Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00041/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00041-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAFAEL DAVID SHERMAN and

SUSAN PATHMAN, Individually and

on Behalf of All Others Similarly

Situated,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 13cv0041-GPC-WVG

ORDER REGARDING

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS PLAINTIFF RAFAEL

DAVID SHERMAN’S CLAIMS

WITHOUT PREJUDICE

PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P.

41(A)(2)

[Dkt. No. 71.]

v.

YAHOO! Inc.,

Defendant.

Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss PlaintiffRafael David Sherman’s claims

without prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2), filed by

Plaintiffs Rafael David Sherman (“Sherman”) and Susan Pathman (“Pathman”)

(collectively, “Plaintiffs”). (Dkt. No. 71.) The Parties have fully briefed the Motion.

(Dkt. Nos. 90, 95.) The Court finds the Motion suitable for disposition without oral

argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons stated below, the

Court intends to grant Plaintiffs’ Motion, but condition Sherman’s withdrawal on his

deposition.

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BACKGROUND

On January 8, 2013, Sherman filed this action against Yahoo! Inc. (“Yahoo”),

individually and on behalf of those similarly situated, claiming that Yahoo violated the

Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A), by sending

him an allegedly unsolicited text message on his cellular telephone through its

messenger service. (Dkt. No. 1.) On February 3, 2014, this Court denied Yahoo’s

motion for summary judgment. (Dkt. No. 30.)

Sherman’s deposition was originally scheduled for August 26, 2014, but was

postponed until October 1, 2014, due to the personal circumstances of one of

Sherman’s attorneys. (Dkt. No. 54 ¶ 5; Dkt. No. 90-1 ¶ 3.) 

On September 3, 2014, Plaintiffs’ counsel advised Yahoo that they intended

to amend the Complaint to add Pathman as a plaintiff, and on September 24, 2014, the

Parties entered into a stipulation in which Yahoo agreed that Pathman could be added

as a named plaintiff. (Dkt. No. 61; Dkt. No. 90-1 ¶ 4.)

On September 30, 2014, Pathman was added as a named plaintiff through the

First Amended Complaint, which was the main change from the original Complaint.

(Dkt. No. 64.) The “early deposition of Mr. Sherman and Ms. Pathman [on October 1

and 2, 2014] was a condition of Yahoo’s agreement to stipulate to allow Plaintiff to file

a First Amended Complaint in this action.” (Dkt. No. 62 at 2.)1

However, around the same time, on September 29, 2014, the Parties filed a

joint motion to stay discovery, and take the depositions of Sherman and Pathman offcalendar, pending the outcome of a motion to consolidate this action with another

action pending against Yahoo in Chicago, Illinois. (Dkt. No. 62.) On October 6, 2014,

thisCourt granted the motion and stayed all discovery,including the depositions. (Dkt.

No. 67.) On October 30, 2014, following the denial of the motion to consolidate, the

Parties agreed that the depositions of Sherman and Pathman would take place on

1Page number citations such as this one are to the page numbers reflected on the

Court’s CM/ECF system and not to page numbers assigned by the parties.

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November 25 and 26, 2014. (Dkt. No. 90-1 ¶ 6.)

Four days later, on November 3, 2014, Sherman informed his attorneys that

he no longer wanted to be a named plaintiff or serve as a potential class representative

in this action “due to personal circumstances and time constraints.” (Dkt. No. 71-8 ¶ 3;

see also Dkt. No. 71-4 at ¶ 4.) That same day, Plaintiffs’ counsel informed Yahoo’s

counsel that Sherman no longer wished to be a named plaintiff and asked to dismiss

his individual claims without prejudice. (Dkt. No. 71-5 ¶ 4; Dkt. No. 90-1 ¶ 7.) The

Parties could not agree to stipulate to the dismissal of Sherman’s individual claims

because Yahoo wanted to still depose Sherman, which Plaintiffs refused. (Dkt. No. 90-

1 ¶ 7.) The Parties have stipulated that Sherman will not be deposed until this Court

decides the instant Motion to Dismiss Sherman’s claims. (Id.) 

