Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00376/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00376-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES EVANS,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-06-0376 LKK GGH P

vs.

TOM L. CAREY, et al., AMENDED

Respondents. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

I. Introduction

Petitioner, now in his mid-to-late 70’s, is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a

petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In 1982 petitioner was

convicted of kidnapping for robbery, robbery and attempted murder. Petitioner is serving a

sentence of 7 years to life. In this action, petitioner challenges the 2004 decision by the

California Board of Prison Terms (BPT) finding him unsuitable for parole. Petitioner argues that

the BPT’s decision was not supported by sufficient evidence. Petitioner also argues that the BPT

violated his right to due process by requiring him to admit guilt in order to be found suitable. 

This was petitioner’s eleventh subsequent parole suitability hearing. 

On March 6, 2007, this court recommended that the petition be denied. In the

findings and recommendations, the court acknowledged that this was a close case. On March 6,

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2007, the Ninth Circuit decided Irons v. Carey, 479 F.3d 658 (9th Cir. 2007). Based on Irons,

this court finds it even more likely that the Ninth Circuit would uphold the BPT’s decision

finding petitioner unsuitable for parole. Accordingly, the court amends that findings and

recommendations to include a discussion of Irons.

II. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) applies to this

petition for habeas corpus which was filed after the AEDPA became effective. Neelley v. Nagle,

138 F.3d 917 (11th Cir.), citing Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S. Ct. 2059 (1997). The

AEDPA “worked substantial changes to the law of habeas corpus,” establishing more deferential

standards of review to be used by a federal habeas court in assessing a state court’s adjudication

of a criminal defendant’s claims of constitutional error. Moore v. Calderon, 108 F.3d 261, 263

(9th Cir. 1997). 

In Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S. Ct. 1495 (2000), the Supreme

Court defined the operative review standard set forth in § 2254(d). Justice O’Connor’s opinion

for Section II of the opinion constitutes the majority opinion of the court. There is a dichotomy

between “contrary to” clearly established law as enunciated by the Supreme Court, and an

“unreasonable application of” that law. Id. at 1519. “Contrary to” clearly established law applies

to two situations: (1) where the state court legal conclusion is opposite that of the Supreme

Court on a point of law, or (2) if the state court case is materially indistinguishable from a

Supreme Court case, i.e., on point factually, yet the legal result is opposite.

“Unreasonable application” of established law, on the other hand, applies to

mixed questions of law and fact, that is, the application of law to fact where there are no factually

on point Supreme Court cases which mandate the result for the precise factual scenario at issue. 

Williams (Terry), 529 U.S. at 407-08, 120 S. Ct. at 1520-1521 (2000). It is this prong of the

AEDPA standard of review which directs deference to be paid to state court decisions. While the

deference is not blindly automatic, “the most important point is that an unreasonable application

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of federal law is different from an incorrect application of law....[A] federal habeas court may not

issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant

state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather,

that application must also be unreasonable.” Williams (Terry), 529 U.S. at 410-11, 120 S. Ct. at

1522 (emphasis in original). The habeas corpus petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating the

objectively unreasonable nature of the state court decision in light of controlling Supreme Court

authority. Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 123 S. Ct. 357 (2002).

The state courts need not have cited to federal authority, or even have indicated

awareness of federal authority in arriving at their decision. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 123 S.

Ct. 362 (2002). Nevertheless, the state decision cannot be rejected unless the decision itself is

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, established Supreme Court authority. Id. An

unreasonable error is one in excess of even a reviewing court’s perception that “clear error” has

occurred. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76, 123 S. Ct. 1166, 1175 (2003). Moreover, the

established Supreme Court authority reviewed must be a pronouncement on constitutional

principles, or other controlling federal law, as opposed to a pronouncement of statutes or rules

binding only on federal courts. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. at 9, 123 S. Ct. at 366.

However, where the state courts have not addressed the constitutional issue in

dispute in any reasoned opinion, the federal court will independently review the record in

adjudication of that issue. “Independent review of the record is not de novo review of the

constitutional issue, but rather, the only method by which we can determine whether a silent state

court decision is objectively unreasonable.” Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir.

2003).

Petitioner raised the claims raised in this action in a habeas corpus petition filed in

the California Supreme Court. Answer, Exhibit 4. On February 1, 2006, the California Supreme

Court denied the petition by order citing In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061 (2005) and In re

Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th 616 (2002). Answer, Exhibit 5. Accordingly, the court will

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independently review the record to determine whether the denial of the petition by the California

Supreme Court was an unreasonable application of the facts to the due process law surrounding

parole suitability hearings.

