Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-35866/USCOURTS-ca9-13-35866-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ALASKA WILDERNESS LEAGUE;

CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL

DIVERSITY, INC.; GREENPEACE, INC.;

NATIONAL AUDOBON SOCIETY, INC.;

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE

COUNCIL, INC.; OCEAN

CONSERVANCY, INC.; OCEANA, INC.;

PACIFIC ENVIRONMENT AND

RESOURCES CENTER; REDOIL, INC.;

SIERRA CLUB,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

SALLY JEWELL, Secretary of the

Interior; BRIAN SALERNO, Director

of Bureau of Safety and

Environmental Enforcement; MARK

FESMIRE, Regional Director of

Bureau of Safety and Environmental

Enforcement, Alaska Region,

Defendants-Appellees,

SHELL GULF OF MEXICO INC.; SHELL

OFFSHORE INC.,

Intervenor-Defendants–Appellees.

No. 13-35866

D.C. Nos.

3:12-cv-00048-

RRB

1:12-cv-00010-

RRB

OPINION

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2 ALASKA WILDERNESS LEAGUE V. JEWELL

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Alaska

Ralph R. Beistline, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

August 13, 2014—Anchorage, Alaska

Filed June 11, 2015

Before: Jerome Farris, Dorothy W. Nelson,

and Jacqueline H. Nguyen, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Nguyen;

Dissent by Judge D.W. Nelson

SUMMARY*

Environmental Law

The panel affirmed the district court’s summary judgment

in favor of federal defendants and Shell Gulf of Mexico, Inc.

and Shell Offshore Inc. in an action brought by environmental

groups alleging that the Bureau of Safety and Environmental

Enforcement acted unlawfully in approving two of Shell’s oil

spill response plans for its oil leases in the Beaufort and

Chukchi Seas on Alaska’s Arctic coast.

The panel held that the Bureau’s approval of Shell’s oil

spill response plans was not arbitrary, capricious, or

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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ALASKA WILDERNESS LEAGUE V. JEWELL 3

otherwise not in accordance with law under the

Administrative Procedures Act. 

Concerning the plaintiffs’ contention that the Bureau

should have engaged in Endangered Species Act consultation

before approving the plans, the panel applied Chevron

analysis to the Clean Water Act provisions. At Chevron Step

One, the panel held that the relevant portions of the Clean

Water Act were ambiguous; and at Chevron Step Two, the

panel held that the Bureau’s interpretation of the provisions

was reasonable. The Bureau interpreted the provisions to

conclude that Congress limited the Bureau’s discretion to

only reviewing an oil spill response plan to determine if it

met the six enumerated requirements of 33 U.S.C.

§ 1321(j)(5)(D), and the implementing regulations. 

According deference to the Bureau’s interpretation of the

Clean Water Act and its own regulations, the panel held that

the Bureau lacked discretion to deny approval once it

determined that the oil spill response plans satisfied the

statutory requirements. The panel concluded that the

Bureau’s approval of the plans was a nondiscretionary act

that did not trigger a requirement for interagency consultation

under the Endangered Species Act.

The panel rejected plaintiffs’ contention that the Bureau

violated the National Environmental Policy Act by failing to

prepare an Environmental ImpactStatement before approving

the plans. The panel held that the Bureau reasonably

concluded that it must approve any plan that met the statutory

requirements of the Clean Water Act. The panel concluded

that the Bureau’s approval of Shell’s plans was not subject to

the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act. 

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4 ALASKA WILDERNESS LEAGUE V. JEWELL

Judge D.W. Nelson dissented. Judge Nelson concurred

with the majority that the Bureau did not act in an arbitrary or

capricious manner in approving the plans, but dissented from

the remainder of the majority opinion. Judge Nelson would

hold that the Bureau was required to engage in Endangered

Species Act consultation, and conduct analysis pursuant to

the National Environmental Policy Act, and she would

reverse the summary judgment accordingly.

COUNSEL

Holly A. Harris (argued), Brettny E. Hardy, and Eric P.

Jorgensen, Earthjustice, Juneau, Alaska, for PlaintiffsAppellants.

Maggie B. Smith (argued), Attorney; Robert G. Dreher,

Acting Assistant Attorney General, and David B. Glazer,

Bridget Kennedy McNeil, Kent E. Hanson, and David C.

Shilton, Attorneys, United States Department of Justice,

Environment and Natural Resources Division, Washington,

D.C.; Sarah Doverpike, Office of the Solicitor, Department of

the Interior, Washington, D.C., for Defendants-Appellees

Sally Jewell, Brian Salerno, and Mark Fesmire.

Kathleen Sullivan (argued), William B. Adams, and David S.

Mader, Quinn Emmanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP, New

York, New York; Kyle W. Parker, Crowell & Moring LLP,

Anchorage, Alaska, for Intervenors-Defendants–Appellees.

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ALASKA WILDERNESS LEAGUE V. JEWELL 5

OPINION

NGUYEN, Circuit Judge:

Shell Gulf of Mexico Inc. and Shell Offshore Inc.

(collectively “Shell”) for many years have sought to develop

offshore oil and gas resources in the remote Beaufort and

Chukchi seas on Alaska’s Arctic coast. Shell secured leases

for the Beaufort Sea in 2005 and 2007, and the Chukchi Sea

in 2008, but its exploration efforts have been waylaid by a

variety of legal, logistical, and environmental problems,

including multiple lawsuits,1the wreck of one of its drill rigs,2

and the temporary suspension of drilling activities in the

1

See, e.g., Resisting Envtl. Destruction on Indigenous Lands, REDOIL,

v. EPA, 716 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2013) (challenging permitting of

exploratory drilling in the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas); Native Vill. of

Point Hope v. Salazar, 680 F.3d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 2012) (challenging

the approval of exploration plans in the Beaufort Sea); Inupiat Comm. of

the Arctic Slope v. Salazar, 486 F. App’x 625 (9th Cir. 2012) (mem.)

(challenging the approval of exploratory drilling plans in the Chukchi

Sea); Native Vill. of Point Hope v. Salazar, 378 F. App’x 747 (9th Cir.

2010) (mem.) (challenging the approval of exploration plans in the

Beaufort and Chukchi Seas); Alaska Wilderness League v. Kempthorne,

548 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2008), vacated, 559 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2009)

(challenging the approval of exploration plans in the Beaufort Sea),

dismissed as moot sub nom., Alaska Wilderness League v. Salazar,

571 F.3d 859 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Ctr. for Biological Diversity v.

Salazar, 695 F.3d 893 (9th Cir. 2012) (challenging the authorization of

incidental take of polar bears and Pacific walruses related to exploration

activity in the Chukchi Sea); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Kempthorne,

588 F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 2009) (same, as to the Beaufort Sea).

2

See Gary Braasch, The Wreck of the Kulluk, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30,

2014, at MM24.

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6 ALASKA WILDERNESS LEAGUE V. JEWELL

Arctic after the Deepwater Horizon Spill.3 We review here

another challenge, a claim by a coalition of environmental

groups that the Bureau of Safety and Environmental

Enforcement (“BSEE”) acted unlawfully in approving two of

Shell’s oil spill response plans (“OSRPs”). The district court

granted summary judgment in favor of the federal defendants

and intervenor-defendant Shell. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

I.

The Statutory Schemes

We begin with an overview of the complex statutory

backdrop to BSEE’s approval of the OSRPs in this case.

The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”),

43 U.S.C. § 1331 et seq., establishes a four-stage process for

the exploration and development of offshore oil and gas

resources. First, the Secretary of the Interior prepares and

maintains a five-year oil and gas leasing program. 43 U.S.C.

