Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00559/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00559-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHARZEL P. SHEARS,

Petitioner,

v.

M.E. SPEARMAN, Warden,

Respondent.

Case No.: 17cv0559-MMA (BLM)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION RE 

DENIAL OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF 

HABEAS CORPUS

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Charzel M. Shears (“Petitioner” or “Shears”), a state prisoner proceeding pro 

se, has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his 

San Diego Superior Court conviction in case number DO65200. (Pet. at 1, ECF No. 1 “Pet.”)1 

The Court has reviewed the Petition, the Answer and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 

Support of the Answer, the Traverse, the lodgments, and all the supporting documents 

submitted by both parties. For the reasons discussed below, the Court RECOMMENDS the 

Petition be DENIED. 

/ / / 

 

1

 Page numbers for docketed materials cited in this Report and Recommendation refer to those imprinted 

by the court’s electronic case filing system.

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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact and presumes them to be 

correct; Petitioner may rebut the presumption of correctness, but only by clear and convincing 

evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (West 2006); see also Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 35-36 

(1992) (holding findings of historical fact, including inferences properly drawn from those facts, 

are entitled to statutory presumption of correctness). The following facts are taken from the 

California Court of Appeal opinion:

Hallak owned the Moonlite Market. He kept two guns behind the counter. On the 

morning of April 17, 1996, Hallak was in the market with his employee, Shivers, 

and a cigar salesman, Shaw. Hallak and Shaw were near the cash register and 

Shivers was near the cooler. Between 10 a.m. and 10:30 a.m., a Black man entered 

the store. According to Shivers, he was approximately five feet five inches, or 

about Shivers’s height (five feet eleven inches tall), and of medium build. Shaw 

saw the man for 20 to 30 seconds; according to Shaw, the man was between five 

feet six and five feet eight inches tall and of “real slim” build, between 130 and 

140 pounds. The man’s face was completely covered by a ski mask. The ski mask 

was dark, either blue or black. The man was wearing dark gloves, either blue or 

black, with something white, perhaps a stripe. He was wearing something plaid –

a jacket, shirt or vest. Dark skin was visible around the eye holes of the ski mask, 

and on his wrist, between the glove and the shirt. 

The man pulled a gun and repeatedly said to Hallak, “Give me the money.” The 

man fired two shots. Shaw ran to the end of an aisle. He heard a third shot. He 

continued to the back of the market and knelt down. The counters blocked his 

view of the front of the market. He heard, “Give me the money, give me the 

money” then heard two more shots. The gunman went behind the counter and 

shot at Shivers, who had hit the floor when he heard the shots. The crimes were 

recorded on videotape. 

One of the market’s regular customers walked in and called to Hallak. Shivers got 

up, saw Hallak had been shot and called 911. Shaw went to the front of the store 

and saw Hallak lying on the floor behind the counter. Hallak died at the scene from 

multiple gunshot wounds. During an autopsy, three bullets were recovered from 

his body. 

See Lodgment No. 6 at 4-5.

/ / / 

/ / / 

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III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On February 1, 2013, Petitioner was charged by information with one count of murder 

(Pen. Code, §187) and two counts of attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 187). See Lodgment 

No. 2, at 4-6. For the murder, the prosecution alleged that it was committed during the special

circumstance commission of a robbery (Pen. Code, § 190.2(a)(17); for the attempted murders 

the prosecution alleged they were “willful, deliberate, and premeditated” (Pen. Code §189); and 

for all three charges, there was a charged enhancement for personal use of a firearm 

(Pen. Code, § 12022.5(a)(1)). Id. at 5.

On November 19, 2013, a jury found Shears guilty of all three counts. Id. at 194-97, 

422-25. The jury also found true the special circumstance for the murder, and the personal gun 

use enhancement for all three counts. Id.; Lodgment No. 6 at 3. On December 18, 2013, the 

trial court sentenced Shears to life in prison without the possibility of parole, and imposed two 

consecutive sentences of life with the possibility of parole. See Lodgment No. 2, at 352-53, 

429-30; Lodgment No. 6 at 3. 

Shears appealed his conviction to the California Court of Appeal, arguing (1) a pre-charge 

delay of more than fifteen years constituted a prejudicial violation of due process because it 

caused an alibi witness, Gerald Dushone Young (hereinafter “Young”), to be unavailable for trial 

and (2) the trial court erred in admitting into evidence Shears’s admission that he used a gun 

taken during the Moonlite Market robbery to commit an unrelated crime two days later at a

Foodland grocery store in National City. See Lodgment Nos. 3, 4, 5. On May 20, 2015, the Court 

of Appeal denied Shears’s claims and affirmed his conviction in a reasoned opinion. 

See Lodgment No. 6. On November 30, 2015, Shears filed a petition for review for in the 

California Supreme Court raising the same two issues. See Lodgment No. 7. The court denied 

the petition on January 20, 2016 without comment or citation. See Lodgment No. 8.

