Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_08-cv-03912/USCOURTS-cand-5_08-cv-03912-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Denying Request for Certificate of Appealability

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NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JIMMY G. MEJIA,

Petitioner,

 vs.

BEN CURRY, Warden,

Respondent. 

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No. C 08-03912 JF (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS AND DENYING

REQUEST FOR CERTIFICATE

OF APPEALABILITY

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks a petition for a writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging the decision of the Board of Parole

Hearings (the “Board”) finding him unsuitable for parole. The Court found that the

petition stated cognizable claims and ordered Respondent to show cause why the petition

should not be granted. Respondent filed an answer addressing the merits of the petition,

and Petitioner filed a traverse. Having reviewed the papers and the underlying record, the

Court concludes that Petitioner is not entitled to relief based on the claims presented and

will deny the petition.

STATEMENT

On November 14, 1979, Petitioner was sentenced to a term of fifteen-years-to-life

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in state prison after pleading guilty to second degree murder and use of a firearm in the

California Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles County. Petitioner challenges

the Board’s decision denying him parole following his most recent parole suitability

hearing on October 25, 2006. (Resp. Ex. A.) Petitioner filed habeas petitions in the state

superior court, state appellate court, and the state supreme court, all of which were denied

as of June 18, 2008. Petitioner filed the instant federal petition on August 15, 2008.

 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

This Court will entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is

in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(a). The petition may not be granted with respect to any claim adjudicated

on the merits in state court unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted

in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2)

resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the

state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a

question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set

of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-413

(2000). “Under the ‘reasonable application clause,’ a federal habeas court may grant the

writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s

decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id.

at 413. “[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied

clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must

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Order Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Denying Request for Certificate of Appealability

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also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. 

“[A] federal habeas court making the ‘unreasonable application’ inquiry should

ask whether the state court’s application of clearly established federal law was

‘objectively unreasonable.’” Id. at 409. In examining whether the state court decision

was objectively unreasonable, the inquiry may require analysis of the state court’s method

as well as its result. Nunes v. Mueller, 350 F.3d 1045, 1054 (9th Cir. 2003). The

standard for “objectively unreasonable” is not “clear error” because “[t]hese two

standards . . . are not the same. The gloss of error fails to give proper deference to state

courts by conflating error (even clear error) with unreasonableness.” Lockyer v.

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003).

A federal habeas court may grant the writ if it concludes that the state court’s

adjudication of the claim “results in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). The court must presume correct any determination

of a factual issue made by a state court unless the petitioner rebuts the presumption of

correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

Where, as here, the highest state court to consider Petitioner’s claims issued a

summary opinion which does not explain the rationale of its decision, federal review

under § 2254(d) is of the last state court opinion to reach the merits. See Ylst v.

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-06 (1991); Bains v. Cambra, 204 F.3d 964, 970-71, 973-

78 (9th Cir. 2000). In this case, the last state court opinion to address the merits of

Petitioner’s claims is the opinion of the California Superior Court for the County of Los

Angeles. (Petition, Ex. 4.)

B. Petitioner’s Claims

Petitioner alleges that the Board’s decision to deny him parole on the basis that he

posed a current risk to society was without evidentiary support and thereby violated due

process. The Ninth Circuit has determined that a California prisoner with a sentence of a

term of years to life with the possibility of parole has a protected liberty interest in release

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on parole and therefore a right to due process in the parole suitability proceedings. See

McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 902 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Board of Pardons v.

Allen, 482 U.S. 369 (1987); Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Corr. Complex,

442 U.S. 1 (1979)). See also Irons v. Carey, 505 F.3d 846, 851 (9th Cir. 2007); Sass v.

California Board of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1127-28 (9th Cir. 2006); Biggs v.

Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 915-16 (9th Cir. 2003).

A parole board’s decision must be supported by “some evidence” to satisfy the

requirements of due process. Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128-29 (adopting “some evidence”

standard for disciplinary hearings outlined in Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454-

55 (1985)). The standard of “some evidence” is met if there was some evidence from

which the conclusion of the administrative tribunal may be deduced. See Hill, 472 U.S.

at 455. An examination of the entire record is not required, nor is an independent

assessment of the credibility of witnesses nor weighing of the evidence. Id. The relevant

question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion

reached by the Board. See id. Accordingly, “if the Board’s determination of parole

suitability is to satisfy due process there must be some evidence, with some indicia of

reliability, to support the decision.” Rosas v. Nielsen, 428 F.3d 1229, 1232 (9th Cir.

