Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01278/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01278-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity - Legal Malpractice

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Charles W. Campbell, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Dirk L. Hubbard, Stephen Jenkins, Lowell

Finson, John Klamann, Courtney Hueser,

Defendants. 

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No. CV 05-1278-PHX-DGC

ORDER

Plaint iff has filed a motion for reconsideration. See Doc. # 43. The Court has

discretion to reconsider its order granting Defendant s’ motion to dismiss. See Barber v.

Hawaii, 42 F.3d 1185, 1198 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Nutri-Cology, Inc., 982 F.2d 394,

396 (9t h Cir. 1992). Motions for reconsideration are disfavored, however, and are not the

place for parties t o make new arguments not raised in their original briefs. See Northwest

Acceptance Corp. v. Lynnwood Equip., Inc., 841 F.2d 918, 925-26 (9th Cir. 1988). Nor is it

the time t o ask the Court to rethink what it has already thought. See United States v.

Rezzonico, 32 F. Sup p . 2d 1112, 1116 (D. Ariz. 1998) (citing Above the Belt, Inc. v. Mel

Bohannon Roofing, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 99, 101 (E. D. Va. 1983)).

Because there was no trial, the Court will construe Plaintiff’s motion as a motion to

alter or amend judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) and for relief from judgment pursuant to

Rule 60(b). A judgment may not properly be reopened under Rule 59 “‘absent highly

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unusual circumst ances[.]’” Weeks v. Bayer, 246 F.3d 1231, 1236 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation

omitted). The Court may do so only if (1) it is presented with newly discovered evidence,

(2) it committed clear error or the initial decision was manifestly unjust, or (3) there is an

int ervening change in controlling law. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County, Or. v.

ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993); Zimmerman v. City of Oakland, 255 F.3d

734, 740 (9th Cir. 2001). “This requirement is a high hurdle for Plaintiff to meet.” Weeks, 246

F.3d at 1236. The Court may grant a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)

only “upon a showing of (1) mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered

evidence; (3) fraud; (4) a void judgment; (5) a satisfied or discharged judgment; or (6)

extraordinary circumstances which would just ify relief.” Id. at 1263; see Fed. R. Civ. P.

60(b); Allmerica Fin. Life Ins. & Annuity Co. v. Llewellyn, 139 F.3d 664, 666 (9th Cir. 1997)

(stating that part y must show “extraordinary circumstances” to obtain relief under Rule

60(b)(6)).

Plaintiff asserts two reasons for reconsideration of the Court’s decision. T he Court

will address them separately.

First, Plaintiff argues that the Court should have t aken as t rue his assertion that

Defendants knew he was “moving to Arizona permanently.” Doc. #43. Plaintiff argues

that if Defendants were aware of his int ent to move to Arizona at the time they entered their

contractual relat ionship, then personal jurisdiction is proper because Defendants could

reasonably expect to litigate in Arizona if they caused injury to an Arizona resident. Id.

As the Court ’s p rior order explained, however, foreseeablity of injury in another state is not

a sufficient basis for personal jurisdiction in that state. See Doc. #41; Gray & Co. v.

Firstenberg Mach. Co., 913 F.2d 758, 760 (9th Cir. 1990). M oreover, “[t]he law is clear, that

a contract alone is not sufficient to establish purposeful interjection into the forum st at e.”

Id. Moreover, even assuming Defendants were aware that Plaintiff was planning to move

to Arizona, the analysis under the “reasonableness” prong of the p urp oseful availment test

does not change. Defendants did not interject themselves into the forum state, Defendants

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would be burdened litigating in Arizona, judicial efficiency weighs in Defendants’ favor

because all the events and most of t he witnesses are located in Kansas, and Plaintiff has

not shown the unavailability of an alternative forum. Doc. #42. 

Second, Plaintiff argues that the Court should have applied the Calder effects test.

See Doc. #43. Plaintiff reasons that if the Court takes as true his assertion that Defendants

“purposefully and intentionally caus[ed] injury to Plaintiff in Arizona,” then jurisdiction

is proper. Doc. #43. 

The Ninth Circuit has held that the Calder effects test is generally applicable in the

cont ext of claims arising from intentional torts. See Caruth v. Int’l Psychoanalytical Ass’n,

59 F.3d 126, 128 n.1 (9t h Cir. 1995) (applying effects test to defamation, tortious interference

with business relations, and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims); Core-Vent

Corp. v. Nobel Industries AB, 11 F.3d 1482, 1486 (9th Cir. 1993) (libel); Bancroft & Masters,

Inc., v. Agusta National, Inc., 223 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2000) (declaratory judgment action

involving trademark infringement); Brainerd v . Governors of the Univ. of Alberta, 873 F.2d

1257, 1259 (9th Cir. 1989) (defamation and tortious int erference with contracts). The effects

test requires that the defendant “(1) committed an intentional act, which was (2) expressly

aimed at the forum state, and (3) caused harm, the brunt of which is suffered and which the

defendant knows is likely to be suffered in the forum state.” Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1087. 

Here, Plaintiff’s complaint asserts claims for legal malpractice growing out of the

attorney-client relat ionship. He alleges that Defendants “took no actions which could be

construed as competently representing plaintiff, thereby p urp osefully and intentionally

causing injury to plaintiff in Arizona.” Doc. #43. In other words, Plaintiff alleges that

Defendants failed to represent him competently in the Kansas lawsuit. Because the

complained-of actions do not involve Defendants committing an intentional act “expressly

aimed” at the forum state, the Calder effects test does not ap p ly . Bancroft, 223 F.3d at

1087; see Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racime et L’Antisemitisme, 145 F.Supp.2d

1168, 1174 (N.D.Ca.2001) (noting that “in every Ninth Circuit decision to date in which t he

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effects test has been applied, the plaintiff’s cause of action has been akin to a tort claim or

the defendant’s conduct has been tortious in nat ure”); see also McClinchy v. Shell

Chemical Co., 845 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (refusing to apply Calder effects test

to a contract claim).

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider (Doc. #43) is denied.

DATED this 2nd day of February, 2006.

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