Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00815/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00815-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Marcel Ralph Pelletier, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of Social 

Security Administration, 

Defendant.

No. CV11-0815-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

 Plaintiff Marcel Ralph Pelletier filed an application for disability insurance 

benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act on May 12, 2007. Tr. 16. He filed an 

application for supplemental security income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act 

on May 22, 2007. Id. In both applications, Plaintiff alleged a disability onset date of 

March 15, 2007. Id. The applications were denied initially on October 18, 2007, and 

upon reconsideration on June 12, 2008. Id. A hearing before an administrative law judge 

(“ALJ”) was held on October 7, 2009. Tr. 32-54. The ALJ issued his decision on 

December 18, 2009, finding that Plaintiff was not disabled for purposes of receiving 

disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income because he could perform 

work that existed in significant numbers. Tr. 27. This decision became Defendant’s final 

decision when the Appeals Council denied review. Tr. 1-3. Plaintiff commenced this 

action for judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). For the reasons that follow, the 

Court will affirm Defendant’s decision. 

Case 2:11-cv-00815-DGC Document 23 Filed 01/18/12 Page 1 of 12
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

I. Background. 

 A. Physical Impairments. 

Plaintiff originally ruptured his right knee quadriceps tendon in July or August 

2005 and underwent surgical knee repair shortly thereafter. Tr. 367. His knee became 

infected and required hospitalization in October 2005. Tr. 352-53. In May 2006, 

Plaintiff received surgery to drain his infected right knee and remove loose hardware 

from his right patella. Tr. 286. A January 2007 x-ray revealed “multiple patellar defects, 

presumably related to prior internal fixation hardware,” with fracture of the patella and 

surrounding soft tissue swelling and effusion. Tr. 305. The infection persisted, and 

Plaintiff received surgery in April 2007 to remove the patella. Tr. 314-15. 

 In August 2007, a state agency physician, Dr. M. Desai, opined that Plaintiff could 

perform a range of medium work that allowed occasional use of the right lower 

extremity; occasional climbing of ramps and stairs, balancing, crouching, and crawling; 

frequent stooping, no kneeling or climbing ladders, ropes, and scaffolds; and avoiding 

hazards. Tr. 377-83. An examination in September 2007 showed that Plaintiff was 

limping and experiencing tenderness in his right knee, but that he had no deformity or 

effusion. Tr. 416. He had a good range of motion with normal strength. Tr. 417. His 

neurological examination was normal. Id. 

 Dr. Fernando DeCastro, Plaintiff’s primary care physician, referred him to the 

Pain Center of Arizona, where he was initially evaluated by Dr. Ramoun D. Jones on 

September 5, 2007. Tr. 428-33. Plaintiff was placed on narcotic pain medication 

(Tr. 432) and received a muscle relaxant through Dr. DeCastro (Tr. 441, 766). 

 A November 2007 x-ray and bone scan with Dr. Gregory Sirounian showed 

arthritis of the knee and moderate to severe degenerative changes, making Plaintiff a 

candidate for knee replacement surgery. Tr. 413, 415. Plaintiff had surgery for a right 

knee replacement on February 25, 2008. Tr. 551-53. After surgery, x-rays of Plaintiff’s 

right knee showed no problems. Tr. 506-07. He experienced some stiffness. Tr. 506. 

He reported that his knee pain was much better than prior to surgery, but he continued to 

Case 2:11-cv-00815-DGC Document 23 Filed 01/18/12 Page 2 of 12
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

use narcotic medication. Id. 

 In June 2008, a nonexamining state agency physician, Dr. Thomas Glodek, 

completed a residual functional capacity (“RFC”) assessment form, in which he rated 

Plaintiff’s work ability at the light exertional level. Tr. 517-20. He opined that Plaintiff 

could perform a light range of work that allowed for occasionally climbing ramps and 

stairs; frequently stooping, balancing, crouching, kneeling, and crawling; never climbing 

ladders, ropes, and scaffolds; and avoiding hazards. Id. 

 On July 7, 2008, Dr. DeCastro completed a RFC assessment. Tr. 560-61. He 

rated Plaintiff’s pain at “moderately severe,” which “seriously affects ability to function.” 

