Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02298/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02298-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:0405id Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARGARET NOYES WEBB,

Plaintiff,

v.

NANCY BERRYHILL, ACTING 

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 

SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,

Defendant.

Case No.: 17cv2298-GPC(MSB)

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION GRANTING 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 

DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION 

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

[Dkt. Nos. 16, 17.]

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Margaret Noyes Webb (“Plaintiff”) filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 405(g) of the Social Security Act (“Act”) seeking judicial review of the final 

administrative decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration 

(“Commissioner”) denying Plaintiff’s application for supplemental security income 

(“SSI”). (ECF No. 1.) On September 10, 2018, Magistrate Judge Robert N. Block issued 

a report and recommendation (“Report”) that the case be remanded to the ALJ for further 

proceedings. (ECF No. 25.) No objections were filed. After careful consideration of the 

pleadings and supporting documents, the Court ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s Report 

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and GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and DENIES Defendant’s crossmotion for summary judgment. 

BACKGROUND

On March 6, 2014, Plaintiff filed an application for SSI under Title XVI of the 

Social Security Act, alleging a disability date of August 1, 2011. (Administrative Record 

[“AR”] 221-226.) Plaintiff alleged disability because of her arthritis, degenerative disc 

disease, scoliosis, high blood pressure and carpal tunnel syndrome. (AR 241.) Plaintiff 

also complained of severe headaches. (AR 241.) Plaintiff’s claims were initially denied 

on June 23, 2014, and were denied again on reconsideration on October 23, 2014. (AR 

109, 120). 

On December 16, 2014, Plaintiff filed a written request for an administrative 

hearing. (AR 146.) On June 20, 2016, Plaintiff appeared with counsel and testified 

before Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Donald P. Cole. (AR 34–80.) On September 

14, 2016, Plaintiff appeared with different counsel at a supplemental hearing before the 

ALJ. (AR 81-108.) On November 23, 2016, the ALJ issued a written decision finding 

that Plaintiff was not disabled as defined under the Act. (AR 10–23.)

In the decision, the ALJ followed the five step sequential evaluation process. See 

20 C.F.R. § 416.920. For steps one through three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not 

engaged in substantial gainful activity, had severe medically determinable impairments 

including degenerative disc disease and carpal tunnel syndrome, and that none of 

Plaintiff’s impairments or combination of impairments met the severity of one of the 

impairments listed in the Commissioner’s Listing of Impairments. (AR 15–18.) The 

ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform 

light work with the following additional limitations:

“[C]laimant can stand and walk for a total of two to four hours in an eighthour day, and requires a five minute break for every hour of sitting. The 

claimant can occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. The 

claimant cannot climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolding. The claimant can 

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occasionally perform gross handling and forceful grasping with her left 

(non-dominant) upper extremity.”

(AR 18.)

For the step four determination, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was unable to perform 

any of her past relevant work as a janitor or industrial cleaner. (AR 21–22.) In his step 

five evaluation, the ALJ posed a hypothetical to the vocational expert (“VE”) at the 

supplemental hearing based on the Plaintiff’s vocational profile and RFC. (AR 104–05.) 

The VE opined that Plaintiff could perform the requirements of occupations that existed 

in significant numbers in the national economy. (AR 105.) Based on this testimony, the 

ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled. (AR 22–23.) On September 15, 2017, the 

ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the Commissioner when the Appeals Council 

denied Plaintiff’s request for review. (AR 1–3.)

On November 13, 2017, Plaintiff commenced the instant action seeking judicial 

review of the Commissioner’s decision. (ECF No. 1.) On February 5, 2018, Defendant 

answered and lodged the administrative record with the Court. (ECF Nos. 10, 11.) On 

April 16, 2018, Plaintiff moved for summary judgment. (ECF No. 16.) On June 20, 

2018, the Commissioner cross-moved for summary judgment and responded in 

opposition to Plaintiff’s motion. (ECF Nos. 20, 21.) On July 3, 2018, Plaintiff filed a 

reply in opposition to the Commissioner’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF 

No. 23.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The district court’s duties in connection with a Report of a magistrate judge are set 

forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). The district judge 

must “make a de novo determination of those portions of the report . . . to which 

objection is made,” and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings 

or recommendations made by the magistrate.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). The district court 

need not review de novo those portions of a Report to which neither party objects. See 

United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121–22 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). When 

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no objections are filed, the Court may assume the correctness of the magistrate judge’s 

findings of fact and decide the motion on the applicable law. Campbell v. United States 

Dist. Ct., 501 F.2d 196, 206 (9th Cir. 1974). 

Because no objections have been filed, the Court assumes the correctness of the 

magistrate judge’s factual findings and adopts them in full. See id.

