Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01205/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01205-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2003 Job Discrimination

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MAZEN KHENAISSER,

Plaintiff,

v.

SALLY JEWELL, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:15-cv-1205 MCE CKD PS

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Defendants’ motion to dismiss came on regularly for hearing on June 15, 2016. Plaintiff

Mazen Khenaisser appeared in propria persona. Chi Soo Kim appeared for defendants. Upon 

review of the documents in support and opposition, upon hearing the arguments of plaintiff and 

counsel, and good cause appearing therefor, THE COURT FINDS AS FOLLOWS:

In this action, plaintiff alleges claims of discrimination arising out of his employment as a 

civil engineer in the Bureau of Reclamations Design and Construction Division, Mid-Pacific 

Region. This matter was previously heard on defendants’ motion to dismiss, which was granted 

with leave to amend as to certain claims. ECF No. 29. Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint 

on March 11, 2016. ECF No. 30.1 Defendants move to dismiss the amended complaint with 

prejudice, contending that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over certain claims and that 

 

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Prior to the filing on March 11, 2016 of the first amended complaint, plaintiff filed another 

amended complaint, which was stricken as premature. ECF Nos. 26, 27.

Case 2:15-cv-01205-MCE-CKD Document 40 Filed 06/16/16 Page 1 of 6
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the remaining claims are subject to dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 

ECF No. 32.

In the first amended complaint, plaintiff alleges a claim for defamation, arising in part 

from allegations made by agency employees that plaintiff put his fist in a manager’s face. ECF 

No. 30 at p. 20, ¶ 10(d). Plaintiff also alleges defamation of character and that he was slandered 

by an employee “putting words in my mouth.” ECF No. 30, ¶¶ 3(b), 4(c), 5(c), 6(a), 10(b), 10(g), 

10(h), 12(f). Defendant moves to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction plaintiff’s claim 

for defamation. Defendant contends this court lacks jurisdiction because the United States has 

not waived sovereign immunity over such a claim. This contention is correct. 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) allows a defendant to raise the defense, by 

motion, that the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of an entire action or of specific 

claims alleged in the action. “A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction may 

either attack the allegations of the complaint or may be made as a ‘speaking motion’ attacking the 

existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact.” Thornhill Publ’g Co. v. Gen. Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 

594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979). 

When a Rule 12(b)(1) motion attacks the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact, 

no presumption of truthfulness attaches to the plaintiff’s allegations. Thornhill Publ’g Co., 594 

F.2d at 733. “[T]he district court is not restricted to the face of the pleadings, but may review any 

evidence, such as affidavits and testimony, to resolve factual disputes concerning the existence of 

jurisdiction.” McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1988). When a Rule 

12(b)(1) motion attacks the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact, plaintiff has the burden 

of proving that jurisdiction does in fact exist. Thornhill Publ’g Co., 594 F.2d at 733.

Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the United States and its agencies from suit. 

See Loeffler v. Frank, 486 U.S. 549, 554 (1988). Sovereign immunity is jurisdictional in nature. 

See United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983) (“It is axiomatic that the United States 

may not be sued without its consent and that the existence of consent is a prerequisite for 

jurisdiction”). This court has jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claims against the United States for 

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defamation only where there is an express waiver of sovereign immunity. See United States v. 

Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33-34 (1992). 

Under the Federal Torts Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h), any claims for libel, 

slander, misrepresentation or deceit are expressly excluded from the general waiver of sovereign 

immunity for tort claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674(b) (“The United States [is] liable ... in the same 

manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances.”); see also

28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (conferring original jurisdiction on district court over tort claims). 

Accordingly, plaintiff’s defamation claims are barred in this court and must be dismissed without 

leave to amend. See Thomas-Lazear v. F.B.I., 851 F.2d 1202, 1206-1207 (9th Cir. 1988) (slander 

and libel claims barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) dismissed without leave to amend). 

Defendant also moves to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a claim. In 

considering a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state 

a claim upon which relief can be granted, the court must accept as true the allegations of the 

complaint in question, Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007), and construe the 

pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 

(1974). 

In order to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than 

“naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause 

of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-557 (2007). In other words, 

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Furthermore, a claim 

upon which the court can grant relief has facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A 

claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

at 678. 

