Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-02213/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-02213-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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JWB

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Frederick W. Covell, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Joseph Arpaio, 

Defendant.

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No. CV 07-2213-PHX-DGC (DKD)

ORDER

Plaintiff Frederick W. Covell brought this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

against Maricopa County Sheriff Joseph Arpaio (Doc. # 10). Before the Court is Defendant’s

Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 32). Plaintiff did not respond to the motion. The

Court will grant Defendant’s motion and terminate the action.

I. Background

Plaintiff’s claims arose during his confinement at the Maricopa County Lower

Buckeye Jail in Phoenix, Arizona (Doc. # 10 at 1). In Count I, Plaintiff alleged that

Defendant was aware of asbestos and lead contaminants in the jail but was deliberately

indifferent in failing to take any action to abate these risks (id. at 3). In Count II, Plaintiff

claimed that Defendant was deliberately indifferent to the overcrowded conditions at the jail,

which led to increased agitation and fighting (id. at 4). In Count III, Plaintiff claimed that

Defendant’s policies denied Plaintiff’s Sixth Amendment right of access to the courts

because he was denied access to the law library and could not obtain the assistance of a

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1 The Court dismissed Maricopa County and the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office as

Defendants (Doc. # 11 at 5). 

2

Notice required under Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962 (9th Cir. 1998).

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paralegal or law clerk (id. at 5). As a result, Plaintiff claimed he could not subpoena

witnesses for his criminal case. The Court ordered Defendant to respond to Counts I, II, and

III, and Defendant filed an Answer (Doc. # 13).1

 The Court issued a Scheduling Order (Doc.

# 14) and discovery commenced.

Defendant has now moved for summary judgment on the grounds that (1) some of

Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations, (2) Plaintiff’s constitutional rights

were not violated, and (3) Plaintiff’s claims must be dismissed because he has not suffered

the requisite physical injury (Doc. # 32). In support of his motion, Defendant submitted his

Statement of Facts (Doc. # 32, Def’s Statement of Facts (DSOF)), Plaintiff’s booking ticket

(id., Ex. 1), Plaintiff’s inmate housing information (id., Ex. 2), an inmate grievance response

(id., Ex. 3), an asbestos report dated October 29, 2004 (id., Ex. 4), an asbestos report dated

October 1, 2007 (id., Ex. 5), Plaintiff medical records (id., Ex. 6), Maricopa County Sheriff’s

Office Policy DP-6, Inmate Legal Services (id., Ex. 7), Guidelines for the Pro Per Inmate

(id., Ex. 8); and copies of Plaintiff’s grievances (id., Exs. 9-11). 

The Court issued an order informing Plaintiff of his obligation to respond to the

motion (Doc. # 21).2

 Plaintiff sought three extensions of time to respond. Each extension

was granted (Doc. ## 34, 36, 38, 40, 43, 45). Plaintiff still failed to respond. The Court will,

however, consider Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint as an affidavit in opposition to

Defendant’s motion. Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 460 (9th Cir. 1995) (verified

complaint may be used as an affidavit opposing summary judgment if it is based on personal

knowledge and sets forth specific facts admissible in evidence). 

II. Legal Standards

A. Summary Judgment

A court must grant summary judgment if the pleadings and supporting documents,

viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, “show that there is no genuine

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issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). Under

summary judgment practice, the moving party bears the initial responsibility of presenting

the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record, together with affidavits,

that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477

U.S. at 323; Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc). 

If the moving party meets its burden with a properly supported motion, the burden

then shifts to the opposing party to present specific facts that show there is a genuine issue

for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Auvil v. CBS “60 Minutes”, 67 F.3d 816, 819 (9th Cir. 1995);

see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The opposing party need not

establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor; it is sufficient that “the claimed

factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions

of the truth at trial.” First Nat’l Bank of Arizona v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89

(1968). But conclusory allegations, unsupported by factual material, are insufficient to defeat

a motion for summary judgment. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989).

Instead, the opposing party must, by affidavit or as otherwise provided by Rule 56, designate

specific facts that show there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249;

Devereaux, 263 F.3d at 1076.

At summary judgment, the judge’s function is not to weigh the evidence and

determine the truth but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Summers v.

A. Teichert & Son, Inc., 127 F.3d 1150, 1152 (9th Cir. 1997). In assessing whether a party

has met its burden, the court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. And all reasonable inferences that may be drawn

from the facts must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus.

Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). 

B. Conditions of Confinement

The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause provides that “detainees have a

right against jail conditions or restrictions that ‘amount to punishment.’” Pierce v. County

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of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190, 1205 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-37

(1979)). The Fourteenth Amendment standard is more protective than the Eighth

Amendment; “[t]his standard differs significantly from the standard relevant to convicted

prisoners, who may be subject to punishment so long as it does not violate the Eighth

Amendment’s bar against cruel and unusual punishment.” Pierce, 526 F.3d at 1205; Jones

v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 931 (9th Cir. 2004). The Ninth Circuit has held that pretrial

detainees’ rights under the Fourteenth Amendment are nonetheless comparable to prisoner’s

rights under the Eighth Amendment; therefore, the same standards are applied. Byrd v.

