Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02659/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02659-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

IRWIN GUZMAN, 

Petitioner,

v. 

SPEARMAN, Warden, 

Respondent.

Case No.: 16cv2659-MMA (AGS)

ORDER DENYING AMENDED 

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS 

CORPUS; 

[Doc. No. 39] 

DENYING REQUEST FOR 

EVIDENTIARY HEARING; 

[Doc. No. 56] 

DECLINING TO ISSUE 

CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY 

Petitioner Irwin Guzman (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has 

filed an Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254, challenging his 2013 conviction for eight counts of robbery (Cal. Penal Code § 

211), and one count of assault with a deadly weapon (Cal. Penal Code § 245(a)(1)).1

 See 

                                               

1

 Although this case was randomly referred to United States Magistrate Judge Andrew G. 

Schopler pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), the Court has determined that neither a Report and 

Recommendation nor oral argument are necessary for the disposition of this matter. See S.D. Cal. 

Civ.L.R. 72.1(d). 

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Doc. No. 39. Respondent filed an answer, and Petitioner filed a traverse. See Doc. Nos. 

43, 56. For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES the Petition. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

 The factual background set forth below is excerpted from the California Court of 

Appeal’s opinion. See Doc. No. 35-17.2

A. Robbery at the Mi Pueblo Market 

 On May 16, [2013,] a group of teenage boys, Ruben V., Juan L., Luis 

D., Jonathan R., David O., and Carlos F. were skateboarding in the parking 

lot of an abandoned Mi Pueblo Market in Escondido. The shopping center 

was located near a flood control channel. The channel runs throughout 

Escondido and is frequently used by gang members as a pathway. While the 

youths were skating, they left their backpacks and other personal belongings 

up against a nearby wall. Most of the skaters were taking a break from 

skateboarding and lying up against the wall when defendants Mendoza, 

Guzman, and Garcia jumped over a nearby fence and approached the 

skaters. The trio approached the skaters and immediately began picking up 

the skaters’ backpacks. Jonathan and Juan were about five to six feet away 

from the rest of their group and still skateboarding when the robbery began. 

 Jonathan thought he heard somebody say, “Empty out your pockets.” 

Guzman pulled a hammer from his waistband and held it in a threatening 

manner while he picked up some of the backpacks. While wielding the 

hammer, Guzman demanded David hand over his cell phone, and David 

complied. Guzman also took Juan’s and Jonathan’s cell phones, which had 

been left lying by the wall. Luis ran away when he saw the hammer, leaving 

his cell phone and headphones on top of Ruben’s backpack. Carlos 

attempted to leave with his backpack and skateboard, but Guzman knocked 

Carlos’s skateboard out of his hands and seized his wallet and backpack. 

Juan asked for his phone back from Guzman, to which Guzman replied, 

“Fuck you, it’s mine now,” while brandishing the hammer as if he was going 

                                               

2

 The Court gives deference to state court findings of fact and presumes them to be correct; 

Petitioner may rebut the presumption of correctness, but only by clear and convincing evidence. See 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 35-36 (1992) (holding that findings of 

historical fact, including inferences properly drawn from those facts, are entitled to statutory 

presumption of correctness). Petitioner does not challenge the Court of Appeal’s recitation of the facts. 

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to hit Juan. After that exchange, Juan and Jonathan fled the scene on their 

skateboards. After taking the skaters’ belongings, the three defendants 

jumped back over the fence. The skaters left the scene for a nearby 

Walgreens and called 911. 

B. Robbery on Mission Avenue 

 Daniel M. and Abraham D. were skateboarding down the sidewalk on 

Mission Avenue, approximately two miles away from the abandoned market 

and approximately half an hour after the robbery. They were both listening 

to music through headphones as they skated; Daniel was about 10 feet ahead 

of Abraham. Mendoza jumped out in front of Abraham, forcing Abraham to 

jump off his skateboard. Daniel, who was skating ahead of Abraham, 

stopped when he realized he could no longer hear Abraham skating behind 

him. Daniel turned around, seeing a man standing in front of Abraham. 

Daniel got off his skateboard and was approached by Garcia, who said to 

Daniel, “Give me your shit.” Daniel unplugged his headphones, and Garcia 

yanked them out of Daniel’s shirt. Garcia then walked towards Abraham 

and took Abraham’s skateboard. 

 Mendoza and Guzman had surrounded Abraham when Garcia joined 

them. Mendoza took a swing at Abraham with his fist, grazing Abraham’s 

cheekbone. Mendoza then took a hammer out of his waistband and

demanded Abraham hand over his cell phone. Abraham refused, and 

Mendoza swung the hammer at Abraham; however, Mendoza pulled his arm 

back as if he injured his arm and did not strike Abraham. Mendoza returned 

the hammer to his waistband and then reached into Abraham’s pocket for the 

phone. Abraham took a step back, and Mendoza threatened to hit Abraham 

with the hammer if he did not comply. Abraham finally allowed Mendoza 

to take his phone. 

 After the robbery, the three defendants got into an old gray Honda 

with a broken back window and drove away. Shortly after the robbery, 

Abraham made a 911 call using Daniel’s cell phone. 

C. Traffic Stop 

 Approximately five hours following the robberies, Escondido police 

officers from the Gang Enforcement Team (“GET”) attempted to stop a gray 

Honda with a broken rear window in an area considered Diablos gang 

territory. The car had four persons inside of it. After spotting the car, the 

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officers confirmed the license plate number matched that of the getaway car 

described by Abraham. The driver refused to stop, and police pursued the 

car into the parking lot of an apartment complex, where the driver and 

passengers bailed out of the still moving car and attempted to escape on foot. 

Police apprehended Garcia, Mendoza and Guzman as they attempted to flee. 

