Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00454/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00454-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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1 In accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d), which allows for substitution

when, among other reasons, “a public officer who is a party in an official capacity

. . . ceases to hold office while the action is pending[,]” the court hereby

substitutes Michael Connor, Commissioner of the Bureau of Reclamation

(“Reclamation”), for former Acting BOR Commissioner, Robert W. Johnson.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Protect Lake Pleasant, LLC, )

an Arizona limited liability )

company; David Maule-Ffinch; ) No. CIV 07-0454-PHX-RCB

Michael Viscuis; and Pensus )

Group, L.L.C., an Arizona )

limited liability company, )

)

Plaintiffs )

)

vs. ) O R D E R

)

Michael Connor,1 in his )

official capacity as ) 

Commissioner, United States )

Bureau of Reclamation; )

United States Bureau of )

Reclamation; an agency of )

the United States Department )

of Interior, and Ken Salazar, )

in his official capacity as )

Secretary, United States )

Department of Interior, )

)

Defendants )

)

and )

)

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Lake Pleasant Marina Partners,)

LLC, an Arizona limited )

liability company, )

)

)

Defendant-Intervenor) )

Introduction

Plaintiff David Maule-Ffinch is the owner of Pensus Group,

LLC, also a plaintiff herein. Pensus Group is the developer and

operator of the Pleasant Harbor Marina located on the eastern shore

of Lake Pleasant in Maricopa County (“the County”), Arizona. As

thoroughly discussed in Protect Lake Pleasant, LLC v. McDonald, 609

F.Supp.2d 895 (D.Ariz. 2009) (“Protect Lake Pleasant V”), Pensus

Group was precluded from bidding on a 2005 Request for Proposal for

the development and operation of Scorpion Bay Marina, to be located

on the western shore of Lake Pleasant. Eventually, Lake Pleasant

Marina Partners, LLC (“LPMP”), the defendant-intervenor, was

awarded that contract, and the Scorpion Bay Marina & Yacht Club is

now operating. 

On February 8, 2007, the Arizona Corporation Commission

approved the formation of Protect Lake Pleasant LLC, also a

plaintiff herein. See http://starpas.azcc.gov/scripts/

cgiip.exe/WService=wsbroker1/names-detail.p?name-id=L1. That nonprofit limited liability company was “formed[,]” among other

reasons, to protect the natural environment, wildlife and resources

at Lake Pleasant and Lake Pleasant Regional Park [(“LPRP”)][.]"

First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) (Doc. 4) at 3, ¶ 4:2-3. Plaintiff

Michael Viscuis is a “participating member of Protect Lake

Pleasant[.]" Id. at 4, ¶ 7:18. Several weeks after the formation

of the LLC, on February 27, 2007, plaintiffs commenced this

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2 Previously, the court granted summary judgment in favor of Reclamation

and LPMP as to count one of the FAC, alleging violations of the Federal Property

and Administrative Services Act of 1949, 40 U.S.C. §§ 100-126. See Protect Lake

Pleasant V, 609 F.Supp.2d 895.

3 Hereinafter Reclamation shall be read as including the individual

defendants as well, Messrs. Connor and Salazar. However, when citing to

Reclamation’s memoranda, the court will use the abbreviation “BOR.”

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lawsuit. 

The FAC alleges several violations of the National

Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (“NEPA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347,

and a violation of the Clean Air Act (“CAA”), 42 U.S.C. 42 U.S.C.

§§ 7401-7671q,2 by defendant, the United States Bureau of

Reclamation (“Reclamation”3). Basically, plaintiffs allege that

Reclamation violated NEPA by issuing a Final Environmental

Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact (“FONSI”) with

respect to the Scorpion Bay project. Plaintiffs further allege

that Reclamation violated NEPA by not preparing an Environmental

Impact Statement (“EIS”) for that project. Alternatively, if the

court determines that an EIS was not required, plaintiffs allege

that Reclamation violated NEPA by failing to perform an adequate

environmental assessment (“EA”). Plaintiffs’ final NEPA claim is

based upon Reclamation’s supposed failure to provide meaningful

opportunity for public comment of the Final EA. 

Currently pending before the court are motions for summary

judgment by plaintiffs (Doc. 150), and cross-motions for summary

judgment by Reclamation (Doc. 154) and LPMP’s (Doc. 157). Three

motions to strike also are pending before the court (Docs. 152;

168; and 169). Reclamation is seeking to strike from plaintiffs’

statement of facts (“PSOF”) an internal Maricopa County Air Quality

Department (“MCAQ”) e-mail. Plaintiffs are seeking to strike

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4 “PM” refers to “‘particulate matter,’ that is, the particles found in

the air, such as dust, dirt, soot, smoke, and liquid droplets.” Latino Issues

Forum v. EPA, 558 F.3d 936, 938-39 (9th Cir. 2009). “Particles with a diameter less

than or equal to ten micrometers are known as PM-10.” Id. at 939 (citing 40 C.F.R.

§ 50.6(c)). 

5 Only the plaintiffs are requesting oral argument. Given the court’s

intimate familiarity with this action, in its discretion, the court denies

plaintiffs’ request as oral argument will not aid the decisional process. See

Fed.R.Civ.P. 78; Lake at Las Vegas Investors Group, Inc. v. Pac. Dev. Malibu Corp.,

933 F.2d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 1991); Partridge v. Reich, 141 F.3d 920, 926 (9th Cir.

1998). 

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exhibit A to Reclamation’s Reply - an untitled document which

Reclamation describes as “Calculation of PM104 and Ozone Emissions

Using Plaintiffs’ Mileage Estimates[]” (“the Emissions Chart”)

(footnote added). See BOR’s Reply (Doc. 164) at 16:20. If granted,

these two motions to strike could expand the scope of the record. 

Therefore, the court will address these motions at the outset.5

. . .

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6 Roughly coinciding with the filing of plaintiffs’ summary judgment

motion, Scorpion Bay Marina began operating. Despite that, wisely neither

Reclamation nor LPMP argue that this action is moot, and hence this court lacks

jurisdiction. See, e.g., Ocean Advocates v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 402 F.3d

846, 871-872 (9th Cir. 2005) (proper remedy for Corps of Engineers’ failure to

prepare an EIS before issuing a permit to allow construction of an extension to an

oil refinery dock was to require preparation of an EIS, even though the dock

extension had been completed); West v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Transp., 206 F.3d 920,

925 (9th Cir. 2000) (NEPA action not moot although Stage I of a highway interchange

project was complete because court’s “remedial powers would include remanding for

additional environmental review and, conceivably, ordering the interchange closed

or taken down[]”); and Feldman v. Bomar, 518 F.3d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 2008)

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (cataloging Ninth Circuit

decisions finding “live controversies in environmental cases even after the

contested . . . projects were complete[]” because the “violation complained of may

have caused continuing harm and . . . the court can still act to remedy such harm

by limiting its future adverse effects[]”). 

However, LPMP alone argues that plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief is

moot. (Plaintiffs also are seeking (1) a declaration that the FONSI was issued in

violation of NEPA; and (2) a remand . . . to [Reclamation] with instructions to

prepare an EIS regarding the proposed marina[.]” Pls’. Mot. Summ. J. (Doc. 150)

at 25:19-20; and 22-23 (citations omitted))). LPMP posits that plaintiffs’ “request

for ‘an injunction barring the continued operation of, or, at a minimum, any

further consideration at, the proposed marina’ is not cognizable because the

injunctive relief was rendered moot by [Reclamation’s] approval of the FONSI.”

LPMP’s Cross-mot. (Doc. 157) at 24:11-13. Assuming arguendo that LPMP is correct,

and in part because there are no challenges to the other forms of relief which

plaintiffs are seeking, the court will first address the merits. If plaintiffs’

ultimately prevail on any or all of their three remaining claims, obviously then

the court will address the nature and scope of available remedies. For now

though, the court will concentrate on the merits of plaintiffs’ claims. 

7 Local Rule of Civil Procedure 7.2(m)(2) is clear: “An objection to the

admission of evidence offered in support of or opposition to a motion must be

presented in the objecting party’s response or reply memorandum (or, if the

underlying motion is a motion for summary judgment, in the party’s response to

another party’s separate statement of material facts) and not in a separate motion

to strike or other separate filing. LRCiv 7.2(m)(2) (emphasis added). In direct

contravention of that Rule, LPMP and Reclamation filed separate motions to strike.

Also in direct contravention of that Rule, the parties filed separate responses to

the various motions to strike. (Admittedly, LPMP did partially comply with that

Local Rule by setting forth its position as to Reclamation’s motion to strike

exhibit one in its response to plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion.) Further,

although LRCiv 7.2(m)(2) makes no provision for replies in connection with a motion

to strike, the parties also filed replies. By failing to fully comply with the

Local Rules of this court, the parties have unnecessarily multiplied the filings

in this action. 

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Discussion6

I. Motions to Strike7

The primary basis for all three motions to strike is that the

parties are impermissibly seeking to expand the scope of the

administrative record herein. Twice already this court has

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28 8 Hereinafter that 2007 EA will be referred to as the “Final EA.”

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“enumerated the limited circumstances . . . where it is proper to

consider extra-record material when reviewing an agency decision

under the APA [Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et

seq.].” Protect Lake Pleasant v. Johnson, 2:07-cv-00454-RCB (Doc.

97) at 6:17-19 (“Lake Pleasant IV”). Rather than repeating those

exceptions and the case law construing them, the court incorporates

by reference the relevant portions of its prior decisions, see id.;

and Protect Lake Pleasant v. Johnson, 2007 WL 1486869, at *4

(D.Ariz. May 21, 2007) (“Lake Pleasant I”), aff’d without pub’d

opinion, 252 Fed. Appx. 856 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Lake Pleasant III”),

and continues to be guided by those principles in addressing these

motions to strike. 

A. MCAQ e-mail

Exhibit one to PSOF is a January 24, 2007, MCAQ e-mail 

pertaining to carbon monoxide (“CO”) emissions from Matthew Poppen,

a MCAQ Planner. In that capacity, Mr. Poppen ran models for

“calculat[ing] . . . CO emissions generated by the proposed marina

to assist [Reclamation] in preparing the [EA] at issue”8

 herein. 

Pls.’ Resp. (Doc. 159) at 1:12-15 (citations omitted). In that email, Mr. Poppen listed the reasons why he “ran into nothing but

dead ends when looking through the CO redesignation request for

information on pleasure craft[.]” Id. Opining that the “[S]corpion

[B]ay [M]arina is dead in the water, up a creek, etc.,” Poppen

concluded, “[s]ince we have already exceeded projected emission

values for 2006 and 2015, [he] [did not] know where else to go[.]”

Id. 

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Reclamation is moving to strike this e-mail (exhibit one) from

PSOF, and LPMP joins in that motion. See LPMP’s Cross-mot. (Doc.

157) at 15, n. 6. This motion to strike is one of several aspects

of the pending motions with which the court has more than passing

familiarity. 

During the preliminary injunction hearing, plaintiffs sought

to introduce this same e-mail into evidence. Plaintiffs offer 

the same rationale as they did then. Primarily because that e-mail

is not part of the administrative record, Reclamation contends that

the court must strike it from PSOF. Reclamation further asserts 

that the court should not consider this e-mail because it is an

internal MCAQ e-mail which was not provided to Reclamation until

after the fact. Lastly, Reclamation notes that this e-mail “is a

pre-decisional document.” BOR’s Mot. Strike (Doc. 152) at 4:21. 

Sustaining Reclamation’s objection as “well[-]taken[,]” this court

refused to consider the January 24, 2007, MCAQ e-mail in connection

with plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction motion. Id., exh. A

thereto (Doc. 152-2) at 6. 

Despite the foregoing, plaintiffs counter that the court now

should consider this e-mail as “background information that

explains and gives context to the prior and subsequent e[-]mails

and other communications” in the administrative record pertaining

to “Poppen’s calculation of emissions for the proposed marina which

are also part of the [administrative record].” Pls.’ Resp. (Doc.

159) at 3 (citations omitted). Additionally, given Mr. Poppen’s

acknowledgment in that e-mail that the County “ha[s] already

exceeded projected emission values for 2006 and 2015,” plaintiffs

suggest that “the subsequent adjustments to the data at the behest

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of [LPMP] were not done in good faith, but instead to reach a

predetermined result.” Id. (citation omitted). 

Plaintiffs also deem significant the timing of this e-mail. 

From plaintiffs’ standpoint, the fact that this e-mail was created

after the November 17, 2006, deadline for public comment on the

Revised Draft EA “reinforce[s] [its] argument that [Reclamation] 

violated the public disclosure requirements of [NEPA].” Id. at

3:25 - 4:1 (citation omitted). These reasons, according to

plaintiffs, provide more than a sufficient basis for denying

Reclamation’s motion to strike exhibit one (the January 24, 2007

MCAQ e-mail) from PSOF.

Generally in reviewing agency determinations, judicial review

is limited to the administrative record. The Ninth Circuit has

identified four exceptions allowing consideration of extra-record

materials, however:

(1) if necessary to determine whether the agency has 

considered all relevant factors and has explained its

decision,

(2) when the agency has relied on documents not in

 the record,[ ]

(3) when supplementing the record is necessary to 

explain technical terms or complex subject matter, 

[or] . . . 

(4) when plaintiffs make a showing of agency bad faith.

Biological Diversity v. U.S. Fish, Wildlife, 450 F.3d 930, 943 (9th

Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Reclamation responds to plaintiffs’

effort to expand the administrative record by noting that

“background information” is not one of those four delineated

exceptions. 

Reclamation’s position is well-taken. Plaintiffs have not

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shown, as they must, that this particular e-mail comes within the

ambit of any of the four exceptions to the general rule that “‘the

focal point for judicial review should be the administrative record

already in existence, not some new record made initially in the

reviewing court.’” See id. (quoting Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138,

142, 93 S.Ct. 1241, 36 L.Ed.2d 106 (1973)) (other citation

omitted). 

Further, the authority to which plaintiffs cite does not

support a “background” exception to the rule disfavoring

supplementation of the administrative record. In Inland Empire

Pub. Lands Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 88 F.3d 754 (9th Cir.

1996), an environmental action, the Ninth Circuit did hold that the

district court properly considered an extra-record declaration on a

summary judgment motion. That declaration was not allowed as

“background information” per se, but to explain a “highly technical

matter” as to how the Forest Service’s “‘habitat viability

analyses’ [we]re insufficient.” Id. at 760. Mr. Poppen’s January

24, 2007, e-mail, does mention some CO numbers, but it does not

contain or explain “highly technical matter[s]” such as the

analyses at issue in Inland Empire. 

Plaintiffs’ citation to Thompson v. U.S. Dept. Of Labor, 885

F.2d 551 (9th Cir. 1989), is equally inapposite. There, the

disputed evidence fell within the second exception - agency

reliance upon a document. More particularly, the Court found that

certain correspondence was part of “the whole administrative

record” because it was “considered by the [agency], either directly

or indirectly, . . . and consequently [was] properly part of the

administrative record.” Id. at 555-56. Plainly the January 24,

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2007 e-mail was not considered either directly or indirectly by

Reclamation as part of the administrative process. Reclamation did

not even become aware of this e-mail until well after the fact.

Thus, the court disagrees with plaintiffs that Thompson supports

the view that this court should consider that e-mail even though it

was not part of the “whole administrative record” herein. 

Plaintiffs do imply bad faith on Reclamation’s part, as

mentioned earlier, and bad faith is one of the bases for

considering extra-record materials. As Reclamation soundly

reasons, however, the subject e-mail cannot support a finding of

bad faith by Reclamation because its decision-makers never received

that e-mail. Hence, as Reclamation also soundly reasons, it would

be practically impossible for plaintiffs to establish any casual

connection between that e-mail and any purported bad faith by

Reclamation. Merely incanting the phrase “bad faith,” as

plaintiffs do, is not tantamount to a “strong showing of bad faith

or improper behavior,” discussed in Lake Pleasant IV, so as to

justify consideration of extra-record materials. See id. (Doc. 97)

at 13-20. Finally, given the timing of this e-mail – after the

November 17, 2006, deadline for public comment on the Revised Draft

EA – it strikes the court that perhaps plaintiffs are improperly

attempting to “use post-decision information as a new

rationalization . . . for . . . attacking [BOR’s] decision.” See

Biological Diversity, 450 F.3d at 943 (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). 

Although the parties’ respective arguments are more fully

developed than they were at the preliminary injunction hearing,

that does not change the result. The court abides by its prior

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ruling, and for the reasons outlined above, in deciding these

cross-motions for summary judgment, it will not consider the

January 24, 2007 MCAQ e-mail. Accordingly, the court grants

Reclamation’s “Motion to Strike Exhibit One from Plaintiffs’ Motion

for Summary Judgment” (Doc. 152). 

B. Emissions Chart

Correspondingly, plaintiffs filed a motion to strike an

exhibit which Reclamation is proffering - an untitled three page

document Reclamation describes as “Calculation of PM10 and Ozone

Emissions Using Plaintiffs’ Mileage Estimates[]” (“the Emissions

Chart”). See BOR’s Reply (Doc. 164) at 16:20. That Emissions

Chart is attached to Reclamation’s Reply, as opposed to a

supporting affidavit. 

On its face, there is no indication on that Emissions Chart as

to the purpose for which it was prepared; the sources for most of

the data thereon; who prepared it and when. These omissions are

all problematic, as is the timing of its offering. Reclamation

produced this Emission Chart for the first time as an attachment to

its Reply on these summary judgment motions. 

Despite these obvious shortcomings, Reclamation is relying

upon this Chart to counter plaintiffs’ argument that the Final EA

understates the PM10 and Ozone emissions. That Chart is based upon

plaintiffs’ mileage estimates which Reclamation acknowledges are

not part of the administrative record. See BOR’s Resp. (Doc. 171)

at 1:24-25. Nonetheless, Reclamation urges this court in its

discretion to consider that Chart to illustrate that “[e]ven

assuming, as plaintiffs wish, that a 10 mile trip is insufficient

to realistically project PM10 and ozone emissions, a recalculation of

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these emissions using plaintiffs [’] proposed mileage figures would

not result in emissions in excess of the de minimus levels.” BOR’s

Reply (Doc. 164) at 16:17-20 (citation omitted). 

Plaintiffs offer a host of reasons as to why the court should

strike that Chart from Reclamation’s Reply. There are several

possible reasons for striking that Chart, but the most fundamental

is lack of authentication. 

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a trial court “may

only consider admissible evidence[.]” Ballen v. City of Redmond,

466 F.3d 736, 745 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). It is the

contents of the evidence which must be admissible; at the summary

judgment stage the “focus [is not] on the admissibility of the

evidence’s form.” Fraser v. Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir.

2003) (citations omitted). Here, the issue is whether the contents

of the Emissions Chart are admissible. See id. at 1036 (“It would

be sufficient if the contents of the diary are admissible at trial,

even if the diary itself may be inadmissible.”)

As the Ninth Circuit has explained, “[a]uthentication is a

‘condition precedent to admissibility, and this condition is

satisfied by ‘evidence sufficient to support a finding that the

matter is what its proponent claims.’” Orr v. Bank of America, 285

F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 901(a))

(footnotes omitted). “[U]unauthenticated documents cannot be

considered in a motion for summary judgment[,]” as this Circuit has

“repeatedly held[.]” Id. (citing cases). 

Here, the Emissions Chart is not attached to an affidavit

which meets the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Therefore,

it must be authenticated in “any manner permitted by Federal Rule

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9 That Rule makes clear that the “examples of authentication or

identification” enumerated therein are “[b]y way of illustration only, and not by

way of limitation[.]” Fed.R.Evid. 901(b).

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of Evidence 901(b) or 902.” See id. at 774 (citations omitted). 

This Chart does not come within the ambit of any of the ten

illustrative ways in which evidence can be authenticated or

identified pursuant to Rule 901(b). Rule 901(b) permits other

means of authentication,9 but Reclamation does not suggest any

other means.

Likewise, Reclamation did not attempt to show (and indeed it

could not) that the Chart was self-authenticating pursuant to

Fed.R.Evid. 902, such that no extrinsic foundation is required. In

fact, as with several other of plaintiffs’ proffered reasons for

striking this Chart, Reclamation did not dispute this lack of

authentication ground. Because a proper foundation has not been

laid to authenticate this Chart, the court grants “Plaintiffs’

Motion to Strike Exhibit A to Federal Defendants’ Reply” (Doc.

168). Consistent with that ruling, the court will strike the

reference to that Chart in Reclamation’s Reply.

C. Pretasky Affidavit & Ninth Circuit Transcript

Plaintiffs direct their second motion to strike (Doc. 169) to

two “extra-record” documents upon which LPMP relies. The first is

an affidavit from Michael Pretasky, LPMP’s Chief Executive Officer

and a partner in that entity. The second is the transcript from

oral argument before the Ninth Circuit appealing this court’s

denial of plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction (“the

transcript”). LPMP is offering those two documents strictly with

respect to remedies, and the availability of permanent injunctive

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relief in particular. 

Plaintiffs are seeking a permanent injunction. Accordingly,

they must show “actual success” on the merits. See Winter v.

Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. ___, ___, 129

S.Ct. 365, 381, 172 L.Ed.2d 249, ___ (2008) (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted) (“The standard for a preliminary

injunction is essentially the same as for a permanent injunction

with the exception that the plaintiff must show a likelihood of

success on the merits rather than actual success.”) Because the

affidavit and transcript which plaintiffs are moving to strike

relate solely to the issue of a permanent injunction, it would be

premature for the court to consider this particular motion at this

juncture. See Sierra Club v. Penfold, 857 F.2d 1038, 1319 (9th Cir.

1988) (“Because actual success on the merits was not shown, the

district court did not err in denying permanent injunctive

relief.”) Only if the court grants summary judgment in plaintiffs’

favor as to one or all of its remaining claims, will plaintiffs be

able to show “actual success” on the merits. At that point, the

issue of remedies will become germane; and at that point it will

become necessary for the court to address this particular motion to

strike - but not before. So for now, the court will hold in

abeyance plaintiffs’ motion to strike the Pretasky affidavit and

the transcript.

II. Law of the Case

In moving for summary judgment as to Count Two of the FAC,

basically plaintiffs argue that the 2007 Final EA does not comport

with NEPA. LPMP responds that “[a]ll issues related to Count Two

[NEPA] have been repeatedly considered and rejected” by this Court

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10 This is a typographical error in that the FAC only has five sections

denoted by Roman numerals; and the “counts” are denoted by Arabic numbers. Even

if “VI” is a transposition, i.e., “IV,” it still would make no sense. Count Four

is a narrow NEPA violation, i.e. “failure to provide meaningful opportunity for

public comment[,]” raised for the first time on these motions. Obviously then,

LPMP cannot be invoking the law of the case doctrine as to Count Four. In fact,

LPMP does not; its summary judgment argument is based upon the merits, or lack

thereof, of that count. See LPMP’s Cross-mot. (Doc. 157) at 19-23; and LPMP’s

Reply (Doc. 166) at 19-20. Consequently, the court is disregarding this reference

to “count VI.”

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and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. LPMP’s Reply (Doc. 166) at

11:3-4 (emphasis added); and LPMP’s Cross-mot. (Doc. 157) at 4:15. 

LPMP thus argues that in the exercise of its discretion the court

should apply the law of the case doctrine and grant summary

judgment in its favor on “Count[s] II and VI10[.]” LPMP’s Reply

(Doc. 166) at 12:14 (footnote added).

Plaintiffs’ response is two-fold. First, because LPMP is a

defendant-intervenor, plaintiffs challenge its right to invoke the

law of the case doctrine when, according to plaintiffs, defendant

Reclamation did not. Second, implicitly recognizing that the law

of the case doctrine eliminates at least some of their claimed NEPA

violations, plaintiffs contend that their preliminary injunction

motion “did not encompass all of [such] violations” in Count Two. 

Pls.’ Reply (Doc. 161) at 1:16 (emphasis added). Thus, plaintiffs

argue that the law of the case doctrine does not preclude this

court from revisiting Count Two’s alleged NEPA violations. The

court will address these arguments in turn. 

A. Intervenor Status

Plaintiffs broadly declare that “an intervenor may not raise

arguments not raised by the principal parties.” Pls.’ Resp. (Doc.

161) at 4 (citing, inter alia, Time Warner Entertainment Co., L.P.

v. F.C.C., 56 F.3d 151 (D.C.Cir. 1995)). Thus, plaintiffs assert

that “[b]ecause [BOR] do[es] not invoke the [law of the case]

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doctrine, Intervenor [LPMP] may not either.” Pls.’ Reply (Doc.

161) at 2:6-7 (citations omitted). 

