Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-04115/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-04115-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1Docket No. 17, filed on July 1, 2005.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

POORE,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

 ALAMEIDA ET AL,

Defendants.

 /

No. C03-04115 MJJ

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is former director of the California Department of Corrections (“CDC”)

Edward J. Alameida, Jr., former acting director of the CDC Law Enforcement and Investigations

Unit (“LEIU”) Steven Moore, and former warden of San Quentin Prison J.S. Woodford’s

(collectively “Defendants”) Motion for Summary Judgment on Christopher Poore’s (“Plaintiff”)

claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 Plaintiff opposes the motion. For the following reasons, the Court

GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.

BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Plaintiff is currently a condemned prisoner on death row at San Quentin State Prison (“San

Quentin”). In August of 1997, Plaintiff was transferred from Corcoran State Prison to Pelican Bay

State Prison’s (“PBSP”) Facility A. While at PBSP, Plaintiff was involved in several prison gangs

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 In June of 1999, Plaintiff’s parole was placed on hold. (Cattermole, Ex. B, AGO-003.)

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including the Aryan Brotherhood Prison Gang. In February and March of 1999, Plaintiff received

two rule violation reports for conspiracy to commit murder after officials discovered Plaintiff

conspired to stab members of a rival prison gang. Defendants allege that while at PBSP, Plaintiff

gained the reputation of a “shot caller” or director of on-going gang violence and stabbing assaults

occurring in Facility A. (See Declaration of A. Cattermole in Support of Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment (“Cattermole”), Ex. D, AGO-051, Ex. E, AGO-231.) Following segregation and

an investigation, Plaintiff was notified that information gathered by prison officials established that

he was the leader of a racially segregated gang composed of white inmates. (Cattermole, Ex. E,

AGO-231-232, Ex. H, AGO-255.) Subsequently, in February of 1999, following the investigation

that discovered Plaintiff’s leadership of the gang, the LEIU validated that Plaintiff was an associate

of the Aryan Brotherhood. (Cattermole, Ex. G., AGO-249.)

To support Plaintiff’s validation, the LEIU specifically relied on three pieces of evidence. 

First, the LEIU cited a prison form establishing that Plaintiff attempted to circumnavigate prison

regulations while attempting to correspond with a member of the Aryan Brotherhood at another

institution. (Cattermole, Ex. C.) The second source upon which the LEIU relied was a confidential

memorandum dated January 4, 1999, which described Plaintiff’s role as a “shot caller” of certain

gang assaults and homicides that took place in Facility A of PBSP. (Cattermole, Ex. B, Ex. D,

AGO-055-056.) The third source was an informational form indicating that Plaintiff harbored names

and addresses of inmates known to be members of the Nazi Low Riders and Aryan Brotherhood

gangs. (Cattermole, Ex. D.) In March of 1999, Plaintiff was paroled.2 Plaintiff’s parole was

conditioned upon not associating with gang members or participating in gang activity. (Cattermole,

Ex. F, AGO-247.) Shortly after being released, Plaintiff committed murder. 

During Plaintiff’s criminal trial for that murder, witnesses testified about the nature of the

murder. These witnesses testified that they were told by Plaintiff that the murder was a “hit” ordered

by the Aryan Brotherhood. Additionally, Plaintiff admitted to detectives that “upstate had ordered

the victim taken care of.” (Cattermole, Ex. C, AGO-024-040.) While in county jail, awaiting his

murder trial, Plaintiff continued his gang activity, which included altercations with other inmates,

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 Plaintiff’s previous validation by the LEIU was confirmed and documented in an informational form dated March

28, 2002, written by the San Quentin Institutional Gang Investigator.

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possession of weapons, and the solicitation of the murder of a witness in his criminal trial. Plaintiff

also told county correctional staff that he was a ranking member of the Aryan Brotherhood. 

(Cattermole, Ex. C, AGO-041, Ex. I, AGO-260.) In February of 2002, Plaintiff was sentenced to

death and placed in custody of the warden at San Quentin. 

