Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00767/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-00767-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Paul Hupp,

Plaintiff,

v.

Kamala Harris,

Defendant.

Case No.: 16-CV-767-GPC (JLB)

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION DENYING 

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS 

CORPUS

Petitioner Paul Hupp (“Petitioner”), proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his 2013 state 

court conviction (“2013 Conviction”). On June 19, 2018, the Magistrate Judge filed a 

Report and Recommendation denying the Petition. (ECF No. 25.) On August 24, 2018, 

Petitioner filed Objections and a supplemental Objection on October 31, 2018. (ECF 

Nos. 31, 32, 34.) On November 29, 2018, Petitioner filed a request for judicial notice in 

support of his Objections. (ECF No. 36.) On December 10, 2018, Petitioner filed 

another request for judicial notice in support of his Objections. (ECF. No. 38.) For the 

reasons stated below, this Court ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation and DENIES and DISMISSES the Petition.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 13, 2012, the Riverside County District Attorney’s Office charged 

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Petitioner with one count of simple stalking in violation of California Penal Code (“Penal 

Code”) section 646.9(a); one count of stalking in violation of a court order in violation of 

Penal Code section 646.9(a); one count of making a criminal threat in violation of Penal 

Code section 422, and one count of misdemeanor disobeying a court order in violation of

Penal Code section 166(a)(4). (Lodgment No. 8, ECF No. 6-29 at 8, 10-111). 

A jury trial was held from January 28, 2013 to February 19, 2013. (Lodgment No. 

3, ECF No. 6-21 at 96-124.) The jury found Petitioner guilty of all charges. (Id. at 125.) 

On March 20, 2013, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to a three-year prison term, but 

suspended execution of the sentence, and granted him a one year jail sentence with five 

years of probation. (Id. at 127-28.) 

On March 12, 2014, Petitioner filed a direct appeal of his conviction in the 

California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One. (Lodgment No. 5, 

ECF No. 6-26.) Petitioner requested reversal of his convictions based on (1) ineffective 

assistance of counsel for failing to object to the admission of Petitioner’s contempt 

conviction; (2) repeated acts of prosecutorial misconduct; (3) due process violations in 

permitting impeachment with collateral matters. (Id.) Petitioner alternatively requested 

reversal of his simple stalking conviction as a lesser included offense of stalking in 

violation of a court order. On January 8, 2015, the state appellate court modified the 

judgment to dismiss Petitioner’s simple stalking conviction, but otherwise found no error. 

(Lodgment 8, ECF No. 6-29.) Petitioner then filed a petition for review in the California 

Supreme Court in February 2015, which was denied on April 1, 2015. (Lodgment No. 9, 

ECF No. 6-30; Lodgment 10, ECF No. 6-31.)

On March 31, 2016, Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Petition, ECF No. 1.) Petitioner asserts six grounds 

challenging his conviction:

 

1 The pages numbers are based on the CM/ECF pagination. 

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(1)Petitioner claims that it was prosecutorial misconduct for the prosecutor to 

use Petitioner’s 1982 misdemeanor conviction (“1982 Conviction”) to 

“vouch for and bolster current charges” because the conviction was illegally 

obtained. 

(2)Petitioner claims ineffective assistance of counsel in allowing Petitioner’s 

1982 Conviction to be used at trial as it was invalid and stale.

(3)Petitioner claims that it was misconduct for the prosecutor to use the 1982 

Conviction because the conviction was “invalid for violating the 5th, 6th, 

and 14th Amendments.”

(4)Petitioner claims prosecutorial misconduct due to failure to turn over 

exculpatory evidence in his 2011 contempt of court case “that was then used 

to vouch for and bolster” his 2013 Conviction.

(5)Petitioner claims prosecutorial misconduct arising from the use of his 2011 

contempt conviction (“2011 Conviction”) to “vouch for and bolster” his 

current conviction.

(6)Petitioner claims that it was misconduct for the prosecutor to spend over 

eight hours in closing argument referring to the “invalid” 1982 conviction. 

(Petition, ECF No. 1 at 5, 7, 8, 10, 16.) On April 8, 2016, Respondent filed an Answer. 

(Answer, ECF No. 5-1.) On June 19, 2018, Magistrate Judge Jill L. Burkhart filed a 

Report and Recommendation Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“R&R”).

(R&R, ECF No. 25.) On August 24, 2018, Petitioner filed Objections to Report and 

Recommendation. (Objection, ECF Nos. 31, 32.) On October 31, 2018, Petitioner filed a 

supplemental Objection. (ECF No. 34.) On November 29, 2018, Petitioner filed a 

request for judicial notice in support of his Objections. (ECF No. 36.) On December 10, 

2018, Petitioner filed another request for judicial notice in support of his Objections. 

(ECF No. 38.) In both requests for judicial notice, he asks the Court to consider 

additional California state court cases and federal cases in support of his petition. The 

Court construes the requests for judicial notice as a notice of supplemental authority. 

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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Court gives deference to state court findings of fact and presumes them to be 

correct. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 29, 35 (1992) 

(state court findings are entitled to statutory presumption of correctness). A habeas 

petitioner bears the burden of rebutting these facts by clear and convincing evidence.2In 

the absence of any rebuttal, the following facts are taken from the California Court of 

Appeal’s opinion on Petitioner’s direct appeal, affirming in part and reversing in part the 

judgment of the trial court.

3

 (Lodgment No. 8; ECF No. 6-29.)

