Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_13-cv-02335/USCOURTS-alnd-2_13-cv-02335-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 445
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

KIM A. MASON,

Plaintiff,

vs.

UNITED PARCEL SERVICE CO., 

INC., d/b/a UPS, and UNITED 

PARCEL SERVICE INC.,

Defendants.

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Civil Action Number

 2:13-cv-02335-AKK

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Kim A. Mason brings this case against the United Parcel Service, Inc. 

(“UPS”) and the United Parcel Service Co., Inc. (collectively, “Defendants,”)

alleging discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act

(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. Doc. 1. Defendants now move for summary 

judgment. Doc. 37. For the reasons below, the court will grant Defendants’ motion 

and will dismiss this case with prejudice.1

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary

judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any

 1 Mason acknowledges in her response that she was never an employee of United Parcel Service 

Co., Inc. See doc. 41 at 29. Therefore, because “[t]he ADA requires employers [only] to provide 

reasonable accommodations for known disabilities,” summary judgment is properly due to this 

defendant. See LaChance v. Duffy’s Draft House, Inc., 146 F.3d 832, 835 (11th Cir. 1998) 

(emphasis added); see also docs. 38 at 28-29; 41 at 29.

FILED

 2016 Jan-13 PM 03:13

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

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material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” To support 

a summary judgment motion, the parties must cite to “particular parts of materials 

in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, 

affidavits or declarations, stipulations, admissions, interrogatory answers, or other 

materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Moreover, “Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of 

summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a 

party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an 

element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden 

of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The moving 

party bears the initial burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of material 

fact. Id. at 323. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who is required to 

“go beyond the pleadings” to establish that there is a “genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 

324 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A dispute about a material fact 

is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for 

the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

The court must construe the evidence and all reasonable inferences arising 

from it in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Adickes v. S. H. Kress 

& Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970); see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 (all 

justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party’s favor). Any factual 

disputes will be resolved in the non-moving party’s favor when sufficient 

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competent evidence supports the non-moving party’s version of the disputed facts. 

See Pace v. Capobianco, 283 F.3d 1275, 1276 (11th Cir. 2002) (a court is not 

required to resolve disputes in the non-moving party’s favor when that party’s 

version of events is supported by insufficient evidence). However, “mere 

conclusions and unsupported factual allegations are legally insufficient to defeat a 

summary judgment motion.” Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 

2005) (per curiam) (citing Bald Mountain Park, Ltd. v. Oliver, 863 F.2d 1560, 

1563 (11th Cir. 1989)). Furthermore, “[a] mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence supporting 

the opposing party’s position will not suffice; there must be enough of a showing 

that the jury could reasonably find for that party.” Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 

1577 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252).

II. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS2

 2 Mason moved to strike under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(e) the deposition errata sheets 

for Terry White, Doreen Ingle, and Tammy Butler. Docs. 46 and 49. The motions are DENIED 

because, first, by noting the rationale behind each change (for example, “Clarification”), the 

errata sheets comply with Rule 30(e)’s requirement to “list the changes and the reasons given by 

the deponent for making them.” See McCarver v. PPG Indus., Inc., 243 F.R.D. 668 (N.D. Ala. 

2007) (striking errata sheets because, among other reasons, the proponent had entirely failed to 

provide reasons for the changes). Second, UPS acknowledges in multiple filings (for example, in 

docs. 39-3 at 4 and 42-5 at 1-2) that three positions came available during the relevant period. As 

such, the court construes the errata changes as clarifications of the record and does not rely on 

the employees’ testimony here when making its determination on the motion for summary 

judgment. Third, Butler’s testimony regarding employees assisting others with lifting is not 

substantive and does not affect the court’s reasoning. Fourth, regarding Ingle’s errata change at 

doc. 39-9 at 6 related to her preliminary determination that Mason could perform the essential 

functions of all the positions on Mason’s accommodation checklist, even though the change is 

substantive, it complies with the plain language of Rule 30(e). See Cultivos Yadran S.A. v. 

Rodriguez, 258 F.R.D. 530, 533 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (applying the plain language of Rule 30(e) that 

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Since May of 1994, Mason has worked for UPS at its Huntsville package 

center (the “Huntsville center”). Doc. 39-1 at 10, 18-19. UPS is a package delivery 

company that conducts its operations from “package centers” responsible for the 

pick-up and delivery of packages across a specific geographic area. Doc. 39-3 at 2-

3. UPS initially hired Mason as a part-time employee and, in the early 2000s, 

promoted her to a full-time position as a Package Car Driver. Docs. 39-1 at 10, 18-

19; 39-3 at 3. As a Package Car Driver, Mason picked up and delivered packages 

along assigned routes. Docs. 39-1 at 19; 39-3 at 2-3.

A. Bargaining Unit and Non-Bargaining Unit Positions at UPS

UPS job functions are slightly different depending on the size of a specific 

facility. Doc. 39-8 at 12. The Huntsville center, which is one of UPS’s smaller 

facilities, is leanly staffed and located in an older, non-automated building. Docs.

39-3 at 10; 39-8 at 10, 12. That is, “everything is pretty much manual.” Doc. 39-8 

at 12. The closest “automated” building is located in Memphis, Tennessee. Doc. 

39-8 at 12.

a. The Collective Bargaining Agreement

As a Package Car Driver, Mason’s employment is covered by the terms of 

the collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) negotiated between UPS and the 

 

allows “changes in form or substance” and aligning with “the majority view interpreting Rule 

30(e) broadly”) (emphasis added). Still, the court will not rely on the portions of Ingle’s 

deposition testimony that Mason challenges in ruling on the motion for summary judgment.

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International Brotherhood of Teamsters. Docs. 39-1 at 17-19; 39-3 at 3, 11.

