Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_03-cv-00909/USCOURTS-almd-2_03-cv-00909-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

LINDA PETTWAY, )

)

Plaintiff, )

v. ) 2:03-CV-00909-B

) WO

ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF )

PUBLIC HEALTH, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ON MOTION

Linda Pettway (“Pettway”), an African-American currently employed by the Alabama

Department of Public Health (“the Department”), seeks damages for job discrimination claims

grounded on race, disability, and retaliation. Sued along with the Department are four supervisory

employees, in individual and official capacities: Lisa Pezent (“Pezent”), Complaint Unit Supervisor

of the Division of Health Care Facilities in the Bureau of Health Provider Standards (“the Bureau”);

Elva Goldman (“Goldman”), Licensure and Certification State Program Director; Bill Godwin

(“Godwin”), Deputy Director of the Bureau; and Rick Harris (“Harris”), Director of the Bureau.

After considered scrutiny of the pleadings, evidence, briefs, and relevant law, the court

concludes, as herein explained, that only Pettway’s disparate discipline claim of race discrimination

againstthe Department survivesDefendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment(Doc. 39,July 7, 2004).

I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,

and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to

any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.

Case 2:03-cv-00909-DRB Document 82 Filed 07/15/05 Page 1 of 38
2

P. 56(c). The party seeking summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility of informing

the district court of the basis for its motion, identifying those portions of “the pleadings and

evidentiary record” which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986); see also Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d

1112, 1116 (11th Cir. 1993) (discussing burden-shifting under Rule 56).

In response to a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the “adverse party may

not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party’s pleading, but the adverse party’s

response, by affidavits, or as otherwise provided .... must set forth specific facts showing that there

is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). As the Supreme Court instructed in Celotex, 477

U. S. at 323, “the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment . . . .

against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element

essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”

The court’s role is neither to weigh the evidence nor to find the facts; instead, it is “the

threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the need for a trial – whether, in other words, there

are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they

may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

250 (1986). Substantive law identifies those facts which are material. Id. at 258. The court is

bound to accept the evidence of the non-moving party as true, resolve all doubts against the moving

party, construe all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and draw all

reasonable inferences in the non-moving party’s favor. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Anderson, 477 U. S. at 255. If more than one reasonable

Case 2:03-cv-00909-DRB Document 82 Filed 07/15/05 Page 2 of 38
1These background facts are grounded on the evidentiary record viewed most favorably to

the non-movant plaintiff, who submitted a “statement of undisputed facts taken directly from

Defendants’ Brief” with minor modifications as well as “pertinentfacts not addressedinDefendant’s

Statement of Facts.” (See Pl.’s Response to Def.’s Motion for Summary Judgment, hereinafter Pl.’s

Br. at 1, 10-14). 

3

inference can be drawn, and that inference creates a genuine issue of material fact, summary

judgment is not warranted because the trier of fact is entitled to decide which inference to believe.

See Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 550-55 (1999); Patterson & Wilder Const. Co., Inc. v. U.S.,

226 F.3d 1269, 1273 (11th Cir. 2000). 

II. Undisputed Facts 1

In March 2000, Pettway started work in the Bureau in the classification now known as

Licensure & Certification Surveyor (“L&C Surveyor”). Following assignments in several units

within the Bureau’s Division of Health Care Facilities (“the Division”), in July 2001 she settled in

the Complaint Unit to conduct investigative surveys of nursing home facilities initially in response

to complaints and thereafter to assess the facility’s correction of identified problems. Defendant

Pezent, Division Director, acted as Pettway’s immediate supervisor, while Defendant Goldman

served as immediate supervisor for Pezent.

While assigned to the Complaint Unit, Pettway suffered a series of personally traumatic

events within a period of nine months: her father’s unexpected death, her daughter’s military

deployment to Afghanistan, her own gynecological surgery for cancer on January 15, 2002, and

her sister’s suicide five days later. Approved sick leave extended her post-surgery return from the

scheduled date of February 27, 2002, and she received another extension until March 13, 2002,

following complications during her surgery and subsequent hospitalization for emotional problems.

Case 2:03-cv-00909-DRB Document 82 Filed 07/15/05 Page 3 of 38
2For her extended leave between January and July 15, 2002, Pettway used a combination

of compensatory leave, holiday leave, annual leave, leave without pay, accumulated sick leave,

advanced sick leave, and donated sick leave from both co-employees and Defendants Pezent and

Harris.

3Pettway met with supervisors in June or July about her desire and need to return to work

in a less stressful job not requiring overnight travel. She acknowledged her doctor’s contrary

recommendation due to her mental state and medication side effects which included drowsiness,

disorientation, memory lapse, and confusion. The parties dispute whether the Department

wrongfully failed to accommodate her requests, and the court discusses the disputed facts in the

context of the disability claim premised on these requested accommodations. 

4

From March 13 until March 29, 2002, Pettway worked half-days intermittently on desk

reviews. After she “passed out” in an anxiety attack at her desk on March 29, she was hospitalized

before being re-admitted to a mental health facility. She received additional medical leave requested

until May 10, but pursuant to her treating physician’s recommendation, remained on medical leave

until July 15,2 although she desired to return sooner.3 

On August 7, 2002, Pettway received an assignment to conduct a follow-up survey at

Montgomery’s Capital Hill Healthcare Center (“CHHC”) because a prior survey by another L& C

Surveyor resulted in deficiency findings which included a “jeopardy level” indicative of a serious

threat. A day’s end telephone inquiry by Defendant Pezent to this nursing home disclosed that

Pettway had placed the facility “back in compliance” after arriving at 8:30 a.m. and leaving between

11:00 a.m. and noon. Pettway’s survey packet submitted two days later indicated, however, a

workday of 9.25 hours at CHHC , and it raised other discrepancies which prompted an investigatory

conference on August 16 involving Pettway, Pezent, and Deputy Director Godwin.

Further investigation of the CHHC survey resulted in an October 18, 2002, notice to

Pettway specifying proposed disciplinary action for her alleged falsification of record, solicitation

Case 2:03-cv-00909-DRB Document 82 Filed 07/15/05 Page 4 of 38
4The Eleventh Circuit follows the rule inJett v. Dallas Independent School District, 491 U.S.

701, 733 (1989) that “the express cause of action for damages created by Section 1983 constitutes

(continued...)

5

of false information from nursing home staff, unprofessional conduct, and failure to perform her job

as a L&C Surveyor. Pettway waived her right as a merit system employee to challenge these

charges in a scheduled due process hearing and instead accepted the recommended discipline: 

suspension without pay from October 28, 2002 through November 1, 2002, and effective with her

November 4, 2002 return to work, a demotion and transfer – without any corresponding decrease

in salary – to Staff Nurse in the Worksite Wellness Division.

Pettway originated this action on August 29, 2003, and filed an Amended Complaint on

February 10, 2004, to correct clerical errors and factual omissions.(Mot. to Amend, Doc. 17, Jan. 26,

2004). Asserted discrimination claims are grounded jurisdictionally on the Equal Protection Clause

of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; 42 U.S.C. §1983 (“Section 1983");

42 U.S.C. §1981 (“Section 1981"); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42

U.S.C. §2000e et. seq. (“Title VII”); the American with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §12101

et. seq (“ADA”); and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 794 et seq. (“Rehab Act”).

Jurisdiction and venue are not contested. 

III. DISCUSSION

A. INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS

All the individual defendants, indisputably state actors, are entitled to summary judgment

on all claims against them in individual and official capacities. Pettway does not dispute that

Section 1981 is an inappropriate jurisdictional vehicle for asserted claims.4 Nor does she challenge

Case 2:03-cv-00909-DRB Document 82 Filed 07/15/05 Page 5 of 38
4

(...continued)

the exclusive federal remedy for violation of the rights guaranteed in Section 1981 by state

governmental units.” See Butts v. County of Volusia, 222 F.3d 891, 893-894 (11th Cir. 2000)

(concluding that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 did not amend Section 1981 to create a cause of action

against state actors and “§ 1983 contains the sole cause of action against state actors for violations

of § 1981. . . .; § 1981(c) makes clear that the section creates a right that private or state actors may

violate but does not itself create a remedy for that violation."); Godby v. Montgomery County Board

of Education, 996 F.Supp. 1390, 1411 (M.D. Ala. 1998). 

5

See Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F. 2d 764, 772 (11th Cir. 1991)(“The relief granted under

Title VII is against the employer, not the individual employees whose action would constitute a

violation of the Act.”). 

6The ADA provides only for liability of the employer and not individual employees. Mason

v. Stallings, 82 F. 3d 1007, 1009 (11th Cir. 1996)(reasoning that since the definition of “employer”

under the ADA is like the definition of “employer” under Title VII and the ADEA, then no such

liability should exist under the ADA). Likewise, the Rehab Act does not provide relief against

individual defendants. Pritchard v. Southern Co. Servs., 102 F. 3d 1118, 1119 (11th Cir. 1996). 

7Neither a state nor a state official acting in his or her official capacity is a “person” for the

purposes of a Section 1983 action. Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989).

"Official-capacity suits ... 'generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an

entity of which an officer is an agent.' " Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985), quoting

Monell v. New York City Dep't. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n. 55 (1978). 

