Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-01696/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-01696-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEVEN R. SAUCEDO,

Petitioner,

v.

P. D. BRAZELTON,

Respondent.

Case No. 13-cv-01696-SI 

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Re: Dkt. No. 1

INTRODUCTION

Steven R. Saucedo (“petitioner”), a prisoner at Pleasant Valley State Prison in California, 

has filed this pro se action for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging 

his 2010 conviction in Santa Clara County Superior Court. This matter is now before the Court 

for consideration of the merits of the petition. For the reasons discussed below, the petition is 

DENIED.

BACKGROUND

Following a jury trial, petitioner was convicted of first degree burglary, assault with a 

deadly weapon or by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury, and assault with a 

deadly weapon. People v. Saucedo, 2011 WL 5356796, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 8, 2011). 

Several sentence enhancement allegations were found true. Id. He was sentenced to 19 years in 

prison. Id. Petitioner was tried in a single proceeding together with codefendants Martell and 

Samuel. Id. at *4. At the end of the trial, Martell pleaded no contest to misdemeanor assault, 

while Samuel pleaded no contest to assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury. 

Id. at *6-7. 

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The California Court of Appeal summarized the facts of the offense as follows:

Mauricio and Gabriel Ortiz [FN2] shared an apartment in San Jose.

Early in the evening on July 1, 2009, Gabriel, a barber, was cutting 

Charlie Sanchez’s hair while another client, Sanchez’s friend Mark 

Gonzales, waited. Mauricio was watching television. He had 

consumed “two or three” 24–ounce cans of beer that evening, and 

had “probably” used methamphetamine the night before.

FN2. To avoid confusion occasioned by shared surnames, 

we refer to the Ortiz brothers and to Samuel and Valerie 

Palacios by their first names. We intend no disrespect. 

Dustin Martell, his girlfriend Valerie Palacios, their two small 

children, and Valerie’s brother Samuel Palacios lived in the 

apartment next door to the Ortizes. Defendant lived nearby and 

sometimes visited Martell. 

Mauricio had rearranged some pictures and “wanted to cover up ... 

the little nail holes in the wall” with putty. Martell had borrowed 

the putty a few months before and Mauricio was “a little, you know, 

bothered that he never returned it back.” Around six or seven that 

evening, Mauricio saw Samuel outside and “confronted” him about 

the putty. Mauricio “wasn’t being a jerk about it or anything,” but 

Samuel responded in a “very aggressive” manner and then 

“offended” Mauricio “in some way.” That caused Mauricio to 

become a little “impolite,” and things went downhill from there. 

Valerie yelled at Mauricio to stop “talking smack” to her brother. 

Mauricio told Valerie, “You’re drunk.” And “she was just ... 

cursing and yelling at me.” Mauricio went back inside. Gabriel 

“started talking to Valerie, ... trying to fix things ...,” but that “just 

made the situation worse.” 

Gabriel left to buy cigarettes. About five minutes later, Samuel, 

Martell, and defendant appeared “side by side” on the threshold of 

Mauricio’s open door. He told them to leave and tried to slam the 

door on their hands. Unable to close the door because the three 

outside were “pushing as hard as they could” on it, Mauricio “pulled 

out the mace” and sprayed them. 

According to Mauricio, the three pushed their way inside.

“[Samuel] went towards me,” Mauricio claimed, “and me and 

[Samuel] were having a physical altercation.” Martell was 

“[s]winging, kicking.” There was “a TV that was on a dresser in the 

living room,” and somebody “dropped the TV on the back of 

[Mauricio’s] head.” Mauricio was “hunched down and just 

fighting” and “like, looking at the floor,” so he did not see who 

threw the television. He believed it was Martell, however, “because 

I don’t think [Samuel] would [have] be[en] able to reach [it].” 

Mauricio said defendant was on his left when the television landed 

on his head, and he was stabbed “[j]ust about the same time.” “I 

was hit with the television first, and then after, I was stabbed.” 

Samuel, defendant, and Martell “were all in the apartment” at the 

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time. Mauricio had seen defendant with his right hand “hiding 

something” in his pocket when he entered the apartment, and when 

defendant took his hand out of his pocket as Mauricio “was being 

beaten,” Mauricio saw “an object” in his hand. Mauricio claimed 

defendant stabbed him during the fight with Samuel. “He sneaked 

up on me and got me from the side without me looking.” 

Gonzales witnessed much of the fracas from a couch “[r]ight next to 

the door” in Mauricio’s apartment. Gonzales, who was drinking a 

22–ounce Corona, saw Mauricio arguing with “the neighbor lady,” 

who called him a “pervert” and told him “he couldn’t handle his 

alcohol.” Mauricio shut the door but opened it again in response to 

a knock, and Gonzales saw Martell, Samuel, and a “third guy” who 

was “kind of tall, about 6–foot one,” standing there. Samuel was in 

front of the other two. Mauricio exchanged words with “[o]ne of the 

guys ... about why [Mauricio] was talking to his wife or his 

girlfriend that way.” All three were arguing with Mauricio, and 

“[e]verybody was yelling at the same time.” When Mauricio tried to 

close the door, one of the three blocked it with his foot, and Samuel 

and Martell pushed their way into the apartment. Mauricio said, “ ‘I 

got something for you,’ and then he busted out a bottle of pepper 

spray.” Samuel “threw the first punch,” but Gonzales “could barely 

see who was throwing what punch” because the pepper spray hit 

him in both eyes. He saw Mauricio “fall back on the couch.” 

