Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-01785/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-01785-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 29:623 Job Discrimination (Age)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT H. GELBER,

Plaintiff,

 v.

THE LEONARD WOOD MEMORIAL FOR

THE ERADICATION OF LEPROSY AND

THE AMERICAN LEPROSY

FOUNDATION, and AMERICAN LEPROSY

MISSIONS, INC.,

Defendants. /

No. C 07-01785 JSW

ORDER DENYING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

TRANSFER VENUE

Now before the Court is the motion filed by The Leonard Wood Memorial for the

Eradication of Leprosy and the American Leprosy Foundation (“LWM”) and The American

Leprosy Missions, Inc. (“ALM”) (collectively “Defendants”) to transfer venue to the United

States District Court for the District of South Carolina pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Having

carefully reviewed the parties’ papers and considered their arguments and the relevant legal

authority, and good cause appearing, the Court hereby DENIES Defendants’ motion to transfer

venue. The Court finds this matter suitable for disposition without oral argument and

VACATES the hearing set for June 22, 2007. See N.D. Civil L.R. 7-1(b).

BACKGROUND

On March 29, 2007, Plaintiff Robert H. Gelber filed a complaint in this Court against

Defendants for retaliation, age discrimination, religious discrimination, wrongful discharge in

violation of public policy, and breach of contract. (Compl., ¶¶ 26-37.) Gelber seeks injunctive

relief, damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs. (Id. ¶¶ 38-39.)

Case 3:07-cv-01785-JSW Document 29 Filed 06/21/07 Page 1 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Defendants filed a counterclaim on April 30, 2007, seeking damages for Gelber’s

alleged breach of contract, breach of duty of loyalty, conversion of Defendants’ property, and

breach of the covenant of good faith. (Defendants’ Answer and Counterclaim, ¶¶ 50-66.) Now

before the Court is Defendants’ motion to transfer venue to the District of South Carolina

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).

This suit arises from the termination of Gelber’s employment by Defendants as of

December 3, 2006. (Declaration of Robert H. Gelber (“Gelber Decl.”), ¶ 6.) Gelber was a

resident of Marin County, California throughout his employment and continues to reside there. 

(Id. ¶ 2.) Defendants are nonprofit organizations incorporated in the State of New York and

have their principal places of business in Greenville, South Carolina. (Declaration of

Christopher J. Doyle (“Doyle Decl.”), ¶ 6.) LWM, a wholly owned subsidiary of ALM, is an

international charitable organization focused on research and clinical work aimed at the

eradication of leprosy and tuberculosis. (Id. ¶¶ 3-4.) 

Gelber served as the Scientific Director for LWM beginning in 2003. (Compl., ¶ 10.) 

His employment was governed, in part, by an employment agreement signed in Greenville,

South Carolina on May 6, 2006 (the “Agreement”). (Id. ¶ 8.) The Agreement contained a

choice-of-law provision specifying that its terms shall be governed by the laws of the State of

South Carolina. (Gelber Decl. Ex. 1, ¶ 14.) 

Gelber was a part-time employee who worked from his home in Marin County,

conducted research in Cebu, Philippines, and traveled domestically and internationally in his

capacity as Scientific Director. (Gelber Decl., ¶¶ 6-11.) Gelber also used administrative

support from LWM staff located in South Carolina, Maryland and Cebu while he worked from

home or in Cebu. (Id. ¶¶ 12-13.) In early 2006, LWM’s administrative staff was relocated from

Maryland to Greenville, South Carolina. (Doyle Decl., ¶ 19.) On September 1, 2006,

Christopher J. Doyle, CEO of LWM, notified Gelber that his employment would be terminated

pursuant to the Agreement. (Id. ¶ 21.) The Court will address additional specific facts as

required in the analysis.

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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ANALYSIS

Defendants seek to transfer this action to the District of South Carolina. Pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1404(a), a district court may transfer a civil action to any district where the case could

have been filed originally for the convenience of the parties and witnesses and in the interest of

justice. As the moving party, Defendants bear the burden of showing that the inconvenience of

litigating in this forum favors transfer. See E. & J. Gallo Winery v. F. & P. S.p.A., 899 F. Supp.

