Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-00481/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-00481-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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1 05CV0481

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ELMER R. SEEVERS,

Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA;

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY;

GORDON R. ENGLAND, Secretary of

the Navy; DEPARTMENT OF LABOR;

ELAINE L. CHAO, Secretary of Labor, 

Defendants.

 

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Civil No. 05CV0481 J (BLM)

ORDER:

(1) GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS WITH

PREJUDICE; AND

(2) DENYING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR SANCTIONS

Before the Court is Defendants United States of America, et al.’s (“Defendants”)

Amended Motion to Dismiss under Federal Rule 12(b)(6), Motion to Dismiss under Federal

Rule 12(b)(2), (4), and (5), Motion for Summary Judgment in the alternative, and Motion for

Sanctions. [Doc. No. 15.] Plaintiff Elmer R. Seevers (Plaintiff) has not filed an Opposition to

the Motion. The Court has determined the issues presented herein are appropriate for decision

without oral argument. See S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 7.1(d)(1) (2006). For the reasons set forth below,

the Court (1) GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss with prejudice, and (2) DENIES

Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions. 

Case 3:05-cv-00481-J-BLM Document 19 Filed 01/22/07 Page 1 of 12
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2 05CV0481

Background

I. Prior Administrative Proceedings

This case arises out of the partial denial of benefits to Plaintiff under the Federal Employee’s Compensation Act (“FECA”) for injuries dating back to 1984. Plaintiff has litigated his

claims through many administrative channels and has unsuccessfully brought five previous

actions in the district court relating to these claims. Plaintiff has failed to provide a clear

statement of the factual and procedural background of this case. Therefore, the following facts

are taken from the November 10, 1997, Order Granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss with

Prejudice, Civil No. 97-0396 K (CGA): 

From May 7, 1984 until January 25, 1985, plaintiff was employed as a

physical science technician at the Mare Island Naval Shipyard in Vallejo,

California. His employment was terminated during his probationary year. On

December 11, 1984, prior to his termination, while containing a chemical spill,

plaintiff suffered injuries causing throat irritation. On December 19, 1984,

plaintiff filed a notice of traumatic injury and claim for continuation of

pay/compensation with the Office of Workers’ Compensation (“OWCP”). The

OWCP accepted plaintiff’s claim for chemical inhalation. This claim sought

benefits under FECA.

OWCP approved continuation of pay and paid temporary disability

compensation for December 28, 1984 through April 1, 1985. In a March 26,

1986 decision, OWCP found that plaintiff was not disabled for work beyond

April 1, 1985. The case was kept open, however, for medical benefits. Three

administrative bodies affirmed this March 1986 decision: (1) the Branch of

Hearings and Review (the “Branch”) on June 30, 1987; (2) OWCP (on a

request for reconsideration) on September 24, 1987 and (3) the Employee’s

Compensation Appeals Board (“ECAB”) on March 31, 1988. During and after

this review process, plaintiff continued to submit medical reports regarding

various physical complaints. In addition, OWCP referred plaintiff for second

opinion evaluations. Plaintiff claims that OWCP provided false information

to the doctors who performed these evaluations.

On September 11, 1990, plaintiff filed with OWCP a notice of

occupational disease and claim for compensation asserting that his chronic

throat problem was aggravated during subsequent employment at the Census

Bureau. On September 16, 1991, OWCP denied benefits on this claim because

plaintiff failed to show a casual nexus between his injuries and his federal

employment. On July 15, 1992, however, the OWCP hearing representative

issued a decision setting aside the September 16, 1991 decision and returning

the case to the District Office (the “Office”) for a de novo decision. On

November 20, 1992, the Office accepted plaintiff’s claim (File No. A13-

940120) for a temporary aggravation of chronic laryngitis for the period of his

employment with the Census Bureau. The Office also accepted the conditions

of chronic laryngitis, vocal cord scarring and partial vocal cord paralysis as

resulting from the December 11, 1984 employment injury. (File No. A13-

759139). 

