Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01308/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01308-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 

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NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

LET’S GO AERO, INC., 

A COLORADO CORPORATION,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

CEQUENT PERFORMANCE PRODUCTS, INC., 

A DELAWARE CORPORATION, FKA CEQUENT 

TOWING PRODUCTS, INC., 

Defendant-Appellant

U-HAUL INTERNATIONAL INC., 

A NEVADA CORPORATION,

Defendant

______________________ 

2015-1308

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

District of Colorado in No. 1:14-cv-01600-RM-MEH, Judge 

Raymond P. Moore.

______________________ 

Decided: March 3, 2016

______________________ 

 MARTIN D. BEIER, Silver & DeBoskey, P.C., Denver, 

CO, argued for plaintiff-appellee. Also represented by

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2 LET'S GO AERO, INC. v. CEQUENT PERFORMANCE PRODUCTS

THOMAS M. HASKINS III; J. MARK SMITH, Berg Hill Greenleaf Ruscitti, LLP, Denver, CO.

 DAVID BOGDAN CUPAR, McDonald Hopkins LLC, 

Cleveland, OH, argued for defendant-appellant. Also 

represented by MATTHEW JOHN CAVANAGH. 

______________________ 

Before MOORE, TARANTO, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.

TARANTO, Circuit Judge. 

A settlement agreement that resolved an earlier lawsuit between Let’s Go Aero, Inc. and Cequent Performance Products, Inc. contains an arbitration provision 

that governs certain disputes that might arise between 

the parties. When Let’s Go Aero brought the present 

action against Cequent, asserting patent-infringement 

and other claims, Cequent invoked that arbitration provision by filing a motion to stay the litigation and to compel 

arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 

§§ 3, 4. The district court analyzed the twelve claims of 

Let’s Go Aero’s complaint and concluded that six come 

within the arbitration provision and six do not. Challenging the non-arbitrability conclusion as to the latter group 

of six claims, Cequent appeals the resulting order entered 

by the district court, invoking 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1). We 

dismiss the appeal. The order does not deny the requested § 3 stay and so is outside § 16(a)(1)(A). Although the 

order refuses to compel arbitration, which is within 

§ 16(a)(1)(B), our ruling on arbitrability would be advisory 

as to that refusal, which undisputedly is compelled by an

independent ground we cannot disturb. We therefore do 

not address arbitrability, which the parties now agree will 

be decided de novo by another district court in a separate 

action brought by Cequent under the Arbitration Act.

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LET'S GO AERO, INC. v. CEQUENT PERFORMANCE PRODUCTS 3

BACKGROUND

A 

In 2008, Let’s Go Aero and Cequent entered into a license agreement that authorized Cequent to make and 

sell certain products involving technology for which, the 

agreement states, Let’s Go Aero had patent rights. The 

products include cargo bins that attach to the back of a 

vehicle to provide storage space, a bike rack, and a pin 

that connects a vehicle to a towed object. In 2010, Cequent sued Let’s Go Aero for breach of the 2008 license, 

asserting, among other things, that Let’s Go Aero had let 

its patents and applications expire or go abandoned, so 

that the license issued to Cequent was without value. 

Let’s Go Aero counterclaimed that Cequent breached the 

licensing agreement by not paying required royalties and 

also had infringed Let’s Go Aero’s patents. 

In January 2012, Let’s Go Aero and Cequent entered 

into a settlement agreement. Two provisions are noteworthy for present purposes. First: In exchange for 

paying $17,500 to Let’s Go Aero, Cequent is permitted to 

continue selling some 25,792 units of a product called 

Silent Hitch Pins that Cequent already had in inventory. 

Second: Any disputes arising out of or relation to the 

settlement agreement are to be arbitrated in Chicago, 

Illinois.

In the event of any dispute, claim, question, or 

disagreement arising from or relating to this 

Agreement or the breach thereof . . . all disputes, 

claims, questions, or differences shall be finally 

settled by arbitration administered by the American Arbitration Association in accordance with the 

provisions of its Commercial Arbitration Rules. 

Venue for the arbitration proceedings shall be in 

Chicago, Illinois. . . . 

J.A. 394 ¶ 23. 

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B 

In June 2014, Let’s Go Aero filed the present action 

against Cequent in district court in Colorado. J.A. 190. 

The operative Second Amended Complaint states twelve 

claims, patent infringement among them. In lieu of 

answering, Cequent moved for an order compelling arbitration under 9 U.S.C. § 4 or, in the alternative, for a stay 

of the case pending arbitration under 9 U.S.C. § 3. J.A. 

