Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01949/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-01949-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MIGUEL C. CASTANEDA,

Petitioner,

v.

W.L. MONTGOMERY, Warden, et

al.,

Respondents. 

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Civil No. 14cv01949 GPC (RBB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS AND ORDER

DENYING REQUEST FOR

EVIDENTIARY HEARING

[ECF NO. 1]

Petitioner Miguel C. Castaneda, a state petitioner proceeding

pro se, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254 on August 20, 2014 [ECF No. 1]. There, Castaneda

alleges that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his

probation. (Pet. 6, ECF No. 1.)1 Second, Petitioner contends that

the trial court improperly increased his restitution fines after

his probation was revoked. (Id. at 7.) 

The Respondent, W.L. Montgomery, filed an Answer and Notice of

Lodgment on February 3, 2015 [ECF Nos. 9, 10]. Castaneda filed a

"Tr[a]verse" (hereinafter, the "Traverse") on April 6, 2015 [ECF

1 The Court will cite to all documents using the page numbers

assigned by the electronic case filing system.

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No. 13]. In the Traverse, Petitioner argues for the first time

that his due process rights were violated when his probation was

revoked. (Traverse 9-11, ECF No. 13.) For the reasons discussed

below, the Petition [ECF No. 1] should be DENIED.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In March of 2010, Petitioner took a homeless man's fishing

pole and struck him with it. (Lodgment No. 6, People v. Castaneda,

No. D062947, slip op. at 2 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 3, 2013).) A

witness criticized Castaneda for doing so; Petitioner then beat the

witness in the face with a pipe. (Id.) Castaneda was subsequently

charged with assault with a deadly weapon, dissuading a witness by

force or threat, and making a criminal threat. (Id.) Petitioner

pleaded guilty to assault with a deadly weapon in May of 2011. 

(Id. at 3.) The remaining counts were dismissed. (Id.) 

Castaneda was placed on probation in June of 2011 on condition

that he (1) serve 365 days in jail, (2) get "treatment and

therapy," and (3) stop using drugs and alcohol. (Id.) Petitioner

was later alleged to have violated his probation, and on October

10, 2012, an evidentiary hearing was held. (Id.) Castaneda's

probation officer testified at the hearing that Petitioner had

tested positive for methamphetamine and failed to comply with other

conditions of his probation. (Id.)

At the hearing, Petitioner requested that he be placed in a

residential treatment program to help address his substance abuse

issues. (Id. at 4.) Instead, the court revoked his probation and

sentenced him to twelve years in prison. (Id. at 1.) The

superior court also imposed fines of $2,400 each for restitution

and probation revocation. (Id. at 1-2.) The fines were in

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addition to two fines of $200 each that had previously been imposed

for the same purposes in June of 2011. (Id. at 2.)

Castaneda appealed the sentence, requesting that the

California Court of Appeal remand the case because "the failure to

reinstate probation after the revocation, under the circumstances

existing at the time the final order was made, was an abuse of

discretion." (Lodgment No. 1, Appellant's Opening Brief at 12,

People v. Castaneda, No. D062947 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 3, 2013).)2

Petitioner also requested that the court of appeal modify the fine

amount owed. (Id. at 15-16.) 

On October 3, 2013, the California Court of Appeal struck the

increased fines but affirmed the remainder of the superior court's

judgment. (See Lodgment No. 6, People v. Castaneda, No. D062947,

slip op. at 6.) 

The court, id. at 5, explained:

Castaneda has not made a showing the court abused its

discretion in declining to reinstate him on probation. 

It was not irrational for the court to withdraw its grant

of clemency in light of Castaneda's repeated failure to

comply with several probation requirements. On this

record, the court reasonably found Castaneda's latest

pledge to comply with the probation terms unavailing.

Castaneda filed a petition for review in the California

Supreme Court, which was denied on December 18, 2013, without

citation or comment. (Lodgment No. 8, Petition for Review, People

v. Castaneda, No. S214550 (Cal. Dec. 18, 2013); Lodgment No. 7,

People v. Castaneda, No. S214550, order at 1 (Cal. Dec. 18, 2013).)

2

 Because Lodgment No. 1 is not consecutively paginated, the

Court has paginated the document and will cite to it using the

assigned page numbers.

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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"),

28 U.S.C. § 2244, applies to all federal habeas petitions filed

after April 24, 1996. Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 204

(2003) (citing Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326 (1997)). AEDPA

sets forth the scope of review for federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit

judge, or a district court shall entertain an application

for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on

the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(a) (West 2006); see Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S.

