Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_08-cv-00340/USCOURTS-alsd-1_08-cv-00340-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000rt Job Discrimination/Retaliation

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[1] 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

SOUTHERN DIVISION 

SHELTON M. FRYE, ) 

 ) 

Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

v. ) CIVIL ACTION 08-0340-WS-N 

 ) 

ESCAMBIA COUNTY BOARD OF ) 

EDUCATION, et al., ) 

 ) 

Defendants. ) 

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the parties’ competing motions for summary 

judgment. (Docs. 57, 64). The parties have submitted briefs and evidentiary materials in 

support of their respective positions, (Docs. 58-63, 65, 69-75), and the motions are ripe 

for resolution. After carefully considering the foregoing and other relevant material in 

the file, the Court concludes that the defendants’ motion is due to be granted in part and 

denied in part and that the plaintiff’s motion is due to be denied. 

BACKGROUND 

 The plaintiff, a black male, sought a number of positions within the Escambia 

County school system, obtaining none of them. He sues the Escambia County Board of 

Education (“the Board”), superintendent William Hines, assistant superintendent Mary 

Beth Powell, human resource director/EEOC supervisor Mona Simmons, and Rachel 

Patterson Elementary School principal Susan McKenzie. 

 The third amended complaint alleges that the plaintiff was denied the following 

positions: 

 October 2006 Resource teacher/ Rachel Patterson Elementary 

 Assistant principal 

 August 2007 Assistant principal Escambia County High School 

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[2] 

 Fall 2007 Assistant principal Rachel Patterson Elementary 

 June 2008 Assistant principal Rachel Patterson Elementary 

 June 2008 Assistant principal Escambia County High School 

(Doc. 24 at 3-5).1 The third amended complaint continues that the plaintiff filed an 

internal complaint of discrimination in November 2007 and an EEOC charge of 

discrimination in January 2008. (Id. at 4). The third amended complaint alleges that 

each of the defendants engaged in race discrimination and retaliation in violation of 42 

U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 and that the Board also engaged in race discrimination and 

retaliation in violation of Title VII. (Id. at 6-7). 

DETERMINATIONS OF UNCONTROVERTED FACT 

 The plaintiff is black. He applied for the position of resource teacher at Rachel 

Patterson Elementary School in October 2006. McKenzie conducted the interviews and 

made the recommendation for hire. McKenzie recommended Ann Stephens, a white 

female. McKenzie recommended the hiring of Stephens because she wanted to improve 

the school’s math scores, and Stephens had been a math teacher while the plaintiff had 

not. McKenzie also relied on reports that the plaintiff had backed out of a teaching 

commitment at the last minute. 

 In the fall of 2007, Stephens obtained another position. McKenzie decided to 

convert the vacant position to a kindergarten position, in response to changing 

demographics, and she received permission from Hines to do so. There was no position 

of resource teacher during the 2007-2008 school year, and the position was not advertised 

or filled during that school year, and the plaintiff did not apply for it. McKenzie used 

three classroom teachers to assist in the office periodically, in addition to their classroom 

duties and without additional compensation. 

 1

 A number of other employment decisions are discussed in the defendants’ brief after 

having been addressed in the plaintiff’s deposition. Because these employment decisions are not 

made part of the third amended complaint and have not otherwise been made a part of this 

lawsuit, they will not be discussed herein. 

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[3] 

 In June 2008, the plaintiff applied for the position of assistant principal at Rachel 

Patterson. The position was filled by Dr. Auty Horn, like the plaintiff a black male. 

McKenzie recommended that Dr. Horn be hired based on his experience as an assistant 

principal and his work with the State Department of Education. 

 In June 2008, the plaintiff applied for the position of assistant principal at 

Escambia County High School. Principal Harvey Means did not interview the plaintiff 

but recommended David Lanier, a white male, for the position. Means did not know that 

the plaintiff had filed an internal complaint in November 2007 and an EEOC charge in 

January 2008. 

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 

 The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ''

1331 and 1343(a)(3) and 42 U.S.C. ' 2000e-5(f)(3). Venue is proper in this Court 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 1391(b)(2) and 42 U.S.C. ' 2000e-5(f)(3). 

 Summary judgment should be granted only if Athere is no issue as to any material 

fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.@ Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(c). The party seeking summary judgment bears Athe initial burden to show the district 

court, by reference to materials on file, that there are no genuine issues of material fact 

that should be decided at trial.@ Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 

1991). AIf the party moving for summary judgment fails to discharge the initial burden, 

then the motion must be denied and the court need not consider what, if any, showing the 

non-movant has made. [citation omitted] If, however, the movant carries the initial 

summary judgment burden ..., the responsibility then devolves upon the non-movant to 

show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.@ Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 

F.3d 1112, 1116 (11th Cir. 1993). AIf the nonmoving party fails to make >a sufficient 

showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of 

proof,= the moving party is entitled to summary judgment.@ Clark, 929 F.2d at 608 

(quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986)) (footnote omitted). 

