Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-04592/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-04592-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DARRYL WILLINGHAM,

Plaintiff,

 v.

COUNTY OF SAN MATEO, et al.,

Defendants /

No. C-04-4592 MMC

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT;

VACATING HEARING

Before the Court is defendant Tracy Martin’s (“Martin”) motion for summary

judgment, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff Darryl

Willingham (“Willingham”) has filed opposition, to which Martin has replied. Having

considered the papers filed in support of and in opposition to the motion, the Court deems

the motion suitable for decision on the papers, VACATES the hearing scheduled for

November 18, 2005, and rules as follows.

In his complaint, Willingham alleges that his constitutional rights were violated when

he was discharged from parole on November 10, 2003, instead of on November 8, 2003,

the date plaintiff believes he should have been discharged. It is undisputed that

Willingham, who was convicted of “sex crimes,” (see Compl. ¶ 12), was originally

scheduled to be released from prison on November 10, 2000, to be followed by a threeCase 3:04-cv-04592-MMC Document 62 Filed 11/07/05 Page 1 of 4
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Willingham was subject to a maximum parole term of three years. See Cal. Penal

Code § 3000(b)(1).

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Section 3060.7(d), as applicable to Willingham, provides that the CDCR “shall

release an inmate . . . one or two days before his or her scheduled release date if the

inmate’s release date falls the day before a holiday or weekend.” See Cal. Penal Code

§ 3060.7(d).

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year period of parole. (See Martin Decl., filed October 7, 2005, ¶ 3.)1 Because November

10, 2000 was a Friday, however, the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), acting pursuant to § 3060.7(d) of the California Penal Code,2

released Willingham from prison on November 8, 2000, a Wednesday. (See Martin Decl.,

filed October 7, 2005, ¶ 5 and Ex. 1.) Thereafter, Willingham received “documents”

indicating he would remain on parole until November 10, 2003 and he told Martin, his

parole officer, that his parole discharge date should be November 8, 2003, i.e., three years

from November 8, 2000. (See Willingham Decl., filed October 28, 2005, ¶ 5.) According to

Willingham, Martin initially advised Willingham that he would be discharged from parole on

November 8, 2003, but later advised Willingham that he would not be discharged until

November 10, 2003. (See id. ¶¶ 5-6.) Willingham states that because he thereafter was

discharged from parole on November 10, 2003, rather than on November 8, 2003, he

“miss[ed] an important family matter, causing [him] great distress and emotional upset.” 

(See id. ¶ 7.)

Willingham argues that because he was released from prison two days earlier than

scheduled as a result of application of § 3060.7(d), his term of parole began to run on the

earlier release date, rather than from the scheduled release date. Martin, although

disagreeing with Willingham’s interpretation of the applicable state statutes, argues she is

entitled to summary judgment because, even if Willingham was entitled to be discharged

from parole on November 8, 2003, he cannot show she was responsible for the two-day

delay. The Court agrees.

“A person deprives another of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section

1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to

Case 3:04-cv-04592-MMC Document 62 Filed 11/07/05 Page 2 of 4
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Willingham does not offer any evidence, or even allege, that Martin acted contrary

to any determinations made by the CDCR and/or BPT.

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perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which the

plaintiff complains.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F. 2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (internal quotation

and alterations omitted). “The inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on

the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are

alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation.” Id.; see, e.g., Bergen v. Spaulding,

881 F. 2d 719, 721 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding plaintiff released from prison 21 days late stated

§ 1983 claim against defendants who “refus[ed] to perform [their] duty” to determine

plaintiff’s proper release date).

Martin offers evidence that her job duties do not include determining parole dates,

but, rather, enforcing parole dates calculated by CDCR officials in another division. (See

Martin Decl. ¶ 2.) Additionally, Martin offers evidence that she uses an “OBIS” computer

system to ascertain a parolee’s discharge date and that, using the OBIS system, she

learned that Willingham was scheduled to be discharged from parole on November 10,

2003. (See id. ¶¶ 2, 3.) In opposition, Willingham fails to offer any evidence to dispute

Martin’s showing. As a result, it is undisputed that Martin did not determine or change

Willingham’s parole discharge date and, further, that she did not have the authority to

change the discharge date, even if she so desired. Indeed, California law provides that the

entity responsible for considering an inmate’s requests “regarding the length of his or her

parole” is the Board of Prison Terms (“BPT”). See Cal. Penal Code §§ 3000(b)(4), (b)(7). 

Consequently, Willingham has not brought this action against the parties potentially

responsible for any miscalculation of his parole discharge date, i.e., the officials within the

CDCR or BPT having such responsibility.3

 See Leer, 844 F. 2d at 634 (holding plaintiff, to

establish § 1983 claim, “must establish individual fault” against each defendant from whom

he seeks damages).

In sum, assuming, arguendo, Willingham’s federal constitutional rights were violated

when he was discharged from parole on November 10, 2003 instead of November 8, 2003,

Case 3:04-cv-04592-MMC Document 62 Filed 11/07/05 Page 3 of 4
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Willingham fails to offer evidence to support a finding that any such violation was caused by

an act or omission of Martin. Accordingly, Martin is entitled to summary judgment.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Martin’s motion for summary judgment is hereby

GRANTED. Because Willingham’s claims against all other defendants have been

dismissed, the Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of defendants.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 7, 2005 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

Case 3:04-cv-04592-MMC Document 62 Filed 11/07/05 Page 4 of 4