Seniority for purposes of bidding on positions at a package center is determined by 

the employee’s seniority date at that package center; if an employee moves to 

another package center, she starts at the bottom of the seniority list. Doc. 39-3 at 

11. Consistent with the CBA, when a bargaining unit position becomes available, 

the person with the highest seniority at that package center who submitted a bid is 

first offered the position; if she declines it, the position is then offered to the person 

with the second-highest seniority, and so forth. Docs. 39-1 at 20; 39-8 at 17. With 

the exception of provisions relating to layoffs and specific circumstances under 

which a driver loses her license or is otherwise disqualified, “the CBA prohibits 

employees from bumping or displacing other employees from the bargaining unit 

jobs they occupy,” doc. 39-3 at 11, although UPS has the option of negotiating 

with the union to accommodate a disabled employee, doc. 39-8 at 31-32.

b. Non-Bargaining Unit Positions—Management Assessment and 

Promotion Process

During the times relevant to this case, UPS required all employees who were 

interested in pursuing non-bargaining unit positions to complete the Management 

Assessment Promotion Process (“MAPP”). Docs. 39-5 at 8-9; 39-8 at 7-8. To 

initiate the process, the employee bore the responsibility of submitting on an 

annual basis a letter of intent indicating that she would like UPS to consider her for 

available part-time or full-time supervisory positions. Docs. 39-5 at 9; 39-8 at 8-9. 

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After the employee submitted the letter of intent, the second step in the MAPP 

process required that the employee pass an Initial Assessment, in which the 

employee’s supervisor would score the employee’s performance in a number of 

competency areas relevant to working in a management role. Docs. 39-5 at 9; 39-8 

at 8. At the time, the minimum score to advance past the Initial Assessment was 

3.5. Doc. 39-8 at 46. Successful employees must then advance through a number of 

other steps in the MAPP process before ultimately being placed in the promotion 

pool for that calendar year. Docs. 39-5 at 9.

Mason submitted a letter of intent in 2003, 2004, and (as will be discussed 

below) in 2012. Docs. 39-1 at 16; 39-5 at 5-6; 42-15 at 1-2. Although Mason 

passed her Initial Assessment in 2003 and 2004, doc. 39-8 at 36, she has never held

a non-bargaining unit position at UPS, doc. 39-1 at 20.

B. Mason’s Injury

On March 22, 2011, Mason fell from the rear of her package truck, breaking 

both bones of her forearm near her left wrist. Docs. 39-1 at 21-22; 32-2 at 4; 39-5 

at 16; 42-2 at 2. As a result of the injury, Mason underwent surgery and was placed 

on a medical leave of absence. Doc. 39-1 at 21-22. Dr. James Martens, Mason’s 

physician, determined in October 2011 that Mason had reached maximum medical 

improvement (“MMI”), albeit with certain restrictions, including a permanent 

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lifting restriction of 25 pounds that left Mason unable to do her job. Doc. 39-1 at 

10, 22. To date, none of these restrictions have changed. Id. at 22.

C. ADA Accommodation Process

a. February 10, 2012 Checklist Meeting

Upon learning that Mason was no longer able to perform the duties of a

Package Car Driver, UPS suggested in early 2012 that Mason engage in an 

accommodation process to determine her eligibility for a job-related 

accommodation. Docs. 39-2 at 1; 39-2 at 1. After Mason contacted UPS, on 

February 10, 2012, Doreen Ingle, Lois Forsmo, and Tammy Butler3 met with 

Mason for a so-called “checklist meeting” regarding Mason’s medical restrictions 

and potential reasonable accommodations that would allow her to perform the 

essential functions of a position at UPS. Docs. 39-1 at 23-24; 39-2 at 2; 39-5 at 2-3. 

In preparation for this meeting, Dr. Martens had completed a document describing 

Mason’s physical limitations, which stated that Mason was unable to: “(1) lift, 

lower, push, pull, leverage, and manipulate equipment . . . or packages weighing 

up to 70 pounds; (2) assist in moving packages weighing up to 150 pounds; (3) lift 

packages to heights above the shoulder[; or (4)] lower [packages] to foot level.” 

 3 At the time, Ingle was the Area Human Resources Manager for UPS’s Mid-South District, doc. 

39-5 at 2; Forsmo was the Mid-South District Occupational Health Nurse/District Occupational 

Health Supervisor for the Mid-South District, doc. 39-4 at 2; and Butler was a Human Resources 

Specialist in Decatur, Hartselle, and Huntsville, doc. 39-6 at 2. Mason does not specifically recall 

Forsmo attending the meeting via teleconference. Doc. 39-1 at 24.

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Docs. 39-1 at 24; 39-2 at 3-6; 39-5 at 16. Moreover, Dr. Martens indicated that 

Mason had a permanent 25-pound lifting restriction and that she could only lift 10 

pounds occasionally. Docs. 39-1 at 24; 39-2 at 4-5; 39-5 at 16-17.

After Mason and the UPS team reviewed the information submitted by Dr. 

Martens and discussed the accommodation form, Mason completed the employee 

portion (“Part A”) of the accommodation checklist form, which requested that 

Mason describe how her medical condition affected her ability to do her job, 

outline the ways UPS could accommodate her condition, and suggest other jobs 

she felt she could perform with or without reasonable accommodation. Docs. 39-1 

at 25-26; 39-5 at 3, 23-24. On this form, Mason described the same lifting and 

weight restrictions as those delineated by Dr. Martens (except that she left out his 

restriction on lowering packages to foot level), see docs. 39-1 at 24, 26-7; 39-2 at 

3-6, 8; 39-5 at 23-24; failed to describe any reasonable accommodations that she 

believed would help her do her job; and, instead, requested jobs that did not require 

her “to lift ‘heavy’ packages,” specifically non-bargaining unit positions in human 

resources and other management-type positions that did not require lifting, doc. 39-

2 at 8. When asked to identify other jobs that she believed she could perform with 

or without reasonable accommodation, Mason listed, “[a]ir driver, customer 

counter, clerk, office, safety, preload, spa, decap, dispatch, local sort smalls, 

overgoods, office clerk, porter, car wash, misloads, [and] hazmat.” Docs. 39-2 at 8;

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39-5 at 23. This list included a mix of bargaining unit and non-bargaining unit

positions, as well as a mix of tasks that fall within different positions.4 Docs. 39-2 

at 27-28; 39-3 at 4-9; 39-5 at 4. Significantly, Mason instructed Ingle and others to 

limit their search for positions to the general geographic area of Huntsville. Docs. 

