Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02736/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02736-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 895
Nature of Suit: Freedom of Information Act of 1974
Cause of Action: 05:0552fi Freedom of Information Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DENNIS M. BUCKOVETZ,

Plaintiff, 

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT 

OF THE NAVY,

Defendant. 

Case No.: 18-cv-2736-MDD-KSC

ORDER GRANTING 

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 

DISMISS FOR LACK OF 

JURISDICTION 

[ECF No. 34]

Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of 

Jurisdiction, or for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 34). Pursuant to Civil 

Local Rule 7.1(d)(1), the Court finds that oral argument is not necessary and 

will decide the matter on the briefs. For the reasons set forth below, the 

Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended 

Complaint for lack of jurisdiction and DENIES Defendant’s Motion for 

Summary Judgment as moot.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff Dennis M. Buckovetz, proceeding pro se, filed a First Amended 

Complaint (“FAC”) against the United States Department of the Navy 

alleging Defendant violated the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5

U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). (ECF No. 30). In his FAC, Plaintiff alleges that 

Defendant closed his 2018 FOIA records request as duplicative of his 2015 

FOIA request based upon Secretary of the Navy Instruction (SECNAVINST) 

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5720.42F. (See ECF No. 30). Plaintiff’s 2018 FOIA request was 

administratively closed as a duplicate of his 2015 FOIA request. (Id. at 3, 9). 

Plaintiff appealed the administrative closure. (Id. at 3, 11). Plaintiff’s appeal 

was denied, and the administrative closure of his 2018 FOIA request, due to 

the duplicative request policy, was affirmed. (Id. at 3, 12-14). 

Plaintiff’s FAC asserts the following remaining claims for relief: (1) a 

declaratory statement by the Court that the Navy’s duplicate request policy, 

under SECNAVINST 5720.42F, to be unlawful, (2) an order requiring the 

Navy cease complying with the policy provisions of SECNAVINST 5720.42F, 

and (3) attorney’s fees and reasonable costs of litigation, (4) and any other 

relief as the Court may deem just and proper. 

On January 22, 2020, Defendant answered the FAC. (See ECF No. 32). 

As an affirmative defense, Defendant asserted that it’s duplicative request 

policy is a valid rule and that it did not withhold any records responsive to 

Plaintiff’s requests. (Id. at 3). 

On January 17, 2020, the parties stipulated to the dismissal of 

Plaintiff’s challenge to the adequacy of the Navy’s search for records under 

FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B), without prejudice. (See ECF Nos. 31, 33). 

Accordingly, the remaining requests for relief are those set forth in 

paragraphs 14, 15, 18, and 20 of Plaintiff’s FAC, regarding the legality of 

Defendant’s policy regarding the administrative closure of duplicative FOIA 

requests. (See ECF No. 30). 

On January 22, 2020, Defendant answered Plaintiff’s FAC. (ECF No. 

32). On January 24, 2020, Defendant filed the instant motion. (ECF No. 34). 

On February 24, 2020, Plaintiff filed a response in opposition, (ECF No. 36), 

to which Defendant replied on February 28, 2020. (ECF No. 37).

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II. STATEMENT OF FACTS1

On January 23, 2015, Plaintiff submitted a FOIA request, numbered 

DON-USMC-2015-002772 (“2015 FOIA”), to the Marine Corps Recruit Depot 

San Diego (“MCRD”).2 (ECF No. 30). Plaintiff’s 2015 FOIA request was 

partially referred to the Marine Corps Headquarters (“MCHQ”) because 

specific emails requested were in their control. (ECF No. 34 at 3). The 

partial referral was assigned an individual tracking number, DON-USMC2015-003493 (“2015 MCHQ”). (Id.). 

In response to Plaintiff’s 2015 FOIA request, Defendant sent Plaintiff 

responsive records on March 5, 2015. (ECF Nos. 34 at 3, 34-1 at 17). This 

initial response included 319 pages of records regarding 384 individual email 

records. (ECF No. 36 at 3). On May 22, 2015, after Plaintiff informally 

raised concerns regarding the initial response on March 5, 2015, a second set 

of responsive records was sent to Plaintiff. (ECF No. 34 at 3, 34-1 at 20, 22-

24).