III. Background

The factual background of petitioner’s offense is relevant to the analysis of

petitioner’s claims. A factual summary is contained in the probation report, attached to the

petition as exhibit B. 

James Eugene Evans, age 51, had a romantic relationship with Agnes “Janie”

Whorton for approximately eight years. She is the wife of the victim, Warren

Whorton. Evans reportedly attempted to persuade Mrs. Whorton to leave her

husband, however, she refused on the grounds that her religious beliefs would not

allow her to do this. In the last few years, Mr. Evans expressed to several of his

friends and acquaintances that “something should happen” to Mr. Whorton. He

allegedly also stated that it would be possible to have someone “bump off” Mr.

Whorton, since he had a lot of money and it could be made to look like a robbery. 

In June of 1979, Mr. Evans told Mary Whatley of his “perfect plan.”

In February of 1980, Patricia June “P.J.” Miller, began to frequent the Pizza King

Restaurant owned by Mr. Evans. She apparently was told of Mr.Evans’ idea and,

in December of 1980, she told Rich Poma of Mr. Evans’ plan to get rid of Warren

Whorton. On December 11, 1980, Mr. Poma left his mother’s home in Modesto,

enroute to Turlock to meet with Mr. Evans. Also that afternoon, a phone call was

placed from the home of Kenneth Krantz to the Pizza King. It is the

understanding of the investigating agencies that this contact, as well as others

between Poma, Krantz and Evans resulted in Mr. Evans offering $1,000 each to

Poma and Krantz, for them to murder Warren Whorton.

Mr. Poma and Mr. Krantz “cased” a furniture store in Riverbank, California,

owned by Warren Whorton. The two subjects did not see a safe and then decided

to rob him at a second store, (Great Valley Furniture) in Oroville. In late

December and early January they made two trips to Oroville. After the second

trip (on about January 8, 1981), they obtained several handguns.

On Sunday night, January 11, Krantz and Poma left Modesto and proceeded to

Chico, where they stayed overnight in a motel. On the next day they observed Mr.

Whorton’s activities at the Oroville Store.

Sometime between 6:30 and 7:00 p.m., January 12, 1981, Krantz and Poma

parked their car near the apartment complex where Mr. Whorton lived. Krantz

armed himself with a .38 revolver, and Mr. Poma with a stolen .45, and donned

latex surgical gloves. When Mr. Whorton arrived at his apartment complex, they

reportedly confronted him while displaying the weapons in their waistbands, and

commanded him to get back into his own car. Mr. Poma drove the car back to the

furniture store, Krantz sitting on the passenger side, Mr. Whorton between them. 

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Mr. Whorton was instructed by the subjects not to look at them and neither

subject made any apparent attempt to disguise his face.

After arriving at the store, the subjects had Mr. Whorton unlock the door. Upon

entering the store, they demanded that he open the safe, and were told that there

was no safe on the premises. After a cursory search, the two defendants did not

find a safe, and took Mr. Whorton upstairs where he was tied up with an electrical

cord and placed on a bed. The store was then searched for money, Mr. Krantz

finding approximately $120.00 in the cash box of the office area. Poma

reportedly locating a small amount of money in a money clip which was carried in

Mr. Whorton’s pocket. It appears that, for whatever reason, Poma then struck Mr.

Whorton in the head three or four times with a hammer which was found

somewhere inside the store, after which Mr. Krantz cut the victim’s throat with a

straight edge razor he had been carrying on his person. Leaving the victim for

dead, the two subjects departed the store, returning to the apartment complex in

the victim’s vehicle. They then got into the car in which they had been driving

and returned to Modesto.

Early the following morning, Mr. Whorton was discovered by his employees. He

was immediately rushed to a hospital, underwent surgery and although in

extremely critical condition for some days, he survived.

It appears that after the incident, Mr. Poma bragged about it to at least two

acquaintances in the Modesto area, one of whom contacted law enforcement. An

investigation was effected which ultimately led to the arrest of Krantz and Poma

on January 27, in Modesto. They were shortly thereafter returned to custody to

this jurisdiction where they were charged and convicted with kidnapping for the

purpose of robbery, robbery, and attempted murder. Initial pleas of not guilty

were entered and, on June 15, 1981, both defendants entered pleas of guilty for

kidnapping for robbery and attempt[ed] murder, both having personally inflicted

great bodily injury in connection with the commission of the attempted murder. 

On July 9, 1981, both Krantz and Poma were sentenced to state prison for

consecutive sentences of life and 108 months plus 30 months enhancement.

