Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_21-cv-01012/USCOURTS-azd-2_21-cv-01012-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Aaron Smith,

Plaintiff,

v. 

City of Mesa, et al.,

Defendant.

No. CV-21-01012-PHX-DJH

ORDER 

On March 10, 2023, the Court granted in part and denied in part summary judgment 

to Defendant City of Mesa (“the City”) (Doc. 42) (the “March 2023 Order”). The Court 

granted the City judgment on the disparate treatment and retaliation claims that 

Plaintiff Aaron Smith (“Plaintiff”) brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 

42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”). (Id. at 15–23). However, the Court denied the City 

judgment on Plaintiff’s failure to accommodate claim due to issues of fact as to whether 

the City initiated good faith efforts to accommodate Plaintiff’s religious beliefs but could 

not reasonably do so without facing undue hardship. (Id. at 15). The Court accordingly

directed the parties to prepare for trial on Plaintiff’s remaining Title VII claim. 

Plaintiff has since filed a “Motion for Reconsideration of Order on Summary 

Judgment on Issue of Undue Hardship” (Doc. 50)1in light of the Supreme Court’s recent 

decision in Groff v. DeJoy, 600 U.S. 447 (2023) (“Groff”), which clarified the undue 

hardship standard in Title VII cases. The Court must determine whether and to what extent

1 The City filed a Response (Doc. 76) and Plaintiff filed a Reply (Doc. 77).

Case 2:21-cv-01012-DJH Document 80 Filed 12/03/23 Page 1 of 13
- 2 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Groff impacts the March 2023 Order. For the following reasons, the Court grants 

Plaintiff’s Motion and enters summary judgment in his favor on the issue of undue 

hardship. The City cannot bring an undue hardship defense at trial.

I. Background2

A. The March 2023 Order (Doc. 42)

In the March 2023 Order, the Court applied the burden shifting framework set forth 

in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 (1973) to determine whether 

summary judgment was proper on Plaintiff’s failure to accommodate claim. (Doc. 42 at 8 

citing Berry v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. 447 F.3d 642, 655 (9th Cir. 2006)). The framework 

imposes the initial burden on the employee to establish a prima facie showing that he 

requested and was denied a religious accommodation. Id. If the employee proves a 

prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the employer to establish that “it initiated good 

faith efforts to [reasonably] accommodate [an] employee’s religious practices or that it 

could not reasonably accommodate the employee without undue hardship.” Id. (quoting 

Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 606 (9th Cir. 2004)).

The Court found Plaintiff met his initial burden. (Doc. 42 at 8–10). When 

evaluating the City’s burden, the Court found (1) there was insufficient evidence to hold 

the City’s scheduling system was a reasonable accommodation under Title VII as a matter 

of law (id. at 11–13); (2) there were issues of fact regarding the sincerity of the City’s 

efforts to provide Plaintiff with a reasonable accommodation (id. at 13–14); and (3) there 

were issues of fact regarding whether the City (a) would been left short-staffed at the time 

Plaintiff requested leave and (b) denied Plaintiff’s request to avoid undue hardship. 

(Id. at 15). The latter two factual disputes prevented the Court from entering summary 

judgment. (Id.) To determine whether the City faced undue hardship, the Court applied 

the de minimis standard historically recognized in the Ninth Circuit. (See id. at 14 citing 

Balint v. Carson City, Nev., 180 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 1999)). 

/ / /

2 The March 2023 Order contains extensive background information on Plaintiff’s failure 

to accommodate claim, and the Court will not repeat it here. (See Doc. 42 at 2–5). 

Case 2:21-cv-01012-DJH Document 80 Filed 12/03/23 Page 2 of 13
- 3 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

B. The Supreme Court’s Decision in Groff v. DeJoy

In June 2023, the Supreme Court issued Groff and recognized that lower courts have 

erroneously interpreted Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977) 

(“Hardison”) to set forth a de minimis standard for determining undue hardship in Title VII 

cases. Groff, 600 U.S. at 472 (citing Hardison, 432 U.S. at 84). The Groff Court clarified 

that in order for an employer to establish undue hardship, it “must show that the burden of 

granting an accommodation would result in substantial increased costs in relation to the 

conduct of its particular business.” Id. at 470. It “th[ought] it appropriate to leave the 

context-specific application of the clarified standard to the lower courts in the first 

instance.” Id. at 473. 

