Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01553/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01553-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Armando Ramirez-Valadez,

Movant/Defendant

-vsUnited States of America,

Respondent/Plaintiff.

CV-11-1553-PHX-JAT (JFM)

CR-07-0798-PHX-JAT

Report & Recommendation On 

Motion To Vacate, Set Aside 

or Correct Sentence

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Movant, following his conviction in the United States District Court for the 

District of Arizona, filed a Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2255 on August 8, 2011 (Doc. 1). On October 13, 2011 Respondent filed 

its Response (Doc. 4). Movant has not replied

The Movant's Motion is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the 

undersigned makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation 

pursuant to Rule 10, Rules Governing Section 2255 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

On May 17, 2007, Movant was arrested, and on May 18, 2007 he was charged in 

a Complaint with counts of attempted re-entry after removal and re-entry after removal. 

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(Complaint, CR Doc. 2.) (The docket in the underlying criminal case, CR-07-0798-

PHX-JAT, is referenced herein as “CR Doc. ___.”) After several extensions, an 

Indictment was filed on July 3, 2007 (CR Doc. 12) charging Movant with one count of 

reentry after deportation. 

Movant proceeded to trial, but on the first day entered a plea to the sole charge in 

the indictment, without benefit of a plea agreement. (CR Doc. 46, M.E. 3/27/08.) On 

June 19, 2008, Movant was sentenced to 70 months in prison and 36 months supervised 

release. (CR Doc. 51, Judgment and Sentence.) 

B. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Movant filed a direct appeal arguing that “his guilty plea was not intelligent and 

was thus involuntary because he was unaware and not informed of his constitutional trial

rights.” (CR Doc. 76, Mem. Dec. at 1-2.) On April 1, 2011, the Ninth Circuit found that 

Movant’s plea was voluntary and intelligent, and that any failure by the District Court to 

comply with Rule 11 did not affect his substantial rights, and affirmed his conviction. 

(Id. at 3-4.)

C. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Motion - Movant commenced the current case by filing his Motion to Vacate, Set 

Aside, or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on August 8, 2011 (Doc. 1). 

Petitioner’s Petition asserts the following seven grounds for relief:

(1) He was denied his rights to the effective assistance of 

counsel and due process because his attorney failed to 

conduct a thorough investigation and interrogate witnesses, 

failed to submit a memorandum seeking the suppression of 

“frivolous” evidence, and failed to apprise Movant of his

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“substantive rights and potential defenses.”

(2) He was denied his rights to the effective assistance and due 

process because his attorney failed to file a notice of appeal 

at Movant’s request, seek a speedy trial, request Brady 

material, and submit “3553(a) factors that would have 

justified a sentencing downward departure” based on the 

insufficiency of the evidence against him. Movant also 

asserts that his attorney engaged in illegal, unethical, or

dishonest conduct to induce Movant to enter into a plea 

agreement.

(3) He did not knowingly and voluntarily enter into the plea 

agreement because the District Court failed to advise him of 

his trial rights and his rights under Rule 11 of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure. Movant also claims that he did not 

validly waive the right to appeal his sentence and the manner 

in which it was determined.

(4) A prior felony conviction is an element of the offense, rather 

than a sentencing enhancement.

(5) “The U.S.S.G. on cultural assimilation as a commentary 

amendment may be considered for a modification of sentence 

under the authority of Title 18 U.S.C.A. § 3582(c)(2).”

(6) Movant is entitled to a downward departure because he is a 

deportable alien.

(7) “The District Court committed procedural error by failing to

acknowledge and address [Movant’s] nonfrivolous fast-track 

disparity argument in support of a below-guideline 

sentence.” Movant also claims that there was procedural 

error because the District Court failed to adequately explain 

its sentence.

(Service Order, Doc. 3 at 1-2.)

Response - On October 13, 2011, Respondents filed their Response (Doc.4). 

Respondents argue:

1. Grounds 1 and 2 - Ineffective Assistance – Movant fails to do more than 

make conclusory allegations of ineffective assistance, and the record reflects 

counsel’s performance was not deficient. Thus Grounds 1 and 2 are without 

merit.

2. Ground 3 - Involuntary Plea and Waiver – Because Movant fails to show 

ineffective assistance of counsel, he has failed to show his plea was not 

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knowingly and voluntarily entered, and he did not waive a right to appeal his 

sentence.

