Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00759/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00759-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LARRY C. ALEXANDER

Plaintiff,

v.

JAMES C. TILTON, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:07-cv-00759-LJO-DLB PC

ORDER REQUIRING PLAINTIFF TO FILE

AMENDED COMPLAINT OR NOTIFY

COURT OF WILLINGNESS TO PROCEED

ONLY ON COGNIZABLE CLAIMS WITHIN

THIRTY DAYS

(Doc. 7)

Screening Order

A. Screening Standard

Plaintiff Larry C. Alexander (“plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in this civil

rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed this action on May 23, 2007. Plaintiff then

filed a First Amended Complaint on August 13, 2007.

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

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“Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited

exceptions,” none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S.

506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).

“Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. A court may dismiss a complaint only

if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with

the allegations. Id. at 514. “‘The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether

the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Indeed it may appear on the face of

the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the test.’” Jackson v. Carey,

353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)); see also

Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004) (“‘Pleadings need suffice only to put the

opposing party on notice of the claim . . . .’” (quoting Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 977 (9th Cir.

2001))). However, “the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff’s factual allegations.”

Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). “[A] liberal interpretation of a civil rights

complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat’l

Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d

266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).

B. Summary of Plaintiff’s Complaint

The events at issue in this action allegedly occurred at various California State Prison

locations, where Plaintiff has resided since 1982. Plaintiff names over 100 defendants in this action.

Plaintiff is seeking money damages. Plaintiff alleges that beginning around 1984, Defendants have

consistently failed to provide Plaintiff with adequate medical care, and have acted in a retaliatory

manner toward him for attempting to pursue medical treatment. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants

violated his rights under the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiff further alleges that

Defendants violated his rights under the Americans With Disabilities Act, and the Rehabilitation

Act.

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C. First Amendment Claims

Plaintiff alleges that prison staff members have been retaliating against him for exercising

his protected right to file grievances via the inmate appeals process.

Allegations of retaliation against a prisoner’s First Amendment rights to speech or to petition

the government may support a section 1983 claim. Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir.

1985); see also Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1989); Pratt v. Rowland, 65

F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995). “Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment

retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action

against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled

the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance

a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005). An

allegation of retaliation against a prisoner’s First Amendment right to file a prison grievance is

sufficient to support claim under section 1983. Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 2003).

Adverse action is action that “would chill a person of ordinary firmness” from engaging in

that activity. Pinard v. Clatskanie School Dist., 467 F.3d 755, 770 (9th Cir. 2006); White v. Lee, 227

F.3d 1214, 1228 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Lewis v. Jacks, No. 06-1995, 2007 WL 1374746, *2 (8th

Cir. May 11, 2007); see also Thomas v. Eby, 481 F.3d 434, 440 (6th Cir. 2007); Bennett v. Hendrix,

423 F.3d 1247, 1250-51 (11th Cir. 2005); Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ.,

411 F.3d 474, 500 (4th Cir. 2005); Gill v. Pidlypchak, 389 F.3d 379, 381 (2d Cir. 2004); Rauser v.

Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001). Both litigation in court and filing inmate grievances are

protected activities and it is impermissible for prison officials to retaliate against inmates for

engaging in these activities. However, not every allegedly adverse action will be sufficient to

support a claim under section 1983 for retaliation. In the prison context, cases in this Circuit

addressing First Amendment retaliation claims involve situations where the action taken by the

defendant was clearly adverse to the plaintiff. Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 568 (arbitrary confiscation and

destruction of property, initiation of a prison transfer, and assault in retaliation for filing grievances);

Austin, 367 F.3d at 1171 (retaliatory placement in administrative segregation for filing grievances);

Bruce, 351 F.3d at 1288 (retaliatory validation as a gang member for filing grievances); Hines v.

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Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 267(9th Cir. 1997) (retaliatory issuance of false rules violation and

subsequent finding of guilt); Pratt, 65 F.3d at 806 (retaliatory prison transfer and double-cell status);

Valandingham, 866 F.2d at 1138 (inmate labeled a snitch and approached by other inmates and

threatened with harm as a result); Rizzo, 778 F.2d at 530-32 (retaliatory reassignment out of

vocational class and transfer to a different prison). 

