Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-00028/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-00028-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN REGINALD MCGATHON,

Plaintiff,

v.

D PETROVIC, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 14-cv-00028-JSC 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Dkt. No. 28

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, a California prisoner proceeding pro se, filed this civil rights action under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that officials at San Quentin State Prison inadequately investigated 

disciplinary charges against him. The Court reviewed the complaint and, after reconsideration, 

found that, when liberally construed, it states a cognizable claim for the violation of Plaintiff’s 

right to due process. Defendants were served by the United States Marshal, and they have filed a 

motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff filed an opposition, and Defendants have filed a reply 

brief. For the reasons discussed below, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is 

GRANTED. 

BACKGROUND

In support of their motion, Defendants have submitted the records of the disciplinary 

proceedings and declarations by prison officials involved in those proceedings. Plaintiff has 

submitted similar documents, as well as his own declaration and a verified complaint.

On October 10, 2011, Defendant Sergeant Petrovic responded to a fight at San Quentin 

between Plaintiff and his cellmate Jeffrey Coley; when Petrovic arrived at their cell, he saw that 

Coley was bleeding “profusely” from his face and mouth. (Petrovic Decl. ¶¶ 3-4, Exh. A.) The 

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other inmates in the area were lying on the ground or pointing at Plaintiff who was punching his 

fist into his hands. (Id. ¶ 4.) Plaintiff was subdued by other officers, and he told Petrovic that he 

had attacked Coley because he “was stressed out but I’m sorry.” (Id.) Coley was taken to the 

medical clinic where he told medical staff that he was hit with a lock, and he was treated for cuts 

around his mouth. (Arnold Decl. Exh. A. at 6.) Another officer confiscated the lock from 

Plaintiff. (Petrovic Decl. Exh. A.) Petrovic prepared a Rules Violation Report on a “CDC 115” 

form, also known as an “RVR” or a “115”, charging Plaintiff with battery with a deadly weapon (a 

lock). (Id. ¶ 5, Exh. A.) Petrovic subsequently received confidential information from an 

informant that Plaintiff had hit Coley with a lock; this informant had previously provided accurate 

information to prison officials. (Id. ¶ 6.) 

Plaintiff asserts that he did not hit Coley with a lock; rather, he felt threatened by Coley, 

there was a brief struggle, and he punched Coley in the face. (Opp. at 2.) He then went to the 

back wall of the cell, and Coley used one of Plaintiff’s shirts and some toilet paper to staunch the 

bleeding from his nose. (Id.) Plaintiff denies punching his fist into his hands. (Id.) 

The day after the incident, Plaintiff was placed on administrative segregation and 

transferred to San Quentin’s Secured Housing Unit (“SHU”) pending further investigation and a 

hearing on the charges. (Erickson Decl. ¶ 5, Exh. B.) Plaintiff requested that the disciplinary 

hearing be postponed until the District Attorney decided whether to prosecute. (Dkt. No. 1 at 16.)1 

According to Plaintiff, the possibility that he would be prosecuted for what would be his third 

“strike” offense caused his blood pressure to “spike” to 147/98, and he continues to take high 

blood pressure medication. (Opp. at 4.) Plaintiff is a participant in the prison’s Mental Health 

Services Delivery System at the CCMS level of care. (Petrovic Decl. Exh. A; Lee Decl. Exh. B.) 

The District Attorney declined to prosecute Plaintiff, and Defendant Lieutenant Arnold 

held a disciplinary hearing on December 9, 2011. (Arnold Decl. Exh. A at 4, 9.) Plaintiff had 

 

1

The voluminous attachments to the complaint are not consecutively paginated. Therefore, the 

Court cites to the volumes and page numbers assigned when they were filed in the Court’s 

electronic case filing system. The complaint and attachments were broken into three parts, 

numbered as Docket No. 1 with “Attachment 1” and “Attachment 2.” These parts are cited herein 

as Dkt. Nos. 1, 1.1 and 1.2, respectively. 

