Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_07-cv-00908/USCOURTS-almd-2_07-cv-00908-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Sex)

---

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

TAMMY EDWARDS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) CIVIL ACTION NO.

v. ) 2:07cv908-MHT

) (WO) 

HYUNDAI MOTOR )

MANUFACTURING ALABAMA, )

LLC, and MIKE SWINDLE, )

individually, )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This case is now before the court on defendant

Hyundai Motor Manufacturing Alabama’s (HMMA) motions for

a new trial based on juror misconduct. The court held a

full evidentiary hearing and oral argument on this matter

on August 25, 2009. The court now concludes that one of

the jurors did engage in misconduct that denied HMMA’s

right to an impartial jury. Therefore, the motions for

a new trial will be granted. 

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RULE 59 STANDARD

HMMA has filed its motion for a new trial pursuant to

Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which

provides that, after a jury trial, the court may grant a

new trial “for any reason for which a new trial has

heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal

court.” However, the rule is not as expansive as it

might first appear. The Eleventh Circuit has explained,

“‘The only grounds for granting a Rule 59 motion are

newly-discovered evidence or manifest errors of law or

fact.’” Arthur v. King, 500 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir.

2007) (quoting In re Kellogg, 197 F.3d 1116, 1119 (11th

Cir. 1999)). 

II. BACKGROUND

This lawsuit centered on plaintiff Tammy Edwards

sexual-harassment claims against defendants HMMA and Mike

Swindle, an employee at the HMMA plant. The case went to

trial in April 2009, and the jury returned a verdict in

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Edwards’s favor, ultimately awarding her $ 6 million in

compensatory and punitive damages. After trial, however,

HMMA filled motions for a new trial, arguing that one of

the jurors had failed to answer honestly a question asked

during voir dire; that this juror was biased; and that

HMMA deserved a new trial. The following are the key

dates and facts related to this claim. 

April 17, 2009: The court supplied the parties with

the juror questionnaire forms for the entire jury pool.

A paralegal working for HMMA ran these names through its

database, looking for jurors who may have worked for or

applied for positions with HMMA. This search revealed

several names, two of which ended up in the jury pool

convened for this case.

April 19: HMMA’s paralegal sent the names of

potential applicants to HMMA’s trial attorneys.

April 20: During voir dire, HMMA asked whether any

of the jurors had "applied for work at HMMA at any point

in the past and [] didn't get that job?" Trans. Jury

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Selection at 93. There was no response to that question.

During venire, HMMA raised its concern that one of the

jurors on the list (J-XXX) may actually have applied to

work at Hyundai. J-XXX was called back for questioning;

she admitted to being nervous but denied ever having

applied for a position at HMMA. The court did not strike

this juror for cause and HMMA chose not to use one of its

peremptory strikes to remove her. HMMA then decided not

to question the second juror (J-125) named on its list of

potential applicants. Jury selection finished that

afternoon; both potential applicants (J-XXX and J-125)

were selected for the petit jury.

That evening HMMA’s attorneys received an email from

HMMA’s legal department which had a “candidate profile”

attached. This profile revealed that someone with the

same name and address as J-125 had applied for employment

with HMMA in April 2006 and that this person had received

an interview before she was ultimately denied a position

after failing her final review. The email from HMMA’s

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legal department speculated that the applicant was denied

employment because of information revealed in her

background check and concluded that the applicant and J125 were the same person.

April 21: HMMA’s legal department followed up with

another email, this time attaching the application and

background check. HMMA’s trial attorneys did not pursue

this issue at this point or during trial and had no

further communication with HMMA on the matter until after

trial. 

April 30: Trial concluded.

May 1: The jury returned a verdict awarding Edwards

approximately $ 5.8 million in compensatory and punitive

damages; $ 5.7 million of these damages were apportioned

to HMMA. 

May 2 – 13: HMMA resumed its investigation of juror

J-125. During this renewed investigation, the attorneys

became aware that Alabama Industrial Department Training

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1. While Swindle also filed a motion for new trial,

his motion did not rest on a contention of juror

misconduct.

