Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca6-14-01373/USCOURTS-ca6-14-01373-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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1 

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION 

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b) 

File Name: 15a0216p.06 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 

_________________ 

TIMOTHY ETHERTON, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

v. 

STEVEN RIVARD, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

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No. 14-1373 

Appeal from the United States District Court . 

for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit 

No. 2:11-cv-11958—Arthur J. Tarnow, District Judge. 

Decided and Filed: September 2, 2015 

Before: KETHLEDGE and DONALD, Circuit Judges; McCALLA, District Judge.*

_________________ 

COUNSEL 

ON BRIEF: James Sterling Lawrence, Southfield, Michigan, for Appellant. David H. Goodkin, 

OFFICE OF THE MICHIGAN ATTORNEY GENERAL, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellee. 

 McCALLA, D.J., delivered the opinion of the court in which DONALD, J., joined. 

KETHLEDGE, J. (pp. 24–25), delivered a separate dissenting opinion. 

_________________ 

OPINION

_________________ 

JON P. McCALLA, District Judge. On February 15, 2007, a Michigan jury convicted 

Timothy Etherton of possession with intent to deliver cocaine. After exhausting both direct and 

collateral appellate review procedures in Michigan, Etherton timely filed a petition for writ 

 *

The Honorable Jon P. McCalla, United States District Judge for the Western District of Tennessee, sitting 

by designation. 

>

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habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The 

district court denied Etherton’s petition but certified for appeal four issues: (1) whether the 

anonymous tip presented at trial denied Etherton’s right to confrontation under the Sixth 

Amendment so as to result in prejudice; (2) whether the prosecutor improperly vouched for the 

credibility of a witness during closing argument; (3) whether Etherton’s counsel’s failure to 

object to the anonymous tip, as well as other alleged shortcomings, amounted to prejudicially 

ineffective assistance of counsel; and (4) whether Etherton was prejudiced by ineffective 

assistance of counsel on appeal. For the reasons discussed below, we AFFIRM IN PART and 

REVERSE IN PART the district court’s decision, and REMAND with directions to issue a writ 

of habeas corpus unless Etherton is afforded a new appeal or, in the alternative, is granted a new 

trial. 

I

A 

Timothy Etherton was tried in Michigan State Court on a single count of possession with 

intent to deliver 50 grams or more but less than 450 grams of cocaine. (R. 5-3, 5-4.) The trial 

began with voir dire at 9:09 a.m. on February 15, 2007. (R. 5-3 at PageID 243.) The prosecutor 

called his first witness at 10:59 a.m. (R. 5-3 at PageID 315.) After roughly forty-five minutes of 

testimony, the jury broke for lunch and returned approximately an hour later. (R. 5-3 at PageID 

341–42.) At 3:18 p.m., the final witness stepped down. (R. 5-4 at PageID 441.) The jury began 

deliberations at 5:16 p.m. and returned a verdict of guilty at 6:10 p.m. that same day. (R. 5-4 at 

PageID 496, 499–500.) 

During trial, the prosecution called six witnesses, (R. 5-3 at PageID 314, 342, 370, 380, 

388, 421), and introduced three exhibits into evidence: a video tape of the stop and search of 

Etherton’s car (R. 5-3 at PageID 322); a bag of cocaine (R. 5-3 at PageID 354); and a plastic bag 

(R. 5-3 at PageID 354). 

The following facts were not contested at trial: Etherton was driving a white Audi on I-96 

between Detroit and Grand Rapids at the time he was pulled over for speeding; Etherton 

admitted that the Audi was his car; co-defendant Ryan Pollie was in the passenger seat; Etherton 

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initially did not consent to a search of the car, but then quickly did consent to a search; Trooper 

Trevin Antcliff did a preliminary physical search of the car, but did not find anything illegal; a 

K-9 unit was called to the scene and searched the car, but also did not find anything illegal; 

Detective Adam Mercer then searched the car and ultimately found a 125.2 gram bag of cocaine 

under an empty bag of potato chips in the map compartment of the driver’s side door. Although 

the bag was tested, neither Etherton’s nor Pollie’s fingerprints were found on the bag. 

The only evidence that Etherton had knowledge that the cocaine was in the car—aside 

from potential inferences that could arguably be drawn from the above-mentioned evidence—

came from two sources: first, the testimony of Etherton’s co-defendant, Pollie; and, second, an 

anonymous tip that was introduced for its truth. 

1

On direct examination, Pollie testified in some detail regarding the day that he and 

Etherton were arrested. (R. 5-4 at PageID 388–94.) Pollie stated that he accompanied Etherton 

on a trip to Detroit in order to drop off members of Etherton’s family at the airport. (R. 5-4 at 

PageID 388–89.) According to Pollie, Etherton dropped him off at a Ruby Tuesday’s restaurant 

while Pollie “was under the assumption that [Etherton] was going to the airport to drop these 

family members off.” (R. 5-4 at PageID 390.) Pollie testified that he had a couple of beers while 

he was at the restaurant before Etherton came back to pick him up approximately thirty to fortyfive minutes later. (R. 5-4 at PageID 390–91.) Pollie stated that after he and Etherton got back 

in the car: 

[W]e pull out of the parking lot and we’re about to get onto the highway and 

that’s when the package of cocaine became known to myself. He showed it to 

me. I held it like kind of, wow you know that’s quit [sic] a bit. Gave it back to 

him. 

(R. 5-4 at PageID 391:4–8.) Pollie went on to explain that he and Etherton talked about how he 

had obtained the cocaine. According to Pollie: 

[Etherton] met a guy down by McDonald’s, I think it was further down the road 

from the Ruby Tuesday’s. . . . What initially was supposed to happen was the title 

for his vehicle was supposed to go up to pay for the---I guess as collateral and the 

vehicle had got transferred from his dad’s name the previous day into his name so 

he didn’t have the title. So he was supposed to return there by Sunday to go 

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ahead and pay the money for the cocaine that was given to him that day. . . . 

[Etherton] made a comment about, you know, I can do a certain amount of it and 

then still be able to go ahead and sell the rest for payment. 

(R. 5-4 at PageID 392:7–25.) 

 Pollie also testified on direct that he was testifying as part of a plea agreement. (R. 5-4 at 

PageID 389.) Pollie acknowledged that he was to be sentenced to nine months in jail as a result 

of the plea. (Id.) 

