Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01342/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-01342-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

David Lin Seagle,

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles Ryan, et. al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV 10-1342-ROS (MHB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE ROSLYN O. SILVER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

This matter comes before this Court upon consideration of a pro se Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus, filed on June 28, 2010, by Petitioner David Lin Seagle, who is confined in

the Arizona State Prison (Doc. 1). Respondents filed an Answer on September 29, 2010

(Doc. 11). Petitioner filed a Reply, which he titled a “Response to Answer,” on November

15, 2010 (Doc. 9).

BACKGROUND OF STATE COURT PROCEEDINGS

On December 26, 2007, Petitioner entered a plea of guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement,

in the Maricopa County Superior Court of Arizona, to one felony count of Attempted Sexual

Conduct with a Minor and one felony count of Attempted Molestation of a Child. (Doc. 9,

Exh. A.) Petitioner stipulated, in the plea agreement, to a sentence of lifetime probation on

the attempted sexual conduct charge, and to a presumptive, 10-year sentence on the

attempted molestation charge. (Doc. 1-1, at 3.) On May 9, 2008, Petitioner was sentenced

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to the presumptive term of 10-years in prison for Attempted Sexual Conduct with a Minor,

and lifetime probation for Attempted Molestation of a Child. (Id., Exh. B.) 

On July 10, 2008, Petitioner filed a pro se Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (“PCR”),

in the trial court presenting three issues: (1) the trial court abused its discretion when it

sentenced him pursuant to A.R.S. §13-604.01 because the statute did not include attempted

offenses; (2) A.R.S. §13-604.01 was unconstitutionally vague because it did not define the

term “prepatory”; and (3) the application of “prepatory” within A.R.S. §13-604.01 violated

Article IV of the Arizona Constitution “for failure to provide such subject matter within the

title of said law.” (Doc. 9, Exh. C.) On January 6, 2009, the trial court dismissed the

petition, finding that A.R.S. §13-604.01 is not unconstitutionally vague, in that it “provides

persons of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to learn what it prohibits and does

provide explicit standards for those who apply it.” (Id., Exh. D.) The court further found

“that the term ‘prepatory offense’ is sufficiently common and well understood that a person

of ordinary intelligence applying the statute would understand that it encompasses an

attempted offense.” (Id.) The court dismissed Petitioner’s PCR. (Id.)

Petitioner filed a petition for review of the trial court’s decision in the Arizona Court of

Appeals, raising one claim, that A.R.S. §13-604.01 was unconstitutionally vague and

overbroad regarding attempted sexual offenses. (Doc. 9, Exh. E.) The court of appeals

summarily denied relief on March 11, 2010. (Id., Exh. F.) On June 28, 2010, Petitioner filed

his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, raising the following grounds for relief:

Ground One: whether the court had jurisdiction to automatically enhance [Petitioner’s]

sentence absent elements or allegations additional to those essential to prove guilt of

the substantive offense[,]

Ground Two: whether the court, under the color of law, illegally enhanced my sentence

pursuant to A.R.S. 13-604.01 based on questionable statutory language and judicial

interpretation that do not resolve constitutional conflicts relevant to A.R.S. 13-1410[,]

Ground Three: whether the trial court abused it discretion by not sentencing the

defendant pursuant to A.R.S. 13-702 a first-time non dangerous felon violated his

United States Constitutional rights afforded by the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth

amendments whereas to create an illegal sentence[,]

Ground Four: whether non-compliance with due process guarantees of the Fifth, Sixth,

and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution deprives the state courts

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jurisdiction to authorize a sentence enhancement that triples the unenhanced

presumptive sentence when I have not waived my rights to a jury trial[.]

(Doc. 1, at 6-9.)

The Government responds that Petitioner’s grounds for relief are not cognizable on

federal habeas review, and are in any event procedurally defaulted. (Doc. 9.)

DISCUSSION

A. State Claims Cognizable on Habeas Review.

The Court can grant habeas relief “only on the ground that [a petitioner] is in

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(a). “[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court

determinations on state-law questions.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); see

Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990) (“[F]ederal habeas corpus relief does not lie for

errors of state law.”). This includes a trial court’s evidentiary rulings based upon state law

matters unless admission of the evidence was so prejudicial that it offends due process.

Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir. 1995); Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d

918, 919 (9th Cir. 1991). Additionally, a petitioner cannot “transform a state-law issue into

a federal one merely by asserting a violation of due process.” Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d

1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 881 (1997); see Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S.

107, 1120-21 (1982) (“While they attempt to cast their first claim in constitutional terms, we

believe that this claim does no more than suggest that the instructions at respondents’ trials

may have violated state law.”). 

Petitioner claims in Ground One that the trial court erred in imposing an enhanced

sentence pursuant to A.R.S. §13-604.01 because the legislature did not intend it to be

mandatory, and because the statute allegedly allowed “double counting of elements.” (Doc.

1, at 5-16.) In Ground Two, he argues that the trial court erred in interpreting and applying

A.R.S. §13-604.01. (Id., at 18-26.) In Ground Three, Petitioner asserts that the trial court

abused its discretion when it failed to sentence him under A.R.S. §13-702 as a first time, nondangerous offender. (Id., at 8.) In Ground Four, Petitioner argues that, by improperly

applying A.R.S. §13-604.01, the trial court divested itself of jurisdiction, and thus, lacked the

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Petitioner’s arguments are not clearly delineated; he intertwines his claims regarding

the state court’s misinterpretation and misapplication of A.R.S. §13-604.01, with his claim

that the statute, as it relates to sentencing enhancement, is unconstitutionally vague.

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authority to impose sentence. (Id., at 26-32.) Petitioner’s claims that the state court

misinterpreted and misapplied state law1

 are not cognizable on habeas review, and the fact

that Petitioner labels the court’s errors in federal constitutional terms does not transform

these state claims into federal ones. Petitioner’s claims two, three, and four, insofar as they

relate to the misinterpretation and misapplication of state law, are therefore barred from

federal habeas review.

B. Exhaustion and Procedural Default.

A state prisoner must exhaust his remedies in state court before petitioning for a writ of

habeas corpus in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) and (c); Duncan v. Henry, 513

U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995); McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 833 (9th Cir. 1991).

Petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating exhaustion. See Cartwright v. Cupp, 650 F.2d

1103, 1104 (9th Cir. 1981). To properly exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must fairly

present his claims to the state’s highest court in a procedurally appropriate manner. See

O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 839-46 (1999). In Arizona, a petitioner must fairly

present his claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals by properly pursuing them through the

state’s direct appeal process or through appropriate post-conviction relief. See Swoopes v.

Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999); Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir.

1994). In cases not carrying a life sentence or the death penalty, claims are exhausted once

the Arizona Court of Appeals has ruled on them. Swoopes, 196 F.3d at 1010. 

Where a prisoner fails to "fairly present" a claim to the state courts in a procedurally

appropriate manner, his claim is procedurally defaulted. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797,

802-05 (1991); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, at 731-32 (1991).

In Arizona, claims not previously presented to the state courts via either direct appeal or

collateral review are generally barred from federal review because an attempt to return to

state court to present them is futile unless the claims fit in a narrow category of claims for

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which a successive petition is permitted. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d)-(h) & 32.2(a)

(precluding claims not raised on appeal or in prior petitions for post-conviction relief, except

for narrow exceptions); Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4 (time bar); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-

99 (1989). Because Arizona’s preclusion rule (Rule 32.2(a)) is both “independent” and

“adequate,” either its specific application to a claim by an Arizona court, or its operation to

preclude a return to state court to exhaust a claim, will procedurally bar subsequent review

of the merits of that claim by a federal habeas court. See Smith v. Stewart, 241 F.3d 1191,

1195 n.2 (9th Cir. 2001) (“We have held that Arizona’s procedural default rule is regularly

followed [“adequate”] in several cases.”) (citations omitted), reversed on other grounds,

Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856 (2002); see also Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 931-32

(rejecting argument that Arizona courts have not “strictly or regularly followed” Rule 32 of

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure); State v. Mata, 916 P.2d 1035, 1050-52 (Ariz. 1996)

(waiver and preclusion rules strictly applied in post-conviction proceedings).