§ 1344(a). Second, the Secretarymay grant oil and gas leases

for submerged lands in the outer continental shelf at a lease

sale, subject to certain terms and provisions. See id.

§ 1337(a)–(b). Third, a lessee must “submit an exploration

plan to the Secretary for approval,” id. § 1340(c)(1),

accompanied by an Oil Spill Response Plan required under

3 U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Decision Memorandum Regarding the

Suspension of Certain Offshore Permitting and Drilling Activities in the

Outer Continental Shelf, July 12, 2010, at 1 available at

http://www.doi.gov/deepwaterhorizon/loader.cfm?csModule=security/

getfile&PageID=38390.

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ALASKA WILDERNESS LEAGUE V. JEWELL 7

the Clean Water Act, see 30 C.F.R. § 550.219 (the approval

of which is at issue in this case). In the fourth and final

phase, if exploration reveals oil or gas, a lessee must then

submit “a development and production plan” for the

Secretary’s approval. 43 U.S.C. § 1351(a)(1). Each stage

triggers certain environmental analysis, and the Bureau of

Ocean Energy Management (“BOEM”) is responsible for

managing the process, including the necessaryenvironmental

reviews. See Native Vill. of Point Hope v. Salazar, 680 F.3d

1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 2012).

While OCSLA governs the development of oil and gas

resources, the Clean Water Act provides a framework for

preventing and responding to potential oil spills. See

33 U.S.C. § 1321(b). The Clean Water Act mandates oil spill

contingency planning at four levels: the national, regional,

and area levels, and, lastly, at the level of individual owners

and operators of offshore oil facilities. First, at the national

level, the President prepares a National ContingencyPlan that

sets forth “efficient, coordinated, and effective action to

minimize damage from oil and hazardous substance

discharges.” Id. § 1321(d)(2). Second, Regional Response

Teams, co-chaired by the Environmental Protection Agency

and the Coast Guard, prepare Regional Contingency Plans

that coordinate “planning, preparedness, and response

activities” across federal agencies, “states, local governments,

and private entities.” 40 C.F.R. § 300.105(a); see also id. at

300.115. Third, Area Committees prepare Area Contingency

Plans that, “when implemented in conjunction with the

National Contingency Plan, [are] adequate to remove a worst

case discharge, and to mitigate or prevent a substantial threat

of such a discharge.” 33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(4)(C)(i).

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8 ALASKA WILDERNESS LEAGUE V. JEWELL

Fourth and finally, and most relevant to this litigation, the

President must promulgate regulations that require owners

and operators of offshore oil facilities4to submit an OSRP

“for responding, to the maximum extent practicable, to a

worst case discharge . . . of oil or a hazardous substance.” Id.

§ 1321(j)(5)(A)(i). The Secretary of the Interior delegated

this responsibility to BSEE.5

56 Fed. Reg. 54,757, 54,761-62

(Oct. 18, 1991); 76 Fed. Reg. 64,432-01, 64,448 (Oct. 18,

2011). OSRPs must comply with the Clean Water Act’s six

requirements, listed at 33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(5)(D), one of

which is compliance with the governing Area Contingency

Plan. Id. § 1321(j)(5)(D)(i); 30 C.F.R. § 550.219. BSEE

must “promptly review” submitted plans, “require

amendments to any plan that does not meet the requirements

of this paragraph,” and “shall . . . approve any plan that

meets” the statutory requirements. Id. § 1321(j)(5)(E)(i)–(iii)

(emphasis added).

4 While OCSLA refers to “lessees,” the Clean Water Act refers to

“owners and operators.” Compare 43 U.S.C. § 1331 et. seq. with

33 U.S.C. § 1321. Because this case concerns the approval of OSRPs

under the Clean Water Act, we primarily employ the term “operators.”

5

Initially, a single agency, the Minerals Management Service (“MMS”),

managed compliance with both OCSLA and the Clean Water Act. See

76 Fed.Reg. 64,432, DOI Secretarial Order No. 3229. After the

Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2010, however, the Secretary divided MMS

into three new entities. Native Vill., 680 F.3d at 1127 (quoting Press

Release, U.S. Dep’t ofInterior, Salazar Divides MMS’s Three Conflicting

Missions (May 19, 2010), available at http://www.doi.gov/news/

pressreleases/Salazar-Divides-MMSs-Three-Conflicting-Missions.cfm). 

BOEM now manages the development of offshore resources under

OCSLA, and BSEE is responsible for the “enforcement of safety and

environmental functions” under the Clean Water Act, including approval

of the OSRPs at issue here. Id. at 1128.

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ALASKA WILDERNESS LEAGUE V. JEWELL 9

Environmental consultation occurs at several points

throughout both OCSLA and the Clean Water Act’s fourtiered processes. National Environmental Policy Act

(“NEPA”) and Endangered Species Act (“ESA”)

consultations occur when oil and gas exploration leases are

first issued (at OCSLA’s second stage), 43 U.S.C.

§ 1344(a)(1) & (b)(3); see also Sec’y of the Interior v.

California, 464 U.S. 312, 338 (1984), and again when lessee

exploration plans are submitted (at OCSLA’s third stage),

43 U.S.C. § 1340(c). Additional environmental review takes

place upon submission of lessee development and production

plans (OCSLA’s fourth stage), including another round of

NEPA review, see id. § 1351(c), and the submission of

environmental impact statements (“EIS”) to the governors of

any affected states, id. § 1351(f)–(g). The Secretary may

“approve, disapprove, or require modifications” of

development plans, and must reject any plan that would

“probably cause serious harm or damage to . . . the marine,

coastal, or human environments,” when weighed against the

extent of the threat and the potential advantages of allowing

production. Id. § 1351(h)(1).

Likewise, the Clean Water Act has several types of

environmental review built in throughout its various stages. 

At the Area Contingency Plan level, Area Committees must

consult with both the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the

National Oceanic and AtmosphericAdministration to prepare

“a detailed annex containing a Fish and Wildlife and

Sensitive Environments Plan” that “provide[s] the necessary

information and procedures to immediately and effectively

respond to discharges that may adversely affect” the

environment. 40 C.F.R. § 300.210(c)(4)(I). An operator’s

OSRP must be consistent with the protocols established at

this stage. See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(5)(D)(i). The National

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10 ALASKA WILDERNESS LEAGUE V. JEWELL

Contingency Plan also lays out procedures for emergency

consultation in the case of an actual oil spill. See 40 C.F.R.

§ 300.305(e).

II.

The Current Dispute

The case before us arises in the context of these

overlapping statutory schemes, and represents “the latest

chapter in a long-running saga beginning back in April 2002,

when the Minerals Management Service (“MMS”)

established a five-year lease sale schedule for the outer

continental shelf of Alaska.” Native Vill., 680 F.3d at 1126. 

After Shell acquired offshore oil leases in the Beaufort Sea in

2005 and 2007, and in the Chukchi Sea in 2008, it submitted

exploration plans, and the required OSRPs, for activities that

were scheduled to commence in the summer of 2010. MMS,

which was then in charge of approving exploration plans and

OSRPs, id. at 1127, approved Shell’s Beaufort Sea OSRP in

March of that year and approved Shell’s Chukchi Sea OSRP

the following month.

The April 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of

Mexico shifted the landscape in a number of ways. BOEM

assumed control over the approval of exploration plans, and

BSEE assumed responsibility for approving OSRPs. Id. at

1128. Also, following a moratorium on all oil and gas

drilling, the Department of the Interior issued new guidance

regarding the content and analysis that should be provided in

OSRPs. See, e.g., U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of

Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement,

Information Requirements for Exploration Plans,

Development and Production Plans, and Development

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ALASKA WILDERNESS LEAGUE V. JEWELL 11

Operations Coordination Documents on the OCS 3 (2010),

available at http://www.boem.gov/Regulations/Notices-ToLessees/2010/10-n06.aspx.

