Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02127/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02127-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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The jury also convicted Petitioner on four counts of premeditated attempted murder,

one count of mayhem, and one count of shooting into an occupied vehicle. These convictions

were reversed on appeal. People v. Ojito, No. D049765, slip op. (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 18, 2008)

[(Lodgment No. 4)].

09cv2127

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GERALDO OJITO,

Petitioner,

v.

KEN CLARK, Warden,

Respondent.

 

 

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Case No. 09-CV-2127-LAB (JMA)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

RE DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

I. Introduction

Petitioner Geraldo Ojito (“Ojito” or “Petitioner”) is a California state prisoner

proceeding pro se with a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2254. He was convicted by a jury in San Diego County Superior Court, consolidated

case numbers SCD 169899 / SCD 174154, of two counts of second degree murder

(Cal. Penal Code § 187(a)). (Lodgment No. 8, Clerk’s Transcript (“CT”) at 285-93.)1

Petitioner asserts the trial court violated his due process rights by admitting the

following into evidence: (1) photographs of Petitioner brandishing guns, (2) evidence

that Petitioner possessed an inoperable firearm when he was arrested, (3) violent lyrics

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adopted by Petitioner from other music, and (4) gang evidence. Petitioner contends

that the cumulative impact of this evidence deprived him of his Fourteenth Amendment

right to a fundamentally fair trial. (Pet. at 6.)

The Court has considered the Petition, Respondent’s Answer and Memorandum

of Points and Authorities in support thereof, Petitioner’s Traverse, and all the supporting

documents submitted by the parties. Based upon the documents and evidence

presented in this case, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court recommends that

the Petition be DENIED. 

II. Factual Background

The following statement of facts is taken from the California Court of Appeal

opinion, People v. Ojito, No. D049765, slip op. (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 18, 2008). 

(Lodgment No. 4.) This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact and

presumes them to be correct. Tilcock v. Budge, 538 F.3d 1138, 1141 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Petitioner may rebut the presumption of correctness, but only by clear and convincing

evidence. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). The facts as found by the state

appellate court are as follows:

The crimes were committed as part of the familiar saga of cyclical violence

between rival gangs. The TNS gang, to which Ojito (aka Mist) belonged

and of which he was considered a leader, were rivals of the KN gang. All

of the victims were associated with or connected to the KN gang. 

A. The March 2002 Murders

On March 1, 2002, six TNS members, including Ojito, were gathered at

Ojito’s apartment. Around 4:00 p.m., a large group of young men affiliated

with KN gathered near a bus stop outside Ojito’s apartment building. They

were looking towards Ojito’s apartment complex and were throwing gang

signs identifying themselves as KN members. 

Ojito’s group went outside to investigate the situation. As Ojito emerged

from the driveway and stepped outside the security gate, someone from

the KN group said, “There he is.” Two members of the KN group, Larson

Tufi and Jose Alegria, separated themselves from the group and took a

few steps toward Ojito. One made a motion as if to indicate he had a gun

in his waistband and Ojito responded by making the same sort of motion. 

Tufi and Alegria began running toward Ojito. One of them started

shooting at Ojito with a BB gun, and some of the BB’s struck Ojito on his

face and head. Ojito nevertheless ran toward them, and the two turned

and began to flee. As the two fled, one of them fired over his shoulder at

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the pursuing Ojito. As Ojito was chasing them, he fired numerous shots

with his .38 caliber handgun. One bullet struck Tufi in the back, killing

him. Another shot struck Alegria in the back, killing him. 

Later that evening, Ojito told Jesus Morales, who was with Ojito during the

confrontation and was a TNS member, that one of the KN members had

pulled out a BB gun and shot at Ojito with BB’s. He told Morales some of

the BB’s had struck Ojito’s back and face, and that Ojito had become

upset and shot toward the person holding the BB gun. Other than the BB

gun, Ojito did not mention seeing any other weapon. 

Another person with Ojito at his apartment on the day of the confrontation,

Raul Estrada, stated the two groups had been trading derogatory remarks

with each other, and Estrada and two other TNS members had charged

toward the KN group, intending to fight them. A member of the KN group

pulled out a pellet gun and started shooting. Estrada then heard loud

gunshots and saw the pellet gun holder fall, and then Estrada heard

additional shots. 

