Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01270/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01270-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 480
Nature of Suit: Consumer Credit
Cause of Action: 47:0227 FCC-Unsolicited Telephone Sales

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ZACH TUCK,

Plaintiff,

v.

PORTFOLIO RECOVERY 

ASSOCIATES, L.L.C. et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 19-CV-1270-CAB-AHG

ORDER ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS

[Doc. Nos. 21, 23, 27, 30, 45]

Before the Court are Defendants Portfolio Recovery Associates L.L.C., Diversified 

Consultants, Inc., Collection at Law, Inc., and Experian Information Solutions Inc.’s

(collectively “Defendants”) motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint. [Doc. Nos. 21, 23, 

27, 30, 45.] The Court deems the motions suitable for determination on the papers 

submitted and without oral argument. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons set 

forth below, Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed with leave to amend.

I. BACKGROUND

On July 10, 2019, Plaintiff Zach Tuck proceeding pro se, filed his complaint against 

nineteen different business entities. [Doc. No. 1.] The pending motions to dismiss 

Plaintiff’s complaint are made on the same or similar grounds. The complaint alleges 

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violations under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq.

(“TCPA”); the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq. (“FDCPA”); 

the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq. (“FCRA”); the California 

Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1785, et seq. (“CCRAA”); and 

the California Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1788, et seq.

(“Rosenthal Act” or “RFDCPA”).

A. Factual Allegations as to the “Credit Bureau Defendants”

Plaintiff categorizes Defendants Portfolio Recovery Associates L.L.C., Diversified 

Consultants, Inc., and Collection at Law, Inc. as the “credit bureau defendants.” [Doc. No. 

1 at ¶ 54.] According to the complaint, the credit bureau defendants called Plaintiff’s 

emergency cell phone number more than twenty times, many times before 8:00 a.m. and 

after 9:00 p.m. between the dates of August 20, 2015, and July 10, 2019, often on the same 

business day. [Id. at ¶¶ 58–60.] Plaintiff alleges that none of these calls were made for 

emergency purposes and were made by using automatic telephone dialing system 

capabilities or artificial or prerecorded messages or voices. [Id. at ¶¶ 61, 63.] Plaintiff also

states that some of the named credit bureau defendants called Plaintiff more than one 

hundred and fifty times at all hours of the day often on the same day, attempting to assert 

a right to enforce a consumer debt allegedly owed by Plaintiff. [Id. at ¶¶ 62, 64.] Further, 

Plaintiff alleges that on numerous occasions he demanded in writing that the credit bureau 

defendants provide him with written “verification” and consumer debt “validation” as it 

pertained to any alleged consumer debt, which the credit bureau defendants have ignored. 

[Id. at ¶ 66.] Plaintiff alleges he has no business debt, and therefore the alleged debt could 

only have been used for personal, family, or household purposes. [Id. at ¶ 72.] Plaintiff 

also states the “alleged debt is not [his] consumer debt” [Id. at ¶ 116], and “an alleged nonexistent consumer debt he never owed.” [Id. at ¶ 138].

B. Factual Allegations as to the “Credit Reporting Agency Defendants”

Plaintiff categorizes Defendant Experian Information Solutions Inc. as one of the

“credit reporting agency defendants.” [Id. at ¶ 55.] According to the complaint, around 

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January 2016, Plaintiff checked his consumer credit report from the credit reporting agency 

defendants and discovered several negative consumer credit accounts reported by the credit 

bureau defendants named above as well as from the credit reporting agency defendants. 

[Id. at ¶ 156.] Plaintiff states all of these negative accounts were unfamiliar to him and he 

was never informed by any of the furnishers or the credit reporting agency defendants of 

their negative credit reporting activities. [Id.] Plaintiff contacted all of the Defendants 

disputing the negative accounts and requested an investigation of such. [Id. at ¶ 157.] After 

further requests for investigation, the Defendants continued to report the negative accounts 

on his credit report and failed to provide him the requested “verification” and “validation.” 

[Id. at ¶¶ 158–160.] Plaintiff alleges he has never had any business dealings or had any 

accounts with any of the Defendants. [Id. at ¶ 172.]

