Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-00965/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-00965-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 09cv965 BTM(WMc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILFREDO A GOLEZ,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 09cv965 BTM(WMc)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO

DISMISS; GRANTING MOTION TO

STRIKE; GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART MOTION TO

FILE FOURTH AMENDED

COMPLAINT

v.

JOHN E. POTTER, POSTMASTER

GENERAL,

Defendant.

Defendant has filed a motion to dismiss certain claims in Plaintiff’s Third Amended

Complaint and a motion to strike certain allegations. Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, has filed

a motion to amend his complaint. For the reasons discussed below, Defendant’s motion to

dismiss is GRANTED, Defendant’s motion to strike is GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s motion to

amend his complaint is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

I. BACKGROUND

In his Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”), Plaintiff alleges that he was employed as

a custodian by the United States Postal Service from February 1998 until his termination in

July 2008 (TAC ¶¶ 4, 8.) Plaintiff alleges that beginning around 2004, Defendant took

adverse employment actions against him, including, inter alia, disapproving leave requests,

disapproving transfer requests, suspending him and attempting to remove him, disapproving

Case 3:09-cv-00965-AJB-WMC Document 56 Filed 07/12/10 Page 1 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 09cv965 BTM(WMc)

light duty requests, marking Plaintiff AWOL, and ultimately terminating him.

Plaintiff asserts the following claims: (1) violation of the FMLA; (2) violation of the

California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”); (3) violation of California public policy;

(4) wrongful termination; (5) EEO discrimination; (6) negligent supervision/retention; (7)

intentional infliction of emotional distress. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Dismiss

Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s state law claims for violation of FEHA, violation

of California public policy, wrongful termination, negligent supervision/retention, and

intentional infliction of emotional distress on the ground that Plaintiff’s exclusive remedy for

the alleged violation of his workplace rights is under federal law. The Court agrees.

Plaintiff’s second cause of action under FEHA alleges that Plaintiff suffers from

disabilities and that Defendant failed to accommodate him. However, any claim of disability

discrimination against a federal agency must be brought under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,

29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794. See Boyd v. United States Postal Service, 752 F.2d 410, 413 (9th

Cir. 1985) (holding that § 501 of the Rehabilitation Act is “the exclusive remedy for

discrimination by the Postal Service on the basis of handicap.”) Therefore, Plaintiff’s FEHA

claim is dismissed. Because Plaintiff has not asserted a claim under the Rehabilitation Act,

the Court will allow Plaintiff to amend his Complaint to add a claim for violation of the

Rehabilitation Act.

Plaintiff’s third cause of action generally alleges discrimination based on age, gender,

disability, race, and national origin (TAC ¶ 82). As discussed above, any claim of disability

discrimination is governed by the Rehabilitation Act. As for Plaintiff’s other claims of

discrimination, the TAC’s factual allegations pertain to race and/or gender discrimination

only. (TAC ¶¶ 46, 76). Section 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16,

provides the exclusive remedy for federal employees complaining of job-related

discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Brown v. General

Case 3:09-cv-00965-AJB-WMC Document 56 Filed 07/12/10 Page 2 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 Plaintiff’s Fifth Cause of Action is for “Equal Employment Opportunity Discrimination.”

The Court construes this claim as a claim under § 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

 

2

 The CSRA is not to be construed to extinguish or lessen any right or remedy

available to any employee or applicant for employment in the civil service under § 717 of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964 or § 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(e). In

contrast, claims under Title II of the FMLA (applicable to federal civil service employees with

more than twelve months of service) are preempted by the CSRA. Russell v. United States

Dept. of the Army, 191 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 1999). If Plaintiff is a Title II employee, his FMLA

claims are preempted. However, Defendant has not moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s FMLA claim

at this time.

3 09cv965 BTM(WMc)

Services Administration, 425 U.S. 820, 835 (1976). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s state claim for

race and/or gender discrimination is dismissed.1

Plaintiff’s third cause of action also alleges that Defendant retaliated against Plaintiff

for “engaging in protected activities, namely filing [a] report to OSHA.” However, any claim

that Defendant took prohibited personnel actions against him as a result of his whistleblowing

activities must be brought under the Civil Service Reform Act (“CSRA”). By enacting the

CSRA, Congress established “an integrated scheme of administrative and judicial review,

designed to balance the legitimate interests of the various categories of federal employees

with the needs of sound and efficient administration.” United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439,

445 (1988). If conduct challenged by the plaintiff falls within the scope of the CSRA’s

“prohibited personnel practices,” then the CSRA’s administrative procedures are the

employee’s only remedy. Mangano v. United States, 529 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2008).

