Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_09-cv-00362/USCOURTS-azd-4_09-cv-00362-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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 The pincites provided refer to the pagination on the Court’s electronic case management

system, CM/ECF.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

MICHAEL V. LEGGINS, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

DAVID DUNCAN,

Respondent. 

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No. CV-09-362-TUC-CKJ (CRP)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

Michael Leggins (“Petitioner”), presently an inmate at the Federal Correctional

Institution in Safford, Arizona (“FCI Safford”), filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2241 (“Habeas Petition”) on June 29, 2009. (Doc. 1). Petitioner

alleges the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) violated his due process rights when it

classified him with a “greater security” management variable without providing him with

notice, a hearing, or an opportunity to defend against the allegations supporting the

classification. (Doc. 1, pp. 4, 9).1

 A classification of “greater security” denies Petitioner the

ability to participate in furloughs, work release, and other community-based rehabilitative

programs. (Doc. 1, p. 11). The Government contests the Habeas Petition, arguing Petitioner

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 The facts in this paragraph derive from the Declaration of Matthew J. Carney, Supervisory

Attorney Advisor for the Federal Bureau of Prisons and the attached Inmate History. (See

Doc. 7-1, pp. 2-3, 4-8). Documents from the original criminal record were not provided to

the Court. 

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is not entitled to a due process hearing on classification decisions and that inmates may

challenge their custody classification through administrative remedies, which Petitioner did.

(Doc. 7, pp. 5-6). Petitioner replied to the Government’s answer, arguing (1) federal

regulations show he is entitled to notice and a hearing prior to classification decisions and

(2) his access to administrative remedies does not cure the violation of his due process

rights. (Doc. 8).

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner is in federal custody following his conviction for felon in possession of a

firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and possession with intent to distribute cocaine

base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) and (b). (Doc. 7-1, p. 8). Petitioner was sentenced

on February 12, 2007 to 120-months, followed by 5 years of supervised release. (Doc. 7-1,

p. 8). He is projected to be released on June 12, 2015 via Good Conduct Time Release.2

(Doc. 7-1, p. 2).

After commitment to FCI Safford, in November 2007, BOP determined Petitioner’s

security level through its classification system. (See Program Statement 5100.08, September

12, 2006, Doc. 7-2). During classification, Petitioner received a seven-point increase in his

base score because the severity of his current offense was listed as “GREATEST”. (Doc.

1, p. 24). Petitioner appealed the seven-point increase through the BOP’s administrative

process. (Doc. 7-1, p. 10). Petitioner’s counselor Hernandez and his Unit Manager Barbara

Beal informed him Program Statement 5100.08 authorized BOP to increase his base score

because (1) Petitioner was convicted for felon in possession of a firearm and possession with

intent to distribute cocaine base; (2) Petitioner brandished and threatened to use a handgun

during commission of the offense; and (3) during his arrest, Petitioner possessed cocaine and

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marijuana and told law enforcement officers that he was a drug dealer and possessed the

shotgun for protection. (Doc. 1, pp. 17-18). 

Petitioner appealed this decision to the Warden. In the appeal, Petitioner pointed out

the gun he brandished was a toy gun. (Doc.7-1, p. 11). In denying his appeal, the Warden

first noted Petitioner’s convictions fell under a category of Greatest Severity. The Warden

then noted in the pre-sentence report Petitioner was described as getting into a dispute with

the victim, going outside to his vehicle to retrieve a handgun, displaying the handgun,

pointing it at the victim, and following the victim back inside the store with the gun still

pointed at the victim. (Doc. 7-1, p. 12). The Warden found Petitioner’s behavior in the

commission of the crime also resulted in a public safety factor of greatest severity. (Doc.

7-1, p. 12). 

Petitioner appealed the Warden’s decision to the regional director. The regional

director rescored Petitioner’s offense level to moderate but did note Petitioner brandished

and threatened to use a handgun against the victim. (Doc. 7-1, p. 14). Unsatisfied with the

regional director’s decision, Petitioner appealed that finding to Harrell Watts, the National

Inmate Appeals Administrator. (Doc. 7-1, p. 15). Petitioner claimed the regional director’s

rescoring of Petitioner’s offense severity was an admission by the BOP that it “breach[ed]

[the] plea agreement.” (Doc. 7-1, p. 15). 