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3 05CV0481

On October 6, 1994, following further medical evaluations and reports,

the Office denied plaintiff any further benefits, finding that although the Office

accepted plaintiff’s claim for temporary aggravation of chronic laryngitis

stemming from his work at the Census Bureau, this temporary aggravation

ended when his work at the Census Bureau ended and he was no longer

exposed to the aggravating conditions. The Office found no residual

disfunction and no resulting disability due to the temporary aggravation of

plaintiff’s chronic laryngitis. With respect to plaintiff’s previous claim in

connection with his December 11, 1984 injury, because the Office found that

plaintiff had residuals from the injury, it decided to leave the case open so that

plaintiff could receive medical treatment and supplies when needed. 

The Office further found, however, that while plaintiff’s laryngitis

would preclude him from jobs requiring moderate to extensive speaking, his

previous job of physical science technician did not fall within this category.

Plaintiff disagrees with this assessment. Because plaintiff would have been

capable of performing that job had he not been terminated for cause, the Office

did not alter the March 1986 decision denying disability benefits for any time

after April 1, 1985 (except for the brief period of disability during his

employment with the Census Bureau.)

Plaintiff requested a hearing to review the October 6, 1994 decision and

on February 15, 1996 an OWCP hearing representative in Washington, D.C.

affirmed the decision. Then on April 8, 1996, the Office denied plaintiff’s

request for reconsideration. After plaintiff requested a “reconsideration

hearing,” the OWCP, in an April 23, 1996 letter, explained that no such

hearing existed and advised him that he could either request another reconsideration or file an appeal. Plaintiff chose to request another reconsideration

which the Office denied on June 13, 1996 because plaintiff failed to present

any new evidence or issues that the Office had not previously considered and

thus did not meet the requirements for reconsideration.

Plaintiff again made a request for a hearing which the Office denied on

June 27, 1996, explaining that under the regulatory scheme, plaintiff was not

entitled to both a reconsideration and a hearing, but that plaintiff still had the

right to appeal the June 13, 1996 decision to the ECAB and that plaintiff

remained entitled to request reconsideration until April 8, 1997.

On October 17, 1996, plaintiff submitted a request for “administrative

mandamus” to the Branch to obtain review of the written record. Plaintiff

claimed that the Office violated various statutes and regulations. Many of

these allegations appear in the complaint in the current action. On November

15, 1996, the Branch advised plaintiff that he was not entitled to a review of

the written record because he had previously requested reconsideration. The

Branch, nevertheless, considered plaintiff’s request for reconsideration and

denied it, stating that plaintiff must either submit new evidence or legal

contentions to the District Office in a request for reconsideration, or file an

appeal with ECAB. Plaintiff elected to submit an appeal to the ECAB. 

Id. at 2-4 (citations omitted). On October 7, 1999, the ECAB issued its decision on Plaintiff’s

appeal. It affirmed the previous decisions of the OWCP and denied Plaintiff administrative

relief. (See Mot. to Dismiss at 4, Ex. B.)

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4 05CV0481

II. Prior Judicial Proceedings

Plaintiff has filed five previous complaints in federal district court relating to his 1984

injury and the subsequent administrative proceedings. (See Mot. to Dismiss at 4.) On March 25,

1988, Plaintiff filed a complaint in the Eastern District of California against the United States

Government, Department of Navy (“DON”), Department of Labor (“DOL”), Office of Personnel

Management, and Mare Island Naval Shipyard. See Seevers v. United States, et al., Civil No.

88-154 REC (E.D. Cal. 1988). In that complaint, Plaintiff alleged a variety of claims including

the denial of workers’ compensation benefits, the denial of disability retirement benefits, unfair

labor practices, the removal of sick leave benefits, and termination of employment. See id. On

May 18, 1990, after allowing Plaintiff two opportunities to amend his complaint, the court

dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (See

Decision and Order Re Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss Second Am. Compl. and/or for Summ. J. (May

18, 1990); Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. D.) The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. See Seevers v.

United States, 936 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1991) (unpublished); (see also Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. E.) 