On September 3, 2018, Plaintiff filed a FOIA request, numbered DONUSMC-2018-011145 (“2018 FOIA”), seeking identical information to his 2015 

FOIA request. (ECF Nos. 30 at 8, 34-1 at 4). Plaintiff submitted the 2018 

FOIA request to allow for a comparison with the email records provided in 

 

1 Regarding the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, the Court analyzes a facial 

attack by accepting the allegations of the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable 

inferences in favor of Plaintiff. See Doe v. Holy See, 557 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(citing Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 2004)). Where a material fact is in 

dispute, it will be so noted. 

2 The 2015 FOIA requested “all email messages dated on or after 1 May 2014 that 

have any of the following email addresses Mark.Tull@usmc.mil, Jim.Gruny@usmc.mil, 

Michael.Lee@usmc.mil, james.Bierman@usmc.mil, Thomas.W.Spencer@usmc-mccs.org, 

and John.Ming@usmc.mil on the ‘From:’, ‘To:’, ‘Cc:’ or ‘Bcc:’ lines AND contain the word 

‘coin’ or ‘coins’ on the subject line or within the body of the message.” (ECF No. 30 at 2, 7).

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2015 claiming that some responsive records were withheld, either improperly 

or mistakenly, in response to his 2015 request. (ECF No. 30 at 3). On 

September 17, 2018, MCRD administratively closed his FOIA request stating 

that in light of their previous responses to Plaintiff’s 2015 FOIA and 2015 

MCHQ requests, they consider the current request to be duplicative. (ECF 

Nos. 30 at 3, 9, and 34-1 at 32).

Plaintiff appealed the administrative closure of his FOIA request. 

(ECF No. 30 at 3, 11). On appeal, Plaintiff clarified that his 2018 FOIA was

intended to duplicate his 2015 FOIA submitted to MCRD in 2015, but not his 

2015 MCHQ request. (ECF No. 34-1 at 35). Plaintiff specifically asserted 

that the case of Thomas W. Sikes v. United States Department of the Navy,

applies. Id. (referring to Sikes v. United States Dep’t of the Navy, 896 F.3d 

1227 (11th Cir. 2018) (finding that an agency’s refusal to grant a request for 

records in its control is a “withholding,” even if the agency knows the records 

are otherwise available to or in the possession of the requester.))

3. On 

October 4, 2018, MCRD upheld its duplicative closure policy on appeal, under 

Section 11n of SECNAVINST §5720.42F. (ECF Nos. 30 at 3, 12-14, 34-1 at

15, 38). 

On October 19, 2018, an unidentified individual with the same address 

as Plaintiff filed a FOIA request, numbered DON-USMC-2019-000608, for 

the same records requested in [Plaintiff’s] 2015 and 2018 FOIA requests. 

(ECF Nos. 36 at 4, 34-1 at 5). While searching for records responsive to that 

 

3 Sikes is not analogous to the instant case. In Sikes, the Defendant refused to 

provide Plaintiff with any records in response to his request seeking identical information,

because they had already provided him with responsive records to his initial request. 

Whereas here, Defendant provided plaintiff with responsive records in response to his 

request, despite the administrative closure as duplicative . 

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request, an additional 106 pages of records in formats not previously 

produced to Plaintiff were discovered. (ECF No. 34-1 at 5). On June 14, 

2019, Defendant provided the additional 106 pages to Plaintiff in response to 

his 2018 FOIA request. (See ECF Nos. 34-1 at 5, 42, and 36 at 5, 41-43).

On September 25, November 4, and November 11, of 2019, Plaintiff 

filed three separate FOIA requests to Defendant targeting individual email 

accounts and seeking identical information as his 2015 and 2018 FOIA 

requests. (See ECF No. 34-1 at 6-7, 36 at 5-6). Plaintiff asserts that these 

requests “duplicated [his] 2015 and 2018 requests except that [they were] 

limited to [their respective] email addresses ....” (ECF No. 36 at 5-6). 

Accordingly, Defendant administratively closed each request as a duplicate. 

(Id.). 

