Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-00672/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-00672-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TASH HEPTING, et al,

Plaintiffs,

v

AT&T CORPORATION, et al,

Defendants. /

No C-06-672 VRW

ORDER

As in any case, the court has reviewed this matter for

possible recusal. In this case, because of the circumstances and

reasons discussed below, the court’s review has been more extensive

than in the usual instance. Based on this review, the court

concludes that recusal is not necessary here, but wishes to apprise

the parties of the court’s analysis.

The undersigned informs the parties that for many years

he was a residential subscriber to AT&T long-distance and PT&T/SBC

local telephone services. As such, he apparently is encompassed by

the proposed class, which is broadly defined as “[a]ll individuals

in the United States that are current residential subscribers or

customers of Defendants’ telephone services or Internet services,

or that were residential telephone or Internet subscribers or

customers at any time after September 2001.” Doc #8, ¶ 65.

Case 3:06-cv-00672-VRW Document 59 Filed 04/14/06 Page 1 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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The undersigned discontinued telephone service from

AT&T/SBC, thereby eliminating any possible interest in the

declaratory and injunctive relief sought by plaintiffs. The

undersigned also is prepared to opt out of any class that is

certified in this case and disclaim interest in any monetary or

other award that might be recovered in this case.

In determining whether recusal is appropriate under these

circumstances, the court focuses on certain potentially relevant

provisions of 28 USC § 455. In particular, the undersigned

examines whether: (1) he is “a party to the proceeding,” §

455(b)(5)(i); (2) he has a “financial interest in the subject

matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other

interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the

proceeding,” § 455(b)(4); or (3) “his impartiality might reasonably

be questioned” in this proceeding, § 455(a).

First, it appears that a putative class member is not a

party within the meaning of § 455(b)(5)(i). See In Re Initial

Public Offering Sec Litigation, 174 F Supp 2d 70, 93 (SDNY 2001),

aff’d on recusal sub nom, In Re Certain Underwriter Defendants, 294

F3d 297 (2d Cir 2002). On this point, accord Tramonte v Chrysler

Co, 136 F3d 1025, 1030 (5th Cir 1998) (“[M]embers of a putative

class are not ‘parties’ to a class action * * *.”) (citing New

Orleans Public Service, Inc v United Gas Pipe Line Co, 719 F2d 733,

735 (5th Cir 1983) (reporting opinion of the Advisory Committee on

Codes of Conduct of the Judicial Conference of the United States)). 

But see Gordon v Reliant Energy, Inc, 141 F Supp 2d 1041, 1043 (SD

Cal 2001). Hence, recusal under this provision would be

inappropriate. Moreover, this issue is moot because the

Case 3:06-cv-00672-VRW Document 59 Filed 04/14/06 Page 2 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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undersigned has waived his status as a potential class member and

discontinued service with AT&T. In Re Certain Underwriter

Defendants, 294 F3d at 305 (“Congress did not consider judges with

minor interests in a class action to be parties to a proceeding

once they have divested themselves of said financial interest.”).

Second, it appears that whatever interest, if any, that

the undersigned previously had in this case is highly speculative

and is insufficient to constitute a “financial interest” within the

meaning of § 455. See In re Virginia Electric & Power Co, 539 F2d

357, 366-67 (4th Cir 1976); id at 366 (finding that a judge “did

not ‘own’ a legal or equitable interest in the subject matter of

the controversy” because his only interest was “the remote

contingent possibility that he may in futuro share in any refund

that might be ordered for all [utility] customers * * *.”); In re

New Mexico Natural Gas Antitrust Litigation, 620 F2d 794, 795-96

(10th Cir 1980) (finding no financial interest in a case in which a

judge had “opt[ed] out as a class member to avoid receipt of any

potential refund”); Christiansen v Natl Savings and Trust Co, 683

F2d 520, 526 (DC Cir 1982). But see Tramonte, 136 F3d at 1030. At

most, the undersigned’s previous interest as a former putative

class member was some “other interest” that was not substantial

enough to require recusal. See In re New Mexico, 620 F2d at 796

(finding that “a remote, contingent benefit, such as a possible

beneficial effect on future utility bills, is not a ‘financial

interest’” but an “other interest” that was “too insubstantial to

require recusal”). Compare Aetna Life Insurance Co v Lavoie, 475

US 813, 826-27 (1986) (noting that state supreme court justices’

interest as members of an uncertified class seeking pecuniary

Case 3:06-cv-00672-VRW Document 59 Filed 04/14/06 Page 3 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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relief was “clearly highly speculative and contingent” and that