6

In response, Shell updated its

OSRPs for the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas in May 2011, and

again in early 2012. BSEE approved the two OSRPs in

February and March of 2012, respectively.

Following these approvals, Plaintiffs sued the Secretary

of the Interior and the Department of the Interior under the

Administrative Procedure Act, challenging BSEE’s approval

of the OSRPs. Shell successfully intervened. The parties

filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district

court, following extensive briefing and argument, granted

summary judgment in favor of the federal defendants and

Shell. Shell Gulf of Mex. v. Ctr. for Bio. Diversity, Inc., No.

3:12-CV-00048-RRB (D. Alaska Aug. 5, 2013). This appeal

followed.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

“We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, thus

reviewing directly the agency’s action under the

Administrative Procedure Act’s (“APA”) arbitrary and

capricious standard.” Gila River Indian Cmty. v. United

States, 729 F.3d 1139, 1144 (9th Cir. 2013), as amended (July

9, 2013) (quoting Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish &

Wildlife Serv., 378 F.3d 1059, 1065 (9th Cir. 2004)) (internal

6 These revised guidelines were then superceded in January 2015. U.S.

Department of the Interior, Bureau of Ocean Energy Management,

Information Requirements for Exploration Plans, Development and

ProductionPlans, andDevelopment Operations Coordination Documents

on the OCS for Worst Case Discharge and Blowout Scenarios (2015),

available at http://www.boem.gov/NTL-2015-N01/.

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12 ALASKA WILDERNESS LEAGUE V. JEWELL

quotation marks omitted). Review under this standard “is

narrow, and [we do] not substitute [our] judgment for that of

the agency.” Ecology Ctr. v. Castaneda, 574 F.3d 652, 656

(9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d

981, 987 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc)) (alterations in original)

(internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, reversal is only

proper

if the agency relied on factors Congress did

not intend it to consider, entirely failed to

consider an important aspect of the problem,

or offered an explanation that runs counter to

the evidence before the agency or is so

implausible that it could not be ascribed to a

difference in view or the product of agency

expertise.

Id. (quoting Lands Council, 537 F.3d at 987) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

Additionally, under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res.

Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), we engage in a threestep inquiry when reviewing an agency’s interpretation of a

statute that it is entrusted to administer. First, we must decide

whether Congress intended “the agency to be able to speak

with the force of law when it addresses ambiguity in the

statute or fills a space in the enacted law.” United States v.

Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001). Next, we ask

“whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question

at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of

the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give

effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” 

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43. Finally, if the statute is silent

or ambiguous as to the issue at hand, we then defer to the

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ALASKA WILDERNESS LEAGUE V. JEWELL 13

agency’s reading so long as its interpretation is a reasonable

one. Id. at 843.

DISCUSSION

I.

The Administrative Procedures Act

Plaintiffs argue that BSEE’s approval of the OSRPs was

arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative

Procedures Act. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). According to

Plaintiffs, Shell assumed that, in the event of a worst case

discharge, Shell would achieve a mechanical recovery of 90

to 95 percent of any oil spilled in the Arctic Ocean—an

assumption that Plaintiffs characterize as unrealistic and

unsupported. Plaintiffs, however, have misread the record,

which shows that Shell never assumed a 90 to 95 percent

mechanical recovery rate. And even assuming that it did,

BSEE did not rely on any such assumption in approving

Shell’s OSRPs.

The pertinent portion of Shell’s OSRPs reads as follows:

To scale the potential shoreline response

assets needed, and for planning purposes,

Shell based these assets upon the assumption

that 10 percent of the 25,000-[barrels of oil

per day (“bopd”)] discharge escapes the

primary offshore recovery efforts at the

blowout. This unrecovered 2,500 bopd is

assumed to drift toward the mainland . . . . It

is assumed that half of the oil reaching the

nearshore environment is recovered by the

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14 ALASKA WILDERNESS LEAGUE V. JEWELL

skimming systems dispatched from [a large,

mobile oil spill response barge and tug]. The

remaining 1,250 bopd are assumed to migrate

toward the shoreline where [Shell’s spill

response contractor] would mobilize

personnel and equipment to intercept the oil

and deploy boom for shoreline protection.7

Thus, on a straightforward reading of the OSRPs, Shell

made two assumptions—that 10 percent of spilled oil would

“drive toward the mainland,” half of which would be

recovered by skimming systems and half of which would

“migrate toward the shoreline”—for purposes of “scal[ing]

the potential shoreline response assets needed.” Nothing in

the OSRPs’ text suggests that Shell was predicting a 90 to 95

percent mechanical recovery rate. Indeed, Shell’s OSRPs

make clear that it was estimating the potential shoreline

response assets needed in order to comply with an Alaska

state law requiring certain calculations regarding the

magnitude of a worst case scenario oil spill. BSEE’s

regulations identify the specific information an operator must

provide when discussing its worst case discharge scenario,

and these regulations do not require an estimated recovery

rate for spilled oil. See 30 C.F.R. § 254.26(a)–(d). In short,

the record simply does not support Plaintiffs’ claim that Shell

assumed an impossibly high recovery rate of almost 100

percent.

Moreover, it is equally clear from the administrative

record that BSEE did not rely on a purported 90 to 95 percent

7 This quote is taken from Shell’s Chukchi Sea OSRP. Pls.’ Excerpts of

R. at 959, ECF No. 24-10. An analogous claim was made in Shell’s

Beaufort Sea OSRP. See Pls.’ Excerpts of R. at 907, ECF No. 24-10.

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mechanical recoveryrate in approving Shell’s OSRPs. While

Shell’s OSRPs were under consideration, the National

Oceanic Atmospheric Administration expressed concern that

“Shell was claiming it would mechanically recovery 95

percent of oil spilled in any incident, which is many times

more than the best performance currently achievable.” Pls.’

Excerpts of R. at 286, ECF No. 24-3. BSEE responded that

“this was a misreading of the plan, which is not a

performance standard. Shell is claiming to have the capacity

to store up to 95 percent of the [worst case discharge]

volume, not that it would be able to actually collect that

much.” Id. This record shows that BSEE internally

acknowledged some “confusion” over the “planning v.

performance issue” in the OSRPs, but nonetheless reaffirmed

its view that Shell was “in no way claiming an ability to

recover 90 percent of the oil.” Id. at 288. Thus, Plaintiffs’

claim that BSEE’s approval of the OSRPs was arbitrary and

capricious on the ground that Shell assumed an impossibly

high recovery rate fails.

II.

The Endangered Species Act

Next, Plaintiffs argue that BSEE should have engaged in

ESA consultation before approving the OSRPs. Section 7 of

ESA requires federal agencies to consult with the appropriate

environmental agencies before taking an action that may

affect endangered species or habitats. 16 U.S.C.

§ 1536(a)(4); see also Nat’l Res. Def. Council v. Jewell,

749 F.3d 776, 779 (9th Cir. 2014). Even if there is agency

“action,” however, ESA consultation is triggered only if

“there is discretionary Federal involvement or control,” 50

C.F.R. § 402.03 (emphasis added), because consultation

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16 ALASKA WILDERNESS LEAGUE V. JEWELL

would be merely a “meaningless exercise” if the agency lacks

the power to implement changes that would benefit

endangered species, Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 65 F.3d 1502,

1509 (9th Cir. 1995).8

Here, we need not decide whether BSEE’s approval of the

OSRPs constitutes agency action. Even assuming, without

deciding, that the approval of the OSRPs was agency action,

we conclude that it was a nondiscretionary action and thus

ESA’s consultation requirement was not triggered. Because

Congress has “delegat[ed] administrative authority” to the

agencyto interpret this statute, Chevron’s framework applies. 

