Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02043/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02043-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Michael Smalling, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

J. Stearnes, Warden; Arizona Attorney

General, 

Respondents. 

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No. CIV 05-2043-PHX-MHM (DKD)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE MARY H. MURGUIA, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE:

Michael Smalling filed a timely petition for writ of habeas corpus on July 11, 2005,

and an amended petition on November 7, 2005, challenging his convictions following the

entry of guilty pleas. He was convicted of possession of dangerous drugs, burglary, and two

counts of theft of means of transportation, with prior convictions; the trial court imposed

concurrent prison terms, the longest being 13 years. He raises three grounds for habeas

relief: (1) ineffective assistance of trial counsel; (2) a Blakely1

 violation; and (3) denial of

his right to appeal. Respondents contend that his claim of ineffective assistance has been

waived by his guilty plea, that a denial of his right to appeal is a matter of state law not

reviewable in a federal habeas action, and that Blakely does not apply retroactively to his

convictions which were final before the decision was announced. The Court agrees and

recommends that his habeas petition be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

Case 2:05-cv-02043-MHM Document 14 Filed 01/19/07 Page 1 of 3
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Smalling's second post-conviction petition, in which he contends that prison officials

are deducting amounts from his prison account for restitution payments in violation of his

sentence, is not relevant to the issues raised in his federal petition. See Doc. #9, Exh Q-U.

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Although Smalling's conviction became final upon his conviction in 2001, his right

to appeal having been exhausted by operation of law as a result of his guilty plea, the trial

court's use of the later date does not affect this court's decision.

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In February, 2005, Smalling filed another petition in the trial court, alleging a Blakely

violation (Id., Exh DD). The trial court dismissed the petition, finding it untimely, and that

the claims were precluded (Id., Exh EE).

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On June 26, 2001, Smalling pleaded guilty; on September 6, 2001, the trial court

imposed concurrent sentences (Doc. #9, Exh D-I). On September 13, 2001, Smalling filed

a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (Id., Exh J). In May, 2002, following counsel's Notice

of Completion of Post-Conviction Review, Smalling filed a pro per petition, alleging

ineffective assistance, vindictive prosecution, and a sentence in great disparity to the nature

of the crime (Id., Exh L, M). On February 28, 2003, the trial court dismissed his petition,

finding that the sentences imposed were legal, that Smalling was not subjected to double

jeopardy, and that he had failed to establish a colorable claim of ineffective assistance (Id.,

Exh O). On May 12, 2004, his petition for review to the court of appeals was denied (Id.,

Exh X).2

 In July, 2004, Smalling filed a third post-conviction petition, arguing that Blakely

was a significant change in the law that applied to his case (Id., Exh Y). The trial court

dismissed the petition as untimely, finding that Smalling's convictions had become final in

2002, upon dismissal of his initial Rule 32 petition,3

 and as a result, Blakely did not apply.4

His petition for rehearing was also denied (Id., Exh AA, BB).

In his first ground, Smalling contends that his initial attorney was unavailable to

pursue his case to trial, and that the substituted attorney failed to negotiate a fair plea

agreement. A defendant who has pleaded guilty waives all non-jurisdictional challenges, and

is limited in his federal habeas proceeding to a challenge of the voluntary and intelligent

nature of the plea. See Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508 (1984). Smalling does not

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make such an argument; the Court is therefore precluded from reviewing this claim. His

second ground, a claimed Blakely violation, fails because the rule announced in Blakely does

not apply retroactively to cases already final on direct review. See Schardt v. Payne, 414

F.3d 1025, 1038 (9th Cir. 2005). His third ground, that he was denied his right to appeal by

the Arizona Court of Appeals, involves an interpretation of state law, not cognizable in

federal habeas review. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991). 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Michael Smalling's amended petition

for writ of habeas corpus be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE (Doc. #4).

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have ten days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Rules

72, 6(a), 6(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have ten days within

which to file a response to the objections. Failure timely to file objections to the Magistrate

Judge's Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and

Recommendation by the district court without further review. See United States v. ReynaTapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file objections to any factual

determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 19th day of January, 2007.

Case 2:05-cv-02043-MHM Document 14 Filed 01/19/07 Page 3 of 3