Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01073/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01073-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

CARLOS RIOS, 

Plaintiffs,

v. 

DANIEL PARAMO, ET AL., 

Defendants.

 Case No.: 14-cv-01073-WQH (DHB) 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION RE: 

(1) DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR 

PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

(ECF NO. 74); AND 

(2) DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 

DISMISS (ECF NO. 73) 

Plaintiff Carlos Rios, a state prisoner incarcerated at the R.J. Donovan Correctional 

Facility (“RJD”), is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff commenced this action on April 28, 

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2014 by filing a Complaint in which he asserts a variety of claims against sixteen RJD staff 

members. (Id.) 

On October 8, 2014, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and 

Preliminary Injunction. (ECF No. 20.) On November 24, 2014, Defendants filed a Motion 

to Dismiss and a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (ECF Nos. 34, 35.) On June 29, 

2015, the Honorable David H. Bartick issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) on 

these motions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72 and Local Civil Rule 72.1. 

(ECF No. 55.) On September 1, 2015, the Honorable William Q. Hayes issued an order 

denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, 

granting in part and denying in part Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 

and granting in part and denying in part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 63.) 

Judge Hayes granted Plaintiff leave to file a First Amended Complaint. (Id. at p. 21.) 

On October 20, 2015, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) in which 

he asserts several claims against thirteen RJD staff members.1

 (ECF No. 64.) The 

following motions are currently pending before the Court: (1) Defendants’ Motion for 

Partial Summary Judgment (ECF No. 74); and (2) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF 

No. 73). 

After a thorough review of the pleadings, the parties’ papers and all supporting 

documents, this Court hereby RECOMMENDS that (1) Defendants’ Motion for Partial 

Summary Judgment be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part; and (3) Defendants’ 

Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. 

                                               

1

 Plaintiff’s FAC names the following RJD staff as defendants: (1) Warden 

Daniel Paramo, (2) Correctional Officer J. Behra, (3) Facility Captain E. Benyard, (4) 

Correctional Officer M. Cavazos, (5) Correctional Officer Abad, (6) Correctional Officer 

M. Zuniga, (7) Correctional Lieutenant A. Allamby, (8) Chief Deputy Warden Alan 

Hernandez, (9) Associate Warden W. Suglich, (10) Correctional Officer A.A. Jones, (11) 

Correctional Officer E. Cortez, (12) Appeals Coordinator R. Olson, and (13) Appeals 

Coordinator J. Ramirez (collectively, “Defendants”). Defendants are being sued in their 

individual capacities only. (See FAC at pp. 11-12.) 

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I. BACKGROUND 

 A. Procedural History 

 1. Complaint 

Plaintiff commenced this action on April 28, 2014 by filing a Complaint and motion 

for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1, 2.) On August 14, 2014, Judge Hayes 

granted Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and, following an initial 

screening of the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), directed 

the U.S. Marshal to serve the Complaint on Plaintiff’s behalf. (ECF No. 5.) 

 Plaintiff filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction 

on October 8, 2014. (ECF No. 20.) Defendants filed a Motion for Partial Summary 

Judgment on November 24, 2014, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, arguing 

Plaintiff failed to exhaust all of his administrative remedies prior to filing suit. (ECF No. 

34.) On the same date, Defendants also filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint, 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 35.) 

On June 29, 2015, this Court issued an R&R, recommending that Judge Hayes deny 

Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, grant in 

part and deny in part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, and grant in part and deny in part 

Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 55.) 

With respect to Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the Court 

recommended that Judge Hayes grant summary judgment with respect to the following 

claims: (1) conspiracy and retaliation claims against Defendant Abad; (2) due process 

claims against Defendants Behra, Cavazos, and Paramo; (3) equal protection claim against 

all Defendants except Defendants Benyard, Cavazos, and Paramo; and (4) cruel and 

unusual punishment claim against all Defendants. (See ECF No. 55 at p. 64.) As to all 

remaining claims and Defendants, the Court recommended that genuine issues of material 

fact preclude summary judgment. (See id.) 

On July 13, 2015, Plaintiff filed objections to the R&R as it related to Defendants’ 

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 56.) Defendants filed a reply to the 

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objections on August 10, 2015. (ECF No. 58.) On September 1, 2015, Judge Hayes 

granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment “as 

stated in the [R&R].” (See ECF No. 63 at p. 20.) 

 With respect to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, the Court recommended the 

following: (1) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim against 

Defendants Behra, Olson, and Ramirez be denied, but that Plaintiff’s conspiracy claims 

against the other defendants be granted with leave to amend; (2) Defendants’ Motion to 

Dismiss Plaintiff’s retaliation claims be granted with leave to amend against Defendants 

Abad, Allamby, Alvarez, Cavazos, Cortez, Hernandez, Jones, Rutledge, and Spence, and 

denied as against Defendants Behra, Benyard, Olson, Paramo, Ramirez, Suglich, and 

Zuniga; (3) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s due process claims be granted; (4) 

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim 

be denied as to Defendants Benyard and Cavazos, and granted with leave to amend as to 

all other Defendants; (5) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment 

cruel and unusual punishment claim be granted with leave to amend; (6) Defendants’ 

Motion to Dismiss the claims for money damages against them in their official capacities 

be granted; and (7) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss on the basis of qualified immunity be 

granted as to Defendants Abad, Allamby, Alvarez, Cortez, Hernandez, Jones, Rutledge, 

and Spence, and denied as to Defendants Behra, Benyard, Cavazos, Olson, Paramo, 

Ramirez, Suglich, and Zuniga. (ECF No. 55.) 

 On July 29, 2015, Plaintiff filed objections to the R&R as it related to Defendants’ 

Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 57.) Defendants filed a reply to the objections on August 

10, 2015. (ECF No. 58.) On September 1, 2015, Judge Hayes granted in part and denied 

in part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, as stated above, with the following modifications: 

(1) all retaliation and conspiracy claims arising from Plaintiff’s disciplinary hearings and 

the Rules Violation Report (“RVR”) issued for the January 18, 2013 altercation are 

dismissed without prejudice as barred by Heck v. Humphrey; (2) Plaintiff’s retaliation 

claim against Defendants Paramo and Suglich is dismissed without prejudice; (3) 

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Plaintiff’s retaliation claim against Defendant Benyard is dismissed without prejudice, with 

the exception of the claim that Defendant Benyard retaliated against Plaintiff for submitting 

the “Memorandum” to Defendant Paramo by placing him in administrative segregation, 

and Defendant Benyard is entitled to qualified immunity, with the exception of the claim 

that Defendant Benyard retaliated against Plaintiff for submitting the “Memorandum” to 

Defendant Paramo by placing him in administrative segregation; (4) Plaintiff’s equal 

protection claim against Defendants Benyard and Cavazos is dismissed without prejudice; 

and (5) Defendants Paramo, Suglich, and Cavazos are entitled to qualified immunity. (See

ECF No. 63.) 

 2. First Amended Complaint (FAC) 

On October 20, 2015, Plaintiff filed his FAC. (ECF No. 64.) Plaintiff alleges in the 

FAC that Defendants have engaged in an ongoing conspiracy to threaten and harass him, 

in violation of his state and federal constitutional rights and privileges, in retaliation for 

Plaintiff having filed a previous civil rights lawsuit2

 in this district and prison grievances 

against Defendants and other RJD staff. (See id.) Plaintiff asserts federal legal claims 

under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, in addition to a claim under the 

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). (Id. at ¶¶ 54-59.) Plaintiff seeks money 

damages and declaratory and injunctive relief. (Id. at pp. 28-30.) 

 In his FAC, Plaintiff incorporates by reference the documents attached to his 

Complaint. (See id. at p. 2, n. 1.) Although typically “[a]ll amended pleadings must contain 

copies of all exhibits referred to in such amended pleadings[,] . . . [p]ermission may be 

                                               

2

 In Plaintiff’s prior civil rights lawsuit, Rios v. Cate, et al., Case No. 10-cv01064-PCL (S.D. Cal.) (“Cate Lawsuit”), Plaintiff asserted several claims against the 

defendants, none of whom are Defendants in the instant action, including the claim that 

Mr. Togafu, Plaintiff’s supervisor in the prison laundry, retaliated against Plaintiff for 

initiating the Cate Lawsuit by temporarily removing him from his work assignment without 

penological justification. (See Second Amended Complaint in Case No. 10-cv-01064-

PCL, ECF No. 45-2 at 2, 10.) 

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obtained from court . . . for the removal of any exhibit or exhibits attached to prior 

pleadings, in order that the same may be attached to the amended pleading.” Civ. L.R. 

15.1(a). In accordance with Civil Local Rule 15.1(a), the Court grants Plaintiff’s implied 

request to consider all exhibits attached to his Complaint as attached to his FAC. (See ECF 

Nos. 1-1, 1-2.) 

In its prior R&R, the Court detailed at great length Plaintiff’s allegations and the 

documents attached to the Complaint. As the FAC is substantially similar and relies on the 

same documents, the Court incorporates the “Background” section of its prior R&R into 

this Report and Recommendation. (See R&R at pp. 2-31.) Below, the Court discusses 

only the changes made by Plaintiff with respect to his FAC. 

a. Parties

In the FAC, Plaintiff does not bring any claims against Rutledge, E. Alvarez, or K. 

Spence. (See FAC at pp. 1, 11-12.) All claims brought against these individuals in the 

Complaint were dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend. (See R&R; ECF 

No. 63.) Accordingly, these individuals are dismissed from the case. Lacey v. Maricopa 

Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding that a plaintiff waives all claims dismissed 

without prejudice and with leave to amend if not re-alleged in an amended complaint). In 

addition, Plaintiff only brings suit against the remaining Defendants in their individual, and 

not official, capacities. (FAC at pp. 11-12.) 

b. Claims

In the FAC, Plaintiff alleges the following claims against Defendants: 

 Defendant Behra: 

o Retaliation (threatened and harassed Plaintiff and issued a false 

misbehavior report (CDC 128-A) in retaliation for filing the Cate 

Lawsuit) (FAC at ¶¶ 15, 45 and pp. 1-2); 

o Conspiracy (to retaliate with non-defendants involved in the Cate 

Lawsuit) (id.); and 

o Due process violation (id. at ¶ 45). 

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 Defendant Zuniga: 

o Retaliation (intentionally deprived Plaintiff of his personal property in 

retaliation for the filing of a staff complaint) (Id. at ¶ 46, p. 4); 

o Conspiracy (with unnamed others to intentionally deprive Plaintiff of 

his personal property) (id.); 

o Due process violation (based on intentional deprivation of personal 

property) (id. at p. 5); and 

o Intentional deprivation of personal property (state law) (id. at ¶ 46 at 

pp. 4-5). 

 Defendant Benyard: 

o Retaliation 

 (conspired with Cavazos and Abad to delay and deny Plaintiff a 

fair and impartial Unit Classification Committee (“UCC”) 

hearing on 7/23/13 with a “retaliatory bias”) (Id. at ¶ 47, p. 2); 

 (decided to retain or place Plaintiff in Administrative 

Segregation (“Ad-Seg”) on 2/4/13, and filed a false Rule 

Violation Report (“RVR”) against Plaintiff, in retaliation for 

Plaintiff previously filing grievances and complaints against 

him) (id. at p. 6, ¶¶ 48, 54.) 

o Due process violation 

 (along with Jones, Cortez, Allamby, and Hernandez, delayed and 

denied Plaintiff procedural due process during his RVR hearing 

process) (id. at ¶¶ 48, 54, p. 6) 

 (along with Cavazos and Abad, denied Plaintiff a fair and 

impartial UCC hearing on 7/23/13) (id. at ¶ 49, pp. 2-3) 

o Conspiracy 

 (with Cavazos and Abad, to delay and deny Plaintiff a fair and 

impartial UCC hearing on 7/23/13) (id. at ¶ 47, p. 2); 

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 (with Jones, Cortez, Allamby, and Hernandez, to fabricate and 

manipulate evidence against Plaintiff in support of the RVR 

issued by Benyard to punish Plaintiff, and to deny Plaintiff 

procedural due process during his RVR hearing) (id. at ¶¶ 48, 54 

pp. 6-8); 

o Violation of equal protection clause (along with Cavazos and Abad, by 

discriminating against Plaintiff on the basis of his handicap and noncitizenship status; Plaintiff was denied the opportunity to participate in 

rehabilitative programs such as “re-enter programs,” which are 

available to other inmates) (id. at ¶ 50, pp. 2-3); and 

o Violation of ADA (along with Cavazos and Abad, by discriminating 

against Plaintiff on the basis of his handicap and non-citizenship status; 

Plaintiff was denied the opportunity to participate in rehabilitative 

programs such as “re-enter programs,” which are available to other 

inmates) (id. at ¶ 50, pp. 2-3). 

 Defendant Cavazos: 

o Retaliation (conspired with Benyard and Abad to delay and deny 

Plaintiff a fair and impartial UCC hearing on 7/23/13 with a “retaliatory 

bias”) (Id. at ¶ 47, p. 2); 

o Due process violation (along with Benyard and Abad, delayed and 

denied Plaintiff a fair and impartial UCC hearing on 7/23/13) (id. at ¶ 

49, pp. 2-3) 

o Conspiracy (with Benyard and Abad, to delay and deny Plaintiff a fair 

and impartial UCC hearing on 7/23/13) (id. at ¶ 47, p. 2); 

o Violation of equal protection clause (along with Benyard and Abad, by 

discriminating against Plaintiff on the basis of his handicap and noncitizenship status; Plaintiff was denied the opportunity to participate in 

rehabilitative programs such as “re-enter programs,” which are 

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available to other inmates) (id. at ¶ 50, pp. 2-3); and 

o Violation of ADA (along with Benyard and Abad, by discriminating 

against Plaintiff on the basis of his handicap and non-citizenship status; 

Plaintiff was denied the opportunity to participate in rehabilitative 

programs such as “re-enter programs,” which are available to other 

inmates) (id. at ¶ 50, pp. 2-3). 

 Defendant Abad: 

o Retaliation (conspired with Benyard and Cavazos to delay and deny 

Plaintiff a fair and impartial UCC hearing on 7/23/13 with a “retaliatory 

bias”) (Id. at ¶ 47, p. 2); 

o Due process violation (along with Benyard and Cavazos, delayed and 

denied Plaintiff a fair and impartial UCC hearing on 7/23/13) (id. at ¶ 

49, pp. 2-3); 

o Conspiracy (with Benyard and Cavazos, to delay and deny Plaintiff a 

fair and impartial UCC hearing on 7/23/13) (id. at ¶ 47, p. 2); 

o Violation of equal protection clause (along with Benyard and Cavazos, 

by discriminating against Plaintiff on the basis of his handicap and noncitizenship status; Plaintiff was denied the opportunity to participate in 

rehabilitative programs such as “re-enter programs,” which are 

available to other inmates) (id. at ¶ 50, pp. 2-3); and 

o Violation of ADA (along with Benyard and Cavazos, by discriminating 

against Plaintiff on the basis of his handicap and non-citizenship status; 

Plaintiff was denied the opportunity to participate in rehabilitative 

programs such as “re-enter programs,” which are available to other 

inmates) (id. at ¶ 50, pp. 2-3). 

 Defendant Cortez: 

o Retaliation 

 (conspired with Jones, Benyard, Allamby, and Hernandez to 

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fabricate and manipulate evidence against Plaintiff in support of 

the RVR issued by Benyard to punish Plaintiff, and to deny 

Plaintiff procedural due process during his RVR hearing) (Id. at 

p. 6, ¶ 48.) 

o Due process violation 

 (along with Jones, Benyard, Allamby, and Hernandez, denied 

Plaintiff procedural due process during his RVR hearing process) 

(id. at ¶ 48, p. 6) 

o Conspiracy 

 (with Jones, Benyard, Allamby, and Hernandez, to fabricate and 

manipulate evidence against Plaintiff in support of the RVR 

issued by Benyard to punish Plaintiff, and to deny Plaintiff 

procedural due process during his RVR hearing) (id. at ¶ 48 pp. 

6-8). 

 Defendant Jones: 

o Retaliation 

 (conspired with Cortez, Benyard, Allamby, and Hernandez to 

fabricate and manipulate evidence against Plaintiff in support of 

the RVR issued by Benyard to punish Plaintiff, and to deny 

Plaintiff procedural due process during his RVR hearing) (Id. at 

p. 6, ¶ 48). 

o Due process violation 

 (along with Cortez, Benyard, Allamby, and Hernandez, denied 

Plaintiff procedural due process during his RVR hearing process) 

(id. at ¶ 48, p. 6). 

o Conspiracy 

 (with Cortez, Benyard, Allamby, and Hernandez, to fabricate and 

manipulate evidence against Plaintiff in support of the RVR 

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issued by Benyard to punish Plaintiff, and to deny Plaintiff 

procedural due process during his RVR hearing) (id. at ¶ 48 pp. 

6-8). 

 Defendant Hernandez: 

o Retaliation 

 (conspired with Cortez, Benyard, Allamby, and Jones to 

fabricate and manipulate evidence against Plaintiff in support of 

the RVR issued by Benyard to punish Plaintiff, and to deny 

Plaintiff procedural due process during his RVR hearing, 

because of Plaintiff filing grievances against him and fellow 

prison staff) (Id. at pp. 6, 8, ¶ 48). 

o Due process violation 

 (along with Cortez, Benyard, Allamby, and Jones, denied 

Plaintiff procedural due process during his RVR hearing process) 

(id. at ¶ 48, pp. 6, 8). 

o Conspiracy 

 (with Cortez, Benyard, Allamby, and Jones, to fabricate and 

manipulate evidence against Plaintiff in support of the RVR 

issued by Benyard to punish Plaintiff, and to deny Plaintiff 

procedural due process during his RVR hearing) (id. at ¶ 48 pp. 

6-8). 

 Defendant Allamby: 

o Retaliation 

 (conspired with Cortez, Benyard, Hernandez, and Jones to 

fabricate and manipulate evidence against Plaintiff in support of 

the RVR issued by Benyard to punish Plaintiff, and to deny 

Plaintiff procedural due process during his RVR hearing) (Id. at 

p. 6, ¶ 48). 

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o Due process violation 

 (along with Cortez, Benyard, Hernandez, and Jones, denied 

Plaintiff procedural due process during his RVR hearing process) 

(id. at ¶ 48, p. 6). 

o Conspiracy 

 (with Cortez, Benyard, Hernandez, and Jones, to fabricate and 

manipulate evidence against Plaintiff in support of the RVR 

issued by Benyard to punish Plaintiff, and to deny Plaintiff 

procedural due process during his RVR hearing) (id. at ¶ 48 pp. 

6-8). 

 Defendant Suglich: 

o Conspiracy (with Paramo, to deny Plaintiff access to courts, by 

promulgating and implementing the policy of delivering a grievance to 

the appeals coordinator even when it alleges misconduct by the appeals 

coordinator) (Id. at pp. 8-10, ¶ 51); 

o Denial of access to the courts (by promulgating and implementing the 

policy of delivering a grievance to the appeals coordinator even when 

it alleges misconduct by the appeals coordinator) (id. at pp. 8-10, ¶¶ 51, 

55); and 

o Retaliation (by not responding to Plaintiff’s grievances adequately, 

and/or failing to fix the wrongs) (id. at ¶ 51). 

 Defendant Paramo: 

o Conspiracy (with Suglich, to deny Plaintiff access to courts, by 

promulgating and implementing the policy of delivering a grievance to 

the appeals coordinator even when it alleges misconduct by the appeals 

coordinator) (Id. at pp. 8-10, ¶ 51); 

o Denial of access to the courts (by promulgating and implementing the 

policy of delivering a grievance to the appeals coordinator even when 

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it alleges misconduct by the appeals coordinator) (id. at pp. 8-10, ¶¶ 51, 

55); and 

o Retaliation (by not responding to Plaintiff’s grievances adequately, 

and/or failing to fix the wrongs) (id. at ¶ 51). 