II. Legal Standard

Local Rule of Civil Procedure 7.2(g) provides “[t]he Court will ordinarily deny a 

motion for reconsideration of an Order absent a showing of manifest error or a showing of 

new facts or legal authority that could not have been brought to its attention earlier with 

reasonable diligence.” L.R.Civ.P. 7.2(g)(1); see also 389 Orange St. Partners v. Arnold, 

179 F.3d 656, 665 (9th Cir. 1999) (motions for reconsideration are generally denied, 

“absent highly unusual circumstances, unless the district court is presented with newly 

discovered evidence, committed clear error, or if there is an intervening change in the 

controlling law”). Both parties characterize Groff as an intervening change in the undue 

hardship standard that controls this case. (Doc. 76 at 1). The Court agrees. Because the 

Court applied a now displaced de minimis standard in its March 2023 Order, Groff merits 

reconsideration of that Order as it relates to Plaintiff’s failure to accommodate claim.

III. Discussion

Title VII makes it unlawful “for an employer not to make reasonable 

accommodations, short of undue hardship, for the religious practices of his employees and 

prospective employees.” Hardison, 432 U.S. at 74 (emphasis added). Plaintiff argues that 

following the Supreme Court’s decision in Groff, no reasonable jury could find that 

accommodating him with 1.5 days of unpaid leave would result in undue hardship to 

Case 2:21-cv-01012-DJH Document 80 Filed 12/03/23 Page 3 of 13
- 4 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the City. (Doc. 77 at 9). Plaintiff thus requests the Court to grant him summary judgment 

on the issue of undue hardship. (Doc. 50 at 5). The City contends that regardless of Groff, 

determining undue hardship is a context specific analysis that more appropriately reserved 

for the trier of fact. (Doc. 76 at 2). It further argues that even if the Court were to grant 

Plaintiff summary judgment on the issue of undue hardship, that ruling is not dispositive 

of Plaintiff’s failure to accommodate claim because additional issues of fact remain—

namely, whether Plaintiff was subjected to an adverse employment action and whether 

the City’s generous time-off policy was a reasonable accommodation. (Id. at 9–11).

The Court first reconsiders the City’s undue hardship defense under the clarified

standard announced in Groff. Finding that the City fails to show undue hardship, the Court 

then considers the greater implications of this conclusion on Plaintiff’s failure to 

accommodate claim.

A. Whether the City Can Show Undue Hardship Under Groff

Title VII obligates employers to accommodate their employees’ religious practices

unless doing so would impose an “undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s 

business.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). In Hardison, the Supreme Court stated that to require an 

employer “to bear more than a de minimis cost in order to give [an accommodation] is an 

undue hardship.” 432 U.S. at 84.3 The Ninth Circuit has cited to Hardison for the 

proposition that an employer may generally show hardship where (1) an accommodation 

“results in . . . more than a de minimis cost to the employer, which could include additional 

costs in the forms of lost efficiency or higher wages[;]” or (2) an accommodation “would 

have more than a de minimis impact on other employees, such as depriving the other 

employees of seniority rights or causing them to shoulder plaintiff’s share of the work.” 

Balint, 180 F.3d at 1054. The Court applied this standard in the March 2023 Order to 

determine whether the City’s claimed staffing hardships constituted a sufficient defense. 

3 Hardison also made clear that seniority rights among employees are afforded special 

treatment under Title VII when addressing requests for religious accommodations. 432 

U.S. at 81. The Court will not discuss this issue as the City did not raise seniority systems 

in either its Response to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 27) or its 

Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 76).

