Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02042/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02042-24/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1981 Civil Rights

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

L.H., A.Z., D.K., and D.R.,

on behalf of themselves and

all other similarly 

situated juvenile parolees

in California,

NO. CIV. S-06-2042 LKK/GGH

Plaintiffs,

v. O R D E R

ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER, 

Governor, State of 

California, et al,

Defendants.

 /

Plaintiffs, a class of juvenile parolees, allege that the

California parole revocation system deprives them of due process

and violates the Americans with Disabilities Act. Defendants are

the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation

(“CDCR”), Division of Juvenile Justice (“DJJ”), and Board of Parole

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1

 On September 15, 2006, this case was related to Valdivia v.

Schwarzeneeger, 94-CV-671 and on February 28, 2007, the court

certified a class of California juvenile parolees. 

2 The budget change proposals at issue appear to be narrative

explanations of budget requests plus attachments which provide

justification in the form of graphs, charts, and numerical data.

The BCPs include detailed analysis of current financial burdens

associated with providing parole services, as well as projected

financial burdens associated with adhering to more stringent time

frames, providing increased attorney representation, increasing

witness participation, and decreasing hearing location radius. 

2

Hearings (“BPH”).1 Pending before the court is plaintiffs’ request

for reconsideration of the Magistrate Judge’s May 25, 2005 Order

(“Order”) denying plaintiffs’ motion to compel production of

documents. For the reasons explained herein, plaintiffs’ motion

for reconsideration is GRANTED. 

I.

Facts & Procedural History 

At issue are 201 documents consisting of Budget Change

Proposals (“BCPs”) prepared by the DJJ and BPH for fiscal years

2004-05, 2005-06, 2006-07, and 2007-08, as well as memoranda and

emails between various CDCR employees regarding clarification of

figures for BCPs, BCP approval and appeal, and legal strategy.2

The documents at issue relate to two document requests that

defendants refused to comply with based on a variety of privileges,

including the deliberative process privilege. Order at 4-5. The

pertinent portions of the two document requests at issue are:

DOCUMENT REQUEST NO. 9:

ALL DOCUMENTS and COMMUNICATIONS reflecting arrangements

between DJJ and attorneys, to provide legal assistance

to WARDS in PAROLE REVOCATION PROCEEDINGS

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including...budgets, budget requests, or requests for

funds to provide counsel to WARDS.

DOCUMENT REQUEST NO. 10:

ALL DOCUMENTS and COMMUNICATIONS that RELATE to budgets,

budget proposals OR requests for funds for reforms,

improvements OR changes of PAROLE REVOCATION

PROCEEDINGS.

Joint Statement Re: Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel at 15 (“Joint

Statement”).

Plaintiffs filed a motion to compel production of these

documents on March 22, 2007. Unable to reach a compromise after

several meet and confer discussions, the parties filed a Joint

Statement regarding this discovery disagreement on April 19, 2007.

Oral argument was held on April 26, 2007 before the Magistrate

Judge assigned to this case.

The Magistrate Judge held that all documents in question are

protected by the deliberative process privilege and are therefore

not discoverable. Because the Magistrate Judge found that the

documents in question were protected by the deliberative process

privilege, he did not reach the question of whether the documents

were protected under the other two privileges asserted by

defendants, namely, the work product doctrine and the attorneyclient privilege. 

II.

Standards

A. Standard for Review of Magistrate Judge’s Decision 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a) provides that non-dispositive pretrial

matters may be decided by a Magistrate Judge, subject to

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4

reconsideration by the district judge. The district judge shall,

upon reconsideration, modify or set aside any part of the

magistrate judge's order which is found to be “clearly erroneous”

or “contrary to law." See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Local Rule

303(f); Ainsworth v. Vasquez, 759 F. Supp. 1467, 1469 (E.D. Cal.

1991). 

Discovery motions are non-dispositive pretrial motions within

the scope of Rule 72(a) and 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(A), and thus

subject to the "clearly erroneous or contrary to law" standard of

review. Brown v. Wesley's Quaker Maid, Inc., 771 F2d 952, 954 (6th

Cir. 1985). "A finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although there

is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire

evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a

mistake has been committed." United States v. United States Gypsum

Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948); Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. United

States Forest Serv., 861 F.2d 1114, 1116 (9th Cir. 1988). 

