Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-07022/USCOURTS-ca10-90-07022-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

VICKI H. BROWN, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

FJL.ED· 

U;n'i't.ed 9tr..tc:. Co· t.n 0.i. Appeals- ,.~:"-=·. t .•• , ... ~,l!t. 

FEB 2 0 1991 

ROBEit'l' L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. ) No. 90-7022 

) 

HARTSHORNE PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT #1, ) 

JANIE TRUEBLOOD; LORRAINE HOLLIS; JACK ) 

HOLLOWAY; TOMMY MCCULLAR; DR. ROY ) 

HONEYWELL, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. NO. 89-590-C) 

Submitted on the Briefs; 

James D. Wadley, McAlester, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Gene L. Mortensen, of Rosenstein, Fist & Ringold, for 

Defendants-Appellees. 

Before McKAY, SEYMOUR, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 90-7022 Document: 01019729006 Date Filed: 02/20/1991 Page: 1 
Vicki Brown filed this suit against the Hartshorne School 

District and its school board members under 42 u.s.c. §§ 2000e et 

~ (1988) (Title VII) and 42 u.s.c. § 1983 (1988), alleging that 

she was the victim of national origin discrimination and 

retaliation. The district court granted defendants' motion to 

dismiss, concluding that the suit was barred by the applicable 

statute of limitations and by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4l(a)(1). Brown 

appeals, and we affirm in part and reverse in part. 1 

We previously considered Brown's claims and set out the 

history of her attempts to seek relief under Title VII and section 

1983 in Brown v. Hartshorne Pub. School Dist. No . 1, 864 F.2d 680, 

681 (lOth Cir. 1988) (Brown I), as follows: 

"She filed her first EEOC charge alleging national 

origin discrimination in January 1979, and filed her 

first suit in April of that year. That suit was 

dismissed without prejudice. Brown refiled the suit in 

November 1980, and it was again dismissed in September 

1981. She filed a second administrative charge of 

discrimination with respect to the 1984-85 school year 

on August 7, 1984, received a right-to-sue letter from 

the EEOC October 5, 1985, and filed this action January 

2, 1986. In the instant complaint, Brown seeks relief 

under Title VII and section 1983, alleging both that the 

District has discriminated against her during the last 

ten years because she is Mexican-American, and that the 

District refused to hire her for the 1985-86 school year 

in retaliat ion for her previous suits." 

Thus, Brown received her most recent right-to-sue letter on 

October 5, 1985, and filed a timely action on January 2, 1986. On 

appeal in that action we reversed the district court's grant of 

1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the dete rmination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

2 

Appellate Case: 90-7022 Document: 01019729006 Date Filed: 02/20/1991 Page: 2 
summary judgment in favor of the school district and remanded for 

further proceedings. Following our remand and shortly before 

trial was to begin, Brown filed a motion for voluntary dismissal 

because her attorney was incapacitated with a back injury. The 

case was dismissed without prejudice on October 18, 1989, and 

Brown filed the instant action on November 17, 1989. 

As an initial matter, we conclude that the district court 

erred in holding sua sponte that the preclusive effect of Rule 

4l(a)(1) applies to this action. Rule 4l(a)(l) provides in 

pertinent part that an action voluntarily dismissed by a plaintiff 

"is without prejudice, except that a notice of dismissal operates 

as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who 

has once dismissed in any court of the United States or of any 

state an action based on or including the same claim." Under this 

"two dismissal rule," it is the second voluntary dismissal which 

is in essence with prejudice, and the third suit which is 

therefore barred. 

As set out in Brown I, the first two dismissals, which 

occurred in March 1980 and September 1981, involved claims 

alleging discrimination occurring in 1979. In the third action as 

well as in the instant suit, although Brown asserted that the 

discrimination begun in 1979 continued up to the time the suits 

were filed, she specifically challenged defendants' failure to 

hire her for the school years 1984-85 and 1985-86. Accordingly, 

the first two dismissals were not "based on or including the same 

3 

Appellate Case: 90-7022 Document: 01019729006 Date Filed: 02/20/1991 Page: 3 
claim" as the third and present actions within the meaning of Rule 

41(a)(1). Those earlier dismissals are therefore irrelevant for 

purposes of the two dismissal rule. Moreover, as defendants 

forthrightly noted in their brief on appeal, while Brown's prior 

Title VII suits have been dismissed three times, the first time 

was on defendant's motion, and the second time was by order of the 

court for failure to comply with one of its orders. Only the 

third dismissal was voluntary within the ambit of Rule 41(a)(1). 

The two dismissal rule thus does not apply and Brown's suit is not 

barred under Rule 41(a)(1). 

The district court was correct, however, in holding Brown's 

Title VII claim barred by the applicable statute of limitations. 

Title VII requires that a plaintiff bring a judicial action within 

ninety days of receipt of a right-to-sue letter. See 42 u.s.c . 

S§ 2000e-5(f)(l) (1988). It is hornbook law that, as a general 

rule, a voluntary dismissal without prejudice leaves the parties 

as though the action had never been brought. See, e.g., Robinson 

v. Willow Glen Academy, 895 F.2d 1168, 1169 (7th Cir. 1990); 

Dupree v. Jefferson, 666 F.2d 606, 611 (D.C. Cir. 1981); 5 J. 

