Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_16-cv-00409/USCOURTS-alsd-1_16-cv-00409-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Breach of Contract

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

DEREK QUINN, :

Plaintiff, :

vs. : CA 16-00409-KD-C

OCWEN LOAN :

SERVICING, LLC, et al., :

Defendants. :

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter is before the Magistrate Judge for issuance of a report and 

recommendation, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), on Plaintiff Derek Quinn’s 

Request for Letter of Recommendation for Remand to the Removing Judge for 

this Case, (Doc. 11); Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand to State Court, (Doc. 13); and 

Defendants Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC’s (“Ocwen”), and Deutsche Bank 

National Trust Company’s (“Deutsche”) Motion to Dismiss, (Doc. 9). Upon 

consideration of the record and the foregoing pleadings, it is recommended that 

Plaintiff’s Request for Letter of Recommendation for Remand to the Removing 

Judge for this Case, (Doc. 11), and Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand to State Court, 

(Doc. 13), be DENIED and that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, (Doc. 9), be 

GRANTED. I.

In 2007, Plaintiff executed a thirty (30) year mortgage (“the Mortgage”)

with Novastar Mortgage (“Novastar”). (Doc. 1-1, at 2). Novastar was acquired 

by Saxon Mortgage Services (“Saxon”), which was subsequently acquired by 

Case 1:16-cv-00409-KD-C Document 18 Filed 10/26/16 Page 1 of 14
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Ocwen in December 2009. Id. The Mortgage was on property in Mobile County, 

Alabama. Id. 

On July 29, 2016, Plaintiff filed a complaint against the Defendants1 in the

Circuit Court of Mobile County, Alabama, seeking “damages in the amount of 

the mortgage, being in excess of $115,000,” “the immediate quiet enjoyment of 

the property,” “compensatory damages,” “punitive damages,” “a declaratory 

judgment,” and “any and all other equitable and legal relief as deemed 

appropriate, plus all costs of these proceedings.” (Doc. 1-1, at 2-14). On that 

same date, Plaintiff filed with the Mobile County Circuit Court a summons and 

complaint to be served by certified mail on “Ocwen c/o Jauregui & Lindsey.” 

(Id. at 29). Also on that same date, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Ex Parte 

Temporary Restraining Order, (id. at 15-16), with the Mobile County Circuit 

Court and asked the court to enjoin the Defendants from conducting a 

foreclosure sale of the subject property, (id. at 15). Mobile County Circuit Judge 

John Lockett enjoined the Defendants from conducting the sale and set the 

matter for a preliminary injunction hearing on August 5, 2016. (Id. at 20). On 

August 3, 2016, at 5:33 p.m. Defendants filed a Notice of Removal in the Mobile 

County Circuit Court, (Doc. 1-2, at 2), and filed the same Notice of Removal in 

this Court at 12:53 p.m. on August 4, 2016, (Doc. 1, Notice of Electronic Filing), 

invoking diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).2 (See Docs. 1 & 1-3). 

II.

 1 Ocwen was improperly named as Ocwen Loan Services and Deutsche was improperly named 

as Deutsche National Bank and Trust.

 

2 28 U.S.C. 1332(a) provides:

The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in 

controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between-

(1) citizens of different States . . . .

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Because Plaintiff’s Request for Letter of Recommendation for Remand to 

the Removing Judge for this Case, (Doc. 11), and Motion to Remand to State 

Court (“Motions for Remand”), (Doc. 13), seek the same relief, a remand of this 

action to the Circuit Court of Mobile County, they are analyzed together. In 

Plaintiff’s Motions for Remand, he avers that this matter should be remanded to 

the Mobile County Circuit Court because the parties are not diverse and that 

federal question jurisdiction does not exist. Plaintiff further claims that the 

Defendants waived service by removing the case.

In general, removal of a case from state court to federal court is proper if 

the case originally could have been brought in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 

1441(a). “An action filed in state court may be removed to federal court based 

upon diversity or federal questions jurisdiction.” Stillwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 663 

F.3d 1329, 1332 (11th Cir. 2011). 

As a procedural matter, the removal must be timely. See, e.g., Clingan v. 

Celtic Life Ins. Co., 244 F.Supp.2d 1298, 1302 (M.D. Ala. 2003) (“The time limit in 

28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) is ‘mandatory and must be strictly applied.’”); cf. Moore v. 