B. Standard for Asserting the Deliberative Process Privilege 

The deliberative process privilege protects materials created

by administrative agencies during the decision-making process.

Nat’l Wildlife, 861 F.2d at 1114. The purpose of the privilege is

to protect the quality of agency decisions by shielding internal

discussions from public scrutiny which might discourage the freeflow of ideas and frank discussion of legal or policy matters.

NLRB v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 150, (1975). 

In order for documents to be protected under the privilege,

two preliminary procedural requirements must be satisfied: (1)

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there must be a “formal claim of privilege, lodged by the head of

the department which has control over the matter, after actual

personal consideration by that officer,” United States v. Rozet,

183 F.R.D. 662, 665 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (citing Unites States v.

Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1953)), and (2) the information for

which privilege is claimed must be specified and “precise and

certain reasons” given for asserting confidentiality. United

States v. O’Neill, 619 F.2d 222, 226 (3d Cir. 1980). See also In

re Sealed Case, 856 F.2d 268 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Moore’s Federal

Practice, Civil § 26.52.

In addition to these procedural requirements, the party

asserting the privilege must prove that the documents in question

are “predecisional” and “deliberative.” Carter v. United States

Dep’t of Commerce, 307 F.3d 1084, 1089 (9th Cir. 2002). This dual

requirement reflects the privilege’s purpose of protecting the

deliberative process leading up to those decisions. Nat’l Wildlife

Fed’n, 861 F.2d at 1117.

 The deliberative process privilege is a qualified privilege

rather than an absolute privilege. Therefore, even if the

privilege applies, the court must apply a balancing test whereby

a litigant may obtain privileged documents “if his or her need for

the materials and the need for accurate fact-finding override the

government’s interest in non-disclosure.” FTC v. Warner Commc’ns.,

Inc., 742 F.2d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 1984); see also Rozet, 183

F.R.D. 662 at 665 (“[privilege] may be overcome by a strong

showing of need on the part of the party seeking discovery”). 

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In balancing the need to preserve the integrity of internal

government deliberations with the need for open discovery, the

court considers the following factors: (1) the relevance of the

evidence sought to the litigation; (2) the availability of

comparable evidence from other sources; (3) the government's role

in the litigation; and (4) the extent to which disclosure would

hinder frank and independent discussion regarding contemplated

policies and decisions. FTC v. Warner, 742 F.2d at 1161. The

court may also take into account (5) the interest of the litigant,

and society, in accurate judicial fact finding, North Pacifica, LLC

v. City of Pacifica, 274 F. Supp 2d 1118, 1122 (N.D. Cal. 2003),

United States v. Irvin, 127 F.R.D. 169, 173 (C.D. Cal 1989); and

(6) the seriousness of the litigation and the issues involved,

Irvin, 127 F.R.D. at 174.

As with privileges generally, the deliberative process

privilege should be narrowly construed because confidentiality may

impede full and fair discovery of the truth. See Eureka Fin. Corp.

v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 136 F.R.D. 179, 183 (E.D. Cal.

1991)(citing Weil v. Investment/Indicators, Research and

Management, Inc., 647 F.2d 18, 24 (9th Cir. 1981)); see also North

Pacifica, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 1122 (deliberative process privilege

is “strictly confined within the narrowest possible limits

consistent with the logic of its principles.”) 

///

///

///

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3

 Plaintiffs do not contend that the second procedural

requirement (that the information for which privilege is claimed

must be specified and precise and certain reasons given for

asserting confidentiality) has not been satisfied.

7

III.

Analysis

For the reasons discussed herein, the court concludes that the

Magistrate Judge did not err in finding that the documents are

protected by the deliberative process privilege. However, given

that the privilege is qualified, it appears to the court that

plaintiffs may obtain at least some of the documents in question

as their “need for the materials and the need for accurate factfinding override the government’s interest in non-disclosure.” FTC

v. Warner, 742 F.2d at 1161. 

A. Procedural Requirements 

As a preliminary matter, plaintiffs assert that the Magistrate

Judge erred in finding that the privilege was asserted by the

appropriate head of the agency.3 The court cannot agree.

