Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_17-cv-00064/USCOURTS-almd-2_17-cv-00064-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 540
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Mandamus and Other
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

WILLIAM L. CROSBY, #228412, )

 )

 Plaintiff, )

)

 v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:17-CV-64-WHA

)

REBECCA C. OATES, et al., )

 )

 Defendants. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

This case is before the court on a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint filed by William L. 

Crosby (“Crosby”), a state inmate and frequent federal litigant. In this complaint, Crosby

challenges actions taken in December of 2015 by the Clerk of the Alabama Court of Civil 

Appeals, the Clerk of the Alabama Supreme Court and the Attorney General for the State 

of Alabama with regard to an action he initially filed with the Alabama Court of Civil 

Appeals. A review of the records of the federal courts of this state indicates that the 

instant complaint presents claims virtually identical to those raised in Crosby v. State of 

Alabama, et al., Civil Action No. 1:16-CV-70-KD-C (S.D. Ala. 2016). In that case, the 

United States District Court for the Southern District observed as follows:

Crosby’s “factual allegations” establish that, on or about December 21, 

2015, he filed a petition in the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals, putatively 

in accordance with Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 

seeking to enjoin the Circuit Court of Mobile County and the Attorney 

General of the State of Alabama in some respect with respect to his 

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underlying murder conviction. According to Crosby, instead of “keeping” 

his Rule 57 briefs and ruling on the same, the Clerk of the Alabama Court 

of Civil Appeals improperly transferred his case to the Alabama Supreme 

Court – on the basis that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction – and the 

Clerk of the Supreme Court of Alabama then, two days later, exceeded its 

authority/jurisdiction in striking his petition for injunctive relief as 

prematurely filed[.]

Crosby v. State of Alabama, et al., Civil Action No. 16-CV-70-KD-C (S.D. Ala. 2016), 

Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge - Doc. No. 3 at 2 (citations to the 

record omitted), adopted as opinion of the court June 8, 2016.1 Based on the claims 

presented by Crosby, the Southern District construed the civil action as one arising under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. After a thorough discussion of the claims presented by Crosby, and in 

accordance with applicable federal law, the court dismissed the “action, prior to service, 

for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), and alternatively, as 

frivolous in accordance with this same statutory subsection.” Id., Doc. No. 3 at 11. 

II. DISCUSSION

Upon initiation of this case, Crosby filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma 

pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of 

Fees - Doc. No. 6. However, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) directs that a prisoner is not allowed to 

bring a civil action or proceed on appeal in forma pauperis if he “has, on 3 or more 

occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a 

court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, 

 

1

In its opinion, the Southern District noted that the complaint contained “Crosby’s extremely confused and 

confusing ‘factual allegations’” challenging actions of the state appellate clerks and the Attorney General for the 

State of Alabama. Id., Doc. No. 3 at 2-3. The same is true of the complaint pending before this court. 

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malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner 

is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.”2 

The undersigned takes judicial notice of federal court records which establish that 

Crosby, while incarcerated or detained, has on at least three occasions had civil actions 

and an appeal dismissed as frivolous and/or for failure to state a claim on which relief 

could be granted. The actions on which this court relies in finding a § 1915(g) violation 

are Crosby v. State of Alabama, et al., Civil Action No. 1:16-CV-70-KD-C (S.D. Ala.

2016) (case summarily dismissed for failure to state a claim and/or as frivolous) and 

Crosby v. State of Alabama, et al., Civil Action No. 1:03-CV-42-CG-D (S.D. Ala. 2004) 

(case dismissed as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 19159(e)(2)(B)(i)), and appeal dismissed 

as frivolous, August 6, 2004.

3

 

As Crosby has three strikes, he may not proceed in forma pauperis in this case 

unless he demonstrates that he is “under imminent danger of serious physical injury.” 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(g). In determining whether a plaintiff satisfies this burden, “the issue is 

whether his complaint, as a whole, alleges imminent danger of serious physical injury.” 

