Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-00480/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-00480-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 443
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Accommodations
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilities Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

JAMES SANFORD,

NO. CIV. S 02-0480 MCE JFM

Plaintiff,

v. ORDER

THRIFTY PAYLESS, INC., dba

RITE AID CORPORATION,

Defendant.

----oo0oo----

Through the present motion, Plaintiff James Sanford

(“Plaintiff”) seeks attorney’s fees and litigation expenses,

pursuant to both state law and 42 U.S.C. § 12205 of the Americans

with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), as a result of his May 24, 2005

acceptance of an Offer of Judgment submitted by Defendant Thrifty

Payless, Inc. dba Rite Aid (“Rite Aid”) pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 68. Pursuant to that Offer of Judgment, Rite

Aid agreed to pay $4,001.00 in damages to Plaintiff, and further

agreed to remedy certain Title III ADA violations, as alleged by

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Plaintiff, pertaining to Rite Aid’s facility located at 4980

Freeport Blvd. In Sacramento. Plaintiff now requests $28,531.50

for fees incurred by various attorneys, paralegals, and legal

assistants, and $20,708.30 for costs and litigation expenses, for

a total of $49,239.80. Rite Aid opposes the motion, claiming

that the fees and expenses sought are excessive and unreasonable.

BACKGROUND

This dispute arises from Plaintiff’s claim that he

encountered architectural barriers making it difficult or

impossible for him to access various portions of Rite Aid’s

Sacramento Freeport facility. Plaintiff is a quadriplegic with

limited arm strength, and requires the use of a wheelchair for

mobility. 

Plaintiff filed his lawsuit against Rite Aid on March 6,

2002. On September 5, 2003, Plaintiff moved for summary

judgment, or in the alternative for summary adjudication of

issues, claiming that his declaration, as well as expert

declarations obtained from Ronald Wilson and Joe Card,

established his entitlement to judgment as a matter of law

against Rite Aid. The Court denied Plaintiff’s motion, by

Memorandum and Order filed October 17, 2003, on grounds that the

proffered declarations were inadmissible and failed to support

his request for summary judgment.

Thereafter, as stated above, Plaintiff accepted Rite Aid’s

Offer of Judgment in this case, which included provisions for

both payment of damages in the amount of $4001.00 as well as

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provisions for remediating Rite Aid’s claimed ADA violations. 

Plaintiff filed the instant motion for fees and costs after

judgment was entered against Rite Aid on or about June 9, 2005.

STANDARD

Plaintiff’s complaint alleged violations of federal and

California law. Plaintiff’s federal claim arose under the ADA,

while his state law claims arose under the California’s Unruh

Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 51, California Health & Safety Code §

19953, and the California Disabled Persons Act, Cal. Civ. Code §

54-55. 

Section 12205 of the ADA authorizes a court, in its

discretion, to “allow the prevailing party, other than the United

States, a reasonable attorney’s fee, including litigation

expenses, and costs . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 12205. A prevailing

plaintiff under a statute so worded “should recover an attorney’s

fee unless special circumstances would render such an award

unjust.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1976).

Section 55 of the California Disabled Persons Act provides

that “the prevailing party in the action shall be entitled to

recover reasonable attorney’s fees.” Cal. Civ. Code § 55. Also,

under California Health & Safety Code § 19953, “[a]ny person who

is aggrieved or potentially aggrieved by a violation of this part

. . . may bring an action to enjoin the violation. The

prevailing party in the action shall be entitled to recover

reasonable attorney’s fees.” 

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ANALYSIS

Rite Aid does not dispute that Plaintiff, as the prevailing

party in this litigation, may recover both attorneys’ fees, as

well as litigation expenses and costs, in pursuing the instant

case. Rite Aid nonetheless asserts that the Court should

exercise its discretion in determining that, under the

circumstances present, those fees and expenses should either be

disallowed in their entirety or significantly reduced.

Rite Aid first asks the Court to follow the Central

District’s recent decision in Doran v. Del Taco, Inc., 373 F.

Supp. 2d 1028 (C.D. Cal. 2005), which denied attorneys’ fees in

an ADA case where the plaintiff had neither provided prelitigation notice of his intent to sue nor afforded the

defendant, prior to suit, a reasonable opportunity to cure any

alleged violations. As even the Doran court recognized,

however, there is no Ninth Circuit precedent requiring an ADA

plaintiff to provide notice before filing suit. Id. at 1031. 

Indeed, in Botosan v. Paul McNally Realty, 216 F.3d 827, 832 (9th

Cir. 2000), the Ninth Circuit held squarely to the contrary. 

Moreover, as Doran further concedes, repeated efforts by Congress

to amend the ADA to provide pre-suit notice have uniformly

failed. Id. Consequently, even assuming Plaintiff failed to

provide Rite Aid with adequate notice of its ADA shortcomings

before instituting this lawsuit, the Court declines to rely on

the reasoning of Doran in altogether denying Plaintiff’s instant

request for fees/expenses.

