Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-86-02854/USCOURTS-ca10-86-02854-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

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11 .FILED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

United S~t.es Co~rt of Appeals .1enth Circuit 

JAN 1 01989 

LINDA E. KIRBY, as next friend 

of TROY ANDREWS, a minor, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

THE ATCHISON, TOPEKA AND 

SANTA FE RAILROAD COMPANY, 

a Delaware corporation, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

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ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 86-2854 

(D. New Mexico) 

(D.C. No. CV 85-1509-JC) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, SETH and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. 

Troy Andrews, a minor suing through Linda E. Kirby as next 

friend, appeals from an adverse summary judgment dismissing 

Andrews' negligence action against the Atchison, Topeka and Santa 

Fe Railroad Company ("ATSF"). This is a diversity case, applying 

New Mexico law. 

Andrews, then age 15, lost both his legs below the knees when 

he slipped while attempting to jump onto a slow moving freight 

train, and fell under the wheels. Kirby, on Andrews' behalf, sued 

ATSF in federal court, alleging that ATSF failed to exercise 

reasonable care to protect Andrews from injury, attractive 

nuisance, and negligence in maintaining unsafe railroad 

Appellate Case: 86-2854 Document: 01019962032 Date Filed: 01/10/1989 Page: 1 
equipment. 1 Kirby also alleged that ATSF, its agents and/or 

employees acted willfully and wantonly. 

ATSF moved for summary judgment contending that it did not 

owe a duty of reasonable care to Andrews. Kirby's response placed 

in issue the question of the legal principles to be applied. She 

maintained, among other things, that New Mexico's adoption of pure 

comparative negligence had displaced the common law doctrines of 

attractive nuisance, open and obvious danger, and the differing 

standards of care owed trespassers, invitees and licensees. 

also argued that the facts created a jury question 

Kirby 

on the 

attractive nuisance issue, and that ATSF owed a duty of reasonable 

care to Andrews because he was a discovered trespasser. 

The district court rejected those arguments. It ruled that 

Andrews appreciated the danger of climbing aboard a moving train, 

and dismissed the attractive nuisance and discovered trespasser 

theories. The court also held that ATSF fulfilled its common law 

duty to refrain from wanton and willful injury. On appeal Andrews 

reasserts the contentions he raised below in opposition to the 

motion for summary judgment by ATSF. We affirm. 

BACKGROUND 

The essential facts are not in dispute. On October 12, 1985, 

Andrews and a friend, Brian Siow, were walking from Siow's home to 

Andrews' home in Belen, New Mexico. They proceeded westward on 

Aragon Road to a point where the ATSF tracks crossed the road. 

Andrews lived on the other side of the tracks, south of Aragon 

1 The unsafe railroad equipment allegation was later abandoned. 

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Road. Their progress was blocked by a long, slow-moving 

(approximately two and one-half miles per hour) freight train. 

The warning gate, bells, and flashing lights were operating at the 

crossing. 

Instead of waiting for the train to pass the boys decided to 

climb aboard and cross through the moving train. They boarded the 

train approximately 65 feet south of the Aragon Road crossing. 

Andrews positioned himself between two boxcars and grabbed onto a 

brake wheel, pulling his left leg up onto the car. At that point 

(approximately 90 feet south of the crossing) the brake wheel 

turned, Andrews fell under the train, and the wheels of the car 

ran over his legs. 

Kirby produced considerable evidence that children played on 

and around the tracks in the area, to the railroad's knowledge, 

and that the railroad considered the Aragon Road crossing to be a 

problem. The evidence also established that there was no fence 

along the west side of the railroad right-of-way immediately south 

of Aragon Road, and there were no signs at the crossing warning 

people not to climb on moving trains. There was no railroad 

patrolman at the crossing. There is no allegation that the train 

was being operated improperly, or that any ATSF employee saw 

Andrews on the railroad right-of-way or saw him attempt to board 

the train. 

Andrews admits climbing on moving railway cars on two or 

three prior occasions, although not in the same manner by which 

his injury ensued. As to his appreciation of the danger of slow 

moving trains he testified: 

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Q. Do you recall your mother telling you 

that it was dangerous to play around [railroad 

tracks]? 

A. Yes. 

Q. When was that? 

A. It was about a couple of weeks before my 

accident. 

* * * 

Q. How did she find out that you had been 

riding on these trains or playing around them? 

A. I don't know. 

* * * 

Q. Is that something that you would have 

gone in and told her about? 

A. Me jumping on trains? 

Q. Yes. 

A. No. 

Q. Why? 

A. Because I'd probably get in trouble for 

it. 

Q. Why? 

A. I don't know. It is just a reaction of 

parents, I guess. 

Q. Why do you think parents react that way? 

A. Because they 

worried. (sic) 

care for their kids, 

Q. Did you think it was dangerous to do 

that? 

A. Yes. 

Q. What did you think could happen to you if 

you were playing around trains like that? 