Shears states that he also filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the San Diego 

Superior Court, alleging “ineffective assistance of counsel, use of false testimony, failure to track 

witnesses corroborating [Petitioner’s] testimony, claim of whereabouts at time of murder.” 

Pet. at 3. On July 27, 2016, the trial court denied the petition. Id. Petitioner did not pursue 

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further collateral review in the state courts. Id. at 3-4. 

On March 20, 2017, Shears filed the instant federal petition for writ of habeas corpus 

raising the two claims asserted during direct appeal. ECF No. 1. Respondent filed an Answer 

and Memorandum of Points and Authorities on August 11, 2017. ECF No. 13. Respondent also 

submitted Lodgments on August 11, 2017. ECF No. 14. On September 15, 2017, Petitioner 

filed a Traverse. ECF No. 17.

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Shears’s Petition is governed by the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). Under AEDPA, a 

habeas petition will not be granted unless the adjudication: (1) resulted in a decision that was 

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light 

of the evidence presented at the state court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Early v. Packer, 

537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). 

A federal court is not called upon to decide whether it agrees with the state court’s 

determination; rather, the court applies an extraordinarily deferential review, inquiring only 

whether the state court’s decision was objectively unreasonable. See Yarborough v. Gentry, 

540 U.S. 1, 4 (2003); Medina v. Hornung, 386 F.3d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 2004). In order to grant 

relief under § 2254(d)(2), a federal court “must be convinced that an appellate panel, applying 

the normal standards of appellate review, could not reasonably conclude that the finding is 

supported by the record.” See Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1001 (9th Cir. 2004).

A federal habeas court may grant relief under the “contrary to” clause if the state court 

applied a rule different from the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or if it decided 

a case differently than the Supreme Court on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. 

See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). The court may grant relief under the “unreasonable 

application” clause if the state court correctly identified the governing legal principle from 

Supreme Court decisions but unreasonably applied those decisions to the facts of a particular 

case. Id. Additionally, the “unreasonable application” clause requires that the state court 

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decision be more than incorrect or erroneous; to warrant habeas relief, the state court’s 

application of clearly established federal law must be “objectively unreasonable.” See Lockyer 

v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). “[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply 

because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision 

applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must 

also be unreasonable.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411 (2000). “A state court’s 

determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded 

jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 

562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). 

Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, the Court “looks 

through” to the underlying appellate court decision and presumes it provides the basis for the 

higher court’s denial of a claim or claims. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 805-06 (1991). 

If the dispositive state court order does not “furnish a basis for its reasoning,” federal habeas 

courts must conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the state court’s 

decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court 

law. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000) (overruled on other grounds by 

Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75-76); accord Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). 

However, a state court need not cite Supreme Court precedent when resolving a habeas corpus 

claim. See Early, 537 U.S. at 8. “[S]o long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the statecourt decision contradicts [Supreme Court precedent,]” the state court decision will not be 

“contrary to” clearly established federal law. Id. Clearly established federal law, for purposes 

of § 2254(d), means “the governing principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the 

time the state court renders its decision.” Andrade, 538 U.S. at 72.

V. DISCUSSION

Shears raises two claims in his Petition. In Claim One, Petitioner contends the negligent 

pre-charge delay of fifteen years violated his due process rights because it caused the loss of a 

material alibi witness. See Pet. at 6, 14-20. In Claim Two, Petitioner argues that his Fifth

Amendment due process rights were violated when the trial court admitted evidence that 

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Petitioner committed an unrelated gun crime two days after the charged crimes. Id. at 7, 

21-25. Respondent argues both claims must be denied because Petitioner has failed to establish 

the state court’s decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established 

law. See generally, P. & A. in Supp. Answer, ECF No. 13-1.

A. Petitioner’s Claim of Negligent Pre-Charge Delay

In Claim One, Petitioner argues that the negligent pre-charge delay of fifteen years 

violated his due process rights because it caused the loss of a material alibi witness. Pet. at 6, 

21-25. Petitioner contends that the pre-charge delay and resulting prejudice violated his “right 

to Due Process of Law under the 6th and 14th amendment to the United States Constitution.” 

Id. 

Petitioner raised this claim in his petition for review to the California Supreme Court and 

it was denied without comment or citation. See Lodgment Nos. 7 & 8. This Court therefore 

looks through to the last reasoned decision to address the claim – that of the California Court of 

Appeal. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805-06. The pre-charge delay was the subject of lengthy pre-trial 

and post-trial motions in state court. See Lodgment No. 6 at 14; see also Lodgment No. 2 at 

95-131, 279-293, 295-313. The trial court ultimately concluded that Petitioner did not suffer 

actual prejudice as a result of the pre-charge delay. Lodgment No. 1, at 1678-1679. In a 

comprehensive review of the trial judge’s decision, the state appellate court upheld the trial 

judge’s decision reasoning as follows: 

Background

Before trial, Shears filed a motion to dismiss for violation of due process 

and failure to preserve evidence due to prosecutorial delay. In the motion, he 

argued the delay had prejudiced his ability to prepare his defense in that material 

witnesses had died or were missing, the memories of the remaining witnesses had 

been substantially impaired, valuable evidence had been destroyed or was missing 

and a crucial investigation was delayed. The People opposed the motion. The court 

reserved ruling until during or after trial. 

