Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-03580/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-03580-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 370
Nature of Suit: Other Fraud
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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1 This disposition is not designated for publication and may not be cited. 

2 Ciolino owns a HP PSC 2510 Photosmart printer. Feder did not identify the

printer model he owns. 

Case No. C 05-3580 JF (PVT)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

(JFEX2)

**E-Filed 6/6/06**

NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

In re: HP INKJET PRINTER LITIGATION Case Number C 05-3580 JF (PVT)

ORDER1 GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS

[re: docket no. 38]

I. BACKGROUND

Hewlett-Packard Co. (“HP”) manufactures printing supplies and inkjet printers. Plaintiffs

Nicklos Ciolino (“Ciolino”) and Daniel Feder (“Feder”) both own HP printers that use “smart

chip” technology.2 “Smart chip” technology, according to HP, keeps track of the remaining ink

in a cartridge and alerts printer owners when new ink needs to be ordered.

On October 31, 2005, Plaintiffs filed an amended class action complaint against HP. On

March 7, 2006, this Court issued an Order granting in part and denying in part HP’s motion to

dismiss and denying HP’s motion to strike. The Court concluded that Plaintiffs did not have

standing because they had not alleged an actual injury in connection with their six claims for

Case 5:05-cv-03580-JF Document 44 Filed 06/06/06 Page 1 of 7
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Case No. C 05-3580 JF (PVT)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

(JFEX2)

relief. In addition, the Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims for breach of express warranty and

breach of implied warranty. On March 31, 2006, Plaintiffs filed a Second Consolidated and

Amended Class Action Complaint (“SAC”).

 Plaintiffs now allege the following: HP engaged in unfair and deceptive conduct in

connection with the “smart chip” technology in its ink cartridges. HP’s “smart chips” are

programmed to indicate prematurely that replacement is needed, when in fact “hundreds of

additional pages” of ink remain. HP’s “smart chip” technology also renders cartridges unusable

on a concealed, built-in “expiration date,” which is the earlier of thirty months after installation

or thirty months after a factory-set “install-by” date, regardless of the amount usable ink

remaining. HP’s “SureSupply” marketing campaign falsely promises consumers an easy way to

maintain adequate printer supplies that saves time and money, while failing to disclose the

premature ink warnings and expiration date discussed above. Plaintiffs allege that “HP has

deliberately withheld from its consumers information about the true functioning of the smart chip

. . . .” SAC, ¶¶ 2, 23-28. They allege that they have suffered economic harm because they

discarded usable printer cartridges based on premature low-ink warnings. They allege that they

relied on specific terms of HP’s express warranty that were breached by HP. Plaintiffs also

allege that they relied on HP’s promotional material in purchasing HP printer cartridges.

Plaintiffs allege six claims for relief: (1) breach of express warranty; (2) breach of implied

warranty; (3) unjust enrichment; (4) violations of the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act

(“CLRA”), California Civil Code § 1750 et seq.; (5) violations of the California False

Advertising Act (“FAA”), California Business & Professions Code § 17500 et seq.; and (6)

violations of the California Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), California Business & Professions

Code § 17200 et seq. 

On April 21, 2006, HP filed the instant motion to dismiss on the ground that Plaintiffs

lack standing to allege claims arising from the alleged “expiration date” feature of the “smart

chip” technology. Plaintiffs oppose the motion. The Court heard oral argument on June 2, 2006.

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Case No. C 05-3580 JF (PVT)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

(JFEX2)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“A Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack may be facial or factual.” Safe Air For Everyone v.

Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). In a facial attack, the moving party asserts that the

allegations in the complaint are insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction. Id. In a

factual attack, the moving party disputes the truth of the allegations in the complaint, which

otherwise would be sufficient to invoke federal jurisdiction. Id. In resolving a facial attack, the

Court accepts the allegations in the complaint as true. Whisnant v. United States, 400 F.3d 1177,

1179 (9th Cir. 2005).

III. DISCUSSION

HP argues that Plaintiffs do not have standing to allege claims related to the “expiration

date” feature because neither named Plaintiff has experienced an injury-in-fact as a result of this

feature. “To establish the ‘irreducible constitutional minimum of standing,’ the plaintiff must

demonstrate that there was an injury-in-fact that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct and

that the injury can be redressed by a favorable decision by the Court.” Muir v. Navy Fed. Credit

Union, 366 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2005) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.

555, 560-61 (1992)). The elements necessary to establish standing are “not mere pleading

requirements but rather an indispensable part of the Plaintiffs’ case, [and] each element must be

supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof,

i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation.” 

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 512. Article III “requires the party who invokes the court’s authority to show

that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal

conduct of the defendant, and that the injury fairly can be traced to the challenged action and is

likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.” Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans

United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (internal quotation marks

omitted). Plaintiffs argue that they have alleged both an actual and a threatened injury. 