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss allows for 

dismissal of a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Subject 

matter jurisdiction must exist when the action is commenced. Morongo Band 

of Mission Indians v. Cal. State Bd. of Equalization, 858 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th 

Cir. 1988). Further, subject matter jurisdiction may be raised “at any stage 

of the litigation.” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506 (2006); see also 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks 

subject matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”). A party may 

properly challenge standing in a Rule 12(b)(1) motion given standing 

“pertain[s] to a federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction under Article III.” 

White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000).

A facial attack on jurisdiction asserts that the allegations in a 

complaint are insufficient to invoke federal jurisdiction, whereas a factual 

attack disputes the truth of the allegations that would otherwise confer 

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federal jurisdiction. Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th 

Cir. 2004). In resolving a facial challenge to jurisdiction, the Court accepts 

the allegations of the complaint as true and draws all reasonable inferences 

in favor of the plaintiff. See Doe, 557 F.3d at 1073 (citing Wolfe, 392 F.3d at 

362). In resolving a factual attack, the Court may examine extrinsic evidence 

“without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary 

judgment,” and the Court need not accept the allegations as true. Safe Air 

for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039; see also Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 735 n.4 

(1947) (“[W]hen a question of the District Court’s jurisdiction is raised . . . the 

court may inquire by affidavits or otherwise, into the facts as they exist.”).

However, a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is “not appropriate for determining 

jurisdiction . . . where issues of jurisdiction and substance are intertwined. A 

court may not resolve genuinely disputed facts where ‘the question of 

jurisdiction is dependent on the resolution of factual issues going to the 

merits.’” Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting 

Augustine v. United States, 704 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1983)). When there 

is an entanglement, determination of the jurisdictional issue should be 

determined “on either a motion going to the merits or at trial.” Augustine, 

704 F.2d at 1077. Unless the summary judgment standard is met, the 

disputed jurisdictional fact “must be determined at trial by the trier of fact.” 

Id.

IV. DISCUSSION

The Court previously denied a motion by Defendant to dismiss 

Plaintiff’s claims as moot. (See ECF Nos. 9, 13). The Court found that the 

“record at this stage in the litigation does not support a finding that 

Plaintiff’s claims are moot with respect to” his 2018 FOIA request and 

SECNAVINST 5720.42F. (Id. at 5). The posture of the case, however, has 

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changed. Plaintiff has dismissed his claims regarding the adequacy of the 

search for responsive records conducted by Defendant. With this change in 

circumstances, Defendant now contends that Plaintiff lacks standing to 

challenge Defendant’s administrative closure of his duplicative FOIA request

pursuant to SECNAVINST 5720.42F. (See ECF No. 34).

Standing is the “irreducible constitutional minimum” necessary to make 

a justiciable “case” or “controversy” under Article III, § 2, of the United States 

Constitution. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). To 

satisfy Article III's standing requirements,

a plaintiff must show (1) [he] has suffered an "injury in fact" that 

is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not 

conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the 

challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed 

to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a 

favorable decision.

Friends of Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-181 

(2000) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. 555 at 560-661). Here, neither party debates 

causation or redressability. The parties only contest the showing of an injury 

in fact as it relates to standing.

In Hajro v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., the Ninth Circuit 

specifically defined Article III’s “injury in fact” standing requirements for 

FOIA claims. See Hajro v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 811 F.3d 

1086, 1102–03 (9th Cir. 2016). Hajro placed FOIA claims into two categories: 

“specific” claims and “pattern and practice” claims. Id. A pattern or practice

claim may arise where a plaintiff alleges that he regularly files FOIA 

requests with a certain agency, but that agency consistently fails to respond 

to those requests in a timely fashion. Civil Beat Law Ctr. For the Pub. 

Interest, Inc. v. CDC & Prevention, 929 F.3d 1079, 1086 (9th Cir. 2019). For a 

“specific” claim, a plaintiff has standing by alleging that they made a request 

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for records that was improperly denied. Pub. Citizen v. DOJ, 491 U.S. 440, 

449 (1989) (analogizing in non-FOIA case that all that is required to establish 

standing under FOIA is for requesters to show "that they sought and were 

denied specific agency records.”). 