Inside the Honda, police found a hammer, backpacks, cell phones and cell 

phone chargers. Ruben’s backpack and its contents were recovered, as were 

Luis’s cell phone and headphones. Carlos’s wallet, with his school 

identification card still inside, was also found in the car. The police 

recovered Juan’s backpack from the car, but not his cell phone. No items 

taken from David, Daniel or Abraham were found in the car. 

D. Identification 

 After stopping the gray Honda, police contacted Daniel and Abraham 

and transported them to the apartment parking lot for a curbside lineup at 

around midnight. Daniel did not recognize any of the three men presented to 

him, but Abraham identified all three men as being his assailants. Both 

Daniel and Abraham did recognize the gray Honda as the vehicle their 

assailants used in driving away from the robbery. 

 After the curbside lineup, police prepared three separate six-pack 

photo arrays to show the victims of the earlier marketplace robbery. The 

photos were shown to the victims the day after the robbery. Ruben, 

Jonathan and Carlos recognized Guzman as the robber who wielded a 

hammer. Luis did not recognize anyone in the photo arrays. 

 At trial, Ruben initially did not identify Guzman as the robber 

wielding the hammer, but he positively identified Guzman on the second day 

of trial. Juan also identified Guzman in court as the robber with a hammer. 

Jonathan and David did not recognize any of the defendants at trial. Juan 

recognized Mendoza as being one of the robbers; however, Juan did not 

identify Garcia as the third robber. Juan stated that the third robber was 

someone that he went to school with and that he did not see him in court. 

Carlos identified all three defendants in court, stating that Mendoza was the 

robber who wielded the hammer. Abraham identified all three defendants in 

court, specifically identifying Mendoza as the man who wielded the 

hammer. Daniel was unable to identify any of the defendants in court. 

Id. at 3-7. 

/ / / 

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PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

 On October 8, 2013, a California jury found Petitioner guilty of eight counts of 

second-degree robbery and one count of assault with a deadly weapon. See id. at 3. The 

jury also concluded that Petitioner used a deadly weapon in the commission of six of the 

robberies and found that all nine felonies were committed for the benefit of a criminal 

street gang. See id. Petitioner was sentenced to twenty-six years and four months in 

prison. See id. 

 After sentencing, Petitioner appealed to the California Court of Appeal, which 

affirmed. See id. at 1. From there, Petitioner applied to the California Supreme Court for 

review, but was denied without opinion. See Doc. No. 35-21 at 1. Petitioner did not file 

a state collateral attack. Instead, he filed his Petition in this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 2254. See Doc. No. 39. Petitioner presents five claims for relief: (1) substantial 

evidence did not support the jury’s true findings on the gang enhancement in violation of 

Petitioner’s due process rights; (2) the trial court erred by denying a defense motion to 

bifurcate the trial as to the gang enhancement allegations in violation of Petitioner’s 

rights to due process and a fair trial; (3) impermissibly suggestive pre-trial identification 

procedures and tainted in-court identification of Petitioner violated his rights to due 

process; (4) jury instructions permitted the jury to equate motive and intent for purposes 

of proof of the intent requirement for the charged offenses and the gang enhancement 

which denied Petitioner of his due process right to proof of all elements of the charged 

offenses and the gang allegations beyond a reasonable doubt; and (5) the cumulative 

effect of the trial errors rendered Petitioner’s trial fundamentally unfair in violation of his 

due process rights. See id.; see also Doc. No. 56.3

 

                                               

3

 Petitioner also argued that the jury instruction on the intent portion of the gang enhancement 

instruction lacked a knowledge element and “failed to properly instruct on specific intent.” Doc. No. 39 

at 2. In his traverse, however, Petitioner abandons this claim and “seeks to have [it] dismissed.” Doc. 

No. 56 at 23. As such, the Court DISMISSES this claim for relief. See Daniels v. Davey, No. 1:15-cv01211-DAD-MJS, 2016 WL 282694, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2016) (recognizing that a “petitioner 

is the master” of his “petition”). 

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LEGAL STANDARD

 The provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 

(“AEDPA”) govern federal habeas corpus petitions. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 

327 (1997). Under AEDPA, a federal habeas corpus petition will not be granted with 

respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings unless 

that adjudication of the claim: (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved 

an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the 

Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the state 

court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 7–8 (2002). “A 

state court’s decision can involve an ‘unreasonable application’ of Federal law if it either 

1) correctly identifies the governing rule but then applies it to a new set of facts in a way 

that is objectively unreasonable, or 2) extends or fails to extend a clearly established legal 

principle to a new context in a way that is objectively unreasonable.” Hernandez v. 

Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1142 (9th Cir. 2002). Under § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court 

may grant relief under the “contrary to” clause “if the state court applies a rule different 

from the governing law set forth in [United States Supreme Court] cases, or if it decides a 

case differently than [the United States Supreme Court] ha[s] done on a set of materially 

indistinguishable facts.” Shammam v. Paramo, 664 F. App'x 629, 630 (9th Cir. 2016) 

(citing Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002)). 

 For purposes of federal habeas corpus review under § 2254(d), clearly established 

federal law means “the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme 

Court at the time the state court renders its decision” and refers to the holdings, as 

opposed to the dicta, of Supreme Court decisions. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-

72 (2003). A federal court is not called upon to decide whether it agrees with the state 

court’s determination; rather, the court applies an extraordinarily deferential review, 

inquiring only whether the state court’s decision was objectively unreasonable. See 

Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003); Medina v. Hornung, 386 F.3d 872, 877 (9th 

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Cir. 2004). In order to grant relief under § 2254(d)(2), a federal court must be 

“convinced that an appellate panel, applying the normal standards of appellate review, 

could not reasonably conclude that the [state court’s] finding[s] [are] supported by the 

record.” Murray v. Schriro, 745 F.3d 984, 1012 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Taylor v. 

Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004)). 

 Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, the Court 

“looks through” to the underlying appellate court decision and presumes it provides the 

basis for the higher court’s denial of a claim or claims. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 

797, 805-06 (1991). Here, the California Court of Appeal gave a reasoned opinion as to 

Petitioner’s claims, and so the Court looks through to that opinion as the basis for the 

state court denial. See Doc. No. 35-17. 

DISCUSSION

 A. Gang Enhancement: Sufficiency of the Evidence 

 Petitioner first challenges the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that sufficient evidence 

supported the jury’s finding that he committed the offenses for the benefit of a criminal 

street gang. “[A] due process claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence can only 

succeed when, viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, no 

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” Johnson v. Montgomery, 899 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2018) 

(quotation marks omitted). The Court must apply a “second level of deference” to the 

state court’s determinations in habeas corpus proceedings. Id. As such, the Court “must 

conclude that the state court’s determination that a rational jury could have found each 

required element proven beyond a reasonable doubt was not just wrong but was 

objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 1056-57. 

 In addressing this argument, the Court of Appeal stated: 

 In this case, there is substantial evidence to support an inference that 

defendants committed the crimes in association with the Diablos street gang 

and that they had a specific intent to assist in criminal conduct by Diablos 

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gang members: Mendoza and Guzman were known members of the Diablos 

gang, and there is sufficient evidence to draw an inference that they relied 

upon their gang membership in conducting the robberies. It can be 

reasonably inferred based upon expert testimony and the circumstances of 

the crimes that Mendoza and Guzman knew that, as fellow Diablos gang 

members, they could count on each other to assist when engaging in crimes 

of opportunity against victims in their territory and could count on the other 

gang members’ silence if confronted by the police. 

 While Garcia is a documented member of a different gang in a 

different part of San Diego County, this fact would not prevent a reasonable 

fact finder from nonetheless finding that he committed the armed robberies 

in association with and for the benefit of the Diablos. Our state high court’s 

recent ruling in People v Prunty (2015) 62 Cal.4th 59, 71-72 (Prunty) does 

not foreclose the possibility of such a conviction, because while expert 

witnesses did not submit evidence proving that the Eastside gang is either a 

criminal street gang or a subset of a larger criminal gang to which both 

Eastside and the Diablos are associated, section 186.22, subdivision (b) does 

not require that a defendant be a member of a criminal street gang, only that 

the defendant commits a felony either to benefit a gang, or in association 

with a gang and that the defendant has a specific intent to aid gang members 

in the commission of a felony. 

 Garcia worked with the Diablos gang members in the armed 

robberies, and they apparently relied upon and trusted him as if he were one 

of them. An expert witness also testified that there was a great deal of 

crossover between Hispanic criminal street gangs in San Diego County. 

Given these facts, a reasonable jury could have inferred that Garcia 

committed the armed robberies in association with and support of the 

Diablos even if he was not formally a member of that organization. The fact 

that the armed robberies occurred in Diablos territory and armed robbery of 

members of the public is a crime that was identified by an expert witness as 

one of the primary criminal activities of the Diablos gang support a strong 

inference that all three defendants committed the armed robberies with the 

intent of assisting Diablos gang members in conducting criminal activity, 

thus satisfying both prongs of section 186.22, subdivision (b).

Doc. No. 35-17 at 26-28 (citation and footnote omitted). 

 “California’s gang enhancement applies to ‘any person who is convicted of a 

felony committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with any 

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criminal street gang, with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in any criminal 

conduct by gang members.’” Johnson, 899 F.3d at 1057 (quoting Cal. Penal Code § 

186.22(b)(1)). The government must prove: (1) that the “crime be related to a gang”; and 

(2) that the defendant “specifically intended to assist a gang member’s crime.” Id. It 

appears that Petitioner challenges both prongs. 

1. Related to a Gang 

Petitioner takes issue with the Court of Appeal’s analysis because, although the 

evidence indicated both he and Mendoza were Diablos gang members, Garcia was a 

member of a different gang. Thus, he argues, “there was no evidence of any kind 

indicating these crimes were gang related.” Doc. No. 56 at 4. Petitioner further contends 

that there were no gang tattoos, signs, or yelling during the commission of the robberies, 

showing that the victims did not know that Petitioner and his codefendants were in a 

gang. 

The government can prove this first prong by showing that the eight robbery 

counts and the assault count were at the direction of, in association with, or for the benefit 

of a gang. Johnson, 899 F.3d at 1057. Because the statute is disjunctive, the state need 

only prove one of the three. See id. 

“Committing a crime in concert with known gang members can be substantial 

evidence that the crime was committed in ‘association’ with a gang.” Id. Moreover, a 

“crime is committed in association with the gang if the defendants relied on their 

common gang membership and the apparatus of the gang when they committed the 

crime.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). 

Here, Petitioner committed the crime with fellow Diablos gang member Mendoza. 

The Court of Appeal’s conclusion that Garcia’s involvement did not alter this result, 

despite the fact that he is a member of a different gang, is not unreasonable. Specifically, 

the court noted the expert’s testimony concerning the overlap of Hispanic gangs in the 

area. See Doc. No. 35-17 at 28. The court also noted that Garcia worked with the 

Diablos regularly, the Diablos trusted him, and the Diablos treated him as one of their 

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own. Id. Finally, the jury could reasonably conclude that the three individuals relied on 

the apparatus of the gang because they used the “flood control channel” located near the 

Mi Pueblo Market to escape from the first six robberies, which was a “pathway” 

“frequently used by gang members.” Doc. No. 35-17 at 4; see also Doc. No. 35-4 at 80; 

Doc. No. 35-8 at 43-44. 

