Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca2-14-02611/USCOURTS-ca2-14-02611-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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14-2611

Brown v. City of New York

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

August Term 2014

Heard: June 17, 2015 Decided: August 19, 2015

Docket No. 14-2611

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 

1 IMANI BROWN,

2 Plaintiff-Appellant,

3

4 v.

5

6 CITY OF NEW YORK, a municipal entity, 

7 JUSTIN NAIMOLI, in his individual capacity, 

8 THEODORE PLEVRITIS, in his individual capacity,

Defendants-Appellees1 9

10

11 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 12

13 Before: NEWMAN, JACOBS, and CALABRESI, Circuit Judges. 

14

15 Appeal from the June 18, 2014, judgment of the United States

16 District Court for the Southern District of New York (Katherine

17 B. Forrest, District Judge), dismissing on motion for summary

18 judgment, a complaint primarily alleging false arrest and use of

19 excessive force.

20 Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. Judge

21 Jacobs concurs in the judgment in part and dissents in part with

22 a separate opinion.

1

 The Clerk is directed to conform the official caption to the

caption in this opinion.

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1 Joshua S. Moskovitz, Beldock Levine &

2 Hoffman LLP, New York, NY (Jonathan

3 C. Moore, Beldock Levine & Hoffman

4 LLP, New York, NY, on the brief),

5 for Appellant.

6

7 Julie Steiner, Asst. Corp. Counsel,

8 New York, NY (Zachary W. Carter,

9 Corp. Counsel of the City of New

10 York, New York, NY, on the brief),

11 for Appellees.

12

13

14

15

16 JON O. NEWMAN, Circuit Judge.

17 A pre-dawn sidewalk conversation between police officers and

18 a member of the public that began with a request for help finding

19 a bathroom escalated into a confrontation, an arrest, a struggle,

20 a use of force and pepper spray, a lawsuit, and now this appeal

21 from dismissal of the lawsuit. Imani Brown appeals from the June

22 18, 2014, judgment of the District Court for the Southern

23 District of New York (Katherine B. Forrest, District Judge),

24 granting a motion for summary judgment by New York City police

25 officers Justin Naimoli and Theodore Plevritis and the City of

26 New York.

27 We conclude that Brown’s claim against the officers for

28 unlawful arrest is defeated by their defense of qualified

29 immunity, her First Amendment claim was properly dismissed as

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1 lacking any merit, and her claim against them for use of

2 excessive force must be remanded for trial. We have no occasion

3 to consider Brown’s claims against the City because her brief on

4 appeal does not challenge the dismissal of those claims. We

5 therefore affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

6 Background

7 Several facts are undisputed, and, on this appeal from the

8 grant of the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, those that

9 are disputed must be viewed in the light most favorable to the

10 Plaintiff, Imani Brown. See Costello v. City of Burlington, 632

11 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 2011).

12 On the night of November 15, 2011, an Occupy Wall Street

13 crowd gathered in Zuccotti Park in lower Manhattan. Brown

14 received a text message saying that the park had been raided. 

15 She went to observe around 2 a.m. and left around 5 a.m. to find

16 a bathroom. Two blocks away, she came to a Starbucks store and

17 spoke to an employee who told her that the store was closed but

18 would open at 5:30, which was 15 or 20 minutes later. She

19 remained on the sidewalk, intending to wait until the store

20 opened. 

21 That night Officers Naimoli and Plevritis were working the

22 11:15 p.m. to 7:50 a.m. shift. They drove by Zuccotti Park as

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1 the crowd was being cleared. They arrested a man who was

2 blocking traffic and after taking him to Central Booking resumed

3 their patrol around 4 a.m.

4 At 5:05 a.m., an assistant manager of the Starbucks store

5 called 911 and reported six people knocking on the door of his

6 closed store, trying to get in to use the bathroom. He said that

7 they were “knocking on the door really really bad trying to get

8 in,” and “making nasty comments.” Defendants’ Statement of

Undisputed Facts, ¶ 21.2 9 The 911 operator heard the assistant

10 manager tell an employee to lock the bathroom door from the

11 outside because he heard “banging on the doors . . . [t]he

12 outside doors.” Exhibit 16 (911 call transcript). A radio

13 dispatcher immediately relayed the substance of the 911 call to

14 Officers Naimoli and Plevritis, stating in part, “[S]ix people

15 banging on the doors refusing to leave at Starbucks coffee.”