2005) (citing McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 904). 

When assessing whether a state parole board’s suitability determination was

supported by “some evidence,” the court’s analysis is framed by the statutes and

regulations governing parole suitability determinations in the relevant state. Irons, 505

F.3d at 850. Accordingly, in California, the court must look to California law to

determine the findings that are necessary to deem a prisoner unsuitable for parole, and

then must review the record in order to determine whether the state court decision

constituted an unreasonable application of the “some evidence” principle. Id.

California Code of Regulations, title 15, section 2402(a) provides that “[t]he panel

shall first determine whether the life prisoner is suitable for release on parole. Regardless

of the length of time served, a life prisoner shall be found unsuitable for and denied

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 The circumstances tending to show an inmate’s unsuitability are: (1) the

commitment offense was committed in an “especially heinous, atrocious or cruel

manner;” (2) previous record of violence; (3) unstable social history; (4) sadistic sexual

offenses; (5) psychological factors such as a “lengthy history of severe mental problems

related to the offense;” and (6) prison misconduct. Cal. Code of Regs., tit. 15, § 2402(c). 

The circumstances tending to show suitability are: (1) no juvenile record; (2) stable social

history; (3) signs of remorse; (4) commitment offense was committed as a result of stress

which built up over time; (5) Battered Woman Syndrome; (6) lack of criminal history; (7)

age is such that it reduces the possibility of recidivism; (8) plans for future including

development of marketable skills; and (9) institutional activities that indicate ability to

function within the law. Cal. Code of Regs., tit., 15 § 2402(d).

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parole if in the judgment of the panel the prisoner will pose an unreasonable risk of

danger to society if released from prison.” Cal. Code of Regs., tit. 15, § 2402(a). The

regulations direct the Board to consider “all relevant, reliable information available.” 

Cal. Code of Regs., tit. 15, § 2402(b). Further, the regulations enumerate various

circumstances tending to indicate whether or not an inmate is suitable for parole. Cal.

Code of Regs., tit. 15, § 2402(c)-(d).1

It is now established under California law that the task of the Board and the

Governor is to determine whether the prisoner would be a danger to society if he or she

were paroled. See In re Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th 1181 (2008). The constitutional “some

evidence” requirement therefore is that there be some evidence that the prisoner would be

such a danger, not that there be some evidence of one or more of the factors that the

regulations list as factors to be considered in deciding whether to grant parole. Id. at

1205-06. 

Most recently, the Ninth Circuit reheard en banc the panel decision in Hayward v.

Marshall, 512 F.3d 536 (9th Cir. 2008), reh’g en banc granted, 527 F.3d 797 (9th. Cir.

2008), which presented a state prisoner’s due process habeas challenge to the denial of

parole. The panel opinion concluded that the gravity of the commitment offense had no

predictive value regarding the petitioner’s suitability for parole and held that the

governor’s reversal of parole was not supported by some evidence and resulted in a due

process violation. 512 F.3d at 546-47. The Ninth Circuit has not yet issued an en banc

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decision in Hayward.

Unless or until the en banc court overrules the holdings in Biggs, Sass, and Irons, it

remains the law in this circuit that California’s parole scheme creates a federally

protected liberty interest in parole and therefore a right to due process, which is satisfied

if some evidence supports the Board’s parole suitability decision. Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128-

29. These cases also hold that the Board may rely on immutable events, such as the

nature of the conviction offense and pre-conviction criminality, to find that the prisoner is

not currently suitable for parole. Id. at 1129. Biggs and Irons also suggest, however, that

over time, the commitment offense and pre-conviction behavior become less reliable

predictors of danger to society such that repeated denial of parole based solely on

immutable events, regardless of the extent of rehabilitation during incarceration, could

violate due process at some point after the prisoner serves the minimum term on his

sentence. See Irons, 505 F.3d at 853-54. It is undisputed that Petitioner’s minimum

parole eligibility date was March 17, 1987.

The Board’s decision denying parole in this case was based upon its review of the

nature of the commitment offenses, Petitioner’s prior criminal and social history, and

Petitioner’s behavior and programming during imprisonment. (Resp. Ex. A, p. 58-61.) 

