Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01373/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01373-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

DEBORAH COONEY, 

 Plaintiff, 

Case No. 13-cv-01373-BAS(KSC) 

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION TO RECONSIDER THE 

COURT’S ORDER TO DISMISS 

DEFENDANTS WITHOUT 

LEAVE TO AMEND 

(ECF No. 59) 

 v. 

THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, ET 

AL., 

 Defendants. 

On July 18, 2014, the Court issued an order granting Defendants’ motions to 

dismiss (ECF Nos. 35, 36, 38) without leave to amend. (ECF No. 52.) On September 

2, 2014, plaintiff Deborah Cooney (“Plaintiff”) filed a motion for reconsideration 

under Rules 54(b), 59(e), and/or 60(b)(1)-(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

solely as to the Court’s determination that Plaintiff should not be granted leave to file 

a Second Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 59.) Defendants City of San Diego, John 

Kerr, Bonny Hsu, Keith Phillips, County of San Diego, Ivan Baroya, and George W. 

Brewster, Jr. (collectively “Defendants”) filed an opposition. (ECF No. 60.) For the 

following reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion. 

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I. LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for extraordinary 

relief and may be invoked only upon a showing of exceptional circumstances. 

Engleson v. Burlington N.R. Co., 972 F.2d 1038, 1044 (9th Cir.1994) (citing Ben 

Sager Chem. Int’l v. E. Targosz & Co., 560 F.2d 805, 809 (7th Cir. 1977)). Under 

Rule 60(b), the court may grant reconsideration of a final judgment or an order based 

on: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered 

evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered before the court’s 

decision; (3) fraud by the adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment 

has been satisfied; or (6) any other reason justifying relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). The 

last prong is “used sparingly as an equitable remedy to prevent manifest injustice and 

is to be utilized only where extraordinary circumstances prevented a party from taking 

timely action to prevent or correct an erroneous judgment.” Delay v. Gordon, 475 

F.3d 1039, 1044 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 

984 F.2d 1047, 1049 (9th Cir. 1993) (internal quotations marks omitted)). It “applies 

only when the reason for granting relief is not covered by any of the other reasons.” 

Id. “A party seeking to re-open a case under Rule 60(b)(6) must demonstrate both 

injury and circumstances beyond his [or her] control that prevented him [or her] from 

proceeding with the prosecution or defense of the action in a proper fashion.” Id.

 District courts also have the authority to entertain motions for reconsideration 

of interlocutory orders at any time before the entry of final judgment. See Amarel v. 

Connell, 102 F.3d 1494, 1515 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[I]nterlocutory orders and rulings 

made pre-trial by a district judge are subject to modification by the district judge at 

any time prior to final judgment.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Balla v. Idaho State Bd. of 

Corr., 869 F.2d 461, 465 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Courts have inherent power to modify their 

interlocutory orders before entering a final judgment. . . . In addition, [Rule 54(b) of] 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly grants courts the authority to modify 

their interlocutory orders.”). To determine the merits of a request to reconsider an 

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interlocutory order, the court applies the standard required under a Rule 59(e) 

reconsideration motion. See Hydranautics v. FilmTec Corp., 306 F. Supp. 2d 958, 

968 (S.D. Cal. 2003) (Whelan, J.). 

Rule 59(e) permits a party to file a motion to alter or amend a judgment “no 

later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). “Although 

Rule 59(e) permits a district court to reconsider and amend a previous order, the rule 

offers an extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of finality and 

conservation of judicial resources.” Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 

877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

“Reconsideration is appropriate if the district court (1) is presented with newly 

discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error or the initial decision was manifestly 

unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening change in controlling law.” Sch. Dist. No. 1J, 

Multnomah Cnty. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993); see also Allstate 

Ins. Co. v. Herron, 634 F.3d 1101, 1111 (9th Cir. 2011); Kona Enters., Inc., 229 F.3d 

at 890. However, a Rule 59(e) motion for reconsideration may not be used to raise 

arguments or present evidence for the first time when they could reasonably have been 

raised earlier in the litigation. Kona Enters., Inc., 229 F.3d at 890. It does not give 

parties a “second bite at the apple.” See Weeks v. Bayer, 246 F.3d 1231, 1236-37 (9th 

Cir. 2001). “[A]fter thoughts” or “shifting of ground” do not constitute an appropriate 

basis for reconsideration. Ausmus v. Lexington Ins. Co., No. 08-CV-2342-L, 2009 

WL 2058549, at *2 (S.D. Cal. July 15, 2009) (Lorenz, J.). 

