Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00390/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00390-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 480
Nature of Suit: Consumer Credit
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Dale Sundby, Trustee,

Plaintiff,

v.

Marquee Funding Group, Inc.; Salomon

Benzimra, Trustee; Stanley Kesselman,

Trustee; Jeffrey Myers; Kathleen Myers;

Andres Salsido, Trustee; Benning

Management Group 401(k) Profit

Sharing Plan; Christopher Myers; Vickie

McCarty; Dolores Thompson; Kimberly

Gill Rabinoff; Steven M. Cobin, Trustee;

Susan L. Cobin, Trustee; Equity Trust

Company, Custodian FBO Steven M.

Cobin Traditional IRA; Todd B. Cobin,

Trustee; Barbara A. Cobin, Trustee;

Fasack Investments LLC; and Does 1-X,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:19-cv-0390-GPC-AHG

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 

JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS.

ECF NO. 62.

Before the Court is Plaintiff Dale Sundby’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.

The motion has been fully briefed. Upon consideration of the moving papers and the 

applicable law, and for the following reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion.

I. Procedural History

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On November 3, 2019, Plaintiff filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(c). (ECF No. 62). The Pleadings here 

include Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (the “FAC”), (ECF No. 13), and 

Defendants’ three Answers. (ECF Nos. 45, 48, 49.) Plaintiff’s motion includes 26 

voluminous exhibits, (see ECF No. 62-4 (Index of Exhibits)), and a request to take 

judicial notice of an amicus brief in another matter. (ECF No. 62-3).

On December 5, 2019, Defendants Salomon Benzimra, Trustee, Stanley 

Kesselman, Trustee, Jeffrey Myers, Kathleen Myers, Andres Salsido Trustee, Benning 

Management Group 401(k) Profit Sharing Plan, Christopher Myers, Vickie McCarty, 

Delores Thompson, Kimberly Gill Rabinoff, Steven M. Cobin, Trustee, Susan L. Cobin,

Trustee, Equity Trust Company, Custodian FBO Steven M. Cobin Traditional IRA, Todd 

B. Cobin, Trustee, Barbara A. Corbin, Trustee, Fasack Investments LLC (collectively, the 

“Lender Defendants”) filed the first opposition. (ECF No. 75.) The Lender Defendants 

attach, to an accompanying declaration by Counsel Troy Slome various, prior filings in 

this matter. (See ECF No. 75-1 at 2–3 (Index of Exhibits)).

On December 6, 2019, Marquee Funding Group, Inc. (“MFG”) filed the second 

opposition. (ECF No. 76.) Defendant MFG “joins in and incorporates” the Lender 

Defendants’ arguments. (Id. at 2–5.) Defendant MFG also writes separately to request

that the Court treat Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as a motion for 

summary judgment, to set a briefing schedule on the motion, and to offer preliminary 

arguments against the motion as such. (Id. at 5–11.)

On December 19, 2019, Plaintiff filed a reply to the Lender Defendants’ 

opposition. (ECF No. 77.) Plaintiff’s first reply contains another request for judicial 

notice of five documents filed in this action. (See ECF No. 77-1 at 2 (Index of Exhibits)). 

On December 20, 2019, Plaintiff filed a reply to MFG’s opposition. (ECF No. 78). 

II. Requests for Judicial Notice.

Courts generally do not consider materials beyond the pleadings when ruling on a 

motion for judgment on the pleadings. See Harris v. Cty. of Orange, 682 F.3d 1126, 1128 

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(9th Cir. 2012). However, if so inclined, a court may take judicial notice of a fact that 

“(1) is generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be 

accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 

questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). 

Judicial notice is appropriate in “matters of public record” not disputed by the 

opposing party. Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 999 (9th Cir. 2018), 

cert. denied sub nom. Hagan v. Khoja, 139 S. Ct. 2615 (2019). Courts may also take 

judicial notice of documents attached to, or “properly submitted as part of,” the 

complaint. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001). In applying the 

doctrine of judicial notice to any document, the Court must specify what facts it has 

judicially noticed within that document. Khoja, 899 F.3d at 999–1000.

