Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-4_06-cv-01720/USCOURTS-ared-4_06-cv-01720-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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Michael J. Astrue was sworn in as the Commissioner of Social

Security on February 12, 2007. He is therefore substituted for Jo

Anne B. Barnhart pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 25(d)(1).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

WESTERN DIVISION

WANDA J. GREEN Plaintiff

v. 4:06CV01720 JMM/JFF

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,

Commissioner, Social 

Security Administration,1 Defendant

PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION

INSTRUCTIONS

This recommended disposition has been submitted to United States

District Judge James M. Moody. The parties may file specific

objections to these findings and recommendations and must provide the

factual or legal basis for each objection. The objections must be

filed with the Clerk no later than eleven (11) days from the date of

the findings and recommendations. A copy must be served on the

opposing party. The District Judge, even in the absence of

objections, may reject these proposed findings and recommendations in

whole or in part.

RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION

Plaintiff, Wanda J. Green, has appealed the final decision of

the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration to deny her

claims for Disability Insurance benefits and Supplemental Security

Income, based on disability. Both parties have submitted appeal

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briefs and the case is ready for decision.

The Court's function on review is to determine whether the

Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence on the

record as a whole and free of legal error. Long v. Chater, 108 F.3d

185, 187 (8th Cir. 1997); see also, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial

evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept

as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S.

389, 401 (1971); Reynolds v. Chater, 82 F.3d 254, 257 (8th Cir.

1996).

 In assessing the substantiality of the evidence, the Court must

consider evidence that detracts from the Commissioner's decision as

well as evidence that supports it; the Court may not, however,

reverse the Commissioner's decision merely because substantial

evidence would have supported an opposite decision. Sultan v.

Barnhart, 368 F.3d 857, 863 (8th Cir. 2004); Woolf v. Shalala, 3 F.3d

1210, 1213 (8th Cir. 1993).

"Disability" is the "inability to engage in any substantial

gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or

mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which

has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not

less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). A "physical or

mental impairment" is "an impairment that results from anatomical,

physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable

by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic

techniques." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3).

Plaintiff alleged that she was limited in her ability to work by

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Plaintiff appealed a prior adverse decision to this Court, which

reversed and remanded. Green v. Barnhart, 4:04CV00654 JTR (Judgment,

Aug. 22, 2005) (Tr. 209-19)

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carpal tunnel and tendinitis of the thumb. (Tr. 79) The

Commissioner found that she was not disabled within the meaning of

the Social Security Act. The only issue before this Court is whether

the Commissioner's decision that Plaintiff was not disabled within

the meaning of the Act is supported by substantial record evidence.

After conducting an administrative hearing, the Administrative

Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that Plaintiff had not been under a

disability within the meaning of the Social Security Act at any time

through January 27, 2006, the date of his decision. (Tr. 201) On

November 3, 2006, the Appeals Council declined to assume

jurisdiction, making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the

Commissioner. (Tr. 186-89) Plaintiff then filed her complaint

initiating this appeal. (Docket #2)

After consideration of the record as a whole, the Court finds

that the decision of the Commissioner is not supported by substantial

evidence and that the case should be remanded. 

Plaintiff was 37 years old at the time of the second hearing.2

(Tr. 242) She graduated high school and obtained an Associates

Degree in medical records technology. (Tr. 85, 242) She has past

relevant work as an auditor, operator, cashier, nursing assistant and

dishwasher. (Tr. 199-200, 250-53)

The ALJ considered Plaintiff's impairments by way of the

required five-step sequential evaluation process. The first step

involves a determination of whether the claimant is involved in

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substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i);

416.920(a)(4)(i) (2005). If the claimant is, benefits are denied,

regardless of medical condition, age, education or work experience.

Id. at §§ 404.1520(b); 416.920(b).

Step 2 involves a determination of whether the claimant has an

impairment or combination of impairments which is “severe” and meets

the duration requirement. Id. at §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii);

416.920(a)(4)(ii). If not, benefits are denied. Id. A “severe”

impairment significantly limits a claimant’s ability to perform basic

work activities. Id. at §§ 404.1520(c); 416.920(c).

Step 3 involves a determination of whether the severe

impairment(s) meets or equals a listed impairment. Id.,

§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii); 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If so, and the duration

requirement is met, benefits are awarded. Id.

