Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01912/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01912-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Thomas Lovejoy and Carolynn Lovejoy,

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

Sheriff Joseph Arpaio, et al., 

Defendants. 

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CV 09-1912-PHX-NVW

ORDER

Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (doc. #10), which the Court

grants in part and denies in part. 

I. The Allegations of the Complaint

Plaintiffs make the following allegations in their complaint. It bears emphasis that

the recitation that follows is only what Plaintiffs allege; the Court is not now called upon

to determine the extent to which those allegations are true. Thomas Lovejoy was a wellrespected sergeant in the Chandler Police Department for fifteen years before the events

alleged herein took place. In January 2003, Sgt. Lovejoy was promoted to the K9 unit

and partnered with his first dog, Bandit. Over the next four years, Sgt. Lovejoy and

Bandit worked together. During that time, Sgt. Lovejoy developed an impeccable record

with the K9 division, rescuing dogs and raising funds to purchase additional dogs, in

addition to performing his regular duties. 

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Sgt. Lovejoy took good care of Bandit. Bandit shared a large backyard with Sgt.

Lovejoy’s other dogs, but also had special accommodations. Bandit had a 20' x 10'

kennel that was shaded with plants and swamp air cooled. He also had three drinking

stations and his own stock tank where he could immerse himself fully in water to cool off

during hot summer days. 

Sgt. Lovejoy and Bandit typically maintained a regular work routine. They

worked the night shift from 7 p.m. to 4 a.m. Upon their return from duty, Bandit would

immediately retire to his kennel, where he would eat and then sleep for several hours

without being disturbed. The daytime was Bandit’s opportunity for rest and sleep. Sgt.

Lovejoy frequently worked overtime duties where needed, but Bandit did not usually

accompany Sgt. Lovejoy in his overtime jobs, although he would occasionally come

along when needed. 

In the days leading up to the incident, Sgt. Lovejoy worked several shifts in a row

because the Chandler Police Department was on sustained alert for a serial rapist that had

been targeting local residents. On the morning of August 11, 2007, he had an overtime

assignment. Knowing that he might be called at any moment to help with the serial rapist

investigation, he drove his SUV and brought Bandit with him to his assignment. When

his shift ended, he placed Bandit in his kennel in the back of the SUV, and Bandit

immediately fell asleep. At this point, Sgt. Lovejoy had slept only six and one-half hours

in the previous fifty-one hours. 

On his way home, Sgt. Lovejoy learned that his oldest son had been involved in a

minor car accident and needed his immediate help. Shortly afterward, Sgt. Lovejoy’s

wife, Carolynn, called him in tears and told him that she was having a personal crisis at

work. At home, both of Sgt. Lovejoy’s daughters needed his attention, one to be driven

to a friend’s house and the other to look for a new pet at a local shelter. After attending to

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the scene of his son’s accident, running his daughters on their errands, and stopping into

his wife’s work to check on her, Sgt. Lovejoy went home and took a brief nap. When his

wife arrived, the two went out for dinner. 

Upon returning from dinner with his wife, Sgt. Lovejoy went to his SUV to grab

his gear. As soon as he opened the door, he noticed a strange smell in the vehicle. He

went to the back of the vehicle and realized that Bandit had never come out of the SUV. 

Bandit had remained in the SUV all day and had died from heat exhaustion. 

Sgt. Lovejoy was distraught. He immediately called a fellow Chandler Police

Officer, Ron Emary, to help him report the incident. Officer Emary noted that Sgt.

Lovejoy was so disturbed that he was babbling on the phone. When Officer Emary

arrived at Sgt. Lovejoy’s home, he found the entire family outside weeping. 

Sgt. Lovejoy and Officer Emary then contacted their supervisor, Commander

Gaylord, who immediately drove to Sgt. Lovejoy’s residence. Commander Gaylord

photographed Bandit and began cleaning up the scene. Commander Gaylord performed a

thorough initial investigation. The following Monday morning, the Chandler Police

Department issued a statement to the public, explaining that there would only be an

internal investigation to determine whether any department policies had been violated and

not a criminal investigation.

Because Sgt. Lovejoy’s residence sat on an unincorporated island, Sheriff Joseph

Arpaio and the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office (“MCSO”) had jurisdiction. Within

days, Sheriff Arpaio held a press conference to announce that he would be launching a

criminal investigation into Sgt. Lovejoy’s actions. Although there was no evidence or

reason to believe that Sgt. Lovejoy intended to harm Bandit, did not care for Bandit, or

sought to hurt or abuse Bandit, Sheriff Arpaio launched a high profile investigation of

Sgt. Lovejoy.

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For nearly a month, the MCSO interviewed witnesses and collected evidence. In

September 2007, unbeknownst to Sgt. Lovejoy, Sheriff Arpaio scheduled a press

conference to publicly announce Sgt. Lovejoy’s arrest before the arrest took place. To get

Sgt. Lovejoy to come to the station in time for the press conference, an MCSO detective

asked Sgt. Lovejoy to meet with him. Sgt. Lovejoy offered to meet the detective after his

shift, but the detective demanded they meet sooner. When Sgt. Lovejoy questioned the

urgency, the detective admitted that it was because the MCSO was going to arrest him

under the animal abuse statute. 

Sgt. Lovejoy eventually agreed to meet the detective voluntarily, but encountered a

delay. The detective’s supervisor, Sgt. Summers, then called Sgt. Lovejoy directly and

demanded to know why he had been delayed. He also told Sgt. Lovejoy that he had

spoken with Sgt. Lovejoy’s lawyer and that the lawyer said that “it was ok” for Sgt.

Lovejoy to speak with MCSO detectives. Sgt. Lovejoy’s lawyer, however, never spoke

with MCSO officers and never gave them permission to speak with Sgt. Lovejoy. Sgt.

Summers then told Sgt. Lovejoy not to notify his “command staff” and to simply come

alone to the police station to meet Sgt. Summers. 

Sheriff Arpaio and the MCSO would later tell the public that Sgt. Lovejoy was

“behind bars” and that he could be charged with a felony. Neither were true. At the press

conference, Sheriff Arpaio touted himself as tough on crime and announced that the

MCSO’s investigation had found that Sgt. Lovejoy had broken the law by recklessly

leaving his dog in a police vehicle for thirteen hours. 