465, 466 (E.D. Cal. 1994).

A district court has discretion “to adjudicate motions for transfer according to an

‘individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience and fairness.’” Steward Org., Inc.

v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988) (quoting Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 622

(1964)). In order for a district court to transfer an action under section 1404, the court must

make the following two findings: (1) that the transferee court is one where the action “might

have been brought,” and (2) that the convenience of the parties and witnesses and the interest of

justice favor transfer. Hatch v. Reliance Ins. Co., 758 F.2d 409, 414 (9th Cir. 1985). There is

no dispute that Gelber could have sued LWM and ALM in the District of South Carolina. 

Therefore, Defendants have met their burden under the first prong.

To determine whether Defendants have met their burden on the second prong, the Court

considers the following factors: Plaintiff’s choice of forum; convenience of the parties and

witnesses; ease of access to sources of proof; local interest in the controversy; familiarity of

each forum with the applicable law; and relative congestion in each forum. Decker Coal Co. v.

Commonwealth Edison Co., 805 F.2d 834, 843 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,

330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947)). 

1. Plaintiff’s Choice of Forum.

Typically, a court should give a plaintiff’s choice of forum great deference unless the

defendant can show that other factors of convenience clearly outweigh the plaintiff’s choice of

forum. Decker Coal Co., 805 F.2d at 843. In addition, claims arising under Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964 afford greater deference to the plaintiff’s choice of forum. Ellis v.

Costco Wholesale Corp., 372 F. Supp. 2d 530, 537 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (“Where venue is governed

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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by a more permissive standard, a plaintiff’s choice is entitled to greater deference as a matter of

law.”) Actions arising under Title VII are subject to a special venue provision. 42 U.S.C. §

2000e-5(f)(3). Title VII actions may be brought (1) in any judicial district in the state in which

the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed, (2) in the judicial district

in which the employment records relevant to such practices are maintained and administered,

(3) in the judicial district in which the aggrieved person would have worked but for the alleged

unlawful employment practice, or (4) in the judicial district in which respondent has his

principal office, if the respondent is not found in any of the previously listed districts. Id.

On the other hand, a plaintiff’s choice of forum is afforded less deference when the facts

giving rise to the action have little connection to the forum of original selection. Pacific Car

and Foundry Co. v. Pence, 403 F.2d 949, 954 (9th Cir. 1968) (“If the operative facts have not

occurred within the forum of original selection and that forum has no particular interest in the

parties or the subject matter, the plaintiff’s choice is entitled only to minimal consideration.”)

(footnote omitted). 

In the instant case, Gelber resides in Marin County, California and conducted a

significant portion of his work from his home. (Gelber Decl., ¶¶ 2, 7-9.) Moreover, Gelber

sues under Title VII, which increases the deference this Court gives to his choice of forum.

(Compl. ¶ 31.) Contrary to Defendants’ contention, these provisions are not simply factors that

should be weighed in deciding whether or not to give the plaintiff’s choice of forum greater

deference. See Ellis, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 537. (“[A] plaintiff’s choice of forum is entitled to

greater deference where a case arises under Title VII.”).

Defendants assert that this action has no rational connection to California. (Br. at 10.) 

The central dispute in this case arises from the decision to terminate Gelber’s employment with

LWM. To the extent that such a decision was made entirely outside of California, and largely

in South Carolina, the plaintiff’s choice of forum is slightly diminished. However, Gelber’s job

performance is also a key aspect of this case. Because Gelber performed a significant portion of

his job from his home in California, the Court finds that this action does have a rational

connection to Plaintiff’s chosen forum.

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 The court did not consider any new information in Defendants’ Reply. Therefore, a

surreply is not necessary.

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Therefore, the Court concludes that because Gelber resides in Marin County, California

and worked there for a significant portion of his employment, and because his Title VII claim

affords his choice of forum even stronger deference, this factor strongly favors Plaintiff’s

choice of forum. As a result, the Court will only upset Plaintiff’s choice of forum if Defendants

make a strong showing of inconvenience. Decker Coal Co., 805 F.2d at 843.