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[4] 

AWhen the moving party has the burden of proof at trial, that party must show 

affirmatively the absence of a genuine issue of material fact: it must support its motion 

with credible evidence ... that would entitle it to a directed verdict if not controverted at 

trial. [citation omitted] In other words, the moving party must show that, on all the 

essential elements of its case on which it bears the burden of proof, no reasonable jury 

could find for the nonmoving party.@ United States v. Four Parcels of Real Property, 941 

F.2d 1428, 1438 (11th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (emphasis in original); accord Fitzpatrick, 2 

F.3d at 1115. 

 In deciding a motion for summary judgment, “[t]he evidence, and all reasonable 

inferences, must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant ....” 

McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003). 

AThere is no burden upon the district court to distill every potential argument that 

could be made based upon the materials before it on summary judgment.@ Resolution 

Trust Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599 (11th Cir. 1995). Accordingly, the 

Court=s review is limited to those legal arguments the parties have expressly advanced. 

 Both the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and his brief in opposition to 

the defendants’ motion for summary judgment focus exclusively on his June 2008 

application for the position of assistant principal at Escambia County High School. The 

defendants conclude that the plaintiff has thereby “abandoned” his claims as to all other 

applications and that he has similarly abandoned his claims against McKenzie, Powell 

and Hines, whom he does not mention in his briefs. (Doc. 74 at 1).2

 

 Because Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) specifies that summary judgment 

may be entered only when the record evidence shows that there is no genuine issue of 

material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, “the district 

court cannot base the entry of summary judgment on the mere fact that the motion was 

unopposed but, rather, must consider the merits of the motion.” United States v. One 

 2

 In fact, Hines is mentioned repeatedly. (Doc. 72 at 14; Doc. 73 at 2, 14). 

Case 1:08-cv-00340-WS-N Document 79 Filed 07/08/10 Page 4 of 21
[5] 

Piece of Real Property, 363 F.3d 1099, 1101 (11th Cir. 2004). The quoted statement 

constitutes a holding. Reese v. Herbert, 527 F.3d 1253, 1269 (11th Cir. 2008). This rule 

does not allow a district court to enter summary judgment in favor of a defendant as to 

any claim presented in the third amended complaint merely because the plaintiff has not 

opposed the motion for summary judgment as to that claim or that defendant. 

 On the other hand, the Court’s review when the plaintiff does not respond to a 

motion for summary judgment is less searching than when he does respond. “The district 

court need not sua sponte review all of the evidentiary materials on file at the time the 

motion is granted, but must ensure that the motion itself is supported by evidentiary 

materials. [citation omitted] At the least, the district court must review all of the 

evidentiary materials submitted in support of the motion for summary judgment.” One 

Piece of Real Property, 363 F.3d at 1101. Should this review reveal a defendant’s 

entitlement to summary judgment as to any particular claim, under Dunmar the Court 

will not consider any legal or factual arguments the plaintiff could have, but has not, 

asserted in opposition. 

I. Discrimination. 

 Because the plaintiff does not rely on direct evidence of discrimination, the 

shifting burden appropriate for cases resting on circumstantial evidence applies. In Title 

VII cases alleging discrimination, the burden is first on the plaintiff to establish a prima 

facie case. If he succeeds, the employer must meet its burden of producing evidence of 

one or more legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the adverse employment action. 

The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the employer=s proffered reasons 

are a mere pretext for illegal discrimination. E.g., Scott v. Suncoast Beverage Sales, Ltd., 

295 F.3d 1223, 1228 (11th Cir. 2002). Section 1981 carries the same proof requirements 

and same analytical framework. Standard v. A.B.E.L. Services, Inc., 161 F.3d 1318, 1330 

(11th Cir. 1998). 

 The plaintiff frames his claims as being for failure to promote. The defendants 

deny the plaintiff was ever employed and describe the claims as being for failure to hire. 

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[6] 

Because neither directs the Court to any evidence, or provides any argument, as to 

whether the plaintiff was or was not employed in the Escambia County school system, 

the Court assesses the existence of a prima facie case for both sorts of claim. 

 The plaintiff identifies the elements of a prima facie case of discriminatory failure 

to promote as follows: (1) the plaintiff is a member of a protected group; (2) he applied 

for a position for which he was qualified; (3) he was rejected despite his qualifications; 

and (4) the position was filled by one outside the plaintiff’s protected group and with 

lesser or equal qualifications. (Doc. 62 at 3; Doc. 72 at 5). The defendants agree with 

this statement of the elements. (Doc. 59 at 16-17).3

 The defendants identify the elements of a prima facie case of discriminatory 

failure to hire as follows: (1) the plaintiff is a member of a protected group; (2) he 

applied for a position for which the defendant was accepting applications; (3) despite his 

qualifications he was not hired; and (4) after his rejection, the position remained open or 

was filled by someone outside his protected class. (Doc. 59 at 17). The plaintiff 

expresses no disagreement with this rendition of the prima facie case. 

The defendant=s burden is usually described as one of articulating a reason Afor the 

adverse employment action.@ E.g., Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 976 (11th Cir. 