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(AIDT) conducted pre-employment training programs for

Hyundai during the period in which J-125 applied. 

May 14: HMMA’s attorneys contacted AIDT and received

J-125's training profile, which contained her “Production

Pre-Employment Assessment,” a numerical assessment of her

performance at various production work stations and in

the classroom. This information revealed that the

applicant began her pre-employment classroom training at

HMMA’s training center on April 10, 2006, and that she

began her workstation training on April 12, 2006. 

May 15 and 22: HMMA’s attorneys filed the present

motions for a new trial, arguing that J-125 had engaged

in misconduct during voir dire when she failed to answer

honestly after HMMA asked whether any of the potential

jurors had applied for a job with Hyundai at any time in

the past.1

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August 24: HMMA received J-125's pre-employment

training test scores from AIDT, indicating that she in

fact attended four days of classroom and workstation

training between April 10 and 14, 2006.

August 25: The court held an evidentiary hearing and

oral argument concerning the juror misconduct issue. The

court examined J-125 at length. She conceded that it was

her signature and handwriting on the application for

employment, but she stated that she did not remember

anything about applying, interviewing, or training at

HMMA. She indicated that she had only been to HMMA’s

facilities to visit relatives who worked there. 

III. Discussion

a. Juror Misconduct

“To obtain a new trial based on juror misconduct

during voir dire, a party must: 1) demonstrate that a

juror failed to answer honestly a material question on

voir dire, and then 2) show that a correct response would

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have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause.”

United States v. Carpa, 271 F.3d 962, 967 (11th Cir.

2001) (restating the test established in McDonough Power

Equip. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548 (1984)). 

“The first prong ... requires a determination of

whether the juror's answers were honest.” BankAtlantic

v. Blythe Eastman Paine Webber, Inc., 955 F.2d 1467, 1473

(11th Cir. 1992). “[A] juror’s mistaken, though honest,

response to a question asked during voir dire will not

invalidate the result of trial.” McDonough, 464 U.S. at

555. “The second prong ... requires a showing of actual

bias.” BankAtlantic, 955 F.2d at 1473. “A relationship

between a juror and defendant, albeit a remote one, can

form the basis of a challenge for cause.” United State

v. Perkins, 748 F.2d 1519 (11th Cir. 1984). Furthermore,

"[a] juror's dishonesty is a strong indication of bias."

Carpa, 271 F.3d at 967. 

"When a prospective juror reveals actual bias, or

when bias is implied because the juror has some special

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relationship to a party ..., the court must dismiss the

prospective juror for cause." United States v. Rhodes,

177 F.3d 963, 965 (11th Cir. 1999). "When the juror

demonstrates, however, that she can lay aside any opinion

she might hold and render a judgment based solely on the

evidence presented in court, then dismissal is not

required." Id. 

The evidence is conclusive that J-125 is the same

person that applied, interviewed, and trained at HMMA.

She admitted that it was her signature and handwriting on

the application and that the candidate profile contained

her information and criminal background. This same

signature appears on several forms dated April 10, 2006,

which J-125 apparently signed before beginning preemployment training at HMMA’s facilities. When

questioned about this information, however, J-125 simply

denied any recollection of these events. She did not

offer any explanation as to why her handwriting and

signature appeared on the application, merely stating

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that a lot of things have happened with her family since

2006. 

During the evidentiary hearing, J-125's memory did

not seem faulty; for example, she quickly recalled the

questions she had been asked during voir dire, even

offering certain specific details about them. Nor did

she have trouble remembering that she had visited HMMA’s

facilities several times in the past to visit family

members. Yet she maintains that she has no memory

whatsoever of the fact that she applied for employment

with HMMA and trained there for several days. Excluding

the possibility of episodic amnesia, this is nearly

impossible to believe. The only reasonable explanation

for this phenomenon is that she has consistently failed

to answer honestly when she has been asked whether she

ever applied to work at HMMA. Thus, the first prong of

the juror misconduct inquiry is satisfied.

