Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00896/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00896-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Adrian Vasquez, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-14-0896-PHX-NVW (DKD)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

TO THE HONORABLE NEIL V. WAKE, UNITED STATE DISTRICT JUDGE: 

 Adrian Vasquez filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus challenging his 

conviction, pursuant to a plea agreement, in Maricopa County Superior Court for 

manslaughter. His Petition alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and 

was improperly induced into accepting a plea agreement. Respondents contend that his 

petition is untimely and that, even if timely, it would fail on the merits. As explained 

below, the Court recommends that Vasquez’s petition be denied and dismissed with 

prejudice. 

BACKGROUND 

 In November 2009, Vasquez was indicted in Maricopa County Superior Court for 

one count of manslaughter for the death of Antonio Lugo. (Doc. 9, Ex. A) Vasquez, 

through counsel, moved in limine to exclude evidence and for a voluntariness hearing. 

(Doc. 9, Exs. C, D, E) The Superior Court conducted a settlement conference and gave 

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Vasquez an advisory pursuant to State v. Donald, 10 P.3d 1193 (Ariz. App. 2000). (Doc. 

9, Ex. F) Several weeks later, Vasquez signed a plea agreement whereby he agreed to 

plead guilty to one count of manslaughter. (Doc. 9, Ex. G) He initialed his 

acknowledgement that his minimum sentence would be five years. (Doc. 9, Ex. G) The 

Superior Court then held a change-of-plea hearing where the Court reviewed the plea 

agreement with Vasquez and advised him on the range of his possible sentence, the 

availability of parole, any special conditions of sentencing and probation, and his 

pertinent constitutional rights and rights of review. (Doc. 9, Ex. H) Vasquez then 

entered a plea of guilty to the count of manslaughter. (Id.) 

 The Superior Court received a sentencing memorandum and additional supporting 

documents from Vasquez, a presentence investigation report, and statements from the 

victim’s family. (Doc. 9, Exs. B, I, J) On May 10, 2010, the Superior Court held a 

sentencing hearing. (Doc. 9, Ex. K) At this hearing, the Court found that Vasquez had 

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived all pertinent constitutional and appellate 

rights and entered a plea of guilty. (Id.) The Court sentenced Vasquez to 8.5 years. (Id.) 

 On June 23, 2010, Vasquez timely filed a notice of post-conviction relief and he 

was appointed counsel. (Doc. 9, Exs. L, M) After his counsel notified the Court that she 

would not file a petition because she was unable to find any claims for relief, Vasquez 

filed a pro per Petition for Post-Conviction Relief raising six claims related to alleged 

promises made to him during his plea proceedings, including that he would receive a five 

year sentence. (Doc. 9, Exs. N, O, P) At the completion of briefing, the Superior Court 

dismissed Vasquez’s Petition. (Doc. 9, Exs. Q, R, S, T) Specifically, the Court found 

that Vasquez’s change of plea and sentencing records showed “no mention of a guarantee 

of a five year sentence,” that no “misrepresentations or trickery was employed to gain his 

willingness to enter this plea,” and that there was “no reason to doubt the validity of the 

plea he accepted.” (Doc. 9, Ex. T at 2) The Court further found “no merit to the claim 

that [Vasquez’s] counsel’s performance was deficient for any of the reasons stated,” that 

“there is nothing presented to the Court suggesting that there is any prosecutorial 

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misconduct surrounding this plea agreement or otherwise,” and that “the record is clear 

that [Vasquez] entered into this plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, that his 

constitutional rights were not compromised and the sentence was in accordance with the 

law.” (Id. at 2-3) 

 Vasquez’s motion for reconsideration was denied and he petitioned the Arizona 

Court of Appeals for review. (Doc. 9, Exs. U, V, W) On February 27, 2013, the Court of 

Appeals denied his petition. (Doc. 9, Ex. W) Vasquez did not petition the Arizona 

Supreme Court for review. (Doc. 9 at 7) 

 On April 21, 2014, Vasquez signed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and it 

was filed in this Court on April 28, 2014. (Doc. 1 at 15) His Petition alleges that he 

received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. (Id. at 6) He acknowledges that his 

Petition is untimely but argues that his Petition should be accepted because he had been 

subjected to a prison-wide lockdown that left him confined to his cell for 24 hours a day 

for an extended period. (Id. at 9) 

Vasquez’s Petition for Habeas Relief is Untimely. 

