Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_00-cv-00113/USCOURTS-caed-2_00-cv-00113-25/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 42:9607 Real Property Tort to Land

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

AMERIPRIDE SERVICES, INC.,

A Delaware corporation,

NO. CIV. S-00-113 LKK/JFM

Plaintiff,

v.

VALLEY INDUSTRIAL SERVICE, INC.,

a former California corporation, O R D E R

et al.,

Defendants.

 /

AND CONSOLIDATED ACTION AND

CROSS- AND COUNTER-CLAIMS.

 /

 Pending before the court are three motions filed by AmeriPride

Services Inc. (“AmeriPride”) : motion to stay; motion for

certification under 28 U.S.C § 1292(b); and motion for

reconsideration. The court has reviewed the motions and oppositions

and decides them based on the papers and without oral argument.

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Case 2:00-cv-00113-MCE-DB Document 586 Filed 08/29/06 Page 1 of 8
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 The underlaying facts involving the spoilation of evidence 1

are laid out in detail in the August 8, 2006 order. 

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I.

Background

This case involves a cost recovery action filed by plaintiff

Huhtamaki Foodservice Inc. (“Huhtamaki”) against defendant,

AmeriPride, pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental Response,

Compensation and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) and related state causes

of action. One of the key issues in the case is whether PCEcontaminated groundwater spread from the AmeriPride property to the

Huhtamaki property. The details of the case are long and

complicated and rather than repeat them here, the court

incorporates by reference the facts as set forth in prior orders.

On August 8, 2006 the court issued an order imposing sanctions

against AmeriPride for the spoliation of evidence. The sanction 1

imposed by the court dictated that an adverse inference would be

drawn against AmeriPrde. Specifically, the jury will be instructed

that the removed pipes leaked PCE-contaminated wastewater into the

soil and groundwater and that this contamination was a cause of the

contamination on the Huhtamaki property. Moreover, AmeriPride will

be prohibited from presenting any evidence which denies that

AmeriPride contributed to the soil and groundwater contamination.

 See August 8, 2006 Order at 24:7-12. 

Also pending before the court are ten motions for summary

judgment and a proposed settlement agreement between other related

parties. A hearing on the motions for summary judgment was set for

Case 2:00-cv-00113-MCE-DB Document 586 Filed 08/29/06 Page 2 of 8
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September 1, 2006. 

Huhtamaki now seeks a ruling on the motion for certification

and the motion for reconsideration of the August 8, 2006 order

prior to the adjudication of the motions for summary judgment and

approval of the settlement agreement. 

II.

Motion for Reconsideration 

“Under the ‘law of the case’ doctrine a court is generally

precluded from reconsidering an issue that has already been decided

by the same court, or a higher court in the identical case.” United

States v. Alexander, 106 F.3d 874, 876 (9th Cir.1997)(citing Thomas

v. Bible, 983 F.2d 153, 154 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 951

(1993)). Although motions to reconsider are directed to the sound

discretion of the court, see Kern-Tulare Water Dist. v. City of

Bakersfield, 634 F.Supp. 656, 665 (E.D.Cal.1986), aff'd in part and

rev'd in part on other grounds, 824 F.2d 514 (9th Cir.1987), cert.

denied, 486 U.S. 1015 (1988), considerations of judicial economy

weigh heavily in the process. 

Thus, Local Rule 78-230(k) requires that a party seeking

reconsideration of a district court's order must brief the “new or

different facts or circumstances...which... were not shown upon

such prior motion, or what other grounds exist for the motion.”

Generally speaking, before reconsideration may be granted there

must be a change in the controlling law or facts, the need to

correct a clear error, or the need to prevent manifest injustice.

See Alexander, 106 F.3d at 876.

Case 2:00-cv-00113-MCE-DB Document 586 Filed 08/29/06 Page 3 of 8
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Motions to reconsider are not vehicles permitting the

unsuccessful party to “rehash” arguments previously presented. See

Costello v. United States Government, 765 F.Supp. 1003, 1009 (C.D.

Cal.1991). Nor is a motion to reconsider justified on the basis of

new evidence available prior to the court's ruling. See Fay Corp.

v. BAT Holdings One, Inc., 651 F.Supp. 307, 309 (W.D.Wash.1987),

aff'd, 896 F.2d 1227 (9th Cir.1990). Finally, “after thoughts” or

“shifting of ground” do not constitute an appropriate basis for

reconsideration. See id. These relatively restrictive standards

“reflect [ ] district courts' concern for preserving dwindling

resources and promoting judicial efficiency.” Costello, 765 F.Supp.

at 1009.

In the case at bar, AmeriPride fails to demonstrate that there

was a change in the controlling law or facts, the need to correct

a clear error, or the need to prevent manifest injustice. See

Alexander, 106 F.3d at 876. AmeriPride explains that the order is

dispositive, and that the court misapplied the law pertaining to

sanctions. Specifically, AmeriPride argues that the court failed

to find that AmeriPride acted in bad faith before imposing the

sanction of an adverse inference. See AmeriPride Mot. for Recon.

at 5:18-26. AmeriPride also maintains that the court failed to

seek and identify extrinsic evidence that the destroyed evidence

was relevant to the issues in the case. Id. at 7:15-19. Finally,

AmeriPride asserts that the court failed to consider other material

facts about the pipes that were removed. Id. at 9. 

