Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02162/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02162-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1331fl Fed. Question: Fair Labor Standards

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EDUARDO NUNEZ, individually and on 

behalf of others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

BAE SYSTEMS SAN DIEGO SHIP 

REPAIR INC., a California Corporation; 

and DOES 1 through 50 inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: 16-CV-2162 JLS (NLS)

ORDER: (1) CONDITIONALLY 

CERTIFYING SETTLEMENT 

CLASS ACTION; (2) 

PRELIMINARILY APPROVING 

PROPOSED SETTLEMENT; (3) 

APPROVING NOTICE TO CLASS; 

AND (4) SETTING FINAL 

APPROVAL HEARING DATE

(ECF No. 15)

Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Eduardo Nunez’s and Defendant BAE 

Systems San Diego Ship Repair Inc.’s (the “Parties”) Joint Motion for Order (1) 

Conditionally Certifying Settlement Class Action; (2) Preliminarily Approving Proposed 

Settlement; (3) Approving Notice to Class; and (4) Setting Final Approval Hearing Date. 

(“Prelim. Settlement Mot.”) (ECF No. 15). Because the settlement is fundamentally fair, 

reasonable, and adequate, the Court GRANTS the Parties’ Preliminary Settlement Motion.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Eduardo Nunez brings a class action suit seeking compensation on behalf 

of all non-exempt employees of Defendant BAE Systems San Diego Ship Repair Inc. 

(“SDSR”) for unpaid wages and penalties, as well as other violations of California law. 

(Prelim. Settlement Mot. 9,1 ECF No. 15-1.) Defendant SDSR is an international defense, 

aerospace, and security company that maintains a single shipyard in San Diego Bay, where 

it works on virtually all types of government and commercial vessels (e.g., the U.S. Navy 

fleet). (FAC ¶ 14, ECF No. 11.) The proposed class includes all non-exempt employees at 

SDSR who worked at any time during the period May 27, 2012 through October 13, 2016 

(“Settlement Class / Class Members”). (Prelim. Settlement Mot. 10, ECF No. 15-1.)

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint asserts seven claims for relief under various 

provisions of California law:

1. Failure to Pay Straight-Time & Overtime Wages 

2. Violation of the Unfair Competition Law 

3. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq.

4. Failure to Provide Accurate Wage Statements 

5. Failure to Provide Rest Periods 

6. Failure to Reimburse Employees for Business Expenses 

7. Failure to Provide All Compensation Owed Upon Termination of 

Employment 

8. Violation of the Private Attorney General Act

(See generally FAC, ECF No. 11.) Plaintiff generally alleges that because there would 

typically be 100 SDSR workers waiting in line to pass through a checkpoint before they 

could break their shift for lunch, Plaintiff and other workers were not provided with a full 

30-minute meal break due to the time spent waiting in line. (Id. ¶ 10.) Thus, Plaintiff argues 

Defendant failed to provide Plaintiff and other workers with a duty-free 30-minute meal 

period and failed to pay them wages for their time spent disembarking from the ship, 

 

1 Pin citations refer to the CM/ECF page numbers electronically stamped at the top of each page.

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returning tools, and waiting in the security line, among other activities. (Id.) Plaintiff 

additionally alleges that Defendant improperly forced him and others to purchase clothes 

and shoes from Defendant and that Defendant did not provide reimbursements for these 

purchases. (Id.) As a result of this fraudulent behavior, the wage statements that Defendant 

provided were inaccurate. (Id. ¶ 11.)

The Parties entered into extensive pre-suit negotiations for the purpose of settling 

their disputes, such as (1) voluntary exchange of information, including SDSR’s 

employment policies, sworn declarations from putative class members, and thousands of 

electronic records containing class member data (e.g., individualized rates of pay, 

employment dates, time records, and badge-swipe data); and (2) a full-day mediation in 

San Francisco with Antonio Piazza, Esq., of Mediated Negotiations. (Prelim. Settlement 

Mot. 10, ECF No. 15-1.) The mediation was successful and resulted in a non-reversionary 

settlement of $2.9 million, (id.), though Defendant SDSR maintains its complete denial of 

wrongdoing, (id. at 9 n.1).

