Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-5_04-cv-05298/USCOURTS-arwd-5_04-cv-05298-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION

DONALD RAY CUNNINGHAM PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 04-5298

OFFICER KERN, an officer of the Washington 

County Sheriff's Office/Detention Center;

LEE OWEN, Sheriff, Washington County 

Sheriff's Department; OFFICER STRAIN, 

an officer of the Washington County Sheriff's 

Office/Detention Center; RHONDA BRADLEY,

Nurse at the Washington County Detention Center;

and SGT. REESER, investigating officer. DEFENDANTS

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Donald Ray Cunningham brings this pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

alleging that his constitutional rights were violated while he was detained in the Washington

County Detention Center. 

On October 28, 2005, defendants filed a motion (Doc. 21) for summary judgment. The

court entered an order (Doc. 24) directing plaintiff to respond to the summary judgment motion.

On December 30, 2005, the plaintiff filed hisresponse to the motion. (Doc. 25.) The defendants'

motion for summary judgment is currently before the undersigned for issuance of this report and

recommendation. 

I. Background

When plaintiff was booked into the Crawford County, Kansas, Detention Center on July

20, 2004, he completed an intake medical questionnaire. On this questionnaire, plaintiff stated

that he hasseizures, but that he was not taking any medication for this condition. (Doc. 22 at Ex.

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1.) On that same day, plaintiff was taken to the Mt. Carmel Regional Medical Center where he

was diagnosed with headaches and possible seizures. Dr. Augusto Ramirez evaluated the

plaintiff. Dr. Ramirez noted that plaintiff had been brought in on the claim that he had had a

seizure, but that no one had witnessed the seizure. A CT scan was conducted which was

negative. Several laboratory tests were conducted which were also normal. After a first attempt

to conduct a lumbar puncture was unsuccessful, Cunningham refused a second attempt.

Cunningham decided to return to the jail against medical advice. (Doc. 22 at Ex. 1.) 

The next morning, Cunningham told a jailer that he had had another episode of seizure

which was not witnessed. Cunningham was again taken to Mr. Carmel. There, Dr. Ramirez

informed him that there was no clinical evidence of a serious central nervous system problem.

When Cunningham asked what was left that could be causing the problem, Dr. Ramirez told him

that they would have to observe him. Cunningham then "got kind of aggressive." Dr. Ramirez

opined that plaintiff needed confinement and a neurological consultation if his seizures were

witnessed, but Dr. Ramirez thought "that this is more a behavioral problem than a neurological

problem." At that time, Cunningham was given a prescription for Imileptol for two weeks.

(Doc. 22 at Ex. 1.) On August 26, 2004, Cunningham was again booked into the Crawford

County, Kansas jail. On his medical intake, he indicated only that he had headaches and

blackouts--not seizures. (Doc. 22 at Ex. 1.) 

On October 1, 2004, Cunningham was arrested by the Fayetteville Police Department and

transported to the Washington County Detention Center on failure to appear charges and on a

hold for another department. (Doc. 25 at ¶ 8.) Upon intake, he signed a medical release and

consent for medical services. (Doc. 25 at ¶¶ 9, 10.) 

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According to Cunningham's medical records maintained by the Washington County

Detention Center, Nurse Bradley attempted to obtain Cunningham's medical records from the

Mt. Carmel Hospital on October 1, 2004. Also, on October 1, 2004, Nurse Baker contacted the

Wal-Mart pharmacy in Pittsburg, Kansas because this was the pharmacy through which plaintiff

stated that he had received Dilantin medication for his seizures. That pharmacy reported that

they did not have any record information for Cunningham. Cunningham also reported that he

had taken Dilantin that morning, but when test results came back that contradicting that claim,

plaintiff reported that he did not know what medication he was taking. (Doc. 22 at Ex. 3.)

Later on October 1, 2004, it was reported that an inmate had fallen. When Nurse Baker

arrived, plaintiff had a cut over his right eye. His vitals were taken, and he was removed to the

nurses' station. There, Nurse Baker reported that Cunningham was "hostile, cussing, and noncooperative." Cunningham complained about pain on the left side of his rib cage, but there was

no redness or abrasions seen. Cunningham then reported that he had been seen by emergency

medical service (EMS) when he was first arrested on his claims of seizures, but that he had

refused to go the emergency room, but now he was threatening to sue if he was not taken to the

emergency room. The cut over his right eye was glued and he was transported to the emergency

room by officers Lansford, Jason and Reeser. (Doc. 22 at Ex. 3.) Plaintiff states that he does

not recall going to the hospital. (Doc. 25 at ¶ 16.) 