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Rule 12(b)(6), a party may bring a motion to dismiss based on the failure to 

state a claim upon which relief may be granted. A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the 

sufficiency of a complaint as failing to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). For purposes 

of ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court “accept[s] factual allegations in the complaint 

as true and construe[s] the pleadings in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” 

Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008).

Even under the liberal pleading standard of Rule 8(a)(2), which requires only that a 

party make “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 

relief,” a “pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the 

elements of a cause of action will not do.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “[C]onclusory allegations of law and unwarranted 

inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Adams v. Johnson, 355 F.3d 

1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011)

(“[A]llegations in a complaint or counterclaim may not simply recite the elements of a 

cause of action, but must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair 

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notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively.”). “Determining

whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief . . . [is] a context-specific task that 

requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 679.

III. DISCUSSION

Initially, each Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s claims fail as a matter of law 

because Plaintiff improperly asserts sweeping allegations against all named Defendants 

without specifying which Defendants committed which act, thereby failing to give proper 

notice. The Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff has failed to comply with Rule 8’s 

pleading standards. Plaintiff’s complaint is replete with broad conclusory allegations 

towards all named Defendants generally and fails to identify which Defendant is

responsible for which alleged wrongful act. Moreover, Plaintiff’s allegations of any 

wrongful acts consist primarily of copying the statutory language under each of his claims 

with little to no facts offered in support. Plaintiff categorizes the Defendants and then 

proceeds to refer to all Defendants throughout the complaint with abbreviations. 

Thereafter, Plaintiff groups all of the Defendants together throughout the complaint. In 

some instances, Plaintiff refers to the abbreviated entities “CPS, PR, HH, MAB, ANSI, 

MBLLC” which do not appear to be in reference to any parties in this case. [Doc. No. 1 

at ¶¶ 150, 159.]

Plaintiff’s generalized allegations do not provide the Defendants with fair notice as 

to the basis of Plaintiff’s claims because Defendants and the Court cannot determine which 

Defendants are responsible for which act. “Experience teaches that, unless cases are pled 

clearly and precisely, issues are not joined, discovery is not controlled, the trial court’s 

docket becomes unmanageable, the litigants suffer, and society loses confidence in the 

court’s ability to administer justice.” Bautista v. Los Angeles County, 216 F.3d 837, 841 

(9th Cir. 2000) (citations and quotations omitted).

By submitting imprecise and sprawling claims, Plaintiff effectively “calls on the 

court to disentangle and interpret his allegations.” Kuzmicki v. Hanrahan, No. 3:17-CVCase 3:19-cv-01270-CAB-AHG Document 61 Filed 10/16/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 13
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00342-RCJ-VPC, 2018 WL 2088745, at *6 (D. Nev. May 4, 2018), report and 

recommendation adopted, No. 3:17-CV-00342-RCJ-VPC, 2018 WL 3577246 (D. Nev. 

July 25, 2018). The Court is reluctant to do so. See Jacobson v. Schwartzenegger, 226 

F.R.D. 395, 397 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (“[N]either the Court nor opposing counsel should be 

required to expend time and effort searching through large masses of conclusory, 

argumentative, evidentiary and other extraneous allegations in order to discover whether 

the essentials of claims asserted can be found in such a melange.” (Silver v. Queen’s Hosp., 

53 F.R.D. 223, 226–27 (D. Haw. 1971)). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s complaint is 

DISMISSED with leave to amend to plead more precisely and coherently which 

Defendants committed which acts that Plaintiff alleges were violations and sufficient facts 

in support of such allegations.

The Court reiterates that the purpose of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, and its 

requirements that allegations be pled with sufficient specificity, is to put the opposing party 

on notice of the wrong they allegedly committed so that they can adequately defend 

themselves. FED. R. CIV. P. 8; see Gauvin v. Trombatore, 682 F. Supp. 1067, 1071 (N.D. 

