Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-03847/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-03847-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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28 1 Plaintiff claims that the reason for the cell move was that

he and his cell mate (from cell #107) "did not get along."

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BOBBY W. LEE,

Plaintiff,

 v.

M. COLLIER, ET AL.,

Defendants. _________________________________

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No. C 06-3847 CW (PR)

ORDER OF SERVICE

(Docket no. 2)

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Bobby W. Lee, a state prisoner currently

incarcerated at California State Prison - Sacramento (SAC), has

filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and seeks

leave to proceed in forma pauperis. 

Venue is proper in this district because the injuries

complained of occurred when Plaintiff was incarcerated at Salinas

Valley State Prison (SVSP) and Corcoran State Prison (CSP), which

are both located within the Northern District of California. See

28 U.S.C. §§ 84(a), 1391(b).

BACKGROUND

The following facts are derived from the allegations in

Plaintiff's complaint, which are taken as true and construed in the

light most favorable to Plaintiff for purposes of the Court's

initial review of the complaint. See Parks School of Business,

Inc., v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1483 (9th Cir. 1995).

On June 23, 2003, Plaintiff was in the process of moving his

property from cell #107 to cell #110 in Building D-5 at SVSP,1

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2 Plaintiff also claims that his eyeglasses were confiscated

as a result of his placement in segregation; however, they were

eventually returned to him. While he claims that his glasses were

"broken" when they were returned to him, he fails to allege any

constitutional violations relating to the confiscation or

destruction of his eyeglasses. Therefore, the Court will only

consider his claim relating to the confiscation of his legal

documents.

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when the inmates housed in cell #110 assaulted Defendant SVSP

Correctional Officer Marshall E. Denning. Plaintiff was placed in

restraints and interviewed by SVSP prison officials immediately

following the incident. During the interview, Plaintiff claimed

that he "had no knowledge of, nor did he have any involvement in

[the] incident." Later that day, Plaintiff and two other inmates

from cell # 110 were transferred to CSP and placed in

administrative segregation. The Administrative Segregation

Placement Notice dated June 23, 2003 states that the "placement

occurred based on [Plaintiff's] possible participation in 'Assault

on Staff' at SVSP." (See Pl.'s Ex. A.) Plaintiff claims that his

legal documents were confiscated after he was placed in

segregation.2 He alleges that he remained in CSP's Secured Housing

Unit (SHU) for fourteen months and that he was transferred to SAC

on October 20, 2004.

Plaintiff claims that Defendants Lewis and Collier, who signed

the Incident Report regarding a charge of "Attempted Murder of a

Peace Officer" dated June 24, 2003, "conspired to and did violate

Plaintiff's constitutionally protected rights as they (without even

some evidence) or (investigation) . . . concluded and signed

documents which contained fabricated charges." (See Pl.'s Ex. E.) 

He also claims that Defendant Pennisi falsely reported in a Rules

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Violation Report on July 3, 2003 that Plaintiff was involved in

"Conspiracy to Commit Murder/Attempted Murder." (See Pl.'s Ex. D.)

Plaintiff filed the present complaint on June 20, 2006,

alleging that Defendants violated his federal and state

constitutional rights based on their involvement in placing him in

segregation for fourteen months without any substantive evidence. 

He seeks injunctive relief and monetary damages. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any

case in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity

or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable

claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seek monetary

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id.

§ 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must

allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the

Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and 

(2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting

under the color of State law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48

(1988). "'[A] complaint should not be dismissed for failure to

state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can

prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle

him to relief.'" Terracom v. Valley National Bank, 49 F.3d 555,

558 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46

(1957)). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri

v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988).

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DISCUSSION 

I. Legal Claims

A. Injunctive Relief Claims

Plaintiff seeks both injunctive relief and money damages

(including compensatory and punitive damages). The jurisdiction of

the federal courts depends on the existence of a "case or

controversy" under Article III of the Constitution. PUC v. FERC,

100 F.3d 1451, 1458 (9th Cir. 1996). A claim is considered moot if

it has lost its character as a present, live controversy, and if no

effective relief can be granted: "Where the question sought to be

adjudicated has been mooted by developments subsequent to filing of

the complaint, no justiciable controversy is presented." Flast v.

Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968). Where injunctive relief is

involved, questions of mootness are determined in light of the

present circumstances. See Mitchell v. Dupnik, 75 F.3d 517, 528

(9th Cir. 1996). 