But even if there is insufficient evidence to show that Petitioner’s actions were “in 

association with” the Diablos, there is sufficient evidence to show the actions were “for 

the benefit of” the Diablos. In Johnson, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the following 

facts were sufficient to show the crimes were “for the benefit of” the Project Watts Crips 

gang, notwithstanding the fact only one of the two individuals that committed the robbery 

were members of that gang: 

(1) the robbery was a violent crime, committed with a gun pointed 

directly into the face of a victim, (2) the robbery occurred within the 

territory of the Project Watts Crips, (3) robbery is one of the primary 

activities of the Project Watts Crips, (4) the robbery occurred in broad 

daylight, (5) the robbery was brazen because it involved multiple victims 

and occurred at a time of the day, roughly 9:00 a.m., when neighbors were 

most likely to observe the crime; (6) King had numerous tattoos, including 

some visible on his face and hands, indicating membership in the Project 

Watts Crips, (7) during the robbery, either Johnson or King used the term 

“cuz,” a term used by members of Crips gangs, and (8) the victims were 

ordinary members of the public with no personal relationship with the 

defendants or gangs. 

899 F.3d at 1058. A gang expert “testified that violent crimes benefit a gang by 

increasing the intimidation in the community, lowering reporting rates among witnesses, 

and allowing the criminal enterprise to continue free from police restraint.” Id. “The 

gang expert also opined that such crimes bestow ‘respect’ on the individual and elevate 

the status of the gang.” Id. The court explained that these facts were “sufficient for a 

jury to infer that the crime was meant to send a message to the public about gang 

brutality and control” in their territory. Id.

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Here, the Diablos gang expert testified that the Diablos “frequently commit crimes 

against members of the public in their home turf” and by doing so “benefit the gang by 

instilling fear within the surrounding community.” Doc. No. 35-17 at 21. “Members of 

the Diablos gang are expected to automatically back up their fellow gang members if a 

member decides to commit a crime of opportunity against a member of the public.” Id. 

Indeed, the expert opined that “the primary purpose and activity of the Diablos gang is to 

commit crimes such as robbery, assault with a deadly weapon, and making criminal 

threats.” Id. Finally, the expert explained that “respect” is a “core value” of gangs, 

gained through the commission of crimes by gangs and individual gang members. Doc. 

No. 35-8 at 20-21. 

Similar to Johnson, (1) the robberies were violent crimes involving physical 

violence and threats of violence with a hammer, (2) the robberies occurred within the 

Diablos’ territory (see Doc. No. 35-8 at 85-86), (3) the expert testified that robbery is one 

of the primary activities of the Diablos, (4) the first robbery occurred in broad daylight 

and the second occurred in twilight hours (see Doc. No. 35-4 at 103; Doc. No. 35-6 at 19, 

64), (5) the robberies were brazen because they involved multiple victims and one of the 

robberies was on a public street (Doc. No. 35-6 at 65), (6) both Petitioner and Mendoza 

were documented and known members of the Diablos, and (7) the victims were ordinary 

members of the public with little or no personal relationship with the defendants or gangs 

(see Doc. No. 35-4 at 121; Doc. No. 35-5 at 113; Doc. No. 35-6 at 150-51; but see Doc. 

No. 35-5 at 148-49 (one victim identifying one of the defendants as someone he went to 

school with)). Although Petitioner and his codefendants did not use any lingo associated 

with members of the Diablos, the Court finds that the Court of Appeal reasonably 

determined that the evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to conclude that the 

robberies were “for the benefit of” the Diablos. See Johnson, 899 F.3d at 1058. 

2. Specific Intent to Assist a Gang Member 

Petitioner also challenges the specific intent prong, arguing that the Court of 

Appeal allowed the gang expert’s testimony to serve as the sole basis to determine 

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specific intent because, according to Petitioner, that was the only evidence offered 

concerning his intent to assist any gang. See Doc. No. 56 at 4. Petitioner’s argument, 

however, is foreclosed by the California Supreme Court’s interpretation of this element: 

“[I]f substantial evidence establishes that the defendant intended to and did commit the 

charged felony with known members of a gang, the jury may fairly infer that the 

defendant had the specific intent to promote, further, or assist criminal conduct by those 

gang members.” People v. Albillar, 244 P.3d 1062, 1076 (Cal. 2010). Critically, the 

California Supreme Court interpreted the second prong to require proof that a defendant 

had a “specific intent to promote, further, or assist in any felonious criminal conduct by 

gang members.” Id. at 1075. Moreover, felonious criminal conduct does not have to be 

old conduct; it can be the instant offense if that offense is committed with another known 

gang member. Id. Here, a rational jury could conclude that Petitioner had the specific 

intent to assist Mendoza—a fellow Diablos—in the commission of these felonious 

robberies, and thus Petitioner’s challenge to the second prong similarly fails. See id. at 

1076. 

Accordingly, Petitioner fails to demonstrate that the California courts’ denial of 

this claim was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, established federal law, or 

was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

presented. 

B. Gang Enhancement: Failure to Bifurcate 

 Petitioner next claims that the trial court’s refusal to bifurcate proof of the gang 

enhancement violated his due process rights. The Supreme Court, however, has not 

recognized that a trial court’s denial of a motion to bifurcate trial of the gang 

enhancement implicates the Due Process Clause; thus, there is no clearly established 

federal law. See Stenson v. Lambert, 504 F.3d 873, 881 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Where the 

Supreme Court has not addressed an issue in its holding, a state court adjudication of the 

issue not addressed by the Supreme Court cannot be contrary to, or an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established federal law.”); see also Demirdjian v. Gipson, 832 F.3d 

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1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 2016) (noting that federal courts cannot “grant habeas relief unless 

the California Court of Appeal’s decision on that claim was ‘contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of’ clearly established Supreme Court authority”) (quoting 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). 

