Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-02035/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-02035-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID SALGADO,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-01-2035 GEB DAD P

vs.

ROSEANNE CAMPBELL, et al.,

Respondents. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with an application for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges his 1999 conviction on

charges of petty theft with an enhancement for having served two prior prison terms. He seeks

relief on the grounds that: (1) he was denied the rights to due process and a speedy trial because

of the trial court’s failure to set a date for his preliminary hearing within time limits prescribed by

California law; and (2) the California Superior Court erred in denying his petition for writ of

habeas corpus. Upon careful consideration of the record and the applicable law, the undersigned

will recommend that petitioner’s application for habeas corpus relief be denied.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On November 17, 1998, a complaint was filed in the Sacramento County Superior

and Municipal Court charging petitioner with two counts of petty theft with a prior, in violation

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of California Penal Code § 666 and alleging that he had previously been convicted of a serious

felony bringing him within the provisions of California Penal Code §§ 667(b) - (I) and 1170.12. 

(Clerk’s Transcript on Appeal (CT) at 7-8.) On that same date petitioner made his initial

appearance and was arraigned. (Reporter’s Augmented Transcript on Appeal (ART) at 2.) At

that initial appearance, the following colloquy occurred between the presiding judge, petitioner, a

public defender and appointed counsel from the indigent criminal defense panel:

THE COURT: David Salgado.

THE DEFENDANT: That’s me.

THE COURT: You’re charged with petty theft with a prior

incarceration for theft in two counts alleged occurred between

November 12, 1998, and November 15, 1998. It’s also alleged you

have prior convictions – or a prior conviction from August 24,

1988, that is for burglary in the first degree out of Yolo. That’s a

serious felony strike within the meaning of Penal Code Section

667(b) through (I) and 1170.12.

You’re entitled to an attorney on this. Can you afford to hire an

attorney?

THE DEFENDANT: No, I can’t.

THE COURT: All right. Public Defender, conflict for you on

Monday?

MR. ARKELIAN: Yes, please.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Long.

MR. ARKELIAN: Overload.

MR. LONG: Yes, your Honor. I acknowledge receipt of the

complaint in Mr. Salgado’s case and acknowledge receipt and have

advised him of his constitutional rights.

Next court date will be?

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1

 As is made clear by this exchange, Mr. Arkelian is a deputy public defender who

declined to accept appointment due to work overload. As indicated in the minutes, Mr. Long was

a member of the Sacramento County Indigent Criminal Defense Panel (“ICDP”) who accepted

appointment of the panel on petitioner’s behalf. (See CT at 1.)

2

 It appears from subsequent court proceedings that defense counsel was referring to a

motion to dismiss on the grounds that the preliminary hearing had not been set within ten days of

petitioner’s entry of plea, as required by California law.

3

 Petitioner’s preliminary examination was continued one day to December 18, 1998 due

to the unavailability of witnesses. (CT at 2; ART at 8-9.) 

3

THE COURT: November 30th at 8:30 in this department. And he

has a parole hold.

(Id. at 1-2.)1 

The court minutes reflect that the November 30, 1998 hearing was for further

proceedings (“F/P”). (CT at 1.) On November 30, 1998 the case was set for Superior Court

Review (“SCR”) on December 7, 1998. (Id.) The record does not reflect the entry of any plea

by petitioner at these first two appearances. Rather, on December 7, 1998, petitioner entered a

plea of not guilty and a date was set for the preliminary hearing within ten days thereafter on

December 17, 1998. (CT at 1; ART at 3.) Immediately after entering the plea, petitioner’s

counsel informed the court that petitioner believed he had previously entered a plea of not guilty

to the charges at the November 17, 1998 arraignment and had asked counsel to “file a motion

with respect to that matter.” (Id. at 4.)2 At a subsequent court hearing on December 17, 1998,

defense counsel moved to dismiss the charges against petitioner “on the grounds that [defense

counsel] stated before on the record.” (Id. at 8.) The trial court denied the motion to dismiss,

finding that petitioner had not entered a guilty plea at his arraignment on November 17, 1998 and

that the preliminary hearing had been properly set within ten days of the entry of petitioner’s

plea on December 7, 1998. (Id.)

