Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01464/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01464-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 

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NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

HIGH POINT DESIGN LLC,

Plaintiff-Appellee

MEIJER, INC., SEARS HOLDINGS CORPORATION, 

WAL-MART STORES, INC.,

Third Party Defendants-Appellees

v. 

BUYER’S DIRECT, INC.,

Defendant/Third Party Plaintiff-Appellant

______________________ 

2014-1464

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of New York in No. 1:11-cv-04530-KBF, 

Judge Katherine B. Forrest.

______________________ 

Decided: July 30, 2015

______________________ 

MARK S. DAVIES, Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, 

Washington, DC, argued for plaintiff-appellee and third 

party defendants-appellees. Also represented by ROBERT 

M. ISACKSON, RACHEL WAINER APTER, NICHOLAS H. LAM, 

New York, NY; JEFFREY MARK KADEN, DAVID S. KASHMAN,

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2 HIGH POINT DESIGN LLC v. BUYER’S DIRECT, INC. 

MARIA A. SAVIO, ARIEL S. PEIKES, Gottlieb Rackman & 

Reisman, P.C., New York, NY. 

ANDREW M. OLLIS, Oblon, Spivak, McClelland, Maier 

& Neustadt, LLP, Alexandria, VA, argued for defendant/third party plaintiff-appellant. Also represented by 

TIA DAE FENTON, LISA MANDRUSIAK, CHRISTOPHER 

RICCIUTI.

_____________________ 

Before DYK, SCHALL, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.

CHEN, Circuit Judge. 

This is the second time this case has been appealed to 

our court. In High Point Design LLC v. Buyers Direct, 

Inc., 730 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“High Point I”), we 

reversed the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York’s grant of summary judgment of 

invalidity of the design patent belonging to Buyers Direct, 

Inc. (BDI). We ruled that the district court made various 

errors in finding the claimed design obvious, including 

that it applied the wrong legal standard and failed to 

adequately explain how it reached the conclusion that the 

prior art created “basically the same” visual impression as 

the patented design. Id. at 1313–14. We also vacated the 

district court’s dismissal of BDI’s trade dress infringement claim because there was insufficient basis for this 

court to review the district court’s decision to deny BDI 

the opportunity to amend the complaint. Id. at 1319–20. 

On remand, the district court again granted summary 

judgment, finding that: (1) the asserted patent was anticipated; (2) the accused products did not infringe; (3) BDI 

was not entitled to additional discovery on infringement 

issues; and (4) BDI failed to show “good cause” for allowing its amendments to the complaint after the deadline in 

the scheduling order. High Point Design LLC v. Buyer’s 

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HIGH POINT DESIGN LLC v. BUYER’S DIRECT, INC. 3

Direct Inc., No. 11 CIV. 4530 KBF, 2014 WL 1244558, at 

*7–9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2014) (“Remand Order”). 

BDI challenges each of these determinations on appeal. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse summary judgment of invalidity, affirm summary judgment of 

non-infringement, affirm the denial of BDI’s motion for 

additional discovery, and affirm the denial of BDI’s motion to amend the complaint. 

I. BACKGROUND

The background of the case is set forth in High Point I

and the Remand Order. We recount below only the facts 

pertinent to the issues on appeal.

BDI owns a design patent for the ornamental appearance of a fuzzy slipper, U.S. Patent No. D598,183 (the 

D’183 patent). The D’183 patent is entitled “Slipper,” and 

recites one claim for “the ornamental design for a slipper, 

as shown and described” in eight figures. Exemplary 

Figures 1 and 4 are reproduced below: 

Fig. 1 Fig. 4

The claimed design discloses two embodiments for the

slipper soles. One embodiment has a sole with two groups 

of raised dots (Figure 7 on the left), and the other has a 

sole with a smooth bottom (Figure 8 on the right).

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4 HIGH POINT DESIGN LLC v. BUYER’S DIRECT, INC. 

A. 

