Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_07-cv-00539/USCOURTS-alsd-1_07-cv-00539-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Product Liability

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

ARTHUR MACONEGHY, et al., )

 )

Plaintiffs, )

 )

v. ) CIVIL ACTION 07-0539-WS-M

 )

COOPER TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY,)

et al., )

 )

Defendants. )

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the plaintiff’s motion to remand. (Doc. 7). The

parties have filed briefs and evidentiary materials in support of their respective positions,

(Docs. 8, 12, 13), and the motion is ripe for resolution. After carefully considering the

foregoing and other relevant materials in the file, the Court concludes that the motion is

due to be granted.

BACKGROUND

The complaint, filed in the Circuit Court of Wilcox County, alleges that the

plaintiffs purchased a used vehicle from defendant Dick Moye Auto Sales, Inc. (“Moye”)

equipped with one or more Cooper Sumitomo tires. While plaintiff Arthur Maconeghy

was driving the vehicle on an Alabama interstate highway, the right rear tire separated,

resulting in a rollover and substantial injuries to Mr. Maconeghy. In addition to Moye,

the plaintiffs sued Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. (“Cooper”) and Sumitomo Rubber

Industries, Ltd. (“Sumitomo”), who apparently were involved with the tire’s creation and

marketing, along with various fictitious defendants. The complaint includes claims

against all defendants under AEMLD, negligence/wantonness, willfulness, and loss of

consortium.

Cooper timely removed the action on the basis of diversity. The parties agree that

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Accord Crowe v. Coleman, 113 F.3d 1536, 1539 (11th Cir. 1997) (the issue is

“whether the facts alleged in Plaintiffs’ complaint state even an arguable cause of action

under Georgia law”) (emphasis omitted). 

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Cooper and Sumitomo are diverse and that the plaintiffs and Moye are all citizens of

Florida. Cooper argues that the citizenship of Moye may be ignored because he was

fraudulently joined. Cooper identifies three bases for this conclusion: (1) the “as is”

nature of the sale negates any duty running from Moye to the plaintiffs; (2) Moye is

protected by the “no causal relation” defense; and (3) the Alabama courts have no

personal jurisdiction over Moye. 

DISCUSSION

“Fraudulent joinder is a judicially created doctrine that provides an exception to

the requirement of complete diversity.” Triggs v. John Crump Toyota, Inc., 154 F.3d

1284, 1287 (11th Cir. 1998). “If there is even a possibility that a state court would find

that the complaint states a cause of action against any one of the resident defendants, the

federal court must find that joinder was proper and remand the case to state court.” Coker

v. Amoco Oil Co., 709 F.2d 1433, 1440-41 (11th Cir. 1983). Conversely, if no such

possibility exists, the joinder is fraudulent as a matter of law. Id. at 1440.1

 There must be

“no reasonable possibility” of legal liability; a mere theoretical possibility will not

prevent a conclusion of fraudulent joinder. Legg v. Wyeth, 428 F.3d 1317, 1325 & n.5

(11th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added). The burden is on the defendants to make the required

showing by “clear and convincing evidence.” Henderson v. Washington National

Insurance Co., 454 F.3d 1278, 1281 (11th Cir. 2006). “[T]he district court must evaluate

the factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and must resolve any

uncertainties about state substantive law in favor of the plaintiff.” Crowe v. Coleman,

113 F.3d 1536, 1538 (11th Cir. 1997); accord Florence v. Crescent Resources, LLC, 484

F.3d 1293, 1299 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[A]ny ambiguity or doubt about the substantive law

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See Bagley ex rel. Bagley v. Creekside Motors, Inc., 913 So. 2d 441, 444 (Ala.

2005) (“The general rule is that there is no implied warranty of the quality or condition of

a used automobile and the rule of caveat emptor applies.”) (internal quotes omitted). 

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favors remand to state court.”) (internal quotes omitted). 

I. Caveat Emptor.

Cooper acknowledges that the plaintiffs’ claims against Moye include at least the

allegation that Moye negligently inspected the tire before selling the vehicle to them. 

