Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00536/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00536-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROSALIN D. SUTTON

Plaintiff,

v.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE

Defendant. 

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Civil No. 11-0536-JLS(WVG)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION:

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

(DOC. #15)

GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

(DOC. #17) 

I

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Rosalin D. Sutton (hereinafter “Plaintiff”), filed a

Complaint for Judicial Review and Remedy On Administrative Decision

under the Social Security Act [42 U.S.C. § 405(g)]. Defendant Michael

J. Astrue (hereinafter “Defendant”), filed an Answer to the Complaint

and the administrative record (hereafter “Tr.”), pertaining to this

case. Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendant has

filed an Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and a

Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.

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The Court, having reviewed Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment,

Defendant’s Opposition to Plaint iff’s Motion for Summary Judgment,

Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, and the administrative

record filed by Defendant, hereby finds that Plaintiff is not entitled

to the relief requested and therefore RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Motion

for Summary Judgment be DENIED and Defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment be GRANTED. 

II

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

 On February 2, 2006, Plaintiff filed applications for Supplemental

Security Income benefits and Disability Insurance Benefits, alleging

that she was disabled since September 23, 2004. The Commissioner of

Social Security denied her application initially and upon reconsideration. On February 12, 2009, a hearing was held at which Plaintiff

appeared with counsel and testified before an Administrative Law Judge

(“ALJ”). On July 27, 2009, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not

disabled. The ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security when the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s

request for review. (Tr. 1-3).

III

ALJ’S FINDINGS1/

The ALJ made the following pertinent findings:

1. Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the

Social Security Act through December 31, 2004.

2. Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity

after her alleged onset date.

3. (Plainfiff) has the following severe impairment: 

seizures, status post-cerebral vascular accident.

1/

The ALJ’s findings are found at Tr. 16-21.

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4. (Plaintiff) does not have an impairment or combination of

impairments that meets or medically equals one of the

listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P,

Appendix 1. No physician has opined that (Plaintiff)’s

condition meets or equals any listing, and the state

agency physicians have opined that it does not. 

5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the ALJ

finds that (Plaintiff) has the residual functional

capacity to perform the full range of light work. 

(Plaintiff) could lift and carry twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently due to having slight

weakness in her left upper extremity, stand and walk six

hours of an eight-hour workday and sit six hours of an

eight-hour workday. (Plaintiff) could stoop, bend,

reach, squat, kneel and crawl occasionally. (Plaintiff)

must avoid unprotected water, extreme heat, hazardous

machinery, driving and heights as defined in 20 CFR

404.1567(b) and 416.967(b).

In making this finding, the ALJ considered all symptoms

and the extent to which these symptoms can reasonably be

accepted as consistent with the objective medical

evidence and other evidence, based on the requirements of

20 CFR 404.1529 and 416.929 and SSRs 96-4p and 96-7p. 

The ALJ also considered opinion evidence.

In considering (Plaintiff)’s symptoms, the ALJ must

follow a two-step process in which it must first be

determined whether there is an underlying medically

determinable physical or mental impairment that can be

shown by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory

diagnostic techniques—that could reasonably be expected

to produce (Plaintiff)’s pain or other symptoms. Second, once an underlying physical or mental impairment

that could reasonably be expected to produce (Plaintiff)’s pain or other symptoms has been shown, the ALJ

must evaluate the intensity, persistence, and limiting

effects of (Plaintiff’s) symptoms to determine the extent

to which they limit (Plaintiff’s) ability to do basic

work activities. For this purpose, whenever statements

about the intensity, persistence, or functionally

limiting effects of pain or other symptoms are not

substantiated by objective medical evidence, the ALJ must

make a finding on the credibility of the statements based

on a consideration of the entire case record.

John R. Morse, M.D., a medical expert and board certified

internist, testified to his thorough review of the

medical records and (Plaintiff)’s testimony. Dr. Morse

testified (Plaintiff) has a history of seizures starting

in 2004. Dr. Morse testified (Plaintiff)’s seizures

became more frequent when she stopped being consistent

taking her medication. Dr. Morse testified the (Plain3 11cv00536

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tiff)’s seizures became controlled when she was consistent taking her medication. 

(Plaintiff) has a history of seizures, status post

cerebrovascular accident after she had hemorrhage to the

brain. On October 3, 2006, Sarah L. Maze, M.D., reported

(Plaintiff)’s first seizure occurred six months after her

stroke. Dr. Maze said (Plaintiff) was not taking her

seizure medication regularly when her last seizure

occurred. Because the cerebrovascular accident caused

(Plaintiff) to have very slight weakness in the left

upper extremity, Dr. Maze performed a physical examination and determined an assistive device was not required. 

