Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-02540/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-02540-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GEORGE AUSTIN,

Petitioner,

v.

P.D. BRAZELTON, Warden, 

Respondent.

 

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Civil No. 13cv2540 BAS(RBB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS [ECF NO. 1] AND

ORDER DENYING REQUEST FOR

JUDICIAL NOTICE [ECF NO. 17]

Petitioner George Austin, a state prisoner proceeding pro se

and in forma pauperis, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

on October 21, 2013 [ECF Nos. 1, 2]. There, on several bases, he

challenges his conviction for gang-related possession of a firearm

by a felon. (Pet. 6-9, ECF No. 1; Lodgment No. 1, Clerk's Tr. vol.

1, 122-23, Dec. 2, 2011 (abstract of judgment describing

convictions).) In claim one, he alleges that his right to a speedy

trial was violated by a ten-day continuance granted to the

prosecution. (Pet. 6, ECF No. 1.) Austin maintains, in claim two,

that his right to due process was violated by the admission of the

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gang expert’s opinion testimony. (Id. at 7.) In claim three,

Austin argues the collection of his DNA at the time of arrest was

an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth

Amendment. (Id. at 8.) Finally, his fourth claim is that his

trial was rendered fundamentally unfair by cumulative error. (Id.

at 9.)

Respondent P.D. Brazelton filed an Answer to Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus [ECF No. 6], along with a Notice of Lodgment [ECF

No. 7]. Austin filed a Traverse on April 4, 2014 [ECF No. 9]. On

April 25, 2014, Petitioner filed an ex parte Motion for Appointment

of Counsel [ECF No. 12], which was denied without prejudice [ECF

No. 15]. On August 8, 2014, the Court received from the Petitioner

a document entitled “Motion of Judicial Notice of Newly Discovered

Evidence of Actual Innocence Exculpatory DNA/Impeachment Evid.”

[ECF No. 17], which was filed on the Court’s docket as a Request

for Judicial Notice. For the reasons discussed below, the Petition

should be DENIED, and the Request for Judicial Notice is DENIED.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On the morning of January 3, 2011, a San Diego police officer

noticed a Nissan Altima driving on El Cajon Boulevard with its

trunk open. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.'s Appeal Tr. vol. 11, 1176-82,

1184, Oct. 3, 2011.) He ran the license plate and discovered the

vehicle was a rental car. (Id. at 1181.) There were three

individuals in the car. (Id. at 1183.) The officer initiated a

stop, but the car continued driving for about two blocks. (Id.) 

The car eventually stopped in a parking lot, the front

passenger door opened, and Petitioner got out. (Id. at 1185-86.) 

He wore a white dress shirt. (Id. at 1186.) Austin looked at the

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police officer and took off running. (Id.) Another passenger,

Aquantes Russell, got out of the rear driver's side and ran off in

the same direction as Austin. (Id. at 1189, 1221.) Russell was

wearing a dark dress shirt. (Id. at 1186.) The driver, Lawrence

Cochran, stayed in the car. (Id. at 1189-90, 1205.) 

Other police units arrived and a perimeter was set up around

the area to find the suspects who ran off. (Id. at 1190.) The

driver was detained and the vehicle was searched. (Id. at 1208-

09.) Police found a handgun holster and a loaded magazine for a

nine-millimeter Makarov pistol on the floorboard near the driver’s

seat. (Id. at 1211-12, 1215.) Austin and Russell were discovered

hiding in a dumpster several blocks from where the rental car was

stopped. (Id. at 1219-20.) Both wore black t-shirts at the time

of the apprehension. (Lodgment No. 6, People v. Austin, No.

D061046, slip op. at 3 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 20, 2013).) 

A Makarov handgun was found later under a bush in a gated

apartment complex between the location of the traffic stop and the

dumpster where Austin was arrested. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.'s Appeal

Tr. vol. 11, 1226; Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Appeal Tr. vol. 12, 1325,

Oct. 4, 2011.) The gun was loaded and its ammunition matched the

rounds found in the magazine in the car. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s

Appeal Tr. vol. 11, 1232-33.) The firearm was not registered. 

(Id. at 1241.) A member of the landscaping crew directed the

police to the gun. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Appeal Tr. vol. 12,

1327-29.) His coworker saw a man discard a hooded sweatshirt as he

ran through the complex toward an abandoned property. (Id. at

1365-67, 1369.) Another employee saw two African–American men

running down the street as one of them took off his top and threw

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it in a bush near the apartment complex. (Id. at 1400-01.) He

also observed one of the men crouching by a bush. (Id. at 1471.) 

A resident from the area noticed two black males walk by “real fast

real nervously.” (Id. at 1436-38.) One of them threw a jacket

into a recycling bin. (Id. at 1444.) The witness recognized

Austin and Russell during a curbside identification process as the

men he had seen walking by. (Id. at 1453.) 

DNA testing of the handgun and holster was conducted by

criminalist Tamira Ballard from the San Diego Police Department

Crime Laboratory. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Appeal Tr. vol. 13,

1582, 1586, Oct. 5, 2011.) Ballard testified at trial that

Cochran, the driver of the car, was a contributor to the DNA found

on the holster and the handgun. (Id. at 1595-1607.) Austin was

excluded as a possible contributor to one of the swabs of the

firearm. (Id. at 1597.) A comparison of Austin's DNA to the

mixture from two other swabs of the gun was inconclusive. (Id. at

1605.) 

At trial, Austin stipulated that he had a previous felony

conviction. (Id. at 1616.) Detective Jon Brown from the San Diego

Police Department testified as the prosecution’s gang expert about

the Skyline criminal street gang based in southeast San Diego. 

(Id. at 1624-26, 1647-48.) In Brown’s expert opinion, Austin was

“without a doubt” an active member of the Skyline gang, and both

Cochran and Russell were active Skyline gang members. (Id. at

1686, 1679-80.) He also expressed an opinion that three gang

members riding in a car with a gun would all have the mutual right

to control it. (Id. at 1688.) Brown further testified that

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fleeing from the car with a gun after a police stop would benefit

the gang. (Id. at 1689-90.) 

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The information filed in San Diego Superior Court Case No.

SCD233495 on June 9, 2011, charged Austin1 with three felony

counts: (1) possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of

California Penal Code section 12021(a)(1); (2) illegal carrying of

a loaded firearm in public in violation of California Penal Code

section 12031(a)(1); and (3) possession of ammunition by a

prohibited person in violation of California Penal Code section

12316(b)(1). (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr. vol. 1, 5-7, June 9,

2011 (information).) The charging document also alleged that

Petitioner was an active gang member within the meaning of

California Penal Code section 12031(a)(2)(C) and had one prison

prior. (Id. at 6-7.) 

On September 26, 2011, a jury trial commenced on the charges

against Austin. (Id. at 169-70, Sept. 26, 2011 (minutes).) The

jury returned guilty verdicts on October 7, 2011, and found the

enhancement allegations to be true. (Id. at 193-95, Oct. 7, 2011

(verdicts).) Austin admitted his prison term priors. (Id. at 191,

Oct. 7, 2011 (minutes).) On November 29, 2011, Petitioner was

sentenced to eight months on count one and to one year on the

prison term priors. (See id. at 197-98, Nov. 29, 2011 (minutes);

Lodgment No. 6, People v. Austin, No. D061046, slip op. at 2.) His

sentence under count two was stayed, and the court imposed a two1

 The information also charged Lawrence Cochran, the driver of

the vehicle, as a codefendant. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr. vol.

1, 5-7, June 9, 2011.) 

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year concurrent sentence for count three.2 (Lodgment No. 6, People

v. Austin, No. D061046, slip op. at 2.)

Austin filed a notice of appeal. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr.

vol. 1, 125, Dec. 8, 2011 (notice of appeal).) On appeal, he

contended that he was prejudiced when the court granted the

prosecution a ten-day continuance and that the trial court

erroneously admitted certain gang expert testimony. (Lodgment No.

3, Appellant’s Opening Brief at 8, 22, People v. Austin, No.

