Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01536/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01536-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 463
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Alien Detainee
Cause of Action: 28:2241fd Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (federal)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

N.B., a minor child,

Petitioner,

v.

WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General 

of the United States; KEVIN K. 

MCALEENAN, Acting Secretary of the 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security; 

MARK A. MORGAN, Acting 

Commissioner of U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection; MATTHEW T. 

ALBENCE, Acting Director of 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement; 

DR. STEWART D. SMITH, Assistant 

Director for ICE Health Services Corps; 

FRED FIGUEROA, Warden of the Otay 

Mesa Detention Center; OLIVER 

CASTANEDA, Deportation Office, Otay 

Mesa Detention Center; CORECIVIC, 

LLC, a Delaware limited liability 

corporation,

Respondents.

Case No.: 19-CV-1536 JLS (LL)

ORDER (1) APPOINTING HUGO 

IVAN SALAZAR AS “NEXT 

FRIEND” TO MINOR PETITIONER 

N.B. PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2242, 

AND (2) PRELIMINARILY 

ENJOINING RESPONDENTS FROM 

FURTHER UNLAWFULLY 

DETAINING N.B.

(ECF No. 1)

Presently before the Court is Petitioner N.B.’s Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus (“Pet.,” ECF No. 1). Also before the Court are the Return to the Petition (“Ret.,” 

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ECF Nos. 6, 10) filed by Respondents William P. Barr, Attorney General of the United 

States; Kevin K. McAleenan, Acting Secretary of the United States Department of 

Homeland Security (“DHS”); Mark A. Morgan, Acting Commissioner of the United States 

Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”); Matthew T. Albence, Acting Director of 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”); Dr. Stewart D. Smith, Assistant Director 

for ICE Health Services Corps (“IHSC”); Fred Figueroa, Warden of the Otay Mesa 

Detention Center; Oliver Castaneda, Deportation Officer, Otay Mesa Detention Center; 

and CoreCivic, LLC, as well as Petitioner’s corrected Verified Traverse (“Trav.,” ECF No. 

9), both filed in response to the Court’s August 19, 2019 Order to Show Cause Pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2243. See generally ECF No. 5. 

The Court finds this matter suitable for determination without oral argument 

pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1) and without holding an evidentiary hearing pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 2243. Having carefully considered the Parties’ arguments, the evidence, 

and the law, the Court APPOINTS Hugo Ivan Salazar to serve as N.B.’s “next friend” 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2242 and PRELIMINARILY ENJOINS Respondents from 

further unlawfully detaining N.B. in custody with unrelated adults.

BACKGROUND

I. Legal Background

United States Magistrate Judge James P. Donohue provided a thorough overview of 

the legal framework relevant to the instant Petition in B.I.C. v. Asher, No. C16-132-MJPJPD, 2016 WL 8672760 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 19, 2016):

Before the creation of DHS in 2002, the care and placement of 

unaccompanied alien children (“UAC”) in the United States was 

the responsibility of the Office of Juvenile Affairs in the former 

Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”). See F.L. v. 

Thompson, 293 F. Supp. 2d 86, 96 (D.D.C. 2003). In 2002, 

INS’s functions were split between the enforcement of federal 

immigration law, which was left to DHS, and the care of 

immigrant children, which was left to HHS. See Homeland 

Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002) 

(“HSA”). Those laws were amended again in 2008 through the 

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William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Act 

(“TVPRA”), further separating DHS’s and HHS’s functions by 

placing the care and custody of children under HHS’s 

jurisdiction and clarifying the respective roles and 

responsibilities of the two agencies with respect to UACs.

A. The Homeland Security Act of 2002

With the enactment of the HSA, Congress created DHS and 

transferred most immigration functions formerly performed by 

INS to DHS and its components, including U.S. Citizenship and 

Immigration Services, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and 

ICE. See HSA; Department of Homeland Security 

Reorganization Plan Modification of January 30, 2003, H.R. 

Doc. No. 108-32 (2003) (also set forth as a note to 6 U.S.C. 

§ 542). Notably, Congress transferred to [the Office of Refugee 

Resettlement (“ORR”)] the responsibility for the care of any 

UAC “who [is] in Federal custody by reason of [his or her] 

immigration status.” 6 U.S.C. §§ 279(a), (b)(1)(A). The HSA 

also transferred to ORR the responsibility for making all 

placement decisions for UACs, required ORR to coordinate these 

placement decisions with DHS, and required ORR to ensure that 

UACs are not released upon their own recognizance. See 6 

U.S.C. §§ 279(b)(l)(C), (D), (b)(2).

B. The Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization 

Act of 2008

The TVPRA, which was signed into law on December 23, 2008, 

contains statutory protections relating to UACs and codified 

protections related to the processing and detention of UACs. The 

TVPRA built on the split of duties in the HSA and further 

requires that “the care and custody of all unaccompanied alien 

children, including responsibility for their detention, where 

appropriate, shall be the responsibility of the Secretary of Health 

and Human Services.” 8 U.S.C. § 1232(b)(1). It also provides 

that in most instances, “any department or agency of the Federal 

Government that has an unaccompanied alien child in custody 

shall transfer the custody of such child to the Secretary of Health 

and Human Services not later than 72 hours after determining 

that such child is an unaccompanied alien child.” 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1232(b)(3).

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The TVPRA makes clear that HHS is responsible for all 

placement decisions for UACs in its custody, and for conducting 

suitability assessments for those placements. 8 U.S.C. § 1232(c). 

It requires that UACs in HHS custody be “promptly placed in the 

least restrictive setting that is in the best interest of the child,” 

and it provides guidelines for the reunification of UACs with 

their families by HHS. 8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(2), (3).

The protections TVPRA affords UACs apply after the HHS, in 

consultation with DHS, determines that the applicant is indeed a 

child. 8 U.S.C. § 1232(b)(a). Importantly for this litigation, the 

TVPRA provides:

The Secretary of Health and Human Services, in 

consultation with the Secretary of Homeland 

Security, shall develop procedures to make a 

prompt determination of the age of an alien, which 

shall be used by the Secretary of Homeland Security 

and the Secretary of Health and Human Services for 

children in their respective custody. At a minimum, 

these procedures shall take into account multiple 

forms of evidence, including the non-exclusive use 

of radiographs, to determine the age of the 

unaccompanied alien.

