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Nature of Suit Code: 310
Nature of Suit: Airplane Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 8, 2004 Decided December 28, 2004

No. 03-7165

CHRISTOPHER MANION,

APPELLEE

v.

AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.,

APPELLEE

ROY W. KRIEGER,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 96cv02094)

Carol E. Bruce argued the cause for appellant. With her on

the briefs was Neal Goldfarb.

Randell C. Ogg argued the cause and filed the brief for

appellee Christopher Manion.

Before: EDWARDS, ROGERS, and ROBERTS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge EDWARDS.

USCA Case #03-7165 Document #867475 Filed: 12/28/2004 Page 1 of 11
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EDWARDS, Circuit Judge: Appellant Roy W. Krieger

represented American Airlines, Inc. ("American Airlines") in a

jury trial on a tort claim brought by Appellee Christopher

Manion. Krieger was sanctioned by the District Court for

making statements during his closing argument that defied

specific orders of the court. Krieger concedes that his conduct

was sanctionable, but contests the amount of the sanctions

awarded against him. Appellant submits that the sanction,

ordered pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2000), includes

components that are not compensable under the statute. Krieger

principally contends that the District Court had no authority

under § 1927 to award sanctions for matters that arose before the

sanctionable conduct. He also challenges three other elements

of the award. In defending the sanction, Manion argues that the

District Court intended to rely on its inherent authority in

addition to § 1927.

We find that the sanctions award was expressly ordered

pursuant to § 1927, not the court's inherent authority. However,

we do not reach Krieger's principal contention that matters

arising prior to the sanctionable misconduct are not compensable

under § 1927, because it was not properly raised below. Krieger

did preserve three questions that warrant our attention: whether

the § 1927 sanction appropriately included compensation

relating to (1) Manion's time attending trial proceedings, (2)

Krieger's interlocutory appeal, and (3) Manion's motion for

sanctions before the District Court. We hold that litigation costs

pertaining to Manion's time in court and the interlocutory appeal

are not compensable under § 1927. The litigation costs relating

to Manion's motion for sanctions arose in conjunction with his

defense to Krieger's opposition to a motion for new trial, which

is compensable. Because the costs relating to those two

litigation items cannot be disaggregated, we affirm the judgment

against Krieger on this point. 

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I. BACKGROUND

Manion sued American Airlines in tort alleging that he

developed tinnitus because of excessive engine noise while

taking an American Airlines flight from Chicago to Boston.

Krieger served as counsel for American Airlines during the jury

trial. It is not disputed that Krieger engaged in serious and

sanctionable misconduct at closing argument. Manion objected

to Krieger's argument and reserved the right to move for a

mistrial. See Trial Tr. of 4/11/02 at 151, reprinted in Appellant's

Appendix ("App.") 67. The jury returned a verdict for American

Airlines, see Trial Tr. of 4/12/02 at 3-5, reprinted in App. 75-77,

and Manion immediately moved for a mistrial. In the course of

defending his motion for a new trial, Manion also argued for

costs associated with the need for a new trial. See Trial Tr. of

4/12/02 at 7, App. 79. In a memorandum of law supporting his

motion, Manion posited that Krieger's improper and prejudicial

closing argument was grounds for a new trial and submitted that

the court had authority under its inherent power and under §

1927 to award costs, including attorney's fees. See Pl.'s Legal

Mem. Regarding Mot. for New Trial and Other Sanctions,

4/19/02, reprinted in App. 87-90. The District Court granted

Manion's motion for a mistrial on August 1, 2002, and further

ordered "in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1927, that plaintiff is

awarded his costs, including reasonable attorney's fees, of the

trial." Manion v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 215 F. Supp. 2d 90, 93

(D.D.C. 2002). In awarding Manion's costs, including

reasonable attorney's fees, the court noted that "Defendant, in his

supplemental opposition, makes no mention whatsoever of

plaintiff's request for costs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927." Id. at

93 n.6.

On September 13, 2002, Manion filed a submission of fees,

which included $41,375.00 for "Attorney Time," $3,656.85 for

"Trial Expenses," and $2,600.00 for "Client Time." See Pl.'s

Submission of Fees, 9/13/02, reprinted in App. 119-23.

