Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00490/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00490-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Johnny Rodriguez,

Petitioner

-vsCharles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

CV-12-0490-PHX-FJM (JFM)

Report & Recommendation On Petition 

For Writ Of Habeas Corpus

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, presently incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison Complex at 

Buckeye, Arizona, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2254 on March 8, 2012 (Doc. 1). On October 26, 2012 Respondents filed their Limited 

Response (Doc. 15). Petitioner has not filed a reply.

The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the 

undersigned makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation 

pursuant to Rule 8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil 

Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

Petitioner was implicated in the death of a two year old, the son of Petitioner’s 

roommate, and co-defendant, Boyd. (Exhibit E, Mem. Dec. at 1-5.) (Exhibits to the 

Answer, Doc. 15, are referenced herein as “Exhibit ___.”) Petitioner and Boyd were 

charged with first degree felony murder and one or more count(s) of child abuse. 

(Exhibit A, Complaint (listing one count of child abuse; Exhibit E, Mem. Dec. at 5 

Case 2:12-cv-00490-FJM Document 16 Filed 01/11/13 Page 1 of 18
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(listing two counts).)

Petitioner was convicted of first degree felony murder and child abuse, and on 

January 11, 2008 was sentenced to life in prison on the murder, consecutive to a 17 year 

sentence on the child abuse charge. (Exhibit B, Sentence.)

C. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal (Exhibit C), and in a brief filed December 8, 

2008, raised a single claim that the theory of child abuse relied upon for both convictions 

had been found by the trial court to be insufficient as a matter of law, and yet was 

included in the final jury instructions. (Exhibit D, Open. Brief at 10; Exhibit E, Mem. 

Dec. at 6-7.) In an order filed July 23, 2009, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the 

convictions and sentences, concluding, in part, that the jury could have convicted based 

upon findings that even if Petitioner had not caused the victim’s injuries, Petitioner may 

have endangered the victim by failing to seek medical help. (Exhibit E, Mem. Dec. at 

10-12.) 

Petitioner did not seek further direct review. (Exhibit F, Order and Mandate 

9/15/09; Petition, Doc. 1 at 3.) 

D. PROCEEDINGS ON POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

Appellate counsel wrote Petitioner on August 4, 2009, advising of the decision 

and apprising Petitioner of the deadline for a notice of post-conviction relief. Petitioner 

contends that he had been moved to a new prison complex and did not receive the letter. 

Petitioner contends that phone calls by his family to counsel’s office resulted in 

messages that his appeal was pending, and that he would be notified in writing when the 

results came. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 9.) On May 1, 2011, Petitioner wrote appellate counsel 

to inquire about the status of his appeal. Counsel responded on May 16, 2011, noting the 

earlier correspondence and recommending that Petitioner “immediately file a Notice of 

Post Conviction Relief and explain to the court why your Notice is untimely.” (Petition, 

Case 2:12-cv-00490-FJM Document 16 Filed 01/11/13 Page 2 of 18
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Doc. 1, Exhibit D; 

On November 29, 2011, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief

(Exhibit G), arguing that his untimeliness should be excused because of his non-receipt 

of notice of the denial of his direct appeal, and because his mental illness and 

dependence on prescribed psychotropic medications resulted in his “inability to 

understand time frames.” (Exhibit G, PCR Not., at Exhibit 1.) 

On December 13, 2011, the PCR court summarily dismissed the PCR notice as 

untimely, finding that his mental impairment and use of psychotropic drugs did not, of 

themselves, justify his delay of two years after denial of the direct appeal. The court 

further found that counsel had informed Petitioner of the denial and PCR deadline, and 

that in any event Petitioner had delayed more than six months after again being told of 

the results and PCR deadlines before seeking relief. (Exhibit H, M.E. 12/13/11.) 

Petitioner did not seek further review. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 5.)

E. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition - Petitioner commenced the current case by filing his Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on March 8, 2012 (Doc. 1). Petitioner’s 

Petition asserts two grounds for relief: (1) a due process argument based upon the errors 

raised on direct appeal (i.e. that the trial judge had ruled the prosecution’s theory of child 

abuse insufficient); and (2) ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to 

inform Petitioner of the results of his direct appeal.

Response - On October 26, 2012, Respondents filed their Response (“Limited 

Answer”) (Doc. 15). Respondents argue that Petitioner’s petition is untimely, his 

untimeliness not subject to equitable tolling, and his claim of ineffective assistance

procedurally defaulted.

Reply – The Court’s service Order provided “Petitioner may file a reply within 30 

days from the date of service of the answer.” (Doc. 6 at 3.) To date, Petitioner has not 

replied in support of his Petition, and the time to do so has expired.

Case 2:12-cv-00490-FJM Document 16 Filed 01/11/13 Page 3 of 18
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. TIMELINESS

1. One Year Limitations Period

Respondents assert that Petitioner’s Petition is untimely. As part of the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Congress provided a 1-

year statute of limitations for all applications for writs of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging convictions and sentences rendered by state courts. 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d). Petitions filed beyond the one year limitations period are barred and 

must be dismissed. Id.

2. Commencement of Limitations Period

Finality - The one-year statute of limitations on habeas petitions generally begins 

to run on "the date on which the judgment became final by conclusion of direct review or 

the expiration of the time for seeking such review." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). 

Here, Petitioner’s direct appeal was denied by the Arizona Court of Appeals on 

July 23, 2009. Thereafter, Petitioner had 30 days to seek further review by the Arizona 

Supreme Court. Ariz.R.Crim.Proc. 31.19(a). Accordingly, Petitioner’s conviction 

became final on Monday, August 24, 2009, and his one year generally began running 

thereafter,

1

and expired on August 24, 2010.

Discovery - Although the conclusion of direct review normally marks the 

beginning of the statutory one year, section 2244(d)(1)(D) does provide an alternative of 

“the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been 

discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” Thus, where despite the exercise of 

due diligence a petitioner was unable to discover the factual predicate of his claim, the 

statute does not commence running on that claim until the earlier of such discovery or 

 

1

The delay in issuance of the Mandate by the Arizona Court of Appeals on September 

15, 2009 (Exhibit F) did not delay the finality of the conviction. Hemmerle v. Schriro, 

495 F.3d 1069 (2007). 

Case 2:12-cv-00490-FJM Document 16 Filed 01/11/13 Page 4 of 18
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the elimination of the disability which prevented discovery.2

Actual Discovery - On the basis of the record herein, the undersigned finds that 

Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel was not discovered until 

Petitioner was advised in May, 2011 that his appeal had been denied. Petitioner 

contends, and nothing in the record has been offered to the contrary, that Petitioner had 

been relocated at the time counsel wrote Petitioner, and that Petitioner did not receive 

counsel’s incorrectly addressed 2009 letter. 

Respondents only effort to refute these allegations is to point at counsel’s May, 

2011 letter referencing the earlier letter. (Answer, Doc. 15 at 10.) However, 

Respondents offer nothing to suggest that the 2009 letter was ever received by Petitioner. 

However, the commencement is not delayed until actual discovery, but only until 

the date on which it “could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). A duly diligent defendant ordinarily would have inquired 

sooner than some two years after an appellate ruling.

Petitioner does assert that his family was inquiring by telephone, and that 

counsel’s office responded with “messages that his appeal was pending and that the 

Petitioner would be notified in writing when the results came.” (Petition, Doc. 1 at 7.) 

However, Petitioner does not clarify when these contacts occurred, i.e. before or after the 

decision was rendered.

Petitioner further asserts that his mental illness and related medications interfered 

with his ability to appreciate time, and that in the face of those disabilities, his discovery 

in May, 2011 with the assistance of a fellow prisoner was due diligence.

