Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-01418/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-01418-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1114 Trademark Infringement

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

FITBUG LIMITED, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

FITBIT, INC., 

 Defendant. 

)

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

)

Case No. 13-1418 SC 

ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT 

I. INTRODUCTION 

 Now before the Court are two motions for summary judgment in 

this trademark infringement and unfair competition case. First, 

Plaintiff Fitbug Ltd. ("Fitbug") seeks partial summary judgment on 

likelihood of confusion; Defendant Fitbit, Inc.'s ("Fitbit") 

affirmative defense of laches; and Fitbit's fifth and sixth 

counterclaims. ECF No. 47-3 ("Fitbug Mot."). Second, Fitbit moves 

for summary judgment on two affirmative defenses: laches and 

acquiescence. ECF No. 50 ("Fitbit Mot."). Both motions are fully 

briefed,1

 and appropriate resolution without oral argument under 

 

1

 ECF Nos. 61-3 ("Fitbit Opp'n"); 65-3 ("Fitbug Opp'n"); 71-3 

("Fitbit Reply"); 74 ("Fitbug Reply"). 

Case 3:13-cv-01418-SI Document 96 Filed 01/26/15 Page 1 of 31
2 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California 

Civil Local Rule 7-1(b). Relatedly, Fitbit has filed an objection 

to reply evidence under Civil Local Rule 7-11(b) or, in the 

alternative, a motion to file supplemental briefing. ECF No. 81 

("Fitbit Obj."). Fitbug opposes that request. ECF No. 83. For 

the reasons set forth below, Fitbug's motion for summary judgment 

is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Fitbit's motion for summary 

judgment is GRANTED. Fitbit's objection to reply evidence is 

DENIED, but the alternative motion for leave to file supplemental 

briefing is GRANTED. 

II. BACKGROUND 

Fitbit and Fitbug both produce portable electronic fitness 

tracking devices. These devices are wearable, and collect data 

about a user's steps walked, calories burned, activity intensity, 

sleep, and other health and fitness metrics. Portable electronic 

fitness tracking devices also connect to the internet or a user's 

computer or smartphone, and, in conjunction with an application or 

website, allow the user to view and analyze the data collected, set 

or track fitness goals, and collect other information relevant to 

the user's health and fitness plans. 

Fitbug owns two federal trademark registrations, and Fitbit 

also owns a federal trademark registration. 

/// 

/// 

/// 

/// 

/// 

/// 

Case 3:13-cv-01418-SI Document 96 Filed 01/26/15 Page 2 of 31
3 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California 

There have been several variations of the parties' logos throughout 

their history, but the relevant logos are: 

Fitbug's original designs: Fitbit's original design: 

Fitbug's current design: Fitbit's current design: 

Fitbug, headquartered in the United Kingdom and founded in 

2004, was one of the first companies to enter the portable 

electronic fitness tracker market. Since that time, Fitbug has 

made both sales directly consumers ("business-to-consumer" sales), 

and so-called "business-to-business-to-consumer" sales of its 

products. Business-to-business-to-consumer sales include sales to 

health insurance plans, corporate wellness programs, and other 

programs, and generally involve incentives like bulk discounts as 

well as special tools for tracking group fitness goals or running 

fitness competitions. Initially, Fitbug focused on the British 

market, but in 2005 it sought to sell its products in the United 

States as well. Since that time, however, Fitbug's success in the 

Case 3:13-cv-01418-SI Document 96 Filed 01/26/15 Page 3 of 31
4 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California 

United States market has been limited. 

Fitbit, headquartered in San Francisco, is one of the leading 

providers of portable electronic fitness trackers. James Park and 

Eric Friedman founded the company in March 2007. Fitbit's name was 

chosen after a poll on Facebook, and at the time the name was 

chosen, as far as Park is aware, nobody at Fitbit was aware of 

Fitbug's existence. ECF No. 46-5 ("Park Decl.") ¶¶ 4-6. However, 

by December 2007, prior to the launch of Fitbit's website or the 

sale of its first products, Friedman sent Park a link to the Fitbug 

website, although Park contends that he thought little of the link 

at the time. Id. ¶ 7. 

Fitbit first announced its products on September 9, 2008. By 

the next day, Fitbit's website featured information regarding its 

first device, the Fitbit Classic, as well as a link for businesses 

or individuals to place orders for the devices. Id. ¶ 13; Ex. 5. 

Nonetheless, Fitbit did not begin shipping its products until 

September 2009, and early on, only a small amount of Fitbit's sales 

were in the business-to-business-to-consumer category. However, 

over time Fitbit's sales grew substantially both in general and in 

the business-to-business-to-consumer market. 

The day Fitbit announced its product, Fitbug received several 

emails and other contacts stating that Fitbit was entering the 

portable electronic fitness tracking device market. Additionally, 

a representative of Fitbug sought (unsuccessfully) to contact 

Fitbit to explore a potential business partnership. Over the next 

weeks and months, internal communications show that Fitbug was 

concerned about potential competition from Fitbit, and was 

contemplating various responses including sending a cease and 

Case 3:13-cv-01418-SI Document 96 Filed 01/26/15 Page 4 of 31
5 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California 

desist letter. See ECF No. 46 ("Wakefield Decl.") Exs. 17-23. 

Nevertheless, Fitbug did not assert any violation of its trademark 

rights at that time. Instead, Fitbug first assert infringement of 

its rights by Fitbit in a December 2011 letter. Park Decl. at ¶ 

26; Ex. 11. Fitbit denied infringement, and subsequent letters 

failed to resolve the dispute. Id. 

Fitbug filed suit on March 29, 2013 alleging trademark 

infringement under 15 U.S.C. Section 1114(1), unfair competition 

under 15 U.S.C. Section 1125(a), common law trademark infringement 

and unfair competition, violations of the California Business and 

Professions Code Section 17200, and seeking cancellation of 

Fitbit's trademark registration. See ECF No. 1 ("Compl."). Fitbit 

counterclaimed, alleging unfair competition and false or misleading 

advertising under California law. ECF No. 43 ("Am. Answer & 

Counter-Cls.") at ¶¶ 189-255. 

Now, both parties have filed motions for summary judgment 

seeking to resolve significant portions of these claims. The 

matter is currently set for trial beginning on February 9, 2015. 

III. LEGAL STANDARD 

Entry of summary judgment is proper "if the movant shows that 

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant 

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(a). Summary judgment should be granted if the evidence would 

require a directed verdict for the moving party. Anderson v. 

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251 (1986). The moving party 

bears the initial burdens of production and persuasion. Nissan 

Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 

Case 3:13-cv-01418-SI Document 96 Filed 01/26/15 Page 5 of 31
6 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California 

1102 (9th Cir. 2000). 

