Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_07-cv-00171/USCOURTS-alsd-1_07-cv-00171-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 371
Nature of Suit: Truth in Lending
Cause of Action: 15:1601 Truth in Lending

---

1 Under the E-Government Act of 2002, this is a written opinion and therefore is

available electronically. However, it has been entered only to decide the motion or matter

addressed herein and is not intended for official publication or to serve as precedent.

2 During briefing on defendants’ predecessor Rule 12(b)(6) motions, which were

superseded by the filing of the First Amended Complaint, plaintiff filed a Motion for Oral

Argument on 12(b)(6) Motions (doc. 31). That request is echoed in plaintiff’s brief on the

current motions, which bears the legend “Oral Argument Requested.” (Doc. 39.) Pursuant to

Local Rule 7.3, the Court in its discretion may rule on any motion without oral argument. After

careful consideration of the parties’ voluminous briefs, the undersigned is of the opinion that oral

argument would not be of substantial assistance in resolving the issues presented in the Rule

12(b)(6) Motions. Accordingly, plaintiff’s Motion for Oral Argument (doc. 31) is denied.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

LORI A. HAZEWOOD, )

 )

Plaintiff, )

 )

v. ) CIVIL ACTION 07-0171-WS-B

 )

FOUNDATION FINANCIAL GROUP, )

LLC, et al., )

 )

Defendants. )

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on defendant Ticor Title Insurance Company’s Motion to

Dismiss First Amended Complaint (doc. 32); the Motion for More Definite Statement by

Defendants Network Closing Services, Inc. and Meridian Title Services, LLC (doc. 34); and the

Motion to Dismiss by Defendants Foundation Financial, Network Closing Service, and Meridian

Title Services (doc. 35).1

 The Motions have been briefed and are ripe for disposition.2

I. Background.

This action is one of a spate of putative class actions filed in this District Court in recent

months seeking to bring federal statutory claims against mortgage lenders, title insurers, and

closing agents relating to residential real estate transactions. In her 10-count, 26-page First

Amended Complaint (doc. 30), plaintiff Lori A. Hazewood maintains that defendants failed to

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make certain disclosures and improperly marked up certain charges in connection with the

closing of her home refinance loan on April 24, 2006. Defendants Meridian Title Services, LLC

and Network Closing Services (“MTS/NCS”) are alleged to have been the settlement agents,

while defendant Foundation Financial Group, LLC (“Foundation”) is alleged to have been the

lender on the transaction and defendant Ticor Title Insurance Company, Inc. (“Ticor”) is alleged

to have been the provider of the lender’s title insurance policy. (Doc. 30, at ¶¶ 5-8.) The First

Amended Complaint alleges that MTS/NCS was acting as Ticor’s agent and pursuant to specific

closing instructions from Foundation in the transaction. (Id. at ¶¶ 3-5, 8.) According to the First

Amended Complaint, certain charges on the HUD-1 settlement statement for Hazewood’s loan

were “marked-up charges,” “constituted charges imposed for some reason other than in exchange

for services actually rendered,” or constituted charges that were “non-bona fide,”

“unreasonable,” “split,” or “padded” in some unspecified way. (Id. at ¶ 14(a)-(h).)

Based on these factual allegations, the First Amended Complaint purports to assert the

following causes of action: (1) a claim against Foundation for violation of the Truth in Lending

Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq. (“TILA”) because the required disclosures omitted certain finance

charges levied in the transaction (Count I); (2) a claim against MTS/NCS for violating Section

8(b) of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq. (“RESPA”), by

imposing unspecified charges that were marked up, imposed for reasons other than in exchange

for services rendered, or were non-bona fide, unreasonable, split or padded (Count II); (3) a

claim alleging that Ticor violated Section 8(b) of RESPA by giving and/or accepting a portion of

a charge made or received for a real estate settlement service other than for services actually

performed (Count III); (4) a claim styled as a cause of action for declaratory judgment but

requesting monetary relief in the form of “a refund from defendants for any sum charged in

excess of the amount approved by the state insurance department” (doc. 30, at 13) (Count IV);

(5) a claim for unjust enrichment on the grounds that “defendants charged rates for title

insurance which were in excess of the amount approved by the state insurance department” (id.)

