Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-02268/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-02268-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal - Employment Discrimination

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1

By order filed August 11, 2005, the Court deferred ruling on plaintiff’s motion to

continue the hearing on defendant’s motion for summary judgment, to the extent the motion

was based on plaintiff’s seeking a further opportunity to depose a third-party witness,

Michelle Dannis (“Dannis”). The Court hereby DENIES the remaining aspect of plaintiff’s

motion to continue as moot. As the Court previously stated, testimony by Dannis, “at best,

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LASHAWN BUTLER,

Plaintiff,

 v.

NORDSTROM, INC.,

Defendant /

No. 04-2268 MMC

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT;

VACATING HEARING

Before the Court is defendant Nordstrom, Inc.’s motion for summary judgment,

pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff LaShawn Butler has

filed opposition, to which defendant has replied. Having reviewed the papers filed by the

parties, the Court deems the matter suitable for decision on the papers, VACATES the

hearing scheduled for September 9, 2005, and rules as follows.

1. Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s wrongful termination

claim. Assuming, arguendo, plaintiff could establish she was constructively discharged,

plaintiff has failed to present evidence to support a finding that any such discharge was

wrongful.1 First, defendant has offered evidence that plaintiff’s employment was at-will,

Case 3:04-cv-02268-MMC Document 119 Filed 08/25/05 Page 1 of 4
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might support a finding that plaintiff was constructively discharged.” (See Order, filed

August 11, 2005, at 2:8-10.) As explained herein, however, plaintiff cannot establish a

wrongful discharge claim, even assuming she can establish she was constructively

discharged.

2

Plaintiff offers evidence that Wheatfill advised plaintiff during a performance review

that plaintiff “sort of rocked the boat,” (see Butler Decl. ¶ 3), and that, on another occasion,

Wheatfill expressed “anger” after learning plaintiff met with the store director about

plaintiff’s interest in becoming a fashion buyer, (see id. ¶ 7). While such evidence may

indicate some concern on Wheatfill’s part about intra- and/or inter-departmental relations, it

2

(see Choi Decl. Ex. B; Barbara Decl. Ex. A at 198:13-24), and plaintiff offers no evidence to

the contrary. Second, plaintiff has failed to offer any evidence to support a finding that her

termination implicated a fundamental public policy. See Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 7

Cal. 4th 1238, 1251-52 (1994) (holding that in absence of breach of express or implied

contract for other than at-will employment, employee can prevail on claim for wrongful

termination only if reason for termination “contravenes fundamental public policy as

expressed in a constitutional or statutory provision”).

2. Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s conversion claim. 

Plaintiff asserts that some of her co-workers credited, to another employee, certain sales

for which plaintiff was entitled to credit. Plaintiff argues that defendant should be held

responsible because the managers to whom she complained failed to take sufficient action. 

“[T]he rule in this state is that the employer is liable for the willful misconduct of his

employees acting in a managerial capacity.” Agarwal v. Johnson, 25 Cal. 3d 932, 947

(1979), disapproved on other grounds, White v. Ultrimar, 21 Cal. 4th 563, 574 fn. 4 (1999). 

In support of its motion, defendant has offered evidence that two of its managers, Andrea

Wheatfill (“Wheatfill”) and May Choi (“Choi”), as well as defendant’s “Loss Prevention”

department, conducted separate investigations into plaintiff’s charges, and that defendant

determined as a result of such investigations that plaintiff’s co-workers had not engaged in

improper conduct. (See Choi Decl. ¶ 5; Wheatfill Decl. ¶ 5.) In opposition, plaintiff offers

no evidence to contradict defendant’s evidence or to otherwise establish a triable issue of

fact as to whether the manner in which defendant’s managers investigated plaintiff’s

complaints constituted “willful misconduct” on the part of the managers.2

 Cf. Agarwal, 25

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does not constitute evidence sufficient to support a finding that Wheatfill engaged in willful

misconduct with respect to the manner in which Wheatfill investigated plaintiff’s claims

against her co-workers.

3

Attached to plaintiff’s declaration is a “Demand for Production of Documents,” which

plaintiff apparently served on defendant; plaintiff has not indicated, however, which

documents referenced therein have not been produced.

3

Cal. 3d at 947 (holding defendant employer properly held liable for act of supervisor who

ratified plaintiff’s termination even though supervisor knew proffered reason for termination

was untrue); Cotran v. Rollings Hudig Hall Int’l, Inc., 17 Cal. 4th 69, 109 (1998) (holding,

where manager has made determination as to whether employee engaged in misconduct,

“the question critical to defendants’ liability is not whether [the misconduct occurred], but

whether at the time the decision . . . was made, defendants, acting in good faith and

following an investigation that was appropriate under the circumstances, had reasonable

grounds for believing [the misconduct occurred]”).

3. In a declaration dated August 9, 2005, plaintiff states defendant has not produced

documents that, according to plaintiff, defendant had been ordered to produce by

Magistrate Judge Edward Chen. The Court construes plaintiff’s declaration as a request for

a continuance under Rule 56(f). So construed, the request is denied on the ground plaintiff

has failed to identify the documents that allegedly have not been produced,3

 and has failed

to set forth the reasons why such documents, if offered, would suffice to defeat defendant’s

motion. See Garrett v. City and County of San Francisco, 818 F. 2d 1515, 1518 (9th Cir.

1987) (holding party opposing summary judgment, to properly support a request for

continuance, “must make clear what information is sought and how it would preclude

summary judgment”).

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4

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, defendant’s motion for summary judgment is

hereby GRANTED.

The Clerk shall close the file and terminate all pending motions.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 25, 2005 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

Case 3:04-cv-02268-MMC Document 119 Filed 08/25/05 Page 4 of 4