Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-05662/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-05662-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Before the Court is Defendant Wal-Mart Incorporated’s (“Wal-Mart”) Motion to 

Dismiss (the “Motion”), which is fully briefed. For the reasons that follow, the Motion will 

be granted without prejudice.

I. Background

Plaintiffs Claudia Sobarzo (“Sobarzo”) and John Keck (“Keck”) initiated this action 

on November 21, 2019. (Doc. 1) Plaintiffs amended their complaint as a matter of right on 

January 9, 2020. (Doc. 7) The First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) is the operative 

complaint in this case. In the FAC, Plaintiffs brought two causes of action against WalMart: (1) sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 

2000e, et seq. (“Title VII”) and (2) retaliation under Title VII. (Doc. 7 at 17–19) 

In the FAC, Sobarzo, a Hispanic woman, alleges that she was an employee of WalMart for approximately sixteen years, working in different positions until her termination 

on October 9, 2018. (Doc. 7 at 5, ¶ 11) Sobarzo alleges that on several different occasions, 

she was singled out by various supervisors and managers through accusations of 

Claudia M. Sobarzo, et al.,

 

Plaintiffs, 

vs. 

Wal-Mart Inc., a Delaware corporation,

Defendant. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV-19-05662-PHX-SPL

ORDER

Case 2:19-cv-05662-SPL Document 15 Filed 05/06/20 Page 1 of 7
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

misconduct. Specifically, Sobarzo lists incidents she labeled as the “paperwork incident,” 

the “(alleged) stolen shoe incident,” the “(alleged) stolen inventory incident,” the “false 

background check incident,” and Wal-Mart’s filings of false police reports for shoplifting. 

(Doc. 7 at 7–16) Plaintiff alleges that, through those various incidents, other Wal-Mart 

employees made false accusations that she falsified paperwork, stole merchandise, 

provided incorrect answers on her background check, and even filed false police reports 

wrongly accusing her of shoplifting. (Doc. 7 at 7–16) Based on those incidents, Sobarzo 

alleges that she was subject to a hostile work environment, was discriminated against on 

the basis of her gender, and was terminated in retaliation of her activities in reporting the 

incidents. (Doc. 7 at 16–19)

Finally, the Court notes that co-Plaintiff Keck was listed only “by virtue of him 

being married to Plaintiff Claudia Sobarzo at all relevant times complained of herein and 

has thereby suffered damages as well.” (Doc. 7 at 4, ¶ 10)

II. Standard of Review

Rule 8(a)(2) requires a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief,” so that the defendant has “fair notice of what the ... claim is 

and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) 

(internal quotations omitted). Also, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 

which, if accepted as true, states a claim to relief that is “plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Facial plausibility exists if the pleader pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged. Id. Plausibility does not equal “probability,” but plausibility 

requires more than a sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully. Id. “Where a 

complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops 

short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’” Id. (citing 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

Although a complaint attacked for failure to state a claim does not need detailed 

factual allegations, the pleader’s obligation to provide the grounds for relief requires “more 

Case 2:19-cv-05662-SPL Document 15 Filed 05/06/20 Page 2 of 7
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action 

will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations omitted). Rule 8(a)(2) “requires 

a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief. Without some factual 

allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant could satisfy the requirement 

of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of the nature of the claim, but also ‘grounds’ on which 

the claim rests.” Id. (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 

1202, pp. 94, 95 (3d ed. 2004)). Thus, Rule 8’s pleading standard demands more than “an 

unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 

(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

In deciding a motion to dismiss the Court must construe the facts alleged in the 

complaint in the light most favorable to the drafter of the complaint and must accept all 

well-pleaded factual allegations as true. OSU Student Alliance v. Ray, 699 F.3d 1053, 1061 

(9th Cir. 2012); Shwarz v. United States, 234 F.3d 428, 435 (9th Cir. 2000). Nonetheless, 

the Court does not have to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation. 

Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). 

Furthermore, a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) must rely solely on the 

contents of the pleadings. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). A court may, however, consider 

“matters of judicial notice” without converting a motion to dismiss into one for summary 

judgment. United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003). Furthermore, a court 

need not accept as true “allegations that contradict matters properly subject to judicial 

notice” or “allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or 

unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 

2008) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

A court may take judicial notice of documents referenced in the complaint, as well 

as matters in the public record. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688–89 (9th Cir. 

