Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00466/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00466-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEVEN WAYNE BONILLA,

CDCR #J-48500,

Plaintiff,

vs.

JUDGE ANTHONY BATTAGLIA, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:19-cv-00466-JLS-WVG

ORDER: (1) DENYING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS AS 

BARRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); 

AND (2) DISMISSING CIVIL 

ACTION WITHOUT PREJUDICE 

FOR FAILURE TO PAY FILING 

FEE REQUIRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 

1914(a)

(ECF No. 3)

Plaintiff Steven Wayne Bonilla, currently incarcerated at San Quentin State Prison

located in San Quentin, California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil action (ECF No. 

1). Plaintiff did not prepay the filing fee required to commence a civil action at the time 

he filed his Complaint; instead, he has filed a Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma 

Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF No. 3).

I. Motion to Proceed IFP

A. Standard of Review

“All persons, not just prisoners, may seek IFP status.” Moore v. Maricopa County 

Sheriff’s Office, 657 F.3d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 2011). Prisoners like Plaintiff, however, “face 

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. . . additional hurdle[s].” Id. Specifically, in addition to requiring prisoners to “pay the 

full amount of a filing fee,” in “monthly installments” or “increments” as provided by 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3)(b), Bruce v. Samuels, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (2016); Williams 

v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), the Prison Litigation Reform Act 

(“PLRA”) amended section 1915 to preclude the privilege to proceed IFP

if [a] prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while 

incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or 

appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the 

grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim 

upon which relief can be granted, unless the prisoner is under 

imminent danger of serious physical injury.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). “This subdivision is commonly known as the ‘three strikes’ 

provision.” Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1116 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005).

“Pursuant to § 1915(g), a prisoner with three strikes or more cannot proceed IFP.” 

Id.; see also Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007) (hereafter 

“Cervantes”) (under the PLRA, “[p]risoners who have repeatedly brought unsuccessful 

suits may entirely be barred from IFP status under the three strikes rule”). The objective 

of the PLRA is to further “the congressional goal of reducing frivolous prisoner litigation 

in federal court.” Tierney v. Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310, 1312 (9th Cir. 1997). “[S]ection 

1915(g)’s cap on prior dismissed claims applies to claims dismissed both before and after 

the statute’s effective date.” Id. at 1311.

“Strikes are prior cases or appeals, brought while the plaintiff was a prisoner, which 

were dismissed on the ground that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim,” 

Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1116 n.1 (internal quotations omitted), “even if the district court 

styles such dismissal as a denial of the prisoner’s application to file the action without 

prepayment of the full filing fee.” O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1153 (9th Cir. 2008). 

When courts “review a dismissal to determine whether it counts as a strike, the style of the 

dismissal or the procedural posture is immaterial. Instead, the central question is whether 

the dismissal ‘rang the PLRA bells of frivolous, malicious, or failure to state a claim.’” ElCase 3:19-cv-00466-JLS-WVG Document 4 Filed 07/02/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 5
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Shaddai v. Zamora, 833 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Blakely v. Wards, 738 

F.3d 607, 615 (4th Cir. 2013)).

Once a prisoner has accumulated three strikes, section 1915(g) prohibits his pursuit 

of any subsequent IFP civil action or appeal in federal court unless he faces “imminent 

danger of serious physical injury.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 

1051–52 (noting § 1915(g)’s exception for IFP complaints which “make[] a plausible 

allegation that the prisoner faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at the time 

of filing.”).

B. Discussion

As an initial matter, the Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s Complaint, and finds it does 

not contain any “plausible allegations” to suggest he “faced ‘imminent danger of serious 

physical injury’ at the time of filing.” Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055 (quoting 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(g)). And while Defendants typically carry the initial burden to produce evidence 

demonstrating a prisoner is not entitled to proceed IFP, Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119, “in 

some instances, the district court docket may be sufficient to show that a prior dismissal 

satisfies at least one on the criteria under § 1915(g) and therefore counts as a strike.” Id.

at 1120. That is the case here.

A court may take judicial notice of its own records, see Molus v. Swan, Civil Case 

No. 3:05-cv-00452-MMA-WMc, 2009 WL 160937, *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2009) (citing 

United States v. Author Services, 804 F.2d 1520, 1523 (9th Cir. 1986)), and “‘may take 

notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, 

if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.’” Bias, 508 F.3d at 1225 

(quoting Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002)); see also United 

States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th 

Cir. 1992).

Based on the records and court proceedings available on PACER, this Court takes 

judicial notice that Plaintiff Steven Wayne Bonilla, identified as CDCR #J-48500, while 

incarcerated, has had dozens of prisoner civil actions or appeals dismissed on the grounds 

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that they were frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted. See, e.g., In re Steven Bonilla, 2012 WL 216401, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2012) 

(noting Plaintiff’s litigation history in the Northern District of California, including the 

dismissal of 34 pro se civil rights actions between June 1 and October 31, 2011 alone, 

which were dismissed “because the allegations in [his] complaints d[id] not state a claim 

for relief under § 1983.”); id. at *3 (“The following five actions are DISMISSED without 

prejudice and without leave to amend for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted: Bonilla v. Superior Court of Alameda County, C 11-6306; Bonilla v. Alameda 

County District Attorney’s Office, C 11-6307; Bonilla v. California Supreme Court, C 12-

0026; Bonilla v. Cullen, C 1200027; Bonilla v. California Supreme Court, C 12-0206.”); 

id. at *3 n.1 (“The Court recently informed Plaintiff that, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(g), he no longer qualifies to proceed in forma pauperis in any civil rights action.” 

(citing In re Steven Bonilla, Nos. C 11-3180, et seq. CW (PR), Order of Dismissal at 6:23-

7:19.)); see also Bonilla v. Hernandez, No. 3:18-CV-978-JLS-BLM, 2018 WL 3817864, 

at *3 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2018) (denying Plaintiff leave to proceed IFP as barred by 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(g)); Bonilla v. Plourd, No. 3:18-CV-0954-BAS-JLB, 2018 WL 3656105, at 

*3 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2018) (same).

Accordingly, because Plaintiff has, while incarcerated, accumulated far more than 

three “strikes” pursuant to § 1915(g), and he fails to make a “plausible allegation” that he 

faced imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time he filed his Complaint, he is 

not entitled to the privilege of proceeding IFP in this civil action. See Cervantes, 493 F.3d 

at 1055; Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1180 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding that 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(g) “does not prevent all prisoners from accessing the courts; it only precludes 

prisoners with a history of abusing the legal system from continuing to abuse it while 

enjoying IFP status”); see also Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1231 (9th Cir. 1984) 

(“[C]ourt permission to proceed IFP is itself a matter of privilege and not right.”).

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II. Conclusion and Orders

 For the reasons explained, the Court:

1) DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 3) as barred by 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(g);

2) DISMISSES this civil action without prejudice based on Plaintiff’s failure to 

pay the full statutory and administrative $400 civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1914(a);

3) CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal from this Order would be frivolous and,

therefore, would not be taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); and

4) DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 2, 2019

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