8 U.S.C. § 1232(b)(4) (emphasis added).

C. ORR’s age determination procedures1

Pursuant to § 1232(b)(4), ORR developed age determination 

procedures for individuals without lawful immigration 

status. See Dkt. 3-2 (Children Entering the United States 

Unaccompanied: Section 1 (updated Oct. 5, 2015) (“ORR 

Guide”)). The ORR Guide provides that “HHS may make age 

determinations of [UACs] when they are in HHS custody on a 

reasonable suspicion that a child in HHS custody is 18 years or 

older.” Id. at 8 (ORR Guide § 1.6.1). When conducting age 

determinations, ORR case managers are directed to seek the 

 

1 Magistrate Judge Donohue notes that “ICE developed a matching policy.” BIC, 2016 WL 8672760, at 

*2 n.2.

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following evidence, but information from each category is not 

required: (1) documentation, such as official government-issued 

documents and other reliable records that indicate the UAC’s 

date of birth; and (2) statements by individuals who can credibly 

attest to the age of the UAC, including the UAC (but generally, 

a UAC’s uncorroborated declaration regarding age is not used as 

the sole basis for an age determination). Id. at 8 (ORR Guide 

§ 1.6.2).

When other information is “inconclusive,” case managers may 

use medical age assessment procedures, such as dental maturity 

assessments using radiographs. Id. The ORR Guide provides 

that a “medical professional experienced in age assessment 

method(s) must perform the examination, taking into account the 

individual’s ethnic and genetic background.” Id. The ORR 

Guide recognizes that “no medical assessment method can 

determine an exact age [so] best practice relies on the estimated 

probability that an individual is 18 or older.” Id. “The 

examining doctor must submit a written report indicating the 

probability percentage that the individual is a minor or an adult 

. . . If an individual’s estimated probability of being 18 or older 

is 75 percent or greater, ORR will refer the individual to 

DHS.” Id.

B.I.C., 2016 WL 8672760, at *1–3 (all alterations but first in original) (emphasis in 

original) (footnotes omitted).

I. Factual and Procedural Background

N.B. is a citizen of the Republic of Guinea, Pet. ¶ 27; Resps.’ Ex. (ECF No. 4-1) at 

16, who speaks a tribal language known as Fella Minakakan and also French. Trav. ¶ 30(a). 

Having been threatened and fearing for his life, Resps.’ Ex. at 3, 20, 23, N.B. decided to 

go to the United States, id. at 19, where his cousin lives. Id. at 18. On March 3, 2019, 

N.B. flew from Guinea to Ecuador. Id. at 2, 18. He then traveled by bus to Turbo, 

Colombia, id., and by foot to Panama. Id. at 2–3; 18. N.B. then bussed through Costa 

Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras, and Guatemala, id. at 3, 18, where he lost his Guinea passport. 

Id. at 2, 3, 19–20. N.B. then took a bus through Mexico, from Tapachula to Tijuana. Id.

at 3, 18. 

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In Tijuana, N.B. stayed in a center with other migrants. Id. at 3, 18. N.B. heard from 

a non-government organization and from other migrants about the San Ysidro port of entry. 

Id. at 18. Although he did not hire an attorney before coming to the United States, a lawyer 

named Nicole Ramos from Al Otro Lado brought N.B. to San Ysidro. Id. at 3, 18–19; 

Trav. ¶ 30(e). The attorney told N.B. that N.B. could request asylum in the United States 

by claiming fear because of sexual orientation, political or religious affiliation, or fear of 

returning to Guinea. Resps.’ Ex. at 3, 19.

During his travels from Guinea to Mexico, N.B. gave his date of birth as December 

1992 on the advice of an older friend, Grand Balpe, who informed N.B. that he would be 

deported immediately or detained as a minor and held until he was an adult. Id. at 2, 16; 

Trav. ¶ 30(a). In Costa Rica, Mr. Balpe helped N.B. complete an immigration form that 

was written in Spanish, a language N.B. does not know. Trav. ¶ 30(b). At Mr. Balpe’s 

suggestion, see id., N.B. used the December 1992 birthdate on the Costa Rican immigration 

form, which N.B. used to travel through Central America to the Mexican border. Id.

¶ 30(c). April 9 and 21, 2019 intake forms from ICE agents in Mexico reflect this 

December 1992 birthday. Resps.’ Ex. at 5a, 7; Trav. ¶¶ 30(d), (g). Once in Mexico, N.B. 

was provided with a second immigration form, also written in Spanish, that he used to 

travel from Tapachula to Tijuana. Trav. ¶ 30(d). N.B. had difficulty understanding the 

form and does not recall what birthday he used on it. Id. Although a May 3, 2019 intake 

form notes that N.B.’s birthday was in December 2000, Resps.’ Ex. at 6; Trav. ¶ 30(g), 

N.B. claims he never provided a December 2000 birthdate to Mexican officials. Trav. 

¶ 31(a). 

On May 22, 2019, N.B. presented himself at the United States port of entry in San 

Ysidro as an unaccompanied minor, Pet. ¶¶ 27, 38; Resps.’ Ex. at 19, and requested asylum.

Resps.’ Ex. at 2. Although N.B. did not have legal documents allowing him entrance to 

the United States, id. at 2, 16, he presented an extract from his birth certificate bearing the 

seal of the Office of the Registrar and Chief Clerk of the Republic of Guinea and showing 

/ / /

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that he was born in December 2001.

2

 Pet. ¶ 27; see also Pet. Ex. 1, ECF No. 1-2; Pet. Ex. 

2, ECF No. 1-3; Resps.’ Ex. at 2. N.B. also had in his possession a government-issued 

education system photo identification card indicating N.B. was born in December 2001,3

see Pet. ¶ 36; Pet. Ex. 3, ECF No. 1-4; an April 30, 2019 extract of an April 11, 2019 

judgment, certified May 9, 2019, ruling that N.B. was born in December 2001, see Resps.’ 

Ex. at 35; and the April 11, 2019 judgment, certified May 9, 2019.4

 See id. at 36. 

N.B. was taken in DHS custody and referred to CBP processing. Pet. ¶ 28. On 

May 25, 2019, he was placed in expedited removal proceedings pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1225(b)(1). Resps.’ Ex. at 12. N.B. was held in solitary confinement for four days, Pet.

