Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_16-cv-00976/USCOURTS-cand-4_16-cv-00976-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 12:1461 Homeowners Loan Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PAUL CHRISTENSEN,

Plaintiff,

v.

JP MORGAN CHASE BANK NA, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 16-cv-00976-PJH 

ORDER DISMISSING CASE WITH 

PREJUDICE

Re: Dkt. No. 33

Before the court is defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint. Dkt. 33. Plaintiff 

Paul Christensen has not responded to the motion or requested an extension of time, and 

the deadline for responding has passed. See L.R. 7-3(a); Dkt. 36. Accordingly, the 

hearing set for October 26, 2016 is VACATED. Having read the defendants’ papers and 

good cause appearing, the court GRANTS the motion, and dismisses the case with 

prejudice.

BACKGROUND

This is home foreclosure case, with federal jurisdiction based on diversity, in which 

Christensen seeks to avoid a foreclosure sale of 3095 Willow Road, Kelseysille, CA (the 

“Property”), following his 2011 default. The two named defendants are JPMorgan Chase 

Bank NA (“Chase”) and Bank of New York Mellon Trust Co. N.A. (“BNY”). Chase was 

the original holder of the deed of trust for Christensen’s loan, which was secured by the 

Property; the deed was subsequently assigned to BNY. See Compl. ¶ 20; Dkt. 34 Exs. 

A–B.1 The complaint, filed on February 29, 2016, asserts seven causes of action based 

 

1 Defendants have filed a request for judicial notice of certain documents in support of 

their motion. Dkt. 34. As these documents are all either public records or records from 

judicial proceedings in state court, the court GRANTS the request and takes notice of the 

documents.

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on various alleged problems with the origination of Christensen’s home loan in 2007 and, 

in particular, the defendants’ failure to approve his loan modification request in 2010. 

Compl. ¶¶ 27–33.

On April 5, 2016, the court held a hearing regarding plaintiff’s ex parte motion to 

restrain a foreclosure sale. The court denied the motion because plaintiff’s attorney 

“could not answer the court’s questions regarding the adequacy of the service of process, 

nor why an appropriate declaration was not filed per Rule 65(b)(1) if service were to be 

excused.” Dkt. 16 at 2. Moreover, “even putting aside the deficiencies with respect to 

service, plaintiff’s papers do not even attempt to meet the legal standard for temporary 

restraining orders.” Id.

At a September 8 case management conference, the court set a hearing date and 

briefing schedule for defendants’ motion to dismiss. Dkt. 32. In compliance with the 

court’s order, defendants filed their motion on September 21. Dkt. 33. Plaintiff’s 

response to the motion was due by October 5, in accordance with the court’s order and 

the Local Rules. To date, no response has been filed.

Although plaintiff’s non-response would be sufficient grounds to support 

dismissal,2the court has reviewed the papers and dismisses on the merits.

DISCUSSION

Defendants’ motion to dismiss asserts several bases for dismissal, including that:

(1) the complaint is barred by res judicata (in particular, claim preclusion); and (2) all of 

plaintiff’s claims are time-barred. Because the court finds that these two grounds are 

meritorious, it declines to consider defendants’ other arguments for dismissal.

A. Legal Standards

1. Res Judicata

A defendant may raise the affirmative defense of res judicata by way of a motion 

to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See Scott v. Kuhlmann, 746 F.2d 1377, 1378 (9th Cir. 

 

2 Because the deadline to respond was set by the court, dismissal would be proper per

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure to comply with a court order. 

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1984). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1738, federal courts are required to give full faith and credit to 

state court judgments. San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco, 545 

U.S. 323, 336 (2005); Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1268 (9th Cir. 2009). To

determine the preclusive effect of a state court judgment, federal courts look to state law. 

Heinrichs v. Valley View Development, 474 F.3d 609, 615 (9th Cir. 2007). 

