Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-3_02-cv-01282/USCOURTS-almd-3_02-cv-01282-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1Plaintiff’s Response to the Defendants Answer and Report at 2 (“Pl’s Resp.” Doc. 39,

March 26, 2004)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

JAMES EDMONDSON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 3:02-CV-1282-F

)

CHAMBERS COUNTY SHERIFF, et al., )

)

)

Defendants. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

In this pro se action grounded on 42 U.S.C.§ 1983, James Edmondson, now a state

inmate (“Edmondson”), alleges that law enforcement officers violated his constitutional

rights during searches and seizures following the checkpoint stop of his wife’s car.

Edmondson “is currently serving a sentence that is irrelevant to the facts in this case.”1 After

due consideration of all evidentiary submissions, arguments, and applicable law, the court

concludes that summary judgment is warranted for all defendants.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

While incarcerated in the Montgomery County Detention Facility, Edmondson filed

this Complaint on November 25, 2002, against law enforcement officers who are identified

properly as Chambers County Sheriff Sid Lockhart and Sgt. Mike Parrish along with

Chambers County Multi-Jurisdictional Drug Task Force Agent Aris Murphy and Investigator

Case 3:02-cv-01282-MEF-DRB Document 41 Filed 10/13/05 Page 1 of 13
2Edmondson designated Chambers County Commissioner as a defendant in the caption of

his complaint but failed to reference him at all in the body of the complaint. Adopting this

Magistrate Judge’sRecommendation, on February 10, 2003, the court dismissed with prejudice any

claims against this defendant prior to service of process, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B)(i.).

(Docs. 6, 9). In a Motion for Leave to Amend the Original Complaint, granted December 11, 2003

(Docs. 20, 21), Edmondson acknowledged the propriety of this dismissal. 

3The dismissal Recommendation noted the return of an order mailed on February 10, 2003

as evidence of Edmondson’s non-compliance with instructions to inform the court of any new

address. An Order on February 24, 2003, set a February 28 deadline for him to supply his present

address. Edmondson filed notice of his changed address on March 11, 2003, but the district court

proceeded to adopt the dismissal recommendation entered on March 7. (Docs. 12, 14, 15). The

appellate court determined: “[T]he district court dismissed Edmondson’s complaint without first

imposing lesser sanctions and did not make findings that lesser sanctions would be insufficient.

Furthermore, the district court abused its discretion by dismissing Edmondson’s case three weeks

after Edmondson submitted his new address.” (Doc. 22)

4Edmondson transferred on February 20, 2004, to Draper Correctional Facility. ( Doc. 35)

5Amendment to Complaint (Doc. 20); Edmondson also explained his designation of the

sheriff as a defendant: “Sheriff Sid Lockhart for allowing his officers to act under color of the law

and do so wrongfully. . .” (¶ 5).

2

Clay Stewart.2 Edmondson’s failure to prosecute this action in compliance with the court’s

directives resulted in the dismissal of this action with prejudice on April 1, 2003.

Edmondson appealed the dismissal, and on November 7, 2003, the U. S. Court of Appeals

for the Eleventh Circuit vacated the dismissal and remanded this case for further

proceedings.3 

In an amended complaint allowed December 11, 2003, Edmondson –then residing at

an Elmore County Correctional Facility4 – corrected a misnamed defendant, added Chambers

Co. Sheriff’s deputy Jimmy Sanders as a defendant, and clarified his intent to sue each

defendant in his official and personal capacity.5

Case 3:02-cv-01282-MEF-DRB Document 41 Filed 10/13/05 Page 2 of 13
6

See scheduling orders, Docs.5 and 38.

3

In addition to answering the complaint with, inter alia, claims of immunities and

jurisdictional defenses (Docs. 33 and 36), Defendants Lockhart, Stewart, Sanders, and

Parrish filed on February 23, 2004, and Defendant Murphy on February 25, 2004, special

reports and supporting evidentiary materials which addressed Edmondson’s claims for relief.

