Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01946/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01946-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332oc Diversity-Other Contract

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THE SHERWIN-WILLIAMS COMPANY,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 13cv1946-LAB (WVG)

ORDER DENYING SHERWINWILLIAMS' OBJECTION (DOCKET

NO. 99) TO NONDISPOSITIVE

PRETRIAL ORDER OF MAGISTRATE

JUDGE (DOCKET NO. 98) AND

GRANTING MOTION IN LIMINE TO

EXCLUDE DAVID SEWELL FROM

TESTIFYING AT TRIAL (DOCKET NO.

204.)

vs.

JB COLLISION SERVICES, INC. et al.,

Defendants.

This discovery dispute involves Sherwin-Williams' failure to produce one of its

executives—David Sewell—for a deposition. Sherwin-Williams objects to a nondispositive

order issued by Magistrate Judge Gallo. (Docket No. 99 (requesting relief from order at

Docket No. 98).) Defendants seek to exclude Sewell from testifying at trial. (Docket no.

204.)

Background

In their Second Amended Counterclaim, Defendants allege that, after quality problems

arose with Sherwin-Williams' products, Sewell met with Tyczki and told him that he would

"take care of all of these issues." (Docket no. 36 at ¶ 20(i).) But, Defendants contend,

"Tyczki never heard from Mr. S[e]well again" and "the defects . . . were not corrected." (Id.) 

On September 15, 2014, Defendants noticed Sewell's deposition for October 29, 2014.

- 1 - 13cv1946

Case 3:13-cv-01946-LAB-WVG Document 236 Filed 11/04/15 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(Docket no. 99-1.) Sherwin-Williams objected based on the apex doctrine, under which highlevel executives are generally not subject to deposition. (See Docket no. 68.) At an October

3, 2014 discovery conference, "Defendants represented that they [were] willing to forgo

taking Mr. Sewell's deposition if [Sherwin-Williams would] stipulate that it will not assert a

hearsay objection during trial." (Docket no. 54 at 2.) Based on the possibility of a stipulation,

the Court ordered the parties to meet and confer to discuss a possible resolution. (Id.) 

Sherwin-Williams contends that, on October 10, 2014, it verbally accepted the proposed

stipulation, but Defendants then added two new conditions—that Sherwin-Williams (1) waive

all objections to testimony concerning Sewell; and (2) waive its right to call Sewell at trial. 

(Docket no. 68 at 1.) Defendants argue that these requirements were always part of the

proposed stipulation. (Docket no. 73 at 2.)

Defendants filed a motion on this dispute, and on October 29, 2014, Magistrate Judge

Gallo warned Sherwin-Williams that it needed to make Sewell available for a deposition on

or before November 7, 2014. (Docket nos. 85 and 98.) It gave Sherwin-Williams two

options:

(1) Mr. Sewell could either return to the United States and sit for his deposition

on or before November 7, 2014; or 

(2) the Court would issue an Order that any and all testimony by or about Mr.

Sewell, and any testimony regarding conversations that he may have had with

Defendants, offered and/or attempted to be offered by or on behalf of Plaintiff,

shall be excluded from trial, and that Plaintiff has waived all objections,

especially hearsay, to testimony that may be offered by or on behalf of

Defendants regarding the same, and that Mr. Sewell is prohibited from

testifying.

(Docket no. 98 at 4.) Sherwin-Williams didn't make Sewell available. (Docket no. 98.) 

Instead, on November 5, 2014 it moved for an extension of the discovery schedule. (Docket

no. 88.) Judge Gallo denied the motion, noting it had been "generous by not imposing

severe sanctions" against Sherwin-Williams for "blatantly ignoring" the Court's order "by

allowing Mr. Sewell to leave the country and become unavailable for his properly noticed and

Court ordered deposition." (Docket no. 98 at 4.) 

/ / /

- 2 - 13cv1946

Case 3:13-cv-01946-LAB-WVG Document 236 Filed 11/04/15 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Sherwin-Williams objects to Judge Gallo's order, arguing it is contrary to its asserted

interpretation of the stipulation between the parties. (Docket no. 99.)

Discussion

Legal Standard

Motions for relief from nondispositive orders of a magistrate judge will be granted only

where the moving party demonstrates that the magistrate judge's ruling is clearly erroneous

or contrary to law. See Bhan v. NME Hospitals, Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1414 (9th Cir. 1991)

("the magistrate's decision on a nondispositive issue will be reviewed by the district judge

under the clearly erroneous standard"); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 ("The district judge in the case

must consider timely objections and modify or set aside any part of the order that is clearly

erroneous or is contrary to law."). "In finding that the magistrate judge's decision is 'clearly

erroneous,' the Court must arrive at a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been

committed." Wi-Lan, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 2011 WL 841271, *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8,

2011) (internal citation omitted). "This standard is extremely deferential and the magistrate's

rulings should be considered the final decisions of the district court." Id. (brackets omitted).

Analysis

Sherwin-Williams' objection is without merit. First, Sherwin-Williams' suggested

interpretation of the stipulation makes no sense. In light of its prior argument that Sewell was

an apex witness that shouldn't be bothered to take a deposition, it's evident that the purpose

of a stipulation would be to get Defendants' representations regarding Sewell's prior

statements into evidence, despite his unavailability. Second, Judge Gallo only suggested

that it may be worthwhile for the parties to meet and confer to see if they could reach an

agreement. His order doesn't purport to be a recitation of a final agreement between the

parties. Thus, at most, the record suggests that the parties tried to reach a suitable

stipulation but failed. Third, on October 29, 2014, Judge Gallo specifically cautioned

Sherwin-Williams of the consequences of failing to produce Sewell on or before November

7. It was not clear error or contrary to law for Judge Gallo to follow through on his warning.

/ / /

- 3 - 13cv1946

Case 3:13-cv-01946-LAB-WVG Document 236 Filed 11/04/15 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The Court disagrees that excluding Sewell from testifying at trial will result in "extreme

prejudice" to Sherwin-Williams. (Docket no. 219.) Defendants' allegations demonstrate that

Sewell's role in this dispute is limited to a single meeting. (Docket no. 36 at ¶ 20(i).) 

Defendants can't credibly expand Sewell's role now that he's been excluded. And it would

be unfairly prejudicial to Defendants if Sewell could thwart attempts to depose him, but testify

at trial.

Sherwin-Williams' motion (Docket no. 99.) is DENIED. Defendants' motion to exclude

Sewell (Docket no. 204) is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 3, 2015

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

- 4 - 13cv1946

Case 3:13-cv-01946-LAB-WVG Document 236 Filed 11/04/15 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 4