Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_12-cv-08224/USCOURTS-azd-3_12-cv-08224-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Kee Nelson Steah, Sr., 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-12-8224-PCT-JAT (LOA)

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court is Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The 

Magistrate Judge to whom this case was assigned issued a Report and Recommendation 

(R&R) recommending that this Court deny the Petition. Petitioner has filed objections to 

the R&R. In addition, the Petitioner also requested an evidentiary hearing that the R&R 

recommends the Court denies. 

I. Factual Background 

 As the R&R quoted, the Arizona Court of Appeals summarized the facts of this 

case as follows: 

 On December 20, 2004, suspecting his wife, Laverne Steah, was 

having an affair, Steah left his jobsite in Craig, Colorado and drove home to 

St. Johns, Arizona. At home, Steah discovered Laverne together with 

another man, B.C. A fight ensued between Steah and B.C. 

 Shortly thereafter, St. Johns Police Officer Aaron Smith responded 

to a dispatch concerning a knife fight at Steah’s home. Officer Smith 

testified that upon arriving at the scene, he observed Steah kicking and 

hitting B.C., who was trying to get up from the ground in the front yard. 

Officer Smith stated that Steah was covered in blood from “head to toe” 

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and that B.C. had multiple wounds, including a wound “from the base of 

his ear . . [that] was bleeding profusely.” Officer Smith recalled Steah 

stating, “I cut him and stabbed him . . . . I, [sic] had the only knife . . . . 

I’m not hurt, none of this blood is mine. It’s all his.” 

 B.C. was transported to a hospital and later died while in the 

emergency room. Maricopa County medical examiner, Dr. Vladimir 

Shvarts, opined that the cause of death was “multiple wounds.” According 

to Dr. Schvarts, B.C. had sustained ten wounds to the head and neck area, 

including a stab wound by the ear that damaged a major artery, eleven 

wounds and multiple superficial cuts on other parts of his body, and blunt 

force injuries. 

R&R at 1–2. 

II. Reply by Petitioner to Respondents’ Reply 

 Petitioner submitted a reply to the Respondents’ reply to Petitioner’s initial 

objection to the R&R. (Doc. 44). While a reply to Respondents’ reply is not allowed by 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 72 and is moot, the Court will consider it 

regardless. 

III. Review of Report and Recommendation 

 This Court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). It is “clear that 

the district judge must review the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations de 

novo if objection is made, but not otherwise.” United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 

1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (emphasis in original); Schmidt v. Johnstone, 263 

F.Supp.2d 1219, 1226 (D.Ariz. 2003) (“Following Reyna-Tapia, this Court concludes 

that de novo review of factual and legal issues is required if objections are made, ‘but not 

otherwise.’”); Klamath Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 589 F.3d 

1027, 1032 (9th Cir. 2009) (the district court “must review de novo the portions of the 

[Magistrate Judge’s] recommendations to which the parties object.”). District courts are 

not required to conduct “any review at all . . . of any issue that is not the subject of an 

objection.” Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985) (emphasis added); see also 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (“the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of 

the [report and recommendation] to which objection is made.”). 

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 The Petition in this case was filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 because Petitioner is 

incarcerated based on a state conviction. With respect to any claims that Petitioner 

exhausted before the state courts, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(1) and (2) this Court must 

deny the Petition on those claims unless “a state court decision is contrary to, or involved 

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law”1

 or was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts. See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003). 

This is a “highly differential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which demands 

that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 

U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (citation and internal quotation omitted). The petitioner bears the 

burden of proving the standards for habeas relief have been met. Id. at 25. Further, this 

Court must presume the correctness of the state court’s factual findings regarding a 

petitioner’s claims. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 936 (9th Cir. 

1998). Additionally, “[a]n application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the 

merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in 

the courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). 

“When applying these standards, the federal court should review the ‘last reasoned 

decision’ by a state court . . . .” Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Accordingly, the summary denial of Petitioner’s petition for review by the Arizona Court 

of Appeals renders the trial court’s decision on Petitioner’s Petition for Post-Conviction 

Relief the “last reasoned decision” of the state court, subject to this Court’s review. See 

Y1st v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-03 (1991) (“later unexplained orders upholding 

[a] judgment [rejecting a federal claim]” raises a presumption that the reviewing court 

“looks through” that order to the last reasoned decision). 

