Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02946/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02946-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 430
Nature of Suit: Banks and Banking
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 1 Prior to oral argument on these motions, Plaintiff stipulated to the dismissal of Fidelity

National Title Insurance Company (“Fidelity”), which had also filed a motion to dismiss.

Because that stipulated motion has been granted, Fidelity’s pending motion to dismiss is

DISMISSED as moot.

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN JENKINS,

Plaintiff,

 v.

 CALIFORNIA FEDERAL LOAN

ASSOCIATION ET AL,

Defendant. /

No. C 05-02946 CRB

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

In this lawsuit, Plaintiff John Jenkins alleges that myriad defendants have engaged in

an “elaborate scheme to defraud [him],” ultimately resulting in the foreclosure on his home

in Hillsborough, California. Now pending before the Court are motions to dismiss filed by

Ocwen Loan Servicing, Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company, and Transnation

Title Insurance Company (collectively, the “Moving Defendants”).1

 For the reasons set forth

below, the Moving Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

In July 2001, in a different lawsuit, Plaintiff and his wife alleged that thirteen

defendants (some of whom have been named in the instant lawsuit) had “concocted . . .

fraudulent devices” in an effort to divest Plaintiff and his wife of their home and their

Case 3:05-cv-02946-CRB Document 75 Filed 10/20/06 Page 1 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

possessions. The complaint contained vague allegations regarding the defendants’ failure to

deduct a down payment allegedly paid by Plaintiff and his wife. It further asserted a demand

for $7.2 billion in damages. Beyond this, the complaint contained no specific allegations

regarding any of the named defendants, and it provided little foundation for the claims it

asserted against these defendants.

This Court granted Plaintiff and his wife numerous opportunities to amend their

complaint. First, the Court granted leave to amend the complaint on July 11, 2001. Four

months later, no amended complaint had been filed, and so, in November 2001, this Court

issued an order to show cause why the complaint should not be dismissed for failure to

prosecute. At a hearing, the Court provided Plaintiff and his wife with three additional

months to file an amended complaint. By January 2002, no amended complaint had been

filed. At a case management conference in February 2002, this Court provided Plaintiff and

his wife with another month to amend the complaint. On March 22, 2002, the Plaintiff and

his wife again failed to comply with the Court’s deadline. (Plaintiff and his wife did,

however, submit a motion for recusal, which this Court denied.) The defendants in the

lawsuit filed motions to dismiss, and this Court granted the motions on two grounds: (1)

because the complaint failed to state a legal claim, and (2) because Plaintiff and his wife had

failed to comply with the Court’s repeated orders to amend their complaint. Plaintiff

appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed this Court’s decision, and to the Supreme

Court, which denied certiorari.

In December 2005, Plaintiff filed the instant action. As in his first lawsuit, Plaintiff

now alleges that various financial institutions, real estate agencies, bankruptcy trustees, and

employees of these various institutions and agencies all participated in “an elaborate scheme

to defraud [him].” First Am. Compl. ¶ 8. As in his first lawsuit, Plaintiff’s claims stem from

actions taken by the defendants that resulted in the foreclosure on his house in Hillsborough,

California. Plaintiff’s new complaint, however, is not identical to the old one. In particular,

although Plaintiff names several defendants who were also named in his original lawsuit, he

identifies several new defendants. See id. ¶ 4. In addition, Plaintiff asserts that he has

Case 3:05-cv-02946-CRB Document 75 Filed 10/20/06 Page 2 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

discovered new evidence — specifically, new evidence revealing that he never in fact had

proper title to his property in Hillsborough and that defendants were aware (or should have

been aware) of the defective title. See id. ¶¶ 40-45. Finally, in addition to the many causes

of action that were previously asserted in the original lawsuit, Plaintiff raises new claims

based on an alleged conspiracy among the various defendants (which included this Court as a

“un-indictable co-conspirator”) to deprive Plaintiff of his constitutional rights, in part out of

antipathy toward him because he is African-American. Id. ¶¶ 2, 52; see also id. ¶¶ 54-56

(alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986). The Complaint indicates that

Plaintiff has filed this suit pursuant to Rule 60(b), pursuant to which a party may request

relief from a final judgment due to “newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could

not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial.” Id. ¶ 2.

