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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 23-1463 

NATHANIEL PRYOR, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

MICHAEL CORRIGAN, et al., 

Defendants-Appellees. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. 

No. 1:17-cv-01968 — Steven C. Seeger, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED FEBRUARY 5, 2024 — DECIDED DECEMBER 23, 2024 

____________________ 

Before ROVNER, BRENNAN, and KIRSCH, Circuit Judges. 

BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. After receiving a tip about drug 

activity linked to a van in a specific area of Aurora, Illinois, 

officers pulled over a vehicle that fit the description. Once the 

van stopped, Nathaniel Pryor and another man exited 

quickly. An officer yelled to Pryor to get on the ground, ran 

to him, took him down, struck him twice, and later searched 

him. Although officers determined that Pryor was not 

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2 No. 23-1463 

involved with drug activity, the state charged him with obstructing/resisting a police officer. The state later dropped the 

charge. 

Pryor sued several officers and the City of Aurora. He 

brought multiple federal and state law claims, including under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court granted in part defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The remaining claims 

went to trial, at which the jury found for the defendants. Pryor 

appeals, claiming the district court erred in its summary judgment decision and in many evidentiary and procedural rulings at trial. 

The district court did not err in granting defendants summary judgment on Pryor’s false arrest claim and qualified immunity on part of his excessive force claim. And Corrigan’s 

two searches were proper incident to Pryor’s arrest. The district court also did not abuse its discretion in its trial decisions. 

So, we affirm the district court in full. 

I. Background

A. Factual 

On March 23, 2015, Aurora police received a tip from a 

confidential informant that someone would be “cooking crack 

cocaine at a home on Kane Street,” and “would be in a conversion van.” Five police officers joined a stakeout of that location. Officer Damien Cantona and another officer surveilled 

the home from a distance in their vehicle. Officer Michael Corrigan and another officer cruised the neighborhood. Officer

Nathaniel Isaak parked further down Kane Street with directions, if probable cause existed, to stop the van. 

Later that evening, a conversion van drove into the neighborhood. Pryor sat in the front passenger seat and the man 

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No. 23-1463 3

named in the tip sat in the back seat. They were headed to 

Pryor’s house to grab his gym bag and then to “go to the gym 

for a workout.” 

Isaak was the first officer to see the van. He watched it approach the intersection of Kane and Ohio Streets, stop at a 

stop sign, signal, and then turn right. But the van failed to signal 100 feet before turning, a violation of Illinois law. Isaak 

decided to stop the van, so he began to follow it. Corrigan followed Isaak’s squad car in their cruiser, trailing by a few 

blocks. 

Corrigan’s and Isaak’s police car dash cameras captured 

this sequence, the ensuing traffic stop, and the events that followed. The two dashcams recorded video and audio, some of 

which overlapped. Corrigan’s camera showed Pryor’s initial 

actions after the traffic stop. Isaak’s camera captured the beginning of the interaction between Pryor and Corrigan, and 

Corrigan’s camera showed the end. 

The parties characterize what took place differently, but 

the videos tell their own story. On appeal, we “view the facts 

and draw reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to 

the party opposing the summary judgment motion.” Scott v. 

Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007) (cleaned up). But when parties 

tell two different stories, “one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record,” we “should not adopt that version of 

the facts... .” Id. at 380. And “[w]hen video ‘firmly settles a 

factual issue,’ we will not ‘indulge stories clearly contradicted 

by the footage’ because there is no genuine factual dispute.” 

Smith v. Finkley, 10 F.4th 725, 730 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing Horton 

v. Pobjecky, 883 F.3d 941, 944 (7th Cir. 2018)). The district court 

found that certain parts of the videos are susceptible to different interpretations (creating an issue of fact) or were unclear. 

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But most of the video depictions were clear. There is no suggestion that the recordings are unreliable or inauthentic.

The dashcam from Isaak’s squad car shows him following 

the van for about 20 seconds over two blocks before pulling it 

over. The driver of the van hit the brakes, activated his turn

signal, and within a few seconds pulled into a driveway. Isaak 

parked his squad car in front of the house just before the 

driveway. 

As soon as the van parked, the man in the back seat exited 

the vehicle and took off running. Isaak then called into his radio, “I got—I got a male bailing out of the house! 1123 Fenton.” Isaak ran toward the van and then pursued the fleeing 

man, yelling, “Get on the ground! Get on the ground now! Get 

on the ground!” 

At the same time, Corrigan’s squad car approached the 

scene. That car’s dashcam recorded Pryor exiting the van, 

shutting the passenger door, and moving down the driveway 

toward the street. Pryor did not run, but he did not walk either. His feet moved quickly, yet he did not cover much

ground, taking about 12 steps in roughly four seconds. 

As Pryor reached the end of the driveway, Corrigan and 

Christoffel pulled in behind Isaak’s vehicle. One officer yelled, 

“Go” five times, and “He’s out, he’s out! He’s running, he’s 

running!” Pryor slowed to a stop where the driveway met the 

street, directly in front of the hood of Isaak’s squad car. He 

faced the squad cars and raised both hands, which were 

empty, in the air. He stood still for a few seconds, looking at 

the officers. Corrigan twice yelled for Pryor to “Get on the 

ground!” Then, Corrigan ran toward Pryor. Pryor claims that 

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No. 23-1463 5

Corrigan had his gun drawn, but if so, this was outside of the 

dashcam view. 

Corrigan approached Pryor, who was a much larger man, 

from the front. Corrigan later testified that because Pryor had 

not been searched and was larger than him, Corrigan feared 

Pryor was going to gain control over the situation and harm 

him. 

Corrigan ran behind Pryor and put both arms around his 

midsection. Corrigan then used his right leg to sweep Pryor’s 

left leg, taking him to the ground, and then tackled him. Pryor 

claims he was not given time to get on the ground, he did not 

resist Corrigan, and Corrigan did not tell him he was under 

arrest or why he was being arrested. 

Pryor landed on his side in the snow-spotted pavement. 

He was face down with Corrigan straddling him. Pryor says 

he hit his head on the cement, making him woozy. Pryor then 

asked, “what’s going on?” Corrigan yelled, “don’t fight, stop 

fighting!” Pryor responded, “I’m not fighting.” Corrigan ordered Pryor to put his hands behind his back. Pryor asked, 

“Sir, what is the problem?” The video shows that Pryor may 

not have put his hands behind his back right away. Pryor repeated, “what is the problem?” 

Corrigan then raised his right arm and hit Pryor. The 

video does not show where the blow landed, but Pryor says

it was on his head. Corrigan once again commanded Pryor to 

put his hands behind his back. Pryor repeatedly asked, “Sir, 

what is the problem?” Corrigan told Pryor “don’t move.” 

Meanwhile, Corrigan reached for his handcuffs, grabbed 

Pryor’s arms, and placed him in the restraints. This took about 

30 seconds. While handcuffing Pryor, Corrigan struck him a

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second time. The video does not make clear if Pryor was fully 

handcuffed during the second strike. The officer continued to 

yell “stop fighting” and “don’t move!” Corrigan then stood 

up, and Pryor laid on the ground in handcuffs, asking to get 

up. 

About a minute later, Corrigan asked, “Why didn’t you 

get on the ground when I told you to get on the ground?” 

Pryor responded, “I had got my hands up! You didn’t see me 

with my hands up?” After some back and forth, Corrigan 

said, “When the police stop a car, and you get out and run 

from it, that’s a problem.” He added, “The crazy part is, when 

you normally get stopped by the police, you don’t run from 

the car. That’s the crazy part.” 

Corrigan searched Pryor while he laid on the pavement. 

Pryor wore black jeans over a pair of sweatpants. Under the 

sweatpants were basketball shorts and then underwear. Corrigan later helped Pryor to his feet and searched him a second 

time. The dashcam videos do not show the details of Corrigan’s searches. 

Eventually, the police put Pryor into a transport vehicle 

and took him to the police station. Pryor testified that, while 

he sat in the back of the vehicle, Cantona searched him a third 

time. Cantona denied this search happened, and the alleged 

third search was not captured on video. Pryor testified, and 

the officers denied, that Corrigan and Cantona inappropriately touched Pryor during their respective searches of him. 

Those searches uncovered no contraband. The officers found 

no contraband in the conversion van or in the area where the 

other passenger had fled the scene. 

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No. 23-1463 7

B. Procedural 

Pryor was charged with “obstructing/resisting a police officer in violation of 720 ILCS 5/31-1.” He was not charged with 

any other crime, and the state eventually dismissed the 

charge. 

Pryor filed suit against Corrigan, Cantona, several other 

officers, and the City of Aurora. He brought six claims: three 

under federal law, 42 U.S.C. § 1983—false arrest, excessive 

force, and illegal search; one under both federal and state 

law—malicious prosecution; and two under state law alone—

battery and indemnification. 

The parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The district court denied Pryor’s motion in its entirety and granted in 

part and denied in part defendants’ motion. In a lengthy and 

detailed order, the court dismissed the false arrest and malicious prosecution claims in their entirety; dismissed part of 

the excessive force, illegal search, and battery claims; and dismissed all defendants except Corrigan and Cantona. Three 

claims survived for trial: (1) the excessive force claims under 

§ 1983 against Corrigan for the two punches; (2) the illegal 

search claims under § 1983 against Cantona for the third 

search; and (3) the state law battery claims against Corrigan, 

Cantona, and the City of Aurora. 

Before trial, the parties filed nearly forty motions in limine

and raised multiple evidentiary disputes. The district court issued two thorough sets of orders and rulings resolving these 

challenges. During trial, Pryor filed largely duplicative motions on which the court also ruled. A four-day trial took place

in February 2023, and the jury found defendants not liable on 

all remaining claims.

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On appeal, Pryor claims the district court erred in granting 

defendants summary judgment on his three § 1983 claims—

false arrest, excessive force, and illegal search.1 Pryor also 

challenges five of the district court’s evidentiary and procedural rulings for trial.

II. Summary Judgment

We review de novo a trial court’s summary judgment ruling. Turubchuk v. S. Ill. Asphalt Co., Inc., 958 F.3d 541, 548 (7th 

Cir. 2020). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is 

no dispute of material fact, and the moving party is entitled 

to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Brown v. 

Osmundson, 38 F.4th 545, 549 (7th Cir. 2022). The same principles apply when parties file cross-motions for summary judgment. We treat each cross-motion “separately in determining 

whether judgment should be entered in accordance with Rule 

56.” Marcatante v. City of Chicago, 657 F.3d 433, 439 (7th Cir. 

2011). 

Pryor claims the district court erred in granting defendants summary judgment on his false arrest, excessive force, 

and illegal search claims. We discuss each in turn.

A. False Arrest

Pryor was arrested and charged with “obstructing/resisting a police officer in violation of 720 ILCS 5/31-1.” He claims 

1 Pryor mentions his malicious prosecution claim in his opening brief, 

but he does not explicitly address it, except to conclude without analysis 

that he is entitled to summary judgment. Absent more discussion, Pryor 

waives this argument on appeal. See Bradley v. Village of University Park, 59 

F.4th 887, 897 (7th Cir. 2023).

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No. 23-1463 9

Corrigan could not arrest him on this charge, so he was falsely 

arrested.

Probable cause is an absolute defense to a false arrest 

claim, and we analyze it objectively. Abbott v. Sangamon 

County, 705 F.3d 706, 713 (7th Cir. 2013). Probable cause exists 

if the “totality of the facts and circumstances known to the officer at the time of the arrest would warrant a reasonable, prudent person in believing that the arrestee had committed, was 

committing, or was about to commit a crime.” Id. at 714. Only 

a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity is required, not an actual showing of such activity. See United 

States v. Carroll, 750 F.3d 700, 706 (7th Cir. 2014). 