The PCR court found Petitioner’s claim of mental illness and medications 

unconvincing as a cause for his delay in seeking its review:

The fact that the Defendant was on psychotropic drugs and may 

have a mental impairment does not in itself justify allowing the 

Defendant to proceed in this Rule 32 proceeding more than two 

 

2 Respondents do not address the application of § 2244(d)(1)(D), and address Petitioner’s 

excuses only in the context of equitable tolling. To the extent applicable, the 

undersigned considers the arguments on equitable tolling in this context as well.

Case 2:12-cv-00490-FJM Document 16 Filed 01/11/13 Page 5 of 18
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

years after the Order and Mandate was filed and almost four years 

after the Defendant was sentenced.

(Exhibit H, M.E. 12/13/11 at 2.) Indeed, Petitioner proffers nothing more than his bald 

claim of illness, medication, and difficulty appreciating time to explain his delays. For 

example, Petitioner does not suggest that during the two year interim he was incoherent, 

unable to communicate, unaware of the date, etc. 

On the other hand, Respondents proffer nothing to counter Petitioner’s allegations

concerning calls by his family and the effects of his illness and medications.

While an evidentiary hearing could resolve the matter, the claim of ineffective 

assistance of appellate counsel is plainly without merit. Accordingly, the undersigned 

presumes, without deciding, that Petitioner’s discovery of his ineffective assistance claim 

in May, 2011 was the earliest date on which it “could have been discovered through the 

exercise of due diligence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). 

Based on that presumption, his one year would have began running on that claim 

in May, 2011, and would have expired until May, 2012, making his March, 2012 petition 

timely as to that claim.

3. Statutory Tolling

The AEDPA provides for tolling of the limitations period when a "properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral relief with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

Here, Petitioner’s one year on Ground 1 expired on August 24, 2010. His only 

state post-conviction application was his November, 2011 PCR notice (Exhibit G). At 

that time his one year limitations period had already been expired for over a year. Once 

the statute has run, a subsequent post-conviction or collateral relief filing does not reset 

the running of the one year statute. Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001); 

Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling with regard to Ground 1.

/ /

Case 2:12-cv-00490-FJM Document 16 Filed 01/11/13 Page 6 of 18
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4. Equitable Tolling

"Equitable tolling of the one-year limitations period in 28 U.S.C. § 2244 is 

available in our circuit, but only when ‘extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner's 

control make it impossible to file a petition on time' and ‘the extraordinary circumstances 

were the cause of his untimeliness.'" Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 

2003). 

To receive equitable tolling, [t]he petitioner must establish two 

elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) 

that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way. The 

petitioner must additionally show that the extraordinary 

circumstances were the cause of his untimeliness, and that the 

extraordinary circumstances ma[de] it impossible to file a petition 

on time.

Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal citations and quotations 

omitted). “Indeed, ‘the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] 

is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.’ ” Miranda v. Castro,292 F.3d 1063, 

1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir.). 

Petitioner contends that he is entitled to equitable tolling based on the reasoning 

discussed hereinabove in connection with the delayed discovery of Ground Two. 

For the reasons discussed hereinabove, the undersigned presumes that Petitioner 

is entitled to equitable tolling until the discovery of the denial of his direct appeal.

"Where a habeas petitioner's mental incompetence in fact caused him to fail to 

meet the AEDPA filing deadline, his delay was caused by an "extraordinary 

circumstance beyond [his] control," and the deadline should be equitably tolled." Laws 

v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 923 (9th Cir. 2003). “However...mental incompetence is 

not a per se reason to toll a statute of limitations. Rather, the alleged mental 

incompetence must somehow have affected the petitioner's ability to file a timely habeas 

petition.” Nara v. Frank, 264 F.3d 310, 320 (3rd Cir. 2001), overruled in part on other 

grounds by Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002). “[M]ental illness tolls a statute of 

limitations only if the illness in fact prevents the sufferer from managing his affairs and 

thus from understanding his legal rights and acting upon them. Any other conclusion 

Case 2:12-cv-00490-FJM Document 16 Filed 01/11/13 Page 7 of 18
8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

would perpetuate the stereotype of the insane as raving maniacs or gibbering idiots.” 

