Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00986/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00986-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 950
Nature of Suit: Contitutionality of State Statutes
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LONGSTREET DELICATESSEN, FINE

WINES & SPECIALITY COFFEES,

L.L.C, a Virginia Company;

SHARON L. WINTORY, an

individual; ELLEN

ANSOLABEHERE, an individual,

Plaintiffs,

v.

JERRY R. JOLLY, DIRECTOR,

California Alcohol Beverage

Control Board,

Defendant.

1:06-CV-00986-OWW DLB

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

GRANTING DEFENDANT’S CROSSMOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF

STANDING (DOC. 29); DENYING

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT (DOC. 26)

1. INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the court based on Plaintiffs’

complaint that Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 23661.2 and § 23661.1,

which regulate the out-of-state shipment and delivery of wine

into California, are unconstitutional in violation of the dormant 

Commerce Clause, U.S. Const. Article I, §8, Cl. 3, and violate

Plaintiffs’ civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1,

Complaint, Filed July 28, 2006.) The Plaintiffs moved for

summary judgment. (Doc. 27, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary

Judgment, Filed September 12, 2006.) Defendant opposed the

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motion and moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint for lack of

standing. (Doc. 29, Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment,

Filed October 6, 2006.) 

2. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on July 28, 2006. (Doc. 1,

Complaint.) Plaintiffs then filed a motion for summary judgment

and a finding that Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 23661.2 and § 23661.1

unlawfully violates the Commerce Clause and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

(Doc. 27, Motion for Summary Judgment (“Motion”), Filed September

12, 2006.) Defendant opposed Plaintiffs’ motion and also moved

to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint for lack of standing. (Doc. 29,

Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment (“Opposition”), October

6, 2006.) Defendant also filed several objections to Plaintiffs’

evidence submitted in support of their motion. (Doc. 30,

Evidentiary Objections, October 6, 2006.) On October 16, 2006,

Plaintiffs filed their reply to Defendant’s Opposition and to

Defendant’s Evidentiary Objections. (Doc. 37, Reply to Opposition

to Motion for Summary Judgment; Doc. 43, Reply Response to

Defendant’s Objections to Plaintiff’s Evidence, Filed October 16,

2006.) 

On November 7, 2006, Defendant filed a request for

consideration of a ruling in Nothing to It!!! v. Jerry R. Jolly,

06-02653 MJJ (N.D.Cal. November 3, 2006.). (Doc. 45, Request for

Consideration of Ruling, Filed November 7, 2006.) Plaintiffs

filed a request for judicial notice of the files and records

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 Plaintiffs did not attach the files they are requesting 1

judicial notice for. The files are not found anywhere in the

record. Plaintiffs only attached files from the case of Coulombe

v. Jolly, 447 F. Supp. 2d 1117 (C.D. Cal. 2006). 

 Cal. Bus. and Prof. Code § 23661.2 states in pertinent 2

part: 

“Notwithstanding any other law, an individual or

retail licensee in a state that affords California

retail licensees or individuals an equal reciprocal

shipping privilege, may ship, for personal use and not

for resale, no more than two cases of wine (no more

than nine liters each case) per month to any adult

resident in this state. Delivery of a shipment

pursuant to this subdivision shall not be deemed to

constitute a sale in this state. The shipping

container of any wine sent into or out of this state

under this section shall be clearly labeled to indicate

that the container cannot be delivered to a minor or an

intoxicated person.”

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filed in Nothing To It!!! on December 29, 2006. (Doc. 48, 1

Request for Judicial Notice, Filed December 29, 2006.) On

January 1, 2007, Defendant opposed Plaintiffs’ request for

judicial notice. (Doc. 50, Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s

Request for Judicial Notice, Filed January 1, 2007.) 

3. FACTUAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. Cal. Bus. and Prof. Code § 23661.2 

Plaintiffs first contest the constitutionality of Cal. Bus.

and Prof. Code § 23661.2. Plaintiffs argue that, under the 2

statute, only if a state has reciprocal shipping privileges with

California, can retail licensees and individuals of that state

ship, no more than two cases of wine per month to adult residents

of California for personal use and not for resale. Plaintiffs

argue that the statute unlawfully discriminates in at least three

ways: 

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 Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 23661.1 states in pertinent 3

part: 

“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an

adult passenger on board a chartered airplane on a

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1. As between in-state and out-of-state licensed

retailers in non reciprocity states, if the State

does not have a reciprocal shipping privilege with

California, then retail licensees and individuals

in non reciprocity states are not allowed to ship

any wine to adults in California.

2. As between licensed retailers in a reciprocity

state versus licensed retailers in a non

reciprocity state, licenced retailers in

reciprocity states can ship 2 case per month of

wine to an individual within California but a

licensed retailer in a non reciprocity state

cannot ship any wine to an individual in

California. 

3. As between in-state retailers and out-of-state 

licensed retailers in a reciprocity state, out-ofstate licensed retailers in reciprocity states are

limited to a shipment of two cases of wine per

month to individuals in California whereas instate retailers may make unlimited shipments to

California individuals. 

B. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 23661.1

Plaintiffs also dispute the constitutionality of the

chartered flight provision in Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 23661.1.3

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flight which commences and terminates in the

continental United States and which does not land

outside the continental United States, may bring not to

exceed one quart of alcoholic beverages into this State

for household or personal use. Such alcoholic beverages

shall be exempt from state licensing restrictions. No

person shall bring in more than one quart of alcoholic

beverages during any calendar year pursuant to the

authority granted in this section.”

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Plaintiffs argue that even though not part of the

reciprocity sales regime, the discrimination § 23661.1 effects is

generically similar in many ways to that inflicted by the

reciprocity regime. According to Plaintiffs, under the statute:

1. an adult on a chartered flight, 2. that starts and ends in the

continental US, and 3. does not stop outside the continental US,

4. can bring into California one quart of wine per year. 

Plaintiffs argue that § 23661.1 discriminates against out-ofstate interests as follows: 

1. § 23661.1 does not allow an adult passenger on

board a chartered or regularly scheduled airplane

on a flight which commences in Alaska or Hawaii

and terminates in California and which lands

outside the continental United States to bring any

wine into California but allows passengers on a

chartered flight that commences and terminates in

the United States but does not land outside the

United States to bring into California one quart

of wine per year

2. An adult passenger on board a chartered airplane

on a flight which commences and terminates in the

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continental United States and does not land

outside the continental United States is

restricted to bringing one quart of wine into

California, but passengers on board a chartered

plane on a flight that commences and terminates in

California, without landing outside of California,

is allowed to carry an unlimited amount of wine on

that flight into California

3. Adults aboard a non chartered regularly scheduled

airplane flight which commences and terminates in

the continental United States and which does not

land outside of the continental United States

cannot bring into California any wine on that

flight but adult passengers on board a chartered

plane on a flight that commences and terminates in

the continental United States and which does not

land outside the continental United States are

allowed to bring into California an amount of wine

no greater than one quart.

4. Adult passengers on chartered flights that

commence and terminate in the continental United

States and do not land outside the continental

United States are limited to one quart of wine per

year they can bring into California but there are

no restrictions placed on the cumulative annual

amounts of wine a passenger can travel with on

board a chartered or non chartered regularly

scheduled flight within California. 

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By contrast, passengers on any flights that commence and

terminate in California have an unlimited right to carry

unlimited quantities of wine with them. Plaintiffs argue that as

a result of the statutes’ facial discrimination it must be

declared unconstitutional. 

C. The Parties

I. Plaintiffs Ansolabehere and Longstreet

Plaintiff Ellen Ansolabehere, is an adult resident of

Bakersfield, California. She ordered five (5) cases of

Barboursville Virginia cabernet wine to be shipped to her at her

residence for her personal use (and not for resale) from

Plaintiff Longstreet’s Delicatessen, Fine Wines, and Specialty

Coffees, LLC (“Longstreet”). Longstreet is a wine retailer

located in Petersburg, Virginia and licensed by the Commonwealth

of Virginia to sell and ship wine including to, among others,

residents of other States (for their personal use and not for

resale) should that recipient State’s laws so allow. 

Ansolabehere placed her order by letter in which she ordered

five cases of wine to be delivered at her residence to herself or

to some other person over the age of 21 who would sign for the

wine. Plaintiff Longstreet, however, was unable to fill her

request because it is located in Virginia, a non reciprocity

state. 

