Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01749/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01749-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983cv Civil Rights Act - Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JACOB GREGOIRE,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 14CV1749-GPC(DHB)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

[Dkt. No. 25.]

v.

CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL,

an agency of the State of California;

SERGIO FLORES; and DOES 1 to 20,

Defendants.

Before the Court is Defendants California Highway Patrol and Sergio Flores’

motion for summary judgment. (Dkt. No. 25.) An opposition was filed on January 20,

2016. (Dkt. No. 35.) A reply was filed on February 2, 2016. (Dkt. No. 42.) After a

review of the briefs, supporting documentation, and the applicable law, the Court

GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. 

Procedural Background

On June 12, 2014, PlaintiffJacob Gregoire, a Fire Engineer/ EmergencyMedical

Technician (“EMT”) for the Chula Vista Fire Department filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983

complaint against Defendant Sergio Flores, a California Highway Patrol (“CHP”)

officer, and Defendant California Highway Patrol in San Diego Superior Court for

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unreasonable seizure, excessive force and state law causes of action for violation of 1

California Civil Code (“Civil Code”) section 52.1, battery, false imprisonment, and

intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Dkt. No. 1-1, Compl.) The case was

removed to this Court on July 25, 2014. (Dkt. No. 1.) Defendants bring a motion for

summary judgment on all causes of action in the complaint. (Dkt. No. 25.) 

Factual Background

The undisputed facts are the following. During the evening of February 4, 2014,

CHP Officers Eliazar Colunga (“Colunga”) and Sergio Flores (“Flores”) were on duty

for C-watch (5:00 p.m. to 5:30 a.m.). (Dkt. No. 35-1, SSUF Nos. 1, 4.) Colunga has

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been a CHP patrol officer for about 17 years and Flores has been a CHP patrol officer

since July 1994. (Id., SSUF Nos. 3, 6.) 

Just before 9:30 p.m., Officer Colunga responded to a radio call about an

overturned vehicle in the area of Interstate 805 (“I-805") and Telegraph Canyon Road

in the City of Chula Vista. (Id., SSUF No. 7.) The collision occurred in the

northbound lanes of the I-805, and the vehicle to which Colunga wasresponding came

to rest in a wide construction area between cement k-rail walls that separated the

northbound and southbound lanes. (Id., SSUF No. 8.) Colunga saw no other on-duty

emergency responders at the scene when he arrived and parked his patrol car south of

the collision in the center construction area, where the k-rails on the southbound side

ended and the center construction area was accessible. (Id., SSUF No. 9.)

Colunga approached the overturned vehicle and made contact with two civilians,

James Hutton (“Hutton”) and Autumn Mitchell (“Mitchell”) who had come upon the

accident scene after the accident but before Colunga arrived. (Id., SSUF No. 11.) 

In the motion for summary judgment, both parties address unreasonable seizure

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as an unlawful arrest cause of action. “Courts generally treat an unlawful arrest as one

manner of violating the Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable seizures.” 

Kyles v. Baker, 72 F. Supp. 3d 1021, 1050 n. 2 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (citing cases) (district

court considered separate claims of unlawful arrest and unreasonable seizure under a

single unlawful arrest analysis). 

Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’ Separate Statement of Undisputed Material 2

Facts. (Dkt. No. 35-1.) 

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Hutton was an off-duty EMT. (Id.) Officer Colunga saw that both of the occupants of

the rollover vehicle were conscious, with one lying on the ground and the other

standing. (Id., SSUF No. 12.) During the evening, Officer Colunga was able to

communicate with the two occupants. (Id., SSUF No. 13.) Seeing that the off-duty

EMT was holding the head of the person on the ground in a C-spine position and was

without equipment, Officer Colunga went to his vehicle to retrieve a first aid bag that

would have a C-spine collar. (Id., SUF No.14.) 

On the way to his patrol car, Officer Colunga saw an ambulance from American

MedicalResponse (“AMR”) arrive and park just south of Officer Colunga’s patrol car.3

(Id., SSUF No. 15.) The ambulance had its emergency lights activated. (Id.) When

Colunga saw the ambulance crew walk over to the rolled over vehicle with their gear,

Officer Colunga determined that it was not necessary for him to retrieve a first aid bag. 

(Id., SSUF No. 16.) Colunga saw three people from the AMR ambulance, and, at the

time, he believed all three were paramedics. (Id., SSUF No. 17.) Later, he learned that

two of them were paramedics and one was an EMT. (Id.) 

Soon after the ambulance arrived, fire trucks began arriving. (Id., SSUF No. 20.)

Officer Colunga saw Chula Vista Engine 52 arrive and park in the number 1 lane on

the southbound side. (Id.) Firefighter/EMT Gregoire drove Engine 52 with Captain

David Albright and Firefighter/EMT JoshuaRees on board. (Dkt. No. 35-5, Rees Decl.

¶ 3.) Two other fire trucks arrived within short succession and parked behind Engine

52, blocking the number 1 and 2 lanes. (Dkt. No. 35-1, SSUF No. 21.) Then a fourth

fire truck also came to the scene. (Id.) Colunga talked to crew members from two fire

trucks, explained that they were not needed, should leave and return to their stations. 

(Dkt. No. 25-4, Colunga Decl. ¶ 10.) Two fire trucks left the scene within a few

The parties dispute whether the ambulance was out of traffic lanes. Colunga

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assertsthat the ambulance was parked outside of traffic lanes. (Dkt. No. 25-4, Colunga 

Decl. ¶ 6.) However, Captain David Albright testified that as he approached the scene,

he spotted the ambulance, meaning where you position your apparatus, and it was

about 50% into the dirt shoulder and 50% into the No. 1 or fast lane. (Dkt. No. 35-2,

Luneau Decl., Ex. 1, Albright Depo. at 64:2-65:2.) He concluded that the AMR

ambulance was 2-3 feet into the number 1 southbound lane. (Id.)

