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Nature of Suit Code: 422
Nature of Suit: Bankruptcy Appeals Rule 28 USC 158
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

WENDELL REGINALD SYLVESTER, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, } 

) 

v. ) 

) 

JANE LEE SYLVESTER; SYLVIA ) 

MARKS-BARNETT & ASSOCIATES, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

No . 87-1791 

FILED 

11nfk!d St1~1 Court ~:Jf Appeals Tenth Circuit · 

JAN 1 71989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Oklahoma 

(D.C. No. 86-2413-T) 

Kenneth G. Mayfield, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for PlaintiffAppellant. 

Sylvia Marks-Barnett and Barton S. Levy of Sylvia Marks-Barnett & 

Assoc., Oklahoma Ci ty, Oklahoma, for Defendants-Appelleeso 

Before MOORE, BRORBY, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM. 

Appellate Case: 87-1791 Document: 01019677801 Date Filed: 01/17/1989 Page: 1 
This is an appeal from an order by the United States District 

Court for the Western District of Oklahoma affirming a bankruptcy 

court's decision holding that certain obligations owed by 

appellant to his former spouse pursuant to a divorce settlement 

are in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support and thus are 

nondischargeable under 11 u.s.c. S 523(a)(5). 1 Appellant argues 

that (1} the obligations are part of a property settlement rather 

than support or alimony and thus are not covered by § 523{a}(5), 

and (2) even if the obligations are in the nature of support or 

alimony, the district court should have considered his former 

spouse's present need for support in determining dischargeability. 

For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the district court. 

In January 1969, after seventeen years of marriage, appellant 

Wendell Sylvester and appellee Jane Sylvester obtained a divorce 

in Texas. The divorce decree incorporated a settlement agreement 

which provides in relevant part that, in recognition of the 

medical education and training of appellant acquired in large part 

through the earnings of his former wife and contributions by her 

parents, appellant agrees to meet a number of obligations: to pay 

his former wife $750 .00 per month until their mi nor child reaches 

the age of 18; to pay his former wife $1,000 per month thereafter 

until his former wife remarries or either appellant or his former 

wife dies; to pay the taxes, insurance premiums, and note payments 

1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has 

determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a)j lOth Cir. R. 34.1.8. Therefore, the-cause is ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

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Appellate Case: 87-1791 Document: 01019677801 Date Filed: 01/17/1989 Page: 2 
on the real property awarded to his former wife when the payments 

become due; to pay the premiums on the life insurance policies 

awarded to his former wife; to pay the college expenses of the 

minor child; and to pay for all indebtedness incurred by the 

parties before the divorce. 

In July 1984, appellant filed a voluntary petition for relief 

under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Thereafter, his former 

wife sought to enforce the settlement agreement through a state 

contempt proceeding. Appellant subsequently filed a· complaint in 

the bankruptcy court against his ex-wife and her attorney to 

determi ne the dischargeability of the debt obligations arising 

from the divorce decree and to enjoin the defendants from 

proceeding with a state court contempt citation brought to enforce 

the decree. The bankruptcy court found that appellant's 

obligations in the settlement agreement were in the nature of 

alimony, maintenance, or support and thus were nondischargeable 

under ll U.S . C. § 523(a)(5}. Appellant appealed the bankruptcy 

court's decision to the district court, arguing that his 

obligations were part of a property settlement and not in the 

nature of alimony or support and that the bankruptcy court erred 

in failing to consider the changed circumstances of his ex-wife in 

determining dischargeability. The district court affirmed the 

bankruptcy court's decision. 

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Appellate Case: 87-1791 Document: 01019677801 Date Filed: 01/17/1989 Page: 3 
I. 

The Nature of the Obligations 

Although the Bankruptcy Code allows individual debtors to 

discharge most debts in bankruptcy in order to allow those debtors 

to obtain a "fresh start," a specific exception to 

dischargeability exists for debts "to a spouse, former spouse, or 

child of the debtor, for alimony to, maintenance for, or support 

of such spouse or child, in connection with a separation 

agreement, divorce decree or other order of a court of record 

• • • but not to the extent that • • • such debt includes a 

liability designated as alimony, maintenance, or support, unless 

such liability is actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance, 

or support." 11 u.s.c. § 523(a)(S). 