Letters Sent by Defendant in 2000 and 2006

Concerning Freedman’s 1998 Administrative Decision

In June 1998, victim Jeffrey Freedman, sitting as a pro tem administrative 

law judge (ALJ), presided over an administrative hearing to adjudicate an 

appeal filed by defendant to challenge a decision by the California 

Commission on Teacher Credentialing (Commission) denying defendant’s 

application to obtain an emergency permit to be a substitute teacher. 

Freedman submitted a written proposed decision unfavorable to defendant, 

which was adopted by the Commission. Defendant filed a petition for writ 

of mandate in superior court, and in September 1999 the trial judge ruled 

in defendant’s favor, finding that the Commission’s findings did not 

support that defendant was unfit to teach and ordering the Commission to 

grant his application for a teaching permit.4

 

2 While Petitioner generally disputes the state court’s facts, Petitioner offers no evidence, clear and 

convincing or otherwise, to rebut the presumption that the state court findings are correct. See ECF No. 

31 at 2:4-8 (“. . . JLB goes through the “boilerplate” format of regurgitating disputed “facts,” lifted 

verbatim from the California District Court of Appeals (“DCA”) “Opinion” [. . . .]”; Id. at 3:9-10 

(“There are so many mistakes of “fact” and law in the RR that it is impossible for PETIONER [sic] to

cover all of them in their totality.”). Thus, the Court gives deference to the state court’s findings of fact. 

3 Footnotes 4 through 9 are taken directly from the California Court of Appeals opinion but have been 

renumbered consistent with this Order.

4 The basis for the Commission’s denial of defendant’s teaching permit application arose from defendant’s 

1982 misdemeanor conviction for contributing to the delinquency of a minor. Defendant (then age 21) pled 

no contest to this offense based on an incident in which he and another 21-year-old male were in a car 

drinking beer with two girls ages 14 and 15. In 1987, defendant applied for a certificate of clearance from the 

Commission to allow him to obtain a teaching credential. Defendant failed to disclose his 1982 conviction in 

this application, and due to this nondisclosure and an assessment that his offense involved moral turpitude, 

the Commission declined to issue the certificate of clearance. In 1997, defendant obtained an expungement 

of his 1982 conviction. That same year, defendant submitted an application for an emergency substitute 

teaching permit; the Commission’s executive director denied his application for the same reasons used to 

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Notwithstanding his ultimate success in the mandamus proceedings, 

defendant was extremely upset by Freedman’s 1998 decision. In February 

2000 and June 2006, defendant sent letters to Freedman at his home address 

expressing his sentiments in a derogatory and expletive-laden style. The 

February 2000 correspondence was in an envelope addressed to “Jeffery 

‘Dickhead’ Freedman”; it included a handwritten note stating “Pull your 

head out of your ass!”; and it enclosed a copy of the 1999 mandamus order 

overturning the Commission’s denial of defendant’s teaching permit 

application. The June 2006 correspondence consisted of a lengthy 

typewritten letter which was addressed to “Bozo Freedman” and which 

contained numerous attacks on the 1998 decision and Freedman himself, 

stating such things as the decision was “one of the worst administrative law 

decisions in California history”; it was either a “set up” or Freedman was a 

“stupid motherfucker”; Freedman was a “cock sucking liar” and “cock 

sucking piece of shit”; Freedman misrepresented and made up evidence; 

based on the “lies and damage” Freedman had caused it was a miracle that 

“nothing has happened” to him; Freedman “better learn to treat people in a 

fair and decent manner—do you understand me bitch?”; and Freedman had 

“a beautiful home.” Defendant included a copy of the 1998 administrative 

decision with handwritten comments referring to portions of the opinion 

and containing numerous additional derogatory statements and 

obscenities.5

Freedman testified that about four months before he received the June 2006 

correspondence, he began receiving obscene phone calls at home from a 

caller who said Freedman’s name and then used “a stream of obscenities” 

that matched the obscenities used in the June 2006 letter, stating for 

example, “‘Hey motherfucking cocksucker. Hey, Jeff, you are a fucking 

cocksucker.” 

 

deny him the certificate of clearance in 1987; and defendant requested an administrative hearing to review 

the executive director’s denial. After hearing the evidence presented at the administrative hearing, Freedman 

concluded denial of a substitute teaching permit was warranted because defendant’s 1982 conviction 

involved acts of moral turpitude and directly related to his fitness to teach, and defendant failed to disclose 

this conviction in his 1987 application for a certificate of clearance. 

5 Defendant’s handwritten annotations on the administrative opinion stated such things as “piece of bullshit”; 

“you mother fucking liar”; “more bullshit”; “piece of shit liar”; “wrong code section Einstein”; “total bull 

shit”; “petty crime asshole”; “hey dickhead—did they teach you the 1st am. in law school?”; “total bullshit 

pulled out of your ass”; “you fucking retard”; “ass clown”; “one thing your pea brain got right”; and “Hey 

Jeff Go Fuck! Yourself! You cock sucking loser!” 

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After receiving the June 2006 letter, Freedman applied for a restraining 

order prohibiting defendant from contacting him. In his written opposition 

to the restraining order application, defendant asserted that his letter was 

constitutionally protected free speech and it contained no threats, and 

repeatedly accused Freedman of fabricating information in the restraining 

order request and in his 1998 administration decision.6 After holding a 

hearing, the court granted a three-year restraining order, which expired on 

July 7, 2009.