The Parties present to the Court a Joint Motion for an Order: (1) conditionally 

certifying the proposed Settlement Class, defined below; (2) preliminarily approving the 

proposed settlement of $2.9 million; (3) approving the proposed Notice and directing 

distribution of the Notice and related documents; and (4) setting a schedule for final 

approval. As noted above, although SDSR stipulates both to certification of a Settlement 

Class and the proposed Settlement, Defendant continues to deny all allegations of unlawful 

conduct alleged in the Complaint, and does not admit or concede that it has, in any manner, 

violated federal or California laws or committed any other unlawful action that would 

entitle Plaintiff or any class to any recovery.

SETTLEMENT TERMS

The Parties have submitted a comprehensive settlement document with 

approximately twenty-three pages of substantive terms, and a five-page proposed class 

notice. (Joint Stipulation of Settlement and Release (“Settlement Agreement”) 31–60, ECF

/ / /

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No. 15-1.) The settlement provides monetary relief but no programmatic relief. Plaintiff 

Eduardo Nunez, as class representative, supports the Settlement Agreement. (Id. at 54.)

I. Monetary Relief

SDSR proposes to pay a Maximum Settlement Amount of $2.9 million. (Prelim. 

Settlement Mot. 10, ECF No. 15-1.) From this amount will be deducted: (a) all Settlement 

payments to Class Members eligible for Settlement payments; (b) the Class Representative 

service payment approved by the Court; (c) Class Counsel’s attorneys’ fees and expenses 

approved by the Court; (d) the Settlement Administrator’s fees and expenses; (e) payment 

made to the State of California Labor Workforce and Development Agency (“LWDA”); 

(f) the employer’s portion of FICA, FUTA, and all other state and federal payroll taxes on 

the “wage” portion of the Settlement payments to Class Members; and (g) an additional 

flat amount of $250 for each employee who separated employment during the Covered 

Period (“Wait Time Penalties”). (Id. at 11.) SDSR will automatically make Settlement 

payments to Class Members (unless they choose to opt out) based on the following 

formula:

After deductions of the Court-approved service payment to the Class 

Representative, the Court-approved attorneys’ fees and costs for Class 

Counsel, a payment for the Settlement Administrator’s fees and 

expenses, payment to the LWDA, the employer’s portion of state and 

federal payroll taxes and payment of Wait Time Penalties, the 

Remainder of the Maximum Payment will be available for distribution 

to the Payment-Eligible Class Members (the “Class Settlement 

Proceeds”). The Remainder shall be distributed as follows:

Payment-Eligible Class Members will receive a payment based on each 

person’s compensable work weeks, which shall be all weeks worked as 

non-exempt employees by the Payment-Eligible Class Members during 

the Covered Period (“Compensable Work Weeks”). The dollars per 

Compensable Work Week will be calculated by dividing the total 

Compensable Work Weeks into the Remainder. That amount (dollars 

per week) will be multiplied by the number of Compensable Work 

Weeks for each Payment-Eligible Class Member.

(Id.) The check will escheat to the State of California or any other State having jurisdiction 

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over the Class Member’s assets if the Class Member fails to cash his or her check within 

120 days after it is mailed. (Id. at 12.)

RULE 23 SETTLEMENT CLASS CERTIFICATION

Before granting preliminary approval of a class action settlement agreement, the 

Court must first determine whether the proposed class can be certified. Amchem Prods. v. 

Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997) (indicating that a district court must apply “undiluted, 

even heightened, attention [to class certification] in the settlement context” in order to 

protect absentees).

Class actions are governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. In order to certify 

a class, each of the four requirements of Rule 23(a) must first be met. Zinser v. Accufix 

Research Inst., Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir. 2001). Rule 23(a) allows a class to be 

certified only if:

(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is 

impracticable;

(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; 

(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical 

of the claims or defenses of the class; and 

(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect 

the interests of the class.