The Board concluded that Petitioner was “not suitable for parole and would pose an

unreasonable risk of danger to society, or a threat to public safety if released from

prison.” (Id. at 58.) The Board observed that the commitment offense was carried out “in

an especially cruel and callous manner,” and “carried out in a dispassionate manner” that

“demonstrate[d] an extremely callous disregard for human suffering.” (Id.) The state

superior court summarized the facts of the crime in its order denying Petitioner’s state

habeas petition: 

The record reflects that on June 10, 1979, the Petitioner and a

friend decided to rob a drug dealer at gunpoint. They armed themselves

and went to the drug dealer’s apartment. While they were heading

toward the drug dealer’s apartment, they encountered a man who

inquired as to why they were there with guns. Fearing that they would

be caught, the Petitioner and his friend left the apartment building. At

that point, the victim, Thomas Biddle, and another man chased after the

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Petitioner and his friend. The Petitioner claims that he stopped and told

the victim, “we don’t have to hurt each other,” but that the victim

continued to confront him. The Petitioner saw that the victim was

armed and fired several shots in the victim’s direction. The victim was

able to run away, however, one of the shots hit the victim and he was

killed.

(Pet., Ex. 4, p. 1.)

The Board first considered Petitioner’s criminal history. After determining that

Petitioner’s commitment offense had been carried out “in an especially cruel and callous

manner,” the Board observed that the Petitioner’s criminal history included several prior

inflictions or attempts to inflict serious injuries to others. (Resp. Ex. A, p. 58-59.) The

Board also noted Petitioner’s long record of criminal misconduct, including a conviction

for shooting and killing his common-law wife, eight convictions for driving under the

influence, which resulted in two deaths, multiple robberies, burglaries, and serious longterm drug and alcohol abuse. (Id. at 59.) The Board also acknowledged that Petitioner

had failed several times on probation and parole since his relationship with the

correctional system began as a juvenile. (Id.) 

In addition, the Board concluded that Petitioner had not participated sufficiently in

self-help and therapy programs and failed to demonstrate evidence of positive change. 

(Id. at 59-60.) The Board noted that Petitioner had received two 128a counseling chronos

while incarcerated, the most recent having been in 2003 for having an “unacceptable

attitude.” (Id. at 60.) The Board further recognized that Petitioner had not received any

disciplinary reports since March 1986. (Id.) That disciplinary report was for being under

the influence of alcohol. (Id.) The Board concluded by stating that it was concerned with

Petitioner’s lack of insight into his criminal behavior, especially with respect to his role in

killing four people. (Id.) 

The Board also considered Petitioner’s efforts to rehabilitate himself. The Board

commended Petitioner for his participation in Alcoholics Anonymous (“AA”),

completing a alternatives to violence course, being discipline free since 1986,

participating in group studies, and advancing his education. (Id. at 61.) However, the

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Board opined that Petitioner needed more therapy and self-help participation and

concluded that these positive factors did not outweigh the factors of unsuitability. (Id.) 

The state superior court rejected the Board’s findings regarding the commitment

offense, finding that there was no evidence to support a finding that the commitment

offense was carried out in a calculated manner or that it demonstrated an exceptionally

callous disregard for human suffering, or that Petitioner’s motive was very trivial in

relation to the offense. (Pet., Ex. 4, p. 2.) However, the state court nonetheless

determined that the record contained “some evidence” to support the Board’s finding that

Petitioner was unsuitable for parole. The state court made the following additional

observations:

The Court finds that there is some evidence to support the

Board’s finding that the Petitioner has a previous record of violence.

[Citation omitted.] The Petitioner has several serious, violent prior

convictions, including robbery; assault with intent to commit murder,

which resulted in the death of the Petitioner’s common law wife; as well

as manslaughter by vehicle, which resulted in the deaths of two women. 

This shocking criminal history began when the Petitioner was a juvenile,

continued throughout his adulthood and demonstrates serious assaultive

behavior throughout the Petitioner’s life. Further, when the Petitioner

was arrested for the commitment offense, he was still carrying a

concealed handgun. This demonstrates that he was planning to continue

his violent behavior and is some evidence that the Petitioner would be

an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released on parole.

