Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-93-07243/USCOURTS-caDC-93-07243-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 290
Nature of Suit: Other Real Property Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 6, 1995 Decided March 3, 1995

No. 93-7243

DAVID MONRO SOUDERS;

MARGARET HOPKINS PLANK;

EDMUND ALLISON RENNOLDS, III;

DOROTHY JOAN WARREN;

WEBB L. SMEDLEY;

ANGELA CAULI SMEDLEY,

APPELLANTS

v.

WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(92cv01574)

-Neil D. Intrater argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellants.

Gerard J. Stief, AssociateGeneralCounsel,WashingtonMetropolitanAreaTransit Authority, argued

the cause and filed the brief for appellee. With him on the brief were Robert L. Polk, General

Counsel, and Robert J. Kniaz, Deputy General Counsel, Washington Metropolitan Area Transit

Authority.

Before WALD, SILBERMAN, and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WALD.

WALD, Circuit Judge: Appellants are three married couples who own homes near a section

of Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority ("WMATA") track in Silver Spring, Maryland.

They appeal a district court judgment dismissing their noise nuisance suit against WMATA on the

ground of sovereign immunity. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

In September 1990, WMATA extended its red line service to include surface track passing

close to appellants' homes in Silver Spring. In June 1992, appellants initiated an action against

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1A "decibel" or "dBA" is a unit for measuring sound levels, approximately equal to the smallest

difference in loudness detectable by the human ear. The range runs from 1 dBA, the faintest

audible sound, to 130 dBA. 

2On November 6, 1966, Congress consented to, and enacted for the District of Columbia, the

WMATA Compact. See Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Compact, Pub. L. No.

89-774, 80 Stat. 1324 (1966) ("WMATA Compact"). The Compact created WMATA to operate

a mass transit system for the District of Columbia and the surrounding suburban areas. The

Compact is codified at D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2431 and MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 10-204. 

WMATA in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, alleging that noise from passing

Metrorail trains constituted a nuisance. WMATA timely removed the case to the United States

District Court for the District of Columbia.

Appellants' argument to the district court emphasized the undisputed fact that noise generated

byWMATA'strainsregularlyexceedsthe 55 decibel1 maximumlevelpermitted by the noise pollution

law of Montgomery County, Maryland. See MONTGOMERY COUNTY VA. CODE § 31B-5(b)(1)(b).

Experts on both sides measured sound levelsfrom62 to 73 dBA on appellants' property. Appellants'

expert also obtained a measurement of 81 dBA at a point along WMATA's property line, some

distance from appellants' grounds. Appellants contended that these decibel levels constituted

evidence of a nuisance.

Appellants also argued that faulty welds in WMATA's tracks resulted in "clacking" sounds

louder and more annoying than ordinary train noise. They sought compensatory and injunctive relief,

including replacement tracks and construction of a sound wall to insulate their property. WMATA

has since replaced the tracks in question, but has declined to build a sound wall.

WMATA claimed that sovereign immunity barred appellants' suit. WMATA is an

instrumentality of Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia created by interstate compact,2

which enjoys sovereign immunity except where it has consented to suit. The WMATA Compact

provides a limited waiver of sovereign immunity for torts committed "in the conduct of any

proprietary function," but preserves immunity for torts "occurring in the performance of a

governmentalfunction." See D.C.CODEANN. § 1-2431(80) (1981). WMATA argued to the district

court that it had not built a sound wall in this case because the sound levels at appellants' property

were within WMATA's own sound level guidelines, which permit readings up to 75 dBA on

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3The Morris court declined to decide whether WMATA benefits separately from immunity

conferred by Congress; we find it unnecessary to reach that question here as well. 

appellants' property. WMATA claimed that the alleged tort thus resulted from its exercise of a

"governmental function"the design ofsound level guidelinesfor the Metrorailsystem. Therefore,

WMATA concluded, § 80 of the Compact preserves its sovereign immunity in this case.

In an oral decision pronounced on July 9, 1993, the district court agreed with WMATA's

sovereign immunity argument and entered summary judgment in its favor. In November 1993, the

court denied appellants' motion for reconsideration. They then filed a timely notice of appeal.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Sovereign Immunity

In Morris v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 781 F.2d 218, 222-28 (D.C.

Cir. 1986), we held that WMATA partakes ofthe state sovereign immunity conferred by the eleventh

amendment upon Virginia and Maryland.3 The nub of the present appeal is whether § 80 of the

Compact confers eleventh amendment immunity to a nuisance suit for challenged noise levelsthat fall

within WMATA's adopted guideline policy for the Metrorail system.