Cal. 1988) (lumping together of multiple defendants in one broad allegation fails to satisfy 

notice requirement of Rule 8(a)(2)). Even if the Court were to “disentangle and interpret

[Plaintiff’s] allegations,” Kuzmicki, 2018 WL 2088745, at *6, Plaintiff’s allegations

nevertheless fail under Rule 12(b)(6) as discussed below.

A. The TCPA Violations

Plaintiff alleges violations of the TCPA against all of the credit bureau defendants. 

[Doc. No. 1 at 20–27.] Plaintiff mostly repeats statutory language under the TCPA and 

refers to the credit bureau defendants’ alleged actions against all consumers seemingly

nationwide. The Court finds such portions of the complaint largely unnecessary and futile. 

As far as Plaintiff’s allegations pertaining to him, as stated above, Plaintiff merely repeats

the language under the TCPA and alleges the violations were committed by all of the credit 

bureau defendants generally. Plaintiff’s complaint lacks any facts pertaining to the conduct 

of any specific credit bureau defendant and their actions against him which could result in 

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a sufficient TCPA claim.

To successfully plead a TCPA claim, a plaintiff must allege defendant (1) called a 

cellular telephone number; (2) using an ATDS or an artificial or prerecorded voice; (3) 

without the recipient’s prior express consent. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1); Los Angeles Lakers, 

Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 869 F.3d 795, 804 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Meyer v. Portfolio 

Recovery Assocs., LLC, 707 F.3d 1036, 1043 (9th Cir. 2012).

To “make” a call under the TCPA the person must either (1) directly make the call, 

or (2) have an agency relationship with the person who made the call. See Gomez v. 

Campbell-Ewald, Co., 768 F.3d 871, 877–79 (9th Cir. 2014). An ATDS is “equipment 

which has the capacity to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random 

or sequential number generator.” Satterfield v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d 946, 954 

(9th Cir. 2009). Under 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1), an ATDS is defined as “equipment which 

has the capacity—(A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random 

or sequential number generator; and (B) to dial such numbers.” An ATDS “need not 

actually store, produce, or, call randomly or sequentially generated telephone numbers, it 

need only have the capacity to do it.” Satterfield, 569 F.3d at 951. Courts in this district 

have taken two approaches when facing a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the 

allegations of use of an ATDS are insufficient. See Maier v. J.C. Penney Corp., No. 13-

CV-0163–IEG (DHB), 2013 WL 3006415 at *3 (S.D. Cal. June 13, 2013). Under the first 

approach, courts permit a plaintiff to make minimal allegations at the complaint stage, 

permitting discovery to proceed on the issue of ATDS, because the information is in the 

sole possession of the defendant. Id., citing In re Jiffy Lube Int’l Inc., Text Spam Litig., 

847 F.Supp.2d 1253, 1260 (S.D. Cal. 2012). Under the second approach, factual

allegations beyond mere statutory language are required which may lead to the inference 

that an ATDS was used. See Maier, 2013 WL 3006415 at *3.

Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege that an ATDS was used or that there was a 

TCPA violation under either approach. Plaintiff’s complaint simply parrots the statutory 

definition of an ATDS and other provisions of the TCPA, but the Defendants would have 

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no way of determining if they have any information in their possession with respect to such 

calls with Plaintiff’s conclusory and sweeping allegations. Plaintiff does not allege the

phone number belonging to any of the credit bureau defendants was used to make the calls 

to him, the content of such calls, or any circumstances that could support an inference that 

the calls were placed with an ATDS or an artificial or prerecorded voice. Plaintiff’s 

conclusory allegations fall short of what is required for plausibility. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims under the TCPA are DISMISSED with leave to amend

for failure to state a claim.

B. The FDCPA and Rosenthal Act Violations

Plaintiff alleges several violations of the FDCPA against all of the credit bureau 

defendants and violations of the Rosenthal Act against all of the Defendants. [Doc. No. 1 

at 28–35, 42–44.]

The FDCPA prohibits debt collectors from engaging in abusive, deceptive, and 

unfair practices in the collection of consumer debts. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692. “In order to 

state a claim under the FDCPA, a plaintiff must show: 1) that he is a consumer; 2) that the 

debt arises out of a transaction entered into for personal purposes; 3) that the defendant is 

a debt collector; and 4) that the defendant violated one of the provisions of the FDCPA.” 