Further, the mere involvement of some defendants in the resolution of an inmate’s appeal,

alone, does not provide a basis upon which to impose liability under section 1983. Buckley v.

Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing Azeez v. DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. 8, 10 (N.D. Ill.

1982)); see also Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (no liberty interest in

processing of appeals because no entitlement to a specific grievance procedure); Massey v. Helman,

259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2001) (existence of grievance procedure confers no liberty interest on

prisoner); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Plaintiff alleges that numerous defendants have retaliated against him for pursing his inmate

grievances. For example, plaintiff complains that seventeen of the named defendants, as well as

numerous Doe defendants, “blatantly threatened to leverage plaintiff’s medical treatment and

prescriptions”. (Doc. 7, court record pg. 30, ¶59.) However, earlier in his complaint plaintiff refers

only to certain Doe defendants as behaving in such a manner. (Doc. 7, court record pg. 12, ¶24). As

a result, it is unclear from the complaint how each defendant acted in a retaliatory manner towards

plaintiff. In order to proceed under section 1983, plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to support a

claim that each defendant either acted or failed to act in a manner that was adverse to plaintiff and

that the defendant did so in retaliation against plaintiff for filing inmate grievances. Finally, many

of these defendants listed by plaintiff address and resolve inmate appeals. As stated above,

involvement in the resolution of an inmate’s appeal, alone, does not provide a basis upon which to

impose liability under section 1983. 

The court will provide plaintiff with the opportunity to file an amended complaint that sets

forth for each defendant, as briefly as possible, what action that defendant took or failed to take and

why (e.g., to retaliate against plaintiff for litigating in court or for filing inmate grievances). 

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D. 8 Amendment Medical Care Claims th

A prisoner’s claim of inadequate medical care does not constitute cruel and unusual

punishment unless the mistreatment rises to the level of "deliberate indifference to serious medical

needs." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). The “deliberate indifference” standard involves

an objective and a subjective prong. First, the alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms,

“sufficiently serious.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501

U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second, the prison official must act with a “sufficiently culpable state of

mind,” which entails more than mere negligence, but less than conduct undertaken for the very

purpose of causing harm. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 837. A prison official does not act in a

deliberately indifferent manner unless the official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to

inmate health or safety.” Id. 

In applying thisstandard, the Ninth Circuit has held that before it can be said that a prisoner's

civil rights have been abridged, "the indifference to his medical needs must be substantial. Mere

'indifference,' 'negligence,' or 'medical malpractice' will not support this cause of action." Broughton

v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980), citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06. “[A]

complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not

state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does

not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.” Estelle v. Gamble,

429 U.S. at 106; see also Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995);

McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1050 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Techs.,

Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997)(en banc). Even gross negligence is insufficient

to establish deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. See Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d

1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990). A prisoner’s mere disagreement with diagnosis or treatment does not

support a claim of deliberate indifference. Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Plaintiff alleges that he sought treatment for Condyloma Accuminata Popaloma Virus

(CAPV) and also Hepatitis C Virus (HCV) throughout his incarceration. Plaintiff alleges that

defendants failed to provide plaintiff with adequate medical care despite knowledge of his medical

conditions. Plaintiff alleges that defendants’ inaction caused him to suffer unnecessarily.

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I) Treatment at California State Prison - Calipatria (CSP-CAL) - Defendants

Sands, Peterson, Nguyen, Fas o lo ,E dwards, and Doe 3.

Plaintiff’s complaint is devoid of any facts supporting a claim that defendants Sands,

Peterson or Nguyen acted with deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s serious medical needs. Plaintiff

claims that the treatment he received has been inadequate and that he disagrees with the treatment

that had been rendered. This is insufficient to state a claim. Plaintiff has failed to allege that

defendants Sands, Peterson or Nguyen knew of and disregarded a serious risk to plaintiff’s health.

Rather, the defendants Sands, Peterson and Nguyen rendered treatment and/or ordered medical

referrals for plaintiff, though plaintiff considers this insufficient.

