Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01588/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01588-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1983 Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

B.O.L.T. an unincorporated 

association of motorcycle

riders and enthusiasts; MARK

TEMPLE; JOHN DALKE; LAWRENCE

“WOLF” HAVEN; NOREEN McNULTY;

WARREN PEARL; LYLE

DUVAUCHELLE; JEFFREY RABE;

DAVID ZALITSKIY; WILLIAM

LANGHORNE; THOMAS BELL; 

ROBERT BALTHORPE II, 

Plaintiffs.

v.

CITY OF RANCHO CORDOVA, a 

political subdivision of the 

State of California; COUNTY

OF SACRAMENTO; a political

subdivision of the State of 

California; RANCHO CORDOVA 

POLICE DEPARTMENT, an 

independent legal agency of

the COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO and 

the CITY OF RANCHO CORDOVA;

SACRAMENTO COUNTY SHERIFF’S

DEPARTMENT; MICHAEL GOOLD, in 

his official capacity as the 

Chief of Police of the

CITY OF RANCHO CORDOVA; 

RANCHO CORDOVA POLICE TRAFFIC 

SERGEANT G. LANE, in his 

individual and official

capacity as Supervisor of the 

Traffic Division; SCOTT R. 

JONES, in his official 

capacity as the SHERIFF of 

the COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO;

RANCHO CORDOVA POLICE OFFICER 

S. CARROZZO; RANCHO CORDOVA 

POLICE OFFICER M. JAMES; 

RANCHO CORDOVA POLICE OFFICER 

S. PADGETT, 

No. 2:14-cv-01588-JAM-KJN

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION

TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO FED. R. 

CIV. P. 12(b)(1)

Case 2:14-cv-01588-JAM-DB Document 56 Filed 01/29/16 Page 1 of 8
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Defendants.

Defendants City of Rancho Cordova, County of 

Sacramento, Rancho Cordova Police Department, Sacramento 

Sheriff’s Department, Michael Goold, Scott Jones, G. Lane, S. 

Carrozzo, M. James, S. Padgett (“Defendants”) move to dismiss the 

municipal liability claim alleged in Plaintiffs’ Second Amended 

Complaint (SAC), under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 

12(b)(1) on the following grounds:

Plaintiffs in this action... filed this 

lawsuit against the Defendant public entities

and several of their employees regarding 

claims over the Defendants’ enforcement of 

motorcycle helmet laws. In summary, 

Plaintiffs allege that they were improperly 

cited for violation of state motorcycle 

helmet safety laws by the individual 

Defendant officers as a result of the failure 

of the public entities to train their 

employees with regard to enforcement of the 

helmet laws. This action now proceeds on the 

Second Amended Complaint which alleges a

single Monell-type claim for declaratory and 

injunctive relief for “future enforcement 

only” for violations of the Fourth Amendment 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983.

The Sacramento County Sheriff Department 

implemented General Order 22/02: Enforcement 

of California’s Mandatory Helmet Law 

(“General Order 22/02”) on August 5, 2015. 

The General Order was adopted by the Rancho 

Cordova Police Department. The General Order 

meets the appropriate legal requirements set 

forth in California Vehicle Code §§ 27800-

27803 and related Ninth Circuit case law. 

Thus, both the Sacramento County Sheriff’s

Department and Rancho Cordova Police 

Department now have an express policy in place 

detailing the policy and procedure for 

personnel for enforcement of California Vehicle 

Code § 27803, which nullifies the Second 

Amended Complaint. Defendants respectfully 

submit the injunctive relief for future 

enforcement requested by the Second Amended 

Case 2:14-cv-01588-JAM-DB Document 56 Filed 01/29/16 Page 2 of 8
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Complaint is therefore rendered moot, this 

court no longer has subject matter jurisdiction 

over Plaintiff’s claim, and request the Second 

Amended Complaint be dismissed with prejudice 

pursuant to F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1).

(Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss (“Mot.”) 2:15-3:6, ECF No. 38.) For the 

reasons stated below, Defendants dismissal motion is DENIED.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

“The objection that a federal court lacks subjectmatter jurisdiction, [under Rule] 12(b)(1), may be raised by a 

party, or by a court on its own initiative, at any stage in the 

litigation, even after trial and entry of judgment.” Arbaugh v. 

Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506 (2006). 

A Rule 12(b)(1) attack may be facial or 

factual. White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 

(9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). In a 

facial attack, the challenger asserts that 

the allegations contained in a complaint are 

insufficient on their face to invoke federal 

jurisdiction. By contrast, in a factual 

attack the challenger disputes the truth of 

the allegations that, by themselves would 

otherwise invoke federal jurisdiction....

....

In resolving a factual attack on 

jurisdiction, the district court may review 

evidence beyond the complaint without 

converting the motion to dismiss into a 

summary judgment. 

Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 

2004).

“‘The presumption of correctness that we accord to

. . . [Plaintiff’s] allegations falls away on the jurisdictional 

issues once a defendant proffers evidence that calls the court’s 

jurisdiction into question.’” Harris v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., Case 

No.: ED CV 13-02329-AB (AGRx), 2015 WL 4694047 at *2 (CD Cal. 

Case 2:14-cv-01588-JAM-DB Document 56 Filed 01/29/16 Page 3 of 8
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August 6, 2015) (quoting Commodity Trend Serv., Inc. v. Commodity 

Futures Trading Comm’n, 149 F.3d 679, 685 (7th Cir. 1998)).

II. BACKGROUND

The dismissal motion concerns the following allegations

in the SAC. Plaintiffs are California residents with “class M1 

motorcycle license[s].” (Pls.’ SAC ¶ 2, ECF No. 31.) Defendants’

enforcement of California’s mandatory helmet law, prescribed by

California Vehicle Code §27803, violates Plaintiffs’ Fourth 

Amendment right to be free from unlawful seizure. (Id. ¶ 147.)

Defendants have failed to ensure that “an officer [has] specific 

probable cause to believe that a motorcyclist has actual 

knowledge of a helmet’s non-compliance before citing that 

motorcyclist for violating the helmet law” as required by

Easyriders Freedom F.I.G.H.T. v. Hannigan, 92 F.3d 1486 (9th Cir. 

1996). (Id.) “The acts of the officers were official policy and 

custom of and are attributable to the entity Defendants who 

employ the officers.” (Id. ¶ 153.) Plaintiffs allege:

... because [D]efendants allow their officers 

to use their own discretion and visual 

criteria in determining which helmets are 

non-conforming and because [P]laintiffs are 

motorcyclists who wear a variety of helmets 

of the type that are not worn by motorcycle 

officers or their own subjective perceptions, 

[P]laintiffs are at real and immediate risk 

of being repeatedly cited for helmet law 

violations.

(Id. ¶ 69.)

Plaintiffs further allege:

Given Defendants clear policy of ticketing 

motorcyclists for non-complying helmets based 

on officers’ discretion and without regard to 

the motorcyclists’ knowledge of noncompliance, and given the irreparable harm 

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from Fourth Amendment violations that cannot 

be adequately compensated at law, Defendants 

must be enjoined to have probable cause to 

believe that the motorcyclists wearing

helmets that were certified at the time of 

purchase have actual knowledge of the 

helmet’s non-compliance with Standard 218.

(Id. ¶ 167.)

Plaintiffs seek declaratory relief “... including but 

not limited to mandatory language in the Sacramento Sherriff

Department Policy Manual and Rancho Cordova Policy Manual, 

defining law enforcement limitations and prohibitions on 

enforcement of CVC 27803; and prohibiting named individual 

officers from citing Plaintiffs without probable cause.” (Id. at

44:25-45:21.) Plaintiffs additionally seek injunctive relief 

“permanently enjoin[ing Defendants]: From citing any motorcyclist 

for suspected violation of Vehicle Code 27803 unless there is 

probable cause [sufficient to satisfy the standard announced in 

Easyriders].” (Id. at 45:22-46:7.)