Virginia allows its retailers to engage in the direct sale

and shipment of wine to consumers in other States. However,

Ansolabehere alleges that because Virginia is not a “reciprocity”

state with California, Longstreet would violate California law if

it shipped and delivered the five cases of wine to her for her

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personal or household use in California. In addition, Longstreet

informed Ansolabehere that even if Virginia was a “reciprocity”

state so that California would have allowed Virginia’s retailers

to sell and ship wine directly to California consumers, that it

was still unable to fully comply with her order since California

law limited such shipments to two (2) cases per month. 

Despite this, Ansolabehere desires to and would, if it were

not contrary to California law, purchase, for her personal or

household use and not for resale, and have shipped directly to

her at her home, three cases of wine or more per month from

Longstreet or other licensed retailers located in non-reciprocity

states. She would also purchase three or more cases of wine in

one month from a licensed retailer located in a reciprocity state

for personal use and not for resale if it were not contrary to

California law. She has not alleged she actually placed such

additional orders. 

II. Plaintiffs Ansolabehere and Wintory

Plaintiff Sharon Wintory is over the age of 21 years and

resides in Henrico County, Virginia. Neither she nor Plaintiff

Ansolabehere is a holder of any license issued by any State or

the federal government relating to the importation, distribution,

shipment or sale of alcoholic beverages, including wine. Within

the past year Plaintiff Wintory wanted to ship wine as a gift to

Ellen Ansolabehere (for personal use and not for resale) at her

home in Bakersfield, California the receipt of which would have

to be signed for by Ansolabehere or other adults at her home. 

Plaintiff Wintory also wanted to ship wine to other friends in

California to be signed for by an adult person to whom she

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shipped the wine. Wintory, however, was unable to do so since,

according to Plaintiffs, the shipment of wine by her, as an

individual residing in Virginia, to Ansolabehere or other

California adult residents of California is not permitted by

Section 23661.2. The wine which Wintory would have shipped would

have been purchased by her in Virginia from a business entity

licensed by the Commonwealth of Virginia to sell wine to adults

and which is located in the Commonwealth. Plaintiff Ansolabehere

would have accepted this gift of wine from Plaintiff Wintory. 

According to Plaintiff both Wintory and Plaintiff Ansolabehere

would, if required, pay any taxes, duties, or other fees

attendant to the shipment of wine to Ansolabehere or other

resident of California to whom Wintory shipped wine. Wintory has

not alleged or offered evidence she has made any such purchases.

III. Plaintiff Ansolabehere and Airplane Flights

Plaintiffs argue that within one year preceding the filing

of the Complaint in this action and continuing into the future,

Plaintiff Ansolabehere would carry with her into California more

than one (1) quart of wine a year as a passenger on a chartered

airplane on a flight which commences and terminates in the

continental United States and which does not land outside of the

continental United States were she not precluded from doing so by

Section 23661.1. She would also, within one year preceding the

filing of the Complaint in this action and continuing into the

future, carry with her into California one or more quarts of wine

per year as a passenger on a non-chartered airplane on a flight

which commences and terminates in the continental United States

and which does not land outside the continental United States

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were she not precluded from doing so by California law.

By the same means and during that same time period,

Plaintiff Ansolabehere would carry with her into California more

than one (1) quart of wine a year as a passenger on a chartered

airplane on a flight which commences in Hawaii and/or Alaska

(which wine she would have purchased in Hawaii or Alaska) and

which, without landing at any point outside of California,

terminates in the California were she not precluded from doing so

by Section 23661.1. During this same period, Ansolabehere would

carry with her into California one or more quarts of wine per

year as a passenger on a non-chartered airplane on a flight which

commences in Hawaii and/or Alaska (which wine she would have

purchased in Hawaii or Alaska) and which, without landing at any

point outside of California, terminates in California were she

not precluded from doing so by California law. She would pay any

taxes or duties owing on the wine brought in with her. 

Ansolabehere has not alleged she has actually done so. 

D. Botting Letter of April 19, 2003

There is a factual dispute as to whether or not Virginia is

a “reciprocity” state such that a licensed retailer or individual

may ship no more than two cases of wine per month under the

statute. 

Defendant has submitted a letter from Matthew Botting dated

April 19, 2003 acknowledging that Virginia is a reciprocity

state. (Doc. 29, Declaration of Matthew Botting (“Botting

Declaration”) in support of Defendant’s Motion for Dismissal for

Lack of Standing and Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment, Filed October 6, 2006). Matthew Botting was the Chief

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Counsel for the California Department of Alcoholic Beverage

Control (“ABC”) in April 2004. (Id. at ¶ 1) He now holds the

position of ABC Staff Counsel III. (Id. at ¶ 3) While serving as

Chief Counsel for the ABC, Botting wrote a letter dated August

19, 2003 opining that Virginia is a reciprocity state, after

researching the legal issues for the ABC, to respond to a request

from the Virginia Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control that

California recognize Virginia as a reciprocity state. (Id. at ¶

4) 

However, Plaintiffs request that the court take note of a

judicial admission Defendant made in a joint stipulation in the

case of Coulombe v. Jolly, 447 F. Supp. 2d 1117 (C.D. Cal. 2006.) 

Plaintiffs offer evidence of a joint stipulation of

uncontroverted facts entered into by the parties in Coulombe.

(Doc. 13, Affidavit of Matthew S. Hale (“Hale Declaration”) in

support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Ex. 3, Filed

August 21, 2006.) The stipulation was signed on May 17, 2006 and

provides a list of reciprocity states. Virginia is not on the

list of reciprocity states.

E. Enforcement of §§ 23661.1 and 23661.2 by California’s

Department of Alcoholic and Beverage Control

Defendant also offers evidence that Botting researched the

ABC files regarding its history on the issuance of citations to

out-of-state persons or entities, prior prosecutions, or

recommendations for prosecutions, of persons or entities in

violation of §§ 23661.1 and 23661.2. (Doc. 29, Botting

Declaration, ¶ 8). According to Botting the ABC does not have a

system in place, nor is it contemplating a system to police

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packages shipped by common carrier to an individual citizen’s

home. (Id. at ¶ 9) The ABC has no means of tracking what winery,

retailer or individual is shipping wine to a California consumer

for personal consumption. (Id. at ¶ 10) Reports of alcohol

importation, for taxation purposes, are made to the Board of

Equalization, not the ABC. (Id. at ¶ 11) The ABC does not police

the amount of alcoholic beverages a person carries on board air

flights into this state or within this state. (Id. at ¶ 12) The

ABC has no personnel at airports, or landing strips, to check

passengers boarding or arriving on commercial or charter air

flights from any destination. (Id.) The ABC has no regulations

or procedures in place, nor is it contemplating procedures, that

would allow it to inspect luggage, search passengers or ask

passengers how much wine they are carrying. (Id.) 

Defendant also argues that the ABC does not have a budgetary

provision for enforcement of Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 23661.1 or

23661.2, nor is it contemplating a provision that would allow it

to utilize its staff to pursue the policing of shipments of wine

to a California citizen’s home or monitoring passengers who

choose to carry alcoholic beverages into California on air

flights. (Id. at ¶ 13) In Botting’s search of the ABC files, he

found no record of the ABC having issued a citation, or

threatened to issue a citation, to a California citizen for

receiving wine as a gift or accepting delivery of wine purchased

in another state. (Id. at ¶ 14) 

Also, the ABC has no proposal before it to begin issuing

citations, or warnings to California citizens receiving shipments

of wine from other states. (Id. at ¶ 15) In his search of the

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ABC’s files, Botting has found no record indicating that the ABC

has ever issued, or threatened to issue, a citation to a

passenger commencing or terminating a flight, or landing in

California on a leg of a flight for carrying more than a quart of

wine. (Id. at ¶ 16) Botting also declares he found no record

indicating that the ABC has ever cited, or reported, an out-ofstate retailer for shipping wine to a California consumer. The

ABC has no proposal before it to begin policing such shipments.

(Id. at ¶ 17) There is no record that the ABC has ever

prosecuted, nor recommended prosecution, of any person or entity

for violation of either code section. (Id. at ¶ 18) The ABC has

no proposal before it to consider implementing procedures for

prosecuting any person or entity for violation of either section

23661.1 or 23661.2. (Id. at ¶ 19) 

Further, Defendant sent a letter dated August 19, 2003 to

Curtis Coleburn, Chief Operating Officer of the Virginia

Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control. (Doc. 29, Botting

Declaration, Exhibit A) According to the letter, “California’s

reciprocal shipping statute is intended to be liberally construed

to extend reciprocity privileges whenever possible.” (Id.) 