IV. DISCUSSION 

Fitbug moves for summary judgment on three issues. First, 

Fitbug believes the Court should find as a matter of law that they 

have demonstrated a likelihood of confusion among consumers. 

Second, Fitbug argues that laches do not bar its claims. Finally, 

Fitbug seeks summary judgment on Fitbit's unfair competition and 

false advertising claims on the grounds that that Fitbit lacks 

statutory standing to bring those claims. 

Fitbit opposes these arguments and moves for summary judgment 

in its own right arguing that Fitbug's claims are barred by laches, 

and, in any event, Fitbug's claims are barred by its acquiescence 

to Fitbit's use of the Fitbit mark. Because the Court finds that 

Fitbug's claims are barred by laches, the Court need only address 

that issue and Fitbit's unfair competition and false advertising 

claims. 

A. Laches 

Fitbit's primary argument is that Fitbug's claims are barred 

by laches. "Laches is an equitable time limitation on a party's 

right to bring suit, resting on the maxim that one who seeks the 

help of a court of equity must not sleep on his rights." Jarrow 

Formulas, Inc. v. Nutrition Now, Inc., 304 F.3d 829, 835 (9th Cir. 

2002) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Laches is 

a defense to both Lanham Act claims (including trademark 

infringement and unfair competition) as well as to California state 

law claims. Id.; Saul Zaentz Co. v. Wozniak Travel, Inc., 627 F. 

Supp. 2d 1096, 1109 (N.D. Cal. 2008); see also 

Case 3:13-cv-01418-SI Document 96 Filed 01/26/15 Page 6 of 31
7 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California 

Bridgestone/Firestone Research, Inc. v. Auto. Club De L'Ouest De La 

France, 245 F.3d 1359, 1362, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that a 

petition for cancellation of registered trademark was barred by 

laches). A claim is only barred by laches if the defendant can 

show "(1) unreasonable delay by plaintiff in bringing suit, and (2) 

prejudice . . . ." Miller v. Glenn Miller Prods., Inc., 454 F.3d 

975, 997 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Couveau v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 218 

F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2000)). 

Two issues determine whether a delay was unreasonable. "First 

[a court] assess[es] the length of delay, which is measured from 

the time the plaintiff knew or should have known about its 

potential cause of action." Jarrow, 304 F.3d at 838. Next, the 

Court must "decide whether the plaintiff's delay was unreasonable." 

Id. The Court will address each in turn. 

First, the Court must determine when Fitbug "knew or should 

have known about its potential cause of action." Id. This 

standard can be satisfied by either actual or constructive 

knowledge, because "[c]ompanies expecting judicial enforcement of 

their marks must conduct an effective policing effort." Grupo 

Gigante Sa De CV v. Dallo & Co. Inc., 391 F.3d 1088, 1102 (9th Cir. 

2004) (emphasis omitted). Nonetheless, a trademark holder is "'not 

required to constantly monitor every nook and cranny of the entire 

nation and to fire both barrels of [its] shotgun instantly upon 

spotting a possible infringer.'" adidas Am., Inc. v. Kmart Corp., 

No. CV-05-120-ST, 2006 WL 2044857, at *8 (D. Or. June 15, 2006) 

(quoting Cullman Ventures, Inc. v. Columbian Art Works, Inc., 717 

F. Supp. 96, 127 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)). 

The undisputed facts are as follows. Fitbit announced its 

Case 3:13-cv-01418-SI Document 96 Filed 01/26/15 Page 7 of 31
8 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California 

products on September 9, 2008 and began receiving significant media 

coverage. Park Decl. ¶ 10. By the next day, Fitbit's website was 

active and visitors to the site could see Fitbit's trademark, learn 

about its products, and place an order for the original Fitbit 

device. Id. ¶ 13, Ex. 5. Beginning that day and continuing for 

some time after, individuals within and outside the Fitbug 

organization contacted Fitbug to point out Fitbit's entry in the 

market. Those emails refer to Fitbit as, among other things, 

"[a]nother competitor," suggest aspects of Fitbit's user interface 

are a "total ripoff," and note that while Fitbit's entry into the 

market is "[n]othing to panic about, . . . [Fitbit] will become an 

issue and I'd rather be one step ahead." Wakefield Decl. Exs. 9-

17. In reference to Fitbit's announced products and user 

interface, a consultant wrote to Paul Landau, Fitbug's CEO, that 

Fitbit "appears to be doing what Fitbug does but slightly 

more . . ." and noting that Fitbit "appear[s] to only be available 

in the US." Id. Ex. 14. 

Over the next several months, Fitbug explored several 

potential responses to Fitbit. First, beginning two days after 

Fitbit announced its products, Fitbug's Chief Marketing Officer 

("CMO") (unsuccessfully) attempted to contact Fitbit to discuss 

potential partnerships. Id. Exs. 17, 20. Then, on October 14, in 

an email conversation with the CMO, an attorney said, "I was 

wondering if they were infringing on your IP -- sounds like some 

improvements on your idea, but pretty close to [F]itbug including 

the name." Id. Ex. 19. A month later a Fitbug employee wrote to 

Landau "to remind [him] of Fitbit" because he was "thinking of 

sending them a cease and desist." Id. Ex. 21. Around the same 

Case 3:13-cv-01418-SI Document 96 Filed 01/26/15 Page 8 of 31
9 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California 

time, Landau referred to Fitbit as "thieving bastards[.]" Id. Ex. 

23. 

Nevertheless, Fitbit did not begin shipping its products to 

consumers until September 2009. After that point, Fitbug received 

several further emails regarding Fitbit's activities. For 

instance, another lawyer contacted Fitbug's CMO to point out that 

Fitbit "could cause confusion in the classic trademark sense." Id. 

Ex. 31. 

That statement -- that Fitbit's mark could cause consumer 

confusion -- is the crucial issue for determining when Fitbug knew 

or should have known of its potential cause of action. "The 

essence of . . . a [trademark infringement] claim centers on the 

likelihood of confusion between two marks or products." Internet 

Specialties W., Inc. v. Milon-DiGiorgio Enters., Inc., 559 F.3d 

985, 990 (9th Cir. 2009). As a result, when we ask whether Fitbug 

or another trademark owner "knew or should have known" of its 

potential cause of action, what we are really asking is when the 

mark holder "knew or should have known about the likelihood of 

confusion between" the marks. Id. 