39-1 at 31; 39-9 at 18.

After the checklist meeting, Ingle reviewed the essential functions of each 

position Mason had identified and populated Part B of the accommodation 

 4 Mason listed the following bargaining unit positions: Air Driver, Customer Counter Clerk, 

Preloader, Clerk, Porter, and Car Washer. Docs. 39-3 at 4-8; 39-5 at 43. The job descriptions for

these positions require the employee to lift as many as 70 pounds unassisted. Doc. 39-3 at 16, 18, 

20, 22, 30, 33. Air Drivers, Customer Counter Clerks, Center Clerks, and Preloaders must also

assist with the moving of packages weighing up to 150 pounds, lift packages to heights above the 

shoulder, and lower packages to floor level. Id. at 16, 18, 20, 22. Porters constantly lift up to 10 

pounds above their shoulder and lower between 51 and 70 pounds below their waist, while Car 

Washers must constantly lower between 51 and 70 pounds below the waist. Id. at 30, 33.

Mason also listed certain tasks performed by employees in bargaining unit positions: “local sort 

smalls,” “spa,” misloads, overgoods, and hazmat, docs. 39-5 at 4-5, which are not stand-alone

positions in a small facility such as Huntsville, docs. 39-3 at 8; 39-5 at 4. Employees in the 

Loader/Unloader job classification complete the small sort, spa, misloads, and hazardous 

materials tasks. Docs. 39-3 at 8, 36; 39-5 at 4-5; 39-8 at 10. Job descriptions for the 

Loader/Unloader positions require employees to lift up to 70 pounds unassisted, assist in the 

moving of packages weighing up to 150 pounds, lift up to 50 pounds over their shoulders, and 

lower as many as 70 pounds below their waist. Doc. 39-3 at 25-28. One of the tasks assigned to 

Loaders/Unloaders performing the small sort tasks is to sort and bag smaller packages that fit 

within a certain size classification into specified containers or bags for delivery elsewhere. Doc. 

39-3 at 8. The parties dispute how much these containers typically weigh. See docs. 39-3 at 8 

(UPS stating that the packages “typically weigh more than 25 pounds”); 42-9 at 3 (Martha 

Pender stating that the packages are “no heavier than six to eight pounds, [and are] supposed to 

be kept around fifteen to twenty-five pound[s] maximum”). “Spa” tasks require employees to 

label packages as they move through the package center; “misloads” tasks involve the correction 

of package misloads; and “hazardous materials” tasks entail the handling of hazardous materials. 

Doc. 39-5 at 5. Finally, a Clerk corrects “overgoods,” a term used to describe displaced package 

contents. Docs. 39-1 at 28; 39-5 at 5.

Finally, Mason listed “office clerk,” “dispatch,” and “safety,” which are tasks performed by nonbargaining unit employees and are not stand-alone positions. See doc. 29-5 at 5.

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checklist, which inquired into the employee’s eligibility for the positions listed as 

well as the reasonableness of the accommodations requested. Docs. 39-2 at 10-11;

39-5 at 6; 39-9 at 11. This form required Ingle to examine the proposed 

accommodations Mason suggested and to determine whether the positions were

available; whether Mason possessed the requisite education, skills, and experience 

(“ESE”) for the positions; whether Mason “preliminarily appear[ed]” capable of 

performing the essential job functions (“EJF”) of the positions; and whether the 

transfer or reassignment would constitute a conflict with any portion of the CBA. 

Doc. 39-2 at 10-11. Regarding the Air Driver, Customer Clerk, Preload, Small 

Sorts, Porter, Car Wash, Office, and Clerk positions and tasks, Ingle noted that 

none were currently available or expected to be available within a reasonable 

period of time, that Mason had the qualifying ESE for them, and that she 

preliminarily appeared to have the EJF for the positions with or without 

accommodations.5 Docs. 39-2 at 10; 42-4 at 3. Ingle did not have access to 

Mason’s medical records when she filled out this form, so she was not able to 

review them when making this preliminary determination. Doc. 39-2 at 20. On the 

form, Ingle underlined the word “with,” seemingly to indicate that Mason would 

 5 Although Mason asserts that Ingle “identified numerous positions [Mason] could perform with

reasonable accommodations,” doc. 42-4 at 2 (emphasis in original), the checklist form belies 

Mason’s contention by making it clear that Ingle’s determination was preliminary, doc. 39-2 at 

10 (asking if “the employee preliminarily appear[ed] capable of performing the essential job 

functions” Mason had listed) (emphasis added). Mason did not see Part B of this form until she 

had filed her union grievance in September of 2012. Doc. 39-1 at 25.

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need accommodation. Id. at 10. In any event, Ingle’s determination was not final, 

as Ingle apparently did not have the authority to solely determine whether a 

reasonable accommodation existed. Docs. 39-2 at 10; 39-8 at 14, 29; 39-9 at 8, 16.

After Ingle completed Part B of the accommodation checklist, she forwarded 

it to Forsmo, a representative of UPS’s Occupational Health department. Doc. 39-4 

at 5; 39-5 at 6. After Occupational Health reviewed Mason’s accommodation 

checklist, UPS determined that, at the time, it had no positions available for which 

Mason qualified, with or without accommodation. Doc. 39-4 at 5.

b. Search for Reasonable Accommodation

Despite the initial determination, the accommodation process continued. At 

UPS, an accommodation request for bargaining unit employees remains open for 

three years from the date of injury; after that time period has passed, the CBA 

states that the employee’s seniority is considered “broken,” and the employee may

be terminated.6 Doc. 39-8 at 43. Additionally, bargaining unit employees are 

entitled to a six-month period from the time of their initial checklist meeting during

which UPS will actively look for available positions to accommodate disabled 

employees. Docs. 39-2 at 23; 39-5 at 7-8; 39-8 at 42.