On April 8, 1992, Plaintiff filed a complaint in the Southern District of California against

the United States of America, Department of Defense, DON, DOL, Department of Personnel

Management, and the heads of those agencies. See Seevers v. United States, et. al., Civil No. 92-

0592-G (LSP) (S.D. Cal. 1992). The complaint contained many of the same allegations as in the

previously dismissed action filed in the Eastern District of California. (See Compl. for Comp.

Relief (Apr. 8, 1992); see also Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. F.) On January 8, 1993, the court dismissed

with prejudice on res judicata grounds Plaintiff’s claims for state and federal workers’ compensation, disability retirement, unfair labor practices, and accrued sick leave. (See Mem. and

Decision Order (Jan. 8, 1993); see also Motion to Dismiss, Ex. G.) Plaintiff’s additional claim

for willful misrepresentation regarding false statements by Navy personnel to Congresswoman

Barbara Boxer was also dismissed with prejudice for failing to state a claim on which relief

could be granted. (See id.)

On March 10, 1997, Plaintiff filed a complaint in the Southern District of California

against the United States of America, DON, DOL, and the secretaries of those agencies. See

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5 05CV0481

Seevers v. United States, et al., Civil No. 97-0396 K (CGA) (S.D. Cal. 1997). The complaint

attempted to describe violations of various statutes and regulatory provisions. (See Pet. for

Mandamus Relief (Mar. 10, 1997)); Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. H.) Judge Judith N. Keep found the

1988 and 1992 actions had reached a final judgment on the merits and that Plaintiff had not

raised any new claims related to the 1984 injury, which had not already been rejected by the two

previous courts, or claims that Plaintiff could not have raised in earlier actions. (See Order

Granting Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss with Prejudice (Nov. 10, 1997); Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. A. at 7-9.) 

Plaintiff’s case was dismissed with prejudice because it was barred by res judicata. (See id.) 

The Ninth Circuit dismissed Plaintiff’s appeal for failure to file a timely notice of appeal. 

Seevers v. United States et al., 187 F.3d 648 (9th Cir. 1999) (unpublished); (see also Mot. to

Dismiss, Ex. I). 

On July 21, 2000, Plaintiff filed a complaint in the Southern District of California against

the United States, DON, DOL, and the secretaries of those agencies. See Seevers v. United

States, et al., Civil No. 00-1457 K (JAH) (S.D. Cal. 2000). The complaint alleged deprivation of

due process and property rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. (See Compl. (July

21, 2000); Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. J.) However, the complaint concerned the same nucleus of facts

and sought the same relief as the earlier actions. See id. The court granted Plaintiff’s motion to

proceed in forma pauperis, but dismissed the action sua sponte based on res judicata grounds. 

(See Order Granting Mot. to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Dismissing Compl. (Aug. 16,

2000); Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. K.) The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. Seevers v. United

States, et al., 19 Fed. Appx. 626, 627 (9th Cir. 2001) (unpublished); (Motion to Dismiss, Ex. L).

On August 18, 2003, Plaintiff filed a complaint in the Southern District of California

against the United States of America, DON, DOL, and the secretaries of those agencies. See

Seevers v. United States, et al., Civil No. 03-1639 J (JFS) (S.D. Cal. 2003). Like the previous

action, the complaint alleged violations of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. (See Compl.

(Aug. 18, 2003)); Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. M.) On August 25, 2003, this Court found that the

allegations in the complaint arose from the same nucleus of facts as the prior complaints, and

therefore, sua sponte ordered dismissal of the action with prejudice on res judicata grounds. (See

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6 05CV0481

Order Granting Mot. to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Dismissing Compl. (August 25, 2003);

Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. N.) 