See Adams Fruit Co., Inc. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649

(1990) (“A precondition to deference under Chevron is a

congressional delegation of administrative authority.”). As

discussed below, at Chevron Step One, we find the relevant

provisions of the Clean Water Act ambiguous, and therefore

“Congress has [not] directly spoken to the precise question at

issue.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. At Chevron Step Two, we

find the agency interpretation reasonable, and therefore we

must accord its interpretation deference. See id. at 843.

A. Chevron Step 1: The Statute’s Ambiguity

The Clean Water Act, as amended by the Oil Pollution

Act of 1990, offers three pertinent instructions regarding the

content and approval of operators’ OSRPs. First, at

8 Because we determine that discretionary agency action did not occur,

we need not decide whether the action “may affect a listed species or

designated critical habitat.” Karuk Tribe of Cal. v. U.S. Forest Serv.,

681 F.3d 1006, 1027 (quoting Turtle Island Restoration Network v. Nat’l

Marine Fisheries Serv., 340 F.3d 969, 974 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal

quotation marks omitted)).

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33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(5)(A)(i), the statute states that “[t]he

President shall issue regulations which require an . . . operator

. . . to prepare and submit to the President a plan for

responding, to the maximum extent practicable, to a worst

case discharge, and to a substantial threat of such a discharge,

of oil or a hazardous substance.” Second, at § 1321(j)(5)(D),

the statute lists six requirements that OSRPs “shall” meet. 

Specifically, OSRPs must

(i) be consistent with the requirements of

the National Contingency Plan and Area

Contingency Plans;

(ii) identifythe qualified individual having

full authority to implement removal actions,

and require immediate communications

between that individual and the appropriate

Federal official and the persons providing

personnel and equipment pursuant to clause

(iii);

(iii) identify, and ensure by contract or

other means approved by the President the

availability of, private personnel and

equipment necessary to remove to the

maximum extent practicable a worst case

discharge (including a discharge resulting

from fire or explosion), and to mitigate or

prevent a substantial threat of such a

discharge;

(iv) describe the training, equipment

testing, periodic unannounced drills, and

response actions of persons on the vessel or at

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18 ALASKA WILDERNESS LEAGUE V. JEWELL

the facility, to be carried out under the plan to

ensure the safety of the vessel or facility and

to mitigate or prevent the discharge, or the

substantial threat of a discharge;

(v) be updated periodically; and

(vi) be resubmitted for approval of each

significant change.

Id. The statute then mandates approval if the above

requirements are met, stating that “the President shall . . .

approve any plan that meets the requirements of this

paragraph.” Id. § 1321(j)(5)(E)(iii). All three instructions—

the “maximum extent practicable” language, the six

enumerated statutory criteria, and the President’s “shall

approve” requirement—fall within the same statutory section

(specifically, paragraph (5)). Pursuant to the Clean Water

Act’s directive, the agency has issued regulations that set

forth what an operator must do to meet the criteria set out in

this section. 30 C.F.R. pt. 254.

We find the statute ambiguous in two ways—in the

statutory language itself, and in the statute’s structure. The

text does not explicitly grant or deny BSEE discretion to

consider additional environmental factors in the OSRP

approval process. Section 1321(j)(5)(A)(i), which directs the

agency to issue regulations requiring operators “to prepare

and submit . . . a plan for responding, to the maximum extent

practicable, to a worst case discharge,” suggests agency

discretion because of the open-ended nature of the phrase

“maximum extent practicable.” On the other hand,

§ 1321(j)(5)(D) reads like a checklist statute, and BSEE must

approve “any plan that meets the requirements of this

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paragraph,” 33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(5)(E)(iii). Thus, these

sections suggest no agency discretion.

The statute’s structure adds to the ambiguity. These two

directives are listed in two separate portions of the paragraph

that delineates an OSRP’s requirements. It is unclear how the

broad language of section 1321(j)(5)(A)(i), with its reference

to the “maximum extent practicable,” interacts with the finite

statutory criteria of section 1321(j)(5)(D). “And that means

we . . . face a statute whose halves do not correspond to each

other– giving rise to an ambiguity that calls for Chevron

deference.” Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191,

2210 (2014) (plurality opinion). We must defer to the

agency’s interpretation of the statute unless it is unreasonable. 

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.

B. Chevron Step 2: The Reasonableness of the Agency’s

Interpretation

Reaching Chevron’s second step, we must determine if

the agency’s interpretation of the ambiguous governing

statute is a reasonable one. When “the agency’s answer is

based on a permissible construction of the statute,” we must

defer to the agency’s view and not “impose [our] own

construction on the statute.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843; see

also Young v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974, 981 (1986)

(noting that the court is “preclude[d] . . . from substituting its

judgment for that of the [agency]” when the agency’s

interpretation of a statute it administers is “sufficiently

rational”).

BSEE argues that the purpose of an OSRP is to ensure

that private operators have response capacity consistent with

federal contingency plans in the event of a worst case

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discharge. Thus, Congress has limited its discretion to

reviewing an OSRP to determine if it meets the six

enumerated requirements of section 1321(j)(5)(D) and the

agency’s coterminous implementing regulations. BSEE reads

its regulations as providing further refinement of the statutory

criteria and the framework under which compliance with the

criteria will be assessed. Since the statute mandates that the

President (and now, BSEE by delegation) “shall . . . approve

any plan that meets the requirements of this paragraph,”

33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(5)(E), BSEE contends that it lacks

discretion to consider factors apart from these delineated

statutory criteria.

We conclude that BSEE’s interpretation of the statute is

reasonable, and thus we must defer to the agency. 

Significantly, the sections on which the agency relies,

§ 1321(j)(5)(D)–(E), speak directly to what a plan shall

contain and what the agency shall approve. Section

1321(j)(5)(A)(i), in contrast, is more circuitous, discussing

what thePresident’s implementing regulationsshould require. 

See id. (“The President shall issue regulations which require

an owner or operator . . . to prepare and submit to the

President a plan for responding, to the maximum extent

practicable, to a worst case discharge . . . .”). In other words,

the agency reads § 1321(j)(5)(A)(i) as an instruction to issue

regulations that delineate how operators can comply with the

statutory checklist enumerated at § 1321(j)(5)(D). Thus, the

agency reasonably understands its discretion to be

constrained by § 1321(j)(5)(D)’s list of requirements which,

upon their satisfaction, trigger mandatory agency approval of

the OSRP.

Our deference to the agency’s reading is similar to that

provided by the Supreme Court in Young v. Community

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Nutrition Institute, 467 U.S. 974 (1986). In Young, the

Supreme Court considered a statute which required the Food

andDrugAdministration (“FDA”) to “promulgate regulations

limiting the quantity [of poisonous or deleterious substances

that cannot be avoided within foods] therein or thereon to

such an extent as [the agency] finds necessary.” 476 U.S. at

977 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 346). The FDA interpreted this

provision to “give it the discretion to decide whether to

promulgate” a quantity limit, while the plaintiffs interpreted

the statute to require the agency to set a limit whenever a

poisonous substance was present. Id. at 977 (emphasis

added), 980. Applying the Chevron framework, the Court

first found the statutory language to be ambiguous as to the

question of the agency’s discretion and then deferred to the

FDA’s interpretation, finding it “to be sufficiently rational to

preclude a court from substituting its judgment for that of the

[agency].” Id. at 980–81. No regulation explicitly reflected

the agency’s view of its discretion, but its position was

consistent with the statutory scheme and longstanding agency

policy. Id. at 977, 981–84.