In the first amended complaint (ECF No. 30), plaintiff names as a defendant Benjamin 

Wagner, United States Attorney. No allegations are made against this defendant in the body of 

the complaint. As noted in the prior findings and recommendations (ECF No.24), which were 

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adopted by the District Court (ECF No. 29), the only properly named defendant is defendant Sally 

Jewell, the Secretary of the Interior, in her official capacity. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (Title 

VII); 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(1); Vinieratos v. United States, 939 F.2d 762, 772 (9th Cir. 1991). As 

such, defendant Benjamin Wagner should be dismissed with prejudice.

In the amended complaint, plaintiff has restated his claims for disability discrimination. 

However, the first amended complaint does not cure the deficiencies this court found in the 

original complaint. Plaintiff’s disability claim is premised on “back discomfort” allegedly caused 

by improper seating arrangements. Such a claim falls far short of the requirement under section 

501 of the Rehabilitation Act2that plaintiff have a physical or mental impairment that 

substantially limits one or more of the major life activities in order to state a claim under that Act. 

See Walton v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 492 F.3d 998, 1005 (9th Cir. 2007); 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a), 

12102; 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(B); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g).

The amended complaint also reprises plaintiff’s discrimination claims on the basis of 

religion, national origin and race. Again, as with the original complaint, plaintiff fails to establish 

a prima facie case under Title VII. See Leong v. Potter, 347 F.3d 1117, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003) (to 

state a prima facie discrimination claim, plaintiff must show he belongs to protected class, was 

qualified for position, subjected to adverse employment action, and similarly situated individuals 

outside protected class were treated more favorably). The amended complaint alleges 

discrimination on the basis of religion (non-Jewish) but does not allege any discrimination based 

on religion other than alleging that the Branch Chief collaborated with another Jew because they 

went to the same synagogue together. This conclusory allegation does not set forth a sufficient 

basis for religious discrimination. Similarly, the amended complaint sets forth no allegations 

related to national origin. Also deficient are the allegations relating to racial discrimination in 

which plaintiff alleges that the Branch Chief is a racist because the Branch Chief responded to 

plaintiff’s Union grievance by informing plaintiff that discrimination was an EEO matter and was 

 

2

 Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act is the exclusive remedy for disability discrimination in 

employment for federal employees. See Boyd v. United States Postal Serv., 752 F.2d 410, 412-

13 (9th Cir. 1985). The Act incorporates the definition of disability set forth under the Americans 

with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Walton, 492 F.3d at 1005.

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excluded from contract. In sum, all of plaintiff’s discrimination claims contain only conclusory 

allegations which are insufficient to support a claim for discrimination on the basis of religion, 

national origin and race.

Plaintiff’s claim for retaliation is similarly deficient. Plaintiff asserts that the Branch 

Chief retaliated against plaintiff by subjecting him to “Direct Orders” which provided instruction 

of weekly substantive work tasks and allocated plaintiff’s time between these tasks. To establish 

a prima facie case of retaliation, plaintiff must show that he engaged in statutorily protected 

activity, that an adverse employment action was thereafter taken against him, and a causal link 

between the two events. See Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air., Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1064-65 (9th 

Cir. 2002). The amended complaint is simply devoid of such allegations and this claim should be 

dismissed.

This court lacks jurisdiction over plaintiff’s remaining claims because plaintiff’s exclusive 

remedy for his employment related disputes is the Civil Service Reform Act (“CSRA”). 

Mangano v. United States, 529 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2008). In the amended complaint, 

plaintiff raises several challenges related to his employment including mediation, discipline, nonselection for a promotion and a reassignment request. Such actions are encompassed within the 

definition of “personnel action” under the CSRA and accordingly are preempted. See 5 U.S.C. § 

2302(a)(2)(A) (definition of “personnel action” includes any appointment, promotion, 

disciplinary action, transfer, reassignment, performance evaluation, or other significant change in 

duties, responsibilities, or working conditions); Mangano, 529 F.3d at 1246 (CSRA exclusive 

even when no administrative or judicial remedy available).

Plaintiff has been afforded an opportunity to amend the complaint after being fully 

apprised of the prima facie elements of his claims. The amended complaint fails to cure the 

deficiencies and plaintiff raised no argument, either in opposition to the pending motion or at oral 

argument, that suggests amendment would be anything other than futile. The amended complaint 

should be dismissed with prejudice. 

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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 32) be granted without leave to amend;

2. This action be dismissed and the case closed. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections 

within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. 

Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: June 16, 2016

4 khenaisser1205.mtd.2.57

_____________________________________

CAROLYN K. DELANEY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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