When Ojito was arrested in September 2002, he told police that he knew

one of the victims had shot at him with a BB gun. He also told police KN

members had engaged in various acts of vandalism at his home before

the shooting. 

B. The Freeway Shooting

On September 10, 2002, Zet Martinez (a member of the KN gang who had

been near Tufi’s body immediately after he was shot,) was attacked and

beaten by Ojito and another TNS member. Zet’s mother arrived and tried

to stop the attack. Ojito eventually ceased the assault but, before leaving,

threatened Zet, stating he (Ojito) would “smoke [Zet’s] ass like [he]

smoked [his] f----ing friends.”

On September 13, Zet’s older brother (Julio) asked Zet to get into Julio’s

car to see if they could find the people who attacked Zet. Julio and Zet

were also accompanied by Zeat (Zet’s twin brother) and a fourth person

(Andres Campos). On that day, Ojito was a passenger in a car being

driven by Morales. The other passengers in Morales’s car were Fivol

(Ojito’s brother), Marlen Gallardo, and Marcia Lucero. 

When Morales’s car neared 36th and Market, they saw “Chelli” (Ojito’s

girlfriend) and pulled over. Chelli told them a group of KN members was

looking for Ojito. As they were talking Chelli saw the KN group in Julio’s

car approaching their location, and pointed out the group to Ojito. 

Julio spotted Ojito sitting in Morales’s parked car. Julio pulled over and

stopped near Morales’s car. Julio and Zeat (carrying a stick) got out and

began to approach Morales’s car, challenging Ojito to a “one-on-one” fight. 

Ojito stepped from the parked car, apparently wearing gloves and holding

a gun covered by a towel, which he was pointing at Julio, and began to

approach Julio. Julio and Zeat saw the gun and immediately ran back to

Julio’s car, jumped in, and drove off as Ojito pursued on foot while pointing

the gun at Julio’s car. 

Ojito jumped back into Morales’s car and, at Ojito’s direction, they began

pursuing Julio’s car onto the freeway. A car chase ensued, with

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occupants throwing gang signs at each other. Ojito said “f--- it” and told

Morales to pull alongside Julio’s car, saying, “Get them” numerous times. 

Morales’s car finally pulled even with Julio’s car on the freeway but

remained separated from Julio’s car by two empty lanes. Ojito told

Morales to pull next to Julio, but when Morales instead moved into Julio’s

lane in front of Julio, Ojito said “what the f--- are you doing?” However,

Ojito (who had the gun in his hand) said he could lean out the window and

fire back at Julio’s car. Julio’s car was behind and moving closer to

Morales’s car and made contact with Morales’s rear bumper.2 Julio’s car

then pulled alongside Morales’s car on the driver’s side, away from Ojito,

and was less than a foot from Morales’s car. Ojito reached across

Morales and fired a shot into Julio’s car. The shot struck Zeat’s face and

caused him substantial bodily harm. 

After the first shot was fired, Julio’s car pulled up ahead of Morales’s

car and Julio’s group began throwing objects out the window

towards Morales’s car. Julio’s car was moving toward the right lane

to leave the freeway, and as Morales’s car passed by Julio’s car,

Ojito fired several more shots at Julio’s car from the front

passenger’s side window. When Morales failed to follow, Ojito

expressed anger that Morales had not followed Julio. 

After the freeway confrontation, Morales drove everyone back to the

motel room where he was staying. At the hotel room, Ojito made

telephone calls during which he said, “we got those faggots” and “we

got them Korn Nuts,” derogatory terms used by TNS members to

refer to KN members. Ojito seemed happy and excited when he

made those statements. Later that day, Ojito told Morales he

wished Morales had followed Julio’s car when it left the freeway so

Ojito “could finish it off.” 

C. Ojito’s Statements to Police

On September 24, police arrested Ojito at the home of Jose

Rodriguez, another TNS member. Police found several items of

evidence at Rodriguez’s home, including a handgun with a missing

firing pin (which Ojito admitted was his), and several albums with

photographs of Ojito posing with fellow gang members and guns. 

During his interview with police, Ojito admitted he was the shooter at

the March 2002 killings and the September 2002 freeway shooting. 

He stated that, just prior to the March 2002 shooting, the victims had

been laughing, “talking shit” and using disrespectful language

toward Ojito’s gang, and he had shot them after one of the victims

shot at him first with a BB gun and had struck him several times. 

