Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02371/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02371-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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- 1 - 09cv2371-IEG (BLM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EDWARD PERUTA,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 09-CV-2371 - IEG (BLM)

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS

[Doc. No. 3]

vs.

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO; and WILLIAM

D. GORE, individually and in his capacity as

sheriff,

Defendants.

This is a Section 1983 action, challenging the constitutionality of California’s law governing

the carrying of concealed weapons, both facially and as applied to Plaintiff. Currently before the Court

is Defendant William Gore’s (“Gore”) Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Having

considered the parties’ arguments, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES the motion.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a sixty year old United States citizen and a California resident, who “maintains

several residences across the United States, including but not limited to a residence in San Diego

County.” (Compl. ¶ 17.) According to Plaintiff, he maintains a permanent mailing address in San

Diego, “where he and his wife have a room in which they keep a wardrobe and other personal items.”

(Id.) Plaintiff and his wife have made their motor home their “permanent residence,” and allegedly

stay in San Diego for extended periods of time. (Id. ¶ 18.) For example, Plaintiff claims to have

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reserved space at Campland on the Bay, in San Diego, from November 15, 2008 through April 15,

2009. He had also reserved spaces at the same place from February 2007 through April 2007. Plaintiff

is a founder, and sole stockholder, of American News and Information Services, Inc., which gathers

and provides raw, breaking news video, photographs, and news tips to various mainstream media

outlets. According to Plaintiff, both his work and his lifestyle choice often require him to travel to

high crime areas as well as remote rural areas, sometimes carrying large sums of cash, valuables, and

equipment.

By way of background, Plaintiff is a certified National Rifles Association (“N.R.A.”) instructor

with the authority to train and certify individuals in the N.R.A. Basic Pistol Safety Course. Plaintiff

has a valid pistol permit issued by the State of Connecticut, and is recognized by the Department of

Public Safety to teach the pistol course required to obtain a Connecticut Pistol Permit. In 1969,

Plaintiff was assigned as a marine small arms instructor (rifle and pistol) at the U.S. Naval Academy.

In 1970, Plaintiff successfully completed the Connecticut Municipal Training Course. From 1969 to

1971, Plaintiff was a law enforcement officer in the State of Connecticut.

The present case arises from Plaintiff’s attempts to obtain a concealed weapon’s permit in San

Diego County. Plaintiff alleges that he obtained and provided to the San Diego County Sheriff the

required 8 Hour Firearms Safety and Proficiency Certificate in accordance with California Penal Code

§ 12050(E)(i). He also alleges that the Firearms Licensing and Permits Unit of the State of California

Department of Justice found him eligible to possess firearms. On November 17, 2008, Plaintiff

requested a license to carry a concealed weapon from the San Diego County Sheriff’s License

Division (“SD License Division”), at which time he was interviewed by a licensing supervisor to

determine whether he satisfied the licensing criteria. On February 3, 2009, Plaintiff submitted an

application for a license to carry a concealed weapon. Plaintiff alleges he was denied a license to carry

a concealed weapon by Defendant Gore’s predecessor because the SD License Division made a

finding that Plaintiff did not have good cause and was not a resident of San Diego–both of which are

requirements under Section 12050.

Plaintiff filed his complaint on October 9, 2009, alleging three causes of action. First, Plaintiff

argues Section 12050’s requirements of (1) “good cause” beyond the interests of self-defense and (2)

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durational “residency” violate the Second and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.

Second, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ subjective application of the “good cause” and “residency”

requirements results in an unequal treatment of similarly situated individuals, and therefore violates

the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Finally, Plaintiff argues the requirement that

individuals reside full time in San Diego County before they can apply for a concealed weapon’s

permit violates Plaintiff’s right to travel under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

On November 12, 2009, Defendant Gore filed the current Motion to Dismiss. [Doc. No. 3].

Plaintiff filed a response on December 7, 2009, and Defendant Gore filed a reply on December 14,

2009. [Doc. Nos. 4, 5]. On December 17, 2009, having determined that the Court can proceed without

oral argument, the Court vacated the hearing set for December 21, 2009. [Doc. No. 6].

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the pleadings. A

complaint survives a motion to dismiss if it contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.544, 570 (2007). The court may dismiss

a complaint as a matter of law for: (1) “lack of cognizable legal theory,” or (2) “insufficient facts

under a cognizable legal claim.” SmileCare Dental Group v. Delta Dental Plan of California, 88 F.3d

780, 783 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). The court only reviews the contents of the complaint,

accepting all factual allegations as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the

nonmoving party. al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 956 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).

Despite the deference, the court need not accept “legal conclusions” as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

--- U.S. ---, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009). It is also improper for the court to assume “the [plaintiff]

can prove facts that [he or she] has not alleged.” Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State

Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). On the other hand, “[w]hen there are well-pleaded

factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly

give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950.

DISCUSSION

The Second Amendment provides: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security

of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” The Supreme

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1

 The Supreme Court characterized the challenged law as follows: “the law totally bans

handgun possession in the home. It also requires that any lawful firearm in the home be disassembled

or bound by a trigger lock at all times, rendering it inoperable.” Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817.

