Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_16-cv-00892/USCOURTS-alnd-2_16-cv-00892-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

ROBERT UNDERWOOD,

Plaintiff,

v.

WARDEN LEON BOLLING, et al.,

Defendants.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Case No.: 2:16-cv-00892-LSC-TMP

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

The plaintiff has filed a pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

alleging violations of his rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States. 

(Doc. 1). The plaintiff names the following defendants in the complaint: Warden 

Leon Bolling, Captains White, Tew and Baldwin, Lieutenant Terry Thomas and 

Corrections Officer Fox. (Id. at 3). The plaintiff seeks monetary and injunctive 

relief. (Id. at 4). In accordance with the usual practices of this court and 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1), the complaint was referred to the undersigned magistrate judge for a 

preliminary report and recommendation. See McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136 

(1991).

I. Standard of Review

The Prison Litigation Reform Act, as partially codified at 28 U.S.C. §

1915A, requires this court to screen complaints filed by prisoners against 

FILED

 2017 Mar-07 AM 11:14

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:16-cv-00892-LSC-TMP Document 8 Filed 03/07/17 Page 1 of 20
2

government officers or employees. The court must dismiss the complaint or any 

portion thereof that it finds frivolous, malicious, seeks monetary damages from a 

defendant immune from monetary relief, or which does not state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted. Id. Moreover, the court may sua sponte dismiss a 

prisoner’s complaint prior to service. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 

Under § 1915A(b)(1) and § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), a claim may be dismissed as 

“frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 

490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim is frivolous as a matter of law where, inter alia, 

the defendants are immune from suit or the claim seeks to enforce a legal right that 

clearly does not exist. Id. at 327.

Moreover, a complaint may be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A 

(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. A review on 

this ground is governed by the same standards as dismissals for failure to state a 

claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Jones v. 

Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007). In order to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 

678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). That is, “[f]actual allegations must 

be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and must be a 

“‘plain statement’ possess[ing] enough heft to ‘show that the pleader is entitled to 

Case 2:16-cv-00892-LSC-TMP Document 8 Filed 03/07/17 Page 2 of 20
3

relief.’” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 557 (2007) (alteration 

incorporated). But “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. Similarly, when a 

successful affirmative defense, such as a statute of limitations, appears on the face 

of a complaint, dismissal for failure to state a claim is also warranted. Jones v. 

Bock, 549 U.S. at 215.

Pro se pleadings “are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted 

by attorneys” and are liberally construed. Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 

(11th Cir. 2006). However, they still must allege factual allegations that “raise a 

right to relief above the speculative level.” Saunders v. Duke, 766 F.3d 1262, 1266 

(11th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

II. Factual Allegations

Taking the well-pleaded factual allegations of as complaint as true, the 

plaintiff has alleged the following:

During the time period relevant to his allegations, the plaintiff was a state 

inmate assigned to O Dorm at W.E. Donaldson Correctional Facility (WEDCF), a 

maximum security prison. (Doc. 1 at 6, 14, 16). O Dorm housed 130 inmates and 

was operating at “double its designed capacity.” (Id. at 7). 

Lt. Terry Thomas “is responsible for approving and or assigning ‘each 

security post’ an officer” (id. at 12, 15) in accordance with numerous Alabama 

Case 2:16-cv-00892-LSC-TMP Document 8 Filed 03/07/17 Page 3 of 20
4

Department of Corrections’ rules, regulations, policies, and WEDCF’s Standard 

Operating Procedures (id. at 8) (citing Regulation Nos. 018, 024, 204, 208, 218, 

231-232; Rule No. 006; and Administrative Regulation Nos. 300, 302, 306, 316, 

321, 331, 402).1

 As a housing quarter, O Dorm “constitutes a security post that 

must be filled [by three corrections officers] 24 hours a day/night.” (Id. at 15-16). 