 In his Petition, Petitioner raised one legal theory for habeas relief, ineffective 

assistance of counsel. However, Petitioner raised eight different factual variations of 

ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court will review the theory and factual variations 

 

1

 Further, in applying “Federal law” the state courts only need to act in accordance with 

Supreme Court case law. See Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003). 

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on which Petitioner filed an objection de novo. 

A. Legal Standards for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

 The R&R recounts the law governing a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel 

as follows: 

 The controlling Supreme Court precedent on claims of ineffective 

assistance of counsel is Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 

Under Strickland, a convicted defendant must show that counsel’s 

performance was objectively deficient and counsel’s deficient performance 

prejudiced the petitioner. Id. at 687. To be deficient, counsel’s 

performance must fall “outside the wide range of professionally competent 

assistance.” Id. at 690. When reviewing counsel’s performance, the court 

engages a strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance and 

exercised reasonable professional judgment. Id. “A fair assessment of 

attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the 

distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s 

challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective 

at the time.” Id. at 689. Review of counsel’s performance is “extremely 

limited.” Coleman v. Calderon, 150 F.3d 1105, 1113 (9th Cir. 1998), rev’d 

on other grounds, 525 U.S. 141 (1998). Acts or omissions that “might be 

considered sound trial strategy” do not constitute ineffective assistance of 

counsel. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 

 In addition to showing counsel’s deficient performance, a petitioner 

must establish that he suffered prejudice as a result of that deficient 

performance. Id. at 691-92. To show prejudice, a petitioner must 

demonstrate a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional 

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A 

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in 

the outcome.” Id. at 694; Hart v. Gomez, 174 F.3d 1067, 1069 (9th Cir. 

1999); Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 934 (9th Cir. 1998). The prejudice 

component “focuses on the question whether counsel’s deficient 

performance renders the result of the trial unreliable or the proceeding 

fundamentally unfair.” Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993). It 

is not enough to merely show “that the errors had some conceivable effect 

on the outcome of the proceeding.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693. 

 A habeas court may proceed directly to the prejudice prong without 

deciding whether counsel’s performance was deficient. Id. at 697; Jackson 

v. Calderon, 211 F.3d 1148, 1155 n. 3 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Strickland). 

The court, however, may not assume prejudice solely from counsel’s 

allegedly deficient performance. Jackson, 211 F.3d at 1155. 

 In the context of a habeas petition, a petitioner must do more than 

demonstrate to the federal court that the state court applied Strickland 

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incorrectly. Bell, 535 U.S. at 698-99. Rather, a petitioner must show the 

state court “applied Strickland to the facts of his case in an objectively 

unreasonable manner.” Id. Because the standards created by Strickland 

and § 2254(d) are both “highly deferential,” review under both standards in 

tandem is even more deferential. Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 788 (citations 

omitted). “[T]he question is not whether counsel’s actions were reasonable. 

The question is whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel 

satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” Id. 

R&R at 7–9. 

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim 

 As noted above, Petitioner argues only one legal theory: ineffective assistance of 

counsel. However, Petitioner asserts eight different factual variations upon this single 

legal theory. 

 1. Ground One 

 “Petitioner alleges in ground one that his trial counsel provided ineffective 

assistance when he failed to elicit a statement Petitioner made while being questioned by 

the police chief that during the fight with the victim, Petitioner picked up from a table the 

knife he used to defend himself and stab the victim.” R&R at 9. As the R&R states, 

Petitoner’s counsel did in fact elicit a statement from the police chief in regards to the 

knife. R&R at 9; (Doc. 19. Ex. R at 1182). As the record reflects, Petitioner’s trial 

counsel questioned: “Now, Nelson told you that he picked up the knife, the knife he used 

off the table in the living room, correct?” (Doc. 19, Ex. R at 1182). The police chief then 

responded with: “Yes. That’s what Mr. Steah told me.” (Id.). Thus, Petitioner’s first 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim is not supported by the facts in the record. 