The Ninth Circuit's answer to this question in Internet 

Specialties is instructive. In that case, the parties were 

internet service providers with similar names ("ISWest.com" and 

"ISPWest.com"). Id. at 988. ISWest became aware of ISPWest's 

existence shortly after ISPWest registered its domain name in late 

1998. Id. At that time, the two companies offered somewhat 

different services -- ISWest offered dial-up and high-speed access 

nationwide, while ISPWest initially provided only dial-up access in 

Southern California. Id. According to ISWest's CEO, the company 

Case 3:13-cv-01418-SI Document 96 Filed 01/26/15 Page 9 of 31
10 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California 

was not concerned about ISPWest at the time (even though they were 

aware of its existence) because ISPWest did not offer high speed 

internet and because the highly volatile internet startup market 

meant that ISPWest might well go out of business. Id. Instead, 

ISWest waited to file suit alleging trademark infringement until 

2005, after ISPWest had expanded into a provider of nationwide, 

high-speed internet access. Id. Despite this gradual expansion 

into the high speed internet market, the Ninth Circuit found that 

the laches period started in 1998. The court noted that even 

though ISPWest "did not offer DSL in 1998, both companies did offer 

internet access, e-mail, and web hosting in the same geographic 

area under remarkably similar names," and thus "[a] prudent 

business person should recognize the likelihood of confusion to 

consumers under such circumstances . . . ." Id. at 990-91. 

In this case, the Court finds that Fitbug knew or should have 

known of the likelihood of confusion by, at the latest, September 

2008, after Fitbit's launch. While Fitbit was not yet shipping its 

products, at that time, Fitbit was selling similar devices "in the 

same geographic area under [a] remarkably similar name[] . . . ." 

Id. at 990. As a result, a prudent business person should have 

recognized the likelihood of confusion at that point. See id. 

Fitbug argues essentially for a per se rule that the laches 

period can never run "prior to the defendant's actual sale of its 

goods or services." Fitbug Opp'n at 8. There are several problems 

with that proposal. First, it is undisputed that Fitbit was 

selling its product in September 2008; it simply had not shipped 

the products yet. Park Decl. ¶ 13 ("On September 9 or September 

10, 2008, Fitbit's website . . . . contained a description and 

Case 3:13-cv-01418-SI Document 96 Filed 01/26/15 Page 10 of 31
11 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California 

images of the Fitbit fitness tracker and invited any potential 

customer to order the product by clicking a prominent "BUY" 

button.") (emphasis added). 

Moreover, Fitbug's support for this rule rests on two flawed 

premises. First, Fitbug argues that "concrete evidence" of several 

of the likelihood of confusion factors in AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft 

Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979) (the "Sleekcraft 

factors") was lacking in September 2008 (and is lacking in all presale trademark infringement cases). But, as the Ninth Circuit has 

stated, "each [Sleekcraft] factor represents only a facet of the 

single dispositive issue of likely confusion," and need not be 

satisfied in every case or mechanically applied. Entrepreneur 

Media, Inc. v. Smith, 279 F.3d 1135, 1141 (9th Cir. 2002); see also 

Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994, 1008 (9th Cir. 2001) 

("Although these are all factors that are appropriate for 

consideration in determining the likelihood of confusion, they are 

not necessarily of equal importance, nor do they necessarily apply 

to every case."). Thus, even if evidence were lacking on the 

marketing channels and proximity of goods at sale factors, the two 

factors Fitbug specifically identified as lacking evidence in 

September 2008, that would not have barred a finding of likelihood 

of confusion at that time. Similarly, Fitbug's point that 

"evidence of widespread actual consumer confusion was not available 

until 2012" is misplaced, because actual confusion is not required 

to demonstrate a likelihood of confusion. See Network Automation, 

Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137, 1151 (9th Cir. 

2011); see also Pfizer Inc. v. Sachs, 652 F. Supp. 2d 512, 523 

(S.D.N.Y. 2009) ("The absence of proof of actual confusion is not 

Case 3:13-cv-01418-SI Document 96 Filed 01/26/15 Page 11 of 31
12 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California 

fatal to a finding of likelihood, particularly where, as here, the 

junior mark has been in the marketplace for a relatively short 

period of time.") (citations and internal alterations omitted). 

Fitbug's second argument, that between September 2008 and 

September 2009 (when Fitbit first shipped its products) and it 

appeared possible that Fitbit would go out of business, is 

irreconcilable with the purpose of laches. As Judge Learned Hand 

wrote in the copyright context: 

it is inequitable for the owner of a copyright, with full 

notice of an intended infringement, to stand inactive 

while the proposed infringer spends large sums of money 

in its exploitation, and to intervene only when his 

speculation has proved a success. Delay under such 

circumstances allows the owner to speculate without risk 

with the other's money; he cannot possibly lose, and he 

may win. 

Haas v. Leo Feist, Inc., 234 F. 105, 108 (S.D.N.Y. 1916); see also 

Danjaq, 263 F.3d at 951 (discussing Hand's justification for laches 

in the trademark context). Here too, Fitbug's argument is that it 

should be permitted to wait and watch, with full knowledge of 

Fitbit's allegedly infringing use, as Fitbit invested substantial 

sums of money in advertising and building up goodwill in its 

allegedly infringing brand, only to intervene once those 

investments panned out. That result is not just inequitable, it is 

also inefficient, and renders this argument untenable. See also 

Grupo Gigante, 391 F.3d at 1102-03 (noting that "the plaintiff 

'cannot simply wait without explanation to see how successful the 

defendant's business will be and then ask for an injunction to take 

away good will developed by defendant in the interim.'") (quoting 5 

McCarthy on Trademarks § 31:14, at 31-50). 

The Court concludes that Fitbug had actual knowledge of its 

Case 3:13-cv-01418-SI Document 96 Filed 01/26/15 Page 12 of 31
13 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California 

potential causes of action against Fitbit in September 2008. As a 

result, the length of Fitbug's delay runs for approximately four 

and a half years until it filed suit in March 2013. 

Even though Fitbug delayed approximately four and a half years 

before filing suit, that does not end the inquiry. See Internet 

Specialties, 559 F.3d at 991. Instead, the Court must still decide 

whether Fitbug's delay in bringing suit was reasonable. Id. 

In assessing whether a plaintiff's delay was reasonable, the 

Court looks to the limitation period for the most analogous state 

law cause of action. Jarrow, 304 F.3d at 837. If Fitbug's claims 

were "filed within the analogous state limitation period, the 

strong presumption is that laches is inapplicable; if the claim is 

filed after the analogous limitations period has expired, the 

presumption is that laches is a bar to suit." Id. (collecting 

cases); see also Internet Specialties, 559 F.3d at 990; Miller, 454 

F.3d at 997. 

