Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-97-07239/USCOURTS-caDC-97-07239-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 14, 1998 Decided July 7, 1998

No. 97-7165

Isaiah Webb,

Appellee

v.

The District of Columbia,

Appellant

Consolidated with

No. 97-7239

---------

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 90cv02787)

Donna M. Murasky, Assistant Corporation Counsel, argued the cause for appellant, with whom John M. Ferren,

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tion Counsel, and Carol E. Burroughs, Assistant Corporation

Counsel, were on the briefs.

Lynn Estes Calkins argued the cause for appellee, with

whom Michael L. Martinez, Melinda Burrows, and Theodore

W. Small, Jr., were on the brief.

Before: Wald, Williams, and Garland, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Wald.

Wald, Circuit Judge: In 1990, Isaiah Webb ("Webb"), an

African-American male correctional officer, sued the District

of Columbia Department of Corrections ("the District"), alleging that he had been unlawfully denied promotion to more

than one hundred positions for which he had applied. In

1994, the District terminated Webb for sexually harassing two

female co-workers. After the district court dismissed many

of his claims, Webb filed an amended complaint in 1996 that

limited his claims of discrimination to three positions and

added a claim of retaliatory termination. As discovery proceeded, it became clear that the District, in accordance with

general internal policies and in contravention of federal regulations, had discarded portions of Webb's personnel file as

well as other files relevant to the positions at issue. Webb

moved for sanctions, and the district court, concluding that

the destruction of documents was too extensive to permit a

trial to go forward, entered a default judgment against the

District and ordered that Webb be placed in one of the

positions for which he had applied, declining to consider the

District's evidence of Webb's harassment activities. Because

we believe that the district court did not give adequate

consideration either to alternative sanctions or to the District's harassment evidence, we vacate the default judgment

against the District and remand for further proceedings.

I. Background

Webb was hired as a probationary correctional officer with

the District in January 1973 at a DS-6 level. He received

numerous promotions and wage increases throughout the

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ry Correctional Officer, a DS-11 position, by 1990. At this

point, in Webb's view, his ascent stalled. On November 13,

1990, after exhausting his administrative remedies, Webb

brought a pro se suit against the District, alleging that

between November 1983 and November 1990, he had applied

for and was denied promotion to more than one hundred

positions 1 on the basis of his sex, race, and/or personal

appearance in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, 42 U.S.C. s 2000e et seq., and 42 U.S.C. s 1981.2 Webb

sought an injunction ordering the District to promote him and

an award of back pay. In June 1994, while proceedings in his

nonselection suit were ongoing, the District terminated Webb

for the sexual harassment of two female co-workers, Barbara

Shank ("Shank") and Sandra Stevens ("Stevens").

The District moved to dismiss the nonselection suit or, in

the alternative, for summary judgment. In Webb v. District

of Columbia (Webb I), 864 F. Supp. 175 (D.D.C. 1994), the

district court granted the motion in part and denied it in part,

retaining only ten of Webb's claims of racial discrimination,

seventeen of his claims of sex discrimination, and forty-two of

__________

1 Webb's initial complaint did not identify any specific position

to which he had been allegedly denied promotion. His first amended complaint included claims that he had been denied promotion to

several positions in retaliation for his protected activity. On May

12, 1992, the district court directed Webb to file a second amended

complaint setting forth with particularity the positions for which he

applied and was not selected. That complaint, filed on September

9, 1992, listed sixty-nine individuals who Webb claimed had been

selected over him for various positions, although the complaint

noted that Webb's claims were not limited to those examples.

In 1992, Webb was promoted to a DS-12 chaplain's position but

contended that the discriminatory denial of more than one hundred

DS-12 positions from 1983 to 1992 hampered his advancement to

DS-13 and DS-14 positions. See Webb v. District of Columbia, 864

F. Supp. 175, 179 n.3 (D.D.C. 1994).

2 Webb also asserted claims under other federal and constitutional provisions; these claims, as well as his allegations of discrimination based on personal appearance, were eventually abandoned.

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his claims of retaliation.3 The court also granted Webb leave

to amend his complaint to add a claim of retaliatory discharge

and race/sex discrimination resulting from his 1994 termination. Id. at 187. On November 1, 1996, Webb (for whom

counsel had been appointed) filed his fourth amended complaint. The complaint limited Webb's claims of discrimination

to three positions--Special Assistant, Correctional Program

Officer, and Supervisor Correctional Officer/Major 4--and included a claim of retaliatory discharge pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

s 2000e-3. With the scope of the suit thus narrowed, the

district court ordered that the discovery process conclude by

February 24, 1997,5 and set a trial date of March 24, 1997.

Webb v. Government for the Dist. of Columbia, Dep't of

Corrections (Webb II), 175 F.R.D. 128, 130 (D.D.C. 1997).

Beginning in 1990, Webb had served on the District numerous requests and interrogatories asking for information and

__________

3 The grounds for dismissal included failure to state a claim for

which relief could be granted, failure to exhaust administrative

remedies and untimeliness. See, e.g., Webb I, 864 F. Supp. at 181

(noting that eleven of the selectees listed in the complaint appeared

twice and that of the remaining selectees, eighteen were black

males).

4 Webb identified the following positions and vacancy announcement numbers: Special Assistant to the Director (DC-89-125);

Major (DC-90-167); and Correctional Program Officer (DC-89-

163). Patricia Britton was selected for DC-89-125. Webb claimed

that Robert Fulton and Steven Smith were selected for DC-90-167;

the District asserted that although these two were among the

individuals selected for the position, the position was ultimately not

filled and both men subsequently were promoted to Major through

other applications. The District also claimed that no vacancy

announcement numbered DC-89-163 existed and that the selectee

for DC-89-63, for which Webb applied, was an African-American

male. Webb abandoned this claim during pretrial proceedings, thus

limiting his claims of discrimination to two positions.

