Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05743/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05743-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 This information is derived from the petition for writ of habeas corpus and Respondent’s answer.

2

 As Respondent cites this Court too draws upon the records of all three cases related to and underlying

Petitioner’s claim, Tulare Superior Court No. 46103, 64966, 46009. Upon remand by the Court of Appeal, Tulare

Superior Court No. 46103 served as the prior conviction for an offense enumerated in California Penal Code section

666. All references to 1CT or 1RT are to the Clerk’s Transcript or Reporter’s Transcript in No. 64996; 2CT or 2RT

refers to the respective transcripts in No. 46009; any references to 3CT are to the Clerk’s Transcript in No. 46103. 

The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, took judicial notice of the record in Case No. 46103 in

Case No. F042623, Petitioner’s appeal after remand in Case No. 64996. (See Ex. M [Order].) References to

Supplemental 1CT (hereafter Supp. 1CT) refer to the bound volume of the Clerk’s Transcripts in Case No. 64996

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAUL RODRIGUEZ

Aka Martin Medina,

Petitioner,

v.

G.J. GIURBINO,

Respondent.

 /

CV F 04-5743 REC DLB HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

[Doc. 1]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY1

On March 7, 2001, in the Tulare County Superior Court, a jury convicted Petitioner of

petty theft, and found true the special allegation that he had suffered a conviction for a prior

serious felony within the meaning of California’s Three Strikes Law (Cal. Pen. Code §§ 667(b)-

(i), 1170.12). (1CT 116-117; 1RT 32, 49.)2

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(pages 120) for Petitioner’s second appeal, California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, No. F042623.

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 The term imposed in Case No. 46009 is subordinate to the term imposed in Case No. 64996. The court

had previously imposed and stayed execution of a two year prison term, therefore the aggravated term for felony

petty theft with a prior provided for a longer period of incarceration, thus became the base term. (See Cal. Pen. Code

§ 1170.1.) 

2

 On April 4, 2001, the trial court found that Petitioner had suffered the prior convictions

as alleged in the information as to the petty theft charge. On this date, the trial court held a

hearing on the issue of identity for the prior serious felony. (Respondent’s Exhibit G [Reporter’s

Transcript for April 4, 2001].) Petitioner was sentenced as follows: for the petty theft with a

prior in No. 64966, the aggravated term of three years, was doubled because of the prior strike

felony (1CT 122); for the first degree burglary in Case No. 46009, the court ordered that to run

consecutive and imposed one third of the middle term (see Cal. Pen. Code, § 1170.1)3 (1CT 122-

123; 2CT 141-143); the court terminated probation in No. 46103 (3CT 68.)

Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal with the California Court of Appeal, Fifth

Appellate District. The Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed Petitioner’s conviction, but

remanded the matter for retrial on the issue of whether Petitioner had suffered a prior conviction

for a crime enumerated in section 666 of the California Penal Code (petty theft with a prior

conviction). (Respondent’s Exhibit A, attached to Answer, Opinion in F037994.)

On or about December 20, 2002, Petitioner filed a petition for review with the California

Supreme Court. (Respondent’s Exhibit E, attached to Answer, Case No. F037994.) The petition

was denied on January 15, 2003. (Respondent’s Exhibit F, attached to Answer.) 

Upon return to the Superior Court for the County of Tulare, Petitioner was identified as

the person who suffered the prior conviction in Case No. 46103 for theft, a crime enumerated in

California Penal Code section 666, and for which he served time in a penal institution. 

(Respondent’s Exhibit P [RT of February 28, 2003].) The trial court re-sentenced Petitioner and

re-imposed the same seven year, four month term. (Supp 1CT 9-10.) Petitioner filed a timely

notice of appeal in Case Nos. 64996 and 46009. (Supp. 1CT 11; 2CT 151.) Petitioner’s counsel

on appeal briefed both matters in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1976), and

People v. Wende, 25 Cal.3d 436 (1979) (see Respondent’s Exh. H [Petitioner’s Brief Pursuant to

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 Petitioner’s Exhibit A, and Respondent’s Exhibit N, show that the California Supreme Court assigned

Case No. S123156 to Petitioner’s Petition from the Opinion of the Court of Appeal in Case No. F042623; however,

the California Supreme Court’s order denying the petition references the companion appeal in F042617. Although

this discrepancy may have been a clerical error, Respondent notes that Petitioner attached the Opinion of the Court

of Appeal in Case No. F042617. (See Respondent’s Exh. O [Denial, with register of action]; compare Petitioner

Exhibit A.) See Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 28.1(e) [no attachments to petition for review except opinion from which

party seeks relief]. As Respondent submits, in any event, Petitioner’s claim was exhausted following his first appeal.