Obstruction of Justice. 720 ILCS 5/31-1 prohibits a person 

from knowingly “obstruct[ing] the performance by one 

known to the person to be a peace officer... .” 720 ILCS 5/31-

1. As the dashcam videos showed, after the traffic stop Pryor 

exited the van, shut the passenger door, and moved down the 

driveway toward the street. Pryor traveled quickly, but he did 

not cover a lot of ground—taking about 12 steps in roughly 

four seconds. As Pryor reached the end of the driveway, Corrigan arrived at the scene. Observing Pryor leave the van and 

head south away from him and the other officers, Corrigan 

yelled for Pryor to “Get on the ground!” 

Pryor argues that Corrigan did not have probable cause to 

arrest him for obstruction of justice. His argument rests on 

Corrigan’s discovery response to one of Pryor’s requests to 

admit, which stated:

The individual defendant responding to this Request to Admit is not claiming that he/she had 

probable cause to arrest NATHANIEL PRYOR 

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on March 23, 2015, for any charge other than resisting arrest.

RESPONSE: Officer Corrigan admits.

Pryor contends that Corrigan’s response is a judicial admission that there was not probable cause to arrest Pryor for any 

crime other than resisting arrest. Accordingly, no probable 

cause existed for an underlying offense, such as obstruction 

of justice by leaving a lawful traffic stop.

But Pryor misunderstands the impact of Corrigan’s 

discovery response. Probable cause is an objective standard. 

Corrigan’s subjective understanding of probable cause is irrelevant to the objective existence of probable cause. See 

Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004) (“[An officer’s] 

subjective reason for making the arrest need not be the criminal offense as to which the known facts provide probable 

cause.”). As the Supreme Court has explained, “the fact that 

the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for 

the officer’s action does not invalidate the action taken as long 

as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.” 

Id.

Instead, the court must view all facts from the standpoint 

of an “objectively reasonable police officer” and determine, 

based on those facts, whether probable cause existed. District 

of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 57 (2018); see also Washington 

v. City of Chicago, 98 F.4th 860, 875 (7th Cir. 2024) (“Probable 

cause is ‘assessed objectively based on ‘the conclusions that 

the ... officer reasonably might have drawn from the information known to him.’” (citing Young v. City of Chicago, 987 

F.3d 641, 644 (2021))). So, even if Corrigan’s response were an 

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No. 23-1463 11

admission, probable cause could have supported Corrigan’s 

decision to arrest Pryor for obstruction of justice.

Considering the totality of the evidence, a reasonable officer in Corrigan’s position could have concluded that Pryor 

was leaving a lawful traffic stop. When a passenger does so, 

an officer has probable cause to arrest for resisting or obstructing a police officer. See People v. Johnson, 945 N.E.2d 2, 14–15 

(Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (defendant, a passenger in vehicle lawfully 

stopped for traffic infraction, attempted to evade police by 

running from vehicle; officers had probable cause to arrest 

him for obstruction under Illinois law). Corrigan thus had 

probable cause to arrest and charge Pryor with obstruction of 

justice under 720 ILCS 5/31-1. The district court did not err, 

therefore, in granting Corrigan summary judgment on 

Pryor’s false arrest claim as to his obstruction of justice 

charge.

Resisting Arrest. To evaluate whether defendants appropriately arrested Pryor for this crime, we must decide (1) 

whether probable cause for an underlying offense existed to 

arrest Pryor, (2) when Pryor was under arrest, and (3) whether 

Pryor resisted arrest as defined by 720 ILCS 5/31–1. See 720 

ILCS 5/31–1; Abbott, 705 F.3d at 719–20. 

First, as explained above, a reasonable officer in Corrigan’s 

position could have concluded that Pryor was leaving a lawful traffic stop. Corrigan consequently had probable cause to 

arrest and to charge Pryor. 

Second, an arrest occurs when “a reasonable person in the 

suspect’s position would have understood the situation to 

constitute a restraint on freedom of movement” and submits 

to the known police officer. Tebbens v. Mushol, 692 F.3d 807, 

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816 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Ochana v. Flores, 347 F.3d 266, 270 

(7th Cir. 2003)). Here, the emergency lights were activated on 

Corrigan’s police vehicle, and he ran toward Pryor ordering

him to “get on the ground.” Pryor stopped and raised his 

hands, then lowered them as Corrigan approached. As the 

district court explained, Pryor’s actions constituted submission because no reasonable person would have felt “free to 

decline the officer’s request or otherwise terminate the encounter.” Kernats v. O’Sullivan, 35 F.3d 1171, 1177 (7th Cir. 

1994) (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 435–36 (1991)).

So, at this point Pryor was under arrest.

Third, because Pryor was under arrest, any subsequent resistance violates 720 ILCS 5/31–1. Resistance under Illinois 

law is an action that “impedes, hinders, interrupts, prevents, 

or delays the performance of the officer's duties” and is defined as “withstanding the force or effect of or the exertion of 

oneself to counteract or defeat.” Brooks v. City of Aurora, 653 

F.3d 478, 484 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting People v. Agnew-Downs, 

936 N.E.2d 166, 173 (2010)). This is true even if the arrest was 

“unlawful.” Id. (quoting Hardrick v. City of Bolingbrook, 522 

F.3d 758, 762 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing People v. Villarreal, 604 

N.E.2d 923, 926–27 (1992))). 

In Brooks, this court held that an officer had probable cause 

to arrest for resisting under 720 ILCS 5/31–1(a) when the subject pulled back from the officer’s attempt to seize him. 653 

F.3d at 483–84. Here, Pryor refused Corrigan’s orders to “get 

on the ground.” Instead, Pryor began to lower his arms as 

Corrigan ran toward him. This prevented Corrigan from gaining control of Pryor and placing him in handcuffs. Once on 

the ground, Pryor continued to resist Corrigan’s attempt to 

place his hands behind his back to restrain him. A reasonable 

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No. 23-1463 13

officer in Corrigan’s place could have believed that Pryor resisted within the meaning of 720 ILCS 5/31-1(a). 

Altogether, Corrigan could appropriately arrest Pryor for 

resisting arrest. The district court did not err in granting Corrigan summary judgment on Pryor’s false arrest claim on this 

charge.2

B. Excessive Force

Qualified immunity rests on two questions: “first, whether 

the facts presented, taken in the light most favorable to the 

plaintiff, describe a violation of a constitutional right; and second, whether the federal right at issue was clearly established 

at the time of the alleged violation.” Smith, 10 F.4th at 737. If 

the plaintiff fails to prove either prong, “the defendant official 

is protected by qualified immunity.” Id. (citing Koh v. Ustich, 

933 F.3d 836, 844 (7th Cir. 2019)). Pryor argues the district 

court erred in granting Corrigan qualified immunity against 

Pryor’s claim of excessive force during the leg sweep and 

tackle, in violation of the Fourth Amendment.3

The district court, in its discretion, addressed only the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis—whether the 

2 Pryor sued the remaining ten defendants under theories of failure to 

intervene and supervisor liability. Given that Corrigan had probable cause 

to arrest Pryor for resisting arrest or obstructing justice, there is no underlying constitutional violation in the arrest. See supra, Section II.A. Thus, the

district court properly granted summary judgment to the remaining defendants on Pryor’s false arrest claim. 

3 Pryor also argues that the district court should not have granted

qualified immunity when facts are disputed. But, as discussed above, the

district court correctly interpretated the dashcam video footage. So, we 

reject this argument.

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14 No. 23-1463 

right at issue was “clearly established” at the time of the incident—without first determining whether a constitutional violation occurred. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 

(2009) (“judges of the district courts and the courts of appeals 

should be permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity 

analysis should be addressed first”). A constitutional right is 

clearly established “if the right in question is sufficiently clear 

that a reasonable official would understand that what he is 

doing violates that right.” Smith, 10 F.4th at 742 (cleaned up). 

In addition, the right must be “defined with specificity.” Id.

To decide whether a right satisfies these requirements, we 

“analyze whether precedent squarely governs the facts at issue... .” Id. (citing Strand v. Minchuk, 910 F.3d 909, 917 (7th 

Cir. 2018)). 

The parties discuss two cases, Johnson v. Scott, 576 F.3d 658 

(7th Cir. 2009) and Hollingsworth v. City of Aurora, No. 11 CV 

4597, 2014 WL 7204083 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 11, 2014). But neither 

parallels this one. In Johnson and Hollingsworth, officers were 

granted qualified immunity for tackling suspects. But both 

cases involved violent underlying crimes. See Johnson, 576 

F.3d at 660 (noting that “there were two serious crimes at issue: a shooting and reckless flight from the police in a vehicle”); Hollingsworth, 2014 WL 7204083, at *3 (explaining that 

“the initial crime at issue was a robbery involving a substantial amount of money”). And both involved longer police 

chases. See Johnson, 576 F.3d at 661 (characterizing Johnson’s 

attempt to evade police in his car and on foot as “reckless and 

determined”); Hollingsworth, 2014 WL 7204083, at *4 (describing Hollingsworth’s “jump out of a moving vehicle”). This

case does not present such extreme facts.

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No. 23-1463 15

Relying on these differences, Pryor submits that an officer 

tackling someone was acceptable in Johnson and Hollingworth, 

but this case is not like Johnson and Hollingsworth, so tackling 

was unacceptable here. Pryor’s argument is flawed because 

those two cases do not clearly establish when tackling is impermissible. To satisfy his burden, Pryor needs to show that 

it is “beyond debate” that the tackle here was unacceptable. 

See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). He must establish that tackling is clearly a constitutional violation in cases 

like this one. Neither Johnson nor Hollingsworth does that, so 

Pryor fails to meet his burden.

Pryor also cites two cases explaining that “police officers 

do not have the right to shove, push, or otherwise assault innocent citizens without any provocation whatsoever.” Taylor 

v. City of Milford, 10 F.4th 800, 808 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing Clash 

v. Beatty, 77 F.3d 1045, 1048 (7th Cir. 1996)); see also Gupta v. 

Melloh, 19 F.4th 990, 1001 (7th Cir. 2021). Again, these cases 

are distinguishable. Here, because of the informant’s tip about 

the possibility of drugs and the surveillance background, a 

reasonable officer in Corrigan’s circumstances could have believed Pryor committed a dangerous act of provocation when 

he exited the van and traveled down the driveway. Common 

v. City of Chicago, 661 F.3d 940, 943 (7th Cir. 2011) (“This standard requires that a fact finder analyze whether the officer’s actions are objectively reasonable in light of the facts and under 

the circumstances confronting the officer at the time of the incident, without regard to the underlying motive or intent of 

the officer, and without the benefit of hindsight.”). For all Corrigan knew, he faced a dangerous situation involving drugs 

and two individuals fleeing a lawful traffic stop. What Corrigan knew before the alleged use of force matters, not what he 

learned after. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) 

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16 No. 23-1463 

(“The ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be 

judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the 

scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”). 

Qualified immunity “protects actions in the hazy border 

between excessive and acceptable force.” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 

U.S. 7, 18 (2015) (cleaned up). Pryor has not shown that it was 

clearly established when he was tackled that such force was 

excessive under the Fourth Amendment. So, the district court 

did not err in finding Corrigan’s tackle protected by qualified 

immunity.4

* * *

We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment 

on parts of Pryor’s false arrest and excessive force claims. Our 

dissenting colleague takes a different view of the factual record. We offer an overarching response and then counter the 

specific contentions.