3

 At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing on December 18,

1998, petitioner was held to answer on all charges, the complaint was deemed by the court to be 

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an information and petitioner was arraigned on the information after refusing to waive

arraignment. (CT at 7, 11, 34-36.) 

On February 9, 1999, an amended information was filed in the Sacramento

County Superior Court charging petitioner with two counts of petty theft with a prior, in violation

of California Penal Code § 666. (Clerk’s Transcript on Appeal (CT) at 39-41.) It was also

alleged at that time that petitioner had previously suffered a prior dangerous or serious felony

conviction, within the meaning of California Penal Code §§ 667(b) - (I) and 1170.12; and had

served two prior prison terms, within the meaning of California Penal Code § 667.5(b). (Id.) 

Jury trial commenced the following day, February 10, 1999. (Reporter’s Transcript on Appeal

(RT) at 1.) On February 17, 1999, the jury found petitioner’s not guilty of the petty theft charged

in count one of the information but found him guilty of the petty theft charged in count two. (CT

at 131-32.) Petitioner waived jury trial on the prior conviction allegations and the court found

those allegations true. (Id. at 134-35.) On March 26, 1999, petitioner was sentenced to a term of

six years in state prison. (RT at 233-34.) 

On October 21, 1999, petitioner filed an opening brief on appeal, in which he

argued that the trial court committed prejudicial error when it allowed the jury to view an

unredacted version of a California pattern jury instruction and when it refused petitioner’s

proposed jury instruction on the meaning of the phrase “burden of proof.” (Answer, Exs. A, D.) 

Petitioner’s judgment of conviction was affirmed by the California Court of Appeal in a decision

dated June 6, 2000. (Answer, Ex. D.) On approximately July 5, 2000, petitioner filed a petition

for review in the California Supreme Court. (Answer, Ex. E.) That petition was summarily

denied by order dated August 16, 2000. (Answer, Ex. F.) 

On March 27, 2001, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

California Superior Court. (Answer, Ex. G.) Therein, he alleged that he was denied the right to a

speedy trial when the state trial court failed to allow him to enter a plea at his initial appearance

and failed to set a date for the preliminary hearing within ten days of that appearance. (Id.) 

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4

 The following summary is drawn from the June 2, 2000 opinion by the California Court

of Appeal for the Third Appellate District (hereinafter Opinion), at pgs. 2-3, filed on January 31,

2002 as Ex. D to the answer.

5

Petitioner also claimed that “ineffectiveness of counsel” prevented him from entering a plea at

the November 17, 1998 arraignment. (Id.) That petition was denied in a reasoned decision dated

April 19, 2001. (Answer, Ex. H.) On May 1, 2001, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas

corpus in the California Court of Appeal, claiming that he was denied the right to a speedy trial

and that the Superior Court erred in denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. (Answer,

Ex. I.) That petition was summarily denied by order dated May 4, 2001. (Answer, Ex. J.) On

May 29, 2001, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme

Court raising the same claims. (Answer, Ex. K.) That petition was denied on September 26,

2001, with a citation to In re Dixon, 41 Cal. 2d 756 (1953.) (Answer, Ex. L.) Petitioner filed a

petition for writ of habeas corpus in this court on November 2, 2001. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND4

On November 12, 1998, a security guard at the Downtown Plaza

Macy’s watching a surveillance monitor saw the defendant in the

men’s furnishings department. The defendant chose two belts and

three pairs of gloves. He then went down the escalator to the

parking garage without paying for the items. Although the security

guard and a colleague both attempted to follow the defendant,

neither could find him in the garage. The jury acquitted the

defendant on this count.

