Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_20-cv-00063/USCOURTS-caed-1_20-cv-00063-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

AHKEEM DESHAVIER WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff,

v.

ROBERT H. STOVER, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:20-cv-00063-NONE-SAB

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

REQUEST FOR DIFFERENT JUDGE

(ECF No. 5)

Ahkeem Deshavier Williams (“Plaintiff”) is appearing pro se and in forma pauperis in 

this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On February 3, 2020, Plaintiff filed a 

request for this action to be reassigned to a different judge. Plaintiff seeks reassignment 

contending that the judge has a conflict of interest because the undersigned was assigned to his 

prior case, 1:19-cv-00856-DAD-SAB and his appeal of that action. Plaintiff contends that the 

undersigned is biased and he wants a different judge to oversee his claims in this matter because 

the undersigned has already been on one of his cases. He demands a new judge and is moving to 

dismiss the undersigned from the screening process. 

As relevant here, a “magistrate judge shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which 

his impartiality might reasonably be questioned” or “[w]here he has a personal bias or prejudice 

concerning a party.” 28 U.S.C. §§ 455(a). A magistrate shall also disqualify himself “[w]here 

he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed 

Case 1:20-cv-00063-DAD-SAB Document 7 Filed 02/05/20 Page 1 of 3
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evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding[.] 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1). 

“The standard for judging the appearance of partiality requiring recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 

455 is an objective one and involves ascertaining ‘whether a reasonable person with knowledge 

of all the facts would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.’ ” 

United States v. Holland, 519 F.3d 909, 913 (9th Cir. 2008); Preston v. United States, 923 F.2d

731, 734 (9th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted). “The standard “’must not be so broadly construed 

that it becomes, in effect, presumptive, so that recusal is mandated upon the merest 

unsubstantiated suggestion of personal bias or prejudice.’ ” Holland, 519 F.3d at 913. 

Here, Plaintiff alleges a conflict of interest and bias due to the fact that the undersigned 

was assigned to his prior matter. However, the fact that the undersigned has previously been 

assigned to one of Plaintiff’s cases would not cause a reasonable person to conclude that the 

judge’s impartiality would reasonably be questioned. 

Recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 144 is only required where the prejudice or bias of the judge is 

both personal and extra-judicial. United States v. Carignan, 600 F.2d 762, 763 (9th Cir. 1979). 

In order for the alleged bias and prejudice to be disqualifying, it must stem from an extrajudicial 

source other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case. United States v. 

Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583 (1966). The source of the bias must be extra-judicial because 

the recusal statutes were “never intended to enable a discontented litigant to oust a judge because 

of adverse rulings made. . . .” Ex parte Am. Steel Barrel Co., 230 U.S. 35, 44 (1913). 

None of the circumstances requiring recusal are present in this action. The fact that this 

court made judicial rulings adverse to Plaintiff in the prior case does not provide a basis for this 

court to recuse itself. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (“judicial rulings alone 

almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion”). Even opinions that are 

formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of prior 

proceedings do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deepseated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. Liteky, 510 U.S. at

555. Plaintiff’s contention that the undersigned has been the judge on a prior case is not a 

ground for recusal. 

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The undersigned has no personal bias against Plaintiff nor a personal favoritism for the 

defendants named in this matter. Plaintiff has asserted no grounds for recusal of the undersigned 

in this matter. “[I]n the absence of a legitimate reason to recuse himself, ‘a judge should 

participate in cases assigned.’ ” United States v. Holland, 519 F.3d 909, 912 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(citations omitted). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request for a different judge is HEREBY DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 5, 2020 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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