Section 80 provides, in pertinent part:

[WMATA] shall be liable for its ... torts [committed] ... in the conduct of any

proprietary function ... but shall not be liable for any torts occurring in the

performance of a governmental function.

D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2431(80). We have already held that "given the state of our society" it is

infeasible to distinguish in every case between public sector ["governmental"] and private sector

["proprietary"] functions. Dant v. District of Columbia, 829 F.2d 69, 74 (D.C. Cir. 1987). We have

therefore interpreted "governmental functions" to include those acts that are "discretionary," as

opposed to those that are purely "ministerial." Id.

Dant also established that the critical inquiry in determining whether a challenged WMATA

action is "discretionary" is whether the action expresses the "political, social, and economic

judgments" of the agency. Id.; see also Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 537 (1988)

(enunciating thissame test for deciding whether an action falls within the "discretionary function" of

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4WMATA's sound level limits closely parallel those adopted by the United States Department

of Transportation, which appear in the DOT's HANDBOOK OF URBAN RAIL NOISE AND VIBRATION

CONTROL B-18 (1982). WMATA's noise ceiling for an "average urban residential" neighborhood,

such as appellants', is 75 dBA. The DOT provides a 75 dBA maximum limit for "average

residential" neighborhoods. 

the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1988)). If so, we presume that

Congressintended to make the WMATA action immune "fromcourtssecond-guessing [its decision]

through private tort suits." Dant, 829 F.2d at 74 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

On its face, certainly WMATA's development of noise level guidelines for the Metrorail

system would appear to be grounded in "political, social, and economic judgments." Appellants

nonetheless offer two objections that merit attention.

First, appellants argue that WMATA has not in fact developed its own noise guidelines. They

claim that the noise level limits cited by WMATA are those of "a trade association which represents

and lobbies on behalf of the private railroad industry." The record does not support this contention.

Rather, it revealsthat WMATA hired two engineering and consulting firmsto aid in developing noise

control measures, both of which conducted considerable original research on behalf of WMATA.

These efforts culminated in WMATA's "Washington Metropolitan Area Transit AuthorityNoise and

Vibration Control Program," ("Program") which itself appears in the record. The Program includes

extensive discussion ofWMATA's goals and methods of controlling noise, as well asthe specific dBA

limits for different types of neighborhoods upon which WMATA relies.4

The record also contains an affidavit from WMATA's expertthe president of one of the

consulting agencies retained by WMATA in developing its guidelinesstating that WMATA does

follow the noise criteria contained in its Program. Indeed, appellants do not dispute that WMATA

has consistently utilized the Program's guidelines in building the Metrorail system. Appellants'

argument thus appearsto reduce to the objection that WMATA never held public hearings or formal

proceedings, nor made any official comments, to "adopt" the Program. We note, however, that the

WMATA Compact imposes no obligation upon WMATA to conduct formal proceedingsin order to

adopt particular design criteria. We therefore find that where WMATA has consistently held the

Program out as embodying its noise level guidelines and has actually followed the Program's limits,

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it would be unduly formalistic to require WMATA to hold an official proceeding before it may be

considered to have adopted the Program in the exercise of its governmental discretion.

In a somewhat similar vein, appellants also contend that conferring immunity on WMATA

because it has developed noise controlcriteriawould somehow permit WMATAto "create" immunity

not intended by Congress. This objection is puzzling, as it runs headlong into the essential logic of

the discretionary function exception to governmental liability. By insulating from liability decisions

involving the balancing of "social, political, and economic" factorswhether under the WMATA

Compact, theFTCA, or elsewhereCongress presumablydid intend to allowgovernment to "create"

immunity by carefully considering a question in policy terms. It is true, as appellants argue, that such

immunity could have substantial and even on occasion undesirable impact if those policies are

ill-considered. But the hard fact remains that insulating policy determinations, good and bad, is the

raison d' etre of the discretionary function exception.

We note that accepting appellants' argument would, in this very case, create a conundrum of

its own. Appellants claim, in essence, that whether particular noise levels generated by WMATA's

trains rise to the level of a nuisance is in each instance a question for jury determination. WMATA

would thus be subject to the different noise ceilings applicable in different localities; indeed, different

juries within the same area might find that a particular noise level is a nuisance in one case but is not

in another. Such diversity of acceptable noise levels would clearly impose an undue burden on

WMATAone, we feel certain, not intended by the Compact's signatories.

