Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02295/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02295-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

MASON KENT McENTIRE, )

)

Petitioner, ) CIV 09-02295 PHX JAT (MEA)

)

v. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

DEPUTY WARDEN WHITE, ARIZONA )

ATTORNEY GENERAL, )

) 

 Respondents. )

) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE JAMES A. TEILBORG:

On or about October 29, 2009, Petitioner filed a pro se

petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254. Respondents filed an answer to the petition on May 17,

2010. See Docket No. 11 (“Answer”). On June 1, 2010,

Petitioner filed a response to the motion to dismiss the habeas

petition. See Docket No. 12.

 I Procedural History

A Maricopa County grand jury indictment issued August

2, 2006, charged Petitioner with two counts of child

molestation, each a Class 2 felony and dangerous crime against

children, and one count of public sexual indecency involving a

minor under fifteen years of age, classified as a Class 5

felony. See Answer, Exh. A. The state further alleged several

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1 The presentence report indicates that, in the context of

the investigation into the charges on which he was indicted,

Petitioner admitted to molesting the female named in the plea

agreement at some point prior to the time of the events stated in the

indictment. Petitioner is the uncle of all three of the victims.

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aggravating circumstances, including multiple offenses not

occurring on the same date. See id., Exh. B.

On January 12, 2007, Petitioner and his counsel signed

a plea agreement with regard to the charges stated in the grand

jury indictment. See id., Exh. C. Petitioner and the state

agreed that Petitioner would plead guilty to one count of public

indecency to a minor and two counts of attempted child

molestation. Id., Exh. C. The plea agreement provided that,

pursuant to his conviction on the first count of attempted child

molestation, Petitioner would be sentenced to a term of no less

than 10 years imprisonment, the presumptive sentence for this

crime. Id., Exh. C. The plea agreement further provided

Petitioner would be sentenced to a term of lifetime probation

pursuant to his convictions on the other two counts of the

indictment. Id., Exh. C. The plea agreement also stipulated

that the state would not file charges against Petitioner with

regard to another female not named in the original indictment.

Id., Exh. C.1 

Additionally, the plea agreement specifically waived

Petitioner’s right to appeal his convictions and sentences if he

was sentenced in accord with the agreement. Id., Exh. C.

Petitioner also agreed to judicial fact-finding by a

preponderance of the evidence with regard to any imposed

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sentence enhancement. Id., Exh. C. 

A hearing regarding Petitioner’s guilty plea was

conducted on January 19, 2007. Id., Exh. D & Exh. E. At the

hearing Petitioner and his counsel stipulated as to the factual

basis for each count of conviction. Id., Exh. D & Exh. E.

Petitioner averred his guilty pleas were knowing and voluntary.

Id., Exh. D & Exh. E. 

A presentencing investigation was conducted. Id., Exh.

F. The presentence report recommended imposition of the

presumptive term of imprisonment pursuant to Petitioner’s

conviction on Count 1. Id., Exh. F. The prosecutor asked the

trial court to impose the maximum sentence of 15 years

imprisonment pursuant to Petitioner’s conviction on Count 1.

Id., Exh. F. A sentencing hearing was conducted on February 26,

2007. Id., Exh. G. Petitioner’s mother and his counsel spoke

on his behalf at the sentencing hearing. Id., Exh. G.

Petitioner addressed the trial court at the hearing, stating

that, although it did not excuse his behavior, the court did not

have subject matter jurisdiction over his case. Id., Exh. G at

15-18. 

The state trial court found the existence of

aggravating factors, including the age of the victims, i.e.,

seven years old and three years old, and the fact that the

victims were Petitioner’s nieces. Id., Exh. G. The court also

found the existence of mitigating factors, including

Petitioner’s age, his mental disposition, and his acceptance of

responsibility. Id., Exh. G. Finding that the mitigating and

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aggravating factors counter-balanced each other, the court

imposed the presumptive term of imprisonment pursuant to

Petitioner’s conviction for attempted child molestation, i.e.,

ten years. Id., Exh. G at 20. The trial court imposed a

sentence of lifetime probation on each of the other two counts

to which Petitioner pled guilty. Id., Exh. G.

