Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01461/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01461-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983cv Civil Rights Act - Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES EDWARD ROSE,

Plaintiff,

v.

EDMUND GERALD BROWN, 

Governor; STATE OF 

CALIFORNIA; COUNTY OF SAN 

DIEGO; ALEX LANDON, an 

individual, 

Defendants.

Case No.: 18-cv-01461-BTM-MDD

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT 

FOR FAILURE TO STATE A 

CLAIM 

[ECF Nos. 10, 12]

Pending before the Court are Plaintiff James Edward Rose’s First Amended 

Complaint, Motion to Open Judgment in 1974 Homicide Conviction, and Motion to 

Purge Plaintiff’s Criminal Records and Conviction. (ECF Nos. 10, 12). The Court 

interprets the Motions as a Second Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 12). For the 

reasons set forth below, both of Plaintiff’s amended pleadings are dismissed with 

prejudice. (ECF Nos. 10, 12).

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff initiated this action on June 25, 2018. (ECF No. 1). The Complaint 

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asserted civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1987 and 

names as defendants Governor Brown, the State of California, the County of San 

Diego, and Attorney Alex Landon. (ECF No. 1 “Compl.”). Plaintiff alleged that forty 

years ago, he was extradited from Georgia to California pursuant to a detainer and 

warrant naming a man other than Plaintiff. (Compl. at 1-3). Because the warrant 

and indictment allegedly named a “fictitious character who did not exist,” and 

whose name did not match Plaintiff’s, Plaintiff asserted he was wrongfully 

kidnapped, convicted of first degree murder, and sentenced to eight years in 

prison. Id. The Complaint also alleged legal malpractice against Plaintiff’s defense 

attorney, (Compl. at 7) and raised tort claims against prison officials for beating 

him and causing other injuries while he was incarcerated. (Compl. at 5-7). 

On December 10, 2018, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure 

to state a claim. (ECF No. 9). The Court gave Plaintiff until January 4, 2019 to file 

a First Amended Complaint, and specified that failure to timely file would result in 

the dismissal of the action. (ECF No. 9 at 10). Plaintiff filed the First Amended 

Complaint (“FAC”) on February 4, 2019 and stated he was too ill to make the 

January 4, 2019 deadline. (ECF No. 10). The FAC names the previously 

dismissed Defendants and largely repeats the earlier pleading. (ECF No. 10). On 

May 20, 2019, Plaintiff moved this Court to open the judgment in his 1974 homicide 

conviction and purge his criminal record and convictions. (ECF No. 12). The 

Motion is formatted like a complaint, re-alleges the facts in the original Complaint 

and FAC, and aside from cursorily referencing the Fourteenth Amendment at the 

conclusion of the pleading, does not set forth the statutory or other constitutional 

basis basis for relief. (ECF No. 12). The Court interprets the pleading as a Second 

Amended Complaint (“SAC”) re-alleging Plaintiff’s section 1983 claims. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The court must dismiss an IFP litigant’s complaint if it determines the action 

“is frivolous or malicious; fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or 

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seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), all 

complaints must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The pleading must “contain 

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible 

on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when 

the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Conclusory 

statements, devoid of factual support, are insufficient. Id.

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff submitted the FAC a month after the Court-ordered deadline. (ECF 

No. 9). The Court may thus dismiss this action because of Plaintiff’s failure to 

prosecute in compliance with a court order requiring amendment. See Lira v. 

Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005) (“If a plaintiff does not take advantage 

of the opportunity to fix his complaint, a district court may convert the dismissal of 

the complaint into dismissal of the entire action.”).

Even if the Court were to accept Plaintiff’s untimely filed FAC and SAC, the 

Court must nevertheless dismiss the pleadings because Plaintiff’s amendments 

have not cured the deficiencies identified in the Court’s December 2018 Order. 

First, Plaintiff still does not allege facts curing the statute of limitations or equitable 

tolling issues. The fact remains that Plaintiff filed this section 1983 Complaint forty 

years after his claim first accrued, well beyond the statutory deadline. See Cal Civ. 