A. I didn't take too much time to think 

about it. I just knew it was something that 

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Appellate Case: 86-2854 Document: 01019962032 Date Filed: 01/10/1989 Page: 4 
you could probably get hurt. (sic) I never 

stopped to think about what all could happen, 

until after my accident. (Emphasis supplied). 

Document No. 61, Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion for 

Summary Judgment, filed 9/9/86, Exhibit "l" at pp. 39-41. 

I. 

We are unpersuaded by Kirby's argument that New Mexico no 

longer recognizes the traditional categories of trespasser, 

licensee, and invitee for purposes of defining the duties of 

owners and occupiers of land. In Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 634 

P.2d 1234 (1981), the New Mexico Supreme Court approved the 

doctrine of comparative negligence in tort cases. But that 

decision did not explicitly address, or purport to address, every 

existing definition of duty, and concomitant standard of care, as 

they relate to the status of every person. 

Some jurisdictions have noted that, to varying degrees, 

common law distinctions should be abandoned in favor of a unified 

standard of care. See, ~, Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 

108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968). 2 See also Limberhand 

v. Big Ditch Co., 706 P.2d 491 (Mont. 1985) (applying Montana 

statute). Most jurisdictions have not gone so far, and have 

refused to abandon the common law classifications of trespasser, 

licensee and invitee notwithstanding the existence of comparative 

negligence in that jurisdiction. See Annotation, Modern Status of 

2 In 1971, the California legislature restored the wanton and 

reckless disregard standard to persons injured getting on, riding 

on, or getting off a moving locomotive or railroad car. See Cal. 

Civ. Code S 1714.7 (West). 

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Rules Conditioning Landowner's Liability Upon 

Party as Invitee, Licensee, or Trespasser, 

(1983). 

Status of Injured 

22 A.L.R. 4th 294 

More to the point, however, existing indications in New 

Mexico law give us no satisfactory basis upon which to predict 

that the New Mexico Supreme Court has departed or would wholly 

depart from its previously settled, and the more traditional, law 

of torts with respect to owners and occupiers of land. That is 

particularly so with respect to trespassers. New Mexico Uniform 

Jury Instructions, Civil, have retained the trespasser, licensee 

and invitee distinctions, along with consistent references to the 

Restatement (Second) of Torts§§ 328E, et~, through multiple 

amendments since 1981, including a complete recompilation 

effective January 1, 1987. See N.M. U.J.I., Civ. (1986 

Recompilation), Introduction to Chapter 13, and§§ 13-1301 to -03, 

13-1305 to -12, and committee comments to§§ 13-1302, 13-1303, 13-

1312 and 13-1619. Those Uniform Instructions are approved and 

adopted by the New Mexico Supreme Court, and their use is 

mandatory. Jewell v. Seidenberg, 82 N.M. 120, 477 P.2d 296 (N.M. 

1970). Thus, they would apply to any trial of this case. See 

N.M.R. Civ. Proc. l-05l(F). 

Additionally, multiple decisions by the New Mexico Court of 

Appeals since Scott v. Rizzo, have continued to refer in varying 

contexts to the traditional licensee, invitee, trespasser 

distinctions, and related principles from the Restatement of 

Torts. See Savinsky v. The Bromley Group. Ltd., 106 N.M. 175, 740 

P.2d 1159 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 106 N.M. 174, 740 P.2d 1158 

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J 

(1987); Woolwine v. Furr's, Inc., 106 N.M. 492, 745 P.2d 717 (Ct. 

App. 1987); Valdez v. Warner, 106 N.M. 305, 742 P.2d 517 (Ct. App. 

1987); Arenivas v. Continental Oil Co., 102 N.M. 106, 692 P.2d 31 

(Ct. App. 1983), cert. quashed, 102 N.M. 88, 691 P.2d 881 (1984); 

Ruiz v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co., 97 N.M. 194, 638 P.2d 

406 (Ct. App. 1981). In Savinsky v. The Bromley Group. Ltd., 740 

P.2d at 1161, the court stated: 

Where a person is injured on a landowner's 

premises, the owner's liability is limited by the duty 

he owes to the person who entered his property. See W. 

Prosser, The Law of Torts at 357 (4th ed. 1971). "Those 

who enter upon land are divided into three fixed 

categories: trespassers, licensees, and invitees, and 

there are subdivided duties as to each." Id. (emphasis 

added). -

As we stated above, under these circumstances there is simply 

an insufficient basis in New Mexico law as presently articulated, 

especially with regard to trespassers, to allow us to conclude, or 

predict, with any confidence that a single, unified standard of 

reasonable or ordinary care applies to possessors of land. We 

join the district court, therefore, in holding that New Mexico's 

traditional status distinctions with respect to entrants upon 

property, and levels of duty and concomitant standards of care 

related to those distinctions, govern Kirby's case for purposes of 

determining liability. Consistent with that holding, we likewise 

conclude that the traditional doctrines of attractive nuisance and 

discovered or anticipated trespasser have not been supplanted by 

comparative negligence principles under New Mexico law. 