(Plaintiff)’s reflexes and gait was (sic) normal.

On January 29, 2007. The University of Southern California Medical Center (sic)(University of California San

Diego) (UCSD) reported the results of cranial nerve

testing (which) revealed (Plaintiff)’s nerves were

intact. (Plaintiff) had normal shoulder shrug bilaterally. The results of the motor test revealed (Plaintiff)

had a normal bulk and tone in all four extremities. 

(Plaintiff) had a full range of motion in all muscle

groups in her upper extremities. Although she had some

pain in her elbow, x-rays showed no discoloration or

joint effusion in the elbow. 

In August 2007, (Plaintiff) was doing well since taking

Keppra.2/ In October 2007, (Plaintiff) was taking good

care of herself. (Plaintiff) had good control of her

gout and she had no seizures for a while. (Plaintiff)

was walking for exercise, drinking a lot of water and she

was eating smaller meals. On July 24, 2008, treatment

records from Mid-City Community Clinic reported (Plaintiff) had her last seizure in August 2007. On September

18, 2008, treatment records from Mid-City Community

Clinic reported (Plaintiff) was off her medications for

six months. 

After careful consideration of the evidence, the (ALJ)

finds that (Plaintiff)’s medically determinable impairment could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged

symptoms; however, (Plaintiff)’s statements concerning

the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these

symptoms are not credible to the extent they are inconsistent with the above residual functional capacity

assessment.

However, to the extent that it is alleged that (Plaintiff) cannot perform work at an (sic) light exertional

2/ Keppra (Levetiracetam) is used in combination with other medications to

treat certain types of seizures in people with epilepsy. NATIONAL CENTER FOR

BIOTECHNOLOGY INFORMATION, U.S. LIBRARY OF MEDICINE,

www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmedhealth/PMH0001067.

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level, the ALJ finds those allegations are not totally

credible for the following clear and convincing reasons. 

First, (Plaintiff) is able to perform activities of daily

living such as her personal hygiene, washing dishes,

vacuuming, light cooking, laundry and she takes care of

her finances.

Second, (Plaintiff) said she was not sure of her compliance with her medication. She reported compliance with

Dilantin3/ for one year and her seizures stopped. When

she was non-compliant with Dilantin she ended up in the

emergency room. (Plaintiff) started back taking her

medication after she was admitted into the hospital with

a seizure. 

Third, two days after her last visit to the emergency

room for non-compliance with her medication, she had

another seizure for non-compliance and was back in the

emergency room. Dr. Maze reported on October 3, 2006,

(Plaintiff’s) seizures are under control when she takes

her medication regularly.

Fourth, treatment records from UCSD Medical Center reveal

(Plaintiff) was instructed to keep a seizure diary and

return with it two months later to alter her anti-seizure

therapy. 

Fifth, in August 2007, (Plaintiff) was doing well since

taking Keppra.

Sixth, in October 2007, (Plaintiff) had good control of

her gout and she had no seizures for a while.

Seventh, on September 18, 2008, treatment records from

Mid-City Community Clinic reported (Plaintiff) was off

her medications for six months.

Consequently, (Plaintiff’s) allegations are not credible

to establish a more restrictive residual functional

capacity than that found above. 

Alan E. Cummings, Ph.D., a vocation expert testified to

his thorough review of the vocational records. At the

hearing, the vocation expert classified (Plaintiff)’s

past relevant work as a day care worker as semi-skilled

3/

Dilantin (Phenytonin) is used to control certain types of seizures, and to

treat and prevent seizures that may begin during or after surgery to the brain or

nervous system. NATIONAL CENTER FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY INFORMATION, U.S. LIBRARY OF MEDICINE,

www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmedhealth/PMH0000549. 

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work performed at a light level of exertion, and a

sandwich maker as unskilled work performed at the medium

level of exertion according to the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. Dr. Cummings then considered a question

involving a hypothetical individual with (Plaintiff’s)

testimony and past relevant work experience. He replied

that such an individual is not able to perform her past

relevant work. 

6. (Plaintiff) is unable to perform her past relevant work

as a day care worker and as a sandwich maker because her

potential for a seizure would jeopardize both jobs. 

Accordingly, (Plaintiff) is unable to perform past

relevant work.

7. (Plaintiff) was born on November 16, 1957 and was 46

years old, which is defined as a younger individual age

18-49, on the alleged disability onset date.

8. (Plaintiff) has at least a high school education and is

able to communicate in English.