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American Airlines petitioned for mandamus and noted an appeal

in this court of the § 1927 sanction; Manion moved to dismiss

the appeal and for sanctions for filing a frivolous appeal. We

denied the petition for mandamus and dismissed the appeal

because the challenged order did not conclusively determine the

sanctions award as no amount had been set. We also denied the

motion for sanctions. See In re Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 02-5340,

Order (D.C. Cir. Dec. 12, 2002) (denying petition for

mandamus); Manion v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 02-7110, Order,

2002 WL 31818922 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 12, 2002) (dismissing

interlocutory appeal and denying motion for sanctions).

On December 19, 2002, Manion moved to liquidate, or set,

the award of sanctions in the amount of $53,983.99, in

accordance with the order of August 1, 2002. This amount

included the initial submission of fees, as well as additional fees

and expenses incurred in defending against American Airlines'

attempt to vacate and appeal the August order. The additional

litigation costs totaled $6,347.14, of which $3,217.50 pertained

to defending against the interlocutory appeal and petition for

mandamus. See Mot. to Liquidate Award of 8/1/02, 12/19/02,

reprinted in App. 135-37. In an order filed September 29, 2003,

the District Court ordered "for the reasons offered by Plaintiff,

that Plaintiff's Motion to Liquidate Award of August 1, 2002 is

GRANTED, and that Defendant and its counsel shall pay to

Plaintiff the sum of $53,983.99, in accordance with the Court's

August 1, 2002 Order . . . ." Manion v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No.

96-2094, Order (D.D.C. Sept. 29, 2003), reprinted in App. 169.

Manion has since settled his dispute with American Airlines.

On this appeal, Krieger concedes that his conduct was

sanctionable, but challenges the amount of the sanctions

awarded against him. 

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II. ANALYSIS

A. Jurisdiction

As a preliminary matter, Manion submits that this court

lacks jurisdiction over Krieger's appeal, because Krieger had

filed a "petition to appeal" the sanctions award under Rule 5 of

the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, rather than a "notice

of appeal" pursuant to Rules 3 and 4. See Appellee's Br. 1-2.

The argument is without merit. Krieger's filing was not a model

of clarity, but it was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of

Rule 3. See, e.g., Interstate Natural Gas Ass'n of Am. v. FERC,

756 F.2d 166, 170 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (per curiam) ("Federal

appellate courts have broadly recognized that the filing of a

paper substantially equivalent to one that formally inaugurates

the normal review process may well suffice for that purpose.").

Rule 3 requires that a notice of appeal:

(A) specify the party or parties taking the appeal by naming

each one in the caption or body of the notice . . . ;

(B) designate the judgment, order, or part thereof being

appealed; and

(C) name the court to which the appeal is taken.

FED. R. APP. P. 3(c)(1). In his mislabeled filing, Krieger

provided the requisite data to comply substantively with Rule 3.

His "petition to appeal" began: 

NOW COMES Petitioner, Roy W. Krieger . . . and hereby

petitions to appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for

the District of Columbia Circuit the final judgment entered

in Manion v. American Airlines, Inc. . . . on September 29,

2003 awarding sanctions against him under 28 U.S.C. §

1927, and all prior related rulings. 

USCA Case #03-7165 Document #867475 Filed: 12/28/2004 Page 5 of 11
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Pet. to Appeal, 10/28/03, reprinted in Appellant's Supplemental

App. 1. We are satisfied that our jurisdiction is properly

invoked. 

B. District Court's Sanctioning Authority

The District Court's order granting sanctions expressly

relied only on 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Manion contends, however,

that we should review the sanctions award as an exercise of the

District Court's inherent authority. See Appellee's Br. 14-15.

We decline the invitation, because the District Court did not

purport to rely on its inherent authority. Instead, it specifically

granted the sanctions award under § 1927. The court's passing

reference to the "reasons offered by Plaintiff" in the subsequent

order liquidating the award of sanctions, Manion v. Am. Airlines,

Inc., No. 96-2094, Order (D.D.C. Sept. 29, 2003), App. 169,

does not indicate that the District Court intended to rely on a

different sanctioning authority than that pursuant to which the

sanction was expressly granted. We therefore conclude that the

sanctions award was ordered solely pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1927. See GRiD Sys. Corp. v. John Fluke Mfg. Co., 41 F.3d

1318, 1320 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that a sanction cannot be

affirmed under the district court's inherent authority where the

court relied on § 1927); cf. Ashby v. McKenna, 331 F.3d 1148,

1151 (10th Cir. 2003) ("[W]ith respect to a matter committed to

the district court's discretion, we cannot invoke an alternative

basis to affirm unless we can say as a matter of law that it would

have been an abuse of discretion for the trial court to rule

otherwise.") (internal quotation marks omitted). 