2001), overruled on other grounds by Galbraith v. Cty. of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 

1125–26 (9th Cir. 2002). In addition, the Court may take judicial notice of matters that are 

either “generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction” or “can be 

Case 2:19-cv-05662-SPL Document 15 Filed 05/06/20 Page 3 of 7
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 

questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). Public records, including judgments and other court 

documents, are proper subjects of judicial notice. See, e.g., United States v. Black, 482 F.3d 

1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2007). However, “[j]ust because the document itself is susceptible to 

judicial notice does not mean that every assertion of fact within that document is judicially 

noticeable for its truth.” Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 999 (9th Cir. 

2018).

III. Analysis

Plaintiffs’ disparate treatment and retaliation claims are subject to the burdenshifting analysis of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, (1973). The analysis 

has three steps. The employee must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. If 

she does, the employer must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the 

challenged action. Finally, if the employer satisfies this burden, the employee must show 

that the “reason is pretextual ‘either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory 

reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's 

proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.’” Chuang v. Univ. of Cal. Davis, 225 F.3d 

1115, 1123–24 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 

248, 256, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981)).

In order to state a claim for discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff must establish 

that: “(1) she belongs to a protected class, (2) she was qualified for her position, (3) she 

was subject to an adverse employment action, and (4) similarly situated individuals outside 

her protected class were treated more favorably.” Davis. V. Team Elec. Co., 520 F.3d 1080, 

1089 (9th Cir. 2008).

Here, the Court finds that under the Iqbal/Twombly standard, the FAC fails to plead 

enough facts to survive the Motion on both the gender discrimination and the retaliation 

claims. Indeed, the FAC is entirely devoid of any fact related to Sobarzo’s gender, 

explaining why any of the incidents were based on her gender. Additionally, the FAC is 

devoid of any allegation that Wal-Mart treated similarly situated male co-workers more 

Case 2:19-cv-05662-SPL Document 15 Filed 05/06/20 Page 4 of 7
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

favorably than Sobarzo.1 Plaintiffs also allege that Sobarzo was subject to a “hostile work 

environment” but do not offer factual support that such allegation and conduct was genderbased. The Court can only guess that Plaintiffs believe the various incidents listed in the 

FAC support her claim of hostile work environment, but they failed to provide any fact 

which gives rise to an inference of gender-based hostile work environment. Plaintiffs 

included two examples of rude behavior but neither has anything to do with Sobarzo’s

gender.2

Plaintiffs also fail to allege enough facts to support a claim for retaliation. A claim 

for retaliation under Title VII requires a plaintiff to establish that his or her protected 

activity was a but-for cause of the alleged adverse action by the employer. See University 

of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 360 (2013). To establish 

the first element of a prima facie case of retaliation, the plaintiff must show that she had a 

“reasonable belief” that the employment practice being protested is prohibited under Title 

VII. Sias v. City Demonstration Agency, 588 F.2d 692, 695 (9th Cir. 1978). The FAC is 

again devoid of any allegation which would support the elements of a retaliation claim, 

with the exception of the adverse employment action by the employer, Sobarzo’s 

termination. Indeed, the FAC contains no allegation linking such termination to Sobarzo’s 

activities, no allegation that Sobarzo was engaged in a protected activity, and no allegation 

that Sobarzo believed she was engaged in a protected activity. Accordingly, the FAC must 

be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. However, at this 

stage, the Court cannot conclude that it is impossible for Sobarzo to allege sufficient facts 

to survive a Motion to Dismiss and accordingly, the Court will grant Sobarzo leave to 

1 The Court notes that the FAC contains very broad allegations regarding the 

percentages of male and female workers in varying positions throughout Wal-Mart’s 

workforce. (Doc. 7 at 2–3) Those allegations are fatally deficient to support Plaintiff’ 

claims of gender discrimination and retaliation because they are nothing more than 

conclusory and broad-brush allegations without any support.

2 Plaintiffs claim that a co-manager called her a thief and fat. (Doc. 7 at 13, ¶ 58) 

Plaintiffs also claim that Sobarzo had stage 3 gout and Gail and another co-manager 

mocked her limp. (Doc. 7 at 13, ¶ 59)

Case 2:19-cv-05662-SPL Document 15 Filed 05/06/20 Page 5 of 7
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

amend the FAC. Indeed, the Court finds that it is possible that Sobarzo could plead enough 

facts to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) and the Court finds that justice so 

requires. This will be the only leave to amend the Court will grant.