Our review and consideration of the Corrigan and Isaak 

dashcam videos is criticized as “usurp[ing] the jury’s role” 

and invading “the province of the jury.” But our dissenting 

colleague has not offered a clear line separating when a video 

4 Pryor contends the district court erred by granting Corrigan summary judgment on his leg sweep and tackle of Pryor but allowing Corrigan’s two punches of Pryor to go to trial. By separating these actions that 

occurred only seconds apart, Pryor claims the court “creat[ed] an almost 

impossible case to try.”

But Pryor cites no authority in support of his claim. And we see no 

error in presenting to the jury the punches, on which the parties presented 

conflicting evidence and the video is inconclusive. Nor did the court err

in deciding that Corrigan warranted qualified immunity for the tackle. 

Pryor has failed to offer case law that holds beyond debate that the tackle 

here is impermissible.

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No. 23-1463 17

depiction allows for recognizing facts as established for summary judgment versus reserving a factual dispute for a jury. 

After innumerable viewings of the videos and thorough review of this voluminous record, we remain comfortable 

drawing that line in the same place as the district court. As 

that court correctly concluded, certain video depictions are 

susceptible to different reasonable interpretations, such as the 

excessive force claim on the two punches. Or, the video is captured from too far away, such as Corrigan’s second search of 

Pryor. But most of the events that form the basis for Pryor’s 

many claims are plainly portrayed, unobstructed and in their 

entirety, in one or both videos. So, neither the parties nor the 

district court were mistaken to consider and rely on them in 

the manner they did.5

5 The dissent cites several authorities which suggest it is improper to 

rely on videos in these circumstances. But those decisions are factually 

distinguishable. 

Kailin v. Village of Gurnee, 77 F.4th 476 (7th Cir. 2023), involved a sixsecond video, without audio, in which an officer shot a dog, and in which 

the audio was key to the case’s resolution. Id. at 482. The dashcam videos 

here are much longer (Corrigan’s 52 minutes, Isaak’s 31 minutes), and 

even if only the traffic stop and arrest portions are considered, they last a 

few minutes and include audio.

In Jackson v. Curry, 888 F.3d 259 (7th Cir. 2018), this court said a “video 

is bound to be subject to varying interpretations.” Id. at 264. There—opposite from here—the district court did not even view the video in question, 

id. at 263, and our court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to review that 

decision not to watch the video. Id. at 263–64.

In Gant v. Hartman, 924 F.3d 445 (7th Cir. 2019), the video depicted the 

plaintiff standing in a doorway, arm extended holding a door, and then 

his arm lowering slightly before an officer fired, all occurring within a 

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18 No. 23-1463 

The dissent also reviews several resisting and obstructing 

episodes, disputing that the videos show that probable cause 

existed to arrest Pryor. But the dissent’s descriptions of the 

videos and findings of disputed inferences are unduly 

cramped. 

Before the traffic stop, the officers had substantial information about drugs, as well as surveillance that had been performed concerning the driver and the van. The videos also 

show the officers driving behind the van through Aurora for 

blocks before the traffic violation.

As for resisting arrest, when Corrigan approached Pryor 

at the end of the driveway, Pryor was seized when he was no 

longer free to leave. See Tebbens, 692 F.3d at 816 (7th Cir. 2012) 

(citation omitted). The video unquestionably conveys Corrigan’s commands to Pryor and his failure to follow those commands. Our colleague cites to “common sense” that resistance 

is not possible before an arrest has been attempted. But these 

events occurred in 2015, and not until 2021 did Illinois enact 

the version of 720 ILCS 5/31-1(d) which requires an underlying offense before arrest for resisting.

The videos do not require inferences to conclude that 

Pryor leaving the van and traveling down the driveway constituted obstruction. The officers were executing a lawful traffic stop. Regardless of how fast Pryor traveled, he left the van 

during that stop, proceeded away from the vehicle, admitted 

single second. Id. at 450. From that snippet our court concluded that 

material facts were in dispute, foreclosing interlocutory appellate jurisdiction. Id. at 448–51. The videos here are much longer than in Gant and depict most of the events that form the basis of Pryor’s claims and the officers’ defenses.

Case: 23-1463 Document: 39 Filed: 12/23/2024 Pages: 59
No. 23-1463 19

he was moving away from the officers, and stopped only after 

Corrigan’s commands. 

The same is true for obstruction for Pryor’s refusal to get 

on the ground. Our dissenting colleague says the videos are 

not definitive, and that Pryor’s protest that he had insufficient 

time to get down created a fact issue. But his claim is “clearly 

contradicted” by the dashcam videos which capture the commands for Pryor to get on the ground, his failure to do so, and 

the duration of his delay. See Finkley, 10 F.4th at 730. 

As for resisting during handcuffing, Illinois law prohibits 

an individual from delaying, impeding, or hindering the performance of a police officer’s duties. The videos are not unclear that Pryor’s actions meet at least one, if not all three of 

these prohibitions. The Isaak dashcam video shows the one 

minute in which Corrigan approached Pryor, executed the leg

sweep and tackle, and Corrigan handcuffed him.6 The Corrigan dashcam video, for approximately three and a half 

minutes, shows Pryor stopping at the end of the driveway; 

Corrigan leg sweeping, tackling, handcuffing, and searching 

Pryor; them discussing why he was taken down; and Corrigan helping Pryor up.7

Last, our dissenting colleague concludes that Corrigan 

should not have been granted summary judgment on the leg 

sweep and tackle because whether that force was excessive 

depends on if Pryor was resisting or submitting to the officers. 

Even if there was a fact dispute as to the resisting, though, 

6 Dist. Ct. Ex. 18, Isaak dashcam video and audio, 0:53–1:50.

7 Dist. Ct. Ex. 17, Corrigan dashcam video and audio, 1:00–4:34. 

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20 No. 23-1463 

Pryor has cited no case law that in these circumstances Corrigan’s actions were impermissible.8 

Without clearly established case law that the leg sweep 

and tackle here were impermissible beyond debate, the district court properly granted Corrigan qualified immunity on 

this portion of Pryor’s excessive force claim. 

C. Illegal Searches 

Pryor claims certain defendants searched him three times. 

The district court granted defendants summary judgment on 

the two searches performed by Corrigan and recorded on 

video. The third search, performed by Cantona and not recorded, was contested at trial. Pryor reasserts that the police 

did not have probable cause or reasonable suspicion to believe he possessed drugs or a gun. To Pryor, defendants had 

no justifiable reason to search him, and the district court erred 

in granting defendants summary judgment on the first two 

searches.

We have “recognized that, given the dangers of drug trafficking, guns and drugs often go hand in hand.” United States 

v. Jones, 900 F.3d 440, 449 (7th Cir. 2018). Corrigan assisted in 

a lawful traffic stop of a van related to suspected drug activity. 

8 Neither of the authorities our dissenting colleague references on this 

point involved facts remotely like the leg sweep and tackle here. 

In Gupta v. Melloh, 19 F.4th 990 (7th Cir. 2021), an intoxicated arrestee 

was handcuffed and fell and fractured a vertebra in his neck. Id. at 995–

1000. There, an officer placed his hands on the arrestee’s arm and pulled 

him forward, purportedly because the arrestee was actively resisting arrest. Id. at 997–98. And in Miller v. Gonzalez, 761 F.3d 822 (7th Cir. 2014), 

the officer leaped a chain link fence and landed with his knee directly on 

the plaintiff’s head, breaking his jaw. Id. at 825.

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No. 23-1463 21

He saw Pryor get out of the van and move quickly down the 

driveway toward the street. For these reasons, Corrigan could 

have reasonably believed that Pryor was fleeing and had 

drugs or a weapon on his person. 

It is a “bright-line rule that police are entitled to search the 

persons and possessions of everyone arrested on probable 

cause, with or without any reason to suspect that the person 

is armed or carrying contraband.” United States v. Jackson, 377 

F.3d 715, 716 (7th Cir. 2004) (discussing the search of a defendant who was “stopped for a traffic violation, arrested, and 

taken into custody”) (citing Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 

(1973) and United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973)). Corrigan thus could constitutionally search Pryor incident to arrest. Such a search can be “‘a relatively extensive exploration 

of the person.’” Campbell v. Miller, 499 F.3d 711, 717 (7th Cir. 

2007) (citing Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235). But it becomes unlawful when the search is conducted in a manner that is “‘extreme 

or patently abusive.’” Id. (citing Robinson, 414 U.S. at 236). 

The district court correctly found that Corrigan’s two 

searches of Pryor were not “extreme or patently abusive.” 

First, there is no support in the record that Corrigan searched 

Pryor for sexual gratification or to humiliate him. Second, 

there was no evidence that Corrigan exposed Pryor’s private 

parts to the public. At most, as Pryor argues, the searches exposed his boxers. But this contention is insufficient to create a 

genuine issue of fact about whether the search exposed his 

private parts. See United States v. Williams, 209 F.3d 940, 943–

44 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that an officer may conduct “a full 

search of the person,” including “pat[ting]-down” and subsequently “sliding his hand under [a defendant’s] waistband 

and down the back part of his pants,” as long as the defendant 

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22 No. 23-1463 

“was never disrobed or exposed to the public”). Third, Pryor 

alleges that during the first search Corrigan “searched him 

thoroughly, going up his boxers, [and] into his private area” 

and during the second search Corrigan “put his hand down 

inside the front of Plaintiff’s boxers and searched, touching 

his genitals.” But those allegations, even if true, do not 

amount to a strip or body cavity search. See id. Thus, there is 

no factual support to establish that Corrigan’s two searches 

incident to arrest were unlawful.9

III. Jury Trial

Pryor also challenges many of the evidentiary and procedural rulings before and at the jury trial. The evidentiary rulings, including on motions in limine, are reviewed for abuse 

of discretion. Turubchuk, 958 F.3d at 548. When rulings involve 

a question of law, though, review is de novo. Id. We also review jury instruction decisions for abuse of discretion. 

E.E.O.C. v. AutoZone, Inc., 809 F.3d 916, 921–22 (7th Cir. 2016). 

And harmlessness is evaluated “in light of the entire record,” 

9 Pryor also claims the district court abused its discretion when it 

barred him from testifying as to the “cumulative effect” of the three 

searches. He says Cantona’s third search was unreasonable because Corrigan had already searched him two times. But the district court correctly 

noted that Pryor first raised this argument one week before trial. It was 

not offered in the complaint, during discovery, or in the cross–motions for 

summary judgment. Because Pryor tried to add a new theory of liability 

just before trial, the district court did not abuse its discretion in precluding 

it. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2); Liebhart v. SPX Corp., 917 F.3d 952, 964 (7th 

Cir. 2019) (explaining when a court can deny an amendment under Rule 

15). Further, any error that might have occurred on this point was harmless. Cantona denied performing a third search. He testified he “was not 

even on the scene until way later.” So, any theory of cumulative effect 

would not have affected the jury’s decision.

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No. 23-1463 23

and “[w]here there are several errors, each of which is harmless in its own right, a new trial may still be granted if the cumulative effect of those otherwise harmless errors deprives a 

litigant of a fair trial.” Nelson v. City of Chicago, 810 F.3d 1061, 

1075 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Barber v. City of Chicago, 725 F.3d 

702, 715 (7th Cir. 2013)).

