Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01459/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01459-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAYSHEON MARQUISE

BURTON

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 13-CV-1459-WQH (MDD)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

RE: PETITION FOR WRIT OF

v HABEAS CORPUS

D. PARAMO, Warden, et al.,

Respondents.

I. INTRODUCTION

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States

District Judge William Q. Hayes pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and

Local Civil Rule 72.1(d) of the United States District Court for the

Southern District of California. After reviewing the Petition (ECF No. 1),

Respondents’ Answer and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in

support thereof (ECF. No. 7), Petitioner’s Traverse (ECF No. 12), and the

supporting documents and pertinent state court Lodgments, the Court

RECOMMENDS the Petition be DENIED for the reasons stated below.

II. FEDERAL PROCEEDINGS

On June 24, 2013, Raysheon Burton (“Petitioner”), a California

state prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis, filed a Petition for Writ of

- 1 - 13-cv-01459-WQH (MDD) 

Case 3:13-cv-01459-WQH-MDD Document 13 Filed 04/21/14 Page 1 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF No. 1.) Petitioner

challenges his conviction in San Diego Superior Court Case No. SCD

215531 for first degree murder and premeditated attempted murder. 

(ECF No. 1 at 2; Lodg. No. 6 at 1-2.) 

 Petitioner’s sole claim is that the trial court’s exclusion of codefendant Warren Hargrove’s statements violated his federal

constitutional rights. (ECF No. 1 at 8-9.) 

On September 4, 2013, Respondents answered the Petition. (ECF

No. 7.) Respondents contend that habeas relief is not appropriate

because the California Court of Appeal properly rejected Petitioner’s

evidentiary arguments and acted in accordance with clearly established

federal law. (ECF No. 7-1 at 8-12.) On November 15, 2013, Petitioner

filed his Traverse. (ECF No. 12.) 

III. STATE PROCEEDINGS

On July 23, 2008, Petitioner was charged by information with

murder, in violation of California Penal Code section 187(a), and

premeditated attempted murder, in violation of California Penal Code

sections 187, 664, and 189. (Lodg. No. 1 at 7.) As to the murder charge,

the information alleged that Petitioner: (1) intentionally and personally

discharged a firearm and caused great bodily injury and death to a

person (Cal. Penal Code § 12022.53(d)); (2) personally used a firearm

(Cal. Penal Code § 12022.53(b)); (3) intentionally and personally

discharged a firearm (Cal. Penal Code § 12022.53(c)); and (4) was armed

with a firearm (Cal. Penal Code § 12022(a)(1)). (Lodg. No. 1 at 8.) As to

the attempted murder charge, the information further alleged that

Petitioner: (1) personally used a firearm (Cal. Penal Code § 12022.5(a));

(2) intentionally and personally discharged a firearm and caused great

bodily injury or death (Cal. Penal Code § 12022.53(d)); (3) personally

- 2 - 13-cv-01459-WQH (MDD) 

Case 3:13-cv-01459-WQH-MDD Document 13 Filed 04/21/14 Page 2 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

used a firearm (Cal. Penal Code § 12022.53(b)); (4) intentionally and

personally discharged a firearm (Cal. Penal Code § 12022.53(c)); and (5)

was armed with a firearm (Cal. Penal Code 12022(a)(1)). (Lodg. No. 1 at

8.)

The Petitioner and co-defendant Hargrove were tried by dual

juries.1

 The jury found Petitioner guilty on all counts and found the

firearm enhancement allegations to be true. (Lodg. No. 1 at 177.) 

Petitioner was sentenced to a total term of life plus 75 years to life. (Id.

at 218.)

On February 18, 2010, Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal of his

conviction. (Lodg. No. 1 at 220.) In his appeal, Petitioner contended the

trial court erred, in violation of Petitioner’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment

rights, when it excluded Hargrove’s statements to police regarding

Petitioner’s mental capacity. (Lodg. No. 3 at 23.) 

On January 13, 2012, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the

Petitioner’s conviction, finding that the trial court properly exercised its

discretion in ruling Hargrove’s statements were inadmissible hearsay

under California Evidence Code section 1200. (Lodg. No. 6.)

On February 24, 2012, Petitioner appealed to the California

Supreme Court. (Lodg. No. 7.) The California Supreme Court denied

review on March 28, 2012, without comment. (Lodg. No. 8.)

