Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-02355/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-02355-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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U

nite

d

States District C

o

u

rt

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOANNE P. FRAZIER ,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

THE COMMISSIONER OF THE

SOCIAL SECURITY

ADMINISTRATION,

 Defendant.

___________________________/

No. C 05-2355 WDB

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT,

DENYING PLAINTIFF'S CROSSMOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT AND DENYING

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO

REMAND

I. Introduction

Plaintiff Joanne Frazier seeks judicial review of a final decision by the

Commissioner of Social Security denying her Disability Insurance Benefits under

Title II of the Social Security Act. On November 21, 2005, plaintiff moved for

summary judgment. Defendant JoAnne B. Barnhart, in her capacity as Commissioner

of Social Security, opposed plaintiff’s motion and filed a cross-motion for summary

judgment on December 22, 2005. Plaintiff replied on January 19, 2006. The matter

was then deemed submitted for decision by this court without oral argument, pursuant

to Civil Local Rule 16-5. After careful review and consideration of the record and

the papers submitted, the Court hereby grants defendant’s motion for summary

Case 4:05-cv-02355-WDB Document 17 Filed 03/13/06 Page 1 of 33
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 Between October 15, 2004, and June 9, 2005, plaintiff applied for, and received, 

 numerous extensions of time in which to file her federal Complaint.

 

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judgment, denies plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, and denies plaintiff’s

motion for remand.

II. Procedural Background

Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits on November 4, 2002,

alleging that back pain had rendered her disabled since December 11, 2001. Her

request was denied initially and on reconsideration. Plaintiff then requested and

received a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). On February 11,

2004, that hearing was held before the Honorable Richard P. Laverdure. Ms. Frazier

testified at the hearing and was accompanied by her legal counsel, Mr. William

Galvin. Robert Raschke, M.S., a vocational expert, also appeared and testified at the

hearing. On March 16, 2004, Judge Laverdure issued his written decision. Judge

Laverdure found that, although plaintiff was unable to perform her past relevant

work, she was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. He

therefore denied her request for disability benefits.

Plaintiff then appealed to the Social Security Administration’s Appeals

Council, which determined that there was no basis for review. On October 15, 2004,

Judge Laverdure’s decision became the final decision of the Commissioner of Social

Security in plaintiff’s case.1 On June 9, 2005, plaintiff filed a complaint in federal

court seeking review of Judge Laverdure’s decision. Both parties have consented in

writing to proceed before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge.

///

///

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III. Standard of Review

The district court may set aside the Commissioner’s denial of disability

insurance benefits only when the ALJ’s findings are based on legal error or are not

supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);

Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097-98 (9th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted).

“Substantial evidence” means more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance; it

is such evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971); Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d

1111, 1113 (9th Cir. 1999). “If the evidence can support either outcome, the court

may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ.” Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1098,

quoting Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1018 (9th Cir. 1992). “But the

Commissioner’s decision ‘cannot be affirmed simply by isolating a specific quantum

of supporting evidence.” Id., quoting Sousa v. Callahan, 143 F.3d 1240, 1243 (9th

Cir. 1998). “Rather, a court must ‘consider the record as a whole, weighing both

evidence that supports and evidence that detracts from the Secretary’s conclusion.”

Id., quoting Penny v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 1993).

IV. Discussion

A. Applicable Law -- Steps To Determining Disability

A Social Security claimant is considered disabled if (1) she suffers from a

“medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to

result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period

of not less than twelve months,” and (2) the “impairment or impairments are of such

severity that [s]he is not only unable to do [her] previous work but cannot,

considering [her] age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of

substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.” 42 U.S.C. §

423(d)(1)(A), (2)(A).

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 Residual functional capacity is the most an individual can do in a work setting despite 

his or her limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1).

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The Social Security Regulations set out a five-step sequential process for

determining whether a claimant is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security

Act. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. First, the claimant must not be presently engaged in

substantial gainful employment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). Second, the

claimant’s impairment must be “severe.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). Third,

when the claimant has an impairment that both (1) meets the duration requirement

and (2) is listed in Appendix 1 (impairments listed in subpart P of part 404 of 20

C.F.R., which are presumed severe enough to preclude work ), or is equal to a listed

impairment, benefits are awarded without considering the claimant’s age, education,

and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). Fourth, if the claimant’s

impairments do not meet or equal a listed impairment, all relevant medical and other

evidence in the claimant’s case record is assessed and findings are made to determine

the residual functional capacity2 of the claimant in order to evaluate whether the

claimant can do his or her past work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(a)(4)(iv). Fifth, if the

claimant cannot continue with her past work, the ALJ must determine whether the

claimant is able to do any other type of work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(a)(4)(v). If the

ALJ finds against the claimant at any step along the way, the claimant is not

"disabled" and there is no need to continue subsequent steps of the analysis. 

To establish a disability claim, the claimant bears the initial burden of proof to

show that he or she is unable to perform his or her past relevant work. If met, the

burden of proof then shifts to the Commissioner to demonstrate that the claimant

retains residual functional capacity to perform a significant number of other jobs in

the national economy that are consistent with the claimant’s impairments and

vocational factors such as age, education and work experience. Howard v. Heckler,

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782 F.2d 1484, 1486 (9th Cir. 1986); Pinto v. Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 844 (9th Cir.

2001).

B. The ALJ’s Decision -- Application of the Five-Step Process

In the first step of the five-step evaluative process, Judge Laverdure found that

plaintiff had not performed substantial gainful activity since December 11, 2001, the

alleged onset date of her disability. He then found that she had 'severe impairments'

that arose from degenerative disk disease of the lumbar spine at L3-4 and L4-5 with

left lower extremity radiculopathy and some secondary depression. Upon finding that

plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or equal any of the “listed impairments”, Judge

Laverdure proceeded, as required, to determine plaintiff’s Residual Functional

Capacity (RFC). He found that plaintiff had an “RFC for a range of work at the light

exertional level with the need for a sit-stand option ‘at will’, the ability to lift/carry

up to 10 pounds frequently and up to 20 pounds occasionally, the ability to

occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl and preclusion from working on

heights (ladders, ropes, or scaffolds).” ALJ Decision, p. 5; Administrative Transcript

("AT"), p. 39. As evidence to support his findings, Judge Laverdure relied on a

comprehensive orthopedic evaluation by Dr. Holly Kelly, the RFC assessment of state

agency medical advisors, and, to a lesser extent, the provisional opinions of

examining orthopedic surgeon Ramsey and neurologic QME Abeliuk. He also relied

on plaintiff's own testimony about the extent and nature of her activities of daily

living.

Judge Laverdure found that plaintiff’stestimonywas generally credible but that

her allegation that she could not perform any work was inconsistent with the medical

evidence and opinions supporting an RFC for a range of work at the light exertional

level and with her own account of her activities of daily living. Judge Laverdure also

found that plaintiff “perceived the issue of disability in the context of the ability to

perform her past work as a grocery clerk.” ALJ Decision, p. 4; AT, p. 38. He further

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noted that plaintiff originally alleged that her low back pain and radiculpathy were

not work-related, but later claimed that these symptoms were exacerbated by a

December 2001 slip and fall at her job.