Although plaintiff states that he does not believe he was ever taken to the Washington

Regional Medical Center, the defendants have provided a copy of plaintiff's discharge

instructions, dated October 1, 2004, reflecting that he was being discharged and prescribed 15

Ativan tablets to be taken three times a day. (Doc. 22 at Ex. 2.) On October 1, 2004, Nurse

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Rhonda Bradley ordered 15 Ativan tablets for plaintiff. These tablets were to be taken three

times a day. (Doc. 22 at Ex. 2.) Cunningham refused to sign the inmate medical insurance form,

which states that he would be responsible for the cost of medical treatment. (Doc. 22 at Ex. 2.)

On October 6, 2004, Cunningham was seen by Dr. Howard who noted that Cunningham

claimed to have had a seizure on October 4. Dr. Howard noted that plaintiff was not currently

taking medications, and placed him on Dilantin to see how he would do. Cunningham also

complained of headaches and was prescribed Aleve to be taken twice daily. (Doc. 22 at Ex. 3.)

On October 11, 2004 at 12:21 a.m., Deputy Jason Stanley filed a report, stating that at

approximately 11:28 p.m., he observed Cunningham fall while stepping out of the shower room.

Deputy Stanley observed Cunningham hit his head and begin to shake violently. At 11:45 p.m.,

Deputy Parker contacted Nurse Baker by phone. Nurse Baker instructed Deputy Parker that if

jail officials could get the bleeding to stop, Cunningham could be taken to the clinic the next day.

EMS personnel were contacted, and they moved Cunningham to the nurses' station where EMS

personnel treated a laceration to Cunningham's head. Cunningham was then moved to Cell 238

where a 15-minute watch was continued. (Doc. 22 at Ex. 4.) Cunningham disagree with this

account of facts only in that he was already in Cell 238 and was not moved to there for

observation. (Doc. 25 at 22.) 

On October 11, 2004, Deputy Bruce Strain filed a report, stating that at 12:30 a.m. he

heard loud banging coming from Cell 238. There Deputy Strain found detainee Robert Chavez

beating on the door and screaming that Cunningham was having a seizure. Deputy Strain

reported that Cunningham was laying face down on his mat and moaning and did not seem to

be having any type of seizure. Deputy Strain left the lights on in cell 238 so Cunningham could

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be monitored. (Doc. 22 at Ex. 4.) Cunningham disagrees with this account only on the basis that

he does not believe Deputy Strain was working at the Washington County Detention Center in

October 2004. (Doc. 25 at ¶ 19.) 

According to a Washington County Detention Center Medical Transport Sheet,

Cunningham was taken to a Medi-Serve clinic on October 11, 2004 where he received stitches

for the laceration above his right eye brow. Per the doctor's orders, the stitches were to be

removed on October 18, 2004. (Doc. 22 at Ex. 4.) Cunningham disagrees with this, claiming

that it was days later before he was taken to a doctor or hospital. (Doc. 25 at ¶ 23.) 

On October 11, 2004, Officer Nancy Luther reported that Cunningham received an

answered request concerning his charges and bond amount and supposedly had a seizure when

he received this response. Officer Luther told Cunningham that he had gone to the hospital the

day before, but that she would call the nurse for ibuprofen for his back that was hurt in the fall.

Nurse Bradley approved ibuprofen to be taken daily as needed. Officer Luther further reported

that a doctor at the Washington Regional Medical Center had discreetly told Sgt. Reeser that

Cunningham was faking his seizures. (Doc. 22 at Ex. 4, Doc. 25 at ¶¶ 20-21.) On October 13,

2004, Cunningham was treated by Dr. Howard for continued seizure problems and headaches.

(Doc. 22 at Ex. 3.) 

On November 20, 2004, at approximately 4:15 p.m., Deputy Kern was assisting Deputy

Waggoner in escorting a detainee from the cell block to the shower room. As they passed by

Cunningham's door, Deputy Kern noticed that the small door covering the window in the large

door was open and that Cunningham had his face in the window trying to watch what the

deputies were doing. As they passed by the door, Deputy Kern reached up and pushed the small

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window door shut. After Deputy Kern closed the door, Cunningham began yelling profanities

toward Deputy Waggoner, saying "Waggoner, you asshole, you hit me in the head with the

door!" A few minutes later, Cunningham was still yelling at Deputies Waggoner and Kern.

Deputy Waggoner opened the door to Cell 272 to see what Cunningham was yelling about, and

at that time there did not appear to Deputy Waggoner or Kern to be anything wrong with

Cunningham. Approximately 15 minutes later, Cunningham began yelling at every officer who

walked by his cell, stating that he wanted to speak to the sergeant. Deputy Halley took

Cunningham to the sergeant's office to discuss his complaints with Sgt. Calvin Mitchell and Sgt.

