Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-05233/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-05233-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT H. DIAZ, 

Plaintiff,

 v.

ROBERT L. AYERS, JR., KAREN

SAYLOR, DOCTOR SCOTT,

Defendants. ____________________________________ 

 

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No. C 06-5233 TEH (PR)

ORDER OF

DISMISSAL, DENYING

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION

TO PROCEED IN

FORMA PAUPERIS

AND INSTRUCTIONS

TO THE CLERK

(Docket No. 2)

Plaintiff, formerly an inmate at San Quentin State Prison, has filed this pro se civil

rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleges that he has received inadequate

medical care for pain in his left knee and left shoulder while incarcerated at different

prison facilities. The complaint is now before the court for review pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A. Because the complaint is dismissed, Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma

pauperis is now DENIED as moot (docket no. 2). 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that prior to his release from Soledad in 2003 and since his

subsequent incarceration at San Quentin State Prison, he has suffered from knee and

shoulder pain and that "I now also have both knees in constant pain and swelling[.] I can't

walk or stand for long periods of time. My left shoulder I've complained since 2002 in

folsom and here in San Quentin." Plaintiff has alleged that "now all my muscles are in

pain and very uncomfortable" and that he wants "San Quentin responsible for all my

health care and disability benefits" and to be compensated for "pain and suffering." Since

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the filing of the complaint, Plaintiff has been released from state prison. 

Plaintiff has attached to his complaint his prison medical records which document

the treatment he received for his knees and shoulder while incarcerated at San Quentin. 

These records document that Plaintiff has had x-rays of his left knee taken during his

incarceration on November 24, 2004 and September 26, 2005, which were compared with

an earlier one taken on May 27, 2003, apparently during a prior incarceration. The

records also document that Plaintiff was referred to and seen by an orthopedic specialist

on November 17, 2005 and that an MRI was taken of Plaintiff's left knee on February 9,

2006. Plaintiff's medical records and the radiologist reports from the x-rays and MRI note

osteo-arthritic degenerative changes in Plaintiff's knee and abnormality in the medial

meniscus "consistent with mucoid degeneration and tear." Plaintiff's medical records also

document that Plaintiff received pain medication in the form of motrin and naproxen at

numerous medical appointments in 2004 and 2005 and that he was subsequently treated

with steroid injections, as well as pain medications naproxen and ultram in 2006 after

being seen by the orthopedic specialist. Medical records also note that Plaintiff was

treated for his shoulder pain on multiple occasions in 2005 and 2006, an x-ray was taken

of his shoulder on May 31, 2005 and he received cortisone injections to relieve the pain

on January 27, 2006. The orthopedic specialist also treated his shoulder during Plaintiff's

consultation on November 17, 2005.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a

prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a

governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any

cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is

immune from such relief. See id. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se pleadings must, however, be

liberally construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.

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1988). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements:

(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and

(2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state

law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

B. Legal Claims

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have provided inadequate medical care. Although

he does not allege that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs, the

Court will liberally construe his complaint as such. 

Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment's

proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,

104 (1976); McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other

grounds, WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997). A

determination of "deliberate indifference" involves an examination of two elements: the

seriousness of the prisoner's medical need and the nature of the defendant's response to

that need. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059. 

In order for deliberate indifference to be established, there must be a purposeful act

or failure to act on the part of the defendant and resulting harm. See id. at 1060. A prison

official is deliberately indifferent if he knows that a prisoner faces a substantial risk of

serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable steps to abate it. See

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). The prison official must not only “be

aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious

harm exists,” but he “must also draw the inference.” Id. If a prison official should have

been aware of the risk, but was not, then the official has not violated the Eighth

Amendment, no matter how severe the risk. Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175,

1188 (9th Cir. 2002). 

A"difference of opinion between a prisoner-patient and prison medical authorities

regarding treatment does not give rise to a § 1983 claim." Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d

1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981). Plaintiff's allegations do not state a claim for violation of his

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constitutional rights because the Eighth Amendment does not require that plaintiff be

afforded his choice of tests and treatment. Plaintiff's allegations and documentation make

clear that he received competent medical care from Defendants: medical staff were aware

of his medical history, they examined him multiple times and provided various diagnostic

tests and pain medications to treat Plaintiff's discomfort. Plaintiff does not allege any

manner in which he contends that Defendants were deliberately indifferent, only that he

continues to be in pain in these joints, despite the medical care he has received. Even a

difference of medical opinion as to the need to pursue one course of treatment over

another is insufficient, as a matter of law, to establish deliberate indifference. See

Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). 

To the extent that Plaintiff contends that the medical care was inadequate or

negligent, that claim is not cognizable under § 1983. A claim of medical malpractice or

negligence is insufficient to make out a violation of the Eighth Amendment. See Toguchi

v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060-61 (9th Cir. 2004); Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744

(9th Cir. 2002); Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981); see, e.g., Frost

v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1130 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding delays in administering pain

medication, treating broken nose and providing replacement crutch did not constitute

deliberate indifference); O'Loughlin v. Doe, 920 F.2d 614, 617 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding

repeated failure to satisfy requests for aspirins and antacids to alleviate headaches, nausea

and pains does not rise to level of unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain); Anthony v.

Dowdle, 853 F.2d 741, 743 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding no constitutional violation alleged

where prison warden and work supervisor failed to provide prompt and sufficient medical

care). 

While Plaintiff's joint pain is regrettable, the allegations in the complaint establish

that he received significant medical attention from numerous doctors at San Quentin to

treat his knee and shoulder issues and pain. Plaintiff's complaints regarding his continued

discomfort notwithstanding the treatment received do not rise to the level of deliberate

indifference necessary to establish a constitutional violation. Accordingly, the complaint

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fails to state a claim under § 1983. Because plaintiff's factual allegations establish that his

medical treatment was constitutional, there is no indication that the claims could be fairly

cured by amendment. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en

banc).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons expressed, plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED. The Clerk shall

terminate Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis as moot, close the file and enter

judgment in accordance with this order.

SO ORDERED.

DATED: 04/16/07 

THELTON E. HENDERSON

United States District Judge

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