Gonzales announced that he “wasn’t acquainted with any of them, 

you know,” and one of the three men, [FN4] who had remained 

outside, told him, “Then leave.” “And that’s when I got up, and I 

just ran out of the house.” 

FN4. Although Gonzales described this person as the “taller 

of the three of them,” he then identified defendant (the “third 

guy,” who was “about 6–foot one”) as that person. Martell 

testified that he is six feet four inches tall. Samuel testified 

that he is five feet six inches tall. Martell's counsel stated 

during colloquy outside the presence of the jury that 

defendant is “five-nine, apparently. I'm getting that 

information.” 

About “a minute, two minutes” later, Gonzales saw Sanchez running 

across the parking lot. One of the men was chasing Sanchez, but his 

back was to Gonzales, “so I really couldn’t make out the face.” 

Sanchez, who occasionally went to Gabriel’s apartment for a haircut 

when the barbershop was closed, also witnessed the melee. Sanchez 

consumed “like, one or two” 12–ounce cans of beer that evening.

He “heard a girl yelling ... towards [Mauricio’s] apartment.” The 

door to the apartment and the curtains on the window were closed, 

but the window was open. Mauricio closed it. “And then-then, like, 

I guess someone was at the door.” Mauricio opened it, and Sanchez 

saw Samuel, Martell, and defendant on the doorstep. Gonzales 

heard Martell say “[s]omething about ‘This is the last time.’" 

Mauricio tried to shut the door but “someone was pushing it from 

outside.” Sanchez did not see who it was. “The door opened, and 

then [Mauricio] started wrestling with [Samuel].” Gonzales “didn’t 

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really see any punches.” “It was more just like somebody rushing 

towards someone else, and then them falling over and kind of, like, 

stumbling all around the apartment.” Samuel was already inside but 

the other two were still at the door when Mauricio pulled out the 

pepper spray, and Sanchez saw Samuel try to move the hand holding 

it. Sanchez did not get pepper spray in his eyes. 

Things happened “fast.” One of the two at the door stayed there 

while the other one came inside “and grabbed an object and 

slammed it over Mauricio’s head.” Sanchez did not get a good look 

at the object, but it “looked like” a television. Sanchez could not 

recall exactly when the person who threw the television entered the 

apartment because he was focusing on the person at the door, but 

“everybody was inside that apartment when it all happened.” 

Sanchez was focused on the person at the door because that person 

had a knife in his hand. Sanchez could see two inches of the blade. 

The tip of the knife “had, like, a hook on it.” According to Sanchez, 

the person who had the knife was not the person who dropped the 

television on Mauricio’s head. “Mauricio’s back had hit the couch; 

and right after that, the TV got down on his head; and then right 

after that, the knife came out. So the person that had the knife 

couldn’t do both things at the same time.” Sanchez said defendant 

was the person at the door. 

Defendant was “[i]nside, by the door,” and he asked Sanchez and 

Gonzales if they were involved. “At the same time he was 

confronting us, he was taking [the knife] out.” Sanchez told 

defendant, “I’m just here to get a haircut,” and defendant told him 

and Gonzales to leave. As they left, Sanchez saw defendant “go 

towards Mauricio” with the knife in his hand. Sanchez did not see 

defendant or anyone stab Mauricio. 

Sanchez hurried past Martell, who was standing at the door, 

“[p]artway in.” Martell was not paying attention to Sanchez. “He 

was more concentrated on what was happening to Mauricio.” 

Sanchez said Martell looked “like, traumatized from what was going 

on.” Sanchez did not agree that Martell had remained outside the 

entire time. If he had, Sanchez would have seen him behind 

defendant as defendant pulled out the knife, “[a]nd ... I remember 

not seeing nobody behind him when he was pulling out the knife.” 

Sanchez explained that there was “enough time in the-in the total 

time where the knife was pulled out and [defendant] pulled out the 

knife and went towards Mauricio. The time that I focused on 

[defendant] walk[ing] over there, that was enough time for [Martell] 

to go back to the door.” 

Once outside, Sanchez ran to the right and “then ... I looked back.” 

Sanchez saw defendant, with the knife in his hand, about 21 feet 

behind him. Defendant chased Sanchez through the parking lot of 

the apartment complex for 20 or 30 yards. Sanchez got away by 

jumping a fence into another apartment complex. From the other 

side of the fence, Sanchez looked back “to see what he was going to 

do next” and saw defendant getting into the passenger seat of a blue 

van. The van left the apartment complex, and Sanchez called the 

police.

