Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-02245/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-02245-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:416 Denial of Social Security Benefits

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ALISA MICHELLE FORD, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security, 

Defendant. 

No. 2:13-cv-2245-EFB 

ORDER 

 

 Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

(“Commissioner”) denying her applications for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and 

Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. The parties 

have filed cross-motions for summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, plaintiff’s motion is 

denied and the Commissioner’s motion is granted. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 Plaintiff filed applications for a period of disability, DIB, and SSI on October 25, 2011, 

alleging that she had been disabled since January 1, 2004. Administrative Record (“AR”) 93, 

172-189. Plaintiff’s applications were denied initially and upon reconsideration. Id. at 117-121, 

124-129. On May 30, 2013, a hearing was held before administrative law judge (“ALJ”) 

Evangelina P. Hernandez. Id. at 26-76. Plaintiff was represented by counsel at the hearings, at 

which she, a third-party witness, and a vocational expert (“VE”) testified. Id. 

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 On July 19, 2013, the ALJ issued a decision finding that plaintiff was not disabled under 

sections 216(i), 223(d), and 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Act.1 Id. at 10-20. The ALJ made the following 

specific findings: 

1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act 

through December 31, 2016. 

2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since October 1, 2011, 

the alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq., and 416.971 et seq.). 

* * * 

3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: bipolar disorder and 

depression (20 CFR 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)). 

 1

 Disability Insurance Benefits are paid to disabled persons who have contributed to the 

Social Security program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq. Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) is paid 

to disabled persons with low income. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382 et seq. Under both provisions, 

disability is defined, in part, as an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity” due to 

“a medically determinable physical or mental impairment.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(a) & 

1382c(a)(3)(A). A five-step sequential evaluation governs eligibility for benefits. See 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 423(d)(1)(a), 416.920 & 416.971-76; Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987). The 

following summarizes the sequential evaluation: 

 Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful 

activity? If so, the claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed 

to step two. 

 Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? 

If so, proceed to step three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is 

appropriate. 

 Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination 

of impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 

404, Subpt. P, App.1? If so, the claimant is automatically 

determined disabled. If not, proceed to step four. 

 Step four: Is the claimant capable of performing his past 

work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step 

five. 

 Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional 

capacity to perform any other work? If so, the claimant is not 

disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled. 

 

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995). 

 

 The claimant bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential evaluation 

process. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5. The Commissioner bears the burden if the sequential 

evaluation process proceeds to step five. Id.

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* * * 

4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that 

meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR 

Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 

416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926). 

* * * 

5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned find that the 

claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform a fully range of work at all 

exertional levels but with the following nonexertional limitations: She is limited to 

simple work, defined in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) as SVP 

levels 1 and 2, routine and repetitive; she needs to work in a low stress job defined 

as involving only occasional decisions making and occasional changes in the work 

setting; she can have occasional interaction with the general public; and the work 

can be around co-workers throughout the day, but with only occasional interaction 

with co-workers. 

* * * 

6. The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work (20 CFR 404.1565 and 

416.965). 

* * * 

7. The claimant was born on June 24, 1970 and was 33 years old, which is defined as 

a younger individual age 18-49, on the alleged disability onset date (20 CFR 

404.1563 and 416.963). 

8. The claim has at least a high school education and is able to communicate in 

English (20 CFR 404.1564 and 416.964). 

9. Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of disability 

because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework supports a finding 

that the claimant is “not disabled,” whether or not the claimant has transferable job 

skills (See SSR 82-41 and 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2). 

10. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual 

functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national 

economy that the claimant can perform (20 CFR 404.1569, 404.1569(a), 416.969, 

and 416.969(a)). 

* * * 

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11. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, 

from October 1, 2011, through the date of this decision (20 CFR 404.1520(g) and 

416.920(g)). 

Id. at 12-20. 

The Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s request for review on August 28, 2013, leaving the 

ALJ’s decision as the final decision of the Commissioner. Id. at 6. 