6

the impropriety of designating these individuals as defendants on her Title VII race discrimination

claim5 and the disability and retaliation claims which are premised on the ADA and the Rehab Act.

6

In their official capacities, the individual defendants share with the Department immunity

from Section 1983 liability.7 For individual liability against these defendants under Section 1983,

Pettway contends that, “acting under color of law, [they] deprived [her] of rights, privileges and

immunities secured by the U.S. Constitution, which includes but is not limited to violations of the

Equal Protection Clause, when [they] intentionally discriminated against [her] on the basis of race

Case 2:03-cv-00909-DRB Document 82 Filed 07/15/05 Page 6 of 38
8Am. Compl. ¶ 34. In Count One at ¶¶ 31-33, Pettway appears to state a Section 1983 cause

of action against the individual defendants for “intentional race discrimination” grounded on the

identical claims asserted for Title VII liability against the Department. As these Title VII claims

are barred against the individual defendants, the court confines this Section 1983 analysis to the

asserted constitutional violation of equal protection.

7

regarding accommodations, promotions, and discipline.”8 

A claim cognizable under the Equal Protection Clause requires the plaintiff to allege her

similarly situated status with others treated differently based on race or another constitutionally

protected status. Jones v. Ray, 279 F.3d 944, 947 (11th Cir. 2001). Discriminatory intent or purpose

must be proven to establish an Equal Protection claim:

Discriminatory purpose . . . implies more than intent as volition or intent as

awareness of consequences. It implies that the decision maker . . . selected . . . a

particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its

adverse effects upon an identifiable group.

Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (footnote and citation

omitted);see also Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,

265-266 (1979). 

Pettway’s equal protection claim against the individual defendantsrests on the same material

facts specified for her Title VII claims. As discussed infra, she fails even to state an adverse

employment action on two of her racial discrimination claims and affirmatively declines to attribute

any racial animus to another claim; thus, on these claims, she cannot establish any constitutional

right violated. With respect to the final claim of disparate discipline, Pettway does not document

any act or omission by the individual defendants from which the requisite intent can be inferred.

Consequently, absent either direct evidence of discrimination or disputed issues of material fact on

circumstantial evidence, the individual defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the Section

Case 2:03-cv-00909-DRB Document 82 Filed 07/15/05 Page 7 of 38
9This summary judgment in favor of the individual defendants makes unnecessary any

analysis of their qualified immunity defenseon individual-capacityclaims arising from performance

of discretionary functions. “[G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions generally

are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.800,818 (1982); Lassiter v. Alabama A & M Univ., 28 F.3d 1146,

1149 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc). See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S.603, 609 (1999) ([C]ourt "must first

determine whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right at all, and

if so, proceed to determine whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged

violation."); see also Killian v. Holt, 166 F.3d 1156 (11th Cir.1999) (affirming entry of summary

judgment without qualified immunity analysis because plaintiff "failed to bring forth evidence from

which reasonable jurors could find that defendant prison officials knew of and were deliberately

indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm").

10The analysis is identical for claims based on the same facts but asserted under both Title

VII and Section 1983. See Butts v. County of Volusia, 222 F.3d 891, 893-94 (11th Cir. 2000); Abel

v. Dubberly, 210 F.3d 1334, 1338 (11th Cir. 2000); Richardson v. Leeds Police Dep’t, 71 F.3d 801,

805 (11th Cir. 1995)

8

1983 claim premised on the Fourteenth Amendment.9

B. TITLE VII RACE DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS10

1. Overview of Claims

Pettway asserts racially disparate treatment claims that the Department “failed to make

accommodations for [her] that were made for similarly situated white employees (¶ 31), . . .hired

a less qualified white applicant for the position of Assistant MDS coordinator (¶ 32), . . .[and]

suspended and demoted her.” (¶ 33). The Department moves for summary judgment because

Pettway “cannot establish a prima facie case of race discrimination” and, alternatively, because “all

actions taken with respect to [her] employment were taken for legitimate business reasons not shown

by Pettway to be a pretext for unlawful discrimination.” 

In response to Pettway’s accommodations and hiring claims, the Department denies that she

“suffered an adverse employment action or that a suitable comparator was treated more favorably”;

the Department responds similarly to the allegation that “Lisa Pezent and Elva Godwin, Plaintiff’s

Case 2:03-cv-00909-DRB Document 82 Filed 07/15/05 Page 8 of 38
11Defendants’ Memorandum In Support Of Defendants’ Motion For Summary Judgment at

2-3, n. 2 (“Defs.’ Br.”); Am. Compl. ¶¶ 19, 31-33.

9

superiors, stopped employees from donating Plaintiff their unused sick time.” (¶ 19). Concerning

Pettway’s suspension and demotion, the Department maintains that she “has failed to demonstrate

that a suitable comparator was treated more favorably or that she suffered from a differential

application of workplace disciplinary rules.”11 Discussion on each of these four claims follows a

general outline of the applicable analytical framework.

2. Analytical framework: disparate treatment claims 

Title VII makes it an “unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire

or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to

his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race,

color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a). On a claim of disparate or

discriminatory treatment, as alleged by Pettway, the employee may offer direct or circumstantial

evidence, and the latter is evaluated pursuant to the familiar burden-shifting analysis framed by the

United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) and Texas

Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), and summarized cogently by United

States District Judge Myron H. Thompson in a “well-reasoned memorandum opinion” so

characterized when affirmed on appeal:

[A]n employee has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of unlawful

discrimination by a preponderance of evidence. A “prima facie case requires

‘evidence adequate to create an inference that an employment decision was based on

an illegal discriminatory criterion.’” ... If the employee establishes a prima facie

case, the burden then shifts to the employer to rebut the presumption by producing

sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether the employer

discriminated against the employee. This may be done by the employer articulating

a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the employment decision, which is clear,

Case 2:03-cv-00909-DRB Document 82 Filed 07/15/05 Page 9 of 38
12Direct evidence of discrimination is evidence that “if believed, proves [the] existence of

[a] fact in issue without inference or presumption.. . . [i]f an alleged statement at best merely

suggests a discriminatory motive, then it is by definition only circumstantial evidence.” Burrell v.

Board of Trustees of Ga. Military College, 125 F.3d 1390, 1393 (11th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted).

As an Eleventh Circuit panel noted in Schoenfield v. Babbitt, 168 F.3d 1257, 1267 (11th Cir. 1999):

“As our precedent illustrates, direct evidence is composed of “only the most blatant remarks, whose

intent could be nothing other than to discriminate” on the basis of some impermissible factor.”

(citations omitted). 

10

reasonably specific, and worthy of credence. The employer has a burden of

production, not of persuasion, and thus does not have to persuade a court that it was

actually motivated by the reason advanced...Once the employer satisfies this burden

of production, the employee then has the burden of persuading the court that the

proffered reason for the employment decision is a pretext for discrimination. The

employee may satisfy this burden either directly, by persuading the court that a

discriminatory reason more than likely motivated the employer, or indirectly, by

persuading the court that the proffered reason for the employment decision is not

worthy of belief. By so persuading the court, the employee satisfies his ultimate

burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that he has been the

victim of unlawful discrimination.

Hall v. Ala. Assn. of School Bds., 326 F.3d 1157, 1166 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted)

Because Pettway does not rely on direct evidence,12 her prima facie case must establish that

(1) she belongs to a racial minority; (2) she was subjected to adverse job action; (3) her employer

treated similarly situated employees outside her racial classification more favorably; and (4) she

was qualified for the job. Pettway’s task “ is not onerous; it requires only that [she] establish facts

adequate to permit an inference of discrimination.” Holifield v. Reno, 114 F.3d 1555, 1561-1562

(11th Cir. 1997). The ultimate issue in a race discrimination claim is whether the defendant

intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff. See St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S.

502, 511 (1993); United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715

(1983). The McDonnell Douglas analysis provides an invaluable method of “progressively ...

sharpen[ing] the inquiry into the elusive factual question of intentional discrimination.” Hall, 326

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13Am.Compl. ¶¶ 20-22, 31; see Pl.’s Br. at 27-28; Defs.’Ex.A, Pettway Dep. at 210-213. 

Pettway maintains that (a) both her requested accommodation and an allegedly similar request by

a white employee, Melody Tompkins, “stemmed from emotional issues deriving from personal

situations”; and (b) the Department granted in 1999 an ADA accommodation restricting travel for

another similarly situated white employee. Pl.’s Br. at 27-29, Pl’s Ex. G. 

11

F.3d at 1167 (Mem. Op., Thompson, J.), quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255, n.8.