 6 Although UPS could have terminated Mason in March of 2014, three years after her injury,

Mason remains an inactive UPS employee. Doc. 39-8 at 43.

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Consistent with UPS policy, on April 3, 2012, Ingle sent Mason a letter 

notifying her that UPS was not aware of any available position for which she was 

qualified and capable of performing the essential job functions, with or without 

reasonable accommodation. Docs. 39-2 at 2-3; 39-5 at 7, 39. In this letter, Ingle 

also informed Mason that UPS would continue to look for available positions in 

the general Huntsville area for up to six months. Docs. 39-2 at 23; 39-5 at 7, 39.

Additionally, Ingle requested that Mason contact Ingle if her physical condition 

changed or if Mason became aware of a position that Mason felt she could 

perform. Docs. 39-2 at 23; 39-5 at 7, 39. The letter also asked Mason to call Ingle 

if she had any questions. Docs. 39-2 at 23; 39-5 at 7, 39.

Throughout the following six months, Mason and Ingle communicated 

“regularly” regarding job openings and the availability of positions in Huntsville 

for which Mason could qualify.

7 Docs. 39-1 at 32, 35-36 (indicating that Mason 

“had many conversations with [Ingle and UPS]” and that they had spoken on 

“[n]umerous[] occasions”); 39-5 at 8; 42-2 at 5. Additionally, at least twice a 

month Ingle contacted Paul Witt, the Huntsville center’s Business Manager, and 

Butler to investigate whether any positions for Mason had become available. Docs. 

39-5 at 7; 39-9 at 10. During that period of time, UPS determined that no eligible

positions came available, and Ingle told Mason as much when they spoke. Docs. 

 7 Mason surreptitiously recorded “[s]everal”—but not all—of these telephone calls. Doc. 39-1 at 

32. These recordings are not part of the summary judgment record.

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39-5 at 7-8; 42-2 at 5. As Mason herself observed, “Any job at UPS is 

demanding,” doc. 39-1 at 19, and accommodating Mason was all the more 

challenging because “UPS does not have permanent light duty work assignments,” 

doc. 39-3 at 10.

At least once, Ingle inquired as to whether Mason had applied for the MAPP 

process so UPS could consider her for supervisory jobs. Docs. 39-1 at 30-31, 33; 

39-5 at 10; 42-2 at 4. In response, Mason informed Ingle and others that she had 

begun the MAPP process a number of years previously and that her letter of intent

had expired. Doc. 39-1 at 30-31. At some point in the summer of 2012, Mason 

inquired with Ingle about the Clerk and Customer Counter Clerk positions that 

Mason believed had come available. Doc. 39-5 at 8. Ingle informed Mason that 

UPS had determined that she was not qualified for these positions because they 

required lifting well in excess of her 25-pound weight limitation. Doc. 39-5 at 8.

On September 13, 2012, Mason wrote Ingle a letter inquiring about the 

status of her accommodation process. Docs. 39-1 at 34-35; 39-2 at 25; 39-5 at 8, 

41. In this letter, Mason also requested that Ingle consider her for two positions 

that Mason described as “Package Center Clerks.” Docs. 39-2 at 25; 39-5 at 41. 

However, the available positions at that time were actually Part-Time Package 

Center Supervisor positions—positions that required successful completion of the 

MAPP process. Docs. 39-5 at 8; 39-8 at 42. Perhaps because of this, Mason also

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submitted a letter of intent to initiate her participation in the MAPP process. Docs. 

39-2 at 24; 39-5 at 8, 43.

In light of Mason’s letter of intent, docs. 39-5 at 8; 39-9 at 9, 21, in the fall 

of 2012, Jeff Hill, Mason’s supervisor of several years, completed Mason’s Initial 

Assessment as part of the MAPP process and awarded Mason a score of 2.215,

doc. 39-7 at 4-5. This score fell short of the 3.5 out of 5 required to advance to the 

next step in the MAPP process. Docs. 39-1 at 38; 39-7 at 4-5; 42-17 at 1-2.

Therefore, because Mason did not successfully advance through the MAPP 

process, UPS did not consider her for any management positions that became 

available in 2012. Docs. 39-5 at 7-8, 10-11; 39-6 at 3-4.

c. Positions Available During the Relevant Period

In the period between February 2012 and April 2013, both bargaining unit 

and non-bargaining unit positions became available at the Huntsville center. Docs. 

39-5 at 8-9; 42-5 at 1-2.

i. Bargaining Unit Positions

The only bargaining unit positions on Mason’s accommodation checklist 

that became available were: Preloader, Clerk, and Air Driver. Doc. 42-5 at 1-2.

UPS did not contact Mason about these openings. Doc. 42-4 at 5.

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1. Preloader

Preloaders are responsible for moving packages through the package centers 

and for loading these packages onto package cars at the beginning of each day. 

Doc. 39-3 at 6. The job description requires that Preloaders lift, lower, and carry 

packages at a rate of 200 to 400 per hour; additionally, employees must assist with

moving packages weighing up to 150 pounds. Id. at 23. Preloaders occasionally

(i.e., between “1%-33%” of time) lift items weighing up to 70 pounds, and they

constantly lift items between 1 and 20 pounds, frequently lift items between 21 and 

50 pounds, and occasionally lift items between 51 and 70 pounds above the 

shoulder. Id.

2. Clerk

Customer Counter Clerks staff the counter and are responsible for receiving 

and processing packages from customers. Doc. 39-3 at 5. At times, only one 

Customer Counter Clerk works at a given time in the Huntsville center, doc. 39-3 

at 5, although employees filling other positions may be “regularly in the area,” doc. 