Moving Defendants filed motions to dismiss, arguing that Plaintiff’s suit (1) is

improper under Rule 60(b), (2) fails to state a claim, (3) is barred by the doctrine of res

judicata, and (4) is barred by applicable statutes of limitations.

DISCUSSION

To the extent that Plaintiff’s complaint identifies itself as a motion under Rule 60(b)

for relief from the final judgment in his initial lawsuit, the motion is improper. Rule 60(b)

requires that any motion must be made “not more than one year after the judgment, order, or

proceeding was entered or taken.” Plaintiff’s original lawsuit was dismissed on April 29,

2002. This lawsuit was filed more than three-and-a-half years later, on December 20, 2005. 

The deadline for any Rule 60(b) motion — including for such motions based on the

discovery of new evidence — has long since passed, and Plaintiff’s motion under Rule 60(b)

is therefore DENIED.

If Plaintiff’s Complaint is construed not as a Rule 60(b) motion, but instead as an

entirely new lawsuit, then the case must be dismissed because it is barred both by applicable

statutes of limitations and by the doctrine of res judicata.

Each of Plaintiff’s claims is time-barred. As for Plaintiff’s constitutional claims, the

events underlying each of these claims ended, at the very latest, when this Court dismissed

Case 3:05-cv-02946-CRB Document 75 Filed 10/20/06 Page 3 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

the original lawsuit on April 19, 2002, more than three-and-a-half years before Plaintiff filed

his complaint on December 20, 2005. None of the constitutional causes of action asserted by

the defendants has a statute of limitations greater than three years in length. See Jones v.

Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004) (applying a two-year statute of limitations, taken from

California law, to claims brought under § 1983); Taylor v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 993 F.2d

710, 711-12 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting that the statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 claims

also applies to claims brought under § 1985); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (establishing a oneyear limitation).

Each of remaining claims — encompassing Plaintiffs’ state-law claims and an alleged

violation of the Truth in Lending Act — accrued, at the very latest, when Plaintiff was

forcibly removed from his Hillsborough home on December 27, 1999. Plaintiff filed this

lawsuit nearly six years later on December 20, 2005. None of the state-law claims advanced

by the Plaintiff has a statute of limitations exceeding four years. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code

§ 17208 (unfair business practices, four years); Cal. Civ. Code § 337(1) (breach of contract,

four years); id. § 338(d) (fraud, three years); id. § 343 (breach of fiduciary duty, four years);

id. § 335.1 (negligence, two years); id. §§ 337(1), 339(1), 340(d) (setting forth four, two, and

one year limitations, respectively, which apply to different categories of claims for violations

of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing); see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 1635(f),

1640(e) (setting forth three-year and one-year restrictions under the Truth in Lending Act in

actions for rescission and damages, respectively). Thus, none of the applicable statutes of

limitations permit Plaintiff to proceed on his various claims.

Moreover, even if Plaintiff could escape the applicable statutes of limitations, his

lawsuit is almost entirely barred by the doctrine of res judicata. This doctrine “bars litigation

in a subsequent action of any claims that were raised or could have been raised in [a] prior

action.” Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 713 (9th Cir. 2001). The

doctrine applies when (1) the prior and present lawsuits involve identical claims, (2) there

was a final judgment on the merits of the first action, and (3) there is privity between the two

Case 3:05-cv-02946-CRB Document 75 Filed 10/20/06 Page 4 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 The only claims potentially not barred by res judicata are the constitutional claims

advanced in Plaintiff’s newest complaint, which were not included in Plaintiff’s original lawsuit.

The reason that such claims are not barred by res judicata is that they involve an entirely distinct

set of factual allegations. Specifically, these claims rest on new allegations that the named

defendants colluded with this Court, and thereby acted under color of law, to deprive him of his

constitutional rights. While these claims may survive analysis under the doctrine of res judicata

— this Court makes no explicit determination of that issue — they are all barred by the

applicable statutes of limitations, as noted above.

