Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-15-01690/USCOURTS-ca3-15-01690-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 720
Nature of Suit: Labor Management Relations Act
Cause of Action: 

---

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

__________________________

No. 15-1690

__________________________

JAMES HUGHES; MELISSA HUGHES; 

JOHN K. HUGHES; BEVERLY HUGHES,

 Appellants 

v.

UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC; 

INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF 

TEAMSTERS, LOCAL 623; JOHN DOES 1-10

______________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

(D.C. Civ. Action No. 2-14-cv-03822)

District Judge: Honorable R. Barclay Surrick

_____________

Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

January 21, 2016

______________

Before: JORDAN, HARDIMAN, and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges.

(Opinion Filed: February 1, 2016)

Case: 15-1690 Document: 003112194535 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/01/2016
______________

OPINION*

______________

GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge.

James Hughes and John K. Hughes (collectively, “Appellants”), along with their 

respective spouses, appeal from the dismissal of their complaint pursuant to the Rule

12(b)(6) Motion filed by Appellees, United Parcel Service, Inc. (“UPS”), and the 

International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 623 (“Teamsters”). For the reasons set 

forth below, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.

I. BACKGROUND

Appellants are employees of UPS and members of the Teamsters union. 

Appellants had worked for UPS as part-time “air drivers” for twelve years and attained an 

hourly pay rate of $23.70 when, in January 2012, they learned that full-time positions 

were opening. Appellants allege that they asked certain members of the Teamsters 

whether their rate of pay would change if they became full-time employees and were told 

that it would not. “Based on these representations, the collective bargaining agreement 

[(“CBA”)], and the job descriptions for the full-time positions, [Appellants] applied for 

and were hired by Defendant, UPS[,] for full-time employment as air drivers.” (App. 

25.) When they received their first paycheck as full-time employees, Appellants 

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 

does not constitute binding precedent.

Case: 15-1690 Document: 003112194535 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/01/2016
discovered that their hourly rate of pay had dropped to $13.50 and that their seniority had 

been eliminated. 

Upon discovering the reduction in their rate of pay, Appellants “immediately 

contacted UPS” and were told that “their previous wages would not be restored.” (App. 

26.) Appellants allege that they contacted the National Labor Relations Board, which 

was unable to help, and filed grievances with the Teamsters.1 

On June 4, 2014, Appellants and their spouses filed a state court complaint against 

UPS and the Teamsters, in which they alleged breach of contract (Count One); violation 

of Pennsylvania Wage and Payment Collection Law (Count Two); unjust enrichment 

(Count Three); loss of consortium (Count Four); and violation of the Fair Labor 

Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (Count Five).2 

On June 19, 2014, the Teamsters removed the matter to the United States District 

Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on the ground that Appellants’ claims all 

arose under the CBA and were thus preempted by Section 301 of the Labor Management 

Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (“Section 301”).3 The Teamsters then moved 

 

1 Appellants have not argued that they complied with the grievance procedure set 

forth in Article 49 of the CBA, discussed below.

2 Appellants ultimately withdrew the claims alleged in Count Five in their 

omnibus response to Appellees’ motions to dismiss. 

3 Section 301 confers federal jurisdiction on claims arising under CBAs. See N.J. 

Carpenters & Trs. Thereof v. Tishman Constr. Corp. of N.J., 760 F.3d 297, 302 (3d Cir. 

2014) (noting that “complete preemption ‘operates to confer original federal subject 

matter jurisdiction notwithstanding the absence of a federal cause of action on the face of 

the complaint,’” and that Section 301 of the LMRA is one of only three examples of 

Case: 15-1690 Document: 003112194535 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/01/2016
to dismiss, and Appellants amended their complaint. Both the Teamsters and UPS 

moved to dismiss Appellants’ amended complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). 4

On March 6, 2015, the District Court granted Appellees’ motion and dismissed 

Appellants’ complaint with prejudice. Hughes v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. CIV.A. 

