Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-2_05-cv-00058/USCOURTS-ared-2_05-cv-00058-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

EASTERN DIVISION

CHARLES L. JOHNSON PLAINTIFF

ADC #114545

 

V. NO. 2:05CV00058 JWC

DON YANCEY, et al DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

On April 19, 2005, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss (or, in the alternative, a

motion for summary judgment) and brief in support (docket entries #6, #7) seeking to

dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint on the grounds that he had failed to exhaust his administrative

remedies pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) as well as the doctrine of sovereign immunity.

Defendants alternatively sought dismissal on the grounds that Plaintiff had failed to state

a claim upon which relief could be granted. By order entered April 22, 2005 (docket entry

#8), Plaintiff was notified of his opportunity to file a responsive pleading opposing

Defendants’ motion to dismiss. In addition, Plaintiff was advised that since Defendants had

attached evidence to their motion, the Court could construe it as a motion for summary

judgment. Plaintiff was therefore advised that his response to Defendants’ motion could

include opposing or counteraffidavits, executed by him or other persons, which had either

been sworn to under oath, or declared to under penalty of perjury in accordance with 28

U.S.C. § 1746. Pursuant to Local Rule 56.1 of the Rules of the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Arkansas, Plaintiff was also advised to file a separate, short and

concise statement setting forth the facts which he thought needed to be decided at a trial.

Plaintiff has filed a timely response (docket entry #9).

Case 2:05-cv-00058-JWC Document 11 Filed 09/16/05 Page 1 of 8
1 The Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted is a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff’s pleadings before the

defendant’s answer is due. However, if a 12(b)(6) motion is based on evidence outside the pleading, the

motion may be converted to a motion for summary judgment. Id. 12(b). Generally, if the court considers the

evidence, the motion must be converted to a motion for summary judgment. Id. Because Defendants

included attachments to its motion which the Court relies upon, and since Plaintiff has been given the

opportunity to respond to Defendants’ motion thus negating any potential claim of unfair surprise, Defendants’

motion will be construed as one for summary judgment. Id. 56.

2

I. Background

Plaintiff is a pro se inmate who is currently confined to the East Arkansas Regional

Unit of the Arkansas Department of Correction (“ADC”). According to his complaint (docket

entry #2), his religious rights are violated when Defendants serve him tuna. Plaintiff

contends that a religiously-mandated Kosher diet requires him to eat only fish that have

scales. Plaintiff does not believe that tuna have scales and alleges that Defendants have

failed to provide him with any evidence to the contrary. Plaintiff further contends that since

tuna is served every other day, he has not received three meals a day since November 25,

2004 (the Court assumes that Plaintiff does not eat the meals when tuna is served).

Plaintiff seeks to abolish tuna from the ADC’s Kosher diet and compensation for the meals

that he is forced to miss.

II. Standard

Summary judgment1 is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there

is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

322 (1986). The Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party, giving him the benefit of all reasonable factual inferences. Reed v. ULS

Case 2:05-cv-00058-JWC Document 11 Filed 09/16/05 Page 2 of 8
3

Corp., 178 F.3d 988, 990 (8th Cir. 1999). A moving party is nevertheless entitled to

summary judgment if the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an

essential element of his case with respect to which he will have the burden of proof at trial.

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. To avoid summary judgment, the nonmovant must go beyond

the pleadings and come forward with specific facts, “by [his] own affidavit” or otherwise,

showing that a genuine, material issue for trial exists. Id. at 324; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). A

nonmovant has an obligation to present affirmative evidence to support his claims. Settle

v. Ross, 992 F.2d 162, 163-64 (8th Cir. 1993). A litigant’s verified complaint is generally

considered an affidavit for purposes of summary judgment. Burgess v. Moore, 39 F.3d

216, 218 (8th Cir. 1994). Moreover, pro se complaints must be liberally construed and held

“to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner,

404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972).

III. Analysis

A. Administrative Exhaustion

Failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense. Guerra v. Kempker, 134 Fed. Appx.

112 (8th Cir. 2005) (unpub. per curiam) (citing Nerness v. Johnson, 401 F.3d 874, 876 (8th

Cir. 2005) (per curiam)). An inmate must exhaust all available administrative remedies

prior to initiating a § 1983 prison conditions suit. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (“[n]o action shall

be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 . . . until such

administrative remedies as are available are exhausted”); Johnson v. Jones, 340 F.3d 624,

627 (8th Cir. 2003) (“Under the plain language of § 1997e(a), an inmate must exhaust

administrative remedies before filing suit in federal court . . . . If exhaustion was not

completed at the time of filing, dismissal is mandatory”); Graves v. Norris, 218 F.3d 884,

Case 2:05-cv-00058-JWC Document 11 Filed 09/16/05 Page 3 of 8
2 See evidence supplied by both sides (docket entries #2, #6, Exh. “B”)

4

885 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that “all available prison grievance remedies must be

exhausted as to all of the [plaintiff’s] claims”); Chelette v. Harris, 229 F.3d 684, 688 (8th

Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1156 (2001) (stating that “if administrative remedies are

available, the prisoner must exhaust them,” regardless of his subjective beliefs about their

availability). At the time the incident in question occurred, exhaustion of remedies required

the inmate to first attempt informal resolution and then to timely file and appeal a particular

grievance through several administrative levels. Plaintiff was required to appeal his

grievance(s) to the highest administrative level, the Deputy/Assistant Director of the ADC.

See ADC Adm. Dir. 04-01 § IV(G)(5) (February 1, 2004).

Defendants first assert that Plaintiff filed an informal resolution on November 24,

2004 (docket entries #6, Exh. “A” & #7). The following day, he filed a formal grievance

regarding the same matter (docket entries #6, Exh. “B” & #7). Plaintiff did not wait for a

response to his informal resolution before proceeding to the formal grievance process;

therefore, Defendants contend that he has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.

