Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-01-05376/USCOURTS-caDC-01-05376-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 5, 2002 Decided October 18, 2002

No. 01-5376

Tulare County, et al.,

Appellants

v.

George W. Bush, in his official capacity as

President of the United States of America, et al.,

Appellees

Natural Resources Defense Council, et al.,

Intervenors

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 00cv02560)

Gary G. Stevens argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellants.

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Susan Pacholski, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for appellees. With her on the brief were

Ellen J. Durkee, Michael Gheleta and Ann Navaro, Attorneys, U.S. Department of Justice.

Andrew E. Wetzler argued the cause for intervenors Natural Resources Defense Council, et al. With him on the brief

were Nathaniel S.W. Lawrence, Michael R. Sherwood, Anne

Harper and James S. Pew.

Raissa S. Lerner, Deputy Attorney General, Attorney General's Office of the State of California, argued the cause for

intervenor People of the State of California. With her on the

brief were Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Richard M.

Frank, Chief Assistant Attorney General and Theodora Berger, Senior Assistant Attorney General.

Before: Edwards and Rogers, Circuit Judges, and

Williams, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Rogers.

Rogers, Circuit Judge: This is the second case we decide

today involving a challenge to Presidential authority under

the Antiquities Act of 1906 ("Act"), 16 U.S.C. s 431 (2000).

In Mountain States v. Bush, slip op. at 1, ___ F.3d ____ (D.C.

Cir. Oct. 18, 2002), the court, upon de novo review, affirmed

the dismissal of the complaint, holding that the complaint,

which challenged a series of monument designations under

the Act, contained insufficient factual allegations under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) to trigger ultra vires review

of the President's Proclamations. Id. at 8-10. The court also

held that the complaint failed as a matter of law insofar as it

alleged that the Proclamations violated the plain terms of the

Antiquities Act and other federal statutes. Id. at 8, 10-11.

We likewise hold, upon de novo review, that the complaint in

the instant case fails for the same reasons. Accordingly, we

affirm the dismissal of the complaint for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).

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I.

In April 2000 President Clinton established by proclamation the Giant Sequoia National Monument pursuant to his

authority under the Antiquities Act. Proclamation 7295, 65

Fed. Reg. 24,095 (Apr. 15, 2000). The Monument, which

encompasses 327,769 acres of land in the Sequoia National

Forest in south-central California, contains groves of giant

sequoias, the world's largest trees, and their surrounding

ecosystem. Id. at 24,095-97, 24,100.

Tulare County, which contains land near and within the

Grand Sequoia National Monument ("Monument"), along with

a number of other public and private entities that use the

Monument area for business or recreational purposes (hereinafter "Tulare County"), filed a complaint seeking declaratory

and injunctive relief. Tulare County alleged that the Proclamation violated various provisions of the Antiquities Act and

the Property Clause of the Constitution, as well as the

National Forest Management Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, and the parties' existing rights under a prior

mediated settlement agreement. The district court, concluding that only facial review was appropriate, dismissed the

complaint. Tulare County v. Bush, 185 F. Supp. 2d 18

(D.D.C. 2001).

II.

On appeal, Tulare County contends that in dismissing its

complaint prior to discovery, the district court erred in failing

to accept as true the facts alleged in the complaint and in

limiting its review to the face of the Proclamation rather than

reviewing the President's discretionary factual determinations. Tulare County does not contend that the President

lacks authority under the Antiquities Act to proclaim national

monuments like Giant Sequoia, as the Supreme Court has

long upheld such authority. Cappaert v. United States, 426

U.S. 128, 142 (1976); Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450,

455 (1920). Rather, in Counts 1-4 of the complaint, Tulare

County alleged that the Proclamation violated the Antiquities

Act because it: (1) failed to identify the objects of historic or

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scientific interest with reasonable specificity; (2) designated

as the basis for the Monument objects that do not qualify

under the Act; (3) did not confine the size of the Monument

"to the smallest area compatible with proper care and management of the objects to be protected," 16 U.S.C. s 431; and

(4) increased the likelihood of harm by fires to any objects of

alleged historic or scientific interest within the Monument

rather than protecting those objects. In Count 5, Tulare

County argued that, absent judicial review of the President's

action under the Antiquities Act, the statute constitutes an

unconstitutional delegation of congressional authority. The

remaining counts alleged that other federal statutes barred

the Proclamation and that the Proclamation violated extant

legal rights arising from a mediated settlement agreement

with the National Forest Service prior to the Proclamation.

