Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_12-cv-05563/USCOURTS-cand-4_12-cv-05563-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

EDWARD THOMAS, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

GERALD ELLIS, et al., 

Defendants. 

Case No. 12-cv-05563-CW (PR) 

ORDER REVOKING PLAINTIFF’S IN 

FORMA PAUPERIS STATUS AND 

DISMISSING COMPLAINT 

Plaintiff Edward Thomas, a state prisoner currently 

incarcerated at Corcoran State Prison, filed a pro se civil 

rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging the 

violation of his constitutional rights by prison officials and 

medical staff at Salinas Valley State Prison (SVSP), where he was 

formerly incarcerated. On April 8, 2013, the Court granted 

Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). On the 

same day, the Court found Plaintiff had stated cognizable claims 

for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs based on 

the denial of pain medication and directed that the complaint be 

served on Defendants.1 Subsequently, Defendants filed a motion 

for summary judgment. 

 On October 29, 2014, the Court issued an order directing 

Defendants to address whether Plaintiff’s IFP status should be 

 

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 The Court has dismissed Plaintiff’s other claims including a 

claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act. 

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revoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) based on its ruling in 

another case filed by Plaintiff, Thomas v. Sepulveda, 2014 WL 

5409064, *2-4 (N.D. Cal.), that he had three previous cases that 

counted as strikes under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). In their 

responsive brief, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s IFP status 

should be revoked because he is a three-strike litigant under 

§ 1915(g) and his complaint does not allege that he is in 

imminent danger. Plaintiff has filed an “objection” to 

Defendants’ response and a surreply. 

LEGAL STANDARD 

A prisoner may not bring a civil action IFP under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915 "if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while 

incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or 

appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the 

grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a 

claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is 

under imminent danger of serious physical injury." 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(g). 

For purposes of a dismissal that may count under § 1915(g), 

the phrase "fails to state a claim on which relief may be 

granted" parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6) and carries the same interpretation; the word 

"frivolous" refers to a case that is "'of little weight or 

importance: having no basis in law or fact,'" and the word 

"malicious" refers to a case "filed with the 'intention or desire 

to harm another.'" Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). Only cases within one of these 

three categories can be counted as strikes for § 1915(g) 

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purposes, so the mere fact that a plaintiff has filed many cases 

does not alone warrant dismissal under § 1915(g). Id. Rather, 

dismissal of an action under § 1915(g) should only occur when, 

"after careful evaluation of the order dismissing an [earlier] 

action, and other relevant information, the district court 

determines that the action was dismissed because it was 

frivolous, malicious or failed to state a claim." Id. A 

dismissal under § 1915(g) means that a prisoner cannot proceed 

with his action IFP under § 1915(g), but he still may pursue his 

claims if he pays the full filing fee at the outset of the 

action. Tierney v. Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310, 1311 (9th Cir. 1997). 

DISCUSSION 

I. Plaintiff’s Strikes 

 Based on the Court’s finding in Thomas v. Sepulveda, 2014 WL 

5409064 (N.D. Cal.), that Plaintiff is a three strikes litigant 

under § 1915(g), Defendants argue that he is collaterally 

estopped from arguing that he does not have three strikes. In 

Sepulveda, the Court found the following cases qualified as 

strikes under § 1915(g): (1) Thomas v. Terhune, case no. 03-cv5467 (E.D. Cal.) (complaint dismissed for failure to state a 

claim on which relief may be granted); (2) dismissal of the 

appeal in Thomas v. Terhune, case no. 06-1501 (9th Cir. 2006) 

(Ninth Circuit determined Plaintiff not entitled to IFP on 

appeal, Plaintiff did not pay filing fee and appeal dismissed for 

failure to prosecute); and (3) denial of the appeal in Thomas v. 

Lamarque, case no. 07-16437 (9th Cir. 2007) (Ninth Circuit 

determined appeal not taken in good faith, revoked Plaintiff’s 

IFP status and dismissed appeal for failure to prosecute after 

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Plaintiff failed to pay filing fee). 

 For collateral estoppel to bar relitigation of an issue, 

the following elements must be satisfied: (1) the issue at stake 

must be identical to the one alleged in the previous litigation; 

(2) the issue must have been actually litigated by the party 

against whom preclusion is asserted; and (3) the determination of 

the issue in the previous case must have been a critical and 

necessary part of the judgment. Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 

923 (9th Cir. 1996). 