BDI manufactures a slipper called the SNOOZIE® 

(Snoozie), which it contends is an embodiment of the 

design disclosed in the D’183 patent. An exemplary 

Snoozie slipper is shown below:

High Point Design LLC (High Point) manufactures 

and distributes the accused FUZZY BABBA® slipper 

(Fuzzy Babba). Fuzzy Babba slippers are sold through 

various retailers, including Meijer, Sears, and Wal-mart 

(collectively Retailers) and are alleged to compete with 

Snoozie. An exemplary Fuzzy Babba slipper is shown 

below: 

After learning about the Fuzzy Babba slippers, BDI 

sent a cease and desist letter to High Point asserting 

design patent infringement. In response, High Point filed 

a complaint in district court seeking declaratory judgment

that the design of the accused slipper does not infringe 

the D’183 patent, and that the patent is invalid and/or 

unenforceable. BDI then counterclaimed for patent 

infringement and infringement of its trade dress for 

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Snoozie. BDI also filed a third-party complaint which

alleged that the Retailers infringe the D’183 patent and

BDI’s trade dress by selling Fuzzy Babba slippers.1 

B. 

On February 28, 2012, the district court issued a 

scheduling order which set March 16, 2012, as the deadline for parties to amend their pleadings. BDI did not 

move to amend its counterclaims by that date. Four days 

after the deadline, on March 20, 2012, High Point filed 

motions seeking summary judgment of invalidity and 

non-infringement of the D’183 patent, and judgment on 

the pleadings with respect to BDI’s trade dress claim.

BDI opposed the motion, including with its briefing an 

amended complaint that provided added detail describing

the particular trade dress at issue in its trade dress claim.

The district court granted High Point’s motion for 

summary judgment of invalidity, finding the patented 

design obvious over the prior art. High Point Design LLC 

v. Buyer’s Direct, Inc., No. 11 CIV. 4530 KBF, 2012 WL 

1820565, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 15, 2012) (“2012 Order”). 

The district court based its determination on two primary

references: the Laurel Hill and the Penta slippers, both of 

which were sold at one point in time by Woolrich (collectively the Woolrich Prior Art). 

Laurel Hill Penta

1 High Point and the Retailers are collectively referred to as High Point for the remainder of this opinion. 

 

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6 HIGH POINT DESIGN LLC v. BUYER’S DIRECT, INC. 

The district court also dismissed BDI’s trade dress 

claim as inadequate under the pleading requirements of 

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

(Federal Rules). Id. at *6. In particular, the district court 

found BDI failed to set forth the specific characteristics 

and scope of the trade dress at issue as required by Second Circuit law. Id. (citing Sherwood 48 Assoc. v. Sony 

Corp. of Am., 76 F.App’x. 389, 391 (2d Cir. 2003)). Accordingly, the district court entered final judgment in favor of 

High Point. 2012 Order, 2012 WL 1820565, at *6. 

BDI appealed the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment and the dismissal of its trade dress infringement claim. 

C. 

In High Point I, we held that the district court’s obviousness analysis was flawed for a number of reasons. We 

determined that the district court wrongly used an “ordinary observer” standard, instead of the appropriate 

“ordinary designer” test for obviousness. High Point I, 

730 F.3d at 1313. We also found that the district court’s 

verbal description of the D’183 patent translated the 

scope of the patented design at “too high a level of abstraction” and failed to focus on the distinctive visual 

appearance of the design. Id. at 1314 (quoting Apple, Inc. 

v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 678 F.3d 1314, 1331–32 (Fed. Cir. 

2012)). We also found that the district court failed to 

sufficiently explain its determination that the Woolrich 

Prior Art created “basically the same” visual impression 

as the claimed design. High Point I, 730 F.3d at 1314. 

We instructed the district court on remand to (i) apply 

the “ordinary designer” test for obviousness, id. at 1313; 

(ii) add sufficient detail to its verbal description of the 

claimed design “to evoke a visual image consonant with 

that design[,]” id. at 1314; and (iii) perform a side-by-side 

comparison of the D’183 patent design and the Woolrich 

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Prior Art to determine if they create the same visual 

impression, id. 

As to BDI’s trade dress claim, we concluded that the 

appropriate standard in the Second Circuit for addressing 

BDI’s request to amend the pleadings was Rule 16(b)’s 

good cause standard. Id. at 1318–19 (citing Parker v. 

Columbia Pictures Indus., 204 F.3d 326, 340 (2d Cir. 