D061046 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 20, 2013).) Austin also challenged the

warrantless collection of DNA after his arrest as unconstitutional

and argued that the cumulative effect of these errors mandates

reversal. (Id. at 34, 42.) Finally, Petitioner asserted that

insufficient evidence supported the gang allegation in count two

and that the trial court committed a sentencing error by imposing a

two-year term for count three. (Id. at 43, 45.) The California

Court of Appeal rejected all of Austin’s claims, except that it

modified and stayed the sentence under count three pursuant to

California Penal Code section 654. (Lodgment No. 6, People v.

Austin, No. D061046, slip op. at 32.) 

Austin filed a petition for review with the California Supreme

Court, raising claims of speedy trial violation, warrantless DNA

collection, and unsupported gang allegation. (Lodgment No. 7,

Petition for Review at 9-19, People v. Austin, [No. S209489] (Cal.

May 3, 2013).) The California Supreme Court issued a summary order

which stated: "The petition for review is denied." (See Lodgment

2

 The court sentenced Austin in this case, SCD233495, at the

same time it sentenced him in another matter in which he was also a

defendant, SCD233723. (See Lodgment No. 6, People v. Austin, No.

D061046, slip op. at 2.) 

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No. 8, People v. Austin, No. S209489, order at 13 (Cal. May 3,

2013).)

While the direct appeal of his criminal conviction was

pending, Austin filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

superior court, alleging that his conviction was based on

insufficient evidence and that admission of forensic evidence and

gang expert testimony violated his due process rights. (Lodgment

No. 9, Austin v. Brazelton, No. HC20989 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed June

21, 2012) (petition for writ of habeas corpus at 3a-3d).) 

Petitioner also claimed the trial court abused its discretion by

denying Austin’s motion for mistrial. (Id. at 4b-4c.) The

superior court issued a reasoned decision denying the petition. 

(Lodgment No. 10, In re Austin, No. HC20989, order at 1-4 (Cal.

Super. Ct. July 31, 2012).) 

On August 27, 2012, Austin filed a habeas corpus petition in

the California Court of Appeal, raising the same claims. (Lodgment

No. 11, Austin v. Brazelton, No. HC20989 (Cal. Ct. App. filed Aug.

27, 2012) (petition for writ of habeas corpus).) The appellate

court denied the petition.

In addition to the reasons stated in the opinion filed on

February 20, 2013 in People v. Austin (D061046), to the

extent the petitioner attempts to raise an issue of juror

misconduct, we determine his evidence of misconduct

(consisting of petitioner’s unsigned declaration)

insufficient. (See People v. Hayes (1999) 21 Cal. 4th

1211, 1256; People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 697.) As

such the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

failing to grant a new trial.

3 Respondent’s Notice of Lodging [ECF No. 7] describes

Lodgment No. 8 as the “Order denying Petition for Review in

California Supreme Court case number S209489.” (See Notice Lodging

2, ECF No. 7.) There are, however, two orders attached as Lodgment

No. 8 –- the superior court’s July 31, 2012 Order Denying Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus followed by the California Supreme

Court’s order denying Austin’s petition for review.

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(Lodgment No. 12, In re Austin, No. HC20989, order at 1 (Cal. Ct.

App. Feb. 22, 2013).) 

On May 20, 2013, Austin filed a habeas petition with the

California Supreme Court, repeating the claims he raised on habeas

review in lower courts. (Lodgment No. 13, Austin v. Brazelton, No.

S210876 (Cal. filed May 20, 2013) (petition for writ of habeas

corpus).) The court summarily denied the petition, citing People

v. Duvall, 9 Cal. 4th 464, 474, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 259, 265, 886 P.2d

1252, 1258 (1995); In re Dixon, 41 Cal. 2d 756, 759, 264 P.2d 513,

514 (1953); and In re Lindley, 29 Cal. 2d 709, 723, 177 P.2d 918,

926-27 (1947). (Lodgment No. 14, In re Austin, No. S210876, order

at 1 (Cal. July 10, 2013).)

Austin filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this

Court on October 21, 2013, raising four of the claims he pursued on

direct appeal or collateral review. (Pet. 6-9, ECF No. 1.)

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"),

28 U.S.C. § 2244, applies to all federal habeas petitions filed

after April 24, 1996. Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 204

(2003) (citing Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326 (1997)). AEDPA

sets forth the scope of review for federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit

judge, or a district court shall entertain an application

for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on

the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(a) (West 2006); see Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S.

339, 347 (1994); Hernandez v. Ylst, 930 F.2d 714, 719 (9th Cir.

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1991). Because Austin's Petition was filed on October 29, 2012,

AEDPA applies to this case. See Woodford, 538 U.S. at 204. 

Section 2254(d) reads as follows:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf

of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a

State court shall not be granted with respect to any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court

proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim--

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d).

To present a cognizable federal habeas corpus claim, a state

prisoner must allege his conviction was obtained "in violation of

the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28

U.S.C.A. § 2254(a). A petitioner must allege the state court

violated his federal constitutional rights. Hernandez, 930 F.2d at

719; Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 1990); Mannhalt

v. Reed, 847 F.2d 576, 579 (9th Cir. 1988).

A federal district court does "not sit as a 'super' state

supreme court" with general supervisory authority over the proper

application of state law. Smith v. McCotter, 786 F.2d 697, 700

(5th Cir. 1986); see also Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780

(1990) (holding that federal habeas courts must respect a state

court's application of state law); Jackson, 921 F.2d at 885

(explaining that federal courts have no authority to review a

state's application of its law). Federal courts may grant habeas

relief only to correct errors of federal constitutional magnitude. 

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Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395, 1400 (9th Cir. 1989)

(stating that federal habeas courts are not concerned with errors

of state law "unless they rise to the level of a constitutional

violation"). 

The Supreme Court, in Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003),

stated that "AEDPA does not require a federal habeas court to adopt

any one methodology in deciding the only question that matters

under § 2254(d)(1) -- whether a state court decision is contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law." Id. at 71. In other words, a federal court is not

required to review the state court decision de novo. Id. Rather,

a federal court can proceed directly to the reasonableness analysis

under § 2254(d)(1). Id.

The "novelty in . . . § 2254(d)(1) is . . . the reference to

'Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States.'" Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 869 (7th Cir. 1996) (en

banc), rev'd on other grounds, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). Section

2254(d)(1) "explicitly identifies only the Supreme Court as the

font of 'clearly established' rules." Id. "A state court decision

may not be overturned on habeas review, for example, because of a

conflict with Ninth Circuit-based law . . . ." Moore v. Calderon,

108 F.3d 261, 264 (9th Cir. 1997). "[A] writ may issue only when

the state court decision is 'contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of,' an authoritative decision of the

Supreme Court." Id. (citing Childress v. Johnson, 103 F.3d 1221,

1224-26 (5th Cir. 1997); Baylor v. Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th

Cir. 1996)). 

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Furthermore, with respect to the factual findings of the trial

court, AEDPA provides:

In a proceeding instituted by an application for a

writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to

the judgment of a State court, a determination of a

factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to

be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of

rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and

convincing evidence.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)(1).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Right to Speedy Trial 

In his first claim for relief, Austin alleges that he was

denied his right to a speedy trial in violation of state and

federal law. (Pet. 6, ECF No. 1.) Petitioner states that the

information charging him was filed on June 9, 2011, and his

original trial date was August 2, 2011. (Id.) He claims the trial

court granted the prosecution several continuances over defense

objections, and the case was continued because “numerous required

witnesses,” including a DNA expert, were not available. (Id.) 

Austin alleges that his trial started on September 26, 2011, fortysix4 days after the original August 2, 2011 date. (Id.) 

Respondent claims that the delay between Austin’s arraignment on

June 13, 2011, and the commencement of trial on September 26, 2011,

was not presumptively prejudicial. (Answer Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A.

10-11, ECF No. 6.)

In California, the right to a speedy trial is both

constitutional and statutory. Cal. Const. art. I, § 15; Cal. Penal

Code § 1049.5 (West 2008); Cal. Penal Code § 1382 (West 2011). 