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minutes. (Id.) Colunga then asked members of the other two fire crews to move their

trucks into the center median. (Id.) Despite his requests to the remaining two Chula

Vista Fire crews to move their trucks, the trucks were not moved. (Id. ¶ 12.) Later,

Officer Colunga noticed that the two fire trucks were not moved, so he went back to

speak to the fire crews again and requested that they move the fire trucks. (Id. ¶ 12.) 

It was at this point that Colunga saw Officer Flores walk up to where he was standing

with the fire fighters, close enough so that Flores could have overheard the

conversation. (Dkt. No. 35-1, SSUF No. 43.) 

At around 9:30 p.m., Defendant Officer Flores heard radio traffic regarding the

collision. (Id., SSUF No. 49.) After clearing a traffic stop in Mission Valley, Flores

began driving southbound on the I-805 to respond to the accident scene. (Id., SSUF

No. 50.) Upon approaching the scene, Flores noticed that traffic was backing up so he

began a traffic break to bring traffic approaching the scene in slowly. (Id., SSUF No.

52.) He came upon a fire truck that was parked mostly in the number 1 lane and

partially into the number 2 lane. (Id., SSUF No. 53.) Where the fire truck wasstopped,

there was a cement k-rail abutting the number 1 lane on the east side of the southbound

lanes. (Id., SSUF No. 54.) Flores stopped his patrol car about 100 feet behind the fire

truck and started to lay a flare pattern on the road proceeding from the rear of his patrol

vehicle in a diagonal pattern moving southbound toward the number 2 lane. (Id., SSUF

No. 56.) 

Flores saw fire personnel, paramedics, and at least one of the people who had

been involved in the collision near the vehicle in this center area. (Id., SSUF No. 59.) 

Flores determined that the collision had occurred on the northbound side and that the

vehicle had come to rest in the construction area. (Id., SSUF No. 60.) Officer Flores

saw paramedics providing medical care to the vehicle occupants. (Id., SSUF No. 61.) 

Soon after completing his flare pattern, Officer Flores saw Officer Colunga speaking

to a group of firefighters. (Id., SSUF No. 62.) Officer Flores heard Officer Colunga

asking the group why they had not yet moved their fire engine and told them several

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times that they needed to move their fire engine. (Id., SSUF Nos. 63, 64.) 

In his efforts to get the fire trucks moved, Officer Flores called out to the group

of fire fighters and asked who was driving the truck. (Id., SSUF No. 80.) Plaintiff

responded and stated he was driving the truck. (Id., SSUF No. 81.) The facts are

disputed as the conversation between Gregoire and Officer Flores which will be

discussed below. (Id., SSUF Nos. 82-89.) 

After the conversation, Flores directed Gregoire to step over a k-rail, Gregoire

stepped over the k-rail, and Officer Flores placed him under arrest and placed

handcuffs on Gregoire’s wrists and walked him back to Flores’ patrol car. (Id., SSUF

Nos. 90, 92, 101.) Plaintiff remained in custody for approximately 30 minutes before

being released. (Id., SSUF No. 116.) 

Discussion

A. Legal Standard on Motion for Summary Judgment

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 empowers the Court to enter summary

judgment on factually unsupported claims or defenses, and thereby “secure the just,

speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 325, 327 (1986). Summary judgment is appropriate if the “pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue asto any material fact and that the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A fact

is material when it affects the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of any

genuine issues of material fact. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. The moving party can

satisfy this burden by demonstrating that the nonmoving party failed to make a

showing sufficient to establish an element of his or her claim on which that party will

bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322-23. If the moving party fails to bear the

initial burden, summary judgment must be denied and the court need not consider the

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nonmoving party’s evidence. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159-60

(1970). 

Once the moving party has satisfied this burden, the nonmoving party cannot rest

on the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but must “go beyond the pleadings

and by her own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for

trial.’” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. If the non-moving party fails to make a sufficient

showing of an element of its case, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law. Id. at 325. “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier

of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). In

making this determination, the court must “view[] the evidence in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party.” Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 876 (9th Cir.

2001). The Court does not engage in credibility determinations, weighing of evidence,

or drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts; these functions are for the trier of

fact. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. 

B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Causes of Action 

1. Unlawful Arrest as to Defendant Flores

Defendants argue that based on the totality of the circumstances, Flores4

Defendants argue that, under the “collective knowledge” doctrine, Officer 4

Colunga’s knowledge must be considered in support of Officer’s Flores’ conclusion

that his orders were lawful and he had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for refusing to

comply with Flores’ orders. Under the collective knowledge doctrine, the Court must

look at “the collective knowledge of all the officers involved in the criminal

investigation although all of the information known to the law enforcement officers

involved in the investigation is not communicated to the officer who actually

[undertakes the challenged action].” United States v. Ramirez, 473 F.3d 1026, 1032

(9th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Sutton, 794 F.2d 1415, 1426 (9th Cir.1986)). 

Defendants cite to cases addressing the “collective knowledge” rule in probable cause

cases. See United States v. Bertrand, 926 F.2d 838, 844 (9th Cir. 1991) (“information

possessed by the undercover police woman and the lookout officer provided back up

team with probable cause to arrest regardless of whether that information was actually

communicated to them”); Ramirez, 473 F.3d at 1032 (collective knowledge doctrine

applied to warrantless stop of automobile by police officer at the request of

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reasonably believed that it was appropriate to direct that the fire trucks be moved out

of lanes for safety reasons. When Plaintiff failed to comply, it was reasonable for

Flores to conclude that Plaintiff was disobeying an order of a peace officer and was in

violation of California Penal Code section 148(a) and California Vehicle Code section

2800(a). Plaintiff disputes Defendant’s characterization as to what happened and

argues that his arrest was not supported by probable cause because Flores’ order to

move the fire truck was not lawful. In fact, Plaintiff assertsthat Flores wasin violation

of California Penal Code section 148(a) for delaying and obstructing the work of an

EMT. 