On cross, redirect, and recross-examination, Pollie acknowledged at least eight facts that 

were damaging to his testimony. (See R. 5-4 at PageID 402–411, 418–21.) First, he disclosed 

on redirect examination that he had read the police reports concerning both his arrest and 

Etherton’s. (R. 5-4 at PageID 416.) Second, he acknowledged that he had been convicted of 

both cocaine possession and distribution in the past. (R. 5-4 at PageID 409–10.) Third, he 

admitted that he had been alone in the car on the day of the arrest. (R. 5-4 at PageID 403.) 

Fourth, he conceded that he had eaten chips that day: 

Q. Now there was testimony that the cocaine was found on the driver’s side door 

and there were chips----a bag of chips covering it. 

A. I don’t know what was covering it. I wasn’t able to see that side of the vehicle 

when the cop took that out----took that out of wherever he found it. 

Q. Okay but you admitted that you had chips that day? 

A. I did. 

(R. 5-4 at PageID 405:18–25.) Fifth, Pollie admitted that he was allowed to plead to a lesser 

charge when he was otherwise facing what he agreed was “a very lengthy incarceration.” (R. 5-4 

at PageID 409, 420.) Sixth, Pollie testified that he believed his fingerprints would be on the bag 

of cocaine. (R. 5-4 at PageID 405:18–25.) Specifically, Pollie testified: 

Q. And you plead[ed] also not just for a deal but because you knew your finger 

prints were going to come back on the---or you thought they were going to come 

back on the bag, didn’t you? 

A. That’s correct. I explained--- 

Q. Because you had handled the bag? 

A. I did. 

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(R. 5-4 at PageID 405:18–25.) Seventh, he acknowledged that he had initially lied to the police 

and had only changed his story when offered a plea deal. (R. 5-4 at PageID 416, 419–20.) Last, 

defense counsel impeached Pollie concerning his testimony regarding not driving. The 

following exchange occurred on cross-examination after defense counsel asked whether Pollie 

had driven on the way to Detroit: 

A. I do not have a driver’s license, so no I did not drive. 

Q. Well, that doesn’t mean you can’t drive. Have you never driven without---

you’re telling---how long have you not had a license? 

A. I’m not sure actually. Probably about a year. 

Q. Okay and you’re telling the jury that in a year you have never driven a vehicle? 

A. Oh, I have. But I didn’t on that day. 

(R. 5-4 at PageID 405:18–25.) On recross-examination, defense counsel once again asked about 

Pollie’s driving: 

Q. Okay and also sir you said that you don’t drive or that you wouldn’t have 

driven that day but isn’t it true that Mr. Etherton actually passed you driving in a 

truck, I think it was his brother’s truck or roommate[’]s Blazer, when he went to 

pick you up? 

A. Yeah, I went to cash my check. That’s correct. 

Q. Okay, so you admit that you were driving earlier that day when you just said 

you wouldn’t have been driving. 

A. I didn’t drive his vehicle but I can admit to driving to cash my check. 

(R. 5-4 at PageID 420:21–422:5.) 

2

Recognizing the factual questions inherent in Pollie’s testimony, the Court must examine 

the role of the accusatory content of the tip testimony in the trial. Testimony regarding the 

anonymous tip was elicited by the prosecution on three separate occasions. The first elicitation 

occurred during the direct examination of Trooper Antcliff of the Michigan State Police, who 

testified that he pulled over Etherton’s car. (R. 5-3 at PageID 315–17.) The prosecutor asked 

Antcliff why he pulled Etherton over. (R. 5-3 at PageID 316:15–316:16.) Antcliff responded: 

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Well, on our radio I received a call from Lieutenant that the CMET team, 

Lieutenant Roe, and he advised that there was a white Audi matching the 

description from an anonymous tip that we were looking for. A BOL was put out 

for us, a be on the look out [sic] for a white Audi with two while [sic] males 

traveling from Grand Rapids to Detroit back to Grand Rapids, possibly carrying 

cocaine in the vehicle. . . . So Lieutenant Roe advised that he had---the possible 

suspect vehicle in sight. I was in position near Lieutenant Roe’s vehicle, he 

advised me that the suspect vehicle was in front of him. 

(R. 5-3 at PageID 316:17–317:4.) 

 The prosecutor then elicited testimony regarding the tip for a second time during the 

direct examination of Detective Mercer, who stated: 

We wanted, based on the tip, we wanted to try and separate the two passengers of 

the vehicle, the driver and the passenger and give a short interview and see if their 

stories matched up and if they didn’t that would add to our probable cause and go 

along with the tip that we had received. 

(R. 5-3 at Page ID 344:21–345:1.) 

 The third time the prosecutor elicited testimony regarding the tip was from Detective 

Sergeant Joel Abendroth. (R. 5-4 at PageID 427.) The prosecutor specifically asked Abendroth 

about the tip: “[T]o cut to the chase, in regard to the defendant here did you receive some sort of 

tip earlier in the day?” (R. 5-4 at PageID 427:7–8.) Abendroth responded: 

Yes, we did. We received a very specific tip. I followed up personally on the tip 

and spoke to the individual that received the anonymous call. The tip consisted of 

information provided to a secretary at the Grand Rapids vice unit, reference [to] a 

specific vehicle, a white Audi, occupied by two individuals, two white males. 

The tip was specific on the time frame they were going to be leaving Grand 

Rapids and specific on the approximate time frame returning back. It also 

included a route of travel along I-96. The tip was that the--- 

(R. 5-4 at PageID 427:9–18.) At this point, defense counsel objected to Abendroth’s testimony 

as hearsay. (R. 5-4 at PageID 427:19–21.) The trial judge did not rule on the objection; the 

prosecutor simply stated, “I’ll move on, your Honor,” and then proceeded to ask her next 

question. (R. 5-4 at PageID 427:22–24.) The prosecutor next asked, “You received a tip?” 

(R. 5-4 at PageID 427:24.) Abendroth responded, “Yes.” (R. 5-4 at PageID 427:25.) The 

prosecutor then inquired “who Grand Rapids vice is.” (R. 5-4 at PageID 428:1.) Abendroth 

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responded that “Grand Rapids vice is the drug team for the City of Grand Rapids.” (R. 5-4 at 

PageID 428:2–3.) 

 Having elicited testimony regarding the tip in its case-in-chief, the prosecution used the 

content of the tip during closing argument: 

We started out with Trooper Antcliff and you got to see the video, which is kind 

of neat cause that doesn’t always happen but you saw what precipitated this. 