Appellant argues that the settlement agreement at issue is 

actually a 11 property settlement 11 rather than alimony, maintenance, 

or support, and thus his obligations in the agreement are 

dischargeable in bankruptcy. While it is true that the divorce 

decree refers to the settlement agreement as a "property 

settlement, 11 that label does not resolve the issue. The 

determination of whether an obligation arising out of a divorce 

settlement is in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support is 

a matter of federal bankruptcy law . In re Goin, 808 F.2d 1391, 

1392 (lOth Cir. 1987). In determining dischargeability under 

§ 523(a), the initial inquiry is the intent of the parties at the 

time they entered into their agreement. In re Yeates, 807 F.2d 

874, 878 (lOth Cir. 1986). 

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Appellate Case: 87-1791 Document: 01019677801 Date Filed: 01/17/1989 Page: 4 
Here, several facts demonstrate that the obligations imposed 

on appellant in the settlement agreement were intended to be in 

the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support: the settlement 

agreement segregates the property settlement provisions from 

appellant's obligations, ~Yeates, 807 F.2d at 879 ; the 

agreement states that the obligations imposed upon appellant are 

in consideration of appellee "relinquishing any rights that she 

might have against [appellant] for support, 11 see id.; the parties 

had a minor child at the time of the divorce and appellant had 

substantially more income that appellee, ~ Goin , 808 F.2d at 

1392-93; the agreement provides that appellant i s to make payments 

directly to appellee over a substantial period of time, ~ id. at 

1393; and the obligation to make monthly payments to appellee 

terminates on remarriage or death, see id. Additionally, as the 

district court found, "[t]he provisions in the agreement in 

dispute had the actual effect of providing support to the appellee 

-- enabling her to maintain a home • • • and have a monthly 

income . " (April 27, 1987 Ordere) In light of those factsy we 

agree with the bankruptcy court and the district court that 

appellant's obligations are covered by§ 523 (a)( 5) and therefore 

are not dischargeable in bankruptcy. 

II. 

Relevance of Present Need or Changed Circumstances 

Appellant's next argument is that even if the obligations at 

issue are in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support, the 

bankruptcy court erred in not conducting an evidentiary hearing to 

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Appellate Case: 87-1791 Document: 01019677801 Date Filed: 01/17/1989 Page: 5 
determine his ex-wife's present need for support, citing In re 

Calhoun, 715 F.2d 1103, 1109 (6th Cir. 1983). In Calhoun the 

Sixth Circuit held that after determining that the parties to a 

divorce intended to create an obligation for support, the next 

inquiry is whether the obligation "has the effect of providing the 

support necessary to ensure that the daily needs of the former 

spouse and any children of the marriage are satisfied." Id. at 

1109. In conducting this analysis, the bankruptcy court should 

"look to the practical effect of the discharge" of the obligation 

"upon the dependent spouse's ability to sustain daily needs. 

If the [obligation} is not found necessary to provide such 

support, the inquiry ends and the debtor's obligation •• • must 

be discharged." Id. See also, ~, In re Warner, 5 B.R. 434, 

442-43 (Bankr. D. Utah 1980). 

Although Calhoun supports appellant's argument, it is a 

minority approach which we decline to follow. A requirement that 

the former spouse's present need for support or changed 

circumstances be analyzed in determining dischargeability finds no 

support in either the language or the legislative history of 

§ 523(a)(5). See In re Harrell, 754 F.2d 902, 906-07 (11th Cir. 

1985). Furthermore, as the court in Calhoun recognized, such an 

inquiry would put federal courts in the position of modifying 

state matrimonial decrees. Calhoun, 715 F.2d at 1109 n.lO. We 

decline to make such an intrusion into the area of domestic 

relations absent a clearer congressional mandate to do so. 

Therefore, we join the other circuits that have rejected the 

approach of the Sixth Circuit in Calhoun. ~, Forsdick v. 

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Appellate Case: 87-1791 Document: 01019677801 Date Filed: 01/17/1989 Page: 6 
Turgeon, 812 F.2d 801, 804 (2d Cir. 1987); Draper v. Draper, 790 

F.2d 52, 54 n.3 (8th Cir. 1986); In re Harrell, 754 F~2d 902, 907 

(11th Cir . 1985). 

Accordingly, the district court ' s affirmance of the 

bank r uptcy court is AFFIRMED. 

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