Ojito said he got tired and mad at being shot with BB’s, and fired two

shots that caused everyone to start running away. He fired again,

hitting one of the victims in the back as the victim was running away,

and shot the other victim in the back of the head.

D. The Disputed Evidence

Detective Rounds, testifying at Ojito’s preliminary hearing, repeated

statements made by Marcia Lucero to Rounds about Ojito’s conduct

and statements made during the freeway shooting. Ojito wrote a

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letter to a friend, two weeks after his preliminary hearing, in which he

expressed anger at Lucero and labeled her a “rat.” Over Ojito’s

objection, the content of Lucero’s statements to Rounds was

admitted at trial as an “adoptive admission . . . .” 

A gang expert testified generally about gang culture and mores, and

about Ojito’s and the victims’ membership in the rival gangs. The

court allowed this evidence, along with photographs showing Ojito

with guns and other gang members, Ojito’s handwritten rap lyrics,

and evidence he possessed the inoperable gun. Ojito objected to

much of this evidence. . . .

E. The Defense

Ojito did not testify. He asserted the prosecution evidence lacked

credibility because of inconsistencies and because the witnesses

received favorable treatment from the prosecution in exchange for

their testimony. [He] argued the evidence showed he acted in selfdefense in both incidents.

2 Morales later checked his rear bumper and saw a

dent and chipped paint that had not been there prior to

the incident. However, Morales was arrested a week

after the freeway incident, and police photographs of

the rear bumper showed no damage. Police found five

shell casings near the freeway exit ramp where

Morales’s car ultimate broke away from Julio’s car, and

police found that several bullets had struck Julio’s car. 

(Lodgment No. 4 at 2-7.)

III. Procedural Background

On December 2, 2003, the District Attorney for the County of San Diego

filed an Amended Consolidated Information charging Petitioner with two counts of

murder, four counts of premeditated attempted murder, one count of mayhem,

four counts of assault with a semi-automatic firearm, and one count of shooting

into an occupied vehicle. (CT at 11-17.) On January 15, 2004, a jury found

Petitioner guilty on the murder, attempted murder, mayhem, and shooting into an

occupied vehicle charges. (CT at 626-29.) 

Petitioner appealed to the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate

District, Division One (“California Court of Appeal”). (Lodgment Nos. 1-3.) On

August 18, 2008, in an unpublished opinion, the California Court of Appeal

affirmed the convictions on the murder charges and reversed the convictions on

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the other charges. (Lodgment No. 4.) Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review in

the California Supreme Court (see Lodgment No. 6), which was denied without

comment on November 17, 2008 (Lodgment No. 7).

On September 28, 2009, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in this Court. (Doc. No. 1.) Respondent

filed an Answer on January 29, 2010, and Petitioner filed a Traverse on April 5,

2010. (Doc. Nos. 14, 17.) 

IV. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

Title 28, United States Code, § 2254(a) sets forth the following scope of

review for federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a

district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas

corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of

a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of

the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

The current Petition is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). As

amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) reads:

 (d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not

be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the

merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the

claim --

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). “A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit

precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on

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the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct.

770, 786 (2011) (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). As

amended by AEDPA, § 2254(d) permits habeas relief only “where there is no

possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court’s decision conflicts

with [the Supreme] Court’s precedents.” Id. at 786. “[A] state prisoner must show

that the state court’s ruling . . . was so lacking in justification that there was an

error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for

fairminded disagreement.” Id. at 786-87.

Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, the

Court “looks through” to the underlying appellate court decision. Ylst v.

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991). If the dispositive state court order

does not “furnish a basis for its reasoning,” federal habeas courts must conduct

an independent review of the record to determine whether the state court’s

decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Supreme Court law. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 981-82 (9th Cir. 2000)

(overruled on other grounds by Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75-76); Himes v. Thompson,

336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). However, a state court need not cite Supreme

Court precedent when resolving a habeas corpus claim. Early v. Packer, 537

U.S. 3, 8 (2002). “[S]o long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the statecourt decision contradicts [Supreme Court precedent],” the state court decision

will not be “contrary to” clearly established federal law. Id. 