4

 Petitioner is mistaken in his calculations: There are

fifty-five calendar days between those two dates. 

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Under the California Constitution, the right to a speedy trial is

triggered by the filing of the felony complaint. See People v.

Martinez, 22 Cal. 4th 750, 765, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 381, 392, 996 P.2d

32, 42 (2000). California statutes require the trial court to set

a trial date within sixty days of the felony arraignment. See Cal.

Penal Code §§ 1049.5, 1382. This period may be extended for good

cause or by the defendant’s waiver or consent. Id. § 1382.

Petitioner was arraigned on the criminal charges in this case

on June 13, 2011, and the case was set for trial on August 2, 2011. 

(Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr. vol. 1, 134, June 13, 2011 (minutes).) 

Petitioner had another criminal case pending at that time; he was

also charged in San Diego Superior Court Case No. SCD233723, along

with another individual, Keshawn Price, as a codefendant. 

(Lodgment No. 6, People v. Austin, No. D061046, slip op. at 4.) 

Both of Austin’s criminal cases were on the same timeline and were

assigned to the same courtroom for trial.5 (See Lodgment No. 2,

Rep.’s Appeal Tr. vol. 4, 286-87, Aug. 8, 2011.) 

On August 2, 2011, the prosecution requested a continuance,

and the trial was trailed over Austin’s objection. (Lodgment No.

1, Clerk’s Tr. vol. 1, 141, Aug. 2, 2011 (minutes).) The court

held a scheduling hearing in all three cases on August 8, 2011. 

(Id. at 143, Aug. 8, 2011 (minutes); Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Appeal

Tr. vol. 4, 286-87.) The court and all parties agreed that Friday,

August 12, 2011, would mark the final day for starting the trial: 

The Court: All right. You want to state your basis for

–- well, first let’s agree on the timing. I think in

chambers this morning all parties agreed that all cases

5

 A third criminal case, involving Keshawn Price alone, was

also on the same “clock.” (See Lodgment No. 6, People v. Austin, No. D061046, slip op. at 4.) 

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are running on the same timeline without a waiver and

that today was the 56th day, which means that Friday is

the 60th day; is that correct?

Ms. Diaz: Yes.

The Court: Everyone agree?

Ms. Lacher: Yes, Your Honor.

Mr. Roberts: I agree, Your Honor. 

Mr. Leahy: Yes, Your Honor.

The Court: Okay. All parties agree. All right. So

with that in mind, knowing that Friday is the 60th day, I

will hear your motion.

(Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Appeal Tr. vol. 4, 289.) 

At the August 8, 2011 hearing, the prosecutor argued her

motion to continue the trial because of witness unavailability

issues. (Id. at 289-293.) Austin’s counsel objected to any

continuance beyond August 12, 2011. (Id. at 327.) The court

observed that “in all three cases, time runs out on Friday. 

Obviously if you have a defendant who’s got two cases, one of them

has to start first. So if the other one starts after the 60 days,

there’s clearly good cause. You can’t do both cases at the same

time.” (Id. at 301.) The court did not find good cause for a

continuance of the Austin-Cochran case, SCD233495, and proceeded

with a pretrial suppression motion in the case. (Id. at 318-19.) 

Because Austin was a defendant in two separate cases, the court

then considered which case would be tried first and determined that

the Case No. SCD233723, the Austin-Price case, would proceed first. 

(Id. at 328.) The court found good cause to trail Petitioner’s

other criminal case, Case No. SCD233495 and the subject of this

habeas proceeding, because Austin and his counsel could not be in

two trials at the same time. (Id. at 329-330.)

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On September 14, 2011, jury deliberations began in Case No.

SCD233723, and the court resumed pretrial proceedings in the case

underlying this habeas petition. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Appeal

Tr. vol. 6, 656, 665-67, Sept. 14, 2011.) On September 15, 2011,

the trial court found that because the first trial had concluded,

there was no longer good cause justifying a continuance of the

trailing case. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Appeal Tr. vol. 7, 754-55,

Sept. 15, 2011.) The prosecution requested a continuance until

September 26, 2011, because Tammy Ballard, a DNA analyst, was on a

preplanned vacation out of state from September 9-23, 2011. (Id.

at 761.) The court heard sworn testimony from the prosecutor about

her efforts to subpoena the witness, as well as defense objections. 

(Id. at 759-82.) The trial judge explained his reasoning for

granting a continuance:

This is a situation where the witness had been under

subpoena before and it was not possible for [the

prosecutor] or counsel or the defendant to know exactly

when everyone would be available for this trial because

we were doing another trial, which just –- well, it

didn’t really end. I mean, the guilt phase ended and the

jury is still deliberating, but we still don’t know what

they’re going to do, and we don’t know if we’re going to

have to have the bifurcated trial on the priors. So

everything has been in a state of flux.

. . . .

I don’t find that there was any lack of due

diligence on the part of the people. They just simply

didn’t know all the facts. I also find that the witness

is out of the jurisdiction of the court and that despite

counsel’s objection to my ruling the way I did on the

[suppression] motion, so long as that motion remains

denied, which it is as I sit here now, she is a key

witness in the trial, and I don’t believe that continuing

the matter for a short time will deprive the defendant of

any constitutional right until that witness gets back.

So I’m going to grant the motion for continuance

based on a finding of good cause and let the appellate

court evaluate my reasons and decide whether I did this

rightly or wrongly. But I will continue the matter until

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the 26th of September, which is basically a week of court

time from now -- a week and two days.

(Lodgment No. 2, Augment Rep.’s Appeal Tr. vol. 2, 46-47, Sept. 15,

2011.) Thus, the court granted a ten-day continuance to the

prosecution, which Austin now challenges. (Pet. 6, ECF No. 1.) 

Petitioner presented this claim in a petition for review to

the California Supreme Court. (Lodgment No. 7, Petition for Review

at 9-13, People v. Austin, [No. S209489].) The California Supreme

Court denied it without comment. (Lodgment No. 8, People v.

Austin, No. S209489, order at 1.) Austin had raised the speedy

trial claim on direct review by the California Court of Appeal. 

(Lodgment No. 3, Appellant’s Opening Brief at 8, People v. Austin,

No. D061046.) Consequently, this Court will look through the state

supreme court's silent denial to the appellate court opinion. 

Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805. 

The California Court of Appeal acknowledged that the right to

a speedy trial is a fundamental right under the United States and

California Constitutions. (Lodgment No. 6, People v. Austin, No.

D061046, slip op. at 5 (citing Bailon v. Superior Court, 98 Cal.

App. 4th 1331, 1344, 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 360, 369 (2002).) The court

rejected Austin’s claim that a ten-day continuance violated his

right to a speedy trial, holding that Austin failed to show

prejudice from the delay. (Id. at 4-7.) The appellate court

explained that, under California law, prejudice exists if a delay

impaired the ability to defend against a charged crime, such as

where the continuance results in “the unavailability of a witness,

the loss of evidence, or the impairment of a witness's memory.” 

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(Id. at 5-6 (citing People v. Lowe, 40 Cal. 4th 937, 946 (Cal.

2007).) The court held petitioner failed to make that showing.

Here, Austin claims he was prejudiced because the

continuance allowed Ballard to testify for the

prosecution about DNA evidence, which linked Cochran to

the nine-millimeter gun found by the police when they

arrested Austin. In other words, the continuance allowed

the prosecutor to present evidence that helped establish

Austin's guilt. This does not constitute prejudice. 

(Id. at 6.) 

In his Petition, Austin contends that he was denied the right

to a speedy trial “in violation of state and federal law.” (Pet.

6, ECF No. 1.) To the extent Petitioner raises this claim on the

basis that his trial was held beyond the sixty-day time period

provided under California Penal Code section 1382, it must be

rejected. Clearly established federal law provides that federal

habeas relief is not available for an alleged error in the

interpretation or application of state law. Estelle v. McGuire,

502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (reemphasizing that federal habeas courts

may not reexamine state-court determinations of state-law

questions).