Tr. 560. Dr. DeCastro found that Plaintiff’s pain could reasonably be expected to result 

from objective clinical or diagnostic findings. Id. He marked that Plaintiff’s pain 

frequently interfered with attention and concentration, and constantly resulted in failure 

to complete tasks in a timely manner. Id. at 560-61. At Plaintiff’s hearing, the vocational 

expert testified that these limitations would preclude the ability to sustain work. Tr. 53. 

 Plaintiff had a follow-up visit with Dr. Sirounian in February 2009. At the time, 

his right knee was reportedly doing better, though he experienced continued pain and 

stiffness. Tr. 602. He was ambulatory and full weight bearing. Id. X-rays of his right 

knee showed that the knee replacement components were well fixed and without 

problems; x-rays of his left knee showed moderate degenerative changes. Id. Plaintiff 

underwent a series of joint fluid injections to his left knee. Tr. 596-601. 

 On July 6, 2009, Plaintiff saw Dr. DeCastro to check his weight. Tr. 710. 

Plaintiff has a medical history of morbid obesity and has been dieting, walking, and doing 

acquatic exercises. Id.

B. Mental Impairments.

 In June 2007, Plaintiff was diagnosed with depressive and anxiety disorders at 

Jewish Family and Children’s Services. Tr. 481. He was assessed a global assessment 

functioning (“GAF”) rating of 60, which indicates moderate limitations but is at the top 

of the GAF scores for the moderate range. Id. The GAF scale ranges from 1 to 100 and 

Case 2:11-cv-00815-DGC Document 23 Filed 01/18/12 Page 3 of 12
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

reflects a person’s overall psychological, social, and occupational functioning. See 

Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 169 F.3d 595, 598 n.1; Vargas v. Lambert, 159 F.3d 

1161, 1164 n.2 (9th Cir. 1998). A GAF score of 41 to 50 indicates severe symptoms or 

severe difficulty in functioning and a GAF score of 51 to 60 indicates moderate 

symptoms or moderate difficulty in functioning. See id. Nurse practitioner Gayle 

Campbell prescribed antidepressants for Plaintiff. Tr. 481. 

 In August 2007, Plaintiff was examined by Dr. Marc Strickland. Tr. 389-94. Dr. 

Strickland reviewed Plaintiff’s history and performed a mental status examination. He 

diagnosed major depression and assessed a GAF rating of 63. Tr. 393. Dr. Strickland 

observed that “the likelihood of recovery at this time is poor because of inability for him 

to work due to his medical condition.” Id. He concluded, “I do not feel [Plaintiff] could 

perform work activities on a consistent basis or complete a normal workday and 

workweek, both due to his physical condition as well as his psychiatric condition. 

Furthermore, the stress encountered in a competitive work environment may deepen his 

depression.” Id. Dr. Strickland found that Plaintiff had mild limitations in some 

capacities, such as carrying out short and simple job instructions, responding 

appropriately to supervision, and getting along with coworkers. Tr. 384-87. He assessed 

moderate limitations in activities such as maintaining attention and concentration for 

extended periods, performing activities within a schedule, maintaining regular attendance 

and punctuality, sustaining an ordinary schedule without special supervision, working in 

proximity to others without being distracted by them, and completing a normal work 

week without interruptions from psychologically-based symptoms. Tr. 385-86. The 

vocational expert at Plaintiff’s hearing testified that the cumulative effect of the moderate 

limitations would preclude work on a sustained basis. Tr. 52. 

 In October 2007, a nonexamining psychologist, Dr. Charles Lawrence, rated 

Plaintiff’s mental impairments as not severe. Tr. 396. Dr. Lawrence noted that 

Dr. Strickland’s opinion that Plaintiff could not work due to his physical condition as 

well as his psychological condition would be given “limited weight” because “Dr. 

Case 2:11-cv-00815-DGC Document 23 Filed 01/18/12 Page 4 of 12
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Strickland did not perform a physical exam, nor would he appear qualified to do so, and 

he should not be assessing limitations based upon physical conditions.” Tr. 408. 