A comparison of this case with Thomas v. Sepulveda shows all 

of the collateral estoppel requirements are satisfied. Plaintiff 

was the adverse party in Sepulveda, and the parties in that case 

litigated the same issue that is currently before this Court, 

that is, whether Plaintiff brought at least three actions or 

appeals that were dismissed on the ground that they were 

frivolous, malicious or failed to state a claim for relief. 

Sepulveda, 2014 WL 5409064, at *1-2. That determination was a 

critical and necessary part of the judgment because it directly 

resulted in the dismissal of Plaintiff’s action. Id. at *5. The 

judgment in Sepulveda is final; on January 14, 2015, Plaintiff’s 

appeal was dismissed because it was “so insubstantial as to not 

warrant further review.” In re Edward Thomas, No. 09-80085 (9th 

Cir. 2015). 

Furthermore, in Sepulveda, the Court already determined that 

Plaintiff was collaterally estopped from challenging his threestrike status based on the findings in two other previous 

district court cases, Thomas v. Felker, No. 09-cv-2486 FEC-CKD-P 

(E.D. Cal.), and Thomas v. Beutler, No. 10-cv-1300 MCE-CKD (E.D. 

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Cal.). Sepulveda, 2014 WL 5409064, at *3-4. Therefore, 

collateral estoppel bars Plaintiff from litigating whether the 

three cases addressed in Sepulveda qualify as strikes under 

§ 1915(g). 

Defendants also submit that a fourth case qualifies as a 

strike, Thomas v. Lamarque, No. C 04-4339 VRW (N.D. Cal.), where, 

on initial review, the court found that the allegations in 

Plaintiff’s complaint, at most, constituted negligence, but not 

deliberate indifference to his health, and dismissed the 

complaint for failure to state a claim for relief under § 1983. 

See Defs.’ Request for Judicial Notice (RJN), Ex. 1 at 001-007.2 

A dismissal for failure to state a claim for deliberate 

indifference where the allegations might state a claim for 

negligence qualifies as a strike under § 1915(g). See Fahie v. 

Mercy Hosp., 2011 WL 355822, *1 (E.D. Cal.); Eagleman v. 

Sandstrom, 2013 WL 2350377, *3 (D. Mont.). Therefore, Plaintiff 

has at least four cases that qualify as strikes under § 1915(g). 

He may proceed under IFP status only if he was in imminent danger 

at the time he filed his complaint. 

II. Imminent Danger 

 A plaintiff who has three strikes under § 1915(g) may still 

proceed IFP by showing that he or she “is under imminent danger 

of serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). This 

 

2

 Defendants request judicial notice, under Federal Rule of 

Evidence 201, of proceedings in this Court and other district 

courts and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. This request is 

granted. See Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 

2007) (court may take judicial notice of proceedings in other 

courts if they have a direct relation to the matters at issue); 

United States v. Wilson, 631 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir. 1980) (court 

may take judicial notice of its own records in other cases). 

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exception only “applies if the complaint makes a plausible 

allegation that the prisoner faced imminent physical danger at 

the time of filing” the complaint. Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 

F.3d 1047, 1055 (9th Cir. 2007). The complaint is the focus of 

the inquiry. Id.; Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 312 (3d 

Cir. 2001) (en banc). The plaintiff must show a nexus between 

the imminent danger alleged in the complaint and the claims it 

asserts. Pettus v. Morgenthau, 554 F.3d 293, 299 (2nd Cir. 

2009). This means that the plaintiff must show that (1) the 

imminent danger of serious physical injury is fairly traceable to 

the unlawful conduct asserted in the complaint and (2) a 

favorable judicial outcome would redress that injury. Id. 

Under certain circumstances, imminent danger may arise from 

the denial of medical treatment for serious or life-threatening 

diseases. See Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1350 (11th Cir. 

2004) (withdrawal of medications for HIV and hepatitis); 

Ciapaglini v. Saini, 352 F.3d 328, 330 (7th Cir. 2003) (denial of 

medication for psychiatric disorders caused plaintiff heart 

palpitations, chest pains and paralysis). However, the exception 

does not apply where the prisoner is receiving medical treatment 

but disputes the quality of treatment he is receiving. See Ball 

v. Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448, 468 (3rd Cir. 2013) (allegations of 

disagreements about quality of medical care insufficient to show 

imminent danger); Brown v. Beard, 492 F. Supp. 2d 474, 478 (E.D. 

Pa. 2007) (same). 