Anonymous Letters Sent to Freedman in 2009 and 2010,

and 2010 Restraining Order Against Defendant

Shortly after the expiration of the three-year restraining order issued in 

2006, Freedman again started receiving letters, but this time they were 

anonymous. These anonymous letters form the basis for the stalking and 

other charges brought in the criminal proceeding at issue in this appeal. 

The first anonymous letter, sent in September 2009 to both Freedman’s 

home and office, consisted of a short typed note stating, “Hey you little 

cock sucking mother fucker-have you lied under oath recently you little 

fucking bitch? . . . [¶] Why don’t you do the world a favor and get cancer 

and DIE. [¶] Because the world will be a much better place without a 

perjuring piece of shit like you in it.” Freedman testified he was certain the 

letter was from defendant, explaining the language was similar to the 2006 

letter from defendant; Freedman had testified at the hearing on his 2006 

restraining order application; no one else had ever accused him of lying 

under oath; and he had “no feuds, no vendettas, no arguments with anybody 

on earth other than the letter that [he] got from [defendant] in 2006.”

In March and September 2010, Freedman received additional anonymous 

typed letters at his home and office, which used similar language to call 

Freedman obscene names and accuse him of perjury.7 Freedman obtained 

 

6 For example, defendant’s opposition stated that Freedman “made numerous false statements and 

fabricated false evidence” in his 1998 administrative decision; Freedman’s “fabrication of false evidence 

is well documented by the reversal of his administrative decision”; Freedman’s claims in the restraining 

order application contain “false fabrication[s]”; Freedman “has a history of making false accusations 

[and] fabricating evidence”; and Freedman “tries to manipulate evidence.”

7 The March 2010 letter stated: “Your PERJURYING days are OVER you little cock sucking piece of shit. 

[¶] You can run but you can’t hide [¶] Remember that you little bitch [¶] . . . [Freedman’s home address]” 

The September 2010 letter stated: “What did I tell you bitch [¶] Your perjuring days are over you cock 

sucking mother fucker [¶] Remember that the next time you think about committing perjury you little 

fucking cock sucker.” 

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a temporary restraining order (TRO) in March, but it was dissolved after 

multiple unsuccessful attempts to serve defendant. After receiving the 

September 2010 letter, Freedman sought legal assistance from the office of 

administrative hearings, which arranged for the Attorney General’s office 

to assist him. Represented by a deputy attorney general, on October 14, 

2010, Freedman obtained another TRO, with a hearing set for November 

15, 2010. The TRO was served on defendant on October 27, 2010. Two 

days later, on October 29, another anonymous typed letter was sent to 

Freedman’s home and office, stating, “What did I tell you fuck head, your 

perjuring days are over. [Freedman’s home address].”

In a written response to Freedman’s 2010 restraining order application, 

defendant claimed Freedman was attempting to “frame” him by making 

“false and unsupported accusations,” which was Freedman’s “pattern and 

practice” as shown by his “false and fabricated” 1998 decision which tried 

to deny defendant his “rights and livelihood to become a teacher.”

Defendant failed to appear at the November 15, 2010 hearing, and the court 

imposed another three-year restraining order, to expire on November 14, 

2013.

Anonymous Letters Sent in 2011, Contempt Conviction,

and Other Actions by Defendant

After issuance of the 2010 restraining order, additional anonymous typed 

letters were sent to Freedman’s home and office in January and February 

2011. The January letter stated: “Your perjuring days are over you cock 

sucking little bitch, remember that because there is not a rock on the face 

of this earth you are going to be able to hide under[.]” The February letter 

stated: “Your perjuring days are over motherfucker. [¶] Remember that you 

cock sucking piece of shit [Freedman’s home address].”

After receiving the January and February 2011 letters, on July 12, 2011, 

Freedman filed an order to show cause (OSC) to hold defendant in 

contempt for violating the 2010 restraining order. Defendant appeared at an 

ex parte hearing on July 20, and the matter was set for a full hearing. About 

one week after the ex parte hearing, on July 28, 2011, another anonymous 

typed letter was sent to Freedman’s home. The letter stated: “[Freedman’s 

home address] you perjuring motherfucker [¶] your perjuring days are over 

cocksucker.”

While the hearing on the contempt petition was pending, in October 2011 

defendant filed a federal lawsuit against Freedman in which he complained 

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about the 1998 administrative proceeding, stating that Freedman framed 

him, improperly failed to disclose that he was a pro tem ALJ, made false 

and fabricated statements in his decision, and defrauded defendant out of 

“[l]iterally millions of dollars.”

The contempt petition was adjudicated in November 2011, with defendant 

in attendance. The court found defendant in contempt, and ordered him to 

serve 25 days in custody, with a report date of January 3, 2012. On 

December 19, 2011, defendant’s federal lawsuit against Freedman was 

dismissed with prejudice.

On December 27, 2011 (one week before defendant’s date to report for 

custody), another anonymous typed letter was sent to Freedman’s home, 

stating: “Your perjuring days are over you cocksucking motherfucker we’ll 

see how much perjury you do with your brains splattered all over the wall 

the end will come at a time and place of my choosing you little fucking 

bitch[.]” Freedman contacted the police, and the police recommended that 

he and his wife leave town.

On January 13, 2012, the district attorney’s office filed the stalking and 

other charges at issue in the case before us. Freedman received no more 

threatening letters after the December 2011 letter. Freedman testified that 

he was certain all the anonymous letters were sent by defendant, explaining 

that defendant was the only person who had made accusations that 

Freedman had committed perjury, ruined his life, and conspired to frame 

him.