Just like in Young, BSEE’s position is consistent with the

statute’s scheme and the agency’s longstanding policy. The

applicable regulations “provide specific instructions to

operators as to what they must do to meet [the] Clean Water

Act requirements,” which then trigger the agency’s

mandatoryapproval under § 1321(j)(5)(E)(iii). E.g., compare

30 C.F.R. § 254.5(b) (requiring the OSRP to “be consistent

with the National Contingency Plan and the appropriate Area

Contingency Plan(s)”) with 33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(5)(D)(i)

(imposing the same requirement); compare 30 C.F.R.

§ 254.23(g) (requiring information about procedures the

operator “will follow in the event of a spill”) with 33 U.S.C.

§ 1321(j)(5)(D)(iii) (requiring the OSRP to “identify, and

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ensure by contract or other means . . . the availability of,

private personnel and equipment necessary to remove to the

maximum extent practicable a worst case discharge”). 

Further, BSEE’s interpretation is consistent with the

Department’s longstanding position on the interaction of its

regulations with the statute. When promulgating its 1997

final rule, MMS understood its regulatory requirements to be

coextensive with the statutory requirements, stating in the

rule’s preamble that “[t]he rule will bring MMS regulations

into conformance with the Oil Pollution Act of 1990.” 

Response Plans for Facilities Located Seaward of the Coast

Line, 62 Fed. Reg. 13991, 13991 (Mar. 25, 1997). Moreover,

the Department has expressly confirmed this understanding

in its briefing on appeal. The fact that “the Secretary’s

interpretation comes to us in the form of a legal brief . . . does

not, in the circumstances of this case, make it unworthy of

deference,” so long as it “reflect[s] the agency’s fair and

considered judgment on the matter in question.” Auer v.

Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997).

The legislative history of the Oil Pollution Act’s passage

lends further support to BSEE’s interpretation. See Natural

Res. Def. Council v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 526 F.3d 591, 603

(9th Cir. 2008) (providing that we may look to legislative

history to assist our interpretation of an ambiguous statute

under Chevron). In its comments on the Senate version of the

Oil Pollution Act of 1990, much of whose language was

incorporated into the House Bill that ultimately passed and

amended the Clean Water Act, the Committee on Commerce,

Science, and Transportation noted that the bill imposed

“[s]pecific requirements for the [oil spill contingency] plans.” 

S. Rep. 101-99, at 4 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.

749, 752. This suggests that Congress likelymeant to impose

specific obligations upon operators in their oil spill response

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preparations, and not create an amorphous standard for the

Executive Branch to interpret and enforce. See also

136 Cong. Rec. S11931-01 (Aug. 2, 1990) (statement of Sen.

Warner) (noting that “[t]he bill imposes rigorous new

contingency planning requirements on areas and vessels,”

while obliging “the President to take charge of all major

oilspills and to determine when cleanup is complete”).

The dissent focuses on the breadth of § 1321(j)(5)(A)(i)’s

“maximum extent practicable” language and emphasizes that

because this language reads like a broad mandate, the

evaluation of which would require significant agency

discretion, BSEE must engage in ESA consultation before

approving an OSRP. Under the dissent’s view,

§ 1321(j)(5)(A)(i)’s “maximum extent practicable” language

serves as an independent “standard” that must be met in

addition to the list of enumerated requirements at

§ 1321(j)(5)(D). The dissent’s reading of the statute,

however, gives short shrift to the ambiguity in the statute’s

text and structure.

Of course, we agree that § 1321(j)(5)(A)(i)’s “maximum

extent practicable” language is broad, and the statute arguably

could be read to support the dissent’s interpretation. But we

must accord Chevron deference to the agency’s alternative

understanding. While focusing on § 1321(j)(5)(A)(i), the

dissent largely overlooks the presence of § 1321(j)(5)(D),

which lays out a list of specific requirements that OSRPs

must meet. BSEE reads this subsection, and the mandatory

agency approval required once the specific requirements are

met, see § 1321(j)(5)(E), to eliminate its discretion. This

interpretation is assuredly a “permissible construction” of the

ambiguous statutory language and structure. Chevron,

467 U.S. at 843. And it is not our role to displace the

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agency’s reasonable construction of a statute that it is

responsible for administering. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 229

(“[A] reviewing court has no business rejecting an agency’s

exercise of its generally conferred authority to resolve a

particular statutory ambiguity simply because the agency’s

chosen resolution seems unwise.”).

The dissent resists the Chevron deference that we must

give to the agency’s interpretation by finding the

implementingregulations to be an unreasonable interpretation

of the statute. The regulations define “maximum extent

practicable” to mean “within the limitations of available

technology, as well as the physical limitations of personnel.” 

30 C.F.R. § 254.6. The dissent argues that this definition is

incomplete because it fails to account for the superlative

nature of the word “maximum” and instead provides a

definition only of what is “practicable.” Since the definition

is incomplete, the dissent reasons, it is therefore

unreasonable, obviating the need for this court to apply

Chevron’s framework.

Tellingly, even Plaintiffs do not rely on the purported

vagueness of the agency’s implementing regulations. To the

contrary, Plaintiffs’ counsel conceded the adequacy of the

regulatory definition at oral argument, stating that “[t]he

regulations clearly define maximum extent practicable” and

that “the regulations are fully consistent with” the maximum

extent practicable standard. Oral Argument at 7:55, 8:44,

available at http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view_

video.php?pk_vid=0000006548. We also do not find the

regulatory definition to be problematic. “In the absence of

. . . a definition, we construe a statutory term in accordance

with its ordinary or natural meaning.” F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510

U.S. 471, 476 (1994). A natural reading of the regulation

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indicates that operators must be prepared to respond to an oil

spill to the highest degree possible (to the “maximum”), not

exceeding “the limitations of available technology . . . [and]

the physical limitations of personnel.” 30 C.F.R. § 254.6. 

While the agency could have been more explicit by

specifying that “maximum extent practicable” means the

highest degree of response possible “within the limitations of

available technology,” id., such a clarification would be

superfluous since the plain meaning of “maximum” leads to

the same reading. Therefore, we cannot say that the agency

regulation constitutes an “[im]permissible construction of the

statute.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.

More importantly, this regulatory definition is largely

peripheral to our analysis. We defer to the agency’s

interpretation here not because of its regulatorypromulgation,

but because we face a “statutory inconsistency . . . giving rise

to an ambiguity that calls for Chevron deference.” Cuellar de

Osorio, 134 S. Ct. at 2210 (plurality opinion). The text and

structure of the statute are unclear as to whether the statute

grants the agency discretion to use a broad, indeterminate

standard to review OSRPs, or whether it mandates approval

of plans that meet the requirements of § 1321(j)(5)(D). 

“Confronted with a self-contradictory, ambiguous provision

in a complex statutory scheme, the [agency] chose a textually

reasonable construction consonant with its view of the

purpose and policies underlying . . . [the] law.” Id. at 2213. 

We do not “assume as our own the responsible and expert

agency’s role,” and instead defer to BSEE’s reasonable

interpretation of the gap in a statute it has been tasked with

interpreting. Id.

We address a number of additional arguments raised by

Plaintiffs. They note that the statutory sections governing the

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federal government’s spill plans, at §§ 1321(d)(1)–(2),

(j)(4)(B)–(D), contain the same “shall approve” formulations,

and yet are admittedly subject to ESA’s consultation

requirements. These provisions, however, are different. 

