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Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 

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In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 23-3114 

AMRA E. SCHMITZ, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, 

Acting Commissioner of Social Security, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Central District of Illinois. 

No. 3:22-cv-3068-CRL-KLM — Colleen R. Lawless, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED APRIL 9, 2024 — DECIDED DECEMBER 17, 2024 

____________________ 

Before EASTERBROOK, ROVNER, and JACKSON-AKIWUMI,

Circuit Judges. 

ROVNER, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-appellant Amra Schmitz 

appeals from the district court’s decision sustaining the denial 

of her application for Social Security disability benefits. She 

argues that the Administrative Law Judge’s determination

that she is not disabled lacks the support of substantial evidence, because the vocational expert who testified that there 

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2 No. 23-3114 

were multiple jobs that Schmitz could perform despite her 

limitations failed to disclose the sources supporting the expert’s testimony as to the number of positions available in 

each of the jobs the expert identified. See Biestek v. Berryhill, 

587 U.S. 97 (2019). We affirm.

I.

Schmitz is 52 years old; she formerly worked as a public 

relations representative. She applied for disability benefits in 

February 2020, alleging that she was disabled beginning in 

January 2018, when she was 45. 

Following a telephonic evidentiary hearing, the ALJ applied the sequential five-step disability analysis specified by 

the administrative regulations and concluded that despite 

Schmitz’s multiple limitations and her inability to perform 

her prior job, there was still work available to her that she 

could perform and therefore she was not entitled to disability 

benefits. R. 9 at 18–29. See, e.g., Crowell v. Kijakazi, 72 F.4th 810, 

814–15 (7th Cir. 2023) (outlining the five-step inquiry); 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a). At step one, the ALJ found 

that Schmitz had not engaged in substantial gainful activity 

since January 16, 2018, the date as of which she allegedly had 

become disabled. R. 9 at 20. The ALJ at step two found that 

Schmitz suffered from the following medically severe impairments: rheumatoid arthritis, degenerative changes to the cervical and lumbar spine, systemic lupus erythematosus, fibromyalgia, major depressive disorder, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, and a history of alcohol and cannabis 

abuse. R. 9 at 19. However, at step three, the ALJ found that 

Schmitz did not have an impairment or a combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one 

of the impairments identified in the regulations as 

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No. 23-3114 3

establishing that one is disabled. R. 9 at 21–24. At step four, 

the ALJ found that Schmitz’s impairments significantly limited her ability to perform basic work activity and that she 

could no longer perform her past relevant work as a public 

relations representative. R. 9 at 24–27. Despite the limitations, 

the ALJ also found at step five that Schmitz remained capable 

of performing light work (with certain exceptions), so long as 

she could learn the job in 30 days or less, needed only to make 

simple, work-related decisions, had only occasional contact 

with co-workers and supervisors, and faced only occasional 

changes to work processes and procedures. R. 9 at 24. The ALJ 

then proceeded to find, based in large measure on the testimony of vocational expert Brianne Lott, who holds a master 

of science degree in rehabilitation counseling, that in view of 

Schmitz’s age, education, work experience and residual functional capacity, Schmitz could perform six types of unskilled 

light or sedentary jobs that were available in substantial numbers in the national economy: cafeteria attendant, cleanerhousekeeping, folder, final assembler, circuit board assembler, and sorter. R. 9 at 28–29. Having so found, the ALJ determined that Schmitz was not disabled and therefore was not 

entitled to benefits. R. 9 at 29. 

After the Appeals Council denied review of the ALJ’s decision, Schmitz filed suit in the district court, asserting that the 

ALJ’s adverse decision was not supported by substantial evidence in multiple respects. As relevant here, Schmitz argued 

that substantial evidence did not support the ALJ’s finding as 

to the jobs that Schmitz was qualified to perform notwithstanding her limitations, in that the vocational expert did not 

identify the sources for her testimony as to how many positions existed in the national economy for each of the six jobs

that the expert (and the ALJ) found that she could perform. 

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The district court found that Schmitz had forfeited any 

such objection, in that her counsel had asked no questions of 

the vocational expert as to the foundation for her position estimates and had made no objection to the sufficiency of the 

vocational expert’s testimony, whether at the hearing or in the 

post-hearing briefing. Schmitz v. Kijakazi, No. 22-cv-03068, 

2023 WL 7984743, at *2–*3 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 21, 2023). The court 

went on to find that the expert’s testimony was sufficiently 

reliable on its face in view of her expertise. Id. at *3–*4. 

II.

We review de novo the district court’s decision upholding 

the denial of disability benefits to Schmitz. E.g., Chavez v. 

O’Malley, 96 F.4th 1016, 1021 (7th Cir. 2024) (“Chavez II”). 

Thus, like the district court, we examine the ALJ’s decision 

applying the same deferential standard that the district court 

did. Martin v. Kijakazi, 88 F.4th 726, 729 (7th Cir. 2023). We will 

reverse the ALJ’s decision only if it is the result of an error of 

law or is unsupported by substantial evidence. Id. “Substantial evidence is ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind 

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Id. (quoting Biestek, 587 U.S. at 103). Schmitz’s appeal, as we have 

noted, focuses on the adequacy of vocational expert Lott’s testimony as to the availability of positions in the national economy that Schmitz can perform, given the limitations resulting 

from her impairments. 