 

2

In Rivera v. Allin, 144 F.3d 719, 731, cert. denied, 524 U.S. 978, 119 S.Ct. 27 (1998), the Court determined that the 

“three strikes” provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), which requires frequent filer prisoner indigents to prepay the entire 

filing fee before federal courts may consider their cases and appeals, “does not violate the First Amendment right to 

access the courts; the separation of judicial and legislative powers; the Fifth Amendment right to due process of law; 

or the Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection, as incorporated through the Fifth Amendment.” The Court 

further determined that the language of § 1915(g) makes it clear that the three strikes provision applies to claims 

dismissed prior to the effective date of the PLRA and, therefore, does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Id. at

728-730; Medberry v. Butler, 185 F.3d 1189, 1192 (11th Cir. 1999). In Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 127 S.Ct. 910, 

921 (2007), the Supreme Court abrogated Rivera but only to the extent it compelled an inmate to plead exhaustion 

of remedies in his complaint as “failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense under the PLRA . . . and inmates are not 

required to specifically plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints.” 549 U.S. at 216, 127 S.Ct. at 921. 

 

3

Crosby concedes he filed these civil actions while incarcerated in the state prison system and does not dispute the 

dismissals of these cases in establishing “three strikes” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Doc. No. 9 at 3. 

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Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1350 (11th Cir. 2004). “General allegations that are 

not grounded in specific facts which indicate that serious physical injury is imminent are 

not sufficient to invoke the exception to § 1915(g).” Niebla v. Walton Correctional Inst., 

2006 WL 2051307, *2 (N.D. Fla. July 20, 2006) (citing Martin v. Shelton, 319 F.3d 1048, 

1050 (8th Cir. 2003)); Skillern v. Paul, 202 F. App’x 343, 344 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding 

that vague allegation challenging adequacy of medical treatment for heart condition did 

“not satisfy the dictates of § 1915(g).”); Margiotti v. Nichols, 2006 WL 1174350, at *2 

(N.D. Fla. May 2, 2006) (holding that allegations regarding treatment provided for “an 

ongoing medical condition that [plaintiff] concedes is already a permanent handicap or 

deformity . . . is not the type of serious injury” which entitles plaintiff “to avoid the bar of 

§ 1915(g), as they do not establish that he is under imminent danger of serious injury.”)

(internal citation omitted) (emphasis in original); Ball v. Allen, 2007 WL 484547, at *2-3

(S.D. Ala. Feb. 8, 2007) (finding general allegations regarding a myriad of conditions, 

including claims of deliberate indifference, insufficient to satisfy the imminent danger 

exception and noting that “[p]laintiff’s allegation that there is ‘imminent danger to [his]

health and well being,’ is a conclusory allegation that merely demonstrates ‘that plaintiff

is a seasoned vexatious litigant who has read 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and is manipulating it 

to serve his ends.’”). 

 “The plaintiff must allege and provide specific fact allegations of ongoing serious 

physical injury, or a pattern of misconduct evidencing the likelihood of imminent serious 

physical injury, and vague allegations of harm and unspecific references to injury are 

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insufficient.” Niebla, supra. (internal quotations omitted) (citing Martin, 319 F.3d at 

1950 and White, 157 F.3d at 1231); Abdullah v. Migoya, 955 F. Supp.2d 1300, 1307 

(S.D. Fla. 2013) (“A plaintiff must provide the court with specific allegations of present 

imminent danger indicating that a serious physical injury will result if his claims are not 

addressed.”). Neither conclusory allegations that overcrowding and understaffing create 

a potential for violence among inmates nor general allegations that the defendants acted 

with deliberate indifference to basic human needs and inmate safety are sufficient to 

establish that plaintiff “was under ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at the 

time he filed this action.” May v. Myers, 2014 WL 3428930, at *2 (S.D. Ala. July 15, 

2014); Jemison v. White, 2012 WL 3028061, at *2 (S.D. Ala. June 18, 2012) (conclusory 

allegations regarding conditions of confinement, i.e., lack of adequate exercise, 

unsanitary cells and eating area, insufficient living space, inadequate cooling and

ventilation, and lack of reasonable measures to ensure inmate’s health and safety, do not 

demonstrate “that plaintiff was ‘under imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at the 

time he filed the complaint.”). 