On November 7, 2014, Plaintiffs filed the instant Motion to Dismiss Sherman’s

claims without prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2).

2

(Dkt.

No. 71.) On January 9, 2015, Yahoo opposed. (Dkt. No. 90.) On January 23, 2015,

Plaintiffs replied. (Dkt. No. 95.)

Plaintiffs have not yet moved for class certification. The current deadline for

discovery related to class certification is February 27, 2015, and Sherman’s deposition

is to take place no later than that date unless the Court has granted the instant Motion

beforehand. (Dkt. No. 92.) The deadline for Plaintiffs to move for class certification

is March 27, 2015.3 (Id.) 

LEGAL STANDARD

Under Rule 41(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, after an opposing

2

In support of the motion, Sherman declares that: “I desire that my claims in this

action be dismissed without prejudice rather than with prejudice so that I may be

entitled to any award to the class members, in the event this action is certified as a class

action. . . . I have no desire to re-file my claims asserted in this action against Yahoo!,

Inc. in any other action, and I agree not to re-file the same claims asserted in this action

in any other action against Yahoo!, Inc.” (Dkt. No. 71-8 ¶¶ 5-6.)

3On January 23, 2015, the Court granted in part the Parties’ joint motion, and

moved the class discovery deadline from January 30 to February 27, and moved the

class certification deadline from February 27 to March 27. (Dkt. Nos. 51, 77, 92.) 

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party has served an answer or motion for summary judgment, “an action may be

dismissed at the plaintiff’s request only by court order, on terms that the court

considers proper.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). “The purpose of the rule is to permit a

plaintiff to dismiss an action without prejudice so long as the defendant will not be

prejudiced, or unfairly affected by dismissal.” Stevedoring Servs. of Am. v. Armilla

Int’l, B.V., 889 F.2d 919, 921 (9th Cir. 1989). In resolving a motion under Rule

41(a)(2), the Court must make three separate determinations: (1) whether to allow

dismissal; (2) whether the dismissal should be with or without prejudice; and (3) what

terms and conditions, if any, should be imposed. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2); Williams

v. Peralta Cnty. Coll. Dist., 227 F.R.D. 538, 539 (N.D. Cal. 2005).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs contend that this Court should allow Sherman to voluntarily dismiss

his individual claims without prejudice. (Dkt. No. 71-1.) Yahoo counters that the

Court should deny Plaintiffs’ Motion, and alternatively that the Court should dismiss

with prejudice and impose conditions regarding discovery and attorneys’ fees and

costs. (Dkt. No. 90.) 

I. Whether to Allow Dismissal

The initial question for the Court is whether to allow dismissal of Sherman’s

claims at all. Whether to grant a voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2) rests in a

district court’s sound discretion. Smith v. Lenches, 263 F.3d 972, 975 (9th Cir. 2001).

However, the Ninth Circuit has instructed that a “district court should grant a motion

for voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2) unless a defendant can show that it will

suffer some plain legal prejudice as a result.” Id. 

“‘[L]egal prejudice’ means ‘prejudice to some legal interest, some legal claim,

some legal argument.’” Id. at 976 (quoting Westlands Water Dist. v. United States, 100

F.3d 94, 97 (9th Cir. 1996)). “‘[U]ncertainty because a dispute remains unresolved’

or because ‘the threat of future litigation . . . causes uncertainty does not result in plain

legal prejudice.’” Id.(quoting Westlands Water Dist., 100 F.3d at 96-97). “Also, plain

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legal prejudice does not result merely because the defendant will be inconvenienced

by having to defend in another forum or where a plaintiff would gain a tactical

advantage by that dismissal.” Id.(citing Hamilton v. Firestone Tire &Rubber Co., 679

F.2d 143, 145 (9th Cir. 1982)). 