 Petitioner continues to argue in his objection to the R&R that his counsel did not 

elicit the statement from the police chief and that this undermined Petitioner’s selfdefense argument. (Doc. 41 at 12–13). This assertion is simply not supported by the 

record. Therefore, the Court agrees with the R&R that Petitioner has failed to show that 

the trial court’s decision denying this claim on post-conviction relief was contrary to, or 

an objectively unreasonable application of, Strickland, or that the decision was based on 

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an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the record before the trial court. 

Ground one is denied. 

 2. Ground Two 

“Petitioner alleges in ground two that his trial counsel provided ineffective 

assistance when he failed to protect Petitioner’s right to [a] unanimous jury verdict on his 

claim of self-defense.” R&R at 10. Petitioner claims that his counsel “failed to request a 

jury instruction requiring a unanimous verdict on the affirmative defense and failed to 

inquire after the verdict whether the jury unanimously rejected the defense.” R&R at 10. 

 Here, the trial court judge instructed the jury as to the Petitioner’s burden of proof 

for self-defense by stating: “[t]he defendant must prove the defense of self-defense by a 

preponderance of the evidence.” (Doc. 19, Exh. T at 1411). Furthermore, the trial judge 

also instructed the jury to the State’s burden of proof in regards to the elements of the 

charged offense by stating: “the burden of proof with regard to the elements of the 

charged offense is with the state. The burden of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt as 

defined in these instructions.” (Doc. 19, Exh. T at 1412). The trial judge then proceeded 

to define self-defense and explain what the jury would need to find to conclude that the 

Petitioner committed the act in self-defense. (Doc. 19, Exh T at 1412–13). Finally, the 

trial judge instructed the jurors that their verdicts “do need to be unanimous.” (Doc. 19, 

Exh. U at 1487). The trial judge then explained that this means “all twelve of you must 

agree upon a verdict.” (Id.). 

 Petitioner cites to a number of cases to support his argument that the trial court 

should have instructed the jury with a specific unanimity instruction for Petitioner’s 

affirmative defense. (Doc. 32 at 9–11). Petitioner then argues that because his trial 

counsel failed to seek this jury instruction, his counsel provided ineffective assistance. 

(Doc. 32 at 11). While some of these cases are indeed Supreme Court cases, see 

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 402–03 (2000) (whether a state court ruling was 

contrary to or an unreasonable application of “clearly established” Federal law, is 

determined only by the Supreme Court of the United States in the context of habeas 

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cases), other cases cited by Petitioner are not and will not be taken into consideration. 

(Doc. 32 at 9–11). Looking exclusively at the Supreme Court cases, none of these cases 

addresses the issue of specific unanimity instruction for an affirmative defense. 

Furthermore, as stated in United States v. Southwell, 432 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 2005), 

the Supreme Court has not resolved the question of whether a specific unanimity 

instruction is needed for an affirmative defense. Therefore, there is no clearly established 

Federal law—as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States—on this 

question. Petitioner cannot show that the trial court’s denial of this ineffective assistance 

of counsel claim was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of United States 

Supreme Court precedent. 

 Additionally, Petitioner has failed to show that the trial court’s decision was based 

on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Based on the instructions that the trial 

judge gave, the jury knew they had to unanimously convict Petitioner. They also knew 

the burdens that both the State and Petitioner had to meet regarding the charged offense 

and the affirmative defense. The jury implicitly indicated that they unanimously rejected 

Petitioner’s self-defense argument by finding Petitioner unanimously guilty. For these 

reasons, ground two is denied. 

