Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00636/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00636-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

John Loudermilk and Tiffany Loudermilk,

et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

Joseph Arpaio, in his official capacity as

Maricopa County Sheriff; et al., 

Defendants. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV 06-0636-PHX-EHC

ORDER

Plaintiffs John and Tiffany Loudermilk, individually and on behalf of their minor

children, have filed an Amended Complaint against Defendants Joe Arpaio, Sheriff of

Maricopa County; Joshua Ray, Joseph Sousa, Richard Gagnon and Michael Danner,

Maricopa County Sheriff’s Deputies; Rhonda Cash and Jenna Cramer, protective services

workers employed by the Arizona Department of Economic Security, Administration for

Children, Youth and Families, Child Protective Services; and Julie Rhodes, an Assistant

Attorney General for the State of Arizona at the time of the alleged events. (Dkt. 20).

Plaintiffs assert claims for constitutional violations that allegedly occurred during a home

investigative visit following an anonymous complaint of child neglect. Plaintiffs have

asserted a claim for violation of their Fourth Amendment right to be secure from

unreasonable searches against Defendant caseworkers Cash and Cramer and the four

Sheriff’s Deputies (First Claim), violation of Plaintiffs’ liberty interest in family privacy and

integrity guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause based on threats to

place the children into custody without cause as against Defendant caseworkers Cash and

Case 2:06-cv-00636-ROS Document 45 Filed 09/28/07 Page 1 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

The remaining Defendants have filed an Amended Answer to the Amended

Complaint. (Dkt. 32). 

- 2 -

Cramer and Defendant Rhodes (Second Claim), and failure to provide adequate training

against Defendant Sheriff Arpaio (Third Claim). 

Defendants Cash and Cramer have filed an Amended Motion to Dismiss the Amended

Complaint (Dkt. 38) for failure to state a claim for relief under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) as

based on qualified immunity. Defendant Rhodes has filed a separate Motion to Dismiss the

Second Claim for failure to state a claim for relief. (Dkt. 15). Plaintiffs have filed Responses

(Dkt. 22 & 40) and Defendants have filed their Replies. (Dkt. 31 & 41).1

 

I.

Standard of Review

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a claim.

Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). "A claim may be dismissed only if it

appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which

would entitle him to relief." Id. (quotation omitted). In deciding on a motion to dismiss, the

court should accept all material allegations of the complaint as true, as well as all reasonable

inferences that can be drawn from them. Id. (citing Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d

336, 338 (9th Cir. 1996)). A court should only dismiss a claim where there is no cognizable

legal theory or an absence of sufficient facts alleged to support a cognizable legal theory. Id.

(citing Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.1988)).

II.

Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint

Plaintiffs have asserted the following allegations in their Amended Complaint. (Dkt.

20, Amended Complaint). In January 2005, Child Protective Services ("CPS") received an

anonymous tip that Plaintiffs John and Tiffany Loudermilk's children were being neglected.

(id., ¶ 13). The tip alleged that the Loudermilks’ house was not habitable, it was not painted

Case 2:06-cv-00636-ROS Document 45 Filed 09/28/07 Page 2 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 3 -

on the outside and lacked doors, stairs and adequate flooring, and it was inhabited with

rodents. (id., ¶ 14). 

On or about January 29, 2005, at 12:30 p.m., CPS Agent Brenda Cagle visited

Plaintiffs' home in Phoenix and left her business card. (id., ¶ 15). Ms. Cagle requested an

appointment to discuss the anonymous tip but did not disclose the specific allegations. (id.,

¶ 16). Plaintiffs declined to meet with her because they had not been provided with the

allegations prior to the meeting. (id., ¶ 17).

Plaintiffs allege that they learned of the allegations regarding the “habitability” of

their home on or about February 7, 2005. (id., ¶ 18). Plaintiffs allegedly had moved into the

newly constructed house about a year earlier, finish work remained to be completed, but the

house had been approved by the county as habitable. (id., ¶¶ 19-20). Plaintiffs (the

Loudermilks) offered to provide CPS with a copy of the occupancy permit. (id., ¶ 21). 