Defense

Defendant did not dispute that he sent the letters to Freedman in 2000 and 

2006 which referenced the 1998 administrative hearing, but claimed he did 

not send the anonymous letters that were sent starting in 2009.

Testifying on his own behalf, defendant stated that while his substitute 

teaching permit application was pending he had obtained teaching jobs and 

was doing well; the Commission’s denial of his permit caused him to lose 

these jobs; and even after the superior court overturned the Commission’s 

denial he was unable to get rehired in the teaching field because too much 

time had passed, he would have had to return to school to retake 

credentialing classes, and he lacked the funds to do this. Defendant 

maintained that because of the Commission’s denial of his teaching permit, 

his career and future “had basically been destroyed.” After losing his 

teaching career, he obtained a law degree from a school in another state so 

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he could learn to defend himself; the California State Bar initially granted 

him the required background clearance and he took the California bar 

examination several times; but in 2005 or 2006 when he did not pass the 

California bar examination and had to renew his clearance application, the 

clearance was denied.

Concerning his communications to Freedman, defendant explained that 

after the superior court judge overturned the Commission’s denial of his 

teaching permit, he sent the 2000 letter because he wanted Freedman to 

know “what an idiot he was.” He sent the 2006 letter because during this 

time period he re-read Freedman’s administrative decision to get 

information for his bankruptcy case that he was filing, and he noticed how 

“bad” the administrative decision was now that he had a legal education. 

He acknowledged he was “very angry” and writing the letter made him feel 

less angry, but denied that he intended the letter to be a threat.

Defendant stated that during the time period of the anonymous letters, he 

was occupied with filing numerous lawsuits in which he represented 

himself about a variety of matters, and he filed these lawsuits to stand up 

for himself and others who could not defend their rights. He testified that 

he viewed the various judges who ruled against him as “lying,” committing 

“perjury,” and “railroad[ing] the poor and innocent,” and he used 

derogatory language in pleadings and documents he filed concerning these 

judges because he was “blowing off steam” and the judges oppressed and 

“steamroll[ed] little people all the time” and he wanted them to know how 

he felt.8 To support that he did not send the anonymous letters received by 

Freedman, he noted that he identified himself in these materials concerning 

the various judges. He stated that when he was upset with Freedman he 

sued him, and he had no reason to send Freedman anonymous letters and 

he had no idea who sent them.

Jury Verdict and Sentence

Defendant was charged with simple stalking between September 30, 2009 

and December 29, 2011 (count 1, Pen. Code, § 646.9, subd. (a))9; stalking 

 

8

In these various pleading and documents, defendant stated such things as “‘slimeball, piece of shit, ass 

clown judges’”; “‘you cocksuckers are now on notice’”; “‘the days of dirty judges violating the 

Constitution with impunity are over’”; “‘civil unrest is going to start at the doorsteps of dirty slimeball 

judges who lie, commit perjury, and conspire with others to violate constitutional protections under 

color of authority’”; “I don’t know how many dicks this pond scum, ass clown [judge] sucked to get 

appointed”; and “fuck you, [judge].”

9 Subsequent unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code. 

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in violation of a court order between October 29, 2010 and December 29, 

2011 (count 2, § 646.9, subd. (a)); making a criminal threat between 

December 27 and 29, 2011 (§ 422); and misdemeanor disobeying a court 

order between December 27 and 29, 2011 (§ 166, subd. (a)(4)). The jury 

found defendant guilty as charged.

At sentencing, the court selected a three-year term for count 2 stalking in 

violation of a court order and a concurrent term for count 1 stalking, and 

stayed the terms for counts 3 and 4. The court suspended execution of the 

sentence and granted defendant probation conditioned on a one-year jail 

sentence.

(Lodgment 8, ECF No. 6-29 at 2-11.)

III. SCOPE OF REVIEW

A. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Because 

objections were made, the Court reviews the magistrate judge’s findings and 

recommendations de novo. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 

F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 

B. AEDPA STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), a court will 

not grant a habeas petition with respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits by the state 

court unless that adjudication: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved 

an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law; or (2) resulted in a 

decision based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

presented at the state court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Early v. Packer, 537 U.S

3, 8 (2002). 

A federal court may grant habeas relief under the “contrary to” clause if the state 

court applied a different rule than the governing law established by the Supreme Court, or 

if it decided a case differently than the Supreme Court on a set of materially 

indistinguishable facts. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). The court may grant 

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relief under the “unreasonable application” prong if the state court correctly identified the 

governing Supreme Court principle but unreasonably applied it to the facts of the case. 

Id. Additionally, the “unreasonable application” prong requires the state court’s 

application of clearly established federal law to be “objectively unreasonable.” Lockyer

v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). 

A federal court uses the decision of the highest state court to make its habeas 

determination. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803–04 (1991). However, if no 

reasoned decision from the highest state court exists, the Court “looks through” to the last 

reasoned state court decision and presumes it provides the basis for the higher court’s 

denial of a claim or claims. Id. at 805–06. A state court need not cite Supreme Court 

precedent when resolving a habeas corpus claim, “[s]o long as neither the reasoning nor 

the result of the state-court action contradicts [Supreme Court precedent].” Early, 537 

U.S. at 8. 

IV. DISCUSSION

Petitioner raises six grounds for relief in his 2013 Conviction. These six grounds 

fall within two broader claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial 

misconduct relating to the use of Petitioner’s 1982 Conviction and 2011 Conviction

(collectively “Prior Convictions”) that he claims are invalid, void or illegal. All six 

grounds ask the Court to presume that Petitioner’s Prior Convictions are invalid, void or

illegal.

