Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_03-cv-01501/USCOURTS-casd-3_03-cv-01501-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 1 - 03cv1501

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HERCULANO DELGADILLO,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 03cv1501 DMS (BLM)

ORDER (1) ADOPTING IN PART

AND REJECTING IN PART

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION OF

MAGISTRATE JUDGE AND (2)

DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

vs.

JEANNE WOODFORD, Director,

Respondent.

Petitioner Herculano Delgadillo, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, is serving a fifteen-year

sentence for four counts of aggravated assault, two counts of corporal injury to a cohabitant, and one

count of making a terrorist threat. On July 12, 2005, Petitioner filed a first amended petition for writ

of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner raises four claims for relief: (1) the

admission of victim Rosa Ramirez’s preliminary hearing testimony at trial violated his Sixth

Amendment right to confrontation; (2) several pieces of evidence were inadmissible, and absent that

evidence, there was insufficient evidence to support the verdicts; (3) he received ineffective assistance

of appellate counsel; and (4) he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The Magistrate Judge

issued a thorough Report and Recommendation (“R&R”), finding Petitioner was not entitled to habeas

relief on his first claim, but he was entitled to habeas relief on his other claims as to counts six and

seven only. Petitioner and Respondent have each filed objections to the R&R, and Petitioner has filed

a reply to Respondent’s objections. The Court addresses these objections below. 

Case 3:03-cv-01501-DMS-BLM Document 67 Filed 12/15/06 Page 1 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 - 03cv1501

I. 

DISCUSSION

Respondent objects to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that the Court grant Petitioner

habeas relief as to two counts involving assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury, counts

six and seven, respectively. Respondent disagrees with the Magistrate Judge’s finding that

Petitioner’s convictions on those counts were based on inadmissible hearsay and that admission of that

evidence violated Petitioner’s rights under the Confrontation Clause. Respondent also asserts

Petitioner did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel. Finally, Respondent disagrees with the

Magistrate Judge’s finding that there was insufficient evidence to support count seven. 

Petitioner objects to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation to deny him relief as to counts

three through five. He disagrees with the Magistrate Judge’s findings that Ramirez’s preliminary

hearing testimony was properly admitted by the trial court. He also disagrees with the Magistrate

Judge’s analysis of the admissibility of Ramirez’s prior statements to Officer Vasquez and Detective

Behrendt. Petitioner also challenges the Magistrate Judge’s analysis of his ineffective assistance of

counsel claims. 

A. Standard of Review

Because Petitioner filed his habeas corpus petition after the effective date of the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), the Court’s review is limited by the

provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Under this Section, a habeas petitioner is not entitled to

relief unless he can demonstrate that the state court’s adjudication of his claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application

of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts

in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

As the facts of the case are not in dispute, Petitioner is entitled to federal habeas relief only if

he can meet one of the two bases for relief provided in Section 2254(d)(1). Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S.

634, 639–40 (2003). According to the Supreme Court, Section 2254(d)(1) imposes a “highly

Case 3:03-cv-01501-DMS-BLM Document 67 Filed 12/15/06 Page 2 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 - 03cv1501

deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings,” and “demands that state court decisions be

given the benefit of the doubt.” Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Lindh

v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 (1997); Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19 (2002)). The Supreme Court

reemphasized the deferential standard of review imposed by AEDPA when it reversed the Ninth

Circuit’s grant of a habeas petition for “fail[ing] to give appropriate deference to the state court’s

decision.” Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 437 (2004). 

In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000), the Supreme Court clarified the terms “contrary

to” and “unreasonable application of” under Section 2254(d)(1). A state court’s decision is “contrary

to” clearly established federal law if it fails to apply the correct controlling authority, or if it applies

the controlling authority to a case involving facts materially indistinguishable from those in a

controlling case, but nonetheless reaches a different result. Id. at 405. On the other hand,

a state court's decision involves an “unreasonable application of” federal law if it either

(1) correctly identifies the correct governing legal rule but then applies it to a new set

of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or (2) extends or fails to extend a

clearly established legal principle to a new context in a way that is objectively

unreasonable.