16 Hearing the transmission, Naimoli and Plevritis drove to the

17 store location, arriving there within minutes of the 911 call. 

18 From this point on, most of the facts, as recounted in

19 depositions and testimony at a civilian complaint hearing, are

2 The Plaintiff “does not dispute this fact,” disputing only that

she was not knocking on the doors or making nasty comments and that no

one else was doing these things while she was present. See Plaintiff’s

Statement of Undisputed Facts, ¶ 21.

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1 in dispute. We continue with Brown’s version. When the officers

2 arrived, only she and two other persons were waiting near the

3 Starbucks store. Brown approached the police car, gestured to

4 have the window rolled down, and spoke to the officers through

5 the passenger side front window. Brown asked if the officers

6 knew where she could find a bathroom.

7 One officer answered her question with a question of his

8 own, “What do we look like, the potty police?” Brown asked her

9 question again. One officer answered that Brown should “piss in

the park.”3 10 Brown asked whether that would be illegal and was

11 told that it would be. Brown then said, “[S]o you are just not

12 going to help me, you don’t have anything you can offer me, any

13 advice you can offer?” One officer, still in the police car,

14 then told Brown that she “should go home.” She responded that

15 she lived over an hour away and preferred to wait until the

16 Starbucks opened.

17 As Brown walked away from the police car, the officers got

18 out of the police car and asked for her ID. She repeatedly asked

19 why they wanted it, they gave no explanation, and she refused to

3 The dissent dismisses this crude remark as understandable

“irony,” prompted by the officer’s awareness that some people had

urinated in Zucotti Park during “Occupy” protests. Dissenting op. [5]. 

The first word on the vehicles of all New York City police officers is

“courtesy,” not “irony.”

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1 provide any ID. As Officer Plevritis acknowledged in his

2 deposition, he then grabbed Brown and said to her, “[G]ive me

3 your identification or you’re going to be placed under arrest.”

4 When she again refused, he told her, “You’re under arrest.” 

5 Brown repeatedly asked why she was being arrested but received

6 no explanation. One or both of the officers then grabbed her

7 arm, held it behind her back, and attempted to apply handcuffs. 

8 An officer kicked her legs out from under her, and she fell to

9 her knees. A videotape shows that handcuffs had been placed on

10 one of Brown’s wrists before she was thrown to the ground. On

11 the ground, Brown reached with her other arm for her phone,

12 wallet, and scattered contents of her purse.

13 The videotape shows both officers on the ground, endeavoring

14 to bring her free arm behind her in order to complete the

15 handcuffing. The videotape shows a struggle with considerable

16 shouting by Brown, the officers, and a bystander. 

17 Officer Plevritis administered a burst of pepper spray 

18 directly to Brown’s face. When Brown realized her skirt had come

19 up and “that [her] bottom was exposed,”, she ask if the officers

20 could pull her skirt down. They prudently declined, one of them

21 answering, “No, it wouldn’t have been like that, if you weren’t

22 causing trouble.” When asked what she then did, Brown said she

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1 was “reaching with my free arm trying to pull my skirt down.” 

2 As the struggle to handcuff Brown continued, Officer Plevritis

3 administered a second burst of pepper stray directly in her face

4 from a distance of one foot.

5 The officers then completed the handcuffing, raised Brown to

6 her feet, placed her in the police car, and drove her to a police

7 station.

8 The officers’ arrest report stated that Brown “was asked to

9 leave . . . after causing a disturbance in front of a store” and

10 “refuse[d] to give ID and responded with profanity.” Document 54-

11 11 (emphasis added). Her arrest was stated to be for “refusing

12 to move on” in violation of the disorderly conduct provision,

13 subsection 6, of N.Y. Penal Law § 240.20. Later, Officer Naimoli

14 spoke with an assistant district attorney who prepared a criminal

15 complaint. That complaint charged Brown with violating

16 subsections (1) and (3) of Penal Law § 240.20 by “engag[ing] in

17 fighting and in violent, tumultuous and threatening behavior” and

18 “us[ing] abusive and obscene language . . . in a public place”

19 “with intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance and alarm,

20 and recklessly causing a risk thereof.” The complaint, which

21 Officer Naimoli signed under oath, alleged that he personally

22 observed Brown “banging on the door of Starbucks and screaming”

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1 and that her conduct “caused a crowd to gather and people to

2 express alarm.” Officer Naimoli later admitted in his deposition

3 that he did not personally observe Brown banging on the door of

4 Starbucks and that he did not see her yelling at a Starbucks

5 employee.

