Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-01090/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-01090-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWW)

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- 1 - 08cv1090

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HAMED SHAHABZADA,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 08-CV-1090 JLS (NLS)

ORDER (1) ADOPTING

MAGISTRATE JUDGE

STORMES’S REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION, (2)

GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT, AND (3) DENYING

DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(Doc. Nos. 12, 13, & 16.)

vs.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,

Defendant.

Presently before the Court are cross motions for summary judgment by Plaintiff Hamed

Shahabzada and Defendant Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of Social Security. (Doc. Nos. 12 & 13.)

Also before the Court is a Report and Recommendation (R&R) from Magistrate Judge Stormes

advising this Court to grant Plaintiff’s motion and deny Defendant’s motion. (Doc. No. 16.) Finally,

Defendant has filed objections to the R&R and Plaintiff has replied to those objections. (Doc. Nos.

17 & 18.) Having considered the R&R and Defendant’s objections, the Court (1) OVERRULES

Defendant’s objections, (2) ADOPTS Magistrate Judge Stormes’s Recommendation and Report, (3)

GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment; and (4) DENIES Defendant’s cross-motion for

summary judgment.

//

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1

 Magistrate Judge Stormes’s summary of the relevant law is entirely correct and unchallenged

by the Commissioner. The contours of the legal standard, however, are reiterated here for the sake

of clarity.

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BACKGROUND

The Court finds that the background contained in the R&R is both accurate and complete.

Further, Defendant has not objected to this aspect of the R&R. Therefore, the Court incorporates the

R&R’s “Procedural History” section by reference. (R&R at 1–3.)

LEGAL STANDARDS

I. DISTRICT COURT REVIEW OF A REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) set forth the

duties of the district court in connection with a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. “The

district court must make a de novo determination of those portions of the report . . . to which objection

is made,” and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the finding or recommendations

made by the magistrate.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c); see also United States v. Remsing, 874 F.2d 614,

617 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676 (1980). However, the Court has no

obligation to review a legal conclusions to which neither party objects. Schmidt v. Johnstone, 263 F.

Supp. 2d 1219, 1226 (D. Ariz. 2003); see also United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th

Cir. 2003) (en banc).

II. REVIEW OF DENIAL OF DISABILITY CLAIM1

When an applicant’s claim for disability benefits under the Social Security Act has been

denied, he may seek judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The

reviewing Court will reverse the Commissioner’s decision only if “it is based upon legal error or is

not supported by substantial evidence.” Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1214 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005)

(citing Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 1999)). “Substantial evidence is such relevant

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion” and is “more than

a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance.” Webb v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 2005)

(citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)); Tidwell, 161 F.3d at 601 (citing Jamerson

v. Chater, 112 F.3d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir.1997)). This inquiry looks to the record as a whole. Sample

v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1982). However, if the evidence supports more than one

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2

 Plaintiff also asserted that the ALJ incorrectly found that he could return to work as a home

care attendant. (Pl.’s MSJ at 6.) The Commissioner concedes that this finding was incorrect.

(Objections at 2.)

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interpretation, the Court must uphold the Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ) decision. Tackett v.

Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). “Where, as here, the Appeals Council denies a request

for review of an ALJ's decision, the decision of the ALJ represents the final decision of the

Commissioner.” Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 n.1 (9th Cir 2004)

(citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.981).

In order to qualify for disability benefits, an applicant must show that he is “disabled,”

meaning (1) that he suffers from a medically determinable impairment that can be expected to last for

a continuous period of twelve months or more, or would result in death, and (2) the impairment

renders applicant incapable of performing the work they previously performed or any other

substantially gainful employment that exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A),

(2)(A). To evaluate the applicant’s claim, an ALJ must apply a five-step analysis. 20 C.F.R. §

404.1520.

In step one, the ALJ determines whether a claimant is currently engaged in substantial

gainful activity. If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, the ALJ proceeds to step two

and evaluates whether the claimant has a medically severe impairment or combination

of impairments. If not, the claimant is not disabled. If so, the ALJ proceeds to step

three and considers whether the impairment or combination of impairments meets or

equals a listed impairment under 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, App. 1. If so, the

claimant is automatically presumed disabled. If not, the ALJ proceeds to step four and

assesses whether the claimant is capable of performing her past relevant work. If so,

the claimant is not disabled. If not, the ALJ proceeds to step five and examines

whether the claimant has the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform any other

substantial gainful activity in the national economy. If so, the claimant is not disabled.

If not, the claimant is disabled.

Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). A claimant bears the burden of proof with

respect to the first four steps, but for the fifth step the burden shifts to the Commissioner. Id. (citing

Swenson v. Sullivan, 876 F.2d 683, 687 (9th Cir. 1989)).

DISCUSSION

Magistrate Judge Stormes found that “the sole issue presented is whether the ALJ properly

relied upon the Grid or erred by failing to obtain the testimony of a vocational expert.”2

 (R&R at 4.)

In holding that the ALJ’s ruling was not supported by substantial evidence, Judge Stormes noted that

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“it would be error for an ALJ to rely solely on the Grid for claimants with only non-exertional

limitations.” (Id. at 5.) And, although the ALJ did not take testimony from a vocational expert, he

“recognized that the Grid could not be used as a sole basis [for its decision, but] instead provided a

‘framework for decisionmaking.’” (Id. at 6.) The problem, according to Judge Stormes, is that when

ALJ Trembly found that Plaintiff’s “limitations have little or no effect on the occupational base of

unskilled work at all exertional levels,” his conclusion is not supported by anything in the record. (Id.)

