Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01527/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-01527-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DENO E. WOODIS,

Booking No. 17137550,

Plaintiff,

vs.

LAW OFFICE OF GARY MARKS; 

STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:17-cv-01527-LAB-RBB

ORDER:

1) GRANTING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

[ECF No. 8]

AND

2) DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION 

FOR FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM 

AND AS FRIVOLOUS PURSUANT 

TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 

AND § 1915A(b)(1)

DENO E. WOODIS (“Plaintiff”), while detained at the San Diego County Sheriff’s 

Department Vista Detention Facility (“VDF”) in Vista, California, first filed this civil 

action by submitting a Complaint on Sheriff’s Department inmate stationary, invoking 

the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and naming the “Law Office of Gary Marks” and 

the State of California as Defendants, on July 24, 2017. See ECF No. 1. 

He has since filed an Amended Complaint naming the same Defendants, but this 

time alleging federal jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and Bivens v. Six 

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Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). See

ECF No. 7. 

Plaintiff has failed to prepay the civil filing fees required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a), 

and has instead filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF No. 8).

I. Motion to Proceed IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$400.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. 

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a prisoner granted leave to proceed 

IFP remains obligated to pay the entire fee in “increments” or “installments,” Bruce v. 

Samuels, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (2016); Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 

1185 (9th Cir. 2015), and regardless of whether his action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).

Section 1915(a)(2) requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a 

“certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for ... the 

6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified 

trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average 

monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly 

balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner 

 

1

 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative 

fee of $50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court 

Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. June 1, 2016). The additional $50 administrative fee does 

not apply to persons granted leave to proceed IFP. Id.

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has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having 

custody of the prisoner then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the 

preceding month’s income, in any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards 

those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); 

Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629.

In support of his Motion to Proceed IFP, Plaintiff has submitted a copy of his San 

Diego Sheriff’s Department Account Activity. See ECF No. 8 at 7; see also 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(2); S.D. CAL. CIVLR 3.2; Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119. This statement shows 

Plaintiff had a total of $100 “posted directly to [his] books,” during the months of July 

and August, and that a $50.96 balance remained in his account as of August 21, 2017. See 

ECF No. 8 at 7. Based on this accounting, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to 

Proceed IFP (ECF No. 8), and assesses an initial partial filing fee of $10 pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)(A).

However, the Court will direct the Facility Commander at VDF, or his designee, to 

collect this initial fee only if sufficient funds are available in Plaintiff’s account at the 

time this Order is executed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event 

shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or

criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to 

pay the initial partial filing fee.”); Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based 

solely on a “failure to pay ... due to the lack of funds available to him when payment is 

ordered.”). The remaining balance of the $350 total fee owed in this case must be 

collected and forwarded to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment payment 

provisions set out in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

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II. Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A

A. Standard of Review

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his complaint requires a preanswer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these 

statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss his complaint, or any portion of it, which is 

frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are 

immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) 

(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 

2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that 

the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” 

Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford 

Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 

F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 

applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121.

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 

relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its 

judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or 

“unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting 

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this plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 

(9th Cir. 2009).

B. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff’s Complaint, Amended Complaint, and several miscellaneous filings 

submitted in support, while difficult to decipher, all seek money damages against a 

private attorney and the State of California for erroneously having released a personal 

injury “settlement check” in the amount of $18,750 to his wife, Karen Woodis, while he 

was incarcerated at Soledad State Prison sometime in 1996 or early 1997. See ECF No. 1 

at 2-4; ECF No. 7 at 3, 5; ECF No. 10 at 3-4. Plaintiff claims Defendants “defrauded” 

him in violation of his “constitutional right” to due process. ECF No. 1 at 4; ECF No. 7 at 

3; ECF No. 10 at 3.

C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,2 a plaintiff must allege two essential 

elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was 

violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the 

color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Naffe v. Frye, 789 F.3d 1030, 

1035-36 (9th Cir. 2015).

D. State of California

First, Plaintiff’s pleadings fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted 

because states are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983. See Arizonans for Official 

English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 69 (1997); Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 

U.S. 58, 65-66 (1989). Therefore, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against the State of California 

are legally frivolous, see Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 641 (9th Cir.1989), 

 

2 The Court notes that Plaintiff also invokes federal question jurisdiction pursuant to Bivens.

See ECF No. 7 at 1. But neither the Law Offices of Gary Marks or the State of California 

are federal officers alleged to have violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 675 (citing Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 66 (2001)).

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superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 

(9th Cir. 2000) (en banc), and leave to amend them is denied. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127 n.8 

(“When a case may be classified as frivolous or malicious, there is, by definition, no 

merit to the underlying action and so no reason to grant leave to amend.”); see also

Turner v. San Diego Cty., No. 14CV1965 LAB WVG, 2015 WL 5254610, at *3 (S.D. 