During trial, defense counsel asked to have deleted from the transcript of 

Shears’s April 1996 interview Shears’s statement that he was at Young’s home at 

the time of the Moonlite Market crime. Defense counsel argued that because of 

the passage of time, Young could not be located, and this might lead the jury to 

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believe that Shears’s alibi was fictitious. The prosecutor argued that Young had 

said that Shears was at Young’s home between 9:30 a.m. and 9:45 a.m. and 

returned around 11:00 a.m., leaving Shears enough time to commit the crime. 

Defense counsel’s investigator then testified, out of the jury’s presence, that she 

was assigned to the case in November 2012; in December, she was told to locate 

Young; in September 2013, counsel told her to subpoena Young; and about a 

week before trial, she learned that the National City police had issued an arrest 

warrant for Young on August 7. The investigator testified concerning her efforts 

to find Young. The court found ‘there had been some solid effort to locate [Young,] 

[b]ut during the . . . month preceding the trial, [there had been] little, if any, 

follow-up.’ The court therefore declined to redact the transcript. 

After the jury found Shears guilty, defense counsel renewed the motion to 

dismiss. Defense counsel argued that Young had told Detective Lampert in 1996 

that Shears had been with him at the time of the crimes; beginning several months 

before trial, there was an active arrest warrant for Young; and the defense was 

unable to locate Young at the time of trial.6 Defense counsel concluded that but 

for the delay, ‘it is likely . . . Young would have been in a more cooperative spirit, 

as he had been when he agreed to be interviewed by Detective Lampert in 1996, 

and would have made himself available to testify as a crucial alibi witness.’

The People opposed the renewed motion to dismiss. At sentencing, the 

court denied the motion. The court concluded as follows. The defense had not 

been diligent in searching for Young. Although there was no explanation for some 

portions of the delay, the delay was not purposeful or the result of a tactical 

decision. The investigation continued intermittently until Shears was charged. The 

new information obtained in 2005 (Mrs. Shears’s later retracted statement that 

Shears said he was the planner and shooter) was significant and led to the charges. 

The jury would have considered testimony by Young that Shears was at Young’s 

home at the time of the crimes in the context of Shears’s statements during 

interrogation that he was at the crime scene immediately before the crimes. Thus, 

there was no actual prejudice. 

[FN 6] Shears made further arguments in the trial court that he does not 

pursue on appeal. 

Discussion

Shears contends the negligent pre-charging delay of more than 15 years 

constituted a violation of due process; the delay caused alibi witness Young to be 

unavailable, prejudicing Shears; and the court erred by denying his renewed 

motion to dismiss. 

A “[d]efendant’s state and federal constitutional speedy trial rights (U.S. 

Const., 6th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15, cl. 1) are not implicated . . . until at 

least the defendant has been charged or a charging document has been filed. 

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[Citation.]” (People v. Nelson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1242, 1250). “Although precharging delay does not implicate speedy trial rights, a defendant is not without 

recourse if the delay is unjustified and prejudicial. ‘[T]he right of due process 

protects a criminal defendant’s interest in fair adjudication by preventing 

unjustified delays that weaken the defense through the dimming of memories, the 

death or disappearance of witnesses, and the loss or destruction of material 

physical evidence.’ [Citation.] Accordingly, ‘[d]elay in prosecution that occurs 

before the accused is arrested or the complaint is filed may constitute a denial of 

the right to a fair trial and to due process of law under the state and federal 

Constitutions. A defendant seeking to dismiss a charge on this ground must 

demonstrate prejudice arising from the delay. The prosecution may offer 

justification for the delay, and the court considering a motion to dismiss balances 

the harm to the defendant against the justification for the delay.’” (Ibid.) “[If] the 

defendant fails to meet his or her burden of showing prejudice, there is no need 

to determine whether the delay was justified.” (People v. Abel (2012) 53 Cal. 4th 

891, 909.)

“The state and federal constitutional standards regarding what justifies 

delay differ. Regarding the federal constitutional standard, we have stated that 

‘[a] claim based upon the federal Constitution also requires a showing that the 

delay was undertaken to gain a tactical advantage over the defendant.’” (People 

v. Nelson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1251.) Although “the exact standard under [the 

United States] Constitution is not entirely settled[,] [i]t is clear, however, that the 

law under the California Constitution is at least as favorable for [the] defendant in 

this regard as the law under the United States Constitution. Accordingly, we . . . 

apply California law.” (Ibid.). “[U]nder California law, negligent as well as 

purposeful, delay in bringing charges may, when accompanied by a showing of 

prejudice, violate due process.” (Id. at p. 1255). Thus, “whether the delay was 

negligent or purposeful is relevant to the balancing process. Purposeful delay to 

gain an advantage is totally unjustified, and a relatively weak showing of prejudice 

would suffice to tip the scales towards finding a due process violation. If the delay 

was merely negligent, a greater showing of prejudice would be required to 

establish a due process violation.” (Id. at p. 1256.)