In order to assert the deliberative process privilege, there

must be a “formal claim of privilege, lodged by the head of the

department which has control over the matter, after actual personal

consideration by that officer,” Rozet, 183 F.R.D. at 665 (citing

Unites States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1953)).

The Supreme Court has provided the following standard for the

invocation of executive privileges such as the deliberative process

privilege:

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4

 The requirement that the privilege be invoked by the agency

head is not always applied literally, see e.g., Smith v. Federal

Trade Com., 403 F. Supp. 1000, 1017 (D. Del. 1975)(allowing

Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission to assert the privilege

rather than the Secretary). However, the duty to invoke the

privilege cannot be delegated so far down the chain of command that

purposes of the requirement are undermined, see Coastal Corp. v.

Duncan, 86 F.R.D. 514, 516-17 (D. Del. 1980) (disallowing the

Assistant Administrator of a sub-agency to assert the privilege

over Department of Energy documents rather than the Secretary of

Energy). 

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There must be a formal claim of privilege, lodged by the

head of the department which has control over the

matter, after actual personal consideration by that

officer. The court itself must determine whether the

circumstances are appropriate for a claim of privilege

. . . 

Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1953).

The purpose of this requirement is to assure “that some one

in a position of high authority” within the agency has examined the

materials “from a vantage point involving both expertise and an

overview-type perspective,” and actually believes the items to be

privileged. Rozet, 183 F.R.D. at 665.4 

Here, the privilege was asserted by John Monday, Executive

Officer of the BPH and Bernard Warner, Chief Deputy Secretary of

the DJJ. Plaintiffs argue that the privilege should have been

asserted by James Tilton, as the head of the CDCR, or an executive

official with authority over budget decisions such as the Governor,

a high level official in the Governor’s office, or the Director of

the Department of Finance. Pls.’ Req. for Reconsideration at 10-

11, (“Pls.’ Req.”). 

The Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that John Monday and Bernard

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 The plaintiffs do not contest that the documents are

deliberative in nature. 

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Warner were appropriate department heads to assert the privilege

is not clearly erroneous or contrary to law. The BCPs in question

are the work product of the DJJ and BPH departments of the CDCR.

The memoranda and emails are primarily between employees in these

departments, discussing clarification of figures for the BCPs,

decisions to appeal Department of Finance (“DOF”) decisions

regarding these BCPs, and legal strategies. It is clear that the

DJJ and BPH are the relevant departments in this matter. Because

the Mr. Monday and Mr. Warner are high level officials within these

departments, the court declines to find that the Magistrate Judge

was clearly erroneous in his determination that these two officials

possessed the requisite expertise and overview perspective to

properly assert the deliberative process privilege over materials

created within their departments.

B. “Predecisional” and “Deliberative” Documents

Plaintiffs also contend that the Magistrate Judge erred in

concluding that the documents in question are predecisional. Pls.’

Req. at 11.5 The court cannot agree. 

In the Ninth Circuit, “[an] agency must identify a specific

decision to which the document is predecisional” in order to

successfully assert the deliberative process privilege. Maricopa

Audubon Soc'y v. United States Forest Serv., 108 F.3d 1089, 1094

(9th Cir. 1997). Here, defendants assert, and the Magistrate Judge

agreed, that the relevant decision is the Governor’s approval of

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6

 Each BCP in question contains some indication that it is

a draft. See, e.g., 2007-08 DJJ BCP and attachments (documents

bates stamped: 593-636)(including cover sheet but “XX” instead of

figures in the narrative); 2007-08 DJJ BCP and attachments

(documents bates stamped: 637-65)(containing handwritten notes,

which are incorporated into the typewritten text in the version of

the BCP at bates stamp 593-636).

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the final budget. Based on this determination, the Magistrate

Judge held that since the BCPs are but a prelude to the Governor’s

budget, they are predecisional. Order at 7-8.

Plaintiffs contend that if executives of the DJJ and BPH are

authorized to assert the privilege, as was determined by the

Magistrate Judge, then the relevant decision must be the final BCPs

that the DJJ and BPH forwarded to the DOF. Plaintiffs contend that

the BCPs in question are therefore not predecisional documents, but

rather embodiments of final agency decisions. Pls.’ Req. at 11-12.

