Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01137/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01137-12/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROY D. TAYLOR, on behalf of himself 

and all others similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

v.

FEDEX FREIGHT, INC., an Arkansas 

corporation; and DOES 1 through 10, 

inclusive,

Defendants.

No. 1:13-cv-01137-DAD-BAM

ORDER GRANTING FINAL APPROVAL OF 

CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT AND 

ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS

(Doc. Nos. 68 and 69)

On June 7, 2016, plaintiff’s counsel filed a motion for attorney’s fees and costs (Doc. No. 

27) and, on August 1, 2016, a motion for final approval of class action settlement (Doc. No. 68.) 

These matters came before the court on August 29, 2016, 2016, for a final fairness hearing. 

Attorney R. Duane Westrup appeared telephonically for plaintiff. Attorneys Keith A. Jacoby and 

Mireya A.R. Llaurado appeared telephonically for defendants. Oral argument was heard and the

motions were taken under submission. For the reasons set forth below, the motion for final 

approval of class action settlement and the motion for attorney’s fees and costs will be granted.

BACKGROUND

This action was removed from Kings County Superior Court on July 19, 2013. (Doc. No. 

1.) The complaint, filed as a class action against defendant FedEx Freight, Inc. (“FedEx”), 

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alleges violation of the California Labor Code § 201-03, 204, 210, 226, 226.7, 510, 512, 558, 

1174, 1194, 1197, 1197.1, 2698, and California Business and Professions Code § 17200 et seq., 

for failing to pay truck drivers for all time worked when driving to and from designated hotels 

and dispatch centers, failing to pay for non-personal time spent at designated hotels, failing to pay 

for time spent off the clock while waiting to trade trailers with other drivers, failing to pay for all 

time worked inspecting trucks, failing to provide meal and rest periods, failing to timely pay 

compensation upon termination, and failing to provide accurate itemized wage statements. (Doc. 

No. 1, at 21.)

Plaintiff Roy Taylor filed a motion to certify the class action on August 14, 2014. (Doc. 

No. 17.) The assigned magistrate judge issued findings and recommendations recommending that 

class certification be granted and, on July 24, 2015, the previously assigned District Judge 

adopted those findings and recommendations. (Doc. Nos. 36 and 48.) In doing so, the court 

certified the classes as follows:

All person who worked for Defendant as line-haul drivers from 

January 28, 2012 through the date of trial.

All Class Members who have left their employment with Defendant 

from January 28, 2012, through the date of trial. (Labor Code § 

203: Waiting time penalties subclass).

(Doc. No. 48, at 5.) The court also appointed Roy D. Taylor as class representative and the law 

firm of Westrup & Associates and the Labor Law Office, APC as class counsel. (Id.)

On January 14, 2016, the parties attended mediation with Judge Stephen J. Sundvold 

(retired). (Doc. No. 57 at 7.) As a result of that mediation, the parties reached a settlement of this 

action. (Id.)

On April 20, 2016, the court granted preliminary approval of the class action settlement. 

(Doc. No. 63.) In that order, the court: (1) granted preliminary approval of the class action 

settlement; (2) confirmed Westrup & Associates, including Duane Westrup, Esq., and Labor Law 

Office APC, including Michael L. Carver, as class counsel; (3) approved Rust Consulting as the 

administrator; (4) directed that notice be given to the class; and (5) adopted the settlement

implementation schedule. (Id. at 16.)

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The court further conditionally certified the following class for purposes of the settlement:

[A]ll California-based employees who worked for Defendant as 

Road Drivers or other drivers paid by the hour to the extent they 

performed road runs paid on a piece rate basis, in California on or 

after January 28, 2012 through December 31, 2015.

(Id. at 3-6.)

Claim forms with respect to the settlement were mailed on May 10, 2016. (Doc. No. 69-1, 

at 3.) The objection period closed on June 9, 2016, and the opt-out and claim submission period 

closed on June 24, 2016. Of the 1445 class members, 965 settlement class members submitted 

valid claim forms to recover their individual shares of the net settlement fund of $2,530,000, with 

one request for exclusion and no objections. Individual payouts will total up to $7,042, with the 

average award estimated to be $2,616. (Id.)

