Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00891/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00891-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSEPH C. SISNEROS, 

CDCR #F-17317,

Plaintiff,

vs.

D. BROWN, Sergeant; D. MENDEZ, 

Correctional Officer; J. DAVIS, 

Psychiatrist; S. KRITTMAN, 

Psychologist,

Defendants.

Case No.: 14cv0891 GPC (RBB)

ORDER: 

(1) GRANTING DEFENDANT DAVIS 

AND KRITTMAN’S MOTION TO 

DISMISS PURSUANT TO 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) 

[Doc. No. 10]

AND

(2) GRANTING DEFENDANT 

BROWN AND MENDEZ’S MOTION 

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

PURSUANT TO Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 

AND 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)

[Doc. No. 9]

Joseph C. Sisneros (“Plaintiff”), is a prisoner currently incarcerated at the 

California Health Care Facility (“CHCF”) in Stockton, California, and is proceeding pro 

se and in this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants are all correctional 

and medical officials employed at Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”) 

where Plaintiff was incarcerated in September and November 2013. See Compl., Doc. 

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No. 1, at 1-2. Plaintiff claims Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his safety 

in violation of the Eighth Amendment by failing to protect him from being attacked by 

his cellmate. Id. at 3-4. He seeks $49,000 in both general and punitive damages. Id. at 6.

I. Procedural History

Defendants Davis and Krittman have filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s

Complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (Doc. No. 10). 

Defendants Brown and Mendez have filed a Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to 

FED. R. CIV. P. 56 based on Plaintiff’s failure to properly exhaust available administrative 

remedies prior to suit, as is required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (Doc. No. 9). In response to 

the Court’s Notice to Plaintiff of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 

12), Plaintiff has filed an Opposition (Doc. No. 14), as well as several additional 

supplemental oppositions, exhibits, and other miscellaneous documents (Doc. Nos. 18, 

20, 22, 29). In response to Plaintiff’s original Opposition, Defendants have filed a Reply 

(Doc. No. 16).

After careful review of both Motions, as well as all evidence submitted both by 

Defendants in support of summary judgment and Plaintiff in response, the Court 

GRANTS both Defendant Davis & Krittman’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint 

for failing to state a claim, and Defendant Brown and Mendez’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment based on Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies for the 

reasons set out below.

II. Factual Allegations 

Plaintiff is “70 years old,” weighs “168 pounds,” and suffers from “three lifethreatening diseases—diabetes, hypertension & the Hep. C virus.” Compl. at 3. “A few 

days” or “about one week” before September 10, 2013, Plaintiff was assigned a cellmate 

named Gomez, whom Plaintiff describes as “loud & obnoxious,” “43 years old at 200+ 

lbs. & as crazy as they come.” Id. This “first time,” Plaintiff contends he “got rid of Mr.

Gomez” by explaining his “bizarre, erratic & crazy behavior” and “the big differences 

between them,” to Defendant Mendez, a Correctional Officer. Id. at 3, 7. Plaintiff claims 

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Gomez “looked dangerous” and he “didn’t want to deal with [him].” Id. at 3. Mendez 

“agreed, and moved Mr. Gomez out.” Id. at 7.

On September 10, 2013, Gomez was “moved back with [Plaintiff]” for a “second 

and final time.” Id. at 3-4. Plaintiff “objected & complained,” but Mendez told him he 

“had no choice,” because “Sergeant Brown ok[ayed] the move.” Id. at 3. Plaintiff 

“believes” that neither Mendez nor Brown “bothered to check the master file, or the 

I.S.R.S. file1 on Mr. Gomez[’s] psychological evaluation” before placing him with 

Plaintiff. Id. at 7.

After Gomez moved in, Plaintiff claims he initially helped Gomez with “his 

laundry, and [his] store,” and “protected him from other inmates trying to take advantage 

of him.” Id. at 4. Plaintiff also assisted Gomez by “reading and writing” letters from his 

mother and sister, which is “how [he] found out that Mr. Gomez should be on psych. 

meds.” Id. 

Plaintiff claims that on November 8, 2013, he “talked to Dr. Davis—the prison 

psychiatrist,” “explained” Gomez’s “bizarre and crazy behavior,” and told him that 

“according to [Gomez’s] mom,” Gomez needed medication. Id. Davis replied that 

Gomez “had to go through his clinician[,] Dr. Krittman.” Id. One or two weeks before 

 

1

 The Institutional Staff Recommendation Summary (ISRS) is part of an inmate’s 

Cumulative Case Summary, and is prepared for each inmate committed or returned to the 

custody of the CDCR as a parole violator with a new life term. See CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 

15 § 3075.1(a)(6), (h) (Jan. 1, 2015). “The ISRS shall state the sources of information used 

and summarize the inmate’s history of or status concerning: type of confidential 

information on file; holds or detainers; medical and dental requirements or limitations; 

results of a psychiatric or psychological referral; work experiences and skills; narcotics, 

drugs and alcohol use; escapes; arson offenses; sex-related offenses; academic and Career 

Technical Education program needs or interests; necessary casework follow-up; the 

counselor’s evaluation of the inmate; release plans if the inmate has six months or less to 

release; Reentry Hub eligibility; classification score and custody designation suffix; 

community correctional facility eligibility; and recommended facility placement.” Id.

§ 3075.1(h)(1).

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November 10, 2013, Plaintiff contends both Drs. Krittman and Davis “had a one on one 

with inmate Gomez,” but “nothing was done.” Id.

On November 10, 2013, Plaintiff claims Gomez “almost took [his] life because 

[Plaintiff] asked Gomez politely” to lower the volume on the TV. Id. Plaintiff claims 

Gomez “bushwacked [him],” by “pummeling [him] on the head, face & torso,” biting his 

cheek, stabbing him on the head and face with his eyeglasses, spitting in his ear and face, 

and kicking him in the ribs, kidneys and shins. Id. at 3. Plaintiff claims “the whole ordeal 

lasted about one hour.” Id. at 3. Plaintiff claims Gomez was able to “pin[] [him] down 

real good,” and was able to “severely beat [him] almost to the point of death,” because 

Plaintiff’s “medical problems, one bad arm,” hypoglycemia, and dizzy spells rendered 

him “defenseless.” Id. at 4, 7.

III. Defendant Davis and Krittman’s Motion to Dismiss

Both Drs. Davis and Krittman move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint against them 

pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) on grounds that he has failed to “allege facts 

necessary to support a claim of deliberate indifference to his safety,” and because they 

are entitled to qualified immunity. See Defs.’ Mem. of P&As in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss 

(Doc. No. 10-1) at 4-8. 