III. The Complaint in this Action

On March 10, 2005, Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint. The Complaint alleges

violations of rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as violations of various

statutes and regulatory provisions, arising from Plaintiff’s 1984 injury. (See Compl. at 1-3.) In

the Complaint, Plaintiff demands that Defendants: (1) compensate him at full salary from

January 25, 1985 to June 13, 1986; (2) compensate him for accrued sick leave benefits which

Plaintiff claims were removed from his records; (3) compensate him for wage loss at 66 2/3% of

his wage earning capacity; (4) provide all benefits and supplements to wages and salaries prior

to and subsequent to December 11, 1984; (5) compensate him for latent disabilities such as

cancer of the throat, which Plaintiff believes he might experience due to his 1984 injury; (6)

award him benefits under California workmen’s compensation laws; (7) reimburse the costs of

this action; (8) issue a new decision on plaintiff’s 1984 traumatic injury claim within 120 days of

the court’s decision in this action; (9) make an award for or against payment of compensation

within 90 days thereafter; (10) provide any other relief which the court orders; and (11) ensure

that the relief requested in this Complaint does not restrict Plaintiff from seeking further

compensation from Defendants. (See Compl. at 7-8.) On March 24, 2005, the Court granted

Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. (See Order Granting Mot. to Proceed In Forma

Pauperis (Mar. 24, 2005).) Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice, Motion for

Summary Judgment, and Motion for Sanctions. [Doc. No. 13.] Defendants then filed the instant

Amended Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice, Motion for Summary Judgment, and Motion for

Sanctions. [Doc. No. 15.]

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7 05CV0481

Discussion

I. 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss

A. Legal Standard

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a complaint. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); see also Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1199-1200 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Dismissal of a claim under this rule is appropriate only where it “appears beyond doubt that the

plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” 

Edwards v. Marin Park, Inc., 356 F.3d 1058, 1061 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Conley v. Gibson,

355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). A complaint may be dismissed as a matter of law for two reasons:

(1) lack of a cognizable legal theory, or (2) insufficient facts under a cognizable theory. See

Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). 

In reviewing the motion, the court must assume the truth of all factual allegations and

must construe them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Gompper v. VISX,

Inc., 298 F.3d 893, 895 (9th Cir. 2002). However, the court is not bound to accept as true a legal

conclusion couched as a factual allegation. See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986); see

also Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). Instead, the court must

determine “whether conclusory allegations follow from the description of facts as alleged by the

plaintiff.” Holden v. Hagopian, 978 F.2d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 1992). When ruling on a motion

to dismiss, the court may consider the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached to the

complaint, and documents relied upon but not attached to the complaint when authenticity is not

contested. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688-89 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

B. Res Judicata

Res judicata “bars litigation in a subsequent action of any claims that were raised or could

have been raised in the prior action.” Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 244 F.3d 708, 713

(9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Western Radio Servs. Co. v. Glickman, 123 F.3d 1189, 1192 (9th

Cir.1997)). “The doctrine is applicable whenever there is (1) an identity of claims, (2) a final

judgment on the merits, and (3) identity or privity between parties.” Id. To determine if an

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8 05CV0481

identity of claims exists, the following factors are considered: “(1) whether rights or interests

established in the prior judgment would be destroyed or impaired by prosecution of the second

action; (2) whether substantially the same evidence is presented in the two actions; (3) whether

the two suits involve infringement of the same right; and (4) whether the two suits arise out of

the same transactional nucleus of facts.” Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs v. Karr, 994 F.2d 1426,

1429 (9th Cir. 1993). “The central criterion in determining whether there is an identity of claims

between the first and second adjudications is whether the two suits arise out of the same

transactional nucleus of facts.” Owens, 244 F.3d at 714 (quoting Frank v. United Airlines, Inc.,

216 F.3d 845, 851 (9th Cir. 2000)). 

The Court’s review of the docket reveals that Plaintiff has litigated and attempted to

relitigate the claims raised in the instant complaint in five separate actions in this District and in

the Eastern District of California. See Seevers v. United States, et al., Civil No. 88-154 REC

(E.D. Cal. 1988); Seevers v. United States, et al., Civil No. 92-0529G (LSP) (S.D. Cal. 1992);

Seevers v. United States, et al., Civil No. 97-0396 K (CGA) (S.D. Cal. 1997); Seevers v. United

States, et al., Civil No. 00-1457 K (JAH) (S.D. Cal. 2000); Seevers v. United States, et al., Civil

No. 03-1639 J (JFS) (S.D. Cal. 2003). The allegations in the instant Complaint arise from the

same nucleus of facts as those in the prior complaints, Plaintiff’s 1984 injury, and Plaintiff has

presented no new information or claims that could not have been litigated in the prior actions. 