3. Ground 4 – Sentencing Enhancement – Applicable case law shows that the 

sentencing enhancement is not an element of the offense, and Movant’s 

Ground 4 is without merit.

4. Ground 5, 6 and 7 – Sentencing Adjustments – Movant fails to show that he 

is entitled to adjustments to his sentence for cultural assimilation, status as an 

alien, or fast-track disparity, and his Grounds 5, 6, and 7 are without merit.

Reply – Movant has not filed a reply, and the time to do so has expired. (Service 

Order 8/11/11, Doc. 3 at 4.)

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. GROUNDS 1 AND 2: INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE/VOLUNTARINESS

Movant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in a variety of ways, and thus 

his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. Respondent argues that Movant 

fails to support his claims of ineffective assistance, thus he has failed to show his plea 

was involuntary.

Voluntariness - “When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court 

that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter 

raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred 

prior to the entry of the guilty plea. He may only attack the voluntary and intelligent

character of the guilty plea.” Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973). 

The Supreme Court has stated that “[w]here, as here, a defendant is represented 

by counsel during the plea process and enters his plea upon the advice of counsel, the 

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voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel’s advice was within the range of 

competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. . . . [A] defendant who pleads 

guilty upon the advice of counsel ‘may only attack the voluntary and intelligent character 

of the guilty plea by showing that the advice he received from counsel was 

[ineffective].’” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56-57 (1985) (quoting Tollett, 411 U.S. at 

267) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Ineffective Assistance - Generally, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are 

analyzed pursuant to Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In order to prevail 

on such a claim, Movant must show: (1) deficient performance - counsel’s 

representation fell below the objective standard for reasonableness; and (2) prejudice -

there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of 

the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 694; see also 

United States v. Thornton, 23 F.3d 1532, 1533 (9th Cir. 1994)(per curiam); and United 

States v. Solomon, 795 F.2d 747, 749 (9th Cir. 1986). Although the petitioner must 

prove both elements, a court may reject his claim upon finding either that counsel's 

performance was reasonable or that the claimed error was not prejudicial. Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 697.

In evaluating claims of defective performance, the court must focus on whether 

the attorney's advice was appropriate under the circumstances existing at the time of the 

guilty plea. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. In evaluating claims of prejudice, the 

defendant must prove he was prejudiced from counsel's ineffectiveness by demonstrating 

a reasonable probability that but for his attorney's errors, he would not have pleaded 

guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. at 58-59; 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; United States v. Keller, 902 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1990). 

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The defendant must show "that but for counsel’s errors, he would either have gone to 

trial or received a better plea bargain." U.S. v. Howard, 381 F.3d 873, 882 (9th Cir. 

2004).

Movant’s Claims – Movant argues that in the time leading up to his plea,1trial 

counsel was ineffective for: (1) failing to conduct a thorough investigation and 

interrogate witnesses; (2) failing to submit a memorandum seeking the suppression of 

“frivolous” evidence; (3) failing to apprise Movant of his “substantive rights and 

potential defenses”; (4) failing to seek a speedy trial; (5) failing to request Brady

material; and (7) misrepresenting the sentence to be obtained.

Cursory allegations that are purely speculative cannot support a claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel. Shah v. United States, 878 F.2d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir.

1989). Thus, for example, a defendant cannot satisfy the Strickland standard by "vague 

and conclusory allegations that some unspecified and speculative testimony might have 

established his defense." Zettlemoyer v. Fulcomer, 923 F.2d 284, 298 (3d Cir. 1991). 

Here, Movant’s allegations in instances 1 (investigation), 2 (suppression), 3 

(advice), 5 (Brady material) and 7 (sentence) are wholly conclusory. Movant proffers no 

specifics of the evidence that could have been obtained, what specific evidence should 

have been suppressed, what Brady materials were not disclosed, or how counsel 

misrepresented the sentence. 

Movant also fails to suggest what basis for a speedy trial challenge existed. “A 

criminal defendant's trial must normally commence within seventy days of the filing of 

 

1 Movant also argues that counsel was ineffective after entry of his plea by: (1) failing to 

file a notice of appeal at Movant’s request; and (2) failing to submit “3553(a) factors that 

would have justified a sentencing downward departure” based on the insufficiency of the 

evidence against him. (Motion, Doc. 1 at 4.) These alleged deficiencies occurred after 

the plea, and thus could not have affected the voluntariness of the plea.

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the indictment or the defendant's initial court appearance, whichever is later.” U.S. v. 