A. Standard of Review

A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal may be based on either a “‘lack of a cognizable legal 

theory’ or ‘the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.’” 

Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare System, LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(quoting Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990)). 

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft 

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 

570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that 

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Id. at 679 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Threadbare recitals 

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of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not 

suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (on motion to dismiss court is 

“not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”). “The 

pleading standard ... does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more 

than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

678 (citations omitted).

In analyzing a pleading, the Court sets conclusory factual allegations aside, accepts 

all non-conclusory factual allegations as true, and determines whether those nonconclusory factual allegations accepted as true state a claim for relief that is plausible on 

its face. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-684; Turner v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, __ F.3d __, 

2015 WL 3619888 at *3 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting that “conclusory allegations of law and 

unwarranted inferences are insufficient to avoid a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.”) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). And while “[t]he plausibility standard is not akin 

to a probability requirement,” it does “ask[] for more than a sheer possibility that a 

defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). In determining plausibility, the Court is permitted “to draw on its 

judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679.

Nevertheless, claims asserted by pro se petitioners, “however inartfully pleaded,” 

are held “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. 

Kerner, 404 U.S. 519-20 (1972). Thus, courts “continue to construe pro se filings 

liberally when evaluating them under Iqbal.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 

(9th Cir. 2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (noting 

that courts “have an obligation where the petitioner is pro se, particularly in civil rights 

cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of any 

doubt.”)).

B. Eighth Amendment Failure to Protect Claims

The Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to “take reasonable measures to 

guarantee the safety of the inmates.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984); 

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DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 199-200 (1989) 

(“[W]hen the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his will, 

the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for 

his safety and general well-being.”). In fact, the Supreme Court has specifically held that 

this duty requires officials to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other 

prisoners. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994) (citations omitted); Hearns v. 

Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2005).

However, “[p]rotecting the safety of prisoners and staff involves difficult choices 

and evades easy solutions.” Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 460 (9th Cir. 1986). Thus, 

in order to state a cruel and unusual punishment claim based on a prison official’s failure 

to protect him, Plaintiff must first allege facts sufficient to show that the risk he faced 

was objectively “sufficiently serious,” i.e., that the conditions under which he was 

confined posed a “substantial risk of serious harm” to him. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; 

Cortez v. Skol, 776 F.3d 1046, 1050 (9th Cir. 2015). Second, because “only the 

unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain implicates the Eighth Amendment,” Plaintiff’s 

pleading must also contain “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 

inference,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, that each individual defendant he seeks to hold liable 

acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297 (internal 

quotation marks, emphasis and citations omitted); see also Hudson, 503 U.S. at 5, 8. 

In a failure to protect case, “that state of mind is one of ‘deliberate indifference’ to 

inmate health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Prison officials display a deliberate 

indifference to an inmate’s well-being only when they know of and consciously disregard 

a substantial risk of harm to his health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. “[T]he official 

must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial 

risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id.; see also Taylor v. 

Barkes, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2045 (2015) (noting that Farmer holds that “Eighth 

Amendment liability requires actual awareness of risk.”). This “subjective approach” 

focuses only “on what a defendant’s mental attitude actually was,” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 

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839, and “is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 

2004).

Thus, if prison officials “did not know of the underlying facts indicating a 

sufficiently substantial danger,” and “were therefore unaware of the danger,” or if “they 

knew the underlying facts but believed (albeit unsoundly) that the risk to which the facts 

gave rise was unsubstantial or nonexistent,” they may not be held liable. Farmer, 511 

U.S. at 844; see also Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nevada, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir.

2002) (noting that a prison official who “should have been aware of the risk, but was not, 

... has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.”).

Moreover, the deliberate indifference standard requires that even if a prison official 

is alleged to have “actually kn[own] of a substantial risk to [Plaintiff’s] health or safety[,] 

[he] may be found free from liability if [he] responded reasonably to the risk, even if the 

harm was not ultimately averted.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844. Deliberate indifference is, 

therefore, “‘something more than mere negligence,’ but ‘something less than acts or 

omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will 

result.’” Cortez, 776 F.3d at 1050 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835). 

 Thus, in order to state a plausible claim for relief against Drs. Davis and Krittman, 

Plaintiff’s Complaint must include enough “factual content that allows the court to draw 

the reasonable inference” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556), that

both Davis and Krittman actually knew his cellmate, Gomez, posed an objectively serious 

risk to his safety or health, “inferred that substantial harm might result from the risk,” and 

then failed to take reasonable action to abate it. See Wallis v. Baldwin, 70 F.3d 1074, 

1077 (9th Cir. 1995). As currently pleaded, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to 

allege a plausible claim for relief under the Eighth Amendment against either Dr. 

Krittman or Dr. Davis because he has failed to include sufficient “factual enhancement” 

from which the Court may reasonably infer that either of them acted, or failed to 

reasonably act, under circumstances which presented a “substantial” or “obvious risk of 

“imminent” harm to him. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 50 

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(2008) (to be deliberately indifferent, a prison official must fail to reasonably act under 

circumstances which are “‘sure or very likely to cause serious . . . and needless 

suffering’” and which “give rise to ‘sufficiently imminent dangers.’” (quoting Helling v. 

McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33-35 (1993)).

First, Plaintiff claims that while he “talked to Dr. Davis” on November 8, 2013 

about Gomez’s “bizarre and crazy behavior,” and mentioned Gomez’s mother’s belief 

that her son “should be on psych meds,” see Compl. at 4, he pleads no further factual 

allegations to show that Davis knew, based on this conversation alone, that he faced a 

“substantial risk” of serious harm if Gomez were not medicated or assigned to another 

cell; nor does Plaintiff allege any additional facts from which the Court might reasonable 

infer that Davis consciously disregarded any risk that was “obvious.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at

842; Cortez, 776 F.3d at 1050. In fact, Plaintiff admits Dr. Davis did not simply ignore 

his concerns, but instead took some action when he recommended to Plaintiff that Gomez 

consult with his clinician, Dr. Krittman, and then met “one on one” with Gomez 

approximately two weeks before Plaintiff was attacked. See Compl. at 4; Farmer, 511 

U.S. at 844 (defendant is not liable “if [he] responded reasonably to the risk, even if the 

harm was not ultimately averted.”). Moreover, Plaintiff does not allege Gomez made any 

threats against him in Davis’s presence during their meeting, and does not proffer any 

other facts from which the Court might reasonably infer how or why Davis might have 

actually “drawn the inference” that Plaintiff faced a substantial risk of harm simply 

because he shared a cell with Gomez. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837 (“[T]he official must both 

be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of 

serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”); see also Taylor, __ U.S. at 

__, 135 S. Ct. at 2045 (“Eighth Amendment liability requires actual awareness of risk.”). 

Even assuming Plaintiff’s conversation with Davis on November 8, 2013, provided 

Davis with information consistent with a potential for harm, a “mere suspicion” without 

more is insufficient to show deliberate indifference. Berg, 794 F.2d at 459 (deliberate 

indifference “does not require that the guard or official ‘believe to a moral certainty that 

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one inmate intends to attack another at a given place at a time,’” but “he must have more 

than a mere suspicion that an attack will occur.’”) (citations omitted); see also Labatad v. 

