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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 11, 2006 Decided January 19, 2007

No. 06-5092

ORANNA BUMGARNER FELTER, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

DIRK KEMPTHORNE, SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 02cv02156)

Dennis G. Chappabitty argued the cause and filed the briefs

for appellants.

John E. Arbab, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief was David

C. Shilton, Attorney.

Before: TATEL and KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judges, and

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.

TATEL,Circuit Judge: In 2002, appellants, former members

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of the Ute Indian Tribe and their descendants, filed a multicount complaint alleging that in the 1950s and 1960s the federal

government improperly terminated their status as federally

recognized Indians and, in the process of partitioning tribal

assets prior to termination, breached its fiduciary duty to them.

The district court dismissed the complaint, finding that

plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the six-year statute of

limitations for non-tort actions against the United States.

Although we agree with the district court’s reasoning, we

nonetheless remand the case for consideration of whether

plaintiffs’ claims have been saved by recently enacted

legislation providing that the statute of limitations “shall not

commence to run” on Indian claims of trust fund

mismanagement until the United States has provided an

accounting.

I.

Because the district court dismissed plaintiffs’ claims under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b), “we assume that the facts

alleged in plaintiffs’ complaint are true.” Wagener v. SBC

Pension Benefit Plan—Non Bargained Program, 407 F.3d 395,

397 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (regarding motion to dismiss for failure to

state a claim); see also Jerome Stevens Pharms., Inc. v. FDA,

402 F.3d 1249, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (regarding motion to

dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction). Viewed through

this lens, the complaint relates the following:

In 1861, President Abraham Lincoln declared the Uinta

Valley in Eastern Utah to be an Indian reservation, later named

the Uinta and Ouray Reservation. Several years later, the Uinta

Band, the aboriginal occupants of substantial portions of

present-day Utah, including the Uinta Valley, was forcibly

relocated to the reservation. Then, in 1881, the United States

government removed the White River Band of Utes, who had

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historically resided in western Colorado, to the same reservation.

Around the turn of the century, the government allotted portions

of the reservation to the Uncompaghre Band, who had also

historically resided in western Colorado. Recognizing the

“exclusive property” interest of the Uinta Band to the Uinta and

Ouray Reservation, the federal government provided

compensation to the Uinta Band for the portions of their

reservation given to the White River and Uncompaghre Bands.

Am. Compl. ¶ 31.

In 1937, the “Ute Indian Tribe,” repeatedly referred to in

the complaint as “a modern fiction,” was created pursuant to the

Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 461 et seq. See Am.

Compl. ¶ 33. This new “tribe” consisted of the three

bands—Uinta, White River, and Uncompaghre—now living on

the Uinta and Ouray Reservation. Under a newly adopted tribal

constitution, a “Tribal Business Committee” acted as the

governing body of the tribe, with each band having equal

representation on the Committee. Id. ¶¶ 34-36. Despite the

consolidation of the bands, each band retained all property rights

held prior to the formation of the Ute Indian Tribe. Moreover,

the Tribal Business Committee was authorized to take action

regarding a band’s preexisting property only with that band’s

consent.

In 1950, the Confederated Bands of Colorado Utes, of

whom the Uncompaghre and White River Bands—but not the

Uinta Band—were members, obtained a thirty-two million

dollar Indian Claims Commission judgment against the United

States for the seizure of their western Colorado lands. The Ute

Indian Tribe then adopted the “Share and Share Alike”

agreement, under which the Uinta Band, in exchange for a share

of the judgment, would agree to relinquish its separate claim

against the United States for compensation for seized land. As

characterized by Congress in an act related to payment of the

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judgment, the Share and Share Alike agreement also stated that

“land within the Uintah and Ouray Reservation and income

issuing therefrom . . . shall become the tribal property of all the

Indians of the Ute Indian Tribe . . . without regard to band

derivation.” 25 U.S.C. § 672. According to the complaint,

however, the Bureau of Indian Affairs knew that the Share and

Share Alike agreement was invalid because the members of the

Uinta Band had never approved it.