Sgt. Lovejoy was eventually taken to an East Mesa jail, where he was processed,

booked, and taken for an initial appearance before a judge on animal cruelty charges. The

judge denied the MCSO’s request for bail and released Sgt. Lovejoy. Several members of

the law enforcement community spoke out against the arrest, calling it ridiculous. 

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In order to validate the high profile and highly controversial investigation and

arrest of Sgt. Lovejoy, Sheriff Arpaio pressured the Maricopa County Attorney’s Office

(“MCAO”) to prosecute the case. With pressure mounting from Sheriff Arpaio, the

MCAO filed a criminal complaint. The MCAO attorney that was working on the case,

Anthony Church, believed that there was no basis for prosecuting Sgt. Lovejoy due to a

complete lack of evidence that Sgt. Lovejoy intended to harm Bandit. Church conveyed

this formally, in writing, to his MCAO superiors, questioning whether or not the MCAO

had an ethical basis to proceed with a prosecution that lacked probable cause. However,

because he believed that Sheriff Arpaio would never allow the MCAO to drop the case,

he worked behind the scenes with Sgt. Lovejoy’s criminal attorney, Robert Kavanagh, to

obtain dismissal of the case. In April 2008, Church and Kavanagh jointly drafted a

motion to dismiss and a stipulated statement of facts, which effectively admitted that

there was no evidence of the intent required by the animal abuse statute. Church agreed

to not oppose the motion strongly. 

When Sheriff Arpaio learned of Church’s involvement he ordered the MCAO to

change course. Church was removed from the case and replaced with Lisa Aubuchon,

who aggressively fought the motion and urged the court to deny it, promising to produce

evidence showing that Sgt. Lovejoy acted with the requisite intent, even though she knew

that there was no such evidence because she was on the panel that reviewed Church’s

written concerns. On August 15, 2009, the case was tried in the San Tan Justice Court. 

The presiding justice of the peace promptly acquitted Sgt. Lovejoy and noted that the

prosecution had not produced a shred of evidence to show that Sgt. Lovejoy’s conduct

was reckless. 

Sheriff Arpaio had never before arrested a law enforcement officer in connection

with the death of a police dog, even though at least three other dogs had died under

unusual circumstances while in the care of Sheriff Arpaio’s deputies. The first dog died

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trying to escape from a chain-linked kennel in his handler’s home. The second dog was

found dead in his kennel in the back yard of his handler’s residence on a hot August

evening. The veterinarian concluded that the dog had died from heat exhaustion. The

third dog died from complications of Valley Fever, apparently due to not having received

needed medication for nine months. None of Sheriff Arpaio’s own deputies were ever

criminally investigated, arrested, or prosecuted, even though the MCSO detective in

charge of investigating animal deaths admitted that all of the deaths were suspicious. 

II. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard

In considering a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations of the complaint are

accepted as true, and all reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the plaintiff. Rhodes

v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 563 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005). A complaint must state a claim for

relief that is plausible and that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the conduct alleged. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949

(2009). 

III. Collateral Estoppel

Defendants argue that Sgt. Lovejoy cannot contest whether there was probable

cause to arrest him because that issue was already litigated and decided in a prior state

proceeding. Federal courts employ the rules of the state that rendered the prior judgment

to determine its preclusive effect. Jones v. Bates, 127 F.3d 839, 848 (9th Cir. 1997). In

Arizona, issue preclusion applies if: (1) the issue was actually litigated in a previous

proceeding; (2) the parties had a full and fair opportunity and the motivation to litigate the

issue; (3) there was a valid and final decision on the merits; (4) resolution of the issue was

essential to the decision; and (5) there was a common identity of the parties. Campbell v.

Szl Props., 204 Ariz. 221, 223, 62 P.3d 966, 968 (2003). The party asserting estoppel

bears the burden of pleading and proving that the issue cannot be relitigated. Hernandez

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v. City of Los Angeles, 624 F.2d 935, 937 (9th Cir. 1980).

Sgt. Lovejoy was charged by means of a Uniform Traffic Ticket and Complaint in

the San Tan Justice Court for violating Arizona’s animal cruelty statute. A person

commits cruelty to animals if he “intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly leaves an animal

unattended and confined in a motor vehicle and physical injury to or death of the animal

is likely to result.” A.R.S. § 13-2910A(7). A violation of A.R.S. 13-2910A(7) is a class

1 misdemeanor. A.R.S. § 13-2910G. 

In state court, Sgt. Lovejoy moved to dismiss pursuant to Ariz. R. Crim. P. 16.6(b),

which allows a defendant to test the sufficiency of an indictment, information, or

complaint. A court considering a Rule 16.6(b) motion only has authority to decide

whether the indictment “informs the defendant of the essential elements of the charges; is

sufficiently definite so that the defendant can prepare to meet the charges; and protects

the defendant from subsequent prosecution for the same offense.” Arizona v. RickardHughes, 182 Ariz. 273, 275, 895 P.2d 1036, 1038 (Ct. App. 1995). The determination of

legal sufficiency does not “categorically exclude challenges that involve application of

law to facts.” Chronis v. Steinle, 220 Ariz. 559, 561, 208 P.3d 210, 212 (2009). 

However, in a Rule 16.6(b) challenge, the court cannot weigh the evidence against the

defendant. See Rickard-Hughes, 182 Ariz. at 275, 895 P.2d at 1038 (“Weighing the

evidence before trial is not appropriate.”); Mejak v. Granville, 212 Ariz. 555, 556, 136

P.3d 874, 875 (Ct. App. 2006) (“If a defendant can admit to all the allegations charged in

the indictment and still not have committed a crime, then the indictment is insufficient as

a matter of law.”).

Sgt. Lovejoy’s motion was titled “Motion to Dismiss Complaint Based on Lack of

Probable Cause,” and it argued that the evidence failed to establish that he had acted with

the state of mind required for a conviction under the animal cruelty statute. The parties

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argued the motion, but no witnesses were called and no evidence was presented. The

justice of the peace who heard the motion denied it in a minute entry that summarily

stated: “On April 8, 2008, Counsel for Defendant, Thomas Lovejoy, filed [a] motion to

dismiss. Motion to dismiss is denied.” The matter then proceeded to a bench trial in

which Sgt. Lovejoy was acquitted. 

