Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-04347/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-04347-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 29:201 Fair Labor Standards Act

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD CASTLE, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

WELLS FARGO FINANCIAL, INC., d/b/a/

WELLS FARGO FINANCIAL AND WELLS

FARGO FINANCIAL ACCEPTANCE, and

DOES 1-50,

Defendants. /

No. C 06-4347 SI

ORDER DENYING WITHOUT

PREJUDICE PLAINTIFFS’ RENEWED

MOTIONS TO AMEND COMPLAINT

AND FOR CERTIFICATION UNDER §

216(b); DENYING WITHOUT

PREJUDICE MOTION TO SEVER;

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY

MOTION TO EQUITABLY TOLL

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS SHOULD

NOT BE GRANTED

By order filed March 5, 2007, the Court stayed this action until the California Supreme Court

decides Gentry v. Superior Court, (S141502). In light of the stay, the Court also deferred ruling on

defendants’ motion to compel arbitration, and denied without prejudice plaintiffs’ motions to amend the

complaint and for conditional certification under Section 216(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29

U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq.

Plaintiffs have renewed their motions to amend the complaint and for certification under

§ 216(b), and have also filed a motion to sever and a motion for equitable tolling. (Docket Nos. 141,

143, 144 & 146). Plaintiffs’ motions seek to add named plaintiffs who did not sign arbitration

agreements with defendants, to certify those plaintiffs’ claims under § 216(b), and to sever their claims

from the claims of plaintiffs who did sign arbitration agreements. Plaintiffs also request the Court to

equitably toll the FLSA statute of limitations for all putative collective class members from March 2,

2007 until the stay is lifted.

The Court DENIES without prejudice plaintiffs’ motion to sever, as well as the renewed motions

Case 3:06-cv-04347-SI Document 150 Filed 04/10/07 Page 1 of 3
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 The Court does not express any view as to the merits of plaintiffs’ certification motion.

2

 March 2, 2007 is the date of the hearing on plaintiffs’ original motion for § 216(b)

certification.

2

to amend the complaint and for conditional certification under § 216(b). (Docket Nos. 141, 144 & 146).

The Court finds that the better course for managing this litigation is to wait for the California Supreme

Court’s decision in Gentry because that decision will affect the scope of the putative class.1 If the Court

partially lifts the stay and proceeds with litigation only as to individuals who did not sign arbitration

agreements, and the Gentry court later holds that class action waivers are unenforceable, the parties are

faced with the unwieldy prospect of two FLSA classes proceeding on different tracks. 

However, the Court agrees with plaintiffs that the FLSA statute of limitations should be

equitably tolled for all putative class members – those who signed arbitration agreements and those who

did not – from March 2, 20072 until the stay is lifted. The statute of limitations under the FLSA is not

tolled for putative class members with the commencement of the action. Instead, the statute of

limitations continues to run until putative class members file consent forms. See 29 U.S.C. § 256; see

also Grayson v. K-Mart Corp., 79 F.3d 1086, 1106 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, Helton v. K-Mart, 519 U.S.

987 (1996). Courts have equitably tolled the statute of limitations in a FLSA action when doing so is

in the interest of justice. See, e.g., Partlow v. Jewish Orphans’ Home of Southern Cal., Inc., 645 F.2d

757, 760-61 (9th Cir. 1981) (equitable tolling proper where plaintiffs were without fault and “practical

effect of not tolling the statute would be to bar forever any claim” the employees had against defendant),

abrogated on other grounds by Hoffman-LaRoche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165 (1989); see also

Beauperthuy v. 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc., 2007 WL 707475 at *8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2007) (equitably

tolling FLSA statute of limitations because of factors outside plaintiffs’ control, including litigation,

arbitration and settlement of related action). 

Here, the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled to eliminate any prejudice suffered by

collective class members as a result of the stay of this litigation. As in Partlow and Beauperthuy,

plaintiffs here are without fault, and equitably tolling the statute of limitations will preserve claims that

will otherwise be lost as a result of the stay. Accordingly, the Court is inclined to grant plaintiffs’

Case 3:06-cv-04347-SI Document 150 Filed 04/10/07 Page 2 of 3
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

motion and equitably toll the statute of limitations for all putative collective class members from March

2, 2007 until the stay is lifted. If defendants contend that equitable tolling is not appropriate, defendants

shall file an opposition no later than April 20, 2007, and plaintiffs may file a response no later than

April 27, 2007. The Court shall rule on the motion without oral argument. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 10, 2007 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

Case 3:06-cv-04347-SI Document 150 Filed 04/10/07 Page 3 of 3