 Defendant Olson: 

o Retaliation (obstructed Plaintiff’s access to the courts in retaliation for 

Plaintiff filing complaints and grievances against them) (Id. at p. 10, ¶ 

52); 

o Conspiracy (with Ramirez, to obstruct Plaintiff’s access to the courts in 

retaliation for Plaintiff filing complaints and grievances against them) 

(id. at p. 10, ¶ 52); and 

o Denial of access to the courts (by intentionally delaying the appeals 

process, abusing his discretion and rejecting grievances without 

authority, erroneously cancelling grievances, and/or refusing to process 

or answer Plaintiff’s grievances within a reasonable time frame) (id. at 

p. 10, ¶ 55). 

 Defendant Ramirez: 

o Retaliation (obstructed Plaintiff’s access to the courts in retaliation for 

Plaintiff filing complaints and grievances against them) (Id. at p. 10, ¶ 

52); 

o Conspiracy (with Olson, to obstruct Plaintiff’s access to the courts in 

retaliation for Plaintiff filing complaints and grievances against them) 

(id. at p. 10, ¶ 52); and 

o Denial of access to the courts (by intentionally delaying the appeals 

process, abusing his discretion and rejecting grievances without 

authority, erroneously cancelling grievances, and/or refusing to process 

or answer Plaintiff’s grievances within a reasonable time frame) (id. at 

p. 10, ¶ 55). 

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II. DISCUSSION 

A. Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (ECF No. 74) 

Defendants move for partial summary judgment in their favor against Plaintiff, 

because Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies as to all but one of his claims 

before filing this lawsuit. Defendants concede Plaintiff exhausted his retaliation claim 

against Officer Zuniga. (See ECF No. 74-1 at p. 10.) 

1. Legal Standard 

The Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) provides that “[n]o action shall be 

brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal 

law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such 

administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion 

is “mandatory.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002) (citing Booth v. Churner, 532 

U.S. 731, 739 (2001)); McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1200-01 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Failure to exhaust is “an affirmative defense the defendant must plead and prove.” Jones 

v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 204 (2007). “In a typical PLRA case, a defendant will have to 

present probative evidence [in a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment] . . . that the 

prisoner has failed to exhaust administrative remedies under § 1997e(a).” Albino v. Baca, 

747 F.3d 1162, 1169 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc).3

 

 Under the burden-shifting analysis recognized in Albino, “a defendant must first 

prove that there was an available administrative remedy and that the prisoner did not 

                                               

3

 “[I]n . . . rare cases where a failure to exhaust is clear from the face of the 

complaint, a defendant may successfully move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure 

to state a claim.” Albino, 747 F.3d at 1169 (citing Jones, 549 U.S. at 215-16; Scott v. 

Kuhlmann, 746 F.2d 1377, 1378 (9th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (“[A]ffirmative defenses may 

not be raised by motion to dismiss, but this is not true when, as here, the defense raises no 

disputed issues of fact.”); Aquilar-Avellaveda v. Terrell, 478 F.3d 1223, 1225 (10th Cir. 

2007) (“[O]nly in rare cases will a district court be able to conclude from the face of the 

complaint that a prisoner has not exhausted his administrative remedies and that he is 

without a valid excuse.”)). 

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exhaust that available remedy.” Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir. 2015) 

(citing Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 767 (9th Cir. 1996)). “Once the defendant 

has carried that burden, the prisoner has the burden of production. That is, the burden shifts 

to the prisoner to come forward with evidence showing that there is something in his 

particular case that made the existing and generally available administrative remedies 

effectively unavailable to him.” Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172 (citing Hilao, 103 F.3d at 778 

n.5 (“Once the defendant makes a showing of remedies abroad which have not been 

exhausted, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to rebut by showing that the local remedies 

were ineffective, unobtainable, unduly prolonged, inadequate, or obviously futile.”)). “The 

ultimate burden of proof, however, remains with the defendants, and the evidence must be 

viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Packnett v. Wingo, No. 09-cv-00327-

YGR (PR), 2015 WL 1478597, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2015) (citing Williams, 775 F.3d 

at 1191). “If undisputed evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the prisoner shows 

a failure to exhaust, a defendant is entitled to summary judgment under Rule 56. If material 

facts are disputed, summary judgment should be denied, and the district judge rather than 

a jury should determine the facts.” Albino, 747 F.3d at 1166. 

 The Supreme Court has “held that to properly exhaust administrative remedies 

prisoners must ‘complete the administrative review process in accordance with the 

applicable procedural rules,’ [citation] -- rules that are defined not by the PLRA, but by the 

prison grievance process itself.” Jones, 549 U.S. at 218 (quoting Woodford v. Ngo, 548 

U.S. 81, 88 (2006)). 

 The administrative appeal system for inmates in the California prison system is 

described in Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations: “Any inmate . . . under the 

[CDCR’s] jurisdiction may appeal any policy, decision, action, condition, or omission by 

the department or its staff that the inmate . . . can demonstrate as having a material adverse 

effect upon his or her health, safety, or welfare.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(a). For 

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appeals submitted after January 28, 20114

, inmates must commence the appeals process by 

submitting a CDCR Form 602 to the facility’s appeals coordinator describing “the specific 

issue under appeal and the relief requested.” Id. at § 3084.2(a), (c). Among other 

requirements, the appeal must be “limited to one issue or related set of issues” and “list all 

staff member(s) involved and shall describe their involvement in the issue.” Id. at 

§ 3084.2(a)(1), (3). “To assist in the identification of staff members, the inmate . . . shall 

include the staff member’s last name, first initial, title or position, if known, and the dates 

of the staff member’s involvement in the issue under appeal. If the inmate . . . does not 

have the requested identifying information about the staff member(s), he or she shall 

provide any other available information that would assist the appeals coordinator in making 

a reasonable attempt to identify the staff member(s) in question.” Id. at § 3084.2(a)(3).5

 

“Administrative remedies shall not be considered exhausted relative to any new issue, 

information, or person later named by the appellant that was not included in the originally 

submitted CDCR Form 602 . . . and addressed through all required levels of administrative 

review up to and including the third level. In addition, a cancellation or rejection decision 

does not exhaust administrative remedies.” Id. at § 3084.1(b). 

 If a prisoner is not satisfied with the first level response, he may submit a formal 

appeal for a second level review, which is “conducted by the hiring authority or designee 

at a level no lower than Chief Deputy Warden . . . or the equivalent.” Id. at § 3084.7(d)(2). 

If the prisoner is not satisfied with the second level review, he may appeal to the third level 

of review by the chief of the Office of Appeals in Sacramento. Id. at § 3084.7(c), (d)(3). 

                                               

4

 California’s administrative appeal regulations were significantly revised 

effective January 28, 2011. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.7. 

5

 In Jones, the Supreme Court “conclude[d] that exhaustion is not per se 

inadequate simply because an individual later sued was not named in the grievances.” 

Jones, 549 U.S. at 219. “The level of detail necessary in a grievance to comply with the 

grievance procedures will vary from system to system and claim to claim, but it is the 

prison’s requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.” 

Id. at 218. 

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“The third level review constitutes the decision of the Secretary of the California 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation on an appeal, and . . . exhausts administrative 

remedies.” Id. at § 3084.7(d)(3). 

 CDCR has exceptions to the regular appeals process for certain types of appeals, 

including staff complaints, disciplinary appeals, and property appeals. See id. at § 3084.9. 

An inmate alleging staff misconduct by a departmental employee, as defined by § 3291(b), 

shall attach a § 3391(d) “Rights and Responsibility Statement” to the appeal and forward 

the appeal to the appeals coordinator. Id. at §§ 3084.9(i)(1). “All appeals alleging staff 

misconduct will be presented by the appeals coordinator to the hiring authority or designee 

within five working days.” Id. at § 3084.9(d)(i)(3). “An appeal alleging staff misconduct 

by an appeals coordinator shall be reviewed by the hiring authority for determination of 

processing.” Id. at § 3084.9(i)(6). “If the hiring authority makes a determination that the 

complaint shall not be accepted as a staff complaint, it shall be processed as a routine 

appeal.” Id. at § 3084.9(i)(1). 

 With respect to disciplinary appeals, “[a] disciplinary action cannot be appealed until 

the hearing process is completed, including any re-hearing.” Id. at § 3084.9(g)(1). For 

property appeals, “[i]f an administrative decision is made that the department is responsible 

for loss or damage to the appellant’s property . . . , an attempt by staff to use donated 

property to substitute for or replace lost property at no cost to the state, or any effort to 

repair damaged property at institution expense, will be made prior to awarding monetary 

compensation for the loss.” Id. at § 3084.9(f)(4). “An appellant’s refusal to accept repair, 

replacement, or substitution of like items and value shall be cause to deny the appeal.” Id. 

at § 3084.9(f)(5). 

 2. Available Administrative Remedy 

As an initial matter, the Court finds that Defendants have established through 

undisputed admissible evidence that California allows prisoners to complain about their 

conditions of confinement through an administrative remedies system. As set forth in the 

Self and Voong declarations (see ECF No. 74-2 (“Self Decl.”); ECF No. 74-6 (“Voong 

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Decl.”)) and the California regulations identified therein, see Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 

3084 et seq., this system provides for a three-level procedure by which inmates may assert 

non-medical inmate grievances, or appeals, utilizing a CDCR Form 602. Thus, the Court 

initially finds that Defendants have satisfied part of their initial burden under Albino, 

namely, the existence of a generally available administrative remedy. Thus, the remainder 

of the Court’s exhaustion analysis determines whether Defendants have satisfied the 

second part of their initial Albino burden, namely, whether Plaintiff failed to exhaust that 

available remedy, and, if not, whether Plaintiff is able to meet his burden of demonstrating 

“that there is something particular in his case that made the existing and generally available 

administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him by ‘showing that the local remedies 

were ineffective, unobtainable, unduly prolonged, inadequate, or obviously futile.’” 

Williams, 775 F.3d at 1191 (quoting Hilao, 103 F.3d at 778 n.5). 

 3. Exhaustion of Remedies 

 In Defendants’ prior Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to the Complaint, 

Defendants appeared to concede that Plaintiff had exhausted the following claims: 

 Property deprivation claim against Defendant Zuniga (Log No. 13-00777) 

(ECF No. 34-1 at p. 3, n. 1; ECF No. 34-2 at ¶ 9(d); ECF No. 34-3 at ¶ 6(b)); 

 Retaliation and conspiracy claims against Defendants Benyard and Hernandez 

(Log No. 13-01319) (ECF No. 34-1 at p. 3, n. 1; ECF No. 34-5 at ¶ 1); 

 Due process claim against Defendants Benyard and Hernandez (Log No. 13-

01319) (ECF No. 34-1 at p. 3, n. 1; ECF No. 34-5 at ¶ 4); and 

 Retaliation and conspiracy claims against Defendants Olson and Ramirez 

(Log No. 13-03340) (ECF No. 34-1 at p. 3, n. 1; ECF No. 34-5 at ¶ 2). 

After review of Defendants’ prior motion, the Court concluded that Defendants had 

satisfied their burden of providing undisputed evidence that Plaintiff failed to exhaust 

available administrative remedies as to the following: 

 Conspiracy and retaliation claims against Defendant Abad; 

 Due process claims against Defendants Behra, Cavazos, and Paramo; 

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 Equal protection claim against all Defendants except Defendants Benyard, 

Cavazos, and Paramo; and 

 Cruel and unusual punishment claim against all Defendants. 

(ECF No. 64 at p. 20; R&R at p. 64.) 

In Defendants’ present Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to the FAC, 

Defendants raise exhaustion arguments they did not previously raise, and no longer 

concede exhaustion of certain claims, which they previously appeared to have conceded. 

It is well-settled that district courts have the authority to reconsider and revise interlocutory 

orders, such as orders granting motions for partial summary judgment. Amarel v. Connell, 

102 F.3d 1494, 1515 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he interlocutory orders and rulings made pretrial by a district judge are subject to modification by the district judge at any time prior to 

final judgment.”); Balla v. Idaho State Bd. of Corr., 869 F.2d 461, 465 (9th Cir. 1989); 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). A district court may reconsider and revise a previous interlocutory 

decision for any reason it deems sufficient, even in the absence of new evidence or an 

intervening change in or clarification of controlling law. Washington v. Garcia, 977 F. 

Supp. 1067, 1068 (S.D. Cal. 1997) (Stiven, J.); Sport Squeeze, Inc. v. Pro–Innovative 

Concepts, Inc., 51 U.S.P.Q.2d 1764, 1771, 1999 WL 696009 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (Whelan, 

J.). However, a court should generally leave a previous decision undisturbed absent a 

showing that it either represented clear error or would work a manifest injustice. 

Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 817 (1988). 

 As district courts may reconsider and revise interlocutory orders, the Court will 

consider the new arguments raised and evidence submitted. However, the Court will not 

disturb its prior order unless the new arguments raised or evidence submitted indicates that 

its prior order was clearly erroneous or would work manifest injustice. 

 a. May 22, 2012 Appeal (Log No. Unassigned)

Plaintiff alleges in his FAC that on May 22, 2012 he filed a CDCR Form 602 alleging 

retaliation and conspiracy against Defendant Behra and other non-party officers in 

connection with the May 16, 2012 laundry floor incident and subsequent termination of 

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Plaintiff’s job assignment. (FAC at ¶ 16.) However, the grievance Plaintiff attaches to his 

FAC is a “Citizen’s Complaint” pursuant to California Penal Code § 832.5. (ECF No. 1-1 

at 4-8.) Section 832.5 requires that a procedure be established for investigating complaints 

by “members of the public” against state personnel. Cal. Penal Code § 832.5; see also Cal. 

Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3391(b) (“An allegation by a non-inmate of misconduct by a 

departmental peace officer . . . is a citizen’s complaint pursuant to Penal Code section 

832.5.”). The filing of a Citizen’s Complaint under section 832.5 does not properly exhaust 

Plaintiff’s remedies. See Gaston v. Hedgepeth, No. 13-cv-01395-RRB, 2014 WL 4104203, 

at *4-5 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2014). “[B]ecause the California Department of Corrections 

and Rehabilitation has established an administrative grievance system, a prisoner may not 

use a citizen’s complaint to exhaust administrative remedies when it is not part of that 

prescribed grievance process.” Id. at * 4, n. 53 (citing House v. Walker, No. CIV–S–06–

0331 DFL DAD P, 2007 WL 201161 at *5 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2007); McCoy v. Schirmer, 

No. S05–0165 DFL DAD P, 2006 WL 845630, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2006); Evans v. 

Woodford, No. 1:06–cv–01250 ALA (P), 2008 WL 5114653, at *2 (E.D. Cal.Dec.4, 

2008)). 

The Court acknowledges, however, that Plaintiff attaches to his Citizen’s Complaint 

a CDCR Form 602. This CDCR Form 602 was never given a Log Number or entered into 

the prison’s tracking system. (See ECF No. 74-1 (“Mot.”) at p. 14:5-7; Voong Decl. at 

Exh. H; Self Decl. at Exh. L.) Defendants claim they never received this form, and it is 

unclear whether Plaintiff went through the normal CDCR Form 602 filing procedures for 

this particular grievance. (Id.) In the Court’s prior R&R, the Court found that Plaintiff’s 

sworn allegations that he filed the May 22, 2012 appeal, but never received a response from 

prison officials, were sufficient to survive summary judgment. (R&R at pp. 45-47.) 

Defendants now argue that even if Plaintiff had properly submitted the CDCR Form 

602, “that grievance could have provided evidence upon which the Appeals Coordinator 

could have reversed the cancellation under California Code of Regulations, Title 15, § 

3084.6(a)(3), or upon which a subsequent grievance about the cancellation could have been 

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decided in Plaintiff’s favor.” (Mot. at p. 14.) Defendants further argue that Log No. 12-

02759 was Plaintiff’s attempt to challenge the cancellation of his May 22, 2012 grievance. 

(Id.) These arguments are unavailing, however, as Plaintiff does not allege that his May 

22, 2012 grievance was cancelled; he alleges he never received a response at all. (FAC at 

¶¶ 16-19; ECF No. 82 (Declaration of Carlos Rios In Support of Plaintiff’s Opposition to 

Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment for Failure to Exhaust (“Rios Decl.”)) 

at ¶¶ 2-3.)6

 The failure to respond to a grievance makes remedies “unavailable” and 

therefore excuses the failure to exhaust. See Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813, 822 (9th Cir. 

2010) (citing Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809, 811 (7th Cir. 2006)). 

Because there remains facts in dispute as to whether the May 22, 2012 grievance 

was properly filed and whether there were generally available administrative remedies 

effectively available to Plaintiff as to this appeal, the Court finds Defendants have not 

satisfied their burden of demonstrating that Plaintiff failed to exhaust available 

administrative remedies concerning Plaintiff’s retaliation and conspiracy claims against 

Defendant Behra arising out of Defendant Behra’s involvement in “plan[ning] and 

plant[ing] a controlled contraband in the inmates’ open work area to injure, oppress, or 

intimidate [Plaintiff],” which resulted in Plaintiff losing his job assignment. (See ECF No. 

1-1 at 6-7.) 

 b. June 11, 2012 Appeal (Log No. 12-2146)

 Plaintiff alleges in his FAC that his June 11, 2012 appeal, assigned Log No. 12-2146, 

asserts retaliation and conspiracy claims against the “ACO staff” for their failure to respond 

                                               

6

 The Court notes that Plaintiff’s sworn allegations are not contradicted by the 

evidence submitted. See ECF No. 1-1 at 6 (Under Section A of Form 602, Plaintiff states 

“This is a citizens’ complaint submitted pursuant to [C]alifornia Penal Code section 832.5 

and Title 15 CCR sections 3291(b) and 3084.9(i)”); 19 (“Additionally, I served to your 

office two citizen’s complaints dated 5/22/12 and 5/29/12.”); 27 (“On 5/22/12, I filed a 

CDCR 602 complaint...”); 42 (“Please take notice that this appeal claim was previously 

file[d] on 5/22/12 . . . hoever [sic] I never receive[d] any response to my appeal”); 66 (“On 

5/22/12, I filed a complaint, and that I never receive any response by the AC office.”). 

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to Plaintiff’s grievances within a reasonable time frame and their refusal to process 

Plaintiff’s grievances where they allege misconduct by RJD and ACO staff. (FAC at ¶ 21.) 

Plaintiff alleges that this CDCR Form 602 was delivered to the Office of Internal Affairs 

headquarters for its review; however, it was forwarded to Defendant Paramo instead for 

further review and investigation. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant Paramo forwarded the 

grievances to ACO staff in violation of CDCR’s rules and regulations which prohibit 

review of appeals by staff involved in the event or decision being appealed. (Id.) As a 

result of Defendant Paramo’s actions, Plaintiff alleges the appeal was cancelled by ACO 

staff after several rejections. (Id.) 

As an initial matter, this appeal does not contain any allegations against any 

Defendants in the present litigation. Rather, the appeal alleges non-party officer Cobb 

violated Plaintiff’s right to appeal by conspiring, retaliating, delaying, and intentionally 

obstructing Plaintiff’s access to justice in order to cover up the misconduct of other prison 

officials. (See ECF No. 1-1 at 50-51.) Thus, this appeal does not serve to exhaust any 

claims in Plaintiff’s FAC. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.2(a)(3) (requiring that inmate 

appeals “list all staff member(s) involved and . . . describe their involvement in the issue. 

To assist in the identification of staff members, the inmate . . . shall include the staff 

member’s last name, first initial, title or position, if known, and the dates of the staff 

member’s involvement in the issue under appeal. If the inmate . . . does not have the 

requested identifying information about the staff member(s), he or she shall provide any 

other available information that would assist the appeals coordinator in making a 

reasonable attempt to identify the staff member(s) in question.”). 

 Moreover, Plaintiff did not proceed with the appeal through the third level of review. 

