Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02963/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02963-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 17:101 Copyright Infringement

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1 “Defendants” include Vision House Production, Inc., Cindy Rarig, and Jonathan

Rarig.

2 “Plaintiff” includes Lori Jo Giddings.

3 No oral argument was requested regarding the Motions for Summary Judgment.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Lori Jo Giddings, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Vision House Production, Inc., Vision

House Production, Inc., d/b/a Designer Art

Direct, Cindy Rarig, individually and

d/b/a/ Designer Art Direct, Jonathan Rarig,

individually and d/b/a Designer Art Direct,

and John/Jane Does I through V, whose

true identities are presently unknown, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-05-2963 PHX MHM

ORDER

Currently before the Court is: (1) Defendants’1

 Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt.#68),

(2) Plaintiff’s2

 Motion for Summary Judgment as to Liability of Defendants (Dkt.#70), and

(3) Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions Against Plaintiff and Counsel (Dkt.# 81). After

reviewing the papers and deeming oral argument regarding the Motion for Sanctions

unnecessary,3

 the Court issues the following Order.

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I. Procedural History

On September 27, 2005, Plaintiff Lori Jo Giddings asserted a four-count complaint

against Defendants asserting copyright infringement and three other claims. (Dkt.#1) The

three other claims were dismissed with prejudice because they were preempted by the

copyright infringement claim and because of Plaintiff’s lack of standing regarding one of the

claims. (Dkt.#24) The Rule 16 Scheduling Conference was held on September 20, 2007 and

the deadline for all dispositive motions was set for March 21, 2008. (Dkt.# 31) On January

14, 2008, the Court granted a thirty-day extension of all pretrial deadlines, making the

deadline for all dispositive motions due by April 21, 2008. (Dkt.#40) On this deadline, the

parties filed the motions for summary judgment that are presently before this Court.

(Dkt.#68,70) Defendants moved for sanctions against plaintiff and counsel on July 15, 2008.

(Dkt.#81) The Court will first address the summary judgment motions and then address the

motion for sanctions. 

II. Summary Judgment Motions

Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s copyright infringement claim;

Plaintiff moves for summary judgment regarding Defendants’ liability only on this claim. 

A. Factual Background

Plaintiff is an artist; this case involves twelve of her paintings: “Iron Cowboy,” “Cowboy

at Rest,” “Just Relax,” “Superbowl Cowboy,” “Golf Cowboy,” “Fixin to Rain,” “Ellie Mae,”

“Let’s Play,” “Takin a Break,” “Cowboy Paraphernalia,” “Holdin On,” and “Champion.”

From 1996 to 1998, Plaintiff sold prints and originals of these paintings in her gallery in

Scottsdale. 

In 1998, Plaintiff closed the gallery and entered into an agreement with Cindy and

Jonathan Rarig for the reproduction and distribution of her work. From 1998 to June 16,

2001, the Rarigs sold Plaintiff’s artwork through Vision House Productions, a music

production company they owned. They also sold prints of Plaintiff’s art to or through The

Room Store, Costco, and Sam’s Club. However, in June 2001, the relationship soured and

the parties agreed to part ways. This case concerns their disagreement about how the

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remaining inventory of Plaintiff’s prints were divided; Defendants contend that they owned

several of Plaintiff’s prints based on a $500 monthly advance on future royalties (25% of the

selling price) that they had paid Plaintiff. Because sales sufficient to cover this monthly

advance never materialized, Defendants claim that they had purchased several of Plaintiff’s

prints to make up the difference. Plaintiff denies that this arrangement ever existed and also

contends that all of the prints belonged to her. She contends that Defendants continued to

make unauthorized reproductions of her work and to display her originals without her

permission in their store and on their internet site, as well as forging her signature on the

prints. Defendants argue that they owned the prints that they continued to sell, that they

owned the originals that were displayed in their store and that their internet site merely

contained a representation of one of her works as an example of the types of artists with

whom they had worked. 

On September 27, 2005, Plaintiff filed this action, alleging that Defendants had infringed

her copyright of the paintings beginning in June 2001 and “continuing to the present time.”