Pryor claims the district court erred in: (1) allowing evidence regarding Corrigan’s and Cantona’s drug surveillance; 

(2) barring Pryor from testifying that he was not involved in 

illegal drug activity and that the police did not locate any 

drugs during the incident; (3) allowing Corrigan to testify 

about his knowledge of the area and limiting Pryor’s testimony about race; (4) allowing Corrigan’s statements made in 

his dashcam video and testimony at trial; and (5) denying 

Pryor’s jury instruction regarding who would pay any judgment.

A. Surveillance Evidence

Pryor sought to bar all evidence about the drug surveillance conducted before his arrest. He claims the court erred in 

admitting that evidence because the officers did not observe 

any criminal activity and the informant’s name was never disclosed. Surveillance evidence thus would be “speculative and 

grossly prejudicial to plaintiff.” 

The district court denied in part and granted in part 

Pryor’s motion. In a lengthy order, the court explained this 

evidence was relevant for two reasons. First, surveillance information “provides important context for the traffic stop.” 

Second, “the suspicion of drug-related activity also has a 

bearing on the reasonableness of the use of force.” 

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24 No. 23-1463 

Courts consider the totality of the circumstances to evaluate whether an officer used more force than reasonably necessary to effectuate an arrest. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396; Phillips 

v. Cmty. Ins. Corp., 678 F.3d 513, 519 (7th Cir. 2012). This can 

include “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect 

poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting 

to evade arrest by flight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396; see also

Turner v. City of Champaign, 979 F.3d 563, 567 (7th Cir. 2020). 

And “[i]n order to assess objective reasonableness, the [jury] 

must consider all the circumstances.” Johnson, 576 F.3d at 660.

Here, the evidence about the drug surveillance provided 

context for the jury when they viewed the dashcam videos. 

This included why multiple police officers followed the van, 

the circumstances of the traffic stop and foot chase, and the 

chronology of events. Without this context, the district court 

found, the jury would have difficulty “understanding why 

the traffic stop played out as it did,” as there would be a 

“chronological gap and a conceptual hole in the story if the 

jury watched the videos without some explanation for how 

the whole thing got started.” See United States v. Boros, 668 

F.3d 901, 907 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[O]ne measure of relevance is 

whether its exclusion would leave a chronological and conceptual void in the story.”) (quotations omitted); Whitehead v. 

Bond, 680 F.3d 919, 930–31 (7th Cir. 2012) (evidence giving rise 

to a traffic stop is relevant to an excessive force claim and not 

unfairly prejudicial).

As the district court stated, the drug surveillance information was relevant to Corrigan’s use of force based on the 

Seventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions and an in-depth 

analysis of the Graham factors. For example, the surveillance 

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No. 23-1463 25

“created a suspicion that the occupants of the van were engaged in criminal activity” and provided important context 

for the flight. It also spoke to the “severity of the crime” and 

situated Corrigan’s perception of the threat. Accordingly, the 

court did not abuse its discretion in allowing this limited information into evidence at trial.

Pryor does not dispute that the drug surveillance goes to 

the reasonableness of Corrigan’s use of force. Instead, Pryor 

asserts the district court endorsed “a drug stop and arrest, absent any showing of probable cause or reasonable suspicion.” 

He claims that characterization provided defendants “a justification for the use of force on Plaintiff.” But the record does 

not support Pryor’s argument. Defendants did not discuss 

probable cause at trial, and they did not argue that this was a 

drug stop or drug arrest. In fact, the court denied defendants’ 

motion to instruct the jury that Corrigan had probable cause 

to arrest Pryor and that the initial tackle was a reasonable use 

of force. 

Pryor also contends the district court erred in allowing the 

informant to remain confidential because it “ruled that the information [provided by the informant] was not relevant to 

Plaintiff’s interaction with the police later on Fenton Street.” 

First, during depositions, Pryor learned what the informant 

had told Cantona and why Cantona believed the informant 

was reliable. Second, Pryor misstates the court’s ruling. The 

court said, “Plaintiff does not adequately demonstrate how 

the identity of the alleged informant is relevant to Plaintiff's 

arrest for obstruction of Officer Corrigan.” It was not an abuse 

of its discretion to rule that the identity of the informant—allegedly to evaluate reliability—is irrelevant to Pryor’s excessive force or illegal search claims.

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26 No. 23-1463 

B. Pryor’s Barred Testimony and Presentation of Admissions

Under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, relevant evidence 

“may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” United States v. 

Earls, 704 F.3d 466, 471 (7th Cir. 2012). To Pryor, the district 

court abused its discretion by barring his testimony and 

defendants’ discovery responses showing that he was not involved in illegal drug activity and that the police did not locate any drugs on his person or in the van. Pryor submits that 

the district court’s rulings “weighed heavily in Defendants’ 

favor, with Defendants being allowed to claim that Plaintiff 

was involved in drug trafficking, and Plaintiff being unable to 

counter that.”

Yet before trial, the district court made multiple decisions

favorable to Pryor about his alleged drug activity. The court 

ruled that “Defendants may not introduce evidence, testimony, or arguments indicating that they believed that Plaintiff is a drug dealer.” And “Defendants should not suggest or 

argue to the jury that Pryor was, in fact, engaged in drug-related illegality.” In sum, “Defendants should not paint Plaintiff as a drug dealer, or anything of that sort.” The court 

further alleviated prejudice to Pryor by barring evidence that 

Corrigan found cash on Pryor during his search. This precluded an inference that Pryor had “drug money” on him. 

The district court also properly discussed the risks of prejudice against defendants, aiming to limit equally what both 

parties could discuss. The court found that “the risks of unfair 

prejudice tug in both directions.” “[T]he fact that Pryor did 

not possess any drugs has low probative value, if any.” And 

“[w]hether Pryor in fact possessed drugs has no bearing on 

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No. 23-1463 27

whether Officer Corrigan exercised reasonable force when he 

struck Pryor.” Again, the district court explained that “the 

reasonableness of force turns on the knowledge of the officer 

at that moment in time, not in hindsight. ... And here, the 

search of Pryor took place after Corrigan restrained him, not 

before.” So, Pryor could “not argue that the traffic stop, the 

physical interaction, or the arrest were unlawful because he 

was not in fact involved in the drug trade.” 

At the beginning of trial, the court instructed the jury:

During trial, you may hear evidence that the police performed the traffic stop in connection 

with a drug-related investigation. Mr. Pryor 

was not arrested for a drug-related offense. Mr. 

Pryor was not charged with a drug-related offense. 

The court repeated this instruction near the end of trial. During two pre-trial conferences, Pryor’s counsel agreed with this 

approach. 

Moreover, at trial Pryor’s counsel mentioned the lack of 

drugs multiple times, including when Pryor testified: 

Q. Okay. Were you arrested for a drug offense 

that day?

A. No, I was not. 

Q. Were you charged with a drug offense?

A. No, I was not. 

And Pryor’s counsel had a similar conversation with Corrigan 

during his testimony:

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28 No. 23-1463 

Q. You did not arrest Mr. Pryor for a drug offense, did you?

A. No, I did not.

Q. You did not charge him with a drug offense, 

right?

A. No, I did not.

Further, despite the trial court precluding the parties from 

discussing the details of the drug surveillance, Pryor’s counsel argued in closing:

Remember Mr. Cantona’s testimony. He said he 

conducted a surveillance of a Kane Street residence, a conversion van, and someone named 

Raymond Johnson. His surveillance consisted 

of watching 1020 Kane Street for a van. He saw 

no drug transaction. He saw no criminal activity. He didn’t have enough information to go to 

a judge to get a search warrant for the Kane 

Street property.

Thus, although the court prohibited Pryor from testifying 

that he was not involved with drugs, the jury knew that Pryor 

was not arrested for or charged with a drug-related offense. 

This mitigated the risk that the jury would be misled into 

thinking that Pryor was involved with illegal drug activity 

and that the police located drugs on Pryor—the facts Pryor 

wanted to testify about. 

With this full view of the evidence, we do not see any 

abuse of discretion in the district court’s limits on Pryor’s testimony and his presentation of admissions on the lack of drug 

activity.

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No. 23-1463 29

C. Geographic Area and Race-Based Testimony

Pryor’s next argument stems from three district court rulings on motions in limine. First, defendants could not testify 

that the arrest took place in a “high crime area.” Second, Corrigan could testify about his knowledge of specific incidents 

in that area. Third, Pryor could not testify about the racebased reasons for his actions. 

The district court allowed Corrigan to testify about specific incidents he was aware of when he arrested Pryor, including that members of his unit had recently been shot at in 

the area. The court reasoned that “knowledge of specific acts 

of violence against police officers in the area is relevant to the 

reasonableness of the use of force.” The court explained this 

was “part of the ‘totality of the circumstances’” necessary to 

determine whether an officer used more force than reasonably necessary to effectuate an arrest. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 

396; Phillips, 678 F.3d at 519. And it commented that “[s]uch 

acts have a bearing on how a reasonable officer would have 

responded in that situation ... [because a] reasonable officer 

could take a need for personal safety into account.” The district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Corrigan to 

testify to specific acts of violence because it was relevant to 

Pryor’s excessive force claim. 

Next, Pryor does not address whether Corrigan’s 

knowledge of specific instances in the same area where he was 

arrested is relevant to the reasonableness of force. Instead, 

Pryor submits it was unfair that Corrigan was allowed to testify to the above, while Pryor was barred from telling the jury 

that he was afraid of the police and exited the van because “he 

had seen on the news what police have done to other black 

men.” But Pryor does not explain how his two statements are 

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30 No. 23-1463 

relevant to the excessive force or illegal search claims. Even 

more, the court did allow Pryor to tell the jury that he was 

afraid, the court just limited Pryor’s explanation of why. (“If 

he was afraid, he can testify that he was afraid. There is no 

need to tell the jury why he felt afraid. He can testify about 

what he did, but he cannot get into social justice issues writ 

large.”). 

The district court concluded that the testimony Pryor 

sought to introduce was more prejudicial than probative and 

was “likely to distract and confuse the jury.” It was “not 

aware of any evidence suggesting that racial animus played a 

role in the events in question.” Generalized evidence about 

the police, such as a “‘code of silence’ is unduly prejudicial 

and may not be used at trial.” Townsend v. Benya, 287 F. Supp. 

2d 868, 876 (N.D. Ill. 2003). So, the court did not abuse its discretion by barring Pryor from making irrelevant, race–related 

statements. 

D. Corrigan’s Dashcam Statements and Testimony

Pryor argues the district court abused its discretion when 

it allowed the jury to hear Corrigan’s statements, captured in 

the dashcam video. He claims the statements were hearsay 

that confused the issues, misled the jury, and improperly 

played to jurors’ sympathies. But Pryor is incorrect for several

reasons. 

First, Corrigan’s statements recorded by the dashcam 

were not hearsay. Defendants did not offer Corrigan’s statements to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Rather, they 

offered the statements to show Corrigan’s state of mind and 

rebut a claim of actual malice, which was directly relevant to 

Pryor’s punitive damages claim. See FED. R. EVID. 801(c)(2).

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No. 23-1463 31

Second, Pryor argues that by playing the video, “Defendants succeeded in instructing the jury erroneously on the 

law.” Pryor, pointing to Corrigan’s statements that Pryor 

should not have exited the vehicle, claims Corrigan’s summary of the law was incorrect. But Corrigan did not use the 

words “legal” or “illegal” in his discussion with Pryor about 

exiting the van. Instead, he said, “when police stop the car and 

you get out and run from it, that’s a problem” and “the crazy 

part is that when you normally get stopped by the police, you 

don’t run from the car, that’s the crazy part.” 

