Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_06-cv-00103/USCOURTS-cand-5_06-cv-00103-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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Order Denying Ms. For Appt. Of Counsel, Default Judgment, TRO

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NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FREDERICK WAYNE SMITH, 

Plaintiff,

 vs.

JOANNE WOODWARD, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. C 06-0103 JF (PR)

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR

APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL;

DENYING MOTION FOR

DEFAULT JUDGMENT; DENYING

MOTIONS FOR TEMPORARY

RESTRAINING ORDER AND

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

(Docket Nos. 29, 30, 32 & 42)

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights complaint

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Pelican Bay State Prison officials. Plaintiff

has filed a motion for appointment of counsel (docket no. 29), motion for default

judgment (docket no. 30), and a motion for a temporary restraining order and

preliminary injunction (docket no. 32) with a supplement thereto (docket no. 42). 

The Court will deny these motions for the reasons set forth below.

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Order Denying Ms. For Appt. Of Counsel, Default Judgment, TRO

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DISCUSSION 

A. Motion for Appointment of Counsel

Plaintiff has filed a motion for appointment of counsel (docket no. 29) in

which he maintains that appointment of counsel is necessary because he cannot

afford to hire counsel, the issues involved are complex, he requires assistance in

factual investigation and dealing with expert witnesses, and he has limited access

to the law library and legal material. (Pl.’s Mot at 1-2.) 

There is no constitutional right to counsel in a civil case. Lassiter v. Dep’t

of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981). 28 U.S.C. § 1915 confers on a district

court only the power to “request” that counsel represent a litigant who is

proceeding in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). The Court may ask

counsel to represent an indigent litigant under § 1915 only in “exceptional

circumstances,” the determination of which requires an evaluation of both (1) the

likelihood of success on the merits and (2) the ability of the Plaintiff to articulate

his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved. See Rand

v. Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th Cir. 1997); Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d

1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991); Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir.

1986). Both of these factors must be viewed together before reaching a decision

on a request for counsel under § 1915. See id. Neither the need for discovery, nor

the fact that the pro se litigant would be better served with the assistance of

counsel, necessarily qualify the issues involved as complex. See Rand, 113 F.3d at

1525 (where Plaintiff’s pursuit of discovery was comprehensive and focused and

his papers were generally articulate and organized, district court did not abuse

discretion in denying request for counsel). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for

appointment of counsel (docket no. 29) is DENIED for lack of exceptional

circumstances. See id.; Terrell, 935 F.2d at 1017; Wilborn, 789 F.2d at 1331.

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Order Denying Ms. For Appt. Of Counsel, Default Judgment, TRO

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B. Motion for Default Judgment

Plaintiff filed a motion for default judgment. (Docket No. 30.) Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b) contemplates that a default judgment may be sought

after default has been entered against a defendant. See also New York Life Ins.

Co. v. Brown, 84 F.3d 137 (5th Cir. 1996) (“After defendant’s default has been

entered, plaintiff may apply for a judgment based on such default. This is a default

judgment.”); Lee v. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees, 139 F.R.D.

376, 380 (D. Minn. 1991). Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment was premature

because default had not been entered against Defendants. Furthermore,

Defendants were not in default at the time Plaintiff’s motion was filed as they

appeared in the action shortly after summons were returned executed. (See Docket

No. 28.) The motion for default judgment is therefore DENIED. (Docket No. 30.)

C. Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”)

Plaintiff filed a motion for a TRO/preliminary injunction pursuant to Fed.

R. Civ. P. 65(b) (docket no. 32), and a supplement thereto (docket no. 42). 

Plaintiff requests that the Court order Defendants, Pelican Bay State Prison

officials, “to return Plaintiff’s personal legal and religious materials which they

confiscated; grant [P]laintiff a 3000 calory [sic] diabetic diet (pursuant to Kashrut;

Jewish Dietary Laws/Kosher); continue the peanut butter crackers..., and rule that

Plaintiff return to his single-cell status....” (Pl.’s Mot. at 2) (Docket No. 32). 

Plaintiff also requests that the Court issue a declaratory judgment declaring the

rights and liabilities of the parties. Id. In his supplemental motion for a

TRO/preliminary injunction, Plaintiff requests the Court to order Defendants to

transfer Plaintiff to another prison and stay this action until the transfer. (Pl.’s

Mot. at 2) (Docket No. 42). 

The Ninth Circuit has held that requests for injunctive relief may be based

upon either of two sets of criteria. The “traditional” test requires the movants to:

(1) establish a strong likelihood of success on the merits; (2) show the possibility

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 1 The district court cannot properly balance the hardships without taking into account

the hardship, or lack of hardship, to the non-movants. Armstrong v. Mazurek, 94 F.3d

566, 568 (9th Cir. 1996).

Order Denying Ms. For Appt. Of Counsel, Default Judgment, TRO

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of irreparable injury to the plaintiff if the preliminary relief is not granted; (3)

show a balance of hardships favoring the movants1

; and (4) show that granting the

injunction favors the public interest. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm’n v.

Nat’l Football League, 634 F.2d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1980). 

The “alternative” test requires that the movants demonstrate either a

combination of probable success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable

injury, or that serious questions are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply

in their favor. See Diamontiney v. Borg, 918 F.2d 793, 795 (9th Cir. 1990);

Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie, 856 F.2d 1384, 1388 (9th Cir. 1988);

American Motorcyclist Ass’n v. Watt, 714 F.2d 962, 965 (9th Cir. 1983). These

two formulations represent two points on a sliding scale in which the required

degree of irreparable harm increases as the probability of success decreases. 

Diamontiney, 918 F.2d at 795. At the very least, however, the moving party must

show a fair chance of success on the merits. Armstrong v. Mazurek, 94 F.3d 566,

567 (9th Cir. 1996).

The Court finds that Plaintiff has not shown sufficient facts to establish that

he actually faces irreparable harm due to his complaints of the Defendants’ alleged

confiscation of his property and their failure to provide a specific diet. Nor has

Plaintiff shown his probable success on the merits, particularly in light of

Defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint (docket no. 32) for failure to exhaust

administrative remedies and for failure to state a claim under Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which, if granted, is fatal to Plaintiff’s action. Finally,

Plaintiff’s request for a Court order directing Defendants to transfer Plaintiff to

another prison (docket no. 42) is DENIED because prisoners have no

constitutional right to incarceration in a particular institution. See Olim v.

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Order Denying Ms. For Appt. Of Counsel, Default Judgment, TRO

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Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 244-48 (1983); Meachum, 427 U.S. 224. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for a TRO/preliminary injunction (docket nos. 32

& 42) are DENIED. 

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel (docket no. 29) is DENIED

without prejudice. Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment (docket no. 30) is

DENIED. Plaintiff’s motion for TRO/preliminary injunction (docket no. 32 & 42)

is DENIED. 

This order terminates dockets 29, 30, 32 and 42.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: JEREMY FOGEL 

 United States District Judge

 

6/12/08

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