Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-01968/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-01968-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALVIN KIMBROUGH, 

Petitioner,

 vs.

MIKE KNOWLES, Warden,

Respondent.

 

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No. C 03-1968 JSW (PR)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO

DISMISS PETITION AS UNTIMELY 

(Docket No. 39)

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner, a prisoner of the State of California currently incarcerated at Mule

Creek State Prison, filed a habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254

challenging the constitutionality of his state conviction. On September 12, 2003, the

Court ordered Respondent to show cause why the amended petition, filed August 19, 2003

should not be granted (docket no. 4). On September 16, 2003, Petitioner moved to hold

the petition in abeyance, so that he could exhaust additional claims in the state courts

(docket no. 5). Thereafter, on August 15, 2005, Petitioner filed an amended petition

(docket no. 36). On February 28, 2006, the Court again ordered Respondent to show

cause as to why the second amended petition should not be granted (docket no. 37). On

April 27, 2006, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition as untimely (docket no.

39). On June 16, 2006, Petitioner filed an opposition to the motion (docket no. 42) and on

November 28, 2006, Respondent filed a reply (docket no. 46). This order grants the

motion to dismiss.

BACKGROUND

The uncontested procedural history is as follows: An Alameda County Superior

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Court jury convicted Petitioner of manslaughter and murder. Petitioner was sentenced to

six years plus nineteen years-to-life in prison. On August 4, 1998, the California Court of

Appeal affirmed the judgment. On November 18, 1998, the California Supreme Court

denied review.

Petitioner pursued three rounds of collateral challenges in the state courts. On

February 6, 2000, Petitioner filed his first petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the state

courts by signing the petition and sending it to the superior court. That petition was

denied on March 10, 2000. Petitioner’s first round of state habeas petitions in the

California courts was ultimately denied in the California Supreme Court on September 13,

2000.

About five months later, on February 8, 2001, the cell of another prisoner, Nathan

Ellis, who had Petitioner’s legal papers in his possession, was searched and legal papers

belonging to Petitioner were removed from his possession (Petitioner’s Exhibit

“Declaration of: Nathan J. Ellis” in Petitioner’s Opposition to Respondent’s Motion to

Dismiss). That individual apparently continued to have some access to the papers that

were removed from his cell (Petitioner’s Exhibit “Legal Property Log” in Opposition.)

Petitioner commenced his second round of collateral challenges by filing a petition

for a writ of habeas corpus in superior court on March 14, 2002 (which was signed by

Petitioner on March 10, 2002). This round of state collateral review ended on January 29,

2003. 

Petitioner filed his federal habeas action on April 30, 2003. Petitioner filed his first

amended petition on August 19, 2003. Petitioner’s third round of state collateral

challenges commenced after Petitioner moved this Court to stay proceedings while he

exhausted additional claims in state court on September 16, 2003 (docket no. 5). After

that round was completed by a denial from the California Supreme Court on June 29,

2005, Petitioner filed an amended petition on August 15, 2005, (docket no. 36), which is

currently the operative petition in this matter. 

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DISCUSSION

I. The Statute of Limitations

Respondent Attorney General moves to dismiss the petition as untimely. The

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) became law on April

24, 1996, and imposed for the first time a statute of limitations on federal petitions for a

writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners. Petitions filed by prisoners challenging

non-capital state convictions or sentences now must be filed within one year from the

date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the

expiration of the time for seeking such review. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Respondent

argues that the present petition must be dismissed because it was not filed within one

year of the date on which Petitioner’s conviction became final.

The one-year period generally will run from “the date on which the judgment

became final by conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such

review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). "Direct review" includes the period within which a

petitioner can file a petition for a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme

Court, whether or not the petitioner actually files such a petition. Bowen v. Roe, 188

F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, if a petitioner fails to seek a writ of

certiorari from the United States Supreme Court, AEDPA's one-year limitations period

begins to run on the date the ninety-day period defined by Supreme Court Rule 13

expires. See Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002) (where petitioner

did not file petition for certiorari, his conviction became final 90 days after the California

Supreme Court denied review); Bowen, 188 F.3d at 1159 (same). 