Responding to Petitioner’s appeal, the national administrator cited Program

Statement 5100.08 for authority to “allow[] staff to use professional judgment in making

decisions involving custody classification matters.” (Doc. 7-1, p. 16). The national

administrator noted the BOP’s classification of Petitioner did not relate to any plea

agreement he reached with the U.S. Attorney’s Office. (Doc. 7-1, p. 16). The administrator

also noted Petitioner’s offense severity was rescored from a seven to a three because

Petitioner’s behavior leading to his arrest, including his brandishing of the gun and

threatening the use of it against victim was behavior “not considered part of the Federal

offense.” (Doc. 7-1, p. 14). Because brandishing the weapon and threatening to use it was

“found to be indirectly related to the offense conduct for which [Petitioner was] sentenced

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. . . it was not considered in [Petitioner’s] most recent classification score.” (Doc. 7-1, p.

16). 

After the regional director lowered Petitioner’s offense severity score from a seven

to a three, staff at Petitioner’s prison facility requested the Designation and Sentence

Computation Center (“DSCC”) assess Petitioner’s case to determine whether to place a

Greater Security Management Variable (“MGTV”) on Petitioner’s custody classification.

(Doc. 7-1, p. 20). The DSCC determined a MGTV was appropriate. (Doc. 7-1, p. 20).

Petitioner learned of the MGTV placement on his custody classification in a May 3, 2008

meeting with Unit Counselor Scott Warner. (Doc. 1, p. 19). Petitioner’s MGTV was based

on past criminal behavior that resulted in arrests but not convictions. Petitioner appealed

the placement of the MGTV on his custody classification. (Doc. 1, p. 19). 

In his Request for Administrative Remedy, Petitioner asked BOP to specify what

“other offenses” were used to justify placement of the MGTV. Unit Manager Barbara Beal

listed four events in Petitioner’s criminal history that supported the MGTV: (1) arrest for

assault with a deadly weapon, not a firearm on October 24, 1986 (case was rejected for

prosecution as the complainant refused to prosecute); (2) arrest for an attempt to mobilize

an immobilized vehicle on June 7, 1991 and failure to appear in that case (case was

eventually dismissed); (3) arrest for assault with a deadly weapon, not a firearm; urge riot

or destroy property (including yelling “Fuck the Police! Riot Again” and telling officers

“Fuck you, Pussy! Mother Fuckers! I don’t have to do a fucking thing you say. I’m outta

here!”), battery, and resisting a peace officer on August 30, 1992; (4) arrest for battery on

spouse on March 18, 2006 (no charges filed; victim was heard crying and yelling “You are

punching me in the stomach! Stop hitting me!” Victim later said Petitioner had also called

her a “bitch” and punched her in the face); and (5) brandishing and threatening to use a

handgun, later determined to be a replica, against a victim (which included retrieving the

replica gun from his car and following the victim back into the store with the gun pointed

at the victim). (Doc. 1, pp. 20-21). The Unit Manager acknowledged most of the above

cases resulted in dismissal but stated the MGTV was appropriate because the above

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incidents showed “[Petitioner’s] characteristic of the behavior during the arrests . . .” (Doc.

1, p. 21). 

Petitioner appealed the decision of the Unit Manager. The regional director found

a Greater Security MGTV was properly applied to Petitioner’s custody classification. (Doc.

7-1, p. 20). The regional director determined Petitioner’s MGTV classification was based

on security concerns not reflected in Petitioner’s classification, specifically the prior arrests.

(Doc. 7-1, p. 20). The national appeals administrator also denied Petitioner’s appeal. (Doc.

7-1, p. 23). The national administrator noted Program Statement 5100.08 requires staff use

professional judgment in making decisions involving custody classification and that MGTVs

are applied when staff determine an inmate’s demonstrated security needs are inconsistent

with the results of the classification process. (Doc. 7-1, p. 23).