14-3822, 2015 WL 1021312, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 6, 2015). The Court determined that, 

although Appellants did not attach the CBA, the CBA was “integral to and explicitly 

relied upon” in the complaint. Id. at *2–3. Thus, the Court considered the CBA, which 

UPS attached to its motion in full and which the Teamsters attached in part. Id. 

The District Court determined that Appellants’ claims arose out of their

employment relationship, which is governed by the CBA, and that the claims are

therefore preempted by Section 301. Id. at *4–5. Because federal labor law “requires 

that individual employees wishing to assert contract grievances must attempt use of the 

contract grievance procedure agreed upon by the employer and union as the mode of 

redress,” id. at *5 (quoting Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652 (1965)), 

the District Court determined that Appellants “were first required to exhaust their 

available administrative remedies prior to initiating this suit,” id. at *6.5 

 

complete preemption that the Supreme Court has recognized) (quoting In re U.S. 

Healthcare, Inc., 193 F.3d 151, 160 (3d Cir. 1999).)

4

 All references to the complaint in this opinion will be to the amended complaint, 

which did not differ substantially from the original complaint.

5 Although the District Court uses the term “administrative remedies,” that might 

be seen as a misnomer. The District Court’s reference is to the CBA grievance 

procedure, which is a contractual remedy, different in kind from the governmentCase: 15-1690 Document: 003112194535 Page: 4 Date Filed: 02/01/2016
The Court thus dismissed Appellants’ state-law claims for failure to exhaust the 

remedies available under the CBA. Id. The Court also dismissed the loss of consortium 

claims asserted by Appellants’ spouses, because those derivative claims could not 

proceed independently of Appellants’ claims. Id. The Court determined, finally, that

granting Appellants leave to amend their complaint would be futile given the dispositive 

nature of Appellants’ failure to exhaust the remedies available under the CBA. Id. The 

Court accordingly dismissed Appellants’ claims with prejudice. Id. at *7. This timely 

appeal followed.

II. JURISDICTION & STANDARD OF REVIEW

The District Court had jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 

This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

We review a district court’s decision to grant a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 

12(b)(6) de novo. Kaymark v. Bank of Am., N.A., 783 F.3d 168, 174 (3d Cir. 2015). 

Thus, “we accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most 

favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the 

complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 

799 F.3d 236, 242–43 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 

361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002)). 

“[C]onclusory or ‘bare-bones’ allegations will no longer survive a motion to 

dismiss.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Ashcroft 

 

provided administrative procedures and remedies one often thinks of when hearing the 

term “administrative remedies.”

Case: 15-1690 Document: 003112194535 Page: 5 Date Filed: 02/01/2016
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). Rather, “[t]o prevent dismissal, all civil complaints 

must now set out ‘sufficient factual matter’ to show that the claim is facially plausible.”

Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). 

III. ANALYSIS

Appellants raise three arguments on appeal. First, they contend that the District 

Court erred in considering the CBA because it was neither attached to nor integral to the 

complaint.6 Second, they assert that what they seek to litigate is an extra-CBA promise 

to pay that is not preempted by Section 301, and that the District Court should thus have 

remanded the case to state court in lieu of dismissing it. Finally, Appellants contend that 

they should have been granted leave to amend their complaint, to cure any perceived 

deficiencies. For the reasons set forth below, these claims are unavailing.

A. Consideration of the CBA

“In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must consider only the complaint, 

exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly 

authentic documents if the complainant’s claims are based upon these documents.” 

Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010). Even if a plaintiff does not attach 

the subject documents to the complaint, the court may consider them if a defendant 

 

6 Appellants also assert that the Court should not have considered the CBA 

because “movants’ motion did not attach the entirety of the CBA upon which there [sic] 

Respondents, Hughes’ [sic] could argue from the CBA contrarily.” (Appellants’ Br. 19.) 