Proceeding to steps four and five, Judge Laverdure found -- with the aid of

testimony from a vocational expert, Mr. Raschke – that given her RFC, plaintiff was

unable to perform her past relevant work as a produce stocker or grocery clerk. Judge

Laverdure then asked plaintiff’s counsel to stipulate that there would be a significant

number of other jobs in the national economy that an individual with the RFC

described above could perform. Plaintiff’s counsel agreed to so stipulate, and Judge

Laverdure thereupon found that defendant Commissioner hadmet her burden of proof

with respect to step five. Based on this finding, Judge Laverdure found that plaintiff

was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act.

C. Review of the ALJ’s Decision

The primary issues raised by plaintiff are (1) whether a new report from one of

her doctors warrants a remand for further administrative proceedings; (2) whether

substantial evidence exists to support the Administrative Law Judge’s finding that

plaintiff had a Residual Functional Capacity for work at the light exertional level with

certain postural and height limitations; and (3) whether the Administrative Law

Judge’s finding at step five -- that a significant number of other jobs existed in the

national economy that she could perform -- was properly reached.

1. Does the September 27, 2004, Report by Orthopedic Surgeon

James Zucherman Warrant A Remand of Plaintiff's Case for

Further Administrative Proceedings?

Plaintiff first argues that her case should be remanded to the Commissioner of

Social Security for the consideration of new evidence. Plaintiff's new evidence

consists of a September 27, 2004, report from orthopedic surgeon James Zucherman.

See Attachment to Plaintiff's Motion and Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment

And/Or Remand, filed November 21, 2005 ("Plaintiff's Motion").

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A. Dr. Zucherman's September 27, 2004 Report

Dr. Zucherman's report documents his consultationwith plaintiff on September

27, 2004. At this consultation, Dr. Zucherman examined plaintiff, reviewed her

recent MRI results, and evaluated her answers to a pain questionnaire. Dr.

Zucherman's report states that plaintiff's MRI scan, "shows a broad based disc

herniation at the L3-4 and L4-5" which is "consistent with the findings on plaintiff's

discography back in the latter part of 2002." September 27, 2004, Dr. Zucherman

Report, p. 1 ("New Zucherman report"). Dr. Zucherman also noted that plaintiff

reported to him that her symptoms had worsened since her last evaluation, and that

she had new symptoms in her low back and legs, which "started without apparent

cause". New Zucherman Report, p. 2. 

Dr. Zucherman's reportrecommendsthat plaintiff undergoarthroplasty surgery.

This recommendation was apparently based primarily on the results of plaintiff's new

MRI scan, the failure of more conservative care options to alleviate plaintiff's lower

back and leg pain, plaintiff's new and worsening symptoms, and Dr. Zucherman's

opinion that disc arthroplasty would be preferable to a fusion procedure. 

B. Statutory Requirements for Remand 

Two statutory requirements exist for the remand of an action in light of

additional evidence in a disability insurance benefits case: (1) there must be good

cause for failing to include that new evidence in prior proceedings, and (2) the

evidence must be new and material. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Mayes v. Massanari, 276

F.3d 453, 461 (9th Cir. 2001).

(i) Good Cause Requirement

We first address the good cause requirement. Plaintiff's counsel asserts that

there is good cause for his failure to include Dr. Zucherman's report in the record

before the Appeals Council. Defendant's brief does not seriously contest this

assertion.

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 We note that, after the Appeals Council issued its order, plaintiff's counsel requested additional

time in which to file an action in district court. A Social Security Administration Legal Assistant,

who appears to have misapprehended plaintiff's counsel's request, responded by sending

correspondence indicating that the Appeals Council would wait to issue a decision until the new

evidence had been submitted. See Correspondence dated May 19, 2005, from Lona Murphy to

William Galvin, AT, pp. 7-8; Correspondence dated July 19, 2005, from Lona Murphy to William

Galvin, AT, pp. 5-6. To repeat, however, the Council had already issued its decision.

 We find that the correspondence of May 19, 2005, and July 19, 2005, was NOT responsive to

plaintiff's counsel's request and therefore does not alter our finding that plaintiff has shown good

cause for her failure to present Dr. Zucherman's report to the Appeals Council. 

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Dr. Zucherman's report is dated approximately eighteen days before the

Appeals Council issued an order and notice ending the administrative proceedings.

Plaintiff's counsel contends, however, that the report did not come into his possession

until after the Council issued its order. We also note that plaintiff's counsel did send

correspondence to the Appeals Council informing them of the report's anticipated

existence and implicitly requesting that the Council wait to decide plaintiff's case

until it had reviewed the report. See Correspondence dated August 16, 2004; AT, p.

18 and Correspondence dated September 23, 2004; AT, p. 15. The Council appears

to have either ignored or denied counsel's request. 

Given that Dr. Zucherman's report apparently was not in plaintiff's counsel's

possession at the time that the Appeals Council issued its decision, and that plaintiff's

counsel attempted to ensure its inclusion in the administrative record, we find that

plaintiff has shown good cause for her failure to include the report in the

administrative proceedings.3

(ii) Materiality of Dr. Zucherman's Report

We must now decide whether Dr. Zucherman's report is "new and material"

such that remand is warranted. "To be material under section 405(g), the new

evidence must bear 'directly and substantially' on the matter in dispute. [The plaintiff]

must additionally demonstrate that there is a 'reasonable possibility' that the new

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evidence would have changed the outcome of the administrative hearing." Mayes v.

Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 462 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal citations omitted).

Defendant argues that there is not a 'reasonable possibility' that Dr.

Zucherman's report would have changed the ALJ's determination. Defendant points

out that evidence that surgery had been recommended for plaintiff was already in the

administrative record. Defendant also asserts that, "[w]hile Dr. Zucherman's new

report may indicate that plaintiff's symptoms have recently worsened, plaintiff has

failed to show that the new evidence is material to and probative of her condition as

it existed at the relevant time." Defendant's Notice, Motion and Memorandum In

Support of Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Plaintiff's

Motion for Summary Judgment, filed December 22, 2005 ("Opposition"), p. 4

(emphasis added) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.970(b) (Appeals Council shall consider

new and material evidence only where it relates to period on or before date of

Administrative Law Judge's hearing decision) (emphasis added).)

Plaintiff disputes defendant's assertion, claiming that Dr. Zucherman's

September 2004 surgery recommendation "does reflect on, affect and effect the

retroactive and more informed views of Plaintiff's condition during the period under

review." She argues that this more informed view of her past condition "would

require a change in considerations and findings about the severity and permanency

of her impairment," Plaintiff's Reply to Defendant's Opposition and Opposition to

Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, filed January 19, 2006 ("Reply"),

p. 3, which could reasonably cause the ALJ to change his assessment of her Residual

Functional Capacity -- and thus the outcome of the administrative hearing.

We are more persuaded bydefendant's characterization ofDr. Zucherman's new

report than by plaintiff's. Review of the administrative record reveals that the option

of arthroplasty surgery had been discussed with plaintiff for close to two years before

Dr. Zucherman issued his report in September of 2004. See, e.g., October 1, 2002,

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Correspondence From Dr. Zucherman to Dr. Pickett ("Whether she decides to go

ahead with surgery is elective. Since there is no right answer as to what people

should do in such situations, I told her personally if I was in her shoes and was unable

to do a job, I would go ahead and proceed with surgery . . ."); October 14, 2002,

Correspondence from Dr. Zucherman to Rolando Gonzales ("The patient recounted

her current situation of being unable to work for a year and she has been feeling

worse than usual lately. She still has not formally made a decision as to whether she

wishes to pursue surgery; namely, fusion or arthroplasty of L3-4 and L4-5 or consider

the IDET procedure.") We also note that Dr. Zucherman's September, 2004, report

characterizes plaintiff's then-recent MRI findings as 'consistent' with the findings

from plaintiff's 2002 discography. In addition, while this report does seem to

recommend arthroplasty surgery more emphatically than past reports, it seems to us

that the primary emphasis is on the election of arthroplasty surgery over a fusion

procedure, rather than the necessity for surgery in the first instance.