3. “Failure to Accommodate” Title VII Claim

Pettway cites the following facts as support for her Title VII claim that the Department

“committed intentional race discrimination . . . when it failed to make accommodations for [her] that

were made for similarly situated white employees:

Plaintiff’s Doctor advised Defendant to accommodate Plaintiff’s disability. Specifically,

Plaintiff’s Doctor advised that Plaintiff’s duties not involve overnight travel and that she be

assigned only those work activities that produced relatively low levels of stress. Pursuant

to Doctor’s advice, Plaintiff requested a temporary transfer to a less stressful position that

did not require overnight travel. Mrs. Goldman and Mrs. Pezent refused to make any

accommodations for Plaintiff. However, they made similar accommodations for similarly

situated white employees. Plaintiff alleges that she was denied accommodations because of

her race.13

Careful scrutiny of the relevant admissible evidence yields compelling support for the

Department’s contention that its challenged failure to remove “overnight travel” from Pettway’s

job duties does not constitute an “adverse employment action.” Notwithstanding her burden to

establish this element for her prima facie case, Pettway fails altogether to address this contention

 Neither her deposition testimony nor any other evidentiary exhibit demonstrates how the asserted

failure to accommodate effected a modification in duties or other conditions of her employment

sufficiently to be deemed an adverse job action.

Whether an employee has suffered an adverse employment action is generally a question for

Case 2:03-cv-00909-DRB Document 82 Filed 07/15/05 Page 11 of 38
14The district court in Crumpton v. St. Vincent’s Hospital, 963 F. Supp. 1104, 1115 n.8 (N.D.

Ala. 1997) expressed doubt about the viability of a disparate treatment claim based on

accommodations for a disability. In Phillip v. Ford Motor Corp., 328 F. 3d 1020 (8th Cir. 2003), the

only published circuit opinion, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment on a race

discrimination claim for failure to accommodate because the plaintiff was not “disabled” under the

ADA so as to trigger the employer’s duty to accommodate. Without resolving whether the plaintiff

must be “disabled” as defined by the ADA, the district court for the District of Columbia Circuit

has acknowledged Title VII claims based on failures to accommodate a disability. See Richard v.

Bell Atlantic Corp., 209 F. Supp. 2d 23 (D.D.C. 2002) and Dorchy v. Washington Metro. Area

Transit Authority, 45 F. Supp. 2d 5 (D.D.C. 1999).

12

case-by-case consideration. Gupta v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 212 F. 3d 571, 586 (11th Cir. 2000).

Unmistakably clear from Davis v. Town Lake Park, Fla., 245 F. 3d 1232, 1238-1239 (11th Cir. 2001)

is the Eleventh Circuit’s view that “not all conduct by an employer negatively affecting an

employee constitutes adverse employment action:

. . . to support a claim under Title VII’s anti-discrimination clause the employer’s action

must impact the ‘terms, conditions, or privileges’ of the plaintiff’s job in a real and

demonstrable way. Although the statute does not require proof of direct economic

consequences in all cases, the asserted impact cannot be speculative and must at least have

a tangible adverse effect on the plaintiff’s employment. We therefore hold that, to prove

adverse employment action in a case under Title VII’s anti-discrimination clause, an

employee must show a serious and material change in the terms, conditions, or privileges

of employment. Moreover, the employee’s subjective view of the significance and adversity

of the employer’s action is not controlling; the employment action must be materially

adverse as viewed by a reasonable person in the circumstances.” 

See also Smith v. Alabama Dept. of Public Safety, 64 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1221(M.D. Ala. 1999).

The court finds no reported Eleventh Circuit holding that a failure to accommodate a

disability constitutes an adverse employment action.14 Logic sanctions the availability of Title VII

to a protected plaintiff who demonstrates that an employer reasonably accommodated disabilities

shown by employees not within a protected class but failed - motivated by a racially discriminatory

intent – to make similar reasonable accommodations for the similarly situated plaintiff’s disability.

Case 2:03-cv-00909-DRB Document 82 Filed 07/15/05 Page 12 of 38
15 Pettway Dep. at 165-166 and Ex. 21.

13

Pettway makes no such showing on this record; indeed, as explained infra, she cannot establish her

own statutory disability for any evaluation of comparators. Nor does she assert the Department’s

racially discriminatory accommodation ofrequestsby non-disabled employees outside the protected

class while refusing to accord her the same “privileges” of employment by granting her similar

requests for accommodation. 

 Pettway proffers no evidence that the Department’s refusal to grant her requested

accommodations for returning to work resulted in her loss of pay, benefits, or other economic

injury; instead, it is undisputed that once released for a return to work without restrictions, Pettway

resumed her former position as an L&C Surveyor and sometime in February 2003, applied

successfully for a nurse coordinator’s position.15 Without evidence to support a finding that a

reasonable person would view the Department’s specified failure to accommodate as effecting a

serious and material change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of her employment, Pettway

cannot carry her burden to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Summary judgment for

the Department is thus appropriate. See Turlington v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 135 F. 3d 1428, 1432

(11th Cir. 1998)(“Although a plaintiff’s burden in proving a prima facie case is light, summary

judgment against the plaintiff is appropriate if he fails to satisfy any one of the elements of a prima

facie case.”)(citations omitted).

Even if Pettway’s showing established an actionable adverse employment action, her Title

VII failure to accommodate claim would still fail on her inability to demonstrate the Department’s

disparate preferential treatment of similarly situated white employees. Proffered evidence does not

Case 2:03-cv-00909-DRB Document 82 Filed 07/15/05 Page 13 of 38
16Petttway testified that she was “not sure Melody’s was medical.” Pettway Dep. at 48. 

Tompkins herself declares that she never suffered from a medical condition that resulted in an

inability to travel overnight or that she requested an accommodation, including an ADA

accommodation. Tompkins Aff. ¶¶ 7-8.

17There is no evidence that this unnamed employee had the same “no overnight travel”

restrictions as Pettway. According to Ex.G, the employee was “unable to drive” but “able to

perform the essential functions” of her job, and the Department provided an accommodation by

modifying work assignments temporarily. The fact that an employer has offered a certain

accommodation to one employee does not mean, however, that the same accommodation must be

extended to a plaintiff as a matter of law. Crumpton v. St. Vincent’s Hospital, 963 F. Supp. 1104,

1115 (N.D. Ala. 1997) (citations omitted).

18Pettway requested placement at the intake desk, a transfer to the Assistant MDS position,

or an assignment to perform desk audits. By June or July of 2002, when Pettway sought a return to

work with such accommodation, the Department no longer needed to man the intake desk since the

designated employee had returned to work, and it had no vacant desk audit jobs (see Def.’s Ex. B,

Pezent Aff. ¶¶12, 13 and14). The Department filled the Assistant MDS vacancy through the opencompetitive process, as discussed infra in the context of Pettway’s separate Title VII claim arising

therefrom. Moreover, as the principal non-discriminatory, legitimate reason for not making the

accommodation requested, the Department established overnight travel as an essential function of

Pettway’s job. See Def.’s Ex. C, Godwin Aff. and Ex. 1 attachment.

14

establish the only comparator identified, Melody Tompkins, as a similarly situated employee.16

Although no race is supplied for an unnamed employee referenced as a comparator in Plaintiff’sEx.

G, it is not disputed that the employee is outside of Pettway’s race; nonetheless, Pettway similarly

fails to document a similarly situated status.17 Moreover, even if the court deemed Pettway’s

“adverse action” and “similarly situated showing” sufficient for a prima facie case of racial

discrimination, this record establishes her inability to rebut the Department’s non-discriminatory

reason for failing to make the accommodation requested.18

4. Claim from Hiring of Assistant MDS Coordinator

Case 2:03-cv-00909-DRB Document 82 Filed 07/15/05 Page 14 of 38
19Defs.’ Br. at 36, citing Davis v. Town Lake Park, 245 F.3d 1232, 1239 (11th Cir. 2001).

20See Am. Compl. ¶ 34; Pettway Dep. at 65-70; Pl.’s Br. at 25, 29.

21Defs.’ Br. at 38-39.

15

In response to Pettway’s claim that the Department hired a less qualified white applicant for

the position of Assistant MDS Coordinator, the Department denies that its action constituted an

employment action adverse to Pettway “because the position at issue was a purely lateral transfer that

did not effect a serious and material change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.”19

Notwithstanding the complaint’s reference to the position as a promotion, Pettway admits in

deposition testimony, as does her counsel in brief, that it did represent only a transfer for her.

20

 To prove this disparate treatment claim, Pettway must show that (1) she is a member of a

protected class; (2)she was qualified for the position; ( 3) she suffered an adverse employment action;

and ( 4) someone outside of the protected class was hired into the position. Hinson v. Clinch Co., Ga.

Bd. of Educ., 231 F. 3d 821, 828 (11th Cir. 2000). Conceding that Pettway satisfies the first, second,

and fourth requirements, the Department argues its entitlement to summary judgment for lack of

proof that Pettway suffered any adverse employment action resulting from the transfer:

The Plaintiff admits that the Assistant position would not have been a promotion for the

Plaintiff, but a transfer, with no increase in pay or change in job title or classification.