Daychild, 357 F.3d 1082, 1091 (9

th Cir. 2004) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). Movant 

was indicted on July 3, 2007. (CR Doc. 12.) His trial was then set for July 17, 2007 

(M.E. 7/5/07, CR Doc. 13) and then reset for August 21, 2007 (M.E. 7/18/07, CR Doc. 

14), well within the 70 day limit. 

Trial was subsequently continued 5 times, each time on Movant’s own motion, 

with the first motion being filed August 7, 2007. (CRDocs. 19, 21, 22, 23, 31, 32, 33, 

34, 37, and 38.) “Any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by any judge 

on his own motion or at the request of the defendant or his counsel” is excluded from the 

calculation of the 708 day limit. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A) The last continuance 

granted was for trial to commence on March 25, 2008. (Order 1/16/08 , CR Doc. 38.) 

On March 19, 2008, trial was continued until March 27, 2008 because of a scheduling 

conflict. (M.E. 3/19/08, CR Doc. 40.) Movant’s trial commenced on, and he pled guilty 

on, March 27, 2008. 

Thirty-five days elapsed between Movant’s indictment on July 3, 2007 and his 

first motion to extend on August 7, 2007. And two days elapsed between the final date 

requested by Movant’s continuances, March 25, 2008, and the date trial commenced, 

March 27, 2008. Thus only 37 of the permitted 70 days elapsed. Movant offers no 

explanation what basis existed for a Speedy Trial Act challenge. 

Perhaps Movant simply disagrees with counsel’s decision to seek the various 

continuances. Tactical decisions with which a defendant disagrees cannot form the basis 

for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Morris v. California, 966 F.2d at 456. 

"Mere criticism of a tactic or strategy is not in itself sufficient to support a charge of 

inadequate representation." Gustave v. United States, 627 F.2d 901, 904 (9th Cir. 1980).

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In sum, Movant fails to support with specific allegations any claim of deficient 

performance by counsel prior to entry of his plea.

Post Plea Ineffectiveness – Movant also asserts in his Ground 2 that counsel was 

ineffective after entry of his plea, by: (1) failing to file a notice of appeal at Movant’s 

request, and (2) failing to move for a downward departure pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 

3553(a) based upon the insufficiency of the evidence against him. 

Notice of Appeal – Plaintiff’s complaint about the failure to file a notice of appeal 

is without merit because a notice of appeal was filed on June 30, 2008 (CR Doc. 52), and 

the appeal was considered and rejected on the merits. (Mem. Dec. CR Doc. 76.)

Downward Departure – Movant argues counsel should have sought a downward 

departure pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) based upon the insufficiency of the evidence. 

However, that statute merely indicates the factors to be considered by the court in 

imposing a sentence. No provision is made for consideration of the insufficiency of the 

evidence, nor even its weight.

Summary – Movant fails to support his Grounds 1 or 2 by showing that counsel 

performed deficiently before or after his plea, and therefore has failed to show that his 

plea was not voluntarily entered. Accordingly, Grounds 1 and 2 must be denied.

B. GROUND THREE: RULE 11 AND VOLUNTARINESS

In his Ground 3, Movant argues that he did not knowingly and voluntarily enter 

into the plea agreement because the District Court failed to advise him of his trial rights 

and his rights under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Movant also 

claims that he did not validly waive the right to appeal his sentence and the manner in 

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which it was determined.2

Respondent argues that Movant was properly advised of his rights and the Ninth 

Circuit resolved this issue on direct appeal. Respondent argues that Movant did not, in 

fact, waive any right to appeal his sentence.

Rule 11 – Movant’s attack on the voluntariness of his plea was raised and 

resolved on direct appeal. The Ninth Circuit found that the District Court had indeed 

failed to properly advise Movant, and that the failure constituted plain error. However, 

the circuit court also found that Movant had failed to show an effect on his substantial 

rights. (Mem. Dec. CR Doc. 76 at 3-4.) 

