Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02705/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02705-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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MDR 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Charles Koons, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

Parole Officer Donna Phillips, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV 12-2705-PHX-DGC (SPL) 

ORDER 

Plaintiff Charles Koons, who is confined in the Maricopa County Lower Buckeye 

Jail, has filed a pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 1) and 

an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2). The Court will dismiss this 

action. 

I. Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Filing Fee

 Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis will be granted. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). Plaintiff must pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). 

The Court will assess an initial partial filing fee of $10.67. The remainder of the fee will 

be collected monthly in payments of 20% of the previous month’s income each time the 

amount in the account exceeds $10.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The Court will enter a 

separate Order requiring the appropriate government agency to collect and forward the 

fees according to the statutory formula. 

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II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff 

has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is 

immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 

does not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 

 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible 

claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw 

on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s 

specific factual allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must 

assess whether there are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id.

at 681. 

 But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, 

courts must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 

342 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less 

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. 

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). 

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 If the Court determines that a pleading could be cured by the allegation of other 

facts, a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend a complaint before dismissal 

of the action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). The 

Court should not, however, advise the litigant how to cure the defects. This type of 

advice “would undermine district judges’ role as impartial decisionmakers.” Pliler v. 

Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004); see also Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131 n.13 (declining to 

decide whether the court was required to inform a litigant of deficiencies). Plaintiff’s 

Complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, without leave to amend because 

the defects cannot be corrected. 

III. Complaint 

 In his three-count Complaint, Plaintiff names as Defendants Parole Officer Donna 

Phillips and the Arizona Department of Corrections Parole Office. 

 Plaintiff contends that because Defendant Phillips and others told him that he did 

not have a term of probation to serve after he completed his parole, Plaintiff did not 

“check in” with the probation department after he was released from parole. Plaintiff 

asserts that because he did not check in after he was released from parole, the probation 

department issued a warrant for his arrest. Plaintiff asserts that as a result of Defendant 

Phillips’s conduct, he is in jail for violating the terms of his probation. 

 In Count One, Plaintiff alleges that he was subjected to cruel and unusual 

punishment and a due process violation because of Defendant Phillips’s negligence. In 

Count Two, he asserts that he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment and a due 

process violation because Defendant Phillips was intentionally negligent “out of some 

kind of wanton need to keep [Plaintiff] in the cycle of the judic[ial] system.” In Count 

Three, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Phillips acted intentionally and purposefully and, 

therefore, violated her “oath[]s and affirmations” to be truthful and engaged in perjury 

and “fraud by false report.” 

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 In his Request for Relief, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages, “some Administrative 

review rel[]ated to [his] claims of [Defendant Phillips’s] nonchalant misinforma[tion] of 

[his] true probation status,” and “administrative remedy for such negligence.” 

IV. Failure to State a Claim

 A prisoner’s claim for damages cannot be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if “a 

judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction 

or sentence,” unless the prisoner demonstrates that the conviction or sentence has 

previously been reversed, expunged, or otherwise invalidated. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 

U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). See also Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005) (“[A] 

state prisoner’s § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation)–no matter the relief 

sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s suit (state 

conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings)–if success in that action 

would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.”). 

 Plaintiff’s claims imply the invalidity of his probation revocation and are therefore 

barred by Heck. See Crow v. Penry, 102 F.3d 1086, 1087 (10th Cir. 1996) (suit against 

probation officer, probation department, and parole commission for alleged violations of 

his constitutional rights (including claim that his probation officer failed to advise him or 

misadvised him regarding a term of his probation) that resulted in his arrest as a parole 

violator, revocation of parole, and additional incarceration, necessarily implied the 

invalidity of his parole revocation and was not permitted under Heck). 

IT IS ORDERED: 

 (1) Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2) is granted. 

 (2) As required by the accompanying Order to the appropriate government 

agency, Plaintiff must pay the $350.00 filing fee and is assessed an initial partial filing 

fee of $10.67. 

(3) The Complaint (Doc. 1) is dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), and the Clerk of Court must enter judgment accordingly. 

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 (4) The Clerk of Court must make an entry on the docket stating that the 

dismissal for failure to state a claim may count as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

(5) The docket shall reflect that the Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(3) and Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(3)(A), that any appeal of 

this decision would not be taken in good faith. 

Dated this 5th day of March, 2013. 

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