“A claim for unlawful arrest is cognizable under § 1983 as a violation of the

Fourth Amendment, provided the arrest was without probable cause or other

justification.” Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 918 (9th Cir. 2012). Probable

cause exists when the officer has “a reasonable belief, evaluated in light of the officer’s

experience and the practical considerations of everyday life, that a crime has been, is

being, or is about to be committed.” Hopkins v. City of Sierra Vista, 931 F.2d 524, 527

investigating officer within same police department without relaying any factual basis

for investigating officer’s determining of reasonable suspicion or probable cause);

United States v. Bernard, 623 F.2d 551, 560-61 (9th Cir. 1979) (collective knowledge

of all three DEA agents was sufficient to establish probable cause where the DEA

agents were working in close concert and where arresting officer relied to a “great

degree” on the opinion of another agent even though some of the critical information

had not been communicated to him.”) While Defendants cite to the general rule in

these casesthat an arresting offer need not have personal knowledge of facts indicating

probable cause and may rely on the collective knowledge of other officers in the case,

the specific facts in these cited cases reveal that there was a close relationship between

the officers or a communication to arrest an individual based on the ordering person’s

information that supported probable cause. 

Here, the facts establish that Flores overheard Colunga asking the group of

firemen who their Fire Captain was and why they had not yet moved their fire engine. 

(Dkt. No. 25-5, Flores Decl. ¶ 7.) He heard someone state their truck was there to

protect the scene. (Id.) He heard Colunga say that he told them several times to move

the fire engine and that the collision scene was safely within the construction area and

the truck was not providing protection. (Id.) 

First, the facts and interaction that Flores witnessed do not rise to the level of

probable cause especially in light of the statutes concerning the role of EMTs in an

accident scene. Furthermore, there was no indication or direction by Colunga that

Plaintiff should be arrested. However, even applying the collective knowledge

doctrine, based on the record before this Court, a genuine issue of material fact exists

as to whether there was probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. 

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(9th Cir. 1991) (citation and internal quotations omitted). “Probable cause existsif the

arresting officers‘had knowledge and reasonably trustworthy information of facts and

circumstances sufficient to lead a prudent person to believe that [the arrestee] had

committed or was committing a crime.’” Maxwell v. Cnty. of San Diego, 697 F.3d

941, 951 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Ricardo D., 912 F.2d 337, 342 (9th

Cir. 1990)). “Where the facts or circumstances surrounding an individual’s arrest are

disputed, the existence of probable cause is a question for the jury.” Harper v. City of

Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1022 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing McKenzie v. Lamb, 738 F.2d

1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 1984)). 

Penal Code section 148(a)(1) provides, 

Every person who willfully resists, delays, or obstructs any public

officer, peace officer, or an emergency medical technician . . . in the

discharge or attempt to discharge any duty of his or her office or

employment, when no other punishment is prescribed, shall be

punished by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by

imprisonment in a county jail not to exceed one year, or by both that

fine and imprisonment.

Cal. Penal Code § 148(a)(1). This section makes it a crime to “willfully resist[], delay

[], or obstruct[]” a peace officer or emergency medical technician “in the lawful

exercise of his duties.” Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 695 (9th Cir. 2005) (en

banc) (emphasis in original). The elements of a violation of section 148(a)(1) are “(1)

the defendant willfully resisted, delayed, or obstructed a peace officer, (2) when the

officer was engaged in the performance of his or her duties, and (3) the defendant knew

or reasonably should have known that the other person was a peace officer engaged in

the performance of his or her duties.” Smith, 394 F.3d at 695 (quoting In re

Muhammed C., 95 Cal. App. 4th 1325, 1329 (2002)). “In California, the lawfulness

of the officer’s conduct is an essential element of the offense of resisting, delaying, or

obstructing a peace officer.” Id. at 695. It is not a crime to resist unlawful orders. Id.

In addition, California Vehicle Code section 2800(a) states,

It is unlawful to willfully fail or refuse to comply with a lawful order,

signal, or direction of a peace officer . . . when that peace officer is in

uniform and is performing duties pursuant to any of the provisions of

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this code, or to refuse to submit to a lawful inspection pursuant to this

code.

Cal. Veh. Code § 2800(a). This section authorizes traffic officers to make “‘an order,

signal, or direction’ the disobedience of which is illegal, is limited to lawful orders,

willfully disregarded or disobeyed.” People v. Ritter, 115 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 6

(1980) (quoting Cal. Veh. Code § 2800). 

To determine whether Plaintiff violated these provisions, the Court must look

at other related statutes, raised by both parties, that describe and define the role of CHP

officers and EMT personnel during a traffic accident involving personal injury. See

Cal. Veh. Code §§ 2410, 2412; Cal. Penal Code § 409.3; Cal. Health & Safety Code

§ 1798.6. 

CHP officers have lawful authority to investigate and direct traffic during 

accidents involving personal injuries on California highways. See Cal. Veh. Code §

2412 (“All members of the California Highway Patrol may investigate accidents

resulting in personal injuries or death and gather evidence for the purpose of

prosecuting the person or persons guilty of any violation of the law contributing to the

happening of such accident.”); Cal. Veh. Code § 2410 (“Members of the California

Highway Patrol are authorized to direct traffic according to law, and, in the event of

a fire or other emergency, or to expedite traffic or insure safety, may direct traffic as

conditions may require notwithstanding the provisions of this code.”) 

California Penal Code section 409.3 provides,

Whenever law enforcement officers and emergency medical

technicians are at the scene of an accident, management of the scene

of the accident shall be vested in the appropriate law enforcement

agency, whose representative shall consult with representatives of

other response agencies at the scene to ensure that all appropriate

resources are properly utilized. However, authority for patient care

management at the scene of an accident shall be determined in

accordance with Section 1798.6 of the Health and Safety Code.

For purposes of thissection, “management of the scene of an accident”

means the coordination of operations which occur at the location of an

accident.