 C. ALJ Hearing. 

At his October 7, 2009 hearing, Plaintiff testified that he stopped work in 2007 

because his “kneecap shattered and the infection set in again, and was coming and oozing 

out, and I went to the doctor and they took me off from work, and then I got a letter that I 

was terminated because of my disability.” Tr. 40. The vocational expert, Dr. Mitchell, 

classified Plaintiff’s past relevant work and responded to a hypothetical question from the 

ALJ that mirrored Dr. Glodek’s assessment. See Tr. 516-23. Dr. Mitchell testified that 

Plaintiff could perform a job as a security guard at the light exertional level. Tr. 51. On 

cross examination by Plaintiff’s attorney, Dr. Mitchell testified that the cumulative effect 

of the psychological limitations assessed by Dr. Strickland would preclude sustained 

work. Tr. 52. Dr. Mitchell also testified that the physical limitations assessed by Dr. 

DeCastro would preclude sustained work. Tr. 53. 

II. Standard of Review. 

Defendant’s decision to deny benefits will be vacated “only if it is not supported 

by substantial evidence or is based on legal error.” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 

466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006). “‘Substantial evidence’ means more than a mere 

scintilla, but less than a preponderance, i.e., such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind 

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. To determine whether substantial 

evidence supports Defendant’s decision, the Court must review the administrative record 

as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports the decision and the evidence that 

detracts from it. Reddick v. Charter, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998). If there is 

sufficient evidence to support Defendant’s determination, the Court cannot substitute its 

own determination. See Young v. Sullivan, 911 F.2d 180, 184 (9th Cir. 1990). 

III. Analysis. 

Plaintiff claims that the ALJ erred by (1) rejecting the assessment of the treating 

physician, Dr. DeCastro, (2) rejecting the assessment of the examining psychologist, 

Case 2:11-cv-00815-DGC Document 23 Filed 01/18/12 Page 5 of 12
- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Dr. Strickland, (3) rejecting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony, and (4) finding Plaintiff’s 

mental impairments “nonsevere.” Doc. 16, at 1-2. Plaintiff asks the Court to exercise its 

discretion to remand for a determination of disability benefits. Id. at 2. 

A. The ALJ did not err by rejecting Dr. DeCastro’s pain assessment. 

Dr. DeCastro was Plaintiff’s treating physician. He rated Plaintiff’s pain at 

“moderately severe,” which “seriously affects ability to function.” Tr. 560. He opined 

that Plaintiff’s pain would frequently interfere with attention and concentration, and that 

Plaintiff would constantly experience deficiencies of concentration, persistence, or pace 

resulting in failure to complete tasks in a timely manner. Tr. 561. Dr. Mitchell, the 

vocational expert at Plaintiff’s hearing, testified that the limitations noted by 

Dr. DeCastro in his July 2008 RFC assessment would prevent Plaintiff from sustaining 

work. Tr. 53. The ALJ considered Dr. DeCastro’s RFC assessment. Tr. 24. The ALJ 

gave Dr. DeCastro’s opinion “little weight as it appears to be based primarily on 

subjective complaints and is not supported by clinical signs, diagnostic examinations and 

other evidence[.]” Tr. 25. 

 The opinions of treating physicians are given greater weight than the opinions of 

non-treating physicians. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1996). An ALJ is 

not bound to accept a treating physician’s opinion; however, “[w]here the treating 

doctor’s opinion is not contradicted by another doctor, it may be rejected only for ‘clear 

and convincing’ reasons.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998). Where 

there is conflicting medical evidence, the ALJ must state specific and legitimate reasons 

supported by substantial evidence in the record. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 632 

(9th Cir. 2007). The ALJ can meet this burden by setting out a detailed and thorough 

summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his own interpretation 

thereof, and making findings. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 725 (citing Magallanes v. Bowen, 

881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989)). Plaintiff argues that the clear and convincing 

standard should apply “because the ALJ did not rely on any substantial evidence that 

contradicted the treating physician’s assessment.” Doc. 16, at 19. Plaintiff correctly 

Case 2:11-cv-00815-DGC Document 23 Filed 01/18/12 Page 6 of 12
- 7 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

notes that the opinion of a nonexamining physician cannot by itself constitute substantial 

evidence that justifies the rejection of an examining or treating physician. Ryan v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec’y, 528 F.3d 1194, 1202 (9th Cir. 2008). The ALJ did rely in part on 

the opinion of Dr. Glodek, a nonexamining physician, that Plaintiff could perform 

physical activity at the light exertional level. Tr. 24. But he also comprehensively 

discussed medical evidence in the record that conflicted with Dr. DeCastro’s assessment, 

and therefore only needed to state specific and legitimate reasons for discounting Dr. 

