Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-01287/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-01287-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PREETINDER K HUNDAL, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

EAGLE VISTA EQUITIES LLC, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 16-cv-01287-WHO 

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS 

TO DISMISS SECOND AMENDED 

COMPLAINT

Re: Dkt. Nos. 38, 39, 41

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs Preetinder and Nishan Hundal (“the Hundals”) bring this action against 

defendants PLM Loan Management Services, Inc. (“PLM”), Alice Glazer as Trustee of the Glazer 

Living Trust dated 12/30/87 (the “Glazer Living Trust”), and Eagle Vista Equities, LLC (“Eagle 

Vista”). In 2006, the Hundals obtained a mortgage loan secured by a deed of trust on their 

residence. Through assignment and substitution, the Glazer Living Trust became the beneficiary 

under the deed of trust, and PLM the trustee. After the Hundals defaulted, PLM conducted a 

trustee’s sale at which Eagle Vista purchased the property. The Hundals now bring wrongful 

foreclosure and related claims against PLM, Glazer,1and Eagle Vista.

I previously granted PLM and Eagle Vista’s motions to dismiss the Hundals’ first amended 

complaint (“FAC”). Dkt. No. 36 (“Prior Order”). PLM, Glazer, and Eagle Vista now move to 

dismiss the Hundals’ second amended complaint (“SAC”). While most of the Hundals’ claims are 

deficient for the same or similar reasons as those stated in the Prior Order, their breach of contract 

cause of action against Glazer may proceed. PLM and Eagle Vista’s motions to dismiss are 

GRANTED, and Glazer’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

 

1 All references to Glazer in this Order are to her in her capacity as trustee of the Glazer Living 

Trust.

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BACKGROUND

On October 20, 2003, the Hundals borrowed $450,000 from Argent Mortgage Company, 

LLC and secured the transaction with a deed of trust (“First DOT”) against their residence (the 

“Property”). SAC ¶ 2 (Dkt. No. 37). On March 8, 2006, the Hundals borrowed an additional 

$165,000 and again secured the transaction with a deed of trust (“Second DOT”) against the 

Property. Id. ¶ 3; PLM RJN Ex. 2 (Dkt. No. 40).2 The Second DOT was recorded on March 21, 

2006. Second DOT at p.1. The Hundals allege that they borrowed the $165,000 from “Associated 

Real Estate Advisors, a Partnership” (“AREA”). SAC ¶ 3. AREA is identified as the trustee in 

the Second DOT, but it is not identified as the beneficiary or lender. See Second DOT at p.1. 

According to the Second DOT, the beneficiary and lender was Bank of the West as Trustee for the 

Donald A. Glazer IRA (“Bank of the West”). See id. at p.1, Ex. A. Specifically, in the space for

the identity of the beneficiary and lender, the Second DOT states, “SEE ATTACHED EXHIBIT 

A,” and the attached “EXHIBIT A” states in whole:

Bank of the West as Trustee for the 

Donald A. Glazer IRA

C/O Oak Financial Services

P.O. Box 3687

Saratoga, CA 95070

Id. at p.1, Ex. A. In addition to claiming that they borrowed the $165,000 from AREA, the 

Hundals allege that “the lender [under the Second DOT] is Oak Financial Services since this is the 

firm to [which] they made their monthly payments on the loan.” SAC ¶ 3; see also id. ¶ 7.

 

2

PLM’s, Glazer’s, and Eagle Vista’s requests for judicial notice, Dkt. Nos. 38-1, 40, 42, are 

GRANTED. The Hundals’ objections to the requests for judicial notice, Dkt. No. 47, are 

OVERRULED. See Prior Order at 5-6 (discussing the Hundals’ objections to PLM’s previous 

request for judicial notice).

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On January 24, 2008, Bank of the West executed a Substitution of Trustee substituting PLM 

in place of AREA as the trustee under the Second DOT. SAC ¶ 7; PLM RJN Ex. 3 (Dkt. No. 40). 

The Substitution of Trustee was recorded on February 4, 2008.3 PLM RJN Ex. 3.

