Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_19-cv-08161/USCOURTS-azd-3_19-cv-08161-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

John Duffy,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Commissioner of Social Security 

Administration,

Defendant.

No. CV-19-08161-PCT-JAT

ORDER 

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff John Duffy’s (“Claimant”) appeal from the 

denial of his application for social security disability benefits. (Doc. 11). The 

Commissioner has responded, (Doc. 17), and Claimant has replied, (Doc. 18). The Court 

now rules on the appeal.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Disability Determination

To qualify for benefits, an applicant must first show he is “under a disability.” 42 

U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(E). If he shows he suffers from a medically determinable physical or 

mental impairment that prevents him from engaging in any “substantial gainful activity,” 

the applicant is disabled. Id. § 423(d)(1)–(2). 

By rule, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) for the Social Security 

Administration (“SSA”) follows a five-step process to determine whether the applicant 

meets the statutory definition of disability. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(1). This process may 

end at any step at which the ALJ can find the applicant disabled or not. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4). 

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At step one, the ALJ determines whether the applicant is “doing substantial gainful 

activity.” Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so, the applicant is not disabled. Id. If he is not, the 

ALJ proceeds to step two and considers whether any of the applicant’s physical or mental 

impairments or combination of impairments are “severe.” Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If that 

threshold is met, the ALJ proceeds to step three to determine whether the applicant’s 

impairment or combination of impairments “meets or equals” an impairment listed in 

Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. Part 404. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the applicant 

is disabled. Id. If not, before proceeding to step four, the ALJ must assess the applicant’s 

“residual functional capacity” (“RFC”). Id. § 404.1520(a)(4). The RFC represents the most 

an applicant “can still do despite [his] limitations.” Id. § 404.1545(a)(1). At step four, the 

ALJ uses the RFC to determine whether the applicant can still perform his “past relevant 

work.” Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If so, the applicant is not disabled. If not, the ALJ proceeds 

to the final step to determine whether—considering the applicant’s RFC, age, education, 

and work experience—he “can make an adjustment to other work.” Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). 

If the applicant cannot, he is disabled. Id.

B. The ALJ’s Decision

Here, the ALJ first found Claimant was not engaged in substantial gainful activity. 

(Doc. 10-3 at 17). Next, the ALJ found Claimant had the following severe impairments: 

coronary artery disease, status post two myocardial infarctions with stent placement, status 

post bilateral total knee replacements, status post bilateral shoulder surgeries, and 

osteoarthritis. (Id.). The ALJ then determined that none of these impairments met or 

medically equaled anything in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. Part 404. (Id. at 19). 

Before proceeding to step four, the ALJ found Claimant had the requisite RFC to perform 

light work as defined by SSA regulations. (Id. at 20). As relevant here, the ALJ assigned 

great weight to the opinions of the state agency’s medical consultants in making that 

finding. (Id. at 27). At step four, the ALJ concluded Claimant was not disabled because he 

could perform his past relevant work as it is usually performed in the national economy. 

(Id. at 29). This appeal followed.

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II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

This Court may not overturn the ALJ’s denial of disability benefits absent legal error 

or a lack of substantial evidence. Luther v. Berryhill, 891 F.3d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 2018). 

“Substantial evidence means . . . . such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept 

as adequate to support a conclusion.” Revels v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 648, 654 (9th Cir. 2017) 

(quoting Desrosiers v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988)). 

On review, the Court “must consider the entire record as a whole, weighing both the 

evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the [ALJ’s] conclusion, and may 

not affirm simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Id. (quoting 

Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1009 (9th Cir. 2014)). The ALJ, not this Court, draws 

inferences, resolves conflicts in medical testimony, and determines credibility. Andrews v. 

Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995); Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1453 (9th 

Cir. 1984). Thus, the Court must affirm even when “the evidence admits of more than one 

rational interpretation.” Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1984).

B. State Agency’s Medical Opinion

Claimant argues substantial evidence does not support the RFC because, while the 

ALJ assigned great weight to the state agency’s medical consultants’ opinions, she did not

include a limitation that the initial consultant found—that Claimant was limited to frequent 

handling in the right upper extremity—in the RFC without explaining why. (Doc. 11 at 9). 