Dr. Zucherman’s report of September 24, 2004, also notes that plaintiff

complained that her symptoms had recently intensified – but for no apparent reason.

 Any such intensification of plaintiff’s pain or worsening of her condition is irrelevant

to our disposition of the request for a remand because it is only evidence about

plaintiff’s condition at the time the ALJ made his decision that is relevant. Changes

in medical conditions that occurred thereafter might be sufficient to support a new

application by plaintiff for benefits, but could not justify a remand. 

In sum, because the administrative record before the ALJ clearly reflected that

surgery had been recommended to plaintiff, and in light of the consistency of

plaintiff's MRI findings with her 2002 discography findings, we cannot find that there

is a 'reasonable possibility' that Dr. Zucherman's September, 2004, report

recommending that plaintiff undergo surgery would have changed the outcome of

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plaintiff's administrative hearing. We therefore must DENY plaintiff's motion to

remand her case for consideration of this report.

2. Was the Social Security Administration's Determination of

Plaintiff's Residual Functional Capacity Unsupported by

Substantial Evidence or Otherwise Improperly Reached?

At the heart of plaintiff's case is her assertion that the Social Security

Administration improperly overestimated her Residual Functional Capacity. As

explained above, Judge Laverdure essentially found that plaintiff could perform a job

that requires only light physical exertion - so long as she could sit or stand at will.

Plaintiff claims, however, that she cannot perform even 'light' work because the pain

associated with her back condition would cause her to need frequent and unscheduled

rest breaks, and that those breaks would render her too unproductive to perform any

type of job.

Plaintiff's primary challenge is to the Residual Functional Capacity finding

made by Judge Laverdure, although she also challenges the Appeals Council decision

upholding that finding. We first address plaintiff's challenges to Judge Laverdure's

Residual Functional Capacity finding. 

A. Judge Laverdure's Residual Functional Capacity

Determination

Plaintiff's motion contains many challenges to Judge Laverdure's assessment

of her Residual Functional Capacity. For the most part, her challenges focus on the

Judge's failure to incorporate her alleged need for frequent unscheduled rest breaks

into his Residual Functional Capacity assessment. She alleges that the Judge reached

his Residual Functional Capacity finding by improperly ignoring and/or rejecting her

testimony regarding the need for rest breaks and by improperly rejecting her treating

physician's opinion that she needed such breaks. She also alleges that a Residual

Functional Capacity finding that does not include a need for unscheduled rest breaks

is not supported by substantial evidence in the record. 

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In addition to these substantive arguments, plaintiff's motion contains a

technical argument that Judge Laverdure's decision does not comply with Social

Security Ruling 96-7p. We turn first to plaintiff's substantive arguments.

(i) Alleged Need for Unscheduled Rest Breaks

Whether or not plaintiff truly has a need for frequent unscheduled rest breaks

is a question that is answered inconsistently by the various informational sources

compiled in the administrative transcript before this court. Clearly plaintiff and her

lawyer believe that she has such a need. Her treating physician, Dr. Pickett, has

repeatedly stated that plaintiff needs frequent rest breaks. On the other hand, other

medical evaluations included in the transcript, prepared by Dr. Holly Kelly and a

state agency physician, and a careful examination of plaintiff's testimony and other

documents regarding the extent of her daily activities, strongly suggest otherwise.

We first examine plaintiff's testimony at the hearing before Judge Laverdure.

The most relevant portions of plaintiff's testimony are transcribed below:

Q: Now, in a given day, in an ordinary day, would you run us through

a typical day from the time you get up until the time you go to bed? But let’s

break it into pieces. What time do you get up?

A: I usually get up between -- about 6:30 a.m. Get up and wake my son

up. My daughter’s already up, she’s going off to school. I help my son with

his breakfast, make his lunch. He is picked up to go to school. Then I try to

do a load of laundry a day so that it doesn’t get overwhelming. And then, you

know, I kind of, you know, maybe I -- housework-wise, I try to do -- like I’ll

vacuum one day, I’ll sweep one day. So maybe I do a household task and, you

know, if I have a couple errands to do. I might visit my mom. I try to take a

walk every other day between 30 and 40 minutes. I don’t go to the physical

therapist anymore, but I still do the exercises at home that they’ve done, so I

try to do that. And you know, I am taking the class, the computer class, so

that’s two days a week for about an hour and a half maybe I’m there. So I

have that. And then, you know, then I have to pick up the kids from -- well,

pick up my daughter and my son from school. Come home, kind of sit around

and talk to them, see what’s going on, then get their homework going. If they

need help, I help them with their homework. You know, and then it’s

dinnertime. Sometimes the kids help me with dinner, depending on what

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we’re doing. We have dinner and then, you know, I usually sit down and read

or watch TV or, you know, we might play a game or something.

Q: During the course of the day, do you need to rest?

A: You know, I do, you know, like I say, I watch more TV than I like

to, so I do, you know, sit down or --

Q: Do you find it’s necessary to sit down or lay down on --

A: Yeah. If I can sit down and put my feet up, you know, on the couch,

that’s like good rest for me. I – 

Q: [Inaudible]

A: -- doze off for a few minutes.

Q: Do you do that every day?

A: I would say yeah.

Q: Do you do it in the morning or the afternoon or when?

A: More so in the afternoon.

Social Security Administration Offices of Hearings and Appeals, Transcript of

February 11, 2004 Hearing ("Hearing Transcript"), pp. 13-14; AT, pp. 355-56.

Q: If you put in an active day as you described, running errands, driving,

maybe even doing housework, do you have to take breaks just when you need to stop

or lay down or sit or do anything else to relieve the back?

A: Yeah, I’ll, you know, I’ll do something. And like if I’ve done

errands, then I come home and I’ll sit down and relax and read a book or, you

know.

Q: And how long would you need to do that? If you had one of those

actives [sic] days, would there be a number of times during the day when you

would have to stop and -

A: Three or four times, you know. If I could take a break, you know,

between 15 minutes to a half an hour, you know, if I could sit down with my

feet up.

Q: Does the feet up help?

A: Yeah.

Q: Does you elevating that foot, even when you’re seated doing

something, help or does it only help if you’re trying to relieve pain? Can you

work with your foot elevated?

A: I never tried that, never done that.

Q: But at some point you need to stop, elevate your foot, elevate your

leg.

A: That’s the best way for me to -- yeah. If I’m going to rest I’ll sit

down on the couch or sit down on the bed with the pillows behind me with my

feet up. That’s the best.

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Q: And in an active day you may have to do something like that as

many as four times during the day?

A: Yeah. And then - yeah. And then at the end of the day, like I say,

after dinners over, the couch is mine.

Q: Okay. And those breaks, those four breaks you take during the day,

how long would you need to do that?