Chris Reeser. (Doc. 22 at Ex. 4; Doc. 25 at ¶¶ 26-29.) Cunningham only disagrees with this

account of events in that Deputy Kern "slamed" [sic] the window door instead of just shutting

the door. (Doc. 25 at ¶ 26.) 

During Cunningham's time at the Washington County Detention Center, there was a

policy that the windows on the cell block doors were to remain closed at all time for the safety

and security of the detention center, for the privacy of showering inmates, and for the

maintenance of order in the intake process. Detainees at the detention center often attempted to

pry open the windows on the cell block doors and deputies were constantly shutting those

windows. (Doc. 22 at Ex. 6.) 

On November 21, 2004, Cunningham filed a medical request to see the jail nurse about

his headache. (Doc. 22 at Ex. 5.) The next day, November 22, 2004, Cunningham saw Nurse

Bradley, who noted that Cunningham was hit in the head by a door on Saturday, but that there

was no bruising. She stated that he was on Aleve and would continue monitoring him.

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Cunningham contends that the nurse refused to give him any medication for his headache. (Doc.

22 at Ex. 6, Doc. 25 at ¶ 30.) 

On November 22, 2004, Cunningham again complained of a headache, and Nurse

Bradley responded that he was receiving Aleve twice daily. She also noted that Cunningham

told an officer that he had a seizure, but that no one had examined him. Cunningham's Dilantin

levels were drawn per Dr. Howard's orders and Cunningham was permitted to have Ibuprofen.

(Doc. 22 at Ex. 5.) Cunningham claims that Nurse Bradley would not provide him anything for

his headaches. (Doc. 25 at ¶ 31.) The defendants have submitted plaintiff's medication logs

which reflect that he received Aleve from November 10 through December 1, 2004, twice a day

per his request, and was offered Ibuprofen at least twice a day every day of December, although

Cunningham often refused the Ibuprofen. (Doc. 22 at Ex. 3.) 

On November 23, 2004, Cunningham's Dilantin level was checked by the Washington

Regional Medical Center, and those results were forwarded to the jail on November 24, 2004.

(Doc. 22 at Ex. 5.) 

On November 28, 2004, Cunningham submitted a grievance about the November 20

incident, claiming that it had caused a knot on his head. Officer Matthews responded that Sgt.

Reeser was investigating the incident. (Doc. 22 at Ex. 5.) On November 27, 2004, Cunningham

complained about seeing black spots and that he had blacked out twice and was having severe

headaches. Nurse Bradley responded that Cunningham was on the list to see the doctor. On

December 1, 2004, Dr. Howard examined Cunningham for headaches and dizzy spells. Dr.

Howard prescribed Meclizine and Ibuprofen. On December 13, 2004, Cunningham requested

to be back on the medication because it really helped, and on December 15, 2004, Dr. Howard

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verbally ordered that Cunningham continue to receive the Meclizine. (Doc. 22 at Ex. 5.)

Defendants have provided Cunningham's medication logs which show that he received Meclizine

three times a day from December 1 through December 9, 2004, and from December 16 through

January 10, 2004. (Doc. 22 at Ex. 3.) 

Cunningham was released on probation from the Washington County Detention Center

on January 11, 2005. (Doc. 22 at Ex. 2.) 

Defendants contend that they are being sued in their official capacities only. (Doc. 21.)

Plaintiff indicates that he is without knowledge as to the capacity in which he is suing

defendants. (Doc. 25 at ¶ 58.) Also, defendants contend that Cunningham is attempting to hold

Sheriff Owen liable for the allegations in this complaint because of Sheriff Owen's role as a

supervisor. (Doc. 21.) Again, Cunningham states that he is without knowledge as to why he

believes Sheriff Owen is liable. (Doc. 25 at ¶ 59.) 

II. Summary Judgment Standard

Summaryjudgment is appropriate if, after viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences

in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986), the record "show[s] that

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). "Once a party moving for summary judgment has

made a sufficient showing, the burden rests with the non-moving party to set forth specific facts,

by affidavit or other evidence, showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists." Nat’l Bank

of Commerce v. Dow Chem. Co., 165 F.3d 602, 607 (8th Cir.1999). 

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The non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical

doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. "They must show there is sufficient

evidence to support a jury verdict in their favor." Nat’l Bank, 165 F.3d 607 (citing Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986)). "A case

founded on speculation or suspicion is insufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment."

