Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_07-cv-00210/USCOURTS-almd-2_07-cv-00210-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

LARRIE HOPE, #181215, )

)

 Plaintiff, )

)

 ) CASE NO. 2:07-CV-210-MHT v.

) [WO]

)

RICHARD ALLEN, et al., )

)

 Defendants. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This is a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in which Larrie Hope ["Hope"], a state inmate,

challenges actions taken against him at the Kilby Correctional Facility. In his complaint,

Hope seeks issuance of an injunction against the defendants. Plaintiff’s Complaint - Court

Doc. No. 1 at 4. The court therefore construes this document to contain a motion for

preliminary injunction under Rule 65, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction “is within the sound

discretion of the district court ....” Palmer v. Braun, 287 F.3d 1325, 1329 (11th Cir. 2002).

The four prerequisites which Hope must demonstrate to warrant issuance of a preliminary

injunction are: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a substantial threat

of irreparable injury without the injunction; (3) that the harm to Hope outweighs the harm

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to the non-moving parties; and (4) that an injunction would be in the interest of the public.

Palmer, 287 F.3d at 1329; Cate v. Oldham, 707 F.2d 1176 (11th Cir. 1983); Shatel Corp.

v. Mao Ta Lumber and Yacht Corp., 697 F.2d 1352 (11th Cir. 1983). “[A] preliminary

injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy not to be granted unless the movant

clearly established the burden of persuasion” as to each of the four prerequisites. See

McDonald's Corp. v. Robertson, 147 F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th Cir. 1998) (internal citations

and quotations omitted); see also Texas v. Seatrain Int'l, S.A., 518 F.2d 175, 179 (5th Cir.

1975) (grant of preliminary injunction “is the exception rather than the rule,” and movant

must clearly carry the burden of persuasion). The moving party’s failure to demonstrate

a “substantial likelihood of success on the merits” may defeat the party’s claim, regardless

of the party’s ability to establish any of the other elements. Church v. City of Huntsville,

30 F.3d 1332, 1342 (11th Cir. 1994); see also Siegel v. Lepore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11th

Cir. 2000) (noting that “the absence of a substantial likelihood of irreparable injury would,

standing alone, make preliminary injunctive relief improper”).

II. DISCUSSION

 Hope asserts that he fears retaliation from correctional officials and seeks issuance

of an injunction to prevent any further adverse action against him. Turning to the first

prerequisite for issuance of preliminary injunctive relief, the court considers whether Hope

has proven a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. Having thoroughly reviewed

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the documents filed by the plaintiff, the court concludes that Hope has failed to carry his

burden. Other than his self-serving, conclusory allegations of constitutional violations,

Hope presents no proof or objective evidence that the actions about which he complains

violated his constitutional rights. Essentially, the court has nothing other than the inmate’s

mere conclusions of law and unsupported factual allegations in support of his claim that

whether the actions of the defendants violate the Constitution. 

Hope likewise fails to demonstrate that he will suffer the requisite irreparable injury

absent issuance of a preliminary injunction. As noted, Hope provides no proof or objective

evidence in support of his allegations concerning the actions about which he complains.

With respect to the third factor, whether issuance of injunctive relief would cause

substantial harm to others, this component is basically a neutral factor at this juncture.

Finally, the pleadings before the court are devoid of any evidence which indicates that

issuance of an injunction would serve the public interest. Thus, Hope fails to meet his

burden of demonstrating the existence of each prerequisite necessary to warrant issuance

of a preliminary injunction.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:

1. The motion for preliminary injunction filed by the plaintiff be DENIED. 

2. This case be referred back the undersigned for additional proceedings.

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It is further

ORDERED that on or before March 28, 2007 the parties may file objections to the

Recommendation. Any objection must specifically identify the findings in the

Recommendation objected to. Frivolous, conclusive or general objections will not be

considered by the District Court. The parties are advised that this Recommendation is not

a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings in the Recommendation

shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the District Court of issues covered in

the report and shall bar the party from attacking on appeal factual findings in the report

accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest

injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982). See Stein v. Reynolds

Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d

1206 (11th Cir. 1981, en banc), adopting as binding precedent all decisions of the former

Fifth Circuit issued prior to September 30, 1981.

DONE, this 15th day of March, 2007.

/s/ Susan Russ Walker 

SUSAN RUSS WALKER

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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