A: You know, between 15 minutes to half hour, you know, if nothing’s

goin on, you know, I’ll stay there for an hour.

Hearing Transcript, pp.25-26; AT, pp. 367-68.

Later in the hearing, plaintiff's counsel posed the following hypothetical to

vocational expert Robert Raschke:

Atty: If even under the sit/stand option at will, would that allow for

breaks, unscheduled breaks of up to 15 minutes to a half an hour up to four

times a day?

VE: Generally not. I mean it would, you know, according to labor

regulations everybody gets a 10 to 15 minutes break, morning and afternoon

and a half hour to an hour lunch break, depending upon the employer. But if

you’re talking about unscheduled ones where the person’s going to be away

from the workplace as long as up to half an hour a couple of times a day, no.

Atty: So that would undermine even the light with the sit/stand option?

VE: Sure. It wouldn’t be -- 

ALJ: I think it would rule out all work on a --

VE: Yes, it would.

ALJ: -- regular basis probably.

VE: It wouldn’t be a productive pace.

ALJ: Yeah. Under those kinds of circumstances, I don’t think there’s

any issue about that, because -- 

Atty: Right.

ALJ: -- that much absence from the work station basically --

Atty: Yeah.

ALJ: rules out all work.

Hearing Transcript, pp. 36-37; AT, pp. 378-79.

Plaintiff’s counsel contends that Judge Laverdure rejected plaintiff’stestimony

about the severity of her symptoms – and that any such rejection by an ALJ must be

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4

 

 In her reply, plaintiff argues that where there is no evidence of malingering, an ALJ's findings

supporting his rejection of subjective pain testimony must be "clear and convincing". Reply, p. 6.

In contrast, the government's opposition suggests that the ALJ must only make 'specific findings' that

are supported by substantial evidence in the record to properly reject a claimant's subjective pain

testimony.

 Because we believe that Judge Laverdure's findings in support of his rejection of plaintiff's

testimony meet the higher 'clear and convincing' standard, we assume, without deciding, that that

standard applies.

15

supported by clear and convincing evidence.4 Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1283-

84 (9th Cir. 1996). We conclude, however, that plaintiff’s counsel has

mischaracterized the central thrust of Judge Laverdure’s reasoning. 

Plaintiff's counsel specifically focuses on the issue of unscheduled rest breaks,

arguing that Judge Laverdure's RFC finding improperly ignores plaintiff's testimony

that she needed up to four unscheduled rest breaks a day. The problem with this

argument is that plaintiff did not testify that she needed four unscheduled rest breaks

a day. 

In fact, the distinction between 'unscheduled' and 'scheduled' rest breaks first

surfaced during plaintiff's counsel's hypothetical to the vocational expert. Plaintiff's

testimony was that, on an average "active" day, she might rest for fifteen minutes to

a half-hour three or four times. Nothing in her testimony suggests that, if at work, she

could not rest during scheduled breaks.

In other words, we think that there is some space between plaintiff's testimony

and her counsel's hypothetical. It is not clear why plaintiff's scheduled rest breaks

(i.e. the two fifteen minute breaks and half-hour to hour lunch breaks to which

plaintiff is entitled under the pertinent labor regulations) could not accommodate

most -- if not all -- of her need for rest breaks, particularly if she was performing

'light' work.

Accordingly, when we focus on plaintiff's testimony, it is not at all clear that

Judge Laverdure “rejected” that testimony. Instead, he appears to have concluded

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5

 Judge Laverdure also found that plaintiff mis-perceived the issue of disability. Plaintiff argues that

Judge Laverdure "apparently gave weight to the finding that plaintiff misperceived the issue of

disability without explaining how that factor would bear on credibility." Plaintiff's Motion, p. 7.

16

that, at least when she was not answering transparently leading questions, she was

trying to be truthful and was generally describing accurately the extent to which and

the circumstances under which her medical condition caused her to experience pain.

With substantial evidentiary justification, Judge Laverdure perceived that plaintiff’s

testimony on these subjects was in some measure inconsistent – but that, considered

in its entirety and viewed objectively, that testimony’s essential message was that

plaintiff could engage in at least light activities for substantial periods of time as long

as her routine included rest breaks. 

Viewing Judge Laverdure’s reasoning in this way, we cannot conclude that he

“rejected” or refused to credit plaintiff’s testimony about her subjective symptoms.

Instead, as we have indicated, it appears to us that the judge essentially credited

plaintiff’s testimony about how she felt – but rejected her conclusion that how she felt

made it impossible for her to work at any reasonably accessible job. It follows that

Judge Laverdure was not constrained to identify clear and convincing evidence that

plaintiff’s account of her symptoms was incredible. 

But even if that standard were applied, Judge Laverdure’s decision would

withstand plaintiff’s attack. Judge Laverdure pointed to several kinds of evidence

in the record that contradicted an assertion that the extent of plaintiff’s symptoms

would prevent her from doing any job for which she was qualified. That evidence

included: (1) plaintiff's testimony was inconsistent with the medical evidence

(including, most significantly, the report prepared by Dr. Holly Kelly, and the

assessment prepared by State Agency medical advisors), (2) plaintiff initially stated

that her lower back pain was not aggravated by her December 2001 slip and fall, and

(3) plaintiff's testimony is inconsistent with the extent of her daily activities.5

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Plaintiff further contends that Judge Laverdure improperly discounted her credibility based on that

finding.

 The pertinent statement from Judge Laverdure's decision reads as follows: "to this extent [i.e., to

the extent that plaintiff claims that she cannot perform any work], I find that claimant perceives the

issue of disability in the context of the ability to perform her past work as a grocery clerk and

produce stocker that she has performed for the last 28 years." ALJ Decision, p.4; AT, p. 38. 

 We do not view the judge's statement as a 'finding'. Rather, we believe it is an explanation -- an

explanation of how he could find plaintiff and her testimony 'generally credible' and yet not find that

she is disabled. In other words, we believe Judge Laverdure is stating (speaking in his voice)

something akin to the following: 'plaintiff genuinely believes that she is disabled, and generally I

find that she and her testimony are credible - but I don't think that her belief that she is disabled

within the meaning of the Social Security Act is credible because she mistakenly conflates the idea

of being disabled with not being able to perform her past job.'

 In any case, we do not rely upon Judge Laverdure's view that plaintiff 'misperceives the issue of

disability' to support our determination that there was substantial evidentiary support for the judge's

conclusion that plaintiff's testimony about how her medical condition affected her was not

inconsistent with a finding that she was not disabled from performing any relevant work.

6

 In her reply, plaintiff argues that Dr. Kelly's 'RFC report' was based only on objective measures

and not on plaintiff's 'reported symptomology'. Reply, p. 6, n.4. We note that although the form

referenced by plaintiff, AT at 299-302, did not include a category that would naturally encompass

a rest-break type limitation, Dr. Kelly also wrote a comprehensive orthopedic evaluation that

concludes with a textualfunctional assessment/medical source statement that describes what plaintiff

could reasonably be expected to do. We see no reason why a rest-break limitation would not have

been included (if warranted by the evaluation) in this section.