A court “will disturb the denial of benefits only if the decision contains legal error 

or is not supported by substantial evidence.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 

(9th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as reasonable to support a conclusion.” Id. The “evidence 

must be more than a mere scintilla but not necessarily a preponderance.” Connett v. 

Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 873 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). The court will uphold the 

ALJ’s conclusion when the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 

interpretation. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). Finally, the court 

will not reverse an ALJ’s decision for harmless error, which exists when it is clear from 

the record that “the ALJ’s error was ‘inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability 

determination.’” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation 

omitted).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff alleges that (1) the ALJ erred at step five of the sequential evaluation 

process by improperly applying the Commissioner’s Medical-Vocational Guidelines 

(“grids”), and (2) the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the opinions of Plaintiff’s treating 

physician when determining Plaintiff’s RFC. 

1. The ALJ did not improperly apply the grids at step five.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment could be decided only on the issue of 

the ALJ’s failure to properly evaluate the opinions of Plaintiff’s treating physician.

However, because Plaintiff dedicated much of her Motion for Summary Judgment and all 

of her Reply brief to arguing that the ALJ committed a step five error, the Magistrate 

Judge decided to address that issue. For the same reasons, this Court will do so as well.

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Plaintiff argues that even assuming that the ALJ’s RFC determination is supported 

by substantial evidence, the ALJ erred in using the grid rule for light work. According to 

Plaintiff, because the ALJ found that she could only stand and/or walk two to four hours 

in an eight hour day, the ALJ was obligated to determine that there was a significant 

reduction in Plaintiff’s ability to perform light work, and therefore the ALJ should have 

used the grid rule for sedentary work. It is not enough to just merely consult a VE. The 

grid rule for sedentary work would direct a finding that Plaintiff is disabled. 

The Court concurs with the Magistrate Judge that the ALJ did not err. Social 

Security Ruling (“SSR”) 83-12 directs that “[i]n situations where the rules would direct 

different conclusions, and the individuals exertional limitations are somewhere ‘in the 

middle’ in terms of the regulatory criteria for exertional ranges of work, . . . [vocational 

expert] assistance is advisable.” SSR 83-12(2)(c). The ALJ was therefore correct to use 

a VE in order to assist in making the disability determination. See Moore v. Apfel, 216 

F.3d 864, 870 (9th Cir. 2000) (“SSR 83-12 directs that when a claimant falls between two 

grids, consultation with a VE is appropriate.”). “When a claimant’s exertional limitation 

falls between two grid rules, the ALJ fulfills his obligation to determine the claimant’s 

occupational base by consulting a vocational expert regarding whether a person with 

claimant’s profile could perform substantial gainful work in the economy.” Thomas v. 

Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 960 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).

Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, SSR 83-12 does not require the ALJ to ask the 

VE whether “there is a significant reduction in the light job base as a result of the 

standing/walking limitations set forth in the RFC.” (Dkt. No. 23 at 4.) The same 

argument was rejected in Rice v. Berryhill, Case No. 3:17cv5069-TLF, 2017 WL 

3700799, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 25, 2017), where the court concluded that ALJ did not 

have an affirmative duty to ask the VE whether a claimant’s exertional work level has 

been “significantly reduced” or that the ALJ specifically address that issue in the 

decision. Id. SSR 83-12 only requires the ALJ to consult a VE. Id.; Bailey v. Colvin,

Case No. EDCV 15-1805-KK, 2016 WL 8732075, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2016) (ALJ 

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properly consulted VE to assist in applying the Guidelines). Moreover, Plaintiff’s 

citation to POMS1 25015.006(E)(1)(d) to support her position is unavailing. This section 

concerns RFC for borderline age, and does not concern standing/walking limitations. 

Moreover, POMS is an agency interpretation “that does not impose judicially enforceable 

duties on either this court or the ALJ.” Lockwood v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 616 

F.3d 1068, 1073 (9th Cir. 2010). 

In this case, at the supplemental hearing, the ALJ fulfilled his obligation when he 

posed to the VE a hypothetical that included the plaintiff’s age, education, work 

experience, and RFC. (AR 104–05.) In response, the VE testified that such an individual 

could perform such occupations as parking lot cashier and furniture rental consult, which 

respectively represented 15,000 and 52,000 jobs in the national economy. (AR 105.) It 

was not error for the ALJ to conclude that Plaintiff could perform work that existed in 

significant numbers, and therefore was not disabled. 