Case 2:21-cv-01012-DJH Document 80 Filed 12/03/23 Page 4 of 13
- 5 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(Doc. 42 at 14–15). The Court concluded there were factual disputes that precluded 

summary judgment on Plaintiff’s failure to accommodate claim. (Id. at 14). Three months 

later, the Supreme Court held in Groff that the de minimis standard the Court applied in its 

March Order was insufficient to assess undue hardship under Title VII. 600 U.S. at 468. 

To show undue hardship, an employer must instead establish that accommodating the 

request would pose a substantial burden on the employer’s business. Id.4 

1. The Clarified Hardship Standard in Groff

The plaintiff in Groff was an Evangelical Christian who was unwilling to work on 

the Sunday Sabbaths. 600 U.S. at 454. In light of the plaintiff’s religious beliefs, the 

plaintiff’s employer made efforts to designate the plaintiff’s work to other staff members 

even though those employees were not ordinarily responsible for performing that type of 

work. Id. at 455. The plaintiff continued to receive discipline for failing to work on 

Sundays, and so the plaintiff resigned. Id. The plaintiff filed suit against his employer, 

arguing it could have accommodated his Sunday Sabbath practice without undue hardship 

to its business. Id. The district court granted summary judgment because “the impact that 

would be felt by the other [employees] if [the plaintiff] was permitted to be skipped in the 

schedule every Sunday would clearly be more than de minimis, and [the employer] [met]

its burden of proving undue hardship.” Groff v. DeJoy, 2021 WL 1264030, *12 (E.D. Pa. 

Apr. 6, 2021). On appeal, the circuit court affirmed, citing to Hardison for the proposition 

“that requiring an employer ‘to bear more than a de minimis cost’ to provide a religious 

accommodation is an undue hardship.” Groff v. DeJoy, 35 F.4th 162, 174 n.18 (3d Cir. 

2022). The Groff Court granted certiorari to clarify the contours of the undue hardship 

4 Ten opinions within the Ninth Circuit have applied the clarified standard in Groff since 

its publication. See Bordeaux v. Lions Gate Ent., Inc., 2023 WL 3667353 (C.D. Cal. May 

5, 2023); Demeyer v. St. Charles Health Sys., Inc., 2023 WL 5614946 (D. Or. July 3, 2023); 

Payne v. St. Charles Health Sys., 2023 WL 4711431 (D. Or. July 6, 2023); Johnson v. St. 

Charles Health Sys., Inc., 2023 WL 5155591 (D. Or. July 21, 2023); Conner v. Raver, 2023 

WL 5498728 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2023); MacDonald v. Or. Health & Sci. Univ., 2023 WL 

5529959 (D. Or. Aug. 28, 2023); Brown v. NW Permanente, P.C., 2023 WL 6147178 (D. 

Or. Sep. 20, 2023); Trusov v. Or. Health & Sci. Univ., 2023 WL 6147251 (D. Or. Sep. 20, 

2023); Gamon v. Shriners Hosps. for Children, 2023 WL 7019980 (D. Or. Oct. 25, 2023); 

Zimmerman v. PeaceHealth, 2023 WL 7413650 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 9, 2023). Among 

those, Bordeaux v. Lions Gate Ent., Inc. is the only opinion that addressed undue hardship 

on a motion for summary judgment. 2023 WL 3667353.

Case 2:21-cv-01012-DJH Document 80 Filed 12/03/23 Page 5 of 13
- 6 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

standard set forth by Hardison. Groff, 600 U.S. at 456. 

The Groff Court found that lower courts had erroneously interpreted an isolated 

phrase from Hardison to mean that an employer must only show “more than a de minimis

cost,” or something “very small or trifling” to establish undue hardship in the Title VII

context. Id. at 464, 469, 467. When read in context, the Court found a better 

“understand[ing of] Hardison to mean that ‘undue hardship’ is shown when a burden is 

substantial in the overall context of an employer’s business.” Id. at 468. That is—“the 

requisite burden, privation, or adversity would have to rise to an ‘excessive’ or 

‘unjustifiable’ level.” Id. The Groff Court determined that the clarified standard “may 

prompt little, if any, change in the [Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s]

guidance explaining why no undue hardship is imposed by temporary costs, voluntary shift 

swapping, occasional shift swapping, or administrative costs. Id. at 471 (citing

29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(d)).