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We find Judge Laverdure's findings both clear and convincing. The report

prepared by Dr. Kelly, who examined plaintiff in October of 2003, found that plaintiff

had a number of physical limitations -- but did not find that plaintiff needed frequent

rest breaks. Her opinion clearly contemplates plaintiff working at a job.6 The state

agency physician's separate assessment opines that plaintiff has aResidual Functional

Capacity to perform light work. This assessment states that plaintiff can stand and/or

walk about six hours in an eight-hour work day, and can sit for about six hours in an

eight hour workday with normal breaks. We also find that the discrepancy in

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7

 Plaintiff argues that Judge Laverdure should not have drawn a negative inference about her

credibility from the change in her position regarding the effect of her fall at work. She insists that

her "consistent account" has been that her existing back pain was aggravated by her fall at work.

Plaintiff's Motion, pp. 6-7. In contrast, defendant contends that plaintiff originally alleged that her

low back pain and radiculopathy were not work-related, and that it was not until May 14, 2002, that

plaintiff alleged that her low back pain was aggravated by her December 2001 slip and fall.

 The relevant statement from Judge Laverdure's decision, in context, is as follows: "I find that

claimant perceives the issue of disability in the context of the ability to perform her past work as a

grocery clerk and produce stocker that she has performed for the last 28 years. In that context, I also

note Dr. Ramsey's observation that claimant originally alleged that her low back pain and

radiculopathy was not work-related. However, on May 14, 2002, claimant alleged that her low back

pain was secondary to the December 2001fall." ALJ Decision, p. 4; AT, p. 38.

 After carefully reviewing the portions of the record which the parties cite in their papers as

supporting their respective positions, we find that both sides are overreaching.

 Plaintiff first cites an assessment signed on April 8, 2002, by Dr. Ramsey, an orthopedic surgeon.

The assessment appears to have been completed in the context of plaintiff's workers compensation

claim.

 In this assessment, Dr. Ramsey describes the “history as provided by the patient . . She describes

a fall at work, landing on the left hip or buttock area on December 11, 2001. She indicates that this

aggravated pre-existing low back pain and initiated left sciatic complaints.” Ramsey Assessment,

p. 1; AT, p. 169. The letter goes on to say, “Based on the history she provided and limited medical

records, which appear to support this history, I would consider it medically probable that she has

aggravated a preexistent back problem and created related sciatic complaints as a result of her

industrial fall in December 2001. This is superimposed on the past history of nonradiating low back

pain, not known to be work related. Review of previous medical data would be desirable to

confirm this impression.” Ramsey Assessment, p. 4; AT, p. 172 (Emphasis added). 

 Dr. Ramsey, however, performed a second assessment of plaintiff in June of 2002. Defendant

cites this assessment in support of her position. In this assessment, Dr. Ramsey summarizes

additional medical records that he has received and reviewed regarding plaintiff. Following this

summary, Dr. Ramsey states that, “The above information contradicts the history previously

received. Clearly, Dr. Talcott describes her recent fall in December 2001 as causing no change in

her pre-existing complaints. Prior to this time, her problem had been indicated as non-industrially

related . . . It is somewhat curious that a slip and fall aggravating pain is now claimed, whereas at

the time or shortly thereafter, her treating doctor thought it was not particularly aggravating. 

 Such a history is certainly consistent with an aggravating incident, but I would certainly expect

some evidence of the aggravation to be recognized shortly after it occurred. Otherwise, I would have

to conclude that this incident was not particularly aggravating and that her problem represents a longstanding ongoing problem not known to be related to work.” Second Ramsey Assessment, pp. 2-3;

AT, pp. 167-68.

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plaintiff's positions regarding the effect of her fall at work on her back condition

somewhat diminished her credibility.7

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 Besides Dr. Ramsey’s first assessment, plaintiff cites only an RFC assessment dated in December

of 2002 (in connection with plaintiff’s application for Social Security benefits). Although the

assessment does describe plaintiff’s medical history as ‘undocumented low back pain aggravated by

December 2001 fall” there is nothing in the assessment whichundermines the notion that plaintiff

and her treating physician initially described the fall as NOT aggravating her back condition. Indeed,

later on in the assessment the evaluator notes, “Initially claimant and TP [treating physician]

submitted paperwork for nonindustrial injury and disability, then changed their history to suggest

industrial cause (Ramsey MD 6/02), which erodes their credibility somewhat.” RFC Assessment,

p. 6; AT, p. 260.

 Defendant also cites a “Doctor’s First Report of Occupational Injury or Illness” which describes

plaintiff’s slip and fall as causing/aggravating plaintiff’s leg and lower back pain. It is dated May

14, 2002. Despite the title of this document (i.e., Doctor's First Report) we located another 'Doctor's

First Report of Occupational Injury or Illness' -- this one dated in February of 2002. AT, at 125. The

February, 2002, report includes statements from plaintiff describing her left sciatica pain as constant

since the December11, 2001, fall and her lower back pain as worse since the fall.

 From what we can ascertain from the record, plaintiff first complained that the fall aggravated her

back and leg pain in February of 2002 - two months after the fall. Given this significant lapse in

time, we do not believe that it was unreasonable for Judge Laverdure to draw a negative inference

regarding plaintiff's credibility from the discrepancy between her and her treating physician's initial

position regarding the impact of the fall and their later position.

 On the other hand, Judge Laverdure's statement that "on May 14, 2002, claimant alleged that her

low back pain was secondary to the December 2001 fall" implies that he may have believed that

plaintiff did not change her position until May of 2002. If this was the case, the judge probably drew

a stronger inference than warranted about plaintiff's (lack of) credibility.

 In sum, we believe that the change in plaintiff's position about the effect of her fall on her back

condition could lend some modest support to a finding that plaintiff was in some measure

exaggerating the severity of her symptoms. We emphasize, however, that regardless of whether

Judge Laverdure understood the change in plaintiff’s position to have first occurred in February or

in May, it is unlikely that he ascribed appreciable significance to that change when he determined

plaintiff’s RFC. We also emphasize that there was ample support in the record for the way Judge

Laverdure treated plaintiff’s testimony without ascribing any significance to the change in her

position or when that change occurred.

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Finally, we find that plaintiff's description of her daily activities is inconsistent

with the notion that she cannot routinely perform a light day's work. Plaintiff's

typical day encompasses getting up at 6:30 a.m., preparing breakfast for her son and

dinner for her family (with occasional help), doing laundry, performing some

housework, taking a thirty-forty minute walk (every other day), performing physical

therapy exercises, running errands, picking up both her children from school, and,

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8

 

 Dr. Pickett does not state that plaintiff's need to rest frequently could be accommodated only by

unscheduled rest breaks. Therefore, as with plaintiff's hearing testimony, we believe that Judge

Laverdure's Residual Functional Capacity finding can be interpreted as largely consistent with Dr.

Pickett's opinion. However, we will assume, for the purposes of our analysis, that Dr. Pickett's June

2003 report envisioned at least some unscheduled rest breaks.

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sometimes, visiting her mother, taking a computer class, and helping her children

with their homework. 

In sum, we find that Judge Laverdure's assessment of plaintiff's Residual

Functional Capacity is largely consistent with her testimony. To the extent it rejects

any of plaintiff's testimony, we find that that rejection is supported by clear and

convincing reasons.