Even if Plaintiff failed to fully comply with informal resolution procedures before filing a

formal grievance, the fact remains, ADC officials went ahead and addressed Plaintiff’s

grievance on the merits and without mention of any procedural defect. Moreover, it was

fully exhausted.2

 Defendants next contend that Plaintiff’s complaint raises multiple claims

that have not each been exhausted. Specifically, Defendants read Plaintiff’s complaint as

alleging two additional and separate claims: (1) that Defendants lied to him; and (2) that

he has not received three full meals a day since November 25, 2004. Such a reading of

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3 Plaintiff does not state the capacity in which he sues; therefore, it must be assumed that Defendants

are being sued only in an official capacity.

4 Plaintiff is apparently under the mistaken impression that Defendants’ motion claims he should have

filed his lawsuit against the State of Arkansas rather than employees of a state agency.

5

Plaintiff’s complaint defies logic. Clearly, Plaintiff’s contention that Defendants are lying

to him about whether tuna does or does not have scales falls squarely within the claim that

forms the basis of his lawsuit. Furthermore, a careful reading of Plaintiff’s complaint

indicates that he has not received three meals a day since November 25, 2004, because

tuna is served every other day. It can easily be assumed that Plaintiff is claiming that he

does not eat the meals when tuna is served. For these reasons, Defendants’ motion is

denied on exhaustion grounds.

B. Alternate Grounds

Defendants next assert that alternate grounds mandate the dismissal of Plaintiff’s

case. They are correct. Public officials may be sued under § 1983 in either their official

or individual capacity, or both. Johnson v. Outboard Marine Corp., 172 F.3d 531, 535 (8th

Cir. 1999). To sue a public official in his individual capacity, a plaintiff must expressly and

unambiguously state so in the pleadings, otherwise it will be assumed that the defendant

is being sued only in an official capacity. Id. Plaintiff seeks an unspecified amount of

compensatory damages from Defendants in an official capacity.3 Defendants have raised

and placed Plaintiff on notice of this issue in their summary judgment motion. Despite this

notification, Plaintiff has nevertheless failed to change his position (see docket entry #9);4

thus, his claim for monetary damages against Defendants is barred.

The Eleventh Amendment bars a citizen from bringing suit in federal court against

a state, a state agency, or a state official sued in his official capacity for monetary damages

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which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury. Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State

Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89,

100 (1984); Barnes v. State of Missouri, 960 F.2d 63, 64 (8th Cir. 1992) (per curiam); Nix

v. Norman, 879 F.2d 429, 431-32 (8th Cir. 1989). However, a state official may

nevertheless be sued in an individual capacity for action taken in an official capacity and

such a claim is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25

(1991). Only two exceptions exist to Eleventh Amendment immunity: (1) “where Congress

has statutorily abrogated such immunity by ‘clear and unmistakable language,’” or (2)

where a state has waived its immunity to suit in federal court, but “only where stated by the

most express language or by such overwhelming implications from the text as will leave

no room for any other reasonable construction.” Barnes, 960 F.2d at 64-65 (citing Welch

v. Texas Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 473-74 (1987)). Neither

exception is applicable to Plaintiff’s case. See Will, 491 U.S. at 66.

C. The Merits

Even if Plaintiff had sued Defendants in an individual capacity, his claim still fails on

the merits. Defendants assert that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can

be granted. Plaintiff claims that Defendants, both ADC Chaplains, misinformed him as to

the outer covering of tuna. Warden Harmon consulted Defendants and the issue as to

whether or not tuna have scales was addressed. Defendants contend that tuna do have

scales; thus, it is properly included in the Kosher diet (docket entries #6, Exh. “D” & #7).

According to Defendants’ evidence, the Torah requires that Kosher fish have both scales

and fins. The Talmud further teaches that all fish that have scales also have fins. The first

step in determining a Kosher fish is verifying that it has a Kosher scale. Although tuna

Case 2:05-cv-00058-JWC Document 11 Filed 09/16/05 Page 6 of 8
5 The Fortunes of a Fish, by Rabbi Zushe Blech at Kashrut.com (The Premiere Kosher Information

Source on the Internet).

6 One who is trained to supervise kosher food production.

7

have very few scales, they are nevertheless considered a Kosher fish (docket entry #6,

Exh. “D”).5

 However, Defendants fail to point out in their own evidence that the Kosher

status of canned fish, such as tuna, has received much debate especially where the

supervision of the cannery is based upon spot checks rather than each fish being checked

by a Mashgiach.6 Many authorities are reluctant to accept the Kosher status of such fish

(docket entry #6, Exh. “D”). Although Defendants overlook this issue, Plaintiff has provided

a package wrapper of the tuna fish served at the ADC (see docket entry #9, attachments).

Fresh Catch Chunk Light Tuna is distributed by Keefe Supply Company in St. Louis,

Missouri. Keefe Supply Company is a “Star-K” certified company, meaning, it has received

Kosher certification. Thus, not only is tuna a Kosher fish, but the packaged tuna that

Plaintiff is served is, in fact, Kosher certified. Because Plaintiff has failed to allege the

violation of a constitutional right, Defendants’ motion must be granted on these grounds

too.

IV. Conclusion

In accordance with the above, IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss (or, in the alternative, motion for summary

judgment) (docket entries #6-1 & #6-2) is GRANTED and Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed

in its entirety WITH PREJUDICE.

2. All pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT.

Case 2:05-cv-00058-JWC Document 11 Filed 09/16/05 Page 7 of 8
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3. The Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an in forma

pauperis appeal from this memorandum opinion and order and any judgment entered

hereunder, would not be taken in good faith.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 16th day of September, 2005.

 

 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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