Id. at 407. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that “an unreasonable application of federal

law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.” Clark, 331 F.3d at 1067 (citing

Williams, 529 U.S. at 410). See also Woodford, 537 U.S. at 24 (a federal court may not “substitute

its own judgment for that of the state court, in contravention of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).”); Penry v.

Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 793 (2001) (“Even if the federal habeas court concludes that the state court

decision applied clearly established federal law incorrectly, relief is appropriate only if that application

is also objectively unreasonable.”) Thus, a “federal habeas court may not issue [a] writ simply

because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied

clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 411. Rather, the

application must be objectively unreasonable. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 665-66 (2004).

In addition, when ruling on a habeas petition under AEDPA, the key inquiry is not whether

the state court “erred.” In Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003), the Supreme Court did “not reach

the question whether the state court erred” in deciding whether habeas relief should be granted, but

rather focused “solely on whether § 2254(d) forecloses habeas relief.” Id. at 71. In doing so, the

Case 3:03-cv-01501-DMS-BLM Document 67 Filed 12/15/06 Page 3 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 - 03cv1501

Supreme Court overruled the Ninth Circuit’s previous requirement that federal habeas courts review

the state decision de novo before applying the AEDPA standard of review, and expressly held that the

only question that matters under Section 2254(d)(1) is whether the state court decision is contrary to,

or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. Id.

B. Confrontation Clause: Admission of Ramirez’s Preliminary Hearing Testimony at Trial

As indicated in the R&R, the victim, Rosa Ramirez, did not testify at Delgadillo’s trial.

However, Ramirez’s testimony at the preliminary hearing was read into the record. Petitioner argues

the admission of Ramirez’s preliminary hearing testimony violated his Sixth Amendment

confrontation rights. The state appellate court and the Magistrate Judge disagreed. Petitioner

nonetheless objects to the finding in the R&R, and maintains his confrontation rights were violated.

Petitioner argues the admission of Ramirez’s preliminary hearing testimony does not meet the

“unavailability” requirement of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause because the prosecution

did not exercise “reasonable diligence” to procure Ramirez’s presence at trial. Specifically, Petitioner

argues the prosecution’s efforts were unreasonable given that Ramirez was a critical witness, and was

known to be uncooperative and unwilling to testify at trial. Although the prosecution (a) subpoenaed

Ramirez, (b) requested the state trial judge to order her back, (c) requested the court to issue a warrant

of attachment after she failed to appear, and (d) had investigators drive to her last known address in

Los Angeles in an attempt to execute the warrant, Petitioner argues the prosecution should have done

more to secure Ramirez’s attendance. Namely, the prosecution should not have left Ramirez’s last

known address immediately after the search, and the prosecution should have requested a continuance

to attempt to procure Ramirez’s presence at trial.

The California Court of Appeal determined the prosecution exercised due diligence to secure

Ramirez’s presence at trial. This Court agrees with this finding. For essentially the same reasons

outlined in the California Court of Appeal’s “unavailability analysis,” the totality of the circumstances

indicates the prosecution employed reasonable diligence in its efforts to secure Ramirez’s presence

at trial. Namely, the prosecution subpoenaed Ramirez and had the trial judge order her back. When

she failed to appear for trial on September 6, 2000, the prosecution obtained a warrant of attachment

from the court and directed investigators to drive to Ramirez’s last known address in Los Angeles to

Case 3:03-cv-01501-DMS-BLM Document 67 Filed 12/15/06 Page 4 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 See R&R at 14-15 (citing Leavitt v. Arave, 383 F.3d 809, 830 n. 2, cert. denied 125 S.Ct.

2540 (2005) (statements to police by victim who initiates contact with police for the purpose of

gaining their assistance are not testimonial.))

- 5 - 03cv1501

execute the warrant and physically return her to court. On September 7, 2000, the investigators

interviewed the occupants of Ramirez’s residence, searched the house, and searched the street for

Ramirez’s car. However, the investigators were unable to locate her. Because the prosecution took

these affirmative and timely steps to secure Ramirez’s presence at trial, it appears the prosecution

made a good-faith effort to locate and present the witness. Ramirez was appropriately deemed

unavailable at the time of trial, therefore this Court cannot find that the state court’s adjudication of

this claim was contrary to clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court or was

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Petitioner’s first objection to the R&R is

overruled.

