Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01505/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01505-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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09cv1505 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PAUL DENHAM,

Plaintiff,

v.

CORRECTIONAL OFFICER ARANDA, 

et al.,

Defendants.

 

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Civil No. 09-1505-JLS(WVG)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION 

TO DISMISS

(Doc. # 16)

On July 10, 2009, Paul Denham (hereafter “Plaintiff”), an

inmate proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a Complaint

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (hereafter “Complaint”) claiming that

his civil rights were violated in August 2007, when he was housed at

the Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility (hereafter “RJD). He

sues all Defendants in their official and individual capacities, and

seeks compensatory damages, punitive damages and reimbursement of

the costs he incurred in pursuing this litigation. Defendants have

filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint (hereafter “Motion”).

Plaintiff has filed an Opposition to the Motion. Defendants have

filed a Reply to Defendants’ Opposition. Plaintiff has filed a

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1/ Cate filed a Joinder to Defendants’ Motion.

2/ The Court notes that Defendants’ Motion is not brought on behalf of

Garcia, Aranda and Benvin, who have not been served in this action.

09cv1505 2

Surreply. The Court, having reviewed the Complaint, Opposition,

Reply, Surreply, the exhibits attached thereto, and GOOD CAUSE

APPEARING, HEREBY RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss be

GRANTED.

I

 FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff sues the following Defendants: Correctional Officer

Aranda (hereafter “Aranda”); Nurse Benvin (hereafter “Benvin”);

Captain Marrero (hereafter “Marrero”); E.A. Contreras (hereafter

“Contreras”); Silvia Garcia (hereafter “Garcia”); P. Cortez

(hereafter “Cortez”); Mr. Hernandez, Director of Corrections

(hereafter “Hernandez”); Matthew Cate, Secretary of the California

Department of Correction and Rehabilitation (hereafter “Cate”)1/; and

Mr. K. Smith (hereafter “Smith”).2/

Plaintiff is an inmate at Salinas Valley State Prison. He

alleges that while he was incarcerated at RJD, he worked at the

prison medical clinic where he became aware of misconduct of inmates

and staff. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that inmate Barno

(hereafter “Barno”) committed wrong doings while Barno was assigned

to work at the clinic. Plaintiff confidentially provided the

information regarding the misconduct to Correctional Officer Diaz.

(Complaint at 4). 

On August 8, 2007, Plaintiff was questioned by a Correctional

Officer, (who Plaintiff identifies as “J. Doe,” to protect his

identity, hereafter “Doe”). Doe told Plaintiff that he (Doe) feared

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28 3/ Plaintiff alleges that Aranda was having an affair with Benvin.

Benvin worked at the prison medical clinic.

09cv1505 3

physical harm should Aranda3/ discover his identity and that Aranda

has the reputation for violence. Doe’s identity was known to Sgt.

Strickland (hereafter “Strickland”) and Lt. Garza (hereafter

“Garza”). Plaintiff described Barno’s wrong doings to Doe and that

Benvin was providing things to inmates that she was not supposed to

provide. Plaintiff further alleged that Benvin could be a source of

syringes for inmates, and that she was having an affair with Aranda.

(Complaint at 4).

On August 12, 2007, Barno questioned and threatened Plaintiff. Barno told Plaintiff that Benvin said Plaintiff provided

confidential information to prison authorities to get Barno fired

and, further that Benvin planned to retaliate against Plaintiff by

falsely accusing Plaintiff of threatening her. Plaintiff denied

that he was the confidential informant, and said that Benvin was

trying to have him assaulted because she accused Plaintiff of being

the confidential informant. Plaintiff told Barno to report the

foregoing to the Office of Internal Affairs. (Complaint at 4).

On August 14, 2007, Plaintiff sent a written statement to Doe

that described the information provided to him by Barno. On August

15, 2007, Doe informed Plaintiff that he (Doe) had made copies of

the written statement and forwarded the original statement to Sgt.

Bravado in the Office of Internal Affairs. (Complaint at 5).

On September 4, 2007, Benvin informed the authorities at RJD

that Plaintiff had threatened her. The threat was contained in two

notes. (Complaint at 5).

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09cv1505 4

Thereafter, Strickland told Plaintiff that he was ordered to

move to Administrative Segregation (hereafter “Ad Seg”) because he

was accused of threatening staff. Plaintiff told Strickland about

his allegations regarding Barno and Benvin. Strickland, and later

Garza, concluded that there was no reason to put Plaintiff in Ad

Seg. They also concluded that the threatening notes to Benvin were

attributed to another inmate. Also, Doe stated that Benvin had been

starting false rumors about Plaintiff in an attempt to get Plaintiff

fired from his job. (Complaint at 5).