James Evans had been arrested on February 19, 1981, for the same offenses as

Krantz and Poma. He pled not guilty to all charges and was granted a jury

hearing. That hearing began September 28, 1981, and was presided over by the

Honorable Lucian Vandergrift. In November of 1981, Judge Vandergrift was

seriously injured in an automobile accident and the hearing was recessed. 

Approximately four months later, the hearing was reconvened with the Honorable

Reginal Watt presiding. On April 14, 1982, the jury was out for less than two

hours, returning a verdict of guilty on all counts.

IV. Discussion

In Sass v. California Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2006), the

Ninth Circuit found that California law gives rise to a federally protected liberty interest in parole

release. 

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In the parole context, the requirements of due process are met if “some evidence”

supports the decision.” Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128-1129. In reviewing the BPT decision, the court

analyzes whether the factors relied on by the BPT, set forth in the relevant regulations, are

supported by some evidence. 

Cal. Code of Regulations, section 2402(c), sets forth the circumstances tending to

show unsuitability. The court lists those of significance here:

(1) Commitment Offense. The prisoner committed the offense in

an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner. The factors to be

considered include:

(A) Multiple victims were attacked, injured or killed in the same or separate

incidents.

(B) The offense was carried out in a dispassionate and calculated

manner, such as an execution-style manner.

*****

(D) The offense was carried out in a manner which demonstrates an 

exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering.

(E) The motive for the crime is inexplicable or very trivial in

relation to the offense.

(2) Previous Record of Violence. The prisoner on previous

occasions inflicted or attempted to inflict serious injury on a

victim, particularly if the prisoner demonstrated serious assaultive

behavior at an early age. 

(3) Unstable Social History. The prisoner has a history of unstable

or tumultuous relationships with others.

*****

*****

(6) Institutional Behavior. The prisoner has engaged in serious misconduct in 

prison or jail.

Section 2402(d) sets forth the circumstances tending to indicate suitability:

(1) No Juvenile Record. The prisoner does not have a record of

assaulting others as a juvenile or committing crimes with a

potential of personal harm to the victims.

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(2) Stable Social History. The prisoner has experienced reasonably

stable relationships with others.

(3) Signs of Remorse. The prisoner performed acts which tend to

indicate the presence of remorse, such as attempting to repair the

damage, seeking help for or relieving suffering of the victim, or

indicating that he understands the nature and magnitude of the

offense.

(4) Motivation for the Crime. The prisoner committed his crime as

the result of significant stress in his life, especially if the stress has

built over a long period of time.

(5) Battered Woman Syndrome . . .

(6) Lack of Criminal History. The prisoner lacks any significant

history of violent crime.

(7) Age. The prisoner’s present age reduces the probability of

recidivism.

(8) Understanding and Plans for Future. The prisoner has made

realistic plans for release or has developed marketable skills that

can be put to use upon release.

(9) Institutional Behavior. Institutional activities indicate an

enhanced ability to function within the law upon release.

In Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2003) the Ninth Circuit indicated that

a continued reliance on an unchanging factor such as the circumstances of the offense could

result in a due process violation. Biggs was serving a sentence of twenty-five years to life

following a 1985 first degree murder conviction. In the case before the Ninth Circuit, Biggs

challenged the 1999 decision by the BPT finding him unsuitable for parole despite his record as a

model prisoner. 334 F.3d at 913. While the Ninth Circuit rejected several of the reasons given

by the BPT for finding Biggs unsuitable, it upheld three: 1) petitioner’s commitment offense

involved the murder of a witness; 2) the murder was carried out in a manner exhibiting a callous

disregard for the life and suffering of another; 3) petitioner could benefit from therapy. 334 F.3d

at 913.

The Ninth Circuit cautioned the BPT regarding its continued reliance on the

gravity of the offense and petitioner’s conduct prior to the offense:

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 Of course, what Biggs was struggling with was the apparent arbitrariness in revisiting 1

the parole suitability decision using the very same factors which were considered when a

petitioner was involved in the criminal process. That is, in ultimately determining the sentence a

defendant, facing an indeterminate sentence, should receive, at the inception of the process, the

district attorney exercises some discretion, utilizing factors such as the manner in which the

crime was committed, motive, previous criminal history and the like, in reaching a charging

decision within the parameters of the law. If a case is bargained out of the process with a

determination that based on law and circumstances an indeterminate term of incarceration with

the possibility of parole is the appropriate sentence, again, the very same factors set forth in the

parole suitability regulations are the factors obviously considered at plea bargaining time – again

