Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02489/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02489-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Rexford J. Rothery,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner 

of Social Security,

Defendant.

No. CV-13-02489-PHX-ESW

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Rexford Rothery’s (“Plaintiff”) appeal of the 

Social Security Administration’s (“Social Security”) denial of his claim for disability 

insurance benefits. Plaintiff filed his Title II Social Security Disability Insurance 

(“SSDI”) application on July 12, 2010. (A.R. 159). Plaintiff alleges disability beginning 

June 1, 2010. (A.R. 161). 

This Court has jurisdiction to decide Plaintiff’s appeal pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 

405(g). Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the Court has the power to enter, based upon the 

pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the 

decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the case for 

a rehearing. Both parties have consented to the exercise of U.S. Magistrate Judge 

jurisdiction.1

 (Doc. 12). After reviewing the Administrative Record (“A.R.”), Plaintiff’s 

1 This case was reassigned to Hon. Eileen S. Willett on November 14, 2014. 

 

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Opening Brief (Doc. 25), Defendant’s Response Brief (Doc. 26), and Plaintiff’s Reply 

(Doc. 30), the Court finds that the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) decision is 

supported by substantial evidence and is free of harmful legal error. The decision is 

therefore affirmed.

I. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Disability Analysis: Five-Step Evaluation

The Social Security Act provides for disability insurance benefits to those who 

have contributed to the Social Security program and who suffer from a physical or mental 

disability. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1). To be eligible for benefits, the claimant must show 

that he or she suffers from a medically determinable physical or mental impairment that 

prohibits him or her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. The claimant must 

also show that the impairment is expected to cause death or last for a continuous period 

of at least 12 months. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). 

To decide if a claimant is entitled to Social Security benefits, an ALJ conducts an 

analysis consisting of five questions, which are considered in sequential steps. 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 404.1520(a). The claimant has the burden of proof regarding the first four steps:2

Step One: Is the claimant engaged in “substantial gainful 

activity”? If so, the analysis ends and disability benefits are 

denied. Otherwise, the ALJ proceeds to step two.

Step Two: Does the claimant have a medically severe 

impairment or combination of impairments? A severe 

impairment is one which significantly limits the claimant’s 

physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c). If the claimant does not have a severe 

impairment or combination of impairments, disability benefits 

are denied at this step. Otherwise, the ALJ proceeds to step 

three.

Step Three: Is the impairment equivalent to one of a number 

of listed impairments that the Commissioner acknowledges 

2 Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742,746 (9th Cir. 2007).

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are so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity? 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d). If the impairment meets or equals 

one of the listed impairments, the claimant is conclusively 

presumed to be disabled. If the impairment is not one that is 

presumed to be disabling, the ALJ proceeds to the fourth step 

of the analysis.

Step Four: Does the impairment prevent the claimant from 

performing work which the claimant performed in the past? 

If not, the claimant is “not disabled” and disability benefits 

are denied without continuing the analysis. 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1520(f). Otherwise, the ALJ proceeds to the last step. 

 If the analysis proceeds to the final question, the burden of proof shifts to the 

Commissioner:3

Step Five: Can the claimant perform other work in the 

national economy in light of his or her age, education, and 

work experience? The claimant is entitled to disability 

benefits only if he or she is unable to perform other work. 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g). Social Security is responsible for 

providing evidence that demonstrates that other work exists in 

significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant 

can do, given the claimant’s residual functional capacity, age, 

education, and work experience. Id.

B. Standard of Review Applicable to ALJ’s Determination

The Court must affirm an ALJ’s decision if it is supported by substantial evidence 

and is based on correct legal standards. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 

2012); Marcia v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 172, 174 (9th Cir. 1990). Although “substantial 

evidence” is less than a preponderance, it is more than a “mere scintilla.” Richardson v. 

Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 

229 (1938)). It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion. Id. 

In determining whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision, the 

Court considers the record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and 

3 Parra, 481 F.3d at 746.

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detracts from the ALJ’s conclusions. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 

1998); Tylitzki v. Shalala, 999 F.2d 1411, 1413 (9th Cir. 1993). If there is sufficient 

evidence to support the ALJ’s determination, the Court cannot substitute its own 

determination. See Morgan v. Comm’r of the Social Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th 

Cir.1999) (“Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, it 

is the ALJ’s conclusion that must be upheld.”); Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 

(9th Cir. 1989). This is because the ALJ, not the Court, is responsible for resolving 

conflicts, ambiguity, and determining credibility. Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 750; see also 

Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). 

