Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-03851/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-03851-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Bivens Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Taplima Ansu,

Plaintiff,

v. 

CoreCivic, et al.,

Defendants.

No. CV-18-03851-PHX-DWL (DMF)

ORDER 

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Taplima Ansu’s appeal (Doc. 57) of the 

Magistrate Judge’s decision (Doc. 53) compelling him to provide a preliminary expert 

affidavit to Defendant Dr. Akhtar Hamidi (“Dr. Hamidi”). For the following reasons, the 

decision will be affirmed. 

RELEVANT BACKGROUND

This is a pro se civil rights case. Ansu is a detainee at the Central Arizona Florence 

Correctional Center (“CAFCC”). CoreCivic, a Tennessee corporation, operates CAFCC, 

which holds Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) detainees. (Doc. 6 at 4-5.) 

On November 28, 2018, Ansu filed his first amended complaint (“FAC”), which 

lists Janelle Gonzales, Mario Miranda, Case Manager Broe, Dr. Kirby, Dr. Hamidi, and 

CoreCivic as defendants. (Doc. 6 at 2.) Among other things, the FAC alleges that on April 

4, 2018, another inmate sexually assaulted Ansu during scheduled recreation time. (Id. ¶¶ 

13-25.) The inmate “forced penetration with his finger” into Ansu’s anus while Ansu 

“leaned over to have a drink of water.” (Id.) ICE’s follow-up investigation substantiated 

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Ansu’s reported assault. (Id.) 

The FAC alleges that, after the assault, Ansu requested mental health assistance and 

met with Dr. Kirby, a psychologist, who referred him to Dr. Hamidi, a psychiatrist. (Id. ¶¶ 

44-46.) The FAC alleges that Dr. Hamidi interviewed Ansu through his cell door, forcing 

Ansu to yell and allowing other inmates to overhear their conversation. (Id. ¶¶ 47-50.) 

The FAC further alleges that despite Ansu’s complaints about “sleeplessness,” “disturbing 

unnatural sexual dreams,” and “trust issues about having a cell mate,” both Dr. Hamidi and

Dr. Kirby failed to “address the sexual violation issue,” refused to provide treatment, and 

failed to follow up about Ansu’s anxiety and depression. (Id. ¶¶ 57-60, 118-23.) 

In Count Four of the FAC, Ansu asserts a state-law claim against Dr. Kirby and Dr. 

Hamidi for “negligence/gross negligence.” (Id. ¶¶ 118-23.)1 The upshot of this claim is 

that, had Dr. Kirby and Dr. Hamidi properly treated Ansu’s anxiety and depression 

stemming from the assault, “it is very likely that [Ansu’s] suffering would not be as severe 

as it is today.” (Id. ¶ 122.) 

On August 2, 2019, Dr. Hamidi answered the FAC, denying the allegations in Count 

Four. (Doc. 34.) 

On October 10, 2019, Dr. Hamidi filed a motion to compel a preliminary expert 

affidavit. (Doc. 44.) 

On October 23, 2019, Ansu filed a response to that motion. (Doc. 45.)

On November 1, 2019, Dr. Hamidi filed a reply. (Doc. 48.)

On November 14, 2019, Magistrate Judge Fine issued an order compelling Ansu to 

provide a preliminary expert affidavit. (Doc. 53.)

On November 25, 2019, Ansu appealed that order. (Doc. 57.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Rule 72(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, when a magistrate judge 

issues an order resolving a non-dispositive motion, “[a] party may serve and file objections 

to the order within 14 days after being served with a copy. . . . The district judge in the 

1 The Court has pendent jurisdiction over this claim because Counts One and Three 

assert federal causes of action.

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case must consider timely objections and modify or set aside any part of the order that is 

clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” Id. “The clearly erroneous standard applies to the 

magistrate judge’s factual findings . . . [while] the contrary to law standard applies to the 

magistrate judge’s legal conclusions, which are reviewed de novo.” Morgal v. Maricopa 

Cty. Bd. of Sup'rs, 284 F.R.D. 452, 458 (D. Ariz. 2012) (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted). “The clearly erroneous standard . . . is ‘significantly deferential, requiring 

a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’” Silva v. Olson, 2013 

WL 870218, *2 (D. Ariz. 2013) (citation omitted). “[T]he contrary to law standard . . . 

permits independent review of purely legal determinations by the magistrate judge.” Id.

DISCUSSION

Under Arizona law, a party asserting a claim against a “health care professional” 

must file a written statement at the outset of the case certifying “whether or not expert 

opinion testimony is necessary to prove the health care professional’s standard of care or 

liability for the claim.” A.R.S. § 12-2603(A). If the party agrees that expert testimony is 

necessary, it must “serve a preliminary expert opinion affidavit” that addresses the expert’s 

qualifications, summarizes the factual basis for the claim, explains why the health care 

professional’s conduct constituted “a violation of the applicable standard of care,” and 

explains why the health care professional’s conduct “caused or contributed to the damages 

or other relief sought by the claimant.” Id. § 12-2603(B). Moreover, if the party disagrees 

that expert testimony is necessary, the opposing party may “dispute[] that certification in 

good faith” and request “an order requiring the claimant . . . to obtain and serve a 

preliminary expert opinion affidavit.” Id. § 12-2603(D). In that circumstance, the court 

must determine whether a preliminary expert affidavit is required. Id. § 12-2603(E).

