Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-03877/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-03877-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:1651 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Maurice Williams, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora B. Schriro; Arizona Attorney

General, 

Respondents 

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No. CIV 05-3877-PHX-EHC (DKD)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE EARL H. CARROLL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

Maurice Williams filed a timely, fully exhausted petition for writ of habeas corpus on

December 1, 2005, challenging his convictions for 13 drug-related crimes committed over

the course of four years, and the imposition of concurrent sentences, the longest being 8

years, followed by a two-year probationary period. In his first ground for habeas relief he

contends that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation by admitting

a trial exhibit consisting of two charts created by the case agent summarizing the number of

calls between two telephones registered to and/or used by Williams and his co-defendants.

In his second ground, he argues that the trial court erroneously denied Williams’ motion to

suppress the fruits of the search of his residence. In his third ground, he contends that the

trial court’s imposition of aggravated terms violated the rule announced in Blakely v.

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542 U.S. 296 (2004).

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Washington.1

 The Court recommends that Williams’ petition be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

FACTS

Williams was charged with twelve other individuals in a sixty-eight count indictment

for the following offenses: illegally conducting an enterprise; conspiracy; possession of

marijuana for sale; transportation for sale, sale, or transfer of marijuana; misconduct

involving weapons; child abuse; and use of wire communication in a drug-related transaction.

The charged offenses originated from an alleged conspiracy to supply large quantities of

marijuana to individuals in several states, including Arizona. Nine of the thirteen defendants

entered into plea agreements; the four remaining defendants were tried together. Several of

the defendants who pleaded guilty testified at trial on behalf of the state. Following a

twenty-day jury trial, Williams was convicted of illegally conducting an enterprise,

conspiracy, possession of marijuana for sale, and transportation for sale, sale, or transfer of

marijuana. 

DISCUSSION

In his first ground, Williams argues, as he did on direct review, that the trial court

erred when it admitted charts summarizing 1,600 telephone calls between certain telephone

and pager numbers made during a three-month period. The charts listed the telephone and

pager numbers, the number of calls between each pair of numbers, the date or general time

frame of the call, and the persons who subscribed to/and or used the listed numbers.

Following a very thorough discussion of the issue, the court of appeals found no reversible

error in the trial court’s admission of the charts pursuant to Rule 1006 of the Arizona Rules

of Evidence.

Rule 1006 provides that the contents of voluminous documents which cannot

conveniently be examined in court may be presented in the form of a chart or summary. See

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The Court recognizes that Williams is not entitled to habeas relief based upon statelaw evidentiary rulings. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). This procedural

history is noted to explain the context in which Williams’ constitutional argument is made.

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Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).

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Ariz. R. Evid. 1006. Although the rule allows it, Williams did not “seek production of the

documents in court or otherwise seek their admission,” (Doc. #11, Exh JJ at 4) and conceded

that he had notice of the records’ existence, what the records were, that he waited until the

middle of trial to request a review of the records, and that he knew a summary would be

offered into evidence (Id. at 5). The agent who prepared the charts testified at length

concerning their preparation, including how he obtained the documents and compiled the

information from the documents, and how the charts were prepared at his direction based on

those documents as well as other information (Id. at 5-6).

The primary issue on appeal was Williams’ assertion that there was information

contained in the summarized documents that was not independently admissible as required

by Rule 1006. The court of appeals concluded that there was nothing in the record to support

this claim. The court of appeals pointed out that independent evidence at trial from another

witness established that the phone number involved in 140 of the 167 calls pertaining to

Williams was a number used by him. In addition, the documents were available to Williams

for his inspection, and the agent was subject to cross-examination regarding the documents

and the charts and any alleged oral communications that became part of the summary. In

light of the overwhelming evidence of Williams’ guilt, and the fact that the charts were

cumulative to the testimony establishing telephone contact with Williams and other members

of the conspiracy, the court of appeals found no prejudice in the admission of the charts (Id.

at 6-10).2

Finally, the court of appeals addressed the Crawford3 issue. Williams contends that

the charts contained “testimonial” evidence from non-testifying witnesses and that the charts

were inadmissible unless those witnesses were shown to be unavailable and that he had a

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prior opportunity to cross-examine those witnesses (Id. at 10-11). The court of appeals found

no error as a result of Williams’ failure to point to any portion of the record to support his

assertion, and further cited the Supreme Court’s language in Crawford that most of the

hearsay exceptions, including the business records or statements in furtherance of a

conspiracy exceptions, “covered statements that were by their nature not testimonial” (Id.)