See Owens, 244 F.3d 713. Accordingly, this Court FINDS that there is an identity of claims

between this action and the five prior actions filed by Plaintiff. 

The Court also FINDS that the courts in Plaintiff’s five previous cases reached a final

judgment on the merits. In the first case in the Eastern District of California, the court dismissed

Plaintiff’s second amended complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. A judgment of

dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is final and on the merits so long as the jurisdictional defect has

not or cannot be remedied. See Segal v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., Inc., 606 F.2d

842, 845 (9th Cir. 1979); see also Dozier v. Ford Motor Co., 702 F.2d 1189, 1192 (D.C. Cir.

1983); . Plaintiff has failed to cure this defect for the same reason previously stated by this

Court: 

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9 05CV0481

[D]espite all of the statutory and regulatory violations that plaintiff alleges, an

examination of his prayer for relief reveals that his entire action is predicated

on an injury sustained as a federal employee. FECA provides a comprehensive

and exclusive program of workers’ compensation for government employees

injured in work-related accidents and precludes recovery for such injuries in

any other judicial proceeding.

(Order Granting Dfs.’ Mot. to Dismiss with Prejudice (Nov. 10, 1997); Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. A at

9.) Plaintiff’s four subsequent cases in this Court were dismissed based on res judicata grounds,

failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted, or lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

Additionally, in the 1997 action, Judge Judith N. Keep found that both the 1988 and 1992

actions reached a final decision on the merits. (See Order Granting Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss with

Prejudice (Nov. 10, 1997).) In this case, where five court decisions have dismissed Plaintiff’s

claims with prejudice and the last four decisions were themselves based on res judicata principles, the Court FINDS that those decisions were final and on the merits. 

The Court FINDS that the instant action involves the same parties or their privities as in

the previous actions before this District and in the Eastern District of California. “Even when

the parties are not identical, privity may exist if ‘there is a substantial identity between the

parties, that is, when there is sufficient commonality of interest.’ ” Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council,

Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 322 F.3d 1064, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting In re

Gottheiner, 703 F.2d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 1983)). The instant Complaint names the United

States, DON, DOL, and the secretaries of those departments. (See Compl. at 1.) Plaintiff’s

second amended complaint from the Eastern District action names the United States, DON, and

DOL. (See Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. C at 1.) The prior complaints in this District named the United

States, DON, DOL, and the then secretaries of those departments. (See Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. F at

1, H at 1, J at 1, M at 1.) Therefore, the only new defendants in the instant complaint are the

current secretaries. “There is privity between officers of the same government so that a

judgment in a suit between a party and a representative of the United States is res judicata in

relitigation of the same issue between that party and another officer of the government.” 

Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 402-03 (1940). Therefore, the Court

FINDS there is an identity or privity between parties. 

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Lastly, the Ninth Circuit has previously affirmed a dismissal of Plaintiff’s instant claims

on res judicata grounds. Seevers v. United States, et al., 19 Fed. Appx. 626, 627 (9th Cir. 2001)

(unpublished). Accordingly, the Court FINDS that the instant claims are barred by res judicata. 

II. The Court Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over This Action

Federal courts have limited jurisdictional power, and therefore, are under a continuing

duty to confirm their subject matter jurisdiction over a particular case. See Steel Co. v. Citizens

for a Better Env’t., 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998); Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle,

429 U.S. 274, 278 (1977). Furthermore, courts may sua sponte raise the issue of subject matter

jurisdiction at any time during the proceedings. See United Investors Life Ins. Co. v. Waddell &

Reed Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 967 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“Whenever it

appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject

matter, the court shall dismiss the action.”). 