Because the Petition is challenging his Prior Convictions as void, the Court must 

first determine whether it has the subject matter jurisdiction to review Petitioner’s claims 

for relief. If the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the Prior Convictions, the 

Court must also determine whether the challenges are cognizable. 

A. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OVER THE PETITION

Neither party raised the issue of subject matter jurisdiction; instead, the Magistrate 

Judge sua sponte properly raised the issue of whether this Court has subject matter 

jurisdiction over the Petition. (ECF No 25 at 13.) The Magistrate Judge noted that 

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Petitioner’s challenge to his 2013 Conviction “rest[s] on his ability to launch successful 

collateral attacks either on his 1982 misdemeanor conviction for contributing to the 

delinquency of a minor, or on his 2011 civil contempt of court conviction for sending Mr. 

Freedmen letters in violation of a November 2010 restraining order.” (Id. at 13:11-15.) 

After a thoughtful analysis, the Magistrate Judge found that Petitioner was not “in 

custody” as to Petitioner’s 1982 and 2011 Convictions and the Court lacks jurisdiction to 

consider the Petition. (ECF No. 25 at 14:12-16.)

In his Objections, Petitioner does not address the “in custody” requirement and 

whether the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the case. Therefore, the Court may 

accept the recommendations of the Magistrate Judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

The requirement that a petitioner seeking habeas relief must be “in custody in 

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States” is jurisdictional.

Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490 (1989) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)). Thus, federal 

courts have subject matter jurisdiction to consider habeas petitions by individuals 

challenging state court criminal judgments only if, at the time the petition is filed, the 

petitioner is “in custody” under the conviction challenged in the petition. Id. at 492. 

When a petitioner's sentence has fully expired, he is precluded from challenging that 

conviction because he is no longer “in custody” for purposes of federal habeas review. 

Id.

In Lackawanna, the Court held that the petitioner satisfied the “in custody” 

requirement because the petition could be construed as asserting a challenge to his 

current sentence as enhanced by an allegedly invalid prior conviction. Lackawanna Cnty. 

Dist. Attorney v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394, 401-02 (2001) (challenge to constitutionality of 

1958 expired conviction construed as challenge to current 1978 sentences enhanced by 

1958 conviction); see also Brock v. Weston, 31 F.3d 887, 889-91 (9th Cir. 1994) 

(challenge to expired 1974 assault conviction must be construed as challenge to current 

civil confinement predicated upon an enhancement due to the prior conviction); Allen v. 

Oregon, 153 F.3d 1046, 1048-49 (9th Cir. 1998) (challenge to prior state convictions 

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must be construed as collateral attack on current federal sentence enhanced by prior state 

convictions). The Ninth Circuit, in Zichko v. Idaho, 247 F.3d 1015, 1019-20 (9th Cir.

2001), also held that the “in custody” requirement is met where a prior conviction was a 

necessary predicate to his current conviction or sentence. In Zichko, the Ninth Circuit 

explained that “a habeas petitioner is in custody for the purposes of challenging an 

earlier, expired rape conviction, when he is incarcerated for failing to comply with a state 

sex offender registration law [,] because the earlier rape conviction is a necessary 

predicate to the failure to register charge”. Id. at 1019. The Supreme Court clarified, 

however, that a petitioner satisfying the requirement is “in custody” for the purpose of the 

current conviction and not for the prior conviction. See Lackawanna, 532 U.S. at 401.

Here, Petitioner has not demonstrated that the “in custody” requirement has been 

met as to his 1982 and 2011 Convictions. Petitioner’s 1982 Conviction was expunged in 

1997 and he cannot be deemed to be in custody for that conviction. Moreover, he was 

never imprisoned for the 1982 Conviction. Petitioner is also no longer serving the 

sentence imposed pursuant to the 2011 conviction.10 Therefore, Petitioner has not met 

the “in custody” requirement for the Court to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over his 

challenges to the Prior Convictions. 

Petitioner also does not claim the Prior Convictions were used to enhance his 

current sentence but instead challenges them because they were introduced as evidence 

that was used against him that resulted in his current conviction. He also does not claim 

that his Prior Convictions were necessary predicates to his current conviction. 

Accordingly, the Court concludes that it does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the

claims challenging the Prior Convictions. Alternatively, even if the Court had subject 

matter jurisdiction, the Court concludes that his claims based on challenges to his Prior 

Convictions are not cognizable under Lackawanna. 

 

10 The R&R explained that Petitioner served 25 days in jail for his civil contempt conviction beginning 

in early January 2012. (Dkt. No. 25 at 14 n. 12.)

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B. PETITIONER’S CHALLENGES TO HIS PRIOR CONVICTIONS AS 

COGNIZABLE

Next, the R&R raised the issue sua sponte regarding whether Petitioner’s 

challenges would be cognizable under Lackawanna. (ECF No. 25 at 16-18.) The 

Magistrate Judge again found that Petitioner could not meet the requirements and 

recommended denying the Petition. (Id. at 18:24-27.)

In his Objections, Petitioner contends that Lackawanna is inapplicable because it 

dealt with “convictions” and because his Prior Convictions were invalid or void, they 

cannot be considered “convictions.” (ECF No. 31 at 10:8-15.) Petitioner also asserts that 

the government is required to prove the validity of the prior convictions. (Id. at 7:1-3.) 