On June 29, 2009, Petitioner filed his Habeas Petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

Petitioner contends his due process rights were violated when BOP denied him prior notice

and a hearing regarding his custody classification and the subsequent addition of an MGTV

to his custody classification. The Government contends Petitioner is not entitled to a due

process hearing on classification decisions because (1) custody classification procedure is

within the discretion of the Attorney General as delegated to the Director of the BOP; and

(2) the classification procedures developed by BOP are nothing more than guidelines for

determining the security and custody needs of an inmate, while the ultimate judgment is to

be based on professional judgment of the staff. (Doc. 7, pp. 3-4). 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

Federal prisoners challenging the manner, location, or conditions of the execution of

a sentence properly bring their claims pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2241. Brown v. United States, 610 F.2d 672, 677 (9th Cir.1990). To obtain relief under

28 U.S.C. §2241 a petitioner in federal custody must show that his sentence is being

executed in an illegal, but not necessarily unconstitutional, manner. Clark v. Floyd, 80 F.3d

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371, 372, 374 (9th Cir.1996) (contending time spent in state custody should be credited

toward federal custody). A petitioner filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28

U.S.C. § 2241 must file the petition in the judicial district of the petitioner's custodian.

Brown, 610 F.2d at 677.

In this case, Petitioner challenges the application of a MGTV to his custody

classification in violation of his right to due process. The MGTV prevents Petitioner from

participating in community based rehabilitative programs. Petitioner is challenging the

legality of the manner in which his sentence is being executed. Thus, his petition is proper

under 28 U.S.C. §2241. This Court has territorial jurisdiction over the case in question since

Petitioner is incarcerated at FCI Safford, which is within the District of Arizona.

B. Exhaustion

Before filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus, a federal prisoner challenging any

circumstance of imprisonment must first exhaust all administrative remedies. Martinez v.

Roberts, 804 F.2d 570, 571 (9th Cir.1986). The Government concedes Petitioner has

exhausted his available administrative remedies. (Doc. 7, p. 2;see also Doc. 7-1, Exhibit 1,

pp. 2-3). 

C. Merits

1. Classification of Inmates and Program Statement P5100.08

Congress authorizes federal correctional institutions to develop a classification

system that segregates inmates based on “the nature of the offenses committed, the character

and mental condition of the prisoners, and such other factors as should be considered in

providing an individualized system of discipline, care, and treatment of the persons

committed to such institutions.” 18 U.S.C. § 4081. The Attorney General is vested with the

control and management of Federal penal and correctional institutions. 18 U.S.C. §

4001(b)(1). As part of the authority, the Attorney General may classify inmates and provide

for their proper government, discipline, treatment, care, rehabilitation, and reformation. 18

U.S.C. § 4001(b)(2). The Attorney General authorizes the Director of the Bureau of Prisons

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3

 Respondent provided the Court with copies of the relevant chapters, Chapters Five and Six,

of Program Statement 5100.08. The Court cites these documents and pincites as they appear

on the Court’s electronic case management system, CM/ECF.

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“to exercise or perform any of the authority, functions, or duties conferred or imposed upon

the Attorney General by any law relating to the commitment, control, or treatment of

persons . . .” 28 C.F.R. § 0.96. The BOP is responsible for designating a federal inmate to

a penal or correctional facility and for making any subsequent transfers. 18 U.S.C. §

3621(b). The BOP classification procedure is within the discretion of the Attorney General

as delegated to the Director of the Bureau of Prisons. See 18 U.S.C. § 4081; 28 C.F.R. §

0.96; Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n. 9 (1976) (dicta). 

The BOP’s policy and procedures for classifying inmates are set forth in the Inmate

Security Designation and Custody Classification Manual. The Manual is referenced as

Program Statement (“PS”) 5100.08.3

 The intent of the Custody Classification system is to

permit staff to use professional judgment within specific guidelines. (Doc. 7-2, p. 2). 

The classification procedure involves consideration of various factors to determine

the proper security and custody classification. These factors include severity of the current

offense, length of the current sentence, criminal history, history of violence, history of

escape and escape attempts, number and type of detainers, involvement with drugs and

alcohol, mental or psychological stability, institutional adjustment and responsibility. (Doc.

7-2, Exhibit 2). An inmate's custody classification is determined when he enters BOP

custody (within seven months upon arrival at the institution). (Doc. 7-2, p. 2). The custody

classification is re-calculated annually during the inmate’s institutional Program Review.