Here, Plaintiffs contend that this Court should allow Sherman to voluntarily

dismiss his claims without prejudice because Sherman has no intention of re-filing his

claims against Yahoo, Yahoo has not likely incurred great expense yet, the action is

still at a relatively early stage since no motion for class certification has been filed,

Plaintiffs acted diligently in bringing this Motion after Sherman informed counsel of

his wishes, and Sherman is not attempting to avoid an adverse ruling as there are no

motions currently pending. (Dkt. No. 71-1 at 4-8.) 

Yahoo countersthat this Court should not allow dismissal of Sherman’s claims

for three reasons. (Dkt. No. 90 at 9-12.) First, Yahoo argues that Plaintiffs have

engaged in bad faith conduct. (Dkt. No. 90 at 10.) Yahoo points to “the delay and

ultimate cancellation of Sherman’s deposition, a meritless motion to consolidate, the

addition of a new named plaintiff, [and] the timing of the Motion in relation to the

settlement of the Kaiser action.”4(Id.) Plaintiffs reply that Sherman’s recent

preliminary approval of a class settlement in the Kaiser action does not show bad faith,

but only further supports Sherman’s decision to leave this action because his attention

is required elsewhere to focus on obtaining final approval. (Dkt. No. 95 at 3.)

Plaintiffs also assert that they and their attorneys owe it to the putative class members

to put forth the best case possible, which sometimes means asking the Court to only

appoint those of the named plaintiffs that have the strongest claims as the class

representative(s). (Id. at 2-3, 7.) Further, Plaintiffs note that it was not Sherman or

Pathman, but rather the Chicago plaintiffs who filed the motion to consolidate, and that

4Yahoo states that Sherman is the named plaintiff in a separate TCPA class

action, Sherman v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc., No. 13-cv-0981-JAH-JMA

(S.D. Cal.), in which he filed a motion for preliminary approval of class action

settlement on October 21, 2014, two weeks before Plaintiffs advised Yahoo that

Sherman sought to dismiss his claims in the instant action. (Dkt. No. 90-1 ¶ 9.)

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Yahoo similarly cancelled Pathman’s November 25 deposition the day beforehand due

to an “emergency.” (Id. at 3 n.1, 8.) 

“Ninth Circuit caselaw intimates that a district court may refuse to grant

dismissal underRule 41(a)(2) when exceptional circumstancessuggest bad faith and/or

vexatioustactics on the part of the plaintiff, and that the defendant may suffer the ‘legal

prejudice’ of never having claims resolved.” Manuel Shipyard Holdings, 01-cv-883-

WHA, 2001 WL 1382050, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2001) (citing In re Exxon Valdez,

102 F.3d 429, 432 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming denial of Rule 41(a)(2) motions because,

among other reasons, the court considered themto be a “thinly-veiled attempts to avoid

discovery” where there had been total refusal to provide discovery)); see also Zagano

v. Fordham Univ., 900 F.2d 12, 14 (2d Cir. 1990) (affirming denial of Rule 41(a)(2)

motion filed ten days before trial after four years of vigorous litigation). Here,

Sherman provided responses to interrogatories and, unlike In re Exxon Valdez,

Sherman did not obstruct resolution of the claims on the merits. As such, the Court

finds that Plaintiffs’ conduct does not amount to bad faith warranting refusal to grant

dismissal. See Blacks Law Dictionary, 149 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “bad faith” as

“dishonesty of belief or purpose”).

Second, Yahoo argues that it has already expended significant resources in

discovery during the past two years of litigation, much of it specific to Sherman. (Dkt.

No. 90 at 7-8, 10-11.) However, “the expense incurred in defending against a lawsuit

does not amount to legal prejudice” because “[t]he defendants’ interests can be

protected by conditioning the dismissal without prejudice upon the payment of

appropriate costs and attorney fees.” Westlands Water Dist., 100 F.3d at 97. 