There are two flaws with this argument. First, contrary to

plaintiffs’ assertion, Reclamation does invoke the law of the case

doctrine, albeit implicitly. In responding to plaintiffs’ summary

judgment motion, Reclamation discusses Lake Pleasant I at some

length, concluding that “this Court previously thoroughly discussed

and analyzed Reclamation’s evaluation of the carrying capacity of

the lake and determined that Reclamation’s actions and analysis

were not arbitrary or capricious.” BOR’s Cross-mot. (Doc. 154) at

11:3-5 (citation omitted). Similarly, several times in its Reply,

Reclamation specifically relies upon earlier findings by this court

to bolster its argument that summary judgment in its favor is

warranted as to Count Two. For example, Reclamation points out

that in Lake Pleasant I this court rejected plaintiffs’ arguments

as to Reclamation’s supposed failure to give meaningful

consideration to alternatives to the proposed marina. See BOR’s

Reply (Doc. 164) at 11-12. As the foregoing shows, despite

plaintiffs’ contrary assertion, Reclamation’s cross-motion and

reply implicate, albeit inferentially, the law of the case

doctrine. Consequently, there is no basis for plaintiffs’ argument

that the law of the case doctrine is not implicated here because

Reclamation did not invoke that doctrine in the first instance.

Second, even if the court agreed with plaintiffs that

Reclamation has not raised the law of the case doctrine, as

discussed below, that would not preclude LPMP from invoking that

doctrine. LPMP could still rely upon the law of the case because

the rule prohibiting intervenor’s from raising arguments not raised

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by principal parties is slightly more nuanced than plaintiffs

suggest, and their reasoning too simplistic. 

“It is a general rule that an intervenor may argue only the

issues raised by the principal parties and may not enlarge those

issues.” See Southwestern Penn. Growth Alliance v. Browner, 121

F.3d 106, 121 (3rd Cir. 1997) (citing, inter alia, Vinson v.

Washington Gas Light Co., 321 U.S. 489, 498, 64 S.Ct. 731, 735, 88

L.Ed. 883 (1944)) (emphasis added). Enlargement of issues is not a

concern here, however. In part that is because LPMP is a defendant

intervenor, not an intervening plaintiff or petitioner. Thus,

because LPMP is defensively asserting the law of the case doctrine,

if the court finds that that doctrine governs Count Two, there will

be a reduction, if not complete elimination, in the number of

issues to be resolved herein. Therefore, rather than enlarging the

issues herein, by relying upon the law of the case doctrine, LPMP

is seeking to do just the opposite. It is seeking to reduce or

eliminate the issues for this court’s consideration. 

Time Warner, to which plaintiffs cite, is factually and

legally distinguishable and hence does not warrant a different

result here. In Time Warner, various cable companies and

municipalities petitioned the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals for

review of several Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”)

regulations. The Court held that the intervenor, a small cable

television association, was barred from challenging those

regulations on grounds not raised by petitioners where the

intervenor had participated in the FCC proceedings, and did not

avail itself of the opportunity to file an independent petition for

review with the Court. The Time Warner Court stressed that

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“[h]aving foregone that opportunity, the [intervenor] was barred

from protesting the [FCC’s] regulations on grounds not presented by

the petitioners.” Time Warner, 56 F.3d at 202. 

Plainly no such waiver argument can be made in the present

case. Moreover, the law of the case doctrine is not the sort of

issue which would have been raised in the context of the

Reclamation proceedings at issue herein. In short, because LPMP’s

law of the case argument does not broaden the scope of the FAC or

alter the nature of the underlying proceedings, LPMP’s intervenor

status does not preclude it from arguing that the law of the case

doctrine bars the NEPA allegations in Count Two. See Vinson, 321

U.S. at 499, 64 S.Ct. 731, 88 L.Ed.2d 883 (“[A]n intervenor is

admitted to the proceeding as it stands, and in respect of the

pending issues, but is not permitted to enlarge those issues or

compel an alteration in the nature of the proceeding.”) 

B. Legal Standards

The law of the case doctrine is “an imminently practical

rule[.]” Casumpang v. Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union,

Local 142, 297 F.Supp.2d 1238, 1249 (D.Haw. 2003). It is a

doctrine of “a judicial invention designed to aid in the efficient

operation of court affairs.” U.S. v. Lummi Indian, 235 F.3d 443,

452 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

“[T]he law of the case doctrine ensures the finality of legal

issues decided in an earlier proceeding in the same suit.” 

Orantes-Hernandez v. Gonzales, 504 F.Supp.2d 825, 836 (C.D.Cal.

2007) (citing Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 619, 103 S.Ct.

1382, 75 L.Ed.2d 318 (1983)). Avoiding “reconsideration of

questions previously decided . . . during the course of a single

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case” promotes and maintains “consistency[.]” United States v.

Mills, 810 F.2d 907, 909 (9th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted). 

Accordingly, the law of the case doctrine “ordinarily precludes a

court from reexamining an issue previously decided by the same

court or a higher court in the same case.” Southern Oregon Barter

Fair. v. Jackson County, 372 F.3d 1128, 1136 (9th Cir. 2004)

(citation omitted). 

“For the doctrine to apply, the issue in question must have

been decided explicitly or by necessary implication in [the]

previous disposition.” Lummi Indian, 235 F.3d at 452 (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted). “A significant corollary to the

[law of the case] doctrine is that dicta have no preclusive

effect.” Rebel Oil Co., Inc. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 146 F.3d

1088, 1093 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted). Likewise, the “‘law of the case’ does not apply to

issues or claims that were not actually decided.” Mortimer v.

Baca, 594 F.3d 714, 720 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations and internal

quotation marks omitted); cf. Casumpang, 297 F.Supp.2d at 1249

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (“[D]istrict courts

are necessarily free to decide[] issues not otherwise resolved on

appeal.”). Given the discretionary nature of the law of the case

doctrine, “[a] trial judge’s decision to apply [it] is . . .

reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” Lummi Indian, 235 F.3d at

452 (citation omitted). 

Here, LPMP premises its law of the case doctrine argument

primarily upon this court’s denial of a preliminary injunction. 

Precisely because of that, plaintiffs urge that the law of the case

doctrine does not apply here. 

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Plaintiffs are correct that generally “decisions on

preliminary injunctions are not binding at trial on the merits, 

. . . and do not constitute the law of the case[.]” Jackson

County, 372 F.3d at 1136 (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted). One reason for that is that typically “a preliminary

injunction leaves open the final determination of the merits of the

case.” Ranchers Cattlemen Action v. Dept. of Agric., 499 F.3d

1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation and internal quotations

omitted). Furthermore, “decisions on preliminary injunctions are

just that – preliminary – and must often be made hastily and on

less than a full record.” Id. (citation and internal quotations

omitted). 

Of course, here, the initial preliminary injunction decision,

Lake Pleasant I, 2007 WL 1486869 (D.Ariz. May 21, 2007), and

related decisions by this court, Protect Lake Pleasant v. Johnson,

2007 WL 2177327 (D.Ariz. July 27, 2007) (“Lake Pleasant II”); and

Protect Lake Pleasant v. Johnson, No. CIV 07-454 (D.Ariz. May 5,

2008) (Doc. 97) (“Lake Pleasant IV”), were not “made hastily.” 

More importantly, this is an action brought pursuant to the APA. 

Therefore, the administrative record is the source of the relevant

facts - not an expanded record based upon discovery taken after

denial of the preliminary injunction. The same administrative

record which is the factual basis for these summary judgment

motions was the factual basis at the preliminary injunction phase. 

Thus, if otherwise warranted, the court will apply the law of the

case doctrine here, regardless of the fact that the prior

determinations were made in the preliminary injunction context. 

Insisting that the law of the case doctrine does not entirely

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bar Count Two’s NEPA allegations, plaintiffs stress that previously

they only “focus[ed] on BOR’s most glaring [NEPA] failures[.]” See

Lake Pleasant I, 2007 WL 1486869, at *6 n. 4 (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). Plaintiffs further

stress that when moving for injunctive relief, they reserved their

right to address, inter alia, “additional NEPA violations at the

summary judgment stage[,]” Pls.’ Reply (Doc. 161) at 1:19 (citation

omitted) (emphasis added), as this court previously noted. Lake

Pleasant I, 2007 WL 1486869, at *6 n. 4. Accordingly, plaintiffs

contend that because their summary judgment motion “raise[s] . . .

[a] number of issues” which were not decided in their earlier

preliminary injunction motion, the law of the case doctrine does

not apply to these newly raised issues. Pls.’ Reply (Doc. 161) at

2:13-14. Plaintiffs list four such issues but they do not expand

upon any of them, merely citing to their summary judgment motion

instead. 

Plaintiffs add that the law of the case doctrine does not

apply because their summary judgment motion “raises air emissions

and public disclosure issues that were not raised in” their earlier

preliminary injunction motion. Id. at 2:24 - 3:1. While accurate,

this is irrelevant. LPMP confines its law of the case argument to

Count Two of the FAC, alleging NEPA violations. LPMP argues the

merits, however, of the Clear Air Act and NEPA public disclosure

claims. Accordingly, as did LPMP, the court will limit its law of

the case analysis to Count Two. 

After selectively quoting from prior decisions, LPMP broadly

pronounces that “[p]laintiffs are making the same arguments, under

the same standard, based upon the same set of facts.” LPMP’s

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11 LPMP also cites to the “Attachment to Civil Appeals Docketing

Statement” plaintiffs filed on appeal. See LPMP’s Reply (Doc. 166) at 12:10. LPMP

asserts that that Docketing Statement, along with the four prior Lake Pleasant

decisions, “all addressed the issues that Plaintiffs claim were not previously

raised[.]” Id. at 12:10-11 (emphasis added). It is incongruous to even suggest

that a Docketing Statement addresses issues. 

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Cross-mot. (Doc. 157) at 10:10-11. Therefore, “[i]n the interest

of judicial economy,” LPMP maintains that the law of the case

doctrine “preclude[s] Plaintiffs from re-litigating these same

arguments[.]” Id. at 11:2-4. LPMP merely string cites to prior

decisions,11 and then objects to what it characterizes as an

“unsuccessful[]” attempt by plaintiffs “to repackage previously

decided issues by alleging four ‘new’ NEPA violations.” LPMP’s

Reply (Doc. 166) at 12:5-6 (citations omitted). LPMP did not

specifically identify any of the issues which purportedly were

decided earlier in this litigation. Nor did LPMP explain precisely

the impact of prior court rulings on plaintiffs’ summary judgment

motion. This lack of analysis is troublesome to say the least.

Compounding this lack of analysis was plaintiffs’, for the

most part unsuccessful, attempt to reframe issues in their reply to

suggest that those issues had not previously been decided. A

thorough analysis of the law of the case doctrine by the parties

would have been preferable; and the lack of one made this court’s

task unnecessarily arduous. Nevertheless, keeping in mind the

underlying purpose of that doctrine – judicial efficiency - the

court has carefully compared plaintiffs’ summary judgment arguments

to prior Lake Pleasant decisions. That comparison shows, as fully

discussed below, that some of plaintiffs’ current, “additional”

issues are, as LPMP declares, “repackage[d]” versions of NEPA

issues which this court as previously decided. See LPMP’s Reply

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12 For the sake of brevity, unless necessary to distinguish between the

new EIS and the SEIS, “SEIS” shall be read as encompassing both a new EIS and a

SEIS. 

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(Doc. 166) at 12:6. Other issues are not, however. So although

the law of the case doctrine has some applicability here, it is

not, as LPMP contends a complete bar to the NEPA claims in Count

Two.

C. New or Supplemental EIS

 The first “additional” NEPA issue which plaintiffs claim is

not subject to the law of the case is Reclamation’s alleged

improper failure to prepare a new EIS or a supplemental EIS

(“SEIS”12). Based upon what plaintiffs characterize as “dramatic

changes in the Lake’s environment” since the issuance of the 1984

EIS, they argue that NEPA regulations mandate that Reclamation

prepare a SEIS. Pls.’ Mot. Summ. J. (Doc. 150) at 11:2. Because

Reclamation did not prepare a SEIS, plaintiffs are seeking summary

judgment on this aspect of Count Two. 

Unlike some of the NEPA issues plaintiffs’ summary judgment

motion raises, this is the first time that they are arguing a NEPA

violation based upon Reclamation’s failure to prepare a SEIS. 

Necessarily then, that SEIS issue has not already been decided. 

The law of the case doctrine, therefore, does not limit the court’s

ability to consider whether Reclamation should have issued a SEIS

due to changed circumstances. 

Before continuing, the court must address one discrete aspect

of this SEIS issue – - plaintiffs’ assertion that the Lake has

become a breeding ground for bald eagles, and on that basis

Reclamation had an obligation under NEPA to issue a SEIS. This is

not the first time the bald eagle issue has arisen in this

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litigation. Thus, from defendants’ viewpoint the court should not

revisit the bald eagle issue now. 

While analyzing plaintiffs’ carrying capacity argument in Lake

Pleasant I, this court stated:

Bald eagle nesting in an area of LPRP was addressed 

in the 1984 EIS and more recently in the 2007 EA, 

. . . , and Plaintiffs have claimed that BOR did not 

take a ‘hard look’ at the impact of the proposed 

marina on the bald eagles or other endangered species 

populations in the park.

Id., 2007 WL 1486869, at *10 n. 9 (emphasis added) (citation

omitted). Relying upon that footnote, LPMP states that “this Court

acknowledged the Final EA’s discussion of the eagle issue and found

that BOR did not act arbitrarily or capriciously.” LPMP’s Reply

(Doc. 166) at 12 n.4 (citation omitted). On that basis, LPMP

asserts that the law of the case precludes consideration of the

“‘catch all’ NEPA issue . . . relat[ing] to the Bald Eagle.” Id. 

LPMP is reading that footnote far too expansively. As just

explained, plaintiffs’ claim that NEPA requires a SEIS based upon

changed circumstances, including the bald eagle breeding grounds,

was not an issue in Lake Pleasant I. So clearly this court did not

decide that issue - explicitly or implicitly. The court thus

rejects LPMP’s suggestion that the mention of bald eagles in Lake

Pleasant I forecloses consideration, under the law of the case

doctrine, of the bald eagle issue as it relates to a SEIS. 

Moreover, at most, footnote nine was dicta and as such it will not

be given preclusive effect as the law of the case. See Rebel Oil,

146 F.3d at 1093. 

D. Final EA’s “Inaccurate Data and Guesswork”

Plaintiffs further contend that the law of the case doctrine

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does not apply to the issue of “the Final EA’s improper reliance on

inaccurate data and guesswork about watercraft usage at the Lake

and various environmental impacts of the proposed marina, including

the addition of human waste and resulting contaminants into the

water[.]” Pls.’ Reply (Doc. 161) at 2:17-20. Referring to

plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion for clarification, plaintiffs

claim that there is no basis for the “20% daily [watercraft] usage

rate” in the Final EA. Pls.’ Mot. Summ. J. (Doc. 150) at 15:6

(internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiffs also contend that

the Final EA’s provision for a marina “pump-out system to remove

waste from boats[]” is an insufficient response to “[p]ublic

comment to the Draft EA warn[ing] that an increase in boat usage

would increase the amount of human waste and resulting contaminants

being deposited in the Lake.” Id. at 16:3 (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted); and at 15:24-25 (citations omitted). 

Comparing these two issues with the prior rulings in this action

shows that neither has been previously decided - either explicitly

or by necessary implication. Thus, as explained below, the law of

the case doctrine does not preclude plaintiffs’ NEPA claims to the

extent they are challenging the basis for the Final EA’s 20% daily

usage rate assumption, and the pump-out system provision.

In denying plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction in

Lake Pleasant I, this court held that “there is no basis to find

that BOR’s determination of average daily watercraft counts was

arbitrary and capricious.” Lake Pleasant I, 2007 WL 1486869, at

*12. Initially, this holding might appear to encompass plaintiffs’

current argument that the Final EA lacks a basis for its 20% daily

usage rate assumption. A close reading of Lake Pleasant I shows

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that this court did not decide that particular usage rate issue,

however. Rather in that decision, the court addressed plaintiffs’

narrowly tailored argument that “the EA inadequately explains BOR’s

decision to ignore evidence in the administrative record that, on

the weekend of July 4, 2006, over 3,000 boats were on the lake.” 

Id. at *11 (citation omitted). In fact, plaintiffs’ preliminary

injunction motion did not mention at all this ostensibly baseless

20% daily usage rate assumption. 

Admittedly, in that prior motion plaintiffs did note in

passing, as they do again now, Reclamation’s “failure to account

for boats to be stored in the 5-acre fenced-in area at the marina

when it estimated the number of boats using the Lake.” Pls.’ Mot.

(Doc. 12) at 15 n. 11; and Pls.’ Mot. (Doc. 15) at 15:11-15

(citation omitted). That alleged failure did not factor into the

court’s analysis in Lake Pleasant I. As just mentioned, there, the

court’s focus was upon the alleged uncertainty of daily average

watercraft counts during peak season, and more particularly, on the

weekend of July 4, 2006. Consequently, plaintiffs’ current

challenge to Reclamation’s “‘20% daily usage rate’ assumption” was

not decided by necessary implication either. For these reasons,

the law of the case doctrine is not a bar to plaintiffs’ claim that

there is no basis for the Final EA’s 20% daily usage rate

assumption. In deciding these summary judgment motions, the court

thus will address that particular usage rate issue on the merits. 

The same reasoning applies to plaintiffs’ current argument

that the Final EA violates NEPA because the “pump-out system” is an

inadequate response to public comment that there will be an

increase in human waste deposits in the Lake due to an increase in

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watercraft usage. This court has not before been confronted with

that issue, so obviously it has not decided that issue -

explicitly or implicitly. Because the law of the case doctrine is

not implicated as to that pump-out system issue, the court will

address that issue on the merits. 

E. Final EA’s “Baseless Speculation”

 Plaintiffs’ reply identifies two additional issues which they

contend are not governed by the law of the case. In particular, 

the Final EA “improper[ly] reli[ed] on baseless speculation”

regarding (1) the “purported need for another marina[;]” and 

(2) the amount of additional watercraft that the proposed marina

will add to the Lake[.]” Pls.’ Reply (Doc. 161) at 2:20-21. 

Separately examining these issues in conjunction with Lake Pleasant

I shows that, with one exceedingly narrow exception, the law of the

case doctrine does not foreclose consideration of those issues now. 

Turning to plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion for

elucidation, it is evident that plaintiffs’ attack on the

“purported need for another marina” is part of their broader

argument that “[t]he Final EA’s rejection of the ‘no action’

alternative is based upon speculation[.]” Pls.’ Mot. (Doc. 150) at

16 (emphasis omitted). This court did address that “No Action

Alternative” in Lake Pleasant I, finding that “the [Final] EA

sufficiently consider[ed]” that alternative. Lake Pleasant I, 2007

WL 1486869, at *13. Despite that seemingly broad finding, a

careful reading of plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction motion and

Lake Pleasant I shows the relatively narrow basis for that finding. 

The only argument that plaintiffs made regarding the “No

Action Alternative” in Lake Pleasant I is that Reclamation’s

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consideration of that alternative was “not meaningful[] because

Reclamation did not analyze current waiting times by visitors or

whether those times are acceptable to the lake’s visitors.” Id. at

*12 (citing Mot. (doc. #12) at 17-18). Addressing that discrete

argument, this court explained:

Although the EA does not set forth exact figures for

the waiting times at the public boat ramps or poll 

results regarding visitors' satisfaction with the 

waiting times, the EA's conclusions regarding increased

waiting times under the “no action” option are 

reasonable in light of the increased visitation numbers

that have been documented. 

Id. at *13 (citation omitted). As just shown, in Lake Pleasant I,

this court did address the “No Action Alternative,” but in the

narrowly circumscribed context of waiting times. Plaintiffs did

not raise, and hence the court did not consider, their current

challenges to the “No Action” Alternative, which include disputing

the need for a new marina, and two other objections unrelated to

waiting times, discussed herein. Thus, the law of the case

doctrine does not bar these three most recent objections to the

Final EA’s elimination of the “No Action” Alternative. 

Plaintiffs’ reply also does not explain what is meant by the

assertion that the Final EA “improper[ly] reli[ed] on baseless

speculation . . . about the amount of additional watercraft that

the proposed marina will add to the Lake[.]” Pls.’ Reply (Doc. 161)

at 2:21-22. Nor is plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion

particularly helpful. This asserted “speculation” as to the

“amount of additional watercraft” can be read as just another

iteration of plaintiffs’ theory that “BOR acted arbitrarily and

capriciously by allowing an increase in the number of boats on the

Lake without first determining the Lake’s carrying capacity.” 

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Pls.’ Mot. (Doc. 150) at 12:25-56. As more fully discussed below,

that carrying capacity argument has been thoroughly considered and

rejected several times during the course of this litigation. 

Therefore, the law of the case doctrine clearly precludes

reconsideration of any form of that argument now. 

On the other hand, it is possible to read plaintiffs’ claim of

“baseless speculation” regarding additional watercraft as

incorporating plaintiffs’ theory that the Final EA does not include

a basis for the “‘20% daily usage rate’ assumption[.]” See id. at

15:6. The law of the case doctrine does not bar consideration of

that particular issue because, as already discussed, that issue has

not been previously decided. 

F. Final EA’s “Various Other Infirmities”

The list of purportedly new or additional NEPA violations

in plaintiffs’ reply includes a catch-all category, i.e. “various

other infirmities in the Final EA’s analysis of the proposed

marina.” Pls.’ Reply (Doc. 161) at 2:22-23 (citation omitted). 

Plaintiffs’ reply does not identify or describe the exact nature of

those “infirmities,” leaving the court to once again extrapolate

from their summary judgment motion. When it does that, the court

finds that those “various other infirmities,” in general, pertain

to the Lake’s capacity and the Final EA’s consideration of

alternatives to the proposed marina. 

1. Carrying Capacity

Plaintiffs maintain that “BOR acted arbitrarily and

capriciously by allowing an increase in the number of boats on the

Lake without first determining the Lake’s carrying capacity.” 

Pls.’ Mot. (Doc. 150) at 12:25-56. Undoubtedly, plaintiffs have

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13 Those exceptions are “when (1) the decision is clearly erroneous and

its enforcement would work a manifest injustice, (2) intervening controlling

authority makes reconsideration appropriate, or (3) substantially different

evidence was adduced at a subsequent trial.” Mortimer v. Baca, 594 F.3d 714, 721

(9th Cir. 2010) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

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made this carrying capacity argument before. In fact, as LPMP

accurately states, this is now the fifth time plaintiffs have made

this argument. Each time, regardless of context, this argument has

been soundly rejected – three times by this court, see Lake

Pleasant I, 2007 WL 1486869, at *6 - *11; Lake Pleasant II, 2007 WL

2177327, at *4 - *6; Lake Pleasant IV, 2:07-cv-00454-RCB (Doc. 97)

at 22-25; and once by the Ninth Circuit. See Lake Pleasant III,

252 Fed.Appx. at 858-859. What is more, plaintiffs are not

suggesting that any of the three exceptions to the law of the case

doctrine apply here.13 Once again, “‘[n]othing has changed[]” –

nothing whatsoever. Lake Pleasant IV, 2:07-cv-00454-RCB (Doc. 97)

at 24:21. Consequently, based upon the law of the case, LPMP and

Reclamation are entitled to summary judgment as to Count Two

insofar as it alleges NEPA violations for failure to conduct a

carrying capacity study.

2. “Post-construction Study”

Plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion includes another familiar

argument. They assert that “a post-construction study of

watercraft usage at the Lake is no substitute for a preconstruction capacity study[.]” Pls.’ Mot. (Doc. 150) at 13:1-2

(emphasis omitted). This is just another way of arguing, as

plaintiffs have before, “that the County’s obligation to conduct a

future WROS [Water Recreation Opportunity Spectrum] study is

insufficient to satisfy BOR’s NEPA obligations.” See Lake Pleasant

II, 2007 WL 2177327, at *6. In Lake Pleasant II, the court

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14 Hereinafter, unless otherwise stated, all references to the

administrative record shall be read as referring to volume three, and the Final EA

more particularly. 

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discussed and rejected that argument, distinguishing plaintiffs’

primary authority, LaFlamme v. FERC, 852 F.2d 389 (9th Cir. 1988)

(“LaFlamme”), on several grounds. See id. 

To be sure, plaintiffs are no longer relying upon LaFlamme. 

But they also are not arguing that any of the exceptions to the law

of the case doctrine apply, such as “intervening controlling

authority mak[ing] reconsideration appropriate[.]” See Mortimer,

594 F.2d at 721 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Thus, because this court has already rejected plaintiffs’ argument

that a future WROS study by the County does not satisfy NEPA, as

with their carrying capacity argument, the law of the case governs

here too. As a result, LPMP and Reclamation also are entitled to

summary judgment as to Count Two insofar as it alleges a NEPA

violation based upon the failure to conduct a pre-construction

capacity study of the Lake. 