Next, the complaint alleges that in 1954 defendants

“coerced, threatened, fooled and otherwise forced” the three

bands to seek “termination” of their status as federally

recognized Indians in order to secure the dispersal of the thirtytwo million dollar judgment. Am. Compl. ¶ 43. A federal

policy implemented during the 1950s and early 1960s,

“termination” sought to assimilate Indians by ending their

special relationship with the United States, discontinuing federal

programs for “terminated” Indians, and subjecting them to state

law and taxation. See H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83rd Cong. (1953)

(declaring termination policy); see also Charles F. Wilkinson &

Eric R. Biggs, The Evolution of the Termination Policy, 5 AM.

INDIAN L. REV. 139, 151-54 (1977) (decribing common

elements in termination plans). In 1970, however, President

Nixon called on Congress to “renounce” and “repudiate”

termination, referring to this chapter of federal Indian policy as

“morally and legally unacceptable.” See MESSAGE FROM THE

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INDIAN POLICY, H.R. DOC. NO. 91-

363, at 3 (1970).

In March 1954, under pressure from the Department of the

Interior, the Ute Indian Tribe voted to “terminate” from the tribe

what it referred to as its “mixed-blood” members, and to divide

the assets of the tribe between the “mixed-blood” and “fullblood” Utes. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 46-47. As later defined by statute,

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“full-blood” Utes are “member[s] of the tribe who possess[]

one-half degree of Ute Indian blood and a total of Indian blood

in excess of one-half.” 25 U.S.C. § 677a(b). “Mixed-blood”

Utes—members of the tribe who do not meet these criteria, id.

§ 677a(c)—were predominantly members of the Uinta Band.

The complaint alleges that the tribe’s vote suffered from

significant procedural irregularities, including that it was never

ratified by the Uinta Band. 

Nonetheless, in response to the tribe’s vote, Congress

passed the Ute Partition and Termination Act (UPA), 25 U.S.C.

§ 677 et seq., which provided for the “partition and distribution

of the assets of the Ute Indian Tribe . . . between the mixedblood and full-blood members thereof; [and] for the termination

of Federal supervision over the trust, and restricted property, of

the mixed-blood members of said tribe . . . .” Id. § 677. The

UPA directed the tribe “to prepare and submit to the Secretary

a proposed roll of the full-blood members of the tribe, and a

proposed roll of the mixed-blood members . . . . [but i]f the tribe

fails to submit such proposed rolls within the time specified in

this [Act], the Secretary shall prepare such proposed rolls for the

tribe.” Id.. § 677g. Final rolls published on April 5, 1956,

identified 490 members of the Ute Indian Tribe as “mixedbloods.” See Mixed-Blood Members and Full-Blood Members

of Ute Indian Tribe of Uintah and Ouray Reservation, Utah, 21

Fed. Reg. 2208 (Apr. 5, 1956). After publication of these rolls,

the statute required the Tribal Business Committee, on behalf of

the “full-blood” Utes, and an “authorized representative[]” of

the “mixed-blood” members to divide “the assets of the tribe

that are then susceptible to equitable and practicable

distribution.” 25 U.S.C. § 677i. Upon completion of the

partition process, the statute instructs the Secretary to

“immediately transfer to [each “mixed-blood” Ute] unrestricted

control of all other property held in trust for such mixed-blood

member by the United States,” and terminate “Federal

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supervision of such member and his property.” Id. § 677o. On

August 24, 1961, the Secretary published a notice terminating

the 490 “mixed-blood” Utes’ status as federally recognized

Indians. See Termination of Federal Supervision over the

Affairs of the Individual Mixed-Blood Members, 26 Fed. Reg.

8042 (Aug. 26, 1961). 

Appellants Oranna Bumgarner Felter and her fellow

plaintiffs are either among the 490 members whose status as

federally recognized Indians was terminated in 1961 or are

descended from those individuals. In a complaint initially filed

on November 4, 2002, and later amended, Felter alleges that the

Interior Department improperly implemented the UPA, and

thereby unlawfully deprived her of her status as a federally

recognized Indian, her land rights, and her share of the thirtytwo million dollar judgment. Claiming that the U.S. government

never properly terminated its trust relationship with her, Felter

asserts that “defendants were and are obligated to safeguard the

trust status of the lands and Indian rights and status of the

individual ‘mixed-blood’ members [of the] Uinta Band.” Am.