On May 25, 2012, Bank of the West executed an Assignment of Deed of Trust transferring 

all beneficial interest in the Second DOT from Bank of the West to Glazer. SAC ¶ 5; PLM RJN 

Ex. 4 (Dkt. No. 40). The Assignment of Deed of Trust was recorded on June 4, 2012. PLM RJN 

Ex. 4.

The Hundals defaulted on their obligations under the Second DOT, see, e.g., SAC ¶ 10,4and 

on January 21, 2015, PLM caused to be recorded a Notice of Default and Election to Sell Under 

Deed of Trust, PLM RJN Ex. 5 (Dkt. No. 40). Then, on April 24, 2015, PLM caused to be 

recorded a Notice of Trustee’s Sale identifying the “[a]mount of unpaid balance and other 

charges” as $373,147.98 and setting the trustee’s sale for May 20, 2015. PLM RJN Ex. 6 (Dkt. 

No. 40).

The Hundals filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 13 of the United States Bankruptcy Code in 

the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of California. SAC ¶ 12. On July 

31, 2015, the Bankruptcy Court granted Glazer’s Motion for Relief From the Automatic Stay, 

finding that the Hundals’ bankruptcy petition was part of a scheme to hinder, delay, or defraud 

 

3 On December 22, 2014, Glazer executed another Substitution of Trustee, again substituting PLM 

in place of AREA as the trustee under the Second Deed of Trust. Eagle Vista RJN Ex. E (Dkt. 

No. 38-1). This Substitution of Trustee was recorded on January 21, 2015. Id. As in the prior 

round of briefing, the parties do not address the significance, if any, of there being two different 

substitutions of PLM in place of AREA.

4 At one point in the SAC, the Hundals state that if their payments under the Second DOT to Oak 

Financial Services “had been properly credited [towards the loan], the payments would have been 

current.” SAC ¶ 4. The Hundals do not elaborate on this allegation in the SAC or their briefing, 

and it is unclear whether they mean to allege that they did not default under the Second DOT; 

elsewhere in the SAC, they allege that they did. See, e.g., SAC ¶ 10. The Hundals also allege that 

when PLM became the trustee under the Second DOT, they “were in default on the provisions of 

the [Second DOT] that required [that] all senior lie[n] payments be current,” but that they “had 

secured approval for a loan modification from the servicer on the [First DOT].” Id. ¶ 10. They 

state that they notified PLM of this loan modification, but that PLM “refused to acknowledge the 

correspondence . . . or to rescind the Notice of Default.” Id. However, the Hundals continue to 

focus on the alleged mis-appointment of PLM as trustee and the alleged mis-assignment to Glazer

as beneficiary as the basis for their wrongful foreclosure claim, and it is unclear whether they 

mean to rely on the alleged loan modification in support of that claim.

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creditors and permitting Glazer “to exercise her lawful remedies and lien rights under applicable 

non-bankruptcy law as to [the Property].” PLM RJN Ex. 7 (Dkt. No. 40).

Eagle Vista subsequently purchased the Property at the trustee’s sale for $640,100. PLM 

RJN Ex. 8 (Dkt. No. 40) (“Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale”). PLM remitted $440,784.86 to Glazer and 

allotted $704.55 to the documentary transfer tax, leaving a surplus of $198,610.59. See SAC ¶ 16; 

PLM RJN Ex. 8. When the Hundals filed their FAC, PLM had not yet paid them the surplus 

funds. See Prior Order at 3. According to the SAC, PLM has now done so. The Hundals allege, 

“Prior to this lawsuit being filed, PLM offered to pay plaintiffs $198,610.59 if and only if 

plaintiffs gave up their claims to the balance of the money received by PLM as well as all other 

claims against PLM. After the Joint Case Management Statement was filed, PLM agreed to waive 

this condition and [paid] plaintiffs $198,610.59.” SAC ¶ 16. 