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 The following summary of facts are taken from the opinion of the California Court of Appeal, Fifth

Appellate District appearing as Exhibit A, of the Answer to the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The Court finds

the state Court of Appeal’s summary is a correct and fair summary of the facts of the case. 

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Wende, F042623]; Exh. I [Petitioner’s Brief Pursuant to Wende, F042617].) The California

Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions. (See Exh. K [Opinion, F042623]; Exh. L

[Opinion, F024617.) Review was denied on April 14, 2004.4 (Respondent’s Exhibit O.)

Petitioner filed the instant federal petition for writ of habeas corpus on May 20, 2004. 

Pursuant to the Court’s order, Respondent filed an answer on November 18, 2004. Petitioner did

not file a traverse.

STATEMENT OF FACTS5

[Petitioner] entered a department store with an open backpack. Store security

officers, both in person and on security cameras, observed [Petitioner] putting

various items of merchandise both in his pockets and in the backpack. [Petitioner]

left the store where he was detained by store security officers after a short

struggle. After he was taken back to the security office, [Petitioner] struck one of

the security officers in the groin with his knee.

DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws

or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362, 375, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1504, n.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered

violations of his rights as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. The challenged conviction arises

out of the Tulare County Superior Court, which is located within the jurisdiction of this Court. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 2241(d).

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

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of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its

enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S.

1008, 118 S.Ct. 586 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting

Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107, 117 S.Ct.

1114 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059

(1997) (holding AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after statute's enactment). The instant

petition was filed after the enactment of the AEDPA and is therefore governed by its provisions.

B. Standard of Review

This Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The AEDPA altered the standard of review that a federal habeas court must apply with

respect to a state prisoner's claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court. Williams v.

Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518-23 (2000). Under the AEDPA, an application for habeas corpus

will not be granted unless the adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States;” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade,123 S.Ct.1166 (2003) (disapproving of

the Ninth Circuit’s approach in Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2000)); Williams v.

Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000). “A federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply

because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision

applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Lockyer, at 1175 (citations

omitted). “Rather, that application must be objectively unreasonable.” Id. (citations omitted). 

While habeas corpus relief is an important instrument to assure that individuals are

constitutionally protected, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3391-3392

(1983); Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 1086 (1969), direct review of a

criminal conviction is the primary method for a petitioner to challenge that conviction. Brecht v.

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Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1719 (1993). In addition, the state court’s

factual determinations must be presumed correct, and the federal court must accept all factual

findings made by the state court unless the petitioner can rebut “the presumption of correctness

by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115

S.Ct. 1769 (1995); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 116 S.Ct. 457 (1995); Langford v. Day,

110 F.3d 1380, 1388 (9th Cir. 1997).

C. Sufficient Evidence Prior Conviction

Petitioner contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his prior conviction of

residential burglary, a serious felony under California Three Strikes Law (Cal. Pen. Code, §§

667(b)-(i), 1170.12.) Petitioner asserts that the evidence presented to the court as proof that he

suffered a conviction for a prior serious felony was insufficient because on remand the trial court

examined only the record of his conviction in the Tulare County Superior Court Case No. 46103.

The law on insufficiency of the evidence claim is clearly established. The United States

Supreme Court has held that when reviewing an insufficiency of the evidence claim on habeas, a

federal court must determine whether, viewing the evidence and the inferences to be drawn from

it in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could find the essential

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). 

Sufficiency claims are judged by the elements defined by state law. Id. at 324, n. 16. 

Under California law, the prosecution has the burden of proving alleged prior convictions

beyond a reasonable doubt. See People v. Jones, 37 Cal.App.4th 1312, 1315 (1995). Pursuant to

section 969b, to establish prima facie evidence of a person's prior conviction punishable by

commitment, "records or copies of records of any state penitentiary...in which such person has

been imprisoned, when such records or copies thereof have been certified by the official

custodian of such records, may be introduced as such evidence." 

The California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment without addressing this claim, and

remanded for the sole issue of whether Petitioner suffered a prior conviction for an offense

enumerated in the California Penal Code § 666. (Respondent’s Exhibit A.) The California

Supreme Court denied review. (Respondent’s Exhibit F.) Following the trial court remand,

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 The record in Case No. 64996 does not contain the actual exhibits, but the trial court referred to those

documents from the record in Case No. 46009. (1RT 27-28.) 

7

 In this instance, the prior strike conviction of first degree burglary is per se a serious felony under

California Penal Code section 1192.7(c)(18). 