Although the parties presented probable cause as the issue to be decided in Sgt.

Lovejoy’s Rule 16.6(b) motion, the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure do not authorize

the court to make that determination in a misdemeanor case. Arizona authorizes a pretrial testing of the sufficiency of the state’s evidence only in felony cases. Ariz. Const.

Art. 2 § 30; Ariz. R. Crim. P. 5.3(a). Chronis is not to the contrary. See Chronis, 220

Ariz. 559, 208 P.3d 210. There, the Arizona Supreme Court construed a particular rule

adopted in 2002 for the explicit purpose of giving a right to a probable cause hearing on

aggravating factors alleged in a capital prosecution. Id. at 561-63, 208 P.3d at 212-14. 

However, the rule was badly drafted and did not say what the rulemaking petition stated it

was supposed to accomplish. Id. The Supreme Court interpreted the rule to give effect to

the plain purpose of the rule petition, notwithstanding the bad drafting. Id. Nothing in

Chronis comes close to overturning the longstanding Arizona rule that misdemeanors are

not open to pre-trial testing of the sufficiency of the state’s evidence. 

Taking the complaint at face value, a defense attorney and a conscience-burdened

prosecutor made up a procedure to force the dismissal of a case the prosecutor’s

supervisors would not drop on their own. But a procedure that the law does not sanction

does not have preclusive effect. If the justice of the peace had purported to find probable

cause, it would have no preclusive effect because he had no authority to make such a

finding. In any event, the state court’s one line order does not explain why the motion

was denied. The most likely explanation is that the court understood the motion was

improper, because the court only had authority to decide whether the indictment was

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legally sufficient. The court did not make any finding of probable cause. Defendants

therefore cannot establish that Sgt. Lovejoy fully and fairly litigated the issue of probable

cause, that there was a valid and final decision on the merits, or that resolution of the

issue was essential to the decision, as required by Arizona’s issue preclusion rules. Sgt.

Lovejoy is therefore not precluded from litigating the issue of probable cause. 

IV. Qualified Immunity For Fourth Amendment Violation

Sheriff Arpaio asserts that he is entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Sgt.

Lovejoy’s Fourth Amendment false arrest claim. To defeat qualified immunity, the facts,

viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, must establish that the officer’s

conduct violated a constitutional right. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). The

constitutional right must be “clearly established in light of the specific context of the

case.” al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 964 (9th Cir. 2009). The court may exercise its

discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should

be considered first. Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 818 (2009). 

A. Constitutional Violation

The Fourth Amendment requires probable cause for an arrest. See Beck v. Ohio,

379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). A plaintiff states a Fourth Amendment violation claim if the

allegations in the complaint allow the reasonable inference that there was no probable

cause to arrest. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949; see also Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v.

Mendocino County, 14 F.3d 457, 462 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that plaintiff stated a claim

when the factual assertions alleged in the complaint accepted as true established that a

reasonable officer would have known that plaintiff did not have the requisite state of mind

to commit the alleged crime). 

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1

These are cases of sufficiency of the evidence to convict, and therefore the evidence

has been construed in the light most favorable to the prosecution. See Illinois v. Kozlow, 301

Ill. App. 3d 1, 5 (Ct. App. 1998); Arteaga v. Texas, No. 01-00-00482-CR, 2002 WL

1935268, 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 6096 (Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2002); Tennessee v. Every, No.

W2005-00547-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 1860789, at *1-3, 2007 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS

512, at *6-9 (Crim. App. June 28, 2007). Here, in contrast, the facts, though not the legal

conclusions, should be construed and all reasonable inferences should be drawn in favor of

Sgt. Lovejoy. 

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1. Criminal Recklessness

An arrest is unlawful unless probable cause exists under a specific criminal statute. 

Torres v. City of Los Angeles, 548 F.3d 1197, 1207 (9th Cir. 2008). A person violates

Arizona’s animal cruelty if he “recklessly leaves an animal unattended and confined in a

motor vehicle and physical injury to or death of the animal is likely to result.” A.R.S §

13-2910. Recklessness requires that the person be “aware of and consciously disregard a

substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists,”

and that the risk be “of such nature and degree that disregard of such risk constitutes a

gross deviation from the standard that a reasonable person would observe in the

situation.” A.R.S. § 13-105. In contrast, criminal negligence, which is related to criminal

recklessness in requiring a “substantial” risk and a “gross” deviation from applicable

norms, requires only “a failure to perceive a risk, as compared to the recklessness

requirement of an awareness and conscious disregard of the risk.” In re William G., 192

Ariz. 208, 213, 963 P.2d 287, 291 n.1 (Ct. App. 1997). A person’s mental state is

generally ascertained by inference from all of the relevant surrounding circumstances. Id. 

While there are no Arizona cases on point, several out-of-state cases illustrate the

circumstances that support recklessness in failing to remove a child from a vehicle.1

Recklessness has been found from prior neglect of a child and knowledge that the

child remained in the vehicle. Illinois v. Kozlow, 301 Ill. App. 3d 1, 3-5, 703 N.E.2d 424,

226-27 (Ct. App. 1998), found enough evidence to convict the mother of a three-monthCase 2:09-cv-01912-NVW Document 23 Filed 02/10/10 Page 10 of 28
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old baby of involuntary manslaughter, which requires a mental state of recklessness,

when she left her child in a car for four hours on a summer morning and the child died

from exposure. Id. at 2, 703 N.E.2d at 426. The mother claimed that she had forgotten

the baby in the car when she went inside her house to take a nap. Id. at 3, 703 N.E.2d at

427. However, the mother was in the habit of leaving her baby in the car for up to twenty

minutes while she visited friends and ran errands. Id. at 4-5, 703 N.E.2d at 427. In

addition, there was evidence that the mother had left the child in the car in an effort to get

uninterrupted sleep. Id. at 6, 703 N.E.2d at 428. There was a “conscious disregard” of a

substantial risk to the child because the mother knew the child had been left in the car and

disregarded the risk that the conditions in the car would lead to the child’s death. Id. at 5-

7, 703 N.E.2d at 427-28.