Next, in addition to Rule 23(a)’s requirements, the proposed class must satisfy the 

requirements of one of the subdivisions of Rule 23(b). Zinser, 253 F.3d at 1186. Here, 

Plaintiff seeks to certify the Settlement Class under subdivision Rule 23(b)(3), which 

permits certification if “questions of law or fact common to class members predominate

over any questions affecting only individual class members,” and “a class action is superior 

to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” The 

Court addresses each of these requirements in turn.

I. Rule 23(a)(1): Numerosity

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(1) requires that a class must be “so numerous 

that joinder of all members is impracticable.” “[C]ourts generally find that the numerosity 

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factor is satisfied if the class comprises 40 or more members and will find that it has not 

been satisfied when the class comprises 21 or fewer.” Celano v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 242 

F.R.D. 544, 549 (N.D. Cal. 2007). 

Here, the proposed Settlement Class consists of approximately 1,930 individuals, all 

of which are identifiable from SDSR’s data. (Prelim. Settlement Mot. 16, ECF No. 15-1.) 

Accordingly, joinder of all members would be impracticable for purposes of Rule 23(a)(1), 

and the numerosity requirement is therefore satisfied.

II. Rule 23(a)(2): Commonality

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(2) requires that there be “questions of law or 

fact common to the class.” Commonality requires that “the class members ‘have suffered 

the same injury.’” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 349–50 (2011) (quoting 

Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 (1982)). “The existence of shared legal 

issues with divergent factual predicates is sufficient, as is a common core of salient facts 

coupled with disparate legal remedies within the class.” Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 

F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Here, the Parties have carefully defined the Settlement Class to encompass all SDSR 

employees adversely affected by the allegedly fraudulent policies and practices set forth 

above. All common questions thus revolve around whether the alleged fraudulent policies 

and practices in fact were fraudulent and impacted the class members. Accordingly, it is 

appropriate for these issues to be adjudicated on a class-wide basis, and Rule 23(a)(2) is 

satisfied.

III. Rule 23(a)(3): Typicality

To satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(3), Plaintiff’s claims must be 

typical of the claims of the Class. The typicality requirement is “permissive” and requires 

only that Plaintiff’s claims “are reasonably coextensive with those of absent class 

members.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020. “The test of typicality ‘is whether other members 

have the same or similar injury, whether the action is based on conduct which is not unique 

to the named plaintiffs, and whether other class members have been injured by the same 

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course of conduct.’” Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 508 (9th Cir. 1992) 

(quoting Schwartz v. Harp, 108 F.R.D. 279, 282 (C.D. Cal. 1985)). “[C]lass certification 

should not be granted if ‘there is a danger that absent class members will suffer if their 

representative is preoccupied with defenses unique to it.’” Id. (citation omitted).

Here, Plaintiff is an SDSR employee whose claims allegedly arise out of the same 

underlying SDSR policies and practices as those pertaining to the proposed Settlement 

Class. (Prelim. Settlement Mot. 17–18, ECF No. 15-1.) Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims are 

typical of the claims of the members of the proposed Settlement Class, thus satisfying Rule 

23(a)(3).

IV. Rule 23(a)(4): Adequacy

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(4) requires that the named representatives 

fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. “To satisfy constitutional due 

process concerns, absent class members must be afforded adequate representation before 

entry of judgment which binds them.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020 (citing Hansberry v. Lee, 

311 U.S. 32, 42–43 (1940)). To determine legal adequacy, the Court must resolve two 

questions: “(1) do the named plaintiffs and their counsel have any conflicts of interest with 

other class members, and (2) will the named plaintiffs and their counsel prosecute the 

action vigorously on behalf of the class?” Id.

Here, there is no reason to believe that the named representative and Class Counsel 

have any conflict of interest with the proposed Settlement Class members. There is also no 

reason to believe that the named representative and Class Counsel have thus far failed to 

vigorously investigate and litigate this case. Plaintiff has retained competent counsel, who 

have conducted extensive investigation, research, and informal discovery in this case. 

(Prelim. Settlement Mot. 18–19, ECF No. 15-1.) Furthermore, Class Counsel have 

significant class action litigation experience, are knowledgeable about the applicable law, 

and will continue to commit their resources to further the interests of the Class. (Id. at 19.) 

Accordingly, the named representative and Class Counsel adequately represent the 

proposed Settlement Class members, and Rule 23(a)(4)’s adequacy requirement is met.