2

 Because Heller involved a challenge to a District of Columbia statute, the Supreme Court

there did not have to decide whether the Second Amendment also applied to the states. See id. at 2812-

13. No party has raised this issue in the present case either. Accordingly, because it appears that both

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Court’s landmark decision in District of Columbia v. Heller, --- U.S. ---, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008),

resolved some of the hotly debated issues with regard to the Second Amendment, but left many others

lingering for future determination. In Heller, after an exhaustive analysis of the text of the Amendment

and the founding-era sources of its original public meaning, the Supreme Court stated unequivocally

that the Second Amendment guarantees “the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of

confrontation.” 128 S. Ct. at 2797. However, like most rights, “the right secured by the Second

Amendment is not unlimited.” Id. at 2816. Thus, the Supreme Court also made it clear that “the right

was not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever

purpose.” Id. For example, the Supreme Court noted that:

the majority of the 19th-century courts to consider the question held that prohibitions

on carrying concealed weapons were lawful under the Second Amendment or state

analogues. Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of the

full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast

doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the

mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as

schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on

the commercial sale of arms.

Id. at 2816-17 (internal citations omitted). In a footnote immediately following, the Supreme Court

explained: “We identify these presumptively lawful regulatory measures only as example; our list does

not purport to be exhaustive.” Id. at 2817 n.26.

In Heller, having concluded that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to “keep

and bear arms,” and noting that “the inherent right of self-defense has been central to the Second

Amendment right,” the Supreme Court turned to the challenged law before it.1

 Id. at 2817-18. Without

deciding what level of scrutiny should be applied (except stating that it would have to be more than

“rational basis”), the Supreme Court concluded that the District of Columbia’s “absolute prohibition

of handguns held and used for self-defense in the home” clearly violated the Second Amendment. Id.

at 2817-22.2

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parties agree that the Second Amendment applies in this case, the Court will proceed on that

assumption, without deciding the issue at this time. The Court does note, however, that it is aware of

the pre-Heller Ninth Circuit case law on this issue, as well as the post-Heller trend. Compare Fresno

Rifle & Pistol Club, Inc., 965 F.2d 723, 731 (9th Cir. 1992) (concluding that until such time as United

States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876), and Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886), are overturned,

“the Second Amendment limits only federal action”) with Nordyke v. King, 563 F.3d 439, 457 (9th

Cir. 2009), reh’g en banc granted, 575 F.3d 890 (concluding that “the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second Amendment and applies it against the states and local

governments”). It should also be noted that after rehearing Nordyke en banc, the Ninth Circuit

vacated its submission of the case pending the Supreme Court’s disposition of Maloney v. Rice, 08-

1592; McDonald v. City of Chicago, No. 08-1521; and N.R.A. v. City of Chicago, No. 08-1497.

3

 Section 12050(a)(1) provides, in pertinent part:

(A) The sheriff of a county, upon proof that the person applying is of good moral

character, that good cause exists for the issuance, and that the person applying satisfies

any one of the conditions specified in subparagraph (D) and has completed a course

of training as described in subparagraph (E), may issue to that person a license to carry

a pistol, revolver, or other firearm capable of being concealed upon the person in either

one of the following formats:

(i) A license to carry concealed a pistol, revolver, or other firearm capable of

being concealed upon the person.

(ii) Where the population of the county is less than 200,000 persons according

to the most recent federal decennial census, a license to carry loaded and

exposed in only that county a pistol, revolver, or other firearm capable of being

concealed upon the person.

. . . .

(D) For the purpose of subparagraph (A), the applicant shall satisfy any one of the

following:

(i) Is a resident of the county or a city within the county.

(ii) Spends a substantial period of time in the applicant's principal place of

employment or business in the county or a city within the county.

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I. Right to Bear Arms

A. Parties’ arguments

Plaintiff’s first cause of action alleges that Section 12050’s requirements of (1) “good cause”

beyond the interests of self-defense and (2) durational residency violate the Second and Fourteenth

Amendments.3

 Defendant moves to dismiss this cause of action, arguing that the Supreme Court in

Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2816-17, expressly stated that the right secured by the Second Amendment is not

unlimited, and that it certainly does not prohibit states from regulating the carrying of concealed

weapons. Defendant argues that, unlike possession of a gun for protection within a residence–which

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4

 In addition, Defendant argues there is no constitutionally protected interest in a concealed

weapon’s permit because, in light of the extremely broad discretion delegated to the sheriff under

Section 12050, there is no legitimate claim of entitlement to such a permit. (Def. Reply, at 2.)

However, because Defendant raised this issue for the first time in the reply, Plaintiff had no

opportunity to respond and the Court has not received the benefit of full briefing. Accordingly, the

Court will not consider this in deciding the Motion to Dismiss. See Sogeti USA LLC v. Scariano, 606

F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1086 (D. Ariz. 2009) (“The Court will not grant a motion to dismiss on the basis

of argument first raised in a reply.”(citing U.S. ex rel. Giles v. Sardie, 191 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1127

(C.D. Cal. 2000))); see also Sanchez v. City of Santa Ana, 915 F.2d 424, 430 (9th Cir. 1990) (“As a

general rule, an appellant may not raise an argument for the first time in a reply brief.” (citation

omitted)). In any event, the cases relied on by Defendant for the proposition that there is no protected

interest in a concealed weapon’s permit all predate Heller, which held–for the first time–that the

Second Amendment guarantees “the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of

confrontation.” 128 S. Ct. at 2797. The validity of those cases post-Heller is not clear.