II. DISCUSSION 

 Plaintiff requests reconsideration of the Court’s Order granting the motions to 

dismiss filed by Defendants and MD Dominick Addario, without leave to amend. (See

ECF No. 52.) With respect to her motion, Plaintiff only seeks reconsideration of the 

Court’s decision not to grant Plaintiff leave to amend her First Amended Complaint. 

(ECF No. 59 at 2, lines 4-5; ECF No. 61 at 3, ¶ 6.) Plaintiff claims that “[a]lthough 

the Court may not have imagined it, it is possible to amend the Complaint so as to 

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state a valid claim.” (Id. at 4, lines 14-15.) Plaintiff seeks to amend her First Amended 

Complaint to pursue relief from the assessment of Defendants’ costs against her in the 

state court action on the basis that “[s]uch an assessment is unconstitutional.” (Id. at 

4, lines 18-21.) Plaintiff has not previously presented this claim before any court, 

including this Court. (See id. at 6, lines 1-4.) To explain her failure to previously 

raise the claim, Plaintiff asserts she was deprived of the assistance of counsel in the 

state court action and, in representing herself, she “may have made mistakes or 

excusable errors.” (Id. at 6.) 

 As final judgment has already been entered in this case, the Court will analyze 

Plaintiff’s motion under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 60(b). In applying 

Rule 59(e), the Court finds Plaintiff has presented no newly discovered evidence or 

intervening change in controlling law, and further does not argue the Court committed 

clear error or was manifestly unjust in ruling on the motions to dismiss. Plaintiff 

simply seeks to bring an entirely new claim, of which she was aware prior to bringing 

suit, and chose not to raise in either her initial complaint or amended complaint. A 

Rule 59(e) motion for reconsideration may not be used to raise arguments or present 

evidence for the first time when they could reasonably have been raised earlier in the 

litigation. See Kona Enters., Inc., 229 F.3d at 890. “After thoughts” do not constitute 

an appropriate basis for reconsideration. See Ausmus, 2009 WL 2058549, at *2. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion under Rule 59(e) must be denied. 

In applying Rule 60(b), the Court finds Plaintiff has made no showing of any 

of the relevant factors, with the possible exception of “excusable neglect” on the basis 

that Plaintiff is proceeding pro se. While a late filing by a pro se plaintiff may in the 

rare circumstance be excused by negligence, see Briones v. Riviera Hotel & Casino, 

116 F. 3d 379, 382 (1997), the Court finds Plaintiff’s failure to allege a claim, of which 

she was aware, on two separate occasions, is not excusable neglect. Under Rule 

60(b)(6), the Court may grant relief for “any other reason justifying relief;” however, 

this option is to be “used sparingly as an equitable remedy to prevent manifest injustice 

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and is to be utilized only where extraordinary circumstances prevented a party from 

taking timely action to prevent or correct an erroneous judgment.” Delay, 475 F.3d at 

1044. The Court finds Plaintiff has not demonstrated manifest injustice will arise if 

she is not permitted leave to file a Second Amended Complaint seeking relief from 

the assessment of Defendants’ costs in her state court action, or that extraordinary 

circumstances prevented her from taking timely action to protect her interests. 

Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion under Rule 60(b) must also be denied. 

III. CONCLUSION & ORDER

Because Plaintiff fails to demonstrate entitlement to reconsideration, the Court 

DENIES her motion in its entirety. (ECF No. 59.) 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: June 29, 2015 

 

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