Specifically, “[a]t all times an officer is to be assigned on the ‘floor,’” another 

officer is to be assigned as “a ‘rover,’” and a third officer is to be assigned to the 

“‘cube’ . . . overlooking the entire O Dorm.” (Id. at 16). Despite these 

requirements, Lt. Thomas never assigns an officer to man the cube in O Dorm, and 

he “authorizes, permits” and “allows officers to abandon their post[s] on . . . 

Southside Dorms” K through O. (Id.). 

Captains White, Tew and Baldwin are bound by the same rules, regulations, 

policies and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) as defendant Thomas. (Id. at 

8). They are responsible for ensuring duty rosters are filled, overseeing security 

and investigative functions from an administrative perspective (id.), and enforcing 

policies related to administrative, security, general population and segregation 

matters (id. at 16). However, White, Tew and Baldwin ignore their 

responsibilities, including their duties to assign “an adequately trained officer” to 

O Dorm and to discipline officers who abandon post. (Id. at 8). 

 1 The plaintiff also refers generally to state statutes, but does not identify any statutory provisions 

by number or content.

Case 2:16-cv-00892-LSC-TMP Document 8 Filed 03/07/17 Page 4 of 20
5

Warden Bolling is “directly or indirectly responsible for” the plaintiff’s 

“safety from violence” because he is responsible for “ensuring adequately trained 

officers oversee the assigning of officers to security post[s] such as ‘O Dorm’ and 

ensuring administrative action is taken when such duties are in fact neglected and 

abandoned.” (Id. at 13). Bolling “intentionally, willfully, recklessly and 

knowingly fail[s] to do so,” and as a result, inmate “safety” is “being thwarted and 

no proper action” is taken “to correct” the security issues. (Id.).

“Each and every defendant knew or should have known” prior to January 16, 

2016, that the security problems in O Dorm needed to be corrected as inmates had 

“been assaulted, stabbed, or injured by other inmates solely because the dorm was 

not being adequately secured,” i.e., the dorm was not “occupied by the presence of 

an assigned correctional officer” in the cube and the roving and floor officers 

“regularly abandon[ed] their O dorm post.” (Id. at 10) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Yet, Thomas and his defendant supervisors refused to “correct” the duty 

roster deficiencies and ensure proper training for the officers who were assigned to 

and abandoned their posts. (Id.). 

Further, as a matter of “practice and or custom,” any officer’s “breach of 

duty” is “cover[e]d” up, inmates are denied access to the Alabama Department of 

Corrections’ (ADOC) internal investigative agency (I&I), and inmate “complaints, 

requests or demands” to the WEDCF administration about the lack of security are 

Case 2:16-cv-00892-LSC-TMP Document 8 Filed 03/07/17 Page 5 of 20
6

ignored. (Id. at 16). Finally, the plaintiff alleges WEDCF “administration . . . has 

an extended history of intervening to stop proper investigation into criminal 

activities such as I & I coming in on inmates assaulted with prison made weapons.” 

(Id. at 17). 

Having set forth the preceding background, the plaintiff alleges he went to 

bed in O Dorm “without incident or conflict with any inmate or inmates” on 

January 15, 2016. (Id. at 14). At approximately 1:20 a.m. on January 16, 2016, 

the plaintiff was awakened “by inmate Jerry Lee Matthews” beating him “with a 

lock on a belt, and stabbing him “with a prison made ice pick.” (Id.). The plaintiff 

had to defend himself in bed until he could get up, push inmate Matthews off, and 

run away. (Id.). “[F]or a few minutes,” Matthews chased the plaintiff around O 

Dorm and blocked “the only way out.” (Id.). Finally, the plaintiff was able to 

make it out of the door and ran 200 yards away from the dorm to the guard shack. 

(Id.). 

When he reached the guard shack, Officer Cunningham asked the plaintiff 

what had happened, the plaintiff explained to the best of his ability, and 

Cunningham took him to the infirmary where he gave his first statement. (Id.). 