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was the issue in Heller–carrying a concealed firearm presents a recognized “‘threat to public order.’”

(Def. MTD, at 3 (quoting People v. Hale, 43 Cal. App. 3d 353, 356 (1974).)4

Plaintiff agrees that the constitutional right to “keep and bear arms” is not unlimited, and

therefore concedes that some regulations are permissible under the Second Amendment. However,

also relying on Heller, Plaintiff argues that at the center of the Second Amendment is an individual

right “to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation, self-defense, or other traditionally lawful

purposes, unconnected with service in a militia.” (Pl. Opp., at 3.) Thus, to be armed and ready in case

of confrontation, Plaintiff argues the Second Amendment requires that a person be allowed to carry

a weapon “that is immediately capable of being used for its intended purpose.” (Id. at 4.) According

to Plaintiff, by imposing the “good cause” requirement, Section 12050 violates the Second

Amendment. In the alternative, Plaintiff argues the application of Section 12050's “good cause” and

“residency” requirements violates the Second Amendment because law abiding citizens who desire

to carry concealed firearms solely for self-defense purposes and/or those that are not full-time

residents of San Diego County are deemed by the sheriff not to satisfy the statute’s requirements.

B. Analysis

The Supreme Court’s decision in Heller made it clear–for the first time–that the Second

Amendment guarantees “the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.”

128 S. Ct. at 2797. It also made clear that this right is not unlimited. Id. at 2816-17. Accordingly,

while Heller does not preclude Second Amendment challenges to laws regulating firearm possession

outside of home, “Heller’s dicta makes pellucidly clear that the Supreme Court’s holding should not

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5

 The level of scrutiny is necessary to determine whether the application of Section 12050

violates the Second Amendment as applied through the Fourteenth Amendment. The Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which appears to be implicated by Plaintiff’s first cause of

action, provides that “No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due

process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment, which is the basis for Plaintiff’s second cause of action, provides that: “No State shall

. . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” Id. These two

provisions of the Constitution both stem from the “American ideal of fairness” and are “not mutually

exclusive.” Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). However, depending on the circumstances,

these clauses serve slightly different purposes. As one court has explained, “Substantive Due Process

generally provides a constitutional safeguard against arbitrary laws to all citizens, but Equal

Protection[] ensures that a certain class, which might be as small as a single individual, will not be

treated differently under the law from people similarly situated.” United States v. Miller, 604 F. Supp.

2d 1162, 1168 n.7 (W.D. Tenn. 2009).

6

 “Dictum,” the singular form of “dicta,” is a remark “by the way” and is a shortened version

of “obiter dictum,” which is a Latin phrase often translated as “something said in passing.” BLACK’S

LAW DICTIONARY 519, 1177 (9th ed. 2009). Black’s Law Dictionary defines “obiter dictum” as “[a]

judicial comment made while delivering a judicial opinion, but one that is unnecessary to the decision

in the case and therefore not precedential (although it may be considered persuasive).” Id. at 1177.

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be read by lower courts as an invitation to invalidate the existing universe of public weapons

regulations.” United States v. Masciandaro, 648 F. Supp. 2d 779, 788 (E.D. Va. 2009).

In the present case, Plaintiff’s complaint challenges constitutionality of Section 12050's

requirements of “good cause” and “residency” as they relate to his ability to obtain a concealed

weapon’s permit. This precise issue was not directly addressed by the Supreme Court in Heller, which

involved a challenge to District of Columbia’s prohibition on the possession of a loaded firearm in the

home. 128 S. Ct. at 2817-22. Thus, the Court must determine whether Section 12050's application to

Plaintiff’s request for a permit withstands the appropriate level of constitutional scrutiny.5

1. Presumptive constitutionality of concealed weapon bans

As a threshold matter, the Court rejects Defendant’s contention that the Supreme Court in

Heller held that prohibitions on carrying of concealed weapons are presumptively constitutional. First,

because this precise question was not before the Supreme Court, any pronouncements to that effect

would generally be considered dicta, even if persuasive.6

 Moreover, the Supreme Court in Heller

expressly stated that it was leaving the determination of the scope of “permissible” Second

Amendment restrictions for a later time. Id. at 2816-18, 2821 (“[T]here will be time enough to

expound upon the historical justifications for the exceptions we have mentioned if and when those

exceptions come before us.”).

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7

 Section 12031(a)(1) provides:

A person is guilty of carrying a loaded firearm when he or she carries a loaded firearm

on his or her person or in a vehicle while in any public place or on any public street in

an incorporated city or in any public place or on any public street in a prohibited area

of unincorporated territory.