We proceed, then, to analyze this case under traditional tort 

doctrines. 

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II. 

Kirby does not dispute that Andrews was a trespasser on the 

railroad right-of-way, and on the train. As the New Mexico Court 

of Appeals reiterated just last year in Savinsky: 

As a general rule, with specifically stated exceptions, 

"a possessor of land is not liable to trespassers for 

physical harm caused by his failure to exercise 

reasonable care (a) to put the land in a condition 

reasonably safe for their reception, or (b) to carry on 

his activities so as not to endanger them." Restatement 

(Second) of Torts§ 333 (1965). 

Id. at 1162 (emphasis added). 

Kirby relies upon two recognized exceptions to the general 

rule: the doctrine of attractive nuisance; and a landowner's duty 

of ordinary care to a particular trespasser which the landowner 

''knows or should know" is on his land, when the landowner's 

activities, or creation or maintenance of an artificial condition, 

involve unreasonable risk of death or great bodily harm to persons 

coming on the land. See N.M. U.J.I., Civ. (1986 Recompilation) 

§§ 13-1305 to 6, -1312. Savinsky v. The Bromley Group. Ltd., 740 

P.2d at 1162; Latimer v. City of Clovis, 83 N.M. 610, 495 P.2d 788 

(Ct. App. 1972). 

Both doctrines invoked by Kirby would increase the standard 

of care owed by ATSF to Andrews from slight to one of ordinary 

care. See N.M. U.J.I., Civ. §§ 13-1305 to 6, -1312; Saul v. 

Roman Catholic Church of Arch. of Santa Fe, 75 N.M. 160, 402 P.2d 

48 (1965); Latimer v. City of Clovis, 495 P.2d at 788; Savinsky v. 

Bromley , 740 P.2d at 1162. 3 See also Restatement (Second) of 

3 N.M. U.J.I., Civ. 13-1312 provides: 

(Cont'd on next page.) 

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, 

Torts§§ 334-35, 339 (1965). 

Generally, as Kirby urges, the existence or absence of 

ordinary care to save another from foreseeable harm is a jury 

(Cont'd from previous page.) 

An [owner] [occupant] has a duty to prevent injury 

to a trespassing child resulting from (Describe 

structure or artificial condition) artificial condition 

of the land if: 

(1) The place where the condition is maintained is 

one upon which the [owner] [occupant] knows or has 

reason to know that children are likely to trespass; 

(2) The condition is one which involves an 

unreasonable risk of injury to trespassing children and 

the [owner] [occupant] knows or has reason to know of 

such risk; and 

(3) The child because of his 

discover the condition or realize the 

intermeddling with it or coming into 

dangerous by it. 

youth does not 

risk involved by 

the area made 

In such a case, the [owner] [occupant] has a duty to 

exercise ordinary care, considering the youth of the 

child, to prevent injury to the child. 

N.M. U.J.I., Civ. 13-1305 provides: 

If the [owner] [occupant] creates or maintains an 

artificial condition on the land, then he has a duty to 

a trespasser to use ordinary care to warn of the 

condition and of the risk involved if: 

(1) The condition involves an unreasonable risk of 

death or bodily harm to persons coming onto the land; 

(2) He 

are constant 

area] [that 

proximity to 

knows or reasonably should know [that there 

intrusions by persons in the dangerous 

there are persons on the land in dangerous 

the condition]; and 

( 3 ) 

will not 

involved. 

He has reason to believe that the trespasser 

discover the condition or realize the risk 

The [owner] [occupant] owes no duty to make his 

land safe for a trespasser, unless and until he knows or 

reasonably should know that the trespasser is on his 

(Cont'd on next page.) 

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I 

question. However, the special exceptions invoked here do not 

apply to increase the duty of an occupier of land to trespassers 

to one of ordinary care unless the specific elements or conditions 

upon which they rest are shown to exist. See, ~, Latimer v. 

- City of Clovis, 495 P.2d at 791 ("[A]ll elements must concur if 

the doctrine is to be applied."). Therefore, the issue of the 

existence of a jury question goes in the first instance to the 

threshold conditions. 

In its opinion granting summary judgment in this case the 

district court accurately set out the conditions to be satisfied 

before the doctrines invoked by Kirby would apply. The court also 

(Cont'd from previous page.) 

land. 

N.M. U.J.I., Civ. 13-1306 provides: 

If the owner is engaged in activities on his land, 

he has a duty to use ordinary care to avoid injury to a 

trespasser, if: 

(1) The activity involves an unreasonable risk of 

death or great bodily harm to persons coming onto the 

land; 

(2) He knows or should reasonably know that [there 

are constant intrusions by trespassers onto the area in 

which the activity is permitted] [there are trespassers 

on the land in dangerous proximity to the activity]; and 

(3) He has reason to believe that the trespasser 

will not realize the risk of harm involved. 