The Hundals filed this action on December 8, 2015 in the Superior Court of California for 

the County of Alameda. Dkt. No. 1. They filed their FAC on February 19, 2016. Id. The FAC 

brought six causes of action against defendants: (1) wrongful foreclosure against all defendants, 

FAC ¶¶ 13-17; (2) breach of fiduciary duty against PLM and Glazer, id. ¶¶ 18-20; (3) violation of 

the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) against PLM and Glazer, id. ¶¶ 21-27; 

(4) breach of contract against PLM and Glazer; (5) dual tracking against PLM and Glazer, id. ¶¶ 

32-35; and (6) violations of California’s Rosenthal Act against PLM and Glazer, id. ¶¶ 36-37. 

On March 16, 2016, PLM removed the case to federal court, asserting federal question 

jurisdiction on the basis of the FDCPA cause of action. Notice of Removal ¶ 2 (Dkt. No. 1). On 

March 23, 2016, PLM and Eagle Vista moved to dismiss. Dkt. Nos 6, 8. On May 20, 2016, I 

issued the Prior Order, granting PLM and Eagle Vista’s motions to dismiss, and on June 3, 2016, 

the Hundals filed the SAC. Dkt. Nos. 36, 37. Defendants filed their motions to dismiss the SAC 

shortly thereafter. I heard argument from the parties on August 31, 2016. Dkt. No. 52. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a complaint to contain “a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), in 

order to “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,” 

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Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotation marks and alterations 

omitted). 

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 

2001). “Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate only where the complaint lacks a cognizable 

legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.” Mendiondo v. Centinela 

Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008). While a complaint “need not contain 

detailed factual allegations” to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “it must plead enough facts to state 

a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1067-68 (9th 

Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). A claim is facially plausible when it 

“allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 

alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

In considering whether a claim satisfies this standard, the court must “accept factual 

allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marines Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 

2008). However, “conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to 

avoid a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.” Cousins, 568 F.3d at 1067 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

A court may “reject, as implausible, allegations that are too speculative to warrant further factual 

development.” Dahlia v. Rodriguez, 735 F.3d 1060, 1076 (9th Cir. 2013)

DISCUSSION

The SAC brings six causes of action: (1) wrongful foreclosure against all defendants, SAC 

¶¶ 20-23; (2) “breach of state law duties” against PLM and Glazer, id. ¶¶ 24-26; (3) violation of 

various provisions of the FDCPA against PLM and Glazer, id. ¶¶ 27-33;5(4) breach of contract 

 

5

Specifically, the Hundals bring FDCPA claims under 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) (for failure to send a 

debt validation notice), 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) (for failure to verify a disputed debt), and 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1692f(1), (6) (for “us[ing] unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect [a] 

debt,” specifically, by attempting to “collec[t] [an] amount [not] expressly authorized by the 

agreement creating the debt or authorized by law,” and by “[t]aking . . . nonjudicial action to effect 

dispossession . . . of property [where] there is no present right to possession of the property 

claimed as collateral through an enforceable security interest”). 

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against Glazer, id. ¶¶ 34-37; (5) dual tracking against PLM and Glazer, id. ¶¶ 38-40; and 

(6) violations of California’s Rosenthal Act against PLM and Glazer, id. ¶¶ 41-42. I address each 

in turn. 

I. WRONGFUL FORECLOSURE

Under their wrongful foreclosure cause of action, the Hundals state that they seek 

cancellation of the Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale and reinstatement of their title in the Property. SAC 

¶ 23. “[T]he elements of an equitable cause of action to set aside a foreclosure sale are: (1) the 

trustee or mortgagee caused an illegal, fraudulent, or willfully oppressive sale of real property 

pursuant to a power of sale in a mortgage or deed of trust; (2) the party attacking the sale (usually 

but not always the trustor or mortgagor) was prejudiced or harmed; and (3) in cases where the 

trustor or mortgagor challenges the sale, the trustor or mortgagor tendered the amount of the 

secured indebtedness or was excused from tendering.” Lona v. Citibank, N.A., 202 Cal. App. 4th 

89, 104 (2011). Circumstances where a plaintiff may be excused from tendering include when 

“(1) the underlying debt is void, (2) the foreclosure sale or trustee’s deed is void on its face, (3) a 

counterclaim offsets the amount due, (4) specific circumstances make it inequitable to enforce the 

debt against the party challenging the sale, or (5) the foreclosure sale has not yet occurred.” 

