Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_01-cv-00825/USCOURTS-azd-2_01-cv-00825-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 29:1132 E.R.I.S.A.-Employee Benefits

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

NANCY J. PANNEBECKER, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

LIBERTY LIFE ASSURANCE

COMPANY OF BOSTON, a foreign

corporation, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV 01-0825-PHX-JAT

ORDER

Pending before this Court is Plaintiff Nancy J. Pannebecker’s Motion to Reconsider

(Doc. # 153). Plaintiff seeks reconsideration of this Court’s May 18, 2009 Order (Doc. #

147), wherein the Court denied Plaintiff’s request for prejudgment interest. For the reasons

that follow, the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion.

Motions for reconsideration are disfavored and appropriate only if the court is

presented with newly discovered evidence, if there is an intervening change in controlling

law, or if the court committed clear error. McDowell v. Calderon, 197 F.3d 1253, 1255 (9th

Cir.1999) (per curiam). See also Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County, Or. v. ACandS, Inc.,

5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir.1993). It is not clear from Plaintiff’s motion whether she is only

contending that there has been an intervening change in controlling law, or also that the

Court committed clear error. In either event, the Court does not find that there has been an

Case 2:01-cv-00825-JAT Document 154 Filed 06/10/09 Page 1 of 3
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 Plaintiff attempts to bootstrap bad faith or ill will on the part of Defendant by

pointing to statements in the Court’s May 18, 2009 Order and the Court’s March 3, 2004

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that Plaintiff asserts are inconsistent. The

statements upon which Plaintiff relies, however, do not amount to inconsistencies. The fact

that the Court was troubled by Defendant’s initial reason to audit Plaintiff’s claim does not

translate into Defendant having terminated Plaintiff’s claim out of bad faith or ill will.

Likewise, the fact that the Court found that Defendant was operating under a conflict of

interest does not necessarily equate to Defendant acting out of bad faith or ill will. More

importantly, in her Motion to Reconsider, Plaintiff does not point to anything in the record

before this Court that constitutes bad faith or ill will on the part of Defendant.

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intervening change in controlling law or that the Court committed clear error in its May 18,

2009 Order.

In her Motion to Reconsider, Plaintiff directs the Court’s attention to Slupinski v. First

Unum Life Insurance Co., 554 F.3d 38 (2nd Cir. 2009). The Court is unclear how a case in

the Second Circuit Court of Appeals constitutes controlling law as required for a motion for

reconsideration. Moreover, Slupinski was published in January 2009. This Court did not

issue the Order that is the subject of Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider until May 2009. If

Slupinski is as important as Plaintiff suggests, the Court is likewise unclear why Plaintiff

failed to file a supplemental citation of authority for the purpose of bringing Slupinski to the

Court’s attention, as opposed to waiting to do so in a motion for reconsideration. In any

event, the Court has reviewed Slupinski, and Slupinski does not alter the analysis conducted

by this Court in its May 18, 2009 Order.

In as much as Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider can be construed to argue that the

Court committed clear error in its May 18, 2009 Order, the Court disagrees. The Court

weighed the equities as required. Shaw v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers

Pension Plan, 750 F.2d 1458, 1465 (9th Cir. 1985). In doing so, the Court gave particular

weight to the absence of bad faith or ill will on the part of Defendant, Landwehr v. DuPree,

72 F.3d 726, 739 (9th Cir. 1995),1

 and the absence of any motive on the part of Defendant

to act arbitrarily in the future given the fact that Defendant is required to pay a reinstatement

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of benefits award in the amount of $213,243.25 despite Plaintiff not being disabled under the

terms of the Plan. Such findings rest within the sound discretion of this Court, and the Court

elects not to revisit them.

Lastly, Plaintiff argues that the Court committed manifest error in permitting

Defendant to move for attorneys’ fees as stated in the Court’s October 22, 2008 Order,

November 20, 2008 Order, and May 18, 2009 Order. In all three of these Orders, the Court

simply indicated that upon entry of an amended judgment, either party may move for

attorneys’ fees as permitted by the Court of Appeals’ Opinion. In none of the three Orders

did the Court indicate that Defendant was entitled to receive its attorneys’ fees. The Court

was simply reserving judgment on the issue of attorneys’ fees until after an amended

judgment was entered. To do so is no error, let alone manifest error.

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff Nancy J. Pannebecker’s Motion to Reconsider (Doc.

# 153) is denied.

DATED this 9th day of June, 2009.

Case 2:01-cv-00825-JAT Document 154 Filed 06/10/09 Page 3 of 3