III. STATEMENT OF FACTS

“[A] determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be

presumed to be correct.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). The court must be

1 Petitioner and Hargrove had a joint trial before dual, independent

juries because Petitioner and Hargrove each claimed the other was the

shooter. (Lodg. No. 6 at 12.) When Petitioner’s jury reached a verdict in

April, the trial court sealed the verdict pending a verdict from Hargrove’s

jury. In late April, after a mistrial was declared in Hargrove’s case, the trial

court unsealed and recorded the verdict in Petitioner’s case. (Id.)

- 3 - 13-cv-01459-WQH (MDD) 

Case 3:13-cv-01459-WQH-MDD Document 13 Filed 04/21/14 Page 3 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

“particularly deferential to [its] state-court colleagues.” Taylor v.

Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004). When a state court does not

supply reasoning for a decision, an independent review of the record is

required to determine if the court clearly erred in applying controlling

federal law. Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 981-82 (9th Cir. 2000). This

independent review is not de novo, but merely provides the basis for

determining whether the state court decision was objectively reasonable. 

Id. Accordingly, the following facts from the California Court of Appeal’s

opinion are presumed correct:

1. The 2007 murder and stabbing

In 2007, Gregory Smith, a friend of Burton and Burton’s friend and accomplice co-defendant Warren Hargrove III, was shot and killed by Kevin Marquez. About a week after

Smith’s killing, Andre Mann and Beltran were involved in a

stabbing incident during an altercation at an apartment complex in the Clairemont area of San Diego, where Beltran

lived with his two sisters. Fearing for his life after the

stabbing incident, Beltran fled to Mexico for about four

months. Before he left, Beltran told his girlfriend Samantha Sanchez that he was afraid something was going to happen to

him.

2. Encounter with Hargrove and Burton

Sanchez and her friend Ashley Garcia, also a friend of Beltran, encountered Burton and Hargrove one evening at the

apartment complex. Initially the encounter was cordial . . .

things became heated because Hargrove was angry about the

death of Smith. Hargrove believed Smith was killed by a “Mexican,” and he told Sanchez and Garcia that whoever

killed Smith was “going to get payback for what they did” and

that “[someone] is going to get their ass kicked. Sanchez later told police that during this exchange. Hargrove threatened “every Mexican’s gonna get it.” Garcia also reported . . . that Hargrove told Sanchez that a stabbing

was not the ‘worst] that’s going to happen’ and that he will

‘make sure that when [Beltran] dies, my [Hargrove’s] name is in your head.’ In September 2007, Burton and Hargrove applied for and received range cards at the American Shooting Center . . .

The records from the range show that Burton used the range

on the same day he obtained his range card . . . . From October 2007 through February 2008, Hargrove lived with Tonya Aune, his girlfriend . . . Aune helped

Hargrove purchase a white late model four-door Cadillac.

- 4 - 13-cv-01459-WQH (MDD) 

Case 3:13-cv-01459-WQH-MDD Document 13 Filed 04/21/14 Page 4 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

On March 17, 2008, Smith’s mother had a memorial party for her son. Burton and Hargrove attended, along with

other friends and family.

3. The March 18, 2008 murder

[On March 18, 2008], Patricia Mathena met Hargrove and Burton at Hargrove’s family’s house. Mathena recalled

Burton that night was wearing a brown pair of Dickie pants

and a black hooded sweatshirt. After they ate and hung out

for a while, Hargrove and Burton followed behind Mathena in

the white Cadillac as she drove her family car home. After

dropping off the car at about 11:00 p.m., Mathena got in the

back seat of Hargrove’s Cadillac and together they planned on

taking Burton home and then going out. On their way to Burton’s home, Hargrove drove down Chateau drive near the apartment complex. At the same

time, Rosalio H. was walking with Beltran, who was slowly

pedaling his bike as the two left a convenience store and

headed towards Beltran’s home nearby. As they walked,

Rosalio testified he saw an African-American man sitting in the passenger seat staring at them as the Cadillac passed by. 

