Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-02135/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-02135-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALLAN C HERNANDEZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

RALPH DIAZ, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 19-cv-02135-SI 

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 

AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

Re: Dkt. No. 2

This is a pro se prisoner’s civil rights action in which plaintiff complains of the integration 

of several groups at the Correctional Training Facility in Soledad. Plaintiff alleges in the 

complaint filed on April 19th that prison officials merged the prisoners in the Special Needs Yard 

(SNY), formerly known as protective custody, with the General Population (GP) prisoners in 

2018. As a result of the merger, there was a “major riot” that resulted in “multiple injuries.” 

Docket No. 1 at 3. He also alleges that, whenever mergers take place, “there has [sic] been well 

documented incidents of violence, whether the SNY prisoners attacked and assaulted the GP 

prisoners out of fear for their lives or were attacked and assaulted themselves by GP prisoners.” 

Id. He further alleges that this “planned merger” “would place Plaintiff at serious risk of harm,” 

id. – a confusing allegation, given the allegation that the merger already occurred. He also alleges 

that a merger of GP prisoners with the “security threat group (STG) Fresno Bulldogs poses the 

same risks and violence,” yet it is unclear when this merger will occur or has occurred Id. In his 

prayer for relief, plaintiff requests an injunction preventing the merger of SNY, GP and Fresno 

Bulldogs prisoners and a declaration that defendants’ actions violate his Eighth Amendment 

Case 3:19-cv-02135-SI Document 8 Filed 04/23/19 Page 1 of 4
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rights. Id.1

This matter is now before the court for consideration of plaintiff’s motion for a temporary 

restraining order (TRO) and injunction prohibiting Defendants and persons acting on their behalf 

“from merging the SNY and/or STG Fresno Bulldogs with GP prisoners” at CTF-Soledad. 

Docket No. 2 at 3.

A temporary restraining order preserves the status quo and prevents irreparable harm until 

a hearing can be held on a preliminary injunction application. See Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. 

Brotherhood of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers, 415 U.S. 423, 439 (1974). A temporary 

restraining order is an “extraordinary remedy” that the court should award only when a plaintiff 

makes a clear showing that he is entitled to such relief. See Winter v. Natural Res. Defense 

Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). The standards for a temporary restraining order are the same 

as those for a preliminary injunction. See Stuhlbarg Int'l Sales Co., Inc. v. John D. Brush & Co., 

Inc., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). A plaintiff must demonstrate (1) a likelihood of 

success on the merits, (2) a likelihood of irreparable harm that will result if an injunction is not 

issued, (3) the balance of equities tips in favor of the plaintiff, and (4) an injunction is in the public 

interest. See Winter, 555 U.S. at 20.2 The irreparable injury must be both likely and immediate.

See id. at 22; Caribbean Marine Services Co., Inc. v. Baldrige, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988) 

(“A plaintiff must do more than merely allege imminent harm sufficient to establish standing; a 

plaintiff must demonstrate immediate threatened injury as a prerequisite to preliminary injunctive 

relief.”)

 

1 The complaint and motion for a TRO are extremely similar to at least ten other cases filed 

recently by prisoners at the CTF-Soledad. See, e.g., Ruiz v. Diaz, No. 19-cv-1928 LHK; Alvarez v. 

Diaz, 19-cv-1968 WHA; Saenz v. Diaz, 19-cv-2031 WHO. 

2 Winter did not, however, completely reject the validity of the sliding scale approach to 

preliminary injunctions. Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1134 (9th Cir. 

2011). Under the “sliding scale” approach used in the Ninth Circuit – also dubbed the “serious 

question” test in Alliance for Wild Rockies -- “the elements of the preliminary injunction test are 

balanced, so that a stronger showing of one element may offset a weaker showing of another.” Id.

at 1131. Thus, even after Winter, “‘serious questions going to the merits’ and a hardship balance 

that tips sharply toward the plaintiff can support issuance of an injunction, assuming the other two 

elements of the Winter test are also met.” Id. at 1132 (citations omitted).