Plaintiffs’ argument is unpersuasive for two reasons. First,

they cite no authority (and indeed, the court can find none) for

the proposition that the decision that makes the documents predecisional must correspond with the agency head asserting the

privilege. Whether the appropriate agency head asserted the

privilege is a distinct question from whether the document is

predecisional. There is simply no legal authority to support

plaintiffs’ contention. 

Second, even assuming, arguendo, that the relevant decision

is the BPH and DJJ’s decision to submit BCPs to the DOF, the

documents in question are clearly predecisional as they appear to

be draft BCPs and documents related to those drafts.6

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7

 Plaintiffs additionally cite the court’s June 14, 2006

Order in Coleman v. Schwarzenegger (finding that BCPs created by

the CDCR were not protected by the deliberative process privilege)

for the proposition that BCPs are not predecisional. However, this

assertion is misplaced. Privilege was denied in Coleman not

because BCPs are not predecisional, but rather because it was the

deliberative process of the agency itself which was in question.

Where the agency’s deliberative process is at issue, the

deliberative process privilege does not apply. See In re Subpoena

Duces Tecum Served on the Office of the Comptroller of the

Currency, 145 F.3d 1422, 1424 (D.C. Cir. 1998) In the June 2006

Order in Coleman, the court stated: “Put directly, the court

requires the BCPs in part to determine whether the state’s

deliberative process is frustrating the ability of the state to

comply with the courts orders.” See Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, No.

CIV S-90-0520 LKK-JFM, June 14, 2006 Order, Doc. #1840. In the

case at bar, it is the policies and procedures of the CDCR that are

being challenged, not the deliberative process behind those

policies. The court’s June 14, 2006 Order in Coleman is therefore

irrelevant to the issue of whether BCPs are predecisional in this

case. 

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The standard under which the District Court reviews a

Magistrate Judge’s decision is a highly deferential one, wherein

the court reverses a Magistrate Judge’s decision only if the

decision was clearly erroneous or contrary to law. Ainsworth, 759

F. Supp. at 1469. Because the question of which decision within

the state’s budget process is the relevant one appears, at best,

uncertain, and because it could reasonably be interpreted that the

Governor’s approval of the budget is the relevant decision for the

purposes of the privilege, the court cannot find that the

Magistrate Judge’s order was clearly erroneous or contrary to law.7

C. Qualified Privilege

Even if the requirements above are satisfied and the privilege

applies, the privilege is qualified and may be overcome if the need

for accurate fact-finding outweighs the government’s interest in

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non-disclosure. FTC v. Warner, 742 F.2d at 1161. Plaintiffs

allege that the Magistrate Judge erred in two ways: (1) by

erroneously determining that the documents are not relevant to the

litigation and (2) by failing to properly weigh the competing

interests under balancing test required by FTC v. Warner. Pls.’

Req. at 13. 

Although the Magistrate Judge set forth the four FTC v. Warner

factors in the “standards” section of his order, only one paragraph

is devoted to analysis of these factors. The order reads, in

pertinent part, 

Nor does plaintiffs’ contention that the BCPs are highly

relevant to their claims hold water. Whether defendants

were good, bad, or indifferent in their alleged intent to

violate plaintiffs’ rights is not particularly

significant in this injunctive relief case. Either

plaintiffs’ due process, equal protection and ADA rights

were violated, or they were not. Plaintiffs do not assert

that they must demonstrate any state of mind on the part

of defendants in order to prevail. The court questioned

defendants whether they were raising some type of

“feasibility” defense, in which case, of course, budget

documents would be very relevant. Defendants represented

that they were not, and their answer in this case

contains no such affirmative defense. 

Order at 11. This court respectfully disagrees with the Magistrate

Judge’s conclusion. As previously noted, under the FTC v. Warner

balancing test, courts should consider the following four factors:

(1) the relevance of the evidence sought to the litigation; (2) the

availability of other evidence; (3) the government's role in the

litigation; and (4) the extent to which disclosure would hinder

frank and independent discussion regarding contemplated policies

and decisions. FTC v. Warner, 742 F.2d at 1161. Courts may also

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consider (5) the interest of the litigant, and ultimately society,

in accurate judicial fact finding, North Pacifica, 274 F. Supp 2d

at 1122; and (6) the seriousness of the litigation and the issues

involved, id. 