Austin’s claim that his speedy trial rights were violated

under federal law likewise fails. A speedy trial is a fundamental

right guaranteed the accused by the Sixth Amendment to the

Constitution and imposed on the states under the Due Process Clause

of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386

U.S. 213, 222-23 (1967). No per se rule has been devised to

determine whether the right to a speedy trial has been violated. 

[Federal courts] do not establish procedural rules for

the States, except when mandated by the Constitution. We

find no constitutional basis for holding that the speedy

trial right can be quantified into a specified number of

days or months. The States, of course, are free to

prescribe a reasonable period consistent with

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constitutional standards, but our approach must be less

precise.

Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 523 (1972). 

The Supreme Court has stated that “any inquiry into a speedy

trial claim necessitates a functional analysis of the right in the

particular context of the case . . . .” Id. at 522. The courts

analyze four factors to determine whether a defendant has been

deprived of his speedy trial rights: (1) the length of any delay,

(2) the reason for the delay, (3) whether the defendant asserted

his right to a speedy trial, and (4) any resulting prejudice to the

defendant. Id. at 530; see Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647,

651 (1992). 

No single factor is either a necessary or sufficient condition

for finding a speedy trial deprivation. Barker, 407 U.S. at 533. 

Instead, the factors must be analyzed together with other relevant

circumstances. Id. Deliberate delay attributable to the

government designed to hamper the defense “weighs heavily against

the prosecution,” Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81, 90 (2009)

(quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 531), while neutral reasons, such as

court congestion, weigh less heavily. Id. “[D]elay caused by the

defense weighs against the defendant . . . .” Id.

The Supreme Court divided the first inquiry, the length of the

delay, into two steps. First, to trigger a speedy trial inquiry,

“an accused must allege that the interval between accusation and

trial has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from

‘presumptively prejudicial’ delay.” Doggett, 505 U.S. at 651–52

(citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-31). “If this threshold is not

met, the court does not proceed with the Barker factors.” United

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States v. Beamon, 992 F.2d 1009, 1012 (9th Cir. 1993). If the

threshold showing is made, “the court considers the extent to which

the delay exceeds the threshold point in light of the degree of

diligence by the government and acquiescence by the defendant to

determine whether sufficient prejudice exists to warrant relief.” 

Id. 

The Supreme Court has observed that courts generally have

found that delays approaching one year are presumptively

prejudicial, which is sufficient to trigger the Barker inquiry. 

Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652 n.1. The Ninth Circuit has described a

six-month delay as a “borderline case” that warrants an inquiry

into the remaining Barker factors. See United States v. Valentine,

783 F.2d 1413, 1417 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing United States v.

Simmons, 536 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1976)). More recently, it noted a

general consensus among the courts of appeals that eight months

constitutes the threshold minimum. United States v. Gregory, 322

F.3d 1157, 1162 n.3 (9th Cir. 2003). Under the Sixth Amendment,

delay is measured from “the time of the indictment [or other

charging document] to the time of trial.” United States v. Sears,

Roebuck & Co., 877 F.2d 734, 739 (9th Cir. 1989). 

If the delay exceeds this minimum threshold, the court must

consider “as one factor among several, the extent to which the

delay stretches beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger judicial

examination of the claim.” Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652; see also

Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. at 88, 91-92 (discussing overall delay

of nearly three years between arrest and trial and employing Barker

factors to evaluate the reasons for delay); United States v.

Mendoza, 530 F.3d 758, 762 (9th Cir. 2008) (“If the length of delay

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is long enough to be considered presumptively prejudicial, an

inquiry into the other three factors is triggered.”). 

Where the prosecution proceeded with reasonable diligence, the

defendant must show specific prejudice for his speedy trial claim

to succeed. See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 656; United States v.

Aguirre, 994 F.2d 1454, 1457 (9th Cir. 1993). Prejudice is

assessed in the light of the interests that the speedy trial right

is designed to protect, including (1) preventing oppressive

pretrial incarceration; (2) minimizing anxiety and concern of the

accused; and (3) limiting the possibility that the defense will be

impaired. Barker, 407 U.S. at 532. Of these considerations, “the

most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant [to]

adequately . . . prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire

system.” Id. 

Austin cannot demonstrate that the delay between his

arraignment and the first day of trial was presumptively

prejudicial. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 651–52. He was arraigned on

June 13, 2011, and his trial began approximately three months later

on September 26, 2011. This time period is far from the one-year

mark and does not approach the minimum threshold of eight months. 

Id. at 652 n.1; United States v. Gregory, 322 F.3d at 1162 n.3. 

Thus, the length of delay in Austin’s case does not weigh in his

favor. 

Petitioner also fails to show that the reason for the delay,

the second factor in Barker, 407 U.S. at 531, should be assigned

any great weight. Barker explained that a deliberate delay

designed to hinder the defense should be weighed heavily against

the prosecution.

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A more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded

courts should be weighted less heavily but nevertheless

should be considered since the ultimate responsibility

for such circumstances must rest with the government

rather than with the defendant. Finally, a valid reason,

such as a missing witness, should serve to justify

appropriate delay. 

Id. 

In this case, the delay in bringing Austin to trial on the

weapons charges (No. SCD233495) is attributable to the fact that he

had another criminal case pending (No. SCD233723) that went to

trial first. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Appeal Tr. vol. 4, 329-30.) 

At the hearing on August 8, 2011, the trial judge decided that

Austin’s other criminal case, Case No. SCD233723, would proceed to

trial first and found good cause for the continuance of the weapons

case because Austin and his counsel could not be in two different

trials at once. (Id.) After the first case was submitted to the

jury, the trial court found good cause to continue the trial of the

weapons case ten days because a key prosecution witness was

unavailable. (Lodgment No. 2, Augment Rep.’s Appeal Tr. vol. 2,

46-47.) The court explained that the prosecutor was diligent and

properly subpoenaed the witness, but nobody, including the court,

could predict when Austin’s first trial would be over and the

second trial could start. (Id.) 

The third factor in the Barker analysis is whether the

defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial. At the hearing on

August 8, 2011, Austin, through his trial counsel, would not waive

the statutory time limit for proceeding to trial and objected to

any continuance of the case. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Appeal Tr.

vol. 4, 327.) On September 15, 2011, he objected to a ten-day

continuance, arguing that the prosecutor should have found a

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different criminalist to retest DNA samples and testify at Austin’s

trial. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Appeal Tr. vol. 7, 775-79.) 

[Austin’s counsel]: Mr. Austin was held to answer on

this case on June the first. We did a speeded up

arraignment on July the 13th, I believe, no excuse me it

was June the 13th. We did an arraignment on June the

13th, Mr. Austin did not waive time. We set the case for

trial for August the second. August 2 was day 50 so as

of July the 13th when they knew that Mr. Austin wasn’t

waiving time, if they knew, if they meaning the DA, if

the DA knew by July 13 that they had a scheduling

conflict with Ms. Ballard, they had from July 13 on to

get this sample retested with somebody who didn’t have an

up coming vacation to Maui, it’s just that simple. 

The Court: That would assume they knew when the trial

was going to go and if the witness would be unavailable,

correct?

[Defense counsel]: They knew –- according to Ms. Diaz

Ms. Ballard has had this vacation scheduled since

February. Ms. Diaz has just recounted all of the lengthy

discourse between herself and Ms. Ballard.

The Court: I’m just saying I was sent three cases. If

that case had gone first there wouldn’t have been an

issue, correct? The first date of her vacation was –-

[Defense counsel]: –- Your Honor.

The Court: -– September 9.

[Defense counsel]: –- I believe the DA controls which

case goes first.

The Court: No, I made the decision as to which case goes

first. I mean I was sent three cases. My instructions

from Judge Danielsen were you figure it out.

[Defense counsel]: Well, Your Honor, I’m not sure that

it was clear on the record who made the decision to

proceed on the case ending in 723. Now I may be

mistaken.

The Court: Well I think it is pretty clear if I hadn’t

ordered that case to proceed it wouldn’t have proceeded.

[Defense counsel]: My understanding is that the D.A.

elects which case goes first.

The Court: Even over the Court’s objection.

