Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02049/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02049-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 120
Nature of Suit: Marine Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 46:31301 Federal Maritime Lien Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DONALD C. SWENSON and 

CHRISTINA L. SWENSON

Plaintiffs,

v.

GEORGE WEVELL,

Defendant.

Case No.: 3:18-cv-2049-CAB-LL

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 

FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT 

JUDGMENT

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ motion for entry of default judgment. 

For the following reasons, the motion is granted.

I. Background

Pro Se Plaintiffs Donald and Christina Swenson filed a complaint in admiralty on 

September 4, 2018. The complaint seeks declaratory judgment that a lien recorded by 

Defendant George Wevell on the title of the vessel M/V Christina L. (the “Vessel”), which 

Plaintiffs currently own, was invalid from the start and also has been extinguished by the 

passage of time, and that the Vessel is therefore no longer subject to the notice of claim of 

lien recorded by Wevell. According to the complaint, Plaintiffs paid Wevell the full 

amount he requested for work performed on the Vessel in the fall of 2010 even though the 

amount Wevell requested exceeded the amount agreed upon before Wevell started work, 

and even though Wevell did not finish the job. Plaintiffs allege that their ability to sell the 

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Vessel for fair value is significantly hampered so long as Wevell’s notice of claim of lien 

remains on the title. 

The summons and complaint were served on Wevell on October 7, 2018, but Wevell 

did not respond and has not otherwise appeared in this case. On December 17, 2018, 

Plaintiffs requested entry of default as to Wevell, and the Clerk of Court entered default. 

Plaintiffs now move for entry of default judgment. The motion was served by mail on 

Wevell, and he has not responded.

II. Discussion

In light of Wevell’s failure to respond to the complaint, all of the allegations 

contained within it, aside from the amount of damages, are deemed admitted. Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 8(b)(6); Geddes v. United Fin. Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977) (“The general 

rule of law is that upon default the factual allegations of the complaint, except those relating 

to the amount of damages, will be taken as true.”) “However, necessary facts not contained 

in the pleadings, and claims which are legally insufficient, are not established by default.” 

Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 980 F.2d 1261, 1267 (9th Cir. 1992).

It is within the Court’s discretion to enter default judgment following entry of default 

by the clerk. Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471 (9th Cir. 1986). The Ninth Circuit has 

identified seven factors for district courts to consider before entering default judgment:

(1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff; (2) the merits of plaintiff’s 

substantive claim; (3) the sufficiency of the complaint; (4) the sum of money 

at stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; 

(6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect; and (7) the strong policy 

underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the 

merits.

Id. at 1471-72. All of these factors support entry of default judgment against Wevell.

1. Possibility of Prejudice to Plaintiffs

If denial of default judgment will likely leave a plaintiff without recourse for 

recovery, such potential prejudice favors entering default judgment. PepsiCo, Inc. v. 

California Sec. Cans, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2002); Landstar Ranger, Inc. 

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v. Parth Enters., 725 F. Supp. 2d 916, 920 (C.D. Cal. 2010). Here, Plaintiffs assert that 

they cannot sell the Vessel for fair value while Wevell’s notice of claim of lien remains on 

the title. Defendant has not appeared in this lawsuit and by failing to respond to the 

complaint has admitted all of the allegations in the complaint. Thus, Plaintiffs have no 

other means to obtain relief, and Plaintiffs will likely suffer prejudice without the entry of 

default judgment. 

2. Merits of Plaintiffs’ Substantive Claim/Sufficiency of the Complaint

This Court has jurisdiction over this lawsuit pursuant to 46 U.S.C. § 31343(c)(2) 

which states:

The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction over a civil 

action in Admiralty to declare that a vessel is not subject to a lien claimed 

under subsection (b) of this section, or that the vessel is not subject to the 

notice of claim of lien, or both, regardless of the amount in controversy or the 

citizenship of the parties. Venue in such an action shall be in the district where 

the vessel is found or where the claimant resides or where the notice of claim 

of lien is recorded. The court may award costs and attorneys fees to the 

prevailing party, unless the court finds that the position of the other party was 

substantially justified or other circumstances make an award of costs and 

attorneys fees unjust. The Secretary shall record any such declaratory order.

The complaint alleges that the lien recorded by Wevell was invalid from its inception 

because Plaintiffs had paid Wevell the amount Wevell demanded for work performed on 

the Vessel, even though that amount exceeded the amount agreed upon and the value of 

the work performed. The complaint also alleges that the notice of lien was invalid because 

a copy was never provided to Plaintiffs as required by 46 U.S.C. § 31343(b)(1)(B). With 

their motion for default judgment, Plaintiffs have provided evidence supporting these 

allegations, including declarations and documentation. As Wevell has not appeared, this 

evidence is unrebutted 

Plaintiffs also argue that even if the notice of claim of lien was initially valid, it has 

since expired pursuant to 46 U.S.C. § 31343(e), which states that a notice of claim of lien 

like the one recorded by Wevell on the Vessel “shall expire 3 years after the date the lien 

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was established, as such date is stated in the notice. . . .” Wevell’s notice of lien stated that 

the lien was established on April 5, 2012. Thus, the notice of lien has long since expired 

pursuant to the statute. 