The Antiquities Act provides, in relevant part, that the

President, "in his discretion" may declare "historic landmarks

... and other objects of historic or scientific interest ...

situated upon [federal] lands ... to be national monuments,

and may reserve ... parcels of land ... confined to the

smallest area compatible with the proper care and management of the objects to be protected...." 16 U.S.C. s 431.

The court pointed out in Mountain States, after reviewing

Supreme Court authority discussing the scope of judicial

review of discretionary Presidential decisionmaking, that the

court "is necessarily sensitive to pleading requirements

where, as here, it is asked to review the President's actions

under a statute that confers very broad discretion on the

President and separation of powers concerns are presented."

Mountain States, slip op. at 9, ___ F.3d at ____. Acknowledging that Congress has entrusted the courts with responsibility for determining the limits of statutory grants of authority, id. at 8, the court nonetheless declined to engage in ultra

vires review in light of the absence of allegations or arguments in the record to indicate any infirmity in the challenged

Proclamations. Id. at 9. Consequently, we review Tulare

County's complaint to determine whether it contains factual

allegations to support an ultra vires claim that would demonUSCA Case #01-5376 Document #708577 Filed: 10/18/2002 Page 4 of 9
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strate the district court erred in declining to engage in a

factual inquiry to ensure that the President complied with the

statutory requirements.

Count 1 of Tulare County's complaint is premised on the

assumption that the Antiquities Act requires the President to

include a certain level of detail in the Proclamation. No such

requirement exists. The Act authorizes the President, "in his

discretion, to declare by public proclamation historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and other objects

of historic or scientific interest." 16 U.S.C. s 431. The

Presidential declaration at issue complies with that standard.

The Proclamation lyrically describes "magnificent groves of

towering giant sequoias," "bold granitic domes, spires, and

plunging gorges," "an enormous number of habitats," "limestone caverns and ... unique paleontological resources documenting tens of thousands of years of ecosystem change," as

well as "many archaeological sites recording Native American

occupation ... and historic remnants of early Euroamerican

settlement." Proclamation at 24,095. By identifying historic

sites and objects of scientific interest located within the

designated lands, the Proclamation adverts to the statutory

standard. Hence, Count I fails as a matter of law.

Count 2 alleges that the President has designated nonqualifying objects for protection. The Antiquities Act provides

that, in addition to historic landmarks and structures, "other

objects of historic or scientific interest" may qualify, at the

President's discretion, for protection as monuments. 16

U.S.C. s 431. Inclusion of such items as ecosystems and

scenic vistas in the Proclamation did not contravene the

terms of the statute by relying on nonqualifying features. In

Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 141-42, the Supreme Court rejected a

similar argument, holding that the President's Antiquities Act

authority is not limited to protecting only archeological sites.

As relevant to Count 3 of the complaint, the Proclamation

states that the Monument's 327,769-acre size "is the smallest

area compatible with the proper care and management of the

objects to be protected." Proclamation at 24,097. It also

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states that the sequoia groves are not contiguous but instead

comprise part of a spectrum of interconnected ecosystems.

Id. Tulare County alleges that no one in the Clinton Administration "made any meaningful investigation or determination of the smallest area necessary to protect any specifically

identified objects of genuine historic or scientific interest."

Compl. p 149. Instead, it alleges, President Clinton "bowed

to political pressure ... in designating a grossly oversized

Monument unnecessary for the protection of any objects of

genuine historic or scientific interest." Compl. p 150. This

allegation is a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.

"Although in reviewing the dismissal of a complaint the court

must take 'all factual allegations in the complaint as true,' the

court is 'not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion

couched as a factual allegation.' " Mountain States, slip op.

at 9, ___ F.3d at ____ (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S.

265, 286 (1986)).

Contrary to the assumption underlying Count 3, the Antiquities Act does not impose upon the President an obligation to

make any particular investigation. And to the extent that

Tulare County alleges that the Proclamation designates land

that should not be included within the Monument, the complaint fails to identify the improperly designated lands with

sufficient particularity to state a claim. Id. Insofar as

Tulare County alleges that the Monument includes too much

land, i.e., that the President abused his discretion by designating more land than is necessary to protect the specific

objects of interest, Tulare County does not make the factual

allegations sufficient to support its claims. This is particularly so as its claim that the Proclamation covered too much land

is dependent on the proposition that parts of the Monument

lack scientific or historical value, an issue on which Tulare

County made no factual allegations. Cf. Dalton v. Specter,

511 U.S. 462, 473-74 (1994); United States v. George S. Bush

& Co., 310 U.S. 371, 379 (1940).

