Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01162/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01162-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Norbert L. Alcaide, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Todd Thomas 

Corrections Corporation of America, 

Defendants.

No. CV-11-01162-JAT-JFM

ORDER 

 Before the Court is Plaintiff ’s Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement (Doc. 29) 

and Defendants’ Motion to Seal Exhibit 1 (Unredacted Declaration of T. Thompson) in 

Support of Defendants’ Response to Plaintiff’s Motion Seeking Request for Relief. (Doc. 

34). The Court now rules on the Motions. 

I. Facts

 Plaintiff Norbert L. Alcaide (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Defendants 

Todd Thomas and the Corrections Corporation of America (“Defendants”) on June 10, 

2011. (Doc. 1). The parties reached a settlement and notified the Court of their agreement 

on January 23, 2012. (Doc. 21). Based upon the stipulation of the parties (Doc. 27), the 

Court dismissed the complaint with prejudice on March 5, 2012. (Doc. 28). 

 On August 17, 2015, Plaintiff filed a “Motion Seeking Request for Relief,” 

claiming he “did not know he was entitled to ‘relief sum’ stated in his complaint.” (Doc. 

29). Plaintiff requested ten thousand dollars in punitive damages “which both parties 

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agreed to settle.” (Doc. 29 at 2).1 On September 11, 2015, Defendants filed a response 

(Doc. 33), lodged an exhibit in support of their response (Doc. 35), and filed a motion to 

seal the exhibit. (Doc. 34). 

II. Analysis 

 A. Plaintiff’s Motion to Enforce Settlement 

 1. Legal Standard 

 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recognizes a district court’s authority to 

enforce settlement agreements in litigation pending before it. See In re City Equities 

Anaheim, Ltd., 22 F.3d 954, 957 (9th Cir. 1994); Calli v. Near, 829 F.2d 888, 890 (9th 

Cir. 1987). State contract law governs whether the parties “reached an enforceable 

agreement settling the federal and state law claims.” Wilcox v. Arpaio, 753 F.3d 872, 876 

(9th Cir. 2014); see Botefur v. City of Eagle Point, Or., 7 F.3d 152, 156 (9th Cir. 1993) 

(“a settlement agreement is governed by principles of state contract law . . . even where a 

federal cause of action is ‘settled’ ”).2

 

 In Arizona, “settlement agreements, including determinations as to the validity and 

scope of release terms, are governed by general contract principles.” Emmons v. Superior 

Court, 968 P.2d 582, 585 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998) (citing Hisel v. Upchurch, 797 F. Supp. 

1509, 1517 (D. Ariz. 1992)). General contract principles require, at a minimum, an offer, 

an acceptance, consideration, and adequate specification of terms so that obligations can 

be ascertained to have an enforceable contract. Rogus v. Lords, 804 P.2d 133, 135 (Ariz. 

Ct. App. 1991). Arizona law requires a mirror image acceptance of an offer to 

consummate an agreement. See Clark v. Compania Ganadera de Cananea, S.A., 385 P.2d 

691, 697 (Ariz. 1963). Thus, the addition of materially different terms to an agreement 

 

1

 The Court interpreted Plaintiff’s motion as a Motion to Enforce Settlement and 

issued an order to that effect on September 3, 2015. (Doc. 31). 

2

 Because Plaintiff’s motion was ambiguous, the Court has not analyzed whether the Court would have the authority to enforce the settlement agreement. Kokkonen v. 

Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 375-76 (1994) (“[E]nforcement of [a] 

settlement agreement is for state courts, unless there is some independent basis for federal jurisdiction.”). 

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results in a counteroffer containing the additional terms instead of being treated as an 

acceptance. See United Cal. Bank v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 681 P.2d 390, 422–23 

(Ariz. Ct. App. 1983) (citing Clark, 385 P.2d 691). 

 “It is well-established that before a binding contract is formed, the parties must 

mutually consent to all material terms. A distinct intent common to both parties must 

exist without doubt or difference, and until all understand alike there can be no assent.” 

Hill–Shafer P’ship v. Chilson Family Trust, 799 P.2d 810, 814 (Ariz. 1990) (en banc). “A 

manifestation of assent sufficient to conclude a contract is not prevented from doing so 

because the parties manifest an intention to memorialize their already made agreement in 

writing.” Rennick v. O.P.T.I.O.N. Care Inc., 77 F.3d 309, 313–14 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing 

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 27 (1981)). A party “attacking a . . . settlement 

‘must bear the burden of showing that the contract he [or she] made is tainted with 

invalidity.’ ” Hisel v. Upchurch, 797 F. Supp. 1509, 1519 (D. Ariz. 1992) (quoting Callen 

v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 332 U.S. 625, 630 (1948)). 