C. Sufficiency of the Evidence 

The Magistrate Judge found the testimony of Officer Vasquez was properly admitted under

Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), the testimony of Detective Behrendt was properly admitted under

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), but the testimony of Ramirez’s co-workers was

improperly admitted under Roberts. As a result, the Magistrate Judge determined the evidence was

sufficient to support all counts except count seven (assault by means of force likely to produce great

bodily injury by choking Ramirez on or about May 15, 2000). Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge

recommended the Court grant habeas relief based on this ground as to count seven. 

Petitioner objects to the Magistrate Judge’s finding that Officer Vasquez and Detective

Behrendt’s testimony was admissible. Respondent objects to the Magistrate Judge’s finding that there

was insufficient evidence to support count seven. For the reasons set forth below, the Court sustains

Petitioner’s objection concerning the admission of Detective Behrendt’s testimony, and sustains

Respondent’s objection to the dismissal of count seven for insufficient evidence. 

1. Officer Vasquez’s Testimony

The Magistrate Judge found Ramirez’s statements to Officer Vasquez were not testimonial,1

therefore they were subject to the Supreme Court’s decision in Roberts. Roberts states that nonCase 3:03-cv-01501-DMS-BLM Document 67 Filed 12/15/06 Page 5 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 - 03cv1501

testimonial hearsay is admissible if the prosecution demonstrates the declarant is unavailable and the

statement bears adequate indicia of reliability. 448 U.S. at 66. As discussed above, Ramirez was

determined to be unavailable for trial. The Magistrate Judge also found Ramirez’s statements to

Vasquez satisfied the second prong of Roberts because they fell within the spontaneous declaration

exception to the hearsay rule. 

The spontaneous declaration exception states: “[e]vidence of a statement is not made

inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement: (a) purports to narrate, describe, or explain an act,

condition, or event perceived by the declarant; and (b) was made spontaneously while the declarant

was under the stress of excitement caused by such perception.” Cal. Evid. Code § 1240. The

California Supreme Court has stated:

To render [statements] admissible [under the spontaneous declaration exception] it is

required that (1) there must be some occurrence startling enough to produce the

nervous excitement and render the utterance spontaneous and unreflecting; (2) the

utterance must have been before there has been time to contrive and misrepresent, i.e.,

while the nervous excitement may be supposed still to dominate and the reflective

powers to be yet in abeyance; and (3) the utterance must relate to the circumstance of

the occurrence preceding it. 

People v. Poggi, 45 Cal. 3d 306, 318 (1988) (quoting Showalter v. Western Pacific R.R. Co., 16 Cal.2d

460, 468 (1940)). In a subsequent decision, the court explained: 

The crucial element in determining whether a declaration is sufficiently reliable to be

admissible under this exception to the hearsay rule is thus not the nature of the

statement but the mental state of the speaker. The nature of the utterance . . . may be

important, but solely as an indicator of the mental state of the declarant. 

People v. Farmer, 47 Cal. 3d 888, 903-04 (1989)(emphasis added), overruled on other grounds by

People v. Waidla, 22 Cal. 4th 690 (2000).

In this case, Ramirez came directly to the San Diego Police Department immediately following

a violent altercation with her boyfriend, Petitioner Herculano Delgadillo, on May 19, 2000. Officer

Vasquez testified that while he was speaking to Ramirez, she was crying, shaking, visibly upset and

fearful the Petitioner would see her car outside the police station and kill her or her family.

(Lodgment No. 5 at 2; Lodgement No. 3, Reporter’s Tr., vol. 2 at 336-38, 356). Ramirez described

a cycle of abuse beginning in January of 2000. Officer Vasquez noted that while Ramirez was

describing the attacks, she moved slowly, groaned, and stated that her entire body hurt. Vasquez

Case 3:03-cv-01501-DMS-BLM Document 67 Filed 12/15/06 Page 6 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 As set out in the R&R, Detective Behrendt called Ramirez while she was staying with her

brother’s girlfriend in Los Angeles. He interviewed Ramirez for the purpose of investigating and

preparing the prosecution’s case against Petitioner. The Magistrate Judge correctly found this was

akin to an interrogation, and therefore Ramirez’s statements were testimonial. 

