Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00250/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-00250-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Qurian Vere Roberson, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-12-0250-PHX-ROS (DKD)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

AND ORDER 

TO THE HONORABLE ROSLYN O. SILVER, SENIOR U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE: 

Qurian Vere Roberson filed a timely Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his convictions for three counts of aggravated assault, 

two counts of armed robbery, one count of misconduct involving weapons, and the trial 

court’s imposition of prison terms totaling 31.5 years. He raises eight grounds for habeas 

relief: (1) counsel admitted Roberson’s guilt on the record thereby creating a conflict of 

interest; (2) the State withheld exculpatory evidence; (3) a juror committed misconduct; 

(4) the criminal charges should have been severed; (5) appellate counsel was ineffective 

for failing to raise an issue on appeal; (6) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to prove 

that the firearm used in the offenses was inoperable; (7) the trial court improperly 

considered Roberson’s prior convictions; and (8) he was improperly tried by an all-white 

jury. 

 Respondents contend that the grounds are either unexhausted and procedurally 

defaulted, moot, not cognizable on federal habeas review, or without merit. For the 

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reasons stated below, the Court recommends that the petition be denied and dismissed 

with prejudice. Roberson also seeks to have the petition stayed and held in abeyance, 

pending the completion of his latest round of state post-conviction proceedings. The 

Court will deny the Motion for Stay and Abeyance. 

BACKGROUND

 The facts surrounding the convictions are summarized in the court of appeals 

memorandum decision: 

 On June 19, 2002, Oscar A. (“Oscar Sr.”), his wife, Yolanda A. 

(“Yolanda”), and their five-year-old son, Oscar, (“Oscar Jr.”), were 

operating their family-owned mobile hotdog stand at the corner of 27th

Avenue and Georgia Street in Phoenix, Arizona. At approximately 11:15 

p.m., appellant, who was wearing a ski mask, approached Oscar Sr. and his 

family, pointed a rifle at them, and demanded their money. Appellant took 

$87.00 from Oscar Sr. and Yolanda, and fled. The business ledger recorded 

that Oscar Sr. and Yolanda had $87.50 in their possession that day. 

 Immediately after Oscar Sr. and Yolanda had been robbed, Oscar Sr. 

saw a police car and ran towards it waving his arms to get the officer’s 

attention. Sergeant Rother of the Phoenix Police Department was the 

officer driving the patrol car that Oscar Sr. flagged down. At trial, Sergeant 

Rother testified that he witnessed appellant running in the same direction in 

which Oscar Sr. was pointing. Sergeant Rother caught up to appellant, 

ordered him to lie on his stomach, and waited for other law enforcement 

officers to assist him. Once appellant was handcuffed, Sergeant Rother 

testified that he observed a ski mask lying in the same location where 

appellant was previously ordered to stop. Rother also found an assault rifle 

in the same area where he had witnessed appellant running. Officer 

Conway, also of the Phoenix Police Department, searched appellant and 

found $87.00 in his front pants pocket. 

 During the time in which appellant was detained, another Phoenix 

police officer was called to the hotdog stand to assist in the investigation. 

Sergeant Rother told that officer to bring Oscar Sr. and Yolanda in a patrol 

car to the location where appellant was detained to perform a one-on-one 

identification of appellant. Oscar Sr. and Yolanda each positively and 

individually identified appellant as the armed robber. They also positively 

and individually identified the rifle as the one used in the commission of 

the robbery. Testimony was also given at trial that appellant had a prior 

felony conviction and, as such, was prohibited from possessing any 

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firearms without first having his civil rights restored. According to the 

Superior Court Clerk’s Office, appellant had not had his civil rights 

restored as of the date of trial. 

(Doc. 10 , Exh A at ¶¶ 2-4). 

 On direct review, counsel filed an Anders brief, raising two arguable issues: (1) 

whether the trial court erred in failing to hold a hearing pursuant to State v. Torres, 206 

Ariz. 52 (App. 2003), when Roberson expressed dissatisfaction with trial counsel; and (2) 

whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying a motion for mistrial based on the 

delayed disclosure of a photograph of Roberson taken the night of the robbery showing 

him in different clothing than that described by Oscar Sr. and Yolanda during their 

testimony (Doc. 10, Exh C). In his supplemental pro se brief, Roberson also argued these 

claims, and challenged the officer’s stop, the pat-down search, the one-man show-up, 

Roberson’s allegedly aggravated sentences, his enhanced sentence in light of Blakely v. 

Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and the constitutionality of Arizona’s sentencing 

scheme (Doc. 10, Exh D at 1, 20-24, 27-34). Roberson also raised claims of ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel, prosecutorial misconduct based on alleged violations of Brady 

v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and juror misconduct (Doc. 10, Exh. D at 24-27). The 

Arizona State Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences; the Arizona 

Supreme Court denied review (Id., Exh A, E, F). 

 Following the initiation of post-conviction proceedings, appointed counsel filed a 

notice with the trial court that he had completed a review of the record and determined 

that there were no colorable claims that could be raised in a petition for post-conviction 

relief (Id., Exh G). In his subsequent pro se petition, Roberson asserted that trial counsel 

was ineffective for failing to challenge the grand jury, argue prosecutorial misconduct 

based on alleged Brady violations and other alleged abuses, file motions to suppress the 

fruits of an allegedly overbroad pat-down search and unlawful arrest, challenge the 

identification evidence, object to an all-white jury, strike jurors for cause, object to juror 

bias and misconduct, call Oscar Jr. and a 911 caller as witnesses, impeach Sergeant 

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Rother’s and the victims’ testimony, object to an incorrect jury instruction, object to 

evidence that Roberson’s probation had been revoked, object to the admission of the 

victims’ business records for the day of the robbery, prove that the weapon used in the 

armed robbery was inoperable, investigate and call unnamed alibi witnesses, object to 

sentencing errors, and provide Roberson with a copy of the presentence report (Id., Exh I 

at 8-25). He also alleged trial counsel was negligent in admitting Roberson’s guilt to the 

jurors in the jury room and in allowing admission of the late-disclosed photographic 

evidence (Id., Exh I at 8). 

 In a detailed minute entry, the trial court denied relief (Id., Exh J). In his petition 

for review, Roberson alleged trial counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge the 

grand jury, prove that the weapon used in the armed robbery was inoperable, file motions 

to suppress the fruits of an allegedly overbroad pat-down search and unlawful arrest, 

challenge the identification evidence, object to a biased jury, challenge prosecutorial 

misconduct, object to the jury instructions, call a 911 caller as a witness, call unnamed 

alibi witnesses, object to the improper use of prior convictions, and object to consecutive 

sentences and double punishment (Id., Exh L at 2-8). He also contended that trial counsel 

was negligent in admitting Roberson’s guilt to the jurors in the jury room and that 

appellate counsel was ineffective in filing an Anders brief (Id. at 5, 8-9). 

 The Arizona Court of Appeals granted relief on the claim of ineffective assistance 

regarding the imposition of consecutive sentences, concluding that but for counsel’s 

deficient performance, Roberson would have received concurrent sentences for the armed 

robberies and aggravated assaults. The court of appeals remanded the case to the trial 

court for correction of the sentences; the Arizona Supreme Court denied review (Id., Exh 

M, N). In his third post-conviction petition, Roberson alleged that the court of appeals 

failed to decide the merits of his Blakely claim, that his sentences violated Blakely, and 

that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise the Blakely claim (Id., Exh O at 

4-13). The trial court found the claims precluded and summarily denied relief (Id., Exh 

P). In his fourth post-conviction petition, Roberson argued the indictment was 

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“multiplicitous.” The trial court found the claim precluded and summarily denied relief 

(Id., Exh Q). 

 The trial court subsequently corrected Roberson’s sentences, imposing concurrent 

sentences for the armed robbery and aggravated assault offenses, the longest being 15.75 

years (Id., Exh R). The trial court reiterated the remaining sentences for the aggravated 

assault of Oscar Jr. and the misconduct involving weapons, and ordered these sentences 

to be served concurrently with one another, but consecutively to the corrected terms (Id., 

Exh R). On direct review, Roberson argued that the trial court erred in failing to 

resentence him for all his convictions. The court of appeals affirmed the corrected 

sentence and the supreme court denied review (Id., Exh S, T, U). 

EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES

 A state prisoner must exhaust his state remedies before petitioning for a writ of 

habeas corpus in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) & (c); Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 

364, 365-66 (1995); McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 833 (9th Cir. 1991). To 

properly exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must fairly present his claims to the state’s 

highest court in a procedurally appropriate manner. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 

838, 839-846 (1999). In Arizona, a petitioner must fairly present his claims to the 

Arizona Court of Appeals by properly pursuing them through the state’s direct appeal 

process or through appropriate post-conviction relief. Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 

1010 (9th Cir. 1999); Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994). A claim has 

been fairly presented if the petitioner has described both the operative facts and the 

federal legal theory on which the claim is based. Bland v. Cal. Dep't of Corrections, 20 

F.3d 1469, 1472-73 (9th Cir.1994), overruled on other grounds by Schell v. Witek, 218 

F.3d 1017, 1025 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Tamalini v. Stewart, 249 F.3d 895, 898 -99 (9th

Cir. 2001). A “general appeal to a constitutional guarantee,” such as due process or a fair 

trial, is insufficient to achieve fair presentation. Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987 

(9th Cir. 2000). The exhaustion requirement will not be met where the Petitioner fails to 

fairly present his claims. Roettgen, 33 F.3d at 38. 

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 If a petition contains claims that were never fairly presented in state court, the 

federal court must determine whether state remedies remain available to the petitioner. 

See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 519-20 (1982); Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 268-270 

(1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring). If remedies are available in state court, then the 

federal court may dismiss the petition without prejudice pending the exhaustion of state 

remedies. Id. However, if the court finds that the petitioner would have no state remedy 

were he to return to the state court, then his claims are considered procedurally defaulted. 

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 298-99 (1989); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602-605 (9th

Cir. 1989). The federal court may decline to consider these claims unless the petitioner 

can demonstrate that a miscarriage of justice would result, or establish cause for his 

noncompliance and actual prejudice. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995); 

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750-51 (1991); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 

495-96 (1986); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 86 (1977); United States v. Frady, 456 

U.S. 152, 167-68 (1982). 

 Further, a procedural default may occur when a Petitioner raises a claim in state 

court, but the state court finds the claim to be defaulted on procedural grounds. Coleman, 

501 U.S. at 730-31. In such cases, federal habeas review is precluded if the state court 

opinion contains a plain statement clearly and expressly relying on a procedural ground 

"that is both 'independent' of the merits of the federal claim and an 'adequate' basis for the 

court's decision." See Harris, 489 U.S. at 260. A state procedural default ruling is 

"independent" unless application of the bar depends on an antecedent ruling on the merits 

of the federal claim. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74-75 (1985); Stewart v. Smith, 

536 U.S. 856 (2002). A state's application of the bar is "adequate" if it is "'strictly or 

regularly followed.'" Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 587 (1988) (quoting Hathorn 

v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255, 262-63 (1982)). In cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted 

his federal claims in state court pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural 

rule, just as in cases involving defaulted claims that were not fairly presented, federal 

habeas review of the claims is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate a miscarriage 

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of justice or cause and actual prejudice to excuse the default. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 

750-51. 

 “Inadequate assistance of counsel at initial-review collateral proceedings may 

establish cause for a prisoner’s procedural default of a claim of ineffective assistance at 

trial.” Martinez v. Ryan, ____U.S. ____, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 1315 (2012). A prisoner may 

show cause for default of an ineffective assistance claim by demonstrating that this claim 

of ineffective assistance of trial counsel is a substantial one, that the claim has merit. 

Martinez, 132 S.Ct. at 1318. 

DISCUSSION

Motion for Stay and Abeyance

 Following the completion of briefing, Roberson filed a Motion for Stay and 

Abeyance, requesting that his federal petition be stayed and held in abeyance pending the 

conclusion of his most recent post-conviction proceedings. Habeas corpus relief is 

unavailable “unless the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the 

State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). Generally, “a district court must dismiss habeas 

petitions containing both unexhausted and exhausted claims.” Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 

509, 522 (1982). However, a district court has limited discretion to hold in abeyance a 

habeas petition containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims in order to allow a 

petitioner to return to state court to exhaust additional claims while the federal 

proceedings are stayed. Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277 (2005). Stay and abeyance 

is appropriate only when (1) there is good cause for petitioner’s failure to exhaust his 

claims first in state court; (2) the unexhausted claims are potentially meritorious; and (3) 

there is no indication that the petitioner has engaged in intentionally dilatory litigation 

tactics. Id. at 277-278. In addition, the district court may decline to stay and hold in 

abeyance when it is clear the unexhausted claim would be untimely. King v. Ryan, 564 

F.3d 1133, 1140-41 (9th Cir. 2009). 