 A state prisoner seeking federal habeas relief from a state court conviction is 

required to file the petition within one year of “the date on which the judgment became 

final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such 

review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). The period of limitations is statutorily tolled during 

the time in which a “properly filed application for State post-conviction or other 

collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending” in the State 

courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). If a defendant is convicted pursuant to a guilty plea, then 

the first post-conviction proceeding is considered a form of direct review and the 

conviction becomes “final” for purposes of Section 2244(d)(1)(A) when the Rule 32 ofright proceeding concludes. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414 (2005) (“When a 

postconviction petition is untimely under state law, that is the end of the matter for 

purposes of § 2244(d)(2).”) (internal quotation omitted); Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 

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710, 711 (9th Cir. 2007) (conviction pursuant to plea agreement is final on expiration of 

the time for seeking Rule 32 relief). 

 On February 27, 2013, the Arizona Court of Appeals denied Vasquez’s petition to 

review the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Accordingly, his postconviction proceedings became final on April 3, 2013, when the time period for filing a 

petition for review with the Arizona Supreme Court expired, and his one year limitations 

period began the next day. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 1.3, 32.4(a); State v. Savage, 573 P.2d 1388, 

1389 (1978). 

 Vasquez was required to file his habeas petition in this court by April 4, 2014. He 

did not and so his one year period expired; once expired, it could not be revived. 

Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) (“section 2244(d) does not 

permit the reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended before the state petition 

was filed”). As he acknowledges, his Petition was not timely filed.1

Vasquez is Not Entitled to Equitable Tolling. 

 Vasquez’s habeas petition is untimely unless he can show that he is entitled to 

equitable tolling. To make such a showing, Vasquez must demonstrate both that he 

pursued his rights diligently and that some extraordinary circumstance prevented him 

from filing his petition. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010). 

 Vasquez argues that he encountered extraordinary circumstances that entitle him 

to equitable tolling; Respondents counter that he has not met his burden of demonstrating 

any such extraordinary hurdles. Vasquez’s allegations of a long-term, prison-wide, 24-

hour lockdown could rise to the level of an extraordinary circumstance that might entitle 

him to equitable tolling. The Court agrees that Vasquez has not met his burden of 

showing that this type of lockdown occurred. However, even if the Court were to grant 

Vasquez the opportunity to further develop this claim, he would not be eligible for relief 

because his habeas petition would fail on the merits. 

 

1

 Even looking to the Petition’s signature date, not its filing date, does not make this Petition timely. Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107, n.2 (9th Cir. 1999) (applying mailbox rule in context of habeas petition). 

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 Vasquez’s habeas petition alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel 

during the pre-trial proceedings and plea bargaining. (Doc. 1 at 6-10) The Superior 

Court reviewed this claim and determined that his claims did not meet the standard for an 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim as described in Strickland v. Washington, 466 

U.S. 668 (1984). Habeas review would require this Court to determine “whether the state 

court’s application of the Strickland standard was unreasonable.” Harrington v. Richter, 

562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011). Here, the Superior Court reviewed the relevant portions of the 

record, applied the correct legal standard, and found that Vasquez’s claims had “no 

merit.” This Court cannot say that this application of Strickland was unreasonable. 

 IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Adrian Vasquez’s Petition for 

Writs of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied because dismissal of the petition 

and amended petition are justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would 

not find the ruling debatable. 

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. 

The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, 

the parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure 

timely to file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may 

result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the district court without 

further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Failure timely to file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will 

be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an 

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order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 

72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

Dated this 10th day of June, 2015. 

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