Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-02625/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-02625-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:0206 Surgeon General - Assignment of Officers

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL NELSON HANES,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 13cv2625-GPC(WMC)

ORDER GRANTING COUNSEL

FOR PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

ATTORNEY FEES PURSUANT TO

42 U.S.C. § 406(b)

[Dkt. No. 38.]

vs.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

Plaintiff’s counsel filed a motion for attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)

in the amount of $19,000.00 and seeks an order to reimburse Plaintiff Michael Nelson

Hanes(“Plaintiff”) the sum of $4,500.00 in Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”) fees

previously paid by the Commissioner. (Dkt. No. 38.) Plaintiff did not file an

opposition. Defendant filed a response in its role as “trustee” for Plaintiff without

indicating a position on the reasonableness of the request. (Dkt. No. 40.) Plaintiff’s

counsel filed a reply on September 2, 2015. (Dkt. No. 42.) Based on the reasoning

below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s counsel’s motion for attorney fees pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 406(b). 

Background

On October 30, 2013, Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking the Court’s review of

the Commissioner’s decision to deny him disability insurance benefits under Title II

of the Social Security Act. (Dkt. No. 1.) On May 2, 2014, Plaintiff filed a motion for

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summary judgment. (Dkt. No. 20.) On July 24, 2014, Defendant filed a cross motion

for summary judgment. (Dkt. No. 28.) On January 30, 2015, the Magistrate Judge

issued a report and recommendation recommending that Plaintiff’s motion for summary

judgment be granted in part and denied in part, that Defendant’s motion for summary

judgment be denied, and that the case be remanded to the Commissioner for further

proceedings. (Dkt. No. 31.) On March 16, 2015, the Court adopted in part the

Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation. (Dkt. No. 32.) Specifically, the Court

granted Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment reversing the Commissioner’s

decision to deny benefits to Plaintiff and awarded benefits, and denied Defendant’s

motion for summary judgment. (Id.) 

On remand, the Commissioner calculated $78,057.00 in retroactive benefits

under Title II benefits. (Dkt. No. 38-3 at 3.) On May 14, 2015, the Court granted the

parties’ joint motion for attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”)

in the amount of $4,500.00 and costs in the amount of $400.00. (Dkt. No. 35.) 

Plaintiff’s counsel then filed the instant motion for attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 406(b). 

Discussion

Sections 406(a) and (b) of Title II of the Social Security Act govern attorney fees

for representation of disability claimants in front of the Commissioner and in federal

court. 42 U.S.C. § 406(a) & (b). Section 406(a) governs fees for representation in

administrative proceedings before the Commissioner. 42 U.S.C. § 406(a). Section

406(b) governs fees for representation in the federal courts, and provides in relevant

part:

Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant . . .who

was represented before the court by an attorney, the court may

determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such

representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the total past-due benefits

to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment. . . .

42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). The fee is payable “out of, and not in addition to, the

amount of [the] past-due benefits.” Id. Plaintiff’s counsel indicated he does not seek

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fees pursuant to § 406(a), and only seeks fees pursuant to § 406(b). (Dkt. No. 38-1,

Cho Decl. ¶ 5.) 

The United States Supreme Court has held that § 406(b) does not override or

displace attorney-client contingency fee agreements. Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S.

789, 808-09 (2002) (“[Section] 406(b) does not displace contingent-fee agreements

within the statutory ceiling; instead, § 406(b) instructs courts to review for

reasonableness fees yielded by those agreements.”). Rather, § 406(b) instructs courts

to review for reasonableness fees yielded by those agreements. Id. at 809; see also

Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1148 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (quoting Gisbrecht,

535 U.S. at 793, 808) (“a district court charged with determining a reasonable fee

award under § 406(b)(1)(A) must respect ‘the primacy of lawful attorney-client fee

arrangements,’. . . ‘looking first to the contingent-fee agreement, then testing it for

reasonableness.’”) Therefore, courts must first look to the contingent-fee agreement,

then determine whether the fees are reasonable. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808. In

determining whether fees are reasonable, attorney fees may be reduced based on “the

character of the representation and the results the representative achieved.” Id. Fees

may be subject to reduction if the attorney is responsible for delays or if the benefits

are large in comparison to the amount of time counsel spent on the case. Id. Courts

should also look at the attorney’s record of hours worked. Id. Section 406(b) requires

the Court to conduct an independent check to assess the reasonableness of the fee

request in light of the particular circumstances of the case. Id. 

On October 2, 2013, Plaintiff and his counsel entered into a “Social Security

Representation Agreement.” (Dkt. No. 38-2.) Under the contingent-fee arrangement,

Plaintiff agreed to payCounsel up to 25% of any past-due benefits. (Id. at 1.) Plaintiff

was awarded $78,057.00 in retroactive benefits under Title II benefits. (Dkt. No. 38-3

at 3.) Therefore, a 25% fee award would amount to $19,514.25. In the instant motion,

Plaintiff’s counsel seeks attorney fees in the amount of $19,000 which is 24.3 % of the

past due benefits paid. This includes 25.6 hours of attorney and paralegal time. 

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Plaintiff’s counsel also submitted a billing statement as to the number of hours spent

and work performed in connection with Plaintiff’s case in federal court. (Dkt. No. 38-4

at 1-1.) 

Based on the amount sought by Plaintiff’s counsel, the effective hourly rate is

$742.19. While the effective hourly rate appears excessive, such rates have been

deemed reasonable, and courts have accepted that the de facto hourly rates may exceed

those for non contingency-fee arrangements. See Hearn v. Barnhart, 262 F. Supp. 2d

1033, 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2003); see also Coffman v. Comm’r of Social Security, No. CV13-1242-PK, 2015 WL 5008847 (D. Oregon Aug. 20, 2015) ($643.40 per hour for

31.45 hours of work wasreasonable); Knudsen v. Colvin, No. CV 11-5093-JEM, 2015

WL 4205319 (C.D. Cal. July 10, 2015) (hourly rate of $973.78 for 26.7 hours of work

was reasonable); Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1145-46, 1153 (approving contingent fee

awards that resulted in effective hourly rates of $875, $519 and $813.5 in 2009). 

Here, there is no indication that a reduction of fees is warranted due to any

performance by counsel. There is no evidence of dilatory conduct. The Court has also

considered the results achieved by counsel which include not only past-due benefits,

but also future on-going benefits. (Dkt. No. 28-3 at 1.) A review of the billing records

reveal that the work performed is not excessive. In addition, Plaintiff has not filed an

opposition to his attorney’s fee request. Therefore, after an independent review of the

case, the Court concludes that the attorney fees sought by Plaintiff’s counsel pursuant

to § 406(b) are reasonable. 

Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s counsel’s motion

for attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) in the amount of $19,000.00 payable

to the Law Offices of Lawrence D. Rohlfing. Plaintiff’s counsel is further ordered to

/ / / /

/ / / /

/ / / /

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refund $4,500.00 in EAJA feesto Plaintiff Michael Nelson Hanes. The Clerk of Court

is directed to serve this order on Plaintiff at: PO Box 162, El Cajon, CA 92922. The

hearing date set for September 11, 2015 shall be vacated. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 3, 2015

HON. GONZALO P. CURIEL

United States District Judge

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