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Saucedo, 2011 WL 5356796, at *1-4 (footnote omitted). 

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this habeas action for relief under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This action is in the proper venue because the challenged conviction

occurred in Santa Clara County, California, within this judicial district. 28 U.S.C. §§ 84, 2241(d). 

EXHAUSTION

Prisoners in state custody who wish to challenge collaterally in federal habeas proceedings 

either the fact or length of their confinement are required first to exhaust state judicial remedies, 

either on direct appeal or through collateral proceedings, by presenting the highest state court 

available with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of each and every claim they seek to raise in 

federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)-(c). The parties do not dispute that the state judicial 

remedies were exhausted for the claims in the petition, except for petitioner’s ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim based on a failure to investigate. Docket (“Dkt.”) 17-1 at 12. The 

unexhausted failure-to-investigate claim is discussed below on pages 13-15. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in 

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The 

petition may not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state 

court unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary 

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by 

the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court 

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arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if 

the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially 

indistinguishable facts.” Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412–13 (2000). “Under the 

‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court 

identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but unreasonably 

applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. “[A] federal habeas court 

may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the 

relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. 

Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. A federal habeas court making 

the “unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the state court’s application of clearly 

established federal law was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409. 

DISCUSSION

I. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims. 

Petitioner claims that defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance when she (a) failed to 

move to sever petitioner’s case from that of his codefendants, and (b) failed to move to reopen the 

case. 

The Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which guarantees not only assistance, but effective 

assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). The benchmark for 

judging any claim of ineffectiveness is whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper 

functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just 

result. Id. In order to prevail on a Sixth Amendment ineffectiveness of counsel claim, petitioner 

must establish two things. First, he must establish that counsel's performance was deficient, i.e., 

that it fell below an "objective standard of reasonableness" under prevailing professional norms. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. Second, he must establish that he was prejudiced by counsel's 

deficient performance, i.e., that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. A 

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. A 

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court need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before examining the 

prejudice suffered by the defendant as the result of the alleged deficiencies. See Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 697; Williams v. Calderon, 52 F.3d 1465, 1470 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1995) (applauding district 

court's refusal to consider whether counsel's conduct was deficient after determining that petitioner 

could not establish prejudice). 

A. Failure to Move to Sever. 

Petitioner and his codefendants pursued a joint defense. Saucedo, 2011 WL 5356796, at

*7. There was evidence that petitioner, Martell, and Samuel were involved in the fight, and all 

three were arrested. Id. at *4-5. They were charged together but only petitioner was charged with 

personal use of a deadly or dangerous weapon (a knife). Id. at *1, *4. 

Petitioner contends that defense counsel’s failure to move to sever his case from that of his 

codefendants was ineffective assistance of counsel. He urges that the motion to sever should have 

been made because (1) his defense “was clearly inconsistent” with Martell’s and Samuel’s,

because they all agreed that one of them stabbed Mauricio and they all pled not guilty and (2) 

“strong evidence” against his codefendants would have strengthened his defense. Dkt. 13-1 at 33-

34. He further contends that this failure prejudiced him because it prevented his defense counsel 

from calling exculpatory witnesses to impeach the testimony of his codefendants and the victim. 

Dkt. 10-1 at 15. 

The Santa Clara County Superior Court rejected this claim of ineffective assistance, 

concluding that binding precedent would not allow a severance under the circumstances: 

Regarding petitioner’s assertion that a motion to sever the case 

should have been made and would have been granted, case law is to 

the contrary. Indeed, this was a “classic case” for joinder. (People 

v. Homick (2012) 55 Cal.4th 816, 850; People v. Souza (2012) 54 

Cal.4th 90, 110; People v. Letner and Tobin (2012) 50 Cal.4th 99,

150; and People v. Coffman v. Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 40.)

Trial counsel correctly saw that there was no likelihood of a 

severance motion being granted and “trial counsel is not required to 

make frivolous or futile motions, or indulge in idle acts.” (People v. 

Reynolds (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1402, 1409.)

Dkt. 12-4 at 2. 

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The Santa Clara County Superior Court’s February 21, 2014 order denying petitioner’s 

petition for writ of habeas corpus is the last reasoned decision from a state court on the ineffective 

assistance of counsel claims. See Dkt. 12-4. Therefore, that is the decision being examined 

through the deferential lens of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Petitioner’s claim fails under the first prong of Strickland because he cannot show that 

defense counsel’s decision not to move for severance fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness. A lawyer need not file a motion that she knows to be meritless on the facts and 

the law. See Wilson v. Henry, 185 F.3d 986, 990 (9th Cir. 1999) (“to show prejudice under 

Strickland from failure to file a motion, [a petitioner] must show that (1) had his counsel filed the 

motion, it is reasonable that the trial court would have granted it as meritorious, and (2) had the 

motion been granted, it is reasonable that there would have been an outcome more favorable to 

him.”). As the Santa Clara County Superior Court explained, “there was no likelihood” that a 

severance would be granted because “this was a ‘classic case’ for joinder.” Dkt. 12-4 at 2. Trial 

counsel did not engage in deficient performance by not filing a meritless motion for severance.

See Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1273 (9th Cir. 2005); Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1445 (9th 

Cir. 1996) (failure to take futile action can never be deficient performance). 

Further, the record indicates that attorney for petitioner had made a tactical decision to 

present a joint defense strategy with the other codefendants, rather than seek separate trials.

Respondent’s Exhibit (“Resp’t Exh.”) B, RT 916-17. Petitioner was the only defendant with the 

alleged enhancements for personal use of a deadly weapon and personal infliction of great bodily 

injury, and was the only defendant charged with assault with a deadly weapon in count three, and 

thus was considered the most culpable of the three under the prosecution’s theory of the case.

Resp’t Exh. A, CT 196-202. It was not deficient performance for his attorney to have pursued a 

joint defense because testimony from codefendants Martell and Samuel benefitted petitioner by 

painting a picture of him as coming to his friend Samuel’s protection. Resp’t Exh. B at 587, 644-

45, 704, 741-42. The codefendants described Mauricio as the one commencing the physical 

aggression by spraying mace at them, thus provoking the fight between Samuel and Mauricio and 

subsequently prompting petitioner’s involvement. Id. A difference of opinion as to trial tactics 

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does not constitute denial of effective assistance, see United States v. Mayo, 646 F.2d 369, 375 

(9th Cir. 1981), and tactical decisions are not ineffective assistance simply because in retrospect 

better tactics are known to have been available. See Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1241 (9th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 838 (1984). Federal courts should not overlook the “wide latitude 

counsel must have in making tactical decisions”; therefore, there are no “strict rules” for counsel's 

conduct “[b]eyond the general requirement of reasonableness.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 

1388, 1406-07 (2011) (“‘No particular set of detailed rules for counsel's conduct can satisfactorily 

take account of the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range of legitimate 

decisions . . . .’”) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89). 

Petitioner also has not shown that defense counsel’s decision not to move for severance 

was prejudicial to him, so his claim fails under the second prong of Strickland. Since the case was 

a “‘classic case’ for joinder” under state law, there is no reasonable likelihood the motion would 

have been granted. See Wilson, 185 F.3d at 990. 

The Court concludes that petitioner has not shown that defense counsel was ineffective. 

His claims do not satisfy the deferential Strickland test: he has failed to establish that defense 

counsel engaged in deficient performance or that that he suffered prejudice as a result of the 

deficient performance. Given that petitioner fails to establish either element in Strickland, he 

cannot show the state court’s rejection of his claim was an unreasonable application of Strickland. 

B. Failure to Timely Move to Reopen. 

Toward the end of the trial, codefendants Martell and, later, Samuel, chose to enter guilty 

pleas. Saucedo, 2011 WL 5356796, at *6-7. Petitioner’s defense counsel then moved for a 

mistrial. Id. at *7. When the mistrial motion was not granted, she moved to reopen the case and 

for a two-week continuance because she needed more time to gather evidence. Id. at *8. These 

motions were denied. Id. The California Court of Appeal described at length the circumstances of 

the motion to reopen, although that court was not adjudicating an ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim:

At the close of Samuel’s case but before defendant’s case, Martell 

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moved for a judgment of acquittal (§ 1118.1). The court granted the 

motion on count 1 [i.e., the burglary charge]. It denied the motion 

on count 2 [i.e., the assault with a deadly or dangerous weapon or by 

means of force likely to produce great bodily injury charge] and also 

denied Martell’s motion to dismiss the case in the interest of justice 

(§ 1385). The court stated it was “prepared to make an offer” if 

Martell wished to enter a plea to count 2: “The Court would 

consider ... a grant of a Section 17, credit for time served, and it 

would be informal probation.” 

Later that same day, Martell accepted the court’s offer. The court 

reduced count 2 from a felony to a misdemeanor (§ 17, subd. (b)(5)), 

and Martell pleaded no contest to misdemeanor assault. The court 

suspended imposition of sentence, granted him credit for time 

served, placed him on informal probation for one year, and ordered 

that he be “released forthwith.” 

Samuel also moved for a judgment of acquittal and for dismissal in 

the interest of justice. His motions were denied. 

Defendant’s counsel then brought up some “housekeeping” matters, 

asking the court to exclude photographs of defendant’s tattoos and 

to “pare down” the number of prior felony convictions that would be 

admitted to impeach him. The court excluded the photographs as 

more prejudicial than probative but ruled that defendant could be 

asked whether his arms were covered with tattoos. The court also 

ruled that evidence of defendant’s numerous prior convictions, 

including one for assault with a deadly weapon (a knife), two for 

burglary, one for forgery, and one for vehicle theft, would be 

admitted to impeach him if he were to testify. The court would also 

permit the district attorney to question defendant about a toxicology 

report that had come back positive for methamphetamine use. 