42-9 at 2-3. Center Clerks handle damaged packages, rewrap and repackage 

damaged packages, and correct labeling errors. Doc. 39-3 at 5. The job description 

for both positions requires the employee to: (1) lift, lower, push, pull, leverage, and 

manipulate equipment or packages weighing up to 70 pounds; (2) assist in moving 

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packages weighing up to 150 pounds; (3) lift packages to heights above the 

shoulder; and (4) lower packages to foot level. Id. at 18, 20. However, Mason and 

Martha Pender, one of the employees who received the Clerk position in early July 

2012, doc. 42-5 at 2, disagree with the lifting component. Specifically, Mason 

contends that she has witnessed employees receiving help lifting packages that are 

“heavy.” Doc. 42-2 at 3. Indeed, Pender notes that, when she has “heavy packages 

that [she] needs to move,” she can move these packages with the assistance of 

“various people” during her shift, that she “can also push heavier packages out of 

the way and leave them for local sort and they will come in and move them for 

[her],” and that she directs customers “with heavy packages [to] place the[m] 

directly on the counter or rollers for [her].” Doc. 42-9 at 1-3.

3. Air Driver

Air Drivers pick up and deliver next-day air packages. Doc. 39-3 at 5. The 

job description indicates that the employee: (1) lift, lower, push, pull, leverage, and 

manipulate equipment and packages weighing up to 70 pounds; (2) assist in 

moving packages weighing up to 150 pounds; (3) lift packages to heights above the 

shoulder; and (4) lower packages to foot level. Id. at 16.

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ii. Non-Bargaining Unit Positions

In late summer 2012, two Part-Time Package Center Supervisor positions 

became available at the Huntsville center. Doc. 39-6 at 3. Because no current UPS 

employees, including Mason, had successfully completed the MAPP process, UPS 

looked to—and eventually hired—two candidates from outside the company. Id. at 

3, 5. In fact, the Huntsville center had already received authorization to hire 

outside candidates prior to Mason submitting her September 2012 letter of intent to 

initiate the MAPP process. Docs. 39-1 at 34-35; 39-2 at 24; 39-5 at 8, 43.

III. ANALYSIS

The only remaining claim at issue in this case is for discrimination in 

violation of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq.

8 Mason claims that UPS violated 

the ADA by failing to provide her a position she could perform with reasonable 

 8 Mason originally pursued claims for: (1) discrimination on the basis of disability, race, gender, 

sex, and seniority (Count I); (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count III); and (3) 

negligent infliction of emotional distress (Count IV). This court previously dismissed with 

prejudice Mason’s claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, as such a claim is not 

cognizable under Alabama law. Doc. 21. Also, pursuant to a previous joint stipulation of 

dismissal, this court dismissed without prejudice Mason’s claims of discrimination on the basis 

of age and gender. Doc. 25. Because Mason did not advance any argument or supporting 

authority in support of her sex and seniority claims (Count I) or in response to UPS’s motion for 

summary judgment as to her intentional infliction of emotional distress claim (Count III), the 

court will grant summary judgment as to these claims. See, e.g., Fischer v. Fed. Bureau of 

Prisons, 349 F. App’x 372, 375 n.2 (11th Cir. 2009) (finding that the plaintiff waived claims he 

did not address in his response to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment) (citing 

Transamerica Leasing, Inc. v. Inst. of London Underwriters, 267 F.3d 1303, 1308 n.1 (11th Cir. 

2001)); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599 (11th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he onus 

is upon the parties to formulate arguments; grounds alleged in the complaint but not relied upon 

in summary judgment are deemed abandoned.”) (citations omitted).

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accommodation. See docs. 1 at 5; 41 at 5. For the reasons discussed more fully 

below, summary judgment is due to be granted as to this claim.

The ADA prohibits an employer from “discriminat[ing] against a qualified 

individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the 

hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, . . . and other terms, conditions, 

and privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112. In general, “[t]he ADA 

requires employers to provide reasonable accommodations for known disabilities 

unless that accommodation would result in undue hardship for the employer.” 

LaChance v. Duffy’s Draft House, Inc., 146 F.3d 832, 835 (11th Cir. 1998) 

(citation omitted); see also Lucas v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 257 F.3d 1249, 1256

(11th Cir. 2001). The employee must also show that “such an accommodation is 

reasonable.” Willis v. Conopco, Inc., 108 F.3d 282, 283 (11th Cir. 1997).

To establish a prima facie case for failure to accommodate, Mason must 

show that (1) she is disabled; (2) she is a “qualified individual;” and (3) she was 

subjected to unlawful discrimination because of her disability. See, e.g., Lucas, 257 

F.3d at 1255. Mason has failed to make such a showing.

A. Mason is Disabled

UPS concedes that Mason’s impairments constitute a disability under the 

ADA. See docs. 38 at 18; 41 at 15; see also Stewart v. Happy Herman’s Cheshire 

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Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278, 1285 (11th Cir. 1997); 42 U.S.C. § 12102. Therefore, 

Mason has satisfied the first prong of the prima facie case.

B. Mason is Not a “Qualified Individual”

To be a “qualified individual,” a person with a disability “must satisfy ‘the 

requisite skill, experience, education and other job-related requirements of the 

employment position,’ and ‘with or without reasonable accommodation,’ the 

individual must be able to perform the ‘essential functions of the position.’” 

LaChance, 146 F.3d at 835 (citing § 12112(a)); Earl v. Mervyns, Inc., 207 F.3d 

1361 (11th Cir. 2000) (“An individual is ‘qualified’ if she, with or without 

reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions and job 

requirements of the position the individual holds.”) (citations omitted). “An 

accommodation can qualify as ‘reasonable,’ and thus be required by the ADA, 

only if it enables an employee to perform the essential functions of the job.” Lucas, 

257 F.3d at 1256; see LaChance, 146 F.3d at 835 (citation omitted). Indeed, “[t]he 

ADA defines ‘essential functions’ to be the fundamental job duties of the 

employment position, as differentiated from ‘marginal’ functions.” LaChance, 146 

F.3d at 835. The plaintiff bears “the burden of identifying an accommodation that 

would allow a qualified individual to perform the job[, and she also bears] the 

ultimate burden of persuasion with respect to demonstrating that such an 

accommodation is reasonable.” Stewart, 117 F.3d at 1286.