[If the 

owner has a 

control the 

warning.] 

activity involves a controllable force, the 

duty either to use reasonable care to 

force to avoid injury or to give adequate 

The [owner] [occupant] of the land has no duty to 

regulate his activities so as to avoid injury to a 

trespasser, unless and until he knows or should know 

that the trespasser is on his land. 

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, 

satisfied here. The element is Andrews' realization of the risk 

involved. With respect to these points we adopt the district 

court's reasoning and authorities: 

I hold that, as a matter of law, a 15 year old 

youth of normal intelligence and experience appreciates 

the danger of climbing on moving trains, and 

accordingly, the doctrine of attractive nuisance does 

not apply in this case. 

The overwhelming weight of authority in 

jurisdictions across the country is that the 

attractive nuisance doctrine does not apply as 

a matter of law in cases where child 

trespassers are injured by moving trains ••• 

(n)othing could be more pregnant with warning 

of danger than the noise and appearance of a 

huge, rumbling string of railroad cars. It 

cannot be compared with the silent, deadly 

danger of high power electricity, the 

inanimate attraction of stationary machines, 

traps or turntables, loose boards, unseen 

pitfalls, or the still, inviting depths of a 

swimming pool to a tiny child .... 

Holland v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co., 431 A.2d 

597, 602-603 (D.C. 1981). 

In the present case, Andrews was not a tiny child, 

but a young man of high school age and corresponding 

education, who lived nearly adjacent to railroad tracks 

and regularly encountered trains. Given his age, 

education, intelligence and experience, I cannot expand 

the concept of attractive nuisance, meant to protect 

inexperienced children, to include him. See, Klaus v. 

Eden, 70 N.M. 371, 373, 374 P.2d 129,131 (1962). 

The Plaintiff relies on Latimer v. City of Clovis 

for the proposition that Andrews, despite being warned, 

did not appreciate the danger. In Latimer, the court 

held that "the fact that warnings had been given does 

not eliminate the question of whether there was a 

realization of the risk." 83 N.M. at 615, 495 P.2d at 

793. Plaintiff attempts to prove too much with this 

argument. In Latimer, the decedent was a 5 year old 

boy; while he may not have been able to understand the 

warnings, there is no reason to presume that Troy 

Andrews, at age 15, would have similar difficulty. 

Moreover, the dangerous instrumentality in Latimer was a 

partially filled swimming pool, not a moving train. In 

Holland, the court explicitly distinguished the latent 

danger of swimming pools from the obvious danger of 

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moving trains. Thus, 

"controlling authority 

the Plaintiffs, and this 

approach on the present 

with Latimer. 

the Latimer case is not 

directly on point" as argued by 

Court's adoption of the Holland 

facts is in no way inconsistent 

The Plaintiff argues that appreciation of general 

danger is not enough; the Plaintiff must understand the 

particularized danger of the causes in fact of his 

injury. The Plaintiff's citation of Latimer as 

authority for this proposition is unpersuasive, and this 

Court can find no reason to hold that Andrews had to 

understand the specific danger of grabbing a brake-wheel 

instead of the general danger of climbing on a moving 

train. Because the Plaintiff, as a matter of law, 

cannot establish that Troy Andrews did not appreciate 

the general danger of climbing onto a moving train, she 

cannot establish the attractive nuisance doctrine. 

R. Vol. I, Doc. 77 pp. 5-7. 

We recognize that the realization of danger element is worded 

slightly differently under the attractive nuisance and discovered 

or anticipated trespasser doctrines. However, for purposes 

relevant here the difference is not consequential. 

There remains the question of the application of Restatement 

(Second) of Torts S 334 and a similar rule contained in former 

N.M. U.J.I., Civ. 10.3. The district court rejected the application of S 334 on the ground that Andrews realized the risk of harm 

posed by a moving train. Mem. Op., R. Vol. I, Doc. 77 pp. 7-8. 

However, S 334 contains no such condition. It provides: 

A possessor of land who knows, or from facts within his 

knowledge should know, that trespassers constantly 

intrude upon a limited area thereof, is subject to 

liability for bodily harm there caused to them by his 

failure to carry on an activity involving a risk of 

death or serious bodily harm with reasonable care for 

their safety. 

Former N.M. U.J.I., Civ. 10.3 contains a similar rule. In Latimer 

v. City of Clovis, 495 P.2d at 794, the Court of Appeals referred 

to the rule, quoting the instruction, as follows: 

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Generally speaking, a defendant owes no duty to an 

undiscovered trespasser except to refrain from wilfully 

or wantonly injuring the trespasser. Where, however, 

the trespasser is discovered or reasonably should have 

been anticipated, the duty is that of ordinary care to 

prevent injury to the trespasser. These views are 

illustrated by N.M.U.J.I. 10.3 which states: 

"An owner owes no duty to a trespasser 

unless his presence on the premises is either 

known or from facts and circumstances should 

reasonably have been anticipated. However, 

the owner is under a duty not to willfully or 

wantonly injure a trespasser. 