Section 1321(d)(1) states that the President “shall prepare and

publish a National Contingency Plan for removal of oil and

hazardous substances pursuant to this section.” Nothing in

the text prohibits such a plan from being prepared in light of

concerns that an ESA consultation might raise. Similarly,

§ 1321(d)(2) specifies that the National Contingency Plan

“shall provide for efficient, coordinated, and effective action

to minimize damage from oil and hazardous substance

discharges,” and “shall include, but not be limited to” a list of

enumerated factors. This suggests that a National

Contingency Plan could (and should) contain additional

factors that might be deemed necessary after an ESA

consultation occurs. Likewise, while the President shall

“review and approve Area Contingency Plans,” this

language does not suggest that any plan meeting a list of

set requirements must be approved. Compare id.

§ 1321(j)(4)(B)–(D) with id. § 1321(j)(5)(D)–(E).

Section 1321(j)(5)(E)’s language,in contrast,requires that

the President “shall . . . approve any plan that meets the

requirements of this paragraph.” This language leaves no

room for the inclusion of additional factors. The absence of

agency discretion is apparent not from the words “shall

approve” alone, but from the phrase “shall . . . approve any

plan that meets the requirements of this paragraph.” Id.

§ 1321(j)(5)(E) (emphasis added).

Plaintiffs next argue that “[t]he regulations never say that

so long as a plan addresses in some fashion various questions,

the agency must conclude the plan meets the statutory

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mandates.” Pls.’ Opening Br. at 46. Yet, 30 C.F.R.

§ 254.9(b) explicitly states that the information in the OSRP

is collected to “ensure that the owner or operator . . . is

prepared to respond to an oil spill” and to “verify compliance

with the mandates” of the Oil Pollution Act’s amendments to

the Clean Water Act. In any event, such an explicit

pronouncement is not a prerequisite for Chevron deference to

apply. See, e.g., Young, 476 U.S. at 981–82 (deferring to the

FDA’s interpretation of an ambiguous statutory provision

even in the absence of a regulation explicitly stating the

agency’s position); Fernandez v. Brock, 840 F.2d 622, 633

(9th Cir. 1988) (deferring to the Secretary of Labor’s

interpretation of statute that was ambiguous as to the presence

of agency discretion).

Finally, plaintiffs argue that ESA’s consultation

requirement is triggered because BSEE exercises discretion

in deciding whether the six statutory criteria are met. This

position, however, is irreconcilable with the Supreme Court’s

decision in National Association of Home Builders v.

Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 671 (2007), which held

that ESA cannot defeat an agency’s nondiscretionary

statutory directive. The statute at issue there listed nine

statutory criteria; if those criteria were satisfied, the agency

bore a nondiscretionary duty to perform a specific action

(namely, transfer certain permitting powers to state

authorities). Id. at 661. Home Builders’s analysis is directly

applicable here.

9 BSEE may only determine whether the

9 The dissent points out that Home Builders relied in part on the fact that

ESA was passed after the statute requiring the transfer of permitting

power, while the provisions of the Clean Water Act at issue here were

enacted in 1990, post-dating ESA’s 1972 passage. See Home Builders,

551 U.S. at 662–64. This factual distinction in timing does not change the

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statutory criteria in 33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(5)(D) have been met,

and if they have been met, BSEE must approve the plan. 

Since determining whether the statutory criteria have been

achieved does not trigger ESA’s consultation requirement,

Plaintiffs’ argument must again fail.

In sum, deferring to the agency’s interpretation of the

statute that it has been entrusted to administer, and its own

regulations, we hold that BSEE’s approval of the OSRPs was

a nondiscretionary act that did not trigger a requirement for

inter-agency consultation under the ESA. 

III.

The National Environmental Policy Act

Finally, Plaintiffs argue, and the dissent agrees, that

BSEE violated NEPA by failing to prepare an Environmental

Impact Statement (“EIS”) before approving the OSRPs. 

NEPA requires federal agencies to provide an EIS for all

“major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of

the human environment.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C); see also

Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 757 (2004). 

NEPA’s implementing regulations define “[m]ajor Federal

action” to include “actions with effects that may be major and

which are potentially subject to Federal control and

responsibility.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18. Even when a major

federal action occurs, however, NEPA remains subject to a

“rule of reason” that frees agencies from preparing a full EIS

outcome of our analysis. See, e.g., Grand Canyon Trust v. United States

Bureau of Reclamation, 691 F.3d 1008, 1020 (9th Cir. 2012) (relying on

Home Builders to hold that agency action required in part by a 1992

statute did not require ESA consultation).

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on “the environmental impact of an action it could not refuse

to perform.” Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. at 769. Thus, “where an

agency has no ability to prevent a certain effect due to its

limited statutory authority over the relevant actions,” the

agency“[does] not need to consider the environmental effects

arising from” those actions. Id. at 770; see also Sierra Club,

65 F.3d at 1513 (“The [Bureau of Land Management’s]

inability meaningfully to influence Seneca’s right-of-way

construction leads us to conclude that the procedural

requirements of NEPA do not apply to this case.”). 

Here, as our ESA analysis suggests, BSEE reasonably

concluded that it must approve any OSRP that meets the

statutory requirements. See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(5)(D)–(E). 

Thus, even assuming, without deciding, that BSEE’s approval

of Shell’s OSRPs constitutes a “major Federal action,” its

approval is not subject to NEPA’s requirements.

The dissent accepts Plaintiffs’ argument that no authority

prevents BSEE from requiring Shell to make changes to the

OSRPs in order to minimize adverse environmental effects. 

On the contrary, BSEE’s authority is just so constrained. The

governing statute mandates that the agency “shall . . . approve

any plan that meets the requirements” of the statutory section. 

Id. § 1321(j)(5)(E). This language is similar to the statutory

mandate at issue in Public Citizen, where the governing

statute required that the Federal Motor Carrier Safety

Administration (“FMCSA”) “shall register a person to

provide transportation . . . as a motor carrier if [it] finds that

the person is willing and able to comply with” that statute’s

requirements. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. at 766 (alterations in

original) (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 13902(a)(1)). Examining this

statutory mandate, the Supreme Court found that FMCSA

registration of cross-border motor carriers did not trigger

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NEPA review because “FMCSA [had] no ability

categorically to prevent the cross-border operations of . . .

motor carriers, [and thus] the environmental impact of the

cross-border operations would have no effect on FMCSA’s

decisionmaking.” Id. at 768. NEPA review was not required

because the FMCSA lacked the power to consider

environmental consequences outside of its statutory

obligation. See id. at 768–70.

The statute here similarly restricts BSEE’s discretion. 

BSEE is required to approve an OSRP that meets the statute’s

requirements, which the agency reasonably interprets to be

the checklist of six requirements set forth in § 1321(j)(5)(D). 

Applying NEPA to this process, then, would merely “require

an agency to prepare a full EIS due to the environmental

impact of an action it could not refuse to perform,” which

would clearly violate NEPA’s “rule of reason.” Pub. Citizen,

541 U.S. at 769.

This does not mean that NEPA review is entirely absent. 

Indeed, the NEPA environmental assessment that is required

to be conducted as to Shell’s exploration plan expressly

considered the environmental effects of Shell’s OSRPs. As

mentioned supra, an operator’s OSRP, which is the fourth

step of the Clean Water Act’s oil spill response framework,

must be submitted in conjunction with a lessee’s exploration

plan, which is OCSLA’s third step. 30 C.F.R. § 550.219. In

a memorandum dated February 17, 2012, BSEE clarified that

the Chukchi OSRP was considered in the development of an

environmental assessment of Shell’s Revised Exploration

Plan for the Chukchi Sea. Similarly, Shell’s Beaufort Sea

OSRP was considered in the exploration plan Shell submitted

regarding its Flaxman Island Leases. Thus, both of the

OSRPs at issue here underwent NEPA review at OCSLA’s

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third step—which is consistent with the requirement that

OSRPs be submitted at this stage. See id. In sum, we

conclude BSEE is not required to prepare an EIS prior to

approving the OSRPs.

