Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_17-cv-06386/USCOURTS-cand-4_17-cv-06386-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ESTATE OF NANA BARFI ADOMAKO, 

et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CITY OF FREMONT, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 17-cv-06386-DMR 

ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS

CLAIM FOR MUNICIPAL LIABILITY

Re: Dkt. No. 33

Plaintiffs Estate of Nana Barfi Adomako (“the Estate”), Nana N. Dwomoh, and Augustina 

Yeboah filed a complaint against the City of Fremont (“Fremont”), police officer James Taylor, 

and ten Doe Defendants alleging claims arising out of the February 2017 shooting death of Mr. 

Adomako. Fremont and Taylor now move pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to 

dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim for municipal liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services of 

City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). [Docket No. 33.] This matter is suitable for disposition 

without oral argument. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). For the following reasons, Defendants’ motion is 

granted.

I. BACKGROUND

Augustina Yeboah is the decedent’s mother and successor in interest to his estate. Nana N. 

Dwomoh is the decedent’s brother and administrator of his estate. The FAC contains the 

following allegations, all of which are taken as true for purposes of this motion.1 On February 5, 

2017 at about 4:20 p.m., Taylor shot and killed Mr. Adomako. Plaintiffs allege on information 

 

1 When reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court must “accept as true all 

of the factual allegations contained in the complaint.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) 

(per curiam) (citation omitted).

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and belief that at the time of the shooting, Mr. Adomako had not committed any “serious crime or 

other serious incident” to justify the use of deadly force against him. [Docket No. 32 (First 

Amended Complaint, “FAC”) ¶¶ 13-14.] They further allege that it was clear or should have been 

clear at the time of the shooting that Mr. Adomako was “in the midst of some mental health 

breakdown or mental health crisis which necessitated the intervention of mental health 

professionals,” and that Taylor and Does 1-8 had no reason to believe that he posed a deadly threat 

to anyone’s physical safety. Id. at ¶ 14. Instead, Defendants “wrongly assessed the 

circumstances” and “violently confronted Mr. Adomako” by repeatedly firing multiple rounds at 

him, causing his death. Id. at ¶¶ 15-16. Plaintiffs allege upon information and belief that prior to 

and during the shooting, Mr. Adomako “made no aggressive movements, no furtive gestures, and 

no physical movements which would suggest to a reasonable officer that Mr. Adomako had the 

will, or the ability to inflict deadly harm against any other individual.” Id. at ¶ 18.

Plaintiffs allege the following claims against Defendants: 1) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for 

unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment, by the Estate and Yeboah 

against Taylor and Does 1-8; 2) section 1983 claim for excessive force and denial of medical care 

in violation of the Fourth Amendment, by the Estate and Yeboah against Taylor and Does 1-8; 3) 

section 1983 claim for interference with Yeboah’s right to a familial relationship and freedom of 

association, based upon the Fourteenth Amendment, by Yeboah against Taylor and Does 1-8; 4) 

section 1983 municipal liability claim under Monell, by the Estate against Fremont and Does 9-10; 

5) false detention, by the Estate against all Defendants; 6) battery/wrongful death, by the Estate 

against all Defendants; and 7) negligence/wrongful death, by the Estate against all Defendants. 

The court previously granted in part Defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint with 

leave to amend. Estate of Nana Barfi Adomako v. City of Fremont, No. 17-cv-06386-DMR, 2018 

WL 587146 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2018). In relevant part, the court dismissed the section 1983 

municipal liability claim with leave to amend, holding that the allegations in the complaint were 

insufficient to show a pattern, policy, or custom by Fremont that caused Plaintiffs’ injuries. The 

court also held that the complaint failed to allege facts to support ratification and inadequate 

training theories of Monell liability. Id. at *6-8. Plaintiffs timely filed their first amended 

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complaint, and Defendants now move to dismiss the Estate’s Monell claim.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the claims alleged in 

the complaint. See Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). 

When reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court must “accept as true all 

of the factual allegations contained in the complaint,” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (2007) (citation 

omitted), and may dismiss a claim “only where there is no cognizable legal theory” or there is an 

absence of “sufficient factual matter to state a facially plausible claim to relief.” Shroyer v. New 

Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 622 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009); Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001)) (quotation marks 

omitted). A claim has facial plausibility when a plaintiff “pleads factual content that allows the 

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). In other words, the facts alleged must demonstrate 

“more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action 

will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007) (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 

U.S. 265, 286 (1986)); see Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 679 (9th Cir. 2001), overruled on 

other grounds by Galbraith v. Cty. of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants argue that the Estate’s Monell claim remains deficient, asserting that the FAC 

does not add facts to state a valid Monell claim under any theory.

A municipality may face section 1983 liability if it “‘subjects’ a person to a deprivation of 

rights or ‘causes’ a person ‘to be subjected’ to such deprivation.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 

51, 60 (2011) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 692). However, the municipality may be held liable 

“only for ‘[its] own illegal acts.’” Id. (quoting Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986)). 

It cannot be held vicariously liable for its employees’ actions. Id. (citations omitted). To establish 

municipal liability, plaintiffs “must prove that ‘action pursuant to official municipal policy’ caused 

their injury.” Id. (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 691). “The ‘official policy’ requirement ‘was 

intended to distinguish acts of the municipality from acts of employees of the municipality,’ and 

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thereby make clear that municipal liability is limited to action for which the municipality is 

actually responsible.” Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 479-80 (emphasis in original). Official municipal 

policy includes “the decisions of a government’s lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking officials, 

and practices so persistent and widespread as to practically have the force of law.” Connick, 563 

U.S. at 61 (citations omitted). Such policy or practice must be a “moving force behind a violation 

of constitutional rights.” Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing 

Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). 

In order to establish Monell liability, a plaintiff must prove that (1) he or she possessed a 

constitutional right of which he was deprived; (2) “that the municipality had a policy”; (3) “that 

this policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional right”; and (4) “that 

the policy is the moving force behind the constitutional violation.” Dougherty, 654 F.3d at 900 

(quotation omitted). “A single constitutional deprivation ordinarily is insufficient to establish a 

longstanding practice or custom.” Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231, 1235 (9th Cir. 1999). 

However, an isolated constitutional violation may be sufficient to establish a municipal policy in 

the following three situations: 1) “when the person causing the violation has ‘final policymaking 

authority,’” see id. at 1235; 2) when “the final policymaker ‘ratified’ a subordinate’s actions,” see 

id. at 1238; and 3) when “the final policymaker acted with deliberate indifference to the 

subordinate’s constitutional violations.” See id. at 1240.

Here, Plaintiffs allege that Fremont knowingly maintained official customs, policies, and 

practices of employing police officers with “dangerous propensities for abusing their authority” 

and using excessive and deadly force; inadequately supervising, training, and disciplining police 

officers who used excessive and deadly force; maintaining inadequate procedures for reporting, 

supervising, investigating, and disciplining “intentional misconduct” by police officers; detaining 

and arresting individuals without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, and using excessive 

force. FAC ¶ 49. Additionally, Plaintiffs allege that Fremont’s police department supervisorial 

officers ratified Defendants’ conduct. Id. at ¶¶ 47, 49. 

Based on the court’s comparison of the original complaint and the FAC, it appears that the 

Plaintiffs have added allegations regarding two additional “official recognized custom[s], 

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polic[ies], and practice[s]” by Fremont, as follows:

a. Shooting unarmed individuals and then justifying the 

shooting by alleging that the suspect was violent and/or reaching for 

the officers’ weapon; [and]

b. Improperly training officers on how to assess, deal and 

confront persons suspected to be suffering from a mental illness 

including the use of deadly force against these individuals instead of 

employing less than lethal techniques

FAC ¶ 49(a), (b).

The court concludes that the allegations in the FAC are insufficient to plead a pattern, 

policy, or custom by Fremont that caused Plaintiffs’ injuries. As with the original complaint, the 

FAC alleges only facts specific to Mr. Adomako’s shooting. Although the FAC adds the 

allegation that Fremont has a policy of “[s]hooting unarmed individuals and then justifying the 

shooting by alleging that the suspect was violent and/or reaching for the officers’ weapon,” the 

FAC contains no factual allegations to support the existence of a practice or custom beyond the

incident involving Mr. Adomako. See Bagley v. City of Sunnyvale, No. 16-CV-02250-LHK, 2017 

WL 344998, at *15 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2017) (finding custom or practice inadequately pleaded 

where plaintiff only pleaded actions relating to his own arrest and prosecution). Moreover, 

Plaintiffs’ allegation that Fremont policies were “affirmatively linked to and were a significantly 

influential force behind the injuries” is vague and conclusory. See id. at ¶ 53.