When an inmate has been transferred to another prison and

there is no reasonable expectation nor demonstrated probability

that he will again be subjected to the prison conditions from which

he seeks injunctive relief, the claim for injunctive relief should

be dismissed as moot. See Dilley v. Gunn, 64 F.3d 1365, 1368-69

(9th Cir. 1995). A claim that the inmate might be re-transferred

to the prison where the injury occurred is too speculative to

overcome mootness. Id.

Because Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated at either SVSP or

CSP, his claims for injunctive relief are DISMISSED as moot. See

Mitchell, 75 F.3d at 528.

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B. Claims Related to Plaintiff's Placement in CSP's SHU

Plaintiff asserts that his placement in segregation for

fourteen months without a hearing and without any substantive

evidence as to his involvement in the June 23, 2003 assault

incident violated his due process and equal protection rights.

1. Due Process Claim

Construing his complaint liberally, Plaintiff seems to be

challenging both his initial placement in administrative

segregation "pending investigation by SVSP" and the final

disciplinary determination that led to his fourteen-month placement

in CSP's SHU.

In Toussaint v. McCarthy, the Ninth Circuit held that when

prison officials initially determine whether a prisoner is to be

segregated for administrative reasons due process requires that

they comply with the following procedures: (1) they must hold an

informal nonadversary hearing within a reasonable time after the

prisoner is segregated, (2) the prisoner must be informed of the

charges against him or the reasons segregation is being considered,

and (3) the prisoner must be allowed to present his views. See

Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1100 (9th Cir. 1986). Due

process does not require detailed written notice of charges,

representation by counsel or counsel-substitute, an opportunity to

present witnesses, a written decision describing the reasons for

placing the prisoner in administrative segregation or disclosure of

the identity of any person providing information leading to

placement of a prisoner in administrative segregation. See id. at

1100-01.

Before a prisoner may be placed in disciplinary segregation

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for the violation of prison rules, he or she must be afforded

greater procedural protections than those set out in Toussaint. 

First, "written notice of the charges must be given to the

disciplinary-action defendant in order to inform him of the charges

and to enable him to marshal the facts and prepare a defense." See

Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564 (1974). Second, "at least a

brief period of time after the notice, no less than 24 hours,

should be allowed to the inmate to prepare for the appearance

before the [disciplinary committee]." See id. Third, "there must

be a 'written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence

relied on and reasons' for the disciplinary action." Id. (quoting

Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972)). Fourth, "the

inmate facing disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to call

witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense when

permitting him to do so will not be unduly hazardous to

institutional safety or correctional goals." Id. at 566. Fifth,

"[w]here an illiterate inmate is involved . . . or where the

complexity of the issues makes it unlikely that the inmate will be

able to collect and present the evidence necessary for an adequate

comprehension of the case, he should be free to seek the aid of a

fellow inmate, or . . . to have adequate substitute aid . . . from

the staff or from a[n] . . . inmate designated by the staff." Id.

at 570.

In Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985), the

Supreme Court held that disciplinary proceedings do not satisfy due

process requirements unless there is "some evidence" in the record

to support the findings of the prison disciplinary board. The

Ninth Circuit requires that "some evidence" also support a decision

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to place an inmate in segregation for administrative reasons. See

Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1104. The standard is met if there was some

evidence from which the conclusion of the administrative tribunal

could be deduced. See id. at 1105 (citing Hill, 472 U.S. at 455). 

Ascertaining whether the standard is satisfied does not require

examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the

credibility of witnesses or weighing of the evidence. See id.

Instead, the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in

the record that could support the conclusion reached. See id. 

The Ninth Circuit also requires that the evidence relied upon

by prison disciplinary boards contain "some indicia of

reliability," see Cato v. Rushen, 824 F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir.

1987), but has not directly considered whether a corresponding need

for evidentiary reliability exists when prison officials segregate

an inmate for administrative reasons. Some district courts have

extended the reliability requirement to the administrative context,

however, holding that "the evidence relied upon to confine an

inmate to the SHU for gang affiliation must have 'some indicia of

reliability' to satisfy due process requirements." Madrid v.

Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1273-74 (N.D. Cal. 1995).

If Plaintiff is complaining of his initial placement in

administrative segregation pending disciplinary proceedings, his

claim will fail because he was provided with all the procedural

protections he was due at that stage. In fact, SVSP prison

officials informed him that "placement occurred based on [his]

possible participation in 'Assault on Staff' at SVSP." 