within the parameters of the law. If the case goes through trial and then to sentencing, the factors

will be considered yet again at sentencing time. A sentence is then imposed with the settled

expectation that the possibility of parole is not a sham, but that a meaningful possibility of parole

exists. And, the possibility, if meaningful, has to be based upon future conduct as the past cannot

be undone, and was considered already. The California parole regulations have the potential,

nonetheless, to allow for reinstitution of the sentencing process such that if a commissioner or a

governor does not like the fact that a certain defendant was sentenced with a possibility of parole,

the established possibility of parole evaporates simply because of a latter day redetermination

that the crime was egregious, or the motive was trivial etc. – something that was obviously

apparent at the time the possibility of parole sentence was issued. Thus, we have cases, like the

present one, where the parole suitability parole is denied numerous times based on a

determination that the seriousness of the crime, or a related factor, precludes the possibility of

parole. While it is perfectly fine to have a system where no possibility of parole exists for any

murder or other crime for which an indeterminate life sentence is appropriate, it is not perfectly

fine to have a parole system that is based on misrepresentation. 

8

As in the present instance, the parole board’s sole supportable

reliance on the gravity of the offense and conduct prior to

imprisonment to justify denial of parole can be initially justified as

fulfilling the requirements set forth by state law. Over time,

however, should Biggs continue to demonstrate exemplary

behavior and evidence of rehabilitation, denying him a parole date

simply because of the nature of his offense would raise serious

questions involving his liberty interest.

334 F.3d at 916.1

In the instant case, the BPT found petitioner unsuitable for parole for the

following reasons: 1) the offense was carried out in a dispassionate and calculated manner (§

2402(c)(1)(B)); 2) the offense demonstrated an exceptionally callous disregard for human

suffering (§ 2402(c)(1)(D)); 3) the motive for the offense was inexplicable or trivial (§

2402(c)(1)(E)); 4) petitioner had an unstable social history prior to his incarceration (§

2402(c)(3)); 5) petitioner’s institutional activities did not indicate an enhanced ability to function

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within the law upon release (§ 2402(d)(9)). Answer, Exhibit 2, pp. 50-59.

Four of the five factors relied on by the BPT in finding petitioner unsuitable

involved unchanging factors occurring prior to his incarceration, i.e. the circumstances of the

offense and his unstable social history.

Petitioner argues that there was not some evidence to support the BPT’s finding of

unsuitability because the unchanging factors relied on by the BPT no longer demonstrated that he

posed an unreasonable risk of danger if released on parole. Pursuant to Biggs, supra, the reliance

on these factors alone violated petitioner’s right to due process if these factors no longer had

predictive value in determining whether petitioner was suitable for parole. The court will

evaluate petitioner’s record following his incarceration to determine whether these unchanging

factors had any predictive value.

The only reason the BPT found petitioner unsuitable for parole based on postcommitment conduct was that he had not sufficiently participated in self-help programs that

would help give him insight into the commitment offense. Answer, Exhibit 2, p. 55. In making

this finding, the BPT relied on psychiatric reports from 1995, 1996 and 2000. The BPT quoted

from the 1995 report which stated, 

Mr. Evans’s tendencies to distort information was evidenced in his responses to

mental status questions wherein he manifested a pronounced inclination to overly

personalize information presented to him. He appears to have very weak

boundaries and this contributes to his pattern of distorting information he receives

from others. He is also highly narcissistic and in keeping with his character

pathology, he possesses an unrealistic sense of entitlement. This particular type of

pathology is not typically amenable to treatment interventions. Furthermore, he is

not motivated to make any significant changes in himself. He is probably of

bright normal intelligence and he possesses no meaningful personal insight. His

primary defenses are denial, projection, rationalization, and externalization. 

Judgment in day-to-day matters is fair. Currently there is no indication that he

suffers from any type of mood or thought disorder and the diagnostic impression

was personality disorder not otherwise specified with narcissistic dependent and

obsessive compulsive features.

Answer, Exhibit 2, pp. 55-56. 

/////

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The BPT quoted from the 1996 psychological report:

Mr. Evans is a friendly manipulative 65 year old man. His intellectual ability

appears to be in the average range and he does not have a psychotic disorder. Mr.

Evans’ ability to reason is intact. However, his judgment is poor. This seems to

be a byproduct of a significant self-absorption which impairs his ability to

emphasize and accurately read these interactions with others. The above noted

psychopathology is indirectly related to the instant offense and that it contributed

to his crime but did not determine it. There is no noticeable improvement in this

inmate during his period of incarceration. 