///

///

Plaintiff next argues that Judge Laverdure's finding of plaintiff's Residual

Functional Capacity improperly ignored or rejected an opinion expressed in June of

2003 by her treating physician, Dr. Pickett. In June, 2003, Dr. Pickett noted on a onepage form titled 'Treating Physician's Report of Disability Status' that plaintiff's job

performance limitations included a need for "frequent rest periods." AT, p. 270.8 The

Disability Status form does not explain the bases for Dr. Pickett's opinion regarding

plaintiff's limitations, including the rest break limitation. On the form, Dr. Pickett also

opines that plaintiff is currently able to perform light job duties if they are available,

provided that the physical limitations described on the form are accommodated.

Plaintiff insists that Judge Laverdure's decision improperly discounted the

opinion expressed by Dr. Pickett on the June 2003 Disability Status form that her

physical limitations included a need for frequent rest breaks. Plaintiff appears to

make two arguments with regard to Dr. Pickett's opinion: first, that Judge Laverdure

failed to either 'credit or discount' the opinion, and second, if Judge Laverdure's

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decision is interpreted as rejecting Dr. Pickett's opinion, that the judge's decision

failed to give adequate reasons for the rejection. 

In response to plaintiff's first argument, defendant contends that Judge

Laverdure acknowledged -- and rejected -- Dr. Pickett's opinion that plaintiff needed

frequent unscheduled rest breaks. We agree with defendant. 

First, we note that in the section of his decision entitled "Evaluation of the

Evidence", Judge Laverdure expressly acknowledges Dr. Pickett's rest break

limitation: "J.C. Pickett, M.D. has treated claimantsince January 2002 and completed

multiple disability forms indicating temporary disability. Exhibit 11F. However, Dr.

Pickett did not specify functional limitations until June 5, 2003, when he stated that

claimant could lift up to 10 pounds, carry up to 15 pounds with preclusion from

bending, climbing and kneeling and the need for frequent rest breaks." Exhibit

11F/5. (Emphasis added). 

In the section of his decision explaining his RFC determination, Judge

Laverdure does not explicitly mention Dr. Pickett's rest break limitation, but he does

state that he "gives little weight to Dr. Pickett's various opinions indicating temporary

disability as they were provided within the context of workers' compensation and, as

such, address issues of causation and the ability to return to past work. In addition,

until the June 2003 assessment, Dr. Pickett's disability opinions are vocational in

nature and do not specify functional capacities." ALJ Decision, p.4 (emphasis

added); AT, p. 38. Judge Laverdure also notes that, "Dr. Pickett's June 2003 opined

functional limitations are generally consistent with the above RFC." ALJ Decision,

p. 4; AT, p. 38.

In the Court's view, Judge Laverdure's decision acknowledges Dr. Pickett's

opinion that plaintiff's physical limitations included a need for frequent rest breaks,

and rejects that opinion to the extent it implies a need for frequent unscheduled rest

breaks. See Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747 (9th Cir. 1989) (administrative law

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 "It is true that the ALJ did not recite the magic words, 'I reject Dr. Fox's opinion about the onset

date because . . .' But our cases do not require such an incantation. As a reviewing court, we are not

deprived of our faculties for drawing specific and legitimate inferences from the ALJ's opinion. It

is proper for us to read the paragraph discussing Dr. Pont's findings and opinion, and draw inferences

relevant to Dr. Fox's findings and opinion, if those inferences are there to be drawn." Magallenes,

881 F.2d at 755.

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judge is not required to recite any magic words or incantation to reject a doctor's

opinion; reviewing court may draw inferences from administrative law judge's

opinion).9 Accordingly, we reject plaintiff's argument that the judge's decision fails

to sufficiently 'credit or discount' Dr. Pickett's opinion.

As mentioned above, plaintiff makes the alternative argument that Judge

Laverdure's decision fails to give sufficient reasons for rejecting Dr. Pickett's 'rest

break' limitation. Defendant disagrees, contending that Judge Laverdure properly

rejected that opinion.

As a general rule, more weight should be given to the opinion of a treating

source than to the opinion of doctors who do not treat the claimant. Tonapetyan v.

Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 2001). Although the treating physician's

opinion is given deference, an administrative law judge may reject the opinion of a

treating physician in favor of a conflicting opinion of an examining physician if the

administrative law judge makes "findings setting forth specific, legitimate reasons for

doing so that are based on substantial evidence in the record." Thomas v. Barnhart,

278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002).

We find that the combination of Dr. Kelly's opinion, the state agency

physician's assessment, the conclusory nature of Dr. Pickett's opinion, the fact that it

clearly was directed at a 'prior-job' inquiry, and the extent of plaintiff's daily activities

constitute substantial evidence supporting Judge Laverdure's rejection of Dr. Pickett's

'rest-break' opinion. 

Accordingly, we reject plaintiff's arguments to the contrary.

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 Plaintiff also alleges that Judge Laverdure's residual functional capacity finding was improperly

reached in that the judge did not acknowledge and apparently did not consider her work and

earnings history. We disagree. Judge Laverdure did acknowledge plaintiff's work and earnings

history. On page three of his decision, Judge Laverdure describes plaintiff as "a 47-year old

individual with a high school education and past relevant work as a produce stocker and grocery

clerk during the last 15 years," and on page four, he refers to plaintiff's "past work as a grocery clerk

and produce stocker that she has performed for the last 28 years." ALJ Decision, pp. 3, 4; AT, pp.

37-38. ("By published regulations, the Commissioner has defined 'past relevant work' as a work

experience which was done within the last 15 years, lasted long enough for an individual to learn

to do it, and constituted substantial gainful activity." HarveyL. McCormick, Social Security Claims

and Procedures (5th ed. 1999, Supp. 2005), § 2:53.) 

 Judge Laverdure clearly acknowledged that plaintiff had worked consistently over a very

substantial period of time. We see no reason to believe that he did not consider this fact when

assessing her credibility. 

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///

///

Finally, plaintiff argues that Judge Laverdure's residual functional capacity

finding was not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree. We find that, when

considered together, the evidence discussed above, including Dr. Kelly's evaluation,

the assessment of the state agency medical advisors, the extent of plaintiff's daily

activities, and a careful review of plaintiff's hearing testimony, do constitute

substantial evidence supporting Judge Laverdure's residual functional capacity

assessment.10

(ii) Compliance with Social Security Ruling 96-7p

In addition tomaking the substantive arguments addressed above, plaintiff also

argues that Judge Laverdure "avoided" the process set out in Social Security Ruling

("SSR") 96-7p by omitting the first step of the analysis and by failing to address

factors other than plaintiff's activities in the second step. Defendant's brief does not

respond to this argument.

SSR 96-7p clarifies whether an ALJ's evaluation of a claimant's symptoms,

including pain, requires a finding about the credibility of the individual's statements

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 As stated above, we assume, without deciding, that these findings must be clear and convincing.

See Note 4.

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about pain or other symptom(s) and its functional effects; explains the factors to be

considered in assessing the credibility of the individual's statements about symptoms,

and stresses the importance of explaining the reasons for the finding about the

credibility of the individual's statements in the disability determination. SSR 96-7p,

1996 WL 374186 (S.S.A.), p.1.

The determination under SSR 96-7p involves a two-step analysis. See SSR 96-

7p. In the first step, known in the Ninth Circuit as the Cotton test, the administrative

law judge determines whether the claimant has produced objective medical evidence

of an impairment and has shown that the impairment could reasonably be expected

to produce some degree of the alleged symptoms (i.e. pain). See Smolen v. Chater,

80 F.3d 1273, 1281-82 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403 (9th

Cir. 1986). If the administrative law judge determines that there is insufficient

medical evidence of an impairment, or that the impairment could not reasonably be

expected to produce some degree of the alleged pain or other symptoms, then the

symptom or combination of symptoms cannot be the basis for a finding of disability.