6 After the criminal complaint was dismissed, Brown filed suit

7 under 42 U.S. C. § 1983, alleging claims for false arrest and use

8 of excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and

9 retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. The District

10 Court ultimately granted the Defendants’ motion for summary

11 judgment, concluding that “[q]ualified immunity insulates

12 defendants from liability on [Brown’s] First and Fourth Amendment

13 claims,” Brown v. City of New York, No. 13-cv-1018, 2014 WL

14 2767232, at *10 (June 18, 2014), because “even if probable cause

15 did not actually exist,” “the officers directed plaintiff to

16 leave the area and go home, but plaintiff decided not to leave

17 the area, and told the officers that she could not go home,”

18 Brown, 2014 WL 2767232, at *9 (emphasis added), and “[t]hus it

19 was objectively reasonable for the officer[s] to believe that

20 probable cause existed to arrest [Brown],” id. The Court also

21 granted summary judgment for the Defendants on the excessive

22 force claim, concluding that their use of force was “reasonable

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1 under the circumstances.” Id. at *8.

2 Discussion

3 Before considering the legal issues on appeal, we pause to

4 observe that, even on the officers’ version of the events, the

5 arrest, the ensuing scuffle, and this lawsuit could very likely

6 have been avoided if the police had explained to Brown why they

7 were asking for her ID. Commendably, the officers initially

8 intended to issue a summons, rather than make an arrest, for an

9 offense, disorderly conduct, that was only a “violation” under

New York law,4 10 an offense category less serious than even a

“misdemeanor.”5 11 To use the summons procedure, they needed to

12 know Brown’s name and address. Their request for her to produce

13 some ID was entirely appropriate. So was her repeated inquiry,

14 “[O]n what grounds?”

15 At that point, the officers could have explained that they

16 needed her name and address from her ID in order to issue a

4 “Disorderly conduct is a violation.” N.Y. Penal L. § 240.20.

5 “‘Violation’ means an offense, other than a ‘traffic

infraction,’ for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment in excess

of fifteen days cannot be imposed.” See N.Y. Penal Law 10.00(3);

“‘Misdemeanor’ means an offense, other than a ‘traffic infraction,’

for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment in excess of fifteen

days may be imposed, but for which a sentence to a term of

imprisonment in excess of one year cannot be imposed.” Id. 100.00(4). 

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summons.6 1 Instead, as Officer Plevritis admitted in his

2 deposition, he grabbed Brown before he told her she was going to

3 get a summons. Then, still giving her no reason why they wanted

4 her ID, they told her only, as Officer Plevritis recounted, “[W]e

5 were going to give you a citation, but now you are going to

6 jail.” Neither officer claims that he explained to Brown that

7 they needed her name and address from her ID in order to issue

8 a summons, an explanation that likely would have avoided the

9 arrest, the sidewalk struggle, the pepper spraying, and this

10 lawsuit.

11 1. False Arrest Claim

12 Turning to the District Court’s dismissal of Brown’s claims,

13 we consider first her claim for false arrest. The District Court

14 concluded that the facts sufficed to arrest her “for disorderly

15 conduct for ‘congregat[ing] with other persons in a public place

16 and refus[ing] to comply with a lawful order of the police to

17 disperse.’” Brown, 2014 2767232, at *6 (quoting N.Y. Penal Law

18 § 240.20(6)). Viewing the facts in the light favorable to Brown,

6 The dissent states that Brown should have known that the

officers needed her name and address in order to issue a summons.

Dissenting op. [6]. Perhaps she should have. But once the officers

arrested her, they were in total control of the situation, and it is

their explanation to her that would likely have avoided escalation of

the episode. 

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1 we are not as sure as Judge Forrest that the police officers

2 issued an “order” to disperse. Judge Forrest cited the

3 Defendants’ Rule 56.1 Statement of Undisputed Facts, ¶ 46, in

4 which they asserted that “they directed [Brown] to leave the area

5 and ‘go home,’” Brown, 2014 WL 2767232, at *6 (emphasis added),

6 but Brown’s response to that claim is that the officers told her

7 that she “should go home,” and that these words were spoken in

8 reply to her statement: “you don’t have anything to offer me, any

9 advice you can offer?” Plaintiff’s Statement of Undisputed Facts,

10 ¶ 46 (emphasis added). A fact-finder considering all the

11 evidence, including what Brown claims was the officers’ rude

12 suggestion that she should “piss in the park,” would be entitled

13 to conclude that advice that a person should go home did not rise

14 to the level of an order to disperse.

