Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_11-cv-00097/USCOURTS-almd-2_11-cv-00097-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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The court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis in this cause of action. (Doc. No. 3.) A

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prisoner who is allowed to proceed in forma pauperis will have his complaint screened under the provisions of 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) which requires this court to dismiss a prisoner’s civil action prior to service of process if

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

 NORTHERN DIVISION

 ____________________________

RODNEY MCKENZIE, #229 611 *

Plaintiff, *

v. * 2:11-CV-97-ID

 (WO) 

ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF *

CORRECTIONS,

*

Defendant.

 ____________________________

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action is pending before the court on a complaint filed by

Plaintiff, a state inmate currently incarcerated at the Easterling Correctional Facility

[“Easterling”]. Plaintiff seeks to challenge the actions of classification correctional officials

with respect to his designation as a restricted offender which he complains prohibits his

classification to minimum custody status. Plaintiff names as the defendant the Alabama

Department of Corrections [“ADOC”]. Plaintiff seeks a court order that he be treated like

other similarly situated inmates by removing him from the restricted offender classification.

(Doc. No. 1.)

Upon review of the complaint, the court concludes that dismissal of this case prior to

service of process is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii). 

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it determines that the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or

seeks monetary damages from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii).

I. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff is currently serving a twenty year sentence for manslaughter. He brings this

action alleging that classification specialists with the ADOC are violating his rights to equal

protection and due process by placing inmates with similar or worse convictions than his in

honor camps or work release while hisrequestsfor such treatment have been denied. Plaintiff

further argues that he has right to receive a fair decision regarding placement in an honor

camp and/or work release just like other inmates but that classification officials are arbitrarily

and capriciously denying him the right to receive such privilege. 

A. The Alabama Department of Corrections

The sole defendant named to this cause of action is the Alabama Department of

Corrections. The ADOC is not subject to suit or liability under § 1983. The Eleventh

Amendment bars suit directly against a state or its agencies, regardless of the nature of relief

sought. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984). In light of the

foregoing, the court concludes that Plaintiff's complaint against the Alabama Department of

Corrections are due to be dismissed. Id. 

B Equal Protection

Plaintiff complains that classification personnel are violating his equal protection

rights because they have placed other inmates with similar and/or worse convictions and

prison records on minimum custody status and/or removed them from restricted offender

status while his requests for such treatment have been denied. (Doc. No. 1 at pg. 2-4.) Even

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if Plaintiff were allowed to amend his complaint to name a proper defendant to this cause of

action, his claim of an equal protection violation entitles him to no relief.

In order to establish a claim of discrimination cognizable under the Equal Protection

Clause, “a prisoner must demonstrate that (1) he is similarly situated to other prisoners who

received more favorable treatment; and (2) the state engaged in invidious discrimination

against him based on race, religion, national origin, or some other constitutionally protected

basis. Jones v. Ray, 279 F.3d 944, 946-47 (11 Cir. 2001); Damiano v. Florida Parole and th

Prob. Comm’n, 785 F.2d 929, 932-33 (11 Cir. 1986).” Sweet v. Secretary, Department of th

Corrections, 467 F.3d 1311, 1318-1319 (11 Cir. 2006). “[O]fficial action will not be held th

unconstitutional solely because it results in a ... disproportionate impact.... [An allegation]

of ... discriminatory intent or purpose [related to a constitutionally protected interest] is

required to [set forth] a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.” Village of Arlington

Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-265 (1977).

“‘Discriminatory purpose’ ... implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of

consequences. It implies that the decision maker ... selected ... a particular course of action

at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable

group.” Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)

(footnote and citation omitted); see also Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359 (1991).

In a case such as this one, where Plaintiff challenges actions of correctional officials,

exceptionally clear proof of discrimination is required. Fuller v. Georgia Bd. of Pardons and

Paroles, 851 F.2d 1307, 1310 (11 Cir. 1988). Moreover, mere differential treatment of th

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similarly situated inmates, without more, fails to allege a violation of the Equal Protection

Clause. E & T Realty Company v. Strickland, 830 F.2d 1107 (11 Cir. 1987), cert. denied,

th

485 U.S. 961 (1988); McKleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987) (claims of mere

disparity of treatment are insufficient to establish discrimination).

Plaintiff utterly and completely fails to meet his pleading burden as he does not allege

that correctional officials subjected him to adverse treatment based on some constitutionally

impermissible reason; rather, he simply makes the conclusory assertion that differential

treatment resulted in an equal protection violation. To the extent Plaintiff relies on the fact

that some inmates other than himself have been removed from restricted offender status

and/or placed in minimum custody status as the basis for this claim, the law is well settled

that the mere differential treatment of inmates fails to constitute a violation of the Equal

Protection Clause. E & T Realty, supra. 

 Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that Plaintiff’s claim of discrimination

does not rise to the level of an equal protection violation and, therefore, provides no basis for

relief in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. Consequently, this claim is subject to dismissal in

accordance with the directives of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

C. Due Process

To the extent Plaintiff complains that the classification level assigned to him at

Easterling is improper, he is likewise entitled to no relief. An inmate confined in the

Alabama prison system has no constitutionally protected interest in the procedure affecting

his classification level because the resulting restraint, without more, does not impose an

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“atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison

life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). Because Plaintiff has no constitutionally

protected interest in the level of his custody classification, correctional officials may assign

him to any classification level without implicating the protections of due process. Thus, any

claim challenging the decision to classify Plaintiff as a restricted offender or to deny his

request for minimum custody status is due to be summarily dismissed pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(I).

II. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that this case

be DISMISSED with prejudice prior to service of process pursuant to the directives of 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii).

It is further 

ORDERED that on or before March 10, 2011 the parties may file objections to the

Recommendation. Any objections filed must specifically identify the findings in the

Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation to which a party objects. Frivolous, conclusive or

general objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties are advised that

this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and advisements in the

Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the

District Court of issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from

attacking on appeal factual findings in the Recommendation accepted or adopted by the

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District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v.

Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982). See Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d

33 (11th Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981, en

banc), adopting as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed

down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.

Done this 24 day of February, 2011. th

 /s/Charles S. Coody 

CHARLES S. COODY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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