Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-01856/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-01856-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

INGRID & ISABEL, LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.

BENTIBO, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 18-cv-01856-JCS 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

RE MOTION FOR DEFAULT 

JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. No. 46

I. INTRODUCTION

In this action, Plaintiff Ingrid & Isabel, LLC (“Ingrid & Isabel”) asserts patent 

infringement claims and claims for unfair competition under the Lanham Act and California state 

law against Defendants Bentibo and Jinliang Qian. The undersigned authorized alternative service 

after efforts to served Defendants in China under the Hague Convention were unsuccessful. 

Neither Defendant answered or appeared and the Clerk entered their defaults on February 5, 2019. 

Presently before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Entry of Default Judgment and Permanent 

Injunction Against Defendants Bentibo and Jinliang Qian (“Motion”). The Court finds that the 

Motion is suitable for determination without oral argument and therefore vacates the hearing set 

for May 17, 2019 pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b). Because Defendants have not consented to 

the jurisdiction of a United States magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), this case will 

be reassigned to a district judge for further action. For the reasons set forth below, it is 

recommended that the Court GRANT the Motion and award the relief requested in the Motion, 

namely, entry of a permanent injunction as set forth below and an award of costs in the amount of 

$7,655.91.

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II. BACKGROUND

A. Allegations in the Complaint

Ingrid & Isabel is a California limited liability company with its principal place of business 

in San Francisco, California. Complaint ¶ 5. Defendant Bentibo is a foreign business 

organization, form unknown, with both its principal place of business and a regular and 

established place of business in Yiwu, China. Id. ¶ 3. Likewise, Defendant Jinliang Qian is an 

individual who resides in Yiwu, China. Id. ¶ 8.

According to the Complaint, Ingrid & Isabel has marketed and sold its BELLABAND 

maternity bands in interstate commerce since November 2003. Id. ¶ 6. Ingrid & Isabel’s 

BELLABAND maternity bands have obtained widespread commercial success in the

maternity clothes market and consumers have come to know and associate the BELLABAND

maternity bands exclusively with Ingrid & Isabel. Id. 

Ingrid & Isabel is the sole and exclusive owner of U.S. Patent No. 7,181,775 (the “’775

Patent”), U.S. Patent No. 7,676,852 (the “’852 Patent”), US. Patent No. 8,191,177 (the “’177

Patent”), and U.S. Patent No. 8,276,216 (the “’216 Patent”) (collectively, “Patents-in-Suit”). Id. ¶ 

1. The Patents-in-Suit describe various methods for accommodating the shape of a woman during

pregnancy without the need for a series of different-sized maternity clothes. Id. ¶13. The

Patents-in-Suit describe the use of a flexible band that is worn around the torso and allows

for pants or skirts that would otherwise be too tight to be worn without requiring them to be

fastened around the waist. Id. The Patents-in-Suit also describe the use of a flexible band

that is worn around the torso that allows for clothes that would otherwise be too loose and/or large

to be worn. Id.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants make, use, import, distribute, offer for sale and/or sell 

certain products in the United States that infringe the Patents-in-Suit, including, but not limited, to 

the Maternity Belly Band product, as well as other maternity products. Id. at ¶¶ 14, 20-65. Like 

Ingrid & Isabel’s BELLABAND, Defendants’ Maternity Belly Band product is a flexible band of 

fabric that is worn around the torso and holds in place pants that are unbuttoned or are too loose to 

be worn on their own, thus allowing women to minimize the amount of different-sized clothes 

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needed during the course of pregnancy. Id. ¶8. Plaintiff sent copies of the Patents-in-Suit to 

Defendants on December 14, 2017. Id. ¶16.

Plaintiff alleges that it has created, developed, and authored certain stylistic and unique 

advertising and marketing materials in connection with the promotion and sale of its 

BELLABAND products, including, but not limited to customer communications, advertisements, 

press releases, pencil drawings, sizing charts, product inserts, product colors, product descriptions 

and photographs (“Plaintiff’s Advertising”). Id. ¶ 17. According to Plaintiff, Defendants’ 

communications, marketing and advertising of their Maternity Belly Band Product have been, and 

continue to be, confusingly similar to Plaintiff’s Advertising. Id. ¶¶ 18-19.

