Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-01342/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-01342-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Personal Injury

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 This case was referred to the undersigned pursuant to Eastern District of California 1

Local Rule 302(c)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and by an order entered February 8, 2010 (Dkt.

No. 12).

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD ADAMS,

Plaintiff, No. 2:09-cv-01342 JAM KJN

v. ORDER

THYSSENKRUPP SAFWAY, INC., and 

DOES 1 through 60, inclusive,

Defendants. 

 /

Presently before the court is plaintiff’s motion for a protective order seeking to

prevent defendant from: (1) removing certain physical evidence, a scaffolding plank broken in

two pieces, from the possession of a third party; (2) transporting the pieces of plank outside of

the State of California, as defendant has suggested it would do; and (3) conducting any

destructive testing of the pieces of plank. (See Dkt. Nos. 13, 15.) Plaintiff also seeks $4,700.00 1

in attorneys’ fees and costs. 

Having concluded that oral argument would not assist the court, the undersigned

hereby submits plaintiff’s motion on the briefs and record on file. The undersigned has fully

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 Exhibit E to the Righthand Declaration, upon which plaintiff relies, does not expressly

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indicate that defendant would transport the plank pieces to Wisconsin. However, defendant has

not objected to plaintiff’s characterization of defendant’s intentions.

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considered the parties’ briefs and the record in this case and, for the reasons that follow, grants

plaintiff’s motion for a protective order and denies plaintiff’s request for attorneys’ fees and

costs.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that he was employed as a plasterer for W.F. Hayward Company

and that, on or around March 1, 2007, he suffered personal injuries at a job site when he stepped

on a scaffolding plank and it snapped into two pieces. The two pieces of scaffolding plank

involved in the incident are the subject of plaintiff’s motion. Defendant is alleged to have

provided and installed the scaffolding at the job site, and it is undisputed that defendant owns the

pieces of plank at issue. 

J.L. Bray & Son, Inc. (“J.L. Bray”), a non-party that was the general contractor on

the subject job, currently possesses the pieces of the plank. J.L. Bray is located in Salida,

California, and both parties appear to have unfettered access to the evidence. Plaintiff represents

that defendant intends to transfer the pieces of plank to Wisconsin for visual inspection and nondestructive testing if it is permitted custody of that evidence. (Righthand Decl. ¶ 16 & Ex. E.) 

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It appears that defendant attempted to remove the pieces of plank at issue on the

day plaintiff was allegedly injured. According to deposition testimony submitted by the parties,

an individual believed to be defendant’s representative, a superintendent, attempted to remove

the plank pieces but was stopped by Bruce Cole, an employee or agent of J.L. Bray. (Joint

Statement re Discovery Dispute (“Joint Statement”), Exs. L, M, Dkt. No. 15.) Mr. Cole placed

the evidence in J.L. Bray’s trailer at the job site. (Id., Ex. L.) 

On February 24, 2009, plaintiff filed a complaint in Sacramento Superior Court.

Defendant subsequently removed this action to federal court. (Dkt. No. 1.) 

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 The parties’ Joint Statement contains a representation by defendant’s counsel that he is 3

aware that “plaintiff’s consultants inspected the subject planks on at least two occasions, early in

2010 and again on June 10, 2010.” (Joint Statement at 4:16-18.) No declaration or documentary

evidence has been submitted in support of this representation. 

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Jack Bray, of J.L. Bray, was deposed in this case on March 26, 2010. (See Joint

Statement, Ex. B.) He brought the subject plank pieces to his deposition and offered to release

them to one of the parties. (Id.) Neither party left the deposition with the evidence. In the

parties’ Joint Statement, defendant asserts, unsupported by documents or declarations, that

Mr. Bray would like to release the evidence to defendant. (Joint Statement at 4:2-3.) Plaintiff’s

portion of the Joint Statement states that “Mr. Bray has not objected to retaining custody of the

subject planks.” (Id. at 7:23.) 

According to a letter from plaintiff, defendant allegedly noticed an inspection of

the pieces of scaffolding plank for May 24, 2010, at J.L. Bray’s location. Plaintiff alleges that

defendant again attempted to remove the plank pieces during this scheduled inspection, and that

Mr. Bray prevented defendant from doing so. (Joint Statement, Ex. J.) 