(Dkt.#1 ¶ XIX) Her Amended Complaint alleged that Defendants sold unauthorized

reproductions of her work in January 2001, summer and fall of 2002, fall of 2003, November

of 2004, and September 2005 and that during the summer of 1999 through the spring of

2000, Cindy Rarig forged her signature on various pieces of copyrighted artwork. (Dkt.#19

¶¶ XXXVI - XLI)

B. Summary Judgment Standard

A motion for summary judgment may be granted only if the evidence shows “that

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). The Court views the evidence in the

light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draws any reasonable inferences in the

nonmoving party’s favor. See Warren v. City of Carlsbad, 58 F.3d 439, 441 (9th Cir. 1995),

cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1171 (1996). A material issue of fact is one that affects the outcome

of the litigation and requires a trial to resolve the differing versions of the truth. S.E.C. v.

Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1305-06 (9th Cir. 1982). To defeat the motion, the nonCase 2:05-cv-02963-MHM Document 84 Filed 10/23/08 Page 3 of 12
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moving party must show that there are genuine factual issues “that properly can be resolved

only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). Summary judgment is

appropriate against a party who “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence

of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of

proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 

C. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

Defendants present five different grounds for their summary judgment motion; however,

the Court finds the first two grounds case dispositive and thus will not address the remaining

three grounds in this order. The Court addresses first the effect of Plaintiff’s failure to

register three of the paintings; next, it addresses the consequence of Plaintiff’s lack of

ownership of the nine remaining paintings during the period of the alleged infringement. 

1. The Three Unregistered Paintings

The parties agree that Plaintiff has never registered three of the twelve paintings in

dispute, “Let’s Play,” “Champion,” and “Hold On.” (Dkt.#69 ¶ 15; Dkt.# 73-3 ¶ 15) While

Defendants argue that this failure amounts to a jurisdictional defect, Plaintiff contends that

an artist’s rights to attribution and integrity do not require registration, citing for the first time

to 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a). 

Under 17 U.S.C. § 411(a), no infringement action based on a violation of exclusive rights

may be brought until the copyright is registered. Kodadek v. MTV Networks, 152 F.3d

1209, 1211 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Copyright registration . . . is a prerequisite to a suit based on

copyright.”) Exempted from this requirement are actions brought under 17 U.S.C. §

106A(a), which protect the author’s rights to attribution and integrity. Thus, whether an

infringement action for these three paintings may proceed depends on whether Plaintiff

should be allowed to change her theory of infringement at this late stage, asserting the new

moral rights theory for the first time in her response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment. Up to this point, Plaintiff had relied solely on an exclusive rights theory,

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objecting to Defendants’ alleged unauthorized reproduction and distribution of the paintings

in the Amended Complaint. 

Since approximately June 2001 and continuing to the present time defendants have

been infringing on plaintiff’s copyright and plaintiff’s artwork by reproducing and

distributing in the stream of commerce without plaintiff’s permission unauthorized

reproductions of plaintiff’s artwork. 

(Dkt.#19 ¶ 19 (emphasis added))

Helpful to this analysis is Coleman v. Quaker Oats Company, 232 F.3d 1271 (9th Cir.

2000), in which employees suing under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act changed

their theory from disparate treatment (which they had alleged in the complaint and relied on

throughout discovery) to disparate impact (which had never been raised before the summary

judgment stage). Though both disparate treatment and disparate impact are theories that are

found in the act, the district court refused to allow the employees to rely on the new theory

at the summary judgment stage, reasoning that the employer was prejudiced by the lack of

disclosure regarding this theory. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, explaining that “[a]fter having

focused on intentional discrimination in their complaint and during discovery, the employees

cannot turn around and surprise the company at the summary judgment stage on the theory

that an allegation of disparate treatment on the complaint is sufficient to encompass a

disparate impact theory of liability.” Id. at 1292-93. Where a plaintiff sets forth one theory

in the complaint and does not move to amend until summary judgment proceedings, it is

barred from proceeding on a new theory. Id. at 292. 

