Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-00637/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-00637-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHRISTOPHER S. RIDER,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-09-0637 DAD P

vs.

PARENTE, et al.,

Defendants. ORDER

 /

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with a civil

rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. By order filed February 5, 2010, the court dismissed

plaintiff’s original complaint and granted him leave to file an amended complaint. Plaintiff has

filed an amended complaint. 

SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised

claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) & (2).

Case 2:09-cv-00637-MCE -DAD Document 12 Filed 08/06/10 Page 1 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

2

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28

(9th Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an

indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke,

490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully

pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th

Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.

Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47

(1957)). However, in order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must

contain more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain

factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic,

550 U.S. at 555. In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the

allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S.

738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all

doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the

actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

(1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the

Case 2:09-cv-00637-MCE -DAD Document 12 Filed 08/06/10 Page 2 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

 Plaintiff has inserted several pages in his amended complaint that are not numbered. 1

For citation purposes, the court will denote these pages with “A”. Thus, for example, the nonnumerated page between pages 5 and 6 will be referred to by the court as page “5A”.

3

meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or

omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which

complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the

actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named

defendant holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed

constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862

(9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory

allegations concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not

sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED COMPLAINT

In his amended complaint, plaintiff has identified close to twenty defendants and

appears to allege six separate categories of claims.

I. Inadequate Medical Care

First, plaintiff claims that defendants failed to provide him with adequate medical

care. In this regard, plaintiff alleges that on April 18, 2008, the prison dining hall was lockeddown by prison officials and inmates were forced to lay on their stomachs. According to

plaintiff, while he was laying on his stomach, he was scalded by hot water dripping from the

coffee urn. After plaintiff was told to stand and leave the dining hall, he was forced to sit out in

the sun for approximately nine hours. Plaintiff maintains that he has suffered burns on 90% of

his body as a result of this incident. (See Am. Compl. at 5A. ) 1

/////

/////

Case 2:09-cv-00637-MCE -DAD Document 12 Filed 08/06/10 Page 3 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

4

II. Excessive Force

Second, plaintiff appears to claim that defendants Tovar and Unknown Officer 1

used excessive force against him. Plaintiff alleges the following in this regard. After sitting in

the sun, plaintiff was ushered to administrative segregation. There, defendant Tovar instructed

plaintiff to remove his stomach ring. When plaintiff informed him that the ring was in-grown

and that removing it would cause him intense pain, defendant Tovar pulled out his pepper spray,

directed it at plaintiff’s face, and ordered plaintiff to remove the ring. Plaintiff complied, causing

himself to bleed and cry out in severe pain. Thereafter, defendant Unknown Officer 1 noticed

that plaintiff had a tongue ring. Once again, plaintiff was ordered to remove the ring, despite his

complaints that removing the in-grown tongue ring would cause him severe pain. Plaintiff again

complied with the officers’ orders but cried out in pain. (Am. Compl. at 5A.) 

III. Destruction of Personal Property

Third, plaintiff claims that defendant Vansant destroyed or lost almost fifty items

of his personal property. According to plaintiff, when he informed defendant Gray about the lost

property, Gray told him that defendants Bond and Head agreed that plaintiff would only be

compensated with a television. Plaintiff alleges that although he accepted the new television, he

was forced to do so because he would have received nothing otherwise. (Am. Compl. at 5A.)

In addition, plaintiff alleges that defendants Young and Fannon entered his cell

and destroyed his property. In particular, plaintiff maintains that these two defendants shredded

his papers, threw them into the toilet, and then placed them on his mattress. (Am. Compl. at 5A.)

Finally, plaintiff alleges that on February 25, 2009, defendants Switzer and Dodge

entered his cell to conduct a search and while conducting the search, destroyed his CD player. 

(Am. Compl. at 11.) 

IV. Failure to Protect

Fourth, plaintiff claims that defendants Switzer and Dodge failed to protect him

when they placed him in the yard while they conducted a cell search. According to plaintiff, at

Case 2:09-cv-00637-MCE -DAD Document 12 Filed 08/06/10 Page 4 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

5

least seven of his enemies were also in the yard, and he therefore could have been seriously

injured by the defendants’ action. (Am. Compl. at 11.)

