Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-01177/USCOURTS-ca10-88-01177-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

JAMES EDWARD CLARK, 

Plaintiff-Apppellant, 

SEP 21 1990 

ROBERT L. .f-IOECKER 

Clerk 

v. 

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No. 88-1177 

ROBERT POULTON, UTAH STATE 

CORRECTIONS DEPARTMENT, 

DAVID JORGENSON, SALT LAKE 

COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, and 

JOHN DOES I through X, 

Defendant-Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Utah 

(D.C. No. 86-C-0396W) 

Janice M. Church, Holme Roberts & Owen (Jeffrey A. Chase with her 

on the brief), Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for 

Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Jerry G. Campbell, Deputy County Attorney (David E. Yocom, Salt 

Lake County Attorney, with him on the brief), Salt Lake City, 

Utah, for Salt Lake County Defendant-Appellees. 

Brent A. Burnett, Assistant Attorney General (R. Paul Van Dam, 

Attorney General, David L. Wilkinson, Attorney General, Stephen J. 

Sorenson, Asst. Attorney General, and William F. Bannon, Asst. 

Attorney General with him on the brief), Salt Lake City, Utah, for 

Defendant-Appellees Robert Poulton and Utah State Corrections 

Department. 

Before HOLLOWAY, SEYMOUR, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. 

SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 88-1177 Document: 01019846017 Date Filed: 09/21/1990 Page: 1 
James E. Clark brought this suit under 42 u.s.c. § 1983 

(1982) against the Adult Parole Division of the Utah State 

Corrections Department, parole officer Robert Poulton, the Salt 

Lake County jail, and David Jorgenson, a transportation officer 

employed at the jail. Clark alleged that his constitutional 

rights were violated by two separate incidents of excessive force, 

and by the denial of medical treatment and of reasonable access to 

the mails during his pretrial detention in the jail. The district 

court referred the case to a magistrate pursuant to 28 u.s.c. § 

636(b)(l)(B)(l988). The magistrate held an evidentiary hearing 

and submitted a report recommending that Clark's claims be 

dismissed. The district court adopted this report and entered 

judgment accordingly. Clark appeals, asserting that the 

magistrate had no jurisdiction because the referral was not 

authorized by statute, that in any event the district court failed 

to conduct a proper de novo review of the portion of the report to 

which Clark had objected, and that the magistrate erred in his 

application of the law. We conclude that the magistrate was 

without jurisdiction, and we therefore reverse. 

I , 

BACKGROUND 

The relevant facts are briefly as follows. While on parole 

following state court convictions, Clark returned to Salt Lake 

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City after an out-of-state visit approved by his parole officer, 

Poulton, and learned that the police were looking for him in 

connection with two armed robberies. The day after Clark 

returned, he reported to Poulton at the Salt Lake County Parole 

office. Poulton arrested him on suspicion of the armed robberies, 

handcuffed him, and took him down the hall to be booked. When 

Clark objected during the booking to being photographed without an 

attorney, Poulton allegedly pushed Clark against the wall and 

lifted his handcuffed arms over his head, aggravating a previous 

back injury. Following his transportation to the jail, Clark 

purportedly did not receive requested medical treatment for his 

back for several weeks. 

While detained in the jail, Clark and several other inmates 

were transported to court by Jorgenson. On leaving the courtroom, 

Clark asked to use the restroom and Jorgenson told him he would 

have to wait. Because of previous surgery, waiting was difficult 

and uncomfortable for Clark and he later doubled over in the 

courthouse elevator. Jorgenson allegedly grabbed Clark's neck and 

chest and pushed him into the elevator wall, again aggravating his 

back injury. Clark required physical therapy for a year after his 

release from jail and sought recovery of these medical expenses as 

part of his damages. 1 

1 Clark spent nine months in the jail pending disposition of 

the charges against him, one of which was dismissed after his 

acquittal on the other. During his incarceration, his truck was 

repossessed, and he could not attend school for which he had 

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Clark's original complaint was filed May 12, 1986. On May 

14, the district court entered an order of reference which stated: 

"IT IS ORDERED that as authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(l)(B) and the rules of this court the above 

entitled case is referred to the magistrate. He is 

directed to manage the case, to receive all motions 

filed, hear oral arguments hereon, to conduct 

evidentiary hearings when proper and make proposed 

findings of fact, and to submit to the undersigned judge 

a report and recommendation for the proper resolution of 

dispositive matters presented." 

Rec., vol. I, doc. 2. Pursuant to the order, the magistrate 

thereafter determined that Clark could proceed in forma pauperis, 

appointed him counsel, held scheduling and pretrial conferences, 

conducted an evidentiary hearing (described in the relevant 

documents as a trial), and issued a report recommending that 

Clark's claims be dismissed. Clark objected to the report, which 

the district court summarily adopted in all respects. 

II. 

REFERENCE TO A MAGISTRATE 

We begin our analysis of this issue by examining the 

jurisdiction and powers of a federal magistrate set out in 28 

already paid tuition. Because of this loss of student status, he 

also lost the deferral of his student loan repayment. In addition 

to his medical expenses, Clark sought recovery for these losses, 

as well as injunctive relief relating to his parole and to the 

jail's magazine subscription policy. We express no opinion on the 

relief Clark seeks. 

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U.S.C. § 636 (1988). Under section 636(b)(l)(A), a judge may· 

designate a magistrate to hear and determine all pretrial matters 

except for those dispositive motions specifically listed therein. 2 

The district court reviews a section 636(b)(l)(A) determination 

under the same standard that an appeals court applies to a 

district court determination, ascertaining whether the "order is 

clearly erroneous or contrary to law." Id. 

