Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01256/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01256-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Fraud

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LARRY BRANDON, an individual;

and KERRY BEATTY, an individual,

 Plaintiffs,

 vs.

D.R. Horton, INC., a corporation; and

DOES 1 through 10, inclusive

 Defendants.

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Case No. 07cv1256 J (POR)

[AMENDED] ORDER:

(1) OVERRULING PLAINTIFFS’

OBJECTION TO ORDER AWARDING

SANCTIONS

(2) GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL

SANCTIONS

Plaintiffs’ Larry Brandon and Kerry Beatty (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) have filed an

Objection to Magistrate Judge Louisa S. Porter’s award of attorneys’ fees in the amount of

$5,280 to Defendant D.R. Horton, Inc. (“Defendant”). After a thorough review of the arguments

presented, this Court OVERRULES Plaintiffs’ Objection in its entirety. 

Background

On February 29, 2008, Magistrate Judge Porter heard argument on Plaintiffs’ Motion to

Compel Return of Privileged Communications (the “Motion”). The Motion pertained to certain

documents which were inadvertently produced by Plaintiffs’ counsel (hereinafter, the

“Documents”). [See Doc. No. 18 at 2.] It was Plaintiffs’ position that the Documents

constituted confidential communications between lawyer and client and were, therefore, subject

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to the attorney-client privilege. (Id.) Plaintiffs’ Motion also sought an order striking certain

testimony of Plaintiff Brandon as it related to the Documents. (Id.) After reviewing the

pleadings submitted by the parties, and hearing oral argument, Judge Porter denied the Motion

and granted Defendant fees incurred in opposition of the Motion in the amount of $5,280. (Id.)

On February 15, 2008, Plaintiffs filed a written objection to Judge Porter’s imposition of

sanctions against Plaintiffs. [See Doc. No. 18.] Plaintiffs asserted that Judge Porter’s Order on

the Motion was not substantially justified and the award of fees was unjust. (Id.) On March 4,

2008, Plaintiffs provided a Notice of Hearing for the Objection. [See Doc. No. 19.] On March

31, 2008, Defendant filed an Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Objection alleging that: (1) the Objection

was untimely and (2) Judge Porter’s Order on the Motion and subsequent award of attorneys’

fees was both substantially justified and compelled by the controlling law. [See Doc. No. 20 at

1.]

Legal Standards

I. Timeliness

Under Rule 72(a), a party may object to a non-dispositive pretrial order of a magistrate

judge within ten days after service of the order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). Local Rule 7.1 states that

objections filed pursuant to Rule 72(a) must be filed as noticed motions (after obtaining a

hearing date from the court) and that failure to comply with this rule may be deemed as a waiver

of the objection. S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 7.1.

II. Reviewing a Magistrate Judge’s Order

 A magistrate judge’s determination is entitled to deference unless it is clearly erroneous

or contrary to law. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); Computer Economics, Inc.,

v. Gartner Group, Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 980, 983 (S.D. Cal. 1999). The “clearly erroneous”

standard applies to the magistrate judge’s factual determinations and discretionary decisions,

including orders imposing discovery sanctions. Maisonville v. F2 Am., Inc., 902 F. 2d 746, 748

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(9th Cir. 1990) (factual determinations in connection with a sanction award are reviewable for

clear error); Grimes v. City and County of San Francisco, 951 F. 2d 236, 240 (9th Cir. 1991)

(discovery sanctions are non-dispositive pretrial matters reviewable for clear error under Rule

72(a)). Under this standard, “the district court can overturn the magistrate judge’s ruling only

if the district court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.”

Weeks v. Samsung Heavy Indus. Co., Ltd., 126 F.3d 926, 943 (7th Cir. 1997). “District Courts

are not required to hear evidence not previously presented to the magistrate judge.” United

States v. Howell, 231 F. 3d 615, 622 (9th Cir. 2000). 

The “contrary to law” standard applies to review of purely legal determinations by a

magistrate judge. See e.g., Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F. 2d 81, 91 (3d Cir. 1992) (“the

phrase ‘contrary to law’ indicates plenary review as to matters of law.”); Medical Imagine

Centers of America, Inc., v. Lichtenstein, 917 F. Supp. 717, 719 (S.D. Cal. 1996) (Brewster, J.)

(“Section 636(b)(1)...has been interpreted to provide for de novo review by the district court on

issues of law.”); 12 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Richard L. Marcus, Federal

Practice and Procedure § 3069 at 350 & 355 (2d ed. 1997). Accordingly, the district court

exercises its independent judgment with respect to a magistrate judge’s legal conclusions.

Gandee v. Glaser, 785 F. Supp. 684, 686 (S.D. Ohio 1992), aff’d 19 F. 3d 1432 (6th Cir. 1994).