The plaintiff told Lt. Terry Thomas what had occurred. (Id.). “Medical staff 

released” the plaintiff back into population the same morning “without 

observation.” (Id.). The plaintiff suffered five stab wounds, a black eye and 

Case 2:16-cv-00892-LSC-TMP Document 8 Filed 03/07/17 Page 6 of 20
7

lifelong scar on his nose from the attack. (Id. at 16). He “still has trouble 

sleeping.” (Id. at 15). 

Officer Fox was assigned to O Dorm from 6 p.m. on January 15, 2016, to 6 

a.m. on January 16, 2016. (Id. at 13-14). However, “[a]t no time before or during 

the attack was Officer Fox on or around his assigned post.” (Id. at 14-15). Instead, 

he “intentional[ly], knowingly” and “willing[ly]” abandoned his post.” (Id. at 11). 

“Many inmates in O Dorm” are “willing to testify” that “Fox left his post and was 

nowhere around at the time of the incident.” (Id. at 15). The plaintiff “requested 

to speak with I & I to no avail and Officer Fox was never disciplined,” as “his 201 

file will establish.” (Id.). The plaintiff asserts that if “Fox been on the post he was 

assigned, just his presence alone may have prevented the attack.” (Id.). 

III. Analysis

A. Representation of similarly situated inmates 

The plaintiff claims he is suing on his behalf and on behalf of similarly 

situated inmates. (Doc. 1 at 1). However, the plaintiff only “has standing to seek 

redress for injuries done to him,” and “may not seek redress or injuries done to 

others.” Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 166 (1972). Further, a pro 

se prisoner cannot represent other prisoners in a class action lawsuit. Oxendine v. 

Williams, 509 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 1975). It would be clear error to allow the 

plaintiff to bring this suit on behalf of other prisoners. See Johns v. County of San 

Case 2:16-cv-00892-LSC-TMP Document 8 Filed 03/07/17 Page 7 of 20
8

Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 876 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting C.E. Pope Equity Trust v. 

United States, 818 F.2d 696, 697 (9th Cir. 1987) (“While a non-attorney may 

appear pro se on his own behalf, ‘[he] has no authority to appear as an attorney for 

others than himself.’”)). As such, the remainder this report and recommendation 

shall address only the claims for which the plaintiff seeks personal redress. 

B. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process

Throughout his pleadings, the plaintiff claims the defendants violated his 

Fourteenth Amendment procedural and substantive due process rights by refusing 

to protect him from unsafe conditions in WEDCF’s O Dorm and refusing to 

discipline Officer Fox. (Doc. 1 at 7-8, 10-11). However, “[w]here a particular 

Amendment ‘provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection’ 

against a particular sort of government behavior, ‘that Amendment, not [procedural 

due process or] the more generalized notion of ‘substantive due process,’ must be 

the guide for analyzing these claims.’” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 813 

(1994) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)). As set out infra, 

the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment 

provides the constitutional grounds upon which the plaintiff’s claims rest. Thus, 

the plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claims against all defendants are 

due to be dismissed. 

Case 2:16-cv-00892-LSC-TMP Document 8 Filed 03/07/17 Page 8 of 20
9

C. Injunctive Relief

To the extent the plaintiff requests injunctive relief from the defendants, his 

claims are due to be dismissed. “Absent class certification, an inmate’s claim for 

injunctive and declaratory relief in a section 1983 action fails to present a case or 

controversy once the inmate has been transferred.” Wahl v. McIver, 773 F.2d 

1169, 1173 (11th Cir. 1985) (citing Dudley v. Stewart, 724 F.2d 1493, 1494-95 

(11th Cir. 1984)). “Past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a 

pending case or controversy regarding injunctive relief if unaccompanied by any 

continuing, present injury or real and immediate threat of repeated injury.” O’Shea 

v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1974)). 