Answer, Exhibit 2, p. 54.

The BPT quoted from the 2000 psychological report:

Mr. Evans speaks in a rather impulsive and defensive manner at times with

underlying irritability. He continues to deny having committed the offense. This

may be due to his actual innocence or an almost delusional belief in his innocence,

the latter which would not portend well for him in the future.

*****

In a more denying scenario, he may have misled others with his intentions, with

his impulsive and bravado speech. In either case, one would think that self-help

groups might be beneficial in his communications and interaction with others. 

However, he continues to reject the idea of self-help groups.

Answer, Exhibit 2, p. 53. 

The BPT stated that the 2004 psychological report prepared by Dr. Rouse was not

useful because it did not address the concerns that were discussed at the 2003 suitability hearing,

although the BPT did not go on to discuss those concerns. Answer, Exhibit 2, p. 52. 

Attached to the petition as exhibit I is a copy of Dr. Rouse’s 2003 psychological

report. In the section of the report titled Mental Status Examination, Dr. Rouse states,

Mr. Evans presented as a well-nourished, well developed white male of the stated

age of 73 years. He arrived on time for his appointment at the Satellite Clinic and

is described as a medium height, grey haired, older gentleman. He was dressed

appropriately and neatly in prison attire and was cooperative with the examiner. 

His speech was clear, organized and coherent. He was alert and fully oriented in

all spheres. His thinking was clear, organized, and directed to inquiry. He denied

any history of severe mental problems or any diagnosis of a sever mental disorder. 

His insight and judgment seemed within the normal limits. His mood was

euthymic and his affect was non-restricted. There was nothing indicating that Mr.

Evans was suffering from any type of severe mental disorder or was mentally

distressed in any form or fashion.

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In the section of the report titled “Estimated Dangerousness,” Dr. Rouse stated

that petitioner demonstrated sufficient impulse control and had clearly made the most appropriate

personal, social and behavior adjustments in the institutional setting. Petition, Exhibit I. Dr.

Rouse concluded that there was a high probability that petitioner could do the same if released on

parole. Id. Dr. Rouse stated, 

It is my professional opinion that Mr. Evans risk of dangerousness is lower than

that of the average inmate incarcerated here at CSP-Solano and consistent with

that of the average citizen in the broader society. A synthesis of all the

information reviewed regarding Mr. Evans leads this examiner to determine that

Mr. Evans commitment offense was not driven by nor caused by any type of

mental disorder and there are no current mental health issues which Mr. Evans is

burdened with. Thus, any current considerations that the Board would ponder for

Mr. Evans parole should be based on factors other than mental health issues. 

Id.

Dr. Rouse also prepared a psychological report for petitioner’s 2002 suitability

hearing. Petition, Exhibit J. Dr. Rouse stated that petitioner’s insight and judgment were within

normal limits. Id. Dr. Rouse again concluded that parole should be based on factors other than

psychiatric issues. Id.

Attached to the petition as exhibit K is the psychological report prepared in

support of petitioner’s 1998 suitability hearing by Dr. Clair. Dr. Clair states, 

He continues to be unhappy at the tone of his two previous writeups. A possible

source of tension was his persisting claim of innocence in the commitment

offense. The writer has less of a problem with this and feels that the truth or

falsehood of this claim at this point in time has little to do with the inmate’s

potential for conforming behavior if paroled. In this respect, I see him as posing

little or no threat to the public order.

*****

No recommendations come to mind. If denied parole the inmate can be expected

to continue his stable adaptation to prison life. 

Petition, Exhibit K.

As noted by petitioner, Cal. Penal Code § 5011(b) prohibits the BPT from

requiring an inmate to admit guilt for any crime for which an inmate is committed when setting

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parole dates. See also In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061, 1098-1099, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 417,

443-444 (2005). In the instant case, petitioner denied his involvement in the commitment

offense, and apparently this has always been his position. Answer, Exhibit 2, p. 18. In finding

petitioner unsuitable for parole because he failed to participate in self-help programs that would

give him insight into the commitment offense, the BPT did not expressly require petitioner to

admit guilt but petitioner reasonably perceives it that way.

This court considers other factors in order to determine whether the precommitment unchanging factors continued to have predictive value. Petitioner had no juvenile

record, which tended to show suitability. Answer, Exhibit 2, p. 20; § 2402(d)(1) (lack of juvenile

record tends to show suitability). Petitioner’s only other criminal conviction was a 1973 federal

conviction for counterfeiting. Answer, Exhibit 20. Petitioner’s lack of a previous violent record

supported a finding of suitability. Section 2402(c)(2) (previous record of violence tends to show

unsuitability). 