(Count V); (6) a claim for “price discrimination” again alleging that defendants charged

Hazewood title insurance rates exceeding the amount approved by the state insurance department

(Count VI); (7) a putative class claim against MTS/NCS and Ticor for violation of Section 8(b)

of RESPA (Count VII); (8) a putative class claim for declaratory judgment (Count VIII), again

Case 1:07-cv-00171-WS-B Document 48 Filed 07/02/07 Page 2 of 13
3 No motion to dismiss has been filed with respect to the TILA cause of action set

forth against Foundation in Count I; therefore, that cause of action will remain in play,

irrespective of the outcome of the Rule 12(b) motions on the other nine theories of relief

articulated in the First Amended Complaint.

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seeking a refund of all sums charged in excess of amounts approved by the state insurance

department; (9) a putative class claim for unjust enrichment (Count IX); and (10) a putative class

claim for price discrimination (Count X). The class claims closely parallel the corresponding

individual claims.

By way of summary, then, the ten causes of action interposed by Hazewood in the First

Amended Complaint cluster neatly into the following discrete categories: (i) a TILA claim

against Foundation (Count I); (ii) RESPA claims against MTS/NCS and Ticor alleging violations

of Section 8(b) because the title insurance fee was marked up or otherwise improper (Counts II,

III, and VII); and (iii) state-law claims seeking recovery of fees charged Hazewood for title

insurance that eclipsed the amounts approved by the state insurance department (Counts IV, V,

VI, VIII, IX, and X). Ticor has moved to dismiss all claims against it, and defendants

Foundation and MTS and NCS have filed a tagalong motion that seeks dismissal of the same

claims on the same grounds as Ticor’s motion. Apparently as an alternative to their Rule

12(b)(6) motion, MTS and NCS have also filed a Rule 12(e) motion for more definite statement,

which need be reached only if their Rule 12(b)(6) motion is denied.3

II. Legal Standard.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the

Court must view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Hill v. White, 321

F.3d 1334, 1335 (11th Cir. 2003). Thus, “all facts set forth in the plaintiff’s complaint are to be

accepted as true and the court limits its consideration to the pleadings and exhibits attached

thereto.” Grossman v. Nationsbank, N.A., 225 F.3d 1228, 1231 (11th Cir. 2000) (citation

omitted). The rules of pleading require only that a complaint contain “a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Rule 8(a)(2), Fed.R.Civ.P. 

As the Supreme Court recently observed, while a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion

need not be buttressed by detailed factual allegations, the plaintiff’s pleading obligation

“requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause

Case 1:07-cv-00171-WS-B Document 48 Filed 07/02/07 Page 3 of 13
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of action will not do.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, --- U.S. ----, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65

(2007). The rules of pleading do “not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only

enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 1974. The Court’s

inquiry at this stage focuses on whether the challenged pleadings “give the defendant fair notice

of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.

41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). Thus, a plaintiff must meet only an “exceedingly low”

threshold to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. United States v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 345 F.3d 866,

881 (11th Cir. 2003).

III. Analysis.

A. The RESPA Claims.

As noted supra, three of plaintiff’s causes of action assert violations of Section 8(b) of

RESPA, which provides as follows: “No person shall give and no person shall accept any

portion, split, or percentage of any charge made or received for the rendering of a real estate

settlement service in connection with a transaction involving a federally related mortgage loan

other than for services actually performed.” 12 U.S.C. § 2607(b). The gravamen of these claims

is plaintiff’s contention that Ticor and MTS/NCS charged Hazewood more for the lender’s title

insurance policy than Ticor’s filed rate approved by the Alabama Department of Insurance

would have allowed, such that this fee was “marked-up,” “non-bona fide,” “unreasonable,”

“split,” or “padded.” (First Amended Complaint, at ¶ 31.) The cause of action is articulated

most completely in Count III, wherein Hazewood alleges that “[t]he title insurance charge

imposed on Plaintiff for title insurance premium exceeded the maximum allowed premium set by

the Alabama Department of Insurance pursuant to Alabama law”; that this charge “was split

between the settlement agent and defendant Ticor”; and that Ticor violated Section 8(b) “by

giving and/or accepting a portion of a charge made or received for a real estate settlement service

other than for services actually performed.” (Id., ¶¶ 37-38, 40.)

The undersigned has been afforded multiple opportunities in recent weeks to construe

Section 8(b) of RESPA in response to allegations quite similar to those advanced by Hazewood. 