Defendant wrote that in his reviewing the matter further, the

California ABC sought input from the Wine Institute and learned

that Virginia’s statute is based upon the Wine Institute’s “Model

Shipment Bill” language. (Id.) As a result, and in the interest

of furthering reciprocity rather than restricting it, Defendant

determined that Virginia’s statute is considered to be reciprocal

with California. (Id.) No contrary evidence is offered that the

California ABC has ever enforced the flight shipment restrictions

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of alcoholic beverage under §§ 23661.1 or 23661.2.

4. STATEMENTS OF FACTS

A. Undisputed Facts

Defendant Jerry R. Jolly is sued in his capacity as Director

of the ABC, a position to which he was duly appointed pursuant to

California Business & Professions Code § 23050. (PSUF, No. 4.) 

As Director, he is responsible for the enforcement of provisions

of the California Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, California

Business & Professions Code § 23000, et seq,, ("Act" or "ABC

Act"), including those sections dealing with the sale,

importation, shipping, and delivery of alcoholic beverages into

the State of California and their sale, purchase and

transportation there. (Id.) He is sued only in his official

capacity as Director acting under color of his authority and

pursuant to the official policy of California. (Id.)

California Bus. & Prof. Code Sec. 23661.2, which deals with

the importation of wine into California for personal or household

use, and not for resale, provides: 

"Notwithstanding any other law, an individual or retail

licensee in a state that affords California retail

licensees or individuals an equal reciprocal shipping

privilege, may ship, for personal use and not for

resale, no more than two cases of wine (no more than

nine liters each case) per month to an adult resident

in this state.” 

(PSUF, No. 5.) Delivery of a shipment pursuant to this

subdivision shall not be deemed or constitute a sale in this

state. (Id.) "The shipping container of any wine sent into or

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out of this state under this section shall be clearly labeled to

indicate that the container cannot be delivered to a minor or an

intoxicated person." (Id.)

B. Plaintiffs’ Disputed Facts

I. The Parties

Plaintiff Ansolabehere is an individual who resides in

Bakersfield, California and within this Judicial District. At

all times mentioned herein she was (a) over the age of 21 years,

and (b) not a holder of any California license relating to the

importation, distribution, or sale of alcoholic beverages,

including wine. (PSUF, No. 1) 

Plaintiff Wintory at all times is (a) a citizen of the

Commonwealth of Virginia, (b) over the age of 21 years, and (c)

not a holder of any California license relating to the

importation, distribution, or sale of alcoholic beverages,

including wine. (PSUF, NO. 2) 

Plaintiff Longstreet is (a) a corporation incorporated in

the Commonwealth of Virginia, having its principal place of

business located in Petersburg, Virginia, (b) in business as a

retailer of wines located in Virginia providing wine to consumers

in the Commonwealth and throughout the United States (wherever

the direct shipment of wine to consumers is permitted by law),

and (c) holds a license issued by, among others, the Virginia

Alcoholic Beverage Department to engage in such retail sales and

shipment of wine. (PSUF, No.3)

II. The Statutory Scheme

According to Plaintiffs’ interpretation California Bus. &

Prof. Code Sec. 23661.2, when read in conjunction with California

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Bus. & Prof. Code Sec. 23661: 

(a) allows an individual in a State that affords

California retail licensees or individuals an equal

reciprocal shipping privilege ("Reciprocity States") to

ship, for personal use and not for resale, no more than

two cases of wine per month to an adult resident of

California, but denies an individual in a State that

does not afford California retail licensees or

individuals an equal reciprocal shipping privilege

("Non-reciprocity States”) the right to ship any wine

for personal use and not for resale to an adult

resident of California; 

(b) allows a licensed retailer in a Reciprocity State

to ship, for personal use and not for resale, not more

than two cases of wine per month to an adult resident

of California, but denies a licensed retailer in a NonReciprocity State the right to ship any wine for

personal use and not for resale to any adult resident

of California; and 

(c) places no restriction on the amount of wine an

adult resident or licensed retailer located in

California may ship to an adult resident of California,

but restricts to two cases per month the amount of wine

that an individual or licensed retailer in a

Reciprocity State may ship to an adult resident of

California. (PSUF No. 6.)

A violation of Sections 23661.1 and/or 23661.2 is a

misdemeanor under California Bus. & Prof. Code Sec. 23670, which

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states: "Every person violating the provisions of this article is

guilty of a misdemeanor." (PSUF, No. 7.)

Wine imported into California in violation of Sections

23661, 23661.1 or 23661.2 is subject to forfeiture pursuant to

California Bus. & Prof. Code Sec 23666, which deals with

unauthorized imports: "Alcoholic beverages imported into this

State contrary to the provisions of Section 23661 to 23664,

inclusive, shall be seized by the Department." (PSUF, No. 8.)

As stated in the Historical and Statutory Notes of the

California Legislature accompanying Section 3 of Stats. 1994, c.

394 (A.B. 611), which added and amended § 23661.2: 

"It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting

Section 1 of this act to encourage the adoption of

reciprocal wine shipping privileges legislation in

other states for purposes of improving fairness and

equity for the small, family vintners and winegrowers

of California. Currently, only 12 states have adopted

reciprocal wine shipping privileges legislation, [¶]

The Legislature encourages the Department of Alcoholic

Beverage Control to notify other states of California

laws relating to reciprocal wine shipping privileges

through established channels of communication."

(PSUF, No. 9)

At least thirteen (13) states, including California, have

"reciprocity" laws extending an equal reciprocal shipping

privilege to their residents or licensed retailer to ship wine,

for personal use and not for resale, to adults in other States

also having a similar reciprocal shipping privilege which allows

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its individual citizens or licensee to ship, for personal use and

not for resale, wine to adult residents, in other States having

reciprocal shipping privilege. (PSUF, No. 10)

The States having such "reciprocity laws," in addition to

California, include: (a) Colorado, pursuant to Colo. Rev. Stat. §

12-47-104 (2004); (b) Hawaii, pursuant to H.R.S. § 281-33.5; (c)

Idaho, pursuant to Idaho Code §23-1309A (2005); (d) Illinois,

pursuant-to 235 I.L.C.S. 5/6-29 (2005); (d) Iowa, pursuant to

Iowa Code § 123.187 (2005); (e) Minnesota, pursuant to Minn.

Stat. § 340A-417 (2005); (f) Missouri, pursuant to Rev. Mo. §

311.462 (2005); (g) New Mexico, pursuant to N.M. Stat. Ann. § 60-

7A-3 (2005); (h) Oregon, pursuant to O. R. S. §471.229(2003); (i)

Washington, pursuant to Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 66.12.190 (2005);

(j) West Virginia, pursuant to W.Va. Code § 60-8-6 (2005); and,

(k) Wisconsin, pursuant to Wis. Stat. §§ 125.58(4), 125.68(10),

139.035 (2004). (PSUF, No. 11)

Plaintiffs argue that retailers located in a Non-Reciprocity

State such as Virginia, which sell, ship, and deliver wine to

California residents in California may violate the Alcoholic

Beverage Control Act of the State in which they are located

should they sell, ship, and deliver wine directly to adult

California residents. (PSUF No. 12) No Virginia statute is

referred that would be violated by the transactions and proposed

transactions at issue. 

A violation of the laws of the State of California by a

retailer located in a Non-Reciprocity State that sells, ships,

and delivers wine to an adult consumer in California in violation

of California law can result in the suspension or revocation of

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the retailer's license. See, e.g., ibid; Va. Code Ann. §§ 4.1-

225(c), 4.1-324(A)(4) and (B) (1006). (PSUF, No. 13.) 

The Twenty First Amendment Enforcement Act, 27 U.S.C. §

122a, authorizes state attorneys general to enforce the liquor

laws of their State in their home-state federal courts against

out-of-state retailers, to among other things enjoin the direct

marketing of wine in violation of State laws banning or limiting

such marketing. (PSUF, No. 14.)

A retail package off-sale wine licensee may sell, to

consumers only and not for resale, wine in packages and in

quantities of 52 gallons or less per sale, for consumption off

the premises where sold. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 23393.