Chavez v. Indymac Mortgage Servs., 219 Cal. App. 4th 1052, 1062 (2013). 

In the Prior Order, I dismissed the Hundals’ wrongful foreclosure cause of action because 

it was “based on the theory that PLM was never lawfully appointed trustee under the Second DOT 

and thus lacked the authority to conduct the trustee’s sale,” but “the judicially noticeable 

documents in th[e] case establish[ed] that Bank of the West did appoint PLM as trustee under the 

Second DOT.” Prior Order at 5-7.

As alleged in the SAC, the Hundals’ wrongful foreclosure cause of action is based on three 

theories. First, the Hundals assert, as they did in the FAC, that the trustee’s sale was void because 

PLM was never lawfully appointed trustee under the Second DOT and thus lacked the authority to 

conduct the trustee’s sale. SAC ¶ 20. According to the Hundals, only Oak Financial Services 

(and not Bank of the West) had the power to substitute a new trustee. Id. Second, and similarly, 

the Hundals assert that the Donald A. Glazer IRA never conveyed its interest in the Second DOT 

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to Glazer, meaning that Glazer “never had the lawful authority to appoint PLM or any other entity 

as trustee on the [Second DOT].” Id. ¶ 21. Third, the Hundals assert that even if PLM was 

lawfully appointed trustee under the Second DOT, the trustee’s sale was void because of PLM’s 

alleged FDCPA violations. Id. ¶ 22. 

The Hundals’ first wrongful foreclosure theory is essentially identical to the theory I 

addressed and rejected in the Prior Order, and the Hundals’ have not identified any convincing 

basis for reaching a different conclusion here. Their second wrongful foreclosure theory likewise

fails because the judicially noticeable documents in this case show that the Donald A. Glazer IRA 

did covey its interest in the Second DOT to Glazer. See, e.g., PLM RJN Ex. 4. The Hundals have 

not plausibly alleged any defect in that assignment.

The Hundals’ third theory, regarding PLM’s alleged FDCPA violations, comes closer to 

the mark, in particular given that PLM does not dispute that the Hundals have adequately pleaded

that it committed the alleged FDCPA violations. The theory still falls short, however, for at least 

two reasons. First, the Hundals do not dispute that they have not complied with the tender 

requirement, and they have not adequately established that they are excused from doing so. The 

Hundals argue in their opposition brief that they are excused from tendering because the trustee’s 

sale is facially void, but their only apparent grounds for characterizing the trustee’s sale as facially 

void are the alleged mis-appointment of PLM as trustee and the alleged mis-assignment to Glazer

as beneficiary. See Oppo. to PLM & Glazer at 22-23 (Dkt. No. 45). As discussed above and in 

the Prior Order, neither of those theories has merit. The Hundals also assert without explanation 

that other exceptions to the tender requirement also apply, but they do not explain what those 

exceptions are or why they should apply here. See id. In particular given PLM’s alleged FDCPA 

violations, the Hundals may be able to establish that tender is not required here, but they must at 

the very least present a coherent argument to that effect. On this record, their failure to adequately 

allege tender precludes their wrongful foreclosure cause of action. 

Second, the facts alleged in the SAC fail to plausibly establish that Eagle Vista is not a 

bona fide purchaser (“BFP”). “[A] purchaser at foreclosure is a BFP if he or she (1) purchases the 

property in good faith and for value, and (2) has no knowledge or notice of the asserted rights 

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claimed by another.” Melendrez v. D & I Inv., Inc., 127 Cal. App. 4th 1238, 1254 (2005); accord 

Solomon v. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC, No. 12-cv-00209, 2012 WL 4747151, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 

3, 2012); Singh v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. 10-cv-1659, 2012 WL 691705, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 