The Groff Court also clarified two points that frequently arose in applying the undue 

hardship framework. The Court first confirmed that in assessing the effect of an 

employee’s requested accommodation on the overall “conduct of the employer’s business,”

not all impacts on coworkers are relevant to the query. Id. at 472 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 

2000e(j)). The Court noted, for example, that a coworker’s dislike of the religious practice 

being accommodated—though it may potentially affect the business—is “not cognizable 

to factor into the undue hardship inquiry.” Id. (cleaned up). Second, the Court clarified 

that “Title VII requires that an employer reasonably accommodate an employee’s practice 

of religion, not merely that it assess the reasonableness of a particular possible 

accommodation or accommodations.” Id. at 473 (citing Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, 

LLC, 721 F.3d 444, 455 (7th Cir. 2013)) (emphasis added). 

2. The City Fails to Establish that Accommodating 1.5 Days of Leave 

Would Have Posed Undue Hardship 

When applying the clarified standard in Groff to the City’s undue hardship defense,

the Court finds the City failed to establish how Plaintiff’s absence would have substantially 

Case 2:21-cv-01012-DJH Document 80 Filed 12/03/23 Page 6 of 13
- 7 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

burdened its overall business, nor demonstrated how any and all other accommodations 

would have posed an undue hardship to the conduct of its business. 

a. The City Fails to Show How Plaintiff’s Requested 

Accommodation Would Have Effected the Conduct of Its 

Business

The Court must first assess whether and to what extent Plaintiff’s requested 

accommodation would affect the City’s business. Id. at 472 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j)). 

During this analysis, “courts should resolve whether a hardship would be substantial in the 

context of an employer’s business in the common-sense manner[.]” Id. at 471. When 

applying the de minimis hardship standard in the March 2023 Order, the Court found there 

were issues of fact regarding whether the City would been left short staffed at the time 

Plaintiff requested leave and thus denied Plaintiff’s request to avoid undue hardship. 

(Doc. 42 at 15). Plaintiff argues under the clarified standard in Groff, the City would not 

have been substantially burdened by granting Plaintiff 1.5 days of paid leave. The City 

disagrees and says it would have faced undue hardship because the Department “was busy 

and had short deadlines.” (Doc. 76 at 23). It contends the Department “only ha[d] a team 

of eight [permit technicians]” and “that presents a hardship when you keep piling on people 

being off.” (Id. at 4). The City further maintains it was difficult for Ms. Basford to 

maintain sufficient employee coverage because “staffing levels had a tendency to be 

uncertain on any given day.” (Id. at 3, 5–6). The Court agrees with Plaintiff that the City 

fails to meet its burden to establish an undue hardship defense. 

To start, the City must do more than outline the workload of the specific department 

that Plaintiff worked to demonstrate undue hardship. (Doc. 76 at 2–3). The City speaks in 

generalities to claim the Department was “short-staffed” and “very busy” and so Plaintiff’s 

absence would be burdensome on the Department’s operations. (Id. at 3). But apart from 

stating it was “difficult” for the Department to have absent employees, the City does not 

quantify or otherwise explain how Plaintiff’s absence for 1.5 additional days would have 

resulted in substantial increased costs in relation to its business. Groff, 600 U.S. at 470. 

Case 2:21-cv-01012-DJH Document 80 Filed 12/03/23 Page 7 of 13
- 8 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

For example, the City has not articulated any concrete financial harm that would result 

from granting Plaintiff unpaid leave. Although the City states that absent employees would

result in “reallocating resources” that could result in potential “refunds” to customers if 

there are delays (Doc. 76 at 6), those costs are unascertained, merely conceivable, or 

hypothetical. See E.E.O.C. v. Townley Eng’g & Mfg. Co., 859 F.2d 610, 615 (9th Cir. 