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received notice of the charges and hearing more than 24 hours earlier, and indicated that he was 

ready to proceed. (Id. at 4-5.) Plaintiff was provided a staff assistant (Officer Phillips, who is not 

a defendant) and an investigator (Defendant Alvarez) to help him prepare for the hearing. (Id. at 

5-8.) On October 25, 2011 they met with Plaintiff before the hearing , to confirm that Plaintiff 

understood the charges, take his statement, and see if he needed assistance. (Id.; Alvarez Decl. ¶¶

4, 6.) At Plaintiff’s request, Alvarez interviewed four inmates, but each stated that he had not 

witnessed the incident. (Alvarez Decl. ¶ 4, Exh. A at 7.) Alvarez relayed this information to 

Arnold (the hearing officer). (Id.) Plaintiff states that he told Alvarez that these witnesses could 

not have been elsewhere in the prison at the time of the incident, as they claimed, because there 

was a “lockdown” requiring them to be in their cell areas at the time. 2 (Opp. at 9-10.) Plaintiff 

further states that he handed Arnold an envelope with documents at the hearing, but Arnold did 

not review them.3 (Opp. at 8.) 

At the hearing, plaintiff stated, “I never hit him with a weapon, he pushed me and I 

protected myself.” (Arnold Decl. ¶ 8, Exh. A at 5.) Arnold found Plaintiff guilty of violating 

prison rules by committing battery on an inmate with a deadly weapon (a lock) based on 

Petrovic’s rules violation report, an incident report, Coley’s statement to medical staff, Coley’s 

injuries, Plaintiff’s statements to Petrovic and at the hearing, and Alvarez’s report. (Id. Exh. A at 

5-7.) Plaintiff was assessed a forfeiture of 360 days of good time credits, verbally reprimanded, 

and referred for assessment whether he should serve a term in the SHU. (Id. at 6.)

Plaintiff appealed the disciplinary findings, and on January 26, 2012, Defendant Associate 

Warden Foss vacated them and ordered a new RVR and hearing because there was confidential 

information that was not considered at the hearing. (Decl. Foss ¶ 4, Exh. A.)4 A new RVR was 

prepared the same day, and a second disciplinary hearing was held on February 25, 2012, by 

 

2

Plaintiff asserts his administrative appeal of the disciplinary proceedings establishes that he also 

requested the witnesses also be present at this hearing. (Opp. at 9.) That finding was made about 

his second disciplinary hearing, discussed below, however, not this first hearing. (Dkt. 1.1 at 32.) 

3

Plaintiff does not describe what was in those documents.

4Although Foss does not say what the confidential information was, it appears from the subsequent 

hearing that it was the statement from a confidential informant to Petrovic that Plaintiff hit Coley 

with a weapon. (See Decl. Alvarez Exh B. at 7.) 

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Lieutenant Larkins (not a defendant). (Lee Decl. Exh. B at 10-13.) Plaintiff was again given 

notice of the charges more than 24 hours prior, and at the hearing he confirmed that he was 

prepared to proceed. (Id. at 10-11.) Plaintiff was provided with a new staff assistant, Officer 

France, as well as Defendant Alvarez as an investigator, and they met with Plaintiff prior to the 

hearing to review the charges, take his statement and offer assistance. (Id. at 10-11, 17, 20; 

Alvarez Decl. ¶ 6.) Plaintiff requested that Alvarez interview Coley and another inmate, Mainor. 

(Alvarez Decl. Exh. B at 9.) Coley said that Plaintiff hit him with a finger through the lock and 

the body of the lock inside his clenched fist, and Mainor reported Coley saying that he did not 

understand why Plaintiff had hit him with a weapon. (Id.) France was present at the hearing as 

well. Plaintiff admitted punching Coley, but in self-defense and not with a lock. (Id. at 6.) 