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This Court must therefore determine the extent to which

attorneys’ fees and litigation expenses are recoverable. In

making that assessment, the Court must identify the applicable

“lodestar” for calculating attorneys’ fees. Under the lodestar

method, a court multiplies the number of hours the prevailing

attorney reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable

hourly rate. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433; see also Ketchum v.

Moses, 24 Cal. 4th 1122, 1132 (2001) (expressly approving the use

of prevailing hourly rates as a basis for the lodestar). Courts

may then adjust the lodestar to reflect other aspects of the

case. See Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70

(9th Cir. 1975); see also Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 25

(1977).

Turning first to the number of hours reasonably billed, the

Court finds that certain categories of claimed fees are

unreasonable and will not be permitted. As indicated above,

Plaintiff filed a summary judgment motion based upon declarations

that even he conceded were inadmissible. Plaintiff should not be

permitted to recover fees based on that ill-taken motion.

Fees for unsuccessful stages of litigation are not

recoverable, unless such un unsuccessful stage was a necessary

step towards ultimate victory. Cabrales v. County of Los

Angeles, 935 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9 Cir. 1991). Given the clear th

deficits of Plaintiff’s motion and the fact that the case settled

soon thereafter based on Rite Aid’s Offer of Judgment, this Court

cannot conclude that the summary judgment was a necessary step

towards victory. No fees or expenses associated with that motion

will therefore be allowed. A total of $4,399.50 in fees will be

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While Plaintiff did provide an amended declaration of Mr. 1

Card in reply to Rite Aid’s opposition, that declaration was

procedurally improper and was consequently not admissible in

determining the propriety of summary judgment.

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disallowed on that basis, as will $75.03 in courier/overnight

fees associated with Plaintiff’s summary judgment motion.

Even more significant than the fees generated by Plaintiff’s

attempt at summary judgment were expert expenses incurred in

attempting to provide factual support for the motion. In that

regard, Plaintiff seeks $15,226.62 for expenses incurred by Joe

Card. No report was ever submitted on Mr. Card’s behalf, and his

activity in this matter consisted of preparing architectural

plans with proposed changes to the Rite Aid facility, along with

an unsubstantiated cost breakdown. No proper foundation for the

opinions presented in those plans was provided. In now 1

requesting reimbursement for the cost of Mr. Card’s services,

Plaintiff submits a three line invoice that provides little

evidence as to just what Mr. Card actually did, let alone whether

his charges are reasonable, as they must be for this Court to

direct that they be paid by Rite Aid. Moreover, Mr. Card’s work

was performed to support a baseless summary judgment motion in

any event. The Court must therefore conclude that Plaintiff

should not be permitted to recoup any monies paid for Mr. Card’s

services.

Two other general classifications of fees sought by

Plaintiff will also not be permitted. Plaintiff seeks a total of

$1,842.75 for services performed by legal assistants in this

case. While the Court will permit recovery of time expended by

paralegals (see Shaffer v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. App. 4th

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Rite Aid does argue that certain paralegal costs should be 2

disallowed because they were “clerical/secretarial” in nature. 

The Court declines, however, to parse the paralegal tasks

performed that closely and will permit reimbursement of the

amounts claimed by Plaintiff for paralegal services.

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993 (1995)), secretarial costs are deemed by courts within 2

this circuit to constitute overhead, or the cost of doing

business, and are thus not separately reimbursable. See,

e.g., Loskot v. USA Gas Corporation, CIV. S-01-2125 WBS KJM

(E.D. April 26, 2004), citing In re Pac. Exp., Inc., 56 B.R.

859, 865 (Bkrtcy. E.D. Cal. 1985); In re Wepsic, 238 B.R. 845,

851 (Bkrtcy. S.D. Cal. 1999) (even though attorney billed for

preparation of the service of the complaint at half her hourly

rate, the court disallowed the cost, finding that it was

secretarial in nature and therefor part of general overhead);

Connally v. Denny’s Inc., CV-F 96-5521 SMS (E.D. Cal. Aug 10,

1999) (holding that administrative work was not recoverable). 

The Court will not therefore not require that Rite Aid pay for

time expended in this matter by legal assistants ($1,842.75) on

Plaintiff’s behalf.

Finally, although Plaintiff’s counsel maintains offices in

Chico, he seeks reimbursement for travel time to Sacramento. 

This is despite the fact, as Rite Aid points out, that

Plaintiff’s counsel has filed literally hundreds of cases in the

Sacramento Division of the Eastern District within the last five

years. No evidence has been presented suggesting that

Plaintiff’s counsel tries more cases in Chico than in Sacramento,

or that Plaintiff’s counsel maintains offices outside the

Sacramento area for any reason other than his own convenience. 

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In addition, while Plaintiff claims $700.00 for counsel’s 3

travel time to Los Angeles on July 30, 2003 for the Musser

Deposition, Rite Aid claims that deposition was actually for

three different cases and must be allocated accordingly. 