¶¶ 28, 39, and in the “ice box” for another twenty-four days. Id. ¶¶ 29, 39. On June 18, 

/ / /

 

2 “In the Republic of Guinea, original birth certificates are not issued to individuals for them to retain, 

rather the government holds the original in a registry depository in the city hall of the individual’s birth 

city—essentially a records department in the city hall.” Trav. ¶ 33(3)(b) (citing ECF No. 4-2 at 1–2). “If 

someone wants to obtain the information contained within a birth certificate, they may request a birth 

certificate extract from the registry depository.” Id. (citing ECF No. 4-2 at 2). “The extract contains the 

birthdate, ‘child’s surnames, given names and place of birth, as well as their parents’ names, place of birth, 

procession and place of residence.’” Id. (quoting ECF No. 4-2 at 2).

3 During his May 25, 2019 interview with DHS, N.B. indicated that “[he] d[id] not have a picture ID but 

[he] ha[d his] birth certificate from Guinea.” Resps.’ Ex. at 16. N.B. explains in his verified Traverse 

that he “misunderstood the questions being asked” because they were translated into French, which is a 

secondary language, not his native tongue. Trav. ¶ 54.

4 According to Respondents, the April 11, 2019 judgment indicates that it was issued in response to the 

April 10, 2019 request of N.B.’s father, who passed away in 2011. See Ret. at 1, 3, 11; see also Resps.’ 

Ex. at 2, 17, 38–39. N.B. responds that “the government again seems either to be ignorant of the facts 

and/or is willfully hurling misplaced accusations of fraud,” Trav. ¶ 33(3)(a), because “N.B.’s cousin 

obtained a judgment entitling her to obtain N.B.’s birth certificate extract, on behalf of N.B.’s deceased 

father’s estate, and on behalf of and authorized by N.B. himself, according to the Guinean Civil Code.” 

Id. ¶ 33(3)(b). Consequently, “[n]o one impersonated N.B.’s father as the government claims.” Id. In 

any event, N.B. contends, “the government has not shown what about the document warrants disregarding 

its facially certified, sealed, attestations as to N.B.’s birth information.” Id.

Respondents also contend that N.B. had in his possession a certified copy of a Guinean birth certificate 

for Mohamed Saliuo Bah, born January 25, 2002. See, e.g., Ret. at 3; see also Resps.’ Ex. at 40. But 

“N.B. disputes that he was ever in possession of another person’s birth certificate, or any birth certificate 

showing a 2002 birthdate.” Trav. ¶ 33(5)(a).

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2019, N.B. was transferred to the Otay Mesa Detention Center, id. ¶ 40, which is managed 

by CoreCivic. Id. ¶ 26.

On June 24, 2019, IHSC ordered a dental x-ray examination of N.B. to determine 

his age. Id. ¶¶ 29, 41; see also Resps.’ Ex. at 24. The dental x-ray determined N.B.’s 

“mean age” to be 20.24 years of age, with a standard deviation of 2.98 years. Pet. ¶ 29; 

Resps.’ Ex. at 24. Accordingly, the report concluded that “[t]he interval of possible ages 

for such a male is 17.26 to 23.23 years,” with “[t]he empirical statistical probability of 

[N.B.] having attained 18 years of age [being] 93.53%.” Resps.’ Ex. at 24. ICE therefore 

concluded that N.B. would “be treated as an adult” because “the empirical statistical 

probability the subject[] attained 18 years of age is 93.53%.” Pet. ¶ 29; see also Pet. ¶ 41; 

Ex. 12, ECF No. 1-13. Accordingly, N.B. is being detained in group quarters with more 

than 100 adult men. Pet. ¶ 32. These conditions have left N.B. feeling helpless, distraught, 

and in constant fear. Id. ¶ 33.

On July 16, 2019, an asylum officer conducted a credible fear interview of N.B. See 

Resps.’ Ex. at 25. 

On August 5, 2019, Mr. Salazar of Al Otro Lado entered an appearance as N.B.’s 

counsel via DHS Form G-28 and requested N.B.’s immediate release to his cousin and 

sponsor, Mariama Tounkara, in Columbus, Ohio, pursuant to the stipulated settlement 

agreement in Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993) (the “Flores Settlement”). Pet. ¶¶ 30, 

42; Pet. Ex. 4, ECF No. 1-5; Pet. Ex. 5, ECF No. 1-6; see also Pet. Ex. 13, ECF No. 1-14. 

That same day, Respondent Castaneda refused the request on the basis ICE would continue 

to treat N.B. as an adult in light of the results of the Dental Age Assessment. See Pet. 

¶¶ 31, 43; see also Pet. Ex. 12.

On August 8, 2019, N.B. retained Arent Fox LLP to represent him pro bono. Pet. 

¶ 34. 

The asylum officer issued a negative credible fear determination on August 12, 2019. 

See Resps.’ Ex. at 28. In response to N.B.’s request for review by an immigration judge 

/ / /

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pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1208.30(g)(2), see id. at 32, N.B.’s case was referred for review on 

August 14, 2019. See id. at 30–31. 

Al Otro Lado and Arent Fox LLP filed the instant Petition on behalf of N.B. on 

August 15, 2019. See generally ECF No. 1. The Petition alleges the following claims for 

relief: (1) violation of the TVPRA and implementing guidelines; (2) violation of the 

Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); (3) violation of 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1236.3(d); (4) violation of the Flores Settlement; (5) violation of N.B.’s procedural and 

substantive due process rights under the Fifth Amendment; (6) violation of the APA 

because of violation of N.B.’s due process rights; (7) declaratory relief pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202; and (8) writ of habeas pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See Pet. 

¶¶ 71–129.

On August 16, 2019, N.B. filed an Application for Issuance of Writ or Order to Show 

Cause Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2243, see generally ECF No. 3, to which Respondents filed 

an opposition. See generally ECF No. 4. On August 19, 2019, the Court issued an Order 

to Show Cause Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2243, see generally ECF No. 5, ordering 

Respondents to show cause why the Petition should not be granted. See id. at 2. 

On the same day, the immigration judge vacated the asylum officer’s credible fear 

determination as procedurally defective, see Trav. Ex. 1, ECF No. 9-1, and ICE placed 

N.B. in removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1208(g)(2)(iv)(B). Resps.’ Ex. at 41–42. On August 20, 2019, N.B.’s counsel submitted 

a second request that ICE release N.B. Trav. Ex. 2, ECF No. 9-2. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Once a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is filed in federal court pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2241, the court must comply with the procedures set forth by 28 U.S.C. § 2243:

A court, justice or judge entertaining an application for a writ of 

habeas corpus shall forthwith award the writ or issue an order 

directing the respondent to show cause why the writ should not 

be granted, unless it appears from the application that the 

applicant or person detained is not entitled thereto.