On March 26, 2004, Edmondson filed his response to the special report in accordance with

another scheduling order.6 The parties having been advised of the court’s prerogative to treat

the defendants’ reports and the plaintiff’s response as a motion for summary judgment and

response, the court now deems it appropriate to do so. As now explained, the court

concludes that the submissions demonstrate the propriety of summary judgment for the

defendants.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

To survive the defendants’ properly supported motion for summary judgment, the

plaintiff is required to produce some evidence which would be admissible at trial supporting

his constitutional claim. Rule 56(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Specifically, he must

“go beyond the pleadings and ... designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine

issue for trial.’” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). To meet this standard,

“[a] mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence supporting the opposing party’s position will not suffice;

there must be enough of a showing that the jury could reasonably find for that party. 

Case 3:02-cv-01282-MEF-DRB Document 41 Filed 10/13/05 Page 3 of 13
4

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).”

Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1576 -1577 (11th Cir. 1990). A plaintiff’s conclusory

allegations do not provide sufficient evidence to oppose a motion for summary judgment.

Harris v. Ostrout, 65 F.3d 912 (11th Cir. 1995); Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 556-57

(11th Cir. 1984). Consequently, when a plaintiff fails to make a showing sufficient to

establish the existence of an element essential to his case, and on which the plaintiff will bear

the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the moving

party. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322; Barnes v. Southwest Forest Industries, Inc., 814 F.2d 607

(11th Cir. 1987). Where all the evidence before the court which is admissible on its face or

which can be reduced to admissible form indicates that there is no genuine issue of material

fact and that the party moving for summary judgment is entitled to it as a matter of law,

summary judgment is proper. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322; Everett v. Napper, 833 F.2d

1507, 1510 (11

th Cir. 1987); Wright v. Southland Corp., 187 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 1999);

Pritchard v. Southern Co. Servs., 92 F.3d 1130, 1135 (11th Cir. 1996); McMillian v. Johnson,

88 F.3d 1573, 1584-85 (11th Cir. 1996) . 

Although factual inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and pro se complaints are entitled to liberal interpretation by the courts, a pro

se litigant does not escape the burden of establishing a genuine issue of material fact. Brown

v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 670 (11th Cir. 1990). 

Case 3:02-cv-01282-MEF-DRB Document 41 Filed 10/13/05 Page 4 of 13
7An experienced police officer, Sgt. Parrish joined the Chambers Co. Sheriff’s Department

in 1999. Also a veteran officer now employed by the Lee Co. Sheriff’s Department, Deputy Sanders

served the Chambers Co. Sheriff for about two years. Special Report at 3-4, n.1,n.2.

5

III. RELEVANT FACTS

The incident underlying Edmondson’s claim occurred on the evening of November

6, 2001, at County Road 388 and Judge Brown Road in Chambers County, Alabama, a

scheduled checkpoint for Chambers Co. Sheriff’s Sgt. Mike Parrish (“Sgt. Parrish”)and

Deputy Sheriff Jimmy Sanders (“Dep. Sanders”),7 who were conducting authorized stops of

vehicles traveling in each direction to check for driver’s licenses and proof of insurance.

After stopping the Camaro driven by Edmondson’s wife Debra, Sgt. Parrish secured her

driver’s license, and instructed her to pull over to the side of the road after ascertaining that

she had no insurance.

Edmondson maintains that his wife had the necessary “proof of insurance” and

otherwise “denies all the statements made by officers (Defendants) as being untrue and

fabricated.” As it is duty-bound on this summary judgment submission, while viewing facts

and inferences most favorably to Edmondson as the non-movant, the court has examined the

record for evidentiary support which goes beyond conclusory allegations in search of “any

genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may

reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 250 (1986). On the question of the purpose of the stop, for example, Edmondson

Case 3:02-cv-01282-MEF-DRB Document 41 Filed 10/13/05 Page 5 of 13
8While acknowledging that his wife presented her driver’s license upon request,

Edmondson’s affidavit makes no mention at all of the request for insurance proof; instead, he

declares that Sgt. Parrish “informed [his wife] that he had asked her to pull over because her car had

been involved in a methamphetamine bust a few days prior to this.” Affidavit of James Edmondson

(“Edmondson Aff.”) ¶¶ 4-6.

9According to Sgt. Parrish, Debra Edmondson’s “hand was trembling uncontrollably” when

she handed over her license, and “Edmondson was sweating profusely even though it was a cool

day, only about 50 degrees.” Affidavit of Mike Parrish (Parrish Aff.), ¶ 4. Edmondson denies

“sweating profusely” but explains that he “was feeling very sick.” Edmondson Aff. ¶ 16.