In the Complaint, Plaintiff asserts claims for infringement of the Patents-in-Suit (Counts IIV), a claim for unfair competition under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (Count V), a claim 

for unfair competition in violation of California Business and Professions Code § 17200 et seq.

(Count VI), and a claim for common law unfair competition (Count VII). With respect to the 

patent infringement claims, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ infringement was willful at least as 

of December 14, 2017, when Plaintiff’s counsel provided copies of the Patents-in-Suit to 

Defendants via the law firm that purported to represent Defendants at the time (discussed further 

below). Id. ¶ 16. In the Prayer, Plaintiff seeks, inter alia, monetary damages, including treble 

damages for willful infringement, a permanent injunction enjoining Defendants from infringing its 

Patents-in-Suit and from engaging in unfair competition related to Plaintiff’s products, and 

attorneys’ fees and costs. Id. at pp. 16-17.

B. Procedural Background

In September 2017, Plaintiff noticed a company called “Bentibo” advertising products on 

Amazon.com that it believed infringed the Patents-in-Suit. Declaration of Ilene Goldberg In 

Support of Plaintiff Ingrid & Isabel, LLC’s Ex Parte Application for Order Authorizing Alternate 

Service of Process on Defendant Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Section 4(f)(3), Dkt. 

No. 27-01 (“First Goldberg Decl.”) ¶ 2. Bentibo is a trademark (“Trademark”) that was registered 

with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) on November 29, 2016; the 

Trademark is owned by “jinliang qian” at the address “Room 102 Unit 9 Danxi 1 Destrict, yiwu 

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CHINA.” Declaration of Ilene H. Goldberg in Support of Plaintiff Ingrid & Isabel, LLC’s Ex Parte 

Application for Order Authorizing Alternate Service of Process on Defendant Pursuant to Rule 4 

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Dkt. No. 32 (“Second Goldberg Decl.”) ¶ 3 & Ex. A 

(trademark certificate for Bentibo mark). Jinliang Qian signed the Trademark application and 

submitted an affidavit of ownership of the mark in support of application. Id. ¶ 4 & Ex. C 

(trademark application for Bentibo mark). 

On or about November 28, 2017, Plaintiff filed a patent infringement report through an 

automated system with Amazon Brand Registry with Amazon.com in order to stop the sale of the 

infringing products being sold by “Bentibo” with ASIN B071XSRWNW on Amazon.com. First 

Goldberg Decl. ¶ 3. When a report is filed with Amazon Brand Registry, a notification is 

automatically sent to the seller. Id. ¶ 4. On November 30, 2017, attorney Josh Han with the Tian 

IP firm in Bellevue, Washington (which also employs attorneys in China), responded to Plaintiff’s 

complaints, stating that his firm represented “Carla Stancil” (which Plaintiff understood to be an

alias for Bentibo), who sold the Maternity Belly Band on Amazon.com with ASIN

B071XSRWNW. First Goldberg Decl. ¶ 5 & Ex. C. Attorney Han sent claim charts to Plaintiff 

and argued that the accused products did not infringe the Patents-in-Suit. Id. 

Plaintiff’s counsel responded to the correspondence from Han with a letter and detailed 

claim charts setting forth the basis for Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendants’ Maternity Belly 

Band infringed the Patents-in-Suit, which counsel sent to Han on December 14, 2017. Id. ¶ 6 & 

Ex. D. With the claim charts counsel also sent copies of the Patents-in-Suit. Id. Three of the 

Patents-in-Suit listed the assignee as “Ingrid & Isabel, LLC, San Francisco, CA (US).” Id. The 

fourth did not list an assignee but reflected that the inventor was “Ingrid Carney, San Francisco, 

CA (USA).” Id. Han spoke with Plaintiff’s counsel twice about Plaintiff’s infringement 

allegations, on January 30, 2018 and February 1, 2018, but in the second conversation Han told 

Plaintiff’s counsel that his client was in China, that he had not heard back from his client, and his 

client had not paid him. Id. ¶¶ 7-8. Plaintiff’s counsel was unable to obtain any more 

information from Mr. Han after that point. Id. ¶ 8.

On March 27, 2018, Plaintiff filed its complaint in this action. On April 5, 2018, Plaintiff

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served a Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons by mail to Defendants’

address in China. Id. ¶ 10 & Ex. E. Defendants had 60 days to respond and failed to do so. Id. 