339, 347 (1994); Hernandez v. Ylst, 930 F.2d 714, 719 (9th Cir.

1991). Because Castaneda's Petition was filed on August 20, 2014,

AEDPA applies to this case. See Woodford, 538 U.S. at 204. 

Section 2254(d) reads as follows:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that

was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings

unless the adjudication of the claim–

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined

by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d).

To present a cognizable federal habeas corpus claim, a state

prisoner must allege his conviction was obtained "in violation of

the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28

U.S.C.A. § 2254(a). A petitioner must allege the state court

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violated his federal constitutional rights. Hernandez, 930 F.2d at

719; Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 1990); Mannhalt

v. Reed, 847 F.2d 576, 579 (9th Cir. 1988).

A federal district court does "not sit as a 'super' state

supreme court" with general supervisory authority over the proper

application of state law. Smith v. McCotter, 786 F.2d 697, 700

(5th Cir. 1986); see also Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780

(1990) (holding that federal habeas courts must respect a state

court's application of state law); Jackson, 921 F.2d at 885

(explaining that federal courts have no authority to review a

state's application of its law). Federal courts may grant habeas

relief only to correct errors of federal constitutional magnitude. 

Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395, 1400 (9th Cir. 1989)

(stating that federal habeas courts are not concerned with errors

of state law "unless they rise to the level of a constitutional

violation"). 

The Supreme Court, in Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003),

stated that "AEDPA does not require a federal habeas court to adopt

any one methodology in deciding the only question that matters

under § 2254(d)(1) -- whether a state court decision is contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law." Id. at 71. In other words, a federal court is not

required to review the state court decision de novo. Id. Rather,

a federal court can proceed directly to the reasonableness analysis

under § 2254(d)(1). Id.

The "novelty in . . . § 2254(d)(1) is . . . the reference to

'Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States.'" Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 869 (7th Cir. 1996) (en

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banc), rev'd on other grounds, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). Section

2254(d)(1) "explicitly identifies only the Supreme Court as the

font of 'clearly established' rules." Id. "A state court decision

may not be overturned on habeas review, for example, because of a

conflict with Ninth Circuit-based law . . . ." Moore v. Calderon,

108 F.3d 261, 264 (9th Cir. 1997). "[A] writ may issue only when

the state court decision is 'contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of,' an authoritative decision of the

Supreme Court." Id. (citing Childress v. Johnson, 103 F.3d 1221,

1224-26 (5th Cir. 1997); Baylor v. Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th

Cir. 1996)). 

Furthermore, with respect to the factual findings of the trial

court, AEDPA provides: 

In a proceeding instituted by an application for a

writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to

the judgment of a State court, a determination of a

factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to

be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of

rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and

convincing evidence.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)(1).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Claim One: Improper Revocation of Probation

In his Petition, Castaneda alleges that the superior court

abused its discretion when it revoked his probation and sentenced

him to prison. (See Pet. 6, ECF No. 1.) At the October 31, 2012

evidentiary hearing, Petitioner argued that because he was seeking

help for his substance abuse issues, he should remain on probation

and be placed in a drug treatment program. (Id.) Castaneda

explained to the judge that he had contacted several drug treatment

facilities and had been accepted into the House of Metamorphosis. 

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(Id.) Petitioner contends that the denial of his request for

probation should be reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Id.)

In the Answer, Warden Montgomery asserts that because

Castaneda challenges the application of state law, federal habeas

relief is not available. (Answer Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 7-8, ECF

No. 9 (citing Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991)).) 

Even if this Court could examine this state law issue, Respondent

maintains that this Court should find that the superior court acted

within its discretion by revoking probation because Petitioner had

a long criminal history. (Id. at 10-12.) 

Montgomery insists that prior to May 2011, when Castaneda

pleaded guilty to assault with a deadly weapon, he had a history of

criminal conduct that included convictions for having sex with a

minor three years younger, illegal drug use, and violating gang

injunction orders. (Id. at 10.) "Before this current case,

Castaneda had violated probation nine times and parole six times." 

(Id.) While on probation, he tested positive for drugs on several

occasions and was arrested for driving under the influence. (Id.

at 10-11.) In light of his criminal history, Montgomery argues

that the court did not abuse its discretion in revoking

Petitioner's probation. (Id. at 11-12.)

