Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00794/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00794-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

ALFREDO KUBA,

NO. CIV. S-05-0794 WBS JFM

Plaintiff,

v. ORDER RE: MOTION FOR 

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIVE AND 

DECLARATORY RELIEF

MARINE WORLD JOINT POWERS

AUTHORITY, an unknown business

entity; SIX FLAGS THEME PARKS

INC., d/b/a Six Flags Marine

World, a Delaware corporation;

PARK MANAGEMENT CORPORATION,

d/b/a Six Flags Marine World,

a California corporation; JOE

MECK, an individual; DALE

ARNOLD, an individual; AARON

ARKY, an individual; CITY OF

VALLEJO, d/b/a Marine World

Joint Powers Authority;

VALLEJO POLICE DEPARTMENT;

LIEUTENANT SALINAS, an

individual; OFFICER DOUGLAS

WILCOX, an individual;

SERGEANT SCHROEDER, an

individual; OFFICER THOMPSON,

an individual; OFFICER

HAMMRICK, an individual;

OFFICER BAUTISTA, an

individual; RAY MATELA, an

individual; CHRIS NEVASCA, an

individual; MICAH BAKER, an

individual; RON CERVANTEZ, an

individual; and DOES 1 through

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96, inclusive,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff Alfredo Kuba seeks declaratory and injunctive

relief establishing that he has a constitutional right of freedom

of expression at the front entrance of Marine World Park, and

that defendants’ public assembly policy is unconstitutional. 

Defendant City of Vallejo has filed a statement of non-opposition

to the motion, pursuant to Local Rule 78-230(c). Defendants Park

Management Corp., d/b/a Six Flags Marine World, Six Flags Theme

Parks, Inc., Dale Arnold, Joe Meck, Ray Matela, Chris Nevasca,

Micah Baker, and Ron Cervantez oppose this motion.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

In 1997, defendant Six Flags, Inc. contracted to manage

a portion of Six Flags Marine World with the Marine World Joint

Powers Authority (“MWJPA”), a public agency created by agreement

between the City of Vallejo and the Redevelopment Agency of the

City of Vallejo. (Pl.’s Mot. for Preliminary Injunctive and

Declaratory Relief, Evans Decl. Ex. 6 (Amended and Restated 1997

Management Agreement Relating to Marine World).) MWJPA’s purpose

is to accept conveyance of the assets, assume the liabilities,

and protect the City of Vallejo’s interests related to Marine

World (“the park”). (Id. at 2.) Moreover, MWJPA bears the

“overall responsibility for all activities and facilities at

Marine World.” (Id.) Defendant Six Flags, Inc. operates the

park pursuant to a long-term lease, paying nominal rent in the

amount of one dollar per year per forty acres of land (id. Ex. 7

(Parcel Lease) at 5), and receiving a management fee and 80% of

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the net cash flow generated by the combined operations of the

park. (Id., Ex. 3 (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Form

10-K) at 2.) Defendant MWJPA receives the remaining 20% of the

net revenue. (Id., Ex. 9 (Revenue Sharing Agreement) at 5.) 

The land at the park is divided into two categories: a

public parcel and a private parcel. (Id., Ex. 7 at 3.) The

private parcel is leased by Six Flags, Inc., but the public

parcel is, as its name suggests, public land. (Id.) The public

parcel includes parking facilities, the front entrance, the entry

area including ticket sales and admission facilities, public

walkways, paths, restrooms, dining facilities, and other areas

intended for use by patrons. (Id., Ex. 8 (Reciprocal Easement

Agreement) at 6.) 

Plaintiff has been arrested twice while at Marine World

in the “public parcel” section, once while on a sidewalk, and

then again while on the grass outside the entrance of the park. 

(Id., Ex. 1 (Trial Transcript).) Plaintiff was charged with

trespass under California Penal Code § 602(o), but the case was

dismissed based in part on a finding that the entire park,

including where plaintiff was arrested, was open to the general

public. (Id.)