Defendants contend that General Order 22/02 moots 

Plaintiffs’ claim. (Mot. at 3:2-6.) Specifically, Defendants

argue:

General Order 22/02 for Sacramento County 

Sheriff’s Department and Rancho Cordova 

Police Department was implemented on August 

5, 2015.... The Policy states that: 

“[m]embers of the Sacramento County Sheriff’s

Department will enforce California’s 

Mandatory Helmet Law, currently codified at 

California Vehicle Code 27800 et. Seq., in 

accordance with the terms of the statutes and 

controlling state and federal case law.” With 

regard to the Law and whether a helmet is 

identified as “conforming or non-conforming,”

General Order 22/02 incorporates the 

requirements for safety helmets from the text 

of California Vehicle Code §27802.

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General Order 22/02 also addresses the 

specific intent element of California Vehicle 

Code §27803 and procedure for enforcement. At 

§ II.D., General Order 22/02 states 

“[r]easonable suspicion is required to 

detain, and probable cause is required to 

arrest, a motorist subject to the Mandatory 

Helmet Law.” General Order 22/02 further 

details appropriate procedures to comply with 

California Vehicle Code 27803 at § III.A-B[.]

(Id. at 4:3-17.)

III. DISCUSSION

As noted above, Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’

SAC as moot. Further, Defendants argue that “Plaintiffs have not 

met their burden to establish that this Court has subject matter 

jurisdiction over the remaining claim, nor can they.” (Defs.’ 

Reply (“Reply”) 2:24-26, ECF No. 46.)

“[F]ederal courts are without power to decide questions 

that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before 

them.” North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971). “The

inability of the federal judiciary ‘to review moot cases derives

from the requirement of Art[icle] III of the Constitution under 

which the exercise of judicial power depends upon the existence 

of a case or controversy.’” DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 

316 (1974)(quoting Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U.S. 301, 306 n.3 

(1964)). A claim is moot “when the issues presented are no longer 

live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the 

outcome.” Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721, 726 (2013) 

(quoting Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481 (1982)(per curiam)).

Further, “[a] case becomes moot when the interim relief or events 

have deprived the court of the ability to redress the party’s 

injuries.” United States v. Alder Creek Water Co., 823 F.2d 343, 

Case 2:14-cv-01588-JAM-DB Document 56 Filed 01/29/16 Page 6 of 8
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345 (9th Cir. 1987). 

“There is a line of decisions in this Court standing 

for the proposition that the ‘voluntary cessation of allegedly 

illegal conduct does not deprive the tribunal of power to hear 

and determine the case, i.e., does not make the case moot.’” 

DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 318 (quoting United States v. W.T. Grant 

Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953)). However, “[t]he case may 

nevertheless be moot if the defendant can demonstrate that ‘there 

is no reasonable expectation that the wrong will be repeated[;]’ 

[t]he burden is a heavy one.” W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. at 633 

(quoting United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 

448 (2d. Cir. 1945)).

The Supreme Court has made clear that the 

standard for proving that a case has been 

mooted by a defendant's voluntary conduct is 

“stringent”:

“A case might become moot if subsequent 

events made it absolutely clear that the 

allegedly wrongful behavior could not 

reasonably be expected to recur.” United

States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export 

Ass'n, 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968). The 

“heavy burden of persua[ding]” the court 

that the challenged conduct cannot 

reasonably be expected to start up again 

lies with the party asserting mootness. 

Id.

Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. 

Serv. (TOC), Inc.,528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000);

see also W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632–33

(1953).

White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1243 (9th Cir. 2000).

Defendants have not satisfied their “heavy burden” of 

demonstrating that the alleged wrongful behavior “could not 

reasonably be expected to recur.” Concentrated Phosphate Exp.

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Ass’n, 393 U.S. at 203. Defendants “impermissibly attempt[] to 

shift the burden to [Plaintiffs] to defeat mootness.” Rosemere

Neighborhood Ass’n v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 581 F.3d 

1169, 1173 (2009). While Defendants may ultimately be able to 

satisfy their burden, they have not demonstrated nor even argued 

in their motion to dismiss that the General Order allegedly 

alleviating Plaintiffs’ harms will remain in place such that the 

alleged harm “cannot reasonably be expected to recur.” Therefore, 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction is DENIED.

Dated: January 29, 2016

Case 2:14-cv-01588-JAM-DB Document 56 Filed 01/29/16 Page 8 of 8