There was a tip that a white Audi would be traveling at such and such time on 

I-96 with two white males that came in through the drug team in Grand Rapids 

. . . . 

(R. 5-4 at PageID 452:9–14.) During his rebuttal argument, the prosecutor once again discussed 

the content of the tip: 

What [the witnesses] did talk about was this tip that they received and 

coincidently, the defendant and his car matched the tip headed west from Detroit 

to Grand Rapids. Was there another Audi stopped that day, yeah and they told 

you about that. But this is the Audi that was found later in the day that matched 

the tip, two white males heading from Detroit to Grand Rapids, and coincidently 

they have a hundred and twenty-five grams of cocaine in the car. 

(R. 5-4 at PageID 476:8–16.)1

 1

The prosecution also made comments in closing that Etherton argues amounted to improper vouching for 

Pollie: 

And honestly enough, what else did he tell you? . . . Do I wish that we could bring 

somebody in here that doesn’t have a criminal history, who doesn’t have prior drug convictions 

and who didn’t lie to the police when he initially encountered them? Heck yeah I wish we could 

do that but those aren’t the kind of people we’re dealing with in the drug culture, the drug world. 

So what we have is Mr. Pollie who came in here and was incredibly frank with you. 

. . . 

What else did Mr. Pollie do today that would suggest to you that he was lying? Let me 

point out some of his testimony and she raised it. He said I never drove his car and then a follow 

up question, because I don’t have a license. Well are you saying you never drive? What did he 

say, when she asked him didn’t he pass you driving before he got to your house? Yeah, he did. 

He admitted under oath on the stand that he was committing another crime today. Thus exposing 

himself to potentially more criminal charges. Does that sound like somebody is lying to you, 

someone who is not trying to be truthful with you? Somebody who is arguing with the----the 

attorney? That’s one of the questions the Judge will give you when you’re judging creditability. 

Did he sound like somebody who was hiding something, arguing with the attorney? No, in fact he 

admitted another crime today that he as [sic] committing in answering her questions truthfully. 

(R. 5-4 at PageID 455:1–456:5, 479:9–480:1.) 

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B

Following his conviction, Etherton was sentenced to twenty to forty years in prison. 

(R. 5-5 at PageID 515.) Etherton sought relief on both direct and collateral appeal in the State of 

Michigan. On direct review, Etherton’s counsel sought a reversal of the conviction on four 

grounds: (1) that the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant’s request for an 

adjournment of trial; (2) that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately prepare for 

trial; (3) that the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence found 

in Etherton’s car; and (4) on the basis of purportedly newly discovered evidence. (R. 5-7 at 

PageID 641–80.) The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court on October 16, 2008. 

(R. 5-7 at PageID 706–14.) On February 24, 2009, the Michigan Supreme Court denied 

Etherton’s application for leave to appeal. (R. 5-8.) 

Etherton subsequently filed a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to 

Subchapter 6.500 of the Michigan Rules of Court. (R. 5-11.) In the motion, Etherton argued six 

grounds for relief: (1) that the anonymous tip was hearsay and violated his right to confrontation; 

(2) that the prosecutor improperly explained during closing argument why he had given a plea 

deal to Pollie but not Etherton; (3) that the prosecutor acted improperly in closing argument by 

vouching for Pollie’s credibility; (4) that the prosecution presented false testimony; (5) that 

defense counsel at trial was ineffective; and (6) that appellate counsel was ineffective. (R. 5-11 

at PageID 920-22.) The Circuit Court for Ionia County denied the motion. (R. 5-12.) That court 

found that the first five grounds were procedurally defaulted under M.C.R. 6.508(D)(3), which 

prohibits granting a petitioner relief on grounds “other than jurisdictional defects, which could 

have been raised on appeal from the conviction and sentence.” (R. 5-12 at PageID 987.) 

Because the first five asserted grounds were not jurisdictional and could have been—but were 

not—raised on appeal, the Ionia County Circuit Court declined to review them on the merits. 

(See id.) The court only considered Etherton’s argument that his appellate counsel was 

ineffective, denying the motion on the basis of both sound strategy and a lack of prejudice. (R. 

5-12 at PageID 988.) 

The Michigan Court of Appeals denied Etherton’s application for leave to appeal, noting 

that Etherton had “failed to meet his burden of establishing entitlement to relief under 

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MCR 6.508(D).” (R. 5-9 at PageID 773.) On October 26, 2010, the Supreme Court of Michigan 

again denied Etherton’s application for leave to appeal on the same grounds. (R. 5-10.) 

C

Etherton timely filed a petition for habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on May 4, 

2011. (R. 1.) His petition asserted the same six grounds that he had raised on collateral review 

in the state courts of Michigan. (Id.) On February 26, 2014, the United States Court for the 

Eastern District of Michigan issued an opinion denying Etherton’s petition for relief and 

certifying four issues for appeal: (1) whether the admission of the anonymous tip violated 

Etherton’s right to confrontation and was prejudicial; (2) whether the prosecution improperly 

vouched for Pollie’s credibility; (3) whether trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective; and 

(4) whether appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective. Etherton now argues that each 

issue entitles him to a new trial. Rivard argues in response that the first three issues certified for 

appeal were procedurally defaulted by Etherton when he failed to raise them on direct appeal and 

that, in any case, none of the four issues raised entitles Etherton to relief on the merits. 

II

 We agree that Etherton has procedurally defaulted the first three claims certified for 

appeal. A habeas petitioner procedurally defaults a claim if four conditions are met: 

“(1) the petitioner fails to comply with a state procedural rule; (2) the state courts 

enforce the rule; (3) the state procedural rule is an adequate and independent state 

ground for denying review of a federal constitutional claim; and (4) the petitioner 

cannot show cause and prejudice excusing the default.” 

Guilmette v. Howes, 624 F.3d 286, 290 (6th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quoting Tolliver v. Sheets, 

594 F.3d 900, 928 n.11 (6th Cir. 2010)). 

 Etherton argues that there is no state procedural rule that barred him from raising new 

arguments in his motion for relief from judgment. He is mistaken. As noted in Part I.B, supra, 

M.C.R. 6.508(D)(3) prohibits granting a petitioner relief on grounds “other than jurisdictional 

defects, which could have been raised on appeal.” Etherton does not argue that the first three 

grounds certified for appeal were jurisdictional defects, nor does he argue that they could not 

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have been raised on direct appeal. We therefore conclude that Etherton failed to comply with a 

state procedural rule. 