Freeman v. ABC Legal Servs. Inc., 827 F.Supp.2d 1065, 1071 (N.D. Cal. 2011).

The Rosenthal Act is the California state equivalent of the Fair Debt Collection 

Practices Act. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1788 et seq. The RFDCPA “mimics or incorporates 

by reference the FDCPA’s requirements . . . and makes available the FDCPA’s remedies 

for violations.” Riggs v. Prober & Raphel, 681 F.3d 1097, 1100 (9th Cir. 2012). The 

RFDCPA states that “every debt collector collecting or attempting to collect a consumer 

debt shall comply with the provisions of Sections 1692b to 1692j” of the FDCPA. Cal. 

Civ. Code § 1788.17. To establish a violation of the RFDCPA, a plaintiff must show (1) 

the defendant was attempting to collect a “consumer debt,” (2) the defendant was a “debt 

collector,” (3) the plaintiff was a “debtor,” and (4) the defendant’s collection activities 

violated the FDCPA and thus the RFDCPA. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.17.

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Plaintiff’s FDCPA and Rosenthal Act claims fail for several reasons. First, Plaintiff 

states all Defendants are debt collectors, but fails to allege any facts to support such a 

conclusion. A “debt collector” is “any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate

commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of 

any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed 

or due or asserted to be owed or due another.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). Plaintiff fails to 

provide any factual basis from which the Court could plausibly infer that the Defendants’

principal purpose is the collection of debts or that either Defendant regularly collects or 

attempts to collect debts owed or due to another. Nor does Plaintiff provide facts to infer 

the alleged debt at issue was owed or due to another.

Plaintiff also fails to set forth any factual allegations to suggest that any Defendant 

engaged in conduct prohibited by the FDCPA or Rosenthal Act beyond mere conclusory 

allegations repeating the provisions under each statute. Again, because Plaintiff fails to 

identify which Defendants made which calls or any factual content of such calls the 

Defendants in this case would be unable to defend themselves as to Plaintiff’s conclusory 

allegations. Defendants would be unable to determine whether or not calls were made at 

any unusual time or place, whether calls were made with the intent to annoy, abuse, or 

harass, or whether calls were made without meaningful disclosure of identity. Further, 

Plaintiff has not alleged any false, deceptive, or misleading representation was made by 

any of the Defendants in such calls.

Lastly, Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the debt at issue are insufficient. A “debt” 

is defined as “any obligation or alleged obligation of a consumer to pay money arising out 

of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or services which are the subject 

of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, whether or not 

such obligation has been reduced to judgment.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). Proving the

existence of a “debt” is a “threshold” issue in every FDCPA action. Turner v. Cook, 362 

F.3d 1219, 1226–27 (9th Cir. 2004). Here, Plaintiff first states that “[t]he same consumer 

business debt[s] allegedly owed to all of the defendant’s [sic] herein arose out of a 

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transaction that was primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.” [Doc. No. 1 

at ¶ 71.] Then, Plaintiff states the “alleged debt is not [his] consumer debt” [Id. at ¶ 116],

and “an alleged non-existent consumer debt he never owed.” [Id. at ¶ 138]. Plaintiff’s 

allegations are contradictory and provide no factual basis to infer that the debt at issue was 

indeed an obligation arising out of a transaction primarily for personal, family, or 

household purposes as required under the FDCPA and Rosenthal Act.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims under the FDCPA and Rosenthal Act are 

DISMISSED with leave to amend for failure to state a claim.

C. The FCRA Violations

Plaintiff alleges violations of the FCRA pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681 against all of 

the Defendants except counts X and XI which he alleges against only the credit reporting 

agency defendants. [Doc. No. 1 at 35–40, 44–46.]

1. § 1681s-2

The FCRA aims to “ensure fair and accurate credit reporting, promote efficiency in 

the banking system, and protect consumer privacy.” Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 

U.S. 47, 52 (2007). The FCRA imposes duties on “furnishers” as well as imposing 

responsibilities on the consumer reporting agencies. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2; Gorman v. 

Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 584 F.3d 1147, 1154 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Section 1681s-2 sets 

forth ‘[r]esponsibilities of furnishers of information to consumer reporting agencies.’”). 

Section 1681s-2(b) imposes obligations on furnishers that are “triggered ‘upon notice of

dispute’ – that is, when a person who furnished information to a [consumer reporting 

agency] receives notice from the [consumer reporting agency] that the consumer disputes 

the information.” Gorman, 584 F.3d at 1154. Pursuant to section 1681s-2(b)(1), after 

receiving notice of a dispute, a furnisher must “conduct an investigation with respect to the 

disputed information” among other responsibilities. 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)(1)(A). 

“[T]hese duties arise only after the furnisher receives notice of dispute from a [consumer

reporting agency]; notice of dispute received directly from the consumer does not trigger 

furnishers’ duties under subsection (b).” Gorman, 584 F.3d at 1154.

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The credit reporting agency defendants are not furnishers of information; rather, they 

are consumer reporting agencies as defined by § 1681a(f) of the FCRA. Accordingly, 

Plaintiff’s claims under § 1681s-2 of the FCRA as to the credit reporting agency defendants 

Trans Union, LLC and Experian Information Solutions Inc. are DISMISSED with 

prejudice. As to the credit bureau defendants, Plaintiff alleges he sent notices of disputes 

to all of the named Defendants but does not allege sufficient facts to support an inference 

that any of the Defendants received a notice of dispute from a credit reporting agency as 

required. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims under § 1681s-2(b) are DISMISSED with leave 

to amend for failure to state a claim. Section 1681s-2(a) also imposes duties upon 

furnishers of information. However, there is no private right of action under section 1681s2(a); a violation of this section can be pursued only by federal or state officials, and not by 

a private party. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(c)(1); Gorman, 584 F.3d at 1162. Accordingly, 

Plaintiff’s claims under 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a) are DISMISSED with prejudice.

2. § 1681b

“The FCRA imposes civil liability on any person who obtains a consumer report for 

an impermissible purpose.” Thomas v. Fin. Recovery Servs., No. EDCV 12-1339 PSG 

(Opx), 2013 WL 387968, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2013); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1681b. 

Thus, to survive a motion to dismiss on a section 1681b claim, “the plaintiff must allege 

facts that, if proven, would establish that the defendant did not have a permissible purpose 

for obtaining the credit report at issue.” Thomas, 2013 WL 387968 at *4. “[B]are 

allegations that the defendant did not have a permissible purpose for obtaining a credit 

report, without more, are insufficient.” Id. “Merely reciting each of the permissible 

circumstances and denying that they apply is similarly inadequate.” Id.

Here, Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference that 

any Defendant obtained his consumer report for an impermissible purpose. Plaintiff merely 

alleges the Defendants did not have a permissible purpose because he never had any 

business dealings or accounts with defendants. “However, a credit report can be accessed 

without a consumer’s permission for other ‘permissible purposes’ under the FCRA.” Jones 

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v. Best Serv. Co., No. CV 14-9872 SS, 2017 WL 490902, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2017); 

see also Perretta v. Capital Acquisitions & Mgmt. Co., No. C-02-05561 RMW, 2003 WL 

21383757, at *5 n.7 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2003) (noting that “section 1681b does not appear 

to require the existence of a debtor-creditor relationship for a party to lawfully acquire a 

consumer report”). Plaintiff’s complaint “offers no factual basis to infer what purpose—

permissible or impermissible—[defendants] had in making” inquiries on his credit report,

and therefore it does not allege a plausible claim that defendants’ purposes for obtaining 

his credit report were impermissible. Perez v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, No. CIV. 

12-1603 JAG, 2012 WL 5373448, at *2 (D.P.R. Oct. 30, 2012); see also Twombly, 550 

U.S. at 570. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims under § 1681b are DISMISSED with leave 

to amend for failure to state a claim. 

