,

1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir.

2002)).

-9- 14cv1503 BAS (NLS)

Case 3:14-cv-01503-BAS-NLS Document 7 Filed 02/02/15 Page 9 of 9