 On October 9, 2012, Roberson filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief, arguing 

for the first time that trial counsel had been ineffective during the plea-bargaining process 

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(Doc. 17, Exh A at 3). He argued that he had not filed the claim in a timely manner 

because Frye1

 and Cooper 2 constituted a significant change in the law that applied to his 

case (Id.). The trial court dismissed the notice as untimely, reasoning that Frye and 

Cooper “did not change the law concerning ineffective assistance of counsel: they 

merely applied the right to counsel to a factual context” (Id., Exh B). Roberson’s motion 

for reconsideration was denied for the same reason, with the trial court also concluding 

that Frye and Cooper were not significant changes in law that would allow Roberson to 

file an untimely Rule 32 motion (Id., Exh C, D). Roberson’s untimely PCR was 

excusable only by a “significant change in the law that if determined to apply to 

defendant’s case would probably overturn the defendant’s conviction or sentence.” See

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(g). It has long been recognized that plea bargain negotiations are a 

critical phase of the proceedings for purposes of the right to the effective assistance of 

counsel. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 373 (2010). During the plea negotiations, 

Roberson participated in a Donald3

 hearing during which the trial court explained the 

plea offer to him. Because plea bargain negotiations have long been held to be a critical 

phase of the proceedings, Padilla, any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during 

these proceedings could have been raised by Roberson in his first post-conviction 

proceedings in 2006, along with the seventeen other claims of ineffective assistance that 

Roberson alleged in his pro se petition. The claim is therefore precluded and 

procedurally barred. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 802-05 (1991). Roberson has 

shown neither cause nor prejudice, nor actual innocence, to excuse his failure to exhaust 

this claim in state courts. Carrier, 477 U.S. at 488. The Court will therefore deny the 

motion. 

 

1 Missouri v. Frye, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 1399 (2012). 

2 Lafler v. Cooper, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 1376 (2012). 

3 State v. Donald, 10 P.3d 1193, 1198, ¶ 9, 1200, ¶ 14 (Ariz. App. 2000) 

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Procedurally Defaulted, Noncognizable, or Moot Claims

 In Ground One, Roberson argues that trial counsel violated his rights under the 

fifth, sixth, and fourteenth amendments by admitting his guilt on the record after jury 

selection, thereby creating a conflict of interest. Appellate Counsel raised the conflict 

between Roberson and trial counsel in his Anders brief, but did not cite a federal basis for 

it. Roberson raised the conflict issue in his pro se supplemental brief as a violation of his 

rights to a fair trial and to the effective assistance of counsel. A general appeal to a 

constitutional guarantee, such as due process or a fair trial, is insufficient to demonstrate 

fair presentation. Shumway, 223 F.3d at 987. Therefore, Roberson’s fifth and fourteenth 

amendment claims are precluded from federal review. His ineffective assistance claim 

will be considered on the merits. 

 In Ground Four, Roberson argues he was denied “his fundamental right due to the 

prejudicial nature of probation violation and prohibited possessor count,” because the 

counts were not severed. There is no clearly-established constitutional right to severance 

of charges. See Collins v. Runnels, 603 F.3d 1127, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 2010). His claim is 

therefore not cognizable in a federal habeas proceeding. 

 In Ground Five, Roberson contends that he was denied the effective assistance of 

appellate counsel, claiming that counsel omitted “a significant and obvious issue on 

appeal without strategic purpose leaving [him] to fix the issue on his own and the court 

granting relief without fixing the problem.” In his petition for review, he asserted “12 

issues in the memorandum concerning appellate [counsel’s] omissions.” The court of 

appeals granted relief on one issue: the imposition of consecutive sentences for the 

armed robberies and aggravated assaults against Oscar Sr. and Yolanda. To that extent, 

the claim is properly exhausted, but moot in light of the relief granted by the court of 

appeals. 

 In Ground Seven, Roberson contends that his due process rights were violated by 

the improper use of his prior convictions “that were neither proven dangerous nor crimes 

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of violence.” An error of state sentencing law is not a cognizable claim in a federal 

habeas proceeding. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). 

 In Ground Eight, Roberson argues that he was tried by an all-white jury, which he 

alleges was biased in violation of his due process and fundamental rights. He did not 

raise this claim on direct review, and it is therefore not fairly presented. Swoopes, 196 

F.3d at 1010. He raised it as a basis for ineffective assistance of trial counsel in his 

petition for review, not as a substantive claim, and as such is insufficient for exhaustion 

of the underlying claim. See Rose v. Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 1111-12 (9th Cir. 2005). 

He has demonstrated neither cause nor prejudice to excuse the default. See Coleman, 501 

U.S. at 750-51. 

