Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00020/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00020-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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MDR 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Samuel Louis Fuller, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

Kari Jill Granville, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV 14-0020-PHX-DGC (JFM) 

ORDER 

Plaintiff Samuel Louis Fuller, who is confined in the Maricopa County Fourth 

Avenue Jail, has filed a pro se civil rights Complaint (Doc. 1) pursuant to Bivens v. Six 

Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971),1

 and an 

Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2). He has also filed a Motion for a 

Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. 6). The Court will grant 

the Application to Proceed, will order Defendant Hansdall to answer a portion of Count 

Two of the Complaint, will dismiss the remaining claims and Defendants, and will deny 

the Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. 

. . . . 

 

1

 Although Plaintiff brought his Complaint pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown 

Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), he has only sued individuals who are acting under color of state law. Therefore, the Court will construe 

his claims as brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Martin v. Sias, 88 F.3d 774, 775 

(9th Cir. 1996) (“Actions under § 1983 and those under Bivens are identical save for the 

replacement of a state actor under § 1983 by a federal actor under Bivens.” (quoting Van 

Strum v. Lawn, 940 F.2d 406, 409 (9th Cir. 1991))). 

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I. Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Filing Fee

 Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis will be granted. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). Plaintiff must pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). 

The Court will not assess an initial partial filing fee. Id. The statutory filing fee will be 

collected monthly in payments of 20% of the previous month’s income credited to 

Plaintiff’s trust account each time the amount in the account exceeds $10.00. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(2). The Court will enter a separate Order requiring the appropriate government 

agency to collect and forward the fees according to the statutory formula. 

II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff 

has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is 

immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

 A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 

does not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 

 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible 

claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw 

on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s 

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specific factual allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must 

assess whether there are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id.

at 681. 

 But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, 

courts must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 

342 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less 

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. 

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). 

III. Complaint 

 In his two-count Complaint, Plaintiff sues the following Defendants: courtappointed defense attorney Kari Jill Granville, Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office 

(MCSO) Sergeant Hansdall, MCSO Field Training Officer Abbott, and MCSO 

Visitation/Inmate Property Department Officer Alger. 

 In Count One, Plaintiff alleges that he has received “ineffective advice of 

counsel”, in violation of his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and has 

been subjected to a “[c]onspiracy to co[]erce incompetency during trial.” Plaintiff asserts 

that when Defendant Granville initially met with Plaintiff, she told him that his case was 

going to be “unbelievable” if Plaintiff took the stand and testified and that the testimony 

of nine police officers would likely be more credible. Plaintiff states that Defendant 

Granville suggested that Plaintiff make his testimony “beli[e]vable,” which Plaintiff 

construed to mean that he should either not testify or testify falsely. Plaintiff contends 

that when Plaintiff stated that he would testify truthfully, Defendant Granville explained 

to Plaintiff that “[t]his system is nothing more th[a]n a ‘big pimp’ and unfortunately 

[Plaintiff was] on the ‘whore’ end of the spectrum in this instance.” Plaintiff claims he 

was injured because Defendant Granville tried to persuade him to either fabricate his 

testimony or waive his right to testify and “disrespected [him] by calling [him] a Hoe!” 

 In Count Two, Plaintiff alleges that he has been subjected to cruel and unusual 

punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Although Plaintiff’s 

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rambling allegations are difficult to follow, it appears he is raising two separate claims. 

 First, it appears that Plaintiff is alleging that he was subjected to retaliation by 

Defendants Alger and Abbott. Plaintiff asserts that after he filed a grievance regarding 

Defendant Alger and informed Defendant Alger that he had filed two civil rights lawsuits 

against another officer, Defendant Alger told Plaintiff that he should not attempt to 

intimidate MCSO staff. Plaintiff states that he then noticed that he had named Defendant 

Alger as a defendant in another lawsuit and then spoke to Defendant Alger regarding 

Defendant Alger’s statement that Plaintiff should not attempt to intimidate staff. 

 Plaintiff contends that Defendant Alger directed other sergeants to target and 

harass Plaintiff. He claims that the following day, Defendant Alger retaliated against 

Plaintiff by serving Plaintiff with a disciplinary action report/write-up in which he 

accused Plaintiff of using “laud” language in an inmate request form. He also asserts that 

two shift sergeants approached Plaintiff’s cell and harassed Plaintiff by making him stand 

up and show his face while he was sleeping or by telling him to remove a piece of paper 

from his wall. Plaintiff claims that Plaintiff also contends that on one occasion, 

Defendant Abbott repeatedly kicked Plaintiff’s cell door and demanded that Plaintiff 

show his face, although Plaintiff was asleep and his identification was in plain view. 