Id. (citing Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 625 (8th Cir. 1985)). 

III. Discussion

Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action for the deprivation, under color of law,

of a citizen's "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws" of the

United States. "To establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, [a plaintiff] must show [1] a

deprivation [under color of law] of [2] a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the

Constitution or the laws of the United States." Dunham v. Wadley, 195 F.3d 1007, 1009 (8th Cir.

1999). "[T]o establish a violation of constitutional rights under § 1983, the plaintiff must prove

that the defendant’s unconstitutional action was the 'cause in fact' of the plaintiff’s injury."

Butler v. Dowd, 979 F.2d 661, 669 (8th Cir. 1992).

The plaintiff raises three claims in this action: (1) that Deputy Kern used excessive force

in closing the window door to Cunningham's cell which hit Cunningham on his forehead, (2) that

defendants were deliberately indifferent to his seizure condition, and (3) that defendants were

deliberately indifferent in seeking medical care for Cunningham after he was hit by the door. 

Excessive Force

Excessive force claims brought by a pretrial detainee, although grounded in the Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments, are analyzed under an objective reasonableness standard. See Graham

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v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 388, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 104 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1989). Due process requires

that a pretrial detainee, such as the plaintiff in this case, not be punished. See Bell v. Wolfish,

441 U.S. 520, 537 n.16, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447 (1979) (due process requires that a

pretrial detainee not be punished; the Eighth Amendment requires that the punishment imposed

not be cruel and unusual). Thus, excessive force claims are analyzed under the reasonable

objectiveness standard instead of the standard used in Eighth Amendment cases. 

The injuries received by a pretrial detainee "must be necessarily incident to administrative

interests in safety, security, and efficiency. Constitutionally inform practices are those that are

punitive in intent, those that are not rationally related to a legitimate purpose, or those that are

rationally related but are excessive in light of their purpose." See Johnson-El v. Schoemehl, 878

F.2d 1043, 1048 (8th Cir. 1989) (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 539 n.20.) 

The alleged force used here--slamming closed the door that covers the window opening

in the plaintiff's cell door--simply does not amount to the type of force that could constitute a

constitutional violation. Defendants showed that it was the policy of the detention center that

the window doors were to remain closed for the safety and security of the facility. Additionally,

it was common practice for detainees to pry their doors open in violation of this policy, requiring

jailers to frequently close these doors. Also, the injury that plaintiff claims to have suffered--a

knot on his head and headaches--is de minimis. The de minimis nature of plaintiff's injuries does

not support plaintiff's claims that he was subjected to excessive force which amounts to

punishment. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 535, Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 ("Not every push

or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge's chambers, violates a

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prisoner's constitutional rights.") Therefore, defendants are entitled to summary judgment on

plaintiff's claim that he was subjected to excessive force that violated his constitutional rights.

Deliberate Indifference

In the absence of a clearly binding standard, the Eighth Circuit in analyzing inadequate

medical care claims brought bypretrial detainees has applied the Eighth Amendment's deliberate

indifference standard. See e.g., Hartsfield, 371 F.3d at 456-457; Spencer, 183 F.3d at 905-06;

Hall v. Dalton, 34 F.3d 648, 650 (8th Cir. 1994) (analyzing a pretrial detainee's claim of

inadequate medical care under the deliberate indifference standard). “In order to state a

cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence

deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S. Ct.

285, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1976). 

The deliberate indifference standard includes "both an objective and a subjective

component: 'The [plaintiff] must demonstrate (1) that [he] suffered [from] objectively serious

medical needs and (2) that the prison officials actually knew of but deliberately disregarded those

needs.'" Jolly v. Knudsen, 205 F.3d 1094, 1096 (8th Cir. 2000) (quoting Dulany v. Carnahan,

132 F.3d 1234, 1239 (8th Cir. 1997)). Additionally, "'[t]he prisoner must show more than

negligence, more even than gross negligence, and mere disagreement with treatment decisions

does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.'" Jolly, 205 F.3d at 1096 (quoting Estate

of Rosenberg v. Crandell, 56 F.3d 35, 37 (8th Cir.1995)). See also Gregoire v. Class, 236 F.3d

413, 417 (8th Cir. 2000) ("To establish a constitutional violation, it is not enough that a

reasonable official should have known of the risk, a plaintiff must establish that the official in

question did in fact know of the risk.").

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"Because society does not expect that prisoners will have unqualified access to health

care, deliberate indifference to medical needs amounts to an Eighth Amendment violation only

if those needs are 'serious.'" Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9, 112 S. Ct. 995, 1000, 117 L.

