Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_15-cv-00017/USCOURTS-azd-4_15-cv-00017-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Michael Gerard Schottenbauer, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan; et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CIV 15-017-TUC-DCB (LAB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the court is a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed on January 15, 2015,

by Michael Gerard Schottenbauer, an inmate confined in the Arizona State Prison Complex in

Buckeye, Arizona. (Doc. 1) 

Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this court, the matter was referred to Magistrate

Judge Bowman for report and recommendation. LRCiv 72.2(a)(2).

The Magistrate Judge recommends the District Court, after its independent review of the

record, enter an order dismissing the petition. It is time-barred.

Summary of the Case

On May 19, 1995, Schottenbauer was convicted after a jury trial of “two counts of child

molestation and one count of sexual conduct with a minor under the age of 14.” (Doc. 1, p. 1);

(Doc. 12-2, p. 27) On June 20, 1995, the trial court sentenced Schottenbauer to “consecutive

prison terms totaling 39 years.” (Doc. 12-2, p. 27); see also (Doc. 12-1, pp. 2-9)

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On direct appeal, Schottenbauer challenged the trial court’s denial of his motion to

suppress his videotaped confession. (Doc. 12-2, p. 28) He argued his confession was coerced

because he was encouraged to confess by his sister, Elizabeth Schottenbauer. (Doc. 12-1, pp.

17-21) Earlier that day, Elizabeth had spoken with detectives who told her that if Schottenbauer

confessed, he would get intensive counseling or intensive probation. Id. The Arizona Court of

Appeals affirmed Schottenbauer’s convictions and sentences on June 11, 1996. (Doc. 12-2, p.

27) His motion for reconsideration was denied on July 2, 1996. (Doc. 12-2, p. 42) The

Arizona Supreme Court denied Schottenbauer’s petition for review on December 23, 1996.

(Doc. 12-3, p. 24) It does not appear that Schottenbauer filed a petition for review with the U.S.

Supreme Court.

On February 11, 1997, Schottenbauer filed his first notice of post-conviction relief.

(Doc. 12-3, p. 26) The trial court summarily dismissed the petition on June 26, 1997. (Doc. 12-

4, p. 42) Schottenbauer appealed raising the claim that his sentence was cruel and unusual

punishment. (Doc. 12-4, pp. 44-47) He also filed an addendum pro se in which he argued three

of the state’s witnesses were mentally unstable. (Doc. 12-4, pp. 12-28) The Arizona Court of

Appeals granted review but denied relief on April 30, 1998. (Doc. 12-5, p. 16) The court noted

that Schottenbauer’s claims against the state’s witnesses were based on information he had well

before trial. (Doc. 12-5, p. 17)

More than eleven years later, on February 18, 2010, Schottenbauer filed a second notice

of post-conviction relief. (Doc. 12-5, p. 30) He argued he uncovered “newly discovered facts”

in case reports and victim interview transcripts that would have constituted reasonable doubt

had they been raised at trial. (Doc. 12-5, p. 31) He further argued he had “new evidence” from

his son, Christopher, that the victim lied so she could live with her mother and that Elizabeth

Schottenbauer colluded with the detectives to coerce the defendant’s confession. (Doc. 12-5,

p. 31) The trial court summarily dismissed the notice on March 5, 2010 because Schottenbauer

“raise[d] no new issue, legal or factual, that could not have been addressed through his first

Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.” (Doc. 12-5, p. 30) The Arizona Court of Appeals

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summarily dismissed his petition for review on September 7, 2010 for failing to file a petition

in compliance with the rules. (Doc. 12-5, pp. 36, 38)

On July 2, 2012, Schottenbauer filed a third notice of post-conviction relief. (Doc. 12-6,

p. 20); but see (Doc. 12-7, p. 52) Appointed counsel was unable to find any meritorious issues

and asked that Schottenbauer be permitted to file a petition pro se. (Doc. 12-6, p. 25)

Schottenbauer filed a petition on October 16, 2012 arguing trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to evaluate properly the state’s plea offer. (Doc. 12-6, p. 28, 33) On January 18, 2013,

the trial court denied the petition ruling that all issues “either should have been raised or were

previously raised . . . and are therefore barred from additional consideration by the rule.” (Doc.

12-7, p. 53) On May 30, 2013, the Arizona Court of Appeals granted review but denied relief.