 Ordinarily, the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel do not apply to 

habeas corpus proceedings. Sanders v. U.S., 373 U.S. 1, 8 (1963). However, the law of 

the case doctrine is applicable on federal habeas review. Shore v. Warden, 942 F.2d 

1117, 1123 (7th Cir. 1991). "The law of the case doctrine ordinarily precludes a court 

from re-examining an issue previously decided by the same court, or a higher appellate 

court, in the same case." U.S. v. Caterino, 29 F.3d 1390, 1395 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting 

U.S. v. Maybusher, 735 F.2d 366, 370 (9th Cir. 1984)). Under this doctrine, a district 

court will ordinarily refrain from acting if an appellate court previously has issued a 

decision on the merits of the claim. Caterino, 29 F.3d at 1395. Thus, the Ninth Circuit 

has long held that "[i]ssues disposed of on a previous direct appeal are not reviewable in 

 

2 Ordinarily a Section 2255 petitioner raising a claim other than ineffective assistance for 

the first time in post-conviction proceedings would be in procedural default, and would 

be precluded from asserting the claim. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 

621(1998)(finding default where petitioner challenging his guilty plea did not raise 

Bailey claim in direct appeal); United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 165 (1982) (noting 

that a motion to vacate or modify a sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 cannot be used as a 

substitute for a direct appeal). It appears that Petitioner’s Ground 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 are all 

procedurally defaulted. However, Respondent does not raise this affirmative defense. 

Because the claims are plainly without merit, and Movant has not had an opportunity to 

reply on the matter, the undersigned does not raise it sua sponte. 

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a subsequent petition under 2255." Stein v. U.S., 390 F.2d 625, 626 (9th Cir. 1968).

Accordingly, this portion of Ground 3 should be dismissed with prejudice.

Waiver of Appellate Rights – Movant’s claim that he did not validly waive his 

right to appeal his sentence is moot. Respondents do not assert any such waiver, and non 

appears from the record. 

A case is moot if it does not satisfy the case-or-controversy requirement of Article 

III, § 2, of the Constitution. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998)). “The case-orcontroversy requirement demands that, through all stages of federal judicial proceedings, 

the parties continue to have a personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit.” United 

States v. Verdin, 243 F.3d 1174, 1177 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). “This means that, throughout the litigation, the plaintiff ‘must have 

suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to 

be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.’ ” Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7 (quoting Lewis v. 

Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990)).

The lack of any contention that Movant waived his sentencing appeal rights 

means there is no threatened or actual injury and no controversy to be resolved, thus this 

claim should be dismissed with prejudice as moot.

Summary – Movant’s Ground 3 must be dismissed with prejudice, as to the Rule 

11 argument as being barred by the law of the case, and as to the waiver issue as being 

moot.

C. GROUND FOUR: SENTENCING ENHANCEMENT

For his Ground 4, Movant argues that his sentence was improperly enhanced 

based on a prior felony conviction which is an element of his offense under 18 U.S.C. § 

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1326(b)(2). Respondents argue that this claim was rejected in Almendarez-Torres v. 

United States, 523 U.S. 224, 247 (1998). 

Indeed, the Court in Almendarez-Torres rejected such an argument, and 

concluded that the additional sentence imposed under § 1326(b)(2) “is a penalty 

provision, which simply authorizes a court to increase the sentence for a recidivist. It 

does not define a separate crime.” 523 U.S. at 226. 

Movant argues that Almendarez-Torres was decided by a slim majority, and one 

of the majority has shied away from the decision. Nonetheless, Movant acknowledges 

that Almendarez-Torres remains the law of the land, and raises the issue to preserve it for 

appeal.

Indeed, Almendarez-Torres remains good law. See Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 

130 S.Ct. 2577, 2581 n.3 (2010) (citing Almendarez-Torres approvingly).

Accordingly, Movant’s Ground 4 is without merit and must be denied.

D. GROUND FIVE: CULTURAL ASSIMILATION ADJUSTMENT

In his Ground 5, Movant argues that he should have been afforded a downward 

departure on his sentence based on his cultural assimilation, asserting his long time 

residence, family in the United States, and lack of ties to Mexico. 

Respondents acknowledge that the Ninth Circuit has recognized such a departure, 

but argue that Movant has failed to show error in failing to grant him such a departure, 

and fails to show that a modification would now be permissible under 18 U.S.C. § 

3582(c)(2) and U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a). 

In U.S. v. Lipman, 133 F.3d 726 (9th Cir. 1998), the Ninth Circuit recognized that 

“a sentencing court may depart on the basis of cultural assimilation if it finds that the 

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defendant's circumstances remove his case from the heartland of cases governed by the 

relevant individual guidelines and the Guidelines as a whole.” 133 F.3d at 731. 

However, the court also concluded that the exercise of such discretion was not subject to 

review. Movant offers nothing to suggest that his case would entitle him to review on 

this issue. 