15 Nevertheless, we agree with the District Court that the

16 false arrest claim was defeated by the officers’ qualified

17 immunity claim, although we reach that conclusion by a different

18 route than that taken by the District Court. Whether or not

19 there was an “order” to disperse, the undisputed facts available

20 to be considered likely showed probable cause to arrest for

21 subsections 1 or 2 of section 240.20, which provide:

22 A person is guilty of disorderly conduct when, with

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1 intent to cause public . . . annoyance . . ., or

2 recklessly creating a risk thereof:

3

4 1. He engages in . . . tumultuous . . . behavior;

5 or

6

7 2. He makes unreasonable noise[.]

8

9 First, it does not matter that the officers arrested for

10 violation of subsection 6 of the disorderly conduct provision,

11 punishing failure to disperse. “‘[T]he probable cause inquiry

12 is not necessarily based upon the offense actually invoked by the

13 arresting officer but upon whether the facts known at the time

14 of the arrest objectively provided probable cause to arrest.’”

15 Jaegly v. Couch, 439 F.3d 149, 153 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting United

16 States v. Jones, 432 F.3d 34, 41 (1st Cir. 2005)).

17 Second, under the “collective or imputed knowledge

18 doctrine,” Zellner v. Summerlin, 494 F.3d 344, 369 (2d Cir. 2007,

19 “‘an arrest . . . is permissible where the actual arresting . . .

20 officer lacks the specific information to form the basis for

21 probable cause . . . but sufficient information to justify the

22 arrest . . . was known by other law enforcement officials

23 initiating . . . the investigation.’” id. (quoting United States

24 v. Colon, 250 F.2d 130, 135 (2d Cir. 2001)), and the other

25 officers “have communicated the information they possess

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1 individually, thereby pooling their collective knowledge to meet

2 the probable cause threshold.” United States v. Chavez, 534 F.3d

3 1338, 1345 (10th Cir. 2008).

4 In the pending case, the officer receiving the 911 call knew

5 that six people were trying to get into a closed Starbucks store

6 at 5 a.m. to use a bathroom, that they were “knocking on the door

7 really really bad trying to get in,” and “making nasty comments,”

8 and heard the assistant store manager tell an employee to lock

9 the doors because he heard banging on the outside doors. That

10 report provided probable cause to arrest whoever was outside the

11 store asking to get in to use the bathroom. Their banging on the

12 door provided a reasonable basis to believe that they were

13 engaged in tumultuous behavior, especially in light of the

14 assistant manager’s expressed concern that the doors needed to

15 be locked.

16 When Officers Naimoli and Plevritis arrived at the store

17 within minutes of hearing the dispatcher’s relay of the 911

18 information, saw three people still outside the store, and were

19 told by Brown that she wanted to use the bathroom, their on-the20 scene information, combined with the 911 call information,

21 provided a reasonable basis to believe that Brown was one of the

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1 people who had been banging on the store doors and doing so with

2 sufficient intensity to prompt the assistant manager to fear that

3 he needed to lock the doors. Even if these facts, collectively

4 known by the police, did not suffice to create probable cause for

5 a disorderly conduct arrest, it was “objectively reasonable for

the officers to believe that probable cause existed,”7 6 and

7 “officers of reasonable competence could disagree on whether the

8 probable cause test was met.” Golino v. Ciy of New Haven, 950

9 F.3d 864, 870 (2d Cir. 1991). Those circumstances entitled the

arresting officers to the defense of qualified immunity.8 10 Id.

11 The Plaintiff’s argument that New York law requires an

12 officer’s personal observation of facts alleged to support an

13 arrest for a violation, such as disorderly conduct, see N.Y.

7 We have called such belief “arguable probable cause.” Zaleski

v. City of Hartford, 723 F.3d 382, 390 (2d Cir. 2013).