(Doc. 12-8, p. 16); State v. Schottenbauer, 2013 WL 2395048, 1 (Ariz.App. 2013). On

January 21, 2014, the Arizona Supreme Court denied review. (Doc. 12-9, p. 34)

On January 15, 2015, Schottenbauer filed the pending petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1) His petition consists of four claims, which raise in turn

the arguments he made in his direct appeal and his first, second, and third post-conviction relief

proceedings. Id. He claims (1) the trial court should have suppressed his involuntary

confession, (2) trial counsel was ineffective for (a) failing to call his friends, the Van Dykes,

to testify, (b) failing to investigate the backgrounds of the state’s witnesses, and (c) failing to

investigate and argue the totality of the circumstances surrounding the false allegations and his

coerced confession, (3) trial counsel was ineffective for (a) failing to argue that his sister,

Elizabeth, was a state actor when she coerced him into confessing, (b) failing to call his friends,

the Van Dykes, to testify, and (c) failing to call a brain expert to testify about his motorcycle

injury, and (4) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to evaluate properly the state’s plea offer.

Id.

On April 23, 2015, the respondents filed an answer arguing among other things that the

petition is time-barred. (Doc. 12) Schottenbauer filed a reply on July 23, 2015. (Doc. 15) The

respondents are correct. The petition is time-barred.

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Discussion

The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The petition,

however, must be filed within the applicable statute of limitations or it will be dismissed. The

statute reads in pertinent part as follows:

 (1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of--

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created

by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the

United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing

by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of

limitation under this subsection.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). The “one-year statute of limitations . . . applies to each claim in a habeas

application on an individual basis.” Mardesich v. Cate, 668 F.3d 1164, 1170 (9th Cir. 2012).

Claim (1) was raised for the first time in Schottenbauer’s direct appeal. Accordingly, the

limitation period for Claim (1) was triggered on “the date on which the judgment became final

by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). 

The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Schottenbauer’s convictions and sentences on

June 11, 1996. (Doc. 12-2, p. 27) His motion for reconsideration was denied on July 2, 1996.

(Doc. 12-2, p. 42) The Arizona Supreme Court denied Schottenbauer’s petition for review on

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December 23, 1996. (Doc. 12-3, p. 24) Schottenbauer then had 90 days to petition the U.S.

Supreme Court for review. Sup. Ct. R. 13. When he did not do so, his judgment became final.

See Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1999). 

 The one-year limitation period did not start immediately, however, because

Schottenbauer was pursuing post-conviction relief, which tolled the running of the limitation

period. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Tolling pursuant to § 2244(d)(2) continued until the

Arizona Court of Appeals denied relief on April 30, 1998. (Doc. 12-5, p. 16) The limitation

period began running the next day and expired one year later on April 30, 1999. See also White

v. Klitzkie, 281 F.3d 920, 923 n. 4 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[I]t is the decision of the state appellate

court, rather than the ministerial act of entry of the mandate, that signals the conclusion of

review.”). 

Approximately 15 years later, on January 15, 2015, Schottenbauer filed the pending

petition in this court. Claim (1) is time-barred. See also Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820,

823 (9th Cir. 2003) (The limitation period is not renewed each time a petitioner files notice of

post-conviction relief.).

The facts underlying Claim (2) were known to Schottenbauer before trial. (Doc. 12-5,

p. 17) Accordingly, the limitations period for this claim was also triggered when the judgment

became final. Claim (2), like Claim(1), is time-barred. See above.

Claim (3) was presented in Schottenbauer’s second post-conviction proceeding. (Doc.

1, p. 10) In this claim, Schottenbauer argues counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce

certain evidence at trial. It is not clear when the facts that underlie this claim became known

to Schottenbauer. The court will assume, without deciding, that they were not known to

Schottenbauer at the time his conviction became final. But see (Doc. 12-5, p. 30) Accordingly,

the limitation period for this claim was triggered “on the date on which the factual predicate

of the claim . . . presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.”

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). 

The limitation period for this claim was triggered at the latest on February 18, 2010 when

Schottenbauer filed his second notice of post-conviction relief. (Doc. 12-5, p. 30); 28 U.S.C.

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§ 2244(d)(1)(D). The limitation period was statutorily tolled until September 7, 2010, when his

petition before the Arizona Court of Appeals was dismissed. (Doc. 12-5, 38); 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(2). The limitation period began running the next day and expired one year later on

September 7, 2011. Approximately three years later, on January 15, 2015, Schottenbauer filed

the pending petition in this court. Claim 3 is time-barred. See also Ferguson v. Palmateer,

321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) (The limitation period is not renewed each time a petitioner

files notice of post-conviction relief.).

Claim (4) was presented in Schottenbauer’s third post-conviction proceeding. (Doc. 1,

p. 11) In this claim, Schottenbauer argues his trial counsel failed to evaluate the state’s plea

offer properly. (Doc. 1, p. 11) According to Schottenbauer, counsel did not know about his

videotaped confession when the state offered a favorable plea. Id. Counsel therefore did not

know how advantageous the plea really was. Id. Schottenbauer maintains that in April of 1995,

trial counsel told him: “I didn’t know they had that videotape. Had I known, I would have taken

the plea deal. Damn, I wish we’d taken it now!” Id. 