Although the Magistrate Judge appears to have discussed the

first two factors, the order is silent as to the other factors.

The standard for discovery is that the requested matters may lead

to relevant evidence. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S.

340, 351 (1978). Thus even a finding that the documents are not

directly relevant would not lead to the conclusion that they were

not discoverable. As explained below, even the finding of

irrelevance is open to doubt. In any event, the court finds that

with respect to the BCPs, the need for fact-finding outweighs the

government’s interest in non-disclosure. Because the Magistrate

Judge did not fully engage in the balancing test and address each

of the factors set forth in FTC v. Warner, the court finds that the

Magistrate Judge’s conclusion is contrary to law.

1. Relevance 

The gravamen of plaintiffs’ complaint is that the parole

revocation system violates their due process rights. As in

Valdivia v. Daivs, the court looks to Mathews v. Elridge to

determine what process is due. See Valdivia v. Davis, 206 

F.Supp. 2d 1068, 1072 (E.D. Cal. 2002) (Karlton, J.). Under

Mathews, the determination of what process is due, “requires

consideration of three distinct factors:” (1) the private interest

affected by the official action, (2) the probable value of any

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additional procedural safeguards, and (3) “the government’s

interest, including the fiscal and administrative burdens that

additional or substitute procedural requirements would entail.”

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 

It appears that at least some of the documents in question

pertain to the third prong of the Mathews test, namely, the 

fiscal and administrative burdens associated with increasing

procedural safeguards. A central component of this litigation will

be determining the level of public burden associated with

additional procedures in order to determine what level of process

is constitutionally required. 

The BCPs and associated attachments represent the DJJ and

BPH’s own estimates of the types of additional procedures necessary

to come into Constitutional compliance, and the estimated costs

associated with such procedures. The 2007-08 BCPs (documents bates

stamped: 543-636; 637-665; 855-878; 838-855) provide detailed

projections of the financial burden associated with providing

parole revocation hearings within a certain amount of time and with

a certain staffing level. The analysis includes projected workload

and funds needed for additional staffing, broken down by tasks such

as actual time spent in probable cause hearings, revocation

hearings, travel time, rest breaks, and miscellaneous additional

time such as escorting parolees and administrative tasks. Other

BCP documents reflect expected time needed for attorney training,

and developing tracking systems and review procedures. 

These documents clearly provide estimates of the fiscal and

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 The court notes that even if the deliberative process

privilege did not protect these tangential documents, these

documents may be independently protected as work product or under

the attorney-client privilege.

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administrative burden of providing due process to juvenile

parolees. The Magistrate Judge’s order does not mention the

Mathews test, and rather focuses on defendant’s contention that

feasability will not be raised as a defense. The Mathews test does

not speak of the “defense” of feasability; rather, it sets forth

three considerations necessary in the evaluation of what process

is due. 

Though the BCPs are relevant to the third prong of the Mathews

due process test, the same cannot be said for the remainder of the

documents. As previously mentioned, there are 201 documents at

issue. While the documents are not clearly labeled, the court has

conducted an independent in camera review of the documents and as

best the court can decipher, only some of these documents

constitute BCPs. The other documents, such as emails, personal

notes, and diagrams discuss legal strategy, respond to questions

from the DOF regarding BCPs, and the decision to appeal the DOF’s

recommendation. This information is merely tangential to the data

provided by the BCPs, and sheds little light on the third prong of

the Mathews test. With respect to these documents, the court finds

that they are not relevant.8

In sum, the BCPs appear relevant to the third prong of the

Mathews test and accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of

disclosure. 

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 An unpublished decision from the Northern District supports

the court’s position. In Sanchez v. Johnson, plaintiffs challenged

the State’s developmental disabilities services and filed a motion

to compel disclosure of agency BCPs. The court ordered the

documents disclosed: 

[T]he BCPs...as well as drafts of those documents are highly

relevant to Plaintiffs’ claims. They contain detailed facts

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2. Availability of Comparable Evidence from Other Sources

Defendants assert that the privilege should apply to these

documents because there is other evidence available, namely final

BCPs, depositions, and written discovery. In his order, the

Magistrate Judge determined that the documents should remain

protected because the “final budgets for the years in question” are

available to plaintiffs. Order at 11:16.