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V. Rule 23(b)(3)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) permits certification if “questions of law 

or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual 

class members,” and “a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and 

efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”

A. Predominance

“The Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry tests whether the proposed classes are 

sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.” Amchem Prods., 521 U.S. 

at 623. “Rule 23(b)(3) focuses on the relationship between the common and individual 

issues.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1022.

Here, the common issues of whether Defendant’s policies and practices failed to, for 

example, compensate Class Members for all time worked, provide an opportunity for 

compliant meal and rest periods, and provide accurate wage statements predominate over 

the individual issues such as length of employment and particularized grievances. (See 

Prelim. Settlement Mot. 19–20, ECF No. 15-1.) Further, for purposes of settlement, Class 

Members are not required to prove any evidentiary or factual issues that could arise in 

litigation. Accordingly, the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) is satisfied.

B. Superiority

The final requirement for certification pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

23(b)(3) is “that a class action [be] superior to other available methods for fairly and 

efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” The superiority inquiry requires the Court to 

consider the four factors listed in Rule 23(b)(3):

(A) the class members’ interests in individually controlling the 

prosecution or defense of separate actions;

(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the 

controversy already begun by or against class members;

(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the 

litigation of the claims in the particular forum; and 

(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.

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See also Zinser, 253 F.3d at 1190. A court need not consider the fourth factor, however, 

when certification is solely for the purpose of settlement. See True v. Am. Honda Motor 

Co., 749 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1066 n.12 (C.D. Cal. 2010); see also Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620 

(“Confronted with a request for settlement-only class certification, a district court need not 

inquire whether the case, if tried, would present intractable management problems, for the 

proposal is that there be no trial.”). The superiority inquiry focuses “‘on the efficiency and 

economy elements of the class action so that cases allowed under [Rule 23(b)(3)] are those 

that can be adjudicated most profitably on a representative basis.’” Zinser, 253 F.3d at 1190 

(quoting 7A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice 

and Procedure § 1780, at 562 (2d ed. 1986)). A district court has “broad discretion” in 

determining whether class treatment is superior. Kamm v. Cal. City Dev. Co., 509 F.2d 

205, 210 (9th Cir. 1975).

Here, Class Members’ claims involve the same issues arising from the same factual 

bases. If Class Members’ claims were considered on an individual basis, almost 1,930 cases 

would follow a similar trajectory, and each would come to a similar result. Furthermore, 

individual cases would consume a significant amount of the Court’s and the Class 

Members’ resources. It is also likely that Class Members would not pursue litigation on an 

individual basis due to the high costs of pursuing individual claims. The interests of the 

Settlement Class Members in individually controlling the litigation are minimal, especially 

given the same broad-based policy and practices would be at issue. Additionally, because 

the majority of SDSR’s employees are located in San Diego, many of the individual cases 

would likely be filed in this district, and thus it is desirable to concentrate the litigation in 

a single forum. Given all of the above, class treatment is the superior method of 

adjudicating this controversy, and the superiority requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) is met.

VI. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the Court finds certification of the Settlement Class 

proper under Rule 23(b)(3). Accordingly, the Settlement Class is CERTIFIED for 

settlement purposes only.

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RULE 23 PRELIMINARY FAIRNESS DETERMINATION

Having certified the Settlement Class, the Court must next make a preliminary 

determination as to whether the proposed settlement is “fair, reasonable, and adequate” 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e). Relevant factors to this determination 

include:

The strength of the plaintiffs’ case; the risk, expense, complexity, and 

likely duration of further litigation; the risk of maintaining class action 

status throughout the trial; the amount offered in settlement; the extent 

of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings; the experience 

and views of counsel; the presence of a governmental participant; and 

the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement.

Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1026. Furthermore, due to the “dangers of collusion between class 

counsel and the defendant, as well as the need for additional protections when the 

settlement is not negotiated by a court designated class representative,” any “settlement 

approval that takes place prior to formal class certification requires a higher standard of 

fairness.” Id. Additionally, although in the present case the Court has not been presented 

with formal applications for Class Counsel’s attorney fees or class service awards, the 

Court nonetheless considers these potential fees because they form part of the settlement 

agreement.