(Doc. 7-2, p. 2). 

Classification of inmates includes designating points for the various abovementioned factors. (Doc. 7-2, pp. 4-16). The factors are divided into a “base score”

addressing the inmate’s offense severity and criminal history and a “custody score”

addressing the inmate’s institutional behavior. (Doc. 7-2, pp. 10, 15). The custody score

is then adjusted up or down to determine the custody variance score. Together, the base

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score and custody variance score create an inmate’s “security score”. (Doc. 7-2, p. 16).

This score along with any applicable public safety factors determine an inmate’s “scored

security level”. (Doc. 7-2, p. 16). That security level indicates the level of supervision

required for an inmate and ultimately effects where an inmate can be housed and what

programs are available to the inmate. 

BOP also has the option of adding a third “score” to the classification analysis.

(Doc. 7-2, p. 17). When the resulting “scored security level” of an inmate does not reflect

the inmate’s assessed security needs, a management variable can be added to the inmate’s

classification. See Chapter 5 of PS 5100.08 (Doc. 7-1, p. 26). A management variable

overrides the inmate’s scored security level. (Doc. 7-2, p. 17). A management variable can

effect placement at either a higher security or lower security institution than the scored

security level indicates. (Doc. 7-1, p. 25). Application of a management variable requires

review and approval by the Designation and Sentence Computation Center (“DSCC”)

located in Grand Prairie, Texas. (Doc. 7-1, p. 25). Prison staff must complete a written

request asking DSCC to review an inmate’s file and apply a management variable. (Doc.

7-1, p. 25). There are various management variables; specific to this case, a “V”

management variable represents “Greater Security” and applies when “[t]here may be

security concerns which are not adequately reflected in the classification scheme.” (Doc.

7-1, p. 29). A greater security management variable can only be assigned to an inmate’s

classification for up to twenty-four months. (Doc. 7-1, p. 31). Staff must apply again to the

DSCC and an inmate must be reevaluated to update an expiration date for a management

variable. (Doc. 7-1, p. 25). 

2. Petitioner’s Due Process Claim

Petitioner alleges the BOP violated his due process rights when prison officials

assigned him a management variable of greater security (“MGTV”) without notice, a

hearing, and the opportunity to present a response. The Court finds the BOP was not

required to provide Petitioner with any notice, a hearing, or an opportunity to be heard prior

to classifying him with a MGTV. 

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In Moody v. Daggett, the Supreme Court noted in dicta that prisoner classification

and eligibility for rehabilitative programs in the federal system are matters delegated by

Congress to the “full discretion” of federal prison officials. 429 U.S. at 88 n. 9. Inmates do

not have “legitimate statutory or constitutional entitlement sufficient to invoke due process”

regarding their classification. Id. Similarly, the Supreme Court held the transfer of a state

prisoner to a less favorable institution without an adequate fact-finding hearing does not in

itself deprive the prisoner of liberty without due process of law. Meachum v. Fano, 427

U.S. 215, 225 (1976). In Meachum, the Court expressed concern that finding a liberty

interest in the transfer of prisoners would trigger procedural protections of due process that

“would subject to judicial review a wide spectrum of discretionary actions that traditionally

have been the business of prison administrators rather than of the federal courts.” Id. The

Court was “unwilling to go so far” as to find a liberty interest when transfers between

institutions are made for a variety of reasons including institutional security or the safety and

welfare of the inmate. Id. The Ninth Circuit also held that prisoners have no constitutional

right to a particular classification status. Hernandez v. Johnston, 833 F.2d 1316, 1318 (9th

Cir.1987) (citing Moody, 429 U.S. at 88 n. 9). In Hernandez, the prisoner brought a § 1983

action alleging state prison officials improperly classified him based on false statements in

his file without giving him due process to argue against those statements. Id. The Ninth

Circuit disagreed; holding Petitioner did not have a due process right in his classification

status nor was he deprived of liberty by the presence of challenged statements in his record.

Id. 