CONCLUSION

BSEE’s approval of Shell’s OSRPs was not “arbitrary,

capricious, . . . or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 

5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). In its OSRPs, Shell never asserted, nor

did BSEE ever rely on, a 90 to 95 percent mechanical

recovery rate for spilled oil. According deference, as we

must, to BSEE’s interpretation of the statute and its own

regulations, BSEE lacked discretion to deny approval once it

determined that the OSRPs satisfied the statutory

requirements. Therefore, ESA consultation and NEPA

review were not required.

AFFIRMED.

D.W. NELSON, Senior Circuit Judge, dissenting:

I agree with the majority that the Bureau of Safety and

Environmental Enforcement (the Bureau) did not act in an

arbitrary or capricious manner in approving the oil response

plans, and I concur in the majority opinion as to that issue. I

respectfully dissent, however, from the remainder of the

majority opinion.

In my view, the Bureau was required to engage in

consultation pursuant to the Endangered Species Act (ESA)

before approving Shell’s oil response plans. Moreover, the

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Bureau should have conducted analysis pursuant to the

National Environmental PolicyAct (NEPA) before approving

the oil response plans. Thus, I would reverse the grant of

summary judgment as to ESA consultation and compliance

with NEPA.

1. ESA Consultation

The majority holds that the Bureau’s approval of an oil

response plan is a nondiscretionary action, and, thus, the

Bureau had no obligation to consult pursuant to the ESA. I

disagree.

a. Agency Action

The first question is whether the Bureau engaged in

agency action. It did. The duty to consult exists only where

“agency action” is present. Natural Res. Def. Council v.

Houston, 146 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 1998). Agency

action includes “federal agencies’ authorization of private

activities,” such as the Bureau’s approval of the oil response

plans here. Karuk Tribe of Cal. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 681 F.3d

1006, 1021 (9th Cir. 2012); 33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(5)(F).

Of course, not all agency actions necessitate consultation. 

Indeed, only those actions that “may affect” a protected

species trigger the requirement, 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(a), though

the “may affect” requirement is an admittedly low threshold,

Karuk Tribe, 681 F.3d at 1027. Here, the approval of the oil

response plans satisfies the “may affect” standard. In the

event of an oil spill, Shell would have to carry out its oil

response plan, which governs the protection of wildlife. 30

C.F.R. § 254.5(a). Thus, the Bureau’s decision to approve the

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oil response plans, or to require amendments to those plans,

“may affect” a protected species.

b. Agency Discretion

Next, we must consider whether the Bureau had

discretion to approve the oil response plans. It did. “The

ESA’s consultation duty is triggered . . . only when the

agency has authority to take action and discretion to decide

what action to take. There is no point in consulting if the

agency has no choices.” Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack,

718 F.3d 829, 842 (9th Cir. 2013). What is more, “the

discretionary control retained by the federal agency also must

have the capacity to inure to the benefit of a protected

species.” Karuk Tribe, 681 F.3d at 1024.

“Whether an agency must consult does not turn on the

degree of discretion that the agency exercises regarding the

action in question, but on whether the agency has any

discretion to act in a manner beneficial to a protected species

or its habitat.” Natural Res. Defense Council v. Jewell,

749 F.3d 776, 784 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). In other words,

if the agency could take action that benefits protected species,

the agency must conduct ESA consultation. See id.; see also

Karuk Tribe, 681 F.3d at 1024 (“[T]o avoid the consultation

obligation, an agency’s competing statutory mandate must

require that it perform specific nondiscretionary acts rather

than achieve broad goals.”). Ultimately, “[t]he relevant

question is whether the agency could influence a private

activity to benefit a listed species, not whether it must do so.” 

Karuk Tribe, 681 F.3d at 1025.

In my view, the Bureau’s decision to approve or reject an

oil spill response plan is precisely the kind of discretionary

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act that triggers ESA consultation. The Oil Pollution Act

requires private owners or operators of vessels and facilities,

such as Shell, to prepare an oil spill response plan. 

33 U.S.C. § 1321(j). This response plan must explain how an

operator like Shell will respond “to the maximum extent

practicable, to a worst case discharge, and to a substantial

threat of such a discharge, of oil or a hazardous substance.” 

33 U.S.C. § 1321(j)(5)(A)(i). The phrase “maximum

extent practicable” suggests that Congress intended entities

like Shell to create plans that have the capacity to respond to

an oil spill to the greatest possible degree, given logistical

constraints. See 30 C.F.R. § 254.6 (defining “maximum

extent practicable” as “within the limitations of available

technology, as well as the physical limitations of personnel”). 

At the same time, this broad, subjective standard does not

direct the Bureau to act in a specific or clearly defined way,

but, rather, contemplates that the Bureau will exercise its

judgment when determining whether an oil response plan

satisfies the “maximum extent practicable” requirement. See

Karuk Tribe, 681 F.3d at 1024–25.

The implementing regulations bolster my view, as they

make clear that the Bureau can exercise its discretion to

benefit a protected species. For instance, the regulations

require both an owner or operator to identify resources of

“environmental importance” that could be harmed by a

“worst case discharge scenario” and to provide strategies that

will be used to protect those resources. 30 C.F.R.

§§ 254.26(a), (c). In addition, the regulations also call for an

owner or operator to explain how, in the event of an oil spill,

it will “protect beaches, waterfowl, other marine and

shoreline resources, and areas of special . . . environmental

importance.” 30 C.F.R. § 254.23(g)(4). Furthermore, Shell’s

response plans themselves underscore the importance of

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protecting wildlife. Each plan devotes an entire appendix to

discussing wildlife protection tactics and includes measures

to protect wildlife.

Shell and the government would have us hold that the

Bureau lacked discretion here because the Oil Pollution Act

states that the Bureau “shall approve” any oil response plan

that meets the statutory criteria. 33 U.S.C. § 1321. This

compulsory language, the argument goes, reflects the absence

of Bureau discretion. I disagree. The Bureau cannot avoid

consultation here because it is not obligated to “perform

specific nondiscretionary acts.” Karuk Tribe, 681 F.3d at

1024. Neither the Oil Pollution Act nor its implementing

regulations sets forth a rigid, mechanical set of requirements

that specify when the Bureau must approve an oil response

plan. There is no checklist to be ticked off; approval is not

rote. Rather, the Bureau must consider a wide range of

environmental, ecological and other factors in deciding

whether an oil response plan meets the “maximum extent

practicable” standard.

Shell and the government note that the Bureau interprets

the implementing regulations as coextensive with the

“maximum extent practicable” standard. Thus, they contend,

and the majority agrees, both that the regulations do not give

the Bureau any discretion and that we should accord Chevron

deference to the Bureau’s interpretation of the Oil Pollution

Act. Yet again, I disagree.

Our analysis pursuant to Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural

Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), involves two

questions. First, we ask “whether Congress has directly

spoken to the precise question at issue.” Id. at 842. If so, the

court “must give effect to the unambiguouslyexpressed intent

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36 ALASKA WILDERNESS LEAGUE V. JEWELL

of Congress.” Id. at 842–43. But “if the statute is silent or

ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for

the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a

permissible construction of the statute.” Id.

Here, I do not believe the implementing regulations

contain a reasonable definition of “maximum extent

practicable.” The regulations reference the phrase only once. 

They provide: “Maximum extent practicable means within

the limitations of available technology, as well as the physical

limitations of personnel, when responding to a worst case

discharge in adverse weather conditions.” 30 C.F.R. § 254.6. 