When the jury returned to the courtroom, the court explained that 

the counts against Martell “no longer need to be decided in this 

case” and advised the jurors not to speculate about or consider why 

that was so. 

Mauricio had earlier testified about his prior felony assault 

conviction, and the defense began its case by asking the court to take 

judicial notice of the court file reflecting that 1995 conviction. The 

court did so, and without offering further evidence or calling any 

witnesses, the defense rested. There was no rebuttal by the 

prosecution, and the jury was dismissed for the day. 

That afternoon, Samuel accepted the prosecution’s offer to plead no 

contest to assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily 

injury in return for dismissal of the burglary count and three years’ 

probation with a maximum four-year sentence for a violation of 

probation. The jury was later told that “[t]he Court has already 

instructed you that ... there is one defendant in this case, that you are 

not to speculate in terms of what happened to the other two 

defendants. The fact that those defendants are not now present is 

not something for you to consider. You do, however, consider all of 

the evidence, which includes the testimony that was offered by those 

defendants.” 

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Defendant moved for a mistrial that afternoon. His trial counsel 

explained that there had been “some indication” several days before 

that Martell and Samuel were entering into negotiations, “and then 

when we came back from ... lunch ..., there was an indication that ... 

discussions had broken down.” “And the Court made clear that it 

was ... the People’s right and the defendant’s [sic] rights to enter into 

those negotiations at any time, and it was my indication informally 

that I was concerned about fairness to my client and due process to 

my client based upon what happened up to that moment, a joint 

defense effort. ... I cannot say that ... is the only reason that 

[defendant] did not take the stand in this case. I can say that [it] 

early impacted his decision to do that. And I will for the record list 

five things, five tactical decisions that were made jointly and were 

made with compromise in this case, and I will say on the record as 

an officer of this Court that those decisions would all have been 

different had I not entered into a joint defense agreement with 

codefendant Counsel. The first was opening the door ... regarding 

Mauricio[’s] prior violent conduct.... [O]bviously there was a 

tactical issue in question for my client about whether to open that 

door, given his own 245 conviction.... Number two, the crossexamination of ... Martell by myself was severely curtailed as a 

courtesy to his attorney.... The third would be the cross-examination 

of [Samuel], which, again, was severely curtailed as a courtesy to 

his attorney and in an effort to enter compromise. The fourth would 

be my decision not to call Valerie ... as a witness.... Fifth-and I’llyou know, should the Court deny my mistrial motion, I’ll obviously 

be making these points much more fully in a motion for a new trial. 

But also the-my decision not to pursue impeachment evidence 

regarding a defense witness who we interviewed was the apartment 

manager for the complex, who had several acts of, I guess, bad 

character or misconduct by Mauricio ... as a tenant. We did not call 

him as a witness, because he also had negative things to say about ... 

Martell. And in an effort to keep that door closed, and again as a 

compromise with Counsel, I did not call that witness to testify. 

These are the five things at this point that I can offer to the Court. 

Obviously, the first being the most important, in my view.” 

Responding to the mistrial motion the next morning, the district 

attorney argued that the decision to open the door to Mauricio’s 

prior violent conduct was a tactical one “that ... does not rise to a 

denial of due process for [defendant].” She pointed out that Martell 

had entered his plea before defendant began his case, so the defense 

could have recalled him during its case-in-chief and thoroughly 

cross-examined him then. The defense could also have presented 

the apartment manager’s testimony, since there was no longer any 

issue about showing Martell in a bad light. “There’s no denial of 

due process rights when this is all evidence that could have been 

presented to a jury.” The court denied the mistrial motion. 

Raising the same issues, defendant’s trial counsel then moved to 

reopen the case and for a two-week continuance (from January 12, 

2010 to January 25, 2010) “to allow me to subpoena the appropriate 

witnesses and to ... pursue some issues that I was not able to pursue 

based on the joint defense agreements.” Defendant’s ability to argue 

third party culpability had been “hampered,” his counsel contended, 

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when Martell and Samuel suddenly “accepted culpability,” and she 

needed “to fully explore the defense options that I set aside, or I 

need to consider whether there’s been ineffective assistance of 

counsel. But either way, my client’s facing 29 years, and he’s 

entitled to a fair trial, and he’s not getting one, in my view.” 

The court denied the motions. “The fact that codefendants settle 

their cases during a trial is something that certainly does happen,” 

the court explained. “The Court doesn’t view it as something that is 

highly unusual.” “For ... co-defense counsel not to advise their 

clients to accept settlement, if they view it in ... those specific 

clients’ best interests, of course, is a conflict that Counsel can’t 

have.” “In other words, while the Court understands that there was 

a mutual understanding ..., certainly Counsel could not advise their 

clients that there might not be resolutions along the way.... 

Certainly, that is something that is foreseeable.... [I]t isn’t possible 

for Counsel to state a hundred percent that there won’t be conflicts 

amongst Counsel in terms of their visions ... of how the case should 

proceed.” 

The jury was instructed the next morning, heard closing and rebuttal 

arguments, and began deliberating.

