Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00432/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00432-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 28:1132 E.R.I.S.A.

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

JUDY CAVELL,

NO. CIV. S-05-0432 FCD DAD

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

FIDELITY NATIONAL FINANCIAL,

INC., FIDELITY NATIONAL

FINANCIAL’S WELFARE BENEFIT

PLAN, CHICAGO TITLE

CORPORATION, CHICAGO TITLE AND

TRUST COMPANY, CHICAGO TRUST

AND TITLE COMPANY’S GROUP

INSURANCE PLAN, HARTFORD LIFE

AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY

and DOES 1 through 10,

inclusive,

Defendants.

_________________________/

----oo0oo----

This matter comes before the court on defendants’

Fidelity National Financial, Inc. (“FNF”), Fidelity National

Financial’s Welfare Benefit Plan, Chicago Title Company (“CTC”)

Chicago Title and Trust Company (“CTTC”), and Chicago Title and

Case 2:05-cv-00432-FCD-DAD Document 14 Filed 12/21/05 Page 1 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

All further references to a “Rule” are to the Federal 1

Rules of Civil Procedure.

Because oral argument will not be of material 2

assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. 

E.D. Cal. Local Rule 78-230(h).

The facts of this case are taken from plaintiff’s 3

allegations in the complaint.

2

Trust Company’s Group Insurance’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s

complaint pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons set forth below, 1 2

defendants’ motion is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND3

Plaintiff Judy Cavell is 54 years old, and has been unable

to work since 1990 due to a brain tumor she suffered in 1989. 

(Compl., filed Mar. 3, 2005, ¶ 11). From 1987 until 2000,

plaintiff was a participant in CTTC’s Group Insurance Plan, which

included a comprehensive major medical and dental plan, a life

insurance plan, and disability insurance plans. (Id. ¶ 4). 

Beginning February 5, 1991, plaintiff received Long Term

Disability benefits under the terms of a plan sponsored by CTC

and administered by CTTC. (Id. ¶¶ 12, 7). In or around 2000,

FNF merged with CTC. (Id. ¶ 12). Plaintiff then became a

participant in FNF’s Welfare Benefit Plan, which provided Group

Life, Supplemental Life, Accidental Death and Dismemberment,

Dependent Life, and Supplemental Dependent Life Insurance. (Id.

¶ 5). CTC has remained a separate and distinct corporation. 

(Id.) 

In October 2001, FNF notified plaintiff that it did not

consider her an employee and was therefore terminating her

Case 2:05-cv-00432-FCD-DAD Document 14 Filed 12/21/05 Page 2 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

medical plan effective December 31, 2001. (Id. ¶ 13). However,

in January 2002, FNF permitted plaintiff to choose a new medical

coverage plan and continued to provide her medical coverage. 

(Id. ¶ 14). In January 2003, FNF again notified plaintiff that

they were terminating her medical coverage effective March 31,

2003. (Id. ¶ 15). 

On March 12, 2003, plaintiff wrote to FNF and requested

various plan documents from FNF and CTC. (Id. ¶ 16). Plaintiff

renewed this request on April 14, 2003. (Id. ¶ 17). Plaintiff

renewed this request again on July 6, 2004. (Id. ¶ 19). On July

1, 2004, FNF informed plaintiff that FNF would be terminating her

medical coverage on July 31, 2004, and subsequently, did

terminate plaintiff’s benefits on that date. (Id. ¶ 18).

On August 2, 2004, plaintiff again requested that the

various plan documents be provided forthwith. (Id. ¶ 20). On or

about September 23, 2004, defendants informed plaintiff that they

did not have the time or staff to provide the requested

documents, but that they would provide a summary plan

description. (Id. ¶ 21). Defendants have never provided the

description or the requested documents. (Id. ¶ 21).

Plaintiff brings this claim seeking information and monetary

penalties pursuant to Section 502 of the Employee Retirement

Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1) and

29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1). Plaintiff asks the court to (1) declare

her right to receive the documents she has requested from

defendants; (2) declare that defendants violated 29 U.S.C. §

1132(c)(1) by failing or refusing to provide plaintiff with the

requested information within 30 days of the request; (3) order

Case 2:05-cv-00432-FCD-DAD Document 14 Filed 12/21/05 Page 3 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

defendants to pay $100 per day for each day after April 11, 2003

until such information is provided to plaintiff; (4) award

plaintiff attorneys’ fees and costs; and (5) any such other

relief as the court deems proper.

Defendants FNF, FNF’s Welfare Benefit Plan, CTC, CTTC, and

CTTC’s Group Insurance filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to

Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Defendants contend that the court

lacks jurisdiction over this action because plaintiff lacks

standing to bring this claim. Defendants further argue, that if

plaintiff does have standing, she fails to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted and that any claim she could have is

barred by the statute of limitations. 