Condemned inmates at San Quentin have either Grade A or Grade B status. Grade B status is

more restrictive than Grade A status. Inmates who pose little or no security risks are classified as

Grade A. Those inmates who threaten security and the safety of other inmates are classified as Grade

B. Grade B inmates have a high escape risk, potential for violence, and discipline issues. Inmates

classified as Grade B are housed in San Quentin’s Adjustment Center and do not enjoy the same

privileges Grade A inmates enjoy. For example, Grade B inmates cannot make personal telephone

calls or receive contact visits with outside individuals; are allowed ten hours in the exercise yard per

week, as opposed to the forty-two hours permitted to Grade A inmates; are allowed forty-five dollars

per month to purchase additional food, compared to the one hundred and eighty dollars per month for

Grade A inmates; are allowed only one thirty-pound bag of food from outside of the prison per year,

as opposed to four thirty-pound bags per year Grade A inmates receive; are unable to possess

typewriters, tape-players, or water heaters; may not purchase razors from outside sources; and, are

housed in different facilities. A review of an inmate’s Grade B classification occurs every ninety

days.

Upon entering San Quentin, Plaintiff underwent an initial review before the San Quentin

United Classification Committee and was classified as a Grade B inmate because of his February

1999 validation as an associate of the Aryan Brotherhood by the LEIU.3 The Classification

Committee also based Plaintiff’s Grade B classification on two new prison informational forms

compiled by prison staff. One informational form, dated March 27, 2002, noted that a correctional

counselor contacted the county jail and confirmed that Plaintiff was involved in gang activity while

incarcerated there. That same informational form noted that Plaintiff had already received a rules

violation report at San Quentin for possession of a weapon. (Cattermole, Ex. G, AGO-250, Ex. I,

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AGO-260.) 

On April 10, 2002, Plaintiff filed an inmate appeal challenging his February 1999 gang

validation. On June 5, 2002, the San Quentin Institutional Gang Investigator (“IGI”), in Plaintiff’s

presence, reviewed the documents used to validate Plaintiff as a member of the Aryan Brotherhood,

and explained to Plaintiff that the institution felt the documents were reliable and sufficient to

validate him as a gang member. On July 16, 2002, San Quentin denied Plaintiff’s request to repeal

his gang validation, and explained to Plaintiff that he presented no compelling evidence or otherwise

substantiated his claim that his gang validation was incorrect. (Cattermole, Ex. K, AGO-288-299.) 

Since that time, correctional staff has observed Plaintiff passing written notes to other inmates and

swallowing the notes after reading them. (Cattermole, Ex. I, AGO-259.) A search of Plaintiff’s cell

revealed two written items, upon which were drawn inmate gang symbols. (Cattermole, Ex. I, AGO261-263.) Also, two confidential memoranda dated May 19, 2003, and May 23, 2003, indicated

Plaintiff planned to batter another inmate as part of a gang related conspiracy.

B. Procedural Background

On September 10, 2003, Plaintiff filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff asserts

substantive due process violations under the Fourteenth Amendment, arguing that his gang validation

and subsequent Grade B classification violated both his First Amendment right to associate and his

protected liberty interest as a prisoner in avoiding atypical and significant hardship. Plaintiff also

asserts procedural due process violations, arguing that his validation as a gang member by prison

officials was based upon insufficient evidence, indeterminate standards, and that Plaintiff did not

have an opportunity to contest the evidence. Plaintiff also asserts a procedural due process claim

arguing that this validation effectively relegates him to indefinite Grade B status since he contends

that it is extremely difficult to overcome the presumption of gang association once having been

validated as a gang member.

LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes summary judgment if there is

no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

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law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The moving party bears the

initial burden of demonstrating the basis for the motion and identifying the portions of the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, affidavits, and admissions on file that establish the absence

of a triable issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the moving

party meets this initial burden, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to present specific

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324;

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). The non-movant’s

bare assertions, standing alone, are insufficient to create a material issue of fact and defeat a motion

for summary judgment. Id. at 247-48. An issue of fact is material if, under the substantive law of

the case, resolution of the factual dispute might affect the case’s outcome. Anderson, 477 U.S. at

248. Factual disputes are genuine if they “properly can be resolved in favor of either party.” Id. at

250. Thus, a genuine issue for trial exists if the non-movant presents evidence from which a

reasonable jury, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to that party, could resolve the

material issue in its favor. Id. However, “[i]f the [non-movant’s] evidence is merely colorable, or is

not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Id. at 249-50 (internal citations

omitted).