(emphasis added) (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56). This is not contrary to or an

unreasonable application of Crawford.

In his second ground, Williams argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion

to suppress the fruits of the search of his residence. Williams was arrested pursuant to a

warrant in the front hallway inside the house (Id. at 22). He told officers that there were

other people inside; the arresting officers then conducted a protective sweep of the residence

(Id. at 23-24). During the protective sweep, they observed several weapons, marijuana, and

drug paraphernalia (Id.). They also found a woman and infant upstairs. All items observed

were either in plain view during the course of the protective sweep or were discovered as a

result of searches consented to by other occupants. Once the residence was secured, all

weapons found were placed on a table in a central location in the residence. All drugs and

paraphernalia observed were left in place, pending a search warrant (Id.). 

Following an evidentiary hearing on Williams’ motion to suppress at which several

witnesses testified, the trial court found the protective sweep was proper under the

circumstances; that the weapons, found in plain view, were properly taken to a central

location for safety; and that because the weapons and drugs were found in plain view,

“ample” probable cause existed for a search warrant, and thus the weapons would have been

inevitably discovered (Id. at 25). The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling,

reasoning that because Williams was arrested inside the residence, under the circumstances

“the arresting officers could conduct a protective sweep of the entire residence for the limited

purpose of determining whether anyone who may pose a danger to the officers or others may

be hiding inside” (Id. at 26). Because the state court provided an opportunity “for full and

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Respondents correctly note that because the court of appeals decided Williams’

appeal prior to the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Martinez, 210 Ariz. 578,

585-86 (2005), the court of appeals unnecessarily found both aggravating circumstances

Blakely-compliant. As the supreme court later held in Martinez: "once a jury finds or a

defendant admits a single aggravating factor, the Sixth Amendment permits the sentencing

judge to find and consider additional factors relevant to the imposition of a sentence up to

the maximum prescribed in that statute." Id. (emphasis added). However, assuming that

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fair litigation” of Williams’ Fourth Amendment claim, with an evidentiary hearing in the trial

court, and a thorough review of the ruling on appeal, Williams is not entitled to habeas relief

on the ground that evidence was admitted at his trial pursuant to an unconstitutional search

and seizure. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494-95 (1976).

In his third ground, Williams reiterates his argument made in his appeal that his

sentence was aggravated in violation of Blakely. The court of appeals ordered supplemental

briefing on the issue and concluded that Blakely applied, and that the trial court had not

violated Blakely in imposing an aggravated sentence. Specifically, the court of appeals

concluded that “[b]ecause the aggravating circumstances of pecuniary gain and the presence

of accomplices were included in the jury’s verdict, the judge committed no Blakely error

when aggravating defendant’s sentences” (Doc. #11, Exh JJ at 44). The Court finds this is

not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Blakely.

As the court of appeals reasoned, the “maximum sentence” for purposes of Blakely

must be based “solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the

defendant” (Id. at 41, quoting Blakely) (emphasis in original). In Arizona, an aggravated

term may only be imposed when there has been a finding of at least one statutory aggravating

circumstance pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-702 (Id. at 42). The court of appeals correctly

concluded that two of the statutory aggravating factors cited by the trial court were implicit

in the jury’s verdict: the jury had to find that Williams engaged in criminal conduct for

pecuniary gain and did so with accomplices in order to return guilty verdicts for

transportation of marijuana for sale and illegally conducting an enterprise.4

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Martinez had been decided while Williams’ appeal was pending before the court of appeals,

and that the court of appeals had applied Martinez to Williams’ case, it would have been

neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of Blakely.

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Finally, Williams argues in his notice of supplemental authority that the Supreme

Court’s decision in Cunningham v. California, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 856 (2007) “should

lay this matter to rest in favor of the Petitioner” (Doc. #13 at 2). The Court disagrees. The

decision in Cunningham in fact reaffirms Arizona’s current sentencing statutes, amended in

response to Blakely, as consistent with the Sixth Amendment. See Id. at 871, n. 17. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Maurice Williams’ petition for writ

of habeas corpus be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE (Doc. #1).

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have ten days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Rules

72, 6(a), 6(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have ten days within

which to file a response to the objections. Failure timely to file objections to the Magistrate

Judge's Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and

Recommendation by the district court without further review. See United States v. ReynaTapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file objections to any factual

determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 15th day of January, 2008.

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