Thus, “[t]he general rule in our circuit is that a transfer or a release of a 

prisoner from prison will moot that prisoner’s claims for injunctive and declaratory 

relief.” Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255, 1267 (11th Cir. 2007) (alteration supplied) 

(citing McKinnon v. Talladega Co., Ala., 745 F.2d 1360, 1363 (11th Cir. 1984); 

Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397, 399 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam)). On 

January 3, 2017, the plaintiff notified the court he had been transferred from 

WEDCF to Limestone Correctional Facility in Harvest, Alabama. (Doc. 7). After

his transfer from WEDCF, the plaintiff’s claims regarding the conditions at that 

facility “no longer presented a case or controversy.” Spears v. Thigpen, 846 F.2d 

1327, 1328 (11th Cir. 1988) (citing Wahl v. McIver, 773 F.2d 1169, 1173 (11th 

Case 2:16-cv-00892-LSC-TMP Document 8 Filed 03/07/17 Page 9 of 20
10

Cir. 1985)). 

Accordingly, the plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief is MOOT.

D. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

A law “suit against the State [of Alabama] and its [agencies for monetary 

damages] is barred by the Eleventh Amendment, unless Alabama has consented to 

the filing of such a suit.” Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978) (citing 

Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Ford Motor Co. v. Department of 

Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945); Worcester County Trust Co. v. Riley, 302 U.S. 292 

(1937)). No such consent can “be given under Art. I, Sec. 14, of the Alabama 

Constitution, which provides that “the State of Alabama shall never be made a 

defendant in any court of law or equity.” Id.; see also, Pennhurst State Sch. & 

Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98-100 (1984). Further, “a suit against a state 

official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a 

suit against the official’s office. As such, it is not different from a suit against the 

state itself.” Will v. Michigan Dept. Of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) 

(citation omitted). 

All defendants are employees of the Alabama Department of Corrections, 

which is an agency of the State of Alabama. The plaintiff’s lawsuit against the 

defendants in their official capacities is a suit against the state itself; and as such, 

Eleventh Amendment immunity prohibits his claims for monetary damages. The 

Case 2:16-cv-00892-LSC-TMP Document 8 Filed 03/07/17 Page 10 of 20
11

remainder of this report and recommendation addresses the plaintiff’s Eighth 

Amendment claims for monetary damages against the defendants in their 

individual capacities. 

E. Eighth Amendment - Failure to Protect 

In order to establish an Eighth Amendment violation, a plaintiff “must prove 

three elements: (1) a condition of confinement that inflicted unnecessary pain or 

suffering [constituting cruel and unusual punishment], Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 

U.S. 337, 347 (1981), (2) the defendant[s’] ‘deliberate indifference’ to that 

condition, Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303 (1991), and (3) causation, Williams 

v. Bennett, 689 F.2d 1370, 1389-90 (11th Cir. 1982).” LaMarca v. Turner, 995 

F.2d 1526, 1535 (11th Cir. 1993) (footnotes and parallel citations omitted). 

Whether a particular condition of confinement constituted cruel and unusual 

punishment is an objective inquiry; whether jail officials were deliberately 

indifferent to that condition is a subjective inquiry. See Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298.

1. The Objective Standard

“‘[I]t is well settled that a prison inmate has a constitutional right to be 

protected . . . from physical assault by other inmates.’” Bowen v. Warden, Baldwin 

State Prison, 826 F.3d 1312, 1320 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Zatler v. Wainwright, 

802 F.2d 397, 400 (11th Cir. 1986)). “The Eighth Amendment ‘imposes [a] dut[y] 

on [prison] officials’ to ‘take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the 

Case 2:16-cv-00892-LSC-TMP Document 8 Filed 03/07/17 Page 11 of 20
12

inmates.’” Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1099 (11th Cir. 

2014) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 5121 U.S. 825, 832 (1994)). Still, “a ‘prison 

custodian is not the guarantor of a prisoner’s safety.’” Purcell ex rel. Estate of 

Morgan v. Toombs Co., Ga, 400 F.3d 1313, 1321 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting 

Popham v. City of Talladega, 908 F.2d 1561, 1564 (11th Cir. 1990)). Therefore, 

not “every injury suffered by one prisoner at the hands of another that translates 

into [a] constitutional liability....’” Id. at 1319 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833 

(citations omitted)).15 

In order for constitutional liability to attach, “a prisoner-plaintiff must first 

demonstrate ‘an objectively substantial risk of serious harm to prisoners.’” 