However, the record makes plain that Schmitz posed no 

such objection to the testimony either at the hearing before the 

ALJ or in the post-hearing briefing. Only before the district 

court did Schmitz argue for the first time that the vocational 

expert’s testimony was defective in that Lott did not cite her

sources for the number of positions she estimated were 

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No. 23-3114 5

available in the national economy for each of the six jobs she 

had identified as being within Schmitz’s capability to perform. 

By not making a timely objection to the ALJ regarding 

Lott’s analysis, Schmitz forfeited this objection. “[A] claimant 

who does not object to a VE's testimony during the administrative hearing forfeits those objections.” Fetting v. Kijakazi, 62 

F.4th 332, 337 (7th Cir. 2023) (citing Brown v. Colvin, 845 F.3d 

247, 254 (7th Cir. 2016)). In the criminal context, this would 

mean that we review the objection for plain error. E.g., United 

States v. Carlberg, 108 F.4th 925, 929 (7th Cir. 2024). In the civil 

context, however, plain-error review is reserved only for the 

extraordinary case. See Henry v. Hulett, 969 F.3d 769, 786 (7th 

Cir. 2020) (en banc) (describing the “rare situation” in which 

plain-error review is available in civil cases); Bronson v. Ann 

& Robert H. Lurie Children’s Hosp. of Chicago, 69 F.4th 437, 452 

(7th Cir. 2023); Walker v. Groot, 867 F.3d 799, 802 (7th Cir. 

2017).1 This is not an extraordinary case.

It is true, as Schmitz argues, that the agency bears the burden at step five to show that there exist substantial numbers 

of jobs in the national economy that the claimant can actually 

do. Martinez v. Kijakazi, 71 F.4th 1076, 1079 (7th Cir. 2023). Yet, 

as we have previously observed, requiring a claimant to raise 

a timely objection to the sufficiency of a vocational expert’s 

testimony does not improperly shift that burden to the claimant. Leisgang v. Kijakazi, 72 F.4th 216, 220 (7th Cir. 2023). A 

claimant cannot waive the substantial evidence standard. Id.

(citing Biestek, 587 U.S. at 104). Thus, the ALJ retains the duty 

1 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51(d)(2) provides an exception for 

plain-error review of civil jury instructions.

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in all cases to “hold the VE to account for the reliability of his 

job-number estimates,” id. (quoting Chavez v. Berryhill, 895 

F.3d 962, 970 (7th Cir. 2018)), and even in the absence of an 

objection, “the ALJ still cannot accept testimony from a VE 

that is facially implausible or incoherent, id. (citing Brace v. 

Saul, 970 F.3d 818, 822–23 (7th Cir. 2020). But assuming there 

are no obvious flaws in the testimony, where a claimant has 

failed to put the vocational expert’s foundation or methodology into issue and the expert’s testimony is otherwise uncontradicted, the ALJ is entitled to credit that testimony. Fettig, 62 

F.4th at 337; Liskowitz v. Astrue, 559 F.3d 736, 744 (7th Cir. 

2009); see also Donahue v. Barnhart, 279 F.3d 441, 446–47 (7th 

Cir. 2002). 

In this case, there are no such glaring defects in Lott’s testimony. Lott testified that she was familiar with Schmitz’s 

prior work and the requisite skills and exertional levels associated with that work. She concluded that a hypothetical person with the same education, work history, and limitations 

the ALJ had attributed to Schmitz—including constraints on 

her ability to learn the requirements of a new job, to make 

work decisions, to interact with co-workers and adapt to 

changes in work processes and procedures—would not be 

able to perform Schmitz’s past relevant job as a public relations representative. But Lott identified a number of lightwork jobs that she believed such an individual could perform. 

When asked by the ALJ if there were jobs the individual could 

do if she were limited to sedentary work, Lott answered yes 

and identified examples of those jobs and indicated the numbers of positions associated with each job. But as the ALJ 

posed a variety of additional restrictions on this hypothetical 

person’s ability to work—including a reaching limitation, regular absences, and a substantial amount of time spent offCase: 23-3114 Document: 36 Filed: 12/17/2024 Pages: 10
No. 23-3114 7

task—Lott indicated that the person would be unable to perform the jobs she had just identified and that, depending on 

the particular limitation, there would be few to no other jobs 

that the individual could perform. In addressing these additional restrictions, Lott indicated that the Dictionary of Occupational Titles(“the Dictionary”)—which describes jobs that exist in the national economy and identifies the requirements 

associated with those jobs—was unhelpful as to two out of 

three of the restrictions the ALJ had posited. In those instances, Lott relied on her own experience in identifying what 

jobs, if any, an individual with such restrictions might be able 

to perform. R. 9 at 65–71.2

When Schmitz’s counsel cross-examined Lott, he asked 

follow-up questions of her regarding the extent to which there 

would be tolerance for off-task behavior, absenteeism, taking 

hourly breaks, or being unable to interact with managers or 

co-workers. Again, Lott agreed that a hypothetical individual 

with these additional limitations would be unable to perform 

any of the light-work or sedentary jobs she had previously 

identified and more generally would not be eligible for regular, competitive employment of any kind. R. 9 at 71–73. 