The Court must also consider the harmless error doctrine when reviewing an 

ALJ’s decision. This doctrine provides that an ALJ’s decision need not be remanded or 

reversed if it is clear from the record that the error is “inconsequential to the ultimate 

nondisability determination.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(citations omitted); Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115 (an error is harmless so long as there 

remains substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s decision and the error “does not 

negate the validity of the ALJ’s ultimate conclusion”) (citations omitted).

II. Plaintiff’s Appeal

A. Procedural Background

Plaintiff was born in 1961 and has an associate’s degree in computer 

programming. Plaintiff has experience working as a computer programmer and as a selfemployed pool technician. (A.R. 39, 42-43, 45). Plaintiff alleges that he is unable to 

work due to the following impairments: (i) bipolar depression; (ii) bipolar disorder; (iii) 

pain in hips and feet; (iv) post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”); (v) lower back pain; 

and (vi) Serious Mental Illness (“SMI”). (A.R. 70).

Plaintiff filed his initial SSDI benefit application on July 12, 2010, alleging that he 

became disabled on January 1, 2006. (A.R. 159). On August 20, 2010, Social Security 

spoke with Plaintiff to clarify the nature of his pool business. (A.R. 161). Plaintiff stated 

that he purchased the business in October 2006 and closed it on June 1, 2010. After 

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discussing possible disability onset dates, Plaintiff stated that he did not want to furnish 

any additional paperwork for the business and would use the onset date of June 1, 2010. 

(Id.). 

Social Security initially denied Plaintiff’s application on November 5, 2010. 

(A.R. 81). On April 1, 2011, upon Plaintiff’s request for reconsideration, Social Security 

affirmed the denial of Plaintiff’s application. (A.R. 96). Thereafter, Plaintiff requested a 

hearing before an ALJ. (A.R. 108). The ALJ held a hearing on July 12, 2012, during 

which Plaintiff was represented by an attorney. (A.R. 34-68). In his August 6, 2012 

decision, the ALJ found that Plaintiff is not disabled. (A.R. 15-27). The Appeals 

Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, making the ALJ’s decision the final 

decision of the Social Security Commissioner. (A.R. 1-6). On December 6, 2013, 

Plaintiff filed a Complaint (Doc. 1) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) requesting judicial 

review and reversal of the ALJ’s decision.

B. The ALJ’s Application of the Five-Step Disability Analysis

The ALJ completed steps one through four of the disability analysis before finding 

that Plaintiff is not disabled and entitled to disability benefits. 

1. Step One: Engagement in “Substantial Gainful Activity”

The ALJ determined that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity 

since the amended alleged onset date of June 1, 2010 through the date last insured of 

December 31, 2010. (A.R. 20). Neither party disputes this determination.

2. Step Two: Presence of Medically Severe Impairment/Combination 

of Impairments 

The ALJ found that Plaintiff has the following four impairments: (i) bipolar 

disorder; (ii) history of PTSD; (iii) polysubstance dependency; and (iv) amphetamine 

induced mood disorder. (A.R. 21). The ALJ’s determination at this step is undisputed.

3. Step Three: Presence of Listed Impairment(s) 

The ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of 

impairments that met or medically equaled an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, 

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Subpart P, Appendix 1 of the Social Security regulations. (A.R. 21). This finding is 

undisputed. 

4. Step Four: Capacity to Perform Past Relevant Work 

The ALJ assessed that Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) 

to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels. The ALJ acknowledged that 

Plaintiff has been diagnosed with various mental illnesses, but did not find that Plaintiff 

has “significant, ongoing functional limitations in understanding and memory, sustained 

concentration and persistence, social interaction, and adaptation.” (A.R. 23).

A vocational expert (“VE”) testified at the July 12, 2012 hearing. The ALJ asked 

the VE whether an individual with Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC 

could perform Plaintiff’s past work as a computer programmer or pool technician. (A.R. 

62-63). The VE testified that the hypothetical individual could perform both positions. 