(Exhibit A - Deposition of Plaintiff, page 65, line 15, to page 66, line 1.). . . [T]he Plaintiff

cannot provide any evidence that shows any “serious and material” differences in the position

of L&C Surveyor assigned to work in the Complaint Unit and an L & C Surveyor assigned

to work as the Assistant in the Health Care Assessment Unit. See Smith, 145 F.Supp.2d at

1299. The coordinator retains the same classification of L&C Surveyor (Exhibit J - Affidavit

of Tompkins, pages 1-2, paragraph 3). A salary increase would not occur by transferring to

the coordinator position. (Exhibit A - Deposition of Plaintiff, page 65, line 15, to page 66, line

1.) Ms. Tompkins continues to travel, including overnight travel, as a part of her job duties

as the coordinator to instruct and train health care providers in the field. (Exhibit J. page 2,

paragraph 4).21 

Case 2:03-cv-00909-DRB Document 82 Filed 07/15/05 Page 15 of 38
22Rather than viewing the transfer as an opportunity for more prestige or advancement,

Pettway acknowledged that concerns for her health fueled her interest: “No, it would not have been

a promotion. It would have actually been a position that would have helped me. The reason why

I applied for it was my accommodations that my physician said that I needed in order to get well.

. . I had not been medically released from Dr. Awtrey’s care.” (Pettway Dep. at 65-66)

23Assuming arguendo that Pettway has demonstrated an adverse employment action, further

analysis of her “pretext” rebuttal to the Department’s proffered reason for its selection decision

reveals no disputed issue of material fact which precludes summary judgment. The Department

documents the superior qualifications and first-place ranking of Melody Tompkins among the

interviewed applicants as well as Pettway’s pending investigation for workplace misconduct. See

Defs.’ Br. at 47-49; Defs.’ Ex. L, Furlow Aff. ¶¶ 7-8; Defs.’ Ex. K, Sadler Aff. ¶ 11. Pettway cites

her greater seniority and experiencein teaching, training, and supervising health professionals while

attacking as “premature and prejudicial” the consideration of misconduct charges not yet brought

and adjudicated against her. See Pl.’s Br. at 29-32; Pl.’s Exs.W at 31, T, and C at 27. After

considering all pertinent evidence, including the testimony cited as support for Pettway’s

characterization of the whole interview process as a pretext, the court does not find a genuine issue

of disputed fact for a race-based animus tainting the selection process or for a showing that Pettway

was “substantially more qualified” than Tompkins. See Lee v. GTE Florida, Inc., 226 F. 3d 1249,

1253 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that disparities in qualifications are not alone enough to demonstrate

discriminatory intent; ... disparities must be “so apparent as virtually to jump off the page and slap

you in the face.”); Hall v. Alabama Ass’n of School Bds., 326 F. 3d at 1167-68; Cofield v. Goldkist,

(continued...)

16

Because Pettway again fails to respond specifically to the Department’s legal contention, the

court has examined the evidence for any disputed issue of material fact which is relevant. The

undisputed fact that the transfer would not have increased Pettway’s pay or benefits prompts an

alternative showing that it would have heightened her job prestige or responsibility sufficiently to

trigger a serious and material change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of her employment. See

Davis, 245 F. 3d 1239; Doe v. Dekalb County Sch.Dist., 145 F.3d 1441, 1448-1449 (11th Cir. 1998);

Smith v. Ala. Dep’t of Corrections, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1297-1298 (M.D. Ala. 2001); Rowlin v.

Ala. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, No. 00-D-580-N, 2001 WL 630581 (M.D. Ala. May 22, 2001). The court

is unable to discern any material dispute underlying this necessary component of Pettway’s prima

facie case.22 Summary judgment is thus dictated for the Department.23

Case 2:03-cv-00909-DRB Document 82 Filed 07/15/05 Page 16 of 38
23(...continued)

Inc., 267 F. 3d 1264, 1268 (11th Cir. 2001); Thomas v. Troy City Bd. of Educ., 302 F. Supp. 2d

1303, 1308 (M.D. Ala. 2004). 

24See Am. Compl. ¶19 ( “Plaintiff was forced to return to work on July 15, 2002 despite her

Doctor’s recommendation. Plaintiff’s fellow employees, aware of the seriousness of Plaintiff’s

condition, donated Plaintiff sick leave. Lisa Pezent and Elva Godwin, Plaintiff’s supervisors,

stopped employees from donating Plaintiff their unused sick time.”) ; see also Pl.’s Br. at 28

(“Defendant furthered its discriminatory purpose by forcing the Plaintiff back to work. That is,

Defendant caused the recruitment of donated sick leave to cease.”).

25See Pettway Dep. at 73-74:

Q. Do you believe that the donated leave was stopped because of your race?

A. The donated leave was stopped in order to force me to come back to work

before the doctor was allowing me to come back to work–for my medical

condition to allow me to come back to work.

Q. Is it your belief you were being forced to come back to work before your

doctor released you because of your race?

A. I’m not going to really try to say what the overall behind that. I just felt like

during that time I got lots of calls from Lisa. Sometimes people put time

frames on illnesses that you really can’t put time frames on.

Q: Can you identify a person outside your race for whom the defendants did not

stop people from donating sick leave?

A. I wouldn’t have no idea of knowing that?

.

17

5. Claim relating to “sick leave” 

Pettway’s allegations regarding the Department’s termination of sick leave donated by coemployees are not specified as the basis for any kind of actionable discrimination, but her apparent

intent to claim racial discrimination is clarified 24 and discussed as a distinct Title VII claim. The

claim requires no judicial analysis, however, because Pettway could not attribute to the Department

any racial animus,25 has not shown and cannot show on this record either the actual occurrence

alleged – thereby negating any adverse employment action – or the Department’s more favorable

Case 2:03-cv-00909-DRB Document 82 Filed 07/15/05 Page 17 of 38
26See Pettway Dep. at 74.

27See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 29,33; Pettway Dep. at 167-169; Pl.’s Br. at 26.

28Defs.’ Br. at 3.

29Pl.’s. Br. at 26, ¶ 1.

18

treatment of donated sick leave to similarly situated white employees.26 Accordingly, the Department

is entitled to summary judgment on this claim due to Pettway’s inability to make a prima facie case.

6. Disparate Discipline Claim

Pettway’s claim that the Department “suspended and demoted [her]based on race” rests on her

allegation that “[w]hite surveyors guilty of various and similar employment violations were not

suspended or demoted despite the Defendant’s awareness of the misconduct.” She identifies Patty

Boyd (“Boyd”) and Wayne Cumbie (“Cumbie”) as the similarly situated comparators treated more

favorably because the Department suspended each without pay but did not demote them.27 The

Department submits that Pettway “has failed to demonstrate that a suitable comparator was treated

more favorably or that she suffered from a differential application of workplace disciplinary rules”;

alternatively, the Department maintains that Pettway cannot show that its asserted reason for her

discipline amounts to a pretext for racial discrimination.28 

After summarizing case law pertinent for the evaluation of this claim, the court analyzes “the

factual dispute [which centers] around whether or not similarly situated white employees were

disciplined more favorably than was [Pettway]”29, concluding that material issues of fact must be

resolved by the jury.

a. Controlling Legal Standards

Case 2:03-cv-00909-DRB Document 82 Filed 07/15/05 Page 18 of 38
19

 The familiar standards for circumstantial evidence in Title VII discrimination cases govern

Pettway’s claim of racially discriminatory discipline.

...[A] plaintiff must first make out a prima facie case demonstrating: (1) that he belongs

to a protected class under Title VII; (2)that he was qualified for the job; and (3) that

a similarly situated employee engaged in the same or similar misconduct but did not

receive similar discipline. See Lathem v. Dep’t of Children and Youth Servs., 172 F.3d

786, 792 (11th Cir. 1999); Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1562 (11th Cir. 1997).

Once a plaintiff makes a prima facie showing, the burden of going forward shifts to the

employer who must provide a specific legitimate non-discriminatory reason for

disciplining the employees differently. See [Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v.]

Burdine, 450 U.S. [248], [] 254-44, 101 S.Ct. 1089[(1981)]; Lathem, 172 F.3d at 793.

Finally, the ultimate burden of persuasion rests with the plaintiff who must show that

the proffered legitimate reasons for the different disciplinary actions were pretextual

thereby permitting, but not compelling, the trier of fact to conclude that the

employment action at issue was the product of illegal discrimination. See Burdine, 450

U.S. at 256, 101 S.Ct. 1089; Lathem, 172 F.3d at 793; Combs [v. Plantation Patterns,

106 F.3d 1519, [] 1529-38 [(11th Cir. 1997]

Alexander v. Fulton County, 207 F. 3d 1303, 1336 (11th Cir. 2000).

Because the court need not resolve any dispute on Pettway’s status and qualifications, the

evidentiary analysis necessarily focuses on the Department’s disciplinary treatment of any similarly

situated employees who engaged in the same or similar misconduct.. Notwithstanding the

Department’s view that “[t]he Eleventh Circuit has yet to articulate a definitive standard for analyzing

comparable employees and their misconduct” (Defs.’ Br. at 41), the court finds instructive then-Chief

District Judge Albritton’s assessment of Circuit precedent in an affirmed decision on point from this

court, 

Under Eleventh Circuit precedent, if two employees are not similarly situated, then the

different application of workplace rules does not constitute illegal discrimination.

(citing Lathem , supra, 172 F.3d at 793). In order to determine whether employees are

similarly situated for purposes of a prima facie case, a court must consider whether the

employees are involved in the same or similar conduct and are treated in different

ways. See Silvera v. Orange County Sch.Bd., 244 F.3d 1253, 1259 (11th Cir. 2001).