Under section 636(b)(l)(B), the provision which the district 

court invoked in this case, a magistrate may be designated to 

conduct evidentiary hearings and submit reports and 

recommendations in three types of proceedings: 1) hearings on 

those dispositive motions excepted in section 636(b)(l)(A); 2) 

applications by criminal defendants for posttrial relief; and 3) 

prisoner petitions challenging conditions of confinement. 3 Upon 

2 Section 636(b)(l)(A) provides: 

"[A] judge may designate a magistrate to hear and 

determine any pretrial matter pending before the court, 

except a motion for injunctive relief, for judgment on 

the pleadings, for summary judgment, to dismiss or quash 

an indictment or information made by the defendant, to 

suppress evidence in a criminal case, to dismiss or to 

permit maintenance of a class action, to dismiss for 

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted, and to involuntarily dismiss an action." 

28 U.S.C, § 636(b)(l)(A). 

3 Section 636(b)(l)(B) provides: 

"[A] judge may also designate a magistrate to conduct 

hearings, including evidentiary hearings, and to submit 

to a judge of the court proposed findings of fact and 

recommendations for the disposition, by a judge of the 

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the objection by a party to the magistrate's proposed findings and 

recommendations under this section, the district court is required 

to make a de novo determination. Id, 

Section 636(b)(2) allows a judge to appoint a magistrate to 

serve as a special master, either pursuant to the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure or, upon consent of the parties, without regard to 

Rule 53(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 

636(b)(3) provides that "[a] magistrate may be assigned such 

additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution 

and laws of the United States." 28 u.s.c. § 636(b)(3). 

Finally, section 636(c)(l) provides that a magistrate "[u]pon 

consent of the parties ... may conduct any or all proceedings in 

a jury or nonjury civil matter and order the entry of judgment in 

the case, when specially designated to exercise such jurisdiction 

by the district court or courts he serves," 28 U.S.C, § 636(c)(l) 

(emphasis added). Section 636(c)(2) sets out specific 

requirements regarding such consent: 

"If a magistrate is designated to exercise civil 

jurisdiction under paragraph (1) of this subsection, the 

clerk of court shall, at the time the action is filed, 

notify the parties of their right to consent to the 

exercise of such jurisdiction. The decision of the 

court, of any motion excepted in subparagraph (A), of 

applications for posttrial relief made by individuals 

convicted of criminal offenses and of prisoner petitions 

challenging conditions of confinement," 

28 U,S,C, § 636(b) (1) (B), 

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parties shall be conununicated to the clerk of court. 

Thereafter, neither the district judge nor the 

magistrate shall attempt to persuade or induce any party 

to consent to reference of any civil matter to a 

magistrate. Rules of court for the reference of civil 

matters to magistrates shall include procedures to 

protect the voluntariness of the parties' consent." 

28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(2) (emphasis added). A judgment entered 

pursuant to Section 636(c)(l) may be appealed either to the court 

of appeals or to the district court, in the same manner as a 

4 district court judgment would be appealed to a court of appeals. 

A. Authorization 

As we have noted, the district court here stated that the 

order of reference was made under section 636(b)(l)(B), which 

applies to hearings on certain dispositive motions, applications 

for post-conviction relief, and prisoner petitions challenging 

conditions of confinement. Since no dispositive motion was filed 

below, and since Clark was not seeking post-conviction relief, the 

only arguably applicable provision is the one allowing reference 

of prisoner challenges to conditions of confinement. 

Conditions of confinement have been described as "ongoing 

prison practices and regulations with regard to matters such as 

4 In addition to the provisions discussed above, section 

636(a)(3) grants magistrates the power to conduct trials under 18 

u.s.c. § 3401 (1988), Section 3401 gives a magistrate 

jurisdiction to try and sentence defendants accused of 

misdemeanors upon special designation by the district court and 

the written consent of the defendant. 

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placement in maximum security, deadlocks, unhealthy living 

conditions, unnecessary exposure to violence-prone inmates, 

overcrowded physical environments, and cruel or unusual punishment 

by prison authorities." Hill v. Jenkins, 603 F.2d, 1256, 1260 

(7th Cir. 1979) (Swygert, J., concurring). Such ongoing practices 

do not include "a single incident that occurred in the prison." 

Id. (concurring on ground that loss of property from prison 

shakedown not condition of confinement). The above definition has 

been generally accepted by those courts addressing the issue. 

See,~, Houghton v. Osborne, 834 F.2d 745, 749 (9th Cir. 1987); 

Hall v. Sharpe, 812 F.2d 644, 647 n.1 (11th Cir. 1987); Wimmer v. 

Cook, 774 F.2d 68, 74 n.9 (4th Cir. 1985); Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 

F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982); but see McCarthy v. Brown, 906 F.2d 

835, 839 (2d Cir. 1990). This definition, which we likewise 

adopt, does not encompass the two instances of the use of 

excessive force alleged by Clark. Those incidents, one of which 

occurred before Clark was even admitted to the jail, are clearly 

isolated events rather than part of a series of ongoing jail 

practices. Accordingly, the reference to the magistrate of the 

claims is not authorized by section 636(b)(l)(B). 

The dissent's characterization of our construction of 

"conditions of confinement" as unsupported by reason or authority 

is simply wrong. As the dissent recognizes, only two circuits 

have reached decisions contrary to the construction we adopt in 

this opinion, and only one of those circuits has explicitly 

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disagreed with it. See McCarthy, 906 F.2d at 839. The court· in 

McCarthy relied on Branch v. Martin, 886 F.2d 1043 (8th Cir. 