Larkins found Plaintiff guilty of battery with a deadly weapon (a lock) based upon the RVR by 

Petrovic, the statements from Coley, Mainor and Plaintiff to Alvarez and Petrovic, Plaintiff’s 

statement at the hearing, Coley’s injuries and statements to medical staff, and the confidential 

information provided to Petrovic. (Id. at 6-8.) Plaintiff was again assessed a forfeiture of 360 

days of time credits and referred to other prison officials to assess whether he should be placed in 

the SHU. (Id. at 8.)

On March 15, 2012, Coley retracted his story by telling Officer France that Plaintiff had 

never hit him with a lock. (Dkt. 1.2 at 20; see also Lee Decl. Exh. B at 9.) Plaintiff states that he 

gave this retraction to Foss “around March 2012,” and to Defendant Warden Chappell “around 

April 2012.” (Dkt. 1 at 3; see also Opp. at 13.) On March 26, 2012, Plaintiff included Coley’s 

retraction in his in his administrative appeal of his second disciplinary hearing. (Opp. at 10; Lee 

Decl. Exh. A.) Defendant Lieutenant Lee, who reviewed the appeal at the second level of review 

(the first level was bypassed), interviewed Plaintiff and told him he would investigate the charges. 

(Lee Decl. Exh. B.) Plaintiff states that he informed Lee about Coley’s retraction. (Opp. at 11.) 

Lee denied the appeal on April 27, 2012. (Lee Decl. Exh. B.) Plaintiff appealed the decision to 

the third level of review. Petitioner’s staff assistant was thereafter changed from France to 

Correctional Officer Valdez. (Opp. at 11.) 

On June 27, 2012, Coley indicated in writing that he no longer considered Plaintiff an 

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enemy. (Briggs Decl. Exh. D at 35.) On August 15, 2012, Plaintiff was transferred from the San 

Quentin SHU to California State Prison, Solano (“Solano”). (Cervantes Decl. ¶ 6.) On November 

16, 2012, plaintiff’s appeal was granted at the third level of review. (Dkt. No. 1.1 at 31-33.) The 

reasons for granting the appeal were that Larkins did not adequately address the reliability of 

confidential information, Larkins did not indicate whether a staff assistant (in addition to the 

investigator Alvarez) had been present during the witness interviews, Plaintiff did not have at least 

24 hours of preparation time with the staff assistant, the witnesses Mainor and Coley were not 

present at the hearing despite Plaintiff’s requests, and there was an incorrect date in the re-issued 

RVR. (Id. at 31-32.) That RVR was therefore vacated, and ordered reissued and reheard for a 

third time. (Id. at 32-33.) 

After a new RVR was issued, a third disciplinary hearing was held at Solano by Lieutenant 

Richardson (who is not a party) on January 31, 2013. (Dkt. No. 1.2 at 15-21.) At the hearing, 

Richardson found Plaintiff guilty of the lesser-included offense of fighting with another inmate, 

and no credit loss or SHU term was assessed. (Id. at 21.) Plaintiff agreed with this decision. (Id.

at 57-58.) He was ordered reprimanded and counseled, and he was not required to forfeit any 

good time credits. (Id. at 21.)

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits show that there 

is "no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Material facts are those which may affect the outcome of 

the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,248 (1986). A dispute as to a material 

fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the 

nonmoving party. Id. 

The moving party for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those 

portions of the pleadings, discovery and affidavits which demonstrate the absence of a genuine 

issue of material fact. Celotex Corp.v. Cattrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). When the moving 

party has met this burden of production, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and, 

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by its own affidavits or discovery, set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 

trial. Id. If the nonmoving party fails to produce enough evidence to show a genuine issue of 

material fact, the moving party wins. Id.

At summary judgment, the judge must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party: if evidence produced by the moving party conflicts with evidence produced by 

the nonmoving party, the judge must assume the truth of the evidence set forth by the nonmoving 

party with respect to that fact. Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1865 (2014).