After conducting the final fairness hearing and carefully considering the terms of the 

settlement, the court now addresses whether the proposed settlement is fair, reasonable, and 

adequate; and whether class counsel’s request for attorneys’ fees and costs should be granted.

CERTIFICATION OF SETTLEMENT CLASS

The court previously conditionally certified the proposed settlement class and determined 

that the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Rule 23(a) and (b) had been met. (Doc. No. 63 at 

3-6.) Accordingly, there is no need for the court to repeat the analysis here. See, e.g., Harris v. 

Vector Marketing, No. C–08–5198, 2012 WL 381202 at *3, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Feb.6, 2012) (“As a 

preliminary matter, the Court notes that it previously certified ... a Rule 23(b)(3) class ... [and 

thus] need not analyze whether the requirements for certification have been met and may focus 

instead on whether the proposed settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable”); In re Apollo 

Group Inc. Securities Litigation, Nos. CV 04–2147–PHX–JAT, CV 04–2204–PHX–JAT, CV 04–

2334–PHX–JAT, 2012 WL 1378677 at *4 (D. Ariz. Apr.20, 2012) (“The Court has previously 

certified, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and hereby reconfirms its 

order certifying a class”). The court therefore certifies the proposed settlement class.

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FINAL APPROVAL OF THE SETTLEMENT

A class action may be settled only with the court’s approval. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e). 

“Approval under 23(e) involves a two-step process in which the Court first determines whether a 

proposed class action settlement deserves preliminary approval and then, after notice is given to 

class members, whether final approval is warranted.” Nat’l Rural Telecomms. Coop. v. 

DIRECTV, Inc., 221 F.R.D. 523, 525 (C.D. Cal. 2004). At the final approval stage, the primary 

inquiry is whether the proposed settlement “is fundamentally fair, adequate, and reasonable.” 

Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811, 818 (9th Cir. 2012); Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 

1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998). “It is the settlement taken as a whole, rather than the individual 

component parts, that must be examined for overall fairness.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1026 (citing 

Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of S.F., 688 F.2d 615, 628 (9th Cir. 1982)); see also 

Lane, 696 F.3d at 818-19. Having already completed a preliminary examination of the 

agreement, the court reviews it again, mindful that the law favors the compromise and settlement 

of class action suits. See, e.g., In re Syncor ERISA Litig., 516 F.3d 1095, 1101 (9th Cir. 2008); 

Churchill Village, LLC. v. Gen. Elec., 361 F.3d 566, 576 (9th Cir. 2004); Class Plaintiffs v. City 

of Seattle, 955 F.2d 1268, 1276 (9th Cir. 1992); Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 688 

F.2d 615, 625 (9th Cir. 1982). Ultimately, “the decision to approve or reject a settlement is 

committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge because he [or she] is exposed to the litigants 

and their strategies, positions, and proof.” Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 953 (9th Cir. 

2003) (quoting Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1026.

Assessing a settlement proposal requires the district court to 

balance a number of factors: the strength of the plaintiffs’ case; the 

risk, expense, complexity, and likely duration of further litigation; 

the risk of maintaining class action status throughout the trial; the 

amount offered in settlement; the extent of discovery completed and 

the stage of the proceedings; the experience and views of counsel; 

the presence of a governmental participant; and the reaction of the 

class members to the proposed settlement.

Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1026 (citing Torrisi v. Tucson Elec. Power Co., 8 F.3d 1370, 1375 (9th Cir.

1993)); see also Lane, 696 F.3d at 819. “To survive appellate review, the district court must 

show it has explored comprehensively all factors[.]” Allen v. Bedolla, 787 F.3d 1218, 1223 (9th 

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Cir. 2015) (quoting Dennis v. Kellogg Co., 697 F.3d 858, 864 (9th Cir. 2012)); Hanlon, 150 F.3d 

at 1026.

1. Strength of Plaintiff’s Case

When assessing the strength of plaintiff’s case, the court does not reach “any ultimate 

conclusions regarding the contested issues of fact and law that underlie the merits of this 

litigation.” In re Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 720 F. Supp. 1379, 1388 (D. Arizona 

1989). The court cannot reach such a conclusion, because evidence has not been fully presented. 

