Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-4_15-cv-00739/USCOURTS-ared-4_15-cv-00739-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 29:201 Denial of Overtime Compensation

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

WESTERN DIVISION

ALAN HUNTER PLAINTIFF

v. Case No. 4:15-cv-739-KGB

JHOOK INVESTMENTS, INC. d/b/a

JHOOK TOWING AND RECOVERY; JEFF 

HOOKER, Individually and as Officer and 

Director of JHOOK INVESTMENTS, INC.; 

IVY HALL, INC.; WILLIAM E. HALL, 

Individually and as Officer and Director of 

IVY HALL, INC. DEFENDANTS

ORDER

Before the Court is defendants William E. Hall, Ivy Hall, Inc., and Ivy Edward Hall’s 

(collectively the “Hall Defendants”) motion to dismiss original complaint (Dkt. Nos. 7, 8). 

Plaintiff Alan Hunter filed a response (Dkt. No. 9). The Court denies the motion.

I. Facts

In his complaint, Mr. Hunter alleges that he was employed by the defendants as a tow 

truck driver. Mr. Hunter specifically alleges that he entered into an employment relationship 

with separate defendants JHook Investments, Inc., and Jeff Hooker in May 2015. He alleges that 

he performed towing services for the Hall Defendants and that dispatchers employed by the Hall 

Defendants called him to perform towing services on a regular basis. Mr. Hunter alleges that, for 

at least one week, he worked more than 40 hours per week and was not paid overtime for those 

hours. Mr. Hunter alleges violations of the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 

29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (“FLSA”), and the overtime provisions of the Arkansas Minimum Wage 

Act, Ark. Code Ann.§ 11-4-201 et seq. (“AMWA”).

The Hall Defendants filed a motion to dismiss. In their motion, the Hall Defendants 

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contend that, on or about April 1, 2015, William E. Hall of Ivy Hall, Inc., sold its towing 

business to Mr. Hooker of JHook Investments, Inc. The Hall Defendants contend that Ivy 

Edward Hall is deceased, having died in 1992. The Hall Defendants also contend, “[s]eparate 

Defendants Hall never entered into an employer-employee relationship with Plaintiff, they do not 

have ‘dispatchers’ nor did they ever dispatch Plaintiff on any tow calls. Further, Separate 

Defendant Ivy Edward Hall passed away in 1992 and could not possibly have had any 

communication with Plaintiff.” (Dkt. No. 7, at 2). The Hall Defendants request that this Court 

dismiss Mr. Hunter’s complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure 

to state facts upon which relief can be granted.

In his response, Mr. Hunter argues against dismissal and contends that, at this stage of the 

litigation, the court must construe all facts alleged in his complaint as true. Mr. Hunter contends 

that the Hall Defendants presented facts outside of the pleadings in their motion to dismiss and 

that this Court may not rely on facts outside of the pleadings without converting the motion to 

dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Mr. Hunter contends that, if this Court does 

convert the motion, he must be provided with fair notice and an opportunity to resist summary 

judgment. The Court agrees with Mr. Hunter’s position in regard to the facts outside of the 

pleadings and the necessary procedure to be followed if this Court considers or relies upon those 

facts. The Court concludes that consideration of facts outside of the pleadings is not necessary to 

resolve the pending motion to dismiss,. For the reasons that follow, the Court denies the motion 

to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

II. Legal Standard

In reviewing a motion to dismiss, the Court assumes as true all factual allegations of the 

complaint. Levy v. Ohl, 477 F.3d 988, 991 (8th Cir. 2007). “However, the complaint must 

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contain sufficient facts, as opposed to mere conclusions, to satisfy the legal requirements of the 

claim to avoid dismissal.” Id. (citing DuBois v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 276 F.3d 1019, 1022 

(8th Cir. 2002)). “In appraising the sufficiency of the complaint we follow, of course, the 

accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it 

appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would 

entitle him to relief.” Id. (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957)). 