Marine World has a public assembly policy (“the

policy”) explaining that the park is a “privately managed

property that invites the general public.” (Id., Ex. 10 (Public

Assembly Policy at 1).) The policy further requires that any

individual or group “desiring to assemble for the purpose of

exercising constitutional rights” must make a written request and

provide personal information about themselves at least seven days

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Plaintiff’s counsel represented at oral argument that 1

there are generally three people present at any given protest

organized by plaintiff, but that no more than ten people would

attend. 

4

in advance of the intended exercise of those rights. (Id.) 

Assembly is permitted only in three locations that have been

expressly designated for assembly by Marine World. (Id.) The

policy prohibits the distribution of leaflets, handouts, fliers,

and other writings regardless of content and also prohibits

“grossly or gruesome displays.” (Id. at 1-2.) The policy also

prohibits assembly altogether on “high volume days.” (Id. at 2

(“Due to increased traffic activities during high volume days,

and to avoid problems with ingress and egress of vehicular and/or

pedestrian traffic, no assembly can occur [on blackout days] . .

. .” ).) These blackout days are: Memorial Day Weekend, July 4th

Weekend, Labor Day Weekend, and Easter Weekend. (Id.) 

Plaintiff seeks to exercise his free speech rights with

a group of no more than ten people at Marine World on Memorial 1

Day weekend, just two weeks from the date of oral argument on

this motion. (Kuba Decl. ¶ 6.) Additionally, plaintiff requests

immediate injunctive relief enjoining defendants from enforcing

their Public Assembly Policy and/or a court order for declaratory

relief that would establish his ability to exercise his

constitutional right of freedom of expression at the front

entrance of Marine World. 

II. Discussion

A. Injunctive relief

“To obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party

must demonstrate either (1) probable success on the merits and

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the possibility of irreparable injury, or (2) that serious

questions are raised and the balance of hardships sharply favors

the moving party. These are not separate tests, but are the ends

of a continuum; the greater the relative hardship to the moving

party, the less probability of success must be shown.” Nat’l

Ctr. for Immigrants Rights, Inc. v. I.N.S., 743 F.2d 1365, 1369

(9th Cir. 1984) (internal citations omitted). Plaintiff seeks a

preliminary injunction, arguing that the balance of hardships

tips heavily in his favor and that he has a high probability of

success on the merits. 

1. Balance of Hardships

Defendants’ interest here is to “provide freedom from

the disruption of normal business operations and freedom from

interference with customer convenience, as well as safety to

guests.” (Defs.’ Opp’n to Mot. for Preliminary Injunctive Relief

6.) However, defendants fail to provide any evidence that the

safety of their guests is in any way threatened by plaintiff’s

plan for a group of three to ten people to stand outside the

entrance of the park, hold signs, and distribute leaflets. Thus,

this threat to customer safety is purely speculative. 

Moreover, although it may be reasonable to assume that

defendants’ customers may be caused some inconvenience as they

attempt to enter the park, inconvenience to customers does not

clearly outweigh the value of exercising first amendment rights. 

Carreras v. City of Anaheim, 768 F.2d 1039, 1046 (1985)

(“Annoyance and inconvenience, however, are a small price to pay

for preservation of our most cherished right” (quoting Wirta v.

Alameda-Contra Costa County Transit Dist., 68 Cal. 2d 51, 62

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Plaintiff does not specify whether his challenge is 2

“facial” or “as-applied.” A “facial” challenge alleges that the

policy on its face is unconstitutional and “creates an

unacceptable risk of the suppression of ideas.” Foti v. City of

Menlo Park, 146 F.3d 629, 635 (9th Cir. 1998). An “as-applied”

challenge requests that the court find the policy

unconstitutional as applied to the activity in which the

plaintiff in particular seeks to engage. Id. Based on

plaintiff’s arguments for declaratory relief that the policy is

unconstitutional, and the fact that plaintiff seeks injunctive

relief in order to enable him to protest on Memorial Day weekend,

the court presumes that plaintiff challenges the

constitutionality of defendants’ policy both facially and asapplied.