North America Sports, Inc., 623 F.3d 1325, 1329 (11th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he timeliness 

of removal is a procedural defect-not a jurisdictional one.”).

The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed 

within 30 days after the receipt by the defendant, through service 

or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim 

for relief upon which such action or proceeding is based, or within 

30 days after the service of summons upon the defendant if such 

initial pleading has been filed in court and is not required to be 

served on the defendant, whichever period is shorter.

28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1). In this case, the removal was timely because Plaintiff filed 

his complaint in the Mobile County Circuit Court on July 29, 2016, (Doc. 1-1, at 2-

14), and Defendants filed their Notice of Removal with the Mobile County 

Case 1:16-cv-00409-KD-C Document 18 Filed 10/26/16 Page 3 of 14
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Circuit Court and this Court on August 3, 2016, (Doc. 1-2, at 2), and August 4, 

2016, (Doc. 1, Notice of Electronic Filing), respectively, well within the thirty (30) 

day removal period.

The first task for the Court when confronted with a removed case, is to 

determine if it has subject-matter jurisdiction over the action. 

It is by now axiomatic that the inferior federal courts are courts of 

limited jurisdiction. They are empowered to hear only those cases 

within the judicial power of the United States as defined by Article 

III of the Constitution, and which have been entrusted to them by a 

jurisdictional grant authorized by Congress. Congress, however, 

may give, withhold or restrict such jurisdiction at its discretion, 

provided it be not extended beyond the boundaries fixed by the 

Constitution. And because the Constitution unambiguously 

confers this jurisdictional power to the sound discretion of 

Congress, federal courts should proceed with caution in construing 

constitutional and statutory provisions dealing with their 

jurisdiction. 

Accordingly, when a federal court acts outside its statutory subjectmatter jurisdiction, it violates the fundamental constitutional 

precept of limited federal power. Indeed, such an action 

unconstitutionally invades the powers reserved to the states to 

determine controversies in their own courts as well as offends 

fundamental principles of separation of powers. Simply put, once a 

federal court determines that it is without subject-matter

jurisdiction, the court is powerless to continue.

 

. . .

The jurisdiction of a court over the subject-matter of a claim 

involves the court’s competency to consider a given type of case, 

and cannot be waived or otherwise conferred upon the court by the 

parties. Otherwise, a party could work a wrongful extension of 

federal jurisdiction and give district courts power the Congress 

denied them. 

We add that our removal jurisdiction is no exception to a federal 

court’s obligation to inquire into its own jurisdiction. Pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1994), “any civil action brought in a State court 

of which the district courts of the United States have original 

jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, 

to the district court of the United States for the district and division 

embracing the place where such action is pending.” Therefore, 

when an action is removed from state court, the district court first 

Case 1:16-cv-00409-KD-C Document 18 Filed 10/26/16 Page 4 of 14
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must determine whether it has original jurisdiction over the 

plaintiff’s claims. . . . If there is jurisdiction, then removal is 

appropriate and the court may proceed to the merits of the case. 

. . .

Because removal jurisdiction raises significant federalism concerns, 

federal courts are directed to construe removal statutes strictly. 

Indeed, all doubts about jurisdiction should be resolved in favor of 

remand to state court.

. . .

The burden of establishing subject-matter jurisdiction falls on the 

party invoking removal. A district court has original jurisdiction 

over all cases between citizens of different states when the amount 

in controversy exceeds $75,000. Where jurisdiction is predicated on 

diversity of citizenship, all plaintiffs must be diverse from all 

defendants. 

Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco. Co., 168 F.3d 405, 409-12 (11th Cir. 1999) (citations 

and quotations omitted) (emphasis in original). 

“If jurisdiction is based on [diversity], the pleader must affirmatively 

allege facts demonstrating the existence of jurisdiction and include ‘a short and 

plain statement of the grounds upon which the court’s jurisdiction depends.’” 

Taylor v. Appleton, 30 F.3d 1365, 1367 (11th Cir. 1994) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)). 