Maricopa County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 565 F.3d 1205, 1216 (9th Cir. 2009).

Under the Eighth Amendment, courts must consider two components: (1) whether the

deprivation was sufficiently serious to constitute “cruel and unusual punishment”; and (2)

whether the defendants acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Id. (citing Wilson

v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). With respect to the latter component, if the pain

inflicted is not part of the punishment prescribed by the prisoner’s sentence, there must be

some “mental element” attributed to the defendant to constitute punishment. Byrd, 565 F.3d

at 1217. 

This “mental element,” or intent requirement, applies in the pretrial detainee context;

“whether a particular action or condition of confinement amounts to punishment turns on

whether the action taken, or condition imposed, was accompanied by punitive intent.” Id.

(citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 538-39). Thus, the test for identifying unconstitutional punishment

of pretrial detainees is whether there was an express intent to punish or whether there was

an alternative purpose for the restriction and whether the restriction appears excessive in

relation to this alternative purpose. Demery v. Arpaio, 378 F.3d 1020, 1028 (9th Cir. 2004).

Not every disability imposed during pretrial detention constitutes “punishment” in the

constitutional sense. Bell, 441 U.S. at 537. To constitute punishment, the harm caused by

the action or condition “must either significantly exceed, or be independent of, the inherent

discomforts of confinement.” Id. at 1030. A court should look at the nature of the condition

and whether it is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective. Pierce, 526 F.3d

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at 1205. If the condition or restriction is arbitrary or purposeless, a court may infer that the

purpose of the action is punishment that may not be inflicted on pretrial detainees. Id. (citing

Bell, 441 U.S. at 539). 

C. Access to the Courts

Under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, state prisoners have

a right of access to the courts. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996); Phillips v. Hust,

477 F.3d 1070, 1075 (9th Cir. 2007), vacated on other grounds, 129 S. Ct. 1036 (2009). The

right is limited to direct criminal appeals, habeas petitions, and civil rights actions. Lewis,

518 U.S. at 354. “[A]ccess to the courts means the opportunity to prepare, serve and file

whatever pleadings or other documents are necessary or appropriate in order to commence

or prosecute court proceedings affecting one’s personal liberty.” Id. at 384. 

To ultimately prevail on his claim, a plaintiff “must show: 1) the loss of a

‘nonfrivolous’ or ‘arguable’ underlying claim; 2) the official acts frustrating the litigation;

and 3) a remedy that may be awarded as recompense but that is not otherwise available in a

future suit.” Phillips, 477 F.3d at 1076.

III. Analysis

A. Asbestos and Overcrowding

1. Asbestos

In Count I, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant was deliberately indifferent to a serious

risk to Plaintiff’s health by ignoring lead and asbestos contaminants in the jails. In support

of his argument that he was not deliberately indifferent, Defendant submits an October 29,

2004 report from the Maricopa County Facilities and Equipment Management Department

reflecting that no asbestos-containing materials were identified in their tests (Doc. # 32, Ex.

4). Further, Defendant submits an October 1, 2007 report from Synergy Environmental

Management, Inc. indicating that no asbestos-containing materials were found (id., Ex. 5).

Consequently, Defendant contends that Plaintiff cannot and has not shown a policy of

unconstitutional conditions of confinement nor the culpable intent to establish a

constitutional violation because no hazardous materials were found in the jail. 

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2. Overcrowding

In Count II, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant was deliberately indifferent to

overcrowded conditions in the Maricopa County Jails, which led to tension and fighting.

Defendant argues that the record contains no evidence that he enacted a policy or custom that

resulted in a violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights and summary judgment is

appropriate. 

3. Analysis

On this record, Defendant has met his initial burden to present the basis of his motion

and identify portions of the record that show an absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

The burden now shifts to Plaintiff to present specific facts to show that a genuine issue exists.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). In failing to respond to Defendant’s summary judgment motion,

Plaintiff has not adduced any evidence to suggest that Defendant personally took any action

to place him at risk of asbestos, lead, or overcrowding, or instituted any policy that placed

him at risk. Nor do the allegations in Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint change this

conclusion. Plaintiff does not submit any specific allegations or evidence to support his

claim that Defendant knew that Plaintiff was at risk from asbestos, lead, or overcrowding.

The allegations in Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint are nothing more than conclusory

assertions insufficient to defeat summary judgment. Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th

Cir. 1988). “The prisoner must set forth specific facts as to each individual defendant’s

deliberate indifference.” Id. at 634. He must prove that the specific prison official was

deliberately indifferent and that this indifference was the actual and proximate cause of the

injury. Id. 