Moreover, the comparator’s conduct must be nearly identical to the plaintiff’s so that

courts will not second-guess an employer’s reasonable decisions. Id. *** In

Case 2:03-cv-00909-DRB Document 82 Filed 07/15/05 Page 19 of 38
30The Cooley court’s evidentiary analysis is instructive: “Here, the only comparator the

plaintiffs identified in their amended opposition to summary judgment was Oliveira, asserting that

Great Southern did not terminate Oliveira’s employment as quickly as it terminated [plaintiff]

(continued...)

20

evaluating whether employees are similarly situated within the context of a disparate

discipline claim, the most important factors to be considered are “the nature of the

offenses committed and the nature of the punishments imposed.” (quoting Silvera, 244

F. 3d at 259)

Gaddis v. Russell Corp., 242 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1140 -1141 (M.D. Ala. 2003), aff’d, No. 03-10585,

2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 27845 (11th Cir., Nov. 28, 2003).

That the Gaddis court gleaned properly the “nearly identical” misconduct standard finds some

confirmation in the Eleventh Circuit’s discussion of the issue in a recent decision, albeit unpublished,

also emanating from this court:

“To show that employees are similarly situated, the plaintiff must know that the

‘employees are similarly situated in all relevant respects.’” Knight v. Baptist Hospital

of Miami, Inc., 330 F. 3d 1313, 1316 (11th Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted). Indeed, “the

comparator must be nearly identical to the plaintiff, ‘to prevent courts from secondguessing a reasonable decision by the employer.’” Wilson [v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376

F.3d 1079, 1087 (11th Cir. 2004)] (quoting Silvera, 244 F.3d. at 1259) [FN5]

FN5 In examining claims that employees were disciplined in a

disparate manner, we have explained that “it is necessary to consider

whether the employees are involved in or accused of the same or

similar conduct and are disciplined in different ways.” See Maynard

v. Bd. of Regents of Universities of Fla. Dep’t of Educ., 342 F. 3d

1281,1289 [(11th Cir. 2003)] Different panels of this Court, however,

have determined that this conduct requires “similar” conduct, see

e.g.,Jones v. Gerwens, 874 F. 2d 1534, 1540 (11th Cir. 1989), as

opposed to “nearly identical” conduct, see, e.g., Maniccia v. Brown,

171 F. 3d 1364, 1368-69 (11th Cir. 1998). See Maynard, 342 F.3d at

1290.

Cooley v. Great Southern Wood Preserving, No. 04-15912, 2005 U.S.App. LEXIS 8932, at*20 (11th

Cir. May 18, 2005).30

Case 2:03-cv-00909-DRB Document 82 Filed 07/15/05 Page 20 of 38
30(...continued)

Hackett’s employment, based on the same misconduct. However, in determining that Oliveira was

not similarly situated, the court properly considered the undisputed evidence that Hackett’s

employment was terminated because Great Southern believed that he twice failed to report within

48 hours a speeding ticket and that he had received two speeding tickets within 12 months. Oliveira,

on the other hand, reported within 48 hours all of the speeding tickets that he received, and his

termination was based solely on his involvement in accidents. Thus, whether we apply the “similar”

or “nearly identical” analysis, Oliveira was not a proper comparator.” Id. at*21 (citation omitted).

31In the Jones v. Gerwens, 874 F.2d at 1541,n.12 opinion referenced in Cooley, supra, the

Eleventh Circuit emphasized this guidance from the Supreme Court. See also Holifield , 115 F.3d

at 1563 (“[Plaintiff] has failed to establish that the non-minority employees with whom he compares

his treatment were similarly situated in all aspects, or that their conduct was of comparable

seriousness to the conduct for which he was discharged.”); “Exact correlation [,however,] is neither

likely nor necessary, but the cases must be fair congeners. In other words, apples should be

compared to apples.” Silvera, 244 F. 3d at 1259 (quoting Dartmouth Review v. Dartmouth College,

889 F. 2d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 1989)).

21

Also informing this court’s analysis is this guidance from the Supreme Court on assessing the

comparability of misconduct by similarly situated employees:

Of course, precise equivalence in culpability between employees is not the ultimate

question: as we indicated in McDonnell Douglas, an allegation that other “employees

involved in acts against [the employer] of comparable seriousness...were nevertheless

retained...” is adequate to plead an inferential case that the employer’s reliance on his

discharged employee’s misconduct as grounds for terminating him was merely a

pretext. 

McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 427 U.S. 273, 283 n. 11 (1976) (emphasis in

original)(quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804).31

Finally, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed recently this district court’s grant of summary judgment

for a demoted employee’s failure to make a prima facie case of race discrimination by showing the

employer’s disparate disciplinary treatment to a similarly situated employee; the non-published

opinion reaffirms the “nearly identical” standard to compare alleged misconduct:

The gravamen of the parties’ dispute is whether a similarly situated white employee

Case 2:03-cv-00909-DRB Document 82 Filed 07/15/05 Page 21 of 38
32In an unpublished decision from the Northern District of Georgia, filed June 29, 2005, a

third panel (Barkett, Hull and Wilson, Circuit Judges) joined the Cooley panel (Tjoflat, Dubina and

Fay, Circuit Judges) and the Moore panel (Birch, Barkett and Kravitch, Circuit Judges) in

reaffirming the Eleventh Circuit’s view that “[i]n order to satisfy the similar offenses prong, the

comparator’s misconduct must be nearly identical to the plaintiff’s in order to prevent courts from

second-guessing employers’ reasonable decisions and confusing apples with oranges.” Johnson v,

Atlanta Independent School System, No. 04-16131, 2005 U.S.App. LEXIS 13214 *5-6 (11th Cir.

June 29, 2005) (quoting Silvera, 244 F.3d at 1259). 

22

was disciplined less severely than Moore. (footnote omitted). The district court held

that Moore failed to produce evidence of a similarly situated employee, and we agree.

We have held tht “the most important factors in the disciplinary context ... are the

nature of the offenses committed and the nature of the punishment imposed.” Silvera

[ ], 244 F.3d at 1259 [ ]. “The comparator’s misconduct must be nearly identical to the

plaintiff’s in order to prevent courts from second-guessing employers’ reasonable

decisions and confusing apples with oranges.” Id. (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted).

Moore v. Alabama Dep’t of Corrections, No. 04-12956, 2005 U.S.App. LEXIS 12079,* 7-8 (11th Cir.

June 21, 2005).32 Of particular relevance for this court’s analysis is the Moore court’s reminder of

how the Eleventh evaluates evidence of different titles and different supervisors for allegedly

comparable employees.:

The district court held that Sgt. Pierce’s and Lt. Moore’s different ranks and different

supervisors served to distinguish the two. Our prior cases compel the conclusion that

these factors are not alone dispositive of the issue. See Anderson v. WPMG-42, 253

F.3d 561, 565-66 (11th Cir. 2001) (different supervisors not dispositive); Lathem v.

Dep’t of Children and Youth Servs., 172 F.3d 786, 793 (11th Cir. 1999) (different job

titles not dispositive).

Moore, supra, *9-10.

Summary judgment is appropriate if the plaintiff fails to show the existence of a similarly

situated employee, and no other evidence of discrimination is present. Holifield, 115 F.3d at 1562.

b. Evidentiary Analysis - Disparate Discipline 

Case 2:03-cv-00909-DRB Document 82 Filed 07/15/05 Page 22 of 38
33See Pettway Dep, Defs.’Ex. 14 (Sept. 24, 2002 memorandum to Pettway from Defendant

Pezent, providing chronology of relevant events between August 7 and 20, 2002, with notice of a

recommended five-day suspension as discipline ); Defs.’ Ex. 17 (October 18, 2002 letter from State

Health Officer Donald Williamson to Pettway, providing notice of and the basis for recommended

disciplinary action, notice of Pettway’s right as a merit system employee to a due process hearing,

the scheduled date, time, and place for the hearing, as well as Pettway’s option to “waive [her] right

to such a hearing [and] accept the [discipline proposed].” Pettway Dep. at 148-149;

34Defs.’Ex. 19, Pettway Dep.

23

Undisputed are the alleged charges and the resulting discipline accepted by Pettway in lieu

of a due process hearing. She was “suspended without pay for a period of five working days,

transferred, and demoted to a Staff Nurse with the Worksite Wellness Division in the Bureau of Health

Promotion and Information” for misconduct described as “falsification of records, solicitation of false

information from nursing home staff, unprofessional conduct, and [ ] failure to perform [her] job

properly as a Licensure and Certification Surveyor.”33 Pettway does not provide evidence either that

she did not commit the infractions charged or that she did not acquiesce in the recommended

punishment. Instead, she rests her disparate discipline claim solely on a contention that “... [two]

white employees [L & C Surveyors Patty Boyd and Wayne Cumbie] were [not] demoted for their

conduct which was under the circumstance more egregious than that alleged against [Pettway].” (Pl.’s

Br. at 9).