Miller v. Runyon, 77 F.3d 189, 191 -192 (7th Cir. 1996) (applying equitable tolling to 

Rehabilitation Act). Here Petitioner’s unassailed contention is that his mental illness and 

medications impeded his ability to pursue his federal petition through his discovery of 

the denial of his state direct appeal.

Respondents contend that counsel’s failure to notify Petitioner does not justify 

equitable tolling because it is a species of attorney miscalculation that must be attributed 

to Petitioner. (Answer, Doc. 15 at 10, citing LaCava v. Kyler, 398 F.3d 271, 276-277 

(3rd Cir. 2005).) See Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2564 (2010) (concluding that a 

“garden variety” claim of “excusable neglect” or attorney misconduct such as 

miscalculation of a deadline did not justify equitable tolling, but that an attorney’s 

repeated failures to respond to a client’s inquiries over a period of years, and demands 

for timely action, might establish equitable tolling). 

However, here the factual allegations (as opposed to Petitioner’s attempts to claim 

ineffective assistance) are not simply that the lack of notice was as a result of deficient 

performance or miscalculation by counsel, but rather as a result of the failure of the 

prison system to deliver counsel’s letter to Petitioner at his new prison location.

The Ninth Circuit has “agree[d] with our sister circuits that ‘a prisoner's lack of 

knowledge that the state courts have reached a final resolution of his case can provide 

grounds for equitable tolling if the prisoner has acted diligently in the matter.’” Ramirez 

v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9

th Cir. 2009) (quoting Woodward v. Williams, 263 F.3d 

1135, 1143 (10th Cir.2001)). 

Nonetheless, even if extraordinary circumstances prevent a petitioner from filing 

for a time, equitable tolling will not apply if he does not continue to diligently pursue 

filing afterwards. “If the person seeking equitable tolling has not exercised reasonable 

diligence in attempting to file after the extraordinary circumstances began, the link of 

causation between the extraordinary circumstances and the failure to file is broken, and 

the extraordinary circumstances therefore did not prevent timely filing.” Valverde v. 

Case 2:12-cv-00490-FJM Document 16 Filed 01/11/13 Page 8 of 18
9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Stinson, 224 F.3d 129, 134 (2nd Cir. 2000). But see Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918 (9th 

Cir. 2002), McKeown, J. dissenting (arguing that equitable tolling should work a 

stoppage of the clock, with a resulting extension of the deadline). Ordinarily, thirty days 

after elimination of a roadblock should be sufficient. See Guillory v. Roe, 329 F.3d 

1015, 1018, n.1 (9th Cir. 2003).

Here, even after Petitioner discovered the denial of his direct appeal, he did not 

file his federal habeas petition for some ten months. 

Perhaps Petitioner might argue that he was occupied in attempting to bring his 

state PCR proceeding. Assuming that such intervening trip through the state court was 

somehow an exercise of due diligence in bringing his federal petition, Petitioner delayed 

his federal petition some three months after the dismissal of his state proceeding. 

In sum, whatever equitable tolling Petitioner might be entitled to as a result of 

events occurring prior to May, 2011, his actions thereafter break the causation, and 

render his March, 2012 Petition untimely.

5. Actual Innocence

The Ninth Circuit has concluded that the statute of limitations is subject to an 

exception for claims of actual innocence. Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 2011). 

Petitioner makes no such claim in this proceeding.

6. Summary

Petitioner’s conviction became final on conclusion of direct review on August 24, 

2009, on the expiration of his time to seek further review in his direct appeal. His one 

year on Ground One expired a year later, on August 24, 2010, and his subsequent PCR 

proceeding did not revive it. Assuming Petitioner was entitled to equitable tolling until 

his actual discovery of the denial of his direct appeal, his failure to exercise reasonable 

diligence thereafter precludes a finding of equitable tolling sufficient to render his 

Petition timely as to Ground One. Accordingly, Ground One must be dismissed as 

Case 2:12-cv-00490-FJM Document 16 Filed 01/11/13 Page 9 of 18
10

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

untimely.