Id. Instead, the court is to “evaluate objectively the strengths and weaknesses inherent in the 

litigation and the impact of those considerations on the parties’ decisions to reach these 

agreements.” Id.

Here, the court has already granted plaintiff’s motion for class certification. (Doc. No. 

48.) The court found that the claims should be certified based on FedEx’s concededly uniform 

pay plan as well as documentary evidence, including FedEx’s time keeping and wage records, 

which would show that class members were paid on a load or line basis and whether they were 

separately compensated for non-piece-rate work and rest breaks. (Id.) Accordingly, plaintiff’s 

claims are not without merit.

2. The Risk, Expense, Complexity, and Likely Duration of Further Litigation and the Risk of 

Maintaining Class Action Status Through Trial

If this litigation were to proceed, however, both sides would face significant risks. For 

instance, defendant has suggested its exposure is limited by the recent enactment of Labor Code 

§ 226.2 concerning piece rate compensation, which went into effect on January 1, 2016. That 

new Labor Code provision (i) clarifies pay requirements for mandated breaks and other 

nonproductive time going forward; and (ii) provides a short time period for employers to make 

back wage payments for the time between July 1, 2012, through December 31, 2015, in exchange 

for relief from statutory penalties and other damages. The parties would likely dispute, however, 

whether cases filed prior to March 1, 2014 are excluded from the penalty relief provisions of § 

226.2. (Doc. No. 69-1, at 4-5.)

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Plaintiff also faces risks associated with decertification, liability and damages, as well as 

satisfying the burden of proof necessary to overcome defendant’s defenses and any motion for 

summary adjudication and/or judgment. There is also a risk that the trier of fact could determine 

that drivers were compensated for all of their non-driving activity time. (Id.) Defendant, on the 

other hand, would face the risk that the certified class could recover on its claims if the case goes 

to trial. The damage on those claims could be substantial and, of course, both parties risk losing 

costs and attorney’s fees if the other party prevails. In light of all of these risks, the strength of 

plaintiff’s case, and all known facts and circumstances, the court finds that the proposed 

settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and is in the best interest of the class members.

3. The Amount Offered in Settlement

To fairly allocate settlement funds based on the class member’s length of service, whether 

the class member drove road runs on a regular basis as opposed to only occasionally, and whether 

the class member may be entitled to waiting time penalties, the distribution amounts will be 

calculated using a point system: (i) each class member will be credited one point for each shift 

employed during the class period unless the class member was on leave of absence for that 

workweek; and (ii) each class member who separated from employment during the class period 

will be credited five additional points to compensate the class member for his or her potential 

waiting time penalty claim. The payouts will be divided among class members who have timely 

submitted claims as follows: (i) five percent will be paid to settlement class members who did 

not regularly work as road drivers, and who instead perform road services only on an occasional 

basis and were paid pursuant to the road pay plan for such work; and (ii) ninety-five percent will 

be paid to class members who regularly worked as road drivers for some or all of the class period.

The total proposed settlement amount is $3,750,000 with $25,000 allocated for the cost of 

administration of the settlement, $25,000 for the class representative, $1,125,000 for attorney’s 

fees, $25,000 for attorney costs, $20,000 for a penalty payment under California’s Private 

Attorney General Act of 2004, Cal. Labor Code § 2698 et seq. (“PAGA”), and $2,530,000 for the 

net settlement fund. Individual payouts will total up to $7,042, with the average award estimated 

to be $2,616. (Doc. No. 69-1, at 3.) The court concludes that the settlement pays a reasonable 

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amount of what each settlement class member may be owed.

4. The Extent of Discovery Completed and the Stage of the Proceedings

Here, the settlement was reached after informed, arm’s length negotiations between the 

parties. Both parties conducted extensive investigation and discovery allowing them to assess the 

strengths and weaknesses of the case. (Doc. No. 59–1, at 6–8.) Plaintiff’s counsel took 

depositions of defendant’s corporate designees, reviewed documents and data, consulted with 

experts, prepared a damage analysis, and prepared briefings. (Id.) The settlement resulted from 

mediation presided over by an impartial mediator. (Id.) The settlement is the product of noncollusive negotiations after substantial discovery had been conducted, giving plaintiff and 

plaintiff’s counsel a good grasp of the merits of the case before settlement talks began. The 

settlement is “not the product of fraud or overreaching by, or collusion among, the negotiating 

parties.” Class Plaintiffs v. City of Seattle, 955 F.2d 1268, 1290 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Ficalora 

v. Lockheed Cal. Co., 751 F.2d 995, 997 (9th Cir. 1985)); see also Rodriguez v. West Publishing 

Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 965 (9th Cir. 2009).