5 Discovery had originally been scheduled to conclude by January 24, 1997, but the district court extended the period by one

month due to the District's "failure to produce discovery in a timely

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documents relating to his nonselection and termination

claims. His ninth such request, on October 30, 1996 (the first

to be prepared by counsel), included a request for documents

from Webb's personnel file as well as documents from the

"merit case files" for the positions identified in his complaint.6

After the District informed Webb's counsel that it could not

locate Webb's personnel file, Webb moved for sanctions as

well as to compel the District's full response to his discovery

requests. As part of its opposition to Webb's motion, the

District submitted two declarations to explain its inability to

comply fully with Webb's requests. In the first declaration,

Joan Murphy ("Murphy"), a Supervisory Personnel Management Specialist with the District of Columbia, stated that she

believed that the merit case files relevant to Webb's case

were destroyed two years after the end of the selection

process in accordance with District regulations. In the second declaration, Karen Adams ("Adams"), also a Supervisory

Personnel Management Specialist with the District of Columbia, stated that although she had located Webb's personnel

file, all "temporary records" had been removed and discarded

in preparation for routine archiving. Although Adams could

not identify the number or content of any discarded documents, she noted that the term "temporary records" would

include corrective or adverse action final decision letters as

well as official reprimands.7 The District thus asserted that

it had responded to the bulk of Webb's requests and where it

had not done so, it had acted in good faith. See Defendant's

Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Compel and Request for

Sanctions (February 3, 1997).

__________

fashion." Webb v. Government for the Dist. of Columbia, Dep't of

Corrections, 175 F.R.D. 128, 130 (D.D.C. 1997).

6 "Merit case files" are used by the District of Columbia's

Office of Personnel for each job vacancy and generally contain the

qualification standard for the position, the applications received, and

paperwork relating to the selection process and decision. Webb II,

175 F.R.D. at 135.

7 Notwithstanding Adams's statement, the District's supplemental responses to Webb's discovery request failed to note, as

required by the document request, that portions of Webb's personnel file had been destroyed, a failure the district court characterized

as a "glaring omission." Webb II, 175 F.R.D. at 134.

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On March 1, 1997, the district court granted Webb's motion

for sanctions for destruction of the documents, stating that

the appropriate sanction would be determined at a later date.

The court also granted Webb's motion to compel and ordered

the District to respond fully to Webb's discovery requests by

March 6, 1997, and to provide written confirmation of its

compliance. The District's supplementary responses, inter

alia, identified Walter Ridley and Earthel C. Foster as

individuals who participated in the selection process for vacancy announcement 89-125 and Bernard Braxton, Douglas

Stempson, and Warren Bragg as the interviewing committee

for vacancy announcement 90-167.8

On March 20, 1997, the second day of the pretrial conference, the court informed the parties that it would enter a

default judgment in Webb's favor. It thus vacated the trial

date and requested that Webb submit proposed findings of

fact and conclusions of law. The District moved for reconsideration. On August 4, 1997, the district court denied the

District's motion, finding that because the destruction of

documents was "far more extensive than originally represented," the only appropriate action was the entry of a default

judgment in Webb's favor. Webb II, 175 F.R.D. at 129.

Because "[a] sanction for failure to preserve evidence is

appropriate only when a party has consciously disregarded its

obligation to do so," Shepherd v. American Broadcasting

Cos., Inc., 62 F.3d 1469, 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1995), the district

court first determined whether the District had knowingly

violated 29 C.F.R. s 1602.31,9 which requires government

__________

8 In the joint pretrial statement submitted to the district court,

the District identified Walter Ridley, Earthel Foster, and Bernard

Braxton as witnesses to be called to testify on the selection processes for the positions at issue. See Joint Pretrial Statement (March

12, 1997). Webb moved to exclude Ridley and Foster on the

ground that the District had not identified these individuals until

March 6, 1997. See Plaintiff's Motion in Limine to Exclude Defendant's Proposed Witnesses and Evidence Related Thereto (March

18, 1997).

9 29 C.F.R. s 1602.31 provides:

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entities to maintain all personnel files for two years from the

__________

Any personnel or employment record made or kept by a

political jurisdiction (including but not necessarily limited to

requests for reasonable accommodation, application forms submitted by applicants and other records having to do with

hiring, promotion, demotion, transfer, layoff, or termination,

rates of pay or other terms of compensation, and selection for

training or apprenticeship) shall be preserved by the political

jurisdiction for a period of 2 years from the date of the making

of the record or the personnel action involved, whichever

occurs later. In the case of involuntary termination of an

employee, the personnel records of the individual terminated

shall be kept for a period of 2 years from the date of termination. Where a charge of discrimination has been filed, or an

action brought by the Attorney General against a political

jurisdiction under title VII or the ADA, the respondent political

jurisdiction shall preserve all personnel records relevant to the

charge or action until final disposition of the charge or the

action. The term "personnel record relevant to the charge,"

for example, would include personnel or employment records

relating to the person claiming to be aggrieved and to all other

employees holding positions similar to that held or sought by

the person claiming to be aggrieved; and application forms or

test papers completed by an unsuccessful applicant and by all

other candidates for the same position as that for which the

person claiming to be aggrieved applied and was rejected. The

date of final disposition of the charge or the action means the

date of expiration of the statutory period within which a person

claiming to be aggrieved may bring an action in a U.S. district

court or, where an action is brought against a political jurisdiction either by a person claiming to be aggrieved or by the

Attorney General, the date on which such litigation is terminated.