On May 24, 2007, Petitioner initiated an action for

post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of

Criminal Procedure. Id., Exh. I. Petitioner’s appointed

counsel subsequently averred she could find no colorable claims

to raise on Petitioner’s behalf. Petitioner filed a pro se

petition for post-conviction relief in which he argued that his

10 year prison sentence was illegal because attempted

molestation of a child was not a “dangerous crime against

children” as that term is defined by Arizona Revised Statutes §

13–604.01.

The state trial court denied relief in a decision

issued September 22, 2008. The trial court concluded Petitioner

was “properly sentenced” pursuant to his conviction for

attempted child molestation. Id., Exh. S. As recited by

Respondents, the record in this matter indicates that the

Arizona Court of Appeals may or may not have properly denied

reviewed of the trial court’s decision denying relief pursuant

to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. Because

Respondents do not assert Petitioner has not exhausted his state

remedies, the Magistrate Judge concludes recitation of that

portion of the record is not necessary.

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In his federal habeas petition Petitioner asserts he is

subject to an illegal sentence in violation of his rights

pursuant to the Sixth Amendment and his right to due process of

law. Petitioner contends:

In April 2008, Petitioner filed a pro se PCR

petition raising one claim––specifically,

that his 10 year prison term imposed on count

one is illegal because ... Arizona Revised

Statute 13–604.01 does not apply to his crime

of Attempted Molestation of Child. Petitioner

claims that A.R.S. 13–604.01 does not provide

a conviction or sentence for “Attempted”, but

that under ARS provides for a sentence and

conviction for molestation of a child, but

ARS 13–604.01 does not provide for a

conviction of Attempted Child Molestation in

this case. 

Petitioner argues he has been sentenced pursuant to a

statute that does not “provide a conviction or sentence in this

case.”

Respondents assert:

Neither an extended exegesis on the contours

of the Sixth Amendment and the Due Process

Clause nor a comprehensive exploration of

federal habeas jurisprudence is needed to

resolve Petitioner’s claim. The state trial

court correctly rejected Petitioner’s federal

claim because the trial court lawfully

sentenced him under statutes that

indisputably apply to his conviction.

In his reply to the answer to his petition, Petitioner

contends his Eighth Amendment rights were violated because he

has a due process right to have a “correct sentence imposed by

proper authority.” Petitioner alleges that his lifetime

probation sentences violate his constitutional rights because

“sentences imposed on more than one offense at the same time are

presumed to run concurrently.” Petitioner asserts his sentences

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are “wrong,” in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights.

II Analysis

Regardless of any failure to properly exhaust his

habeas claims in the state courts, Petitioner is not entitled to

federal habeas relief based on a claim that he was sentenced

pursuant to the “wrong” state statute. As explained by

Respondents, Petitioner was not sentenced pursuant to the

“wrong” statute.

The State of Arizona classifies the completed

crime of molestation of a child as a

first-degree dangerous crime against children

under § 13–604.01(M)(1)(d), and establishes

a presumptive term of 17 years’ imprisonment

for this Class 2 felony. See A.R.S. §

13–604.01(D) (“[A] person who is at least

eighteen years of age or who has been tried

as an adult and who stands convicted of a

dangerous crime against children in the first

degree involving ... molestation of a child

... shall be sentenced to a presumptive term

of imprisonment for seventeen years.”). The

State classifies the preparatory crime of

attempted molestation of a child as a Class

3 felony and a second-degree dangerous crime

against children in two ways: the general

language of the State’s “attempt” statutes,

and the specific language of the

dangerous-crimes-against-children statute

itself. Compare A.R.S. § 13– 1001(C)(2)

(“Attempt is a ... Class 3 felony if the

offense attempted is a [C]lass 2 felony.”)

with A.R.S. § 13–604.01(M)(1) (“A dangerous

crime against children is in the first degree

if it is a completed offense and is in the

second degree if it is a preparatory offense,

except attempted first degree murder is a

dangerous crime against children in the first

degree.”). A Class 3 felony that is a

second-degree dangerous crime against

children--such as the attempted molestation

of a child conviction to which Petitioner

pleaded guilty––carries the same presumptive

term of imprisonment to which Petitioner

stipulated in his plea agreement: 10 years’

imprisonment. See A.R.S. § 13–604.01(I).