The parties make a number of arguments on whether and

how the District Court can invoke its inherent authority, but we

do not address these issues. The District Court was explicit in

this case regarding its sanctioning authority, and Manion did not

object below that the court should have invoked its inherent

power. 

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C. Compensable Litigation Costs Under 28 U.S.C. § 1927

Krieger argues that certain amounts and particular elements

of the sanctions award exceed the scope of permissible sanctions

under § 1927. We now turn to those issues. 

Section 1927 provides:

Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in

any court of the United States or any Territory thereof who

so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and

vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy

personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees

reasonably incurred because of such conduct.

28 U.S.C. § 1927. We review the trial court's calculation of

sanctions for abuse of discretion. See LaPrade v. Kidder

Peabody & Co., 146 F.3d 899, 904 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("This court

reviews a district court's decision to award attorneys' fees under

28 U.S.C. § 1927, and the way it chooses to set the award, only

for abuse of discretion.").

Krieger contests specific amounts awarded by the District

Court for certain litigation costs, e.g., expert witness fees. See

Appellant's Br. 27. Upon careful review of the record, we

discern no legal or factual errors, and nothing even approaching

an abuse of discretion, in the District Court's findings in support

of the amounts awarded. Therefore, save for the two categories

of costs discussed below, we affirm the amounts awarded

against Krieger. Krieger primarily contends that § 1927 does

not authorize sanctions for matters that arose before the

sanctionable conduct. See Appellant's Br. 12-13. We decline to

consider this argument, however, because it was not presented

to the District Court. "It is the general rule, of course, that a

federal appellate court does not consider an issue not passed

upon below." Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976). We

consistently have refused to "hold a trial court to be in error in

failing to decide an issue not put before it in a civil action."

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Stouper v. Jones, 284 F.2d 240, 243 (D.C. Cir. 1960). Krieger

did raise three other points, however, that warrant our attention.

First, Krieger submits that § 1927 does not authorize

compensation for Manion's time in attending court proceedings.

See Appellant's Br. 13-17. Manion makes a futile attempt to

argue that this issue was not raised below. Before the trial court,

in his opposition to plaintiff's motion to liquidate the sanctions

award, Krieger argued that 

Plaintiff's claim for "Client Time" in the amount of $65.00

per hour for 40 hours is non-recoverable. Not only does

Plaintiff provide no evidence that he would have earned this

amount absent his attendance at trial, as a matter of law he

is entitled to no compensation for attendance at trial . . . .

Def.'s Opp'n to Pl.'s Mot. to Liquidate Award of 8/1/02, 1/2/03

("Def.'s Opp'n"), reprinted in App. 159. The issue clearly was

preserved. 

Manion appears wisely to concede that his time in attending

court proceedings does not constitute "attorney's fees" or "costs"

under § 1927. See Appellee's Br. 32-33 & n.52. He submits,

however, that his lost income comprises an "expense" under the

statute. See id. at 33. The argument is without merit. In an

analogous situation, we held that a pro se litigant's time as an

attorney or an expert witness in his own case did not constitute

"fees and other expenses" under the governing fee-shifting

statute for Equal Access to Justice Act awards. Kooritzky v.

Herman, 178 F.3d 1315, 1317-23 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (internal

quotation marks omitted). We noted that "it would seem a

strange incentive to provide witness fees not for the purpose of

reimbursing a litigant for his out-of-pocket costs, but as salary

for time spent as a witness in his own litigation." Id. at 1322.

It would be stranger still to provide the plaintiff with a salary for

his entire time at trial. 