Petitioner did not discover the factual predicate of his Ground Two until May, 

2011. The undersigned has presumed, for purposes of this Report and Recommendation, 

that, in light of the circumstances, Petitioner could not have sooner discovered the claim. 

Under that presumption, his Petition would have been timely as to his claim in Ground 

Two.

B. EXHAUSTION & PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

Respondents argue that Petitioner’s Ground Two was not properly exhausted, and 

is now procedurally defaulted and/or was procedurally barred on independent and 

adequate state grounds.

1. Exhaustion Requirement

Generally, a federal court has authority to review a state prisoner’s claims only if 

available state remedies have been exhausted. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 

(1981) (per curiam). The exhaustion doctrine, first developed in case law, has been 

codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c). When seeking habeas relief, the burden is on 

the petitioner to show that he has properly exhausted each claim. Cartwright v. Cupp, 

650 F.2d 1103, 1104 (9th Cir. 1981)(per curiam), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1023 (1982).

Ordinarily, “to exhaust one's state court remedies in Arizona, a petitioner must 

first raise the claim in a direct appeal or collaterally attack his conviction in a petition for 

post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32.” Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th 

Cir. 1994). Only one of these avenues of relief must be exhausted before bringing a 

habeas petition in federal court. This is true even where alternative avenues of reviewing 

constitutional issues are still available in state court. Brown v. Easter, 68 F.3d 1209, 

1211 (9th Cir. 1995); Turner v. Compoy, 827 F.2d 526, 528 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 

489 U.S. 1059 (1989). “In cases not carrying a life sentence or the death penalty, ‘claims 

of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal habeas once the Arizona

Case 2:12-cv-00490-FJM Document 16 Filed 01/11/13 Page 10 of 18
11

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Court of Appeals has ruled on them.’” Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 

2005)(quoting Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999)).

Here, Petitioner has never filed any appeal, petition for review, or other 

application with the Arizona Court of Appeals asserting a claim of ineffective assistance 

of counsel in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, such as he now asserts 

in his Ground Two.. 

Procedural Bar - Respondents argue that the dismissal of Petitioner’s PCR Notice 

as untimely amounted to a denial of his ineffective assistance claim in Ground Two on 

an independent and adequate state ground. (Answer, Doc. 15 at 13-14.) Ordinarily , 

such a denial would preclude federal habeas review. “[A]bsent showings of ‘cause’ and 

‘prejudice,’ federal habeas relief will be unavailable when (1) ‘a state court [has] 

declined to address a prisoner's federal claims because the prisoner had failed to meet a 

state procedural requirement,’ and (2) ‘the state judgment rests on independent and 

adequate state procedural grounds.’ ” Walker v. Martin, - - - U.S. - - -, 131 S.Ct. 1120, 

1127 (2011). 

However, Petitioner asserted no Sixth Amendment Claim in his PCR Notice to 

which the state court could apply a state bar. To be sure, Petitioner did complain that 

counsel had failed to notify him of the denial of his direct appeal. However, Petitioner 

did not identify a claim of ineffective assistance, nor did he cite to the Sixth Amendment 

nor any other federal authority. (See generally Exhibit G, PCR Notice.) Nor did the 

PCR court identify such a claim. (See generally Exhibit H, M.E. 12/13/11.) Thus no 

independent and adequate state ground has been applied to bar the claim.

Failure to Exhaust - On the other hand, Petitioner’s failure to raise his claim (and 

pursue it to the Arizona Court of Appeals) means he has not properly exhausted his state 

remedies. Although Petitioner asserted the underlying facts (e.g. the failure to notify him 

of the appellate denial), a claim has been fairly presented to the state court only if the 

petitioner has described both the operative facts and the federal legal theory on which 

the claim is based. Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2003) (overruled on 

Case 2:12-cv-00490-FJM Document 16 Filed 01/11/13 Page 11 of 18
12

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

other grounds, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1149 (9th Cir. 2007)).