2000)). In doing so, we found the analysis turned on the 

fact that BDI was seeking to amend the pleading after the 

deadline set forth in the scheduling order. High Point I, 

730 F.3d at 1319. But because the district court did not 

explain why good cause did not exist under the circumstances, we vacated the dismissal and remanded for 

reconsideration under that standard. Id. at 1319–20. 

D. 

On remand, the district court again granted summary 

judgment of invalidity. This time the district court found 

that the D’183 patent was anticipated by the Woolrich 

Prior Art. The district court offered the following description of the claimed design in support of its decision: 

To an ordinary observer, the ’183 Patent is the design of a slipper with a formed body, a protrusion 

of fuzz or fluff, and a sole with some solidity. The 

outside of the slipper appears durable and looks to 

be made of a relatively tough material; the inside 

looks soft, plush, and made of a warm material. 

The sole appears to be fairly thick and looks sturdy.

Remand Order, 2014 WL 1244558, at *6. 

Addressing each of the prior art designs in turn, the 

district court first determined that the Laurel Hill anticipated because it also had “a structured body, a softlooking fluff surrounding the opening of the slipper, and a 

sole that appears durable and fairly thick.” Id. The 

district court then found that the Penta also anticipated, 

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concluding that the Penta was even more similar to the 

D’183 patent than the Laurel Hill. The court found that 

the Penta “conveys the visual effect of a slipper, the body 

and sole of which have some defined shape and solidity 

but which has a protrusion of fluff or fuzz emanating from 

the foot opening.” Id. at *7. Although the district court 

noted that a close study of the patented and prior art 

designs revealed differences, those differences were 

“minor” and insufficient to defeat anticipation. Id. 

The district court also ruled in favor of High Point on 

grounds that the Fuzzy Babba slipper did not infringe the 

patented design. In particular, the district court found:

The Fuzzy Babba conveys the visual effect of an 

entirely soft and malleable body with an indistinguishable sole; it is soft and malleable all around. 

In contrast, the visual effect of the ’183 Patent is 

of a formed body and sole with some solidity; and 

a body distinct from the sole. 

Id. 

As to the trade dress claim, the district court found 

that BDI failed to demonstrate sufficient diligence to meet 

the “good cause” standard. Id. at *8–9. The district court 

relied primarily on its conclusion that BDI was on notice, 

prior to the deadline, that its trade dress claim was 

deficiently pled. Id. The district court found it would be 

“plainly inequitable to allow BDI to commit to dates in 

[the scheduling order], thereafter ignore them, and then 

be given another chance.” Id. at *9. The district court 

also denied BDI’s motion for additional discovery on 

infringement issues. Id. 

Having found the D’183 patent invalid, not infringed, 

and the trade dress claim properly dismissed, the district 

court entered final judgment in favor of High Point. BDI 

timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1295(a). 

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II. DISCUSSION

We apply regional circuit law in reviewing a district 

court’s grant of summary judgment. Broadcast Innovation L.L.C. v. Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 420 F.3d 1364, 

1366 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The Second Circuit reviews a grant 

of summary judgment without deference. Kuebel v. Black 

& Decker Inc., 643 F.3d 352, 358 (2d Cir. 2011). All 

evidence is construed in the light most favorable to the 

non-movant and all reasonable inferences are drawn in 

that party’s favor. Id. Summary judgment is appropriate 

when no “reasonable jury could return a verdict for the 

nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 

U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

A. Invalidity

We turn first to the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment on anticipation. 

Design patents are presumed to be valid. 35 U.S.C. 

§ 282(a). A party seeking to invalidate a patent on the 

basis of anticipation must do so by clear and convincing 

evidence. See Catalina Lighting, Inc. v. Lamps Plus, Inc., 

295 F.3d 1277, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Design patent 

anticipation requires a showing that a single prior art 

reference is “identical in all material respects” to the 

claimed invention. Door-Master Corp. v. Yorktowne, Inc., 

256 F.3d 1308, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (quoting Hupp v. 

Siroflex of Am., Inc., 122 F.3d 1456, 1461 (Fed. Cir.