Applying Coleman to the present case, Plaintiff is precluded from asserting her new

moral rights theory of infringement at this late stage of litigation, over six months after the

deadline for discovery has passed. (Dkt.#40, 31) The Court construes Plaintiff’s attempt to

do so as an untimely motion to amend the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

15(a). In re Stratosphere Corp. Sec. Litig., 66 F.Supp.2d 1182, 1201 (D. Nev. 1999) (“When

new issues or evidence supporting a legal theory outside the scope of the complaint is

introduced in opposition to summary judgment, a district court should construe the matter

as a request to amend pleadings . . . .”). Here, the deadline to amend the complaint passed

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on November 16, 2007. (Dkt.# 31) Because permitting an amendment now, nearly a year

later would prejudice Defendants (who would not be able to conduct discovery regarding this

issue), the motion to amend the complaint to include Plaintiff’s new moral rights theory is

denied. Eagle v. American Tel. & Tele. Co., 769 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1985) (where pretrial

status conference order precluded amendments after certain deadline, district court correctly

denied use of new theory at summary judgment stage). 

Because plaintiff cannot amend the complaint at this phase of litigation to include her

new moral rights theory, she is limited to the unauthorized reproduction and distribution

theory of copyright infringement that she alleged in the Amended Complaint. (Dkt.#19 ¶ 19)

Because this theory requires copyright registration, and it is undisputed that Plaintiff did not

register “Let’s Play, “Champion,” and “Holdin’ On,” these three paintings are outside this

Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a); In re Literary Works in Electronic

Databases Copyright Litig., 509 F.3d 116, 121 (2d Cir. 2007). 

2. Plaintiff’s Lack of Ownership of the Remaining Nine Paintings During the

Period of Alleged Infringement 

Regarding the remaining nine paintings, “Iron Cowboy,” “Cowboy at Rest,” “Just Relax,”

“Superbowl Cowboy,” “Golf Cowboy,” “Fixin to Rain,” “Ellie Mae,” “Takin a Break,” and

“Cowboy Paraphernalia,” Defendants argue that because Plaintiff did not own the copyrights

for these paintings during the time of the alleged infringement, she lacks standing. Plaintiff

somewhat creatively responds that Defendants have no standing to challenge ownership. Put

another way, Plaintiff is arguing that Defendants have no standing to challenge Plaintiff’s

standing. Plaintiff relies on cases that interpret 17 U.S.C. § 204, which requires that transfers

of a copyright be in writing. However, these cases are inapplicable because Defendants are

not arguing that the copyright was not validly transferred; instead they are arguing that the

copyright was validly transferred. Thus, the statements in the cases regarding standing to

assert a section 204 claim are inapposite. Stated another way, the section 204 argument that

a copyright was not validly transferred because it was not in writing has no application here;

all the transfers were in writing and no party is alleging that any oral transfer of the

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4 In Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, (1962), the Supreme Court explained that

a court may deny leave to amend a complaint if it finds undue delay or bad faith on the part

of the plaintiff, prejudice to the defendant, or futility of the amendment.

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copyrights took place or that the written transfers were defective in any way. Plaintiff also

argues that her moral rights to attribution and integrity are not transferable; however, as

explained above, Plaintiff is precluded from asserting this new theory at this late stage of

litigation. 

Moreover, allowing amendment in this case would be futile; Plaintiff has not alleged that

Defendants falsely attributed her work to another artist – she is alleging that they forged her

signatures on the prints. Thus, there appears to be no violation of the non-transferrable right

to attribution. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a). Neither has Plaintiff alleged that Defendant defaced,

distorted, or otherwise mutilated her artwork in a manner that would be prejudicial to her

reputation; thus, there appears to be no violation of her right to the non-transferrable right to

integrity. Id. Having considered the factors outlined in Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182,

(1962),4

 this Court denies Plaintiff’s implied request to amend the pleadings on the grounds

that it would unduly prejudice defendant (because defendant would not be able to conduct

discovery on this issue given that discovery is over), that it is untimely asserted, and that it

would constitute an exercise in futility. 

The evidence before this Court demonstrates that Plaintiff transferred ownership of the

nine remaining paintings to various relatives and to her attorney by 1998, according to a

number of Assignment and Transfer documents that appear to be signed by Plaintiff (and

whose validity Plaintiff has not challenged). (Dkt.#69, Exh. D) The copyright registration

for many of these paintings also reflect the new owner (Plaintiff’s niece, nephew, or attorney)

as the claimant. (Dkt.#69, Exh. E) To effectuate the transfers, Plaintiff executed nine

Assignment and Transfer of Original Artwork and Copyright documents. Each assignment

provided that Plaintiff transferred all the rights in her work:

The undersigned [Giddings] does hereby sell, transfer, convey, absolutely

assign and set over . . . all right, title and interest in said original mixed media

painting . . . including without limitation all copyrights and the right to secure

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copyright registration and any and all copyright renewal rights and in any

works derived therefrom throughout the entire world and any and all rights the

assignor now has or to which he may become entitled under existing or

subsequently enacted federal, state or foreign law statutes or regulations for or

during the full term of said copyright including without limitation the right to

produce the artwork and copies of prints, the right to prepare derivative works

based on the artwork, the right to distribute copies of the artwork, the right to

perform and display the artwork publically.