DeCastro’s opinion. 

 The ALJ noted that Dr. DeCastro’s opinion “appears to be based primarily on 

subjective complaints[.]” Tr. 25. Dr. DeCastro did not assess Plaintiff’s ability to do 

work-related physical activities and left much of the form blank. Tr. 557-59. He 

explained, “I do not do functional capacity evaluation.” Tr. 557. The ALJ need not 

accept the opinion of any physician, including a treating physician, if that opinion is 

“brief, conclusory, and inadequately supported by clinical findings.” Thomas v. 

Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002). Given that Dr. DeCastro did not perform a 

physical functional capacity evaluation, the ALJ reasonably inferred that the pain 

functional capacity assessment was based on Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. See 

Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec’y, 359 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004) (permitting an ALJ 

to give minimal weight to a treating physician’s opinion when it was based on subjective 

complaints without supportive objective evidence). 

 The ALJ cited clinical evidence that contradicted Dr. DeCastro’s assessment. 

Specifically, the ALJ considered a June 2008 treatment note following Plaintiff’s right 

knee surgery, which reported that the knee appeared “well-healed with no focal 

tenderness,” “minimal soft tissue swelling and no effusion or deformity,” and “no sign of 

anterior, posterior, varus, or valgus instability[.]” Tr. 23-24. In a February 2009 

treatment note entered after Dr. DeCastro’s evaluation, Dr. Sirounian reported that the 

Plaintiff still had some pain and stiffness, but that he “was ambulatory and full weight 

bearing,” and that he now alleged that his left knee was starting to hurt him more than the 

Case 2:11-cv-00815-DGC Document 23 Filed 01/18/12 Page 7 of 12
- 8 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

right knee, though he had not yet sought specific treatment for the left knee. Tr. 24. 

“The [Plaintiff] denied locking and instability and the pain was essentially with weight 

bearing activities, and not much pain at rest.” Id. 

 The ALJ discussed the facts and medical evidence in detail, provided his own 

interpretation of the evidence – that Dr. DeCastro’s opinion was inconsistent with the 

medical record – and made findings accordingly. See Reddick, 157 F.3d at 725. The 

Court concludes that the ALJ met his burden of providing specific and legitimate reasons 

for discounting Dr. DeCastro’s assessment. 

B. The ALJ did not err by rejecting Dr. Strickland’s psychological 

assessment. 

Dr. Strickland, Plaintiff’s examining psychologist, opined that Plaintiff could not 

perform work activities on a consistent basis or complete a normal workday and 

workweek “both due to his physical condition as well as his psychiatric condition.” 

Tr. 393. Dr. Mitchell, the vocational expert, testified that the cumulative effect of the 

moderate limitations assessed by Dr. Strickland would preclude sustained work. Tr. 52. 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by rejecting Dr. Strickland’s assessment. Doc. 16, 

at 23. 

 1. Plaintiff’s GAF Scores. 

 First, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ should not have consulted medical texts outside 

the record and should not have treated the GAF scores as predictors of ability to work 

because they were not assessed in a work setting. Doc. 16, at 24. Plaintiff does not cite 

any evidence in the record indicating that the ALJ did either of these things, nor does the 

Court’s review of the ALJ’s opinion reveal support for either of Plaintiff’s assertions. 

The ALJ did not consider Plaintiff’s GAF scores in isolation, but rather considered 

Plaintiff’s entire mental health treatment record. Examinations indicated that Plaintiff 

was fully oriented and that his memory appeared normal. See, e.g., Tr. 447, 452, 772. 