Corr. Corp. of Am., 714 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding summary judgment 

proper as to prisoner’s Eighth Amendment claim where only evidence offered to 

demonstrate deliberate indifference was defendants’ knowledge that plaintiff fought three 

days prior to his cellmate’s attack with a member of his cellmate’s gang); Johnson v. 

Hicks, No. 1:11-CV-02162-GSA-PC, 2014 WL 1577280, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2014)

(finding prisoner failed to sufficiently allege Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim 

where he claimed attacker was “in Ad–Seg for disciplinary reasons,” and was “well 

known for in-cell violence,” but failed to claim any defendant knew his attacker “posed a 

particular, present danger” to him).

Plaintiff’s claims as to Dr. Krittman are even less availing. Specifically, Plaintiff 

alleges only that Davis told him Krittman was Gomez’s clinician, and that Krittman, like 

Davis, had a “one on one” with Gomez “about one week before he assaulted [Plaintiff].” 

Compl. at 4. Plaintiff offers no “further factual enhancement” as to Dr. Krittman or any 

role he may have played in causing Plaintiff’s injury. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557; Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 677 (“[E]ach Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only 

liable for his or her own misconduct.”); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 

1978) (a person “subjects” another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the 

meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s 

affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes 

the deprivation of which complaint is made.”). Critically, Plaintiff fails to further allege 

Krittman actually knew Plaintiff had complained to Davis about Gomez’s “bizarre and 

crazy behavior,” id., and fails to offer any additional facts from which the court might 

reasonably infer that Krittman consciously disregarded any substantial risk posed by 

Gomez that was otherwise “obvious.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842; Cortez, 776 F.3d at 1050. 

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Thus, as currently pleaded, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment failure to 

protect claims against both Drs. Davis and Krittman are merely “consistent with” 

possible liability, but, without further factual enhancement, are insufficient to “nudge 

[Plaintiff’s] claim” of cruel and unusual punishment “across the line from conceivable to 

plausible.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 680 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 570).

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant Davis and Krittman’s Motion to 

Dismiss Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment failure to protect claims pursuant to FED. R. CIV.

P. 12(b)(6).2

IV. Defendants Brown and Mendez’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Next, Defendants Brown and Mendez seek summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s 

Eighth Amendment failure to protect claims on grounds that he failed to exhaust his 

administrative remedies before filing suit as is required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (Doc. 

No. 9). 

A. Legal Standards

1. Statutory Exhaustion Requirement

Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”), “[n]o action shall 

be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other 

Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until 

such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). This 

statutory exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, Porter v. 

 

2

 Because the Court finds Plaintiff has failed to state an Eighth Amendment failure 

to protect claim against either Defendant Davis or Krittman, it need not further decide 

whether they are entitled to qualified immunity. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 

(2001) (“If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations 

established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.”); 

see also County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5 (1998) (“[T]he better 

approach to resolving cases in which the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to 

determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right at

all.”).

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Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002) (quotation marks omitted), regardless of the relief 

sought by the prisoner or the relief offered by the process. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 

731, 741 (2001).

“Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other 

critical procedural rules[.]” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006). The Supreme 

Court has also cautioned against reading futility or other exceptions into the statutory 

exhaustion requirement. See Booth, 532 U.S. at 741 n.6. Moreover, because proper 

exhaustion is necessary, a prisoner cannot satisfy the PLRA exhaustion requirement by 

filing an untimely or otherwise procedurally defective administrative grievance or appeal. 

See Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90-93. Instead, “to properly exhaust administrative remedies 

prisoners ‘must complete the administrative review process in accordance with the 

applicable procedural rules,’[ ]-rules that are defined not by the PLRA, but by the prison 

grievance process itself.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007) (quoting Woodford, 

548 U.S. at 88). See also Marella v Terhune, 568 F.3d 1024, 1027 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The 

California prison system’s requirements ‘define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.’”) 

(quoting Jones, 549 U.S. at 218).

Because the failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense, Defendants bear the 

burden of raising and proving its absence. Jones, 549 U.S. at 216; Albino v. Baca, 747 

F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). “In the rare event that a failure to exhaust is 

clear from the face of the complaint, a defendant may move for dismissal under Rule 

12(b)(6).” Albino, 747 F.3d at 1166. Otherwise, Defendants must produce evidence 

proving the Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust, and they are entitled to summary judgment 

under Rule 56 only if the undisputed evidence, viewed in the light most favorable 

Plaintiff, shows he failed to exhaust. Id.

2. Rule 56 Summary Judgment

Any party may move for summary judgment, and the Court must grant summary 

judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and 

the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) (quotation 

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marks omitted); Albino, 747 F.3d at 1166; Washington Mut. Inc. v. U.S., 636 F.3d 1207, 

1216 (9th Cir. 2011). Each party’s position, whether a fact is disputed or undisputed, 

must be supported by: (1) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, 

including but not limited to depositions, documents, declarations, or discovery; or (2) 

showing that the materials cited do not establish the presence or absence of a genuine 

dispute or that the opposing party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact. 

FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1) (quotation marks omitted). The Court may consider other 

materials in the record not cited to by the parties, although it is not required to do so. 

FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(3); Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 

1031 (9th Cir. 2001); accord Simmons v. Navajo Cnty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th 

Cir. 2010).

When Defendants seek summary judgment based on the Plaintiff’s failure to 

exhaust specifically, they must first prove that there was an available administrative 

remedy and that Plaintiff did not exhaust that available remedy. Williams v. Paramo, 775 

F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172) (quotation marks 

omitted). If they do, the burden of production then shifts to the Plaintiff “to come forward 

with evidence showing that there is something in his particular case that made the 

existing and generally available administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him.” 

Williams, 775 F.3d at 1191; see also McBride v. Lopez, __ F.3d __, 2015 WL 3953483 at 

*1, 2 (9th Cir. June 30, 2015) (No. 12-17682) (citing “certain limited circumstances 

where the intervening actions or conduct by prison officials [may] render the inmate 

grievance procedure unavailable.”).