Petitioner had received no rules violations report during his entire incarceration,

which tended to show his suitability. Answer, Exhibit 2, p. 30; Section 2402(d)(9) (institutional

activities indicate an enhanced ability to function within the law upon release). Petitioner’s age

(74) reduced the probability of recidivism. Section 2402(d)(7) (prisoner’s present age reduces

probability of recidivism). 

Petitioner’s positive work history, which included excellent work reports and

laudatory chronos, tended to show his suitability. Answer, Exhibit B, p. 57; § 2402(d)(9). 

Following the 2003 suitability hearing, petitioner had participated in a five week stress

management class and was participating in an anger management class, i.e., self-help groups. 

Answer, Exhibit B, pp. 40, 42. When asked what he had learned from the anger management

class, petitioner told the panel that it was hard to say because “all they’ve talked about is drinking

and drugs and I don’t do neither of those, and drinking and getting in fights, I don’t do that

either...” Id., p. 41. Petitioner also told the BPT,

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What else have I learned from it, I think before I say anything, and what I’ve

always maintained, if somebody gets combative or derogatory, find some excuse

to go off somewhere else leave them. I don’t have the time or patience to–well, I

won’t say the patience, I just don’t want to get involved with them, I’m not into

violence. 

Id., p. 41-42.

The BPT stated that it was “a little bit dismayed about the answers” petitioner

gave to what he learned from anger management, id., p. 57, although one could differ with such

an interpretation. Petitioner stated that he found the information regarding alcohol and drugs not

particularly useful because he does not drink or use drugs. Petitioner also stated that he learned

that if someone is engaging in combative behavior, he should walk away. Petitioner’s comments

appear appropriate.

Petitioner had realistic parole plans. Section 2402(d)(8). Petitioner had remarried

following his incarceration and planned to live with his wife in Tecopa and receive social

security. Answer, Exhibit B, p. 32. 

Petitioner maintained stable relationships with family members. His brother and

sister, living in Florida, bought some land in Florida for petitioner to live on following his release

from prison. Answer, Exhibit B, p. 23. Petitioner had several supportive letters in his file from

family members. Id., pp. 34-38. Petitioner’s family ties tended to show his suitability. Section

2402(d)(1) (stable relationships with others tends to show suitability). 

Certainly, an inference to be drawn is that the BPT commissioners simply

stretched every bit of adverse evidence as a legal cover for their antipathy to this “stubborn old

man” who would not admit his complicity in the crime. Moreover, it also appears stretched to

attribute to petitioner’s mental state some of the callous acts performed by the actual perpetrators

on the victim. While petitioner would, of course, be legally responsible for the acts of those who

he hired, the point of the parole suitability hearing was to assess petitioner’s suitability for parole

– not that of the perpetrators. If petitioner had actually initiated or encouraged the manner of

killing the victim, such would have said much about his state of mind and suitability for release,

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at least for the initial suitability hearings. However, the record contained no evidence that

petitioner had actually planned or had any involvement in deciding the actual method chosen by

the perpetrators for their attempted murder, nor did the record reflect that petitioner had any

knowledge of a left-to-die victim. Finally, the commissioners went out of their way to choose the

old, adverse psychiatric reports instead of the more recent, favorable ones. The commissioners

decision that this mid-to-late 70’s aged prisoner, who has a few years left on his life, if that, 

would actually pose a danger to individuals or his release community after twenty-plus years

incarceration is somewhat fantastic.

Nevertheless, the analysis here focuses on the “some evidence” test and the

California Supreme Court’s acceptance of the basis for the BPT decision. Although the

undersigned would conclude that adoption of the BPT findings as some evidence was clearly

erroneous, more is required to vacate the decision of the California court – it must be

unreasonable in the AEDPA sense. The undersigned cannot make that conclusion.

For the following reasons, the court also finds that there was sufficient evidence to

find petitioner unsuitable for parole based on the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Irons v.