Ed. 2d 156 (1992). "A medical need is serious if it is obvious to the layperson or supported by

medical evidence." Moore v. Jackson, 123 F.3d 1082, 1086 (8th Cir. 1997) (per curiam)

(internal quotation and citation omitted).

"[T]he failure to treat a medical condition does not constitute punishment within the

meaning of the Eighth Amendment unless prison officials knew that the condition created an

excessive risk to the inmate's health and then failed to act on that knowledge." Long v. Nix, 86

F.3d 761, 765 (8th Cir. 1996). In Dulany v. Carnahan, 132 F.3d 1234 (8th Cir. 1997), the

Eighth Circuit said:

As long as this threshold is not crossed, inmates have no constitutional right to

receive a particular or requested course of treatment, and prison doctors remain

free to exercise their independent medical judgment. Deliberate indifference may

be demonstrated by prison guards who intentionally deny or delay access to

medical care or intentionally interfere with prescribed treatment, or by prison

doctors who fail to respond to prisoner's serious medical needs. See Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103, 97 S. Ct. 285, 290, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1976). Mere

negligence or medical malpractice, however, are insufficient to rise to a

constitutional violation. Id. at 106, 97 S. Ct. at 292.

Dulany, 132 F.3d at 1239. See also Tlamka v. Serrell, 244 F.3d 628, 633 (8th Cir. 2001). 

Regarding the treatment plaintiff received for his seizure condition, he was taken to the

hospital upon intake, the nurses attempted repeatedly to obtain plaintiff's medical records,

plaintiff was examined by Dr. Howard on several occasions, and plaintiff received both Dilantin

and Meclizine for his seizures and dizziness, as well as over-the-counter pain medications for

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headaches. This extensive treatment for plaintiff's condition does not constitute deliberate

indifference, rather it shows that plaintiff received substantial medical treatment while detained

at the Washington County Detention Center. 

Plaintiff also claims that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical

needs after he was hit in the forehead by window door being closed on him. This incident

occurred on a Saturday, plaintiff submitted a medical request on Sunday claiming headaches, and

on Monday he was examined by Nurse Bradley on Monday. At that time, Nurse Bradley noted

that there did not appear to be any bruising on plaintiff's forehead. Despite the lack of evidence

of injury, Nurse Bradley prescribed Aleve to be taken twice a day, and records show that plaintiff

did received this medication as prescribed. 

Plaintiff's claim fails here, first because, as noted above, the injury was de minimis and

thus not objectively serious. Second, plaintiff did receive medical care in the form of an

examination by Nurse Bradley and the administration of over-the-counter pain medications for

the headache. Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this claim. 

Official Capacity Claims

The claims against the defendants in their official capacities are equivalent to claims

against Washington County. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25, 112 S. Ct. 358, 116 L. Ed. 2d

301 (1991). Washington County may only be held liable for a constitutional deprivation if the

deprivation is the result of a policy or custom of the county. See City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris,

489 U.S. 378, 385, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 103 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1989). An official policy involves a

deliberate choice by an official who has the authority to establish governmental policy to follow

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a specific course of action made from various alternatives. See Ware v. Jackson County, MO,

150 F.3d 873, 880 (8th Cir. 1998). As the plaintiff has failed to sustain an underlying substantive

claim under which his constitutional rights were violated, municipal liability does not attach.

See McCoy v. City of Monticello, 441 F.3d 920, 922 (8th Cir. 2005) ("This circuit has

consistently recognized a general rule that, in order for municipal liability to attach, individual

liability first must be found on an underlying substantive claim"). 

Respondeat Superior Claim

Cunningham also fails to support a claim against Sheriff Owen on the doctrine of

respondeat superior. Cunningham does not allege that Sheriff Owen was personally involved

in any of the actions or decisions forming the factual basis of his claim, nor does Cunningham

allege that Sheriff Owen was personally aware of the facts forming the basis of his complaint

allegations. Without proof of actual knowledge or involvement, Sheriff Owen cannot be held

liable in this claim. See Boyd v. Knox, 47 F.3d 966, 968-69 (8th Cir. 1995) (no respondeat

superior liability under § 1983; supervisor is liable where he is personally involved in violation,

i.e., where he knows about conduct and facilitates it, condones it, or turns blind eye). 

IV. Conclusion

I recommend that defendants' motion (Doc. 21) for summary judgment be granted. 

The parties have ten days from receipt of this report and recommendation in which

to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely

written objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties

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are reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by

the district court. 

DATED this 22nd day of June 2006.

/s/ Beverly Stites Jones

_________________________________________

HON. BEVERLY STITES JONES 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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