"If an owner knows or from facts known to 

him should reasonably anticipate the presence 

of a trespasser in a place of danger then the 

owner is under a duty to use ordinary care to 

prevent injury to him." 

In James v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co., 464 

F.2d 173, 176 (10th Cir. 1972), we referred to S 334 of the 

Restatement and Instruction 10.3, in tandem, and cited Latimer in 

that connection, for a statement of New Mexico law. In Ruiz v. 

Southern Pacific Transp. Co., 638 P.2d at 409, the New Mexico 

Court of Appeals also makes a passing reference both to S 334 and 

Instruction 10.3 (citing James). More recently, in Savinsky v. 

Bromley Group, Ltd., 740 P.2d at 1162, the New Mexico Court of 

Appeals referred to exceptions to the general rule that a 

possessor of land is not liable to trespassers for physical harm 

caused by failure to exercise reasonable care, stating: 

As a general rule, with specifically stated exceptions, 

"a possessor of land is not liable to trespassers for 

physical harm caused by his failure to exercise 

reasonable care (a) to put the land in a condition 

reasonably safe for their reception, or (b) to carry on 

his activities so as not to endanger them.": 

Restatement (Second) of Torts S 333 (1965). Cf. SCRA 

1986, 13-1306 (providing an exception to the general 

rule, requiring ordinary care to avoid injury to a 

trespasser where the owner is engaged in activities on 

his land involving unreasonable risk of death or great 

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yet 

bodily harm); Latimer v. City of Clovis, 83 N.M. 610, 

495 P.2d 788 (Ct.App.1972) (holding no duty to an 

undiscovered trespasser unless the trespasser is 

discovered or reasonably should have been anticipated, 

in which case there is a duty of ordinary care to 

prevent injury to the trespasser). (emphasis added). 

However, we cannot conclude that these references establish 

another, broader rule in New Mexico with respect to 

anticipated trespassers. N.M. U.J.I. 10.3, upon which the cited 

statements of law rely, was eliminated from the New Mexico Uniform 

Jury Instructions in the second edition, 1980 (see Appendix, N.M. 

U.J.I., Civ. p.304; 1986 Recompilation). It was replaced by N.M. 

U.J.I., Civ. 13.6 which was later renumbered as the present 

section 13-1306. That instruction has added the realization of 

risk element. With that one critical change N.M. U.J.I. §§ 13-

1305 to 6, and 1312 now parallel Restatement (Second) of Torts, 

§§ 334, 335 and 339. 

In view of the careful statement of exceptions to the general 

rule contained in the modern revisions to the New Mexico Jury 

Instructions, it would be incongruous to perceive the existence of 

some omnibus rule, not found in the instructions, which would 

render much of the instructions obsolete. We decline to find such 

a rule. 

III. 

The remaining issue of willful or wanton conduct by ATSF with 

respect to Andrews is not seriously pursued by Kirby. Her written 

opposition to the motion for summary judgment by ATSF in the 

district court did not dispute summary judgment on this ground, 

although some opposition on the point might by gleaned from oral 

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argument by Kirby's counsel before the district court. 

II. 

R. Vol. 

On appeal Kirby devotes scant attention to the subject. Four 

pages in her Brief-in-Chief, pp. 44-47, quote Section 500 of the 

Restatement (Second) of Torts, and comment on the definition of 

willful and wanton. But no cases are cited in support of any 

particularized charge of willful or wanton conduct in this case. 

Kirby's Reply Brief on appeal does not mention the issue. There 

is no attempt to dispute the position by ATSF, supported by a 

plethora of cases, that ATSF did not owe Andrews any duty to 

fence, patrol or warn. 

Furthermore, even in connection with Kirby's ordinary care 

related arguments pertaining to the presence, in general, of 

trespassing children, Kirby points to no evidence of children 

hopping trains at the Aragon Crossing, or to any injuries there. 

Indeed, her own witness, quoted in her Brief-in-Chief for the 

proposition that children played around the tracks, stated: 

Q. Have you ever observed any of the kids riding the 

trains right in that area? 

A. Not kids riding them. I've watched them cross over 

them when they were stopped and stuff, but not 

riding on them. 

Id. at 10, quoting from the deposition of William Temple, who 

lived at the Aragon Crossing (Exhibit 10 at 13-14). 

There is nothing in this record which suggests a need for us 

to pursue the issue of willful or wanton conduct by ATSF more 

extensively than Kirby herself. 

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IV. 

When reviewing a grant of summary judgment this court is 

obliged to examine the record to "determine whether any genuine 

issue of material fact pertinent to the ruling remains and, if 

not, whether the substantive law was correctly applied." Setliff 

v. Memorial Hospital of Sheridan County, 850 F.2d 1384, 1391 (10th 

Cir. 1988) (citations omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 

"In determining whether any genuine issues of material fact exist, 

the record must be construed liberally in favor of the party 

opposing the summary judgment." Setliff, 850 F.2d at 1391-92; see 

also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). This deferential stance does not mean 

that any alleged factual dispute will suffice to defeat a motion 

for summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 

242, 247-48 (1986) (mere existence of some alleged factual dispute 

will not defeat an otherwise proper motion for summary judgment). 