A person is also reckless in creating the conditions, such as by drinking and

driving with little sleep, that lead to the child being placed at risk. Arteaga v. Texas, No.

01-00-00482-CR, 2002 WL 1935268, at *1-4, 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 6096, at *3, *8-10

(Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2002). Arteaga found enough evidence to convict the mother of an

eight-month old baby of reckless injury to a child when the mother forgot her baby in a

car overnight and the baby died of exposure. Id. The mother, her husband, their twoyear-old daughter, and their eight-month-old son, were visiting friends the night before

the incident. Id. at *1-2, 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 6096, at *1-3. The parents drank and

were intoxicated. Id. At one point in the evening, the mother offered to give away her

baby to her friends. Id. at *1, 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 6096, at *2-3. The mother’s

friends asked the family to stay overnight; however, after sleeping for only a short while,

the mother decided to drive home despite her husband’s warning not to do so. Id. at *1-2,

2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 6096, at *2-4. While driving, the mother became drowsy and

stopped at a gas station where she asked a limousine driver to take her and “the babies”

home. Id. The mother took her daughter but left her son in a car seat in the back seat of

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the car. Id. at *1, 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 6096, at *4. Both parents claimed that they did

not remember placing their eight-month-old son in the car. Id. at *2, 2002 Tex. App.

LEXIS 6096, at *3. The mother was found to be reckless because it was unlikely that she

was unaware that the child was in the car, and leaving an eight-month-old child in a car

consciously disregards a substantial risk of harm. Id. at *3-4, 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS

6096, at *9-10.

In both cases there was strong circumstantial evidence of recklessness. First, there

was evidence that the children had been previously neglected or were unwanted. In

Kozlow, the mother often left her child in the car while she attended to other matters, and

in Arteaga, the mother offered to give away her son to her friends the night before the

child was left in the car. Second, there was evidence that the defendants wilfully created

the conditions that led to the children being placed at risk of serious harm. In Kozlow, the

mother knew she was leaving her child in the car on a hot morning in order to take a nap. 

In Arteaga, the mother drove with her children even though she had been drinking

heavily, had slept very little, and was advised not to drive home. Third, there was reason

to believe that the mothers had not sincerely “forgotten” their children. In Kozlow, the

mother left the child in the car in order to take a nap. In Arteaga, it was unlikely that the

mother did not know that the child had been left in the car because the child was in the

back seat, the mother removed one child and not the other from the car, and the mother

had referred to both children in conversation with the limousine driver when she asked

him whether he could give her and “the babies a ride home.” Finally, both cases involved

very young children. Because young children require constant care and attention, adults

tasked with caring for them are expected to be vigilant as to their well-being and

whereabouts. 

Recklessness has also been found where a specific directive to take precautions in

a high risk situation was ignored. Tennessee v. Every, No. W2005-00547-CCA-R3-CD,

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2007 WL 1860789, at *1-3, 2007 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 512, at *6-9 (Crim. App. June

28, 2007). In Every, a daycare worker was found to be reckless when she failed to inspect

the van used to transport children to the day care center and a two-year-old child was left

in the van and died. Id. The day care worker had been specifically instructed to

personally walk the length of the van and to check above and below the seats for children

after the van arrived at the day care center to ensure that no children remained in the van. 

Id. at *1-2, 2007 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 512, at *2-4. The day care worker did not do

so, relying instead upon the van attendant’s statement that the van was empty. Id. The

day care worker consciously disregarded the substantial risk that a child would be left

behind in the van by failing to personally perform an inspection. Id. at *3, 2007 Tenn.

Crim. App. LEXIS 512, at *6-9.

Every is in line with Kozlow and Arteaga. The day care worker was entrusted with

the care of very young children and it was reasonable to expect a heightened awareness to

their safety. It would be relatively easy to overlook a single child in a van loaded with

children, and thus there was a significant risk that a child could be left behind when the

van was unloaded. A specific policy was developed to eliminate that risk–the day care

worker was required to walk the van up and down to ensure that no child had been

forgotten. In deciding to ignore that directive, the day care worker disregarded the

substantial risk that a child would be left in the van.

2. Probable Cause

The test for probable cause is whether “officers have knowledge or reasonably

trustworthy information sufficient to lead a person of reasonable caution to believe that an

offense has been or is being committed by the person being arrested.” Torres, 548 F.3d at

1206 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 482 F.3d 1067, 1072 (9th Cir. 2007)). Conclusive

evidence of guilt is not necessary, but “[m]ere suspicion, common rumor, or even strong

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reason to suspect are not enough.” Id. To state a claim, Sgt. Lovejoy’s allegations must

give rise to a reasonable inference that Sheriff Arpaio was aware of facts that would lead

a reasonable person to believe that Sgt. Lovejoy was not reckless. 

Because the MCSO conducted a month-long investigation into the circumstances

surrounding Bandit’s death and there was a lot of public attention to the case before and

after Sgt. Lovejoy was arrested, it must be taken that Sheriff Arpaio knew, as Sgt.

Lovejoy has alleged, that (1) Sgt. Lovejoy was an animal lover and took very good care

of Bandit during the four years prior to the incident; (2) Sgt. Lovejoy was operating under

the stress of family pressures and with very little sleep on the day of the incident as a

result of being called upon to perform overtime work by the Chandler Police Department;

(3) Bandit did not usually accompany Sgt. Lovejoy on overtime assignments; (4) Sgt.

Lovejoy took Bandit on his last overtime assignment in case he was called to help with

the serial rapist investigation; (5) Sgt. Lovejoy was not at fault for the circumstances that

led to him being sleep deprived and to have to deviate from his usual routine; (6) Bandit

was asleep in his kennel in the back of the SUV when Sgt. Lovejoy reached his home;

and (7) Sgt. Lovejoy was genuinely surprised when he discovered Bandit dead in the

SUV to the point of weeping and babbling. Accepting the allegations in the complaint as

true and excluding other possible circumstances that may have been known to Sheriff

Arpaio but not alleged in the complaint, there was no reason for Sheriff Arpaio to

disbelieve this account of the incident. 