On October 6, 2012, Defendant Olson rejected the appeal at the first level of review due to 

Plaintiff’s failure to comply with various appeal procedures. (See ECF No. 1-1 at 54-57.) 

On December 11, 2012, following Plaintiff’s re-submittal of the appeal, Defendants Olson 

and Ramirez again rejected the appeal at the first level of review for the same reasons stated 

in the October 6, 2012 screening letters. (Id. at 58-61.) On the same date, Defendants 

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Olson and Ramirez also cancelled the appeal under California Code of Regulations, Title 

15, § 3084.6(c)(3), because Plaintiff had “continue[d] to submit a rejected appeal while 

disregarding appeal staff’s previous instructions to correct the appeal.” (Id. at 62.) Plaintiff 

cannot show that administrative remedies were unavailable as to this appeal when Plaintiff 

failed to correct deficiencies in the appeal as instructed by the ACO staff. 

 In conclusion, the evidence before the Court is sufficient to satisfy Defendants’ 

burden of showing that Plaintiff did not exhaust any claims against Defendants based on 

the allegations set forth in appeal Log No. 12-2146. 

c. July 2, 2012 Appeal (Log No. 12-1879); December 6, 2012 (Log 

No. 13-0108)

 On July 2, 2012, Plaintiff filed another CDCR Form 602 that was assigned Log No. 

12-1879. (FAC at ¶ 19; ECF No. 1-1 at 24-25.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Behra and 

non-defendants Togafau and Cabrera conspired to retaliate against him by fabricating a 

false CDC-128A report signed by Defendant Behra claiming he was out of bounds in the 

laundry facility. (ECF No. 1-1 at 22, 24-25.) Plaintiff contends that on the date of the 

incident (i.e., May 16, 2012), he was not out of bounds and the contraband was never in 

his possession, surveillance video would support these two claims, and there is no evidence 

to support the “false[], fictitious and fraudulent” allegation that Plaintiff was attempting to 

steal personal property. (ECF No. 1-1 at 25.) In the appeal, Plaintiff requests that (1) an 

investigation be conducted, including the disclosure of the video camera recording and the 

taking of inmate witness interviews; (2) the CDC-128A report be dismissed; (3) Plaintiff 

be returned to his job assignment with back pay from the date of the wrongful termination; 

and (4) involved staff be reprimanded. (Id. at 24-25.) 

With respect to this appeal, Defendants have satisfied their initial burden of showing 

that an available administrative remedy existed and that Plaintiff did not exhaust that 

available remedy. See Williams, 775 F.3d at 1191. Indeed, Plaintiff failed to proceed 

through the third level of review with appeal Log No. 12-1879. (See Self Decl. at ¶ 10(c); 

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Voong Decl. at ¶ 11, Exh. H.)7

 Therefore, the burden shifts to Plaintiff to come forward 

with evidence showing that there is something with this appeal “that made the existing and 

generally available administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him.” Albino, 747 

F.3d at 1172. 

In its prior R&R, the Court found that Plaintiff had produced sufficient evidence to 

raise a triable issue of material fact concerning whether the local remedies were truly 

available as to this appeal. (R&R at pp. 49-50.) The Court found that “Plaintiff has 

produced evidence (i.e., improper rejection of appeal as untimely) showing that ‘the 

existing and generally available administrative remedies [were] effectively unavailable to 

him’ in connection with appeal Log No. 12-1879.” (Id. at p. 49:25-28.) Defendants argue 

in their present motion that an existing and generally available administrative remedy was 

available and Plaintiff failed to exhaust it. (Mot. at p. 13:17-27.) As discussed below, the 

Court agrees.

On September 14, 2012, Defendant Olson cancelled appeal Log No. 12-1879 at the 

first level of review for failure to submit the appeal in a timely fashion.8

 (ECF No. 1-1 at 

26.) Plaintiff alleges in the FAC that Defendant Olson erred in cancelling the appeal and 

failed to investigate the matter adequately. (FAC at ¶ 19.) Defendants contend that 

Plaintiff did not properly challenge the cancellation under California Code of Regulations, 

Title 15, §§ 3084.6(a)(3), (e). (Mot. at p. 13:17-27; Self Decl. at ¶ 10(c).) 

                                               

7

 Plaintiff attaches a Memorandum of Default Notice addressed to Defendant 

Paramo, dated December 13, 2012, in which he deems Log No. 12-1879 exhausted at the 

second level of review because of a delay in responding at the first level. (ECF No. 1-1 at 

67.) However, a letter to the Warden does not relieve Plaintiff from proceeding through 

all the administrative steps required to properly exhaust his claim. See Avery v. Paramo, 

No. 13cv2261 BTM (DHB), 2015 WL 4923820, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2015) 

(Moskowitz, B.). 

8

 “An appeal may be cancelled for any of the following reasons, which include, 

but are not limited to: (4) Time limits for submitting the appeal are exceeded even though 

the inmate or parolee had the opportunity to submit within the prescribed time constraints.” 

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.6(c)(4). 

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According to Defendants, all CDCR Form 602 grievances which do not meet the 

requirements for being reviewed are screened out – rejected or cancelled – by the Appeals 

Coordinator. (Mot. at p. 11 (citing Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.6.); Self Decl. at ¶ 4.) 

“Appeals that are cancelled are returned to the inmate with a letter explaining why the 

appeal is being cancelled.” (Mot. at pp. 11-12; see also Self Decl. at ¶ 4 (citing Cal. Code 

Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.6(c)).) A cancelled appeal may be subsequently accepted if a 

determination is made that cancellation was made in error or new information is received 

that makes the appeal eligible for further review. (Id. at p. 12 (citing Cal. Code Regs. tit. 

15, § 3084.6(a)(3).) If an inmate believes that his CDCR Form 602 has been wrongly 

cancelled, Defendants contend the inmate can file a grievance complaining about the 

wrongful cancellation, or he can provide information upon which the Appeals Coordinator 

can determine whether the cancellation was made in error. (Id.; see also Self Decl. at ¶ 5.) 

Plaintiff alleges he did file a grievance, assigned Log No. 12-2759, complaining 

about the wrongful cancellation of Log No. 12-1879. (FAC at p. 13:5.) However, as 

Defendants point out, Log No. 12-2759 does not address the allegedly erroneous 

cancellation. (Mot. at p. 13:21-27.) Moreover, on November 29, 2012, Log No. 12-2759 

was rejected at the first level of review because it was missing necessary supporting 

documents, involved multiple issues, and concerned an anticipated action or decision. (See

ECF No. 1-1 at 29-31.) Plaintiff did not pursue the appeal to the next level and, as 

discussed below, the appeal was not improperly rejected. (See Self Decl. at ¶ 10(f).) 

Therefore, even if Plaintiff had claimed erroneous cancellation of Log No. 12-1879 in Log 

No. 12-2759, he did not exhaust the claim. 

On December 6, 2012, Plaintiff filed an appeal, assigned Log No. 13-0108, in which 

he does argue that Log No. 12-1879 was cancelled in error. (ECF No. 1-1 at 43 (“Inmate 

contends that the Appeals Coordinator screening [on September 14, 2012] at the first level 

was an error”); Self Decl. at ¶¶ 10(f), (h).) Plaintiff also alleges he never received a 

response to his May 22, 2012 appeal and set forth his prior efforts to follow up regarding 

its status, including his filing of various CDCR Form 602 appeals and CDCR 22 requests. 

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(Id.) Log No. 13-0108 was rejected at the first level of review because it involved multiple 

issues and was “obscured by pointless verbiage or voluminous unrelated documentation.” 

(Id. at 40-41.) Plaintiff has presented no evidence that he sought a second level of review 

or that there was something about this appeal “that made the existing and generally 

available administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him.” Albino, 747 F.3d at 

1172. Thus, the Court finds that the undisputed evidence establishes that Plaintiff failed to 

exhaust available administrative remedies as to appeal Log Nos. 12-1879 and 13-0108. 

Based on the foregoing, Defendants have satisfied their burden of demonstrating that 

Plaintiff failed to exhaust available administrative remedies concerning Plaintiff’s 

retaliation, conspiracy, and due process claims against Defendant Behra arising out of the 

allegedly false statements contained in Defendant Behra’s CDC-128A disciplinary report. 

 d. September 20, 2012 Appeal (Log No. 12-2759)

Plaintiff’s September 20, 2012 appeal, assigned Log No. 12-2759, generally alleges 

a delay in the processing of his earlier appeals as part of a conspiracy to obstruct justice 

and Plaintiff’s access to the courts. (ECF No. 1-1 at 27-28.) Plaintiff also complains that 

Defendant Olson’s response to a CDCR Form 22 request for a status update on his May 

22, 2012 and July 2, 2012 appeals was erroneous. (Id. at 28.) In his response, dated August 

23, 2012, Defendant Olson states that Plaintiff should have received a response to the May 

22, 2012 appeal and that there was a backlog of appeals due to a high volume and staffing 

shortage. (Id. at 28, 34.) Plaintiff claims in Log No. 12-2759 that the evidence contradicted 

Defendant Olson’s response. (Id. at 27-28, 34.) 

As demonstrated by the Self and Voong declarations, Plaintiff did not proceed with 

this appeal through the third level of review. (Self Decl. at ¶ 10(f); Voong Decl. at ¶ 7(a), 

Exh. H.) Accordingly, Defendants have satisfied their initial burden of showing that an 

available administrative remedy existed and that Plaintiff did not exhaust that available 

remedy. See Williams, 775 F.3d at 1191. 

In its prior R&R, the Court similarly found that Defendants had satisfied their initial 

burden of demonstrating there was an available administrative remedy which Plaintiff 

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failed to exhaust with respect to this appeal. (R&R at p. 50.) However, it then proceeded 

to find that “Plaintiff has met his burden of showing that administrative remedies were 

effectively unavailable regarding this appeal” because Defendant Olson screened the 

appeal, although it contained allegations against him. (Id.) In support of this finding, the 

Court cited California Code of Regulations, Title 15, § 3084.7(d)(1)(A), which provides: 

(1) Appeal responses shall not be reviewed and approved by a staff person 

who: (A) Participated in the event or decision being appealed. This does not 

preclude the involvement of staff who may have participated in the event or 

decision being appealed, so long as their involvement with the appeal 

response is necessary in order to determine the facts or to provide 

administrative remedy, and the staff person is not the reviewing authority 

and/or their involvement in the process will not compromise the integrity or 

outcome of the process. 

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.7(d)(1)(A). 

In their present motion, Defendants argue for the first time that “Appeals 

Coordinators do not conduct reviews of 602s. Rather their role is limited to the 

administrative task of processing inmate grievances into the system.” (Mot. at p. 12:11-14 

(citing Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.2(c)); see also Self Decl. at ¶ 6; Mot. at pp. 19-20.) 

Therefore, Defendants contend there is no genuine and material dispute concerning 

whether Plaintiff had available and effective administrative remedies as to this appeal. For 

the following reasons, the Court agrees. 

The participation of appeals coordinators in the screening process is necessary to 

provide an administrative remedy. See Sylvester v. Alameido, No. 2:10-cv-2380 KJN P, 

2012 WL 4038421, at *15 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2012) (acknowledging that Section 

3084.7(d)(1)(A) authorizes participation in review by a staff person who participated in the 

event or decision being appealed when deemed necessary). Under Section 3084.5(b), 

appeals coordinators are tasked with “screen[ing] all appeals prior to acceptance and 

assignment for review.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.5(b). The screening is governed 

by California Code of Regulations, Title 15, §§ 3084, et seq., and is notably distinct from 

review of the underlying facts. Compare Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.5(b) (appeals 

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coordinators tasked with screening all appeals “prior to acceptance and assignment for 

review” (emphasis added)), with § 3084.7(d)(1) (addresses which staff are precluded from 

“reviewing” and “approving” appeal responses). As such, Defendant Olson, as an Appeals 

Coordinator at RJD, necessarily participated in the appeal response to provide an 

administrative remedy and was not the reviewing authority. 

Defendant Olson’s participation also did not compromise the integrity or outcome 

of the process. Both the California Code of Regulations and the Ninth Circuit have put in 

place checks to ensure the integrity of the process. As described above, appeals deemed 

“staff complaints” are processed in such a manner that when an appeal alleges staff 

misconduct by an appeals coordinator, it is initially reviewed by the hiring authority for a 

determination of whether it is to be treated as a staff complaint or a routine appeal. See

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.9(i). In addition, under Ninth Circuit law, improper 

screening of an inmate’s administrative grievances renders administrative remedies 

“effectively unavailable” such that exhaustion is not required. Sapp, 623 F.3d at 823. As 

laid out by the Ninth Circuit in Sapp: 

To fall within this exception, a prisoner must show that he attempted to 

exhaust his administrative remedies but was thwarted by improper screening. 

In particular, the inmate must establish (1) that he actually filed a grievance 

or grievances that, if pursued through all levels of administrative appeals, 

would have sufficed to exhaust the claim that he seeks to pursue in federal 

court, and (2) that prison officials screened his grievance or grievances for 

reasons inconsistent with or unsupported by applicable regulations. 

Sapp, 623 F.3d at 823-24. Therefore, the proper question before the Court is whether 

Defendant Olson screened this appeal “for reasons inconsistent with or unsupported by 

applicable regulations.” See id. 

As an initial matter, Plaintiff did not designate this complaint as a “staff complaint.” 

(See ECF No. 1-1 at 27-28.)9

 Therefore, it was treated as a routine appeal and screened by 

                                               

9

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applicable regulations, and in all instances in which Plaintiff designated an appeal as a staff 

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the appeals coordinator. Next, in his FAC, Plaintiff does not allege that Log No. 12-2759 

was screened for reasons inconsistent with or unsupported by applicable regulations. (See

FAC at p. 13:7-24.) Rather, he only alleges it was improper for Defendant Suglich, who 

initially received the appeal, to forward it to the RJD Appeals Coordinator for review. (Id.; 

see also Rios Decl. at ¶ 9.) Plaintiff also does not make any argument in his Opposition to 

Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment that Log No. 12-2759 was improperly 

screened. (See Rios Decl. at ¶ 9.) The only place Plaintiff makes that argument is in Log 

No. 13-0108. (See ECF No. 1-1 at 42-43.) 

Plaintiff asserts in Log No. 13-0108 that he did attach at least one of the CDCR Form 

22s that were allegedly missing, the CDCR Form 22 dated August 17, 2012. (See id. at 29, 

43.) However, Defendant Olson screened Log No. 12-02759 on several grounds, including 

the following: the appeal was missing necessary documentation (CDCR Form 22 dated 

8/17/12 and CDCR Form 22 to W. Suglich, CDW(A)); the appeal involved multiple issues 

that did not derive from a single event; and the appeal concerned an anticipated action or 

decision. (Id. at 29-31.) Given that Defendant Olson set forth multiple grounds for 

rejection, and any one of them would have served as grounds to reject the appeal, the Court 

finds that Log No. 13-0108 was not improperly screened. Moreover, unlike Log No. 12-

3429, which is discussed below, there was nothing precluding Plaintiff from taking 

corrective action on his appeal, and he chose not to do so. 

                                               

complaint, the appeals coordinator referred it to the hiring authority for review pursuant to 

California Code of Regulations, Title 15, § 3084.9(i). (See ECF No. 1-1 at 24 (for Log No. 

12-1879, Plaintiff stated: “In accordance with Title 15 CCR Sections 3291 and 3391, and 

3084.9(i)(1) . . . .”) and 26 (screening letter indicating it had been reviewed by the hiring 

authority); ECF No. 1-1 at 97 (for Log No. 13-0326, Plaintiff stated: “This is a staff 

complaint . . . in accordance with 15 CCR §§§ 3084(c)(g); 3084.9(i)(1).”) and 101 

(screening letter indicating it had been reviewed by the hiring authority); ECF No. 1-2 at 

90 (for Log No. 14-104, Plaintiff stated: “This is a staff complaint . . . in accordance with 

Title 15 CCR §§§ 3084.9(i)(1), 3291 and 3391(d).”) and 92 (screening letter indicating it 

had been reviewed by the hiring authority). 

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 Therefore, the Court finds Defendants have satisfied their burden of demonstrating 

that Plaintiff failed to exhaust available administrative remedies concerning Plaintiff’s 

conspiracy claim against Defendant Olson arising out of Defendant Olson’s August 22, 

2012 CDCR Form 22 response. 

 e. October 30, 2012 Appeal (Log No. Unassigned)

 In his October 30, 2012 appeal, which was never assigned a log number, Plaintiff 

alleges that in connection with his prior appeals, i.e., his May 22, 2012, June 11, 2012, and 

July 2, 2012 appeals, “the AC have Obstructed inmate access to the court and intentionally 

refuse to process inmate’s above mentioned grievances as required by law under the First 

Amendment of U.S. Constitution and CDCR Own rules and Regulations. Inmate contends 

that in [sic] several occasssions [sic] I have attempted to resolve this matter without the 

necessary [sic] of litigation without any results.” (ECF No. 1-1 at 38-39.) 

 In its prior R&R, the Court found that “[a]lthough the appeal was addressed to 

Defendant Suglich, the appeal did not identify any specific individual as required by the 

applicable regulations.” (R&R at p. 51:18-20.) Therefore, the Court held that Plaintiff’s 

October 30, 2012 appeal failed to adequately identify any individual Defendant and, 

therefore, this appeal was not properly exhausted.10 (Id. at pp. 51-52.) In the FAC, Plaintiff 

alleges that he provided “sufficient facts, title and office [sic] name responsible for the 

processing of Plaintiff’s grievances and RJDCF only employed two appeals coordinators 

staff, so the Plaintiff adequately provide [sic] other available information that would assist 

the Supervisor Suglich in making a reasonable attempt to identify the staff member in 

question.” (FAC at p. 14:1-6; see also Rios Decl. at ¶ 10.) 

                                               

10 The Court notes there is a material dispute as to whether Plaintiff ever 

submitted his October 30, 2012 appeal. The prison records do not reflect its existence. But 

Plaintiff alleges under penalty of perjury that he did. While this genuine factual dispute 

could preclude summary judgment as to this claim, see supra Part II(B)(2)(a), summary 

judgment is nevertheless warranted because the appeal fails to identify any specific 

Defendant, in violation of the applicable prison appeal regulations. 

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 For the reasons stated in its prior R&R, however, namely the fact that “the 

undisputed evidence demonstrates that Plaintiff could have identified the name of the 

individuals engaging in misconduct because the appeal was based on administrative 

responses received by Plaintiff that specifically identified the responding officials,” see

R&R at p. 51:21-25, the Court finds Plaintiff’s October 30, 2012 appeal fails to adequately 

identify any individual Defendant and, therefore, is not properly exhausted. See Parks v. 

Chappell, No. C-13-4048 EMC (pr), 2015 WL 3466280, at *4-5 (N.D. Cal. June 1, 2015) 

(finding the plaintiff did not properly exhaust his remedies where he failed to name the 

defendant in his appeal although he could have done so); Woodford, 548 U.S. at 93 (finding 

that the PLRA exhaustion requirement requires “proper exhaustion”). 

 f. November 19, 2012 Appeal (Log No. 12-3429)

 In his November 19, 2012 appeal, assigned Log No. 12-3429, Plaintiff alleges that 

Defendant Abad violated his due process rights by not providing a timely response to 

Plaintiff’s request for a UCC review based on his contention that he was improperly 

removed from his job assignment. (ECF No. 1-1 at 79-80, 83.) In the appeal, Plaintiff 

requests that he be scheduled for a UCC review at the next reasonable opportunity and that 

he be ordered to return to his job assignment. (Id. at 79.) 

 Based on the evidence presented in the Self and Voong declarations showing that 

Plaintiff did not proceed with appeal Log No. 12-3429 through the third level of review, 

the Court finds Defendants have satisfied their initial burden under Albino. (See Self Decl. 

at ¶ 10(g); Voong Decl. at ¶ 7(a), Exh. H.) Therefore, the burden shifts to Plaintiff to come 

forward with evidence showing that there is something with this appeal “that made the 

existing and generally available administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him.” 

Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172. 

In its prior R&R, the Court found that Plaintiff satisfied his burden of showing that 

the first level of review rejection was improper and, therefore, administrative remedies 

were effectively unavailable. (R&R at pp. 53-54.) The Court noted that Defendants Olson 

and Ramirez sent Plaintiff a screening letter on December 28, 2012 rejecting the appeal 

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because it was missing necessary supporting documents, including the “128 UCC Removal 

from job” and the “CDCR 22 complete through section D.” (Id.; see also ECF No. 1-1 at 

81.) However, as discussed by the Court, a genuine factual dispute exists regarding 

whether the appeal could have included the “CDCR 22 completed through section D, i.e., 

the supervisor’s response, when the evidence Plaintiff submits indicates that Plaintiff never 

received a response to his request.” (See R&R at p. 53.) 

In their present Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Defendants do not address 

the Court’s concern or resolve this genuine factual dispute. Defendants simply state that 

“Plaintiff never re-submitted the appeal with the necessary documents attached, even 

though he could have done so.” (Mot. at p. 14:22-24; 15:10-14.) Accordingly, for the 

reasons set forth in the Court’s prior R&R, see R&R at pp. 53-54, the Court finds that 

Defendants have not satisfied their burden of demonstrating that Plaintiff failed to exhaust 

available administrative remedies concerning Plaintiff’s due process claim against 

Defendant Abad arising out of Defendant Abad’s alleged delay in responding to Plaintiff’s 

request for a UCC review.11

 g. December 13, 2012 Appeal (Log No. 13-00372)

 In his December 13, 2012 appeal, assigned Log No. 13-00372, Plaintiff alleges that 

non-party officers Cobb and Stratton, along with Defendants Olson, Ramirez, and Suglich, 

failed to provide reasonable and adequate administrative remedies and failed to timely 

respond to his grievances as part of a conspiracy to retaliate against him, cause intentional 

delay, obstruct his access to the courts, and cover-up wrongdoing of other officers in 

connection with the May 22, 2012 incident. (ECF No. 1-1 at 64, 66.) Plaintiff also alleges 

                                               

11 Plaintiff alleges Log No. 12-3429 also addresses the actions of Defendants 

Benyard and Cavazos. (FAC at ¶ 24; Rios Decl. at ¶ 11.) However, the undisputed 

evidence demonstrates that this appeal only identifies Defendant Abad. Thus, Defendants 

have satisfied their burden of demonstrating that Plaintiff failed to exhaust available 

administrative remedies as against Defendants Benyard and Cavazos based on his delayed 

UCC review claim. 

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that administrative remedies are futile, unavailable, and inadequate, and he requests that 

his prior grievances identified in appeal Log No. 13-0037212 be deemed exhausted. (Id.) 

 In its prior R&R, the Court found that Plaintiff did not proceed with appeal Log No. 

13-00372 through the third level of review. (R&R at pp. 55-56.) Plaintiff has presented 

no evidence contradicting this finding. Based on the evidence presented in the Self and 

Voong declarations, Plaintiff’s appeal was screened out and returned to Plaintiff on January 

22, 2013, and he did not re-submit the appeal. (Self Decl. at ¶ 10(k); Voong Decl. at ¶ 

9(b).) Accordingly, the Court finds Defendants have satisfied their initial burden under 

Albino. 

 In his Opposition, Plaintiff argues the appeal was screened out in violation of 

California Code of Regulations, Title 15, § 3084.7(d)(1)(A), because the appeal brings 

allegations against Defendants Olson and Ramirez, among others, and Defendants Olson 

and Ramirez screened the appeal. (Rios Decl. at ¶ 11; see also ECF No. 1-1 at 70-72.) As 

discussed above, however, Defendants Olson and Ramirez were performing a necessary 

administrative function and therefore were not necessarily prohibited from screening the 

appeal. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.7(d)(1)(A). The proper question is whether 

Defendants Olson and Ramirez screened the appeal “for reasons inconsistent with or 

unsupported by applicable regulations.” See Sapp, 623 F.3d at 823-24. Plaintiff does not 

make any arguments or present any evidence that Log No. 13-00372 was improperly 

screened.13 (See FAC at ¶ 22; Rios Decl. at ¶ 12; ECF No. 82 at 15.) Plaintiff had an 

                                               

12 Appeal Log No. 13-00372 identifies the following prior CDCR Form 602s 

and Form 22s: (1) unassigned 5/22/12 appeal; (2) CDCR Form 22 dated 6/10/12; (3) Log 

No. 12-1879; (4) Log No. 12-2759 (acknowledged as still pending); (5) 7/12/12 CDCR 

Form 22; (6) 8/17/12 CDCR Form 22; (7) 10/18/12 CDCR Form 22; (8) 10/21/12 CDCR 

Form 22; (9) 10/24/12 CDCR Form 22; and (10) unassigned 10/30/12 appeal. (ECF No. 

1-1 at 64, 66.) 

13 Defendants Olson and Ramirez rejected Log No. 13-00372 on the following 

grounds: (1) it was missing necessary supporting documents (the original CDCR Form 

602s), see Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.6(b)(7); (2) the appeal involves multiple issues 

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opportunity to re-submit his appeal and correct the deficiencies identified by Defendants 

Olson and Ramirez, and chose not to do so.14

 Given the foregoing, the Court finds Defendants have satisfied their burden of 

demonstrating that Plaintiff failed to exhaust available administrative remedies concerning 

Plaintiff’s conspiracy, retaliation, and due process claims against Defendants Olson, 

Ramirez, and Suglich arising out of their handling of the following administrative appeals: 

(1) unassigned 5/22/12 appeal; (2) CDCR Form 22 dated 6/10/12; (3) Log No. 12-1879; 

(4) Log No. 12-2759; (5) 7/12/12 CDCR Form 22; (6) 8/17/12 CDCR Form 22; (7) 

10/18/12 CDCR Form 22; (8) 10/21/12 CDCR Form 22; (9) 10/24/12 CDCR Form 22; and 

(10) unassigned 10/30/12 appeal. (ECF No. 1-1 at 64, 66.) 

 h. February 14, 2013 Appeal (Log No. 13-00777)

 Plaintiff alleges property deprivation and retaliation claims against Defendant 

Zuniga in his February 14, 2013 appeal, assigned Log No. 13-00777. (ECF No. 1-1 at 128, 

130.) Defendants acknowledge that Plaintiff exhausted Log No. 13-00777 through the 

third level of review. (Mot. at p. 10:20-21; p. 20:20-21; Self Decl. at ¶ 9(d).) As a result, 

Defendants have conceded that Plaintiff has exhausted a retaliation claim against 

                                               

that do not derive from a single event, or are not directly related, see Cal. Code Regs. tit. 

15, § 3084.6(b)(8); and (3) supporting documents were attached (letters), see Cal. Code 

Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.6(b)(12). (ECF No. 1-1 at 70-72.) Although Plaintiff alleges a 

conspiracy, which is a single issue which may derive from multiple events, and therefore 

does not necessarily fall under Section 3084.6(b)(8), because Plaintiff seeks in the appeal 

to have multiple unrelated appeals reviewed and deemed exhausted, the appeal cannot be 

reasonably addressed in a single response. Therefore, the Court finds the appeal was not 

improperly rejected under Section 3084.6(b)(8). As stated in the rejection letter, Plaintiff 

was not precluded from addressing his issues with each appeal separately. (ECF No. 1-1 

at 71.) 

14 The Court notes that Plaintiff submitted this appeal to the Office of Appeals 

in February 2013, but it was rejected in March 2013 for having improperly bypassed a 

required lower level of review. (ECF No. 1-1 at 64, 66, 74.) 

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Defendant Zuniga.15 (Mot. at p. 21:9-10.) 

 However, as explained in the Court’s prior R&R, the evidence before the Court 

plainly demonstrates that Plaintiff did not exhaust any claims against Defendant Zuniga 

based on Log No. 13-00777 prior to filing suit. The third level appeal decision included 

as an exhibit to the Self declaration is dated July 25, 2014 (Self Decl. at ¶ 9(d), Exh. A), 

nearly three months after the filing of Plaintiff’s Complaint on April 28, 2014 (ECF No. 

1). The Self and Voong declarations also indicate the appeal was denied at the third level 

of review on July 25, 2014. (Self Decl. at ¶ 9(d); Voong Decl. at ¶ 8(h).) Although Plaintiff 

had requested consideration of this appeal at the third level of review on February 25, 2012 

prior to filing suit (see ECF No. 1-1 at 129), prisoners must exhaust administrative 

remedies before filing suit. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (“No action shall be brought with respect 

to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner 

confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies 

as are available are exhausted.”); Jones, 549 U.S. at 211 (“There is no question that 

exhaustion is mandatory under the PLRA and that unexhausted claims cannot be brought 

in court.” (citing Porter, 534 U.S. at 524)); Albino, 747 F.3d at 1171 (“The PLRA mandates 

that inmates exhaust all available administrative remedies before filing ‘any suit 

challenging prison conditions,’ including, but not limited to, suits under § 1983.” (emphasis 

added) (quoting Woodford, 548 U.S. at 85)); Cano v. Taylor, 739 F.3d 1214, 1219 (9th Cir. 

2014) (“The Ninth Circuit has explained that Congress purposely made exhaustion a 

precondition to suit, rather than to judgment, and this was done with the goal of affording 

corrections officials the opportunity to address complaints internally.” (citing McKinney v. 

Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1200-01 (9th Cir. 2002) (per curiam)). 

 Plaintiff argues he should be excused from this requirement because it took over a 

                                               

15 Defendants do not appear to concede that this appeal exhausts any other 

claims against Defendant Zuniga, including Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Zuniga 

for retaliation, conspiracy, due process, and intentional deprivation of personal property. 

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year for his appeal to be exhausted at the third level of review. (FAC at ¶ 35; Rios Decl. 

at ¶ 16.) Plaintiff cites California Code of Regulations, Title 15, § 3084.8, which sets forth 

time limits for appeal. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.8. Section 3084.8(c) states that first 

and second level responses shall be completed within thirty working days from the date of 

receipt by the appeals coordinator, while third level responses shall be completed within 

sixty working dates from date of receipt by the third level Appeals Chief. Id. at § 3084.8(c). 

Deviation from these time limits is expressly authorized in certain circumstances, including 

the “‘[u]navailability of the inmate or parolee, or staff, or witnesses,’ and where “[t]he 

complexity of the decision, action or policy require[s] additional research.’” Id. at § 

3084.8(d)(1), (2). Under Section 3084.8(e), “[e]xcept for the third level, if an exceptional 

delay prevents completion of the review within specified time limits, the appellant, within 

the time limits provided [above], shall be provided an explanation of the reasons for the 

delay and the estimated completion date.” Id. at § 3084.8(e). 

On November 14, 2012, CDCR sent a Memorandum to all Facility C Inmates and 

Housing Units, advising them that CDCR is “looking at 3 to 4 months to catch up on the 

amount of 602s the [sic] have stacked up.” (ECF No. 1-1 at 69.) Plaintiff was also 

interviewed on January 28, 2013 by Defendant Suglich regarding Plaintiff’s concerns about 

the timely processing of his appeals and Form 22’s, and informed that the recent changes 

within the Inmate Appeals Office has “caused a slight delay in the processing of appeals.” 

(ECF No. 1-1 at 68.) Because of the unavailability of CDCR staff, the Court does not find 

that strict compliance with the deadlines set forth in Section 3084.8(c) was required.16 

Moreover, the evidence demonstrates Plaintiff was not only provided with an explanation 

for the delay, but he was able to exhaust his appeal through the third level. Thus, Plaintiff 

                                               

16 Plaintiff alleges in his FAC that several of his appeals should be deemed 

exhausted because CDCR did not respond to them in a timely manner. For the reasons 

discussed with respect to Log No. 13-00777, the Court does not consider them deemed 

exhausted because they were untimely. 

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is not excused from exhausting his claim prior to filing this lawsuit. 

 In conclusion, based on the record before the Court, Plaintiff failed to fully exhaust 

appeal Log No. 13-00777 before filing suit. Therefore, he did not exhaust his property 

deprivation and retaliation claims against Defendant Zuniga on the basis of this appeal. 

However, summary judgment in favor of Defendant Zuniga as to the retaliation and due 

process property deprivation claims is not warranted because, as set forth below, triable 

issues of fact remain as to these claims against Defendant Zuniga based on a separate 

appeal, Log No. 13-1365. 

 i. April 17, 2013 Appeal (Log No. 13-1365)

 In his April 17, 2013 appeal, assigned Log No. 13-1365, Plaintiff asserts claims 

against Defendants Benyard and Zuniga, and non-parties Alvarez and Rutledge, for 

allegedly conspiring to retaliate against Plaintiff by depriving Plaintiff of his personal 

property without due process of law. (FAC at ¶ 46, pp. 4-5; ECF No. 1-2 at 38-39.) 

As demonstrated by the Self and Voong declarations, Plaintiff did not proceed with 

this appeal through the third level of review. (Self Decl. at ¶ 10(l); Voong Decl. at ¶ 8(c).) 

On April 22, 2013, Defendants Olson and Ramirez cancelled appeal Log No. 13-1365 as 

untimely because the February 25, 2013 date on which Plaintiff was informed by the staff 

that his television could not be located was more than thirty days before he filed the appeal, 

in violation of California Code of Regulations, Title 15, § 3084.6(c)(4). (ECF No. 1-2 at 

40.) Plaintiff filed appeals challenging this cancellation, and while he succeeded in 

exhausting one of his challenges through the third level of review, this challenge was 

denied.17 Based on this evidence, Defendants have satisfied their initial burden under 

                                               

17 On April 24, 2013, Plaintiff filed a grievance alleging improper cancellation 

of Log No. 13-1365, which was assigned Log No. 13-1467 and rejected at the first level of 

review. (Self Decl. at ¶ 9 (m); ECF No. 1-2 at 48-50.) On May 15, 2013, Plaintiff filed 

another grievance alleging improper cancellation of Log No. 13-1365, which was assigned 

Log No. 13-01753 and denied at the third level of review. (Self Decl. at ¶ 9(f); Voong 

Decl. at ¶ 8(c); ECF No. 1-2 at 57-58.) Therefore, Plaintiff has exhausted his claim that 

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Albino of showing that Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies as to the claims 

asserted in this appeal. 

 In its prior R&R, however, the Court found there was a genuine issue of material 

fact as to whether administrative remedies were effectively unavailable regarding this 

appeal because Plaintiff had introduced evidence suggesting that the appeal was improperly 

cancelled as untimely. (R&R at pp. 58-59.) Because Defendants do not identify any claims 

against Defendants Benyard and Zuniga in their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 

arising out of this appeal, they do not address the issues previously raised by the Court in 

their present motion. 

 Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in its prior R&R, the Court finds Defendants 

have not satisfied their burden of demonstrating that Plaintiff failed to exhaust available 

administrative remedies concerning Plaintiff’s conspiracy, retaliation, and due process 

claims against Defendants Benyard and Zuniga based on the allegations set forth in appeal 

Log No. 13-1365. 

 j. April 10, 2013 Appeal (Log No. 13-01319) 

 In his April 10, 2013 appeal, assigned Log No. 13-01319, Plaintiff alleges 

Defendants Benyard and Hernandez, and non-party officers Smith and Spence, violated his 

rights under the First, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments by conspiring to retaliate 

against Plaintiff and deprive him of due process protections in relation to Plaintiff’s March 

18, 2013 RVR hearing. (ECF No. 1-1 at 107, 109.) Because this appeal was processed 

through the third level of review, Plaintiff has exhausted his claims in this appeal. (See

ECF No. 1-1 at 105-112; R&R at p. 58; see also Self Decl. at ¶ 9(e), Exh. B; Voong Decl. 

at ¶ 8(d), Exh. D.)18

                                               

the cancellation of Log No. 13-1365 was erroneous, but not the underlying claims listed in 

Log No. 13-1365. 

18 Although appeal Log No. 13-01319 was granted in part at the third level of 

review because Plaintiff had not been provided with medical reports sufficiently in advance 

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 In their present motion, Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff exhausted his claims 

in Log No. 13-01319. (See Mot. at p. 17:10-12.) Rather, Defendants argue that Plaintiff 

has not alleged any claims with respect to his March 18, 2013 RVR hearing in the FAC. 

(Id. at pp. 16-17.) The Court agrees.19 Therefore, although Defendants have not satisfied 

their burden of demonstrating that Plaintiff failed to exhaust available administrative 

remedies concerning Plaintiff’s conspiracy, retaliation, and due process claims against 

Defendants Benyard and Hernandez arising out of the March 18, 2013 RVR disciplinary 

hearing, such claims are not raised in the FAC. 

k. August 5, 2013 & August 21, 2013 Appeals (Log Nos. 

Unassigned)

 In his August 5, 2013 appeal, which was not assigned a log number, Plaintiff alleges 

equal protection, ADA, retaliation, due process, and conspiracy claims against several RJD 

officials, including Defendants Benyard, Cavazos, and Paramo for their refusal to consider 

Plaintiff’s job termination complaint during the July 23, 2013 UCC review. (ECF No. 1-1 

at 86-87.) Plaintiff claims he never received a response to this appeal. (FAC at ¶ 39.) 

Similarly, in his August 21, 2013 appeal, which also was not assigned a log number, 

Plaintiff alleges discrimination, retaliation, due process, and conspiracy claims against 

Defendants Benyard, Cavazos, and Paramo due to their refusal during the July 23, 2013 

UCC review to permit Plaintiff to participate in re-entry programs and to re-consider 

Plaintiff’s job termination. (ECF No. 1-1 at 89-90.) 

 Defendants rely on the Self and Voong declarations for the position that Plaintiff 

never filed the appeals, let alone exhausted the appeals through the third level of review. 

(Mot. at pp. 15-16; Self Decl. at Exh. L; Voong Decl. at Exh. H.) Thus, Defendants have 

                                               

of the RVR disciplinary hearing, and the RVR was re-issued and re-heard (see ECF No. 1-

2 at 105-06), Plaintiff nevertheless exhausted his claims asserted in the appeal. 

19 See also ECF No. 82 at 11 (specifying that Plaintiff’s claims relate to the 

October 16, 2013 RVR hearing). 

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satisfied their initial burden under Albino of demonstrating that an available administrative 

remedy exists and that Plaintiff did not exhaust that available remedy. 

In his FAC, Plaintiff alleges that he filed both CDCR Form 602s, but never received 

a response. (See FAC at ¶ 39.)20 In light of Plaintiff’s sworn statement under penalty of 

perjury that he filed his August 5, 2015 and August 21, 2015 appeals but never received a 

response, Plaintiff has satisfied his burden of demonstrating administrative remedies were 

effectively unavailable to him. (See R&R at pp. 59-61.) The failure to respond to a 

grievance makes remedies “unavailable” and therefore excuses the failure to exhaust. 

Sapp, 623 F.3d at 822.

In their present motion, Defendants argue for the first time that although they have 

no record of the appeals, the grievance procedure was available to Plaintiff, as evidenced 

by the fact that between May 2012 and October 2015, the RJD Appeals Coordinators 

received and assigned log numbers to thirty-two grievances from Plaintiff, including three 

in August 2013. (Mot. at pp. 15-16; Self Decl. at ¶ 9(a)-(o).) The Court finds this argument 

unavailing. In Williams, the defendants similarly argued that remedies were available to 

the plaintiff “as evidenced by the multiple unrelated appeals that she was able to file 

successfully.” Williams, 775 F.3d at 1192. In response, the Ninth Circuit stated that “[t]his 

                                               

20 The Court notes that Plaintiff’s sworn allegations are not contradicted by the 

evidence submitted. Plaintiff submitted two CDCR Form 22s, dated August 5, 2013 and 

August 21, 2013, respectively, which apparently accompanied the CDCR Form 602s. (See

ECF No. 1-1 at 88; ECF No. 1-1 at 91.) The CDCR Form 22s state that the CDCR Form 

602s were delivered to staff and both CDCR Form 22s appear to be signed as received by 

R. Dopwell. (See ECF No. 1-1 at 88; ECF NO. 1-1 at 91; cf. ECF No. 1-2 at 30.) As with 

the May 22, 2012 appeal, however, it is uncertain whether Plaintiff properly filed these 

appeals. Both appeals are stamped as being “Received” on January 16, 2014 by the Inmate 

Appeals Branch. The records of the Inmate Appeals Branch appear to reflect that at least 

one of these appeals was received on January 16, 2014, but screened out because it was not 

authorized to bypass any level. (See Voong Decl. at ¶ 11, Exh. H.) This indicates that 

Plaintiff may have improperly submitted these appeals directly to the Inmate Appeals 

Branch in an attempt to bypass the first level of review. 