On or about May 25, 2018, Plaintiff initiated the process of serving Defendants through the Hague 

Convention. Id. ¶ 11. Plaintiff engaged the services of a process server called Judicial Support 

and sent all service documents to Judicial Support to translate and serve on the Defendants in 

China. Id. After all the documents were translated, on or about July 30, 2018, Judicial Support 

paid for service by the Chinese Central Authority by making a wire transfer to The Supreme 

People’s Court of China. Id. On August 21, 2018, Plaintiff sent the service documents by express 

mail to Defendants. Id. On or about August 31, 2018, the service documents were sent via FedEx 

to the Chinese Central Authority, with a September 3, 2018 expected delivery date. Id. On 

October 25, 2018, Plaintiff learned that the Chinese Central Authority had returned the service 

package because the beneficiary’s name on the receipt issued in connection with the wire transfer

did not reflect “The Supreme People’s Court of China” as the recipient. Id. ¶ 12. Instead, the 

name on the receipt was reflected as “The Supreme People’s Court of Chin” because the field to 

insert the beneficiary’s name on the form provided for the wire transfer would not allow for the 

required number of letters to type “The Supreme People’s Court of China.” Id. 

Following its unsuccessful attempt to serve Defendants under the Hague Convention, 

Plaintiff sought leave to serve Defendants using alternative means, pursuant to Rule 4(f)(3) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Dkt. No. 27. The Court held a hearing and requested 

additional information, which Plaintiff supplied in a supplemental declaration by counsel. See 

Second Supplemental Declaration of Ilene H. Goldberg In Support of Plaintiff Ingrid & Isabel, 

LLC’s Ex Parte Application for Order Authorizing Alternate Service of Process on Defendant 

Pursuant to Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Third Goldberg Decl.”). Among 

other things, counsel stated that she had contacted at least one process server that had been able to 

serve documents under the Hague Convention, despite the issue with the field size, by dropping 

the word “The” from “The People’s Republic of China.” Third Goldberg Decl. ¶ 7. However, all 

three process servers with whom counsel spoke told her that there was a backlog for service on 

Chinese entities through the Hague Convention of over two years. Id. ¶¶ 5-7. Based on the 

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information provided by Plaintiff, including counsel’s supplemental declaration, the Court granted 

the request to serve by alternative means. See Dkt. No. 37. 

Pursuant to the Court’s order, Plaintiff served Defendants in the following manner: 1) 

Plaintiff sent by U.S. mail a copy of the complaint and summons to Josh Zhihua Han at the 

following address: Josh Zhihua Han Ph.D., J.D.,Tian IP & Technology, LLC,14150 NE 20th St 

F1-55, Bellevue, Washington 98007 and also sent those documents via email to Josh Zhihua Han 

at the email addresses Josh@tianip.com and info@tianip.com; 2) Plaintiff sent by U.S. Mail a 

copy of the complaint and summons to LIWEI LU, 308 E. 5th Ave., Vancouver, B.C. V5T1H4

Canada and QUEST QIAN, 308 E. 5th Ave., Vancouver, B.C. V5T1H4 Canada; 3) Plaintiff sent 

via email a copy of the complaint and summons to Liwei Lu at filing@zoroip.com and to Quest 

Qian at ninbharati@gmail.com. Declaration of Ilene H. Goldberg in Support of Plaintiff Ingrid & 

Isabel, LLC’s Request for Entry of Default Against Defendants Bentibo and Jinliang Qian 

(“Fourth Goldberg Decl.”) ¶ 3. Liwei Wu and Quest Qian are individuals listed for 

correspondence on the Bentibo Trademark application. Second Goldberg Decl. ¶ 5.

On January 28, 2019, after Defendants failed to appear or answer, Plaintiff requested that 

the Clerk enter default against both Defendants, and that request was granted on February 5, 2019.