3. Alternatives

In moving for summary judgment, plaintiffs assert that “the

Final EA does not adequately consider alternatives to the proposed

marina[]” as NEPA requires. Pls.’ Mot. (Doc. 150) at 16:8-9

(emphasis omitted). The Final EA considered three alternatives to

the proposed marina. The first, the “No Action Alternative,” is

self-explanatory: the proposed marina would not be built. The

second alternative, the “Proposed Action alternative,” called for

the development of Scorpion Bay Marina in four phases. Admin. R.,

Vol. 3 (Final EA14) at 8-9. “[A]t total build-out,” that proposed

marina complex would consist of, among other things, a “200 boat

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capacity,” and “an 800-slip wet dock[.]” Id. at 9. “Alternative

A” was a slightly scaled down version of the Proposed Action,

entailing only three phases of construction and resulting in a

“storage capacity for 804 watercraft at full build-out.” Id.

(FONSI) at 3. 

Plaintiffs argue that Reclamation violated NEPA because: 

(1) it eliminated the No Action Alternative “based upon

speculation[;]” (2) Alternative A is “not sufficiently different

from the proposed marina to constitute a meaningful alternative[;]”

and (3) it “improperly eliminated from consideration the

alternative of allowing” expansion of the existing marina. Pls.’

Mot. Summ. J. (Doc. 150) at 16:19-20; 17:16-17; and 18:15-16

(emphasis omitted). 

Much like they are now, plaintiffs previously argued that the

“BOR did not give meaningful consideration to alternatives to the

proposed marina.” Lake Pleasant I, 2007 WL 1486869, at *12 (citing

Mot. (Doc. 12) at 17-20). Therefore, to determine whether the law

of the case bars any of plaintiffs’ current arguments regarding

alternatives, the court must carefully examine plaintiffs’ earlier

arguments as to alternatives, as well as the court’s prior

decisions – an analytical step which neither LPMP nor plaintiffs

undertook. 

a. “No Action Alternative”

Plaintiffs proffer three reasons why Reclamation’s elimination

of the No Action Alternative was, in their view, “based upon

speculation[.]” See Pls.’ Mot. (Doc. 150) at 16:19-20. The first

is that Reclamation improperly “abdicate[d] its “NEPA-imposed

obligation to consider and evaluate alternatives to [the] proposed

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action[]” by relying upon the County’s determination of need for a

new marina in the first place. Id. at 16:23-24 (citation and

internal quotation mark omitted). Second, plaintiffs assert that

the Final EA’s elimination of the No Action Alternative is “based

on [the] incorrect premise[,]” that “water-based recreational

opportunities appear to be limited to those that presently exist.” 

Id. at 17:2-3 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Third, according to plaintiffs, the Final EA contains baseless

“speculation” that “taking no action will leave demand for water

recreation unmet because, allegedly, the existing . . . Marina will

not maintain the quality of its facilities.” Id. at 17:8-10. 

As LPMP is quick to point out, and as mentioned earlier, this

court has already found “that the EA sufficiently consider[ed] the

‘no action’ alternative.” Lake Pleasant I, 2007 WL 1486869, at

*13. As already discussed however, and what LPMP overlooks, is

that this court’s finding as to the No Action Alternative was made

in the specific context of waiting times at public boat ramps, and

visitor satisfaction with those times. See id. at *12 - *13. 

Therefore, the law of the case doctrine does not preclude

consideration of plaintiffs’ arguments, enumerated above and made

for the first time in this motion, regarding Reclamation’s other

alleged improprieties in rejecting the No Action Alternative.

The court is well aware, as LPMP also notes, of the Ninth

Circuit’s finding that this “court . . . properly concluded that

[BOR] gave adequate consideration to other alternatives in its EA.” 

Lake Pleasant III, 252 Fed. Appx. at 859. That general finding

does not change this court’s law of the case analysis as to the No

Action Alternative. As just stated, plaintiffs’ arguments as to

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15 Reclamation did not specifically address either of these arguments. 

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the “No Action” arguments are new. They were not a basis for

plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction motion. Likewise, these

arguments certainly were not a basis for plaintiffs’ Ninth Circuit

appeal or grounds for affirmance by that Court. See Rivera v.

National R.R. Passenger Corp., 2004 WL 603587, at *5 (N.D.Cal. Mar.

22, 2004) (citation omitted) (refusing to apply law of the case to

arguments “made somewhere in the record before the appellate

court[]” because “[a]n appellate court is not presumed to have

decided issues not presented and argued before it, of issues that

were not addressed in its opinion[]”). 

b. “Action Alternative A ”

In their summary judgment motion, plaintiffs are challenging

the Final EA’s treatment of “Action Alternative A” on two grounds. 

First, plaintiffs assert that that Alternative “is not sufficiently

different from the proposed marina to constitute a meaningful

alternative.” Pls.’ Mot. (Doc. 150) at 17:16-17. Second,

plaintiffs charge Reclamation with violating NEPA by “narrowly

defin[ing]” the “purpose and need” of the proposed marina “so as to

winnow down the alternatives until only the desired one

survives[,]” i.e. the proposed marina. Id. at 18:7-8 (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted).15 A close reading of Lake

Pleasant I establishes that the law of the case doctrine forecloses

the latter argument, but not the former.

In Lake Pleasant I, plaintiffs “argue[d] that BOR . . .

impermissibly identified the project objectives in unreasonably

narrow terms by deferring to the County and concessionaire’s

determination of economic feasibility[.]” Id. at *12; see also

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Pls.’ Mot. (Doc. 12) at 18:21-28 - 19:1-2. Rejecting that

argument, in Lake Pleasant I, this court “s[aw] nothing arbitrary

and capricious in BOR’s . . . eliminat[ing] other alternatives

[including Alternative A] from further consideration by relying on

the County’s statement of need and economic viability.” Lake

Pleasant I, 2007 WL 1486869, at *13. The court emphasized that

“the EA makes clear that the proposed marina and associated revenue

stream is necessary to assist the County in its management of the

park.” Id. (citations omitted). 

Plaintiffs are making a nearly identical argument in seeking

summary judgment. They posit that “[b]y delegating to the County

and LPMP authority to determine the need for, and appropriate size

of, the proposed marina,” Reclamation so narrowly defined the

purpose and scope of that projection that it violated NEPA. See

Pls.’ Mot. (Doc. 150) at 18:10-11. As just explained, this court

has previously decided that narrowness of purpose issue; hence, the

law of the case doctrine precludes reconsideration of that issue. 

Turning to the issue of whether Alternative A is a “meaningful

alternative[,]” plaintiffs note that there are “few differences”

between that Alternative and the proposed marina. Pls.’ Mot. (Doc.

150) at 17:25. Alternative A “would consist of three of the four

phases of the proposed marina,” resulting in roughly 200 fewer

spaces for watercraft than the proposed marina. Id. at 17: 24-25. 

Plaintiffs also stress that, according to the EA, the potential

environmental impact between Alternative A and the proposed marina

is “essentially the same, if not identical[.]” Id. at 17:27-28 -

18:1. 

Plaintiffs made this same argument in Lake Pleasant I. See

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Lake Pleasant I, 2007 WL 1486869, at *12 (emphases added)

(“Plaintiffs maintain that [] - a marina adding 196 fewer boats and

deemed to have essentially the same environmental impact as the

proposed marina - does not constitute a meaningful alternative.”);

and (Plaintiffs “argue that BOR’s resulting consideration of a

nearly identical marina plan with the essentially same

environmental impact as the proposed marina is inadequate.”)

Further, then, as now, Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. U.S. Forest

Serv., 177 F.3d 800, 813 (9th Cir. 1999), was the primary legal

support for this argument. See Pls.’ Mot. (Doc. 12) at 18:8-11;

and Pls.’ Mot. (Doc. 150) at 18:2-7. 

Significantly, though, the court did not address that

argument. As quoted above, the court merely reiterated plaintiffs’

position as set forth in their preliminary injunction motion. 

Instead, in Lake Pleasant I, the court focused on the economic

viability arguments to the exclusion of plaintiffs’ argument that

Alternative A was not a meaningful alternative. Thus, because this

court has not previously resolved that discrete issue, either

explicitly or implicitly, the law of the case doctrine does not

“limit[] the court’s ability to consider th[at] issue now.” See

Orantes-Hernandez v. Gonzales, 504 F.Supp.2d 825, 836-37 (C.D.Cal.

2007) (“Because the government’s argument regarding the relevance

of conditions in El Salvador was not addressed in Orantes III,

either explicitly or implicitly, the court cannot accept

plaintiffs’ argument that . . . the ‘law of the case’ doctrine

limits the court’s ability to consider the issue now.”), aff’d

without pub’d opinion, 321 Fed.Appx. 625 (9th Cir. 2009). And, as

explained in the preceding section, the Ninth Circuit’s finding

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that this court “properly concluded that [Reclamation] gave

adequate consideration to other alternatives in its EA[,]” Lake

Pleasant III, 252 Fed.Appx. at 859, likewise does not alter the law

of the case analysis as to Alternative A. 

In sum, as to Alternative A, the law of the case doctrine

precludes reconsideration of plaintiffs’ argument that Reclamation

so narrowly defined the scope and purpose of the proposed marina as

to violate NEPA. By the same token, though, that doctrine does not

preclude this court from addressing plaintiffs’ argument that

Alternative A was not a meaningful alternative.

c. Expansion of Existing Marina

 Plaintiffs’ last argument regarding alternatives is that

the Final EA gave “virtually no consideration at all” to allowing

expansion of the existing Pleasant Harbor Marina; and thus,

Reclamation “improperly eliminated” that alternative. Pls.’ Mot.

(Doc. 150) at 18:15-16 (emphasis omitted). Plaintiffs declare that

“[w]ithout explanation, the Final EA simply asserts, . . . that

‘[a]lternative marina proposals not associated with the County

would not satisfy the purpose and need for the project.’” Id. at

18:18-21 (quoting Admin. R., at 17). 

Plaintiffs made this same argument in Lake Pleasant I. There,

also relying upon the just quoted sentence from the Final EA,

plaintiffs argued that Reclamation “flat ignored” the expansion

alternative. Pls.’ Mot. (Doc. 12) at 18:13-14; and at 18:21-23. 

In Lake Pleasant I, 2007 WL 1486869, at *13, this court found it

“apparent that BOR did not find th[at] [expansion] option[]

feasible in light of the EA’s statement of purpose and need for the

marina.” Lake Pleasant I, 2007 WL 1486869, at *13. This court

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also found, as discussed above, that Reclamation did not act

arbitrarily or capriciously in “relying on the County’s statement

of need and economic viability[]” when “eliminat[ing] other

alternatives from further consideration[.]” Id. The court reasoned

that “the [Final] EA makes clear that the proposed marina and

associated revenue stream is necessary to assist the County in its

management of the park.” Id. (citation omitted). In deciding that

Reclamation properly relied upon the County’s statement of need and

economic viability, by necessary implication, the court decided

that Reclamation’s reasoning for eliminating the expansion

alternative was sufficient. 

Noting “that Plaintiffs have not demonstrated at this stage

any reasonable probability of success on the merits of their claim

that Reclamation did not adequately consider alternatives to the

proposed marina[,]” this court did leave open the possibility that

plaintiffs could prevail on such a claim later in this litigation. 

See id. (emphasis added). Renewal of a previously unsuccessful

argument is not a sufficient reason for the court to deviate from

its prior findings, however. Therefore, for the reasons set forth 

above, the law of the case precludes reconsideration of the issue

of whether Reclamation improperly eliminated from consideration the

expansion alternative. 

 Since moving for a preliminary injunction, plaintiffs have

painstakingly “scour[ed] the record” to identify what they deem to

be other NEPA violations beyond “BOR’s most glaring failures[,]”

which were the basis for that unsuccessful motion. See Lake

Pleasant II, 2007 WL 2177327, at *4 and at *3 (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted). Not all of these recently

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16 LPMP joins in and incorporates by reference Reclamation’s arguments.

LPMP’s Cross-mot. (Doc. 157) at 11:5-8. Therefore, all references to Reclamation

in this section shall be read to include LPMP as well.

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identified NEPA violations are new, however. For the reasons

discussed above, despite plaintiffs’ stubborn insistence, the law

of the case forecloses consideration of the following alleged NEPA

violations: (1) Reclamation’s failure to conduct a carry capacity

study; (2) Reclamation’s failure to conduct a pre-construction

capacity study; (3) Reclamation’s narrow definition of the scope

and purpose of the proposed marina; and (4) Reclamation’s

elimination of the expansion alternative. Consequently,

Reclamation and LPMP are entitled to summary judgment in that

regard. 

III. NEPA 

Next, the court will address the NEPA claims not foreclosed

by the law of the case doctrine. The first such claim is that

Reclamation violated NEPA by failing to complete a SEIS.16

A. New or Supplemental EIS

Count Two of the FAC broadly alleges, inter alia, that “BOR

violated NEPA by failing to prepare an EIS for the proposed

[marina].” FAC (Doc. 4) at 22, ¶ 103:19-20. Plaintiffs are taking

a different tack on summary judgment though. Claiming that because

“conditions at the Lake have changed dramatically in the [25] years

since” issuance of the 1984 EIS, plaintiffs argue that Reclamation

had a duty under NEPA, which it did not fulfill, to issue a SEIS. 

Pls.’ Mot. (Doc. 150) at 10:2-3 (citation and footnote omitted). 

 Purportedly, those changes are an increase in the Lake’s size and

volume, and that the Lake and its environs have “become one of the

most productive breeding grounds for eagles in the state.” Id. at

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17 Broadly defined, “[t]iering refers to the coverage of general matters

in broader [EISs] . . . with subsequent narrower statements or environmental

analyses.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.28. 

18 See Lake Pleasant III, 252 Fed. Appx. at 858 (“Final EA was tiered to

an . . . EIS”); and Lake Pleasant I, 2007 WL 1486869, at *8 (citation omitted)

(“Final EA . . . is tiered to the 1984 EIS[]”); and Pls.’ Mot. (Doc. 150) at 10:1

(“[T]he Final EA is ‘tiered’ to the 1984 EIS[.]”)

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11:1 (citations omitted). Recognizing that the Final EA is tiered17

to the 1984 EIS,18 plaintiffs further argue that that tiering does

not “excuse” Reclamation from preparing a SEIS. Id. at 10:2-4

(citation and footnote omitted).

Readily conceding that “[d]ramatic changes have occurred at

Lake Pleasant with the construction of the New Waddell Dam,”

Reclamation responds that because those were “not new or

unanticipated[,]” it had no obligation under NEPA to issue a SEIS. 

BOR’s Cross-mot. (Doc. 154) at 11:21-22; and 12:1. Moreover,

according to Reclamation, those changes “were anticipated and

implemented in each document utilized in preparing the Final EA[.]”

Id. at 11:24. Essentially, Reclamation contends that it did not

act arbitrarily or capriciously by not issuing a SEIS. 

1. Scope

Preliminarily the court must clarify the scope of plaintiffs’

“changed circumstances” argument. As discussed in conjunction with

the law of the case, from plaintiffs’ standpoint, one of the

purported changed circumstances is that since 1984 the Lake and its

environs have “become one of the most productive breeding grounds

for eagles in the state.” Pls.’ Mot. (Doc. 150) at 10:25-11:1

(citations omitted). Elaborating, plaintiffs claim that “a

substantial question has arisen in recent years about whether the

desert nesting bald eagle, . . . , should be considered a separate

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19 That “delist[ing]” did not occur until after the issuance of the 2007

Final EA in this matter, as Reclamation is quick to note. BOR’s Reply (Doc. 164)

at 7:4 (citations omitted).

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species . . . [u]nder the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”)[.]” Pls.’

Reply (Doc. 162) at 4:10-15 (citations omitted). Plaintiffs

further note that during the course of this litigation, the United

States Forest Service has “re-listed the desert nesting bald eagle

as threatened effective May 1, 2008.”19 Id. at 4-5, n. 1 (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, plaintiffs devote

the bulk of their changed conditions argument to bald eagles. 

Reclamation astutely retorts that the FAC does not “claim or

mention the [ESA] or potential failure to consider the impacts of

the project on the bald eagle[.]” BOR’s Reply (Doc. 164) at 6:6-8. 

Reclamation, therefore, argues that the court should “dismiss[]”

plaintiffs’ claim, raised for the first time in their summary

judgment motion, that NEPA mandated the issuance of a SEIS because

of changes effecting the “bald eagle population in the Lake

Pleasant area.” Id. at 6:5-8. 

An examination of the FAC readily shows the validity of

Reclamation’s position. Nowhere in the FAC is there any mention of

bald eagles or the ESA. Thus, to the extent plaintiffs are arguing

a NEPA violation because Reclamation did not issue a SEIS after

supposedly the Lake Pleasant environs became a breeding ground for

bald eagles, Reclamation and LPMP are entitled to summary judgment

on that narrow claim. See Richter v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co.,

2007 WL 6723708, at *6 n.5 (C.D.Cal. Feb. 1, 2007) (citation

omitted) (granting defendant summary judgment on alleged Health

Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPPA”) violations

because such violations could not “form the basis of Plain[tiffs’]

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unfair business practices claim because [they] never raised HIPPA

in the Complaint[]”); see also Rastelli Brothers Inc. v.

Netherlands Ins. Co. T/A Peerless Inc., 68 F.Supp.2d 440, 447

(D.N.J. 1999) (footnote omitted) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument

for summary judgment on an insurance coverage issue because it

could not “seek summary judgment on an issue . . . never raised in

the Complaint[]”). Accordingly, the court will limit its

discussion of assertedly “changed circumstances” to the Lake’s

increase in size and volume and expansion of the size of the

proposed marina.

2. Governing Legal Standards

“[A]n agency that has prepared an EIS cannot simply rest on

the original document.” Friends of Clearwater v. Dombeck, 222 F.3d

552, 557 (9th Cir. 2000). That is because “NEPA . . . imposes on

federal agencies an ongoing duty to issue supplemental

environmental analyses.” Cold Mountain v. Garber, 375 F.3d 884,

892 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). That ongoing duty demands

that an agency “be alert to new information that may alter the

results of its original environmental analysis, and continue to

take a “hard look at the environmental effects of [its] planned

action, even after a proposal has received initial approval.’”

Friends of Clearwater, 222 F.3d at 557 (quoting Marsh v. Or.

Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 374, 109 S.Ct. 1851, 104

L.Ed.2d 377 (1989)).

The duty to supplement under NEPA is not without limits. 

“[A]n agency need not start the environmental process anew with

every change in the project.” Price Rd. Neighborhood Ass’n v. U.S.

Dept’ of Transp., 113 F.3d 1505, 1509 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Marsh,

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490 U.S. at 373, 109 S.Ct. at 1859). The Supreme Court in Marsh

soundly reasoned that there is no need to “supplement an EIS every

time new information comes to light after the EIS is finalized. To

require otherwise would render agency decisionmaking intractable,

always awaiting updated information only to find the new

information outdated by the time a decision is made.” Marsh, 490

U.S. at 373, 109 S.Ct. 1851 (footnote omitted). 

On the other hand, “[i]f there remains major Federal action to

occur, and the new information is sufficient to show that the

remaining action will affect the quality of the human environment

in a significant manner or to a significant extent not already

considered, a supplemental EIS must be prepared.” Id. at 374, 109

S.Ct. 1851 (citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis added). 

That same obligation to supplement exists where, as here, “[a]n

agency has prepared an EA and issued a FONSI[.]” See Oregon Natural

Resources Council Action v. U. S. Forest Serv., 445 F.Supp.2d 1211,

1219 (D.Or. 2006) (“ONRC”) (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c)(1)(ii))

(other citation omitted). Further, “[t]he decision whether to

supplement is governed by the same standard which applies to

preparing an EIS[.]” Tri-Valley Cares v. U.S. Dept. of Energy, 2009

WL 347744, at *24 (N.D.Cal. Feb. 9, 2009). As with other NEPA

mandates, “[a]n agency’s decision not to prepare an EIS or other

supplemental NEPA analysis may be overturned only if it was

arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in

accordance with law.” Cold Mountain, 375 F.3d at 892 (citations

omitted). 

a. “Major Federal Action”

As just alluded to, an agency’s obligation to supplement its

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20 The court observes that it is debatable whether a major federal action

remains to occur here. If, as plaintiffs state in their reply, the Scorpion Bay

Marina was merely a “proposed marina . . . to be constructed on land owned by the

[BOR], and its construction [still] require[d] BOR approval[,]” Pls.’ Reply (Doc.

162) at 1:27-28 - 2:1 (citation omitted) (emphasis added), then, almost certainly,

there would be a major federal action within the meaning of section 4333(2)(C).

See, e.g., Marsh, 490 U.S. at 385, 109 S.Ct. 1851 (major federal action remained

to occur where dam construction project giving rise to environmental review was

only a third complete). 

Despite plaintiffs’ depiction of the Scorpion Bay Marina, it is not

“proposed[,]” awaiting construction. That Marina is and has been a reality for

some time. In accordance with Fed. R. Evid. 201, the court takes judicial notice

that that marina has been constructed and is operational. On that basis, arguably,

there is no major federal action remaining to occur so as to trigger a duty by

Reclamation to supplement the 1984 EIS. See, e.g., SUWA, 542 U.S. at 73, 124 S.Ct.

2373 (citation and emphasis omitted) (“no ongoing ‘major Federal action’ . . .

requir[ing] supplementation” where agency had already finally approved programmatic

land use plan); Cold Mountain, 375 F.3d at 894 (holding, with no analysis, that

given the Forest Service’s issuance and approval of a special use permit, there was

“no ongoing ‘major Federal action’ requiring supplementation[,]” although the

permit arguably required the Forest Service’s oversight); Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr.

v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 2005 WL 3021939, at *6 (N.D.Cal. Nov. 10, 2005) (no

“major federal action” implicating the duty to supplement an EIS where adoption of

the Conservation Plan and issuance of the Take Permit were “all complete[,]” and

all that remained was federal defendants’ “‘adaptive management’” thereunder); but

see Sierra Club v. Bosworth, 465 F.Supp.2d 931, 939 (N.D.Cal. 2006) (“timber sales

contract . . . approved by the Forest Service and awarded to a third party

remain[ed] a ‘proposed action’ . . . requir[ing] supplementation [of EIS] if new

significant information emerges[]” because contracts: (1) were “akin to the sitespecific dam construction at issue in Marsh[;]” (2) permitted unilateral

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NEPA analysis is predicated upon the existence of a “major federal

action[] ‘significantly affecting the quality of the human

environment.’” Cold Mountain, 375 F.3d at 892 (quoting 42 U.S.C. 

§ 4332(2)(C)) (emphasis added). In other words, “supplementation

is necessary only if “there remains ‘major federal actio[n]’ to

occur,’ as that term is used in § 4332(2)(C).” Norton v. Southern

Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 73, 124 S.Ct. 2373, 159

L.Ed.2d 137 (2004) (“SUWA”) (quoting Marsh, 490 U.S. at 374, 109

S.Ct. 1851) (emphasis added). 

Reclamation does not suggest, much less argue, that it need

not supplement the 1984 EIS because no “‘major Federal actio[n]’

[remains] to occur[.]” See Marsh, 490 U.S. at 374, 109 S.Ct. at

1859 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4333(2)(C)). Assuming, as did

Reclamation, that the “major federal action” element is met here,20

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termination by Forest Service “if its original environmental analysis has been

altered[;]” and (3) “required . . . Forest Service’s written approval of the

operating plan prior to the commencement of logging[]”); ONRC, 445 F.Supp.2d at

1222 (major federal action remaining to occur where “agency’s original decision to

award the [timber sale] contracts were set aside, and the logging of . . . timber

sales [were] permanent[ly]” enjoined “until the Forest Service . . . ma[k]e[s] a

fully-informed decision, in compliance with NEPA, that is should proceed with the

logging[]”).

Courts have taken a somewhat nuanced approach to the issue of whether a

federal action remains to occur, as can be seen. Further, the resolution of that

issue also is highly fact-intensive. Neither plaintiffs nor Reclamation engaged

in that critical analysis. Thus, as indicated above, the court declines to

speculate and instead assumes arguendo that a major federal action remains to occur

here. 

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the court will confine its analysis of the supplementation issue to

whether, as plaintiffs argue, Reclamation had a duty to supplement

in accordance with 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c)(1)(I) or (ii).

“Under NEPA, agencies must not only perform EISs prior to

taking federal action, but agencies must perform supplemental EISs

whenever 

‘(I) The agency makes substantial changes in the proposed

 action that are relevant to environmental concerns; or

(ii) There are significant new circumstances or information

relevant to environmental concerns and bearing on the 

proposed action or its impacts.’

Klamath Siskiyou Wildlands Center v. Boody, 468 F.3d 549, 560 (9th

Cir. 2006) (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c)(1)) (bold emphasis

added). The Supreme Court, as earlier noted, has interpreted these

regulations to require preparation of a SEIS “if the new

information is sufficient to show that the remaining [major federal

action] will affec[t] the quality of the human environment in a

significant manner or to a significant extent not already

considered[]” by the federal agency. Marsh, 490 U.S. at 374, 109

S.Ct. 1851) (citation, footnote and internal quotation marks

omitted). 

