Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca2-14-01469/USCOURTS-ca2-14-01469-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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DENNY CHIN, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:

I concur in the majorityʹs holding that the district court properly granted

summary judgment dismissing plaintiff‐appellant Ya‐Chen Chenʹs Title VII

discrimination claims.    I respectfully dissent, however, from the majorityʹs

affirmance of the district courtʹs dismissal of Chenʹs retaliation claims under Title

VII and her claims for discrimination and retaliation under the New York City

Human Rights Law (the ʺNYCHRLʺ).  In my view, the record contains sufficient

evidence to permit a reasonable jury to find that: 1) with respect to her Title VII

claims, Chen was fired because of her complaints of discrimination; and 2) under

the NYCHRLʹs more lenient standard, Chen was treated less well because of her

race or gender and because of her complaints of discrimination.   

Chen, an Asian woman, was employed as an Assistant Professor at the

City College of New York (ʺCCNYʺ) starting in September 2007.    She had

generally positive reviews, was appointed Interim Director of the Asian Studies

Program at the start of her second year, and was reappointed as a tenure‐track

Assistant Professor for the 2008‐2009 and 2009‐2010 academic years.   Yet, after

she complained about receiving too much attention from a fifty‐four‐year‐old

male student (the  ʺStudentʺ) and then complained of what she believed to be

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discrimination, she was dismissed as Interim Director of the Asian Studies

Program, denied reappointment to a tenure‐track professorship, and then fired.  

A reasonable jury could find that these adverse actions were retaliatory.  

Accordingly, I would vacate the judgment of the district court with respect

to Chenʹs retaliation claims under Title VII and her retaliation and discrimination

claims under the NYCHRL and remand for further proceedings.

I

Title VII provides that  ʺ[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for

an employer to discriminate against any of his employees . . . because he has

opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this

subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated

in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this

subchapter.ʺ  42 U.S.C. § 2000e‐3(a).  Such unlawful discrimination occurs where

an employer takes an  ʺadverse action[]ʺ  against an employee, meaning any

action that ʺcould well dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting

a charge of discrimination.ʺ  Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53,

57 (2006).    We have observed that such adverse actions often arise when  ʺan

employee whose primary claim of discrimination cannot survive pre‐trial

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dispositive motions is able to take to trial the secondary claim that he or she was

fired or adversely affected in retaliation for asserting the primary claim.ʺ  Quinn

v. Green Tree Credit Corp., 159 F.3d 759, 762 (2d Cir. 1998); see Alvarez v. City of

New York, 31 F. Supp. 2d 334, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (ʺAll too often . . . employers

react negatively to the assertion of a claim and consequently turn a weak

discrimination case into a strong retaliation case.ʺ).

To prove retaliation, a plaintiff must show that 1) her employer

discriminated or took an adverse employment action against her 2) ʺbecauseʺ she

opposed an unlawful employment practice.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e‐3(a).  ʺTitle VII

retaliation claims must be proved according to traditional principles of but‐for

causation . . . .ʺ  Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2533 (2013).  

ʺʹ[B]ut‐forʹ causation does not[, however,] require proof that retaliation was the

only cause of the employerʹs action, but only that the adverse action would not

have occurred in the absence of the retaliatory motive.ʺ   Zann Kwan v. Andalex

Grp. LLC, 737 F.3d 834, 846 (2d Cir. 2013).  Thus, there may be multiple but‐for

causes, and ʺ[t]he determination of whether retaliation was a ʹbut‐forʹ cause . . . is

particularly poorly suited to disposition by summary judgment, because it

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requires weighing of the disputed facts, rather than a determination that there is

no genuine dispute as to any material fact.ʺ  Id. at 846 n.5.   

In my view, the district court erred in granting summary judgment

dismissing Chenʹs Title VII retaliation claims for three reasons: 1) the district

court engaged in improper fact‐finding; 2) there are genuine issues of material

fact to be resolved by a jury; and 3) there is sufficient evidence in the record to

permit a reasonable jury to find retaliation.

A

First, the district court erred by drawing factual conclusions at the

summary judgment stage rather than simply determining whether genuine

issues of material fact existed for trial.   

The district court found that Chen failed to handle the incident involving

the Student according to Lesenʹs instructions, but the record contained

conflicting evidence in this respect.  Chen contends that Lesen instructed her to

confront the Student and set up boundaries even though he was not then

enrolled in her class, and that Lesen suggested that Chen do so immediately, that

is, before the end of the semester.  In contrast, Lesen denies that she suggested

that Chen should interact with the Student before the end of the semester and

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contends specifically that she told Chen ʺnot to deal with these behaviors before

they actually occurred.ʺ    Ya‐Chen Chen v. City Univ. of New York, No. 11 Civ.