2008). To meet its burden, the defendant must articulate a reason Alegally sufficient@ to 

justify judgment in its favor and must support the articulated reason Athrough the 

introduction of admissible evidence.@ Texas Department of Community Affairs v. 

Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 (1981). AMoreover, this Court has squarely held that an 

employer may not satisfy its burden of production by offering a justification which the 

employer either did not know or did not consider at the time the decision was made.@ 

 3

 It appears the plaintiff may have accepted a more onerous burden than necessary. He 

relies for his statement of the prima facie case on Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079, 

1089 (11th Cir. 2004), but in 1998 the Eleventh Circuit ruled that cases requiring a plaintiff to 

address relative qualifications at the prima facie case stage could not be good law under the 

prior-panel-precedent rule, since the earliest articulation of the prima facie case contained no 

such requirement. Walker v. Wortham, 158 F.3d 1177, 1186-93 (11th Cir. 1998). 

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Turnes v. AmSouth Bank, 36 F.3d 1057, 1061 (11th Cir. 1994). Rather, the defendant 

Amust present specific evidence regarding the decision-maker=s actual motivations with 

regard to each challenged employment decision.@ Walker v. Mortham, 158 F.3d 1177, 

1181 n.8 (11th Cir. 1998). 

 “The inquiry into pretext requires the court to determine, in view of all the 

evidence, whether the plaintiff has cast sufficient doubt on the defendant’s proffered 

nondiscriminatory reasons to permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the 

employer’s proffered legitimate reasons were not what actually motivated its conduct” 

but “were a pretext for discrimination.” Crawford, 529 F.3d at 976 (internal quotes 

omitted). The plaintiff’s burden is to “demonstrate weaknesses or implausibilities in the 

proffered legitimate reason so as to permit a rational jury to conclude that the explanation 

given was not the real reason, or that the reason stated was insufficient to warrant the 

adverse action.” Rioux v. City of Atlanta, 520 F.3d 1269, 1279 (11th Cir. 2008); accord 

Cooper v. Southern Co., 390 F.3d 695, 725 (11th Cir. 2004). Of course, “a reason is not 

pretext for discrimination unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and that 

discrimination was the real reason.” Springer v. Convergys Customer Management 

Group Inc., 509 F.3d 1344, 1349 (11th Cir. 2007) (emphasis in original) (internal quotes 

omitted). To make this showing, the plaintiff may resort to “all the evidence,” Crawford, 

529 F.3d at 976, including “the evidence establishing the plaintiff’s prima facie case and 

inferences properly drawn therefrom.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 

530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000). 

 A. October 2006.

 According to the third amended complaint, the plaintiff applied for the position of 

resource teacher/assistant principal at Rachel Patterson Elementary, but the position was 

awarded to Ann Stephens, a white female. (Doc. 24 at 3).4

 

 4

 The plaintiff admitted in deposition that the position was that of resource teacher, not 

assistant principal. (Plaintiff Deposition at 55). 

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[8] 

 The plaintiff is black, the defendants concede he applied for the position, and they 

do not suggest he was unqualified to receive it. The plaintiff was not hired, and a white 

applicant was awarded the position. This establishes for present purposes a prima facie 

case of discriminatory failure to hire. Because the defendants do not assert that the 

plaintiff was less qualified than Stephens, there is also presented a prima facie case of 

discriminatory failure to promote under the formulation proposed by the plaintiff. 

 The defendants offer evidence of two reasons for the selection of Stephens over 

the plaintiff. First, McKenzie wanted to increase the school’s math scores, and Stephens 

had been a math teacher. Second, McKenzie had reservations about the plaintiff’s 

reliability, given a report from her predecessor of the plaintiff’s having backed out of a 

teaching commitment at Rachel Patterson at the last minute, leaving the principal in the 

lurch. (Doc. 10 at 4; McKenzie Affidavit at 2, 4). These are legally sufficient reasons for 

the plaintiff’s non-selection, and they are supported by admissible evidence. The burden 

thus shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact concerning 

pretext. 

 As noted, the plaintiff does not in his brief address this employment decision. 

However, he has filed as a separate document his response to the defendants’ proposed 

determinations of uncontroverted fact. (Doc. 73). The plaintiff therein admits that his 

only basis for claiming race discrimination in this decision is that, because he is black and 

Rachel Patterson’s student body is predominantly black, he had a “cultural advantage” 

over Stephens. (Id. at 6-7; Plaintiff Deposition at 60-61). Assuming without deciding 

that the plaintiff’s race was or should have been a factor favoring his selection, it does 

nothing to undermine the articulated reason that McKenzie desired a math teacher, which 

Stephens was, while the plaintiff had taught social studies for ten years. (Plaintiff 

Deposition at 25). Certainly the selection of a white person to a position in a largely 

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[9] 

black school cannot by itself raise an issue of pretext or race discrimination.5 The 

defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to this claim.6

 

 

B. August 2007. 

According to the third amended complaint, the plaintiff applied for the position of 

assistant principal at Escambia County High School, but the position was awarded to 

Stephens. (Doc. 24 at 3). The plaintiff in deposition disavowed any contention that he 

was denied this position because of his race. (Plaintiff Deposition at 76). The defendants 

are thus entitled to summary judgment as to this claim. 