(A.R. 63). The ALJ accepted the VE’s testimony. (A.R. 26). After comparing Plaintiff’s 

RFC with the physical and mental demands of Plaintiff’s past work, the ALJ found that 

Plaintiff is able to perform the past work as actually and generally performed. (Id.). The 

ALJ thus found Plaintiff not disabled. (A.R. 27).

Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s determination at this step by arguing that the ALJ 

improperly discredited Plaintiff’s testimony regarding his symptoms. Plaintiff also 

argues that the ALJ erred in rejecting the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist, 

Russell Gilbert, M.D. In a report dated June 26, 2012, Dr. Gilbert opined that Plaintiff 

has “moderately severe” and “severe” limitations in a number of areas. (A.R. 838-39). 

Dr. Gilbert further opined that the limitations existed prior to Plaintiff’s last insured date 

of December 31, 2010.4

 (A.R. 839).

4 A claimant seeking disability insurance benefits under Title II must establish disability on or prior to the last date insured. 42 U.S.C. § 416(I)(3); Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 

676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). 

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5. Step Five: Capacity to Perform Other Work 

The ALJ did not analyze Plaintiff’s capacity to perform other work as the ALJ 

found Plaintiff not disabled at step four. 

C. Plaintiff’s Challenge to the ALJ’s Analysis at Step Four

1. The ALJ Did Not Improperly Reject Plaintiff’s Testimony

When evaluating the credibility of a claimant’s testimony regarding subjective 

pain or symptoms, the ALJ must engage in a two-step analysis. Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 

F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009). In the first step, the ALJ must determine whether the 

claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment “which 

could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.” 

Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007). The claimant does not have 

to show that the impairment could reasonably be expected to cause the severity of the 

symptoms. Rather, a claimant must only show that it could have caused some degree of 

the symptoms. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1282 (9th Cir. 1996). 

If a claimant meets the first test, and there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ 

can only reject a claimant’s testimony about the severity of his or her symptoms by 

offering specific, clear and convincing reasons. Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1036. The ALJ 

cannot rely on general findings. The ALJ must identify specifically what testimony is not 

credible and what evidence undermines the claimant’s complaints. Berry v. Astrue, 622 

F.3d 1228, 1234 (9th Cir. 2010). In weighing a claimant’s credibility, the ALJ can 

consider many factors including: a claimant’s reputation for truthfulness, prior 

inconsistent statements concerning the symptoms, unexplained or inadequately explained 

failure to seek treatment, and the claimant’s daily activities. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284; see 

also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(4) (Social Security must consider whether there are 

conflicts between a claimant’s statements and the rest of the evidence). 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to give clear and convincing reasons for 

rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony. The ALJ’s reasons for finding Plaintiff not credible

include the following:

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1. Plaintiff has always been employed. (A.R. 24). A claimant’s work record is a 

proper consideration in weighing Plaintiff’s credibility. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284-85

(stating that a claimant’s work record is one of the factors an ALJ is to consider in 

weighing a claimant’s credibility). 

2. Plaintiff avoided reporting income to tax agencies.5

 (A.R. 24). In addition, the 

ALJ also noted that Plaintiff admitted to driving without a license in violation of state 

law. (Id.). These are also valid considerations in weighing Plaintiff’s credibility. Light 

v. Social Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997) (in weighing a claimant’s 

credibility, the ALJ may consider his reputation for truthfulness).

3. The ALJ also found that evidence suggests that Plaintiff exaggerated his 

symptoms. (A.R. 24). For example, Plaintiff stated he only goes to stores twice a month 

to shop for groceries. (A.R. 24, 220). However, the October 15, 2010 surveillance report 

from the Cooperative Disability Investigation Unit (“CDI”) found that this statement “is 

contradicted by the regular activity on [Plaintiff’s] EBT/Food Stamp card.”6

 (A.R. 455). 

See Curry v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 1990) (upholding denial of disability 

benefits where claimant could “take care of her personal needs, prepare easy meals, do 

light housework, and shop for some groceries”); see also Molina, 674 F.3d at 1113 

(“Even where [daily] activities suggest some difficulty functioning, they may be grounds 

for discrediting the claimant’s testimony to the extent that they contradict claims of a 

totally debilitating impairment.”).