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Case No. C 05-3580 JF (PVT)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

(JFEX2)

A. Actual Injury

Plaintiffs admit that they “have not yet encountered an expired cartridge.” Plaintiffs’

Opposition, p. 4. However, they argue that they have standing regarding all claims arising from

“smart chips” based on their alleged actual injury from false low-ink warnings. Plaintiffs argue

that the low-ink warnings and expiration date features are “companion features” of the same

“smart-chip” technology and are marketed in the same “SureSupply” campaign. Thus, they

contend that the harm resultant from the low-ink warnings also establishes standing for claims

related to the “expiration date” feature. 

As Plaintiffs correctly note, “At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury

resulting from the defendant’s conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we presum[e] that

general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.” Lujan,

504 U.S. at 512 (internal quotation marks omitted). However, Plaintiffs have not made even

general allegations of actual injury based on the “smart chip” technology. Rather, the only actual

injury that they have alleged is that the premature “low-ink” warnings have caused them to

discard usable, non-expired cartridges. SAC, ¶¶ 30-33. Moreover, Plaintiffs have expressly

conceded that they have not yet suffered an actual injury as a result of the “expiration date”

feature. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have not suffered an actual injury-infact traceable to the “expiration date” feature.

B. Threatened Injury

In the alternative, Plaintiffs argue that the threat of future harm resulting from the

“expiration date” feature establishes standing. They argue that, because HP continues to use the

concealed “expiration dates” in printer cartridges, they face an ongoing risk of encountering a

cartridge that will shut down before its ink supply is exhausted. They argue that such an

encounter is now more likely since they are likely to ignore low-ink warnings and use cartridges

longer than they had previously. 

Three elements are required to establish standing: (1) “the plaintiff must have suffered an

‘injury in fact’—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and

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Case No. C 05-3580 JF (PVT)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

(JFEX2)

particularized, and (b) ‘‘actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical,’’” (2) “there must

be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be

fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the

independent action of some third party not before the court,” and (3) “it must be ‘likely,’ as

opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’”

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61 (1992) (internal citations omitted).

Of these three, Plaintiffs have adequately addressed only the second element. This Court

agrees with Plaintiffs that the threat of injury from the “expiration date” feature is “fairly

traceable” to the conduct of the defendant, because it arises from HP’s alleged inclusion of this

feature in the “smart chip” technology. 

However, with respect to the first element, the SAC does not include an allegation of an

imminent threat of injury to Plaintiffs’ interests, nor have Plaintiffs alleged facts that might allow

the Court to infer an imminent threat to those interests, such as facts concerning the frequency

with which cartridges expire. In their opposition brief, they suggest that there is an imminent

threat that cartridges they presently own will expire, because they now ignore low-ink warnings

and thus use cartridges longer. Opposition, pp. 6-7. However, Plaintiffs do not attempt to

quantify the likelihood that cartridges will expire or when such expiration will occur. At oral

argument, counsel emphasized the clock starts ticking on cartridges even prior to purchase. 

However, the SAC contains no allegations as to how long cartridges actually sit on store shelves.

Imminence is a “somewhat elastic concept,” but “cannot be stretched beyond its purpose, which

is to ensure that the alleged injury is not too speculative for Article III purposes—that the injury

is ‘certainly impending.’” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564 n.2 (citations omitted). This Court concludes

that the Plaintiffs have failed to allege an imminent threat to their interests. Even if they were to

incorporate the points raised in their opposition brief and at oral argument into an third amended

complaint, the Court doubts that their arguments would succeed in alleging a ‘certainly

impending’ injury rather than a speculative one.

Relying on Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2001), Plaintiffs also suggest that

harm arises from HP’s express warranty. Armstrong establishes the proposition that “where the

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Case No. C 05-3580 JF (PVT)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

(JFEX2)

harm alleged is directly traceable to a written policy, . . . there is an implicit likelihood of its

repetition in the immediate future.” Armstrong, 275 F.3d at 861 (internal citations omitted). In

Armstrong the written policy of the California Board of Prison Terms failed to comply with the

Americans with Disabilities Act. Plaintiffs had suffered past injuries, and the injuries resulted

from following the written policy. Id at 861-63. The instant case is distinguishable from

Armstrong because Plaintiffs have suffered no past injuries and the alleged threat of future injury

is alleged to result from a breach of HP’s warranty rather than from the terms of the policy itself.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s arguments with respect to threatened

future harm are insufficient to establish standing to allege claims arising out of the “expiration

date” feature of the “smart chip.”

IV. ORDER

Good cause therefore appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED HP’s motion to dismiss is

GRANTED. This determination is without prejudice to Plaintiffs’ seeking leave to reassert the

dismissed claims should new facts emerge in discovery or otherwise. 

DATED: June 6, 2006

 

 

JEREMY FOGEL

United States District Court

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Case No. C 05-3580 JF (PVT)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

(JFEX2)

This Order has been served upon the following persons:

Sally J. Berens sberens@gibsondunn.com, sberens@gibsondunn.com

Kelly L Bulawsky kbulawsky@cpsmlaw.com

Philip L. Gregory pgregory@cpsmlaw.com, jacosta@cpsmlaw.com

Bruce Lee Simon bsimon@cpsmlaw.com, jlein@cpsmlaw.com 

Case 5:05-cv-03580-JF Document 44 Filed 06/06/06 Page 7 of 7