2012); Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. United States, No. 02-cv-06405, 2007 WL 87827, at *9 

(E.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2007); United States v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 408 Fed. Appx. 3, 5 (9th 

Cir. 2010). The Hundals argue that Eagle Vista does not qualify as a BFP because it was on notice 

that “PLM was probably not validly appointed as the substitute trustee.” Oppo. to Eagle Vista at 

10 (Dkt. No. 46). As discussed above and in the Prior Order, however, the Hundals have not 

plausibly established that PLM was not the validly appointed trustee. Nor have they identified any 

other basis from which to plausibly infer that Eagle Vista is not entitled to BFP status.

“[A]s a general rule, a trustor has no right to set aside a trustee’s deed as against a bona 

fide purchaser for value by attacking the validity of the sale.” Moeller v. Lien, 25 Cal. App. 4th 

822, 831 (1994); see also Melendrez, 127 Cal. App. 4th at 1258. While there are exceptions to 

this general rule, see, e.g., Miller & Starr, 5 Cal. Real Est. §§ 13:254, 13:255 (4th ed.); Melendrez, 

127 Cal. App. 4th at 1256-57, the Hundals have not articulated any plausible basis for concluding 

that any exception applies here. Nor do they allege a damages theory of wrongful foreclosure or

discuss one in their briefing. See Moeller, 25 Cal. App. 4th at 832 (“Where the trustor is 

precluded from suing to set aside the foreclosure sale, the trustor may recover damages from the 

trustee.”); see also Miles v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 236 Cal. App. 4th 394, 408-09 (2015) 

(setting out “the basic elements of a tort cause of action for wrongful foreclosure”); accord Majd 

v. Bank of Am., N.A., 243 Cal. App. 4th 1293, 1306-07 (2015). 

Accordingly, defendants’ motions to dismiss the first cause of action are GRANTED. 

II. “BREACH OF STATE LAW DUTIES”

This cause of action is based on the theory that PLM had an unidentified “state law duty” 

to interplead the entirety of the $640,100.00 rather than pay $440,784.86 to Glazer. See SAC ¶¶ 

24-26. The Hundals previously used this theory as the basis for their breach of fiduciary cause of 

action, and I rejected it in the Prior Order on the ground that the Hundals “ha[d] not identified 

anything in the Second DOT or governing statutes that required PLM to interplead the entirety of 

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the $640,100.” Prior Order at 7. The Hundals again cite no authority indicating that PLM was 

required to interplead the entirety of the $640,100. Nor do they identify any basis for holding 

Glazer liable under this theory – Glazer is not alleged to have been in possession of the entirety of 

the $640,100.00 at any time, or to have otherwise been in a position to interplead that amount. 

PLM’s and Glazer’s motions to dismiss the second cause of action are GRANTED. 

III. VIOLATIONS OF THE FDCPA

Only Glazer moves to dismiss the FDCPA cause of action. See Glazer Mot. at 10-11 (Dkt. 

No. 41); PLM Reply at 4-5 (Dkt. No. 48). She contends that she is not a debt collector under the 

FDCPA, and that the FDCPA does not apply to nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings. Glazer Mot. 

at 10-11. The FDCPA defines “debt collector” as

any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or 

the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the 

collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to 

collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be 

owed or due another.

15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). The FDCPA explicitly excludes from its definition of “debt collector”

any person collecting or attempting to collect any debt owed or due 

or asserted to be owed or due another to the extent such activity (i) 

is incidental to a bona fide fiduciary obligation or a bona fide 

escrow arrangement; (ii) concerns a debt which was originated by 

such person; (iii) concerns a debt which was not in default at the 

time it was obtained by such person; or (iv) concerns a debt obtained 

by such person as a secured party in a commercial credit transaction 

involving the creditor.

15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F).