Though the final BCPs shed some light on the administrative

burden associated with due process compliance, the final BCPs are

revised versions, created after the agencies have received

recommendations from the DOF. As previously noted, the draft BCPs

contain in-depth analysis of the need for budget adjustment, and

analyze the costs and burdens associated with providing probable

cause and revocation hearings within a certain amount of time. 

Plaintiffs suggest, and an independent review of the BCPs

confirms, that the Governor’s final budget contains information

substantially inferior to the agencies’ own budget requests. The

Governor’s final budget contains only a skeletal outline of funding

and positions granted to the CDCR’s juvenile parole budget, as

opposed to the BCPs, which contain detailed analysis of new

positions needed.9 For these reasons, this factor weighs in favor

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and analysis concerning the adequacy of funding for various

programs....While some of the factual information contained

in these documents may be available elsewhere, it is obvious

that the quality and persuasiveness of such evidence is

likely to be substantially inferior to the agencies’ own

budget requests, which provide detailed analysis by those

encharged with administering the State programs...

Sanchez. Johnson, No. C-00-1593 CW (N.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2001).

10 Plaintiffs cite North Pacifica and Newport Pacific Inc.

for the proposition that the Magistrate Judge should have

additionally considered that (1) the government is the defendant

and (2) the litigation is constitutional and of serious import.

Pls.’ Request at 17. However, this assertion is a

mischaracterization of the two cases. In both cases, the

government’s decision-making process (and in North Pacifica, the

intent of the decision-makers) was in question, and that is what

“tip[ped] the scales in favor of disclosure.” Newport Pac. Inc.,

200 F.R.D. 628, 640 (S.D. Cal. 2001); See also North Pacifica, 274

F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1124 (N.D. Cal. 2003). Because neither the

decision-making process nor intent of the government is at issue

in the case at bar, the court does not find that the Magistrate

Judge’s order was clearly erroneous in failing to explicitly

consider these cases. 

17

of disclosure. 

3. The Government’s Role in Litigation

Under FTC v. Warner, the court considers the role of the

government in the litigation. 742 F.2d at 1161-62. Plaintiffs

assert that the Magistrate Judge “did not touch upon this factor

at all” in his analysis, thereby committing clear error. Pls.’

Req. at 17:15.

Contrary to plaintiffs’ contention, the Magistrate Judge did

discuss the role of the government in this litigation, albeit, in

the context of misconduct. See Order at 9-11.10 In this regard,

the Magistrate Judge considered the government’s interest in this

litigation. The role of the government in this litigation is

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11 When the BCPs were disclosed in the Coleman case, the court

specifically ordered that the documents be turned over to the

Special Master under seal. See Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, No. CIV

S-90-0520 LKK-JFM, June 14, 2006 Order, Doc. #1840

12 The court in Sanchez v. Johnson, No. C-00-0593 at 18 (N.D.

Cal. Nov. 19, 2001) reached a similar conclusion in finding that

the disclosure of BCPs “intrudes minimally and without prejudice

into agency deliberations,” while production of internal emails,

and memoranda “may result in far greater intrusion.” Id. The court

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significant, and weighs in plaintiffs’ favor. 

 4. Extent Disclosure Will Chill Agency Discussion

Under the fourth factor of the FTC v. Warner balancing test,

the court considers, “the extent to which disclosure would hinder

frank and independent discussion regarding contemplated policies

and decisions.” FTC v. Warner, 742 F.2d at 1161. The Magistrate

Judge’s order did not address this factor.

Defendants argue that releasing the BCPs in the instant case

would discourage “candid discussions to consider changes in the

budget.” Defs.’ Opp’n at 9. This argument is unpersuasive. As

the parties are well aware, BCPs have been turned over to

plaintiffs in both the Valdiva and Coleman cases. Moreover,

defendants’ concerns may be mitigated by having the court issue a

protective order or have the documents disclosed under seal.11

See, e.g., Price v. County of San Diego, 165 F.R.D. 614, 620 (S.D.