1997)). In other words, the two designs must be substantially the same. See Door-Master, 256 F.3d at 1312, 1313

(applying design patent infringement test from Gorham 

Mfg. Co. v. White, 81 U.S. 511, 528 (1871), as the test for 

anticipation). Two designs are substantially the same “if 

the resemblance is such as to deceive [an ordinary observer], inducing him to purchase one supposing it to be the 

other[.]” Gorham, 81 U.S. at 528. Anticipation is a question of fact. Int’l Seaway Trading Corp. v. Walgreens 

Corp., 589 F.3d 1233, 1237 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Summary 

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judgment is proper only when the evidence underlying 

anticipation is clear and convincing such that no reasonable fact-finder could find otherwise. See SRAM Corp. v. 

AD-II Eng’g, Inc., 465 F.3d 1351, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 

Viewing all evidence in the light most favorable to the 

non-moving party—BDI—we conclude that a reasonable 

jury could have found there was not clear and convincing 

evidence of anticipation. 

In High Point I, we instructed that on remand, the 

district court should “add sufficient detail to its verbal 

description of the claimed design to evoke a visual image 

consonant with [the] claimed design.” 730 F.3d at 1314. 

We also instructed that the district court should perform 

a side-by-side comparison of the claimed and prior art 

designs as part of the proper obviousness determination. 

Id. Notably, we cautioned that there appeared to be 

“genuine issues of material fact as to whether the Woolrich Prior Art are, in fact, proper primary references” for 

obviousness purposes under 35 U.S.C. § 103. Id. 

On remand, the district court did not perform a sideby-side comparison, but concluded that the claimed and 

prior art designs share the “same characteristics” because 

they share “a structured body, a soft-looking fluff surrounding the opening of the slipper, and a sole that appears durable and fairly thick.” Remand Order, 2014 WL 

1244558, at *6; see also id. at *7. 

We find again that the district court fundamentally 

erred in its analysis by analyzing the designs from “too 

high a level of abstraction” and failing to focus “on the 

distinctive visual appearances of the reference and the 

claimed design.” High Point I, 730 F.3d at 1314 (quoting

Apple, 678 F.3d at 1331–32). Specifically, the court’s 

description does little more than point out the main 

concepts of the claimed design: a structured slipper 

having fuzzy material at the foot opening. See Durling v. 

Spectrum Furniture Co., 101 F.3d 100, 104 (Fed. Cir. 

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There are also clear differences between the protruding fuzz of the claimed and prior art designs. In particular, the Woolrich Prior Art appears to differ from the 

claims in that both prior art slippers have a pronounced 

fleece overlap oriented outward and which obscures the 

top edge of the foot opening.2 By contrast, no such overlap is visible in the patented design.

We also find that the district court failed to take into 

consideration the substantial differences between the 

ornamental aspects of the soles of the claimed design and 

the prior art designs. As we stated in Contessa Food 

Prods., Inc. v. Conagra, Inc., “[o]ur precedent makes clear 

that all of the ornamental features illustrated in the 

figures must be considered in evaluating design patent 

infringement.” 282 F.3d 1370, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2002), 

abrogated on other grounds by Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. 

Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 672–79 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 

The district court did not address the ornamental aspects of the soles in the Remand Order, but stated in the 

2012 Order that “[t]he only difference between the slippers relates to the sole of the slippers, which is quite 

2 We take note that the PTO also found substantial 

differences between the claimed and prior art fuzz designs 

in determining that the claims are patentable over the 

Woolrich Prior Art in reexamination proceedings. See 

Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 

F.2d 955, 961 (Fed. Cir. 1986). The PTO’s Notice of Intent 

to Issue an Ex Parte Reexamination Certificate was 

issued during pendency of this appeal, on August 19, 

2014, and was not part of the record on appeal. Pursuant 

to Rule 201(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, we 

take judicial notice of the PTO’s decision. See also Reliable Wholesale, Inc. v. Cornell Corp., 635 F.3d 539, 549 

(Fed. Cir. 2011). The Ex Parte Reexamination Certificate 

confirming patentability issued on September 25, 2014. 

 

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minor in the context of the overall slipper.” 2012 WL 

1820565, at *4. We disagree. There are unmistakable

differences between the sole design of the D’183 patent 

and the Woolrich Prior Art. The patent claims one embodiment, shown in Figure 7, where the sole has dots. 