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a. Essential Functions of the Available Bargaining Unit Positions9

Mason claims that she is a “qualified individual” because she possesses the 

requisite skill and education to perform with reasonable accommodations “several” 

of the positions she identified in her accommodation checklist. See doc. 41 at 18. 

UPS disagrees and counters that the positions that came available during the 

accommodation period—Preloader, Clerk, and Air Driver—require physical 

capabilities that fall outside of Mason’s restrictions.10 Doc. 38 at 18-21. Indeed, 

Mason’s medical restrictions only allow her to lift up to 25 pounds and to only

occasionally lift 10 pounds, and they prohibit her from lifting packages above the 

shoulder or lowering them to foot level. It seems Mason agrees that she cannot 

 9 To the extent that Mason argues that UPS should have awarded her a non-bargaining unit 

position, it is undisputed that such positions only go to bargaining unit employees who have 

successfully completed the MAPP process. Mason had not done so when UPS filled the only two 

positions that became open during the relevant period. Moreover, when Mason submitted a letter 

of intent to enter into the MAPP process in September of 2012, she did not pass her Initial 

Assessment, did not challenge her unsatisfactory score on her Initial Assessment, and has not 

applied for a non-bargaining unit position since. Because she has not satisfied the requirements 

for a non-bargaining unit position, UPS had no obligation to place her in such a position. See 

Lucas, 257 F.3d at 1257 (“The ADA does not mandate that employers promote disabled 

employees in order to accommodate them.”) (citation omitted).

10 Although Mason included Car Washer and Porter on her accommodation checklist, these 

positions did not become available during the time period at issue. See doc. 42-5 at 1-2. 

Therefore, Mason cannot establish that UPS discriminated against her as to these positions. 

Willis, 108 F.3d at 284 (“Reassignment to another position is a required accommodation only if 

there is a vacant position available for which the employee is otherwise qualified.”) (citations 

omitted). Mason similarly cannot establish that the tasks she identified in her accommodation 

checklist—for example, small sort—are the basis for her discrimination claim because UPS did 

not make them a stand-alone position for her. Cf. Rabb v. School Bd. of Orange Cnty, Fla., 590 

F. App’x 849, 851 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding that an employer had not discriminated against the 

plaintiff by failing to create a part-time position for her, because “there is no duty to create a 

part-time position where the employer has eliminated part-time positions”) (citations omitted).

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perform the Preloader and Air Driver positions because her response focuses only

on the Clerk position, for which she argues that she is qualified because the 

essential functions do not actually include lifting and lowering activities outside of

her physical capabilities.11 See doc. 41 at 20-23. In particular, Mason argues that 

the Clerk position rarely spends time lifting packages outside of her limitations,

that the consequences of not requiring her to lift packages would be minimal, and 

that she can do the job because Clerks receive assistance lifting “heavy” packages. 

See id. However, Mason’s arguments miss the mark.

To be deemed a “qualified individual” for purposes of the ADA, Mason 

must establish that the essential job functions of the Clerk position fall within her 

medical limitations. See Stewart, 117 F.3d at 1278. Indeed, “[i]f the individual is 

unable to perform an essential function of his job, even with an accommodation, he 

is, by definition, not a ‘qualified individual’ and, therefore, not covered under the 

ADA.” Holly v. Clairson Indus., 492 F.3d 1247, 1256 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing 

D’Angelo v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1229 (11th Cir. 2005)). When 

determining which aspects of a position are essential, “‘consideration shall be 

 11 Mason does address the Preloader position in one sentence in her brief: “The ‘preloader’ 

functions only ‘occasionally’ fall outside Mason’s restrictions.” See doc. 41 at 21. While Mason 

is correct that the Preloader job description indicates that Mason would “[o]ccasional[ly]” lift up 

to 70 pounds, the job description defines the term “[o]ccasional” as up to 33% of the time, and 

Mason has presented no evidence indicating that the Preloader does not, in fact, spend a third of 

her time lifting weights above Mason’s medical restrictions. Moreover, Mason has presented no 

evidence to contradict that the Preloaders are required to assist in the moving of packages 

weighing up to 150 pounds, or that a reasonable accommodation exists that would enable Mason

to move between 200 and 400 packages an hour as required by the job description.

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given to the employer’s judgment . . . and if an employer has prepared a written 

description . . . for the job, this description shall be considered evidence of the 

essential functions of the job.’” Earl, 207 F.3d at 1365 (quoting § 12111(8)). While

the job descriptions are given “substantial weight in the [court’s] calculus,” other 

factors to consider when examining the essential functions of a position include the 

amount of time spent on the job performing the function, the consequences of not 

requiring an employee to perform the function, and the work experience of past 

and current employees in the job. See D’Angelo, 422 F.3d at 1230, 1233 (quoting 

Davis v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 205 F.3d 1301, 1305 (11th Cir. 2000)). 

Significantly, an employer “‘[is] not require[d] . . . to eliminate an essential 

function of the . . . job’” in order to accommodate an employee. Holly, 492 F.3d at 

1256 (quoting D’Angelo, 422 F.3d at 1229).

Mason argues that consideration of factors beyond UPS’s job descriptions 

for the Clerk position establishes that lifting and lowering outside of Mason’s 

medical parameters are not essential job functions of those positions. To overcome 

the “substantial weight” afforded to the job descriptions,12

see D’Angelo, 422 F.3d 

at 1233, Mason argues first that the amount of time the Clerk actually spends

lifting outside of her physical restrictions is “infrequent,” doc. 41 at 20. She notes 

 12 Relevant here, the position requires that the employee: lift, lower, push, pull, leverage, and 

manipulate equipment and/or packages weighing up to 70 pounds; assist in moving packages 

weighing up to 150 pounds; and lift packages to heights above the shoulder and lower to foot 

level, see doc. 39-3 at 18, 20,—all of which are tasks Mason cannot do medically.

