Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02024/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02024-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 370
Nature of Suit: Other Fraud
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Fraud

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Liberty Life Insurance Company,

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Eric L. Myers, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV 10-2024-PHX-JAT 

ORDER 

 

 Pending before the Court is Defendants’ Donald D. Myers and Joan L. Myers 

(respectively “Donald” and “Joan”) Motion to Dismiss claims against Donald pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(a)(1). (Doc. 227 at 1). Plaintiff Liberty Life 

Insurance Company (“Liberty Life”) has filed a Response to the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 

231), and Defendants have filed a Reply (Doc. 240). 

 Liberty Life has also filed a Motion to Substitute the Estate of Donald D. Myers, 

by and through Personal Representatives Brooke M. Wilson and Heather M. Craig, in 

place of Defendant Donald D. Myers, who is deceased. (Doc. 232). Defendants have 

filed a Response to the Motion to Substitute (Doc. 242), and Liberty Life has filed a 

Reply (Doc. 248). 

I. BACKGROUND 

 This suit was initiated by Liberty Life against Defendants, including Donald, on 

September 21, 2010. (See Doc. 1). During the pendency of this case Donald passed 

Case 2:10-cv-02024-JAT Document 275 Filed 02/11/13 Page 1 of 5
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away. On December 21, 2011, Defendants Joan and Brooke Wilson, filed a Suggestion 

of Death Upon the Record Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(a)(1). (Doc. 180). 

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(a)(1), 

If a party dies and the claim is not extinguished, the court 

may order substitution of the proper party. A motion for 

substitution may be made by any party or by the decedent’s 

successor or representative. If the motion is not made within 

90 days after service of a statement noting the death, the 

action by or against the decedent must be dismissed. 

Defendants claim the 90 day time period under this rule expired on March 23, 2012. 

(Doc. 227 at 2). On March 30, 2012, Defendants filed the pending Motion to Dismiss for 

failure to comply with Rule 25. (Id.) On the same day, Liberty Life addressed the merits 

of its claim against Donald and filed a Partial Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 

228). Four days later and eleven days after the March 23 deadline, on April 3, 2012, 

Liberty Life filed its Response arguing against Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 

231) and filed a motion for substitution pursuant to Rule 25(a)(1) and Rule 6(b). (Doc. 

232). Liberty Life requests that the Court substitute Donald’s estate (the “Estate”), by 

and through personal representatives Brooke M. Wilson and Heather M. Craig, as 

Defendant to replace Donald. (Id. at 1). 

II. DISCUSSION 

 Defendants argue that under Rule 25(a)(1), neither Liberty Life nor any other 

party filed a motion to substitute within the 90 day period, and therefore, the action must 

be dismissed. (Doc. 227 at 2). Liberty Life contends that the 90 day time period was not 

triggered by the Suggestion of Death that Defendants filed because it did not identify the 

successor or representative who could be substituted as a defendant for Donald.1

 (Doc. 

231 at 2). Alternatively, Liberty Life argues that in the event the Court finds the time 

period was triggered, Plaintiff has good cause for a brief extension under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 6(b). (Id. at 3). 1

 The Suggestion of Death reads in its entirety, “Defendants Joan L. Myers and Brooke 

Wilson, by and through undersigned counsel, pursuant to Rule 25(a)(1), Fed. R. Civ. P., 

suggest upon the record, the death of Defendant Donald D. Myers, during the pendency of 

this action.” (Doc. 180 at 1-2). 

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 Courts within the Ninth Circuit have disagreed over whether the suggestion of 

death must identify the successor or representative who may be substituted for the 

decedent in order for the 90 day time period to run. Compare Dummar v. Lummis, 2:07-

CV-459J, 2007 WL 4623623, at *3 (D. Nev. Dec. 26, 2007) (“To be valid and trigger the 

90-day limitation period . . . a suggestion of death must identify the successor or 

representative who may be substituted for the decedent.”), with Jackson v. Rowlett, No. 

CIV S–04–0741, 2007 WL 397114, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2007) (“Rule 25’s sole 

requirement concerning the content of a suggestion of death on the record is that it must 

contain a statement of the fact of the death.”). The Court declines to make a 

determination on this issue because it is not dispositive in this case. 

 Rule 25(a)(1) was amended in 1963. The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 25 

state that the 90 day limit can be “extended pursuant to Rule 6(b).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 25 

advisory committee’s note, 1963 amendment. Under Rule 6(b)(1), 

In General. When an act may or must be done within a 

specified time, the court may, for good cause, extend the 

time: (A) with or without motion or notice if the court acts, . . 

. ; or (B) on motion made after the time has expired if the 

party failed to act because of excusable neglect. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b). “It is intended that the court shall have discretion to enlarge [the 90 

day] period” of Rule 25(a)(1). Id. advisory committee’s note, 1963 amendment, 

subdivision (b). 

 While the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has not explicitly commented on the 

issue, numerous federal courts have found “[t]he law is clear that, despite the mandatory 

language in Rule 25(a), the Court has substantial discretion to interpret the rule liberally 

so as to effectuate its underlying purpose.” Williams v. Scott, 07-22617-CIV, 2010 WL 

5791517, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 3, 2010); see also Rende v. Kay, 415 F.2d 983, 986 (D.C. 

Cir. 1969) (“The amendment to Rule 25(a)(1) [ ] was intended to dispel unwarranted 

rigidity and allow more flexibility in substitution. ‘It was intended that liberal effect be 

given to the 1963 amendment.’” (quoting Roscoe v. Roscoe, 379 F.2d 94, 99 (D.C. Cir. 

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1967)); United States v. Miller Bros. Const. Co., 505 F.2d 1031, 1035 (10th Cir. 1974) 

(“A discretionary extension should be liberally granted absent a showing of bad faith on 

the part of the movant for substitution or undue prejudice to other parties to the action.”). 

Accordingly, “[a]lthough Rule 25 states that an action ‘must’ be dismissed if a motion to 

substitute is not brought within ninety days, this has been held not to preclude a Rule 6(b) 

motion to enlarge this timeframe.” Williams v. Baron, No. 2:03-CV-2044, 2009 WL 

331371, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2009). 

 Given the intent of Rule 25(a)(1) and Rule 6(b), courts have consistently held that 

“[t]he 90 day period was not intended to act as a bar to otherwise meritorious actions.” 

Staggers v. Otto Gerdau Co., 359 F.2d 292, 296 (2d Cir. 1966) (citing 4 Moore, Federal 

Practice P25.01-02 (2d ed. 1965 Supp.)); see also Continental Bank, N.A. v. Meyer, 10 

F.3d 1293, 1297 (7th Cir. 1993) (same); Scott, 2010 WL 5791517, at *2 (“Rule 25(a) is 

not meant to be used as a procedural mechanism to ‘bar . . . otherwise meritorious 

actions’”) (quoting Staggers, 359 F.2d at 296). 

 The Court finds the mere eleven day delay after the 90 days had expired does not 

warrant a rigid application of Rule 25. Looking to the merits of Plaintiff’s claim (See

Doc. 228), the Court finds granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss would effectively bar 

an otherwise meritorious claim. This is precisely what Rule 25 what not intended to 

facilitate. 

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III. CONCLUSION 

 Based on the foregoing, 

IT IS ORDERED denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 227). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting Plaintiff’s Motion to Substitute the Estate 

of Donald D. Myers, by and through Personal Representatives Brooke M. Wilson and 

Heather M. Craig, in place of Defendant Donald D. Myers. (Doc. 232). 

 Dated this 11th day of February, 2013. 

Case 2:10-cv-02024-JAT Document 275 Filed 02/11/13 Page 5 of 5