“If the undisputed evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the prisoner 

shows a failure to exhaust, a defendant is entitled to summary judgment under Rule 56.” 

Albino, 747 F.3d at 1166. However, “[i]f material facts are disputed, summary judgment 

should be denied, and the district judge rather than a jury should determine the facts.” Id.

B. Defendants’ Arguments

Brown and Mendez claim the California Department of Corrections and 

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Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) has established an administrative grievance procedure which 

was available to Plaintiff, and that he, in fact, did avail himself of that procedure by filing

three separate administrative appeals referencing Gomez’s November 10, 2013 attack. 

Brown and Mendez seek summary judgment, however, because they claim none of these 

appeals are sufficient to show Plaintiff exhausted the Eighth Amendment failure to 

protect claims he now seeks to pursue. See Defs.’ Mem. of P&As in Supp. of Mot. for 

Summ. J. (Doc. No. 9-1) (hereafter “Defs.’ P&As”) at 15-18. Specifically, Brown and 

Mendez claim Plaintiff’s first two administrative appeals failed to put them on notice that 

he was complaining about Gomez’s cell assignment, and not merely seeking medical 

attention for the injuries he sustained. Id. at 15-17. Brown and Mendez further contend 

that while Plaintiff’s third appeal did include allegations related to the danger posed by 

Gomez’s cell assignment, it was not properly exhausted because it was untimely. Id. at 

17-18. 

C. Discussion

First, no party disputes that the CDCR provides inmates with an administrative 

remedy to address both “non-medical inmate grievances,” also known as Inmate/Parolee 

Appeals, which are initiated by filing a CDCR Form 602, see Decl. of R. Olson in Supp. 

of Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. (Doc. No. 9-3) (hereafter “Olson Decl.”) at 1, ¶ 1; CAL.

CODE REGS., tit. 15 § 3084.2(a), and “medical, dental and mental health care issues,” also 

known as Patient/Inmate Health Care Appeals, which are initiated by filing a CDCR 

Form 602 HC. See Decl. of R. Robinson in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. (Doc. No. 

9-6) (hereafter “Robinson Decl.”) at 2 ¶ 2; Williams, 775 F.3d at 1191. No party further 

disputes that appeals related to medical care are “handled under the same regulatory 

framework” as non-medical appeals, see Defs.’ P&As at 8, insofar as both are initially 

reviewed by either custody or medical staff at the institutional level, see Robinson Decl. 

¶ 3; Olson Decl. ¶ 1; however, “third level” health care appeals are “processed by the 

Inmate Correspondence and Appeals Branch (ICAB)” and California Correctional Health 

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Care Services (CCHCS),3 while third level non-medical inmate appeals are heard by the 

CDCR’s Office of Appeals in Sacramento. See Robinson Decl. at 1-2 ¶¶ 1-3; Olson Decl. 

at 1-2 ¶¶ 1-2. 

In addition, no party disputes that an administrative appeal must be filed within 

thirty calendar days: (1) of the event or decision being appealed, (2) upon the inmate first 

having knowledge of the action or decision being appealed, or (3) upon receipt of an 

unsatisfactory departmental response to an appeal filed. See CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 15, 

§ 3084.8(b)(1) (quotation marks omitted); Vaden v. Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 1049 

(9th Cir. 2006); see also Olson Decl. at 2-3 ¶¶ 2-4.

A California prisoner may appeal “any policy, decision, action, condition, or 

omission by the department or its staff that [he] can demonstrate as having a material 

adverse effect upon his . . . health, safety, or welfare.” CAL CODE REGS., tit. 15 

§ 3084.1(a). Since January 28, 2011, and during the times alleged in Plaintiff’s 

Complaint, Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations requires three formal levels of 

appeal review. See Olson Decl. at 2 ¶ 2.

Thus, in order to properly exhaust, a California prisoner must, within 30 calendar 

days of the decision or action being appealed, or “upon first having knowledge of the 

action or decision being appealed,” CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 15 § 3084.8(b), “use a CDCR 

Form 602 (Rev. 08/09), Inmate/Parolee Appeal, to describe the specific issue under 

appeal and the relief requested.” Id. § 3084.2(a). The CDCR Form 602 “shall be 

submitted to the appeals coordinator at the institution.” Id. § 3084.2(c), § 3084.7(a). If the 

first level CDCR Form 602 appeal is “denied or not otherwise resolved to the appellant’s 

satisfaction at the first level,” id. § 3084.7(b), the prisoner must “within 30 calendar days 

 

3

 Health care appeals have been handled separately from non-medical appeals within the 

CDCR since August 1, 2008, as a result of a still-pending Northern District of California 

class action lawsuit regarding medical care standards throughout the State’s prisons. See

Robinson Decl., at 2 ¶ 2 (citing Plata v. Brown, et al., N. D. Cal. Civil Case No., 3:01-cv01351-TEH (2001)).

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. . . upon receiving [the] unsatisfactory departmental response,” id. § 3084.8(b)(3), seek a 

second level of administrative review, which is “conducted by the hiring authority or 

designee at a level no lower than Chief Deputy Warden, Deputy Regional Parole 

Administrator, or the equivalent.” Id. § 3084.7(b), (d)(2). “The third level is for review of 

appeals not resolved at the second level.” Id. § 3084.7(c). “The third level review 

constitutes the decision of the Secretary of the CDCR on an appeal, and shall be 

conducted by a designated representative under the supervision of the third level Appeals 

Chief or equivalent. The third level of review exhausts administrative remedies,” id.

§ 3084.7(d)(3), “unless otherwise stated.”1Id. § 3084.1(b); see also Olson Decl. ¶¶ 2-3; 

CDCR OP. MAN. § 541100.13 (“Because the appeal process provides for a systematic 

review of inmate and parolee grievances and is intended to afford a remedy at each level 

of review, administrative remedies shall not be considered exhausted until each required 

level of review has been completed.”).

Therefore, the only question in this case is whether Defendants Brown and Mendez 

have carried their burden under Rule 56 to show there is no material dispute as to whether 

Plaintiff exhausted the administrative remedies made available to him as to the failure to 

protect claims he now alleges against them before he filed suit as is required by CAL.

CODE REGS., tit. 15 § 3084, et seq. See Compl. at 2-3; Williams, 775 F.3d at 1191. 