0320(RA), 2014 WL 1285595, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2014) (internal quotation

marks omitted).  Rather than viewing the record in the light most favorable to

Chen, see Fabrikant v. French, 691 F.3d 193, 205 (2d Cir. 2012), the district court

stated that it ʺshares Defendantsʹ viewʺ that Chenʹs handling of the incident was

ʺdisturbingʺ  and  ʺinappropriate,ʺ  Chen, 2014 WL 1285595, at *8.    Indeed, the

district court resolved the factual dispute in favor of defendants, finding, for

example, that ʺthere is no evidence that Lesen instructed Chen to . . . speak to the

Student immediately,ʺ id., when there was such evidence: Chenʹs recollection of

the meeting and Lesenʹs e‐mail following the meeting, which can be reasonably

construed as contemplating immediate action, see id. at *2.

As the majority observes, the district court also found that  ʺ[d]efendantsʹ 

actions, contrary to constituting evidence of retaliation for Chenʹs complaints, are

entirely consistent as a progressive response to Chenʹs  ʹdisturbing incidentʹ with

the Student.ʺ  Id. at *11 (emphasis added); see Maj. Op. at 20‐21.  By finding these

actions  ʺentirely consistentʺ  with the notion of progressive discipline, and by

finding that non‐retaliatory reasons existed for defendantsʹ decisions, the district

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court made a factual finding that should have been reserved for the jury.    Of

course, while the actions might have been ʺentirely consistentʺ with the concept

of progressive discipline, they also could have been found by a reasonable jury to

be retaliatory.  

B

Second, genuine issues of fact remain that should be resolved by a jury.   

First, many of the facts relating to the incident involving the Student are

disputed.    As discussed above, whether Chen handled the meeting with the

Student in accordance with Lesenʹs instructions is a factual question for the jury.  

Similarly, factual questions remain as to whether there was a sexual undertone to

the incident and whether Chen described it as a sexual incident.    Chen

complained that the Student harassed her by blocking the doorway, spending

long periods of time in her office hours, and would move closer and closer to her

when speaking to her.   Chen used words like  ʺworried, afraid, strange,ʺ when

complaining about the incident and noted that a male colleague did not

experience the same interactions with the Student.  App. at 329.   

Second, factual questions remain regarding defendantsʹ treatment of Chen

after the incident.  Chenʹs complaint alleges that Lesen ʺraised the volume of her

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voice and discriminated against me by requesting me to read the word,  ʹstop,ʹ 

after her at least six to eight times as if I were only a child.ʺ  App. at 211.  Chen

alleged ‐‐ and a reasonable jury could find ‐‐ that this conduct was ʺracially and

linguistically discriminatoryʺ  and made her feel like  ʺa foreign fool or a

kindergarten child.ʺ  App. at 213, 333.  Chen also complained that her May 20,

2009 meeting with Calichman and Murphy was inappropriate, and testified that

the meeting highlighted ʺvery, very strong cultural differences.ʺ  App. at 525.   

Third, a factual question exists as to whether the reappointment process

was tainted.  Calichman was present and voted at the October 15, 2009 executive

committee meeting to reappoint professors.    He had been named in Chenʹs

Affirmative Action complaint, and thus there is a question as to whether his

involvement unduly influenced the decision.

These and other disputed factual questions are all relevant to a

determination of whether retaliation was a cause of Chenʹs adverse treatment,

and accordingly should be considered by a jury.  

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C

Third, there is evidence in the record from which a reasonable jury could

find retaliation, including the temporal proximity of events, Chenʹs mostly

positive evaluations, concerns about the reappointment process, the

disproportionate nature of Chenʹs punishment, and defendantsʹ  shifting

explanations for her dismissal.

First, the timeline of events supports the notion that defendants acted with

a retaliatory motive.   The incident occurred on May 13, 2009.    Chen met with

Calichman and Murphy seven days later to discuss the incident.    A mere

eighteen days later, Calichman recommended that Chen be removed as Director

of the Asian Studies Program, and she was replaced as Director.  On August 25,

2009, Chen filed a complaint with CCNYʹs Affirmative Action Office.  Within two

months of filing, on October 20, 2009, defendants voted not to reappoint Chen.  

On November 4, 2009, Chen filed a complaint with the New York State Division

of Human Rights.    Within a couple weeks, on November 19, 2009, Chen was

notified that her position would be permanently terminated.   

