Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-00366/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-00366-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DONALD GEORGE FLETCHER,

Petitioner, Case No. 2:03-cv-00366 ALA (HC)

vs.

SCOTT P. RAWERS, Warden, 

Respondent. ORDER

 /

On May 29, 2008, the parties were ordered to discuss the applicability, if any, of Spencer

v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1 (1998), and Zegarra-Gomez v. INS, 314 F.3d 1124, 1126 (9th Cir. 2003),

to the question of whether Petitioner’s application for habeas corpus is moot. 

In Spencer, the Supreme Court stated that

[o]nce the convict's sentence has expired . . . some concrete and continuing injury

other than the now-ended incarceration or parole -- some ‘collateral consequence’

of the conviction -- must exist if the suit is to be maintained . . . . In recent

decades, we have been willing to presume that a wrongful criminal conviction has

continuing collateral consequences (or, what is effectively the same, to count

collateral consequences that are remote and unlikely to occur).

523 U.S. at 7-8. In Zegarra-Gomez, the Ninth Circuit explained that Spencer “discuss[ed] the

case or controversy requirement in the criminal context” of challenging an expired sentence. 

314 F.3d at 1126. Pursuant to Zegarra-Gomez, Spencer requires that in order to challenge an

expired conviction, there must be some collateral consequence flowing from the conviction. 

Case 2:03-cv-00366-ALA Document 55 Filed 06/12/08 Page 1 of 2
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

2

Importantly, “these collateral consequences cannot be presumed.” Id.

Both parties addressed the applicability of Spencer, but ignored Zegarra-Gomez. Instead

of alleging specific collateral consequences, they both offered conclusory statements. See

Respondent’s Status Report on Mootness at 2 (“Petitioner is currently suffering from the

restrictions imposed by him upon parole.”); Petitioner’s Mootness and the Applicability of

Spencer v. Kemna Brief at 2 (alleging that because Petitioner “attacks the validity of his

underlying conviction, [he] satisfies the case or controversy requirement”). 

The parties have failed to provide the Court with any information regarding the

conditions of petitioner’s parole. The Court will not presume that a case or controversy exists. 

The parties must allege facts that establish Article III jurisdiction. 

THEREFORE, the parties are ordered to show cause by June 19, 2008, as to why this

case should not be dismissed on grounds of mootness, by way of simultaneous briefs consisting

of no more than seven pages. 

/////

DATED: June 12, 2008

/s/ Arthur Alarcón 

UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE

Sitting by Designation

Case 2:03-cv-00366-ALA Document 55 Filed 06/12/08 Page 2 of 2