 As to the second condition, the Supreme Court has held that there is a presumption that a 

state court denying a federal claim “adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any 

indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.” Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 

770, 784–85 (2011). As we noted in Barton v. Warden, the presumption is rebuttable. 786 F.3d 

450, 460 (6th Cir. 2015). “The presumption may be overcome when there is reason to think 

some other explanation for the state court’s decision is more likely.” Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 785 

(citing Yist v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991)). In general, however, “we may only treat 

a state court order as enforcing the procedural default rule when it unambiguously relied on that 

rule.” Peoples v. Lafler, 734 F.3d 503, 512 (6th Cir. 2013). 

 In this case, the state courts applied the procedural rule. Where the short orders of 

appellate courts “are ambiguous as to whether they refer to procedural default or denial of relief 

on the merits,” we must “look to the last reasoned state court opinion to determine the basis for 

the state court’s rejection of [a petitioner’s] claim.” Guilmette, 624 F.3d at 291. Because both 

the intermediate and supreme courts simply issued form orders in this case finding that Etherton 

had not met his burden to establish relief under M.C.R. 6.508(D), we look to the Ionia County 

Circuit Court’s decision. (R. 5-12.) 

 Although the Ionia County Court’s decision is far from clear, it unambiguously relies on 

a procedural rule in dismissing the first three claims certified for appeal in this case. The court 

begins its opinion by questioning “whether the court can even grant relief under 

MCR 6.508(D)(3).” (R. 5-12 at PageID 987.) According to the court’s opinion, “[w]ith the 

exception of the failure to appoint counsel, constitutional violations, including the denial of 

effective assistance of counsel, do not constitute a jurisdictional defect under MCR 6.508(D).” 

(Id.) The court then addressed only one of Etherton’s claims on the merits: his claim for 

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. (R. 5-12 at PageID 988.) Without further discussing 

any of his other claims, the court denied Etherton’s motion. (Id.) Because of the unambiguous 

references to MCR 6.508(D)(3)—which applies only in cases of procedural default—and the 

context of the opinion that makes a ruling on the basis of procedural default as opposed to a 

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finding on the merits the more likely explanation, we find that the state courts enforced their 

procedural default rule as to Etherton’s first three claims. 

 Procedural default is not, however, an absolute bar to habeas relief. See McFarland v. 

Yukins, 356 F.3d 688, 699 (6th Cir. 2004). “Ineffective assistance of counsel can supply the 

cause that, together with prejudice, would excuse a procedural default.” Id. (citing Murray v. 

Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986)). We therefore turn to the fourth issue certified for appeal: 

whether Etherton’s appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective. 

III

 Because the Michigan courts ruled on the merits of Etherton’s ineffective assistance of 

appellate counsel claim (see R. 5-12 at PageID 988), Etherton is only entitled to relief if he can 

demonstrate that the ruling was either: (1) “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application 

of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court,” or (2) “based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). At issue in this case is whether the Michigan court’s ruling 

was “an unreasonable application” of clearly established Federal law. 

Under the “unreasonable application” clause, habeas relief is available in two scenarios: 

first, if “the state court correctly identifie[s] the correct legal principle from Supreme Court 

precedent but unreasonably applie[s] that principle to the facts of the case before it,” Dennis v. 

Mitchell, 354 F.3d 511, 517 (6th Cir. 2003); and second, when a “state court decision either 

unreasonably extends or unreasonably refuses to extend a legal principle from the Supreme 

Court precedent to a new context,” Keith v. Mitchell, 455 F.3d 662, 669 (6th Cir. 2006). 

We first consider whether the Michigan court “identified the correct legal principle.” 

Dennis, 354 F.3d at 517. To prevail on a habeas petition on the basis of ineffective assistance of 

appellate counsel, a habeas petitioner must demonstrate that his appellate counsel’s failure to 

raise a potentially meritorious argument rose to the level of a constitutional violation under 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 289 (2000). To 

meet this burden, a petitioner must satisfy two prongs: deficiency and prejudice. In order to 

demonstrate deficiency, a petitioner must show his “counsel’s representation fell below an 

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objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. To demonstrate prejudice, a 

petitioner must show “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional 

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. Consequently, in the 

appellate context as to counsel’s failure to raise a claim, a petitioner must show that “there is a 

reasonable probability that the claim would have prevailed at the time counsel failed to raise it.” 

McFarland, 356 F.3d at 699. 

The Michigan court applied the correct legal principal from Supreme Court precedent. 

(See R. 5-12 at PageID 988 (considering, under state law, an analogous two prongs in evaluating 

the merits of Etherton’s ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim).) Accordingly, we 

consider whether the Michigan court “unreasonably applied that principle to the facts of the case 

before it.” Dennis, 354 F.3d at 517. That requires us to determine whether, once a Strickland 

violation is found, “it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 

102. 

 Etherton argues that his appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to 

raise any of the five issues raised in his Motion for Relief from Judgment (R-11). We address 

each in turn. 

A

We begin by considering whether the Michigan court unreasonably applied Strickland in 

addressing Etherton’s argument that his appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective for 

failing to argue that his confrontation rights were violated. The admission of the content of an 

anonymous tip should have alerted Etherton’s appellate counsel as to the presence of a serious 

Confrontation Clause issue. Many less meritorious issues were raised on direct appeal in this 

case, which suggests that the failure to raise the issue was an oversight and not deliberate 

strategy. See Smith, 528 U.S. at 288 (“‘[W]hen ignored issues are clearly stronger than those 

presented, . . . the presumption of effective assistance of counsel [is] overcome.’”) (quoting Gray 

v. Greer, 800 F.2d 644, 646 (7th Cir. 1986)); Joshua v. DeWitt, 341 F.3d 430, 441 (6th Cir. 

2003); Roe v. Delo, 160 F.3d 416, 419 (8th Cir. 1998). In these circumstances, “the 

ineffectiveness prong of Strickland turns on whether an objectively reasonable attorney would 

have presented the issue for plain error review because it had a reasonable likelihood of success.” 

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Roe, 160 F.3d at 419. In other words, both prongs of Strickland in this case turn on the same 

issue regarding appellate counsel’s failure to present a Confrontation Clause argument: whether 

there is a reasonable probability that Etherton would have prevailed on appeal if the issue were 

raised. 