Nor does Movant suggest that a post-sentence modification on this basis is 

authorized on some other basis. Post judgment modifications are authorized under 18 

U.S.C. § 3582, but only in specified circumstances (e.g. extraordinary and compelling 

reasons, or advanced age, or subsequent reduction in sentencing guidelines). 

Modifications for “substantial assistance” are authorized under Federal Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 35(b), but that would not apply to Movant’s simple claim of assimilation.

Movant suggests the Court hold the issue in abeyance until a memorandum of law 

on the issue could be prepared. Movant has never sought to file such a memorandum, 

nor has he replied in support of his Motion. No reason to delay consideration of the 

claim has been shown.

Movant’s Ground 5 is without merit and must be denied. 

E. GROUND SIX: DOWNWARD DEPARTURE AS ALIEN 

For his Ground 6, Movant argues he is entitled to a downward departure because 

he is a deportable alien, noting his inability to participate in various early release 

programs because of his immigration detainer. Respondents argue that Ninth Circuit 

authority has rejected such a downward departure.

In U.S. v. Martinez-Ramos, 184 F.3d 1055 (9th Cir. 1999), the court recognized 

the incongruity of arguing that alien status justifies lenient sentencing for violation of 

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immigration laws. 

[T]he crime itself assumes an alien who is deportable, and 

sentencing necessarily involves a defendant who is a deportable 

alien... Absent any credible argument or evidence to the contrary, 

we must assume that the Sentencing Commission took deportable 

alien status into account when formulating a guideline that applies 

almost invariably to crimes, such as 8 U.S.C. § 1326, that may be 

committed only by aliens whose conduct makes them deportable.

Martinez-Ramos, 184 F.3d at 1058. Accordingly, the court held that “deportable status 

may not be a ground for downward departure from the applicable guideline range for 

aliens who are deportable.” Id.

F. GROUND SEVEN: FAST TRACK DISPARITY

For his Ground 7, Movant argues that the Court committed procedural error by 

failing to acknowledge and address his fast-track disparity argument in support of a 

below-guideline sentence. Movant also claims that there was procedural error because 

the District Court failed to adequately explain its sentence.

Respondents argue that Movant has no fast-track disparity argument to make 

because he was offered a fast-track plea agreement, but rejected it, and no greater 

explanation was required.

Fast Track Disparity - The sentencing statutes direct judges to consider “the 

need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records 

who have been found guilty of similar conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). In United 

States v. Marcial-Santiago, 447 F.3d 715, 718 (9th Cir.2006), the Ninth Circuit held that 

sentencing disparities between defendants prosecuted in districts that offer fast-track 

programs and defendants prosecuted in non-fast-track districts are not “unwarranted”

within the meaning of § 3553(a)(6), and thus did not justify a downward departure. In 

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U.S. v. Vasquez-Landaver, 527 F.3d 798 (9th Cir. 2008), the court extended MarcialSantiago’s reasoning on inter-district disparities to intra-district disparities. 

In U.S. v. Gonzalez-Zotelo, 556 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2009), the court rejected 

arguments that the district court nonetheless retained authority to grant a departure based 

upon the judge’s policy disagreement with disparate sentencing under fast-track 

programs, noting that the PROTECT Act of 2003 had expressed a congressional policy 

of permitting disparities for fast-track defendants. Although Kimbrough v. U.S., 552 

U.S. 85 (2007) “permits a district court to consider its policy disagreements with the 

Guidelines, it does not authorize a district judge to take into account his disagreements 

with congressional policy.” Id. at 741.

Thus, no fast-track disparity departure was permissible, and the district court did 

not err in failing to consider or grant one.

Explanation of Sentence – Movant complains the sentence was not adequately 

explained because the trial court failed to give its reasons for rejecting Movant’s 

arguments at sentencing. The obligations of the district court in this regard were 

addressed in U.S. v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984 (9

th Cir. 2008):

Once the sentence is selected, the district court must explain 

it sufficiently to permit meaningful appellate review. A statement of 

reasons is required by statute, § 3553(c), and furthers the proper 

administration of justice. An explanation communicates that the 

parties' arguments have been heard, and that a reasoned decision has 

been made. It is most helpful for this to come from the bench, but 

adequate explanation in some cases may also be inferred from the 

PSR or the record as a whole.