The facts underpinning this claim were known to Schottenbauer in April of 1995, before

his sentence was imposed. (Doc. 12-1, pp. 2-9); see also (Doc. 12-7, p. 53) The limitation

period for this claim was also triggered when his judgment became final. It is also time-barred.

See above.

In his reply, Schottenbauer argues his petition should be considered on the merits

because he has made a showing of “actual innocence.” (Doc. 15)

“Actual innocence, if proved, serves as a gateway through which a petitioner may pass

whether the impediment is a procedural bar or expiration of the statute of limitations.” Stewart

v. Cate, 757 F.3d 929, 937-938 (9th Cir. 2014). “When an otherwise time-barred habeas

petitioner presents evidence of innocence so strong that a court cannot have confidence in the

outcome of the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was free of non-harmless

constitutional error, the Court may consider the petition on the merits.” Id. (punctuation

modified). “The Supreme Court has recently cautioned, however, that tenable actual-innocence

gateway pleas are rare.” Id. “A petitioner does not meet the threshold requirement unless he

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persuades the district court that, in light of the new evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would

have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. The court finds that

Schottenbauer’s allegation of “actual innocence” is insufficient to excuse his failure to file a

timely petition.

At trial, the state introduced evidence that Schottenbauer sexually abused his

stepdaughter one night when she was nine years old. (Doc. 12-2, p. 6) The child victim

testified, and the state introduced Schottenbauer’s videotaped confession in which he admitted

the abuse, said “he was very sorry,” and reported “I don’t even feel like I deserve to be alive

right now.” (Doc. 12-1, p. 21); (Doc. 12-2, pp. 10, 11, 15) The abuse was first reported when

Schottenbauer was in the hospital for eye surgery, and his children were in the temporary

custody of his girlfriend, Michelle Cole. (Doc. 12-5, pp. 4-5) Schottenbauer argued at trial that

his stepdaughter was unhappy with Michelle Cole and made a false accusation because she

wanted to live with her mother or her grandparents. (Doc. 12-5, p. 31) He testified that he

confessed falsely because he thought that he would get his children back if he did so. (Doc. 12-

2, p. 16, n. 6)

In the pending petition, Schottenbauer argues his son Christopher could offer additional

evidence that his stepdaughter was “desperate” to escape the care of his girlfriend during his 10-

day hospital stay. (Doc. 15, p. 13) He further argues his stepdaughter was encouraged to make

a false accusation by his girlfriend, his sister, and his mother. (Doc. 15, p. 14) All of these

women, he reports, were sexually molested, and therefore they were predisposed to see sexual

abuse even where it did not exist. Because he had previously suffered a head injury, he was

easily manipulated by his sister into making a false confession based on her assurance that by

doing so he would regain custody of his children. (Doc. 15, p. 13); He further argues his

friend, Sheila A. Van Dyke, could have offered testimony supporting his allegations that his

girlfriend was a poor care giver and “the setting was ripe for an accusation against Michael.”

(Doc. 12-5, p. 4)

The additional evidence cited by Schottenbauer in the pending petition would have

strengthened his case. Nevertheless, the court cannot conclude that had it been offered at trial

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along with his confession and the victim’s testimony, “no juror, acting reasonably, would have

voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” See McQuiggin v. Perkins, __ U.S. __,

__, 133 S.Ct. 1924, 1928 (2013). At trial, the victim related in detail the abuse that occurred.

(Doc. 12-2, p. 16). She remembered what she had been wearing, described the color and pattern

of the bed sheets, and gave a detailed timeline of the abuse that occurred. Id. Schottenbauer’s

videotaped confession corroborated her testimony. He admitted to the abuse, said “he was very

sorry,” and reported “I don’t even feel like I deserve to be alive right now.” (Doc. 12-2, pp. 10,

11, 15) A reasonable juror could have believed the victim’s testimony and concluded

Schottenbauer’s videotaped confession was sincere. See (Doc. 12-2, p. 29) (“[E]very indication

is that appellant was remorseful and that he was doing what his sister had told him to do, that

is to tell the truth.”). 

Schottenbauer has not presented “evidence of innocence so strong that a court cannot

have confidence in the outcome of [his] trial.” See Stewart v. Cate, 757 F.3d 929, 937-938 (9th

Cir. 2014). His allegation of “actual innocence” is insufficient to excuse his failure to file a

timely petition.

RECOMMENDATION

The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after its independent review

of the record, enter an order DISMISSING the petition for writ of habeas corpus. (Doc. 1) It

is time-barred. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636 (b), any party may serve and file written objections within

14 days of being served with a copy of this report and recommendation. If objections are not

timely filed, they may be deemed waived. The Local Rules permit a response to an objection.

They do not permit a reply to a response.

DATED this 29th day of July, 2015.

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