The regulation thus requires that "an employer notified of a charge

of discrimination preserve relevant personnel records until the

charges' final disposition." Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d

1406, 1418 (10th Cir. 1987). In her deposition, Murphy stated that

she was "somewhat" familiar with this requirement, although she

was unaware of how long records were to be maintained. See Webb

II, 175 F.R.D. at 141. The District does not now challenge the

district court's conclusion that it violated this regulation in the

destruction of certain documents from its files.

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making of the record or the date of the action involved and to

preserve those records relevant to a filed charge of discrimination until final disposition of the charge. Because Webb

had been terminated in June 1994, and the evidence showed

that records from his personnel file had been destroyed in

late 1994 or early 1995, the district court concluded that the

District had engaged in a clear violation of the regulation.

Next, the court rejected the District's claim that it did not

have sufficient notice of which positions plaintiff intended to

challenge, stating that Webb's second amended complaint,

filed on May 12, 1992, named "the selectees for the positions

[identified], together with the allegations of a pattern and

practice of discrimination" and thus was "sufficient to put the

District on notice that the relevant documents should have

been retained." Webb II, 175 F.R.D. at 144. (The court was

troubled, moreover, by the fact that the record indicated that

"there was no procedure in place to ensure that relevant

employment records were flagged so that they would not be

destroyed." Id.) Finally, the court determined, based on the

testimony adduced during the hearings, that the District

knew of the requirement to preserve employment records and

willfully chose to ignore it. Id. at 145. It thus held that

some sort of sanction for the destruction of documents was

appropriate and that, in accordance with the case law of this

circuit, a default judgment was the only appropriate sanction.

Following this decision, the District proffered several summaries of sexual harassment claims involving Webb that had

been submitted in other ongoing litigation and contended that

Webb would ultimately have been discharged on harassment

grounds even if he had not been terminated for discriminatory reasons.10 On September 10, 1997, the court held that it

__________

10 The claim summaries were filed as part of the litigation in

Neal v. Director, Dist. of Columbia Dep't of Corrections, in which

the district court found that the District had tolerated widespread

sexual harassment of female employees at the Department of

Corrections. In Bonds v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 801 (D.C.

Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2453 (1997), this court reversed

the discovery sanction imposed against the District in Neal and

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would not consider this evidence 11 and awarded Webb

$80,745.35 in back pay, $75,000 in compensatory damages,12

and $4,018.93 for medical expenses.13 The court also directed

that the District rehire Webb to a DS-12 Special Assistant

position, the position for which he applied in 1989, with "such

other pecuniary compensation as one reinstated would be

entitled to receive." 14 Joint Appendix ("J.A.") 60.

The District appealed. Before this court, the District does

not contest the district court's conclusion that the District

discarded files relevant to Webb's claims in violation of

federal regulations and thus that some sanction is appropriate. See, e.g., Shepherd, 62 F.3d at 1478 ("[A] district court

may impose issue-related sanctions whenever a preponderance of the evidence establishes that a party's misconduct has

tainted the evidentiary resolution of the issue."). It does

challenge, however, the district court's conclusion that default

was the only appropriate sanction for its misconduct and the

__________

remanded the case for further proceedings. The parties subsequently settled the case.

11 The court refused to consider the claim summaries because it

believed the evidence went to the merits of Webb's case. Because a

default judgment was entered against the District, the District had

"lost the opportunity to challenge the merits of plaintiff's claims";

thus, "taking plaintiff's well-plead [sic] allegations as true, the court

must conclude that this proffered reason [sexual harassment] was a

pretext, and that plaintiff was fired in retaliation for complaining of

race and gender discrimination." Joint Appendix 52.

12 In this regard, the district court noted that "[t]he branding of

plaintiff by his employer as a sexual harasser was an egregious act

that affected both plaintiff's professional and personal life." J.A.

58.

13 The district court also ordered, on December 2, 1997, that

the District pay attorneys' fees in the amount of $207,294.25 and

costs in the amount of $25,125.92. J.A. 121.

14 The monetary awards and injunctive relief were subsequently stayed pending appeal.

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requirement that Webb be reinstated to a supervisory position despite strong evidence of sexual harassment.

II. Analysis

A.The Default Judgment

A district court may order sanctions, including a default

judgment, for misconduct either pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2) of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which authorizes a

court to assess a sanction for violation of a discovery order, or

pursuant to the court's inherent power to "protect [its] integrity and prevent abuses of the judicial process." Shepherd,

62 F.3d at 1474. In Shea v. Donohoe Construction Company,

795 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1986), we set forth three basic

justifications that support the use of dismissal or default

judgment as a sanction for misconduct. First, the court may

decide that the errant party's behavior has severely hampered the other party's ability to present his case--in other

words, that the other party "has been so prejudiced by the

misconduct that it would be unfair to require him to proceed

further in the case." Id. at 1074. Second, the court may take

account of the prejudice caused to the judicial system when

the party's misconduct has put "an intolerable burden on a

district court by requiring the court to modify its own docket

and operations in order to accommodate the delay." Id. at

1075. And finally, the court may consider the need "to

sanction conduct that is disrespectful to the court and to

deter similar misconduct in the future." 15 Id. at 1077. A

sanction imposed pursuant to any of these considerations

must be based on findings supported by the record. Bonds v.

District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 801, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1996), cert.

denied, 117 S. Ct. 2453 (1997).

Although our review of a district court's order of default

under either source of authority looks only to whether an

__________

15 Although Shea concerned dismissal ordered pursuant to Rule

37(b), we have also held that these considerations are appropriate

when a district court orders dismissal pursuant to its inherent

power. See, e.g., Ripalda v. American Operations Corp., 977 F.2d

1464, 1466 (D.C. Cir. 1992).

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abuse of discretion has occurred, the review should be a

thorough, not a cursory, one. See, e.g., Bonds, 93 F.3d at 808

(Rule 37(b)); Shepherd, 62 F.3d at 1475 (inherent power).