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. . .

The person to whom the writ or order is directed shall make a 

return certifying the true cause of detention.

. . .

The applicant or the person detained may, under oath, deny any 

of the facts set forth in the return or allege any other material 

facts.

The return and all suggestions made against it may be amended, 

by leave of court, before or after being filed.

The court shall summarily hear and determine the facts, and 

dispose of the matter as law and justice require.

28 U.S.C. § 2243.

ANALYSIS

I. Petitioner’s Capacity to Sue

In a footnote on the caption page of their Return, Respondents assert that, “[i]f 

Petitioner is indeed a minor, he lacks capacity to bring this action.” Ret. n.1 (citing Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 17). 

Here, Mr. Salazar twice has represented that he is acting on N.B.’s behalf pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 2242. See Pet. at 34; Trav. At 34. The Court therefore construes these 

representations as a request for appointment of “next friend” status. See, e.g., Ward v. 

Ortega, No. CV 02-1022 MMM (FMO), 2003 WL 27382360, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 

2003) (construing opposition to motion to dismiss petition filed by attorney on behalf of 

minor as request for appointment of next friend status).

The habeas statutes explicitly provide for such next friend standing: “Application 

for a writ of habeas corpus shall be in writing signed and verified by the person for whose 

/ / /

/ / /

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relief it is intended or by someone acting in his behalf.”5 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (emphasis 

added). The United States Supreme Court has established “at least two firmly rooted 

prerequisites for ‘next friend’ standing.” Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 163 (1990). 

“First, a ‘next friend’ must provide an adequate explanation—such as inaccessibility, 

mental incompetence, or other disability—why the real party in interest cannot appear on 

his own behalf to prosecute the action.” Id. (citing Wilson v. Lane, 870 F.2d 1250, 1253 

(7th Cir. 1989); Smith ex rel. Mo. Pub. Def. Comm’n v. Armontrout, 812 F.2d 1050, 1053 

(8th Cir. 1987); Weber v. Garza, 570 F.2d 511, 513–14 (5th Cir. 1978)). “Second, the 

‘next friend’ must be truly dedicated to the best interests of the person on whose behalf he 

seeks to litigate,” id. (citing Morris v. United States, 399 F. Supp. 720, 722 (E.D. Va.

1975)), meaning the “‘next friend’ must have some significant relationship with the real 

party in interest.” Id. (citing Davis v. Austin, 492 F. Supp. 273, 275–76 (N.D. Ga. 1980)); 

see also Massie ex rel. Kroll v. Woodford, 244 F.3d 1192, 1194 (9th Cir. 2001). The Ninth 

Circuit has clarified that “the contours of the requisite ‘significant relationship’ do not 

remain static, but must necessarily adapt to the circumstances facing each individual 

detainee” because “[n]ot all detainees may have a relative, friend, or even a diplomatic 

delegation able or willing to act on their behalf.” Coal. of Clergy, Lawyers, & Professors 

v. Bush, 310 F.3d 1153, 1162 (9th Cir. 2002). “In such an extreme case it is plausible that 

a person with ‘some’ relationship conveying some modicum of authority or consent, 

‘significant’ in comparison to the detainee’s other relationships, could serve as the next 

friend.” Id.

As Respondents themselves concede, the first Whitemore/Massie requirement is 

satisfied by N.B.’s minority status. See ECF No. 4 at n.1; Ret. at n.1. That Mr. Salazar 

filed the Petition—which comprises over 150 pages—pro bono demonstrates that he is 

“truly dedicated to the best interests of” N.B. See Whitemore, 495 U.S. at 163; see also 

 

5 Such “next friend” standing is also authorized by Rule 17 in suits by minors. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c)(2) 

(“A minor . . . who does not have a duly appointed representative may sue by a next friend.”).

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ACLU ex rel. Unnamed U.S. Citizen v. Mattis, 286 F. Supp. 3d 53, 58 (D.D.C. 2017)

(concluding that ACLU satisfied “best interests” prong of Whitemore test where “it is clear 

. . . that [the detainee] wishes to have the assistance of a lawyer”). The Court also concludes 

that, under N.B.’s particular circumstances,6 Mr. Salazar has the requisite significant 

relationship with N.B. See, e.g., Tinsley v. Flanagan, No. CV-15-00185-PHX-ROS, 2016

WL 8200450, at *6 (D. Ariz. May 13, 2016) (“The present record is limited but it 

establishes the relationships between [attorneys and minors] are all that can be expected 

under the circumstances. . . . Accordingly, [attorneys] satisfy the ‘significant relationship’

requirement.”); Nichols v. Nichols, No. CIV. 10-651-HA, 2011 WL 2470135, at *5 (D. Or. 

June 20, 2011) (“[Court-appointed fiduciary]’s ‘authorized representation’ established a 

sufficient relationship for purposes of Next Friend standing in this case.”). 

The Court therefore determines that Mr. Salazar has met his burden of establishing 

the “next friend” requirements applicable to 28 U.S.C. § 2242 pursuant to the Supreme 

Court’s decision in Whitemore and the Ninth Circuits decisions in Massie and Coalition of 

Clergy. Consequently, the Court APPOINTS Mr. Salazar to serve as N.B.’s “next friend.”

II. Jurisdiction

Respondents challenge the Court’s jurisdiction over Counts Two, Three, Six, and 

Seven on the grounds that those Counts are not proper habeas claims and that the Court 

lacks personal jurisdiction over Respondents as to those claims. See Ret. at 5–7.

A. Habeas Jurisdiction

“Absent intervening law, this court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.” 

Nguyen v. Fasano, 84 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1104 (S.D. Cal. 2000); Alikhani v. Fasano, 70 F. 

Supp. 2d 1124, 1126 (S.D. Cal. 1999). 

Respondents’ sole argument against this Court’s jurisdiction is that Counts Two, 

Three, Six, and Seven are not proper habeas claims that therefore are subject to dismissal 

 

6 N.B.’s father died in 2011, Resps.’ Ex. 38, and N.B. has not had contact with his mother, who remains 

in Guinea, since 2013. Id. at 2, 16–17. N.B.’s only relative in the United States is his cousin, who lives 

in Columbus, Ohio. Resps.’ Ex. at 17–18, 21.