Thus, the court now examines the evidence to determine if Boyd and Cumbie are proper

comparators and, if so, whether they received more favorable treatment than Pettway for “nearly

identical” misconduct. Pettway served her five-day suspension between October 28 and November

1, 2002, and returned to work in her demoted status on November 4.34 Undisputed evidence discloses

that Boyd served a five-day suspension without pay (06/02/03 - 06/06/03) for (1) falsification of

records, (2) false information to supervisors, (3) hindering an investigation, (4)excessive mileage to

Case 2:03-cv-00909-DRB Document 82 Filed 07/15/05 Page 23 of 38
35Defs.’ Ex. C, Godwin Aff. ¶19. Defendant Godwin represents that he “participated in the

investigation of and the decision to discipline both individuals.” Aff. ¶18.

36Defs. Br. at 43.

37The Department’s additional contention that Boyd and Cumbie “are not similarly situated

to [Pettway} because different supervisors were involved in each disciplinary situation” is not

dispositive. See Anderson , 253 F.3d at 565-66 and Lathem, 172 F.3d at 793. Moreover, the

Department’s submissions demonstrate that supervisoryDefendantsGodwinand Harris participated

in either or both investigations and decisions to discipline Pettway, Boyd, and Cumbie. 

24

a State vehicle, and (5) violation of the Department’s Professional Conduct Policy. It is similarly

acknowledged that Cumbie received a five-day suspension without pay ( 08/04/03 - 08/08/03) for (1)

failure to follow supervisor’s directive, (2) violation of the Department’s Professional Conduct Policy,

and (3)failure to perform job properly as an L&C Surveyor.35 

The Department does not deny that these employees – all classified as L&C Surveyors – are

proper comparators but argues that Pettway “is not similarly situated to Ms. Boyd and Mr. Cumbie

because [she] engaged in misconduct that is not ‘nearly identical’ to their misconduct and thus she

received a different punishment:

While the Plaintiff was disciplined for her lack of professionalism, like Ms. Boyd and

Mr. Cumbie, and for the falsification of records, like Ms. Boyd, there is no evidence

to suggest that Ms. Boyd and Mr. Cumbie were guilty of the remaining misconduct in

which the Plaintiff engaged: the solicitation of false information from a representative

of a regulated facility and for an incomplete work assignment. It was appropriate for

the Plaintiff to receive different discipline because she violated different work rules.

Thus, with the “nature of the offense[s] being different, the Plaintiff cannot be

similarly situated to Ms. Boyd and Mr. Cumbie.”36

Upon analysis, the court isolates disputed issues of fact which preclude concurrence with the

Department’s contention.37 With respect to the “solicitation of false information” charge against

Pettway, the record establishes that Boyd’s disciplinary charges included “false information to

superiors.” Insufficient evidence is provided on this record, however, for any meaningful evaluation

Case 2:03-cv-00909-DRB Document 82 Filed 07/15/05 Page 24 of 38
38Defs’ Ex. D, the Affidavit of Sandra Wood, Director of Health Personnel, includes a March

1993 departmental handbook which is captioned “Discipline - Due Process and Pre-Disciplinary

Hearings - Grievances and Complaints.” Although it makes references to “general work rules”,

“safety rules”, and “other rules”, none of the offenses attributed to Pettway, Boyd, and Cumbie are

specified in the same language. There is no provision regarding the nature of offenses which merit

a demotion, but it is described as a “major disciplinary action.”[page 1-1] Notably missing from the

list of 11 infractions which follow the following provision [at page 1-5] is any of the offenses

enumerated specifically for Pettway and the two comparators:

 “Although progressively severe disciplinary measures are

normally applied under Positive Discipline, cases may arise

involving very serious violations of general work rules which

may warrant and justify suspension or termination on the first

offense. These include but are not limited to... [ ] “

Among the listed offenses sufficiently serious for immediate suspension or demotion

are “falsifying official records such as the employment application form, medical

excuse, travel reimbursement request, time card, etc” (no.5) – and “refusal to follow

orders.” (no. 7); the former arguably is comparable to the “falsification of records”

offense for which both Boyd and Pettway were cited while the latter appears to

implicate the “failure to follow supervisor’s directive” offense attributed to Cumbie.

25

of these offenses. Though the Department refers to violations of different work rules, the applicable

rules are not provided for the court’s evaluation.38

 Defendant Godwin’s description of Boyd’s “false information to superiors” offense does not

reference any work rule thus violated. Similarly, Defendant Pezent’s memorandum detailing

Pettway’s misconduct on her assignment to follow up on deficiencies cited at the Capital Hill Health

Care nursing home does not specify a work rule violated by the stated facts for the resulting charge

of “solicitation of false information” 

I conducted a one on one interview with Hugh Davis on 8/20/02 at 4:00 p.m. At which

time, I again explained my position as your supervisor. He voiced understanding of

my questioning your visit. Mr. Davis told me that on Friday, August 16, 2002 during

the time that Bill Godwin and I were speaking with hom on the phone requesting that

he put his statement in writing, that you had called the facility and spoke with his

Director of Nursing and after that, called him and basically asked him to “fudge” your

time in the facility and also stated that you would be fired over this. Mr. Davis said

Case 2:03-cv-00909-DRB Document 82 Filed 07/15/05 Page 25 of 38
39Defs.’ Ex. 14, Pettway Dep. Mr. Davis, the nursing home Administrator at Capitol Hill,

submitted a “to whom it may concern” letter verifying his reported conversation with Pettway,

Defs.Ex. 15.

40Defs.’Ex. 17, Pettway Dep. (emphasis added).

26

that he asked you, wouldn’t it be better to tell the truth? 39

State Health Officer Williamson’s notice to Pettway of recommended discipline includes the same

documentation for the “solicitation of false information from nursing home staff” charge. Though this

notice does not indicate a work rule violated by this “solicitation” charge, its only references to

specific work rules and specified sanctions are relevant for this analysis:

The Alabama Department of Public Health’s Employee Handbook that you received,

and for which you signed a statement taking responsibility for the contents, states that

failure to perform your job and violation of specific departmental rules are violations

that normally result in disciplinary actions of increasing severity. It also states that

falsification of records is a violation that may result in suspension or discharge on the

first offense, considering work record and length of service.40

It does not appear that the “solicitation of false information from nursing home staff” charge

against Pettway represents a violation of a specific departmental rule or that the Employee Handbook

specified mandatory sanctions or a range of sanctions for such a solicitation. Arguably, the

Department would find offensive and thus warranting disciplinary action an employee’s action in

soliciting or supplying any kind of “false information”, whether the recipient is a departmental

superior or an agency regulated by the department. Discipline for both charges appears to fall within

a discretionary range not subject to written guidelines. Boyd’s four offenses and Pettway’s five

offenses are not described in a manner which suggests any significant differences in the nature of the

offenses: each falsified records and acted unprofessionally, and while Pettway solicited false

information, Boyd acted inappropriately with “false information to superiors” in some unspecified

Case 2:03-cv-00909-DRB Document 82 Filed 07/15/05 Page 26 of 38
41Defs.’Ex. 17, Pettway Dep. at 4. 

42Defs.’ Ex. F, Pettway Dep., Affidavit of Rick Harris at ¶14. As Director of the Bureau of

Health Provider Standards, Harris avers that “[i]t is within the authority of [his] job to recommend

disciplinary action against Bureau employees who have engaged in workplace misconduct.” (¶ 3)

Additional testimony by Harris, as follows, makes it material to know the nature of the discipline

suffered by Story for, inter alia, “solicitation of regulated parties and parties with whom the

Department does business” in contrast to Pettway’s discipline for, inter alia, “soliciting false

information” from a regulated business:

 “Surveyors are forbidden to solicit any kind of personal favor from

(continued...)

27

manner. Additionally, Boyd hindered an investigation and apparently accumulated or reported

excessive mileage to a State vehicle.

Given the reported departmental policy that “employees . . should demonstrate the highest

standard of personal integrity, truthfulness, and honesty to instill public confidence and trust in the

Department and its functions”41, a fact finder might concur with Pettway’s assessment of Boyd’s

misconduct as more “egregious” and deserving of greater discipline. Because the summary

judgment record does not permit a determinative ruling by the court on the comparability of

misconduct by Boyd and Pettway, disputed facts which will decide Boyd’s status as a similarly

situated disciplined employee must be resolved by the jury based on supplemental evidence.

Independent of the similarity between Boyd’s “false information” offense and Pettway’s

“solicitation of false information”, the Department submits evidence which raises instead of resolving

the question of the Department’s pattern or policy in disciplining employees whose offenses relate to

agencies regulated by the Department:

Prior to the Plaintiff’s discipline in 2002, John Story, a Caucasian male employed as

the Director of the Department’s Emergency Medical Services Division, was

disciplined for: (1) violations of Department rules concerning solicitation of regulated

parties and parties with whom the Department does business and (2) violations of

Department policies concerning travel.42

Case 2:03-cv-00909-DRB Document 82 Filed 07/15/05 Page 27 of 38
42(...continued)

a nursing home employee, let alone a personal favor that, if granted,

would involve a dishonest act. Surveyors may not be beholden to

nursing home staff for any reason – to do so would fatally undermine

the integrity of our enforcement process.” (¶ 8). 

43The disciplinary notice to Pettway admonished, in part: “It is the policy of the Alabama

Department of Public Health that employees conduct themselves in a professional and unbiased

manner in the performance of their duties.” Defs.Ex. 17, Pettway Dep.