1989), in which the court noted in passing that "[t]he term 

'conditions of confinement' has been interpreted expansively to 

include almost any prisoner§ 1983 action challenging 'the type of 

confinement, and matters concerning health, safety, or 

punishment.'" 886 F.2d at 1045 n.1 (quoting Houghton v. Osborne, 

834 F.2d 745, 749-50 (9th Cir. 1987), and citing additional 

cases). However, the cases cited in Branch do not support 

McCarthy's holding because they involve claims falling within our 

construction of the statute, with the exception of Archie v. 

Christian, 808 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1987), which does not describe 

the challenged conduct, and Cay v. Estelle, 789 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 

1986), which does not address the condition-of-confinement issue. 

Moreover, our construction is grounded, as it must be, on the 

plain and commonly understood meaning of the word "condition." 

See Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979) ("A 

fundamental canon of construction is that, unless otherwise 

defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, 

contemporary, common meaning."). "Condition" is defined as 

"existing state of affairs," and "a mode or state of being." 

Webster's Third New International Dictionary 473 (1981). The word 

thus clearly connotes an ongoing situation as opposed to an 

isolated incident. The court in McCarthy and the dissent here 

improperly defend their refusal to give effect to this plain 

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meaning as justified by Congressional policy. The law, however, 

is to the contrary. "[I]t should be generally assumed that 

Congress expresses its purposes through the ordinary meaning of 

the words it uses." Escondido Mut. Water Co. v. La Jolla Band of 

Mission Indians, 466 U.S. 765, 772 (1984). 

Finally, we note that one of Clark's excessive force claims 

arises from an alleged incident occurring before he was jailed and 

involving his probation officer. This claim indisputably does not 

challenge a condition of confinement even under the dissent's 

broad construction of that term. 

Nor is the reference authorized under section 636(b)(3), 

which permits assignment to the magistrate of additional duties 

not inconsistent with the Constitution and federal law. This 

conclusion is compelled by the Supreme Court's analysis in Gomez 

v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2237 (1989), in which the Court 

considered the scope of section 636(b)(3), In Gomez, a magistrate 

had empaneled a jury in a felony trial over the objection of the 

defendants. In reversing the defendants' convictions, the Supreme 

Court concluded that the additional-duties clause, when considered 

in the context of the overall statutory scheme, does not encompass 

the seating of a jury in a felony trial. 

In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied upon two 

established canons of statutory construction which apply with 

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equal force in the instant case. First, the Court followed its 

"settled policy to avoid an interpretation of a federal statute 

that engenders constitutional issues if a reasonable alternative 

interpretation poses no constitutional question." Id. at 2241. 

The Court thus obviated the need to consider the constitutionality 

of assigning felony jury selection to a magistrate under section 

636(b)(3) by determining that section 636(b)(3) itself did not 

authorize such an assignment. In so doing, the Court applied a 

second principle, stating that in interpreting a statute a court 

must not be "'guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, 

but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and 

policy.'" Id. (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 

41, 51 (1987)). The Court then reviewed the Act as a whole in 

light of its evolution and legislative history and concluded that 

while a literal reading of section 636(b)(3) in isolation would 

encompass the assignment of the duties at issue, "the carefully 

defined grant of authority to conduct trials of civil matters and 

of minor criminal cases should be construed as an implicit 

withholding of the authority to preside at a felony trial." Id. 

at 2245. 

Applying these principles to the instant facts, we hold that 

section 636(b)(3) does not authorize a district court to designate 

a magistrate to conduct a hearing on a prisoner's petition that 

does not challenge a condition of confinement. Gomez precludes 

both construing section 636(b)(3) in isolation, and upholding the 

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assignment of additional duties on constitutional grounds without 

first ascertaining whether the assignment is authorized by the 

statute when considered as a whole. Here, section 636(b)(l)(B) 

carefully limits a magistrate's authority to conduct hearings on 

prisoner petitions, extending that authority only to petitions 

challenging conditions of confinement. Under Gomez, this 

articulation of specific duties must be construed as implicitly 

withholding other duties not so specified, particularly when, as 

here, the contrary construction would in effect render the 

specific limitations a nullity. 5 See Mountain States Tel. & Tel. 

Co. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472 U.S. 237, 249 (1985) ("elementary 

canon of construction that a statute should be interpreted so as 

not to render one part inoperative"). 

Defendants argue on appeal that the reference can be upheld 

under section 636(c). We disagree. While section 636(c) permits 

a magistrate to conduct a trial in a civil matter, neither the 

district court nor the magistrate here purported to act pursuant 

to that provision. Moreover, magistrate jurisdiction to proceed 

5 The dissent cites Marvel v. United States, 719 F.2d 1507 

(10th Cir. 1983), for the proposition that ''the majority's 

construction of the statute does not avoid deciding a 

constitutional issue, for this court has already held that Article 

III allows a magistrate to preside over a civil matter so long as 

the district court reviews the matter de novo." Dissent at 4 n.2. 

Marvel is totally inapposite inasmuch as the parties there 

consented to trial before the magistrate. See 719 F.2d at 1512 

("[W]e hold there is ample statutory authority under 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(2) to refer a civil case to a federal magistrate for trial 

on the merits, provided the parties consent to such a procedure.") 