 Second, Plaintiff alleges that he was subjected to excessive force by Defendant 

Hansdall. Plaintiff claims that Defendant Hansdall directed other officers to use chemical 

devices and fire mace, pepper spray bullets, gas fogger bombs, and a taser at Plaintiff in 

response to Plaintiff’s refusal to follow a nurse’s instruction that Plaintiff chew in her 

presence a chewable Tums tablet. He also contends that after the medical department 

“cleared” Plaintiff, Defendant Hansdall instructed other detention officers to put Plaintiff 

in a “contaminated” holding cell for three hours. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant 

Hansdall knew the cell was contaminated and that the holding cell was not wellventilated and the toilet was filled with urine and feces and would not flush. Plaintiff 

also claims Defendant Hansdall was acting vicariously for Defendant Alger and another 

officer. 

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 In his Request for Relief, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and “interposition by 

way of [an] injunction order” that requires Plaintiff to be transferred to the custody of the 

United States Marshal “for the duration and final decision in [his] ongoing criminal 

prosecution CR-2012-006837-001 DT.” 

IV. Failure to State a Claim

 Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 

520-21 (1972), conclusory and vague allegations will not support a cause of action. Ivey 

v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Further, a 

liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the 

claim that were not initially pled. Id. 

A. Count One 

 A prerequisite for any relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is a showing that the 

defendant has acted under the color of state law. A public defender or court-appointed 

attorney representing a criminal defendant does not act under color of state law. See Polk 

County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981); see also Szijarto v. Legeman, 466 F.2d 864, 

864 (9th Cir. 1972). However, a public defender engaged in intentional misconduct as a 

part of a conspiracy with state actors to violate a plaintiff’s rights can be liable under 

§ 1983 for that misconduct. See Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 923 (1984). 

 To state a conspiracy claim, a plaintiff “must show ‘an agreement or ‘meeting of 

the minds’ to violate constitutional rights.’” Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 441 (9th Cir. 

2002) (citation omitted). The Court “need not, however, accept as true allegations that 

are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” 

Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir.), amended on other 

grounds, 275 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001). “A mere allegation of conspiracy without 

factual specificity is insufficient.” Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 

621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Woodrum v. Woodward County, 866 F.2d 1121, 1126 

(9th Cir. 1989) (conclusory allegations of conspiracy did not support a § 1983 claim). 

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 Plaintiff has used the word “conspiracy,” but has not made any allegations of an 

agreement or meeting of the minds between Defendant Granville and any other 

individual. Plaintiff has therefore failed to state a claim against Defendant Granville and 

the Court will dismiss Defendant Granville and Count One. 

B. Count Two – Defendants Alger and Abbott

 First, to the extent Plaintiff is alleging that Defendants Alger’s and Abbott’s 

conduct constitutes excessive force, he has failed to state a claim. The Fourteenth 

Amendment Due Process Clause, not the Eighth Amendment, protects pretrial detainees 

from excessive force that amounts to punishment. Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 

1175, 1197 (9th Cir. 2002). “[T]he Fourth Amendment sets the ‘applicable constitutional 

limitations’ for considering claims of excessive force during pretrial detention.” Id. 

(quoting Pierce v. Multnomah County, 76 F.3d 1032, 1043 (9th Cir. 1996). 

 The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the use of reasonable force. Tatum v. 

City & County of San Francisco, 441 F.3d 1090, 1095 (9th Cir. 2006). Whether the force 

was excessive depends on “whether the officers’ actions [were] ‘objectively reasonable’ 

in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their 

underlying intent or motivation.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989); Tatum, 

441 F.3d at 1095; Lolli v. County of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 415 (9th Cir. 2003). The 

Court must balance the nature and quality of the intrusion against the countervailing 

governmental interests at stake. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396; Lolli, 351 F.3d at 415. 

Moreover, 

[t]he “reasonableness” of a particular use of force must be 

judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the 

scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. . . . . 

“Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem 

unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers,” violates the 

Fourth Amendment. 

Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (citations omitted). 