Plaintiffs also allege ratification and inadequate training theories. “To show ratification, a 

plaintiff must prove that the ‘authorized policymakers approve a subordinate’s decision and the 

basis for it.’” Christie, 176 F.3d at 1239 (quoting City of St. Louis v. Paprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 

(1988)). A police department’s “mere failure to discipline [its officers] does not amount to 

ratification of their allegedly unconstitutional actions.” Sheehan v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 

743 F.3d 1211, 1231 (9th Cir. 2014), rev'd in part, cert. dismissed in part sub nom., 135 S. Ct. 

1765 (2015). As in the original complaint, Plaintiffs allege upon information and belief that 

Defendants’ conduct in the shooting “was ratified” by police department supervisorial officers. 

Compl. ¶ 47. However, there are no allegations that any “authorized policymakers” knew of and 

approved the officers’ actions “before the alleged constitutional violations ceased.” See Christie, 

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176 F.3d at 1239. 

As to Plaintiffs’ failure to train theory, under limited circumstances, “a local government’s 

decision not to train certain employees about their legal duty to avoid violating citizens’ rights 

may rise to the level of an official government policy for purposes of § 1983.” Connick, 563 U.S. 

at 61. However, “[a] municipality’s culpability for a deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous 

where a claim turns on a failure to train.” Id. In order to establish liability under this theory, the 

“municipality’s failure to train its employees in a relevant respect must amount to ‘deliberate 

indifference to the rights of persons with whom the [untrained employees] come into contact.’” 

Id. (citing Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)). This “stringent standard of fault” requires 

proof that “policymakers are on actual or constructive notice that a particular omission in their 

training program causes city employees to violate citizens’ constitutional rights.” Connick, 563 

U.S. at 61; see also Canton, 489 U.S. at 389 (“[o]nly where a failure to train reflects a ‘deliberate’ 

or ‘conscious’ choice by a municipality—a ‘policy’ as defined by our prior cases—can a city be 

liable for such a failure under § 1983.”). The training deficiency must be the “functional 

equivalent of a decision by the city itself to violate the Constitution.” Id. “The issue is whether 

the training program is adequate and, if it is not, whether such inadequate training can justifiably 

be said to represent municipal policy.” Long v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1186 (9th Cir. 

2006) (citing Canton, 489 U.S. at 39). 

In order to establish section 1983 municipal liability based on a failure to train, a plaintiff 

must show: 1) deprivation of a constitutional right; 2) a training policy that “amounts to deliberate 

indifference to the [constitutional] rights of the persons with whom [the police] are likely to come 

into contact”; and 3) that his constitutional injury would have been avoided had the municipality 

properly trained the officers. Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 484 (9th Cir. 2007) 

(quoting Canton, 489 U.S. at 388-89) (first alteration in original). While the court previously 

concluded that the complaint plausibly alleged a violation of Mr. Adomako’s Fourth Amendment 

right to be free from excessive force, the FAC does not contain any specific factual allegations in 

support of the remaining elements of a Monell claim. Specifically, the FAC states no nonconclusory facts as to Fremont’s police training policy or program and fails to plausibly allege any 

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facts to support a causal link between the training program and the Estate’s excessive force claim. 

Instead, the complaint alleges generally that Fremont “[i]mproperly train[ed] officers on how to 

assess, deal and confront persons suspected to be suffering from a mental illness,” “inadequately” 

trained its police officers, and “improperly train[ed]” officers “regarding shooting at individuals 

during the course of a physical altercation.” FAC ¶ 49(b), (d), (j). These conclusory, unspecific 

allegations are unsupported by any facts and are insufficient. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Estate’s Monell claim is 

granted. As Plaintiffs already had an opportunity to amend the Monell claim, it is dismissed 

without leave to amend.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 16, 2018

______________________________________

Donna M. Ryu

United States Magistrate Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORN

I

A

IT IS SO ORDERED

Judge Donna M. Ryu

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