C. Fall 2007. 

 According to the third amended complaint, once Stephens took the Escambia 

County job, the plaintiff “inquired about” the position at Rachel Patterson that she had 

vacated, which the plaintiff describes as that of assistant principal. The third amended 

complaint describes his inquiry as an “applica[tion]” for the position. The plaintiff was 

advised that the position was being closed for the balance of the school year, only to learn 

 5

 The plaintiff complains that he rejected a teaching position at the last minute only 

because it was offered at the last minute. He has no evidence, however, that McKenzie heard 

this version. At any rate, even had the plaintiff raised a fact issue as to this articulated reason for 

his non-selection, he has not done so with respect to McKenzie’s other stated reason for not 

hiring him, and that failure is fatal. “In order to avoid summary judgment, a plaintiff must 

produce sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to conclude that each of the employer’s 

proffered nondiscriminatory reasons is pretextual.” Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 

1037 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (emphasis added). Thus, “even if [the plaintiff] could discredit 

one of the reasons [the defendants] offered for not hiring him, it would still not establish pretext, 

because to do so, [the plaintiff] would have to establish that each of [the defendants’] reasons 

was pretextual.” Cooper, 390 F.3d at 730 (emphasis in original). 

6

 The Title VII aspect of this claim is invalid for the additional reason that it is timebarred. The plaintiff’s EEOC charge is dated February 21, 2008 and stamped as received by the 

EEOC on February 23, 2008. (Doc. 58, Exhibit 18). AA charge under this section shall be filed 

within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred ....@ 

42 U.S.C. ' 2000e-5(e)(1). AFailure to file a timely complaint with the EEOC mandates the 

dismissal of the Title VII suit.@ Wilson v. Bailey, 934 F.2d 301, 304 n.1 (11th Cir. 1991). 

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[10] 

that a white male was placed in the position in an acting capacity despite his lack of 

certification to handle administrative responsibilities. (Doc. 24 at 3-4). 

 The uncontroverted facts paint quite a different picture. First, the position was not 

assistant principal but resource teacher. (McKenzie Affidavit at 2). Second, when 

Stephens left, McKenzie decided that the vacant position could be better used for an 

additional kindergarten teacher than for a resource teacher. (Id. at 4). She received 

permission from Hines to use the position for a kindergarten teacher rather than for a 

resource teacher. (Id.). Thus, there was no position of resource teacher during the 2007-

2008 school year. (Id. at 2-3). The white male to whom the plaintiff refers was a 

classroom teacher who, along with two other teachers, assisted in the office on some days 

during non-instructional/resource periods without any additional compensation. (Id. at 

3). The position of resource teacher was not advertised or filled during the 2007-2008 

school year. (Id. at 5; McKenzie Deposition at 15-17). The plaintiff did not apply for the 

position. (Id. at 16). 

 Given the evidence, the plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of race 

discrimination. First, he has identified no evidence that he applied for the position. 

Second, he has identified no evidence that the employer was accepting applications. 

Third, because he did not apply and because the employer was not accepting applications, 

he was not rejected. Fourth, the position was not filled and did not remain open; instead, 

it was converted to a kindergarten slot. The defendants are entitled to summary judgment 

as to this claim. 

D. June 2008 – Rachel Patterson Elementary. 

 According to the third amended complaint, the plaintiff applied for the position of 

assistant principal in June 2008 but was not awarded the position. (Doc. 24 at 4). It is 

uncontroverted that this position was awarded to a black male. (McKenzie Affidavit at 

5). Because the position was filled by one within the plaintiff’s protected group, he 

cannot establish a prima facie case of race discrimination. The defendants are entitled to 

summary judgment as to this claim. 

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[11] 

E. June 2008 – Escambia County High School. 

 According to the third amended complaint, Stephens was promoted to a central 

office position, and the plaintiff applied for the vacant assistant principal position. The 

position was awarded to David Lanier, a white male, even though he did not possess the 

minimum qualification of a valid Alabama administrator’s license. The plaintiff was not 

interviewed for the position. (Doc. 24 at 4-5). 

 It is uncontroverted that the plaintiff applied for the position, that he was rejected, 

and that one outside his protected group received the position. The defendants do not 

contend that the plaintiff was unqualified for the position, so a prima facie case of 

discriminatory failure to hire is established for present purposes. There is some dispute 

as to whether Lanier was equally or more qualified, so the Court delays consideration of 

the plaintiff’s prima facie case of discriminatory failure to promote. 