After the car drove by Rosalio and Beltran, Mathena recalled Burton saying, “I think that’s the guy that stabbed Andre [Mann].” Hargrove pulled over . . . and he and Burton exited the Cadillac and walked up the middle of the street towards

Rosalio and Beltran. Rosalio recalled a darker skinned

African-American man (later identified as Burton) in a dark hooded sweatshirt getting out of the passenger seat. Both

Hargrove and Burton appeared to be wearing gloves. As Hargrove and Burton walked past Rosalio and Beltran, Rosalio heard one of the men ask, “where are you

from?” As Rosalio looked over his shoulder, he saw the

darker-skinned African-American man, about 20 feet away,

begin shooting at them. In court, Rosalio identified Burton as the shooter with 70 percent certainty. Rosalio did not see the

face of Burton’s companion, but testified the other man was

lighter skinned than Burton. Rosalio received bullet wounds to his left leg and back. Rosalio also saw Beltran being hit by gunfire. Rosalio ran to the opposite side of the street and fainted on the sidewalk. 

After he got up, Rosalio saw Beltran fall off his bicycle and the two African-American men run towards the fire station at the

end of the block. Rosalio ran back to where Beltran lay and

told Beltran he would get help . . . . Several residents living on Chateau Drive heard the gunshots. From their windows, two of the residents each

testified they saw two males –one wearing all dark clothing and the other wearing a light shirt and dark pants–running

towards the fire station and down the alley. One of the

residents saw a white Cadillac drive down the street . . . .

Another resident saw an individual, later identified as

Rosalio, get up from the ground and limp over to where the

other man, later identified as Beltran, was rolling on the ground ostensibly in pain. As this resident called 9-1-1, she

- 5 - 13-cv-01459-WQH (MDD) 

Case 3:13-cv-01459-WQH-MDD Document 13 Filed 04/21/14 Page 5 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

could hear Beltran through an open window saying, “Help me. 

Somebody help me.” This resident then saw Rosalio run to get help . . . . As the resident continued to look out the window,

she saw a “white car” drive by at about 11:10 p.m. in the

direction of the fire house. . . . .

About 11:12 p.m. that night, San Diego Police Officer Kevin Conkle was nearby when he received a dispatch about

the shooting. Officer Conkle and another police officer found

Beltran lying on the ground, moaning and moving side to side. 

In response to the officers’ question whether he was shot,

Beltran said “Yes” but he did not respond to any other

questions posed by the officers. Before paramedics arrived,

Beltran appeared to have a seizure, gave his final breath and then his body went limp. Beltran died from a gunshot wound to the thorax, which caused extensive internal injuries. Beltran also received

gunshot wounds to his right hand and his right hip. All of

Beltran’s wounds were inflicted from behind.

4. The events following the March 18, 2008 murder

Mathena testified that after Burton and Hargrove exited the white idling Cadillac, Mathena moved into the front seat

of the car. A few seconds later, after she lost sight of the two

men, she testified she heard about five loud gunshots coming from their direction. Scared and concerned, Mathena took off in the Cadillac, made a U-turn on Chateau Drive and drove

back the way Burton and Hargrove had walked . . . . After

driving a few minutes and unable to locate Burton and/or

Hargrove, Mathena decided to drive home. On the way, a police officer pulled behind her and put a spotlight on the Cadillac. Mathena abruptly pulled over and

was subsequently arrested. . . . .

On questioning, Mathena denied any knowledge of a shooting and instead told police she had picked up three

Hispanic males she barely knew and had dropped them off at a fast-food restaurant. Mathena gave the police fake names

for the men. However, Mathena subsequently changed her

story after police told her that she could receive a lengthy

prison sentence for her involvement in the shooting and that

her story conflicted with the statement that Hargrove had

already given police. Mathena told police Burton was wearing a dark sweatshirt and a ball cap and Hargrove was wearing an

orange and black jacket with a white T-shirt underneath. She

said that while they had been driving down Chateau Drive,

Burton told Hargrove to pull over because Burton had

identified Beltran as the “guy that stabbed Andre [Mann].” 

Mathena said Hargrove asked Burton what he was doing and

Burton responded, “Come on. Come on” as both men then got

out of the car. Hargrove told Mathena to get in the front seat. After giving her statement to police, officers placed Mathena and Hargrove in an interview room and videotaped

their conversation, which was shown to the jury. During their

- 6 - 13-cv-01459-WQH (MDD) 