The district court found Corrigan’s statements relevant to 

Pryor’s malice claim. It concluded there was “little risk that 

the jury will be confused about the governing law based on 

the short statement.” The court’s jury instructions cement that 

conclusion:

Any statement of the law comes from the Court 

only. It does not come from any statements 

made by any of the parties, including anything 

said in the videos during the conversation between Plaintiff Pryor and Defendant Corrigan.

And Pryor’s counsel approved the instruction—“we would 

strongly be in favor of such an instruction.” 

Third, Pryor contends the district court should not have 

allowed the jury to hear Corrigan’s statements that he did not 

know whether Pryor had a gun, followed by “I got a family. 

You know what? I’d like to go home tonight.” Pryor also objects to the court permitting Corrigan to explain why he made 

those statements. Nevertheless, Federal Rule of Evidence 106 

provides that “[i]f a party introduces all or part of a statement, 

an adverse party may require the introduction ... of any other 

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32 No. 23-1463 

part—or any other statement—that in fairness ought to be 

considered at the same time.” And the “adverse party may do 

so over a hearsay objection.” Id. So, the entirety of this exchange was permissible.

Fourth, Pryor challenges the district court’s decision to allow Corrigan’s testimony about his fears that Pryor may be a 

dangerous person. As explained above, given the context of 

the incident, Corrigan had reason to fear that Pryor possessed 

a gun. See Jones, 900 F.3d at 449. And Corrigan’s fear that Pryor 

posed a dangeris directly relevant to his justification for force.

Fifth, Corrigan’s statement that Pryor was a dangerous 

person because he was a “maybe person” was relevant and 

not unduly prejudicial. At trial Corrigan testified twice that 

Pryor was a “maybe person.” The first time, the district court 

sustained Pryor’s objection that it was inadmissible as expert 

testimony. But the second time, defense counsel asked, 

“where in your training do you receive that information?”

And Pryor’s counsel did not object until Corrigan laid the 

foundation of his training. Then, the district court limited 

Corrigan’s testimony to “what he saw and how it related to 

his training and how it matched up.” 

As Corrigan explained, the most dangerous type of person 

for an officer to come across in the field is a “maybe person”—

someone who says one thing but whose actions indicate otherwise. Corrigan’s testimony about his observations of Pryor 

on the day of the incident, and how that related with his training, is relevant to his justification for using force. We therefore 

affirm the district court’s ruling. And given the district court’s 

limiting instruction, any error was harmless. See United States 

v. York, 572 F.3d 415, 421–22 (7th Cir. 2009) (district court’s 

failure to identify officer as expert was harmless when 

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No. 23-1463 33

knowledge and experience “would have easily qualified [the 

witness] as an expert had the court conducted the formal Rule 

702 analysis”). 

E. Jury Instructions

Finally, Pryor asserts the district court should have instructed the jury that the City of Aurora, not the individual 

defendants, would pay any judgment. He claims the district 

court improperly implied to the jurors during voir dire that 

Corrigan and Cantona would pay any judgment. Specifically, 

two jurors had concerns with awarding a judgment in Pryor’s 

favor if Corrigan and Cantona had to pay. But the court 

granted Pryor’s motion to remove the first juror for cause. 

And the second juror consistently stated he would be fair to 

both sides, and that if the evidence favored Pryor, he would 

return a verdict in favor of Pryor even though Corrigan and 

Cantona are sued individually. 

Even more, any evidence or argument about indemnification is barred at trial as irrelevant and highly prejudicial 

under Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 403. See Lawson v. 

Trowbridge, 153 F.3d 368, 378–79 (7th Cir. 1998); Betts v. City of 

Chicago, 784 F. Supp. 2d 1020, 1030 (N.D. Ill. 2011); Christmas 

v. City of Chicago, 691 F. Supp. 2d 811, 819 (N.D. Ill. 2010). The 

only exception is when defendants raise an officer’s inability 

to pay damages; then, a plaintiff may introduce evidence of 

indemnification. See Lawson, 153 F.3d at 378–79. 

Defendants did not introduce any evidence regarding 

Corrigan’s or Cantona’s inability to pay. In fact, defendants 

did not oppose Pryor’s motion in limine—which the district 

court granted—barring defendants from using financial circumstances as a defense to Pryor’s request for punitive 

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34 No. 23-1463 

damages. So, the district court was within its discretion not to 

instruct the jury that the City of Aurora, not the individual 

defendants, would pay any judgment.

IV. Conclusion

The district court properly granted defendants’ summary 

judgment motion on Pryor’s § 1983 claims. And the district 

court did not abuse its discretion in its evidentiary and procedural rulings before and at trial. For these reasons, we AFFIRM. 

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No. 23-1463 35 

ROVNER, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in 

part. This court has oft warned that judges must resist “the 

siren song that tempts courts into making factual determinations at the summary judgment phase.” Gupta v. Melloh, 19 

F.4th 990, 996 (7th Cir. 2021). Some courts have justified succumbing to that impulse by referencing the Supreme Court’s 

statement in Scott v. Harris that “[w]hen opposing parties tell 

two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by 

the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court 

should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 

U.S. 372, 380 (2007). Scott did not announce a new rule, but 

merely applied an old rule to new technology—police dashcam video. It has always been the case that on summary judgment a court need not credit facts that are so incredible or implausible that no reasonable fact finder could believe them. 

Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 773 (7th Cir. 2003); Hurt v. Wise, 

880 F.3d 831, 840 (7th Cir. 2018) (explaining how this rule applies to video evidence). Outside of this narrow scenario of 

implausibility, however, fact finding remains firmly within 

the province of the jury. It is the right of the parties to fully 

present their evidence to a fact finder, explain discrepancies, 

describe nuances, caution against biases, or offer expert testimony about the evidence. It is only after this full airing of evidence that a fact finder will be in a sufficient position to 

weigh evidence, decide which inferences to draw from the 

facts, and resolve factual disputes. See Johnson v. Advoc. Health 

& Hosps. Corp., 892 F.3d 887, 893 (7th Cir. 2018). In upholding 

the district court’s dismissal on summary judgment, the majority has usurped the jury’s role by making its own factual 

determinations from the disputed video evidence. For this 

reason, I dissent from the majority’s holdings affirming 

Case: 23-1463 Document: 39 Filed: 12/23/2024 Pages: 59
36 No. 23-1463 

summary judgment as to the false arrest and excessive force 

claims. I concur as to the remaining issues.

Fact finding is essential to evaluations of probable cause 

because those determinations depend on the facts and circumstances known to the reasonable officer at the scene. D.C. 

v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 57 (2018). Only when there are no material facts in dispute may a court decide whether officers had

probable cause as a matter of law. Braun v. Vill. of Palatine, 56 

F.4th 542, 550 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting Holloway v. City of Milwaukee, 43 F.4th 760, 769 (7th Cir. 2022)). 

A police officer has probable cause to arrest if a reasonable 

officer, knowing all of the facts and circumstances known to 

that officer, would believe that the individual in question has 

committed or is committing a crime. United States v. Cherry, 

920 F.3d 1126, 1133 (7th Cir. 2019). It follows that the question 

for this case is: what crime could a reasonable officer believe 

Pryor had committed or was committing? As the majority 

points out, Officer Corrigan could have been subjectively incorrect in his reasoning; probable cause looks through an objective lens to the reasonable officer. United States v. Wanjiku, 

919 F.3d 472, 487 (7th Cir. 2019). 

1. Probable cause for resisting arrest at the moment of seizure?

At the moment Officer Corrigan arrived at the scene, he

could not have arrested Pryor for resisting arrest. In Illinois, 

an officer may not arrest a suspect for resisting arrest unless 

there is an underlying offense. It is true, as the majority points 

out, that the Illinois legislature did not codify this concept into 

statutory law until 2021 (see 720 ILCS 5/31-1(d)), but it had 

been established by caselaw in Illinois for some time. See Abbott v. Sangamon Cnty., Ill., 705 F.3d 706, 720 (7th Cir. 2013)

Case: 23-1463 Document: 39 Filed: 12/23/2024 Pages: 59
No. 23-1463 37 

(noting that the officer lacked probable cause to arrest the defendant for resisting arrest under Illinois law, inasmuch as 

there had been no arrest or attempted arrest prior to that 

point); People v. Slaymaker, 2015 IL App (2d) 130528, ¶ 13, 27 

N.E.3d 642, 645 (explaining that the statute prohibiting resisting arrest does not apply where police are not effectuating an 

arrest); People v. Agnew-Downs, 936 N.E.2d 166, 174 (Ill. App. 

Ct. 2010) (noting that the trial court recognized that pinpointing the time of arrest was crucial in determining whether the 

defendant had in fact resisted arrest). In any event, in addition 

to the Illinois case law at the time and the now-confirmatory 

statutory law, common sense dictates that one cannot be arrested for resisting arrest before an arrest has been attempted. 

2. Probable cause for obstructing a police officer for leaving a lawful stop? 

The majority concludes that a reasonable officer in Corrigan’s position could have surmised that Pryor was leaving a 

lawful traffic stop, and therefore had probable cause to arrest 

him for resisting or obstructing a police officer pursuant to 

720 ILCS 5/31-1. Majority Op. at 11 (citing People v. Johnson, 945 

N.E.2d 2, 7, 14–15 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010)). That statute prohibits a 

person from “obstruct[ing] the performance by one known to 

the person to be a peace officer ... of any authorized act within 

his official capacity,” (720 ILCS 5/31-1(a)), which has been interpreted to mean “conduct [that] interpose[s] an obstacle that 

impedes or hinders the officer in the performance of his 

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38 No. 23-1463 

authorized duties.” People v. Baskerville, 2012 IL 111056, ¶ 23, 

963 N.E.2d 898, 905.1 

The majority and I are in agreement that “a traffic stop of 

a car communicates to a reasonable passenger that he or she 

is not free to terminate the encounter with the police and 

move about at will.” Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 

(2009).2 And we need not spend time deciding at what precise 

1 The statute, 720 ILCS 5/31-1(a), includes both the terms “resisting” 

and “obstructing a peace officer.” Illinois courts do not appear to distinguish charges based on “resisting” from those on “obstructing.” In discussing whether the statute requires proof of a physical act, however, the 

Illinois Supreme court noted that the statute contains two separate verbs—

“resist” and “obstruct”—and then reasoned that because “resist implies 

some type of physical exertion,” the word “obstruct” must have a different 

meaning in the statute. Baskerville, 2012 IL 111056 ¶ 25; 963 N.E.2d at 905–

06. The court concluded that “obstructing” a peace officer can involve either physical or non-physical acts that impede, hinder, interrupt, prevent, 

or delay peace officers from performing their duties. Id. ¶¶ 23–25(2012); 

963 N.E.2d at 905. Mere argument will not suffice for obstruction. Neither 

does it require physical resistance. “That inquiry is for the trier of fact, 

based upon the facts and circumstances of each case.” Id. ¶¶ 22–23, 936 

N.E.2d at 904–05. In short, the Illinois Supreme Court distinguished “resisting” from “obstructing” for the purposes of inferring the types of acts 

the legislature meant to include, but it is unclear whether a person could 

be charged with separate crimes under this statute. For our purposes, the 

answer to this question is not important. 

2 The Illinois Supreme Court has concluded that a traffic stop is analogous to a Terry investigative stop. People v. Bass, 2021 IL 125434, ¶ 15, 182 

N.E.3d 714, 719 (citing Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 251 (2007)). Thus,

its reasonableness is viewed through a Fourth Amendment lens to determine “whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception, and 

whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 

1, 20, (1968)). The majority concludes that Pryor was arrested the moment 

(continued)

Case: 23-1463 Document: 39 Filed: 12/23/2024 Pages: 59
No. 23-1463 39 

moment the stop here became a full arrest. If Pryor fled, it 

would be illegal for him to have done so from a valid Terry

stop. A Terry stop is a temporary seizure, but it is a seizure 

nevertheless. It “imposes a substantial intrusion on a person’s 

liberty” and restrains that person’s freedom. United States v. 