5 In his Opening Brief, Plaintiff argues that there is no evidence in the record that 

Plaintiff earned enough to require tax payments. (Doc. 25 at 23). But Plaintiff admitted 

at the July 12, 2012 hearing that he should have filed tax returns during the time his pool business had gross monthly earnings of $2,700.00. (A.R. 64). 

6 Plaintiff argues that the word “regular” does not necessarily mean that Plaintiff shops 

more than twice a month. The ALJ, however, is responsible for interpreting ambiguities in the evidence. The Court finds that ALJ’s interpretation of “regular activity” as 

meaning more than twice a month is reasonable given the context in which the phrase is 

used in the CDI report. Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, it is the ALJ’s conclusion that must be upheld. Morgan, 169 F.3d at 599. 

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4. The ALJ discussed the report of consultative examiner, Dr. Jacqueline 

Worsley. During the exam, Plaintiff commented that he was having a “mixed” bipolar 

episode. (A.R. 24-25, 460). Dr. Worsley explained that most individuals with bipolar 

disorder cannot identify or understand what constitutes a “mixed episode.” (A.R. 460). 

Dr. Worsley noted that Plaintiff’s “presentation and functioning level appeared higher 

than the typical SMI client.”7

 (A.R. 460). The ALJ properly considered these statements 

in determining Plaintiff’s credibility. Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1039 (in weighing a 

claimant’s credibility, an ALJ may consider “other testimony by claimant that appears 

less than candid”). 

5. Finally, the ALJ noted that the medical evidence indicates that Plaintiff’s 

alleged mental impairments are less than totally disabling in severity. (A.R. 25). For 

example, the ALJ discussed a December 28, 2010 visit at Magellan in which Plaintiff had 

good hygiene, normal alertness, good eye contact, normal speech, and normal motor 

functioning. (A.R. 472). The report also indicated that Plaintiff was functioning with the 

help of his medication regimen and was alcohol and drug free. (Id.).

The ALJ’s credibility finding in this case is unlike the brief and conclusory 

credibility findings that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has deemed insufficient in 

other cases. For example, in Treichler v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 

1090, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 2014), an ALJ stated in a single sentence that “the claimant’s 

statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms 

are not credible to the extent they are inconsistent with the above residual functional 

capacity assessment.” The Court of Appeals held that stopping after this introductory 

remark “falls short of meeting the ALJ’s responsibility to provide a discussion of the 

evidence and the reason or reasons upon which his adverse determination is based.” Id. 

at 1103 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1). The Court 

further stated that an ALJ’s “vague allegation that a claimant’s testimony is not consistent 

7 Plaintiff was deemed eligible in 2010 to receive benefits under the SMI program 

through Magellan of Arizona. (A.R. 457). 

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with the objective medical evidence, without any specific findings in support of that 

conclusion is insufficient for our review.” Id. (quoting Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 

592 (9th Cir. 2009).

In Robbins v. Astrue, 466 F.3d 880, 883-84 (9th Cir. 2006), the Court of Appeals 

found the ALJ’s “fleeting credibility finding” insufficient. In Robbins, the ALJ simply 

stated that (i) the claimant’s testimony was “not consistent with or supported by the 

overall medical evidence of record” and (ii) “[claimant’s] testimony regarding his alcohol 

dependence and abuse problem remains equivocal.” Id. In discussing why the ALJ’s 

finding was insufficient, the Court explained that the ALJ did not provide a “narrative 

discussion” containing “specific reasons for the finding . . .supported by the evidence in 

the record.” Id. at 884-85. 

Similarly, in Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 833 (9th Cir. 1995), an ALJ simply 

concluded that the claimant’s complaints were “not credible” and “exaggerated.” The 

Court held that the finding was insufficient as the ALJ did not provide any specific 

reasons for disbelieving the claimant other than a lack of objective evidence. Id. at 834.

The ALJ’s credibility finding in this case is more like the credibility finding in 

Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2008). In Stubbs-Danielson, the 

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that an ALJ sufficiently explained the reasons for 

discrediting a claimant’s symptom testimony where the ALJ stated that:

The claimant’s allegations as to the intensity, persistence and 

limiting effects of her symptoms are disproportionate and not 

supported by the objective medical findings nor any other 

corroborating evidence. The record reflects that the claimant 

has normal activities of daily living, including cooking, house 

cleaning, doing laundry, and helping her husband in 

managing finances.

