Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-06017/USCOURTS-ca8-04-06017-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 422
Nature of Suit: Bankruptcy Appeals Rule 28 USC 158
Cause of Action: 

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United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 04-6017EM

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In re: *

 *

Julia A. Strong, *

 *

Debtor. *

 *

Julia A. Strong, *

 *

Debtor-Appellant, * Appeal from the United States

 * Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern 

v. * District of Missouri

 *

Bank of America, *

 *

Movant-Appellee. *

 *

 *

 *

 *

 *

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Submitted: July 16, 2004

Filed: July 28, 2004

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Before KRESSEL, Chief Judge, MAHONEY and VENTERS, Bankruptcy Judges.

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KRESSEL, Chief Judge.

Appellate Case: 04-6017 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/28/2004 Entry ID: 1793094 
1 The Honorable Barry S. Schermer, United States Bankruptcy Judge for the

Eastern District of Missouri.

2

 Strong appeals from an order of the bankruptcy court1 granting Bank of

America’s request for relief from the automatic stay. Because Strong’s appeal is

moot, we dismiss her appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

BACKGROUND

On May 23, 2000, Strong executed a note in the amount of $44,500 in favor of

Bank of America, N.A. The note was secured by a first deed of trust against Strong’s

residence. Strong subsequently defaulted on her payments. On June 5, 2002, Bank of

America attempted to foreclose on Strong’s residence. Strong then filed her first

Chapter 13 petition on May 28, 2002, which resulted in a cancellation of Bank

America’s June 5, 2002 foreclosure sale. 

On January 14, 2003, Bank of America sought relief from the automatic stay.

On January 21, 2003, prior to the hearing on the bank’s motion for relief, Strong’s

case was dismissed for failure to make plan payments. On February 13, 2003, Strong

filed a second Chapter 13 petition. On June 18, 2003, Bank of America again sought

relief from the automatic stay. 

The bank’s motion was settled with a consent order and stipulation, entered

August 7, 2003, requiring Strong to remain current on all future post-petition

payments while making an extra payment each month to cure the post-petition

delinquency that existed at the time of the hearing. On December 19, 2003, Bank of

America filed a notice of default for breach of the terms of the consent order and

stipulation. As a result of Strong’s failure to file a response to the notice of default

and her failure to cure the breach, an order granting the bank relief from the stay was

entered on January 12, 2004. On January 16, 2004, Strong’s second Chapter 13 case

was dismissed for failure to make plan payments. 

Appellate Case: 04-6017 Page: 2 Date Filed: 07/28/2004 Entry ID: 1793094 
3

After the dismissal of Strong’s case, Bank of America proceeded with

foreclosure on Strong’s residence. The foreclosure sale was scheduled for March 9,

2004. On March 8, 2004, Strong filed a third Chapter 13 petition. Bank of America

postponed the foreclosure sale to March 16, 2004. On March 12, 2004, Bank of

America filed a motion for an expedited hearing and a motion to dismiss or in the

alternative for relief from the automatic stay. On March 16, 2004, a hearing on the

bank’s motions was held. Strong and her attorney appeared at the hearing. The

bankruptcy court granted Bank of America relief from the stay to proceed with its

foreclosure sale, and waived the ten day stay under Bankruptcy Rule 4001.

On March 16, 2004, Bank of America proceeded with the foreclosure sale on

Strong’s residence. The residence was sold to Federal National Mortgage

Association, the only bidder, for $44,826.57. On March 26, 2004, Strong filed a

notice of appeal. On April 2, 2004, a petition for eviction was filed by Federal

National Mortgage Association. Strong was subsequently served with notice of the

eviction proceedings. On June 2, 2004, Strong moved for a stay pending appeal

which we denied. On that same date, a judgment of unlawful detainer was taken

against Strong. On June 17, 2004, Strong was evicted from the property.

THIS COURT’S JURISDICTION

Bank of America argues that Strong’s appeal is moot and should be dismissed.

Mootness arises frequently in the context of bankruptcy when property is sold or

relief from stay is granted and foreclosure proceedings move ahead. Blackwell v.

Lurie (In re Popkin & Stern), 234 B.R. 724, 727 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 1999), rev’d on other

grounds, 223 F.3d 764 (8th Cir. 2000). In those cases, an appeal is almost always moot

because a stay pending appeal was not obtained and the property at issue has been

transferred to a good faith, third party purchaser. Van Iperen v. Production Credit

Ass’n of Worthington-Slayton Branch (In re Van Iperen), 819 F.2d 189, 190-191 (8th

Cir. 1987). When a case no longer presents an actual ongoing controversy, the case

is moot and the court lacks the requisite subject matter jurisdiction to hear it.

Appellate Case: 04-6017 Page: 3 Date Filed: 07/28/2004 Entry ID: 1793094 
4

Hickman v. State of Missouri, 144 F.3d 1141, 1142 (8th Cir. 1998). An appeal is moot

when it is impossible for the court to grant “any effectual relief whatever” to a

prevailing party. Church of Scientology v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12, 113 S.Ct.

447, 121 L.Ed.2d 313 (1992) (quoting Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653, 16 S.Ct.

132, 40 L.Ed. 293 (1895)).

On March 16, 2004, a foreclosure sale was held and the debtor’s homestead

sold. Under longstanding and well settled Eighth Circuit case law, the sale rendered

the appeal from the order granting relief from the automatic stay moot. 

CONCLUSION

Because her appeal is moot, we dismiss Strong’s appeal for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction. 

 

Appellate Case: 04-6017 Page: 4 Date Filed: 07/28/2004 Entry ID: 1793094