Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-01618/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-01618-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 17:501 Copyright Infringement

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRIGHT SOLUTIONS FOR DYSLEXIA, 

INC., et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

DOE 1 A.K.A. MARCUS LEE,

Defendant.

Case No. 15-cv-01618-JSC 

ORDER RE: EX PARTE 

APPLICATION FOR EXPEDITED 

DISCOVERY AND PRESERVATION 

ORDER

Re: Dkt. No. 14

Plaintiffs Bright Solutions for Dyslexia, Inc., (“Bright Solutions”) and Susan Barton 

(“Barton,” and together, “Plaintiffs”), filed suit against Doe 1 a.k.a. “Marcus Lee,” and a number 

of other individual Doe Defendants and Roe entities (collectively, “Defendants”), alleging 

trademark counterfeiting, trademark infringement, copyright infringement, and vicarious and 

contributory copyright infringement. (Dkt. No. 1.) Now pending before the Court is Plaintiffs’ ex 

parte application for expedited discovery and for an order directing third parties to preserve 

evidence. (Dkt. No. 14.) The Court finds the requests suitable for disposition without oral 

argument, see Civ. L.R. 7-1(b), and VACATES the hearing set for August 20, 2015. For the 

reasons discussed below, the Court ORDERS Plaintiffs to make a supplemental filing.

BACKGROUND

Barton is the founder and chief executive officer of Bright Solutions, and also author and 

owner of the copyrighted Barton Reading & Spelling System (“Barton System”), a program and 

course materials for instructing dyslexic students in literacy. (Dkt. No. 14-2 ¶¶ 1, 3.) Barton owns 

registered copyrights for a number of course materials used in the Barton System. (Id. ¶ 8 & Ex. 

1.) In addition, Bright Solutions owns two trademarks associated with the materials and Barton 

owns a third. (Id. ¶ 9 & Ex. 2.)

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This action also involves three third-party entities. Third party Google, Inc. (“Google”) is 

a “provider of electronic communication services.” In re Google, Inc. Privacy Policy Litig., No. 

C-12-01382-PSG, 2013 WL 6248499, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2013). Third party eBay, Inc. 

(“eBay”) is “a commerce technology company well known for the online marketplace it operates 

through its website at www.ebay.com.” Locata LBS, LLC v. Yellowpages.com, LLC, No. LA 

CV13-07895 JAK (SHx) et al., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81050, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2014). 

Third party PayPal, Inc. (“PayPal”), a “wholly owned subsidiary of eBay, id s ‘payment 

technology company’ that allows payments and transfers of money to be made at its website, 

www.paypal.com.” Id.

Plaintiffs allege that in February 2015 Defendant Doe 1, using the eBay username 

“kingmarco14,” listed for sale by eBay auction a set of Barton System materials, including text, 

software, and titles, which were counterfeit copies of Barton’s copyrighted materials. (Dkt. No. 

14-2 ¶¶ 10-13.) Barton discovered the counterfeit sale when the purchaser, Jacquelyn Lundberg, 

who had received the materials she purchased from “kingmarco14,” called Barton to activate her 

software but was not listed in Plaintiffs’ database of authorized sales, and confirmed the 

counterfeit nature of the products by their distinct binding and packaging, though it was made to 

imitate packing for authentic, authorized Barton System materials. (Id. ¶¶ 10-11.) In 

conversations with Ms. Lundberg, Barton learned that the eBay seller “kingmarco14” identified 

himself as “Marcus Lee” and listed his shipping address in Newport, California and his email 

address “marcuslee@gmail.com[.]” (Id. ¶ 13.) Later in 2015, Plaintiffs discovered five more 

listings of counterfeit Barton System materials by “kingmarco14” and three completed sales. (Id.

¶ 14; Dkt. No. 14-3 ¶¶ 3-4.) Barton spoke with two other “kingmarco14” customers in March 

after they purchased materials from him. (Dkt. No. 14-2 ¶ 14.) Plaintiffs sent “takedown” notices 

pursuant to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) to eBay regarding the counterfeit 

listings posted by “kingmarco14,” and eBay confirmed removal. (Dkt. No. 14-3 ¶¶ 4-7 & Exs. 3-

7.)

In June 2015 Plaintiffs discovered another posting selling infringing Barton System 

materials posted by eBay user “nikewatches.” (Id. ¶ 8.) After a takedown notice, eBay confirmed 

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removal of the posting. (Id. ¶¶ 9-10 & Exs. 9-10.) The same thing happened in July 2015 with a 

user named “tryusinghonesty.” (Id. ¶¶ 11-13 & Exs. 11-13.) The materials posted for sale by 

“nikewatches” and “tryusinghonesty” use the same binding and packaging as the “kingmarco14” 

materials that Plaintiffs’ authorized printers do not use. (Dkt. No. 14-2 ¶¶ 15-16.) Plaintiffs worry

that customers will be dissatisfied with the quality of the unlicensed goods and frustrated with the 

inability to access support, online software, and other features available to purchasers of 

authorized sales or resales of the Barton System materials. (Id. ¶ 18.)