Plaintiff alleges that no hearing was held before the final

disciplinary determination that led to his fourteen-month placement

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in CSP's SHU. He claims that Defendant Pennisi falsified a report

charging Plaintiff with "attempted murder and conspiracy to commit

murder" because of his alleged involvement in the June 23, 2003

incident. He alleges that he was "placed in punitive segregation

with false charges of attempted murder (when Defendants knew

Plaintiff had nothing to do with the charged incident)." Liberally

construing this claim, if Plaintiff is complaining that he was

disciplined based on false charges, he has stated a cognizable

claim because he alleges he was not afforded the Wolff protections.

Because the exact nature of Plaintiff's placement in

segregation is unclear, the Court will order service of this claim

so that Defendants may address Plaintiff's claim.

2. Equal Protection Claim

"The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

commands that no State shall 'deny to any person within its

jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,' which is

essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should

be treated alike." City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473

U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216

(1982)). A plaintiff alleging denial of equal protection under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 must plead intentional unlawful discrimination or

allege facts that are at least susceptible of an inference of

discriminatory intent. See Monteiro v. Tempe Union High School

Dist., 158 F.3d 1022, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998). Plaintiff must

demonstrate that state actors "acted with the intent to

discriminate." Sischo-Nownejad v. Merced Community College Dist.,

934 F.2d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Plaintiff does not allege that he was placed in segregation

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because of his race, instead he claims it was based on false

charges against him. In the body of the complaint, his allegations

of racial discrimination are conclusory and ambiguous. Thus, the

Court finds that Plaintiff has not stated a cognizable equal

protection claim.

Accordingly, Plaintiff's equal protection claim is DISMISSED.

C. Denial of Access to the Courts Claim

In conjunction with the aforementioned claims relating to his

placement in CSP's SHU, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated

his constitutional right to access to the courts by confiscating

his legal documents, which he needed for an action that was active

at that time.

Prisoners have a constitutional right to be afforded "'a

reasonably adequate opportunity to present claimed violations of

fundamental constitutional rights to the courts.'" Lewis v. Casey,

518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996) (quoting Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817,

825 (1977)). This right applies to prisoners' challenges to their

convictions or sentences or their conditions of confinement. See

id. at 355. Prison officials may not "actively interfer[e] with

inmates' attempts to prepare legal documents or file them." Id. at

350 (citations omitted). In order to state a cognizable claim for

denial of access to the courts, a prisoner must allege an actual

injury. Id. at 349-50. Specifically, the prisoner must allege

that interference by prison officials hindered his or her efforts

to pursue a legal claim. Id. at 351. Even if the prisoner makes

this showing, the denial of access claim will fail if the hindrance

of the prisoner's access to court was reasonably related to

legitimate penological interests. See id. at 361 (citing Turner v.

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Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)).

The Court finds that Plaintiff has asserted a cognizable claim

of denial of access to the courts.

D. State Law Claims 

In addition to the federal claims discussed above, Plaintiff

asserts state law claims against Defendants. Because his state law

claims arise out of the same acts and events giving rise to

Plaintiff's federal claims, the Court will exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over the claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). 

Plaintiff asserts claims against Defendants for violating his

state constitutional rights by filing false reports regarding his

involvement in the June 23, 2003 assault incident. The Court finds

his state law claims cognizable. If Defendants believe Plaintiff's

claims fail to assert valid state law causes of action, they may

seek dismissal of the claims by filing a motion to dismiss. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

II. Proper Defendants

Liability may be imposed on an individual defendant under

section 1983 if the plaintiff can show that the defendant

proximately caused the deprivation of a federally protected right. 

Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988); Harris v. City

of Roseburg, 664 F.2d 1121, 1125 (9th Cir. 1981). A person

deprives another of a constitutional right within the meaning of

section 1983 if he does an affirmative act, participates in

another's affirmative act or omits to perform an act which he is

legally required to do, that causes the deprivation of which the

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3 The inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus

on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant

whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional

deprivation. Leer, 844 F.2d at 633 (citations omitted).

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plaintiff complains. Leer, 844 F.2d at 633.3 Sweeping conclusory

allegations will not suffice; the plaintiff must instead "set forth

specific facts as to each individual defendant's" acts which

deprived him of protected rights. Id. at 634. 

A. Named Defendants

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Lewis, Collier and Pennisi

acted directly to place Plaintiff in segregation without

justification and to deny him of his legal property, in violation

of his federal and state constitutional rights. 