2. Procedural Default

Ordinarily, unexhausted claims are dismissed without prejudice. Johnson v. 

Lewis, 929 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1991). However, where a petitioner has failed to 

properly exhaust his available administrative or judicial remedies, and those remedies are 

now no longer available because of some procedural bar, the petitioner has "procedurally 

defaulted" and is generally barred from seeking habeas relief. Dismissal with prejudice 

of a procedurally barred or procedurally defaulted habeas claim is generally proper 

absent a “miscarriage of justice” which would excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 

1, 11 (1984).

Respondents argue that Petitioner may no longer present his unexhausted claims 

to the state courts. Respondents rely upon Arizona’s preclusion bar, set out in Ariz. R. 

Crim. Proc. 32.2(a) and time limit bar, set out in Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4. (Answer, Doc. 

15 at 5.) 

Remedies by Direct Appeal – As noted hereinabove, under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 

31.19, the time for Petitioner to seek further review in his original direct appeal expired 

in 2009. The Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure do not provide for a successive direct 

appeal. See generally Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31. 

Remedies by Post-Conviction Relief - Petitioner can no longer seek review by a 

subsequent PCR Petition. 

Waiver Bar - Under the rules applicable to Arizona's post-conviction process, a 

claim may not ordinarily be brought in a petition for post-conviction relief that "has been 

waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral proceeding." Ariz.R.Crim.P. 

32.2(a)(3). Under this rule, some claims may be deemed waived if the State simply 

shows "that the defendant did not raise the error at trial, on appeal, or in a previous 

collateral proceeding." Stewart v. Smith, 202 Ariz. 446, 449, 46 P.3d 1067, 1070 (2002) 

(quoting Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2, Comments). For others of "sufficient constitutional 

Case 2:12-cv-00490-FJM Document 16 Filed 01/11/13 Page 12 of 18
13

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

magnitude," the State "must show that the defendant personally, ''knowingly, voluntarily 

and intelligently' [did] not raise' the ground or denial of a right." Id. That requirement is 

limited to those constitutional rights “that can only be waived by a defendant 

personally.” State v. Swoopes 216 Ariz. 390, 399, 166 P.3d 945, 954 (App.Div. 2, 2007). 

Indeed, in coming to its prescription in Stewart v. Smith, the Arizona Supreme Court 

identified: (1) waiver of the right to counsel, (2) waiver of the right to a jury trial, and (3) 

waiver of the right to a twelve-person jury under the Arizona Constitution, as among 

those rights which require a personal waiver. 202 Ariz. at 450, 46 P.3d at 1071.3 The 

Arizona courts have held that claims of ineffective assistance are waived by simple 

omission. Id.

Timeliness Bar - Even if not barred by preclusion, Petitioner would now be barred 

from raising his claims by Arizona’s time bars. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4 requires that 

petitions for post-conviction relief (other than those which are “of-right”) be filed 

“within ninety days after the entry of judgment and sentence or within thirty days after 

the issuance of the order and mandate in the direct appeal, whichever is the later.” See 

State v. Pruett, 185 Ariz. 128, 912 P.2d 1357 (App. 1995) (applying 32.4 to successive 

petition, and noting that first petition of pleading defendant deemed direct appeal for 

purposes of the rule). That time has long since passed.