10See Affidavit of Jimmy Sanders (“Sanders Aff.”) ¶ 4 (“ I walked over to the passenger’s

side of the vehicle and looked through the window. At that point, I observed the butt of a gun in the

back floorboard behind the driver’s seat. I raised up, looked at Deputy Parrish and mouthed the

word ‘gun’ to him. I saw Deputy Parrish look into the window in the direction of the gun and he

then instructed both subjects to exit the car.”) 

11See Edmondson Aff. ¶ 7; Parrish Aff.¶ 5; Sanders Aff. ¶ 5.

6

provides no evidentiary support for his contentions that his wife had proof of insurance and

that officers stopped her vehicle for ulterior purposes.8

Suspicious behavior by both the driver and Edmondson prompted Sgt. Parrish to

summon Dep. Sanders for assistance.9 Alerted by Dep. Sanders to “the butt of a gun in the

back floorboard behind the driver’s side”, Sgt. Parrish ordered the Edmondsons to exit the

car and stand at its rear.10

The officers conducted a pat-down search of husband and wife and Deputy Sanders

stayed with them while Sgt. Parrish searched the vehicle for the weapons acknowledged by

Mrs. Edmondson to be inside.11 She was arrested for “failure to have a license to carry” a

handgun retrieved near the driver’s side, and officers also seized the handgun initially

observed in the back floorboard. After confirming that the serial number on one of the

handguns matched a stolen weapon, officers also charged Mrs. Edmondson with Receiving

Case 3:02-cv-01282-MEF-DRB Document 41 Filed 10/13/05 Page 6 of 13
12See Special Report (Doc. 34), Ex. 1 (Incident Offense Reports); Ex.3 (Arrest Report).

13Defendants Stewart and Sanders overheard Mrs. Edmondson’s claim of ownership. See

Affidavit of Clay Stewarat (“Stewart Aff.”) ¶ 4; Sanders Aff. ¶ 7. Moreover, the plea agreement

pursuant to which Mrs. Edmondson plead guilty on November 3, 2003, to possession of a controlled

substance recited: “all items seized in connection with this case shall be condemned and forfeited

to the investigating agency for proper disposal or destruction.” Thus, all cash seized from the

Edmondson and all weapons, drugs, and paraphernalia seized from the car and her purse have been

forfeited to the Chambers Co. Sheriff’s Department. See Ex. 5 and Special Report at 9 (Doc. 34).

14See Ex. 4 (Sealed Evidence Bag); Stewart Aff. ¶ 6; Sanders Aff. ¶ 9; Affidavit of Aris

Murphy (“Murphy Aff.”) ¶ 6.

7

Stolen Property 2nd. 

12

Sgt. Parrish’s search of the vehicle produced not only the two handguns but also some

ecstasy tablets,methamphetamine as well as manufacturing supplies and paraphernalia. From

Mrs. Edmondson’s purse officers retrieved other items used for the manufacture of

methamphetamine along with $473 in currency. According to Sgt. Parrish , Mrs. Edmondson

claimed ownership of everything in the car and denied her husband’s knowledge.

13

Defendants Clay Stewart and Aris Murphy, both investigators with the Chambers

County Multi-Jurisdictional Drug Task Force, arrived to evaluate and photograph the

evidence. Sgt. Parrish then subjected the Edmondsons to a more extensive search than the

initial pat-downs, finding in Mr. Edmondson’s front pocket $543.00 cash; the parties dispute

Edmondson’s statements regarding his ownership of this money. According to Sgt. Parrish,

overheard by other officers, Edmonson denied any knowledge and insisted that the officer

take the cash.14 Edmondson declares that Sgt. Parrish “took ...my money out of my wallet”

rather than from his pocket and told him to contact Inv. Stewart if he wanted the money

Case 3:02-cv-01282-MEF-DRB Document 41 Filed 10/13/05 Page 7 of 13
15See Edmondson Aff. ¶¶ 14, 22.