Case 3:13-cv-01459-WQH-MDD Document 13 Filed 04/21/14 Page 6 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

discussion, Mathena became upset and told Hargrove she had

lied to the police. A security guard working at the apartment complex on the night of the shooting testified he heard about six shots

from what sounded like a revolver. As the guard investigated,

he saw two African-American men in their early 20's running

through an alley. The guard testified that one of the men

wore all dark clothing and possibly a baseball cap while the

other wore a light-colored top and dark pants. Sometime after 11:00 p.m. on the night of the shootings, Hargrove called his friend Gayle Martin . . . and asked her to

pick him up from a taco shop in Clairemont Mesa. Martin

agreed. Just after picking up Hargrove and Burton, Martin

testified Burton said to Hargrove, “I’m going to jail because of you.” Martin also testified both men appeared upset . . . . On the way to Hargrove’s home, they passed the white Cadillac and saw Mathena with the police, which, according to

Martin, further upset Hargrove and Burton. In addition, she

saw Burton and Hargrove passing between them a grocery- type bag and heard them talk about how to get rid of its

contents. After dropping off Hargrove . . . Martin drove

Burton home. On the way, Martin slowed down the car and

Burton threw something away in a black trash can . . . . Aune testified that Hargrove called about 12:45 a.m. on March 19, 2008, and asked her to pick him up so they could

spend the night together. Hargrove told Aune that he needed

a ride because his cousin had the Cadillac. After picking him

up, they went to Aune’s apartment and then a short time later

to a nearby convenience store . . . where they were detained by police.

5. Burton’s arrest and subsequent interviews

On the morning of March 19, the day after the murder, police arrested Burton. During the initial police interview,

Burton denied any knowledge of the shooting, stating that he had been walking the night before in Serra Mesa when

Hargrove picked him up in the white Cadillac. Burton told

police they then drove to another friend’s house where they stayed until 11:00 p.m. and then drove to Hargrove’s home. As police were “processing” Burton at the station, Burton “all of the sudden” nervously told police he wanted to

tell them “what really happened” the night before. During

[the] second 45-minute interview, which was played for the

jury, Burton said Hargrove was the shooter. Burton also said

he was afraid for his family after the shooting because of

threats made by Hargrove after the shooting. Burton told police during the second interview Hargrove picked him up about 8:45 p.m. the night before . . . . After

eating, the two left in Hargrove’s car and followed a van

driven by Mathena. After dropping off the van at Mathena’s house, all three were returning to Hargrove’s house when, according to Burton, they saw “some Mexicans, a dude . . . on

his bike.” Hargrove pulled over and got out of the car, and

went to the trunk, where he pulled out a gun from a large,

purple laundry bag. Hargrove and Burton next approached

- 7 - 13-cv-01459-WQH (MDD) 

Case 3:13-cv-01459-WQH-MDD Document 13 Filed 04/21/14 Page 7 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

two Hispanic males later identified as Beltran and Rosalio. According to Burton, the man on the bike (Beltran) pulled out a gun but the two kept walking. Hargrove then

asked, “where are you from” and then, before either could answer, Hargrove started shooting at them when he was

about five or six feet away. Hargrove and Burton then fled into the alley where Hargrove hid the gun behind a wall. 

Hargrove then used a payphone to try and reach Mathena,

who had stayed in the Cadillac. When Mathena did not

answer, Hargrove called Martin, who eventually picked them

up. While trying to reach Mathena, Hargrove kept saying,

“it’s over,” or words to that effect because he believed

Mathena was going to “tell” on them.

(Lodg. No. 8 at 2-15) (quoted from the Court of Appeal opinion, with

minor edits for clarity). 

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Petition is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), which provides the

scope of review for federal habeas corpus claims: 

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of

habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

the United States. 

As amended by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, 28 U.S.C. § 2254

provides:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court

shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was

adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim– 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 

When determining what constitutes “clearly established federal

law” under § 2254(d)(1), federal courts look to United States Supreme

- 8 - 13-cv-01459-WQH (MDD) 

Case 3:13-cv-01459-WQH-MDD Document 13 Filed 04/21/14 Page 8 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Court holdings at the time of the state court’s decision. Lockyer v.

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72 (2003). A state court’s decision is “contrary

to” clearly established United States Supreme Court precedent if (1) the

state court applies a rule different from the governing law set forth in

Supreme Court cases, or (2) the state court confronts a set of facts that

are materially indistinguishable from a Supreme Court case, but still

reaches a different result. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06

(2000); Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 73. A state court decision does not have to

demonstrate an awareness of clearly established Supreme Court

precedent, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state

court decision contradict such precedent. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8

(2002).