Count 4 of the complaint alleges that the Monument designation actually increases the risk of harm from fires to many

of the objects that the Proclamation aims to protect. However, the Proclamation expressly addresses the threat of wildfires and the need for forest restoration and protection. The

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Proclamation observes that forest renewal is needed because

environmental change "has led to an unprecedented failure in

sequoia reproduction," and that "a century of fire suppression

and logging" has created "an increased hazard of wildfires of

a severity that was rarely encountered in pre-Euroamerican

times." Proclamation at 24,095. Count 4 contains no factual

allegations, only conclusions, see, e.g., Compl. p 160, and it

refers to current management rather than the designation

under the Proclamation as the cause for likely increases in

catastrophic fires, Compl. p 159.

Count 5, alleging that if judicial review is not available

under the Antiquities Act then the Act violates the Property

Clause of the Constitution as an improper delegation of

congressional authority to the President, fares no better. As

the court held in Mountain States, "[n]o Constitutional Property Clause claim is before us, as the President exercised his

delegated powers under the Antiquities Act, and that statute

includes intelligible principles to guide the President's action." Slip op. at 8, ___ F.3d at ____ (citing Whitman v. Am.

Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2000); Dalton, 511

U.S. at 473-74 & n.6).

Tulare County's remaining contentions, involving other federal statutes and contractual rights, fail as a matter of law.

Contrary to Count 6 of the complaint, the Proclamation does

not violate the National Forest Management Act of 1976

("NFMA"), Pub. L. No. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949 (codified as

amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.) (2000), by unlawfully withdrawing land from the national forest system. The

NFMA provides that no national forest land "shall be returned to the public domain except by an act of Congress."

16 U.S.C. s 1609(a). The Proclamation states that "[a]ll

federal lands and interests in lands within the boundaries of

this monument are hereby appropriated and withdrawn from

entry, location, selection, sale, leasing, or other disposition

under the public land laws...." Proclamation at 24,097.

The Proclamation also states that "[n]othing in this proclamation shall be deemed to revoke any existing withdrawal,

reservation, or appropriation; however, the national monument shall be the dominant reservation." Id. at 24,098. The

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Proclamation thus conceives of the designated land as having

a dual status as part of both the Monument and the Sequoia

National Forest. Cameron, 252 U.S. at 455; Tulare County,

185 F. Supp. at 27. Compare United States v. California, 436

U.S. 32, 40 (1978). The Proclamation is therefore wholly

consistent with NFMA.

Tulare County alleges alternatively, in Counts 7 and 8, that

if the Proclamation did not remove land from the national

forest system, then the current management of the Monument by the National Forest Service violates the NFMA and

the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 ("NEPA"), 42

U.S.C. s 4332 (2000). Neither NFMA nor NEPA provides a

cause of action, so the claims must be brought under the

Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. s 702 (2000).

Because Presidential actions, of course, are not subject to

APA review, Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800-01

(1992), Tulare County attempts to overcome this bar by

challenging the non-presidential actions of the Forest Service,

referring to two Forest Service documents--an internal Forest Service memorandum interpreting the Proclamation and

an interim plan that directs the day-to-day management of

the Monument--allegedly showing that the Service is not

acting consistently with the Proclamation. Although Tulare

County refers to the existence of foresters on the ground, the

complaint does not identify these foresters' acts with sufficient specificity to state a claim.

Finally, regarding Count 9, the Proclamation explicitly

states that "the establishment of the monument is subject to

valid existing rights." Proclamation at 24,097. Tulare County alleges that the Proclamation violates existing rights that

were established by the Mediated Settlement Agreement in

1990, which provided that commercial logging would continue

to be available in the Converse Basin area of the Monument.

Tulare County ignores the fact that the settlement agreement

did not create in any of the parties a right to actual timber

harvest, cf. Ohio Forestry Ass'n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726,

733 (1998), and it failed to allege that any of the appellants

possess a contract for timber harvest. The allegation that

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the Proclamation violates the Sequoia National Forest Trail

Plan likewise fails for lack of sufficient particularity.

Accordingly, because "[a]t no point has [Tulare County]

presented factual allegations that would occasion ... ultra

vires review of the Proclamation[ ]" Mountain States, slip op.

at 8-9, ___ F.3d at ____ - ____, we affirm the dismissal of the

complaint.

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