Street, 917 F.3d 586, 592–93 (7th Cir. 2019). Consequently, under Illinois law, “if the passenger flees, he is attempting to 

avoid detention by an officer who has a valid right to seize 

him. Since the police officer has the right to detain him, flight 

by that passenger has been held to constitute an offense of obstruction of a peace officer, which constitutes a Class A misdemeanor.” Johnson, 945 N.E.2d at 12–13 (citing People v. Holdman, 383 N.E.2d 155, 159 (Ill. 1978) and People v. Jones, 613 

N.E.2d 354, 357 (Ill. Ct. App. 1993)). 

These cases speak of “flight,” which the majority softens 

to “leaving a lawful traffic stop.” Indeed, in People v. Johnson, 

cited by the majority, the defendant passenger, when 

stopped, suddenly exited the vehicle and started running, 

and was apprehended a block away. The Johnson court relied 

on Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000), for the proposition 

that when an individual flees from police in a high-crime area, 

a police officer has the requisite reasonable suspicion that the 

individual was involved in criminal activity to conduct a

Terry stop. Johnson, 945 N.E.2d at 6–7. 

In this case the question remains, did Pryor flee? Some 

parts of the dashcam video require no inference drawing. For 

Officer Corrigan ordered him to get on the ground. For my purposes the 

distinction does not matter, as I also conclude that Pryor was obligated to 

submit to the authority of the officers irrespective of whether it was a Terry

stop or a full arrest. My analysis turns instead on the factual inquiry as to 

whether Pryor was, in fact, submitting. 

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40 No. 23-1463 

example, by my count, Pryor took approximately three to four 

steps from the van door to the back corner of the van as Officer Isaak ran past him in pursuit of the driver and Officers 

Corrigan and Christoffel were still en route. (R. 202, Corrigan 

dashcam at 0:53-0:55). He then took seven faster steps from 

the back of the van to the front of Officer Isaak’s police vehicle 

before Officers Corrigan and Christoffel arrived. (Id. at 0:56-

0:59). He took his final step once he was in front of Officer 

Isaak’s police vehicle, as he took his hands out of his pockets

(or perhaps away from the pants he was holding up) and 

parked himself motionless, in front of Officer Isaak’s vehicle, 

with his hands in the air. (Id. at 0:59); (R. 202, Isaak dashcam 

at 0:52-0:54). That is exactly where he stood when Officers 

Corrigan and Christoffel arrived. Despite the majority’s description of Pryor’s actions as “fleeing,” (Majority Op. at 16), 

I surmise that many people would be surprised to learn that 

a passenger who takes twelve steps from their car door toward

the pursuing police car and then stops, dead still, with his 

hands in the air in front of that police car, has fled the scene 

of a traffic stop.

A party ought to have the opportunity to explain to a jury 

the many reasons why a person might take a few steps away 

from the vehicle during a traffic stop. Pryor’s post hoc explanation—that he wanted to get in front of the dashcam for his 

protection—is certainly among them. Many people who have 

been pulled over might view themselves as being more legally and physically protected in front of a recording dashcam. After all, both the potential suspect and the officer know 

that a person in a car has access to various sorts of items that 

might put the officer’s life and safety in jeopardy—including 

the car itself. It was for these safety reasons that the Supreme 

Court ruled that a police officer may order either a driver or 

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No. 23-1463 41 

passenger of a lawfully stopped car to exit the vehicle. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110–11 (1977) (driver); Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 413–15 (1997) (passenger). And it 

is undoubtedly true that there are parents who have lectured 

their children, “if you are stopped by the police, get your 

hands in the air and get in front of a video camera.” For that 

reason, a driver or passenger might wish to exit a car and immediately put her hands in the air or place them on the hood 

to signal to the police officer that she is of no danger to the 

officer. Or perhaps a driver might exit a car to step over the 

guardrail to avoid being struck on a narrow shoulder in the 

dark. See, e.g., Mimms, 434 U.S. at 111 (noting the dangers of 

traffic stops near moving traffic). 

Whatever we, as individuals, think of the wisdom of exiting a vehicle when stopped by the police, Illinois law does not 

forbid it. In fact, in People v. Kotlinski, the Illinois Appellate 

court found that “the mere act of stepping outside the car was 

not an act of obstruction, because [the officer] never told defendant he had to stay inside the car.” People v. Kotlinski, 2011 

IL App (2d) 101251, ¶ 45 & ¶46 n. 6, 959 N.E.2d 1230, 1240 & 

n.6 (further explaining that the officer “admitted that he never 

told defendant that he could not get out of the car. Therefore, 

when defendant opened the door and stood outside of the car, 

he was not disobeying any order.”). And in People v. Smith, 

the appellate court highlighted that it was the refusal to obey 

an officer’s command to remain in the car that gave the officer 

probable cause to arrest for obstruction when the driver left 

his vehicle to enter his house. People v. Smith, 2013 IL App (3d) 

110477, ¶ 21-23, 77 N.E.3d 87, 91–92. In sum, if an officer instructs a person to remain in the car, exiting it might constitute obstruction, but barring that instruction, there is simply 

no statutory or case law in Illinois that could make a 

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42 No. 23-1463 

reasonable officer, even under qualified immunity analysis, 

believe that a passenger in a car had obstructed a peace officer 

by exiting the car and remaining close to the scene. See Kotlinski, 2011 IL App (2d) 101251, ¶ 45 & ¶46 n. 6, 959 N.E.2d at

1240 & n.6; Smith, 2013 IL App (3d) 110477, ¶ 21-23, 77 N.E.3d 

at 91–92. 

Importantly, when Pryor took his seven steps from the 

back of the van to the front of Officer Isaak’s police vehicle, 

there were no police officers on site. Officer Isaak had left the 

scene to apprehend the fleeing driver, and Officers Corrigan 

and Christoffel were driving toward the scene, but had yet to 

arrive. During the entire twelve steps that Pryor took, no officer told him to stay in the van, to stop moving, or to do, or 

refrain from doing anything. In fact, there was no officer on 

site to give him any direction at all. No Illinois caselaw or statute indicates that a suspect is fleeing if he takes twelve steps 

and then stands still with his hands in the air in front of a police car, where no officer had directed the passenger to remain 

in the car, or was even on the scene. I have concerns about any 

opinion from this court that concludes or implies otherwise.

This is, however, but one of my concerns. The other stems 

from the troubling trend in which appellate courts become 

fact finders by watching video, and drawing their own inferences, rather than leaving the fact finding to the trial court and 

jury. See Erwin Chemerinsky, A Troubling Take on ExcessiveForce Claims, Trial, July 2007, at 74, 76. As I noted above, probable cause depends on the facts and circumstances known to 

the reasonable officer at the scene, and therefore heavily relies 

on fact-based determinations. Wesby, 583 U.S. at 57. Those 

facts must be found by a jury.

Case: 23-1463 Document: 39 Filed: 12/23/2024 Pages: 59
No. 23-1463 43 

Because Pryor alleges a violation of his constitutional 

rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, any evaluation of liability 

requires the court to address the additional question of qualified immunity. “[Q]ualified immunity protects government 

officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 

known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting 

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). In reviewing a 

defendant’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, a court considers “(1) whether the facts, taken 

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, show that the defendant violated a constitutional right; and (2) whether the 

constitutional right was clearly established at [that] time.” Estate of Clark v. Walker, 865 F.3d 544, 550 (7th Cir. 2017). In the 

case of a false arrest, “[e]ven if, in hindsight, it appears that 

probable cause was lacking, qualified immunity is still available if the arresting officers reasonably could have believed 

the arrest to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and 

the information the arresting officers possessed. This is often 

called arguable probable cause.” Hurt, 880 F.3d at 841 

(cleaned up), overruled on other grounds by Lewis v. City of Chicago, 914 F.3d 472 (7th Cir. 2019). In this case we must ask 

whether the video conclusively resolves whether the officers 

had arguable probable cause.

Pryor alleges that he was submitting to the authority of the 

officers by standing still in front of the dashcam with his 

hands up. The defendants allege that Pryor was fleeing. This 

is a classic factual dispute involving the drawing of inferences 

from what is depicted on a video and therefore cannot be resolved on summary judgment. See Hurt, 880 F.3d at 840. On 

summary judgment, a court may not make credibility 

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44 No. 23-1463 

determinations, weigh the evidence, or decide which inferences to draw from the facts, or resolve swearing contests. 

Johnson, 892 F.3d at 893 (citing Payne, 337 F.3d at 770). For purposes of a qualified immunity determination on summary 

judgment, this court must resolve inferences in Pryor’s favor 

rather than resolve any disputes. See Hurt, 880 F.3d at 840. 

The majority, however, asserts that this is a factual dispute 

that can be resolved on summary judgment because “the videos tell their own story.” Majority Op. at 3. The majority cites 

Scott for the proposition that “when parties tell two different 

stories, ‘one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record,’ 

we ‘should not adopt that version of the facts... .’” Majority 

Op. at 3 (quoting Scott, 550 U.S. at 380) (ellipsis in original). 

As I alluded to above, the exception in Scott to the usual 

rules prohibiting fact finding on summary judgment, however, is a “narrow, pragmatic exception allowing appellants 

to contest the district court’s determination that material facts 

are genuinely disputed,” but only where the video “utterly 

discredit[s]” the non-movant’s version of the facts. Gant v. 

Hartman, 924 F.3d 445, 449 (7th Cir. 2019). “Video evidence ... 

can eviscerate a factual dispute only when the video is so definitive that there could be no reasonable disagreement about 

what the video depicts.” Kailin v. Vill. of Gurnee, 77 F.4th 476, 

481 (7th Cir. 2023) (citing Scott, 550 U.S. at 380). It cannot be 

used when it does not clearly and definitively resolve a material disputed fact. Id. at 482 (declining to apply the Scott exception when video does not clearly show the events in question); Gupta, 19 F.4th at 998 (reversing summary judgment 

where “reasonable jurors could certainly disagree about what 

[the video] reveals about the events of the night.”); Ferguson 

v. McDonough, 13 F.4th 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2021) (explaining that 

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No. 23-1463 45 

Scott does not apply where the video is open to multiple interpretation); Jackson v. Curry, 888 F.3d 259, 264 (7th Cir. 2018) 

(same).

As this court explained in Gant, 

Scott does not hold that courts should reject a 

plaintiff’s account on summary judgment 

whenever documentary evidence, such as a 

video, offers some support for a governmental 

officer’s version of events. Instead, Scott holds 

that where the trial court’s determination that a 

fact is subject to reasonable dispute is blatantly 

and demonstrably false, a court of appeals may 

say so ... . 

Id. at 450 (internal citations omitted). Only in the rare case, 

however, will video evidence leave no room for interpretation 

by a fact finder. Kailin, 77 F.4th at 481.3 

The line between the permissible and impermissible use of 

video evidence is therefore clear: video evidence can only be 

used when it “blatantly contradict[s],” or “utterly discredits” 

the non-movant’s facts, or assures us beyond doubt that the 

non-movant’s facts are “blatantly and demonstrably false.” 