(Complaint at 9, ¶ 26(l); Doc. 1 at 6; Doc. 12 at 7). Cooper argues that, because it sold

the vehicle “as is,” Moye “did not undertake any duty to Plaintiffs with respect to the

condition of the vehicle or its tires.” (Id. at 8; accord id. at 11). That is, Cooper suggests

that a disclaimer of warranty on a used automobile somehow negates a negligence claim

of failure to inspect the automobile. Cooper’s argument depends on two explicit

premises: (1) without a warranty, the sale of a used vehicle is governed by the rule of

caveat emptor; and (2) “caveat emptor is a defense to a negligence claim.” (Id. at 11-12). 

The first premise may be taken as established,2

 but the second may not. For this

proposition, Cooper cites only Keck v. Dryvit Systems, Inc., 830 So. 2d 1 (Ala. 2002), in

which the purchasers of a used home sued the manufacturer, distributor and installer of

the home’s original cladding system. Keck held that, because the plaintiffs were not in

privity with these defendants, the doctrine of caveat emptor applied and defeated the

claims of negligent design, supervision, installation, and failure to warn. Id. at 3, 9. The

Keck Court relied on Boackle v. Bedwell Construction Co., 770 So. 2d 1076 (Ala. 2000),

which involved a similar fact pattern, similar claims, and a similar conclusion that “[t]he

lack of privity between the plaintiffs and the defendants forecloses such claims.” Id. at

1081. Both Keck and Boackle suggested the result would have been different had

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See also McFadden v. Ten-T Corp., 529 So. 2d 192, 201 (Ala. 1988) (“[T]he rule

of caveat emptor ... has no applicability to a theory of liability based on personal injury

caused by negligent construction, whether in regard to new homes or used homes.”). 

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personal injury been involved. 830 So. 2d at 4; 770 So. 2d at 1081.3

Cooper’s authorities are insufficient to foreclose Moye’s liability for negligent

inspection in this case for at least three reasons: (1) they involved used homes, not used

automobiles; (2) they depended on the absence of privity between plaintiff and defendant;

and (3) they made exception for cases involving personal injury. Whatever the true state

of Alabama law may be, on this record there are uncertainties concerning its reach, and

the Court is obligated to resolve those uncertainties in favor of the plaintiff.

II. No Causal Relation.

In response to claims brought under the AEMLD, a defendant may assert the

“affirmative defense” of “no causal relation.” E.g., Tillman v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco

Co., 871 So. 2d 28, 30 n.1 (Ala. 2003); Atkins v. American Motors Co., 335 So. 2d 134,

143 & n.4 (Ala. 1976). “In order to avail itself of the no-causal relation defense, [the

defendant] must show that he was in the business of distributing ... finished products; that

he received the product already in a defective condition; that he did not contribute to this

defective condition; and that he had neither knowledge of the defective condition nor an

opportunity to inspect the product that was superior to the knowledge or opportunity of

the consumer.” Foremost Insurance Co. v. Indies House, Inc., 602 So. 2d 380, 382 (Ala.

1992) (internal quotes omitted). Cooper argues that this defense precludes the plaintiffs

from establishing Moye’s liability.

The threshold problem with Cooper’s position is its failure to establish that the “no

causal relation” defense applies to products cases sounding in negligence. Cooper

identifies no case applying the defense to a negligence claim; instead, it cites generally to

Atkins for the proposition that the AEMLD, like negligence, is a fault-based concept. 

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Cf. Henderson, 454 F.3d at 1282-83 (a failure to plead fraudulent concealment, if

such pleading were required by Alabama law in order to take advantage of statutory

tolling in a fraud case, would establish fraudulent joinder). 

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(Doc. 12 at 11). This unremarkable fact does not of itself prove that the “no causal

relation” defense applies to negligence claims, especially considering that Atkins created

the defense specifically for AEMLD cases. 335 So. 2d at 143.

Even had Cooper met this burden, it has failed to show that application of the

defense dooms the plaintiff’s negligent inspection case against Moye. As noted, “no

causal relation” is an affirmative defense, and “[t]he party asserting the affirmative

defense bears the burden of proving it.” Lloyd Noland Foundation, Inc. v. HealthSouth

Corp., 2007 WL 2405675 at *5 (Ala. 2007). Neither Cooper nor Moye has presented any

evidence to demonstrate that Moye is entitled to the protection of the no-causal-relationdefense. Instead, Cooper argues that Moye was fraudulently joined because the

complaint does not allege that a proper inspection would have revealed the defect in the

tire or that Moye’s opportunity to inspect the tire was superior to that of the plaintiffs. 