On Wednesday, March 9, 2005, at approximately 10:00 a.m., Defendants Cash and

Cramer, accompanied by two armed and uniformed sheriff's deputies, arrived at Plaintiffs'

home. (id., ¶ 22). Defendant Cash indicated that they had a court order permitting them to

remove the Loudermilks’ children. Cash allegedly pulled out a piece of paper which she

claimed was the order. (id., ¶ 23). Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Cash said, "I'd prefer not

to remove the children; I just need to come in and look around." (id., ¶ 24). When Plaintiff

Tiffany Loudermilk requested to see the order, Defendant Cash refused but stated she could

provide the order within five minutes. (id., ¶ 25-27). Plaintiffs allege that, based upon

information and belief, Defendants never obtained a court order allowing them to remove the

children or search Plaintiffs’ home. (id., ¶¶ 28-29). 

While the Defendant CPS agents and deputies were at the house, Plaintiffs, members

of the Home School Legal Defense Association, telephoned that organization and spoke with

attorney Thomas J. Schmidt. (id., ¶ 30). Mr. Schmidt requested the cellular phone numbers

of the CPS agents, but the agents refused to provide them. (id. ¶ 31). Mr. Schmidt spoke with

one of the sheriff's deputies using Plaintiffs’ telephone. (id., ¶ 32). The deputy acknowledged

Case 2:06-cv-00636-ROS Document 45 Filed 09/28/07 Page 3 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 4 -

that Plaintiffs had a right to be free from a search of their dwelling without a court order (id.,

¶ 33), but stated that if Plaintiffs did not permit the search, he would obtain a court order.

(id., ¶ 34). 

The deputy handed the phone to Defendant Cash who spoke with Mr. Schmidt and

“adamantly maintained” that unless Plaintiffs consented to the search, she had the authority

to arrest Plaintiff Parents and take the children into custody. (id., ¶ 36). Mr. Schmidt

allegedly informed Defendant Cash that an anonymous tip was not sufficient to permit the

search. (id., ¶ 37). Defendant Cash, however, insisted that she be allowed to enter and search

Plaintiffs’ dwelling, citing certain Arizona statutes which purportedly allow a search without

a court order, but allegedly misrepresenting the law. (id., ¶¶ 38-39). Defendants Cash and

Cramer repeatedly asked the Loudermilks what they were hiding and told Plaintiffs that the

investigation would be dropped if they could determine that the allegations were false by

searching the dwelling. (id., ¶¶ 40-41). These Defendants informed Mr. Schmidt that they

could arrest the Plaintiff Parents and remove the children from the home. (id., ¶ 42).

Defendants Cash and Cramer further stated that if Mr. Schmidt continued to advise Plaintiffs

not to consent to the search, "the Plaintiffs would be handcuffed in front of their children and

their children would be taken into custody." (id., ¶ 43).

Mr. Schmidt related to Plaintiffs his conversations with the sheriff's deputy and

Defendant Cash and advised Plaintiffs to allow Defendants to see the children so they could

verify that the children were in good health and well cared for. (id., ¶ 44). Plaintiffs brought

their children to the front door so Defendants could see them. (id., ¶ 45). However,

Defendants Cramer and Cash continued to insist on searching the home. (id., ¶ 46).

Meanwhile, two to four additional police officers arrived at the scene. (id., ¶ 47).

Defendant Cash suggested that Mr. Schmidt call "her attorney," Defendant Julie

Rhodes, at the State of Arizona Attorney General's Office. (id., ¶ 48). Mr. Schmidt spoke

with Defendant Rhodes who allegedly advised him that Arizona gives CPS agents greater

latitude to search a person's dwelling than that permitted by the Fourth Amendment when

Case 2:06-cv-00636-ROS Document 45 Filed 09/28/07 Page 4 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 5 -

there was suspected child neglect. (id., ¶ 49). Defendant Rhodes allegedly stated that

Defendants Cash and Cramer did not need a search warrant or a court order to search

Plaintiffs’ home and that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to CPS when investigating

reported child neglect . (id., ¶¶ 50-51). Defendant Rhodes further stated that if Plaintiffs did

not permit the search, the CPS agents could take temporary custody of the children under

A.R.S. § 8-821. (id., ¶ 52). Mr. Schmidt allegedly advised Defendant Rhodes there was no

necessity under § 8-821 that would allow the CPS agents to remove the children. (id., ¶ 53).

Plaintiffs allege that, "Defendant Rhodes then said that unless a search was permitted, CPS

agents would remove the children from the Plaintiffs' home." (id., ¶ 54). 

Mr. Schmidt related his conversation with Defendant Rhodes to Plaintiffs. (id., ¶ 56).

