Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-02158/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-02158-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:205 Denial Social Security Benefits

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIE ROGERS, JR. )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

)

MICHAEL ASTRUE COMMISSIONER )

OF SOCIAL SECURITY )

)

Defendants. )

 )

Case No.: 1:09-cv-02158-JLT

ORDER DIRECTINGREMANDPURSUANTTO

SENTENCE FOUR OF 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)

(Doc. 13)

ORDER DIRECTING THE CLERK TO ENTER

JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFF WILLIE

ROGERS, JR. AND AGAINST DEFENDANT

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE

On June 16, 2010, Defendant filed a motion to remand this case for further proceedings

pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Doc. 13.) In the motion and in an errata (Doc. 15),

Defendant recited that the parties had not been able to reach an agreement regarding the request to

remand the matter. The Court ordered responsive briefing and on July 9, 2010, Plaintiff filed his

opposition. (Doc. 16.)

NATURE OF THE DISPUTE

Defendant contends that remand of this case is necessary because the residual functional

capacity (“RFC”) finding of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) conflicts with the hypothetical

posed to the vocational expert (“VE”) which formed the basis for the ALJ’s decision. (Doc. 13.) 

Defendant notes that the ALJ’s RFC finding limits the claimant to two hours walking,

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standing, and sitting in an eight-hour day although the hypothetical adopted by the ALJ (“the first

hypothetical”), allows standing and walking for two hours and sitting for six hours (AR at 14, 46). 

Defendant contends that remand in this case would permit the ALJ to clarify whether the RFC

finding is accurate, or whether the hypothetical posed to the vocational expert is accurate. Because

there are different outcomes depending on the ALJ’s clarification, Defendant contends that further

proceedings are necessary rather than a remand for payment of benefits. Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d

1172, 1178 (9 Cir. 2000) (court cannot grant an award of benefits where, among other conditions, th

there are “outstanding issues that must be resolved”). 

Plaintiff opposes this motion on several grounds. Plaintiff’s primary argument is that the

matter should be reversed with an award of benefits to Plaintiff, rather than remanded without such

an award. Plaintiff argues that the first hypothetical, was explicitly rejected by the ALJ in his

narration. Instead, Plaintiff contends that a second hypothetical posed to the VE “mirrors” the ALJ’s

RFC findings, and therefore, forms the evidentiary basis for the RFC finding. (Doc. 16 at 2.) 

Because, under this second hypothetical, the VE testified that the person would be unable to work

(AR at 47), Plaintiff argues that it is the ALJ’s ultimate conclusion that he is not disabled that is

incongruous, rather than the ALJ’s RFC assessment. (Doc. 16 at 3.) 

Plaintiff notes further that the only support for the limitations outlined in the first

hypothetical, is from the opinions of the state-retained experts which the ALJ explicitly discounted. 

Id. Instead, the ALJ afforded “greater weight” to the opinion of orthopedist, Dr. Kim. Further,

Plaintiff argues that accepting Dr. Kim’s opinion requires the conclusion that Plaintiff is, indeed,

disabled because he is unable to meet the eight-hour per day work demand. Id. 

The Court has considered and evaluated the arguments of counsel and consulted the

administrative record and based thereon orders the matter REMANDED for the reasons set forth

below.

ANALYSIS

1. Because of the various inconsistencies in the ALJ’s decision, remand is warranted

When determining Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was capable of lifting and

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carrying no more than 10 pounds, of sitting, standing and walking for two hours in an eight-hour

workday and only occasionally climbing ramps and stairs, balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching

and crawling. AR at 14. He found that Plaintiff was precluded from climbing ropes, ladders and

scaffolds and had to avoid walking on uneven terrain and exposure to unprotected heights. AR at 14. 

Although the RFC related to lifting and carrying was consistent with the requirements for

sedentary work (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(a), 416.967(a)), the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was capable 

of sitting, standing and walking for only two hours in an eight-hour workday. Because this finding

demonstrates that Plaintiff can work for only a quarter of an eight-hour day, this RFC finding does

not support the conclusion that Plaintiff could do sedentary wok or that he was not disabled. Soc.

Sec. Ruling 83-10. 

Additionally, the ALJ’s RFC is not supported by the hypotheticals posed to the VE and,

specifically, is not supported by the first hypothetical upon which his opinion purports to rely. AR 1

at 14, 46-47). The first hypothetical described a person that could lift and carry 20 pounds

occasionally and 10 pounds frequently and had the ability to stand and walk for two hours and to sit

for six hours. AR at 46. Based upon this hypothetical, the vocational expert opined that there were

approximately 6,400 sedentary jobs available for the person. This opinion, therefore, determined

that the person was not disabled, which is the ultimate conclusion that the ALJ reached in his

opinion. AR at 20-21. As noted above, this hypothetical is significantly different from the ALJ’s

RFC with respect to the number of total hours worked per day and in the ability to lift and carry. AR

at 14, 46. 

The second hypothetical is deficient also. The second hypothetical described a person who

could lift and carry less than 10 pounds, stand approximately 30 minutes at a time, walk a maximum

of one-and-a-half blocks and sit for two hours. AR at 47. This person was described to have

difficulty in using the left upper extremity at and above shoulder level, and in bending and was

precluded from kneeling, stooping or squatting. AR at 46-47. This hypothetical seems consistent

The ALJ cites specifically to the testimony of the vocational expert and his opinion given as to the first hypothetical

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in his conclusion that Plaintiff is not disabled. AR at 20.