I. Strength of Plaintiff’s Case

In order to succeed on the merits, Plaintiff would have to prove that Defendant’s 

practices and policies were fraudulent. (See generally FAC, ECF No. 11.) SDSR denies 

any wrongdoing, that Plaintiff is entitled to any relief at law or equity, and that Plaintiff 

would be able to validly certify a class in the absence of the settlement agreement. (See 

Def.’s Answer to FAC, ECF No. 14.) Plaintiff, however, estimates SDSR’s potential 

liability exposure on the underlying Labor Code claims to be approximately $11.5 million. 

(Prelim. Settlement Mot. 23, ECF No. 15-1.) Additionally, the Settlement is the result of 

arm’s-length negotiations conducted over several months, including each Party’s 

individual discovery and valuation of the case and one full-day mediation session before 

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an experienced and nationally renowned mediator. (Id. at 22–23.) Given this disagreement 

and neutral third-party evaluation of the same, the Court thus finds that this factor weighs 

in favor of the $2.9 million settlement being fair, reasonable, and adequate.

II. Risk, Expense, Complexity, and Likely Duration of Further Litigation

Were the case to proceed to further litigation rather than settlement, the Parties 

would each bear substantial risk and a strong likelihood of protracted and contentious 

litigation. Even though the Parties have agreed to settle this action, they fundamentally 

disagree regarding the validity of Plaintiff’s claims. (Prelim. Settlement Mot. 23–26, ECF 

No. 15-1.) Additionally, the Parties document a number of risks in litigating Plaintiff’s 

claims—including the fact that a class might not even be certified—and thus argue that the 

present Settlement affords class members at least some compensation where there might 

be none. (Id.) Indeed, the fact that Defendant disputes all aspects of Plaintiff’s claims, 

including the propriety of class certification in the absence of the settlement agreement, 

suggests that these issues would be vigorously (and therefore costly) litigated were there 

to be further litigation. Given the foregoing, this factor weighs in favor the settlement being 

fair, reasonable, and adequate.

III. Risk of Maintaining Class Action Status Throughout Trial 

The Parties dispute whether the classes can be validly certified in the absence of the 

Settlement Agreement. Implicit in this disagreement is the likelihood of initial challenges 

to class certification and the potential for decertification motions even if class status is 

granted. Weighed against the fact that Defendant does not object to a finding that the class 

elements are met for purposes of this settlement, this factor also weighs in favor of the 

settlement being fair, reasonable, and adequate.

IV. Amount Offered in Settlement

SDSR has agreed to pay $2.9 million to settle this lawsuit. (Prelim. Settlement Mot. 

26, ECF No. 15-1.) The crux of Plaintiff’s claims are that SDSR failed to pay the class 

members the entirety of their earned wages. Because SDSR has data regarding each 

affected class member, which it provided to Plaintiff prior to negotiating the Settlement 

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Agreement, the proof of each class member’s damages is largely calculable and less prone 

to subjective considerations. Indeed, the Parties note that the Settlement Agreement

provides for Settlement Shares that are divided proportionally based on each Participating 

Class Member’s number of workweeks, and that each former employee will additionally 

receive a flat amount of $250 in full satisfaction of wait time penalties. (Id. at 27.) 

Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of the settlement being fair, reasonable, and 

adequate.

V. Extent of Discovery Completed and Stage of Proceedings

Prior to the agreed-upon settlement, the Parties engaged in substantial informal 

discovery, including payroll, timekeeping, and other records. (Prelim. Settlement Mot. 23, 

ECF No. 15-1.) Defendant also performed its own investigation, interviewing 

approximately ninety potential class members and collecting approximately eighty-three 

declarations, on which it relied to demonstrate the disparity of class member experiences 

and that proper compensation was paid for time worked. (Id.) And as discussed, the Parties 

engaged a neutral third-party mediator who fully examined and discussed with each party 

the strengths and weaknesses of each party’s case. (Id.) Both Class Counsel and Defense 

Counsel gained significant knowledge of the relevant facts and law throughout the 

discovery process and through independent investigation and evaluation. Accordingly, it 

appears the Parties have entered into the Settlement Agreement with a strong working 

knowledge of the relevant facts, law, and strengths and weaknesses of their claims and 

defenses. Given all of the above, this factor weighs in favor of the proposed settlement 

being fair, reasonable, and adequate.

