Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-02358/USCOURTS-azd-2_03-cv-02358-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Levonnie Wooten, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

David Cluff and Terry Goddard, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV- 03-2358-PHX-DGC

ORDER

Pending before the Court is United States Magistrate Judge Mark E. Aspey’s Report

and Recommendation (“R&R”). Doc. #18. The R&R recommends that the Court deny the

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Petitioner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Doc. #1. Petitioner filed an objection to the R&R on November 21, 2005. Doc. #24. The

Court must undertake a de novo review of those portions of the R&R to which objections are

made. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985); United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d

1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). The Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the

findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge. See id.

Background

In 1994, Petitioner was charged by an indictment with first degree murder, first degree

burglary, and tampering with a witness. Prior to trial, Petitioner moved to exclude testimony

in the form of a statement made by the murder victim to a friend during a telephone call on

the night of the murder, in which the victim stated that Petitioner was at the victim’s

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apartment. The trial court rejected Petitioner’s argument that the testimony would violate

his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation and concluded that the testimony was admissible

under two hearsay exceptions: present sense impression and the catch-all exception based

on sufficient indicia of reliability. Petitioner was convicted, and on July 11, 1996 was

sentenced to a term of life imprisonment for first degree murder, 21 years for burglary, and

1.875 years for witness tampering. 

Petitioner filed a timely appeal on July 22, 1996. The Arizona Court of Appeals

affirmed Petitioner’s conviction on April 30, 1998, concluding that the victim’s statement

was admissible as a present sense impression. The Arizona Supreme Court declined to

review this decision on March 19, 1999. 

On April 13, 1999, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief. Petitioner’s postconviction action was dismissed by the Arizona Superior Court on June 15, 2001. On

January 16, 2004, Petitioner filed an amended petition for writ of habeas corpus claiming that

his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was violated by admission of the hearsay

evidence.

Discussion

The Court may not grant the writ of habeas corpus unless the state court reached a

decision contrary to clearly established federal law or one involving an unreasonable

application of such law, or unless the state court decision was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at trial. See 28 U.S.C. § 2554(d).

In this case, the trial court applied the rule that a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to

confrontation is not violated by the admission of non-testimonial hearsay statements if those

statements fall within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule. See Lilly v. Virginia, 527

U.S. 116, 124-25 (1999). Additionally, it found that the right to confrontation is not violated

if the specific testimony is reliable. See Forn v. Hornung, 343 F.3d 990, 996 (9th Cir. 2003).

 Petitioner first argues that the trial court’s admission of the evidence is contrary to the

Supreme Court’s ruling in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 35 (2004). Crawford held that

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the Sixth Amendment demands unavailability and a prior opportunity to cross-examine

before out-of-court “testimonial” statements are admitted, regardless of whether courts find

the statements to be reliable or within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. Id. at 68. Nontestimonial statements, however, may be admitted under traditional hearsay law. Id.

Crawford does not apply to this case because the victim’s out-of-court statement to

her friend was not “testimonial.” Although Crawford did not define the full scope of

“testimonial” statements, it did explain that such statements include “prior testimony at a

preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and [responses] to police

interrogations.” Id. The challenged testimony in this case involved a statement made by the

murder victim to a friend, over the phone, placing Petitioner at the scene of the crime.

Whatever the scope of “testimonial” statements might be, the Court concludes that the

victim’s statement in this case does not fall within it. Statements made by phone to a friend

simply cannot be equated with testimonial statements made in judicial proceedings or police

interrogations. See Jensen v. Puller, ___ F.3d ___, 2006 WL 560691 at *3 (9th Cir. 2006)

(statement made by defendant to his attorney not testimonial; citing cases). The Supreme

Court explained in Crawford that “where nontestimonal hearsay is at issue, it is wholly

consistent with the Framers’ design to afford the States flexibility in their development of

hearsay law.” Id. Crawford explained that state law can properly “exempt[] such statements

from Confrontation Clause scrutiny altogether.” Id. Admission of the victim’s nontestimonial statement under Arizona hearsay law, therefore, did not violate Petitioner’s

confrontation rights and was not contrary to clearly established federal law or an

unreasonable application of such law.

Petitioner also argues that the present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule

is not “firmly rooted.” Doc. #25. It is not clear whether the “firmly rooted” requirement of

Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), survives Crawford for purposes of admitting nontestimonial statements. See Jensen, 2006 WL 560691 at *4. Even if it does, however, the

present sense impression exception is an ancient and well-established doctrine and constitutes

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a firmly rooted hearsay exception. See United States v. Peacock, 654 F.2d 339, 350 (5th Cir.

1981); Reedus v. Stegall, 197 F. Supp. 2d 767, 777 (E.D. Mich. 2001). 

Finally, even if the admission of the hearsay statement had violated Petitioner’s

constitutional rights, he would not be entitled to relief. For purposes of federal habeas

review, a constitutional error that implicates trial procedures is considered harmless if it did

not have a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.”

Brecht v. Abramson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993). The Court concludes that admission of the

hearsay statement did not have a substantial or injurious effect or influence in determining

the jury’s verdict in this case because of the overwhelming evidence of Petitioner’s guilt,

including Petitioner’s own admission. 

The Court will accept the R&R and deny the Petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Magistrate Judge Mark E. Aspey’s R&R (Doc. #18) is accepted.

2. Petitioner Wooten’s petition for writ of habeas corpus (Doc. #1) is denied.

3. The Clerk of Court shall terminate this action.

DATED this 20th day of March, 2006.

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