Even where a petitioner is “in custody” for the purpose of § 2254 review, the 

Supreme Court recognizes a general bar on challenging a current conviction on the basis 

that the prior conviction was unconstitutionally obtained. See Lackawanna, 532 U.S. at 

403-04. In Lackawanna, the United States Supreme Court held:

Once a state conviction is no longer open to direct or collateral attack in its 

own right because the defendant failed to pursue those remedies while they 

were available (or because the defendant did so unsuccessfully), the 

conviction may be regarded as conclusively valid. If that conviction is later 

used to enhance a criminal sentence, the defendant generally may not 

challenge the enhanced sentence through a petition under § 2254 on the 

ground that the prior conviction was unconstitutionally obtained.

Id. (internal citation omitted). The Court noted three exceptions. First, the general bar

does not apply if the “prior conviction . . . was obtained where there was a failure to 

appoint counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment, as set forth in Gideon v. 

Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed. 2d 799 (1963).” Id. at 404. Second, 

the plurality in Lackawanna suggested another exception to the general bar where a 

petitioner obtains “compelling evidence that he is actually innocent of the crime for 

which he was convicted, and which he could not have uncovered in a timely manner.”

Id. at 405. The third exception is where state courts had “‘without justification, refuse[d] 

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to rule on a constitutional claim that has been properly presented’ to them.” Id.; Dubrin 

v. California, 720 F.3d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir. 2013) (recognizing exception to Lackawanna

where state courts had, “‘without justification, refuse[d] to rule on a constitutional claim 

that ha[d] been properly presented’ to them”). 

Here, Petitioner does not specifically argue that any of the exceptions to 

Lackawanna apply and the R&R correctly explains why the exceptions do not apply. 

(ECF No. 25 at 17-18.) The R&R explained that the Prior Convictions were not 

uncounseled in violation of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Even though 

Petitioner claims that his 1982 Conviction was uncounseled, an uncounseled 

misdemeanor conviction for which the defendant was not imprisoned11 does not violate 

the Sixth Amendment. Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 743 (1994) (“In Scott v. 

Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 [ ] (1979), we held that where no sentence of imprisonment was 

imposed, a defendant charged with a misdemeanor had no constitutional right to 

counsel.”). Therefore, the Gideon exception does not apply. 

The R&R also concluded that Petitioner was not deprived of an opportunity for 

review. (ECF No. 25 at 17-18.) As noted in the R&R, Petitioner, while he argued that 

his 2011 Conviction was not appealable, he filed habeas corpus petitions in state and 

federal court. This is noted in the Petition. (ECF No. 1 at 12.) On December 14, 2011, 

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus contesting his 2011 conviction.

(Hupp v. Harris, Case No. 11-cv-02909-IEG-RBB, ECF No. 1.) On December 16, 2011, 

the district court dismissed the habeas petition without prejudice after finding that 

Petitioner did not meet the “in custody” requirement and had failed to exhaust his state 

court remedies. (11-cv-02909, ECF No.7.) The court acknowledged Petitioner’s claims 

that the judgment of contempt of court was not appealable, but notified Petitioner that 

habeas review was available in the state court system. (Id. at 3:8-16.) 

 

11 Petitioner received no jail time and no probation for his 1982 conviction. (ECF No. 6-8 at 46 (“the 

entire punishment that Mr. Hupp was given was a fine totaling $250 or thereabouts”, 55.) 

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On January 3, 2012, Petitioner filed an Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus (“Amended Petition”). (11-cv-02909, ECF No. 11.) In his Amended Petition, 

Petitioner conceded that the California Supreme Court had not yet reviewed his petition, 

but asserted that they had sufficient time to rule.12 (Id. at 4.) Thus, Petitioner claimed 

they had constructively denied his petition. (Id.) On January 12, 2012, the Amended 

Petition was again dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust his state remedies. 

(11-cv-02909, ECF No. 13.) Petitioner did not file any subsequent amended petitions in 

that case. Instead, Petitioner filed a petition under a new case, Hupp v. San Diego 

Superior Court et als., Case No. 12-cv-274-WQH-JMA, ECF No. 1). Again, the petition 

was dismissed without prejudice for failure to comply with procedural rules. (Id., ECF 

No. 5.) Therefore, the third exception to Lackawanna does not apply. 

In sum, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s challenges to his Prior Convictions 

are not cognizable under Lackawanna and they are presumptively valid. See

Lackawanna, 532 U.S. at 403-04. Therefore, because Ground Four, alleging 

prosecutorial misconduct due to a failure to turn over exculpatory evidence in his 2011 

contempt of court case that was then used as evidence to support his 2013 Conviction, 

rises or falls based on the validity of the underlying 2011 Conviction, the Court DENIES 

the claim in Ground Four. Similarly, the Court also DENIES Ground Three claiming 

prosecutorial misconduct for the prosecution to use the unconstitutionally obtained 1982 

Conviction to support his 2013 Conviction because the claim rises or falls based on the 

validity of the underlying 1982 Conviction. 

However, the Court considers the First, Second, Fifth and Sixth Grounds based on 

prosecutorial misconduct arising from the prosecutors use of his Prior Convictions to 

“vouch for and bolster” his 2013 conviction and claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 

in allowing the 1982 conviction to be used at trial. In liberally construing Petitioner’s 

 

12 According to Petitioner, the California Supreme Court had received the petition on December 28, 

2011 at 10:00 a.m. 

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challenges, even if the Prior Convictions are presumed valid, the Petition plausibly

alleges claims under § 2254.

