Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-00522/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-00522-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1983 Civil Rights

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 This action proceeds before this court pursuant to Eastern District of California Local 1

Rule 302(c)(21) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and was reassigned by an order entered February 9,

2010 (Dkt. No. 105). 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRENT ALLEN WINTERS, et al.,

Plaintiffs, No. 2:09-cv-00522 JAM KJN PS

v.

ORDER & FINDINGS AND 

RECOMMENDATIONS

DELORES JORDAN, et al., 

Defendants.

______________________________/

Presently before the court is a special motion to strike plaintiffs’ Third Amended

Complaint pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16 filed by defendant Judy Ford

(“Ford”), and a related request for judicial notice. (Dkt. No. 69.) The court submitted this matter

without oral argument. (Dkt. No. 102.) The undersigned has fully considered the parties’ briefs

1

and the record in this case and, for the reasons that follow, will: (1) grant Ford’s request for

judicial notice, and (2) recommend that all of plaintiffs’ claims against Ford be dismissed with

prejudice.

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 In an order dated September 24, 2009, the court ordered that all references to the minor 2

plaintiffs in this action—Joy Winters, Clark Winters, and Jill Winters—be stricken from

plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint because those minors were not represented by an attorney

or attorneys. (Dkt. No. 80; see also Dkt. Nos. 68, 89 at 2 n.1.)

 Plaintiffs filed the operative complaint under the title “Amended Complaint,” 3

notwithstanding this court’s order that it be labeled “Third Amended Complaint.” (Compare

Dkt. No. 66 with Dkt No. 56 at 4.) The Third Amended Complaint supersedes plaintiffs’

“Second Amended Complaint.” (Dkt. No. 15.) As the court noted in a prior order, the Second

Amended Complaint represented plaintiffs’ first amendment of the original complaint (Dkt. No.

56 at 1 n.1), and the operative Third Amended Complaint represents plaintiffs’ second

amendment of the original complaint.

2

I. BACKGROUND2

Plaintiffs’ operative complaint, the Third Amended Complaint, is a wide-ranging, 3

25-page complaint that alleges, in eight-point font, 38 claims for relief against 61 defendants. 

(Dkt. No. 66.) In dismissing plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 15), which

spanned 163 pages and 607 numbered paragraphs, the court ordered that plaintiffs’ Third

Amended Complaint could not exceed 25 pages and must conform to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 8(a), including the requirement that the pleading contain a short and plain statement of

the claims alleged instead of recounting all of the evidence and arguments in support of those

claims. (Dkt. No. 56 at 3.) The court had stated that “[t]his will be plaintiffs’ last chance to

comply.” (Id.) 

The claims against Ford arise out of an underlying internecine family dispute. 

The Third Amended Complaint alleges that in or around the year 2002, plaintiff Susan Winters’s

elderly parents, Joe and Virginia Armstrong, encouraged plaintiffs Susan and Brent Winters to

sell their house in Illinois and move to Nevada City, California, to live with the Armstrongs. 

(Third Am. Compl. at 4.) Plaintiffs allege that before plaintiffs returned to California, Joe

Armstrong passed away and that Virginia Armstrong eventually transferred properties from the

Armstrong Living Trust dated July 29, 1994, to the Virginia Armstrong Living Trust. (Id.) 

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3

Plaintiffs allege that Virginia Armstrong took these actions due, in part, to the undue influence of

defendants Valerie Logsdon and Michael Armstrong. (Id.) 

Relevant here, the relationship between Virginia Armstrong and plaintiffs resulted

in proceedings in the Nevada County Superior Court. Plaintiffs allege that Delores Jordan and

“adult protective services” unduly influenced Virginia Armstrong to file, on October 15, 2007, a

request for a temporary restraining order against plaintiffs Susan and Brent Winters. (Third Am.

Compl. at 5.) That petition for a restraining order was denied. (Id.)

In turn, however, plaintiff Susan Winters successfully petitioned the state court for

a restraining order against Jordan. (Id.; Req. for Judicial Notice, Ex. 1-3, Dkt. No. 69.) On

February 10, 2007, after entry of the restraining order against Jordan, Jordan allegedly trespassed

on the plaintiffs’ property in violation of the order. (Third Am. Compl. at 5.) 