6

(1967), overruled on other grounds by L.A. Alliance For Survival

v. City of L.A., 22 Cal. 4th 352 (2000))). The disruption of

normal business relationships will also be short-lived, as

plaintiff does not seek to enter the park, but merely plans for

his group to protest at the entrance. However, defendants may

experience some increased disruption or added expenses because

they will have to collect the trash resulting from plaintiff’s

distribution of leaflets. 

Plaintiff’s potential hardships, by contrast, are

significant and irreparable. Denying plaintiff his right to

exercise his freedom of expression is a denial of constitutional

rights. Unlike monetary injuries, “[a]ny loss of First Amendment

freedoms, even briefly, can constitute irreparable injury.” Id.

at 1214 (citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)). Thus,

the balance of hardships clearly tilts in plaintiff’s favor.

2. Probability of Success on the Merits

Plaintiff seeks the invalidation of defendants’ permit

policy governing the exercise of rights to free speech and

assembly. Thus, an analysis of the constitutionality of 2

defendant’s policy is required to determine the likelihood of

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plaintiff’s success on the merits.

Where possible, the court should attempt to address 

issues that may be resolved without addressing federal

constitutional law. “Generally speaking, district courts must

address issues of state constitutional law prior to addressing

issues of federal constitutional law.” Int’l Soc’y for Krishna

Consciousness v. City of L.A., 966 F. Supp. 956, 959 (C.D. Cal.

1997). In particular, “where the state provisions offer more

expansive protection than the federal constitution, we must

address the state constitutional claims in order to avoid

unnecessary consideration of the federal constitutional claims.” 

Id. (citing Vernon v. City of L.A., 27 F.3d 1385, 1391-92 (9th

Cir. 1994)). Because “[i]t is widely recognized that the Liberty

of Speech provision of the California Constitution provides more

expansive protection of speech than does the First Amendment to

the United States Constitution,” id., the court will first look

to the constitutionality of defendants’ actions under California

law. 

a. Public Forum Analysis

A determination that a place is a public forum is

merely “constitutional shorthand for the proposition that . . .

government cannot regulate speech-related conduct in such places

except in narrow ways shown to be necessary to serve significant

government interests . . . even if [there are] ample alternatives

for communicati[on].” Prisoners Union v. Cal. Dep’t of Corrs.,

135 Cal. App. 3d 930, 935 (1982) (quotation omitted). The first

question in an application of the public forum doctrine is

whether a particular place is a public forum. Making this

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 Under the broad protection offered by the California 3

Liberty of Speech Clause, even privately owned facilities that

are open to the public are subject to the public forum doctrine. 

See Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 23 Cal. 3d 854, 908

(1979). Additionally, although defendant Six Flags, Inc. is a

private party, and a showing of state action is essential to

establish the occurrence of a constitutional violation, Sutton v.

Providence St. Joseph Med. Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 838 (9th Cir.

1999), actions taken by private parties may constitute state

action in certain circumstances. The government may become

“sufficiently entangled in the actions of a private party to

warrant a requirement that such conduct conform to constitutional

standards of behavior.” Holodnak v. Avco Corp., 514 F.2d 285,

289 (2d Cir. 1975). 

A lessor-lessee relationship between the government and

a private actor and interconnected finances have been found to

warrant state responsibility for the private actor’s conduct. 

See, e.g., Avco, 514 F.2d at 289-90 (applying constitutional

strictures where the government and a private corporation had a

“symbiotic” relationship in that the “enterprise to which the

Government contributed land, buildings, and equipment, and for

which Avco supplied the labor force, was operated to their mutual

benefit”); Burton, 365 U.S. at 719-720, 726 (concluding that

where the government leased property to a private company,

furnished heat for the premises, made structural repairs at its

own expense, and retained the right to place directional signs on

the exterior of the space, constitutional standards apply “as

certainly as though they were binding covenants written into the

agreement itself”).

 Here, the state agency formed by the City of Vallejo, 

MWJPA, owns the land, infrastructure, and buildings in question,

and private entity defendant Six Flags, Inc. leases this land for

a nominal fee. The management of the park is given over to

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determination under California law requires determining whether

“the manner of expression is basically incompatible with the

normal activity of a particular place at a particular time.” 