See Morrisette v. NovaStar Home Mortgage, Inc., 484 F. Supp.2d 1227 (S.D. Ala. 2007);

Williams v. Saxon Mortgage Services, Inc., 2007 WL 1845642 (S.D. Ala. June 25, 2007). These

decisions state the following principles as to the interpretation of the challenged statute: (a)

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4 Perhaps such a contention could have been made because Hazewood does not

limit her RESPA claims to the title insurance provider (Ticor), as did the plaintiffs in Morrisette

and Williams, but additionally brings RESPA claims against the closing agents (MTS/NCS)

based on a purportedly excessive title insurance fee. As plaintiff effectively concedes that the

Morrisette analysis would apply with equal force to those claims, and at any rate fails to argue

that the analysis differs as to MTS and NCS, the Court need not address whether these

defendants’ status as closing agents, rather than title insurers, would impact the analysis under

the principles enunciated in Morrisette. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d

587, 599 (11th Cir. 1995) (“There is no burden upon the district court to distill every potential

argument that could be made based upon the materials before it .... Rather, the onus is upon the

parties to formulate arguments.”); Pinto v. Universidad De Puerto Rico, 895 F.2d 18, 19 (1st Cir.

1990) (“the court is under no duty to exercise imagination and conjure what a plaintiff might

have alleged, but did not, and do counsel's work for him or her”). Even if that issue were

considered, however, the First Amended Complaint does not allege sufficient facts under the Bell

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Section 8(b) is not a price-control mechanism, but is instead designed to prohibit kickback and

referral fee arrangements; (b) Section 8(b) prohibits markups (which occur when a settlement

service provider hires a third party to provide a service, adding no value itself to the service, and

then passes along to the borrower the third party’s charge after tacking on a surcharge), not

overcharges (which occur when a settlement provider performs a service itself, then charges an

amount for that service that the borrower perceives as unreasonable, excessive or illegal); (c)

Section 8(b) neither requires nor permits courts to disaggregate a fee charged by a settlement

provider for a given service into an “earned” component (relating to the service actually

provided) and an “unearned” component (not relating to the service actually provided), so as to

derive a RESPA violation from the excessive piece; and (d) Section 8(b) is not violated when a

title insurer receives a higher fee for a lender’s title insurance policy than its filed rate authorized

by the Alabama Department of Insurance, because that is simply an overcharge for the title

insurance services that the title insurer provided, and RESPA does not outlaw overcharges.

In response to defendants’ arguments that her Section 8(b) RESPA claims are not

cognizable because they allege mere overcharges for title insurance services actually performed,

Hazewood acknowledges that the Morrisette ruling “indicate[s] that RESPA claims will be

dismissed in this action.” (Plaintiff’s Brief (doc. 39), at 15.) She does not maintain that the facts

or claims in this case are distinguishable from those in Morrisette, nor does she suggest that the

analysis should be any different here.4

 Instead, Hazewood’s position is that if Morrisette is

Case 1:07-cv-00171-WS-B Document 48 Filed 07/02/07 Page 5 of 13
Atlantic standard to assert a plausible RESPA claim against MTS and NCS. Far from alleging

that MTS and NCS performed no services concerning the lender’s title insurance policy, the First

Amended Complaint alleges that they acted as Ticor’s agent in connection with the issuance of

that policy and that they sold title insurance for Ticor. (Doc. 30, at 2, 8.) Thus, by plaintiff’s

own admission, MTS and NCS did perform services in connection with the title insurance policy

at issue. Their acceptance of an allegedly excessive fee for that service cannot state a viable

claim under RESPA.

5 Plaintiff’s original Complaint (doc. 1) filed on March 6, 2007 was confined to

TILA and RESPA causes of action. All of these common-law claims were pleaded into this

lawsuit for the first time via Amended Complaint (doc. 30) filed as of right on April 24, 2007,

just five days after the Morrisette decision was issued. This sequence of events strongly

suggests that Hazewood pleaded these claims in an attempt to sidestep Morrisette and salvage

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followed then she cannot prevail on her RESPA claims. In that regard, Hazewood simply

attaches a copy of a brief filed by plaintiff’s counsel in Morrisette in connection with a motion to

reconsider and urges the Court in conclusory terms to “reconsider its interpretation of RESPA

for the reasons set forth in the brief” from Morrisette, without directing the Court’s attention to

any particular aspect of that brief or showing how those arguments are persuasive here. The

arguments presented in the Morrisette brief (i.e., that the Court’s interpretation of RESPA cannot

be squared with the statutory language, that it conflicts with HUD guidance, and that it places

too much weight on an artificial overcharge/markup distinction) have been rejected by the Court

after extensive analysis in both Morrisette and Williams. Little purpose would be served by

reiterating that reasoning at this time.