. . .

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21 Ordinarily the court would not consider a new argument made for the

first time in a reply. However, where, as here, the opposing party, i.e.

Reclamation, has had an opportunity to respond in its reply, there is no resultant

prejudice. 

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b. “Substantial Change” in Proposed Marina

Plaintiffs advance a new theory of changed circumstances in

their reply.21 They assert that “[t]he 1984 EIS contemplated a

“‘relatively small (12-acre) marina[,]” but it was later

“substantially expanded.” Pls.’ Reply (Doc. 162) at 3:20-22

(citing PSOF (Doc. 151) at ¶ 64). Referring to paragraph 64 of

PSOF shows that plaintiffs believe that “the proposed marina will

encompass about 164 acres.” PSOF (Doc. 151) at 18:5-6, ¶ 64

(citation omitted) (emphasis added). That is an inaccurate

statement of the record. The 164 acres refers to the total acreage

for the “project[]” - not just for the marina. Admin. R., at 9.

Conveniently overlooking that discrepancy, plaintiffs argue that

the increase in marina size constitutes a “substantial change in

the proposed action after issuance of the 1984 EIS[,]” thus

warranting preparation of a SEIS. Pls.’ Reply (Doc. 162) at 22-24

(citing Cold Mountain, 375 F.3d at 892). 

In response, Reclamation simply declares that because “[t]he

increase in size of the proposed marina was considered and

addressed[,]” it was not required to prepare a SEIS. BOR’s Reply

(Doc. 164) at 5:22. Reclamation further responds that that change

was “not of sufficient . . . character to require preparation of an

EIS.” Id. at 5:23 (citation omitted). Both contentions are valid. 

It is readily apparent from the administrative record that

during the protracted environmental review process, from the 1984

EIS through the Final 2007 EA, the acreage for the proposed marina

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28 22 That Plan, in turn, was part of the 1984 EIS and is the “Agency

Proposed Action” in the EIS. Admin. R., at 2.

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fluctuated. The 1984 EIS took into account that as a result of

increasing the height of the Waddell Dam, most of the recreational

facilities then-existing at Lake Pleasant would be submerged. See

Admin. R., at 1-2. That EIS therefore included a “conceptual

recreation plan for LPRP[.]” Id. at 3. That Plan mentioned a

“ranger station/marina complex . . . anticipated to be about 12

acres[,] . . . based upon estimated acreages identified for other

features[.]” Id. (emphases added). 

At one point “[d]uring the [County’s] Master Recreation Plan

[“MRP”] planning process, a 200-acre marina was envisioned[.]” Id.

at 17. Based upon the 1984 EIS, however, the County’s 1995 MRP

“indicated[,]” that “there would be a 400-acre marina which

conceptually[]” would include a variety of amenities. Id.; see

also id., Vol. 6 at 13. Indeed, “[t]he 1997 EA recognized [that]

the MRP included greatly expanded marina facilities from what was

envisioned in the Plan 622 conceptual recreation plan[.]” Id., Vol.

3 at 3 (footnote added). Because of that, although Reclamation

“determined a [FONSI] was appropriate for approval of the MRP,” the

“1997 EA indicated that development of a marina would require

separate Reclamation review and approval” to ensure “site-specific

NEPA compliance . . . prior to Reclamation’s approval of the marina

plans.” Id. Ultimately, the Final EA reflected that the proposed

“project would encompass about 164 acres total[.]” Id. at 9. “Of

the 71 acres located above elevation 1702 feet, approximately 37

acres would be permanently affected by the construction of marina

facilities. The area within the [L]ake that would be taken up by

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the marina facilities would be about 33 acres.” Id.

On this record, the court is not convinced that the difference

between the “anticipated” 12 acre marina and marina acreage just

described is “substantial” so as to require a SEIS pursuant to 40

C.F.R. § 1502.9(c)(1)(I). This is especially so given that the

1997 EA contemplated a vastly larger 400 acre marina. See Admin.

R., at H-98 (“The 1997 EA analyzed a 400-acre marina at the

Scorpion Bay site.”) Therefore, it can hardly be said that the

marina acreage in the Final EA was a “substantial change”

necessitating a SEIS. 

Additionally, even if the court were to find that increased

marina size is tantamount to a “substantial change,” plaintiffs

have not shown that such a change would “significantly impact the

environment in a way not previously considered[.]” N. Idaho Cmty.

Action Network v. U.S. DOT, 545 F.3d 1147, 1158 (9th Cir. 2008)

(citing, inter alia, Marsh, 490 U.S. at 373-74, 109 S.Ct. 1851). 

There is no requirement that an agency “start the environmental

assessment process anew with every change in a project.” Price

Road, 113 F.3d at 1509 (citation omitted). “[S]upplemental

documentation is only required when the environmental impacts reach

a certain threshold - i.e. significant (defined at 40 C.F.R. 

§ 1508.27) or uncertain.” Id. at 1509. Plaintiffs have made no

such showing here. For these reasons, the court finds that

Reclamation did not have an obligation to issue a SEIS based upon

40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c)(1)(I). 

c. “Significant New Information or Circumstances”

 Plaintiffs’ reliance upon the second prong of section

1502.9(c)(1) is similarly unavailing. Plaintiffs declare that

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since preparation of the 1984 EIS, “the Lake has dramatically

increased in size and volume.” Pls.’ Mot. (Doc. 150) at 10:16-17

(citing PSOF (Doc. 151) at ¶ 14). Plaintiffs add, “[t]he maximum

volume has more than quadrupled, while the surface area has almost

tripled[,]” id. at 10:17-18 (citation omitted), which Reclamation

does not dispute. BOR’s Resp. PSOF (Doc. 156) at 4-5, ¶ 14. 

Plaintiffs believe that that increase in size and volume

constitutes a “significant new circumstance[] or information”

within the meaning of section 1502.9(c)(1)(ii), in turn, compelling

the issuance of a SEIS. 

Reclamation agrees that the Lake’s size has increased, but it

disagrees that that information is “new.” See id. This position

is well-taken. That increase in the Lake’s size is hardly a

“significant new circumstance[] or information” given that at least

since the 1984 EIS it was known that the Lake would become larger

due to the construction of the New Waddell dam. As this court

previously explained:

Because water levels were to increase significantly 

with the construction of the New Waddell Dam, 

submerging the then existing public marina, the 1984 

EIS included a recreational development plan for the

enlarged lake resulting from the new dam.

Lake Pleasant I, 2007 WL 1486869, at *1 (emphasis added); see also

Admin. R., at 1-2. Moreover, even if plaintiffs had shown that an

increase in the size of the Lake was a “significant new

circumstance [or] information,” again, they have not shown that

that increase “will affec[t] the quality of the human environment

in a significant manner or to a significant extent not already

considered[.]” See Marsh, 490 U.S. at 347, 109 S.Ct. 1851

(citations, footnote and internal quotation marks omitted)

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(emphasis added). Plaintiffs therefore cannot prevail on their

claim that Reclamation violated NEPA by not issuing a SEIS pursuant

to 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c)(1)(ii). 

Lastly, the court notes that plaintiffs’ reliance upon Cold

Mountain, as a basis for requiring a SEIS here, is misplaced. 

Hence, Cold Mountain does not alter this court’s analysis of the

duty to supplement. There, the Ninth Circuit held that the Forest

Service did not have an obligation to supplement its NEPA analysis

under 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c)(1)(I) and (ii), due to the lack of an

“ongoing major Federal action requiring supplementation.” Cold

Mountain, 375 F.3d at 894 (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted). Thus, the Court had no reason to and, indeed, did not 

consider what constitutes “substantial changes” or “significant new

. . . information” as those phrases are used in section

1502.9(c)(1). 

“Particularly considering its limited role in determining

whether [Reclamation] acted arbitrarily or capriciously” by not

“prepar[ing] a[] SEIS,” the court is satisfied that Reclamation did

not have an obligation to prepare a SEIS pursuant to 40 C.F.R. 

§ 1502.9(c)(1)(I) or (ii). See Friends of Canyon Lake v. Brownlee,

2004 WL 2239243, at *14 (W.D.Tex. Sept. 30, 2004). The change in

Lake Pleasant’s size and volume and the expansion of the marina are

not “substantial changes” or “significant new circumstances or

information” that have not already been considered “sufficient to

trigger the need for [Reclamation] to take another ‘hard look’ at

the [marina project].” See id. Based upon plaintiffs’ arguments,

the court cannot find that they have “present[ed] a seriously

different picture of the environmental landscape of [Lake

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Pleasant], requiring a[] SEIS.” See id. (footnote omitted). In

sum, Reclamation is not in derogation of its NEPA duties for not

preparing a SEIS because plaintiffs have not shown that either the

increase in the Lake’s size or the expansion of the marina

“result[ed] in significant environmental impacts in a manner not

previously evaluated and considered.” See N. Idaho Cmty. Action

Network, 545 F.3d at 1157 (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted). 

B. “Deficiencies” in Final EA

Plaintiffs’ next NEPA claim pertains to alleged deficiencies

in the Final EA. Plaintiffs argue that that EA “is deficient

because it overlooked a number of potential environmental impacts

and other considerations which, at a minimum, could have influenced

BOR’s decision whether to issue a FONSI.” Pls.’ Mot. (Doc. 150) at

11:17-19. Given the law of the case rulings herein, plaintiffs’

remaining challenges to the Final EA pertain to: (1) the watercraft

usage rate calculation; (2) the pump-out system response; 

(3) elimination of the No Action Alternative; and (4) whether

Alternative A is a meaningful alternative.

Addressing each challenge in turn, the court is mindful of its

modest task and the limited scope of its review. In accordance

with the APA, the court will engage in a “‘searching and careful’”

review of the Final EA[.]” Ctr. for Biological Diversity v.

Kempthorne, 588 F.3d 701, 707 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Marsh, 490

U.S. at 378, 109 S.Ct. 1851). At the same time, this review must

be “‘narrow’” given that the court cannot “substitute [its]

judgment for that of the agency.” Id. (quoting Marsh, 490 U.S. at

378, 109 S.Ct. 1851). 

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1. Standards of Review

“NEPA exists to ensure a process, not to mandate particular

results.” Native Ecosystems Council v. Tidwell, 599 F.3d 926, 936

(9th Cir. 2010) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

“NEPA requires a federal agency to the fullest extent possible, to

prepare a detailed statement on the environmental impact of major

Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human

environment.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

In the NEPA process, preliminary to an agency’s preparation of an

EIS it may prepare an EA “to determine whether a proposed action

may significantly affect the environment.” Id. at 936-37

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “If the agency

concludes in the [EA] that there is no significant effect from the

proposed project, the federal agency may,” as Reclamation did here,

“issue a [FONSI] in lieu of preparing an EIS.” Id. (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted). However, “[i]f an agency

decides not to prepare an EIS,” which also occurred here, “it must

supply a convincing statement of reasons to explain why a project's

impacts are insignificant.” Id. at 937 (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted). “Th[at] statement . . . is crucial to

determining whether the agency took a hard look at the potential

environmental impact of a project.” Id. (citations and internal

quotation marks omitted). 

NEPA does not include standards for judicial review. 

Therefore, plaintiffs’ NEPA challenges to the Final EA are subject

to review under the APA. See Tidwell, 599 F.3d at 932 (citation

omitted) (“review[ing] agency decisions for compliance with . . .

NEPA under the . . . APA[]”). The APA directs reviewing courts to

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“hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and

conclusions” only if they are “found to be . . . arbitrary,

capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance

with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). 

“The court may not substitute its judgment for that of the

agency concerning the wisdom or prudence of [the agency’s] action.” 

River Runners for Wilderness v. Martin, 593 F.3d 1064, 1070 (9th

Cir. 2010) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Courts

accord deference to “agency environmental determinations not

because the agency possesses substantive expertise, but because the

agency’s decisionmaking process is accorded a ‘presumption of

regularity.’” Akiak Native Comty. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 213 F.3d

1140, 1146 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton

Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 401, 415, 91 S.Ct. 814, 28 L.Ed.2d

136 (1971)); see also Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 588 F.3d at

707 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (Courts “are

highly deferential [to the agency and] presume[] the agency action

to be valid.”) 

This court cannot emphasize enough the deferential nature of

this APA standard of review. “The APA does not allow the court to

overturn an agency decision because it disagrees with the decision

or with the agency’s conclusions about the environmental impact.” 

River Runners, 593 F.3d at 1070 (citing, inter alia, Vt. Yankee

Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 555,

98 S.Ct. 1197, 55 L.Ed.2d 460 (1978)). As the Ninth Circuit

recently reiterated:

In conducting an APA review, the court must 

determine whether the agency’s decision is 

founded on a rational connection between the 

facts found and the choices made and whether 

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[the agency] has committed a clear error of 

judgment.

Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Simply put,

“[t]he [agency’s] action . . . need only be a reasonable, not the

best or most reasonable decision.” Id. (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). 

Finally, before discussing the merits, the court notes that

because these NEPA claims involve review of an agency decision

under the APA, summary judgment is “an appropriate mechanism for

deciding the legal question of whether the agency could reasonably

have found the facts as it did.” City & County of San Francisco v.

U.S., 130 F.3d 873, 877 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted); see also Border Power Plant v. Dep’t of

Energy, 467 F.Supp.2d 1040, 1054 (S.D.Cal. 2006) (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted) (“In the absence of fact finding,

summary judgment is an appropriate vehicle for disposing of the

legal issues [under NEPA and the CAA].”) “The court’s role in such

cases is not to resolve contested fact questions which may exist in

the underlying administrative record, but rather the court must

determine the legal question of whether the agency’s action was

arbitrary and capricious.” Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.

v. U.S. Forest Serv., 634 F.Supp.2d 1045, 1054 (E.D.Cal. 2007)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

2. Watercraft Usage Rate Calculation

Plaintiffs argue that because the Final EA “acknowledges

uncertainty as to current, actual Lake usage figures[,] . . .

preparation of an EIS [is] warrant[ed][.]” See Pls.’ Reply (Doc.

162) at 15:23 - 16:1 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). This

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23 In reality, the Final EA states that “the actual number of watercraft

entering from LPRP may be slightly higher.” Admin. R. at H-31 (emphasis added).

Perhaps plaintiffs’ omission of the word “slightly” was an oversight. All of the

parties at times seem to have mischaracterized the evidence – either by selectively

quoting from the record or by citing to a part of the record which did not support

their contention.

The parties’ submissions are replete with such instances too numerous to

count. To illustrate, in discussing CO emissions, LPMP argued that Reclamation

“has no authority to address the increasing amount of traffic and visitors to the

Maricopa County Park – it cannot control where they come from, what they drive or

emit, or whether they travel through a non-attainment or maintenance area.” LPMP’s

Reply (Doc. 166) at 18:14-17 (citing ACSOF ¶ 4)). The cited paragraph reads as

follows:

The Final EA states,

Under the No Action alternative, it is expected that 

visitation to LPRP and use of Lake Pleasant would 

continue to increase. As the northern portion of 

Maricopa County continues to become urbanized the rural 

nature of the LPRP experience will become more like that 

of a suburban park.

ACSOF (Doc. 167) at 6, ¶ 4:24-28 (citation omitted). It is readily apparent that

the just quoted statement is not germane to the issue of Reclamation’s authority,

or lack thereof, to control increasing traffic and visitors to LPRP.

In its Response to PSOF, Reclamation similarly misstates the record.

Reclamation “assert[s] that the [MCAQ] reviewed the air quality sections of the

Draft [EA] and noted that an analysis of CO emissions from watercraft and vehicles

should be estimated in the [EA].” BOR’s Resp. PSOF (Doc. 156) at 8, ¶ 34:6-10

(citing at pp. D-9 - D-10.) (emphasis added). Conspicuously absent from the cited

pages is any mention of vehicles. The subject line of that letter is “Nonroad

engines emission estimates for proposed Scorpion Bay Marina[.]” Admin. R., at D-9

(emphasis added). Given that subject line, it is not surprising that vehicles are

not discussed therein. Whether such statements of all the parties are due to

oversight or adversarial overzealousness, they are not helpful in resolving the

complex issues raised in these motions. 

 

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claimed uncertainty is based upon three discrete factual

underpinnings. First, plaintiffs perceive an inconsistency because 

the Final EA states that the watercraft calculation was “‘based

upon the entry fees collected at the Park entry stations[,]’” while

at the same time “admit[ting] that the actual number of watercraft

may be higher23 ‘due to noncompliance at self-pay stations and

alternative access points.’” Pls.’ Mot. (Doc. 150) at 14:25-57

(quoting PSOF (Doc. 151) at ¶ 69 (quoting in turn Admin. R., at HCase 2:07-cv-00454-RCB Document 176 Filed 07/30/10 Page 55 of 123
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31) (footnote omitted). The court observes that to the extent

plaintiffs are suggesting that collection of entry fees was the

sole basis for Reclamation’s calculation of watercraft usage, they

are wrong. The Final EA, and particularly the appendix entitled

“Methodology for Estimating Current and Anticipated Future

Watercraft Use at Lake Pleasant,” thoroughly explains the manner in

which watercraft usage was calculated. Entry fee collection was

just one part of the calculation. When read as a whole, there is

nothing arbitrary and capricious about the Final EA’s candid

recognition that “the actual number of watercraft entering from

LPRP may be slightly higher[,]” taking into account “non-compliance

at self-pay stations and alternative access points.”

Second, plaintiffs strenuously disagree with the Final EA’s

assumption of a 20% daily watercraft usage rate. Plaintiffs

denounce that percentage as “nothing more than an arbitrary figure

plucked out of thin air.” Id. at 15:10. Third, in plaintiffs’

view, the alleged uncertainty as to watercraft usage rates arises

from the Final EA’s “fail[ure] to give any consideration to the

increased Lake usage that will result from watercraft that are

stored at the proposed marina’s 5-acre storage yard[.]” Id. at

15:13-14. 

Plaintiffs, with no analysis, cite only to Nat’l Parks &

Conservation Ass’n v. Babbitt, 241 F.3d 722 (9th Cir. 2001), as the

basis for their assertion that due to the “uncertainty” as to the

factors listed above, Reclamation violated NEPA by not preparing a

SEIS. Plaintiffs’ reliance upon National Parks demonstrates a

fundamental misunderstanding of that decision, however. There, the 

Court did not address uncertainty in EAs generally. Nor did it

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address uncertainty as to the factual basis for a given conclusion. 

Rather the focus of the Court’s uncertainty analysis in Nat’l Parks

was more narrow – “the environmental effects of a proposed agency

action[.]” Id. at 731 (citation omitted).

In National Parks, the EA upon which the FONSI was based

catalogued a number of “special effects” that an increase in cruise

ship traffic entering Glacier Bay National Park would have on the

environment. Id. at 732. Significantly, however, the EA

“describe[d] the intensity or practical consequences of these

effects, individually and collectively, as unknown.” Id. at 732

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The EA repeatedly

stated “unknown” as to variety of environmental impacts, such as

the effects of cruise ship disturbance upon wildlife; “the

effect[s] of noise and air pollution” upon wildlife; and “the

degree of increase [in oil spills as a result of increased

traffic][.]” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The Ninth

Circuit thus held that National Park Service “made a clear error of

judgment” by, inter alia, not preparing an EIS before allowing an

increase in the number of cruise ship entries into Glacier Bay. 

Id. at 739 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

In so holding, the Ninth Circuit reiterated that “[a]n agency

must generally prepare an EIS if the environmental effects of a

proposed agency action are highly uncertain.” Id. at 731 (emphasis

added) (citation omitted). “Preparation of an EIS is mandated

where uncertainty may be resolved by further collection of data, 

. . . , or where the collection of such data may prevent

speculation on potential [environmental] effects.” Id. at 732

(emphasis added) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 

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The EA at issue in National Parks established both criteria. Id.

at 733. As the foregoing amply demonstrates, it is not the mere

existence of some uncertainty which implicates a duty to prepare a

SEIS. Rather, that uncertainty must pertain to environmental

impacts and be “highly uncertain.” See Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v.

U.S. Forest Serv., 451 F.3d 1005, 1011 (9th Cir. 2006) (citations

and internal quotation marks omitted) (“[T]he regulations do not

anticipate the need for an EIS anytime there is some uncertainty,

but only if the effects of the project are highly uncertain.”) 

Here, as outlined above, plaintiffs stress the purported

uncertainty of some of the data used in calculating the watercraft

usage rate. They do not argue, nor have they shown, that the

environmental impacts of the proposed marina are highly uncertain

as National Park requires. That omission is fatal to plaintiffs’

assertion that due to uncertainty in the EA, Reclamation violated

NEPA by not preparing a SEIS. Consequently, the court finds that

plaintiffs have not met their burden of showing that the

environmental impacts of the proposed marina are highly uncertain

so as to warrant preparation of a SEIS. 

3. “Pump-out System”

 After issuance of the Draft EA, there was public comment that

Reclamation had “overlooked” certain “water quality issues on the

Lake[,]” such as “human fecal waste[.]” Admin. R. at H-87, at 

¶ XIV(A). As part of its broader argument that “[t]he Final EA is

based on inaccurate and incomplete data[,]” plaintiffs take issue

with Reclamation’s response to that particular water quality issue. 

Plaintiffs underscore that the “Final EA . . . acknowledges,

‘[t]he concessionaire would have no control over what boaters do

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out in the [L]ake.’” Pls’. Mot. Summ. J. (Doc. 150) at 15:25 - 16:1

(quoting Admin R., at H-104). That is true, but plaintiffs are

ignoring the broader context of that quote. Following that candid

admission, the EA adds that “[a]ll concession-run activities such

as maintenance and repair activities, operation of boat pump-out

stations, fueling operations, etc., would comply with all

applicable regulations and follow generally accepted best

management practices to avoid runoff into the lake.” Admin. R., at

H-104 (emphasis added). The court fails to see how Reclamation’s

candid nod to reality equates to arbitrary or capricious conduct. 

This is especially so given the Final EA’s recognition that the

concessionaire must operate its boat pump-out stations in

conformity with applicable regulations and accepted best practices. 

Notably, the Final EA also explains that the “boat pump-out system

would be constructed in cooperation with the Arizona Game & Fish

Department . . . in response to the Clean Vessel Act of 1992[]” -

an Act “passed to help reduce pollution from vessel sewage

discharges.” Id. at 14. 

Further, the FONSI states that “[t]he [p]roposed Marina would

be equipped with a ‘state-of-the-art’ boat pump-out system to

remove and transport waste from boats to the marina’s lift

station.” Id., Vol. 3 (FONSI) at 5. From plaintiffs’ perspective,

this too was an inadequate response to the human waste issue,

because the Use Management Agreement (“UMA”) between the County and

LPMP does not require LPMP do provide such a system. See Admin R.,

Vol. 1 (UMA) at 000171-000172. To comport with NEPA, the source of

LPMP’s obligation to provide a pump-out system does not necessarily

have to be contractual, however. 

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Moreover, in responding to concerns about water quality due to

human waste, the FONSI explains: 

The existing marina has been in operation for ten 

years. As indicated in the EA, there has been no

detection of human or animal fecal waste in Lake 

Pleasant water in the 3 years that CAWCD [Central

Arizona Water Conservation District] has been testing for

cryptosporidium and giardia.

Id., Vol. 3 (FONSI) at 5; see also id., (Final EA) at 23. In light

of the foregoing, combined with Reclamation’s discussion and

analyses of water quality standards and the proposed marina’s

wastewater system, see, e.g., Admin. R. at 23; and at H-109,

Reclamation’s response to public comment as to water quality was

not “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion” or “otherwise

not in accordance with the law.” See 5 U.S.C. § 760(2)(A).

4. Alternatives

“NEPA requires [an] agenc[y] to ‘study, develop, and describe

appropriate alternatives to recommended courses of action in any

proposal which involves unresolved conflicts concerning alternative

uses of available resources.’” N. Idaho Cmty. Action Network, 545

F.3d at 1153 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(E)). “This ‘alternatives

provision’ applies whether an agency is preparing an . . . EIS”

or[,]” as here, “an . . . EA, and requires the agency to give full

and meaningful consideration to all reasonable alternatives.” Id.