Plaintiff does not refute that assertion in his reply, and 

$500.50 will thus be deducted from the total attorneys’ fees

claimed due to that discrepancy.

Rite Aid makes an additional argument that any time 4

expended after March 21, 2005, when its served its initial Offer

of Judgment, should be excluded. The Court, however, disagrees

due to the fact that the revised Offer of Judgment ultimately

accepted was materially different from its predecessor in

specifying just what remediation activities would occur.

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Rite Aid should not be required to shoulder travel expenses to

Sacramento, and $1,575.00 in claimed attorneys’ fees for such

travel will not be permitted.3

Aside from general classifications of time expended, which,

as discussed above, were not found to be reasonable, the Court 4

must also determine the reasonableness of the number of hours

claimed for any otherwise compensable task. In opposing the

reasonableness of Plaintiff’s claimed charges for preparing

documents that are literally the same in this case as in dozens

of other cases also filed by Plaintiff’s counsel, Rite Aid points

to the fact that the complaint, discovery, deposition notices and

subpoenas issued in this case are no different from those

generated by the myriad of other cases litigated by Plaintiff’s

counsel. After analyzing the billing entries generated by

Plaintiff’s counsel and the evidence submitted by Rite Aid, the

Court agrees that the claimed charges are not reasonable. A

total of $2,425.00 in claimed fees will be deducted for that

reason.

The above analysis all pertains to the reasonableness of the

number of hours for which compensation is sought. The second

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step of the lodestar analysis requires that the rate sought to be

charged per hour also be reasonable. Courts generally calculate

reasonable hourly rates according to the prevailing market rates

in the relevant legal community. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886,

895 (1984). The general rule is that courts use the rates of

attorneys practicing in the forum district, in this case, the

Eastern District of California, Sacramento Division. Gates v.

Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392,1405 (1993); Davis v. Mason County, 927

F.2d 1473, 1488 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied 502 U.S. 899

(1991). 

The burden is on the fee applicant to produce satisfactory

evidence that the requested rates are “in line with those

prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of

reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.” Blum,

465 U.S. at 895 n.11. A court will normally deem a rate

determined this way to be reasonable. Id.

In this case, Rite Aid does not dispute the $250.00 rate

sought on behalf of attorney Lynn Hubbard for Plaintiff as

unreasonable. (Opp., 15:7-8). Nor does Rite Aid question the

$75.00 hourly rate requested by Plaintiff for paralegal services.

Id. Rite Aid does, however, question the $175.00 sought by

associate attorneys Scott Hubbard and Adam Sorrels. Courts in

this district have generally limited associate attorney

compensation to $150 per hour in cases of this nature. See,

e.g., Loskot v. USA Gas Corporation, CIV. S-01-2125 WBS KJM (E.D.

Cal. April 26, 2004); Pickern v. Marino’s Pizza & Italian Rest.,

CIV. S-01-1096 WBS GGH (E.D. Cal. April 9, 2003); Loskot v. Pine

Street Sch. Off. Bldg., CIV. S-00-2405 DFL JFM (E.D. Cal. Nov. 7,

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2002). Consequently, after deducing 3 hours already deemed

excessive by the Court as discussed above, a total of 6.4 hours

remaining is reduced from $175/hour to $150/hour, for a total

reduction of $160.00.

Lastly, Plaintiff may recover, as part of the award of

attorneys’ fees in this matter, litigation expenses pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 2205. The term “litigation expenses” in Section

12205 has been interpreted to include “the same out-of-pocket

expenses that are recoverable under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.” Robbins

v. Scholastic Book Fairs, 928 F. Supp. 1027, 1037 (D. Or. 1996). 

Under Section 1988, Plaintiff recover those out-of-pocket

expenses that “would normally be charged to a fee paying client.” 

Harris v. Marhoefer, 24 F.3d 16, 19 (9th Cir. 1994).

As stated above, Plaintiff seeks a total of $20,708.30 in

litigation expenses. The $15,226.62 claimed for Joe Card’s

services, as well as $75.03 sought in courier/overnight expenses

in connection with Plaintiff’s failed summary judgment motion,

has already been disallowed and will be deducted from that

amount. In addition, the amount sought by Plaintiff includes

some $1,748.25 already claimed as costs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1920. That amount will not be awarded twice and will also be

deducted. Finally, consistent with footnote 3, supra, expenses

claimed in connection with the Musser deposition must be split

between three cases, resulting in a reduction from the $426.08

claimed to $284.05. The remaining litigation expenses sought by

Plaintiff, which total $3,516.37, will be allowed.

//

//

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Because oral argument would not be of material assistance, 5

this matter was deemed suitable for decision without oral

argument. E.D. Local Rule 78-230(h).

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CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff is entitled to reasonable

attorneys’ fees in the amount of $17,628.75 and reasonable

litigation expenses in the amount of $3,516.37, for a total of

$21,145.12. Plaintiff will accordingly be awarded that amount.5

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 11, 2005

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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