For purposes of diversity jurisdiction, “a limited liability company is a citizen of 

any state of which a member of the company is a citizen.” Rolling Greens MHP, 

L.P. v. Comcast SCH Holdings L.L.C., 374 F.3d 1020, 1022 (11th Cir. 2004). “For a 

corporate defendant the complaint must allege either the corporation’s state of 

incorporation or principal place of business.” Taylor, 30 F.3d at 1367 (citing 28 

U.S.C. § 1332). As to the amount in controversy, the Eleventh Circuit has stated 

that “if the jurisdictional amount is either stated clearly on the face of the 

documents before the court, or readily deducible from them, then the court has 

Case 1:16-cv-00409-KD-C Document 18 Filed 10/26/16 Page 5 of 14
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jurisdiction. If not, the court must remand.” Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 

1184, 1211 (11th Cir. 2007). 

When jurisdiction is based on diversity, the inquiry begins with 

determining whether the amount in controversy has met the monetary threshold. 

Defendants aver in their response to Plaintiff’s motion to remand, (Doc. 14), that 

Plaintiff concedes that the amount in controversy requirement has been met, id.

at 1 (“[T]he damages amount sought by [Plaintiff] meets the requirements of 

federal jurisdiction . . . .” (Doc. 13, at 3)). Indeed, Plaintiff’s complaint, (Doc. 1-1, 

at 1-14), filed with the Mobile County Circuit Court indicates that Plaintiff 

demands “damages in the amount of the mortgage, being in excess of $115,000.” 

(Doc. 1-1, at 4). Therefore, the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional 

threshold without further review of the Plaintiff’s complaint for additional 

demands. 

As to the diversity of the parties, Plaintiff states in his motion for remand 

that he is a “citizen of the State of Alabama over the age of 19,” (Doc. 13, at 2). 

Defendants’ notice of removal states that “Deutsche is a national banking 

association with its main office[-principal place of business-]in California and is 

therefore a citizen of California,” (Doc. 1, at 3), and Plaintiff does not challenge 

the citizenship of Deutsche, (see Doc. 13, at 7 (“Although [Deutsche] may possess 

diversity . . . .”).

As to Ocwen, Defendants aver in their notice of removal that:

Ocwen is a citizen of the U.S. Virgin Islands. Ocwen is a limited 

liability company. . . . The sole member of Ocwen is Ocwen 

Mortgage Servicing, Inc. [(“Ocwen Mortgage”)]. Ocwen Mortgage

[ ] is incorporated under the laws of the U.S. Virgin Islands with its 

principal place of business in the U.S. Virgin Islands, thus making it 

a citizen of the U.S. Virgin Islands, and making Ocwen a citizen of 

[the] U.S. Virgin Islands for diversity purposes.

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(Doc. 1, at 3). Thus, the Defendants have clearly met their burden of alleging 

facts demonstrating the existence of diversity jurisdiction as well as meeting the 

amount in controversy jurisdictional threshold.

Plaintiff’s challenge to the diversity of Ocwen is that “[Ocwen] maintains

an office at 150 S. Perry St., Montgomery, Alabama, and maintains a registered 

agent there,” that Ocwen is “registered with the Alabama Secretary of State as a 

business entity licensed to do business in the state on a regular basis,” that 

Ocwen’s registered agent is a member of its company, and that those facts make 

Ocwen a citizen of Alabama. (Doc. 13, at 2 & 4). Plaintiff’s argument is without 

merit. The sole inquiry to determine the citizenship of a limited liability 

company is the citizenship of its members. Rolling Greens MHP, L.P., 374 F.3d at

1022. The citizenship of Ocwen’s registered agent is not relevant in determining 

Ocwen’s citizenship. See Island Pipeline, LLC v. Sequoyah Ltd., LLC, No. 3:08-cv1133-J-32HTS, 2009 WL 413584, at *4 n. 6 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 18, 2009) (“[T]he 

citizenship of an LLC’s registered agent is not relevant in determining the 

citizenship of an LLC.” (citing Rolling Greens MHP, L.P., 374 F.3d at 1021-22)). 

Ocwen’s notice of removal states that “[t]he sole member of Ocwen is Ocwen 

Mortgage [ ]. Ocwen Mortgage [ ] is incorporated under the laws of the U.S. 

Virgin Islands with its principal place of business in the U.S. Virgin Islands.” 

(Doc. 1, at 3). Therefore, for purposes of diversity jurisdiction of a limited 

liability corporation, Ocwen is a citizen of the U.S. Virgin Islands because its sole 

member, Ocwen Mortgage, is a citizen of the U.S. Virgin Islands. Accordingly, 

this matter was properly removed under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) because this Court 

Case 1:16-cv-00409-KD-C Document 18 Filed 10/26/16 Page 7 of 14
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has original jurisdiction of this civil action in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 

1332(a)(1).