“We review for abuse of discretion a trial court’s ruling on a motion to 

dismiss for prejudicial prearrest delay [citation], and defer to any underlying 

factual findings if substantial evidence supports them [citation].” (People v. Cowan

(2010) 50 Cal. 4th 401, 431). Here, the trial court found that Shears had not met 

his burden of showing prejudice in light of the conflict between any testimony by 

Young that Shears was at Young’s home7 at the time of the crimes and Shears’s 

statements that he was at the crime scene immediately before the crimes. This 

finding is supported by substantial evidence. In April 1996, Shears told the police 

he was not at the Moonlite Market “or around it” at the time of the robbery; at the 

time of the robbery, around 9:15 a.m. or 9:30 a.m., he was at Young’s home. In 

the same interview, Shears said he was at the Moonlite Market the morning of the 

crimes, “right before it happened,” from “8:50 to 9:05,” and after the crimes. 

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Shears’s own statements undermined any alibi testimony Young would have given 

at trial. 

[FN 7:] Young lived in the neighborhood of the Moonlite Market. 

Moreover, substantial evidence supports the court’s conclusion that the 

defense was not diligent in attempting to locate Young. After being told to find 

Young in December 2012, defense counsel’s investigator found Young’s mother’s 

residence. The investigator telephoned the number listed for that address, but 

the number had been disconnected. In September 2013, when defense counsel 

told the investigator to subpoena Young, the investigator went to Young’s mother’s 

home and spoke with his mother, who said Young “comes around quite often.” 

The investigator left her business card. When the investigator returned one week 

later, Young’s mother said she had not given him the card. The investigator left 

another card and did not return to the house or conduct any surveillance. The 

investigator unsuccessfully checked into two other possible addresses for Young 

and unsuccessfully contacted two of Young’s associates after obtaining their 

names from Young’s mother. The investigator knew of the August 7, 2013, arrest 

warrant for Young, last checked to see whether he was in custody in early October, 

and never checked to see whether he was on probation or parole. Thus, factors 

independent of any delay by the prosecutor, including a lack of diligence by the 

defense investigator and Young’s fugitive state, led to Young’s unavailability. 

Shears quotes People v. Mirenda (2009) 174 Cal. App. 4th 1313, in which 

this court stated: “[A]lthough a federal speedy trial case, the reasoning in [Doggett 

v. United States (1992) 505 U.S. 647 [], is instructive on the issue of showing 

prejudice for analyzing either speedy trial or due process violations as the 

constitutional guarantees ‘converge in protecting the same interest of the accused’ 

for a fair adjudication. [Citation.] The court in Doggett noted that ‘impairment of 

one’s defense is the most difficult form of speedy trial prejudice to prove because 

time’s erosion of exculpatory evidence and testimony “can rarely be shown.” 

[Citation.] And although time can tilt the case against either side, [citations], one 

cannot generally be sure which of them it has prejudiced more severely. Thus, 

we generally have to recognize that excessive delay presumptively compromises 

the reliability of a trial in ways that neither party can prove or, for that matter, 

identify. While such presumptive prejudice cannot alone carry a Sixth Amendment 

[speedy trial] claim . . . , it is part of the mix of relevant facts, and its importance 

increases with the length of the delay. (Doggett, supra, at pp. 655-656.)” (People 

v. Mirenda, supra, at p. 1329 [26 year delay between filing of criminal charges and 

beginning of prosecution].) Shears concludes that the sheer length of a delay 

increases prejudice; thus, the lengthy delay here suggests that Young’s 

unavailability should be attributed to the prosecution. This proposition does not 

take into account the fact that Shears’s own statements decreased Young’s value 

as an alibi witness or the lack of diligence by the defense investigator. 

The court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion to dismiss. 

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See Lodgment No. 6 at 15-21.

1. Federal Law

Initially, the Court notes that the state court correctly determined that the Sixth 

Amendment does not govern Petitioner’s claim of negligent pre-accusation delay because the 

speedy trial provision contained in the Sixth Amendment is not implicated until formal charges 

are filed or a defendant suffers an actual restraint on his liberty. See United States v. Marion, 

404 U.S. 307, 320-21 (1971). Rather, the state court correctly analyzed Petitioner’s 

pre-accusation delay claim under the Due Process clause.

In Marion, the Supreme Court held that a defendant may assert a constitutional violation 

for pre-indictment delay under the Due Process Clause. Id. However, the Court cautioned that 

the “primary guarantee against bringing overly stale criminal charges” is the applicable statute 

of limitation. Id. at 322. The Court reversed the decision based on the Sixth Amendment but

opined that the Appellees had not established a due process violation because “[n]o actual 

prejudice to the conduct of the defense is alleged or proved, and there is no showing that the 

Government intentionally delayed to gain some tactical advantage over appellees or to harass 

them.” Id. at 325. 

