Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02544/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02544-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Kent Marshall, )

)

Petitioner, ) CIV 10-02544 PHX SRB (MEA)

)

v. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

Charles Ryan, Arizona Attorney )

General, ) 

) 

 Respondent. )

) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE SUSAN R. BOLTON:

On or about November 23, 2010, Petitioner filed a pro

se petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254. The petition for habeas relief is captioned as

being filed by an individual on probation, rather than a person

in the custody of law enforcement. Respondents filed an Answer

to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Doc. 11) on

May 6, 2011. Petitioner filed a traverse (Doc. 17) on

September, 2011. 

I Procedural background

On October 10, 2006, a Maricopa County grand jury

indicted Petitioner on three counts of sexual conduct with a

minor under the age of fifteen, and the crimes were charged as

dangerous crimes against a child. See Answer, Exh. A. On

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November 17, 2006, the state filed its disclosure and notice

that it intended to use other-act evidence against Petitioner

under Arizona Rules of Evidence 404(b) and (c). See id., Exh.

B. On December 20, 2006, the state filed another notice of

intent to introduce other acts of the defendant under Rule

404(b) and (c). See id., Exh. C. The state asserted that,

during the same time period that Petitioner had committed the

charged acts involving the victim named in the indictment,

Petitioner had also grabbed a different 12-year-old’s buttocks

and attempted to fondle her breasts. Id., Exh. C. 

On June 4, 2007, Petitioner and the state entered into

a written plea agreement. Id., Exh. D. The plea agreement

provided Petitioner would plead guilty to one count of sexual

conduct with a minor under the age of fifteen (count 1) and

would plead guilty to two counts of attempted sexual conduct

with a minor under the age of fifteen (amended counts 2 and 3).

Id., Exh. D. In the plea agreement the parties stipulated that,

with regard to Petitioner’s guilty plea on count 1, Petitioner

would face a sentencing range of a 20-year presumptive sentence

that could be mitigated downward to 13 years or aggravated

upward to 27 years imprisonment. Id., Exh. D. 

The plea agreement also provided that “the defendant

hereby waives and gives up any and all motions, defenses,

objections, or requests which he has made or raised, or could

assert hereafter, to the court’s entry of judgment against him

and imposition of a sentence upon him consistent with this

agreement.” Id., Exh. D. The plea agreement also specified:

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“The parties hereto fully and completely

understand and agree that by entering into a

plea agreement, the defendant consents to

judicial factfinding by preponderance of the

evidence as to any aspect or enhancement of

sentence, and that any sentence either

stipulated to or recommended herein in

paragraph two is not binding on the court. In

making the sentencing determination, the

court is not bound by the rules of evidence.

Id., Exh. D.

Petitioner signed his initials next to the paragraph of

the plea agreement that states he had read the plea agreement,

and discussed the case and his rights with his lawyer.

Petitioner acknowledged that his lawyer had explained the

charges and the elements of the charged crimes. Petitioner

further acknowledged in writing that: “I understand that by

pleading guilty I will be waiving and giving up ... a trial by

jury to determine guilt and to determine any fact used to impose

a sentence within the range stated above in paragraph one ....”

Id., Exh. D.

On June 6, 2007, the trial court conducted a

change-of-plea hearing and conducted a plea colloquy. Id.,

Exhs. E & F. Petitioner responded “Yes, sir” when the trial

court asked him if he understood that, “as to Count 1, you are

facing a prison sentence with a range of up to 27 years, a

mitigated term of 13 years, and presumptive term of 20 years and

that probation is not available?” Id., Exh. E at 3. At the

plea hearing Petitioner also agreed with his attorney’s

rendition of the factual basis for the three counts to which

Petitioner was pleading guilty. At the conclusion of the

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hearing the trial court found that Petitioner was pleading

guilty knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, and entered

the plea agreement into the record. Id., Exh. E at 9 & Exh. F

at 2. The trial court granted Petitioner’s request for a 60-day

period before sentencing so that Petitioner could consult with

a mitigation specialist. Id., Exh. E at 9–10 & Exh. F at 2.