The Hundals have not adequately alleged that either Glazer or the Glazer Living Trust is a 

“debt collector” under the FDCPA. They include a conclusory allegation in the SAC that “the 

principal purpose of [Glazer’s business] is to collect on debts in default such as the [Second 

DOT],” SAC ¶ 28, but they allege no facts to support that assertion. This is insufficient. See 

Schlegel v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, 720 F.3d 1204, 1209 (9th Cir. 2013) (“The complaint fails to 

provide any factual basis from which we could plausibly infer that the principal purpose of 

[defendant’s] business is debt collection. Rather, the complaint’s factual matter, viewed in the 

light most favorable to [plaintiffs], establishes only that debt collection is some part of 

[defendant’s] business, which is insufficient to state a claim under the FDCPA.”); see also 

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Amelina v. Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co., No. 14-cv-01906, 2015 WL 1138345, at *7 (S.D. 

Cal. Mar. 12, 2015) (dismissing FDCPA claims for “fail[ure] to allege factual content that allows 

the court to draw the reasonable inference that defendants are ‘debt collectors’”) (some internal 

quotation marks omitted); Arostegui v. Bank of Am., No. 13-cv-06009-PJH, 2014 WL 1230762, at 

*6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2014).

6

 Accordingly, Glazer’s motion to dismiss the third cause of action 

is GRANTED. 

IV. BREACH OF CONTRACT

The elements of a claim for breach of contract under California law are: (1) existence of a 

contract; (2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance; (3) defendant’s breach; and 

(4) damages to plaintiff as a result of the breach. Abdelhamid v. Fire Ins. Exch., 182 Cal. App. 4th 

990, 999 (2010); CDF Firefighters v. Maldonado, 158 Cal. App. 4th 1226, 1239 (2008).

The Hundals allege in the SAC that Glazer breached the Second DOT by (1) “wrongfully 

causing a Notice of Default to be recorded [and] the property to be sold by an entity that was not 

lawfully appointed as the trustee;” (2) failing to “promptly refund plaintiffs all funds [Glazer] 

received in excess of the unpaid . . . balance of principal and interest;” and (3) “add[ing] 

substantial charges not authorized by law to the actual amount of default,” specifically, by 

charging “grossly excessive” attorney’s fees “related to securing relief from stay in the bankruptcy 

court,” and by improperly charging both these attorney’s fees and trustee’s fees, instead of just one 

sort of fees or the other. SAC ¶¶ 34-36. In their opposition brief, the Hundals appear to abandon 

their first theory of breach and address only the second and third, stating that Glazer’s “demand 

and retention of more than double the actual debt is an obvious breach of contract.” Oppo. to 

PLM & Glazer at 23; see also id. at 14-16.

The Hundals do not dispute that paragraph 7 of the Second DOT authorized Glazer to 

charge the Hundals with attorney’s fees incurred in protecting her interest in the Second DOT. 

See Oppo. to PLM & Glazer at 14-16; see also Second DOT ¶ 7. The Hundals rely instead on 

 

6 Because I grant Glazer’s motion to dismiss the third cause of action on this ground, I do not 

address the parties’ dispute over whether the FDCPA applies to nonjudicial foreclosure 

proceedings.

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California Civil Code sections 2924c(d) and 2924d, both of which relate to the charging of certain 

attorney’s and trustee’s fees against mortgagors and trustors. The Hundals assert that these 

statutes set a maximum limit on the amount of attorney’s fees Glazer could charge, and also 

prohibited the charging of both attorney’s fees and trustee’s fees. Oppo. to PLM & Glazer at 14-

16.

The Hundals have not shown that sections 2924c(d) and 2924d set a maximum limit on the 

amount of attorney’s fees Glazer could charge. The one relevant case cited by the parties on this 

issue rejects the same argument the Hundals make here:

Plaintiffs assert that . . . section 2924d provides a maximum amount 

which may be charged as trustee’s or attorney’s fees upon a trustee’s 

sale of the property. We disagree. That section provides amounts 

which may be claimed as reasonable costs and expenses of 

foreclosing upon the property, it does not serve to define or limit the 

contractual obligation of the parties. This is the holding of the 

decision in [Buck v. Barb, 147 Cal. App. 3d 920 (1983)]. There the 

plaintiff defaulted on her obligation and as a result the defendant . . . 

was obliged to employ an attorney to protect her security interest. 