Cal. Penal Code § 409.3 (emphasis added). Lastly, California Health & Safety Code

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section 1798.6 provides, 

(a) Authority for patient health care management in an emergency shall

be vested in that licensed or certified health care professional, which

may include any paramedic or other prehospital emergency personnel,

at the scene of the emergency who is most medically qualified specific

to the provision of rendering emergency medical care. If no licensed or

certified health care professional is available, the authority shall be

vested in the most appropriate medically qualified representative of

public safety agencies who may have responded to the scene of the

emergency. . . .

(c) Notwithstanding subdivision (a), authority for the management

of the scene of an emergency shall be vested in the appropriate

public safety agency having primary investigative authority. The

scene of an emergency shall be managed in a manner designed to

minimize the risk of death or health impairment to the patient and

to other persons who may be exposed to the risks as a result of the

emergency condition, and priority shall be placed upon the

interests of those persons exposed to the more serious and

immediate risks to life and health. Public safety officials shall

consult emergency medical services personnel or other

authoritative health care professionals at the scene in the

determination of relevant risks.

Cal. Health & Safety Code § 1798.6 (emphasis added). “Management of the scene”

under section (c) refers to “nonmedical management and therefore vests authority in

law enforcement personnel . . . .” Cnty. of San Bernardino v. City of San Bernardino,

15 Cal. 4th 909, 928 (1997). Based on these statutes, management of the scene of an

emergency vests in the CHP officers while patient health care management in an

emergency vests in the paramedics/EMTs. Management of the scene requiresthe CHP

officers to consult “with representatives of other response agencies at the scene to

ensure that all appropriate resources are properly utilized”, Cal. Penal Code § 409.3,

and as it specifically relates to patient care, CHP officers must “consult emergency

medicalservices personnel or other authoritative health care professionals at the scene

in the determination of relevant risks,” Cal. Health & Safety § 1798.6. In addition, the

accident scene must be managed to “minimize the risk of death or health impairment

to the patient and to other persons who may be exposed to the risks as a result of the

emergency condition, and priority shall be placed upon the interests of those persons

exposed to the more serious and immediate risks to life and health.” Id. Penal Code

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section 409.3 and Health & Safety Code section 1798.6 contain mandatory provisions

requiring CHP officersto consult with medical personnel at the scene of an emergency

accident. See Cal. Penal Code § 409.3; Cal. Health & Safety Code § 1798.6. 

According to Defendant Flores, based on his training and experience and

personal observations, he concluded that having fire trucks parked in traffic lanes were

not necessary to protect the scene. (Dkt. No. 25-5, Flores Decl. ¶ 8.) CHP officers are

responsible for managing the entire accident scene to protect the safety of the people

at the scene and the motoring public near the scene. (Id. ¶ 9.) Secondary accidents

occur at the scene of accidents due to the motoring public’s surprise and confusion

resulting from suddenly encountering lane blockages from emergency equipment in

roadways during an accident scene. (Id.) This risk is higher on freeways where traffic

can come upon accident scenes at high speeds. (Id.) 

At this accident scene, as he heard the conversation between Colunga and the

firefighters, Flores assessed that the ambulance which had responded to treat the

patients was parked in the center median area and out of traffic lanes and the collision

did not occur in any southbound lanes, so there was no debris field in any southbound

lanes. (Id. ¶ 9.) Flores believed that having fire trucks parked in traffic lanes were

posing a serious risk and unnecessary risk to the public and the trucks were not needed

to protect the accident scene since it was fully shielded in a large center construction

area by cement k-rail walls. (Id.) The truck he was trying to get moved was on the

I-805, which is a freeway on which people commonly travel at high speeds and he was

concerned about vehicles approaching at high speeds and unexpectedly coming upon

stopped emergency vehicles without time to react and causing secondary accidents and

additional people getting injured or killed. (Id.) 

Flores states that prior to arresting Gregoire, he did not see him engaged in any

activities that Flores perceived to be patient care. (Id. ¶ 14.) It appeared that Gregoire

was standing with a group of other fire fighters while others were actually treating

patients. (Id.) Prior to ordering Gregoire to move the fire truck, Officer Flores was

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aware that the patients were being treated by paramedics from an ambulance. (Id. ¶

14.) Given his belief that the patients were being treated by paramedics, Officer Flores

did not perceive a reason why Engineer Gregoire could not move his fire truck. (Id.)

Officer Flores’ purpose in ordering Engineer Gregoire to move the fire truck was to

eliminate a risk that Officer Flores believed it was posing to public safety. (Id.) 

When Flores asked who was driving the truck, Plaintiff said that he was the

driver. (Id. ¶ 10.) Flores directed Plaintiff to move the fire truck but Plaintiff said he

would not move the truck. (Id.) Flores told him that he was giving him a direct order

to move his fire truck but Plaintiff stated he would not move it. (Id.) Flores warned

Plaintiff that if he did not comply he would be arrested by disobeying an order and for

delaying officers in their investigation. (Id.) Plaintiff said to go ahead and arrest him. 

(Id.) Flores argues he reasonably believed that Plaintiff wasin violation of Penal Code

section 148(a) and Vehicle Code section 2800(a) when Plaintiff failed to comply with

Flores’ order to move the fire truck. 

In response, Plaintiff argues that Flores improperly walked on the scene,

assumed he was in charge and without any investigation, without consulting with

representatives from other responding agencies, and without even consulting with the

other CHP officer at the scene before him, ordered Plaintiff to stop assisting with

patient care and move the fire truck. Plaintiff contends that the arrest of Plaintiff was

not supported by probable cause because Flores’ order was not lawful. Flores failed 

to consult with the health care providers concerning the status of the injured victims

which is required under Penal Code section 409.3 and Health & Safety Code section

1798.6. Flores did not consult with any of the paramedics, EMTs or anyone else

regarding the care of the patients. (Dkt. No. 35-3, Hutton Decl. ¶ 7; Dkt. No. 35-4,

Mitchell Decl. ¶ 9.) In fact, Flores testified that he did not know how many people

were injured and that one person was lying down on either a gurney or backboard. 