Plaintiff alleges that while incarcerated at CSP-CAL, Plaintiff filed an inmate grievance

complaining of the lack of medical treatment provided. Plaintiff alleges that defendants Fasolo and

Edwards failed to promptly process plaintiff’s inmate grievance on an emergency basis, despite

plaintiff’s pain and suffering. Plaintiff further alleges that defendants Fasolo and Edwards

improperly rejected plaintiff’s re-submission of his appeal on the grounds that plaintiff’s resubmission was filed too late. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Doe 3 was put on notice regarding

the lack of treatment provided to him at CSP-CAL, but refused to intervene. 

As stated above, with respect to the defendants involved in responding to plaintiff’s inmate

appeal, the resolution of an inmate’s appeal, alone, is an insufficient basis upon which to impose

liability under section 1983. Further, “deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi, 391

F.3d at 1060. “Under this standard, the prison official must not only ‘be aware of the facts from

which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,’ but that person

‘must also draw the inference.’” Id. at 1057 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). “‘If a prison official

should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the official has not violated the Eighth

Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.’” Id. (quoting Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nevada,

290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002)). Under federal notice pleading standards, plaintiff’s allegations

are insufficient to support a claim against defendants Doe 3 for acting with deliberate indifference

to plaintiff’s serious medical needs. Plaintiff’s complaint is also devoid of facts supporting a claim

that defendants Sands, Peterson, Nguyen, Fasolo, Edwards, and Doe 3 acted with deliberate

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indifference to plaintiff’s serious medical needs.

ii) Treatment at California State Prison -Los Angeles County at Lancaster (CSP

-LAC) - Defendants Kittner, Baumgardner, Deliberto Fortaleza, MTA Does,

Carlson, Collins, Fitter, Sighn, and Attygalla.

Plaintiff alleges that while incarcerated at CSP-LAC, defendants Kittner, Collins, Carlson

and Baumgardner improperly handled plaintiff’s medical grievances. Plaintiff alleges that defendant

Kittner miscategorized his appeal in order to prevent plaintiff from receiving medical care. Plaintiff

alleges that defendant Deliberto improperly dismissed plaintiff’s other separate medical grievance

by relying solely on a physician’s report recommending that no surgery be performed, and ignoring

plaintiff’s more recent medical complaints.

Plaintiff also alleges that various certain defendant MTA Does refused to administer

medication prescribed to plaintiff by defendant Fortaleza, and instead discarded the medication. 

Plaintiff alleges that he met with defendant Fortaleza, who recommended plaintiff for a

surgical consultation, as part of plaintiff’s grievance appeal concerning his medical treatment. 

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Fortaleza treated plaintiff with an “anciently ordered medication”

that caused plaintiff to suffer vision loss, and then failed to follow-up with plaintiff in seven days

as promised, to provide the next injection of medication. Plaintiff further alleges that defendant

Attygalla examined plaintiff concerning his vision, and improperly determined that plaintiff’s vision

was within expected and normal limits.

Plaintiff additionally alleges that a further inmate appeal concerning his medical treatment

was cancelled by defendant Sighn, as a result of various unknown Does informing defendant Sighn

that plaintiff refused to meet and be interviewed for the purpose of processing his appeal. 

As explained above, actions in reviewing a prisoner’s administrative appeal cannot serve as

the basis for liability under a § 1983 action. Buckley, 997 F.2d at 495. No basis for liability has

been stated against defendants Baumgardner, Collins, Carlson, and Fitter. With respect to defendant

Kittner, it appears that defendant Kittner was involved in plaintiff’s appeal process and had granted

plaintiff’s appeal. Further, plaintiff’s allegations fail to show that defendant Kittner knew of and

disregarded an excessive risk to plaintiff’s health.

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Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to support a claim against defendant Deliberto. First,

defendant Deliberto was involved in plaintiff’s appeal process, which cannot serve as a basis for

liability. Second, a prisoner’s mere disagreement with diagnosis or treatment does not support a

claim of deliberate indifference. Plaintiff has not demonstrated that defendant Deliberto acted with

deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. 

Plaintiff’s complaints are insufficient to support a claim that defendant Fortaleza acted with

deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s serious medical needs. Defendant’s failure to follow-up does

not give rise to a claim for violation of the Eighth Amendment, and a prisoner’s mere disagreement

with diagnosis or treatment does not support a claim of deliberate indifference. However, plaintiff’s

allegations are sufficient to give rise to claims for relief under the Eighth Amendment against

defendants MTA Does. 