Cal. Sept. 9, 2015), appeal dismissed (Apr. 5, 2016).

E. Law Offices of Gary Marks

Second, a “person” acts under color of state law when he or she “exercises power 

possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed 

with the authority of state law.” West, 487 U.S. at 49. “The purpose of § 1983 is to deter 

state actors from using the badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their 

federally guaranteed rights.” McDade v. West, 223 F.3d 1135, 1139 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(emphasis added) (citing Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992)). Section 1983 does not 

allow such a claim to be brought against private parties who are not alleged to have not 

acted under color of state law. West, 487 U.S. at 49; Single Moms, Inc. v. Montana Power 

Co., 331 F.3d 743, 746 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The United States Constitution protects 

individual rights only from government action, not from private action.”) (emphasis in 

original). “Only when the government is responsible for a plaintiff’s complaints are 

individual constitutional rights implicated.” Single Moms, Inc., 331 F.3d at 746-47 (citing 

Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Assoc., 531 U.S. 288, 295 

(2001)) (emphasis in original).

Therefore, because Plaintiff has failed to allege any plausible facts to suggest that 

his attorney acted in any way attributable to the state, he has not and cannot state a 

§ 1983 claim for relief against Gary Marks or his Law Offices based on his 

representation, or any fraud or misconduct allegedly committed with respect to a personal 

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injury settlement check disbursed more than twenty years ago.3 Id.; see also Polk v. 

Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 319 n.9 (1981) (attorneys appointed to represent indigent criminal 

defendants do not act “under color of state law”); Miranda v. Clark County of Nevada, 

319 F.3d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 2003) (upholding dismissal of complaint on basis that public 

defender was not acting on behalf of county for purposes of section 1983 in representing 

plaintiff’s interests); Harkins v. Eldredge, 505 F.2d 802, 805 (8th Cir. 1974) (“The 

conduct of counsel, either retained or appointed, in representing clients does not 

constitute action under color of state law for purposes of a § 1983 violation.”); accord 

Palmer v. Woodford, No. 1:06-CV-00512-LJO, 2011 WL 3666712, at *11 (E.D. Cal. 

Aug. 22, 2011).

III. Conclusion and Orders

Based on the foregoing, the Court: 

1. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

(ECF No. 8).

 

3 Even if Plaintiff had alleged facts sufficient to show state action, he admits, on the face 

of his pleadings, that the incident giving rise to his claim occurred in 1996 or 1997. See

ECF No. 1 at 2; ECF No. 10 at 1. Thus, his claims far exceed California’s statute of 

limitations for personal injury actions, even including the two additional years of statutory 

tolling provided for persons incarcerated at the time a cause of action accrues. See Von 

Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 969 (9th Cir. 2010) (“A 

claim may be dismissed [for failing to state a claim] on the ground that it is barred by the 

applicable statute of limitations only when ‘the running of the statute is apparent on the 

face of the complaint.’” (quoting Huynh v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 465 F.3d 992, 997 (9th 

Cir. 2006)); Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 391 (2007) (“Under the traditional rule of 

accrual ... the tort cause of action accrues, and the statute of limitation begins to run, when 

the wrongful act or omission results in damages.”); Douglas v. Noelle, 567 F.3d 1103, 1109 

(9th Cir. 2009) (§ 1983 claims are governed by forum state’s statute of limitations for 

personal injury actions); Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that 

before 2003, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340(3) provided a one year statute of limitations 

applicable to personal injury actions; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 352.1 entitles prisoners to 

two years of statutory tolling); Mimms v. Lewis, et al., __ Fed. App’x __, No. 16-56868, 

2017 WL 4461123, at *1 (9th Cir. Oct. 5, 2017). 

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2. DIRECTS the Facility Commander of the VDF, or his designee, to collect 

from Plaintiff’s prison trust account the initial partial filing fee assessed by this Order, if 

those funds are available, and to forward the balance of the $350 filing fee owed in this 

case by garnishing monthly payments from his account in an amount equal to twenty 

percent (20%) of the preceding month’s income and forwarding those payments to the 

Clerk of the Court each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE 

NAME AND NUMBER ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.

3. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on the 

Facility Commander, San Diego Sheriff’s Department, Vista Detention Facility, 325 

South Melrose Drive, Vista, California, 92081.

4. DISMISSES this civil action both as frivolous and for failing to state a 

claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b)(1) and denies leave to 

amend as futile. Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (leave to amend 

is not required if it is “absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be 

cured by amendment.”) (internal citations omitted).

5. CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal from this Order would be frivolous and 

therefore, would not be taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See 

Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962); Gardner v. Pogue, 558 F.2d 548, 

550 (9th Cir. 1977) (indigent appellant is permitted to proceed IFP on appeal only if 

appeal would not be frivolous); and

7. DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 13, 2017

HON. LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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