219, 229. It argued that Let’s Go Aero’s claims come 

within the arbitration clause of the 2012 settlement 

agreement. J.A. 224. 

In opposing Cequent’s motion, Let’s Go Aero raised a 

venue objection under Ansari v. Qwest Communications 

Corp., 414 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 2005). In Ansari, the 

Tenth Circuit ruled that “where the parties agreed to 

arbitrate in a particular forum only a district court in that 

forum has authority to compel arbitration under § 4.” Id.

at 1219–20; see id. at 1220 (“a district court lacks authority to compel arbitration in other districts, or in its own 

district if another has been specified for arbitration”)

(internal quotation omitted). The Ansari rule can be 

waived, see Sanchez v. Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C., 762 F.3d 

1139, 1151–52 (10th Cir. 2014); 1mage Software, Inc. v. 

Reynolds & Reynolds Co., 459 F.3d 1044, 1052 (10th Cir. 

2006), but here Let’s Go Aero invoked the Ansari rule. 

Because the 2012 agreement specifies that arbitration is 

to be conducted in Chicago, Let’s Go Aero argued that the 

Colorado district court in this case lacked power under 

Ansari to grant Cequent’s § 4 motion to compel arbitration.

Cequent responded by filing a new action—a Petition 

to Compel Arbitration under § 4 of the Arbitration Act—in 

the Northern District of Illinois (which includes Chicago). 

It told the Illinois court in its Petition that “[u]nder the 

Federal Arbitration Act, as interpreted by the U.S. Court 

of Appeals for the 10th Circuit, the proper venue to comCase: 15-1308 Document: 55-2 Page: 4 Filed: 03/03/2016
LET'S GO AERO, INC. v. CEQUENT PERFORMANCE PRODUCTS 5

pel arbitration is the district court encompassing the 

arbitration location required by the clause,” and that, in 

its reply brief responding to Let’s Go Aero’s opposition in 

Colorado, “Cequent will ask the Colorado district court to 

either stay the case pending this Court’s resolution of this 

petition or to dismiss [the Colorado action] for improper 

venue.” Petition to Compel Arbitration, Doc. 1, ¶¶ 32, 33, 

Cequent Performance Products, Inc. v. Let’s Go Aero, Inc., 

No. 1:14-CV-08457 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 27, 2014). In December 

2014, however, the Illinois district court stayed its case 

pending the outcome of Cequent’s motion to compel arbitration in Colorado district court.

C 

On January 28, 2015, the Colorado district court in 

this case issued an order addressing Cequent’s motion to 

compel arbitration and to stay the litigation.1 In the

January 28 Order, the court explained that it would first 

consider whether each of the claims in the complaint was

subject to the arbitration provision. “If such claim does 

[arise from the settlement agreement]—that claim is 

arbitrable. If such claim does not—then that claim is 

non-arbitrable and subject to litigation in the Court.” J.A.

10. Proceeding claim by claim, the court concluded that 

six claims (1–3, 6, 10, and 12) are subject to the 2012 

arbitration provision, J.A. 12–14, 16, 18–20, and six 

others (4, 5, 7–9, and 11) are not, J.A. 15–19. 

The court then considered whether it could compel arbitration as to the first group of claims—those it had held 

arbitrable. It concluded that Ansari precludes such a § 4 

order. J.A. 20. It added, however, that it would stay the 

 

1 The court also set aside a default judgment (ECF 

No. 42) and gave Cequent more time to answer or otherwise respond to the complaint. J.A. 21–22.

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case as to those claims pending what it said would be a 

“de novo resolution of the Illinois Action.” J.A. 20–21. 

Although the court had found six claims not to be arbitrable (4, 5, 7–9, 11)—the ones now at issue in this 

appeal—the court then considered “Whether to Stay the 

Entire Litigation Pending Arbitration.” J.A. 21 (emphasis 

added). The court explained: “Where a court has found 

that a party’s lawsuit contains some claims that raise 

arbitrable issues and others that do not, the court has 

considerable discretion with respect to whether it stays 

the claims that do not raise arbitrable issues or allows 

them to proceed.” J.A. 21. As to whether the nonarbitrable claims should be stayed along with the arbitrable ones, the district court said: “the Court reserves ruling 

on the request to stay the matter in its entirety. The 

Court orders the parties to file cross briefs within thirty 

(30) days of this Order as to whether a stay is appropriate 

as to individual Claims Four, Five, Seven, Eight, Nine, 

and Eleven.” J.A. 21.