II. LEGAL STANDARDS 

 The Commissioner’s decision that a claimant is not disabled will be upheld if the findings 

of fact are supported by substantial evidence in the record and the proper legal standards were 

applied. Schneider v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 223 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2000); 

Morgan v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999); Tackett v. Apfel, 

180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). 

 The findings of the Commissioner as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are 

conclusive. See Miller v. Heckler, 770 F.2d 845, 847 (9th Cir. 1985). Substantial evidence is 

more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 521 (9th 

Cir. 1996). “‘It means such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.’” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. 

N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). 

 “The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical 

testimony, and resolving ambiguities.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 

2001) (citations omitted). “Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 

interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.” 

Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). 

III. ANALYSIS 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in (1) rejecting his treating physician’s opinion without 

providing legally sufficient reasons, and (2) rejecting third-party statements without a legitimate 

reason. ECF No. 17 at 13-20. 

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A. The ALJ Provided Legally Sufficient Reasons for Rejecting the Opinion of Plaintiff’s 

Treating Physician 

Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s rejection of the medical opinion from Dr. Susan Andrews, 

plaintiff’s treating physician. ECF No. 17 at 13-17. The weight given to medical opinions 

depends in part on whether they are proffered by treating, examining, or non-examining 

professionals. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1996). Ordinarily, more weight is 

given to the opinion of a treating professional, who has a greater opportunity to know and observe 

the patient as an individual. Id.; Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1295 (9th Cir. 1996). To 

evaluate whether an ALJ properly rejected a medical opinion, in addition to considering its 

source, the court considers whether (1) contradictory opinions are in the record; and (2) clinical 

findings support the opinions. An ALJ may reject an uncontradicted opinion of a treating or 

examining medical professional only for “clear and convincing” reasons. Lester, 81 F.3d at 831. 

In contrast, a contradicted opinion of a treating or examining professional may be rejected for 

“specific and legitimate” reasons, that are supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 830. While a 

treating professional’s opinion generally is accorded superior weight, if it is contradicted by a 

supported examining professional’s opinion (e.g., supported by different independent clinical 

findings), the ALJ may resolve the conflict. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 

1995) (citing Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989)). However, “[w]hen an 

examining physician relies on the same clinical findings as a treating physician, but differs only 

in his or her conclusions, the conclusions of the examining physician are not ‘substantial 

evidence.’” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 632 (9th Cir. 2007). 

 Dr. Andrews submitted a Complete Medical Report (Mental) indicating that she had been 

treating plaintiff since July 10, 2012. AR at 491. She diagnosed plaintiff with Bipolar I mixed, 

Borderline Intellectual Functioning, and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”). Id. Dr. 

Andrews opined that plaintiff had a poor ability to follow work rules, relate to co-workers, deal 

with the public, interact with supervisors, use judgment, deal with work stress, function 

independently, and maintain attention/concentration. Id. at 492. She further opined that plaintiff 

had a poor ability to understand, remember, and carry out simple job instructions; behave in an 

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emotionally stable manner; relate predictably in social situations, demonstrate reliability, but a 

good ability to maintain personal appearance. Id. at 494. 

 Dr. Anderson explained that plaintiff has marked memory loss, poor concentration and 

focus, and a short term attention span, resulting in an inability to learn or retain new information. 

Id. at 493. Plaintiff also has paranoia that results in isolation, difficulty leaving the house, panic 

attacks, helplessness and hopelessness. Id. She noted that plaintiff is also irritable, angry with 

hostile outbursts, and has exhibited inappropriate sexual advances towards strangers, all resulting 

in an inability to appropriately interact with co-workers, supervisors, and the public. Id. Dr. 

Andrews further stated that due to her mental impairments, plaintiff forgets to adjust her 

medication based on whether she is depressed or manic, and she needs constant reminders to 

adjust her medication. Id. 