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 Although Petitioner is correct that the

phrase “Attempted Child Molestation” does not

appear in § 13–604.01, the crime is included

by reference in § 13–604.01(I) by that

section’s explicit statement that “a person

who is at least eighteen years of age or who

has been tried as an adult and who stands

convicted of a dangerous crime against

children in the second degree pursuant to

subsection C or D of this section is guilty

of a [C]lass 3 felony and shall be sentenced

to a presumptive term of imprisonment for ten

years.” See State v. Peek, 195 P.3d 641,

642–644 (Ariz. 2008) (referring to the

inclusion of second-degree, preparatory based

offenses in § 13–604.01 as “clear language

subjecting attempt offenses” to its

provisions)...

Docket No. 11 at 6-7. Accordingly, Petitioner was not sentenced

pursuant to the “wrong” statute.

 Additionally, a state prisoner may obtain a writ of

habeas corpus only upon a showing that he is being held in

violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United

States. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1994 & Supp. 2010); Engle v.

Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 119, 102 S. Ct. 1558, 1567 (1982). Federal

habeas relief is not available for alleged errors in the

interpretation or application of state law, including a state’s

statutes regarding imposition of consecutive or concurrent

sentences. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68, 112 S.

Ct. 475, 480 (1991); Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th

Cir. 1985). “[A] mere violation of state law is not the

automatic equivalent of a violation of the federal

Constitution.” Chambers v. Bowersox, 157 F.3d 560, 564 (8th

Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). 

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Federal habeas relief must be predicated on a violation

of the United States Constitution or a federal statute; to be

entitled to habeas relief based on an error of state law, the

state court’s decision must be so fundamentally unfair or unjust

as to violate due process, a condition rarely satisfied. See

Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41-42, 104 S. Ct. 871, 874-75

(1984). Some aspects of the sentencing process created by state

law are so fundamental that the state must adhere to them in

order to impose a valid sentence. See Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447

U.S. 343, 345-47, 100 S. Ct. 2227, 2229-30 (1980); Lannert v.

Jones, 321 F.3d 747, 751-52 (8th Cir. 2003). However, in

Pulley, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the state’s

alleged failure to apply its own proportionality analysis in a

death sentence case was a basis for federal habeas relief.

Accordingly, Petitioner’s objections to the sentencing procedure

in his case do not warrant federal habeas review.

To the extent that Petitioner is requesting habeas

relief on the basis of the trial court’s violation or

misapplication of Arizona statutes in and of themselves, “he

fails to state a basis for federal habeas relief because

‘alleged errors in the application of state law are not

cognizable in federal habeas corpus.’” Moor v. Palmer, 603 F.3d

658, 661 (9th Cir. 2010), quoting Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d

1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1996). To the extent that Petitioner

asserts his sentence violated his right to due process because

it was improper pursuant to Arizona statutory law, Petitioner

has not stated a claim for federal habeas relief. See Souch v.

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Schaivo, 289 F.3d 616, 623 (9th Cir. 2002). Although Petitioner

asserts that his right to due process was violated because the

state allegedly did not follow its sentencing statutes, the

characterization of this claim in this fashion does not render

it cognizable on federal habeas review. See Cacoperdo v.

Demonsthenes, 37 F.3d 504, 507 (9th Cir. 1994); Dellinger v.

Bowen, 301 F.3d 758, 765 (7th Cir. 2002). 

Similarly, the assertion that the state violated its

sentencing statutes with regard to categorization of

Petitioner’s crimes does not implicate the Eighth Amendment

right to be free of a cruel and unusual sentence or the Sixth

Amendment’s guarantee of a fair trial, including representation

by competent counsel and the right to be found guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt by a jury on each element of the crime of

conviction. Because this claim is not cognizable on federal

habeas review, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this

claim. 

III Conclusion

The habeas petition does not state a cognizable claim

for federal habeas relief. Petitioner’s assertion that the

state court erred by sentencing him pursuant to statute not

applicable to his crime of conviction is factually and legally

incorrect. Additionally, even if legally correct, a state’s

violation its own sentencing statutes does not in and of itself

violate the petitioner’s right to due process of law and

Petitioner did not receive a sentence that was fundamentally

unfair or fundamentally unjust.

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IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. McEntire’s

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter,

the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a

response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules

of Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the

District of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation

may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. 

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge.

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DATED this 3rd day of June, 2010.

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