B. The Admission of the Contested Evidence at Trial Did Not

Violate Petitioner’s Right to Due Process

In the single ground for relief raised in his Petition, Petitioner contends that

the trial court violated his right to due process by admitting into evidence 

(1) photographs of Petitioner brandishing firearms, (2) evidence that Petitioner

possessed an inoperable firearm at the time he was arrested, (3) rap lyrics written

by Petitioner, and (4) gang evidence. (Pet. at 6.) Petitioner asserts that the

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cumulative impact of this evidence deprived him of his Fourteenth Amendment

right to a fundamentally fair trial. (Id.)

Respondent argues that Petitioner’s challenges to the trial court’s

evidentiary rulings do not warrant federal habeas relief as they involve issues of

state law. (Resp’t Mem. at 5-6.) Respondent further contends that to the extent

Petitioner alleges the admission of the evidence violated his due process rights,

the California Court of Appeal’s rejection of Petitioner’s claim was neither contrary

to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. (Id.) 

1. The Photographs

Petitioner argues that the photographs admitted into evidence of Petitioner

brandishing firearms were “in no way similar to the circumstances of the charged

crimes, and so were not probative of intent, but were instead impermissible

‘proclivity’ evidence.” (Pet. at 6.) 

In denying Petitioner’s claim, the California Court of Appeal stated:

The prosecution sought to introduce numerous photographs

showing Ojito brandishing guns while posing with fellow gang

members. The prosecutor asserted the photographs were relevant

(1) to show Ojito had access to guns, (2) to show how Ojito’s gang

had evolved from a tagging crew to a criminal gang, and (3) as

circumstantial evidence bearing on Ojito’s intent at the time of the

shootings. The defense objected that the photographs were

irrelevant to showing Ojito’s intent in rebuttal of his claim of . . . self

defense, the evidence was unduly prejudicial under section 352 [of

the California Evidence Code], and there was no foundational

showing that the photographs were taken near the time of the

shootings. The court ruled that, although the photographs were

cumulative as to the first theory of relevance (because Ojito

admitted having access to the guns he used) and the second theory

(i.e. the gang’s evolutionary history) was tangential to any disputed

issue in the case, the issue of Ojito’s intent was the core disputed

issue. The court concluded that, because the jury would be required

to decide whether Ojito shot the victims in self-defense or whether

he killed them because he harbored animosity toward KN members

and believed violence was a commendable quality, photographs

showing Ojito coupled gang affiliation with glorification of violence

was relevant circumstantial evidence that could tend to show his

intent was retribution toward a rival gang. 

We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding

the evidence was relevant and not unduly prejudicial. Evidence

showing Ojito closely associated his gang membership with being

armed with firearms has some tendency in reason to show that

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affronts to his gang provided motivation for Ojito to engage in violent

retaliation, regardless of whether the threats from the other gang

were de minimus or had ceased, and therefore it was not an abuse

of discretion to determine the photographs were relevant to a

disputed issue. Moreover, because Ojito had already told police

(and the evidence was undisputed) that he was a gang member and

was armed when he confronted KN members outside of his

apartment, it was not an abuse of discretion to conclude that

photographs showing his gang affiliation and possession of

weapons was not so unduly inflammatory that their prejudicial effect

outweighed their probative value under section 352. 

Ojito asserts the evidence was inadmissible under Evidence Code

section 1101 as prior bad acts evidence. Ojito did not interpose this

objection at trial, and the issue is thus not preserved for appeal. 

However, even assuming the issue was preserved, the trial court

noted the evidence was not being offered as character evidence, but

was instead being offered on issues of intent and motive, both of

which are acceptable exceptions under Evidence Code section

1101, subdivision (b), to support the admission of the photographs. 

(Lodgment No. 4 at 20-22.) 

The admission of evidence is an issue of state law. Holley v. Yarborough,

568 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th Cir. 2009). “Simple errors of state law do not warrant

federal habeas relief.” Id. (citing Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991)).

According to the Ninth Circuit,

We are not a state supreme court of errors; we do not review

questions of state evidence law. On federal habeas we may only

consider whether the petitioner’s conviction violated constitutional

norms. . . . We therefore consider whether the admission of the

evidence so fatally infected the proceedings as to render them

fundamentally unfair. 

Jammal v. Van De Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919 (9th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted). 