Harrison v. Culliver, 746 F.3d 1288, 1298 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Marsh v. 

Butler Co., Ala., 268 F.3d 1014, 1028–29 (11th Cir. 2001)). This is accomplished 

by alleging facts tending to show the existence of “an excessive risk of inmate-oninmate violence at” a prison i.e.., an atmosphere where the “‘threat of violence’” at 

the hands of other inmates is “‘constant.’” Purcell, 400 F.3d at 1320 (quoting 

Woodhaus v. Virginia, 487 F.2d 889, 890 (4th Cir. 1973) (citation omitted)). 

Conversely, “‘occasional, isolated attacks by one prisoner on another may not 

constitute cruel and unusual punishment.’” Id.; Shrader v. White, 761 F.2d 975, 

978 (4th Cir. 1985) (quoting Withers v. Levine, 615 F.2d 158, 161 (4th Cir. 1980)

(“‘A pervasive risk of harm may not ordinarily be shown by pointing to a single 

Case 2:16-cv-00892-LSC-TMP Document 8 Filed 03/07/17 Page 12 of 20
13

incident or isolated incidents, but it may be established by much less than proof of 

a reign of violence and terror.”)). “Within [a prison’s] volatile ‘community,’ 

prison administrators are . . . under an obligation to take reasonable measures to 

guarantee the safety of the inmates.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 

(1984) (emphasis supplied

The facts supporting the presence of an objectively substantial risk of serious 

harm to prisoners in the plaintiff’s case are as follows. O Dorm is designated a 

security post and as such, ADOC rules and regulations as well as WEDCF standard 

operating procedures require the dorm (at an intended 75-inmate capacity) to be 

manned 24 hours a day by a cube officer, a roving officer and a floor officer. At 

the time the plaintiff was assaulted, O Dorm housed 130 inmates. While a more 

detailed factual connection between dorm overcrowding and violence would have 

been preferable, the plaintiff’s assertion that inmates had been stabbed, assaulted or 

injured by other inmates prior to January 16, 2016, is sufficient to infer that link.

To accommodate the 130 inmates and the inferential increase in violence, O 

Dorm security was not bolstered. Nor was the dorm manned at the level required 

by various rules, regulations and policies for 75 inmates. Instead, dorm security 

was decreased from 3 to 2 officers. Therefore, an officer never was assigned to 

man the cube, the only security location providing a full overview of the entire 

dorm. The two remaining corrections officers, either assigned to the floor or as a 

Case 2:16-cv-00892-LSC-TMP Document 8 Filed 03/07/17 Page 13 of 20
14

rover, were responsible for maintaining constant security in the dorm during their 

12 hour shifts. In reality, the floor and roving officers were authorized and 

permitted to abandon their posts and routinely did so. 

In this environment, inmate-on-inmate assaults, including the plaintiff’s 

assault, occurred. Abandoning officers, including Officer Fox in the plaintiff’s 

case, were not disciplined and additional training was not provided. The plaintiff’s 

and other inmates’ complaints about the lack of security were ignored, the failure 

of officers to man their posts was covered up or downplayed, and WEDCF 

administration either denied inmates access to the ADOC internal investigations 

division, as happened to the plaintiff, or intervened to stop internal investigations 

concerning inmate on inmate criminal activity with prison made weapons. It is 

obvious that such conditions proliferate violence. 

“[W]here a pro se pleading alleges specific facts, it should not be dismissed 

unless it appears ‘beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in 

support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.’” Riley v. Jeffes, 777 F.2d 

143, 148 (3rd Cir. 1985) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) 

(internal citation omitted)). The plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to establish the 

strong likelihood of serious injury to inmates in O Dorm. 