Therefore, as Respondent points out, the one year period began to run in this case

on February 16, 1999. Ordinarily, Petitioner would have until February 16, 2000 to file a

timely petition. However, the federal petition was not filed until April 30, 2003, more

than three years later. Therefore, the petition is untimely unless Petitioner can show that

he is entitled to delayed commencement of the statute of limitations under §

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2244(d)(1)(A)-(D), or that the statute of limitations was statutorily tolled under §

2244(d)(2), or that he is entitled to equitable tolling. 

II. Delayed Commencement Under § 2244(d)(1)(B) and/or Statutory Tolling

In most cases, the one year limitations period will start on the date on which the

judgment becomes final after the conclusion of direct review or the time passes for

seeking direct review, but the limitations period may start on a later date. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D). Petitioner primarily argues that the seizure of his legal papers from

another prisoner constitutes a state-imposed impediment which delayed commencement

of the limitations period. 

Section § 2244(d)(1)(B) allows for commencement of the statute of limitations on

the date on which "an impediment to filing an application created by State action in

violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was

prevented from filing by such State action." Petitioner contends that the actions of state

officials in seizing his legal materials from another prisoner on February 8, 2001

constitutes an impediment to filing under § 2244(d)(1)(B) that should delay the

commencement of the limitations period. 

However, Petitioner's argument is without merit. Ordinarily § 2244(d)(1)(B)

provides for the delayed commencement of the statute of limitations until an impediment

to filing is removed, “if the applicant was prevented from filing by such state action[.]” 

Here, however, the impediment was not even created until more than one year after the 

limitations period set forth in § 2244(d)(1)(A) had passed. It would defy logic for §

2244(d)(1)(B) to re-commence the statute of limitations ordinarily in place under §

2244(d)(1)(A) when the impediment did not even exist until after more than a year had

passed. While the Ninth Circuit has applied section 2244(d)(1)(B) to provide delayed

commencement where prisoners have been impeded in their ability to file a habeas

petition due to ongoing conduct on the part of state prison officials, see, e.g.,

Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146, 1148 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (remanding case

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to district court for development of facts concerning whether AEDPA materials were

unavailable in the prison law library and the legal significance of such a finding), this

Court finds no precedent for applying § 2244(d)(1)(B) to delay the commencement of the

limitations period when the alleged impediment did not exist until more than one year

after the date on which the judgment became final under § 2244(d)(1)(A).

In this case, Petitioner contends that he filed his first state collateral challenge on

February 6, 2000, only 11 days before the one year limitations period would have

expired under § 2244(d)(1)(A). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), the time during which a

properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review is pending

does not count toward the one year limitations period. See Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S.

214, 219-20 (2002). Until the state habeas application has achieved final resolution

through the State's post-conviction procedures, by definition it remains "pending." Id. at

220. In California, this means that the statute of limitations is tolled from the time the

first state habeas petition is filed until the California Supreme Court rejects the

petitioner's final collateral challenge, as long as the petitioner did not "unreasonably

delay" in seeking review. Id. at 221-23. 

The Ninth Circuit has held in Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999) 

that an application for collateral review is "pending" in state court for "all of the time

during which a state prisoner is attempting, through proper use of state court procedures,

to exhaust state court remedies with regard to a particular post-conviction application."

Nino held that the limitation period "remains tolled during the intervals between the state

court's disposition of a state habeas petition and the filing of a petition at the next state

appellate level." This means that a state habeas petition is pending while a California

petitioner “complete[s] a full round of [state] collateral review” all the way to the

California Supreme Court. Biggs v. Duncan, 339 F.3d 1045, 1048 (9th Cir. 2003)

(citation and internal quotations marks omitted). 

 However, if there is any gap between the completion of one round of review and

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1

The rationale of Allen v. Lewis only applies to denials of the Supreme Court of California

filed before January 1, 2003. On January 1, 2003, the Supreme Court of California made clear

that its orders denying a petition for a writ of habeas corpus within its original jurisdiction are

final on filing. See Cal. Rule of Court 29.4(b)(2)(C).