Although the Teamsters proffered only portions of the CBA, UPS attached a complete 

copy of the agreement to its motion to dismiss. After UPS filed that motion, Appellants 

filed both a response and a sur-reply. Appellants thus had ample opportunity to argue 

“contrarily,” and this argument is without merit.

Case: 15-1690 Document: 003112194535 Page: 6 Date Filed: 02/01/2016
attaches them to a motion to dismiss. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. 

Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993).

“[A] ‘document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint’ may be 

considered ‘without converting the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment.’” 

Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting In re Burlington Coat 

Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir.1997)). When a plaintiff relies on a 

document without attaching it to the complaint, the plaintiff nevertheless has notice that 

the document will be at issue. Id. 

Because notice to the plaintiff is the principal reason for which courts decline to 

look beyond the complaint, the consideration of documents upon which the plaintiff 

relies does not implicate this rationale. Id. Indeed, failure to consider such documents 

would raise the countervailing concern that “a plaintiff with a legally deficient claim 

could survive a motion to dismiss simply by failing to attach a dispositive document on 

which it relied.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 998 F.2d at 1196.

Appellants contend that their complaint did not rely on the CBA. However, the 

complaint provides that, “[a]t all times material, Plaintiffs [sic] employment with 

Defendants was subject to a [CBA]. [In possession of Defendants].” (App. 26 (third 

bracketed phrase in original).) Appellants incorporated this statement in each of the 

counts alleged, and the dispute unquestionably arises out of Appellants’ employment. 

Appellants’ complaint demonstrates awareness of the CBA, mooting concerns of 

notice. Failure to consider this potentially dispositive document—invoked but not 

attached by Appellants—would raise the concerns addressed in Pension Benefit Guaranty 

Case: 15-1690 Document: 003112194535 Page: 7 Date Filed: 02/01/2016
Corp., 998 F.2d at 1196. We therefore find that the District Court did not err in 

considering the parties’ CBA.

B. Effect of the CBA

Consideration of the CBA, in turn, quickly reveals that the District Court also 

correctly dismissed Appellants’ complaint.

Section 301 provides:

Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a 

labor organization representing employees in an industry 

affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any 

such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court 

of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without 

respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the 

citizenship of the parties.

29 U.S.C. § 185(a). Section 301 completely preempts state-law claims that require 

interpretation of CBAs, Voilas v. Gen. Motors Corp., 170 F.3d 367, 373–74 (3d Cir. 

1999) (citing Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 394–95 (1987)), and converts 

the state-law claims into Section 301 claims to which “the statute of limitations for 

section 301 applies.” Berda v. CBS Inc., 881 F.2d 20, 28 (3d Cir. 1989).

This Court has recognized that, as a general matter, an employee who wishes to 

press contract-based grievances must endeavor to follow the grievance procedure upon 

which the employer and the union agreed prior to seeking judicial relief. Seborowski v. 

Pittsburgh Press Co., 188 F.3d 163, 168 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing Republic Steel Corp., 379 

U.S. at 652; Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 184 (1967)). More specifically, an employee 

who alleges that “the employer breached the [CBA] ‘is bound by terms of that agreement 

which govern the manner in which contractual rights may be enforced. For this reason, it 

Case: 15-1690 Document: 003112194535 Page: 8 Date Filed: 02/01/2016
is settled that the employee must at least attempt to exhaust exclusive grievance and 

arbitration procedures established by the bargaining agreement.’” Crafts v. Gen. Motors 

Corp., 192 F. Supp. 2d 310, 317 (D. Del. 2002) (quoting Vaca, 386 U.S. at 185); accord 

McCoy v. Maytag Corp., 495 F.3d 515, 524 (7th Cir. 2007) (“It is well settled that if a 

CBA establishes a grievance and arbitration procedure for the redress of employee 

complaints, employees wishing to assert claims based on a CBA first must exhaust the 

grievance procedure before resorting to a judicial remedy.”).