A state court decision may involve an “unreasonable application” of

Supreme Court precedent “if the state court identifies the correct

governing legal rule from [the Supreme] Court’s cases but unreasonably

applies it to the facts of the particular state prisoner’s case.” Williams,

529 U.S. at 407. Alternatively, an unreasonable application may be

found “if the state court either unreasonably extends a legal principle

from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context where it should not

apply, or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context

where it should apply.” Id. An unreasonable application of federal law

requires the state court decision to be more than incorrect or erroneous. 

Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 76. Instead, the state court’s application must be

“objectively unreasonable.” Id. The Petitioner bears the burden of

proving the state court acted in an unreasonable, or contrary manner. 

Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002). 

The United States Supreme Court has held that “[w]here there has

been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim, later

- 9 - 13-cv-01459-WQH (MDD) 

Case 3:13-cv-01459-WQH-MDD Document 13 Filed 04/21/14 Page 9 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

unexplained orders upholding the judgment or rejecting the same claim

rest upon the same ground.” Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 

(1991). Further, when a state court does not supply reasoning for a

decision, an independent review of the record is required to determine if

the court clearly erred in applying controlling federal law. Delgado, 223

F.3d at 981-82. This independent review is not de novo, but merely

provides the basis for determining whether the state court decision was

objectively reasonable. Id. at 982.

V. DISCUSSION

Petitioner claims the trial court violated his Fifth and Sixth

Amendment rights when it excluded co-defendant Hargrove’s statements

to police about the Petitioner’s mental capacity as inadmissible hearsay. 

(ECF No. 1 at 8.) 

A habeas petitioner “bears a heavy burden in showing a due process

violation based on an evidentiary decision.” Boyde v. Brown, 404 F.3d

1159, 1121 (9th Cir. 2005). The right of a defendant to present testimony

in his defense is not absolute, as even “relevant and reliable evidence can

be excluded when the state interest is strong.” Perry v. Rushen, 713 F.2d

1447, 1450 (9th Cir. 1983). Nevertheless, “the Supreme Court has made

clear that the erroneous exclusion of critical, corroborative evidence” can

rise to the level of a violation of the Fifth Amendment due process right

to a fair trial and the Sixth Amendment right to present a defense. 

DePetris v. Kuykendall, 239 F.3d 1057, 1062 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing

Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973)).

1. Trial Court Proceedings

California Evidence Code section 1200 generally prohibits the

introduction of “a statement that was made other than by a witness while

testifying at the hearing and that is offered to prove the truth of the

- 10 - 13-cv-01459-WQH (MDD) 

Case 3:13-cv-01459-WQH-MDD Document 13 Filed 04/21/14 Page 10 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

matter stated.” California Evidence Code section 1220, however,

provides an exception to the hearsay rule, stating that “[e]vidence of a

statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule when offered

against the declarant in an action to which he is a party in either his

individual capacity or representative capacity, regardless of whether the

statement was made in his individual or representative capacity.”

Before trial commenced, Petitioner’s counsel moved in limine to

introduce evidence of Hargrove’s statements to police in which he stated

Petitioner “was kind of slow in the head” and “talks retarded.” (Lodg. No.

2 at 1671-72.) Petitioner’s counsel provided the trial court several

reasons why co-defendant Hargrove’s statements were not inadmissible

hearsay: (1) the statements fell under an exception to hearsay under

California Evidence Code section 1220; (2) pursuant to California

Evidence Code 356,2

 the statements completed evidence proffered by the

prosecution; and (3) Petitioner offered the statements for the nonhearsay

purpose of showing Hargrove’s consciousness of guilt. (Id. at 1671-73.) 

The trial court did not allow admission of co-defendant Hargrove’s

statements calling Petitioner “slow” and “retarded,” and found that the

statements were inadmissible hearsay. (Id. at 1671-76.) In deciding not

to admit Hargrove’s statements to police about Petitioner, the trial court

explained:

Well, my initial thought is it’s inadmissable [sic] hearsay. It

doesn’t come in under 1220 because it’s not being used against

the declarant [co-defendant Hargrove]. . . .

. . . .

2

California Evidence Code section 356 provides “[w]here part of an act, declaration, conversation or writing is given in evidence by one party, the whole on the same subject may be inquired into by an adverse party; when a letter is read, the answer may be given; and when a detached act, declaration, conversation or writing is given in evidence, any other act, declaration, conversation, or writing which is necessary to make it understood may also be given in evidence.”