On August 16, 2007, the trial court held a sentencing

hearing. Id., Exhs. I–J. At the hearing the victim’s mother

addressed the court. Id., Exh. I at 4–9. After also hearing

from the prosecutor, defense counsel, and Petitioner, the trial

court explained its imposition of the maximum sentence:

***

I find that there are aggravating factors.

One, you continued to pursue young girls of

this age by evidence, by that text message,

when you knew or had reason to know that this

girl was not 17.

 The Court finds aggravating factor that you

continued to pursue this relationship when

you knew or had reason to know that this

girl was of the same age as your girlfriend’s

children.

 The Court finds aggravating factor that you

knew or had reason to know that these

children were the same age, you attempted to

pursue additional relationships with another

person of the same age.

 The Court finds that the presumptive

sentence is not appropriate.

 The Court finds that an aggravated term of

27 years is appropriate in this case, as the

victim will live with this for the rest of

her life.

Id., Exh. I at 18.

On October 5, 2007, Petitioner initiated a state action

for post-conviction relief pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal

Procedure 32. Id., Exh. K. Petitioner’s appointed

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post-conviction counsel disclosed that he was unable to find any

meritorious claims to raise on Petitioner’s behalf. Petitioner

filed a pro se brief in which he argued that he received

ineffective assistance of counsel and that his sentence was

illegal. Id., Exh. M.

On October 21, 2008, the trial court summarily denied

post-conviction relief, stating Petitioner had failed to present

a colorable claim. Id., Exh. O. Petitioner sought review in

both the Arizona Court of Appeals and the Arizona Supreme Court,

both of which summarily denied review. Id., Exhs. P–S. 

On November 5, 2010, Petitioner filed a pro se petition

for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to section 2254.

Petitioner asserts that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right

to the effective assistance of counsel. Petitioner alleges his

defense counsel improperly “allow[ed]” the sentencing judge to

utilize the 12-year-old victim’s age as an aggravating factor

“when the age is already a part of the element of the crime” and

when the age of the victim already yielded the enhanced

sentencing range as a dangerous crime against children. See

Doc. 1 at 6. Petitioner maintains that his trial counsel’s

allegedly deficient performance prejudiced Petitioner because,

he alleges, he was thereby sentenced to the maximum rather than

the presumptive sentence. 

Petitioner also contends he is entitled to habeas

relief because the trial court violated his right to a jury

trial under the Sixth Amendment, as interpreted in the United

States Supreme Court’s opinions in Blakely and Apprendi: “The

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judge made as an aggravating factor [that Petitioner] attempted

to pursue additional relationships with another person of the

same age. Petitioner was never charge[d] with this crime, nor

w[ere] these facts proven by a jury (reasonable doubt). I was

never convicted of this aggravating factor.” Id. at 7.

II Standard of review 

The Court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus to a

state prisoner on a claim adjudicated on the merits in state

court proceedings unless the state court reached a decision

contrary to clearly established federal law, or the state court

decision was an unreasonable application of clearly established

federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1994 & Supp. 2010); Carey

v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 75, 127 S. Ct. 649, 653 (2006);

Musladin v. Lamarque, 555 F.3d 834, 838 (9th Cir. 2009).

Factual findings of a state court are presumed to be correct and

can be reversed by a federal habeas court only when the federal

court is presented with clear and convincing evidence. See 28

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240-41,

125 S. Ct. 2317, 2325 (2005); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S.

322, 340, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 1041 (2003); Crittenden v. Ayers, 624

F.3d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 2010); Stenson v. Lambert, 504 F.3d 873,

881 (9th Cir. 2007). Additionally, the United States Supreme

Court recently held that, with regard to claims adjudicated on

the merits in the state courts, “review under § 2254(d)(1) is

limited to the record that was before the state court that

adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 131

S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011). 

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A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit

precludes federal habeas relief so long as “fairminded jurists

could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s

decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011).

To obtain a writ of habeas corpus from a federal court, a

petitioner must show that the state court’s decision “was so

lacking in justification” that it resulted in “an error well

understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any

possibility [of] fairminded disagreement.” Id. at 786–87. 

Where the state court reaches a decision on the merits

but provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, a federal

habeas court independently reviews the record to determine

whether habeas corpus relief is available under section 2254(d).

Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 860 (9th Cir. 2011); Himes v.

Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). “Independent review

of the record is not de novo review of the constitutional issue,

but rather, the only method by which we can determine whether a

silent state court decision is objectively unreasonable.”

Himes, 336 F.3d at 853. Even where no reasoned decision is

available, the habeas petitioner still has the burden of

“showing there was no reasonable basis for the state court to

deny relief.” Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 784.

A state court decision is contrary to federal law if it

applied a rule contradicting the governing law of Supreme Court

opinions, or if it confronts a set of facts that is materially

indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court but

reaches a different result. See, e.g., Brown v. Payton, 544

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U.S. 133, 141, 125 S. Ct. 1432, 1438 (2005); Yarborough v.

Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 663, 124 S. Ct. 2140, 2149 (2004). For

example, a state court’s decision is considered contrary to

federal law if the state court erroneously applied the wrong

standard of review or an incorrect test to a claim. See Knowles

v. Mirzayance, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1419 (2009); Wright v. Van

Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 124-25, 128 S. Ct. 743, 746-47 (2008);

Norris v. Morgan, 622 F.3d 1276, 1288 (9th Cir. 2010), cert.

denied, 131 S. Ct. 1557 (2011). See also Frantz v. Hazey, 533

F.3d 724, 737 (9th Cir. 2008); Bledsoe v. Bruce, 569 F.3d 1223,

1233 (10th Cir. 2009). “A state court decision is contrary to

clearly established federal law if it arrives at a conclusion of

law opposite to that of the Supreme Court or reaches a result

different from the Supreme Court on materially indistinguishable

facts.” McNeal v. Adams, 623 F.3d 1283, 1287-88 (9th Cir.

2010), cert. denied, 79 U.S.W.L. 3727 (June 27, 2011) (No.

10-10109), citing Taylor v. Lewis, 460 F.3d 1093, 1097 n.4 (9th

Cir. 2006). 

The state court’s determination of a habeas claim may

be set aside under the unreasonable application prong if, under

clearly established federal law, the state court was

“unreasonable in refusing to extend [a] governing legal

principle to a context in which the principle should have

controlled.” Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 166, 120 S. Ct.

2113, 2120 (2000). See also Cheney v. Washington, 614 F.3d 987,

994 (9th Cir. 2010); Cook v. Schriro, 538 F.3d 1000, 1015 (9th

Cir. 2008). “A state court decision involves an unreasonable

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1

 “That test is an objective one and does not permit a court

to grant relief simply because the state court might have incorrectly

applied federal law to the facts of a certain case.” Adamson v.

Cathel, 633 F.3d 248, 255-56 (3d Cir. 2011).

-9-

application of clearly established federal law if it correctly

identifies a governing rule but applies it to a new set of facts

in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or if it extends, or

fails to extend, a clearly established legal principle to a new

set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable.”

McNeal, 623 F.3d at 1287-88. However, the state court’s

decision is an unreasonable application of clearly established

federal law only if it can be considered objectively

unreasonable. See, e.g., Renico v. Lett, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1862

(2010). An unreasonable application of law is different from an

incorrect one. See, e.g., McNeal, 623 F.3d at 1287-88; Cooks v.

Newland, 395 F.3d 1077, 1080 (9th Cir. 2005).1

 “[E]valuating whether a rule application was

unreasonable requires considering the rule’s

specificity. The more general the rule, the

more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes

in case-by-case determinations.” Ibid. “[I]t

is not an unreasonable application of clearly

established Federal law for a state court to

decline to apply a specific legal rule that

has not been squarely established by this

Court.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, [] 129 S.Ct.

1411, 1413–14, [] (2009) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786. See also Howard v. Clark, 608

F.3d 563, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2010).

If the Court determines that the state court’s decision

was an objectively unreasonable application of clearly

established United States Supreme Court precedent, the Court

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must review whether Petitioner’s constitutional rights were

violated, i.e., the state’s ultimate denial of relief, without

the deference to the state court’s decision that the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) otherwise

requires. See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953-54, 127

S. Ct. 2842, 2858-59 (2007); Greenway v. Schriro, ___ F.3d ___,

2011 WL 3195310, at *14 (9th Cir.); Norris, 622 F.3d at 1286;

Howard, 608 F.3d at 568.