(Dkt.#69, Exh. D)

Defendants allege that Plaintiff transferred ownership of the nine copyrights in order to

keep them out of the reach of the bankruptcy court when she filed for a Chapter 7 bankruptcy

in 1997. Though Plaintiff disputes that she had any such motivation, she does not contest the

accuracy of the bankruptcy schedules attached to her Bankruptcy Petition, in which she only

claimed to have transferred ownership of one of the paintings (“Just Relax”) in the previous

year and avowed that she did not own any interest in patents, copyrights, or other intellectual

property.

Plaintiff claims that she disputes that all of the copyrights were transferred and points to

a few bits of information relating to “Iron Cowboy.” However, none of her exhibits create

a genuine issue of fact regarding this issue. The deposition excerpt she cites actually

supports the conclusion that the copyrights were transferred. In the excerpt, there is an

exchange where Defendants’ counsel ask why the registration for “Iron Cowboy” lists her

as the copyright claimant if she needed protection as she had claimed earlier in the

deposition. She responds with a statement that actually supports Defendants’ argument that

she transferred copyright ownership of all her paintings to other people: “I thought that it had

been transferred into another name.” (Dkt#73-3, Exh. 1 at 15) Moreover, even if the

copyright registration dated January 26, 1995 lists Plaintiff as the copyright claimant, this

fact does nothing to dispute Defendants’ evidence that she later transferred ownership to her

niece on November 1, 1996. (Dkt#73-3, Exh. 6) Defendants presented a copy of an

assignment signed by Plaintiff that transferred “all right title and interest . . . including all

copyrights” in “Iron Cowboy” to Carmi Jo Jenners (Plaintiff’s niece) on November 1, 1996.

(Dkt.#69 Exh. N) Plaintiff has never asserted that the signature on this assignment was not

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hers nor claimed that this document was somehow faked. Moreover, Defendants also

presented evidence that on February 8, 2008, Plaintiff obtained an assignment of “Iron

Cowboy” from her niece, which further corroborates their argument that she did not own the

copyright prior to this period. (Dkt.#69 Exh. N) Plaintiff has never challenged the validity

or accuracy of either transferring document. 

For similar reasons, Plaintiff’s general claim, “I own the copyright in each of my pieces

of art,” is insufficient to create a factual controversy. (Dkt.# 72) Even if Plaintiff currently

owns the copyright for all of her paintings, this statement does nothing to dispute

Defendant’s evidence that she did not own them during the period in which she alleges the

infringement occurred (June 16, 2001 to the date of the filing of the Complaint, September

27, 2005). Thus, there is no genuine issue of fact regarding whether Plaintiff owned the

copyrights to the remaining nine paintings during the time period at issue. Defendants have

presented evidence that she did not own the copyrights, and Plaintiff has failed to present any

evidence that would create a factual dispute over this issue . 

Moreover, the allegation that Defendants forged Plaintiff’s signature on the alleged

unauthorized reproductions from summer 1999 through the spring of 2000 would not violate

copyright law, but would sound as a trademark claim. A forged signature on artwork is a

trademark claim in that the forged signature misleads the public. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114

(reproducing a registered mark to cause confusion or deceive constitutes trademark

infringement). For reasons similar to those mentioned above, this Court denies Plaintiff’s

implicit request to amend the complaint to include this theory. 

A copyright infringement claim requires proof of (1) ownership of a valid copyright, and

(2) violation of the copyright-holder’s exclusive rights. Feist Publications, Inc. V. Rural

Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991); A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d

1004, 1013 (9th Cir. 2001). If a claimant does not own a copyright, the claimant does not

have standing to sue for infringement of the exclusive rights belonging to the owner. Silvers

v. Sony Pictures Entm’t, Inc., 402 F.3d 881, 889 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[O]nly the owner of an

exclusive right under the copyright is entitled to sue for infringement.”) Moreover, the owner

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of the copyright must have owned the copyright at the time the alleged infringement took

place. The “owner of an exclusive right under a copyright is entitled . . . to institute an action

for any infringement of that particular right committed while he or she is the owner of it.”