16See Pl.’s Resp. At 2 (“...officers took his money and never reported the money until a suit

was filed against them.”); Parrish Aff. ¶ 8 (“I then conducted an inventory of the drugs, drug

paraphernalia and money, and bagged, sealed, and labeled the evidence.”); Special Report, Ex. 4

(sealed evidence bag)

17See Parrish Aff. ¶ 5; Stewart Aff. ¶ 7; Sanders Aff. ¶ 11; Murphy Aff. ¶ 7.

18Edmondson Aff. ¶¶ 23-25. Defendant Murphy’s testimony did not reference a cell phone:

Investigator Stewart offered a ride to Mr. Edmondson so that he

could be taken to a telephone, as the car belonging to Ms.

Edmondson was being impounded. I recall Mr. Edmondson stating

“I do not want a ride from y’all, I just want to get to Lee County.”

Someone responded that “Lee County is that way” as we were all

standing at the Lee County line. Mr. Edmondson then began walking

away from the scene towards the county line despite our offer to

transport him to a telephone to obtain a ride.” Murphy Aff. ¶ 7. 

8

returned. 15

Contradicting Edmondson, the evidence establishesthat Sgt. Parrish included the cash

taken from him when he inventoried all other items seized during this incident.16 Edmondson

was not arrested and, while officers impounded the car, he purportedly declined an offer of

a ride and walked instead toward the Lee County line.17 Disputing all four officers’

testimony, Edmondson maintains that Defendant Murphy tossed to him his cell phone and

“told [him] to start walking before he locked [him] up too.”18 Drug Task Officers

transported Mrs. Edmondson to their office and later for booking in the Chambers County

Detention Facility. 

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Sheriff Lockhart

Case 3:02-cv-01282-MEF-DRB Document 41 Filed 10/13/05 Page 8 of 13
19Affidavit of Sid Lockhart,¶¶ 1-2, Special Report (Doc. 34). 

20Pl.’s Resp. at 2.

9

The single allegation against Sheriff Lockhart – made in the amended complaint

docketed just over a year after the complaint – is that he “allow[ed] his officers to act under

color of the law and do so wrongfully.” Edmondson proffers no evidence to dispute Sheriff

Lockhart’s sworn testimony denying any familiarity with or personal knowledge of the

incident in controversy and further denying any direct control or authority over the drug task

force officers involved.19 The doctrine of respondeat superior is not applicable to actions

filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978);

Greason v. Kemp, 891 F.2d 829, 836 (11th Cir.1990). Accordingly, this action is due to be

dismissed against the Sheriff. 

B. Defendants Parrish, Sanders, Stewart, and Murphy

The undisputed factual basis for the legal claims in this action is stated succinctly by

Edmondson:

On November 6, 2001 the Plaintiff, a passenger in his wife’s automobile, was

deprived of $543.00 in U.S. currency by officers armed with weapons. The

Plaintiff was never charged with a crime, officers took his money and never

reported the money until a suit was filed against them on November 25, 2002.

The Plaintiff has construed this to be “armed robbery.”20

Equally clear is the gist of his dual-pronged legal claim:

The plaintiff has construed the checkpoint to be unlawful and the search and

seizure to be a violation of the Plaintiff’s fourth amendment rights. There is

also the question of whether officers abused their authority by forcing the

Case 3:02-cv-01282-MEF-DRB Document 41 Filed 10/13/05 Page 9 of 13
21Id. at 3. As a remedy for the officers’ conduct, Edmondson requests “$500 back that was

took from me; 400 back that was took from my wife; 3000.00 for the car we had to replace; the car

back that they took; 25 million dollars to punish them for what they did to me.” (Compl. ¶ VI)

10

Plaintiff to walk back to another county.21

Indisputably, Sgt. Parrish searched Edmondson’s person and seized $543 in the act

Edmondson construes as armed robbery; whether he secured the money from his front pocket

or from his wallet is irrelevant analytically. Since Edmondson attributes liability for this

wrong to all the officers, all join Defendant Parrish in asserting as an affirmative defense

Edmondson’s lack of standing. 

 The defense is well taken on this evidentiary record and is determinative of the claim.

Edmondson’s conclusory allegation of ownership now is insufficient to create a genuine

issue of disputed material fact in response to (a) the officers’ affidavits of his specific denial

of ownership when confronted with the money at the scene and his wife’s specific claim of

ownership, along with (b) the inclusion of this currency in the resulting criminal case to

which Mrs. Edmondson plead guilty, and its consequent forfeiture to the Chambers Co.