The majority contends that because Lesen, Calichman, and Murphy

developed their ʺopinions about Chenʹs conductʺ before she filed her complaint

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with the Affirmative Action Office,  ʺ[n]o reasonable jury could conclude that

their views of the situation were motivated by retaliatory animus.ʺ  Maj. Op. at

24‐27.    This reading of the facts, however, gives undue weight to defendantsʹ 

initial reactions to the incident, ignoring the escalation of both Chenʹs complaints

and defendantsʹ  actions against her.    While defendants removed Chen as

Director of the Asian Studies Program before she filed with the Affirmative

Action Office, this occurred after she had already complained to Calichman and

Murphy about the incident.  Further, the decision to not reappoint her came after

the Affirmative Action Office filing.  Accordingly, the timeline of events supports

an inference that Chen was dismissed for complaining about the incident and

then complaining of discrimination against her.

Second, Chenʹs demonstrated history of positive performance evaluations

supports an inference of retaliation.  Chenʹs June 2, 2008 evaluation recognized

her strengths and noted that her overall relations with others had improved.  The

evaluation noted: ʺChen is an excellent teacherʺ; ʺ[s]he also received a colleague

evaluation of  ʹGoodʹ  and  ʹExcellentʹʺ; and  ʺChen is a committed teacher and

scholar.ʺ    App. at 185.    The only negative comment in this review referenced

ʺwhat some perceive as her overaggressiveness and lack of tact.ʺ  Id.  Even the

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review Chen received after the incident highlighted her achievements, including

that she received  ʺtwo colleague evaluations of  ʹVery Goodʹ  and  ʹExcellent,ʹʺ 

secured a book contract, wrote several articles, and delivered several conference

presentations.  Id. at 202.  It also observed that her  ʺproductivity as a scholar is

commendable,ʺ  and she provided valuable services to the Asian Studies

Program.  Id. Again, in her three years at CCNY, Chen was promoted to Interim

Director of the Asian Studies Program and was twice reappointed to a tenure‐

track professorship.    See Stratton v. Depʹt for the Aging for City of N.Y., 132 F.3d

869, 874, 879‐81 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing history of positive performance evaluations

as supporting plaintiffʹs discrimination claims).  Chenʹs handling of the incident,

even assuming she mishandled it, must be viewed in the context of her overall

record.  

Third, Chen presented evidence that Calichman tainted the reappointment

process, further supporting her retaliation claim.  Calichman was aware that he

was a subject of Chenʹs Affirmative Action complaint and actively advocated

against Chen and ultimately voted against her reappointment.    Moreover, the

other seven professors up for reappointment that year were reappointed

unanimously.  Yet Chen did not receive a single favorable vote: two members of

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the committee abstained and three voted against reappointment.  A reasonable

jury could infer an intent to punish.

Fourth, the disproportionate nature of Chenʹs punishment supports a

finding of retaliation.    See Nembhard v. Memʹl Sloan‐Kettering Cancer Ctr., 918 F.

Supp. 784 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), affʹd, 104 F.3d 353 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that harsh

punishment coupled with positive employment record supports finding of

pretext).  Chen served as a tenure‐track assistant professor from 2007 until 2010

and was reappointed twice during that time.  As recognized by Paaswell, Chen

was generally well‐regarded, her  ʺproductivity as a scholar ha[d] been

ʹcommendable,ʹʺ  and she provided valuable service to the college, including

serving on the Department Curriculum Committee, managing the Department

website, offering two independent studies courses, and grading Chinese

language placement exams.  App. at 169.  Paaswell also acknowledged that Chen

had been ʺpositively evaluatedʺ by her peers and students.  Id.  Murphy echoed

Paaswellʹs recognition of Chenʹs positive impact and even testified that he was

surprised when Chen was removed as the Director of the Asian Studies Program.  

In light of this record, a reasonable jury could surely infer a retaliatory motive

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from the failure of defendants to impose a punishment less severe than

termination.

Fifth, defendantsʹ  shifting explanations for Chenʹs termination support a

finding of retaliation.  See Zann Kwan, 737 F.3d at 849 (vacating grant of summary

judgment dismissing retaliation claims where defendants provided shifting

explanation for employeeʹs termination). Defendants now contend that they had

legitimate reasons for dismissing Chen: ʺher longstanding inability to work in a

collegial manner with other faculty members, and her inappropriate conduct

with respect to [the Student].ʺ  Appelleesʹ Br. at 17.  The district court likewise

relied on  ʺample evidence that Chenʹs reappointment had been called into

question long before she filedʺ her complaints.  Chen, 2014 WL 1285595, at *11.  