Defendants Alger’s and Abbott’s conduct does not rise to the level of excessive 

force. See Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830 F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir. 1987) (“‘[v]erbal 

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harassment or abuse . . . is not sufficient to state a constitutional deprivation under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983’” (quoting Collins v. Cundy, 603 F.2d 825, 827 (10th Cir. 1979))). Thus, 

the Court will dismiss without prejudice Plaintiff’s excessive force claim against 

Defendants Alger and Abbott. 

 Second, to the extent Plaintiff is alleging that he was subjected to retaliation by 

Defendants Alger and Abbott, he has failed to state a claim. A viable claim of First 

Amendment retaliation contains five basic elements: (1) an assertion that a state actor 

took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected 

conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment 

rights (or that the inmate suffered more than minimal harm) and (5) did not reasonably 

advance a legitimate correctional goal. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th 

Cir. 2005); see also Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 267 (9th Cir. 1997) (retaliation claims 

requires an inmate to show (1) that the prison official acted in retaliation for the exercise 

of a constitutionally protected right, and (2) that the action “advanced no legitimate 

penological interest”). The plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating that his exercise of 

his First Amendment rights was a substantial or motivating factor behind the defendants’ 

conduct. Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977); 

Soranno’s Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989). 

 Plaintiff does not allege that the exercise of his First Amendment rights was 

chilled by Defendants Alger’s and Abbott’s conduct, that he suffered more than minimal 

harm from their conduct, or that there was no reasonable correctional goal advanced by 

their conduct. Thus, the Court will dismiss without prejudice Plaintiff’s retaliation claim 

against Defendants Alger and Abbott. 

 Finally, to the extent Plaintiff is alleging that Defendant Hansdall was acting 

vicariously for Defendant Alger, this does not state a claim against Defendant Alger 

because there is no vicarious liability under § 1983. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. 

V. Claims for Which an Answer Will be Required – Defendant Hansdall

 Liberally construed, Plaintiff has stated a Fourteenth Amendment excessive force 

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claim against Defendant Hansdall in Count Two. The Court will require Defendant 

Hansdall to answer Count Two. 

VI. Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order

 In his Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order, 

Plaintiff seeks to be transferred to the custody of the United States Marshal “until the 

conclusion of his state criminal proceeding in . . . . CR 2012-006837-001 DT”;2

 to 

prevent Defendants Hansdall, Abbott, and Alger from engaging in any written, verbal, or 

physical interaction regarding “any of Plaintiff’s criminal proceedings and or institutional 

functions”; and to prevent “any representation or hand[]ling of discover[y] of the 

Plaintiff’s criminal case.” 

 Whether to grant or deny a motion for a temporary restraining order or preliminary 

injunction is within the Court’s discretion. See Miss Universe, Inc. v. Flesher, 605 F.2d 

1130, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 1979). 

 1. Temporary Restraining Order

 A temporary restraining order can be issued without notice 

only if: (A) specific facts in an affidavit or a verified 

complaint show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or 

damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can 

be heard in opposition; and (B) the movant’s attorney 

certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and the 

reasons why it should not be required. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1) (emphasis added). See also LRCiv 65.1 (“Ex parte restraining 

orders shall only issue in accordance with Rule 65, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”). 

 To the extent Plaintiff is seeking a temporary restraining order, he is seeking a 

temporary restraining order without notice, yet has not certified the “efforts made to give 

notice and the reasons why it should not be required.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(B). 

Because the request for a temporary restraining order fails to comply with Rule 

 

2

 On April 21, 2014, Plaintiff pleaded guilty to Attempted Aggravated Assault on a Law Enforcement Officer in CR 2012-006837-001-DT. See http://www.courtminutes. maricopa.gov/docs/Criminal/042014/m6273559.pdf (last visited Aug. 18, 2014). 

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65(b)(1)(B), the Court, in its discretion, will deny that request. See LRCiv 65.1. See also 

American Can Co. v. Mansukhani, 742 F.2d 314, 321 (7th Cir. 1984) (district court 

abused its discretion in granting ex parte temporary restraining order “when there was no 

valid reason for proceeding ex parte and by disregarding the strict procedural 

requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b) for the issuance of such ex parte orders”); Adobe 

Systems, Inc. v. South Sun Products, Inc., 187 F.R.D. 636 (S.D. Cal. 1999). 

 2. Preliminary Injunction 

 To obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must show “that he is likely 

to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 

preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in 

the public interest.” Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 

(2008). The moving party has the burden of proof on each element of the test. 