5. The Experience and Views of Counsel

Plaintiff’s counsel are qualified law firms with extensive experience handling class actions 

and labor law litigation. (Doc. No. 69-1, at 7.) Class counsels collectively have been appointed 

as class counsel in over one hundred class action cases during the fifteen years. (Id.) In the prior 

orders granting class certification and preliminary approval of the class action settlement, the 

court found that the same plaintiff and class counsel were adequate to represent the class. (Doc. 

Nos. 48 and 63.) Plaintiff’s counsel, as well as the class representative, “strongly believe” that 

the settlement is fair, adequate, and preferable to continued litigation. (Doc. No. 69, at 15.)

6. The Presence of a Governmental Participant

Plaintiff sought to enforce claims under PAGA on behalf of the state and affected 

employees. The settlement will result in a $20,000 PAGA penalty payment. This weighs in favor 

of approval. See Adoma v. Univ. of Phoenix, Inc., 913 F. Supp. 2d 964, 977 (E.D. Cal. 2012); 

Zamora v. Ryder Integrated Logistics, Inc., No. 13cv2679-CAB (BGS), 2014 WL 9872803, at 

*10 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2014) (factoring civil PAGA penalties in favor of settlement approval).

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7. The Reaction of the Class Members to the Proposed Settlement

In this case, the administrator undertook measures to ensure the class members’ receipt of 

the claim packages, including performing address traces and re-mailing notices. (Doc. No. 69-2, 

at 4.) On May 10, 2016, notices were mailed to 1,445 class members. (Id.) The notice advised 

class members that they could submit a claim form, request exclusion, or object. (Id.) The notice 

further contained comprehensive information regarding the terms of the proposed settlement. 

(Doc. No. 57-3.) The administrator received only one complete and timely request for exclusion. 

(Doc. No. 69-2, at 4.) The administrator also received 966 valid claimants1and zero objections. 

(Id.) The absence of objections to a proposed class action settlement supports that the settlement 

is fair, reasonable, and adequate. See National Rural Telecommunications Cooperative v. 

DIRECTV, Inc., 221 F.R.D. 523, 529 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (“The absence of a single objection to the 

Proposed Settlement provides further support for final approval of the Proposed Settlement.”) 

(and cases cited therein); Barcia v. Contain-A-Way, Inc., 3:07-cv-00938-IEG-JMA, 2009 WL 

587844, at *4 (S.D. Cal. 2009).

Accordingly, all factors weigh in favor of granting final approval of the settlement.

ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS

1. Attorney’s Fees and Costs

When a negotiated class action settlement includes an award of attorneys’ fees, the fee 

award must be evaluated in the overall context of the settlement. Knisley v. Network Assocs., 312 

F.3d 1123, 1126 (9th Cir. 2002). At the same time, the court “ha[s] an independent obligation to 

ensure that the award, like the settlement itself, is reasonable, even if the parties have already 

agreed to an amount.” In re Bluetooth Headset Products Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 941 (9th Cir. 

2011); see also Zucker v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 192 F.3d 1323, 1328–29 (9th Cir. 1999).

Where, as here, fees are to be paid from a common fund, the relationship between the class 

members and class counsel “turns adversarial.” In re Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. 

Litig., 19 F.3d 1291, 1302 (9th Cir. 1994). As a result the district court must assume a fiduciary 

 

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Fourteen untimely submitted but otherwise complete claims forms are being counted as valid 

and will receive a settlement payout.

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role for the class members in evaluating a request for an award of attorney fees from the common 

fund. Id.; see also Rodriguez v. Disner, 688 F.3d 645, 655 (9th Cir. 2012); Rodriguez v. West 

Publishing Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 968 (9th Cir. 2009).