Additionally, the Court finds that there is some evidence to

support the Board’s finding that the Petitioner has an unstable social

history. [Citation omitted.] The Petitioner admits that he was a gang

member since he was a teenager and that he was involved in gangrelated activities. Also, the Petitioner shot his common law wife to

death. This constitutes some evidence that the Petitioner has a history of

tumultuous relationships with others and may, therefore, be unsuitable

for parole.

The Board also considered the Petitioner’s previous lack of

insight into his responsibility for taking four lives, his reported attitude

problems with correctional staff, and his limited self-help programming. 

While these factors, alone, may not justify a finding of unsuitability, the

Board may properly consider them as relevant to a determination of

whether the Petitioner is suitable for parole. [Citation omitted.]

The Board’s decision may be upheld, despite flaws in its

findings, if it is clear it would have reached the same decision even

absent the errors. [Citation omitted.] Here, it is clear that the Board

would have denied the Petitioner parole, even absent the aggravating

offense factors, based on his previous record of violence, unstable social

history, and other factors, all of which weighed against his suitability. 

The Court finds that together, these factors constitute some evidence

that the Petitioner poses an unreasonable risk of danger to society and is,

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therefore, not suitable for release on parole.

(Pet., Ex. 4.)

Petitioner claims that the Board violated his due process rights in continuing to

rely on immutable factors of his criminal and social history, even in the face of his

rehabilitation. (Pet., p. 13.) Although Respondent points out that there is no Supreme

Court precedent prohibiting a parole board from relying on the unchanging facts of a

prisoner’s crime, the Ninth Circuit has cautioned that where the prisoner has served the

minimum sentence and has demonstrated “substantial evidence” of rehabilitation, reliance

on unchanging facts could violate due process. Irons, 505 F.3d at 853-54. 

Here, although Petitioner had been incarcerated beyond his minimum term, there

was sufficient evidence before the Board to support a conclusion that Petitioner would

pose an unreasonable danger to society if released. Beyond the commitment offense, the

Board considered Petitioner’s lack of insight into his role in the deaths of four people and

Petitioner’s need for additional therapy and self-help programs to understand, discuss,

and cope with stress. Cal. Code of Regs., tit. 15, § 2402(b). (Resp. Ex. A, p. 24-29, 38-

39, 60-61.) The Board’s reliance on these factors in denying parole did not violate due

process. It cannot be said that Petitioner has demonstrated “substantial evidence” of

rehabilitation such that denial of parole would raise due process concerns. Irons, 505

F.3d at 853-54. 

This Court concludes that Petitioner’s due process rights were not violated by the

Board’s decision to deny him parole. Accordingly, the state courts’ decisions were not

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court

precedent, nor were they based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

the evidence presented. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2).

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

The federal rules governing habeas cases brought by state prisoners have recently

been amended to require a district court that denies a habeas petition to grant or deny a

certificate of appealability (“COA”) in its ruling. See Rule 11(a), Rules Governing §

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2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254 (effective December 1, 2009). However, the Ninth

Circuit has made clear that a state prisoner challenging the Board of Prison Terms’

administrative decision to deny a request for parole need not obtain a certificate of

appealability. See Rosas, 428 F.3d at 1232. Accordingly, any request for a COA is

DENIED as unnecessary. The clerk shall forward to the court of appeals the case file

with this order. See Fed. R. App. P. 22(b). 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court concludes that Petitioner has failed to

show any violation of his federal constitutional rights in the underlying state criminal

proceedings. Accordingly, the petition for writ of habeas corpus and COA are DENIED. 

The Clerk shall terminate all pending motions, enter judgment and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 

JEREMY FOGEL

United States District Judge

3/17/10

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JIMMY G. MEJIA,

Petitioner,

 v.

BEN CURRY, Warden,

Respondent. /

Case Number: CV 08-03912 JF 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District

Court, Northern District of California.

That on , I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by

placing said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by

depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office

delivery receptacle located in the Clerk's office.

Jimmy G. Mejia C-10575

Correctional Training Facility

P.O. Box 689

Eeast Dorm 83L

Soledad, CA 93960-0689

Dated: 

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Diana Munz, Deputy Clerk

3/18/10

3/18/10

Case 5:08-cv-03912-JF Document 12 Filed 03/18/10 Page 11 of 12
Jimmy G. Mejia C-10575

Correctional Training Facility

P.O. Box 689

Eeast Dorm 83L

Soledad, CA 93960-0689

CV08-03912 JF 

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