If the claimant does not satisfy the first step, the administrative law judge is not

required to proceed to step two of the analysis -- in other words, it is unnecessary for

him to make a finding regarding the credibility of the claimant's statements.

If the first step is satisfied, and there is no evidence of malingering, the

administrative law judge must make a finding about the credibility of the individual's

statements about the symptom(s) and its functional effects. He may reject the

claimant's testimony regarding the severity of symptoms only if he makes specific

findings justifying his decision.11

An administrative law judge is not required to believe every allegation of

disabling pain. Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989). In the second step

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12

 Bunnell refers to SSR 88-13 rather than SSR 96-7p. SSR 88-13 has since been superseded, first

by SSR 95-5p and then by SSR 96-7p. See Brider v. Apfel, 18 F.Supp.2d 900, 906 (N.D. Ill. 1998);

Calehuff v. Halter, 11 Fed. Appx.811 (9th Cir. 2001) (unpublished).

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of the analysis, the administrative law judge may consider factors such as

inconsistencies in the claimant's testimony, the extent of the claimant's daily

activities, any inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a

prescribed course of treatment, or other methods of credibility determination.

Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 346 (9th Cir. 1991).12 In addition, the

administrative law judge must consider the factors set out in SSR 96-7p when

evaluating the credibility of symptom testimoy. See id. These factors include: (i) the

individual's daily activities; (ii) the location, duration, frequency, and intensity of the

individual's pain and other symptoms; (iii) factors that precipitate and aggravate the

symptoms; (iv) the type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication the

individual takes or has taken to alleviate pain or other symptoms; (v) treatment, other

than medication, the individual receives or has received for relief of pain or other

symptoms; (vi) any measures other than treatment the individual uses or has used to

relieve pain or other symptoms; and (vii) any other factors concerning the individual's

functional limitations and restrictions due to pain or other symptoms. SSR 96-7p, p.3,

citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c) and 416.929(c).

Plaintiff's argument breaks down into two sub-parts. First, plaintiff argues that

Judge Laverdure improperly omitted the first step of the SSR 96-7p analysis. Second,

plaintiff arguesthat the judge's step-two analysis improperly failed to address the SSR

96-7p factors other than plaintiff's activities.

(a) Judge Laverdure's Alleged Omission of the

First Step of the SSR 96-7p analysis 

As described above, in the first step of the SSR 96-7p analysis, the

administrative law judge is required to determine whether the claimant has produced

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 Plaintiff has not directed the Court to any legal authority requiring an administrative law judge to

make an explicit finding on the first step of the SSR 96-7p process. Moreover, our research has

revealed two cases in which district courts have found an implicit finding sufficient. See Powell

v. Massanari, 2001 WL 1563712, *3 (N.D. Ca. 2001); Brider v. Apfel, 18 F.Supp.2d 900, 907, n.6

(N.D. Ill. 1998).

 

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objective medical evidence of an impairment that could reasonably be expected to

produce some degree of the alleged symptoms (the Cotton test). Plaintiff argues that

Judge Laverdure improperly failed to perform this step of the analysis.

Although Judge Laverdure did not explicitly find that plaintiff "produced

objective medical evidence of an impairment that could reasonably be expected to

produce some degree of the alleged symptoms," it is clear that he implicitly made

such a finding. As explained above, SSR 96-7p did not require the judge to assess

the credibility of plaintiff's testimony unless he found that the first step of the Cotton

test had been satisfied. But Judge Laverdure did, in fact, make such an assessment:

"Claimant's testimony is generally credible but her allegations regarding inability to

perform any work are inconsistent with the medical evidence and opinions supporting

an RFC for a range of work at the light exertional level and her activities of daily

living. In so finding, I note that . . ." ALJ Decision, p. 4; AT, p. 38 (emphasis

added); "Findings (6.) Claimant's subjective complaints, as discussed above, are

generally credible, but not to the extent that they would conclusively establish a

complete inability to perform any work." ALJ Decision, p. 5; AT, p. 39. In addition,

we observe that, at step two of the five-step evaluative disability analysis, Judge

Laverdure found that plaintiff had a severe medical impairment.13

We interpret Judge Laverdure's decision as finding that plaintiff satisfied the

Cotton test and reject plaintiff's arguments to the contrary.

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(b) Judge Laverdure's Alleged Failure to Consider 

 the Second Step Factors Other than Plaintiff's 

 Activities

As explained above, there are seven factors that an administrative law judge

must consider in the second-step of the SSR 96-7p analysis. Plaintiff argues that

Judge Laverdure improperly failed to address six of the seven factors (the exception

being plaintiff's daily activities). 

Although it is clear that an administrative law judge must consider all SSR 96-

7p factors, plaintiff cites no authority for the proposition that he must document this

consideration by separately analyzing, in writing, each of the factors. We have found

one case that directly addresses this issue, Powell v. Massanari, 2001 WL 1563712

(N.D. Ca. 2001) (Chesney, J.). In Powell, Judge Chesney specifically found that

although the administrative law judge is required to consider the various factors, he

is not required to separately discuss them. 

We have reviewed numerous additional opinions addressing the SSR 96-7p

process issued by the Ninth Circuit and by district courts falling within the Ninth

Circuit's jurisdiction. The cases all state that the administrative law judge must

consider the SSR 96-7p factors, but do not state that he must separately address them.

See, e.g., Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273 (9th Cir. 1996); Vick v. Commissioner, 57

F.Supp.2d 1077 (D.Or. 1999); Hixson v. Apfel, 2000 WL 1897293 (N.D. Ca. 2000).

In sum, plaintiff has not cited, nor could we find, any authority within the Ninth

Circuit stating that the administrative law judge must separately analyze all seven

factors. In these circumstances, we must decline to fault him for not doing so. 

Moreover, it is apparent that Judge Laverdure did consider the SSR 96-7p

factors. Indeed, the section of his decision titled, "Evaluation of the Evidence"

includes a description of the location (low back and left leg) and duration/frequency

(chronic) of plaintiff's pain, the activities that plaintiff described as aggravating that

pain (i.e. too much standing, sitting, walking, etc.), the type of medication she was on

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(Darcovet) and the fact that she suffered no side effects from that medication, other

measures she had taken to alleviate the pain (heating pads) and other treatment both

had (physical therapy, epidural injections) and considered (surgery). 

Accordingly, we conclude that Judge Laverdure did not improperly 'avoid' the

process set forth in SSR 96-7p.

B. Appeals Council Decision

As mentioned above, in addition to challenging Judge Laverdure's Residual

Functional Capacity finding, plaintiff also challenges the Appeals Council decision

upholding that finding. More specifically, plaintiff argues that the Appeal Council

improperly failed to consider an August 2004 work release prepared by Dr. Pickett,

plaintiff's treating physician.

The August 2004 work release is essentially a form report listing the medical

conditions under which Dr. Pickett believed it appropriate to release plaintiff to work.

These conditions include a need for "frequent rest periods" and a restriction that

plaintiff work no more than twenty hours per week.

