Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-07542/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-07542-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1981 Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LAWRENCE HALEY,

Plaintiff,

v.

CLARK CONSTRUCTION GROUPCALIFORNIA, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No. 18-cv-07542-HSG 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 

MOTION TO MODIFY THE 

SCHEDULING ORDER

Re: Dkt. No. 23

Defendant Clark Construction Group-California, Inc. filed a motion to modify the Court’s 

scheduling order. Dkt. No. 23 (“Mot.”). Specifically, Defendant requests that the Court modify 

its order to provide that the scheduled March 23, 2020 trial will be a bench rather than a jury trial. 

Id. at 1. For the reasons articulated below, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion.

I. RELEVANT PROCEDURAL FACTS

Plaintiff Lawrence Haley filed his complaint in San Francisco Superior Court on October 

24, 2018 and served Defendant on November 14, 2018. Dkt. No. 1-1, Ex. A. The Complaint did 

not pray for a jury trial. See id. Defendant filed its answer and removed the action to federal court 

on December 14, 2018. Dkt. No. 1; Dkt. No. 1-2, Ex. B. The parties filed their joint case 

management statement on March 13, 2019, in which Plaintiff for the first time requested a jury 

trial. Dkt. No. 16 at 10. Defendant objected to Plaintiff’s request, arguing that Plaintiff did not 

make a timely jury demand. Id.

In May 2019, the Court issued its scheduling order and set a jury trial for March 2020. 

Dkt. No. 22. Defendant filed this motion, requesting that the Court modify the jury trial to be a 

bench trial. See generally Mot. Plaintiff did not file his opposition to the motion within the 

mandated period of fourteen days, although he was still actively participating in the case. See Civ. 

Case 4:18-cv-07542-HSG Document 56 Filed 09/27/19 Page 1 of 3
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United States District Court

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L.R. 7-3(a). The Court then issued an order to show cause why Defendant’s motion should not be 

granted in light of Plaintiff’s failure to oppose. Dkt. No. 52. Plaintiff filed his response and 

opposition to Defendant’s motion on September 20, 2019, citing an attorney’s illness as the reason 

for counsel’s oversight in filing a timely opposition. Dkt. No. 54 (“Opp.”) at 8. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Although styled as a motion to modify the scheduling order, the substance of Defendant’s 

motion is to strike Plaintiff’s jury demand. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38(b), a party 

may demand a jury trial on any issue triable of right by serving the other parties with a written 

demand “no later than 14 days after the last pleading directed to the issue is served.” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 38(b)(1). If demand is not properly served and filed, then a party waives the right to a jury trial. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(d). In the case of removal proceedings, if all necessary pleadings have been 

served at the time of removal, then a party is entitled to a jury trial if the party serves a demand 

within 14 days after it files a notice of removal, or is served with a notice of removal. Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 81(c)(3).1

If a party fails to make a timely jury demand, the district court may, in its discretion, order 

a jury trial on any issue for which a jury might have been demanded. Fed. R. Civ. P. 39(b). 

However, the Ninth Circuit has held that this “discretion is narrow,” and “does not permit a court 

to grant relief when the failure to make a timely demand results from an oversight or 

inadvertence.” Pac. Fisheries Corp. v. HIH Cas. & Gen. Ins., Ltd., 239 F.3d 1000, 1002 (9th Cir. 

2001) (citations omitted). “An untimely request for a jury trial must be denied unless some cause 

beyond mere inadvertence is shown.” Id. (citations omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff does not dispute that he did not make a jury trial demand when this matter was 

pending in state court. Nor does he dispute that he did not make a jury trial demand within 

fourteen days after Defendant filed its answer and removed this action to state court. See Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 38(b); Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(c)(3). Instead, he proffers that by taking “the first opportunity to 

 

1 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7(a) defines a “pleading” as a complaint, answer to a complaint, 

or a reply to an answer (if the court orders one). Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(a).

Case 4:18-cv-07542-HSG Document 56 Filed 09/27/19 Page 2 of 3
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United States District Court

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advise the court of the expressed demand for jury trial by way of the Initial Joint Case 

Management Conference Statement,” he did not waive his right to a jury trial. Opp. at 5.

The Court disagrees with Plaintiff. It is unambiguous that under either Rule 38 or Rule 81, 

Plaintiff’s request for a jury trial, made three months after removal and the filing of Defendant’s 

answer, is insufficient to constitute a timely jury demand. And Plaintiff’s counsel does not 

provide any reason why the Court, in its discretion, should grant the untimely jury demand. The 

Court is bound by Ninth Circuit law, and given Plaintiff’s failure to show the untimely request 

resulted from more than mere inadvertence or oversight, the Court cannot grant the untimely jury 

demand. See Pac. Fisheries, 239 F.3d at 1002; see also Lutz v. Glendale Union High Sch., 403 

F.3d 1061, 1065 n.4 (9th Cir. 2005) (“had the district judge ordered a jury trial under Rule 39(b),

he would have abused his discretion ... [plaintiff] points to no explanation other than inadvertence 

for her failure to make a timely jury trial request”); Zivkovic v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 

1087 (9th Cir. 2002) (pro se plaintiff’s good faith mistake as to the deadline and requirements 

establishes “no more than inadvertence, which is not a sufficient basis to grant relief from an 

untimely jury demand”); Kletzelman v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 91 F.3d 68, 71 (9th Cir. 

1996) (district court correctly denied motion for jury trial when failure was due to inadvertence or 

oversight); Lewis v. Time Inc., 710 F.2d 549, 556 (9th Cir. 1983) (same); Chandler Supply Co. v. 

GAF Corp., 650 F.2d 983, 988 (9th Cir. 1980) (that the lawyer “was swamped with other work” is 

insufficient to excuse failure to file a timely jury demand).

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IV. CONCLUSION

The Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to modify the scheduling order. The Court

RESETS the schedule as follows: 3-Day Bench Trial set for March 23, 2020 at 8:30 a.m.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 9/27/2019 ______________________________________

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

United States District Judge

2 Plaintiff argues that the Court, in its discretion, should extend time for Plaintiff to file a jury 

demand under Rule 6(b). Opp. at 6. But that “discretion should rarely be exercised” to grant an 

untimely jury request. Rutledge v. Elec. Hose & Rubber Co., 511 F.2d 668, 675 (9th Cir. 1975)

(citation omitted). 

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