Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-95-05087/USCOURTS-caDC-95-05087-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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1Castle also appeals an order awarding her attorney's fees. That aspect of her appeal does not,

however, warrant a published opinion. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Filed March 15, 1996

No. 95-5087

DIAN L. CASTLE,

APPELLANT 

v.

ROBERT E. RUBIN, SECRETARY,

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY,

APPELLEE 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(93cv2643)

-

ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY AFFIRMANCE

-

Michael J. Kator was on the opposition to the motion for summary affirmance, for appellant.

Eric H. Holder, Jr., United States Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence and Madelyn E. Johnson,

Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the motion for summary affirmance, for appellees

Before: SILBERMAN, SENTELLE, and RANDOLPH, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM: Dian Castle appeals district court orders denying her reinstatement and front

pay and awarding her only partial back pay after a jury found that she was terminated in violation of

Title VII of the CivilRights Act of 1964 as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1993).1 The district

court relied on the after-acquired evidence doctrine, which allows the court to limit relief based on

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evidence of misconduct acquired after an unlawful termination. We reject Castle's contention that

the doctrine does not apply when the Title VII plaintiff would have become a tenured federal

employee covered bytheCivilServiceReformAct of 1978 as amended (codified in scattered sections

of 5 U.S.C.) after her unlawful termination but before discovery of the after-acquired evidence.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court's orders.

I.

Castle was employed in the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) from February

11, 1991, until January 10, 1992, when she was terminated during her probationary period. On

December 30, 1993, Castle filed this action alleging, inter alia, that her termination wasthe product

ofsex discrimination. On November 4, 1994, a jury found that Castle was terminated in violation of

Title VII and awarded her $75,000 in damages. The parties orally stipulated that the court would

decide Castle's entitlement to reinstatement, front pay, and back pay on the basis of the entire record.

On November 8, 1994, the court denied Castle reinstatement and front pay and awarded her

back pay only from January 10, 1992, until September 30, 1992, the date on which the OCC

discovered that she had engaged in plagiarism while employed at the agency. The court found that

Castle had plagiarized a book entitled The Coach, in violation of federal copyright laws, and

unspecified works by J.H. Harliss and Jeffrey Nelson Associates while preparing training materials

for the OCC. The court also found that the OCC would have fired Castle for this plagiarism had she

still worked for the OCC when it discovered her misconduct. The court determined that

reinstatement and front paywere inappropriate in light ofthis after-acquired evidence ofmisconduct,

and because reinstatement would create intense hostility or friction in the workplace. The court also

held that Castle was entitled to back pay only for the period between her dismissal and the OCC's

discovery of her misconduct.

On November 28, 1994, Castle moved to amend the judgment. Castle noted that, but for her

unlawful termination, she would have become a tenured employee covered by the Civil Service

Reform Act (CSRA) on February 11, 1992, months before the OCC discovered her plagiarism. She

argued that under United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439 (1988), the court lacked jurisdiction to

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utilize the after-acquired evidence doctrine because the court had "adjudicate[d] and effectuate[d] a

final unappealable removal from the Federal service" for plagiarism, and the CSRA gives the Merit

Systems Protection Board (MSPB) exclusive authority over such disciplinary matters. It was also

contended that the court had denied her the rights she would have enjoyed under the

CSRAincluding a pre-termination right to notice and an opportunity to respond and a

post-termination right of appeal to the MSPBin violation of the Act and the Constitution, and that

the court had denied her "make whole" relief by denying her these rights. Finally, Castle argued that

discharge is an excessive penalty for plagiarism as a matter of law.

The district court denied the motion to amend the judgment on January 18, 1995. Although

the parties had stipulated that the court would decide the reinstatement, front pay, and back pay

issues, the court reached the merits of Castle's jurisdictional argument because she claimed the

stipulation did not encompass jurisdiction. The court determined that it had broad discretion to

fashion appropriate equitable relief, and that nothing in Title VII or the caselaw interpreting it limited

the court's discretion in the manner suggested by Castle. The court added that Faustowhich held

that nonpreference eligible members of the excepted service may not obtain judicialreview of certain

types of adverse personnel actionsdid not require a different result, because Fausto did not arise

under Title VII and did not address the court's discretion to fashion equitable relief for a Title VII

plaintiff. Finally, the court declined to speculate on how the MSPB would view a termination for

plagiarism on the facts of this case.