 3. Ground Three 

 “Petitioner alleges in ground three that his trial counsel provided ineffective 

assistance when he failed to seek a jury instruction on the shifting burden of proof for an 

affirmative defense.” R&R at 12. Petitioner further explains that the jury needs to be 

instructed as to the precise burden that the “defense was legally required to bear in order 

to make a prima facie case for self-defense. (Doc. 6 at 8). Petitioner seems to be 

confused as to the jury instruction provided by the trial judge. The trial judge instructed 

the jury that “[t]he defendant must prove the defense of self-defense by a preponderance 

of the evidence. Preponderance of the evidence means that the defense of self-defense is 

more probably true than not.” (Doc. 19, Exh. T at 1411). Furthermore, as stated in the 

above section, the trial judge instructed the jury that “the burden of proof with regard to 

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the elements of the charged offense is with the state. The burden of proof is beyond a 

reasonable doubt as defined in these instructions.” (Id. at 1412). 

 Therefore, Petitioner’s belief that there was no jury instruction on the shifting 

burden of proof for an affirmative defense is not supported by the record. The trial court 

instructed the jury as to the burden of proof for Petitioner’s affirmative defense and as to 

the State’s higher burden of proof to the charged offense. Because there is no factual 

basis behind Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for not seeking a jury 

instruction on the shifting burden of proof for an affirmative defense, ground three is 

denied. 

 4. Ground Four 

 Petitioner alleges in ground four that his trial counsel provided ineffective 

assistance of counsel when his counsel “entered into a stipulation without Petitioner’s 

knowledge or consent, that was: a) false and b) allowed the prosecution to introduce 

highly prejudicial and inflammatory expert testimony that was otherwise inadmissible.” 

(Doc. 6 at 9). Petitioner further asserts that “[t]he stipulation entered into by defense 

counsel held that the marriage between Petitioner and his wife was abusive and that he 

was controlling her.” (Id.). The two stipulations at issue in ground four are: 

 Number ten, the parties stipulate that the defendant Kee Nelson 

Steah, Sr. and his wife Laverne Steah were involved in an abusive 

marriage. 

 Number eleven, the parties further stipulate that the prior stipulation of an abusive marriage provides the foundational requisite necessary for 

Kathleen Ferraro, Ph.D. to testify on the general characteristic of abusive 

relationships and its effects. 

(Doc. 19, Exh. T at 1401–02). There is nothing in the record as to the reasons that parties 

entered into the stipulations. Furthermore, there is nothing on the record that indicates 

Petitioner was unaware of, or opposed to the stipulations. 

Strickland provides that there is a strong presumption that counsel rendered 

adequate assistance and exercised reasonable professional judgment in the context of an 

ineffective assistance claim. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Additionally, acts or omissions 

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that “might be considered sound trial strategy” do not constitute ineffective assistance of 

counsel. Id. at 689. 

 The timeline of events in this case leading up to the stipulations shown above are 

informative as to Petitioner’s trial counsel’s strategy and could prove the soundness of 

such a strategy. Initially, Petitioner filed a motion in limine to stop the State from 

introducing evidence of five prior acts of violence “alleged to have been directed against 

[Petitioner] at [Petitioner’s wife] . . . .” (Doc. 19, Exh. F). The Court granted the 

Petitioner’s motion in limine and then moved to bar admission of trial testimony by the 

State’s expert witness about “battered spouse syndrome.” (Id.). The State then moved in 

limine to introduce prior acts of the Petitioner on June 14, 2005 in response to Petitioner’s 

introduction of his intention to present a claim of self-defense. (Doc. 19, Exh. E). The 

State alleged that these prior acts of violence were admissible to refute Petitioner’s claim 

of self-defense. (Id.). 

 In response to the State’s motion in limine filed on June 14, 2005, Petitioner 

argued that no alleged prior acts of violence by Petitioner against Petitioner’s wife should 

be admitted. (Doc. 19, Exh. G). The State’s response to Petitioner’s motion to preclude 

the State’s expert testimony was that the prior acts of violence were admissible and 

provided a proper foundation for the expert testimony. (Doc. 19, Exh. H). During a pretrial motions hearing on June 27, 2005, Petitioner’s wife testified that she was physically 

and emotionally abused during their twenty-five years of marriage. (Doc. 19, Exh. I at 

49, 57). On a June 30, 2005 continuation of the pre-trial motions hearing, before the 

Court issued a ruling on the motions, the State withdrew its “404B Motion regarding 

prior bad acts.” (Doc. 19, Exh J). 