C. The Motion

Plaintiff asks the Court to enter default judgment against Defendants, to enter a permanent 

injunction enjoining further infringement of its Patents-in-Suit and deceptive advertising of their 

infringing products, and award costs of suit in the amount of $7,655.91. Plaintiff has dropped its 

request for monetary damages (including treble damages for willful infringement) and attorneys’ 

fees. Plaintiff points to the evidence discussed above in support of its request. Plaintiff also 

supplies another declaration of counsel that lists the costs Plaintiff seeks and states, inter alia, that 

Defendants continue to sell the infringing products on Amazon.com to the present date. See 

Declaration of Ilene H. Goldberg in Support of Plaintiff Ingrid & Isabel, LLC’s Motion for Entry 

of Default Judgment and Permanent Injunction Against Defendants Bentibo and Jinliang Qian

(“Fifth Goldberg Decl.”) ¶¶ 2-3. In response to the Court’s request, Plaintiff also filed a 

supplemental declaration with copies of invoices and other documentation reflecting the costs it 

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seeks. See Docket No. 49 (Supplemental Declaration of Ilene H. Goldberg Pursuant to Order to 

Supply Documentation in Support of Requested Costs in Support of Plaintiff Ingrid & Isabel, 

LLC’s Motion For Entry of Default Judgment and Permanent Injunction Against Defendants

Bentibo and Jinliang Qian). 

III. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard

When entry of default judgment is sought against a party who has failed to plead or 

otherwise defend, a district court has the affirmative duty to determine whether it has jurisdiction, 

In re Tuli, 172 F.3d 707, 712 (9th Cir. 1999), and whether there was “adequa[te] service of 

process on the party against whom default judgment is requested.” Disney Enters., Inc. v. Vuong 

Tran, No. 12-5030 SC, 2013 WL 1832563, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 1, 2013) (citation omitted). If 

those requirements are satisfied, the Court proceeds to consider the following non-exclusive

factors in determining whether to grant default judgment: 

(1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of 

plaintiff’s substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, 

(4) the sum of money at stake in the action, (5) the possibility of a 

dispute concerning material facts, (6) whether the default was due to 

excusable neglect, and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits. 

Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471 (9th Cir. 1986). The decision by the district court whether 

to enter default judgment is discretionary. Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). 

“[U]pon default the factual allegations of the complaint, except those relating to the amount of 

damages, will be taken as true.” Geddes v. United Financial Group, 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir.

1977).

B. Jurisdiction and Service

1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Because Plaintiff brings this action under federal statutes governing patent and trademark

infringement, this Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which provides 

that “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the 

Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” It also has subject matter jurisdiction under 

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28 U.S.C. § 1338(a), which provides, in relevant part, that “[t]he district courts shall have original 

jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents . . . and 

trademarks.” 

2. Personal Jurisdiction

The undersigned further concludes that the Court has personal jurisdiction over 

Defendants. Because California’s long-arm statute allows for the exercise of personal jurisdiction 

to the full extent permissible under the U.S. Constitution, the analysis for personal jurisdiction is 

the same under both state and federal law in California. Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor 

Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800-01 (9th Cir. 2004); Cal. Code Civ. Pro. § 410.10. Under federal law, a

court may exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only when the defendant has 

“‘minimum contacts’ with the forum state such that jurisdiction ‘does not offend traditional 

notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 801 (quoting 

International Shoe v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).

One way the International Shoe test may be satisfied is by establishing the existence of 

specific jurisdiction, which is governed by the following three-part test: 

(1) The non-resident defendant must purposefully direct his activities 

or consummate some transaction with the forum or resident thereof; 

or perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the 

privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the 

benefits and protections of its laws;

(2) the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the 

defendant's forum related activities; and

(3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and 

substantial justice, i.e. it must be reasonable.

Picot v. Weston, 780 F.3d 1206, 1211 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802).

With respect to the first requirement, “[p]urposeful availment is most often used in contract suits, 

and purposeful direction is most often used in tort suits.” Archie v. Pop Warner Little Scholars, 

Inc., No. CV16-6603 PSG PLAX, 2017 WL 3084160, at *6 (C.D. Cal. May 12, 2017) (citing 

Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802). 

In cases involving infringement of intellectual property rights, courts typically look to 

whether the purposeful direction requirement is satisfied because a claim of infringement is a 

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“tort-like cause of action.” See Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs., Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1228 (9th 

Cir. 2011). Purposeful direction has its own three-part test, which is “traceable to the Supreme 

Court’s decision in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984).” Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 803. The 

Calder test requires that the defendant have “‘(1) committed an intentional act, (2) expressly 

aimed at the forum state, (3) causing harm that the defendant knows is likely to be suffered in the 

forum state.’” Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 805 (9th Cir. 2004)

(quoting Dole Food Co. v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2002)). “[S]omething more” than 

just foreseeability of harm is required, however, to establish personal jurisdiction under Calder.