(Doc. 12 at 7, 9). Cooper, however, makes no attempt to demonstrate that Alabama law

requires a plaintiff to “plead around” the affirmative defense of no causal relation.4

Cooper relies on Johnson v. General Motors Corp., 82 F. Supp. 2d 1326 (S.D. Ala. 1997),

but in that case the defendant had moved for summary judgment and had thereby (unlike

here) met its initial burden of showing that it qualified for the defense; the Court found

fraudulent joinder because the plaintiff offered no evidence to counter the defendant’s

evidence presented in support of the defense. Id. at 1328. To the extent, if any, that

Johnson can be read as casting a burden on the plaintiff to plead around a no-causalrelation defense, it is not a decision of an Alabama court and so cannot establish Alabama

law. 

Finally, the no-causal-relation defense applies only if the defendant “did not

contribute to th[e] defective condition.” Cooper has not addressed this element of the

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defense in any fashion, either by producing evidence to satisfy it or by complaining that

the plaintiffs have not adequately pleaded Moye’s inability to satisfy it. 

III. Personal Jurisdiction. 

Personal jurisdiction can be specific or general. The affidavit of Dick Moye

establishes that all of the events concerning Moye’s purchase, possession and sale of the

vehicle occurred exclusively in Florida. Thus, specific jurisdiction is lacking.

“General jurisdiction applies where a defendant’s activities in the forum state are

substantial or continuous and systematic, regardless of whether those activities gave rise

to the lawsuit. ... [T]he nexus between the defendant and the forum state must arise out of

an action of the defendant [that was] purposefully directed toward the forum State.” Ex

parte Troncalli Chrysler Plymouth Dodge, Inc., 876 So. 2d 459, 463 (Ala. 2003) (internal

quotes omitted). In that regard, Moye’s affidavit reflects that Moye’s only business

location is in Pensacola, that it has no property in Alabama, and that it does not conduct

business there. The affidavit also reflects that Moye “has never advertised on television

or radio stations located in Alabama nor does it otherwise target Alabama with any of its

advertising.” (Doc. 5, Exhibit A). 

In its motion to dismiss, Moye concludes in a single, unamplified sentence that the

affidavit negates general jurisdiction. (Doc. 5 at 5). Cooper repeats this bald conclusion,

(Doc. 12 at 18), later insisting that Moye “simply has no contacts” with Alabama. (Id. at

20). The Court does not find the defendants’ conclusion so obvious. While the affidavit

confirms that Moye does not purchase advertising from Alabama broadcasters or

publishers, it does not deny that Moye purchases advertising in Florida that purposefully

reaches Alabama consumers, and the Court judicially knows that broadcast media in the

Pensacola area reach far into Alabama. This case is thus different from those relied on by

Cooper, in which it was established that the defendant conducted no advertising in the

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World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980) (“They [the

defendants] solicit no business there [the forum state] either through salespersons or

through advertising reasonably calculated to reach the State.”); Thomas v. Mitsubishi

Motor, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1252 (M.D. Ala. 2006) (“The evidence presented by

[the dealer] also states that it does not advertise or solicit business in Alabama.”); Ex

parte Covington Pike Dodge, Inc., 904 So. 2d 226, 231 (Ala. 2004) (affidavit asserted that

the defendant “does not advertise its services in Alabama”).

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forum state.5 And while the affidavit denies that Moye conducts business in Alabama, it

does not deny that Alabama consumers regularly travel the few miles into Florida to

purchase Moye’s wares. The Court is thus not free to assume that such commerce does

not occur. Because Cooper has not presented cases concluding that personal jurisdiction

was lacking on evidence materially similar to that in this case, it has not shown that there

is no reasonable possibility of an Alabama court upholding the exercise of personal

jurisdiction over Moye.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the motion to remand is granted. This action is

remanded to the Circuit Court of Wilcox County.

 

DONE and ORDERED this 1st day of October, 2007.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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