Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00006/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00006-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RUBEN ORTIZ,

Petitioner,

v.

SCOTT FRAUENHEIM, Warden,

Respondent.

No. 1:13-cv-00006-DAD-SKO HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

TO DENY PETITION FOR WRIT OF 

HABEAS CORPUS AND DECLINE TO 

ISSUE CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY

Petitioner Ruben Ortiz is a state prisoner proceeding with a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He alleges six grounds for habeas relief: (1) erroneous

aiding and abetting jury instructions; (2) erroneous jury instructions on transferred intent and 

proximate cause; (3) misapplied the Kelly/Leahy1rules to bar the testimony of Petitioner’s 

ballistics experts; (4) Griffin2error in the prosecutor’s arguments to the jury; (5) ex parte 

communications between the trial judge and a juror; and (6) cumulative error. Having reviewed 

the record as a whole and applicable law, the undersigned recommends that the Court deny the 

petition.

I. Factual Background3

On the afternoon of March 5, 2008, Jesus Vargas, Josie Canel, and Petitioner were 

hanging out at the apartment of their friend, Lulu. Petitioner was a member of the Floradora 

 

1 People v. Leahy, 8 Cal. 4th 587 (1994); People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24 (1976), superseded by statute as recognized in 

People v. Wilkinson, 33 Cal. 4

th 821 (2004).

2 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).

3 The factual background is derived from the factual and procedural history set forth in People v. Ortiz, 2012 WL 

1652888 (Cal.App. May 11, 2012) (No. F060792).

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Street Bulldogs. When Lulu’s daughter, Celeste, who was about nine years old, needed 

something from Walgreens, Vargas drove Petitioner, Canel, and Celeste there in Vargas’ car. 

As Vargas drove down Hammond Avenue, the group saw an Asian man dressed in blue4

standing outside an apartment complex at 4336 East Hammond Avenue (the Hammond 

apartments), throwing gang signs, and “mad-dogging” them.5 Canel testified that mad-dogging 

meant “looking at you ugly,” that is, threatening them. She identified the man as Chrisna Long, 

whom she thought was a member of the Asian Crips. Although Ortiz did not respond 

aggressively, he was upset that a rival gang member would try to provoke an altercation when 

there was a child in the car.

When Petitioner and his friends passed the same spot on their return from the store, Long

was in the same place and had been joined by more Asian men. Vargas and Petitioner dropped 

Canel and Celeste at Lulu’s house. Petitioner returned to Lulu’s house about 15 minutes later.

Celeste testified that when they went to the store, she saw Asian people outside the 

Hammond apartments, playing dice and staring at the car. As Celeste returned home in Vargas’ 

car, one Asian man lifted his shirt to show his tattoo, and others flashed gang signs. In an early 

interview, Celeste said that Petitioner waved something red out of the window; later, she said that 

Vargas put something red on his shoulder.

While resident Donovan Pullen was smoking a cigarette on the balcony of his second 

floor apartment, he witnessed an interchange between an Asian man in the garage area of the 

Hammond apartments and a Hispanic man across the street. The Asian man said something like, 

“What’s up cuz?” The Hispanic man replied, “I’m not a Crip: I’m not a cuz.” Pullen described 

the Asian man as confrontational, making gang gestures and pulling out a firearm. At that point, 

 

4 The Asian Boyz gang colors were blue; the Bulldog gang colors were red.

5 The record reveals substantially more testimony concerning the gang-related circumstances of the crime than is 

reflected in the state court’s brief factual summary.

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“a whole lot” of shots were exchanged, with the first shot coming from the Hammond apartments 

area and the Hispanic man shooting back. Pullen reported hearing both 9 mm shots, which 

sounded like loud gunshots, and .22-caliber shots, which sounded like firecrackers. He thought

that the Asian man had a 9 mm or .40 caliber Glock and the Hispanic man had a “machine gun, 

pistol, a TEC-9 or something like that.” When the gunfire ended, the Asian man was lying on the 

ground, and the Hispanic man ran away. A group of Asian men came out of the Hammond 

apartments parking lot, got into a car, and drove away.

James Tep, a member of the Asian Boyz and friend of the victim, was hanging out in the 

Hammond apartments parking lot that afternoon. He saw the same car pass by at least three times

and witnessed an “exchange of looks” between a passenger and a person or persons in front of the 

Hammond apartments. Tep remembered that a bandana was waived from the car but could not 

recall if it was waved by the driver or the passenger. He identified Petitioner as one of the men in 

the car.