The Ninth Circuit has approved two methods for determining the appropriate attorneys’

fees in such cases where the attorneys’ fee award is taken from the common fund set aside for the 

entire settlement: the “percentage of the fund” method and the “lodestar” method. Vizcaino v. 

Microsoft Corp., 290 F.3d 1043, 1047 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). The district court retains 

discretion in common fund cases to choose either method. Id. Under either approach, 

“[r]easonableness is the goal, and mechanical or formulaic application of either method, where it 

yields an unreasonable result, can be an abuse of discretion.” Fischel v. Equitable Life Assurance 

Soc’y of the U.S., 307 F.3d 997, 1007 (9th Cir. 2002).

Under the percentage of the fund method, the court may award class counsel a given 

percentage of the common fund recovered for the class. Id. In the Ninth Circuit, a twenty-five

percent award is the “benchmark” amount of attorneys’ fees, but courts may adjust this figure 

upward or downward if the record shows “‘special circumstances’ justifying a departure.” Id. 

(quoting Six (6) Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1311 (9th Cir. 1990)); 

see also Stetson v. Grissom, 821 F.3d 1157, 1165 (9th Cir. 2016). Percentage awards of between 

twenty and thirty percent are common. See Vizcaino, 290 F.3d at 1047; In re Activision Sec. 

Litig., 723 F. Supp. 1373, 1377 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (“This court’s review of recent reported cases 

discloses that nearly all common fund awards range around 30% even after thorough application 

of either the lodestar or twelve-factor method.”). Nonetheless, an explanation of how the court 

arrived at the award figure is necessary when the district court departs from the twenty-five 

percent benchmark. Powers v. Eichen, 229 F.3d 1249, 1256–57 (9th Cir. 2000).

To assess whether the percentage requested is reasonable, courts may consider a number 

of factors, including 

[T]he extent to which class counsel achieved exceptional results for 

the class, whether the case was risky for class counsel, whether 

counsel’s performance generated benefits beyond the cash 

settlement fund, the market rate for the particular field of law (in 

some circumstances), the burdens class counsel experienced while 

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litigating the case (e.g., cost, duration, foregoing other work), and 

whether the case was handled on a contingency basis.

In re Online DVD-Rental Antitrust Litigation, 779 F.3d 934, 954–55 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal 

quotation marks omitted) (quoting Vizcaino, 290 F.3d at 1047-50). The Ninth Circuit has 

permitted courts to award attorneys’ fees using this method “in lieu of the often more timeconsuming task of calculating the lodestar.” Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 942.

In this case, plaintiff brings various state law claims. Previously, under California law,

“[t]he primary method for establishing the amount of reasonable attorney fees [was] the lodestar 

method.” In re Vitamin Cases, 110 Cal. App. 4th 1041, 1053 (2003). The court determines the 

lodestar amount by multiplying a reasonable hourly rate by the number of hours reasonably spent 

litigating the case. See Ferland v. Conrad Credit Corp., 244 F.3d 1145, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001). 

The product of this computation, the “lodestar” amount, yields a presumptively reasonable fee. 

Gonzalez v. City of Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 1202 (9th Cir. 2013); Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., 

Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 978 (9th Cir. 2008). However, the California Supreme Court recently also 

endorsed the percentage of the fund method for calculating reasonable attorneys’ fees. See

Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l Inc., No. S222996, 2016 WL 4238619, at *1 (Cal. Aug. 11, 2016).

Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit has recommended that district courts apply one method but crosscheck the appropriateness of the amount by employing the other, as well. See Bluetooth, 654 

F.3d at 944.

The settlement agreement here includes an award of $1,125,000 in attorney’s fees. (Doc. No. 

68-1, at 2.) This represents thirty percent of the $3,750,000 gross settlement. (Id.) Class counsel has 

significant experience in the field and the results of the settlement, if approved, would pay a 

reasonable amount of what each settlement class member may be owed. The class members have 

not filed a single objection to the settlement and only one class member filed a complete and timely 

exclusion to the settlement. As discussed above, both parties would face risks if the case proceeded to 

trial. Moreover, class counsel has litigated this factually and legally complex case on a contingency 

fee basis for nearly three years. Finally, thirty percent is consistent with attorney fee awards made in 

many other wage-and-hour class actions in this court. (See Doc. 68 at 12.) Consideration of these 

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factors supports an attorneys’ fees award of thirty percent of the gross settlement. See Hensley v. 

Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 436 (1983) (noting that the “most critical factor” to the reasonableness 

of an attorney fee award is “the degree of success obtained”).

The Lodestar cross-check confirms that the requested attorney fees are reasonable. Class 

counsel contends that they collectively have incurred nearly $500,000 in lodestar attorneys’ fees and 

$8,712 in costs, excluding the time drafting the motion for final approval, and traveling to and 

appearing at the hearing on the final approval of the class action settlement.2 (Doc. No. 68-1 at 2.) 

Westrup & Associates has expended a total of 874 hours representing $446,178 in fees and Labor 

Law Offices APC has expended attorney time of $51,643 in lodestar fees. Class counsel calculates its 

attorneys’ fees with a rate of $525/hour for senior associates and $700/hour for the senior partner R. 

Duane Westrup. (Id. at 6–8.) These rates have been approved in other class actions litigated in this 

district by class counsel. See Owens v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., No 1:10-cv-02062-AWI-SMS, Doc. 

No. 56 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2013) (approving $700/hour for R. Duane Westrup); Miller v. CEVA 

Logistics USA, Inc., No. 2:13-cv-01321-TLN-CKD, 2015 WL 4730176 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2015) 

(approving $525/hour for associates and $700/hour for R. Duane Westrup).

Class counsel further requests a Lodestar multiplier of 2.26 to arrive at the requested 

$1,125,000 attorney’s fees award. (Doc. No. 68, at 14.) “Multipliers in the 3–4 range are common in 

lodestar awards for lengthy and complex class action litigation.” Van Vranken v. Atlantic Richfield 

Co., 901 F. Supp. 294, 298 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (citing Behrens v. Wometco Enterprises, Inc., 118 F.R.D. 

534, 549 (S.D. Fla. 1988)); see also 4 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 14.7 (courts typically 

approve percentage awards based on lodestar cross-checks of 1.9 to 5.1 or even higher, and “the 

multiplier of 1.9 is comparable to multipliers used by the courts”); In re Prudential Ins. Co. America 

Sales Practice Litigation Agent Actions, 148 F.3d 283, 341 (3d Cir. 1998) (“[M]ultiples ranging from 

one to four are frequently awarded in common fund cases when the lodestar method is applied.”) 

(quoting Newberg). Here, the multiplier of 2.26 therefore falls within the range of multipliers 

 

2 Class counsel notes that costs to date of $8,712.00 does not include the costs to attend the final 

approval hearing, but that the difference between the actual costs and the preliminary approved 

costs of $25,000 will be add to the net settlement sum for distribution to the class. (Doc. No. 68

at 19.)

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generally awarded to counsel in successful class action litigation. The court therefore approves class 

counsel’s motion for attorneys’ fees.

2. Class Representative Payment

The settlement agreement provides for a class representative payment of $25,000. 

“Incentive awards are fairly typical in class action cases.” Rodriguez v. West Publ’g Corp., 563 

F.3d 948, 958–59 (9th Cir. 2009). However, the decision to approve such an award is a matter 

within the court’s discretion. In re Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 213 F.3d 454, 463 (9th Cir. 

2000). Generally speaking, incentive awards are meant to “compensate class representatives for 

work done on behalf of the class, to make up for financial or reputational risk undertaking in 

bringing the action, and, sometimes, to recognize their willingness to act as a private attorney 

general.” Rodriguez, 563 F.3d at 958–59. The Ninth Circuit has emphasized that “district courts 

must be vigilant in scrutinizing all incentive awards to determine whether they destroy the 

adequacy of the class representatives . . . . [C]oncerns over potential conflicts may be especially 

pressing where, as here, the proposed service fees greatly exceed the payments to absent class 

members.” Radcliffe v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., 715 F.3d 1157, 1165 (9th Cir. 2013) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A class representative must justify an incentive 

award through “evidence demonstrating the quality of plaintiff’s representative service,” such as 

“substantial efforts taken as class representative to justify the discrepancy between [his] award 

and those of the unnamed plaintiffs.” Alberto v. GMRI, Inc., 252 F.R.D. 652, 669 (E.D. Cal. 