Amini Innovation Corp. v. JS Imports, Inc., 497 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1105 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (quoting

Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir. 2006)). 

Calder’s “something more” requirement is satisfied “‘where the defendant is alleged to 

have engaged in wrongful conduct targeted at a plaintiff whom the defendant knows to be a 

resident of the forum state.’” Id. (quoting Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et 

L’Antisemitisme, 379 F.3d 1120, 1124–25 (9th Cir. 2004)) (citation omitted)). Thus, “the Ninth 

Circuit has held that specific jurisdiction exists where a plaintiff files suit in its home state against 

an out-of-state defendant and alleges that defendant intentionally infringed its intellectual property 

rights knowing it was located in the forum state.” Id. (citing Columbia Pictures Television v. 

Krypton Broadcasting of Birmingham, Inc., 106 F.3d 284 (9th Cir. 1997), rev’d on other grounds 

sub nom. Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340 (1998) (“Columbia alleged, 

and the district court found, that Feltner willfully infringed copyrights owned by Columbia, which, 

as Feltner knew, had its principal place of business in the Central District. This fact alone is 

sufficient to satisfy the “purposeful availment” requirement [under Calder v. Jones]”). 

Here, Plaintiff alleges in the Complaint that Defendants sold products that infringe 

Plaintiff’s Patents-in-Suit even though they are aware that their products infringed the Patents-inSuit. Complaint ¶ 16. In doings so, Plaintiff alleges, Defendants “knowingly and purposefully 

directed their infringing acts to this District, knowing that Plaintiff is a resident of this District and 

would suffer injuries in this District.” Complaint ¶ 3. The Court deems these allegations to be 

true based on Defendants’ default. In addition, Plaintiff has offered evidence, discussed above, 

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that Defendants have been aware since at least December 2017 that they are selling products that 

infringe Plaintiff’s Patents-in-Suit and that Ingrid & Isabel is based in San Francisco, California, 

as is reflected on three of the four patent’s that Plaintiff’s counsel sent to the attorney who 

represented Defendants at that time. Thus, the evidence in the record supports the allegations in 

the Complaint, showing that Defendants have been infringing Plaintiff’s patents and engaging in 

deceptive advertising of their products with the knowledge that their conduct is causing harm to 

Plaintiff in California. 

3. Service of Process

Finally, the Court concludes that service on Defendants was proper. As discussed above, 

the undersigned authorized alternative means of service under Rule 4(f)(3), ordering that the 

complaint and summons be sent by U.S. mail and by email to: 1) the law firm that purported to 

represent Defendants at its office in Washington state; 2) the two individuals listed for 

correspondence on the Bentibo Trademark owned by Defendant Jinliang Qian, both of whom were 

served in Canada.

Rule 4(f) permits “an individual--other than a minor, an incompetent person, or a person 

whose waiver has been filed—[to] be served at a place not within any judicial district of the 

United States: (1) by any internationally agreed means of service that is reasonably calculated to 

give notice, such as those authorized by the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial 

and Extrajudicial Documents; . . . [or] (3) by other means not prohibited by international 

agreement, as the court orders.” “[Rule] 4(f)(3) stands independently of [Rule] 4(f)(1); it is not 

necessary for plaintiffs to first attempt service through ‘internationally agreed means’ before 

turning to ‘any other means not prohibited by international agreement.’” In re LDK Solar Sec. 

Litig., No. C 07-05182 WHA, 2008 WL 2415186, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 12, 2008) (citing Rio 

Properties, Inc. v. Rio Intern. Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1014 (9th Cir. 2002)). Nonetheless, the 

alternate means of service ordered under Rule 4(f)(3) must comport with constitutional notions of 

due process. Rio Properties, 284 F.3d at 1016. “To meet this requirement, the method of service 

crafted by the district court must be ‘reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise 

interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their 

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objections.’” Id. at 1016-1017 (quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 

306, 314 (1950) (Jackson, J.)).