Instead, such allegations must create genuine issues of material 

fact. A "genuine" issue is neither created by conclusory 

allegations, Setliff, 850 F.2d at 1392; nor by unsupported 

assertions: 

In a response to a motion for summary judgment, a party 

cannot rest on ignorance of facts, on speculation, or on 

suspicion and may not escape summary judgment in the 

mere hope that something will turn up at trial. The 

mere possibility that a factual dispute may exist, 

without more, is not sufficient to overcome convincing 

presentation by the moving party. The litigant must 

bring to the district court's attention some affirmative 

indication that his version of relevant events is not 

fanciful. 

Conaway v. Smith, 853 F.2d 789, 794 (10th Cir. 1988) (citations 

and footnotes omitted). The "materiality" requirement assures 

that "[o]nly disputes over facts which might affect the outcome of 

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the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry 

of summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. 

We have considered all of the arguments of the parties, 

addressing those we deemed necessary. Upon a careful review of 

the record in this case in the light of applicable legal standards 

we are unable to conclude that any genuine issue of material fact 

exists. 

AFFIRMED. 

Therefore, the judgment of the district court 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Stephen H. Anderson 

Circuit Judge 

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is 

Appellate Case: 86-2854 Document: 01019962032 Date Filed: 01/10/1989 Page: 17 
HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, concurring and dissenting No. 86-2854 

Kirby v. Atchison, Topeka 

& Santa Fe Railway Co. 

I respectfully dissent from the affirmance of the summary 

judgment. While I agree with some of the rulings of the district 

judge and views on them in the Order and Judgment, I am convinced 

that this record and New Mexico case law do not justify a summary 

judgment rejecting all of the claims brought for the injured boy 

and dismissing his case. 

First, I agree with the Order and Judgment that New Mexico 

has retained the trespasser, licensee, and invitee distinctions 

with respect to the duties of owners and occupiers of land. The 

continued recognition of those classifications in the New Mexico 

Uniform Jury Instructions for civil cases supports that view. 

Second, turning to the alternative doctrines relied on by 

Troy Andrews -- the doctrines of attractive nuisance and known or 

discovered trespassers -- the remaining issue is a narrow one, 

concerning only one element of the doctrines. The issue is 

whether Troy, because of his youth, did not "realize the risk" of 

the slowly moving train in the residential area of Belen. Saul v. 

Roman Catholic Church of Archdiocese of Santa Fe, 402 P.2d 48, 49 

(N.M. 1965) (adopting the elements of the attractive nuisance 

doctrine as stated in the Restatement of Torts§ 339). 

In Saul, the New Mexico Supreme Court stated the elements of 

the doctrine of attractive nuisance: (1) the place or property 

must be one on which the owner knows or should know children are 

likely to trespass; (2) the condition must be one which the owner 

knows or should know involves an unreasonable risk of death or 

harm to such children; (3) "the children because of their youth do 

Appellate Case: 86-2854 Document: 01019962032 Date Filed: 01/10/1989 Page: 18 
not discover the condition or realize the risk;" and (4) the 

u t i l ity to the possessor or owner of maintaining the condition is 

slight as compared to the risk to young children. Saul, 402 P.2d 

at 49. The trial judge specifically addressed these four 

elements, citing Saul in his Memorandum Opinion. The judge then 

clearly stated the focus of his ruling: 

While Plaintiffs show 

as to other elements 

doctrine, unless they 

to Troy Andrews' lack 

of climbing on moving 

become immaterial. 

Memorandum Opinion at 5. 

numerous fact questions exist 

of the attractive nuisance 

can establish a fact issue as 

of appreciation of the danger 

trains, the other fact issues 

Thus, the district judge clearly recognized a fact issue on 

all elements of the doctrine except the third the discovery and 

realization of the risk. His holding, upheld by the Order and 

Judgment, was that "as a matter of law, a 15 year old youth of 

normal intelligence and experience appreciates the danger of 

climbing on moving trains, and accordingly, the doctrine of 

attractive nuisance does not apply in this case." 

Opinion at 5. 

Memorandum 

Here the pert inent fact issue is whether the boy did "realize 

the risk." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1890 

(1981 ), gives this definition for "realize:" 

3: to conceive vividly as real: be fully aware of: 

understand clearly <realized the risk he was 

taking> 

At the outset, as noted in the Memorandum Opinion of the 

district judge, this was a very slowly moving train the 

district judge said it was moving approximately at l1⁄2 miles per 

2 

Appellate Case: 86-2854 Document: 01019962032 Date Filed: 01/10/1989 Page: 19 
hour. IR. Document No. 77, Memorandum Opinion at l; see I R. 