Plaintiff fails to directly link Defendants Denning and Caden

to his allegations and instead, he makes conclusory allegations

that they "conspired to and did violate Plaintiff's

constitutionally protected rights." 

In support of his allegations against Defendant Denning,

Plaintiff attaches the first page of a Complaint for Damages filed

by Defendant Denning against Plaintiff and the other two inmates

involved in the June 23, 2003 incident. (See Pl.'s Ex. N.) 

However, the Court finds this attachment is insufficient to warrant

service on Defendant Denning. Therefore, Plaintiff's claim against

Defendant Denning is dismissed with leave to amend. In his amended

complaint, Plaintiff must link Defendant Denning to his claim by

explaining what Defendant Denning did that caused a violation of

Plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Leer, 844 F.2d at 634.

Plaintiff claims that Defendant Caden, who is responsible for

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running the prison as Chief Deputy Warden, should be liable because

he is "required to follow the letter of the law, and safeguard

Plaintiff's due process [rights]." This is a respondeat superior

claim, that is, Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendant Caden liable as

the superior of the persons Plaintiff contends violated his rights. 

This is, however, not a proper basis for Section 1983 liability. A

supervisor may be liable under section 1983 upon a showing of

(1) personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation or (2) a

sufficient causal connection between the supervisor's wrongful

conduct and the constitutional violation. See Redman v. County of

San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (citation

omitted), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1074 (1992). "A supervisor is

only liable for constitutional violations of his subordinates if

the supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew

of the violations and failed to act to prevent them." Taylor v.

List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Accordingly, the claims

against Defendant Caden are dismissed.

 B. Doe Defendants

Plaintiff identifies several Doe Defendants involved in the

review and classification of the report written by Defendant

Pennisi regarding the June 23, 2003 assault incident. The use of

"John Doe" to identify a defendant is not favored in the Ninth

Circuit. Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir.

1980). However, where the identity of alleged defendants cannot be

known prior to the filing of a complaint, the plaintiff should be

given an opportunity through discovery to identify them. See

Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Accordingly, the claims against the Doe Defendants are

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dismissed from this action without prejudice. Should Plaintiff

learn their identities, he may move to file an amended complaint to

add them as named defendants. See Brass v. County of Los Angeles,

328 F.3d 1192, 1195-98 (9th Cir. 2003). 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows:

1. Leave to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED (docket no.

2).

2. Plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief are DISMISSED.

3. Plaintiff has stated COGNIZABLE claims against SVSP

Lieutenant G.D. Lewis and SVSP Correctional Officers M. Collier and

L.M. Pennisi for their involvement in deciding to retain Plaintiff

in segregation for fourteen months, in violation of Plaintiff's

rights to due process and access to the courts.

4. Plaintiff's equal protection claim is DISMISSED.

5. The Court asserts SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION over

Plaintiff's state law claims. 

6. Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Denning are

DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND as indicated above. Within thirty

(30) days of the date of this Order Plaintiff may file an amended

claim against Defendant Denning (Plaintiff shall resubmit only that

claim and not the entire complaint) as set forth above in Section

II(A) of this Order. The failure to do so will result in the

dismissal of the claim against Defendant Denning without prejudice.

7. Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Caden are DISMISSED.

8. Plaintiff's claims against the Doe Defendants are

DISMISSED from this action without prejudice. 

9. The Clerk of the Court shall mail a Notice of Lawsuit and

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Request for Waiver of Service of Summons, two copies of the Waiver

of Service of Summons, a copy of the complaint and all attachments

thereto (docket no. 1) and a copy of this Order to SVSP Lieutenant

G.D. Lewis and SVSP Correctional Officers M. Collier and L.M.

Pennisi. The Clerk of the Court shall also mail a copy of the

complaint and a copy of this Order to the State Attorney General's

Office in San Francisco. Additionally, the Clerk shall mail a copy

of this Order to Plaintiff.