A reasonable person with knowledge of these facts and only these facts would not

have believed that Sgt. Lovejoy was reckless by “consciously disregarding” the risk to

Bandit. There is no allegation that Sgt. Lovejoy ever neglected Bandit. To the contrary,

the allegation is that Sgt. Lovejoy was an animal lover who lavished upon Bandit, rescued

dogs, and volunteered to help his police department raise money to purchase new dogs. 

There is no allegation that Sgt. Lovejoy was intoxicated or that he otherwise created the

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conditions that led to Bandit being at risk. Sgt. Lovejoy was sleep deprived and stressed,

but only because he had been called to work overtime by the Chandler Police Department

and because of external family pressures. Bandit was not in the backseat of a car where

he could easily be spotted--he was in a kennel, asleep, in the rear of the SUV. The

allegations in the complaint indicate that Sgt. Lovejoy sincerely forgot that Bandit was in

the SUV for reasons not caused by his own prior recklessness or fault. A person who

fails to perceive a risk, even when the failure to do so is a “gross” deviation from

applicable norms, can only be negligent, not reckless. See In re William G., 192 Ariz.

208, 213, 963 P.2d 287, 291 n.1 (Ct. App. 1997). 

Finally, although Bandit was dependent on Sgt. Lovejoy to remove him from the

car, unlike an infant, Bandit did not require constant supervision. Bandit usually spent

most of his day in Sgt. Lovejoy’s yard, with Sgt. Lovejoy’s other dogs. The level of

vigilance expected of a person who cares for an adult animal is less than that expected of

someone caring for an infant. Viewed in the light most favorable to Sgt. Lovejoy, the

complaint pleads enough facts to take Sgt. Lovejoy’s claim that he was arrested without

probable cause “across the line from the conceivable to the plausible.” See Iqbal, 129 S.

Ct. at 1951.

B. Immunity

Even though, assuming the allegations in the complaint are true, Sgt. Lovejoy’s

arrest was without probable cause, Sheriff Arpaio cannot be personally liable unless his

conduct “violate[d] clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable officer would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 

This is an objective inquiry–whether an officer subjectively believed that he had probable

cause to arrest is irrelevant. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641(1987); see

also Mendocino Envtl. Ctr., 14 F.3d at 462 (explaining that it is the officer’s knowledge

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that is relevant, since the objective qualified immunity analysis is focused on a reasonable

officer confronted with the facts and circumstances actually known to the officer). 

To defeat qualified immunity, the unlawfulness of Sheriff Arpaio’s actions must

have been apparent in light of pre-existing law. While there is no other case analyzing

whether a person is reckless in the circumstances presented here, “[t]his is not to say that

an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question has

previously been held unlawful.” See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640. “The relevant

dispositive inquiry is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct

was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Moreno v. Baca, 431 F.3d 633, 642 (9th

Cir. 2005) (emphasis in original); see also Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640-41 (explaining that

it does not follow immediately from the conclusion that it was firmly established that

warrantless searches not supported by probable cause violate the Fourth Amendment that

the officer’s search was objectively unreasonable, but that the determination requires an

examination of the information possessed by the officer). 

The Ninth Circuit recognizes that an assertion of qualified immunity at the motion

to dismiss stage puts the court in the difficult position of deciding far-reaching

constitutional questions on a nonexistent factual record. al-Kidd, 580 F.3d at 965. 

However, looking only to the circumstances alleged in the complaint, they clearly state

that Sgt. Lovejoy was not reckless in Bandit’s death. Sheriff Arpaio is said to have been

aware of this. Sheriff Arpaio was not called upon to make a quick decision on the spot

regarding Sgt. Lovejoy’s culpability–the MCSO and the Sheriff had conducted a thorough

investigation for nearly a month before arresting Sgt. Lovejoy in conjunction with a

scheduled press conference. Moreover, it is clearly established, and Sheriff Arpaio

should have known, that in the absence of probable cause to believe that Sgt. Lovejoy

was reckless, Sgt. Lovejoy’s arrest was unlawful. It may turn out that Sgt. Lovejoy’s

allegations fall short on the evidence, or that Sheriff Arpaio was not aware of the

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circumstances surrounding Bandit’s death; however, at this stage of the proceedings the

Court is required to accept Sgt. Lovejoy’s factual allegations as true and to draw all

reasonable factual inferences in Sgt. Lovejoy’s favor. Sheriff Arpaio is not entitled to

qualified immunity now. He may soon present his defense again on summary judgment.

V. Equal Protection

Sgt. Lovejoy alleges that Sheriff Arpaio violated his equal protection rights by

selectively arresting and prosecuting him. “The purpose of the equal protection clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment is to secure every person within the State’s jurisdiction

against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a

statute or by its improper execution through duly constituted agents.” Lazy Y Ranch LTD

v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 588 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Village of Willowbrook v. Olech,

528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000)). Where state action does not implicate a fundamental right or

a suspect classification, the plaintiff may nevertheless state an equal protection claim by

demonstrating that he has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly

situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment. Squaw Valley

Dev. Co. v. Goldberg, 375 F.3d 936, 944 (9th Cir. 2004), overruled on other grounds,

Action Apt. Ass’n v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., 509 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir. 2007). 

In any equal protection analysis, it is first necessary to identify the class or group

being discriminated against. Id. at 945. Sgt. Lovejoy claims that he was singled out from

all other police officers, and Sheriff Arpaio’s own MCSO officers in particular, whose

service dogs died under their care. Sgt. Lovejoy alleges that at least three other police

dogs died under suspicious circumstances, but that their handlers were never investigated,

disciplined, or prosecuted. 