 Plaintiff also underwent a comprehensive psychiatric evaluation, which was performed by 

Dr. Silvia Torrez, Doctor of Psychology. Id. at 367-375. Dr. Torrez diagnosed plaintiff with 

adjustment disorder with depressed mood, and found that plaintiff’s psychological symptoms 

were in the mild range. Id. at 373. She concluded that despite plaintiff’s reported symptoms, 

plaintiff was not suffering from a major mental disorder. Id. at 374. Dr. Torrez opined that 

plaintiff had no limitations in understanding and remembering detailed instruction, accepting 

instructions from supervisors, maintaining attention and concentration, and completing a normal 

workday and workweek without interruption. Id. It was also her opinion that plaintiff could deal 

with changes in the work setting, interact with coworkers, and that the likelihood of plaintiff’s 

emotionally deteriorating in work environment was minimal. Id. at 374. Thus, Dr. Torrez opined 

that plaintiff did not have any metal impairments that would impact her ability to work. 

 In finding that plaintiff was not disabled, the ALJ gave great weight to Dr. Torrez’s 

opinion, while giving little weight to Dr. Andrews’s treating opinion. Id. at 17-18. As Dr. 

Andrews’s opinion was contradicted by Dr. Torrez’s opinion, the ALJ was required to provide 

specific and legitimate reasons for discounting the treating opinion. 

 The ALJ gave a single reason for rejecting Dr. Torrez’s treating opinion: the “opinion is 

not supported by the underlying treatment records, . . . which indicate that the claimant’s 

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symptoms are generally stable on medication.” Id. at 18. An ALJ may reject a treating 

physician’s opinion that is inconsistent with the physician’s own treatment notes. Tommasetti v. 

Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008). 

 Dr. Andrews’s treatment notes from plaintiff’s initial visit in July 2012 indicate that 

plaintiff was cooperative, her affect was congruent, speech was clear, thought content was 

normal, she was oriented to time place and purpose, attention was fair, and she had no memory 

problems. Id. at 476-477. Plaintiff reported feeling depressed, detached and unemotional, and 

stated that she had experienced mood swings and some mania symptoms. 474, 477. She also 

reported seeing a male silhouette in her living room at night and that voices would tell her to 

spend money when she was under stress. Id. at 477. 

 Treatment notes from September 10, 2012, indicate that plaintiff’s hygiene and grooming 

was good, her thought process was linear, there was no psychosis, her affect was pleasant, and 

there were no suicidal ideations or hallucinations. Id. at 472. In November 2012, plaintiff 

reported having difficulty focusing and experiencing short term memory loss. Id. 471. Her 

hygiene and grooming was good, thought process was linear, speech was within normal limits, 

and her affect was flat but pleasant. Id. Dr. Andrews noted that plaintiff was stable on her 

medication. Id. In January 2013, plaintiff reported feeling happy for one week, but then “it 

stopped.” Id. at 470. Plaintiff reported being irritable, lacking confidence, and being less 

talkative. Id. She was depressed, but negative for mania. Id. Her hygiene and grooming was 

good, speech was soft but within normal limits, thought process was linear, and affect pleasant. It 

was noted that plaintiff had minimal mood changes and was stable on lithium. Id. Treatment 

notes from February 2013 indicated that plaintiff had improved mood on her medication. Id. at 

463. 

 In March 2013, plaintiff was hypomanic and hypersexual, and plaintiff reported having 

inappropriate sexual encounters with strange men. Id. at 501. Plaintiff’s speech was within 

normal limits, thought process was linear, and her affect was pleasant. Id. Plaintiff was 

instructed on how to adjust her medications depending on whether she felt depressed or manic. 

Id. In May 2013, plaintiff reported that she had stopped taking her lithium and was controlling 

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her mania and sexual urges by staying busy. Id. at 498. She reported volunteering and attending 

parenting and skills building groups. Id. Dr. Andrews again indicated that plaintiff was stable 

while on her medication. Id. at 498. 

 As discussed above, Dr. Andrews opined that plaintiff had poor ability to perform all 

work-related functions, with the exception of having a good ability to maintain personal 

appearance. Id. at 491-496. While Dr. Andrews’s treatment records demonstrate some level of 

impairment caused by plaintiff’s bipolar disorder, an impairment that the ALJ found to be severe, 

the ALJ logically concluded that Dr. Andrews’s treatment notes did not support the extreme 

limitations she assessed. Indeed, treatment notes indicated that plaintiff experienced improved 

mood on medication and was stable on her medication. While plaintiff reported feeling 

hypomanic in March 2013, id. at 498, she stated in May that she was able to control her mania by 

staying busy, id. at 498. The ALJ permissibly concluded that these treatment records were 

inconsistent with Dr. Andrews’s extreme opinion. See Marci v. Chater, 93 F.3d 540, 544 (9th 

Cir. 1996) (“[T]he ALJ is entitled to draw inferences ‘logically flowing from the evidence.’”). 