B. Analysis

Plaintiff claims that Defendants’ investigation of his fight with Coley was ineffective and 

unprofessional, which caused him to undergo disciplinary proceedings for an offense (battery with 

a deadly weapon (lock)) greater than the offense he actually committed (fighting). (Dkt. 1 at 3, 

Opp. at 4-6.) Plaintiff asserts that as a result of Defendants’ errors, he suffered high blood 

pressure, spent ten months in the SHU, lost his prison job, and was eventually transferred to 

another prison and placed into higher security environment. (Dkt. 1 at 3; Opp. at 2-4.) He seeks

monetary damages, including “back pay” from March 2012 (when Coley stated that Plaintiff did 

not hit him with a lock). (Dkt. 1 at 3-4.) He also seeks an injunction to transfer him back to the 

general population at San Quentin from his current institution, CSP Solano. (Id. at 4.)

An essential element of a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is that the defendant violated a 

right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 

(1988). Plaintiff does not identify what federal law or constitutional right Defendants violated. 

In limited circumstances, the federal constitutional right to due process affords prisoners certain 

minimum procedural protections when facing prison disciplinary measures. Wolff v. McDonnell, 

418 U.S. 539, 556-57, 571-72 n. 19 (1974). To trigger such due process protections, however, the 

deprivation imposed by prison officials must (1) impose “atypical and significant hardship on the 

inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life” or (2) state action that “will inevitably 

affect the duration of [a] sentence.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472,484, 487 (1995).

The evidence in the record does not support a finding that Plaintiff suffered hardships that 

are “atypical and significant” compared to the ordinary deprivations of prison life. In determining 

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whether a restraint is an “atypical and significant hardship” under Sandin, courts “look to three 

guideposts by which to frame the inquiry: (1) whether the challenged condition ‘mirrored those 

conditions imposed upon inmates in administrative segregation and protective custody,’ and thus 

comported with the prison’s discretionary authority; (2) the duration of the condition, and the 

degree of restraint imposed; and (3) whether the state's action will invariably affect the duration of 

the prisoner's sentence.” Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1078 (9th Cir. 2003); Ramirez v. 

Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 861 (9th Cir. 2003). “These factors need not all be present for there to be an 

atypical and significant hardship.” Palmer v. Salazar, 2010 WL 5138575 *3 (N.D. Cal. June 19, 

1995).

Plaintiff was placed in administrative segregation while the disciplinary charges were 

pending. “Typically, administrative segregation in and of itself does not implicate a protected 

liberty interest.” Serrano, 345 F.3d at 1078. Plaintiff does not present any evidence about the 

conditions of such segregation. As a result, although it lasted a considerable amount of time, there 

is no evidence that the conditions exceeded those ordinarily imposed upon inmates in

administrative segregation or protective custody. 

The other deprivations Plaintiff cites, namely losing work and educational privileges and 

being transferred to a higher security environment at another prison, are no different from the 

ordinary hardships of prison life. See Ward v. Carr, 467 Fed.Appx. 721 *1 (9th Cir. Feb. 3, 2012) 

(holding that due process claim failed because the plaintiff did not show that transfer to a different 

correctional facility posed an atypical or significant hardship); cf. Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 

1254-55 (9th Cir. 1982) (no constitutional right to job in prison); Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 

530 (9th Cir. 1985) (prisoner has no right to vocational courses, and his liberty interests are 

sufficiently extinguished that state may transfer him to any of its institutions without offending

Constitution). 

Finally, the deprivations Plaintiff suffered will not inevitably affect the duration of his 

confinement because the time credits he initially forfeited were restored to him after the third 

hearing. As a result, there is no evidence from which a trier of fact could reasonably conclude that 

the conditions Plaintiff faced as a result of the disciplinary proceedings, including his time in 

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segregation, were “atypical and significant” compared to the ordinary hardships of prison life. 

Absent such a deprivation, Defendants’ actions do not implicate his constitutional right to due 

process. 

Moreover, even if his right to due process were implicated, the shortcomings in 

Defendants’ investigation of the fight would not violate due process. A “professional” 

investigation of disciplinary charges is not one of the procedural rights guaranteed by due process. 