- 11 - 13-cv-01459-WQH (MDD) 

Case 3:13-cv-01459-WQH-MDD Document 13 Filed 04/21/14 Page 11 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

You certainly can mention in your opening statement, “I

expect you’re going to see and hear an interview of my client and I think it will be pretty apparent to you that he is a little

slow. . . . [T]hat’s okay . . . because [the jury is] going to see

and hear that video. 

. . . .

[A]lthough [the statements] might show some consciousness of guilt on Hargrove, I don’t think that makes it admissible. I

don’t think that gets around the hearsay rule. 

. . . .

I think under 1220 it doesn’t come in. Maybe some other

theory. And, of course, there may be some nonhearsay theory.

. . . .

Okay. So for now, that’s my ruling.

(Id. at 1674-76) (quoted from the Reporter’s Appeal Transcript, with

minor edits for clarity.) 

2. State Court Appeal

On appeal, Petitioner argued the trial court abused its discretion

and violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights when it denied

Petitioner the right to introduce Hargrove’s statements during trial. 

(Lodg. No. 3 at 23.) Petitioner contended that Hargrove’s statements are

nonhearsay circumstantial evidence of Hargrove’s guilty state of mind. 

Specifically, Petitioner asserted “a statement that is not offered for its

truth is not hearsay, and a statement that does not directly declare a

mental state but merely reflects circumstantial evidence of that state of

mind is not hearsay because it is not received for the truth of the matter

stated, but as relevant nonhearsay determination of the declarant’s state

of mind.” (Lodg. No. 3 at 30) (internal citations omitted.) Petitioner

further contended that the relevant state of mind is Hargrove’s

consciousness of guilt; “ [. . .] Hargrove’s comments about appellant were

admissible to reflect his efforts to deflect culpability for the shooting by

implying appellant was too dumb to be taken seriously by the police.” 

(Id. at 31.) Under the consciousness of guilt theory, Petitioner contends

that Hargrove’s statements demonstrated his assessment that “[co-

- 12 - 13-cv-01459-WQH (MDD) 

Case 3:13-cv-01459-WQH-MDD Document 13 Filed 04/21/14 Page 12 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

defendant Hargrove and his girlfriend] could get away with pointing at

[Petitioner] because he is kind of slow,” and if Petitioner gave police a

different story than conveyed, “it’s because he’s retarded, he’s slow.” 

(Lodg. No. 2 at 1673.)

The California Court of Appeal noted that under California law,

“statements of a party, or party admissions, are admissible against the

party declarant, which is Hargrove, and not Burton.” (Lodg. No. 6 at 17.) 

Additionally, section 1220 requires that the statement is offered by the

party opposing the declarant (Hargrove), “which in this case is the

People, and not Burton.” (Id.) (citing People v. Castille, 108 Cal. App. 4th

469, 479 (2003).) The state appellate court observed that Petitioner

offered Hargrove’s statements for the truth of the matter–to show

Hargrove believed Petitioner to be “‘a very simple young man’ and a ‘little

bit different,’ and thus incapable of dealing with the murder or

possessing the wherewithal to protect or safeguard himself against or

from accusations that he was the shooter because he was in fact ‘slow’

and/or ‘retarded.’” (Lodg. No. 6 at 16.)

The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court properly exercised its

discretion in deciding to exclude Hargrove’s statements as inadmissible

hearsay. The Court of Appeal further noted that even assuming

Hargrove’s statements had a nonhearsay purpose, and that the trial

court erred in not admitting the statements, the error was harmless. 

(Id.) The state appellate court explained as follows:

First, [Petitioner ] was not precluded from presenting evidence to the jury that he was allegedly “slow.” As the trial

court noted, the defense was certainly entitled to argue to the jury that [Petitioner] was in fact “slow” (in connection with some defense theory), as evidenced (according to defense

counsel) by the video-taped interview of Burton conducted by

police shortly after his arrest in which Burton made noises and

sounds like a child. Thus, we conclude it was not reasonably

probable that a result more favorable to [Petitioner] would

- 13 - 13-cv-01459-WQH (MDD) 

Case 3:13-cv-01459-WQH-MDD Document 13 Filed 04/21/14 Page 13 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

have been reached absent the trial court’s alleged error in failing to admit the statements by Hargrove. Second, there is ample evidence to support the jury’s finding that [Petitioner] was in fact the shooter, a finding [Petitioner] does not directly challenge on appeal. The record shows that at trial Rosalio identified [Petitioner] as the shooter with 70 percent certainty; that Rosalio testified the shooter

wore a dark hooded sweatshirt, had darker skin than the

person with the shooter and exited the white Cadillac from the

passenger seat. The record further shows [Petitioner] wore a dark hooded sweatshirt on the night of the crime, the same sweatshirt police found in his room when they arrested him

the following day, and that [Petitioner] in fact had darker skin

than Hargrove. In addition, the record shows Hargrove drove the white Cadillac on the night of the killing and that he and

Aune owned the Cadillac.