(Dkt. No. 35-2, Luneau Decl., Ex. 3, Flores Depo. at 120:17-121:21.) Also, witnesses

stated that when Plaintiff asked Flores what he was going to do about the patients,

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Flores responded that “he did not care about the patients.” (Dkt. No. 35-4, Mitchell

Decl. ¶ 8; Dkt. No. 35-3, Hutton Decl. ¶ 7; Dkt. No. 35-2, Luneau Decl., Ex. 4 at 20-

21. ) Plaintiff raises a trial issue of fact as to whether Flores’ order was lawful. 

5

In addition, Plaintiff argues that Flores was violating the very same code section

that Defendant used to justify the arrest. He contends that Flores violated Penal Code

section 148(a), which applies to EMTs, by delaying Plaintiff in discharging his duties,

and Vehicle Code section 2801, which requires compliance with any order of a

fireman. Cal. Veh. Code 2801. By ordering that the fire truck be moved, Flores was 6

refusing to comply with the firefighter’s direction. 

Plaintiff also disputes Flores’ assessment of the scene of the accident that the

ambulance which responded to treat the patients was parked out of traffic lanes, and

therefore the fire trucks were not needed. Officer Colunga stated that the ambulance

was parked outside of traffic lanes. (Dkt. No. 25-4, Colunga Decl. ¶ 6.) However,

Captain David Albright testified that as he approached the scene, he spotted the

ambulance and it was about 50% into the dirt shoulder and 50% into the No. 1 or fast

lane. (Dkt. No. 35-2, Luneau Decl., Ex. 1, Albright Depo. at 64:2-65:2.) The fire truck

was parked in the number one lane, behind the ambulance and provided a 25 footsafety

zone between the front of the engine and the ambulance to protect EMS crew during

patient packaging and loading. (Dkt. No. 35-2, Luneau Decl., Ex. 4 at 20.) This raises

a genuine of materialfact whether Flores’s assessment concerning his decision to order

the fire trucks removed was reasonable. 

Lastly,Plaintiff creates a factual dispute asto Defendants’ assertion that Plaintiff

had no role in patient care. Gregoire states he was engaged in patient care when he was

Page numbers are based on the CM/ECF pagination. 

5

California Vehicle Code section 2801 specifically states, “It is unlawful to 6

wilfully fail or refuse to comply with any lawful order, signal, or direction of any

member of any fire department, paid, volunteer, or company operated, when wearing

the badge or insignia of a fireman and when in the course of his duties he is protecting

the personnel and fire department equipment.” Cal. Veh. Code § 2801. 

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arrested by Flores; Plaintiff was standing and holding the flashlight over the gurney

and the patient. (Dkt. No. 35-2, Luneau Decl., Ex. 2, Gregoire Depo. at 66:10-13.) 

Witnesses also confirmed that Plaintiff was involved in patient care. Hutton and

Mitchell were the first people on the scene of the accident. Hutton was an off-duty

EMT and stopped his car in the center divider and began C-spine care of the patient on

the ground. (Dkt. No. 35-3, Hutton Decl. ¶ 4.) The patient was bleeding and it was

dark, and the ground was wet and cold. (Id.) 

Plaintiff was rendering aid to the patient on the ground with other EMTs

preparing the C-spine for transfer to the gurney. (Id. ¶ 6.) According to Hutton,

Plaintiff was fully engaged in the care of the patient on the ground when a Latino CHP

officer approached Plaintiff and arrested him and put him in handcuffs. (Id. ¶ 6.) The

CHP officer never consulted with any firemen or EMTs about the status of the patient

care before arresting Plaitniff. (Id. ¶ 7.) He heard Plaintiff tell the CHP officer “I am

treating patients here” and the officer responded, “I don’t care about your patients, you

need to move.” (Id.) The CHP officer ordered the fireman to take the truck back to the

station. (Id.) 

Mitchell, who was in the same vehicle as Hutton, stated that when the CHP

officer told the fireman to move the truck, the fireman was working on the injured

patient at the time. (Dkt. No. 35-4, Mitchell Decl. ¶ 5.) The fireman was kneeling next

to the patient and said, “I am in the middle of helping this patient.” (Id. ¶ 6.) The CHP

officer told him that he wanted him to stop caring for the patient and move the fire

truck off the freeway and take it back to the station. (Id. ¶ 7.) The fireman replied

“What about the patients?” and the CHP officer replied “I don’t care about the patients,

I just want you to leave.” (Id. ¶ 8.) While she was there, she never heard the CHP

officer ask about the condition of the patients or consult about how long or how many

men were needed to help the two patients. (Id. ¶ 9.) The fireman was kneeling and

preparing a backboard for the patient when the CHP officer approached and put the

fireman in handcuffs. (Id. ¶ 10.) 

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Joshua Rees was also at the scene of the accident as a City of Chula Vista

Firefighter/EMT. (Dkt. No. 35-5, Rees Decl. ¶ 3.) He arrived in the fire truck with

Plaintiff. (Id.) They were working with paramedic units rendering care to two injured

patients. (Id.) Plaintiff was working with paramedics to move the patient from the

ground onto the gurney, using a backboard with straps. (Id.) Plaintiff was helping to

move the patient by supplying the light with his flashlight, as it was dark, and securing

the gurney in order to move the patient into the ambulance. (Id. ¶ 4.) While Plaintiff

was in the process of rendering aid to the immobilized patient, a CHP officer called

him. (Id. ¶ 5.) Rees did not hear the conversation but then saw Plaintiff stop caring for

the patient and then being placed under arrest by the CHP officer. (Id.) According to

Rees, the arrest delayed the entire movement of the patient from the scene to the

hospital and delayed all fire equipment and personnel at the scene. (Id.) These facts

raise a triable issue of fact whether Plaintiff was involved in patient care. 

