Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01685/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01685-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 450
Nature of Suit: Interstate Commerce
Cause of Action: 49:11702(a)(4) Violations of Interstate Commerce Act

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1 Plaintiff sues as the assignee of contracts with Defendant.

Plaintiff alleges that the assignor mistakenly paid Defendant upon receipt

of invoices, which invoices billed for services at a greater price than

agreed upon in the contract. The amount of the alleged overcharges is

$27,418.51, as regards 105 shipments, with claims dated from August 27,

2003, through January 6, 2005. See Docket No. 1, Attach. A (Maricopa County

Superior Court Complaint, Attach.).

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

PHOENIX TRAFFIC SERVICE, LLP, )

) 

 Plaintiff, )

) NO. CIV 05-1685 PHX MEA

vs. ) 

) MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 

KNIGHT TRANSPORTATION, INC., )

) 

 Defendant. )

_______________________________)

All of the parties have now consented to the exercise

of magistrate judge jurisdiction over this case, including the

entry of final judgment. Before the Court is Defendant’s motion

for leave to file an amended answer to the complaint (Docket No.

13).

Background

On April 14, 2005, Plaintiff filed a complaint in the

Maricopa County Superior Court seeking damages and attorneys’

fees for Defendant’s alleged breach of a contract between the

parties for interstate freight shipments. See Docket No. 1,

Attach. A.1 On June 6, 2005, Defendant filed a Notice of

Case 2:05-cv-01685-MEA Document 19 Filed 01/12/06 Page 1 of 6
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Removal, asserting federal jurisdiction over the dispute is

proper because federal law and regulations, inter alia, the

Interstate Commerce Act, govern contracts regarding interstate

freight shipment overcharges. See id.

 Defendant filed their answer to the complaint on June

10, 2005, asserting the affirmative defenses of failure to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted, the applicable statute

of limitations, accord and satisfaction, estoppel, waiver,

laches, and payment and release. See Docket No. 2. Defendant

reserved “the right to amend this Answer at a later time to

assert any matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative

defense.” Id.

The parties conducted a planning meeting pursuant to

Rule 26(f), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and filed a joint

case management report, in which Defendant averred it intended

to assert a statute of limitations defense, in addition to

accord and satisfaction, estoppel, waiver, laches, and payment

and release, and the allegation that Defendant did not overcharge for the provision of services. See Docket No. 8. A

telephonic scheduling conference was conducted with counsel for

the parties and a scheduling order was issued on September 16,

2005, requiring that motions to amend the pleadings be filed by

October 15, 2005. See Docket No. 9. On December 19, 2005,

Defendant filed a motion for leave to file an amended answer,

pursuant to Rule 15, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking

to amend its answer to include the affirmative defenses of

setoff and recoupment. See Docket No. 18. Defendant avers that

it was not aware of the basis for this defense until after the

Case 2:05-cv-01685-MEA Document 19 Filed 01/12/06 Page 2 of 6
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answer was filed. Id. at 2.

Plaintiff opposes Defendant’s motion to amend,

contending that Defendant voluntarily chose not to include this

affirmative defense in its answer and that Defendant knew or

should have known of the availability of this defense as early

as December of 2003 and as recently as September 26, 2005, the

deadline for initial disclosure. Docket No. 16. Plaintiff

further contends that Defendant’s supplemental disclosure

statement, filed December 15, 2005, indicates that all but five

of Defendant’s alleged setoff claims are time-barred. Id.

The Court notes that, pursuant to the stipulation of

the parties, the current deadline for completing discovery in

this matter is March 16, 2006. 

