Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_02-cv-02516/USCOURTS-cand-3_02-cv-02516-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 450
Nature of Suit: Interstate Commerce
Cause of Action: 49:81 Damaged Goods While Being Transported

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 The Court sustains BAX’s objections to the Second Declaration of Jeff Sowers. 

The Court overrules Plaintiffs’ objections to the declarations of Paul Pfeifer and Wayne

McWhirter, and to Exhibit F. The Court need not rule on Plaintiffs’ evidentiary objections to

the Declaration of John Canfield because the Court did not need to consider such evidence in

order to resolve the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NISSAN FIRE AND MARINE INSURANCE

COMPANY LTD.; HITACHI DATA

SYSTEMS CORP.,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

BAX GLOBAL INC.;CATHAY PACIFIC

AIRWAYS, LTD.,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 02-2516 JSW

ORDER DENYING CROSSMOTIONS FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

Now before the Court is the motion for summary judgment filed by plaintiffs Hitachi

Data Systems, Corporation and Nissan Fire and Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. (“Plaintiffs”) and the

cross-motion for summary judgment file by defendant Bax Global Inc. (“BAX”). Having

carefully reviewed the parties’ papers and considered their arguments and the relevant legal

authority, and good cause appearing, the Court hereby DENIES both parties’ motions.1

BACKGROUND

In April 2001, plaintiff Hitachi Data Systems, Corporation (“Hitachi”) contracted with

defendants BAX Global, Inc. (“BAX”) and Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd. (“Cathay Pacific”) for

international carriage via air of eighteen packages of computer equipment from Indianapolis,

Indiana to Hong Kong, S.A.R., China. Hitachi alleges that the cargo was damaged in route. 

Plaintiff Nissan Fire and Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. (“Nissan”) insured the cargo and, having

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reimbursed Hitachi for some or all of its losses, is subrogated to Hitachi’s interests in this

matter. Plaintiffs have dismissed defendant Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd from this lawsuit.

In 2003, Plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment to resolve the issue of

whether attorneys’ fees and costs are available under the applicable governing law. At that

point, the parties agreed that this action fell within the parameters of the Warsaw Convention, as

amended by The Hague Protocol. Accordingly, the issue presented to the Court was whether

attorneys’ fees and costs were available under the Warsaw Convention, as amended by The

Hague Protocol. Although the Court initially granted Plaintiffs’ motion, the Court subsequently

granted BAX’s motion for reconsideration based on the discovery of new facts. BAX submitted

evidence in the form of e-mails authored by two employees of Bax Global, prepared near the

time of the shipment and resulting damage, by persons looking into the status of the cargo, that

BAX contends demonstrates that the cargo at issue was damaged prior to delivery to the airport

in Chicago. The Court concluded that the emails created a question of fact regarding where the

damage occurred and thus, granted BAX’s motion for reconsideration.

The parties now both move for summary judgment on the issue of damages. BAX

contends that pursuant to the applicable law, Plaintiffs’ damages are limited to twenty dollars

per kilogram. Plaintiffs argue that the BAX is not entitled to the weight-based damage

limitations under the applicable law. Plaintiffs also move for prejudgment interest and for

attorneys’ fees.

ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard on Summary Judgment.

A principal purpose of the summary judgment procedure is to identify and dispose of

factually unsupported claims. Celotex Corp. v. Cattrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). 

Summary judgment is proper when the “pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to

any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c). 

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A party moving for summary judgment who does not have the ultimate burden of

persuasion at trial, must produce evidence which either negates an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claims or show that the non-moving party does not have enough evidence of an

essential element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins.

Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). A party who moves for summary

judgment who does bear the burden of proof at trial, must produce evidence that would entitle

him or her to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial. C.A.R. Transp.

Brokerage Co., Inc. v. Darden, 213 F.3d 474, 480 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Once the moving party meets his or her initial burden, the non-moving party must go

beyond the pleadings and by its own evidence “set forth specific facts showing that there is a

genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). In order to make this showing, the non-moving

party must “identify with reasonable particularity the evidence that precludes summary

judgment.” Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). It is not the Court’s task to

“scour the record in search of a genuine issue of triable fact.” Id. (quoting Richards v.

Combined Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 1995). If the non-moving party fails to make this

showing, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

An issue of fact is “genuine” only if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable fact

finder to find for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49

(1986). A fact is “material” if it may affect the outcome of the case. Id. at 248. “In considering

a motion for summary judgment, the court may not weigh the evidence or make credibility

determinations, and is required to draw all inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 723, 735 (9th Cir. 1997).

B. Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment

The Warsaw Convention is an international treaty governing the liability of air carriers

engaging in international air travel. A threshold question central to both parties’ motions for

summary judgment is where did the damage occur. If, as BAX contends, the damage occurred

within the United States, but outside the boundaries of an airport, the federal common law

applies. See Read-Rite Corp. v. Burlington Air Express, Ltd., 186 F.3d 1190, 1194 (9th Cir.

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1999). If the damage occurred within the boundaries of an airport, the Warsaw Convention

applies, but the parties dispute which version would be applicable. Depending on whether the

Warsaw Convention applies, and if so, which version, Plaintiffs’ damages may or may not be

limited to twenty dollars per kilogram.

Where there is a dispute regarding where the damage occurred, Article 18(3) of the

Convention creates a rebuttable presumption that the damage occurred during air transportation

“subject to proof to the contrary.” See Read-Rite Corp., 186 F.3d at 1194. BAX bears the

burden of proving presenting evidence to rebut the presumption and demonstrate where the

damage actually occurred. See Washington Int’l Ins. Co. v. Distribution Specialists Inc., 1996

WL 50232, *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 1996); Royal Ins. Co. of Amer. v. Air Express Int’l, 906 F.

Supp. 218, 219-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). BAX submits two emails authored by its employees

prepared near the time of the shipment and resulting damage, by persons who investigated the

status of the cargo, as well as declarations by the same employees describing the emails. These

are the same emails the Court concluded created a question of fact regarding where the damage

occurred with respect to Plaintiffs’ first motion for summary judgment. While this evidence is

sufficient to create a question of fact regarding where the damage occurred, and thus sufficient

to defeat Plaintiffs’ current motion, the Court finds it insufficient to meet BAX’s burden to

prevail on its motion. In other words, this evidence would not entitle BAX to a directed verdict

if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial. See C.A.R. Transp. Brokerage, 213 F.3d at 480. 

Accordingly, the Court denies both motions for summary judgment.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES the cross-motions for summary judgment.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 21, 2005 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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