9. Transferability of job skills is not material to the

determination of disability because applying the MedicalVocational Rules directly supports a finding of “not

disabled,” whether or not (Plaintiff) has transferable

job skills.

10. Considering (Plaintiff’s) age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there are jobs

that exist in significant numbers in the national economy

that (Plaintiff) can perform.

In determining whether a successful adjustment to other

work can be made, the undersigned must consider (Plaintiff)’s residual functional capacity, age, education, and

work experience in conjunction with the Medical-Vocation

Guidelines, 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2. If

(Plaintiff) can perform all or substantially all of the

exertional demands at a given level of exertion, the

medical-vocational rules direct a conclusion of either

“disabled” or “not disabled” depending upon (Plaintiff)’s

specific vocational profile. When (Plaintiff) cannot

perform substantially all of the exertional demands at a

given level of exertion and/or has nonexertional limitations, the med ical-vocational rules are used as a

framework for the additional exertional and/or

nonexertional limitations. If (Plaintiff) has solely

nonexertional limitations, section 204.00 in the MedicalVocational Guidelines provides a framework for

decisionmaking. 

If (Plaintiff) had the residual functional capacity to

perform the full range of light work, a finding of “not

disabled” would be directed by Medical-Vocational Rule

202.21. However, (Plaintiff)’s ability to perform all or

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substantially all of the requirements of this level of

work has been impeded by additional limitations. To

determine the extent to which these limitation erode the

unskilled light occupational base, the ALJ asked the

vocational expert whether jobs exist in the national

economy for an individual with (Plaintiff)’s age,

education, work experience, and residual functional

capacity. The vocational expert testified that given all

of these factors the individual would be able to perform

the requirements of representative occupations such as an

assembler, DOT No. 731.687-034, classified as unskilled,

light exertional level with 2,000 in the local economy

and 60,000 in the national economy, a (sic) inspector,

DOT No. 727.687-066, unskilled, light exertional level

with 3,000 in the local economy and 92,000 in the

regional economy and a packager, DOT No. 559.687-074,

classified as unskilled, light exertional level with

4,000 in the local economy and 442,000 in the regional

economy.

Pursuant to SSR 00-4p, the vocational expert stated his

testimony was based upon and consistent with the information contained in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles.

Based on the testimony of the vocational expert, the

(ALJ) concludes that, considering (Plaintiff’s) age,

education, work experience, and residual functional

capacity, (she) is capable of making a successful

adjustment to other work that exists in significant

numbers in the national economy. A finding of “not

disabled” is therefore appropriate under the framework of

the above-cited rule (sic).

11. (Plaintiff) has not been under a disability, as defined

in the Social Security Act, from September 23, 2004

through the date of this decision.

IV

STANDARD OF REVIEW

 A district court may only disturb the Commissioner’s final decision

“if it is based on legal error or if the fact findings are not supported

by substantial evidence.” Sprague v. Bowen , 812 F.2d 1226, 1229 (9th

Cir. 1987); see Villa v. Heckler , 797 F.2d 794, 796 (9th Cir. 1986). 

The court cannot affirm the Commissioner’s final decision simply by

isolating a certain amount of supporting evidence. Rather, the court

must examine the administrative record as a whole. Gonzalez v.

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Sullivan, 914 F.2d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1990). Yet, the Commissioner’s

findings are not subject to reversal because substantial evidence exists

in the record to support a different conclusion. See, e.g., Mullen v.

Brown, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986). “Substantial evidence,

considering the entire record, is relevant evidence which a reasonable

person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Matthews v.

Shalala, 10 F.3d 678, 679 (9th Cir. 1993); see Thompson v. Schweiker,

665 F.2d 936, 939 (9th Cir. 1982). The Commissioner’s decision must be

set aside, even if supported by substantial evidence, if improper legal

standards were applied in reaching that decision. See, e.g., Benitez v.

Califano, 573 F.2d 653, 655 (9th Cir. 1978).

V

SUMMARY OF APPLICABLE LAW

Title II of the Social Security Act (hereinafter, “Act”), as

amended, provides for the payment of insurance benefits to persons who

have contributed to the program and who suffer from physical or mental

disability. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(D). Title XVI of the Act provides

for the payment of disability benefits to indigent persons under the

Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program. § 1382(a). Both titles for

the Act define “disability” as the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical

or mental impairment which can be expected to last for a continuous

period of not less than 12 months...” Id. The Act further provides that

an individual:

... shall be determined to be under a disability only if his

physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such

severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work

but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work

which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether

such work exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or

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whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether he

would be hired if he applied for work. 42 U.S.C. §

423(d)(2)(a).