Int’l Soc’y, 966 F. Supp. at 961 (quoting Prisoners Union, 135

Cal. App. 3d at 939); see also In re Hoffman, 67 Cal. 2d 845, 849

(1967); U.C. Nuclear Weapons Labs v. Lawrence Livermore Lab., 154

Cal. App. 3d 1157, 1164 (1984). “Thus, for the purposes of the

California Liberty of Speech Clause, the ‘public forum’ doctrine

is not limited to traditional public forums such as streets,

sidewalks, or parks . . . .” Carreras, 768 F.2d at 1045. 3

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defendant Six Flags, Inc. and the profits are split between the

MWJPA and Six Flags, Inc. Additionally, upon entering into this

joint venture with defendant Six Flags, Inc., defendant MWJPA

retained “overall responsibility for all activities and

facilities at Marine World.” Thus, it is clear that the

relationship between the City of Vallejo and private entity

defendants is a closely intertwined partnership such that

constitutional standards of behavior apply here. 

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The compatibility of speech-related activity at a

government institution is tested in the following way: “(1) if

the activity is peaceful, lawful, and does not interfere with the

functions performed, it cannot be banned; (2) if there is

interference, the availability of alternative channels is

addressed; (3) [w]here the relevant audience is found only in a

particular place . . . [t]he bare possibility of alternative ways

to communicate the same message should not suffice to defeat the

first amendment claim.” Allred v. Shawley, 232 Cal. App. 3d

1489, 1499 (1991) (internal quotations omitted). The party who

is attempting to prevent or halt expressive activity bears the

burden of establishing “basic incompatibility.” Int’l Soc’y, 966

F. Supp. at 964. 

 Defendants here have not met their burden of

establishing the “basic incompatibility” of plaintiff’s exercise

of his freedom of speech with the primary purposes of the

entrance, parking lot, and walkways of the park. In Carreras,

the court found that the exterior walkways and parking areas of a

stadium and convention center were areas where “the public was

free to come and go,” and the primary purpose of these areas was

“to facilitate parking and allow for the free flow of pedestrian

and vehicular traffic.” 768 F.2d at 1045. The court concluded

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that solicitation was not incompatible with that purpose. Id. 

Here, there is no indication that plaintiff seeks to do

anything other than peacefully and lawfully protest with a small

group outside the park. Plaintiff’s proposed exercise of his

freedom of speech is also not incompatible with the primary

purpose of the area at the entrance of the park. Like the

stadium entrance in Carreras, the purpose of the park entrance

here is to facilitate the entrance into the park for members of

the public who wish to enter and are willing to pay a fee to do

so. On Memorial Day in particular, large numbers of people seek

to enter the park. The addition of ten members of the public to

these crowds seems negligible, even if the additional persons are

carrying signs and distributing leaflets. 

Moreover, the presence of peaceful protestors is less

incompatible with the activity of entering the park than the

presence of people soliciting money is with respect to entrance

into a stadium. Solicitation of a potential customer involves

some degree of competition with the activity of paying a fee to

enter the stadium, whereas providing information and exercising

the right to free speech outside of a park does not. Thus,

plaintiff’s proposed activity does not compete or interfere with

the activity of processing customers. Finally, there is no other

effective location to speak to the relevant audience, as

plaintiff and his group are protesting the care of animals at the

park, and it is unclear where visitors to the park would

congregate other than at the park itself. For these reasons, the

areas around the entrance of the park are public fora under the

California Liberty of Speech Clause. 

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With respect to time, place, and manner standards, 4

California law has been “fashioned from a long line of Supreme

Court cases,” and federal standards may be applied to give

meaning to this doctrine. Kuba, 387 F.3d at 857-58. 

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b. Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions

Next, the court turns to the test applied to

regulations in public fora. “[I]n a public forum the government

may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner

of protected speech, provided the restrictions ‘are justified

without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that

they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental

interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for

communication of the information.’” Savage v. Trammell Cow

Company, Inc., 223 Cal. App. 3d 1562, 1573 (1990) (citations

omitted); see also Kuba v. 1-A Agricultural Ass’n, 387 F.3d 850,

858 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 497 U.S.