Case 3:19-cv-02135-SI Document 8 Filed 04/23/19 Page 2 of 4
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Plaintiff is not entitled to a TRO or preliminary injunction to prevent the merger of the 

different prisoner populations. There are several problems with his motion. 

First and foremost, the request to prevent the merger of the different prisoner groups 

appears to be moot because plaintiff alleges in his verified complaint that the merger occurred in 

2018. See Docket No. 1 at 3. Injunctive relief would not be able to prevent an event that has 

already occurred.

Second, the evidentiary support for the requested TRO falls far short of showing that 

irreparable harm is likely and imminent if interim relief is not granted. Plaintiff’s declaration 

provides no specific information about any particular threat to him. His declaration indicates that 

he is a GP prisoner interested in avoiding trouble, but does not explain any specific threat to him 

individually posed by SNY prisoners or Fresno Bulldog prisoners that are being merged with GP 

prisoners. The only other declaration is from Kim McGill, apparently a non-lawyer who works for 

the “Youth Justice Coalition.” McGill’s declaration reads like a position paper for the Youth 

Justice Coalition and does not show that she has any personal knowledge about the merger, prison 

operations, or the actual danger posed by the merger of GP and SNY (or GP and Fresno Bulldogs)

prisoners at CTF-Soledad. Docket No. 6. Additionally, Exhibit B referred to in the motion for a 

TRO is not attached to the motion. Docket No. 2 at 3. Plaintiff does not meet his burden to 

demonstrate that he will suffer immediate and irreparable injury without a TRO.

Third, the complaint lacks sufficient factual allegations to allow the court to determine that 

there is a likelihood of success on the merits in this action. The conclusory allegations that 

mergers have been dangerous in the past are not enough to show that there is a substantial risk of 

harm to plaintiff or that prison officials are being deliberately indifferent to that risk – both of 

which are necessary to show an Eighth Amendment violation in the failure-to-protect context. See 

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-34 (1994). The allegations of the complaint also suggest 

that, at least in one circumstance (i.e., where GP prisoners attack SNY prisoners, see Docket No. 1 

at 3), any risk of danger is to other prisoners rather than to plaintiff (who is a GP prisoner). 

Plaintiff’s failure to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits weighs against the issuance 

of a TRO. 

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Finally, even if the foregoing problems did not exist, plaintiff does not show the need for a 

TRO without any notice to the defendants, who have not yet been served with process in this 

action. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b)(1) provides that a TRO can issue without notice to 

adverse party only if “specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that 

immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse 

party can be heard in opposition” and the movant certifies in writing the efforts to give notice and 

the reasons why notice should not be required. These stringent requirements “reflect the fact that 

our entire jurisprudence runs counter to the notion of court action taken before reasonable notice 

and an opportunity to be heard has been granted both sides of a dispute.” Granny Goose, 415 U.S. 

at 423. Plaintiff urges that notice should not be required because the merger is imminent and 

immediate and irreparable injury will result before defendants can be heard in opposition. Docket 

No. 2 at 2. But this merely states the legal standard, and does not actually show that immediate 

and irreparable injury will occur if the court does not act before allowing defendants to be heard, 

nor does he provide any information about his efforts to give notice to defendants. The court 

notes that, as a result of the class actions in Plata v. Newson, Case No. 01-cv-1351 JST, and 

Ashker v. Newsom, Case No. 09-cv-5796 CW and perhaps other cases, California prisons are 

subject to several existing court orders that may address housing decisions. The possibility that a 

TRO would conflict with existing court orders about California prison housing decisions provides 

another compelling reason not to issue a TRO without notice to the defendants. Plaintiff’s failure 

to satisfy Rule 65(b)(1) is fatal to his ex parte motion. 

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s ex parte motion for a TRO or preliminary injunction 

is DENIED. Docket No. 2.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 23, 2019

______________________________________

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

Case 3:19-cv-02135-SI Document 8 Filed 04/23/19 Page 4 of 4