Jordan’s alleged action resulted in her being named as a defendant in two actions

in the Nevada County Superior Court: (1) a civil contempt hearing, and (2) a misdemeanor

criminal complaint. (Id. at 6; Req. for Judicial Notice, Exs. 7, 12.) In short, defendant Ford, who

is an attorney, was appointed by the Superior Court to represent Jordan in the civil contempt

matter, which was ultimately dismissed. (Req. for Judicial Notice, Exs. 7, 11; Third Am. Compl.

at 13.) Jordan also retained Ford to represent her in the criminal matter, which was also

eventually dismissed by the district attorney’s office. (Req. for Judicial Notice, Ex. 13, 15.) 

Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint does not allege that Ford’s involvement in this matter

extends beyond her representation of Jordan in the Superior Court actions. 

Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint alleges the following claims against Ford:

abuse of process (claim 6); violation of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights

(claim 8); trespass to chattels (claim 13); violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (claim 14); civil

conspiracy in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (claim 15); civil conspiracy (claim 18); violation of

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 Perhaps due to an inadvertent error, exhibit 14 to the request for judicial notice is 4

Ford’s declaration in support of her special motion to strike, and Ford does not request that the

court take judicial notice of that declaration. (See Doc. No. 69-4 at 67-70.)

4

RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. 1962(d) (claim 31); loss of consortium (claim 36); and intentional

infliction of emotional distress (claim 38).

In response to the filing of the Third Amended Complaint, Ford filed an “AntiSLAPP Special Motion to Strike.” (Dkt. No. 69.) Although Ford noticed her motion pursuant to

California’s Anti-SLAPP statute and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), her moving

papers present the motion as a special motion to strike. The implications of pursuing only a

special motion to strike are discussed below. Ford also filed an answer to the Third Amended

Complaint on the same day she filed her special motion to strike. (Dkt. No. 70.) 

Despite the court’s previous order that plaintiffs file a separate opposition to each

pending motion (Dkt. No. 89 at 6), plaintiffs filed a consolidated opposition, which addressed, in

very little part, Ford’s motion (see Dkt. No. 99). Plaintiffs filed their opposition on January 13,

2010, despite a court-ordered deadline of January 6, 2010. (Compare Dkt. No. 89 with Dkt. No.

99.) Although plaintiffs’ opposition was untimely and need not be considered, the undersigned

has fully considered that opposition in arriving at the findings and recommendations that follow.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Ford’s Request for Judicial Notice

In connection with her special motion to strike, Ford requests that the court take

judicial notice of 14 documents, labeled as exhibits 1 through 13 and 15. (See Req. for Judicial 4

Notice, Dkt. No. 69, Doc. Nos. 69-3 & 69-4.) These exhibits consist of documents from the

Nevada County Superior Court’s file, including orders issued by the Superior Court and requests,

motions, and declarations filed with the Superior Court. (See Doc. No. 69-4, Exs. 1-13, 15.) 

The court may take judicial notice of filings in state court actions where the state

court proceedings have a direct relation to the matters at issue. See, e.g., Betker v. U.S. Trust

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 The acronym “SLAPP” stands for “strategic lawsuit against public participation.” 5

Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. La Marche, 31 Cal. 4th 728, 732 n.1, 74 P.3d 737, 739 n.1 (2003). 

5

Corp. (In re Heritage Bond Litig.), 546 F.3d 667, 670 n.1, 673 n.8 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing U.S.

ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992));

Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007); Cactus Corner, LLC v. U.S. Dep’t of

Agric., 346 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1092 (E.D. Cal. 2004); see also Reyn’s Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa

USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006) (“We may take judicial notice of court filings

and other matters of public record.”). Because all of the documents at issue are state court

records that directly relate to Ford’s interactions with plaintiffs that form the basis of the dispute

before this court, the court grants Ford’s request for judicial notice. However, the granting of

Ford’s request for judicial notice is limited in that the court does not take notice of the truth of

any factual findings stated in the noticed documents. See Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1114

& n.5 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[W]e have held that taking judicial notice of findings of fact from another

case exceeds the limits of [Federal Rule of Evidence] 201.”). 