6

Petitioner subsequently filed a second petition for review to the California Supreme Court

(Respondent’s Exhibit N), which again raised the instant claim that the evidence was insufficient

to prove that Petitioner suffered a prior conviction for first degree burglary under California’s

Three Strikes Law. The petition was summarily denied. (Respondent’s Exhibit O.) 

The instant petition only challenges the sufficiency of the evidence of the prior burglary

conviction under California’s Three Strikes Law, not the prior theft conviction under California

Penal Code § 666. Therefore, the determination of that issue on remand is insignificant to

whether there was sufficient evidence to support the finding that Petitioner suffered a prior

serious felony conviction under the Three Strikes law. 

 A review of the record demonstrates that sufficient evidence supports the finding that

Petitioner suffered a prior serious first degree burglary felony conviction under California’s

Three Strikes Law. (Cal. Pen. Code §§ 667.(b)-(i), 1170.12.) At his jury trial, Petitioner elected

not to bifurcate the issue of whether he had suffered a prior serious felony. (1RT 30.) The jury

was presented with a certified verdict form showing Petitioner’s conviction for first degree

residential burglary (see 2CT 89), and a sentencing minute order (see 2CT 113).6 At trial,

Petitioner did not object to the introduction of these documents certified by the court, except to

claim that identity was an issue for the jury. (1RT 28.) Under California law, the trier of fact

considers only court documents, and determines only whether the defendant suffered the

conviction; the questions of identity and whether the prior conviction qualifies as serious under

California’s Three Strikes Law are questions for the court. Cal. Pen. Code §§ 667(b)-(i),

1025(c), 1170.12; People v. Kelli, 21 Cal.4th 452, 456-457 (1999); People v. Epps, 25 Cal.4th

19, 26 (2001).7 The jury was instructed that Petitioner was the person whose name appeared on

the documents showing the prior conviction for a serious felony, and that it was the jury’s role as

trier of fact to determine the truth of that allegation. (1RT 41-42; 1CT 92-93.) The jury returned

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 As Respondent submits, the jury actually made two separate findings; the first that Petitioner suffered

prior convictions as part of the finding that he committed the offense of petty theft with a prior conviction (1CT

101); and, second, that he suffered a prior conviction of a serious or violent felony (1CT 102). 

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a true finding that Petitioner had suffered a prior conviction for a serious felony.8 (1RT 49-50,

1CT 102.)

Following the jury’s verdict, on April 4, 2001, the trial court held a hearing to prove the

prior burglary conviction. (RT April 4, 2001.) Initially, the trial court took judicial notice of the

documents relating to Case No. 46009. (Id. at 4.) The prosecution called Deputy District

Attorney Angela Oliver who testified that on October 4, 1999, she participated in a jury trial in

which Petitioner was charged with and convicted of first degree residential burglary. (Id. at 4-5.) 

For that conviction, Petitioner was sentenced to two years in prison, which was suspended for

three years. (RT April 4, 2001, at 6; 2CT 113.) The trial court made the specific finding that

Petitioner was convicted in Case No. 46009 of first degree burglary. (RT April 4, 2001, at 6.) 

As previously stated the jury was presented with both a copy of the verdict form and

minute order demonstrating that Petitioner was convicted of first degree residential burglary in

violation of California Penal Code § 459. (2CT 89, 113.) 

Based on the evidence and testimony presented, the Court finds that the prosecution

provided sufficient evidence from which a rational trier of fact could find the essential elements

of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, i.e., that Petitioner was previously convicted of a

violation of California Penal Code section 459, so as to warrant the enhancement pursuant to

California’s Three Strikes Law (Cal. Pen. Code §§ 667(b)-(i), 1170.12.) To the extent Petitioner

seeks to argue that because he did not actually serve prison time on the burglary conviction, it

cannot constitute a strike, it is without merit. A two-year prison term was imposed, but was

suspended for the three year term of probation. The instant offense was committed while

Petitioner was serving the probationary term. As previously stated, the term imposed in Case No.

46009 is subordinate to the term imposed in Case No. 64996. The court had previously imposed

and stayed execution of a two year prison term, therefore the aggravated term for felony petty

theft with a prior provided for a longer period of incarceration, thus became the base term. (See

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Cal. Pen. Code § 1170.1.) Accordingly, the California courts' determination of this issue was not

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent. 

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus be DENIED; and

2. Judgment be entered in favor of Respondent.

These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the assigned United States

District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-

304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of

California. Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after

service of the objections. The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951

F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: August 25, 2005 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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