- 7 - 03cv1501

testified her exact words were that “within the last six months he had threatened to kill her so many

times she could not remember, and he had hit her so many times that she could not remember how

many times.” (Id. at 365). Ramirez expressed that she was in a perpetual state of fear that she or her

family would be killed or hurt by Petitioner. (Id.) After completing the interview, Ramirez was afraid

to leave the station. (Lodgment No. 3 at 4). Officer Vasquez offered to follow her when she

expressed concern Petitioner might be watching the police station. (Id.) After Ramirez arrived at her

destination in Los Angeles where she stayed with family members, she called Vasquez to tell him she

had arrived safely. (Id.)

On these facts, this Court disagrees with Petitioner’s objections, and concurs with the

Magistrate Judge’s finding that Ramirez’s statements to Officer Vasquez were spontaneous

declarations. Contrary to Petitioner’s suggestion, the lapse of time between the preceding incidents

and Ramirez’s statements does not automatically defeat the exception. Indeed, “if the elapsed time

is accounted for by shock, unconsciousness, or fear, belated statements may still be admissible as

spontaneous statements made while the declarant is under the stress of excitement.” People v.

Gutierrez,78 Cal. App. 4th 170, 178 n.9 (2000) (quoting 1 Jefferson, Cal. Evidence Benchbook, § 13.5,

p. 201). Under these circumstances, all of Ramirez’s statements to Officer Vasquez fall within the

spontaneous declaration exception. Accordingly, the Court overrules this objection to the R&R. 

2. Detective Behrendt’s Testimony

In the R&R, the Magistrate Judge found Ramirez’s statements to Detective Behrendt were

testimonial,2

 therefore they were subject to the Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford. In Crawford,

the Court stated that testimonial evidence is inadmissible under the Sixth Amendment absent “[a

showing] of unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” 541 U.S. at 68. Here, the

Magistrate Judge found Ramirez was unavailable, and she was subject to cross-examination at the

preliminary hearing, therefore her statements to Detective Behrendt were admissible. Petitioner

objects to the admission of Detective Behrendt’s testimony.

Case 3:03-cv-01501-DMS-BLM Document 67 Filed 12/15/06 Page 7 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

 Ramirez recanted her prior statements to police and co-workers, and, with one exception

relating to count one, denied Petitioner assaulted or threatened her. She offered selective percipient

testimony that ultimately had value to the prosecution only as to proving up count one and some

elements relating to other counts, e.g., cohabitation and physical injuries. 

- 8 - 03cv1501

Because Ramirez testified at the preliminary hearing and was subject to cross examination, the

admission of her preliminary hearing testimony concerning what she said to Detective Behrendt does

not run afoul of Crawford. But when questioned at the preliminary hearing about her statements to

Detective Behrendt, she recanted. Had Ramirez actually testified at the preliminary hearing

concerning Petitioner’s abusive conduct, the Crawford analysis would have more significance – as

it would permit Ramirez’s percipient testimony concerning Petitioner’s assaults and threats to go to

the jury notwithstanding Petitioner’s inability to cross examine her at trial. Instead, what was read

to the jury was Ramirez’s denial of making any statements to Detective Behrendt about abuse by

Petitioner.3 Consequently, Detective Behrendt’s hearsay testimony regarding what Ramirez told

him is admissible only if it falls within a recognized hearsay exception. It does not, as discussed

below. Petitioner’s objection is therefore sustained as to Detective Behrendt’s testimony.

3. Testimony of Ramirez’s Co-Workers

Next, Respondent objects to the Magistrate Judge’s finding that the admission of Ramirez’s

co-workers’ testimony violated the Confrontation Clause. The Magistrate Judge found Ramirez’s

statements to her co-workers were not testimonial, and therefore they needed to satisfy the Supreme

Court’s test set out in Roberts: a showing of unavailability and adequate indicia of reliability.

Although the unavailability prong was satisfied, the Magistrate Judge found Ramirez’s statement to

her co-workers did not satisfy the second prong concerning indicia of reliability. 