Finally, Yahoo argues that it would be prejudiced by Sherman’s dismissal

because it would be prevented fromdeposing Sherman. (Dkt. No. 90 at 10-11.) Yahoo

contends that it has discovered evidence of Sherman’s consent to the text message at

issue, and that Plaintiffs’ Motion is designed to evade Yahoo obtaining further

damaging discovery from Sherman and adverse rulings that could follow as a result.

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(Id. at 11.) The inability to conduct sufficient discovery for a defense can amount to

legal prejudice. See Westlands Water Dist., 100 F.3d at 97. However, any concerns

regarding Yahoo’s ability to conduct discovery can be addressed by the terms and

conditions of dismissal, which the Court considers below.

Therefore, the Court concludes that Sherman should be allowed to dismiss his

claims.

II. Whether the Dismissal Should be With or Without Prejudice

The next question for the Court is whether the dismissal of Sherman’s claims

should be with or without prejudice. Dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2) is without

prejudice unless the order dismissing the case states otherwise. Fed. R. Civ. P.

41(a)(2). “Whether to allow dismissal with or without prejudice is discretionary with

the court, and it may order the dismissal to be with prejudice where it would be

inequitable or prejudicial to defendant to allow plaintiff to refile the action.” Burnette

v. Godshall, 828 F.Supp. 1439, 1443 (N.D. Cal. 1993), aff’d, 72 F.3d 766 (9th Cir.

1995). “The following factors are relevant in determining whether the dismissal should

be with or without prejudice: (1) the defendant’s effort and expense involved in

preparing for trial, (2) excessive delay and lack of diligence on the part of the plaintiff

in prosecuting the action, [and] (3) insufficient explanation of the need to take a

dismissal.” Id. at 1443-43 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Cal.

Prac. Guide Fed. Civ. Pro. Before Trial, Ch. 16-G, § 16:359. 

Here, Plaintiffs contend, as discussed above, that the dismissal should be

without prejudice because Sherman has no intention of re-filing his claims against

Yahoo, Yahoo has not likely incurred great expense yet, the action isstill at a relatively

early stage since no motion for class certification has been filed, Plaintiffs acted

diligently in bringing this Motion after Sherman informed counsel of his wishes, and

Sherman is not attempting to avoid an adverse ruling as there are no motions currently

pending. (Dkt. No. 71-1 at 4-8.) Sherman declares that “ I desire that my claims in this

action be dismissed without prejudice rather than with prejudice so that I may be

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entitled to any award to the class members, in the event this action is certified as a class

action . . . .” (Dkt. No. 71-8 ¶ 5.) 

Yahoo countersthat it has expended significant resources on discovery and the

filing of a summary judgment motion, that Sherman filed this Motion twenty-two

monthsinto the action, and that Sherman’s explanation asto why he wishes to have his

claims dismissed – “personal circumstances and time constraints” – is insufficient.

(Dkt. No. 90 at 12-14.) 

Plaintiffsrespond that Sherman has diligently prosecuted this action (as Yahoo

admits), that Sherman has not unreasonably delayed his deposition and Yahoo merely

speculates that he acted improperly, that Yahoo’s motion for summary judgment was

denied, and that the case is not close to trial. (Dkt. No. 95 at 6-8). Plaintiffs also state

that Sherman provided a reasonable explanation for requesting dismissal, and his

declared “time constraints” include focusing his attention on obtaining final approval

of the separate Kaiser settlement. (Id. at 6-7.) Moreover, to alleviate Yahoo’s

concerns about Sherman joining the Chicago lawsuit or otherwise re-filing his claims

(Dkt. No. 90 at 13-14), Plaintiffs expressly request that the Court condition the

voluntary dismissal such that Sherman may not re-file his individual claims against

Yahoo, but is permitted to receive any award that may be given to a class member.

(Dkt. No. 95 at 7.) 