 As stated above under Strickland, acts or omissions that might be considered 

sound trial strategy do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 689. It is plausible to the Court that Petitioner’s trial counsel stipulated to the 

abusive marriage to eliminate the risk of an adverse ruling by the trial court on the State’s 

motion in limine. And Petitioner’s trial counsel may also have stipulated to the abusive 

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marriage to eliminate the risk of the jury hearing damaging testimony from Petitioner’s 

wife about several specific incidents of domestic violence. Petitioner’s trial counsel 

could have agreed to a more general stipulation of an “abusive marriage” rather than risk 

this damaging testimony. 

 Further evidence of this potential agreement is that Petitioner’s wife did not testify 

at trial about any specific incidents of domestic violence, (Doc. 19, Exh. M at 479–514, 

Exh. N at 519–623, Exh. O at 628–684) and the prosecutor, during Petitioner’s cross 

examination, did not ask any specific domestic violence questions. (Doc. 19, Exh. S at 

1300–1323, Exh. T at 1348–1379). The State’s expert witness only testified about 

general abusive relationships, and not specifically about Petitioner’s relationship with his 

wife. (Doc. 19, Exh. P at 936–965). 

 Petitioner argues that the R&R did not properly address whether the trial strategy 

was sound trial strategy and that “numerous other family members who had lived with 

Petitioner” would testify that Petitioner’s wife was the actual abuser. (Doc. 41 at 14). 

Petitioner then claims that with this testimony, the stipulations at issue cannot reasonably 

be considered sound trial strategy. (Id.). However, as shown above, there is a plausible 

reason as to why Petitioner’s trial counsel stipulated to the “abusive marriage.” 

Therefore, the Court cannot conclude that the trial court applied Strickland to the facts in 

an objectively unreasonable manner in light of this potential strategy. Bell, 535 U.S. at 

698-99. It was reasonable for the trial court to conclude that the stipulations at issue 

made by Petitioner’s trial counsel did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. As 

stated above, Petitioner’s counsel prevented Petitioner’s wife from giving damaging 

testimony about Petitioner’s abusive marriage, and prevented Petitioner from being cross 

examined as to the same. For these reasons, ground four is denied. 

 5. Ground Five 

 Petitioner alleges in ground five that his “trial counsel failed to adduce testimony 

from available witness[es] refuting the stipulation and other testimony.” (Doc. 6 at 10). 

Petitioner further states that Petitioner’s children would testify that it was Petitioner’s 

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wife, not Petitioner, who was “controlling and argumentative.” (Id.). Furthermore, 

Petitioner’s children would also testify that Petitioner would diffuse hostile situations by 

leaving. (Id.). 

 As stated in the above section, the Court found that the trial court’s decision that 

trial counsel’s decision to stipulate to an “abusive marriage” did not constitute ineffective 

assistance of counsel. The Court also found that it was reasonable for the trial court to 

conclude that the stipulation was sound trial strategy by Petitioner’s trial counsel by 

limiting potentially damaging testimony about Petitioner’s abusive marriage. The 

primary purpose of the “abusive marriage” stipulation was to prevent the jury from 

hearing specific evidence of Petitioner’s domestic violence against Petitioner’s wife. 

This purpose would be undermined by having Petitioner’s children testify to refute the 

stipulation. The testimony would then allow the prosecution to cross-examine Petitioner 

and question Petitioner’s wife as to specific evidence of Petitioner’s domestic violence 

against Petitioner’s wife. 

 Therefore, Petitioner has not shown that his trial counsel was objectively deficient. 

Furthermore, Petitioner has not shown that the trial court’s decision “applied Strickland

to the facts of the case in an objectively unreasonable manner.” Bell, 535 U.S. at 698-99. 

For this reason, ground five is denied. 

 6. Ground Six 

 Petitioner alleges that his “[a]ppellate counsel [provided ineffective assistance 

when she] failed to challenge the trial court’s constitutional error, preserved by objection, 

in failing to sup[p]ress Petitioner’s statements that were made after he was in custody but 

prior to being Mirandized.” (Doc. 6 at 11). Petitioner further alleges that his trial 

counsel preserved the issue by objecting at trial. (Id.). 