Plaintiff also argues that federal question jurisdiction is not raised in the 

notice of removal. Contra to that argument, there is a footnote in the Defendants’ 

notice of removal stating that “federal question jurisdiction exists as Count 6 of 

the Complaint seems to be based on the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 

(“FDCPA”), a federal statute, see 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., which would give this 

Court original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.” (Doc. 1, at 3 n. 5). However, 

the “Civil Cover Sheet” to Defendants’ Notice of Removal indicates that the basis 

of jurisdiction is diversity. (See Doc. 1-3). Therefore, although there may be more 

than one basis for removal in this case, the Court need not address federal 

question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 since it was not affirmatively pled as 

a basis for removal in the petition and because diversity jurisdiction exists.

Plaintiff’s final contention as to removal is that the removal was 

procedurally incorrect. Plaintiff’s contention begins with the argument that the 

parties are not diverse and that removal by the Defendants is improper. As

previously discussed, however, there is complete diversity of parties. Plaintiff 

then launches into an argument that the Defendants’ act of removing this action 

was, effectively, a waiver of service and that, now, the Defendants cannot claim 

insufficient service or a lack thereof because only proper defendants may remove 

a case.3 If that is the Plaintiff’s position, it is counter to this Court’s previous 

determination that even though a defendant has not been formerly served in the 

 3 In the state court action, Plaintiff served the summons and complaint on Jauregui & Lindsey by 

certified mail. (Doc. 1-1, at 27). Defendants aver that service was improper because Jauregui & 

Lindsey are foreclosure counsel for Defendants and as such, are “not authorized to receive 

service of process for either Defendant.” (Doc. 9, at 5 n.2). 

Case 1:16-cv-00409-KD-C Document 18 Filed 10/26/16 Page 8 of 14
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state court action, that fact is not a bar to the defendant filing a notice of removal. 

See Vail v. Smarterfuel S., LLC, No. 13-00277-KD-N, 2013 WL 5373525, at *5 n.12 

(S.D. Ala. Sept. 25, 2013) (“Because he was not properly served in state court does 

not mean, however, that Killian was powerless to remove this case.”). 

Accordingly, this Court has original jurisdiction of this civil action based on 

diversity under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).

III.

Defendants move for dismissal on alternative grounds. First, they aver 

that the present action is barred by the doctrine of res judicata and should be 

dismissed. Secondly, if res judicata does not bar the Plaintiff’s defamation claim, 

the Fair Credit Reporting Act (the “FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., preempts it.

In reviewing a motion to dismiss under FRCP 12(b)(6), the Court must:

[A]ccept[ ] the allegations in the complaint as true and constru[e] 

them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

. . . 

Under the federal rules of civil procedure, a complaint must 

contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

plaintiff is entitled to relief. In order to avoid dismissal, a 

complaint must allege enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face and that rises above the speculative level. A 

claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads factual content 

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility 

standard requires that a plaintiff allege sufficient facts to nudge his 

claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.

Traylor v. P’ship Title Co., LLC, 491 F. App’x 988, 989-90 (11th Cir. 2012) (citations 

and quotations omitted). 

“Although res judicata is not a defense under [FRCP] 12(b), it may be 

raised in a[n] [FRCP] 12(b)(6) motion where the existence of the defense can be 

determined from the face of the complaint.” Johnson v. Girl Scouts of the USA, 596 

Case 1:16-cv-00409-KD-C Document 18 Filed 10/26/16 Page 9 of 14
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F. App’x 797, 798 (11th Cir. 2015) (unpublished) (citing Concordia v. Bendekovic, 

693 F.2d 1073, 1075 (11th Cir. 1982). Although the Court’s analysis of the 12(b)(6) 

motion is “limited primarily to the face of the complaint and attachments thereto, 

[the Court] may consider documents attached to the motion to dismiss if they are 

referred to in the complaint and are central to the plaintiff’s claim.” Starship 

Enters. of Atlanta, Inc. v. Coweta Cty., Ga., 708 F.3d 1243, 1252 n.13 (11th Cir. 2013) 

(citing Brooks v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1368-69 (11th 

Cir. 1997). In addition, “a district court may take judicial notice of matters of 

public record without converting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a Rule 56 motion.” 