(citation omitted); see also Te-Moak Tribe v. U.S. Dept. of the

Interior, 2010 WL 2431001, at *6 (9th Cir. June 18, 2010) (citations

omitted) (“Agencies are required to consider alternatives in both

EISs and Eas and must give full and meaningful consideration to all

reasonable alternatives.”) Significantly though, “an agency's

obligation to consider alternatives under an EA is a lesser one

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24 Plaintiffs insinuate that because the Final EA contains only two

alternatives - “No Action” and “Action Alternative A,” it does not comply with

NEPA. See Pls.’ Mot. (Doc. 150) at 16:18-19. This Circuit has recognized, however,

that NEPA regulations “do[] not impose a numerical floor on alternatives to be

considered.” Native Ecosystems Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 428 F.3d 1233, 1246

(9th Cir. 2005) (footnote omitted). Nor does this Circuit “require an agency to

discuss a minimum number of alternatives[]” under NEPA. Natural Resources Defense

Council, 634 F.Supp.2d at 1059 (citing, inter alia, Native Ecosystems, 428 F.3d at

1246). Moreover, because agencies have a lesser obligation to consider

alternatives in an EA, “consideration of only two . . . (a no action and a

preferred alternative) may suffice.” Hamilton v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 2010 WL

889964, at *6 (E.D.Wash. March 8, 2010) (citing N. Idaho Cmty. Action Network, 545

F.3d at 1153). Thus, to the extent plaintiffs are arguing that Reclamation did not

comply with NEPA’s alternatives provision because it considered only two

alternatives, that argument is without merit. See Te-Moak Tribe, 2010 WL 2431001,

at *7 n. 11 (no merit to plaintiffs’ suggestion that the agency violated NEPA “by

considering only two actions-the proposed plan and the No Action Alternative[]”).

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than under an EIS.” N. Idaho Cmty. Action Network, 545 F.3d at

1153 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “[W]ith an

EIS, an agency is required to ‘[r]igorously explore and objectively

evaluate all reasonable alternatives[.]’” Id. (citing 40 C.F.R. §

1502.14(a)). Conversely, “with an EA, an agency only is required

to include a brief discussion of reasonable alternatives.” Id.

(citing 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9(b)) (emphasis added).24 As will soon

become evident, plaintiffs are conveniently overlooking this

distinction. They are attempting to hold Reclamation to the more

stringent standard which applies when discussing alternatives in an

EIS, as opposed to in an EA. 

a. “No Action Alternative”

Plaintiffs fault Reclamation’s elimination of the No Action

Alternative on three separate grounds, which the court will discuss

in turn. 

I. Need Determination

Again selectively quoting from the Final EA, plaintiffs

contend that Reclamation improperly “dismissed the ‘No Action’

alternative by asserting that the County ‘has determined there is a

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need for a [new] marina and its associated amenities as part of’

the Park.” Pls.’ Mot. (Doc. 150) at 16:21-23 (quoting [P]SOF [Doc.

151] at ¶ 86). Based upon that snippet, plaintiffs assert that the

County’s need determination amounts to an impermissible

“abdicat[tion]” of Reclamation’s “NEPA-imposed obligation to

consider and evaluate alternatives to a proposed action.” Id. at

16:23-24 (citations omitted). 

There are legal and factual flaws with plaintiffs’ argument. 

Factually, despite what plaintiffs imply, the County did not act

alone in making the need determination. As Reclamation counters,

and the EA states, “[r]ecreational planning associated with the New

Waddell Dam feature of the Regulatory Storage Division of CAP has

consistently envisioned a marina as one of the developments to be

included in the park to be operated and maintained by the local

sponsor; this was even before the County became the local operating

entity of the park.” Admin. R. at 17 (emphasis added). Further,

as detailed in the “background” section of the Final EA,

Reclamation had a long history of involvement with the recreational

development at Lake Pleasant. See id. at 1-3. 

Not only that, Reclamation was the “lead agency responsible

for prepar[ing]” the EA, and the County was “the cooperating agency

due to its expertise in and responsibility for managing LPRP for

recreation.” Id. at 1. Consistent with the foregoing, “[a]s the

responsible recreation land management agency for LPRP, [the

County] reconfirmed there is a need for a marina and its associated

amenities on the western shore of Lake Pleasant[.]” Id. at 17, 

§ 2.4 (emphasis added). Viewing the administrative record as a

whole, it is readily apparent that the County did not act alone in

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assessing the need for a marina at LPRP. Indeed, the record shows

just the opposite: Reclamation and the County were jointly involved

in the NEPA process at nearly every step of the way. 

To support its “abdication” argument, plaintiffs rely upon 40

C.F.R. § 1506.5(b), stating in relevant part that “[if] an agency

permits an applicant to prepare an [EA], the agency, . . . , shall

make its own evaluation of the environmental issues and take

responsibility for the scope and content of the environmental

assessment.” 40 C.F.R. § 1506.5(b) (emphasis added). Plaintiffs’

reliance upon that regulation is misplaced. First, the EA was

“prepared by” Reclamation as “Lead Agency” and the County as

“Cooperating Agency[.]” Admin. R. at Title Page) (emphasis

omitted). Therefore, on its face, it is questionable whether that

regulation applies. Assuming arguendo that the County is the

“applicant” for purposes of section 1056.5(b), it did not prepare

the EA alone as that regulation presupposes. Second, nothing on

the face of that regulation mandates that an agency must make a

needs determination alone. In short, the court does not find

persuasive plaintiffs’ argument that Reclamation improperly

delegated to the County the decision as to the need for a new

marina. 

ii. Availability of Water Recreational

Opportunities

Plaintiffs’ next argument is similarly unavailing. They

contend that the “EA’s assessment of the No Action Alternative is

based on [the] incorrect premise[,]” that “‘water-based

recreational opportunities appear to be limited to those that

presently exist.’” Pls.’ Mot. (Doc. 150) at 17:1-2 (quoting [P]SOF 

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¶ 87) (emphasis added). Despite the equivocal nature of that

statement, plaintiffs assert that it is “false[]” because their

“existing Pleasant Harbor Marina is not yet fully built out, and is

planning an expansion that would add ‘another 160 wet slips and 400

dry stack storage spaces’ for watercraft.” Id. at 17:3-5 (quoting

[P]SOF ¶ 89, quoting in turn Admin. R. at 8, § 2.1). Plaintiffs

thus reason that “[c]ontrary to the . . . EA’s premise,

recreational opportunities at the Lake will continue to increase

even if no action were taken[.]” Id. at 17:6-7. 

At the risk of repetition, again, plaintiffs are selectively

quoting from the EA to create one impression. Read in context and

in accordance with the record as a whole, however, that quote

creates a different and more accurate impression of the Final EA’s

evaluation of “water-based recreational opportunities.” Plaintiffs

ignore that in discussing the No Action Alternative, the Final EA

factors that expansion into its analysis by explicitly “assum[ing]

. . . complet[ion] [of that] expansion[.]” Admin. R. at 8, § 2.1;

see also id. (FONSI) at 3 (emphasis added) (“Given the recent and

ongoing rapid development in this portion of Maricopa County, and

Lake Pleasant being the only large water body serving this growing

population, at some point demand for marina slips could exceed

available supply, with or without Pleasant Harbor Marina’s planned

expansion[.]”) Thus, in considering future water-based recreational

opportunities, Reclamation did not take the overly restrictive

position which plaintiffs attribute to it. Instead, Reclamation

assumed expansion of Pleasant Harbor Marina but, nonetheless,

eliminated the No Action Alternative because it “would not satisfy

the purpose and need for the project.” Id. (FONSI) at 4, ¶ 2. 

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iii. “Quality of Recreation Experience”

Third, plaintiffs claim that in eliminating the No Action

Alternative the Final “EA speculated that taking no action will

leave demand for water recreation at the Lake unmet because,

allegedly, the existing Pleasant Harbor Marina will not maintain

the quality of its facilities.” Pls.’ Mot. Summ. J. (Doc. 150) at

17:8-10 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs actually misread the Final EA

which states:

As visitation increases for all recreation

activities, and existing facilities reach their

capacity limits, available recreation sites and

facilities would likely deteriorate over time 

from overuse and the quality of the recreation

experience for most users would decline.

Admin. R. at 34, § 3.4.2.1 (emphasis added). That statement does

not correlate an unmet demand for water recreation with

deterioration of existing facilities. That statement focuses on

the overall “quality of the recreation experience[,]” as opposed to

the availability of that experience in the first place. Further,

that statement was made in discussing the “[e]nvironmental

[c]onsequences” of the No Action Alternative. See id. The Final

EA does not suggest elimination of the No Action Alternative due to

deterioration of existing facilities from overuse. It is selfevident that the primary basis for eliminating the No Action

Alternative is because it did not satisfy the project’s stated

purpose and need - development of marina facilities on the western

shore of Lake Pleasant. As is readily apparent from the foregoing

discussion, plaintiffs fail in their attempt to show that the Final

EA’s elimination of the No Action Alternative violated NEPA. It

did not. 

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b. “Action Alternative A”

Given the law of the case, as to Alternative A, plaintiffs are

left with their argument that that Alternative is “not sufficiently

different from the proposed marina to constitute a meaningful

alternative[.]” Pls.’ Mot. Summ. J. (Doc. 150) at 17:16-17

(emphasis omitted). Alternative A is not a meaningful alternative,

plaintiffs contend, because there are “few differences” between it

and the project as proposed. Id. at 17:24. Alternative A “would

consist of three of the four phases of the proposed marina,”

resulting in spaces for roughly 200 watercraft less than the

proposed marina. Id. at 17:24-26. Additionally, plaintiffs point

out that the Final EA “repeatedly notes” that the potential

environmental impacts of Alternative A “will be essentially the

same as, if not identical to, those of the proposed marina.” Id.

at 17:27-18:1 (citation omitted). Hence, plaintiffs assert that 

Reclamation violated NEPA’s alternatives provision, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 4332(2)(E), because Alternative A and the proposed action are

substantially similar. 

Reclamation did not respond to this narrow argument. 

Reclamation instead stresses the purpose and need for the proposed

action. Concisely put, it is Reclamation’s position that it

“reasonably defined the purpose and need of the project to include

some funding for the County’s management of the Lake[;]” and that

“[o]nly projects associated with the county would do so.” BOR’s

Cross-mot. (Doc. 154) at 20:8-9. Reclamation thus argues that it

“rightly rejected any alternative [including Alternative A] that

did not further the purpose and need for the project[.]” BOR’s

Cross-mot. (Doc. 154) at 21:4. 

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 “In judging whether [Reclamation] considered appropriate and

reasonable alternatives, [the court’s] focus [is] first on the

stated purpose for the . . . Project.” See Native Ecosystems, 428

F.3d at 1246 (citation omitted). Here, the “Purpose and Need”

section of the Final EA states in relevant part:

The purpose of the project is to provide expanded

boating access, additional boat storage capacity,

and associated recreational facilities in a manner

that will address the increasing demand for these

services, provide financial resources for the 

maintenance of LPRP, and maintain consistency with

the MPR. 

Admin. R. at 4 (emphasis added). The FONSI explained that “[t]he

proposed marina would operate with oversight by MCPRD [Maricopa

County Parks and Recreation Department], a public entity, and would

offer the public a choice in the type of setting and conditions

under which to store or rent their watercraft.” Id. (FONSI) at 4. 

Moreover, as proposed, the new marina would result in MCPRD

“receiv[ing] additional resources for managing LPRP overall[]” in

the form of “a percentage of the annual revenue generated by the

[marina] concession.” Id. at 8. Alternative A would not advance

the purpose and need of this project as it is not associated with

the County. See id. (Final EA) at 17. Thus, arguably Alternative

A was not a reasonable and appropriate alternative which

Reclamation had to consider in the first place.

In any event, Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. U.S. Forest Serv.,

177 F.3d 800 (9th Cir. 1999), is plaintiffs’ only legal support for

their argument that Alternative A is not a “meaningful” alternative

because purportedly it is too similar to the project as proposed. 

As plaintiffs read Muckleshoot, “[t]he Ninth Circuit . . . held

that an agency cannot satisfy NEPA’s mandate to consider

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alternatives by considering ‘only a no action alternative along

with two virtually identical alternatives.’” Pls.’ Mot. (Doc. 150)

at 18:2-4 (quoting Muckleshoot, 177 F.3d at 813) (emphasis added). 

A close reading of Muckleshoot shows that it does not stand for

that broad proposition. Moreover, Reclamation’s consideration of

alternatives herein is readily distinguishable from that of the

Forest Service’s in Muckleshoot. So, at the end of the day,

Muckleshoot does nothing to advance plaintiffs’ argument that 

Reclamation violated NEPA because Alternative A is not a

“meaningful alternative.”

The first and perhaps the most critical distinction between

Muckleshoot and the present case is that the Court there was

reviewing the adequacy of the range of alternatives in an EIS,

whereas here the court is reviewing an EA. That is a critical

distinction because, as mentioned earlier, “an agency's obligation

to consider alternatives under an EA is a lesser one than under an

EIS.” N. Idaho Cmty. Action Network, 545 F.3d at 1153 (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted). An EA need only “include a

brief discussion of reasonable alternatives.” Id. (citing 40

C.F.R. § 1508.9(b)). On the other hand, the preparation of an EIS

obligates an agency to “[r]igorously explore and objectively

evaluate all reasonable alternatives[.]” Id. (quoting 40 C.F.R. 

§ 1502.14(a)). Muckleshoot, therefore, “provides little support

for requiring similar rigor” when, as here, the court is reviewing

an EA. See Shasta Resources Council v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior,

629 F.Supp.2d 1045, 1055 (E.D.Cal. 2009)(footnote omitted). 

Second, despite plaintiffs’ characterization of Muckleshoot,

that Court did not hold that the Forest Service failed to consider

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an adequate range of alternatives because “[t]he EIS considered

only a no action alternative along with two virtually identical

alternatives.” Muckleshoot, 177 F.3d at 813. What occurred in

Muckleshoot is that “initially” the Forest Service “considered five

action alternatives and a no action alternative for the project.” 

Id. After eliminating three alternatives from “detailed study[,]”

the Forest Service performed analyses on the remaining two

alternatives and the No Action Alternative. Id. The Ninth

Circuit found “troubling” the Forest Service’s failure to consider

one of those “preliminarily eliminated” alternatives “that was more

consistent with [the agency’s] basic policy objectives than the

alternatives that were the subject of final consideration.” Id.

(emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit’s holding was not based upon

the scant number of alternatives or the similarities between two of

them. 

Moreover, to reach that conclusion, the Muckleshoot Court

“deviated” from the “deferential approach” typically afforded to an

agency’s consideration of alternatives. See Shasta Resources

Council, 629 F.Supp.2d at 1055. The court agrees that

“Muckleshoot’s rationale . . . suggests that the obligations

imposed upon the Forest Service were the product of unique

circumstances.” See id. No such “unique circumstances” exist

here. Plaintiffs are not arguing, and would be hard-pressed to do

so, that Alternative A, a slightly smaller scale marina, is

“demonstrably more consistent with [BOR’s] ‘basic policy

objectives’ or in the public interest[.]” See id. at 1056 (emphasis

added). 

One final distinction between Muckleshoot and the present case

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is that there the corporate defendant conceded that the

preliminarily eliminated alternative was a “viable alternative[.]” 

Muckleshoot, 177 F.3d at 814. And, under applicable Ninth Circuit

precedent, “[a] viable but unexamined alternative renders [the]

[EIS] inadequate.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted). In the present case, the viability of Alternative A is

far from clear, especially taking into account the County’s

statement of need and economic viability. Given the many

distinctions between Muckleshoot and the present case, the former

has no bearing on the issue of whether, as plaintiffs urge,

Reclamation ran afoul of NEPA because purportedly Alternative A is

not a meaningful alternative. 

Viewing the administrative record as a whole demonstrates that

Reclamation fulfilled its obligation under NEPA’s alternatives

provision. It provided the requisite “brief discussion of

reasonable alternatives” by considering the No Action Alternative,

Alternative A, and the proposed marina. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9(b). 

Moreover, plaintiffs have not met their burden of showing that 

Reclamation’s decision to eliminate the No Action Alternative and

Alternative A was arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion,

or otherwise not in accordance with law. 

To summarize with respect to the NEPA claims in Count Two,

after carefully considering each of plaintiffs’ arguments in that

regard, the court finds none of them to be convincing. There is a

critical difference between an EA and an EIS. “EAs are by

definition simpler documents not subject to the same rigorous

scrutiny as an EIS.” Sierra Nevada Forest Protection Campaign v.

Rey, 573 F.Supp.2d 1316, 1349 (E.D.Cal. 2008) (citation omitted);

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see also Grand Canyon Trust v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 623

F.Supp.2d 1015, 1026 (D.Ariz. 2009) (an EA “need not be

extensive[]”). “They are designed to reduce government costs,

paperwork and delay through a “concise” public document.” Sierra

Nevada Forest, 573 F.Supp.2d at 1349 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9). 

Plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion seems to be little more

than an attempt to hold Reclamation to NEPA’s more stringent

standards governing an EIS. Logically, an “‘EA cannot be both

concise and brief and provide detailed answers for every

question.’” Id. (quoting Newton County Wildlife Ass'n v. Rogers,

141 F.3d 803, 809 (8th Cir. 1998).” Yet, that seems to be precisely

what plaintiffs are seeking – “detailed answers for every question”

or issue, regardless of how inconsequential, but NEPA does not

demand that, at least in the context of an EA. Thus, for the

reasons delineated above, the court denies plaintiffs’ motion for

summary judgment as to Count Two. Conversely, the court grants the

cross-motions for summary judgment by Reclamation and LPMP as to

that Count. This relief is proper because plaintiffs did not meet

their burden of showing that Reclamation violated NEPA by not

preparing a SEIS. Further, plaintiffs did not meet their burden of

showing that Reclamation acted arbitrarily, capriciously or abused

its discretion with respect to the Final EA’s: (1) calculation of

the watercraft usage rate; (2) pump-out system response to public

comment; and (3) consideration of the No Action Alternative and

Alternative A.

III. Clean Air Act

Plaintiffs style Count Three of their FAC as a claim for

“failure to conduct [a] conformity determination[.]” FAC (Doc. 4)

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28 25 BOR’s Cross-mot. (Doc. 154) at 21:14-15; and LPMP’s Cross-mot. (Doc.

157) at 11 n.4:28.

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at 23:5 (emphasis omitted). As part of their relief, plaintiffs

are seeking a declaration that Reclamation “violated the CAA by

approving construction of the proposed Scorpion Bay Facility

without conducting a conformity determination[.]” Id. at 27, 

¶ 6:4-6 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs reframe this count in their

summary judgment motion, claiming that the Final EA “violates NEPA”

because it “considers only certain ozone and PM10 emissions sources,

and ignores motor vehicles altogether as a source of CO emissions.” 

Pls.’ Mot. (Doc. 150) at 23:7-9. 

A. Standard of Review

“[C]hallenges to conformity determinations may be not brought

under the citizen suit provision[]” of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 7604(a)(1), as LPMP and Reclamation are quick to note.25 See City

of Yakima v. Surface Transportation Board, 46 F.Supp.2d 1092, 1098

(E.D.Wash. 1999) (citing, inter alia, Conservation Law Found.,

Inc., v. Busey, 79 F.3d 1250 (1st Cir. 1996)). Plaintiffs do not

dispute that, most likely because they are not relying upon that

CAA provision as a basis for Count Three. Instead, plaintiffs

respond that their CAA claims, like their NEPA claims, are subject

to review under the APA. See Pls.’ Reply (Doc. 162) at 19:2-3

(citations omitted). Plaintiffs’ position is well-taken. As the

court stated in Environmental Council of Sacramento v. Slater, 184

F.Supp.2d 1016 (E.D.Cal. 2000), “[i]t [is] well established that

challenges to agency determinations under the general provisions of

the [CAA] are properly analyzed under the APA rather than the

citizen provision of the [CAA].” Id. at 1023 (citing, inter alia,

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Conservation Law Foundation v. Busey, 79 F.3d 1250, 1260 (1st Cir.

1996)). 

So, once again, the court’s review is narrowly circumscribed. 

It must apply the “familiar default standard of the [APA],” set

forth earlier, “and ask whether [Reclamation’s] action was

‘arbitrary, capricious, and abuse of discretion, or otherwise not

in accordance with law.’” See Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation

v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 496, 124 S.Ct. 983, 157 L.Ed.2d (2004). 

Arbitrary and capricious review under the APA focuses on “the

reasonableness of [the [agency’s] decision-making processes[.]”

MacClarence v. U.S. E.P.A., 596 F.3d 1123, 1129 (9th Cir. 2010)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

To reiterate, this review entails “determin[ing] whether the

agency’s decision is founded on a rational connection between the

facts found and the choices made and whether [the agency] has

committed a clear error of judgment.” River Runners, 593 F.3d at

1070 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “One example

provided by the [Supreme] Court of such a ‘clear error of judgment’

sufficient to constitute arbitrary and capricious agency action is

when the agency offer[s] an explanation that runs counter to the

evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not

be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency

expertise.” Sierra Club v. EPA, 346 F.3d 955, 961 (9th Cir.)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted), amended, 352 F.3d

1186 (9th Cir. 2003). By the same token, “where, as here, a court

reviews an agency action involv[ing] primarily issues of fact, and

where analysis of the relevant documents requires a high level of

technical expertise, [the court] must defer to the informed

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discretion of the responsible federal agenc[y].” Latino Issues

Forum, 558 F.3d at 941 (citations and internal quotation marks

omitted). Likewise, “[e]ven when an agency explains its decision

with less than ideal clarity, a reviewing court will not upset the

decision on that account if the agency’s path may reasonably be

discerned.” Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, 540 U.S. at 497,

125 S.Ct. 983. 

Agency deference notwithstanding, this court’s overarching

task is to “ensure that [Reclamation] has taken the requisite hard

look at the environmental consequences of [the] proposed [marina],

carefully reviewing the record to ascertain whether [Reclamation’s]

decision is founded on a reasoned evaluation of the relevant

factors.” Te-Moak Tribe, 2010 WL 2431001, at *4 (citation

omitted). Finally it bears repeating that plaintiffs have the

burden of proof, as the party challenging Reclamation’s action as

arbitrary and capricious. See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416, 91

S.Ct. 814. “‘Indeed, even assuming the [agency] made missteps 

. . . the burden is on petitioners to demonstrate that the

[agency's] ultimate conclusions are unreasonable.’” George v. Bay

Area Rapid Transit, 577 F.3d 1005, 1001 (9th Cir. 2009) (alterations

and ellipses in original) (quoting City of Olmsted Falls, Ohio v.

FAA, 292 F.3d 261, 271 (D.C.Cir. 2002)). This is a heavy, although

not insurmountable, burden. 

B. Statutory and Regulatory Framework

The CAA “establishes a comprehensive program for controlling

and improving the United States’ air quality through state and

federal regulation.” Latino Issues Forum, 558 F.3d at 938. 

Pursuant to that Act, the EPA must set national ambient air quality

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standards (“NAAQS”) for air pollutants. 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (West

2003). States, in turn, “are responsible for ensuring that their

air quality meets the NAAQS.” Latino Issues Forum, 558 F.3d at 938

(citing 42 U.S.C. § 7407(a)). States maintain the NAAQs in part

through the development of a “State Implementation Plan” or “SIP”. 

42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1).

 “For planning purposes, EPA has divided each state into

separate “air quality control regions.” Natural Resources Defense

Council, Inc. v. South Coast Air Quality Management District, 2010

WL 939990, at *1 (C.D.Cal. Jan. 7, 2010) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7407). 

“EPA classifies each region based on whether the region meets the

NAAQS.” Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d)); 40 C.F.R. Part 81,

Subpart C). “[E]ach region is designated as being either in

attainment or nonattainment, or as unclassifiable with respect to

each of the NAAQS.” Latino Issues Forum, 558 F.3d at 938 (citing

42 U.S.C. § 7407(d)). Pursuant to the CAA, “federal projects” must

“‘conform’ to emissions limits on six criteria pollutants

established in the [SIP].” City of Las Vegas, Nev. v. F.A.A., 570

F.3d 1109, 1117 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7506(c)(1)). 

“A federal agency must conduct a ‘conformity determination’

analysis for each criteria pollutant where the proposed federal

action would cause the total of direct and indirect emissions of

the pollutant in a nonattainment or maintenance area to equal or

exceed certain rates.” City of Las Vegas, 570 F.3d at 1117 (citing

40 C.F.R. § 93.13(b)). 

C. Summary of Arguments

The three criteria pollutants at issue here are carbon

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26 “Because ozone is not produced directly, EPA focuses on emission of its

precursors: nitrogen oxides (‘NOX emissions’) and volatile organic compounds (‘VOC

emissions’).” Border Power Plant Working Group v. Dep’t of Energy, 467 F.Supp.2d

1040, 1054 (S.D.Cal. 2006) (citing 40 C.F.R. § 51.852). There is no need to

distinguish between those precursors here. Thus, hereinafter the court will refer

generically to ozone emissions. 

27 Although, as will be seen, EPA recently revised the General Conformity

regulations, including section 93.153, those revisions left intact these particular

rates. 