In addition, Plaintiffs contend that the statute of limitations for any claim by Wevell 

on the alleged debt owed for work he performed in 2010 is time-barred under California’s 

two-year statute of limitations for actions upon oral contracts. See Cal. Code. Civ. Proc. § 

339. As more than eight years have passed since Wevell performed any work on the 

Vessel, this argument appears to be a meritorious argument as well.

Finally, Plaintiffs argue that laches extinguished Wevell’s lien. “Laches requires the 

presence of both inexcusable delay and prejudice.” Stevens Tech. Servs., Inc. v. S.S. 

Brooklyn, 885 F.2d 584, 588 (9th Cir. 1989). Wevell’s lack of action to enforce the lien 

for over six years despite the Vessel remaining in San Diego is inexcusable. Further, his 

delay has prejudiced Plaintiffs by clouding the title of the Vessel and hampering their 

ability to sell it. Accordingly, the Court agrees that even if the notice of lien were valid 

and not expired, any suit to enforce the lien would be barred by the doctrine of laches.

In sum, Plaintiffs’ claim has merit, and the allegations in the complaint are sufficient. 

Accordingly, these factors support entry of default judgment.

3. The Sum of Money at Stake

Courts “consider the amount of money at stake in relation to the seriousness of 

Defendant’s conduct.” PepsiCo, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1176. Here, the complaint seeks only 

declaratory relief that a lien for $2,888 is invalid or has been extinguished. The small 

amount at stake supports entry of default judgment.

4. The possibility of a dispute concerning material facts

Upon entry of default, all well-pleaded facts in the complaint are taken as true, 

except those relating to damages. Televideo v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917-918 (9th Cir. 

1987); Geddes, 559 F.2d at 560. Because Plaintiffs have “supported [their] claims with 

ample evidence, and [Wevell] has made no attempt to challenge the accuracy of the 

allegations in the complaint, no factual disputes exist that preclude the entry of default 

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judgment.” Landstar, 725 F. Supp. 2d at 922 (C.D. Cal. 2010). Therefore, this factor 

weighs in favor of entry of default judgment.

5. Whether the default was due to excusable neglect

Wevell was properly served with the summons and complaint. [Doc. Nos. 5, 6, 7-

2.] Therefore, the default is not due to excusable neglect. See e.g.,, Craigslist, Inc. v. 

Kerbel, No. 11-3309, 2012 WL 3166798, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Aug 2, 2012) (finding that 

defendant’s default was unlikely due to excusable neglect considering fact that “Plaintiffs 

served not only the summons and complaint but also the request for entry of default on 

Defendant but still received no response”). Accordingly, this factor favors default 

judgment.

6. Policy for Deciding Cases on the Merits

“Cases should be decided upon their merits whenever reasonably possible.” Eitel, 

782 F.2d at 1472. Here, Wevell’s “failure to answer Plaintiffs’ Complaint makes a decision 

on the merits impractical, if not impossible.” PepsiCo, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 177. “Thus, the 

preference to decide cases on the merits does not preclude a court from granting default 

judgment.” Id. (citation omitted).

III. Relief Sought

The complaint prays for an order declaring that any claims Wevell may have had 

against Plaintiffs arising out of his work on the Vessel are time-barred by the applicable 

statute of limitation and laches, and that any maritime lien claims of Wevell arising out of 

his work on the Vessel are null, void and unenforceable. The complaint also prays for an 

order requiring the United States Coast Guard document center to delete and expunge 

Wevell’s lien from the Vessel’s title. With their motion for default judgment, Plaintiffs 

submitted a proposed order seeking this same declaratory relief along with their costs of 

suit, consisting of their $400 filing fee.

The Court cannot enter an order requiring any action by the United States Coast 

Guard because it is not a party to this action. See generally Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine 

Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 110–12 (1969) (discussing circumstances under which a 

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court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate claims or obligations against non-parties). However, 

the remaining relief appears to be appropriate and within the Court’s jurisdiction to grant 

pursuant to 46 U.S.C. § 31343(c)(2).

IV. Disposition

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment is GRANTED. It 

is further ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall enter JUDGMENT in favor of 

Plaintiffs and against Defendant as follows:

1. Defendant George Wevell improperly recorded a notice of claim of lien on the 

title abstract of the vessel M/V Christina L., official number 672151, on April 12, 

2012 at batch number 859987, document ID 15012261, because the amount owed 

had already been discharged and because the notice of the claim of lien was not 

provided to the owner of the vessel as required by 46 U.S.C. § 31343(b)(1)(B)(i);

2. Any liens George Wevell may have had on the vessel M/V Christina L. arising 

out of work performed before April 12, 2012 are time-barred under the applicable 

statutes of limitations, barred by the doctrine of laches, or both;

3. The vessel Christina L. is not subject to the notice of claim of lien filed by 

Defendant George Wevell on April 12, 2012 at batch number 859987, document 

ID 15012261, or to the lien itself claimed thereunder; and,

4. George Wevell is enjoined from recording any notice of lien on the vessel 

Christina L. arising out of any work allegedly performed prior to April 12, 2012.

It is further ORDERED that costs be taxed in the amount of $400.00 for Plaintiffs.

It is SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 27, 2019

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