The parties dedicate a significant amount of attention to the 

question of what the most analogous cause of action is to trademark 

infringement and unfair competition in California law, and what the 

statute of limitations is for such claims. For years, the Ninth 

Circuit and district courts in California have almost universally 

assumed the answer is the four-year limitation periods contained in 

California Code of Civil Procedure Sections 337 or 343. See, e.g., 

Internet Specialties, 559 F.3d at 990 n.2; Miller, 454 F.3d at 997 

n.11; DC Comics v. Towle, 989 F. Supp. 2d 948, 971-72 (C.D. Cal. 

2013); RSI Corp. v. IBM Corp., No. 5:08-cv-3414-RMW, 2012 WL 

3277136, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2012); Experexchange, Inc. v. 

Doculex, Inc., No. C-08-03875 JCS, 2009 WL 3837275, at *19 n.23 

Case 3:13-cv-01418-SI Document 96 Filed 01/26/15 Page 13 of 31
14 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California 

(N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2009); ATM Express, Inc. v. ATM Express, Inc., 

Civ. No. 07cv1293-L(RBB), 2009 WL 2973034, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 

11, 2009); Miller v. Glenn Miller Prods., 318 F. Supp. 2d 923, 942 

n.11 (C.D. Cal. 2004), aff'd 454 F.3d 975, 997 & n.11 (9th Cir. 

2006); but see Internet Specialties W., Inc. v. ISPWest, No. CV 05-

3296 FMC (AJWx), 2006 WL 4568073, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2006), 

aff'd sub nom. Internet Specialties W., Inc. v. Milon-DiGrigorio 

Enters., Inc., 559 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 2009) (rejecting the 

defendant's argument that the three-year period under California 

Code of Civil Procedure Section 338(d) applied because the case 

involved trademark infringement, and not false and deceptive 

advertising under 15 U.S.C. Section 1125(a)(1)(B)); High Country 

Linens, Inc. v. Block, No. C 01-02180 CRB, 2002 WL 1998272, at *2 

n.1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2002) (applying the two-year period in 

California Code of Civil Procedure Section 339 to common law 

trademark infringement claims). However, Fitbit points out that 

none of these cases actually analyze the question in depth, and in 

nearly all the cases applying a four-year limitation, the parties 

agreed that using the four-year period was appropriate. 

Instead, Fitbit argues that the Ninth Circuit's references to 

the four-year limitations period in Miller and Internet Specialties 

overlooked important California precedent bearing on the statute of 

limitations for trademark infringement and is inconsistent with 

both California law and prior Ninth Circuit precedent. 

Specifically, Fitbit argues that because the California Supreme 

Court stated in Mission Imports, Inc. v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 

921, 931 (Cal. 1982), that "action[s] for trademark infringement 

sound[] in tort," the two-year limitations period for tort claims 

Case 3:13-cv-01418-SI Document 96 Filed 01/26/15 Page 14 of 31
15 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California 

in California Code of Civil Procedure Section 339 applies. See 

also Polar Bear Prods., Inc. v. Timex Corp., 384 F.3d 700, 719-20 

(9th Cir. 2004) (applying Montana law and concluding that because a 

claim for state trademark infringement "generally sounds in tort," 

Montana's three-year statute of limitations for unspecified tort 

actions applied); High Country Linens, 2002 WL 1998272, at *2 n.1 

(finding that "common law trademark infringement claim[s] [are] 

also limited by Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 339" in part because of 

Mission Imports' holding that an "action for trademark infringement 

sounds in tort"). 

 While the Court believes that Fitbit's argument is 

meritorious, and that the line of cases assuming the four-year 

limitation period in Section 343 is applicable to trademark 

infringement and unfair competition claims is questionable, the 

Court need not resolve this issue. Because the Court previously 

found that the laches period began four and a half years before 

Fitbug filed suit, Fitbug's claims are presumptively untimely even 

under the four-year period it urges. Accordingly, the Court 

presumes that Fitbug's claims are untimely. See Saul Zaentz, 627 

F. Supp. 2d at 1113. Nevertheless, the Court must still "consider 

the validity of the reasons proffered by the plaintiff to excuse 

its delay and overcome the presumption of laches." Id. 

First, Fitbug argues that the doctrine of progressive 

encroachment justifies its delay. "'Under this doctrine, the 

trademark owner need not sue in the face of de minimis infringement 

by the junior user.'" Tillamook, 465 F.3d at 1110 (quoting 

Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Gibraltar Fin. Corp. of Cal., 694 

F.2d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 1982). "Instead, a trademark owner's 

Case 3:13-cv-01418-SI Document 96 Filed 01/26/15 Page 15 of 31
16 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California 

obligation to sue arises when the junior user redirects or expands 

its business into different regions or markets bringing it into 

direct competition with the trademark owner." Saul Zaentz, 627 F. 

Supp. 2d at 1114 (citing Tillamook, 465 F.3d at 1110); see also 

Grupo Gigante, 391 F.3d at 1103 ("A defendant can encroach on a 

plaintiff's mark by expanding its business into different regions 

or different markets."). Nevertheless, "[a] junior user's growth 

of its existing business and the concomitant increase in its use of 

the mark do not constitute progressive encroachment." Tillamook, 

465 F.3d at 1110. 

Specifically, Fitbug argues that the doctrine of progressive 

encroachment applies because Fitbit expanded into the so-called 

'business-to-business-to-consumer' market "no earlier than mid2011, less than two years before Fitbug filed suit." Fitbit Opp'n 

at 9. As explained earlier, the business-to-business-to-consumer 

market is made up of health insurance plans and corporate wellness 

programs, among others, and makes up a significant (although not 

always the majority, see Wakefield Decl. ¶¶ 5, 9, Ex. 4 at 

Interrog. No. 18, Ex. 8) share of Fitbug's sales. 

Fitbug bases its view of Fitbit's alleged progressive 

encroachment on the declaration of its CEO, Paul Landau, who 

contends that: 

"[f]rom 2008 through the [sic] mid-2011, it was the 

understanding of myself and others at Fitbug2

 that Fitbit 

 

2

 Landau's description of Fitbit's activities throughout the 

relevant period is insufficient to create an issue of material fact 

as to Fitbit's activities because Landau's testimony on those 

issues would be inadmissible. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4); Orr v. 

Bank of Am., NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002) ("A trial 

court can only consider admissible evidence in ruling on a motion 

for summary judgment.") (citations omitted). 

Case 3:13-cv-01418-SI Document 96 Filed 01/26/15 Page 16 of 31
17 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California 

was focusing its distribution efforts on the direct to 

consumer channel . . . . [and] to the extent Fitbit was 

selling its products through the [business-to-businessto-consumer] market, (a) its distribution was in the form 

of offering bulk discounts to [business-to-business-toconsumer] customers, (b) such sales were almost 

exclusively a result of potential [business-to-businessto-consumer] customers reaching out to Fitbit as opposed 

to Fitbit initiating marketing contact, and (c) Fitbit 

was not providing Add-On Services to its [business-tobusiness-to-consumer] customers. 