The Commissioner counters that the ALJ discussed evidence from which a reasonable 

person could conclude the right upper extremity was not so limited. (Doc. 17 at 13–16).

When reviewing the ALJ’s RFC finding, it is important to bear in mind that it is not

strictly the province of doctors; rather, it is the ALJ’s domain. See Vertigan v. Halter, 260 

F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 2001). Even Claimant recognizes that a wide variety of evidence 

must therefore be considered in this analysis. (Doc. 11 at 10). Here, the ALJ discussed both 

medical and nonmedical evidence from which one could reasonably conclude that 

Claimant’s right upper extremity was not as limited as he now claims.

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For instance, the ALJ mentioned that Claimant had engaged in “a somewhat normal 

level of daily activity,” including chopping wood, shooting, and camping. (Doc. 10-3 at 

21). The ALJ also noted that “within three months after [his] right elbow and wrist surgeries 

. . . [Claimant] had good function and use of the right arm and hand.” (Id. at 22). She 

explicitly stated that “[m]edical records do not confirm [Claimant’s] allegation of inability 

to use his right hand and arm.” (Id. (citing Exs. B4F; B5F; B13F)). The ALJ also described 

that Claimant reported “doing well overall” following the surgery, including experiencing 

less pain and a decrease in numbness following a carpal tunnel injection. (Id. at 23 (citing 

Exs. B4F; B5F)). Several months later, his “bilateral upper extremities appeared normal,” 

his “right elbow showed no obvious swelling or deformity,” and “[h]e did not have pain 

on his endpoints as he did previously. . . . [with] normal grip strength and motor tone.” (Id.

at 24; (citing Ex. B5F)). The ALJ concluded by stating, “[w]hile there is no doubt [that] 

[C]laimant had limitations due to his medically determinable impairments and underwent 

several surgeries, the overall medical records document that he recovered well with no 

ongoing limitations precluding him from performing all work-related activity.” (Id. at 29).

Contrary to Claimant’s assertion, this discussion satisfied any duty in the ALJ to

“set[] out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, 

stat[e] h[er] interpretation thereof, and mak[e] findings,” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 

725 (9th Cir. 1998), in reasoning why the RFC would not include a limitation to the right 

upper extremity. The evidence that the ALJ cited explains fully why the RFC did not 

include the limitation that the initial state agency consultant found and any failure to say 

“magic words” by not citing that consultant’s specific finding does not amount to reversible 

error. Thus, substantial evidence exists to support an RFC that did not include a limitation 

to frequent handling in the right upper extremity. 

C. Res Judicata

Citing Chavez v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1988), Claimant also argues the 

ALJ erred by finding he had different past relevant work than did a prior ALJ. (Doc. 11 at 

5). Specifically, he points out that the previous ALJ found that he worked as a sheriff’s 

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deputy, a job that requires medium work, and, if that finding continued to apply in this 

case, his RFC would have precluded a return to such work because it limited him to light 

exertion. (Id. at 6). The Commissioner argues in response that res judicata principles did 

not preclude the ALJ in this proceeding from finding a different past relevant work because 

she had new evidence in the form of the vocational expert’s (“VE”) testimony that 

indicated Claimant’s description of his work was more in line with the Dictionary of 

Occupational Titles’ (“DOT”) description of a jailer. (Doc. 17 at 16–20).

Res judicata principles apply to administrative proceedings, albeit “less rigidly” 

than they do in judicial proceedings. Chavez, 844 F.2d at 693. Even if an applicant

demonstrates that changed circumstances justify diverging from a prior decision’s 

outcome, the prior decision’s underlying findings are still due “some res judicata 

consideration.” Id. at 694. What the ALJ cannot do is “reconsider[] prior findings based 

strictly on information already presented to the first judge.” Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 

539 F.3d 1169, 1173 (9th Cir. 2008).

In the prior proceeding, the VE testified that Claimant’s past relevant work included 

work as a sheriff’s deputy, which required medium exertion. (Doc. 10-3 at 123). It is clear, 

however, that the VE in that proceeding placed an emphasis on finding DOT entries for all 

the job titles that Claimant had mentioned and did not necessarily focus on finding an entry 

that correlated with Claimant’s description of his work. (See id. at 123–24). The VE finally

opined that a hypothetical person who could perform only light work—as was true for

Claimant—would be precluded from working as a sheriff’s deputy. (Docs. 10-3 at 125; 10-

4 at 81).