On November 15, the security guard was again watching a

surveillance monitor and saw the defendant enter the store. The

defendant walked to the same area of the men’s furnishings

department. He quickly selected three pairs of gloves and headed

for the escalator to the parking garage. When the security guard

saw on another monitor that the defendant was heading to the

lower level of the garage, he took the elevator with his partner to

intercept him. When they got to the garage, his partner started to

run around the corner, yelling that the defendant was running. The

two followed him out to L Street. The security guard could see the

defendant was still holding the merchandise in his hand. The

defendant ran into the west parking garage, and the Macy’s security

guards lost sight of him.

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In the meantime, a Downtown Plaza security guard alerted to a

report of a fleeing shoplifter spied the defendant standing in ivy

between two parking levels holding gloves with sales tags attached. 

The defendant saw him and fled. When the Downtown Plaza

security guard finally was able to catch him, the defendant no

longer had the gloves on his person; the guard had not noticed him

discarding them during the pursuit. The Macy’s security guards

came upon the scene within seconds and handcuffed the defendant. 

The Downtown Plaza guard found three pairs of gloves with

Macy’s sales tags under a car along the defendant’s escape route.

ANALYSIS

I. Standards of Review Applicable to Habeas Corpus Claims

A writ of habeas corpus is available under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 only on the basis of

some transgression of federal law binding on the state courts. See Peltier v. Wright, 15 F.3d 860,

861 (9th Cir. 1993); Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Engle v.

Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 119 (1982)). A federal writ is not available for alleged error in the

interpretation or application of state law. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991);

Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000); Middleton, 768 F.2d at 1085. 

However, a “claim of error based upon a right not specifically guaranteed by the

Constitution may nonetheless form a ground for federal habeas corpus relief where its impact so

infects the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates the defendant’s right to due process.” 

Hines v. Enomoto, 658 F.2d 667, 673 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Quigg v. Crist, 616 F.2d 1107 (9th

Cir. 1980)). See also Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941); Henry v. Kernan, 197

F.3d 1021, 1031 (9th Cir. 1999). In order to raise such a claim in a federal habeas corpus

petition, the “error alleged must have resulted in a complete miscarriage of justice.” Hill v.

United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962). See also Henry, 197 F.3d at 1031; Crisafi v. Oliver,

396 F.2d 293, 294-95 (9th Cir. 1968). Habeas corpus cannot be utilized to try state issues de

novo. Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 377 (1972). 

Because this action was filed after April 26, 1996, the provisions of the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) are applicable. See Lindh v.

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 Although petitioner frames his arguments as two separate claims, for analytical

purposes they comprise only one claim and will be addressed accordingly. 

7

Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997); Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2003).

Section 2254(d) as amended by the AEDPA, sets forth the following standards for granting

habeas corpus relief:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall

not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on

the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the

claim -

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See also Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792-93 (2001); Williams v. 

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000); Lockhart v. Terhune, 250 F.3d 1223, 1229 (9th Cir. 2001).

II. Petitioner’s Claims5

Petitioner first argues that the trial court’s failure to allow him to enter a plea at

his November 17, 1998, arraignment and the court’s failure to set a date for the preliminary

hearing within ten days of that arraignment violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial,

his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and his rights pursuant to California Penal Code

§§ 859a and 859b. Petitioner also contends that he failed to enter a plea at his initial appearance 

“due to effective [sic] assistance of counsel.” (Pet. at 5.) In his second “claim,” petitioner

contends that the California Superior Court’s rejection of his speedy trial/ineffective assistance

claim violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process because it was based on an

incorrect factual finding.

As described above, the California Superior Court provided the only reasoned

decision with respect to petitioner’s claim in this regard and, accordingly, that opinion provides

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the basis for the state court judgment. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Petitioner’s claim presented to the Superior Court in his state petition for writ of habeas corpus

was addressed and rejected by that court as follows:

Petitioner claims that due to “ineffective assistance of counsel,” the

court denied him due process and speedy trial rights and his rights

under Penal Code § 859, in “fail[ing] to allow petitioner to enter a

plea in accordance with the mandatory language of § 859, and to

set preliminary hearing within ten (10) days pursuant to P.C. §

859(b),” during his arraignment before Judge Marlette on

November 17, 1998. Petitioner claims that “ineffectiveness of

counsel” deprived him of the right to enter his plea on that date.