Cal. 1996) (“the Court is convinced that the infringement upon the

frank and independent discussions regarding contemplated policies

and decisions of the County . . .can be alleviated through the use

of a strict protective order against use or dissemination of the

materials outside of this lawsuit.”).12

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also noted that 32 states make agency budget requests part of the

public record, “apparently without any chilling effect.” Id. The

Sanchez court compelled production of BCPs and draft BCPs under a

protective order in order to reduce any harm that might result from

ordering the production. Id.

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In sum, because the government’s concerns about hindering

frank discussion can be mitigated via a protective order or

disclosure under seal, this factor does not weigh heavily on the

side of non-disclosure.

5. Need for Accurate Fact Finding and Seriousness of 

Litigation

In addition to the FTC v. Warner factors, the court may also

consider the interest of the litigant, and ultimately society, in

accurate judicial fact finding, North Pacifica 274 F. Supp. 2d at

1122, Irvin, 127 F.R.D. at 173, and the seriousness of the

litigation and the issues involved, Irvin, 127 F.R.D. at 174. The

Magistrate Judge did not address these factors.

The desirability of accurate fact finding weighs in favor of

disclosure. See North Pacifica, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 1124.

Moreover, when the issues involved are alleged violations of

federally-protected civil rights, courts have consistently found

that this need is heightened and the privilege is outweighed. See

United States v. Phoenix Union High School, 681 F.2d 1235 (9th Cir.

1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1191 (1983); Newport Pacific, 200

F.R.D. at 640; Irvin, 127 F.R.D. at 174.

Plaintiffs’ allege that the State juvenile parole system is

in violation of the due process clause. This suit clearly involves

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13 Although the parties did not brief these issues on

plaintiffs’ request for reconsideration of the Magistrate Judge’s

order, the issues were fully briefed in the parties’ joint

statement regarding plaintiffs’ motion to compel. Accordingly, the

arguments regarding work-product and the attorney client privilege

as applied to the BCPs has been fully briefed and may be resolved

at this time. 

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serious questions of Constitutional magnitude and accordingly,

there is a societal interest in accurate fact-finding. See, e.g.,

Newport Pacific, 200 F.R.D. at 640 (where plaintiffs alleged

violations of the Federal Fair Housing Act and Section 1983, the

court concluded that “[t]he interest in enforcing these laws is not

exclusive to the individual. It is an interest common to every

citizen, including the federal government. As a result, this factor

again favors disclosure.”)

For these reason, the court finds that these final factors weigh

in favor of disclosure. 

D. Whether the BCPs are Protected by Other Privileges 

Because the Magistrate Judge found that the deliberative

process privilege applied, he did not address the question of

whether the BCPs would be protected by either the attorney-client

privilege or the work-product doctrine.13 For the reasons

explained herein, the court concludes that the BCPs are not

protected by either of these alternative privileges. 

1. Work Product Doctrine

Defendants assert that many of the BCPs in question are nondiscoverable because they fall under the work product doctrine. The

court cannot agree. 

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“The work-product doctrine is a qualified immunity which

protects from discovery documents and tangible things prepared by

a party or that party’s representative in anticipation litigation.”

Kintera, Inc. v. Convio, Inc., 219 F.R.D. 503, 507 (S.D. Cal.

2003); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). As the party claiming the

privilege, defendants bear the burden of establishing that the

documents claimed as work product were in fact prepared in

anticipation of litigation. Kintera, at 507. 

In order for a document to be protected, it must be one "that

would not have been generated but for the pendency or imminence of

litigation." Kintera, 219 F.R.D. at 507 (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted). Accordingly, the doctrine does not protect

materials assembled in the ordinary course of business. Griffith

v. Davis, 161 F.R.D. 687, 698-699 (D. Cal. 1995). Rather, the

primary motivating purpose behind the creation of the documents

must be as an aid in possible future litigation. Id. 

It is evident that the BCPs and associated attachments in

question would have been prepared by the DJJ and BPH as part of the

routine budget procedure, regardless of any pending litigation.

Defendants fail to allege, much less meet their burden, that the

BCPs were created in anticipation of litigation. See Joint

Statement Re: Pls.’ Mot. To Compel at 33. Accordingly, the BCPS

are not protected by the work-product doctrine. See Griffith, at

698 (no protection for materials assembled in the normal course of

business).