 The trial court, in an order filed on May 26, 2005, ruled on “Defendant’s Motion 

to Suppress certain Statements.” (Doc. 19, Exh. C). Within this order the trial court 

attempted to separate different statements based upon the timeframe. (Id.). The trial 

court ruled that statements by Petitioner made to the initial arriving officer were 

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admissible because the Petitioner “was not in custody at the time and the statements 

were made in response to questions from the officer” determining the “status of the scene 

and the safety risks to the officer and others.” (Id.). The trial court also ruled that 

statements made to the police chief “while [Petitioner] was in the back of the ambulance 

[were] admissible” because the chief was asking questions related to the Petitioner’s 

well-being and the statements were “clearly voluntary.” (Id.). Finally, the trial court 

ruled that the only statements not admissible were those made after Petitioner invoked his 

Miranda rights at the police station, but before Petitioner “clearly withdrew” the 

invocation of his Miranda rights and “agreed to talk to the officers.” (Id.). 

 Petitioner fails to identify in his Amended Petition, Memorandum of Points and 

Authorities, and his objection to the R&R, the specific statements he is claiming should 

have been suppressed and should have then been addressed on direct appeal. In 

Petitioner’s objection to the R&R, he asserts that “it is the height of absurdity to assert 

that Petitioner was not in custody immediately” upon the first police officer’s arrival at 

the scene. (Doc. 41 at 16). The Court interprets this statement as an assertion that none 

of Petitioner’s statements to police were admissible. Petitioner further supports this 

statement by asserting that Petitioner was in custody immediately after the initial 

handcuffing by the arriving officer at the scene and assumedly for the rest of the police’s 

questioning. (Doc. 41 at 17). Petitioner cites to several Miranda-related Supreme Court 

cases supporting his assertion that he was in custody for all of the questioning. (Id.). 

 As noted above, Petitioner bears the burden of proving that the high standards for 

habeas relief have been met. See Woodford, 537 U.S. at 25. Petitioner has not met this 

burden here. While Petitioner does argue generally that he was in custody, he does not 

address the different times or situations specifically and how these different 

circumstances affect his general custody argument. The trial court ruled that various 

statements were admissible for a variety of reasons, including that the questioning was 

not a custodial interrogation, the statements were clearly voluntary, and that the Petitioner 

withdrew his invocation of his Miranda rights. (Doc. 19, Exh. C). Without an analysis 

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tailored to the different times or statements made to police, Petitioner has not shown that 

the trial court’s decision denying his post-conviction relief was contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of Strickland, or that the decision was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the record before the trial court. For these reasons, 

ground six is denied. 

 7. Ground Seven 

Petitioner alleges in ground seven that his direct appeal counsel provided 

ineffective assistance when she failed to “assert a claim of prosecutorial misconduct for 

impeaching the Petitioner with an alleged statement that had not been disclosed by the 

prosecution” and when she failed to seek “appellate review of the trial court’s ruling on 

the issue.” (Doc. 6 at 12). Petitioner is referring to a statement made by the police chief 

stating that Petitioner had told the police chief that he “pulled the knife.” (Id.). Petitioner 

further asserts that the alleged statement was not found on any recordings or transcripts 

and was not disclosed by the prosecution. (Id.). 

 The statement at issue occurred when the police chief testified on rebuttal that he 

reviewed the audio recording that morning of Petitioner’s statements during the booking 

process. (Doc. 19, Exh. T at 1381–82). The police chief then testified that after a 

detective commented on eating too much pizza, Petitioner stated “I should have just 

kicked his ass. I shouldn’t have pulled the knife. I just should have kicked his ass.” (Id.

at 1383). The police chief further testified that the above statement by Petitioner was 

exactly what was on the audio recording. (Id. at 1384). Before this rebuttal testimony, 

Petitioner initially testified that he told the police chief that he picked the knife up off the 

table after he and the victim started fighting. (Doc. 19, Exh. S at 1311). Petitioner, on 

cross-examination, also denied telling the police chief that he “pulled the knife” during 

the booking process. (Doc. 19, Exh. T at 1365). This is where the statement comes 

under dispute. 