7

In conclusion, the Court concludes that Plaintiffraises genuine issues ofmaterial

fact as to whether Flores had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for a violation of Penal

Code section 148(a)(1) and Vehicle Code section 2800. Therefore, the Court DENIES

Defendant Flores’ motion for summary judgment on the unlawful arrest cause of

action. 

C. Qualified Immunity as to Defendant Flores

Next, Defendant Flores contendsthat he is entitled to qualified immunity for the

unlawful arrest and excessive force causes of action because he reasonably concluded

he was giving lawful orders under the circumstances he confronted, and no facts are

alleged that a reasonable officer would have known that excessive force was being

used. Plaintiff argues that the arrest was not reasonable and Plaintiff’s right as an EMT

Plaintiff also argues that CHP’s authority to direct traffic pursuant to Vehicle 7

Code section 2410 does not apply to fire trucks parked on a highway while engaged in

rescue operations and that firefighters are exempt from nearly all Vehicle Code rules

of the road. Defendants dispute Plaintiff’s assertions. However, the Court need not

address this issue because Plaintiff has raised sufficient facts to demonstrate that there

are factual issues as to whether there was probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. 

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to be free from unlawful arrest while engaged in patient care in an emergency situation

is clearly established by statute. In addition, Plaintiff assertsthat the facts are disputed

on the excessive force allegation. 

Government officials who performdiscretionary functions generally are entitled

to qualified immunity fromliability for civil damages “insofar astheir conduct does not

violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable

person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The

United States Supreme Court has presented a two-part analysis for determining

qualified immunity claims, which the court may address in any order. See Pearson v.

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). The doctrine of qualified immunity protects

government officials from liability for civil damages “unless a plaintiff pleads facts

showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the

right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.” Ashcroft v.

al–Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, ––––, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 2080 (2011). 

Under the first prong, “the court determines whether the facts alleged, construed

in the light most favorable to the injured party, establish the violation of a

constitutional right.” Dunn v. Castro, 621 F.3d 1196, 1200 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). As to the second prong, “the court decides

whether the right is clearly established such that a reasonable government official

would have known that ‘his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.’” Id.

at 1199 (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202). Requiring the alleged violation of law to

be “clearly established” “balances. . . the need to hold public officials accountable

when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from

harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” 

Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231. 

In the Ninth Circuit, a “district court should decide the issue of qualified

immunity as a matter of law when “the material, historical facts are not in dispute, and

the only disputesinvolve what inferences properly may be drawn from those historical

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facts.” Conner v. Heiman, 672 F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Peng v. Mei

Chin Penghu, 335 F.3d 970, 979-80 (2003). 

1. Unlawful Arrest

“In the context of an unlawful arrest, then, the two prongs of the qualified

immunity analysis can be summarized as: (1) whether there was probable cause for the

arrest; and (2) whether it is reasonably arguable that there was probable cause for

arrest—that is, whether reasonable officers could disagree asto the legality ofthe arrest

such that the arresting officer is entitled to qualified immunity.” Rosenbaum v.

Washoe Cnty., 663 F.3d 1071, 1076 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Jenkins v. City of New

York, 478 F.3d 76, 87 (2d Cir. 2007) (noting that an officer will not be entitled to

qualified immunity “if officers of reasonable competence would have to agree that the

information possessed by the officer at the time of arrest did not add up to probable

cause”)). 

In this case, as discussed above, the parties present different accounts concerning

the factual circumstances surrounding Flores’ arrest of Plaintiff. Viewing the facts in

the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Defendants have not demonstrated that there are

no questions of fact whether the arrest was unlawful. The Court is unable to assess

whether qualified immunity applies because the material facts underlying Plaintiff’s

claim of unlawful arrest are disputed. See Cameron v. Craig, 713 F.3d 1012, 1022 (9th

Cir. 2013) (“The County Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity at this

juncture as the record does not permit us to decide whether they violated clearly

established law.”); Espinosa v. City and County of San Francisco, 598 F.3d 528, 532

(9th Cir. 2010) (“In this case, the district court properly denied the summary judgment

motion because there are genuine issues of fact regarding whether the officers violated

[the plaintiff's] Fourth Amendment rights. Those unresolved issues of fact are also

material to a proper determination of the reasonableness of the officers’ belief in the

legality of their actions.”); Santos v. Gates, 287 F.3d 846, 855 n. 12 (9th Cir.2002)

(finding it premature to decide whether the officer-defendants were entitled to qualified

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immunity “because whether the officers may be said to have made a ‘reasonable

mistake’ of fact or law may depend on the jury's resolution of disputed facts and the

inferences it draws therefrom”). 

As such, the Court DENIES Defendant Flores’ motion for summary judgment

on the unlawful arrest claim based on qualified immunity. 

2. Excessive Force

The test for whether force was excessive is “objective reasonableness.” Graham

v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 398 (1989). Graham sets out a non-exhaustive list of factors

for evaluating reasonability: (1) the severity of the crime at issue, (2) whether the

suspect posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and (3)

whether the suspect actively resisted arrest or attempted to escape. Id. at 396. Because

this inquiry is fact-sensitive, summary judgment should be granted sparingly. Santos

v. Gates, 287 F.3d 846, 853 (9th Cir. 2002). The “standard requires us to balance the

amount of force applied against the need for that force.” Deorle v. Rutherford, 272

F.3d 1272, 1279 (9th Cir. 2001). Moreover, where force is not needed, any force used

is constitutionally unreasonable. Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 880 (9thCir. 2001); 

Thornton v. City of Macon, 132 F.3d 1395, 1400 (11th Cir.1998) (“Under the

circumstances, the officers were not justified in using any force, and a reasonable

officer thus would have recognized that the force used was excessive.”)

The Fourth Amendment right to be free from the use of excessive force during

an arrest is clearly established. Palmer v. Sanderson, 9 F.3d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir.