 The defendants offer admissible evidence from principal Harvey Means, who 

interviewed the applicants and recommended Lanier’s hire, of legally sufficient 

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for not interviewing the plaintiff and for selecting 

Lanier over the plaintiff: (1) the plaintiff had no administrative experience; (2) the 

plaintiff had a break in his work history and had not held a full-time teaching job for a 

long period of time; (3) Lanier was already employed at the school as a counselor, which 

was an asset given that Means had been hired from outside the system only a few weeks 

before; (4) Lanier had experience in the high school setting, another asset given that 

Means was coming from a middle school position; and (5) Lanier was friendly and 

professional, and he articulated a clear vision of the school’s mission in meeting 

instructional goals and how he would assist in increasing test scores. (Means Affidavit 

at 2-3). The burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that these reasons are a 

pretext for race discrimination. 

1. Administrator’s license. 

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[12] 

 The plaintiff emphasizes that he held, and Lanier lacked, a valid Alabama 

administrator’s license. The notice of vacancy for the assistant principal position listed 

several “minimum qualifications” for the position, including a “[v]alid Alabama 

administrator’s license.” (Doc. 65, Exhibit A). The plaintiff argues that this shows 

pretext in two ways: (1) the defendants violated their own policy in awarding Lanier the 

position; and (2) the plaintiff was more qualified for the position. (Doc. 72 at 7-8). 

 There is evidence that the defendants have a policy of considering a valid 

certificate a minimum qualification for a teaching or administrative position, as a series 

of contracts entered between Lanier and the school system include the warning that “[i]t 

is illegal for the superintendent of education to sign a contract with any person who does 

not hold the appropriate valid certificate for his (her) position issued by the State 

Department of Education.” (Doc. 65, Exhibit E). The defendants do not deny they have 

such a policy. 

 There is also evidence that this policy extended to the June 2008 hiring of an 

assistant principal at Escambia County High School, since the notice of vacancy listed the 

holding of a valid administrator’s license as a minimum qualification for the position. 

 There is in addition evidence that the defendants violated this policy by hiring 

Lanier. Lanier applied for the position on June 25, 2008. He was interviewed by Means 

on June 26. The same day, Means recommended his hiring to Hines, Hines 

recommended his hiring to the Board, and the Board approved the hire. The hiring was 

effective July 28, 2008. At the time of his application, Lanier had completed his 

coursework for certification, but he had failed the written examination required for 

certification. Lanier took the examination again in July 2008. In October 2008, he was 

awarded an administrator’s license, which was made retroactive to July 28, 2008. There 

is thus evidence that Lanier did not have a valid Alabama administrator’s license on June 

25, June 26 or even July 28.7

 

 7

 The defendants admit Lanier was not certified in June 2008, but they argue this is 

irrelevant because Lanier was certified in July 2008, when his hiring became effective. The 

(Continued) 

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 “The bending of established rules may, of course, be suggestive of 

discrimination.” Walker v. Prudential P&C Insurance Co., 268 F.3d 1270, 1279 (11th

Cir. 2002). However, “[s]tanding alone, deviation from a company policy does not 

demonstrate discriminatory animus.” Mitchell v. USBI Co., 186 F.3d 1352, 1355-56 (11th

Cir. 1999). “To establish pretext, a plaintiff must show that the deviation from the policy 

occurred in a discriminatory manner.” Rojas v. Florida, 285 F.3d 1339, 1344 n.4 (11th

Cir. 2002). Thus, “inconsistent application of employment policies [may be] 

circumstantial evidence of discrimination.” Berg v. Florida Department of Labor and 

Employment Security, 163 F.3d 1251, 1255 (11th Cir. 1998) (emphasis added). 

 The defendants argue they have not inconsistently applied their policy of requiring 

state certification. In particular, they maintain that “[i]t has been the practice within the 

Escambia County school system to consider someone who has met the coursework 

requirements as certified for purposes of meeting the requirements of a job posting.” 

(Powell Affidavit at 2). That is, they assert that their uniform practice is to water down 

their stated policy from actual certification to potential future certification based on 

completed coursework. 

 To bolster this assertion, the defendants provide figures and examples, but these 

do not address the issue here. The defendants state that, in the past three school years the 

Board has “hired at least 50 employees whose certificate was not issued at the time they 

applied even though certification was listed as a minimum job requirement.” (Powell 

Affidavit at 3). For all that appears from this statement, these employees may have 

passed all requirements for certification (not just coursework) at the time of application, 

 

defendants’ position is inaccurate, because Lanier had no certification until October; that the 

license was made retroactive to July does not mean that Lanier in fact held a license in July. On 

the contrary, Lanier served as an administrator without a valid license from July until October. 

Moreover, the defendants’ sole case says only that the successful applicant’s failure to hold all 

minimum qualifications at the time of application is irrelevant to pretext when the applicant 

holds all such qualifications at the time the job is offered. Here, Lanier was offered the job one 

day after he applied, when he unquestionably did not hold a valid administrator’s license. 

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[14] 

such that the issuance of a certificate was guaranteed (not just possible). Similarly, for all 

that appears from this statement, the certificates may have been issued before the 

individuals were hired. The statement is thus unhelpful to the defendants’ position. 

 The defendants also list six specific employees (including three blacks) whose 

certificates were issued months after they were hired. (Powell Affidavit at 3-4). Again, 

however, the defendants do not provide information as to whether these employees had 

merely completed coursework when hired or had also completed all other requirements 

for certification, such that certification was inevitable though delayed for reasons 

unexplained. The examples thus do not strengthen the defendants’ position. 