Plaintiff had no problems with grooming, dressing, and hygiene, and was able to take 

care of his girlfriend’s children and household pets. Tr. 155-57. He could prepare simple 

Case 2:11-cv-00815-DGC Document 23 Filed 01/18/12 Page 8 of 12
- 9 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

meals, perform light chores, drive, shop, and manage his own finances. Id. He attended 

weekly club meetings, socialized, and attended appointments. Tr. 158. He did not have 

difficulty paying attention or following instructions. Tr. 159. Dr. Strickland noted that 

Plaintiff had linear and goal-directed thoughts, did not exhibit looseness of association, 

denied auditory or visual hallucinations, appeared to have intact recent memory, could 

think abstractly, and appeared to have good judgment. Id. Dr. Strickland noticed that 

Plaintiff’s past memory appeared somewhat suspect in that he recalled one out of three 

recent presidents, but could recite his phone number and birthday from memory. Id. 

Dr. Strickland diagnosed Plaintiff with a GAF scale score of 63, which indicates only 

mild symptoms or mild difficulty in social or occupational functioning. Tr. 19-20. 

Plaintiff’s mental health treatment record showed that he was generally assessed with a 

GAF scale score of 60. Tr. 20. 

 The Court concludes that the ALJ properly gave little weight to Dr. Strickland’s 

opinion after finding it inconsistent with Plaintiff’s GAF scores and overall mental health 

treatment record. See Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d at 956-57 (an ALJ need not accept a 

treating doctor’s opinion that is unsupported by clinical findings). 

 2. Dr. Strickland’s Qualifications. 

 Second, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ misread Dr. Strickland’s statement that 

Plaintiff could not perform work activities on a consistent basis or complete a normal 

workday and workweek “both due to his physical condition as well as his psychiatric 

condition.” Doc. 16, at 25; Tr. 393. The ALJ found that “Dr. Strickland’s qualification 

and specialty to make an assessment with regard to physical limits is unclear and this 

particular assessment is not given any weight.” Tr. 25. Plaintiff concedes that, as a 

psychologist, Dr. Strickland was not qualified to opine as to the effects of Plaintiff’s 

physical condition. Doc. 16, at 25. Plaintiff argues instead that the intended meaning of 

Dr. Strickland’s statement was that Plaintiff’s psychiatric impairments were intertwined 

with his physical impairments. Id. 

 This Circuit has made clear that courts “must uphold the ALJ’s decision where the 

Case 2:11-cv-00815-DGC Document 23 Filed 01/18/12 Page 9 of 12
- 10 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation.” Andrews v. Shalala, 53 

F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 

1989)). The Court therefore defers to the ALJ’s interpretation of Dr. Strickland’s 

statement. The ALJ properly discounted Dr. Strickland’s opinion because he was not 

qualified to make an assessment of Plaintiff’s physical condition. 

C. The ALJ did not err by rejecting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony. 

The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments could 

reasonably be expected to cause his alleged symptoms, but that his statements concerning 

the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of those symptoms were not credible. 

Tr. 22. Once Plaintiff produces objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment, 

the ALJ may not reject his subjective complaints based solely on lack of objective 

medical evidence to fully corroborate the alleged severity of the pain. Moisa v. Barnhart, 

367 F.3d 882, 884 (9th Cir. 2004). If the ALJ finds that Plaintiff’s pain testimony is not 

credible, the ALJ must make findings that support this conclusion, and the findings must 

be sufficiently specific to allow a reviewing court to conclude that the ALJ rejected the 

Plaintiff’s testimony on permissible grounds and did not arbitrarily discredit Plaintiff’s 

testimony. Id. “If there is no affirmative evidence that [Plaintiff] is malingering, the ALJ 

must provide clear and convincing reasons for rejecting [Plaintiff’s] testimony regarding 

the severity of symptoms.” Id. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ simply discussed the 

medical evidence without specifying how those findings contradicted Plaintiff’s 

testimony, and thus failed to meet the clear and convincing standard. Doc. 16, at 27. 