Landau Decl. ¶ 18. Fitbug describes "Add-On Services" as 

including, among other things, collecting and analyzing additional 

data for business-to-business-to-consumer customers, creating 

separate web pages for business-to-business-to-consumer users, and 

offering additional exercise games or challenges in which fitness 

groups may participate. Id. at ¶ 5. "To Fitbug, if a distributor 

of activity trackers to [business-to-business-to-consumer] 

customers was not providing Add-On Services to these customers, 

that distributer [sic] was effectively not a participant in the 

[business-to-business-to-consumer] market and as a result, not a 

competitor of Fitbug." Id. at ¶ 18. Furthermore, Fitbug points 

out that Fitbit did not add a "Corporate Wellness" link on its 

website, which specifically targets the business-to-business-toconsumer market, until April 2012. Finally, Fitbug contrasts 

Fitbit's business-to-business-to-consumer sales in 2009, which were 

only a small percentage of Fitbit's overall sales, with its 2013 

business-to-business-to-consumer sales, which accounted for 

substantially larger percent of Fitbit's sales. ECF No. 66 

("Rosenberg Decl.") Ex. 6. 

 The problem with this view is that Fitbit's growth in the 

business-to-business-to-consumer market was simply the growth of 

its existing business, not expansion into a new market. Even 

Case 3:13-cv-01418-SI Document 96 Filed 01/26/15 Page 17 of 31
18 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California 

drawing all justifiable inferences in Fitbug's favor, see Anderson, 

477 U.S. at 255, the undisputed facts show that Fitbit was selling 

its products directly to consumers and businesses from the outset. 

Park Decl. ¶ 28. Furthermore, Fitbit hired an independent 

contractor in 2008 in an effort to develop additional business-tobusiness-to-consumer sales. ECF No. 46-9 ("McDonough Decl.") at ¶¶ 

3-6. Additionally, it is also undisputed that Fitbit received 

inquiries from and made sales to business-to-business-to-consumer 

customers from its inception. Id. at ¶ 7. While Fitbug points out 

that Fitbit's sales in the business-to-business-to-consumer market 

have grown substantially, it is also undisputed that Fitbit had 

sales in that market since its inception. As the Ninth Circuit has 

said, "growth alone does not infringement make," Prudential Ins., 

694 F.2d at 1154, and all phases of Fitbit's business grew rapidly 

from the beginning, including its business-to-business-to-consumer 

sales. See Wakefield Decl. at Ex. 7. 

Nor do the facts support Fitbug's view that Fitbit's initial 

use of its mark was de minimis. On the contrary, Fitbit's use of 

its mark was substantial from the outset, and Fitbit received both 

national and international media attention at the beginning. Park 

Decl. ¶¶ 12-13, 34. In short, this media attention and prominent 

use of the mark (as well as Fitbug's internal response) demonstrate 

that even if "[Fitbug] may have had no obligation to sue a small 

one-shop brick and mortar infringer, [Fitbit's] use of the mark was 

not de minimis." Saul Zaentz, 627 F. Supp. 2d at 1115. 

Further underscoring these conclusions, two years before 

Fitbug argues Fitbit entered the business-to-business-to-consumer 

market, Fitbug knew or should have known the two companies were 

Case 3:13-cv-01418-SI Document 96 Filed 01/26/15 Page 18 of 31
19 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California 

directly competing in that market. First, Fitbug's CEO admits that 

in 2009 Fitbug and Fitbit were competing directly to provide a 

fitness program for several schools. ECF No. 67 ("Landau Opp'n 

Decl.") ¶ 8. Similarly, although the program was to take place in 

Europe and Fitbug's CEO was apparently unaware of Fitbit's 

participation, representatives of Oracle UK (a prospective 

business-to-business-to-consumer customer) copied Landau, Fitbit 

CEO James Park, and representatives of several other portable 

electronic fitness tracking device companies on the same emails 

regarding a potential corporate wellness program. Id. at ¶¶ 10-11; 

Park Decl. ¶¶ 23-25 & Exs. 9-10. Even though Fitbug's CEO states 

he was personally unaware of that instance of direct competition in 

the business-to-business-to-consumer market, "[h]ad [Fitbug] 

conducted further investigation, as a reasonable person would have 

done . . . , it would have discovered that [Fitbit]" had been 

directly competing with Fitbug in the business-to-business-toconsumer market from the outset. Saul Zaentz, 627 F. Supp. 2d at 

1112. 

Also undermining Fitbug's argument is its artificial and 

cramped description of the relevant market. Fitbug states that, in 

its view, unless another portable electronic fitness tracker 

company was providing similar Add-On Services to those Fitbug 

provided, that company was effectively not a competitor in the 

business-to-business-to-consumer market. But Fitbug offers no 

objective explanation for why this is the case, and in any event, a 

close reading of the Ninth Circuit's progressive encroachment cases 

shows that expansion into a "different market" requires something 

more than simply expanding existing marketing channels or 

Case 3:13-cv-01418-SI Document 96 Filed 01/26/15 Page 19 of 31
20 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California 

increasing sales in an area closely related to the junior mark 

holder's existing business. 

Take, for instance, the Ninth Circuit's analysis of 

progressive encroachment in Tillamook Country Smoker, Inc. v. 

Tillamook Community Creamery Association. In Tillamook, the 

plaintiff was a cheese company suing a defendant smoked meat 

company, both located in Tillamook County, Oregon. 465 F.3d at 

1105. While the cheese company was aware of the meat company from 

the outset, it did not sue until twenty-five years later, once the 

meat company began selling its products in supermarkets -- a move 

the cheese company argued constituted progressive encroachment. 

Id. at 1105, 1110. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, finding that the 

meat company's expansion into supermarket sales was not an 

expansion into a different region or different market, but rather 

"growth of its existing business and the concomitant increase in 

its use of the mark . . . ." Id. at 1110. In so doing, the 

Tillamook court noted that if the meat company had "'expanded its 

business' into selling cheese in grocery stores, it would be a 

different story." Id.; see also Internet Specialties, 559 F.3d at 

991 (expanding from localized sales of dial up service to 

nationwide DSL service was "a natural growth of . . . existing 

business); Grupo Gigante, 391 F.3d at 1103 (rejecting progressive 

encroachment where the plaintiff was aware of a potential conflict 

but chose to wait to bring suit until the conflict was actual); 

Saul Zaentz, 627 F. Supp. 2d at 1115 (finding the move to internet 

sales "was the natural outgrowth of [the defendant's] existing 

business," and "the fact that [plaintiff's] internet sales predate 

[defendant's] sales is immaterial"). 

