Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01523/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01523-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES SIMS,

Plaintiff,

v.

J. WOODFORD, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:05-cv-01523-LJO-DLB (PC)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO

DENY IN PART AND TO GRANT IN PART

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS 

(Docs. 28, 36)

I. Order

A. Procedural History

Plaintiff James Sims, (“plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action is proceeding on

plaintiff’s amended complaint, filed November 17, 2006, against defendants Woodford,

Mendoza-Powers, Griffith, Cotta, Guinn, Lawhorn, Arnold and Escobar (“defendants”) for

violation of his due process rights, based on defendants alleged wrongful classification as a sex

offender which resulted in prohibiting plaintiff’s family visitation and transfer to a lower security

facility. On March 26, 2007, defendants Woodford, Arnold, Escobar, Guinn, and MendozaPowers filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Opposition

documents were filed. Defendants Griffith, Cotta, and Lawhorn have not joined in the present

motion. The motion has been deemed submitted. Local Rule 78-230(m). 

B. Plaintiff’s Complaint

In his complaint, plaintiff alleges that his due process rights were violated when he was

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errantly classified as a convicted sex offender which resulted in prohibiting plaintiff from family

visitation and transfer to a lower security facility. Despite various appeal efforts by plaintiff, his

classification was not corrected. Plaintiff has subsequently been released from custody. 

C. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim 

“The focus of any Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal . . . is the complaint.” Schneider v. California

Dept. of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998). In considering a motion to dismiss for

failure to state a claim, the Court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question,

Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in

the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and resolve all doubts in the pleader's

favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421, reh’g denied, 396 U.S. 869 (1969). The federal

system is one of notice pleading. Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1126

(2002). “Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited

exceptions,” none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534

U.S. 506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R.

Civ. Pro. 8(a). “Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the

plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. 

A court may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under

any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations. Id. at 514. Discovery and

summary judgment motions - not motions to dismiss - “define disputed facts” and “dispose of

unmeritorious claims.” Id. at 512. “‘The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail

but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Indeed it may appear

on the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the test.’”

Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232,

236 (1974)); see also Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004) (“‘Pleadings need

suffice only to put the opposing party on notice of the claim . . . .’” (quoting Fontana v. Haskin,

262 F.3d 871, 977 (9th Cir. 2001))). A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should not

be granted unless it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the

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claim that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984)

(citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)); see also Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake Log

Owners Ass’n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). 

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) the Court has a statutory duty to

screen complaints in cases such as this and dismiss any claims that fail to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Given the

requirements of the PLRA, the Court is disinclined to view with favor a subsequent motion to

dismiss for failure to state a claim. It has further been held that defendants' papers filed in

support of a motion to dismiss may demonstrate that they had fair notice of what the plaintiffs'

claims are and the grounds upon which they rest. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotice

Intell. and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993). A motion to dismiss merely questions

the sufficiency of the pleadings to put the opposing party on notice of a plaintiff’s claim(s). 

In the instant case, the Court conducted a preliminary screening of the case on November

21, 2006 wherein it was determined that, per the notice pleading standards, plaintiff stated

cognizable claim(s) against the moving defendants. 

1. Due Process

Defendants argue that plaintiff has failed to state cognizable claims for violation of his

rights to due process arguing that plaintiff cannot state a claim for a particular custody

designation and that family visitation and placement in a lower custody facility are not

constitutionally protected rights. While it is true that an inmate has no right to placement in a

specific facility, inmates do have a fundamental liberty interest in companionship with immediate

family members which cannot be infringed upon without due process. 

a. Fundamental Liberty Interest

“It is well established that a parent has a ‘fundamental liberty interest’ in ‘the

companionship and society of his or her child’ and that ‘[t]he state's interference with that liberty

interest without due process of law is remediable under [42 U.S.C. § ]1983.’ Kelson v. City of

Springfield 767 F.2d 651, 654-55 (9 Cir. 1985) (citing Santosky v. Kramer 455 U.S. 745, 753 th

(1982) ‘[T]his constitutional interest in familial companionship and society logically extends to

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protect children from unwarranted state interference with their relationships with their parents.’ 