 The ALJ considered evidence from Plaintiff’s treatment record, diagnostic 

examinations, and clinical signs that contradict his testimony. The treatment record 

indicates that after Plaintiff’s February 2008 right knee replacement surgery, he 

experienced some stiffness but that the pain was much better than prior to surgery. 

Tr. 22. Plaintiff still required his usual pain medications, but denied problems with the 

surgical incision and was ambulatory with no specific complaints. Id. Plaintiff then 

alleged that his left knee began to hurt him more than his right knee, and received 

Case 2:11-cv-00815-DGC Document 23 Filed 01/18/12 Page 10 of 12
- 11 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

injections on the left knee as well as medication that was effective in alleviating the pain 

symptoms. Id. Diagnostic examinations revealed that Plaintiff’s knee replacement 

surgery was largely successful. His knee components were well-positioned and fixed 

without any evidence of problems after the surgery. Tr. 23. Clinical signs showed that 

Plaintiff appeared healthy and experienced no acute distress. Id. The right hip was 

normal, and the right knee had moderate to severe tenderness, but no swelling. Id. 

Although Plaintiff testified that he had back problems and was treated for back pain, 

Plaintiff’s spine appeared normal and had a full range of motion. Id. The record does not 

contain objective evidence of any severe back impairment beyond Plaintiff’s subjective 

complaints. Tr. 22. Additionally, Plaintiff’s daily activities are inconsistent with his pain 

testimony. He has no problems with grooming, dressing, and hygiene, and is able to 

prepare simple meals, perform light chores, and attend motorcycle club meetings and 

appointments. Tr. 24. 

 The Court concludes that the ALJ has stated clear and convincing reasons for 

finding Plaintiff not credible with respect to his statements regarding the intensity, 

persistence, and limiting effects of his symptoms. The Court is satisfied that the ALJ has 

provided sufficiently specific reasons showing that Plaintiff’s testimony was rejected on 

permissible grounds and was not arbitrarily discredited. 

 D. The ALJ did not err by finding Plaintiff’s mental impairments 

“nonsevere.” 

 Plaintiff claims that the ALJ erred by finding that Plaintiff’s mental impairments 

were “nonsevere” because Plaintiff’s mental impairments surpass a de minimus threshold. 

Tr. 16, at 28. Plaintiff argues that a GAF score of 60 reflects moderate, not nonsevere, 

limitations. Id.

 The ALJ assessed four function areas in determining that Plaintiff’s mental 

impairments were nonsevere: activities of daily living; social functioning; concentration, 

persistence, or pace; and episodes of decompensation. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(c)(3). 

 In daily living, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has no limitation. Tr. 19. He has no 

Case 2:11-cv-00815-DGC Document 23 Filed 01/18/12 Page 11 of 12
- 12 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

problem with grooming, dressing, and hygiene, and is able to take care of his girlfriend’s 

children and household pets. Id. He is able to prepare simple meals, perform light 

chores, drive a vehicle, shop, and manage finances. Id. 

 In social functioning, the ALJ likewise found that Plaintiff has no limitation. Id. 

He lives with his girlfriend and her children, attends motorcycle club meetings once a 

week, socializes with others, and attends appointments. Id. 

 In concentration, persistence, or pace, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has mild 

limitations. Id. In so finding, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff does not need reminders to 

take care of personal needs and grooming, or to take medication. Id. He does not have 

problems paying attention and can follow written and oral instructions, but cannot handle 

stress or changes to routine well. Id. 

 In episodes of decompensation, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has experienced no 

episodes of decompensation which have been of extended duration. Tr. 20. 

 The ALJ then concluded that because Plaintiff’s medically determinable mental 

impairment causes no more than “mild” limitations in any of the first three functional 

areas and no episodes of decompensation in the fourth area, the mental impairment is 

nonsevere. Id. Because there is substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s finding, the 

Court will not substitute its own determination. 

IT IS ORDERED: 

1. Defendant’s decision denying disability insurance benefits and 

supplemental security income (Tr. 16-27) is affirmed. 

 2. The Clerk is directed to terminate this action. 

 Dated this 18th day of January, 2012. 

Case 2:11-cv-00815-DGC Document 23 Filed 01/18/12 Page 12 of 12