Nevertheless, Marrero refused to rescind the order moving

Plaintiff to Ad Seg, because he thought that Plaintiff was a

possible threat to a staff member. However, on September 4, 2007,

Plaintiff believes that there was a riot in Ad Seg, so he did not

immediately go to Ad Seg.

On September 5, 2007, at about 12:30 AM, Aranda told

Correctional Officers Cluck, Sandoval and Barnhardt (who apparently

controlled the opening and closing of Plaintiff’s cell door at that

time), that he needed to see Plaintiff for official business, and

ordered Barnhardt to open Plaintiff’s cell door. Barnhardt did so.

Aranda entered Plaintiff’s cell, asked Plaintiff why he was talking

about Aranda’s personal business, grabbed Plaintiff’s throat, and

pinned Plaintiff down to the bed. Aranda demanded to know to whom

Plaintiff had provided the confidential information. Plaintiff

denied providing any information to anyone. Thereafter, Aranda

released his grip on Plaintiff’s throat and sat on a table in

Plaintiff’s cell. Then, Plaintiff ran out of his cell through the

cell’s partially open door and placed his hands on the wall in the

“arrest position.” Aranda exited the cell and told Plaintiff to

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09cv1505 5

return to his cell. After Plaintiff returned to his cell, Aranda

stepped inside the cell and punched Plaintiff on the left side of

his jaw. Aranda ordered Plaintiff not to report the incident and

threatened that he could return to Plaintiff’s cell if Plaintiff did

report the incident. Aranda ordered Plaintiff to stay away from the

prison clinic. (Complaint at 6). Plaintiff believes that prison

staff saw Aranda enter and exit his cell. Aranda denied to prison

staff that he had been in Plaintiff’s cell, and left the area

without reporting the incident. (Complaint at 7). After Aranda

left, Plaintiff was taken to the prison’s Program Office, where he

reported to Sgt. Dawson the incident involving Aranda. (Complaint at

7).

Thereafter, Correctional Officer Diaz escorted Plaintiff to

the medical clinic. At the clinic, Plaintiff gave a statement to

Nurse Estoesia regarding the incident involving Aranda. Sgt. Diaz

noted that Plaintiff had hand marks around his neck and swelling of

the jaw. (Complaint at 7).

Plaintiff returned to the Program Office where he gave a

video and written statement to Sgt. Dawson and Smith. (Complaint at

7). While Plaintiff was waiting in the Program Office, and after

Aranda discovered that Plaintiff had reported the incident involving

Aranda, Aranda entered the Program Office and called Plaintiff “a

fucking liar,” and slammed his fist down on a counter near Plaintiff. Plaintiff believes that on September 8, 2007, Aranda told

Correctional Officers Sandoval, Cluck, Diaz and Barnhardt that he

had entered Plaintiff’s cell, “got angry,” “lost it,” and “put hands

on (Plaintiff).” (Complaint at 7-8).

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09cv1505 6

Plaintiff believes that after Aranda made the statement to

the Correctional Officers, Aranda was removed from the prison.

Plaintiff also believes that Benvin was restricted from entering the

facility in which Plaintiff was housed. (Complaint at 9).

On September 6, 2007, Plaintiff was placed in Ad Seg because

it was alleged that he was a suspect in a threat against a staff

member, and as a result, he was deemed a threat to the safety and

security of the prison. On the same day, Marrero reviewed Plaintiff’s placement in Ad Seg and retained him there pending a decision

of the Institutional Classification Committee (hereafter “ICC”).

(Complaint at 9).

On September 19, 2007, the ICC indicated that a “threat

assessment” was underway, but added that Plaintiff would not be

issued a Rules Violation Report. Thereafter, the ICC stated that

the reason for Plaintiff’s placement in Ad Seg was due to an ongoing

inquiry about staff misconduct that Plaintiff had made. (Complaint

at 9).

Plaintiff told the ICC that he wanted to be retained in San

Diego because he was awaiting surgery and that his family could

easily visit him in San Diego. (Complaint at 9-10). However, the

ICC referred Plaintiff for transfer to another prison. Plaintiff

appealed the referral. On October 11, 2007, an ICC representative

rescinded Plaintiff’s transfer because Plaintiff was awaiting

surgery and because Plaintiff did not want the transfer. (Complaint

at 10).