 Rather, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on bifurcation and misjoinder of claims 

suggests that there is no constitutional right to bifurcation. See Spencer v. Texas, 385 

U.S. 554, 568 (1967) (“Two-part jury trials are rare in our jurisprudence; they have never 

been compelled by this Court as a matter of constitutional law, or even as a matter of 

federal procedure.”). The closest the Supreme Court has come to holding otherwise is in 

a footnote stating, “[i]mproper joinder does not, in itself, violate the Constitution. Rather, 

misjoinder would rise to the level of a constitutional violation only if it results in 

prejudice so great as to deny a defendant his Fifth Amendment right to a fair trial.” 

United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 446 n.8 (1986). But the Ninth Circuit has squarely 

held that “the statement in Lane regarding when misjoinder rises to the level of 

constitutional violation was dicta” and thus does not serve to clearly establish federal law 

for habeas corpus purposes. Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 776 (9th Cir. 2012); 

accord Collins v. Runnels, 603 F.3d 1127, 1133 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The footnote upon 

which Collins relies did not set forth the governing legal principle in Lane. It was merely 

a comment.”). The Ninth Circuit has continued to refuse to provide habeas corpus review 

of bifurcation decisions, at least in non-death penalty cases. Compare Grajeda v. 

Scribner, 541 F. App’x 776, 778 (9th Cir. 2013) (“The Supreme Court has not held that a 

state or federal trial court’s denial of a motion to sever can, in itself, violate the 

Constitution.”); Hollie v. Hedgpeth, 456 F. App’x 685, 685 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The 

Supreme Court has never held that a trial court’s failure to provide separate trials on 

different charges implicates a defendant’s right to due process.”); with Davis v. 

Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 638-39 (9th Cir. 2004) (reviewing a habeas “joinder challenge” 

in the death penalty context). 

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penalty jurisprudence, Petitioner fails to demonstrate any fundamental unfairness. A 

bifurcation challenge can only be successful if the denial “resulted in an unfair trial. 

There is no prejudicial constitutional violation unless simultaneous trial of more than one 

offense actually rendered petitioner’s state trial fundamentally unfair and hence, violative 

of due process.” Davis, 384 F.3d at 638 (alterations and quotation marks omitted). The 

Ninth Circuit focuses “particularly” on the cross admissibility of evidence and the danger 

of “spillover” from one charge to another but also considers whether one charge or set of 

charges is weaker than another. Id. 

 The California Court of Appeal considered the question of cross admissibility in 

Petitioner’s case, stating that: 

 Here, evidence of defendants’ robbery spree was relevant and 

probative not only with respect to the gang enhancement but also with 

respect to their motive in committing the robberies and, in particular, 

establishing Garcia’s role and motive in assisting Guzman and Mendoza. 

Thus, much of the evidence related to the gang enhancement would have 

been admissible in a separate trial of the robberies. Moreover, the gang 

evidence was not any more inflammatory than the victims’ testimony about 

the robberies. 

Doc. No. 35-17 at 9. The Court agrees that much of the evidence would have been 

admissible in a separate trial. Moreover, the “State did not join a strong evidentiary case 

with a much weaker case in the hope that the cumulation of the evidence would lead to 

convictions in both cases.” Davis, 384 F.3d at 639 (quotation marks omitted). Rather, 

the State had a strong case in both the substantive offenses and in the gang enhancement. 

Also, as in Davis, the trial court “further limited” any prejudice through an instruction to 

the jury to consider each count separately and to consider the gang evidence for limited 

purposes. Id.; see also Doc. No. 35-17 at 19 n.5 (“You may not consider this [gang] 

evidence for any other purpose. You may not conclude from this evidence that the 

defendant is a person of bad character or that he has a disposition to commit crime.”). As 

such, even if it were clearly established that bifurcation decisions are challengeable under 

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the Due Process Clause in habeas corpus proceedings, Petitioner’s argument fails. Thus, 

Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim. 

 Finally, in his direct appeal through the California courts, Petitioner primarily 

argued that the trial judge abused his discretion under California common law relating to 

bifurcation. To the extent Petitioner requests that the Court reconsider those state-law 

rulings, such a request is not cognizable under federal habeas review. See Holley v. 

Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Simple errors of state law do not 

warrant federal habeas relief.”). 

C. Identifications 

 Petitioner further asserts that the in-court identifications were tainted by unduly 

suggestive out-of-court identification procedures and thus violated his due process rights. 

The use of out-of-court identification procedures do not automatically violate due 

process; “due process concerns arise only when law enforcement officers use an 

identification procedure that is both suggestive and unnecessary.” Perry v. New 

Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 238-39 (2012). “Even when the police use such a procedure . . 

. suppression of the resulting identification is not the inevitable consequence.” Id. at 239. 

Instead, “the Due Process Clause requires courts to assess, on a case-by-case basis, 

whether improper police conduct created a ‘substantial likelihood of misidentification.’” 

Id. (quoting Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199-200 (1972)). “Reliability of the 

eyewitness identification is the linchpin of that evaluation” and only “[w]here the 

indicators of a witness’ ability to make an accurate identification are outweighed by the 

corrupting effect of law enforcement suggestion, [should] the identification be 

suppressed.” Id. at 239 (alterations and quotation marks omitted). 

 “To determine whether an identification procedure violates a defendant’s due 

process rights, a court must consider whether under the totality of the circumstances the 

identification was reliable even though the confrontation procedure was suggestive.” 