Several years later, the Court revisited the issue to address whether the fact that a 

defendant suffered prejudice as the result of a pre-indictment delay results in a due process 

violation. United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789 (1977). The Court confirmed that “proof 

of prejudice is generally a necessary but not sufficient element of a due process claim, and that 

the due process inquiry must consider the reasons for the delay as well as the prejudice to the 

accused.” Id. The Court rejected the notion that a prosecutor must file charges as soon as 

there is probable cause to believe a person committed a crime or at any other specific point in 

time and noted that it is appropriate for a prosecutor to wait to file charges until there is evidence 

to prove the suspect’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 790-91. The Court stated that 

the reason for the prosecutor’s delay in filing charges is important, highlighting that 

“investigative delay is fundamentally unlike delay undertaken by the Government solely to gain 

tactical advantage over the accused.” Id. (internal citation and quotation omitted). As a result, 

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the Court held that “to prosecute a defendant following investigative delay does not deprive him 

of due process, even if his defense might have been somewhat prejudiced by the lapse of time.” 

Id. at 796. While the Lovasco Court upheld the lower court ruling finding no due process 

violation based on the investigative delay, the Court opined that “so few defendants have 

established that they were prejudiced by delay that neither this Court nor any lower court has 

had a sustained opportunity to consider the constitutional significance of various reasons for 

delay. We therefore leave to the lower courts, in the first instance, the task of applying the 

settled principles of due process that we have discussed to the particular circumstances of 

individual cases.” Id. at 796-797. 

The Ninth Circuit recently confirmed that Lovasco provides the clearly established federal 

law on this issue. Shammam v. Paramo, 664 F. App’x 629, 630 (9th Cir. 2016). In a case 

involving a direct appeal, the Ninth Circuit stated that a defendant subject to a lengthy preindictment delay must first show “actual, non-speculative prejudice from the delay” and noted 

that showing actual prejudice is a “heavy burden that is rarely met.” United States v. CoronaVerbera, 509 F.3d 1105, 1112 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal citation and quotation omitted). 

“Generalized assertions of the loss of memory, witnesses, or evidence are insufficient to establish 

actual prejudice. Consequently, [a defendant] must show both that lost testimony, witnesses, 

or evidence meaningfully has impaired his ability to defend himself, and [t]he proof must 

demonstrate by definite and non-speculative evidence how the loss of a witness or evidence is 

prejudicial to [his] case.” Id. If the defendant shows actual prejudice, he must then show this 

prejudice outweighs the reasons for the delay and that the delay “offends those fundamental 

conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions.” Id. (internal 

citation and quotation omitted). 

2. Analysis 

Petitioner argues that he suffered prejudice due to the “loss of a material witness due to 

[a] lapse of time” and because the trial court would not redact Petitioner’s interrogation 

statement. Pet. at 6, 16-17. Specifically, Petitioner contends: 

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[D]uring the interrogation of April 22, 1996, Mr. Shears made the claim that 

he was at the house of Shone Young during the robbery and that he heard news 

of the robbery while there. At trial, defense counsel had requested that this be 

redacted from the statement. Although Dushone Young was interviewed in 1996 

by Sergeant Lampert and confirmed this alibi, the defense had not been able to 

locate Young and without this corroboration, it might appear that Shears was lying. 

The prosecutor, supported by the trial judge, would not agree to the redaction 

absent a finding of due diligence in the attempt to locate Young. . . . 

During trial, the court found that [the defense’s] efforts were insufficient 

within the last month before trial to warrant the redaction of the alibi from 

defendant’s statement as requested by defense counsel...

The California Court of Appeal failed to apply the constitution[al] test that 

determines whether the petitioner was denied due process of law under the Fifth 

and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution or the California 

Constitution, Article I, section 7, or both; where there was a negligent delay 

between the April 17, 1996 date the murder was committed and the August 24, 

2012 date of arrest, 16 years later. The negligent delay and the actual prejudice 

to the Petitioner thereof was improperly weighed against insufficient justification... 

There was no justification for this negligent pre-charge delay where the 

prosecutor used the same 1996 evidence to convict him in 2013. The negligent 

delay caused petitioner’s alibi witness to evade being located by the defense 

investigator as alleged in his pre-trial motion to dismiss the case on due process 

grounds based on a claim of prejudice stemming from unavailable material 

witnesses and faded witness memories. 

Id. at 6, 8-9; see also Traverse at 6-8. 