Moore & J. Lucas, Moore's Federal Practice 1 41.05[2] at 41-66 to 

-67 (2d ed. 1990); 9 c. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & 

Procedure§ 2367 at 186 (1971). In the absence of a statute to 

the contrary, the limitation period is not tolled during the 

pendency of the dismissed action. See id.; see also Willard v. 

Wood, 164 u.s. 502, 523 (1896); Stein v. Reynolds Sec., Inc., 667 

F.2d 33, 33-34 (11th Cir. 1982). Courts have specifically held 

4 

Appellate Case: 90-7022 Document: 01019729006 Date Filed: 02/20/1991 Page: 4 
that the filing of a complaint that is dismissed without prejudice 

does not toll the statutory filing period of Title VII. See Price 

v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 1026, 1027 (5th Ci r. 1988) (pe r 

curiam); Wilson v. Grumman Ohio Corp., 815 F.2d 26, 28 (6th Cir. 

1987) (per curiam). We agree. 

Brown argues that her filing of the most recent action was 

nonetheless timely through application of Oklahoma's saving 

statute. See Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 100 (1981) (plaintiff has one 

year from nonmerit dismissal of action to refile). When Congress 

has provided a federal statute of limitation for a federal claim, 

howeve r, state tolling and saving provisions are not applicable. 

See~, Davis v. Smith's Transfer, Inc., 841 F.2d 139, 140 (6th 

Cir. 1988) (per curiam); Garrison v. International Paper Co., 714 

F.2d 757, 759 n.2 (8th Cir. 1983). 

Brown also argues that this suit is timely because it asserts 

a continuing violation. We disagree. We recognized in Brown I 

that a plaintiff who is the victim of a continuing violation may 

not need to exhaust administrative remedies as to acts that are 

part of the continuing violation but occur after the 

administrative charge is filed. See 864 F.2d at 682. However, 

the continuing violation theory does not eliminate the requirement 

that a plaintiff file a judicial action within ninety days of 

receipt of notice of the right to sue. Accordingly, we conclude 

that Brown's Title VII action is barred by her failure to file it 

within the requisite period of limitations. 

5 

Appellate Case: 90-7022 Document: 01019729006 Date Filed: 02/20/1991 Page: 5 
We reach a different conclusion with respect to Brown's claim 

under section 1983. Because no federal statute of limitations is 

provided for section 1983 suits, we measure the timeliness of such 

actions by state law. See Hardin v. Straub, 490 u.s. 536, __ , 

109 S. Ct. 1998, 2000 (1989). The Supreme Court has made clear 

that a federal court applying a state's limitations periods should 

apply that state's tolling provisions as well. "Limitations 

periods in § 1983 suits are to be determined by reference to the 

appropriate 'state statute of limitations and the coordinate 

tolling rules.'" Id. at 2001 (quoting Board of Regents v. 

Tomanio, 446 u.s. 478, 484 (1980)}; see also Bianchi v. Bellingham 

Police Dept., 909 F.2d 1316, 1317-18 (9th Cir. 1990); Jones v. 

City of Hamtramck, 905 F.2d 908, 909 (9th Cir.) (per curiam); 

cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 265 (1990); Rodriguez Narvaez v. Nazario, 

895 F.2d 38, 42 (1st Cir. 1990); Burrell v. Newsome, 883 F.2d 416, 

418 {5th Cir. 1989). The same reasoning applies to the savings 

provision, which is an integral part of a state's limitations and 

tolling rules. See Whittle v. Wiseman, 683 F.2d 1128, 1129 (8th 

Cir. 1982); see also Garrison, 741 F.2d at 759 n.2 (Arkansas 

savings clause applies to § 1981 claim) . 

Accordingly, we must address whether Oklahoma law provides 

for saving Brown's otherwise untimely2 section 1983 claim. Brown 

relies on Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 100 (1981), which states: 

2 The applicable 

brought in Oklahoma 

F.2d 661, 663 (lOth 

statute of limitations for section 1983 claims 

is two years. Se e Abbitt v. Franklin, 731 

Cir. 1984)(en bane). 

6 

Appellate Case: 90-7022 Document: 01019729006 Date Filed: 02/20/1991 Page: 6 
"If any action is commenced within due time, and a 

judgment thereon for the plaintiff is reversed, or if 

the plaintiff fail in such action otherwise than upon 

the merits, the plaintiff, or, if he should die, and the 

cause of action survive, his representatives may 

commence a new action within one (1) year after the 

reversal or failure although the time limit for 

commencing the action shall have expired before the new 

action is filed." 

Under this statute , " [w]here a timely commenced action is 

dismissed without prejudice on plaintiff's motion before trial on 

the merits but after the statute of limitations has run, the 

plaintiff may commence a new action within a year after such 

dismissal." In the Matter of Speake, 743 P.2d 648, 650 n.3 (Okla. 

1987) (citing Powers v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 392 P.2d 

744, 746 (Okla. 1964)). Brown's present suit against the school 

district, filed a month after she dismissed the previous action, 

clearly falls within the ambit of section 100 and is therefore not 

barred by the statute of limitations. However, while the previous 

suit named as defendant only the Hartshorne Public School 

District, the refiled suit names the school board members in 

addition to the district. Because the board members were not 

named in the prior action, the saving statute does not apply to 

the suit against them and it is therefore untimely . 

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further 

proceedings. 

7 

Appellate Case: 90-7022 Document: 01019729006 Date Filed: 02/20/1991 Page: 7