California law does not otherwise limit the amounts of wine that

California instate retailers that hold off-sale licenses can

sell, and/or ship and/or deliver, permitting unrestricted

quantities of wine to be sold directly to California adult

residents for their personal use and consumption (not for

resale). Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 25605; Cal. Code Regs. Tit. 4,

§ 17(c)(2006); (PSUF, No. 15.) 

California does not prohibit California residents from

shipping unrestricted quantities of wine directly to other

California adult residents for their personal use and not for

resale. (PSUF, No. 16.) 

III. Ansolabehere’s Attempted Wine Purchase

Plaintiff Ansolabehere claims that by letter dated July 28,

2006 to Longstreet, Ansolabehere ordered five (5) cases of wine

(Barboursville Virginia cabernet) to be shipped to her at her

residence for her personal or household use (and not for resale). 

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(PSUF, No. 17.) Including a copy of her California driver's

license to assure Longstreet that she was over the age of 21, she

also ordered three (3) cases of wine (Barboursville Virginia

cabernet) to be shipped to her at her residence on December 1,

2006, March 1, 2007, and June 1, 2007, respectively. (Id.) She

informed Longstreet that she would be available to sign for the

wine when it was delivered to her home residence as requested.

(Id.) 

By return letter, dated July 28, 2006 from Longstreet,

Ansolabehere was informed that while Longstreet was able to sell

her wine (since she was over the age of 21) it was unable to ship

wine to her at her home in California because Longstreet is

located in Virginia and, while Virginia does allow its retailers

to engage in the direct sale and shipment of wine to consumers in

other States, it is not, as specified in California Bus. & Prof.

Code § 23661.2, a "state that affords California retail licensees

or individuals an equal reciprocal shipping privilege," (i.e., a

Reciprocity State) and, hence, that it was precluded from doing

so by California law. (PSUF, No. 18.) In addition, Longstreet

informed Ansolabehere that even if Virginia was a Reciprocity

State it was still unable to comply with her order since Section

23661.2 limits shipments of wine to adult individuals in

California to two cases per month. (Id.) 

Plaintiffs claim that within one year preceding the filing

of the Complaint in this action and continuing into the future,

Ansolabehere would, were it not contrary to Section 23661.2,

enter into a contract for the purchase and shipment to her home

(for personal or household use and not for resale) of three or

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more cases of wine in one month from a licensed retailer located

in a Reciprocity State. (PSUF, No. 19.) There is no evidence she

has placed such an order

Within one year preceding the filing of the Complaint in

this action and continuing into the future, Ansolabehere would

carry with her into California more than one (1) quart of wine a

year as a passenger on a chartered airplane on a flight which

commences and terminates in the continental United States and

which does not land outside of the continental United States were

she not precluded from doing so by California law (Bus. & Prof.

Code § 23661.1). (Id.) There is no evidence she has done so. 

Within one year preceding the filing of the Complaint in

this action and continuing into the future, Ansolabehere would

carry with her into California one or more quarts of wine per

year as a passenger on a non-chartered airplane on a flight which

commences and terminates in the continental United States and

which does not land outside the continental United States were

she not precluded from doing so by California law. (PSUF, No.

22.) There is no evidence she has done so. 

Within one year preceding the filing of the Complaint in

this action and continuing into the future, Ansolabehere would

carry with her into California more than one (1) quart of wine a

year as a passenger on a chartered airplane on a flight which

commences in Hawaii and/or Alaska (which wine she would have

purchased in Hawaii or Alaska) and which, without landing at any

point outside of California terminates in California were she not

precluded from doing so by California law (Bus. & Prof. Code §

23661.1). (PSUF, No. 23.) There is no evidence she has done so. 

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Within one year preceding the filing of the Complaint in

this action and continuing into the future, Ansolabehere would

carry with her into California one or more quarts of wine per

year as a passenger on a non-chartered airplane on a flight which

commences in Hawaii and/or Alaska (which wine she would have

purchased in Hawaii or Alaska) and which, without landing at any

point outside of California terminates in California were she not

precluded from doing so by California law. (PSUF, No. 24.) There

is no evidence she has done so. 

IV. Wintory’s Attempted Wine Purchase

According to Plaintiffs, within one year preceding August

18, 2006, Plaintiff Wintory wanted to ship three (3) or more

cases of wine in a one month period as a gift to Ellen

Ansolabehere (for personal use and not for resale) at her home in

Bakersfield, California as well as to other friends of hers

residing in California, the receipt of which would have to be

signed for by Ellen Ansolabehere or other adult at her home, or

by the adult person to whom Wintory otherwise shipped the wine.

(PSUF, No. 20.) Wintory was, however, unable to do so since the

shipment of wine by her, an individual residing in Virginia, to

Ansolabehere or other California adult resident of California is

not permitted by California law (California Bus. & Prof. Code §

23661.2). (Id.) The wine which she would have and wants to ship

to Ansolabehere and others will be purchased by Wintory in

Virginia from a business entity licensed by the Commonwealth of

Virginia to sell wine to adults and which is located in the

Commonwealth. (Id.) There is no evidence she has done so. 

All plaintiffs are willing, able, and agree to pay any

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taxes, duties, or other fees attendant to their shipment or

importation of wine to California to be consumed for personal or

household use and not for resale. (PSUF, No. 25.) There is no

evidence she has done so. 

V. California Law and Its Relationship to Other

States

Plaintiffs allege that the laws of most, if not all, of the

Reciprocity and Non-Reciprocity States allow licensed retailers

located in that State to sell, ship, and deliver wine directly to

residents of other States if such direct sale and shipment of

wine is allowed under that State's alcoholic beverage control

laws. (PSUF, No. 26.) 

Plaintiffs also claim that the laws of most, if not all, of

the Reciprocity and Non-Reciprocity States allow retailers

located in each such State to sell wine directly to consumers who

visit their business premises and carry the purchased wine away

with them. (PSUF, No. 27.) 

The laws of most, if not all, of the Reciprocity and NonReciprocity States allow retailers located in each such State to

sell wine to consumers and to ship the same to the consumer if

not in violation of any law. (PSUF, No. 28.) 

Plaintiffs argue that there are wines that are unavailable

on California retailer's store shelves that are available from

licensed retailers located in Non-Reciprocity States. (PSUF, No.

29.) Adult residents of California and licensed retailers

located in California may ship and deliver an unlimited amount of

wine already physically present in California directly to an

individual adult resident of California regardless of whether the

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wine originally was purchased in California or elsewhere. (PSUF,

No. 30.) 

California Bus. & Prof. Code Sec. 23661.2, read in

conjunction with Sec. 23661 and other California statutes,

creates greater economic burdens and restrictions on individuals

and licensed retailers located in non-reciprocity states than it

does on individuals and licensed retailers located in Reciprocity

States, including California, regarding the direct shipment of

wine to California residents for purposes of their household or

personal use and not for resale. (PSUF, No. 31.) 

C. Defendant’s Disputed Facts

Besides responding to Plaintiffs’ statement of undisputed

facts, the Defendant also offered its own set of disputed facts.

1. Virginia is a reciprocity state. (DSUF, No. 1). California

law does not preclude a retailer in any state from selling

wine at retail, buying it at the supplier’s price and having

the supplier (winery) ship the wine to California consumers

for personal use. (DSUF, No. 2) 

2. Wineries in other states may ship wine to California they

produce or bottle as well as the wines of any other grower

or bottler. (DSUF, No. 3)

3. Barboursville Vineyards has an on-line site for purchasing

wine for direct shipment to California. (DSUF, No. 4)

4. Barboursville Vineyards may sell wine at prices below

wholesale and retail. (DSUF, No. 5)

5. The ABC Board (“Board”) does not have a system in place to

police packages shipped by common carrier to an individual

citizen’s home. (DSUF, No. 6)

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6. The Board has no proposal before it to allocate manpower,

implement procedures, or otherwise begin, to police common

carrier shipments of wine to California citizens for

personal consumption and use. (DSUF, No. 7)

7. Reports of importation of wine to California are made to the

Board of Equalization for taxation purposes. (DSUF, No. 8)

8. The Board does not police the amount of wine a passenger

carries onto air flights any where in the continental United

States, Alaska or Hawaii. (DSUF, No. 9)