The Court of Appeal found that Shears had not met his burden of showing actual prejudice 

in light of the conflict between the statement by Young that Shears was with Young at the time 

of the crimes and Shears’s statements that he was at the crime scene immediately before the 

crimes. Lodgment No. 6 at 18-19. The court explained: “[i]n April 1996, Shears told the police 

he was not at the Moonlite Market ‘or around it’ at the time of the robbery; at the time of the 

robbery, around 9:15 a.m. or 9:30 a.m., he was at Young’s home. In the same interview, 

Petitioner said he was at the Moonlite Market the morning of the crimes, ‘right before it 

happened,’ from ‘8:50 to 9:05,’ and after the crimes.” Lodgment No. 6 at 18. The Court of Appeal 

also found that the defense was not diligent in attempting to locate Young, and that factors 

independent of any delay by the prosecutor led to Young’s unavailability. Id. at 20. As a result, 

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the Court of Appeal found that Shears did not establish actual prejudice. Id. at 18-21. A review 

of the trial court record supports this argument. See, e.g., Lodgment No. 2 at 95-131 (parties’ 

briefing on the motion to dismiss); Lodgment No. 1 (transcript of trial court hearing during which 

court reserved ruling on pre-trial motion until after it had a chance to hear trial evidence); 

Lodgment No. 2 at 279-93 (renewed motion to dismiss); Lodgment No. 2 at 295-313 (state’s

opposition to the renewed motion to dismiss); Lodgment No. 1 (transcript of trial court’s decision 

to deny renewed motion to dismiss). 

This Court finds that the state court’s decision was not an unreasonable factual 

determination. While Young’s statement that Petitioner was at Young’s home between 9:30 and 

9:45 a.m. (returning again at 11 a.m.) could provide an alibi to Petitioner, the strength of that 

alibi was dramatically undercut by Petitioner’s own statements that (1) he was at the Moonlite 

Market right before the crimes occurred, from approximately 8:50 to 9:05 a.m. and (2) he was 

not at the Moonlite Market at the time of the robbery. Based upon these conflicting statements, 

as well as the other trial evidence, Petitioner’s claim is merely an assertion that Young’s 

testimony may have been useful and that its absence may have resulted in prejudice and does 

not establish the requisite actual prejudice. See, e.g., United States v. Horowitz, 756 F.2d 1400, 

1405 (9th Cir. 1985) (“Mere assertions that the testimony of missing witness[es] may have been 

useful . . . is not ‘proof of actual prejudice’ required by [the Supreme Court].); see also CoronaVerbera, 509 F.3d at 1113 (“Allegations of prejudice ‘must be supported by non-speculative 

proof.”). In addition, there is substantial evidence supporting the appellate court’s conclusion 

that circumstances other than the delay in filing charges rendered Young unavailable to testify, 

including the facts that the defense investigator did not diligently attempt to locate Young so he 

could testify at trial and Young was a fugitive due to a pending arrest warrant. 

Petitioner also argues that he suffered prejudice as a result of the sheer “length of the 

delay,” relying primarily on a speedy trial case. Pet. at 19. However, Doggett v. United States, 

505 U.S. 647 (1992) does not support Petitioner’s argument. The court in Doggett specifically 

noted that “the Sixth Amendment right of the accused to a speedy trial has no application beyond 

the confines of a formal criminal prosecution,” which is not triggered until the defendant is 

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arrested, indicted or otherwise officially accused. 505 U.S. at 655; see also United States v. 

MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 7 (1982) (“Although delay prior to arrest or indictment may give rise to 

a due process claim under the Fifth Amendment, or to a claim under any applicable statues of 

limitations, no Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial arises until charges are pending.”). While 

the Court discussed the presumption of prejudice applicable in Sixth Amendment speedy trial 

cases, it did not extend that presumption to due process claims such as Petitioner’s involving 

pre-charge delay. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655-66. Accordingly, the California Court of Appeal’s 

finding that Petitioner failed to meet his burden of showing prejudice cannot be said to be 

“contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 

Even if Petitioner had established the requisite prejudice, clearly established federal law 

requires that the prejudice outweighs the reasons for the delay and that the delay “offends 

those fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political 

institutions.” Corona-Verbera, 509 F.3d at 1112. Here, as the record reflects and Petitioner 

admits, the delay was investigative (or negligent as stated by Petitioner) and there is no evidence 

indicating the delay was the result of purposeful or tactical decisions. The government’s decision 

to delay charges in this case comports with Lovasco’s statement that it is appropriate for a 

prosecutor to wait to seek an “indictment until he is completely satisfied that he ... will be able 

promptly to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” 431 U.S. at 795. Also, under California 

law, there is no statute of limitations for murder [see People v. Wilson, 60 Cal. 2d 139, 170 

(1963)], which is the “primary guarantee [] against bringing overly stale criminal charges.” Id.

at 783. Given the undisputed evidence of investigative delay, the lack of evidence of purposeful 

or tactical delay, and the minimal, if any, evidence of prejudice, Petitioner has not established a 

violation of the Due Process Clause. See Shammam, 664 F. App’x at 632 (upholding denial of a 

habeas petition claiming a due process violation resulting from a 14 year delay between murder 

and indictment where the delay was the result of an open investigation and the delay caused 

“some prejudice” consisting of faded memories).