In addition, numerous district courts, including the United States District Court for 

the Southern District of Alabama and the United States District Court for the Northern 

District of Florida, have adopted the Second Circuit’s determination that “an adequate 

nexus must exist between the claims plaintiff seeks to pursue and the imminent danger he 

alleges. Pettus v. Morgenthau, 554 F.3d 293, 296, (2d Cir. 2009) (finding that the 

exception to § 1915(g) was not satisfied because the nexus was too attenuated between 

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the defendants associated with plaintiff’s conviction and the alleged imminent danger of 

serious physical injury arising from his incarceration that was based on the denial of 

medication and being ‘surrounded by hostile, aggressive, violent inmates who beat, rob, 

assault, extort, and sexually abuse him.’” May v. Barber, 2016 WL 1735556, at *2 (S.D. 

Ala. Mar. 24, 2016); Cole v. Ellis, 2015 WL 6407205, at *1 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 3, 2015), 

Report and Recommendation adopted as opinion of the court, 2015 WL 6394506 (N.D. 

Fla. Oct. 22, 2015) (holding that in addition to showing an imminent danger of serious 

physical injury “there must be an adequate nexus between the imminent danger alleged 

and the legal claims asserted in the prisoner’s complaint.”); Ball v. Hummel, 577 F.

App’x 96, 96 n.1 (3rd Cir. 2014) (recognizing that to satisfy the imminent danger 

requirement of § 1915(g) a prisoner must demonstrate an adequate nexus between the 

claims he seeks to pursue and the imminent danger he alleges) (citing Pettus, 554 F.3d at 

296); see also Stine v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons Designation and Sentence Computation 

Unit, 571 F. App’x 353, 354 (5th Cir. 2014) (finding that the plaintiff failed to establish 

imminent danger arising from claims of inadequate protection by federal prison officials 

in Colorado and further noting he “also failed to plausibly plead any connection between 

the alleged imminent danger in Colorado and his [pending] claims against BOP 

defendants in Texas[.]”); cf. Barber v. Krepp, 2017 WL 694489, at *3 (11th Cir. Feb. 22, 

2017) (acknowledging “the Second Circuit has concluded that, in order to fall within the 

‘imminent danger’ exception to § 1915(g), the prisoner must demonstrate a ‘nexus’ 

between the physical injury he fears and the claims in his complaint, Pettus, [554 F.3d at

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297,]” but declining to decide “whether § 1915(g)’s ‘imminent danger’ exception 

requires proof of such a nexus” because, even if it does, a nexus existed between the 

assertion of imminent harm and the claim presented in the complaint).

In the instant complaint, Crosby presents claims attacking the constitutionality of

actions taken by state appellate court clerks in December of 2015 with respect to their 

handling of a petition he filed seeking injunctive and/or declaratory relief from the 

murder conviction on which he is currently incarcerated. Crosby filed a document in this 

case on March 15, 2017 (Doc. No. 9), which the court construed as an amendment to the 

complaint insofar as Crosby alleged facts regarding establishment of the “imminent 

danger” exception to application of the “three strikes” provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

Doc. No. 11. Specifically, Crosby argues that the actions of the state clerks resulted in 

“genocide of Crosby[’s] equal benefit of law and procedure” causing him to suffer an 

“actual injury in litigation.” Doc. No. 9 at 4-5. Crosby further asserts that conditions 

attendant to his incarceration -- i.e., the provision of inadequate medical care, the 

occurrence of inmate on inmate assaults and the lack of adequate security -- demonstrate 

that he is in “imminent danger” of serious physical injury. Id. at 6. 