In the Conclusion section of the January 28 Order, the 

court formally disposed, in numbered paragraphs, of the 

motions before it. J.A. 21–23. Three paragraphs address 

claims 1–3, 6, 10, and 12. Paragraph 3 “GRANTS, in 

part” the motion to compel arbitration, “to wit, the Court 

finds the following claims are subject to the parties’ 

arbitration agreement,” listing claims 1–3, 6, 10, and 12. 

J.A. 22. Paragraph 4 “DENIES, in part,” the motion to 

compel arbitration, “to wit, the Court lacks jurisdiction in 

which to compel the parties to arbitrate” those claims, id., 

thus referring to the Ansari ground. And paragraph 5 

“GRANTS, in part, [Cequent’s] request to stay proceedings” as to those claims “pending resolution of the Illinois 

Action.” Id.

The final paragraph of the formal ordering portion of 

the January 28 Order addresses the six claims that the 

district court, in the earlier portions, had found nonCase: 15-1308 Document: 55-2 Page: 6 Filed: 03/03/2016
LET'S GO AERO, INC. v. CEQUENT PERFORMANCE PRODUCTS 7

arbitrable. Paragraph 6 “RESERVES ruling, in part, 

[Cequent’s] request to stay proceedings (ECF No. 29), to 

wit the Court ORDERS the parties to file cross briefs 

within thirty (30) days of this Order as to whether a stay 

is appropriate to the following individual claims,” listing 

claims 4, 5, 7–9, and 11. J.A. 23. We note that the January 28 Order includes no formal ordering clause that 

expressly denies Cequent’s request to compel arbitration 

under 9 U.S.C. § 4 with respect to claims 4, 5, 7–9, and 11, 

but the parties agree that the district court’s order necessarily does so. 

D 

After the district court entered its ruling, Cequent 

appealed to this court and obtained from the district court 

a stay pending appeal. Only claims 4, 5, 7–9, and 11—the 

claims the district court found non-arbitrable—are before 

us. Cequent argues principally that those claims are 

subject to the arbitration provision because adjudicating 

those claims will involve determining whether any of the 

challenged sales were covered under a provision of the 

2012 settlement agreement allowing Cequent to continue 

selling certain products. Let’s Go Aero did not appeal 

with respect to claims 1–3, 6, 10, and 12, whose arbitrability the district court stated would be decided de novo by 

the Illinois district court.

In this court, Cequent has acknowledged—as it told 

the Illinois district court—that the Colorado district court 

could not compel arbitration in Chicago under Ansari. 

Appellant’s Reply Br. at 19. And the parties have broadened the scope of the de novo review of arbitrability by the 

Illinois district court to include all of the claims asserted 

in this case by Let’s Go Aero—including the claims, at 

issue on appeal, that the Colorado court found nonarbitrable. Let’s Go Aero so stated in its brief in this 

court, waiving any preclusion. At oral argument, Cequent 

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8 LET'S GO AERO, INC. v. CEQUENT PERFORMANCE PRODUCTS

agreed. This agreement, we note, helpfully opens a path 

to a single-forum definitive resolution of arbitrability. 

DISCUSSION

Jurisdiction to review the January 28 Order exists, if 

at all, under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), (c); and that provision 

applies to this appeal only to the extent that the district 

court issued “an order” covered by 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1). See 

Microchip Tech. Inc. v. U.S. Philips Corp., 367 F.3d 1350, 

1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2004). As relevant here, section 

16(a)(1) of Title 9, U.S. Code, authorizes appeal of an 

order “(A) refusing a stay of any action under section 3 of 

this title” and of an order “(B) denying a petition under 

section 4 of this title to order arbitration to proceed.” 

Those provisions address two forms of concrete action 

authorized by the Arbitration Act: staying litigation; and 

compelling arbitration. Cequent sought both actions in 

this case. We conclude, however, that neither provision 

provides us a basis to reach the merits of arbitrability on 

Cequent’s appeal. We therefore dismiss the appeal.

A 

We begin with the district court’s order to the extent 

it denies the § 4 motion for an order to compel arbitration. 

Cequent does not dispute either of two propositions: (a) 

our unchallenged precedent about when we follow regional circuits’ law requires us to follow the Tenth Circuit’s 

Ansari decision on § 4 here; and (b) with Let’s Go Aero 

having invoked the venue provision of the arbitration 

agreement in this case, Ansari precludes the granting of 

Cequent’s § 4 motion to compel arbitration, even if Cequent is right about the arbitrability of the claims at issue 

before us. Based on those two premises, it is undisputed 

that this court cannot set aside the district court’s refusal 

to compel arbitration. Were we to rule on the arbitrability issue, therefore, that ruling would not alter the district 

court’s concrete action in refusing to compel arbitration. 