B. The Nuisance Exception

Appellants argue that even if WMATA would otherwise benefit from sovereign immunity

under these circumstances, the doctrine does not apply in nuisance suits. This claim represents a

misunderstanding of the law of immunity.

Appellants cite a number of cases that stand for the proposition that a municipal corporation

may not, in many states, assert immunity in a nuisance action. See, e.g., Herilla v. Mayor & City

Council of Baltimore, 37 Md. App. 481, 378 A.2d 162 (1977). But WMATA of course is not a

municipal corporation; as we explain supra at 4, WMATA sharesthe eleventh amendment immunity

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5Appellants contest for the first time on appeal WMATA's classification of their neighborhood

as "average urban residential." They claim that even under WMATA's own Vibration and Noise

Control Program, the proper noise limit in this case is the 70 dBA maximum that applies to "quiet

residential" areas, rather than the 75 dBA ceiling that WMATA selected.

Appellants' failure to present this argument at the district court level is dispositive. The

of both states, Maryland and Virginia. The Maryland Court of Appeals has recently explained the

difference between municipal and state sovereign immunity:

[T]he doctrine ofsovereign or governmental immunity generally protectsthe State of

Maryland from suit unless the immunity has been waived.... Counties and

municipalities, on the other hand, have not been accorded this broad immunity from

suit.... [Indeed], counties and municipalities have [ ] been granted [no] immunity in

contract actions .... [and in] tort actions, [their] liability is limited. As previously

noted, [municipal liability] is inapplicable to nuisance actions.

Board of Education of Prince George's County v. Mayor and Common Council of the Town of

Riverdale, 320 Md. 384, 578 A.2d 207 (1990). Because WMATA benefits from the state-level

immunity of Maryland and Virginia, appellants' claim that WMATA cannot assert immunity in

nuisance suits is incorrect.

C. Beatty v. WMATA

Appellants next raise Beatty v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 860 F.2d

1117 (D.C. Cir. 1988), as compelling a decision in their favor. We, on the other hand, find Beatty

inapposite. In Beatty, the plaintiff had alleged that WMATA's design called for iron beams to be

placed on both sides of the tracks near her home to damp vibrations; she claimed that WMATA had

"forgotten to put them on the east side of the tracks." Id. at 1127. We observed that WMATA

"h[ad] not sought to refute the claim" that its design required such beams, and therefore reversed the

district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of WMATA because a genuine issue of fact

existed as to whether the alleged nuisance resulted from a governmental ("design") or proprietary

("implementation") function.

In contrast, appellants here do not object that WMATA has failed properly to implement its

design. The Noise and Vibration Control Program demonstrates that WMATA's design does not

contemplate corrective action until sound levels exceed 75 dBA in "average urban residential" areas

such as that in which appellants reside.5 Because the highest level recorded on appellants' property

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general rule in this circuit is that "arguments not made below are deemed waived, and absent

exceptional circumstances" are not presented on appeal. Marymount Hospital v. Shalala, 19 F.3d

658, 663 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 

by either expert was 73 dBA, we find that WMATA's design was appropriately implemented in this

case.

D. The 81 dBA Reading

Finally, appellants claim that even if we find that WMATA's 75 dBA design standard

immunizes it from suit for levels beneath that ceiling, it should be liable here because appellants

obtained at least one measurement of 81 dBA. Appellants point out that they included the 81 dBA

figure in their opposition to WMATA's motion for summary judgment, and argue that a trial is

necessary if WMATA disputes the figure.

WMATA responds that the 81 dBA figure is irrelevant for two reasons. First, WMATA

observes that the sound level was not procured as directed by the guidelines: "The[ noise level]

criteria are related ... in residential areas... to the building or area being considered." It is undisputed

that an abandoned avenue and an additional set of train tracks are located between appellants'

property line and the point along the Metro property fence where the 81 dBA measurement was

made.

Second, WMATA argues that because the 81 dBA level was not observed at any point on

appellants' property, it could not possibly support a claim of nuisance. Indeed, nuisance is defined

as "an interference with the interest in the private use and enjoyment of the land," see, e.g., Beatty,

860 F.2d at 1122 (emphasis added); WMATA is therefore clearly correct that appellants cannot

maintain a nuisance suit on the basis of a noise level that did not exist on their property.

III. CONCLUSION

We agree with the district court that appellants' suit was barred by WMATA's sovereign

immunity; the decision below is therefore

Affirmed.

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