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants intended to arrest the Parents and take the children into

custody, and that “[f]aced with this threat, [they] stood aside and did not protest” when

Defendants Cash and Cramer entered and searched the dwelling as accompanied by the

sheriff’s deputies. (id., ¶¶ 57-58). Plaintiffs allege that they permitted the search because

of the coercion and threats of Defendants Cash, Cramer and Rhodes, as “backed” by no fewer

than four armed, uniformed police officers, and because Plaintiffs wanted to avoid having

either themselves or their children taken into custody as Defendants threatened. (id., ¶ 59).

 The interaction at the front door lasted approximately 40 minutes while the search of the

home concluded in less than five minutes. (id., ¶¶ 60-61). Defendants Cash and Cramer told

Plaintiffs they found no evidence of abuse or neglect and that the case would be closed. (id.,

¶ 62). Plaintiffs later received a letter to this effect dated April 26, 2005. (id., ¶ 63).

III. 

Discussion

(A) Defendants Cash and Cramer's Motion to Dismiss First and Second Claims: Qualified

Immunity.

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a cause of action is created against any person who,

acting under color of state law, deprives a person of his constitutional rights. The qualified

Case 2:06-cv-00636-ROS Document 45 Filed 09/28/07 Page 5 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 6 -

immunity inquiry looks to whether, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting

the injury, the facts alleged show that a government official violated a constitutional right.

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001); Calabretta v. Floyd, 189 F.3d 808, 812 (9th Cir.

1999). If a violation is found, it must then be determined whether the right was "clearly

established" such that a reasonable official would have been aware that the conduct was

unlawful in the situation confronted. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201; Calabretta, 189 F.3d at 812-

13. The second inquiry is considered in light of the specific context of the case, not as a

broad general proposition. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.

As raised in the context of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court can only

grant qualified immunity if the facts set forth in the complaint establish that defendants are

entitled to qualified immunity. See Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d 756, 759 (9th Cir. 1999). If

the plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to establish a violation of any constitutional

right, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity. Haynie v.

County of Los Angeles, 339 F.3d 1071, 1078 (9th Cir. 2003). To determine immunity at the

pleading stage, the court must accept the allegations in the complaint as true. Morley, 175

F.3d at 759. 

Plaintiffs have asserted in their First Claim that their Fourth Amendment rights were

violated when Defendants Cash and Cramer searched their home. The Fourth Amendment

generally prohibits the warrantless entry of a person’s home except in a few well-defined

circumstances, such as based on voluntary consent or exigent circumstances. Kyllo v. United

States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001); Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990). Plaintiffs

assert in support of their Second Claim that their Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated

when Defendants Cash and Cramer repeatedly threatened to remove the children without

cause. “The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that parents will not be separated from their

children without due process of law except in emergencies.” Mabe v. San Bernadino County,

Dept. of Public Schools, 237 F.3d 1101, 1107 (9th Cir. 2001)(citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405

U.S. 645, 651 (1972)). 

Case 2:06-cv-00636-ROS Document 45 Filed 09/28/07 Page 6 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 7 -

“Officials may remove a child from the custody of its parents without prior judicial

authorization only if the information they possess at the time of the seizure is such as

provides reasonable cause to believe that the child is in imminent danger of serious bodily

injury and that the scope of the intrusion is reasonably necessary to avert that specific

injury.” Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1136-37 (9th Cir. 2000); Calabretta, 189 F.3d a

813-14. Courts generally have found that entry of social workers or police officers into a

home to inspect or remove a child requires a warrant. Calabrettta, 189 F.3d at 813; Roska v.

Peterson, 328 F.3d 1230, 1240 (10th Cir. 2003). 

With respect to Plaintiffs’ claim based on violation of the Fourteenth Amendment,

parents and children have a constitutional right to live together without governmental

interference and will not be separated without due process of law except in emergencies. Doe

v. Lebbos, 348 F.3d 820, 827 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Mabe, 237 F.3d at 1107). Courts have

analyzed threats to remove a child from a family under the fundamental right to familial

relations, which includes the liberty interests of parents in the care, custody and management

of their children. Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492, 524 (7th Cir. 2003); King v. Olmsted County,

117 F.3d 1065, 1066-68 (8th Cir 1997). The liberty interest in maintaining the family unit is

guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Heck, 117 F.3d at 523.

