Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01088/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01088-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTHONY D. DAWKINS,

CDCR #E-40626,

Civil No. 07-1088 BEN (NLS)

Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING ACTION

FOR FAILING TO STATE A

CLAIM PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) vs.

JEANNE WOODFORD, et al.,

Defendants.

Plaintiff, Anthony Dawkins, a state inmate currently incarcerated at High Desert State

Prison located in Susanville, California and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that his First, Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when he was housed at Calipatria State Prison.

Plaintiff is not proceeding In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) in this matter, but instead, has prepaid the

full $350 filing fee mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). 

I. Sua Sponte Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)

As a preliminary matter, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A obligates this Court to review complaints

filed by all plaintiffs who are “prisoners” at the time the complaint is filed and who “seek redress

from a governmental entity or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).

Under § 1915A, the Court must sua sponte dismiss complaints, or any portions thereof, which

are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or which seek

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monetary relief from defendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) & (2); Resnick

v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 446-47 (9th Cir. 2000). 

“Under § 1915A, when determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must

accept as true all allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff.” Resnick, 213 F.3d at 447 (citing Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 623

(9th Cir. 1997)). The rule of liberal construction is “particularly important in civil rights cases.”

Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). Nevertheless, in giving liberal

interpretation to a pro se civil rights complaint, the court may not “supply essential elements of

the claim that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d

266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 

A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Liability

Section 1983 imposes two essential proof requirements upon a claimant: (1) that a person

acting under color of state law committed the conduct at issue, and (2) that the conduct deprived

the claimant of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the

United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 124 S.Ct. 2117, 2122

(2004); Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc). 

B. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claims

As currently pleaded, Plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed because they are premature

under the doctrine set forth in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). Here, Plaintiff

claims he was found guilty of a rules violation at a disciplinary hearing that was based on false

accusations and reports generated by Defendants. See Compl. at 12. 

In Heck, the Supreme Court held that “in order to recover damages for allegedly

unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose

unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a section 1983 plaintiff must prove

that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order,

declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into

question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Id. (footnote omitted). A

civil rights claim challenging the legality of a conviction or the length of confinement that has

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 The Court will not convert the present action into a habeas petition due to the implications of

the abuse of the writ doctrine. See Blueford v. Prunty, 108 F.3d 251, 255 (9th Cir. 1997); Trimble, 49

F.3d at 586.

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not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. Id. at 487; Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S.

641, 643 (1997).

Heck also held that “when a state prisoner seeks damages in a section 1983 suit, the

district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply

the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless

the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. But

if the district court determines that the plaintiff’s action, even if successful, will not demonstrate

the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be

allowed to proceed, in the absence of some other bar to the suit.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487

(emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). An action that is barred by Heck should be dismissed

for failure to state a claim without prejudice to re-alleging claims for damages after the

underlying conviction has been invalidated. Edwards, 520 U.S. at 649; Trimble v. City of Santa

Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 585 (9th Cir. 1995).

Here, Plaintiff is requesting that the Court find his disciplinary hearing to be declared

invalid. However, because that would necessarily implicate the validity of Plaintiff’s

disciplinary conviction, his Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,

and the claim is subject to dismissal without prejudice.1

 Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87.

Plaintiff also claims that his due process rights have been violated. “The requirements

of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the

Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty and property.” Board of Regents v. Roth, 408

U.S. 564, 569 (1972). State statutes and prison regulations may grant prisoners liberty interests

sufficient to invoke due process protections. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-27 (1976).

However, the Supreme Court has significantly limited the instances in which due process can

be invoked. Pursuant to Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483 (1995), a prisoner can show a

liberty interest under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment only if he alleges

a change in confinement that imposes an “atypical and significant hardship . . . in relation to the

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ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 484 (citations omitted); Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818,

827-28 (9th Cir. 1997). 