A court may typically take notice of orders and filings in other proceedings. See

United States v. Black, 482 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir.2007) (noting that a court “may take 

notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, 

if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue”) (emphasis added). It is 

also “well established that a court may take judicial notice of its own records.” United 

States v. Author Servs., Inc., 804 F.2d 1520, 1523 (9th Cir. 1986), amended, 811 F.2d 

1264 (9th Cir. 1987), and overruled on other grounds by United States v. Jose, 131 F.3d 

1325 (9th Cir. 1997); see Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 157 (1969).

Turning to Plaintiff’s first request for judicial notice, (ECF No. 62-3), the Court 

declines to take judicial notice of a brief filed by the National Consumer Law Center as 

amicus curiae on April 20, 2014 before the Ninth Circuit in Robert Burns, et al v. HSBC 

Bank USA, et al, Case No. 13-56680. The brief does not bear any relation to the facts of 

this case, except that it too arises under TILA. U.S. ex rel. Modglin v. DJO Glob. Inc., 48 

F. Supp. 3d 1362, 1383 (C.D. Cal. 2014), aff’d sub nom. United States v. DJO Glob., 

Inc., 678 F. App’x 594 (9th Cir. 2017) (declining to consider “irrelevant” documents). 

Plaintiff, moreover, does not specify which facts in the document should be noticed and, 

the brief’s legal arguments cannot be noticed. See Blye v. California Supreme Court, No. 

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CV-11-5046-DWM, 2014 WL 295022, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2014) (“A request for 

judicial notice is not a proper vehicle for legal argument”).

As to Plaintiff’s second request, (ECF No. 77-1), the Court also declines to take 

judicial notice of five prior filings and orders in this matter. (See ECF No. 77-1 at 2 

(listing the five documents as ECF Nos. 30-1, 31-2, 31-3, 33-1, and 44)). Certainly, a 

Court has the authority to take notice of documents in matters before the Court. See

Author Servs., Inc., 804 F.2d at 1523. However, there is no reason to do so here. Four of 

the documents cited by Plaintiff in his request are not referenced in his reply, and thus is 

it unclear why they should be judicially noticed. As to the fifth document, this Court’s 

order denying Defendants’ motion to dismiss, (ECF No. 40), it need not be noticed for 

Plaintiff to refer to it in his arguments. (See ECF No. 77 at 4.) 

Consequently, both of Plaintiff’s requests are denied. (ECF Nos. 62-3, 77-1).

III. Defendant MFG’s Request Under Rule 12(d).

a. Standard of Review

If “matters outside the pleadings are . . . not excluded by the court, the motion must

be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(d) 

(emphasis added); Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 

(9th Cir. 1989). “Whether to convert a Rule 12(b)(6) motion into one for summary 

judgment pursuant to Rule 12(d) is at the discretion of the district court.” Adobe Sys. Inc. 

v. Blue Source Grp., Inc., 125 F. Supp. 3d 945, 968 (N.D. Cal. 2015); see also Arthur R. 

Miller, Mary Kay Kane, A. Benjamin Spencer, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1371

(2018 3d ed.) (discussing a court’s discretionary authority under Rule 12(d)). Because 

Rule 12(d) requires that “[a]ll parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present 

all the material that is pertinent to the motion,” such a decision requires that courts 

consider whether the Parties have sufficient notice and an opportunity to respond. Id.

(emphasis added); see Rubert-Torres v. Hosp. San Pablo, Inc., 205 F.3d 472, 476 (1st 

Cir. 2000) (requiring, at a minimum, a party have constructive notice that the motion may 

be converted at the time of filing); Morales v. City of Delano, No. 1:10-CV-1203-AWI, 

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2012 WL 1669398, at *2 (E.D. Cal. May 11, 2012) (converting motion based on the 

parties’ “mutual recognition that the court must convert”). Likewise, if a claim or defense 

would benefit from additional discovery, a court is likely to not consider the documents 

and forgo converting the motion into one for summary judgment. See Rubert-Torres, 205 

F.3d at 475; Century Sur. Co. v. Master Design Drywall, Inc., No. 09-CV-0280-LAB, 

2009 WL 3425326, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2009).

Courts, however, recognize a series of well-worn exceptions to Rule 12(d), 

including (1) attachments to the complaint, Lee, 250 F.3d at 688, (2) judicially noticed

documents, Khoja, 899 F.3d 988, or (3) documents incorporated by reference. Coto 

Settlement v. Eisenberg, 593 F.3d 1031, 1038 (9th Cir. 2010). As relevant here, a plaintiff 

incorporates a document by reference where the complaint “refers extensively to the 

document or the document forms the basis of the plaintiff's claim.” Khoja, 899 F.3d at 