[Defense counsel]: Your Honor, my understanding is that

the D.A. is in the driver’s seat.

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The Court: Well, I think we have a difference of opinion

and I think I’m in the driver’s seat. I get to decide

which case goes first irrespective of counsel’s wishes. 

I consider counsel’s requests and then I rule, but there

is only one judge in the courtroom.

(Id. at 776-78.) Based on the record before this Court, Austin

asserted his right to a speedy trial and satisfied the third Barker

factor.

Because the delay in Austin’s case was not presumptively

prejudicial, Petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating actual

prejudice from the trial continuance. United States v. Aguirre,

994 F.2d at 1455 (recognizing that prejudice may be presumed from

an excessively long delay between indictment and trial). Under the

Barker analysis, prejudice is “assessed in the light of the

interests of defendants which the speedy trial right was designed

to protect.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 532. The most significant

interest is the defendant’s ability to “adequately prepare his

case.” Id.

On appeal, Petitioner claimed that the continuance allowed the

prosecution to present DNA testimony by the criminalist. The court

of appeal rejected Austin’s claim: “‘[T]he mere fact that evidence

sufficient to establish the prosecutor's case was introduced

against the defendant only after his speedy trial rights were

violated could never be considered the requisite prejudice to

justify reversal of the judgment.’” (Lodgment No. 6, People v.

Austin, No. D061046, slip op. at 6 (citing In re Chuong D., 135

Cal. App. 4th 1303, 1312 (2006).) 

The conclusion that Austin suffered no prejudice was

reasonable under federal law. Petitioner does not explain how his

defense of the criminal charges against him was impaired by the

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brief delay in the proceedings. Nor does he point to any loss of

potentially exculpatory evidence or witness testimony from the

continuance. Although Austin was in custody during the delay, he

was also in custody and on trial defending against charges in

another criminal case. See Jones v. Howes, No. 07-12958, 2010 WL

427998, at *22 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 28, 2010) (“[N]o prejudice arose

from petitioner's pretrial incarceration because even if he had not

been detained in this case, he would have been in custody for the

other armed-robbery case . . . .”). Because Austin was eventually

convicted of the charges, his three-month incarceration does not

outweigh the other considerations pointing to the reasonableness of

the delay. See United States v. Lam, 251 F.3d 852, 860 (9th Cir.

2001) (noting that a fourteen and one-half month incarceration by

itself does not outweigh other factors where defendant eventually

pleaded guilty to the charges). 

In his Traverse, Petitioner argues that the continuance

“prejudiced him by allowing the presentation of DNA evidence.” 

(Traverse 1, ECF No. 9.) Austin asserts that the evidence was

inadmissible, the case against him was weak, and good cause did not

exist for the continuance. (Id. at 1-2.) As explained above, the

delay in Austin’s criminal case was not presumptively prejudicial

and thus does not implicate federal speedy trial rights. The

reason for the delay provides little support for his claim. 

Although Petitioner objected, he fails to show actual prejudice

from the continuance. On balance, the four Barker factors do not

weigh in Petitioner’s favor. Based on the foregoing, the court of

appeal's rejection of Austin’s speedy trial claim was not contrary

to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established law, nor

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was it an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the state court proceeding. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d). Therefore, the Court recommends habeas relief be DENIED

as to claim one.

B. Gang Expert’s Testimony

In his second claim, Austin alleges that his constitutional

rights were violated when the trial court admitted gang expert

testimony. (Pet. 7, ECF No. 1.) He claims that the People, over

defense objection, presented opinion testimony from detective Brown

to prove that Austin was guilty of possession based on his

participation in a gang. (Id.) Petitioner argues that Brown

impermissibly opined on Austin’s guilt, and absent this testimony,

the prosecution would not have been able to “prove that Petitioner

ever touched the gun or knew it was in the car.” (Id.) 

Respondent contends that Austin’s claim fails because the

erroneous admission of evidence cannot serve as a basis for federal

habeas relief. (Answer Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 11, ECF No. 6.) 

Respondent also argues that the admission of relevant evidence did

not violate Petitioner’s due process rights. (Id. at 12.)

1. Last reasoned decision

Austin raised the claim regarding gang testimony on direct

review with the California Court of Appeal. (Lodgment No. 3, 

Appellant’s Opening Brief at 8, People v. Austin, No. D061046.) 

The claim was denied on the merits by the appellate court. 

(Lodgment No. 6, People v. Austin, No. D061046, slip op. at 8.) 

Austin failed to assert this claim in his petition for review with

the California Supreme Court. (See Lodgment No. 7, Petition for

Review at 9-19, People v. Austin, No. S209489.) He did, however,

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raise this claim (along with claims of insufficiency of the

evidence for conviction, violation of due process based on the

admission of forensic evidence, and abuse of discretion by trial

court based on the denial of Austin’s motion for mistrial) in a

petition for writ of habeas corpus with the California Supreme

Court. (Lodgment No. 13, Austin v. Brazelton, No. S210876

(petition for writ of habeas corpus).) The state court denied the

petition without comment but with a citation to People v. Duvall, 9

Cal. 4th 464, 474, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 259, 265, 886 P.2d 1252, 1258

(1995); In re Dixon, 41 Cal. 2d 756, 759, 264 P.2d 513, 514 (1953);

and In re Lindley, 29 Cal. 2d 709, 723, 177 P.2d 918, 926-27

(1947). (Lodgment No. 14, In re Austin, No. S210876, order at 1.) 

Citation to these cases indicates that the state supreme court

declined to reach the merits of Austin's claims because they were

procedurally barred. See La Crosse v. Kernan, 244 F.3d 702, 704–05

(9th Cir. 2001).

Under Duvall, a habeas corpus petition must not be based on

conclusory allegations but “should both (i) state fully and with

particularity the facts on which relief is sought, as well as (ii)

include copies of reasonably available documentary evidence

supporting the claim, including pertinent portions of trial

transcripts and affidavits.” People v. Duvall, 9 Cal. 4th at 474,

37 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 265, 886 P.2d at 1258 (internal citations

omitted). The citation to Duvall indicates the state supreme court

denied the petition based in part on Petitioner's failure to plead

a prima facie case for relief. Cross v. Sisto, 676 F.3d 1172,

1176–77 (9th Cir. 2012). The state supreme court also cited In re

Dixon, which held that the failure to raise a claim on direct

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appeal constitutes a procedural bar to collateral consideration of

the claim. See Washington v. Cambra, 208 F.3d 832, 833-34 (9th

Cir. 2000) (“In Dixon, the California Supreme Court held that ‘in

the absence of special circumstances constituting an excuse for

failure to employ [the] remedy [of direct review], the writ will

not lie where the claimed errors could have been, but were not,

raised upon a timely appeal from a judgment of conviction.’”)

(citation omitted).

Finally, a citation to Lindley “stands for the California rule

that a claim of insufficiency of evidence can only be considered on

direct appeal, not in habeas proceedings.” Carter v. Giurbino, 385

F.3d 1194, 1196 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Kim v. Villalobos, 799

F.2d 1317, 1319 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that Lindley “holds that

the sufficiency of the evidence will not be reviewed on

habeas . . . .”). The Ninth Circuit has determined that the

Lindley rule is an adequate and independent state procedural

ground. Carter, 385 F.3d at 1197–98; see also Warren v. Adams, 444

F. App'x 204, 206 (9th Cir. 2011).

If the state court found Petitioner's federal claim barred

pursuant to an independent and adequate state rule, federal review

of that claim is barred unless Petitioner can demonstrate “cause

for the default and actual prejudice” or that “failure to consider

claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” See

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991); Franklin v. Johnson,

290 F.3d 1223, 1230–31 (9th Cir. 2002). To invoke the adequate and

independent grounds doctrine, the respondent must plead procedural

default as an affirmative defense. Bennet v. Mueller, 322 F.3d

573, 585 (9th Cir. 2003). Here, Respondent does not argue a

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procedural bar to this particular claim that is consistently

applied and independent of federal grounds for relief. Thus, this

Court will not discuss procedural bar or whether the state rules

were adequate and independent. See Vang v. Nevada, 329 F.3d 1069,

1073 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Generally, the state must assert the

procedural default as a defense to the petition before the district

court; otherwise the defense is waived.”). 