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under section 636(c) requires a special designation by the 

district court, id.§ 636(c)(l), and the consent of the parties 

communicated to the clerk of court, id,§ 636(c)(2), neither of 

which is present here. 6 In finding the prerequisites for 

magistrate jurisdiction under section 636(c) lacking here, we join 

the great weight of authority and hold that consent under section 

636(c)(2) must be explicit and cannot be inferred from the conduct 

of the parties. See Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. American 

Principals Holdings (In re San Vicente Medical Partners Ltd.), 865 

F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1989); Silberstein v. Silberstein, 859 F.2d 40 

(7th Cir. 1988); Hall v. Sharpe, 812 F.2d at 647; Wimmer, 774 F.2d 

at 76; Ambrose v. Welch, 729 F.2d 1084 (6th Cir. 1984); but see 

Archie v. Christian, 808 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1987)(en bane). 

B. Jurisdiction 

Given our conclusion that the reference was unauthorized, we 

must consider the significance, if any, of Clark's failure to 

object to proceeding before the magistrate. The majority of 

circuits that considered the issue prior to the Gomez decision 

6 Section 636(c)(2) also states that "[r]ules of court for the 

reference of civil matters to magistrates shall include procedures 

to protect the voluntariness of the parties' consent." Our 

examination of the Civil Rules of Practice of the United States 

District Court for the District of Utah reveals no provision for 

the reference of civil trials to a magistrate. To the contrary, 

magistrates do not generally even conduct final pre-trial 

conferences, see Rule 9(d), and are specifically precluded from 

entering any order dispositive of a substantive issue in the case, 

see Rule 9(i). 

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concluded that an improper reference is a matter of jurisdiction 

and therefore not subject to waiver or harmless-error analysis. 

For example, in Houghton v. Osborne, 834 F.2d 745, the Ninth 

Circuit considered facts closely analogous to those before us. 

h 

There the district court had referred a prisoner's civil rights 

action to a magistrate, who held an evidentiary hearing on the 

merits of the claim and filed proposed findings and 

recommendations that were adopted by the district court. On 

appeal, the court held sua sponte that the prisoner's claim did 

not challenge a condition of confinement, and that the district 

court therefore "lacked the jurisdiction to refer this matter to 

the magistrate to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the merits of 

Houghton's 1983 action." Id. at 750. Similarly, in Hall the 

district court purported to refer a prisoner's civil rights suit 

to a magistrate under sections 636(b)(l) and (b)(3) for a trial 

before an advisory jury. The magistrate issued a report 

recommending acceptance of the jury verdict, which the district 

court adopted in entering final judgment against the plaintiff. 

On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that "the district 

court's referral of this case was not authorized by any provision 

of the Magistrate's Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636, and thus the magistrate 

was without jurisdiction to conduct the trial.'' 812 F.2d at 646; 

see also Lovelace v. Dall, 820 F.2d 223 (7th Cir. 1987)(per 

curiam) (unambiguous consent of parties required for magistrate to 

have jurisdiction to enter final judgment under section 636(c)); 

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Frank v. Arnold (In re Morrissey), 717 F.2d 100 (3d Cir. 1983) 

(magistrate had no jurisdiction to hear appeal from bankruptcy 

court order notwithstanding parties' express consent); Taylor v. 

Oxford, 575 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1978) (magistrate had no 

jurisdiction over motion to dismiss for failure to state claim 

referred under section 636(b)(3) for final disposition pursuant to 

parties' stipulation and local rule); but see Archie v. 

Christian, 808 F.2d 1132, at 1134-35 (5th Cir. 1987)(en bane) 

(improper reference under sections 636(b)(l)(B) and (b)(3) matter 

of procedure rather than jurisdiction). 7 

In Gomez, the defendants had objected to the assignment to 

the magistrate, but they made no special claim of prejudice on 

appeal and the government therefore contended that the error was 

harmless. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, stating that 

"harmless-error analysis does not apply in a felony case in which, 

despite the defendant's objection and without any meaningful 

review by a district judge, an officer exceeds his jurisdiction by 

selecting a jury." 109 s. Ct. at 2248 (emphasis added). 

7 The dissent asserts that our reliance on Houghton, Lovelace, 

and In re Morrissey is questionable because those cases do not 

specifically address the failure to object to an unauthorized 

reference. The short answer to the dissent's objection is that a 

determination that the issue is jurisdictional simply obviates the 

need to address a failure to object. Lack of subject-matter 

jurisdiction renders lack of objection irrelevant. See,~, 15 

C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure§ 

3801 at 7 (2d ed. 1986) (subject matter jurisdiction cannot be 

waived by the parties). 

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Notwithstanding this language, courts subsequent to Gomez 

have varied in their assessment of the relevance of that opinion 

to cases in which the defendant did not object to the magistrate's 

unauthorized acts. In United States v. Mang Sun Wong, 884 F.2d 

1537, 1544-46 (2d Cir. 1989) (order on petition for rehearing), 

cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1140 (1990), a majority of the panel 

distinguished Gomez, read it narrowly, and held without analyzing 

the jurisdictional issue that Gomez does not require reversal when 

the defendant consented to the magistrate's improper exercise of 

power. Judge Altimari dissented, concluding that the issue is one 

of jurisdiction, and that consent is therefore irrelevant because 

it "cannot enlarge those powers of office not granted by the 

Federal Magistrates Act." Id. at 1546. See also United States v. 

Mussacchia, 900 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1990)(following Mang Sun Wong, 

one judge dissenting}, 

In United States v. France, 886 F.2d 223 (9th Cir. 1989), 

cert. granted, 110 s. Ct. 1921 (1990), however, the court held 

Gomez applicable to all cases pending on direct appeal, including 

those in which the defendant did not object to the magistrate's 

jury selection. The court did not address the jurisdictional 

issue, grounding its decision intead on its conclusion that Gomez 

announced a new rule appropriate for retroactive application, and 

that under Ninth Circuit precedent France had not waived his 

entitlement to the rule by failing to object at trial. The court 

did emphasize several times the Supreme Court's references in 

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Gomez to the magistrate's lack of "jurisdiction" and "power."· Id. 

at 226 & n.1. 