Here, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to serve by alternative means after Defendants 

had failed to respond to Plaintiff’s request (mailed to Defendants in China) that service be waived 

and its attempt to serve Defendants under the Hague Convention had been unsuccessful; it 

appeared that successful service under the Hague Convention would take at least two additional 

years, if not more. In this context, the undersigned concluded that service by mail and email on

the law firm that had recently represented Defendants in connection with Plaintiff’s allegations of 

infringement and the two individuals listed for correspondence on the Bentibo Trademark owned 

by Jinliang Qian, was a reasonable means of effecting service that comported with due process. 

The Court also took into account the fact that the alternative means that it approved did not

involve service by “postal channels” on any individuals in China. As the court in LDK observed, 

China is a signatory of the Hague Convention but opted out of Article 10, which allows for service 

“by postal channels” or through judicial officers, officials, or other persons in the state of 

destination. 2008 WL 2415186, at *2. Thus, alternative service by such means would likely be 

prohibited by international agreement and therefore, impermissible under Rule 4(f)(3). 

For these reasons, the undersigned concludes that service of process on Defendants was 

proper.

C. The Eitel Factors

The majority of the Eitel factors weigh in favor of granting default judgment. First, 

because Defendants have failed to respond to the complaint or otherwise appear, Plaintiff will be 

left without a remedy and therefore prejudiced if default judgment is not granted. See Pepsico, 

Inc. v. Cal. Sec. Cans, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2002). Second, the sum of money at 

stake is modest and reasonable; Plaintiff seeks only an injunction to prevent further infringing 

conduct and the costs it has incurred in this action while waiving its request for attorneys’ fees and 

monetary damages. Third, there is no evidence that Defendants’ default was the result of 

excusable neglect. To the contrary, based on the evidence discussed above, the Court concludes 

that it is more likely than not that Defendants are fully aware that they are infringing the PatentsCase 4:18-cv-01856-HSG Document 50 Filed 05/10/19 Page 11 of 15
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in-Suit, are aware that they have been named as defendants in this action, and have chosen not to 

appear. 

The Court also concludes that default judgment is warranted because Plaintiff’s patent 

infringement and Lanham Act claims are sufficiently alleged in the Complaint and supported by 

the evidence in the record (Eitel factors two and three).1 Section 271(a) of the Patent Act provides 

that “whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within 

the United States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the 

patent therefor, infringes the patent.” Section 271(b) further provides that “[w]hoever actively 

induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer.” Plaintiff’s allegations are 

sufficient to establish that Defendants violated one or both of these provisions, and the evidence of 

infringement offered by Plaintiff further supports the conclusion that Plaintiff’s patent 

infringement claims have substantive merit. 

Plaintiff’s federal unfair competition claim is asserted under Section 43(a) of the Lanham 

Act, which provides:

1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, 

or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, 

name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false 

designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or 

false or misleading representation of fact, which—

(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as 

to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with 

another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his 

or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another 

person, or

(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the 

nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her 

or another person’s goods, services, or commercial activities, 

shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he 

or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.

15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). Plaintiff has alleged that Defendants’ advertising of their Maternity Belly 

Band is likely to cause confusion or mistake, misleading consumers into thinking that the product 

 

1 Because the remedies requested by Plaintiff are available under the Patent Act and the Lanham 

Act, the Court need not address whether Plaintiff’s state law unfair competition claims are 

adequately alleged or have substantive merit.

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is Plaintiff’s BELLABAND product. It has also supplied screen shots of Defendants’ 

advertisement of their products for sale on Amazon.com. See First Goldberg Decl., Ex. A. The 

Court concludes that this claim is adequately alleged and appears to have merit.

The Eitel factors discussed above significantly outweigh the preference for deciding cases 

on the merits (the seventh Eitel factor). Furthermore, while Defendants might have challenged 

Plaintiff’s factual allegations if they had appeared in this action, they have waived those 

challenges by failing to appear. In any event, the evidence in the record does not suggest that 

there is a high probability Defendants would have prevailed with respect to any material factual 

disputes. Therefore, it is recommended that the Court enter default judgment against both 

defendants.