Yet, in his letter advising Chen of her dismissal, Paaswell made no reference to

collegiality problems.  Instead, Paaswellʹs letter relied only on Chenʹs handling of

the incident.  Moreover, the record contains evidence that while some colleagues

had complained about a lack of collegiality on the part of Chen, she was

improving in this respect and, even after the incident, she received  ʺtwo

colleague evaluations of  ʹVery Goodʹ  and  ʹExcellent.ʹʺ    App. at 202.    Hence,

defendants have providing shifting explanations for Chenʹs dismissal.

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* * *

In any employment case, a plaintiff must take  ʺthe bits and pieces of

available evidenceʺ  to create a  ʺmosaicʺ  of facts supporting her claim of

discrimination or retaliation.  See Gallagher v. Delaney, 139 F.3d 338, 342 (2d Cir.

1998), abrogated in part on other grounds by Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S.

742 (1988).  A reasonable jury could agree with the district courtʹs assessment of

the facts and find Chenʹs mosaic insufficient to paint a retaliation claim.  Taking

all the pieces of evidence Chen has presented together, however, and viewing

them in the light most favorable to her, a reasonably jury could also conclude

that, with her generally positive record, she would not have been fired but‐for

her complaints about the incident.  Accordingly, I would remand Chenʹs Title VII

retaliation claims for resolution by a jury.

II

I would also remand the case for the district court to properly address

Chenʹs NYCHRL claims.  While the district court stated that the standard under

New York City law is different from the standard under Title VII, it did not

engage in a separate and independent analysis.  I thus cannot conclude that the

district court properly applied the NYCHRL.    See Velazco v. Columbus Citizens

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Found., 778 F.3d 409, 411 (2d Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (vacating district courtʹs

grant of summary judgment dismissing plaintiffʹs NYCHRL claims for failing to

explain ʺwith sufficient clarityʺ its reasons for dismissing the NYCHRL claims).   

Claims under the NYCHRL must be analyzed  ʺmore liberallyʺ than Title

VII discrimination and retaliation claims.  See Loeffler v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp.,

582 F.3d 268, 278 (2d Cir. 2009); Bermudez v. City of New York, 783 F. Supp. 2d 560,

592 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).  Following the amendments to the NYCHRL in 2005, ʺcourts

must analyze NYCHRL claims separately and independently from any federal

and state law claimsʺ so ʺeven if the challenged conduct is not actionable under

federal and state law, federal courts must consider separately whether it is

actionable under the broader New York City standards.ʺ    Mihalik v. Credit

Agricole Cheuvreux N. Am., Inc., 715 F.3d 102, 109 (2d Cir. 2013).    Under the

NYCHRL, a plaintiff need only prove ʺby a preponderance of the evidence that

she has been treated less well than other employees because of her gender [or

other protected characteristic].    At the summary judgment stage, judgment

should normally be denied to a defendant if there exist triable issues of fact as to

whether such conduct occurred.ʺ  Williams v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 872 N.Y.S.2d 27,

39 (1st Depʹt 2009).

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The district court here dismissed Chenʹs NYCHRL claims without

referencing any of the relevant facts.    For Chenʹs discrimination claims, the

district court held:  ʺFor the reasons described above [referencing the Title VII

discussion], Chen has failed to put forth sufficient evidence to create a genuine

issue of fact that discrimination played any role in Defendantsʹ actions.ʺ  Chen,

2014 WL 1285595, at *10.  Similarly, for her retaliation claims, the district court

held:  ʺChenʹs alleged evidence of retaliation is insufficient to raise an issue of

fact.ʺ  Id. at *12.  The court failed to elaborate on these findings.   

In my view, a reasonable jury could find, under the NYCHRLʹs more

lenient standard, that Chen suffered both discrimination and retaliation.  

Defendantsʹ  disagreement with Chen about the nature of the incident and

Lesenʹs subsequent instructions, the temporal correlation between Chenʹs

complaints and termination, Chenʹs pattern of positive evaluations until the

incident, the tainted reappointment process, the disproportionate nature of

Chenʹs punishment, and defendantsʹ  shifting explanations surrounding her

termination all support her NYCHRL claims, and I would remand for the district

court to analyze these claims under the proper standard.

* * *

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For the reasons set forth above, I dissent from the majorityʹs disposition

with respect to Chenʹs Title VII retaliation claims and NYCHRL claims, and

would instead vacate the judgment of the district court and remand the case for

further adjudication.   

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