In United States v. Wey, 895 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1990), the 

Seventh Circuit held that subject matter jurisdiction is not 

involved and that the unauthorized exercise of power was therefore 

subject to waiver. The case is thus contrary to the Seventh 

Circuit's decisions in Lovelace, 820 F.2d at 225-26 & n.3, and 

Taylor, 575 F.2d at 154, in which the court held that the 

magistrate's power under the Act is a matter of jurisdiction and 

that the parties cannot confer jurisdiction which the magistrate 

does not possess by failing to object, The court in Wey relied in 

part on the First Circuit decision in United States v. Lopez-Pena, 

890 F.2d 490 (1st Cir. 1989), which was withdrawn upon the grant 

of rehearing en bane. 

In its subsequent en bane opinion, the First Circuit 

emphasized the jurisdictional language in Gomez, and then agreed 

with France, 886 F.2d 223, that Gomez must be applied where the 

magistrate was permitted to empanel the jury, notwithstanding the 

failure to object. See United States v. Martinez-Torres, __ F.2d 

__ , Nos, 87-2006, 87-2007, 87-2008 (1st Cir. Aug. 20, 1990), In 

so doing, the First Circuit expressly disapproved of the opinions 

in Wey and Mang Sun Wong, and criticized the discussion of consent 

in Virgin Islands v. Williams, 892 F.2d 305, 309-12 (3d Cir. 

1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2211 (1990). 

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We also disagree with the analysis in Williams. There, the 

court appeared to hold that the issue of the magistrate's power is 

a jurisdictional matter but nonetheless is subject to waiver. In 

so doing, the court construed section 636(b)(3) in isolation in 

direct contradiction to the analysis in Gomez, held that the 

section authorizes the very reference Gomez specifically held to 

be unauthorized, and then decided the constitutional issue Gomez 

deliberately avoided. The concurrence in Williams concluded that, 

although the magistrate's power raises an issue of jurisdiction, 

Gomez does not preclude plain error analysis, and the magistrate's 

unauthorized exercise of power was not plain error. 

In our view, the Supreme Court's language and analysis in 

Gomez, and the language of the Act itself, compel the conclusion 

that a magistrate's power under the Act is a jurisdictional issue 

not subject to waiver. The Act speaks in terms of a magistrate's 

exercise of jurisdiction, see 28 u.s.c. §§ 636(c)(l) and (2), and 

Gomez repeatedly refers to a magistrate's jurisdiction. In Parts 

III and IV of Gomez, the Court traced the evolution of the powers 

of federal magistrates and reviewed the current authority 

conferred by the Federal Magistrates Act of 1979. See 109 S, Ct. 

at 2242-47, That discussion is couched in terms of Congressional 

grants of and limitations upon jurisdiction. 

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The court in Wey discounted the obvious impact of the use of 

the term "jurisdiction" by Congress and the Supreme Court. 

Instead, the court adopted a plain error rule, observing that 

although the magistrate's conduct at issue was unauthorized, the 

district court had subject matter jurisdiction under the relevant 

jurisdictional statutes. This result ignores the fact that while 

the limitations in the Magistrate Act do restrict a magistrate's 

authority to act in a case properly before the district court, the 

Act also restricts the district court's power to refer a matter to 

a magistrate. Congressionally imposed limits on the exercise of 

judicial power other than the delineation of subject matter 

jurisdiction are nonetheless jurisdictional. See Lau£ v. E.G. 

Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323, 330 (1938); 13 c. Wright, A. Miller & 

E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure§ 3526 at 227-28 (2d ed. 

1984). 

"[T]he jurisdiction of a magistrate to decide a case is 

not based solely on the consent of the parties, but 

derives from a proper designation by the district court. 

Because district court jurisdiction is statutory, its 

ability to make a proper designation of, and thereby to 

confer jurisdiction on, a magistrate is also a creature 

of statute," 

In re Morrissey, 717 F.2d at 102. 

We simply cannot accept an analysis under which parties by 

their conduct may extend the jurisdiction of both the magistrate 

and the district court beyond that established by Congress. We 

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therefore hold that the magistrate in this case was without 

jurisdiction to hear the excessive force claims. 8 

III. 

Accordingly, we vacate the judgment dismissing Clark's claims 

and remand to the district court for further proceeding consistent 

"th th" . ' 9 wi is opinion, 

8 We recognize that two of Clark's claims, his allegations of 

denial of medical treatment while in the jail and his challenge to 

the jail magazine policy, do challenge conditions of confinement. 

However, those claims were consolidated by agreement of the 

parties with Clark's excessive force claims. Given our conclusion 

that the parties may not consent to the magistrate's exercise of a 

power withheld by Congress, the parties' consent here to 

consolidation cannot vest the magistrate with jurisdiction over 

claims not referable to him, 

9 We note Clark's argument that the district court did not make 

the required de novo review of those portions of the magistrate's 

report to which Clark objected. In view of our conclusion that 

this case must be remanded in any event, we need not address this 

argument other than to observe that our opinion in Gee v. Estes, 

829 F,2d 1005, 1008-09 (10th Cir. 1987), is available for the 

guidance of the court on this issue on remand. 

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88-1177, Clark v. Poulton 

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 

I respectfully dissent. The referral of this case to the 

magistrate was authorized by the statute. Furthermore, Clark 

waived his right to challenge the magistrate's authority by failing to object below. The judgment should be affirmed. 