 Accordingly, the ALJ provide a legally sufficient reason for rejecting Dr. Andrews’s 

opinion. 

B. The ALJ did not Err in Rejection Third-Party Statements 

Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ failed to adequately address third-party statements 

from Bruce Jones, plaintiff’s case worker, and Beatrice Spenser, plaintiff’s daughter. ECF No. 17 

at 17-20. Lay testimony as to a claimant’s symptoms is competent evidence that an ALJ must 

take into account, unless he expressly determines to disregard such testimony and gives reasons 

germane to each witness for doing so. Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 511 (9th Cir. 2001). An ALJ 

must consider this testimony in determining whether a claimant can work. Stout v. Comm’r of 

Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 2006); see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.913(d)(4); 

Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1288. However, in doing so the ALJ is free to evaluate that testimony and 

determine the appropriate weight it should be given in the light of other evidence. To discount 

the testimony of a lay witness, the ALJ must “give reasons that are germane to each witness.” Id. 

at 1053; see also Valentine v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 694 (9th Cir. 2009). 

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At the May 30, 2013 hearing, Mr. Jones testified that he had known plaintiff for nine 

months. AR 56. He stated that plaintiff had a history of giving her food away to other people 

even though she and her child would be left without anything to eat. Id. at 57. He also noted that 

the difference between plaintiff’s mental condition nine months ago and the date of the hearing 

was “like night and day,” but that plaintiff still had a long way to go. Id. at 62-63. He stated he 

regularly witnessed the depression and mania associated with plaintiff’s bipolar disorder. As an 

example, he stated that plaintiff would be acting manic and when someone would bring her 

behavior to her attention, she would “go to the other extreme” and become depressed. Id. at 63. 

Plaintiff’s daughter, Ms. Spencer, completed a Third Party Function Report. Id. at 237-

243, 246. She stated that she would visit plaintiff at least twice a week to socialize or help cook 

and clean. Id. at 237-238. She reported that plaintiff cares for her nine-year old son, who is able 

to help out around the house. Id. at 238. Ms. Spencer stated that plaintiff could cook 

microwavable meals, prepare sandwiches, and dress and bathe herself when she was not 

depressed. Id. at 238-239. She stated that plaintiff has no hobbies, spends a lot of the day lying 

down, and “she has no interest in anything.” Id. at 241. She also noted that plaintiff is “afraid of 

simple things. Stays depress[ed]. Has crying spells. Lack[s] sleep. Has to take medicine to cope 

with racing thoughts.” Id. at 243. 

The ALJ discussed Mr. Jones and Ms. Spencer’s statements and found that they were “not 

fully credible because they are not consistent with or supported by the objective evidence.” Id. at 

18. An ALJ may reject lay opinion evidence where it is inconsistent with the medical evidence of 

record. See Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that inconsistency 

with medical evidence is a germane reason for discrediting lay witness testimony); Lewis v. Apfel, 

236 F.3d 503, 511 (9th Cir. 2001) (“One reason for which an ALJ may discount lay testimony is 

that it conflicts with medical evidence.”). As explained above, plaintiff’s treatment record does 

not support the finding that plaintiff experienced debilitating mental impairments. Accordingly, 

the ALJ properly relied upon the inconsistency between Mr. Jones and Ms. Spencer’s statements 

and the medical records in giving reduced weight to their statements. 

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IV. CONCLUSION 

 The ALJ’s applied the proper legal standard and her decision is supported by substantial 

evidence. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that: 

 1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied; 

 2. The Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment is granted; and 

 3. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in the Commissioner’s favor. 

DATED: March 19, 2015. 

 

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