Plaintiff’s complaint is devoid of any facts whatsoever supporting a claim that defendants

Sighn and Attygalla acted with deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s serious medical needs. 

iii) Treatment at California Substance Abuse and Treatment Facility at 

Corcoran II (CSATF/SP) - Defendants Bhatt, Heck, Gomez, Hall, Smith, and

Flores.

Plaintiff alleges that on or about August 16, 2006, plaintiff was examined by defendant Bhatt

concerning plaintiff’s persistent pain. Plaintiff alleges that he informed defendant Bhatt of his

medical history, and that warts were beginning to migrate to plaintiff’s genitalia. Plaintiff alleges

that he informed defendant Bhatt of plaintiff’s extreme pain, but his health concerns were met with

indifference. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Bhatt refused to provide any medical care, including

providing plaintiff with pain medication. Plaintiff then filed an inmate grievance concerning his

medical treatment, which plaintiff alleges defendant Heck improperly classified as a complaint

concerning staff misconduct. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Heck did so in order to prolong

plaintiff’s suffering. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Flores improperly processed plaintiff’s inmate

further appeal of defendant Heck’s decision.

Plaintiff further alleges that he forwarded a copy of the final appeal decision by defendant

Enriquez to defendants Clark, Gomez, Hall, Heck, Flores and Smith. By so doing, plaintiff alleges

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that defendants knew of plaintiff’s serious medical condition, but failed to act. 

Under federal notice pleading standards, plaintiff’s allegations against defendant Bhatt are

sufficient to give rise to claims for relief under the Eighth Amendment.

Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to support a claim against defendants Heck, Clark,

Gomez, Hall, Flores and Smith for acting with deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s serious medical

needs. Again, some of the defendants appear to be involved in the inmate appeal process, which is

an insufficient basis upon which to impose liability under section 1983.

iv) Wardens: Defendants Clark, Doe 1, Doe 2

Plaintiff alleges that as wardens, defendants Clark, Doe 1 and Doe 2 were on notice regarding

the unlawful conditions but refused to intervene.

Liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel under section 1983 for the actions

of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior. When the named defendant holds a

supervisorial position, the causal link between the defendant and the claimed constitutional violation

must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v.

Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). To state a claim for

relief under section 1983 for supervisory liability, plaintiff must allege some facts indicating that the

defendant either: personally participated in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of

the violations and failed to act to prevent them; or promulgated or “implemented a policy so deficient

that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the

constitutional violation.’” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations

omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Although federal pleading standards

are broad, some facts must be alleged to support claims under section 1983. See Leatherman v.

Tarrant County Narcotics Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993). The fact that defendants held or hold the

position of Warden does not provide a basis upon which to impose liability under section 1983.

They must be linked to the violation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. 

Plaintiff’s complaint is devoid of any facts supporting a claim that defendants Clark, Doe 1,

and Doe 2 personally participated in the deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights, knew of the

violations and failed to prevent them, or implemented a policy so deficient so as to be the moving

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force of a constitutional violation. Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim against defendants

Clark, Doe 1, and Doe 2 for violation of plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights. 

E. Eighth Amendment Dental Care Claims

Plaintiff alleges that he suffers from dental conditions that cause him extreme pain. Plaintiff

alleges that while incarcerated at CSP-LAC, a dental plan was initiated by the dental department to

have all his teeth removed. Plaintiff alleges that when he was transferred to CSATF/SP, plaintiff

sought to have his dental treatment plan continued, and that his requests were refused. Plaintiff

alleges that defendants Dental Does refused plaintiff all treatment, and that defendants Dental Does

were under orders from Command Staff not to treat plaintiff’s conditions, no matter how severe.

Plaintiff alleges that he is now required to self-extract his teeth in order to alleviate his pain.

The court has reviewed plaintiff’s allegations and finds that plaintiff has alleged sufficient

facts to give rise to claims for relief under the Eighth Amendment.