Here, Dr. Hamidi filed a motion under A.R.S. § 12-2603(D) to compel Ansu to 

provide a preliminary expert affidavit. In response, Ansu didn’t dispute that Count Four 

involves a claim against a health care professional but argued that the affidavit requirement 

should be deemed inapplicable because Dr. Hamidi’s negligence was obvious. Magistrate 

Judge Fine agreed with Dr. Hamidi, concluding that “[i]n medical malpractice cases, the 

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plaintiff must come forward with an initial expert affidavit that sets forth the acts, errors or 

omissions that the expert considers to be a violation of the applicable standard of care, 

resulting in liability.” (Doc. 53 at 3.) On appeal, Ansu renews his argument that the 

affidavit requirement isn’t absolute and contends an affidavit shouldn’t be required here 

because his claims are “of such a nature that even a layperson would be able to identify 

them as a breach of the reasonable care.” (Doc. 57 at 2.)

Ansu’s argument is unavailing. “Arizona courts have long held that the standard 

of care normally must be established by expert medical testimony.” Seisinger v. Siebel, 

203 P.3d 483, 492 (Ariz. 2009). Similarly, “expert medical testimony is normally required 

to establish proximate cause.” Ryan v. San Francisco Peaks Trucking Co., 262 P.3d 863, 

870 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011). Nevertheless, these aren’t absolute requirements—the standard 

of care need not be established by an expert where “malpractice is grossly apparent,” Rasor 

v. Nw. Hosp., LLC, 403 P.3d 572, 575 (Ariz. 2017), and proximate causation need not be 

established by an expert where the “causal relationship is readily apparent to the trier of 

fact.” Ryan, 262 P.3d at 870. 

Ansu’s claims don’t fall within these exceptions. As an initial matter, although there 

is intuitive appeal to Ansu’s argument that a psychiatrist who is interviewing a sexual 

assault victim shouldn’t conduct the interview while in earshot of third parties (Doc. 6 ¶¶ 

119-20), it can’t be overlooked that the interview here took place in the unique context of 

a detention facility. There are strong reasons to suspect that the standard of care applicable 

to prison psychiatrists may be different than the standard of care applicable to psychiatrists 

practicing in other settings. Thus, it’s not “grossly apparent” that Dr. Hamidi’s interview 

technique fell below the standard of care applicable in the prison setting. 

More important, although Count Four criticizes Dr. Hamidi’s failure to conduct the 

initial interview in a private setting, the thrust of the claim is that Dr. Hamidi failed to 

provide any follow-up treatment after the initial interview, which in turn caused Ansu to 

“continue[] to suffer from mental health issues that could have been treated, causing him 

significant distress.” (Doc. 6 ¶ 121.) This is a textbook example of a situation where expert 

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testimony is needed. It may be that Dr. Hamidi’s medical training caused him to believe 

that the mental distress Ansu was reportedly experiencing following the incident with the 

other inmate would resolve on its own, without the need for further medical intervention. 

Expert testimony is needed to properly evaluate Dr. Hamidi’s conduct. See, e.g., Wade v. 

Castillo, 658 F. Supp. 2d 906, 919 (W.D. Wisc. 2009) (“[I]n general, laypersons do not 

know how to identify and treat psychotic symptoms of prisoners.”); Watson v. Montana, 

2006 WL 1876891, *18 (D. Mont. 2006) (rejecting prisoner’s malpractice claim against 

psychologist, because prisoner failed to proffer expert testimony concerning the standard 

of care, and noting that such claims “present[] complex questions of prison psychiatric 

health care which are beyond the knowledge of laypersons”). See also Rae v. United States, 

2016 WL 4943378, *3 (D. Ariz. 2016) (“Undoubtedly, the complex and nuanced nature of 

psychiatric care that Plaintiff alleges her husband required and was not afforded is not the 

type of negligence that can be apparent to a layman.”).

Finally, and in a related vein, Ansu’s allegation in Count Four is that, although he 

was already suffering from some mental distress before he saw Dr. Hamidi, Dr. Hamidi’s 

alleged negligence “very likely” exacerbated his “suffering” and caused it to be more 

severe than it otherwise would have been. (Doc. 6 ¶ 122.) This type of allegation raises 

complex questions of causation—how much of Ansu’s suffering can be attributed to Dr. 

Hamidi’s conduct and how much would have persisted even if Dr. Hamidi had provided 

Ansu’s preferred course of medical care? Arizona law generally requires expert testimony 

on causation in medical malpractice cases and this case doesn’t fall within the exception 

for “readily apparent” causal relationships. Ryan, 262 P.3d at 870 

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Ansu’s appeal (Doc. 57) is denied. 

Dated this 20th day of February, 2020.

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