Exceptions - Rules 32.2 and 32.4(a) do not bar dilatory claims if they fall within 

the category of claims specified in Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d) through (h). See Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 32.2(b) (exceptions to preclusion bar); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) (exceptions to 

timeliness bar). Petitioner has not asserted that any of these exceptions are applicable to 

his claims. Nor does it appears that such exceptions would apply. The rule defines the 

 

3

Some other types of claims addressed by the Arizona Courts in resolving the type of 

waiver required include: ineffective assistance (waived by omission), Stewart, 202 Ariz. 

at 450, 46 P.3d at 1071; right to be present at non-critical stages (waived by omission), 

Swoopes, 216Ariz. at 403, 166 P.3d at 958; improper withdrawal of plea offer (waived 

by omission), State v. Spinosa, 200 Ariz. 503, 29 P.3d 278 (App. 2001); double jeopardy 

(waived by omission), State v. Stokes, 2007 WL 5596552 (App. 10/16/07); illegal 

sentence (waived by omission), State v. Brashier, 2009 WL 794501 (App. 2009); judge 

conflict of interest (waived by omission), State v. Westmiller, 2008 WL 2651659 (App. 

2008).

Case 2:12-cv-00490-FJM Document 16 Filed 01/11/13 Page 13 of 18
14

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

excepted claims as follows:

d. The person is being held in custody after the sentence 

imposed has expired;

e. Newly discovered material facts probably exist and such 

facts probably would have changed the verdict or sentence. Newly 

discovered material facts exist if:

(1) The newly discovered material facts were 

discovered after the trial.

(2) The defendant exercised due diligence in securing 

the newly discovered material facts.

(3) The newly discovered material facts are not 

merely cumulative or used solely for impeachment, unless the 

impeachment evidence substantially undermines testimony which 

was of critical significance at trial such that the evidence probably 

would have changed the verdict or sentence.

f. The defendant's failure to file a notice of post-conviction 

relief of-right or notice of appeal within the prescribed time was 

without fault on the defendant's part; or

g. There has been a significant change in the law that if 

determined to apply to defendant's case would probably overturn the 

defendant's conviction or sentence; or

h. The defendant demonstrates by clear and convincing 

evidence that the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to 

establish that no reasonable fact-finder would have found defendant 

guilty of the underlying offense beyond a reasonable doubt, or that 

the court would not have imposed the death penalty.

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1.

Paragraph 32.1 (d) (expired sentence) generally has no application to an Arizona 

prisoner who is simply attacking the validity of his conviction or sentence. Where a 

claim is based on "newly discovered evidence" that has previously been presented to the 

state courts, the evidence is no longer "newly discovered" and paragraph (e) has no 

application. Here, Petitioner has long ago asserted the facts underlying his unexhausted 

claim of ineffective assistance, i.e. counsel’s failure to apprise him of the denial of his 

direct appeal. Petitioner has presented no facts to suggest that Paragraph (f) would apply.

While his assertions of equitable tolling might be of the kind of facts that would justif 

relief under Paragraph (f), Petitioner has made no assertion that he has been hampered in 

Case 2:12-cv-00490-FJM Document 16 Filed 01/11/13 Page 14 of 18
15

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the interim between counsel’s May 2011 notice and either the filing of his PCR notice or 

through the present Moreover, Petitioner’s defaults are not merely untimeliness, but 

also his failure to present his federal claims in earlier proceedings. Paragraph (g) has no 

application because Petitioner has not asserted a change in the law since his last PCR 

proceeding. Finally, paragraph (h), concerning claims of actual innocence, has no 

application to Petitioner’s procedural claims. 

Therefore, none of the exceptions apply, and Arizona’s time and waiver bars 

would prevent Petitioner from returning to state court. Thus, Petitioner’s claims are all 

now procedurally defaulted.

3. Cause and Prejudice

If the habeas petitioner has procedurally defaulted on a claim, or it has been 

procedurally barred on independent and adequate state grounds, he may not obtain 

federal habeas review of that claim absent a showing of “cause and prejudice” sufficient 

to excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984). 

"Cause" is the legitimate excuse for the default. Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 

1123 (1991). "Because of the wide variety of contexts in which a procedural default can 

occur, the Supreme Court 'has not given the term "cause" precise content.'" Harmon v. 