999–1002. However, the “mere mention of the existence of a document is insufficient to 

incorporate the contents” of a document. Id. at 1002. And, a document cannot be 

incorporated if another party questions its authenticity. See Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 

449, 454 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds by Galbraith v. Cty. of Santa Clara, 

307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002).

b. Analysis

Defendant MFG asks that the Court treat Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the 

pleadings as a motion for partial summary judgment pursuant to Rule 12(d). (ECF No. 76 

at 5–6.) Defendant MFG asserts that the attachments to Plaintiff’s motion cannot be 

judicially noticed or incorporated by reference because the “authenticity, validity and 

efficacy of the loan documents is in issue.” (Id.) Specifically, Defendant disputes whether 

Plaintiff “authorized changes to the documents.” (Id.)

Plaintiff responds that the motion’s attachments are incorporated by reference, and 

thus the motion need not be converted. (ECF No. 78 at 2 (citing Mulinix v. Unifund CCR 

Partners, No. 07-CV-1629-DMS, 2008 WL 2001747, at *1 (S.D. Cal. May 5, 2008)).

Plaintiff also notes that Defendant MFG mischaracterizes his filing, and that his request 

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for judicial notice does not encompass the exhibits. (Id.; see also ECF No. 62-3 at 2).

Here, the Court agrees with Plaintiff and finds that the attachments to his instant 

motion are incorporated by reference. As Plaintiff notes in reply, (ECF No. 78 at 2), the 

Court has already addressed this issue by stating the following in a prior order:

“All the documents referred to in this case are cognizable by the Court upon 

a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge. The documents attached to Plaintiff’s opposition 

brief were incorporated by reference in his FAC. The Court may thus 

consider them. See, e.g., Mulinix v. Unifund CCR Partners, No. 07-

1629DMS, 2008 WL 2001747 (S.D. Cal. May 5, 2008) (“A complaint is 

deemed to include materials incorporated by reference and documents that, 

although not incorporated by reference, are ‘integral’ to the complaint.”).

Defendants’ materials are also appropriately subject to notice. For one, their 

proffered deeds and notes are incorporated by reference in Plaintiff’s FAC, 

and are integral to Plaintiff’s claim that they have been improperly altered. 

Furthermore, they are independently judicially noticeable. See, e.g., Fimbres 

v. Chapel Mort. Corp., No. 09-CV-0886-IEG (POR), 2009 WL 4163332, at 

*3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2009) (taking judicial notice of deed of trust).

(ECF No. 44 at 9.) The Court sees no reason to reconsider that ruling now as Defendant

MFG’s only argument on point – i.e., that the question of whether Plaintiff consented to 

changing the loan documents is a fact in dispute – is of no consequence. (ECF No. 76 at 

5–6.) After all, Defendant MFG’s argument does not raise a dispute as to the authenticity 

of the loan documents themselves, just what occurred to alter them. (Compare ECF No. 

13 at ¶ 109 (“The recorded deed (‘2017 Altered Deed’) was not the 2017 Signed Deed”) 

with, e.g., ECF No. 48 at ¶ 109 (“Defendant admits that the identified documents are the 

best evidence of the content thereof and denies any allegation characterizing the content 

thereof in Paragraph 109 of the FAC.”)); see also Branch, 14 F.3d at 454.

In addition, to the extent this Court’s prior ruling did not cover all 26 of the 

documents attached to Plaintiff’s motion, the Court finds the attachments are 

incorporated by reference. First, each of the 26 documents were referenced and discussed

in the FAC. (See ECF No. 62-4 at 2–4 (citations for each document)). Second, these 

documents – disclosures, notes, deeds, e-mails, etc. – are “integral” to the instant lawsuit 

in that Plaintiff’s claims turn on their content or because the documents are “themselves 

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alleged to violate” TILA. Figueroa v. Law Offices of Patenaude & Felix, A.P.C., No. EDCV-14325-JGB, 2014 WL 12597118, at *2 (C.D. Cal. May 30, 2014). Other courts

considering mortgage and foreclosure cases have also incorporated or judicially noticed 

similar documents. See, e.g., Haynish v. Bank of America, N.A., 284 F. Supp. 3d 1037, 

1045 (N.D. Cal. 2018); Tefera v. OneWest Bank, FSB, 19 F. Supp. 3d 215, 221 (D.D.C. 