2. Convenience of the Witnesses and Parties.

In addition to considering Plaintiff’s choice of forum, the Court takes into account the

relative convenience to all the parties and their witnesses. See id. (citing Gulf Oil Corp., 330

U.S. at 508). Defendants argue that it would be more convenient to litigate this matter in the

District of South Carolina because the relevant evidence and several witnesses live in South

Carolina or on the East Coast of the United States. Defendants identified at least five witnesses

from South Carolina, all but one of whom are party witnesses.1

 (Br. at 11-12.) The

convenience of Defendants’ party witnesses are entitled to little weight because the witnesses

are employees of the party seeking transfer, and Defendants will be able to compel their

testimony at trial. See STX, Inc. v. Trik Stik, Inc., 708 F. Supp. 1551, 1556 (N.D. Cal. 1988)

(discounting the convenience to the defendant’s employees because they could be compelled to

testify).

Furthermore, the record before the Court indicates that the remainder of Defendants’

party witnesses and almost all of Defendants’ non-party witnesses do not reside in either

California or South Carolina. (Br. at 12.) Although the convenience to the witnesses located on

the East Coast may be slightly enhanced by traveling to South Carolina instead of California,

the witnesses in the Philippines will be more inconvenienced. Regardless of their location,

witnesses residing outside of South Carolina or California will be greatly inconvenienced by

traveling from out of state or abroad. Meanwhile, Gelber lists one witness from this district and

one witness from South Carolina. (Gelber Decl., ¶ 20-21.) The remainder of his witnesses

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2

 However, the Court does not consider Gelber’s assertions that he will be

inconvenienced by higher costs for legal representation because his counsel is located in

Oakland, California. See In re Horseshoe Ent., 305 F.3d 354, 358 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding

that the factor of “location of counsel” is irrelevant and improper for consideration in

determining the question of transfer of venue); Solomon v. Cont’l Am. Life Ins. Co., 472 F.2d

1043, 1047 (3rd Cir. 1973) (“The convenience of counsel is not a factor to be considered.”);

Chicago, Rock Island and Pac. R.R. Co. v. Igoe, 220 F.2d 299, 304 (7th Cir. 1955) (noting

that § 1404(a) does not provide the convenience of counsel as a factor to be considered).

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reside in Maryland, Europe and Asia. (Id. ¶¶ 22-24.) Thus, the convenience to Plaintiff’s

witnesses is neutral while the convenience to Defendants’ witnesses only slightly favors transfer

of venue.

On the other hand, as Gelber asserts, transfer to South Carolina would “merely shift” the

inconvenience from the Defendants to Gelber.

2

 See Decker Coal Co., 805 F.2d at 843. 

Moreover, a court may consider the “convenience of the parties as indicated by their relative

physical and financial condition.” Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 879 (3d Cir.

1995). Gelber is a private individual with $190,236 in net income for 2006 and a significant

portion of his assets in his home. (Gelber Decl., ¶ 25.) In 2005, ALM listed $7,960,969 in

revenue and LWM listed $719,049 in revenue. (Declaration of Dean Royer (“Royer Decl.”),

Ex. 4-5.) Although Defendants are nonprofit organizations whose revenues do not match many

large corporations, they are clearly in a better position to absorb the costs of litigation as

compared to Gelber. 

In sum, the inconvenience to the witnesses only slightly favors transfer because many of

the listed proposed witnesses are party witnesses whose convenience is less significant, or they

reside outside of either jurisdiction and, as a whole, are not considerably affected by transfer to

South Carolina. The inconvenience to the parties slightly favors this district because transfer

would shift the costs onto the party with more limited means. Therefore, the Court finds that

this factor is neutral. 