Proc. Code § 335.1 (providing a section 1983 claim must be brought within two 

years); Cal Civ. Proc. Code § 352.1 (providing that if the cause of action arises 

while claimant is serving a non-life prison sentence, statute of limitations may be 

equitably tolled for up to two years). As currently pled, Plaintiff can prove no set 

of facts to establish the timeliness of the Complaint. Von Saher v. Norton Simon 

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Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 969 (9th Cir. 2010) (“A claim may be 

dismissed [for failure to state a claim] on the ground that it is barred by the 

applicable statute of limitations only when ‘the running of the statute is apparent 

on the face of the complaint.’ ”) 

Plaintiff further fails to allege facts supporting equitable tolling, including that

he diligently pursued his claim, that forces outside of his control have left him 

without judicial forum for the resultion of his claim, and that defendants would not 

be prejudiced by the decades long delay. See Hull v. Central Pathology Serv. 

Medical Clinic, 28 Cal. App. 4th 1328 (1994) (enumerating conditions necessary 

to equitably toll statute of limitations). Although Plaintiff alleges that he 

immediately appealed his alleged unlawful extradition when he arrived to 

California, the pleadings state that the presiding federal judge declined to award 

Plaintiff any relief for the “kidnapping” and Plaintiff did not appeal. (SAC ¶14; FAC 

at 2). Plaintiff’s reasons for not appealing are devoid of factual basis and are not 

plausible. (FAC at 2 (alleging Plaintiff had a personal letter from United States 

Supreme Court Justice Douglas stating that he “would hear the case if the plaintiff 

appealed to the United States Supreme Court,” but another attorney withdrew the 

appeal)). Furthermore, Plaintiff’s generalized fear of the prison system after his 

release, though lamentable, cannot excuse the forty year delay. (SAC ¶¶ 21, 31). 

The amended pleadings do not set forth grounds for equitable tolling. 

Plaintiff’s pleadings primarily allege ineffective assistance provided by his 

public defender. But Plaintiff cannot assert a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against his 

public defender without showing that the public defender acted under the color of 

state law. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 317-18 (1981) (stating that 

attorneys representing criminal defendants generally do not act under color of state 

law because such representation is “essentially a private function . . . for which 

state office and authority are not needed”); Miranda v. Clark County, 319 F.3d 465, 

468 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (holding that public defender was not a state actor 

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subject to suit under § 1983 because, so long as she performs a traditional role of 

an attorney for a client, “h[er] function,” no matter how ineffective, is “to represent 

h[er] client, not the interests of the state or county.”). Because Plaintiff still has not 

set forth facts plausibly showing his attorney’s representation constituted state 

action, these claims remain insufficiently pled. 

The pleadings again name the State of California as a Defendant. (FAC at 

2; SAC ¶ 25). However, the Court previously dismissed the State of California as 

a party to the action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) as barred by the 

Eleventh Amendment. (ECF No. 9 at 6-7). Plaintiff has not shown that the State 

of California has affirmatively waived its sovereign immunity. See Krainski v. Nev. 

ex rel. Bd. of Regents of Nev. Sys. of Higher Educ., 616 F.3d 963, 967 (9th Cir. 

2010) (“The Eleventh Amendment bars suits against the State or its agencies for 

all types of relief, absent unequivocal consent by the state.”) (internal citations 

omitted). Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot state a claim against the State of California. 

Finally, Plaintiff cannot state a claim for monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 because a favorable ruling would necessarily imply the invalidity of 

Plaintiff’s conviction, which remains in effect according to the pleadings. See Heck 

v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994) (providing that section 1983 claims that 

“necessarily imply the invalidity of [plaintiff’s] conviction or sentence” must be 

dismissed “unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has 

already been invalidated”); Guerrero v. Gates, 442 F.3d 697, 704 (9th Cir. 2006) 

(holding Heck applies equally to plaintiffs no longer in custody); SAC ¶ 14 (stating

a sympathetic federal judge told Plaintiff “there was nothing he could do”). The 

Court thus concludes that the pleadings fail to state a claim upon which relief can 

be granted, and dismisses this civil action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

//

//

//

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IV. CONCLUSION

The Court hereby dismisses the FAC and SAC with prejudice. (ECF Nos. 

10, 12). The Clerk of Court is directed to enter final judgment and close the case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 30, 2019

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