Tep was in the courtyard of the Hammond apartments when he heard gunshots. As Tep 

ran back to the garage area, he encountered four individuals, two of whom he recognized as Asian 

Boyz members, running toward the courtyard. He saw Long on the ground in the parking lot, and

Petitioner and another man shooting from the other side of the street. Tep ran to the courtyard to 

hide and then left in a friend’s car.

Wendy Montoya lived on Olive near Rowell. At about 5:00 p.m., Petitioner, who was a 

family friend of Montoya’s boyfriend, knocked on her door and entered through a sliding glass 

door. Petitioner, who was nervous and jumpy, asked Wendy to drive him to his mother’s house, 

which was on the same block as Lulu’s house. Petitioner told Montoya that “they were arguing” 

and “he tried to cap me.”

///

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At about 5:45 p.m., Fresno police officers responded to a call about a possible shooting on 

North Rowell Avenue, just north of Olive Avenue. On arrival, they discovered the victim lying 

face down in the parking lot of the Hammond apartments. His right hand held a 9 mm Beretta 

handgun with an extended capacity magazine. The victim, later identified as 15-year-old Chrisna 

Long, had gunshot wounds in his head and right chest. The head wound was fatal. Long had

“Asian Boyz” tattooed on his chest.

Expended cartridge cases and live cartridges were scattered in the garage area and on a 

walkway that connected the garage to the parking lot. The officers observed multiple bullet holes 

in the garage doors and a bullet strike mark on the garage door hinge, and found deformed 

copper-jacketed bullets and fragments in both garages. Across Rowell Street, the officers found 

five expended 9 mm cartridge cases and observed bullet marks on the wall of the apartment 

building.

In Montoya’s garage, police officers found a Taurus 9 mm semi-automatic handgun, a 

Glock 9 mm semi-automatic handgun, a high-capacity magazine, and a magazine with 14 live 

cartridges. After witnesses reported seeing an individual who had been with Long run into an 

apartment in the Hammond apartments, police searched the apartment and recovered a Bryco 9 

mm semiautomatic handgun.

II. Procedural Background

Following trial in March 2010, a jury found Petitioner guilty of second degree murder and 

found true the following enhancements: (1) committing an offense for benefit of a criminal street 

gang (Cal. Penal Code § 186.22(b)(1)); (2) personally discharging a firearm resulting in death 

(Cal. Penal Code § 12022.53(d)); and (3) being a principal in the murder, and any other principal 

did personally discharge a firearm causing death (Cal. Penal Code § 12022.53(b), (c), and (e)(1)).

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On July 26, 2010, Petitioner moved for a new trial, alleging (1) juror misconduct; (2) the 

trial court’s violation of its duty of impartiality; and (3) prosecutorial misconduct. After 

conducting a two-day hearing, the trial court denied the motion on August 10, 2010.

Petitioner was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 15 years to life for the murder, plus a 

consecutive term of 25 years to life for personally discharging a firearm and proximately causing 

death in the commission of a felony (Cal. Penal Code § 12022.53(d)). 

Petitioner filed a direct appeal to the California Court of Appeal, Fifth District. On May 

11, 2012, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, and Petitioner moved for rehearing. The 

Court of Appeal denied the motion for rehearing on June 4, 2012. The California Supreme Court 

summarily denied the petition for review on August 15, 2012.

On January 2, 2013, Petitioner filed the habeas petition in this Court.

III. Standard of Review

A person in custody as a result of the judgment of a state court may secure relief through a 

petition for habeas corpus if the custody violates the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United 

States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 375 (2000). On April 24, 1996, 

Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), which 

applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed thereafter. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 

322-23 (1997). Under the statutory terms, the petition in this case is governed by AEDPA's 

provisions because Petitioner filed it after April 24, 1996.

Habeas corpus is neither a substitute for a direct appeal nor a device for federal review of 

the merits of a guilty verdict rendered in state court. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332 n. 5 

(1979) (Stevens, J., concurring). Habeas corpus relief is intended to address only "extreme 

malfunctions" in state criminal justice proceedings. Id. Under AEDPA, a petitioner can prevail 

only if he can show that the state court's adjudication of his claim:

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(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of 

the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-71 (2003); Williams, 

529 U.S. at 413.

"By its terms, § 2254(d) bars relitigation of any claim 'adjudicated on the merits' in state 

court, subject only to the exceptions set forth in §§ 2254(d)(1) and (d)(2)." Harrington v. 

Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98 (2011). 

As a threshold matter, a federal court must first determine what constitutes "clearly 

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." Lockyer, 

538 U.S. at 71. To do so, the Court must look to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of the 

Supreme Court's decisions at the time of the relevant state-court decision. Id. The court must 

then consider whether the state court's decision was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law." Id. at 72. The state court need not have cited 

clearly established Supreme Court precedent; it is sufficient that neither the reasoning nor the 

result of the state court contradicts it. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). The federal court 

must apply the presumption that state courts know and follow the law. Woodford v. Visciotti, 

537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002). The petitioner has the burden of establishing that the decision of the 

state court is contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, United States Supreme 

Court precedent. Baylor v. Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996). 

"A federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in its 

independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal 

law erroneously or incorrectly." Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75-76. "A state court's determination that 

a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' 

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on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101 (quoting 

Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). Thus, the AEDPA standard is difficult to 

satisfy since even a strong case for relief does not demonstrate that the state court's 

determination was unreasonable. Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102. 

IV. Grounds One and Two: Jury Instructions

Using the petition for review that he filed with the California Supreme Court,6Petitioner 

contends that the trial court gave the jury incorrect instructions on (1) aiding and abetting and

(2) transferred intent and proximate cause. Respondent counters that because these grounds

raised only questions of state law, neither ground is cognizable in a federal habeas proceeding. 

A. Federal Habeas Review of Jury Instruction Errors

Generally, claims of instructional error are questions of state law and are not cognizable 

on federal habeas review. “It is not the province of a federal court to reexamine state court 

determinations of state law questions.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 71-72 (1991). “The 

fact that a jury instruction violates state law is not, by itself, a basis for federal habeas corpus 

relief.” Clark v. Brown, 450 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 2006). “[A] petitioner may not “transform 

a state-law issue into a federal one merely by asserting a violation of due process.” Langford v. 

Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1997).

To prevail in a collateral attack on state court jury instructions, a petitioner must do 

more that prove that the instruction was erroneous. Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 

(1977). Instead, the petitioner must prove that the improper instruction “by itself so infected the 

entire trial that the resulting conviction violated due process.” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72. Even if 

there were constitutional error, habeas relief cannot be granted absent a “substantial and 

injurious effect” on the verdict. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993). 

 

6 The petition for writ of habeas corpus does not allege specific grounds for relief, but simply incorporates by 

reference the grounds alleged in the petition for review submitted to the California Supreme Court.

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A federal court’s review of a claim of instructional error is highly deferential. Masoner 

v. Thurman, 996 F.2d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1993). A reviewing court may not judge the 

instruction in isolation but must consider the context of the entire record and of the instructions 

as a whole. Id. The mere possibility of a different verdict is too speculative to justify a finding 

of constitutional error. Henderson, 431 U.S. at 157. “Where the jury verdict is complete, but 

based upon ambiguous instructions, the federal court, in a habeas petition, will not disturb the 

verdict unless ‘there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged 

instruction in a way’ that violates the Constitution.” Solis v. Garcia, 219 F.3d 922, 927 (9th Cir. 

2000) (quoting Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72).

Even when the trial court has made an error in the instruction, a habeas petitioner is only 

entitled to relief if the error “had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining 

the jury’s verdict.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637 (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 

776 (1946)). A state prisoner is not entitled to federal habeas relief unless the instructional 

error resulted in “actual prejudice.” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. A violation of due process occurs 

only when the instructional error results in the trial being fundamentally unfair. Estelle, 502 

U.S. at 72-73; Duckett v. Godinez, 67 F.3d 734, 746 (9th Cir. 1995). If the court is convinced 

that the error did not influence the jury, or had little effect, the judgment should stand. O’Neal 

v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 437 (1995).

B. Aiding and Abetting

1. The Instructions

Petitioner’s requested jury instructions included the aiding and abetting instructions set 

forth in CALCRIM Nos. 400 and 401. 4 CT 952. The prosecution did not request those 

instructions. 4 CT 958. In the charge conferences at the close of trial, Petitioner’s counsel was 

undecided as to whether he sought inclusion of the aiding and abetting instructions. Just prior 

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to closing arguments and jury instructions, the defense withdrew its request for CALCRIM Nos.