Scott, 550 U.S. at 380, Gant, 924 F.3d at 449–50. Was the light 

3 The majority states that the cases that I cite for the proposition that it 

is improper to rely on videos can be distinguished on their facts. Undoubtedly the clarity and content of videos will differ case-to-case, but here 

these cases are only cited for the pure legal proposition that courts cannot 

use video evidence to resolve disputed factual issues on summary judgment, unless no reasonable juror could watch the video and come to the 

opposite conclusion. For this proposition, factual differences in the video 

are irrelevant.

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46 No. 23-1463 

green or red? Did the car swerve over the double yellow line 

or not? Who threw the first punch? Did the defendant stop at 

a stop sign or not? See, e.g. United States v. Norville, 43 F.4th 

680, 682 (7th Cir. 2022). These are all questions that can be resolved if both the video evidence and the inferences that can 

be drawn from it is clear and uncontroverted. Video evidence 

cannot resolve disputes where reasonable jurors could disagree about what the video reveals. Gupta, 19 F.4th at 998; Ferguson, 13 F.4th at 581; Jackson, 888 F.3d at 264. More importantly, in some cases, the actual events depicted in the 

video may be “plainly portrayed,” as the majority states, but 

the interpretation of, and inferences from, that evidence still 

must be left to a jury. For example, a video may clearly show 

a defendant wrapping his two arms around another person. 

That act is plainly portrayed, but a jury may still have to interpret whether the video depicts a hug or a violent assault, 

and do so based on an interpretation of the evidence as a 

whole. This is what juries do; not judges on motions for summary judgment. 

In this case the video evidence supports either interpretation of the facts—a reasonable juror could conclude either that 

Pryor’s twelve steps constituted flight, or that he was positioning himself in front of a squad car to safely submit to the 

authority of the police. I do not see anything in the video that 

would make Pryor’s version of the facts impossible or blatantly and demonstrably false as would be required for an application of Scott. I urge readers to watch the video in the district court record at R. 201, and ask themselves “can I definitively and unquestionably determine that Pryor was fleeing, 

or might he have been repositioning himself in front of the 

police dashcam and then submitting to their authority, or is 

there perhaps yet another interpretation of his movements?” 

Case: 23-1463 Document: 39 Filed: 12/23/2024 Pages: 59
No. 23-1463 47 

More importantly, readers should ask themselves, “could a 

reasonable juror, perhaps one with different experiences in 

the world than I have, disagree with what I think is happening in this video?”4 

There is good reason to leave fact finding to a jury. By 

granting a motion for summary judgment we are barring nonmoving parties from exercising an essential element of our 

adversarial court system. Trials allow parties to fully air competing inferences about video evidence by, among other 

things, cross examining witnesses, using closing arguments to 

frame video evidence in light of the surrounding circumstances, and by presenting expert testimony about the benefits and limitations of video evidence. As Gilbert and Sullivan 

said, “things are seldom as they seem,” and video evidence 

often proves this adage. A trial gives parties the opportunity 

to explain why this might be so. For example, researchers 

have demonstrated that prior attitudes toward the police (as 

measured by survey questions) can predict what a viewers’ 

conclusions will be about what they have seen on police body 

4 Although that video is available on the district court docket at R. 201, 

it is cumbersome for the public to access. A member of the public must 

first contact the Certified Copy Desk, wait for an invoice, pay the invoice, 

wait for the payment to be processed, and then wait for a URL via email. 

If, in fact, it becomes more common for district courts and appellate courts 

to decide cases based on video evidence, it will be imperative to have more 

easily available public access to those videos. A litigant ought to be able 

to argue to the court about the ways in which the videos in her particular 

case are similar to or different from the videos analyzed by courts in other 

cases. Moreover, a transparent court system requires the public to have

easy access to the videos on which courts are relying in granting summary 

judgment. 

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48 No. 23-1463 

camera footage. Seth W. Stoughton, Police Body-Worn Cameras, 

96 N.C. L. Rev. 1363, 1407 (2018). A party might wish to submit other expert evidence about various biases inherent in 

video evidence itself. See Nora G. McNeil, Perceptual and Cognitive Biases in the Uptake of Police Body-Worn Camera Footage: 

Implications and Suggestions for Introduction of Video Evidence at 

Trial, 41 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 499, 504–538 (2023) (compiling research on various forms of perceptual and cognitive biases in 

police camera evidence including bias due to the point of 

view of the camera, camera angle, the prominence of people 

and objects in the visual field, speed and movement, how 

much detail the viewer must attend to, and distortions caused 

by wide-angle lenses.). It is a rare case indeed where the video 

evidence leaves no room for interpretation or qualification. 

See Kailin, 77 F.4th at 481. 

Because the video evidence here can be subject to more 

than one interpretation, the court must apply the usual rules 

on summary judgment and take the facts in the light most favorable to Pryor—that is, that he was submitting to officers 

and not fleeing the scene of an arrest, particularly where no 

officers gave him any command not to move from his vehicle 

to the pursuing officer’s police car. In that case, no reasonable 

officer could have believed an arrest for flight to be lawful.

3. Probable cause for obstruction by refusing the order to get on the 

ground? 

Likewise, a jury should have been given the opportunity 

to determine whether Pryor was obstructing a police officer

by not immediately complying with Officer Corrigan’s order 

to “get on the ground.” The relevant events for this inquiry 

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No. 23-1463 49 

are described second-by-second in the footnote below.5 But 

before turning to the factual question, it is helpful to explore 

5 Isaak’s dashcam video caught all of the video from the time Pryor 

walked in front of his vehicle and put up his hands until Officer Corrigan 

tackled him to the ground. The video submitted to the jury and contained 

in the record, however, contains no audio. (R. 202) Officer Corrigan’s 

dashcam recording, on the other hand, contained both audio and video

recordings, but for much of the time the video is obscured by Isaak’s police 

vehicle. (R. 202) To coordinate the actions in the Isaak video with the 

sound in the Corrigan video, I synchronized the actions that were visible 

in both videos and charted each second. The results are in the chart below. 

From this chart I conclude that there were at most three to four seconds 

between the time that Officer Corrigan first yelled to Pryor to “get down” 

and when he began the leg sweep to tackle him. 

second Corrigan dashcam Isaak dashcam

0 0:58 Pryor’s left foot steps in 

front of Isaak’s police vehicle

0:52 Pryor’s left foot steps in 

front of Isaak’s police vehicle camera

1 0:59 1st “get on the ground” 0:53 Pryor shuffles in front of 

Isaak’s police vehicle and faces the 

vehicle

2 1:00 Corrigan runs toward 

Pryor

0:54 Pryor raises his hand above 

his head

3 1:01 2d “get on the ground” 

(no video of events)

0:55 Pryor starts to lower his 

hands 

5 1:02 3d “get on the ground”

(no video of events)

0:56 Corrigan enters the frame 

and puts his hands on Pryor

6 1:03 inaudible yelling (no 

video of events)

0:57 Corrigan pushes Pryor into 

position

7 1:04 Corrigan yells “down”

(no video of events) 

0:58 start of Corrigan’s leg 

sweep

8 1:05 Pryor on way down 0:59 Pryor on way down

9 1:06 Pryor on the ground 1:00 Pryor on the ground

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50 No. 23-1463 

generally what it means to resist arrest or obstruct a police 

officer in Illinois. Under Illinois law, a citizen may not use 

force in resisting an arrest, regardless of whether the arrest in 

question is lawful or unlawful. 720 ILCS 5/7–7; People v. Villarreal, 604 N.E.2d 923, 926 (Ill. 1992). But non-physical resistance such as “[v]erbal resistance or argument alone, even 

the use of abusive language, is not a violation of the statute.” 

People v. Berardi, 948 N.E.2d 98, 103 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011). The 

question for this case is what should a court make of Pryor’s 

inaction, rather than his actions—that is, his failure to move 

when instructed? In People v. Baskerville, the Illinois Supreme 

Court sought to clarify the middle ground between mere argument and a physical act—conduct such as providing false 

information, refusing to disperse or leave a scene, advising 

suspects on how to escape arrest, or refusing to exit a vehicle. 

Baskerville, 2012 IL 111056, ¶¶ 22–25. The Illinois Supreme 

Court held that:

Although a person may commit obstruction of a 

peace officer by means of a physical act, this 

type of conduct is neither an essential element 

of nor the exclusive means of committing an obstruction. The legislative focus of section 31–1(a) 

is on the tendency of the conduct to interpose an 

obstacle that impedes or hinders the officer in 

the performance of his authorized duties. That 

inquiry is for the trier of fact, based upon the facts 

and circumstances of each case. 

Id. ¶ 23, 963 N.E.2d at 905 (emphasis mine). In other words, 

rather than focusing on action versus inaction, a court must 

focus instead on individual facts and discern whether, based 

on those circumstances, the defendant impeded the officer’s 

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No. 23-1463 51 

authorized act. People v. Synnott, 811 N.E.2d 236, 240 (Ill. App. 

Ct. 2004). Two Illinois Appellate Court cases demonstrate the 

importance of this individualized factual discernment. In 

Synnott, the appellate court found obstruction where the defendant refused to exit his vehicle but did so while holding 

firmly onto the steering wheel. Synnott, 811 N.E.2d at 238, 241. 

The appellate court in Kotlinski, distinguished Synnott, and 

opined that merely remaining stationary in the face of an order (in that particular case, a 21-second delay before complying with an order to get back in the car) would not constitute 

knowing and intentional obstruction. Kotlinski, 2011 IL App 

(2d) 101251, ¶¶ 47–48, 959 N.E.2d at 1240–41. 

Any individualized assessment of whether an individual 

impeded an officer must focus on whether the suspect’s action posed a material impediment to the officer’s actions. People v. Mehta, 2020 IL App (3d) 180020, ¶ 26, 156 N.E.3d 608, 

614. In other words, even though “an act might hinder or impede an official act in the technical sense, that hindrance or 

impediment may be so minimal as to not be considered a violation of” 720 ILCS 5/31-1. Id. ¶ 21, 156 N.E.3d at 613. 

Whether the defendant’s conduct actually posed a material 

impediment to the administration of justice is a factual question. Id. ¶ 17, 29, 156 N.E.3d at 612, 614–15. 

“[T]he length of any delay or the brevity of any impediment is a factor, if not the primary factor, in determining 

whether a given defendant has materially obstructed the actions of police.” Id. ¶ 32, 156 N.E.3d at 615 . See also, e.g., People 

v. Taylor, 2012 IL App (2d) 110222, ¶ 17, 972 N.E.2d 753, 758-

59 (ten-minute delay not a material impediment); People v. Comage, 946 N.E.2d 313, 319 (Ill. 2011) (20-second delay to look 

for dropped drugs did not constitute obstruction); Berardi, 948 

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52 No. 23-1463 

N.E.2d at 103 (short encounter with verbal disagreement only 

did not constitute obstruction); Kotlinski, 2011 IL App (2d) 

101251, ¶¶ 49–50, 959 N.E.2d at 1241–42 (no obstruction 

where defendant delayed getting back in the vehicle for 21 

seconds after being ordered to do so). In this case, the video 

reveals that there were a mere 3-4 seconds between the time 

that Officer Corrigan first yelled “get on the ground” and 

when he began the process of tackling Pryor to the ground. In 

comparison to the cases above, such a short delay likely 

would not be a material impediment.

Officer safety is also a significant factor in determining 

whether a suspect has materially obstructed police activity. 