Respondent objects to this finding. She argues the co-workers’ testimony fell within a firmly

rooted hearsay exception under California Evidence Code section 1291 (former testimony) and was

corroborated by physical evidence, therefore it carried a “particularized guarantee of trustworthiness.”

As discussed below, however, the co-workers’ testimony does not fall within the former testimony

exception, nor does it fall within any other hearsay exception, firmly rooted or otherwise. That

Ramirez’s statements to co-workers were generally corroborated by physical evidence is insufficient,

/ / /

Case 3:03-cv-01501-DMS-BLM Document 67 Filed 12/15/06 Page 8 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

 Ramirez confided to co-workers Jarrette and Ponce that Petitioner “had choked her; both

Jarrette and Ponce saw marks on [Ramirez’s] throat, and Jarrette noticed she was hoarse.” (Lodgment

No. 5 at 6).

- 9 - 03cv1501

standing alone, to admit the hearsay testimony.4 Accordingly, the Court overrules this objection.

4. Insufficient Evidence to Support Count Seven

Count seven alleges Petitioner assaulted Ramirez by means of force likely to produce great

bodily injury by choking her on or about May 15, 2000. The Magistrate Judge found the only

evidence to support this count was the testimony of Simon Ponce, one of Ramirez’s co-workers.

Ponce testified that Ramirez told him Petitioner had choked her about a month or two before she was

let go from her job in late May 2000. The Magistrate Judge concluded Ponce’s testimony was

inadmissible, and without it, there was insufficient evidence to support the verdict on count seven.

Respondent objects to the Magistrate Judge’s finding that there was no other evidence to support the

verdict. 

The Magistrate Judge noted the prosecutor attempted to elicit testimony from Detective

Behrendt regarding count seven, but stated the incident occurred on May 19, 2000, not May 15, 2000.

The problem with the date provided by the prosecutor is that the information alleged two counts of

assault based on “choking” Ramirez: count two involving conduct on May 19, 2000, and count seven

involving conduct on May 15, 2000. Respondent argues the jury “was wise enough to understand that

the prosecutor may have used the wrong date in speaking, in the heat of the trial[,]” and the jury

understood Detective Behrendt’s testimony referred to the same incident that was the subject of

Ponce’s testimony. This argument, however, is sheer speculation as Ponce was unable to fix a precise

date of the attack and Behrendt’s testimony concerned numerous counts involving conduct that

occurred on several different dates. The record, therefore, reflects specifically elicited testimony from

Detective Behrendt about a choking incident that occurred on May 19, 2000 (count two), not May 15,

2000 (count seven). Thus, Behrendt’s testimony does not support count seven.

Nevertheless, as the California Court of Appeal noted, “substantial evidence other than

[Ramirez’s] statements supported the jury’s verdict, including photographs, hospital records and

independent observations of her injuries.” (Lodgment No. 11 at 2) (original emphasis). In addition,

Case 3:03-cv-01501-DMS-BLM Document 67 Filed 12/15/06 Page 9 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

 Count six alleged Petitioner assaulted Ramirez on or about May 7, 2000, by choking her and

slamming a closet door on her head.

6

 The state court imposed a six year concurrent sentence as to count seven. The foregoing

discussion, therefore, is largely academic as any habeas relief would not affect Petitioner’s ultimate

sentence.

- 10 - 03cv1501

Nurse Souders testified Ramirez told her that Petitioner had assaulted her on May 19, 2000, and had

assaulted her one or two weeks earlier.5

 (Lodgment No. 5 at 4 n. 3). As discussed below, Nurse

Souders’ testimony was properly admitted at trial. The foregoing evidence is sufficient to support

Petitioner’s convictions on all counts in question. Petitioner’s objection based on insufficiency of the

evidence is therefore overruled as the state appellate court’s determination of this issue is not

objectively unreasonable or contrary to clearly established law.6

D. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

Petitioner raises several instances of alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. The parties’

objections are directed at three of those instances: (1) counsel’s failure to object to the admission of

Ramirez’s prior out of court statements to Officer Vasquez, Detective Behrendt, Nurse Souders, and

Ramirez’s co-workers; (2) counsel’s failure to object to CALJIC No. 2.52; and (3) counsel’s failure

to call Ramirez’s mother, Florentina. The Court addresses these objections in turn. 