2014). Lastly, Defendant MFG does not now dispute the authenticity of these documents.

(See, e.g., ECF No. 48 at ¶¶ 27–35, 37, 39–42, 46, 48–50, 54–63, 71–75, 77–80.) 

Thus, the Court finds that Rule 12(d) does not apply here because the attachments 

to Plaintiff’s motion have been incorporated by reference. This decision is appropriate, 

moreover, given the Parties’ ongoing discovery and the Court’s concerns as to notice. As

Defendant notes, fact “discovery only just commenced on November 26, 2019,” (ECF 

No. 76 at 6), and is due to continue until March 2, 2020. (ECF No. 70 at ¶ 2.) Because 

discovery may yield information material to the Defendants’ alleged affirmative defenses

or which corroborates Plaintiff’s allegations, it would be imprudent for the Court to 

convert Plaintiff’s motion and entertain summary judgment at this time. See RubertTorres, 205 F.3d at 475 (noting the importance of discovery under Rule 12(d)); Soratorio 

v. Tesoro Ref. & Mktg. Co., LLC, No. CV-17-1554, 2017 WL 1520416, at *4 (C.D. Cal. 

Apr. 26, 2017) (same); Century Sur. Co., 2009 WL 3425326, at *2 (same).

In addition, it is plainly not the case that “[a]ll parties” have received a “reasonable 

opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion.” See Fed. R. Civ. 

Pro. 12(d). The Lender Defendants have not addressed the arguments now raised by 

Defendant MFG and, while Plaintiff touched on Defendant MFG’s arguments in reply, 

(ECF No. 78), that is no substitute for a full briefing schedule – as Defendant MFG 

appears to recognize in requesting a schedule for its upcoming “cross-motion” for 

summary judgment. (See ECF No. 76 at 2.)1 In addition, as it appears that pro se Plaintiff 

 

1 The Court respectfully reminds Defendant MFG that, pursusant to Local Rule 7.1, a party cannot file a 

motion that must be briefed by both parties without first obtaining a hearing date from chambers. CivLR 

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attached the documents to his motion with the understanding that they were already 

incorporated, (ECF No. 78 at 2), and thus did not intentionally “invite[]” conversion, the 

Court is reluctant to treat Plaintiff’s motion as one for summary judgment at this time. 

See San Pedro Hotel Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 159 F.3d 470, 477 (9th Cir. 1998)

(quotation omitted).

Consequently, Defendant’s request under Rule 12(d) is denied. (ECF No. 76.) In 

addition, because the Court will not treat Plaintiff’s motion as one for summary 

judgment, the Court DENIES without prejudice Defendant MFG’s other arguments as 

premature. (ECF No. 76 at 7–11.) Defendant MFG may re-assert its arguments in a 

properly filed motion for summary judgment.

IV. Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

a. Standard for Rule 12(c) Motions

“After the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may 

move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(c). A motion for judgment on 

the pleadings under Rule 12(c) is evaluated under a “substantially identical” standard to 

that of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “because, under both rules, a court must 

determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint, taken as true, entitle the plaintiff to 

a legal remedy.” Chavez v. United States, 683 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation 

and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Hason v. Los Angeles Cty., No. CV-11-

5382-SVW, 2013 WL 12377029, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2013).

Consequently, a judgment on the pleadings is proper when the moving party 

clearly establishes on the face of the pleadings that no material issue of fact remains to be 

resolved and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Doleman v. Meiji Mut. Life 

Ins. Co., 727 F.2d 1480, 1482 (9th Cir. 1984). If “the defendant raises an affirmative 

 

7.1.e.1. The Court will not set a briefing schedule until Defendant’s counsel call chambers to do so. A 

failure to abide by this rule is grounds to deny any motion. Prof’l Programs Grp. v. Dep’t of Commerce, 

29 F.3d 1349, 1353 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that local rules have the “force of law”).

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defense in his answer it will usually bar judgment on the pleadings.” Gen. Conference 

Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. Seventh-Day Adventist Congregational Church, 887 

F.2d 228, 230 (9th Cir. 1989) (hereinafter “Seventh-Day Adventist”). When considering a 

motion under Rule 12(c), the court “must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as 

true and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Fleming v. 