1. Defendants’ Evidence

Defendants admit Plaintiff filed three administrative appeals specifically 

addressing Gomez’s November 10, 2103 attack, and have attached evidence of those 

appeals as documented in both the CCHCS’s health care appeals tracking database 

(HCARTS), and the CDCR’s Office of Appeals Inmate Appeals Tracking System 

 

1 For example, “[a] second level of review shall constitute the department’s final action 

on appeals of disciplinary actions classified as ‘administrative’ as described in section 

3314, or minor disciplinary infractions documented on CDC Form 128-A (rev. 4-74), 

Custodial Counseling Chrono, pursuant to section 3312(a)(2), and shall exhaust 

administrative remedy on these matters.” CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 15 § 3084.7(b)(1).

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(IATS). See Defs.’ P&As at 8; Olson Decl. at 3-4 & Exs. A & B; Robinson Decl. at 3-4 

& Exs. A & B. The content, procedural histories, and outcomes of each of these appeals 

are summarized below.

a. RJD-HC-13049994 / RJD-A-13-3696

On November 16, 2013, six days after he was attacked by Gomez, Plaintiff filed a 

CDCR 602 Inmate/Parolee Appeal, which was originally logged as RJD-A-13-3696. See 

Decl. of D. VanBuren in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. (Doc. No. 9-5) (hereafter 

“VanBuren Decl.”) at 3 ¶ 5(a) & Ex. B at 22. In the section of this CDCR 602 Form in 

which he was asked to “state briefly the subject of your appeal,” Plaintiff wrote “personal 

injury.” Id. Ex. B at 22. In the following section A, when asked to “[e]xplain [his] issue,” 

and to use a CDCR 602-A if he required more space, Plaintiff described in great detail 

how he was attacked by Gomez on November 10, 2013, and how he was “caught of[f] 

guard,” when Gomez went “berserk” after he “politely” asked him to lower the volume 

on the TV. Plaintiff continued by listing his infirmities, describing the physical struggle, 

and explaining how “days before,” he had read a letter from Gomez’s mom that said, “Be 

sure to take your psy. meds.” Id. at 23. Plaintiff included allegations related to how, prior 

to the attack, he “went to see Dr. Davis & ... told him about [Gomez’s] behavior & his 

mom’s letter. Dr. Davis replied he [Gomez] had to go through his clinician D. Krittman 

before he can dispense psych. meds.” Plaintiff then claimed he “followed up on this,” by 

“try[ing] to get [Gomez] his medication,” but it was “to[o] late,” and Gomez attacked 

him. Id.

In section B of his CDCR Form 602, entitled “Action requested,” Plaintiff 

continued to describe Gomez’s attack as a “one way fight” due to Plaintiff’s age, 

diabetes, hypertension, and Hep-C status. Id. at 22. On the attached CDCR 602-A, 

Plaintiff further reported that as a result of Gomez’s attack, his jaw and cartilage in his 

nose was broken, he could “only breathe through one nostril,” was experiencing pain 

while chewing, had a bruised arm and face, and believed a loose muscle or tendon was 

“just dangling.” Id. at 23. Plaintiff concluded by “requesting all that’s damaged be 

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repaired,” including “the diaphragm of [his] back where [his] ribs are.” Id. Finally, just

above his signature, Plaintiff explained that no supporting documents were being attached 

to his CDCR Form 602 because he was waiting for his “medical report to arrive at 

medical records.” Id. at 22.

Plaintiff’s CDCR Form 602 Log No. RJD-A-13-3696 was “received” at the Inmate 

Appeals Office on November 21, 2013. See Olson Decl. at 4 ¶ 6(b). On November 22, 

2013, Plaintiff was issued a CDC Form 6954at the first level of screening. See VanBuren

Decl. at 2 ¶ 5(a) & Ex. B at 21. According to Inmate Appeals Coordinator Olson, because 

“the only relief requested was medical treatment for the injuries [he] sustained during the 

attack,” Olson Decl. at 4 ¶ 6(b), Plaintiff was notified that CDC Form 602 Log No. RJDA-13-03696 was being “returned,” and he was “advised that this appeal issue should be 

submitted to the appropriate CDCR unit for review.” Id. However, the same November 

22, 2013 Form 695 also informed Plaintiff that his “appeal ha[d] been forwarded to 

health care staff” for “further processing and review,” id.; indeed, both Olson and Health 

Care Appeals Coordinator VanBuren admit Plaintiff’s appeal was ultimately “accepted 

for review,” “converted to a Health Care Appeal,” and re-assigned tracking No. RJD-HC13049994 on November 25, 2013. Id.; see also VanBuren Decl. at 3 ¶ 5(a).

On either December 9, 2013, or December 22, 2013, RJD-HC-13049994 was 

partially granted at the second level of review, and later denied at the third level of 

 

4

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and Managing Appeals,” provides that “prior to acceptance and assignment for review,” 

the institution’s appeals coordinator, or a “delegated staff member under the direct 

oversight of the coordinator shall screen all appeals.” CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 15 

§ 3084.5(b)(1) (eff. Jan. 2015). “When an appeal is not accepted, the inmate or parolee 

shall be notified of the specific reason(s) for the rejection or cancellation of the appeal and 

the correction(s) needed for the rejected appeal to be accepted.” Id. § 3084.5(b)(3). Chapter 

5 of the CDCR’s OPERATIONS MANUAL further provides that “[w]hen it is determined that 

an appeal will not be accepted[,] an Inmate/Parolee Screening Form, CDC Form 695 . . . 

shall be completed, attached to the CDCR Form 602 and returned to the inmate or parolee.”

CDCR OP. MAN., § 54100.10 (eff. Jan. 1, 2015).

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review on February 26, 2014. See Van Buren Decl. at 3 ¶ 5(a) & Ex. B at 18; see also 

Robinson Decl. at 3 ¶ 6(b) & Ex. B; Pl.’s Supp. Doc. in Opp’n (Doc. No. 29) at 26.

b. RJD-HC-13050039

On November 24, 2013, approximately two weeks after Gomez’s attack, and just 

two days after he was issued the CDC Form 695 in relation to Log No. RJD-A-13-3696, 

Plaintiff filed a separate Patient/Inmate Health Care Appeal on a CDCR 602 HC Form, 

which was assigned Log No. RJD-HC-13050039. VanBuren Decl., Ex. C at 26. In this 

appeal, Plaintiff stated that the “subject/purpose of [his] appeal” was “[t]o follow up on 

injuries [he] sustained [i]n a beating,” repeated the details of Gomez’s November 10, 

2013 attack, and explained how his age and medical condition prevented him from 

“defend[ing] [him]self.” Id., Ex. C at 16, 28. Plaintiff further claimed that while someone 

in the “hospital & the prison clinic” indicated after the attack that there would be a 

“medical follow up,” and he had since “complained various times to the nurse & doctor,” 

he still “want[ed] to talk to medical,” because he believed he had a “brain concussion” 

which was affecting his memory, eyesight, and hearing. Id. at 28. As he did in CDCR 

Form 602 Log No. RJD-A-13-3696, Plaintiff also reported to have “talked to Dr. Davis 

concerning [Gomez’s] meds & bizarre behavior” before the attack, but claimed Gomez 

was “moved back with [him] despite [his] warning to CO Mendoza.”5Id.