Here, there is no evidence to suggest Defendant was deliberately indifferent to

Plaintiff’s health or safety. In short, the evidence does not reflect a genuine issue of fact that

Defendant participated in a constitutional violation, that he directed it, or that he showed a

“callous indifference” to Plaintiff’s health or safety. Defendant’s motion for summary

judgment will be granted as to Counts I and II. 

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B. Access to the Courts

In Count III, Plaintiff claimed that Defendant promulgated policies that denied

Plaintiff his right of access to the courts (Doc. # 10 at 5). Specifically, Plaintiff claimed that

he was denied access to the law library and was not provided with a paralegal (id.). Plaintiff

also alleged that Defendant intentionally “delayed his motions to the court for three weeks”

and refused to supply him with writ-of-mandamus and civil-rights forms until after he filed

a grievance (id.). As a result, Plaintiff claimed he could not recover a pending habeas action

or subpoena witnesses on his behalf (id.)

Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on this claim. The first element of a

denial-of-access-to-the-courts claim, whether there is a nonfrivolous underlying claim,

requires Plaintiff to demonstrate that he had standing to assert his denial of access-to-courts

claim. Id. To do this, Plaintiff must show that he suffered “actual injury[.]” Lewis, 518 U.S.

at 351; Phillips, 477 F.3d at 1076 (finding actual injury when a prisoner was refused access

to a comb-binding machine, which hindered his ability to file a timely petition for certiorari

and ultimately resulted in the petition being rejected as untimely). Actual injury is “actual

prejudice with respect to contemplated or existing litigation, such as the inability to meet a

filing deadline or to present a claim.” Lewis, 518 U.S. at 348 (citations omitted). In his

Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff does not articulate the actual injury he suffered as a

result of Defendant’s policies. Indeed, the pleading itself acknowledges that Plaintiff was

able to procure necessary forms (Doc. # 10 at 5 (“[Inmate Legal Services] did refuse to

supply me with habeas corpus, writ of mandamus, and [civil rights] forms until after I

grieved.”). Plaintiff does not allege that any delay in procuring forms resulted in the loss of

a contemplated action. Additionally, Plaintiff’s conclusory statements that he was denied

access to the law library and paralegal services are insufficient to defeat summary judgment.

Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that conclusory allegations,

unsupported by factual material, are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.)

As for Plaintiff’s statement in his Second Amended Complaint that he could “not

recover a pending habeas [action,]” the Court notes that the right of meaningful access to the

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28 3 Because the Court is granting summary judgment to Defendant, it need not reach

Defendant’s remaining arguments. 

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courts requires only that an inmate not be impeded from commencing an action. Lewis v.

Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 354 (1996); Cornett v. Conovan, 51 F.3d 894, 898 (9th Cir. 1995).

Cornett makes clear that “the constitutional right of access requires a state to provide a law

library or legal assistance only during the pleading stage of a habeas or civil rights action.”

Id. “Once the claim reaches a court . . . [t]he court can determine whether the claim warrants

appointment of counsel to represent the plaintiff.” Id. at 899. This is consistent with the

Supreme Court’s decision in Bounds v. Smith, which articulated that the “main concern”

regarding the right of access to the courts was “‘protecting the ability of an inmate to prepare

a petition or complaint.’” 430 U.S. 817, 828 n.17 (1977) (emphasis added). Consequently,

in this case, Plaintiff’s own statement makes clear he was able to file a habeas action in

district court. And Plaintiff in no way provides any factual support for his conclusion that

he could not “recover” his habeas action. Finally, with respect to Plaintiff’s claim he could

not subpoena witnesses for his criminal case, Plaintiff does not articulate who he attempted

to subpoena, how he was prevented from doing so, and how their testimony would have

impacted his criminal proceeding. 

In short, Plaintiff fails to provide any specific allegations or any evidence to suggest

that Defendant promulgated policies or procedures that gave rise to a constitutional injury.

Moreover, Christopher v. Harbury makes clear that the plaintiff must describe the “predicate

claim . . . well enough to apply the ‘nonfrivolous’ test and to show that the ‘arguable’ nature

of the underlying claim is more than hope.” 536 U.S. 403, 416 (2002). Plaintiff’s Second

Amended Complaint does not articulate the substance of the lost claims so that the Court

could evaluate their merit. For all these reasons, therefore, Defendant is entitled to summary

judgment on Count III.3

IT IS ORDERED:

(1) The reference to the Magistrate Judge is withdrawn as to Defendants’ Motion

for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 32).

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(2) Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 32) is granted. 

(3) Plaintiff’s action is dismissed with prejudice, and the Clerk of Court must enter

judgment accordingly.

DATED this 1st day of September, 2009.

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