On November 15, 2007, at an ICC meeting, Marrero stated that

the investigation into staff misconduct disallowed Plaintiff’s

return to the prison because he could endanger the safety and

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09cv1505 7

security of the prison. Plaintiff alleges that there was no

evidence to support this decision. (Complaint at 10).

Plaintiff informed the ICC that he wanted to stay in San

Diego. But, Cortez recorded the ICC minutes to reflect that

Plaintiff “wanted to transfer.” Plaintiff believes that Cortez

deliberately misreported the minutes to meet the ICC’s requirements

for Plaintiff’s transfer. On December 1,2007, Plaintiff was cleared

to return to the general population of the prison. (Complaint at

10). At some time thereafter, Plaintiff was transferred to another

prison.

 II

 PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS

Plaintiff claims the following: 

(1) His Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual

punishment was violated when he was placed and retained in Ad Seg

and transferred to another prison in retaliation for making

complaints about prison staff;

(2) He was retaliated against for the exercise of his First

Amendment right of freedom of speech - making complaints about

prison staff;

(3) His right to due process was violated because he was unable to

provide further information regarding his appeal that Benvin’s

conduct be investigated, Benvin attempted to put his life in danger

by revealing to Barno that he was the confidential informant, Benvin

retaliated against him by spreading false rumors about him, that

Aranda’s misconduct be investigated, that Plaintiff be provided

copies of all reports generated with respect to the incident 

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09cv1505 8

involving Aranda, and that Plaintiff be provided copies of all prior

complaints against Aranda and Benvin.

Defendant’s Motion asserts:

(1) Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim for cruel and

unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment against

Hernandez, Contreras, Marrero, Cortez, Smith, and Cate.

(2) Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim for deliberate

indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment against Hernandez,

Contreras, Marrero, Cortez, Smith, and Cate.

(3) Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim for retaliation for

exercise of his First Amendment rights against Hernandez, Contreras,

Marrero, Cortez, Smith, and Cate. 

(4) Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim for violation of

due process; and,

(5) Hernandez, Contreras, Marrero, Cortez, Smith and Cate are

entitled to qualified immunity.

 III

 STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to

FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the claims in

the complaint. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to

relief” in order to “give the defendant fair notice of what the ...

claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355

U.S. 41, 47 (1957)); Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200

(2007). Dismissal of a claim is appropriate only where the

complaint lacks a cognizable theory. Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at

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553-565. The court must accept as true all material allegations in

the complaint, as well as reasonable inferences to be drawn from

them, and must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to

the plaintiff. N.L. Industries, Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898

(9th Cir. 1986); Parks School of Business, Inc. v. Symington, 51

F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). The court does not look at whether

the plaintiff will “ultimately prevail.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 94

S.Ct. 1683, 1686 (1974). 

“If a complaint is accompanied by attached documents, the

court is not limited by the allegations contained in the complaint.

These documents are part of the complaint and may be considered in

determining whether the plaintiff can prove any set of facts in

support of the claim.” Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d 617, 625 n.1

(1991) [quoting Durning v. First Boston Corp., 815 F.2d 1265, 1267

(9th Cir.1987)]. "[W]hen the allegations of the complaint are

refuted by an attached document, the Court need not accept the

allegations as being true." Roth, 942 F.2d 625 n.1 [citing Ott v.

Home Savings & Loan Ass'n, 265 F.2d 643, 646 n.1 (9th Cir.1958)].

“The focus of any Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal . . . is the

complaint.” Schneider v. California Dep’t of Corrections, 151 F.3d

1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998). Thus, when resolving a motion to

dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court may not generally

consider materials outside the pleadings. Id. This precludes

consideration of “new” allegations that may be raised in a plaintiff’s opposition to a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to

FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6). Id. (citing Harrell v. United States, 13 F.3d

232, 236 (7th Cir. 1993); 2 Moore’s Federal Practice, § 12.34[2]

(Matthew Bender 3d ed.) [“The court may not . . . take into account

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09cv1505 10

additional facts asserted in a memorandum opposing the motion to

dismiss, because such memoranda do not constitute pleadings under

Rule 7(a).”)].

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must

show: (1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person

acting under color of state law; and, (2)that the conduct deprived

the plaintiff of a constitutional right. Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d

1023, 1028 (9th Cir. 2003); Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901

F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). Vicarious liability does not exist

under § 1983. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1948 (2009); Jones

v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).

To hold a person “liable under section 1983 there must be a showing

of personal participation in the alleged rights deprivation.” Id.