17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (emphasis added). Copyright assignments do not include accrued causes

of action unless they are expressly included in the assignment. ABKCO Music, Inc. v.

Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 944 F.2d 971, 980 (2nd Cir. 1991) (“[T]he assignee is only entitled

to bring actions for infringements that were committed while it was the copyright owner and

the assignor retains the right to bring actions accruing during its ownership of the right, even

if actions are brought subsequent to the assignment.”). This Court’s examination of the

February 8, 2008 assignments that transferred ownership of the copyrights of the paintings

back to Plaintiff (Dkt.# 69, Exh. N) reveals that there was no express transfer of accrued

causes of action. Thus, because Plaintiff did not own the copyright to the remaining nine

paintings during the time period in which she alleges infringement took place, she has no

standing. Standing to assert a copyright claim is a jurisdictional requirement, and the Court

must dismiss an action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction if it determines the plaintiff

lacks standing. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 n.1 (1996) (“[S]tanding . . . is

jurisdictional and not subject to waiver.”); see also Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, 171

F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1063 (C.D. Cal 2001). 

Though the Court is reluctant to dispose of a case without addressing the merits of the

claim, it sees no alternative given the lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the three

unregistered paintings and plaintiff’s lack of standing as a non-owner of the remaining nine

paintings during the time period in question. Besides her late-raised moral rights theory, and

inapplicable cases regarding section 202, Plaintiff has presented the Court with no

alternative. Though she has known of the ownership requirement since at least February

2008 (as demonstrated by the fact that she made arrangements for the prior owners to transfer

ownership back to her at this time), no motion to join the prior owners has been presented

to this Court. Neither have the prior owners made any motion to intervene. Given that no

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individual before the Court owned the copyrights in question during the relevant time

periods, this case must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 

D. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Defendants’ Liability

Because Plaintiff does not have standing to assert this copyright infringement claim, the

Court need not reach her motion for summary judgment as to the liability of the defendants.

Accordingly, the motion is denied.

III. Motion for Sanctions

Defendants argue that Plaintiff and her attorney should be sanctioned under Rule 11 for

failing to reasonably inquire into whether Plaintiff had standing to bring this claim. (Dkt.#

81) Specifically, they argue that a reasonable attorney would have discovered that Plaintiff

had not registered some of the paintings and that she did not own the copyrights for the

remaining paintings during the time of the alleged copyright infringement. (Id.) To support

their claim that sanctions is justified, Defendants cite Christian v. Mattel, Inc., 286 F.3d

1118, 1128-29 (9th Cir. 2002), a case that affirmed an award of sanctions against an attorney

who filed a complaint alleging copyright infringement where the allegedly infringing work

was created six years before the allegedly infringed work. They request that Plaintiff be

ordered to pay all of Defendants’ attorneys’ fees “for having to defend this groundless suit.”

(Dkt.#81 at 7) 

Rule 11 imposes an affirmative duty to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the facts and

law before filing any pleading, motion or paper with the court. By filing any such document,

a party is representing to the court that “the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions

[contained in such documents] are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument

for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law”

and that “the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if

specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity

for further investigation or discovery.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2)-(3). 

Though Plaintiff does not provide any explanation for her failure to register the three

unregistered paintings before bringing suit, she does explain her lack of ownership of the

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copyrights during the relevant time period by arguing that present ownership of the

copyrights is sufficient to transfer accrued causes of action arising under them. (Dkt.# 82)

Though Plaintiff’s legal theory ultimately proved to be incorrect as explained above, this

Court does not find it is so objectively baseless to qualify as completely frivolous. 

Moreover, it is the judgment of this Court that the dismissal of this action is sufficient to

deter Ms. Giddings and counsel from any future arguably frivolous litigation.

Accordingly, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and

dismissing this case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to

Liability of Defendants as moot.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Defendant’s Motion for Sanctions Against

Plaintiff and Counsel.

JUDGMENT ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.

DATED this 21st day of October, 2008.

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