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argument is a virtual non-sequitur because it does nothing to rebut [the plaintiff’s] evidence 

that administrative remedies were not available to her at the time she tried to file the 

relevant grievance and appeal in this case.” Id. Therefore, the Court finds Defendants 

have failed to demonstrate that remedies were effectively available with respect to these 

particular appeals. 

 Because there remains facts in dispute as to whether these grievances were properly 

filed and whether there were generally available administrative remedies effectively 

available to Plaintiff as to these appeals, the Court finds Defendants have not satisfied their 

burden of demonstrating that Plaintiff failed to exhaust available administrative remedies 

concerning Plaintiff’s equal protection, discrimination, ADA, retaliation, due process, and 

conspiracy claims against Defendants Benyard, Cavazos, and Paramo arising out of the 

July 23, 2013 UCC review.

 l. November 7, 2013 Appeal (Log No. 13-3607)

 In his November 7, 2013 appeal, assigned Log No. 13-3607, Plaintiff asserts 

retaliation, conspiracy, and due process claims against Defendants Allamby, Benyard, 

Cortez, Hernandez, and Jones. (ECF No. 1-2 at 84-85.) Plaintiff alleges that during the 

October 17, 2013 RVR disciplinary re-hearing, Defendant Allamby wrongly denied his 

request that a Staff Assistant be interviewed and that the video recording of Plaintiff’s 

February 4, 2013 Ad-Seg hearing with Defendant Benyard be reviewed, thus depriving 

Plaintiff of a fair and impartial disciplinary hearing. (Id.) Plaintiff also alleges Defendants 

Cortez and Jones made false statements during the re-hearing. (Id.) 

 Relying on the Self declaration, Defendants assert that Log No. 13-3607 was rejected 

at the first level of review because it was missing necessary supporting documents and 

attached dividers, and Plaintiff opted not to pursue the appeal, even though he could have. 

(Mot. at p. 17:3-9; Self Decl. at ¶ 10(t); see also ECF No. 1-2 at 85-89.) 

In its prior R&R, the Court held that although Plaintiff was unable to show that he 

exhausted this appeal to the third level of review, he produced sufficient evidence 

demonstrating a factual dispute as to whether he ever filed this appeal in the first place, and 

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if so, whether the prison’s failure to process the re-submitted appeal effectively made 

administrative remedies unavailable. (R&R at p. 61.) In so holding, the Court relied on 

Defendants’ omission of the appeal in its supporting declaration and Plaintiff’s allegation 

and evidence that on November 25, 2013, he re-submitted his appeal after taking corrective 

measures and that he accompanied his appeal with a CDCR Form 22 signed by non-party 

officer J. Delgado verifying receipt of the re-submitted appeal, and never received a 

response. (Id.) 

Plaintiff re-submits the same evidence here. (See Rios Decl. at ¶ 21; see also ECF 

No. 1-2 at 87.) While Defendants now identify Log No. 13-3607 as being received (Self 

Decl. at ¶ 10(t), Exh. J) in their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Defendants fail to 

address the material dispute of fact as to whether Plaintiff re-submitted his appeal. The 

failure to respond to a grievance makes remedies “unavailable” and therefore excuses the 

failure to exhaust. See Sapp, 623 F.3d at 822. 

Accordingly, the Court finds Defendants have not satisfied their burden of 

demonstrating that Plaintiff failed to exhaust available administrative remedies as to his 

retaliation, conspiracy, and due process claims against Defendants Allamby, Benyard, 

Cortez, Hernandez, and Jones arising from the October 17, 2013 RVR disciplinary hearing. 

 m. December 11, 2013 Appeal (Log No. 14-104)

 In his December 11, 2013 appeal, assigned Log No. 14-104, Plaintiff asserts claims 

against Defendants Benyard, Olson, Paramo, and Ramirez and their unidentified “agents” 

for allegedly conspiring to retaliate against Plaintiff by refusing to process his grievances 

and depriving him of access to the courts. (ECF No. 1-2 at 90-91.) Plaintiff identifies 

several “overdue” grievances that he had unsuccessfully tried to resolve, including: (1) Log 

No. 12-2398; (2) Log No. 13-00777; (3) August 5, 2013 appeal (unassigned Log No.); (4) 

August 21, 2013 appeal (unassigned Log No.); (5) Log No. 13-2693; and (6) Log No. 13-

3607. (Id.) Plaintiff seeks to have the listed grievances processed in a timely manner and 

to have the named officials halt their retaliation and conspiracy. (Id. at 90.) On January 

13, 2014, Defendants Olson and Ramirez rejected the appeal at the first level of review for 

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non-compliance with California Code of Regulations, Title 15, § 3084.6(b)(8) for 

involving multiple issues that do not derive from a single event, with instruction for 

Plaintiff to address his issues with each appeal separately. (Id. at 92.) 

As demonstrated by the Self and Voong declarations, Plaintiff did not proceed with 

this appeal through the third level of review. (Self Decl. at ¶ 10(u); Voong Decl. at ¶ 11, 

Exh. H; Mot. at p. 17:20-25.) Accordingly, Defendants have satisfied their initial burden 

of showing that an available administrative remedy existed and that Plaintiff did not 

exhaust that available remedy. See Williams, 775 F.3d at 1191. 

 The Court previously found that Defendants were unable to satisfy their burden of 

proving that Plaintiff failed to exhaust available administrative remedies because the appeal 

was omitted from Defendants’ supporting declarations, and because Defendants Olson and 

Ramirez rejected the appeal while also being named in the appeal. (R&R at pp. 62-63.) 

The same concerns are no longer present. The Self declaration and Inmate/Parolee Appeals 

Tracking System records attached thereto do acknowledge receipt of the appeal. (See Self 

Decl. at ¶¶10(u), Exh. K; ¶ 12, Exh. L.) Moreover, as discussed above, Defendants Olson 

and Ramirez were not necessarily precluded from screening the appeal.21 

The proper question is whether Defendants Olson and Ramirez screened the appeal 

“for reasons inconsistent with or unsupported by applicable regulations.” See Sapp, 623 

F.3d at 823-24. Plaintiff makes no argument that the screening was improper, except for 

the general allegation that “Plaintiff’s grievances were subjected to improper rejections and 

cancellations.” (See Rios Decl. at ¶ 22.) On January 13, 2014, Defendants Olson and 

Ramirez rejected the appeal because it “involves multiple issues that do not derive from a 

single event, or are not directly related and cannot be reasonably addressed in a single 

                                               

21 Although designated as a staff complaint, the rejection letter states: “The 

Hiring Authority reviewed this appeal and determined that it did not meet the requirement 

for assignment as a staff complaint and was referred for routine appeal processing.” (ECF 

No. 1-2 at 92.) 

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response due to this fact,” citing California Code of Regulations, Title 15, § 3084.6(b)(8). 

(ECF No. 1-2 at 92.) In his appeal, Plaintiff seeks to have several unrelated grievances 

processed in a timely manner. (Id. at 90.) Accordingly, Defendants Olson and Ramirez 

did not improperly screen Log No. 14-104.22

 In conclusion, the Court finds Defendants have satisfied their burden of 

demonstrating that Plaintiff failed to exhaust available administrative remedies concerning 

Plaintiff’s conspiracy and retaliation claims against Defendants Benyard, Olson, Paramo, 

and Ramirez arising out of their handling of Plaintiff’s administrative appeals identified in 

appeal Log No. 14-104. 

 n. January 21, 2014 Appeal (Log No. Unassigned)

On January 21, 2014, Plaintiff filed an appeal that was never assigned a log number 

in which he alleges the ACO failed to timely respond to his grievances rendering 

administrative remedies futile, unavailable, or inadequate. Plaintiff references his two 

prior attempts to address this issue, on November 7, 2013, appeal Log No. 13-3607, and 

on December 11, 2013, appeal Log No. 14-104. (ECF No. 1-2 at 95-96.) Plaintiff alleges 

he never received a response to his January 21, 2014 appeal. (ECF No. 48 at 7:14-15.) 

 Not only is Plaintiff unable to show that he exhausted this appeal to the third level 

of review, the appeal did not identify any specific individual as required by the applicable 

regulations. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.2(a)(3). Rather, the appeal only makes 

allegations against the ACO. However, the undisputed evidence demonstrates that Plaintiff 

could have identified the name of the individuals engaging in misconduct because the 

                                               

22 As discussed above, although Plaintiff alleges a conspiracy, which is a single 

issue which may derive from multiple events, and therefore does not necessarily fall under 

Section 3084.6(b)(8), because Plaintiff seeks in the appeal to have multiple unrelated 

appeals reviewed and processed, the appeal cannot be reasonably addressed in a single 

response. Therefore, the Court finds the appeal was not improperly rejected under Section 

3084.6(b)(8). As stated in the rejection letter, Plaintiff was not precluded from addressing 

his issues with each appeal separately. (ECF No. 1-2 at 92.) 

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appeal was based on administrative responses received by Plaintiff that specifically 

identified the responding officials. See Parks, 2015 WL 3466280, at *4-5; Woodford, 548 

U.S. at 93. 

 In conclusion, Plaintiff’s January 21, 2014 appeal23 fails to adequately identify any 

individual Defendant and, therefore, this appeal is not properly exhausted. 

 4. Conclusion 

 Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ 

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. 

Specifically, the Court concludes that Defendants have satisfied their burden of providing 

undisputed evidence that Plaintiff failed to exhaust available administrative remedies as to 

the following: 

 Conspiracy, retaliation, and denial of access to courts claims against 

Defendants Olson and Ramirez;24

 Conspiracy, retaliation, and due process claims against Defendant Behra 

arising out of the allegedly false statements contained in his CDC-128A 

disciplinary report;25

                                               

23 The Court notes there is a material dispute as to whether Plaintiff ever 

submitted his January 21, 2014 appeal. The prison records do not reflect its existence, but 

Plaintiff alleges under penalty of perjury that he did file the grievance. While this genuine 

factual dispute could preclude summary judgment as to this claim, as discussed herein, 

summary judgment is nevertheless warranted because the appeal fails to identify any 

specific Defendant, in violation of the applicable prison appeal regulations. 

24 Therefore, Plaintiff has exhausted no claims alleged in the FAC against 

Defendants Olson and Ramirez. (See Log Nos. 12-2146, 13-00372, 14-104, 12-2759; FAC 

at p. 10, ¶¶ 52, 55.) 

25 (See Log Nos. 12-1879, 13-0108, 12-2759.) There remains a dispute of fact, 

however, whether Plaintiff exhausted retaliation and conspiracy claims against Defendant 

Behra arising out of Defendant Behra’s involvement in “plan[ning] and plant[ing] a 

controlled contraband in the inmates’ open work area to injure, oppress, or intimidate 

[Plaintiff],” which resulted in Plaintiff losing his job assignment. (See May 22, 2012 

appeal.) 

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 Conspiracy, retaliation, and denial of access to courts claims against 

Defendants Suglich and Paramo;26 and 

 Conspiracy, retaliation, and due process claims against Defendant Abad 

arising out of the July 23, 2013 UCC hearing.27

 Accordingly, summary judgment should be granted on these claims as against these 

Defendants only. As to all remaining claims and Defendants, genuine issues of material 

fact preclude summary judgment. 

B. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 73) 

 Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s FAC pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6) on the following grounds: (1) Plaintiff’s retaliation claims, due-process 

claims, and conspiracy claims against Allamby, Benyard, Cortez, Jones, and Hernandez, 

arising out of the RVR for fighting, are barred under Heck v. Humphrey; (2) Plaintiff failed 

to state a retaliation claim against Defendants Paramo, Suglich, Benyard, Cavazos, Abad, 

Cortez, Jones, Allamby, and Hernandez; (3) Plaintiff failed to state a due-process claim 

against Defendants Abad, Allamby, Behra, Benyard, Cavazos, Cortez, Jones, and 

Hernandez; (4) Plaintiff failed to state an equal-protection claim against Defendants 

Benyard, Cavazos, and Abad; (5) Plaintiff failed to state an ADA claim against Defendants 

Benyard and Cavazos; (6) Plaintiff failed to state a conspiracy claim against Defendants 

Abad, Allamby, Benyard, Cavazos, Cortez, Hernandez, Jones, Paramo, and Suglich; and 

(7) Defendants Paramo, Suglich, Benyard, Cavazos, Abad, Cortez, Jones, Allamby, 

Hernandez, and Behra are protected by qualified immunity from liability for damages in 

                                               

26 Therefore, Plaintiff has exhausted no claims alleged in the FAC against 

Defendants Suglich and Paramo. (See Log Nos. 13-0372, 14-104, 12-2146, and unassigned 

October 30, 2012 and January 21, 2014 appeals; FAC at pp. 8-10, ¶¶ 51, 55.) 

27 The August 5, 2013 and August 21, 2013 appeals do not identify Defendant 

Abad. However, there remains a dispute as to whether Plaintiff exhausted his due process 

claim against Defendant Abad arising out of Defendant Abad’s alleged failure to provide 

a timely response to Plaintiff’s request for a UCC review based on his contention that he 

was improperly removed from his job assignment. (See Log No. 12-3429; FAC at p. 2.) 

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their individual capacities for certain of Plaintiff’s claims. (ECF No. 73; 73-1 at pp. 9-10.) 

 Defendants do not move to dismiss the following claims: (1) Plaintiff’s retaliation 

claims against Defendants Behra, Zuniga, Olson, and Ramirez; and (2) Plaintiff’s 

conspiracy claims against Defendants Behra, Olson, and Ramirez. (ECF No. 73-1 at p. 

33.) 

 1. Legal Standard 

 a. Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss

 A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) “tests the legal 

sufficiency of a claim.” Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Because 

Rule 12(b)(6) focuses on the “sufficiency” of a claim rather than the claim’s substantive 

merits, “a court may [ordinarily] look only at the face of the complaint to decide a motion 

to dismiss.” Van Buskirk v. Cable News Network, Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002). 

However, courts may consider materials of which the court may take judicial notice, and 

exhibits that are attached to the complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c) (“A copy of a written 

instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading is a part of the pleading for all purposes.”); Hal 

Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1990) 

(“[M]aterial which is properly submitted as part of the complaint may be considered” in 

ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. (citing Amfac Mortg. Corp. v. Ariz. Mall of 

Tempe, Inc., 583 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1978))); Barron v. Reich, 13 F.3d 1370, 1377 (9th Cir. 

1994). However, exhibits that contradict the allegations of a complaint may fatally 

undermine the complaint’s allegations. See Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 

979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001) (a plaintiff can “plead himself out of a claim by including . . . 

details contrary to his claims.” (citing Steckman v. Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 

1295–96 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[W]e are not required to accept as true conclusory allegations 

which are contradicted by documents referred to in the complaint.”))). 

 “The focus of any Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal . . . is the complaint.” Schneider v. Cal. 

Dep’t of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998). This precludes consideration of 

“new” allegations that may be raised in a plaintiff’s opposition to a motion to dismiss 

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brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Id. (“The ‘new’ allegations contained in the inmates’ 

opposition motion . . . are irrelevant for Rule 12(b)(6) purposes. In determining the 

propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a court may not look beyond the complaint to a 

plaintiff’s moving papers, such as a memorandum in opposition to a defendant’s motion to 

dismiss.” (citations omitted)). 

 A motion to dismiss should be granted if a plaintiff fails to proffer “enough facts to 

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

544, 570 (2007). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient 

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ 

[Citation omitted.] A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content 

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 

U.S. at 556, 570). 

 “All allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party.” Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 

(9th Cir. 1996) (citing Nat’l Wildlife Fed. v. Espy, 45 F.3d 1337, 1340 (9th Cir. 1995)). 

The Court need not, however, “accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, 

unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell, 266 F.3d at 988 

(citing Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1994)); see also 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported 

by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”); Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 

(1986) (on motion to dismiss, court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion 

couched as a factual allegation.”). “[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not 

require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the 

defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 

550 U.S. at 555). 

 Thus, “[w]hile legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they 

must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, 

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a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise 

to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 679. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a 

‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has 

acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678. “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent 

with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility 

of ‘entitlement to relief.’’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (when plaintiffs have 

not “nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must 

be dismissed.”)). 

 “In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory ‘factual 

content,’ and reasonable inferences [drawn] from that content, must be plausibly suggestive 

of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. United States Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 

962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). 

 b. Standards Applicable to Pro Se Litigants in Civil Rights Actions 

 “In a civil rights case where the plaintiff appears pro se, the court must construe the 

pleadings liberally and must afford [the] plaintiff the benefit of any doubt.” Karim–Panahi 

v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). The rule of liberal construction is 

“particularly important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th 

Cir. 1992). In giving liberal interpretation to a pro se civil rights complaint, courts may 

not “supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents 

of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “Vague and conclusory 

allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to withstand 

a motion to dismiss.” Id.; see also Jones v. Cmty. Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th 

Cir. 1984) (finding conclusory allegations unsupported by facts insufficient to state a claim 

under § 1983). 

 Nevertheless, a court must give a pro se litigant leave to amend his complaint “unless 

it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” 

Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quotation omitted) (citing 

Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1447 (9th Cir. 1987)). Thus, before a pro se civil rights 

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complaint may be dismissed, the Court must provide the plaintiff with a statement of the 

complaint’s deficiencies. Karim–Panahi, 839 F.2d at 623–24. But where amendment of 

a pro se litigant’s complaint would be futile, denial of leave to amend is appropriate. James 

v. Giles, 221 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 2000). 

 2. Discussion 

 a. Property Deprivation Claims

 In the FAC, Plaintiff brings retaliation, conspiracy, due process, and state law 

deprivation of personal property claims against Defendant Zuniga. (FAC at pp. 4-5, ¶ 46.) 

Defendants do not move to dismiss any property related claims in the FAC against 

Defendant Zuniga. Accordingly, these claims are not dismissed. 

 b. Access to Courts Claims

 Defendants do not move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Ramirez 

and Olson arising out of Plaintiff’s allegations that these defendants conspired to deny 

Plaintiff his constitutional right to file grievances, retaliated against Plaintiff for filing 

complaints and grievances against them and fellow prison staff, and obstructed Plaintiff’s 

access to the courts. (FAC at p. 10, ¶ 52.) Specifically, in the FAC, Plaintiff alleges 

Defendants Ramirez and Olson intentionally delayed the appeals process, abused their 

discretion and rejected grievances without authority, erroneously cancelled grievances, 

and/or refused to process or answer Plaintiff’s grievances within a reasonable time frame. 

(Id.) However, as discussed above, because Plaintiff failed to exhaust these claims prior 

to filing suit, they are not properly before the Court. 

 Similarly, Defendants do not move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants 

Suglich and Paramo for denial of access to the courts and conspiracy to deny Plaintiff 

access to the courts, based on allegations that these defendants promulgated and 

implemented a policy of delivering an inmate’s grievance to the appeals coordinator, even 

when the grievance alleges misconduct by the appeals coordinator, and deprived inmates 

of fair and impartial appeals procedures. (Id. at pp. 8-10, ¶ 51.) Once again, however, 

because Plaintiff failed to exhaust these claims prior to filing suit, they are not properly 

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before the Court. 