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monoxide (“CO”); PM10; and ozone.26 As the Final EA describes it,

“[a] portion of the project area lies within an area designated as

‘maintenance’ for CO[.]” Admin. R. at 50. Additionally, “the

project area is located within an area designated as being in [a]

serious nonattainment for PM10[.]” Id. at 48. Lastly, “a portion of

the project area falls within an area designated as being in

nonattainment for the 8-hour ozone standard[.]” Id. at 49. Based

upon the foregoing, the parties agree that the governing de minimis

rates are: (1) 100 tons per year for CO; (2) 100 tons per year for

ozone; and (3) 70 tons per year for PM10. See 40 C.F.R. § 93.15327;

and Arizona Administrative Code R18-2-1438. 

There is a fundamental disagreement though arising from

Reclamation’s determination that:

Air emissions attributable to the proposed 

project for carbon monoxide, ozone, and [PM10],

would not exceed the de minimis thresholds which 

would require that a conformity determination be

conducted, in accordance with the [EPA’s] General

Conformity Rule.

Admin. R., Vol. 3 (FONSI) at 8. Plaintiffs contend that that

determination was “based on incomplete information[,]” Pls.’ Mot.

Summ. J. (Doc. 150) at 21:2, whereas emphasizing the process that

the Final EA used to reach that conclusion, defendants respond that

Reclamation “properly considered air quality issues.” LPMP’s

Cross-mot. (Doc. 157) at 11:13; and BOR’s Reply (Doc. 164) at 14:9.

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Somewhat tellingly, although the project at issue is a marina, 

the primary thrust of plaintiffs’ argument is that the Final EA

improperly calculated vehicular emissions. Plaintiffs argue that

by assuming “the average trip per vehicle into/out from [the Park]

is about 10 miles[,]” the Final EA “clearly understates PM10 and

ozone emissions” from vehicular traffic. Pls.’ Mot. Summ. J (Doc.

150) at 21:17-18 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Plaintiffs further claim that the Final EA “ignores motor vehicles

altogether as a source of CO emissions.” Id. at 23:8-9. Turning

to other potential sources of CO emissions, which will be more

fully discussed below, plaintiffs argue that such emissions are

“indirect emissions” within the meaning of 40 C.F.R. § 93.152. 

Hence, plaintiffs maintain that the Final EA should have included

those emissions, but it did not. 

Plaintiffs only disagreement with the Final EA’s calculation

of watercraft emissions is that it improperly “ignore[d]” diesel

engine emissions “because the proposed marina will not sell diesel

fuel.” Id. at 21:12-13 (footnote omitted). For all of these

reasons, plaintiffs charge Reclamation with “taking a myopic view

of the proposed marina by failing to consider all of the ozone, PM10

and CO emissions it will produce,” in “violat[ion] [of] NEPA.” Id.

at 23:6-8.

Concentrating primarily upon watercraft emissions, Reclamation 

emphasizes the process in which it engaged in calculating potential

air emissions for PM10, ozone and CO emissions. In their comment

letters as to the Draft EA and the RDEA, plaintiffs claimed that

“Reclamation’s methodology[] used to calculate de minimis

thresholds for CO, ozone, and PM10 was flawed.” Admin. R., at 47. 

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Turning to MCAQ staff for their “guidance and expertise,” that

staff explained the methodology used in EPA models “and how the

default values used in those models are applied” locally. Id.

“For calculating emissions for nonroad engines, such as watercraft,

EPA’s guidance recommends that default equipment population and

activity levels be changed if local data are available[.]” Id. 

Local data were then derived from a survey “of engines located at

Pleasant Harbor Marina.” Id. That “partial inventory” was 

“conducted by [LPMP] staff[.]” Id. at D-2. Reclamation “reviewed

and modified [those] estimates[;]” id.; independently analyzed the

emissions data it received; revised the calculations; and explained

those adjustments in the Final EA and a 19 page appendix thereto

entitled, “Assumptions and Calculations Used for General Conformity

Rule Determination[.]” Id. at 45-15; and App. D thereto. These

actions, Reclamation maintains satisfy NEPA’s “hard look”

requirement. 

LPMP’s cross-motion echoes Reclamation’s process argument,

stressing Reclamation’s overall “conservative” approach in finding

that a conformity rule determination was not required. See, e.g.,

LPMP’s Cross-mot. (Doc. 157) at 15:20 and 16:7 and 16. Then LPMP

takes a different approach. It contends that Reclamation “made a

reasoned decision to exclude emissions from vehicles outside the

Park in its conformity determination because they are not indirect

emissions required under the CAA.” LPMP’s Cross-mot. (Doc. 157) at

16:9-11 (emphasis added); see also id. at 18:9-11 (same). LPMP

further asserts that Reclamation “reasonably excluded” CO emissions

from vehicles outside LPRP because “such emissions are not indirect

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28 On April 5, 2010, the EPA revised the General Conformity Regulations.

75 Fed. Reg. 17254. Those revisions became effective on July 6, 2010. Id. As

part of those revisions, One of those revisions was to delete this particular

section of the C.F.R., among others, because it “merely repeated the language in

40 C.F.R. . . . § 93.152.” 75 Fed. Reg. 17254, § VI(A). Accordingly, hereinafter

the court will refer only to section 93.152. 

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emissions under 40 CFR § 51.85228.” Id. at 16:24-26 (emphasis

added). As to other potential sources of CO emissions, LPMP

contends that because such emissions will occur outside the CO

maintenance area, Reclamation did not have to include those

emissions in its air quality impact assessment. Basically, it is

LPMP’s position that plaintiffs have not met their burden of

showing that Reclamation “abused its discretion or otherwise acted

arbitrarily or capriciously with respect to air quality issues.” 

Id. at 19:24-25. 

Insofar as PM10 and ozone emissions are concerned, in their

responses to defendants’ cross-motions, plaintiffs reiterate that

the Final EA “grossly understates” those emissions because of the

ten-mile round trip assumption. Pls.’ Reply (Doc. 161) at 13:2;

see also Pls.’ Reply (Doc. 162) at 22:13 (that assumption

“drastically understates” vehicle mileage). Unlike their summary

judgment motion, however, in their replies plaintiffs do not

mention the other possible sources of PM10 and ozone. In sharp

contrast, as explained in section 3(c) below, in their replies

plaintiffs greatly expand the scope of their initial arguments

pertaining to CO emissions - but to no avail. 

D. Analysis

1. Drifting Emissions

The court first will address plaintiffs’ argument common to

all three pollutants - the Final EA improperly failed to consider

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29 During the administrative process, written comments were prepared by

the Washington, D.C. office of Steptoe & Johnson, LLP, the lawyers at the time for

plaintiffs Maule-Ffinch and the Pensus Group. With that clarification, for the

sake of brevity, hereinafter this decision will not make that distinction. It will

simply refer to the comments as having been made on behalf of all plaintiffs. 

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drifting emissions from vehicular traffic. As to ozone and PM10

vehicular emissions, plaintiffs maintain that the Final EA should

have taken into account such emissions occurring outside the LPRP

boundaries. Similarly, plaintiffs contend that the Final EA should

have considered CO emissions even if they did not originate in the

CO maintenance area, because they could have drifted from an

adjacent area into the maintenance area. These potentially

drifting emissions “will not respect . . . boundaries[,]” as

plaintiffs put it. Pls.’ Reply (Doc. 162) at 20:16-17 (citation

omitted); and Pls.’ Reply (Doc. 161) at 13:15 (citation omitted). 

While having some superficial appeal, there is no legal basis

for this argument. Morever, plaintiffs have waived their right to

challenge the Final EA as to drifting emissions because they did

not raise that issue during the administrative process. As the

Supreme Court has explained, “[p]ersons challenging an agency’s

compliance with NEPA must ‘structure their participation so that it

. . . alerts the agency to the [parties’] position and

contentions,’ in order to allow the agency to give the issue

meaningful consideration.” Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541

U.S. 752, 764, 124 S.Ct. 2204, 159 L.Ed.2d 60 (2004) (quoting Vt.

Yankee Power, 435 U.S. at 553, 98 S.Ct. 1197). 

Much like Public Citizen, although plaintiffs submitted three

comment letters during the NEPA process,29 they never criticized the

Final EA’s conformity determination for not including drifting

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30 The court is well aware that Reclamation “bears the primary

responsibility to ensure that it complies with NEPA, . . . , and an EA’s . . .

flaws might be so obvious that there is no need for a commentator to point them out

specifically in order to preserve its ability to challenge the proposed action.”

Public Citizen, 541 U.S. at 765, 124 S.Ct. 2204. That is not the situation here

though. A failure to consider drifting vehicular emissions in the context of this

particular marina project is not “so obvious [a] flaw[]” that plaintiffs were not

required to point it out specifically during the NEPA process. See id. (emphasis

added). 

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emissions. See id. (“None of the respondents identified in their

comments any rulemaking alternatives beyond those evaluated in the

EA, and none urged the [agency] to consider alternatives.”) In

those comment letters, plaintiffs detailed what they perceived to

be a number of flaws in Reclamation’s conclusion that a conformity

determination was not required. Until now, however, plaintiffs

have not mentioned a failure to account for drifting emissions. 

Reclamation therefore did not have an opportunity to address that

issue during the administrative process. Consequently, plaintiffs

have waived any objection to the Final EA on the ground that it did

not consider drifting emissions when arriving at its conformity

determination.30 See id. 

Assuming arguendo that plaintiffs did not waive their argument

as to drifting emissions, this argument lacks merit. Neither of

the two cases to which plaintiffs cite have any bearing whatsoever

on the present case. In League of Wilderness Defenders v.

Forsgren, 309 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2002), “the Forest Service

prepared an EIS to identify and analyze the potential impacts” of a

“program of annual aerial insecticide spraying over 628,000 acres

of national forest lands” in two states. Id. at 1191 and 1182. 

The Ninth Circuit held that the EIS did not “adequately analyze the

issue of pesticide drift[]” where it did “not discuss . . . 

mitigation measures with respect to drift into adjacent areas . . .

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outside the target spray area. Id. at 1191-92.

Forsgren is distinguishable both factually and legally. The

drift at issue in Forsgren is on a scale exponentially greater than

the potential drifting emissions herein. There is a vast

difference between not taking into account pesticide drift from

aerial spraying occurring over half a million acres of national

forest, and not taking into account vehicular emissions in

connection with a marina. Further, in Forsgren the issue was

whether the EIS included a “reasonably complete discussion of

possible mitigation measures” which the Supreme Court requires. 

Id. at 1192 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The

General Conformity Rule and its attendant analysis were not at

issue in Forsgren, as they are here.

Plaintiffs’ reliance upon North Carolina v. Tenn. Valley

Auth., 593 F.Supp.2d 812, 829-34 (W.D.N.C. 2009), [stay denied,

2009 WL 2497934 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 14, 2009)]) is, if possible, even

more attenuated than their reliance upon Forsgren. The former is

not in any way relevant to the issues now before this court. North

Carolina involved an adjudication of a state law public nuisance

claim against TVA for environmental and health effects allegedly

caused by coal-fired power plants. It had nothing to do with the

EPA’s General Conformity Rule and analyzing pollutants in

accordance therewith. 

Partially quoting from North Carolina, plaintiffs state that

“‘emissions from a source located outside a state[,] . . . can

still have significant impact on that state’s air quality[.]]”

Pls.’ Reply (Doc. 162) at 20:19-21) (quoting North Carolina, 593

F.Supp.2d at 825. The omitted phrase was “particularly an upwind

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31 For each pollutant, the Final EA contains two broad classifications of

emissions – those from construction activities and those deemed to be “recurring.”

Presumably the former are essentially one-time emissions. Plaintiffs are not

disputing any of the findings as to construction emissions. Further, they disagree

with only a few discrete aspects of the Final EA’s calculations as to recurring

emissions. 

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source.” North Carolina, 593 F.Supp.2d at 825, ¶ 53 (citation

omitted). Regardless, that was one of the court’s many factual

findings therein unique to that case. It certainly does suggest,

as plaintiffs mistakenly believe, because emissions can drift, they

must be included in making a conformity rule determination. 

Having found no merit to plaintiffs’ argument that the Final

EA improperly failed to consider drifting ozone, CO and PM10

vehicular emissions, the court will turn to plaintiffs’ remaining

arguments. 

2. PM10 and Ozone Vehicle Emissions

In arriving at “Total Recurring31 PM10 Emissions” of 16.03 tons

per year and “Total Recurring Ozone Emissions” of 37.69 tons per

year, Admin. R. at D-15 and D-17, the Final EA employs several

variables and assumptions. The Final EA also takes into account

these emissions from several different sources. Having cherry

picked the administrative record, plaintiffs disagree with only a

single assumption. They dispute the Final EA’s use of a ten mile

round trip assumption to calculate vehicular PM10 and ozone

emissions. 

The Final EA states that PM10 and ozone emissions “from

increased traffic resulting from the proposed project” were

“calculated conservatively,” and based upon three assumptions. Id.

at 48 and 49. First, “the average trip per vehicle into/out from

LPRP is about 10 miles[.]” Id. Second, “every slip and dry storage

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area is rented (1,000 boats),” that is, 100% occupancy. Id.

Third, “20 percent of boat owners visit every day[]” of the year. 

Id. Based upon those assumptions, the Final EA “[e]stimate[s] PM10

emissions from onroad mobile sources [to] be about 2 tons per

year.” Id. at 48. Relying upon those same assumptions, the Final

EA projects “approximately three tons per year of . . . ozone . . .

would be emitted annually.” Id. at 49.

Plaintiffs disagree with only one of the three assumptions in

that hypothesis. They do not challenge the 100% occupancy

assumption, or the assumption that every single day of the year 20%

of boat owners will visit the marina. Nonetheless, plaintiffs

assert that that assumption “clearly understates PM10 and ozone

emissions, because it is obvious that the average visitor to the

Lake will drive more than five miles one-way from home to reach the

Lake.” Pls.’ Mot. Summ. J. (Doc. 150) at 21:18 - 22:1-2. 

 Reclamation’s response is silent as to plaintiffs’

disagreement with the ten mile round trip assumption. With no

rationale, LPMP merely asserts that among other decisions by

Reclamation, use of the that assumption was “a ‘conservative’

decision regarding the distance to the park boundary.’” LPMP’s

Cross-mot. (Doc. 157) at 16:16. 

Regardless, the fact remains that the burden is on plaintiffs

to show that the Final EA’s use of the ten mile round trip

assumption was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or

otherwise not in accordance with law. Plaintiffs have not met that

burden. Because plaintiffs’ arguments in their memoranda on this

particular issue were brief, the court looked elsewhere for

elucidation. PSOF does provide some insight, albeit not much. PSOF

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32 This argument is in direct contravention of LRCiv 56.1, which “does not

permit explanation and argument supporting the party’s position to be included in

the . . . statement of facts.” Marceau v. Int’l Broth. of Elec. Workers, 618

F.Supp.2d 1127, 1141 (D.Ariz. 2009) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted). This is not the only such legal argument in PSOF, but the court is

disregarding all others.

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asserts that “the evidence in the [“Administrative Record] suggests

that assuming 10-miles-round-trip per vehicle visiting the Lake

would grossly understate the vehicular traffic that will be

generated by the proposed marina.” PSOF (Doc. 151) at 27, 

¶ 105:18-20. Overlooking the fact that this argument is

procedurally improper,32 based upon the just quoted language, the

court gleans that plaintiffs are arguing that the PM10 and ozone

vehicular calculations “run[] counter to the evidence” before

Reclamation due to use of the ten-mile assumption. See Sierra

Club, 346 F.3d at 961 (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted). This argument is unavailing. 

 In faulting the Final EA’s use of a ten mile round trip

assumption, plaintiffs state that “[t]here is no residential

population for eight miles to the east of the Lake and five miles

to the south, with ‘minimal population for many miles to the west

and the north.’” Pls’ Mot. Summ. J. (Doc. 150) at 22:2-4 (quoting

PSOF (Doc. 151) at ¶ 106). That statement is taken almost verbatim

from plaintiffs’ August 2006 comment letter to Reclamation

regarding the Draft EA. See Admin. R. at H-83. There is nothing

in that comment letter substantiating plaintiffs’ view, however. 

Plaintiffs do not, for example, rely upon or cite to any maps or

census figures or other pertinent figures from governmental

agencies. Plaintiffs’ unsupported and unsubstantiated views are

not tantamount to record evidence. Plaintiffs do not designate any

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other part of the administrative record to support their argument

as to the existence of residential population areas vis-a-vis the

proposed marina. Thus, they have not shown that the ten mile round 

trip assumption runs counter to the evidence before Reclamation. 

Apparently realizing the futility of disputing the ten mile 

assumption based upon the record evidence, as an afterthought

plaintiffs note that “[i]n discussing the allegedly unmet demand

for water recreation, the [f]inal EA mentions the population growth

of Peoria, Surprise, and Buckeye.” Pls.’ Mot. Summ. J. (Doc. 150)

at 21, n. 12. Yet, the Final EA did not consider driving distances

from those locations when calculating vehicular PM10 and ozone

emissions. Plaintiffs thus ask this court to take judicial notice

of the location of the “main post office branches” in those

municipalities, id., as well as of “the distances from th[os]e 

. . . post offices” to LPRP. Pls.’ Reply (Doc. 162) at 22:22-23

(citation omitted).

This request is problematic on several levels. First, these

post office locations and claimed mileages are not in the

administrative record. Thus, plaintiffs’ request is nothing more

than a transparent attempt to expand the administrative record –

something upon which this court has previously looked with

disfavor. See Protect Lake Pleasant IV, (Doc. 97) (May 6, 2008)

(denying plaintiffs’ motion for extra-record discovery). Second,

the references in the Final EA to the growth rates for Peoria,

Surprise and Buckeye were used as “example[s]” of the “exponential

growth[]” of “several communities in the northern and western

portions of Maricopa County[.]” Admin. R., at 4. They were not

mentioned for any other reason. 

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Third, to be sure, plaintiffs did cite authority supporting

the proposition that a court may take judicial notice of the

location of a federal building, such as United States Post Office. 

Pls.’ Mot. Summ. J. (Doc. 150) at 21, n. 21 (citing Myers

Investigative & Sec. Servs. v. United States, 47 Fed. Cl. 288, 297

(2000)). In paragraph 108 of their statement of facts, plaintiffs

cite to the United States Post Office website for post office

locations, but they omit any sources for corresponding mileage. 

See PSOF (Doc. 151) at 28, ¶ 108. Therefore, plaintiffs did not

provide any basis for taking judicial notice of the mileage from

those post offices to LPRP.

Fourth, even if the court were to take judicial notice of

these Post Office mileages, their relevance is tangential at best. 

The court would be purely speculating if it were to try and

correlate those distances to the number of vehicles that would be

traveling from those areas to LPRP due to the new marina. So in

its discretion, the court declines to take judicial notice of the

distances between the Peoria, Surprise and Buckeye United States

Post Offices and LPRP. Necessarily then, it will not take those

distances into account in determining whether the Final EA’s use of

a ten mile round-trip assumption was arbitrary or capricious. In

short, plaintiffs have not met their burden of showing that the

Final EA’s use of a ten mile round-trip assumption constitutes

clear error of judgment. 

Assuming arguendo that use of that ten-mile assumption was

improper, still, plaintiffs have not shown that the Final EA

violated NEPA because it underestimated vehicular PM10 and ozone

emissions. According to the Final EA, total recurring vehicular

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PM10 emissions are 42.82 pounds per year, or, in the relevant

metric, 0.02141 tons per year. Admin. R. at D-15. The Final EA

indicates 3.07 tons per year of recurring vehicular ozone

emissions. Id. at D-16. Keeping in mind that here the de minimis

levels are 100 tons per year for ozone and 70 tons per year for

PM10, even in the abstract, the 3.07 tons per year of ozone and

0.0214 tons per year of PM10 are relatively inconsequential figures.

Putting these numbers in context makes them analytically more

meaningful, and further demonstrates that plaintiffs have not met

their burden of showing that Reclamation “committed a ‘clear error

of judgment sufficient’ to constitute arbitrary and capricious

agency action[]” in calculating vehicular PM10 and ozone emissions. 

See Sierra Club, 346 F.3d at 961. With respect to PM10, the Final

EA attributes 18.61 tons of such emissions from construction and

16.03 tons per year for recurring emissions, yielding 34.64 tons. 

Id. at D-13 and D-15. So even assuming the construction emissions

are not one-time, the total PM10 emissions still are roughly 50%

below the allowable level of 70 tons per year for a nonattainment

area. Additionally, as calculated, PM10 vehicular emissions are

only 1.15% of PM10 emissions from “Onroad Mobile Sources[,]” and

only 0.13% of the total recurring PM10 emissions. Vehicular PM10

emissions, therefore, are a minuscule part of the total recurring

PM10 emissions. Because of that, even significantly increasing the

ten mile round trip assumption would not impact the final PM10

vehicular emissions so as to render the overall PM10 emissions

calculations arbitrary or capricious.

To illustrate, quadrupling the round trip assumption to forty

miles, would yield a total of 171.26 pounds per year of recurring

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vehicular PM10 emissions. Replacing that number with the 42.82

pounds per year in the Final EA would result in an increase from

1.86 tons per year to 1.92 tons per year for total recurring PM10

emissions from all three onroad mobile sources. See id. at D-15.

So even with that increase, PM10 recurring emissions from vehicles

are negligible in terms of total PM10 recurring emissions. 

The same is true of vehicular ozone emissions. The de minimis

limit here is 100 tons per year, as mentioned at the outset. The

Final EA specifies .02 tons for construction emissions, and 37.69

tons per year for recurring ozone emissions, for a total of 37.71

tons. Id. at D-16 - D-17. Not surprisingly, the dominant source

of recurring ozone emissions is “Pleasure Craft” – 34.08 tons per

year. Id. at D-16. Recurring vehicular ozone emissions

represented in the Final EA, in contrast, account for a relatively

minor 3.07 tons per year, or nine percent of the total recurring

ozone emissions. See id. at D-16. So again, quadrupling the ten

mile round trip assumption would mean a corresponding quadrupling

from 3.07 tons per year of vehicular ozone emissions to 12.28 tons

per year. Importantly though, even adding 12.28 tons per year to

the other sources of recurring ozone emissions, the end result

would be 46.90 tons per year - still less than half of the 100

tons per year de minimus level for ozone in a nonattainment area. 

This holds true even adding the meager .02 tons for construction

emissions. 

As the foregoing shows, especially examining vehicular PM10 

and ozone emissions in the context of the entire administrative

record, plaintiffs have not met their burden of “demonstrat[ing]

that [Reclamation’s] ultimate conclusions” as to those emissions

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28 33 The court may cite this unpublished opinion because it was issued after

January 1, 2007. Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a); U.S.Ct. of App. D.C.Cir. Rule 36(e)(2).

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“are unreasonable.” See George, 577 F.3d at 1001 (9th Cir. 2009)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Lastly, although not dispositive, the court cannot overlook

the APA’s equivalent of the sporting maxim, “no harm, no foul.” 

Even assuming arguendo that Reclamation improperly used a ten mile

round-trip assumption for calculating vehicular PM10 and ozone

emissions, as discussed above, plaintiffs have not shown that the

Final EA’s estimations of those emissions would equal or exceed de

minimis threshold levels, so as to require a conformity

determination. As the Court reasoned in County of Rockland v.

F.A.A., 335 Fed.Appx. 52 (D.C.Cir. 2009)33, cert. denied, ___ U.S.

___, 130 S.Ct. 1168, 78 USLW 3322 (2010), “[a]ssuming the agency

erred when it failed to inventory emissions, the petitioners still

have failed to identify any way in which the error was or might

have been harmful.” Id. at 57 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706 (“due account

shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error” when court reviews

agency action).

3. Carbon Monoxide Emissions

“Pleasure Craft” are the sole source of recurring CO emissions

in the Final EA, at 63.60 tons per year. See Admin. R. at D-18. 

The Final EA concluded that “none will occur in the maintenance

area[.]” Id. The justification for excluding vehicular CO

emissions was “because the [CO] maintenance area within the

Maricopa County portion of the lake extends from the middle of the

lake eastward, and vehicular traffic related to the new marina

would occur on the western portion of the LPRP, outside the [CO]

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maintenance area.” Id. at 50 (emphasis added). “For this same

reason,” the Final EA also excluded CO “emissions from equipment

used to haul boats between the dry stack storage building and boat

ramp . . . , since these facilities would be located west of the CO

maintenance area.” Id. (emphasis added). For a host of reasons,

plaintiffs contest the Final EA’s exclusion of these sources of CO

emissions, as well as the exclusion of CO emissions from cars

idling at the boat ramps and cars driving on the marina’s unpaved

parking lots. 

a. “Indirect Emissions”

Before addressing plaintiffs’ arguments, the court is

compelled to address LPMP’s contention that Reclamation “made a

reasoned decision to exclude emissions from vehicles outside the

Park in its conformity determination because they are not indirect

emissions required under the CAA.” LPMP’s Cross-mot. (Doc. 157) at

16:9-11 (footnote and emphasis added); see also id. at 18:9-11

(same). The pertinent EPA regulation provides that “[f]or Federal

actions . . . , a conformity determination is required for each

criteria pollutant or precursor where the total of direct and

indirect emissions of the criteria pollutant or precursor in a

nonattainment or maintenance area caused by a federal action would

equal or exceed” the stated emission rates. 40 C.F.R. § 91.153(b). 