Pickard, 581 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2009). 

b. Defendants Dispute Plaintiff’s Material Allegations

Plaintiff now moves the Court for a judgment on the pleadings as to his two causes 

of action. (ECF No. 62 -2.) With respect to his TILA claims, Plaintiff asserts that the 

2016 and 2017 loans violated TILA’s prepayment penalties provision (15 U.S.C. § 

1639(c)), arbitration provision (15 U.S.C. § 1639c(e)(1)), and ability-to-pay provision (15 

U.S.C. § 1639b(C)(3)(A)(i)). (Id. at 2.) With respect to his state law claim for declaratory 

judgment, Plaintiff seeks reconveyance of the property and a declaration that 2017 

Altered Note and Deed are void ab initio. (Id.; ECF No. 13 at 21.) The Court has already 

found that Plaintiff’s arguments are adequately pled to survive a motion to dismiss, and 

thus need not re-assess the adequacy of Plaintiff’s pleadings now. (ECF No. 44.)

Instead, the Court looks to whether Defendants’ Answers “raise[] issues of fact or 

an affirmative defense which, if proved, would defeat plaintiff’s recovery.” Qwest 

Commc’ns Corp. v. City of Berkeley, 208 F.R.D. 288, 291 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (citing 

Seventh-Day Adventist, 887 F.2d at 230). Here, they do.2

As a threshold matter, Plaintiff’s argument that “the only alleged facts required to 

prove the claims were previously admitted” is unavailing. (ECF No. 77 at 2.) That the 

Court has incorporated the exhibits attached to Plaintiff’s motion by reference does not 

mean that the Court adopts their contents as true. See Sgro v. Danone Waters of N. Am., 

Inc., 532 F.3d 940, 942 n.1 (9th Cir. 2008) (considering a document referenced by the 

 

2 Defendant MFG joins in the arguments presented by the other Defendants. Consequently, the Court 

refers to all the Defendants collectively in addressing these arguments. (ECF No. 76 at 3.)

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complaint but declining to accept its contents as true). Defendants contest Plaintiff’s 

characterization of the documents and their effect, and thus the facts in those documents 

– even if incorporated into the complaint – remain in dispute. (ECF No. 75 at 11–13.)

Consequently, the Court declines Plaintiff’s invitation to “resolv[e] factual disputes at the 

pleading stage.” Khoja, 899 F.3d at 1003. If Plaintiff seeks a finding of fact, trial or 

summary judgment are the more appropriate vehicles. See Hsu v. Puma Biotechnology, 

Inc., 213 F. Supp. 3d 1275, 1281–82 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (describing how a party’s reliance 

on voluminous exhibits at the pleading stage often results in arguments “more appropriate 

for a motion for summary judgment or some other later stage of the case”).

Defendants, moreover, correctly note that a response in an Answer expressing a

“lack[ of] knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of an 

allegation . . . has the effect of a denial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8; see Gencarelli v. Twentieth 

Century Fox Film Corp., No. 2:17-CV-02818-ODW, 2018 WL 376664, at *4 (C.D. Cal. 

Jan. 11, 2018); Schroeder v. Hundley, No. 17-CV-919-JLS, 2017 WL 6945405, at *2 

(S.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2017). Thus, contrary to Plaintiff’s assertions, Defendants’ Answers 

largely deny Plaintiff’s allegations. (See ECF No. 75 at 11–13 (stating that the Answer 

filed by the Lender Defendants, (ECF No. 49), asserts denials as to 94 of 103 paragraphs 

in the Factual Allegation section and that the Answer filed by Defendants Benzimira and 

Kesselman, (ECF No. 45), asserts denials as to 79 paragraphs). Plaintiff does not dispute 

this point in reply. (ECF No. 77 at 2.)

Some of Defendants’ denials, moreover, directly address claims core to the FAC. 

As to the first cause of action, Defendants deny violating TILA’s prohibition on 

prepayment penalty provisions, (ECF No. 45 at ¶¶ 131(c), 132(c); ECF No. 48 at ¶¶ 

131(c), 132(c); ECF No. 49 at ¶¶ 131(c), 132(c)), TILA’s ban on mandatory arbitration 

provisions, (ECF No. 45 at ¶¶ 74, 75; ECF No. 48 at ¶¶ 74, 75; ECF No. 49 at ¶¶ 74, 75), 

and TILA’s requirement that the lender assess a party’s ability to pay. (ECF No. 45 at ¶¶ 

131(d)–(e), 132(d)–(e); ECF No. 48 at ¶¶ 131(d)–(e), 132(d)–(e); ECF No. 49 at ¶¶ 

131(d)–(e), 132(d)–(e)). As to the second cause of action, Defendants likewise deny 

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altering any documents without Plaintiff’s consent. (See, e.g., ECF No. 45 at ¶¶ 140, 142; 

ECF No. 48 at ¶¶ 140, 142; ECF No. 49 at ¶¶ 140, 142). 