Wolff established five procedural protections required by the federal constitutional guarantee of 

due process for inmates facing disciplinary proceedings: (1) adequate written notice of the 

charges, (2) receipt of written the notice at least 24 hours before the hearing, (3) the ability to call 

witnesses and present documentary evidence unless doing so will be “unduly hazardous to 

institutional safety or correctional goals,” (4) the factfinder must make a written statement of the 

evidence relied upon and the reasons behind the disciplinary action, and (5) assistance from a 

fellow inmate or staff member if the inmate is illiterate or the issues are complex. Wolff, 418 U.S.

at 566-70. Due process also requires that prison disciplinary findings be supported by some 

evidence with some indicia of reliability. See Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985)

(some evidence requirement); Cato v. Rushen, 824 F.2d 703, 704-05 (9th Cir. 1987) (reliability 

requirement). 

Plaintiff’s complaints about Defendants’ investigation, including the failure by a number 

of Defendants to respond more quickly when Plaintiff informed them of Coley’s retraction after 

the second hearing, Officer France’s replacement by Officer Valdez following Coley’s retraction, 

and Alvarez’s failure to discover that witnesses were on lockdown when they claimed not to have 

been in their cells at the time of the altercation, are not violations of due process. Plaintiff 

ultimately received a fair hearing and was disciplined only for the offense that he admits 

committing -- fighting with another inmate. Plaintiff asserts that if Defendants had conducted a 

better investigation he would not have had to endure segregation or a transfer to another prison, 

but this assertion is not supported by any evidence that he would not have been segregated 

pending investigation into a fighting charge or transferred based on his being found guilty of 

fighting. More importantly, even if such evidence existed, there is no authority that such alleged 

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shortcomings in disciplinary investigations by prison officials violate an inmate’s federal 

constitutional right to due process. Absent such authority, Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants’ were 

“unprofessional” in investigating the fight does not amount to a due process violation.

The Court notes that the disciplinary records do evince one instance when Plaintiff was not 

given a procedural protection that due process guarantees: at his second disciplinary hearing he 

requested two witnesses, Coley and Mainor, but they did not appear.

5

 (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 31-32; 

Opp. at 9.) As discussed above, because Plaintiff has not proven that a constitutionally protected 

liberty interest was at issue this omission is immaterial. And, in any event, a violation of 

procedural due process rights requires only procedural correction, that is, a new hearing, and not a 

reinstatement of the substantive right. Raditch v. United States, 929 F.2d 478, 481 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Here, prison officials provided procedural correction by vacating the disciplinary findings and 

giving Plaintiff a new disciplinary hearing. This was the only relief to which he was entitled. 

While compensatory damages can be obtained if it is determined at the new hearing that the 

deprivations were not justified, see id. at 481 n.5, here Plaintiff was found guilty at the new 

hearing and it was not determined that the deprivations for which he seeks damages--segregation, 

loss of a prison job, and transfer to another prison--were unjustified. The only deprivation that 

was not found justified was the forfeiture of time credits, but prison officials vacated that 

forfeiture and those time credits were restored to Plaintiff. 

//

//

 

5

Plaintiff’s assertion that Arnold did not consider documents Plaintiff submitted at the first 

hearing does not set forth a second due process violation because Plaintiff does not describe what 

was in the documents or how they differed from the numerous reports and other documents that 

Arnold did consider at the hearing. (See Opp. at 7-8; Arnold Decl. Exh. A at 4.) 

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CONCLUSION

The evidence in the record does not create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 

Defendants’ actions violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights or other provision of federal law. 

Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims.6 Defendants’ 

motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 28) is GRANTED. The Clerk shall enter judgment and 

close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 15, 2015

________________________

JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY

United States Magistrate Judge

 

6 As a result, the Court need not address Defendants’ alternative argument for summary judgment 

on exhaustion grounds. 

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