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(or even warrant dismissal of the entire Petition).

7

 See Ret. at 5–6. N.B. counters that 

“[t]he government apparently misunderstands N.B.’s habeas petition,” Trav. ¶ 10, because 

“Counts 2, 3, and 6 are not independent civil claims under Section 1983 or any other 

law[, but r]ather . . . are explicitly formulated as theories of habeas relief.” Trav. ¶ 11. “As 

to Count 7, which seeks a declaration of N.B.’s rights pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 

2202, again N.B. is not seeking independent civil relief. Rather, he has sought a declaration

of his rights in his habeas case.” Id. ¶ 16.

The Court agrees that N.B.’s Counts Two, Three, Six, and Seven are proper habeas 

claims. Ultimately, N.B. is seeking injunctive relief, Pet. ¶ 130(d), and “declaration(s) that 

N.B. is a minor for purposes of his immigration detention and immigration proceedings, 

until his eighteenth (18th) birthday,” id. ¶ 130(b); “that Defendants’ age determination of 

N.B. based solely on the dental x-ray assessment violated the TVPRA, 8 U.S.C. § 1232(b),” 

Pet. ¶ 130(c); and “that Ms. Tounkara is a qualified family-member-sponsor pursuant to 

¶ 14 of the Flores Settlement Agreement.” Pet. ¶ 130(f). He seeks no damages pursuant 

to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), see generally Pet. ¶ 130, 

but rather declaratory and injunctive relief, see generally id., both of which are proper

habeas remedies. See 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (“The court shall . . . dispose of the matter as law 

and justice require.”); Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 239 (1968) (“[T]he statute does 

not limit the relief that may be granted to discharge of the applicant from physical custody. 

Its mandate is broad with respect to the relief that may be granted.”); Brian R. Mean,

Federal Habeas Manual § 13:20 (2019) (discussing general availability of declaratory and 

injunctive relief in habeas actions); see also, e.g., Rodriguez v. Hayes, 591 F.3d 1105, 

 

7 N.B.’s second count claims that “Defendants’ age determination and subsequent decisions to continue 

detaining N.B. as an adult are arbitrary and capricious and must be set aside, pursuant to the [APA],” Pet. 

¶ 82, while his third count alleges that “[t]he government’s detention of N.B. . . . violates 8 C.F.R. § 

1236.3(d).” Pet. ¶ 95. N.B.’s sixth count contends that “Defendants’ conduct has and continues to violate 

N.B.’s procedural and substantive Due Process rights” in violation of the APA, Pet. ¶ 120, while his 

seventh count “seeks a declaration that he is a minor for purposes of his immigration detention and 

proceedings, until his eighteenth (18th) birthday” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202. Pet. ¶ 126.

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1111–12, 1119–20 (9th Cir. 2010) (reversing district court’s denial of certification of 

habeas class seeking injunctive and declaratory relief and concluding class was not barred 

from obtaining injunctive of declarator relief). The Court therefore concludes that it has 

subject-matter jurisdiction over all claims presented by the instant Petition.

B. Personal Jurisdiction

Respondents also argue that Counts Two, Three, Six, and Seven must be dismissed 

for lack of personal jurisdiction. Ret. at 6–7. Even in the habeas context, however, 

“personal jurisdiction—unlike subject-matter jurisdiction—may be waived.” Smith v. 

Idaho, 392 F.3d 350, 355 (9th Cir. 2004). To the extent that Respondents’ challenge to the 

Court’s personal jurisdiction survives in light of the Court’s determination that N.B. asserts 

only habeas claims, see supra Section I.A, N.B. is correct that Respondents waived any 

challenge to the Court’s personal jurisdiction when they filed their prior Response in 

Opposition to Request for Immediate Relief. See generally ECF No. 4. The Court 

therefore concludes that it has personal jurisdiction over Respondents. 

III. Merits of the Petition

This brings the Court to the merits of N.B.’s claims. Respondents assert that there 

is “no factual basis for [N.B.]’s habeas claims” in Counts One, Four, and Five because 

“[t]he factors considered to reach an age determination . . . do not violate any statute or 

regulation,” see Ret. at 7–12 (emphasis omitted), and that N.B.’s Count Five for custody 

review is premature because he “has [not] yet made an application for parole” and he “has 

been detained only since May 24, 2019 (fewer than six months), so it is premature to seek 

judicial intervention.” See id. at 12–13 (citing Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. ___, 138 

S. Ct. 830 (2018); Rodriguez v. Marin, 909 F.3d 252 (9th Cir. 2018); Yagao v. Figueroa, 

No. 17-CV-2224-AJB-MDD, 2019 WL 1429582, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2019)). Finally, 

Respondents contend that N.B. cannot obtain the equitable relief he seeks because he is 

barred by the doctrine of unclean hands due to misrepresentations about his age made 

during the course of his travels to the U.S. border. See id. at 13–14.

/ / /

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A. Injunctive Relief

“A federal district court may grant a writ of habeas corpus if the petitioner is ‘in 

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.’” Lucas v. 

Nielson, No. 18-CV-07763-HSG, 2019 WL 884012, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2019)

(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3)). “Preliminary injunctive relief, however, is a matter of 

equitable discretion and is ‘an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear 

showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.’” Id. (quoting Winter v. Natural Res. 

Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008)).

In addition to the various declarations from the Court that N.B. seeks, see Pet. 

¶¶ 130(b), (c), (f), N.B. also seeks “preliminary and injunctive relief enjoining Defendants 

from further unlawfully detaining N.B. in custody with unrelated adults.” Id. ¶ 130(d). 

N.B. must therefore “establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to 

suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips 

in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. A 

preliminary injunction may also be “appropriate when a [petitioner] demonstrates . . . that 

serious questions going to the merits were raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply 

in the plaintiff’s favor,” provided the petitioner can also establish the other two Winter 

factors. All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1134–35 (9th Cir. 2011)

(quoting Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 987 (9th Cir. 2008), overruled on other 

grounds by Winter, 555 U.S. 7) (alterations in original). “Under either standard, 

P[etitioner] bears the burden of making a clear showing that it is entitled to this 

extraordinary remedy.” Lucas, 2019 WL 884012, at *2 (citing Earth Island Inst. v. 

Carlton, 626 F.3d 462, 469 (9th Cir. 2010)).

1. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

N.B. seeks a preliminary injunction “enjoining Defendants from further unlawfully 

detaining N.B. in custody with unrelated adults.” Pet. ¶ 130(d). As discussed above, see 

supra Section II.A, this request is premised on various bases for N.B.’s unlawful detention, 

including Respondents’ violations of (1) the TVPRA and implementing guidance by basing 

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its age determination solely on a dental radiograph, see Pet. ¶¶ 71–91; (2) 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1236.3(d) and the Flores Settlement by failing to house N.B. in a separate 

accommodation for juveniles, Pet. ¶¶ 92–95, 99–100, 102; (3) the Flores Settlement by 

(a) failing to place N.B. in the least restrictive setting, Pet. ¶¶ 97–98, or to release him to 

his cousin, id. ¶¶ 101–02; and (b) preventing N.B. from exercising his rights to seek judicial 

review of his detention placement or allege noncompliance with the minimum standards 

for minor detention, id. ¶¶ 103–05; and (4) N.B.’s due process rights under the Fifth 

Amendment by (a) detaining N.B. for nearly ninety days without a hearing to determine 

whether his detention is necessary, Pet. ¶¶ 109–11, 118–22; (b) violating N.B.’s right to 

family integrity by separating him from his cousin, id. ¶¶ 112–14, 118–22; and (c) violating 

N.B.’s right to be free from physical restraint, id. ¶¶ 115–16, 118–22. In essence, however, 

each of these claims is premised upon Respondents’ allegedly unlawful determination that 

N.B. is an adult based on the exclusive use of a dental radiograph.

“The TVPRA required HHS and DHS to develop procedures that ‘[a]t a minimum 

. . . take into account multiple forms of evidence, including the non-exclusive use of 

radiographs, to determine the age of [a UAC].’” B.I.C., 2016 WL 8672760, at *5 

(emphasis in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1232(b)(4)). As explained in B.I.C., “Congress’s 

mandate that radiographs not be the only basis for an age determination reflects concern 

about the reliability of such determinations.” Id. at *5. “In 2009, the Office of Inspector 

General for DHS released a report that acknowledged the House Appropriations 

Committee had previously ‘expressed concern that ICE was relying on radiographs for age 

determinations for aliens in its custody, and questioned the reliability of radiographic 

evidence that ICE uses when determining whether an individual is an adult or juvenile.’” 

Id. “The report recognized that ‘radiographs of a person’s bones or teeth . . . cannot 

produce a specific age due to a range of factors affecting an individual’s growth,’ including 

normal biological variation, cultural and ethnic differences, the timing of puberty, diet, 

genetics, health, and geography.” Id. “The report also stated, ‘Medical professionals we 

spoke with expressed skepticism that a radiographic exam could be used to discover 

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specifically whether an individual has attained 18 years of age. However, they did 

generally agree that radiographic exams could provide a usable age range.’” Id.

N.B. contends that “[t]he government has itself stated that the only evidence relied 

upon for CBP, ICE, and CoreCivic’s continued detention of N.B. with adults is the dental 

x-ray assessment.” Pet. ¶ 78 (citing Pet. Ex. 12, ECF No. 1-13). Exhibit 12 is an August 5, 

2019 email from Respondent Castaneda to Mr. Salazar providing that:

On June 24, 2019, ICE Health Services Corps (IHSC) ordered a 

Dental Age Assessment report which was conducted by a 

Pediatric and Forensic Dentistry. According to the dental age 

assessment the subject mean age is 20.24 with a standard 

deviation of 2.98 years. The empirical statistical probability the 

subjects attained 18 years of age is 93.53% which is over the 75% 

required by policy. Therefore, the subject will be treated as an 

adult.

Pet. Ex. 12 at 1.

Respondents contest that their age determination was based solely on N.B.’s dental 

radiograph, urging that their “determination of Petitioner’s adult status is based, in the first 

place, on the fact that he repeatedly held himself out as an adult during his journey to the 

United States and did so with a passport that he conveniently lost and replaced with 

fraudulent documents.” Ret. at 8. Further, “Guinean extracts of birth certificates are 

notoriously suspect,” id. at 9, and, “[t]hroughout his petition, Petitioner misrepresents that 

he has presented to ICE a ‘birth certificate’ as evidence of his date of birth” because “[h]e 

presented an ‘extract’ of his birth certificate, not his birth certificate.” Id. at 11.

N.B. responds that each of Respondents’ arguments is impermissible. See Trav. 

¶¶ 34–54. First, N.B. contends that “[a]ny adverse evidence purportedly obtained via the 

ICE interviews should be disregarded,” id. ¶ 37, because Respondents interviewed N.B. in 

a language other than his native tongue and without the presence of counsel. Id. ¶ 36. 

Next, N.B. argues that, “[w]here an applicant states he used a falsified birth date on his 

documents because ‘he had to lie about his age in order to’ gain entry into the U.S., such 

falsified birthdate is ‘not a permissible basis for an adverse credibility determination’ by 

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the government.” Id. ¶ 44 (quoting Abuhawa v. Holder, 378 F. App’x 741, 743 (9th Cir.), 

as amended on denial of reh’g (July 16, 2010)). Further, “the government’s rejection of 

N.B.’s documents showing his age as 17 is based otherwise principally on the notion that 

documents from the Republic of Guinea are inherently suspect” and “[t]he government has 

not addressed the additional documentation N.B. submitted with his Petition (his education 

system I.D.).” Id. ¶ 47. Finally, “the government routinely cites as evidence only to its

intake Form I-213 forms that purport to contain statements by N.B., or which do not even 

purport to contain statements made by N.B. but which the government nevertheless 

attributes to N.B.,” id. ¶ 53, but “[t]here are several factors that cast doubt on the contents 

of the I-213 in this case,” including that “N.B. was never provided a French translator when 

interviewed in Mexico” and “the government did not allow N.B. to consult with his 

attorneys during his most crucial interview.” Id. ¶ 54.

The Court concludes that N.B. has carried his burden of establishing a strong 

likelihood that Respondents impermissibly determined that he is not a minor given the 

totality of the evidence presented by N.B. Not only did Respondents represent to N.B.’s 

counsel that their age determination was based solely on a dental radiograph in violation 

of the TBPRA, see Pet. Ex. 12, but Respondents’ post hoc justifications on alternative bases 

for their age determination are contrary to the law and fail properly to consider the totality 

of other evidence probative of N.B.’s minority, including his extract of birth certificate and 

government-issued student identification card. 

