Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01088/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01088-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

FRED KENNETH MACDONALD, 

 Plaintiff, 

vs. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; UNITED 

STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY; KENT D. HAROLDSEN; 

JOHN GARZON; ROBIN BAKER; ED 

HUGHS; and DOES 1-100, 

Defendants. 

CASE NO: 11-CV-1088-IEG (BLM) 

ORDER DENYING INDIVIDUAL 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 

DISMISS 

[Doc. No. 6] 

Presently before the Court is Defendants Kent D. Haroldsen, John Garzon, Robin Baker, and 

Ed Hughs’s motion to dismiss. This motion is suitable for disposition without oral argument pursuant 

to Local Civil Rule 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons stated below, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion. 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Fred MacDonald alleges that United States immigration authorities unlawfully 

detained him, removed him from the United States, and denied him permission to reenter the U.S. for 

one year. At the time of his removal, MacDonald claims he was in the U.S. under an “S13” 

classification status, meaning he is a Canadian-born Native American and thus could not lawfully be 

removed from or denied entry into the United States. 

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On May 16, 2011, MacDonald filed his initial complaint in state court, alleging two Bivens

claims against individual defendants Kent D. Haroldsen, John Garzon, Robin Baker, and Ed Hughs, all 

employees of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), and one claim alleging a violation 

of 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a), against DHS and the individual defendants. On May 18, 2011, DHS removed 

the action to this Court. On June 8, 2011, MacDonald filed an amended complaint, adding the United 

States as a defendant and adding additional claims. [Doc. No. 4.] 

The individual defendants now move to dismiss MacDonald’s claims against them because he 

has thus far failed to perfect service of process on them as required under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 4(i). 

LEGAL STANDARD

“A federal court does not have jurisdiction over a defendant unless the defendant has been 

served properly under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4.” Direct Mail Specialists, Inc. v. Eclat Computerized Techs., 

Inc., 840 F.2d 685, 688 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Jackson v. Hayakawa, 682 F.2d 1344, 1347 (9th Cir. 

1982)). “Rule 4 is a flexible rule that should be liberally construed so long as a party receives 

sufficient notice of the complaint.” United Food & Commercial Workers Union v. Alpha Beta Co.,

736 F.2d 1371, 1382 (9th Cir. 1984). “Nonetheless, without substantial compliance with Rule 4 

‘neither actual notice nor simply naming the defendant in the complaint will provide personal 

jurisdiction.’” Direct Mail, 840 F.2d at 688 (quoting Benny v. Pipes, 799 F.2d 489, 492 (9th 

Cir.1986)). 

 “To serve a United States officer or employee sued in an individual capacity for an act or 

omission occurring in connection with duties performed on the United States’ behalf . . . a party must 

serve the United States and also serve the officer or employee under Rule 4(e), (f), or (g).” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 4(i)(3). To serve the United States, a plaintiff must: 

(A) [either] 

(i) deliver a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the United States 

attorney for the district where the action is brought—or to an assistant United 

States attorney or clerical employee whom the United States attorney designates 

in a writing filed with the court clerk—or 

(ii) send a copy of each by registered or certified mail to the civil-process clerk at 

the United States attorney’s office; 

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(B) send a copy of each by registered or certified mail to the Attorney General of the 

United States at Washington, D.C.; and 

(C) if the action challenges an order of a nonparty agency or officer of the United States, 

send a copy of each by registered or certified mail to the agency or officer. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(1). 

A party has 120 days from the filing of a complaint to serve the defendants. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

4(m); see also, e.g., Parker v. United States, 110 F.3d 678, 680 (9th Cir. 1997) (applying Rule 4(m) in 

a case requiring service according to Rule 4(i)); Rhodes v. U.S. I.R.S., No. CV10–1074–PHX–DGC, 

2010 WL 5392636, at *3 (D. Ariz. Dec. 28, 2010) (same). The Court may extend the time for a party 

to serve a complaint, but it cannot reduce Rule 4(m)’s 120-day period for service of process. 

Henderson v. United States, 517 U.S. 654, 661 (1996) (“[Rule 4(m)’s] 120-day provision operates not 

as an outer limit subject to reduction, but as an irreducible allowance.”); Mann v. Am. Airlines, 324 

F.3d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Rule 4(m) explicitly permits a district court to grant an extension of 

time to serve the complaint after that 120-day period.” (citing Henderson, 517 U.S. at 661)). 

Additionally, the Court “must allow a party reasonable time to cure its failure to . . . serve the United 

States under Rule 4(i)(3), if the party has served the United States officer or employee.” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 4(i)(4)(B). 

Where an action is removed from state court, the 120-day period to serve process runs from the 

date of removal to federal court, rather than the date the action was filed in state court. E.g., Cowen v. 

American Med. Sys., 411 F. Supp. 2d 717, 721 (E.D. Mich. 2006); Baumeister v. N.M. Comm’n for the 

Blind, 409 F. Supp. 2d 1351, 1352-53 (D.N.M. 2006); Camillo v. Wash. Mut. Bank, F.A., No. 1:09-

CV-1548 AWI SMS, 2010 WL 457346, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2010). The filing of an amended 

complaint does not restart Rule 4(m)’s 120-day period, “‘except as to those defendants newly added in 

the amended complaint.’” Carr v. Int’l Game Tech., 770 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1100 (D. Nev. 2011) 

(quoting Bolden v. City of Topeka, 441 F.3d 1129, 1148 (10th Cir. 2006)). 

DISCUSSION

The sole basis Defendants provide for their motion is that MacDonald has failed to properly 

serve all the parties required to perfect service under Rule 4(i). In their motion, Defendants argue 

MacDonald had not properly served any individual defendant, the U.S. Attorney for this District, or the 

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U.S. Attorney General. Shortly after Defendants filed their motion, however, MacDonald served the 

amended complaint on all four individual defendants pursuant to Rule 4(e), thus satisfying one of Rule 

4(i)(3)’s requirements for serving individual officers or employees of the United States. [See Defs.’ 

Reply, at 2-3 (conceding service of the amended complaint on the individual defendants).] But 

MacDonald has not served the summons and amended complaint for each individual defendant on the 

United States or the U.S. Attorney by the particular methods prescribed by Rule 4(i). [See id.; see also

Pl.’s Opp’n, at 4-13 (detailing MacDonald’s efforts to serve the individual defendants and the United 

States).] Thus, MacDonald has not yet perfected service on the individual defendants. See Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 4(i)(3). 

Defendants’ motion, however, is premature. All of the individual defendants were named in 

MacDonald’s initial complaint. DHS removed this action from state court on May 18, 2011. [Defs.’ 

MTD, at 2.] Accordingly, MacDonald must properly serve the individual defendants within 120 days 

of that date—on or before September 15, 2011. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m); Cowen, 411 F. Supp. 2d at 

721. The Court cannot dismiss this action for failure to perfect service until after Rule 4(m)’s 120-day 

period expires. Henderson, 517 U.S. at 661. Moreover, even after the 120-day period expires, where, 

as here, a plaintiff has served the individual United States officers or employees, Rule 4(i) requires the 

Court to allow the plaintiff “reasonable time to cure its failure to . . . serve the United States.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 4(i)(4)(B). Accordingly, Defendants’ motion is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: _______________________________ 

 IRMA E. GONZALEZ, Chief Judge 

 United States District Court 

 

8/23/11

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