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that both she and Pender (the employee who received the recent Clerk position) 

aver that the Clerk job does not “typically” require lifting “heavy” items and, when 

needed, someone else can move these “heavy” packages. Docs. 41 at 20; 42-2 at 3; 

42-9 at 2-3. This contention is unavailing for several reasons. First, Mason does 

not advance any evidence addressing the job descriptions’ requirement that Clerks 

must lift items above the shoulder and lower them to the floor—actions that Dr. 

Martens has prohibited Mason from doing. See doc. 39-2 at 4 (stating that Mason 

was unable to “lift packages to heights above the shoulder” or “lower [packages] to 

foot level”). After all, even if other employees move “heavy” packages for Clerks,

Mason is still medically unable to lift packages above the shoulder and lower them 

to the ground, tasks that she does not dispute are essential for non-“heavy” 

packages. Second, Mason fails to define what constitutes “heavy”—a significant 

factor because the job descriptions in fact allow for assistance in lifting packages 

weighing more than 70 pounds. See doc. 39-3 at 18, 20. Mason, however, has a 

maximum lifting restriction of 25 pounds and simply does not address whether 

UPS allows other employees to lift packages weighing 25 to 70 pounds for 

coworkers. Even giving Mason the benefit of all reasonable inferences, the court 

does not construe the term “heavy” to encompass all packages that weigh more 

than Mason’s permanent maximum lifting limit of 25 pounds and “occasional[]”

limit of 10 pounds. Indeed, it seems unreasonable to infer from Pender’s 

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declaration that, in saying she receives help with “heavy” packages, Pender, who 

seemingly has no physical restrictions, meant that she typically receives help for 

packages weighing more than 10 pounds or, even, more than 25 pounds.

Ultimately, because this court “[is] not obliged . . . to deny summary judgment for 

the moving party when the evidence favoring the nonmoving party is merely 

colorable or is not significantly probative,” see Stewart, 117 F.3d at 1285 (relying 

on Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249), the court does not find that Mason’s and Pender’s 

averments weigh towards finding that the essential function of the Clerk position 

excludes lifting more than 25 pounds at all or 10 pounds more than occasionally.

The court is similarly unpersuaded by Mason’s contention that the 

consequences of not requiring her to perform the lifting functions of a Clerk are 

minimal or that the 70-pound lifting requirement is not an essential function of 

Clerk position. See doc. 41 at 21. These contentions are based on Mason’s claims

that “others are regularly in the area to assist,” see id., and on Pender’s affidavit

that she moves “heavy” packages by doing a team lift, she pushes heavier packages 

out of the way and leaves them for other employees to move at a later time, she 

gets assistance during her shift from other employees and customers, she uses hand 

trucks for assistance with heavy packages, and she has customers place their heavy 

packages directly onto the rollers. See doc. 42-9 at 2-3. However, Mason’s 

argument here falls prey to the same problems as those described above—i.e., they 

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do not address Mason’s specific restrictions. In particular, because Dr. Martens has 

unequivocally stated that Mason cannot “assist in moving packages weighing up to 

150 pounds,” doc. 39-2 at 4, that Pender “team lifts” with others or pushes heavier 

packages out of the way does not create a material issue of fact because these are 

actions that Mason is precluded medically from doing, see id. Next, the job of a 

Clerk in Pender’s position is to receive and process packages that customers bring

to the Huntsville center. Therefore, it seems unreasonable to infer from Pender’s 

testimony that Pender avoids service failures and still seeks the assistance of others 

with every package weighing more than 25 pounds. Finally, Mason overlooks that 

she can only occasionally lift 10 pounds or more without risking further injury or 

pain in her wrist and shoulder. Although Mason is entitled to reasonable 

inferences, the court finds that it is unreasonable to infer that Pender’s testimony 

indicates that Pender, a person with no lifting restrictions, can leave most packages 

weighing more than 10 pounds and all packages weighing more than 25 pounds for 

coworkers to address without disrupting coworkers’ ability to complete their 

tasks—especially given how leanly staffed the Huntsville center is—or without 

falling behind on her own performance responsibilities. Therefore, Pender’s 

testimony as to the consequences of asking for assistance is not “significantly 

probative” here, and this factor does not sufficiently rebut the substantial deference 

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owed to UPS’s 70-pound lifting requirement for the Clerk position. See Anderson, 

477 U.S. at 249.

In the final analysis, Mason has failed to show that the essential function of 

the Clerk includes only lifting 10-pound packages occasionally and never lifting 

more than 25-pound packages. Requiring UPS to relieve Mason of the duty to ever 

lift packages weighing more than 25-pounds and to only occasionally lift packages 

weighing 10-pounds would be tantamount to “transform[ing] the [Clerk] position 

into another one by eliminating functions that are essential to the nature of the job 

as it exists.” See Lucas, 257 F.3d at 1260. This would be improper under the ADA, 

which does not obligate employers “to accommodate [employees] in any manner in 

which [the employees] desire[]” or to excuse employees from performing essential 

functions. See Ivey v. First Quality Retail Svc., 490 F. App’x 281, 285 (11th Cir. 

2012). Additionally, accommodating Mason by, for instance, scheduling a second 

Clerk only when Mason is working is similarly unreasonable because “UPS has no 

duty to have someone else do [Mason’s] job to accommodate her disability.” See 

Guerra v. United Parcel Service, Inc., No. 00-40435, 2001 WL 274296, at *2 (5th 

Cir. 2001). Because Mason bears “the burden of identifying [a reasonable] 

accommodation that would allow a qualified individual to perform the job,” 

Stewart, 117 F.3d at 1286, and “[b]ecause [Mason] has not proposed a reasonable 

accommodation that would allow her to perform the essential functions of [the 

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Clerk position], she has failed to show that she was a qualified individual” under 

the ADA. See Ivey, 490 F. App’x at 286.

b. Ingle’s Preliminary Determination Regarding Mason’s 

Accommodation

In addition to challenging whether the lifting requirement of the Clerk 

position is essential, Mason also argues that UPS deemed her a “qualified 

individual” for the jobs that she listed in her accommodation checklist. This 

contention is based on Ingle answering “Yes” on Part B of the accommodation 

checklist when populating the portion of the form inquiring as to whether Mason 

had the EJF to perform these jobs with accommodation. See doc. 41 at 18-20. 