3. The Ease of Access to Sources of Proof.

Access to evidence is another factor that may favor transfer. Decker Coal Co., 805 F.2d

at 843 (citing Gulf Oil Co., 330 U.S. at 508). Defendants state that the relevant evidence is

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United States District Court

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3 Plaintiff submitted evidentiary objections to this statement as lacking foundation and

personal knowledge, and as an improper opinion. Christopher J. Doyle, as President and

CEO of LWM and ALM, makes a sworn declaration to those facts and states that it is based

on his personal knowledge of the facts. (Doyle Decl., ¶ 1.) Thus, the Court finds that Doyle

has the requisite personal knowledge and familiarity with his organization’s records to make

such a declaration, and hereby overrules the objection. Plaintiff also submitted evidentiary

objections to other aspects of the Doyle’s Declaration, but the evidence objected to was not

necessary to the resolution of this motion. Therefore, the Court need not rule on the

admissibility of such evidence at this time.

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located in the District of South Carolina.3

 (Doyle Decl., ¶ 23.) Although this factor weighs in

favor of transfer to South Carolina, the Court does not weigh it heavily.

4. The Local Interest.

Another consideration in a decision to transfer venue is the local interest in having

localized controversies decided at home. Decker Coal Co., 805 F.2d at 843 (citing Gulf Oil

Co., 330 U.S. at 509). Here, Defendants contend that the decision to terminate Plaintiff’s

employment took place in South Carolina and that Gelber utilized administrative staff in South

Carolina. (Doyle Decl., ¶¶ 13, 22.) The parties’ employment agreement was also signed in

South Carolina. (Id. ¶ 8.) Thus, South Carolina has an interest in deciding this controversy

because many of the events giving rise to this action took place there. 

 However, California has a strong public interest in deciding controversies involving its

citizens. See Lockman Found. v. Evangelical Alliance Mission, 930 F.2d 764, 771 (9th Cir.

1991) (finding that California has an interest in having its citizens compensated for torts

committed against them). Gelber resides in the Northern District of California and conducted a

significant portion of his work from his home. (Gelber Decl., ¶¶ 2, 7-9.) In addition, although

the parties dispute the exact nature and locations of the negotiations related to Gelber’s

employment agreement, at least some of the negotiations took place in this district. (Id. ¶ 3.) 

These facts neutralize the importance of deciding this controversy in South Carolina instead of

California. Therefore, the Court finds that this factor is neutral. 

5. Familiarity of Each Forum with the Applicable Law.

The parties dispute whether this district has the appropriate expertise to handle this

matter because the state laws of South Carolina would apply to the state law claims. (Br. at 8;

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Opp. Br. at 6.) The choice-of-law provision in the parties’ Agreement provides for the laws of

the State of South Carolina to govern any disputes under state law. (Gelber Decl. Ex. 1, ¶ 14.) 

Although this Court is certainly competent to apply the state laws of South Carolina in this

matter, the District of South Carolina is more familiar with the relevant South Carolina state

laws that govern the state claims. However, there are also several federal questions before the

Court. Because this Court is equally capable as the District of South Carolina in deciding

federal law, this Court’s familiarity with the applicable law lowers the weight in favor of

transfer. On the whole, however, the Court finds that this factor favors transfer to the District of

South Carolina.

6. Relative Court Congestion in Each Forum.

Defendants contend the Northern District of California is more congested than the

District of South Carolina, while the Plaintiff disputes the extent of the difference between the

districts. (Br. at 13; Opp. Br. at 13.) Although less significant, the relative court congestion is a

factor the court considers. Decker Coal Co., 805 F.2d at 843 (citing Gulf Oil Co., 330 U.S. at

509). The Court finds this factor to weigh slightly against transfer to South Carolina because

the median times from filing to disposition in civil cases is slightly higher in the District of

South Carolina than in the Northern District of California. (Opp. Br. at 13 (citing

http://www.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/cmsd2006.pl)).

Overall, Defendants must make a strong showing of inconvenience to upset Plaintiff’s

choice of forum. The Court finds that Defendants have failed to carry their heavy burden of

establishing that the inconvenience of litigating in this forum favors transfer. Accordingly, the

Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to transfer venue.

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For the Northern District of California

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to transfer the case to

the United States Court for the District of South Carolina. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 21, 2007 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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