 2. Discussion 

 Plaintiff claims to be entitled to ten thousand dollars in punitive damages. (Doc. 

29). Plaintiff suggests the parties agreed to this amount in their settlement agreement. 

(Doc. 29 at 2). Defendants respond by arguing Plaintiff is not entitled to ten thousand 

dollars and has already received the relief the parties agreed upon. (Doc. 33 at 1). 

Defendants lodged a copy of the parties’ signed settlement agreement, dated March 1, 

2012, to support their argument. (Doc. 35-1). Additionally, Defendants lodged an 

affidavit of T. Thompson (Doc. 35) and a statement from Plaintiff’s inmate account (Doc. 

35-2) as evidence Plaintiff received the settlement amount provided for in the parties’ 

agreement. (Doc. 35-1). Defendants also submitted a signed affidavit of A. Grijalva as 

evidence Plaintiff received additional, nonmonetary relief agreed upon by the parties. 

(Doc. 33-2). 

 In his motion, Plaintiff states he “is not educated in the law” and claims the “relief 

of punitive damages of [ten thousand dollars] which both parties agreed to settle.” (Doc. 

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29). In his reply, Plaintiff claims the “[p]arties agreed to settle the case, the suit was 

dismissed following the settlement. . . . As outlined under [the] settlement [there] must be 

some kind of relief.” (Doc. 36). This could be interpreted to claim that Plaintiff did not 

understand the terms of the settlement agreement and he believed the agreement included 

an award of ten thousand dollars.3

 If Plaintiff is making this claim, he fails to explain why 

he signed the stipulation with the court agreeing to dismiss the case with prejudice. (Doc. 

27). Plaintiff also fails to explain why over three years have elapsed between when the 

case was dismissed and Plaintiff filed this motion. (Doc. 28; Doc. 29). 

 The parties agreed in writing and signaled their intent to be bound to the terms of 

the agreement by signing the document. (Doc. 35-1 at 6). There is no evidence the 

agreement lacked mutual assent. The terms of the settlement agreement are not 

ambiguous, misleading, or otherwise unclear. (Doc. 35-1). The terms of the parties’ 

settlement agreement (Doc. 35-1) do not provide for Plaintiff to receive ten thousand 

dollars. “A party to a settlement cannot avoid the agreement ‘merely because he [or she] 

subsequently believes the settlement is insufficient.’ ” Hisel, 797 F. Supp. At 1519 

(quoting Taylor v. Gordan Flesch Co., Inc., 793 F.2d 858, 863 (7th Cir. 1986)). Plaintiff 

has already received the relief agreed upon by the parties in the settlement agreement. 

(Doc. 35-1). Plaintiff has made no showing why the agreement should now be set aside. 

Thus, the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion. (Doc. 29). 

 B. Defendants’ Motion to Seal Exhibit 1 

 On September 11, 2015, Defendants lodged an unredacted Exhibit 1 (Doc. 35) in 

support of their reply to Plaintiff’s motion (Doc. 33), pursuant to LRCiv. 5.6. The lodged 

document contains an affidavit of T. Thompson. (Doc. 35). Attached to the affidavit is 

the parties’ settlement agreement, Attachment A (Doc. 35-1) and a statement from 

Plaintiff’s inmate account, Attachment B. (Doc. 35-2). Defendants have also filed a 

 

3

 The filings of a pro se plaintiff are generally treated differently than those of a plaintiff represented by counsel. See Christensen v. C.I.R., 786 F.2d 1382, 1384 (9th Cir. 

1986) (citing Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980) (per curiam)) (noting “[t]he Supreme Court has directed federal trial courts to read pro se papers liberally.”). 

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motion to seal the lodged exhibit. (Doc. 34). Defendants claim the exhibit and 

attachments should be sealed because: “(1) the parties agreed to keep the terms of the 

Settlement Agreement confidential, (2) public policy favors keeping settlement 

negotiations and agreements confidential in order to encourage settlement, and (3) safety 

and security concerns unique to the correctional environment favor keeping monetary 

worth of inmates confidential.” (Doc. 34 at 2). 