1988). This is in contrast to Bordeaux v. Lions Gate Entertainment, where the employer 

showed it would potentially sustain $1,500,000.00–3,000,000.00 in additional costs should 

it be required to grant the plaintiff’s requested accommodation. 2023 WL 3667353, at * 7, 

*14 (C.D. Cal. May 5, 2023) (holding the employer demonstrated undue hardship under 

Groff because granting the plaintiff an exemption from a COVID vaccine requirement 

posed the potential of operation shutdowns due to quarantine requirements). Here, the City 

does not claim any substantial burdens or concrete costs that would result from Plaintiff’s 

absence.

Similarly, the City’s allegations that Plaintiff’s absence would impact other coworkers are too vague to establish undue hardship. The Court has already settled that “a 

claim of undue hardship . . . must be supported by proof of actual imposition on coworkers 

or disruption of the work routine.” (Doc. 42 at 15) (citing Townley, 859 F.2d at 615). Groff 

further made clear that “not all impacts on co-workers are relevant, but only coworker 

impacts that go to affect the conduct of the business.” 600 U.S. at 472. To the extent 

the City claims Plaintiff’s leave would impact other permit technicians, the City does not 

describe the nature of those impacts or identify how those impacts would pose a substantial 

burden to the City’s overall operations. This is again in contrast to Bordeaux, where the 

employer showed plaintiff’s requested vaccine exemption would pose a risk to the health 

and safety of other co-workers and impact operations should the employer have to find 

substitutes for co-workers who fell ill. 2023 WL 8108655, at *13.

The City also relies on Ms. Basford’s testimony to claim that granting Plaintiff leave 

would have impacted Ms. Basford’s ability to maintain sufficient staffing levels. However, 

the record shows the Department was accustomed to facing gaps in staffing and needed to 

Case 2:21-cv-01012-DJH Document 80 Filed 12/03/23 Page 8 of 13
- 9 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

regularly adapt to scheduling challenges. For example, in her deposition, Ms. Basford 

explained that Department employees “regularly used unscheduled sick leave, last minute 

requests for vacation/discretionary leave, and time for training.” (Doc. 76 at 8 citing 

Doc. 34-4 at 4–5). The City further agrees that “[b]ased on the uncertainty of staffing 

levels (as mirrored by the Department’s course of performance), Ms. Basford anticipated 

that multiple employees would take unscheduled time off during any particular week.” 

(Id. at 3). Plaintiff’s request for 1.5 days off therefore did not pose a circumstance that 

subjected the City to burden that rose to an “excessive” or “unjustifiable” level. See Groff, 

600 U.S. at 468; c.f. Adeyeye, 721 F.3d at 455 (finding that an employer could not show 

undue hardship when an employee requested three weeks of unpaid leave because the 

employer “expected and planned for the frequent turnover of employees”).

Furthermore, Plaintiff points out—and the City does not dispute—that Ms. Basford 

conceded that she would have granted Plaintiff requested accommodation if he had enough 

paid time off. (Doc. 50 at 4). Ms. Basford averred at her deposition that she approved 

Plaintiff 2.5 days off because he had the vacation time accrued, and would have approved 

his full request for 4 days off had he had the additional 1.5 days accrued. (Doc. 36-5 at 

34–35). This is evidence that Plaintiff’s requested accommodation would not have posed

a “substantial cost” to the City in the common-sense manner. See Groff, 600 U.S. at 471. 

Although the Court precluded summary judgment due to issues of facts as to whether 

the City’s claimed hardship would pose more than a de minimis cost, it finds the City 

cannot meet its burden of showing Plaintiff’s request for 1.5 days of unpaid leave would 

substantially affect its overall business. 

b. The City Fails to Show that Any and All Other 

Accommodations Would Have Imposed Undue Hardship

The Court also finds the City failed to demonstrate that any and all other potential 

accommodations to Plaintiff would have imposed undue hardship. See 42 U.S.C. § 

2000e(j). The March 2023 Order found disputes of material facts as to the City’s motive 

and sincerity of its efforts to make alternative arrangements to accommodate Plaintiff. 