* * *

These activities tend to suggest that the claimant may still be 

capable of performing the basic demands of competitive, 

remunerative, unskilled work on a sustained basis.

Id. at 1175.

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The Court of Appeals also found that the medical evidence, including the reports 

of two physicians who assessed that the claimant could perform a limited range of work, 

supported the ALJ’s credibility determination. Id.

Here, unlike in Treichler, Robbins, and Lester, the ALJ goes beyond making a 

“fleeting” and conclusory remark that Plaintiff’s testimony is not credible. The ALJ 

discusses the evidence and explains the inconsistencies in the record that he finds 

discredit Plaintiff’s testimony. Like in Stubbs-Danielson, the ALJ’s conclusion is also 

supported by substantial evidence in the record as discussed in Section C(3) below. 

It is possible that a different ALJ would find Plaintiff’s symptom testimony 

credible. But it is not the Court’s role to second guess an ALJ’s decision to disbelieve a 

Plaintiff’s allegations. See Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989) (“An ALJ 

cannot be required to believe every allegation of disabling pain, or else disability benefits 

would be available for the asking. . . .”). The Court finds that the reasons provided by the 

ALJ for discrediting Plaintiff’s testimony are specific, clear, convincing, and are 

supported by substantial evidence in the record. The Court therefore finds that the ALJ 

did not err in discrediting Plaintiff’s testimony. 

2. The ALJ Did Not Improperly Reject Dr. Gilbert’s Opinion

In weighing medical source opinions in Social Security cases, there are three 

categories of physicians: (i) treating physicians, who actually treat the claimant; (2) 

examining physicians, who examine but do not treat the claimant; and (3) non-examining 

physicians, who neither treat nor examine the claimant. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 

830 (9th Cir. 1995). Generally, more weight should be given to a treating physician’s 

opinion than to the opinion of a non-treating physician. Id. An ALJ cannot reject a 

treating physician’s opinion in favor of another physician’s opinion without first 

providing specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence, such 

as finding that a treating physician’s opinion is inconsistent with and not supported by the 

record as a whole. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(4) (ALJ must consider whether an opinion is 

consistent with the record as a whole); see also Batson, 359 F.3d at 1195 (9th Cir.2004); 

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Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir.2002); Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1041 

(finding it not improper for an ALJ to reject a treating physician’s opinion that is 

inconsistent with the record). Another specific and legitimate reason to reject a treating 

physician’s opinion is finding that a treating physician’s opinion is based “to a large 

extent” on a claimant’s self-reports that have been properly discredited. Tommasetti, 533 

F.3d at 1041; Morgan v. Comm'r Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 602 (9th Cir.1999) 

(citing Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 605 (9th Cir.1989)). 

Here, in explaining why he rejected Dr. Gilbert’s opinion, the ALJ stated that:

For the reasons described [previously in the decision], the 

undersigned has reason to doubt the accuracy of [Plaintiff’s] 

reports of his functional abilities in general, as well as to his 

treating provider. The inconsistencies in [Plaintiff’s] 

behavior and activities as observed by CDI and [Dr. 

Worsley], and the fact that [Plaintiff] continues to operate a 

business of undetermined earnings and value, gives the 

undersigned substantial reason to doubt that the [Plaintiff] has 

more than moderate limitations in mental functioning, as 

described by Dr. Gilbert. 

(A.R. 26). The above explanation contains three grounds for rejecting Dr. Gilbert’s 

opinion:8 (i) Dr. Gilbert’s opinion was based on Plaintiff’s self-reported limitations, 

which have been discredited; (ii) Dr. Gilbert’s opinion is inconsistent with the reports of 

Dr. Worsley and CDI; and (iii) Dr. Gilbert’s opinion is inconsistent with Plaintiff’s daily 

activities, such as maintaining a pool business. 

In challenging the ALJ’s rejection of Dr. Gilbert’s opinion, Plaintiff first argues 

that the ALJ “effectively accused [Dr. Gilbert] of being a dupe, just swallowing whole 

[Plaintiff’s] reported symptoms without question. . . . There is no indication from Dr. 

