Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca11-15-10500/USCOURTS-ca11-15-10500-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 362
Nature of Suit: Medical Malpractice
Cause of Action: 

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 15-10500

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 8:14-cv-01340-JSM-TGW

ESTATE OF ELAINE PURCELL, 

through Parker Waggaman as Personal Representative, 

PARKER WAGGAMAN, individually, 

 Plaintiffs-Appellants,

 versus

ARTURO ARAUZO, 

individually,

ARTURO ARAUZO, 

d.b.a. Arturo Arauzo, M.D., 

USA DRUG MART, INC., 

PARK PLAZA PHARMACY, 

USA DRUG MART, 

d.b.a. Park Plaza Pharmacy, et al., 

 Defendants-Appellees.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

________________________

(December 10, 2015)

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Before HULL, ROSENBAUM and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Parker Waggaman, a licensed attorney proceeding pro se as personal 

representative of the estate of his mother, Elaine Purcell, appeals the district 

court’s order dismissing with prejudice his third amended complaint. The 

complaint attempted to allege seventeen varied causes of action against Arturo 

Arauzo, M.D., USA Drug Mart, Inc., USA Drug Mart, Inc., d/b/a Park Plaza 

Pharmacy, the pharmacist in charge David Vernon, and John Does 1–9, arising out 

of their prescribing, dispensing, and shipping prescription medication to Purcell 

from 2002 to 2011. 

Waggaman argues the district court erred in dismissing his complaint with 

prejudice because: (1) due to the defendants’ mischaracterization, the district court 

mistook this case as one for negligence or medical malpractice and imposed a 

higher pleading burden on Waggaman; (2) a motion to dismiss should not be used 

to deny the discovery of evidence the defendants are already statutorily required to 

disclose;1 (3) holding oneself out as a physician or pharmacist constitutes a 

statement for purposes of the deceit claims; (4) the district court should not have

considered Dr. Arauzo’s motion to dismiss because it was not properly served; and 

 1 We do not address this discovery argument as it is irrelevant to whether the district court 

erred in dismissing Waggaman’s complaint for failure to state a claim. 

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(5) Waggaman adequately pled claims for negligence per se, overprescribing, and 

intentional infliction of emotional distress.

2

 After review,3 we affirm.

The district court did not improperly view this as a negligence or medical 

malpractice case. At a hearing on November 10, 2014, the district court heard and 

acknowledged Waggaman’s persistent statements that the action was not founded 

on negligence or wrongful death. Nothing in the district court’s order suggests that 

the district court applied the wrong standard or misperceived Waggaman’s claims. 

The district court did not err in dismissing Waggaman’s deceit counts. Even 

if Waggaman is correct that holding oneself out as a physician or pharmacist 

constitutes a statement under Florida law, the deceit counts still fail to state a 

claim. The complaint fails to specifically allege how the statements were false, 

that Purcell did not know the statements were false, the time and place of such 

statements, what the defendants obtained as a consequence of their deceit, how 

Purcell was harmed, and how the fraud proximately caused the harm. See Ziemba 

 2 We do not address Waggaman’s argument that his claims for overprescribing and 

intentional infliction of emotional distress were properly pled because Waggaman fails to 

provide any citation to authority or arguments in support, thereby waiving these issues. See U.S. 

Steel Corp. v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 1272, 1287 n.13 (11th Cir. 2007). We also do not address 

Waggaman’s argument that the complaint states a claim as to the remaining counts because 

Waggaman raised these issues for the first time in his reply brief. See Timson v. Sampson, 518 

F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008).

3 We review de novo a district court’s dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure, “accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and construing them in the 

light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Hill v. White, 321 F.3d 1334, 1335 (11th Cir. 2003). 

Because Waggaman is a licensed attorney, we do not afford his pleadings the liberal construction 

that we would grant to a typical pro se litigant. See Olivares v. Martin, 555 F.2d 1192, 1194 n.1 

(5th Cir. 1977). 

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v. Cascade Int’l, Inc., 256 F.3d 1194, 1202 (11th Cir. 2001); Simon v. Celebration 

Co., 883 So. 2d 826, 833 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to strike Dr. 

Arauzo’s motion to dismiss.4

 Although Waggaman was not properly served with 

Dr. Arauzo’s motion, Waggaman learned of the motion and responded to it less 

than three weeks after it was filed. Before ruling on the motion, the district court 

considered Waggaman’s response. Thus, Waggaman suffered no prejudice from 

the service error. 

Finally, the district court did not err in dismissing Waggaman’s negligence 

per se claims. Although Waggaman alleges statutory violations throughout his

complaint, the complaint fails to show that Purcell was a member of the class that 

the law was intended to protect, that she suffered a type of injury that the law was 

designed to protect, or how the violation of the law proximately caused those 

injuries. See Resnick v. AvMed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317, 1325 (11th Cir. 2012).

AFFIRMED.

 4 We review for abuse of discretion the district court’s implicit denial of Waggaman’s 

request that Dr. Arauzo’s motion to dismiss be stricken. See Young v. City of Palm Bay, Fla., 

358 F.3d 859, 863 (11th Cir. 2004).

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