781, 791 (1989)). If even one prong of this test is not 4

satisfied, then the government’s restrictions are

unconstitutional. See Grossman v. City of Portland, 33 F.3d

1200, 1205 (9th Cir. 1994).

First, there is no indication that defendants seek to

justify their regulations based on the content of the offending

speech, as the blackout days in the policy are based on days of

high attendance and not the expected content of the messages that

protestors would speak. Furthermore, it appears that defendants

may have a significant governmental interest in regulation.

Defendants presumably have an interest in preventing the

disruption of their business operations and interference with

customers, as well as ensuring the safety of their guests. The

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interest in controlling large crowds and ensuring the orderly

movement and control of people has been found to be a substantial

consideration. See, e.g., Kuba, 387 F.3d at 858 (finding the

interests in “preventing traffic congestion and ensuring the

safety of pedestrians and drivers alike” significant); Heffron v.

Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 650

(1981) (“[I]t is apparent that the State’s interest in the

orderly movement and control of such an assembly of persons

[gathered at a fair] is a substantial consideration.”). 

Plaintiff does not seek to protest in the parking lot,

but rather plans to protest at the entrance to the park, so it is

not clear that traffic congestion provides a basis for the state

interest. Yet plaintiff does seek to protest on a weekend where

the park expects greater than usual attendance, so defendants’

interest in orderly crowd control may be significant. This

interest may also be hampered by plaintiff’s plan to distribute

leaflets, as his interactions with the public will be somewhat

prolonged and the leaflets are likely to be disposed of

immediately, thereby creating additional trash for defendants to

clean. Significantly, however, defendants have not presented any

evidence to establish the strength of this interest. 

Moreover, the policy devised by defendants is not

narrowly tailored to the interests they seek to protect. 

Defendants have failed to show that plaintiff’s proposed

communicative activity endangers their interests in crowd control

in any significant way. See Lim v. City of Long Beach, 217 F.3d

1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Traditionally and logically . . .

the party seeking to restrict protected speech has the burden of

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It is additionally unclear that there are sufficient 5

alternative channels of communication, particularly given that

the weekends with the largest audiences are “blackout dates” for

assembly. However, “[t]he failure to satisfy any single prong of

the test invalidates the requirement,” Grossman, 33 F.3d at 1200,

so analysis of the existence of alternative channels is

unnecessary here. 

13

justifying that restriction.”) At a minimum, the policy requires

seven days of advance notice before a person can be given

permission to protest. Protest on the weekends during which the

largest audience is likely to be present is banned altogether, no

matter how many people seek to peacefully protest. Leaflets,

handouts, fliers, and other writings may not be distributed on

any day, which severely hampers the ability of a protestor to

pass along a meaningful message to the public. Assembly may only

take place in one of three areas in the park. These strictures

prevent a great deal of activity beyond what is necessary to

achieve defendants’ interest in crowd control and safety, and are

not narrowly-tailored to this interest. Therefore, defendants’

policy appears to contain unconstitutional time, place, and

manner restrictions.5

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff has shown a strong

probability of success on the merits and additionally that the

balance of hardships clearly weighs in his favor. Therefore, he

has established that a preliminary injunction is warranted. 

B. Declaratory Relief

The court has heard this motion on an expedited

schedule on plaintiff’s request, in an effort to accommodate his

interest in exercising his first amendment rights over the

weekend of May 27, 2006 (Memorial Day Weekend). By granting

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plaintiff a preliminary injunction, the court has ensured that he

will be able to exercise his rights on that weekend. Further

relief at this time is unnecessary to ensure that plaintiff’s

constitutional rights to freedom of speech and assembly are

secure, and the court therefore declines to address his request

for declaratory relief at this time. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for

injunctive relief enjoining defendants from enforcing their

Public Assembly Policy as it pertains to plaintiff’s proposed

activities over the weekend of May 27, 2006 be, and the same

hereby is, GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for

declaratory relief be, and the same hereby is, DENIED.

DATED: May 17, 2006

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