Analysis

Rule 15(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides

that the parties should be given leave to amend their pleadings

when justice so requires. Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure provides that parties may amend their pleadings

“by leave of the court,” and such leave “shall be freely given

when justice so requires.” Amendments should be granted unless

the court finds an inordinate measure of undue delay, dilatory

motive, futility, or undue prejudice. See BayBank Conn., N.A.

v. Kravitz, 170 F.R.D. 343, 344 (D. Mass. 1997). Granting or

denying a motion to amend in this stage of civil proceedings is

a matter left to the discretion of the Court. See, e.g.,

Flowers v. First Haw. Bank, 295 F.3d 966, 976 (9th Cir. 2002);

Yakama Indian Nation v. Wash. Dep’t of Revenue, 176 F.3d 1241,

1246 (9th Cir. 1999).

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The Supreme Court has stated that the Court should

consider the following factors when deciding whether to grant

leave to amend: 

In the absence of any apparent or declared

reason--such as undue delay, bad faith or

dilatory motive on the part of the movant,

repeated failure to cure deficiencies by

amendments previously allowed, undue

prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of

allowance of the amendment, futility of

amendment, etc.--the leave sought should, as

the rules require, be “freely given.” 

Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S. Ct. 227, 230 (1962). 

Prejudice is the “touchstone of the inquiry under rule

15(a).” See, e.g., Lone Star Ladies Inv. Club v. Schlotzsky’s

Inc., 238 F.3d 363, 368 (5th Cir. 2001). Undue delay, standing

by itself, is an insufficient basis for denying a motion to

amend a pleading. See, e.g., Resorts & Motel Advancement Dev.

Agency, Ltd. v. Sloan, 160 F.R.D. 449, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).

Absent prejudice, or a strong showing of any of the remaining

Foman factors, there exists a presumption under Rule 15(a),

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in favor of granting leave to

amend. See Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d

1048, 1051-52 (9th Cir. 2003). See also Conley v. Gibson, 355

U.S. 41, 48, 78 S. Ct. 99, 103 (1957) (“(t)he Federal Rules

reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which

one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept

the principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a

proper decision on the merits.”). Prejudice, in this context,

generally includes reopening discovery or forcing the Court to

continue a trial or proceedings on a dispositive motion. See,

e.g., National Liberty Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 120 F.3d

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913, 917 (8th Cir. 1997).

The Court concludes that, because discovery is on-going

in this matter and, therefore, Plaintiff will not be prejudiced

by Defendant’s assertion of an additional affirmative defense,

see Zivkovic v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1087

(9th Cir. 2002), the motion to amend should be allowed. See

Grand Sheet Metal Prod. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 500 F.

Supp. 904, 907-08 (D. Conn. 1980) (allowing amendment where the

delay was attributable to the defendants’ “cautious reluctance”

to assert a defense until they were sure there was merit to the

defense”). Additionally, there is no evidence before the Court

of Defendant’s undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive in

seeking to amend their answer. Compare Oxford Furniture Co.,

Inc. v. Drexel Heritage Furnishings, Inc., 984 F.2d 1118, 1124

(11th Cir. 1993) (upholding denial of motion to amend answer

filed seven days before beginning of trial where the defendant

offered no reason for delay in asserting statute of frauds

defense); Barrett v. Foster Grant Co., 450 F.2d 1146, 1149 (1st

Cir. 1971) (upholding the denial of the defendant’s motion to

amend the answer to add a novel defense more than a year after

the answer had been filed); DiPirro v. United States, 181 F.R.D.

221, 223 (W.D.N.Y. 1998).

Conclusion

Defendant has not unduly delayed in seeking to amend

their answer and there is no evidence before the Court of

dilatory motive or bad faith. The Court has concluded that,

because discovery remains open in this matter, Plaintiff will

not be prejudiced by the proposed amendment and, therefore,

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pursuant to Rule 15, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the

motion to amend should be granted.

THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED THAT Defendant’s motion

(Docket No. 13) to file an amended answer is GRANTED. Defendant

shall file with the Court and serve on Plaintiff the amended

answer attached to Defendant’s motion as Exhibit A. 

DATED this 12th day of January, 2006.

Case 2:05-cv-01685-MEA Document 19 Filed 01/12/06 Page 6 of 6