Finally, when asked by the ALJ at the conclusion of her 

testimony, Lott affirmed that her testimony was consistent 

2 The ALJ ultimately did not find that Schmitz’s limitations included 

the reaching constraints, regular absenteeism or 20-percent off-task 

behavior about which he had queried Lott. Lott, of course, testified that 

those additional restrictions would render a person unable to perform any 

of the jobs she had previously identified—cafeteria attendant, cleanerhousekeeping, folder, final assembler, circuit board assembler, and sorter. 

The ALJ’s finding that Schmitz could perform these jobs thus rules out 

these additional limitations.

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with the Dictionary except where she had indicated it was 

based on her own experience in the field. R. 9 at 72–73. 

Lott was a well-credentialed witness with more than 10 

years’ experience in the vocational rehabilitation field. Her 

testimony was coherent and plausible. It is true that Lott did 

not reveal her data sources and methodology for arriving at 

the number of positions associated with each of the jobs she 

had discussed. This was an area of inquiry that Schmitz’s 

counsel could have pursued but did not. As is evident from 

our summary of Lott’s testimony, counsel’s focus was centered on Schmitz’s ability to do those jobs rather than the 

numbers of positions available and Lott’s sources and methodology in arriving at those numbers. Schmitz thus forfeited 

any objection to the reliability of Lott’s job-number estimates. 

On its face, and in the absence of an objection by Schmitz, 

Lott’s testimony met the substantial evidence standard.

Schmitz nonetheless suggests that there is a fatal flaw in 

the record. Invoking Social Security Ruling 00-4p, 65 Fed. Reg. 

75759-01, 2000 WL 1765299 (Dec. 4, 2000),3 Schmitz notes that 

the ALJ had a duty to identify and obtain a reasonable explanation for any apparent conflict between Lott’s testimony and 

the Dictionary and then to explain in her decision how any 

such conflict has been resolved. The Dictionary, which provides job descriptions, does not include data as to the number 

of existing positions associated with each job in the national 

economy; indeed, as the Commissioner points out, that is precisely why ALJs frequently call upon vocational experts to 

3 The Social Security Administration announced recently that it is rescinding SSR-04p effective January 6, 2025. See Social Security Ruling 

24-3p, 89 Fed. Reg. 97158-01, 2024 WL 4988840 (Dec. 6, 2024). 

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No. 23-3114 9

testify as to how many positions exist in the national economy 

that are open to a claimant given her particular abilities and 

limitations. See Chavez II, 96 F.4th at 1021–22. 

Nothing in Lott’s testimony suggested that she was defining the jobs that she discussed in a way that was at odds with, 

or might be at odds with, the definitions set forth in the Dictionary. The duty imposed by Ruling 00-4p thus did not come 

into play. Schmitz simply argues that absent inquiry by the 

ALJ into the bases for Lott’s testimony as to the available job 

numbers, it is possible that Lott may have been identifying 

and defining jobs in a way that could conflict with the Dictionary. But this is nothing more than an abstract possibility; to 

repeat, nothing in Lott’s testimony suggests that she was defining the scope and requisite abilities of the relevant work 

positions in a way that was inconsistent with the Dictionary. 

Schmitz’s contention that Ruling 00-4p required the ALJ 

to inquire further than she did to discover whether there 

might be such a conflict behind the job numbers Lott offered 

stretches the Ruling beyond its limits. See Overman v. Astrue, 

546 F.3d 456, 463 (7th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (if counsel failed 

to identify such a conflict at the hearing, then Ruling 00-4p 

comes into play only if the conflict was so obvious that the 

ALJ was bound to pick up on it without assistance, because 

the ALJ’s duty extends only to apparent conflicts); Donahue, 

279 F.3d at 446–47 (“The ruling requires an explanation only 

if the discrepancy was ‘identified’—that is, if the claimant (or 

the ALJ on his behalf) noticed the conflict and asked for substantiation.”); Sawyer v. Colvin, 512 F. App’x 603, 610 (7th Cir. 

2013) (non-precedential decision) (a potential conflict is not 

the type of apparent, actual conflict that an ALJ must address 

and resolve).That the ALJ did not, on his own initiative, 

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question Lott more closely in order to determine whether an 

unspoken, potential conflict between the Dictionary and her 

methodology, does not render the ALJ’s decision flawed, nor 

does it suggest that the ALJ’s decision lacks the support of 

substantial evidence. 

Schmitz was represented at the hearing and had the opportunity to question Lott as to her sources and to make an 

objection if her answers were insufficient. Instead, she remained silent. As discussed, there was no obvious flaw in the 

foundation or rationale of Lott’s testimony. Consequently, the 

ALJ was entitled to credit Lott’s opinions, and the ALJ’s finding as to the jobs that Schmitz could perform was supported 

by substantial evidence. 

III.

The ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. 

We therefore AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.

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