The Court concludes that the dismissal should be without prejudice. Sherman

seeks dismissal of his claims without prejudice so that he may become an absent class

membershould the putative class be certified. The dismissal without prejudice will not

subject Yahoo to the risk of additional litigation because, per Plaintiffs’ express

request, the Court will condition the dismissal without prejudice on Sherman not refiling his individual claims against Yahoo. Moreover, Plaintiffs have been diligent in

prosecuting this action, and promptly moved to dismiss Sherman after he told his

counsel of his wishes. The case is not close to trial, a class certification motion has not

been filed yet, and Yahoo’s resources spent on discovery and summary judgment will

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remain useful in the continuing litigation against Pathman. Although the Court has

some concerns about Sherman’s vague explanation for the dismissal – “personal

circumstances and time constraints” – Yahoo has failed to show that this explanation

is insufficient. 

Therefore, the Court determines that Sherman’s claims should be dismissed

without prejudice.

III. Terms and Conditions of Dismissal

Finally, the Court must consider what terms and conditions, if any, should be

imposed on the dismissal of Sherman’s claims. Yahoo contends that the Court should

impose two conditions: (1) Yahoo should be entitled to depose Sherman on topics

relevant to the class as a whole, and obtain outstanding discovery responses from him;

and (2) Yahoo should be awarded attorneys’ fees and costs for the approximately

twenty-one months during which it litigated exclusively against Sherman before

Pathman was added as a named plaintiff. (Dkt. No. 90 at 14-18.)

A. Sherman’s Deposition and Outstanding Discovery Responses

Yahoo argues that Sherman’s dismissal should be conditioned on Sherman

being deposed and providing outstanding discovery responses because they could

reveal information relevant to issues of class certification. (Dkt. No. 90 at 14-16.) In

particular, Yahoo contends that Sherman’s testimony and outstanding discovery

responses could reveal facts demonstrating Sherman’s express consent to receive text

messages, which is an element of a TCPA claim. See Meyer v. Portfolio Recovery

Assocs., LLC, 707 F.3d 1036, 1043 (9th Cir. 2012) (elements of TCPA claim). Yahoo

asserts that Sherman could have given consent through two methods: (1) through a

third-party, either orally or in writing; or (2) through Yahoo’s Terms of Service. (Dkt.

No. 90 at 14-15.) Specifically, regarding the first method, third-party consent, Yahoo

arguesthat Sherman has identified the individual who sent himthe message that caused

Yahoo to send its message, but has refused to provide that individual’s contact

information, and that throughSherman’s deposition orfurther discovery Sherman could

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potentially provide facts that would allow Yahoo to contactthat individual and possibly

find evidence that Sherman consented for that individual to send him a text message.

(Id. at 14-15.) Regarding the second method, Yahoo’s Terms of Services, Yahoo

contends that it has learned facts indicating that Sherman has created at least two

accounts with Yahoo, has actively used Yahoo services during the relevant time period,

and that the fact that “Sherman recently accessed his Yahoo account(s) is critical to the

issue of consent under the TCPA because Yahoo’s [Terms of Service] expressly

provides that Yahoo may notify users such as Sherman by SMS/text message.” (Id. at

15.)

Yahoo further argues that evidence that some class members provided prior

express consent is relevant to class certification, and therefore Sherman’s testimony

and additional discovery responses are critical to the viability of the class as a whole

as they could demonstrate that class treatment is inappropriate because of issues of

individualized proof. See, e.g., Connelly v. Hilton Grand Vacations Co., 294 F.R.D.

574, 577-78 (S.D. Cal. 2013) (denying class certification of TCPA action based on

failure to show predominance because differing circumstances under which putative

class members provided their cell phone numbers suggested that consent should be

evaluated individually); Fields v. Mobile MessengersAm.,Inc., No. 12-cv-5160-WHA,

2013 WL 6073426, at *3-4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2013) (denying class certification of

TCPA action based on failure to show predominance because required individualized

inquiries regarding consent).