8

 The qualified immunity defense also defeats whatever claim Brown

might be asserting to the initial brief detention that occurred,

before announcement of the arrest, when Officer Plevritis grabbed her

arm after she refused to provide an ID. Although Brown contends that

she was entitled to refuse to produce an ID, her reliance on the

coincidentally named case, Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979), is

unavailing. In that case, involving a prosecution for failure to

produce an ID, the officers lacked even the “articulable suspicion,”

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 31 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring), needed

for a Terry stop, see Brown, 443 U.S. at 51-52. Here, the facts known

to the officers, even if insufficient for an arrest, fully justified

a Terry stop to ask for an ID, see Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District

Court, 542 U.S. 177, 185-89 (2004), and necessarily supported a

qualified immunity defense to a damages claim based on that stop.

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Penal Law §§ 10.00(1), (3), N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 140.10(1)(a),9 1

2 is unavailing. A defense of qualified immunity is not displaced

3 by a violation of state law requirements. See Davis v. Scherer,

4 468 U.S. 183, 194 & n.12 (1984); Clue v. Johnson, 179 F.3d 57,

5 62 n.3 (2d Cir. 1999). The officers retained a qualified

6 immunity defense to the claim that the arrest violated the Fourth

7 Amendment.

8 2. Excessive Force Claim.

9 The Fourth Amendment prohibits the use of excessive force in

10 making an arrest, and whether the force used is excessive is to

11 be analyzed under that Amendment’s “‘reasonableness’ standard.” 

12 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). Determining

13 excessiveness requires “a careful balancing of the nature and

14 quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment

15 interests against the countervailing governmental interests at

16 stake.” Id. at 396 (internal quotation marks omitted). This

9

 New York distinguishes between an “offense” and a “crime.” For

an “offense,” which includes a “violation,” N.Y. Penal Law §§

10.00(1), (3), a police officer may arrest a person “when he or she

has reasonable cause to believe that such person has committed such

offense in his or her presence.,” N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 140.10(1)(a). 

For a “crime,” which means “a misdemeanor or a felony,” N.Y. Penal Law

§ 10.00(6), a police officer may arrest a person “when he or she has

reasonable cause to believe that such has committed such crime,

whether in his or her presence or otherwise, N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law

§ 140.10(1)(b). 

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1 balancing, the Court noted, “requires careful attention to the

2 facts and circumstances of each particular case, including” the

3 following three factors:

4 1. “[T]he severity of the crime at issue,”

5 2. “whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the

6 safety of the officers or others,” and

7

8 3. “whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to

9 evade arrest by flight.”

10 Id. And, the Court continued, the “‘reasonableness’ of a

11 particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of

12 a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20

13 vision of hindsight.” Id. The Court also made clear that the

14 standard is one of objective reasonableness, and the officer’s

state of mind, whether evil or benign, is not relevant.10 15 See id.

16 at 397.

17 Unusual for a claim of excessive force, most of the relevant

18 facts are undisputed: 

10 Thus, it is not relevant whether the officers thought the

amount of force used was really necessary or were provoked to use that

amount of force because of the abusive language they contend Brown

directed at them. In this respect, a claimed Fourth Amendment

violation for using excessive force while making an arrest differs

from a claimed Eighth Amendment violation for abusing a prisoner. See

Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (Eighth Amendment analysis

turns on “whether force was applied [to prisoner] . . . maliciously

and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.”).

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1 • Officers Plevritis and Naimoli were arresting Brown for

2 disorderly conduct, a violation that; under New York law, is

3 subject to a maximum punishment of 15 days in jail.

4

5 • Officer Plevritis was 5' 10" and weighed 215 pounds; 

6 Officer Naimoli was 5' 7" and weighed 150-160 pounds; Brown was

7 5' 6" and weighed 120 pounds.

8

9 • Officer Plevritis asked Brown to place her hands behind

10 her back so that they could apply handcuffs, and she refused to

11 do so.

12

13 • One of the officers kicked Brown’s legs out from under

14 her, causing her to fall to the ground.

15

16 • One officer succeeded in placing handcuffs on Brown’s

17 right wrist.

18 • Both officers struggled with Brown, forcing her body to

19 the ground.

20

21 • Officer Plevritis used his hand to push Brown’s face onto

22 the pavement.

23

24 • Brown’s left arm, without a handcuff, was under her as she

25 fell to the ground.

26

27 • The officers endeavored to take hold of Brown’s left arm

28 and bring it behind her to complete the handcuffing.

29

30 • While on the ground, Brown did not offer her arms for

31 handcuffing in part because she was trying to keep hold of her

32 phone and wallet and reach for the scattered contents of her

33 purse. 