Accordingly, in light of Hazewood’s acknowledgment that Morrisette is fatal to her

RESPA claims, and pursuant to the principles set forth in Morrisette and Williams, the

undersigned finds that the Motions to Dismiss are due to be granted with respect to the RESPA

causes of action, including both individual and class-based claims and including both the claims

against Ticor and those against MTS and NCS.

B. The Common-Law Claims.

In addition to the RESPA causes of action, Hazewood (individually and on behalf of

others similarly situated) attempts to parlay the allegedly excessive charge for Ticor’s title

insurance services into common-law claims against Ticor, MTS and NCS for declaratory

judgment, unjust enrichment and price discrimination (Counts IV, V, VI, VIII, IX and X).5

 With

Case 1:07-cv-00171-WS-B Document 48 Filed 07/02/07 Page 6 of 13
some basis for suing Ticor, MTS and NCS for excessive charges for title insurance after

Morrisette slammed the door on any attempt to utilize a RESPA theory to remediate the alleged

wrong.

6 Counts VIII, IX and X restate the same factual allegations in support of identical

causes of action to those set forth in Counts IV, V and VI, with the only difference that Counts

VIII, IX and X are class-based claims, while Counts IV, V and VI are brought exclusively in

Hazewood’s name.

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respect to all of these claims, the First Amended Complaint is unmistakably clear that their

factual predicate is that the defendants charged rates for title insurance in excess of those

approved by the Alabama Department of Insurance. In Count IV, for example, plaintiff contends

that she “has been legally injured because she was charged more than the filed rate for title

insurance,” and requests “a refund from defendants for any sum charged in excess of the amount

approved by the state insurance department.” (Doc. 30, at 13.) In Count V, plaintiff argues that

she has been unjustly enriched because “[t]he defendants charged rates for title insurance which

were in excess of the amount approved by the state insurance department.” (Id.) And in Count

VI, Hazewood maintains that defendants engaged in unlawful price discrimination by

“charg[ing] rates to the plaintiff for title insurance which were in excess of the amount approved

by the state insurance department,” while charging other consumers the lawful filed rate. (Doc.

30, at 14.)6

 As pleaded, then, plaintiff’s common-law causes of action originate exclusively from

her contention that Ticor, MTS and NCS charged her a higher fee for title insurance services

than the rate approved by the Alabama Department of Insurance. The complained-of wrong in

all of those causes of action is that Hazewood was charged more for title insurance services than

the Alabama state insurance department permits.

In Alabama, rates for title insurance premiums are regulated pursuant to the Alabama

Title Insurance Act, Ala. Code §§ 27-25-1 et seq. (the “Act”). The Act requires every title

insurer to file with the Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Insurance (the

“Commissioner”) its schedule of premium rates, which the Commissioner then approves or

disapproves based on considerations of fairness and justness. “No person, title insurer, agency,

or agent shall charge any premium rate for any policy or contract of title insurance except in

accordance with the filed premium rates which are in effect for the title insurer as provided in

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7 Enforcement powers conferred upon the Commissioner by the Act include the

discretion to revoke a title agent’s certificate of authority, revoke a title insurer’s license, and

impose a fine of $500 per violation (or $5,000 per willful violation). Ala. Code § 27-25-9(c).