B. Ford’s Special Motion to Strike

Ford contends that all of the claims against her—both claims brought pursuant to

federal law and state law—should be dismissed as a result of her special motion to strike, filed

pursuant to California’s anti-SLAPP statute, California Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16. The 5

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has summarized the purpose and general mechanics of

California’s anti-SLAPP statute as follows:

The anti-SLAPP statute establishes a procedure to expose and dismiss

meritless and harassing claims that seek to chill the exercise of petitioning

or free speech rights in connection with a public issue. Analysis of an

anti-SLAPP motion to strike involves a two-step process. First, the

defendant must show that the cause of action arises from any “act of that

person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under

the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public

issue. . . .” Cal. Code Civ. P. § 425.16(b)(1).

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If the court determines that the defendant has met this burden, it must then

determine whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of

prevailing on the merits. To establish a probability of prevailing, the

plaintiff must show that “the complaint is both legally sufficient and

supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a

favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.”

Kearny v. Foley & Lardner, LLP, 590 F.3d 638, 648 (9th Cir. 2009) (footnote and citations

omitted); accord Metabolife Int’l, Inc. v. Wornick, 264 F.3d 832, 839-40 (9th Cir. 2001); Jarrow

Formulas, Inc. v. La Marche, 31 Cal. 4th 728, 733, 74 P.3d 737, 740 (2003). The anti-SLAPP

statute should be construed broadly. Mindys Cosmetics, Inc. v. Dakar, No. 09-55134, -- F.3d --,

2010 WL 2652480, at *1 (9th Cir. July 6, 2010) (citing Cal. Code Civ. P. § 425.16(a), and Vess

v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1109 (9th Cir. 2003)).

1. Scope of Ford’s Anti-SLAPP Special Motion to Strike

Before turning to the application of the anti-SLAPP statute to the claims against

Ford, the undersigned must address the scope of a special motion to strike filed pursuant to that

statute. As explained below, the undersigned concludes that Ford’s special motion to

strike—even if otherwise meritorious—cannot serve as the basis for the dismissal of plaintiffs’

claims premised on federal law.

Generally speaking, a party may bring an anti-SLAPP special motion to strike in

federal court. Thomas v. Fry’s Elecs., Inc., 400 F. 3d 1206, 1206 (9th Cir. 2005) (per curiam);

Vess, 317 F.3d at 1109. But such a motion has limited reach. A party may seek to specially

strike state law claims brought in federal court on the basis of the court’s diversity subject matter

jurisdiction and state law claims that are supplemental to federal claims in a federal question

jurisdiction matter. See Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 894, 900 n.2 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating

that “we have long held that the anti-SLAPP statute applies to state law claims that federal courts

hear pursuant to their diversity jurisdiction”) (citing United States ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed

Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d 963, 970-73 (9th Cir. 1999)); Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan

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 Decisions in this district, albeit unpublished, are in accord. See Barker v. Koff, No. 6

2:09-cv-00001-GEB-JFM, 2009 WL 2914146, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2009) (unpublished)

(denying defendant’s special motion to strike to the extent it sought dismissal of the federal

claims alleged against them); Smith v. Cal. Dep’t of Correction, No. CIV-F-06-0368 AWI SMS,

2006 WL 3518257, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2006) (unpublished) (“Anti-SLAPP may not be used

against federal Section 1983 claims.”).

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Computer Group, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1130 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (“[I]t appears that under the

Erie analysis set forth in Lockheed the anti-SLAPP statute may be applied to state law claims

which, as in this case, are asserted pendent to federal question claims.”). However, a party may

not use an anti-SLAPP special motion to strike to seek the dismissal of claims based on federal

law, such as claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Hilton, 599 F.3d at 901 (stating

that “a federal court can only entertain anti-SLAPP special motions to strike in connection with

state law claims”); accord Restaino v. Bah (In re Bah), 321 B.R. 41, 46 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005)

(holding that the anti-SLAPP statute does not apply to federal claims); Summit Media LLC v.

City of Los Angeles, 530 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1094 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (“Several District Courts have

determined that the Anti-SLAPP statute does not apply to federal question claims in federal court

because such application would frustrate substantive federal rights.”); Sonoma Foods, Inc. v.

Sonoma Cheese Factory, LLC, 634 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1016 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (same); Bulletin

Displays, LLC v. Regency Outdoor Adver., Inc., 448 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1180 (C.D. Cal. 2006)

(same); Globetrotter Software, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 2d at 1130 (same).