A supervisory official may be liable only if he or she was personally involved in the constitutional deprivation, or if there was a

sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful

conduct and the constitutional violation. See Redman v. County of

San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991). Causation may be

established only by showing that the supervisor set in motion a

series of acts by others, which the supervisor knew or reasonably

should have known would cause others to inflict the injury. Watkins

v. City of Oakland, 145 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Finally, where a plaintiff appears in propria persona in a

civil rights case, the Court must also be careful to construe the

pleadings liberally and afford plaintiff any benefit of the doubt.

See Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th

Cir. 1988); Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027, n.1 (9th Cir.

1985) (en banc). The rule of liberal construction is “particularly

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important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d

1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992); Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448

(9th Cir. 1987) (“Presumably unskilled in the law, the pro se

litigant is far more prone to making errors in pleading than the

person who benefits from the representation of counsel.”). In

giving liberal interpretation to a pro se civil rights complaint,

however, a court may not “supply essential elements of the claim

that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the

University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “Vague and

conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights

violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.”

Id.; see also Sherman v. Yakahi, 549 F.2d 1287, 1290 (9th Cir. 1977)

(“Conclusory allegations, unsupported by facts, [will be] rejected

as insufficient to state a claim under the Civil Rights Act.”).

Thus, at a minimum, even the pro se plaintiff “must allege with at

least some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants

engaged in that support [his] claim.” Jones v. Community Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984).

 IV

PLAINTIFF FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 

 AGAINST HERNANDEZ, CORTEZ, MARRERO, SMITH AND CATE

Petitioner claims that his Eighth Amendment right to be free

from cruel and unusual punishment was violated when he was placed

and retained in Ad Seg, and transferred to another prison.

Defendants Hernandez, Cortez, Marrero, Smith and Cate argue that

Plaintiff’s Complaint does not allege a violation of the Eighth

Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment.

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The Eighth Amendment standards for conditions in disciplinary

housing are the same as those in the general prison population.

Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1258 (9th Cir. 1982). To show

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights have been violated, Plaintiff

must make two showings: “First, the plaintiff must make an ‘objective’ showing that the deprivation was ‘sufficiently serious’ to

form the basis for an Eighth Amendment violation. Second, the

plaintiff must make a ‘subjective’ showing that the prison official

acted ‘with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.’” Johnson v.

Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000) [quoting Wilson v. Seiter,

501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)]. Finally, the Court must analyze each

claimed violation in light of these requirements, for Eighth

Amendment violations may not be based on the “totality of the

conditions” at prison. Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1246-47; Wright v.

Rushen, 642 F.2d 1129, 1132 (9th Cir. 1981). 

Under the objective requirement, the prison official’s acts

or omissions must deprive an inmate of the “minimal civilized

measure of life’s necessities.” Johnson, 217 F.3d at 731 (internal

citations omitted). This objective component is satisfied so long

as the institution “furnishes sentenced prisoners with adequate

food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal

safety.” Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1246; Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.

825, 832 (1970); Wright, 642 F.2d at 1132-33. Under the subjective

standard, deliberate indifference requires a showing that the prison

official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health

or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the

inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm

exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at

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837. A prison official is deliberately indifferent only if he knows

that a prisoner faces a substantial risk of serious harm and

disregards it by failing to take reasonable steps to abate it. Id.

1. Hernandez and Cate

Plaintiff’s Complaint attempts to state a cause of action for

cruel and unusual punishment against Hernandez and Cate for placing

and retaining him in Ad Seg and transferring him to another prison.

However, there are no allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint regarding

Hernandez or Cate. Hernandez, as Director of the Department of

Corrections, and Cate, as Secretary of the California Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation, can not be held liable for any of

the acts of the other named Defendants because Plaintiff must plead

that each official, through that official’s own actions or set in

motion a series of actions by others, violated the Eighth Amendment.

Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1948, Watkins, 145 F.3d at 1093. Since

Plaintiff has failed to allege anything against Hernandez and Cate,

the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss in this

regard be GRANTED without prejudice.

2. Cortez

Plaintiff’s Complaint attempts to state a cause of action for

cruel and unusual punishment for placing and retaining him in Ad Seg

and transferring him to another prison. However, the only allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint pertaining to Cortez are that Cortez

misrecorded minutes of the ICC to reflect that Plaintiff wanted to

be transferred to another prison. Plaintiff alleges that he

specifically told the ICC that he did not want to be transferred to

another prison. This allegation, taken as true, does not support

a cause for action for cruel and unusual punishment in violation of

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the Eighth Amendment because it does not show that Plaintiff was

deprived of the “minimal civilized measures of life’s necessities,”

or that Cortez knew and disregarded an excessive risk to Plaintiff’s

health and safety. Therefore, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss in this regard be GRANTED without prejudice.