400 and 401. 13RT3039. 

 Nonetheless, the trial court presented jury instructions including instructions drawn from 

CALCRIM Nos. 400 and 401:

A person may be guilty of a crime in two ways. One, he or she may 

have directly committed the crime. I will call that person the 

perpetrator. Two, he or she may have aided and abetted a 

perpetrator who directly committed the crime. A person is equally 

guilty of the crime whether he or she committed it personally or 

aided and abetted the perpetrator who committed it.

To prove that a defendant is guilty of a crime based on aiding and 

abetting that crime, the People must prove that, the perpetrator 

committed the crime; Two, the defendant knew that the perpetrator 

intended to commit the crime; Three, before or during the 

commission of the crime, the defendant intended to aid and abet the 

perpetrator in committing the crime; and four, the defendant’s 

words or conduct did in fact aid and abet the perpetrator’s 

commission of the crime.

Someone aids and abets a crime if he or she knows of the 

perpetrator’s unlawful purpose, and he or she specifically intends to 

and does in fact aid, facilitate, promote, encourage, or instigate the 

perpetrator’s commission of that crime. 

If all of these requirements are proved, the defendant does not need 

to actually have been present when the crime was committed to be 

guilty as an aider and abetter.

A person who aids and abets a crime is not guilty of that crime if he 

or she withdraws before the crime is committed. To withdraw, a 

person must do two things:

One, he or she must notify everyone else he or she knows is 

involved in the commission of the crime that he or she is no longer 

participating. That notification must be made early enough to 

prevent the commission of the crime;

And two, he or she must do everything reasonably within his or her 

power to prevent the crime from being committed. He or she does 

not have to actually prevent the crime.

The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt 

that the defendant did not withdraw. If the People have not met this 

burden, you may not find the defendant guilty under an aiding and 

abetting theory.

14 RT 3326:16-3328:5.

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The Court also instructed the jury on mutual combat (CALCRIM No. 3471). These 

instructions included the language, “A fight is mutual combat when it began or continued by 

mutual consent or agreement. That agreement may be expressly stated or implied and must 

occur before the claim of self-defense arose.” 14 RT 3342:26-3343:3.

Petitioner did not object to the trial court’s inclusion of these instructions.

2. State Court Decision

Despite Petitioner’s failure to object to the instructions, the Court of Appeal addressed 

this claim on the merits. Ortiz, 2012 WL 1652888 at *6 n. 6. As he does in his federal petition, 

Petitioner argued “that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that other persons 

intended to kill Long or that [Petitioner] intended to aid and abet them in carrying out that 

intent.” Id. at *7. Citing People v. Sanchez, 26 Cal. 4

th 834 (2001), the prosecution contended 

that a defendant can be “considered an aider and abetter of a rival gang member where the 

defendant and his rival engage in a public gun battle that leads to death.” Ortiz, 2012 WL 

1652888 at *7.

In Sanchez, the California Supreme Court held that where two rival gang members 

engaged in a shoot-out that resulted in the death of an innocent third party struck by a stray 

bullet, each could be charged and convicted of murder, even though the victim was killed by 

only a single bullet. 26 Cal. 4th at 838-39. The Court upheld Sanchez’ conviction, reasoning 

that even though the individual who fired the killing shot could not be determined, each 

defendant’s participation in the life-threatening shooting constituted a proximate cause of the 

victim’s death. Id. at 848-49.

After analyzing the Sanchez decision and the cases on which the Sanchez Court relied, 

the Court of Appeal in this case concluded that:

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[W]here rival gang members engage in mutual combat, each gang 

member’s conduct may be viewed as inciting and encouraging the 

other’s (or others’) conduct. Consequently, each gang member may 

be liable as an aider and abettor for any death caused by the mutual 

combat.” 

Ortiz, 2012 WL 1652888 at *8 (footnote omitted).

C. No Federal Constitutional Error

The jury instructions in this case were complete and accurately expressed California 

precedent concerning the liability of a defendant for a death resulting from a deadly battle 

between two rival criminal street gangs. Petitioner, whose defense attempts to assign liability for 

Long’s death solely to an unidentified member of the Asian Boyz, seeks to have this Court 

overrule a California court’s application of California law. This Court is bound by the state 

court’s determination of state law. Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005). The Court 

should decline to address grounds one and two, which are questions of state law not cognizable in 

federal habeas proceedings.