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the commencement of another round of state habeas review, the petitioner is not entitled

to tolling during the gap. See Delhomme v. Ramirez, 340 F.3d 817, 819-20 (9th

Cir.2003) at 821; Biggs, 339 F.3d at 1046-47, 1048; see also Dils v. Small, 260 F.3d 984,

986 (9th Cir. 2001) (not tolling limitation period during gap between successive state

habeas petitions filed in the state's highest court); Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809, 814-15

(9th Cir. 2002) (when calculating tolling period, excluding gap between first set of state

habeas petitions (superior court, court of appeal and supreme court) and second set of

state habeas petitions (superior court, court of appeal and supreme court)). Tolling under

§ 2244(d)(2) ends thirty days after the Supreme Court of California’s denial of the final

habeas petition is filed because that is when the denial becomes “final” under California

Rule of Court 24. Allen v. Lewis, 295 F.3d 1046, 1046 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc)

(reaffirming Bunney v. Mitchell, 262 F.3d 973, 974 (9th Cir. 2001)).1

Even assuming that Petitioner would be entitled to statutory tolling for the time

during which he alleges that his state collateral challenges were pending, this time does

not adequately toll the limitations period to make the petition timely. Petitioner alleges

that the first round of state collateral challenges was completed on September 13, 2000. 

At that time, only eleven days remained of the one year limitations period. 

However, at the time that the alleged impediment to filing was created by the

seizure of his legal papers on February 8, 2001, close to five additional months had

passed since the first round of collateral challenges had been completed and Petitioner

had neither filed a federal petition nor initiated another round of state collateral

challenges. Approximately four months of this time period (from 30 days after the

California Supreme Court’s denial in Petitioner’s first round of state collateral

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challenges) would not be tolled. This period also occurred prior to the creation of the

impediment upon which Petitioner bases his argument for delay of the commencement of

the limitations period. Therefore, at the time of the creation of the impediment, the one

year limitations period under § 2244(d)(1)(A) had already expired, and does not appear

to have been extended by statutory tolling. 

While Petitioner’s exhibits also suggest that Petitioner’s “Jailhouse lawyer”

continued to have access to the documents of Petitioner’s at the prison, even though they 

were no longer in his possession (see, “Legal Property Log” Exhibit in support of

Petitioner’s opposition), it is not necessary for this Court to determine whether this

seizure would have actually constituted an impediment under § 2244(d)(1)(B) had it not

happened after the limitations period had already expired. 

Because the statute of limitations already had expired by the time the alleged

impediment came into existence, the impediment created thereafter cannot have had an

impact on Petitioner's failure to file a timely petition. Cf. Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321

F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) (state habeas petition filed after AEDPA's statute of

limitations ended cannot toll the limitation period); Jimenez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482

(9th Cir. 2001). Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to delayed commencement of the

statute of limitations under § 2244(d)(1)(B) based on the seizure of his legal papers on

February 8, 2001. 

III. Equitable Tolling

Finally, the Court considers whether Petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling of

the limitations period, which is available upon a showing that a petitioner has been

pursuing his rights diligently and that extraordinary circumstances beyond his control

prevented him from timely filing the petition. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418-

19 (2005). "When external forces, rather than a petitioner's lack of diligence, account for

the failure to file a timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may be

appropriate." Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). The prisoner must

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show that “the ‘extraordinary circumstances’ were the cause of his untimeliness.” 

Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).

The Ninth Circuit has held that the petitioner bears the burden of showing that this

"extraordinary exclusion" should apply to him. Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1065

(9th Cir. 2002). The petitioner must establish two elements in order to be granted

equitable tolling: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some

extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150,

1153 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Pace, 544 U.S. at 419); see Pace, 544 U.S. at 419

(petitioner's lack of diligence in filing timely state and federal petitions precluded

equitable tolling).

Petitioner does not appear to raise equitable tolling in defense of the delays in the

filing of his petition. However, for the reasons already discussed, because more than one

year of time that was not tolled had already passed before the alleged seizure of his legal

papers, this incident did not prevent Petitioner from filing a timely petition. Therefore,

Petitioner cannot show that the ‘extraordinary circumstances’ were the cause for the

delay. Spitsyn, 345 F.3d at 799. Because Petitioner has not established that the

limitations period should be delayed by a state created impediment or that he is entitled to

statutory or equitable tolling, the petition is barred by the statute of limitations and must

be dismissed. 

CONCLUSION

Respondent’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED (docket no. 39). The petition for

writ of habeas corpus is hereby DISMISSED. The Clerk shall enter judgment and close

the file. This order terminates all pending motions.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 19, 2006 JEFFREY S. WHITE

United States District Judge

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