First, the Court determines that Respondents improperly considered N.B.’s 

representations that he was born in December 1992.8

 N.B. concedes that he misrepresented 

 

8 Respondents also contend that Petitioner used a December 2000 birthdate. See Ret. at 2 (citing Resps.’ 

Ex. at 6). In his verified Traverse, N.B. “disputes this,” attesting that he “never gave a December 2000 

date to Mexican officials.” Trav. ¶ 31(a). Not only is “[t]he government is relying on a ‘system generated’

intake form devoid of any underlying evidence, such as a transcript, to show that N.B. ever made this 

representation,” but “either [N.B.] and the Mexican officials misunderstood each other as a result of the

Mexican authorities’ failure to provide N.B. a French translator, or who[]ever input the information into 

the intake system mistyped his actual birthdate, which is exactly one year later.” Id. The Court therefore 

concludes that Respondents have not proven that N.B. ever used a December 2000 birthdate.

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that he was an adult at certain points in his travels to the United States border, but, as he

notes, see Trav. ¶ 39, “in the circumstance of a refugee fleeing persecution, such 

‘misrepresentations are wholly consistent with his testimony and application for asylum: 

he did so because he feared deportation to [his country of origin].’” Akinmade v. INS, 196 

F.3d 951, 955 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Turcios v. INS, 821 F.2d 1396, 1400–01 (9th Cir. 

1987)). Given that N.B. used the December 1992 birthdate only to avoid being detained 

or deported prior to reaching the United States border, the Court determines that 

Respondents impermissibly relied on N.B.’s assertions that he was born in December 1992 

to contravene his evidence that he was actually born in 2001. See Trav. ¶ 30(b). 

Next, the Court determines that Respondents improperly considered the documents 

that N.B. did and did not have in his possession when he arrived at the United States border. 

See Ret. at 8–11. As for the documents N.B. did not have, Respondents contend that N.B.

“conveniently lost” his Guinean passport. See id. at 8. N.B., however, testified under oath 

that he lost his passport in Guatemala. See Resps.’ Ex. at 19–20. Respondents cannot rely 

solely on speculation to conclude that N.B. disposed of his Guinean passport to conceal 

that he is not a minor.

9

 See Yun Wang v. Holder, 404 F. App’x 196, 197 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(citing Shah v. INS, 220 F.3d 1062, 1071 (9th Cir. 2000)).

As for the documents N.B. did have in his possession, Respondents contend that 

N.B.’s extract of birth certificate is “fraudulent” and/or suspect based on several 

arguments: 

• First, Respondents claim that N.B.’s extract of birth certificate was “recently 

acquired by someone posing as Petitioner’s deceased father” and that “[t]he fact that the 

 

9 In any event, it would seem unlikely based on the very radiographic analysis upon which Respondents’ 

now depend that N.B.’s passport would have shown that he actually was born in December 1992. See 

Ret. at 9 (insinuating that N.B.’s passport was a valid document that would have corroborated the date of 

birth N.B. had provided to officials). This birthdate would make N.B. twenty-seven years old, but the 

dental age assessment was consistent with “a male . . . 17.26 to 23.23 years.” Resps.’ Ex. at 24. Based 

on the dental radiograph results, it is therefore much more likely that N.B. was born in December 2001, 

as he contends, than in December 1992, as Respondents intimate. 

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documents were obtained under false pretenses is itself indirect evidence that Petitioner is 

not a minor.” Ret. at 8. In his verified Traverse, however, N.B. explains that “[n]o one 

impersonated N.B.’s father as the government claims” because “N.B.’s cousin obtained a 

judgment entitling her to obtain N.B.’s birth certificate extract, on behalf of N.B.’s 

deceased father’s estate, and on behalf of and authorized by N.B. himself, according to the 

Guinean Civil Code.” Trav. ¶ 33(3)(b) (emphasis in original). The Court therefore 

dismisses Respondents’ contention that N.B.’s documents were obtained fraudulently in 

light of N.B.’s explanation. 

• Second, Respondents attempt to establish that N.B. has been less than 

forthright in his representations concerning his extract of birth certificate, arguing that N.B. 

“misrepresents that he has presented to ICE a ‘birth certificate’” and filed with the Court a 

false translation indicating that the document is a “birth certificate.” See Ret. at 11. The 

Court declines to conclude that N.B. or his counsel was attempting to mislead the Court. 

Not only is it far more likely that any confusion was due to language barriers, but the Court 

declines to attribute to N.B.’s counsel any fraudulent intent related to the filing of a certified 

translation identifying the document as a “birth certificate” rather than an “extract of birth 

certificate.” Compare Pet. Ex. 1, with Pet. Ex. 2, ECF No. 1-3.

• Third, Respondents make much of a birth certificate belonging to Mohamed 

Saliou Bah that was allegedly found in N.B.’s possession. See Ret. at 11. In his verified 

Traverse, however, “N.B. disputes that he was ever in possession of another person’s birth 

certificate, or any birth certificate showing a 2002 birthdate.” Trav. ¶ 33(5)(a). Even if 

N.B. did possess the birth certificate of another individual born in 2002, that does not 

suffice to support speculation that N.B.’s other documents are fraudulent in some 

unspecified way.

• Fourth and most troubling, Respondents claim that “Guinean extracts of birth 

certificates are notoriously suspect,” see Ret. at 8–10, without introducing any evidence 

that N.B.’s extract of birth certificate in particular is in any way suspect. See Trav. ¶ 47. 

As N.B. notes in his Traverse, Respondents’ argument is based solely on “a Refworld 

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report from the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada that itself states it ‘is not, and 

does not purport to be conclusive.’” Trav. ¶ 4 (quoting ECF No. 4-2 at 8). The Court must 

agree with N.B. that “the idea that the government can prejudge an entire country’s 

documents as inauthentic ab initio is preposterous—it is pernicious discrimination based 

on a suspect classification of national origin and alienage.” See id. ¶ 48. In the absence of 

any indications that N.B.’s extract of birth certificate in particular is suspect or fraudulent, 

the Court determines that Respondents impermissibly relied on the generalization that all 

Guinean extracts of birth certificate are suspect in determining that N.B. is not a minor. 

See Virk v. Gonzales, 238 F. App’x 316, 317 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Because the agency 

improperly used the country report to discredit specific testimony regarding [the 

applicant]’s personal experience, these findings are not supported by substantial 

evidence.”).