The second prong–-that this information would have

provided a valid challenge for cause--is also satisfied.

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“A relationship between a juror and defendant, albeit a

remote one, can form the basis of a challenge for cause.”

United State v. Perkins, 748 F.2d 1519, 1432 (11th Cir.

1984). Edwards has argued that J-125's relationship

would not provide a valid challenge for cause because the

court, in this same case, declined to dismiss for cause

a juror who had two sons working at HMMA. Several key

factors distiguish these scenarios. First, J-125's

relationship with HMMA is not one step removed and

mediated through a relative but direct and extensive.

She did not merely visit the factory or hear stories

about it from her sons, she spent several days at HMMA’s

facilities--interviewing, studying in the classrooms, and

training on the workstations. This experience would have

given her substantial first-hand information about HMMA

and its practices and culture, information that would

almost certainly influence her analysis of the evidence

presented in this case. 

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In addition, in the case of the juror who had two

sons working at HMMA, the juror admitted this

relationship and gave the court the opportunity to ask

him whether he could be fair and impartial. He stated

that he could, and the court found him credible. He

therefore demonstrated that he could “lay aside any

opinion [he] might hold and render a judgment based

solely on the evidence presented in court.” Rhodes, 177

F.3d at 965. J-125, on the other hand, still has not

admitted her relationship with HMMA and the court has

therefore not been able to ask her directly about that

relationship and determine whether she might be able set

it aside to render a fair judgment. 

Third, J-125's experiences are very likely to have

engendered bias. HMMA asked her to invest significant

amounts of uncompensated time in pre-employment training

before denying her a job. This would likely embitter

most people. Such is not the case with the juror whose

sons worked at HMMA; unless his sons feel strongly about

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their jobs, the juror’s attitude toward the company is

likely to be neutral and easily set aside. Finally,

although bias may not simply be assumed where a juror has

been dishonest, "[a] juror's dishonesty is a strong

indication of bias." Carpa, 271 F.3d at 967. The fact

that J-125 was dishonest during voir dire about her

relationship with HMMA, and was dishonest again during

the evidentiary hearing, is a powerful indication that

her attitudes toward HMMA are not neutral.

In conclusion, it is apparent that J-125 failed to

answer honestly a question asked during voir dire and

that such information, if revealed, would have provided

a valid challenge for cause. 

b. Newly Discovered Evidence 

As mentioned above, the only grounds for granting a

Rule 59 motion are newly discovered evidence or manifest

error of law or fact. “[A] motion for new trial based on

juror misconduct is a form of new trial motion for newly

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discovered evidence.” United States v. Bolinger, 837

F.2d 436, 439 (11th 1988). “A motion for a new trial

based upon newly discovered evidence must not be based on

evidence or incidents of which appellants had knowledge

prior to return of the jury verdict.” United States v.

Calderon, 127 F.3d 1314, 1351 (11th Cir. 1997).

“Moreover, [movants] have the burden of establishing in

their motions that the evidence was in fact newly

discovered and that failure to discover it prior to

verdict was not due to a lack of due diligence. If

[they] can not make such a showing, their motions should

be denied.” Id. (internal citation omitted). 

Such a rule “serves to ensure that the trial court is

given every available opportunity to attempt to salvage

the trial by ridding the jury of prejudicial influences.”

Bolinger, 837 F.2d at 439. The rule also prevents

parties from gaming the system. “[A] defendant cannot

learn of juror misconduct during the trial, gamble on a

favorable verdict by remaining silent, and then complain

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2. In Bonner v. Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th

Cir. 1981) (en banc), the Eleventh Circuit Court of

Appeals adopted as binding precedent all of the decisions

of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the

close of business on September 30, 1981.

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in a post-verdict motion that the verdict was

prejudicially influenced by that misconduct.” United

States v. Jones, 597 F.2d 485, 488 n.3 (5th Cir. 1979).2

In the case at hand, HMMA’s attorneys did not have

evidence or knowledge during trial that J-125

intentionally failed to answer a question honestly during

voir dire. As explained above, a movant must show

dishonesty, not simply a good-faith or honest mistake.