As a threshold matter, we note that without a constitutional violation, there would have 

been no chance of success on appeal. Consequently, we first address whether Etherton’s 

confrontation rights were violated. We then address whether the violation was sufficiently 

serious such that there was a reasonable probability Etherton would have prevailed on appeal. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 

1

The Confrontation Clause categorically prohibits the introduction of a certain class of 

out-of-court statements. Cf. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004). There are two 

necessary and mutually sufficient conditions to identify whether an out-of-court statement 

implicates the protection of the Confrontation Clause. See id. First, the statement must be 

testimonial. Id. Second, the statement must be introduced for its truth. See id.

The Supreme Court stated in Crawford that “the principal evil at which the Confrontation 

Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex 

parte examinations as evidence against the accused.” 541 U.S. at 50. Consequently, the Court 

held that “[t]he Sixth Amendment must be interpreted with this focus in mind.” Id. The Court 

explained that “[t]he text of the Confrontation Clause reflects this focus. It applies to ‘witnesses’ 

against the accused—in other words, those who ‘bear testimony.’” Id. at 51 (quoting 2 N. 

Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language (1828)). The Court noted that 

various formulations of what might constitute a testimonial statement existed, id. at 51–52, and 

held—without endorsing any particular formulation—that “[s]tatements taken by police officers 

in the course of interrogations” are per se testimonial. Id. at 52. 

Davis v. Washington was the next case that presented the Supreme Court an opportunity 

to elaborate on what constitutes a testimonial statement. 547 U.S. 813 (2006). Davis concerned 

the admission of a recorded statement made to a 911 operator. Id. at 817. The Court carved an 

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exception to its ultimate holding in Crawford to mirror the emergency exception to Miranda

announced in New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 658–59 (1984). The Davis Court held that 

when the totality of the circumstances objectively indicates that the primary purpose of police 

interrogation is “to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency,” statements made in 

response are not testimonial. 547 U.S. at 828. 

Although in both Crawford and Davis, the Court’s holdings applied to statements made 

in response to police interrogation, the Court made clear that it was not implying that “statements 

made in the absence of any interrogation are necessarily nontestimonial.” Davis, 547 U.S. at 822 

n.1. In fact, the Court reiterated in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts that volunteered testimony 

can trigger the protections of the Confrontation Clause. 557 U.S. 305, 316–17 (2009). The 

Court asserted that “‘[t]he Framers were no more willing to exempt from cross-examination 

volunteered testimony or answers to open-ended questions than they were to exempt answers to 

detailed interrogation.’” Id. at 316 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822 n.1); see also Davis, 

547 U.S. at 822 n.1 (noting that “[p]art of the evidence against Sir Walter Raleigh was a letter 

from Lord Cobham that was plainly not the result of sustained questioning”); Crawford, 

541 U.S. at 51–52 (describing one formulation of testimonial statements as “statements that were 

made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the 

statement would be available for use at a later trial” (internal citations and quotation marks 

omitted)). 

In this case, an anonymous tipster made a formal accusation to government officers. It 

was therefore testimonial.2

 See Davis, 547 U.S. at 824 (“‘An accuser who makes a formal 

statement to government officers bears testimony . . . .’”) (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51). 

 2

We had occasion to consider directly whether the content of an anonymous tip is testimonial in United 

States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662 (6th Cir. 2004). In that case, we held that “statements of a confidential informant are 

testimonial.” Id. at 670. We stated in Cromer not just that the admission of an anonymous tip was unconstitutional, 

but further held that “[t]he allowance of anonymous accusations of crime without any opportunity for crossexamination would make a mockery of the Confrontation Clause.” Id. at 675. Every other circuit court that has 

considered this issue is in accord. United States v. Maher, 454 F.3d 13, 22–23 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. 

Adams, 628 F.3d 407, 417 (7th Cir. 2010) (finding a Confrontation Clause violation in the admission of a 

confidential informant’s statement to a police officer that stated the defendant “was involved in drugs, had a large 

amount of money on him[,] was on his way to buy crack, and describ[ing] the car [the defendant] was driving”); 

United States v. Holmes, 620 F.3d 836, 841 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Lopez-Medina, 596 F.3d 716, 730 (10th 

Cir. 2010).

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The content of the tip was also admitted into evidence for its truth. It was elicited by the 

prosecution from three different witnesses during its case-in-chief, and the prosecution 

emphasized the tip during closing argument: “[T]his is the Audi that was found later in the day 

that matched the tip, two white males heading from Detroit to Grand Rapids, and coincidently 

they have a hundred and twenty-five grams of cocaine in the car.” (R. 5-4 at PageID 476:8–16.) 

The prosecutor’s repeated references both to the existence and the details of the content of the tip 

went far beyond what was necessary for background—thereby indicating the content of the tip 

was admitted for its truth. 

Accordingly, it was error to admit the content of the anonymous tip in this case. We now 

consider whether, if Etherton’s appellate counsel had raised the issue on appeal, there would 

have been a reasonable probability that his appeal would have been successful. Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 694. 

2

On direct appeal, a preserved objection to a federal constitutional violation necessitates 

reversal unless the error was “‘harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 

116, 139–40 (1999) (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). In contrast, an 

unpreserved objection to a constitutional violation is subject to a state’s procedural forfeiture 

rules. See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 122–23 (1990) (finding no constitutional violation 

when the state court procedurally barred review of an unpreserved objection of a violation of the 

defendant’s due process rights)). Although defense counsel ultimately objected to the tip at trial 

as hearsay (R. 5-4 at PageID 427:19–21), this did not amount to preservation of a Confrontation 

Clause objection under clearly established federal law. See United States v. Hadley, 431 F.3d 

484, 498 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Because Defendant raised only a hearsay objection to these statements 

at trial, and did not challenge their admissibility on constitutional grounds, our review here is 

governed by the plain error standard.”). Accordingly, we consider whether the Confrontation 

Clause violation would have been forfeited under Michigan’s procedural forfeiture rules. 

Michigan’s procedural forfeiture rules are modeled on the plain error rule in Rule 52(b) 

of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court in 

United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731–34 (1993). See People v. Carines, 597 N.W.2d 130, 

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138 (Mich. 1999). In Michigan, to avoid forfeiture under its plain error rule, “three requirements 

must be met: 1) error must have occurred, 2) the error was plain, i.e., clear or obvious, 3) and the 

plain error affected substantial rights.” Carines, 597 N.W.2d at 138 (citing United States v. 

Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731–34 (1993)). “The third requirement generally requires a showing of 

prejudice, i.e., that the error affected the outcome of the lower court proceedings.” Id. Once a 

defendant establishes these requirements, reversal is warranted “when the plain, forfeited error 

resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant or when an error seriously affected 

the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings independent of the defendant’s 

innocence.” Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). 

a

As explained in Part III.A.1, supra, Etherton’s right to confrontation was violated when 

the trial court admitted the content of the anonymous tip. Because of the clear, consistent, and 

voluminous precedent indicating that the admission of the content of the tip violated Etherton’s 

rights, we find that the error was plain.3 We therefore turn to whether the tip was prejudicial. 

The district court found that the tip did not prejudice Etherton for two reasons: 

(1) because of “the trial court’s jury instruction”; and (2) because of “the overall strength of the 

prosecutor’s case apart from the hearsay testimony.” Etherton v. Rivard, No. 11-11958, 2014 

WL 764843, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 26, 2014). We respectfully disagree. 

The trial court’s attempt to issue a curative instruction did nothing to alleviate the 

prejudice of the tip. The trial court stated that the tip was “not evidence per [se] of the 

defendant’s guilt.” (R. 5-4 at PageID 487.) The instruction was vague, and could have been 

taken by a jury to mean that the tip by itself was not sufficient to find Etherton guilty, but that it 

could otherwise be considered for its truth. The instruction was therefore not in fact curative. 

 3

Even before Etherton’s judgment became final, appellate courts in Michigan consistently held that 

statements of anonymous and confidential informants made to police officers are testimonial. People v. Chambers, 742 N.W.2d 610, 616 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007) (“A statement by a confidential informant to the authorities generally 

constitutes a testimonial statement.”) (citing Cromer at 675); People v. Montgomery, No. 269682, 2007 WL 

3085513, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 23, 2007) (same); People v. Demann, No. 268657, 2007 WL 2404534, at *4 

(Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 23, 2007) (same); People v. Thompson, No. 258336, 2007 WL 2051977, at *4 (Mich. Ct. App. 

July 17, 2007) (same); People v. Tolbert, No. 262792, 2006 WL 2924577, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2006) 

(same). 

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As to the strength of the prosecutor’s case absent the tip, the evidence was 

underwhelming as to Etherton’s knowledge of the presence of the cocaine. The government’s 

case turned almost entirely on the uncorroborated testimony of a codefendant. Although the bag 

of cocaine was found in the driver’s door next to Etherton, the evidence strongly indicated that it 

would not have been obvious to the driver. The video indicates that it took two officers and a 

K-9 unit more than ten minutes of searching before the bag was discovered under an empty bag 

of potato chips. As a result, absent Pollie’s incriminating testimony, the evidence that Etherton 

knew the cocaine was in the car amounted to only the following three facts: (1) the cocaine was 

well-hidden; (2) Etherton was near the cocaine; and (3) the car belonged to Etherton. On their 

own, these three facts, especially in light of the presence of another person in the car, would have 

fallen far short of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that Etherton had knowledge of the 

cocaine. See, e.g., United States v. Newsom, 452 F.3d 593, 609 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that a 

“defendant’s mere presence in a car where [contraband] is found and proximity to [contraband] 

are insufficient proof of constructive possession”—even when the defendant is the only person in 

a car); United States v. Campbell, 549 F.3d 364, 374 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding that “incriminating 

evidence must supplement a defendant’s proximity to [contraband] in order to tip the scale in 

favor of constructive possession”). Given the prosecutor’s heavy reliance on the otherwise 

uncorroborated testimony of a codefendant to establish mens rea, Etherton was vulnerable to 

being prejudiced by error. See United States v. Necoechea, 986 F.2d 1273, 1283 (9th Cir. 1993) 

(“[A] defendant is more likely to be prejudiced by error or misconduct when the government’s 

case rests on uncorroborated accomplice testimony.”), as amended on denial of reh’g (Apr. 15, 

1993). 

Despite this vulnerability, Respondent-Appellee argues that the information contained in 

the tip did not prejudice Etherton for two reasons. First, Rivard argues the tip is not prejudicial 

because it is “fully consistent with Etherton’s defense that, while there was cocaine in the car, he 

did not know about it.” Corrected Brief for Respondent-Appellee at 8. Second, he asserts that it 

caused no prejudice because the tip “stated what was, based on the other evidence presented, an 

undisputed fact.” Id. at 9. The Circuit Court for Ionia County found no prejudice resulting from 

the admission of the tip on just these grounds. (R. 5-12 at PageID 988.) 

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Both Rivard and the Circuit Court for Ionia County overlook the most prejudicial aspect 

of the tip in this case: the tip tends to suggest improper inferences precisely because it is 

consistent with the admitted evidence. The content of the tip that was introduced described: 

(1) two white men; (2) in a White Audi; (3) driving from Grand Rapids to Detroit and back to 

Grand Rapids on I-96; and (4) possibly with cocaine in the vehicle. As Respondent-Appellee 

correctly notes, each element of the tip was ultimately corroborated by largely undisputed 

evidence. The corroboration, though, does not render the tip harmless. The high-degree of 

corroboration exacerbates the error. Any jury would be unlikely to view the similarity between 

the tip and the other evidence at trial as a matter of mere coincidence. As a result, the jury was 

likely to find the tip reliable, and thereby to draw improper inferences from the tip. For example, 

the tip’s reference to two white men could very well have indicated that both were involved with 

the possession with intent to deliver the cocaine—an inference that could have been thoroughly 

examined given the opportunity for cross-examination, which was lacking at trial. 

Because much of Pollie’s testimony was reflected in the content of the tip that was put 

before the jury, the jury could have improperly concluded that Pollie was thereby testifying 

truthfully—that it was unlikely for it to be a coincidence for his testimony to line up so well with 

the anonymous accusation.4

Absent the tip that may have bolstered Pollie’s testimony, there were at least eight 

significant reasons that the jury had to doubt Pollie. First, Pollie acknowledged that he had 

received a plea deal to plead to possession of cocaine and serve nine months in jail in exchange 

for his testimony. (R. 5-4 at PageID 389.) Second, Pollie admitted that he had initially lied to 

the police and only changed his story when, facing “a lengthy incarceration term,” he agreed to a 

plea deal. (R. 5-4 at PageID 416–17, 419–20.) Third, Pollie stated that he had spent some time 

in the car on his own while Etherton went into Meijer to cash a check, indicating that Pollie had 

an opportunity to hide evidence on the driver’s side of the car. (R. 5-4 at PageID 403.) Fourth, 

Pollie admitted that he had eaten chips on the day of the arrest, which demonstrated that the bag 

on top of the cocaine might have been Pollie’s. (Id.) Fifth, Pollie acknowledged that he had 

handled the bag of cocaine and expected his fingerprints to be found on it. (Id.) Sixth, although 

 4

Indeed, in the context of evaluating law enforcement’s quantum of suspicion, corroboration renders an 

anonymous tip more reliable. See, e.g., Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 331 (1990). 

