Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00576/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00576-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1332oc Diversity-Other Contract

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RODNEY E. AKINS,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 12cv00576 BTM (WVG)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS AND

GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS

TO AMEND AND FOR

APPOINTMENT OF A PROCESS

SERVER

v.

SAN DIEGO COMMUNITY COLLEGE

DISTRICT, et al.,

Defendant.

On July 5, 2012, Defendants SAN DIEGO COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT1

(“District”), PENNY HEDGECOTH and MATTHEW TORRES, employees of the District

(together, “District Parties”) filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint

(“Complaint”). In addition, Plaintiff has also filed an ex parte application for appointment of

a process server and a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. For the

reasons below, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants’ motion to

dismiss, GRANTS Plaintiff’s ex parte application to appoint a process server, and GRANTS

Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. Plaintiff shall have ninety

(90) days from the date of this order in which to properly serve defendants.

Plaintiff also named the San Diego Police Department as a defendant. However, the 1

police officers involved in the incident alleged by Plaintiff in his Complaint appear to be

members of the Campus Police, and may properly be considered employees of the San

Diego Community College District rather than the San Diego Police Department. See ECF

No. 20 at 2:12-14.

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I. BACKGROUND

In his Complaint, Plaintiff RODNEY E. AKINS alleges that on May 25, 2010, he

attempted to effect service of process for nine defendants in a case in San Diego Superior

Court via the mail center at the Mesa College Campus, but was deterred from doing so by

Defendant PENNY HEDGECOTH, a District employee. According to the Complaint,

Defendant HEDGECOTH called the campus police, and Defendant MATTHEW TORRES,

a campus police officer, subsequently stopped Plaintiff and, along with another officer,

Defendant JOHN DOE 3, detained Plaintiff using force, resulting in an alleged injury to his

rotator cuff.

II. DISCUSSION

Defendants move to dismiss the Complaint on the grounds that: 1) service of process

was defective as to all Defendants; 2) the District and District Parties are immune from suit

under the Eleventh Amendment as to Counts 1-3 and 5-14, as well as Count 4 to the extent

it is based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and 3) Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted, both as to the Complaint in its entirety and to the fourth cause of action for

racial discrimination under Title VI.

A. Service of Process

Defendants move to dismiss the Complaint in part for insufficient service of process. 

See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(5). “Once service is challenged, plaintiffs bear the burden of

establishing that service was valid under Rule 4.” Brockmeyer v. May, 383 F.3d 798, 801

(9th Cir. 2004). While “Rule 4 is a flexible rule that should be liberally construed so long as

a party receives sufficient notice of the complaint,” United Food & Commercial Workers

Union v. Alpha Beta Co., 736 F.2d 1371, 1382 (9th Cir. 1984), there must still be “substantial

compliance” with Rule 4; otherwise, “neither actual notice nor simply naming the defendant

in the complaint will provide personal jurisdiction.” Direct Mail Specialists, Inc. v. Eclat

Computerized Technologies, Inc., 840 F.2d 685, 688 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Benny v. Pipes,

799 F.2d 489, 492 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 198, 98 L.Ed.2d 149

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(1987)).

Under Rule 4, an individual defendant may be served by:

(1) following state law for serving a summons in an action brought in courts

of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located or where

service is made; or

(2) doing any of the following:

(A) delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the

individual personally;

(B) leaving a copy of each at the individual's dwelling or usual place

of abode with someone of suitable age and discretion who resides there; or

(C) delivering a copy of each to an agent authorized by appointment

or by law to receive service of process.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(b). With regard to serving the District, Rule 4 states that:

A state, a municipal corporation, or any other state-created governmental

organization that is subject to suit must be served by:

(A) delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to its chief

executive officer; or

(B) serving a copy of each in the manner prescribed by that state’s law

for serving a summons or like process on such a defendant.

Id. at 4(j)(2). Under California law, service of process may be effected by: personal

delivery, Code Civ. Proc. § 415.10; leaving a copy at the person’s home or office and

thereafter mailing a copy, id. at § 415.20; mailing a copy along with two copies of the notice

and acknowledgment of summons and a return envelope to sender, id. at § 415.30; or

publication, id. at § 415.50.

It is undisputed that in this case, Plaintiff served Defendants by sending them the FAC

and a copy of the summons via certified mail, which is not authorized under federal or state

law. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s service of process was insufficient.

However, as a pro se plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis, Plaintiff is entitled to have

the U.S. Marshals serve his papers. Therefore, the Court quashes service and grants

Plaintiff’s ex parte application for appointment of a process server as detailed below. Plaintiff

shall have ninety (90) days from the date of this order in which to serve defendants.

//

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B. Sovereign Immunity

1. The District

Under the Eleventh Amendment, “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not

be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one

of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign

State.” The Eleventh Amendment “confirms” the “presupposition” of state sovereign

immunity, such that no state may be sued by an individual without its consent, unless

Congress has unequivocally and constitutionally abrogated that immunity in a statute. See

Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 72-73, 120 S. Ct. 631, 640, 145 L. Ed. 2d 522

(2000). The Ninth Circuit has held that community college districts are state entities

protected by sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. See Mitchell v. Los

Angeles Cmty. Coll. Dist., 861 F.2d 198, 201-02 (9th Cir. 1988); Cerrato v. San Francisco

Cmty. Coll. Dist., 26 F.3d 968, 972 (9th Cir. 1994).