Plaintiff's argument regarding the August 2004 work release consists of three

sub-parts: (i) the Appeals Council did not consider or acknowledge receipt of this

'report'; (ii) the Appeals Council did not provide an adequate explanation for rejecting

the report; and (iii) in light of the report, the Appeals Council improperly found that

Judge Laverdure's residual functional capacity finding was supported by substantial

evidence.

Plaintiff's first argument, that the Appeals Council did not consider the work

release, is not well-founded. The Appeals Council's decision denyingreviewcontains

a list of evidence that it considered -- and that list contains Dr. Pickett's August 2004

work release. AT, at 11-12, 14. Therefore, it is clear that the Appeals Council

considered the work release.

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Plaintiff next argues that the Appeals Council did not sufficiently set forth its

reasons for rejecting the opinion expressed in the work release. Defendant contends

that "the Appeals Council is not required to state its rationale for denying a request

for review of the ALJ's decision." Opposition, p.7. Defendant cites 20 C.F.R.

section 404.970(b) in support of this proposition:

20 C.F.R. § 404.970(b) reads:

If new and material evidence is submitted, the Appeals Council

shall consider the additional evidence only where it relates to the

period on or before the date of the administrative law judge hearing

decision. The Appeals Council shall evaluate the entire record

including the new and material evidence submitted if it relates to the

period on or before the date of the administrative law judge hearing

decision. It will then review the case if it finds that the administrative

law judge's action, findings, or conclusion is contrary to the weight of

the evidence currently of record.

20 C.F.R. § 404.970(b) (emphasis added).

After carefully reviewing Regulation 404.970(b) and other pertinent legal

authorities on this topic, we conclude that there are certain circumstances in which

the Appeals Council must state its rationale when it denies a request for review. The

pertinent authorities are not entirely consistent -- but we believe that the relevant

standard is most accurately stated as follows: when the Appeals Council receives and

considers new evidence from a treating physician, the Council must set forth 'specific,

legitimate reasons' for rejecting that opinion if (and only if) the following conditions

are met: (i) the evidence pertains to the period on or before the date of the

administrative law judge's decision; (ii) the evidence is new and material; and (iii) the

administrative law judge's decision is contrary to the record when all evidence,

including the new and material evidence, is considered. See generally Ramirez v.

Shalala, 8 F.3d 1449 (9th Cir. 1993); 20 C.F.R. § 404.970(b).

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Dr. Pickett's August 2004 work release does not appear to satisfy the above

conditions. First, the report appears to pertain to a period after the date of Judge

Laverdure's decision. Second, the 'frequent rest break' limitation specified in the

work release is not a new opinion -- as discussed above, Dr. Pickett already expressed

that opinion in June of 2003. Finally, we find that the evidence relied upon by Judge

Laverdure in making his residual functional capacity assessment still constitutes

substantial evidence in support of his decision, even when considered in conjunction

with Dr. Pickett's August 2004 work release.

Because we find that the conditions that trigger the requirement that the

Appeals Council set forth 'specific, legitimate reasons' for rejecting Dr. Pickett's

August 2004 work release 'opinion' are not met, we find that the Appeals Council was

not required to set forth in detail its reasons for rejecting that opinion. 

Plaintiff's final argument on this issue is that, in light of the restrictions

contained in Dr. Pickett's August 2004 work release, the Appeals Council should not

have found that Judge Laverdure's residual functional capacity finding was supported

by substantial evidence. As stated above, we disagree with this assertion. We find

that Judge Laverdure's residual functional capacity finding was supported by

substantial evidence, even when considered in conjunction with the August 2004

work release.

Accordingly, we deny plaintiff's challenge to the Appeals Council's decision.

3. Propriety of ALJ's Step Five Finding That a Significant Number

of Jobs Exist in the National Economy that Plaintiff Can Perform

In the fourth step of the five-step sequential process, Judge Laverdure found

that plaintiff was unable to perform her past relevant work as a produce stocker or

grocery clerk. In the fifth step of the analysis, however, the Judge found that there

were a significant number of other jobs in the national economy that plaintiff could

perform. Plaintiff's counsel now disputes the propriety of the ALJ's step-five finding.

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In step five of the disability analysis, the burden of proof shifts to the

Commissioner to demonstrate that the claimant retains residual functional capacity

to perform a significant number of other jobs in the national economy that are

consistent with the claimant's impairments and vocational factors such as age,

education and work experience. The Secretary has developed a series of tables

known as "grids" for use in determining disability. The grids take into account

various vocational factors, such as age, education and work experience, and the

claimant's residual functional capacity. See Razey v. Heckler, 785 F.2d 1426,

amended, 794 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Plaintiff's counsel argues that the ALJ improperly reached his step five finding

that plaintiff could perform a significant number of jobs in the national economy

because the ALJ relied on the medical-vocational guidelines (the grids) and not on

testimony from a vocational expert. For reasons we explain below, we disagree. 

At plaintiff's hearing, when Judge Laverdure reached the fifth step of the

sequential process, the Judge asked plaintiff's counsel whether he would stipulate

that a person with the residual functional capacity that he (Judge Laverdure)

ultimately found plaintiff to possess could perform a significant number of jobs in the

national economy. As Judge Laverdure explained, plaintiff's counsel's stipulation

would obviate the need for expert vocational testimony on this issue. February 11,

2004, Administrative Hearing Transcript, pp. 29-30; AT, pp. 371-72. Plaintiff's

counsel agreed to so stipulate. Hearing Transcript, p. 31; AT, p. 373.

As we have upheld Judge Laverdure's assessment of plaintiff's residual

functional capacityunder the pertinent legal standards, and because plaintiff's counsel

stipulated that a person with that residual functional capacity could perform a

significant number of jobs in the national economy -- and did not insist on expert

vocational testimony on this issue -- we must decline to find that the Commissioner

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failed to meet her burden of proof as to step five or that Judge Laverdure's finding as

to this step was otherwise improperly reached.

Plaintiff's counsel also argues that although he stipulated that a person with the

residual functional capacity described by the ALJ could perform a significant number

of jobs in the national economy, he did not stipulate that plaintiff could perform such

jobs. Rather, plaintiff's counsel posed a hypothetical to the expert, describing an

individual with the same residual functional capacity described in the ALJ's

hypothetical who also needed to take up to four unscheduled rest breaks a day. The

vocational expert testified that the hypotheticalpersondescribed byplaintiff's counsel

would not be sufficiently productive to successfully perform any job. Hearing

Transcript, pp. 36-37; AT, pp. 378-79.

 Plaintiff's counsel argues that plaintiff's residual functional capacity is actually

that of the individual described in his hypothetical. He points out that neither the

expert's vocational testimony nor a stipulation supports a step-five finding that a

person with this residual functional capacity could perform a significant number of

jobs in the national economy. 

We have, however, upheld Judge Laverdure's assessment of plaintiff's residual

functional capacity -- and that assessment does not include the unscheduled rest-break

limitation of the individual described in counsel's hypothetical. Therefore, the

Judge's step-five finding does not need to be supported by evidence that the

hypothetical person described by plaintiff's counsel could perform a significant

number of jobs in the national economy.

Accordingly, we reject plaintiff's contention that the ALJ's step-five finding

was improperly reached.

///

///

///

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V. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby DENIES plaintiff's motion

for remand, DENIES plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, and GRANTS

defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 13, 2006

 

WAYNE D. BRAZIL

United States Magistrate Judge

Copies to:

All parties,

WDB, Stats

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