D. Remedy

4. Injunctive Relief

Plaintiff asks the Court to enter an injunction under the Patent Act and the Lanham Act, the 

specific terms of which are set forth in the Motion and the accompanying proposed order. The 

Patent Act provides that “[t]he several courts having jurisdiction of cases under this title may grant 

injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured 

by patent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable.” Similarly, the Lanham Act provides that 

“[s]ubject to the principles of equity, the owner of a famous mark that is distinctive, inherently or 

through acquired distinctiveness, shall be entitled to an injunction against another person who, at 

any time after the owner’s mark has become famous, commences use of a mark or trade name in 

commerce that is likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment of the famous 

mark, regardless of the presence or absence of actual or likely confusion, of competition, or of 

actual economic injury.”

To obtain injunctive relief, Plaintiff must demonstrate: 

(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies 

available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to 

compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of 

hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is 

warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by 

a permanent injunction.

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eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). Further, to obtain injunctive relief, 

whether preliminary or permanent, the plaintiff must demonstrate a “likelihood of irreparable 

harm” in the future. Flexible Lifeline Sys., Inc. v. Precision Lift, Inc., 654 F.3d 989, 998 (9th Cir. 

2011). The Court concludes that Defendants’ sale of copies of Plaintiff’s BELLABAND is likely 

to cause irreparable injury to Plaintiff that cannot be adequately compensated with money 

damages because Defendants’ conduct is likely to harm Plaintiff’s business reputation and 

goodwill. See Rent-A-Ctr., Inc. v. Canyon Television & Appliance Rental, Inc., 944 F.2d 597, 603 

(9th Cir. 1991) (“intangible injuries, such as damage to ongoing recruitment efforts and goodwill, 

qualify as irreparable harm.”). Moreover, Defendants continue to sell their infringing products 

and have refused to participate in this action even though they have been made aware of Plaintiff’s 

Patents-in-Suit, indicating that any efforts to obtain monetary damages would be fruitless and only 

a permanent injunction will afford Plaintiff any relief. The Court also finds that an injunction will 

not disserve the public interest and that the balance of hardships tips in Plaintiff’s favor. 

Therefore, it is recommended that the request for injunctive relief be granted in the same form as 

Plaintiff has requested.2

5. Costs

Plaintiff requests an award of the following costs: 1) $675.91 for service of process; 2) 

$400 for the Court filing fee; and 3) $6,580 for service under the Hague Convention and 

translation. As the prevailing party in this action, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of its costs under 

Rule 54(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Recoverable costs include fees for service of 

process, including reasonable costs of translation and service under the Hague Convention, and the 

Court’s filing fee. Civ. L. R. 54-3(a); Law Office G.A. Lambert & Assocs. v. Davidoff, 72 F. Supp. 

3d 110, 120 (D.D.C. 2014) (finding costs of translation and service of process under the Hague 

Convention to be allowable under Rule 54); Magic Carpet Ski Lifts, Inc. v. S&A Co., Ltd, No. 14-

CV-02133-REB-KLM, 2015 WL 4237950, at *9 (D. Colo. June 8, 2015), report and 

recommendation adopted, No. 14-CV-02133-REB-KLM, 2015 WL 4162586 (D. Colo. July 9, 

 

2 The injunction that Plaintiff requests is set forth in Dkt. No. 46-4 (Plaintiff’s Proposed Order for 

Permanent Injunction Against Defendants Bentibo and Jinliang Qian.).

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2015) (same). Further, Plaintiff has provided documentation reflecting the costs that it seeks.

Therefore, it is recommended that the Court GRANT Plaintiff’s request for costs as to all three 

categories of costs in the amounts requested.

3

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the undersigned recommends that the Court GRANT the 

Motion and enter default judgment against Defendants Bentibo and Jinliang Qian. It is further 

recommended that the Court enter a permanent injunction as set forth in the proposed order 

supplied by Plaintiff, Dkt. No. 46-4, and award costs in the amount of $7,655.91. Plaintiff may file 

an objection to this recommendation within 14 days after being served with a copy of this Report 

and Recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

Dated: May 10, 2019

______________________________________

JOSEPH C. SPERO

Chief Magistrate Judge

 

3 The Court notes that the documentation provided by Plaintiff in support of its request for service 

of process costs includes one document, a receipt from the Unites States Postal Service reflecting 

the postage charged for a package that Plaintiff mailed to Bentibo in China, which is difficult to 

read. The undersigned concludes that the amount on that receipt is $55.85, which is consistent 

with the total for service of process requested by Plaintiff when added to the other invoice 

amounts in the same exhibit. 

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