Petitioner, however, fails to recognize that he could not have

entered a plea on November 17, 1998, even if he had asked the

court if he could do so, which he did not, because the public

defender who was present at the hearing declared a conflict and

could not represent petitioner in the case. As such, petitioner was

without counsel, and could not enter a plea until counsel had been

obtained (see Penal Code §§ 859, 859a).

Penal Code § 859b provides that the preliminary hearing must be

held within 10 court days of the date on which the defendant is

arraigned or on which the defendant enters a plea, whichever is

later. The court file and the reporter’s transcripts that petitioner

has attached to this petition indicate that petitioner did not enter a

plea at the initial November 17, 1998 arraignment, and instead

entered a plea on December 7, 1998. Therefore, the 10-court-day

time period of Penal Code § 859b did not begin to run until

December 7, 1998. As petitioner’s preliminary hearing took place

on December 18, 1998, it was timely held.

Petitioner has failed to state a prima facie claim for relief (In re

Bower (1985) 38 Cal.3d 865.) He did not attempt to enter a plea

on November 17, 1998, and he could not have entered a plea even

if he had asked to do so because he was not represented by counsel

at that time. For this reason, the petition is denied.

(Answer, Ex. H at 1.)

Petitioner argues that the Superior Court’s opinion is based on the incorrect

factual finding that he was not represented by counsel at the arraignment. He explains:

In the denial of the present habeas corpus the Court properly found

that petitioner was arraigned on November 17, 1998. The Court

also correctly states that the first counsel the court requested to

represent petitioner declined due to conflict of overload. However,

the Court has erred in finding petitioner was without counsel. As

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is plainly in the record, Mr. Arkelian declined to represent

petitioner and the court immediately accepted Mr. Long as

appointed counsel, who acknowledged receipt of the complaint and

declared that petitioner had been advised of his constitutional

rights. At that time petitioner was attempting to plead guilty in

hopes of obtaining a lessor [sic] sentence. However, in the Court’s

egerness [sic], the Court set a preliminary hearing date for

November 30, at 8:30, foreclosing any attempt by petitioner to

enter a plea and to gain a more favorable sentence, due to

ineffective assistance of counsel’s failure to object and seek a more

favorable sentence, denying petitioner due process of law and a

speedy trial process, prejudicing petitioner to suffer a greater

sentence.

(Pet. at 5.)

The transcript of petitioner’s arraignment reflects that although a public defender

(Mr. Arkelian) declared a conflict at the arraignment because of “overload,” an attorney from the

Indigent Criminal Defense Panel (Mr. Long) acknowledged receipt of the complaint in

petitioner’s case and stated that petitioner had been advised of his constitutional rights. (ART at

1-2.) It therefore appears that petitioner was, in fact, represented by counsel at his initial

appearance. Petitioner argues that the Superior Court’s erroneous conclusion that he was

unrepresented by counsel at his initial appearance invalidates the rejection of his claim by the

state courts. 

As discussed above, a writ of habeas corpus is not available for alleged error in

the application of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. at 67-68. Further, federal courts are

“bound by a state court’s construction of its own penal statutes.” Aponte v. Gomez, 993 F.2d

705, 707 (9th Cir. 1993). See also Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 840 (9th Cir. 1995). Thus,

state courts “are the ultimate expositors of state law,” and reviewing courts are “bound by the

state's construction except when it appears that its interpretation is an obvious subterfuge to

evade the consideration of a federal issue.” Peltier, 15 F.3d at 862 (quoting Mullaney v. Wilbur,

421 U.S. 684, 691 (1975) (construing state court judgment)). See also Melugin v. Hames, 38

F.3d 1478, 1482 (9th Cir. 1994) (Construing a state criminal statute challenged on constitutional

grounds and noting that “we accept a state court ruling on questions of state law.” ); Oxborrow v.