2008). Incentive awards are particularly appropriate in wage-and-hour actions where a plaintiff 

undertakes a significant “reputational risk” by bringing suit against their former employers. 

Rodriguez, 563 F.3d at 958–59. The district court must evaluate their awards individually, using 

“‘relevant factors includ[ing] the actions the plaintiff has taken to protect the interests of the class, 

the degree to which the class has benefitted from those actions, . . . the amount of time and effort 

the plaintiff expended in pursuing the litigation . . . and reasonabl[e] fear[s of] workplace 

retaliation.’” Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 977 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Cook v. Niedert, 

142 F.3d 1004, 1016 (7th Cir. 1998)).

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In this case, the class representative estimates that he spent well over eighty hours 

working on this lawsuit. (Doc. No. 69-2, at 10.) Plaintiff faced personal risks associated with the 

stigma of bringing the lawsuit and, if he failed to prevail, could have been ordered to pay 

attorneys’ fees and costs. (Id.) He is the only class representative in the matter and the incentive 

payment makes up a small portion of the overall settlement funds. However, at the hearing on the 

motion for final approval, defense counsel objected to the amount of the class representative 

payment, arguing that an incentive award of $25,000 is high for a case, such as this, that did not 

go to trial and where there is no general release of liability because the class representative has 

another pending case against defendant. 

Plaintiffs’ requested class representative payment of $25,000 is indeed more than the 

typical enhancement award in this circuit, where $5,000 is presumptively reasonable. See Harris 

v. Vector Marketing Corp., No. C-08-5198-EMC, 2012 WL 381202 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2012) 

(“Several courts in this District have indicated that incentive payments of $10,000 or $25,000 are 

quite high and/or that, as a general matter, $5,000 is a reasonable amount.) (citations omitted). 

The decision in Dyer v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A, 303 F.R.D. 326, 335 (N.D. Cal. 2014) is 

illustrative. There, one class representative spent more than 200 hours assisting the case and a 

second devoted many hours as well and attended a four-day mediation. Id. Both class 

representatives faced professional risks as well as the possibility of retaliation because they 

continued to work in the same industry. Id. Nonetheless, the court in Dyer found that a $15,000 

enhancement award for each class representative was too great because the representatives did not 

sign a broader general release than their fellow class members, the litigation had a relatively short 

duration and ended prior to class certification, and the award was disproportionate to the average 

class member’s recovery, which was estimated to be $1,271. Instead, the court awarded $10,000 

to each class representative for the time and effort they spent in connection with the litigation and 

the risks they took on behalf of their fellow class members. Id. at 336.

This court finds that a class representative payment of less than $25,000 is appropriate in 

this case. While there is no general release of liability by the class representative, his release of 

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liability is broader than the class members.3 The duration of this litigation has been slightly 

longer than that in Dyer because a class has been certified in this case. However, this case is 

otherwise remarkably similar to Dyer. Accordingly, the court finds that a class representative 

payment of $15,000 is appropriate in this case.

4

3. Cost of Administration and PAGA Penalty Payment.

The court finds the expected cost of administration of the settlement of $25,000 and the 

PAGA penalty payment of $20,000 are reasonable.

4. The Lien

On August 26, 2016, a notice of lien under Cal. Code of Civ. Pro. § 708.410 was filed by 

Nancy Ann Underwood (formerly Westrup), regarding attorneys’ fees awarded in this case to 

plaintiffs’ attorney, R. Duane Westrup, and related entities. (Doc. No. 71). The basis of that lien 

was an unsatisfied judgment in the case of In re Marriage of Westrup, Case No: BD513445, in 

the Los Angeles County Superior Court. (Id. at 2.) After the filing of the lien, on August 27, 

2016, Nancy Underwood passed away. (Doc. No. 81-1 at 9.) Courtney Finney (the daughter of 

Nancy Underwood and R. Duane Westrup) was appointed successor in interest for Underwood in 

the marital proceeding. (Doc. No. 81-1 at 4, 16-17). She is also the sole beneficiary to the Nancy 

Ann Westrup Family Trust, dated October 15, 2015 (“the trust”), which became irrevocable at the 

 

3

Specifically, the settlement agreement provides the following release of liability for the class 

representative:

As of the Effective Date, Plaintiff hereby releases and waives any 

and all claims of any kind whatsoever, known or unknown, against 

the Released Parties through the Effective Date of the Agreement, 

except for (i) the claims in the pending Hall, et al. v. FedEx 

Freight, Inc. (D.C. Case No. 1:13-CV-1711-AWI-SKO) (9th Cir. 