There are two remaining points the Court must address: (1) John Keck’s status as 

co-Plaintiff and (2) Robert H. Keck’s involvement in the case and threatening conduct

toward defense counsel. The Court addresses those issues in turn.

John Keck is listed as co-Plaintiff simply by virtue of being Sobarzo’s husband. 

(Doc. 7 at 4, ¶ 10) Keck was never employed by Wal-Mart and never filed any charge of 

discrimination with the EEOC, which he could not have done anyway because he never 

worked for Wal-Mart. The Court cannot discern what legal basis John Keck would have to 

join as co-Plaintiff in this action. Indeed, the only possible theory the Court can think of is 

a loss of consortium but this would fail for two reasons: (1) there are no allegations of loss 

of consortium, and (2) a violation of Title VII does not support a loss of consortium claim 

as a matter of law. See Durley v. APAC, Inc., 236 F.3d 651, 658 (11th Cir. 2000); Smith v. 

Auburn Univ., 201 F. Supp. 2d 1216, 1228 (M.D. Ala. 2002); Chergosky v. Hodges, 975 

F. Supp. 799, 801 (E.D.N.C. 1997); Franz v. Kernan, 951 F. Supp. 159, 162 (E.D. Mo.

1996); Murphy v. Cadillac Rubber & Plastics, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 1108, 1125 (W.D.N.Y.

1996). Accordingly, the dismissal of the FAC will be with prejudice as to John Keck.

Turning to the issue of Robert Keck, the Court finds that he was engaged in the 

unauthorized practice of law. From what the Court knows, he is not admitted to the Arizona 

bar, or the bar of any other jurisdiction, nor is he a registered legal document preparer. 

Arizona Supreme Court Rule 31(b) prescribes that no one is permitted to practice law in 

Arizona “unless the person is an active member of the state bar.” Az. Supreme Ct. Rule 

31(b). Additionally, practicing in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona 

requires admission to such court, with limited exceptions not applicable to Robert Keck,

which is based on previous admission and good standing to the State Bar of Arizona. See

L.R.Civ. 83.1(a)–(b). Robert Keck wrote that he was the “document preparer for John and 

Claudia Keck Plaintiff in subject action” at the bottom of the response to the Motion. (Doc. 

Case 2:19-cv-05662-SPL Document 15 Filed 05/06/20 Page 6 of 7
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13 at 4) Robert Keck is not allowed to prepare such document and submit it to the Court 

as he is not admitted to practice law or a certified legal document preparer. Accordingly, 

he was engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. 

Additionally, some of Robert Keck’s statements to defense counsel are threatening. 

Indeed, he stated to defense counsel that “I can tell you what my deceased Master Sergeant 

brother told a subordinate: ‘I can’t make you do anything, but I can damn well make you 

wish you had.’” (Doc. 14, Ex. A at 4)3 Besides the fact that Robert Keck is not allowed to 

contact defense counsel in an action where is he neither a party or attorney of record, such 

statement is harassing and threatening. The Court will not tolerate such behavior. 

Accordingly, the Court hereby orders Robert Keck to refrain from contacting defense 

counsel or Defendant in any manner whatsoever and to refrain from submitting filings to 

the Court. To be clear, if Robert Keck violates either of those orders, the Court will not 

hesitate to hold him in contempt of court and take any appropriate action to prevent such 

behaviors.

Therefore, the FAC must be dismissed without prejudice.

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant Wal-Mart’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 9) is

granted. The First Amended Complaint is dismissed without prejudice in its entirety, 

apart from John Keck who is dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff Sobarzo shall have 30 days from the 

date of this Order to file a Second Amended Complaint in accordance with the term of this 

Order. If Plaintiff fails to do so, the action will be dismissed with prejudice

Dated this 6th day of May, 2020.

Honorable Steven P. Logan

United States District Judge

3 The Court notes that the remainder of Exhibit A showcases the fairly aggressive 

overtone used by Robert Keck in his improper communication with defense counsel.

Case 2:19-cv-05662-SPL Document 15 Filed 05/06/20 Page 7 of 7