I. 

A. 

The referral was authorized by the provision in 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(l)(B) for "prisoner petitions challenging conditions of 

confinement." The majority errs by adopting the narrow formulation of Judge Swygert's concurrence in Hill v. Jenkins, 603 F.2d 

1256, 1259-60 (7th Cir. 1979), which is not supported by reason or 

authority. 1 This court should follow the two circuits which have 

interpreted section 636(b)(l)(B) to authorize the referral to a 

magistrate of prisoner suits complaining of specific incidents. 

See McCarthy v. Bronson, 906 F.2d 835, 839 (2d Cir. 1990); 

1 Judge Swygert's concurrence cites no authority for his narrow 

construction of the statute, and the cases adopting his construction cite no authority other than the concurrence and the other 

cases adopting it. 

In addition, it is not clear that the Eleventh Circuit agrees 

with Judge Swygert. Hall v. Sharpe, 812 F.2d 644, 647 n.l (11th 

Cir. 1987), involved a complaint alleging a single incident, but 

the judgment below was reversed not because the incident was not a 

condition of confinement, but because section 636(b)(l)(B) does 

not authorize magistrates to preside over jury trials. Because 

the citation in Hall to Hill is dictum, "only two circuits," supra 

at __ , clearly interpret "conditions of confinement" to exclude 

single incidents. 

Appellate Case: 88-1177 Document: 01019846017 Date Filed: 09/21/1990 Page: 21 
Thompson v. Nix, 897 F.2d 356, 357 (8th Cir. 1990); Branch v.· 

Martin, 886 F.2d 1043, 1045 & n.1 (8th Cir. 1989). 2 

"Subsection 636(b)(l)(B) was added in 1976 as part of a 

broadening of the authority of magistrates. Act of Oct. 

21, 1976, Pub. L. 94-577, 90 Stat. 2729. The House 

Report does not explain the category 'prisoner petitions 

challenging conditions of confinement' but does refer to 

'petitions under section 1983 of Title 42.' H.R. Rep. 

No. 1609, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted in 1976 

U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 6162, 6171 .... 

We see no reason why a Magistrate with clear 

authority to hold hearings and recommend findings as to 

the unconstitutionality of continuing prison conditions 

may not perform a similar function as to specific 

episodes of unconstitutional conduct by prison officials. The phrase 'conditions of confinement' appears 

not to have been selected as a limitation to preclude 

episodes of misconduct, but rather as a generalized 

category covering all grievances occurring during prison 

confinement." 

McCarthy v. Bronson, 906 F.2d at 839. 

According to the majority, a suit alleging that a prisoner 

was beaten once must be heard by an Article III judge, but a claim 

that the prisoner is beaten daily may be referred to a magistrate. 

Limiting the magistrate's jurisdiction to the more serious claim 

2 The majority's suggestion that the Eighth Circuit does not 

disagree with their interpretation of the statute is incorrect. 

That court has approved the referral to a magistrate, as "prisoner 

petitions challenging conditions of confinement," a claim that 

prison officials "assault[ed the plaintiff] on two occasions," 

Thompson v. Nix, 897 F.2d at 357, and a claim that "on September 

10, 1986, when defendants escorted [plaintiff] from a waiting room 

to his cell, defendants used excessive force against him," Branch 

v. Martin, 886 F.2d at 1044. Moreover, some of the cases cited in 

Branch fall outside the majority's construction of the statute. 

The plaintiff in Gee v. Estes, 829 F.2d 1005, 1006 (10th Cir. 

1987), alleged, inter alia, an incident where "he was dragged into 

court with no clothing on except an oversized pair of trousers 

which dropped to his knees to expose him to the spectators." The 

plaintiff in Cay v. Estelle, 789 F.2d 318, 319 (5th Cir. 1986), 

alleged "that on August 3, 1982, when [he] asked to be relieved 

from work duties because of a back injury, he was beaten severely II 

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makes no sense, and nothing in the legislative history persuades 

me that Congress intended such an anomaly. See Griffin v. Oceanic 

Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982) ("interpretations of a 

statute which would produce absurd results are to be avoided if 

alternative interpretations consistent with the legislative 

purpose are available"); American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson,~ 456 

U.S. 63, 71 (1982) ("Statutes should be interpreted to avoid untenable distinctions and unreasonable results whenever possible."). Their interpretation conflicts with the legislative 

intention to give magistrates broad authority to assist judges. 

See H.R. Rep. No. 1609, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-8, reprinted in 

1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 6162, 6166-68. 

One of the incidents in this case occurred shortly after 

Clark was arrested. The other took place while he was in pretrial 

detention. At neither time was he free to leave. Certainly, he 

was . f' 3 in con inement. See Wimmer v. Cook, 774 F.2d 68, 69, 74 (4th 

Cir. 1985) (pretrial detention); see also Worley v. Sharp, 724 

F.2d 862, 863 (10th Cir. 1983) (same), reh'g denied, 759 F.2d 786 

(10th Cir. 1985). Because his complaint challenged conditions of 

his confinement, section 636(b)(l)(B) authorized the referral. 

B. 

If the referral was not authorized by that subsection, it was 

authorized by section 636(b)(3). The articulation of specific 

3 "Confinement" is the "(s]tate of being confined" or "shut in" 

"by either a moral or a physical restraint, by threats of violence 

with a present force, or by physical restraint of the person." 

Black's Law Dictionary 157 (abr. 5th ed. 1983). 