C. PETITIONER’S CHALLENGES TO HIS 2013 CONVICTION

The Court considers the merits of Petitioner’s challenge to his 2013 Conviction 

with the presumption that both of his Prior Convictions are valid. The Court considers 

the extent to which the Prior Convictions were used in determining whether any 

prosecutorial misconduct or ineffective assistance of counsel occurred. 

1. Prosecutorial Misconduct in the Use of Evidence of Petitioner’s Prior 

Convictions.

Grounds One, Five and Six relate to the prosecutor’s use of the evidence of 

Petitioner’s Prior Convictions. Petitioner claims that the use of his Prior Convictions and 

the eight hours spent during closing arguments discussing his 1982 Conviction 

constituted prosecutorial misconduct. (ECF No. 1.)

“On habeas review of a prosecutorial misconduct claim, [a court] may grant relief 

only if the misconduct rises to the level of a due process violation—not merely because 

[the court] might disapprove of the prosecutor’s behavior.” Towery v. Schriro, 641 F.3d 

300, 306 (9th Cir. 2010). A criminal defendant’s due process rights are violated when a 

prosecutor’s misconduct renders a trial “fundamentally unfair.” Darden v. Wainwright, 

477 U.S. 168, 193 (1986). Petitioner has the burden to prove the prosecutor’s comments 

“‘infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due 

process.’” Id. at 181 (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974)). 

Furthermore, the alleged misconduct must be reviewed in the context of the entire trial. 

Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 643.

a. Permissible Use of Evidence of Prior Acts and Crimes

On Grounds One and Five, Petitioner contends that his Prior Convictions were 

impermissibly used to “vouch for and bolster” his 2013 Conviction. (ECF No. 1.)

Respondent countered that facts relating to the 1982 Conviction were only 

introduced by the prosecutor on cross-examination after Petitioner testified about the 

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1982 Conviction. (ECF No. 5-1 at 10-12.) As to both Prior Convictions as well as all 

legal proceedings offered into evidence, Respondent contends that the jury was instructed 

to consider the evidence only to determine the existence or absence of a motive. (Id. at 

25:13-19.)

The Court of Appeal found that the prosecution’s cross-examination of Petitioner

regarding the 1982 Conviction, though lengthy, “stayed within the bounds of permissible 

cross-examination on matters raised by [Petitioner] in direct examination.” (Lodgment 8 

at 21, ECF No. 6-29.) The court explained that the prosecutor’s questioning and 

arguments regarding the 1982 Conviction were in response to Petitioner’s direct 

testimony about the facts giving rise to the 1982 Conviction. (Id. at 16, 19-20.) The 

Court of Appeal also found that the evidence relating to Petitioner’s 2011 was highly 

relevant to the issue of motive and that the limiting instruction to the jury prevented 

improper use of the Prior Convictions. (Id. at 14.) 

The Magistrate Judge noted that it was Petitioner who initially testified at length on 

direct examination about the facts surrounding his arrest and conviction in 1982 in an 

attempt to explain his reasons for sending letters to Mr. Freedman in 2000 and 2006. 

(ECF No. 25 at 28:10-20.) The Magistrate Judge consequently found that the Court of 

Appeal had reasonably found there was no prosecutorial misconduct because the 

prosecutor’s questioning on cross-examination was within the scope of Petitioner’s direct 

examination. (ECF No. 25 at 30:10-20.)

In his Supplemental Brief, Petitioner counters that in the absence of valid 

convictions, there was no lawful authority to use the evidence surrounding his Prior 

Convictions. (ECF No. 31 at 13:21-22.) Petitioner also asserts that there were no 

limiting jury instructions as to his Prior Convictions. (ECF No. 34 at 7:13-14.)

“Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person's 

character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance 

with the character.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1); see also Cal Evid. Code § 1101(a). 

However, “[t]his evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such as proving 

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motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or 

lack of accident.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2); see also Cal. Evid. Code § 1101(b). Where 

evidence of the facts and circumstances of a prior crime are admissible to show motive, 

the evidence is not rendered inadmissible merely because the conviction is vacated. See 

Morris v. Mathews, 475 U.S. 237, 256-57 (1986) (no reason to believe vacating robbery 

conviction would have precluded evidence of robbery to show motive and opportunity for 

murder). Moreover, a prosecutor may cross examine on anything “reasonably suggested” 

by the direct examination. United States v. Martinez, 967 F.3d 1343, 1347 (9th Cir. 

1992) (quoting United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 627 (1980)); Michelson v. United 

States, 335 U.S. 469, 485 (1948) (“we think defendants in general and this defendant in 

particular have no valid complaint at the latitude which existing law allows to the 

prosecution to meet by cross-examination an issue voluntarily tendered by the defense.”). 

Here, the prosecution’s use of the 1982 Conviction during cross examination and 

use of the 2011 Conviction to establish motive was not a violation of U.S. Supreme Court 

precedent. 

Moreover, despite Petitioner’s assertion that no limiting instructions were given as 

to his Prior Convictions, the record demonstrates the contrary. The first instruction 

addresses Petitioner’s past legal proceedings generally: 

You have heard testimony as to a number of separate legal proceedings that 

may have been connected in some way to one or more of the parties who have 

testified. You are not to consider in your deliberations the appropriateness of 

any of those proceedings or concern yourselves with their outcome. The facts 

surrounding those cases may only be considered in your deliberations for the 

limited purpose of determining the existence or absence of motive, or for other 

limited purposes specified elsewhere in the instructions provided by the court.