 In their Motion to Dismiss, Defendants do move to dismiss Plaintiff’s retaliation 

claims against Defendants Suglich and Paramo for failure to respond to Plaintiff’s 

grievances adequately and/or to fix the wrong “when there is a duty to do so.” (FAC at ¶ 

51.) As with Plaintiff’s other claims against Defendants Suglich and Paramo, however, 

these claims were not exhausted, and therefore are not properly before the Court. 

 c. Claims Against Defendant Behra

 Plaintiff alleges Defendant Behra “threatened and harassed” him because he filed 

the Cate Lawsuit. (Id. at p. 1.) Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Behra subsequently 

issued a false CDC 128-A disciplinary report in retaliation for the filing of the Cate 

Lawsuit. (Id. at pp. 1-2, ¶ 15.) As an initial matter, because Plaintiff did not exhaust his 

claims relating to the issuance of an allegedly false CDC 128-A report, Plaintiff’s 

retaliation, due process, and conspiracy claims are arising out of the issuance of the CDC 

128-A report are not properly before the Court. 

 Next, although Defendants identify a retaliation claim against Defendant Behra in 

their Motion to Dismiss (see ECF No. 73-1 at p. 8:6), they do not move to dismiss any 

retaliation claim against Defendant Behra (see id. at pp. 14-19). Indeed, as Defendants 

expressly state, even if the Court grants their motion in full, Plaintiff’s retaliation claim 

against Defendant Behra will remain. (Id. at p. 33.) Accordingly, Plaintiff’s retaliation 

claim against Defendant Behra, as set forth in Plaintiff’s May 22, 2012 appeal, is not 

dismissed. 

 d. RVR and RVR Hearing

 In the FAC, Plaintiff brings retaliation, conspiracy, and due process claims against 

Defendants Benyard, Cortez, Jones, Hernandez, and Allamby related to the issuance of an 

RVR (CDC Form 115) and the subsequent disciplinary hearing on the RVR. (FAC at pp. 

6-8, ¶¶ 28-31, 37, 48, 54.) 

(i) Background 

On January 18, 2013, Plaintiff alleges he was sent to an outside hospital for surgery 

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and treatment following a fight with another inmate. (FAC at ¶ 28; see also ECF No. 1-2 

at 63-74.) On January 23, 2013, upon his return, he was placed in Ad-Seg because his 

presence was “deemed a threat to the safety and security of the institution.” (FAC at ¶ 29; 

ECF No. 1-2 at 61.) Plaintiff remained in Ad-Seg pending administrative review. (ECF 

No. 1-2 at 61.) 

 On February 5, 2013, Defendant Benyard issued an RVR, stating that on February 

4, 2013, during Plaintiff’s CDC 114 disciplinary hearing, Plaintiff admitted that he had 

initiated the fight with his fellow inmate. (ECF No. 1-2 at 113-116; see also FAC at ¶ 30.) 

On February 7, 2013, the Institutional Classification Committee, chaired by Defendant 

Hernandez, released Plaintiff from Ad-Seg “with no enemy concerns.” (FAC at ¶ 31; ECF 

No. 1-2 at 74.) 

 An initial RVR hearing was held on March 18, 2013. (See ECF No. 1-2 at 105-106.) 

On September 16, 2013, following a third level appeal, the Office of Appeals ordered RJD 

to have the Chief Disciplinary Officer order the RVR to be reissued and reheard. (Id.) On 

September 26, 2013, Defendant Hernandez, the Associate Warden and Chief Disciplinary 

Officer, ordered the RVR to be reissued and reheard. (Id. at 75.) On or about October 2, 

2013, Defendant Benyard reissued the RVR. (Id. at 75-83.) A second RVR hearing was 

held on October 16, 2013. (FAC at ¶ 37; see also ECF No. 1-2 at 77.) Defendant Allamby 

was the Senior Hearing Officer (SHO). (ECF No. 1-2 at 77.) Defendants Cortez, Jones, 

and Benyard were witnesses at the hearing upon Plaintiff’s request. (Id. at 78.) As a result 

of the hearing, Plaintiff was found guilty of violating California Code of Regulations, Title 

15, § 3005(d)(1) for the act of fighting resulting in the use of force. (Id. at 80.) As a result, 

a credit forfeiture of 90 days was assessed. (Id.; see also FAC at ¶ 37.) Plaintiff was given 

a credit restoration period of 180 days. (Id.) If Plaintiff completed the restoration period 

disciplinary free, he was entitled to request a classification review. (Id.) Classification 

would make the final determination whether Plaintiff was eligible for restoration of credits. 

(Id.) 

 Plaintiff alleges that on September 11, 2015, he formally made a request to his 

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caseworker for credit restoration, and she said it would take place at his annual UCC 

review, which was due on September 29, 2015. (FAC at ¶ 37, Exh. 2.) Plaintiff alleges 

that credit restoration took place on October 13, 2015 during the UCC process. (Id.) 

(ii) Allegations 

In the FAC, Plaintiff alleges that on February 4, 2013, Defendant Benyard “decided 

to retain or place” Plaintiff in Ad-Seg in retaliation for “Plaintiff’s previous protected 

conduct and the filing of grievances and complaints against him.” (FAC at p. 6:1-4, ¶ 30.) 

Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant Benyard’s retaliation also “took the form of . . . 

subject[ing] the Plaintiff to a false [RVR, which] falsely claim[ed] that the Plaintiff 

admitted during the February 4, 2013 Ad-Seg hearing to be the one that instigated the 

January 18, 2013 altercation.” (Id. at p. 6:4-9, ¶ 37.) Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant 

Benyard violated Plaintiff’s due process rights during the RVR hearing because the 

procedures were “not impartial or fair enough,” in that Defendant Benyard both issued the 

RVR and supervised the Senior Hearing Officer finding Plaintiff guilty. (Id. at p. 6: 9-24.) 

 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Jones, Cortez, and Allamby conspired with 

Defendant Benyard to “falsely fabricate evidence” against Plaintiff to “punish him.” (Id. 

at pp. 6-7. ¶ 37.) Specifically, Defendants Cortez and Jones “manipulated the evidence by 

changing their version of the facts,” and Defendant Allamby not only allowed them to do 

so at the RVR hearing, but also “intentionally misconstrue[d] the information and facts,” 

which Plaintiff alleges “clearly support a dismissal of the charges.” (Id. at p. 7, ¶ 37.) 

Defendant Allamby also allegedly failed to provide due process at the RVR hearing 

because he refused to allow Plaintiff to present certain evidence and call certain witnesses. 

(Id. at pp. 7-8) Defendant Allamby denied Plaintiff’s request to call a “vital” witness and 

failed to note this denial in his report. (Id. at ¶ 37.) 

 With respect to Defendant Hernandez, Plaintiff alleges that he conspired to deny 

Plaintiff’s constitutional rights and retaliated against Plaintiff “because of Plaintiff filing 

grievances against him and other fellow prison staff.” (Id. at p. 8, ¶ 37.) Defendant 

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Hernandez was a defendant in another lawsuit filed by Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶ 37, Exh. 3.)28 

Plaintiff contends Defendant Hernandez denied Plaintiff “a fair and impartial audit of the 

false RVR issued by Defendant Benyard” and condoned the misconduct of others, of which 

he knew or should have known at the time. (Id.) 

(iii) Heck Analysis 

 Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s retaliation, due process, and conspiracy claims 

against Defendants Benyard, Cortez, Jones, Allamby, and Hernandez in connection with 

the RVR and subsequent disciplinary proceedings are barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 

U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). (ECF No. 73-1 at p. 19.) Defendants maintain that they are 

“barred even though Plaintiff’s forfeited credits were later restored.” (Id.) 

In Heck, the Supreme Court held that: 

in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or 

imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would 

render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the 

conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by 

executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such 

determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ 

of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. . . . Thus, when a state prisoner seeks 

damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment 

in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his 

conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless 

the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been 

invalidated. 

Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87; see also Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81 (2005) (“Heck

specifies that [one] cannot use § 1983 to obtain damages where success would necessarily

imply the unlawfulness of a (not previously invalidated) conviction or sentence.”); 

Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 751 (2004) (per curiam) (“[W]here success in a 

                                               

28 Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Defendants Paramo, Hernandez, Olson, and 

Ramirez, among others, on October 10, 2013, Rios v. Paramo, Case No. 13-cv-02455-

WQH (JMA) (S.D. Cal.). (See FAC at Exh. 3.) 

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prisoner’s § 1983 damages action would implicitly question the validity of conviction or 

duration of sentence, the litigant must first achieve favorable termination of his available 

state, or federal habeas, opportunities to challenge the underlying conviction or sentence.”); 

Harvey v. Waldron, 210 F.3d 1008, 1013 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Under the Court’s holding in 

Heck, a § 1983 action that would call into question the lawfulness of a plaintiff’s conviction 

or confinement is not cognizable[.]”); Smithart v. Towery, 79 F.3d 951, 952 (9th Cir. 1996) 

(per curiam) (“Heck precludes a section 1983 claim based on actions which would ‘render 

a conviction or sentence invalid’ where that conviction has not been reversed, expunged or 

called into question by issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 

486)). 

In Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997), the Supreme Court extended Heck’s 

favorable termination rule to prison disciplinary actions resulting in the loss of a prisoner’s 

good-time credits. In Edwards, the prisoner was found guilty of several prison infractions 

and sentenced to 10 days in isolation, 20 days in segregation, and he was deprived of 30 

days’ good-time credit he had previously earned toward his release. Id. at 643. The 

prisoner filed a Section 1983 action requesting “a declaration that the procedures employed 

by state officials violated due process, compensatory and punitive damages for use of the 

unconstitutional procedures, an injunction to prevent future violations, and any other relief 

the court deems just and equitable.” Id. The Supreme Court held that his claim for 

declaratory and monetary relief necessarily implied the validity of the loss of good-time 

credits and, therefore, was not cognizable under Section 1983. Id. at 648. Thus, the Heck 

rule applies to prison disciplinary actions resulting in the loss of good-time credits, when 

there are “allegations of deceit and bias on the part of the decisionmaker that necessarily 

imply the invalidity of the punishment imposed . . . .” Id.

 In his prior order on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, Judge Hayes 

dismissed without prejudice all due process, retaliation, and conspiracy claims arising from 

Plaintiff’s disciplinary hearings and the RVR issued for the January 18, 2013 altercation, 

as barred by Heck. (See ECF No. 63 at pp. 8-9, 17-18, 20.) Judge Hayes acknowledged 

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Plaintiff’s argument that his credits had been restored; however, Plaintiff made no such 

allegation in his initial Complaint. (Id. at p. 9, n. 2.) Therefore, Judge Hayes did not 

consider the restoration of Plaintiff’s credits in making his findings. These allegations are 

now before the Court. 

 In addition to alleging that his credits have been restored, Plaintiff attaches 

documents to his FAC showing that he was given the opportunity to have his credits 

restored due to good behavior, and that he applied to have the credits restored because he 

remained discipline-free for a specified period of time. (FAC at ¶ 37; Exh. 2.) Under Heck, 

there is no bar to suit if “the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has 

already been invalidated.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims 

do not fall under this exception to Heck, regardless of whether his credits were restored, 

because a “valid guilty finding remains on his record and can be considered by the parole 

board in evaluating Plaintiff’s suitability for parole.” (ECF No. 73-1 at p. 11.) Defendants 

further argue that because Plaintiff’s credits were not restored prior to the filing of this 

lawsuit, he did not have standing to pursue these claims at the outset of the litigation. (Id. 

at p. 12.) For the following reasons, the Court need not address Defendants’ arguments. 

 Based on Plaintiff’s allegations in the FAC, the documents attached thereto, and the 

documents filed in Plaintiff’s related habeas action of which the Court takes judicial 

notice,29 the Court finds that Plaintiff is not barred by Heck from pursuing his claims related 

to the RVR and disciplinary hearings under Section 1983. As stated by the United States 

Supreme Court in Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521 (2011), “[h]abeas is the exclusive 

                                               

29 The Court takes judicial notice of certain documents filed in Plaintiff’s related 

habeas action, Rios v. Paramo, Case No. 15-cv-01331-BAS (RBB) (S.D. Cal.) (“Habeas 

Action”). Court orders and filings are proper subjects of judicial notice. See Fed. R. Evid. 

201; Reyn’s Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 n. 6 (9th Cir. 2006) (a 

court “may take judicial notice of court filings and other matters of public record”); United 

States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th 

Cir. 1992) (courts “may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without 

the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue”). 

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remedy . . . for the prisoner who seeks ‘immediate or speedier’ release from confinement.” 

Id. at 524 (citing Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 82). “Where the prisoner’s claim would not 

‘necessarily spell speedier release,’ however, suit may be brought under § 1983.” Id. 

(citing Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 82); see also Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 859 (9th Cir. 

2003) (“[H]abeas jurisdiction is absent, and a § 1983 action proper, where a successful 

challenge to a prison condition will not necessarily shorten the prisoner’s sentence.”); 

Bostic v. Carlson, 884 F.2d 1267, 1269 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Habeas corpus jurisdiction is 

available . . . when a petitioner seeks expungement of a disciplinary finding from his record 

if expungement is likely to accelerate the prisoner’s eligibility for parole.” (emphasis 

added)); Docken v. Chase, 393 F.3d 1024, 1028-29 (9th Cir. 2004). 

 In the FAC, with respect to his RVR-related claims, Plaintiff seeks a declaratory 

judgment, expungement of the RVR, and money damages. The question before the Court 

is therefore whether a successful challenge to the issuance of the RVR and the associated 

disciplinary proceedings, which results in the expungement of the RVR, will necessarily 

shorten Plaintiff’s sentence. See Skinner, 562 U.S. at 524; Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 859. The 

Ninth Circuit’s decision in Ramirez is instructive. In Ramirez, the plaintiff was charged 

with “battery of an inmate with a weapon with serious bodily injury.” Ramirez, 334 F.3d 

at 853. During his disciplinary hearing, the plaintiff sought to call certain witnesses and 

both requests were denied. Id. He was found guilty and sentenced to ten days of 

disciplinary detention and sixty days loss-of-privileges, and was later assigned to 

administrative segregation for a term of twenty-four months. Id. The plaintiff thereafter 

filed a Section 1983 complaint alleging, in part, that the disciplinary hearing violated his 

federal constitutional rights of due process and equal protection. Id. He sought damages, 

declaratory relief, and an injunction requiring, among other things, the vacation of his 

disciplinary conviction. Id. 

 In determining the application of Heck, the Ninth Circuit stated that the proper 

inquiry is “whether a successful challenge to the procedures used in the hearing ‘could be 

such as necessarily to imply the invalidity of the judgment’ and a reduction of the length 

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of [the plaintiff’s] confinement.” Id. at 859. In that case, the Ninth Circuit found that “if 

successful, [the plaintiff] will not necessarily shorten the length of his confinement because 

there has been no showing by the State that the expungement [the plaintiff] seeks is likely 

to accelerate his eligibility for parole.” Id. Instead, “if [the plaintiff] is successful in 

attacking the disciplinary hearing and expunging his sentence, ‘[t]he parole board will still 

have the authority to deny [his] request[] for parole on the basis of any of the grounds 

presently available to it in evaluating such a request.’” Id. (quoting Neal v. Shimoda, 131 

F.3d 818, 824 (9th Cir. 1997)). Because the plaintiff’s suit did not “threaten to advance his 

parole date,” the Ninth Circuit found that the plaintiff’s challenge to his disciplinary 

hearing was properly brought under Section 1983. Id. 

 Here, Plaintiff was convicted of murder pursuant to California Penal Code section 

187(a) on April 16, 1990. (Habeas Action, ECF No. 18-1 at 3.) In their Motion to Dismiss 

the FAC, Defendants, represented by the California Attorney General’s Office, argue that 

the guilty finding presently on Plaintiff’s record, which has not been invalidated or 

overturned, “can be considered by the parole board in evaluating Plaintiff’s suitability for 

parole.” (ECF No. 73-1 at p. 11.) However, in Plaintiff’s related Habeas Action, the 

California Attorney General’s Office argued on a motion to dismiss that Plaintiff is not 

entitled to federal habeas relief because his challenge to the same RVR disciplinary 

proceeding will neither terminate custody nor accelerate his release from prison. (Habeas 

Action, ECF No. 7.) Specifically, the California Attorney General’s Office, on behalf of 

Warden Paramo, the respondent in Plaintiff’s Habeas Action, states: 

 Here, Rios challenges a 2013 prison disciplinary violation he received 

for Fighting Resulting in the Use of Force. (See generally, Pet.) Rios, 

however, fails to establish how success on his claims will shorten his 

uncontested indeterminate life sentence. Although the disciplinary 

disposition included a 90-day credit forfeiture assessed against Rios, that 

credit forfeiture did not affect Rios’s release date or lengthen his sentence 

because Rios has already passed his minimum parole eligibility date. (Ex. 2, 

Legal Status Summary.) Indeed, Rios’s initial parole hearing was held on 

June 12, 2014 and parole was denied for seven years. (Ex. 3, Chronological 

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History.) Thus, the credit forfeiture included in the disciplinary disposition 

did not impact the duration of Rios’s confinement. 

The relief sought by Rios will neither terminate custody nor accelerate 

any future date of release from custody. See Nettles, 788 F.3d at 995. And 

Rios does not purport to otherwise challenge the legality of his life sentence. 

(See generally, Pet.) Thus, Rios’s claims are a challenge to the conditions, 

rather than the fact or duration, of his confinement, and as such, the Petition 

fails to invoke federal habeas corpus jurisdiction. Nettles, 788 F.3d at 1001; 

Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 852. 

(Id. at pp. 5-6.) 

 The California Attorney General’s Office cannot have it both ways.30 Given the 

foregoing, the Court finds that because, if successful, Plaintiff will not necessarily shorten 

the length of his confinement, his retaliation, conspiracy, and due process claims arising 

from the issuance of the RVR and the associated disciplinary proceeding are not barred by 

Heck. The Court therefore turns to examine each claim. 

(iv) Retaliation 

(a) Applicable Law 

 The Constitution provides protection against “[d]eliberate retaliation” by prison 

officials against an inmate’s exercise of his right to petition for redress of grievances. 

Soranno’s Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Franco v. 

Kelly, 854 F.2d 584, 589 (2d Cir. 1988) (intentional obstruction of the right to seek redress 

“is precisely the sort of oppression that . . . section 1983 [is] intended to remedy.”); 

Harrison v. Springdale Water & Sewer Comm’n, 780 F.2d 1422, 1428 (8th Cir. 1986)). 

Indeed, “[o]f fundamental import to prisoners are their First Amendment ‘right[s] to file 

prison grievances,’ Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 2003), and to ‘pursue civil 

rights litigation in the courts.’ Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 461 (9th Cir. 1995).” 

Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Soranno’s Gasco, 874 

                                               

30 Plaintiff does not contend that the ruling imposed at the disciplinary hearing 

affects the duration of his sentence. (See ECF No. at 83 at 9-10.) 

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F.2d at 1314 (“The right of access to the courts is subsumed under the first amendment 

right to petition the government for redress of grievances.” (citing Cal. Motor Transp. Co. 

v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972); Harrison, 780 F.2d at 1427-28). 

“Without those bedrock constitutional guarantees, inmates would be left with no viable 

mechanism to remedy prison injustices. And because purely retaliatory actions taken 

against a prisoner for having exercised those rights necessarily undermine those 

protections, such actions violate the Constitution quite apart from any underlying 

misconduct they are designed to shield.” Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567 (citing Pratt v. Rowland, 

65 F.3d 802, 806 & n. 4 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he prohibition against retaliatory punishment 

is ‘clearly established law’ in the Ninth Circuit, for qualified immunity purposes. That 

retaliatory actions by prison officials are cognizable under § 1983 has also been widely 

accepted in other circuits.”)). 

Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation 

entails five basic elements: (1) an assertion that a state actor took some 

adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected 

conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First 

Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate 

correctional goal. 

Id. at 567-68 (footnote omitted) (citing Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 449 (9th Cir. 2000);

Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 815-16 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (“A prisoner suing 

prison officials under section 1983 for retaliation must allege that he was retaliated against 

for exercising his constitutional rights and that the retaliatory action does not advance 

legitimate penological goals, such as preserving institutional order and discipline.”)). 

 Because retaliation by prison officials may chill an inmate’s exercise of his 

legitimate First Amendment rights, such conduct is actionable even if it would not 

otherwise rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Thomas v. Carpenter, 881 F.2d 

828, 830 (9th Cir. 1989). However, “[r]etaliation is not established simply by showing 

adverse activity by a defendant after protected speech; rather, Plaintiff must allege 

sufficient facts to plausibly suggest a nexus between the two.” Rojo v. Paramo, No. 

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13cv2237, 2014 WL 2586904, at *5 (S.D. Cal. June 10, 2014) (citing Huskey v. City of San 

Jose, 204 F.3d 893, 899 (9th Cir. 2000) (retaliation claim cannot rest on the logical fallacy 

of post hoc, ergo propter hoc, i.e., “after this, therefore because of this”)). “Thus, while 

‘the timing and nature’ of an allegedly adverse action can ‘properly be considered’ as 

circumstantial evidence of retaliatory intent, the official alleged to have retaliated must also 

be alleged to have been aware of the plaintiff’s protected conduct.” Id. at *13 (quoting 

Soranno’s Gasco, 874 F.2d at 1315-16; Pratt, 65 F.3d at 808 (“[T]iming can properly be 

considered as circumstantial evidence of retaliatory intent.”); see also Wood v. Yordy, 753 

F.3d 899, 905 (9th Cir. 2014) (noting that “mere speculation that defendants acted out of 

retaliation is not sufficient” and affirming summary judgment where the record contained 

“nothing . . . to indicate [defendant] even knew about [an] earlier [law]suit.”)). Moreover, 

a plaintiff must show that the protected conduct was a “substantial” or “motivating” factor 

in the defendant’s decision to act. Soranno’s Gasco, 874 F.2d at 1314. 

 (b) Analysis 

 Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to state a retaliation claim against Defendants 

Cortez, Jones, Allamby, and Hernandez in connection with the October 16, 2013 hearing 

on the RVR for fighting because: (1) Plaintiff alleges no facts to show that Defendants 

Cortez, Jones, or Allamby took any action in response to any exercise by Plaintiff of his 

protected conduct (ECF No. 73-1 at pp. 17-18); and (2) Plaintiff does not allege that 

Defendant Hernandez personally took any specific action against him (ECF No. 73-1 at pp. 

18-19). As discussed below, the Court agrees. 

 Plaintiff does not allege any facts to show that Defendants Cortez, Jones, or Allamby 

took any adverse actions against Plaintiff because of his protected conduct, as required 

under Rhodes. In addition, Plaintiff’s FAC is devoid of any specific factual allegations 

against Defendant Hernandez other than the allegation that he supervised and approved the 

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wrongful conduct of others. (See FAC at p. 8, ¶¶ 37, 48.)31 “A supervisory official . . . 

may be liable under Section 1983 only if he was personally involved in the constitutional 

deprivation, or if there was a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s 

wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” Henry v. Sanchez, 923 F. Supp. 1266, 

1272 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (citing Redman v. Cnty of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446-47 (C.D. 

Cal. 1996); Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989)). Plaintiff’s FAC does not 

contain any specific factual allegations against Defendant Hernandez that would permit a 

retaliation claim to proceed against him based on a theory of supervisory liability. 

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 

Plaintiff’s retaliation claim related to the RVR be GRANTED as to Defendants Cortez, 

Jones, Allamby, and Hernandez. Defendants do not move to dismiss the retaliation claim 

against Defendant Benyard related to the RVR. Accordingly, this claim is not dismissed.

(v) Due Process 

(a) Applicable Law 

The Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o state shall . . . deprive any person of 

life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. “The 

requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interests 

encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty and property.” Bd. of 

Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). “To state a procedural due process claim, [a 

plaintiff] must allege ‘(1) a liberty or property interest protected by the Constitution; (2) a 

deprivation of the interest by the government; [and] (3) lack of process.’” Wright v. 

Riveland, 219 F.3d 905, 913 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Portman v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 995 

F.2d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 1993)). 

Under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, a prisoner is entitled to 

                                               

31 To the extent Plaintiff alleges in the FAC that Defendant Hernandez denied 

Plaintiff a “fair and impartial audit of the false RVR” pursuant to California Code of 

Regulations, Title 15, § 3315(g), he did not exhaust this claim. (FAC at p. 8.) 

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certain due process protections when he is charged with a disciplinary violation. Serrano 

v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1077 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 

564–571 (1974)). “Such protections include the rights to call witnesses, to present 

documentary evidence and to have a written statement by the factfinder as to the evidence 

relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary action taken.” Id. These procedural 

protections, however, “adhere only when the disciplinary action implicates a protected 

liberty interest in some ‘unexpected matter’ or imposes an ‘atypical and significant 

hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.’” Id. (quoting 

Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)). 

To determine atypical and significant hardship, courts examine: 

(1) whether the challenged condition ‘mirrored those conditions imposed 

upon inmates in administrative segregation and protective custody,’ and thus 

comported with the prison’s discretionary authority; (2) the duration of the 

condition, and the degree of restraint imposed; and (3) whether the state’s 

action will invariably affect the duration of the prisoner’s sentence. 

Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 861 (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486-87). “If the hardship is 

sufficiently significant, then the court must determine whether the procedures used to 

deprive that liberty satisfied Due Process.” Id. at 860. 

 (b) Analysis 

 Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s due process claims against Defendants 

Benyard, Cortez, Jones, Allamby, and Hernandez in connection with the hearing on the 

RVR for fighting. (ECF No. 73-1 at pp. 22-25.) In the FAC, Plaintiff alleges these 

defendants violated his due process rights in the following ways: (1) Defendants Cortez 

and Jones changed their version of the facts during the RVR hearing (FAC at ¶ 37; ECF 

No. 1-2 at 78); (2) Defendant Allamby, as the Senior Hearing Officer, denied Plaintiff’s 

request to call a vital corroborating witness, i.e., the Staff Assistant who assisted him in 

preparing for his CDC 114-D hearing, during his RVR hearing and failed to note the denial 

in his report (FAC at p. 7, ¶ 37; ECF No. 1-2 at 79); (3) Defendant Benyard, as the 

supervisor of the Senior Hearing Officer, sustained the guilty finding (FAC at p. 6); and 

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(4) Defendant Hernandez condoned the misconduct of others and failed to stop or fix the 

constitutional violations of others “when there is a duty to do so” (FAC at pp. 7-8, ¶ 37). 

 Defendants first argue that Plaintiff had no liberty interests at stake in the RVR 

hearing, and therefore he was not entitled to procedural due process. Specifically, 

Defendants argue that the results of the guilty finding were Plaintiff’s placement in AdSeg and the assessment of credit loss, and because Plaintiff had no liberty interest in not 

being placed or held in Ad-Seg and his good time credits have been fully restored, he 

cannot state a due process claim. (ECF No. 73-1 at p. 22.) 

As an initial matter, Plaintiff makes no allegation that he was placed in Ad-Seg after 

the RVR hearings, either on March 18, 2013 or October 16, 2013. Rather, Plaintiff alleges 

he was released from Ad-Seg on February 7, 2013. (FAC at ¶ 31.)32 Plaintiff’s only 

allegation is that the RVR disciplinary hearing resulted in the loss of credits. (FAC at ¶ 

37.) As to the loss of credits, the Court does not find Defendants’ argument persuasive. 

Although Plaintiff alleges his credits were restored, the RVR hearing did implicate a 

protected liberty interest because of the potential for loss of credits, and therefore Plaintiff 

was entitled to certain procedural due process. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 557-58.33 

                                               

32 Insofar as this allegation can be read into the FAC, however, Plaintiff has no 

direct liberty interest in not being placed or held in Ad-Seg, and he makes no allegations 

that his time in Ad-Seg posed an atypical and significant hardship. See Sandin, 515 U.S. 

at 483-84 (holding that a constitutionally protected liberty interest arises only when a 

restraint imposes an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the 

ordinary incidents of prison life”); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466-68 (1983); Serrano, 

345 F.3d at 1078 (“Typically, administrative segregation in and of itself does not implicate 

a protected liberty interest.”); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding 

confinement in the special holding unit was within range of confinement normally expected 

and did not violate due process); May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 565 (9th Cir. 1997) 

(holding administrative segregation falls within the terms of confinement ordinarily 

contemplated by a sentence). 

33 See ECF No. 1-2 at 77 (under heading of “Due Process,” the RVR, Part C 

states: “Therefore all due process requirements were met and loss of participation credit is 

permitted in this matter, should the defendant be found guilty.”) 

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Next, with respect to Defendants Cortez and Jones, Defendants argue that, even if 

the Court accepts Plaintiff’s allegation that these defendants testified falsely, Plaintiff has 

no liberty interest in not being falsely accused. (ECF No. 73-1 at p. 23.) The Court agrees. 

Insofar as Plaintiff challenges the issuance of the RVR on grounds that it included false 

information, or the allegedly false statements of Defendants Cortez and Jones in support of 

the RVR, he cannot state a claim. See e.g., Dawson v. Beard, No. 15-cv-01867 DLB, 2016 

WL 1137029, at *5-6 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2016) (“The issuance of a false RVR, alone, does 

not state a claim under section 1983.”); Ellis v. Foulk, No. 14-cv-0802 AC P, 2014 WL 

4676530, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2014) (noting that claims of arbitrary action by prison 

officials are grounded in “‘the procedural due process requirements as set forth in Wolff v. 

McDonnell.’”) (quoting Hanrahan v. Lane, 747 F.2d 1137, 1140 (7th Cir. 1984)); Solomon 

v. Meyer, No. 11-cv-02827-JST (PR), 2014 WL 294576, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2014) 

(“[T]here is no constitutionally protected right to be free from false disciplinary charges.”) 

(citing Chavira v. Rankin, No. C 11-5730 CW (PR), 2012 WL 5914913, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 

Nov. 26, 2012) (“The Constitution demands due process, not error-free decisionmaking.”)); Johnson v. Felker, No. 12-cv-02719 GEB KJN (PC), 2013 WL 6243280, at *6 

(E.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2013) (“Prisoners have no constitutionally guaranteed right to be free 

from false accusations of misconduct, so the mere falsification of a [rules violation] report 

does not give rise to a claim under section 1983.”) (citing Sprouse v. Babcock, 870 F.2d 

450, 452 (8th Cir. 1989) and Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 951-53 (2d. Cir. 1986)). 

Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a due process claim against Defendants Cortez and 

Jones arising out of the October 16, 2013 RVR hearing. 

Defendants further argue that the documents attached to the FAC demonstrate that 

Defendant Allamby complied with the required due process during the October 16, 2013 

RVR hearing. (ECF No. 73-1 at pp. 23-24.) The Court disagrees. An inmate subject to 

disciplinary sanctions that include the loss of good time credits must receive the following 

due process: (1) twenty-four-hour advanced written notice of the charges against him, 

Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-64; (2) a written statement by the fact finder as to the evidence relied 

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on and the reasons for the action, id. at 564-65; (3) an opportunity to call witnesses and 

present documentary evidence where doing so “will not be unduly hazardous to 

institutional safety or correctional goals,” id. at 566; (4) assistance at the hearing if he is 

illiterate or if the matter is complex, id. at 570; and (5) a sufficiently impartial fact finder, 

id. at 570-71. A finding of guilt must also be “supported by some evidence in the record.” 

Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985). 

The report of the hearing attached to the FAC reflects that Plaintiff did receive 

twenty-four-hour advanced written notice of the charges against him, a written statement 

by the fact finder as to the evidence relied on and the reasons for the action, an opportunity 

to call witnesses and present documentary evidence, and a sufficiently impartial fact finder. 

(See ECF No. 1-2 at 75-83.) In addition, the fact finder found that assistance would not be 

necessary because Plaintiff “displayed an ability to comprehend the RVR process,” speaks 

English, and “is literate, the issues were not complex and a confidential relationship was 

not required.” (Id. at 75.) However, while all witnesses Defendant Allamby claims 

Plaintiff requested to testify, did testify at the hearing (see id. at 76-79), Plaintiff alleges he 

requested the presence of another witness, a staff assistant who could corroborate his 

position, and Defendant Allamby arbitrarily denied this request without documenting the 

denial. (FAC at p. 7.) Although prison officials have discretion to refuse to call witnesses 

requested by a prisoner at a disciplinary hearing, they must explain their reasons why the 

witnesses were not allowed to testify, either at the disciplinary hearing or later in court. 

See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566; Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S. 491, 497 (1985); see also Bostic, 884 

F.2d at 1273 (“Prison officials may not arbitrarily deny an inmate’s request to present 

witnesses or documentary evidence.” (citation omitted)). Accordingly, Plaintiff has 

plausibly alleged a due process claim against Defendant Allamby arising from his refusal 

to allow and document Plaintiff’s request for his Ad-Seg staff assistant to testify at the 

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RVR hearing.34

Defendants next argue that Defendant Benyard’s act of sustaining the guilty finding 

did not affect Plaintiff’s liberty interest. (ECF No. 73-1 at pp. 22-23.) As discussed above, 

Plaintiff’s liberty interest was implicated by the RVR hearing, and therefore he was entitled 

to the minimal due process requirements laid out by Wolff. However, in the FAC, Plaintiff 

alleges Defendant Benyard is liable for due process violations in his capacity as the 

supervisor of the Senior Hearing Officer at the RVR hearing and as the UCC Chairperson. 

(FAC at p. 6.) “[S]ection 1983 suits do not impose liability on supervising officers under 

a respondeat superior theory of liability,” Graves v. City of Coeur D’Alene, 339 F.3d 828, 

848 (9th Cir. 2003); abrogated on other grounds by Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct. of 

Nevada, Humboldt Cnty., 542 U.S. 177 (2004). Rather, a plaintiff must establish that each 

individual “Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, 

has violated the Constitution.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). In other words, 

supervisory officials “cannot be held liable unless they themselves” violated a 

constitutional right. Id. Thus, supervisory liability can be imposed only if (1) the 

supervisor was personally involved in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) there is a 

sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the 

constitutional violation. Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir.1989). 

Plaintiff does not make any factual allegations supported by the attached documents 

that Defendant Benyard was personally involved in the alleged constitutional deprivation, 

i.e., that he failed to permit Plaintiff to call a vital witness during his RVR hearing, or that 

he took action to “sustain” or “confirm” the guilty finding. Because he cannot proceed on 

a respondeat superior theory, Plaintiff fails to state a due process claim against Defendant 

                                               

34 The Court notes that the records attached to the FAC reflect that a Staff 

Assistant was assigned to Plaintiff to assist him in preparing for his Ad-Seg hearing, and 

that the Staff Assistant may have been present during the hearing as well. (See ECF No. 

1-2 at 61, 79, 114, 118.) 

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Benyard. 

Lastly, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant Hernandez is 

liable because he condoned the acts of others and/or failed to prevent the unconstitutional 

acts of others when he had a duty to do so, is nothing more than a respondeat superior

claim. (ECF No. 73-1 at 33.) The Court agrees. As discussed above, section 1983 suits 

“do not impose liability on supervising officers under a respondeat superior theory of 

liability.” Graves, 339 F.3d at 848. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to state a due process 

claim against Defendant Hernandez. 

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 

Plaintiff’s due process claim related to the RVR be DENIED as to Defendant Allamby, 

and GRANTED as to Defendants Benyard, Hernandez, Cortez, and Jones. 

(vi) Conspiracy 

(a) Applicable Law 

 To allege a claim of conspiracy under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts with 

sufficient particularity to show an agreement or a meeting of the minds to violate the 

plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 441 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting 

United Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 865 F.2d 1539, 1540-41 (9th Cir. 1989) 

(en banc); Margolis v. Ryan, 140 F.3d 850, 853 (9th Cir. 1998); Woodrum v. Woodward 

Cnty., 866 F.2d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1989). “To be liable, each participant in the 

conspiracy need not know the exact details of the plan, but each participant must at least 

share the common objective of the conspiracy.” United Steelworkers, 865 F.2d at 1540-

41. 

 Pleading a conspiracy requires more than a conclusory allegation that the defendants 

conspired to deprive a plaintiff’s civil rights. The Ninth Circuit applies a heightened 

pleading standard to conspiracy claims under § 1983 and has held that mere conclusory 

allegations of conspiracy (i.e., bare allegations that a defendant “conspired” with another) 

are insufficient to state a claim. See Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1195 (9th Cir. 

1997); Buckey v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 968 F.2d 791, 794 (9th Cir. 1992). Rather, “[t]o 

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state a claim for conspiracy to violate one’s constitutional rights under section 1983, the 

plaintiff must state specific facts to support the existence of the claimed conspiracy.” Burns 

v. Cnty. of King, 883 F.2d 819, 821 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Coverdell v. Dep’t of Soc. & 

Health Servs., 834 F.2d 758, 769 (9th Cir. 1987)); Buckey, 968 F.2d at 794. A plaintiff can 

meet the heightened pleading standard by alleging “which defendants conspired, how they 

conspired and how the conspiracy led to a deprivation of his constitutional rights even 

though he does not identify which officer said or did what at a particular time.” Harris, 

126 F.3d at 1196. Further, because conspiracies, by their very nature, are secret 

agreements, “[a] defendant’s knowledge of and participation in a conspiracy may be 

inferred from circumstantial evidence and from evidence of the defendant’s actions.” 

Gilbrook v. City of Westminster, 177 F.3d 839, 856-57 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing United States 

v. Calabrese, 825 F.2d 1342, 1348 (9th Cir. 1987)); cf. United Steelworkers, 865 F.2d at 

1547 (circumstantial evidence of “[t]he ability and opportunity to conspire” is, standing 

alone, insufficient). 

 (b) Analysis 

 Plaintiff alleges Defendants Allamby, Cortez, Jones, Hernandez, and Benyard 

conspired (1) to fabricate and manipulate evidence against Plaintiff in support of the RVR 

issued by Defendant Benyard to punish Plaintiff, and (2) to deny Plaintiff procedural due 

process during his RVR hearing. (FAC at pp. 6-8, ¶¶ 48, 54.) Defendants move to dismiss 

arguing that Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to meet the standard for pleading a 

conspiracy claim in that “Plaintiff has done nothing more than provide conclusory 

assertions, devoid of any specific facts on which the Court could infer a meeting of the 

minds and thus, the existence of a conspiracy.” (ECF No. 73-1 at p. 30.) The Court agrees. 

Plaintiff’s allegations amount to conclusory allegations unsupported by specific 

facts that Defendants conspired with one another to violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights 

in relation to the issuance of the RVR and the RVR hearing. See Harris, 126 F.3d at 1195; 

Buckey, 968 F.2d at 794. Although conspiracies are, by their very nature, secret 

agreements, Plaintiff’s allegations do not support “a showing that the alleged conspirators 

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have committed acts that ‘are unlikely to have been undertaken without an agreement.’” 

See Mendocino Envtl. Ctr., 192 F.3d at 1301. 