ANALYSIS

A. Substantive Due Process Violation for Atypical Hardship

Plaintiff argues that his gang validation and subsequent Class B classification amount to a

substantive due process violation under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Due Process Clause

prohibits states from “depriving any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” 

U.S. Const. amend. XIV. To determine whether a state has violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s

Due Process Clause with respect to a liberty issue, a court must engage a two-part analysis. As a

threshold issue, the court must determine whether a liberty interest, protected by the Fourteenth

Amendment, is implicated by Plaintiff’s Class B classification. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209,

125 S.Ct. 2384, 2393 (2005); Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). Only if such an interest is

implicated, must a court determine whether sufficient procedural and evidentiary safeguards were in

place to protect that interest. Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. at 2393; see also, Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson,

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Plaintiff argues that California Code of Regulations creates a liberty interest in inmate privileges because it defines

such privileges as “administratively authorized activities and benefits required of the director, by statute, case law,

governmental regulations, or executive orders” and therefore requires prison officials administer these privileges. 15 CCR

§ 3044(c). The Court is unpersuaded by this argument. The Supreme Court has explicitly disavowed the methodology of

identifying state-created liberty interests by focusing on ‘the language of a particular [prison] regulation’ instead of ‘the

nature of the deprivation.’ Wilkinson v. Austin, 125 S.Ct. 2384, 2394 (2005). This is precisely the methodology that Plaintiff

urges the Court to apply here. The Supreme Court stated, “[a]fter Sandin, it is clear that the touchstone of the inquiry into

the existence of a protected, state-created liberty interest in avoiding restrictive conditions of confinement is not the language

of regulations regarding those conditions but the nature of those conditions themselves ‘in relation to the ordinary incidents

of prison life.’ Id.

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490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989); see also, Zimmerlee v. Kenney, 831 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1987). 

 “Those who seek to invoke [the] procedural protection [of the Fourteenth Amendment] must

establish that [an] interest[] is at stake.” Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. at 2393. Defendants contend that

Plaintiff’s Grade B classification does not implicate a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth

Amendment. A liberty interest may derive from two points: the Constitution itself or “it may arise

from an expectation or interest created by state laws or policies . . . .” Id.; see also Wolf v.

McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556-58 (1974). The Supreme Court “[has] held that the Constitution itself

does not give rise to a liberty interest in avoiding transfer to more adverse conditions of

confinement.” Wilkinson, 418 U.S. at 2393. Nonetheless, “a liberty interest in avoiding particular

conditions of confinement may arise from state policies or regulations . . . .” Id. 

1. Plaintiff’s Liberty Interest in Avoiding Class B Classification

As a threshold issue, Plaintiff must establish that he has a protected liberty interest.

4

 

Accordingly, the Court will first examine whether Plaintiff’s assignment from Grade A to Grade B

status gives rise to a protected interest. It is undisputed that Plaintiff’s conviction authorized the state

to impose certain restrictions on Plaintiff’s confinement. See, e.g., Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215,

225 (1976). However, certain restrictions may implicate a protected liberty interest if they “[impose

an] atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison

life.” Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003); Sandin at 484. In determining whether

disciplinary segregation imposes atypical and significant hardship, a court considers the following

factors: 1) whether disciplinary segregation was essentially the same as discretionary forms of

segregation; 2) whether a comparison between the plaintiff’s confinement and conditions in the

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5The Wilkinson court noted that any one of the three factors, standing alone, may not create a liberty interest. 125

S.Ct. at 2394-95. A court, however, must consider the factors as a whole to determine whether the imposed conditions impose

a typical and significant hardship on the prisoner. Id. at 2395. 

6Neither party addresses the issues of whether the disciplinary segregation was essentially the same as discretionary

forms of segregation and whether the length of Plaintiff’s sentence was affected. The record is bare with respect to the first

issue. The record does indicate, however, that Plaintiff’s Grade B status did not affect his sentence, as Plaintiff was (and is)

on Death Row. Accordingly the Court finds no genuine issue of material fact with respect to those issues. 

7Defendants do not deny the conditions imposed on Grade B inmates.

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general population shows that the plaintiff suffers a major disruption in his environment; and 3)

whether the length of the plaintiff’s sentence was affected. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486-87; Jackson, 353

F.3d at 755; Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 448 (9th Cir. 2000).5 Such an inquiry requires a “case

by case, fact by fact consideration.” Jackson, 353 F.3d at 755 (quoting Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d

1083, 1089 (9th Cir. 1996)). 