2. The ALJ did not properly evaluate the opinions of Plaintiff’s treating physician

In this Circuit, a treating physician’s opinion is entitled to special weight because a 

treating physician “is employed to cure and has greater opportunity to know and observe 

the patient as an individual.” McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1989) 

(citation omitted). “To reject the uncontradicted opinion of a treating or examining 

doctor, an ALJ must state clear and convincing reasons that are supported by substantial 

evidence.” Revels v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 648, 654 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Ryan v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008)). “If a treating or examining 

doctor’s opinion is contradicted by another doctor's opinion, an ALJ may only reject it by 

providing specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence.” Id.

(quoting Ryan, 528 F.3d at 1198). “The ALJ must do more than offer his conclusions.

 

1 Program Operations Manual System. 

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He must set forth his own interpretations and explain why they, rather than the doctors’, 

are correct.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998).

Here, three form assessments of Plaintiff’s RFC were provided by Plaintiff’s 

treating physician, Dr. Potwardowski, dated March 26, 2014, February 24, 2015, and 

May 10, 2016. (AR 641–42, 756–58, 2391–93.) The ALJ summarized them as follows: 

The forms completed by Dr. Potwardowski limited the claimant to no more 

than two hours of standing or walking in an eight-hour day, no more than two 

hours of sitting in an eight hour day, and stated the claimant needed the ability 

to shift positions at will. . . . The doctor was of the opinion that the claimant 

could ‘rarely’ lift less than 10 pounds, had postural limitations, and had 

significant limitations with reaching, handling or fingering with either upper 

extremity. . . . Additionally, Dr. Potwardowski indicated the claimant had 

symptoms which frequently interfere with attention and concentration for 

even simple work tasks,2and if employed, she would likely miss more than 4 

days per month due to her impairments. 

(AR 20.)

Dr. Potwardowski’s opinions that Plaintiff was incapable of even sedentary work 

were controverted by the opinions of the consultative examiner and the two State agency 

physicians, who opined that Plaintiff was capable of a significant range of medium work 

activity. (See AR 115–17, 129–29, 648.) Dr. Potwardowski’s opinions were also 

controverted by the opinion testimony of the medical advisor at the supplemental 

administrative hearing regarding the Plaintiff’s RFC. (See AR 88–89.) The ALJ rejected 

Dr. Potwardowski’s conclusions, giving them “little weight.” (AR 20.) The ALJ was 

therefore required to provide specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial 

 

2

In a footnote, the ALJ noted that the record did not provide any objective support, such as mental 

status findings in connection with psychiatric or other care, to support the asserted concentration limits. 

Accordingly, the ALJ stated, he was not including any such limitations in his RFC determination. (See 

AR 20 n. 1.) The Court concurs with the ALJ’s and the Magistrate Judge’s reasoning and confines its 

analysis of Plaintiff’s second claim of error to the ALJ’s rejection of Dr. Potwardowski’s opinions 

regarding Plaintiff’s physical RFC.

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evidence in the record for rejecting Dr. Potwardowski’s opinions regarding Plaintiff’s 

RFC. 

The ALJ’s rationale for rejecting Dr. Potwardowski’s opinions regarding 

Plaintiff’s RFC was as follows:

Generally, the ‘medical opinion’ as defined in 20 CFR 416.927(a), (see also 

SSR 96-5p), from a treating source as defined in 20 CFR 416.902, is entitled 

to a considerable if not controlling amount of weight as compared to the 

opinions of other sources. However, the opinion of the treating source must 

further be ‘well supported’ by ‘medically acceptable’ clinical and laboratory 

diagnostic techniques and must be ‘not inconsistent’ with the other 

‘substantial evidence’ in the case record. Here, the restrictions are greater 

than what is supported by or consistent with the record as a whole, including 

the objective signs and findings discussed elsewhere in this opinion.

(AR 20.) The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that the ALJ’s vague reasoning is 

not sufficient to constitute a legally sufficient reason for according “little weight” to Dr. 

Potwardowski’s opinions. The ALJ did not specifically identify the evidence of record 

that supposedly undermined Dr. Potwardowski’s opinions as required by law. See 

Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 421 (9th Cir. 1988) (“To say that medical opinions are 

not supported by sufficient objective findings or are contrary to the preponderant 

conclusions mandated by the objective findings does not achieve the level of specificity 

our prior cases have required, even when the objective factors are listed seriatim.”). The 

ALJ failed to provide clear and convincing reasons to reject Plaintiff’s treating physician. 

The case is therefore remanded to the ALJ for additional findings with regards to Dr. 

Potwardowski’s opinions.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Based on the above, the Court ADOPTS the Report in full and GRANTS 

Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and DENIES Defendant’s cross-motion for 

/ / / /

/ / / /

/ / / /

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summary judgment and REMANDS the case to the Commissioner of the Social Security 

Administration. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in accordance with this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: February 6, 2019

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