Merits Discussion

 In the exhausted portion of Ground One, Roberson alleges that trial counsel was 

ineffective by admitting Roberson’s guilt after the jury had been selected. He alleges, as 

he did in state court, that counsel was ineffective for having placed on the record the fact 

that Roberson intended to testify and perjure himself, thereby creating an ethical conflict 

of interest. In denying this claim raised in Roberson’s post-conviction petition, the trial 

court ruled that Roberson had not established prejudice under Strickland because “the 

court, the prosecutor and [the] jury were not present when this statement was made. The 

statement was made for the record and did not in any way impact the trial.” Given the 

fact that only Roberson, counsel and the court reporter heard counsel’s comment, the trial 

court’s conclusion was not objectively unreasonable. Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 

27 (2002). 

 In Ground Two, Roberson alleges that law enforcement and the prosecutor 

cooperated with one another to withhold a photograph taken of him on the day of the 

robbery depicting him in different clothing than that described by the victims. The 

prosecution’s withholding of exculpatory evidence violates due process where the 

evidence is material either to guilt or punishment. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 

(1963). “[E]vidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the 

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evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different. A ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence 

in the outcome.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). The trial court 

concluded that there was no Brady violation because the photograph was ultimately 

disclosed and admitted into evidence at trial, and presented to the jury. Under these 

circumstances, there is no reasonable probability sufficient to undermine confidence in 

the jury’s verdicts. Id. 

 In Ground Three, Roberson argues that his due process rights were violated by 

juror misconduct. During the trial, a juror recognized one of the State’s witnesses as the 

husband of a friend, and without discussing it with any other juror, she wrote a note and 

asked the bailiff to give it to the judge (Doc. 10, Exh GG at 35-37). Roberson alleges 

that the trial court erred in failing to question the remaining jurors to determine if the 

excused juror had “said anything to influence or persuade them in [the witness’s] favor or 

the State’s.” When defense counsel expressed concern that the juror may have influenced 

the other jurors, the trial judge assured counsel that the juror had not spoken to anyone 

else on the jury. The trial court denied counsel’s motion for mistrial, but granted the 

State’s motion to have the juror designated as an alternate, and excused the juror from 

further service (Id., Exh BB at 2, GG at 35-37, 55-58). Roberson does not argue that the 

jury was not impartial, and jury bias may be presumed only in extraordinary cases. 

Fields v. Brown, 503 F.3d 755, 772 (9th Cir. 2007). Roberson has not established a claim 

for relief. 

 In Ground Five, Roberson argues he was “constructively” denied the effective 

assistance of appellate counsel, claiming that counsel omitted “a significant and obvious 

issue on appeal without strategic purpose leaving [him] to fix the issue on his own and 

the court granting relief without fixing the problem.” To the extent that this issue is not 

moot, Roberson can no longer establish prejudice because appellate counsel filed an 

Anders brief, Roberson filed a supplemental brief, and the court of appeals searched the 

record for fundamental error, and found none. 

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 In Ground Six, Roberson contends that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

prove that the firearm used in the offenses was inoperable. In denying the claim, the trial 

court ruled that Roberson had not established deficient performance or any resulting 

prejudice. The trial court stated: “At trial, the State presented evidence through its 

criminalist that the Defendant’s gun was loaded and ready to go with a bullet in the 

chamber. A deadly weapon means anything designed for lethal use, including a firearm” 

(Doc. 10, Exh J at 3). Even assuming the gun was temporarily inoperable, it would not 

have been relevant to Roberson’s guilt. Nothing in the statutes defining aggravated 

assault or armed robbery requires the weapon to be operable. See A.R.S. §§ 13-

1204(A)(3), 13-1904(A)(1), (A)(2). Roberson has not satisfied either prong of the 

Strickland standard. 

 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED denying Roberson’s Motion for Stay and 

Abeyance (Doc. 15). 

 IT IS RECOMMENDED that Qurian Vere Roberson’s Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with prejudice (Doc. 1). 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied either because denial of the 

motion is justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the 

ruling debatable, or because Roberson has not made a substantial showing of the denial 

of a constitutional right. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. 

The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, 

the parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure 

timely to file objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation may 

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28 

result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the district court without 

further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Failure timely to file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will 

be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an 

order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 

72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

 Dated this 11th day of March, 2014. 

Case 2:12-cv-00250-ROS Document 20 Filed 03/11/14 Page 13 of 13