We recognize the burdens and management responsibilities a

heavy docket places on a district court, but we must be

equally cognizant of the drastic nature of a default judgment,

which deprives a party completely of its day in court. Because disposition of cases on the merits is generally favored,

we have said that a default judgment must be a "sanction of

last resort," to be used only when less onerous methods (for

example, adverse evidentiary determinations or other "issuerelated sanctions") will be ineffective or obviously futile.

Shea, 795 F.2d at 1075 (internal quotation omitted); Shepherd, 62 F.3d at 1478. While we do not require a district

court, in making this judgment, to exhaust lesser sanctions

before turning to default, see, e.g., Shepherd, 62 F.3d at 1479,

we do require that the court explain its reason for issuing a

default judgment rather than a lesser sanction. This duty to

explain arises out of two different, although related, concerns.

Rule 37(b)(2) permits a district court to issue only such

orders "as are just" in response to a party's failure "to obey

an order to provide or permit discovery." Fed. R. Civ. P.

37(b)(2). The requirement that an ordered sanction be "just"

imposes a duty on the district court, particularly in the case

of severe sanctions, to give adequate consideration to "whether lesser sanctions would be more appropriate for the particular violation." Bonds, 93 F.3d at 808. When sanctions are

ordered under the court's inherent power, the need to consider less onerous alternatives stems from the intrinsic need for

self-restraint in using so powerful a weapon. See, e.g., Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991) ("Because of their

very potency, inherent powers must be exercised with restraint and discretion."). Indeed, we have noted that in order

to justify the use of a court's inherent power to order default,

the court must give "a specific, reasoned explanation for

rejecting lesser sanctions, such as fines, attorneys' fees, or

adverse evidentiary rulings." Shepherd, 62 F.3d at 1478. A

district court must state why, in light of the Shea factors, less

onerous sanctions are not sufficient. Our task of appellate

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review of such orders, limited though it may be, cannot be

properly exercised if we are not assured that the district

court has fully considered whether harm caused by a party's

misconduct may be rectified by sanctions short of default.

Cf., e.g., Outley v. City of New York, 837 F.2d 587, 591 (2d

Cir. 1988) ("Before the extreme sanction of preclusion may be

used by the district court, a judge should inquire more fully

into the actual difficulties which the violation causes, and

must consider less drastic responses."). Conclusory statements are not enough. Thus, in Shepherd, we held that

although the district court had concluded that " '[i]mposition

of a lesser sanction would only reward the defendants for

their misconduct in this litigation,' " id. at 1480 (quoting

Shepherd v. ABC, 151 F.R.D. 179, 192 (D.D.C. 1992)), the

court had not sufficiently explained why lesser sanctions

would " 'only reward the defendants' and fail to provide

meaningful deterrence and punishment for the misconduct."

Id. Rather, it had noted only that "[it] thought the misconduct was serious and imposing a default judgment was appropriate" without further explanation. Id. We thus felt

obliged to remand for reconsideration of alternative sanctions

by the district court.

With these principles in mind, we proceed to examine the

district court's order of default in this case under the framework set out in Shea.16 First, we consider whether a default

__________

16 The court noted that it had the power to order sanctions both

under its inherent power and under Rule 37(b)(2). See Webb II,

175 F.R.D. at 143. As we have noted, authority to impose sanctions

under Rule 37(b)(2) is triggered only by the violation of a production order issued by the district court. Shepherd, 62 F.3d at 1474;

Attorney General v. Irish People, Inc., 684 F.2d 928, 951 n.129

(D.C. Cir. 1982). The order at issue, dated March 1, 1997, directed

the District to respond fully and completely to plaintiff's discovery

requests by March 6, 1997, and to confirm its compliance in writing.

Webb II, 175 F.R.D. at 132. In response to this order, the District

provided, on March 6, supplemental responses to Webb's document

requests and interrogatories but apparently did not provide written

confirmation that the District had complied with Webb's discovery

requests, as ordered by the court. To the extent that the default

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judgment can be justified as a necessary response to the

prejudice suffered by Webb as a result of the District's

document destruction or whether an issue-related sanction

would have sufficed. We noted in Shepherd that the prejudice to the plaintiff engendered by the destruction of documents typically merits default in two instances: "where the

destroyed document is dispositive of the case, so that an

issue-related sanction effectively disposes of the merits anyway, and where the guilty party has engaged in such wholesale destruction of primary evidence regarding a number of

issues that the district court cannot fashion an effective issuerelated sanction." Shepherd, 62 F.3d at 1479 (citations omitted). We do not see that either of these circumstances is

present in this case. The evidence suggests that the personnel files of District employees who apply for vacant positions

are not reviewed during the selection process, see Affidavit of

Louis Chaney, Feb. 3, 1997; Deposition of Joan Murphy, Feb.

4, 1997; thus, any "temporary records" that might have been

removed from Webb's personnel file are seemingly relevant

only to Webb's claim of retaliatory termination. It does not

appear from the evidence before us that the absence of such

documents is dispositive of Webb's case or why an adverse

inference as to these documents would not have sufficed to

__________

judgment was based on the District's failure to include a statement

of confirmation in its responses, the sanction was disproportionate

to the fault. It is difficult to conceive of circumstances in which the

act of failing to state that all relevant documents have been provided, even when that omission is in direct contravention of a court

order, would justify a sanction as severe as a default judgment. To

the extent that the default judgment was a response to the District's inability to respond fully to Webb's discovery requests due to

its previous destruction of certain documents, we are doubtful that

the judgment may be considered an exercise of the court's authority

under Rule 37(b)(2), given that the document destruction took place

well before the order compelling a response. (More important, the

district court had already decided to impose sanctions when it

issued the discovery order.) Because, as previously noted, our

review proceeds in much the same manner whether the district

court took its authority from Rule 37(b)(2) or from its inherent

power, we need not resolve the issue here.