 10. Defendants are cautioned that Rule 4 of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure requires them to cooperate in saving unnecessary

costs of service of the summons and complaint. Pursuant to Rule 4,

if Defendants, after being notified of this action and asked by the

Court, on behalf of Plaintiff, to waive service of the summons,

fail to do so, they will be required to bear the cost of such

service unless good cause be shown for their failure to sign and

return the waiver form. If service is waived, this action will

proceed as if Defendants had been served on the date that the

waiver is filed, except that pursuant to Rule 12(a)(1)(B),

Defendants will not be required to serve and file an answer before

sixty (60) days from the date on which the request for waiver was

sent. (This allows a longer time to respond than would be required

if formal service of summons is necessary.) Defendants are asked

to read the statement set forth at the foot of the waiver form that

more completely describes the duties of the parties with regard to

waiver of service of the summons. If service is waived after the

date provided in the Notice but before Defendants have been

personally served, the Answer shall be due sixty (60) days from the

date on which the request for waiver was sent or twenty (20) days

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from the date the waiver form is filed, whichever is later. 

11. Defendants shall answer the complaint in accordance with

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The following briefing

schedule shall govern dispositive motions in this action:

a. No later than ninety (90) days from the date their

answer is due, Defendants shall file a motion for summary judgment

or other dispositive motion. The motion shall be supported by

adequate factual documentation and shall conform in all respects to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. If Defendants are of the

opinion that this case cannot be resolved by summary judgment, they

shall so inform the Court prior to the date the summary judgment

motion is due. All papers filed with the Court shall be promptly

served on Plaintiff.

b. Plaintiff's opposition to the dispositive motion

shall be filed with the Court and served on Defendants no later

than sixty (60) days after the date on which Defendants' motion is

filed. The Ninth Circuit has held that the following notice should

be given to pro se plaintiffs facing a summary judgment motion:

The defendants have made a motion for summary 

judgment by which they seek to have your case dismissed. 

A motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will, if granted, end

your case. 

Rule 56 tells you what you must do in order to

oppose a motion for summary judgment. Generally, summary

judgment must be granted when there is no genuine issue

of material fact -- that is, if there is no real dispute

about any fact that would affect the result of your case,

the party who asked for summary judgment is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law, which will end your case. 

When a party you are suing makes a motion for summary

judgment that is properly supported by declarations (or

other sworn testimony), you cannot simply rely on what

your complaint says. Instead, you must set out specific

facts in declarations, depositions, answers to

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interrogatories, or authenticated documents, as provided

in Rule 56(e), that contradict the facts shown in the

defendant's declarations and documents and show that

there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. If

you do not submit your own evidence in opposition,

summary judgment, if appropriate, may be entered against

you. If summary judgment is granted [in favor of the

defendants], your case will be dismissed and there will

be no trial.

See Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962-63 (9th Cir. 1998) (en

banc).

Plaintiff is advised to read Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986)

(party opposing summary judgment must come forward with evidence

showing triable issues of material fact on every essential element

of his claim). Plaintiff is cautioned that because he bears the

burden of proving his allegations in this case, he must be prepared

to produce evidence in support of those allegations when he files

his opposition to Defendants' dispositive motion. Such evidence

may include sworn declarations from himself and other witnesses to

the incident, and copies of documents authenticated by sworn

declaration. Plaintiff will not be able to avoid summary judgment

simply by repeating the allegations of his complaint.

c. If Defendants wish to file a reply brief, they shall

do so no later than thirty (30) days after the date Plaintiff's

opposition is filed.

d. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date

the reply brief is due. No hearing will be held on the motion

unless the Court so orders at a later date.

12. Discovery may be taken in this action in accordance with

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Leave of the Court pursuant

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to Rule 30(a)(2) is hereby granted to Defendants to depose

Plaintiff and any other necessary witnesses confined in prison.

13. All communications by Plaintiff with the Court must be

served on Defendants, or Defendants' counsel once counsel has been

designated, by mailing a true copy of the document to Defendants or

Defendants' counsel.

14. It is Plaintiff's responsibility to prosecute this case. 

Plaintiff must keep the Court informed of any change of address and

must comply with the Court's orders in a timely fashion.

15. Extensions of time are not favored, though reasonable

extensions will be granted. Any motion for an extension of time

must be filed no later than fifteen (15) days prior to the deadline

sought to be extended.

16. This Order terminates Docket no. 2.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: 6/11/07

 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BOBBY LEE,

Plaintiff,

 v.

M. COLLIER et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV06-03847 CW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District

Court, Northern District of California.

That on June 11, 2007, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said

envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle

located in the Clerk's office.

Robert Lee T-88957

F.B. 8-102 Low

CA State Prison-New Folsom

P.O. Box 290066

Represa, CA 95671-0066

Dated: June 11, 2007

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Sheilah Cahill, Deputy Clerk

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