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2. Attorney Client Privilege

Defendants also assert attorney-client privilege over some of

the BCPs and attachments in question. The attorney-client

privilege protects “communications between client and attorney for

the purpose of obtaining legal advice, provided such communications

were intended to be confidential.” Gomez v. Vernon, 255 F.3d 1118,

1131 (9th Cir. 2001). “Because the attorney-client privilege has

the effect of withholding relevant information from the factfinder, it is applied only when necessary to achieve its limited

purpose of encouraging full and frank disclosure by the client to

his or her attorney.” Clarke v. American Commerce Nat’l Bank, 974

F.2d 127, 129 (9th Cir. 1992)(citing Fisher v. United States, 425

U.S. 391, 403 (1976)). As the party asserting the privilege,

defendants bear the burden of establishing that the attorney-client

privilege applies. Clarke, 974 F.2d at 129.

Defendants have failed to establish that the BCPs and

attachments in question are communications between attorney and

client, nor that they were intended to be confidential. Unlike

some of the emails the court finds to be protected under the

deliberative process privilege, these documents do not appear to

be communications between the agency and its attorneys; rather they

are drafts of documents to be submitted to another department for

approval. Therefore, the court concludes that the BCPs and

attachments in question are not protected by the attorney-client

privilege. 

////

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14 Because the email communications and memoranda do not

provide information relevant to the Mathews test, these remain

protected by the deliberative process privilege and shall not be

disclosed. 

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IV.

Conclusion

The Magistrate Judge was not in error in finding that the

documents in question are protected by the deliberative process

privilege. That said, the privilege is qualified and as explained

above, it may be overcome if the “need for the materials and the

need for accurate fact-finding override the government’s interest

in non-disclosure.” FTC v. Warner, 742 F.2d at 1161. The

Magistrate Judge’s order failed to fully analyze this question.

Having conducted an independent in camera review of the documents

at issue, and having analyzed the balancing test forth in FTC v.

Warner, the court concludes that the need for BCPs and for accurate

fact finding outweighs the government’s interest in non-disclosure.

Specifically, the BCPs are relevant in evaluating the

administrative burden associated with increased procedural

protections.14

Accordingly, the court orders as follows: 

1. Plaintiffs’ Request for Reconsideration is GRANTED. 

2. The defendants shall produce the following documents

under seal to plaintiffs no later than close of business

on July 13, 2007: 

////

////

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Bates # Document Title 

[593-636] 2007-2008 Budget Change Proposal (BCP)

“Division of Juvenile Justice Parolee Due

Process”

[637-665] 2007-2008 Budget Change Proposal (BCP)

“Division of Juvenile Justice Parolee Due

Process”

[855-878] 2007-2008 Budget Change Proposal (BCP)

“Division of Juvenile Justice Parolee Due

Process”

[838-855] 2007-2008 Budget Change Proposal (BCP)

“Board of Parole Hearings – Youthful

Offender Hearing Services, Parolee Due

Process”

[671-696] 2006-2007 Legislative Proposal Package

“Division of Juvenile Justice/BPH - Youth

Board, Valdivia/Morrissey Hearing

Enhancement”

[821-826] 2006-2007 Legislative Proposal Package

“Division of Juvenile Justice/BPH - Youth

Board, Valdivia/Morrissey Hearing

Enhancement”

[697-716] 2005-2006 Budget Change Proposal (BCP)

“Youth Authority Board/Department of the

Youth Authority, Morrissey Hearing

Enhancements (Valdivia Concept)”

[716-720] 2005-2006 Legislative Proposal

“Youth Authority Board/Department of the

Youth Authority, Valdivia/Morrissey

Hearing Enhancement”

[721-723] 2004-2005 Budget Change Proposal

“Youth Authority Board/Department of the

Youth Authority, Morrissey Hearing

Enhancements (Valdivia Concept)”

[755-65] Draft BCP attached to Dec. 17 Memo

[743-47] Undated document: “Response to the

Department of Finance BCP

Recommendations”

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[748-49] Document dated Nov. 13, 2006: “Response

to the Department of Finance BCP

Recommendations”

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: July 6, 2007.

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