In sum, Petitioner has not shown that the California courts’ findings of fact were 

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unreasonable or that the factual and legal conclusions that Petitioner did not suffer prejudice 

were contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, controlling federal authority. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d)(1). Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS Petitioner’s Claim One be DENIED. 

B. Petitioner’s Claim of Evidentiary Error

In Claim Two, Shears argues that his “conviction resulted from an error of Constitutional 

dimension which was not shown to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt by allowing evidence 

of Petitioner’s Admission to committing an unrelated gun crime.” Pet. at 7 (citing Chapman v. 

California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)). Specifically, Shears contends that his federal constitutional right 

to due process was violated by the introduction of evidence that he used the gun taken from 

Hallak to commit an unrelated crime two days later. Pet. at 21-25. Shears raised this issue in his 

petition for review to the California Supreme Court, which was denied without comment or 

citation. See Lodgment Nos. 7 & 8. As such, this Court looks through to the opinion of the 

California Court of Appeal, the last reasoned state court decision to address this issue. See Ylst, 

501 U.S. at 805-06. The appellate court found no violation of Shears’s due process rights in 

admitting the challenged evidence. In a comprehensive review of the trial judge’s decision, the 

state appellate court upheld the trial judge’s decision reasoning as follows: 

Background

Before trial, Shears filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence of his prior 

crimes, arrests, prison commitment and parole violations. His prior crimes included 

a robbery he committed on April 19, 1996, at the Foodland grocery store in 

National City, two days after the crimes at issue, and to which he pled guilty in 

August. In the Foodland robbery, Shears personally used a gun stolen from Hallak 

on April 17. Shears’s criminal history was a subject of various police reports and 

was mentioned in police interviews of Shears on April 26, 1996, and August 24, 

2012, and in police interviews of Vasquez. In his in limine motion, Shears argued 

that evidence he used Hallak’s gun in the Foodland robbery was irrelevant and its 

introduction would “create substantial danger of undue prejudice and confusion of 

the issues.” The People opposed the motion, arguing that the date on which 

Shears possessed the gun was relevant to the issue [of] whether he was the one 

who committed the April 17, 1996, crimes; Vasquez’s identification of the gun as 

one Shears possessed on April 19 was more relevant than evidence the gun was 

found in the April 23 search of Shears’s apartment, as April 19 was closer in time 

to April 17; the evidence was relevant to bolster Vasquez’s credibility; and if Shears 

chose to testify, the evidence might be relevant to impeach him in that he had 

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initially denied involvement in the Foodland robbery and he had proffered several 

versions of how he came to possess the gun. The prosecutor intended to present 

the evidence at issue through (1) Vasquez’s statement that when he saw Shears 

with the gun on April 19, Shears said he had used it to rob a woman that day and 

(2) Shears’s statement in the April 23 interview that he had committed the 

Foodland robbery. 

After a lengthy discussion, the court admitted evidence that two days after 

the Moonlite Market crimes, Shears had committed another crime with a gun. The 

court deemed too prejudicial for admission any evidence that the other crime was 

an armed robbery. 

Discussion

Shears contends the court abused its discretion under Evidence Code 

section 352 by admitting into evidence his admission that he used a gun taken 

during the murder and attempted murders when he committed an unrelated crime 

two days later. Shears further contends that this abuse of discretion violated his 

right to due process. 

Evidence Code section 352 states: “The court in its discretion may exclude 

evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that 

its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create 

substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading 

the jury.” “We review for abuse of discretion a trial court’s ruling to exclude 

proffered relevant evidence under Evidence Code section 352.” (People v. Fuiava

(2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 663.) An abuse of discretion occurs only when the court’s 

“‘ruling falls outside the bounds of reason’” or when “‘the court . . . exercise[s] its 

discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that result[s] in a 

manifest miscarriage of justice.’” (Ibid, citations omitted.)

Here, there was no abuse of discretion. The court reasonably found that 

Shears’s use of the gun in the April 19, 1996, crime was “highly probative” of his 

guilt in the April 17 crimes and the prejudice did not “substantially outweigh [the] 

probative value.” Shears’s possession of the gun just two days after the Moonlite 

Market crimes tended to show that he took the gun during those crimes, and the 

fact that he did not merely possess the gun on April 19, but also used it in a crime 

that day, added to the probative value. The court also properly found that the 

evidence was relevant to Vasquez’s credibility. Vasquez testified that Shears made 

statements incriminating himself in the April 17 and April 19 crimes, and 

confirmation from an independent source that Shears had indeed committed the 

April 19 crime bore on the credibility of Vasquez’s testimony as to Shears’s 

commission of the April 17 crimes. The court’s sanitization of the evidence, by 

omitting the violent details of the April 19 crime, removed any prejudice. 

Clearly, Shears’s due process rights were not implicated. In People v. 