~ 

Document No. 61, Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion for 

Summary Judgment, Exhibit 2 (Deposition of Dr. Slade Hulbert) at 

27 (estimating the speed at 21⁄2 to 3 miles per hour from 

information furnished by Troy's companion, Brian Siow). Contrary 

to the picture the majority sees, Troy was not faced with the 

noise and appearance of a rumbling string of railroad cars, 

Holland v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co., 431 A. 2d 597, 602-03 

(D.C. 1981), associated with a faster train. Faced instead with 

the very slowly moving train in his residential area of Belen, 1 

the question is whether Troy was "fully aware of," and did 

"understand clearly" the risk. 

In Martinez v. C.R. Davis Contracting Co., 389 P.2d 597, 598 

(N.M. 1964), the Supreme Court of New Mexico faced a similar 

question. There the issue raised on appeal was whether it was 

contributory negligence as a matter of law for a boy aged 14 years 

and 5 months to enter an excavation at a construction site and 

board an object in a pool of water which appeared to be a raft. 

The court said the question posed by the evidence was whether 

reasonable minds could differ as to whether the child: 

1 

because of his youth discovered the condition or 

realized the risk involved in intermeddling in it 

or in coming within the area made dangerous by it? 

If reasonable minds can differ the case should be 

affirmed. If not, it should be reversed. In the 

instant case we think reasonable minds can well 

differ. (emphasis added). 

See photograph, IR., Document No. 61, Exhibit 3. 

3 

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Thus New Mexico does not draw hard and fast lines based on the age 

II 

of the child or the condition he faced. 2 In fact, the New Mexico 

Supreme Court has further said that it: 

has never sanctioned attempts to place 

involving the doctrine of attractive nuisance 

rigid category on the basis of the type 

condition involved. Whether the maintenance 

specific condition can give rise to liability 

harm to trespassing children must necessarily 

on the facts of the particular case. 

cases 

in a 

of 

of a 

for 

turn 

Martinez v. Louis Lyster, General Contractor, Inc., 409 P.2d 493, 

495 (N.M. 1965}; see also Latimer v. City of Clovis, 495 P.2d 788, 

793 (N.M. Ct. App. 1972} (quoting Martinez' statement rejecting 

rigid categories}. 

It seems especially persuasive, since New Mexico has adopted 

§ 339 of the Restatement of Torts, that the following official 

comment c to§ 339 of the Restatement of Torts (Second} is made: 

2 

c. Children. In the great majority of the 

cases in which the rule here stated has been 

applied, the plaintiff has been a child of not more 

than twelve years of age. The earliest decisions 

as to the turntables all involved children of the 

age of mischief between six and twelve. The later 

cases, however, have included a substantial number 

in which recovery has been permitted, under the 

rule stated, where the child is of high school age, 

ranging in a few instances as high as sixteen or 

seventeen years. The explanation no doubt lies in 

the fact that in our present hazardous civilization 

some types of dangers have become common, which an 

immature adolescent may reasonably not appreciate, 

although an adult may be expected to do so. The 

rule stated in this Section is not limited to 

"young" children, or to those "of tender years," so 

long as the child is still too young to appreciate 

the danger, as stated in Clause (c). 

Compare Guilfoyle v. Missouri, Kansas and Texas R.R., 812 

F.2d 1290 (0th Cir. 1987), in which judgment for railroad was 

directed to be entered due to lack of proof by plaintiff to 

satisfy Oklahoma rule requiring 14-year old to overcome 

presumption of capacity to exercise judgment and discretion . 

4 

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A few courts have attempted to state arbitrary 

age limits, setting a maximum age of fourteen for 

the possible application of the rule. This usually 

has been taken over from the rule, in these states, 

as to the presumed capacity of children over the 

age of fourteen for contributory negligence, which 

has in turn been derived from the rule of the 

criminal law as to their presumed capacity for 

crime. The great majority of the courts have 

rejected any such fixed age limit, and have held 

that there is no definite age beyond which the rule 

here stated does not apply. As the age of the 

child increases, conditions become fewer for which 

there can be recovery under this rule, until at 

some indeterminate point, probably beyond the age 

of sixteen, there are no longer any such 

conditions. (emphasis added).~ 

There is an especially persuasive statement interpreting 

§ 339 by the Supreme Court of Minnesota, Hughes v. Quarve & 

3 

The official comment to Clause (c) of§ 339 of the original 

Restatement of Torts read as follows: 

e. A possessor of land is, under the 

statement made in Comment a, under a duty to 

keep so much of his land as he knows to be 

subject to the trespasses of young children, 

free from artificial conditions which involve 

an unreasonable risk of death or serious 

bodily harm to them. This does not require 

him to keep his land free from conditions 

which even young children are likely to 

observe and the full extent of the risk 

involved in which they are likely to realize. 

