Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cv-00548/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cv-00548-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Maan Yousef, 

Petitioner, 

vs. 

Conrad Graber, 

Respondent.

No. 11-548-TUC-RCC (BPV)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 Pending before the Court is a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2241 (Petition), filed on August 31, 2011. (Doc. 1) Petitioner, claims that his 

Constitutional rights were violated when staff at the Federal Correctional Institution 

(FCI) -Manchester subjected him to discrimination as an Arab American and charged him 

with false disciplinary violations in retaliation for utilizing the Administrative Remedy 

Program to address his complaints. Yousef alleges that the false disciplinary convictions 

resulted in his transfer to a new facility and could affect his ability to seek early 

termination of supervised release. Petitioner seeks to have the disciplinary convictions 

expunged. 

Before the Court is the Petition (doc. 1), Respondent’s return with accompanying 

exhibits (doc. 13) (Answer), and Petitioner’s reply (Reply) (doc. 14) with accompanying 

exhibits (doc. 15 -19). Additionally, Respondents have filed a request for this Court to 

take judicial notice of Petitioner’s prior conviction for powder cocaine. (Doc. 20) 

 Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was referred to 

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Magistrate Judge Bernardo P. Velasco for a Report and Recommendation. (Doc. 6) 

 For the reasons discussed below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District 

Court enter an order dismissing the Petition. 

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

 At the time Yousef filed the present Petition he was an inmate at the Federal 

Correctional Institute, in Safford, Arizona (FCI Safford). (Petition, at 1) Yousef contends 

that he was denied due process of law and was retaliated against for utilizing the 

Administrative Remedy Program while incarcerated at the Satellite Prison Camp, FCI 

Manchester, Kentucky (SPC Manchester). (Id.) Yousef challenges three disciplinary 

violations which resulted in a loss of visitation and commissary privileges. (Id.) Yousef is 

currently incarcerated at the Satellite Prison Camp, Pollock, Louisiana (SPC Pollock), 

serving a 292-month sentence of incarceration for conspiracy to possess with intent to 

distribute cocaine, and is projected to complete this sentence on May 4, 2015, via Good 

Conduct Time Release. (Answer, Ex. 1, Attachment 1) Petitioner requests that his record 

and central file be purged of the disciplinary ruling, and that prison staff involved be 

reprimanded and sanctioned as mandated by the Employee Standard of Conduct. 

(Petition, at 13-14) 

II. DISCIPLINARY VIOLATIONS

Yousef was issued three separate incident reports (IRs) for violations while at FCI 

Manchester in 2009 and 2010. Petitioner was issued IR number 1845654 for violations of 

refusing an order in violation of Code 307, and insolence in violation of Code 312. These 

violations were handled before the Unit Disciplinary Committee (UDC). The UDC found 

Petitioner had committed the prohibited acts, and Yousef was sanctioned to 90 days loss 

of visiting privileges and 90 days loss of commissary privileges. (Answer, Ex. 1, ¶ 5; Ex. 

1, Attachment 4, IR and UDC action # 1845654) Petitioner was next issued IR number 

1980264 for insolence in violation of Code 321. This violation was also handled before 

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the UDC, resulting in a finding that Yousef committed the prohibited act; Yousef was 

sanctioned to 90 days loss of visiting privileges. (Answer, Ex. 1, ¶ 6; Ex. 1, Attachment 

5, IR and UDC action # 1980264) Finally, Petitioner was issued IR number 1980580 for 

possession of anything not authorized by staff in violation of Code 305. This violation 

was also handled before the UDC, resulting in a finding that Yousef committed the 

prohibited act and a sanction of 90 days loss of commissary privileges. (Answer, Ex. 1, ¶ 

7; Ex.1, Attachment 6, IR and UDC action # 1980580) 

 Before filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus, a federal prisoner challenging 

any circumstance of imprisonment must first exhaust all administrative remedies. 

Martinez v. Roberts, 804 F.2d 570, 571 (9th Cir. 1986). The Government acknowledges 

that Yousef exhausted all of his administrative remedies as to each of these violations. 

(Answer, Ex. 1, ¶ 8) 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction 

 A federal court may not entertain an action over which it has no jurisdiction. 

Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 2000). Writ of habeas corpus relief 

extends to a person in custody under the authority of the United States if the petitioner 

can show that he is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the 

United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(1) & (3). A prisoner who wishes to challenge the 

manner, location, or conditions of a sentence's execution must bring a petition pursuant to 

§ 2241 in the custodial court. Hernandez,, 204 F.3d at 864, and must file the petition in 

the judicial district of the petitioner's custodian. Brown v. United States, 610 F.2d 672, 

677 (9th Cir. 1980). This Court has territorial jurisdiction over the case in question since 

Petitioner was incarcerated at FCI Safford1

 when he filed his Petition, and named the 

 

1

 FCI Safford is within the District of Arizona. 

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appropriate warden as respondent. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 447 

(2004)(Whenever a §2241 habeas petitioner seeks to challenge his present physical 

custody within the United States, he should name his warden as respondent and file the 

petition in the district of confinement.”). Petitioner’s subsequent transfer to SPC Pollock 

does not change this analysis. See Francis v. Rison, 894 F.2d 353, 354 (9th Cir. 

1990)(”Jurisdiction attaches on the initial filing for habeas corpus relief and it is not 

destroyed by a transfer of the petitioner and the accompanying custodial 

change.”)(internal quotation marks and citations omitted); accord Mujahid v. Daniels, 

413 F.3d 991, 994 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Yousef raises one ground for relief, a claim of a conspiracy to violate Petitioner’s 

due process rights through retaliation for utilizing the administrative remedy process. 

(Doc. 1, at 4) Specifically, Yousef alleges he was retaliated against by Manchester Staff 

after filing Administrative Remedy complaints because he was subjected to racism and 

discrimination which resulted in Internal Affairs investigations against these same staff 

members. (Id) Yousef alleges the crux of the conspiracy was to facilitate a transfer of 

Petitioner so as not to have to answer his numerous filings. Ultimately, Petitioner asserts 

he was transferred to an institution “over 2000 miles away from his family, as a result of 

this conspiracy.” (Id.) Yousef requests a hearing, discovery, that the incident reports be 

expunged, the circumstances surrounding the conspiracy be investigated, and that the 

Court take notice of his outstanding institutional record which would allow Petitioner to 

ask for early termination of his supervised release. (Id, at 13-14) 

Yousef’s conspiracy claims are not properly brought in a habeas corpus action. 

Habeas corpus is not available to challenge an inmate's conditions of confinement not 

resulting in any impact on the legality or duration of that confinement. See Ramirez v. 

Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 859 (9th Cir. 2003) (“habeas jurisdiction is absent and a [civil 

rights] action proper, where a successful challenge to a prison condition will not 

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necessarily shorten the prisoner's sentence”); Crawford v. Bell, 599 F.2d 890, 891–892 

(9th Cir. 1979) (upholding dismissal of petition challenging conditions of confinement, 

the Ninth Circuit noted that “the writ of habeas corpus is limited to attacks upon the 

legality or duration of confinement); Boyce v. Ashcroft, 251 F.3d 911, 914 (10th Cir. 

2001), vacated on other grounds, 268 F.3d 953 (10th Cir. 2001) (“[P]risoners who want to 

challenge their convictions, sentences or administrative actions which revoke good-time 

credits, or who want to invoke other sentence-shortening procedures, must petition for a 

writ of habeas corpus;” however those “who raise constitutional challenges to other 

prison decisions-including transfers to administrative segregation, exclusion from prison 

programs, or suspension of privileges, e.g., conditions of confinement, must proceed 

under Section 1983 or Bivens.”); see also Greenhill v. Lappin, 2010 WL 1539818, at *1 

(9th Cir. 2010) (federal prisoner's claim that prison officials retaliated against him by 

mishandling his legal mail not cognizable in habeas corpus); Blum v. Floyd, 1997 WL 

599370 at *1 (9th Cir. 1997) (petitioner's claim of retaliatory transfer by prison official is 

properly brought under Bivens rather than § 2241); Valenteen v. Driver, 2009 WL 

304835 at *3(N.D.W.Va.2009); but see Bostic v. Carlson, 884 F.2d 1267, 1269 (9th Cir. 