1993). “It is well-established that overly tight handcuffing can constitute excessive

force.” Wall v. Cnty. of Orange, 364 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 2004). The issue of

tight handcuffing is usually fact-specific and usually turns on the credibility of the

witnesses and is a question for the jury. LaLonde v. Cnty. of Riverside, 204 F.3d 947,

960 (9th Cir. 2000). The “relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right

is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his

conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. 

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Here, it is undisputed that Flores placed handcuffs on Plaintiff’s wrists and

walked him back to Flores’ patrol car. (Dkt. No. 35-1, SSUF No. 101.) According to

Flores, in the course of searching Plaintiff and before placing him in the patrol car,

Officer Flores doublelocked the handcuffs, which prevents the handcuffs from

tightening. (Dkt. No. 35-1, SSUF Nos. 102, 103.) 

In contrast, Gregoire testified that when he asked Floresto loosen the handcuffs,

he tightened the handcuffs. (Dkt. No. 35-2, Luneau Decl., Ex. 2, Gregoire Depo. at

72:17-23.) Gregoire states that he made two requests to loosen the handcuffs. (Id. at

72:17-23; 74:14-18.) He states that when he asked Flores to loosen the handcuffs,

Plaintiff said that they were extremely tight, he was not going anywhere and he was

cooperating. (Dkt. No. 35-2, Luneau Decl., Ex. 4 at 22.) Plaintiff made a second

request to loosen the handcuffs because they were making his wrists and his shoulders

really hurt, but Flores did not respond. (Id.) Gregoire testified that he has not had any

pain in the wrist area where the handcuffs were and he never sought any medical care

from any type of medical provider for injuriesthat he attributes to the handcuffs. (Dkt.

No. 35-2, Luneau Decl., Ex. 2, Gregoire Depo. at 75:24-76:2; 76:17-23.) 

In looking at the factors laid out in Graham, the crimes allegedly violated, 

Penal Code section 148(a) and Vehicle Code section 2800(a), are not severe, Plaintiff

did not pose an immediate threat to the safety of the officers, and Plaintiff willingly

complied with Flores’ direction to climb over the wall and go to him. The

governmental interest was minimal; therefore, the amount of force used should have

been minimal. 

Based on Plaintiff’s version of the facts, if Flores’ arrest of Plaintiff was

unlawful, use of handcuffs to effectuate his arrest can constitute excessive force. See

Wall v. Cnty. of Orange, 364 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 2004) (reversing the grant of

summary judgment where the deputy violently arrested the plaintiff, handcuffing his

hands tightly, even though there was no probable cause for arrest and the plaintiff was

following the deputy’s instructions); Devermont v. City of Santa Monica, No. CV 12-

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6772 DDP(MRWx), 2014 WL 2969629, at *5 (C.D. Cal. July 1, 2014) (even if

defendant used normal handcuffing procedures, the use of handcuffs was excessive if

there was no probable cause for the arrest). Moreover, the fact that Plaintiff requested

that the handcuffs be loosened because they were tight, and Flores did not loosen them

during the 30 minutes Plaintiff was handcuffed, creates a genuine issue of fact whether

the only reasonable conclusion that the evidence permits is that the force used was

reasonable. See Dillman v. Vasquez, No. 13cv404-LJO, SKO, 2015 WL 881574, at

*12 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2015) (plaintiffs allegation that he made numerous requests for

defendant to loosen the handcuffs yet defendant refused to loosen them for at least 20

to 30 minutes created an issue for the jury). 

Plaintiff has raised an issue of fact whether handcuffing, by itself, was

warranted since there may not have been probable cause to arrest him. In addition,

there is an issue of fact whether Plaintiff’s request to loosen the handcuffs two times

and Flores responded by either tightening the handcuffs and/or not responding

constitutes excessive force. Therefore, the Court cannot determine whether Flores’

belief as to the legality of his actions was reasonable. Thus, the Court DENIES

Defendant Flores’ motion for summary judgment on the excessive force claim based

on qualified immunity. 

D. State Law Causes of Action as to Defendants Flores and the CHP

The complaint alleges state causes of action against Defendant Flores and

Defendant CHP for violation of California Civil Code section 52.1, battery, false

imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Dkt. No. 1-1, Compl.) 

CHP is a defendant based on the theory of respondeat superior pursuant to California

Government Code section 815.2. (Id.)

1. California Civil Code section 52.1 

Defendant summarily argues that since the California Civil Code section 52.1

claim is based solely on an alleged violation of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition

against unreasonable arrests, then this cause of action fails since it has demonstrated

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that Flores had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. Plaintiff also conclusorily opposes

contending that Flores violated Civil Code section 52.1 because Flores did not have

probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. 

California Civil Code section 52.1 establishes a private right of action for

damages and other relief against a person who “interferes by threats, intimidation, or

coercion,” or attempts to so interfere, “with the exercise or enjoyment” of an

individual’s constitutional or other legal right. Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1.

Plaintiff’s cause of action under Civil Code section 52.1 is premised on a

violation of the Fourth Amendment to be free from arrest without probable cause. 

(Dkt. No. 1-1, Compl. at 15.) Since the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment on the claim of unlawful arrest, the Court DENIES Defendants’

motion for summary judgment on the cause of action under California Civil Code

section 52.1 for the same reasons. 

2. Battery

Defendants argue that the facts demonstrate that no excessive force was used

against Plaintiff. Plaintiff argues that the facts are disputed and the question should go

to a jury. 

“The elements of civil battery are: (1) defendant intentionally performed an act

that resulted in a harmful or offensive contact with the plaintiff's person; (2) plaintiff

did not consent to the contact; and (3) the harmful or offensive contact caused injury,

damage, loss or harm to plaintiff.” Brown v. Ransweiler, 171 Cal. App. 4th 516, 526-

27 (2009). “A state law battery claim is a counterpart to a federal claim of excessive

use of force. In both, a plaintiff must prove that the peace officer’s use of force was

unreasonable.” Id. at 527. 