A unique feature of a pattern or practice claim is that it is not 

necessarily mooted by an agency's production of documents. See Payne 

Enters., Inc. v. United States, 837 F.3d at 491 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding "even 

though a party may have obtained relief as to a specific request under the 

FOIA, this will not moot a claim that an agency policy or practice will impair 

the party's lawful access to information in the future"). Specifically, the 

claim will survive where it alleges that an “agency policy or practice will 

impair the party's lawful access to information in the future." Hajro, 811 

F.3d at 1103 (quoting Payne, 837 F.3d at 491). Policy or practice claims stem 

from an agency's policy of violating FOIA rather than from the results of a 

particular request (such as a claim where the agency has withheld requested 

material under an inapplicable exemption). Animal Legal Def. Fund v. 

United States Dep't of Agric., 933 F.3d 858, 874 (2019).

Hajro established a three-part test for determining whether a plaintiff

alleging that an agency engages in a “pattern or practice” of violating FOIA 

requests has shown injury in fact sufficient to confer standing. The court of 

appeals stated that injury in fact is shown, regardless of whether the specific 

claim is mooted by production of records, if plaintiff demonstrates that:

(1) the agency’s FOIA violation was not merely an isolated incident, 

(2) the plaintiff was personally harmed by the alleged policy, and 

(3) the plaintiff himself has a sufficient likelihood of future harm by 

the policy or practice. 

Hajro, 811 F.3d at 1102–03.

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Plaintiff asserts that he has suffered an injury in fact due to the 

administrative closure of his 2018 FOIA request. (See ECF No. 36). Plaintiff

asserts that Defendant engages in a pattern and practice of unlawfully

closing duplicate FOIA requests, pursuant to SECNAVINST 5720.42F. For 

his pattern and practice claim to survive, Plaintiff must satisfy the Hajro

three-prong test. 

A plaintiff can satisfy the first prong of the Hajro test, requiring a 

showing that the violation was “not merely an isolated incident,” by providing 

evidence that he has been subjected to a FOIA violation more than once.4 

Animal Legal Def. Fund v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 933 F. 3d 1088, 1093 

(9th Cir. 2019) (citing Hajro, 811 F.3d at 1103). A plaintiff may also provide 

the court with affidavits of those similarly situated to the them who were also 

harmed by the violation. Hajro, 811 F.3d at 1104. 

Defendant apparently concedes that Plaintiff has satisfied the first 

prong by arguing only that Plaintiff cannot establish elements (2) and (3) of 

the Hajro standard. (See ECF No. 34 at 6). Defendant administratively 

closed Plaintiff’s initial 2018 FOIA request as a duplicate, along with three 

individual FOIA requests he submitted in 2019.

5 The Court agrees that 

Plaintiff has his burden under the first prong of the Hajro test showing that 

this “was not merely an isolated incident.”

The second prong of Hajro’s test, requiring a showing that plaintiff was 

“personally harmed,” is met if the plaintiff personally filed a request, and 

that request was denied by the policy and records were withheld. Hajro, 811 

 

4 As in Hajro, the “first prong overlaps with the merits of a pattern or practice claim, we 

comment only on the standing aspect here.” Hajro, 811 F.3d at 1103. 

5 Plaintiff filed three individual FOIA request on September 25, November 4, and 

November 11, of 2019, requesting identical information as his 2015 and 2018 FOIA 

request except that they targeted individual emails.

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F.3d at 1104. “The failure to get information is in itself a concrete injury.” 

Id. at 1105 (citing FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 21, 118 S. Ct. 1777, 141 L. Ed. 

2d 10 (1998)). In addition, an agency’s delay in responding to a FOIA request 

can be an injury because FOIA requires agencies to provide for expedited 

processing of requested records if the requestor "demonstrates a compelling 

need." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(E)(i)(I). As relevant here, "the term 'compelling 

need' means . . . that a failure to obtain requested records on an expedited 

basis under this paragraph could reasonably be expected to pose an imminent 

threat to the life or physical safety of an individual[.]" §552(a)(6)(E)(v)(I)

(emphasis added); Animal Legal Def. Fund, 935 F.3d at 1093. 