During trial, HMMA had evidence and knowledge that J-125

inaccurately answered a question during voir dire, but it

had no evidence suggesting that she had been

intentionally dishonest. Before the jury returned a

verdict that was twice what Edwards had requested and

before it was revealed that J-125 spent several

uncompensated days training at HMMA’s facilities, many

innocent and plausible reasons existed for why she might

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have failed to disclose that information. In fact, based

on the minimal evidence HMMA had during trial (that J-125

applied and interviewed for a position but was not

hired), it would have seemed quite likely that she had a

simple, good faith reason for failing to mention her

application during voir dire. For example, she might

simply have forgotten the incident because she was

filling out many job applications at the time and

interviewing frequently, or she might have misunderstood

the question that was asked, or she may simply have been

daydreaming and failed to hear it--the point being that,

before the true extent of J-125's relationship with HMMA

became known, it would not have seemed clear or even

likely that J-125's failure to disclose her application

was dishonest. As such, the court cannot say that HMMA

had evidence or knowledge of J-125's intentional

dishonesty prior to the return of the verdict. 

At the earliest, HMMA had knowledge of J-125's

dishonesty on May 14, 2009, when the full extent of her

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relationship with HMMA first came to light. It is only

at this point that HMMA’s attorneys realized that she had

invested several uncompensated days in training at HMMA

before she failed her final review. This is the

information that finally revealed that J-125 could not

simply have forgotten her application, but had

intentionally failed to answer honestly during voir dire,

and was most likely biased against HMMA. Even then, the

full extent of J-125's dishonesty did not finally become

clear until the evidentiary hearing on August 25, 2009,

when she admitted hearing and understanding the question

asked during voir dire but insisted that she had no

memory of applying, interviewing, or training at HMMA. 

The next question is whether HMMA failed to discover

evidence of dishonesty because of a lack of due

diligence. Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004) defines

“due diligence” as “[t]he diligence reasonably expected

from, and ordinarily exercised by, a person who seeks to

satisfy a legal requirement or to discharge an

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obligation.” It lists synonyms as “reasonable diligence”

or “common diligence.” Therefore, the court must ask

whether HMMA’s attorneys unreasonably failed to discover

the evidence of J-125's dishonesty. 

In this endeavor, it bears remembering that “[a] fair

assessment of attorney performance requires that every

effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of

hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's

challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from

counsel's perspective at the time.” Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (discussing standard

for ineffective assistance of counsel). Considering the

circumstances and perspective that HMMA’s attorneys had

at the time, they did not unreasonably fail to discover

the evidence of J-125's dishonesty.

First, before the jury was selected, HMMA’s attorneys

only had a list of names of possible applicants. They

actually called one of these individuals, J-XXX, for

questioning during venire only to have her deny that she

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had ever applied to HMMA. As HMMA’s attorneys later

explained to the court during an on-the-record conference

call, this was a chastening experience. They had

impugned the honesty of that juror, who admitted to being

nervous when called into chambers, and probably alienated

her. At that point, they had no more information about

J-125 than they had about J-XXX and reasonably decided

not to make the same mistake by questioning J-125 during

venire. 

By the time HMMA received additional information

about J-125, suggesting that she had indeed applied with

the company, she had already been selected for the jury.

At that point, questioning her would have been even more

likely to cause alienation. And there would have been no

reason to do so. HMMA’s attorneys did not yet know the

extent of J-125's relationship with the company, so there

would have been no grounds for asserting the bias

necessary for a valid challenge for cause. For example,

during oral argument, HMMA’s trial attorney noted that he

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had previously tried cases in the Middle District of

Alabama with HMMA applicants on the jury. In those

cases, the mere fact that a juror had applied for a job

at HMMA did not disqualify that juror from hearing a case

against HMMA. Therefore, assuming that J-125 would have

given the same answers during trial that she later gave

during the evidentiary hearing, questioning her during

trial would not only have been fruitless, it would have

been detrimental to HMMA’s case. As such, HMMA was not

unreasonable or indiligent in choosing not to question

her; in fact, under the circumstances and according to

the evidence HMMA had at the time, it was probably the

right decision.