The Secretary of the Social Security Administration has established

a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether a

person is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. 

Step one determines whether the claimant is engaged in “substantial

gainful activity.” If he is, disability benefits are denied. 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). If he is not, the decision maker proceeds

to step two.

Step two determines whether the claimant has a medically severe

impairment or combination of impairments. That determination is

governed by the “severity regulation,” which provides in relevant part:

If you do not have any impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits your physical or mental

ability to do basic work activites, we will find that you do

not have a severe impairment and are, therefore, not disabled. 

We will not consider your age, education, and work experience. 

§§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c).

The ability to do basic work activities is defined as “the

abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs.” 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1521(b), 416.921(b). Such abilities and aptitudes include

“[p]hysical functions such as walking, standing, sitting, lifting,

pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying, or handling;: “[c]apacities for

seeing, hearing, and speaking;” “[u]nderstanding, carrying out, and

remembering simple instructions;” “[u]se of judgment;” “[r]responding

appropriately to supervision, co-workers, and usual work situations;”

and “[d]dealing with changes in a routine work setting.” Id. If the

claimant does not have a severe impairment or combination of impairments, the disability claim is denied. If the impairment is severe, the

evaluation proceeds to step three.

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Step three determines whether the impairment is equivalent to one

of a number of listed impairments that the secretary acknowledges are so 

severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1520(d), 416.920(d). If the impairments meets or equals one of the

listed impairments, the claimant is conclusively presumed to be

disabled. If the impairment is not one that is conclusively presumed to

be disabling, the evaluation proceeds to step four.

Step four determines whether the impairments prevent the claimant

from performing work he has performed in the past. If the claimant is

able to perform his previous work, he is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1520(e), 416.920(e). If the claimant cannot perform his previous

work, the evaluation proceeds to step five.

Step five, the final step of the process, determines whether he is

able to perform other work in the national economy in view of his age,

education, and work experience. The claimant is entitled to disability

benefits only if he is not able to perform other work. 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1520(f), 416.920(f).

VI

DISCUSSION

A. THE ALJ PROVIDED LEGALLY SUFFICIENT REASONS FOR REJECTING

PLAINTIFF’S TESTIMONY

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly assessed her subjective

symptoms and failed to articulate clear and convincing reasons for

rejecting her testimony. Defendant contends that the ALJ provided

sufficient reasons for rejecting the Plaintiff’s claims.

An ALJ must consider all of a claimant’s statements about symptoms

including pain, but such statements are not alone conclusive evidence of

disability. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(a) and 416.929(a) (2012). An ALJ

cannot be required to believe every allegation of disability; but is

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however, required to make specific credibility findings. See Fair v.

Bowen, 885 F. 2d 597 (9th Cir. 1989); See also Social Security Ruling

(SSR) 96-7p (credibility finding “must be sufficiently specific to make

clear to the individual and to any subsequent reviewers the weights the

adjudicator gave to the individual’s statements and the reason for that

weight”). An ALJ’s credibility finding must be properly supported by

the record and sufficiently specific to ensure a reviewing court that he

did not “arbitrarily discredit” a claimant’s subjective testimony. See

Thomas v, Barnhart, 278 F. 3d 947, 958 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Here, Plaintiff testified that she has trouble standing, that she

has seizures in her sleep, uses a walker, and needs assistance while

showering (Tr. 28-29). However, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff performed

numerous daily activities, including taking care of personal hygiene,

washing dishes, sweeping, light cooking, and doing laundry (Tr. 18). 

The ALJ observed that these activities belied Plaintiff’s claim that she

could not perform light work activity (Tr. 18). See Tommasetti v.

Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that an ALJ may

consider many factors in weighing a social security claimant’s credibility, including the claimant’s daily activities). The ALJ properly

inferred that because Plaintiff could sweep, do laundry, and wash

dishes, she could perform light work activity (Tr. 18). 

Plaintiff’s claim for disability benefits is further weakened by

her non-compliance with prescribed medication (Tr. 18). The ALJ noted

that when Plaintiff was non-compliant with her prescribed treatment, she

ended up in the emergency room (Tr. 18). The ALJ further noted that a

consultative examiner reported on October 2, 2006, that Plaintiff’s

seizures were under control when she took her medication regularly, and

that in August 2007, Plaintiff was doing well since taking Keppra (Tr.

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18). Impairments that are amenable to control cannot be a basis for

disability. Warre v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration ,

439 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006), citing Odle v. Heckler , 707 F.2d

439, 440 (9th Cir. 1983) (affirming a denial of benefits and noting that

the claimant’s impairments were responsive to medication). 