VI. Experience and Views of Counsel 

“The recommendations of plaintiffs’ counsel should be given a presumption of 

reasonableness.” Boyd v. Bechtel Corp., 485 F. Supp. 610, 622 (N.D. Cal. 1979). And here, 

Class Counsel believes the Settlement Agreement is fair, reasonable, adequate, and in the 

best interest of the Settlement Class. (Settlement Agreement ¶ 63, ECF No. 15-1.) 

Furthermore, in the present case the presumption of reasonableness is warranted based on 

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Class Counsel’s expertise in complex litigation, familiarity with the relevant facts and law, 

and significant experience negotiating other class and collective action settlements. Given 

the foregoing, and according the appropriate weight to the judgment of these experienced 

counsel, this factor weighs in favor the proposed settlement being fair, reasonable, and 

adequate.

VII. Settlement Attorneys’ Fees Provision 

In the Ninth Circuit, a district court has discretion to apply either a lodestar method 

or a percentage-of-the-fund method in calculating a class fee award in a common fund case. 

Fischel v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc’y of U.S., 307 F.3d 997, 1006 (9th Cir. 2002). When 

applying the percentage-of-the-fund method, an attorneys’ fees award of “twenty-five 

percent is the ‘benchmark’ that district courts should award . . . .” In re Pac. Enters. Sec. 

Litig., 47 F.3d 373, 379 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Six (6) Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus 

Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1311 (9th Cir. 1990)); Fischel, 307 F.3d at 1006. However, a 

district court “may adjust the benchmark when special circumstances indicate a higher or 

lower percentage would be appropriate.” In re Pac. Enters. Sec. Litig., 47 F.3d at 379

(citing Six (6) Mexican Workers, 904 F.2d at 1311). “Reasonableness is the goal, and 

mechanical or formulaic application of either method, where it yields an unreasonable 

result, can be an abuse of discretion.” Fischel, 307 F.3d at 1007.

In the present case, the Settlement Agreement specifies that SDSR will not oppose 

Class Counsel’s request to the Court for approval of attorneys’ fees in the amount equal to 

25% of the Maximum Settlement Amount ($725,000), and reasonable costs in an amount 

not to exceed $20,000. (Settlement Agreement ¶ 29, ECF No. 15-1.) In support of this 

provision, Class Counsel note that the provision is completely consistent with the Ninth 

Circuit’s benchmark for reasonableness. (Prelim. Settlement Mot. 23, ECF No. 15-1 (citing 

Vasquez v. Coast Valley Roofing, Inc., 266 F.R.D. 482, 491 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (stating that 

“[t]he typical range of acceptable attorneys’ fees in the Ninth Circuit is 20% to 33 1/3% of 

the total settlement value, with 25% considered the benchmark”)).) Because Class

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Counsel’s attorneys’ fees provision is set at the benchmark, the Court concludes that the 

provision is reasonable.

VIII. Class Representative Service Award Provision 

The Ninth Circuit recognizes that named plaintiffs in class action litigation are 

eligible for reasonable incentive payments. Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 977 (9th 

Cir. 2003). The district court must evaluate each incentive award individually, using 

“‘relevant factors includ[ing] the actions the plaintiff has taken to protect the interests of 

the class, the degree to which the class has benefitted from those actions, . . . the amount 

of time and effort the plaintiff expended in pursuing the litigation . . . and reasonabl[e] 

fear[s of] workplace retaliation.’” Id. (citing Cook v. Niedert, 142 F.3d 1004, 1016 (7th 

Cir. 1998)).