Discussion

I. Timeliness

As stated above, objections filed pursuant to Rule 72(a) must be filed as noticed

motions and any failure to comply with that rule may be deemed as a waiver of the motion or

objection. S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 7.1. In this case, Judge Porter’s Order was electronically served

on the parties on February 5, 2008. [See Doc. No. 17.] On February 15, 2008, Plaintiffs

electronically filed and served their Objection, without obtaining or filing a Notice of

Hearing. [Doc. No. 18.] Since the Objection was not accompanied with a Notice of Hearing,

this filing was not in compliance with Local Rule 7.1. On March 4, 2008, Plaintiffs

electronically filed and served their “Notice of Hearing” regarding their Objection, but failed

to re-file the Objection itself. [See Doc. No. 19.] Since Plaintiffs failed to file their

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Objection and Notice of Hearing within the ten day limit of Judge Porter’s Order, as required

under Rule 72(a) and Local Rule 7.1, the Court FINDS that Plaintiffs’ Objection is untimely. 

II. Substantial Justification

Plaintiffs’ counsel does not challenge the magistrate judge’s denial of Plaintiffs’

Motion and only objects to the award of sanctions. However, because these sanctions were

awarded under Rule 37(a)(4), the issue of sanctions is necessarily tied to the merits of

Plaintiffs’ underlying Motion. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure section 37(a)(4) provides that

the court shall require the moving party to pay reasonable expenses unless the motion is

substantially justified. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4). 

As stated above, Plaintiffs’ Motion was brought before the magistrate judge under

Plaintiffs’ claim that the Documents were inadvertently produced to opposing counsel and

were documents protected by the attorney-client privilege. Ordinarily, California law

governs the existence of privilege in this matter because the federal court has jurisdiction

solely under the rules governing diversity. See Fed. R. Evid. 501. However, this Court also

considers federal law in determining this issue because the potential waiver in this case

relates to procedural issues such as the production of documents and the taking of

depositions under the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. See Cunningham v. Connecticut

Mutual Life Ins., 845 F. Supp. 1403, 1410 (S.D. Cal. 1994) (“[Federal Rule of Evidence 501]

does not preclude the application of federal common law to a procedural default or

inadvertent production.”). 

To prevail on their Motion, Plaintiffs must prove that the Documents were privileged

and that the failure to assert the privilege when the Documents were introduced did not

independently waive privilege. [See Doc. No. 17 at 2.] Judge Porter correctly found that

there was nothing on the face of the document that indicated it was a confidential

communication. (Id.) In fact, when confronted with the document, Plaintiff Brandon

testified that he created it as a study tool for himself rather than a document for or by his

attorney. (Id.) Both California and federal law clearly state that failure to assert the

attorney-client privilege, especially during deposition, is an absolute waiver of the privilege. 

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Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 2025.460(a) (“The protection of information from discovery on the

ground that it is privileged...is waived unless a specific objection to its disclosure is timely

made during deposition”); Int’l Ins. Co. V. Montrose Chem. Corp., 231 Cal. App. 3d 1367,

1373 fn 4 (1991) (“At...deposition, no objections to the documents were raised on attorneyclient privilege...and those objections were therefore waived”); Perrignon v. Bergen

Brunswig Corp., 77 F.R.D. 455, 459 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (“...even if the statements were

privileged, the privilege was waived. When plaintiff...was deposed on April 21, 1977, she

described her conversations with Nielson without any objection from counsel for HAS. By

failing to make a timely objection, HAS waived any privilege that may have existed with

respect to the statements”). Plaintiffs failure to assert the privilege at Plaintiff Brandon’s

deposition is clear proof that, even if there was a privilege, it was absolutely and irrevocably

waived, regardless of whether disclosure was inadvertent. With federal and California law in

mind, Plaintiffs’ Motion has no merit and lacked substantial justification. Thus, Judge

Porter’s order was neither contrary to law nor clearly erroneous and this Court

OVERRULES Plaintiffs’ Objection. 

III. Defendant’s Request for Additional Sanctions

Defendant has requested additional sanctions in the amount of $2075 for attorneys’

fees accumulated in opposing Plaintiffs’ Objection. [Doc. No. 20.] The Court has found that

Plaintiffs’ underlying motion was not substantially justified and that Plaintiffs’ waiver of

objection was clear by their failure to comply with the local rules. Moreover, Defendant’s

fee request is reasonable and justified. Accordingly, Defendant’s request for sanctions is

GRANTED under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(4). Therefore, Plaintiff’s counsel

is ordered to pay additional sanctions in the amount of $2075 to Luce Forward. 

Conclusion

Judge Porter provided various sound reasons why the award of attorneys’ fees was 

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appropriate and this Court declines to disturb that reasoning. Accordingly, this Court

OVERRULES Plaintiffs’ Objection to Judge Porter’s Order and GRANTS Defendant’s

request for additional sanctions.

DATED: May 21, 2008

HON. NAPOLEON A. JONES, JR.

United States District Judge

cc: Magistrate Judge Porter

 All Parties of Record

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