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LET'S GO AERO, INC. v. CEQUENT PERFORMANCE PRODUCTS 9

In these circumstances, our ruling on arbitrability 

would be advisory as to the denial of the § 4 motion in the 

same way the Supreme Court has long recognized as 

defeating jurisdiction in an analogous setting. The Court 

has held that it lacks jurisdiction to review a state court’s 

“judgment[ ]” under 28 U.S.C. § 1257 where that judgment, even if it includes a ruling on federal law, independently rests on a state-law ground. The Court 

explained the longstanding rule and rationale in Coleman 

v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991):

In the context of direct review of a state court

judgment, the independent and adequate state

ground doctrine is jurisdictional. Because this 

Court has no power to review a state law determination that is sufficient to support the judgment, 

resolution of any independent federal ground for 

the decision could not affect the judgment and 

would therefore be advisory. See Herb v. Pitcairn,

324 U.S. 117, 125–126 (1945) (“We are not permitted to render an advisory opinion, and if the same 

judgment would be rendered by the state court after we corrected its views of federal laws, our review could amount to nothing more than an 

advisory opinion.”).

Id. at 729. The Court added: “When this Court reviews a 

state court decision on direct review pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1257, it is reviewing the judgment; if resolution 

of a federal question cannot affect the judgment, there is 

nothing for the Court to do.” Id. at 730. The same logic 

applies to the order denying the motion for an arbitrationcompelling order under § 4: a ruling by this court on 

arbitrability of claims 4, 5, 7–9, and 11 would be impermissibly advisory because such a ruling would not affect 

the district court’s order refusing to compel arbitration of 

those claims. 

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Our conclusion is reinforced by consideration of the 

Supreme Court’s decision in Electrical Fittings Corp. v. 

Thomas & Betts Co., 307 U.S. 241 (1938). In that patent 

case, the district court’s “decree” contained a validity 

declaration along with a non-infringement determination, 

even though invalidity was asserted only as a defense, not 

a counterclaim. Id. at 242. When the defendant, which 

had won on non-infringement, appealed to the court of 

appeals for reform of the decree to eliminate the validity 

declaration, the Supreme Court held that the court of 

appeals had jurisdiction to do just that, but not to address 

the merits of validity. The Court noted the basic principle 

that “[a] party may not appeal from a judgment or decree 

in his favor, for the purpose of obtaining a review of 

findings he deems erroneous which are not necessary to 

support the decree.” Id. (emphasis added). But in the case 

before the Court, the declaration that was challenged was 

in the decree itself, and what was sought was not review 

of that declaration’s merits, but its simple vacatur. Id.2 

In the present case, unlike in Electrical Fittings, the 

ordering portions of the district court’s ruling do not 

contain a declaration of arbitrability. But even if they 

 

2 “A party may not appeal from a judgment or decree in his favor, for the purpose of obtaining a review of 

findings he deems erroneous which are not necessary to 

support the decree. But here the decree itself purports to 

adjudge the validity of claim 1, and though the adjudication was immaterial to the disposition of the cause, it 

stands as an adjudication of one of the issues litigated. 

We think the petitioners were entitled to have this portion of the decree eliminated, and that the Circuit Court 

of Appeals had jurisdiction, as we have held this court 

has, to entertain the appeal, not for the purpose of passing on the merits, but to direct the reformation of the 

decree.” Id. at 242 (footnotes omitted).

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LET'S GO AERO, INC. v. CEQUENT PERFORMANCE PRODUCTS 11

did, all that Electrical Fittings involved and approved was 

appellate vacatur of that declaration, not an appellate 

decision on the merits of the issue. Cequent does not ask 

us for a bare vacatur. At this point, moreover, both 

parties agree that the arbitrability issue will be decided 

de novo by the district court in Illinois. Even vacatur, in 

the current posture of the case, would have no discernible 

concrete legal effect.3

More broadly, the parties’ agreement that the arbitrability conclusion of the district court in this case lacks 

any preclusive effect in the Illinois case, and that arbitrability is subject to de novo decision by the Illinois district 

court, takes this case outside the rationale of cases in 

which appeal has been allowed where “a losing party 

accepts the adverse judgment and seeks review of only 

one of the independently sufficient alternative grounds for 

the judgment.” 15A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. 

Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure: Jurisdiction, § 3902 (Special Limits on Jurisdiction–

Standing), at 84 (2d. 1992). The rationale of such decisions is that “most courts permit preclusion as to all such 

grounds,” giving a future legal effect in other potential 

proceedings to the ruling on the alternative grounds. Id.