 Petitioner’s trial counsel initially objected on the ground that the prosecutor was 

asking the same questions he asked when the police chief was previously on the stand. 

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(Doc. 19, Exh. T at 1383). The trial court overruled the objection. (Id.). Petitioner’s trial 

counsel did not object on the basis of non-disclosure or prosecutorial misconduct. (Id.). 

On a later motion for a new trial, Petitioner’s trial counsel argued that the prosecution 

failed to disclose this statement about Petitioner pulling the knife instead of picking the 

knife up off the table. (Doc. 19, Exh. X at 14–15). Petitioner’s trial counsel explained 

that the audio recording was of poor quality and that the statement was neither on the 

initial transcript, nor the police chief’s annotated version of the transcript. (Id.). 

Petitioner’s trial counsel then argued that the first mention of this statement was when the 

police chief testified that he heard Petitioner state it based off the audio recording the 

police chief reviewed that morning. (Id.). 

 The trial court denied the motion for a new trial by finding that the police chief’s 

rebuttal testimony was proper impeachment evidence, and the statement was properly 

admitted. (Doc. 19, Exh. X at 23–24). The trial court also found that the transcripts and 

recording were “troublesome,” but both parties knew that going into trial, and the officers 

were available before trial to resolve any problems prior to trial. (Id. at 24). Finally, the 

trial court found that the state did not err in regards to the statement. (Id.). Furthermore, 

the trial court, on post-conviction review, rejected Petitioner’s claim that his appellate 

counsel was ineffective when she did not pursue this issue on direct appeal. (Doc. 19, 

Exh. JJ). 

 The Court finds no basis to conclude that the trial court’s denial of this ground on 

post-conviction relief was an objectively unreasonable application of Strickland to the 

facts of this case. Therefore it is unlikely that the Arizona Court of Appeals would have 

concluded that the trial court erred in its ruling on the police chief’s rebuttal testimony, 

even if Petitioner’s appellate counsel had raised it. Counsel is not ineffective for failing 

to make a futile argument. Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1445 (9th Cir. 1996) (In 

evaluating counsel’s performance, counsel’s failure to take action that would have been 

futile can never be deficient performance.). 

 Petitioner states in his objection to the R&R that the prosecution must have had 

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advanced knowledge of the content of the statement because they used the statement to 

impeach Petitioner. (Doc. 41 at 18). Petitioner further argues that this is prosecutorial 

misconduct and the Magistrate Judge incorrectly concluded that it was highly unlikely 

Petitioner would have prevailed on direct appeal. (Id.). While Petitioner disagrees with 

the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion, he fails to argue how the trial court’s denial of postconviction relief was an objectively unreasonable application of Strickland to the facts of 

this case. Strickland requires that Petitioner shows his counsel’s performance was 

objectively deficient, and that this performance prejudiced Petitioner. Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 687. Here, as stated above, at trial both sides knew about the “troublesome” 

audio recording and the trial judge found that the State did not err in regards to the 

statement made by the police chief. Petitioner has not met his burden of showing that his 

direct appeal counsel’s performance was objectively deficient for not seeking review of 

the issue on appeal. For these reasons, ground seven is denied. 

 8. Ground Eight 

 Petitioner alleges in ground eight that his direct appeal counsel provided 

ineffective assistance when she “failed to challenge the trial court’s denial of trial 

counsel’s objection to the state’s introduction of a prior bad act that the trial court had 

precluded.” (Doc. 6 at 13). Petitioner further alleges that a statement the police chief, 

made in regards to a prior knife fight Petitioner was involved in, denied Petitioner a fair 

trial and was preserved for appellate review. (Id.). 