Those dots are arranged in a uniformly spaced pattern of 

rows and columns in two separate groups. One group is 

positioned closer to the front of the slipper, and narrows 

slightly toward the toe area. The other group is placed 

closer to the rear, and has a corresponding taper toward 

the rear area. The other embodiment, shown in Figure 8, 

has a smooth sole. Neither of the Woolrich Prior Art 

designs has either of these design components. 

The prior art designs instead each have their own distinct ornamental designs. The Laurel Hill sole has embedded within it images of four trees and two moose. The 

Laurel Hill also has a grooved border not present in the 

claimed design. The Penta sole has a large “WOOLRICH” 

image imprinted thereon and is also decorated with a 

distinct pattern. Like the Laurel Hill—but unlike the 

claimed design—the Penta also has a grooved border.

As we cautioned in High Point I, there appeared to be 

genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the 

Woolrich Prior Art properly served as base references 

under this court’s obviousness law. 730 F.3d at 1314. We 

now similarly hold that the evidence is not so clear and 

convincing such that a reasonable fact-finder could not 

find for BDI on anticipation. For these reasons, we reverse summary judgment of invalidity.

B. Infringement

We turn next to the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment of non-infringement.

Infringement is a question of fact, Lockheed Martin 

Corp. v. Space Sys./Loral, Inc., 324 F.3d 1308, 1318 (Fed. 

Cir. 2003), and must be proved by a preponderance of the 

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evidence, Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 678. Summary 

judgment of non-infringement is appropriate when no 

reasonable fact-finder could find the accused design 

substantially similar to the claimed design. See Elmer v. 

ICC Fabricating, Inc., 67 F.3d 1571, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 

Infringement of design patents is judged by the same 

test as anticipation—whether two designs are “substantially the same.” See Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 678 

(adopting test set forth in Gorham, 81 U.S. at 528 as sole 

test for design patent infringement). Under Egyptian 

Goddess, where the claimed and accused designs are 

“sufficiently distinct” and “plainly dissimilar,” the patentee does not meet its burden of proving infringement. Id. 

Only if the claimed and accused designs are not plainly 

dissimilar does the inquiry potentially benefit from comparison of the claimed and the accused designs in with the 

prior art. Id. We agree with the district court that it is 

not necessary to resort to a comparison with the prior art 

in ruling on infringement here. 

The district court conducted a side-by-side comparison 

between the claimed design and the accused Fuzzy Babba 

slippers, and concluded that “the Fuzzy Babba’s appearance evokes a soft, gentle image, while the D’183 patent 

appears robust and durable.” Remand Order, 2014 WL 

1244558, at *7. Finding that a consumer would not 

confuse the two designs, the court then granted summary 

judgment of non-infringement. Id. at *7–8. We agree. 

Accused 

Fuzzy Babba

design

D’183 patent, 

Figure 5

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We conclude that the patented and accused designs 

bring to mind different impressions. The Fuzzy Babba 

design appears soft and formless, whereas the claimed 

design appears structured and formed. These differences 

are reflected in the ornamental aspects of each of the 

designs. For example, the side profile of the Fuzzy Babba 

shows a relatively smooth, downward slope from the rear

toward the front area of the slipper. By contrast, the 

D’183 patent design has a relatively defined, curved 

opening that is lower in the middle and higher at the 

edges. Further, the Fuzzy Babba has a relatively straight 

rear line, whereas the rear of claimed design bulges 

outward. The front areas of the two designs are also 

substantially dissimilar. The Fuzzy Babba has a relatively flatly sloping side profile, whereas the patented design 

has a curved profile, roughly following in an ‘S’ curve 

shape.

As we did with respect to invalidity, we also find that 

there are meaningful differences in the soles which affect 

the overall visual effect of the two designs. See Source 

Search Tech’s, LLC v. LendingTree, LLC, 588 F.3d 1063, 

1075 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“It is axiomatic that claims are 

construed the same way for both invalidity and infringement.” (citing Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 

314 F.3d 1313, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). Unlike the D’183 

patent design, the Fuzzy has a continuous distribution of 

dots throughout almost the entire length of the sole. 

These dots are of a constant width and in one group, in 

contrast to the varying width of dot columns displayed in 

Figure 7, and in further contrast to the embodiment in 

Figure 8 that has a smooth sole and no dots.