Halmos v. Bomardier Aerospace Corp., 404 F. App'x 376, 377 (11th Cir. Dec. 7, 2010) 

(per curiam) (unpublished) (citing Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 

1278 (11th Cir. 1999)); see also Cunningham v. Dist. Attorney's Office for Escambia 

Cty., 592 F.3d 1237, 1255 (11th Cir. 2010) (“We accept all the facts in the complaint 

as true and view them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party . . . . At 

the same time, however, we also take judicial notice of the state and federal court 

proceedings in which Cunningham was convicted or attacked his conviction.”); 

Keith v. DeKalb Cty., Ga., 749 F.3d 1034, 1041 & n.18 (11th Cir. 2014) (taking 

judicial notice of records from DeKalb County’s Superior Court Online Judicial 

System).

As to whether claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata, the 

Eleventh Circuit has stated:

The purpose behind the doctrine of res judicata is that the full and 

fair opportunity to litigate protects a party’s adversaries from the 

expense and vexation attending multiple lawsuits, conserves 

judicial resources, and fosters reliance on judicial action by 

minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions. Res judicata 

bars the filing of claims which were raised or could have been 

raised in an earlier proceeding. 

Case 1:16-cv-00409-KD-C Document 18 Filed 10/26/16 Page 10 of 14
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Under Eleventh Circuit precedent, a claim will be barred by prior 

litigation if all four of the following elements are present: (1) there 

is a final judgment on the merits; (2) the decision was rendered by a 

court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the parties, or those in privity 

with them, are identical in both suits, and (4) the same cause of 

action is involved in both cases.

. . .

In the Eleventh Circuit, the principal test for determining whether 

the causes of action are the same is whether the primary right and 

duty are the same in each case. In determining whether the causes 

of action are the same, a court must compare the substance of the 

actions, not their form. It is now said, in general, that if a case 

arises out of the same nucleus of operative fact, or is based upon 

the same factual predicate, as a former action, that the two cases are 

really the same claim or cause of action for purposes of res judicata. 

Ragsdale v. Rubbermaid, Inc., 193 F.3d 1235, 1238 (11th Cir. 1999) (citations and 

quotations omitted). 

In the motion to dismiss, Plaintiff directs the Court’s attention to a 

previously filed case with this Court styled Quinn v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., 

No. 1:13-cv-00115-WS-C (“Quinn I”). In Quinn I, there was a final judgment on 

the merits4 , the decision was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction5, and 

the parties in Quinn I and the parties in the current action (“Quinn II”) are 

identical6. 

 4 Defendants Deutsche, Ocwen, and Saxon Mortgage Services, Inc., filed motions for summary 

judgment, (Quinn I, Docs. 42 & 44), that Chief Judge Steele granted and dismissed Plaintiff’s 

complaint with prejudice, (id., Docs. 66 & 67). Plaintiff filed a motion for new trial or to alter, 

amend, or vacate the judgment, (id., Docs. 68 & 69), that Chief Judge Steele denied, (id., Doc. 70). 

Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, 

(id., Doc. 71), which affirmed the district court’s ruling as to the granting of summary judgment 

against Plaintiff and denying Plaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint, (id., Doc. 82). Plaintiff 

filed a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court that was denied. (Id., Doc. 84). 

5 Defendants removed Quinn I in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1441 based on federal question, 28 

U.S.C. § 1331, and diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 

6 Plaintiff, Deutsche, and Ocwen were named parties in Quinn I. (Quinn I, Doc. 1-1, at 9-12). 

Case 1:16-cv-00409-KD-C Document 18 Filed 10/26/16 Page 11 of 14
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This leaves for the Court to determine whether the same cause of action is 

involved in Quinn I and II. “Two cases are the same ‘claim’ or ‘cause of action’ 

‘if a case arises out of the same nucleus of operative fact, or is based upon the 

same factual predicate as a former action.’” Horne v. Potter, 392 F. App’x 800, 802 

(11th Cir. 2010) (unpublished) (quoting Ragsdale, 193 F.3d at 1239). 

In Plaintiff’s response to the motion to dismiss, he does not dispute that 

any of his present claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. (See Doc. 15). 

The Court, however, will look to the complaints and the attachments thereto in 

Quinn I and II to determine whether the two cases are the same cause of action. 