9. The Board has no personnel at airports, or air strips, no

matter their location, to check passengers at embarkation or

debarkation, to or from, or landing in, California. (DSUF,

No. 10)

10. The Board has no proposal before it to implement procedures,

allocate personnel, or otherwise police, the amount of wine

passengers carry on flights within California, or landing in

California. (DSUF, No. 11)

11. The Board has no procedures, or personnel, in place to

question flight passengers about the amount of wine they may

be carrying within or into California, to search their bags,

to search them, or inspect their luggage. (DSUF, No. 12)

12. The Board does not have a budgetary provision to allow it to

utilize staff to police wine shipped by common carrier to a

California resident’s home for personal use. (DSUF, No. 13)

13. The Board does not have a budgetary provision to allow it to

utilize staff to police the amount of wine any person

carries onto an air flight from any destination landing in

California. (DSUF, No. 14)

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14. The Board has no record of having issued a citation for

violation of B & P Code section 23661.1. (DSUF, No. 15)

15. The Board has no record of having issued a citation for

violation of B & P Code section 23661.2. (DSUF, No. 16)

16. The Board has no record of threatening to issue a citation

for violation of B & P Code section 23661.1. (DSUF, No. 17)

17. The Board has no record of threatening to issue a citation

for violation of B & P Code section 23661.2. (DSUF, No. 18)

18. The Board has no record of a citation, or a report to the

home state, of an out-of-state vendor, including a retailer,

for shipping wine to a California consumer. (DSUF, No. 19)

19. The Board has no proposal before it to begin to issue

citations to out-of-state vendors, including retailers, for

violation of California wine laws. (DSUF, No. 20)

20. The Board has no record of having prosecuted, or recommended

prosecution to any law enforcement agency, of any person or

entity under B & P Code sections 23661.1 or 23661.2. (DSUF,

No. 21)

21. The Board has no proposal before it to prosecute, or

recommend the prosecution, of any person or entity for

violation of B & P Code sections 23661.1 or 23661.2. (DSUF,

No. 22)

(Doc. 29, Jolly’s Separate Statement of Disputed Facts, Ex. 1,

Filed October 6, 2006) 

5. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is warranted only “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

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genuine issue as to any material fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c);

California v. Campbell, 138 F.3d 772, 780 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Therefore, to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must show (1) that a genuine factual issue exists

and (2) that this factual issue is material. Id. A genuine issue

of fact exists when the non-moving party produces evidence on

which a reasonable trier of fact could find in its favor viewing

the record as a whole in light of the evidentiary burden the law

places on that party. See Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D Co., 68

F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252-56 (1986). Facts are “material”

if they “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing

law.” Campbell, 138 F.3d at 782 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at

248). 

The nonmoving party cannot simply rest on its allegations

without any significant probative evidence tending to support the

complaint. Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir.

2001).

[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the

entry of summary judgment, after adequate time

for discovery and upon motion, against a party

who fails to make a showing sufficient to

establish the existence of an element essential

to the party's case, and on which that party

will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such

a situation, there can be “no genuine issue as

to any material fact,” since a complete failure

of proof concerning an essential element of the

nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all

other facts immaterial.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrell, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The more

implausible the claim or defense asserted by the nonmoving party,

the more persuasive its evidence must be to avoid summary

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judgment. See United States ex rel. Anderson v. N. Telecom,

Inc., 52 F.3d 810, 815 (9th Cir. 1996). Nevertheless, the

evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to the

nonmoving party. Id.; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. A court’s role

on summary judgment is not to weigh evidence or resolve issues;

rather, it is to determine whether there is a genuine issue for

trial. See Abdul-Jabbar v. G.M. Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 410 (9th Cir.

1996).

6. DISCUSSION

A. Judicial Notice

Courts may take judicial notice of adjudicative facts that

are not subject to reasonable dispute. United States v. Ritchie,

342 F.3d 903, 909 (9th Cir. 2003). Courts may take judicial

notice of some public records, including the records and reports

of administrative bodies. Id. The court may also take judicial

notice of court filings. Reyn’s Pasta Bella, LLC v. USA, Inc.,

442 F.3d 741, 746 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Plaintiffs request that the court take judicial notice of

“the files and records filed in Nothing To It!!!, LLC v. Jolly,

06-02653-MJJ (N.D. Cal 2006). Plaintiffs argue that in Nothing

To It!!!, the case was dismissed for lack of standing based on

facts different from this case and “on the woefully inadequate

allegations of the Complaint.” (Doc. 48, Request for Judicial

Notice.) Plaintiffs argue that only conducting a side-by-side

analysis of the allegations in the complaint in Nothing to It!!!

and in this case is it possible to determine the difference

between Nothing To It!!! and this case where Plaintiffs “do have

standing.” 

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Plaintiffs do not provide the court with a copy of the

complaint in Nothing To It!!! or with any other document from

that case in violation of the express requirement of Fed. R. Ev.

P. 201(b)(2).

Plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice is DENIED. 

B. Judicial Admission of Stipulated Facts in Coulombe v.

Jolly, 447 F. Supp. 2d 1117 (C.D. Cal. 2006). 

Under federal law, stipulations and admissions in the

pleadings are generally binding on the parties and the Court.

American Title Ins. Co. v. Lacelaw Corp., 861 F.2d 224, 226 (9th

Cir. 1988) Not only are such admissions and stipulations binding

before the trial court, but they are binding on appeal as well. 

Id. "Judicial admissions are formal admissions in the pleadings

which have the effect of withdrawing a fact from issue and

dispensing wholly with the need for proof of the fact. Id. 

Factual assertions in pleadings and pretrial orders, unless

amended, are considered judicial admissions conclusively binding

on the party who made them.” Id. 

Factual Stipulations in a trial brief may be treated as

judicial admissions. United States v. Davis, 332 F.3d 1163, 1168

(9th Cir. 2003). Such admissions, which have the effect of

withdrawing a fact from issue and dispensing wholly with the need

for proof of the fact, are binding on both the parties and the

court, including the appellate court. Id. 

Plaintiffs request that the court accept as Judicial

Admissions a stipulation of facts the parties entered into in

Coulombe v. Jolly. (Doc. 13, Affidavit of Matthew Hale, Ex. 3,

Filed August 21, 2006). Plaintiffs however request that the

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stipulation be admitted for the truth of the matter asserted in

the stipulation. The court may find a judicial admission based

on the parties’ stipulation, if contained in a publicly available

document, a true copy of which is provided, if the parties are

identical. 

Plaintiffs request for judicial admission only as to the

existence of the stipulation of facts in Coulombe v. Jolly, is

GRANTED. 

C. Standing

In its opposition brief, Defendant moves to dismiss

Plaintiffs’ complaint for lack of standing. “To satisfy the

Article III case or controversy requirement, a litigant must have

suffered some actual injury that can be redressed by a favorable

judicial decision.” Iron Arrow Honor Society v. Heckler, 464 U.S.

67, 70 (1984); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S.

26, 38 (1976); NAACP., Western Region v. City of Richmond, 743

F.2d 1346, 1352 (9th Cir. 1984). Standing is a judicially

created doctrine that is an essential part of the

case-or-controversy requirement of Article III. Pritikin v.

Department of Energy, 254 F.3d 791, 796 (9 Cir. 2001). th

“Standing, unlike other jurisdictional doctrines, focuses on the

party seeking to get his complaint before a federal court and not

on the issues he wishes to have adjudicated.” Id.(quoting Simon

v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976)) 

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs Wintory and Ansolabehere

lack standing because: 

1. Virginia is a reciprocity state and Plaintiffs are

allowed under 23661.2 to ship two cases of wine a

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month into California

2. Wintory is from VA and has the same rights as a CA

citizen because she can buy and ship two cases of

wine to CA tax free.

3. Wintory can buy [any quantity of] the wine at

retail price from Longstreet and Longstreet can

have a licensed winery ship the wine to

California.

4. Wintory has not shown that she bought wine from

Longstreet and suffered an adverse injury from the

California law. 

5. Wintory has not shown that there is a risk of

imminent injury or prosecution. 

6. In addition, 23661.1 on its face does not mention

commercial flights commencing in AK or HI. 

7. Ansolabehere has not offered facts to show that

she tried to carry more than a quart of wine onto

a plane bound for California and was stopped or

even questioned at embarkation or debarkation. 

8. The statute does not place a greater burden on

Longstreet than it places on its CA counterpart.