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this section.” Ala. Code § 27-25-6(a). However, the Act makes clear that non-compliance with

this requirement does not give rise to a private right of action. Indeed, the Act states, “This

chapter shall be enforceable only by the commissioner and does not create any private cause of

action or other private legal recourse.” Ala. Code § 27-25-9(b).7 Where, as here, a plaintiff

claims a private right of action based on a violation of a statutory scheme, she “must show clear

evidence of a legislative intent to impose civil liability for a violation of the statute.” American

Auto. Ins. Co. v. McDonald, 812 So.2d 309, 311 (Ala. 2001). In Morrisette, the undersigned

held that these principles were fatal to the plaintiffs’ attempt to bootstrap claims for negligence

and wantonness on a title insurer’s charging of a premium in excess of its filed rate. See

Morrisette, 484 F. Supp.2d at 1231 (opining that the clarity of § 27-25-9(b) negates plaintiffs’

ability to show that a private right of action existed for title insurance premiums charged in

excess of the approved rate); see generally American Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Central Office

Telephone, Inc., 524 U.S. 214, 217, 118 S.Ct. 1956, 141 L.Ed.2d 222 (1998) (citation omitted)

(“The rights as defined by the tariff cannot be varied or enlarged by either contract or tort of the

carrier.”). The dearth of evidence suggesting a legislative intent to allow consumers to sue for

excessive title insurance charges under § 27-25-6, and the express statutory language to the

contrary, preclude plaintiff’s efforts to do that here, irrespective of how she labels her claims.

In attempting to overcome this persuasive reasoning, plaintiff cites a handful of Alabama

decisions that she contends have allowed plaintiffs to pursue common-law claims to recover

charges in excess of filed rates. None of these authorities involves a common-law claim to

recover title insurance premiums in excess of those permitted by § 27-25-6; rather, these cases

proceed under different provisions with different statutory frameworks. These differences are

substantial and material, rendering all of these authorities readily distinguishable. For example,

plaintiff champions Ex parte Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama, 582 So.2d 469 (Ala.

1991), for the proposition that “a claim for Declaratory Judgment was the appropriate claim to

make when a charge in excess of the filed rate is levied against a consumer.” (Plaintiff’s Brief,

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at 5.) But Blue Cross involves a claim brought pursuant to Ala. Code § 10-4-109, which

regulates rates for health care service plans and which omits the “no private right of action”

language and the Commissioner enforcement mechanism found in § 27-25-9. A pair of other

cases cited by plaintiff, Emperor Clock Co. v. AT&T Corp., 727 So.2d 41 (Ala. 1998) and Allen

v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 59 F. Supp.2d 1217 (S.D. Ala. 1999), rejected claims to obtain

rates below a service provider’s filed rates as being in violation of the filed rate doctrine. Those

cases did not hold that such claims would have passed muster had the plaintiffs alleged that the

rate charged exceeded the provider’s filed rate, and therefore cannot bolster Hazewood’s

attempts to bring claims on that basis. 

Plaintiff also contends that her common-law claims are sustainable under Allen v.

Delchamps, Inc., 624 So.2d 1065 (Ala. 1993), and Birmingham Hockey Club, Inc. v. National

Council on Compensation Ins., Inc., 827 So.2d 73 (Ala. 2002). The Court disagrees. In Allen,

the Alabama Supreme Court recognized that a claim of negligence per se was not barred where

the plaintiff’s theory was that the defendant’s violations of the federal Food Drug & Cosmetic

Act (“FDCA”) constituted negligence per se. The FDCA does not recognize a private cause of

action for civil damages; however, the Allen court determined that the violation of the FDCA

regulations established a duty of care to support a claim of negligence per se. Here, by contrast,

Hazewood does not bring a claim of negligence per se, nor does she attempt to rely on the

Alabama Title Insurance Act to create a duty of care; instead, she sues defendants under

common-law theories of declaratory judgment, unjust enrichment and price discrimination for

violation of that Act. The Alabama Supreme Court’s decision in Allen does not entitle her to do

so, inasmuch as it is rooted firmly in peculiarities of the negligence per se doctrine, which is

inapplicable here. Meanwhile, in Birmingham Hockey, the plaintiff maintained that a defendant

had charged higher workers’ compensation insurance premiums than its filed rate permitted. 

The Alabama Supreme Court found that this claim was “cognizable in the first instance in the

circuit court and that a party bringing such a claim is not required to first seek an administrative

hearing.” Birmingham Hockey, 827 So.2d at 83. But the Alabama Workers’ Compensation Act,

much like the statutory scheme at issue in Blue Cross, has no provision disclaiming any private

right of action or private legal recourse for violation of same. See Ala. Code § 25-5-8(f)(2). 

