Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01037/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01037-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GARLAND AARON JONES,

Plaintiff,

v.

TOLSON, et al.

Defendants.

CASE NO. 1:15-cv-01037-MJS (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT, WITH 

LEAVE TO AMEND, FOR FAILURE TO 

STATE A CLAIM 

(ECF NO. 1)

 THIRTY DAY DEADLINE

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil 

rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF Nos. 1 & 11.) 

Plaintiff’s Complaint is now before the Court for screening. (ECF No. 1.) 

II. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has 

raised claims that are legally “frivolous, malicious,” or that fail “to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted,” or that “seek monetary relief from a defendant who is 

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immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, 

or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any 

time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim on 

which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

III. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT

Plaintiff names as Defendants California Department of Corrections, Mule Creek 

State Prison, and Correctional Officer Tolson.

Plaintiff alleges essentially the following:

Defendant Tolson labeled Plaintiff a predator and stalker because he is gay and 

he argued with a heterosexual. Defendant Tolson refuses to respond to his grievances.

Plaintiff seeks to have his file cleared of these accusations and damages.

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Section 1983

Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the ‘deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws’ of the United States.” 

Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). 

Section 1983 “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a method 

for vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere.’” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 

393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144, n. 3 (1979)).

To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential 

elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States was 

violated and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the 

color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); see also Ketchum v. 

Cnty. of Alameda, 811 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations 

are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

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supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff 

must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.’” Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the mere possibility 

that a defendant committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are accepted as 

true, legal conclusions are not. Id. 

B. State Agencies as Defendants

Plaintiff names California Department of Corrections and Mule Creek State Prison

as Defendants in this action. “State agencies . . . are not ‘persons' within the meaning of 

§ 1983, and are therefore not amenable to suit under that statute.” Maldonado v. Harris, 

370 F.3d 945, 951 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 

70 (1989)). Mule Creek State Prison is an arm of the California Department of 

Corrections and Rehabilitation, which is a state agency. Because a necessary element 

of a successful Section 1983 claim is that a “person” violated the plaintiff’s constitutional 

rights, and the California Department of Corrections and Mule Creek State Prison are not 

“persons”, Plaintiff cannot state a Section 1983 claim against these Defendants.

In addition, “[i]n the absence of a waiver by the state or a valid congressional 

override, ‘under the [E]leventh [A]mendment, agencies of the state are immune from 

private damage actions or suits for injunctive relief brought in federal court.’” Dittman v. 

California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Mitchell v. Los Angeles Cmty. 

Coll. Dist., 861 F.2d 198, 201 (9th Cir. 1989)). “The State of California has not waived its 

Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to claims brought under § 1983 in federal 

court . . . .” Id. at 1025-26; see also Brown v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 554 F.3d 747, 752 (9th 

Cir. 2009). Accordingly, the Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim 

against the California Department of Corrections and Mule Creek State Prison. Because 

amendment would be futile, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against these 

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Defendants without leave to amend. See Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 

1987).

C. Verbal Harassment

“[V]erbal harassment generally does not violate the Eighth Amendment.” Keenan 

v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1092 (9th Cir. 1996) (implying that harassment “calculated to . . . 

cause [the prisoner] psychological damage” might state an Eighth Amendment claim) 

(citing Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir. 1987)), amended by 135 

F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 

2004) (explaining that “the Eighth Amendment’s protections do not necessarily extend to 

mere verbal sexual harassment.”). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Tolson labeled him a 

predator and stalker and that these accusations landed him in the hospital. Plaintiff does 

not allege that these statements were unusually harsh even for the prison setting or that 

they were made with the intent to cause him psychological damage. Plaintiff has not 

stated an Eighth Amendment claim. Plaintiff will be granted leave to amend.

D. Equal Protection

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that persons 

who are similarly situated be treated alike. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 

473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). An equal protection claim may be established in two ways. 

The first method requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant has intentionally 

discriminated against the plaintiff on the basis of the plaintiff's membership in a protected 

class. See, e.g., Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir. 2001). Under 

this theory of equal protection, the plaintiff must show that the defendant's actions were 

a result of the plaintiff's membership in a suspect class, such as race, religion, or 

alienage. Ball v. Massanari, 254 F.3d 817, 823 (9th Cir. 2001).

If the action in question does not involve a suspect classification, a plaintiff may 

establish an equal protection claim by showing that similarly situated individuals were 

intentionally treated differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate state 

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purpose. Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000); San Antonio Indep. 

Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973); SeaRiver Mar. Fin. Holdings, Inc. v. 

Mineta, 309 F.3d 662, 679 (9th Cir. 2002). To state an equal protection claim under this 

theory, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) the plaintiff is a member of an identifiable class; (2) 

the plaintiff was intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated; and (3) 

there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment. Willowbrok, 528 U.S. at 564.

Here, the pleading is devoid of facts suggesting Gonzales was motivated by Plaintiff’s 

race or discriminatory intent. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239–40 (1976) (to 

establish a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, the prisoner must present evidence 

of discriminatory intent). 

It is not entirely clear from Plaintiff’s allegations whether he intends to state an 

Equal Protection claim against Defendant Tolson. To the extent that Plaintiff wishes to 

do so, he must allege true facts which establish the above elements. 

E. Appeals Process

The Due Process Clause protects Plaintiff against the deprivation of liberty 

without the procedural protections to which he is entitled under the law. Wilkinson v. 

Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005). However, prisoners have no stand-alone due process 

rights related to the administrative grievance process. Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 

860 (9th Cir. 2003); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). Failing to 

properly process a grievance or denying a grievance does not constitute a due process 

violation. See, e.g., Wright v. Shannon, No. 1:05-cv-01485-LJO-YNP PC, 2010 WL 

445203, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2010) (plaintiff's allegations that prison officials denied 

or ignored his inmate appeals failed to state a cognizable claim under the First 

Amendment); Williams v. Cate, No. 1;09-cv-00468-OWW-YNP PC, 2009 WL 3789597, 

at *6 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2009) (“Plaintiff has no protected liberty interest in the 

vindication of his administrative claims.”). 

Plaintiff complains that Defendant Tolson refuses to answer his grievances. 

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Plaintiff has not stated a cognizable due process claim since no such rights exist relative 

to the administrative grievance process. Leave to amend would be futile and is denied. 

V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Plaintiff’s Complaint does not state a claim for relief. The Court will grant Plaintiff 

an opportunity to file an amended complaint. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 

(9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff should note that although he has been given the opportunity to 

amend, it is not for the purposes of adding new claims. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 

607 (7th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff should carefully read this Screening Order and focus his 

efforts on curing the deficiencies set forth above.

Finally, Plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 220 requires that an amended 

complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general 

rule, an “amended complaint supersedes the original” complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 

F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original 

complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently 

alleged. Here, the amended complaint should be clearly and boldly titled “First Amended 

Complaint,” refer to the appropriate case number, and be an original signed under 

penalty of perjury. Plaintiff's amended complaint should be brief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). 

Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a right to 

relief above the speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted).

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff's complaint (ECF No. 1.) is DISMISSED for failure to state a claim 

upon which relief may be granted;

2. The Clerk's Office shall send Plaintiff (1) a blank civil rights amended 

complaint form and (2) a copy of his signed Complaint filed June 4, 2015; 

3. Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint within thirty (30) days from service 

of this Order; and 

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4. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, 

the Court will dismiss this action, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim, 

failure to comply with a court order, and failure to prosecute, subject to the 

“three strikes” provision set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Silva v. Di 

Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1098 (9th Cir. 2011).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 6, 2015 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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