V. Obstruction of Religious Practice

Fifth, plaintiff claims that prison officials have burdened his ability to practice his

pagan religion. Plaintiff alleges in this regard that on December 4, 2007, defendant Unknown

Officer 2, a Receiving and Release Officer, confiscated thirty-five religious books and a religious

ring from plaintiff. According to plaintiff, without these items he was unable to freely practice

his pagan religion. Moreover, plaintiff alleges that from April 18, 2008 through May 8, 2008 he

was not allowed to practice his religion while he was confined in administrative segregation. 

(See Am. Compl. at 8A.) 

VI. Denial of Domestic Partnership

Sixth, plaintiff alleges that on December 9, 2007, he wrote to defendant Branch,

the prison’s wedding coordinator, and expressed his desire to enter into a domestic partnership

with his life partner. However, according to plaintiff, defendant Branch told him that domestic

partnerships were not permitted. (Am. Compl. 11.)

DISCUSSION

The allegations in the amended complaint are still so vague and conclusory that

the court is unable to determine whether the current action is frivolous or fails to state a claim for

relief. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Although the Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, a

complaint must give fair notice to the defendants and must allege facts that support the elements

of the claim plainly and succinctly. Jones v. Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th

Cir. 1984). Plaintiff must allege, with at least some degree of particularity, overt acts which each

defendant engaged in that support his claims. Id. Because plaintiff has failed to comply with the

requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), his amended complaint must be dismissed. The court will,

however, give plaintiff a final opportunity to state a cognizable by granting him leave to file a

second amended complaint. Moreover, the court advises plaintiff of the following legal

Case 2:09-cv-00637-MCE -DAD Document 12 Filed 08/06/10 Page 5 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

6

standards that appear to govern the claims he is attempting to present.

I. Inadequate Medical Care 

The Eighth Amendment of the Constitution prohibits the infliction of “cruel and

unusual punishments.” In Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), the U.S. Supreme Court held

that inadequate medical care did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment cognizable under § 

1983 unless the alleged mistreatment amounted to a “deliberate indifference to serious medical

needs.” Id. at 106. In applying this standard, the Ninth Circuit has held that the “indifference to

[the inmate’s] medical needs must be substantial. Mere ‘indifference,’ ‘negligence,’ or ‘medical

malpractice’ will not support this cause of action.” Broughton v. Cutter Lab., 622 F.2d 458, 460

(9th Cir. 1980) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06). 

Here, plaintiff has failed to allege in his amended complaint that he sought, or in

any way requested, medical treatment for his burns. Accordingly, plaintiff has failed to allege

facts showing that defendants’ response to his medical needs were inadequate, let alone

deliberately indifferent. In addition, plaintiff has failed to allege facts linking his inadequate

medical care claim with the actions of specific defendants. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

(1976). Rather, plaintiff merely alleges in general fashion that defendants have violated his

Eighth Amendment rights. Accordingly, unless he is able to allege facts in these respects,

plaintiff should not reassert this claim in any second amended complaint he elects to file.

II. Excessive Force

The core judicial inquiry regarding an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim is

“whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously

and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 318

(1986); Jordan v. Garner, 986 F.2d 1521 (9th Cir. 1993). Accordingly, to prevail on such a claim

a plaintiff must show that objectively he suffered a “sufficiently serious” deprivation. Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). In addition, the plaintiff must show that subjectively each

defendant had a culpable state of mind in allowing or causing plaintiff’s deprivation to occur. Id.

Case 2:09-cv-00637-MCE -DAD Document 12 Filed 08/06/10 Page 6 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

7

In this case, plaintiff has failed to allege facts demonstrating that defendants Tovar and Unknown

Officer 1 ordered plaintiff to remove his rings “for the very purpose of causing harm.” Whitley,

475 U.S. at 318. Accordingly, in any second amended complaint plaintiff elects to file, he should

allege facts explaining why the order to remove his stomach and tongue rings served no

penological purpose and instead was an order issued sadistically for the very purpose of causing

harm . 

III. Destruction of Personal Property

As the court advised plaintiff in its previous screening order, the United States

Supreme Court has held that “an unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a [prison

official] does not constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause

of the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available.” 

Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). Here, plaintiff’s allegations against defendants

Vasant, Gray, Bond, Head, Young, Fannon, Switzer, and Dodge all involve unauthorized and

intentional deprivations of property. The California Legislature has provided a tort remedy for

such deprivations of property under California Government Code §§ 900, et seq. See id. at 533. 

Accordingly, plaintiff’s allegations regarding deprivations of property fail to state a cognizable

due process claim. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981) (holding that a prisoner alleging

the deprivation of property as a result of an agent’s failure to follow state procedures failed to

state a cognizable due process claim); overruled on other grounds by, Daniels v. Williams, 474

U.S. 327 (1986) (holding that a prisoner alleging lack of due care by state officials failed to state

a due process claim). Plaintiff is therefore advised not to reassert these claims in any second

amended complaint he elects to file.

IV. Failure to Protect

Under the Eighth Amendment, “prison officials have a duty . . . to protect

prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832

(1994). A prison official, however, violates the Eighth Amendment in this respect “only if he

Case 2:09-cv-00637-MCE -DAD Document 12 Filed 08/06/10 Page 7 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

8

knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to

take reasonable measures to abate it.” Id. at 847. Here, plaintiff does not allege that defendants

Switzer and Dodge knew that plaintiff’s enemies were in the yard. Accordingly, defendants were

under no obligation to take reasonable measures to ensure plaintiff’s safety. Moreover, to the

extent that plaintiff seeks damages for this claim, he has not alleged that he was actually injured

at the time. See Babcock v. White, 102 F.3d 267, 270 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[I]t is the reasonably

preventable assault itself, rather than any fear of assault, that gives rise to a compensable claim

under the Eighth Amendment.”). Accordingly, plaintiff is advised not to reassert this claim in

any second amended complaint he elects to file, unless he can cure these factual deficiencies.

V. Obstruction of Religious Practice

Incarceration does not eliminate an inmate’s First Amendment right to freely

exercise his religion. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979). His rights are, however,

“necessarily limited by the fact of [his] incarceration, and may be curtailed in order to achieve

legitimate correctional goals or to maintain prison security.” McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196,

197 (9th Cir. 1987). Accordingly, to allege a First Amendment claim, plaintiff should explain

why the confiscation of his property and the prohibition on religious services in administrative

segregation did not serve legitimate penological purposes.

To the extent that plaintiff seeks to pursue a claim under the Religious Land Use

and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), he is advised that the government is prohibited

from imposing “a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined

to an institution . . . even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability.” 42 U.S.C. §

2000cc-1(a). Here, plaintiff has alleged facts indicating that the confiscation of his pagan books

and his ritual ring, along with the denial of religious services in administrative segregation, have

substantially burdened his religious exercise. Plaintiff has not, however, linked his claims

apparently advanced under RLUIPA with the alleged conduct of any specific defendants. 

Accordingly, if he wishes to pursue this claim in any second amended complaint he elects to file,

Case 2:09-cv-00637-MCE -DAD Document 12 Filed 08/06/10 Page 8 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

9

plaintiff must specify the defendants who have burdened his religious practices and allege facts

describing in what way the particular defendant did so. 

VI. Denial of Domestic Partnership

“[W]hile the basic right to marry survives imprisonment, . . . most of the attributes

of marriage . . . do not. Gerber v. Hickman, 291 F.3d 617, 621 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Turner v.

Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 96 (1987)). According to his amended complaint, however, plaintiff is not

seeking a marriage license but instead is seeking to enter into a domestic partnership. Plaintiff’s

vague and conclusory allegations are not sufficient to state a cognizable claim. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s amended complaint (Doc. No. 10) is dismissed.

2. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file a

second amended complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice; the second amended complaint

must bear the docket number assigned to this case and must be labeled “Second Amended

Complaint”; plaintiff must use the form complaint provided by the court; failure to file a second

amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in a recommendation that this action

be dismissed without prejudice.

3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to provide plaintiff with the court’s form

complaint for a § 1983 action.

DATED: August 5, 2010.

DAD:sj

ride0637.14a(2)

Case 2:09-cv-00637-MCE -DAD Document 12 Filed 08/06/10 Page 9 of 9