Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_07-cv-08103/USCOURTS-azd-3_07-cv-08103-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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Plaintiff’s request for oral argument is denied because oral argument will not aid the

Court’s decision. See Mahon v. Credit Bur. of Placer County, Inc., 171 F.3d 1197, 1200

(9th Cir. 1999).

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Manuel Madrid, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Concho Elementary School District

No. 6 of Apache County, an Arizona

political subdivision; Concho Elementary

School District No. 6 of Apache County

Governing Board Members Carl Dye,

Cecilia Roberts, John Taylor, Tracy

Candelaria, and Angela Murphy, 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-07-8103-PCT-DGC

ORDER

Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6)

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Dkt. #13. A response and reply have been filed. 

Dkt. ##15, 21. The Court will deny the motion.1

I. Background.

Concho Elementary School District No. 6 operates one school in Apache County,

Arizona. Plaintiff worked as the District’s superintendent beginning in July 2005. On

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September 18, 2007, the District’s Governing Board decided to terminate Plaintiff’s

employment.

Plaintiff commenced this action on October 3, 2007, by filing a complaint against

the District and individual members of the Board. Dkt. #1. The complaint asserts six claims:

a request for injunctive and declaratory relief, breach of contract, violation of the Arizona

Open Meeting Law, violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, race discrimination in violation of Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id.

II. Analysis.

A.R.S. § 15-543(A) provides that an appeal from a board’s decision to terminate an

employee must be filed with the superior court in the county of employment within 30 days

after the date of the decision. The Board decided to terminate Plaintiff on September 18,

2007. Plaintiff therefore was required to file any appeal of the Board’s decision with the

Apache County Superior Court by October 18, 2007. Plaintiff did not do so. Defendants

argue that Plaintiff’s complaint is barred by the doctrine of res judicata because it seeks to

re-litigate issues heard and decided by the Board that were not appealed and became final.

Dkt. #13 at 3-8.

Federal district courts must accord the same preclusive effect to a state administrative

decision as the state itself would apply. See Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliot, 478 U.S. 788, 798-99

(1986). “First, however, the federal court must independently assess the adequacy of the

state’s administrative forum.” Olson v. Morris, 188 F.3d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1999). “‘This

requires careful review of the administrative record to ensure that, at a minimum, it meets the

state’s own criteria necessary to require a court of that state to give preclusive effect to the

state agency’s decisions.’” Id. (quoting Miller v. County of Santa Cruz, 39 F.3d 1030, 1033

(9th Cir. 1994)). “‘Although a federal court should ordinarily give preclusive effect when

the state court would do so, there may be occasions where a state court would give preclusive

effect to an administrative decision that failed to meet the minimum criteria set down

[for federal courts].’” Id. (alterations omitted). The Supreme Court listed these criteria in

United States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966): (1) that the

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administrative agency acted in a judicial capacity, (2) that the agency resolved disputed

issues of fact properly before it, and (3) that the parties had an adequate opportunity to

litigate. Id. at 422.

Defendants do not address whether the Board’s process comported with the

requirements of Utah Construction. Plaintiff also fails to address the requirements of Utah

Construction, but he does assert that the Board failed to provide him and his counsel with

sufficient notice of various hearings. He also appears to assert that conflicts of interest and

bias precluded the Board from properly considering his termination and precluded him from

having an adequate opportunity to litigate his concerns. Because Defendants have failed to

demonstrate that the Board procedures satisfied the elements of Utah Construction, and

Plaintiff appears to raise factual issues with respect to those elements, the Court cannot

conclude at this stage of the litigation that the Board decision should be given preclusive

effect.

Moreover, the Board’s unreviewed decision to terminate Plaintiff does not have

preclusive effect on Plaintiff’s Title VII claims. See Elliot, 478 U.S. at 797 (“Congress did

not intend unreviewed state administrative proceedings to have preclusive effect on Title VII

claims.”); McInnes v. California, 943 F.2d 1088, 1093 (9th Cir. 1991) (“The clear teaching

of Elliot is that in a Title VII action a prior state decision enjoys preclusive effect only if

rendered or reviewed by a court.”).

The cases cited by Defendants do not require a different conclusion. The Ninth

Circuit’s decision in Olson specifically found that “the state administrative process here

comported with the requirements of Utah Construction.” 188 F.3d at 1086. This Court in

Dommissee v. Napolitano, 474 F.Supp.2d 1121 (D. Ariz. 2007), did not cite Utah

Construction, but it did cite and rely on Elliott and Olson, both of which addressed the

requirements of Utah Construction. Id. at 1128. Moreover, the plaintiff in Dommissee had

a full hearing before the Arizona Medical Board and appealed the Board’s censure decision

to the Arizona Superior Court. Id. at 1124. This Court concluded that the plaintiff’s action

was precluded by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and that any additional claims were preluded

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by the full hearing plaintiff received in the state administrative action. Id. at 1125-27.

Finally, unlike Plaintiff in this case, the plaintiff in Dommissee did not assert claims under

Title VII.

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Dkt. #13) is denied.

2. The Court will schedule a Rule 16 Case Management Conference by separate

order.

DATED this 2nd day of January, 2008.

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