9. The statute allows Longstreet to sell unlimited

quantities of wine for shipment to CA through a

licensed California winery. 

10. Longstreet has not asserted facts to show that it

has been prosecuted under the statute. 

Plaintiffs, on the other hand, argue that they have standing

for the following reasons: 

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1. Plaintiff Ansolabehere is an individual living in

Bakersfield, CA. Plaintiffs argue that

Ansolabehere has standing because, 1) she is

prohibited by 23661.2 from purchasing wine from a

retailer in a Non-Reciprocity State and 2) under

23661.1 she cannot (I) buy wine in HI or AK and

bring it back to CA on a chartered plane flight or

(ii) non chartered flight within the continental

US. 

2. Plaintiff Wintory is an individual living in

Henrico County, Virginia. Plaintiffs argue that

Wintory has standing because she cannot ship or

deliver or give Ansolabehere any wine from

Virginia, a Non-Reciprocity State. If Virginia

were a reciprocity state then it would be limited

to two (2) cases/month. 

3. Longstreet is a wine retailer in Virginia. 

Plaintiffs argue that Longstreet has standing

because 1) it cannot ship or deliver or give

Ansolabehere any wine from Virginia, a NonReciprocity State and 2) if Virginia were a

Reciprocity State then would be limited to two (2)

cases/month. 

Plaintiffs argue that, under §§ 23661.1 and 23661.2,

Longstreet and Ansolabehere are unable to enter into a contract

for the sale of wine and Wintory and Ansolabehere are unable to

enter into an oral contract or gift arrangement from Wintory to

Ansolabehere. 

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 Plaintiffs’ standing argument in Coulombe involved 4

identical language as the arguments made in this case. However,

although Plaintiffs make identical arguments in this case, they

do not offer the legal support offered in Coulombe. The court in

Coulombe reasoned that “notwithstanding Plaintiffs’ sparse

standing allegations, it is clear that Plaintiffs are initiating

a pre-enforcement challenge to the constitutionality of §

33

I. Similar Disputes in the Ninth Circuit

Two recent California District Court cases have found no

standing for Plaintiffs in cases similar to this one. In

Coulombe v. Jolly, 447 F. Supp. 2d 1117 (C.D. Cal. 2006)

Plaintiffs were wine buyers in California and Texas and a

Virginia wine retailer who brought suit against the Director of

the ABC under § 1983, contesting the validity of § 23661.2 only.

Id. at 1118. Plaintiff’s complaint alleged that Plaintiff

Coulombe wrote a letter to Plaintiff K&K, a licensed wine

retailer in Virginia requesting to purchase five cases of a

certain wine. Id. Coulombe’s letter included payment information

and a copy of his drivers license to verify that he was old

enough to purchase the wine. Id. K&K wrote back to Coulombe

stating that it could not ship the wine because Virginia is not a

reciprocity state and it was barred from shipping wine to

California. Id. at 1119. However, K&K stated that even if it

could ship the wine to California, it would be limited to a

shipment of two cases. Id. Plaintiff Daniel M., a resident of

Texas sued Defendant on the grounds that he was unable to ship

more than two cases of wine from a Virginia wine retailer to his

father, a resident of California. Id. Plaintiffs contentions to

establish standing in Coulombe are identical to the arguments

they advance in this case. Id. at 1119-1120. 4

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23661.2.” Coulombe, 447 at 1121. 

 Nothing to It!!! was issued by the Northern District on 5

November 11, 2006. It is attached in the record but has not yet

been published. 

34

Coulombe determined that those Plaintiffs lacked standing

because they had not alleged facts establishing that they

suffered an injury in fact. Id. at 1122. The court reasoned that

Plaintiffs failed to allege a “concrete” plan to violate §

23661.2. Id. Plaintiffs alleged that they would either ship, or

have shipped to them, more than two cases of wine on a monthly

basis, if doing so were not against the law. Id. Yet the

Plaintiffs did not allege any of the specifics of the plan or

that actual purchases and shipments have been made and thwarted

by the law. The Coulombe Plaintiffs failed to provide the who,

what, when, where, and how they intended to effectuate their plan

or that the plan has been effectuated. Id. Even if those

Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding their plan to violate the

statute were sufficient, they did not allege that they faced any

threat whatsoever, let alone a credible threat of prosecution for

violation of the statute. Id. at 1123. Nor did the Coulumbe

Plaintiffs allege any past history of prosecution or enforcement

under the statute. Id.

The case of Nothing to It!!! v. Jolly, 06-02653 MJJ (N.D.

Cal. 2006), also addresses an identical factual scenario. 5

Plaintiffs in Nothing to it!!! included wine customers in

California and Nothing to It!!!, a Nevada company. The court in

Nothing to It!!! reasoned that Plaintiffs had not alleged a

concrete plan to ship wine or an imminent threat of enforcement

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 While Plaintiffs in this case do identify the statutes and 6

the penalties under the statutes, they do not allege a concrete

and executed plan to ship wine into California, a threat of

imminent prosecution, or a history of prosecution or any

enforcement under the statutes. Plaintiffs do not distinguish

this case from Nothing to It!!!. 

35

proceedings against them. Those Plaintiffs did not allege any

history of past prosecution or enforcement of the law as to

themselves or others. Plaintiffs in Nothing to it!!! also failed

to identify the particular statute they were challenging or the

penalties under the statute.6

Plaintiffs cite National Audubon Society, Inc. v. Davis, 307

F.3d 835 (9th Cir. 2002) where a suit was brought against various

California state officials and agencies by the National Audubon

Society and other associations of similar interests, including

trapper associations and individual trappers. Id. at 842. 

Plaintiffs brought suit challenging the constitutionality of

Proposition 4 passed by California voters which banned the use of

certain traps and poisons to capture or kill wildlife in the

state. Id. at 842-843. Members of the Plaintiff associations

actively trapped wildlife within California and engaged in

interstate commerce in shipping and selling furs. Id. at 845. 

Individual trappers had privately trapped with leghold traps;

engaged in interstate commerce in furs; used leghold traps to

protect crops and livestock; worked as trappers for animal damage

control; and trapped as independent contractors for the state to

protect levees. Id. On the issue of justiciability, the court

reasoned that the trappers had standing. Id. at 856. The

trappers alleged that they earned a living through trapping

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 These factors included 1. the newness of the statute; 2. 7

the explicit prohibition against trapping contained in the text

of Proposition 4; 3. the state’s unambiguous press release

mandating the removal of all traps banned under Proposition 4; 4.

the amendment of state regulations to incorporate the provisions

of Proposition 4; and 5. the prosecution of one private trapper

under Proposition 4. 

36

related activities and that cessation of their trapping caused

them direct economic harm. Id. The economic injury was found to

be fairly traceable to the enactment of the proposition and

several factors supported the expectation that Proposition 4

would be enforced against the trappers. Id. The court held the 7

trappers’ injury redressable because the trappers’ had an

uncontested history of using the now prohibited traps before the

passage of Proposition 4, and they intended to continue trapping

if not constrained by the proposition. This was enough to show

that trappers would resume trapping if Proposition 4's ban were

declared invalid. Id.

II. Analysis

Ansolabhere claims that she “desires to, and

would...purchase for her personal use and shipped to her three

cases of wine or more per month” from wine retailers in NonReciprocity States. She also claims that she would also

purchase three or more cases of wine in one month from a licensed

retailer located in a Reciprocity State. Ansolabehere does not

allege that she has actually placed such orders. Ansolabehere

also claims that she has refrained from carrying into California

more than one quart of wine as a passenger on a chartered

airplane or flight: 1) which commences and terminates in the

United States but does not land outside the United States 2)

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which commences in Hawaii and/or Alaska and terminates in

California and 3) as a passenger in a non chartered flight which

commences in Hawaii and/or Alaska and lands in California. She

does not allege that she ever actually attempted to bring more

than one quart of wine on a flight and was detained, fined, or

sanctioned in any way. The only harm she claims is a deterrence

from engaging in the desired activity as a result of Section

23661.1 and Section 23661.2.