Verbal threats generally are not actionable in a federal civil rights proceeding. Nunez

v. City of Los Angeles, 147 F.3d 867, 875 (9th Cir. 1998); King, 117 F.3d at 1067 (citing

Hopson v. Fredericksen, 961 F.2d 1374, 1378 (8th Cir. 1992)). Courts have held that a threat

constitutes an actionable constitutional violation in certain circumstances, including “when

the threat is so brutal or wantonly cruel as to shock the conscience, ... or if the threat exerts

coercive pressure on the plaintiff and the plaintiff suffers the deprivation of a constitutional

right.” King, 117 F.3d at 1067. Threats regarding separation from a child may be viewed

as coercive, depending upon their operation under the totality of the circumstances. Lynumn

v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963)(in the context of a confession in a criminal prosecution).

In Doe v. Heck, the Seventh Circuit explained that the mere threat to remove a child from the

Case 2:06-cv-00636-ROS Document 45 Filed 09/28/07 Page 7 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 8 -

custody of his parents without reasonable suspicion of abuse violated the parents' Fourteenth

Amendment right to familial relations. Id., 327 F.3d at 524-25. 

Based on Plaintiffs’ allegations, Defendants Cash and Cramer lacked a warrant at the

time of the search. Defendants Cash and Cramer argue, however, that there was no Fourth

Amendment violation because Plaintiffs consented to the search. Defendants argue that

Plaintiffs were not in custody, no Miranda warnings were given, there is no allegation that

the sheriff’s deputies drew their weapons, and that Plaintiffs were told by one of the deputies

that if they did not permit the search he would obtain a court order, a correct statement of

Fourth Amendment law and not a threat. In their Reply, these Defendants agree that the

Fourth Amendment applies to investigations of child abuse or neglect by Arizona

caseworkers. They acknowledge that an "informant's tip alone would not have justified entry

into the Loudermilks’ home without their consent," but argue that they could not ignore the

informant’s information about potential child abuse. (Dkt. 41 - Reply at pp. 3-4). Defendants

further clarify that they have not argued that "their entry into the home was justified by

exigent circumstances or any other exception to the warrant requirement." (Dkt. 41 - Reply

at p. 3). Defendants argue that it was permissible for them to approach the front door and ask

for permission to enter and look around, and that Plaintiffs were not “seized” during the

incident. Defendants further argue that Plaintiffs received legal guidance from their attorney

throughout the incident and thus could not have been “coerced” into permitting the search

as they allege. 

A search conducted with voluntary consent is constitutionally permissible. See

United States v. Rodriguez, 464 F.3d 1072, 1077 (9th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). "Whether

consent to search was voluntarily given is to be determined from the totality of the

circumstances." Id. Defendants cite the following five factors relevant in criminal cases as

bearing on whether consent was voluntary: (1) whether the defendant was in custody; (2)

whether the arresting officers had their guns drawn; (3) whether Miranda warnings were

given; (4) whether the defendant was notified that she had a right not to consent; and (5)

Case 2:06-cv-00636-ROS Document 45 Filed 09/28/07 Page 8 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 9 -

whether the defendant had been told a search warrant could be obtained. Id. "[T]hese factors

are only guideposts, not a mechanized formula to resolve the voluntariness inquiry." Id.

(citations omitted).

Plaintiffs do not allege in their Amended Complaint that they were “in custody” using

those specific words, that the sheriff’s deputies had their guns drawn or that Miranda

warnings were given. Plaintiffs do allege, however, that Defendants represented that they

had a court order allowing them to remove Plaintiffs' children when they in fact did not have

an order, and then claimed that an order could be obtained in five minutes. Plaintiffs further

allege that Defendants Cash and Cramer told Plaintiffs’ attorney that if they did not consent

to the search, they would be arrested and their children would be taken into custody.

Defendant Cash allegedly told Plaintiffs' attorney that Plaintiff Parents would be handcuffed

in front of their children if he continued to advise them to refuse consent. Plaintiffs further

allege that their attorney informed Defendants that they had not pointed to any necessity to

remove the children, but that Defendants were still intent on removing them if Plaintiffs did

not allow the search. Defendants’ persistence in seeking entry into the home was not a mere

brief encounter but allegedly occurred over a period of approximately forty minutes.

Moreover, Defendants Cash and Cramer were “backed” by two to four armed police officers.

Having reviewed the facts alleged in the Amended Complaint in the light most favorable to

Plaintiffs, under Plaintiffs’ version of the facts, Defendants by threats and persistence

coerced Plaintiffs into consenting to the search of their home. Plaintiffs have alleged

sufficient facts on the face of the Amended Complaint which state a claim for relief based

on violation of the Fourth Amendment as to Defendants Cash and Cramer.