The allegations in the complaint, however, do not establish that Sgt. Lovejoy was

similarly situated to the other officers who were not investigated. Sgt. Lovejoy was

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prosecuted under A.R.S. § 13-2910A(7), which criminalizes “intentionally, knowingly, or

recklessly leav[ing] an animal unattended and confined in a motor vehicle” when

“physical injury to or death of the animal is likely to result.” Sgt. Lovejoy does not allege

that any other dog died as a result of being left unattended in a motor vehicle. Instead,

Sgt. Lovejoy alleges that one dog died because he did not receive needed medication, that

another dog died trying to escape from a chain-linked kennel, and that a third dog died

from heat exhaustion in his kennel. The circumstances in which those dogs died are

different from those surrounding Bandit’s death. Sgt. Lovejoy was therefore not

“similarly situated” to the other officers who were not investigated. See Squaw Valley

Dev. Co., 375 F.3d at 945 (ski resort not similarly situated to other ski resorts when it

failed to show that others were of comparable size, had a comparable history of noncompliance, engaged in a comparable level of activity, or had a comparable history of

administrative action being ineffective). 

A plaintiff may nevertheless state an equal protection claim based upon selective

enforcement of the law if he can show that the defendant’s alleged rational basis is a

pretext for an impermissible motive. Lazy Y Ranch LTD, 546 F.3d at 592. The class of

one theory is unusual because “the plaintiff in a ‘class of one’ case does not allege that

the defendants discriminate against a group with whom she shares characteristics, but

rather that the defendants simply harbor animus against her in particular and therefore

treated her arbitrarily.” Id. at 592 (emphasis in original).

While there is no Ninth Circuit precedent that directly addresses whether a plaintiff

may bring a class of one claim against police officers, the Seventh Circuit has concluded

that such a cause of action exists when a plaintiff claims that the police have inflicted

unequal treatment for no reason other than malice. Hanes v. Zurick, 578 F.3d 491, 496

(7th Cir. 2009). Sgt. Lovejoy has alleged that Sheriff Arpaio specifically targeted Sgt.

Lovejoy for arrest and prosecution for reasons wholly unrelated to any legitimate state

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objective, that is, for the sole purpose of garnering publicity. In light of Hanes and in the

absence of any contrary authority cited by Defendants, the Court cannot agree at this

stage of the litigation that Sgt. Lovejoy’s class of one equal protection claim fails. A

different conclusion may be warranted upon consideration of a properly supported motion

for summary judgment and with the benefit of a fully developed record.

Finally, Defendants contend that Sgt. Lovejoy cannot maintain a class of one claim

because Sgt. Lovejoy’s arrest was based on probable cause, and the existence of probable

cause would defeat a class of one selective enforcement claim. See Jordan v. Oregon

Dept of Human Servs., No. 07-940-HA, 2009 WL 2184539, at *5, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

61960, at *15-16 (D. Or. July 21, 2009) (“However, if defendants can prove probable

cause existed for the underlying criminal prosecution, then this evidence suggests that the

prosecution would have occurred regardless of the retaliatory motive.”); cf. Hartman v.

Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 257-66 (2006) (holding that plaintiff must show lack of probable

cause in a Bivens action against criminal investigators for inducing prosecution in

retaliation for speech). The Court, however, has found that the complaint sufficiently

alleges lack of probable cause. Therefore, Defendants’ contention fails as of this early

stage of the proceeding. 

VI. Municipal Liability 

Sgt. Lovejoy sued Sheriff Arpaio in his official capacity, and a suit against a

municipal officer in his official capacity is equivalent to a suit against the municipality. 

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Under Monell, municipal

liability may be based on: an expressly adopted official policy; a longstanding practice or

custom; or the decision of a person with final policymaking authority. Lytle v. Carl, 382

F.3d 978, 982 (9th Cir. 2004). Sgt. Lovejoy claims that he is entitled to relief under the

second and third Monell prongs. 

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A. Custom or Practice

Sgt. Lovejoy contends that there is a longstanding practice or custom in Maricopa

County of targeting, arresting, and prosecuting individuals without probable cause. 

However, the complaint only describes political exploitation by Sheriff Arpaio of Sgt.

Lovejoy for publicity. The complaint does not allege a longstanding municipal custom or

practice of arresting people without probable cause. Sgt. Lovejoy therefore has failed to

state a claim under the second Monell prong. At oral argument Plaintiffs requested leave

to amend the complaint to include such allegations. Plaintiffs will be given leave to add

such allegations; but in light of the Court’s alternative conclusion that municipal liability

is established because Sheriff Arpaio is an official policymaker for Maricopa County, it is

a matter of Plaintiffs’ choice whether to add the duplicative ground of a longstanding

practice of arresting and prosecuting persons without probable cause.

B. Final Policymaker

A municipality may be held liable under § 1983 when the person who committed

the violation was an official with final policymaking authority or when such an official

ratified a subordinate’s unconstitutional decision or action and the basis for it. Clouthier

v. County of Contra Costa, __ F.3d __, 2010 WL 114958, at *14, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS

884, at*42-43 (9th Cir. Jan. 14, 2009). “It does not matter that the final policymaker may

have subjected only one person to only one constitutional violation.” Lytle, 382 F.3d at

983. “A municipality can be liable for an isolated constitutional violation when the

person causing the violation has final policymaking authority.” Id. (quoting Christie v.

Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231, 1235 (9th Cir. 1999)); see also Larez v. Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630,

646 (9th Cir. 1991) (“To the extent that the terms ‘policy’ and ‘custom’ imply something

beyond a single decision, official liability may also be imposed where a first-time

decision to adopt a particular course of action is directed by a governmentally authorized

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decisionmaker.”) 

Sgt. Lovejoy contends that Sheriff Arpaio is a final policymaker for Maricopa

County and in this capacity violated Sgt. Lovejoy’s civil rights. Identifying a policymaking official is a question of law for the court to decide by reference to state law, not

one of fact to be submitted to the jury. Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737

(1989). “When determining whether an individual has final policymaking authority, [the

court] ask[s] whether he or she has authority ‘in a particular area or on a particular

issue.’” Lytle, 382 F.3d at 983 (emphasis in original) (quoting McMillian v. Monroe

County, 520 U.S. 781, 785 (1997)).