Smith v. City of Fontana 818 f.2d 1411, 1418 (9 Cir. 1987) overruled on other grounds by th

Hodges-Durgin v. de la Vina 199 F.3d 1037 (9 Cir. 1999). Moreover, ‘the First Amendment th

protects those relationships, including family relationships, that presuppose “deep attachments

and commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with whom one shares not only a

special community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively personal aspects of

one’s life.”’ Board of Dir. v. Rotary Club 481 U.S. 537, 545 (1987) (quoting Roberts v. United

States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619-20 (1984); see also Conti v. City of Fremont, 919 F.2d 1385,

1388-1389 (9 Cir. 1990).” th Lee v. City of Los Angeles 250 F.3d 668, 685 (9 Cir. 2001). th

Thus, plaintiff has a fundamental liberty interest in his relationship with his wife and

children that cannot be infringed on by the state without due process of law. Plaintiff claims

defendants infringed on this liberty without due process, when they errantly classified him as a

convicted sex offender which resulted in prohibiting plaintiff from family visitation, and

thereafter failed to correct his classification despite evidence from the court to the contrary. 

Thus, the first step in the analysis is met.

b. Establishment of the Right

The second step in the analysis is determination as to whether the right was clearly

established at the time the actions complained of took place. The case law identifying and

establishing a parent’s fundamental interest in the relationship with his wife and children dates

back to the early 1980's – approximately 20 years prior to the actions complained of by plaintiff. 

Thus, it was a clearly established right at the time the defendants engaged in their allegedly

wrongful acts.

c. Reasonableness

While the first two areas of inquiry in the Saucier analysis are pure legal questions for the

court, see Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 917 (9 Cir. 1996); Washington v. Lambert, 98 F.3d th

1181, 1192 (9 Cir. 1996); Stivers v. Pierce, 71 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9 Cir. 1995); ACT th th

UP!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 873 (9 Cir. 1993); the third area of inquiry (as to whether th

a reasonable officer would have thought her or his conduct violated plaintiff’s fundamental

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liberty interest in his relationship with his wife and children) requires a legal determination based

upon a prior factual finding as to the government official’s conduct, see Neely v. Feinstein, 50

F.3d 1502, 1509 (9 Cir. 1995); Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 42 F.3d th

1278, 1285-86 (9 Cir. 1994); Romero v. Kitsap County, 931 F.2d 624, 628 (9 Cir. 1991). th th

As stated above, a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is not the proper vehicle for fact

finding/determination. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. A motion to dismiss merely questions the

sufficiency of the pleadings to put the opposing party on notice of a plaintiff’s claim(s). Thus,

the third area of inquiry cannot be properly addressed by the Court in this motion such that

defendants’ motion to dismiss, as to plaintiff’s due process claim(s) is denied. 

3. Equal Protection

The Equal Protection Clause requires that persons who are similarly situated be treated

alike. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). An equal

protection claim may be established in two ways. First, a plaintiff establishes an equal protection

claim by showing that the defendant has intentionally discriminated on the basis of the plaintiff's

membership in a protected class. See, e.g., Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th

Cir.2001). Under this theory of equal protection, the plaintiff must show that the defendants’

actions were a result of the plaintiff’s membership in a suspect class, such as race. Thornton v.

City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1167 (9th Cir. 2005). 

If the action in question does not involve a suspect classification, a plaintiff may establish

an equal protection claim by showing that similarly situated individuals were intentionally treated

differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. Village of Willowbrook

v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000); San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1

(1972); Squaw Valley Development Co. v. Goldberg, 375 F.3d 936, 944 (9th Cir.2004);

SeaRiver Mar. Fin. Holdings, Inc. v. Mineta, 309 F.3d 662, 679 (9th Cir. 2002). To state an equal

protection claim under this theory, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) the plaintiff is a member of an

identifiable class; (2) the plaintiff was intentionally treated differently from others similarly

situated; and (3) there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment. Village of

Willowbrook, 528 U.S. at 564. If an equal protection claim is based upon the defendant’s

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selective enforcement of a valid law or rule, a plaintiff must show that the selective enforcement

is based upon an "impermissible motive." Squaw Valley, 375 F.3d at 944; Freeman v. City of

Santa Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir.1995).

Plaintiff was given the applicable standards for making a claim for violation of his rights

to equal protection under the constitution in this court’s screening order, filed September 13,

2006. However, plaintiff’s amended complaint failed to allege that he was a member of an

identifiable class, that he was intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and

that there was no rational basis for the different treatment he received. Therefore, defendant’s

motion to dismiss as to plaintiff’s claims for violation of his constitutional rights to equal

protection is granted without leave to amend.

