Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_10-cv-08014/USCOURTS-azd-3_10-cv-08014-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 371
Nature of Suit: Truth in Lending
Cause of Action: 15:1601 Truth in Lending

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Christopher Fromkin,

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Indymac Bank FSB, a Federally Chartered

Savings Bank, Mortgage Electronic

Registration Systems, Inc., a Delaware

corporation, OneWest Bank FSB, a

Federally Chartered Savings Bank, Quality

Loan Services, Inc., Trustee, a California

Corporation, IMB REO, LLC, a Delaware

limited liability company, John Does I-X;

Jane Does I-X; ABC Corporations

I-X;CDF Partnerships I-X and XYZ

Investors IX.,

Defendants. 

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No. 10-CV-8014-PCT-PGR

 ORDER

Currently before the Court is Defendants Onewest Bank, FSB, Mortgage Electronic

Registration Systems, Inc., and IMB REO, LLC’s (collectively referred to as Moving

Defendants) Motion for Award of Attorney’s Fees and Related Non-taxable Expenses (Doc.

30.) No Response has been filed by Plaintiff Christopher Fromkin.

I. BACKGROUND

On March 29, 2010, the Moving Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended

Complaint in its entirety. On June 18, 2010, the Court granted the Moving Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss. Consequently, the Court dismissed each of Plaintiff’s claims against the

Moving Defendants and entered judgment in favor of the Moving Defendants and against

Case 3:10-cv-08014-PGR Document 36 Filed 09/09/10 Page 1 of 5
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 The Moving Defendants are entitled to the amount of $685.10 based upon the

unopposed Bill of Costs filed by Moving Defendants and the Taxation of Costs order entered

by the Clerk of Court. (Doc. 32.)

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Plaintiff. In doing so, the Court ordered that Plaintiff take nothing and the Amended

Complaint and action be dismissed in its entirety.

Plaintiff’s claims were contract-based, grounded in the Deed of Trust (the “Deed”)

and the case arose from allegations of wrongful conduct of Moving Defendants involving the

Deed. The Deed unequivocally provides for the recovery of attorney’s fees and costs to the

prevailing party in an action involving the Deed. Accordingly, based on the Court’s

resolution of the Motion to Dismiss, the Moving Defendants are entitled to recover from

Plaintiff their reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.1

Moving Defendants request the Court award them the amount of $24,610.00 for

attorney’s fees incurred in this action and an award of $3,968.81 for related non-taxable

expenses. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD and ANALYSIS

A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A) states that, “[I]n any contested action arising out of a contract,

express or implied, the Court may award the successful party reasonable attorney[’]s fees.”

In addition, the statute provides that the amount of attorney fees awarded to the successful

party need not equal or relate to the attorney’s fees actually paid or contracted. A.R.S. § 12-

341.01(B). The Arizona Supreme Court has acknowledged that the statute vests trial courts

with broad discretion in accessing attorney’s fees. Associated Indem. Corp. v. Warner, 694

P.2d 1181, 1184 (Ariz. 1985) (citations omitted). This action arose out of a contract and

conduct related thereto; therefore, the requests for attorney’s fees are governed by A.R.S. §

12-341.01.

The Arizona Supreme Court has adopted the following six factors to help guide a

court’s discretion as to whether to award attorney’s fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01: (1) the

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merits of the claim or defense presented by the unsuccessful party; (2) the litigation could

have been avoided or settled and the successful party’s efforts were completely superfluous

in achieving the result; (3) assessing fees against the unsuccessful party would cause an

extreme hardship; (4) the successful party did not prevail with respect to all of the relief

sought; (5) the novelty of the legal question presented and whether such claim or defense had

been previously adjudicated in this jurisdiction; and (6) whether the award would discourage

other parties with tenable claims or defenses from litigating or defending legitimate contract

issues for fear of incurring liability for substantial amounts of attorney’s fees. Associated

Indem. Corp., 694 P.2d at 1184. These factors weigh strongly in favor of awarding

attorney’s fees to the Moving Defendants as the successful parties in this litigation.

The first factor considered by the Court is whether Fromkin’s claims against Moving

Defendants were meritorious. The Court concludes that they were not. Fromkin failed to

offer any competent evidence linking Moving Defendants with any adverse conduct with

regard to the foreclosure of Fromkin’s property. Based on the loan documents provided,

Fromkin failed to state a claim against the Moving Defendants. Second, this litigation could

not have been resolved short of Fromkin dismissing its claims against Moving Defendants.

Based on the nature of the claims against Moving Defendants, there was no reasonable option

for settlement in this particular case. Moreover, Fromkin had raised these and/or similar

claims previously in Superior Court without success. The third and fourth factors also weigh

in favor of awarding attorney’s fees. Fromkin has provided no evidence that he would suffer

extreme hardship if he was forced to pay attorney’s fees. However, based on the fact that this

was a forcible detainer/illegal foreclosure case, it is reasonable to infer that it is at least likely

that he would suffer some level of hardship if forced to pay attorney’s fees. Fromkin,

however, did not file a Response to the Moving Defendants’ Motion for an Award of

Attorney’s Fees, thus the Court does not know what level of hardship, if any, he would suffer

if ordered to pay attorney’s fees. Furthermore, though they were not novel claims brought

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by Plaintiff, Moving Defendants prevailed with respect to all relief sought, equitable and

legal.

Finally, as to the last factor, the Court has considered the issue and has determined

that awarding attorney’s fees would not discourage other parties with tenable claims or

defenses from litigating or defending legitimate [contract] issues for fear of incurring liability

for substantial amounts of attorney’s fees. In the pending matter, the Deed at issue provided

for a recovery of attorney’s fees and costs to the prevailing party. Thus, Plaintiff had notice

of the potential liability and took the risk when he filed the claims, some on multiple

occasions in multiple forums. Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that the Moving

Defendants be awarded their reasonable attorney’s fees.

The Ninth Circuit requires a district court to calculate an award of attorney’s fees by

first calculating the lodestar. See Caudle v. Bristow Optical Co. Inc., 224 F.3d 1014, 1028

(9th Cir. 2000). The lodestar is calculated by multiplying the number of hours the prevailing

party reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate and excluding those

hours that are “excessive, redundant or otherwise unnecessary.” Id. at 1028; Van Gerwen

v. Guarantee Mutual Life Ins. Co., 214 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2000).

Next, the district court must assess whether additional considerations require it to

adjust the figure. Caudle, 224 F.3d at 1028; accord Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526

F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 951 (1976) (factors the court can consider

in adjusting the lodestar are: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty

of the questions involved; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the

preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the

customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the

client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the

experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the undesirability of the case; (11)

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the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in

similar cases).

The Court has considered the aforementioned factors. In particular, the Court

carefully considered the individual attorneys and staff who contributed to this case and their

respective experience and reputation, as well as the nature and length of the professional

relationship between the Moving Defendants and their attorneys, and awards in similar cases.

Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that Moving Defendants are entitled to an award

of attorney’s fees in the amount of $24,610.00 and an award of their non-taxable expenses

incurred in the amount of $3,968.81.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED GRANTING the Moving Defendants’ Motion for

Attorney’s Fees and Related Nontaxable Expenses (Doc. 30).

DATED this 9th day of September, 2010.

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