1. Failure to Object to Witness Testimony

The Magistrate Judge found counsel’s failure to object to the admission of the witness

testimony was objectively unreasonable and Petitioner was prejudiced by the admission of testimony

from all witnesses other than Officer Vasquez. Respondent objects to the former finding, and

Petitioner objects to the latter. 

In analyzing this claim, the Magistrate Judge started with the proposition that the witnesses’

testimony was admitted under the prior inconsistent statement exception to the hearsay rule. This

exception allows for admission of a prior inconsistent statement “if the statement is inconsistent with

[the witness’] testimony at the hearing and is offered in compliance with Section 770.” Cal. Evid.

Code § 1235. The Magistrate Judge found “the hearing” as used in Section 1235 referred to

Petitioner’s trial, and since Ramirez did not testify at the trial, her prior inconsistent statements were

not admissible under Section 1235. The Magistrate Judge concluded Petitioner’s trial counsel should

Case 3:03-cv-01501-DMS-BLM Document 67 Filed 12/15/06 Page 10 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 11 - 03cv1501

have raised this objection, and his failure to do so fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.

Respondent concedes Section 1235 cannot serve as the basis for admission of the witnesses’

testimony, but argues the witnesses’ testimony was nevertheless admissible under California Evidence

Code Section 1291. This section is entitled, “Former testimony offered against party to former

proceeding,” and states: 

(a) Evidence of former testimony is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the

declarant is unavailable as a witness and: . . .

(2) The party against whom the former testimony is offered was a party to the action

or proceeding in which the testimony was given and had the right and opportunity

to cross-examine the declarant with an interest and motive similar to that which he

has at the hearing. 

Cal. Evid. Code § 1291. 

Respondent’s reliance on this Section, however, is misplaced. By its plain terms, Section 1291

concerns “former testimony,” which is defined as: 

testimony given under oath in: (a) Another action or in a former hearing or trial of the

same action; (b) A proceeding to determine a controversy conducted by or under the

supervision of an agency that has the power to determine such a controversy and is an

agency of the United States or a public entity in the United States; (c) A deposition

taken in compliance with law in another action; or (d) An arbitration proceeding if the

evidence of such former testimony is a verbatim transcript thereof. 

Cal. Evid. Code § 1290 (emphasis added). Ramirez’s prior out of court statements to Officer Vasquez,

Detective Behrendt, Nurse Souders and her co-workers do not fall within this definition as she did not

make such statements under oath. Accordingly, the Court overrules this objection to the R&R. 

In addition to Section 1291, Respondent argues trial counsel’s failure to object to Nurse

Souders’ testimony was not objectively unreasonable because her testimony would have been

admissible under a separate hearsay exception and thus, carried particularized guarantees of

trustworthiness. Respondent is correct that Souders’ testimony would have been admissible on

grounds other than Sections 1235 and 1291. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 356 n. 8 (1992)

(hearsay exception for statements made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment is “firmly

rooted.”); Cal. Evid. Code § 1370 (infliction or threat of physical injury – admissibility of hearsay

statement by victim to physician or nurse). Her testimony also was corroborated by physical and other

medical evidence. Accordingly, trial counsel’s failure to object to Nurse Souders’ testimony was not

Case 3:03-cv-01501-DMS-BLM Document 67 Filed 12/15/06 Page 11 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

 This finding obviates the need to address Petitioner’s argument that, contrary to the

Magistrate Judge’s finding, he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to object to Officer Vasquez’s

testimony. 

- 12 - 03cv1501

objectively unreasonable. Respondent’s objection is therefore sustained.

The same may be said of counsel’s failure to object to Officer Vasquez’s testimony. The

Magistrate Judge found counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to this testimony, but only

because Petitioner could not demonstrate prejudice. Counsel’s failure to object to Officer Vasquez’s

testimony, however, did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness because Ramirez’s

statements to Vasquez would have been admitted under the spontaneous declaration exception.7 

Having limited counsel’s errors for failing to object to the testimony of Detective Behrendt and

Ramirez’s co-workers (as such testimony did not fall within a recognized hearsay exception), this

Court must consider whether Petitioner was prejudiced by these errors. Had counsel properly

objected, the trial court would have been required to exclude the hearsay testimony of Detective

Behrendt and Ramirez’s co-workers concerning Ramirez’s prior out of court statements to them. This

would have left Ramirez’s preliminary hearing testimony, Vasquez’s testimony, and Souders’

testimony to support the charges, in addition to photographs, hospital records and independent

percipient witness observations of Ramirez’s injuries. This Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge

that the evidence was sufficient to support counts one through five, and thus, counsel’s failure to

object to the testimony of Behrendt and Ramirez’s co-workers did not prejudice Petitioner as to these

counts. 