STANDARD

A. Rule 12(b)(1): Jurisdiction

Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be asserted by

either party or the court, sua sponte, at any time during the

course of an action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Once challenged,

the burden of establishing a federal court’s jurisdiction rests

on the party asserting the jurisdiction. See Farmers Ins. Exch.

v. Portage La Prairie Mut. Ins. Co., 907 F.2d 911, 912 (9th Cir.

1990). There are two forms of 12(b)(1) attacks on subject matter

jurisdiction: facial and factual attacks. See Thornhill Publ’g

Co. v. General Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir.

1979). In an action such as this, where defendant contends that

the lack of federal jurisdiction appears from the “face of the

complaint,” the allegations in the complaint are taken as true

for the purposes of the motion. Id.

/////

Case 2:05-cv-00432-FCD-DAD Document 14 Filed 12/21/05 Page 4 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

B. Rule 12(b)(6): Failure to State a Claim

On a motion to dismiss, the allegations of the complaint

must be accepted as true. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322

(1972). The court is bound to give plaintiff the benefit of

every reasonable inference to be drawn from the “well-pleaded”

allegations of the complaint. Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n v.

Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). Thus, the plaintiff

need not necessarily plead a particular fact if that fact is a

reasonable inference from facts properly alleged. See id. 

Given that the complaint is construed favorably to the

pleader, the court may not dismiss the complaint for failure to

state a claim unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff

can prove no set of facts in support of the claim which would

entitle him or her to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45

(1957); NL Industries, Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th

Cir. 1986).

Nevertheless, it is inappropriate to assume that plaintiff

“can prove facts which it has not alleged or that the defendant[]

ha[s] violated the . . . laws in ways that have not been

alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Calif., Inc. v. Cal.

State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). Moreover,

the court “need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in

the form of factual allegations.” United States ex rel. Chunie

v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986).

ANALYSIS

A. Standing

1. Right of Civil Enforcement

Defendants argue that plaintiff’s claim should be dismissed

Case 2:05-cv-00432-FCD-DAD Document 14 Filed 12/21/05 Page 5 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

because she lacks standing. First, defendants contend that

plaintiff failed to cite any statute that gives her a private

right of civil action or civil enforcement. Plaintiff brings her

claim pursuant to section 502 of ERISA, codified in part in 29

U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1). Section 1132 is titled “Civil Enforcement.” 

Section 1132(c) provides that 

[a]ny administrator . . . who fails or refuses to

comply with a request for any information which such

administrator is required by this subchapter to furnish

to a participant or beneficiary . . . may in the

court’s discretion be personally liable to such

participant or beneficiary in the amount of up to $100

a day.

29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1)(B). This section gives a plan participant

a civil right of action against an administrator. 29 U.S.C. §

1132; See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. V. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101,

115-16 (1989); Moran v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 872 F.2d 296 (9th

Cir. 1989); Hernandez v. S. Nev. Culinary & Bartenders Pension

Trust, 662 F.2d 617, 620-21 (9th Cir. 1981). 

Defendants contend that plaintiff’s complaint should be

dismissed because she did not identify the subsection of §

1132(c)(1) under which she is bringing suit. Plaintiff specified

that she was bringing suit under § 1132(c)(1). (Compl. ¶ 1). 

The sole claim of plaintiff’s complaint is that defendants failed

or refused to send plaintiff the requested material within 30

days of her request. (Id. ¶¶ 24-26). Relief for this claim is

directly addressed in § 1132(c)(1)(B) in terms similar to those

used in plaintiff’s complaint. (Id.) Therefore, under the

liberal notice pleading standard, defendants had notice of the

subsection under which plaintiff was seeking relief. Defendants’

motion to dismiss cannot be granted on these grounds.

Case 2:05-cv-00432-FCD-DAD Document 14 Filed 12/21/05 Page 6 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

2. Plan Participant 

Second, defendants contend that plaintiff does not have

standing pursuant to § 1132(c) because she is not a plan

participant. Section 1132(a) provides that a civil action may be

brought by a plan participant or beneficiary for the relief

provided in § 1132(c). For purposes of ERISA claims,

[t]he term participant means any employee or former

employee of an employer . . . who is or may become

eligible to receive a benefit of any type from an

employee benefit plan which covers employees of such

employer . . . .

29 U.S.C. § 1002(7). The Supreme Court has held that “the term

‘participant’ is naturally read to mean either ‘employees in, or

reasonably expected to be in, currently covered employment.’”

Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 117 (1989)

(quoting Saladino v. I.L.G.W.U. Nat’l Retirement Fund, 752 F.2d

473, 476 (2d Cir. 1985). In order for a claimant to establish

that she “may become eligible” for benefits, a claimant must have

a colorable claim that (1) she will prevail in a suit for

benefits, or (2) eligibility requirements will be fulfilled in

the future. Id. at 118.

Defendants rely on the Ninth Circuit’s ruling and reasoning

in Kuntz v. Reese, 785 F.2d 1410 (9th Cir. 1986), to substantiate

their argument that plaintiff must be a plan participant at the

time the complaint was filed in order to qualify as a

participant. Kuntz is inapplicable to the case at bar. In

Kuntz, plaintiffs were retirees who had accepted the payment of

everything due them in a lump sum payment and were not eligible

for any further benefits. Id. at 1411. The court held that they

did not have standing as “participants” because such retirees

Case 2:05-cv-00432-FCD-DAD Document 14 Filed 12/21/05 Page 7 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiff cites to a myriad of cases that find 4

defendants who are not plan administrators liable under ERISA. 

However, most of these cases do not address claims brought under

§ 1132(c)(1). Those that do, confine liability to defendant

administrators or defendants who functioned as plan

administrators. Further, plaintiff cites to Harris Trust &

Savings Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney, 530 U.S. 238, 246 (2000)

for the proposition that there is “no limit on the universe of

possible defendants” where ERISA does not explicitly establish

one. The plaintiffs in Harris brought claims under 29 U.S.C. §

1106(a). However, § 1132(c)(1) specifically provides that an

“administrator” may be liable. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1). 

8

“have no present or future right to Plan funds.” Id. In this

case, plaintiff was a plan participant at the time she requested

documents from the defendants. (Compl. ¶¶ 16, 26). Further,

plaintiff may have a colorable claim for reinstatement of

benefits, dependant upon what the documents she requested from

defendants reveal. (Compl. ¶ 23). Unlike the plaintiffs in

Kuntz, plaintiff has not surrendered all of her rights and

expectations of benefits in the medical benefits coverage

supplied by defendants. In the words of § 1002(7), plaintiff

“may become eligible to receive a benefit.” Therefore, she is

considered a participant and has standing to bring this claim.

3. Proper Defendants

Third, defendants contend that the only defendant against

whom a claim may be brought is FNF because it is the only plan

administrator named in the action. Section 1132(c)(1) provides

that “any administrator” who does not comply with ERISA’s

disclosure requirements may be personally liable. 29 U.S.C. §

1132(c)(1). Only administrators and those who function as

administrators can be held liable under the section that

plaintiff brings her claim. See Taft v. Equitable Life 4

Assurance Soc’y, 9 F.3d 939, (holding employer who also acted as

Case 2:05-cv-00432-FCD-DAD Document 14 Filed 12/21/05 Page 8 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

administrator liable) (9th Cir. 1993). Plaintiff alleges in her

complaint that “at all relevant times” CTC and CTTC were

fiduciaries of her first benefit plan, and that CTTC functioned

as the plan administrator. (Compl. ¶ 9). Plaintiff also alleges

that “at all relevant times” FNF was a fiduciary of the second

benefit plan and functioned as the plan administrator. (Compl. ¶

10). Reading the allegations of the complaint in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff, plaintiff has adequately alleged that

CTTC and FNF functioned as plan administrators. However,

plaintiff has not alleged that CTC, CTTC’s Group Insurance, or

FNF’s Welfare Benefit Plan were plan administrators or functioned

as plan administrators. Therefore, defendants’ motion to dismiss

plaintiff’s complaint as it relates to defendants CTC, CTTC’s

Group Insurance, and FNF’s Welfare Benefit Plan is GRANTED. To

the extent that defendants’ motion to dismiss relates to

defendants FNF and CTTC, defendants’ motion is DENIED.

Defendants argue that CTTC cannot be liable because

defendant ceased being a plan administrator in 2000. However,

plaintiff alleges that CTTC was a plan administrator “at all

relevant times.” On a motion to dismiss, the court must accept

plaintiff’s allegations as true and must give plaintiff the

benefit of every reasonable inference to be drawn from the “wellpleaded” allegations of the complaint. In this case, the court

must accept that CTTC was the plan administrator at all relevant

times, and that the relevant times include the dates when

plaintiff requested and failed to receive the benefit documents. 

Therefore, plaintiff’s claim against CTTC must stand. 

///// 

Case 2:05-cv-00432-FCD-DAD Document 14 Filed 12/21/05 Page 9 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

For purposes of this motion, the court uses the accrual 5

date urged by defendants, which is the earliest of the dates

offered by the parties.