Additionally, the California Supreme Court's order denying

Austin's petition is ambiguous because the Court denied the

petition with citations to Duvall, Dixon, and Lindley, making it

unclear which of his four claims were denied because of Duvall and

which were denied because of Dixon. When presented with an unclear

opinion from a state court, the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly held

that the petitioner's claims are not procedurally barred. See

Valerio v. Crawford, 306 F.3d 742, 774 (9th Cir. 2002); Morales v.

Calderon, 85 F.3d 1387, 1392 (9th Cir. 1996). If the state court

order is ambiguous, the federal court may proceed to the merits of

the claims. Koerner v. Grigas, 328 F.3d 1039, 1051-52 (9th Cir.

2003). 

When reviewing a state court decision, federal courts must

look to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis of the

judgment. Polk v. Sandoval, 503 F.3d 903, 909 (9th Cir. 2007)

(citing Benson v. Terhune, 304 F.3d 874, 880 n.5 (9th Cir. 2002)). 

The last state court to address the merits of Petitioner's claim

was the California Court of Appeal. (See Lodgment No. 6, People v.

Austin, No. D061046, slip op. at 8.) This Court reviews that

decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. at 806.

//

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2. Admission of gang expert testimony

At trial, the People called as a witness San Diego Police

Officer Jon Brown, a detective assigned to the street gang unit. 

(Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Appeal Tr. vol. 13, 1624-25.) The

prosecutor asked, “In your opinion, if you had three gang members

in a car all from the same gang and there was a gun present, would

all the members in that car have the right to control that gun?” 

(Id. at 1688.) Brown replied, “Yeah, absolutely.” (Id.) He went

on to explain:

In that hypothetical scenario, that would definitely

be a gang-related crime.

I've spoken to dozens of gang members and almost all

of them will tell you if they get in cars with other gang

members, they're going to know that there's a gun in that

car.

And there's a wide range of reasons why they want to

know: If somebody's on probation or parole and they know

that police are going to stop them, they want to know “Do

I need to take this gun and run because they're going to

find it?” “If I get in a confrontation with other gang

members and I want to shoot somebody, where is the gun?”

And it's not, “Oh, this is my gun.” It's

everybody's gang—I mean, it's everybody's gun. That's

part of being a gang member. You're all going to put in

work together. It's an equal opportunity set.

So, therefore, like I said, everybody's going to be

able to access that gun, and it's going to elevate their

status just to do violent acts like that.

(Id. at 1688-89.)

Austin argues that admission of the gang expert testimony was

prejudicial and violated his due process rights because Brown

impermissibly opined that Petitioner committed the crime “by nature

of his participation in the gang.” (Pet. 7, ECF No. 1.) In his

Traverse, Petitioner asserts, “In this case, a weapon was found

next to a dumpster and trial court allowed expert to testify

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def[endant] was a gang member and when one gang member possessed a

gun, every other member in the car knew about the gun and

constructively possessed it.” (Traverse 3, ECF No. 9.) 

The California Court of Appeal denied Austin’s claim, stating

that the trial court did not err in admitting gang expert opinion

because “Brown's testimony concerned the customs and habits of

criminal street gangs and was sufficiently beyond common experience

as to properly be the subject of expert witness testimony.” 

(Lodgment No. 6, People v. Austin, No. D061046, slip op. at 8

(citing People v. Vang, 52 Cal. 4th 1038, 1044, 132 Cal. Rptr. 3d

373, 377, 262 P.3d 581, 584 (2011).) The court rejected

Petitioner’s argument that the expert testimony “concerned the

ultimate issue of Austin’s guilt.” (Id. at 7.) The appellate

court explained that the expert witness could express an opinion in

response to hypothetical questions that were “‘rooted in facts

shown by the evidence.’” (Id. at 8 (quoting Vang, 52 Cal. 4th at

1045, 132 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 378, 262 P.3d at 585).) 

“A federal habeas court . . . cannot review questions of state

evidence law. . . . Even where it appears that evidence was

erroneously admitted, a federal court will interfere only if it

appears that its admission violated fundamental due process and the

right to a fair trial.” Henry v. Kernan, 197 F.3d 1021, 1031 (9th

Cir. 1999). “[F]ailure to comply with the state's rules of

evidence is neither a necessary nor a sufficient basis for granting

habeas relief.” Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919 (9th Cir.

1991). “Evidence erroneously admitted warrants habeas relief only

when it results in the denial of a fundamentally fair trial in

violation of the right to due process.” Briceno v. Scribner, 555

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F.3d 1069, 1077 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Estelle v. McGuire, 502

U.S. at 67–68). 

There is no clearly established Supreme Court precedent

holding that the “admission of irrelevant or overtly prejudicial

evidence constitutes a due process violation sufficient to warrant

issuance of the writ.” Holley v. Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091, 1101

(9th Cir. 2009). Admission of evidence can violate due process

“only if there are no permissible inferences” the jury may draw

from the evidence admitted. Jammal, 926 F.2d at 920. Lay

witnesses are precluded from giving a direct opinion about a

defendant's guilt or innocence; however, an expert witness may

testify regarding an ultimate issue to be resolved by the jury. 

Briceno v. Scribner, 555 F.3d at 1077; Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d

742, 761 (9th Cir. 2009). 

The state appellate court’s rejection of Austin’s claim

regarding gang testimony did not violate Petitioner’s

constitutional rights. The Ninth Circuit in Moses held that there

is no clearly established constitutional prohibition on giving an

expert opinion on an ultimate issue. 555 F.3d at 761. 

[I]n the absence of a Supreme Court decision that

“squarely addresses the issue” in the case before the

state court, or establishes an applicable general

principle that “clearly extends” to the case before us to

the extent required by the Supreme Court in its recent

decisions, we cannot conclude that a state court's

adjudication of that issue resulted in a decision

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Supreme Court precedent.

Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d at 760 (citing Wright v. Van Patten, 552

U.S. 120, 125-26 (2008); Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953

(2007); Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 76 (2006)). The state

appellate court's affirmance of the trial court's decision to admit

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Brown’s expert testimony was not contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, Supreme Court precedent. Accordingly, this claim

should be DENIED.

C. Warrantless DNA Collection Upon Arrest

In claim three, Petitioner argues that the warrantless

collection of his DNA at the time of his arrest constituted a

prohibited search and seizure under state and federal law. (Pet.

8, ECF No. 1.) Petitioner claims that the evidence was used at

trial to connect him to the gun. (Id.) Austin states that the

admission of the DNA evidence allowed the prosecution to argue that

“Petitioner could have been [a] contributor to the DNA found on the

handgun and that he personally handled the weapon.” (Id.) 

Respondent argues that this claim is barred under Supreme

Court precedent, Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), because

Austin had an opportunity to fully litigate his Fourth Amendment

claim. (Answer Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 14, ECF No. 6.) Respondent

also notes that the United States Supreme Court has since held in

Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1970 (2013), that

the collection of the DNA evidence at the time of arrest is

constitutional under the Fourth Amendment. (Id. at 15 n.2.) 

“[W]here the State has provided an opportunity for full and

fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may

not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that

evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was

introduced at his trial.” Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 494

(footnotes omitted). “Under Stone, Fourth Amendment violations are

generally not cognizable on federal habeas, but they are cognizable

when the State has failed to provide the habeas petitioner ‘an

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opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment

claim.’” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 395 n.5 (2007) (quoting

Stone, 428 U.S. at 482). 

Stone is a “categorical limitation on the applicability of

[F]ourth [A]mendment exclusionary rules in habeas corpus

proceedings.” Woolery v. Arave, 8 F.3d 1325, 1328 (9th Cir. 1993). 

The Ninth Circuit has explained that “[t]he relevant inquiry is

whether petitioner had the opportunity to litigate his claim, not

whether he did in fact do so or even whether the claim was

correctly decided.” Ortiz–Sandoval v. Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 899 (9th

Cir. 1996); see also Locks v. Sumner, 703 F.2d 403, 408 (9th Cir.