Moreover, the clothing of the shooter described by Rosalio matched the description of [Petitioner’s] clothing Mathena provided to police. Mathena also confirmed that [Petitioner]

sat in the passenger seat of the Cadillac immediately prior to

the shooting, before the passenger exited the vehicle. Finally, shortly after the shooting a security guard saw two African- American males running through some

apartments, one of whom wore dark clothing and the other a

light shirt. The security guard’s description of the clothing

worn by the suspects generally matched the actual clothing worn that evening by [Petitioner] and Hargrove. In light of such evidence in the record supporting the jury’s finding that Petitioner was the shooter, we conclude it was not reasonably probable [Petitioner] would have achieved

a more favorable result absent the trial court’s alleged error in

excluding the statements by Hargrove regarding [Petitioner’s] mental acuity. See People v. McKinnon 52 Cal. 4th 610, 673 (2011) [any error by the trial court in admitting hearsay

statements was harmless because other, independent evidence

“substantially incriminated” the defendant and the hearsay

statements were, in any event, “cumulative and of minor

value.”]; see also People v. Houston 130 Cal. App. 4th 279, 301 [admission of hearsay harmless when other evidence of

defendant’s guilt was “overwhelming” and hearsay was not “cumulative” and “tangential” on the issue of defendant’s

guilt].

(Lodg. No. 6 at 18-19) (quoted from the Court of Appeal, with minor edits

for clarity). 

3. Analysis

The issue before this Court is whether the state appellate court’s

ruling was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). For the purpose of federal

- 14 - 13-cv-01459-WQH (MDD) 

Case 3:13-cv-01459-WQH-MDD Document 13 Filed 04/21/14 Page 14 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

habeas review, whether an evidentiary ruling is correct under state law is

not relevant; the only question is whether the ruling rendered the trial so

fundamentally unfair as to violate due process. Larson v. Palmateer, 515

F.3d 1057, 1065 (9th Cir. 2008). In order for an evidentiary ruling to be

so fundamentally unfair as to allow issuance of the writ, the trial court’s

decision must have violated clearly established federal law. Carey v.

Musaladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74 (2006). A legal principle is “clearly

established” within the meaning of § 2254(d)(1) if it is embodied in a

holding of the Supreme Court. Id. at 77. “The Supreme Court has made

clear that the erroneous exclusion of critical, corroborative defense

evidence may violate both the Fifth Amendment due process right to a

fair trial and the Sixth Amendment right to present a defense.” DePetris,

239 F.3d at 1062 (citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294

(1973)). 

Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in excluding

Hargrove’s statements because the statements were admissible

nonhearsay evidence of “Hargrove’s consciousness of guilt as the

triggerman for the shootings.” (ECF No. 1 at 8.) Petitioner contends the

value of the statements was not for their “underlying truth,” but rather

for how “they reflected Hargrove’s attempt at ‘damage control.’” (Id. at 9.) 

Specifically, by suggesting to the police that Petitioner was “too dumb to

be believable, Hargrove revealed a state of mind that was highly relevant

to the defense theory that he, and not Petitioner” was the shooter. (Id.) 

Respondents contend Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief

because the state courts reasonably determined that the exclusion of

Hargrove’s statements did not prevent Petitioner from presenting a

defense. (ECF No. 7 at 8.) Respondents also contend that allowing the

statements would have done nothing to refute the weighty evidence

- 15 - 13-cv-01459-WQH (MDD) 

Case 3:13-cv-01459-WQH-MDD Document 13 Filed 04/21/14 Page 15 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

against Petitioner. (Id. at 8,13.) 

Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief. Even accepting

Petitioner’s contention that Hargrove’s statement was entered for a nonhearsay purpose, the Court of Appeal determined, consistent with the

trial court, the statements were of minimal relevance under California

Evidence Code section 352. (Id.) In addition, the Court of Appeal

conducted an error analysis based on the trial court’s decision not to

admit the statements. (Id. at 17.) The Court of Appeals determined that

any resulting error was harmless because “it was not reasonably probable

[Petitioner] would have achieved a more favorable result absent the trial

court’s alleged error in excluding the statements. (Id. at 19.) Specifically,

there was “ample evidence” supporting the finding that Petitioner was the

shooter. (Id. at 18.)