Gilbert’s assessment that his medical conclusions are the result of anything other than his 

own clinical observations.” (Doc. 25 at 16). As Dr. Gilbert’s opinion is in a “check-box” 

format, rather than a narrative, the basis of his report is not clear. Yet Dr. Gilbert’s 

8 A reviewing court may draw specific and legitimate inferences from an ALJ’s decision. 

Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 755.

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records do not contain notes of any observations of Plaintiff’s alleged limitations. Dr. 

Gilbert’s records do include notes of Plaintiff’s self-reports. For example, on October 10, 

2011, Dr. Gilbert wrote that Plaintiff “does report [occasional auditory hallucinations].” 

(A.R. 669). The Court thus finds that the ALJ’s conclusion that Dr. Gilbert’s opinion

was based on Plaintiff’s self-reports was reasonable.9

 As discussed in Section C(1)

above, the ALJ properly discredited Plaintiff’s testimony. The ALJ therefore did not err 

in rejecting Dr. Gilbert’s opinion on the ground that it was based on Plaintiff’s selfreports.

The ALJ’s finding that Dr. Gilbert’s opinion is inconsistent with the reports of Dr. 

Worsley and CDI is also a specific and legitimate reason for rejecting Dr. Gilbert’s 

opinion. Plaintiff argues that Dr. Gilbert’s opinion is not inconsistent with the reports of 

Dr. Worsley and CDI. (Doc. 30 at 6). Yet there are a number of inconsistencies between 

the reports of Dr. Worsley and CDI and Dr. Gilbert’s opinion. For example:

1. Dr. Worsley found that Plaintiff’s condition has not and will not impose 

any limitations for 12 months. (A.R. 461). This directly contradicts Dr. Gilbert’s 

opinion that Plaintiff has numerous “moderately severe” and “severe” impairments.

2. Dr. Worsley found that Plaintiff’s social interactions were appropriate, and 

that Plaintiff was polite, cooperative, and candid. (A.R. 461). The CDI investigator 

observed Plaintiff laughing and smiling with Plaintiff’s friend. (A.R. 455). These 

findings contradict Dr. Gilbert’s opinion that Plaintiff has a “moderately severe” 

impairment in Plaintiff’s ability to relate to other people (Dr. Gilbert’s report defined 

“moderately severe” as an impairment which seriously affects Plaintiff’s ability to 

function). (A.R. 838).

3. Dr. Worsley’s findings that Plaintiff’s “long-term memory seemed intact” 

and that Plaintiff “had no difficulties understanding what was asked during the 

9 Although the ALJ did not explicitly state this conclusion, it is implied. As discussed 

previously, a reviewing court may draw specific and legitimate inferences from an ALJ’s decision. Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 755.

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examination” are inconsistent with Dr. Gilbert’s opinion that Plaintiff has a “moderately 

severe” ability to understand, carry out, and remember instructions. (A.R. 459, 838).

4. Dr. Worsley found that Plaintiff “did not appear to have difficulties 

adapting to the different questions and tasks during the examination . . . .” (A.R. 461). 

This is inconsistent with Dr. Gilbert’s finding that Plaintiff has a “moderately severe” 

ability to respond to customary work pressures. (A.R. 838-39). 

5. The CDI report also stated that “[a]ccording to his SSA file and his Third 

Party/Function Report . . . [Plaintiff] only shops twice a month which is contradicted by 

the regular activities on his EBT/Food Stamp card.”10 (A.R. 455). The CDI report also 

stated that Plaintiff went into the convenience store alone. (Id.). It was reasonable for 

the ALJ to find that these observations conflicted with Dr. Gilbert’s opinion that Plaintiff 

had “severe” impairments in the ability to perform complex and varied tasks. 

Finally, the ALJ noted that Dr. Gilbert’s opinion was inconsistent with Plaintiff’s 

continued operation of his pool business. Although the ALJ did not find that the business 

amounted to substantial gainful activity, the ALJ reasonably found that the continuation 

of the business conflicted with Dr. Gilbert’s opinion that Plaintiff has a “severe” 

impairment in Plaintiff’s ability to perform “varied tasks” and “complex tasks.” This 

contradicts Plaintiff’s testimony that Plaintiff was able to maintain approximately ten 

client accounts at the end of 2010, which is after Plaintiff’s alleged disability onset date 

and at the end of Plaintiff’s insured status. (A.R. 55). 