V. Exclusion of Expert Testimony

As his third ground for habeas relief, Petitioner alleges that the trial court erred in 

excluding proffered expert testimony regarding the likely caliber of the shot that killed Long, 

based on the expert’s shooting bullets into a pig head. Respondent contends that the Court should 

not address this issue in the absence of a U.S. Supreme Court decision establishing rules to 

evaluate the constitutionality of a state court’s application of state evidentiary rules. 

A. State Court Proceedings 7

Seeking to prove that Long was killed by a .22 caliber bullet fired by an Asian Boyz gang 

member, Petitioner sought to introduce the trial testimony of experts Stebens and Zachary, who 

had conducted experiments to determine the size of the entry wounds created by .22 caliber and 9 

mm weapons. Stebens was prepared to testify that Long’s entrance wounds were more consistent 

with his having been shot with a .22 caliber weapon. The prosecution moved for a pretrial 

hearing pursuant to California Evidence Code § 402 to exclude the testimony under Kelly, 17 

 

7 The factual and procedural background relevant to this issue is derived from that set forth in Ortiz, 2012 WL 

1652888.

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Cal.3d 24. Finding that Stebens and Zachary had failed to establish that their testing method was 

generally accepted within the scientific or technical community, the trial court determined that the 

testimony was not admissible. The trial court reiterated its holding in the course of trial, adding 

that the experiments were likely to confuse the jury and consume an undue amount of time.

The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court’s determination was within its 

discretion. It added:

[Petitioner] also claims that the trial court’s evidentiary ruling 

infringed upon his constitutional right to present a defense. We are 

not persuaded. His claim is premised on the assumption that he 

could not be convicted of murder if Long’s fellow gang members 

fired the fatal bullet, but as demonstrated by Sanchez, supra, 26 

Cal.4th 834, and our discussion above on aiding and abetting, this 

assumption is incorrect. To the contrary, determining whether 

[Petitioner] fired the fatal shot was neither necessary or sufficient 

for a murder conviction.

Ortiz, 2012 WL 1652888 at *11.

B. State Law Issues Uncognizable in Federal Habeas Proceedings

As already stated in the discussion of claims one and two, “It is not the province of a 

federal court to reexamine state court determinations of state law questions.” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 

71-72. Issues regarding the admission of evidence are particularly matters of state law, generally 

outside the purview of a federal habeas court. Holley v. Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th

Cir. 2009). "The admission of evidence does not provide a basis for habeas relief unless it 

rendered the trial fundamentally unfair in violation of due process." Johnson v. Sublett, 63 F.3d 

926, 930 (9th Cir. 1995). 

"[T]he Due Process Clause does not permit the federal courts to engage in a finely tuned 

review of the wisdom of state evidentiary rules." Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 438 n. 6 

(1983). "Although the [U.S. Supreme] Court has been clear that a writ should be issued when 

constitutional errors have rendered the trial fundamentally unfair, see Williams, 529 U.S. at 

375 . . ., it has not yet made a clear ruling that admission of irrelevant or overtly prejudicial 

evidence constitutes a due process violation sufficient to warrant issuance of the writ." Holley, 

568 F.3d at 1101. Since the state appellate court's disposition of Petitioner's appeal was not 

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contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent, a federal district court 

should not reach ground three.

VI. Griffin Error

In three-sentences, Petitioner contends in ground five that the Court should reverse the 

Court of Appeal’s Griffin analysis as incorrect. Petitioner provides no further guidance, not even 

providing a full citation of the Griffin decision, and simply refers this Court to the state court’s 

slip opinion. Respondent counters that the state court’s decision was not unreasonable.

A. State Court Decision

The Court of Appeal addressed this issue as follow:

In his rebuttal statement to the jury, the prosecutor said:

“Motive. Motive is not an element of the crime charged 

and need not be shown, however, you may consider 

motive or lack of motive as circumstances in this case. 

Presence of motive may tend to establish the defendant is 

guilty. We’ve got motive out the wazoo. Evidence—

absence of motive may tend to show the defendant is not 

guilty. And there is absolutely no reason for the 

defendant to have done this other than gang.

“The defendant won’t address gang-related content. And 

that is the issue in this case. If it is not gang-related, then 

the defendant’s actions were fully justified self-defense, 

because Long was bringing his gun up and he [Petitioner] 

killed him because he had to. Plain and simple.” (Italics 

added.)