A thorough comparison of the complaints in Quinn I and II7 reveals that the 

claims are based on the same nucleus of operative fact. However, it does appear 

that Plaintiff adds a state law claim of fraud in Count Four of Quinn II. His 

factual basis is the assertion that the Defendants submitted false or misleading 

credit reports, which the Defendants knew were false or misleading about 

Plaintiff and the secured property on which public entities, including, but not 

limited to, other mortgage companies, relied. (Doc. 1-1, ¶¶ 32-36). 

Although it is debatable as to whether Plaintiff could have raised this 

additional claim in Quinn I, the issue of whether the doctrine of res judicata

precludes this new claim is rendered irrelevant since the claim that Defendants’ 

suppressed information or provided incorrect information in its reports to credit 

reporting agencies (“CRAs”) is unavailable to a private citizen. In Green v. RBS 

Nat. Bank, 288 F. App’x 641 (11th Cir. 2008) (unpublished), the Eleventh Circuit 

 7 Both complaints are based on the same mortgage and those servicing deficiencies that Plaintiff 

alleges caused him damage. Specifically, he complains that the Defendants refused to accept 

payments and improperly initiated foreclosure proceedings against the mortgaged property. 

Case 1:16-cv-00409-KD-C Document 18 Filed 10/26/16 Page 12 of 14
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clearly identified the claims available to consumers pursuant to the Fair Credit 

Reporting Act:

The [FCRA] governs claims by consumers . . . against a furnisher of 

information . . . based on an allegation that the furnisher submitted 

incorrect information regarding the consumer to CRAs. The FCRA 

imposes two separate duties on furnishers. First, § 1681s-2(a) 

requires furnishers to submit accurate information to CRAs. 

Second, § 1681s-2(b) requires furnishers to investigate and respond 

promptly to notices of customer disputes. 

Green, 288 F. App’x at 642 (citation omitted). However, the FCRA does not 

provide a private right of action for violation of § 1681s-2(a)8, id., the enforcement 

of which is “limited to federal agencies, federal officials, and state officials.” Id.

at 642 n.2. Thus, even if Plaintiff’s state law fraud claim of false reporting to the

CRAs, raised in Quinn II, is not barred by the doctrine of res judicata, it is 

preempted by the FCRA. See Givens v. Saxon Mortg. Servs., Inc., 2014 WL 2452891, 

at *6 (S.D. Ala. June 2, 2014) (DuBose, J.) (holding that the FCRA preempts state 

law claims that arise from incorrect credit reporting) (citing Wilson v. Midland 

Credit Management, Inc., 2009 WL 2059332 (S.D. Ala. July 7, 2009)(Steele, J.). 

Under the circumstances, Plaintiff has clearly failed to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted and his action is due to be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12, 

Fed. R. Civ. P.

IV.

Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s 

Request for Letter of Recommendation for Remand to the Removing Judge for 

 8 “The FCRA does provide a private right of action for a violation of § 1681s-2(b), but only if the 

furnisher received notice of the consumer’s dispute from a [CRA].” Green, 288 F. App’x at 642 

(citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)(1)). Here, § 1681s-2(b) is inapplicable because Plaintiff does not 

allege that he disputed the information submitted to the CRAs, that the CRAs had sent notice to 

the furnisher of the information, and that the furnisher failed to investigate and respond 

promptly to the notice. 

Case 1:16-cv-00409-KD-C Document 18 Filed 10/26/16 Page 13 of 14
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this Case, (Doc. 11), and Motion to Remand to State Court, (Doc. 13), be

DENIED, and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, (Doc. 9), be GRANTED and this 

matter DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO FILE OBJECTIONS

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all parties in 

the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to this recommendation or 

anything in it must, within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this 

document, file specific written objections with the Clerk of this Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b); S.D. Ala. Gen. L.R. 72(c)(1) & (2). The 

parties should note that under Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, “[a] party failing to 

object to a magistrate judge’s findings or recommendations contained in a report 

and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) 

waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on 

unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party was informed of the time 

period for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the 

absence of a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal for plain 

error if necessary in the interests of justice.” 11th Cir. R. 3-1. In order to be 

specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to 

which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in 

the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed 

determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or 

refers to the briefing before the Magistrate Judge is not specific.

DONE and ORDERED this the 26th day of October 2016.

s/WILLIAM E. CASSADY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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