Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-01967/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-01967-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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1 Although Plaintiffs did not timely file their

opposition, in this instance, it is considered despite its late

submission. Local Rule 78-230(c) requires an opposition to “be

filed not less than fourteen (14) days preceding the noticed 

. . . hearing date.” 

2 RCS also moves for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’

claim under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. (RCS’s Mot. for

Summ. J. (“RCS Mot.”) at 22.) However, even though RCS’s motion

includes Plaintiffs’ § 504 claim, Plaintiffs stipulated that a 

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LARRY McIVER, et al. ) CIV-S-01-1967 GEB KJM

)

Plaintiffs, ) ORDER

)

v. )

)

THE CALIFORNIA EXPOSITION AND )

FAIR, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

 )

Defendant Ray Cammack Shows (“RCS”) and the California

Exposition and Fair (“Cal Expo”) move for summary judgment or partial

summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claims under the Americans with

Disabilities Act (“ADA”), § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29

U.S.C. § 794), and California law. Plaintiffs oppose the motion.1

DISCUSSION

I. RCS

RCS moves for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ remaining

claims for violations of Title III of the ADA and various state laws.2

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§ 504 claim is not asserted against RCS. (Pls.’ Opp’n to RCS’s

Mot. at 1.) 

“The standards applicable to motions for summary judgment

are well known, see, e.g., Rodgers v. County of Yolo, 889

F. Supp. 1284 (E.D. Cal. 1995), and need not be repeated here.” 

Reitter v. City of Sacramento, 87 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1042 (E.D.

Cal. 2000).

2

Title III of the ADA prescribes: “No individual shall be discriminated

against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of

the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or

accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who

owns . . . or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12182(a). Discrimination includes “a failure to remove

architectural barriers . . . where such removal is readily

achievable.” Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv). The ADA Accessibility

Guidelines (“ADAAG”) “‘provide valuable guidance for determining

whether an existing facility contains architectural barriers.’” D'Lil

v. Stardust Vacation Club, 2001 WL 1825832, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 21,

2001) (citation omitted). Readily achievable means “easily

accomplishable and able to be carried out without much difficulty or

expense.” 28 C.F.R. § 36.304(a). “Whether a specific change is

readily achievable ‘is a fact intensive inquiry that will rarely be

decided on summary judgment.’” D’Lil, 2001 WL 1825832, at *5

(citation omitted) (listing ten “factors to be considered”). 

Many California statutes provide similar protections for

individuals with disabilities. See Cal. Health & Safety Code § 19955;

Cal. Gov’t Code § 4450; Cal. Civ. Code §§ 51, 54.1(a). Further, “A

violation of the right of an individual under the [ADA] also

constitutes a violation of [California Civil Code sections 51 and

54.1].” Cal. Civ. Code §§ 51(f), 54.1(d).

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3

RCS argues that Plaintiffs’ state law claims are preempted

by federal law because “the [ADA] has occupied the field. . . .” (RCS

Mot. at 19.) This argument is unavailing since a provision of the ADA

states: “Nothing in [the ADA] shall be construed to invalidate or

limit the remedies, rights, and procedures of any . . . law of any

State . . . that provides greater or equal protection for the rights

of individuals with disabilities than are afforded by [the ADA].” 42

U.S.C. § 12201. Therefore, the ADA does not preempt Plaintiffs’ state

law claims. RCS also argues that “[t]he Commerce Clause [Article I,

Section 8, clause 3 of the United States Constitution] has long been

seen as a limitation on state regulatory powers. . . .” (RCS Mot. at

20.) However, this argument is also unavailing since RCS has not

shown that the applicable state law burdens interstate commerce. (See

id. at 20-21.)

RCS further argues that Plaintiffs’ claims predicated on

violations of the California Building Code (“CBC”) are not viable

because the CBC does not apply to RCS’s “transient and temporary”

facilities; and that “a building standard is defined as applying to ‘a

building, structure, factory-built housing, or other improvements to

real property.” (RCS Mot. at 19 (quoting Cal. Health & Safety Code

§ 18909(a)).) However, since “‘Building’ means any structure used for

support or shelter of any use or occupancy,” Cal. Health & Safety

Code § 18908(a), RCS has not fulfilled its “initial responsibility of

informing the district court of the basis” for its contention that the

CBC does not apply to its facilities. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 

RCS seeks summary judgment on all of Plaintiffs’ claims

regarding the accessibility of its attractions, and RCS contends those

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3 “[P]laintiffs stipulated that they would not seek to

impose ‘alteration’ or ‘new construction’ requirements . . . [on

RCS’s] mechanical rides.” (Opp’n at 2.)

4

claims fall into three categories: rides, concessions, and cable

chases (RCS Mot. at 5-7).