Saucedo, 2011 WL 5356796, at *6-8. 

The Santa Clara County Superior Court rejected petitioner’s habeas claim that counsel was

ineffective in failing to timely move to reopen, finding that petitioner had not satisfied Strickland’s

prejudice prong. Like the state appellate court had earlier concluded, the superior court concluded

that the additional testimony would have been of negligible value. Dkt. 12-4 at 3. The superior

court stated, “‘the value of the evidence was slight.’” Id. Samuel’s testimony “‘would not have 

added anything to defendant’s case.’” Id. The additional testimony from Martell “‘would not 

have added anything of import to defendant’s case either.’” Id. Valerie’s testimony would not 

“‘have added anything to defendant’s case.’” Id. The superior court concluded that the evidence 

petitioner wanted to proffer “‘was not material’” and “‘the evidentiary value...was minimal.’” Id.1 

Petitioner’s claim fails under the second prong of Strickland because he has not shown that 

defense counsel’s failure to timely move to reopen caused him prejudice. Even if the motion to 

reopen had been made in a timely fashion, petitioner has not shown that the trial court would have 

 

1

In reaching its decision on the limited value of the evidence, the superior court relied on the 

California Court of Appeal’s analysis of the evidence. This court considers the state appellate 

court’s reasoning, adopted by the superior court, to evaluate counsel’s conduct in connection with 

the motion to reopen. 

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granted it, or that, had the motion been granted and the evidence been presented, that there is a 

reasonable probability of a different outcome. See Wilson, 185 F.3d at 990; Rupe, 93 F.3d at 

1445. The state court reasonably concluded that the additional testimony was of limited value due 

its mostly cumulative nature. Any reputation evidence from the apartment manager to discredit 

Martell would have been cumulative, because Martell already testified about his frequent loud 

fights with Valerie and reported that neighbors complained to the apartment manager and police 

about them, which led to their eventual eviction. Saucedo, 2011 WL 5356796, at *10. Any 

testimony from the apartment manager to discredit Mauricio would have been cumulative because

Martell and Samuel already had described their problems with him and the jury had heard from 

Mauricio. Id. Mauricio was considered such a “troublesome witness” that he discredited himself, 

as the state appellate court noted. Id. Even the district attorney was compelled to comment during 

closing argument that Mauricio was “not a terribly likeable person.” Id. Regarding defense

counsel’s plan to impeach Martell and Samuel because of a belated acceptance of responsibility, 

Samuel already had admitted that he lied to the police and there was ample circumstantial 

evidence to suggest that Martell had thrown the television on Mauricio. Id. at *10-11. Any 

testimony from Valerie would not have added anything to petitioner’s case because Samuel’s and 

Martell’s credibility had already been impeached. Id.

The superior court’s determination that this ineffective assistance of counsel claim failed 

on Strickland’s prejudice prong was not an unreasonable application of Strickland. Petitioner is 

not entitled to the writ on his claim that counsel was ineffective in failing to timely move to 

reopen the case. 

C. The Unexhausted Failure-To-Investigate Claim. 

Petitioner also asserted a claim in his first amended petition that counsel was ineffective in 

that she failed to investigate. Dkt. 13-1 at 26-27, 31. Counsel allegedly failed to (1) investigate 

and listen to jailhouse recordings of conversations between Martell, Samuel and Valerie, and (2)

failed to interview Martell, Samuel and Valerie. Id. This claim will be denied as unexhausted and 

as meritless. 

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1. Procedural History. 

Petitioner included an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in his original petition. Dkt. 

1-1 at 7. Respondent asserted in his answer filed on July 26, 2013 that petitioner had not 

exhausted state court remedies for his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Dkt. 6-1 at 11-12. 

Petitioner thereafter conceded non-exhaustion and requested a stay of these proceedings to return 

to state court to exhaust the ineffective assistance of counsel claims, including a failure-toinvestigate claim. See Dkt. 8 at 5-6. The Court granted a stay under Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 

269 (2005). Dkt. 11. 

On September 22, 2014, petitioner filed a first amended petition in which he alleged, 

among other things, that counsel was ineffective in that she failed to investigate because she failed 

to listen to certain jailhouse recordings and failed to interview three witnesses (i.e., Valerie, 

Samuel and Martel). Dkt. 13-1 at 26-27, 31. On October 29, 2014, the Court granted petitioner’s 

motion to lift the stay. Dkt. 14. Respondent filed an answer to the first amended petition on 

February 20, 2015, and argued that the claim that counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate 

should be rejected because state court remedies had not been exhausted for it. Dkt. 17-1 at 13. 

Petitioner filed his traverse on April 27, 2015. Dkt. 23. 

Two weeks before he filed his traverse, petitioner filed a motion for discovery, seeking to 

obtain a copy of recorded jailhouse conversations that his attorney allegedly had failed to 

investigate. Dkt. 20. The existence of the recordings was not new information to petitioner, as he 

knew or should have known of the recordings since counsel had mentioned the records at the trial 

in January 2010 petitioner’s presence. 