Sheriff Arpaio is a final policymaker for Maricopa County in the context of

criminal law enforcement. A.R.S. § 11-441(A)(2) provides that the Sheriff shall “arrest

and take before a magistrate for examination all persons who attempt to commit or who

have committed a public offense.” “The purpose of this duty is the prompt and orderly

administration of criminal justice, including the Sheriff’s discretionary investigatory

determination of when enough evidence has been obtained to make an arrest.” De Jesus

Ortega Melendres v. Arpaio, 598 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1039 (D. Ariz. 2009). The Sheriff

can call upon others to assist him in the execution of these duties. See A.R.S. 11-441(B)

(“The sheriff may in the execution of [those] duties . . . command the aid of as many

inhabitants in the county as the sheriff deems necessary.”) The Sheriff also has fiscal

independence. Maricopa County must pay the actual and necessary expenses of the

Sheriff. A.R.S. § 11-444 (“The sheriff shall be allowed actual and necessary expenses

incurred by the sheriff in pursuit of criminals.”) No one above the Sheriff has the

authority to investigate crimes and arrest individuals. Therefore, the Sheriff has final

policymaking authority in the context of criminal law enforcement. See De Jesus Ortega

Melendres, 598 F. Supp. 2d at 1038-39 (holding that the Sheriff is the final policymaker

with respect to criminal investigations); Guillory v. Greenlee County, No. CV 05-352

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TUC DCB, 2006 WL 2816600, at *4, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71926, at *12 (D. Ariz.

Sept. 28, 2006) (same); Flanders v. Maricopa County, 203 Ariz. 368, 378, 54 P.3d 837,

847 (Ct. App. 2002) (holding county liable because the sheriff is a county officer whose

duties regarding jail operations are fixed by law). 

Because Sheriff Arpaio is a final policymaker for Maricopa County, his acts

“surely represent[] an act of official government ‘policy.’” See Harper v. City of Los

Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1027 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475

U.S. 469, 481 (1986)). “For purposes of Monell liability, the term ‘policy’ includes. . . .

‘a course of action tailored to a particular situation and not intended to control decisions

in later situations.’” Lytle, 382 F.3d at 983 (quoting Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481). A

policy is “a deliberate choice to follow a course of action . . . made from among various

alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with

respect to the subject matter in question.” Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir.

1992) (quoting Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483-84)). Sgt. Lovejoy has alleged Sheriff Arpaio

made a deliberate choice to engage in conduct that violated his civil rights. Sgt. Lovejoy

has therefore stated a claim for municipal liability under the third Monell prong. See

Harper, 533 F.3d at 1025 (police chief is final policymaker for City of Los Angeles,

rendering City liable for police chief’s “decision that deprived plaintiffs of their

constitutional rights”). 

VII. Malicious Prosecution 

Sgt. Lovejoy asserts malicious prosecution claims against Sheriff Arpaio under §

1983 and Arizona law. “[T]o prevail on a § 1983 claim of malicious prosecution, a

plaintiff must show that the defendants prosecuted [him] with malice and without

probable cause, and that they did so for the purpose of denying him [a specific

constitutional right.]” Awabdy v. City of Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004)

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(quoting Freeman v. City of Santa Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 1189 (9th Cir. 1995)). Under

Arizona law, “the elements of a malicious prosecution claim are: (1) a criminal

prosecution, (2) that terminates in favor of the plaintiff, (3) with the defendants as

prosecutors, (4) actuated by malice, (5) without probable cause, and (6) causing

damages.” Slade v. City of Phoenix, 112 Ariz. 298, 300, 541 P.2d 550, 552 (1975). 

“Malicious prosecution actions are not limited to suits against prosecutors but may be

brought, as here, against other persons who have wrongfully caused the charges to be

filed.” Awabdy, 368 F.3d at 1066. 

To state a claim for malicious prosecution, Sgt. Lovejoy must have alleged that a

state or local official improperly exerted pressure, knowingly provided misinformation to

the prosecutor, concealed exculpatory evidence, or otherwise engaged in wrongful or bad

faith conduct that was actively instrumental in causing the initiation of legal proceedings. 

Lacy v. County of Maricopa, 631 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1195 (D. Ariz. 2008). Sheriff Arpaio

contends that the allegations in the complaint are insufficient because they merely

establish that Sheriff Arpaio urged the county attorney to prosecute Sgt. Lovejoy, and that

this does not rise to the level of impropriety required to rebut the presumption of

prosecutorial independence. 

The filing of a criminal complaint immunizes police officers from damages

suffered thereafter because it is presumed that the prosecutor filing the complaint

exercised independent judgment in determining that probable cause for an arrest exists at

that time. Harper, 533 F.3d at 1027. “A § 1983 plaintiff may rebut this presumption,

however, by showing that the district attorney was pressured or caused by the

investigating officers to act contrary to his independent judgment.” Id. at 1028. The

presumption of prosecutorial independence does not protect investigative officers if they

interfered with the prosecutor’s judgment by omitting relevant information or by

pressuring the prosecutor to file charges. Id. 

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In Harper, the police exerted improper pressure on the district attorney by

“hounding” him to file criminal charges against several police officers in a high profile

corruption case that generated intense media scrutiny. Id. When the district attorney in

Harper expressed caution about initiating a prosecution without a thorough investigation,

the chief of the police department told him, “I don’t care. Let’s get the case behind us. If

we prosecute the case, even if you lose, it’s over.” Id. at 1028. In addition, there was

evidence that the district attorney was not independent but had worked “hand-in-hand”

with the police throughout the investigation. Id. at 1027. 

Likewise, Sgt. Lovejoy alleged that Sheriff Arpaio pressured the county attorney’s

office to initiate criminal proceedings against him without probable cause. The

prosecutor initially assigned to Sgt. Lovejoy’s case conveyed to his superiors in writing

that there was a complete lack of evidence of any violation of the animal cruelty statutes

and questioned whether the district attorney’s office had an ethical basis to proceed with

the prosecution. When Sheriff Arpaio learned of this and of the prosecutor’s cooperation

with Sgt. Lovejoy’s defense attorney, Sheriff Arpaio “ordered” the county attorney’s

office to change course. The county attorney acquiesced and put a new prosecutor, Lisa

Aubuchon, on the case. The complaint further alleges that Aubuchon knew that there was

no evidence of criminal conduct because Aubuchon was on the panel that reviewed the

first prosecutor’s written concerns. 