A. Rides

RCS argues that summary judgment should be granted on

Plaintiffs’ claims concerning access to RCS’s rides since “Plaintiffs

admit that there is no obligation that the carnival operator has to

make the ride accessible so that the disabled can ride it”3 and since

“an accessible route is only required on accessible rides.” (RCS Mot.

at 8, 9.) RCS argues that access requirements are not imposed on

carnival rides: “[The United States] Access Board created a clear and

logical exemption for portable amusements under the ADA” when it

stated that “Mobile or portable amusement rides such as those in

traveling carnivals, State and county fairs, and festivals, do not

need to comply.” (RCS Reply at 2 (citing the United States Access

Board, Accessible Amusement Rides: A Summary of Accessibility

Guidelines for Recreation Facilities (“Access Board Summary”)).) 

However, the Access Board Summary specifically notes that

while portable amusement rides are not covered by the ADAAG, “other

ADA requirements still apply.” Access Board Summary at 5. Plaintiffs

assert that “[i]t is readily achievable to provide ramps at some of

the . . . rides . . . .” (Pls.’ Statement of Genuine Issues of Fact

(“GIF”) at ¶ 3.) RCS avers barrier removal by providing ramps is not

readily achievable since “[i]t is doubtful that any insurance company

would assume the risk of insuring rides in variance with

manufacturer’s specifications.” (RCS’s Reply to Pls.’ GIF at ¶ 3.) 

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5

The parties’ dispute on this issue is not distilled enough for a

decision on summary judgment. Therefore, the motion is denied.

B. Concessions 

RCS moves for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claims

regarding its concessions, arguing that since “[t]he concession

trailers of [RCS] are mobile units and conveyances . . . [s]tandards

developed for permanent structures do not apply.” (RCS Mot. at 10.) 

However, the ADAAG apply to “temporary buildings or facilities as well

as permanent facilities,” which includes RCS’s concession structures. 

ADAAG 4.1.1(4); Indep. Living Res. v. Or. Arena Corp., 1 F. Supp. 2d

1124, 1138 (D. Or. 1998) (applying the ADAAG to a “concession stand

[that] is a portable cart or similar design”). 

RCS further contends that Plaintiff’s expert’s criticisms of

RCS’s concession structures concern only the allegation that the

service counters at RCS’s “ticket booths, four games, and [a] few

foodstands . . . are too high.” (RCS Mot. at 7.) “[C]ounters . . .

at which goods or services are sold or distributed” must be a maximum

of 36 inches or an “auxiliary counter with a maximum height of 36

in[ches]” or “equivalent facilitation” such as a folding shelf must be

provided. ADAAG 7.2(2). 

1. Foodstands

RCS argues summary judgment should be granted on Plaintiffs’

claims regarding RCS’s foodstands since, although the counters are

higher than 36 inches, the foodstands satisfy ADAAG 7.2(2) since they

“have portable, accessible tables, use clipboards for transactions

[and] [e]mployees working at the food concessions are trained to

assist anyone who needs it . . . .” (RCS SUF ¶ 21.) Plaintiffs

counter that the tables to which RCS refers “are positioned for

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purposes of dispensing condiments [and] do not serve the main counter

area.” (Pls.’ Resp. to RCS SUF ¶ 21). Plaintiffs further contend

that having RCS employees leave the concession trailers or use

clipboards for transactions is “problematic and not a viable

alternative.” (Opp’n at 6; Atwood Decl. ¶ 16.) RCS’s motion is

denied on these claims since a genuine issue of material fact exists

as to whether RCS’s foodstands have an “auxiliary counter” or an

“equivalent facilitation” as required by ADAAG 7.2(2).

2. Games

RCS argues that it operates only four games and that “three

games unquestionably comply [with ADA and state requirements]” and the

other “game has a counter that is too high, but it would require

radical modifications to get the counter lowered 14 inches [to satisfy

the 36 inch maximum].” (RCS Mot. at 10.) RCS avers that modifying

that game would “require re-fabricating the trailer itself.” (RCS SUF

¶ 16.) Plaintiffs aver that modifications to improve accessibility

would “not necessarily entail cutting into the fabric of the trailer”

and might include “lowering the trailer axle closer to grade and/or 

. . . providing a raised . . . platform.” (Pls.’ Resp. to RCS SUF ¶

16; Danz Decl. ¶ 6.) Since there is a genuine issue of material fact

as to whether barrier removal on RCS’s games is readily achievable,

this portion of RCS’s motion is denied.

3. Ticket Booths

RCS seeks summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claims regarding

RCS’s ticket booths since, although most of its ticket booth counters

are higher than 36 inches, “[t]o accommodate persons with

disabilities, the portable ticket booths and information booths

operated by [RCS] have clipboards for transactions” and “[e]mployees

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4 RCS also argues that “at least one ticket booth has its

service counter at the level found acceptable to the Plaintiffs’

expert.” (RCS Mot. at 13.) However, RCS concedes that some of

its ticket booth counters are higher than 36 inches.