United States v. Drake, 543 F.3d 1080, 1088 (9th Cir. 2008) (quotation marks omitted). 

Courts consider a variety of factors, including “the opportunity of the witness to view the 

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criminal at the time of the crime, the witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of the 

witness’ prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the 

witness at the confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and the 

confrontation.” Id. (alteration and quotation marks omitted). 

1. Curbside Lineup 

 Petitioner argues first that the curbside lineup with Abraham and Daniel tainted the 

in-court identifications. Petitioner contends that the lineup was unduly suggestive 

because the officers told the victims that they caught the guys in the car the victims had 

reported, the car was in the parking lot when the victims arrived, Petitioner was in 

handcuffs and surrounded by officers, the victims were presented the culprits 

individually, and there was a lack of exigency to justify these procedures. See Doc No. 

56 at 9-10. 

 The Court of Appeal summarized the facts concerning Abraham and Daniel as 

follows: 

 On direct examination, Abraham explained that police called his home 

and told him that “they had caught the guys.” However, at that point, 

Abraham was not told that he would be asked to identify anyone at a 

curbside lineup. Later, a police officer came to Abraham’s house and 

explained that she was going to take him to a curbside lineup. After 

Abraham and his mother were in the officer’s patrol car, but before leaving 

Abraham’s home, the police officer read him an admonishment, which 

advised Abraham that he should not infer any guilt just because someone 

had been detained, that he did not have to identify anyone and that it was 

just as important to free an innocent person as to identify someone involved 

in the crime. 

 According to Abraham, he understood that he was going to the 

curbside lineup so that he could “[n]otify the cops if those were the correct

guys.” (Italics added.) Abraham stated that he was able to identify 

Mendoza as the one who stole his cell phone based on his recollection of the 

robber’s facial features, clothes, height and weight and physical build; 

Abraham was able to identify Garcia as the one who robbed Daniel based on 

his recollection of the second robber’s clothes and height; and Abraham was 

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able to identify Guzman as the getaway driver based on his recollection of 

the driver’s long straight hair. 

 Daniel testified that he also received a call from Escondido police 

officers in which he was told that the police had stopped some people they 

thought might be involved in the robbery. Daniel was given the same 

admonishment provided to Abraham. As we have indicated, Daniel was 

unable to identify any of the defendants as one of the robbers, but he did 

recognize the Honda as the getaway car. 

Doc. No. 35-17 at 12-13 (footnote omitted). Relying on these facts, the court reasoned: 

 [B]efore asking the two victims to identify the defendants, each victim 

was admonished that they were not to infer guilt from the fact that any of the 

individuals were detained and that they were not obligated to identify 

anyone. The admonishment was effective with both Abraham, who testified 

that he understood his role was to notify the police “if they were the correct

guys,” (italics added) and Daniel, who plainly felt no suggestion or pressure 

because he was unable to identify any of the defendants as suspects but did 

recognize the Honda as the getaway car. Given these circumstances in the 

record, which show that the witnesses acted independent of any suggestion 

or pressure that may have been expressed or inherent in the circumstance, 

defendants did not meet their burden of showing that the statements the 

police made to the witnesses before the lineup were unduly suggestive or 

that the identification Abraham made six hours after the robbery was in any 

way unreliable. 

Id. at 13-14. 

 Here, upon review of the record, the Court finds that the state courts’ adjudication 

of this claim did not result in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established federal law. Although “[t]he practice of showing 

suspects singly to persons for the purpose of identification, and not as part of a lineup, 

has been widely condemned,” Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967) overruled on 

other grounds by Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987), “the admission of 

evidence of a showup without more does not violate due process.” Neil, 409 U.S. at 198. 

Indeed, “[o]ne-on-one identifications are sometimes necessary because of officers’ and 

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suspects’ strong interest in the expeditious release of innocent persons and the reliability 

of identifications made soon after and near a crime.” Morris v. Carey, No. 2:06-cv-0354 

GEB JFM P., 2010 WL 231379, at *16 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2010). 

 The curbside lineup was not unduly suggestive nor was the testimony from Daniel 

or Abraham rendered constitutionally unreliable. See Perry, 565 U.S. at 239 (holding 

that “reliability” is the “linchpin” of the evaluation). Both Daniel and Abraham had 

adequate time to observe the undisguised robbers. See Doc. No. 35-17 at 13. Their 

attention was undividedly on the robbers, since the robbery was committed in the 

immediate vicinity of the boys and the group exchanged both words and physical contact 

with the witnesses. Abraham gave clear, descriptive reasons for his belief that he had 

correctly identified the attackers and the lineup occurred shortly after the incident in 

question. Additionally, courts have held that admonishments like those given to 

Abraham and Daniel reduce the suggestive nature of an identification procedure. See, 

e.g., United States v. White, 38 F. App’x 426, 427 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The in-field 

identification procedure was not impermissibly suggestive because the officers 

admonished each witness that there was no obligation to identify anyone and each 

witness viewed the defendants independently from the other witnesses.”). Finally, the 

admonishment given was clearly impressed on both Daniel and Abraham, as Abraham 

testified he knew his job was to look for the “correct guys,” and Daniel was unable to 

positively identify any of the subjects. Doc. No. 35-17 at 13. Accordingly, Petitioner has 

not met his burden to show that the state courts’ conclusion that the admission of the 

curbside lineup was proper was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, 

clearly established federal law, or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. 