Carey, 479 F.3d 658 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Since the approximate five years since the issuance of McQuillion v. Duncan, 306

F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2002), we know this about the liberty interest implicated by California’s

parole laws regarding indeterminate sentences, i.e., parole suitability hearings, which if

successful for the petitioner, will result in the establishment of an actual parole date (but never

less than the minimum term):

1. A liberty interest exists, Irons v. Carey, 479 F.3d 658 (9th Cir. 2007) citing

cases;

2. Reliance on unchanging factors in denying parole suitability might implicate a

violation of that liberty interest. Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 916 (9th Cir. 2003);

/////

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 Nothing in California statutes or regulations, see Cal. Penal Code 3041, 15 CCR § 2

2402, would expressly so limit the decision of the BPH and Governor, thus the potential

limitation must be of federal origin. However, as undue reliance on unchangeable factors has

never been found thus far by the Ninth Circuit, the commencement point of the limitation, or the

precise blend of crime circumstances and years since, has not been defined. We do know that in

Irons, five times of application was insufficient. Irons did not decide that reliance on unchanging

factors after the minimum term had been served was unlawful. We simply know that “maybe”

that will be the case. 

15

3. A finding by the Board of Parole Hearings (formerly BPT) (or at a later time,

by the Governor) concerning the circumstances or gravity of the crime in and of itself is

sufficient to deny suitability; In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th 616, 682, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 104, 161;

Irons, 479 F.3d at 664; but the nature of the offense must be “particularly egregious” to constitute

a basis to deny parole suitability. Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th at 683, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 161.

4. However, “particularly egregious” means nothing more than finding elements

in excess of those “minimally necessary to convict.” In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061, 1095,

23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 417, 440 (2005);

5. If the petitioner has served less than the minimum term of his indeterminate

sentence, “all we hold today, therefore, is that, given the particular circumstances of the offenses

in these cases, due process was not violated when these prisoners were deemed unsuitable for

parole prior to the expiration of their minimum terms.” Irons 479 at 665, but see footnote 1 of

Irons expressing no opinion if the prisoner has served more than his minimum term, i.e., maybe

that is the time frame against which reliance on unchanging factors is truly suspect ;

2

6. If the BPH determined that the crime was vicious, or performed in a callous

manner, or the motive was trivial, and so forth – all factors relating to the circumstances of the

crime – and such is adopted by the state courts on review, a federal court must find the state court

decision(s) AEDPA-unreasonable before a writ of habeas corpus may be granted. Irons, supra.

With respect, after Irons, the undefined “mights” and “maybes” serve as an

indecipherable present guide to knowing just when the liberty interest in parole may be violated 

by reliance on unchanging factors. Moreover, one does not know whether such reliance, if it is

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 The Board of Prison Terms recently had its name changed to the Board of Prison 3

Hearings. 

 The undersigned has previously determined the arbitrary nature and lack of predictive 4

value generally found in a circumstances of the crime parole suitability denial based on

unchanging circumstances despite the passage of sixteen years and more from the date of the

conviction coupled with an unblemished prison record. See Irons v. Warden of California State

Prison-Solano, 358 F. Supp. 2d 936, 947 (E.D. Cal. 2005). That analysis, focusing on the

predictive nature of the crime for future violence in combination with expert psychiatric reports

or other forward looking evidence, has been cited with approval by the California Court of

Appeal. In re Elkins, 144 Cal. App. 4th 475, 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 503, 522 (2006); In re Scott, 133

Cal. App. 4th 573, 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 905 (2005). However, since that analysis only received the

comment that it was an “understandable [AEDPA] error” in the concurrence of Judge Reinhardt,

that analysis concerning the trigger time of undue reliance will not be utilized herein.

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ever held to be insufficient, is based on passage of time alone, or is an uncertain blend of crime

circumstances and passage of time. The state courts’ adoption of the BPH (BPT ) or Governor’s

3

decision about the circumstances of the crime is now essentially unreviewable – at least prior to

the expiration of the minimum term. That is, the circumstances of the crime in terms of

viciousness, callousness, triviality and the like, is essentially an unchanging value judgment

whose correctness cannot often be disputed regardless of the time when such a judgment is made

– right after the conviction, just prior to expiration of a minimum term, well after the expiration

of a minimum term. 4

Review of the federal appellate cases demonstrates that no guided finding of

undue reliance on unchanging factors can be made in this case. Biggs v. Terhune, supra, the case

that commenced the discussion on unchanging factors, involved the first degree bludgeoning

murder of a witness facilitated, but not committed, by Biggs. He was denied parole eligibility at

his initial hearing in 1999 in part because of the gravity of the crime. All might agree that such a

murder was grave, and it will never be properly classified as anything but such. Nevertheless, the

Ninth Circuit found that “continued reliance” on unchanging factors could violate due process. 

Although not stating such, the intimation of Biggs was that the third or fourth time of reliance on

the circumstances of the crime would be too much. Certainly, it was not understood by the

undersigned from reading Biggs that the time at which continued reliance would be too much

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would occur in 2010 – the time at which Biggs will have served his minimum term. Biggs’

minimum term is served in 2010, and Biggs will have had approximately 5 or 6 more hearings by

that time. However, subsequent Ninth Circuit cases have not upheld the undersigned’s reading

of Biggs.