Plaintiff has alleged the following causes of action: (1) intentional infliction of

emotional distress; (2) denial of public accommodation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (3)

age discrimination in violation of California Government Code 11135(a); (4) racial

discrimination in violation of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act as implemented by 42

U.S.C. § 1983; (5) abuse of process; (6) deprivation of due process and equal protection in

violation of Article 1 § 7 of the California Constitution; (7) conspiracy to interfere with

Plaintiff’s civil rights in violation of California Government Code 11135(a); (8) unlawful

retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (9) unlawful detainment in violation of Article 1

§ 13 of the California Constitution; (10) negligence; (11) interference with Plaintiff’s exercise

and enjoyment of his constitution rights in violation of California Civil Code § 52.1(b); (12)

retaliation in violation of California Government Code 11135(a); (13) personal injury; and (14)

denial of public accommodation in violation of California Government Code 11135(a).

It is well-established that Congress has not abrogated sovereign immunity for section

1983 claims. See Braunstein v. Arizona Dept. of Transp., 683 F.3d 1177, 1188 (9th Cir.

2012). The Eleventh Amendment also bars Plaintiff’s state law claims, since allowing a

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federal court to adjudicate state law claims as against the state itself “conflicts directly with

the principles of federalism that underlie the Eleventh Amendment.” Pennhurst State Sch.

& Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106, 104 S. Ct. 900, 911, 79 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1984); see

also Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2004). However, Congress

has abrogated sovereign immunity as to Title VI claims for damages. See 42 U.S.C. §

2000d-7(a). Thus, Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action for racial discrimination in violation of

Title VI may be allowed against the District, but all of his other claims against the District

must be dismissed as barred by sovereign immunity. The Court therefore DENIES

Defendants’ motion to dismiss the fourth cause of action, but GRANTS the motion as to the

District for the remainder of the claims.

2. Individual Defendants

As to the individual defendants, the Eleventh Amendment extends sovereign immunity

to state officials sued in their official capacity. See Romano v. Bible, 169 F.3d 1182, 1185

(9th Cir. 1999). Even where state officials are sued in their personal capacities, the Eleventh

Amendment bars such suits “when ‘the state is the real, substantial party in interest.’” 

Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101, 104 S. Ct. 900, 908-09, 79

L. Ed. 2d 67 (1984) (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464,

65 S.Ct. 347, 350, 89 L.Ed. 389 (1945)). However, the Supreme Court has recognized a

significant exception to the immunity of state officials, namely that “a suit challenging the

constitutionality of a state official’s action is not one against the State,” id. at 102, since “an

official who acts unconstitutionally is ‘stripped of his official or representative character.’” Id.

at 104 (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)). Here, Plaintiff sues the individual

defendants in their official and individual capacities. The defendants are entitled to

sovereign immunity in their official capacity just as is the District. Thus, the claims against

the individual defendants in their official capacity, except the Title VI claim, are dismissed.

C. Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted

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Finally, Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint on the grounds that

it fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6). However,

because the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint

(see below), it DENIES without prejudice the motion to dismiss under 12(b)(6) as moot.

D. Plaintiff’s Application to Appoint Process Server

Plaintiff has also made an ex parte application for appointment of a process server

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (ECF No. 11). Under Rule 4, a court must order that service

be made by a United States marshal or deputy marshal or by a person specially appointed

by the court if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. §1915.

See Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(c)(3). Because the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma

pauperis (ECF No. 3), the Court now GRANTS Plaintiff’s ex parte application as required by

Rule 4 and hereby ORDERS that the United States Marshal shall serve a summons and a

copy of the Complaint upon Defendants as directed by Plaintiff on U.S. Marshal Form 285,

with all costs of service to be advanced by the United States.

E. Plaintiff’s Motion to File Second Amended Complaint

Leave to amend a complaint should be freely given when justice so requires. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). “Liberality in granting a plaintiff leave to amend is subject to the

qualification that the amendment not cause undue prejudice to the defendant, is not sought

in bad faith, and is not futile.” Bowles v. Reade, 198 F.3d 752, 758 (9th Cir. 1999). Because

this suit is still in its early stages, there is no prejudice to Defendants, and there is nothing

to suggest bad faith by Plaintiff. While Defendants claim amendment would be futile

because Plaintiff’s proposed second amended complaint is “substantially similar” to the

present complaint, that alone is insufficient to override the “extreme liberality” with which

Rule 15's policy of favoring amendments should be applied. See DCD Programs, Ltd. v.

Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion

to file a second amended complaint.

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II. CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants’

motion to dismiss, GRANTS Plaintiff’s ex parte application to appoint a process server, and

GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. Plaintiff’s second

amended complaint must be filed within 21 days of the date of this order. The claims in the

present complaint against the District and the individual defendants in their official capacity

except the Title VI claim, are dismissed with prejudice and shall not be re-alleged in the

Second Amended Complaint. The Court further ORDERS that the United States Marshal

shall serve a summons and a copy of the Second Amended Complaint upon Defendants as

directed by Plaintiff on U.S. Marshal Form 285, with all costs of service to be advanced by

the United States. Plaintiff shall have ninety (90) days from the filing of the Second

Amended Complaint in which to serve defendants.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 2, 2013

BARRY TED MOSKOWITZ, Chief Judge

United States District Court

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