“A habeas petitioner bears a heavy burden in showing a due process

violation based on an evidentiary decision.” Boyde v. Brown, 404 F.3d 1159,

1172 (9th Cir. 2005). The Supreme Court has “defined the category of infractions

that violate ‘fundamental fairness’ very narrowly.” Dowling v. United States, 493

U.S. 342, 352 (1990). “Under AEDPA, even clearly erroneous admissions of

evidence that render a trial fundamentally unfair may not permit the grant of

federal habeas corpus relief if not forbidden by ‘clearly established Federal law,’

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as laid out by the Supreme Court.” Holley, 568 F.3d at 1101. There is no clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the U.S. Supreme Court, on the issue

of whether “admission of irrelevant or overtly prejudicial evidence constitutes a

due process violation.” Id. Thus, it cannot be said that the California Court of

Appeal’s rejection of this claim was contrary to or an unreasonable application of

clearly established federal law. 

Additionally, pursuant to Jammal, “[o]nly if there are no permissible

inferences the jury may draw from the evidence can its admission violate due

process.” Jammal, 926 F.2d at 920. Here, as the California Court of Appeal

explained, the photographs in this case helped the jury determine whether

Petitioner acted in self-defense or in retribution toward a rival gang when he shot

Larson Tufi and Jose Alegria. (Lodgment No. 4 at 21-22.) The jury could draw

from the photographs inferences about Petitioner’s affiliation with a criminal street

gang and further infer from such affiliation that Petitioner might act violently

towards members of rival gangs; this tends to show a motive for the shooting

other than self-defense. No established Supreme Court precedent renders such

inferences impermissible. Holley, 568 F.3d at 1101. Because it is not the case

that there were no permissible inferences the jury could draw from the

photographic evidence (see Jammal, 926 F.2d at 920), admission of this evidence

did not violate due process. 

2. The Inoperable Firearm

Petitioner argues that the “evidence of the inoperable firearm was

inadmissible character evidence” and that there was no evidence that the gun

“was linked to the incidents giving rise to this case.” (Pet. at 6; Traverse at 4.) 

The California Court of Appeal, in disposing of Petitioner’s claim

concerning the inoperable firearm, stated:

The [trial] court rejected the defense argument that the inoperable

firearm should be excluded because it only showed [Ojito’s]

character for possessing guns and was therefore inadmissible

character evidence under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision

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(a). Instead, the trial court concluded the inoperable gun was

circumstantial evidence of Ojito’s intent at the time of the shootings

because it buttressed the inference that Ojito, by frequently arming

himself with weapons and acquiring weapons that could be available

for future use,8

 showed he was willing to engage in confrontations

knowing he had firepower at his disposal to use in such

confrontations. 

Ojito asserts that when the prosecution proves a specific gun was

used in the crime, it may be error to admit evidence of other

weapons found in the defendant’s possession where its purpose is

“to show, not that he committed the crime, but only that he is the

sort of person who carries deadly weapons.” [Citation omitted.] 

Here, however, Ojito admitted to being the shooter in both

shootings, and the inoperable firearm was not admitted to show

Ojito was likely to have been carrying a weapon, but was instead to

show Ojito entered these confrontations carrying tools to accomplish

his intended goals. Because the evidence was relevant to Ojito’s

intent and motive, it was admissible under Evidence Code section

1101, subdivision (b). 

8

 Although the weapon was inoperable, the evidence

permitted the conclusion that Ojito acquired [the]

firearm believing it worked and, even after learning it

was missing the firing pin, he kept it expecting he

could repair it to make it operable. 

(Lodgment No. 4 at 22-23.)

As noted above, it is not the province of a federal habeas court to review state

court determinations on questions of state law. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68. Again

though, if the admission of the inoperable gun evidence was so fundamentally unfair as

to result in a denial of due process, relief may be granted on that basis. Estelle, 502

U.S. at 72. Only if there are no permissible inferences that the jury may draw from the

evidence can its admission rise to the level of a due process violation. Jammal, 926

F.2d at 920. Here, as the state appellate court determined, there were rational

inferences, not constitutionally impermissible, that the jury could draw from the evidence

of the inoperable gun evidence; namely, that the evidence tended to show Ojito entered

confrontations carrying weapons for use in the confrontations. It is of no matter that the

inoperable firearm was not the one used in the shootings at issue; evidence is relevant

if it tends to make any fact relevant to the elements of the crime more or less probable. 