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address any harm resulting from their destruction. First, the

only "temporary records" of potential interest would be any

"Corrective/Adverse Action Final Decision Letters" or "Official Reprimands" in the file.17 We would have supposed that

__________

17 In her affidavit, Adams stated that she located Webb's

personnel folder in a box destined for a St. Louis records center.

She further stated, "My review of the folder for Isaiah Webb

retrieved from the St. Louis-bound box indicated to me that it had

been processed for storage in the Federal Records Center because

all the temporary records had been removed. Temporary records

which could have possibly been removed are described in the

attached copy of DC Standard Form 1258 and designated by the

mark 'LS.' "

Form 1258 is titled "Government of the District of Columbia

Official Personnel Folder Internal Audit Checklist." Documents

designated as temporary records are the following:

1) DC OF-8, Positions Descriptions (All)

2) P.O. Form 12 (Excellent/Satisfactory)

3) DCSF-52 (Resulting in Personnel Form 1)

4) DCSF-52A

5) OMBS-90, Tax Withholding--Non-Resident

6) SF-127, Request for Personnel Records--NPRS

7) SF-1152, Designation of Beneficiary--Unpaid Compensation

8) DCSF-1231, Notification--Emergency

9) Corrective/Adverse Action Final Decision Letters under 3

years old

10) Designation of Essential Employee

11) Employee Notice of Furlough

12) Employee Notification--Drug Free Workplace

13) Official Reprimands under 2 years old

14) Personnel Action Proof List

15) Position Data Proof List

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16) Proof of Residency, Chapter 3, DPM

Webb would want to rely on the absence of any such documents in his file to argue that he was an exemplary employee;

the fact that the District cannot prove that Webb was ever

reprimanded would appear only to bolster his case. (Alternatively, the district court could have ordered that an inference

adverse to the District be drawn that Webb had only favorable letters in his personnel file.) Second, as the district

court suggested, see Webb II, 175 F.R.D. at 148, an adverse

inference could even have included the existence of documents in Webb's personnel file that provided evidence of

retaliatory intent (for example, an official reprimand that

contained a phrase such as "if you continue to pursue these

claims, you will be terminated"). Of course, such an inference, even if accepted by the trier of fact, would not "effectively dispose of the merits": Even if Webb's claims were a

"motivating factor" in the decision to terminate him, the

District could still prevail if it could show "that it would have

reached the same decision ... even in the absence of the

protected conduct"--in this case, by producing sufficient evidence of Webb's sexual harassment activities. Mt. Healthy

City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977);

see also Walden v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 126 F.3d 506, 512-

13 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1516 (1998); Tao v.

Freeh, 27 F.3d 635, 639 (D.C. Cir. 1994).18 We thus cannot

agree with the district court's conclusion that "the only

adverse inference that would adequately compensate plaintiff

... would effectively dispose of the merits of the claim."

Webb II, 175 F.R.D. at 148.

We reach much the same conclusion with respect to the

prejudice caused by the missing merit case files. These files

might indeed have contained information helpful to Webb's

__________

Of these, only numbers 9 ("Corrective/Adverse Action Final Decision Letters") and 13 ("Official Reprimands") would appear to be

relevant to Webb's case.

18 This rule is intended to ensure that an employee is not placed

"in a better position as a result of the exercise of ... protected

conduct than he would have occupied had he done nothing." Mt.

Healthy, 429 U.S. at 285.

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nonselection case, such as the experience and education of

other applicants and the determination of the qualifications of

each applicant.19 The absence of these documents was mitigated, however, by (1) the District's stipulation that it would

not assert that applicants other than the final selectee were

more qualified than Webb, see Webb II, 175 F.R.D. at 138; (2)

the provision to Webb of the personnel file of Patricia Britton,

the selectee for vacancy announcement 89-125; and (3) the

submission, albeit delayed, of the names of the individuals

who participated in the selection process. Each of these

sources provides a way for Webb to discover any helpful

evidence pointing toward the conclusion that his nonselection

was discriminatory. We therefore cannot agree, on the basis

of the current record, that lesser sanctions, such as a presumption that the missing files contained evidence favorable

to Webb, would not suffice to overcome any prejudice suffered by Webb as a result of the destruction of the files.20

And to the extent that the documents would have shown that

Webb's own qualifications were incorrectly evaluated by the

__________

19 See Deposition of Joan Murphy, Feb. 4, 1997 (noting that the

Office of Personnel reviews all applications, assigns scores for level

of experience, education, and so on, and sends an alphabetical list of

the "qualified" candidates to the selecting official).

20 Such a presumption is a common sanction in response to the

destruction of documents. See, e.g., Favors v. Fisher, 13 F.3d 1235,

1239 (8th Cir. 1994); Hicks, 833 F.2d at 1419; Shipley v. Dugan,

874 F. Supp. 933, 940 (S.D. Ind. 1995) (citing cases). (The fact that,

as the district court stated, the District failed to propose an

adequate jury instruction containing an adverse inference presumption, see Webb II, 175 F.R.D. at 148, should not cabin the scope of

the district court's efforts in this regard.) The most reasonable

inference to be drawn that would not be inconsistent with other

evidence would seem to be that no applicant who was not selected

was more qualified than Webb. It is conceivable, although unlikely,

that the destroyed documents contained marginal notes and the like

that reflected discriminatory intent. Although an adverse inference

presumption should not test the limits of reason, Webb would

certainly be entitled to make such an argument; the District,

likewise, would be entitled to attempt to rebut it.

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Office of Personnel, Webb can make that case independently

through deposing Office of Personnel workers and asking

them to explain the process for scoring qualifications. We

therefore are not convinced by the district court's conclusion

that Webb was "so severely prejudiced by the District's

conduct that it would be unfair to require [him] to proceed

with the trial because no lesser alternative [could] compensate [Webb] for the loss of evidence caused by the destruction

and delay of [the District]." Webb II, 175 F.R.D. at 145.