The Court of Appeal held that the defendant could claim those 

additional expenses from the plaintiff. They were like any collateral 

advances made by the beneficiary which, pursuant to the deed of 

trust, could be added to the claim. 

Passanisi v. Merit-Mcbride Realtors, Inc., 190 Cal. App. 3d 1496, 1512 n.10 (1987); see also 

Buck, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 925 (“If the beneficiary has incurred additional attorney’s fees for other 

services related to the deed of trust that are recoverable under the deed of trust, he may also be 

entitled to recover them from the trustor as a condition of reinstatement, if they are included in the 

notice of default . . . In this instance, previously incurred attorney’s fees are like any collateral 

advances made by the beneficiary, which may be added to his claim.”) (internal quotation marks 

omitted).

The Hundals cite no contrary authority. They one case they do cite, 167 E. William, LLC 

v. Devine Blessings, No. 04-00164, 2016 WL 2761054 (Cal. Ct. App. May 10, 2016), is an 

unpublished California Court of Appeal decision that does not address what attorney’s fees can or 

cannot be charged under sections 2924d and 2924(c). The Hundals likewise fail to cite any 

authority to support their contention that charging both attorney’s fees and trustee’s fees is per se 

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illegal under California’s framework for nonjudicial foreclosure. See Oppo. to PLM & Glazer at 

14-16.

On the other hand, Glazer cites no authority indicating that the attorney’s fees she 

allegedly charged the Hundals are presumptively legal. Sections 2924c(d) and 2924d both provide 

that “[a]ny charge for trustee’s or attorney’s fees authorized by this subdivision shall be 

conclusively presumed to be lawful and valid where the charge does not exceed the amounts 

authorized herein.” Cal. Civ. Code §§ 2924c(d), 2924d(a), (b), (d) (emphasis added). Here, 

however, the Hundals assert that they were charged fees greater than those authorized by the 

statutory scheme. In the absence of any authority indicating that such fees are presumptively 

legal, I agree with the Hundals that this issue should not be resolved at this juncture. Glazer’s 

motion to dismiss the fourth cause of action is DENIED.

V. DUAL TRACKING

In the Prior Order, I observed that the Hundals had not addressed their dual tracking cause 

of action at all in their opposition brief. Prior Order at 10. I stated, “Given the general state of the 

Hundals’ FAC and opposition brief, I read this as an implicit concession that the cause of action is 

defective as pleaded.” Id. The Hundals again fail to address their dual tracking claim at all in 

their briefing. I again read this as a concession that the cause of action should be dismissed.

See Robertson v. Cty. of Alameda, No. 15-cv-03416-TEH, 2015 WL 6506966, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 

Oct. 28, 2015); Ramirez v. Ghilotti Bros. Inc., 941 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1210-11, 1210 n.7 (N.D. Cal. 

2013). PLM and Glazer’s motions to dismiss the fifth cause of action are GRANTED.

VI. ROSENTHAL ACT

Only Glazer moves to dismiss the Hundals’ Rosenthal Act claims. See Glazer Mot. at 15; 

PLM Reply at 4-5. As with their dual tracking cause of action, the Hundals do not address this 

cause of action at all in their opposition brief. Glazer’s motion to dismiss the sixth cause of action 

is GRANTED.

CONCLUSION

Defendants’ motions to dismiss are resolved as stated above. All claims are dismissed 

with leave to amend, except for the Hundals’ request for cancellation of the Trustee’s Deed Upon 

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Sale and reinstatement of their title in the Property, which is dismissed without leave to amend on 

the ground that further amendment with respect to that issue would be futile. If the Hundals want 

to attempt to bring a wrongful foreclosure claim in this case, they must do so under a tort theory. 

Eagle Vista is DISMISSED from this action WITH PREJUDICE. The Hundals shall file their 

third amended complaint, if any, within 20 days of the date of this Order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 2, 2016

______________________________________

WILLIAM H. ORRICK

United States District Judge

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