 In Sass, no comparison review of other cases was undertaken, there was simply

the one sentence holding that the “evidence of Sass’ prior offenses [prior DUIs] and the gravity

of his convicted offenses [DUI resulting in a death and injury] constitute some evidence to

support the Board’s decision.” Id., 461 F.3d 1123; the dissent disagreed, and found AEDPA

unreasonableness. The Ninth Circuit was reviewing a third denial of suitability. If jurists of the

Ninth Circuit cannot agree whether the circumstances of the crime can constitute some evidence

given three hearings, how will the BPH or the undersigned know when to stop using the

circumstances of a crime as the reason to deny parole eligibility. What will be the analytical

watershed point of departure from routinely upholding the BPH assessment of the circumstances

of the crime, and more importantly, why? Will the fourth hearing be sufficient, or should it be

the seventh? Will the analysis simply hinge on the non-analytical fact that Sass will have passed

his minimum terms of years under his sentence? Would a later BPT finding of egregiousness be

AEDPA unreasonable simply because Sass just passed his minimum term as opposed to just

before the expiration of his minimum term? None of these questions have been answered.

In Irons, after five parole suitability hearings, the Ninth Circuit determined that

the second degree murder of a perceived thieving drug dealer by a wildly shooting, and then

stabbing, angry “victim” of the deceased was comparatively more egregious than the murder in

Sass. Perhaps so; perhaps other jurists would locate this line in another position because of the

societal impact that drunk drivers impose in this country. Both positions have their points. But

one can validly question whether the ultimate goal of every parole eligibility hearing,

determining future safety of the community, can forever be based on personal judgments on the

comparative seriousness of crimes committed decades ago.

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 Unpublished Ninth Circuit decisions may be cited commencing with decisions issued in 5

2007. Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Although still not precedential in the binding sense, the

unpublished decisions do have a certain amount of persuasive value, and indicate how Ninth

Circuit judges apply binding precedent.

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Nevertheless, taking an implied cue from Irons that the minimum term might

serve as an analytical change point, the undersigned finds that prior to that time, absent

extraordinary circumstances, the BPH determination on factors relating to the circumstances of

the crime are essentially unreviewable, i.e., the determination constitutes “some evidence”

sufficient to deny parole eligibility (suitability).

This case cannot be decided on the above finding because petitioner’s 22 year

incarceration at the time of the 2004 suitability hearing has exceeded his minimum term of 7

years. The 2004 hearing was his eleventh subsequent parole hearing.

Nearly the same day as Irons was decided, the Ninth Circuit reversed a grant of

parole eligibility in Kunkler v. Muntz, 2007 WL 683970 (9th Cir. 2007). The facts of the 5

second degree murder were not set forth in the opinion, but the fact of Kunkler’s 1983

conviction, and the fact that Kunkler had been considered for parole suitability ten times were set

forth. Kunkler had been imprisoned well beyond any minimum term. On his last two BPT (now

BPH) hearings, the commissioners had found Kunkler suitable for parole, but the Governor

reversed both decisions in part on his perception of the seriousness of the crime. Indeed, this was

the ground on which the state courts in unpublished orders had ultimately upheld the Governor’s

decision. The district court applied the Biggs dictum regarding reliance on unchanging factors. 

In reversing the district court, the Ninth Circuit, citing Sass, viewed the Biggs dictum as merely

advice to the next BPH panel that it might wish to depart from its continued reliance on a nonchanging factor. Kunkler at *2 (“‘it is not [this court’s] function to speculate about how future

parole hearings could proceed.’”). Evidently, no matter how many times the BPH and/or the

Governor utter an undoubtedly correct conclusion that a murder is serious, or a motive trivial, or

that the victim suffered, these unchanging factors will always constitute “some evidence” in

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federal habeas corpus review.

As discussed above, the BPT found that the offense was carried out in a

dispassionate and calculated manner, demonstrated an exceptionally callous disregard for human

suffering and that the motive for the offense was trivial or inexplicable. Nevertheless, in light of

the above authority, the undersigned cannot find at this time that the state courts in this case were

AEDPA unreasonable by failing to reject the unchanging circumstances conclusion of the BPT. 

Thus, as a matter of law, some evidence existed to satisfy the standards of the parole suitability

liberty interest.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s application for

a writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: 4/20/07

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 

GREGORY G. HOLLOWS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

evans376.157(2)

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