In the present case, the Settlement Agreement provides up to $5,000 to the Class 

Representative, to be paid from the Maximum Payment, in addition to the Settlement 

payment he may otherwise receive as a class member. (Settlement Agreement ¶ 30, ECF 

No. 15-1.) The Class Notice states that this award is “an enhancement fee to the named 

plaintiff to compensate him for the time, work, and risks undertaken in bringing this Class 

Action.” (Id. at 57.) Given the foregoing, the Court concludes that the current Settlement 

Agreement Class Representative Payment provision should not bar preliminary approval 

of the Settlement Agreement.

IX. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the Parties’ Joint Motion for Preliminary Approval of 

Class Settlement is GRANTED regarding the Settlement Agreement.

NOTICE OF CLASS CERTIFICATION AND SETTLEMENT

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(2)(B), “[f]or any class certified 

under Rule 23(b)(3) the court must direct to class members the best notice that is 

practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can 

be identified through reasonable effort.” Because the Court has determined that

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certification is appropriate under Rule 23(b)(3), the mandatory notice procedures required 

by Rule 23(c)(2)(B) must be followed.

Where there is a class settlement, Federal Rule of Procedure 23(e)(1) requires the 

court to “direct notice in a reasonable manner to all class members who would be bound 

by the proposal.” “Notice is satisfactory if it ‘generally describes the terms of the settlement 

in sufficient detail to alert those with adverse viewpoints to investigate and to come forward

and be heard.’” Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 962 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting 

Churchill Vill., LLC v. Gen. Elec., 361 F.3d 566, 575 (9th Cir. 2004)); see also Grunin v. 

Int’l House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 120 (8th Cir. 1975) (“[T]he mechanics of the notice 

process are left to the discretion of the court subject only to the broad ‘reasonableness’ 

standards imposed by due process.”).

The Parties have agreed to notify the Class Members in writing by mailing all class 

members a Notice of Pendency of Class Action (“Notice”). (Prelim. Settlement Mot. 14, 

ECF No. 15-1.) Given that some Class Members may only read Spanish, the proposed 

Notice will also be translated into and distributed in Spanish. (Id.) The Parties have agreed 

to have the Settlement Administrator send the Class Notice Packets to all identified Class 

Members using the mailing address information provided by SDSR, including use of all 

standard skip tracing to verify the accuracy of all addresses. (Id. at 27; Settlement 

Agreement ¶ 38, ECF No. 15-1.) If the packet is returned because of an incorrect address, 

the Settlement Administrator will make reasonable efforts to locate Class Members and resend the notices. (Prelim. Settlement Mot. 27, ECF No. 15-1.) The proposed Notice 

explains:

(i) the nature of the action; (ii) the definition of class certified; (iii) the 

class claims, issues, or defenses; (iv) that class members may enter an 

appearance through counsel if the member so desires; (v) that the court 

will exclude from the class any member who requests exclusion; (vi) 

the time and manner for requesting exclusion; and (v) the binding effect 

of a class judgment on class members under Rule 23(c)(3).

(Id.) Having thoroughly reviewed the jointly drafted Notice, the Court finds that the method 

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and content of the Notice comply with Rule 23. Accordingly, the Court approves the 

Parties’ proposed notification plan.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS the Parties’ Joint Motion for 

Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement (ECF No. 15). The Court ORDERS as 

follows:

1. PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF PROPOSED SETTLEMENT 

AGREEMENT: The Settlement Agreement is preliminarily approved as fair, reasonable, 

and adequate pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e).

2. PRELIMINARY CLASS CERTIFICATION: Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 23(b)(3), the action is preliminarily certified, for settlement purposes only, as a 

class action on behalf of the following Settlement Class Members with respect to the claims 

asserted in this Action:

Settlement Class: All non-exempt employees at BAE Systems San 

Diego Ship Repair Inc. who worked at any time during the period May 

27, 2012 through October 13, 2016. 

3. CLASS REPRESENTATIVE, CLASS COUNSEL, AND SETTLEMENT 

ADMINISTRATOR: Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, the Court 

preliminarily certifies, for settlement purposes only, Plaintiff Eduardo Nunez as the Class 

Representative, and Alexander Dychter, of Dychter Law Offices, APC, and Walter Haines, 

of United Employees Law Group, PC, as Class Counsel. Additionally, the Court approves 

and appoints Rust Consulting, Inc. as the Settlement Administrator.