The Secretary of the Treasury moves for summary affirmance of the court's orders.

II.

The district court has broad discretion to fashion appropriate equitable relief for a Title VII

plaintiff. The statute provides:

If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally

engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the court may

enjoin the respondent fromengaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order

such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited

to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay ..., or any other

equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (1993) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has likewise noted that

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"[t]he [statutory] scheme implicitly recognizesthat there may be cases calling for one remedy but not

another, andowing to the structure ofthe federal judiciarythese choices are, of course, left in the

first instance to the district courts." Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 415-16 (1975);

see also Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 226 (1982).

Days after the district court denied Castle's motion to amend the judgment, the Supreme

Court confirmed that a district court may deny reinstatement, front pay, and full back pay based on

after-acquired evidence of employeemisconduct. In McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co.,

115 S. Ct. 879 (1995), the Court held that "as a general rule ..., neither reinstatement nor front pay

is an appropriate remedy" for an unlawfulterminationwhen the employer has after-acquired evidence

of misconduct "of such severity that the employee in fact would have been terminated on those

grounds alone if the employer had known of it at the time of the discharge." Id. at 886-87. The

Court reasoned that "[i]t would be both inequitable and pointless to order the reinstatement of

someone the employer would have terminated, and will terminate, in any event and upon lawful

grounds." Id. at 886. "The beginning point in the trial court's formulation of a remedy should be

calculation of back pay from the date of the unlawful discharge to the date the new information was

discovered." Id. And, the trial court "can consider taking into further account extraordinary

equitable circumstances that affect the legitimate interests of either party." Id.

Although McKennon arose under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), its

principles clearly apply in Title VII actions. See id. at 884 (stating that "ADEA and Title VII share

common substantive features and also a common purpose"); see also Russell v. Microdyne Corp.,

65 F.3d 1229, 1238 (4th Cir. 1995); Wallace v. Dunn Construction Co., 62 F.3d 374, 378 (11th Cir.

1995) (en banc); Wehr v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 49 F.3d 1150, 1153 (6th Cir. 1995).

Castle nonetheless contendsthat McKennon does not governthis case, becauseMcKennon concerned

a private, at-will employee rather than a career federal employee entitled to the protections of the

CSRA. We are not persuaded.

Castle argues that the district court lacked jurisdiction to utilize the after-acquired evidence

doctrine because the court's remedial decision constituted a termination of her employment or an

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effectuation of the OCC's termination of her employment for plagiarism. Relying on Fausto, Castle

assertsthat the MSPBhas exclusive jurisdiction oversuch adverse personnel actions. Castle suggests

that the court was required to reinstate her, leaving any termination for plagiarism to the OCC with

subsequent review by the MSPB.

Fausto provides no support for Castle's argument, as Fausto did not address Title VII or the

district court'sremedialdiscretion thereunder. Moreover, Castle's argument rests on a faulty premise.

The district court did not take or approve any adverse personnel action against her. The court merely

exercised its discretion to fashion an appropriate equitable remedy for her prior unlawful termination

by the OCC. Finally, and most importantly, the court, not the MSPB, had jurisdiction over Castle's

discrimination claim, including jurisdiction over the remedial aspects of the claim.

Tenured employees and applicants for employment may pursue certain discrimination claims

before the MSPB. Specifically, if the employee or applicant "has been affected by an action which

[she] may appeal to the [MSPB]" and she alleges that "a basis for the action" was discrimination

prohibited by various provisions, including Title VII, she may pursue the discrimination claim before

the MSPB. See 5 U.S.C. § 7702(a)(1) (1994).

Absent allegations of discrimination based on marital status or partisan political reasons,

however, probationaryemployeeslikeCastlemaynot pursue discrimination claims before the MSPB.