On May 27, 2010, defendant issued a subpoena to J.L. Bray seeking the

production for inspection of the two pieces of scaffolding plank on June 16, 2010, at what the

parties appear to agree is defendant’s site in Benicia, California. (Joint Statement, Ex. C.) With

regard to the command for production, the subpoena included the following: “The two pieces of

plank which are the subject of this litigation and owned by ThyssenKrupp Safway, Inc.,

previously marked as Exhibits 6A and 6B at your deposition on March 26, 2010. Nondestructive testing will be completed by employees of ThyssenKrupp Safway, Inc., at a different

location. Custody of the plank will remain with ThyssenKrupp.” (Id.) 

Also on May 27, 2010, defendant sent a letter to plaintiff wherein it asserted

ownership of the plank pieces and notified plaintiff that it intended to take custody of the plank

pieces, conduct non-destructive testing similar to that conducted by plaintiff, and retain custody 3

of the pieces of plank and maintain a record of the chain of custody. (Joint Statement, Ex. F.)

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26 The parties’ discovery completion deadline is July 30, 2010. (Dkt. No. 9 at 3.) 4

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Defendant also offered to effectuate this transfer of the physical evidence by stipulation. (Id.,

Exs. F, G.) 

On May 28, 2010, plaintiff sent a letter to defendant asserting that he “was

unwilling to allow anyone to take possession of the evidence . . . for reasons pertaining to both

chain of custody and evidence tampering.” (Joint Statement, Ex. J.) This letter also references

the inspection alleged to have been noticed by defendant for May 24, 2010. (Id.) Plaintiff sent

another meet-and-confer letter to defendant on June 2, 2010, wherein plaintiff stated that he was

“receptive to [defendant’s] efforts to inspect the boards,” but that the inspection must occur at

J.L. Bray’s location and it must consist of non-destructive testing. (Id., Ex. K.) Plaintiff also

referenced defendant’s alleged prior attempts to take the evidence at issue. 

On June 3, 2010, plaintiff sent a letter to J.L. Bray referencing the subpoena,

asserting that plaintiff would be filing a motion for a protective order seeking to prevent the

removal and transport of the plank pieces, and stating: “In the meantime, you are not authorized

to release this evidence, nor do the attorneys or representatives of Thyssenkrupp Safway have the

authorization to remove this evidence from your possession.” (Joint Statement, Ex. E.) In

response to this letter, defendant contacted plaintiff and reasserted its position regarding custody

of the pieces of plank and its suggestion of a stipulated transfer. (Id., Ex. H.) 

Plaintiff filed his motion for a protective order on June 9, 2010. (Dkt. No. 13.) 4

In light of the pending motion, it appears no stipulation was ever agreed to by the parties.

On June 17, 2010, defendant issued a Second Amended Subpoena in a Civil Case

with reference to the pieces of plank, which noticed a production date of July 7, 2010, again at

defendant’s Benicia location. (Joint Statement, Ex. D.) The amended subpoena contained the

same or similar statement contained in the original subpoena regarding production, nondestructive testing, and custody of the pieces of plank. (Id.) 

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 A motion seeking such relief “must include a certification that the movant has in good 5

faith conferred or attempted to confer with other affected parties in an effort to resolve the

dispute without court action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1). The parties’ Joint Statement certifies as

much. (Joint Statement at 9:10-13.) 

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Also on July 17, 2010, defendant transmitted a letter to plaintiff summarizing its

position for the purpose of preparing the parties’ joint statement. (Joint Statement, Ex. I.) On

July 15, 2010, the parties filed a timely joint statement re discovery disagreement. (Dkt. No. 15.) 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff’s Motion for Protective Order

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b) states that “[p]arties may obtain discovery

regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claims or defense.” It further

provides that “[r]elevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears

reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Id. However, there are

some limits to these general discovery principles. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

26(c)(1), “[t]he court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from

annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” The party seeking the 5

protective order has the burden “to ‘show good cause’ by demonstrating harm or prejudice that

will result from the discovery.” Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1063 (9th Cir. 2004)

(citation omitted); see also Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir.