The purpose of the duty is to protect children 

from dangers which they are unlikely to 

appreciate and not to protect them against 

harm resulting from their own immature 

recklessness in the case of known danger. 

Therefore, even though the condition is one 

which the possessor should realize to be such 

that young children are unlikely to realize 

the full extent of the danger of meddling with 

it or encountering it, the possessor is not 

subject to liability to a child who in fact 

discovers the condition and appreciates the 

full risk involved therein but none the less 

chooses to encounter it out of recklessness or 

bravado. 

5 

Appellate Case: 86-2854 Document: 01019962032 Date Filed: 01/10/1989 Page: 22 
' Anderson Co., 338 N.W.2d 422 (Minn. 1983). A personal injury 

action was brought where a youth had sustained injury following a 

dive into a quarry pond. The plaintiff was 16 years of age and 

the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the trial judge had 

correctly submitted the case to the jury under the attractive 

nuisance doctrine: 

There is no set age at which a plaintiff should be 

denied the section 339 instruction. Comment c to 

section 339, Restatement (Second) of Torts, states 

that section 339 has been applied in a few 

instances to children as old as 16 or 17 years and 

that a majority of jurisdictions have rejected any 

fixed age for which there can be recovery under 

this rule, until at some indeterminate point, 

probably beyond the age of sixteen, there are no 

longer any such conditions. 

Id. at 424-25 (emphasis added). 

For these reasons, I am convinced it was error for the 

district court to hold, as a matter of law, that a 15 year old 

youth of normal intelligence and experience would clearly realize 

the risk and appreciate the danger of the very slowly moving train 

in these circumstances. 

In addition, the Order and Judgment relies on the deposition 

of Troy as a basis for the summary judgment. It cites a statement 

from the deposition in which he responded affirmatively to a 

question about whether he thought it was dangerous to ride on or 

play around trains. However, as the Order and Judgment also 

notes, Troy responded that "I didn't take too much time to think 

about it. I just knew it was something you could probably get 

hurt. 

until 

(sic) I never stopped to think about what all could happen 

after my accident." Document 61, Exhibit at 39-41. 

(emphasis added). Troy was asked how the accident happened and 

6 

Appellate Case: 86-2854 Document: 01019962032 Date Filed: 01/10/1989 Page: 23 
; said "the train we saw was going pretty slow. So I decided that I 

would go ahead and go across, because I've done it before." Id. 

at 3. Troy was also asked: 

Q. Have you ever told the six to eight-year-old 

kids that it is dangerous to play on or around 

railroad tracks? 

A. After I came home from the hospital, I did. 

Q. But not before that? 

A. No. 

Id. at 39. Read favorably to Troy as it must be, the record shows 

a genuine fact issue. 

In addition, there was testimony from Dr. Hulbert, the Doctor 

of Psychology, who interviewed Troy's companion Brian and other 

witnesses. Document 61, Exhibit 2 at 27 and 31. 

following testimony in his deposition: 

He gave the 

Q. So it is your opinion that a 15 year old boy 

of Troy Andrews' experience, intelligence, 

education would not appreciate the danger of 

getting on this train? 

A. In its slow moving form, yes, I would say that 

they wouldn't appreciate the danger. 

Id. at 64. Doctor Hulbert further testified as follows: 

Q. But you say he wasn't aware of the potential 

for danger? 

A. Not a train moving that slow. See I'm as sure 

as I sit here that when Troy said that or gave 

an answer of that sort that he, like 99 

percent of anybody you would ask on the 

street, would consider that moving train to be 

moving at least ten miles an hour if not 

faster. This thing is just crawling along at 

a snail's pace and I don't think that anybody 

is going to consider that a hazardous moving 

train. It's moving, but its moving so slowly. 

7 

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• 

Id. at 78-79. (emphasis added). 

Id. at 56. 

[I]t is extremely innocuous in appearance slow 

moving freight cars or stopped freight cars just 

don't pose a threat to the uninformed •••• 

Despite the statements cited by the majority from Troy's 

deposition, when the record is viewed as a whole there is a 

question of fact on his full realization of the danger. "As the 

moving party, [the railroad] had the burden of showing the absence 

of a genuine issue as to any material fact, and for these purposes 

the material it lodged must be viewed in the light most favorable 

to the opposing party.'' Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 

(1970); Rea v. Wichita Mortgage Corp., 747 F.2d 567, 573 (10th 

Cir. 1984). When the testimony is viewed as a whole and construed 

in Troy's favor, it is wrong to hold there is no question of fact 

on Troy's full realization of the risk involved in the train 

moving very slowly through his neighborhood. The record shows 

sufficiently a genuine fact issue on this element of Troy's case -

- the only one on which the summary judgment was based. See 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Anderson v. 

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256-57 (1986). 

Troy may not prevail at trial in establishing his case under 

the attractive nuisance and anticipated trespasser theories. But 

in light of the record before us we should not deny him his right 

to trial by a jury which could view him, judge his intelligence, 

and decide whether he realized the risk. 

8 

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