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with the testimony Plaintiff offered about his abilities. AR at 39-40. 

On the other hand, although Plaintiff argues that this second hypothetical “mirrors” the ALJ’s

RFC finding, clearly, it does not. (Doc. 16). The ALJ’s RFC determination found that Plaintiff was

able to sit, stand and walk for two hours, while this hypothetical varies from that. Also, the RFC

indicated that Plaintiff could kneel, stoop or squat occasionally, although this hypothetical supports

that he was precluded from this action. AR at 14. 

Additionally, it does not appear that either hypothetical was fully supported by the medical

evidence. Notably, the ALJ accorded “substantial weight’ to the opinions of treating physician Dr.

Kim and gave “little weight” to the opinion of the state evaluator. AR at 16. Given this, Dr. Kim

opined that Plaintiff could sit six hours in an eight-hour workday, and stand and walk less than two

hours in an eight-hour work day. AR at 15. Dr. Kim opined also that Plaintiff needed a cane to help

with balance over all terrains. AR at 15. 2

Nevertheless, seemingly, the ALJ rejected portions of Dr. Kim’s opinion without providing

any explanation for this in his decision. Also, there seems to be no medical support for the ALJ’s

conclusion that Plaintiff could sit, stand and walk for only two hours in an eight-hour workday. The

law is clear that the ALJ must include in his hypotheticals posed to the VE all of the restrictions that

are supported by substantial evidence. Osenbrock, 240 F.3d at 1164-65 (holding that a hypothetical

question posed to a VE must include all impairments supported by substantial evidence); see also

Tonaypetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9 Cir. 2001) (holding that an examining physician’s th

opinion constitutes substantial evidence if based upon the physician’s own independent examination

of the claimant). If the hypothetical that is adopted by the ALJ is deficient in this regard, then the

opinion of the VE has insufficient evidentiary support and cannot justify the conclusion of the ALJ. 

Matthews v. Shalala, 10 F.3d 678, 681 (9 Cir. 1993) (“If a vocational expert’s hypothetical does th

not reflect all the claimant’s limitations, then the ‘expert’s testimony has no evidentiary value to

The Court notes that Plaintiff’s counsel posed a hypothetical to the VE that incorporated all of thelimitations

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outlined by Dr. Kim. AR at 47. In response, the VE opined that Plaintiff would be considered to be “less than sedentary”

due to his inability to work for eight hours. Id. However, this hypothetical is not consistent with the RFC either.

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support a finding that the claimant can perform jobs in the national economy.’”)

Therefore, the Court finds that the ALJ’s decision contains significant defects and

inconsistencies and, given Defendant’s implied concession that it cannot support an order affirming

the decision, the Court concludes that the decision does not support its ultimate conclusions. 

2. Remand is appropriate in this case

The decision whether to remand a matter pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) or

to order immediate repayment of benefits is within the discretion of the district court. Harman v.

Apfel, 211 F.3 1172, 1178 (9 Cir. 2000). When a court reverses an administrative agency th

determination, the proper course, except in rare instances, is to remand to the agency for additional

investigation or explanation. Moisa v. Barnhart, 367 F.3d 882, 886 (9 Cir. 2004) (citing INS v. th

Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 (2002)). Generally, an award of benefits is directed where no useful

purpose would be served by further administrative proceedings, or where the record is fully

developed. Varney v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 859 F.2d 1396, 1399 (9 Cir. 1988). th

As noted above, the RFC determined by the ALJ is not supported by the medical evidence

and is not supported by the hypothetical posed to the VE. Thus, the VE’s opinions are of no

assistance. Moreover, the ALJ’s ultimate conclusion is not consistent with the RFC or the medical

evidence. Because the ALJ’s decision is riddled with errors , and because it is not clear that an 3

award of benefits to Plaintiff should result after all of these issues are addressed, the Court cannot

provide effective or meaningful review at this time. Therefore, the Court will order the matter

REMANDED. McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 603 (9 Cir. 1989) (the decision to remand for th

further proceedings or simply award benefits is within the discretion of the court).

Upon remand, the Commissioner is ORDERED to resolve the inconsistencies that exist in

the record. Although the Court agrees that on the record as it stands, no additional medical evidence

is needed. However, because Plaintiff asserts the right to present updated medical evidence, the

Court can easily anticipate a situation where these “updated records” would justify the ALJ obtaining

The Court is dismayed that these errors were not discovered, at a minimum, when the Appeals Council conducted

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its reviewed.

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additional evidence and precluding this evidence would be error. However, if Plaintiff does not

present updated medical records upon remand, the Court ORDERS that the ALJ will determine the

issues outlined here upon the record as it constituted currently. Moreover, if the ALJ determines that

the proper RFC is entirely consistent with Dr. Kim’s opinion, no additional testimony should be

taken from a VE because the VE was asked a hypothetical that considered all of Dr. Kim’s opinions. 

(AR at 47)

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, this matter is hereby REMANDED for further proceedings

consistent with this decision. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of

Plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 22, 2010 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

9j7khi UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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