Environmental Council of Sacramento v. Slater, 184 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1027 (E.D. Cal. 

2000). 

 To the extent Plaintiff is seeking a preliminary injunction, he has failed to meet his 

burden and has failed to address many of the elements of the test. Thus, the Court will 

deny Plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction. 

VII. Warnings

A. Release

 Plaintiff must pay the unpaid balance of the filing fee within 120 days of his 

release. Also, within 30 days of his release, he must either (1) notify the Court that he 

intends to pay the balance or (2) show good cause, in writing, why he cannot. Failure to 

comply may result in dismissal of this action. 

B. Address Changes

 Plaintiff must file and serve a notice of a change of address in accordance with 

Rule 83.3(d) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff must not include a motion 

for other relief with a notice of change of address. Failure to comply may result in 

dismissal of this action. 

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C. Copies

 Plaintiff must serve Defendant, or counsel if an appearance has been entered, a 

copy of every document that he files. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a). Each filing must include a 

certificate stating that a copy of the filing was served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d). Also, 

Plaintiff must submit an additional copy of every filing for use by the Court. See LRCiv 

5.4. Failure to comply may result in the filing being stricken without further notice to 

Plaintiff. 

D. Possible Dismissal

 If Plaintiff fails to timely comply with every provision of this Order, including 

these warnings, the Court may dismiss this action without further notice. See Ferdik v. 

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (a district court may dismiss an action 

for failure to comply with any order of the Court). 

IT IS ORDERED: 

 (1) Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2) is granted. 

 (2) As required by the accompanying Order to the appropriate government 

agency, Plaintiff must pay the $350.00 filing fee and is not assessed an initial partial 

filing fee. 

 (3) Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining 

Order (Doc. 6) is denied without prejudice. 

(4) Count One is dismissed without prejudice. 

 (5) Defendants Granville, Abbott, and Alger are dismissed without prejudice. 

 (6) Defendant Hansdall must answer the relevant portion of Count Two. 

 (7) The Clerk of Court must send Plaintiff a service packet including the 

Complaint (Doc. 1), this Order, and both summons and request for waiver forms for 

Defendant Hansdall. 

 (8) Plaintiff must complete and return the service packet to the Clerk of Court 

within 21 days of the date of filing of this Order. The United States Marshal will not 

provide service of process if Plaintiff fails to comply with this Order. 

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 (9) If Plaintiff does not either obtain a waiver of service of the summons or 

complete service of the Summons and Complaint on Defendant within 120 days of the 

filing of the Complaint or within 60 days of the filing of this Order, whichever is later, 

the action may be dismissed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m); LRCiv 16.2(b)(2)(B)(i). 

 (10) The United States Marshal must retain the Summons, a copy of the 

Complaint, and a copy of this Order for future use. 

 (11) The United States Marshal must notify Defendant of the commencement of 

this action and request waiver of service of the summons pursuant to Rule 4(d) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The notice to Defendant must include a copy of this 

Order. The Marshal must immediately file signed waivers of service of the 

summons. If a waiver of service of summons is returned as undeliverable or is not 

returned by a Defendant within 30 days from the date the request for waiver was 

sent by the Marshal, the Marshal must: 

(a) personally serve copies of the Summons, Complaint, and this Order 

upon Defendant pursuant to Rule 4(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; 

and 

(b) within 10 days after personal service is effected, file the return of 

service for Defendant, along with evidence of the attempt to secure a waiver of 

service of the summons and of the costs subsequently incurred in effecting service 

upon Defendant. The costs of service must be enumerated on the return of service 

form (USM-285) and must include the costs incurred by the Marshal for 

photocopying additional copies of the Summons, Complaint, or this Order and for 

preparing new process receipt and return forms (USM-285), if required. Costs of 

service will be taxed against the personally served Defendant pursuant to Rule 

4(d)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, unless otherwise ordered by the 

Court. 

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 (12) If Defendant agrees to waive service of the Summons and Complaint, 

he must return the signed waiver forms to the United States Marshal, not the 

Plaintiff.

 (13) Defendant must answer the relevant portion of Count Two of the Complaint 

or otherwise respond by appropriate motion within the time provided by the applicable 

provisions of Rule 12(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

 (14) This matter is referred to Magistrate Judge James F. Metcalf pursuant to 

Rules 72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure for all pretrial proceedings as 

authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

 Dated this 12th day of September, 2014. 

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