3. Failure to Protect/Safety

“Prison officials have a duty to take reasonable steps to protect inmates from physical

abuse.” Hoptowit v. Ray 682 F.2d 1237, 1250-51 (9 Cir. 1982); see also Farmer v. Brennan

th

511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994).

To establish a violation of this duty, the prisoner must establish that prison officials were

“deliberately indifferent” to serious threats to the inmate’s safety. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.

To demonstrate that a prison official was deliberately indifferent to a serious threat to the

inmate’s safety, the prisoner must show that “the official [knew] of and disregard[ed] an

excessive risk to inmate ... safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the

inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and [the official] must

also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310,

1313 (9 Cir. 1995). To prove knowledge of the risk, however, the prisoner may rely on th

circumstantial evidence; in fact, the very obviousness of the risk may be sufficient to establish

knowledge. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842; Wallis v. Baldwin, 70 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9 Cir. 1995). th

The Ninth Circuit has held that placing a pre-operative transsexual, who acts and dresses

effeminately, in the prison’s general population evidenced of deliberate indifference to an

inmate’s safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 848-49; cf. Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2 1435,

1444-45 (9 Cir. 1991)(en banc)(concluding that placing a young pre-trial detainee in a cell with th

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a known aggressive sexual offender was deliberate indifference to the detainee’s safety). 

Allegations that a defendant placed an “R-suffix” (indicating inmate is a sexual offender) in an

inmate’s file, knowing that the inmate would be stabbed if he was subsequently placed into the

general population are sufficient to show that the defendant had knowledge of a risk to plaintiff’s

safety. See Knight v. Runnels No. CIV S-07-0751-FCD-CMK-P (E.D. Cal. Filed Aug. 20,

2007). The Ninth Circuit has also held that allegations that prison officials called a prisoner a

“snitch” in the presence of other inmates were sufficient to state a claim of deliberate

indifference to an inmate’s safety. See Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1139 (9th

Cir. 1989). But see Morgan v. MacDonald 41 F.3d 1291, 1293-94 (9 Cir. 1994)(rejecting th

Eighth Amendment claim where prisoner who had been labeled a snitch had not been retaliated

against). 

Construing the pleadings in a light most favorable to plaintiff, his allegations that

defendants errantly classified him as a convicted sex offender, and failed to remove that

classification subsequent to correspondence from the court to the contrary, particularly in light of

Knight v. Runnels, satisfies Rule 8(a)’s pleading requirements. Thus, the court denies

defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a cognizable claim for acting in a manner that

was “deliberately indifferent” to serious threats to plaintiff’s safety. 

 4. Linkage Requirement

Plaintiff was advised in the court’s screening order, filed September 13, 2006, that the

Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Section 1983 . . . creates a cause of action for violations of the federal

Constitution and laws.” Sweaney v. Ada County, Idaho, 119 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1997)

(internal quotations omitted.) Section 1983 plainly requires that there be an actual connection or

link between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by

plaintiff. See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode,

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423 U.S. 362 (1976). “‘A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right,

within the meaning of [§] 1983, if [that person] does an affirmative act, participates in another’s

affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which [that person] is legally required to do that

causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.’” Hydrick v. Hunter, 466 F.3d 676, 689 (9th

Cir. 2006) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). “[T]he ‘requisite

causal connection can be established not only by some kind of direct, personal participation in

the deprivation, but also be setting in motion a series of acts by others which the actor knows or

reasonably should know would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury.’” Id. (quoting

Johnson at 743-44). 

Plaintiff’s amended complaint fails to state any factual allegations against Arnold and

Woodford. Thus, plaintiff has failed to connect Arnold and Woodford to any of the deprivations

plaintiff allegedly suffered. Therefore, defendants’ motion to dismiss as to Arnold and

Woodford is granted without leave to amend. 

D. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that this motion to dismiss be

denied in part and granted in part as follows:

(1) denied as to plaintiff’s claims for violations of his rights to due process;

(2) granted without leave to amend as to plaintiff’s claims for violation of his

right to equal protection;

(3) denied as to plaintiff’s claims for failure to protect/provide for his safety;

and 

(4) granted without leave to amend for plaintiff’s failure to comply with Rule

8(a)’s pleading standards as to defendants Arnold and Woodford.

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). 

Within twenty (20) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations,

the parties may file written objections with the court. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections

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within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v.

Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: March 7, 2008 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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