At this point, defense counsel raised an objection based on Griffin 

[v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965)] error, which defense counsel 

described as “[i]nadvertent” but error nonetheless. After a brief 

discussion outside the presence of the jury (which was not recorded 

by the court reporter), the court told the jury:

“The Court would like the record to reflect that throughout 

the closing arguments, both by the People and the defense, 

there have been Power Point presentations presented for 

the jurors’ convenience. The current slide shown by the 

People reads at the top, “Why won’t defense address if 

D’s conduct was gang-related.”

“When [the prosecutor] spoke of that . . . display a moment 

ago, he misspoke. I want to make it very clear to the jury 

by rereading the instruction that applies, as I had given it to 

you earlier in this case.

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“A defendant has an absolute constitutional right not to 

testify. He or she may rely on the state of the evidence 

and argue that the People have failed to prove the charges 

beyond a reasonable doubt. Do not consider for any 

reason at all the fact that the defendant did not testify. Do 

not discuss that fact during your deliberations or let it 

influence your decision in any way.”

The prosecutor then continued his rebuttal argument. He 

corrected his previous statement saying, “Rebuttal is 

addressing counsel’s closing argument. Counsel made no 

reference to the defendant’s gang conduct . . . . “ (Italics 

added.)

On appeal, [Petitioner] contends that reversal is required based 

upon the prosecutor’s initial statement that “defendant won’t 

address the gang-related conduct.” We disagree. Griffin holds that 

the privilege against self-incrimination of the Fifth Amendment 

prohibits any comment by the prosecution on a defendant’s failure 

to testify at trial that invites or allows the jury to infer guilt 

therefrom.” (People v. Roybal (1998) 19 Cal.4th 481, 514.) On the 

other hand, a prosecutor is permitted to comment on the state of the 

evidence and on “the failure of the defense to introduce material 

evidence or to call logical witnesses.” (People v. Vargas (1973) 9 

Cal.3d 470, 475, citations omitted.) “We apply a ‘reasonable 

likelihood’ standard for reviewing prosecutorial remarks, inquiring 

whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jurors misconstrued 

or misapplied the words in question.” (People v. Roybal, supra, at 

p. 514.)

Here, it is not reasonably likely that the jury would have understood 

the prosecutor as inviting the jury to infer guilt based on 

[Petitioner’s] failure to testify. As the trial court noted, the Power 

Point slide that accompanied the prosecutor’s argument read, 

“’Why won’t defense address if D’s conduct was gang-related.’” 

(Italics added.) This was a permissible comment on the state of the 

evidence. The prosecutor simply misspoke, referring to the 

“defendant” instead of “the defense” or “defense counsel.” Even 

defense counsel recognized that the statement was inadvertent. 

After defense counsel objected, the trial court immediately 

explained to the jury that the prosecutor had misspoken and 

admonished that the defendant had the right not to testify. The 

prosecutor then corrected himself. Under these circumstances, the 

jury would not have taken the prosecutor’s initial statement to mean 

that it could use [Petitioner’s] failure to testify as evidence of his 

guilt.

Further, even assuming the jury understood the prosecutor’s 

misstatement as a comment on [Petitioner’s] failure to testify, there 

was no prejudice. The trial court immediately admonished the jury 

that defendant had “an absolute constitutional right not to testify” 

and repeated the instruction, “Do not consider for any reason at all 

the fact that the defendant did not testify. Do not discuss that fact 

during your deliberations or let it influence your decision in any 

way.” We presume that the jury followed these instructions. 

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(People v. Dement (2011) 53 Cal.4th 1, 50 [finding no prejudice 

under any standard where trial court instructed jury not to draw any 

inference from fact that defendant does not testify].)

Ortiz, 2012 WL 1652888 at *12 (footnotes omitted).

B. Commenting on Defense Case

In state criminal proceedings, the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution “forbids either 

comment by the prosecution or instructions by the court that [a defendant’s] silence is evidence of 

guilt.” Griffin, 380 U.S. at 615. See also Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 319 (1976) 

(“Griffin prohibits the judge and prosecutor from suggesting to the jury that it may treat the 

defendant’s silence as substantive evidence of guilt”). 