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 

Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim related to the RVR be GRANTED as to Defendants Allamby, 

Benyard, Hernandez, Cortez, and Jones. 

 e. UCC Hearing Claims 

 Plaintiff brings retaliation, due process, conspiracy, equal protection, and ADA 

claims against Defendants Benyard, Cavazos, and Abad related to his July 23, 2013 UCC 

hearing. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that: (1) Defendants Cavazos, Benyard, and Abad 

conspired to delay scheduling a UCC hearing to address Plaintiff’s termination from his 

laundry job for over fourteen months in violation of his due process rights; and (2) 

Defendants Benyard, Cavazos and Abad conspired to deny Plaintiff a fair and impartial 

UCC hearing on July 23, 2013. (FAC at ¶¶ 47, 49-50, pp. 2-3.) Plaintiff alleges Defendants 

Benyard, Cavazos, and Abad denied him a fair and impartial UCC hearing on July 23, 2013 

because they (1) refused to address the issue of Plaintiff’s alleged wrongful termination 

from his laundry job, thereby causing him to lose his job without penological justification 

and the required due process; and (2) denied him the opportunity to participate in 

rehabilitative programs such as “re-enter programs,” which are available to other inmates, 

on the basis of Plaintiff’s handicap and non-citizenship status, in violation of the equal 

protection clause and the ADA. (Id. at pp. 2-3, ¶ 50.) 

 As an initial matter, while a genuine dispute remains as to whether Plaintiff 

exhausted his retaliation, conspiracy, due process, ADA, and equal protection claims 

arising out of the July 23, 2013 UCC hearing against Defendants Benyard and Cavazos, 

Plaintiff did not exhaust these claims as to Defendant Abad. The only claim remaining at 

this time against Defendant Abad is the alleged delay in scheduling a UCC hearing on 

Plaintiff’s alleged wrongful job termination. Plaintiff has failed to exhaust any claims 

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against Defendants Benyard and Cavazos based on the alleged delay.35 The Court will not 

address claims Defendants have established Plaintiff failed to exhaust. 

 (i) Retaliation 

In their Motion to Dismiss, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to state a 

retaliation claim in his FAC against Defendants Benyard and Cavazos for declining to hold 

a hearing on Plaintiff’s job termination. (ECF No. 73-1 at p. 17.) Plaintiff alleges that 

Defendants Benyard and Cavazos retaliated against him by “arbitrar[ily] refus[ing] to 

address the issue of wrongful termination from his job assignment” at his July 23, 2013 

UCC hearing, thus “remov[ing] him from his job assignment without any penological 

justification or sufficient evidence as required by law.” (FAC at pp. 2-4, ¶ 47.) 

 Defendants contend that the act of declining to hold a hearing on whether Plaintiff 

was wrongfully terminated from his job was not an adverse action, but rather an act 

required by law. (ECF No. 73-1 at p. 17.) Citing California Code of Regulations, Title 15, 

§ 3376, Defendants state that the UCC does not have the authority to make determinations 

about the propriety of a job termination. (Id.) Instead, a challenge to the propriety of a job 

termination must be presented through the grievance and appeal system. (Id.) 

 The express language of the applicable California Code of Regulations, however, 

contradicts Defendants’ assertions that the sole function of the UCC “is to make 

determinations about inmate classification and housing” and that it “does not have the 

authority to make determinations about the propriety of a job termination.” (ECF No. 73-

1 at p. 17.) California Code of Regulations, Title 15, § 3376 provides: 

Unit Classification Committees shall: 

(A) Review each inmate’s case at least annually to consider the accuracy of 

the inmate’s classification score, custody designation, program, work and 

privilege group, and facility placement, including recommendation for 

                                               

35 See FAC at p. 2, lines 15-16 (alleging Defendants Benyard, Cavazos, and 

Abad retaliated against Plaintiff by “making the Plaintiff to wa[it] for over fourteenth 

months to be provided with a UCC hearing”). 

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transfer. A parole violator’s first annual review may be delayed for up to five 

months so that it will coincide with classification score updates. 

(B) Change in inmate’s work/privilege group. 

(C) Conduct post board classification on an inmate within 15 days of receipt 

of official notice of a Board of Parole Hearings’ decision regarding the inmate. 

(D) Act on an inmate’s request for restoration of forfeited credits for less than 

Division C offenses in accordance with section 3327 

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3376(d)(2) (emphasis added). 

 Moreover, the regulations relating specifically to work assignments highlight the 

role played by the UCC. Pursuant to Section 3040, “[e]very able-bodied person committed 

to the custody of [CDCR] is obligated to work.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3040(a). A 

classification committee assigns inmates to a work program. Id. at § 3040(c); see also § 

3044 (“all assignments or reassignments of an inmate to a work group shall be by a 

classification committee action”). “Any staff request for removal of an inmate from a 

program” must be “submitted to the inmate’s correctional counselor on a CDC General 

Chrono Form.” Id. at § 3040(f). Thereafter, the counselor must “refer the request to a 

classification committee for consideration and action.” Id. “If a request is for cause, 

defined as behavior that would result in loss of participation credit pursuant to section 

3043.2(a), the inmate may be temporarily relieved of the position and denied pay (if a paid 

position), pending classification committee action.” Id.

36

 Here, Plaintiff alleges that pursuant to a false disciplinary report (Form CDC-128A) 

and General Chrono (Form CDC-128B), both dated May 16, 2012, he was wrongfully 

terminated from his job assignment, and that Defendants Benyard and Cavazos “arbitrarily 

refused to address the issue of wrongful termination” during his UCC hearing on July 23, 

2013. (FAC at pp. 2-4, ¶ 24; see also ECF No. 1-1 at 23.) The General Chrono requests 

                                               

36 See also Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3375(f)(1)(E) (“The classification of 

inmates shall provide the following procedural safeguards: (1) Inmates shall be given 

written notice at least 72 hours in advance of a hearing which could result in an adverse 

effect. Adverse effect is defined as: (E) Placement in a reduced work group.”). 

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that Plaintiff be removed from his laundry job because he was “out of bounds.” (ECF No. 

1-1 at 23.) Accordingly, the request should have been referred to the UCC for 

consideration and action. 

Defendants argue that the UCC does not have authority to hold evidentiary hearings 

and entertain challenges to a decision to remove an inmate from a job assignment, but that 

their “consideration and action” is limited to affirming or modifying the inmate’s work 

group. (ECF No. 85 at p. 4.) In order to challenge such a decision, Defendants contend an 

inmate must file an appeal. (Id.)37 

However, based on the information presently before the Court as to the role of the 

UCC, the Court cannot say that the act of declining to conduct a hearing on Plaintiff’s job 

termination was an act required by law. 

Next, Defendants argue Plaintiff alleges no facts connecting Defendant Cavazos 

with any prior exercise of protected conduct. (ECF No. 73-1 at p. 17) The Court agrees. 

In the FAC, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Cavazos retaliated against Plaintiff “because of 

exercise of protected conduct in violation of 1st, 5th and 15th Amendment of U.S. 

Constitution.” (FAC at ¶ 47.) However, the Complaint lacks any factual allegations that 

Defendant Cavazos took any allegedly adverse action because of Plaintiff’s exercise of 

protected activity. There is no factual allegation connecting Defendant Cavazos to 

Plaintiff’s prior civil rights lawsuit, nor is there any factual allegation suggesting Plaintiff 

filed prior grievances against him. Although Plaintiff alleges he engaged in certain 

protected conduct and that Defendant Cavazos later took adverse actions against him, 

Plaintiff fails to “allege sufficient facts to plausibly suggest a nexus between the two.” 

Rojo, 2014 WL 2586904, at *5. Thus, Plaintiff fails to state a retaliation claim against 

                                               

37 See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(a) (“Any inmate or parolee under the 

department’s jurisdiction may appeal any policy, decision, action, condition, or omission 

by the department or its staff that the inmate or parolee can demonstrate as having a 

material adverse effect upon his or her health, safety, or welfare.”) 

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Defendant Cavazos related to Defendant Cavazos’ refusal to consider his job termination 

at the UCC hearing. 

Defendants do not make the same argument with respect to Defendant Benyard. 

Rather, they only move to dismiss the retaliation claim against Defendant Benyard on the 

grounds that declining to address the job-termination issue was not an adverse action. For 

the reasons discussed above, the Court finds this argument insufficient. 

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 

Plaintiff’s retaliation claim related to the UCC hearing be GRANTED as to Defendant 

Cavazos and DENIED as to Defendant Benyard. 

 (ii) Conspiracy 

 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Cavazos, Benyard, and Abad conspired to delay a 

UCC hearing on Plaintiff’s alleged wrongful termination from his laundry job, and to deny 

Plaintiff a fair and impartial UCC hearing on July 23, 2013. (FAC at pp. 2-4.) Plaintiff 

further alleges that the documents attached to the FAC show the existence of a meeting of 

the minds. (Id. at p. 3:23-28.) Plaintiff cites to a CDC-128G form addressing his July 23, 

2013 UCC hearing, which is signed by Defendants Benyard, as Chairperson, and Cavazos, 

as Recorder. (ECF No. 1-1 at 85.) Committee members include Defendants Benyard and 

Cavazos, as well as non-parties Crotts and Homer. (Id.) 

 Defendants move to dismiss all conspiracy claims against Defendants Cavazos and 

Benyard, arguing that Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to meet the standard for 

pleading a conspiracy claim in that “Plaintiff has done nothing more than provide 

conclusory assertions, devoid of any specific facts on which the Court could infer a meeting 

of the minds and thus, the existence of a conspiracy.” (ECF No. 73-1 at p. 30.) With 

respect to Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim against Defendants Cavazos and Benyard arising out 

of actions taken at the July 23, 2013 UCC hearing, the Court agrees. 

Plaintiff’s allegations amount to conclusory allegations unsupported by specific 

facts that the Defendants conspired with one another to violate Plaintiff’s constitutional 

rights. See Harris, 126 F.3d at 1195; Buckey, 968 F.2d at 794. Although conspiracies are, 

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by their very nature, secret agreements, Plaintiff’s allegations do not support “a showing 

that the alleged conspirators have committed acts that ‘are unlikely to have been undertaken 

without an agreement.’” See Mendocino Envtl. Ctr., 192 F.3d at 1301. 

 Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 

Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim arising out of actions taken at the July 23, 2013 UCC hearing 

be GRANTED as to Defendants Benyard and Cavazos. 

 (iii) Due Process

 Plaintiff alleges Defendants Benyard, Cavazos, and Abad as members of the UCC, 

violated his due process rights by making Plaintiff wait over fourteen months to be 

provided with a UCC hearing to address Plaintiff’s contention that he was improperly 

removed from his job assignment, and by refusing to address during his July 23, 2013 UCC 

hearing whether he was wrongfully removed from his prison job. (See FAC at pp. 2-4.) 

As an initial matter, as discussed above, Plaintiff did not exhaust his due process claim 

arising out of any delay in scheduling a UCC hearing against Defendants Benyard and 

Cavazos. He only exhausted this claim as to Defendant Abad. Moreover, Plaintiff did not 

exhaust a due process claim arising out of the July 23, 2013 UCC hearing against Defendant 

Abad. 

Defendants move to dismiss this claim on the grounds that Plaintiff has no liberty 

interest in his prison job. The Court agrees. “[T]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment ‘does not create a property or liberty interest in prison employment.’” Walker 

v. Gomez, 370 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Ingram v. Papalia, 804 F.2d 595, 

596 (10th Cir. 1986) (per curiam)) (citing Baumann v. Ariz. Dep’t of Corr., 754 F.2d 841, 

846 (9th Cir. 1985)). Thus, because Plaintiff has no property or liberty interest in prison 

employment, the Court need not reach the issue of what process is due. 

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 

Plaintiff’s due process claim related to the July 23, 2013 UCC hearing be GRANTED as 

to Defendants Benyard, Cavazos, and Abad. 

/// 

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 (iv) Equal Protection 

 (a) Applicable Law 

The “Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no State 

shall ‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,’ which is 

essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of 

Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985), superseded by statute on 

other grounds (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)). “‘The purpose of the equal 

protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is to secure every person within the State’s 

jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by express 

terms of a statute or by its improper execution through duly constituted agents.’” Sunday 

Lake Iron Co. v. Twp. of Wakefield, 247 U.S. 350, 352 (1918)); see also Vill. of 

Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per curiam). 

Conclusory allegations of discrimination are insufficient to withstand a motion to 

dismiss, however, unless the plaintiff alleges facts which may prove invidious 

discriminatory intent. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 

265 (1977). Therefore, when an equal protection violation is alleged, the plaintiff must 

plead facts to show “that the defendant acted in a discriminatory manner and that the 

discrimination was intentional.” FDIC. v. Henderson, 940 F.2d 465, 471 (9th Cir. 1991) 

(citing Stones v. L.A. Comm. Coll. Dist., 796 F.2d 270, 275 (9th Cir. 1986); Lowe v. City 

of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1011 (9th Cir. 1985), as amended, 784 F.2d 1407 (1986)). 

“‘Discriminatory purpose’ . . . implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness 

of consequences. [Citation omitted]. It implies that the decisionmaker . . . selected or 

reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite 

of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.” Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 

U.S. 256, 279 (1979). 

 (b) Analysis 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Benyard, Cavazos, and Abad, as members of the 

UCC, denied him equal protection of the law and discriminated against him on the basis of 

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his handicap and non-citizenship status, in violation of the 14th Amendment. (FAC at ¶ 

50.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants denied him the opportunity to 

participate in rehabilitative programs, such as “re-enter programs,” which are available to 

other inmates, on the basis of Plaintiff’s mental handicap and non-citizenship status. (Id.

at p. 2.) As an initial matter, as discussed above, Plaintiff did not exhaust an equal 

protection claim against Defendant Abad, and therefore it is not properly before the Court. 

Defendants move to dismiss this claim, arguing that Plaintiff does not allege an equal 

protection claim because Plaintiff has failed to allege that he was treated differently from 

similarly situated inmates. (ECF No. 73-1 at pp. 25-27.) More specifically, Defendants 

argue that Plaintiff makes no allegations about how other inmates with mental disabilities 

were treated, or how other non-citizens were treated, and whether the treatment of 

individuals who fell in these groups differed from the treatment of other inmates. (Id. at p. 

26.) Defendants further argue that Plaintiff makes no allegations identifying the particular 

program he was purportedly denied participation in, thereby giving the Court enough 

information to conduct a rational basis analysis. (Id.) 

For the reasons stated in Judge Hayes’ prior order on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 

the Complaint, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state an equal protection claim. 

(See ECF No. 63 at pp. 13-14.) Plaintiff makes no new allegations in the FAC to change 

the analysis. 

 Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 

Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim be GRANTED as to Defendants 

Benyard and Cavazos. 

 (v) ADA 

 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Benyard, Cavazos, and Abad, as members of the 

UCC, denied him equal protection of the law and discriminated against him on the basis of 

his handicap and non-citizenship status, in violation of the ADA. (FAC at ¶ 50.) 

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants denied him the opportunity to participate in 

rehabilitative programs, such as “re-enter programs,” which are available to other inmates, 

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on the basis of Plaintiff’s mental handicap and non-citizenship status. (Id. at p. 2.) As an 

initial matter, as discussed above, Plaintiff did not exhaust an ADA claim against 

Defendant Abad, and therefore it is not properly before the Court. 

Defendants move to dismiss this claim, arguing that Plaintiff’s claim must fail 

because the ADA does not permit recovery against individuals. (ECF No. 73-1 at p. 27.) 

The Court agrees. “[A] Plaintiff cannot bring an action under 24 U.S.C. § 1983 against a 

State official in [his or] her individual capacity to vindicate rights created by Title II of the 

ADA.” Vinson v. Thomas, 288 F.3d 1145, 1156 (9th Cir. 2002). As Plaintiff only brings 

claims against Defendants Cavazos and Benyard in their individual capacities, his ADA 

claim must fail. 

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 

Plaintiff’s ADA claim be GRANTED as to Defendants Benyard and Cavazos. 

 g. Qualified Immunity

 (i) Applicable Law 

 The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials performing 

discretionary functions from liability for “civil damages unless their conduct violates 

‘clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would 

have known.’” Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 910 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (quoting 

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). “Qualified immunity is ‘an entitlement 

not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation.’” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 

200 (2001) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)). “The privilege is ‘an 

immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; and like an absolute immunity, 

it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.’” Id. at 200-01 (quoting 

Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526). 

 Claims of qualified immunity require a two-step analysis. Courts must consider 

whether the facts alleged, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, 

show the officers’ conduct violated a constitutional right. See id. at 201, modified by 

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (holding the order of Saucier’s two-step analysis 

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should not be regarded as an inflexible requirement: “while the sequence set forth [in 

Saucier] is often appropriate, it should no longer be regarded as mandatory”). If the 

allegations do not establish the violation of a constitutional right, “there is no necessity for 

further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.” Id.; see also Cnty. of Sacramento v. 

Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5 (1998) (“[T]he better approach to resolving cases in which 

the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has 

alleged a deprivation of a constitutional right at all.”). 

 If the allegations could make out a constitutional violation, however, courts must 

ask whether the right was clearly established – that is, whether “it would be clear to a 

reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Id. at 202 

(citing Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999)). “This inquiry, it is vital to note, must 

be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general 

proposition.” Id. The “salient question” is whether the state of the law at the time gives 

officials “fair warning” that their conduct is unconstitutional. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 

730, 740 (2002); see also Saucier, 533 U.S. at 2156-57 (“If the law did not put the officer 

on notice that his conduct would be clearly unlawful, summary judgment based on 

qualified immunity is appropriate.” (citing Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986) 

(qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly 

violate the law”))); Norwood v. Vance, 591 F.3d 1062, 1068 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The relevant, 

dispositive inquiry . . . is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct 

was unlawful in the situation he confronted.”). If an officer makes a reasonable mistake as 

to what the law requires, the officer is entitled to immunity. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205. 

 (ii) Analysis 

 Defendants argue Defendants Paramo, Suglich, Benyard, Cavazos, Abad, Cortez, 

Jones, Allamby, Hernandez, and Behra are protected by qualified immunity from the 

following claims: (1) Plaintiff’s retaliation claim against Defendants Paramo, Suglich, 

Benyard, Cavazos, Abad, Cortez, Jones, Allamby, and Hernandez; (2) Plaintiff’s due 

process claims against Defendants Abad, Allamby, Behra, Benyard, Cavazos, Cortez, 

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Jones, and Hernandez; (3) Plaintiff’s equal protection claim against Defendants Benyard, 

Cavazos, and Abad; (4) Plaintiff’s ADA claim against Defendants Benyard and Cavazos; 

(5) Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim against Defendants Paramo, Suglich, Benyard, Cavazos, 

Abad, Cortez, Jones, Allamby, and Hernandez. (ECF No. 73-1 at pp. 31-32.) Defendants 

argue they are entitled to qualified immunity on these claims because Plaintiff has failed 

to state a claim. (Id.) 

Under Saucier, if the allegations do not establish the violation of a constitutional 

right, “there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.” Saucier, 

533 U.S. at 201. As discussed above, Plaintiff does not sufficiently allege a violation of a 

constitutional right against Defendants Cortez, Jones, Hernandez, Abad, Ramirez, 

Cavazos, Olson, Suglich and Paramo.38

 Accordingly, the Court hereby RECOMMENDS Defendants Cortez, Jones, 

Hernandez, Abad, Ramirez, Cavazos, Olson, Suglich and Paramo’s Motion to Dismiss on 

the basis of qualified immunity be GRANTED, but that Defendants Behra, Benyard, 

Allamby, and Zuniga’s Motion to Dismiss on the basis of qualified immunity be DENIED.

III. CONCLUSION 

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United States District Judge 

William Q. Hayes pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 

72.3. For the reasons outlined above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the District 

Judge issue an order: 

1. Approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation; 

2. GRANTING in part and DENYING in part Defendants’ Motion for Partial 

Summary Judgment (ECF No. 74); and 

3. GRANTING in part and DENYING in part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 

                                               

38 Defendants are not precluded from raising their qualified immunity arguments 

in a motion for summary judgment if discovery into Plaintiff’s claims demonstrate that no 

violation of a clearly established right occurred. 

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(ECF No. 73). 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no later than August 1, 2016, any party to this 

action may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The 

document should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” Any reply 

to the objections shall be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than ten 

(10) days from service of filed Objections. 

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may 

waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. 

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th 

Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: July 15, 2016 

 _________________________ 

 DAVID H. BARTICK 

 United States Magistrate Judge

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