Barton, 894 F.2d 1268, 1274 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Reed, 468 U.S. at 13), cert. 

denied, 498 U.S. 832 (1990). The Supreme Court has suggested, however, that cause 

should ordinarily turn on some objective factor external to petitioner, for instance:

... a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not 

reasonably available to counsel, or that "some interference by 

officials", made compliance impracticable, would constitute cause 

under this standard. 

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (citations omitted). 

Here, Petitioner does not proffer any good cause to excuse his failures to exhaust 

and procedural defaults on Ground Two. The undersigned finds none.

Prejudice - Both "cause" and "prejudice" must be shown to excuse a procedural 

Case 2:12-cv-00490-FJM Document 16 Filed 01/11/13 Page 15 of 18
16

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

default, although a court need not examine the existence of prejudice if the petitioner 

fails to establish cause. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n. 43 (1982); Thomas v. Lewis, 

945 F.2d 1119, 1123 n. 10 (9th Cir.1991). Petitioner has filed to establish cause for his 

procedural default. Accordingly, this Court need not examine the merits of Petitioner's 

claims or the purported "prejudice" to find an absence of cause and prejudice. 

Actual Innocence - The standard for “cause and prejudice” is one of discretion 

intended to be flexible and yielding to exceptional circumstances, to avoid a 

“miscarriage of justice.” Hughes v. Idaho State Board of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 

(9th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, failure to establish cause may be excused “in an 

extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the 

conviction of one who is actually innocent.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 

(1986) (emphasis added). Although not explicitly limited to actual innocence claims, the 

Supreme Court has not yet recognized a "miscarriage of justice" exception to exhaustion 

outside of actual innocence. See Hertz & Lieberman, Federal Habeas Corpus Pract. & 

Proc., §26.4 at 1229, n. 6 (4th ed. 2002 Cumm. Supp.). The Ninth Circuit has expressly 

limited it to claims of actual innocence. Johnson v. Knowles, 541 F.3d 933, 937 (9th Cir. 

2008). 

Petitioner makes no claim of his actual innocence, and the undersigned finds no 

basis to conclude that Petitioner was actually innocent.

C. SUMMARY

Petitioner’s claims in Ground One were untimely, and are barred by the habeas 

statute of limitations. Petitioner’s state remedies on his claims in Ground Two were not 

properly exhausted, and are now procedurally defaulted. Accordingly, his Petition must 

be dismissed with prejudice.

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires 

Case 2:12-cv-00490-FJM Document 16 Filed 01/11/13 Page 16 of 18
17

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

that in habeas cases the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability 

when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in 

cases concerning detention arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a 

proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). 

Here, the Petition is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and challenges 

detention pursuant to a State court judgment. The recommendations if accepted will 

result in Petitioner’s Petition being resolved adversely to Petitioner. Accordingly, a 

decision on a certificate of appealability is required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability 

(“COA”) is whether the applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the 

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is 

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “When the district court denies a habeas petition 

on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a 

COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right 

and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in 

its procedural ruling.” Id.

Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the 

district court’s judgment, that decision will be on procedural grounds. To the extent that 

Petitioner’s claims are rejected on procedural grounds, under the reasoning set forth 

herein, the undersigned finds that “jurists of reason” would not “find it debatable 

whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Accordingly, to the 

extent that the Court adopts this Report & Recommendation as to the Petition, a 

certificate of appealability should be denied.

Case 2:12-cv-00490-FJM Document 16 Filed 01/11/13 Page 17 of 18
18

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's Petition for Writ 

of Habeas Corpus, filed March 8, 2012 (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that to the extent the reasoning of this 

Report & Recommendation is adopted, that a certificate of appealability be DENIED.

VI. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties 

shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any 

findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a 

party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's 

right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant 

to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-

47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Dated: January 10, 2013

12-0490r RR 13 01 07 on HC.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 2:12-cv-00490-FJM Document 16 Filed 01/11/13 Page 18 of 18