The federal court will not consider the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim unless a

petitioner can demonstrate that a miscarriage of justice would result, or establish cause for

his noncompliance and actual prejudice. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995);

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750-51; Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1996). Pursuant to

the “cause and prejudice” test, a petitioner must point to some external cause that prevented

him from following the procedural rules of the state court and fairly presenting his claim.

“A showing of cause must ordinarily turn on whether the prisoner can show that some

objective factor external to the defense impeded [the prisoner’s] efforts to comply with the

State’s procedural rule. Thus, “cause is an external impediment such as government

interference or reasonable unavailability of a claim’s factual basis.” Robinson v. Ignacio,

360 F.3d 1044, 1052 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations and internal quotations omitted). Ignorance

of the State’s procedural rules or other forms of general inadvertence or lack of legal training

and a petitioner’s mental condition do not constitute legally cognizable “cause” for a

petitioner’s failure to fairly present his claim. Regarding the “miscarriage of justice,” the

Supreme Court has made clear that a fundamental miscarriage of justice exists when a

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Constitutional violation has resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent. See

Murray, 477 U.S. at 495-96.

Although Petitioner presented a statutory vagueness claim to the state court in his PCR,

he specifically claimed that A.R.S. §13-604.01 was vague because “it [did] not encompass

attempted offenses in the Second Degree, regardless of the victims age.” (Doc. 9, Exh. C,

at 4.) He argued that A.R.S. §13-604.01 “does not tolerate the inclusion of “attempted”

offenses in the text of the statute,” and that the term “prepatory” as set forth in the statute is

unconstitutionally vague. (Id., at 7.) In Petitioner’s petition for review to the court of

appeals, he raised the same singular issue: “whether A.R.S. §13-604.01 is unconstitutionally

vague and overbroad in its application to attempt to commit sex crimes where the statute fails

to provide constructive or reasonable opportunity to discern whether the conduct is

prohibited.” (Id., Exh. E, at 2.) He concludes his petition by asserting that the statute is

“unconstitutionally vague and overbroad in its ambiguous application of attempt to commit

sexual offenses.” (Id., at 8.)

Petitioner does not make this argument in his habeas petition. He argues that the statute

is unconstitutionally vague because it “lends itself to different interpretations but does not,

by any construction, give the courts the authority to enhance a sentence by double counting

elements essential to the substantive offense, without creating grave doubt about its

constitutionality.” (Doc. 1, at 5.) He also argues that the statute permits unlawful

enhancement “by listing an offence under [the] enhancement statute, and then, after

convicting a defendant with the essential element of the offense, use the same element to

enhance his sentence.” (Id., at 47.) Petitioner’s claim in his habeas petition that A.R.S. §13-

604.01 is unconstitutionally vague, is based upon sections of the statute, and theories that

were not raised by Petitioner in state court. See Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 989-90 (9th

Cir. 2002) (habeas petitioner did not fairly present conflict-of-interest Sixth Amendment

claim to Arizona state courts because he presented the federal court with a different conflict

than the conflict of interest claim raised in state court). 

Thus, Petitioner did not raise any of the claims he presents in his habeas petition in the

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state court. Any attempt now to return to state court to present them is futile, as Petitioner’s

claims do not fit in the narrow category of claims for which a successive petition is

permitted. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d)-(h) & 32.2(a).

Petitioner’s claims are therefore procedurally defaulted unless he can demonstrate that a

miscarriage of justice would result, or establish cause for his noncompliance and actual

prejudice. In his Reply, Petitioner argues that he should be excused from the exhaustion

requirement because “newly discovered material facts provide an exception to preclusion,”

but does not identify the “newly discovered” facts. (Doc. 11, at 7.) He also argues

ineffective assistance of counsel because “they failed their primary duty-to ensure a fair trial

- which ultimately prejudiced the petitioner.” (Id., at 8.) Such vague averments are

insufficient to demonstrate a miscarriage of justice or cause and prejudice to excuse

procedural default in this case.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED:

 That the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) be

DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave to

proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because denial of the Petition is justified

by a plain procedural bar, and jurists of reason would not find the procedural bar debatable.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. The parties shall

have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which

to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P.

6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within which to file a response

to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the

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Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to appellate review of the

findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge's

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

DATED this 2nd day of May, 2011.

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