Plaintiff asserts that his Grade B classification imposes an atypical and significant hardship

on him because the Grade B classification substantially impairs some of the privileges and liberties

that Grade A inmates receive. The parties primarily focus on three cases and dispute whether

Plaintiff’s classification imposes a major disruption in his environment.6 These cases are: 

Wilkinson, 125 S.Ct. 2384 (2005); Koch v. Lewis, 216 F. Supp. 2d 994 (D. Arizona 2001), vacated

as moot, 399 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2005); and Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146 (N.D. Cal. 1995).

Specifically, Plaintiff points to the fact that, because he now has Grade B status, he cannot make

telephone calls or receive contact visits; he receives 10 hours per week in the exercise yard, as

opposed to 42 hours for Grade A inmates; his canteen access is limited to $45 per month of nonnutritious food, as opposed to $180 per month for nutritious food; he is allowed one, as opposed to

four, thirty-pound package of food from home every year; he cannot possess typewriters, tape

players, or water heaters; he cannot purchase nutritional supplements or razors from outside sources;

his surroundings are noisier, more violent, and more grim than Grade A surroundings; and he cannot

“embrace his wife.”7 (Complaint at ¶4.) Defendants contend that Plaintiffs allegations do not

amount to a significant and atypical hardship within the meaning of Sandin and, thus, Plaintiff has

failed to establish a triable issue of material fact. The Court agrees. The cases to which Plaintiff

cites in support of his argument involve deprivations significantly harsher than those that Plaintiff

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“Supermax” prisons are maximum security facilities with highly restrictive conditions.

9Although Plaintiff argues that his classification as a gang member is essentially indefinite because it is “nearly

impossible” to overcome the presumption of gang association once having been validated, Plaintiff has presented no

competent evidence indicating that the system does not seriously take into account exonerating evidence, or that Plaintiff

himself has presented exonerating evidence that was ignored. Accordingly, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of

Defendants as to this argument.

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has experienced due to Class B certification. They are distinguishable from the instant case on that

basis.

In Wilkinson, the Supreme Court found that there was a liberty interest in avoiding

confinement in the Ohio State Penitentiary (“OSP”). OSP is a “Supermax” facility.8 Wilkinson, 125

S.Ct. at 2394. OSP prisoners were subject to the following conditions: inmates had to remain in

their 7 x 14 foot cells for 23 hours per day; during the one hour each day an inmate was permitted to

leave his cell he was restricted to one of two indoor recreation areas; a dimmed light had to remain

on in the cell at all times, and inmates who attempted to shield the light were punished; inmates

could not in any way communicate with other inmates; any visitation was rare and conducted

through glass walls; and placement was indefinite. Id. at 2389. The court held that such

confinement imposed an atypical and significant hardship, however, because placement at OSP was

1) indefinite and reviewed only annually and 2) disqualified an inmate for parole consideration. Id.

at 2394-95. 

Here, the restrictions of Plaintiff’s Class B privileges and living conditions are not

particularly severe in comparison to those at issue in Wilkinson. Plaintiff is allowed forty-five

dollars a month for spending on supplemental foods, receives ten hours per week in the yard, and is

allowed a thirty-pound package of additional food from home each year. Unlike OSC inmates,

Plaintiff is not kept in solitary confinement. Moreover, Plaintiff’s Grade B classification is reviewed

every ninety days, and thus is not indefinite.9 Additionally, Plaintiff is on death row, and will

presumably live out the rest of his life on such; his Grade B classification does not alter his sentence. 

 Even viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the imposed restrictions do not work an atypical

and significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.

Similarly, the instant case is distinguishable from Koch. Koch involved an inmate who was

housed in Special Management Unit II (SMU II) of the Arizona Department of Corrections, which, at

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28 10The Ninth Circuit recognized in Sealey v. Giltner that “harsh conditions endured for a brief interval and somewhat

harsh conditions endured for a prolonged interval might both be atypical.” 197 F.3d 578, 586 (9th Cir. 1999). 