McKinney v. Rees, 993 F.2d 1378, 1382 (9th Cir. 1993). Because it is not the case that

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there were no permissible inferences the jury could draw from the inoperable gun

evidence (see Jammal, 926 F.2d at 920), admission of evidence relating to the gun did

not violate due process. 

3. The Rap Lyrics

Petitioner argues that “[t]he lyrics were inflammatory, and not sufficiently

probative of [his] intent at the time of the crimes.” (Pet. at 6.) Respondent contends

that the lyric evidence was relevant to prove a key part of the prosecution’s theory of the

case: “why Ojito would have shot and killed the victims over being shot at by BB’s.” 

(Resp’t Mem. at 11.) 

In regard to the propriety of the admission of this evidence, the California Court

of Appeal stated:

Ojito asserts the admission into evidence of rap lyrics he composed

approximately a year after the shootings was an abuse of discretion. The

lyrics were amenable to the interpretation that Ojito glorified violence,

harbored animosity toward KN members (and specifically Jose Alegria,

one of the murder victims), and was content with his violence toward KN

members.9 The prosecution asserted the lyrics showed Ojito harbored

animosity toward KN members, and was manifesting a willingness to

violently act toward KN members, and this was relevant to his intent when

he confronted them during the two shootings. The defense objected that

the lyrics were irrelevant to Ojito’s intent (because the lyrics were written

long after the shootings), and any probative value was outweighed by its

prejudicial impact. The court ruled the evidence was relevant to showing

Ojito’s intent, and that its probative value outweighed its prejudicial impact. 

The trial court correctly ruled that Ojito’s state of mind and attitude after

the crime, by expressing continued pride in and approval of killing enemy

gang members rather than regret, was relevant to negate his claim that

the killings were not the unfortunate result of necessary self-defense but

were instead the result of Ojito’s animosity toward KN members. [Citation

omitted.] Although the temporal separation between the events and the

lyrics provided the defense an opportunity to argue they should be

discounted, that argument goes to the weight rather than the relevance

and was a question for the jury. 

Moreover, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion when it

rejected the defense’s section 352 objection. The trial court carefully

considered whether the danger of undue prejudice outweighed the

probative value of the evidence. The court noted the core issue in the

case was Ojito’s motive, stating the central dispute was whether he “[w]as

. . . somebody who reasonably feared for his life or feared he was facing

great bodily injury, or was [he] somebody who was in another beef with

these people and wanted to kill them and did his best to do so?” and

“that’s in fact the very relevance for which [the lyrics] are offered. It’s not

like the glorification of violence is a . . . side trip . . . . What the People are

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trying to get across [is] that this wasn’t self-defense, this is someone who

wanted to commit acts of violence and had an occasion to do so.” 

The undue prejudice section 352 is designed to preempt is the harm from

evidence that, by its unique nature, has very little effect on the issues

while simultaneously tending to evoke an emotional bias against the

defendant as an individual. Section 352 addresses “‘”not the prejudice or

damage to a defense that naturally flows from relevant, highly probative

evidence.” [Citations.] “Rather, the statute uses the word in its

etymological sense of ‘prejudging’ a person or cause on the basis of

extraneous factors. [Citation.]” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] In other words,

evidence should be excluded as unduly prejudicial when it is of such

nature as to inflame the emotions of the jury, motivating them to use the

information, not to logically evaluate the point upon which it is relevant, but

to reward or punish one side because of the jurors’ emotional reaction. In

such a circumstance, the evidence is unduly prejudicial because of the

substantial likelihood the jury will use it for an illegitimate purpose.” (Vorse

v. Sarasy (1997) 53 Cal. App. 4th 998, 1009.) The evidence was offered

for a legitimate purpose (to show Ojito approved of group violence toward

KN members) to assist on the pivotal issue--why Ojito inflicted violence on

KN members during the shootings. We conclude it was not a clear abuse

of discretion for the court to reject Ojito’s section 352 objection. 

9

 The lyrics included the phrases “all you x faggots is

jealous, pull your gun out and blast. I dare you x faggots to

open fire, I’ll murder that ass & disappear before the cops

come running. My Glocks spittin rounds fags droping down

clutchin they stomach. Its southwest TNS . . . .” The term

“faggots” was a derogatory appellation for KN members, and

the lyrics also . . . contained the crossed-out word “vicious,”

the gang nickname for Alegria.

(Lodgment No. 4 at 24.) 

