Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-04706/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-04706-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DR. RALPH S. BEREN, ED.D.,

Plaintiff,

 v.

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF CALIFORNIA

STATE UNIVERSITY, et al.,

Defendants

 /

No. C-06-4706 MMC

ORDER GRANTING ELK GROVE

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS;

GRANTING CSU DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS OR,

ALTERNATIVELY, FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT; DISMISSING FIRST

AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE

TO AMEND; VACATING HEARING 

Before the Court are two motions: (1) a motion to dismiss plaintiff Ralph S. Beren’s

First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, filed January 29, 2007 by defendants Elk Grove Unified School District

(“EGUSD”), Kimi Kaneko (“K. Kaneko”), and Elizabeth Kaneko (“E. Kaneko”) (collectively,

“Elk Grove Defendants”); and (2) a motion to dismiss the FAC pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1)

and 12(b)(6), or, in the alternative, for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56, filed

January 29, 2007 by defendants Board of Trustees of California State University

(“Trustees”), California State University (“CSU”), Jacob Perea (“Perea”), and Nathan Avani

(“Avani”) (collectively, “CSU Defendants”). Plaintiff has filed a single opposition to both

motions, to which CSU Defendants and Elk Grove Defendants have separately replied. 

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Plaintiff’s objection to the Declaration of Michael J. Martin, filed by CSU Defendants,

is OVERRULED. First, although the manually-filed version thereof did not contain the sixth

page of said declaration, the electronically-filed version served on plaintiff did contain the

sixth page. Second, the Court discerns no conflict between the declarant’s description of

Exhibit H and the actual document attached to the declaration as Exhibit H.

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In his opposition, plaintiff states that ¶ 11 of the FAC identifies the federal right on

which he bases his claims under §§ 1983 and 1985. The only federal right arguably

identified therein, other than plaintiff’s general reference to §§ 1983 and 1985, is the right

provided plaintiff under § 1681. As discussed below, however, plaintiff has failed to state a

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Having considered the papers filed in support of and in opposition to the motions,1

 the

Court deems the matter suitable for decision on the papers, VACATES the hearing

scheduled for March 30, 2007, and rules as follows:

A. Federal Claims

The FAC contains three federal claims: (1) the First Cause of Action, alleging a claim

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (2) the Third Cause of Action, alleging a claim under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1985, and (3) the Sixth Cause of Action, alleging a claim under 20 U.S.C. § 1681.

1. Elk Grove Defendants

For the reasons stated by the Elk Grove Defendants as set forth below, the Court

finds each federal claim alleged against said defendants is subject to dismissal.

First, as plaintiff concedes, (see Pl.’s Opp. at 9:4-8), the First and Third Causes of

Action are subject to dismissal, to the extent alleged against EGUSD and K. Kameko and

E. Kameko in their respective official capacities, because California school districts and

their employees acting in an official capacity are not “persons” within the meaning of

§§ 1983 or 1985. See Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)

(holding state agency and employees sued in official capacity not “persons” under § 1983);

Belanger v. Madera Unified Sch. Dist., 963 F. 2d 248, 253 (9th Cir. 1992) (“California public

schools have long been treated as state agencies under California law.”).

Second, plaintiff’s First and Third Causes of Action are, to the extent alleged against

K. Kameko and E. Kameko in their individual capacities, subject to dismissal, because

plaintiff has failed to allege the federal civil right(s) of which he was assertedly deprived by

such individuals.2

 See Jones v. Community Redevelopment Agency, 733 F. 2d 646, 649

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claim under § 1681, and, consequently, to the extent plaintiff asserts that his §§ 1983 and

1985 claims are premised on a violation of § 1681, he has failed to state a claim.

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Plaintiff appears to allege that at least one basis for the alleged discrimination was

his sexual orientation. (See, e.g., FAC ¶ 21.) Section 1681 does not, however, prohibit

discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, rather, only on the “basis of sex.” See 20

U.S.C. § 1681(a). Although a § 1681 discrimination claim brought by a person who is gay

or perceived to be gay can, under some circumstances, be considered a claim alleging

discrimination on the “basis of sex,” plaintiff does not allege such, or similar, circumstances. 

See, e.g., Kinman v. Omaha Public Sch. Dist., 94 F. 3d 463, 468 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding, in

case involving unwanted sexual advances, female plaintiff alleged claim of discrimination

on basis of sex, because female defendant “targeted [plaintiff] because she was a woman

[and] directed no similar attentions toward male students”); see also Nichols v. Azteca

Restaurant Enterprises, Inc., 256 F. 3d 864, 874-75 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding, for purposes

of Title VII claim, “discrimination on the basis of sex stereotypes” constitutes discrimination

on the basis of sex).

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The CBA provides for a two-level grievance procedure, followed by arbitration, with

respect to “a claimed violation, misapplication, or misinterpretation of a specific term or

provision of [the CBA]”; such procedures are the “sole and exclusive method for the

resolution of disputes arising out of issues covered by [the CBA].” (See Martin Decl., filed

January 30, 2007, Ex. A Art. 10.)

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(9th Cir. 1984) (holding, to sufficiently allege federal civil rights claim, plaintiff must allege

facts to support finding that defendant’s conduct “subjected the plaintiff to a deprivation of

[federal] rights”; noting “[c]onclusory allegations, unsupported by facts, will be rejected as

insufficient to state a claim under the Civil Rights Act”).

Third, plaintiff’s Sixth Cause of Action is subject to dismissal, because plaintiff has

failed to allege he was “subjected to discrimination” on the “basis of sex.” See 20 U.S.C.