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 The state court record reflects that the complaint filed November 17, 1998, alleged only

one prior “strike” conviction and that the amended information filed February 9, 1999, well after

the preliminary examination and on the eve of trial, added the allegations that petitioner had

served two prior prison terms. (CT at 7, 39.)

10

Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1989) (deferring to state court on questions of state

law in construing a state criminal statute). There is no evidence of subterfuge in the opinion of

the California Superior Court denying petitioner state habeas relief. Accordingly, the state

court’s conclusion that there was no violation of state law under these circumstances is binding

on this court. As noted above, federal habeas corpus relief is unavailable to overturn this state

court decision on a claim involving only state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. at 67-68; Engle,

456 U.S. at 119. 

Petitioner also claims that the failure of the trial court to obtain his plea and set a

hearing within ten days of the arraignment violated his right to due process. In the petition,

petitioner claims that he was negotiating a plea agreement at the time of his arraignment and that

the two-week delay in setting a date for the preliminary hearing prevented the completion of such

an agreement and caused him to “suffer a greater sentence.” (Pet. at 5.) In his traverse,

petitioner argues that if he had been instructed by counsel to plead guilty at the arraignment, he

would have avoided a lengthier sentence because the information was not amended to allege his

two prior prison terms until after his initial appearance. (Traverse at 3.) Petitioner takes the

position that, “prejudice is the longer sentence stemming from the amended complaint, which

would not have occurred had petitioner been advised to plea [sic] guilty at arraignment.” (Id. at

5.)6

As also noted above, a claim based on a right not specifically guaranteed by the

Constitution may form a ground for federal habeas relief where its impact so infects the entire

criminal proceeding that the resulting conviction violates the defendant’s right to due process.

See Henry, 197 F.3d at 1031. Here, however, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the trial

court’s failure to enter his plea and set a date for his preliminary examination at the initial

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appearance resulted in a complete miscarriage of justice in this case. Even if petitioner was

attempting to negotiate a plea agreement, he has not demonstrated that an agreement was

imminent or even possible at the time of his initial appearance. In addition, petitioner or his

counsel could have continued the negotiations and/or consummated a plea agreement at any point

in these proceedings, including during the trial. In short, a two-week delay in setting his

preliminary hearing would have had no impact on petitioner’s ability to reach a plea agreement or

to plead guilty to all charges prior to that preliminary hearing. The additional argument set forth

in petitioner’s traverse that the failure of the court or defense counsel to enter a guilty plea on his

behalf at his initial appearance resulted in prejudice because the complaint against him at that

time did not include allegations of his two prior prison terms is equally unavailing. The

argument that the court or defense counsel should have induced petitioner to enter a guilty plea at

his November 17, 1998 arraignment on the chance that he might later be charged with having

suffered additional prior convictions, is based on pure speculation. Such a bare allegation does

not establish trial court error, ineffective assistance of counsel or prejudice. 

It must be noted that the amended information charging the additional

enhancement was not filed until the eve of trial on February 9, 1999. Petitioner could have pled

guilty to the original charges set forth in the information at any time prior to that date. Again, the

two-week delay in setting and holding the preliminary hearing had no impact on petitioner’s

ability to plead guilty before the amended information was filed months later. 

Respondent essentially concedes that the decision of the California Superior Court

rejecting petitioner’s claim appears to be based, in part, on the inaccurate belief that petitioner

was not represented by counsel at the arraignment. (Answer at 10.) Nonetheless, the state

court’s apparent oversight in this regard is irrelevant to the ultimate determination of whether

petitioner’s due process rights were violated. In this vein, whether or not petitioner was

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7

 Petitioner does not appear to be making a separate claim of ineffective assistance of

trial counsel. However, to the extent he is making such a claim, relief should be denied. In order

to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, petitioner must show that, considering all the

circumstances, counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688 (1984). There is no indication in the state court record

that petitioner’s counsel failed to exercise acceptable professional judgment in his plea

negotiations, his failure to enter petitioner’s plea at his initial appearance, or in any other

particular. There is no indication that defense counsel knew at the arraignment that petitioner

had suffered additional prior convictions that were, as yet, uncharged, or that there was any other

reason a plea should have been entered on the day of the arraignment. On the contrary, it appears

from the record that the attorney from the Indigent Criminal Defense Panel had little or no time

to familiarize himself with petitioner’s case at the time of his appointment. Under such

circumstances a hasty attempt to enter a guilty plea to all charges would likely have constituted

ineffective assistance counsel. 