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Pollie initially denied driving on the day of the arrest because he did not have a license, he 

admitted that he had in fact driven a different vehicle earlier that day. (R. 5-4 at PageID 420–

21.) Seventh, Pollie acknowledged that he had both used and dealt cocaine in the past. (R. 5-4 

at PageID 406.) Finally, Pollie disclosed that he had read the police reports concerning both his 

and Etherton’s arrests, indicating an opportunity to fabricate testimony in order to conform to the 

expected testimony of other witnesses for the prosecution. (R. 5-4 at PageID 416.) 

The entire case from opening statement to return of the verdict was less than a day. The 

proof presented lasted a mere four hours and nineteen minutes. In that time, the prosecution 

relied on the tip as a critical piece of evidence to support and corroborate the otherwise 

unsupported testimony of a cooperating co-defendant who admitted to having lied to the 

police—and to having the opportunity and motive to fabricate. Under the circumstances of this 

case, it is apparent that the admission of the anonymous tip was prejudicial. 

b

 Because Etherton has established each of the three conditions stated in Carines, we now 

consider whether the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of 

judicial proceedings independent of the defendant’s innocence. We find that there is a 

reasonable probability that Etherton would have prevailed on this argument on direct review. 

People v. Shafier, 768 N.W.2d 305 (Mich. 2009) is particularly instructive, as it was 

decided less than four months after the Michigan Supreme Court denied Etherton leave to appeal 

on direct review. In Shafier, the prosecutor repeatedly referred to the defendant’s post-Miranda

silence throughout trial, including during closing argument. Id. at 315. “[T]he strength of the 

prosecutor’s overall case against defendant hinged entirely on the jury’s assessments of the 

witnesses’ credibility.” Id. In light of the repeated nature of the error and the involvement of a 

constitutional right, the Michigan Supreme Court held that “there is no question that this is the 

sort of error that compromises the fairness, integrity, and truth-seeking function of a jury trial.” 

Id. at 316. The Michigan Supreme Court elaborated, stating that the constitutional violation 

“rendered the trial fundamentally unfair and cast a shadow on the integrity of [Michigan’s] 

judicial processes.” Id.

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 This case bears striking similarities to Shafier. The constitutional error was made 

repeatedly throughout Etherton’s trial. The prosecutor’s case against Etherton hinged entirely on 

the jury’s assessment of the credibility of witness testimony—in this case of one witness with the 

motive and opportunity to fabricate. Accordingly, there is a reasonable probability that 

Michigan courts would have found on direct review that the constitutional error in this case 

seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings independent 

of the defendant’s innocence. 

3

Shafier illustrates why an objectively reasonable attorney would have raised this issue for 

plain-error review, and why there is a reasonable probability that Michigan appellate courts 

would have found plain error had the issue been raised. Etherton has therefore established that 

he was denied the right to effective assistance of counsel on his first appeal as of right. 

Moreover, having considered the arguments raised by Rivard and relied on by the Michigan 

courts, we hold that it was an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law for the 

Michigan court to hold otherwise. Fairminded jurists could not disagree. Etherton is therefore 

entitled to a belated appeal on the issue that counsel ineffectively failed to raise. 

B

 Next, we consider Etherton’s argument that he was denied effective assistance of counsel 

on appeal as a result of appellate counsel’s failure to argue ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 

He argues that appellate counsel should have raised three grounds for ineffective assistance of 

trial counsel: (1) that trial counsel should have objected to the admission of the content of the 

anonymous tip on Confrontation Clause grounds; (2) that trial counsel failed to object to 

improper explanations offered by the prosecution on closing argument; and (3) that defense 

counsel was unprepared for trial. 

We agree with Etherton that appellate counsel should have argued that failure to object to 

the admission of the content of the anonymous tip constituted ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel. Because there was a Confrontation Clause violation that resulted in substantial 

prejudice, there is a reasonable probability that Michigan appellate courts would have found trial 

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counsel constitutionally ineffective. See Part III.A.3, supra. The failure to include this 

compelling argument was therefore prejudicial and, in light of the less meritorious arguments 

raised on appeal, amounted to deficient performance of appellate counsel. See id. For the 

reasons stated above, we find that it was an unreasonable application of Federal law to hold 

otherwise. Consequently, we hold that Etherton is also entitled to a belated appeal on this issue. 

Etherton’s second argument, however, is unpersuasive. Minor improprieties in a 

prosecutor’s closing argument can be corrected “by instructing the jury that closing arguments 

are not evidence.” United States v. Crosgrove, 637 F.3d 646, 664 (6th Cir. 2011). The trial 

court instructed the jury in this case that “[t]he lawyer[s’] statements and arguments are . . . not 

evidence.” (R. 5-4 at PageID 486.) There was therefore no prejudice—and thus no ineffective 

assistance—due to trial counsel’s failure to object to the closing argument. 

Finally, Etherton’s third argument is inconsistent with the record. Appellate counsel in 

fact argued that trial counsel was ineffective as a result of being unprepared. Accordingly, there 

was no ineffective assistance of counsel due to any failure to make such an argument. 

C

We now turn to the remaining three issues that Etherton argues should have been raised 

by his appellate counsel: (1) that the prosecutor improperly explained on closing argument why 

he had given a plea deal to the codefendant but not Etherton; (2) that the prosecutor acted 

improperly in closing argument by vouching for Pollie’s credibility; and (3) that the prosecution 

elicited false testimony. None of these arguments are persuasive. 

 First, as noted in Part III.B, supra, there was no prejudice as a result of the prosecution’s 

explanations offered during closing argument. Appellate counsel was therefore not ineffective in 

not raising it. 