Finally, Respondents fail entirely to take into account N.B.’s government-issued 

photo identification. See, e.g., Trav. ¶ 6. The identification card provides a photo of N.B., 

see Pet. Ex. 3, that Respondents do not contend fails to match those in N.B.’s records. See 

Resps.’ Ex. at 5a–11. The photo identification card also provides a 2001 date of birth. See 

Pet. Ex. 3. This identification card corroborates N.B.’s claim that his true date of birth is 

in December 2001, rendering him a minor.

Viewing all evidence in its totality, N.B. had in his possession two forms of 

identification showing that his date of birth was in December 2001, making him a minor. 

N.B. forthrightly informed Respondents that he had lied about his age during his travels to 

avoid being deported or detained prior to reaching the United States border. Nonetheless, 

Respondents discredited this evidence based on speculation and generalizations, permitting 

them to obtain a dental radiograph that is not inconsistent with N.B.’s claim that he is nearly 

eighteen years old. Not only has N.B. established a high likelihood that Respondents relied 

exclusively on the dental radiograph in determining his age in violation of the TVPRA, 

but—based on the totality of the evidence before Respondents—it also appears likely that 

the radiograph itself was impermissible. See B.I.C., 2016 WL 8672760, at *5 (noting that 

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the ORR Guide “permits radiographs ‘if other information is inconclusive’”). 

Consequently, “the Court concludes that petitioner has a strong likelihood of success on 

the merits of his claim that [Respondents’] age determination is invalid under the TVPRA 

. . . . As such, petitioner also has a strong likelihood of success on his claim that 

respondents unlawfully placed him in DHS custody.” See id. at *6.

2. Likelihood of Irreparable Harm

To obtain preliminary injunctive relief, N.B. must also demonstrate that “he is likely 

to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief.” B.I.C., 2016 WL 8672760, 

at *4 (quoting Winter, 555 U.S. at 20). “The Ninth Circuit has recognized ‘the irreparable

harms imposed on anyone subject to immigration detention (or other forms of 

imprisonment).’” Meza v. Bonnar, No. 18-CV-02708-BLF, 2018 WL 2554572, at *4 

(N.D. Cal. June 4, 2018) (Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 995 (9th Cir. 2017)). This 

harm would appear particularly acute and irreparable where the detainee may be a minor 

being held in contravention of the specific protections granted by the TVPRA and Flores 

Settlement. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1232(b) (indicating that one purpose of the TVPRA is to 

“[c]ombat[] child trafficking and exploitation in the United States”); Flores Settlement

¶ 11, ECF No. 1-14 (recognizing “special concern for [minors’] particular vulnerabilities”). 

The Court therefore concludes that N.B. has met his burden of demonstrating irreparable 

harm.

3. Public Interest and Balance of Equities

“[T]he harm to the opposing party and weighing the public interest . . . factors merge 

when the Government is the opposing party.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009). 

“[T]he public interest favors applying federal law correctly.” B.I.C., 2016 WL 

8672760, at *7 (alteration in original) (quoting Small v. Avanti Health Sys., LLC, 661 F.3d 

1180, 1197 (9th Cir. 2011)) (citing N.D. v. Haw. Dep’t of Educ., 600 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th 

Cir. 2010) (“[I]t is obvious that compliance with the law is in the public interest.”)). “As 

discussed above, petitioner has established a strong likelihood of success on the merits of 

his claim that respondents have violated the TVPRA.” See id. 

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Further, “the general public[ ha]s [an] interest in the efficient allocation of the 

government’s fiscal resources,” and “[t]he Ninth Circuit has recognized that [t]he costs to 

the public of immigration detention are staggering.” Meza, 2018 WL 2554572, at *4

(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 996)). On the other 

hand, N.B.’s cousin is “willing and able to ensure that N.B. appears at any and all 

immigration hearings.” Pet. ¶ 36; see also Pet. Ex. 9, ECF No. 1-10. “Given the low risk 

of Petitioner’s causing harm to others . . . , such expenditure in h[is] case would not benefit 

the public.” See Meza, 2018 WL 2554572, at *4. “Accordingly, the public interest and 

balance of equities weigh in his favor.” See B.I.C., 2016 WL 8672760, at *7.

The Court therefore concludes that N.B. has met his burden of establishing his 

entitlement to a preliminary injunction “enjoining Defendants from further unlawfully 

detaining N.B. in custody with unrelated adults.” See Pet. ¶ 130(d).

B. Unclean Hands

Respondents argue that N.B. is barred from seeking habeas relief by the doctrine of 

unclean hands as a result of the alleged misrepresentations about his age made before N.B.

reached the U.S. border. See Ret. at 13–14. N.B. rejoins that “[t]he Supreme Court has 

explicitly rejected that notion that ‘ad hoc equitable departures from the Habeas Corpus 

Rules’ [such as the doctrine of unclean hands] are ‘authorized.’” Trav. ¶ 58 (quoting 

Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314, 328 (1996)). Further, “even if the Court were authorized 

to apply the unclean hands doctrine in this case, the government’s unclean hands defense 

is based on the government’s misunderstanding of the facts.” Id. ¶ 60.

Like N.B., see id. ¶ 59, the Court has not located any authority supporting 

Respondents’ contention that an unclean hands defense is applicable in the habeas context. 

Accordingly, the Court concludes that it would be inappropriate to consider Respondents’ 

unclean hands defense. See Lonchar, 517 U.S. at 328. In any event, the Court concludes 

that Respondents’ alleged misrepresentations do not “render[] inequitable the assertion of 

[the] rights [he now asserts] against the [Respondent]s.” See Ret. at 13–14 (quoting 

Ellenburg v. Brockway, Inc., 763 F.2d 1091, 1097 (9th Cir. 1985) (quoting Republic 

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Molding Corp. v. B.W. Photo Utils., 319 F.2d 347, 349 (9th Cir. 1963))); see also supra 

Sections III.A.1, 3.

CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, the Court (1) APPOINTS Mr. Salazar as N.B.’s next friend 

for purposes of this Petition; and (2) PRELIMINARILY ENJOINS Respondents from 

further unlawfully detaining N.B. in custody with unrelated adults, i.e., Respondents 

SHALL TREAT N.B. as a minor for purposes of his immigration detention and 

immigration proceedings until his eighteenth birthday, as reflected on his Guinean extract 

of birth certificate. The Parties SHALL FILE a Joint Status Report within three (3) days

of the electronic docketing of this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 1, 2019

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