Case 3:13-cv-01418-SI Document 96 Filed 01/26/15 Page 20 of 31
21 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California 

 Similarly, in this case, any expansion into the business-tobusiness-to-consumer market (no matter how that market is 

constituted) was simply the natural growth of Fitbit's existing 

business. If Fitbit had only entered the portable electronic 

fitness tracking market after several years of marketing distinct 

products, the Court might reach a different conclusion. But here, 

Fitbit was selling the same type of products, to the same type of 

customers, with the actual or constructive knowledge of Fitbug from 

2008 through 2011 and beyond. See Grupo Gigante, 391 F.3d at 1103 

(rejecting a progressive encroachment claim where defendant's use 

of the mark did not change over the relevant period); accord 6 

McCarthy on Trademarks & Unfair Competition § 31:20 (4th ed.) 

("Progressive encroachment denotes some change in direction, such 

as expansion into different territories or into a different type of 

business. It must be something more than a normal expansion in 

quantity within its original line of business that most businesses 

will experience over time."). In short, the undisputed facts 

simply do not support Fitbug's view that Fitbit's subsequent 

activities constituted a move into the "same or similar market 

area" or placed Fitbit "more squarely in competition with 

[Fitbug]," because the companies were already squarely competing in 

the same or similar market area beginning in 2008. Opp'n at 10 

(quoting Kellogg Co. v. Exxon Corp., 209 F.3d 562, 573 (6th Cir. 

2000)). 

Despite the presumption in favor of laches and Fitbug's 

inability to show progressive encroachment, the Court must still 

weigh a series of factors to determine whether Fitbug's delay in 

bringing suit was reasonable. Specifically, these factors, the soCase 3:13-cv-01418-SI Document 96 Filed 01/26/15 Page 21 of 31
22 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California 

called E-Systems factors, direct the Court to analyze "(1) the 

strength and value of the trademark rights asserted; (2) 

plaintiff's diligence in enforcing [the] mark; (3) harm to [the] 

senior user if relief is denied; (4) good faith ignorance by [the] 

junior user; (5) competition between [the] senior and junior users; 

and (6) [the] extent of harm suffered by the junior user because of 

[the] senior user's delay." E-Systems, Inc. v. Monitek, Inc., 720 

F.2d 604, 607 (9th Cir. 1983); see also Tillamook, 465 F.3d at 

1108. 

The first two factors weigh in Fitbit's favor. First, while 

both Fitbit's and Fitbug's marks are descriptive or suggestive, and 

thus relatively weak, see Grupo Gigante, 391 F.3d at 1102 

("Descriptive or suggestive marks are relatively weak.") (citing 

Accuride Int'l Inc. v. Accuride Corp., 871 F.2d 1531, 1536 (9th 

Cir. 1989); ATM Express, 2009 WL 2973034, at *4, on balance, 

Fitbit's mark is substantially more valuable by virtue of its 

"rapid and continuing growth" relative to Fitbug. See E-Systems, 

720 F.2d at 607. As a result, this factor weighs in Fitbit's 

favor. Second, as discussed throughout the foregoing analysis, 

Fitbug was not diligent in protecting its mark and did not assert 

its trademark rights against Fitbit's from September 2008, when 

Fitbit announced its products and began offering them for sale on 

its website, to December 2011, when it sent a cease and desist 

letter to Fitbit, and did not file suit until 2013. As the Court 

has explained, this delay was not justified, and accordingly this 

factor weighs against Fitbug. 

The third factor and fifth factors either weigh in Fitbug's 

favor or can be assumed to do so for the sake of argument. The 

Case 3:13-cv-01418-SI Document 96 Filed 01/26/15 Page 22 of 31
23 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California 

third factor, the harm to Fitbug if relief is denied, "turns 

largely on the court's analysis of the likelihood of confusion." 

RSI, 2012 WL 3277136, at *18 (citing Grupo Gigante, 391 F.3d at 

1103). But here, the Court cannot find that the likelihood of 

confusion standard is satisfied as a matter of law because there 

are genuine issues of material fact as to several of the Sleekcraft 

factors. See 559 F.2d at 348-49. In particular, there are 

disputed factual issues going to the existence of actual confusion, 

as well as the similarity of the parties' marks and sophistication 

and care "likely to be exercised by the purchaser[s] . . . ." Id. 

at 348; see Fitbit Opp'n at 16-22 (detailing these factual 

disputes). As a result, the Court cannot decide likelihood of 

confusion (and hence the weight of this factor) as a matter of law. 

Nonetheless, even assuming this factor weighs strongly in Fitbug's 

favor, as the fifth factor, competition between the users, does, 

see RSI, 2012 WL 3277136, at *18 (citing Grupo Gigante, 391 F.3d at 

1104) (noting that where both parties offer "similar products to 

the same companies in the same market, [the competition between 

users] factor plainly weighs against a finding of laches"), it 

would still be insufficient to sway the overall weight of the 

factors. 

The remaining factors, good faith ignorance by Fitbit and the 

harm suffered by Fitbit as a result of Fitbug's delay weigh in 

Fitbit's favor as well. First, while it is undisputed that Fitbit 

was aware of Fitbug's existence prior to announcing or selling its 

products, it is also undisputed that Fitbit selected its mark 

before it was aware of Fitbug, and even after learning of Fitbug's 

existence, Fitbit continued to believe there was no likelihood of 

Case 3:13-cv-01418-SI Document 96 Filed 01/26/15 Page 23 of 31
24 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California 

confusion. Because this factor focuses on whether "[Fitbit] had 

prior knowledge of [Fitbug] when it decided to adopt the name 

[Fitbit]," this factor weighs in Fitbit's favor. Internet 

Specialties, 2006 WL 4568073, at *4, aff'd 559 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 

2008) (emphasis added). Furthermore, because Fitbit "has continued 

to build a valuable business around its trademark during the time 

that [Fitbug] delayed the exercise of its legal rights," it has 

suffered "expectation" or "economic prejudice." Grupo Gigante, 391 

F.3d at 1105; see also Danjaq, 263 F.3d at 956 (discussing economic 

prejudice); McCarthy § 31:12 (discussing expectation prejudice). 

Here, Fitbit has provided substantial evidence detailing its 

efforts through the period of Fitbug's delay to build its business, 

generating substantial sales, hiring large numbers of employees, 

and developing products, all of which it offers under the wellknown Fitbit mark. Those efforts, and Fitbit's products, have 

garnered awards and substantial media coverage. The economic 

prejudice would be severe if Fitbit were to now lose the rights to 

the Fitbit name. See Saul Zaentz, 627 F. Supp. 2d at 1118 

(reaching a similar conclusion where the defendant had spent 

millions of dollars on advertising, appeared on television 

promoting its business, and generated substantial goodwill under 

its existing name). 