1989) (habeas corpus jurisdiction available for prisoner's claims that he has been 

subjected to greater restrictions of his liberty, such as disciplinary segregation, without 

due process of law) (citing McCollum v. Miller, 695 F.2d 1044, 1046 (7th Cir. 1982)); 

McNair v. McCune, 527 F.2d 874, 875 (4th Cir. 1975). Cardenas v. Adler, 2010 WL 

2180378 (E.D.Cal. 2010)(petitioner's challenge to the constitutionality of the sanction of 

disciplinary segregation and contention that the disciplinary proceedings were the product 

of retaliation by prison staff cognizable in habeas). 

 The Magistrate Judge concludes Yousef is challenging the conditions of his 

confinement in Ground One. If Petitioner were successful in this claim, it would not 

result in any impact on the legality or duration of Petitioner's confinement. The 

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Constitution does not itself prohibit conspiracies, merely whatever denials of 

constitutional rights may underlay the conspiracy. In contrast, the Civil Rights laws do 

prohibit such conspiracies, but provide relief only through a civil rights action under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 for state officials, see e.g. Cabrera v. Martin, 973 F.2d 735, 741 (9th Cir. 

1992), private parties, see e.g. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 865 

F.2d 1539, 1540-41 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc), or federal officials, see e.g. Billings v. 

United States, 57 F.3d 797, 801 (9th Cir. 1995) or similar provisions related to federal 

officials. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (conspiracy to deprive equal protection). There is 

no possibility that the Court could afford Petitioner any “sentence-shortening” relief, i.e., 

relief that would affect the fact or duration of his incarceration. Where a Petitioner seeks 

to challenge the conditions of his confinement, his claims are cognizable in a civil rights 

action rather than a habeas corpus action. In the federal context, Bivens v. Six Unknown 

Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), provides petitioners 

with a remedy for violation of civil rights by federal actors. Accordingly, Petitioner is not 

entitled to habeas corpus relief on these claims under § 2241 and the Magistrate Judge 

recommends that the District Court either construe these claims as a Bivens civil rights 

action2

, See Wilwording v. Swanson, 404 U.S. 249, 251 (1971); Hansen v. May, 502 F.2d 

728, 729-30 (9th Cir. 1974) (a pro se litigant whose habeas petition challenges conditions 

of confinement is “entitled to have his action treated as a claim for relief under the Civil 

Rights Act”); see eg. Parker v. Adu-Tutu, 2011 WL 11736 (D. Ariz. 2011), and dismiss 

the petition with leave to amend to allow Petitioner leave to file an amended complaint 

on the appropriate court-approved form, or dismiss these claims without prejudice to 

filing a Bivens civil rights action, directing the Clerk to send an appropriate form 

complaint to Petitioner. 

 

2

 Noting, however, that jurisdiction is not necessarily proper in the District of Arizona. 

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Finally, as to Petitioner’s challenge to the incident reports, the Constitution limits 

the jurisdiction of the federal courts to live cases and controversies, and as such, federal 

courts may not issue advisory opinions. U.S. Const., art. III; Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 

96 (1968). “Failure to satisfy Article III's case-or-controversy requirement renders a 

habeas petition moot.” Mujahid, 413 F.3d at 994 (citing Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 

(1998)). A habeas petition challenging a prison disciplinary action no longer presents 

such a case or controversy, and therefore becomes moot, when the punishment for the 

action has been withdrawn or completed at the time of the petition. See Wilson v. 

Terhune, 319 F.3d 477, 479, 481-482 (9th Cir. 2003). When Yousef filed the Petition, the 

punishment about which he complained was completed and he was no longer at the 

facility about which he was complaining. Collateral consequences will not be presumed 

in the context of prison disciplinary proceedings. Wilson, 319 F.3d at 481. 