7

working at the booths are trained to assist anyone who needs it, even

if it means leaving the trailer in order to accommodate the

customer.”4 (RCS SUF ¶ 23.) Plaintiffs counter that “clipboards do

not mitigate the obstacles that the high counters present” and

“[e]mployee ‘accommodation’ is also not a viable means of access

[since] an employee would [not] actually leave the booth during peak

use period.” (Atwood Decl. ¶¶ 24, 27.) RCS’s motion is denied on

these claims since a genuine issue of material fact exists as to

whether RCS’s ticket booths have an “auxiliary counter” or an

“equivalent facilitation” as required by ADAAG 7.2(2). 

4. Seating at Foodstands

RCS seeks summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claims regarding

the lack of sufficient accessible seating near RCS’s foodstands since

“the requirement [under ADAAG 4.1.3(18) that five percent of seating

be accessible] only applies to fixed or built-in seating or tables.” 

(RCS Mot. at 12 (citation omitted).) Even if ADAAG 4.1.3(18) does not

apply, RCS must nonetheless “remove architectural barriers . . . where

such removal is readily achievable.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv). 

Plaintiffs argue that the lack of sufficient accessible tables near

RCS’s foodstands creates a barrier, the removal of which is “readily

achievable.” (Opp’n at 7; Danz Decl. ¶ 5). 

RCS argues it “does have many portable, accessible tables

located throughout the carnival.” (RCS Mot. at 12.) But, Plaintiffs

aver the tables are “insufficient in number and location.” (Pls.’

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8

Resp. to RCS SUF ¶ 22.) Since there is a genuine issue of material

fact as to whether barrier removal is readily achievable, RCS’s motion

for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claims regarding its seating near

concessions is denied.

C. Cable Chases

RCS also seeks summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ state and ADA

claims regarding its cable chases. Plaintiffs seek damages on their

state claims for the years 2000-2002. (Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 16, 21.)

RCS has placed several cable chases across routes of travel in the

midway. Cable chases “are commercial products purchased by [RCS] to

cover cords and hoses which lie on the ground to provide power and

water to the portable attractions and concessions.” (RCS SUF ¶ 24.) 

RCS argues, “Neither ADA[AG] nor the [CBC] have requirements for cable

chases.” (RCS’s Mot. at 13.) Nonetheless, the ADAAG require “[a]t

least one accessible route [to] connect . . . facilities . . . that

are on the same site.” ADAAG 4.1.2(2). Similarly, the CBC

prescribes: “When more than one . . . facility is located on a site,

accessible routes of travel shall be provided between . . . site

facilities.” Cal. Code. Regs. tit. 24, § 1127B.1. 

RCS avers, “Specially purchased ramps for wheelchair use are

emplaced with the cable chases. . . . During each year of the

California State Fair, every attraction could be accessed either

without crossing over a cable chase at all, or by crossing cables by

use of the special ramps.” (RCS SUF ¶ 25.) Plaintiffs declare the

cable chases are non-compliant because “their sides typically exceed a

slope of 12 percent” and that it was not until “the year 2003 [that]

Defendants started placing modular ramps over the cable chases. . . .”

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9

(Atwood Decl. ¶¶ 5,6.) Further, Plaintiffs declare that the special

ramps were “excessively steep” because “[t]he typical slopes ranged

from 9.5% to 11.6%.” (Id. at ¶¶ 8, 6.) Both the ADAAG and the CBC

set a maximum ramp slope of 8.33 percent. See ADAAG 4.8.2; Cal. Code.

Regs. tit. 24 § 1133B.5.3.1. RCS argues, “It is not sensible that

lengthy ramps with platforms and handrails be required when the

obstacle created by the necessity of a cable chase is negligible in

both height and distance.” (RCS Mot. at 14.) 

RCS argues that Plaintiffs’ ADA claim is moot since “one

could access every attraction and concession without crossing overthe-ground cables” at the 2004 California State Fair. (RCS SUF ¶ 27.)

Plaintiffs counter that “many cable chases remained.” (Pls.’ Resp. to

RCS SUF ¶ 27.) “Damages are not recoverable under Title III of the

ADA--only injunctive relief is available for violations of Title III.”

Wander v. Kaus, 304 F.3d 856, 858 (9th Cir. 2002). Since neither the

ADAAG nor the CBC require that all routes be accessible and there is

no evidence that the remaining cable chases block access to any

facility, RCS’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ ADA claim

as to the cable chases is granted. See ADAAG 4.1.2(2); Cal. Code.

Regs. tit. 24, § 1127B.1.

But disputed questions of fact exist on Plaintiff’s state

claims as to whether, during the years 2000-2002, RCS’s cable chases

and ramps were compliant with the slope requirements of the ADAAG and

the CBC or whether all facilities were otherwise accessible. 