3. Marrero

Plaintiff’s Complaint attempts to state a cause of action for

cruel and unusual punishment for placing and retaining him in Ad Seg

and transferring him to another prison. However, the only allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint pertaining to Marrero are that

Marrero reviewed Plaintiff’s placement in Ad Seg and refused to

rescind that order pending an investigation of Plaintiff’s alleged

threat against a staff member, despite the conclusion of other staff

members that Plaintiff did not threaten the staff member. Further,

Plaintiff alleges that Marrero stated that the ongoing investigation

into staff misconduct (which Plaintiff himself reported) precluded

Plaintiff’s return to the prison’s general population because he

could endanger the safety and security of the prison. 

Here, Plaintiff’s allegations regarding Marrero do not show

that his placement and retention in Ad Seg was “sufficiently

serious” to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation. Nor

are Plaintiff’s allegations regarding Marrero sufficient to show

that Marrero deprived Plaintiff of the “minimal civilized measures

of life’s necessities.” Johnson, 217 F.3d at 731. Further, Plaintiff’s allegations against Marrero are insufficient to show that

Marrero acted “with a sufficiently culpable state of mind,” or that

Marrero “knew and disregarded an excessive risk to (Plaintiff’s)

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4/ The Court acknowledges that Plaintiff alleges in his Opposition

that while he was in Ad Seg, he was “only allowed to go to the yard

once in the 123 days that (he) remained there.” (Opposition at 5).

While this allegation may support Plaintiff’s claim that his

retention in Ad Seg constituted cruel and unusual punishment and/or

deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s health, the Court may not

consider facts stated in Plaintiff’s Opposition that were not

alleged in the Complaint. Schneider v. Cal. Department of

Corrections, 151 F.3d 1194, 1197, n. 1 (9th Cir. 1998).

09cv1505 15

health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Consequently, Plaintiff

has failed to plead the requirements necessary to allege against

Marrero a cause of action for cruel and unusual punishment in

violation of the Eighth Amendment.4/ Therefore, the Court RECOMMENDS

that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss in this regard be GRANTED without

prejudice. 

4. Smith

Plaintiff’s Complaint attempts to state a cause of action for

cruel and unusual punishment for placing and retaining him in Ad Seg

and transferring him to another prison. However, the only allegation

in Plaintiff’s Complaint pertaining to Smith is that Smith was in

the Program Office where Plaintiff gave a video and written

statement about the incident involving Aranda. This allegation,

taken as true, does not support a cause for action for cruel and

unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment because it

does not show that Plaintiff was deprived of the “minimal civilized

measures of life’s necessities,” or that Smith knew and disregarded

an excessive risk to Plaintiff’s health and safety. Therefore, the

Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss in this regard

be GRANTED without prejudice.

5. Contreras

Plaintiff’s Complaint attempts to state a cause of action for

cruel and unusual punishment for placing and retaining him in Ad Seg

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and transferring him to another prison. However, there are no

allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint that pertain to Contreras,

except that Contreras denied Plaintiff’s appeal regarding the

incident involving Aranda. The appeal response, signed by Contreras,

is attached to Plaintiff’s Complaint as Exh. A-8.

This allegation, taken as true, does not support a cause for

action for cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth

Amendment because it does not show that Plaintiff was deprived of

the “minimal civilized measures of life’s necessities,” or that

Contreras knew and disregarded an excessive risk to Plaintiff’s

health and safety. 

Further, actions by prison officials with regard to prison

grievance procedures can not create liability under § 1983. Ramirez

v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003). Moreover, on September

24, 2007, Contreras partially granted Plaintiff’s appeal, informed

Plaintiff that the matter was referred to the Office of Internal

Affairs and that Plaintiff would be notified of the conclusion of

the Internal Affairs investigation. (Plaintiff’s Complaint, Exh. A8). Therefore, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss in this regard be GRANTED with prejudice.

 V

PLAINTIFF FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM FOR RETALIATION FOR THE EXERCISE OF

 HIS FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants retaliated against him for

reporting the misconduct of Benvin and Aranda. Plaintiff contends

that the retaliation took the form of being placed and retained in

Ad Seg and being transferred to another prison. Defendants

Hernandez, Marrero, Contreras, Cortez and Smith contend that

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Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim for retaliation.