III Analysis

A. Petitioner contends he was denied his federal

constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel

Petitioner asserts that his counsel was

unconstitutionally ineffective because, he alleges, counsel

“allowed” the judge to use the victim’s age as an aggravating

factor when imposing sentence. Petitioner alleges this was

error because the victim’s age was an element of the crime and

because the sentence was already “enhanced” by charging

Petitioner with a dangerous crime against children. Petitioner

asserts his counsel’s performance was deficient because counsel

also failed to advise Petitioner that, by pleading guilty,

Petitioner was waiving his right to have a jury determine facts

“essential” to Petitioner’s sentence.

The state courts denied Petitioner’s ineffective

assistance of counsel claim, which he raised in his Rule 32

action. The Arizona state court’s conclusion that Petitioner

was not deprived of his right to the effective assistance of

counsel was not clearly contrary to nor an unreasonable

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application of federal law.

The “clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States” at issue in this case is the test for

ineffective assistance of counsel claims set

forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, [] (1984), and in Hill

v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S. Ct. 366, []

(1985). Under Strickland, to establish a

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,

the petitioner must show (1) grossly

deficient performance by his counsel, and (2)

resultant prejudice. 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.

Ct. 2052. In Hill, the Supreme Court adapted

the two-part Strickland standard to

challenges to guilty pleas based on

ineffective assistance of counsel, holding

that a defendant seeking to challenge the

validity of his guilty plea on the ground of

ineffective assistance of counsel must show

that (1) his “counsel’s representation fell

below an objective standard of

reasonableness,” and (2) “there is a

reasonable probability that, but for [his]

counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded

guilty and would have insisted on going to

trial.” 474 U.S. at 57-59, 106 S. Ct. 366.

Womack v. Del Papa, 497 F.3d 998, 1002 (9th Cir. 2007).

To establish deficient performance, a person

challenging a conviction must show that

counsel’s representation fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness. A court

considering a claim of ineffective assistance

must apply a strong presumption that

counsel’s representation was within the wide

range’ of reasonable professional assistance.

The challenger’s burden is to show that

counsel made errors so serious that counsel

was not functioning as the “counsel”

guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth

Amendment.

Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733, 739 (2011) (internal citations

and quotations omitted), citing Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 788

(“The question is whether an attorney’s representation amounted

to incompetence under ‘prevailing professional norms,’ not

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whether it deviated from best practices or most common

custom.”). Counsel’s performance is not deficient nor

prejudicial when counsel “fails” to raise an argument when

counsel reasonably believes the motion would be futile. See

Premo, 131 S. Ct. at 741; Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 788.

Furthermore, to succeed on a claim that his counsel was

constitutionally ineffective regarding a guilty plea, a

petitioner must show that his counsel’s advice as to the

consequences of the plea was not within the range of competence

demanded of criminal attorneys. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52,

58, 106 S. Ct. 366, 369 (1985).

In assessing prejudice under Strickland, the

question is not whether a court can be

certain counsel’s performance had no effect

on the outcome or whether it is possible a

reasonable doubt might have been established

if counsel acted differently. ... Instead,

Strickland asks whether it is “reasonably

likely” the result would have been different.

Id., at 696, 104 S. Ct. 2052. ... The

likelihood of a different result must be

substantial, not just conceivable. Id., at

693, 104 S. Ct. 2052.

Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 791-92 (some internal citations

omitted). Although the Court may proceed directly to the

prejudice prong, the Court may not assume prejudice solely from

counsel’s allegedly deficient performance. See Jackson v.

Calderon, 211 F.3d 1148, 1155 n.3 (9th Cir. 2000).

Petitioner has not established that his counsel’s

performance was deficient, or that any alleged deficiency

prejudiced Petitioner. The plea agreement was beneficial to

Petitioner and Petitioner indicated both in the written plea

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2

 Had Petitioner proceeded to trial and been convicted on

all three counts he faced three life sentences without the possibility

of parole for 35 years. Answer, Exh. I at 9-10.