In addition, Defendants plead various affirmative defenses which they claim, “if 

proven at trial, would bar Plaintiff’s claim for TILA damages in the Complaint.” (See

ECF No. 75 at 8–11.) And, though Defendants do not allege how each of their defenses is 

to apply with great specificity, they need not do so given the Ninth Circuit’s more lenient 

standard for affirmative defenses. (ECF No. 64); see Wyshak v. City Nat’l Bank, 607 F.2d 

824, 827 (9th Cir. 1979), overruled on other grounds by Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 

833 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc).

Consequently, because the Court is required to take the non-moving parties’

assertions as true, the Court finds that Defendants’ denials and affirmative defenses 

create an issue of disputed fact, and that alone is sufficient to withstand Plaintiff’s 

motion. (ECF No. 77 at 2.); Esilicon Corp. v. Silicon Space Tech. Corp., No. C -11-

06184-EDL, 2012 WL 12920837, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2012) (citing Seventh-Day 

Adventists, 887 F.2d at 230) (“A plaintiff is not entitled to judgment on the pleadings if 

the answer raises issues of fact or an affirmative defense which, if proved, would defeat 

plaintiff's recovery.”) Plaintiff’s arguments that the incorporated documents alone entitle 

him to judgment at this time are misplaced. (ECF No. 77 at 5–8.)

c. The Court Defers Plaintiff’s Other Arguments

With respect to Plaintiff’s first cause of action, Plaintiff asserts that 15 U.S.C. § 

1640 precludes Defendant from raising affirmative defenses except those listed in the 

statute. (ECF No. 77 at 3.) For this proposition, Plaintiff cites Semar, wherein the Ninth 

Circuit held that a technical violation of TILA (a failure to provide adequate notice of 

plaintiffs’ 3-day cancellation right) permitted plaintiffs to rescind a loan agreement, 

without regard for plaintiffs’ subsequent conduct or the fact that the violation was 

immaterial. Semar v. Platte Valley Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 791 F.2d 699, 705 (9th Cir. 

1986); see also Buie v. Palm Springs Motors, Inc., 36 F. App’x 328, 329 (9th Cir. 2002)

(noting that the Ninth Circuit has “explicitly rejected the claim that equitable 

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considerations are a defense to TILA liability”); Jackson v. Grant, 890 F.2d 118, 120 (9th 

Cir. 1989) (noting that “[e]ven technical or minor violations of the TILA impose liability 

on the creditor”).

Plaintiff, however, only asserts this argument in reply, and does so briefly at that. 

Plaintiff did not raise this argument in his initial motion, (ECF No. 62-2), nor has he 

raised it in prior motions directed at the pleadings. (ECF No. 54-2). And, a district court 

“need not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief.” See Zamani v. 

Carnes, 491 F.3d 990, 997 (9th Cir. 2007); see also United States v. Anderson, 472 F.3d 

662, 668 (9th Cir. 2006) (recognizing the general principle that arguments raised for the 

first time in a reply brief are waived); Architectureart, LLC v. City of San Diego, No. 15-

CV-1592-BAS, 2016 WL 1077124, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2016) (declining to consider 

arguments raised in a reply on a motion to dismiss). Because Plaintiff has, perhaps 

inadvertently, deprived Defendants of a meaningful opportunity to address what he 

contends is a dispositive argument, the Court declines to consider this argument now. 

Likewise, Plaintiff presents a last-minute request for an order satisfying the second 

cause of action in reply, thereby precluding Defendants from responding as to whether an 

order should be issued. (ECF No. 77 at 8–11.) The Court also declines to consider this 

argument at this time. Zamani, 491 F.3d at 997.

V. Conclusion.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on 

the pleadings fails. Defendants’ denials and affirmative defenses create issues of fact that 

cannot be resolved at this stage, and Plaintiff’s other arguments presented only in reply 

are not properly before the Court now.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 28, 2020

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