2. The Subjective Standard 

The Supreme Court says that prison officials will be liable for 

violating the Eighth Amendment when they are deliberately 

Case 2:16-cv-00892-LSC-TMP Document 8 Filed 03/07/17 Page 14 of 20
15

indifferent to the substantial risk of serious harm to inmates. Put 

differently, officials, to be liable, must be aware of a substantial risk 

of serious harm to the inmates and not take reasonable measures to 

alleviate that risk. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994).

Marsh v. Butler Co., Ala., 268 F.3d 1014, 1026-27 (11th Cir. 2001) (parallel 

citation omitted).

A prison official possesses actual, subjective knowledge of a 

substantial risk when the official is “both... aware of facts from which 

the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm 

exists, and ... also draw[s] the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.

“Whether a prison official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial 

risk is a question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, 

including inference from circumstantial evidence.” Id. at 842. The 

trier of fact may, therefore, “conclude that a prison official knew of a 

substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious.” Id.

Bowen, 826 F.3d at 1320–21. “[S]ubjective knowledge may be established ‘by 

reliance on any relevant evidence.” Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 848).

“Mere knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm, however, is 

insufficient to show deliberate indifference.” Hale v. Tallapoosa Cty. Ala., 50 F.3d 

1579, 1583 (11th Cir. 1995). The plaintiff also is required to plead facts showing 

“that, with knowledge of the substantial risk of serious harm,” the defendants 

“knowingly or recklessly ‘disregard[ed] that risk by failing to take reasonable 

measures to abate it.’” Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847). This failure can be 

established by pleading facts tending to show a defendant “knew of ways to reduce 

Case 2:16-cv-00892-LSC-TMP Document 8 Filed 03/07/17 Page 15 of 20
16

the harm but knowingly [or recklessly] declined to act.” Id.

The plaintiff alleges “[e]ach and every defendant knew or should have 

known” prior to January 16, 2016, that the security problems in O Dorm needed to 

be corrected because the dorm was overcrowded, and inmates had “been assaulted, 

stabbed, or injured by other inmates solely because the dorm was not” being 

adequately secured,” i.e., the dorm was not “occupied by the presence of an 

assigned correctional officer” in the cube and the roving and floor officers 

“regularly abandon[ed] their O dorm post.” (Doc. 1 at 10) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). 

Despite the obvious risk of harm to O Dorm inmates, as well as knowledge 

of a prior history of violence incidents in the dorm due to overcrowding and lax 

security, on January 16, 2016, Officer “Fox left his post and was nowhere around 

at the time of the incident.” (Id. at 15). Such facts are sufficient to direct 

defendant Fox’s respond to the plaintiff’s allegations.

a. Lieutenant Thomas

Defendant Thomas was directly responsible for assigning security officers to 

O Dorm in accordance with ADOC rules and regulations and WEDCF procedures. 

(Id. at 12, 15). Yet, before and after January 16, 2016, he refused to maintain 

security at a level acceptable for a 75-man dorm. Instead, Thomas scheduled only 

two security officers to monitor some 130 maximum security O dorm inmates and 

Case 2:16-cv-00892-LSC-TMP Document 8 Filed 03/07/17 Page 16 of 20
17

permitted these officers to leave their posts without repercussion. Before the 

plaintiff’s January 2016 assault, other inmates had been stabbed and assaulted 

solely because security was not present in the dorm. The facts suggest Thomas did 

not respond reasonably to the risk because he did not: (1) mandate that security 

officers could not leave their assigned posts, (2) discipline or provide further 

training to the officers (including Fox) who abandoned post, (3) restore security 

levels to that required for a 75-man dorm, or (4) increase the security level even 

more to accommodate the 130-man dorm. 

b. Captains, Tew, White, and Baldwin

Captains White, Tew and Baldwin are bound by the same rules, regulations, 

policies and Standard Operating Procedure as defendant Thomas. (Id. at 8). They 

are responsible for ensuring duty rosters are filled, overseeing security and 

investigative functions from an administrative perspective (id.), and enforcing 

policies related to administrative, security, general population and segregation 

matters (id. at 16). However, White, Tew and Baldwin ignored their 

responsibilities, including their duties to assign “an adequately trained officer” to 

O Dorm and to discipline officers who abandon post. (Id. at 8). Plaintiff has 

alleged that these supervisors refused to “correct” the duty roster deficiencies and 

ensure proper training for the officers who were assigned to and abandoned their 

posts. (Id. at 10).