34

35 • Officer Plevritis twice administered a burst of pepper

36 spray directly to Brown’s face.

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1 • The officers completed the handcuffing while Brown was

2 still on the ground.

3

4 • Officer Naimoli was aware of techniques for applying

5 handcuffs to a reluctant arrestee, other than taking a person to

6 the ground.

7 The relevant disputed facts are:

8 • Brown says the pepper spray was administered one foot away

9 from her face; Officer Plevritis says the first dose was from two

10 feet away and the second dose from three feet away. It is

11 undisputed that the policy of the New York City Police Department

12 instructs officers not to use pepper spray closer than three

13 feet. See New York City Police Department Patrol Guide, Procedure

No. 212-95 (Jan. 1, 2000).11 14

15

16 • Brown contends that she was trying to use her free arm to

17 pull down her skirt, which was exposing her behind.

18

19 Courts have regularly instructed that the three factors

20 identified in Graham are relevant to the required balancing of

21 governmental interest against the intrusion upon the individual’s

22 interests, but they have had very little to say about how this

23 balancing is to be accomplished. Obviously, there are no

11 The dissent suggests that the Patrol Guide standard is not

relevant because the excessive force standard derives from the

Constitution. Dissenting op. [7]. But the Supreme Court in Garner v.

Tennessee, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), considered police regulations of several

jurisdictions in making a constitutional ruling on excessive force,

see id. at 18-19, and regulations of a single department have also

been considered relevant to a constitutional ruling on excessive

force, see, e.g., Ludwig v. Anderson, 54 F.3d 465, 472 (8th Cir.

1995); Maddox v. City of Los Angeles, 792 F.2d 1408, 1414 (9th Cir.

1986).

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1 numerical weights to be assigned, and the weighing metaphor has

been criticized for creating the illusion of precision.12 2 All

3 that can realistically be expected is to make some assessment as

4 to the extent to which each relevant factor is present and then

5 somehow make an aggregate assessment of all the factors. As is

6 true of many methods of analysis that courts prescribe, the

7 excessive force determination is easier to describe than to make.

8 In this case, the severity of the crime is unquestionably

9 slight. The disorderly conduct offense is subject to a maximum

10 penalty of fifteen days in jail, and the underlying facts, even

11 as alleged by the officers, are loud banging on the door of a

12 closed store by someone wanting to use a bathroom, plus the use

13 of loud and nasty language. With respect to the second Graham

14 factor, Brown posed no threat whatever to the safety of the

15 officers or others. As for actively resisting arrest, Brown was

16 not fleeing, cf. Garner v. Tennessee, 471 U.S. 1, 6-8 (1985), nor

17 physically attacking an officer, cf. Sullivan v. Gagnier, 225

18 F.3d 161, 163 (2d Cir. 2000), nor even making a move that an

19 officer could reasonably interpret as threatening an attack, cf.

20 Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 97 (2d Cir. 2010). At most,

12 Salomaa v. Honda Long Term Disability Plan, 642 F.3d 666, 675

(9th Cir. 2011); McEvoy v. Spencer, 124 F.3d 92, 98 n.3 (2d Cir.

1997); Ford Motor Co. v. Ryan, 182 F.2d 329, 331-32 (2d Cir. 1950).

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1 her “resistance” was a refusal to permit the easy application of

2 handcuffs by placing her hands behind her back. An aggregate

3 assessment of all three relevant Graham factors would seem to

4 point toward a determination of excessive force and, at a

5 minimum, to preclude a ruling against the victim on a motion for

summary judgment.13 6

7 The officers could be entitled to a summary judgment only if

8 there existed a per se rule that an arrestee’s refusal to submit

9 to the easy application of handcuffs always permitted police

10 officers to use substantial force, including taking a person to

11 the ground and incapacitating her with pepper stray, to

12 accomplish handcuffing. We know of no such rule. Indeed, by

13 focusing only on resistance to the arrest, such a rule would

14 disregard the three-factor analysis that the Supreme Court

15 required in Graham. Even resistance sufficient to result in

16 conviction for resisting arrest does not preclude a finding of

17 “excessive force in effectuating the arrest.” Sullivan, 225 F.3d

18 at 166. 

13 The dissent concludes that the force used was not excessive by

focusing exclusively on the fact that Brown was resisting arrest

(albeit in a minimal way). Dissenting op. [11-19]. The dissent’s

“balancing” assigns no weight at all to the other Graham factors: the

minor nature of Brown’s offense and the absence of any actual or

threatened injury of the officers.