In his complaint, filed on October 29, 2012, Plaintiff 

alleges the following. Plaintiff suffers from acute chronic pain 

in his mid and lower back and lower extremities due to gunshot 

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injuries he received before his incarceration. Since his 

incarceration in 1999, he has been treated with various pain 

management medications. In 2009, Plaintiff was prescribed 

methadone, which worked very well in alleviating his pain. In 

2011, when Plaintiff was transferred to SVSP, medical staff 

decreased and then discontinued his methadone prescription 

because they did not want inmates taking narcotic medication. 

Instead, Plaintiff was treated with a number of other pain 

medications but none of them adequately controlled his pain. As 

relief, Plaintiff requests damages and an injunction ordering 

Defendants “to reinstate and provide Plaintiff with effective 

pain management medication, methadone (20 mg am, 20 mg noon, 20 

mg bedtime) and that said methadone pain medication be increased 

as needed to alleviate Plaintiff’s ongoing daily severe 

excruciating pain and suffering.” Comp. at 30. 

In summary, Plaintiff alleges that he is receiving medical 

treatment for his chronic pain, but that he disagrees with the 

type of medication the medical staff is prescribing for him. 

These allegations are insufficient to show an imminent danger of 

serious physical injury. See Ball, 726 F.3d at 468 (allegations 

of disagreement about quality of medical care insufficient to 

show imminent danger). Courts have rejected similar arguments of 

imminent danger. See e.g., Jackson v. Jin, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

44109, *6-7 (W.D.N.Y.) (denying imminent danger claim where 

plaintiff alleged he was being treated with pain medications, but 

not to his satisfaction); Tripati v. Hale, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

113101, *7-8 (W.D. Pa.) (finding no imminent danger where 

plaintiff had been seen many times by medical staff for chronicCase 4:12-cv-05563-CW Document 95 Filed 02/26/15 Page 7 of 9
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pain treatment and only disputed the quality of his medical care, 

including pain management). 

In his opposition, Plaintiff does not address the 

allegations in his complaint, but argues that the eleven nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory (NSAID) medications that Defendants 

prescribed for him in place of methadone caused many side 

effects, ranging from chest pains to nose bleeds and seizures. 

Opp. at 12-13. Citing Plata v. Schwarzenegger, 2005 WL 2932253 

(N.D. Cal.), Plaintiff also argues that these dangerous side 

effects are an ongoing physical danger at his present 

institution, Corcoran State Prison, because the health care 

system of the California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation (CDCR) is under federal receivership. Opp. at 38-

39. These post-hoc claims of imminent danger, which are not 

alleged in the complaint, do not satisfy the imminent danger 

exception. 

Furthermore, Plaintiff’s allegations of dangerous sideeffects cannot support the imminent danger exception because they 

are implausible. See Andrews, 493 F.3d at 1057 n.11 (assertions 

of imminent danger may be rejected as overly speculative when 

they are supported by implausible allegations). Most 

importantly, Plaintiff admits that, when he complained of a 

drug’s side effects, his doctors discontinued it and prescribed a 

replacement medication. Opp. at 12-13. His assertion that the 

side effects are an ongoing danger at Corcoran State Prison due 

to the federal receivership of the CDCR’s health care system is 

conclusory and without merit. 

For all of these reasons, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to 

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allege that he was in imminent danger at the time he filed it. 

Accordingly, under § 1915(g), Plaintiff’s IFP status is revoked 

and he is barred from proceeding IFP in this action. 

When IFP status is revoked pursuant to § 1915(g), the 

district court may dismiss the action without prejudice to refiling with payment of fees at the time the action is re-filed. 

See Tierney, 128 F.3d at 1311 (under § 1915(g), case was properly 

dismissed without prejudice to re-filing with payment of filing 

fees). Because Plaintiff’s IFP status is revoked pursuant to 

§ 1915(g), the Court does not address Defendants’ alternative 

argument that Plaintiff’s history of abusive litigation also 

warrants revocation of his IFP status. 

CONCLUSION 

 Based on the foregoing, the Court orders as follows: 

 1. The Order entered on April 8, 2013 (Doc. No. 4), granting 

Plaintiff leave to proceed IFP, is VACATED and Plaintiff's IFP 

status is REVOKED. 

 2. This case is dismissed without prejudice to Plaintiff's 

re-filing it with payment of the $400 filing fee. 

 3. The Clerk of the Court shall terminate all motions, enter 

a separate judgment and close the file. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: February 26, 2015 

__________________________________ 

CLAUDIA WILKEN 

United States District Judge 

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