There was also ample evidence in Harper, and there are numerous allegations

here, that investigating officers acted with an improper purpose. For instance, the police

in Harper planned to arrest the officers publicly and parade them in front of the media. 

Id. at 1020. When the officers learned of this from an article published on the front page

of the Los Angeles Times, they arranged to turn themselves in. Id. The police

department subsequently issued a press release quoting the chief of police stating that

“misconduct would not be tolerated.” Id. The police then pressured the district attorney

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to prosecute although he did not have probable cause to do so. Id. Sgt. Lovejoy has

similarly alleged that Sheriff Arpaio scheduled a press conference before arresting him

and attempted to lure him to the sheriff’s station so that his arrest and felony prosecution

could be announced to the press. The prosecutor first assigned to the case went so far as

to cooperate with Sgt. Lovejoy’s defense to have the case dismissed because he knew that

there was no probable cause. However, his superiors would not have allowed him to drop

the case due to Sheriff Arpaio’s pressure. 

It is possible to infer from these allegations that the prosecution’s ultimate decision

to file charges was tainted by the pressure exerted by Sheriff Arpaio and that Sheriff

Arpaio acted with malice and with the intent to deprive Sgt. Lovejoy of his constitutional

rights. See id. at 1028. While there is no allegation that Sheriff Arpaio withheld or

tampered with evidence, “the presumption of prosecutorial independence protects

investigative officers unless the evidence shows that the officers interfered with the

prosecutor’s judgment by omitting relevant information or by pressuring the prosecutor

to file charges.” Id. (emphasis added). Sgt. Lovejoy has alleged that Sheriff Arpaio

pressured the county attorney to bring charges with malice and without probable cause. 

Further, Sgt. Lovejoy was acquitted of the charges and has alleged damages. Sgt.

Lovejoy has therefore stated a claim for malicious prosecution under both § 1983 and

Arizona law. 

VIII. State Law Claim for Abuse of Process

In Arizona, “one who uses a legal process, whether criminal or civil, against

another primarily to accomplish a purpose for which it was not designed, is subject to

liability to the other for harm caused by the abuse of process.” Nienstedt v. Wetzel, 133

Ariz. 348, 353, 651 P.2d 876, 881 (Ct. App. 1982). “The elements of an abuse of process

claim are ‘(1) a willful act in the use of judicial process; (2) for an ulterior purpose not

proper in the regular conduct of proceedings.’” Crackel v. Allstate Ins. Co., 208 Ariz.

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252, 257, 92 P.3d 882, 887 (Ct. App. 2004) (quoting Nienstedt, 133 Ariz. at 353, 651 P.2d

at 881). “A party can demonstrate the latter element by showing that the process has been

used primarily to accomplish a purpose for which the process was not designed.” Id.

(internal quotations omitted). “Process” encompasses the entire range of procedures

incident to litigation. Crackel, 208 Ariz. at 258, 92 P.3d at 888. 

Abuse of process is “a definite act or threat not authorized by the process, or aimed

at an objective not legitimate in the course of the process.” Id. (internal quotations

omitted). “There is no liability where the defendant has done nothing more than carry out

the process to its authorized conclusion, even though with bad intentions.” Id. “Liability

should result only when . . . the utilization of the procedure for the purposes for which it

was designed becomes so lacking in justification as to lose its legitimate function as a

reasonably justifiable litigation procedure.” Crackel, 208 Ariz. at 259, 92 P.3d at 889

(internal quotations omitted). Sgt. Lovejoy alleges that Sheriff Arpaio investigated,

arrested, and prosecuted him solely to obtain publicity. However, “[a]buse of process . . .

is not commencing an action or causing process to issue without justification.” Morn v.

City of Phoenix, 152 Ariz. 164, 167, 730 P.2d 873, 876 (Ct. App. 1986). In fact, “even a

pure spite motive is not sufficient where process is used only to accomplish the result for

which it was created.” Id. (quoting Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 121 at 897

(5th ed. 1984)). Sgt. Lovejoy has alleged that his arrest and prosecution were improper,

but he has not alleged that any specific judicial process was employed for a purpose other

than for what it was designed. Therefore, Sgt. Lovejoy’s abuse of process claim fails. 

IX. State Law Claim for False Arrest

The statute of limitations for a false imprisonment claim in Arizona is one year

from the date that the claim accrues. A.R.S. § 12-541. The claim accrues on the date the

plaintiff was arrested. Sgt. Lovejoy was arrested only once, on September 5, 2007,

whereas the complaint was filed on August 14, 2009, nearly two years later. Sgt. Lovejoy

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does not dispute that their claim for false arrest is time-barred. Plaintiffs’ claim for false

arrest is therefore dismissed. 

X. Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office

In Arizona, a government entity may be sued only if the legislature has given the

entity the power to be sued. See Schwartz v. Superior Court, 186 Ariz. 617, 619, 925

P.2d 1068, 1070 (Ct. App. 1996). There is a consensus that Arizona’s municipal police

departments are non-jural entities. Payne v. Arpaio, No. CV09-1195-+PHX-NVW, 2009

WL 3756679, at *4, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110553, at *14 (citing relevant cases). 

Courts that have found the MCSO to be a non-jural entity have relied primarily on the

lack of a statute conferring the power on the MCSO to sue and be sued. Id. Plaintiffs

have indicated that they are willing to concede that MCSO is a non-jural entity and to

dismiss MCSO from the suit. Therefore, MCSO is dismissed from the suit. 

XI. Carolynn Lovejoy 

Carolynn Lovejoy has failed to assert claims against Defendants. Plaintiffs have

sought and will be given leave to amend their complaint to make such allegations. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (doc. #10)

is denied, except that Plaintiffs’ state law claims for abuse of process and false arrest are

dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiffs are given leave until February 26, 2010, to amend

their complaint to add allegations by Carolynn Lovejoy and to add claims against

Maricopa County to the extent stated in this order. 

/ / /

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all claims against the Maricopa County Sheriff’s

Office are dismissed without prejudice for lack of jural status. 

DATED this 10th day of February, 2010.

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