Again, the admissibility of evidence is a matter of state law, and is not reviewable

in this proceeding. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67. But, if the admission of the lyrics

evidence was so fundamentally unfair as to result in a denial of due process, relief may

be granted on that basis. Id. at 72. Only if there are no permissible inferences that the

jury may draw from the evidence can its admission rise to the level of such a due

process violation. Jammal, 926 F.2d at 920. Here, the lyrics evidence was admitted

because the jury could draw a permissible inference about Petitioner’s hostility toward

other gangs, and specifically the gang of which the shooting victims were a part. This

inference directly related to Petitioner’s intent as it pertained to his claim of self defense;

if Petitioner could be shown to have a hostility toward KN gang members, it would make

his claim of self-defense less credible. Because the lyrics evidence was probative of

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Petitioner’s intent, the jury could have drawn a permissible inference from the evidence. 

Therefore, the admission of the lyrics evidence did not violate Petitioner’s right to due

process. 

4. Expert Gang Testimony

Petitioner argues that the admission of expert gang testimony was irrelevant,

cumulative, and inflammatory, and that “rather than proving a matter at issue in this

case, it was designed to show appellant should be convicted because he was the leader

of a violent and dangerous criminal street gang.” (Pet. at 6; Traverse at 5-6.) 

The California Court of Appeal dispensed with Petitioner’s assertion that

admission of certain gang testimony was improper as follows:

Ojito finally asserts the trial court erroneously permitted an expert to testify

concerning gangs. Ojito asserts the evidence was irrelevant and

inflammatory, and the erroneous admission was prejudicial. However,

Ojito concedes on appeal that some of the gang evidence was relevant to

the disputed issues: it was relevant to the issue of motive insofar as the

evidence showed the shootings occurred in the context of a gang rivalry in

which Ojito and the victims were members of competing gangs, and was

also relevant to interpreting the evidence (e.g. the “crossing out” of names,

and of gang attitudes towards rats and snitches) the jury was to consider.

The only evidence Ojito on appeal asserts was evidence that should not

have been admitted at all[] was the expert’s discussion of (1) whether TNS

and KN met the criteria for a criminal street gang, and (2) the evolution of

TNS from a “tagging crew” to a criminal street gang. However, the

evidence described by Ojito was a minor component of the expert’s

testimony, and was largely provided as a foundation for the expert’s

knowledge and expertise as to the TNS and KN gangs and as a backdrop

against which the expert could more particularly describe his opinions on

the more central issues in the case on which Ojito concedes his opinions

were relevant.11 We are convinced the trial court correctly permitted the

expert to generally and briefly discuss the nature of street gangs and his

particularized knowledge of the history of TNS and KN for foundational

purposes. Moreover, even if that evidence should have been excluded, it

is not reasonably probable Ojito would have obtained a more favorable

result even if the expert’s testimony could have been sanitized to remove

all references to TNS’s evolution and whether TNS was a criminal street

gang.

11 The expert’s direct testimony consisted of 41 pages of

reporter’s transcript, and the cross-examination covered

another 20 pages, but the testimony devoted to the

complained-of evidence totaled less than six pages of the

expert’s direct testimony, and much of that testimony was

foundational for the expert’s opinion that TNS and KN were

rival gangs and Ojito was a documented member of TNS.

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(Lodgment No. 4 at 25-28.) 

 This Court cannot review the admission of the gang expert’s testimony for error

on state law grounds. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68. For Petitioner to be granted relief

based on the admission of the gang expert’s testimony, the admission of the testimony

must have been so fundamentally unfair as to have resulted in a denial of due process. 

Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72. Once again, if a jury could have made any permissible

inference based on the gang expert’s testimony, the admission of that testimony cannot

be considered a violation of due process. Jammal, 926 F.2d at 920. 