Defendant contends that Plaintiff was not personally harmed by the 

policy because although it was invoked in response to his 2018 FOIA request, 

Defendant continued to provide responsive records pursuant to that request 

as they were discovered. (ECF No. 34 at 6). Defendant also asserts that they

have taken substantial efforts to ensure that Plaintiff received all responsive 

records. Id. (See ECF No. 34-1).6 Accordingly, although the policy was 

invoked, there is no evidence that records were withheld. Plaintiff continued 

to receive responsive records identified after the administrative closure. In 

opposition, Plaintiff argues that he was personally harmed by the duplicate 

 

6 In support of this, Defendant submitted the declaration of Cinthia Camacho, the FOIA 

specialist in charge of Plaintiff’s FOIA requests. (See ECF No. 34-1). The Declaration 

includes a detailed account of all of the steps taken by Defendants to respond to each of 

plaintiff’s FOIA requests. Id. The Declaration indicates that Defendants searched 

appropriately and exhaustively for the document’s Plaintiff was seeking and then sent him 

copies of all of the responsive documents that were located. Id.

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request policy because he was denied responsive records and did not receive 

timely responses. (ECF No. 36 at 11).

At first blush, it appears that Plaintiff was harmed by the denial of his 

2018 FOIA request due to the administrative closure of his request. But, 

after the closure, Defendant continued to provide Plaintiff with responsive 

records identified in other searches. (See ECF Nos. 34-1 at 5, 42, and 36 at 

5, 41-43). In doing so, Defendant did not enforce the duplicative request 

policy as to Plaintiff’s requests. Had Defendant withheld documents due to 

the administrative closure that were discovered later in other searches,

Plaintiff would have suffered a concrete injury. It bears repeating that 

Plaintiff has withdrawn his claims that Defendant’s search for responsive 

records in response to his request was inadequate. And, despite his assertion 

that he has been denied responsive records, there is nothing in the record to 

support the allegation that records were or have been withheld. Defendant 

continued to service Plaintiff’s 2018 FOIA request even after administratively 

closing the claim under its policy. The closure had no effect and, 

consequently, Plaintiff was not personally harmed by the administrative 

closure of his 2018 FOIA request under SECNAVINST §5720.42F.

To clarify, the Court is not holding that Plaintiff lacks standing because 

he received responsive records. If that were the case, no pattern and practice 

claim could survive if the agency ultimately produced responsive records. 

The Hajro court recognized that a pattern or practice claim is not necessarily 

mooted by an agency’s production of documents. Hajro, 811 F.3d at 1103. For 

example, a pattern and practice claim may survive if the agency routinely 

denies proper claims on patently frivolous bases only producing information 

pursuant to court orders. A pattern and practice claim may survive if an 

agency needlessly and without justification otherwise delays production of 

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records. See Hajro, 811 F.3d at 1106. Plaintiff suggests that he was 

personally harmed because he did not receive a “timely” response to his 2018 

FOIA request. Plaintiff did not administratively exhaust his claim of 

receiving an untimely response to his 2018 FOIA request, nor raise it in his 

Complaint. Consequently, the Court will not address timeliness. The reason 

that Plaintiff lacks standing here is because the assertion of the duplicative 

request policy in connection with his 2018 FOIA request had no impact on the 

production of responsive records to Plaintiff.7 

Accordingly, Plaintiff was not personally harmed and fails the second 

Hajro prong. Consequently, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to 

hear his claim. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to 

Dismiss the First Amended Complaint for lack of jurisdiction and DENIES 

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment as moot. The First Amended 

Complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice as any amendment would be futile. 

Accordingly, the CLERK OF THE COURT is instructed to close this case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

May 7, 2020

 

7 The denials of his 2019 requests based on the duplicative policy would have served 

as support for a finding on prong (3) of the Hajro test (likelihood of future harm). The 

Court is not reaching prong (3), however, because of its ruling that Plaintiff failed on 

prong (2). Whether or not the assertion of the policy in connection with the 2019 requests 

would support a policy and practice claim is not before the Court. 

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