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Here, plaintiffs have alleged some claims against Ford that are grounded in federal

law and thus provide this court with federal question subject matter jurisdiction (see Third Am.

Compl. at 2), and others that are premised on California state law. Nevertheless, Ford attempts

through her special motion to strike to dismiss all of the claims against her. This she cannot do. 

Her special motion to strike does not reach the following five federal claims: claim 8, which

alleges a violation of plaintiffs’ Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights; claim 14,

which alleges a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; claim 15, which alleges a conspiracy in violation

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of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; claim 18, which alleges a “civil conspiracy,” ostensibly pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983; and claim 31, which alleges a violation of 18 U.S.C. 1962(d). Accordingly,

the undersigned will only address Ford’s motion with respect to the following state law claims:

claim 6, which alleges abuse of process; claim 13, which alleges a trespass to chattels; claim 36,

which alleges “loss of consortium”; and claim 38, which alleges intentional infliction of

emotional distress. The remaining claims are not the proper subject of an anti-SLAPP special

motion to strike.

2. Application of the Anti-SLAPP Statute to Plaintiffs’ State Law Claims

The state law claims asserted by plaintiffs against Ford are the proper subject of a

special motion to strike. And Ford is correct that the only specific allegation in the Third

Amended Complaint that relates to her conduct is plaintiffs’ allegation that Ford failed to provide

notice of hearings and filings in the cases between the Winters family and Ford’s client, Jordan. 

(See Third Am. Compl. at 6, 13, and 15.) Accordingly, all of the allegations and state law claims

against Ford arise out of her legal representation of Jordan in connection with the civil contempt

hearing and the misdemeanor criminal action. 

With respect to the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, Ford has demonstrated

that the plaintiffs’ state law claims arise from protected activity, i.e., the acts of which plaintiffs

complain were taken in furtherance of Ford’s right of petition or free speech under the United

States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public issue. See Cal.

Code Civ. P. § 425.16(b)(1); see also Jarrow Formulas, Inc., 31 Cal. 4th at 733, 74 P.3d at 740. 

Such protected acts include the following: “(1) any written or oral statement or writing made

before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized

by law; (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under

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 A defendant moving to strike a claim arising from a statement made before, or in

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connection with an issue under consideration by, a legally authorized official proceeding is not

required to separately demonstrate that the statement concerned an issue of public significance. 

See Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity, 19 Cal. 4th 1106, 1123, 969 P.2d 564, 575

(1999). 

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consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official 

proceeding authorized by law . . . .” Cal. Code Civ. P. § 425.16(e). 

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The allegations contained in the Third Amended Complaint indicate that Ford’s

conduct of which plaintiffs complain relates to her legal representation of Jordan in matters

before the Nevada County Superior Court. Specifically, plaintiffs allege that Ford filed papers

and appeared at hearings without providing notice to plaintiffs. (See, e.g., Third Am. Compl. at

15 (“Ford never noticed the Winters of any hearings or filings in Winters v. Jordan (#73025)”).) 

California courts have held that claims against an attorney arising out of that attorney’s

representation of his or her client are the proper subject of an anti-SLAPP special motion to

strike. See Rusheen v. Cohen, 37 Cal. 4th 1048, 1056, 128 P.3d 713, 717-18 (2006) (“A cause of

action ‘arising from’ defendant’s litigation activity may appropriately be the subject of a section

425.16 motion to strike” (citation omitted).); Jarrow Formulas, Inc., 31 Cal. 4th at 733, 74 P.3d

at 740 (holding that malicious prosecution claim arising form attorney’s representation of client

was subject to anti-SLAPP statute); see also Zamos v. Stroud, 32 Cal. 4th 958, 965, 87 P.3d 802,

806 (2004) (same); Daniels v. Robbins, 182 Cal. App. 4th 204, 214-15, 105 Cal. Rptr. 3d 683,

691 (Ct. App. 2010) (noting lack of dispute that attorney’s oral and written statements in prior

judicial proceedings that gave rise to claims of malicious prosecution, abuse of process,

negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress were protected activity under the antiSLAPP statute); Cabral v. Martins, 177 Cal. App. 4th 471, 479-83, 99 Cal. Rptr. 3d 394, 401-04