The CBA that governs Appellants’ employment delineates grievance procedures 

for “any controversy, complaint, misunderstanding or dispute arising as to interpretation, 

application or observance of any of the provisions of this Agreement or Supplements 

hereto.” (App. 73.) Appellants’ allegations that they called the NLRB and filed 

grievances with the Teamsters do not satisfy the multi-step processes set forth in the 

CBA. As the District Court noted, Appellants “have failed to exhaust the administrative 

remedies available to them under the terms of the CBA.” Hughes, 2015 WL 1021312, at 

*6. Appellants’ state-law claims were thus properly dismissed, as were their spouses’ 

claims for loss of consortium, which “must rise or fall” with the primary claims on which 

they depend. Banks v. Int’l Rental & Leasing Corp., 680 F.3d 296, 300 n.6 (3d Cir. 

2012).

C. Dismissal with Prejudice

Although Appellants now characterize the source of the dispute as “[a]n extraCBA promise to pay,” (Appellants’ Br. 15), the CBA controls the terms of Appellants’ 

employment, including their rate of pay. Indeed, Appellants framed their complaint

Case: 15-1690 Document: 003112194535 Page: 9 Date Filed: 02/01/2016
against the backdrop of the CBA, including a claim for breach of that agreement, as 

discussed above. It was not until their sur-reply brief that Appellants suggested their 

claim should be construed to involve this alleged “extra-CBA promise.” Hughes, 2015 

WL 1021312, at *6 n.3.

As this Court has noted, “[i]t is one thing to set forth theories in a brief; it is quite 

another to make proper allegations in a complaint.” Pa. ex rel. Zimmerman v. PepsiCo, 

Inc., 836 F.2d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1988). “[I]t is axiomatic that the complaint may not be 

amended by the briefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss.” Id. (alteration in original) 

(quoting Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1107 (7th Cir. 1984)). 

Further, Appellants did not raise this argument in their response brief, but only in their 

sur-reply, which is not permissible. Cf. United States v. Hoffecker, 530 F.3d 137, 163 (3d 

Cir. 2008) (noting that failure to raise argument in opening brief constitutes waiver 

thereof). The District Court did not err in declining to consider Appellants’ “extra-CBA 

promise” theory, which was not properly pled.

Nor did the District Court abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint with 

prejudice. See U.S. ex rel. Zizic v. Q2Administrators, LLC, 728 F.3d 228, 234 (3d Cir. 

2013) (“[W]e review the District Court’s dismissal of [a] complaint with prejudice for an 

abuse of discretion.” (citation omitted)). “[I]f a claim is vulnerable to dismissal under 

Rule 12(b)(6), but the plaintiff moves to amend, leave to amend generally must be 

granted unless the amendment would not cure the deficiency.” Shane v. Fauver, 213 

F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir. 2000).

Case: 15-1690 Document: 003112194535 Page: 10 Date Filed: 02/01/2016
Here, to the extent that Appellants assert an “extra-CBA promise,” that promise 

was allegedly made by two officers of the Teamsters. But the Teamsters’ duties of fair 

representation are limited to issues arising under the CBA by that document’s merger 

clause, which provides that “during the lifetime of this Agreement there shall be no 

demands for collective bargaining negotiations as to any matter or issue not covered by 

the provisions of this Agreement or for the renegotiations of any of the provisions of this 

agreement.” (App. 94.) 

In short, if the subject promise fell within the CBA, then amendment would be 

futile in light of Appellants’ failure to exhaust the CBA-specified grievance procedure. If 

the subject promise lies outside the CBA, then the claim is not actionable against the 

party alleged to have made the promise, the Teamsters. Viewed in either light, dismissal 

with prejudice was entirely appropriate.

IV. CONCLUSION

We find that Appellants’ arguments, as pled, are foreclosed by the CBA into 

which they entered. We also determine that amendment to plead the alleged “extra-CBA 

promise” would be futile. We therefore affirm.

Case: 15-1690 Document: 003112194535 Page: 11 Date Filed: 02/01/2016