 Even without supporting evidence, Powell’s statement that the defendants follow a 

practice of considering applicants as certified if they merely have completed their 

coursework for certification constitutes evidence that the defendants have not 

inconsistently applied their policy of requiring certification but have in practice 

consistently required only the completion of coursework. The plaintiff has identified no 

example of the defendant following a different practice on any occasion.8

 Instead, the plaintiff notes that the defendants, as their contracts make plain, were 

fully aware that it was “illegal” for them to hire applicants “who do[] not hold the 

appropriate valid certificate,” and he argues it is facially implausible that the defendants 

would repeatedly and deliberately break the law by hiring persons without the legally 

required certificates. 

 The plaintiff cites, and the Court has located, no case addressing such an 

argument. It may well be that, under appropriate circumstances, the tension between an 

employer’s claimed consistent practice and its contrary legal obligations would be 

sufficient to support a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the employer actually 

had such a practice or instead treated the plaintiff differently from others. But where, as 

 8

 The plaintiff notes that Lanier received a position in 2005 when the only other applicant 

was not certified. (Doc. 72 at 9; Doc. 65, Exhibit F). But the plaintiff has no evidence that the 

other applicant had completed his or her coursework for certification and so has not shown the 

defendants’ practice to have been inconsistently applied on that occasion. 

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here, the legal violation has not been shown to be a serious one, likely to be caught and 

likely to result in significant negative repercussions for the school system, the Court is 

unprepared to conclude that the nominal illegality of the claimed practice is sufficient of 

itself to create a fact issue as to whether the practice --- the existence of which is 

supported by sworn testimony --- in fact exists.9 The plaintiff has thus failed to provide 

evidence of an inconsistent application of policy, and he therefore cannot rely on an 

inconsistent application of policy as suggesting pretext.10 

 The preceding discussion answers the plaintiff’s challenge to relative 

qualifications. The plaintiff argues that, since he had an administrator’s license in June 

2008 and Lanier did not, only he satisfied the minimum qualifications for the position, 

and therefore he was more qualified than Lanier. (Doc. 75 at 4). Since, however, the 

defendants considered completion of coursework to satisfy the certification requirement, 

and since Lanier had completed his coursework, he satisfied the defendants’ minimum 

qualifications, evaporating the plaintiff’s argument. As the plaintiff acknowledges, “we 

focus on the employer’s requirements and do not second-guess the employer’s business 

judgment.’” (Doc. 72 at 7 (quoting Turner v. City of Auburn, 361 Fed. Appx. 62, 65 

(11th Cir. 2010)). It is uncontroverted that the defendants required only completion of 

coursework for certification, not actual certification, and the Court may not second-guess 

that business judgment. 

 9

 The plaintiff’s discussion of illegality is confined to the quoted material in Lanier’s 

contracts, with no reference to, or discussion of, any actual law, its enforcement, or its 

ramifications. 

10 The plaintiff believes that Powell’s sworn testimony is not uncontroverted because 

Means testified that he is “not sure” if the practice Powell described exists. (Doc. 72 at 10). 

Powell is the assistant superintendent while Means is but a principal, so it is unclear how his 

uncertainty or ignorance could draw her testimony into question. The plaintiff notes that Means 

was a 30(b)(6) representative, but he has not identified the topics as to which the deposition was 

noticed, and the Court cannot assume that Means was proffered to speak for the entity as to the 

content of its policies and practices concerning the relationship between certification and hiring. 

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2. Balance. 

 The plaintiff has produced evidence that Means told him in early June 2008 that 

Hines told Means he “wanted balance” at the school and that Lanier “was the man for the 

job.” (Doc. 73 at 14; Plaintiff Affidavit at 8; Plaintiff Deposition at 88-91). Because the 

principal (Means) and one assistant principal were both black, the plaintiff concludes that 

Hines was telling Means to select a white as the other assistant principal. 

 The defendants respond that Hines denies the statements and Means does not 

recall them, (Doc. 59 at 26), but these protestations do not eliminate a fact issue as to 

whether they were made. The defendants note that pre-selection of a candidate, as by 

Hines, is permissible unless based on race, (Doc. 74 at 9), but as discussed below the 

plaintiff has evidence of a race-based motivation. 

 The defendants argue that, since Means did not say “racial balance,” there can be 

no reasonable inference that Hines meant racial balance. (Doc. 74 at 13-15). The single 

case the defendants cite is wholly inapposite. While there may be times when the term 

“balance” is racially neutral, when it is used by a white superintendent to a black 

principal with a black assistant principal to describe how the other assistant principal slot 

--- just vacated by a white incumbent --- should be filled, and when a specific white 

individual is named by the superintendent as the appropriate candidate, there is more than 

enough evidence for a properly functioning jury to conclude that Hines was telling Means 

to select a white applicant for the position. It is notable that the defendants have 

suggested no alternative, racially neutral meaning that could have been intended by 

Hines’ alleged use of the term “balance.” 