The court must now ask whether HMMA’s attorneys

lacked due diligence in failing to discover, during

trial, the full extent of J-125's relationship with HMMA.

Once again, the answer is no. First, and most

importantly, HMMA’s attorneys had no reason at the time

to pursue this issue further. There is no evidence

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3. At the evidentiary hearing, HMMA’s attorneys

explained that AIDT conducted training on HMMA’s behalf

during the time that HMMA first began operating its plant

outside Montgomery, Alabama. Although conducted by AIDT,

the training took place at HMMA for employment with HMMA.

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suggesting that HMMA’s trial attorneys should have known

that J-125 received extensive pre-employment training at

the company. Nothing in the application or candidate

profile they received during trial would have tipped them

off to this fact. And, the evidence of her training was

even less accessible than might be assumed because the

pre-employment training was not conducted by HMMA itself

but by AIDT.3

 In fact, it appears that HMMA’s attorneys

did not become aware of the fact that AIDT formerly

conducted training for HMMA until well after the jury

returned its verdict. Once they did become aware of this

fact, they were able to obtain J-125's records from AIDT

very quickly. The court cannot say, however, that they

should have learned about AIDT during trial or should

have known that J-125 might have trained with HMMA. This

is particularly true considering that the attorneys then

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faced the many, more immediate challenges of actually

trying a case. 

The essential fact revealing J-125's dishonesty and

bias in this case is that she spent several unpaid days

at the HMMA plant both in classroom and workstation

training before she was denied a job for failing her

final review. HMMA’s attorneys did not have this

evidence during trial and they had no reason to pursue

this information any sooner than they did. Therefore,

the court finds that HMMA’s failure to discover the

evidence of J-125's dishonesty was not due to a lack of

due diligence. 

The court must candidly add, however, that whether J125's dishonesty constitutes newly discovered evidence is

a close call, for HMMA did have some knowledge that J-125

had applied for a position. Nonetheless, several factors

counsel that the court exercise its discretion to

conclude that a new trial is warranted. First, the court

believes that, where the evidence of bias is as

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substantial as it was in this case (where a juror

intentionally misrepresented a material matter to the

court), doubts regarding whether the evidence is newly

discovered should be resolved in favor of a new trial.

Second, the court heard the evidence and personally

observed all witnesses, and, while this evidence was

sufficient to support a verdict in favor of Edwards, it

was not so clearly in favor of either party such that

bias could not have played a role; or, to put it another

way, this is the type of case in which bias could be

critical to the outcome. Third and finally, the

“elephant in the room” is that the jury returned a

verdict of $ 5.7 million against HMMA. Not only was

this award quite substantial, it was twice what Edwards’s

own attorneys, during closing argument, had appraised the

case to be worth. In the face of such reaching by the

jury (whether appropriate or not), this court must be

sensitive to potential bias, and especially to the

substantial bias displayed in this case.

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The motions for a new trial based on juror misconduct

will be granted.

***

Accordingly, it is the ORDER, JUDGMENT, and DECREE of

the court as follows:

(1) Defendant Hyundai Motor Manufacturing Alabama,

LLC’s alternative motions for new trial (doc. nos. 156 &

166) are granted.

(2) The judgment of the court (doc. no. 150) and the

jury verdicts (doc. nos. 144 & 147) are set aside and

vacated as to defendant Hyundai Motor Manufacturing

Alabama, LLC.

(3) The court will set a date for the jury selection

and re-trial of plaintiff Tammy Edwards’s claims against

defendant Hyundai Motor Manufacturing Alabama, LLC.

 DONE, this the 31st day of March, 2010.

 /s/ Myron H. Thompson 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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