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Appellate Case: 88-1177 Document: 01019846017 Date Filed: 09/21/1990 Page: 23 
duties in subsection (b)(l)(B) did not "implicitly withhold[]· 

other duties not so specified •.. II Supra at __ . Subsection 

(b)(3) is a "'catchall' provision." Garcia v. Boldin, 691 F.2d 

1172, 1178 (5th Cir. 1982); accord,~, King v. Ionization 

Int'l, Inc., 825 F.2d 1180, 1185 (7th Cir. 1987). "Where the 

district court is not specifically empowered to refer a case, it 

may do so under the general provision of 28 u.s.c. § 636(b)(3) 

II Hall v. Vance, 887 F.2d 1041, 1046 (10th Cir. 1989). 

In Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261 (1976), the Supreme Court 

reviewed the legislative history of the original Act: 

"The three examples§ 636(b) sets out are, as the 

statute itself states, not exclusive. The Senate sponsor of the legislation, Senator Tydings, testified in 

the House hearings: 

'The Magistrate[s] Act specifies these 

three areas because they came up in our hearings and we thought they were areas in which 

the district courts might be able to benefit 

from the magistrate's services. We did not 

limit the courts to the areas mentioned .... 

'We hope and think that innovative, 

imaginative judges who want to clean up their 

caseload backlog will utilize the U.S. 

magistrates in these areas and perhaps even 

come up with new areas to increase the efficiency of their courts.'" 

Id. at 267 (quoting Hearings on the Federal Magistrates Act Before 

Subcomm. No. 4 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d 

Sess. 81 (1968)). The legislative history of the 1976 amendments 

to the Act confirms the expansiveness of subsection (b)(3): 

"This subsection enables the district courts to 

continue innovative experimentations in the use of this 

judicial officer. At the same time, placing this 

authorization in an entirely separate subsection 

emphasizes that it is not restricted in any way J2y any 

other specific grant of authority to magistrates." 

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H.R. Rep. No. 1609, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1976·u.s. 

Code Cong. & Admin. News 6162, 6172 (emphasis added). The 

statutory authorization for referring to magistrates prisoner 

petitions challenging conditions of confinement was not meant as a 

bar to the referral of prisoner petitions unrelated to conditions 

of confinement. 4 See,~, John v. Louisiana, 899 F.2d 1441, 

1446 (5th Cir. 1990) (subsection (b)(3) authorizes post-trial 

referral of sanctions question even though subsection (b)(l)(A) 

only refers to pretrial matters), 

As is true of the majority's construction of subsection 

(b)(l)(B), their construction of subsection (b)(3) has absurd 

consequences. If (b)(3) only applies to matters not addressed in 

(b)(l), then a suit by a prisoner about something which preceded 

4 Gomez v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2237 (1989), does not 

require a contrary conclusion. There, the Court concluded that 

"the carefully defined grant of authority to conduct trials of 

civil matters and of minor criminal cases should be construed as 

an implicit withholding of the authority to preside at a felony 

trial," id, at 2245, because 

"[w]hen a statute creates an office to which it assigns 

specific duties, those duties outline the attributes of 

the office. Any additional duties performed pursuant to 

a general authorization in the statute reasonably should 

bear some relation to the specified duties." 

Id. at 2241. Presiding over a felony trial bears no relation to 

the duties specified in the statute, but presiding over a 

prisoner's section 1983 action does. 

Also, unlike in Gomez, the majority's construction of the 

statute does not avoid deciding a constitutional issue, for this 

court has already held that Article III allows a magistrate to 

preside over a civil matter so long as the district court reviews 

the matter de novo. Marvel v. United States, 719 F.2d 1507, 1513 

(10th Cir. 1983). (That the parties in that case consented to 

proceeding before the magistrate is irrelevant, for parties cannot 

expand Article III limitations on a tribunal's jurisdiction. 

Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 

456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982),) 

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Appellate Case: 88-1177 Document: 01019846017 Date Filed: 09/21/1990 Page: 25 
his confinement may not be referred to a magistrate (because it is 

"a prisoner's petition that does not challenge a condition of 

confinement," supra at __ ) but a suit by a non-prisoner making an 

identical allegation may be. 

II. 

I also disagree with the majority's conclusion that the 

absence of statutory authorization for a magistrate's participation is a non-waivable jurisdictional defect. I would hold that 

the issue was waived by Clark's failure to object below. 

The authority upon which the majority relies does not support 

its conclusion. Many of the cited cases do not address the effect 

of a failure to object to a referral to a magistrate. See Gomez 

v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2237 (1989); Houghton v. Osborne, 834 

F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1987); Lovelace v. Dall, 820 F.2d 223 (7th Cir. 

1987); In re Morrissey, 717 F.2d 100 (3d Cir. 1983). In the others, the failure to object was excused on grounds other than nonwaivability. See United States v. Martinez-Torres, __ F.2d --' 

__ & n.3, Nos. 87-2006, -2007, -2008 (1st Cir. Aug. 20, 1990) 

(objection would have been futile because of existing circuit 

authority); United States v. France, 886 F.2d 223, 228 (9th Cir. 

1989) (same), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 1921 (U.S. 1990) 5

; Hall v. 

5 While the Ninth Circuit decided the case on different 

grounds, one of the issues before the Supreme Court, to be heard 

Tuesday, October 2, is whether a magistrate's lack of statutory 

authority is a non-waivable defect. See Brief of the United 

States at 19-21, United States v. France, No. 89-1363 (U.S. 

certiorari granted Apr. 24, 1990). In my view, we should "decline 

appellant's invitation to rule in a vacuum," United States v. De 

La Cruz, 902 F.2d 121, 125 (1st Cir. 1990), and await the Court's 

decision before deciding the instant case. Deciding the matter 

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Sharpe, 812 F.2d 644, 649 (11th Cir. 1987) (appellant was allowed 

to rely upon the appellee's objection to proceeding before a 

magistrate). Taylor v. Oxford, 575 F.2d 152, 154-55 (7th Cir. 