The Griffin rule does not bar comment on the sufficiency of the defendant’s evidence, 

however. In a case in which defense counsel had repeatedly charged that “the Government had 

unfairly denied [the defendant] the opportunity to explain his actions,” the prosecutor’s statement 

that respondent could have explained his story to the jury was admissible as fair response to 

defense counsel’s argument. United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 27, 34 (1988). Similarly, 

where defense counsel focused the jury’s attention on the contemplated defense by referring in 

the opening statement to the version of the facts that defendant’s testimony would show and by

later indicating that the defendant would be the next witness, the prosecutor’s references in his 

closing to the state’s “unrefuted” and “uncontradicted” evidence did not constitute an 

impermissible reference to the defendant’s 5th and 14th amendment right not to testify. Lockett v. 

Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 595 (1978).

Noting that even defense counsel recognized that the prosecutor had simply misspoken, 

the Court of Appeal here found the jury was unlikely to have interpreted the objected-to reference 

as encouraging it to find the defendant guilty because he did not testify. It added that the trial 

court had promptly explained the misstatement, referring to the permissible language of the 

corresponding Power Point slide and repeating the jury instruction concerning Petitioner’s right 

not to testify. The prosecutor then corrected himself. In light of these facts, the Court of Appeal 

determined the statement to constitute a “permissible comment on the state of the evidence.” 

Ortiz, 2012 WL 1652888 at *13.

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Under these circumstances, fairminded jurists could conclude that the Court of Appeal’s 

decision was neither contrary to relevant Supreme Court precedent nor unreasonable.

Accordingly, the Court should decline to treat the prosecution’s misstatement in its closing 

argument as a basis to grant habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

VII. Juror Misconduct

Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in (1) denying his motion for a new trial based 

on the trial court’s ex parte communication with a juror, James Oppliger, then a sitting judge of 

the Fresno County Superior Court, and (2) failing to disclose the communication until after the 

jury had rendered its verdict. He argues that the trial court should have recused itself on its own 

motion and that, by failing to disclose the ex parte communications during trial, the trial court 

denied his right to counsel and his right to be present at all critical stages of the proceedings. 

Respondent counters that the state court’s decision was neither contrary to established federal 

case law nor unreasonable.

A. Factual Background

The California Court of Appeal summarized the background of this issue:

One of the jurors, referred to as Juror No. 10, was also a judge on 

the Fresno County Superior Court. At a hearing called by the trial 

court on April 15, 2010 (three days after the jury had reached its 

verdict)), the court advised counsel that it had received e-mail 

communication from Juror No. 10 during the trial:

“In this courthouse, my name appears on a number of mass e-mail 

lists which I and my colleagues use to facilitate communication. 

One such list is used to learn which if any of us is available to meet 

for lunch. On three occasions during [Petitioner’s] trial, former 

Juror [No.] 10, when responding to a lunch request, replied to 

everyone on the judicial contact list, which included me. These 

communications were uninvited and unanswered by this judicial 

officer. Further, the communications in no way influenced this 

Court in its duty to ensure [Petitioner] a fair trial. This Court 

viewed each communication as nothing more than an innocuous 

attempt at humor. Since none amounted to a violation of the 

Court’s admonition to not talk about the case, I simply ignored 

them. But because the e-mails were in fact a type of ex parte 

communication, I feel disclosure is warranted.

The trial court then provided counsel with copies of the e-mails sent 

by Juror No. 10. Because only Juror No. 10’s messages were 

provided and not the preceding messages from other 

correspondents, the trial court offered some context.

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A series of e-mails dated March 15, 2010, began with a lunch 

inquiry and the presiding judge remarked that judicial officers must 

not discuss any aspect of the case with Juror No. 10. In response, 

Juror No. 10 wrote back, “while it behooves us to be responsible 

and even to [err] on the side [of] caution, other subjects such as the 

process fall outside the admonishment but more importantly fall 

outside [the] scope of common sense.”

An unidentified correspondent observed that Juror No. 10 had 

defended, prosecuted, presided over, and would now hear as a juror 

a homicide case and he needed to handle an appeal, commit a 

homicide, and be the victim of homicide to see all sides of such a 

case. In an e-mail dated March 16, 2010, Juror No. 10 responded in 

part, “here I am livin’ the dream, jury duty with [defense counsel] 

Mugridge and [prosecutor] Jenkins!” In response to another lunch 

inquiry, a colleague mentioned that Juror No. 10 would be taking a 

“field trip,” referring to the jury view of the scene of the crime. In 

an e-mail dated April 7, 2010, Juror No. 10 responded, “I am still 

watching you guys.”