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Fuiava, supra, 53 Cal.4th 622, the California Supreme Court observed: “[A]s the 

United States Supreme Court recently stated, ‘[o]nly when evidence “is so 

extremely unfair that is admission violates fundamental conceptions of justice,” 

[citation], [has the court] imposed a constraint tied to the Due Process Clause.’ 

(Perry v. New Hampshire (2012) 565 U.S. __, __ [181 L.Ed.2d 694, 706, 132 S.Ct. 

716] [citing, as an example, the constitutional prohibition against a prosecutor’s’ 

“knowin[g] use [of] false evidence,”’]; see also id. at pp._-_ [181 L.Ed.2d at 706-

708] [discussing cases in which due process was violated by the admission of 

witness identification evidence that was developed through improperly suggestive 

police procedures that created a ‘“substantial likelihood of misidentification”’]; 

Jammal v. Van de Kamp (9th Cir. 1991) 926 F.2d 918, 920 [‘Only if there are no 

permissible inferences the jury may draw from the evidence can its admission 

violate due process. Even then, the evidence must “be of such quality as 

necessarily prevents a fair trial.”’].)” (People v. Fuiava, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 

696-697.)

(Lodgment No. 6 at 21-24.)

To the extent Petitioner contends the state court’s evidentiary ruling violates California 

state law, he fails to state a cognizable claim on federal habeas review. Estelle v. McGuire, 

502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (finding issues regarding state law are not cognizable on federal 

habeas corpus review and it is not the province of the federal habeas court to re-examine statecourt determinations on state-law questions). 

To the extent Petitioner argues that the state court’s evidentiary ruling violates the federal

Due Process Clause, his claim fails. “Under AEDPA, even clearly erroneous admissions of 

evidence that render a trial fundamentally unfair may not permit the grant of federal habeas 

corpus relief if not forbidden by “clearly established Federal law,” as laid out by the Supreme 

Court. Holley v. Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). As the 

Ninth Circuit noted: 

[t]he Supreme Court has made very few rulings regarding the admission of 

evidence as a violation of due process. Although the Court has been clear that writ 

should be issued when constitutional errors have rendered the trial fundamentally 

unfair . . . , it has not yet made a clear ruling that admission of irrelevant or overtly 

prejudicial evidence constitutes a due process violation sufficient to warrant 

issuance of the writ. Absent such ‘clearly established Federal law,’ we cannot 

conclude that [a] state court’s ruling [on the admission of evidence] was an 

‘unreasonable application.’”

Id. (citations omitted). 

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Because there is no clearly established Federal law dictating that the admission of 

sanitized and relevant, albeit prejudicial, evidence is forbidden, Petitioner’s claim must be 

denied. See, e.g., Spencer v. California, 2013 WL 1092997, at *1-2 (9th Cir. 2012) (federal 

habeas claim that state trial court erred by admitting evidence fails because there is no Supreme 

Court authority which has clearly established that admission of evidence can violate due process) 

(citing Holley, 568 F.3d at 1101 and Alberni v. McDaniel, 458 F.3d 860, 865-67 (9th Cir. 2006)). 

Moreover, in this case, the appellate court found that the trial court did not err as it correctly 

determined that the disputed evidence was relevant to the charged crimes and that the 

sanitization of the evidence removed any prejudice. Lodgment No. 6 at 21-14. As a result, the 

court concluded that there was no constitutional due process violation. Id. at 24. Under the 

deferential review of AEDPA, even if there could be a due process violation, the Court would 

find that the state court’s ruling was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law.

The Court therefore RECOMMENDS Claim Two be DENIED.

C. Petitioner’s Request for Evidentiary Hearing

Spears asks this Court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on his claims. See Traverse 

at 3. A federal court’s discretion to hold an evidentiary hearing is governed by 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(e)(2), which provides:

If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State 

court proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the claim 

unless the applicant shows that—

(A) the claim relies on—

(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral 

review by the Supreme Court, that was previously made unavailable; or

(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered 

through the exercise of due diligence; and

(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear 

and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder

would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.

“Federal courts sitting in habeas are not an alternative forum for trying facts and issues 

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which a prisoner made insufficient effort to pursue in state proceedings.” Williams v. Taylor, 

529 U.S. 420, 437 (2000). Here, Petitioner makes a perfunctory request “that an evidentiary 

hearing be granted on Grounds 1 and 2.” Traverse at 3. However, Petitioner does not establish 

that his request relies on a new rule of constitutional law, or a factual predicate that could not 

have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence. See id. Similarly, 

Petitioner has not alleged facts that would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing 

evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found him guilty 

of the underlying offense. See id. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Petitioner’s request for an 

evidentiary hearing.

VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

For all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the District Judge 

issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation, and (2) directing 

that Judgment be entered DENYING the Petition.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that no later than February 23, 2018, any party to this 

action may file written objections with this Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document 

should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court 

and served on all parties no later than March 16, 2018. The parties are advised that failure 

to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on 

appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 1/26/2018

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