The Court denied the discovery motion, finding that petitioner had not shown good cause 

for the requested discovery. Dkt. 31. Among other things, the Court determined that it was pure 

speculation that the contents of the jailhouse recordings would be of help to petitioner in proving 

his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Id. at 3-4. (Petitioner had never heard the contents of 

the recordings and, in fact, contended that his attorney had not heard them either. Dkt. 13-1 at 26-

27, 31.) The Court also determined that the ineffective assistance of counsel claim was 

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unexhausted, and relied on the fact of nonexhaustion to deny the discovery motion. Dkt. 31 at 4-5. 

2. The Unexhausted Claim Is Denied. 

The claim that counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to investigate is 

unexhausted, but may be denied because it is not even colorable. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b); 

Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 623–24 (9th Cir. 2005). Petitioner has failed to satisfy the 

prejudice prong of the Strickland analysis for his claim that counsel’s alleged failure to investigate 

amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. Petitioner does not know what evidence counsel 

would have unearthed had she investigated and is left to mere speculation that there was helpful 

information to be gained if counsel had listened to the recordings and interviewed the three 

witnesses. That sort of speculation is not sufficient to show “a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. The unexhausted claim that counsel was ineffective in failing to 

investigate is denied.

II. Right To Present A Defense Claim. 

Petitioner claims that his constitutional right to present a defense was violated when the 

trial court denied his motion to reopen the case after his codefendants pled guilty at the end of the 

trial. Dkt. 13-1 at 38. This issue was rejected by the California Court of Appeal on direct appeal:

“The decision to grant or deny a motion to reopen ... remains in the 

discretion of the trial court.” (People v. Monterroso (2004) 34 

Cal.4th 743, 779; § 1094.) “In determining whether a trial court has 

abused its discretion in denying a defense request to reopen, the 

reviewing court considers the following factors: ‘(1) the stage the 

proceedings had reached when the motion was made; (2) the 

defendant’s diligence (or lack thereof) in presenting the new 

evidence; (3) the prospect that the jury would accord the new 

evidence undue emphasis; and (4) the significance of the evidence.’

[Citation.]” (People v. Jones (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1084, 1110 (Jones).)

Considering those factors here, we discern no abuse of discretion. 

The first factor supports the court’s decision because although the 

motion to reopen was not by itself particularly untimely (see Jones, 

supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 1111), it was coupled with an “attendant” 

motion for a two-week continuance that would have unduly 

prolonged the trial...Here, the trial had already run slightly longer 

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than anticipated, which had caused one juror to express concern 

about missing the start of the school year, and jurors had also been 

told that they would be instructed and hear arguments of counsel 

that day. 

The second factor also supports the court’s decision, because the 

reason proffered for the continuance—to permit the defense to 

“subpoena the appropriate witnesses” (i.e., Martell, Samuel, the 

apartment manager, Valerie, and “police officers to lay foundations 

and things like that”)—evidences a lack of diligence. Since Martell 

entered his plea and was sentenced before defendant began his casein-chief, defendant could have recalled him as a witness that same 

afternoon, as his trial counsel had to concede. (People v. Funes

(1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1506, 1520 [motion to reopen properly 

denied where the defense “could easily have introduced” the 

proffered evidence during cross-examination of the prosecution’s 

witnesses or during the defense case.].) We are not persuaded by 

defendant’s argument on appeal that it was not until Samuel also 

entered a no contest plea that the testimony of both codefendants 

became “critical” since both codefendants’ “sudden departure” from 

the case was “highly suggestive of the conclusion that [defendant] ... 

wielded the knife.” The argument assumes jurors would have 

speculated that Martell’s and Samuel’s departures “implied 

innocence on their part.” Jurors might just as easily have speculated 

that the departures implied guilt, in our view, but they were properly 

instructed not to speculate at all about why Martell and Samuel were 

no longer in the case. We “ ‘must assume that jurors are intelligent 

persons and capable of understanding and correlating all jury 

instructions which are given.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Richardson

(2008) 43 Cal.4th 959, 1028.) 

Defendant has also never satisfactorily explained why he had not 

previously served the apartment manager and Valerie with trial 

subpoenas to ensure their prompt appearances in the event his 

counsel decided to call them as witnesses. These were not newly 

discovered witnesses; the defense had previously interviewed the 

apartment manager, and as defendant concedes, both the manager’s 

and Valerie’s addresses were matters of public record. Had they 

been subpoenaed earlier, their testimony could have been presented 

during defendant’s case-in-chief, particularly since there was no 

longer any reason to accommodate Martell’s counsel’s concern 

about the impact of their testimony on Martell’s case. If the 

apartment manager’s and Valerie’s testimony was as “critical” as 

defendant now claims it was, we think he would have had both of 

them waiting in the wings. His failure to do so showed a lack of 

diligence. 

Saucedo, 2011 WL 5356796, at *8-9. 