1992) (“Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning,

do not satisfy the Rule 26(c) test” (citation and quotation marks omitted)). “‘If a court finds

particularized harm will result from disclosure of information to the public, then it balances the

public and private interests to decide whether a protective order is necessary.’” Rivera, 364 F.3d

at 1063-64 (quoting Phillips ex rel. Estates of Byrd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1211

(9th Cir. 2002)). 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 26(c) “confers broad discretion on the trial

court to decide when a protective order is appropriate and what degree of protection is required.”

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 Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c)(1) provides several examples of the 6

types of protective orders a court may enter, that list is not exhaustive. See, e.g., James WM.

Moore, 6 Moore’s Federal Practice § 26.105[1][b] (Matthew Bender 3d ed. 2010).

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Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984) (stating also that the “[t]he unique

character of the discovery process requires that the trial court have substantial latitude to fashion

protective orders”); see also Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v. Lakewood Eng’g & Mfg. Corp., 982 F.2d

363, 368 (9th Cir. 1992) (“This circuit has recognized as part of a district court’s inherent powers

the broad discretion to make discovery and evidentiary rulings conducive to the conduct of a fair

and orderly trial” (citation and quotation marks omitted).). Although the protective order sought

by plaintiff does not fit squarely within the language of the rule, district courts have entered

protective orders in order to preserve physical evidence that might be needed for trial. See, e.g.,

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Jeld-Wen, Inc. v. Nebula Glasslam Int’l, Inc., 248 F.R.D. 632, 641-42 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (entering

a protective order to preserve physical evidence in the form of windows relevant to the

litigation); Pitts v. Bridgestone Americas Holdings, Inc., No. Civ.A. 206CV1008-MEF, 2007 WL

1040510, at *1 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 30, 2007) (unpublished) (entering a protective order prohibiting

parties from “disposing of, selling, materially altering or changing, or conducting destructive

testing on the vehicle or the tires, rims, hubs, and valve stems that were on the vehicle at the time

of the accident . . . .”); Wilson v. Lee, No. 01 C 5773, 2001 WL 1135900, at *7 (N.D. Ill.

Sept. 24, 2001) (unpublished) (entering a protective order directing that prison officials preserve

videotape and photographic evidence until the final disposition of the case). 

Here, plaintiff has made a showing of good cause sufficient to warrant the entry of

a protective order to preserve the pieces of plank for trial and to preclude the transport of that

evidence outside the State of California. The pieces of plank are central to this case, and plaintiff

would suffer particularized prejudice if the planks were lost, damaged, destroyed, or otherwise

materially altered while being transported out of state by defendant. Additionally, it appears that

both parties require access to the pieces of plank to conduct further non-destructive and

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destructive testing, and that neither party has yet completed efforts in this regard. Again, damage

or destruction of the pieces of plank during transport would thwart these efforts. Furthermore,

defendant has provided no explanation regarding why the evidence must be transported out of

state or why any non-destructive or destructive testing could not be sufficiently completed in

California. Accordingly, the undersigned will enter a protective order prohibiting defendant from

transporting the pieces of scaffolding plank at issue outside of the State of California. 

However, plaintiff has not provided the court with a persuasive reason regarding

why this evidence should remain with J.L. Bray, a third party and potential witness in this case. 

Defendant is the undisputed owner of this evidence and is entitled to its possession. In addition,

defendant has offered to maintain a record of the chain of custody with respect to the pieces of

plank. Accordingly, the protective order will further require that the parties arrange for the

transfer of the pieces of scaffolding plank from J.L. Bray to defendant. Defendant will be

required to store the pieces of plank at its Benicia, California, location or another location within

the State of California that is agreeable to both parties. Defendant will also be required to store

the pieces of plank in a manner conducive to the preservation of the condition of those pieces of

plank for trial. Finally, defendant must maintain a record of the chain of custody of the pieces of

plank and provide plaintiff with reasonable access to the evidence for visual inspection or nondestructive testing, and any destructive testing to which the parties agree.