Compl. ¶ 103 (emphasis added). Thus, Felter alleges that

Interior breached its fiduciary duty during the partition process,

as well as that its failure to rectify that violation constitutes a

continuing breach of its fiduciary duty. In the complaint’s

eighth count, Felter further alleges that Interior “failed to

account for” and “grossly mismanaged” her share of the thirtytwo million dollar judgment. Id. ¶ 110.

The district court granted the government’s motion to

dismiss the complaint on the ground that Felter’s claims are

time-barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a), which states that “every

civil action commenced against the United States shall be barred

unless the complaint is filed within six years after the right of

action first accrues.” Felter appeals. We review the district

court’s order granting the motion to dismiss de novo. See, e.g.,

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Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1216 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

II.

Section 2401(a) generally “applies to all civil actions

whether legal, equitable, or mixed.” Kendall v. Army Bd. for

Corr. of Military Records, 996 F.2d 362, 365 (D.C. Cir. 1993).

But see Wilderness Soc’y v. Norton, 434 F.3d 584, 588 (D.C.

Cir. 2006) (“This court has repeatedly refused to hold that

actions seeking relief under 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) to ‘compel

agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed’ are

time-barred if initiated more than six years after an agency fails

to meet a statutory deadline.”). Actions usually accrue “when

[they] come[] into existence.” United States v. Lindsay, 346 U.S.

568, 569 (1954). In this case, as the district court found, none

of the acts underlying any of Felter’s claims occurred within the

six years prior to the filing of the complaint in 2002. See

Hopland Band of Pomo Indians v. United States, 855 F.2d 1573,

1578-79 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding terminated Indians’ claims

accrued during termination and partition process under an

analogous statute of limitations). In particular, the alleged

misapplication of the UPA and the resulting termination of trust

status and asset distribution occurred in the 1950s and 1960s.

Felter’s effort to recharacterize her claim by asserting that

Interior’s failure to rectify its past illegal termination constitutes

a current breach of trust cannot save her case. Any such claim

accrued in 1961 when Interior repudiated its trust relationship

with Felter and the other “mixed-blood” Utes, regardless of

whether that repudiation conformed to Interior’s statutory and

fiduciary obligations. See Hopland Band, 855 F.2d at 1578-79

(holding statute of limitations on breach of trust claims accrued

at the latest when federal government terminated federal trust

relationship over the band).

The district court also correctly held that neither the

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continuing violation nor the equitable tolling doctrines provides

a safe harbor for Felter’s claims. In reaching this conclusion,

the district court engaged in an extensive and interesting

analysis of whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Irwin v.

Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89 (1990), undermined this

court’s precedent holding section 2401(a) to be jurisdictional,

and thus not susceptible to such judicial exceptions. See Felter

v. Norton, 412 F. Supp. 2d 118, 122-24 (D.D.C. 2006); see also

Harris v. FAA, 353 F.3d 1006, 1013 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (noting

tension between Irwin’s holding that the “same rebuttable

presumption of equitable tolling applicable to suits against

private defendants should also apply to suits against the United

States,” 498 U.S. at 95-96, and this court’s precedent that

“[u]nlike an ordinary statute of limitations, § 2401(a) is a

jurisdictional condition attached to the government’s waiver of

sovereign immunity,” Spannaus v. DOJ, 824 F.2d 52, 55 (D.C.

Cir. 1987)). We need not resolve this issue, for Felter’s claims

fail even if these doctrines apply to section 2401(a). 

We begin with the continuing violation argument. Even

assuming that doctrine, which typically pertains to employment

discrimination claims, applies to this case, Felter’s complaint

alleges no acts committed by the defendants within the statute

of limitations that could constitute a continuing violation.

Although Felter and her co-plaintiffs do assert that their

termination and the loss of their lands and other trust assets, all

of which happened in the 1950s and 1960s, continues to have

lasting effects on the lives of all “mixed-blood” Utes, she asserts

no new acts committed by Interior since that time. As we have

held, “[a] lingering effect of an unlawful act is not itself an

unlawful act.” Guerra v. Cuomo, 176 F.3d 547, 551 (D.C. Cir.