Plaintiffs’ counsel has repeatedly sought to identify “kingmarco14” through his identified 

name, Marcus Lee, using public records searches, including a Lexis records database of persons 

named Marcus Lee within 50 miles of Newport Beach, California, as well as Spokeo, which 

searches social media websites, but have been unable to do so. (Dkt. No. 14-3 ¶ 15.) Plaintiffs’ 

counsel likewise has been unable to determine any identity information for eBay users 

“nikewatches” and “tryusinghonesty.” (Id. ¶ 16.) A law clerk working at Plaintiffs’ counsel’s law 

firm avers that “companies such as Google, eBay, and PayPal may only retain information deleted 

from user accounts or in inactive accounts in the ordinary course of business for only a limited 

time, for example up to six months in the case of Google (barring a court order or other legal 

requirement to preserve information).” (Id. ¶ 17.)

Plaintiffs filed the instant complaint on April 8, 2015. (Dkt. No. 1.) On July 8, 2015, 

Plaintiffs filed a case management statement indicating that the true identities of Defendants 

remained unknown to them. (Dkt. No. 12 at 2.) Plaintiffs filed the instant ex parte application for 

early discovery and preservation orders directed to Google, eBay, and PayPal on August 7, 2015. 

(Dkt. No. 14.)

DISCUSSION

I. Early Discovery

A. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(d)(1) requires a court order for discovery if it is 

requested prior to a Rule 26(f) conference between the parties. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(1) (“A 

party may not seek discovery from any source before the parties have conferred as required by

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Rule 26(f), except . . . by court order.”). In fashioning Rule 26(d) discovery orders, the district 

court wields broad discretion. See Laub v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 342 F.3d 1080, 1093 (9th Cir. 

2003). 

Generally, courts within the Ninth Circuit apply a “good cause” standard to determine 

whether to permit such early discovery. See Semitool, Inc. v. Tokyo Electron Am., Inc., 208 

F.R.D. 273, 276 (N.D. Cal. 2002); see also G.N. Iheaku & Co. v. Does 1-3, No. C-14-02069 LB,

2014 WL 2759075, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 17, 2014) (collecting cases). “Good cause may be found 

where the need for expedited discovery, in consideration of the administration of justice, 

outweighs the prejudice of the responding party.” Id.

When the identities of defendants are not known before a complaint is filed, a plaintiff 

“should be given an opportunity through discovery to identify the unknown defendants, unless it is 

clear that discovery would not uncover the identities, or that the complaint would be dismissed on 

other grounds.” Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980). To determine whether 

there is “good cause” to permit expedited discovery to identify doe defendants, courts commonly 

consider whether:

(1) the plaintiff can identify the missing party with sufficient 

specificity such that the Court can determine that defendant is a real 

person or entity who could be sued in federal court; (2) the plaintiff 

has identified all previous steps taken to locate the elusive 

defendant; (3) the plaintiff’s suit against defendant could withstand a 

motion to dismiss; and (4) the plaintiff has demonstrated that there is 

a reasonable likelihood of being able to identify the defendant 

through discovery such that service of process would be possible.

OpenMind Solutions, Inc. v. Does 1-39, No. 11–3311, 2011 WL 4715200, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct.7, 

2011) (citing Columbia Ins. Co.v. seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 578-80 (N.D. Cal. 1999)). 

Notably, in internet infringement cases in particular, “courts routinely find good cause 

exists to issue a Rule 45 subpoena to discover a Doe defendant’s identity prior to a Rule 26(f) 

conference, where a plaintiff makes a prima facie showing of infringement, there is no other way 

to identify the Doe defendant, and there is a risk an ISP will destroy its logs prior to the 

conference.” UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Doe, No. C 08-1193 SBA, 2008 WL 4104214, at *4 (N.D. 

Cal. Sept. 3, 2008) (collecting cases). This is because, in considering “the administration of 

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justice,” early discovery avoids ongoing, continuous harm to the infringed party and there is no 

other way to advance the litigation.” Id. (citation omitted). Moreover, there is no prejudice to the 

defendant “where the discovery request is narrowly tailored to only seek their identity.” Id.

(citations omitted).