Regarding Plaintiffs’ Second Claim based on violation of the Fourteenth Amendment,

Defendants Cash and Cramer argue that Plaintiffs have simply alleged the “knock on the

door” by Defendants who were investigating an anonymous tip regarding the habitability of

the Loudermilks’ home which CPS by Arizona statute is required to investigate. Defendants

argue they did not “threaten” Plaintiffs but correctly represented Arizona law to them.

Case 2:06-cv-00636-ROS Document 45 Filed 09/28/07 Page 9 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 10 -

Defendants again cite Plaintiffs’ allegations that they received legal guidance from counsel

throughout the incident. 

The Amended Complaint, however, contains allegations that for approximately forty

minutes, Defendants Cash and Cramer sought entry into the Loudermilks’ home, despite the

attempts by Plaintiff Parents and their counsel to refuse such entry. As further alleged,

Defendants represented that they had a court order when they did not. Defendants allegedly

threatened to arrest or handcuff Plaintiff Parents and remove or take the children into

custody, “backed” by armed sheriff’s deputies. These allegations are a sufficient factual basis

for Plaintiffs’ claim based on violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 

The Court must next determine whether a reasonable official would have been aware

that the alleged conduct violated clearly established rights. “Objectively viewed, a state

agent whose duties take her into private homes is deemed to know about the basic

constitutional constraints on her activities.” Walsh v. Erie County Dep’t of Job and Family

Servs., 240 F. Supp. 2d 731, 758-59 (N.D.Ohio 2003)(rejecting a finding of qualified

immunity for a social worker). “The principle that government officials cannot coerce entry

into people’s houses without a search warrant or applicability of an established exception to

the requirement of a search warrant is so well established that any reasonable officer would

know it.” Calabretta, 189 F.3d at 813. Similarly, “[t]he constitutional right of parents and

children to live together without government interference is well established.” Mabe, 237

F.3d at 1107 (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982)). 

Defendants Cash and Cramer argue that they reasonably believed that their conduct

was in compliance with A.R.S. § 8-821 and that they are therefore protected by qualified

immunity even if their actions are found to violate the Fourth Amendment or Due Process.

Defendants argue that they reasonably believed that they had probable cause to take custody

of the Loudermilk children and that relying on that probable cause belief, they assumed they

were not violating Plaintiffs’ due process rights. (Dkt. 38 - Amended Motion to Dismiss, p.

14). 

Case 2:06-cv-00636-ROS Document 45 Filed 09/28/07 Page 10 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 11 -

Section 8-821 provides in relevant part as follows:

B. A child may be taken into temporary custody by a peace

officer or a child protective services worker if temporary

custody is clearly necessary to protect the child because

probable cause exists to believe that the child is either:

1. A victim or will imminently become a victim of abuse or

neglect.

2. Suffering serious physical or emotional injury that can only

be diagnosed by a medical doctor or psychologist.

3. Physically injured as a result of living on premises where

dangerous drugs or narcotic drugs are being manufactured. ...

***

H. A person who knowingly interferes with the taking of a child

into temporary custody under this section is guilty of a class 2

misdemeanor.

A.R.S. § 8-821(B)(1-3), (H). 

Defendants additionally cite A.R.S. § 8-802(C)(6), which provides that “[a] child

protective worker shall ... [t]ake a child into temporary custody as provided in § 8-821. Law

enforcement officers shall cooperate with the department to remove a child from the custody

of the child’s parents, guardian or custodian when necessary.” 

The facts alleged in Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint show that Defendants Cash and

Cramer acted in response to an anonymous tip that the Loudermilk children were being

neglected and that Plaintiffs’ home was uninhabitable. “[A]n anonymous tip, without more,

does not constitute probable cause.” See United States v. Wright, 215 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th

Cir. 2000)(citing, inter alia, Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 227 (1983)). For an anonymous

tip to be accorded any weight, there must be some basis that the tip is true. United States v.

Luong, 470 F.3d 898, 903 (9th Cir. 2006). As alleged in Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint,

another CPS caseworker made a visit to their home approximately a month before the

incident involving Defendants and attempted to make an appointment but was not successful.