Prison officials may not retaliate against an inmate for

exercising a constitutional right. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527,

532 (9th Cir. 1985). In Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559 (9th Cir.

2005), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals established a standard for

claiming retaliation under the First Amendment. Under this standard,

a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation in the prison context

is met if five elements are established: (1) an assertion that a

state actor took some adverse action against an inmate; (2) because

of; (3) that inmates’s protected conduct, and that such action; (4)

chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and;

(5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional

goal. Id. at 567-568. Legitimate correctional goals include

preserving institutional order and discipline. See Barnett v.

Centoni, 31 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to allege any of the

elements of a cause of action for retaliation against Hernandez,

Contreras, Cortez and Smith. Therefore, the Court finds that

Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim of retaliation against

these Defendants. 

The allegations against Marrero are that he placed and

retained Plaintiff in Ad Seg pending an investigation that Plaintiff

threatened a staff member, a decision of the ICC, and an ongoing

inquiry about staff misconduct (about which Plaintiff himself

complained). Plaintiff alleges that Marrero prevented him from

returning to the prison due to the investigation into staff

misconduct. However, these allegations do not satisfy at least two

of the elements required to establish a viable claim for retaliaCase 3:09-cv-01505-JLS-WVG Document 35 Filed 05/03/10 Page 17 of 27
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tion. Plaintiff fails to allege facts to support element numbers

four and five of a claim for retaliation - that Marrero’s conduct

chilled the exercise of his First Amendment rights and that

Marrero’s placing and retaining him in Ad Seg and stating that he

could not return to the prison’s general population, did not advance

a legitimate correctional goal. Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567-568.

Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state

a cause of action for retaliation against Marrero.

As a result, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss in this regard be GRANTED without prejudice.

 VI

 PLAINTIFF FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM FOR VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS

Plaintiff asserts that his right to due process was violated

because he was unable to provide further information regarding: (1)

his administrative appeal contentions that Benvin’s conduct be

investigated, (2) Benvin attempted to put his life in danger by

revealing to Barno that he was the confidential informant, (3)

Benvin retaliated against him by spreading false rumors about him,

(4) that Aranda’s misconduct be investigated, (5) that Plaintiff be

provided copies of all reports generated with respect to the

incident involving Aranda, and (6) that Plaintiff be provided copies

of all prior complaints against Aranda and Benvin. Defendants

contend that these allegations fail to state a claim for violation

of due process.

“The requirements of procedural due process apply only to the

deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s

protection of liberty and property.” Board of Regents v. Roth, 408

U.S. 564, 569 (1972). State statutes and prison regulations may

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grant prisoners liberty interests sufficient to invoke due process

protections. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-27 (1976).

However, the Supreme Court has significantly limited the instances

in which due process can be invoked. In Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S.

472 (1995), the Supreme Court “refocused the test for determining

the existence of a liberty interest away from the wording of prison

regulations and toward an examination of the hardship caused by the

prison’s challenged action relative to the ‘basic conditions’ of

life as a prisoner.” Mitchell v. Dupnik, 75 F.3d 517, 522 (9th Cir.

1996) (citing Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484). 

The Supreme Court has specifically held that prisoners have

no constitutionally protected liberty interest in remaining free of

disciplinary segregation. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485-486. Under

Sandin, state-created liberty interests invoking procedural due

process protection are “generally limited to freedom from restraint

which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner

as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own

force, nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the

inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at

484 (citations omitted).

Pursuant to Sandin, Plaintiff must assert facts related to

the conditions or consequences of his placement in Ad Seg which show

“the type of atypical, significant deprivation [that] might

conceivably create a liberty interest.” Id. at 486. The Sandin

Court relied on three factors to determine that the plaintiff

therein did not possess a liberty interest in avoiding disciplinary

segregation: (1) disciplinary and discretionary segregation were

essentially the same; (2) comparison between conditions in the

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general population and conditions in confinement showed that the

plaintiff suffered no “major disruption in his environment”; and (3)

the length of plaintiff's sentence was not extended. Id. at 486-87.

An inmate does not have a liberty interest in being housed at

a particular institution or in avoiding isolation or separation from

the general prison population unless the proposed transfer will

subject the inmate to exceptionally more onerous living conditions,

such as those experienced by inmates at a “Supermax” facility.

Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 223 (2005) (holding that, despite

the general rule that an interprison transfer does not implicate the

Due Process Clause, a transfer to a so-called “Supermax” facility at

which a prisoner would experience exceptionally more onerous

conditions may implicate the Due Process Clause); Montayne v.

Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976) (holding that a mere transfer from

one facility to another does not implicate the Due Process Clause,

regardless of whether the transfer is the result of the inmate's

misbehavior or is punitive in nature if there is no State law to the

contrary). 

California law does not create a liberty interest in nonconsensual prison transfers requiring procedural due process

protection. CAL. PENAL CODE § 5080; CCR § 3379. Pursuant to Pratt v.

Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1995), while prisoners generally

have no constitutionally protected liberty interest in remaining in

a given facility, if they allege retaliation, they may pursue that

claim without having to establish “an independent constitutional

interest.” Id. However a retaliation claim is properly handled

under the First Amendment analysis. Id. Therefore, while there is

no liberty interest in remaining free from non-consensual prison

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transfer sufficient to invoke the protection of the Fourteenth

Amendment, Plaintiff may pursue his transfer claim as a retaliation

claim under the First Amendment.

A prisoner can not premise a Fourteenth Amendment due process

claim upon the denial of an appeal within the prison grievance

system because a prisoner does not have a right to due process in

administrative grievance procedures. Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 860. “The

courts of appeal that have confronted the issue are in agreement

that the existence of grievance procedures confers no liberty

interest on a prisoner.” Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 657 (7th

Cir. 2001).

Here, Plaintiff’s claim for violation of his due process

rights is lacking in several respects:

As previously noted, the requirements of due process apply

only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth

Amendment’s protection of liberty and property. Roth, 408 U.S. at

569. A prisoner has no constitutionally protected liberty interest

in remaining free from Ad Seg. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485-486.

Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff claims that his right to due

process was violated by being placed and retained in Ad Seg, his

claim fails.

To that end, documents attached to Plaintiff’s Complaint

indicate that on September 19, 2007, after Plaintiff’s initial

placement in Ad Seg, he actively participated in a hearing of the

ICC regarding that placement. At the hearing, Plaintiff was

informed that he was initially placed in Ad Seg after it was

determined that he was a “suspect in a possible threat against a

staff member.” Plaintiff was additionally informed that the ICC

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needed to clarify to Plaintiff that his placement and retention in

Ad Seg was also due to an “ongoing inquiry about staff misconduct

that he made.” The ICC determined that Plaintiff would be retained

in Ad Seg and it reaffirmed its recommendation that Plaintiff be

transferred to another prison. Plaintiff indicated that he

understood the ICC’s decision. (Plaintiff’s Complaint, Exh. B-10).

Plaintiff’s Complaint does not allege that the procedures employed

or the hearing held regarding his placement and retention in Ad Seg,

and the recommendation the he be transferred to another prison, were

constitutionally inadequate. Accordingly, the Court finds that to

the extent Plaintiff claims that his placement and retention in Ad

Seg or the procedures employed with regard to that placement

violated his due process rights, his claim fails.

The Constitution does not guarantee that an inmate will be

placed or retained at a particular prison even when the degree of

confinement at one prison might be different from another prison.

Meachum, 427 U.S. at 224-225; Myron v. Terhune, 476 F.3d 716, 718

(9th Cir. 2007). Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff claims that his

due process rights were violated by being transferred to another

prison, his claim fails.

As previously noted, a prisoner does not have the right to

due process in administrative grievance procedures. Ramirez, 334

F.3d at 860. Therefore, to the extent that Plaintiff claims his due

process rights were violated by his inability to submit further

information, his claim fails. Plaintiff’s allegations regarding his

administrative appeal contentions that Benvin’s conduct be investigated, that Benvin attempted to put his life in danger by revealing

to Barno that he was the confidential informant, that Benvin

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retaliated against him by spreading false rumors about him, that

Aranda’s conduct be investigated and that he be provided certain

documents created in connection with the incident involving Aranda,

are insufficient to state a valid claim for violation of due

process.

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS Defendants' Motion to

Dismiss Plaintiff’s due process claims be GRANTED without prejudice.

 VII

DEFENDANTS MARRERO, SMITH, CONTRERAS, CATE AND HERNANDEZ ARE

 ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Defendants Marrero, Smith, Contreras, Cate, and Hernandez

contend that they are entitled to qualified immunity.

The Eleventh Amendment prohibits damages actions against

state officials acting in their official capacities. See Will v.

Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 n.10 (1989).

However, it does not “bar actions against state officers in their

official capacities if the plaintiffs seek only a declaratory

judgment or injunctive relief.” Chaloux v. Killeen, 886 F.2d 247,

252 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted). Nor does it bar

damage actions against state officials in their personal capacities.