2. Photo Array 

 Petitioner next argues that the in-court identifications of the victims of the first 

robbery were tainted by the photo arrays the police showed them the day after the 

robbery. Petitioner argues that there was only one other man with long hair in the photo 

and that others in the photo “grossly dissimilar in appearance” to him in violation of 

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United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 233 (1967). See Doc. No. 56 at 12. The Court of 

Appeal summarized the facts concerning the relevant witnesses as follows: 

 Six of the victims at the Mi Pueblo Market robbery were shown three 

separate six-pack photo lineups (six-pack); each six-pack included a picture 

of one of the defendants. The six-packs were prepared with the assistance of 

a computer program that selected photographs of individuals with physical 

characteristics similar to each of the defendants and organized the 

photographs randomly. 

 The six-packs were shown to the six victims at Ruben’s house. Ruben 

testified that he was told by the police that they had recovered various items 

and that three people were in custody. However, each victim was 

admonished that they did not have to identify anyone in the lineup and that 

they should not assume that anyone whose picture was in the lineup was in 

custody. Each victim was shown the six-packs separately. Three of the 

victims—Ruben, Jonathan, and Carlos—were able to identify Guzman; only 

two of the victims—Ruben and Carlos—were able to identify Mendoza; 

none of the victims was able to identify Garcia. 

Doc. No. 35-17 at 14. 

 Petitioner contends that the six-pack photo array, which included his photo, was 

unduly suggestive. The Court of Appeal reasoned that “courts have upheld lineup 

identifications despite the existence of similar or greater disparities among lineup 

participants,” thus, the fact that “the Guzman six-pack included one other person with 

long hair and only three of the victims were able to identify him,” rendered the lineup 

“not unduly suggestive.” Id. at 15. 

 Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeal’s ruling was unreasonable because the 

six-pack array only contained one other individual with long hair and he was the only 

individual wearing a white shirt. Petitioner primarily focuses on the hair length, since he 

correctly notes that some of the witnesses testified that they recognized him, in part or in 

whole, due to his hair. See, e.g., Doc. No. 35-5 at 174, 204. The following six-pack was 

shown to the witnesses: 

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Doc. No. 63 at 4. Petitioner is the top-center subject. 

 Although the habeas review standard is far more deferential, even if the Court 

performed a de novo review, the Court finds that the photo array in question is not unduly 

suggestive. While only two of the subjects, including Petitioner, appear to have longerthan-shoulder-length hair, none of the subjects have short hair, and all but one of the 

subjects have hair reaching at least to each subjects’ collar. The subjects all appear to be 

of approximately the same age, have similar skin tones, all but one have on similar shirts 

(although of a different color), all but one are clean shaven, and all have the same hair 

color. The instructions of the lineup also warn that “hairstyles, beards and mustaches 

may be easily changed.” Doc. No. 63 at 4. Given the “totality of the circumstances,” the 

photographic lineup was not unduly suggestive because of either the color of Petitioner’s 

shirt or his hair length. Drake, 543 F.3d at 1088. As the Court of Appeal noted, this 

conclusion is reinforced by the fact that several of the witnesses shown this lineup failed 

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to select Petitioner from the lineup or at trial. 

 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has rejected similar challenges. See United States v. 

Beck, 418 F.3d 1008, 1012 (9th Cir. 2005) (concluding that the photospread “was not so 

impermissibly suggestive as to create a substantial likelihood of misidentification” where 

all of the subjects are Caucasian males in the same age range, with similar skin, eye, and 

hair coloring, and where “[f]our of the six photos show men with similar length hair, but 

two having somewhat shorter hair”); United States v. Nash, 946 F.2d 679, 681 (9th Cir. 

1991) (“Nash criticizes the photospread because one of the photographs was of a Latino 

man, only Nash and two others had light complexions, and only Nash and the man Nash 

contends is Latino had afro hairstyles. We find the photospread to be a balanced 

presentation that was not suggestive.”); see also United States v. Mack, No. 99-50595, 

2000 WL 1171143, at *1 (9th Cir. Aug. 17, 2000) (“We have held that a photospread is 

not impermissibly suggestive even though the pictures vary in race and hair style. . . . The 

minor discrepancies among the photos do not make the photospread impermissibly 

suggestive.”). In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that state courts’ conclusion that 

admission of the photo array was proper was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established federal law, or based on an unreasonable determination 

of the facts. 

 D. Jury Instructions 

 Petitioner also challenges the California Court of Appeal’s ruling concerning the 

jury instructions. Generally, federal courts do not grant relief to a petitioner based on a 

challenge to a state jury instruction, even an erroneous one, in a petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 71-72 (1991). To receive relief at 

this stage, Petitioner must show that the challenged instruction “so infected the entire trial 

that the resulting conviction violates due process.” Id. at 72 (quotation marks omitted). 

“A single instruction to a jury may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be 

viewed in the context of the overall charge.” Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 437 

(2004) (quotation marks omitted). 

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 Petitioner challenges the use of model California jury instructions—CALCRIM 

Nos. 370, 1401, and 1403. Petitioner argues that the instructions confused the jury by 

inadequately explaining the difference between the intent required to commit the gang 

enhancement and the concept of motive for committing the robberies. See Doc. No. 56 at 

22. According to Petitioner, this relieved the prosecution of its burden to prove the intent 

component of the gang enhancement beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. The California 

Court of Appeal found Petitioner’s argument unpersuasive, citing to People v. Fuentes, 

171 Cal. App. 4th 1133, 1139-40 (2009), which rejected the same argument in a 

virtually identical situation. Here, CALCRIM 370 addressed the concept of motive for 

the robbery charges and the assault: 

 The People are not required to prove that the defendant had a motive 

to commit any of the crimes charged. In reaching your verdict you may, 

however, consider whether the defendant had a motive. 

 Having a motive may be a factor tending to show that the defendant is 

guilty. Not having a motive may be a factor tending to show the defendant 

is not guilty. 