 There is also evidence from which a properly functioning jury could conclude that 

Means complied with Hines’ direction and based his recommendation on racial grounds. 

Four persons applied for the position, and Means interviewed three of them --- all white. 

This procedure ensured that the successful candidate would be white even if not Lanier. 

Means says he did not interview the plaintiff because he had no administrative experience 

and because he had a gap in his work history, but a properly functioning jury could find 

these explanations to be pretextual. When asked by the EEOC why the plaintiff was not 

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considered for the position, the defendants listed neither of these reasons, (Doc. 75, 

Exhibit 1), which omission would allow a jury to conclude they were concocted after the 

fact. Moreover, the plaintiff asserts --- and the defendants do not challenge --- that 

Lanier also had no administrative experience, yet he was interviewed nonetheless. 

 The defendants do not deny that a direction to maintain racial balance would 

constitute evidence that the hiring decision was motivated at least in part by race. See, 

e.g., Taylor v. Board of Education, 240 Fed. Appx. 717, 720 (6th Cir. 2007) (a 

decisionmaker’s statement that a person was hired to maintain racial balance constituted 

direct evidence of discrimination); Doughtie v. Ashland, Inc., 2005 WL 1239286 at *7 

(W.D. Tenn. 2005) (similar). Viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, his 

evidence would allow a properly functioning jury to find that Hines instructed Means to 

select a white candidate to fill the second assistant principal position. The Court 

concludes that the plaintiff’s evidence concerning “balance” is sufficient on its own to 

“cast sufficient doubt on the defendant’s proffered nondiscriminatory reasons to permit a 

reasonable factfinder to conclude that the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons were 

not what actually motivated its conduct” but “were a pretext for discrimination.” 

Crawford, 529 F.3d at 976.11 

3. Defendants potentially liable. 

 The plaintiff has identified no evidence that Powell, Simmons or McKenzie were 

in any way involved in the hiring decision. As to them, summary judgment is 

appropriate. Means was not authorized to hire Lanier on his own; instead, he 

recommended to Hines that Lanier be hired. Hines, in turn, recommended to the Board 

that Lanier be hired, and the Board approved the hire. Hines and the Board are thus both 

potentially liable. 

 11 Because the plaintiff clearly survives summary judgment under the formulation of the 

prima facie case championed by the defendants for failure to hire, it is unnecessary for the Court 

to consider whether he can also establish a prima facie case (and thus survive summary 

judgment) under the alternate formulation he says is applicable to a failure to promote. 

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 The defendants suggest generally that Hines is entitled to qualified immunity. 

(Doc. 59 at 15-16). Under the plaintiff’s version of the evidence, Hines purposely 

discriminated against him on the basis of his race, and qualified immunity is not available 

under such circumstances. E.g., Alexander v. Fulton County, 207 F.3d 1303, 1321 (11th

Cir. 2000) (“[T]here can be no doubt that in December 1992 ... it was clearly established 

that intentional discrimination in the workplace on account of race violated federal 

law.”). The defendants, whose only argument concerning qualified immunity is that 

Hines did not discriminate, (Doc. 59 at 16, 25-27), make no argument that Hines could 

receive qualified immunity despite intentionally violating clearly established law 

prohibiting such discrimination. 

 The defendants argue the Board cannot be liable because the plaintiff cannot show 

an issue of fact as to pretext. (Doc. 59 at 29). As discussed above, he can and he has. 

The defendants recognize that entity liability can be based on a “cat’s paw” theory. (Doc. 

74 at 9). See, e.g., Crawford, 529 F.3d at 979 n.21 (“Under a ‘cat’s paw’ theory, a nondecisionmaking employee’s discriminatory animus may be imputed to a neutral 

decisionmaker when the decisionmaker has not independently investigated allegations of 

misconduct.”). They argue, however, that no such theory applies in this case, because it 

addresses only a discriminatory recommendation to a higher level person or group, and 

here the plaintiff says Hines directed Means, a lower-level employee, to select a white 

assistant principal. (Doc. 74 at 9-10). The defendants, however, admit that Hines 

recommended to the Board that it hire Lanier, and the Board hired him “[u]pon the 

recommendation” of Hines. (Doc. 69 at 3). According to the plaintiff’s evidence, then, 

Hines is the biased employee, he made a biased recommendation to the Board, and the 

Board hired Lanier based on that biased recommendation. That is a paradigmatic cat’s 

paw scenario. 

II. Retaliation. 

 The plaintiff’s retaliation claims are based on his filing of an internal complaint in 

November 2007 and an EEOC charge in January 2008. (Doc. 24 at 4). Because they 

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occurred before these events, the hiring decisions made in October 2006, August 2007 

and the fall of 2007 cannot be the subject of a retaliation claim. To the extent the third 

amended complaint asserts retaliation claims based on those hiring decisions, the 

defendants are entitled to summary judgment. 