We recognize that both designs essentially consist of a 

slipper with a fuzzy portion extending upward out of the 

foot opening. Such high-level similarities, however, are 

not sufficient to demonstrate infringement. See, e.g.,

Apple, 678 F.3d at 1332 (finding error where district court 

looked to “general concept” of a tablet, as opposed to the 

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distinctive “visual appearance” of the claimed design); 

Durling, 101 F.3d at 104.

BDI also argues that the district court erred by not 

performing a comparison of the accused Fuzzy Babba 

slipper to BDI’s alleged commercial embodiment, the 

Snoozie. We have long-cautioned that it is generally 

improper to determine infringement by comparing an 

accused product with the patentee’s purported commercial 

embodiment. See, e.g., Sun Hill Indus., Inc. v. Easter 

Unlimited, Inc., 48 F.3d 1193, 1196 (Fed. Cir. 1995) 

abrogated on other grounds by Egyptian Goddess, 543 

F.3d at 672–79. 

If a patentee is able to show that there is no substantial difference between the claimed design and the purported commercial embodiment, a comparison between 

that embodiment and the accused design is permissible. 

See L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 

1117, 1125–26 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“When the patented 

design and the design of the article sold by the patentee 

are substantially the same, it is not error to compare the 

patentee’s and the accused articles directly[.]”); Lee v. 

Dayton-Hudson Corp., 838 F.2d 1186, 1189 (Fed. Cir. 

1988). Contrary to BDI’s suggestion, however, we have 

never mandated such comparisons and decline to do so 

here. The proper test for infringement is performed by

measuring the accused products against the claimed 

design. Payless Shoesource, Inc. v. Reebok Int’l Ltd., 998 

F.2d 985, 990 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 

BDI also argues that the district court erred by failing 

to take into account how the accused products appeared 

as worn. We disagree. Even as worn, there are meaningful differences in the visual impression between the two 

designs. The Fuzzy Babba lacks the distinctive ‘S’ curve 

of the front area visible in Figure 4 of the claimed design. 

Moreover, the protrusion of fuzz in the Fuzzy Babba 

remains thicker toward the back then toward the front of 

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the foot opening. And critically, there remain the aforementioned differences in the soles of the two designs. 

For all these reasons, we affirm the district court’s 

grant of summary judgment of non-infringement. 

C. Motion for additional discovery

As a related matter, BDI argues that the district court 

should have allowed it to take additional discovery “related to product presentation and advertising to determine 

how the accused slippers are presented to customers” 

under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules. Appellant’s Br. at 55. 

We apply the law of the regional circuit when reviewing the district court’s decision under Rule 56. Exigent 

Tech., Inc. v. Atrana Solutions, Inc., 442 F.3d 1301, 1310 

(Fed. Cir. 2006). In the Second Circuit, denial of leave for 

additional discovery under Rule 56 is reviewed for abuse 

of discretion. See Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 

321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir. 2003). 

We find the district court did not abuse its discretion. 

As an initial matter, we agree with High Point’s contention that the information BDI seeks is generally available 

to the public. It is undisputed that the Retailers offer and 

sell the accused slippers through brick and mortar stores 

and on the Internet. Notably, BDI’s motion for discovery 

was filed nearly two years after its counterclaims for 

infringement were filed. BDI has presented no reason 

why such discovery could not have been previously obtained. See Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corp. v. 

Esprit De Corp., 769 F.2d 919, 928 (2d Cir. 1985) (“A 

party who both fails to use the time available and takes 

no steps to seek more time until after a summary judgment motion has been filed need not be allowed more time 

for discovery absent a strong showing of need.”). 

We further find that there is already sufficient evidence in the record showing how the accused Fuzzy Babba 

are sold and presented to customers. See, e.g., A1358, 

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A1394–1435, A1440. The discovery sought by BDI is thus 

likely duplicative and, in light of our findings above 

regarding non-infringement, would not have prevented 

summary judgment. See Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, 

Inc. v. Dep’t of Navy, 891 F.2d 414, 422 (2d Cir. 1989) 

(movant must make a showing that additional discovery 

would reasonably expect to create a genuine issue of 

material fact). 

Accordingly, we find that the district court’s denial of 

BDI’s motion for additional discovery was not an abuse of 

discretion. 