Although this statute contains a number of exceptions, see People v. Flores, 169 Cal. App. 4th 568,

576 (2008), its overall effect cannot be compared to the unrestricted right to carry weapons openly

as recognized in both Chandler and Nunn. Accordingly, in the present case, the issue is best addressed

by determining whether Section 12050's requirements, and their application, meet the appropriate

level of constitutional scrutiny, rather than by a categorical approach advocated by Defendant. But see

United States v. Hall, No. 2:08-00006, 2008 WL 3097558, at *1 (S.D. W. Va. Aug. 4, 2008) (“The

court concludes that the prohibition, as in West Virginia, on the carrying of a concealed weapon

without a permit, continues to be a lawful exercise by the state of its regulatory authority

notwithstanding the Second Amendment.”).

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Finally, a closer examination of the cases and authorities relied upon by the Supreme Court

suggests that it did not intend to make all concealed weapon bans presumptively constitutional. The

Supreme Court’s entire pronouncement on the validity of concealed weapon bans was:

Like most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited. . . . .

For example, the majority of the 19th-century courts to consider the question held that

prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons were lawful under the Second

Amendment or state analogues. See, e.g., State v. Chandler, [5 La. Ann. 489, 489-90

(1850)]; Nunn v. State,[1 Ga. 243, 251 (1846)]; see generally [2 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *340, n. 2 (O. Holmes ed., 12th ed. 1873)]; THE

AMERICAN STUDENTS’ BLACKSTONE 84, n. 11 (G. Chase ed. 1884).

Id. at 2816. Both Chandler and Nunn, the two cases relied upon by the Supreme Court, concerned

prohibitions on carrying of concealed weapons where the affected individuals had alternate ways to

exercise their Second Amendment rights–by openly carrying those weapons. See Chandler, 5 La. Ann.

at 489-90 (noting that the law against carrying of concealed weapons was “absolutely necessary” and

that “[i]t interfered with no man’s right to carry arms . . . ‘in full view,’ which places men upon an

equality”); Nunn, 1 Ga. at 251 (“We are of the opinion, then, that so far as the act of 1837 seeks to

suppress the practice of carrying certain weapons secretly, that it is valid, inasmuch as it does not

deprive the citizen of his natural right of self-defence, or of his constitutional right to keep and bear

arms. But that so much of it, as contains a prohibition against bearing arms openly, is in conflict with

the Constitution, and void . . . .” (emphases in original)). The applicability of these cases is

questionable where, as here, the State expressly prohibits individuals such as Plaintiff from openly

carrying a loaded firearm in public places. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 12031(a)(1).7

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8

 The Court can properly take judicial notice of the documents appearing on a governmental

website, such as the Office of the Attorney General handbook attached to Plaintiff’s Opposition. See,

e.g., Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. McPherson, No. C 06-4670 SBA, 2008 WL 4183981, at *5 (N.D.

Cal. Sept. 9, 2008) (noting that the information on government agency websites has often been treated

as a proper subject for judicial notice and citing cases from numerous circuits). Accordingly, because

accuracy of the document attached to Plaintiff’s Opposition “cannot reasonably be questioned” and

because there is no objection to its accuracy by Defendant, the Court will take judicial notice of it. See

FED. R. EVID. 201(b).

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The other authorities cited by the Supreme Court further undermine Defendant’s position.

Thus, in Commentaries on American Law, James Kent states that “[t]here has been a great difference

of opinion on the question” of whether a prohibition on carrying of concealed weapons was

constitutional. 2 KENT, supra, at *340 n.(b). Likewise, in The American Students’ Blackstone, George

Chase first notes that “it is generally held that statutes prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons

are not in conflict with [the Second Amendment], since they merely prohibit the carrying of arms in

a particular manner.” THE AMERICAN STUDENTS’ BLACKSTONE, supra, at 84, n.11. However, he

immediately points out that “[i]n some states . . . a contrary doctrine is maintained.” Id. These

pronouncements are directly at odds with Defendant’s contention that Heller expressed constitutional

approval for all concealed weapon bans. (See Def. MTD, at 3-4.)

Finally, Defendant’s reliance on Hall, 2008 WL 3097558, is misplaced. In that case, the district

court for the Southern District of West Virginia denied the defendant’s second motion to suppress

made after the Supreme Court’s decision in Heller. Hall, 2008 WL 3097558, at *2. In reaffirming its

prior ruling, the court noted that “the prohibition, as in West Virginia, on the carrying of a concealed

weapon without a permit, continues to be a lawful exercise by the state of its regulatory authority

notwithstanding the Second Amendment.” Id. at *1. However, unlike California, West Virginia is an

“open carry” state, and therefore allows individuals to carry weapons openly. See OFFICE OF THE

ATT’Y GEN., WEST VIRGINIA FIREARM LAWS 1 (October 2009), attached to Pl. Opp., Ex. B.8 Thus,

just like in Chandler and Nunn, but unlike California, there is a ready alternative available to the

affected individuals–the ability to carry weapons openly if they cannot obtain a concealed weapon’s

permit.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court is convinced the Heller decision cannot stand for the

broad proposition that all concealed weapon bans are presumptively constitutional. Accordingly, the

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9

 When a fundamental right is recognized, substantive due process forbids infringement of that

right “at all, no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve

a compelling state interest.” Flores, 507 U.S. at 301-02 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). On

the other hand, intermediate scrutiny allows the State to regulate the right at issue if necessary to

further an important governmental interest. See Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 178-80 (2003).