Similarly, Wintory brings this claim on the premise that she

was unable to fulfill her desire to ship wine to Ansolabehere

from her home state of Virginia and was unable to do so. Wintory

claims that she has been harmed because the laws do not permit

her to ship the wine to Ansolabehere. According to the

complaint, “Plaintiff Ansolabehere would have accepted Wintory’s

gift had it been shipped.” There are no allegations that

Ansolabehere actually accepted any shipment of wine from Wintory

and was sanctioned by California law as a result. Plaintiffs’

only allege a desire to ship and receive wine and a deterrence to

do so based on California law. They do not allege an actual or

imminent threat of harm. 

The Coulombe reasoning applies to this case. Here,

Plaintiffs do not sufficiently allege a concrete plan that

violates §§ 23661.2 and 23661.1 to cause actual injury. 

Plaintiffs make the identical allegations to those in Coulombe,

i.e., that Plaintiffs here would either ship or have shipped to

them more than two cases of wine on a monthly basis if doing so

were not against the California law. As in Coulombe, Plaintiffs

do not allege in specific terms that they paid for and shipped or

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caused wine to be shipped to California. Plaintiffs have not

alleged that they face any credible threat of prosecution for

violation of the statute. Plaintiffs only allege that they

“would be” exposed to criminal prosecution and seizure if more

than two cases of wine are to be shipped into California. 

Further, Defendant offers evidence in the form of affidavit that

the ABC does not have a history of prosecuting anyone under the

statutes; does not have a plan in place to prosecute anyone under

the statutes; does not have a budgetary provision for enforcement

of statutes; and is not contemplating a provision that would

allow it to utilize its staff to pursue the policing of shipments

of wine to a California citizen’s home or monitoring passengers

who choose to carry alcoholic beverages into California on

chartered or other air flights. 

Finally, Plaintiffs do not distinguish between this case and

Coulombe. Plaintiffs argue that “salient differences exist

between this case and Coulombe” because this case challenges the

constitutionality of both §§ 23661.1 and 23661.2 and here, only

declaratory relief is sought. (Doc. 11, Plaintiffs Motion for

Summary Judgment, n.4, Filed August 21, 2006.) These differences

run directly into the doctrines of ripeness and the court is

debarred from issuing advisory opinions. An attempt to order

wine and being denied the order by the retailers for fear of

prosecution under §§ 23661.1 or 23661.2 is insufficient to show a

real or imminent harm. 

Alternatively, this case is distinguishable from National

Audobon Society. Plaintiffs Ansolabehere and Wintory have

offered no evidence that they have suffered economic harm by

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operation of the statute. Plaintiff Longstreet as a wine

retailer in Virginia has made allegations of economic harm but

has offered no evidence of actual harm suffered other than by

potential lost sales. Plaintiffs have not offered evidence to

show that whatever economic injury they have suffered is fairly

traceable to §§ 23661.2 and 23661.1. Unlike the evidence in

National Audubon, here Plaintiffs do not respond to Defendant’s

evidence that the ABC does not enforce nor does it have budgetary

provisions for enforcement of §§ 23661.1 or 23661.2. The ABC has

no plans to devote its staff or resources to pursue the policing

of shipments of wine to a California citizen’s home or monitoring

passengers who choose to carry alcoholic beverages into

California on air flights. No ABC record has been identified of

any citation, or threaten to issue a citation, to a California

citizen for receiving wine as a gift or accepting delivery of

wine in California purchased in another state. The ABC has no

proposal before it to begin issuing citations, or warnings to

California citizens receiving shipments of wine from other

states. No record has been found demonstrating that the ABC has

ever issued, or threatened to issue, a citation to a passenger

commencing or terminating on a flight, or landing in California

on a leg of a flight, for carrying more than a quart of wine. No

record has been adduced evidencing that the ABC has ever cited,

or reported, an out-of-state retailer for shipping wine to a

California consumer. The ABC has no program in place to begin

policing such wine shipments. Plaintiffs are unlike the trappers

in that they do not have an uncontested history of conduct that

violates the disputed statutes before or since the enactment of

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 Plaintiffs also refer to a string of cases from other 8

circuits including Dickerson v. Bailey, 87 F.Supp. 2d 691, 705

(S.D. Tex. 2000), Heald v. Engler, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24826

(E.D. Mich. 2001), and Bainbridge v. Turner, 311 F.3d 1104, 1107-

1108 n.8 (11th Cir. 2002). These cases are not binding on this

court. These cases hold that standing is established by an

inability to obtain, or to sell the wines desired. The injury in

each of these cases is the total prohibition of direct sales by

out-of-state wineries. That scenario is not present in this

case. In this case the issue is whether a limitation on the

direct sale of wine by an out-of-state wine retailer, not a

winery, to a California resident is a violation of the commerce

clause. California law authorizes the retailer to apply for a

permit and to effectuate sales through a California winery. 

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§§ 23661.1 and 23661.2. Plaintiffs have not met their burden of 8

showing “an actual injury that can be redressed by a favorable

judicial decision” to support Article III standing in this case. 

Defendant’s cross-motion to dismiss for lack of standing is

GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 

D. The Relationship Between the Commerce Clause and the

Twenty First Amendment 

In support of their motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs

argue that the statutes in dispute are facial violations of the

commerce clause because they limit the importation of out-ofstate wine into California. Under § 23661.1, there is no

restriction on the amount of wine that a passenger, on board a

charter or non chartered airplane flight exclusively within

California, can carry with them on board the airplane and remove

from the airplane once it lands in California. However, there is

a limitation on the amount of wine that a person can bring into

California depending on whether the flight is non chartered or

chartered, or if the flight landed at some point outside the

continental United States before ending in California, or if the

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 The aim of the Twenty-First Amendment is to allow states 9

to maintain an effective and uniform system for controlling

liquor by regulating its transportation, importation, and use. 

The Amendment does not give states the authority to pass non

uniform laws in order to discriminate against out of state goods.

Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 492 (2005). 

41

flight commenced in Alaska or Hawaii and ended in California. 

Defendant responds that § 23661.1 does not restrict the

importation of wine into the state and that it is a legitimate

regulation by the state of alcohol sales. Defendant argues that

regulation of the importation of wine into the state is a valid

exercise of the state’s Twenty First Amendment Powers.9

The parties’ arguments present an issue requiring a balance

of interests between California’s right to regulate alcohol under

the Twenty First Amendment and the restraint on states from

imposing substantial burdens on interstate commerce under the

dormant Commerce Clause. 

The Commerce Clause has a “dormant” or “negative” aspect,

which restrains the ability of the states to discriminate against

or impose substantial burdens on interstate commerce. Oregon

Waste Sys. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 98

(1994). If a state law restricting the flow of interstate

commerce is facially discriminatory, or discriminatory in its

purpose or effect, it is subject to a strict scrutiny test. 

Under this test, discrimination against interstate commerce “is

per se invalid, save a narrow class of cases in which the state

can demonstrate, under rigorous scrutiny, that it has no other

means to advance a legitimate local interest.” C&A Carbone, Inc.

v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 392 (1994). Once a

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plaintiff demonstrates that a regulatory scheme discriminates

against interstate commerce, the burden shifts to the defendant

to demonstrate that it has no other non-discriminatory means to

advance a legitimate local interest. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S.

460, 492 (2005). 

However, under the Twenty First Amendment, the Commerce

Clause is to be considered in light of the states’ rights to

regulate alcohol. “Under the U.S. Const. amend. XXI, § 2, the

states enjoy broad powers to regulate the importation and use of

alcoholic beverages within their borders.” Stein Distributing Co.

v. Department of Treasury Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, & Firearms,

779 F.2d 1407, 1410 (9th Cir. 1986). “The primary effect of the

amendment is to create an exception to the normal operation of

the Commerce Clause.” Id. “Although the federal government

retains Commerce Clause authority to regulate interstate commerce

in liquor, the Commerce Clause must ‘be considered in light of

the Twenty First Amendment and in the context of the issues and

interests at stake in any concrete case.’” Id. “A state has

virtually complete control only over interests that engage in the

‘core powers’ reserved to the states by the Twenty First

Amendment – that of exercising ‘control over whether to permit

importation or sale of liquor and how to structure the liquor

distribution system.’” Id. 

The Supreme Court addressed challenges to state laws

regulating the sale of wine from out-of-state wineries to

consumers in Granholm v. Heald. The issue in Granholm was

whether “a state’s regulatory scheme that permits in-state

wineries to ship alcohol directly to consumers but restricts the

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ability of out-of-state wineries to do so violates the dormant

Commerce Clause in light of § 2 of the Twenty First Amendment.”