(Ct. App. 2009) (claims arising from attorney’s revision of a will, lodging of a will with the

probate court, and representation of clients in probate proceedings were subject to anti-SLAPP

motion); White v. Lieberman, 103 Cal. App. 4th 210, 221, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 608, 614-15

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(Ct. App. 2002) (holding that malicious prosecution claim against attorney arising from

attorney’s representation of clients was subject to anti-SLAPP statute); Dowling v. Zimmerman,

85 Cal. App. 4th 1400, 1418-20, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 174, 188-90 (Ct. App. 2001) (attorney’s

representation of clients in prior unlawful detainer action that gave rise to plaintiff’s claims of

defamation, misrepresentation, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress

against the attorney constituted protected activity). Accordingly, Ford has met the threshold

requirement of her special motion to strike.

Because Ford met her initial burden under the anti-SLAPP framework, the burden

would ordinarily shift to plaintiffs to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the merits, i.e.,

that their complaint is “both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing

of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.” 

Kearny, 590 F.3d at 648. Here, however, plaintiffs are unable to make such a showing as a

matter of law because Ford’s conduct, insofar as plaintiffs’ state law claims are concerned, is

protected by California’s litigation privilege. That privilege, found at California Civil Code

§ 47(b), provides, in part, that a publication or broadcast made as part of a judicial proceeding is

privileged. See also Action Apartment Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Santa Monica, 41 Cal. 4th 1232,

1241, 163 P.3d 89, 95 (Cal. 2007). The California Supreme Court recently summarized this

litigation privilege as follows:

This privilege is absolute in nature, applying to all publications,

irrespective of their maliciousness. The usual formulation is that the

privilege applies to any communication (1) made in judicial or

quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized

by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that [has] some

connection or logical relation to the action. The privilege is not limited to

statements made during a trial or other proceedings, but may extend to

steps taken prior thereto, or afterwards.

Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted, modification in original). “[W]here the

gravamen of the complaint is a privileged communication . . . the privilege extends to necessarily

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 Because the undersigned concludes that plaintiffs’ state law claims should be dismissed 8

with prejudice pursuant to California’s litigation privilege, these findings and recommendations

do not reach Ford’s arguments grounded in the Noerr-Pennington doctrine only insofar as Ford’s

anti-SLAPP special motion to strike is concerned. 

11

related noncommunicative acts. . . .” Rusheen, 37 Cal. 4th at 1062, 128 P.3d at 722. The

California Supreme Court has given this privilege “a broad interpretation” in furtherance of the

purpose of the privilege, which is “to afford litigants and witnesses . . . the utmost freedom of

access to the courts without fear of being harassed subsequently by derivative tort actions.” 

Action Apartment Ass’n, Inc., 41 Cal. 4th at 1241, 163 P.3d at 95. Thus, although the privilege

was originally enacted with reference to claims of defamation, “‘the privilege is now held

applicable to any communication, whether or not it amounts to a publication . . . , and all torts

except malicious prosecution.’” Rusheen, 37 Cal. 4th at 1057, 128 P.3d at 718 (quoting Silberg

v. Anderson, 50 Cal. 3d 205, 212, 786 P.2d 365 (1990)). 

Here, as discussed above, the allegations in the Third Amended Complaint and the

judicially noticeable documents reflect that all of plaintiffs’ state law tort claims alleged against

Ford arise out of Ford’s representation of Jordan as her court-appointed attorney in a civil

contempt hearing and as her retained attorney in regards to a misdemeanor criminal matter. 

Specifically, plaintiffs’ allegations as to Ford relate to her filings and appearances in court and

communications with the court, all in relation to her representation of Jordan. Ford’s actions are

absolutely privileged. As a result, plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that they are entitled to a

favorable judgment on their state law claims against Ford. Accordingly, the undersigned will

recommend the dismissal with prejudice of all of plaintiffs’ state law claims against Ford because

Ford is absolutely immune under California’s litigation privilege.8

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C. The Remaining Claims Brought Pursuant to Federal Law

The undersigned will further recommend, pursuant to the court’s screening

authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(B), that plaintiffs’ remaining claims against Ford premised

on federal law, i.e., claims 8, 14, 15, 18, and 31, be dismissed with prejudice. 