Based on Plaintiffs’ allegations, no further action was taken until Defendants arrived at the

Case 2:06-cv-00636-ROS Document 45 Filed 09/28/07 Page 11 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 12 -

residence some weeks later. Plaintiffs further allege that Defendants Cash and Cramer

observed Plaintiffs' children at the doorway and saw that they were in good health and cared

for. Based on these allegations viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the credibility

of the tip became increasingly doubtful. In addition, based on Plaintiffs’ allegations, there

was no warrant to remove the children and no necessity allowing the children’s removal

without a warrant. 

Based on the Amended Complaint’s allegations, Defendants Cash and Cramer

persisted in seeking entry into Plaintiffs’ home in order to search the premises, despite

Plaintiffs’ continued refusal and consultation with their attorney. Moreover, as further

alleged, Defendants persisted in their threats to remove the children if the Plaintiff Parents

did not consent to the search, stating that they could arrest or handcuff the Parents in front

of the children. Based on the allegations set forth in the Amended Complaint, viewed in

Plaintiffs’ favor, no reasonable official would have believed that his or her conduct was

authorized by state or constitutional law. 

Defendants Cash and Cramer are not entitled to qualified immunity based on the

allegations appearing on the face of the Amended Complaint. Defendants’ Amended Motion

to Dismiss is denied.

(B) Defendant Rhodes' Motion to Dismiss.

Defendant Rhodes filed her Motion to Dismiss addressed to the allegations contained

in the Original Complaint. (Dkt. 15). Plaintiffs subsequently filed an Amended Complaint

(Dkt. 20) after Defendant Rhodes had filed her Motion to Dismiss. In some instances, the

filing of an amended complaint moots a motion to dismiss. The Amended Complaint in this

case substituted the “Doe Defendants” with named parties. (Dkt. 17). The Court therefore

will consider Defendant Rhodes’ Motion to Dismiss as directed at Plaintiffs’ Amended

Complaint.

Plaintiffs assert in the Second Claim that Defendant Rhodes violated their liberty

interest in family privacy and integrity based on threats to take their children into custody

Case 2:06-cv-00636-ROS Document 45 Filed 09/28/07 Page 12 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 13 -

without cause. Defendant Rhodes argues that the facts alleged do not sufficiently demonstrate

that she threatened Plaintiffs because Defendant Cash, a CPS caseworker, was required to

make a prompt and thorough investigation into the neglect allegation provided by the

anonymous tip. Defendant Rhodes argues that she provided correct statements of the law

when speaking with Plaintiffs’ attorney and that she had no authority to take custody of the

children. Defendant Rhodes further argues that there is no allegation that she had personal

contact with Plaintiffs or that she was physically at the scene.

The legal discussion set forth above relevant to Plaintiffs’ claim of violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment applies to Plaintiffs’ claim asserted against Defendant Rhodes.

Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendant Rhodes provided information to their attorney to the

effect that Arizona law gives CPS agents greater latitude to search a person’s home than as

permitted by the Fourth Amendment when there is suspected child neglect; that Defendants

Cash and Cramer did not need a search warrant or court order to search Plaintiffs’ home and

that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to CPS workers when investigating child neglect;

and that if Plaintiffs did not permit the search, the CPS agents cold take temporary custody

of the children under A.R.S. § 8-821. Plaintiffs allege that, "Defendant Rhodes then said that

unless a search was permitted, CPS agents would remove the children from the Plaintiffs'

home." (Dkt. 20 - Amended Complaint, ¶ 54). Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendant

Rhodes was working with the other Defendants to coerce Plaintiffs into permitting a search

of their home. 

 In their Response, Plaintiffs cite A.R.S. § 8-803(D), which provides that “[r]efusal to

cooperate in the investigation or to participate in the offered services does not constitute

grounds for temporary custody of a child except if there is a clear necessity for temporary

custody as provided in § 8-821.” 

Viewing the facts alleged in the Amended Complaint in the light most favorable to

Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that Defendant Rhodes by “threat” exerted

"coercive pressure" on them to allow the search of their home so that their children would

Case 2:06-cv-00636-ROS Document 45 Filed 09/28/07 Page 13 of 14
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 14 -

not be removed. Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a claim of Fourteenth Amendment

violation against Defendant Rhodes. Defendant Rhodes' Motion to Dismiss is denied.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the Amended Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint filed

by Defendants Cash and Cramer (Dkt. 38) is denied.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Rhodes

(Dkt. 15) is denied.

DATED this 27th day of September, 2007.

Case 2:06-cv-00636-ROS Document 45 Filed 09/28/07 Page 14 of 14