9

the time, was the most restrictive confinement in the state and the most secure Supermax facility in

the United States. 216 F. Supp. 2d at 996-97. Koch was placed at SMU II after being validated as a

member of the Aryan Brotherhood prison gang. Id. at 996. There he had to remain in his 10 x 8 foot

cell nearly 24 hours a day; was allowed one hour every other day (three hours per week) in which to

shower and exercise; could only see the sky or sunlight through a mesh grate ceiling in the exercise

area; was shackled during that one hour when he was permitted to leave the cell; could make one

phone call per week; and was allowed no more than two hours of visitation time per week through a

plate glass window. Id. at 997. Additionally, although Koch’s sentence was 25 years to life, his

status as a previous gang member effectively foreclosed him from any possibility of parole. Id. at

999. Koch had been in the SMU II and under these conditions for five and a half years and would

probably have continued to remain there for the rest of his life due to SMU II release procedures. Id. 

The district court held that such conditions implicated a liberty interest because “the deprivation

[was] extreme in both degree and duration.” Id. at 1000. There the court expressed its concern over

the unlimited duration of Koch’s confinement in such conditions but noted that “[a] short stay under

the severe conditions of SMU II may not raise due process concerns.”10 Id. at 1001. Here, as

discussed above, not only are Plaintiff’s conditions as a Grade B inmate less severe than those

imposed at SMU II, but Plaintiff’s Grade B classification is up for review every ninety days. 

Finally, the Court distinguishes Madrid. Madrid involved a class action where inmates of the

Security Housing Unit (“SHU”) of PBSB alleged, inter alia, that, pursuant to a 42 U.S.C. § 1983

claim, their confinement in the SHU imposed on them inhumane conditions. Madrid, 889 F. Supp.

at 1156. There, in addition to being physically assaulted, plaintiffs were confined to windowless,

white-walled cells designed to reduce visual stimulation; inmates could spend years without ever

seeing the outside world; they received little normal human contact, less than other Supermax

facilities; and plaintiffs suffered from mental deterioration as a result of their confinement

conditions. Id. at 1228-30. The district court found that such conditions violated the Eighth

Amendment, but only with respect to certain subgroups of SHU inmates, including the mentally ill. 

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11Although the Court does not need to reach Plaintiff’s procedural due process claims, the Court notes that, in any

event, Defendants have met the evidentiary standard in the Ninth Circuit with respect to Plaintiff’s gang validation.

“California's policy of assigning suspected gang affiliates to the Security Housing Unit is not a disciplinary measure, but an

administrative strategy designed to preserve order in the prison and protect the safety of all inmates.” Bruce v. Ylst,, 351 F.3d

1283, 1287 (9th Cir. 2003). “Although there are some minimal legal limitations...the assignment of inmates within the

California prisons is essentially a matter of administrative discretion...[T]he relevant issue is whether there was ‘some

evidence’ to support [the] validation.” Id. Defendants presented considerable evidence in support of their validation of

Plaintiff as a gang member, including documents discovered in Plaintiff’s possession containing the names and contact

information of known gang members, evidence from multiple confidential sources affirming that Plaintiff ordered at least

one gang-related prison attack, and evidence that Plaintiff’s conviction for murder was related to his gang activities.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendants have presented “some evidence” to support Plaintiff’s validation as a gang

member. Id.

10

Id. at 1279. In the instant case the conditions imposed on Plaintiff are not nearly as atypical or

severe. 

“[T]he Due Process Clause does not protect every change in the conditions of confinement

having a substantial adverse impact on the prisoner.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 478. As described above,

the restrictions Plaintiff faces as a Grade B inmate are significantly less harsh than in the cases

Plaintiff cites. Moreover, these restrictions are for a far shorter time period since a review of a

prisoner’s Grade B status occurs every 90 days. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s

classification as a Grade B inmate does not implicate a protected liberty interest since it does not

significantly disrupt his environment or impose an atypical or significant hardship that rises to the

level of a constitutional violation. Since Plaintiff has not established a constitutional violation on

this basis, the Court need not consider Plaintiff’s procedural due process claim.11 See Pichardo v.

Kinker, 73 F.3d 612 (5th Cir. 1996); Sandin at 485-86.

B. First Amendment–Freedom Of Association

Plaintiff asserts that his Grade B status violates his First Amendment right to associate, citing

to, inter alia, Jones. Plaintiff argues that the regulations restricting Plaintiff’s right to associate

should be analyzed under a “strict scrutiny” standard by the Court. The Court disagrees. The

Supreme Court has held that “[c]hallenges to prison restrictions that are asserted to inhibit First

Amendment interests must be analyzed in terms of the legitimate policies and goals of the

corrections system, to whose custody and care the prisoner has been committed in accordance with

due process of law.” Jones v. North Carolina Prisoner’s Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 125 (1977)

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(quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974)). 