If the claimant does not meet or equal a Listing, then a

residual functional capacity assessment is made. Id.,

§§ 404.1520(a)(4); 416.920(a)(4). This residual functional capacity

assessment is utilized at Steps 4 and 5. Id.

Step 4 involves a determination of whether the claimant has

sufficient residual functional capacity to perform past relevant

work. Id., §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv); 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If so,

benefits are denied. Id.

Step 5 involves a determination of whether the claimant is able

to make an adjustment to other work, given claimant's age, education

and work experience. Id., §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v); 416.920(a)(4)(v) .

If so, benefits are denied; if not, benefits are awarded. Id.

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The ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial

gainful activity since her alleged onset date. (Tr. 200) He found

that Plaintiff had “severe” impairments, carpal tunnel syndrome

(postoperative) and a history of tendinitis of the thumb, but that

she did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met

or equaled a Listing. Id. He judged that Plaintiff’s allegations

were not borne out by the overall record and were not fully credible

to the extent alleged. Id. 

The ALJ found that Plaintiff retained the residual functional

capacity for a wide range of light work, but could not perform jobs

that required constant repetitive grasping and handling with the

right hand. (Tr. 199, 200) Based on the testimony of a vocational

expert in response to a hypothetical question, the ALJ found that

Plaintiff could return to her past relevant work as a cashier and as

a quality control worker. (Tr. 200, 201) Consequently, the ALJ

concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled. Id.

Plaintiff advances several arguments, only one of which need be

discussed, because it has merit. Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s

hypothetical question to the vocational expert was flawed. Marcia L.

Hixson, M.D., performed surgery on Plaintiff’s right hand and treated

her for a number of years. She re-examined Plaintiff on July 18,

2001, and noted these restrictions:

Wanda Green was reexamined on 7-18-01. She has persistent

stiffness and weakness with pain in both hands following

strenuous activity. Ms. Green has permanent work

restrictions due to her hand pain. These are that she

should not perform tasks which require repetitive grasping

and pinching. She can use a computer, but for short

periods of time and with frequent breaks. Lifting, pushing

and pulling are only slightly limited.

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No doubt, this should read “exertionally.”

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Even if the difference were not obvious, it was pointed out as a

deficiency in the first decision reversing and remanding. (Tr. 218)

It is not necessary to repeat what was said in that decision.

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(Tr. 97)

The ALJ’s hypothetical question to the vocational expert reads

as follows:

Q I want you to assume that you're dealing with an

individual the same age as the claimant with the same

educational background and past work experience, further

assume that the individual is limited to light work

exceptionally,3 but the individual could not do jobs that

required constant repetitive grasping and handling with the

right hand. Now with this profile, could this individual

perform any of the claimant's past jobs?

(Tr. 253-54)(emphasis added).

Dr. Hixson restricted Plaintiff from “repetitive grasping and

pinching.” (Tr. 97) The ALJ’s hypothetical restricted “constant

repetitive grasping and handling.” There is an obvious difference.4

The ALJ seems to have adopted Dr. Hixson’s restrictions, but

grafted “constant” into them without explaining why or pointing to

substantial evidence which would support that modification.

It is well settled that a hypothetical question posed to a

vocational expert must fully set forth a claimant's impairments.

E.g., Totz v. Sullivan , 961 F.2d 727, 730 (8th Cir. 1992). A

hypothetical question posed to a vocational expert must capture the

concrete consequences of claimant's deficiencies. England v. Astrue,

F.3d 1017, 1023 (8th Cir. 2007); Lacroix v. Barnhart, 465 F.3d 881,

889 (8th Cir. 2006); Pickney v. Chater , 96 F.3d 294, 297 (8th Cir.

1996).

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The ALJ’s hypothetical question was not supported by substantial

evidence. Based on the preceding and the record as a whole, the Court

finds that the ALJ's decision is not supported by substantial

evidence. Therefore, the ruling of the Commissioner must be reversed

and the matter remanded for a reevaluation and the asking of a proper

hypothetical, if a hypothetical question is required.

THEREFORE, it is hereby 

RECOMMENDED that the decision of the Commissioner be reversed and

remanded for action consistent with this opinion. This would be a

"sentence four" remand within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and

Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89 (1991).

DATED this 8th day of February, 2008.

 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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