Log No. RJD-HC-13050039, like Log No. RJD-HC-13049994, was partially 

granted at the second level of review on December 22, 2013, and later denied at the third 

 

5

 Plaintiff’s Complaint does not name any Correctional Officer named Mendoza as a party 

to this action; nor does he claim that by referring to Mendoza, he intended to implicate 

Defendant Mendez instead. See CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 15 § 3084.2(a)(3) (“To assist in the 

identification of staff members, the inmate or parolee shall include the staff member’s last 

name, first initial, title or position, if known, and the dates of the staff member’s 

involvement in the issue under appeal. If the inmate . . . does not have the requested 

identifying information about the staff member(s), he or she shall provide any other 

available information that would assist the appeals coordinator in making a reasonable 

attempt to identify the staff member(s) in question.”).

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level of review on February 26, 2014. VanBuren Decl., at 3 ¶ 5(b) & Ex. C at 30-32; see 

also Robinson Decl. at 3 ¶ 6(c); Pl.’s Supp. Doc. in Opp’n (Doc. No. 29) at 25.

c. RJD-A-13-04021

Finally, on December 20, 2013, approximately forty days after Gomez’s November 

10, 2013 attack, Plaintiff filed a CDCR 602 Inmate/Parolee Appeal, which was assigned 

Log No. RJD-A-13-04021. See Olson Decl., at 3 ¶ 6(a) & Ex. A at 8-10. This time, when 

asked to “state briefly the subject of [his] appeal,” Plaintiff wrote “reckless behavior.” 

Id., Ex. A at 8. In Section A of the CDCR Form 602, and on the attached CDCR Form 

602-A, in which he was asked to “explain [his] issue,” Plaintiff again claimed to have 

been “viciously attacked” by Gomez on November 10, 2013. But this time, in addition to 

mentioning both Drs. Krittman and Davis’s alleged roles in either failing to medicate 

Gomez or somehow prevent the attack, Plaintiff also identified Defendants Mendez and 

Brown, and claimed “CO Mendez” was at fault for “plac[ing] Gomez twice with [him],” 

and Brown was responsible for “OK[ing] the move.” Id. at 10. Plaintiff then added 

complaints of “never receiv[ing] some prescription medication, and endur[ing] approx.14 

days of excruciating pain,” and questioned, “Why was a demented predator placed with a 

sick old man like myself?” Id. Finally, when asked what action he requested, Plaintiff 

wrote: “It would be nice if everybody involved would admit their mistakes & not pass the 

blame to somebody else.” Id.

While Appeals Coordinator Olson admits that RJD-A-13-04021 did include claims 

that Defendants Mendez, Brown, Krittman, and Davis “failed to protect him from vicious 

attack by his cellmate,” and that “his cellmate was moved to his cell with no regard to his 

safety,” Olson Decl. at 3 ¶ 6(a), this appeal was “screened out/cancelled” at the first level 

of administrative review on December 24, 2013, “due to loss of time constraints,” and

pursuant to CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 15, § 3084.6(c)(4). Id. at 3-4. ¶ 6(a) & Ex. A at 6. R. 

Briggs, the Acting Chief of the CDCR’s Office of Appeals, further attests that a search of 

the IATS database failed to show that Log No. RJD-A-13-04021, or any appeal filed by 

Plaintiff, which included allegations that Brown or Mendez had failed to protect him 

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from Gomez’s November 10, 2013 attack, had ever been accepted for processing at the 

third level of administrative review. See Decl. of R. Briggs in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. for 

Summ. J (Doc. No. 9-4) (hereafter “Briggs Decl.”) at 4 ¶ 8.

2. Plaintiff’s Rebuttal Evidence

In opposition to Defendant Brown and Mendez’s Motion, and in response to their 

evidence, Plaintiff filed hundreds of pages of his medical and mental health records. But 

he does not allege he was denied adequate medical care in his Complaint; therefore these

records are not relevant to show that he exhausted his Eighth Amendment failure to 

protect claims. See Doc. Nos. 14, 18, 20, 29. Buried within these submissions, however, 

Plaintiff also makes further factual allegations as to his former cellmate Gomez’s 

dangerous proclivities, and he includes copies of the same three administrative appeals 

Defendants Brown and Mendez offer as proof of his failure to exhaust. See Doc. No. 29, 

at 2-3, 23-26. 

In fact, Plaintiff appears to concede that he failed to timely exhaust his failure to 

protect claims as to Brown and Mendez, see id. at 31, but argues he was in “excruciating 

pain” for the “30 to 40 days” following Gomez’s attack, that he “tried to fill out the 602 

appeal forms [and] to send [them] in before the 30 day time limit,” but was “not in his 

right mind” and “not operating within his faculties” at the time. Id. at 34; see also Doc. 

No. 14 at 12. By the time Plaintiff claims he submitted his third administrative appeal via 

a CDCR Form 602 (Log No. RJD-A-13-04021), this time specifically mentioning both 

Brown and Mendez’s “reckless behavior” in “placing Gomez” in his cell on December

20, 2013, he acknowledges it was “to[o] late.” See Doc. No. 29 at 31; see also Olson 

Decl., Ex. A at 8-10.

3. Defendants’ Reply

In Reply, Defendants Brown and Mendez contend Plaintiff’s “allegations that he 

was in pain or not in his right mind are not sufficient to excuse compliance with the 

exhaustion requirement,” and are belied by other evidence which shows he was able to 

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timely file three6separate administrative appeals “which discussed the attack and 

requested additional medical care,” but which nevertheless failed to mention Brown and 

Mendez’s failures to protect him from Gomez’s November 10, 2013 attack. See Defs.’ 

Reply (Doc. No. 16) at 3-4.