In Jones, the North Carolina Department of Correction created regulations that barred, among

other things, union meetings. Id. at 121. The union brought suit in district court challenging the

regulations and alleging a First Amendment violation for the no-meeting rule. Id. The district court

held for the union and issued an injunction. Id. at 126. The Supreme Court, however, reversed,

finding that the district court failed to give proper deference to the decisions of prison officials with

respect to potentially dangerous situations. Id. at 125. The Jones court held that with respect to First

Amendment associational rights, courts must give way to the difficult realities of the prison system,

which include violence and confrontation among inmates and employees. Id. at 126. The court

stated: 

First Amendment associational rights . . . must give way to the reasonable

considerations of penal management. . . . Prison life and relations between the

inmates themselves and between the inmates and prison officials or staff,

contain the ever-present potential for violent confrontation and conflagration. 

Responsible prison officials must be permitted to take reasonable steps to

forestall such a threat, and they must be permitted to act before the time when

they can compile a dossier on the eve of a riot. . . . When weighed against the

First Amendment rights asserted, these institutional reasons are sufficiently

weighty to prevail. 

Id. at 132-33. The Jones court found that the prison officials had legitimate policies and goals

warranting the restriction of union meetings; particularly important was the motive to eliminate

friction between inmate and prison personnel, as well as friction between union and non-union

inmates. Id. at 125-27. Accordingly the Jones court did not find a violation of the plaintiff’s First

Amendment associational rights. Id. at 133.

Here, Defendants have equally legitimate, if not more pressing, policy reason for placing

dangerous inmates, particularly members of prison gangs, in Grade B facilities. Prison officials

restrict gang association because it almost inevitably leads to violence and friction among the

inmates and prison employees. Given Plaintiff’s prison affiliation with the Aryan Brotherhood,

coupled with his violent criminal past in connection with the gang, the Court finds that Defendants

had legitimate policy reasons and goals in limiting Plaintiff’s ability to associate with other gang

members by classifying him as a Grade B inmate. See, e.g., Stefanow v. McFadden, 103 F.3d 1466,

1472-73 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Anyone familiar with prisons understands the seriousness of the problems

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12Plaintiff also argues that the rules regarding Grade B classification are impermissibly vague in violation of his First

Amendment rights. Plaintiff contends that the rules “[f]ail to give inmates adequate notice of what conduct is proscribed and

what conduct is prohibited...delegate unbridled discretion to defendants...lack sufficient reasonable minimal standards to

guide defendants in fairly judging whether plaintiff is truly a prison gang associate.” Complaint ¶ 23. However, as noted

above, the decision to house inmates in one location as part of an “administrative strategy designed to preserve order in the

prison and protect the safety of all inmates...is essentially a matter of administrative discretion.” Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1286-

7. Moreover, Plaintiff’s validation as a gang member requires “some evidence” that Plaintiff is involved with other gang

members for the purposes of promoting gang activity. Id. Prisoners are thus on notice that engaging in gang activity or

associating with known gang members for the purposes of furthering gang activity, is prohibited. Accordingly, given the

discretionary nature of such a decision, and the requirement that Plaintiff’s gang validation be supported by evidence of

engagement in gang activity, the Court finds that the rules guiding this decision are not unconstitutionally vague.

13Docket No. 17, filed on July 1, 2005.

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caused by prison gangs that are fueled by actively virulent racism . . . . The security concerns of

prison officials are entitled to respect and deference by the courts.”); Hart v. Cambra, 1997 WL

564059, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 1997) (“To the extent the placement and retention of inmates in

[segregated facilities] as gang affiliates is due to the exercise of their First Amendment rights of

communication with other persons identified as gang affiliates, the infringement on the constitutional

right of the affected prisoners is permissible.”); Koutnik v. Brown, 2005 WL 552192, at *2 (W.D.

Wis. Mar. 2, 2005) (“It is beyond question that prison officials have a compelling interest in

implementing policies designed to combat the threat to institutional security posed by organized

gang activity.”). Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff has not raised any genuine issue of material

fact with respect to his First Amendment claim.12 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

with respect to Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim as Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter

of law.13 The Clerk of the Court is instructed to close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August___, 2006 

MARTIN J. JENKINS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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