“Indirect emissions” and “direct emissions” are regulatory terms of

art. “Indirect emissions” are:

(1) [c]aused by the Federal action, but may occur 

later in time and/or may be farther removed in distance

from the action itself but are still reasonably

foreseeable; and 

(2) The Federal agency can practicably control and will

maintain control over due to a continuing program

responsibility of the Federal agency.

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34 In its recent revisions to the General Conformity regulations, the EPA

did modify this definition, among others. Effective July 6, 2010, 40 C.F.R. §

93.152 defines “indirect emissions to “mean[] those emissions of a criteria

pollutant or its precursors:

(1) That are caused or initiated by the Federal action 

and originate in the same nonattainment or maintenance area 

but occur at a different time or place as the action;

(2) That are reasonably foreseeable;

(3) That the agency can practically control; and

(4) For which the agency has continuing program responsibility. 

For the purposes of this definition, even if a Federal licensing,

rulemaking or other approving action is a required initial step for a

subsequent activity that causes emissions, such initial steps do not

mean that a Federal agency can practically control any resulting 

emissions.”

40 C.F.R. § 40 C.F.R. § 93.152. Nonetheless, the court will apply the General

Conformity regulations in place at the time of this action. See Salazar-Paucar v.

I.N.S., 281 F.3d 1069, 1074 n. 3 (9th Cir.), amended by 290 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2002);

see also Bohrmann v. Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co., 926 F.Supp. 211, 218 (D.Me.

1996) (applying regulations in effect at time of incident that gave rise to action,

rather than revised regulations that took effect while action was pending).

 

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40 C.F.R. § 93.152.34 “Direct emissions . . . are caused or

initiated by the Federal action and occur at the same time and

place as the action.” Id. 

Relatively, LPMP devotes a significant part of its crossmotion as to Count Three arguing that Reclamation “properly

excluded” CO vehicular emissions from the Final EA because they are

“not indirect emissions[.]” LPMP’s Cross-mot. (Doc. 157) at 18:10-

11. More specifically, LPMP argues that Reclamation “does not have

any practicable control over future vehicle emissions outside the

Park.” Id. at 18:1-2. Critically, that is not the Final EA’s

stated rationale for excluding certain CO emissions. 

LPMP gives the impression that the Final EA refers to “direct”

or “indirect” emissions, but it does not. LPMP relies upon pages

47-51 of the Final EA and Appendix D thereto, but those pages are

silent as to “indirect” or “direct” emissions. Further, it cannot

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be inferred from the cited portions of the record that Reclamation

excluded vehicular CO emissions because ostensibly they were

“indirect.” There is no suggestion, for example, that those types

of emissions were excluded because Reclamation could not

“practicably control” them – an essential element of “indirect

emissions.” See 40 C.F.R. § 93.152. The Final EA also does not

justify excluding CO emissions on the basis that Reclamation “can

practicably control and will maintain control over [such emissions]

due to a continuing program responsibility of [Reclamation].” See

id. Nor does the Final EA exclude CO vehicular emissions because

they are not “reasonably foreseeable[.]” See 40 C.F.R. § 93.152. 

There is simply no way to read the Final EA as excluding CO

emissions because they are not “indirect emissions” within the

meaning of 40 C.F.R. §93.152. 

 Moreover, as will be more fully discussed herein, the stated

rationale for excluding vehicular CO emissions was because they

were “outside the maintenance area[]” – not because they were

“indirect emissions.” See Admin. R. at 50. For these reasons, the

rationale which LPMP is advancing in its cross-motion, i.e., that

vehicular emissions are “indirect,” and hence excludable from the

conformity rule determination, is an impermissible “post hoc”

rationalization. See Presidio Golf Club v. National Park Service,

155 F.3d 1153, 1164 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted) (“The Supreme

Court has forbidden district courts from relying upon . . . ‘post

hoc’ rationalizations for agency action.”); Soda Mountain

Wilderness Council v. Norton, 424 F.Supp.2d 1241, 1263 (E.D.Cal.

2006) (citations omitted) (“It is established that the court is not

permitted to accept post-hoc rationalizations.”) As such, the

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court cannot accept this rationalization for Reclamation’s decision

to exclude vehicle emissions when calculating CO emissions for the

proposed marina. There is no valid reason for departing from the

general prohibition against post hoc rationalization where, as

here, it is being offered by the defendant-intervenor rather than

by the agency.

b. Purported “Zero Increase” in CO Emissions

Shifting to plaintiffs’ CO emissions arguments, plaintiffs

charge Reclamation with excluding vehicular CO emissions based upon

the “obviously wrong . . . assumption that the proposed marina will

result in zero increase in CO emissions from motor vehicles.” 

Pls.’ Mot. Summ. J. (Doc. 150) at 22:7-8; see also Pls.’ Reply

(Doc. 162) at 19:26-28 (The “FONSI should be set aside because it

is based on the unsupportable premise that motor vehicles driving

to or from the proposed marina will generate no CO emissions.”). 

The court does not read the Final EA in the same way as do

plaintiffs. If, as plaintiffs posit, the Final EA excluded

vehicular CO emissions because “the proposed marina will result in

zero increase in CO emissions from motor vehicles[,]” that would be

illogical. See id. at 22:8. That was not the Final EA’s

justification though. 

The Final EA excludes vehicular CO emissions because of where

they will occur – not because they will not occur at all. 

Vehicular CO emissions were excluded because “none will occur in

the maintenance area[.]” See Admin. R. at D-18. Those emissions

will not occur in the CO maintenance area because that area “does

not include Castle Hot Springs Road which is on the west boundary

of the lake and is the primary entrance road into the west side of

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35 Ordinarily the court would not consider these arguments made for the

first time in a reply, as earlier mentioned. There is no prejudice to the opposing

parties here though. They each had an opportunity to respond in their respective

replies filed in connection with their cross-motions for summary judgment. 

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the lake[,]” where the new marina is located. BOR’s Cross-mot.

(Doc. 154) at 22:29-21; see also Admin. R. at D-18; and 7. 

Excluding vehicular CO emissions because they will occur outside

the maintenance area is quite different than excluding those

emissions because vehicles will not generate them in the first

place. Accordingly, there is no credence to plaintiffs’ assertion

that the FONSI “should be set aside because it is based on the

unsupportable premise that motor vehicles driving to or from the

proposed marina will generate no CO emissions.” See Pls.’ Reply

(Doc. 162) at 19:26-28 (emphasis added). 

c. Plaintiffs’ Catch-all CO Arguments

In arguing that “[t]he Final EA’s carbon monoxide emissions[’]

calculations are entirely unreasonable[,] Pls.’ Reply (Doc. 162) at

19:12 (emphasis omitted), as previously alluded to, in their

replies plaintiffs have resorted to “an approach aptly described by

the Tenth Circuit in another context as ‘throw - as - much - mud -

against - the - wall - as - you - can - and - hope - some - of - it

- sticks.’” See Cook v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 580 F.Supp.2d 1071,

1086 (D.Col. 2006) (quoting Dodd Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Royal Ins.

Co., 935 F.2d 1152, 1158 (10th Cir. 1991)). This approach is

rarely, if ever, effective. Here, the result is undeveloped and

ultimately unpersuasive arguments.35

 First, plaintiffs point to a County e-mail to Reclamation

written after MCAQ “staff had reviewed [the] air quality related

sections” of the Draft EA. Admin. R., Vol. 2 at 000374. In the

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“General Comments” section, the County states: “Because a portion

of the project area is located within the CO maintenance area, an

analysis of CO emissions from watercraft and from visitors’

vehicles should be estimated in the [EA].” Id. Plaintiffs

strongly imply that the Final EA disregarded that comment by

“[f]ailing to given any consideration to CO emissions generated by

motor vehicles driving to and from the proposed marina[.]” Pls.’

Reply (Doc. 161) at 20-21. 

That generalization distorts the record. The Final EA does

“consider” vehicular CO emissions, finding that “none will occur in

the maintenance area[.]” Admin. R. at D-18 and 50. Plaintiffs’

disagreement with that finding does not render the decisionmaking

process arbitrary and capricious. See Wild Fish Conservancy v.

Kempthorne, 613 F.Supp.2d 1209, 1220 (E.D.Wash. 2009) (quoting

Greenpeace Action v, Franklin, 14 F.3d 1324, 1336 (9th Cir. 1992)

(“The fact that a plaintiff disputes the agency’s findings and

conclusions ‘is not a sufficient basis for [the court] to conclude

that [the agency’s] action was arbitrary and capricious.’”) “If it

were, agencies could only act upon achieving a degree of certainty

that is ultimately illusory.” Greenpeace Action, 14 F.3d at 1336.

Next, plaintiffs insist that “[a]s long as the federal action

will generate CO emissions that may enter a CO maintenance area,

those CO emissions must be considered in the EA or EIS.” Pls.’

Reply (Doc. 161) at 4:28-5:2 (citations omitted) (emphasis in

original); see also Pls.’ Reply (Doc. 162) at 20:21-22 (citation

omitted). Plaintiffs repeat the just quoted sentence twice and

then cite to three cases: Sierra Club, 346 F.3d 955; Ober v.

Whitman, 243 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2001); and North Carolina v. EPA,

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571 F.3d 1245 (D.C.Cir.), modified, 550 F.3d 1176 (D.C.Cir. 2008). 

This limited analysis is troublesome where the applicability of the

cited cases is questionable. 

The three cited cases are distinguishable in a variety of

ways. There is no reason to recount in detail all of those ways. 

A few of the most glaring distinctions are more than sufficient to

make the point. None of those cases involve conformity rule

determinations. They also have nothing to do with the sufficiency

of an EA or EIS in terms of assessing whether a conformity

determination is required pursuant to 40 C.F.R. § 51.853 and

93.153. 

To illustrate, in Sierra Club the Ninth Circuit ordered the

EPA to reclassify a southern California county as a serious

nonattainment area because the EPA wrongly concluded that that 

county would have met the PM10 NAAQS but for transborder emissions

from Mexico. Sierra Club, 346 F.3d at 962-963. The Court remanded

with instructions to reclassify because the evidence from the

State’s monitors as to wind patterns and exceedances of PM10 NAAQS 

did not comport with the State’s position that emissions were

coming from Mexico. See id. Particularly without any explanation

from plaintiffs, the court declines to speculate as to the

purported applicability of Sierra Club, as well as Ober, 243 F.3d

1190, and North Carolina, 531 F.3d 896, to the conformity rule

determination at issue herein.

Citing to Border Power Plant, 260 F.Supp.2d 997, plaintiffs

declare that “[a]ir emissions resulting from a proposed action are

properly considered ‘direct or indirect effects’ pursuant to 40

C.F.R. § 1508.8.” Pls.’ Reply (Doc. 161) at 5:25-27 (emphasis

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36 “Direct effects” are those “which are caused by the action and occur

at the same time and place.” 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8(a). Section 1508.8 further

defines “indirect effects” as “which are caused by the action and are later in time

or farther removed in distance, but are still reasonably foreseeable. Indirect

effects may include growth inducing effects and other effects related to induced

changes in the pattern of land use, population density or growth rate, and related

effects on air and water and other natural systems, including ecosystems.” 40

C.F.R. § 1508.8(b). 

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added). Plaintiffs offer no analysis at all, and LPMP did not

address this assertion in their reply. Without any guidance from

the parties, the court infers that plaintiffs’ theory is that the

vehicular CO emissions are “direct or indirect effects” as section

1508.8 defines them.36 Hence, those emissions should have been

included in the Final EA. 

Plaintiffs have waived this argument because they did not

present it during the administrative process. In commenting on the

Draft EA with respect to CO, plaintiffs state the general

proposition that a conformity determination is required in a CO

maintenance area “if direct and indirect emissions equal or exceed

100 tpy [tons per year].” Admin. R. at H-85 (citing 40 C.F.R. 

§ 93.l53). Significantly, “direct and indirect emissions” are not

synonymous with “direct or indirect effects.” Perhaps the most

important distinction, as earlier explained, is that the former has

a federal control element, but the latter does not. Compare 40

C.F.R. § 93.152 with 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8. Moreover, plaintiffs’

comments pertained strictly to CO watercraft emissions; they did

not mention CO vehicular emissions. See Admin. R. at H-85

(“Emissions from increased watercraft use alone could result in

direct and indirect emissions that equal or exceed 100 tpy.”) So

although plaintiffs informed Reclamation of their opinion that the

Final EA should include watercraft CO emissions because they are

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“direct or indirect emissions,” they did not opine that CO

vehicular emissions also should be included on the theory that they

are “direct or indirect effects.” 

Plaintiffs’ comments pertaining to the RDEA also are directed

only at watercraft CO emissions – not to CO vehicular emissions. 

See id. at H-174. Plaintiffs’ “Supplemental Comments” do not

mention CO emissions at all, regardless of source; they are aimed

primarily at estimated PM10 emissions from construction activities.

See id. at H-193 - H-194. Thus, because plaintiffs did not inform

Reclamation during the NEPA process as to their view that the EA

should have included vehicular CO emissions because they are

“direct or indirect effects” of the project, Reclamation did not

have a chance for meaningful consideration of that issue. See Pub.

Citizen, 541 U.S. at 764, 124 S.Ct. 2204. Accordingly, this

argument is waived. 

Even absent a finding of waiver, this argument is not

persuasive. As is self-evident from the regulatory definition,

whether something is “direct or indirect effect” is a question of

causation. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.8(a) and 1508.8(b); see also

Border Power Plant, 260 F.Supp.2d at 1016 (“Ninth Circuit precedent

makes clear that effects must be causally linked to the proposed

federal action to require consideration of those effects in an EA

or EIS.”). Here, the plaintiffs made no attempt whatsoever to show

that CO vehicular emissions are a “direct or indirect effect” of

this marina project.

Plaintiffs’ “cumulative impact” argument is no more

persuasive. They recite the statutory definition of a “cumulative

impact” found in 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7. Then again, simply citing to

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37 “Under the CWA, the Corps must balance ‘benefits which reasonably may

be expected to accrue from the proposal’ against the proposal’s ‘reasonably

foreseeable detriments’” Florida Wildlife Federation, 401 F.Supp.2d at 1332 n.

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Border Power Plant, 260 F.Supp.2d 997, plaintiffs declare that

“[a]ir emissions from a proposed action are properly considered

‘cumulative impacts’ requiring NEPA analysis.” Pls.’ Reply (Doc.

161) at 6:11-12 (citation omitted). Although this assertion is

made in plaintiffs’ reply to LPMP, LPMP’s reply does not address

cumulative impacts. 

Plaintiffs’ perfunctory argument and LPMP’s lack of response

leaves the court to speculate on both sides of the equation. The

court declines to do so because, as it has previously remarked, “to

do so would mean that it would be impermissibly taking on the role

of advocate, rather than impartial decision-maker.” See Mann v.

GTCR Golder Raunder, L.L.C., 483 F.Supp.2d 884, 891 (D.Ariz. 2007). 

Consequently, the court finds unpersuasive plaintiffs’ cumulative

impact argument. 

In a last-ditch attempt to prevail on their argument that

the Final EA did not properly calculate vehicular CO emissions,

plaintiffs contend that “[b]ecause attracting paying customers is

an admitted purpose of the proposed marina, the CO emissions those

customers will generate should have been considered in the Final

EA.” Pls.’ Reply (Doc. 161) at 6:21-23 (citations omitted). At

the risk of repetition, plaintiffs merely cite to two cases and

provide no analysis. 

In the cited portion of Florida Wildlife Federation v. U.S.

Army Corps of Engineers, 401 F.Supp.2d 1298 (S.D.Fla. 2005), in 

addressing the sufficiency of the EA as to the Corps’ “benefits

analysis” under the Clean Water Act (“CWA”),37 the Court held that

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34. 

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that analysis “exceeded the scope of the impacts analysis as

required by” the Corps’ “own regulations and by regulations under

[CWA].” Id. at 1332 (footnote omitted). Plainly neither the CWA

and its regulations, nor regulations governing the Army Corps of

Engineers are applicable here. Regardless of those obvious factual

distinctions, as a district court decision outside this Circuit, 

Florida Wildlife would have little if any precedential value here.

Western Land Exch. Project v. U.S. Bureau of Land Management,

315 F.Supp.2d 1068 (D.Nev. 2004), the other case to which

plaintiffs cite, likewise does not support their broad assertion

that because “attracting paying customers is an admitted purpose of

the [project],” the Final EA “should have considered. . . the CO

emissions those customers will generate[.]” Pls.’ Reply (Doc. 161)

at 6:22-23 (citations omitted). Plaintiffs quote from that portion

of Western Land wherein the court held that the agency did not

comply with 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8 because it did not adequately

consider the “direct and indirect effects” of the sale of land to

private developers. So presumably, this is just another variation

on plaintiffs’ argument that the Final EA improperly excluded

indirect and direct effects. Plaintiffs have waived any argument

that the Final EA should have included vehicular CO emissions

because they are “direct or indirect effects” of the marina

project, as already explained. Further, plaintiffs have not 

attempted to establish the requisite causal connection. See id.

So despite the slight shift in focus - paying customers as a

purpose of the project – this argument is untenable nonetheless.

There is one final aspect of plaintiffs’ arguments as to CO 

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emissions which the court cannot overlook. There are three other

potential sources of CO emissions, as mentioned earlier, that the

Final EA did not include. Those are emissions emanating from: (1)

equipment used to transport boats from dry storage; (2) “vehicles

idling in line at boat ramps[;]” and (3) vehicles driving in the

proposed marina’s unpaved parking lots.” Pls.’ Mot. Summ. J. (Doc.

150) at 22:13-14 (citation omitted). Plaintiffs argue that the CO

emissions from these three sources are “indirect emissions” as 40

C.F.R. § 93.152 defines them, and thus should have been

“considered” in the Final EA. See id. at 22:15.

Reclamation did not respond to this argument, but LPMP did. 

Again stressing that the applicable NEPA regulations pertain, inter

alia, to “indirect emissions . . . in a . . . maintenance area[,]”

LPMP asserts that because all emissions from the transport

equipment would occur “outside the CO maintenance areas[,]”

Reclamation did not have to consider those emissions in the Final

EA. LPMP’s Cross-mot. (Doc. 157) at 18:23-24 (citation omitted). 

Plaintiffs’ reply to LPMP’s cross-motion discusses vehicular CO

emissions at some length. It makes no mention, though, of the

other potential sources of CO emissions listed above. The court

construes that silence to mean that plaintiffs are abandoning their

argument that those sources are “indirect emissions.” 

Assuming to the contrary, i.e., no abandonment, still, this

argument is groundless. The phrase “indirect emissions,” as

previously discussed, is a regulatory term of art. For an emission

to be “indirect” within the meaning of section 93.152, it must have

several components, including “reasonabl[e] foreseeab[ility][,]”

and an element of control by the Federal agency. See id.. 

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Plaintiffs have not shown that any potential CO emissions from

transport equipment, idling vehicles or driving on unpaved parking

lots, have any of the attributes of an “indirect emission” in

accordance with 40 C.F.R. § 93.152.

4. Diesel Engines

Having addressed all of plaintiffs’ contentions with respect

to how the Final EA calculated PM10, ozone and CO emissions,

plaintiffs are left with their dispute as to how the Final EA dealt

with diesel engines. Undisputably, in providing emissions

“estimates” to MCAQ, LPMP “did not include any diesel engines since

[it] w[ould] not [be] sell[ing] diesel fuel at [its] facility.” 

Admin. R. at D-4. Plaintiffs fault Reclamation for “accepting

LPMP’s non sequitur that the Final EA could ignore diesel engines

in its emissions calculations because the proposed marina will not

sell diesel fuel.” Pls.’ Mot. Summ. J. (Doc. 150) at 21:9-13

(footnote omitted) (emphasis added). Plaintiffs do not expand upon

this argument at all in their motion. 

Even though LPMP did not include diesel engines in its

estimates for calculating watercraft emissions, Reclamation did. 

After receiving LPMP’s estimates, Reclamation revised its emissions

calculations in several ways. Although the estimate for sailboats

at the existing marina was 110, ultimately Reclamation ran the

NONROAD2005 model using 138 sailboats with diesel engines. See

Admin. R. at D-2 and D-8. Also, because EPA had “caution[ed] that

when modifying population numbers in the NONROAD2005 model,

activity levels should also be examined to reflect local data[,]”

Reclamation adjusted “auxiliary diesel sailboat engines[’] activity

levels to reflect local conditions.” Id. at D-9. So even though

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38 Reclamation later discovered that that number should have been 88.

Admin. R. at D-3 n.1. But rather than running the model again, as MCAQ suggested,

Reclamation used MCAQ data “to recalculate the emissions for th[o]se additional 18

personal watercraft.” Id.

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the proposed marina would not be selling diesel fuel, contrary to

what plaintiffs assert, Reclamation’s watercraft emissions

calculations did include diesel engines. 

As an afterthought, in their reply to LPMP’s cross-motion,

plaintiffs mention that “[t]he final EA . . . assumes that no

motorboats at the proposed marina will have diesel engines[]” - an

assumption they label “absurd[.]” Pls.’ Reply (Doc. 161) at 14:10-

11 (emphasis omitted). LPMP did not respond to this argument in

their reply. Regardless, plaintiffs once again are choosing to

ignore the broader context in which the watercraft emissions

calculations were made. 

Looking at the Final EA as a whole, including Appendix D, it

cannot be said that Reclamation acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or

committed a clear error of judgment in its consideration of diesel

engine emissions. Overall, Reclamation’s approach to watercraft

emissions was relatively conservative. Starting from the

assumption of 100 percent occupancy, Reclamation “redistributed”

LPMP’s counts with respect to 100-175 horsepower engines and 175-

300 horsepower engines. Admin. R. at D-2. Rather than a fiftyfifty distribution, Reclamation opted to “favor the higher-power

motors[.]” Id. Reclamation also added 70 jet skis or personal

watercraft into the model,38 which LPMP did not identify in its

inventory. Id. Consequently, despite plaintiffs’ assertion to

the contrary, the Final EA does not completely ignore diesel

engines. Moreover, its overall approach to watercraft emissions

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was, as just noted, relatively conservative. 

Summarizing the various rulings herein as to Count Three, 

plaintiffs simply have not met their burden of “demonstrat[ing]

that [Reclamation’s] ultimate conclusions” as to the PM10, ozone and

CO emission calculations for the proposed marina were

“unreasonable.” See George, 577 F.3d at 1001 (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted). Somewhat ironically, plaintiffs

claim that the Final EA impermissibly takes a “myopic view of the

proposed marina by failing to consider all of the ozone, PM10 and CO

emissions it will produce.” Pls.’ Mot. Summ. J. (Doc. 150) at

23:6-7. On the contrary, it is plaintiffs who selectively and

narrowly read that document so as to see NEPA violations at nearly

every turn of that document’s emissions analysis. Taking into

account as it must, however, “the reasonableness of [Reclamation’s]

decision-making processes[]” with respect to PM10, ozone and CO

emissions associated with the proposed marina, the court finds that

Reclamation did not act arbitrarily, capriciously, abuse its

discretion, or otherwise act not in accordance with law. See

MacClarence, 596 F.3d at 1129 (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted). Accordingly, the court denies plaintiffs’ motion

for summary judgment as to Count Three, and grants the crossmotions for summary judgment as to that Count by Reclamation and

LPMP. 

IV. Public Notice and Comment

The fourth and final count of the FAC alleges that, in

violation of NEPA, Reclamation did not “provide meaningful

opportunity for public comment” prior to issuing the FONSI and

Final EA. FAC (Doc. 4) at 25 (emphasis omitted). The thrust of

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39 Since then, in light of 1995 CAA amendments, that Guidance Document has

been revised, but not with respect to “Q&A #1,” which is the basis for LPMP’s

argument at this juncture. See William T. Harnett, Memorandum, Revision to General

Conformity Applicability Questions and Answers ,

http://www.epa.gov/air/genconform/documents/Jun06/Rev_to_GC_App_QandAs.pdf (last

visited June 8, 2010); see also New General Conformity Q’s & A’s (October 19,

1994), http;//www.epa.gov/air/genconform/documents/gcgqa_941019.pdf (last visited

June 9, 2010). 

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plaintiffs’ argument on summary judgment is that Reclamation did

not comply with NEPA because it “wait[ed] until after the [close of

the] public comment period . . . before substituting a new

methodology for calculating air emissions in place of the one that

was disclosed in the Draft EA and the Revised Draft EA[.]” Pls.’

Mot. Summ. J. (Doc. 150) at 24:26-25:1 (citation omitted). By

waiting until issuance of the Final EA to “replace” that

methodology, plaintiffs contend that they, and the public at large,

were deprived “of an opportunity to scrutinize and comment” on that

“new” methodology. Id. at 25:6-7 (citation omitted).