AmeriPride’s arguments are without merit and fail to

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demonstrate that there are new facts or law that the court should

consider. For these reasons, the court denies the motion for

reconsideration. 

III.

Motion for Certification under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) 

Certification is appropriate where the “order involves a

controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground

for difference of opinion” and where “an immediate appeal from the

order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the

litigation.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). All three factors must be present

in order to merit interlocutory certification; that an issue is

novel does not, in itself, make it immediately appealable. See

Krangel v. General Dynamics Corp., 968 F.2d 914, 915 (9th Cir.

1992).

The first question to ask is whether the imposition of

sanctions based on the destruction of evidence involves a

controlling questions of law. “All that must be shown in order for

a question to be ‘controlling’ is that resolution of the issue on

appeal could materially affect the outcome of litigation in the

district court.” In re Cement Antitrust Litigation, 673 F.2d 1020,

1026 (9th Cir. 1982). The issue need not be “dispositive of the

lawsuit in order to be regarded as controlling,” but it cannot be

collateral to the basic issues of the case. United States v.

Woodbury, 263 F.2d 784, 787 (9th Cir. 1959).

In the case at bar, imposing an adverse inference materially

affects the outcome of the litigation. As both parties

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The court notes that the adverse inference, does not, 2

however, conclusively establish liability under CERCLA. Several

factors are considered in a CERCLA action. In a cost recovery

action under CERLA, a plaintiff must establish that, (1) the site

on which the hazardous substances are contained is a "facility"

under CERCLA's definition of that term; (2) a "release" or

"threatened release" of any "hazardous substance" from the facility

has occurred; (3) such "release" or "threatened release" has caused

the plaintiff to incur response costs that were "necessary" and

"consistent with the national contingency plan,"; and (4) the

defendant is within one of four classes of persons subject to the

liability provisions of Section 107(a). 3550 Stevens Creek Assoc.

v. Barclays Bank, 915 F.2d 1355, 1358 (9th Cir. 1990); 42 U.S.C.

§§ 9613(f); 9607(a). Here, the adverse inference all but

establishes factors one, two, and four. The adverse inference is

not, however, conclusive as to plaintiff’s response costs being

consistent with the national contingency plan. 

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acknowledge, the adverse inference establishes that AmeriPride may

be liable under CERCLA. 

2

One of the key issues in the pending case is whether

AmeriPride discharged PCE into the soil. In brief, Huhtamaki’s

complaint specifically alleges that “[o]perations at the AmeriPride

Site have resulted in the release of contaminants into the soil and

groundwater . . . [these] operations have contaminated the

groundwater beneath the Huhtamaki facility with PCE and its

degradation compounds.” Compl. at ¶¶ 6 & 7. AmeriPride,

meanwhile, claims that the PCE detected in both the soil and

groundwater was caused by previous owners of the facility and that

AmeriPride did nothing to contribute to the contamination.

AmeriPride, therefor, cannot be liable as the current owner of the

facility.

The adverse inference directly impacts this critical dispute.

Namely, the adverse inference establishes that AmeriPride did, in

Case 2:00-cv-00113-MCE-DB Document 586 Filed 08/29/06 Page 6 of 8
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fact, contribute to the contamination of the soil and groundwater

and that this contamination contributed to the contamination on the

Huhtamaki property. The August 8, 2006 order also prohibits

AmeriPride from presenting any evidence which denies that

AmeriPride contributed to the soil and groundwater contamination.

In short, the inferences would serve as a basis for finding that

certain elements of Huhtamaki’s CERLCA claims are satisfied. 

For these reasons, it is apparent that an appeal on the issue

of the sanctions order could materially affect the outcome of

litigation in this court. See In re Cement, 673 F.2d at 1026.

Moreover, this case is a large, complicated environmental matter,

involving hundreds of pages of briefs and supporting evidence.

Allowing “an interlocutory appeal would avoid protracted and

expensive litigation,” a factor that the court must consider. Id.

The court must also consider if there is a substantial ground

for a difference of opinion. Given that there is some suggestion

that a finding of bad faith is required prior to the imposition of

sanctions and that the standard for imposing sanctions is not

completely clear, the court finds that there is ground for a

difference of opinion as to whether sanctions should have been

imposed in this case. 

For these reasons, the court concludes that AmeriPride’s

motion for certification should be granted. Given the court’s

ruling, AmeriPride’s motion to stay the proceedings will also be

granted. 

IV. 

Case 2:00-cv-00113-MCE-DB Document 586 Filed 08/29/06 Page 7 of 8
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CONCLUSION 

For the reasons explained, the court orders as follows:

1. AmeriPride’s motion for reconsideration is DENIED.

2. AmeriPride’s motion for certification for appeal is

GRANTED. Accordingly, the court amends the August 8,

2006 order to include the following language: 

The court is of the opinion that this order

involves a controlling question of law as to which

there is substantial ground for differences of

opinion, and an immediate appeal from the order may

materially advance the ultimate termination of the

litigation. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).

4. The parties are directed to inform the court within ten

(10) days of the effective date of the order of the

court of appeals' disposition as to whether it will

allow interlocutory appeal.

5. All pending motions presently before the court are

hereby STAYED pending the interlocutory appeal, if any.

6. The hearings set for August 31st and September 1st are

hereby VACATED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: August 29, 2006.

Case 2:00-cv-00113-MCE-DB Document 586 Filed 08/29/06 Page 8 of 8