10 See, e.g., United States v. Engstrum, 609 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1231-35 (D. Utah 2009)

(applying strict scrutiny and upholding 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), which prohibits individuals convicted

of domestic violence crimes from possessing firearms).

11 See, e.g., United States v. Skoien, 587 F.3d 803, 810-14 (7th Cir. 2009) (applying

intermediate scrutiny and noting that the standard of review would “fluctuate with character and

degree of the challenged law’s burden on the right and sometimes also with the specific iteration of

the right”); United States v. Miller, 604 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1169-72 (W.D. Tenn. 2009) (applying

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Court will proceed to determine whether Section 12050's application to Plaintiff’s request for a permit

withstands the appropriate level of constitutional scrutiny.

2. Level of scrutiny

The Supreme Court in Heller, while not designating any specific level of scrutiny for

evaluating Second Amendment restrictions, explicitly rejected the “rational basis” test. According to

the Supreme Court, the rational basis test “could not be used to evaluate the extent to which a

legislature may regulate a specific, enumerated right,” such as “the right to keep and bear arms.” 128

S. Ct. at 2818 n.27 (citation omitted). “If all that was required to overcome the right to keep and bear

arms was a rational basis, the Second Amendment would be redundant with the separate constitutional

prohibitions on irrational laws, and would have no effect.” Id. The Heller majority also rejected an

“interest-balancing inquiry” suggested by the dissent that “‘asks whether the statute burdens a

protected interest in a way or to an extent that is out of proportion to the statute’s salutary effect upon

other important governmental interests.” Id. at 2821. According to the Supreme Court, such a

“freestanding” approach, which is subject to future judges’ assessments of the constitutional

guarantee’s usefulness, “is no constitutional guarantee at all.” Id.

With these standards out, the Court must choose between “strict scrutiny”–typically reserved

for laws that restrict certain fundamental rights, see Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1993)–and

some form of “intermediate scrutiny.”9 Following Heller, courts have not been uniform in the level

of scrutiny that should be applied to Second Amendment restrictions. Some courts have applied strict

scrutiny,10 others have used intermediate scrutiny,11 and still others have either formulated their own

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intermediate scrutiny and upholding 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits possession of firearms

by felons).

12 See, e.g., United States v. Marzzarella, 595 F. Supp. 2d 596, 604-06 (W.D. Pa. 2009)

(fashioning a standard of review akin to content-neutral “time, place, and manner” test and upholding

18 U.S.C. § 922(k), which prohibits possession of a firearm if the individual has knowledge that the

firearm’s serial number has been obliterated, removed, or altered); People v. Flores, 169 Cal. App. 4th

568, 573-77 & n.5 (upholding defendant’s convictions for possession of a firearm by a person

prohibited from possessing a firearm (Cal. Penal Code § 12021(c)(1)), carrying a concealed firearm

(Cal. Penal Code § 12025(a)(2)), and carrying a loaded firearm in a public place (Cal. Penal Code §

12031(a)(1)); and suggesting, but not deciding, that a mid-level standard of scrutiny analogous to the

“undue burden” standard should apply).

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tests or have upheld a challenged regulation without specifying a standard of review.12

At this stage of the proceedings, the Court need not decide which heightened level of scrutiny

applies because the government has failed to meet its burden even if the Court applies the more lenient

standard of “intermediate scrutiny.” Under both “strict scrutiny” and “intermediate scrutiny” the

burden is on the government to show that the challenged law is constitutional, by demonstrating that

the law is either “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest,” Flores, 507 U.S. at 301-02

(citations omitted), or necessary to further an important governmental interest, Sell, 539 U.S. at 178-

80. In the present case, apart from arguing that Section 12050 is within one of the “presumptively

lawful” restrictions recognized in Heller and that it passes “rational basis” standard of review, the

government has made little effort to defend the statute’s constitutionality under either of the

heightened levels of scrutiny.

3. Application to Plaintiff’s case

Accordingly, taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true, his first cause of action for violation of the

Second Amendment appears to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 570. Plaintiff alleges that he was denied a license to carry a concealed weapon by Defendant Gore’s

predecessor because the SD License Division made a finding that Plaintiff did not have good cause

and was not a resident of San Diego–both of which are requirements under Section 12050. As an

initial matter, Plaintiff challenges the “good cause” requirement as violating his Second Amendment

right “to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.” See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2797. The

Supreme Court has explained that the natural meaning of “bear arms” is to “‘wear, bear, or carry ...

upon the person or in a pocket, for the purpose ... of being armed and ready for offensive or defensive

action in a case of conflict with another person.’” Id. at 2793 (quoting Muscarello v. United States,

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13 The Court does note that California law provides a number of exceptions, some of which

significantly undermine portions of Plaintiff’s claims. For example, Section 12026(b) of the Penal