1983). 

Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim was fully and fairly

litigated in state court. Austin acknowledges that he moved to

suppress the DNA evidence. (Pet. 8, ECF No. 1.) Petitioner,

through his counsel, filed the motion to suppress pursuant to

California Penal Code section 1538.5. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s

Appeal Tr. vol. 4, 336.) The trial court held a hearing on the

motion where both sides argued and presented witnesses. (Id. at

337-63; id. vol. 5, 364-454, Aug. 9, 2011.) The trial judge

conducted a meaningful inquiry and denied the motion. (Lodgment

No. 2, Rep.’s Appeal Tr. vol. 5, 445-61.) The court ruled that

“pending the decision by the California Supreme Court in a related

case that the collection and use of the DNA was valid.” (Pet. 8,

ECF No. 1.)

Petitioner's claim was also fully litigated on appeal. Austin

argued to the California Court of Appeal that his Fourth Amendment

rights had been violated. (Lodgment No. 3, Appellant’s Opening

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Brief at 34-41, People v. Austin, No. D061046.) The appellate

court thoroughly analyzed the constitutionality of the collection

of Austin’s DNA evidence, devoting fourteen pages of its opinion to

this claim, and determined that the trial court properly denied

Austin’s suppression motion. (Lodgment No. 6, People v. Austin,

No. D061046, slip op. at 9-22.) Austin filed a petition for review

with the California Supreme Court, raising the warrantless DNA

collection claim. (Lodgment No. 7, Petition for Review at 13-18,

People v. Austin, No. S209489.) The California Supreme Court

summarily denied the petition. (Lodgment No. 8, People v. Austin,

No. S209489, order at 1.) Austin had a fair opportunity to

litigate his Fourth Amendment claim in state court; therefore, it

is not cognizable in federal habeas proceedings. Accordingly, the

claim should be DENIED. 

D. Cumulative Error 

In ground four of his Petition, Austin contends that he was

denied a fair trial as a result of the cumulative effect of the

errors asserted in claim one (trial continuance), claim two (gang

expert testimony), and claim three (warrantless DNA collection). 

(Pet. 9, ECF No. 1.) The court of appeal rejected Austin’s first

three claims and denied this claim: “Because we conclude no other

errors exist, this cumulative error argument necessarily fails.” 

(Lodgment No. 6, People v. Austin, No. D061046, slip op. at 22.) 

Respondent argues that cumulative error cannot serve as a

basis for habeas relief, and in any case, Petitioner is not

entitled to relief because his first three claims are without

merit. (Answer Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 15-16, ECF No. 6.) 

Respondent claims that although the Ninth Circuit in Parle v.

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Runnels, 505 F.3d 992, 927 (9th Cir. 2007), interpreted Chambers v.

Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), as establishing a clear rule

regarding cumulative error, the United States Supreme Court has

never stated that a doctrine of cumulative error can form a basis

for federal habeas relief. (Id. at 15.) Respondent points to a

split of authority among the circuit courts on this issue, arguing

that the applicability of cumulative error to AEDPA cases has not

been clearly established. (Id. at 16.) 

In Parle, the Ninth Circuit wrote, “The Supreme Court has

clearly established that the combined effect of multiple trial

court errors violates due process where it renders the resulting

trial fundamentally unfair.” Parle, 505 F.3d at 927 (citing

Chambers, 410 U.S. at 298). It stated that “[t]he cumulative

effect of multiple errors can violate due process even where no

single error rises to the level of a constitutional violation or

would independently warrant reversal.” Id. Although a single

trial error may not be sufficiently prejudicial to warrant habeas

relief, “the cumulative effect of multiple errors may still

prejudice a defendant.” United States v. Frederick, 78 F.3d 1370,

1381 (9th Cir. 1996). When faced with a number of errors at trial,

“‘a balkanized, issue-by-issue harmless error review’ is far less

effective than analyzing the overall effect of all the errors in

the context of the evidence introduced at trial against the

defendant.” Id. (quoting United States v. Wallace, 848 F.2d 1464,

1476 (9th Cir. 1988)). “[W]here the government’s case is weak, a

defendant is more likely to be prejudiced by the effect of

cumulative errors.” Frederick, 78 F.3d at 1381.

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Federal habeas review applies only to clearly established

federal law, as announced by the United States Supreme Court. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 379-82

(2000). Circuit precedent may not be used to “refine or sharpen a

general principle of Supreme Court jurisprudence into a specific

legal rule that the Supreme Court has not announced.” Marshall v.

Rogers, __ U.S. __, __, 133 S. Ct. 1446, 1450 (2013) (citations

omitted). “When analyzing whether federal law was clearly

established, the ‘only definitive source of clearly established

federal law under AEDPA is the holdings (as opposed to dicta) of

the Supreme Court as of the time of the state court decision.’” 

Cudjo v. Ayers, 698 F.3d 752, 761 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations

omitted). 

Other courts have acknowledged the different circuit

approaches to whether the cumulative error inquiry is clearly

established federal law. 

[T]here is a split in the circuits on whether the need to

conduct a cumulative-error analysis is clearly

established federal law under § 2254(d)(1). Compare

Williams v. Anderson, 460 F.3d 789, 816 (6th Cir. 2006)

(“[C]umulative error claims are not cognizable on habeas

because the Supreme Court has not spoken on this

issue.”), with Parle v. Runnels, 505 F.3d 922, 928 (9th

Cir. 2007) (“[T]he Supreme Court has clearly established

that the combined effect of multiple trial errors may

give rise to a due process violation if it renders a

trial fundamentally unfair, even where each error

considered individually would not require reversal.”

(citing Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643, 94

S. Ct. 1868, 40 L. Ed.2d 431 (1974); Chambers v.

Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 290 n.3, 298, 302–03, 93 S.

Ct. 1038, 35 L. Ed.2d 297 (1973))), and Morris v. Sec'y

Dep't of Corr., 677 F.3d 1117, 1132 n.3 (11th Cir. 2012)

(reserving judgment on the issue).

Hooks v. Workman, 689 F.3d 1148, 1194 n.24 (10th Cir. 2012). 

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Even Parle is not clear on the issue. At one point the court

wrote, “Although we have never expressly stated that Chambers

clearly establishes the cumulative error doctrine, we have long

recognized the due process principle underlying Chambers. Parle,

505 F.3d at 927 n.5. The court also described Chambers as “the

seminal cumulative error case.” Id. at 934. The Ninth Circuit

posits that “the Supreme Court has clearly established that the

combined effect of multiple trial errors may give rise to a due

process violation if it renders a trial fundamentally unfair, even

where each error considered individually would not require

reversal.” Id. at 928 (citing Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S.

637, 643 (1974); Chambers, 410 U.S. at 290 n.3, 298, 302-03). 

A standard for evaluating cumulative error is imprecise. 

“[C]laims under the cumulative error doctrine are sui generis.” 

United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1196 (1st Cir. 1993). 

A reviewing tribunal must consider each such claim

against the background of the case as a whole, paying

particular weight to factors such as the nature and

number of the errors committed; their interrelationship,

if any, and combined effect; how the [trial] court dealt

with the errors as they arose (including the efficacy—-or

lack of efficacy—-of any remedial efforts); and the

strength of the government's case. The run of the trial

may also be important; a handful of miscues, in

combination, may often pack a greater punch in a short

trial than in a much longer trial.

Id. (internal citation omitted); accord United States v. Valencia,

600 F.3d 389, 429 (5th Cir. 2010).

The flip side of the cumulative error coin is due process. 

Parle and other cases relying on cumulative error for habeas relief

may be characterized as a due process analysis of trial errors

that, as a whole, deprived the defendant of a fair trial. See,

e.g., Parle, 505 F.2d at 934. 

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The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that

fundamentally unfair trials violate due process, see,

e.g., Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 149, 112 S. Ct.