5

parties in both of the actions. Frank v. United Airlines, 216 F.3d 845, 850 (9th Cir. 2000). 

The claims in this case meet all three criteria.2

First, Plaintiff’s Complaint raises claims that are identical to those raised in the

previous lawsuit. In considering whether claims are “identical,” a court examines not

whether the exact same causes of action have been asserted, but rather “(1) whether rights or

interests established in the prior judgment would be destroyed or impaired by prosecution of

the second action; (2) whether substantially the same evidence is presented in the two

actions; (3) whether the two suits involve infringement of the same right; and (4) whether the

two suits arise out of the same transactional nucleus of facts.” Gospel Missions of America

v. City of Los Angeles, 328 F.3d 548, 555 (9th Cir. 2003). The last of these factors is the

most important. Id. Here, Plaintiff’s claims all clearly “arise out of the same transactional

nucleus of facts” — namely, the same actions that defendants allegedly took to divest

Plaintiff of his home in Hillsborough. The new evidence raised by Plaintiff regarding the

allegedly defective title he received does not change the Court’s analysis. See id. at 558

(“An action that merely alleges new facts in support of a claim that has gone to judgment in a

previous litigation will be subject to claim preclusion.”). Moreover, Plaintiff’s current

lawsuit involves the exact same rights he sought to protect in his first lawsuit, and

adjudication of this lawsuit would impair the exact same interests that defendants had sought

to protect in the first lawsuit. It would also involve evaluation of the same evidence

regarding the financial transactions surrounding Plaintiff’s acquisition and the subsequent

foreclosure on the Hillsborough home. Accordingly, the claims advanced by Plaintiff are,

for purposes of res judicata analysis, “identical” to the ones he advanced in his 2001 lawsuit.

Case 3:05-cv-02946-CRB Document 75 Filed 10/20/06 Page 5 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

Second, there was a final judgment on the merits of Plaintiff’s original suit. See

Owens, 244 F.3d at 714 (holding that dismissal due to a failure to prosecute generally acts as

an adjudication on the merits (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b)); Cook v. Peter Kiewt Sons Co.,

775 F.2d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that dismissal for failure to state a claim is an

adjudication on the merits).

Third, there is privity between the parties in this lawsuit and the parties in the previous

action. Obviously, Plaintiff was a party to both actions. So were most of the named

defendants: Ocwen Loan Servicing, Fidelity National Title Insurance Company,

Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company, Golden State Realty, California Trust

Deeds, Door to Door Storage, Gwen Broadway, David Burchard, and Edward Walsh. As to

all of these defendants, privity clearly exists. As to the two remaining defendants —

Transnation Title Insurance Company and Teresa Richardson — privity also exists because

these defendants are “so closely aligned in interest [with parties named in the previous

lawsuit] that one is the virtual representative of the other.” Nordhorn v. Ladish Co., 9 F.3d

1402, 1405 (9th Cir. 1993). Transnation Title Insurance Company is the subsidiary of a

company that was named in the original lawsuit, which is sufficient on the facts of this case

to establish privity. See In re Imperial Corp. of America v. Alshuler, 92 F.3d 1503, 1507-08

(9th Cir. 1996). Similarly, Teresa Richardson is the employee of a defendant that was named

in the original lawsuit, and privity exists as to her because her alleged liability stems entirely

from acts that she took within the scope of her employment with that previously named

defendant. See Spector v. El Ranco, Inc., 263 F.3d 143, 145 (9th Cir. 1959).

In sum, Plaintiff cannot present a cognizable motion under Rule 60(b) for relief from

the judgment in his previous lawsuit, and all of the claims in this latest round of litigation are

barred either by the applicable statutes of limitations, or by the doctrine of res judicata, or

both. For these reasons, Moving Defendants’ motions to dismiss are GRANTED, and

Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Case 3:05-cv-02946-CRB Document 75 Filed 10/20/06 Page 6 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

G:\CRBALL\2005\2946\Order 1.wpd 7

Dated: October 20, 2006 CHARLES R. BREYER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:05-cv-02946-CRB Document 75 Filed 10/20/06 Page 7 of 7