Case 2:21-cv-01012-DJH Document 80 Filed 12/03/23 Page 9 of 13
- 10 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(Doc. 42 at 13–14). Although these issues were material under the erroneous de minimis

standard for undue hardship, the Court finds these issues of facts are no longer material 

under Groff’s heightened undue standard. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 

242, 248 (1986) (“Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under 

the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes 

that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.”). This is because the alternatives 

the City considered are either insufficient or would not pose undue hardship to the City.

Plaintiff argues the City did not adequately conduct an undue hardship analysis for 

other possible accommodations because it did not know it had to do so in the first instance. 

(Doc. 77 at 1). The City contends it considered and properly ruled out three different ways 

to accommodate Plaintiff: (1) it maintained a “generous time off policy” to accommodate 

time off, which Plaintiff had already exhausted; (2) Plaintiff’s supervisor had already 

approved multiple leave requests to accommodate Plaintiff’s religion; and (3) Plaintiff 

could not work an alternative schedule to “flex” his time because he had to work 40 hours 

within any given work week and “having an individual permit tech work overtime was 

generally not authorized.” (Doc. 76 at 4–5). 

Regarding the City’s first proposed alternative, the March 2023 Order settled there

is inadequate evidence that the City’s “generous time off policy” by itself constitutes a 

reasonable accommodation for any and all religious requests as a matter of law. (Doc. 42 at 

11–13) (rejecting the City’s legal authority as non-binding and non-controlling). The Court 

explained that the mere existence of the City’s scheduling system did not relieve it from its 

duty to explore other reasonable alternatives. (Id. at 13 citing Balint, 180 F.3d at 1056). 

So, the City’s first alternative, without more, is insufficient to relieve the City of its burden

to reasonably accommodate Plaintiff. See Groff, 600 U.S. at 443 (in certain circumstances, 

assessing one alternative is not enough and “[c]onsideration of other options . . . would be 

necessary”). The City’s second proposed alternative is inherently insufficient because 

hardships that are attributed to a coworker’s dislike of “the very notion of accommodating 

religious practice cannot be considered ‘undue.’” 600 U.S. at 472. The City cannot rely 

Case 2:21-cv-01012-DJH Document 80 Filed 12/03/23 Page 10 of 13
- 11 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

on the previous religious accommodations it granted Plaintiff to justify its denial of 

Plaintiff’s separate request for an accommodation to attend to Elders Training. 

As to the City’s third proposed alternative, the City concluded that to grant Plaintiff 

1.5 days off and allow him to work an alternative schedule to make up his time missed was 

unfeasible for two reasons. First, the City maintains Plaintiff could not “flex” his leave 

hours to a different week because he had to work 40 hours within any given work week

and allowing him to “work the prior week would not have allowed him to complete the 

work that was needed to be completed during the week he was missing.” (Doc. 76 at 5). 

But the City fails to explain how allowing Plaintiff to shift the amount of hours he works 

to a different week would result in a substantial burden the overall conduct of its business. 

Groff, 600 U.S. at 468. Indeed, Ms. Zielonka stated that when the Department does not 

meet their turn around time, the Department “contact[s its] customers and tell[s] them 

there’s going to be a delay.” (Doc. 76-1 at 3). The City fails to explain why a delay in the 

work it expected Plaintiff to complete the during the 1.5 days he sought leave would have 

resulted in substantial costs. Second, the City contends it could not allow Plaintiff to work 

overtime because it was “generally not authorized” and a “supervisor needed to be there.” 

(Doc. 76 at 5). This justification is also insufficient under Groff and contradicts the 

summary judgment record. Ms. Zielonka stated the City “had people working overtime a 

fair amount with prior approval” and “it was at the supervisor’s discretion based on the 

needs.” (Doc. 76-1 at 5). 

Although the City argues the issue of undue hardship is more appropriately resolved 

by the trier of fact (Doc. 76 at 2), no reasonable person could find that providing Plaintiff 

with 1.5 days of unpaid leave would result in an “excessive” or “unjustifiable” burden to 

the City’s overall business under the present factual record. See Groff, 600 U.S. at 468. 