3. §§ 1681e and 1681i

15 U.S.C. § 1681e provides that “[w]henever a consumer reporting agency prepares 

a consumer report it shall follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible 

accuracy of the information concerning the individual about whom the report relates.” 15 

U.S.C. § 1681e(b). Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681i, if the completeness or accuracy of any 

item of information contained in a consumer’s file at a consumer reporting agency is 

disputed by the consumer and the consumer notifies the agency directly, or indirectly 

through a reseller, of such dispute, the agency shall, free of charge, conduct a reasonable 

reinvestigation to determine whether the disputed information is inaccurate and record the 

current status of the disputed information . . . before the end of the 30-day period beginning 

on the date on which the agency receives the notice of the dispute from the consumer or 

reseller. 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1)(A).

Both provisions require Plaintiff to make a prima facie showing of inaccurate 

reporting. See Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 890 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(quoting Dennis v. BEH-1, LLC, 520 F.3d 1066, 1069 (9th Cir. 2008)) (addressing § 1681i); 

Guimond v. Trans Union Credit Info. Co., 45 F.3d 1329, 1333 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing 

Cahlin v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 936 F.2d 1151, 1156 (11th Cir. 1991)) 

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(addressing §1681e(b)). “[A]n item on a credit report can be ‘incomplete or inaccurate’ . . 

. ‘because it is patently incorrect, or because it is misleading in such a way and to such an 

extent that it can be expected to adversely affect credit decisions.’” Carvalho, 629 F.3d at 

890 (quoting Gorman, 584 F.3d at 1163 (9th Cir. 2009)).

Plaintiff vaguely alleges that the credit reporting agency defendants failed to delete 

inaccurate information on his credit report but fails to allege what account(s) or what 

information was inaccurate. Plaintiff also fails to allege when and how he notified the 

credit reporting agency defendants of any specific inaccuracy. Plaintiff’s allegations are 

devoid of any factual basis to support an inference that the credit reporting agency 

defendants reported any specific inaccurate information or failed to use reasonable 

procedures to assure the accuracy of information contained in his credit report. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims under §§ 1681e and 1681i are DISMISSED with leave to 

amend for failure to state a claim.

D. The CCRAA Violations

Plaintiff alleges violations of the CCRAA against all of the Defendants but fails to 

cite to any specific provision under the CCRAA. [Doc. No. 1 at 40–42.] 

The CCRAA provides that “[a] person shall not furnish information on a specific 

transaction or experience to any consumer credit reporting agency if the person knows or 

should know the information is incomplete or inaccurate.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1785.25(a). 

In order to state a claim for violation of the CCRAA, the plaintiff must demonstrate “that 

an actual inaccuracy exist[s].” Carvalho, 629 F.3d at 890. Information is inaccurate if it 

is “patently incorrect” or “misleading in such a way and to such an extent that it can be 

expected to adversely affect credit decisions.” Id. at 891. Because the CCRAA is 

“substantially based on the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), judicial 

interpretation of the federal provisions is persuasive authority and entitled to substantial 

weight when interpreting the California provisions. Id. at 889 (citations omitted).

As discussed above, Plaintiff fails to allege what account(s) or what information, if 

any, was inaccurate. Plaintiff presents no facts alleging when and how he notified each of 

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the Defendants or what if any specific inaccuracy. Plaintiff’s allegations are devoid of any 

factual basis to support an inference that the Defendants reported any specific inaccurate 

information or failed to use reasonable procedures to assure the accuracy of information 

contained in his credit report. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims under the CCRAA are 

DISMISSED with leave to amend for failure to state a claim.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motions to dismiss 

Plaintiff’s complaint. Plaintiff’s claims under § 1681s-2 of the FCRA as to the credit 

reporting agency defendants and Plaintiff’s claims under 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a) are 

DISMISSED with prejudice. Plaintiff’s remaining claims are DISMISSED with leave 

to amend. Plaintiff is cautioned that if his First Amended Complaint does not cure the 

deficiencies identified in this Order, his claims may be dismissed with prejudice and 

without leave to amend. The First Amended Complaint shall be filed within thirty (30) 

days of this Order.

It is SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 16, 2019

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