Since the Court found that there are genuine issues of disputed material facts on

the excessive force cause of action, similarly, this conclusion applies to the state law

cause of action for battery. See id. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants’

motion for summary judgment on the battery claim. 

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3. False Imprisonment

Defendants assert that since they demonstrated that there was probable cause to

arrest Plaintiff, the false imprisonment claim fails. Plaintiff disagrees. 

In California, false arrest and false imprisonment are not separate torts. Collins

v. City and Cnty. of San Francisco, 50 Cal. App. 3d 671, 673 (1975). “False arrest is

but one way of committing a false imprisonment, and they are distinguishable only in

terminology.” Id. The probable cause standard for unlawful arrest in California is

similar to the federal standard. See People v. Campa, 36 Cal. 3d 870, 878 (1984);

Ferganchick v. United States, 374 F.2d 559, 560 (9th Cir. 1967). 

Defendant Flores contends he had lawful privilege under California Penal Code

sections 836(a) and 847(b). Section 836(a) allows a peace officer to arrest a person

without a warrant if the officer has probable cause to believe that the person to be

arrested committed a public offense in the officer’s presence. Cal. Penal Code §

836(a). Section 847(b) precludes liability against a peace officer for false arrest or

false imprisonment arising out of a lawful arrest. Cal. Penal Code § 847(b). 

Since the basis of the false imprisonment argument is that Flores had probable

cause to believe the arrest waslawful, and the Court concluded there are genuine issues

of fact as to whether the Plaintiff’s arrest was lawful, the Court DENIES Defendants’

motion for summary judgment on the false imprisonment cause of action. 

4. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Defendants argue that Flores did not engage in outrageous conduct but had

substantial grounds for believing he had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff and was not

aware that Plaintiff was encountering pain from the handcuffs. Plaintiff opposes. 

“A cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress exists when

there is (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of

causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the

plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate

causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct.” Hughes

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v. Pair, 46 Cal. 4th 1035, 1050 (2009) (quoting Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,

6 Cal. 4th 965, 1001 (1993)); see also Christensen v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. 3d 868,

903 (1991). “A defendant’s conduct is ‘outrageous’ [only] when it is so ‘extreme as

to exceed all bound of that [which is] usually tolerated in a civilized community.’” 

Hughes, 46 Cal. 4th at 1050–51 (quoting Potter, 6 Cal. 4th at 1001). “Severe emotional

distress means emotional distress of such substantial . . . or enduring quality that no

reasonable [person] in civilized society should be expected to endure it.” Id. at 1051

(quoting Potter, 6 Cal. 4th at 1004). The California Supreme Court has set a “high bar”

to demonstrate severe emotional distress. Id. Suffering discomfort, worry, anxiety, an

upset stomach, concern and agitation do not constitute emotional distress. Id. 

The complaint alleges that the conduct surrounding the alleged unlawful arrest

and excessive force constitute outrageous conduct with an intent to cause emotional

distress and Plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress as a result of Flores’ conduct. 

(Dkt. No. 1-1, Compl. at 16.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant CHP is liable pursuant

to California Government Code section 815.2.

Defendants assert that the facts in the case do not demonstrate extreme and

outrageous conduct. Flores had grounds to believe he had probable cause to arrest

Plaintiff and cites to paragraphs in the SSUF in support. In addition, as to excessive

force, Plaintiff never told Flores he was encountering pain from the handcuffs and did

not suffer any physical injuries. Plaintiff only stated that the handcuffs were too tight

and he remained in them for about 30 minutes. 

In response, Plaintiff only presentsthe declaration ofRees, the other EMT on the

scene with Plaintiff ,who described Flores’ action as “shocking” and the patient, at the

accident scene, stated “Are you going to fucking leave me here? Are you?” (Dkt. No.

35-5, Rees Decl. ¶¶ 6, 7.) However, these facts alone do not dispute Defendants’ facts

as whether Flores’ conduct was outrageous “with the intention of causing, or reckless

disregard ofthe probability of causing, emotional distress” or whether plaintiffsuffered

severe or extreme emotional distress or whether there was actual or proximate cause. 

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The reaction of the patient or of the other EMT on the scene does not demonstrate

Plaintiff’s emotional state. Plaintiff has not presented any facts to demonstrate the

elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress. 

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to create a genuine

issue of material fact regarding whether the facts surrounding Flores’ alleged unlawful

arrest and alleged excessive force support a claimfor intentional infliction of emotional

distress, and GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this issue. 

As to the Defendant CHP, “[a] public entity is liable for injury proximately

caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of

his employment if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise

to a cause of action against that employee or his personal representative.” Cal. Gov’t

Code § 815.2(a). California’s liability on state entities is based on the doctrine of

respondeat superior for the acts of its employees. Robinson v. Solano Cnty., 278 F.3d

1007, 1016 (9thCir. 2002); A.D. v. State ofCalifornia Highway Patrol., No. C 07-5483

SI, 2009 WL 733872, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2009) (public entity is not vicariously

liable under state law if its employee is not liable). 

In this case, since the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment on this claim as to Flores, and the CHP’s liability is based on respondeat

superior, the Court also GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this

claim as to Defendant CHP. See id. 

E. Evidentiary Objections

Defendants filed objections to Plaintiff’s evidence. (Dkt. No. 42-1.) The Court

notes the objections. To the extent that the evidence is proper under the Federal Rules

of Evidence, the Court considered the evidence. To the extent that the evidence is not

proper, the Court did not consider it. 

Conclusion

Based on the above, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants’

motion for summary judgment. Specifically, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion

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for summary judgment on the cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional

distress, and DENIES Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the remaining

causes of action. The hearing date set for February 19, 2016 shall be vacated. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 16, 2016

HON. GONZALO P. CURIEL

United States District Judge

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