The only remaining issue is whether Petitioner was prejudiced as to counts six and seven. He

was not, for the reasons discussed below.

As set out in the R&R, count six alleged that on May 7, 2000, Petitioner assaulted Ramirez by

choking her and slamming a closet door on her head. Count seven alleged that on May 15, 2000,

Petitioner assaulted Ramirez by choking her. Although some of Ramirez’s co-workers testified that

she told them Petitioner had choked her and Detective Behrendt testified that she told him Petitioner

had choked her and slammed her head in a closet door on May 7, 2000, the admission of this

testimony did not prejudice Petitioner because sufficient evidence unrelated to the hearsay testimony

Case 3:03-cv-01501-DMS-BLM Document 67 Filed 12/15/06 Page 12 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

 CALJIC No. 2.52 allows a jury to use circumstances of flight following a crime as evidence

of the fleeing party’s guilt. 

9

 In his objections to the R&R, Petitioner raises a claim that his trial counsel’s cumulative

errors deprived him of a fair trial. However, Petitioner did not raise a claim of cumulative error in his

first amended petition, and thus, the Court declines to address that argument.

- 13 - 03cv1501

of the co-workers and Detective Behrendt supported the verdict, including the properly admitted

testimony of Officer Vasquez, Nurse Souders, photographs, hospital records, and percipient

observations of Ramirez’s injuries. Petitioner has not shown that there is a reasonable probability that

the result would have been different had counsel objected to the testimony of Detective Behrendt or

Ramirez’s co-workers. Trial counsel’s failure to object to this testimony therefore did not amount to

ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment. 

2. Failure to Properly Object to CALJIC No. 2.52

In addition to raising objections to the Magistrate Judge’s findings on counsel’s failure to

object to the witness testimony discussed above, Petitioner objects to the Magistrate Judge’s finding

that counsel was not ineffective for failing to properly object to CALJIC No. 2.52.8 However, this

Court fully agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s analysis of this issue. As stated in the R&R, counsel

presented witnesses to support his objection to the instruction, but the prosecution also presented

evidence to support the instruction, thus warranting the jury’s consideration of the issue. The state

court fully considered this claim, and Petitioner has not shown the state court’s denial of the claim was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. This objection

is overruled.

3. Failure to Call Florentina Ramirez

Finally, Petitioner objects to the Magistrate Judge’s determination that his counsel was not

ineffective for failing to call Ramirez’s mother, Florentina, as a witness. As with the jury instruction

claim discussed above, however, this Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s analysis of the issue.

Petitioner has not demonstrated the state court’s denial of the claim was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. This objection is, accordingly,

overruled.9

/ / /

Case 3:03-cv-01501-DMS-BLM Document 67 Filed 12/15/06 Page 13 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 14 - 03cv1501

E. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

Petitioner’s final claim is that he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel because

counsel failed to raise his Confrontation Clause claim in the California Supreme Court. For the

reasons set out in Sections I (C) and I (D) above, the Court overrules these objections. 

II.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court ADOPTS in part and REJECTS in part the R&R. Specifically,

the Court adopts the R&R with respect to Petitioner’s first claim that admission of Ramirez’s

preliminary hearing testimony at trial violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause. The Court

rejects the R&R with respect to Petitioner’s second claim of insufficient evidence. The Court also

rejects the R&R with respect to Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. 

For these reasons, the Court denies the Petition in its entirety. This order terminates this

action, and the Clerk of Court shall enter judgment accordingly. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 15, 2006

DANA M. SABRAW

United States District Judge

Case 3:03-cv-01501-DMS-BLM Document 67 Filed 12/15/06 Page 14 of 14