Code provides that no permit or license is necessary to possess, keep, or carry, “either openly or

concealed, a pistol, revolver, or other firearm capable of being concealed upon the person within the

citizen's or legal resident's place of residence, place of business, or on private property owned or

lawfully possessed by the citizen or legal resident.” Because this exemption also applies to anyone

who is “temporarily within this state,” nothing prevents Plaintiff from carrying a gun while inside of

his motor home. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 12026(b); accord id. § 12031(l) (“Nothing in this section

shall prevent any person from having a loaded weapon, if it is otherwise lawful, at his or her place of

residence, including any temporary residence or campsite.”). Likewise, Section 12031(j) allows

carrying of a loaded firearm “by a person who reasonably believes that the person or property of

himself or herself or of another is in immediate, grave danger and that the carrying of the weapon is

necessary for the preservation of that person or property.” However, this exemption is limited to the

“brief interval” between the notification of the local law enforcement agency and its arrival for

assistance. Id. § 12031(j).

Plaintiff’s first cause of action is broader than any of these exceptions. What Plaintiff seeks

is enforcement of what he believes is the right guaranteed by the Second Amendment, as interpreted

in Heller, to carry a weapon that is “immediately capable of being used for its intended purpose,” both

in his motor home and while on public property. (Pl. Opp., at 4-5.) At least at this stage of the

proceedings, even with the above exceptions in mind, the Court cannot say that as a matter of law,

Plaintiff’s first cause of action either lacks cognizable legal theory, or alleges insufficient facts under

a cognizable legal theory. See SmileCare Dental Group, 88 F.3d at 783.

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524 U.S. 125, 143 (1998)). Accordingly, by imposing a “good cause” requirement before a concealed

weapon’s permit can be issued, the State undoubtedly infringes Plaintiff’s right to “possess and carry

weapons in case of confrontation.” See id. at 2797. For such infringement to pass constitutional

muster, Defendant must at the very least demonstrate that it is necessary to further an important

governmental interest. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 178-80. In the present case, Defendant has made very little

effort to either identify an “important governmental interest” or demonstrate the required “fit” between

the law and the interest served.13 Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a

claim Plaintiff’s challenge to the “good cause” requirement of Section 12050 fails. Cf. Skoien, 587

F.3d at 814-15 (vacating and remanding where “the government has made little effort to discharge its

burden of demonstrating the relationship between § 922(g)(9)’s means and its end”).

Plaintiff’s challenge to the requirements of Section 12050 as applied by Defendants also

survives the Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff alleges that he satisfies the “good cause” requirement

because he needs to carry a gun for self-defense, seeing as he is sixty years old and travels to high

crime areas for his job. (Pl. Opp., at 5-7.) Plaintiff also alleges that he satisfies the “residency”

requirement because he resides in San Diego at least four months out of the year, even though he does

so in a motor home. (Id. at 8-10.) Taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true, Defendants’ application of

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Section 12050's requirements appears to infringe upon Plaintiff’s right to “possess and carry weapons

in case of confrontation.” See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2797. As already noted, for such infringement to

be in accord with the Second Amendment, Defendant must at the very least demonstrate that it is

necessary to further an important governmental interest. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 178-180. Seeing as

Defendant has failed to either identify an “important governmental interest” or demonstrate the

required “fit” between the law and the interest served, the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s challenge to

the “good cause” and “residency” requirements as applied by Defendants also fails. Cf. Skoien, 587

F.3d at 814-15.

4. Conclusion

It is important to keep in mind the narrow issue before the Court at this stage of the

proceedings. The Court is not asked to, and does not, decide whether Section 12050 is constitutional.

Rather, the question is whether Plaintiff’s complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. The Court only reviews the contents of the

complaint, accepting all factual allegations as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of

the nonmoving party. al-Kidd, 580 F.3d at 956 (citation omitted). In the present case, because

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges sufficient facts to state a claim for relief and because Defendant’s Motion

to Dismiss does little to identify an “important governmental interest” or to demonstrate the required

“fit” between the law and the interest served, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss as

it relates to Plaintiff’s first cause of action for violation of the Second Amendment.

II. Equal Protection

A. Parties’ arguments

Plaintiff’s second cause of action alleges that Defendant Gore’s application of Section 12050's

“good cause” and “residency” requirements violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment. Defendant argues there is no equal protection violation because the government can

legitimately treat differently persons dissimilarly situated. Moreover, because no suspect classification

or fundamental right is involved, Defendant argues the Court should apply rational basis to Plaintiff’s

challenge. According to Defendant, Plaintiff’s second cause of action should be dismissed because

it is both rational and reasonable to deny a permit to an individual, such as Plaintiff, who only

occasionally visits San Diego and who voluntarily places himself in dangerous situations and places.

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14 Plaintiff urges the Court to adopt the definition of “residency” used in Section 349(c) of the

California Election Code, which provides that: “The residence of a person is that place in which the

person's habitation is fixed for some period of time, but wherein he or she does not have the intention

of remaining. At a given time, a person may have more than one residence.” The Court need not

decide this issue, however, because as noted below, even if the Court adopts the definition suggested

by Defendant, Plaintiff appears to be a “resident” of San Diego County. See infra Part II.B.1.