 Second, for similar reasons, we find no ineffectiveness in appellate counsel’s failure to 

argue that the prosecution improperly vouched for Pollie’s credibility. As the district court 

correctly noted, any comments that improperly bolstered Pollie’s “were not extensive.” 

Etherton, 2014 WL 764843, at *10. Any minor improprieties that may have resulted from the 

prosecution’s comments as to Pollie’s testimony were thus corrected by the trial court’s jury 

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instructions that lawyers’ statements are not evidence. Accordingly, appellate counsel was not 

ineffective in choosing not to argue this issue. 

 Finally, we find that appellate counsel was not ineffective in failing to argue that the 

prosecution introduced false testimony about the rate at which fingerprints are found on plastic 

bags. In order to establish a denial of due process as a result of the introduction of false 

testimony, a petitioner must show: “(1) the statement was actually false; (2) the statement was 

material; and (3) the prosecution knew it was false.” Brooks v. Tennessee, 626 F.3d 878, 894–95 

(6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Coe v. Bell, 161 F.3d 320, 343 (6th Cir. 1998)). Even assuming the 

evidence was material and false, Etherton has put forward no evidence or argument at any stage 

of the proceedings that the prosecution knew it was false. Etherton has therefore not established 

reasonable probability of success as to this argument, and his appellate counsel was thus not 

ineffective in failing to argue it. 

D

 Although Etherton has established a violation of clearly established federal law sufficient 

for relief under § 2254, that relief is circumscribed by the nature of the error and “AEDPA’s 

purpose to further the principles of comity, finality, and federalism.” Williams v. Taylor, 

529 U.S. 420, 436 (2000). When a federal court grants a petition under § 2254 for ineffective 

assistance of appellate counsel, the petitioner is entitled only to have the opportunity for the state 

courts to review the merits of the claims that appellate counsel ineffectively failed to raise, 

consistent with the substantive and procedural rules of the state and the requirements of the 

United States Constitution. See Mapes v. Tate, 388 F.3d 187, 194 (6th Cir. 2004); see also

Payne v. Stansberry, 760 F.3d 10, 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Shaw v. Wilson, 721 F.3d 908, 919 

(7th Cir. 2013), cert. denied sub nom. Brown v. Shaw, 134 S. Ct. 2818, 189 L. Ed. 2d 785 (2014). 

“This remedy avoids unnecessarily interfering with [the State’s] interest in correcting its own 

errors.” Mapes, 388 F.3d at 194. Accordingly, we hold that Etherton is entitled to have 

Michigan courts consider the issues that, absent the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, 

would have been raised on direct appeal. 

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IV

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED IN PART 

and REVERSED IN PART. The case is REMANDED with directions to issue a writ of habeas 

corpus unless, within whatever reasonable period of time the district court deems appropriate, 

Etherton is afforded a new appeal in which he may raise the Confrontation Clause and 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel arguments omitted from his original direct appeal or, in the 

alternative, is granted a new trial. 

 

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_________________ 

DISSENT

_________________ 

KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge, dissenting. The problem with the majority opinion is not 

that it misapplies the habeas standard, but that it fails to apply that standard at all. The opinion 

nowhere gives deference to the state courts, nowhere explains why their application of Strickland 

was unreasonable rather than merely (in the majority’s view) incorrect, and nowhere explains 

why fairminded jurists could view Etherton’s claim only the same way the majority does. The 

opinion, in other words, does exactly what the Supreme Court has repeatedly told us not to do. 

I grant that one could argue the merits of Etherton’s Strickland claim both ways, though 

personally I have a hard time seeing the putative prejudice upon which the majority rests its 

decision. The issue at trial was whether the cocaine in Etherton’s Audi belonged to him or to 

Pollie. Had the tip taken a position on that issue—had it included, for example, some suggestion 

that Etherton purchased the cocaine before picking up Pollie—then Etherton would have had a 

solid argument as to prejudice. But in fact the tip was agnostic as to whom the cocaine 

belonged: it relayed only that two white men would be travelling down I-96 in a white Audi 

containing cocaine. All of those facts were consistent with Etherton’s defense. All of them, 

indeed, were undisputed. One may therefore ask why a “fairminded jurist,” Harrington v. 

Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011), could conclude only that the tip was so prejudicial that 

Etherton’s counsel in state court was constitutionally required to make eight arguments on appeal 

rather than six. 

The majority does not answer that question—its analysis sticks to Strickland rather than 

Harrington—but it does try to make out a case for prejudice simpliciter. The argument boils 

down to this: the tip was prejudicial precisely because all of the information contained in it was 

already common ground at trial. Specifically, since all of the tip’s information was undisputed at 

trial, and because Pollie’s testimony included (among many other things) that same information, 

the tip tended to bolster Pollie’s credibility at trial. If Pollie was right about the color of the Audi 

and the interstate number and the fact that cocaine was in the car, the argument seems to go, 

maybe a juror would think he was right about who possessed the cocaine too. That argument is 

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creative—in the sense that making do with the ingredients on hand is often creative—but it is 

hardly constitutionally required. Meanwhile, the cocaine was found in a driver’s-door 

compartment only inches away from Etherton in a car that he owned and was driving at the time. 

That the cocaine was found under an empty bag of potato chips—as opposed to lying in plain 

view by the time the officers approached—does not help Etherton’s case much. In short, a 

fairminded jurist could conclude, as the state court concluded, that Etherton had bigger problems 

at trial than the tip. 

Too often in habeas cases the petitioner’s brief, or an opinion granting the writ, read just 

like they would in a direct appeal. The court’s opinion here illustrates the point. Respectfully, it 

takes more to apply the fairminded-jurist standard than to perform a direct-review analysis and 

then simply announce that “[f]airminded jurists could not disagree.” Maj. Op. at 20. What it 

takes, rather, is a willingness to take seriously the arguments that supported or “could have 

supported” the state-court decision, Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102; and then to ask not merely 

whether we agree with those arguments, but whether they are coherent and grounded enough in 

the facts and applicable law that an unbiased jurist could agree with them. See, e.g., Drummond 

v. Houk, ___ F.3d ___, 2015 WL 4774940 at *2-3 (6th Cir. 2015). But we have none of that 

here. 

In sum, the governing Supreme Court precedent in this case is not Strickland but 

Harrington. One passage in particular: “Federal habeas courts must guard against the danger of 

equating unreasonableness under Strickland with unreasonableness under § 2254(d).” 

Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105. Our decision today falls prey to that danger, and thus I respectfully 

dissent.

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