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The Federal Circuit recently construed language similar to

§ 1927 and held that a pro se litigant's time working on

discovery did not constitute "'expenses incurred'" under Rule 37

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Pickholtz v. Rainbow

Techs., Inc., 284 F.3d 1365, 1374-75 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting

FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(4)(A) as providing for "reasonable

expenses incurred in making the motion [for order compelling

disclosure or discovery], including attorney's fees"). The court

found the term "incurred" controlling. See id. We agree with

our colleagues on the Federal Circuit that "one cannot 'incur'

fees payable to oneself, fees that one is not obliged to pay," id.,

as the term means "become liable or subject to[;] bring down

upon oneself." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL

DICTIONARY 1146 (1993); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

771 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "incur" as "[t]o suffer or bring on

oneself (a liability or expense)"). Nor can one's time constitute

a "payable 'expense,' as there is no direct financial cost or charge

associated with the expenditure of one's own time." Pickholtz,

284 F.3d at 1375. We therefore conclude that the plain language

of the statute forecloses compensation for Manion's time in

attending court proceedings.

Krieger also contends that § 1927 does not permit

compensation for litigation costs relating to his interlocutory

appeal. See Appellant's Br. 23-25. Krieger relies on Cooter &

Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990), which held that

Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "does not

authorize a district court to award attorney's fees incurred on

appeal." Id. at 409. Although Cooter & Gell does not control

this case, much of its rationale applies with equal force in the §

1927 context. Cooter & Gell emphasized that "expenses

incurred in defending the award on appeal are directly caused by

the district court's sanction and the appeal of that sanction," not

the sanctionable conduct. Id. at 407. Undergirding Cooter &

Gell, moreover, is a concern that the district court oversteps its

bounds when it sanctions conduct before the appellate court that

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the appellate court itself has the authority to sanction under the

appellate rules. See id. at 407-09. This court denied Manion's

motion for sanctions, pursuant to Rule 38 of the Federal Rules

of Appellate Procedure, for the interlocutory appeal of the

sanctions award. See Manion v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 02-7110,

Order, 2002 WL 31818922 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 12, 2002). This is

the end of the matter. 

"The knowledge that, after an unsuccessful appeal of a . . .

sanction, the district court that originally imposed the sanction

would also decide whether the appellant should pay his

opponent's attorney's fee would be likely to chill all but the

bravest litigants from taking an appeal." Cooter & Gell, 496

U.S. at 408. We therefore join several of our sister circuits in

holding that a district court may not award the cost of

interlocutory appellate proceedings as part of a sanctions award

under § 1927. See, e.g., Morris v. Peterson, 871 F.2d 948, 951

(10th Cir. 1989) ("[T]he determination of the right to sanctions

. . . for conduct during an appeal is reserved to the appellate

court, although it may allow the trial court to fix the amount of

the fees and costs."); cf.Conner v. Travis County, 209 F.3d 794,

798-802 (5th Cir. 2000) (district court erred in imposing

sanctions for filing interlocutory appeal). But see United States

v. Blodgett, 709 F.2d 608, 610 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding that the

district court had the authority to sanction counsel for filing a

frivolous appeal).

Finally, Krieger contends that § 1927 does not authorize

compensation for litigation costs pertaining to Manion's motion

for sanctions before the District Court. See Appellant's Br. 21-

23. Manion again counters that this argument was not raised

below. Krieger had argued before the District Court that

compensation for litigation costs incurred following the order

granting sanctions was not sanctionable absent an independent

finding of sanctionable conduct. See Def.'s Opp'n, App. 157.

The argument embraces his point on costs regarding the motion

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for sanctions. Although we conclude that the argument was

preserved, we are not persuaded that it has merit in this case.

The disputed costs arose in the context of Manion's defense

to Krieger's opposition to the motion for a mistrial. As Krieger

concedes, a new trial is not a sanction. See FED. R. CIV. P. 59(a)

(new trials); Appellant's Reply Br. 7. It would be a closer

question if the disputed expenses were related to time spent in

a separate proceeding devoted solely to Manion's defense to

Krieger's opposition to sanctions. We need not decide that

question, however, because the expenses here arose in

connection with Manion's simultaneous defense of the motion

for a new trial. It would be an idle gesture to attempt to separate

time related to defending the motion for a new trial and

defending against the opposition to sanctions in the trial court.

We therefore affirm the portion of the sanctions award that

compensates Manion for these costs.

In sum, we affirm the sanctions award, with the exception

of the components pertaining to Manion's time ($2,600.00) and

proceedings before this court ($3,217.50). We vacate the award

with respect to these two components.

III. CONCLUSION

Consistent with this opinion, the District Court's sanctions

award is hereby affirmed in part and reversed in part. The case

will be remanded to the District Court so that it can adjust the

sanctions award as required by this decision. 

So ordered.

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