10

B. Failure to State a Claim

1. Statute of Limitations

 Defendants argue that plaintiff’s claim should be dismissed

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. 

Specifically, defendants assert that plaintiff’s claims are

barred by the statute of limitations.

Where ERISA does not provide its own statute of limitations,

courts must apply the most analogous statute of limitations under

state law. Felton v. Unisource Corp., 940 F.2d 503, 510 (9th

Cir. 1991). The Ninth Circuit has held that the $100 per day

recovery under ERISA § 1132(c) is not a penalty for purposes of

California limitation. Stone v. Travelers Corp., 58 F.3d 434,

438 (9th Cir. 1995) (relying on Rivera v. Anaya. 726 F.2d 564

(9th Cir. 1984)). Therefore, the applicable limitation for a

claim brought pursuant to § 1132(c)(1) is found in California

Code of Civil Procedure § 338(a), which provides a three-year

limitation for an “action upon a liability created by statute,

other than a penalty or forfeiture.” Id.

Plaintiffs and defendants dispute the appropriate accrual

date for purposes of this action. Plaintiff’s complaint was

filed on March 3, 2005, less than three years after April 11,

2003, the date upon which defendants were required to produce 5

the requested documents. Therefore, plaintiff’s ERISA claim is

timely. Defendants’ motion to dismiss on the grounds that 

/////

Case 2:05-cv-00432-FCD-DAD Document 14 Filed 12/21/05 Page 10 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

plaintiff’s claim was not brought within the statute of

limitations is DENIED.

2. Injunctive and Declaratory Relief

Defendants also argue that plaintiff has failed to state a

claim for declaratory or injunctive relief because plaintiff has

failed to cite any statutes which provide for these forms of

relief. However, § 1132(c) provides that “the court may in its

discretion order such other relief as it deems proper.” 29

U.S.C. § 1132(c). As such, this court may order the declaratory

and injunctive relief plaintiff seeks, and defendants’ motion to

dismiss on these grounds is DENIED.

3. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)

Finally, defendants contend that plaintiff has failed to

state a claim because she has not identified the subchapter of

ERISA which requires defendants to furnish the information

requested by plaintiff. Section 1132(c) provides that a plan

participant may bring a civil action against any administrator

“who fails or refuses to comply with a request for any

information which such administrator is required by this

subchapter to furnish to a participant.” 29 U.S.C. §

1132(c)(1)(B). In her complaint, plaintiff fails to point to the

statute that requires defendants to furnish the documents

requested by plaintiff on March 12, 2003. As such, plaintiff has

failed to state a claim under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1)(B). Even

under the liberal notice pleading standard, plaintiff has failed

to alert defendants of the alleged duty to disclose with which

they failed to comply. Therefore, defendants’ motion to dismiss

is GRANTED. 

Case 2:05-cv-00432-FCD-DAD Document 14 Filed 12/21/05 Page 11 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

C. Leave to Amend

Plaintiff seeks leave to amend any material defects in her

complaint. Pursuant to Rule 15(a), “leave [to amend] is to be

freely given when justice so requires.” “[L]eave to amend should

be granted unless amendment would cause prejudice to the opposing

party, is sought in bad faith, is futile, or creates undue

delay.” Martinez v. Newport Beach, 125 F.3d 777, 785 (9th Cir.

1997). Because there is no indication that plaintiff’s amendment

is sought in bad faith or is futile, and because plaintiff’s case

is at the early stages of litigation, plaintiff is granted leave

to amend the complaint to allege that dismissed defendants were

plan administrators or functioned as plan administrators of the

benefit plan at issue in this case and to allege the statutory

duty requiring defendants to disclose the materials requested by

plaintiff on March 12, 2003. Therefore, justice requires that

plaintiff be granted leave to amend the complaint. 

/////

/////

/////

/////

/////

/////

/////

/////

/////

/////

/////

/////

Case 2:05-cv-00432-FCD-DAD Document 14 Filed 12/21/05 Page 12 of 13
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Defendants contend that the court may want to consider 6

whether Rule 11 sanctions would be appropriate in this case. 

Defendants have not properly made a motion to impose sanctions on

plaintiff. Further, based upon the foregoing analysis, the court

does not consider plaintiff’s claims to be frivolous and thus,

Rule 11 sanctions are not warranted. 

13

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion is GRANTED.6

Plaintiff is granted twenty (20) days from the date of this order

to file an amended complaint in accordance with this order. 

Defendants are granted thirty (30) days from the date of service

of plaintiff’s amended complaint to file a response thereto. 

 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 21, 2005

/s/ Frank C. Damrell Jr. 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:05-cv-00432-FCD-DAD Document 14 Filed 12/21/05 Page 13 of 13