4. Analysis

Based on the evidence presented, the Court finds no genuine material dispute exists 

as to whether Plaintiff has properly exhausted all available administrative remedies as to 

his Eighth Amendment failure to protect claims against Defendants Brown and Mendez, 

and that therefore Brown and Mendez are entitled to summary judgment based on 

Plaintiff’s failure to comply with 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). See Albino, 747 F.3d at 1166 

(noting that if “undisputed evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the prisoner 

shows a failure to exhaust, a defendant is entitled to summary judgment under Rule 56.”). 

First, Brown and Mendez have carried their burden of production by submitting 

sufficient evidence which shows that neither of the administrative appeals Plaintiff timely

filed and properly exhausted through the third and final level of administrative review 

following Gomez’s November 10, 2013 attack (Log No. RJD-HC-1304994 or Log No. 

RJD-HC-13050039), adequately put either of them on notice that he was seeking to 

complain about their failure to protect him from Gomez, and not instead seeking medical 

attention for the injuries he sustained during the attack. An appeal generally “suffices to 

exhaust a claim if it puts the prison on adequate notice of the problem for which the 

prisoner seeks redress.” Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813, 822-23 (9th Cir. 2010); see also

Jones, 549 U.S. at 218 (noting that the level of detail in an administrative grievance 

necessary to properly exhaust a claim is determined by the prison’s applicable grievance

procedures); Woodford, 548 U.S. at 84, 90-1 (noting that to “properly” exhaust, prisoner 

 

6

 In addition to RJD-HC-1304994, and RJD-HC-13050039, Defendants claim that on 

December 10, 2013, Plaintiff timely filed a third appeal, Log No. RJD-HC-13050094, 

requesting orthopedic shoes. See Defs.’ Reply at 4; VanBuren Decl., Ex. A at 9.

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must “comply with an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules.”). In this 

case, the record shows that those “critical procedural rules” required that Plaintiff’s 

CDCR 602 appeal forms “describe the specific issue under appeal and the relief 

requested,” see CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 15, § 3084.2 (a), prohibited him from “combining 

unrelated issues on a single appeal form,” id. § 3084.2(a)(1), and mandated that he “list 

all staff member(s) involved” and “describe their involvement in the issue.” Id., 

§ 3084.2(a)(3)7; see also Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1005 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[A] 

prisoner must exhaust his administrative remedies for the claims contained within his 

complaint before that complaint is tendered to the district court.”) (emphasis added).

The primary purpose of a grievance is to notify the prison of a problem. Griffin, 

557 F.3d at 1120 (quotation marks and citations omitted); accord Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 

772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014); Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1211 (9th Cir. 2012). 

Thus, Plaintiff’s CDCR 602 Log No. RJD-HC-1304994 or Log No. RJD-HC-13050039

would suffice to satisfy § 1997e(a)’s exhaustion requirement if Defendants Brown and 

Mendez were included in a list of staff members involved, if either of these appeals

“describe[d] [Brown and Mendez’s] involvement in the issue under appeal,” and if he 

mentioned or somehow directed his allegations of wrongdoing on their failure to protect

him from Gomez, and did not, instead, focus his grievances on his medical infirmities 

and the injuries he sustained and make specific demands for immediate medical relief. 

See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 3084.2. Because the undisputed evidence in the record 

shows instead that Plaintiff’s CDCR 602 Log No. RJD-HC-1304994 and Log No. RJDHC-13050039 lacked even a modicum of detail involving their purported roles in failing 

to protect him, Defendants Brown and Mendez could not have reasonably been alerted to 

 

7 Before January 28, 2011, the CDCR’s regulations merely required prisoner to include 

a description of the problem and the action requested on the CDCR Form 602. See 

§ 3084.2(a) (2010); Sapp, 623 F.3d at 824 (finding that at the time Sapp filed his grievance, 

15 CAL. CODE REGS., § 3084.2 did not require him to identify prison officials by name in 

order to exhaust).

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the nature of the wrong for which Plaintiff now seeks redress against them. See Sapp, 623 

F.3d at 824; Akhtar, 698 F.3d at 1211; McCollum v. Cal. Dept. of Corr. and 

Rehabilitation, 647 F.3d 870, 876 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding Wiccan prisoner’s grievance 

alleging religious discrimination in the form of unequal access to worship places and 

sacred items insufficient to put prison officials on notice of Plaintiff’s separate legal 

challenge to the prison’s failure to establish a paid Wiccan chaplaincy).

Second, Defendants have also proffered sufficient evidence related to Plaintiff’s 

CDCR Form 602 Log No. RJD-A-13-04021 to demonstrate that while it was sufficient to 

put Brown and Mendez on notice of Plaintiff’s failure to protect claims against them, 

there is nevertheless no genuine dispute as to whether this appeal was “properly” 

exhausted. This is because the record shows, and Plaintiff admits, this appeal was 

rejected as untimely. See CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 15 § 3084.8(b) (requiring inmate or 

parolee to “submit the appeal within 30 calendar days of: (1) [t]he occurrence of the 

event or decision being appealed, or; (2) [u]pon first having knowledge of the action or 

decision being appealed, or; (3) [u]pon receiving an unsatisfactory departmental response 

to an appeal filed.”); CDCR OP. MAN., § 54100.13 (“Cancellation or rejection decisions 

. . . do not exhaust the administrative remedies available.”); Olson Decl. at 3 ¶ 6(a) & Ex. 

A at 6-11; Pl.’s Supp. Opp’n (Doc. No. 29) at 31; Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90 (“Proper 

exhaustion demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines.”).

Thus, because Defendants Brown and Mendez have carried their burden to show 

both that “that there was an available administrative remedy, and that [Plaintiff] did not 

exhaust that available remedy” as to the failure to protect claims alleged against them,

Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172, the burden then shifts to Plaintiff to “come forward with 

evidence” to show “that there is something in his particular case that made the existing 

and generally available administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him.” Id. at

1172; Williams, 775 F.3d at 1191.

As mentioned above, Plaintiff has submitted voluminous copies of his medical 

records in Opposition to Defendant Brown and Mendez’s Motion for Summary 

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Judgment, and has included copies of the same CDCR inmate appeals they offer as proof 

of his failure to exhaust. See Doc. Nos. 14, 18, 20, 29. He does not expressly claim that

administrative remedies were not available to him; but he does argue he should be 

excused from 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)’s exhaustion requirement because he “must not have 

been in [his] right mind,” when he “filed numerous 602’s medical and regular appeals” 

during the “30-40 days” after Gomez’s attack due to a “lot of excruciating pain,” and 

because he was “in duress.” Plaintiff further admits, however, that “[i]t was not that [he] 

couldn’t file 602s,” because his “right arm was good enough to write,” but instead it was 

because he just “could not think straight,” and “fe[lt] like a zombie” at the time. See Pl.’s 

Opp’n, Doc. No. 14 at 12; Supp. Opp’n, Doc. No. 20, at 4.