Sheriff’s Department. 

“Fourth Amendment rights .. . are personal, and only individuals who actually enjoy

the reasonable expectation of privacy have standing to challenge the validity of the

government search.” United States v. Cooper, 203 F. 3d 1279, 1284 (11th Cir. 2000).

Notwithstanding his reference now to the money seized as his own, Edmondson does not

dispute the officers’ testimony of his wife’s volunteered declaration of her own exclusive

Case 3:02-cv-01282-MEF-DRB Document 41 Filed 10/13/05 Page 10 of 13
22Assuming arguendo that Edmondson’s present claim of ownership sufficiently creates an

issue for the factfinder, summary judgment for the defendants would still be appropriate because the

submissions establish no genuine issue of material fact about the constitutionality of the search and

seizure incident to the checkpoint stop. See Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444

(1990) (affirming constitutionality of sobriety checkpoint aimed at removing drunk drivers from the

road is constitutional); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979)( upholding constitutionality of

roadblock to verify license and registration); Merrett v. Moore, 58 F. 3d 1547 (11th Cir.

1995)(affirming constitutionality of license and registration checkpoint constitutional). After

locating inside the car the handguns acknowledged by Mrs. Edmondson, along with drugs and

paraphernalia, safety concerns reasonably dictated that Sgt. Parrish extend his initial pat down

search to the more extensive search which yielded the cash in controversy. Whether the money came

from Edmondson’s front pocket or his wallet, Edmondson concedes that Sgt. Parrish removed the

money “during a ‘pat dow’ or ‘frisk’ search . . . Officer Parrish removed the Plaintiff’s wallet and

opened it to inventory its contents.” Pl.’s Resp. at 4. 

.

23The court in Courson determined that no constitutional right existed as of May 1985 to

have police transport a passenger home after the driver’s arrest and impoundment of the vehicle.

Diligent search of Eleventh Circuit case law since 1991 discloses no modification of this ruling.

11

ownership to everything produced in the search, including the cash seized from her husband.

Having created no factual dispute on her possessory claim, he lacks standing to challenge the

officers’ seizure of her cash and its subsequent inventory and forfeiture in a criminal case not

involving him.22

With respect to Edmondson’s second claim – that officers left him stranded after

impounding his wife’s car – even if the court found a genuine factual dispute in the

conflicting testimony presented by the officers, the claim simply fails to rise to a

constitutional violation. See Courson v. McMillian, 939 F. 2d 1479 (11th Cir. 1991).23 Because

the evidentiary submissions clearly establish that Edmondson’s complaint states no

constitutional claims for which relief can be given under 42 U.S.C. §1983, Defendants’

asserted immunities require no examination. 

Case 3:02-cv-01282-MEF-DRB Document 41 Filed 10/13/05 Page 11 of 13
12

V. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:

1. Defendant Sid Lockhart, Sheriff of Chambers County, be dismissed with

prejudice; 

2. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment be GRANTED, and Judgment be

GRANTED against the Plaintiff, James Edmondson, and in favor of all

defendants: Chambers County Sgt. Mike Parrish, former Chambers County

Sheriff’s Deputy Jimmy Saners, Chambers County Multi-Jurisdictional Drug

Task Force Investigator Clay Stewart and Agent Aris Murphy;

3. This case be dismissed with prejudice.

4. The costs of this proceeding be taxed against the plaintiff.

It is further ORDERED that on or before October 27, 2005 the parties may file

objections to the Recommendation. Any objections filed must clearly identify the findings

in the Magistrate Judge's Recommendation to which the party is objecting. Frivolous,

conclusive or general objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties are

advised that this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not

appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and advisements in the

Magistrate Judge's Recommendation shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the

District Court of issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from

Case 3:02-cv-01282-MEF-DRB Document 41 Filed 10/13/05 Page 12 of 13
13

attacking on appeal factual findings in the Recommendation accepted or adopted by the

District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v.

Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982). See Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d

33 (11th Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981, en

banc), adopting as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed 

down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.

Done this 13th day of October , 2005.

/s/ Delores R. Boyd

DELORES R. BOYD

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 3:02-cv-01282-MEF-DRB Document 41 Filed 10/13/05 Page 13 of 13