We next consider the extent to which the document destruction caused prejudice to the judicial system. Although

the district court stated that the District's conduct "ha[d]

occupied the court's attention with many hearings and motions" and thus frustrated the court's ability to provide "swift

justice" to the litigants appearing before it, id. at 146, the

court's primary concern, at least with respect to Webb's

nonselection claims, seems to have been the delay in furnishing some information until the month of trial rather than the

scope of the information provided. See, e.g., id. at 145 ("By

delaying the disclosure of these names [of individuals participating in the selection process] for so long, defendant thwarted plaintiff's ability to prepare for trial. This injury is

directly traceable to defendant's conduct: if the files had not

been destroyed, the information sought would have been

readily available.").21 It therefore seems that any prejudice

to Webb on this account could have been remedied by a

continuance of the trial date sufficient to permit him to

__________

21 Although we noted in Shea that "prejudice to defendants

resulting from unreasonable delay may be presumed," we also

stated that where the delay is not unreasonable, "the need to show

actual prejudice is proportionally greater." Shea, 795 F.2d at 1075

(internal quotation omitted). While it is true that, as the district

court noted, this litigation began in 1990, it was not until 1996 that

Webb, with the aid of counsel, filed his fourth amended complaint,

which narrowed the focus of his claims from over one hundred

positions to only three positions (two of which remain) and added an

additional claim of retaliatory termination. It thus may be more

appropriate to measure the effect of the delay using 1996, rather

than 1990, as a benchmark.

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depose the individuals identified by the District, perhaps with

costs to be paid by the District. The district court did not

adequately state why such continuance would not be feasible,

noting merely that "the only way for the court to guarantee a

timely outcome was to set a trial date, and enforce it." Webb

II, 175 F.R.D. at 146. Of course, we are cognizant of the

district court's need to manage its schedule, and its calendar

should not be subject to the whims of recalcitrant litigants.

See, e.g., Shea, 795 F.2d at 1076 ("[W]here a party or counsel

announces at the last minute that he cannot participate in a

scheduled trial, the District Court is not required to disrupt

its well-planned trial schedule to find a new date for the

missed trial."). But it is not apparent to us from the record

below that a continuance would place an "intolerable burden"

on the district court, id. at 1075 (emphasis added), or that the

court's continued involvement in the discovery dispute would

continue to call on far more resources into the future than the

system should be required to allocate to the case. (Although

the discovery period had ended two weeks prior to the

District's identification of the selecting individuals on March

6, 1997, trial was set for nearly three weeks later, leaving

some room for the court to maneuver.) The district court's

conclusion that "an adverse inference could not have compensated for the delay suffered by plaintiff and the resulting

inability to prepare for trial," Webb II, 175 F.R.D. at 148,

standing alone, tells us nothing about the availability of a

continuance to permit Webb to depose the named individuals.

We thus cannot conclude, without further explanation from

the district court, that any systemic harm suffered by the

district court warranted a default judgment.

Finally, we might uphold the judgment of default under

Shea had the district court adequately established why no

other sanction would adequately deter the District from committing similar misconduct in the future. Here, again, we

conclude that the record as it now stands does not support

such a finding. Although the district court stated that the

District "must be deterred from continuing to consciously

disregard the retention regulations," Webb II, 175 F.R.D. at

147, it did not explain why lesser sanctions would not achieve

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the same effect; indeed, we were informed by the District

after oral argument that steps have been taken to alert

District of Columbia employees as to their obligations under

federal regulations to preserve employment records. See

Letter from Donna M. Murasky, Assistant Corporation Counsel (May 15, 1998). Moreover, as this court noted in Bonds, if

the sanction of default is based only on deterring future

misconduct, "the more severe sanction [of default] must be

supported by a finding of flagrant or egregious misconduct by

the defendant." Bonds, 93 F.3d at 809; see also Weisberg v.

Webster, 749 F.2d 864, 871 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (dismissal pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2) must be based on "willfulness or at least

gross negligence"). Although the District now concedes that

it failed to recognize its responsibility under 29 C.F.R.

s 1602.31, we do not think that its failure rose to the level of

flagrant or egregious misconduct. The record does not reflect that, for example, the District deliberately discarded

documents relating to Webb's case in an attempt to destroy

key evidence or that its delay in responding to Webb's

discovery requests was an intentionally dilatory effort to

"gain an unfair tactical advantage over its litigation opponent." Bonds, 93 F.3d at 812; cf. Synanon Church v. United

States, 820 F.2d 421, 423, 428 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (affirming

dismissal based on party's "willful, deliberate and purposeful

scheme" to destroy evidence) (internal quotation omitted).

Rather, it seems clear from the record that the District's fault

lay in failing to recognize that its general practice of discarding files after a set period of time would result in the

destruction of materials relevant to litigation and failing to

notify employees systemwide of the federal regulations that

imposed a duty to retain such materials.22 This lack of

__________

22 Although the district court found that there was evidence

that "at least one District personnel official, Joan Murphy, had

knowledge of the existence of EEOC regulations requiring maintenance of documents, yet was unaware of any procedure by which

the District would flag relevant files once litigation ha[d] been

initiated" and thus that "the District knew of the requirement, but

chose to ignore it," Webb II, 175 F.R.D. at 145, the portion of

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compliance is certainly serious, and must be addressed, but it

does not appear to us to warrant sanctions as severe as

default.