“To be available, a remedy must be available as a practical matter; it must be 

capable of use; at hand.” Williams, 775 F.3d at 1191 (internal quotations and citations 

omitted). A prisoner may demonstrate that an administrative remedy was “effectively 

unavailable” to him by “showing that the local remedies were ineffective, unobtainable, 

unduly prolonged, inadequate, or obviously futile.” Id. (quoting Hilao v. Estate of 

Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 778 n.5 (9th Cir. 1996)); Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172. For example, 

Plaintiff may meet his burden of production by offering evidence which shows prison 

officials “thwarted” him by “inform[ing] [him] that he c[ould not] file a grievance,” 

Williams, 775 F.3d at 1192 (citing Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 937 (9th Cir. 2005)), 

threatened him with retaliation if he filed one, see McBride, __ F.3d __, 2015 WL 

3953483 at *3-4, improperly rejected or “screened out” his grievance, see, e.g., Sapp, 623 

F.3d at 822-823; made a “mistake” by erroneously requiring additional paperwork which 

caused him to miss a filing deadline, see e.g., Nunez v. Duncan, 591 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th 

Cir. 2010); failed to provide him with either grievance forms or information about the 

grievance procedure, despite his complaints or requests, see e.g., Albino, 747 F.3d at 

1177; or by pointing to other circumstances, like hospitalization, segregation, or transfer 

to another facility, which precluded any meaningful opportunity to timely comply. See

Marella, 568 F.3d at 1027-28 (remanding exhaustion issue to district court where record 

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unclear as to whether prisoner injured in a knife attack at the hands of another prisoner

had access to the necessary grievance forms or the ability to timely file an appeal due to 

his stay in the hospital, prison infirmary, and subsequent administrative segregation); see 

also O’Neal v. Stewart, 2014 WL 3818117 at *2 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (collecting cases 

suggesting an inmate’s transfer from one institution to another immediately following the 

incident giving rise to his claim could render administrative remedies unavailable).

Here, however, Plaintiff has failed to “come forward with evidence” sufficient to 

rebut the ample evidence offered by Defendants Brown and Mendez which, even when 

viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, shows both the availability of California’s 

prison administrative procedures, and his failure to properly exhaust those procedures.

Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172, 1174.8 Specifically, Plaintiff has failed to show that prison 

officials thwarted his access to the grievance procedure, threatened or intimidated him in 

any way, or were mistaken when they rejected RJD Log. No. 13-A-0421 as untimely. See 

Williams, 775 F.3d at 1191-92; Nunez, 591 F.3d at 1226; McBride, __ F.3d at __, 2015 

WL 3953483 at *2-3. Moreover, while Plaintiff suggests his failure to properly include 

his Eighth Amendment failure to protect claims against Brown and Mendez in either Log 

No. RJD-HC-1304994 or Log No. RJD-HC-13050039 was due to his confusion, 

medication, or pain, see Pl.’s Opp’n, Doc. No. 14 at 12, he has not pointed to any 

 

8

 While Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. No. 1), and the documents he has submitted in 

Opposition to Defendant Brown and Mendez’s Motion for Summary Judgement (Doc.

Nos. 14, 18, 20, 29), contain factual claims related to his ability to exhaust which are based 

on his personal knowledge, none are verified under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1746. “A verified complaint may be used as an opposing affidavit under Rule 56.” 

Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 460 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 

F.2d 196, 197-98 (9th Cir. 1987)). In Williams, the Ninth Circuit considered allegations 

raised in a prisoner’s complaint related to exhaustion as an affidavit sufficient to show that 

administrative remedies were “not available” because they were made under penalty of 

perjury. 775 F.3d at 1192 & n.11. Here, Plaintiff’s allegations are not sworn, but even if 

they were, they would still be insufficient to meet his burden of production as to exhaustion, 

because unlike in Williams, Plaintiff does not claim to have be “thwarted from filing a 

grievance.” Id. (citing Brown, 422 F.3d at 937).

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evidence which shows that his mental or physical state, or any other condition of his 

confinement outside of his control, precluded him from timely or meaningfully seeking

administrative review of either Brown or Mendez’s purported role in Gomez’s attack. Cf. 

Marella, 568 F.3d at 1027-28; O’Neal, 2014 WL 3818117 at *2. In fact, the undisputed 

evidence before this Court shows that Plaintiff was indeed able to properly exhaust

claims related to the medical care and follow-up treatment he received following 

Gomez’s attack when he timely filed Log No. RJD-HC-1304994 and Log No. RJD-HC13050039, despite his allegedly compromised physical and mental condition at the time.

Therefore, the Court finds Defendant Brown and Mendez are entitled to summary 

judgment as to Plaintiff’s failure to protect claims based on his failure to exhaust those 

claims prior to filing suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) and FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).

V. Conclusion and Order

Based on the foregoing, the Court:

1) GRANTS Defendant Davis and Krittman’s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to 

FED. R .CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (Doc. No. 10);

2) GRANTS Defendant Brown and Mendez’s Motion for Summary Judgment 

based on Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies as required by 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1997e(a) pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 56 (Doc. No. 9); 

3) FINDS no just reason for delay and therefore DIRECTS the Clerk to enter a 

partial judgment on behalf of Defendants Brown and Mendez pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P.

50(b); and 

4) GRANTS Plaintiff forty-five (45) days leave from the date of this Order in 

which to file an Amended Complaint which addresses the deficiencies of pleading his 

failure to protect claims against Defendants Davis and Krittman only. Plaintiff is 

cautioned that his Amended Complaint must be complete in itself without reference to his 

original complaint. See S.D. CAL. CIVLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner 

& Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading supersedes 

the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that 

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claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an amended pleading 

may be “considered waived if not repled.”).

Should Plaintiff elect not to proceed by filing an Amended Complaint against 

Defendants Davis and Krittman within 45 days, the Court will enter a final Order of 

dismissal of the remainder of this civil action based on his failure to state an Eighth 

Amendment failure to protect claim against them, and his failure to prosecute in 

compliance with a Court Order requiring amendment. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 

1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (dismissal for failure to prosecute permitted if plaintiff 

fails to respond to a court’s order requiring amendment of complaint); Lira v. Herrera, 

427 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005) (“If a plaintiff does not take advantage of the 

opportunity to fix his complaint, a district court may convert the dismissal of the 

complaint into dismissal of the entire action.”).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 6, 2015 _______________________________

HON. GONZALO P. CURIEL

United States District Judge

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