44SeePl.’sEx.B, Deposition of Sandra Wood at 69, and the departmental grievance handbook

attached to Wood’s affidavit (Defs.’ Ex.D ), which provides, inter alia: “Supervisors must apply the

principles of progressive discipline (as described in the Positive Discipline manual) when seeking

to bring about changes in employee work habits or in applying disciplinary measures for infractions

of established rules and policies.” (page 1-1).

28

The nature of the discipline imposed on this employee is not documented anywhere on this record, but

it could be pertinent to his status as a similarly situated comparator. 

Turning to Wayne Cumbie, the other identified comparator, the court finds no documentation

for the facts underlying his “failure to perform his job properly as a Licensure and Certification

Surveyor” sufficient to compare the same misconduct committed by Pettway. Nor does this record

permit any comparison of his additional charges – failure to follow supervisor’s directive, and

violation of the Department’s Professional Conduct Policy – with Pettway’s arguably similar

misconduct.43

Another disputed issue which may be material relates to evidence suggesting that the

Department did not apply to her its published policy of progressive discipline.44 In sum, a dispositive

analysis of Pettway’s disparate discipline claim must await the jury’s resolution of at least the disputed

facts on the comparable seriousness of the misconduct which triggered differential discipline to

Pettway and the comparators identified for her prima facie case. 

Case 2:03-cv-00909-DRB Document 82 Filed 07/15/05 Page 28 of 38
45 Am.Compl., Count Three, ¶ 43.

46Defs’ Reply (Doc. 54) at 2. 

29

C. PATTERN AND PRACTICE DISCRIMINATION 

Pettway states as follows a purported claim of pattern and practice discrimination: 

The Defendant violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Section 1981 and Section

1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code by failing to promote other African

Americans employed by the Defendant. As a proximate result of the pattern and

practice alleged therein, the Plaintiff was caused to suffer . . . severe emotional distress

and suffering, loss of compensation, financial hardship, pain and suffering,

embarrassment and humiliation.45

Challenging Pettway’s standing to assert this promotional discrimination claim, the

Department argues that undisputed evidence establishes the “Assistant” position in controversy to be

only a “transfer from one unit to another unit” rather than a promotion. Even if Pettway has standing,

the Department maintains that this claim fails for lack of any evidence for the essential element of

discriminatory intent. Because Pettway’s submissions in opposition to summary judgment do not

respond at all to these contentions, the Department urges that this claim be “deemed abandoned and

...dismissed from this action.”46

Duly reminded that “summary judgment cannot be granted as a sanction for merely failing

to file a response to a motion . . . .”, Trustees of Central Pension Fund v. Wolf Crane Service, Inc., 374

F. 3d 1035, 1039 (11th Cir. 2004), this Court will decline the Department’s invitation and examine the

record to evaluate their claimed entitled to summary judgment on this claim. Allegations of pattern

and practice discrimination are presented typically in class actions and fall within the analytical

framework of a Title VII claim for disparate treatment.

Case 2:03-cv-00909-DRB Document 82 Filed 07/15/05 Page 29 of 38
47Pettway Dep. at 223, Defs.’ Ex. A (Doc. 41)

30

To establish a pattern and practice of disparate treatment, the plaintiff must show that

intentional discrimination was the employer’s standard operating procedure. The

plaintiff can prove that discrimination was the standard operating procedure through

a combination of statistics and anecdotes.

Cooper v. Southern Co., 390 F. 3d 695, 716 (11th Cir. 2004)(internal quotations and citations omitted);

see also EEOC v. Joe’s Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F. 3d 1263, 1287 (11th Cir. 2000). In order to satisfy

her burden of proof, Pettway “ must prove more than the mere occurrence of isolated or accidental

or sporadic discriminatory acts. [She] has to establish by a preponderance of the evidence

that...discrimination [is]...the regular rather than unusual practice.” Cooper, 390 F. 3d at 724 (internal

quotations and citations omitted); see also Hall v. Ala. Ass’n of Sch. Bds., 326 F. 3d at 1171; Shuford

v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 846 F. Supp. 1511, 1521 (M.D. Ala. 1994).

Guided by these standards of proof, the court readily concludes that the evidentiary record

cannot sustain Pettway’s discrimination claim based on pattern and practice. There is no statistical

evidence at all of pattern and practice discrimination, and Pettway offers no meaningful anecdotal

evidence of such discrimination. The only probative reference in the record to any pattern and practice

claim is Pettway’s identification of several African American employees who have not been

promoted; she does not provide, however, any facts necessary to evaluate their applications and nonselection. for promotions.47 Summary judgment for the Department is thus appropriate on this claim.

Case 2:03-cv-00909-DRB Document 82 Filed 07/15/05 Page 30 of 38
48Section 501 of the Rehab Act (29 U.S.C.§ 791) provides no separate cause of action for

Pettway as it is concerned principally with affirmative action plans relating to individuals with

disabilities employed in federal agencies. Because it is undisputed that the Department is a state

agency which receives federal funds, the Rehab Act analysis for Pettway’s discrimination claim is

limited to Section 504 (29 U.S.C. § 794) which provides, in pertinent part: [n]o otherwise qualified

individual with a disability...shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the

participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or

activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program...”

49Am. Compl. ¶¶ 37-39.

31

D. DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION

Pettway claims disability discrimination prohibited by Title I of the ADA and Sections 501

and 504 of the Rehab Act48 for the Department’s alleged “fail[ure] to make accommodations for [her]

disability”, (2)“deni[al] [of a]...promotional opportunity on the basis of her disability”, and (3)

“suspen[sion] and demot[ion] [of] Plaintiff because of a disability.”49 Upon analysis pursuant to the

applicable standards of proof, this claim is not buttressed sufficiently to survive summary judgment.

1. Legal Standards

Pettway relies on the same operative facts and legal arguments for disability discrimination claims

asserted under the ADA and the Rehab Act, and for analytical purposes, these statutes are nearly identical

in substance. See Sutton v. Lader, 185 F. 3d 1203, 1208 n. 5 (11th Cir. 1999); Pritchard v. Southern

Co. Servs., 92 F. 3d 1130, 1132 n.2 (11th Cir. 1996);Edwards v. Ala. Dep’t of Corrections, 81 F. Supp.

2d 1242, 1248-49 (M.D. Ala. 2000). Thus, the summary judgment analysis on Pettway’s ADA claim

will be determinative of her Rehab Act claim. See Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Assocs., Inc., 276

F. 3d 1275, 1280 n. 3 (11th Cir. 2001).

The ADAforbids coveredemployersfrom“discriminat[ing] against a qualified individualwith

Case 2:03-cv-00909-DRB Document 82 Filed 07/15/05 Page 31 of 38
5042 U.S.C. §12102(2). This definition of disability in the ADA is identical to the “individual

with a disability” definition in the Rehab Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 705(20)(B)

51Defendants also challenge plaintiff’s status as a “qualified individual with a disability” –

i.e., an “individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform

the essential functions of the employment position [as determined by the employer] that such

individual holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(8). If Pettway cannot establish her disability

within the ADA definition, however, she cannot recover for disability discrimination, and this

additional contentions need not be examined. See Carruthers v. BSA Advertising, Inc., 357 F.3d

1213, 1216 (11th Cir. 2003).

32

a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the

hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other

terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. §12112(a). To establish a prima facie

case of ADA discrimination, Pettway must show that she (1) had or was perceived to have a

“disability”; (2) was a “qualified” individual; and (3) was discriminated against because of her

disability. Carruthers v. BSA Advertising, Inc., 357 F. 3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Williams v.

Motorola, Inc., 303 F. 3d 1284 , 1290 (11th Cir. 2002))

2. Evidentiary Analysis

The Department contends that Pettway’s disability discrimination claim fails for her inability

to establish as the first prong of a prima facie case the fact of her disability within the following

definition set by the ADA:

(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life

activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as

having such an impairment.” 50

Thus, the court examines the record first for any genuine issue of disputed material fact on whether

Pettway was “disabled” or “regarded as disabled.”51

 Pettway claims a qualifying “mental disability” which “not only affected such major life

Case 2:03-cv-00909-DRB Document 82 Filed 07/15/05 Page 32 of 38
52Pl.’s Br. at 15-17.

53Pl.’s Br. at 16. Pettway also claims her mental impairment affected “such major life

activities as her ability to concentrate...[and] her ability to live as it made her prone to suicidal

thoughts and acts.” Pl.’s Br. at 17. When a plaintiff claims an activity that is not specifically listed

in the regulations, the activity must be “significant” to everyday life. See Rossbach, supra at 1357.

Because Pettway provides evidentiary support and arguments only for the major life activity of

working, the Court’s analysis is similarly limited.

33

activities as her ability to concentrate, but . . . her ability to live as it made her prone to suicidal

thoughts and acts”; the Department failed to accommodate this disability, Pettway further claims,

“when [it] refused [her] request to return to work with a restriction on overnight travel and when [it]

attempted to force her back to work without such restrictions.”52

 Pettway’s claimed disability prompts a three-step analytical process, established by the

United States Supreme Court, to determine whether she has “a physical or mental impairment that

substantially limits one or more of [her]major life activities.” 