The court has thoroughly reviewed Crosby’s claims for relief, his assertion of an 

“injury in litigation” and his allegations regarding perceived imminent danger due to his 

conditions of confinement. Initially, it is clear that the legal injury Crosby alleges he 

suffered in December of 2015 when the state clerks failed to file his petition does not 

constitute “imminent danger of serious physical injury” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 

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§ 1915(g). Further, the claims set forth in the amendment regarding his current conditions 

of confinement present nothing more than general conditions claims which merely 

contemplate potential harm that may at some time in the future befall Crosby. Despite 

Crosby’s contention to the contrary, these conclusory and speculative allegations fail to 

demonstrate that he was “under imminent danger of serious physical injury” at the time 

of filing this cause of action as is required to meet the exception to application of 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(g). Medberry v. Butler, 185 F.3d 1189, 1193 (11th Cir.1999) (A prisoner 

who has filed three or more frivolous lawsuits and seeks to proceed in forma pauperis

must allege a present “imminent danger of serious physical injury” to circumvent 

application of the “three strikes” provision set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).); Martin, 319 

F.3d at 1050 (General and/or conclusory allegations regarding conditions are not 

sufficient to establish the requisite imminent threat of serious physical harm); Abdullah, 

955 F. Supp. at 1307 (To establish requisite imminent danger, a plaintiff must present 

“specific allegations of imminent danger indicating that a serious physical injury will 

result if his claims are not addressed.”); May, 2014 WL 3428930, at *2 (general 

allegations challenging the constitutionality of conditions and actions of the defendants 

are insufficient to invoke the imminent danger exception); Jemison, 2012 WL 3028061, 

at *2 (conclusory allegations challenging conditions of confinement do not warrant relief 

under the imminent danger exception); Lewis v. Sullivan, 279 F.3d 526, 531 (7th Cir.

2002) (holding that imminent danger exception to § 1915(g)’s three strikes rule is 

construed narrowly and available only “for genuine emergencies,” where “time is 

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pressing” and “a threat ... is real and proximate.”). To hold that amorphous conditions of 

confinement render an inmate in “imminent danger of serious physical injury” would 

eviscerate the “three strikes” provision set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Finally, if 

Crosby is required to show a nexus between the claims he seeks to pursue and the 

imminent danger alleged, he has failed to do so as the challenged actions of the state 

court clerks “are much too attenuated from” the conditions of confinement presented by 

Crosby to show imminent danger. Pettus, 554 F.3d at 296. Consequently, under the 

circumstances of this case, Crosby cannot avoid the “three strikes” bar of 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(g). 

In light of the foregoing, the court concludes that Crosby’s motion for leave to 

proceed in forma pauperis is due to be denied and this case summarily dismissed without 

prejudice, as Crosby failed to pay the requisite filing and administrative fees upon 

initiation of this case. Dupree v. Palmer, 284 F.3d 1234, 1236 (11th Cir. 2002) 

(emphasis in original) (“[T]he proper procedure is for the district court to dismiss the 

complaint without prejudice when it denies the prisoner leave to proceed in forma 

pauperis pursuant to the provisions of § 1915(g)” because the prisoner “must pay the 

filing fee [and now applicable administrative fee] at the time he initiates the suit.”); 

Vanderberg v. Donaldson, 259 F.3d 1321, 1324 (11th Cir. 2001) (same).

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:

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1. The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis filed by William L. Crosby 

(Doc. No. 6) be DENIED. 

2. The plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction be DENIED as the plaintiff 

has failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits of his claims.

3. This case be dismissed without prejudice for the plaintiff’s failure to pay the 

full filing and administrative fees upon the initiation of this case.

 It is further

ORDERED that on or before April 4, 2017 the plaintiff may file objections to the 

Recommendation. The plaintiff must specifically identify the factual findings and legal 

conclusions in the Recommendation to which objection is made; frivolous, conclusive, or 

general objections will not be considered. Failure to file written objections to the 

Magistrate Judge’s findings and recommendations in accordance with the provisions of 

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) shall bar a de novo determination by the District Court of legal and 

factual issues covered in the Recommendation and waives the right of the plaintiff to 

challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal 

conclusions accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of plain error 

or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982); 11TH CIR. R.

3-1. See Stein v. Lanning Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982). 

DONE, on this the 21st day of March, 2017.

/s/ Susan Russ Walker

Susan Russ Walker

United States Magistrate Judge

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