In the present proceeding, the VE first testified that Claimant’s past relevant work 

included work as a sheriff’s deputy and that he actually performed the work at a heavy, or 

even very heavy, exertional level. (Doc. 10-3 at 82). The ALJ then noted that the state 

agency had classified Claimant’s “work at jail as a jailer” and asked the VE to explain 

“what the difference [wa]s.” (Id.). The VE then read the DOT’s description of jailer and 

concluded that, when compared with Claimant’s testimony, jailer was a “more accurate” 

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job description because Claimant “talked about having to . . . restrain prisoners and having 

lifting requirements so it would be well above light . . . probably again heavy.” (Id. at 83). 

The VE lastly opined that a hypothetical person who could perform only light work like 

Claimant could work as a jailer because, even though he would not be able to do the job as 

he had actually performed it, only a light level of exertion is required for that job as 

performed in the national economy. (Id.). 

Given the foregoing, it is clear that the ALJ not only had the benefit of new evidence 

from the state agency but also different testimony from the VE, which focused more on 

locating a DOT title that comported with Claimant’s own description of his work rather

than the name of the job that Claimant supplied. Thus, the ALJ had new evidence before 

her when classifying Claimant’s past relevant work and did not improperly reconsider the 

findings of the previous ALJ by simply drawing a different conclusion from the same 

evidence. Stubbs-Danielson, 539 F.3d at 1173.1 The foregoing likewise makes clear that 

Claimant’s assertion that the VE gave a contradictory explanation is wrong. (Doc. 11 at 8). 

The VE never asserted that Claimant’s work was “in fact light”; instead, the VE explained 

that, while Claimant had actually performed heavy work as a jailer, most jailers in the 

national economy were required to perform only light work. And although Claimant could 

no longer perform heavy work, he could still perform light work. There is nothing 

inconsistent in this testimony and Claimant’s arguments to the contrary ignore that the ALJ 

may permissibly find an applicant able to perform his past relevant work as generally 

performed in the national economy despite not being able to perform such work as he or 

she actually had before. See Carter v. Astrue, No. C 08-5095 VRW, 2009 WL 2084446, at 

*4 (N.D. Cal. July 14, 2009) (rejecting assignment of res judicata error where the VE 

 

1 Citing no authority, Claimant argues that the ALJ must make a finding that evidence is 

“new.” (Doc. 18 at 2). The Court rejects this novel idea. E.g., Scott v. Colvin, No. 13-CV1189 W(DHB), 2014 WL 3797491, at *14 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2014) (looking to the whole 

record to determine if the evidence was new).The Court likewise rejects Claimant’s 

argument that the ALJ was somehow bound to the prior determination because it was never 

appealed meaning the second ALJ had no transcript of the first proceeding. (Doc. 18 at 2). 

Taken to its endpoint, such logic would mean that findings in unappealed cases are always 

binding on the ALJ, a proposition fundamentally at odds with the “less rigid” application 

of res judicata that Chavez and other like cases require. 

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testified to the applicant’s “ability to perform her past relevant work under a different but 

allowable definition”); see also Pinto v. Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) 

(“The regulations advise an ALJ to first consider past work as actually performed, and then 

as usually performed.”).

2

Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ did not err in “reclassifying” Claimant’s 

past relevant work.

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing,

IT IS ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED. The Clerk 

of the Court shall enter judgment accordingly.3

Dated this 21st day of April, 2020.

 

2 Although Claimant provides that the ALJ violated SSR 00-4p because the VE’s testimony 

was contradictory, this ruling applies to conflicts between the VE testimony and the DOT. 

SSR 00-4p, 2000 WL 1898704, at *1 (Dec. 4, 2000). The ALJ complied with this duty by 

asking whether the VE’s testimony was consistent with the DOT. (Doc. 10-3 at 91).

3 To the extent mandate is required, the judgment shall serve as the mandate.

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