Thus, Birmingham Hockey, like Blue Cross, is readily distinguishable because it does not

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8 Alternatively, plaintiff’s common-law claims for “price discrimination” (Counts

VI, X) fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because they proceed on a novel

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involve a statutory scheme in which the Alabama legislature specifically directed that the statute

“shall be enforceable only by the commissioner and does not create any private cause of action

or other private legal recourse.” Ala. Code § 27-25-9(b).

After all the ink has been spilled and the clamor has abated, the legal issue presented here

is quite straightforward. Hazewood brings a batch of common-law claims for declaratory

judgment, unjust enrichment, and price discrimination, all predicated exclusively on the fact that

defendants charged her a higher title insurance premium than had been approved by the Alabama

Commissioner of Insurance. An Alabama statute sets forth baseline requirements that title

insurers file proposed rates with the Commissioner for approval, and forbids title insurers from

charging rates higher than those filed with and approved by the Commissioner. The

unambiguous thrust of all six of Hazewood’s common-law claims is that defendants violated that

statutory requirement by charging excessive rates. But the Alabama Title Insurance Act on its

face contains an unequivocal expression of legislative intent that no private cause of action of

right of private legal recourse was created by this statute and that title insurance premiums in

excess of approved rates may be policed only by the Commissioner. See Ala. Code § 27-25-

9(b). This language negates any legislative intent to impose civil liability for a violation of the

statute, and forbids any plaintiff from suing a title insurer or closing agent for charging fees

higher than those permitted by the Act. Plaintiff’s claims are based solely on alleged violations

of the Act. Even if Hazewood had attempted to do so (which she has not), she cannot credibly

assert that her claims exist independently of the Act, inasmuch as the only wrongdoing plaintiff

ascribes to defendants is their act of charging her a premium above their rate filed and approved

under the Act. Thus, these common-law claims are inextricably intertwined with, and

functionally identical to, claims under the Act. The legislative ban on private legal recourse for

violations of the Act is therefore fatal to plaintiff’s attempt to mutate those violations into

common-law theories for relief, and plaintiff has not cited a single authority that would enable

her to overcome that prohibition to assert claims for declaratory judgment, unjust enrichment and

price discrimination predicated on violations of the Act.8

Case 1:07-cv-00171-WS-B Document 48 Filed 07/02/07 Page 10 of 13
theory that has apparently never been recognized by Alabama courts. As the Court understands

it, plaintiff claims that Alabama law would allow her to sue for “price discrimination” because

she was charged a higher rate than Ticor’s filed rate, while other consumers were charged less. 

She has failed to cite a single Alabama authority for this proposition, but relies exclusively on an

Eighth Circuit case from 1918 dealing with electricity rates in Iowa, and a 1994 Supreme Court

case relating to the federal Interstate Commerce Act. This Court is not empowered to cut from

whole cloth a new Alabama tort based on such fragmentary and unrelated federal precedent. 

See, e.g., Brown v. City of Clewiston, 848 F.2d 1534, 1542 (11th Cir. 1988) (“Generally, states

may decide what is or is not tortious within their boundaries.”); Beasley v. Fairchild Hiller

Corp., 401 F.2d 593, 596 (5th Cir. 1968) (“federal courts do not make state law”); Kranson v.

Valley Crest Nursing Home, 755 F.2d 46, 52 (3rd Cir. 1985) (“the existence of tort remedies is a

matter of state law”); Blackmon v. American Home Products Corp., 346 F. Supp.2d 907, 919

(S.D. Tex. 2004) (“It is not the province of this Court to expand Texas tort law beyond the limits

articulated by the Texas legislature and the Texas courts.”); Zombori v. Digital Equipment Corp.,

878 F. Supp. 207, 210 (N.D. Fla. 1995) (“Federal courts are entrusted to apply state law, not

make it.”). Therefore, even if Counts VI and X were not foreclosed by operation of § 27-25-

9(b), dismissal would remain appropriate under Rule 12(b)(6) because they effectively ask this

Court to recognize a brand-new Alabama tort.