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1 Here, on the undisputed facts, even shaded with the

2 officers’ account of the episode, no reason appears why, with

3 Brown standing, each officer could not have simply held one of

4 her arms, brought it behind her, and put handcuffs on her wrists. 

5 Or they could have simply surrounded her, at least for a few

6 moments, making it clear that she could not leave until she

submitted to handcuffing.14 7 We do not mean to imply that the

8 availability of a less aggressive way of accomplishing an arrest

9 necessarily means that the technique that was used is thereby

10 shown to have been excessive. Police officers must be entitled

11 to make a reasonable selection among alternative techniques for

12 making an arrest. But when the amount of force used by two

13 police officers involves taking a 120-pound woman to the ground

14 and twice spraying her directly in the face with pepper spray,

15 the availability of a much less aggressive technique is at least

16 relevant to making the ultimate determination of whether

17 excessive force was used.

18 The assessment of a jury is needed in this case. Even

19 though most of the facts concerning the application of force are

14 The dissent suggests that pointing out the minor nature of

Brown’s offense, which is a relevant Graham factor, leads to

“free[ing] suspects resisting arrest for minor offenses.” Dissenting

op. [17]. The available means of effecting Brown’s arrest with less

aggressive force dispel that claim.

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1 undisputed, a jury will have to decide whether Fourth Amendment

2 reasonableness was exceeded when Brown was taken to the ground

3 after refusing to put her hands behind her back and when officers

4 struggled with her on the ground and used pepper spray to

5 accomplish handcuffing. And even if Brown’s unwillingness, while

6 standing, to offer her hands for handcuffing and, while on the

7 ground, to offer her left arm to complete the handcuffing is

8 found to be resisting arrest, that non-threatening form of

9 resistance would be only one factor to be considered along with

10 the minor nature of the disorderly conduct violation, the absence

11 of actual or threatened harm to the officers, and the degree of

12 force, including taking her to the ground and twice applying

13 pepper spray. “The fact that a person whom a police officer

14 attempts to arrest resists . . . no doubt justifies the officer’s

15 use of some degree of force, but it does not give the officer

16 license to use force without limit.” Sullivan, 225 F.3d at 165-66

17 (emphasis in original).

18 The continuum along which the excessiveness of force in

19 making an arrest is assessed is not marked by visible signposts. 

20 A court’s role in considering excessive force claims is to

21 determine whether a jury, instructed as to the relevant factors,

22 could reasonably find that the force used was excessive. In this

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1 case, the majority and the dissent differ on that legal issue. 

2 That division, not uncommon in cases considering the sufficiency

3 of evidence, leaves the factual determination of excessiveness

4 to a jury, whose collective common sense, informed by their life

5 experiences, may well exceed that of all the members of this

panel.15 6

7 3. First Amendment Claim

8 Brown’s First Amendment claim – that she was arrested in

9 retaliation for her attendance at the Occupy rally in Zuccotti

10 Park – was properly dismissed. There is no evidence to support

15 The dissent speculates, without any support in the record,

that, in the event that a jury finds the police officers liable, the

judgment will be paid out of their children’s college funds.

Dissenting op. [12]. For support, the author of the dissent cites

only his own previous speculation, see Gonzalez v. City of

Schenectady, 728 F.3d 149, 162 (2d Cir. 2013).

A far more likely speculation is that a payment, if any, will be

made by the City after a settlement. See, e.g., “New York City Settles

With 6 Occupy Wall Street Protesters Pepper-Sprayed by the Police,”

New York Times, July 6, 2015. And, if a jury were to hold the

officers liable for damages, payment is almost certainly going to be

made by the City by way of indemnification or by the police union. See

Richard Emery & Illan Margalit Maazel, Why Civil Rights Lawsuits Do

Not Deter Police Misconduct: The Conundrum of Indemnification and a

Proposed Solution, 28 Fordham Urban L. J. 587 n. 2 (2000). A study

for the six years from 2006 to 2011 revealed that $348,274,595.81 was

awarded in civil rights settlements and judgments against New York

City police officers, of which $114,000 (0.03 percent) was required to

be paid by police officers, and the study does not indicate whether

some or all of even this amount was paid by the police union. See

Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 885,

913, 962 (2014).

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1 that claim.

2 Conclusion

3 The judgment is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and

4 remanded for further proceedings.

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