Only "employees" or applicants may appeal to the MSPB, and the CSRA defines "employee" to

exclude probationary employees. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7511(a)(1)(A) and 7701(a) (1994); Wren v. MSPB,

681 F.2d 867, 871 (D.C. Cir. 1982); accord Ferry v. Hayden, 954 F.2d 658, 660-61 (11th Cir.

1992). To the extent that a probationary employee believes her termination was the result of a

prohibited personnel practice under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b) (1994),she must submit her complaint to the

Office of Special Counsel in the first instance. See Ferry, 954 F.2d at 660-61; 5 U.S.C. §§

1214(a)(1)(A), (a)(3), and (b) (1994). Castle does not allege, however, in her complaint or her

pleadings before this court that she complained to the Office of SpecialCounsel. Thus, the court, not

the MSPB, had jurisdiction over Castle's discrimination claim. Furthermore, the court's jurisdiction

encompassed both liability and remedies. Castle's suggestion that the proceedings should have been

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bifurcated, with the MSPB participating in the remedial phase, does not comport with the relevant

statutes. We therefore conclude that the court had jurisdiction to utilize the after-acquired evidence

doctrine in fashioning an equitable remedyfor Castle's unlawfultermination bythe OCC. We add that

the court would have been authorized to utilize the doctrine even if Castle had been a tenured

employee. If a tenured employee elects to pursue a discrimination claim before the MSPB, Castle's

concerns do not arise. If the employee cannot or elects not to proceed before the MSPB, but instead

proceeds before the courts and/orthe EEOC,she has no groundsto complain thatshe wasimproperly

denied access to the MSPB.

Castle next argues that the district court denied her make-whole relief because, but for her

unlawful termination by the OCC, she would have become a tenured employee and would then have

been entitled to the protections of the CSRA if the OCC had terminated her for plagiarism. As she

did not receive these protections, she assertsthat she isin a worse position than she would have been

absent discrimination. She also asserts that the denial of these protections violated the CSRA and

the Due Process Clause.

Although one "purpose of Title VII [is] to make persons whole for injuries suffered on

account of unlawful employment discrimination,"AlbemarlePaperCo., 422U.S. at 418,Castle seeks

reliefto which she was not entitled as a probationary employee: MSPB participation in the remedial

aspect of her discrimination claim. Furthermore, the district court proceedings afforded Castle due

process. Castle received notice of and an opportunity to respond to the OCC's claim that she had

engaged in plagiarism and should be denied reinstatement and full back pay as a result. She also

received thorough written decisions explaining the basis for the district court's agreement with the

OCC. Finally, although Castle complains that she did not receive an appeal to the MSPB, we have

already concluded that she was not entitled to such an appeal. While the incidental effect of the

court's remedial decision may have been to deny Castle certain rights she would have enjoyed under

the CSRA had the remedy included reinstatement, this factor does not render the decision legally

erroneous or an abuse of discretion.

Finally, assuming the district court had authority to decide the after-acquired evidence issue,

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Castle argues that the court was required to find not only that the OCC would have terminated her

for plagiarism, but also that the MSPB would have sustained the termination, a finding the court did

not make. Castle refers to Tri v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 24 M.S.P.R. 90 (1984), and

suggests that the court could not have made such a finding because termination is an excessive

penalty for plagiarism as a matter of law.

The district court maynot denyreinstatement based onafter-acquired evidence ofmisconduct

ifthe employer could not lawfully have fired the employee for that conduct. Castle has not, however,

shown that termination is an excessive penalty for plagiarism. In the Tri decision on which she relies,

the MSPB held that the Director of the Office of Personnel Management was not entitled to

reconsideration of an order mitigating an employee'sremoval to a demotion, where the employee had

committed plagiarism and failed to meet minimum performance standards. Tri did not, however,

discuss the nature or circumstances of the plagiarism, nor did it hold that an agency may never

terminate an employee for plagiarism. Tri merely held that a challenge to the Board's application of

Douglas v. Veterans Admin., 5 M.S.P.R. 280 (1981) (establishing standards governing mitigation of

penalties), to the facts of a particular case is not a basis for reconsideration because it is not an

allegation of error in the Board's interpretation of a civil service law, rule, or regulation. Thus, Tri

does not establish that termination is an excessive penalty for plagiarism as a matter of law.

Because Castle's arguments are without merit, we grant the Secretary's motion for summary

affirmance.

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