Therefore, RCS’s motion for summary judgment on those state law claims

is denied.

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Finally, RCS argues, “If, as demonstrated, alleged

violations of access standards are not well founded, meaning that

there is no violation of disability rights statutes, . . . then

[Plaintiffs’ ninth claim under the California Business and Professions

Code section 17200] is untenable as a matter of law.” (RCS Mot. at

23.) This portion of the motion is unavailing because of the above

stated genuine issues of material fact.

II. Cal Expo

Cal Expo seeks summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claims under

Title II of the ADA, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,

California Government Code section 11135, the Disabled Rights Act,

California Government Code section 4450, California Health & Safety

Code section 19955, and the Unruh Civil Rights Act.

Under Title II of the ADA, “no qualified individual with a

disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from

participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs,

or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by

any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. “Each facility or part of a

facility constructed by, on behalf of, or for the use of a public

entity shall be designed and constructed in such manner that the

facility or part of the facility is readily accessible to and usable

by individuals with disabilities . . . .” 28 C.F.R. § 35.151(a). 

Cal Expo argues that the ADAAG do not apply to RCS’s rides

and concessions, and that RCS’s rides, concessions, and cable chases

do not violate the ADA. (Cal Expo’s Mot. for Partial Summ. J. (“Cal

Expo Mot.”) at 3-4.) Since no genuine issue of material fact

prevented granting RCS’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’

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ADA claims regarding the cable chases, Cal Expo’s motion for summary

judgment on Plaintiffs’ ADA claims regarding the cable chases is also

granted. However, since there is a genuine issue of material fact as

to whether RCS is required to remove access barriers to its rides and

whether the service counters at RCS’s concessions are in compliance

with the ADA and the ADAAG, Cal Expo’s motion for summary judgment on

Plaintiffs’ ADA claims regarding access to RCS’s rides and concessions

is denied.

Cal Expo argues that Plaintiffs’ claim for violation of

California Government Code section 11135 must fail because “the ADA

does not require any more access than is already provided to RCS’s

games, rides and concessions.” (Cal Expo Mot. at 6.) Cal Expo also

argues that Plaintiffs’ claim under the Disabled Rights Act must fail

because “RCS’s motion demonstrates that reasonable accommodations have

been made and that its concessions and games are presently accessible”

and that Plaintiff’s California Government Code section 4450 claim

must fail because “no state regulations require that RCS’s games,

concessions and rides be made accessible.” (Id. at 6, 7.) Further,

Cal Expo argues that “Nothing in [the Unruh Civil Rights Act] shall be

construed to require any construction, alteration, repair, structural

or otherwise, or modifications of any sort whatsoever, beyond that 

. . . required by other provisions of law . . . .” (Id. at 7 (quoting

Cal. Civ. Code § 51(d)).) Because RCS’s compliance with federal and

state requirements regarding access to its rides and concessions is

still in dispute, and its compliance with state requirements regarding

its cable chases is also still in dispute, Cal Expo’s motion for

summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claims under California Government

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5 Cal Expo also argues that the CBC does not regulate

RCS’s rides, concessions, and games (Cal Expo Mot. at 6), that

state law is preempted by federal law (id. at 8), and that state

law requiring greater access to RCS’s rides, concessions, and

games is an undue burden on interstate commerce (id. at 9).

However, these arguments have already been addressed above. 

12

Code sections 11135 and 4450, the Disabled Rights Act, and the Unruh

Civil Rights Act is denied.5

Cal Expo notes that “[California Health and Safety Code

section 19955] requires that public accommodations in California

conform with [California Government Code section 4450].” Since Cal

Expo’s motion for summary judgment has been denied on Plaintiffs’

section 4450 claim, summary judgment is also denied on Plaintiffs’

California Health and Safety Code section 19955 claim.

Cal Expo also seeks summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ third

claim for violation of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, which states:

“No . . . individual with a disability . . . shall . . . be subjected

to discrimination under any program or activity receiving [f]ederal

financial assistance . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). Cal Expo avers

that it is not a recipient of federal funds “in relation to the midway

area.” (Cal Expo’s Statement of Undisputed Facts at 4.) To show that

an entity “received federal financial assistance” for purposes of an

anti-discrimination statute, Plaintiffs need not show that federal

funds were spent directly on activities that discriminated against

Plaintiffs. See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Smith, 525 U.S.

459, 460 (1999). Since Cal Expo’s response does not unambiguously

declare that it receives no federal funds, its motion for summary

judgment on Plaintiffs’ third claim is denied.

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CONCLUSION

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ ADA

claims regarding RCS’s cable chases is granted, and Defendants’ motion

for summary judgment on all of Plaintiffs’ other claims is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 28, 2005

/s/ Garland E. Burrell, Jr.

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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