“[A]ny behavior that actually threatens an officer’s safety or 

even places an officer in fear for his or her safety is a significant impediment to the officer’s performance of his or her duties.” Synnott, 811 N.E.3d at 228. And importantly, “obstructive acts that may not create a material impediment in one set 

of circumstances may nevertheless create such an impediment in other circumstances.” Mehta, 2020 IL App (3d) 180020, 

¶ 33, 156 N.E.3d at 615. “For example, actions that do not 

amount to material obstruction in a misdemeanor stop may 

nevertheless be considered a material impediment in a more 

fraught situation, such as the hot pursuit of a violent suspect.” 

Id. ¶ 34, 156 N.E.3d at 616. 

Officer Corrigan arrived to face a rapidly unfolding situation. The officers had received a tip that led them to believe 

the people in the van were involved in crack cocaine production.6 The driver immediately took off running with Officer 

6 Of course, the tipster was incorrect. Officers found no drugs on 

Pryor, the others in the van, or anywhere in the areas near the scene that 

(continued)

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No. 23-1463 53 

Isaak in pursuit. The majority and I agree that these circumstances would allow reasonable officers to use some amount 

of force to temporarily detain the passengers to ensure officer 

safety while the officers assessed whether they had probable 

cause to arrest. See United States v. Olson, 41 F.4th 792, 799 (7th 

Cir. 2022). I will discuss further the appropriateness of the use 

of force in a moment. I discuss it now only to make clear the 

important distinction between whether use of some force 

could have been a lawful part of a Terry stop to protect officer 

safety (if not excessive, it most certainly could) and whether, 

after securing their safety, the officers had probable cause to 

arrest Pryor for obstructing a police officer (I conclude they 

did not).

Returning to the question of probable cause for refusing 

the order to get on the ground, here too, the facts are contested, and the majority recognizes the dispute. The majority 

opinion acknowledges that “Pryor claims that he was not 

given time to get on the ground,” but nevertheless later concludes that “Pryor refused Corrigan’s order to ‘get on the 

ground.’” Id. at 5, 12. Once again, the video evidence is open 

to inference and interpretation. The video would not preclude 

a reasonable jury from concluding that Pryor did not have 

time to get himself to the ground in the three seconds between 

the first commend to “get on the ground,” and the leg sweep, 

or perhaps that he was lowering his hands in preparation to 

do so (most people need to use their hands to support themselves as they get face down on the ground without injuring 

themselves). Or a reasonable jury could look at the video and 

conclude that three seconds was sufficient for Pryor to 

they searched, including with a drug sniffing dog. But for purposes of 

probable cause, we consider the knowledge the officers had at the time. 

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54 No. 23-1463 

process the command and get to the ground. They might view 

the hand-lowering as more evidence of Pryor’s failure to submit. Because the video is not definitive, a court must take the 

facts in the light most favorable to Pryor. I would conclude 

that, although Pryor could have conducted the leg sweep for 

his safety, given the Illinois law requiring material hindrance, 

no reasonable officer could conclude that he had probable 

cause to arrest Pryor for obstructing an officer for failing to 

get on the ground in the three seconds between when Pryor 

gave the order to “get on the ground” and when he began to 

take him down. C.f. Brumitt v. Smith, 102 F.4th 444, 448 (7th 

Cir. 2024) (assuming a police officer would need more than 

four seconds to register that he had knocked a suspect unconscious and then to stop applying force). 

Of course, probable cause depends on the totality of the 

circumstances and cannot necessarily be evaluated by looking 

at each individual part of an event in isolation. Wesby, 583 U.S. 

at 60. In Wesby, the Supreme Court criticized the appellate 

panel majority for evaluating each of the facts one-by-one rather than considering the whole picture. Id. In Wesby, however, the Supreme Court spent six paragraphs detailing myriad facts of which the officers would have been aware that together supported a probable cause determination. Wesby, 583 

U.S. at 57–60. In this case, the officers saw Pryor engage in two 

relevant actions—his twelve steps from the van to Officer 

Isaak’s police vehicle, and his three-second delay getting to 

the ground. The other factor known to the officers at the 

time—that people in the van might be involved in the drug 

trade—supported Corrigan’s need to secure the scene, but 

had no relevance to the obstruction charges. Once again, I emphasize that for purposes of probable cause, this court is not

evaluating whether the officers, viewing the totality of the 

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No. 23-1463 55 

circumstances, could have used reasonable force to secure the 

scene for their safety. They undoubtedly could. Instead, this 

court should be evaluating whether a reasonable officer, 

viewing the totality of the circumstances after the scene had 

been secured, could have concluded that he had probable 

cause to arrest Pryor for obstruction.

Although courts give police officers a wide berth for making probable cause determinations in the heat of the moment 

in rapidly changing chaotic situations (Abbott, 705 F.3d at 

714), once Officer Corrigan subdued and handcuffed Pryor 

for his protection, he had plenty of time to determine whether 

he had probable cause to arrest him for committing the crime 

of obstruction of a police officer. See, e.g., Phillips v. Cmty. Ins. 

Corp., 678 F.3d 513, 526 (7th Cir. 2012) (explaining that once 

the scene has been secured, a court need no longer give officers the same benefit of the doubt for actions taken in tense, 

uncertain, and rapidly evolving situations).

In sum, given that the video evidence does not conclusively and definitively resolve whether Pryor was resisting 

arrest or obstructing a law enforcement officer, the district 

court should have allowed this determination to be made by 

a jury and should not have granted summary judgment in the 

officers’ favor on these claims. 

4. Probable cause for resisting arrest during the handcuffing? 

Once the officers had the scene secured and Pryor in handcuffs could they have arrested him for resisting arrest during 

the handcuffing process? For much of this part of the video 

where Corrigan and Pryor are both on the ground, the action 

is obscured by Officer Corrigan’s body and takes place rather 

far away. The video does not clearly portray, for instance, 

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56 No. 23-1463 

whether Pryor is resisting or moving his face to get it off the 

icy pavement, whether he was attempting to place his hands 

behind his back or resisting Officer Corrigan’s attempts to do 

so, whether it would have been anatomically possible for him 

to get his hands behind his back from certain positions, and 

whether he was applying force to his arms or not. Officer Corrigan tells him to “stop fighting,” (Corrigan dashcam at 1:07, 

1:13, 1:37), but Pryor, responds that he is “not fighting” and 

pointed out that he had submitted to the officers with his 

hands up. (Corrigan dashcam at 1:07, 1:37, 2:05, 3:02). The district court noted that “Pryor appeared to lay motionless as the 

officer continued to yell ‘stop fighting’ and ‘don't move!’” 

R. 141 at 10; Pryor v. Corrigan, No. 17-CV-1968, 2021 WL 

1192581, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 2021) (citing Corrigan dashcam at 1:39-41). Neither Corrigan’s nor Pryor’s words provide 

definitive evidence of what was actually happening. Both 

knew they were being recorded, and their statements may 

have been performative rather than accurate descriptions of 

the actions of the other.7 For all the reasons I describe above, 

the question of resistance during the handcuffing is a factual 

determination for a jury and cannot be resolved on summary 

judgment.

7See Ajay Sandhu, Camera-Friendly Policing: How the Police Respond to 

Cameras and Photographers, 14 Surveillance & Soc’y 78–89 (2016); Josiah 

Bates, Bodycam Footage Hasn’t Brought the Police Accountability Advocates 

Thought It Would, Pulitzer Ctr., Dec. 12, 2023. 

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No. 23-1463 57 

5. Excessive force8 

As I noted above several times, the officers could use reasonable force to subdue Pryor during the Terry stop (or the 

arrest, if it became one) provided the force exercised was in 

proportion to the threat posed. Phillips, 678 F.3d at 519. “Our 

Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has long recognized that 

the right to make an ... investigatory stop necessarily carries 

with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or 

threat thereof to effect it.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 

(1989); see also United States v. Lopez, 907 F.3d 472, 478–79 (7th 

Cir. 2018) (“With the authority to stop comes the authority to 

require the subject to submit to the stop, and to use reasonable 

force to make him submit.”). In the case of either an arrest or 

a Terry seizure, a court must evaluate whether the officer’s actions were objectively reasonable in light of the totality of the 

facts and circumstances confronting that officer. Graham, 490 

U.S. at 396. When considering the reasonableness of force in a 

Terry stop, a court must examine “whether the surrounding 

circumstances would support an officer’s legitimate fear for 

personal safety. No two encounters are identical, so there is 

no litmus-paper test for determining when a seizure exceeds 

the bounds of an investigative stop and becomes an arrest,” 

or when the force used in seizure becomes excessive. Olson, 

41 F.4th at 799 (internal citations omitted). “And because of 

8 The leg sweep and tackle appear to be the only issues of excessive 

force remaining, as the district court allowed the question of excessive 

force on Officer Corrigan’s punches to Pryor’s head to go to a jury. Pryor 

does not raise any other excessive force claims. Pryor does assert that the 

district court erred when it cleaved the full arrest into parts—allowing the 

head strikes to go to a jury, but dismissing the tackle on summary judgment, but the majority has found no error, and I see no reason to address 

the issue in this concurrence/dissent. 

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58 No. 23-1463 

this fact-intensive nature of the inquiry, we have noted that 

‘since the Graham reasonableness inquiry nearly always requires a jury to sift through disputed factual contentions, and 

to draw inferences therefrom, we have held on many occasions that summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law 

in excessive force cases should be granted sparingly.” Gupta, 

19 F.4th at 996 (quoting Abdullahi v. City of Madison, 423 F.3d 

763, 773 (7th Cir. 2005)); Siler v. City of Kenosha, 957 F.3d 751, 

759 (7th Cir. 2020) (“The obligation to consider the totality of 

the circumstances in these cases often makes resort to summary judgment inappropriate.”). The majority does not explain why this case is so exceptional that it warrants skirting 

the usual assumption that a reasonableness inquiry requires 

a jury to sift through the facts.

As this court noted in Gupta, therefore, a court cannot determine whether an officer used greater force than was reasonably necessary until a fact finder resolves whether the officer needed to use force to effectuate the arrest. Gupta, 19 

F.4th at 996. That assessment depends on, among other 

things, a determination of whether the suspect was, in fact obstructing or resisting arrest. And the evaluation of qualified 

immunity requires the same assessment of material fact—

whether a reasonable officer could have concluded that Pryor 

was obstructing the officers or resisting arrest. Our caselaw 

provides officers plenty of notice that they cannot use significant force on a suspect who is not resisting. Gupta, 19 F.4th at 

1001; Miller v. Gonzalez, 761 F.3d 822, 829 (7th Cir. 2014).9 The 

9 The majority argues in footnote 8 that the facts in these two cases are 

not similar to those in the case before us. I cite these cases only for the legal 

proposition that police cannot use significant force on a non-resisting 

(continued)

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No. 23-1463 59 

question of excessive force, therefore, requires a resolution of 

the disputed question of whether Pryor was resisting arrest at 

the time he was tackled, or whether he was submitting to the 

authority of the officers. 

For these reasons, I would have reversed the district 

court’s summary judgment decision which removed from the 

jury factual determinations that were the jury’s to make. I concur with the majority’s conclusions about the legality of the 

searches, the district court’s rulings at trial, and in all other 

respects.

suspect. Comparing the facts of cases is only relevant to step two of a qualified immunity analysis—that is, in trying to determine whether a constitutional right was clearly established at the time. Estate of Clark, 865 F.3d 

at 550. The majority does not dispute, nor can it, that at the time of the 

events in question, a police officer would have been on notice that officers 

cannot use significant force on a suspect who is not resisting. See Gupta, 19 

F.4th at 1001; Miller, 761 F.3d at 829. Because the video does not clearly 

indicate whether Pryor was resisting or not, this fact is for a jury to determine.

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