1810, 118 L. Ed. 2d 479 (1992) (quoting Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 563-64, 87 S. Ct. 648, 17 L. Ed. 2d 606

(1967)), and common sense dictates that cumulative errors

can render trials fundamentally unfair. Additionally,

the Supreme Court has expressly cumulated prejudice from

distinct errors under the Due Process Clause. Chambers

v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 298, 93 S. Ct. 1038, 35 L.

Ed. 2d 297 (1973) . . . .

Williams v. Anderson, 460 F.3d 789, 816 (6th Cir. 2006). 

Whether analyzed as a claim premised on cumulative error or an

alleged due process violation, the result is the same. Despite

disagreement about the availability of cumulative error as a ground

for habeas relief, courts are in agreement that cumulative error

exists only where the “‘cumulative effect of two or more

individually harmless errors has the potential to prejudice a

defendant to the same extent as a single reversible error.’” 

Duckett v. Mullin, 306 F.3d 982, 992 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoting

United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1469 (10th Cir. 1990)); see

United States v. Larson, 460 F.3d 1200, 1217 (9th Cir. 2006)

(rejecting cumulative error claim where the court “discovered no

error” in the defendants' trial). “[A]s the term ‘cumulative’

suggests, ‘[c]umulative-error analysis applies where there are two

or more actual errors. It does not apply . . . to the cumulative

effect of non-errors.’” Hooks, 689 F.3d at 1194-95 (declining to

apply the cumulative error analysis because petitioner’s trial had

“at most” one error).

Austin is not entitled to relief on this claim because there

were no constitutional errors implicating his due process rights. 

See Mancuso v. Olivarez, 292 F.3d 939, 957 (9th Cir. 2002)

(“Because there is no single constitutional error in this case,

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there is nothing to accumulate to the level of a constitutional

violation.”); cf. Parle, 555 F.3d at 928 (“If the evidence of guilt

is otherwise overwhelming, the errors are considered ‘harmless' and

the conviction will generally be affirmed.”). Accordingly, the

state courts' denial of Petitioner's cumulative error claim was not

objectively unreasonable. Therefore, the claim should be DENIED. 

E. Austin’s Request for Judicial Notice

After the briefing on his habeas petition was completed,

Austin submitted a request for judicial notice, asking the Court to

take notice of “newly discovered” exculpatory evidence [ECF No.

17]. His submission contains the first page of a letter from Gary

Roberts, his trial counsel, dated April 11, 2014, discussing

discovery that Austin’s attorney located in his trial files. (Req.

Judicial Notice Ex. A, at 6, ECF No. 17.) Austin also includes a

copy of a consultation report from Human Identification

Technologies dated September 24, 2011, and addressed to

Petitioner’s trial counsel. (Id. Ex. B, at 8.) Petitioner argues

that the report excludes him as a possible DNA contributor. (Req.

Judicial Notice 2, ECF No. 17.) Austin acknowledges that the

report sent to his attorney dates back to 2011, but Petitioner

argues that he was denied access to it at the time of trial. (Id.

at 2-3.) Petitioner claims that the case against him was weak and

that the prosecution was allowed to introduce misleading DNA

evidence. (Id. at 1-2.) 

Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b), “a court may take

judicial notice of ‘matters of public record.’” Lee v. City of Los

Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Mack v. S. Bay

Beer Distrib., 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986)). In addition,

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a court has authority to take judicial notice of a fact “not

subject to reasonable dispute because it: (1) is generally known

within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be

accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy

cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); see also

Lee, 250 F.3d at 689–90. 

Here, none of the items Austin submitted is judicially

noticeable. A letter from his trial counsel and a forensic

consultation report are not matters of public record because they

are not “made publicly available by government entities.” See

Daniels-Hall v. Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir.

2010). These items contain facts subject to reasonable dispute,

and their authenticity and accuracy have not been tested. See Fed.

R. Evid. 201(b). The information contained in the DNA testing

report is not “generally known facts.” Id.; see 21B Wright &

Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 5106.1 (2d ed. 2011) (“If

the source can only be used through an intermediary such as an

expert witness or an interpreter, the court does not really rely on

the source but on the intermediary.”). Because the submitted

documents and their contents are not proper subjects for judicial

notice, the Court denies Austin’s request. 

Even if the additional evidence and arguments raised by

Petitioner were properly before the Court, he would not be entitled

to relief. Austin attempts to advance an untimely claim of actual

innocence. He must show that, in light of all the evidence,

including evidence not introduced at trial or evidence available

only after trial, “it is more likely than not that no reasonable

juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable

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doubt.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327-28 (1995). This

requires “a stronger showing than that needed to establish

prejudice.” Id. “To be credible, [an actual innocence] claim

requires petitioner to support his allegations of constitutional

error with new reliable evidence--whether it be exculpatory

scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical

physical evidence--that was not presented at trial.” Id. at 324. 

Austin cannot demonstrate that his submission constitutes “new

. . . evidence . . . that was not presented at trial.” Schlup, 513

U.S. at 324. Petitioner argues that the DNA report sent to him by

his trial counsel “completely” excludes Austin as a possible

contributor. (Req. Judicial Notice 1-2, ECF No. 17.) The one page

of the report attached to the request for Judicial Notice discusses

testing of one swab collected from the surface of the gun. (Id.

Ex. A, at 8.) The summary of findings indicates that Austin was

excluded as a contributor for this swab. (Id.) This information

is consistent with the evidence presented at Petitioner’s trial. 

The DNA testing introduced at trial showed that Austin was not

a contributor to one of the swabs. (Lodgment No. 2, Rep.’s Appeal

Tr. vol. 13, 1597.) The appellate court noted this fact: “A

comparison of Austin’s DNA to [the mixtures found on the holster

and the handgun] was inconclusive. He was, however, excluded as a

possible contributor to one of the swabs tested.” (Lodgment No. 6,

People v. Austin, No. D061046, slip op. at 4.) Because this fact

was made known to the jury and discussed by the court of appeal,

the evidence excluding Austin as a contributor is not newly

discovered or newly presented. 

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Additionally, assuming the Human Identification Technologies

report constituted new evidence, Petitioner cannot show that

reasonable jurors would find Austin not guilty in light of the

complete record. Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 945 (9th Cir. 2011)

(citing House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 538 (2006)). Substantial

evidence of Petitioner’s guilt was introduced at trial. The jury

heard that Austin was riding in a car with two active gang members,

and he ran away from the police when they initiated a traffic stop. 

(Lodgment No. 6, People v. Austin, No. D061046, slip op. at 2-4.) 

A witness identified Austin as one of two males walking nervously

in the area. (Id. at 3.) Police found a discarded loaded handgun

near the location where the stop occurred. (Id.) A search of the

vehicle uncovered a holster and a loaded magazine matching the

handgun. (Id.) Testimony regarding the DNA testing of the gun and

holster was introduced at trial. The driver of the car was a major

contributor to the DNA mixtures found. (Id.) The jury heard that

a comparison of Austin’s DNA was inconclusive and that he was

excluded as a DNA contributor to one of the DNA swabs. (See id. at

4.) Nonetheless, gang expert testimony explained that gang members

riding in a car with a gun would all have the right to control it. 

(See id.) 

Given the strong record of Austin’s culpability, the fact that

Petitioner’s DNA was not found on one of the swabs did not impact

the jury’s decision. Thus, Petitioner cannot establish that “no

reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt” in light of the report from Human Identification

Technologies. See Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327-28. 

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For all these reasons, Petitioner’s Request for Judicial

Notice is DENIED [ECF No. 17].

V. CONCLUSION

The Court DENIES Petitioner’s Request for Judicial Notice [ECF

No. 17]. In addition, the Court submits this Report and

Recommendation to United States District Judge Cynthia Bashant

under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the United

States District Court for the Southern District of California. For

the reasons outlined above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the

district court issue an Order (1) approving and adopting this

Report and Recommendation and (2) directing that a judgment be

entered denying the Petition. 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than May 29, 2015, any party to

this action may file written objections with the Court and serve a

copy on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections

to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall

be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than

June 12, 2015. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise

those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v.

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951

F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

 IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 30, 2015 __________________________________

Ruben B. Brooks

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Judge Bashant

All parties

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