While Plaintiff alleges constitutional, statutory, and regulatory violations, an examination

of his prayer for relief reveals that his entire action is predicated on an injury sustained as a

federal employee. “FECA establishes a comprehensive and exclusive workers’ compensation

scheme for federal employees.” Markham v. United States, 434 F.3d 1185, 1187 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Furthermore, FECA “explicitly provides that the courts do not have jurisdiction to review FECA

claims challenging the merits of benefit determinations.” Id.; 5 U.S.C. § 8128(b). The Ninth

Circuit recognizes only two exceptions to this prohibition of jurisdiction—constitutional

challenges and claims for violation of a clear statutory mandate or prohibition. Markham, 434

F.3d at 1187; see also Staacke v. U.S. Sec'y of Labor, 841 F.2d 278, 281 (9th Cir. 1988).

Although Plaintiff has again attempted to fashion his Complaint in terms of Defendants’

violations of regulations, Plaintiff’s prayer for relief, which seeks compensation for salary, sick

leave, wage losses, and other monetary benefits related to Plaintiff’s 1984 injury, indicates that

he does not state a claim for violation of statutory mandate, but is seeking review of the

Secretary of Labor’s decision regarding the partial denial of benefits. (See Compl. at 7-8.) 

Accordingly, the Court FINDS no substantial allegations regarding violations of clear statutory

mandate or prohibition.

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11 05CV0481

Plaintiff has also failed to include a recognizable constitutional challenge. While Plaintiff

alleges that Defendants have violated his due process and property rights in violation of the Fifth

and Fourteenth Amendments, Plaintiff, as Judge Keep previously found, “has merely cloaked his

denial of benefits claims in constitutional language to try to obtain judicial review.” (See

Compl. at 1; Order Granting Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss with Prejudice (Nov. 10, 1997) at 10.) As

the Ninth Circuit has held, “[s]prinkling the brief with multiple due process references and

affixing a constitutional label does not change the essence of the claims.” Markham, 434 F.3d at

1187. The Court FINDS Plaintiff’s purported constitutional claims are wholly insubstantial, and

thus, the Court is without subject matter jurisdiction over the instant claims.

III. 12(b)(2), (4) and (5) Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Comply with Service of Process

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Complaint should also be dismissed pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure (12)(b)(2), (4), and (5) because Plaintiff failed to complete service of

process as required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(I) and 4(m). (See Mot. to Dismiss

at 2.) However, because the Court dismisses the Complaint on res judicata grounds, it need not

address whether Plaintiff properly served Defendants.

IV. Rule 56 Motion for Summary Judgment

Defendants argue in the alternative that this Court should grant summary judgment

against Plaintiff. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) states that if, on a motion to dismiss

for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleadings are

presented and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary

judgment and disposed of as provided in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6). However, on a motion to dismiss a court may properly look beyond the complaint to

matters of public record and doing so does not convert a rule 12(b)(6) motion to one for

summary judgement. Gemtel Corp. v. Cmty. Redev. Agency of City of Los Angeles, 23 F.3d

1542, 1544 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Mack v. South Bay Beer Distribs., 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th

Cir. 1986), overruled on other grounds by Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S.

104, 111 (1991)); see also Phillips v. Bureau of Prisons, 591 F.2d 966, 969 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 

Accordingly, this Court FINDS that dismissing the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

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Procedure 12(b)(6) is proper rather than granting summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 56. 

V. Motion for Sanctions

Defendants seek an order from this Court enjoining Plaintiff from filing future complaints

based on the same transactional nucleus of facts, those surrounding the partial denial of workers’

compensation benefits and Plaintiff’s 1984 injury. (See Mot. to Dismiss at 17.) At the present

time, an injunction of this nature is not appropriate. However, the Court has reviewed the record

and STRONGLY CAUTIONS Plaintiff to avoid filing anything which is frivolous or is

intended to harass others in violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. Sanctions for

violating Rule 11 include the imposition of fines or dismissal of the case with prejudice. 

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court (1) GRANTS Defendants’ 12(b)(6) Motion to

Dismiss with Prejudice, and (2) DENIES Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 22, 2007

HON. NAPOLEON A. JONES, JR.

United States District Judge

cc: Magistrate Judge Major

 All Counsel of Record

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