 1. Legal Standard 

 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recognizes the authority of district courts to 

protect confidential settlement agreements. Phillips ex rel. Estates of Byrd v. Gen. Motors 

Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1212 (9th Cir. 2002). However, it has long been recognized that 

the public has a general right of access “to inspect and copy . . . judicial records and 

documents.” Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978). This right 

extends to all judicial records except those which have “traditionally been kept secret for 

important policy reasons.” Times Mirror Co. v. United States, 873 F.2d 1210, 1219 (9th 

Cir. 1989). Generally, any analysis regarding a motion to seal begins with a “strong 

presumption in favor of [public] access.” Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 

F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003). This presumption is far stronger for dispositive motions 

than non-dispositive because dispositive motions resolve the dispute in lieu of trial. 

Kamakana v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir. 2006). Nondispositive motions and their attachments are often “unrelated, or only tangentially 

related, to the underlying cause of action.” Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 

33 (1984). Therefore, the public’s presumption of access is lessened for a non-dispositive 

motion. Williams v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 290 F.R.D. 600, 604 (E.D. Cal. 2013). Thus, a 

showing of “good cause” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) is sufficient to 

establish a basis to protect a party’s information. Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1135. 

 2. Discussion 

 Defendants argue the Court should seal the Declaration and Attachment A 

because the parties signed a confidentiality agreement. (Doc. 35 at 2). Absent other 

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considerations, an agreement to keep a settlement agreement confidential would fail to 

satisfy the “compelling reasons” standard for dispositive motions. See Gamble v. Arpaio, 

No. CV-12-790-PHX-GMS, 2013 WL 142260, at *5 (D. Ariz. Jan. 11, 2013). However, 

since the exhibit was attached to Defendant’s response (Doc. 33), a nondispositive filing, 

the “good cause” standard of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) applies. Under this standard and with 

the facts unique to this case, a different conclusion is reached. 

 Defendants claim the parties only “reached an agreement because of their 

understanding that it would be kept confidential.” (Doc. 34 at 3). Both public and 

judicial policy favors the settlement of disputes. Churchill Vill., L.L.C. v. Gen. Elec., 361 

F.3d 566, 576 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal citation and quotation omitted); Lundy v. Airtouch 

Commc’ns, Inc., 81 F. Supp. 2d 962, 970 (D. Ariz. 1999). The settlement agreement in 

this case was not part of the judicial record prior to Plaintiff’s motion. (Doc. 29). The 

agreement was provided only to prove Plaintiff is not entitled to the relief he seeks. If 

courts were to allow plaintiffs to circumvent bargained for confidentiality by filing 

baseless claims, it would remove an incentive for parties to settle their disputes and 

simultaneously encourage meritless claims. Balancing the competing interests involved 

and considering the lessened presumption of public access, the promotion of settlement 

agreements outweighs the public need for access in this case. Thus, Defendants have 

demonstrated “good cause” why the unredacted affidavit of T. Thompson (Doc. 35) and 

the parties’ settlement agreement (Doc. 35-1) should be sealed. 

 Defendants’ motion also seeks to seal Plaintiff’s inmate account statement (Doc. 

35-2), “to protect Plaintiff’s safety.” (Doc. 34 at 3-4). “A party asserting good cause bears 

the burden, for each particular document it seeks to protect, of showing that specific 

prejudice or harm will result if no protective order is granted.” See Foltz, 331 F.3d at 

1130 (citation omitted). Defendants claim that if the settlement amount or Plaintiff’s 

account information becomes known, Plaintiff may be blackmailed, assaulted, or attacked 

by other inmates. (Doc. 34 at 3-4). Defendants further assert that inmates with knowledge 

of the settlement agreement or Plaintiff’s account information could use the information 

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to “intimidate or manipulate [their] security personnel or pursue frivolous lawsuits.” 

(Doc. 34 at 4). 

 The “good cause” standard permits the protection of information that may subject 

a party to “annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 26(c)(1). The risk posed to Plaintiff, in a prison environment, meets this showing. 

It is likely that public disclosure of Plaintiff’s account information or details of the 

amount of the parties’ monetary settlement could expose Plaintiff to “oppression” in the 

form of violence or exploitation from other inmates. Thus, Defendants have shown good 

cause why Plaintiff’s inmate account statement (Doc. 35-2) should be sealed. 

III. Conclusion

 Based on the foregoing, 

IT IS ORDERED Plaintiff’s Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement (Doc. 29) 

is DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Seal Exhibit 1 (Doc. 

34) is GRANTED. 

 Dated this 15th day of October, 2015. 

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