Before reaching those claims, the undersigned addresses the initial confusion

caused by Ford’s moving papers. The general concern with Ford’s briefing is that it is entirely

unclear whether she intended to file a special motion to strike pursuant to California’s antiSLAPP statute and an alternative motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6), or only an anti-SLAPP special motion to strike that applies the Rule 12(b)(6) standard

as the means of demonstrating why plaintiffs cannot meet the second step of the anti-SLAPP

analysis. Ford’s notice of motion describes her motion as an “Anti-SLAPP Special Motion to

Strike,” but one brought pursuant to both California Code of Civil Procedure and Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Dkt. No. 69.) Moreover, a fair reading of Ford’s memorandum in

support of her motion suggests that Ford is requesting that the court apply the Rule 12(b)(6)

standard only in assessing step two of the anti-SLAPP analysis. Confirming the confusion,

plaintiffs’ opposition brief suggests that plaintiffs believe that Ford filed two motions, a special

motion to strike and a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). (See Dkt. No. 99) Ford’s

reply brief further confuses the matter in that the title of that document appears to relate only to a

special motion to strike, but the text of the brief refers to the motion as an “anti-SLAPP

motion/motion to dismiss” and, at the same time, requests only that Ford’s anti-SLAPP motion

be granted. (Dkt. No. 103 at 1-2, 8-9.) 

The undersigned will not construe Ford’s motion as having alternatively moved to

dismiss plaintiffs’ federal claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). First,

plaintiffs should not bear the brunt of Ford’s ambiguous filing. Second, Ford filed an answer to

plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint on the same day she filed the present motion (Dkt. No. 70),

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that she is entitled to Noerr-Pennington immunity on all of plaintiffs’ claims. Despite having an

opportunity to respond to this argument, plaintiffs’ opposition does not address in any material

respect application of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine here. 

 The Noerr-Pennington doctrine applies to petitioning activity before state governments 10

and the federal government. See Kottle v. Nw. Kidney Ctrs., 146 F.3d 1056, 1059 (9th Cir.

1998). It also applies to “defensive” activity. Freeman v. Lasky, Haas & Cohler, 410 F.3d

1180,1184 (9th Cir. 2005). 

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which suggests that Ford did not intend to file an alternative motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6). 

Nevertheless, because plaintiffs are proceeding in forma pauperis (Dkt. Nos. 55,

89 at 3), the undersigned addresses the remaining federal claims pursuant to its screening

authority under the in forma pauperis statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The court’s determination

that a plaintiff may proceed in forma pauperis comes with the obligation to screen complaints

brought by parties proceeding in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see also Calhoun

v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129

(9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the court is directed to dismiss a

case filed pursuant to the in forma pauperis statute if, at any time, it determines that the

allegation of poverty is untrue, or if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on

which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against an immune defendant. See also

Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27 (“It is also clear that section 1915(e) not only permits but requires a

district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a claim.”).

As with their state law claims described above, all of plaintiffs’ federal claims

alleged against Ford relate to her representation of Jordan in connection with state court

proceedings. As a result, Ford is immune under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine and plaintiffs

cannot state a claim on which relief may be granted. 

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“Under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, those who petition all departments of the

government for redress are generally immune from liability.” Empress LLC v. City & County 10

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 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has applied the Noerr-Pennington doctrine to 11

protect petitioning activity and “activity incidental to and in anticipation of petitioning activity.” 

Cal. Pharm. Mgmt., LLC v. Zenith Ins. Co., 669 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1167 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (citing,

in part, Sosa, 437 F.3d at 934-35 (“[I]n the litigation context, not only petitions sent directly to

the court in the course of litigation, but also ‘conduct incidental to the prosecution of the suit’ is

protected by the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.”)); see also Theme Prods., Inc. v. News Am. Mktg.

FSI, 546 F.3d 991, 1007 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Conduct incidental to a lawsuit, including a pre-suit

demand letter, falls within the protection of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.”); Sanders v. Brown,

504 F.3d 903, 912-13 (9th Cir. 2007) (stating that “Noerr-Pennington immunity protects private

actors when they file court documents and enter contracts with the government” and holding that

Noerr-Pennington immunity protects private parties from liability for negotiating and entering

into settlements or other agreements with the government); Freeman, 410 F.3d at 1184 (“A

complaint, an answer, a counterclaim and other assorted documents and pleadings, in which

plaintiffs or defendants make representations and present arguments to support their request that

the court do or not do something, can be described as petitions . . . .”).