9 In so holding, the Court specifically declines to adopt defendants’ alternative

argument that the “filed rate doctrine” forecloses these causes of action. To the contrary, the

Court agrees with plaintiff that the filed rate doctrine cannot properly be applied to bar her

claims. This doctrine would undoubtedly foreclose plaintiff from suing Ticor to enforce a rate

lower or otherwise different than that on file with the Commissioner. See, e.g., Hill v. BellSouth

Telecommunications, Inc., 364 F.3d 1308, 1316-17 (11th Cir. 2004) (filed rate doctrine bars

challenges that “would have the effect of changing the filed tariff” or would “result in a judicial

determination of the reasonableness of that rate”); Taffet v. Southern Co., 967 F.2d 1483, 1488

(11th Cir. 1992) (“federal courts have applied the filed rate doctrine in a variety of contexts to bar

recovery by those who claim injury by virtue of having paid a filed rate” and describing as

“central to the filed rate doctrine” the principle that a plaintiff “can claim no rate as legal right

that is other than the filed rate”); Allen, 59 F. Supp.2d at 1227 (“The filed-rate doctrine prohibits

collateral challenges to rates set by a regulatory agency ....”); Emperor Clock, 727 So.2d at 42

(“Under the filed-rate doctrine, a consumer of the regulated service is conclusively presumed to

have notice of the contents of the tariff and may not claim that it is entitled to any rate other

than the rate contained in the tariff.”) (emphasis added). Thus, if plaintiff were challenging the

validity or reasonableness of Ticor’s filed rate with the Commissioner, or if she were claiming

that she should be permitted to pay some rate other than that filed rate, then her claims would be

foreclosed by straightforward application of the filed rate doctrine. But that is not the basis for

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For all of these reasons, the Court finds that the Motions to Dismiss are due to be

granted with respect to Counts IV, V, VI, VIII, IX and X because no private right of action

exists for the wrong alleged to have been committed by defendants.9

Case 1:07-cv-00171-WS-B Document 48 Filed 07/02/07 Page 11 of 13
her lawsuit. None of the authorities cited by defendants can reasonably be read as supporting the

proposition that the filed rate doctrine bars a plaintiff from seeking to enforce the actual rate filed

with the Commissioner (which is what Hazewood does here), as opposed to some higher rate

that the defendant charged her. For example, the Taffet decision on which defendants rely

heavily states merely that the filed rate doctrine forbids a plaintiff from challenging an approved

rate as having been obtained by fraud. See Taffet, 967 F.2d at 1485, 1494-95. Taffet is not a

case in which the plaintiffs sought redress for paying a rate higher than the filed rate (as does

Hazewood here), but rather is one in which the plaintiffs sought to undermine the filed rate itself

(which Hazewood decidedly does not do). Accordingly, the filed rate doctrine is inapposite and

has no preclusive effect on Hazewood’s claims.

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IV. Conclusion.

For all of the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ordered as follows:

1. Ticor Title Insurance Company’s Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint

(doc. 32) and the Motion to Dismiss by Defendants Foundation Financial,

Network Closing Service, and Meridian Title Services (doc. 35) are granted. 

The RESPA causes of action (Counts II, III, and VII) are dismissed for failure to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Morrisette and

Williams. The state common-law claims (Counts IV, V, VI, VIII, IX, and X) are

dismissed for failure to state a claim by operation of Ala. Code § 27-25-9(b). The

Clerk of Court is directed to terminate defendants Ticor Title Insurance Company,

Inc., Meridian Title Services, LLC, and Network Closing Services, Inc. as parties

to this action.

2. The Motion for More Definite Statement by Defendants Network Closing

Services, Inc. and Meridian Title Services, LLC (doc. 34) is moot because the

causes of action to which that Rule 12(e) Motion relates have been dismissed.

3. Plaintiff’s Motion to Initially Address Defendant’s Principal Authorities of

Blockbuster, Inc. v. White and C.B. v. Bobo (doc. 42) is denied for the following

reasons: (1) it is entirely proper for a movant to cite rebuttal authority in a reply

brief addressing arguments raised in the non-movant’s response brief; (2) plaintiff

did not attach to her Motion any proposed sur-reply or otherwise provide any

indication of how she would “address” Blockbuster and Bobo if given leave to do

so; and (3) this Court did not rely on Blockbuster or Bobo in deciding the instant

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Rule 12(b)(6) motions, in any event.

4. Plaintiff’s request for oral argument (doc. 31) is denied.

5. This action will proceed as between Hazewood and defendant Foundation

Financial Group, LLC on Count I (violation of TILA). Foundation is ordered to

file its answer on or before July 16, 2007.

DONE and ORDERED this 2nd day of July, 2007.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:07-cv-00171-WS-B Document 48 Filed 07/02/07 Page 13 of 13