The Supreme Court has indeed recognized unpaid leave as a generally reasonable and 

satisfactory form of an accommodation for employees’ religious schedules. See Ansonia 

Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 70–71 (1986). The City has also failed to 

demonstrate that any and all other potential accommodations to Plaintiff would have 

Case 2:21-cv-01012-DJH Document 80 Filed 12/03/23 Page 11 of 13
- 12 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

imposed undue hardship. And Title VII requires the City to reasonably accommodate 

Plaintiff’s practice of religion, “not merely that it assess the reasonableness of a particular 

possible accommodation or accommodations.” 600 U.S. at 473 (citing Adeyeye, 721 F.3d 

at 455 (holding that to permit an employee to take three weeks of unpaid leave in 

conjunction with one week of vacation was a reasonable religious accommodation as a 

matter of law)). 

Plaintiff is therefore entitled to judgment on the matter of undue hardship and 

the City cannot rely on this affirmative defense at trial. 

B. Whether Resolution of the Undue Hardship Issue is Dispositive of 

Plaintiff’s Failure to Accommodate Claim

Having settled that the City failed to show Plaintiff’s requested accommodation or 

any other alternative would result in undue hardship, this begs the question of whether that 

conclusion is dispositive of Plaintiff’s failure to accommodate claim. The City contends it 

is not because additional issues of fact remain to be resolved at trial—namely, (1) whether 

the City’s generous time-off policy was a reasonable accommodation, and (2) whether 

Plaintiff was subjected to an adverse employment action. The Court agrees with the City.

First, the March 2023 Order settled there was insufficient evidence to hold as a 

matter of law that the City’s scheduling system was a reasonable accommodation under 

Title VII. See supra Section III.A(2)(b) (citing Doc. 42 at 11–13). But this is not to say a 

reasonable juror could not find the City’s scheduling system was a reasonable 

accommodation. The Court agrees with the City that this analysis is appropriate for the 

fact finder to resolve at trial. (Doc. 76 at 11). Second, in finding Plaintiff made a 

prima facie showing of a failure to accommodate claim, the March 2023 Order settled it is

undisputed that Plaintiff meets the first and second requirements—that is, Plaintiff “had a 

bona fide religious belief, the practice of which conflicts with an employment duty; [and]

he informed his employer of the belief and conflict.” (Doc. 42 at 8 quoting Berry, 447 F.3d 

at 655). As to the third requirement that Plaintiff suffer an adverse employment action, the 

Court concluded “a reasonable jury could find that Plaintiff faced a threat being disciplined 

Case 2:21-cv-01012-DJH Document 80 Filed 12/03/23 Page 12 of 13
- 13 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

if he was absent from work to attend the Elders Training.” (Doc. 42 at 10). Again, the 

Court agrees with the City that this analysis is appropriate for the fact finder resolve at trial. 

(Doc. 76 at 10). 

IV. Conclusion

In clarifying the undue hardship standard in Title VII cases, the Groff Court 

emphasized that “a bevy of diverse religious organizations has told this Court that the 

de minimistest has blessed the denial of even minor accommodation in many cases, making 

it harder for members of minority faiths to enter the job market.” 600 U.S. at 465. The 

Court concludes that in this case, the City failed to show that Plaintiff’s religious 

accommodation request for 1.5 days of unpaid leave posed undue hardship as a matter of 

law. The City has not met its burden to show that Plaintiff’s requested accommodation, or 

any other alternative, would result in substantial increased costs in relation to the conduct 

of its particular business. Id. at 470 (citing Hardison, 243 U.S. at 83 n. 14). The City is 

precluded from bringing an undue hardship defense at trial. 

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED Plaintiff Aaron Smith’s “Motion for Reconsideration 

of Order on Summary Judgment on Issue of Undue Hardship” (Doc. 50) is granted and 

the City is precluded from raising the undue hardship defense at trial.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall vacate the 

March 10, 2023, Order to the extent it relates to the issue of undue hardship (Doc. 42). The 

remainder of the March 10, 2023, Order is affirmed. 

Dated this 1st day of December, 2023.

Honorable Diane J. Humetewa

United States District Judge

Case 2:21-cv-01012-DJH Document 80 Filed 12/03/23 Page 13 of 13