[F]irst, plaintiff[] must be impaired. Next, the court must identify the life activity that the

plaintiff claims has been limited and determine whether it is a major life activity under the

ADA. The regulations ... define major life activities as ‘functions of caring for oneself,

performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning and

working.’ If not contained within the exemplars, the activity must be “significant” to everyday

life. Finally, the court must determine whether the impairment “substantially limits” that life

activity. 

Rossbach v. City of Miami, 371 F. 3d 1354, 1357 (11th Cir. 2004), citing, inter alia, Bragdon v.

Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631 (1998).

 The court finds that Pettway has satisfied the initial requirement of a demonstrated mental

impairment. For the second inquiry, Pettway identifies working – one of the “major life activities”

enumerated in the regulations – as the major life activity which has been limited by her mental

impairment 53 Accordingly, the final query is whether Pettway has created a triable issue of fact that

Case 2:03-cv-00909-DRB Document 82 Filed 07/15/05 Page 33 of 38
54A “class of jobs” refers to “the job from which the individual has been disqualified because

of an impairment, and the number and types of jobs utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or

abilities, within the geographic area, from which the individual is also disqualified because of this

impairment. 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(B).

55A “broad range of jobs in various classes” is defined as “the job from which the individual

has been disqualified because of an impairment, and the number and types of other jobs not utilizing

similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within that geographical area, from which the

individual is also disqualified because of the impairment.” 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(C).

56Ex. 28 and Ex. 32, Pettway Dep.

57See 29 C.F.R. §1620.2(j ) ( specifying as pertinent the nature and severity of the

impairment; the duration or expected duration of the impairment; and the permanent or long-term

impact, or the expected permanent or long-term impact of or resulting from the impairment).

(continued...)

34

her mental impairment substantially limited her from working. 

Pettway must show that she was “significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class

of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having

comparable training, skills and abilities.” 29 C.F.R. §1630.2(j)(3)(i). “The inability to perform a

single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.”

Id. Thus, an impairment must preclude an individual from more than one type of job, even if that job

foreclosed is the individual’s job of choice. Carruthers, supra at 1216 (citing Sutton v. United Air

Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999)).

 Pettway has failed to provide sufficient evidence that she was restricted in her ability to

perform either a class of jobs54 or a broad range of jobs in various classes.”55 Instead, she merely

asserts her need for a less stressful job and communications from her doctor restricting her from

overnight travel.56 Pettway’s conclusory claim of an ADA-covered disability is not supported by any

evidence to create a disputed fact with respect to whether her mental impairment rises to the level of

a substantial limit on her working.57 Nor does she proffer any evidence sufficient to create a dispute

Case 2:03-cv-00909-DRB Document 82 Filed 07/15/05 Page 34 of 38
57(...continued)

Although Pettway’s treating physician recommended some work-related restrictions (See Exs. 28

and 32, Pettway Dep), the evidence supports only a temporary duration for her her mental

impairment. See 29 C.F.R. §1630 App, §1630.2(j) (“temporary, non-chronic impairments of short

duration, with little or no long term or permanent impact, are usually not disabilities”) 

58Pettway argues: “[d]efendants were intimately aware of the details of Plaintiff’s condition.

They receivedcommunicationsfromPlaintiff’s psychiatrist explaining Plaintiff’s condition. Plaintiff

also talked with Ms. Pezent several times during the week about her condition. Defendants were

also aware of Plaintiff’s suicidal thoughts.” Pl.’s Br. at 17. Pettway testified that she spoke with

Pezent through the whole process and that “she knew [she] was still sick.”(Pettway Dep. at 68-69).

59Count Four,¶ 46. Though Pettway’s complaint does not identify the Department asthe only

defendant for this retaliation claim, as documented at III-A, n.6, supra, there is no individual liability

for discrimination under the ADA or the Rehab Act and accordingly, none exists for retaliation

discrimination under these statutes. Cf. Shotz v. City of Plantation, 344 F. 3d 1161, 1173-80 (11th

Cir. 2003)( addressing an ADA retaliation claim, the court held that individual liability for ADA

retaliation is available in the public services context but declined to decide if such liability exists in

the employment context).

35

that the Department regarded her as having a permanent or long-term impairment; testimony

suggesting the defendants’awareness of her impairment58 is insufficient to demonstrate that the

Department regarded her as disabled. See Sutton v. Lader, 185 F. 3d 1203, 1209 (11th Cir. 1999). Because

Pettway has not produced any evidence sufficient to establish an indispensable element of her

disability discrimination claim – that she is “disabled” within the statutory definition – summary

judgment for the Department is due to be granted.

E. RETALIATION DISCRIMINATION

Pettway contends that the Department retaliated against her, in violation of both the ADA and

the Rehab Act, “upon learning of her disability by demoting her and treating her less favorably than

non-disabled white employees.”59 Notwithstanding Pettway’s failure to respond at all in opposition

to Defendant’s summary judgment motion on this claim, the court proceeds to analyze the summary

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36

judgment submissions after stating the applicable standards.

1. Legal Standards

The ADA prohibits discrimination against any individual “because ...such individual has

opposed any act or practice made unlawful” by the Act or “because such individual made a charge,

testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing” under

the Act. 42 U.S.C. §12203. Incorporating by reference this anti-retaliation language, the Rehab Act

forbids the same retaliatory conduct. 42 U.S.C. §794; see also, Shotz v. City of Plantation, 344 F. 3d

1161 (11th Cir. 2003). 

 Retaliation claims are treated the same – using the Title VII analysis for retaliation

discrimination – whether brought under Title VII, the ADA, the Rehab Act, the Age Discrimination

in Employment Act, or the Family and Medical Leave Act. See Brungart v. Bellsouth Telecomm., Inc.,

231 F.3d 791 (11th Cir. 2000); Stewart v. Happy Herman’s Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278,

1287 (11th Cir. 1997). Absent direct evidence of the employer’s discrimination, the court applies the

burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973),

requiring the plaintiff to establish for a prima facie case of retaliation that: (1)she engaged in

statutorily protected expression; (2)she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) there is a

causal connection between the protected expression and the adverse employment action. See

Williams v. Motorola, Inc., 303 F. 3d 1284, 1291 (11th Cir. 2002); Farley v. Nationwide Mut. Ins.Co.,

197 F. 3d 1322, 1336 (11th Cir. 1999).

2. Evidentiary Analysis

Pettway’s retaliation claim requires no extensive analysis asshe cannot establishthe first prong

Case 2:03-cv-00909-DRB Document 82 Filed 07/15/05 Page 36 of 38
60For her retaliation action, Pettway merely restates the factual underpinnings of her

disability discrimination claim: her suspension, transfer and demotion; the Department’s failure to

provide her accommodations; and the prohibition of continued donation of sick leave. See

Am.Compl. ¶ 46; Pettway Dep. at 229-30; Ex. 1 to Pettway Dep.

37

of the prima facie case – that she engaged in statutorily protected expression.60 She does not claim

retaliation arising from either her EEOC Charge of Discrimination, indisputably filed subsequent to

the culpable acts and failures attributed to the defendants, or any pre-Charge expressions of complaints

or grievances communicated directly to the Department.

In order for Pettway’s request for an accommodation restricting overnight travel to trigger

the anti-retaliatory provisions of the ADA and the Rehab Act, she is bound to demonstrate that she

“had a good faith, objectively reasonable belief that [she] was entitled to those accommodations under

the ADA.” Standard v. A.B.E.L. Servs., Inc., 161 F. 3d 1318, 1333 (11th Cir. 1998);see also Kennedy

v. Kelly Temporary Servs., Inc., 95 F. Supp. 2d 1288, 1296 n.6 (M.D. Ala. 2000). The Eleventh

Circuit explained Pettway’s burden in Little v. United Techs., Carrier Transicold Div., 103 F. 3d 956,

960 (11th Cir. 1997):

[I]t is critical to emphasize that a plaintiff’s burden under this standard has both a

subjective and an objective component. A plaintiff must not only show that she

subjectively (that is, in good faith) believed that [her] employer was engaged in

unlawful employment practices, but also that [her] belief was objectively reasonable

in light of the facts and record presented. 

Pettway has not produced any evidence that, at the time of her request to return to work with

restrictions of no overnight travel, her belief that she was disabled was objectively reasonable. As

explained in discussing the merits of Pettway’s disability discrimination claim, she failed to provide

sufficient evidence that she was “disabled” as defined under the ADA. Because Pettway has not

created any triable issues of fact that she was engaged in a “statutorily protected expression” when she

Case 2:03-cv-00909-DRB Document 82 Filed 07/15/05 Page 37 of 38
38

requested an accommodation, the Department is entitled to summary judgment on this retaliation

claim. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Consistent with the findings and conclusions in this Memorandum Opinion, it is ORDERED

that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 39, July 7, 2004) is

DENIED with respect to Plaintiff Pettway’s Title VII race discrimination claim of disparate

discipline against the Defendant Department; and 

GRANTED on all other claims asserted against all Defendants.

A Partial Summary Judgment is entered herewith.

Done this 15th day of July, 2005.

/s/ Delores R. Boyd

DELORES R. BOYD

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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