LPMP, but not Reclamation, counters that Reclamation had no

obligation in the first instance to disclose its updated

methodology for calculating its air quality conformity

determination “because the de minimis levels were not exceeded.” 

LPMP’s Cross-mot. (Doc. 157) at 21:4-5 (citations omitted). The

court will address this argument at the outset because if LPMP

prevails, LPMP’s and Reclamation’s arguments on substantive grounds

become moot.

The source of LPMP’s argument is a document dated July 

13, 1994,39 entitled “General Conformity Guidance: Questions 

and Answers[,]” and issued by the U.S. Environmental Protection 

Agency’s (“EPA”) Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards

(“General Conformity Guidance”), available at 

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http://epa.gov/ttn/oarpg/conform/gcgqa_71394.pdf. In particular,

LPMP relies upon the following question and partial answer:

1. Must the applicability analysis be made public?

A: If the proposed action was found to result in

emissions below de minimis levels or if a conformity

determination is not required, then it is not obligatory

to make the applicability analysis public under this

rule. . . . In any case, the public is free to request

and the Federal agency is obligated to provide the

applicability analysis under the Freedom of Information

Act.

LPMP’s Cross-mot. (Doc. 157) at 20:24-27 (quoting General

Conformity Guidance at 26) (emphasis added by LPMP). LPMP omitted

the last sentence of that answer, however, as plaintiffs note. 

That sentence expressly provides:

NEPA’s disclosure requirements may also require

publication of the information supporting the

applicability analysis even if the conformity rule 

does not. 

General Conformity Guidance at 26 (emphasis added). This is a

crucial omission because the just quoted sentence clearly manifests

EPA’s recognition that NEPA may impose more stringent public

disclosure requirements than EPA’s guidance document. LPMP also

fails to take into account the nature of this guidance document, as

plaintiffs further note. The purpose of that document is to

“represent[] EPA’s interpretation of the general conformity rule.” 

Id. This EPA-drafted interpretive guidance document was not in any

way intended to supplant Reclamation’s obligation to comply with

NEPA’s public participation procedures, which “are at the heart of

the NEPA review process.” See California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753,

770 (9th Cir. 1982). There is simply no credence to LPMP’s argument

that a selective quote from a 1994 EPA-prepared interpretive

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guidance document, obviates NEPA’s public comment procedures. 

Having found that the 1994 guidance document did not relieve

Reclamation from complying with NEPA’s public comment procedures,

the next issue is whether Reclamation fulfilled that obligation. 

Because they serve differing purposes, “NEPA does not require

federal agencies to assess . . . consider [and] respond to public

comments on an EA to the same degree as it does for an EIS[.]”

California Trout v. F.E.R.C., 572 F.3d 1003, 1016 (9th Cir. 2009)

(citing 40 C.F.R. § 1503.4). For example, NEPA regulations require

circulation of a draft EIS, but those regulations are silent as to

the “necessity of a draft EA[,]” and in fact do “not expressly

require the circulation of a draft EA.” See Bering Strait Citizens

for Responsible Res. Dev. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 524 F.3d

938, 952 (9th Cir. 2008). Nonetheless, even when it issues an

EA,“an agency must permit some public participation[.]” Id. The

pertinent NEPA regulations provide that an “agency must ‘involve

environmental agencies, applicants, and the public, to the extent

practicable, [40 C.F.R.] § 1501.4(b), and ‘[m]ake diligent efforts

to involve the public in preparing and implementing their NEPA

procedures,’ [40 C.F.R.] § 1506.6(a).” California Trout, 572 F.3d

at 1016. 

The Ninth Circuit has not “unequivocally defined what sort of

public participation is required to meet NEPA’s amorphous

standards[.]” Id. at 1017. It “has recognized that the level of

participation required by NEPA’s implementing regulations is not

substantial[,]” however. Id. at 1017 (emphasis added). Not

surprisingly, “a complete failure to involve or even inform the

public about an agency’s preparation of an EA would violate NEPA’s

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regulations[.]” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted). Yet, the Ninth Circuit has “also concluded that ‘the

circulation of a draft EA is not required in every case.’” Id.

(quoting Bering Strait Citizens, 524 F.3d at 952). 

The Bering Strait Court confronted the issue of “what level of

public disclosure” NEPA “require[s] . . . before issuance of a

final EA[.]” Bering Strait, 524 F.3d at 953. Recognizing that

“[e]ach EA will be prepared under different circumstances[;] . . .

the regulations [do] not specif[y] a formal practice for affected

agencies[;]” and “practices have not been uniform,” the Ninth

Circuit “elaborate[d] the factors that should guide the agency.” 

Id. Borrowing heavily from Sierra Nevada Forest Protection

Campaign v. Weingardt, 376 F.Supp.2d 984 (E.D.Cal. 2005), the Ninth

Circuit concurred that the pertinent NEPA regulations:

“‘require that the public be given as much environmental

information as is practicable, prior to completion 

of the EA, so that the public has a sufficient basis 

to address those subject areas that the agency must

consider in preparing the EA. Depending on the

circumstances, the agency could provide adequate

information through public meetings or by a reasonably

thorough scoping notice.’”

Bering Strait, 524 F.3d at 953 (quoting Weingardt, 376 F.Supp.2d at

991). 

 Focusing on the sufficiency of the environmental information,

and “commend[ing]” the approach in Weingardt, the Ninth Circuit in

Bering Strait adopted the following rule: 

An agency, when preparing an EA, must provide the 

public with sufficient environmental information,

considering the totality of the circumstances, to 

permit members of the public to weigh in with their 

views and thus inform the agency decision-making process.

Id. (emphasis added). The Bering Strait Court found that the

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“quality of the [agency’s] dissemination of environmental

information to the public and its consideration of public comment,

before issuing its EA, was reasonable and adequate[,]”

notwithstanding that the agency did not circulate a Draft EA at all

before issuing the Final EA. See id. 

The Ninth Circuit based that holding on several factors. 

“Information about the project was widely disseminated throughout

the community and environmental information was reasonably and

thoroughly tendered to the public.” Id. Dissemination occurred by

the agency’s posting on its website of a notice of a public

meeting, and description of the proposed project. See id. at 944. 

Distribution of the notice in electronic or hard-copy format was

made to a vast cross-section of potentially interested

stakeholders, such as federal, state and local agencies,

neighboring communities and adjacent property owners, as well as

“any member of the community who requested a copy.” Id.

Additionally, the agency “received a high level of public comment

from the . . . community, most of it favoring the project.” Id. at

953. The Court also found significant the agency’s public outreach

efforts through various media outlets, along with the agency’s

“joint efforts with state agencies to explain the permitting

process.” Id. For all of these reasons, in Bering Strait, the

Ninth Circuit held that “[t]he quality of the Corp’s dissemination

of environmental information to the public and its consideration of

public comment, before issuing its EA, was reasonable and

adequate.” Id. 

Based upon Weingardt, plaintiffs argue that Reclamation

violated NEPA because it “did not offer significant pre-decisional

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opportunities for informed public involvement in the environmental

review process.” See Weingardt, 376 F.Supp.2d at 992. Reclamation

vigorously maintains that it did offer such opportunities. 

Reclamation emphasizes that it prepared not one, but two Draft EAs

and submitted both for public comment. Moreover, based upon those

public comments Reclamation “revised its analysis of certain issues

related to the environmental impacts” of the proposed marina and

“included all comments and responses to comments in the Final EA.” 

BOR’s Cross-mot. (Doc. 154) at 25:10-12. LPMP echoes this

response, adding that Reclamation distributed a scoping memorandum

“to about 70 interested agencies[,] organizations and individuals,

which initiated a 23-day public scoping period.” LPMP’s Cross-mot.

(Doc. 157) at 22:14-15 (citation omitted). LPMP thus contends that

“BOR provided sufficient information to foster informed public

participation.” Id. 

“Determining whether the public was adequately involved [for

NEPA purposes] is a fact-intensive inquiry made on a case-by-case

basis.” Natural Resources Defense Council 634 F.Supp.2d at 1067

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Engaging in that

fact-intensive inquiry here shows, as detailed below, that

“considering the totality of the circumstances,” prior to issuing

the Final EA, Reclamation “provide[d] the public with sufficient

environmental information, . . . to permit members of the public to

weigh in with their views and thus inform the agency decision-making

process.” See Bering Strait, 524 F.3d at 953. NEPA, as the Ninth

Circuit interprets its implementing regulations, requires nothing

more. 

In arguing that Reclamation did not comply with NEPA’s public

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notice and comment provisions, plaintiffs partially quote from the

EA as follows:

[BOR] chose to replace the methodology used 

for calculating potential watercraft-related 

emissions from the proposed project described 

in the Draft EA and the Revised Draft EA.

Pls.’ Mot. (Doc. 150) at 150 (citation omitted). Rather than

viewing that statement in the framework of the entire EA process,

plaintiffs are reading it in isolation. As will soon become

evident, regardless of whether the focus is on the EA process

generally or the more narrow issue of air quality emissions

methodology, Reclamation complied with NEPA’s public participation

requirements for an EA. 

On March 1, 2006, Reclamation sent out a scoping memorandum “to

about 70 interested agencies, organizations and individuals,

requesting input regarding any issues or concerns that should be

addressed in the EA[.]” Admin. R. at 5 (citation omitted). During

that 23-day public scoping period, Reclamation received five scoping

comment letters, including one from plaintiffs. Id. at 5; see also

id. at H-61. The “relevant issues and concerns identified during

scoping[,]” and “addressed in the [Final] EA include[d] . . . air

quality[.]” Id. at 5. 

On July 28, 2006, Reclamation instituted “a 21-day public

review and comment period[]” regarding “[a]n initial draft [EA] for

the proposed” marina project. Id. at Preface. As part of that

initial review process two articles were published in The Arizona

Republic. Id. at 2. The first article advised the public about how

to obtain a copy of that Draft EA. See id. In total, Reclamation

received 65 comments during that first comment period, including 21

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public comment letters. Id.; and at H-1. Of the 53 “short e-mail

statements[,]” the vast majority supported the project. Id. 

Plaintiffs submitted a comprehensive public comment letter

during that first review period. See id. at H-61- H-91. That

letter included a detailed review of the “air quality impacts” that

plaintiffs claimed had “not been adequately addressed” in the Draft

EA. Id. at H-82 - H-86 (emphasis omitted). Reclamation responded

in writing, as it did to all public comment letters. All comment

letters, along with Reclamation’s responses thereto regarding both

the Draft EA and the Revised Draft EA (“RDEA”), are appended to the

Final EA. See id., App. H. 

On October 24, 2006, Reclamation issued a RDEA allowing for a

second public comment and review period; this one was for 24 days. 

Id. (FONSI) at 2. Reclamation issued that RDEA “[d]ue to the

discrepancy between the estimated current watercraft use identified

in the [initial] draft EA, and the estimated current watercraft use

based upon corrected data[.]” Id. The Draft EA also was “revised

where appropriate in response to comments that had been received

during the initial public review and comment period.” Id. 

During this second comment period, Reclamation received nine

comment letters, including another one from plaintiffs. Id. at H-2;

and H-162 - H-181. Plaintiffs, among other things, challenged the

methodology used in the RDEA for calculating air quality emissions. 

See id. at H-174 - H-176. The thrust of plaintiffs’ comments was to

fault Reclamation for “rel[ying] on outdated data[,]” such as 2002

PM10 emission assumptions. Id. at H-176. As to “ozone precursor

emissions from watercraft[,]” according to plaintiffs, “[a] better

approach” would be to “estimate” those emissions by “us[ing] the

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most current county-wide emission estimate available as a starting

point.” Id. at H-175. 

The FONSI acknowledges that one unidentified commentator,

presumably plaintiffs, “indicated [BOR’S] methodology for

calculating air emissions that would result from the proposed

project was flawed.” Id. at 8 (footnote added). Consequently, as

the FONSI further explains:

Reclamation sought guidance from . . . MCAQD . . . 

to determine a more suitable approach for calculating

potential emissions. As a result, Reclamation revised

its methodology to be consistent with that used by MCAQD

in compiling the County’s own emission inventory reports. 

Appendix D to the final EA provides a detailed explanation

of the revised methodology, as well as the recalculated 

emissions.

Id. (emphasis added). Reclamation’s written response to

plaintiffs’ comment letter sets forth the efforts Reclamation

undertook, primarily in conjunction with MCAQD, to address

plaintiffs’ “concerns” regarding Reclamation’s methodology for

“estimat[ing] potential air pollutant emissions that could be

generated by th[e] proposed project.” Id. at H-185. In that

response, Reclamation advised plaintiffs that “the emission

calculations for most of the nonroad sources, including pleasure

craft, were derived from use of U.S. [EPA’s] NONROAD2002 model.” 

Id. (emphasis added). As Reclamation further explained, however,

that “model has since been superceded by the NONROAD2005 model.” 

Id. (emphasis added). 

Reclamation’s response also includes a fairly expansive

discussion of an EPA “technical report on the methodology and data

it uses in its NONROAD model, to allocate nonroad mobile equipment

populations from the national to State and county levels (EPA

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2005).” See id. In further explaining its rationale for

“choos[ing] to utilize EPA’s NONROAD2005 model[]” in the RDEA,

Reclamation explained that “MCAQD staff [had] reiterated EPA’s

recommendation that default NONROAD model values be adjusted where

local data are available, and stress that local data are preferred

whenever they are available.” Id. at H-186. 

On February 12, 2007, about a week and a half before

Reclamation issued the FONSI and Final EA, plaintiffs submitted

“supplemental comments[,]” again pertaining to the RDEA. Id. at H193. The purpose of those comments was to make Reclamation aware of

the MCAQD’s then-recent release of its “2005 Emissions Inventory[,]”

and to seek a review by Reclamation of that inventory. Id. As

part of that review, plaintiffs stated their “belie[f]” that

Reclamation should “update its emissions estimates for the proposed

marina, prior to determining whether [that] . . . marina would have

a ‘significant impact’ on the environment.” Id. Plaintiffs then

contrasted three assumptions in the 2005 Emissions Inventory with

those in the RDEA, concluding, inter alia, that “the total project

emissions clearly exceed the conformity threshold of 70 tons.” Id.

at H-194. 

Directly responding to those supplemental comments, Reclamation

explained its contrary view. Reclamation opined, inter alia, that

plaintiffs “either misunderstood or misinterpreted information

presented in the public review draft” of the County’s 2005 Emissions

PM10 Inventory. Id. at H-197. Next, Reclamation clarified the

various sources used in calculating emissions factors, focusing

specifically on PM10. See id. Reclamation further explained:

Appendix D [Assumptions and Calculations Uses 

for General Conformity Rule Determinations] has 

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been revised to more clearly identify the sources 

of each emission factor that were used.

Id.

Moreover, even before plaintiffs submitted their supplemental

comments, on February 7, 2007, Reclamation sent plaintiffs’ thencounsel a letter. In that letter Reclamation offered what it

“hope[d]” was a “concise and easy to understand description of the

future steps [Reclamation] would like to take as it continues its EA

comment response on th[e] issue[]” of air quality emissions

methodology. Admin. R., Vol. 2 at 000450. Reclamation repeated

that “the basic idea is to gather local data that would serve as a

more accurate input into the EPA emissions modeler.” Id. 

Reclamation then explained:

[c]urrently, the estimates are based on 

the default EPA engine data that is gathered

nationally by EPA. While the defaults are 

certainly usable, local data is preferred 

if available.

Id. Specifically “respon[ding] to [plaintiffs’] comments

questioning some of the underlying methodology assumptions,”

Reclamation wrote that it was “open to gathering better local data.” 

Id. Evincing a willingness to coordinate and cooperate with

plaintiffs, Reclamation proposed a “walking survey at [plaintiffs’]

Marina” as “the simplest way to get some good data.” Id. That

February, 2007 letter included the following attachments: (1) a

“Lake Pleasant Air Emissions Estimate,” addressing the “Proposed

Methodology Change[;]” (2) a list of various engine types; and (3)

an EPA “User’s Guide for the Final NONROAD2005 Model[.]” Admin.

Rec., Vol. 2 at 000451-000471. 

As can be seen, Reclamation sought and received active

engagement in the EA process from the March 1, 2006 issuance of the

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scoping memorandum to a wide cross-section of the community, through

the issuance of the FONSI and Final EA nearly a year later, on

February 23, 2007. Through a newspaper article the public was

advised of the issuance of a Draft EA, and how to obtain a copy of

that document. Admin. R. (FONSI) at 2. Further, “[t]he public was

afforded not one, but two distinct comment periods in this case.” 

Natural Resources Defense Council, 634 F.Supp.2d at 1067. 

Plaintiffs took full advantage of both comment periods, each time

submitting quite extensive comment letters. See Admin. R. at H-61 -

H-91; and at H-162 - H-181. Both times Reclamation reciprocated

with similarly detailed written responses. See id. at H-95 - H-110;

and at H-183 - H-190. Other members of the public also engaged in

this process by providing their own written comments. See id.

(FONSI) at 2; and at H-1 - H-2 (list of those who submitted comment

letters to the July 2006 Draft EA).

As to the air quality emissions methodology in particular,

again, at each step in the EA process Reclamation took into account

plaintiffs’ comments, among others. Denouncing Reclamation for

“junk[ing] the air emissions calculations disclosed in the [Draft EA

and RDEA] and proceed[ing] behind closed doors with an entirely new

methodology for calculating [air quality] emissions[,]” plaintiffs

accuse Reclamation of engaging in improper “‘bait and switch’

tactics[,]” as to those calculations. Pls.’ Reply (Doc. 162) at

23:25-28 (emphasis added). This is nothing more than inflammatory

rhetoric unsupported by the administrative record.

Reclamation’s decision to use an updated nonroad model for

assessing air quality emissions was not “bait and switch,” but

rather a result of the fact that the NONROAD2002 model was

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“superceded by the NONROAD2005 model.” Admin. R. at H-185. 

Moreover, the EA process, including formulation of the air quality

emissions methodology was, as the record reflects, not “behind

closed doors.” Furthermore, the court cannot ignore the fact that

“plaintiffs have not identified any additional relevant information

that they would have provided to the [BOR] had there been another

round of public review.” See Natural Resources Defense Council, 634

F.Supp.2d at 1068 (citations omitted). 

Notwithstanding Reclamation’s public involvement efforts

outlined above, plaintiffs assert that Weingardt governs the present

case. There, the court held that the agency did not “give the

public an adequate pre-decisional opportunity to informed comment[]”

where that agency issued an initial scoping notice for comment, but

did not allow comment on the Final EA, prior to releasing the FONSI. 

Weingardt, 376 F.Supp.2d at 992. In sharp contrast to the present

case, however, the circulated pre-decisional documents in Weingardt

“contained no analysis of the environmental impacts of the

projects[.]” Id. (emphasis added). 

Obviously, the same is not true here. The “pre-decisional

documents,” such as the Draft EA, did include such analyses. 

Moreover, in between the issuance of the Draft EA and the Final EA,

plaintiffs in particular were involved in an active exchange with

Reclamation regarding, inter alia, the methodology to be used for

calculating air quality emissions. Finally, although not entirely

dispositive, it is noteworthy that in Weingardt the court “chastised

the [agency] for withholding ‘already-prepared environmental

documents even though the documents were completed before the end of

the public comment period.’” Natural Resources Defense Council, 634

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F.Supp.2d at 1067 (quoting Weingardt, 376 F.Supp.2d at 992). The

Weingardt court expressly found that that “failure to provide

essential information, already in the hands of the agency, d[id] not

comply with the agency’s requirement of involving the public ‘to the

extent practicable.’” Weingardt, 376 F.Supp.2d at 993 (quoting 40

C.F.R. § 1501.4). 

Here, Reclamation did not withhold any documents. Not only

that, also in sharp contrast to Weingardt, Reclamation did involve

the public “to the extent practicable.” Reclamation circulated not

one, but two separate EA drafts prior to issuing the Final EA. 

Plaintiffs commented on the air emissions methodology at least three

times, and each time Reclamation responded. As in California Trout,

plaintiffs “were given a full opportunity to review and comment on

the draft EA[s], as NEPA requires, and they took advantage of

th[ose] opportunit[ies].” California Trout, 572 F.3d at 1017. 

Plaintiffs were not the only members of the public participating in

this process, as the comment letters in the record show. The court

declines to broaden the scope of NEPA’s public participation

requirements under these circumstances. Reclamation did not run

afoul of NEPA by not preparing and circulating another RDEA with the

substituted methodology. Having found that Reclamation adequately

involved the public in the EA process, the court grants the crossmotions for summary judgment by Reclamation and LPMP and denies

plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion as to Count Four.

V. Remedies

Based upon the court’s holdings herein, granting summary

judgment in favor of Reclamation and LPMP as to all remaining counts 

of the FAC, that is, Counts Two, Three and Four, the arguments as to

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remedies are moot. The court’s summary judgment rulings also render

moot plaintiffs’ motion to strike the Pretasky affidavit and Ninth

Circuit transcript because, as explained at the outset, those

exhibits pertain strictly to the issue of a whether to grant a

permanent injunction here. Accordingly, the court denies that

motion to strike (Doc. 169). Likewise, the court’s summary judgment

rulings herein, also render moot all issues pertaining to remedies.

Conclusion

Three fundamental legal tenets have guided this court’s

searching review of the administrative record, and its consideration

of the parties’ arguments. First, throughout, the court has been

mindful of its limited role and the deferential nature of its

review. “The NEPA process involves an almost endless series of

judgment calls[,]” as the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has so

astutely pointed out. Coalition on Sensible Transportation, Inc. v.

Dole, 826 F.2d 60, 66 (D.C.Cir. 1987). “The line-drawing decisions

necessitated by this fact of life are vested in the agencies, not

the courts.” Id. Plaintiffs’ displeasure with where Reclamation

has drawn the lines during this protracted NEPA process is not a

basis for this court to overturn the Final EA and FONSI. 

The second tenet guiding the court is that NEPA imposes only

procedural requirements; it does not mandate any particular

substantive outcome. See Tidwell, 599 F.3d at 936. From their

March 24, 2006, detailed and extensive written response to the

Notice of Public Scoping, prepared by their counsel at the time,

plaintiffs were actively involved in the NEPA process at every step

of the way. See Admin. R., Vol. 2 at 000298 - 000316. Thereafter,

as outlined in discussing Count Four, through their counsel,

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plaintiffs availed themselves of every public comment period,

including “supplemental comments” roughly a week and a half before

issuance of the FONSI and Final EA. See id. at H-61 - H-91; H-163 -

H-181; H-191; and H-193 - H-194. Plaintiffs appear to be much like

those in Spiller v. White, 352 F.3d 235 (5th Cir. 2003), about which

the Court opined, “They really don’t want more process. . . . What

they really desire is a [different] substantive result[.]” See id.

at 245. 

The third and equally determinative tenet is that as the party

challenging Reclamation’s actions as arbitrary and capricious, at

all times, the burden of proof was on plaintiffs. See George, 577

F.3d at 1011. Plaintiffs did not meet that burden, however. 

Instead, plaintiffs engaged in a process which the Ninth Circuit has

described in a slightly different context as “cherry pick[ing]

information and data out of the administrative record to support

their position[.]” See Native Ecosystems, 428 F. at 1240. In Native

Ecosystems, the Ninth Circuit found that method did not support a

finding that the project at issue was “highly controversial or

highly uncertain[]” within the meaning of NEPA regulations. Id.

The same is true here. Cherry picking data and information from the

vast administrative record does not satisfy plaintiffs’ burden of

showing that Reclamation’s actions were “arbitrary, capricious, an

abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” See

Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, 540 U.S. at 496, 124 S.Ct. 938. 

In sum, because the court is satisfied that Reclamation took the

necessary “hard look” at the environmental consequences of the

proposed marina, its “review is at an end.” See National Parks &

Conservation Ass’n v. BLM, 606 F.3d 1058, 1073 (9th Cir. 2010)

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(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

For the reasons set forth herein, the court hereby ORDERS that:

(1) “Federal Defendants’ Motion to Strike Exhibit One from

Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment” (Doc. 152) is GRANTED; 

(2) “Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike Exhibit A to Federal

Defendants’ Reply in Support of their Cross-Motion for Summary

Judgment on Counts Two Through Four of the First Amended Complaint”

(Doc. 168) is GRANTED;

(3) Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 150) is

DENIED in its entirety; 

(4) Federal Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.

154) is GRANTED in its entirety: 

(5) LPMP’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 157) is 

GRANTED in its entirety; and

(6) “Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike Extra-Record Documents

Intervenor Lake Pleasant Marina Partners Attached to its Reply in

Support of its Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment” (Doc. 169) is

DENIED as moot.

(7) The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of the

federal defendants and LPMP and terminate this action.

DATED this 29th day of July, 2010.

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Copies to counsel of record

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