The above findings provide a specific and legitimate basis for the ALJ to discount 

Dr. Gilbert’s opinion in favor of other opinions which the ALJ found were better 

supported by the evidence and more consistent with the record as a whole. Tonapetyan v. 

Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir.2001). Because the ALJ’s rejection of Dr. Gilbert’s 

10 Plaintiff denies that the reported “regular activity” on Plaintiff’s EBT card contradicts the third party statement that Plaintiff only shops twice a month. (Doc. 25 at 23). 

Plaintiff argues that “even if there were a conflict it could only reflect on the third party’s 

accuracy, not [Plaintiff’s] veracity.” (Id.). Plaintiff, however, also stated in Plaintiff’s 

own function report that he shops twice a month. (A.R. 220).

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opinion is supported by substantial evidence, as explained below, the Court finds that the 

ALJ did not improperly discount it.

3. The ALJ’s Decision is Supported by Substantial Evidence

Under Ninth Circuit case law, a non-treating physician’s opinion that rests on 

objective clinical tests constitutes substantial evidence supporting an ALJ’s decision. 

Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751. Plaintiff argues that Dr. Worsley’s report cannot constitute 

substantial evidence, citing to Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625 (9th Cir. 2007). In Orn, an 

ALJ rejected the opinions of a claimant’s two treating physicians in favor of the opinion 

of an examining physician. Id. at 633. The examining physician’s findings, however,

were the same as the treating physicians’ findings. It was the examining physician’s 

conclusions that differed. Id. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that “[w]hen an 

examining physician relies on the same clinical findings as a treating physician, but 

differs only in his or her conclusions, the conclusions of the examining physician are not 

‘substantial evidence’ to support the rejection of a treating physician’s opinion.” Id. at 

632. 

Orn is distinguishable from this case. Here, Dr. Worsley conducted an 

independent mental exam of Plaintiff. Based upon Plaintiff’s behavior and answers 

throughout the exam, Dr. Worsley rendered findings that differed from Dr. Gilbert’s 

findings. Dr. Worsley found that Plaintiff’s thought process was clear and goal-directed 

with no evidence of psychosis. (A.R. 459). Upon consideration of her findings, Dr. 

Worsley concluded that Plaintiff did not have any limitations. (A.R. 461). 

Further, Dr. Worsley’s opinion is supported by other evidence in the record, 

including Dr. Gilbert’s own records:

1. A July 22, 2010 progress note from New Arizona Family indicated that the 

provider “encouraged [Plaintiff] to go back to work.” (A.R. 343). The progress note 

indicated that Plaintiff’s appearance was good, his affect appropriate, his thought process 

was logical, and his thought content was non-psychotic. (A.R. 344-45).

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2. Plaintiff reported on November 17, 2010 to one of Magellan’s therapists 

that he takes care of his pets and does housework (e.g. cooking and cleaning). (A.R. 

476). Notes from the visit state that Plaintiff is not psychotic, suicidal, or homicidal. 

(A.R. 477). 

3. Plaintiff stated on December 28, 2010 that “he is functioning with the help 

of medication.” (A.R. 472).

4. A February 22, 2011 examination at Arcadia Family Clinic found that 

Plaintiff’s judgment, insight, and orientation appear to be intact.11 (A.R. 523).

5. On September 12, 2011, Dr. Gilbert stated that Plaintiff’s mood is stable 

and his mild depressive symptoms were better. (A.R. 693). Dr. Gilbert also stated that 

Plaintiff did not have current psychosis and was caring for himself well. (Id.). In 

addition, Dr. Gilbert noted that the side effects of Plaintiff’s medication “do not 

significantly interfere with function.” (Id.).

6. Notes from a September 15, 2011 visit at Magellan state that “[Plaintiff] 

was pleased with his progress and feels that he is ready to terminate counseling at this 

time.” (A.R. 687).

7. On October 4, 2011, a therapist at Magellan encouraged Plaintiff to “start 

looking for a more steady job with a more steady income . . . .” (A.R. 672).