Ct. of Appeals Case No. 15-15441), and (ii) any claims of any kind 

directly relating to the termination of Plaintiff’s employment with 

Defendant.

(Doc. No. 57-2 at 25.)

4

The settlement agreement provides that “Defendant reserves the right to oppose the amount of 

the Class Representative Service Fee. In the event that the Court awards a lesser amount than 

requested, then any portion of the requested amount not awarded to Named Plaintiff shall be a 

part of the Net Settlement Fund.” (Doc. No. 57-2 at 14.)

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time of Nancy Underwood’s (formerly Westrup) death. (Doc. 81-1 at 3). Ms. Finney has filed a 

notification with this court representing that she has consulted an attorney and wishes to withdraw 

the previously filed lien. (Doc. No. 81-1 at 2–9). Accordingly, the court orders that the lien 

(Doc. No. 71) be released. Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. (“CCP”) § 708.440(a) (unless the creditor’s 

money judgment is first satisfied or the lien is released, no settlement or dismissal in the 

underlying pending action may be entered into without the written consent of the judgment 

creditor); see also CCP § 377.31 (successor in interest has a right to be substituted in for the 

decedent); CCP § 377.32 (listing requirements for acting as successor in interest).

CONCLUSION

There is no evidence of collusion in this case and all factors weigh in favor of granting 

final approval of the settlement. Accordingly, the settlement is approved as fair and reasonable 

and class counsel’s motion for attorney’s fees is granted.

For all of the reasons set forth above, the court:

1) Confirms the certification of the settlement class for settlement purposes;

2) Confirms Westrup & Associates, including Duane Westrup, Esq., and Labor Law 

Office APC, including Michael L. Carver, as class counsel;

3) Confirms Rust Consulting as the claim administrator;

4) Finds the terms of the proposed settlement agreement to be fair, adequate, and 

reasonable and comply with Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;

5) Grants the motion for final approval of the class action settlement (Doc. No. 68);

6) Grants the motion for attorneys’ fees (Doc. No. 68);

7) Orders that the notice of lien filed on August 26, 2016 (Doc. No. 71) against Duane 

Westrup and all entities named therein be released;

8) Orders that the settlement awards be made and administered in accordance with the 

terms of the settlement agreement to the 966 valid claimants;

9) Orders payment of the class representative service fees to plaintiff Roy D. Taylor in 

the amount of $15,000 from the settlement fund;

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10) Orders payment for the costs of administration to the claims administrator Rust 

Consulting in the amount of $25,000 from the settlement fund;

11) Orders that under the California Labor Codes’ Private Attorneys General Act 

(“PAGA”), California Labor Code § 2699, et seq., a PAGA payment of $20,000 is 

reasonable and apportions that payment as follows: $15,000 to the Labor and 

Workforce Development Agency and $5,000 to the claimants, to be distributed 

pursuant to the claims process defined the settlement agreement;

12) Orders payment for class counsel fees of $1,250,000 (40% to be paid to Michael L. 

Carver, Labor Law Offices, and 60% to be paid to the Law Offices of Westrup & 

Associates, A.P.C.) and costs up to $25,000 to be paid from the settlement as final 

payment for and complete satisfaction of any and all attorneys’ fees and costs incurred 

by and/or owed to class counsel as set forth in the settlement agreement;

13) Proceeds from any uncashed checks shall be donated cy pres to Central California 

Legal Services within 140 days after the effective date of this settlement, and within 

10 days thereafter, the claims administrator shall provide a declaration of compliance 

to the parties;

14) Enters this final judgment and orders that parties act in accordance with the terms in 

the settlement agreement;

15) The court will retain jurisdiction over the matter for the purposes of the interpretation, 

implementation, and enforcement of the settlement and agreement and all orders 

entered in connection therewith.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 12, 2016 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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