The gang evidence was provided to the jury in the testimony of Detective Ernest

Encinas during direct examination by the prosecutor. (Lodgment No. 9, Reporter’s

Transcript (“RT”) at 3783-824.) Detective Encinas testified that he had extensive

experience investigating and interacting with gangs. (Id. at 3783-88.) He testified that

he was familiar with TNS and that Petitioner was known as “Mist” within TNS. (Id. at

3788-89.) He gave testimony that there are gang “territories.” (Id. at 3794.) He defined

“criminal street gang” as “a group of three or more individuals who associate on a

regular basis; who have a name; claim a turf or territory; who contribute to the

deterioration of a neighborhood; and more important, is their involvement in criminal

activity.” (Id.) He said he knew of TNS, and had first heard of TNS while investigating

the March 1, 2002 murders (known as the “5000 Logan Incident”), had investigated

other crimes allegedly committed by TNS members, and had spoken to people who

claimed to be members of TNS. (Id.) He said that TNS members had told him that they

claimed Southeast San Diego as their territory. (Id. at 3795.) He was aware that TNS

members had been implicated in murder, robbery, car-jackings, break-ins of schools,

weapons violations, graffiti, and witness intimidation. (Id.) The detective testified that

TNS had evolved from a “tagging crew” into a violent street gang. (Id. at 3796.) He

said that the gangs UF and KN were aligned, and that KN members “graduate” to UF. 

(Id. at 3798.) He said UF and KN were enemies of TNS and that UF and KN also claim

“Southeast” as their territory. (Id. at 3799-800.) He testified that UF and KN were

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violent street gangs. (Id. at 3800-02.) He identified tattoos belonging to Petitioner and

a hat Petitioner wore in a picture as affiliating Petitioner with TNS. (Id. at 3806, 08.) 

The detective then interpreted the photographs discussed above as to what they

indicated concerning the gang affiliation of the subjects and which types of weapons

were depicted. (Id, at 3811-19.) He testified that gang members increase their status

within a gang through violent and criminal acts. (Id. at 3819-20.) He detailed the

process police use to document gang membership of individuals. (Id. at 3821-23.) 

Finally, Detective Encinas testified that Petitioner was a documented gang member and

that Petitioner had admitted his gang affiliation to the detective in an interview. (Id. at

3824.) 

The thrust of the gang expert’s testimony was to establish that Petitioner was a

member of a criminal street gang and that the victims’ gang was the enemy of

Petitioner’s gang. The testimony brought this point across clearly, but not without a

substantial amount of foundation laid for his opinion. In order for the expert to express

his opinion that Petitioner was in a gang and that the victims were enemies of that gang,

the expert had to explain the background of those gangs, the reasons for the expert’s

knowledge about the gangs, the indications that a person was a member of a gang, why

gangs in general might be violent toward one another, and why these particular gangs

were violent toward one another. At each step of the gang expert’s testimony, the jury,

by the prosecutor’s design, could draw a further inference about Petitioner’s intent and

motive in shooting the victims. The jury could draw a permissible inference about

Petitioner’s intent and motive in shooting the victims; the gang expert’s testimony made

Petitioner’s claim of self defense less credible. See, e.g., U.S. v. Santiago, 46 F.3d 885,

889 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding gang evidence relevant to motive). 

Because the gang evidence led the jury to a permissible inference, the admission

of the evidence did not violate Petitioner’s right to due process of law. Estelle, 502 U.S.

at 72; Jammal, 926 F.2d at 920.

//

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5. The Cumulative Effect of the Disputed Evidence on Petitioner’s

Right to Due Process

Petitioner claims that the cumulative effect of the admission of all of the evidence

discussed above amounted to a denial of his right to due process. (Pet. at 6.) None of

the contested evidence gives rise to a ground for federal habeas relief because a jury

could make a permissible inference based on each piece of evidence discussed. See

Jammal, 926 F.2d at 920. Because Petitioner has not demonstrated any single

constitutional error in this case, “there is nothing to accumulate to a level of a

constitutional violation.” Mancuso v. Olivarez, 292 F.2d 939, 957 (9th Cir. 2002). The

California Court of Appeal’s rejection of Petitioner’s arguments regarding the contested

evidence was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established

federal law. Accordingly, the Court recommends that the Petition be denied.

V. Conclusion and Recommendation

After a thorough review of the record in this matter, the undersigned magistrate

judge finds that Petitioner has not shown that he is entitled to federal habeas relief

under the applicable legal standards. Therefore, the undersigned magistrate judge

hereby recommends that the Petition be DENIED WITH PREJUDICE and that judgment

be entered accordingly. 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Larry A. Burns,

United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). IT IS ORDERED that not later than March 25, 2011, any party may

file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document

should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” IT IS FURTHER

ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be served and filed not later than April

4, 2011. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time

may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See

Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153

//

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(9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 2, 2011

Jan M. Adler

U.S. Magistrate Judge

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