Doc. No. 35-17 at 19 n.5. By contrast, the pertinent sections of the CALCRIM 1401 

instruction addressed only the gang enhancement: 

 If you find the defendant guilty of the crimes charged in Counts 1 

through 9, you must then decide whether the People have proved the 

additional allegation that the defendant committed each of those crimes for 

the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal street 

gang. 

 To prove this allegation, the People must prove that: 

 1. The defendant committed the crime for the benefit of, at the 

direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang; 

 AND 

 2. The defendant intended to assist, further, or promote criminal 

conduct by gang members. 

. . . 

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 The People have the burden of proving each allegation beyond a

reasonable doubt. If the People have not met this burden, you must find that 

the allegation has not been proved. 

Id. at 17-18. The CALCRIM 1403 instruction provides: 

 You may consider evidence of gang activity only for the limited 

purpose of deciding whether: 

 The defendant acted with the intent, purpose, and knowledge that are 

required to prove the gang-related enhancements charged; 

 OR 

 The defendant had a motive to commit the crimes charged. 

 You may also consider this evidence when you evaluate the credibility 

or believability of a witness and when you consider the facts and 

information relied on by an expert witness in reaching his or her opinion. 

 You may not consider this evidence for any other purpose. You may 

not conclude from this evidence that the defendant is a person of bad 

character or that he has a disposition to commit crime. 

Id. at 19. 

 Contrary to Petitioner’s argument, CALCRIM 370 by its express terms applies 

only to the substantive charges and thus did not modify CALCRIM 1401. Indeed, 

CALCRIM 1401 provides that the jurors should not even consider the instruction unless 

they had already found the defendants guilty of the substantive charges. If the jurors 

reached that stage, CALCRIM 1401 provides clear instructions to consider Petitioner’s 

intent. Petitioner attempts to distinguish his case from Fuentes because in his trial the 

jury was also instructed on CALCRIM 1403, which further confused motive and intent. 

See Doc. No. 56 at 22. However, CALCRIM 1403 specifies that the gang-activity 

evidence could be used to determine general motive for the substantive crimes, the 

specific intent required by the gang enhancement, or credibility, but for no other purpose. 

The fact that the same evidence could be considered for different purposes is neither 

surprising nor confusing in a criminal case, and a clear instruction limiting the use of 

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such evidence for a specific purpose is neither unusual nor inappropriate. Thus, 

Petitioner fails to show that he is entitled to federal habeas corpus relief because the 

instructions “so infected the entire trial” such that the resulting conviction violates due 

process.4

 Middleton, 541 U.S. at 437; see also Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72. 

 E. Cumulative Error 

 Lastly, Petitioner argues that the cumulative impact of all of the alleged errors 

prejudiced him, requiring a new trial. See Harris v. Wood, 64 F.3d 1432, 1438 (9th Cir. 

1995) (“[P]rejudice may result from the cumulative impact of multiple deficiencies.”). 

However, because Petitioner fails to identify any errors, there can be no constitutional 

violation based on the alleged cumulative impact of the alleged errors. See Hays v. 

Farwell, 482 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1202 (D. Nev. 2007) (“The cumulative error doctrine, 

however, does not permit the Court to consider the cumulative effect of non-errors.”); see 

also Fuller v. Roe, 182 F.3d 699, 704 (9th Cir. 1999), overruled on other grounds, Slack 

v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000) (“where there is no single constitutional error existing, 

nothing can accumulate to the level of a constitutional violation”). 

 F. Evidentiary Hearing 

 Petitioner further requests an evidentiary hearing. See Doc. No. 56. “A habeas 

petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing if: (1) the allegations in his petition would, 

if proved, entitle him to relief; and (2) the state court trier of fact has not, after a full and 

fair hearing, reliably found the relevant facts.” Phillips v. Woodford, 267 F.3d 966, 973 

(9th Cir. 2001) (emphasis omitted). “[I]f the record refutes the applicant’s factual 

allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district court is not required to hold an 

                                               

4

 Numerous courts have reached the same conclusion regarding these instructions. See, e.g.,

Gonzalez v. Montgomery, No. SACV 15-2150-PA (LAL), 2017 WL 3429375, at *17 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 

10, 2017); Martinez v. Hubbard, No. CV 11-5640-JAK (PLA), 2015 WL 9997226, at *23 (C.D. Cal. 

Nov. 12, 2015); Phillips v. Foulk, No. EDCV 11-599-DOC (DTB), 2013 WL 3337825, at *17 (C.D. Cal.

July 1, 2013); Binns v. Allison, No. CV 11-10241-DSF (DTB), 2013 WL 3200503, at *13 (C.D. Cal.

June 24, 2013); Orono v. Hedgepeth, No. 1:12-CV-00581 LJO GSA HC, 2012 WL 3704815, at *22 

(E.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2012). 

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evidentiary hearing.” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007). Here, the Court 

finds that the record precludes habeas relief and the Court does not need any additional 

facts to adjudicate his Petition. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Petitioner’s request for 

an evidentiary hearing. 

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

 Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases states that “[t]he district court 

must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the 

applicant.” A certificate of appealability should issue as to those claims on which a 

petitioner makes a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2253(c)(2). The standard is satisfied if “jurists of reason could disagree with the district 

court’s resolution of [the] constitutional claims” or “conclude the issues presented are 

adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 

322, 327 (2003). Here, the Court concludes that Petitioner has not made the required 

showing. Accordingly, the Court DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability. 

CONCLUSION

 Based on the foregoing, the Court DISMISSES the Petition with prejudice. 

Further, the Court DENIES Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing, and 

DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability. The Clerk of Court is instructed to 

enter judgment accordingly and close the case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 28, 2018

 _____________________________ 

 HON. MICHAEL M. ANELLO 

United States District Judge 

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