Although Castaneda does not allege a due process claim in his

Petition, (see Pet. 1-10, ECF No. 1), Montgomery submits in the

Answer that misapplication of state sentencing law may violate

federal due process if the sentence is arbitrary and capricious. 

(Answer Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 7-8, ECF No. 9 (citing Richmond v.

Lewis, 506 U.S. 40, 50 (1992)).) For the reasons explained above,

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Respondent insists that the sentence was reasonable and did not

violate Petitioner's right to due process. (Id. at 12.) 

Montgomery concedes that under some circumstances,

misapplication of state sentencing law may violate due process if

the law creates a liberty interest. (Id. at 8 (citing Hewitt v.

Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983)).) Respondent argues that when a

liberty interest is created by a state statute, federal courts are

limited to determining whether the state court followed procedures

relating to notice and a probationer's right to a hearing. (Id. at

9.) Montgomery asserts that Petitioner was not deprived of either. 

(Id. at 9-10.)

In the Traverse, Castaneda argues for the first time that his

due process rights were violated when the trial court revoked his

probation under California Penal Code section 1203.2. (Traverse 9-

11, ECF No. 13.) Further, Petitioner maintains that section 1203.2

creates a liberty interest in probation modification. (Id. at 9.) 

Castaneda claims that the trial court "acted on a whimsical

reaction" when it admonished Petitioner and his counsel during

sentencing. (Id. at 10.) These admonishments, Castaneda insists,

demonstrate that the trial court's decision to revoke probation

"falls outside the bounds of reason and constitutes unsound

judgment in the context of rehabilitation for substance abusers." 

(Id. (citation omitted).) Petitioner contends that his probation

should not have been revoked because he was sincere in his efforts

to seek treatment for his substance abuse issues. (Id. at 11.) 

Finally, Castaneda argues that the California Court of Appeal

"failed to discuss the accuracy of the information the court relied

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on and whether it complied with due process." (Id. (citation

omitted).) 

1. Alleging a state law claim

Castaneda contends that the trial court abused its discretion

under California Penal Code section 1203.2 by revoking his

probation. (See Pet. 6, ECF No. 1; Traverse 10-11, ECF No. 13.) 

Yet, in order to invoke federal habeas corpus jurisdiction, a

prisoner must assert that his custody violates federal law. See 28

U.S.C.A. § 2254(a). Federal habeas relief is not available for

violations of state law. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68. 

Because Castaneda’s claim is based on the misapplication of

state law, it is not cognizable on federal habeas review. See

Martin v. Solem, 801 F.2d 324, 331 (8th Cir. 1986) ("[S]tate

prisoners' claims of error involving sentencing, parole, probation,

and revocation of probation or parole are matters governed by state

law that are not cognizable in federal habeas corpus proceedings.")

(emphasis added) (citations omitted); Perez v. Ochoa, No. CV 11-

1178-ODW (DTB), 2012 WL 3018057, at *7 (C.D. Cal. June 11, 2012)

("[T]o the extent that petitioner is claiming that the sentencing

court's revocation of his probation at the summary revocation

hearing violated state law, his claim is not cognizable on federal

habeas review.") (citations omitted). For these reasons,

Petitioner's state law claim should be DENIED. 

2. Failing to allege a federal claim

Petitioner did not raise a due process claim in the Petition

or in any state court filing. (See generally Pet. 6, ECF No. 1;

Lodgment No. 1, Appellant's Opening Brief at 12-15, People v.

Castaneda, No. D062947; Lodgment No. 8, Petition for Review at

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7-11, People v. Castaneda, No. S214550.) In the Answer, however,

Respondent argues that Castaneda’s claim lacks merit because “it

principally challenges the application of state law by a state

court . . . .” (Answer Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 7, ECF No. 9.) 

Montgomery continues, “In general, a misapplication of a state

sentencing law is not a violation of federal due process rights.” 

(Id. at 7-8.) Following Respondent's lead, in the Traverse,

Petitioner argues that his due process rights were violated. 

(Traverse 9-11, ECF No. 13.)

As a preliminary matter, a traverse is not the proper pleading

to raise an additional ground for relief. See Cacoperdo v.

Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504, 507 (9th Cir. 1994) ("In order for the

state to be properly advised of additional claims, they should be

presented in an amended petition, or . . . in a statement of

additional grounds."). On this basis alone, the Court has the

discretion not to consider this claim. See Williamson v. Virga,

No. ED CV 12–1540–BRO (PLA), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133034, at *25

n. 8 (C.D. Cal. July 16, 2013) (citing Brown v. Roe, 279 F.3d 742,

745–46 (9th Cir. 2002)) (deciding not to consider claim raised for

the first time in the traverse). 

Moreover, "[a]n application for a writ of habeas corpus on

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

court shall not be granted unless it appears that the applicant has

exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State." 28

U.S.C.A. § 2254(b)(1)(A). In order "to exhaust a habeas claim, a

petitioner must properly raise it on every level of direct review." 

Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 916 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Ortberg

v. Moody, 961 F.2d 135, 137 (9th Cir. 1992)). The exhaustion

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requirement is not satisfied simply because the "due process

ramifications of an argument might be self evident." Gatlin v.

Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Anderson v.

Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Because Petitioner's due process claim (1) was not raised in the

Petition and (2) is unexhausted, this Court should not consider it. 

See Garcia v. Dexter, No. EDCV 08-00253-JFW (MAN), 2009 WL 178755,

at *5, n.6 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2009) ("Petitioner did not raise

these contentions in his Petition, nor did he present them to the

state courts. The Court will not consider claims raised for the

first time in a Reply, which are, moreover, unexhausted.") (citing

Cacoperdo, 37 F.3d at 507).

Castaneda did not exhaust a federal due process claim by

presenting it to the California courts. See Duncan v. Henry, 513

U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995). Accordingly, in the last reasoned state

court opinion addressing the claim that the superior court abused

its discretion by revoking Castaneda’s probation, the California

Court of Appeal limited its discussions to the application of state

law. (See People v. Castaneda, No. D062947, slip op. at 4-5.) 

Nevertheless, in the Answer to the Petition, the Respondent states,

“Castaneda has exhausted state remedies for his claims by

presenting a petition for review to the California Supreme Court.” 

(Answer 2, ECF No. 9.)

In an analogous case, the Respondent “did not seek to dismiss

the pending Petition as unexhausted, but instead stated that

Petitioner ‘appears to have exhausted his state remedies by

presenting his claim to the California Supreme Court in a petition

for review[,]’ and argued the Petition should be denied on the

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merits.” Holmes v. Frauenheim, Case No. SACV 14-1591 GHK (SS),

2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60889, at *8 (C.D. Cal. May 8, 2015). 

Respondent Montgomery has done the same here. (See Answer 2, ECF

No. 9; id. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. Supp. Answer 5-12.) The court

in Holmes concluded that “Respondent expressly waived the

exhaustion requirement . . . .” Holmes, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

60889, at *8; accord Mann v. Ryan, 774 F.3d 1203, 1212 n.2 (9th

Cir. 2014) (“[T]he state expressly waived the exhaustion

requirement when, in its answer to [the] amended habeas petition,

it stated that Mann exhausted [the claim of ineffective assistance

of counsel] and it responded at length to Mann’s [arguments on the

merits].”) Likewise, Montgomery has expressly waived the

exhaustion requirement for the claim that Castaneda’s due process

rights were violated when the state court revoked his probation.

The claim Castaneda has alleged in his Petition and argued in

his Traverse is that the superior court abused its discretion by

revoking Castaneda's probation and sentencing him to his original

twelve-year sentence. (See Pet. 6, ECF No. 1; Traverse 8-11, ECF

No. 13.) This claim is not a federal one. See Sharper v. Ayers,

No. C 07-0351 JSW (PR), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56813, at *1 (N.D.

Cal. July 27, 2007). There, probation had been revoked by the

state court, and Sharper was sentenced to ten years in custody. He

challenged the "constitutional validity" of his state sentence. 

Id. Judge White allowed Sharper to proceed on other claims but

held that the "claim that the trial court's decision to revoke

probation and sentence Petitioner to ten years in state prison was

an abuse of discretion does not present a federal claim." Id. at

*2. The same rationale applies to Castaneda's claim.

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Any attempt to read the alleged abuse of discretion as a claim

that Castaneda's due process rights were violated does not succeed. 

The basis for a procedural due process claim is nonexistent. The

facts contained in the Petition, even if supplemented by those in

the Traverse, do not suffice to allege anything more than a claimed

abuse of discretion.

Castaneda fails to develop a nexus between his right to due

process and the facts of this case. (See Traverse 9-11, ECF No.

