Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01768/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01768-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Theresa Hume, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Sheryl Foster, Warden, Southern Nevada

Women’s Correctional Center; Attorney

General of the State of Arizona, 

Respondents. 

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No. CV06-01768-PHX-NVW

ORDER

Pending before the court is the Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) of Magistrate

Judge Duncan (Doc. # 16) regarding petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. # 1). The R&R recommends that the Petition be denied

and dismissed with prejudice. The Magistrate Judge advised the parties that they had ten

days to file objections to the R&R. (R&R at 5 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)). Petitioner has

filed objections (Doc. # 17) and, at the court’s direction, Respondents have filed a reply

(Doc. # 22).

The court has considered the objections and reviewed the Report and

Recommendation de novo. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (stating that the

court must make a de novo determination of those portions of the Report and

Recommendation to which specific objections are made). The court agrees with the

Magistrate Judge's determinations, accepts the recommended decision within the meaning

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of Rule 72(b), Fed. R. Civ. P., and overrules Petitioner's objections. See 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1) (stating that the district court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part,

the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate”).

 The court adds the following additional explanation.

1. The court does reach and decide a question that the Magistrate Judge passed

over. Petitioner did exhaust his state court remedies by filing his supplemental citations of

authorities in the Arizona Court of Appeals, arguing his claims under Blakely v. Washington,

542 U.S. 296 (2004), Blakely having been decided after his sentencing and during the appeal

of his post-conviction proceedings of right. The Court of Appeals revested jurisdiction in

the Superior Court to consider those claims, and the Superior Court granted relief, setting a

jury trial to determine the aggravating factors upon which the Superior Court had relied in

the sentencing. Having prevailed at that phase, Petitioner was not then an aggrieved party

in that respect and did not need to file, and could not have filed, an amended petition for

review in the Court of Appeals on the Blakely issues. 

When the Court of Appeals later denied the petition before jury proceedings could be

had on the aggravating factors, it necessarily rejected the Superior Court’s April 27, 2005

finding that Blakely required a jury determination of all aggravating factors not otherwise

exempt from Blakely. It is apparent that the Court of Appeals’ July 21, 2005 decision had

been waiting for and relied on the Arizona Supreme Court’s intervening July 8, 2005

decision in State v. Martinez, 210 Ariz. 578, 585, 115 P.3d 618, 625 (2005). That case held

that only a single Blakely-permissible aggravating factor “permits the sentencing judge to

find and consider additional factors relevant to the imposition of a sentence up to the

maximum prescribed.” Thus, Petitioner adequately presented his Blakely claims to the Court

of Appeals, which rejected them on the merits. Petitioner’s petition for review to the Arizona

Supreme Court did not argue the Blakely issues, but he was not required to do so to

adequately exhaust his state court remedies before seeking federal habeas review under 28

U.S.C. § 2254. Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F.Supp.2d 925 (D. Ariz. 2007).

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2. The sentencing judge stated one of the aggravating factors he relied upon as

follows:

On August 20, 2002 Petitioner was sentenced to the aggravated term of 14

years based upon certain aggravating factors articulated by the court:

. . .

B. Defendant being on probation for an alcohol-related offense for which

she was ordered to refrain from alcohol consumption;

(Answer to Petition, Exh. GG.) The aggravating factor of Petitioner having been on

probation for an alcohol-related offense was within the prior conviction exception to Blakely.

United States v. Cordero, 465 F.3d 626, 632-33 & n. 33 (5th Cir. 2006)(“related facts such

as the timing of the conviction and the type and length of sentence imposed, may be

judicially found at sentencing” and citing cases); United States v. Corchado, 427 F.3d 815,

820 (10th Cir. 2005) (same); United States v. Fagans, 406 F.3d 138, 141-42 (2nd Cir. 2005)

(same). 

Stokes v. Schriro, 465 F.3d 397 (9th Cir. 2006), is not to the contrary. Stokes held a

sentencing enhancement that “defendant’s 1981 convictions for kidnaping and aggravated

assault . . . are striking similar to the instant offense” was a fact finding requiring jury

determination. Id. at 403. That qualitative comparison of the previous offense with the

sentencing offense was “not covered by Apprendi’s prior conviction exception.” Id. In

contrast, the fact of being on probation for an alcohol-related offense, including a term to

refrain from alcohol consumption, is apparent from the conviction itself, without need for

qualitative comparison. Stokes is unlikely to have broken, without discussion or

acknowledgment, from the apparently uniform rule of other circuits allowing consideration

of the judicially apparent fact of prior probation where qualitative comparison is not relied

upon.

3. The Plea Agreement provided, “The defendant shall be sentenced to between

9 and 14 years in the Department of Corrections.” It further agreed that “the Defendant

hereby waives and gives up any and all motions, defenses, objections, or requests that he has

made or raised, or could assert hereafter, to the court’s entry of judgment against him and

imposition of a sentence upon him consistent with this agree.” These provisions plainly

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include waiver of any objection to judicial fact-finding to arrive at a sentence within the

agreed 9-to-14-year range. The Blakely objection was not then known, as Blakely was

decided later, but it was an objection that Petitioner “could assert hereafter” and so was

waived. This waiver of any Blakely objection requires denial of the habeas corpus petition,

independently of the other grounds discussed above.

4. Insofar as the Magistrate Judge also ruled on any non-dispositive matters, error

may not be assigned to any defect in those rulings to the extent that an aggrieved party did

not file a timely objection. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a) (“Within 10 days after being served with

a copy of the magistrate judge’s order, a party may serve and file objections to the order; a

party may not thereafter assign as error a defect in the magistrate judge’s order to which

objection was not timely made.”). The absence of a timely objection precludes later

assignment of error in this court or in any higher court of the non-dispositive rulings of a

magistrate judge. Simpson v. Lear Astronics Corp., 77 F.3d 1170, 1174 (9th Cir. 1996);

Philipps v. GMC, 289 F.3d 1117, 1120-21 (9th Cir. 2002).

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate

Judge (Doc. # 16) is accepted as supplemented by this order.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court enter judgment that the

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. # 1) is denied

and dismissed with prejudice. The Clerk shall terminate this action.

DATED this 30th day of August 2007.

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