With regard to the third factor mentioned in People v. Jones, 30 Cal. 4th at 1110 – the 

prospect that the jury would accord the evidence undue emphasis – the state appellate court stated 

that the jury may accord undue weight to the evidence because petitioner wanted to present it to 

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the jury after a two-week break in the trial. Id. at *10. The long gap, followed by presentation of 

the new evidence just before deliberations began, might lead the jury to give that new evidence 

undue emphasis. Id. With regard to the fourth factor mentioned in Jones – the evidence’s

significance – the state appellate court concluded that the value of the evidence was only slight. 

Id. 

Whether grounded in the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of compulsory process or in the 

more general Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of due process, “the Constitution guarantees 

criminal defendants ‘a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.’” Holmes v. South 

Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324 (2006) (quoting Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 690 (1986)); see 

California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984) (due process); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 

U.S. 284, 294 (1973) (compulsory process). 

The constitutional right to present a complete defense includes the right to present 

evidence, including the testimony of witnesses. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967). 

But the right is only implicated when the evidence the defendant seeks to admit is “relevant and 

material, and . . . vital to the defense.” Id. at 16. Additionally, a violation of the right to present a 

defense does not occur any time such evidence is excluded, but rather only when its exclusion is 

“arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes [the exclusionary rule applied is] designed to serve.” 

Holmes, 547 U.S. at 324 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); Michigan v. Lucas, 500 

U.S. 145, 151 (1991). “State and federal rulemakers have broad latitude under the Constitution to 

establish rules excluding evidence from criminal trials.” Holmes, 547 U.S. at 324 (2006) 

(quotations and citations omitted); see also Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 42 (1996) (holding 

that due process does not guarantee a defendant the right to present all relevant evidence). The 

exclusion of evidence does not violate the Due Process Clause unless “it offends some principle of 

justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” 

Egelhoff, 518 U.S. at 42. The defendant, not the state, bears the burden to demonstrate this. Id. at 

47 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 

A violation of the right to present a defense merits habeas relief only if the error was likely 

to have had a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict. See Lunbery v. Hornbeam, 605 F.3d 

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754, 762 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637-38 (1993)). 

The state appellate court’s reasoning amply supports its determination that the denial of 

petitioner’s motion to reopen the case did not violate his constitutional right to present a defense. 

In sum, the California Court of Appeal rejected the claim that the case should have been reopened 

because reopening the case would have unduly prolonged the trial, the appropriate witnesses were 

available and could have been called before the defense rested its case, the jury might have 

accorded undue weight to the new witness testimony presented long after the other testimony, and 

the value of the new testimony was slight. Id. at *8-10. The state appellate court also discussed 

that the testimony that petitioner wanted to present from the apartment manager, Martell, and 

Valerie would have been cumulative. Id. at *10-11. Testimony from the apartment manager 

would have been cumulative because Martell already testified about his fights with Valerie, 

neighbors’ complaints to the apartment manager and the police, and their later eviction. Id. at *10. 

Testimony about Mauricio would have been cumulative because both Martell and Samuel already 

had testified about their problems with Mauricio and Mauricio had discredited himself in various 

ways (e.g., he had a felony assault conviction, admitted that his statement to police about Martell 

punching and kicking him was merely an assumption, and was a poor witness.) Id. Regarding 

defense counsel’s plan to impeach Martell and Samuel because of a belated acceptance of 

responsibility, Samuel already had admitted that he lied to the police and there was ample 

circumstantial evidence to suggest that Martell had thrown the television on Mauricio. Id. at *10-

11. Any testimony from Valerie about the conversations she had with Samuel and Martell would 

not have added anything to petitioner’s case because their credibility had already been impeached. 

Id.

Petitioner contends that the trial court should have granted his motion to reopen the case so 

he could have presented “critical defense evidence” that was “highly relevant” and “critical” to his 

defense. Dkt. 13-1 at 38-39. Petitioner also asserts that none of the evidence that he sought to 

introduce was marginally relevant or repetitive. Id. at 39-40. However, he does not show what 

that new evidence was, how it was relevant, or how it would make a difference in his favor. As to 

the evidence that was mentioned by counsel in her motion to reopen the case, the California Court 

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of Appeal determined that it was of slight or negligible value, as discussed above. Petitioner’s 

mere disagreement with the California Court of Appeal’s conclusion is not enough to show that 

the California Court of Appeal’s rejection of the claim “was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). 

The California Court of Appeal’s rejection of petitioner’s claim of a denial of a right to 

present a defense was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal 

law as set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court. Petitioner therefore is not entitled to the writ on this 

claim. 

III. A Certificate of Appealability Is Denied. 

A certificate of appealability will not issue. Reasonable jurists would not “find the district 

court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 

473, 484 (2000). Petitioner may seek a certificate of appealability from the Court of Appeals. 

CONCLUSION

The state court’s denial of petitioner’s claims did not result in a decision that was contrary 

to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, nor did it result in a decision 

that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in 

the state court proceeding. Accordingly, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. 

The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of respondent and close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: October 2, 2015

______________________________________

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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