Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_21-cv-01840/USCOURTS-azd-2_21-cv-01840-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Mia Glenn,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Commissioner of Social Security 

Administration,

Defendant.

No. CV-21-01840-PHX-MTL

ORDER 

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Mia Glenn’s Counsel’s Motion for Approval 

of Attorney’s Fees Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1). (Doc. 22.) Section 406(b)(1) 

authorizes the recovery of reasonable attorney fees from the award of past-due benefits:

Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant 

under this subchapter who was represented before the court by 

an attorney, the court may determine and allow as part of its 

judgment a reasonable fee for such representation, not in 

excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to 

which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment, and 

the Commissioner of Social Security may, notwithstanding the 

provisions of section 405(i) of this title, but subject to 

subsection (d) of this section, certify the amount of such fee for 

payment to such attorney out of, and not in addition to, the 

amount of such past-due benefits.

42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A).

Plaintiff prevailed in the appeal to this Court from the administrative law judge’s 

decision. In its Notice of Award, the Social Security Administration withheld $18,602 from 

Case 2:21-cv-01840-MTL Document 25 Filed 12/05/23 Page 1 of 2
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Plaintiff’s past-due benefits, representing 25 percent of that amount, to satisfy a potential 

attorney fee award. 

Having successfully litigated this case, Plaintiff’s Counsel seeks an award of 

$18,602.00 in fees from Plaintiff’s recovery. The Court previously awarded Plaintiff 

$5,463.16 in attorney fees and expenses under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”). 

(Doc. 21.) Plaintiff’s Counsel acknowledges that a § 406(b)(1) fee award must be offset by 

the previously awarded EAJA attorney fee.

The Court finds that the representation agreement between Plaintiff and his Counsel 

represents a lawful contingency fee agreement. See Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789 

(2002). The fee agreement provides that, if successful, Ms. Glenn would pay her counsel 

“a fee equal to twenty-five (25) percent of the past-due benefits resulting from my 

claim(s).” (Doc. 22-3.) The Court further finds that the hourly rate of $784.89 for work 

performed before the District Court is a reasonable hourly rate considering the type of 

work, Counsel’s experience, and the contingency nature of the fee agreement. The Court 

finds that the hours expended by Counsel at the District Court (23.7 hours) is reasonable. 

Finally, the Court finds that the requested fee award does not exceed the statutory cap of 

25 percent of the total past-due benefits. 

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the Motion (Doc. 22) is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s Counsel is 

awarded attorney’s fees in the amount of $18,602.00 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Counsel shall reimburse Plaintiff in 

the amount of $5,463.16, representing the EAJA fees previously awarded.

Dated this 5th day of December 2023.

Case 2:21-cv-01840-MTL Document 25 Filed 12/05/23 Page 2 of 2