Where evidence has been excluded based on state evidentiary law,

the Ninth Circuit uses a balancing test to determine whether a trial

court’s exclusion of evidence violates a petitioner’s due process rights. 

Chia v. Cambra, 360 F.3d 997,1003 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Miller v.

Stagner, 757 F.2d 988, 994 (9th Cir. 1985), amended on other grounds,

768 F.2d 1090 (9th Cir. 1985)). “[W]eighing the importance of the

evidence against the state’s interest in exclusion[,]” the court considers

the following factors: (1) the probative value of the evidence on the central

issue; (2) the reliability of the evidence; (3) whether the evidence is

capable of evaluation by a trier of fact; (4) whether it is the sole evidence

on the issue or merely cumulative; and (5) whether it constitutes a major

part of the attempted defense. Chia, 360 F.3d at 1004 (citing Miller, 757

F.2d at 994).

Here, the Miller factors support the exclusion of Hargrove’s

statements, regardless of whether Petitioner offered the statements for a

- 16 - 13-cv-01459-WQH (MDD) 

Case 3:13-cv-01459-WQH-MDD Document 13 Filed 04/21/14 Page 16 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

nonhearsay purpose. First, Hargrove’s statements about Petitioner’s

mental capacity were not probative of the central issue of the identity of

the shooter. Second, there are no indicators of reliability of the

statements. Third, Petitioner’s intended use of the statements for the

purpose of proving Hargrove was the shooter was not the only evidence on

the issue of the identity of the shooter. As the Court of Appeal explained,

the other victim, Rosalio H., identified Petitioner as the shooter and

identified that Petitioner was wearing a dark hooded sweatshirt. Two

other witnesses corroborated Rosalio’s description of what Petitioner was

wearing on the night of the shooting. Lastly, Hargrove’s statements did

not constitute a major part of Petitioner’s defense. As the Court of Appeal

noted, “[o]n appeal, [Petitioner] [did] not directly attack the evidence in

support of the jury’s finding that he was the shooter.” (Lodg. No. 6 at 2.) 

Taken together, the first, third, fourth and fifth Miller factors weigh in

favor of excluding Hargrove’s statements, and support the Court of

Appeal’s determination that the exclusion of the statements did not

violate Petitioner’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights because the trial

court did not exclude critical, corroborative defense evidence. 

Thus, the trial court’s exclusion of the statements as inadmissible

hearsay did not deprive Petitioner of the opportunity to present a defense. 

The trial court’s ruling, regardless of the characterization of the

statements as hearsay or nonhearsay, did not render the trial so

fundamentally unfair as to violate Petitioner’s due process rights. Chia,

360 F.3d at 1003. 

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS Petitioner’s Petition for

writ of habeas corpus be DENIED.

4. Evidentiary Hearing

The Supreme Court has held that evidence introduced in federal

- 17 - 13-cv-01459-WQH (MDD) 

Case 3:13-cv-01459-WQH-MDD Document 13 Filed 04/21/14 Page 17 of 18
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

court “has no bearing on section 2254(a)(1) review.” Cullen v. Pinholster,

__ U.S.__ 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1400 (2011). Thus, when a state court

precludes a Petitioner’s habeas relief, a district court “is not required to

hold an evidentiary hearing.” Id. (quoting Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S.

465, 474 (2007) (“an evidentiary hearing is not required on issues that can

be resolved by reference to the state court record.”).

Here, Petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. The state

supreme court has already precluded Petitioner’s habeas relief. Further,

Petitioner’s claim that the trial court improperly excluded evidence of codefendant Hargrove’s statements can be resolved with reference to the

record.

VI. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that

the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be DENIED.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any written objection to this

REPORT must be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later

than May 13, 2014. The document should be captioned “Objections to

Report and Recommendations. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall

be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than May 27,

2014. 

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specific time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the

Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 1998 (9th Cir. 1998).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 21, 2014

 

 Hon. Mitchell D. Dembin

 U.S. Magistrate Judge

- 18 - 13-cv-01459-WQH (MDD) 

Case 3:13-cv-01459-WQH-MDD Document 13 Filed 04/21/14 Page 18 of 18