 Plaintiffs’ claims for violation of their due process rights (claim 8) and for civil

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conspiracy (claim 18) are in effect civil rights claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

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of San Francisco, 419 F3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Manistee Town Ctr. v. City of

Glendale, 227 F.3d 1090, 1092 (9th Cir. 2000)). “The Noerr-Pennington doctrine ensures that

those who petition the government for redress of grievances remain immune from liability for

statutory violations, notwithstanding the fact that their activity might otherwise be proscribed by

the statute involved.” White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1231 (9th Cir. 2000). And although this 11

doctrine originated in the antitrust context, it is no longer limited to antitrust actions. Kearny,

590 F.3d at 644 (“The Supreme Court has since held that Noerr-Pennington principles ‘apply

with full force in other statutory contexts’ outside antitrust.”) (citing Sosa v. DIRECTV, 437 F.3d

923, 930 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing BE & K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 525 (2002)).

Here, plaintiffs’ federal claims against Ford are all premised on 42 U.S.C. § 1983

and the conspiracy provision of the RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). The Noerr-Pennington 12

doctrine applies to petitioning activity that gives rise to a claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, a conspiracy claim alleged pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and a claim brought pursuant to

the RICO statute. See Sosa, 437 F.3d at 932-42 (holding that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine

applies to a RICO claim); Empress LLC, 419 F.3d at 1056-57 (holding that Noerr-Pennington

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responds to Ford’s motion, plaintiffs appear to suggest that there exists a “conspiracy” exception

to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. (See Pls.’ Opp’n to Special Mot. to Strike at 10, Dkt. No. 99.) 

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has squarely rejected this argument. Empress LLC, 419 F.3d

at 1057 (“[T]here is no ‘conspiracy’ exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine that applies

when government officials conspire with a private party to employ government action as a means

of depriving other parties of their federal constitutional or statutory rights. In such

circumstances, a remedy lies only against the conspiring government officials, not against the

private citizens.” (citation omitted).). 

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doctrine applies to claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging a conspiracy between

private individuals and government actors); Manistee, 227 F.3d at 1092 (applying NoerrPennington doctrine to Section 1983 claim). Plaintiffs’ federal claims all arise out Ford’s

representation of Jordan, which includes acts of representing Jordan in court proceedings, filing

papers with the court on Jordan’s behalf, and communications with the Nevada County district

attorney’s office. Ford engaged in petitioning activity of the sort protected by the NoerrPennington doctrine. Accordingly, Ford is entitled to immunity with respect to plaintiffs’ federal

claims. 

And although neither party briefed the issue, plaintiffs’ pleadings do not suggest

the possibility that their claims fall within the “sham” exception to the Noerr-Pennington

doctrine. In the context of the sham exception in relation to a defendant’s previous defensive 13

work, the plaintiff must show that the defendant’s defensive activity was “objectively baseless”

and that “the defense as a whole was ‘a concealed attempt to interfere with the plaintiff’s

business relations.’” See Freeman, 410 F.3d at 1185. Here, based on the pleadings and judicially

noticeable documents, that is not the case. Ford acted as Jordan’s court-appointed attorney in the

context of a civil contempt action and as a retained criminal defense attorney in a criminal

proceeding, and all of plaintiffs’ claims arise from those representations. Thus, plaintiffs’ cannot

show that Ford’s defensive work was objectively baseless, and there is no possibility that the

sham defense would apply here. 

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Accordingly, the undersigned will recommend that all of the federal claims

against Ford be dismissed with prejudice. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant Judy Ford’s

request for judicial notice is granted.

Furthermore, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that all claims alleged against

defendant Judy Ford be dismissed with prejudice.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Id.; see also Local Rule 304(b). Such a

document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and

Recommendations.” Any response to the objections shall be filed with the court and served on

all parties within fourteen days after service of the objections. Local Rule 304(d). Failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 

Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57

(9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED AND RECOMMENDED.

DATED: July 19, 2010

_____________________________________

KENDALL J. NEWMAN

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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