B. Plaintiffs are Not Entitled to Early Discovery on This Record

In this internet infringement case, Plaintiffs have only met two of the three elements 

necessary to obtain expedited discovery.

First, Plaintiffs have made a prima facie showing of infringement. To establish copyright 

infringement, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to establish two elements: (1) ownership of a 

valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are original. Fiest Pub’n, 

Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991). Plaintiffs have made this showing by 

establishing that they own valid copyrights in the Barton System materials and providing 

screenshots and lists showing Defendants have offered the materials for sale on eBay without their 

permission. To establish trademark infringement, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to show: 

(1) it has a protectable ownership interest in the mark; and (2) the defendant’s use of the mark is 

likely to cause consumer confusion, mistake, or deception. Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced 

Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137, 1144 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). Plaintiffs have 

likewise made this showing by establishing that they own valid trademarks in the Barton Systems 

mark and that consumers are likely to be misled into thinking they have access to the online 

system associated with the Barton System as a whole when they do not. In fact, Barton’s 

declaration indicates that consumers have already been confused about the origin of the counterfeit 

products they purchased, contacting Barton after purchasing the materials online. Thus, Plaintiffs 

have met the first element of good cause for expedited discovery in an internet infringement case.

Plaintiffs have also adequately alleged the third element: the risk that eBay, PayPal, and 

Google could destroy the account information for these users absent expedited discovery as it is 

their usual practice to destroy information deleted from user accounts after a certain number of 

months rather than saving and storing the information on backup drives. Plaintiffs have therefore 

met the third element of good cause for expedited discovery in an internet infringement action.

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But Plaintiffs have not met the second element—that Plaintiffs cannot discover the 

identities of the alleged infringers—“kingmarco14,” “nikewatches,” and “tryusinghonesty”—other 

than by expedited discovery. See UMG Recordings, Inc., 2008 WL 4104214, at *4; see also 

Columbia Ins. Co., 185 F.R.D. at 579 (noting that prior to seeking early discovery, a plaintiff must 

demonstrate that it has “ma[d]e a good faith effort to comply with the requirements of service of 

process and specifically identif[y] defendants”). For example, in Columbia, the plaintiff sought 

leave to conduct early discovery to learn the identity of the owners or operators of certain domain 

names. Id. The court found that the plaintiff had made a sufficient good faith effort to identify the 

unknown defendant where plaintiff’s counsel called the phone numbers listed in an online 

directory and sent email and hardcopies of the pending pleadings to the contact information listed 

on that directory. Id.

The state of the record precludes the Court from finding that Plaintiffs have made similar 

efforts here. While Plaintiffs have alleged that they ran public record searches to discover the 

identities of Defendants using their eBay usernames, but were unable to do so, and that searches of 

“Marcus Lee” within 50 miles of the shipping address that “kingmarco14” gave his customer 

yielded no results, this argument puts the cart before the proverbial horse. Specifically, Barton 

avers that she had conversations with customers who purchased the counterfeit materials from 

“kingmarco14” and at least one such customer—Ms. Lundberg—shared that user’s shipping 

address with Barton. (Dkt. No. 14-2 ¶ 13.) The Barton Declaration does not indicate whether that 

customer has or provided her with the full shipping address, but Plaintiff at least bears the burden 

of determining whether Ms. Lundberg has the full shipping address and thus information that 

could lead to the identity of the infringer. See Columbia Ins. Co., 185 F.R.D. at 579; cf. Skout, 

Inc. v. Jen Processing, Ltd., No. 14-cv-02341-JSC, 2014 WL 3897166, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 

2014) (denying plaintiff’s request for expedited discovery where the record indicated that the 

plaintiff had failed to make any effort to identify the doe defendants through the contact 

information to which it had access). The Barton Declaration is likewise silent as to whether the 

other two customers provided, or Plaintiffs even sought, the complete shipping address for 

“kingmarco14” in an effort to identify the infringer using that address. (Dkt. No. 14-2 ¶ 14.) It 

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may well be that the customers transacted with “kingmarco14” solely online and had no other 

information about the user’s shipping address aside from the listed city of origin for the materials. 

But the record before the Court is unclear. The Court therefore reserves ruling on the application 

for early discovery to allow Plaintiffs to supplement the application to provide further information 

about whether the customers who contacted Barton had a complete shipping address for 

“kingmarco14” and, if so, what efforts Plaintiffs have made to discover the identity of the 

infringer through such information.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, the Court reserves ruling on the application for expedited 

discovery. Plaintiffs shall supplement the application to provide information about the concerns 

discussed above on or before August 27, 2015. The Court will address Plaintiffs’ request for a 

preservation order at that time.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 13, 2015

________________________

JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY

United States Magistrate Judge

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