At this point, then, we are not persuaded that a default

judgment was the only punitive option available to the district

court. Because, however, we recognize that Shea's analytical

framework "is not to be applied woodenly in evaluating the

myriad and diverse factors that influence district judges in

managing their caseloads," Bristol Petroleum Corp. v. Harris, 901 F.2d 165, 167 (D.C. Cir. 1990), we will refrain from

substituting our judgment for the district court's. Instead,

we vacate the judgment and remand to the district court for

further consideration of less onerous sanctions.23

__________

Murphy's testimony the court cites in support of this conclusion

seems more equivocal:

Q: Are you aware of--are you familiar with the EEOC regulations regarding the destruction of documents?

A: Somewhat, yes.

Q: And what do you know about those regulations?

A: I know that they're supposed to be maintained, but I don't

recall--I have not seen it in writing and I don't recall the

duration.

Q: Is there any manner by which the District flags the merit

case files for which litigation has been initiated?

A: I don't know.

Q: Do you know who would know that information?

A: No.

Q: Are you the person that would know?

A: I don't know.

Id. at 141-42 (quoting Transcript at 293).

23 Despite the district court's contention below that "[i]f this

case were to be remanded with instructions to construct a lesser

sanction, the court would be unable to do so," Webb II, 175 F.R.D.

at 148 n.16, we are confident that further exploration of the issue

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will either reveal the availability of alternative sanctions or result in

B. The Remedy

Because we are remanding this case for further proceedings, we address the propriety of the district court's order

directing that Webb be rehired to a DS-12 Special Assistant

position, since if Webb prevails on the merits of his unlawful

termination claim, or if the district court sufficiently justifies

its sanction of default, the issue of the appropriate remedy

will once again come to the fore.

As a general rule, a district court "has broad discretion to

fashion appropriate equitable relief for a Title VII plaintiff"

including, but not limited to, reinstatement; this court's review is therefore limited to determining whether the district

court abused that discretion. Castle v. Rubin, 78 F.3d 654,

657 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (citing 42 U.S.C. s 2000e-5(g)(1) (1993));

Johnson v. Brock, 810 F.2d 219, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Generally, we would not disturb a district court's decision to order

reinstatement as a remedy for a Title VII violation. We

think it important to recognize, however, that a successful

Title VII plaintiff is entitled only to appropriate equitable

relief, see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. s 2000e-5(g)(1) (1994); Castle, 78

F.3d at 657, a determination that authorizes a district court to

take into account "extraordinary equitable circumstances that

affect the legitimate interests of either party," McKennon v.

Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 362 (1995).24 In

this case, the decision to reinstate Webb to a supervisory

position with the District was made without any consideration

of evidence that suggested that reinstatement may not have

been an appropriate remedy--namely, the claims of several

employees with the District that they had been harassed,

__________

a more complete explanation of why such sanctions were deemed to

be inappropriate. Although we could undertake this investigation

ourselves based on the record before us, we continue to believe, as

in Bonds, that "in light of the deferential standard of review a

statement of reasons from the district court [is] advisable." Bonds,

93 F.3d at 804 n.4.

24 This court noted in Castle, that although McKennon arose

under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, "its principles

clearly apply in Title VII actions." Castle, 78 F.3d at 658.

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sexually and otherwise, by Webb. Because that evidence

would have been relevant to the determination of whether

reinstatement 25 was an appropriate remedy, we direct the

district court on remand, should the remedy phase be

reached, to permit the District to submit such evidence.

Although reinstatement is certainly a preferred remedy in

Title VII cases, it may not always be an appropriate one.

Whether reinstatement is indeed appropriate may be determined only after careful consideration of the circumstances of

a particular case. See, e.g., Hudson v. Reno, 130 F.3d 1193,

1202 (6th Cir. 1997), petition for cert. filed, 66 U.S.L.W. 3791

(U.S. Jun. 8, 1998) (No. 97-1987); McKnight v. General

Motors Corp., 973 F.2d 1366, 1370 (7th Cir. 1992). Courts

have, for example, deemed reinstatement to be inappropriate

when there is "evidence of extreme animosity" between the

plaintiff and the defendant employer, see Williams v. Valentec Kisco, Inc., 964 F.2d 723, 730 (8th Cir. 1992) (internal

quotation omitted); or where the employer has expressed

"genuine dissatisfaction" with the plaintiff's job performance,

see Hudson, 130 F.3d at 1202. In these circumstances,

although reinstatement would technically make the plaintiff

whole, larger considerations of the relationship between the

plaintiff and the employer and, indeed, the environment in

which their relationship is situated, militate against ordering

reinstatement. Cf., e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S.

219, 239 (1982) (rights of "innocent third parties" may be

considered in devising Title VII remedy); Thomas v. National Football League Players Ass'n, 131 F.3d 198, 207 (D.C.

Cir. 1997) (district court "reasonably concluded that reinstatement would not serve the interests of justice where the

employee engaged in behavior that could conceivably have

given rise to a legitimate discharge under other circumstances"); Lander v. Lujan, 888 F.2d 153, 157 (D.C. Cir.

1989) (suggesting that "[i]t may well be appropriate, perhaps

__________

25 We use the term "reinstatement" here to refer to reemployment with the Department of Corrections and not to suggest that

Webb held a Special Assistant position prior to his termination.

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even required," that a district court consider the impact of

reinstatement on displaced employee).

In Webb's case, the record contains evidence that suggests

that reinstatement to a supervisory position within the Department of Corrections may not be an appropriate remedy.26

The seven Neal claim summaries proffered by the District, if

__________

26 Even assuming that default was an appropriate sanction, we

believe the district court failed to distinguish between the claims

allegedly underlying Webb's termination (the complaints of Shank

and Stevens) and the claims offered by the District in support of its

contention that reinstatement was inappropriate (the seven Neal

claim summaries). Once default had been entered, each of Webb's

"allegations of fact [were to] be taken as true and each of [his]

claims ... considered established as a matter of law." Brockton

Sav. Bank v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 771 F.2d 5, 13 (1st Cir.