Plaintiffs counter that Yahoo has not shown that it will be legally prejudiced

if it cannot depose Sherman. (Dkt. No. 95 at 9-10.) Plaintiffs assert that any

information regarding Sherman’s alleged consent is not pertinent to a motion for class

certification because the proposed class would not include persons who consented. (Id.

at 9 (citing Knutson v. Schwan’s Home Serv., No. 12-cv-0963-GPC-DHB, 2013 WL

4774763, at *11 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2013) (in TCPA action, excluding from class

definition those persons who gave prior express consent)).) Plaintiffs further argue that

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there is nothing to stop Yahoo from arguing the issue of individualized consent based

on discovery from Pathman, that in denying summary judgment this Court already

found that Sherman did not consent to the text message, that Sherman has already

indicated in discovery that he does not know the contact information for the individual

who sent him the message, and that whether Sherman recently accessed his Yahoo

account(s) is irrelevant because the TCPA requires “prior,” not retroactive, consent.

(Id. at 9-10 & n.5; Dkt. No. 95-4 at 2; see also Dkt. No. 30 at 7 (Order Denying

Summary Judgment).) In addition, Plaintiffs argue that Yahoo should not be entitled

to further discovery responses because, unlike his deposition, there has been nothing

to stop Yahoo from serving additional discovery on Sherman, but it has not done so.

(Dkt. No. 95 at 3-4, 10.) 

As noted above, the inability to conduct sufficient discovery for a defense can

amount to legal prejudice. See Westlands Water Dist., 100 F.3d at 97 (“In this circuit,

we have stated that a district court properly identified legal prejudice when the

dismissal of a party would have rendered the remaining parties unable to conduct

sufficient discovery to untangle complex fraud claims and adequately defend

themselves against charges of fraud.”). A court may, but need not, condition a Rule

41(a)(2) dismissal on a plaintiff’s deposition or production of discovery. See Roberts

v. Electroluz Home Prods., No. 12-cv-1644-CAS, 2013 WL 4239050, at *1-3 (C.D.

Cal. Aug. 14, 2013) (denying the defendant’s request to condition the named plaintiffs’

withdrawal on deposing them); In re Wellbutrin XL, 268 F.R.D. 539, 543-44 (E.D. Pa.

2010) (holding that dismissal of original plaintiff in class action was conditioned on

the production of discovery to avoid possible prejudice to the defendant); cf. Dysthe

v. Basic Research, LLC, 273 F.R.D. 625, 629-30 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (holding that the

named plaintiff in a class action was subject to deposition despite the fact that he had

a pending motion to be dismissed from the action because his anticipated testimony

was relevant to class certification issues as well as the merits).

The Court concludes that Sherman’s withdrawal should be conditioned on

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Yahoo being entitled to depose Sherman. Sherman wasthe sole named plaintiff in this

action for almost two years before the addition of Pathman. Plaintiffs only added

Pathman as a named plaintiff shortly after the cancellation of Sherman’s original

deposition date. Sherman did not move to dismiss his individual claims until after his

deposition had been noticed and rescheduled several times and only few months before

the close of class discovery, and Yahoo has spent resources conducing discovery

specific to Sherman. Sherman’s testimony regarding his experience with Yahoo is

likely to be relevant to class certification issues, even if he no longer wishes to be

burdened with this litigation. As such, Yahoo would be legally prejudiced if it was

prevented from deposing Sherman.

Therefore, the Court concludes that Sherman’s withdrawal should be

conditioned on his deposition. However, the Court does not condition Sherman’s

withdrawal on providing any outstanding or further discovery responses. 

B. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

Yahoo also arguesthat Sherman’s dismissalshould be conditioned on awarding

Yahoo its attorneys’ fees and costs for the approximately twenty-one months during

which Sherman was the sole named plaintiff. (Dkt. No. 90 at 16-18.) Yahoo contends

that it spent resources propounding and responding to Sherman-specific discovery, as

well as preparing for his deposition which wastaken off-calendar only two days before

the scheduled date. (Id. at 17.) Plaintiffs counter that this Court should not award fees

because any work by Yahoo may be used in the continuing case against Pathman,

Sherman did not improperly delay his deposition, and Yahoo would not be entitled to

attorneys’ fees if Sherman elected to proceed on his individual claims but not seek

appointment as a class representative. (Dkt. No. 95 at 5-6, 8, 11 n.6.) 

While a court can protect a defendant’s interests by conditioning a Rule

41(a)(2) dismissal upon the payment of appropriate attorneys’ fees and costs, the

imposition of fees and costs as a condition for dismissing without prejudice is not

mandatory. Westlands Water Dist., 100 F.3d at 97. Further, fees and costs should only

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be awarded for work which cannot be used in continuing or later litigation. See id. at

97; Koch v. Hankins, 8 F.3d 650, 651 (9th Cir. 1993). “In determining whether to

award costs to a defendant after a voluntary dismissal without prejudice, courts

generally consider the following factors: (1) any excessive and duplicative expense of

a second litigation; (2) the effort and expense incurred by a defendant in preparing for

trial; (3) the extent to which the litigation has progressed; and (4) the plaintiff’s

diligence in moving to dismiss.” Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., No. 11-cv-1726-LHK,

2012 WL 893152, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2012) (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted).

Here, the Court declines to award Yahoo its attorneys’ fees and costs. The

dismissal of Sherman’s claims without prejudice does not expose Yahoo to excessive

or duplicative expense because much of Yahoo’s resources spent litigating against

Sherman will remain useful in the continuing litigation against Pathman, particularly

because the Court has conditioned Sherman’s withdrawal on being deposed.

Moreover, Sherman cannot re-file hisindividual claims against Yahoo. The case isstill

at a relatively early stage, as the class certification motion is not due until March 27,

2015. Further, Plaintiffs have acted with reasonable diligence in moving to dismiss

Sherman after he made his wishes known to his counsel. 

Therefore, the Court finds it unnecessary to condition Sherman’s dismissal on

an award of attorneys’ fees and costs. 

Accordingly, the Court intends to grant Plaintiffs’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff

Rafael David Sherman’s claims without prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 41(a)(2), but exercise its discretion to condition Sherman’s withdrawal on

Sherman sitting for his deposition. As Plaintiffs correctly note, if they are not

amenable to this condition, they may withdraw their Motion. (Dkt. No. 95 at 2) See

Lau v. Glendora Unified Sch. Dist., 792 F.2d 929, 930 (9th Cir. 1986) (for a Rule

41(a)(2) dismissal, the district court must provide the plaintiff “a reasonable period of

time within which to refuse the conditional voluntary dismissal by withdrawing [the]

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motion for dismissal or to accept the dismissal despite the imposition of conditions”).

Therefore, the Court will give Plaintiffs until February 13, 2015, to withdraw their

Motion.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

(1) the Court gives Plaintiffs notice that it intends to grant Plaintiffs’

Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Rafael David Sherman’s claims without

prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2), but with

the condition that Yahoo is entitled to depose Sherman (Dkt. No. 71);

(2) if Plaintiffs are not amenable to the condition imposed by the Court,

Plaintiffs must withdraw their Motion by February 13, 2015;

(3) if Plaintiffs are amenable to the condition imposed by the Court, the

deposition of Sherman will take place no later than February 27, 2015;

(4) the Parties will notify the Court regarding the completion of Sherman’s

deposition on or before March 2, 2015;

(5) upon satisfying the condition of Yahoo deposing Sherman, the Court

will grant Plaintiffs’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Rafael David

Sherman’s claims without prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 41(a)(2) (Dkt. No. 71) 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 5, 2015

HON. GONZALO P. CURIEL

United States District Judge

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