Nevertheless, Fitbug argues, relying on two out-ofjurisdiction authorities, that Fitbit cannot be prejudiced because 

Fitbit knew of Fitbug's rights prior to making these investments. 

See Roederer v. J. Garcia Carrion, S.A., 569 F.3d 855, 859 (8th 

Cir. 2009); Perini Corp. v. Perini Constr., Inc., 715 F. Supp. 719, 

725 (D. Md. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 915 F.2d 121 (4th Cir. 

Case 3:13-cv-01418-SI Document 96 Filed 01/26/15 Page 24 of 31
25 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California 

1990). But Fitbit points out that the Ninth Circuit and other 

courts have found prejudice even where the defendant was aware of 

the plaintiff's existence prior to the prejudice occurring. See, 

e.g., Danjaq, 263 F.3d at 956; Saul Zaentz, 627 F. Supp. 2d at 1118 

(finding the defendant would suffer economic prejudice even though 

it chose its business name with full knowledge of the plaintiff's 

mark). Furthermore, one of the cases on which Fitbug relies for 

this argument, Roederer, applied this limitation on prejudice only 

where "plaintiff objected to the use of the mark." 569 F.3d at 

859. However as the Court found earlier, Fitbug did not object to 

Fitbit's use of its mark until its cease-and-desist letter in 

December of 2011, after Fitbit had already expended substantial 

effort building up good will in its mark. As a result, the Court 

rejects this argument and finds that Fitbit's claim of laches is 

supported by substantial economic prejudice. 

Considering the above factors, the Court finds they weigh in 

Fitbit's favor. Nonetheless, Fitbug has one remaining argument: 

that Fitbit's willful infringement bars it from asserting laches. 

 Because laches is an equitable doctrine, the exception to 

laches for willful infringers stems from "the equitable maxim that 

'he who comes into equity must come with clean hands.'" Danjaq, 

263 F.3d at 956 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Hermes Int'l v. Lederer de 

Paris Fifth Ave., Inc., 219 F.3d 104, 107 (2d Cir. 2000)). This 

rule was originally applied by Judge Hand in the copyright piracy 

context and was subsequently applied to "intentional and 

fraudulent" trademark infringement by the Ninth Circuit. See Nat'l 

Lead Co. v. Wolfe, 223 F.2d 195, 202 (9th Cir. 1955) (citing 

Menendez v. Holt, 128 U.S. 514, 523 (1888)); Haas, 234 F. at 108. 

Case 3:13-cv-01418-SI Document 96 Filed 01/26/15 Page 25 of 31
26 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California 

Hand mused that while all would agree "that it is inequitable for 

the owner of a copyright, with full notice of an intended 

infringement, to stand inactive while the proposed infringer spends 

large sums of money in violation, and to intervene only when his 

speculation proved a success," such a course of conduct by a 

copyright owner "might be irrelevant" if "the defendant [is] a 

deliberate pirate . . . ." Haas, 234 F. at 108. 

In Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp., the Ninth Circuit held that the 

Copyright Act's definition of willful infringement -- infringement 

that occurs "'with knowledge that the defendant's conduct 

constitutes copyright infringement'" -- is the standard by which 

courts should assess whether willful infringement bars the 

application of laches. 263 F.3d at 957 (quoting Columbia Pictures 

Television v. Krypton Broad., 106 F.3d 284, 293 (9th Cir. 1997) 

(alterations and omissions in original) rev'd on other grounds sub 

nom. Feitner v. Columbia Pictures Television, 523 U.S. 340 (1998)). 

At least one other district court in the Ninth Circuit has applied 

this standard to trademark infringement, and the parties do not 

dispute that it applies here. See FLIR Sys. Inc. v. Sierra Media, 

Inc., 965 F. Supp. 2d 1184, 1210 (D. Or. 2013). 

Fitbug points to four facts that it believes demonstrate 

willful infringement. First, "it is undisputed that Fitbit learned 

about Fitbug nearly two years before selling any products (and 

nearly one year before even announcing such products)." Fitbug 

Opp'n at 3. Second, pointing to screenshots of Fitbit's and 

Fitbug's websites, Fitbug argues that "Fitbit . . . borrowed 

significant design elements from Fitbug's website, marketing 

materials, and original logo." Id.; Landau Decl. Exs. 15-18. 

Case 3:13-cv-01418-SI Document 96 Filed 01/26/15 Page 26 of 31
27 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California 

Third, Fitbit continued using its marks after receiving a cease and 

desist letter from Fitbug alleging infringement. Finally, Fitbug 

disputes Fitbit's view that "it began using the FITBIT mark before 

learning of Fitbug's prior rights in FITBUG." Fitbug Opp'n at 3 

n.2. 

 The willfulness exception is inapplicable here because Fitbug 

can show "at most only infringement, not willful infringement," 

Danjaq, 263 F.3d at 942, and Fitbug has offered no evidence 

"demonstrating that [Fitbit] 'employed the alleged infringing mark 

with the wrongful intent of capitalizing on its goodwill.'" RSI 

Corp. v. IBM Corp., No. 5:08-cv-3414-RMW, 2012 WL 3277136, at *20 

(N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2012). First, while it is undisputed that 

Fitbit learned about Fitbug prior to announcing or selling its 

products, in the bad faith infringement context numerous courts 

have found that "[p]rior knowledge of a senior user's trademark 

does not necessarily give rise to an inference of bad faith and may 

be consistent with good faith." Arrow Fastener Co. v. Stanley 

Works, 59 F.3d 384, 397 (2d Cir. 1995); see also McCarthy § 23:115 

at n.13 (collecting cases). Nevertheless, Fitbug suggests that the 

Court should infer bad faith here because "defendant had knowledge 

of plaintiff's mark 'and 'just happened' to choose a mark 

confusingly similar to plaintiff's mark.'" Fitbug Opp'n at 3 n.2 

(quoting McCarthy, supra, at § 23:115). But this overstates the 

facts. First, as the Court discussed earlier, there is no evidence 

that Fitbit was aware of Fitbug's mark at the time it chose the 

Fitbit name. Instead, the record simply demonstrates that Fitbit 

was ignorant of Fitbug's existence until late 2007, after it chose 

the Fitbit name but before it announced or began marketing its 

Case 3:13-cv-01418-SI Document 96 Filed 01/26/15 Page 27 of 31
28 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California 

products under that name. Furthermore, even though Fitbit was 

aware of Fitbug prior to announcing or marketing its products, 

Fitbug provides no evidence disputing Fitbit's asserted good faith 

belief that its use is not infringing and nothing showing a 

"wrongful intent of capitalizing on [Fitbug's] goodwill." RSI, 

2012 WL 3277136, at *20 (quotation omitted). On the contrary, it 

is undisputed that, at the time he learned of Fitbug, Fitbit's CEO 

believed the names were not confusingly similar. As the Ninth 

Circuit has recognized, citing approvingly a case from the Sixth 

Circuit, "a knowing use in the belief that there is no confusion is 

not bad faith." Lindy Pen Co., Inc. v. Bic Pen Corp., 982 F.2d 

1400, 1406 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Nalpac, Ltd. v. Corning Glass 

Works, 784 F.2d 752, 755 (6th Cir. 1986)). 