F. Failure to Train, Supervise and Discipline

Plaintiff alleges defendants Tilton, Kanan, Grannis, Clark, Doe 1, Doe 2, Fitter, Flores, Doe

3, Enriquez and “other Does” are liable for failing to train, supervise and discipline defendants

Kittner, Collins, Carlson, Baumgardner, Fasolo, Edwards, Gomez, Hall, Smith, Deliberto, Heck,

Sighn, Attygalla, Fortaleza, Nguyen, Sands, Peterson, Bhatt, and “certain other Does”. 

At most, plaintiff’s allegations appear to state a claim for relief based on negligence. Pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), in any civil action in which the district court has original jurisdiction, the

district court “shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims in the action within such

original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III,” except as

provided in subsections (b) and ©. “[O]nce judicial power exists under § 1367(a), retention of

supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims under 1367© is discretionary.” Acri v. Varian

Assoc., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1997). “The district court may decline to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if . . . the district court has dismissed all

claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). The Supreme Court has

cautioned that “if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, . . . the state claims should be

dismissed as well.” United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). 

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G. Due Process

I. Procedural

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects prisoners from being

deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,

556 (1974). Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that would support a claim that he was deprived of

a protected interest without procedural due process. 

ii. Substantive

 “To establish a violation of substantive due process . . . , a plaintiff is ordinarily required to

prove that a challenged government action was clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no

substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. Where a particular

amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular sort

of government behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive due

process, must be the guide for analyzing a plaintiff’s claims.” Patel v. Penman, 103 F.3d 868, 874

(9th Cir. 1996) (citations, internal quotations, and brackets omitted), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1845

(1997); County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842 (1998). Plaintiff has not alleged any

facts that would support a claim that his rights under the substantive component of the Due Process

Clause were violated.

H. Equal Protection

The Equal Protection Clause requires that persons who are similarly situated be treated alike.

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). An equal protection

claim may be established in two ways. First, a plaintiff establishes an equal protection claim by

showing that the defendant has intentionally discriminated on the basis ofthe plaintiff's membership

in a protected class. See, e.g., Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir.2001). Under

this theory of equal protection, the plaintiff must show that the defendants’ actions were a result of

the plaintiff’s membership in a suspect class, such as race. Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d

1158, 1167 (9th Cir. 2005). 

If the action in question does not involve a suspect classification, a plaintiff may establish

an equal protection claim by showing that similarly situated individuals were intentionally treated

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differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. Village of Willowbrook v.

Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000); San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1972);

Squaw Valley Development Co. v. Goldberg, 375 F.3d 936, 944 (9th Cir.2004); SeaRiver Mar. Fin.

Holdings, Inc. v. Mineta, 309 F.3d 662, 679 (9th Cir. 2002). To state an equal protection claim under

this theory, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) the plaintiff is a member of an identifiable class; (2) the

plaintiff was intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated; and (3) there is no

rational basis for the difference in treatment. Village of Willowbrook, 528 U.S. at 564. If an equal

protection claim is based upon the defendant’s selective enforcement of a valid law or rule, a

plaintiff must show that the selective enforcement is based upon an "impermissible motive." Squaw

Valley, 375 F.3d at 944; Freeman v. City of Santa Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir.1995).

Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that would support a claim that his rights under the Equal

Protection Clause were violated.

I. Violation of the Plata and Armstrong Remedial Plans

Plaintiff may not pursue any claims in this action based on the alleged violation of the Plata

and Armstrong Remedial Plans. To the extent that plaintiff wishes to seek assistance that he believes

is due pursuant to either remedial plan, plaintiff “must pursue his request via the consent decree or

through class counsel.” Crayton v. Terhune, No. C 98-4386 CRB(PR), 2002 WL 31093590, *4

(N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2002). Plaintiff may not sue for damages in this action solely on the basis that

defendants allegedly violated the remedial plans. Plaintiff’s claim fails as a matter of law. 

J. Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act

Plaintiff also alleges that defendants’ actions in failing to provide him with services,

programs, activities and benefits of adequate medical services and treatment, preventative treatments,

and an adequately safe and humane living environment violated his rights under the Americans with

Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act. 

Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act

(RA) “both prohibit discrimination on the basis of disability.” Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039,

1052 (9th Cir. 2002). Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability

shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the

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services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subject to discrimination by such entity.”