Id. at 471. The wine producers in Granholm were small wineries

that relied on direct consumer sales as an important part of

their businesses. Id. at 468. At issue were statutes from the

state of Michigan and from the state of New York. Id. at 465. 

Under Michigan law, wine producers, as a general matter, had to

distribute their wine through wholesalers. Id. at 469. An

exception applied to Michigan’s in-state wineries, which were

eligible for licenses that allowed direct shipment to in-state

consumers. Id. Out-of-state wineries could obtain an “outside

seller of wine” license for $300 but were limited to selling wine

only to in-state wholesalers and not directly to state resident

consumers. Id. Under the New York statute at issue, wineries

that produced wine only from New York grapes would be able to

apply for a license that allows direct shipment to in-state

consumers. Id. These licensees were able to deliver the wines of

other wineries as well, but only if the wine was made from grapes

that were at least seventy-five percent by volume from grapes

grown in New York. Id. at 470. The court reasoned that laws of

the type at issue contradict the principles of prohibiting

discrimination against interstate commerce. Id. at 472: 

“[These statutes] deprive citizens of their right to

have access to the markets of other States on equal

terms. Id. at 473. State laws that protect local

wineries have led to the enactment of statutes under

which some States condition the right of out-of-state

wineries to make direct wine sales to instate consumers

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on a reciprocal right in the shipping State. Id.”

The court proceeded to specifically mention California’s

reciprocity regime when stating: 

“California, for example, passed a reciprocity law in

1986, retreating from the State’s previous regime that

allowed unfettered direct shipments from out-of-state

wineries. Prior to 1986, all but three States

prohibited direct shipments of wine. The obvious aim

of the California statute was to open the interstate

direct shipping market for the State’s many wineries. 

The current patchwork of laws, with some States banning

direct shipments altogether, others doing so only for

out-of-state wines, and still others requiring

reciprocity, is essentially the product of an ongoing,

low level trade war. Allowing states to discriminate

against out-of-state wine invites a multiplication of

preferential trade areas destructive of the very

purpose of the Commerce Clause.” Id. 

The Court ultimately concluded that the statutes

discriminated against interstate commerce through its directshipping laws. Id. at 476. 

Plaintiffs frame the issue in this case as whether the

Supreme Court’s holding in Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005)

is applicable to California’s wine shipment laws as applied to

out-of-state licensed retailers and California consumers seeking

to ship wine from out-of-state to residents of California. 

In response to Granholm, the California Legislature added §

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 Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 23661.3 provides 10

“Nothwithstanding any law, rule, or regulation to the contrary,

any person currently licensed in this state or any other state as

a winegrower who obtains a wine direct shipper permit pursuant to

this section may sell and ship wine directly to a resident of

California, who is at least 21 years of age, for the resident’s

personal use and not for resale.” 

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23661.3 According to the legislative history of § 23661.3, the 10

legislation sought to “eliminate the requirement that an

unlicensed adult apply and be issued a permit to receive a

shipment of wine.” Deering’s California Advanced Legislative

Service, 2005 Cal ALS 157 (2005). The state also sought to

provide that “a licensed winegrower who obtains a wine direct

shipper permit may sell and ship wine directly to a California

resident, for personal use, under specific conditions.” Id. 

However, no corresponding change was made relative to the

shipment of wine by out-of-state individuals and retailers. The

two case limitation and the need for reciprocity remains a

requirement for out-of-state licensed retailers according to §

23661.2. 

Unlike the Michigan and New York statutes which completely

banned direct shipment to in state consumers from out of state

wineries that did not meet the statutes’ conditions, the statutes

in this case are not a complete ban on direct shipment to

California consumers. Section 23661.2 merely regulates the

amount of wine shipped to directly to California consumers on a

monthly basis. Section 23661.1 also regulates the amount of wine

brought into California by a resident in limiting the amount of

wine the resident may bring per flight. Further, California

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 The three tier structure is made up of in-state wineries, 11

wine wholesalers and wine retailers. 

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state wineries themselves. While the Supreme Court alluded in

Granholm to the proposition that statutes requiring reciprocity

could potentially discriminate against interstate commerce, the

Court failed to expressly decide the issue. Plaintiffs provide

no argument in law to support this premise or to show that the

statutes at issue in this case go beyond California’s broad

powers under the Twenty First Amendment to regulate the

importation of alcohol into the state. 

The only other case to address the issue present before the

court is the case of Brooks v. Vassar, 462 F. 3d 341, 351 (4th

Cir. 2006). Plaintiffs in Brooks challenged Virginia’s Personal

Import Exception, Virginia Code § 4.1-310(E)(i), that prohibited

the importation of alcoholic beverages into Virginia except

through a three-tier structure. Id. at 349. Plaintiffs’ 11

challenge to the Personal Import Exception included an argument

that the provision violated the dormant Commerce Clause because

consumers could purchase unlimited amounts of wine from a

Virginia retailer, but were limited in their wine purchases from

an out-of-state retailer. Id. at 350. The court reasoned that

Plaintiffs’ in arguing that an in state retailer under Virginia’s

three tiered structure is favored over an out of state retailer,

Plaintiffs were challenging the three tiered system itself. Id.

at 352. The court reasoned that this argument was foreclosed by

the Twenty First Amendment and the Supreme Court’s decision in

Granholm, which upheld the three tier system as ‘unquestionably

legitimate.” Id. The court further held: 

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“As the ABC Act now stands, all out-of-state suppliers

of wine are required by Virginia to sell in Virginia

through the tier system... and the Personal Import

exception to that import restriction does not favor instate wineries. Indeed, it favors the out-of-state

wineries insofar as one gallon or four liters of wine

may be imported into Virginia outside of the three-tier

structure, whereas in-state wineries can sell only

through the three tier structure or from their own

retail premises for which they must obtain a separate

retail license.” 

Id. at 352. The court found that the Personal Import Exception

was an exception only to Virginia’s import regulation which is

different from the sales regulation. Id. at 353. Comparing instate sales with importation does not give rise to a legitimate

comparison for determining discrimination. Id. The only fair

comparison is how the statute treats in-state and out-of-state

sales, in-state and out-of-state wineries or in-state and out-ofstate products. Id. 

The court stated that “because the Twenty-first Amendment

grants the states virtually complete control over whether to

permit importation or sale of liquor and how to structure the

liquor distribution system, and because the dormant commerce

clause only prevents a State from enacting regulation that favors

in-state producers and thus discriminates against interstate

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Personal Import Exception is a form of economic protectionism,

the court stated

“While the favortism shown by Virginia in this case to

local wineries by allowing them to sell directly to

consumers did amount to economic protectionism that

violated the dormant Commerce Clause, the

Commonwealth’s interest in otherwise regulating the

importation, transportation, and use of wine in

Virginia is protected by the Twenty-first Amendment. 

It is readily apparent that the Personal Import

Exception is not economic protectionism but part of

Virginia’s import regulation. It provides a de minimis

exception to Virginia’s import regulations, allowing

consumers to import one gallon or four liters of wine

for personal consumption. Under no economic construct

could such a provision be considered economic

protectionism of local industry. To the contrary, it

actually amounts to disadvantage local wineries whose

wine may only be purchased through retailers. 

Accordingly we hold that for this additional reason,

the Personal Import Exception does not violate the

dormant Commerce Clause.” 

Id. 354-355.

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commerce, the Personal Import Exception does not violate the

Clause.” Id. 12

Though the parties do not raise the issues addressed in

Brooks, the California statutes at issue appear to be similar to

Virginia’s personal import exception. In their motion for

summary judgment, Plaintiffs’ have failed to provide any evidence

of the full structure of alcohol regulation in California. It is

unknown whether California’s regulatory structure is similar to

the three tiered structure held “unquestionably legitimate” by

Granholm. However, it appears, as in Brooks, that the statutes

at issue here regulate wine imports rather than wine sales in the

state of California. 

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Plaintiffs’ complaint was dismissed for lack of standing. 

However, had the complaint not been dismissed, it would seem

that, in light of Brooks, a triable issue exists as to whether

the California statutes at issue regulate wine imports rather

than wine sales, and whether, as a result, they are well within

California’s right to regulate alcohol under the Twenty First

Amendment. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, 

(1) Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED. 

(2) Defendant’s cross-motion to dismiss for lack of standing

is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 25, 2007 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

bb4ed UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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