In California, res judicata describes the preclusive effect of a final judgment on the 

merits, and can take the form of “issue preclusion” or “claim preclusion.” Mycogen Corp. 

v. Monsanto Co., 28 Cal. 4th 888, 896-97 (2002). Claim preclusion prevents “relitigation 

of the same cause of action in a second suit between the same parties or parties in privity 

with them.” Mycogen, 28 Cal. 4th at 896. A claim is barred by claim preclusion if three 

requirements are met: “(1) the second lawsuit must involve the same ‘cause of action’ as 

the first one, (2) there must have been a final judgment on the merits in the first lawsuit 

and (3) the party to be precluded must itself have been a party, or in privity with a party, 

to that first lawsuit.” San Diego Police Officers’ Ass’n v. San Diego City Employees’

Retirement Sys., 568 F.3d 725, 734 (9th Cir. 2009).

2. Statutes of Limitation

Plaintiff’s complaint asserts seven causes of action: (1) deceit; (2) intentional 

misrepresentation; (3) fraud and deceit; (4) negligent misrepresentation; (5) negligence; 

(6) violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law (the “UCL”); and (7) promissory 

estoppel. Compl. ¶¶ 119–209.

In California, the limitations period for negligence and negligent misrepresentation 

is two years. Yun Hee So v. Sook Ja Shin, 212 Cal. App. 4th 652, 662 (2013) 

(negligence); Ventura Cty. Nat. Bank v. Macker, 49 Cal. App. 4th 1528, 1531 (1996)

(negligent misrepresentation). The limitations period for fraud, intentional 

misrepresentation, and promissory estoppel is three years. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 

§ 338(d); Ferguson v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 2:14-CV-00328-KJM, 2014 WL 

2118527, at *6 (E.D. Cal. May 21, 2014) (three-year statute of limitations for promissory 

estoppel when “the gravamen of the promissory estoppel claim is fraud”). The limitations 

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period for a UCL claim is four years. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17208.

In order to toll a statute of limitations based on fraudulent concealment, the plaintiff 

must establish “the substantive elements of fraud and an excuse for late discovery of the 

facts. The requisite showing is made when plaintiff establishes that he was not at fault 

for failing to discover the cause of action and had no actual or presumptive knowledge of 

the facts sufficient to put him on inquiry [notice].” Snyder v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 205 

Cal. App. 3d 1318, 1323 (1988).

B. Analysis

1. Plaintiff’s Claims Are Precluded

Defendants’ argument for claim preclusion is a simple one: this case involves 

exactly the same claims and parties as Case No. CV412881, filed in the Superior Court 

of California, Lake County, on March 7, 2013 (“the state court action”). See Dkt. 34 Ex. 

U. Indeed, the complaint here is an almost a word-for-word copy, save for a few 

paragraphs, of Christensen’s first amended complaint filed in the state court action on 

December 10, 2014. Compare Dkt. 1 with Dkt. 34 Ex. X. In particular, the state court 

complaint asserts the same seven causes of action, and names both Chase and BNY as 

defendants. Dkt. 34 Ex. X at 6. From all appearances, the current complaint appears to 

have been simply cut and pasted from the state court complaint; tellingly, the 2016 

complaint itself describes a 2014 case as “very recent.” Compl. ¶ 173. 

The state court action was litigated to a final judgment. On April 13, 2015, the 

state court sustained a demurrer to Christensen’s amended complaint, dismissed all 

seven claims, and entered judgment in favor of defendants. Dkt. 34 Ex. Y–Z; see also

Ex. W (state court docket).

Under these circumstances, there is no doubt that Christensen’s claims are barred 

by res judicata. The prior state court action involved precisely the same claims and the 

same parties, and was litigated to a final judgment on the merits. All of the requirements 

for claim preclusion having been established, San Diego Police Officers’ Ass’n, 568 F.3d 

at 734, dismissal of the complaint with prejudice is warranted.

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2. Plaintiff’s Claims Are Time-Barred

Plaintiff’s complaint also must be dismissed because all of his claims are timebarred. As discussed above, the longest applicable statute of limitations period is four 

years. At the latest, Christensen’s claims—which primarily concern the defendants’

failure to provide a loan modification and to instead initiate foreclosure—accrued when 

default was recorded against him in February 14, 2011. Dkt. 34 Ex. E. Plaintiff’s 

complaint was not filed in this court until over five years later. Because plaintiff was on 

notice of defendants’ intent to foreclose by 2011, and has established no facts that would

toll the applicable statute of limitations, all of his claims are time-barred.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS the motion to dismiss, and 

dismisses the case WITH PREJUDICE. The clerk shall close the case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 13, 2016

__________________________________

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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