12

represented by counsel at the arraignment, the two-week delay in setting and holding the

preliminary hearing was clearly not prejudicial under the circumstances of this case.7 

Petitioner has also failed to demonstrate that the opinion of the California Court of

Appeal denying his Sixth Amendment speedy trial claim is contrary to or an unreasonable

application of clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The Sixth

Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a

speedy and public trial . . ." U.S. Const., Amend. VI. In assessing this claim, the court must

weigh four factors: “whether delay before trial was uncommonly long, whether the government

or the criminal defendant is more to blame for that delay, whether, in due course, the defendant

asserted his right to a speedy trial, and whether he suffered prejudice as the delay's result.” 

Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651 (1992) (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530

(1972)); McNeely v. Blanas, 336 F.3d 822, 826 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Valentine, 783

F.2d 1413, 1417 (9th Cir. 1986). As discussed above, petitioner has not demonstrated that an

“uncommonly long” delay in this case, for which the government was to blame, resulted in

prejudice. Petitioner first appeared on these charges on November 17, 1998. A preliminary

hearing was held on December 18, 1998. Petitioner’s trial commenced on February 10, 1999. 

Thus, there was no delay of any kind in bringing petitioner to trial. Petitioner’s actual claim is

that he should have had a not guilty plea entered on his behalf at his initial appearance so that he

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 In the traverse, petitioner argues that the record in support of his claims is

“underdeveloped” because the state courts failed to appoint counsel or conduct an evidentiary

hearing. (Traverse at 3.) He requests that, “if the record is incomplete,” an evidentiary hearing

on his claims be held in this court. (Id. at 4.) Petitioner’s belated request in this regard is

inappropriately raised in the traverse and should be denied on that basis. Cacoperdo, 37 F.3d at

507.) In addition, petitioner fails to explain why an evidentiary hearing is necessary in this case

or to demonstrate that he is entitled to such a hearing. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). Accordingly,

petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing should be denied.

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could have argued that his was denied his right to a prompt preliminary examination under state

law or that he should have had a guilty plea entered on his behalf at that initial appearance so that

he could have avoided the increased penalties that the amended information filed on the eve of

trial carried. Of course, petitioner has not cited, nor has this court found, any authority for the

proposition that the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial is violated by a state trial court’s

failure to enter a plea on behalf of a criminal defendant and the initial appearance or to set a date

for the preliminary hearing within ten days thereafter. See Stevenson v. Lewis, 384 F.3d 1069,

1071 (9th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his Sixth

Amendment speedy trial claim.8

Finally, in his traverse, petitioner complains for the first time that his counsel

“failed to discuss with petitioner the proper way to proceed with this case, that petitioner had a

right to plea, that the court had a duty to ask petitioner what his plea would be, or that petitioner

should enter a plead [sic] of guilty at this time in order to avoid a harsher sentence.” (Traverse at

6.) To the extent petitioner is attempting to belatedly raise new claims of ineffective assistance

in this manner, they are conclusory and improperly raised and relief should be denied on that

basis. See Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 204 (1995); Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504,

507 (9th Cir. 1994) (a traverse is not the proper pleading to raise additional grounds for relief). 

In any event, as indicated above, petitioner’s unsupported allegations in this regard are

insufficient to show either substandard performance or prejudice. 

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s

application for a writ of habeas corpus be denied.

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These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: April 18, 2005.

DAD:8

salgado2035.hc

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