In this case, Plaintiff has failed to establish a liberty interest protected by the Constitution

because he has not alleged, as he must under Sandin, facts related to the conditions or

consequences of his disciplinary conviction which show “the type of atypical, significant

deprivation [that] might conceivably create a liberty interest.” Id. at 486. In Sandin, the

Supreme Court considered three factors in determining whether the plaintiff possessed a liberty

interest in avoiding disciplinary segregation: (1) the disciplinary versus discretionary nature of

the segregation; (2) the restricted conditions of the prisoner’s confinement and whether they

amounted to a “major disruption in his environment” when compared to those shared by

prisoners in the general population; and (3) the possibility of whether the prisoner’s sentence

was lengthened by his restricted custody. Id. at 486-87. 

Here, Plaintiff has failed to allege how his disciplinary hearing resulted in a placement

which was materially different from that previously imposed upon him. He has further failed

to allege that the results of the disciplinary hearing created “a major disruption” in his

environment. See id. Thus, without more, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s due process claims fall

“within the range of confinement to be normally expected” by prison inmates “in relation to the

ordinary incidents of prison life,” and as such, are insufficient to state a due process claim upon

which relief can be granted. Id. at 486-87.

C. Respondeat Superior

In his Complaint, Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendants Woodford, Ryan, Bourland, Ochoa,

and Janda liable in their supervisory capacities. See Compl. at 2. However, there is no

respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Palmer v. Sanderson, 9 F.3d 1433, 1437-

38 (9th Cir. 1993). Instead, “[t]he inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on

the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged

to have caused a constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988)

(citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976)). In order to avoid the respondeat superior

bar, Plaintiff must allege personal acts by each individual Defendant which have a direct causal

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connection to the constitutional violation at issue. See Sanders v. Kennedy, 794 F.2d 478, 483

(9th Cir. 1986); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). As a supervisor, a

Defendant may only be held liable for the allegedly unconstitutional violations of his

subordinates if Plaintiff alleges specific facts which show: (1) how or to what extent this

supervisor personally participated in or directed Defendants’ actions, and (2) in either acting or

failing to act, the supervisor was an actual and proximate cause of the deprivation of his

constitutional rights. Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). As currently pleaded,

however, Plaintiff’s Complaint in no way sets forth facts which might be liberally construed to

support an individualized constitutional claim against Defendants Woodford, Ryan, Bourland,

Ochoa, and Janda.

D. Harassment Claims

Plaintiff alleges that he has been subjected to verbal sexual harassment by Defendant

Guevara. To the extent that Plaintiff is seeking to hold any of the named Defendants liable for

harassing him, he has failed to state a claim. Verbal harassment or verbal abuse by prison

officials generally does not constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment. See Keenan v. Hall,

83 F.3d 1083, 1092 (9th Cir. 1996) (harassment does not constitute an Eighth Amendment

violation); Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir. 1987) (harassment in the form

of vulgar language directed at an inmate is not cognizable under § 1983); McDowell v. Jones,

990 F.2d 433, 434 (8th Cir. 1993) (verbal threats and name calling are not actionable under

§ 1983).

For all these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint must be dismissed sua

sponte for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(b)(1); Resnick, 213 F.3d at 446-47. The Court will provide Plaintiff with an

opportunity to amend his pleading to cure the defects set forth above. See Lucas v. Dep’t of

Corrections, 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Unless it is absolutely clear that no amendment

can cure the defect . . . , a pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the complaint’s deficiencies and

an opportunity to amend.”).

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 II. Conclusion and Order

 Good cause appearing therefor, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(b). However, Plaintiff is GRANTED forty five (45) days leave from the date this

Order is “Filed” in which to file a First Amended Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of

pleading noted above. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete in itself without

reference to the superseded pleading. See S.D. Cal. Civ. L. R. 15.1. Defendants not named and

all claims not re-alleged in the Amended Complaint will be deemed to have been waived. See

King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Further, if Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, it may be dismissed without further

leave to amend and may hereafter be counted as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See

McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177-79 (9th Cir. 1996). 

The Clerk of the Court is directed to mail a Court approved form § 1983 complaint to

Plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 10, 2007

Hon. Roger T. Benitez

United States District Judge

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