The CSRA specifically prohibits personnel actions taken in retaliation for an employee

reporting (1) a violation of any law, rule, or regulation; or (2) a substantial and specific danger

to public health and safety. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A). Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim of

retaliation for whistleblowing must be dismissed. See Rivera v. United States, 924 F.2d 948

(9th Cir. 1991) (holding that the Whistleblower Protection Act does not authorize government

employees to bring FTCA claims arising out of conduct addressed by the CSRA); Chrisanthis

v. United States, 2008 WL 48487674 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2008) (dismissing plaintiff’s FTCA

claim that the federal government retaliated against him for filing an OSHA complaint

because CSRA was exclusive remedy). 2

 

Case 3:09-cv-00965-AJB-WMC Document 56 Filed 07/12/10 Page 3 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4 09cv965 BTM(WMc)

Plaintiff’s fourth claim for wrongful termination, sixth claim for negligent supervision

and/or retention, and seventh claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, are

premised on the acts of alleged discrimination governed by the federal statutes discussed

above. Therefore, these state claims are dismissed as well.

B. Motion to Strike

Defendant moves to strike Plaintiff’s Doe allegations (TAC ¶ 6) on the ground that the

Postmaster General is the only proper defendant in this case. Defendant’s motion is granted.

John E. Potter in his official capacity as Postmaster General, as the “head of the department,

agency, or unit,” is the only proper defendant. See 42 U.S.C. § 2006e-16(c); 29 U.S.C. §

794a(a)(1). Therefore, there is no need for Doe defendants. 

Defendant also moves to strike Plaintiff’s request for punitive and exemplary

damages. (TAC ¶¶ 68, 79, 87, 92, 100, 103, 107; Prayer for Relief, ¶ 4.) Under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1981a(b)(1), a Title VII plaintiff may recover punitive damages “against a respondent (other

than a government, government agency, or political subdivision) . . . .” The Postal Service

is a “government agency” for purposes of section 1981. Baker v. Runyon, 114 F.3d 668 (7th

Cir. 1997); Robinson v. Runyon, 149 F.3d 507 (6th Cir. 1998). Therefore, Plaintiff cannot

recover punitive damages against Defendant, and his allegations regarding such relief are

stricken. 

C. Leave to Amend

Plaintiff has requested leave to amend his complaint once more. The Court DENIES

Plaintiff’s request as it pertains to the state claims dismissed by the Court. These state

claims cannot be salvaged by amending the pleadings. However, the Court GRANTS

Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint to allege a claim under § 501 of the Rehabilitation Act.

In keeping with this Order, the Fourth Amended Complaint (1) should reassert Plaintiff’s

federal claims under the FMLA and Title VII; (2) should include a claim for disability

discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act; (3) should not include the state claims dismissed

Case 3:09-cv-00965-AJB-WMC Document 56 Filed 07/12/10 Page 4 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5 09cv965 BTM(WMc)

in this order; and (4) should not include allegations pertaining to punitive or exemplary

damages. The Fourth Amended Complaint should be complete in and of itself and should

not refer to previously filed complaints. Civ.L.R. 15.1.

Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Complaint must be filed within 25 days of the filing

of this order. If Plaintiff does not file a Fourth Amended Complaint, Defendant shall

answer the TAC within 45 days of the filing of this order.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

Plaintiff’s second, third, fourth, sixth, and seventh claims are DISMISSED for failure to state

a claim. Defendant’s motion to strike is GRANTED. The Court strikes Plaintiff’s Doe

allegations (TAC ¶ 6) and the allegations pertaining to punitive and exemplary damages

(TAC ¶¶ 68, 79, 87, 92, 100, 103, 107; Prayer for Relief, ¶ 4.) Plaintiff’s motion to amend his

complaint is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Plaintiff is granted limited leave

to amend his complaint to add a claim under § 501 of the Rehabilitation Act.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 12, 2010

Honorable Barry Ted Moskowitz

United States District Judge

Case 3:09-cv-00965-AJB-WMC Document 56 Filed 07/12/10 Page 5 of 5