Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-01923/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-01923-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 17:501 Copyright Infringement

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WARNER BROS. ENTERTAINMENT INC.,

Plaintiff,

 v.

LILIAN YABUT

Defendant. /

No. C-06-01923 CW (EDL)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

RE: PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

DEFAULT JUDGMENT

On March 14, 2006, Plaintiff Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc. filed this action against

Defendant Lilian Yabut for copyright infringement. The summons and complaint were served on

Defendant Yabut on April 18, 2006. See Docket Nos. 5-6 (showing Plaintiff served summons and

complaint by leaving copies with Lilian Yabut’s 25-year-old son and by mailing a set of copies to

Defendant’s home address). This method of service is acceptable in California. See Cal. Code Civ.

Proc. § 415.20(b). The clerk of the court entered default against Defendant Yabut on June 30, 2006. 

On August 9, 2006, Plaintiff filed a motion for default judgment against Defendant Yabut. 

The motion came on for hearing on September 19, 2006. Attorney Karen Thorland of Loeb & Loeb,

LLP appeared for Plaintiff by telephone; attorney Anne Kearns of Krieg, Keller, Sloan, Reilley &

Roman, LLP also appeared for Plaintiff in person. Defendant Yabut did not file an opposition to

Plaintiff’s motion and did not appear at the hearing.

Background

The complaint alleges that Plaintiff owns the exclusive rights to reproduce and distribute

Constantine, a copyrighted motion picture. Compl. ¶ 8. Further, on or about April 15, 2005,

Defendant distributed Constantine and made the motion picture available for distribution to others

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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by uploading it on a P2P network. Compl. ¶ 10; see also Nguyen Decl. ¶ 4, 9; Carpenter Decl. ¶ 5. 

Defendant did not have permission or consent from Plaintiff to distribute this motion picture. 

Compl. ¶ 10. 

Default Judgment

 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2) authorizes the Court to enter judgment against a

defendant against whom a default has been entered, assuming that defendant is not an infant, is not

incompetent or in military service. Defendant is not an unrepresented minor, incompetent or in

military service. See Thorland Decl. ¶¶ 13-14. 

“The general rule of law is that upon default the factual allegations of the complaint, except

those relating to the amount of damages, will be taken as true.” Geddes v. United Fin. Group, 559

F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977) (citing Pope v. United States, 323 U.S. 1, 12 (1944)). In exercising its

discretion to grant default judgment, the court may consider the following factors: (1) the possibility

of prejudice to the plaintiff; (2) the merits of the plaintiff's substantive claims; (3) the sufficiency of

the complaint; (4) the sum of money at stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning

material facts; (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect; and (7) the strong policy

underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits. See Eitel v.

McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471--72 (9th Cir. 1986). Generally, upon entry of default, the factual

allegations of the complaint are taken as true, except for those relating to damages. See Televideo

Systems, Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Geddes, 559 F.2d at 560).. 

Here, the Eitel factors weigh in favor of default judgment. Most importantly, the substantive

claim in the complaint on which Plaintiff seeks default judgment appears to have merit and the

complaint is sufficient to state that claim. A claim for copyright infringement has two elements: (1)

ownership of the copyright; and (2) infringement by the defendant. See Kling v. Hallmark Cards,

Inc., 225 F.3d 1030, 1037 (9th Cir. 2000). In its complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Constantine is

registered with the Copyright Office and the Defendant reproduced the motion picture and

distributed it without permission. Compl. ¶ 8. Therefore, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to

state a claim for copyright infringement.

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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The remaining Eitel factors also weigh in favor of granting default judgment. First, if the

motion were denied, Plaintiff would likely be without a remedy; Plaintiff attempted to reach a

compromise with Defendants but was unsuccessful. See Thorlein Decl. ¶ 8; see Pepsico, Inc. v. Cal.

Sec. Cans, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (“If Plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment

is not granted, Plaintiffs will likely be without other recourse for recovery.”). Second, the amount of

money sought is not completely disproportionate or unreasonable, especially in light of the expenses

Plaintiff incurred in bringing this action. See Nguyen Decl. ¶ 11 (Plaintiff expended between $3,000

and $5,000 to develop the evidence and information necessary to bring the action); Thorland Decl. ¶

16 (Plaintiff incurred $2,689.19 in attorneys’ fees and costs, exclusive of the pre-complaint

investigations). Finally, because Defendant did not file an answer to the complaint, there is little to

suggest that there is a possibility of a dispute concerning material facts, and it is unlikely that

Defendant’s default was due to excusable neglect, especially when Plaintiff served its motion for

default judgment on Defendant, but still received no response. 

Accordingly, the motion for default judgment should be granted. The remaining issue is the

amount of the judgment. 

Damages for Copyright infringement

A copyright infringer is liable for either the actual damages incurred or statutory damages. 

See 17 U.S.C. § 504(a). Plaintiff makes no offer of proof as to its actual damages. Statutory

damages are assessed by the Court in the range between $750 and $30,000 per work, increased to

$150,000 in cases of willful infringement. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c). The Court “has wide discretion

in determining the amount of statutory damages to be awarded, constrained only by the specified

maxima and minima.” See Harris v. Emus Records Corp., 734 F.2d 1329, 1335 (9th Cir. 1984). 

Plaintiff seeks statutory damages of $6,000. 

 To support its request for $6,000, Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s infringement was willful,

that Plaintiff was offering other copyrighted motion pictures for distribution (although Plaintiff’s

investigators did not download them), and that the amount is reasonably related to Plaintiff’s

enforcement costs. Plaintiff also argues that the amount is similar to the statutory damages awarded

to recording industry plaintiffs suing for copyright infringement. 

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United States District Court

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Plaintiff seeks damages for the copyright infringement of one motion picture. Courts

typically award $3,000 per copyrighted work in similar cases as appropriate compensation. See

Supp. Thorland Decl. Ex. B (attaching orders). An award of $3,000 is appropriate here as well. An

award of more than the statutory minimum of $750 per image is warranted because of the expense

Plaintiff must undertake to monitor and enforce its copyright. A higher award is not appropriate

because there is no evidence that Defendant enjoyed any profit from her infringement or that a

greater amount is necessary to deter Defendant and others from engaging in on-line distribution of

copyrighted motion pictures. 

The Court may in its discretion award attorneys’ fees to a prevailing plaintiff in a copyright

action. See 17 U.S.C. § 505. Plaintiff seeks an award of $2,689.19 in attorneys’ fees and costs of

suit. This amount is reasonable, as are the rates charged by Plaintiff’s counsel. The Court

accordingly recommends granting this amount as attorneys’ fees and costs. Finally, Plaintiff seeks

an injunction permanently enjoining Defendant from infringing any of Plaintiff’s copyrights, which

should issue. See 17 U.S.C. § 502(a). 

Conclusion

The Court recommends granting Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment in the total amount

of $8,689.19, and issuing a permanent injunction enjoining Defendant from further infringement. 

Any party may serve and file specific written objections to this recommendation within ten (10)

business days after being served with a copy. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); Civil

Local Rule 72-3. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal

the District Court’s order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 23, 2006 

ELIZABETH D. LAPORTE

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 4:06-cv-01923-CW Document 26 Filed 10/23/06 Page 4 of 4