(emphasis added); see AT&T Corp. v. F.C.C., 317 F.3d 

227, 237-38 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Here, in contrast, the parties have made clear, by their representations on appeal, 

that arbitrability is to be decided afresh in the Illinois 

case, independently of the conclusion on the issue drawn 

by the district court in the present case.

 

3 If this dispute continues, and leads to a decision 

by the Illinois district court in the action filed under the 

Arbitration Act, a question will arise about whether an 

appeal will come to this court or to the Seventh Circuit. 

We merely note but do not address that question. 

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12 LET'S GO AERO, INC. v. CEQUENT PERFORMANCE PRODUCTS

The language used in Coleman and its cited authorities suggests that we lack jurisdiction—not because of 28 

U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), but for advisory-opinion reasons—to 

review the order denying the § 4 motion. But even if we 

view the issue as a matter of “‘federal appellate practice,’” Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2029 (2011), 

the same disposition is appropriate here. We will not 

entertain the appeal insofar as it involves the denial of an 

order to compel arbitration under § 4. 

B 

A different problem undermines Cequent’s appeal regarding the motion under 9 U.S.C. § 3 for a stay pending 

arbitration. The district court has not actually issued an 

order refusing such a stay.4 Although a refusal of a § 3 

stay is separately appealable under 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(A), 

we have no such basis for appeal in this case.

 

4 In the January 28 Order on appeal, the district

court, besides addressing Cequent’s Arbitration Act 

motion seeking relief under 9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4 (ECF No. 29), 

also ruled on a separate motion, which asked that the 

court set aside the default judgment or, if “the [c]ourt 

believes that Cequent is in default and a response to the 

second amended complaint is currently required,” give 

Cequent extra time “to answer or move to dismiss the 

second amended complaint” (ECF No. 42 at 2-3). The 

court set aside the entry of default, but also granted 

Cequent extra time “to answer or otherwise respond to 

the Complaint.” J.A. 22. (Because of Cequent’s immediate appeal, no such response has been filed.) That portion 

of the Order does not address the Arbitration Act motion 

and does not directly order Cequent to answer, but only 

grants it more time. In any event, on appeal Cequent 

does not point to that clause of the Order as a refusal to 

stay under § 3. For at least those reasons, we disregard 

that clause of the Order. 

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LET'S GO AERO, INC. v. CEQUENT PERFORMANCE PRODUCTS 13

Although the district court concluded that the claims 

Cequent presents to us are not subject to arbitration, the 

court’s January 28 Order does not deny the § 3 motion for 

a stay of litigation of those claims. To the contrary, it 

expressly “RESERVES ruling, in part, [on Cequent’s] 

request to stay proceedings” regarding those claims. J.A. 

23. And it directs the parties to file briefs “as to whether 

a stay is appropriate” as to those claims. Id. 

When Cequent appealed the January 28 Order, it said 

in its Docketing Statement, dated February 18, 2015, that 

the relief sought is “[r]eversal of portion of order denying 

motion to compel arbitration” and that the “[o]rder is 

immediately appealable under 9 USC 16 as it denied a 

motion to compel arbitration.” Docketing Statement for 

the Appellant Cequent Performance Products, Inc. at 1-2, 

Let’s Go Aero, Inc. v. Cequent Performance Prods., Inc., 

No. 15-1308 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 18, 2015), ECF No. 5. Cequent thus mentioned only the § 4 ruling. It did not 

mention a refusal of a § 3 stay. 

A few weeks later, when the district court granted 

Cequent’s motion to stay district court proceedings pending the appeal, the court described its January 28 Order 

regarding the claims Cequent brings to us: the court 

“denied, in part, [Cequent’s] motion to compel arbitration 

as to [those claims] . . . and reserved ruling on whether to 

stay the entire proceedings.” J.A. 923. Noting that it had 

“determined that certain of [LGA’s] claims were arbitrable but that it lacked jurisdiction to compel arbitration,” 

while “determin[ing] that certain of [LGA’s] claims were 

not arbitrable,” the court said: “Thus, [Cequent] had a 

right to immediately appeal this prior order. See 9 U.S.C. 

§ 16(a)(1)(B).” J.A. 924. That statement cites only the 

§ 16(a)(1) subparagraph on denials of § 4 motions, not the 

subparagraph, § 16(a)(1)(A), that addresses refusals to 

grant stays under § 3.

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In short, the district court’s January 28 Order does 

not include an order refusing a stay that is appealable 

under 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(A).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is dismissed.

No costs.

DISMISSED

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