“there is no basis for concluding these justices were disqualified

under the Due Process Clause”).

Moreover, even if the undersigned previously had a

financial or other substantial interest in this case, by opting out

of the class and discontinuing service with AT&T, the undersigned

has eliminated any need for recusal here. In Union Carbide Corp v

US Cutting Serv, 782 F2d 710 (7th Cir 1986), Judge Posner stated

that when a judge “divested himself of [a financial] interest [in a

party] as soon as he discovered it[,] and made no rulings between

the date of discovery and the date of divestment,” the “statutory

purpose [of § 455] would not be served by forcing [the judge] to

recuse [himself].” Id at 714. Similarly, the undersigned has

divested any potential interest of which he is aware in this case

prior to making any rulings. “[T]he legislative history [of § 455]

contains no indication that Congress would have wanted a judge to

recuse himself in such a case.” Id. Also compare Tramonte, 136

F3d at 1030 (suggesting that passage in 1988 of 28 USC § 455(f)

limited circumstances in which divestment obviated the need for

recusal to cases in which “substantial judicial time had been

devoted to the matter”) with In Re Initial Public Offering, 174 F

Supp 2d at 87 (finding that “nothing in subsection (f) affected the

ability of a court to take steps prospectively to eliminate a

potential conflict” and that § “455(f) simply added one more safety

valve”) and id at 86-90.

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Case 3:06-cv-00672-VRW Document 59 Filed 04/14/06 Page 4 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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For these same reasons, the undersigned finds that the

facts here do not raise an appearance of partiality requiring

recusal under 28 USC § 455(a). See, e g, In re Certain Underwriter

Defendants, 294 F3d at 306. Having no interest in this matter of

which he is aware, the undersigned “concludes that he can fairly

sit and that it makes judicial sense that he continue in the trial

of the case * * *.” In re Virginia Electric, 539 F2d at 369.

The undersigned also notes that recusal seems especially

inappropriate here given the broad swath cut by the proposed class. 

Although the undersigned has not canvassed the other judges in this

district, given the ubiquity of AT&T telephone services, it seems

highly unlikely that there would be any judge who is not a class

member or has a family member encompassed by the proposed class,

thereby implicating 28 USC § 455. Accordingly, if the undersigned

were to recuse himself, every other judge in the district might

very well follow suit for similar reasons. This “would cause great

inconvenience to the counsel, parties, or judge, particularly if

the litigation takes several years to complete.” See In re New

Mexico, 620 F2d at 797. See also United States v Will, 449 US 200,

213, 217 (1980) (noting the continued vitality of “the time-honored

Rule of Necessity,” which may require a judge to decide a case in

which he has a personal interest if the case cannot be heard

otherwise). The undersigned believes it would be imprudent and

impractical to recuse himself and therefore potentially set this

litigation on such a course.

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Case 3:06-cv-00672-VRW Document 59 Filed 04/14/06 Page 5 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Although the court has reached the conclusion that

recusal is not necessary here, the court has reached this

conclusion without the benefit of guidance from the parties. 

Accordingly, the court invites the parties to submit on or before

April 21, 2006, briefs no longer than 10 pages in length that

address the matters stated above.

If, following such guidance, the court believes that

recusal is not appropriate, the court will address the various

motions that the parties have filed thus far.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

Case 3:06-cv-00672-VRW Document 59 Filed 04/14/06 Page 6 of 6