8. Notes from an October 10, 2011 Magellan visit state that Plaintiff is 

actively pursuing a job. (A.R. 666). The therapist referred him to a driving job at Valley 

Care. Plaintiff told the therapist that “he had [a] DUI several years ago, and had his 

license suspended until a month ago, but that he would like to try for the job.” (A.R. 

667). 

11 Medical reports “containing observations made after the period for disability are relevant to assess the claimant's disability.” Smith v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 122, 1225 (9th 

Cir.1988) ( citing Kemp v. Weinberger, 522 F.2d 967, 969 (9th Cir.1975)).

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9. On October 10, 2011, Dr. Gilbert stated that Plaintiff did not have current 

psychosis, his mood was stable, he was not depressed, and he is caring for himself well. 

(A.R. 668).

10. On October 21, 2011, Plaintiff reported to a therapist at Magellan that “I 

am better. . . .” (A.R. 658). Plaintiff also stated that he “hang[s] out every day with [his]

friend.” (Id.). Notes also indicate that finances are barriers to “achieving the long term 

view.” Results from a mental status exam during the visit indicate that Plaintiff’s thought 

process was logical, his thought content was non-psychotic, his concentration was good, 

his memory was intact, and his intellect was good. (A.R. 659). 

11. On November 17, 2011, Dr. Gilbert noted that the severity of Plaintiff’s 

symptoms were mild and that Plaintiff had good concentration, intellect, judgment, and 

insight. (A.R. 646). Dr. Gilbert also noted that Plaintiff’s memory was intact. (Id.).

12. On December 29, 2011, Plaintiff indicated at a Magellan visit that he would 

be unable to attend a group therapy session as he had plans to visit a friend in San 

Francisco. Plaintiff also stated that the friend was moving to Phoenix and he would be 

driving with the friend from San Francisco to Phoenix. (A.R. 617). On January 11, 

2012, Plaintiff reported to Magellan that he was running low on money after helping a 

friend move from San Francisco to Phoenix. (A.R. 614). These statements support Dr. 

Worsley’s assessment that Plaintiff has adequate social abilities and is not significantly 

impaired by his mental condition.

13. A February 13, 2012 assessment conducted by Magellan stated that 

Plaintiff is “[s]table on current meds.” (A.R. 585). The assessment also noted that 

Plaintiff’s “only reported social barrier is finances.” (A.R. 587). The assessment also 

contains statements regarding Plaintiff’s desired employment. For example, it is stated 

that “I need a better job,” “I want a job,” “[Plaintiff] has a [history] of working as a cab 

driver and would prefer a similar job until he is approved to receive SSI,” “I need to 

figure out what I want to do job-wise with the availability that is out there,” and “I am a 

good worker.” (A.R. 588-89). 

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14. Plaintiff reported on February 9, 2012 at a Magellan visit that he is caring

for a 91 year old woman at the house in which he is renting a room. (A.R. 598). On 

March 7, 2012, Plaintiff again reported at a Magellan visit that he is the main caregiver 

for a 91 year old woman and also spends time caring for the woman’s 68 year old 

daughter. (A.R. 573). 

Given the consistency of Dr. Worsley’s opinion with the other evidence in the 

record, the Court finds that the ALJ did not err in giving Dr. Worsley’s opinion 

significant weight. The ALJ also did not err in giving substantial weight to the March 1, 

2011 opinion of non-examining physician Dr. Jonathan Zuess. Dr. Zuess assessed that 

Plaintiff “is reasonably seen as capable of sustaining at least simple work.” (A.R. 89). 

Since Dr. Zuess’s opinion is consistent with other evidence in the record, including the 

evidence discussed above, the ALJ did not err in giving the opinion substantial weight. 

Thomas, 278 F.3d at 957; Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 753 (upholding an ALJ’s reliance on 

the opinion of a non-examining physician where the opinion was supported by objective 

medical evidence). The Court therefore finds that the ALJ’s decision is based on 

substantial evidence in the record. 

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that the ALJ’s decision is supported 

by substantial evidence and is free from reversible error. Accordingly, the decision of the 

Commissioner of Social Security is affirmed. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED affirming the decision of the Commissioner of 

Social Security. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment accordingly. 

Dated this 11th day of March, 2015. 

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