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) “must be 

treated as a motion for summary judgment when matters outside the pleadings are presented and 

not excluded by the trial court.” Gibb v. Scott, 958 F.2d 814, 816 (8th Cir. 1992) (citing Woods 

v. Dugan, 660 F.2d 379, 380 (8th Cir. 1981) (per curiam)). “Most courts . . . view ‘matters 

outside the pleading’ as including any written or oral evidence in support of or in opposition to 

the pleading that provides some substantiation for and does not merely reiterate what is said in 

the pleadings.” Id. (citing Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1366 (footnotes 

omitted)). A district court must exclude matters outside the pleadings when deciding a motion to 

dismiss; otherwise the motion is converted to a motion for summary judgment. Id. If the district 

court does consider such matters, it must provide the parties with notice and an opportunity to 

defend against summary judgment. The failure to do so requires reversal unless the failure 

constituted harmless error. Id.

III. Analysis

The FLSA requires that employers compensate covered employees for hours worked in 

excess of 40 hours per week at one and one half times the employees’ regular pay rate. 29 

U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). The employee bears the burden of proving that he worked overtime without 

compensation. Fast v. Applebee’s Intern., Inc., 638 F.3d 872, 881 (8th Cir. 2011). However, 

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“[t]he remedial nature of this statute and the great public policy which it embodies . . . militate 

against making that burden an impossible hurdle for the employee.” Anderson v. Mt. Clemens 

Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 687 (1946), superseded by statute on other grounds. 

“[T]he test of employment under the FLSA is one of ‘economic reality.’” Ash v. 

Anderson Merchandisers, LLC, 799 F.3d 957, 961 (8th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 804 

(2016) (quoting Tony and Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 301 (1985) 

(quoting Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 33 (1961))). To allege 

sufficiently a FLSA overtime claim, a complaint should include facts describing the “economic 

reality” of the plaintiff’s employment, such as the alleged employer’s right to control the nature 

and quality of the work, the employer’s right to hire or fire, or the source of compensation for the 

work. Id. A plaintiff who alleges employment with multiple defendants is not required, at the 

pleading stage, to determine conclusively which of the defendants the plaintiff’s employer is, or 

to describe in detail the employer’s corporate structure. The pleading standard under Rule 

12(b)(6) contemplates that plaintiffs will often be unable to prove definitively the elements of the 

claim before discovery, particularly in cases where the necessary information is within the 

control of defendants. Id. The pleading standard therefore requires only that the plaintiff allege 

facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. Id. A complaint that contains only the recitation of a 

legal conclusion that an employer-employee relationship exists is not sufficient to satisfy Rule 

12(b)(6). Id.

In Ash, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of a complaint where the 

plaintiff failed to include any facts—such as the name on plaintiff’s business cards, the identity 

of plaintiff’s supervisors, the source of plaintiff’s work schedules, and the information plaintiff 

was given when plaintiff was hired—to support the legal conclusion that an employer-employee 

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relationship existed between plaintiff and any of the three defendant companies. Id. 

Mr. Hunter, however, alleges some facts in his complaint to support his allegation that an 

employer-employee relationship existed between him and the Hall Defendants. The Court must 

accept those facts as true at this stage of the proceeding. Mr. Hunter’s complaint alleges that he 

entered into an employer-employee relationship with JHook and Mr. Hooker. Mr. Hunter alleges 

that, after he entered into this employer-employee relationship, the Hall Defendants “regularly 

dispatched” him to perform towing services (Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 24). He contends that those 

defendants controlled his work schedule to some degree by dispatching him to perform towing 

services. Although Mr. Hunter’s complaint focuses on the economic reality of his employment 

with JHook, Inc. and Mr. Hooker, the Court concludes that, if taken as true, Mr. Hunter’s 

allegation that the Hall Defendants possessed the authority to assign him additional duties 

narrowly passes the test of stating a claim upon which relief can be granted. Therefore, this 

Court declines to grant the Hall Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

IV. Conclusion

This Court denies the Hall Defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to 

state a claim upon which relief can be granted (Dkt. Nos. 7, 8).

It is so ordered this 13th day of September, 2016.

__________________________________________

Kristine G. Baker

United States District Judge

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