 Yousef urges this Court to find that these disciplinary actions “could result in 

Petitioner having to do up to four extra years of supervised release.” (Petition, at 14) The 

Government does not contest Yousef’s assertion that he had an “outstanding institutional 

record, which Petitioner maintained for over 15 years” (Petition, at 14; see also docs 15-

19), but asserts that termination of supervised release is dependent on a defendant’s 

performance while on supervised release for at least one year. While the Court disagrees 

with the Government’s assertion, that termination of supervised release is strictly 

dependent on a defendant’s performance during supervised release3, nonetheless, this 

 

3

 When a defendant petitions a district court for early termination of supervised release, 

18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) commands the court to first consider “the factors set forth in section 

3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6), and (a)(7).” The statutory 

factors are: the nature and circumstances of the offense and the characteristics of the 

defendant; the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote 

respect for the law and provide just punishment for the offense; afford adequate 

deterrence to criminal conduct; protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; 

provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or 

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“type of nonstatutory consequence dependent on discretionary decisions . . . is 

insufficient to apply the presumption of collateral consequences.” Wilson 319 F.3d at 

481. Here, it is merely conjecture on the part of the Petitioner that he may not be allowed 

early termination of supervised release because of these moderate infractions while 

incarcerated. This is insufficient to support a claim of collateral consequences. See id.; 

Cf. Kele v. U.S Parole Com’n, 119 F.3d 6 (9th Cir. 1997)(Holding, in an unpublished 

opinion, that Parole Commission properly relied on record of defendant’s prison 

disciplinary infraction to continue defendant on parole); United States v. Harris, 689 

F.Supp.2d 692, 694(S.D. N.Y 2010)(Considering defendant’s post-conviction conduct, 

including his conduct as a “model prisoner” as one factor in making decision to terminate 

supervised release), United States v. Spinelle, 835 F.Supp. 987 (E.D. Mich 

1993)(Completion of an “impressive” list of over two-hundred fifty hours of course-work 

to qualify as a licensed Chemical Dependency Therapist considered in early termination 

of supervised release). 

 Yousef also argues that he is currently attempting to obtain some relief from his 

sentencing court due to the old and new “Crack Amendments,” and the incident reports 

will, “unquestionably be used against him if he is ever granted a hearing and/or 

resentencing.” Furthermore, Yousef contends, there are currently numerous proposed 

bills in Congress which will hold one’s institution conduct against him or in his favor 

when relief and or proposed good time is to be awarded. (Doc. 14, at 7) 

 

other correctional treatment; the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established 

for the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of defendant 

as set forth in the Sentencing Guidelines; any pertinent policy statement issued by the 

Sentencing Commission; the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities; and the 

need to provide restitution to victims of the offense. 

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 The Government has filed a request for this Court to take judicial notice of 

Petitioner’s prior notice of conviction for powder cocaine. (Doc. 20) Though the Court 

will take judicial notice of the judgment, it is not evident from the judgment alone that 

Yousef’s conviction was based on powder cocaine, not crack cocaine. Yousef’s argument 

that the incident reports will be used against him if he is ever granted a hearing and/or 

resentencing under the Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines which sought to 

alleviate the sentencing disparity in the treatment of every gram of crack cocaine as the 

equivalent of 100 grams of powder cocaine4 carries no weight, however, because the 

Government has submitted a document, from the Northern District of Ohio, filed after 

Yousef’s Petition was filed, denying Petitioner’s motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) 

because Petitioner’s “sentence was based on powder cocaine, not crack cocaine.”5

 

 Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge finds that Yousef has failed to demonstrate 

collateral consequences sufficient to satisfy Article III's case-or-controversy requirement, 

and recommends that the District Court dismiss these claims as moot. 

RECOMMENDATION

 The Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the District Court, after its 

independent review, enter an order DISMISSING the civil rights claims for lack of 

jurisdiction. 

 The Magistrate Judge FURTHER RECOMMENDS that the District Court, after 

its independent review, enter an order DISMISSING the claims challenging the 

disciplinary violations as MOOT. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written objections 

 

4

 See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 96 (2007). 

5

 Though the spelling of Petitioner’s name is inconsistent on the Petition, 

Judgment and finally, on the denial of the motion for sentence reduction, the Inmate 

Number and Case Number (1:94CR40-001) on these documents demonstrate that these 

are all documents pertaining to Petitioner’s criminal file. 

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within fourteen days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. 

A party may respond to another party's objections within fourteen days after being served 

with a copy thereof. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). 

If objections are not timely filed, then the parties' right to de novo review by the 

District Court may be deemed waived. 

If objections are filed the parties should use the following case number: No. CV11-548-TUC-RCC. 

Dated this 30th day of March, 2012. 

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