If this occupies the full and complete definition of “maximum

extent practicable,” it is unreasonable and not entitled to

deference. The word “maximum,” a superlative, means “the

highest possible magnitude or quantity of something,” or

“highest, greatest.” Maximum, Oxford English Dictionary,

http://www/oed.com/view/Entry/115275?redirectedFrom=

maximum#eid (last visited April 27, 2015). Thus, the phrase

“maximum extent practicable” also has a superlative quality

and therefore must refer to the greatest option in a range of

possibilities. But the Bureau’s definition is not a superlative,

as it refers to a range of possibilities, taking into account

practical limits. Thus, it gives effect only to the term

“practicable” while ignoring the term “maximum.” We

should not defer to this nonsensical and incomplete

definition. Coronado-Durazo v. I.N.S., 123 F.3d 1322, 1324

(9th Cir. 1997) (“We are not obligated to accept an

interpretation that is demonstrably irrational or clearly

contrary to the plain and sensible meaning of the statute.”

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). The

regulations merely clarify that owners and operators, such as

Shell, will not be held to an impossibly high standard that

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exceeds current technological capabilities and other logistical

constraints.

The majority relies on the Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders

v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644 (2007), to hold that the

Bureau has no discretion to determine whether Shell

complied with the six statutory factors enumerated in the Oil

Pollution Act. I find this argument unpersuasive. In Home

Builders, the Supreme Court noted that the Clean Water Act

required the Environmental Protection Agency to approve an

application to transfer permitting authority to a state, unless

that state lacked the authority to perform the nine functions

spelled out in the statute. Id. at 661. The Court described the

statutory language as “mandatory” and the list of nine

functions as “exclusive,” holding that “if the nine specified

criteria are satisfied, the EPA does not have the discretion to

deny a transfer application.” Id. At the same time, however,

the ESA required consultation, in addition to the nine

enumerated factors. Id. at 662. Faced with these

irreconcilable statutory directives, the Court held that the

later-enacted ESA did not amend the Clean Water Act in part

because requiring ESA consultation would “engraft[] a tenth

criterion onto the [Clean Water Act].” Id. at 663.

This case, however, differs in significant respects from

Home Builders. First, the Supreme Court’s analysis in Home

Builders hinged in part on the fact that the ESA came after

the Clean Water Act. See id. at 662–64. Here, however, the

Oil Pollution Act of 1990 postdated the ESA. 33 U.S.C.

§ 2701 et seq. (Oil Pollution Act); 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq.

(ESA, passed in 1972). In fact, Congress passed the Oil

Pollution Act after ESA consultation already had been

required for seventeen years. Thus, the concern that ESA

consultation implicitly amended an exclusive set of statutory

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requirements of the Oil Pollution Act by adding a new

requirement beyond the original enactment is absent here. 

Moreover, both parties in Home Builders appeared to agree

that the state possessed the authority to perform each of the

nine enumerated functions but disagreed about whether ESA

consultation added an extra step to the process. See 551 U.S.

at 662. The question here is of a different sort. It is not

whether the “maximum extent practicable” standard adds an

additional step to the approval process for oil spill response

plans but about how to interpret “maximum extent

practicable,” which is one of many subjective items the

Bureau must consider in whether to approve an oil spill

response plan.

2. NEPA Consultation

The majority holds that because the Bureau had no choice

but to approve any oil response plan that met the enumerated

requirements in the Oil Pollution Act, the Bureau was exempt

from NEPA review. I disagree.

NEPA “declare[s] a national commitment to protecting

and promoting environmental quality.” Ashley Creek

Phosphate Co. v. Norton, 420 F.3d 934, 945 (9th Cir. 2005). 

NEPA achieves these broad goals by “merely prohibit[ing]

uninformed—ratherthan unwise—agencyaction.” Robertson

v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 351 (1989). 

Specifically, NEPA requires agencies to prepare a detailed

environmental impact statement (EIS) for “major Federal

actions significantly affecting the quality of the human

environment.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). An EIS “must

inform decisionmakers and the public of the reasonable

alternatives which would avoid or minimize adverse impacts

or enhance the quality of the human environment.” League

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of Wilderness Defenders-Blue MountainsBiodiversityProject

v. U.S. Forest Serv., 689 F.3d 1060, 1068–69 (9th Cir. 2012)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Here, the Bureau did not conduct any NEPA analysis,

which the majority forgives, reasoning that approval ofthe oil

response plan fell within the “rule of reason.” Dep’t of

Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 769 (2004). In other

words, where an agency is obligated to take specific action,

an analysis of the environmental impact of that action serves

no purpose. Id. But this exception does not apply where an

agency has “statutory authority to regulate the environmental

consequences” of a major federal action. League of

Wilderness Defenders-Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project

v. U.S. Forest Serv., 549 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2008). 

That is the circumstance here.

The Bureau did in fact possess the kind of discretion that

necessitated NEPA review. The Oil Pollution Act and its

implementing regulations grant the Bureau significant

authority to regulate the activities of owners and operators of

offshore facilities. The regulations demand that the plan

include provisions for protecting wildlife and areas of special

environmental importance. 30 C.F.R. §§ 254.23(g)(3)–(4),

(7). In addition, the Bureau must apply the broad and

amorphous “maximum extent practicable” standard in

considering the validity of an oil response plan. 33 U.S.C.

§§ 1321(j)(5)(A)(i) & (D)(iii). This subjective process gives

the Bureau the authority to require amendments to the plan. 

Id. at § 1321(j)(5)(E)(ii). Thus, I would hold that because the

Bureau regulates the response activities and prevention

efforts of entities like Shell, and because it retains authority

to ensure that those entities’ response efforts will protect the

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40 ALASKA WILDERNESS LEAGUE V. JEWELL

environment effectively in the event of an oil spoil, it is not

exempt from its duty to conduct NEPA review.

Morever, the Oil Pollution Act specifically directs the

Bureau to consider environmental factors in its

decisionmaking process. Thus, requiring NEPA analysis is

squarely in line with “NEPA’s core focus on improving

agency decisionmaking.” Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. at 769 n.2;

40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(c). Because environmental protection lies

at the core of the Bureau’s duties pursuant to the Oil Pollution

Act, NEPA review would not offend the rule of reason.

I also do not think that the Bureau discharged its duty to

conduct NEPA review by relying on previous analyses that

considered the environmental impact of oil and natural gas

exploration in the Arctic. Certainly, an agency may rely on

prior analysis to discharge its duties pursuant to NEPA. See

Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. at 767; 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(c)

(“NEPA’s purpose is not to generate paperwork—even

excellent paperwork—but to foster excellent action.”); 43

C.F.R. § 46.120(b) (“If existing NEPA analyses include data

and assumptions appropriate for the analysis at hand, the

[agency] should use these existing NEPA analyses and/or

their underlying data and assumptions where feasible.”).

But an agency cannot discharge its duties pursuant to

NEPA solely by relying on prior analyses if those analyses do

not fulfill NEPA’s purpose of ensuring “that the agency has

taken a hard look at the environmental effects of the proposed

action.” Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Forest Serv.,

349 F.3d 1157, 1166 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted). Here, the documents on which the

Bureau relied did not discuss alternatives to approving Shell’s

response plans. N. Idaho Cmty. Action Newtork v. U.S. Dep’t

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of Transp., 545 F.3d 1147, 1153 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting an

EIS requires “rigorous” evaluation of alternatives); 43 C.F.R.

§ 46.120(c). The prior analyses do provide some

consideration of oil spill response techniques, but they have

nothing to say about alternatives to Shell’s proposed plans. 

The Bureau did not discharge its duty pursuant to NEPA.

Because I would reverse the grant of summary judgment

to Shell as to the duty to conduct ESA consultation and

NEPA analysis, I respectfully dissent.

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