 Since an ALJ may disregard unsupported, self-serving statements,

and due to Plaintiff’s activities of daily living, Plaintiff’s noncompliance with prescribed medication, despite the medication’s positive

effect, the ALJ properly found that Plaintiff’s alleged impairments were

not as severe as alleged.

 B. THE ALJ ERRED IN FAILING TO REJECT OR CONSIDER LAY WITNESS 

 TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE, BUT THE ERROR WAS HARMLESS.

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in ignoring the testimony of

the Plaintiff’s mother, Dorothy Evans (“Evans”). Defendant contends

that even if the ALJ erred, such error was harmless.

Ms. Evans briefly testified that her daughter had seizures but had

difficulty recalling when the seizures had occurred (Tr. 53). She

asserted that Plaintiff had seizures which occurred during her sleep;

however, she had never witnessed this and only based her testimony on

hearsay statements from Plaintiff (Tr. 52-53). She also asserted that

Plaintiff had a memory problem (Tr. 50-51).

Generally, in evaluating a claimant’s disability, the ALJ must

consider the testimony of lay witnesses. Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d

915, 919 (9th Cir. 1993); see also Social Security Ruling (SSR) 96-8p

(ALJ must consider the record as a whole including lay evidence). 

Particularly in cases where a claimant alleges pain or other symptoms

that are not supported by medical evidence in the file, the ALJ must

obtain detailed descriptions of daily activities by directing specific

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inquiries about the pain and its effects to third parties who would be

likely to have such knowledge. Dodrill, 12 F.3d at 919. 

The ALJ did not offer any reason to disregard Dorothy Evans’

description of Plaintiff’s limitations. In fact, the ALJ’s decision is

void of any statements that the ALJ actually considered Ms. Evans’

testimony. Such failure to articulate a rationale is error. However,

this Court disagrees with the Plaintiff that such error warrants remand.

The Ninth Circuit has held that an ALJ’s failure to address a lay

witness’s statements was harmless error and did not warrant remand. 

Ukolov v. Barnhart, 420 F.3d 1002, 1006 fn. 6 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Because

the testimony of the lay witnesses encompassed only symptoms, any

failure of the ALJ to adequately address that testimony does not affect

the outcome of this case”). A reviewing court can consider an error

harmless when an ALJ fails to properly discuss competent lay testimony

favorable to the claimant when it can confidently conclude that no

reasonable ALJ, when fully crediting the testimony, could have reached

a different disability determination. See Stout v. Commissioner, 454

F.3d 1050, 1053-56 (9th Cir. 2006). Friends and family members who are

in a position to observe the claimant’s symptoms daily are considered to

be “competent” to testify to the claimant’s condition. Dodrill, F.3d at

918. 

In the present case, Evans’ testimony was inconsistent with the

treatment reflected in Plaintiff’s medical record and the effectiveness

of treatment when Plaintiff was compliant with her medications. Evans

testified that her daughter needed help because of a mental impairment

(Tr. 50-51), which is the primary impairment Plaintiff alleges prevents

her from working (Tr. 39). However, Plaintiff did not provide objective

medical evidence of her alleged mental impairment. When Plaintiff was

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asked by the ALJ why she believed her memory was more impaired than it

was previously, Plaintiff responded it was because of her stroke (Tr.

39). However, Plaintiff’s stroke occurred in 2002, prior to the ALJ

determination in 2004 that she was not disabled (Tr. 63). Neither

Plaintiff nor Evans alleged an intervening stroke or other event that

would cause Plaintiff’s memory to deteriorate further. Indeed,

according to the medical records, Plaintiff’s mental status had actually

improved from a limitation to simple, repetitive work, to no medically

determinable impairment. (Tr. 76, 336). In short, there was no

evidence to support Evans’ testimony, nor Plaintiff’s testimony, that

Plaintiff was disabled because of poor memory. Accordingly, Evans’

testimony was unsupported. Therefore, Plaintiff’s contention that the

case warrants remand because the ALJ failed to discuss the Evans’

testimony fails. 

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Motion for

Summary Judgment be DENIED and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

be GRANTED.

VII

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

After a review of the record in this matter, the undersigned

Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment

be DENIED and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment be GRANTED.

This Report and Recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate Judge

is submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to this case,

pursuant to the provision of 28 U.S.C. §¤ 636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than March 26, 2012, any party to this 

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action may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy

on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections to Report

and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be

filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than April 13,

2012. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within

the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on

appeal of the court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir.

1991).

DATED: February 27, 2012

 Hon. William V. Gallo

 U.S. Magistrate Judge

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