Having fully reviewed this matter, the Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Stormes. First, the

Court is unpersuaded by the Commissioner’s claim that “this claimant’s non-exertional limitations did

not prevent the ALJ’s reliance on the Grid.” (Objections at 2.) He states that because “Plaintiff was

not limited exertionally, the entire grid was applicable,” however this is, by definition, true for any

claimant without exertional limitations. (Id.) And although the Commissioner protests that he does

not believe that reliance on the Grid is always appropriate for a claimant without exertional

limitations, he offers no limiting principle or suggestion why Plaintiff is any different from other

claimants. (See id.) Thus, as the R&R properly concludes, had the ALJ relied solely on the grid in

this case he would have committed error.

The Court is similarly unpersuaded by the Objections that there is substantial evidence in the

record as to the jobs available to Plaintiff. As previously stated, ALJ Trembly found that Plaintiff’s

nonexertional “limitations have little or no effect on the occupational base of unskilled work at all

exertional levels.” (Administrative Record (AR) at 22; see also R&R at 6.) The R&R concluded that

Defendant had not shown anything “in the record that provides substantial evidence to support the

ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff’s mental impairments did not affect the occupational base of

unskilled work at all exertional levels.” (R&R at 6.) It was unmoved by Defendant’s argument that

“the vast number of unskilled jobs in the national economy that ordinarily involve dealing with objects

rather than people” serve as substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s conclusion. (Id.)

The Commissioner’s objections are unpersuasive. Although he asserts that “there is nothing

in the ALJ’s statement that demonstrates error,” he does not address the primary issue noted in the

R&R. (Objections at 4.) Specifically, the conclusion that Plaintiff’s limitations do not reduce the

occupational base is entirely unsupported. It is conclusory and lacks meaningful analysis. Although

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3

 The criticisms of Magistrate Judge Stormes’s reliance on Polny in the Objections are

disingenuous, to put it mildly. The Commissioner claims that “the primary issue [in Polny] was the

ALJ’s failure to explain why he rejected the opinion of a treating specialist.” (Objections at 2–3.)

This statement is directly contradicted by the first sentence in the “Analysis” section of the Polny

opinion: “The major issue on appeal is whether the administrative law judge erred in applying the

grids in this case where the applicant's impairment was not exertional.” Polny, 864 F.2d at 663.

4

 The Commissioner’s attempts to distinguish these cases misses the mark. He argues that

they “are either inapposite or distinguishable.” (Objections at 2–3.) However, these cases are relied

upon only for statements of law, making the factual differences cited by the Commissioner irrelevant.

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it may, ultimately, turn out to be correct, it is not supported by “such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support [its] conclusion.” Webb, 433 F.3d at 686. As Judge Stomes

noted, “[t]he number of jobs available to those without mental impairments . . . does not provide

substantial evidence that Plaintiff could perform those jobs, given his mental impairments.” (R&R

at 6.) Without some individualized explanation regarding what jobs Plaintiff can perform given his

particular disability, a substantial evidence finding would be improper. 

Finally, the R&R’s conclusion as to remedy is also entirely correct. The Ninth Circuit has

repeatedly held that when reviewing the claim of an individual with only nonexertional impairments,

such as Mr. Shahabzada, an ALJ must consult with a vocational expert. For example, Polny v. Bowen,

864 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1988), held that “where . . . a claimant's nonexertional limitations are in

themselves enough to limit his range of work, the grids do not apply, and the testimony of a vocational

expert is required to identify specific jobs within the claimant's abilities.”3

 Id. at 663–64 (emphasis

added). Similarly, Cooper v. Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1152 (9th Cir. 1989), held that “where a claimant

suffers solely from a nonexertional impairment, the grids do not resolve the disability question; other

testimony is required.” Id. at 1155. Further, our Circuit noted in Lounsburry v. Barnhart, 468 F.3d

1111 (9th Cir. 2006), that “[the Commissioner] may not rely solely on the grids to deny benefits when

additional impairments detract from a claimant’s ability to work.”4 Finally, in Moore v. Apfel, 216

F.3d 864 (9th Cir. 2000), the court stated that “[w]hen the grids do not completely describe the

claimant's abilities and limitations, such as when the claimant has both exertional and nonexertional

limitations . . ., the grids are inapplicable and the ALJ must take the testimony of a VE.” Id. at 869

(emphasis added); see also Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 729 (9th Cir. 1998) (“The ALJ may apply

the grids in lieu of taking testimony of a vocational expert only when the grids accurately and

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completely describe the claimant's abilities and limitations. If the grids fail accurately to describe a

claimant's limitations, the ALJ may not rely on the grids alone to show the availability of jobs for the

claimant. In these cases, the ALJ must also hear the testimony of a vocational expert.” (citations

omitted)). Since there is no question that Plaintiff suffers only from nonexertional impairments and

since the ALJ relied on the Grid in coming to his conclusion, this case must be remanded back to the

Commissioner for additional proceedings in order to take and consider the testimony of a vocational

expert.

Having reviewed the R&R de novo the Court concludes that it has properly addressed the

relevant legal and factual issues in this matter. Therefore, Defendant’s objections are OVERRULED.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, the Court ADOPTS Magistrate Judge Stormes’s Report and

Recommendation. Consequently, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED and

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED. This matter is hereby REMANDED to

the Commissioner for additional proceedings pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), to allow for

testimony by a vocational expert.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 17, 2010

Honorable Janis L. Sammartino

United States District Judge

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