The assignment of an MGTV to Petitioner’s custody classification does not create

a liberty interest entitling Petitioner to procedural protections of due process. Congress and

the Attorney General gave the BOP wide discretion to create and maintain a classification

system. The BOP created Program Statement 5100.08 as a guideline for classifying

inmates. Prison officials complied with P.S. 5100.08 in classifying Petitioner. The fact that

Petitioner cannot access community based rehabilitative programs at a lower security prison

because he is in a higher security prison does not in itself create a liberty interest requiring

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the BOP to provide him procedural protections of due process prior to classifying him. BOP

followed the guidelines outlined in Program Statement 5100.08 in classifying Petitioner with

a MGTV; BOP’s use of its congressionally-mandated discretion to classify Petitioner does

not first require BOP to provide Petitioner with any due process.

In support of his claim, Petitioner cites a non-binding Second Circuit case,

Cardaropoli v. Norton, 523 F.2d 990 (2nd Cir.1975). In Cardaropoli, the Second Circuit

held a petitioner was entitled to some procedural protections of due process before the BOP

could designate him as a “special offender”. Id. at 994-995. The program statement in

effect set forth eight broad categories for special offenders including non-federal prisoners,

members of organized crime, protection cases, extreme custody risks, subversives, notorious

individuals, persons who have threatened high government officials, and any other offender

who requires ‘especially close supervision.’” Id. at 993. In reaching its conclusion that

some due process was required before designating an inmate as a “special offender”, the

Second Circuit noted the consequences of a “special offender” designation were significant

and could include delays or preclusion of social furloughs, release to half-way houses and

transfers to other correction institutions and a possible bar on early parole. Id. at 994.

Significant to the court was the total or partial loss of eligibility for substantial benefits

normally afforded every inmate. Id. at 995, n. 11. The court in Cardaropoli specifically

distinguished the “special offender” classification from other classifications, including the

security risk classification of “maximum”, “medium”, or “minimum”, because “special

offender” classification cannot be mitigated or removed by reason of the inmate’s

subsequent behavior. Id.

Cardaropoli is not binding on this Court and it also addresses a designation “special

offender” that is not at issue in this case. Unlike the “special offender” designation,

Petitioner’s classification as an MGTV has an expiration date. Under Program Statement

5100.08, Petitioner’s classification as an MGTV expires after twenty-four months and

prison staff must reapply to the DSCC Administrator to reevaluate the case if they seek

further MGTV classification. (Doc. 7-1, Exhibit 1, Attachment 4, pp. 26, 31). Also

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different, the designation of MGTV does not result in the loss of eligibility for benefits

afforded to other inmates. An MGTV does effect where Petitioner falls in the classification

system but it is not a separate designation that places him outside the classification system.

An MGTV classification is closer to the classification of “maximum”, “medium”, or

“minimum” custody identified by the Second Circuit as distinguishable from the “special

offender” designation. Cardaropoli is not binding on this Court and is also distinguishable

from this case.

In his Reply, Petitioner alleged BOP classified him in violation of the procedure

prescribed by 28 C.F.R. §524.11(b)(1). This Court finds no violation of this procedure took

place. After the initial classification, inmates receive a program review at least once every

180 calendar days. 28 C.F.R. § 524.11(a)(2). When an inmate is to appear before a

classification team, the inmate receives a 48-hour notice of the scheduled appearance. 28

C.F.R. § 524.11(b). Petitioner confuses 28 C.F.R. § 524.11 to mean he must receive notice

before any change in his classification. This is an incorrect reading of the regulation.

Petitioner need only receive 48-hour notice prior to a meeting at which Petitioner is

scheduled to appear before a classification team. Prison staff were not required to provide

Petitioner with notice or a hearing prior to requesting DSCC apply an MGTV to Petitioner’s

custody classification. 

III. RECOMMENDATION.

Based on the above, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after

itsindependent review and analysis, enter an order DENYING Petitioner’s Habeas Petition

with prejudice. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), any party may serve and file written objections

within fourteen (14) days of being served with a copy of the Report and Recommendation.

If objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. The parties are advised that

any objections filed are to be identified with the following case number: No. CV-09-362-

TUC-CKJ.

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The Clerk is directed to mail a copy of the Report and Recommendation to Petitioner

and counsel for Respondents.

DATED this 27th day of August, 2010.

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