Case 2:16-cv-00892-LSC-TMP Document 8 Filed 03/07/17 Page 17 of 20
18

 

c. Warden Leon Bolling

Warden Bolling is “directly or indirectly responsible for” the plaintiff’s 

“safety from violence” because he is responsible for “ensuring adequately trained 

officers oversee the assigning of officers to security post[s] such as ‘O Dorm’ and 

ensuring administrative action is taken when such duties are in fact neglected and 

abandoned.” (Id. at 13). Bolling “intentionally, willfully, recklessly and 

knowingly fail[s] to do so,” and as a result, inmate “safety” is “being thwarted and 

no proper action” is taken “to correct” the security issues. (Id.). 

Based on these pleaded facts, the court concludes there is a reasonable 

inference from the facts that notice for the defendants to take action rests on: (1) 

repeated inmate incidents occurring because security officers habitually failed to 

man their posts in unsafe population dorms, and/or (2) decision(s) to implement a 

custom or policy of lax security in the unsafe population dorms.

The court also finds that, for screening purposes, the plaintiff has adequately 

pleaded facts to show the defendants refused to respond reasonably to the known 

risk. This is an unreasonable response to the risk, particularly when it is clear the 

defendants did not try to implement or enforce the security measures enforced in 

the honor dorms. The plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to infer that 

implementation or enforcement of even a portion of the honor dorm security 

Case 2:16-cv-00892-LSC-TMP Document 8 Filed 03/07/17 Page 18 of 20
19

measures in the population dorms would have taken only a modest amount of time, 

effort and funds, but the defendants continually refused to do so despite the 

substantial risk of harm to the plaintiff.

IV. Recommendation

For the reasons stated above, the undersigned RECOMMENDS all claims 

in this action, except the Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claims against 

defendants Fox, Thomas, Tew, White, Baldwin and Bolling in their individual 

capacities for monetary damages be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), for failing to state a claim upon which relief 

can be granted. The undersigned FURTHER RECOMMENDS the remaining 

claims be REFERRED to the undersigned for further proceedings.

V. Notice of Right to Object

The plaintiff may file specific written objections to this report and 

recommendation. Any objections must be filed with the Clerk of Court within 

fourteen (14) calendar days from the date the report and recommendation is 

entered. Objections should specifically identify all findings of fact and 

recommendations to which objection is made and the specific basis for objection. 

Failure to object to factual findings will bar later review of those findings, except 

Case 2:16-cv-00892-LSC-TMP Document 8 Filed 03/07/17 Page 19 of 20
20

for plain error. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 

(1985), reh’g denied, 474 U.S. 1111 (1986); Dupree v. Warden, 715 F.3d 1295, 

1300 (11th Cir. 2013). Objections also should specifically identify all claims

contained in the complaint that the report and recommendation fails to address. 

Objections should not contain new allegations, present additional evidence, or 

repeat legal arguments.

On receipt of objections, a United States District Judge will make a de novo

determination of those portions of the report and recommendation to which 

specific objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify in whole or in part, 

the findings of fact and recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The 

district judge also may refer this action back to the magistrate judge with 

instructions for further proceedings.

The plaintiff may not appeal the magistrate judge’s report and 

recommendation directly to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 

Circuit. The plaintiff may only appeal from a final judgment entered by a district 

judge. 

DONE and ORDERED on March 7, 2017.

___________________________________

T. MICHAEL PUTNAM

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 2:16-cv-00892-LSC-TMP Document 8 Filed 03/07/17 Page 20 of 20