1985); see also Black v. Lane, 22 F.3d 1395, 1399 (7th Cir.1994)

("When a default judgment is entered, facts alleged in the complaint

may not be contested."); 10 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R.

Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure

s 2688 (2d ed. 1983). If default is again determined to be an

appropriate sanction, the district court would thus be justified in

crediting Webb's allegation that "[a]lthough [the District] has alleged that [his] termination was the result of sexual harassment

charges brought by two DOC employees, the sexual harassment

charges are without basis and provided a mere pretext that [the

District] has used to justify its illegal conduct." Fourth Amended

Complaint (Nov. 1, 1996), at 10; cf. In re Docteroff, 133 F.3d 210,

215 (3d Cir. 1997) ("To hold otherwise would give litigants who

abuse the processes and dignity of the court an undeserved second

bite at the apple."). Significantly, however, Webb's complaint made

no allegations as to the veracity of any of the claims filed in the

Neal litigation. Thus, even if default was warranted, it was error

for the district court to hold that these claims could not be

considered simply because the claims of Shank and Stevens were

necessarily deemed to be groundless. Cf. In re Dierschke, 975 F.2d

181, 185 (5th Cir. 1992) (noting that "fundamental fairness[ ] dictate[s] that a judgment by default operates as a deemed admission

only as to the relief requested in the complaint"). Of course, should

Webb's case proceed to trial on remand, the District would be

entitled to show that Shank's and Stevens's claims did in fact

constitute the reason for Webb's termination.

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credited, suggest that Webb has engaged in repeated sexual

harassment of the co-workers whom he supervised, including

unwanted physical contact, see, e.g., J.A. 65 (claim summary

of Karen Dudley) ("Webb stuck his hand in her pants,

grabbed her belt buckle and pulled her towards him. Ms.

Dudley pushed him away and told him not do to that."); J.A.

86 (claim summary of Evella Fisher) ("Capt. Webb approached Ms. Fisher, began feeling her breasts and said 'I

like breast milk.' At one point, Capt. Webb actually reached

underneath Ms. Fisher's blouse and took her breast out,

feeling and squeezing it further. Ms. Fisher began crying

and quickly left Capt. Webb's office."); unwelcome sexual

advances, see, e.g., J.A. 102 (claim summary of Norma Rose

Jackson) ("... Captain Webb called Ms. Jackson into his

office, locked the door from the inside, and then requested

that Ms. Jackson perform oral sex on him.... Ms. Jackson

refused Captain Webb's request for oral sex, but Captain

Webb persisted in making unwelcome sexual advances on Ms.

Jackson"); and intimidation, see, e.g., J.A. 73 (claim summary

of Thyra Griffin) ("Captain Webb looked directly at Lt.

Griffin and indicated that 'I'm the master chess player here

and if you don't like it you can meet me on the parking lot,

better still, you can meet me on 19th Street and deal with this

300 lb. African.' "). While we by no means suggest that these

allegations proffered by the District should be accepted on

face value--that is, without the benefit of a hearing in which

Webb is permitted to contest them--we do think the district

court erred in excluding this evidence altogether in determining whether reinstatement to a supervisory position was

appropriate.27

__________

27 In McKennon, the Court held that if evidence acquired after

an unlawful termination showed wrongdoing "of such severity that

the employee in fact would have been terminated on those grounds

alone if the employer had known of it at the time of the discharge,"

513 U.S. at 362-63, reinstatement generally would be an inappropriate remedy. See id. at 362 ("It would be both inequitable and

pointless to order the reinstatement of someone the employer would

have terminated, and will terminate, in any event and upon lawful

grounds."). The parties agree that the events alleged in three of

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III. Conclusion

Our holding today should not be construed as any condonation of the District's conduct during the prolonged discovery

phase in this case. Its failure to institute a citywide policy to

ensure that documents relevant to litigation were not routinely destroyed and its less than direct responses to discovery

requests without doubt complicated and extended the discovery process in this case. On the basis of the record before us,

however, we are not convinced that a default judgment was

an appropriate response to the District's misconduct. We

conclude both that the district court did not adequately

__________

the Neal claim summaries were made known to the District after

Webb's 1994 termination; those summaries should therefore have

been considered by the district court. Although the District does

not contest Webb's claim that the events described in the other four

Neal claim summaries were brought to the District's attention well

in advance of Webb's 1994 termination and yet did not result in his

discharge, we do not believe that the time frame renders these four

summaries irrelevant. To begin with, the extent of the District's

knowledge of the events in those summaries is unclear from the

record before us. It may be the case that those with the authority

to take action were left uninformed, in which case the four earlier

summaries may well be considered "after-acquired evidence" that

would have led to Webb's discharge in any event. Moreover, even

if the District chose not to terminate Webb after receiving the first

four complaints, it is entirely possible it would have chosen to

terminate him once three more complaints had been brought to its

attention. Thus, even if only three of the Neal complaints were

technically "after-acquired evidence," the cumulative effect of all

seven complaints may have been weighty enough that the District

would, in fact, have ultimately terminated Webb in response to the

events alleged. We are not in a position, on the basis of this record,

to judge what action the District might have taken in response to

these allegations. Should the district court determine that Webb

would have been terminated, however, it would be not only "inequitable and pointless" but also potentially harmful to reinstate Webb

to a supervisory position within the Department of Corrections,

particularly given the acknowledgment of the District, and this

court, that "sexual harassment is a long-standing problem at the

Department of Corrections." Bonds, 93 F.3d at 804.

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consider discovery sanctions other than a default judgment

and that it improperly rejected evidence relevant to the

propriety of reinstatement. We therefore vacate the default

judgment against the District, as well as the order awarding

attorneys' fees and costs, and remand for further proceedings.

It is so ordered.

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