42 U.S.C. § 12132. Section 504 of the RA provides that “no otherwise qualified individual with a

disability . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in,

be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving

Federal financial assistance . . . .” 29 U. S. C. § 794. Title II of the ADA and the RA apply to

inmates within state prisons. Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 118 S.Ct. 1952, 1955

(1998); see also Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019, 1023 (9th Cir. 1997); Duffy v. Riveland, 98

F.3d 447, 453-56 (9th Cir. 1996).

“To establish a violation of Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must show that (1) [he] is a

qualified individual with a disability; (2) [he] was excluded from participation in or otherwise

discriminated against with regard to a public entity’s services, programs, or activities; and (3) such

exclusion or discrimination was by reason of [his] disability.” Lovell, 303 F.3d at 1052. “To

establish a violation of § 504 of the RA, a plaintiff must show that (1) [he] is handicapped within

the meaning of the RA; (2) [he] is otherwise qualified for the benefit or services sought; (3) [he] was

denied the benefit or services solely by reason of [his] handicap; and (4) the program providing the

benefit or services receives federal financial assistance.” Id. 

The treatment, or lack of treatment, concerning Plaintiff’s medical condition does not

provide a basis upon which to impose liability under the RA or the ADA. Burger v. Bloomberg, 418

F.3d 882, 882 (8th Cir. 2005) (medical treatment decisions not a basis for RA or ADA claims);

Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1289, 1294 (11th Cir. 2005) (RA not intended to

apply to medical treatment decisions); Fitzgerald v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 403 F.3d 1134, 1144 (10th

Cir. 2005) (Medical decisions not ordinarily within scope of ADA or RA); Bryant v. Madigan, 84

F.3d 246, 249 (7th Cir. 1996) (“The ADA does not create a remedy for medical malpractice.”).

Finally, “‘Title II of the ADA prohibits discrimination in programs of a public entity or

discrimination by any such entity.’” Roundtree v. Adams, No. 1:01-CV-06502 OWW LJO, 2005

WL 3284405, at *8 (E.D.Cal. Dec. 1, 2005) (quoting Thomas v. Nakatani, 128 F.Supp.2d 684, 691

(D. Haw. 2000)). “The ADA defines ‘public entity’ in relevant part as ‘any State or local

government’ or ‘any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State

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or States or local government.’” Roundtree, 2005 WL 3284405, at *8 (citing 42 U.S.C. §

12131(1)(A)-(B)). Public entity, “‘as it is defined within the statute, does not include individuals.’”

Id. (quoting Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999, 1005 n.8 (8thCir. 1999)). 

Based on the above, plaintiff may not pursue his ADA claim against the individual

defendants named in the complaint. In addition, plaintiff’s allegations do not support a claim that

the defendants violated plaintiff’s rights under the RA.

K. Conclusion

Plaintiff’s complaint states some cognizable claims. However, plaintiff’s amended

complaint sets forth many deficient claims, largely due to plaintiff’s failure to adequately link the

violation of his rights to specific acts or omission of individual defendants. The court will provide

plaintiff with the opportunity to file an amended complaint, if plaintiff wishes to do so.

If plaintiff does not wish to file an amended complaint and wishes to proceed on the

cognizable claims only, Plaintiff may so notify the court in writing. The court will then issue

Findings and Recommendations recommending that the remaining claims and defendants be

dismissed from this action, and will forward plaintiff three (3) summons and three (3) USM-285

forms to fill out and return to the court. Upon receipt of these documents, the court will direct the

United States Marshal to initiate service of process.

In the event that plaintiff does wish to amend his complaint, plaintiff is advised Local Rule

15-220 requires that an amended complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior

pleading. As a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux

v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original

pleading no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an

original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.

If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions

complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy,

625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how each named

defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some

affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v.

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Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980);Johnson v. Duffy,

588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk’s Office shall send plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

2. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, plaintiff must either:

a. File an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the court in

this order, or

b. Notify the court in writing that he does not wish to file an amended complaint

and wishes to proceed only on the cognizable claims; and

3. If plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed for failure to

obey a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: March 11, 2008 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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