1999) (quoting Dasgupta v. Univ. of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 121

F.3d 1138, 1140 (7th Cir. 1997)). 

Felter also fails to allege sufficient facts to support equitable

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tolling. To benefit from such tolling, she must demonstrate “(1)

that [she] has been pursuing [her] rights diligently, and (2) that

some extraordinary circumstance stood in [her] way.” Pace v.

DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). Although Felter argues

that the “extraordinary circumstance” element has been met by

Interior’s alleged “fail[ure] or refus[al] to give the Uinta Band

mixed-bloods accurate and adequate information,” Appellants’

Br. at 19, she asserted neither in her brief nor at oral argument

that she diligently pursued her claim over the last forty-plus

years. 

III.

Although at this point we would normally affirm the district

court’s section 2401(a) dismissal of the complaint, Felter argues

that a recently-enacted statute preserves her claims.

Specifically, approximately one month after Felter filed her

response to the government’s motion to dismiss, Congress

enacted the Department of the Interior and Related Agencies

Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-108, 117 Stat. 1241

(2003) (hereinafter P.L. 108-108), which in relevant part

declares: 

[N]otwithstanding any other provision of law,

the statute of limitations shall not commence to

run on any claim, including any claim in

litigation pending on the date of the enactment

of this Act, concerning losses to or

mismanagement of trust funds, until the affected

tribe or individual Indian has been furnished

with an accounting of such funds from which

the beneficiary can determine whether there has

been a loss.

117 Stat. at 1263. 

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The government argues that P.L. 108-108 does not apply to

this case because it covers only claims “concerning the losses to

or mismanagement of trust funds,” whereas “the gravamen of

Felter’s suit” instead concerns “improper termination of

federally recognized Indian status.” Appellees’ Br. at 15.

Felter, however, responds that her complaint includes

allegations that prior to termination Interior breached its

fiduciary duty by conspiring with the “full-blood” Utes and nonIndians to transfer to these individuals land and other property

that the United States held in trust for plaintiffs as members of

the Uinta Band. See, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶ 64. In the same vein,

Felter notes that the complaint alleges that Interior “grossly

mismanaged” assets held in trust prior to termination. See, e.g.,

Am. Compl. ¶¶ 110-11.

The government also argues that Felter has waived her P.L.

108-108 argument by failing to present it to the district court.

But Felter did argue in the district court that section 2401(a)

does not bar her claim, and she now contends that P.L. 108-108

supports that argument. Although we generally decline to

consider arguments not raised in the district court, see District

of Columbia v. Air Fla., Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1084 (D.C. Cir.

1984), we have been careful to distinguish between failure to

make an argument and failure to cite relevant legal authority,

particularly where, as here, the interpretation of a statute is at

issue. As the Supreme Court has explained, courts have an

“independent power to identify and apply the proper

construction of governing law.” Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs.,

Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 99 (1991). As a result, in United States v.

Rapone, 131 F.3d 188, 196-97 (D.C. Cir. 1997), we held that a

defendant who had repeatedly demanded a jury trial but failed

to cite the relevant statute granting him this right may raise the

overlooked legal authority on appeal. “Ignoring relevant

precedents discovered on appeal,” we explained, “could

‘occasion appellate affirmation of incorrect legal results.’” Id. at

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197 (quoting Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 515 n.3 (1994)).

Likewise, in Martini v. Fed. Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n, 178 F.3d

1336 (D.C. Cir. 1999), we relied on a provision of a statute that

the parties had failed to cite, explaining that “we have a duty to

conduct an ‘independent examination’ of the statute in

question.” Id. at 1345-46; see also New York v. EPA, 431 F.3d

801, 802 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Williams, J., concurring) (addressing

similar issue with regard to applicable regulation parties failed

to raise). Here, the government seeks dismissal of Felter’s

action under 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a), but in order to interpret that

statute correctly, it must be determined whether it has been

modified by P.L. 108-108. Because the district court had no

opportunity to consider that question, and because the parties

have not fully briefed the issue here, we remand to the district

court to determine whether P.L. 108-108 applies to any of

Felter’s claims. 

So ordered.

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