 Due to a pre-trial motion in limine, the trial court granted Petitioner’s request to 

preclude the State from introducing evidence of a prior knife fight between Petitioner and 

his brother in 1982. (Doc. 19, Exh. D at 5–8). During the police chief’s questioning, the 

prosecution asked the police chief about his initial questioning of Petitioner’s wife at the 

scene of the alleged crime. (Doc. 19, Exh. R at 1168). The police chief stated that 

Petitioner’s wife said “he was a very violent man. This is not his first knife fight.” (Id.). 

Petitioner’s trial counsel promptly objected and moved for a mistrial, which the trial 

judge denied. (Id. at 1168–69). The trial court offered to order the testimony stricken, 

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but Petitioner’s trial counsel declined. (Id. at 1169). Petitioner’s trial counsel again 

raised the issue in the trial judge’s chambers that the statement by the police chief was 

deeply prejudicial and warranted a mistrial. (Id. at 1180). The trial court clarified its 

ruling that while it had excluded the evidence of the previous knife fight, the statement 

that the police chief attributed to Petitioner’s wife “probably reflects more on her state of 

mind.” (Id.). The trial court then found that there had been a lot of testimony on 

Petitioner’s wife’s state of mind, and the statement did not warrant a mistrial (Id. at 

1180–81). Petitioner’s trial counsel raised this issue for a third time at the end of the trial 

in another motion for a new trial. (Doc. 19, Exh. X at 13). The trial court again denied 

the motion for a new trial, finding that any error was cured by the trial court’s ruling. (Id.

at 24). 

 The Arizona Court of Appeals also addressed the argument in their memorandum 

decision on Petitioner’s direct appeal. (Doc. 19, Exh. EE at 7–11). The Court of Appeals 

explained that the statement “could not be so prejudicial as to tip the scale against 

[Petitioner] because that statement alone does not suggest [Petitioner] was the aggressor 

in the fight or that [Petitioner] was acting in ways other than self-defense.” (Id. at 10). 

This shows that Petitioner’s direct appeal counsel did indeed raise the issue on appeal. 

Thus, Petitioner has not shown that his direct appeal counsel was objectively deficient, as 

required under Strickland. 

 Petitioner argues in his objection to the R&R that his direct appeal counsel only 

argued the “prejudicial effect of the statement, not the trial court’s improper basis for 

denying the trial attorney’s objection or the trial court’s improper basis for denying the 

defense motion for mistrial.” (Doc. 41 at 19). Petitioner also argues that the Arizona 

Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the statement was not significantly prejudicial, “flies in 

the face of Supreme Court precedent.” (Id.). Neither of these arguments show deficient 

performance of Petitioner’s direct appeal counsel nor prejudice under Strickland. 

Therefore, Petitioner has not shown that the trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief 

was an objectively unreasonable application of Strickland to the facts of this case. For 

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these reasons, ground eight is denied. 

IV. Request for Evidentiary Hearing

 Petitioner filed a motion for an evidentiary hearing. (Doc. 6 at 15). In order to be 

entitled to a federal evidentiary hearing, Petitioner needs to show that “(1) he has alleged 

facts that, if proven, would entitle him to habeas relief, and (2) he did not receive a full 

and fair opportunity to develop those facts in a state court.” Williams v. Woodford, 384 

F.3d 567, 586 (9th Cir. 2002). As shown by the analysis above, Petitioner has not alleged 

facts that, if true, would entitle him to habeas relief. Therefore, the Court denies the 

request for an evidentiary hearing. 

V. Conclusion 

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s motion for an evidentiary hearing (Doc. 6 at 

15) is denied. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation is accepted 

and adopted (Doc. 33), the objections are overruled (Doc. 41), the Petition in this case is 

denied, with prejudice, and the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment accordingly. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the “Motion for Extension of Time for Filing 

Reply to Objection to Report and Recommendation” (Doc. 43) is denied. However, the 

Court will consider Petitioner’s reply regardless. 

IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that pursuant to Rule 11 of the Rules Governing 

Section 2254 Cases, in the event Petitioner files an appeal, the Court denies issuance of a 

certificate of appealability because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the 

denial of a constitutional right. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). 

 Dated this 24th day of March, 2015. 

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