The undersigned shares plaintiff’s concerns regarding defendant’s prior attempts

to remove the pieces of plank, although not to the same degree as plaintiff. The undersigned is

also concerned about any possible damage to the evidence prior to trial. However, plaintiff has a

recourse should defendant lose, destroy, damage, or otherwise materially alter the pieces of

scaffolding plank. Plaintiff may request that the court impose evidentiary sanctions for the

destruction or spoliation of evidence. See, e.g, Cont’l Cas. Co. v. St. Paul Surplus Lines Ins. Co.,

265 F.R.D. 510, 533 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (“The court has the inherent authority to impose

evidentiary sanctions based on destruction or spoliation of evidence.”). Although this might not

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be a perfect remedy for plaintiff, it should provide sufficient motivation for defendant to properly

and adequately preserve the pieces of scaffolding plank at issue. 

B. Plaintiff’s Request for Fees and Costs

Plaintiff’s counsel seeks $4,700.00 in attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(5). (Mot. for Protective Order at 9-10; Righthand Decl. ¶ 17.) 

Defendant did not respond to this request for an award of fees and costs in the parties’ Joint

Statement. 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(5) provides:

(5) Payment of Expenses; Protective Orders.

(A) If the Motion Is Granted (or Disclosure or Discovery Is Provided After

Filing). If the motion is granted--or if the disclosure or requested

discovery is provided after the motion was filed--the court must, after

giving an opportunity to be heard, require the party or deponent whose

conduct necessitated the motion, the party or attorney advising that

conduct, or both to pay the movant’s reasonable expenses incurred in

making the motion, including attorney’s fees. But the court must not order

this payment if:

(i) the movant filed the motion before attempting in good faith to obtain

the disclosure or discovery without court action; 

(ii) the opposing party’s nondisclosure, response, or objection was

substantially justified; or 

(iii) other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.

The undersigned concludes that the award of reasonable expenses to plaintiff is

not warranted in this case. First, plaintiff’s motion does not involve a refusal of discovery by

defendant, and defendant made legitimate efforts to resolve this dispute outside of court. 

Second, the court will only grant plaintiff’s motion in part, and defendant will be permitted to

retain possession of the evidence. Moreover, the protective order will include a provision

regarding a documented chain of custody that defendant had offered at the outset of this dispute. 

Thus, defendant’s position was in most respects substantially justified. Finally, the award of

reasonable expenses would be unjust here. First, plaintiff’s counsel needlessly duplicated his

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efforts. A substantial amount of plaintiff’s counsel’s time appears to have been devoted to

preparing an initial memorandum of points and authorities in support of plaintiff’s motion, but

this court clearly requires a Joint Statement Re Discovery Dispute, see Local Rule 251, which the

parties subsequently prepared. Second, plaintiff’s initial memorandum and the Joint Statement

were largely devoid of legal authorities that would have assisted the court in assessing the

propriety of the protective order sought. Under these circumstances, it would be unjust to award

plaintiff with attorney’s fees or costs. Accordingly, plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees and

costs will be denied.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for a protective order (Dkt. No. 13) is granted in part.

2. Plaintiff and defendant, in consultation with J.L. Bray & Son, Inc., shall

arrange for the transfer of the two pieces of scaffolding plank at issue from J.L. Bray & Son, Inc.

to defendant on or before July 30, 2010, which is the date of the parties’ discovery completion

deadline. 

3. Defendant may not transport the pieces of scaffolding plank outside of the

State of California, except with prior approval from plaintiff or an order of this court.

4. Defendant shall store the pieces of scaffolding plank at its Benicia,

California, location, or another location in the State of California agreed to by both parties. 

5. Defendant shall store the pieces of scaffolding plank in a manner

conducive to the preservation of the condition of those pieces of scaffolding plank for trial. 

6. Defendant shall maintain a record of the chain of custody of the pieces of

scaffolding plank and provide plaintiff with reasonable access to this evidence for visual

inspection or non-destructive testing, and mutually agreed upon destructive testing.

7. This protective order shall remain in effect until the conclusion of this

litigation, including termination of any appeal.

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8. Plaintiffs’ request for attorney’s fees and costs is denied. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 19, 2010

_____________________________________

KENDALL J. NEWMAN

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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