1978), appears to agree with the majority, but that opinion, as 

well as Lovelace v. Dall, 820 F.2d 223 (7th Cir. 1987), has been 

superseded by United States v. Wey, 895 F.2d 429 (7th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 110 S. Ct. 3283 (1990) .

6 

The cases which consider the issue hold that a magistrate's 

lack of statutory authority is not a jurisdictional defect, so any 

objection is waived if not raised. See id. at 431; Mylett v. 

Jeane, 879 F.2d 1272, 1275 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. 

Vanwert, 887 F,2d 375, 382-83 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. 

Ct. 1927 (1990); see also Government of the Virgin Islands v. 

Williams, 892 F.2d 305, 309-312 (3d Cir. 1989) (failure to object 

constitutes consent to reference), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2211 

(1990). 7 

Any error below was a procedural lapse, not a jurisdictional 

failing. Archie v. Christian, 808 F.2d 1132, 1134-35 (5th Cir. 

1987). "We do not have a 'jurisdictional' problem . . We have 

at most a mistaken interpretation of a law designating which 

immediately serves little purpose, but risks wasting judicial 

resources. 

6 Similarly, Government of the Virgin Islands v. Williams, 892 

F.2d 305 (3d Cir, 1989), calls In re Morrissey, 717 F.2d 100 (3d 

Cir. 1983), into doubt. 

7 A panel of the First Circuit also reached this conclusion in 

United States v. Lopez-Pena, 890 F.2d 490, 495 n.6 (1st Cir. 1989) 

(advance edition), but the opinion was withdrawn so the case could 

be reheard en bane and the en bane opinion does not address the 

issue. See United States v. Martinez-Torres, F.2d at n.8 

(Selya, J., dissenting). 

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Appellate Case: 88-1177 Document: 01019846017 Date Filed: 09/21/1990 Page: 27 
judicial officer shall preside over which proceedings." United 

States v. Wey, 895 F.2d at 431. 

Gomez does not control, for the appellant there did object to 

the magistrate's involvement. United States v. Sawyers, 902 F.2d 

1217, 1220 (6th Cir. 1990); United States v. Mang Sun Wong, 884 

F.2d 1537, 1545 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1140 

(1990). Gomez's mention of "jurisdiction" does not mean that the 

Act is a jurisdictional statute. "[T]he word is a many-hued term 

.••• Gomez uses the word 'jurisdiction' in a context revealing 

that the Court meant 'authority.'" United States v. Wey, 895 F.2d 

at 431; accord United States v. Musacchia, 900 F.2d 493, 503 (2d 

Cir. 1990) (court is "[u]nable to square the Supreme Court's use 

of the word 'jurisdiction' with traditional notions of subject 

matter jurisdiction"); Black's Law Dictionary 443 (abr. 5th ed. 

1983) ("The word is a term of large and comprehensive import, and 

embraces every kind of judicial action."), 

III. 

On August 18, 1987, the magistrate held an evidentiary hearing, which was recorded. On September 16, he recommended that 

Clark's suit be dismissed. Clark objected to this recommendation, 

but on December 31 the district court dismissed the action. The 

dismissal order states that the court "made a de novo review" of 

the case, R. Vol. I, Tab 49, at 2, but the recording of the 

evidentiary hearing had not yet been transcribed. 

"When objections are made to the magistrate's factual findings based on conflicting testimony or evidence, both§ 636(b)(l) 

-8-

Appellate Case: 88-1177 Document: 01019846017 Date Filed: 09/21/1990 Page: 28 
and Article III of the United States Constitution require de novo 

review. " Gee v. Estes, 82 9 F. 2d 1005, 1008 ( 10th Cir. 19 87) • "In 

conducting this review, the district court must, at a minimum, 

listen to a tape recording or read a transcript of the evidentiary 

hearing." Id. at 1009. 

' Gee was decided three months before the district court 

dismissed Clark's action. We presume that the district court knew 

the relevant law, United States v. Lowden, 905 F.2d 1448, 1449 n.1 

(10th Cir. 1990), so the court's statement that it conducted a de 

novo review must be taken to mean that it listened to the tape 

recording of the hearing before it dismissed Clark's suit. 

Indeed, because of the expense and delay8 of transcription, 

district courts commonly listen to a tape rather than await a 

transcript. 

Branch v. Martin, 886 F.2d 1043 (8th Cir. 1989), which 

remanded in similar circumstances, is distinguishable. As here, 

the district court adopted the magistrate's recommendations before 

the transcript of a recorded hearing was prepared. As here, the 

district court stated that it had conducted a de novo review, but 

did not say anything about listening to the tape. Id. at 1046; 

see also Moran v. Morris, 665 F.2d 900, 901-02 (9th Cir. 1981) 

(court of appeals remanded for further review of tape-recorded 

proceedings before magistrate after district court adopted 

magistrate's recommendations the day they were issued). The 

important distinction is that Branch announced for the Eighth 

8 The transcript in this case was not prepared until almost 14 

months after the hearing was held. See R. Supp. Vol. II. 

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Circuit the rule we adopted in Gee. The district court in Branch 

did not have the benefit of that decision, but the court below was 

aware of Gee. The doubts the Eighth Circuit held about the 

breadth of that district court's review would be unfounded here. 

IV. 

On the merits of Clark's claims, I agree with the decision of 

the district court. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment. 

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