What constitutes a sufficient explanation will necessarily 

vary depending upon the complexity of the particular case, whether 

the sentence chosen is inside or outside the Guidelines, and the 

strength and seriousness of the proffered reasons for imposing a 

sentence that differs from the Guidelines range. A within-Guidelines 

sentence ordinarily needs little explanation unless a party has 

requested a specific departure, argued that a different sentence is

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otherwise warranted, or challenged the Guidelines calculation itself 

as contrary to § 3553(a). This is because both the Commission and 

the sentencing judge have determined that the sentence comports 

with the § 3553(a) factors and is appropriate in the ordinary case. 

But the judge must explain why he imposes a sentence outside the 

Guidelines.

Carty, 520 F.3d at 992 (citations omitted).

A district judge is required to make an “individualized 

determination” of a sentence based on the facts. Although the judge 

is not required to “tick off each of the § 3553(a) factors to show that 

it has considered them,” he is required to provide “defendantspecific reasons for imposing a certain sentence” in order to comply 

with § 3553.

Gonzalez-Zotelo, 556 F.3d at 742.

As noted by Respondent, the district court judge issued a sentence within the 

guidelines. Moreover, the court explicitly acknowledged considering “all of the 

subparagraphs of [18 U.S.C. § 3553](a).” (R.T. 6/17/08, CRDoc. 62 at 17.) 

Further, this was not a case where counsel raised a series of arguments and the 

court tacitly sat by and then simply pronounced a final sentence. Defense counsel 

argued at length for a departure from the guidelines based upon the excessiveness of the 

sentence for what counsel characterized as a “trespass” and the sentences given to 

similar defendants under the fast-track program. The court rejected the arguments, citing 

Carty, and noting that Movant had not pled guilty until half way through jury selection. 

With regard to counsel’s arguments, the court explicitly rejected them, stating:

With respect to Mr. Fontes' argument, I've considered those. They 

were presented to the Court here initially this morning, with perhaps 

more rhetoric than I'm generally accustomed to in these cases, and 

his personal opinions about matters which do not in my judgment 

reflect what the current law is and what I can do and not do.

* * *

But if, in fact, I followed your thoughts, Mr. Fontes, and the case 

went up to the Ninth Circuit, I'm convinced that it would be 

reversed eo instanter [sic], very quickly. And that the Supreme 

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Court would deny review very quickly because of your

characteristics about what those matters are and what a judge

considers now and what I said I've considered in this case.

(Id. at 18-19.) The court also noted its review of the presentence report, and 

characterized it as “generous or accommodating.” (Id.)

Movant does not suggest what more the court should have done. Neither §3553 

nor Carty requires more.

Accordingly, Movant’s Ground 7 is without merit and should be denied.

G. SUMMARY

Movant’s Ground 3 (Rule 11) is partially moot and partially barred by the law of 

the case, and must be dismissed with prejudice. Movant’s Grounds 1 and 2 (Ineffective 

Assistance), 4 (Sentencing Enhancement), 5 (Cultural Assimilation), 6 (Alien Downward 

Departure) and 7 (Fast-Track Disparity) are without merit and must be denied.

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2255 Cases, requires 

that in habeas cases the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability 

when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in 

cases concerning detention arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a 

proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). 

Here, the Motion to Vacate is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The 

recommendations if accepted will result in Movant’s Motion to Vacate being resolved 

adversely to Movant. Accordingly, a decision on a certificate of Appealability is 

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required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability 

(“COA”) is whether the applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the 

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is 

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “When the district court denies a habeas petition 

on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a 

COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right 

and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in 

its procedural ruling.” Id.

Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the 

district court’s judgment, that decision will be in part on procedural grounds, and in part 

on the merits. To the extent that Petitioner’s claims are rejected on procedural grounds, 

under the reasoning set forth herein, the undersigned finds that “jurists of reason” would 

not “find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” To 

the extent that Petitioner’s claims are rejected on the merits, under the reasoning set forth 

herein, the claims are plainly without merit. Accordingly, to the extent that the Court 

adopts this Report & Recommendation as to the Petition, a certificate of appealability 

should be denied.

/ /

/ /

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V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Ground Three of Movant's 

Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, filed 

August 8, 2011 (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the remainder of Movant's Motion to 

Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, filed August8, 2011 

(Doc. 1) be DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that to the extent the reasoning of this 

Report & Recommendation is adopted, that a certificate of appealability BE DENIED.

VI. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties 

shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 10, Rules 

Governing Section 2255 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any 

findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a 

party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's 

right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant 

to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-

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47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Dated: March 9, 2012

11-1553r RR 12 02 28 on HC.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

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