 As a result, the Court finds that willful infringement does 

not bar Fitbit from invoking laches, and Fitbug's claims are timebarred. Accordingly, Fitbit's motion for summary judgment on the 

issue of laches is GRANTED. Further, because Fitbug's claims are 

time-barred, the portion of Fitbit's motion for summary judgment 

addressing acquiescence need not be addressed, and Fitbug's motion 

for summary judgment on likelihood of confusion is DENIED as moot. 

B. Fitbit's Fifth and Sixth Counterclaims 

 The only remaining issue is Fitbug's motion for summary 

judgment as to Fitbit's fifth and sixth counterclaims, which assert 

claims for violations of California's Unfair Competition Law 

("UCL") and False Advertising Law ("FAL"). See Cal. Bus. & Prof. 

Code §§ 17200; 17500. These causes of action relate to allegations 

that Fitbug violated the UCL and FAL by posting online reviews and 

comments about Fitbit products or comparing Fitbit's products to 

Case 3:13-cv-01418-SI Document 96 Filed 01/26/15 Page 28 of 31
29 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California 

Fitbug's without disclosing their affiliations with Fitbug. 

Fitbug argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on these 

claims because Fitbit cannot satisfy the requirement that a UCL or 

FAL plaintiff demonstrate it "suffered injury in fact and . . . 

lost money as a result of" the unfair competition or false 

advertising. See Id. §§ 17204; 17535. Because a UCL or FAL 

plaintiff must demonstrate an economic injury and demonstrate that 

"the misrepresentation was an immediate cause" of the injury 

suffered, standing under the UCL and FAL is "substantially narrower 

than federal standing under [A]rticle III." In re Tobacco II 

Cases, 46 Cal. 4th 298, 326 (Cal. 2009) (internal citation and 

quotation marks omitted); see also Kwikset Corp. v. Super. Ct., 51 

Cal. 4th 310, 323-24 (Cal. 2011). 

The background of this issue is somewhat convoluted, but it 

stems from a stipulation the parties entered into in response to 

Fitbit's desire to amend its counterclaims late in the discovery 

process. When Fitbit sought to amend its counterclaims, Fitbug 

apparently sought to depose a Fitbit representative regarding those 

counterclaims. Fitbit initially agreed, but then the parties 

reached an agreement that, in exchange for not providing the 

witness for deposition, Fitbit and Fitbug would stipulate that, 

among other things, Fitbit did not have evidence of "particular 

instances where individuals who otherwise would have purchased 

Fitbit products instead purchased Fitbug products in reliance on or 

as a result of Fitbug's conduct" that allegedly violated the UCL 

and FAL. ECF No. 49 ("Rosenberg Decl.") Ex. 17 at ¶ 1. 

In response, Fitbit points to several cases holding that, in 

the Lanham Act context, injury in fact may be presumed for 

Case 3:13-cv-01418-SI Document 96 Filed 01/26/15 Page 29 of 31
30 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California 

intentionally deceptive advertising. See Southland Sod Farms v. 

Stover Seed Co., 108 F.3d 1134, 1146 (9th Cir. 1997); U-Haul Int'l, 

Inc. v. Jartran, Inc., 793 F.2d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir. 1986); Nat'l 

Prods., Inc. v. Gamber-Johnson LLC, 699 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1241 

(W.D. Wash. 2010). But these cases do not rebut Fitbug's argument. 

Fitbug's argument is that, as a matter of California law, the 

statutory standing requirement imposed by Business and Professions 

Code Sections 17204 and 17535 require Fitbit to demonstrate an 

economic injury cognizable under the UCL or FAL. These cases only 

address those requirements in the context of the Lanham Act, and 

are thus inapposite. 

Next, Fitbit points to California cases holding that a UCL or 

FAL plaintiff can satisfy the statutory standing requirements in 

"innumerable ways" and that "the quantum of lost money or property 

necessary to show standing" under the UCL and FAL is "only so much 

as would suffice to establish injury in fact and it suffices to 

allege some specific, identifiable trifle of injury." Law Offices 

of Matthew Higbee v. Expungement Assistances Servs., 214 Cal. App. 

4th 544, 561 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) (citations and internal 

quotations omitted). However, Fitbit cannot satisfy even that 

standard. Instead, Fitbit's sole basis for asserting an injury 

under the UCL and FAL is speculation. While Fitbit points out that 

Fitbug saw an increase in web traffic and sales following the 

alleged UCL and FAL violations, Fitbit cannot connect that increase 

with any "quantum of lost money or property" it suffered. Id. 

Similarly, while Fitbug internally estimated that this campaign 

would generate significant revenues, there is nothing in the record 

demonstrating that the campaign actually was responsible for any 

Case 3:13-cv-01418-SI Document 96 Filed 01/26/15 Page 30 of 31
31 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California 

loss of money or property by Fitbit. 

As a result, Fitbit has failed to demonstrate even a 

"specific, identifiable trifle of injury" sufficient to satisfy the 

standing requirements of the UCL or FAL. Id. Accordingly, 

Fitbug's motion is GRANTED as to Fitbit's fifth and sixth 

counterclaims. 

V. CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons set forth above, Fitbit's motion for summary 

judgment on the grounds of laches is GRANTED. Because Fitbug's 

claims are time-barred, the Court need not address Fitbit's 

arguments for summary judgment on the grounds of acquiescence, and 

Fitbug's motion for summary judgment on the grounds of likelihood 

of confusion is DENIED as moot. Fitbug's motion for summary 

judgment on Fitbit's fifth and sixth counterclaims is GRANTED. 

Because, based on the Court's review of the parties' pleadings this 

order fully disposes of the parties' claims, the trial date, 

pretrial conference, and all other pretrial deadlines are hereby 

VACATED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: January 26, 2015 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Case 3:13-cv-01418-SI Document 96 Filed 01/26/15 Page 31 of 31