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Plaintiff opposes the application of “rational basis” standard of review as contrary to the

Supreme Court’s decision in Heller. According to Plaintiff, with heightened level of scrutiny applied,

there is no justification for treating Plaintiff differently than other residents of San Diego County.

First, Plaintiff argues that, as used in Section 12050, “residency” refers to something temporary in

nature, as opposed to the fixed nature of “domicile.”14 Thus, because he resides full-time in his motor

home and rents space at Campland on the Bay for at least four months during the year, Plaintiff alleges

he satisfies the “residency” requirement of Section 12050. (Pl. Opp., at 11-13.) Second, Plaintiff

argues he meets the “good cause” requirement because he needs a gun to protect himself and his wife

when he travels on business and when they travel to remote areas in their motor home. (Id. at 13-14.)

B. Analysis

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall deny

to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, which is “essentially a direction

that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.,

473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (citation omitted). “The general rule is that legislation is presumed to be

valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate

state interest.” Id. at 440 (citations omitted). This general rule gives way, however, where a statute

classifies by race, alienage, or national origin, or impinges on personal rights protected by the

Constitution. Id. When that is the case, the challenged law is subjected to strict scrutiny and will be

upheld only if it is “suitable tailored to serve a compelling state interest.” Id. Moreover, laws that

classify based on other characteristics beyond the individual’s control, such as gender and

illegitimacy, are subject to a somewhat heightened review, and will be upheld only if “substantially

related to a sufficiently important governmental interest.” Id. at 440-41 (citations omitted).

Contrary to Defendant’s arguments, the Supreme Court in Heller explicitly rejected “rational

basis” as the applicable standard of review for Second Amendment restrictions. See 128 S. Ct. at 2818

n.27. Accordingly, the Court has to apply one of the heightened levels of scrutiny to Plaintiff’s

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challenge to Section 12050. In the present case, the Court need not decide which specific standard

controls because Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss fails even if the Court applies “intermediate

scrutiny.” As already noted in Part I above, Defendant has made very little effort to either identify an

“important governmental interest” or show how the challenged law is “substantially related” to that

interest. Cf. Skoien, 587 F.3d at 814-15. Thus, as long as Plaintiff can demonstrate that he is “similarly

situated” to other San Diego County residents and was “treated differently” by Defendants, his second

cause of action for violation of the Equal Protection Clause would survive the motion to dismiss.

1. Similarly situated

Defendant urges the Court to find that Plaintiff is not “similarly situated” to other San Diego

County residents because his residence in San Diego is only temporary. In this regard, Defendant asks

the Court to adopt the definition of “residency” used in Section 17014(a) of the Revenue and Taxation

Code, which defines a resident as “[e]very individual who is in this state for other than a temporary

or transitory purpose.” Defendant’s argument is undercut, however, by the California Code of

Regulations, which clarifies the meaning of “temporary or transitory purpose” as used in Section

17014(a):

Whether or not the purpose for which an individual is in this State will be considered

temporary or transitory in character will depend to a large extent upon the facts and

circumstances of each particular case. It can be stated generally, however, that if an

individual is simply passing through this State on his way to another state or country,

or is here for a brief rest or vacation, or to complete a particular transaction, or perform

a particular contract, or fulfill a particular engagement, which will require his presence

in this State for but a short period, he is in this State for temporary or transitory

purposes, and will not be a resident by virtue of his presence here.

If, however, an individual is in this State to improve his health and his illness is of such

a character as to require a relatively long or indefinite period to recuperate, or he is

here for business purposes which will require a long or indefinite period to accomplish,

or is employed in a position that may last permanently or indefinitely, or has retired

from business and moved to California with no definite intention of leaving shortly

thereafter, he is in the State for other than temporary or transitory purposes, and,

accordingly, is a resident taxable upon his entire net income even though he may retain

his domicile in some other state or country.

CAL.CODE REGS. tit. 18, § 17014 (2009). In the present case, Plaintiff alleges that: (1) he and his wife

have maintained and had nearly exclusive use of a single room in a residence located at 3151 Driscoll

Drive, San Diego for the past 15 years, where they have kept a wardrobe and other personal items; (2)

they have resided regularly in San Diego since 2007, including continuously living in San Diego for

two months between February 2007 and April 2007, as well as five months between November 15,

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2008 and April 15, 2009; and (3) he has a California identification card identifying San Diego as his

place of residence. (Compl. ¶¶ 17-22; Pl. Opp., at 8-10, 11-13, Ex. D.) Given these facts, which the

Court must accept as true at this stage of the proceedings, Plaintiff’s presence in San Diego appears

to be more than “temporary or transitory” even under the definition urged by Defendant. Accordingly,

Plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate he is a “resident” of San Diego County and therefore

is “similarly situated” to other San Diego County residents.

2. Treated differently

According to Plaintiff, he was denied a license to carry a concealed weapon by Defendant

Gore’s predecessor because the SD License Division made a finding that Plaintiff’s need for selfdefense was not a “good cause” and because his residency in a motor home did not meet the

“residency” requirement. Taking these allegations as true, Plaintiff alleges sufficient facts to

demonstrate he was treated differently than other similarly situated individuals.

3. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, because Plaintiff’s complaint alleges sufficient facts to state a claim

for relief and because Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss does little to identify an “important

governmental interest” or to demonstrate the required “fit” between the law and the interest served,

the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss as it relates to Plaintiff’s second cause of action

for violation of the Equal Protection Clause.

III. Right to Travel

A. Parties’ arguments

Plaintiff’s third cause of action alleges that Defendants’ requirement of full-time residence

violates his right to travel under the Fourteenth Amendment. Defendant moves to dismiss this cause

of action, arguing that Section 12050 does not actually deter the right to travel, impeding travel is not

one of its primary objectives, and it does not use any classification which serves to penalize the

exercise of that right. On the other hand, Plaintiff argues Defendants’ application of the statute does

actually deter his right to travel because “San Diego residents, such as Plaintiff, must stay fulltime in

San Diego in order to have any sort of opportunity to apply and be granted a concealed carrying

weapons permit.” (Pl. Opp., at 15.)

//

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15 Although the Supreme Court has made it clear that the “right to travel” exists, it has

struggled in identifying the precise constitutional source of that right. See, e.g., Att’y Gen. of New

York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 902-03 (1986) (plurality) (noting that the right has been inferred

from federal structure of Government, and found variously in Privileges & Immunities Clause of

Article IV, Commerce Clause, and Privileges & Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).

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B. Analysis

The constitutional “right to travel”15 embraces at least three different components: (1) it

protects the right of a citizen of one State to enter and to leave another State; (2) the right to be treated

as a welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly alien when temporarily present in the second State, and

(3) for those travelers who elect to become permanent residents, the right to be treated like other

citizens of that State. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500 (1999). However, not all regulations that

merely have an effect on travel raise an issue of constitutional dimension. Rather, “[a] state law

implicates the right to travel when it actually deters such travel, when impeding travel is its primary

objective, or when it uses any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that right.” SotoLopez, 476 U.S. at 903 (plurality) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

In all cases, the analysis is informed by the same guiding principle–the right to travel “protects

residents of a State from being disadvantaged, or from being treated differently, simply because of the

timing of their migration, from other similarly situated residents.” Id. at 904 (citations omitted).

Whenever a state law burdens the right to travel, the court must apply strict scrutiny and ask whether

the challenged law is “necessary to further a compelling state interest.” Id. at 904-05 & n.4 (citations

omitted); accord Saenz, 526 U.S. at 499 (citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969)).

Accordingly, in the present case, the Court must engage in a two-step analysis: (1) determine whether

Defendants’ alleged requirement of full-time residence penalizes certain individuals, such as Plaintiff,

with respect to their right to travel; and (2) if it does, Plaintiff “must prevail” unless Defendant can

demonstrate that the requirement is “necessary to accomplish a compelling state interest.” See SotoLopez, 476 U.S. at 906 (plurality) (citations omitted); Saenz, 526 U.S. at 499 (citation omitted).

1. Does the requirement of full-time residence “penalize” Plaintiff?

Not all waiting periods and residency conditions are impermissible. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at

903-06 (plurality). Rather, it is important to distinguish between “bona fide residence requirements,

which seek to differentiate between residents and nonresidents,” and “residence requirements, such

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as durational, fixed date, and fixed point residence requirements, which treat established residents

differently based on the time they migrated into the State.” Id. at 903 n.3 (citations omitted).

In the present case, Plaintiff alleges he is being penalized because Defendants’ requirement

of full-time residence “actually deters” him from traveling and spending time outside of San Diego.

(Pl. Opp., at 15.) It is well-established “that a State may not impose a penalty upon those who exercise

a right guaranteed by the Constitution.” Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 540 (1965) (citation

omitted); accord Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 340-41 (1972). “Constitutional rights would be

of little value if they could be ... indirectly denied, or manipulated out of existence.” Harman, 380 U.S.

at 540 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true, it

appears the “residency” requirement as applied by Defendants does actually deter individuals such

as Plaintiff from exercising their right to travel in that they are being “penalized” for traveling and

spending time outside of San Diego by not being able to obtain a concealed weapon’s permit.

2. Does the requirement of full-time residence pass “strict scrutiny”?

Whenever a state law burdens the right to travel, the court must apply strict scrutiny and ask

whether the challenged law is “necessary to further a compelling state interest.” Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S.

at 904-05 & n.4 (plurality) (citations omitted); accord Saenz, 526 U.S. at 499 (citing Shapiro, 394 U.S.

at 634). The heavy burden of justification is on the State, and the court will closely scrutinize the

challenged law in light of its asserted purposes. Dunn, 405 U.S. at 343. In the present case, Defendant

has failed either to identify a “compelling state interest” or to demonstrate that the challenged law is

“necessary” to further that interest. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

as it relates to Plaintiff’s third cause of action for violation of his right to travel.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, because Plaintiff’s complaint alleges sufficient facts to state claims

for relief that are plausible on their face, the Court DENIES the Motion to Dismiss in its entirety.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 14, 2010

IRMA E. GONZALEZ, Chief Judge

United States District Court

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