Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02007/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02007-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Personal Injury

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SERGEY VOYCHUK,

2:05-CV-2007-MCE-GGH

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

STATE OF CALIFORNIA and 

JEFF GEORGE,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Through the present action, Plaintiff Sergey Voychuk

(“Voychuk”) claims that Defendants State of California and

California Highway Patrol Officer Jeff George (“George”)

(collectively “Defendants”) violated his civil rights as well as

caused him physical and emotional injury by using excessive force

to effect his arrest. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges federal

claims under the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (“Section 1983"), 42

U.S.C. § 1983 and state claims for personal injury and

intentional infliction of emotional distress.

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Case 2:05-cv-02007-MCE -GGH Document 18 Filed 03/22/06 Page 1 of 6
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Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 1

the Court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal.

Local Rule 78-230(h). 

2

Defendants now seek to have this proceeding stayed until the

completion of Voychuk’s state criminal proceedings. For the

reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motion is granted.1

BACKGROUND

On October 2, 2004, Officer George and his partner, Amy

Escatel, signaled Voychuk to pull over for a possible vehicle

code violation. Rather than stopping as instructed, Voychuk

allegedly fled from the officers leading them on a high speed

vehicle chase. Ultimately, the chase concluded when Voychuk

entered a cul-de-sac followed by two patrol vehicles. The

officers immediately directed him to exit his vehicle. The

subsequent events are hotly contested, however, it is clear

Officer George discharged his service weapon striking Voychuk in

the back rendering him permanently paralyzed.

On November 16, 2004, a complaint was filed in the Superior

Court of California, County of Sacramento (“State Proceeding”)

charging Voychuk with felony fleeing, assault with a deadly

weapon, driving under the influence of alcohol and driving with a

suspended license. On August 11, 2005, Voychuk filed a civil

complaint for personal injuries in the Superior Court of

California, County of Sacramento. That action was removed to

this Court and is the subject of the present motion.

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3

ANALYSIS

As noted above, Defendants move to stay the present action

on the ground that the Court should abstain from adjudicating

this matter pursuant to the Younger doctrine. In Younger v.

Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S. Ct. 746, 27 L. Ed. 2d 669 (1971), the

Supreme Court "espouse[d] a strong federal policy against

federal-court interference with pending state judicial

proceedings." H.C. v. Koppel, 203 F.3d 610, 613 (9th Cir. 2000)

(citing Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n.,

457 U.S. 423, 431, 73 L. Ed. 2d 116, 102 S. Ct. 2515 (1982)). 

“Abstention is required when: (i) the state proceedings are

ongoing; (ii) the proceedings implicate important state

interests; and (iii) the state proceedings provide an adequate

opportunity to raise federal questions.” Meredith v. Oregon, 321

F.3d 807, 816 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Both Parties concede, and the Court concurs, that the first

two prongs of the Younger doctrine are satisfied in the case at

bar. Specifically, the State Proceeding is ongoing and

implicates important state interests. The Parties diverge,

however, on whether the third Younger prong has been satisfied. 

Voychuk avers he will have no opportunity to litigate his federal

claims in the State Proceedings precluding a finding that Younger

abstention applies. Conversely, Defendants argue that Voychuk

not only can assert his federal excessive force claim in the

parallel State Proceeding, he is in fact doing so. Def. Reply,

p. 2. For the reasons set forth below, the Court agrees with

Defendants.

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Indeed, it appears Voychuk is raising this precise issue in 2

defense of the charges against him. Specifically, he argues in

his Motion for Disclosure of Peace Officer Personnel Records that

“Officer George used excessive force thereby making the arrest

illegal and otherwise improper.” Supplemental Request for

Judicial Notice, Exhibit G, p. 5:4-5. 

4

As an initial matter, the Ninth Circuit has explained that

Younger requires only the absence of procedural bars to raising a

federal claim in the state proceedings." Comm. Telesystems Int’l

v. Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 196 F.3d 1011, 1015 (9th Cir. 1999);

see also Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 14, 95 L. Ed.

2d 1, 107 S. Ct. 1519 (1987). Younger abstention "presupposes

the opportunity to raise and have timely decided by a competent

state tribunal the federal issues involved." Gibson v.

Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 577, 36 L. Ed. 2d 488, 93 S. Ct. 1689

(1973).

Defendants correctly observe that there are no procedural

bars to Voychuk raising his claim that Officer George used

excessive force while effecting Voychuk’s arrest. In fact,

Voychuk is free to defend against certain of the charges in the

State Proceeding by alleging a claim of excessive force.2

Specifically, counts Two, Three, Four and Five of the complaint

in the State Proceeding charge Voychuk with violating California

Penal Code section 245(c), assault with a deadly weapon on a

peace officer. An element of proof for that charge is that the

assault occur while the peace officer “is engaged in the

performance of his or her duties.” Cal. Penal Code § 245(c). 

However, to be “engaged in the performance of his or her duties,”

an officer must be lawfully performing those duties during

commission of the offense. 

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5

People v. Olguin, 119 Cal. App. 3d 39, 46 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981). 

An officer using excessive force during an arrest is not engaged

in the lawful performance of his duties. Id. Because there are

no procedural bars to raising his claim of excessive force in the

State Proceeding and because Voychuk can, in fact, raise his

claim of excessive force in the State Proceeding, the third prong

of Younger is satisfied. 

Given the Court’s determination that Younger principles

apply to this action, the next consideration is whether

adjudication of Voychuk’s claims would enjoin the State

Proceeding or have the practical effect of doing so. Gilbertson,

381 F.3d at 978. Defendants allege that adjudication of

Voychuk’s constitutional claims in this forum would have the

practical effect of enjoining the State Proceeding because, in

addition to the defense of excessive force discussed above,

George has raised the defense of qualified immunity to Voychuk’s

federal claims. Again, the Court agrees with Defendants. 

To determine whether a federal defendant is entitled to

qualified immunity, the district court must first decide whether

a constitutional violation has occurred. See Saucier v. Katz, 533

U.S. 194, 150 L. Ed. 2d 272, 121 S. Ct. 2151 (2001) (holding that

the first step in qualified immunity analysis is to determine

whether the conduct complained of violates the Constitution). By

deciding whether Officer George violated Voychuk’s constitutional

rights in employing excessive force during Voychuk’s arrest, the

Court would be passing upon a constitutional issue that is

squarely before the state court. 

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Engaging in such a determination would cast a negative light on

the state court’s ability to enforce constitutional principles

and put the federal court in the position of prematurely or

unnecessarily deciding a question of federal constitutional law. 

Gilbertson, 381 F.3d at 979-980. In that way, a determination

that Voychuk’s constitutional rights were violated would be just

as intrusive as a declaratory judgment. Id.

When damages are sought and Younger principles apply, it

makes sense for the federal court to refrain from exercising

jurisdiction temporarily by staying the proceedings until such

time as the state proceeding is no longer pending. Id. By

staying the proceedings, the Court protects both Voychuk’s right

to seek damages for constitutional violations in the forum of his

choice and California’s right to dispense justice through its own

system without federal interference.

CONCLUSION

Because the principles of Younger apply to the case at bar,

this Court refrains from exercising its jurisdiction over

Voychuk’s claims until the State Proceeding is no longer pending.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 21, 2006

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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