13.) His conclusory attempt to transform his state-law claim into

a federal claim merely by asserting that the state courts violated

his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process should be rejected. 

See Johnson v. Davis, No. CV 14-3056-JVS (MAN), 2014 WL 2586883, at

*5 (C.D. Cal. June 9, 2014) ("Petitioner's attempt to transform his

claim of an alleged misapplication of Section 1170.126 into a claim

of a violation of his federal constitutional rights, by conclusory

references to 'due process' and 'equal protection,' is

unavailing."); Bradley v. Warden, No. CV 11-1128-JHN (SP), 2012 WL

1577778, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2012), report and recommendation

adopted by 2012 WL 1598013 (C.D. Cal. May 3, 2012) ("Petitioner's

addition of the phrases 'due process' and 'Fourteenth Amendment' to

his state law claims does not transform them into federal ones.")

(citing Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1996)). For

all these reasons, Petitioner's first claim for habeas relief

should be DENIED. 

B. Claim Two: Improper Restitution Fines

Next, Castaneda claims that the increased restitution fines

imposed after his probation was revoked were improper and must be

stricken. (Pet. 7, ECF No. 1.) Petitioner explains that the court

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imposed fines of $200 each for restitution and probation revocation

in June of 2011. (Id.) After his probation was revoked, the court

increased these fines to $2,400 each. (Id.) Castaneda argues that

the new fines were unwarranted "[b]ecause a restitution fine

imposed when probation is granted survives the revocation of

probation." (Id.) Thus, the superior court did not have the

authority to impose additional fines after his probation was

revoked. (Id.)

In the Answer, Respondent alleges that this claim is moot. 

(Answer Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 12, ECF No. 9.) Montgomery

maintains that a case or controversy does not exist because the

California Court of Appeal granted Castaneda relief on this claim. 

(Id.; see Lodgment No. 6, People v. Castaneda, No. D062947, slip

op. at 5.) Petitioner does not dispute this in his Traverse. (See

Traverse 9-11, ECF No. 13.)

Castaneda first raised this claim in the brief he filed with

the California Court of Appeal. (Lodgment No. 1, Appellant's

Opening Brief at 15-16, People v. Castaneda, No. D062947.) The

court of appeal agreed that the additional restitution fines

imposed in October of 2012 were improper. (Lodgment No. 6, People

v. Castaneda, No. D062947, slip op. at 5.) The appellate court

struck the additional fines. (Id.)

Under Article III, § 2 of the U.S. Constitution, a claim is

moot when it no longer presents a case or controversy. See Spencer

v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998). Because the California Court of

Appeal already granted Castaneda relief by striking the additional

fines, this second claim should be DENIED as moot. See Walker v.

Clark, No. CV 08-5587-CJC (JEM), 2010 WL 1643580, at *16 (C.D. Cal.

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Feb. 18, 2010), report and recommendation adopted by 2010 WL

1641372 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2010) ("In the specific context of

habeas corpus petitions, the case or controversy requirement

mandates a finding of mootness if the petitioner has received the

relief requested in the petition or the court is unable to provide

the petitioner with the relief sought.") (citation omitted). 

C. Request for an Evidentiary Hearing

Finally, in conclusory fashion in his Traverse, Castaneda

requests an evidentiary hearing. (Traverse 6, ECF No. 13.) 

Petitioner does not present any facts that would warrant an

evidentiary hearing. See Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 670

(9th Cir. 2005) (stating that the petitioner must demonstrate he

failed to develop the factual basis of his claims in state court

and that his request comes within one of two exceptions in §

2254(e)(2)(A) and (B)). If the factual basis for the claim was

developed in state court, the federal court considers whether an

evidentiary hearing is appropriate or required under Townsend v.

Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963). See Baja v. Ducharme, 187 F.3d 1075,

1078 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Cardwell v. Greene, 152 F.3d 331, 337

(4th Cir. 1998)). Castaneda has not carried his burden. His

request for an evidentiary hearing is therefore DENIED.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons state above, Castaneda's Petition [ECF No. 1]

should be DENIED. His request for an evidentiary hearing is

DENIED. This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to the

United States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties on or

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before September 1, 2015. The document should be captioned

"Objections to Report and Recommendation." Any Reply to the

objections shall be served and filed on or before September 15,

2015. The parties are advised that failure to file objections

within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the

district court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th

Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 4, 2015 ____________________________

Ruben B. Brooks

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Judge Curiel

All Parties of Record

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