See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 31 (1991). The Eleventh Amendment

prohibits only damage actions against the “official’s office;”

actions that are in reality suits against the state itself-rather

than against its individual officials. Id. at 26-27. 

Here, Plaintiff clearly indicates his intent to sue the

above-named Defendants for damages in both their individual and

official capacities. (Complaint at 2-3). For this reason it is

RECOMMENDED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED with

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5/

 The affirmative defense of qualified immunity does not extend to

claims for declaratory or injunctive relief. Keenan v. Hall, 83

F.3d 1083, 1093 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing American Fire, Theft &

Collision Managers, Inc. v. Gillespie, 932 F.2d 816, 818 (9th Cir.

1991). The Court takes notice that Plaintiff is also seeking

injunctive and declaratory relief. 

09cv1505 24

prejudice with respect to Plaintiff’s claim for damages against

Defendants in their official capacities.

1. Qualified Immunity

Marrerro, Smith, Contreras, Cate and Hernandez assert that

they are protected from suits for civil damages due to the doctrine

of qualified immunity because their conduct did not violate any

clearly-established right under the circumstances in which they

acted. These Defendants further claim that they are entitled to

dismissal pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6) based on their qualified

immunity. The entitlement to qualified immunity “is an immunity from

suit rather than a mere defense to liability.” Mitchell v. Forsyth,

472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). The defense of “qualified immunity”

protects “government officials . . . from liability for civil

damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable

person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818

(1982). This standard “‘gives ample room for mistaken judgments’ by

protecting ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly

violate the law.’” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991) (per

curiam) (quoting Malley v. Briggs , 475 U.S. 335, 343 (1986));

Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 909-910 (9th Cir. 2001).5/

The Supreme Court recently held that the test for qualified

immunity in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), is no longer a

rigid two step analysis. Pearson v. Callahan, 192 S.Ct. 808 (2009)

However, the Saucier analysis is still pertinent for qualified

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immunity purposes. Pearson, 192 S.Ct. at 818. Pursuant to Saucier,

the first step in a qualified immunity analysis is, “taken in the

light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts

alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right?”

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201; Jackson v. City of Bremerton , 268 F.3d

646, 650 (9th Cir. 2001); Johnson v. County of Los Angeles, 340 F.3d

787, 791 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that because qualified immunity is

“‘an entitlement not to stand trial’ ... courts, not juries, [must]

settle the ultimate questions of qualified immunity”) (quoting

Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526). “If no constitutional right would have

been violated were the allegations established, there is no

necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.”

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201; Haynie v. County of Los Angeles, 339 F.3d

1071, 1078 (9th Cir. 2003). The second step of the qualified

immunity analysis is whether “it would be clear to a reasonable

officer that (Plaintiff’s) conduct was unlawful in the situation he

confronted.” Saucier 533 U.S. at 202, Wilkins v. City of Oakland

350 F.3d 949, 954 (9th Cir. 2003).

As previously noted in this Report and Recommendation,

Plaintiff’s Complaint failed to set forth sufficient allegations to

support a claim of retaliation for the exercise of his First

Amendment rights against Marrero, Smith, Contreras, Cate and

Hernandez. (See Section V of this Report and Recommendation). As a

result, Plaintiff does not satisfy the first prong of Saucier

because the facts alleged in his Complaint do not show that

Defendants’ conduct violated a constitutional right. Saucier 533 

U.S. at 201. Therefore, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’

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Motion to Dismiss in this regard be GRANTED without prejudice. 

 VIII

 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

For the reasons set forth herein, the Court RECOMMENDS as

follows:

(1) The Court RECOMMENDS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment and

deliberate indifference claims be GRANTED without prejudice.

(2) The Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s claim for Retaliation for Exercise of his First

Amendment rights be GRANTED without prejudice.

(3) The Court RECOMMENDS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s Due Process claims be GRANTED without prejudice. 

(4) The Court RECOMMENDS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss with

regard to Plaintiff’s claim for damages against Defendants in their

official capacities be GRANTED with prejudice.

 (5) The Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s claim for damages

against Defendants in their individual capacities be GRANTED without

prejudice.

(6) The Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff be given a reasonable

amount of time to amend his Complaint. 

This report and recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate

Judge is submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to

this case, pursuant to the provision of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than June 1, 2010, any party to

this action may file written objections with the Court and 

serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned

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“Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections

shall be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later

than June 14, 2010 . The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise

those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst,

951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: May 3, 2010

 Hon. William V. Gallo

 U.S. Magistrate Judge

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