-13-

agreement and at the plea colloquy that he understood the terms

of the plea agreement and was pleading guilty voluntarily and

knowingly. In the plea agreement Petitioner specifically waived

his right to have a jury determine every fact weighed when

imposing sentence. Petitioner has not demonstrated that, but

for counsel’s advice with regard to the plea agreement and the

sentencing procedure, Petitioner would have chosen to go forward

to trial on all of the counts charged in the indictment as

charged in the indictment.2 Accordingly, because counsel’s

performance was neither deficient nor prejudicial, the Arizona

courts did not err in determining that Petitioner was not

deprived of his right to the effective assistance of counsel.

B. Petitioner asserts his sentence violated the

doctrine of Blakely v. Washington and Apprendi v. New Jersey.

Petitioner asserts that the judge improperly found

aggravating sentencing factors using a preponderance of the

evidence standard, depriving Petitioner of his right to have

every element of his crime determined by a jury beyond a

reasonable doubt. Petitioner also asserts the judge improperly

aggravated Petitioner’s sentence based on Petitioner’s alleged

pursuit of another under-age girl after Petitioner had been

charged with the crimes of conviction, even though Petitioner

was never charged with or convicted of a crime regarding the

other girl. Petitioner raised these claims in his state Rule 32

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action and the state court summarily denied the claims.

Petitioner relies on the doctrine espoused by the

United States Supreme Court in Apprendi and Blakely. “Other

than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the

penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must

be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S. Ct. 2348,

2362-63 (2000). The Supreme Court explained in Blakely v.

Washington that “the ‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi purposes

is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis

of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the

defendant.” 542 U.S. 296, 303, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2537, (2004).

However, in the written plea agreement Petitioner

specifically waived his right to a jury determination of facts

or factors which would result in imposition of the maximum

sentence rather than the presumptive sentence. The United

States Supreme Court clearly upheld such a waiver in Blakely v.

Washington. See 542 U.S. at 310, 124 S. Ct. at 2541 (“When a

defendant pleads guilty, the State is free to seek judicial

sentence enhancements so long as the defendant either stipulates

to the relevant facts or consents to judicial factfinding.”).

“[N]othing prevents a defendant from waiving his Apprendi

rights. When a defendant pleads guilty, the State is free to

seek judicial sentence enhancements so long as the defendant ...

consents to judicial factfinding.” Id., 542 U.S. at 310, 124 S.

Ct. at 2541. 

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In his traverse, Petitioner argues that his sentence

was improperly aggravated because the judge applied a

preponderance of the evidence standard to arrive at factual

findings supporting an aggravated sentence. Petitioner also

maintains that he was improperly sentenced because aggravating

factors were found by a judge rather than a jury. Petitioner

notes that the trial judge expressed that he was inclined to

sentence Petitioner to the recommended presumptive sentence

until he listened to the victim’s mother speak at Petitioner’s

sentencing hearing.

Petitioner could and did waive his right to have each

factor that determined his ultimate sentence determined by a

jury and, therefore, the state court did not err by denying this

claim in Petitioner’s Rule 32 proceeding and Petitioner is not

entitled to habeas relief on this claim. See White v. Battaglia,

454 F.3d 705, 707 (7th Cir. 2006).

IV Conclusion

Petitioner has not established that the guilty plea was

not knowing or voluntary and, accordingly, the guilty plea was

valid and Petitioner’s waiver of his rights therein must be

enforced, including Petitioner’s right to have a jury determine

sentencing factors beyond a reasonable doubt. The state court

did not err in determining that Petitioner was not deprived of

his right to the effective assistance of counsel. 

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IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Marshall’s

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter,

the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a

response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules

of Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the

District of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation

may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. 

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

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of the Magistrate Judge. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, R. 11, the District

Court must “issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it

enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” The undersigned

recommends that, should the Report and Recommendation be adopted

and, should Petitioner seek a certificate of appealability, a

certificate of appealability should be denied because Petitioner

has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right as required by 28 U.S.C.A § 2253(c)(2).

DATED this 13th day of September, 2011.

Case 2:10-cv-02544-SRB Document 18 Filed 09/14/11 Page 17 of 17