 The same burden-shifting paradigm utilized in discrimination cases applies as well 

to cases alleging retaliation under Title VII. Sullivan v. National Railroad Passenger 

Corp., 170 F.3d 1056, 1059 (11th Cir. 1999). AA prima facie case of retaliation under 

Title VII requires the plaintiff to show that: (1) she engaged in an activity protected under 

Title VII; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) there was a causal 

connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.@ 

Crawford, 529 F.3d at 970. If the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, the defendant 

must produce evidence of legitimate reasons for the employment decision. If it does so, 

the plaintiff must show that these reasons are a pretext for prohibited retaliatory conduct. 

Sullivan, 170 F.3d at 1059. 

A. June 2008 – Rachel Patterson Elementary. 

 McKenzie interviewed applicants and made the recommendation that Dr. Auty 

Horn be hired. (Doc. 73 at 10). The plaintiff admits that McKenzie made her 

recommendation based on Dr. Horn’s experience as an assistant principal and his work 

with the State Department of Education, (id.), and he has identified no evidence that 

McKenzie’s decision was based on, or influenced by, his internal complaint or EEOC 

charge. McKenzie made her recommendation to Hines, who recommended Horn to the 

Board, which approved Horn’s hire. (McKenzie Affidavit, ¶ 12; Hines Affidavit, ¶ 22). 

The plaintiff has identified no evidence that either Hines or the Board infected the 

decision with retaliatory motive, and no evidence that Powell or Simmons had any 

connection to the employment decision. Accordingly, the defendants are entitled to 

summary judgment as to this claim. 

B. June 2008 – Escambia County High School. 

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 Because, as the defendants point out, the plaintiff has no evidence that Powell, 

Simmons or McKenzie had anything to do with this employment decision, they are 

entitled to summary judgment as to the plaintiff’s claim of retaliation. 

 As the defendants note, (Doc. 59 at 7), Means did not know that the plaintiff had 

filed an internal complaint or an EEOC charge. (Means Affidavit, ¶ 9).12 As they also 

note, (Doc. 59 at 29-30), “[t]o establish a causal connection, a plaintiff must show that 

the decisionmakers were aware of the protected conduct ....” Gupta v. Florida Board of 

Regents, 212 F.3d 571, 590 (11th Cir. 2000) (internal quotes omitted). Thus, the plaintiff 

cannot establish that the employment decision was infected by Means’ retaliatory motive. 

 As to Hines and the EEOC, the defendants do not contest the plaintiff’s ability to 

establish a prima facie case of retaliation. Instead, they rely on the legitimate reasons 

articulated in defense of the plaintiff’s discrimination claim and the plaintiff’s asserted 

inability to raise a fact issue as to whether these reasons are a pretext for illegal 

retaliation. (Doc. 59 at 27). As with discrimination, the plaintiff points to Lanier’s lack 

of an administrator’s license as demonstrating pretext. (Doc. 72 at 13-14). As discussed 

in Part I.E, the plaintiff has not supported a pretext argument based on this circumstance. 

 The plaintiff next argues that the defendants lied to the EEOC by telling it that he 

had been interviewed and that Lanier was a certified employee. (Doc. 72 at 12). The 

document on which the plaintiff relies, however, does not state that Lanier was certified 

as an administrator but only that he was a “full-time certificated employe[e] of the 

district” when he was interviewed. (Doc. 65, Exhibit G). This was a correct statement, 

as Lanier held a teaching certificate in June 2008. (Id., Exhibit D). While the document 

does state that “the charging party was one of the three applicants interviewed,” it also 

states that “[t]he racial and gender composition of the applicants were [sic] three white 

males,” all of them full-time employees, and that the plaintiff was not a full-time 

 12 The plaintiff insists he told Means “about the problems I was having in Escambia 

County.” (Doc. 73 at 12; Plaintiff Affidavit at 8). He does not, however, assert that he told 

Means he had filed a complaint or charge opposing unlawful race discrimination, as would be 

required to trigger protection under the plaintiff’s retaliation claims. 

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employee of the district. (Id., Exhibit G). The document thus clearly explained that the 

interviewees were white, full-time employees and that the plaintiff was black and not a 

full-time employee. No reasonable person reading the document could conclude that the 

plaintiff had been interviewed for the position. Any residual ambiguity in what the 

defendants told the EEOC does not translate into evidence that their articulated reasons 

for the employment decision are a pretext for retaliation. 

 Finally, the plaintiff again challenges the accuracy of Means’ stated reasons for 

not interviewing him. As noted in Part I.E, a jury could find that these were not Means’ 

true reasons, but the plaintiff has offered no evidence or explanation how a jury could 

find that Means’ true motive was retaliation. As noted above, it is uncontroverted that 

Means was unaware of the plaintiff’s allegedly protected conduct and thus could not have 

retaliated against him based on that conduct. 

CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons set forth above, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment is 

denied with respect to the plaintiff’s claim against Hines and the Board for race 

discrimination in the June 2008 selection of an assistant principal for Escambia County 

High School. The defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted in all other 

respects. The plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied. 

 

 DONE and ORDERED this 8th day of July, 2010. 

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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