D. Motion to amend the pleadings

We also apply regional circuit law to our review of the 

district court’s denial of BDI’s motion to amend the pleadings. See Ultimax Cement Mfg. Corp. v. CTS Cement Mfg. 

Corp., 587 F.3d 1339, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2009). The Second 

Circuit reviews the denial of an untimely request to 

amend a pleading for an abuse of discretion. See Holmes 

v. Grubman, 568 F.3d 329, 334 (2d Cir. 2009).

In High Point I, we instructed the district court to 

consider whether there was “good cause” under Rule 16(b) 

of the Federal Rules for allowing BDI to amend its pleadings after the scheduling order deadline. 730 F.3d at 

1319–20; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4) (“A schedule may 

be modified only for good cause and with the judge’s 

consent”). On remand, the district court denied the 

motion on grounds that BDI failed to show sufficient 

diligence to meet that standard. Remand Order, 2014 WL 

1244558, at *8–9. 

The district court’s decision was based on its finding 

that High Point had notified BDI before the deadline that 

the trade dress claim was insufficiently pled. The district 

court found High Point had done so on two separate 

occasions before the March 16, 2012, deadline. On February 6, 2012, High Point submitted a reply to BDI’s counCase: 14-1464 Document: 46-2 Page: 18 Filed: 07/30/2015
HIGH POINT DESIGN LLC v. BUYER’S DIRECT, INC. 19

terclaims and alleged that the “look and feel of [BDI’s 

Snoozies slippers] does not constitute protectable trade 

dress” and that BDI failed to state a claim. Id. at *8 

(quoting A142 ¶¶ 17, 21). And on February 16, 2012, 

during the initial conference, High Point requested leave 

to file to file one or more motions dispositive of all claims 

on the face of the pleadings. Id. Given this notice, the 

district court found that BDI’s failure to amend by the 

March 16, 2012 deadline evidenced a lack of sufficient 

diligence to demonstrate good cause.

We conclude that the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in denying BDI’s motion to amend. In assessing whether good cause exists “the primary consideration is whether the moving party can demonstrate 

diligence.” See id. at *4 (citing Kassner v. 2nd Ave. Delicatessen, Inc., 496 F.3d 229, 244 (2d Cir. 2007)). 

We first disagree with BDI’s proposition that High 

Point was responsible for notifying it, prior to the deadline, that the trade dress claim was deficiently pled. We 

are aware of no such requirement in the Second Circuit, 

and BDI has not presented any compelling reason we 

should so hold here. 

As to “good cause,” BDI presents no persuasive explanation for why it could not have reasonably met the 

agreed-upon deadline. It is undisputed that BDI, as the 

manufacturer of the Snoozie slipper, at all times had in 

its possession the information necessary to properly plead 

the scope of its alleged trade dress protection. See Perfect 

Pearl Co. v. Majestic Pearl & Stone, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 2d 

453, 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (no good cause shown where “the 

proposed amendment rests on information that the party 

knew, or should have known, in advance of the deadline.”

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Likewise, BDI has no explanation for why it was unaware of 

the applicable Second Circuit pleading requirements for 

trade dress infringement, which were at all relevant times

Case: 14-1464 Document: 46-2 Page: 19 Filed: 07/30/2015
20 HIGH POINT DESIGN LLC v. BUYER’S DIRECT, INC. 

readily available. See Landscape Forms, Inc. v. Columbia 

Cascade Co., 113 F.3d 373, 381 (2d Cir. 1997). 

Accordingly, we find that the district court did not 

abuse its discretion in denying the motion to amend the 

complaint. 

* * * 

We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments 

and, in light of the above, find them unpersuasive or 

unnecessary to the disposition of this case.

III. CONCLUSION

Because a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that 

there was not clear and convincing evidence that the 

D’183 patent is anticipated by the Woolrich Prior Art, we 

reverse summary judgment of invalidity. And because 

there can be no genuine dispute that the claimed and 

accused Fuzzy Babba designs are plainly dissimilar, we 

affirm summary judgment of non-infringement. We also 

affirm the district court’s denial of BDI’s motion for 

additional discovery and the denial of BDI’s motion to 

amend the complaint.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART

COSTS

No costs.

Case: 14-1464 Document: 46-2 Page: 20 Filed: 07/30/2015