§ 1681(a) (prohibiting discrimination on “basis of sex”).3

2. CSU Defendants

In their moving papers, the CSU Defendants argue they are entitled to dismissal of

or summary judgment on each of plaintiff’s federal claims on the ground that plaintiff’s right

to a judicial forum has been waived under the provisions of a collective bargaining

agreement (“CBA”),4 and, alternatively, that plaintiff’s § 1681 claim is barred by plaintiff’s

asserted failure to present a claim, pursuant to the California Tort Claims Act, before filing

the instant action. Neither of these arguments is persuasive.

First, the United States Supreme Court, in addressing an analogous issue under

Title VII, has held that a union, when entering into a CBA, may not “prospectively waive” its

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members’ rights to a judicial forum for federal civil rights claims arising under that title. See

Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51-52 (1974). The CSU Defendants cite

no authority, or even advance an argument, that the reasoning set forth in Alexander is

inapplicable as to federal civil rights claims arising under §§ 1983, 1985 and 1681. Cf.

Albertson’s, Inc. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 157 F. 3d 758, 760-61 (9th

Cir. 1998) (holding, in reliance on Alexander, arbitration provision in CBA cannot bar union

members from filing civil action arising under Fair Labor Standards Act, “regardless of

whether those claims may also be covered by the grievance-arbitration procedure [in a

CBA]”); see also McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 288-92 (1984) (holding

where arbitration award not judicially-reviewed, such award has no preclusive effect as to

§ 1983 claim, because arbitration “cannot provide an adequate substitute for a judicial

proceeding in protecting the statutory and constitutional rights that § 1983 is designed to

safeguard”). Moreover, even as to federal claims for which a union is entitled to

prospectively waive a member’s statutory right to a judicial forum, the waiver must be “clear

and unmistakeable.” See Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 77, 80

(1998) (finding it unnecessary to determine whether union can prospectively waive

member’s right to judicial forum for ADA claim, where CBA did not include “clear and

unmistakeable” language requiring mandatory arbitration of ADA claim). The CSU

Defendants fail to point to any language in the CBA that constitutes a “clear and

unmistakeable” waiver of the right to a judicial forum for federal civil rights claims, and none

is apparent from the language of the CBA.

Second, the CSU Defendants’ reliance on the California Tort Claims Act is

misplaced. As the Ninth Circuit has made clear, “a plaintiff seeking in federal court to

vindicate a federally created right cannot be made to jump through the procedural hoops

for tort-type cases that may have commended themselves to the legislative assemblies of

the several states.” See Sethy v. Alameda County Water Dist., 545 F. 2d 1157, 1162 (9th

Cir. 1976) (holding federal civil rights claims do not fall within scope of California Tort

Claims Act).

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5

Accordingly, the CSU Defendants are not entitled to dismissal of or summary

judgment on plaintiff’s federal claims either by reason of the arbitration provision in the CBA

or plaintiff’s asserted failure to present a tort claim before filing the instant action.

In their reply, the CSU Defendants, for the first time, advance the same legal

arguments made by the Elk Grove Defendants in support of their motion for dismissal of

plaintiff’s federal claims, specifically, that (1) CSU, a state agency, and the Trustees, Perea,

and Avani when acting in their respective official capacities are not “persons” for purposes

of §§ 1983 and 1985, (2) plaintiff has not alleged the federal right(s) implicated by his

§§ 1983 and 1985 claims, and (3) plaintiff has not alleged discrimination on the basis of sex

for purposes of § 1681. Although the Court ordinarily would not consider legal arguments

raised for the first time in a reply, at least without affording the opposing party an

opportunity to file a surreply, in this instance plaintiff has had the opportunity to, and did,

respond to such legal arguments in his opposition, given that such legal arguments were

raised by the Elk Grove Defendants in their moving papers. Further, with respect to such

legal arguments, the CSU Defendants are identically situated to the Elk Grove Defendants.

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above with respect to the Elk Grove

Defendants, the CSU Defendants are entitled to dismissal of the First, Third, and Sixth

Causes of Action.

B. State Law Claims

The FAC contains 12 claims arising under state law. Because the Court’s

jurisdiction over such claims is supplemental in nature, the Court declines to exercise

jurisdiction over such claims at the present time. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (providing

district court has discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction where “district

court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction”). Consequently, the

Court does not consider herein defendants’ arguments with respect to such claims.

Accordingly, plaintiff’s state law claims will be dismissed, without prejudice to

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5

In his opposition, plaintiff concedes that certain of his state law claims should be

dismissed, (see Pl.’s Opp. at 16-17), and, consequently, plaintiff should not re-allege such

claims in an amended pleading, at least without curing the conceded deficiencies.

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plaintiff’s re-alleging such claims in any further amended pleading.5

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Elk Grove Defendants’ motion to dismiss is

hereby GRANTED, and the CSU Defendants’ motion to dismiss or, alternatively, for

summary judgment are hereby GRANTED, and the First Amended Complaint is hereby

DISMISSED, as follows:

1. Plaintiff’s First and Third Causes of Action are hereby DISMISSED, without leave

to amend as to EGUSD, CSU, and all individual defendants in their official capacities.

2. Plaintiff’s First and Third Causes of Action are hereby DISMISSED with leave to

amend as to all individual defendants in their individual capacities.

3. Plaintiff’s Sixth Cause of Action is hereby DISMISSED, with leave to amend.

4. Plaintiff’s state law claims are hereby DISMISSED, with leave to amend.

5. Any Second Amended Complaint shall be filed no later than April 16, 2007.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 27, 2007 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

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