4. NOTICE: The Court approves the form and substance of the proposed notice set 

forth in the Settlement Agreement and the Notice attached as Exhibit A to the Settlement 

Agreement. (Settlement Agreement Ex. A, ECF No. 15-1.) The form and method for 

notifying the Class Members of the Settlement and its terms and conditions satisfies the 

requirements of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(c)(2)(B) and 23(e). The Court finds 

that the Notice Procedure submitted by the Parties constitutes the best notice practicable 

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under the circumstances. As provided in the Settlement Agreement, the Settlement 

Administrator SHALL provide notice to the Class Members and respond to Class Member 

inquiries.

Within thirty (30) days of the date on which this Order is electronically docketed, 

the Parties SHALL disseminate the Notice in the form attached as Exhibit A to the 

Settlement Agreement and in the manner and form provided in the Settlement Agreement.

5. FINAL APPROVAL HEARING: Judge Sammartino shall conduct a Final 

Approval Hearing on July 27, 2017 at 1:30 p.m. at 221 W. Broadway, Courtroom 4A, 4th 

Floor, San Diego, CA 92101, to consider:

a. the fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of the proposed 

settlement;

b. Plaintiff’s request for the award of attorneys’ fees and costs;

c. the Class Representative enhancement;

d. dismissal with prejudice of the class action with respect to 

Defendant; and

e. the entry of final judgment in this action.

At the Final Approval Hearing, the Parties shall also be prepared to update the Court on 

any new developments since the filing of the motion, including any untimely submitted 

opt-outs, objections, and claims, or any other issues as the Court deems appropriate. 

The date and time of the Final Approval Hearing shall be included in the Notice to 

be mailed to all class members.

6. MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT: 

No later than twenty-one (21) days before the Final Approval Hearing, the Parties shall file 

a Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement. The Motion shall include and 

address any objections received as of the filing date. In addition to the class certification 

and settlement fairness factors, the motion shall address the number of putative Settlement 

Class members who have opted out and the corresponding number of claims.

7. APPLICATION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES, COSTS, AND CLASS 

REPRESENTATIVE SERVICE AWARDS: No later than twenty-one (21) days before 

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the Final Approval Hearing, Class Counsel shall file an application for attorneys’ fees, 

costs, and class representative service awards. Class Counsel shall provide documentation 

detailing the number of hours incurred by attorneys in litigating this action, supported by 

detailed time records, as well as hourly compensation to which those attorneys are 

reasonably entitled. Class Counsel should address the appropriateness of any upward or 

downward departure in the lodestar calculation, as well as reasons why a percentage-ofthe-fund approach to awarding attorney fees may be more preferable in this case. Class 

Counsel should be prepared to address any questions the Court may have regarding the 

application for fees at the Final Approval Hearing.

8. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS: In the event the proposed settlement is not 

consummated for any reason, the conditional class certification shall be of no further force 

or effect. Should the settlement not become final, the fact that the Parties were willing to 

stipulate to class certification as part of the settlement shall have no bearing on, nor be 

admissible in connection with, the issue of whether a class should be certified in a nonsettlement context.

9. SCHEDULE: The Court orders the following schedule for further proceedings:

Event Date

Defendant to Deliver Class List to 

Settlement Administrator

Within 7 days of the date on which 

this Order is electronically docketed 

Settlement Administrator to Send 

Notice to Class Members

Within 30 days of the date on which 

this Order is electronically docketed

Last Day for Class Members to File 

Request for Exclusion from 

Settlement

No later than 60 days from the date of 

mailing the Notice

Last Day for Class Members to File 

Objections to the Settlement

No later than 60 days from the date of 

mailing the Notice

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Last Day for Class Members to File 

Notice of Intention to Appear at Final 

Approval Hearing

No later than 60 days from the date of 

mailing the Notice

Parties to File Motion for Final 

Approval

No later than 21 days before the Final 

Approval Hearing

Class Counsel to File Motion for 

Attorneys’ Fees and Costs and 

Incentive Fees

No later than 21 days before the Final 

Approval Hearing 

Final Approval Hearing July 27, 2017 at 1:30 p.m.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 13, 2017

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