(Lodgment 4, Part 4, ECF No. 6-25 at 195.) The second specifically addresses 

Petitioner’s 2011 contempt conviction:

You have heard testimony related to a prior finding of civil contempt against

Mr. Hupp, which may have involved some of the conduct alleged in this 

criminal case. The ruling in that contempt hearing was based upon different 

law and different evidence than that which applies to and has been/is being

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presented in this criminal case. The prior finding of civil contempt is not to be 

considered as evidence that the charged crimes have been committed, or in 

determining whether the government has met its burden of proof beyond a 

reasonable doubt as to each of the crimes charged in this case. You are to 

make your own independent determination of the facts presented in this 

proceeding, and apply the law as instructed by this court, in coming to your 

decision.

(Lodgment 4, Part 4, ECF No. 6-25 at 196.) Jurors are presumed to follow their 

instructions. Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234 (2000). Petitioner offers no evidence 

that these instructions were not followed. 

It was reasonable for the Court of Appeal to conclude that the evidence of 

Petitioner’s Prior Convictions were admissible to cross examine Petitioner and establish 

motive, and Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the prosecutor’s comments about his 

Prior Convictions rendered the trial “fundamentally unfair.” See Darden, 477 U.S. at 

193. Thus, the state court’s decision was not contrary to nor an unreasonable application 

of Supreme Court law. See Bell, 535 U.S. at 694. For the reasons stated above, this 

Court ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s R&R and DENIES habeas relief on Grounds 

One, Three and Five of the Petition.

b. Eight Hours Spent Discussing 1982 Conviction in Closing

On Ground Six, Petitioner claims that the prosecutor spent over eight hours in 

closing argument referring to the 1982 Conviction. The record reveals the contrary. The 

trial transcripts show that the prosecution’s closing argument and rebuttal argument took, 

at most, four hours total. (Lodgment No. 3 at 119-22, ECF No. 6-21.) Further, the 

prosecution spent little time discussing the 1982 conviction, and instead spent a 

significant amount of time highlighting the similarity of the threatening letters. 

(Lodgment 1, Part 14 and Part 15; ECF Nos. 6-14 and 6-15.)

Because Petitioner’s claim is premised on a misstatement of the record, the Court 

finds that Petitioner does not meet his burden of proving that the prosecutor’s discussion 

of Petitioner’s 1982 Conviction “‘infected the trial with unfairness as to make the 

resulting conviction a denial of due process.’” See Darden, 477 U.S. at 181. Therefore, 

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this Court ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation and DENIES 

habeas relief Ground Six. 

2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Ground Two of the Petition claims ineffective assistance of counsel in allowing 

Petitioner’s 1982 misdemeanor conviction to be used at trial. 

The state court did not review this issue because Petitioner did not raise an 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim as to the use of his 1982 Conviction in his appeal 

to the state court. Instead, Petitioner’s only claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 

before the state court related to the use of his 2011 Conviction. (Lodgment 5 at 16.) On 

this basis, the Magistrate Judge found that Petitioner did not meet the exhaustion 

requirement with respect to this issue. Nonetheless, the Court may deny a petition on the 

merits “notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in 

the courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). The Ninth Circuit has explained that a 

“federal court may deny an unexhausted petition on the merits only when it is perfectly 

clear that the applicant does not raise even a colorable federal claim.” Cassett v. Stewart, 

406 F.3d 614, 623-24 (9th Cir. 2005). 

A defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”) must show both (1) 

deficient performance under an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) prejudice. 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To demonstrate deficient 

performance, “[t]he challenger’s burden is to show 'that counsel made errors so serious 

that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth 

Amendment.’” Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 787 (2011) (quoting Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 687). To demonstrate prejudice, the petitioner must show that “but for 

counsel’s unprofessional errors,” there is a reasonable probability “the result of the 

proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (“A reasonable 

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome”); see

Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 792 (“The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not 

just conceivable”).

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Ground Two is not only procedurally barred for Petitioner’s failure to raise it on 

direct appeal, but also fails on the merits. As discussed above, evidence of Petitioner’s 

1982 Conviction was permissibly raised because on direct examination, he first raised the 

facts surrounding the 1982 Conviction to explain his version of the facts. Therefore, 

Petitioner has not demonstrated that his counsel was deficient for failing to object, and 

the Court ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s R&R and DENIES habeas relief on Ground 

Two of the Petition.

V. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules Governing section 2254 cases, this Court must

“issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the 

applicant.” If this Court does not issue a certificate of appealability, this decision may 

not be appealed, 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A), and this Court may not issue a certificate of 

appealability unless Petitioner makes a “substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B)(2). To prove a substantial showing of 

denial of a constitutional right, Petitioner must demonstrate that “reasonable jurists would 

find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” 

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483 (2000). “A petitioner satisfies this standard by 

demonstrating that jurists of reason could disagree with the district court's resolution of 

his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate 

to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 

(2003). Here, Petitioner does not make a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right, and it is unlikely that reasonable jurists would find this Court’s 

assessment debatable or wrong. Therefore, the Court DENIES a Certificate of 

Appealability. 

CONCLUSION

This Court ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation and

DENIES and DISMISSES the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and DENIES a 

Certificate of Appealability. The Court also DENIES as moot Petitioner’s motion for a 

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status conference or ruling on the Report and Recommendation. (ECF No. 40.) The 

Clerk of Court shall close the case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 13, 2019

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