Based on this preliminary indication that Mason could perform the positions with 

reasonable accommodation, and because “Ingle never adjusted, or otherwise 

amended, her determination” or “told [Mason] that the initial determination was 

altered,”13 Mason contends that a material factual dispute exists as to whether she 

is a qualified individual for the three available bargaining unit positions on her

accommodation checklist. See doc. 39-2 at 10; 41 at 18-19. This contention is 

unavailing because the accommodation checklist form describes Ingle’s 

determination as “preliminary.” See doc. 39-2 at 10 (asking if “the employee 

 13 Ingle’s purported failure to tell Mason that she had “altered” the initial determination is a 

quintessential red herring. Mason was not aware of Part B (or its contents) until she filed her 

grievance more than seven months after her checklist meeting. Doc. 39-1 at 25. As such, Mason 

can hardly stand upon the fact that Ingle never notified her that UPS did not agree with Ingle’s 

preliminary determination as grounds for this particular discrimination claim.

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preliminarily appear[ed] capable of performing the essential job functions” Mason 

had listed) (emphasis added). Moreover, Mason has not shown that Ingle indicated 

to Mason that Ingle had the sole authority to make this determination. In fact, 

based on the record before this court, Ingle did not have the authority to make an

accommodation determination on her own. See docs. 39-5 at 6; 39-8 at 14, 29; 39-9 

at 8, 16; 42-4 at 3. Rather, the decision also involved UPS’s Occupational Health

department—a fact Mason totally overlooks.

14 In that respect, that Ingle never 

“adjusted, or otherwise amended” her preliminary determination or told Mason that 

she had done so is not determinative absent evidence that Ingle had an obligation

to update this form or that Ingle even kept it in her possession after sending it to 

Forsmo. Additionally, the record is replete with evidence that Ingle informed 

Mason multiple times that UPS had no positions available for which Mason 

qualified—which further belies Mason’s contention that UPS, through Ingle, had 

determined that she was a qualified individual.

Ultimately, to find an issue of fact exists as to whether UPS deemed Mason 

a qualified individual, the court would have to ignore the record—specifically, that 

the form Mason relies on stated that the determination was “preliminary,” that the 

form was then sent to Occupational Health, and that subsequently UPS informed 

 14 According to Forsmo (the Occupational Health Supervisor for the district): “After the checklist 

meeting, I received the completed checklist form. Thereafter, it was determined that, based on 

Ms. Mason’s restrictions as reported by Ms. Mason and her doctor, there were no positions 

available . . . .” Doc. 39-4 at 5.

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Mason that it had no position for which she qualified, with or without 

accommodation. See docs. 39-1 at 31-32; 39-2 at 10, 23; 39-4 at 5. Thereafter, UPS 

continued to evaluate its assessment when it had vacancies in the positions Mason 

identified. See docs. 39-5 at 7-8; 39-9 at 10. Based on this record and on the job 

descriptions, the court finds that Ingle’s preliminary statement that Mason 

appeared to be able to perform the essential job functions of the positions is 

“merely colorable [and] not significantly probative.” See Stewart, 117 F.3d at 1285 

(relying on Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249) (finding that courts “are not obliged . . . to 

deny summary judgment for the moving party when the evidence favoring the 

nonmoving party is merely colorable or is not significantly probative”).

For the reasons outlined above, the court finds that Mason is not a “qualified 

individual” for purposes of the ADA.15 In light of this finding, Mason cannot show 

that UPS discriminated against her. Therefore, the court need not address the final

prong of the prima facie case.

16 See Moses v. Am. Nonwovens, Inc., 97 F.3d 446, 

 15 Insofar as Mason argues that UPS has failed to show that accommodating her would impose an 

undue hardship, doc. 41 at 23-25, she overlooks that it is only “[o]nce the plaintiff has met her 

burden of proving that reasonable accommodations exist[ that] the defendant-employer [is then 

obligated to] present evidence that the plaintiff’s requested accommodation imposes an undue 

hardship on the employer.” Rabb, 590 F. App’x at 850.

16 To the extent that Mason complains that the failure to inform her of positions coming available 

that she had listed on her accommodation checklist is evidence of discrimination, doc. 41 at 26-

28, Mason has presented no case law standing for the proposition that under the ADA, an 

employer must inform an employee of every position that comes available that she has expressed 

interest in, regardless of whether she is qualified for the position. Even still, Mason is not able to 

advance a showing in the first place that she was a qualified individual for the Preloader, Clerk, 

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448 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that the plaintiff must present probative evidence 

that a reasonable accommodation was available because “[a] contrary holding 

would mean that an employee has an ADA cause even though there was no 

possible way for the employer to accommodate the employee’s disability”).

IV. CONCLUSION

In sum, the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, doc. 37, is due to 

be granted as to the discrimination claim under the ADA and on the basis of sex 

and seniority (Count I) as well as the intentional infliction of emotional distress 

(Count III).

DONE the 13th day of January, 2016. 

_________________________________

ABDUL K. KALLON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

or Air Driver positions because she was either unable or did not attempt to rebut the UPS job 

descriptions for the job, so any error on UPS’s part was harmless. Finally, to the extent that 

Mason claims UPS did not engage her in an “interactive process” during the six-month 

accommodation period, doc. 41 at 25-26, this contention also fails. As Mason testified, Ingle and 

Mason communicated “regularly” regarding job openings and the availability of positions for 

which Mason qualified with or without reasonable accommodation during this time period. See

docs. 39-1 at 32, 35-36; 39-5 at 8; 42-2 at 5. Additionally, even if UPS had failed to engage in 

an interactive process with Mason, “that failure neither amounted to a violation of the ADA nor 

relieved [the plaintiff] of his burden of demonstrating the availability of a reasonable 

accommodation.” See McKane v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., 363 F. App’x 679, 682 (11th Cir. 2010). 

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