Finally, on April 12, 2010, Juror No. 10 sent an e-mail to an 

address list titled “Superior Court Judges.” He wrote, “Does 

anyone have the ‘top ten reasons that you know you have been on a 

jury [too] long when . . .’” He asked that the list be sent to his clerk 

and explained, “My friends want a copy.”

On July 26, 2010, defense counsel filed a motion for a new trial. 

Among other arguments, defense counsel argued that Juror No. 10 

engaged in three types of misconduct: (1) he concealed his bias 

during jury selection; (2) he engaged in ex parte communication 

with the trial court by sending e-mails to 22 superior court judges, 

including the trial court judge; and (3) he showed impatience and a 

lack of seriousness when he slammed a book down loudly and 

dramatically during defense counsel’s questioning of an expert 

witness.

In support of the claim of concealed bias, Josie Canel, a witness in 

the trial and a friend of Ortiz, provided a declaration. She stated 

that she was sitting outside the courtroom during jury selection 

when she saw a White man leave through the jury door. He was 

talking on a phone and said, “’It was a Hispanic gang member with 

a gun, what do you expect. If a Hispanic gang member with a gun 

walked into a liquor store you would expect him to rob it. He says 

he’s guilty.’” Later, when she testified in court, she saw the same 

man on the jury. On June 4, 2010, she identified Juror No. 10 as 

the juror she had overheard talking about Hispanic gangs.

The trial court heard testimony from nine witnesses, including 

Canel and Juror No. 10. On August 10, 2010, the court denied the 

motion for a new trial, concluding, “The Court is satisfied that 

[Petitioner] received a fair trial before 12 impartial jurors and 

before an impartial member of the bench.”

Ortiz, 2012 WL 1652888 at 13-14.

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B. State Court Determination

1. Recusal

In California, the statutory basis for disqualifying a judge is set forth in California Code of 

Civil Procedure § 170.1. “The determination of the question of the disqualification of a judge is 

not an appealable order and may be reviewed only by a writ of mandate from the appropriate 

court of appeal sought only by the parties to the proceeding.” Cal. Code of Civil Procedure § 

170.3(d). The Court of Appeal held that because Petitioner had not followed the statutory 

procedural rules, he had forfeited his statutory claim. As a result, his sole remedy rested on a due 

process right to a fair and impartial judge. 

Petitioner contended that to satisfy “the appearance of justice,” due process requires 

recusal even when the judge has no actual bias. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). The 

state court rejected his argument, relying on precedent indicating that cases involving the 

appearance, but not a probability, of bias should be resolved under the disqualification statutes 

and codes of judicial conduct. 

Noting that the trial judge never responded to the juror’s e-mails and that the e-mails 

themselves neither commented on the substance of the trial nor revealed juror bias or 

prejudgment, the state court found no probability of judicial bias. It concluded that “the facts do 

not objectively suggest doubts as to the trial court’s impartiality.” Ortiz, 2012 WL 1652888 at 

*15.

2. Ex Parte Communication

Petitioner claimed that Juror No. 10’s e-mails and the trial judge’s failure to disclose 

them, deprived him of his right to counsel and his right to be present at all critical stages of trial 

proceedings. 

The Court of Appeal acknowledged that ex parte communications between jurors and the 

trial judge are generally improper since the defendant is entitled to “an adequate opportunity to 

evaluate the propriety of a proposed judicial response in order to pose an objection.” People v. 

Clark, 52 Cal. 4

th 856, 985-86 (2011). “Although such communications violate a defendant’s 

right to be present, and represented by counsel, at all critical stages of his trial , and thus 

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constitute federal constitutional error, reversal is not required where the error can be 

demonstrated harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 987. In addition, “[n]ot every

communication between the judge and jury constitutes a critical stage of trial.” Id. Ex parte

communication is harmless error when the calls were made for scheduling or other administrative 

purposes.

The state court found that the challenged e-mails were addressed to many recipients. 

They were brief, and none of them referred to the substance of the case. Juror No. 10 admitted 

that he had carelessly sent the e-mails without considering that the trial court would be included 

among the recipients. The trial court did not respond to the e-mails; Juror No. 10 did not seek 

one. In the absence of a judicial response and of any expectation of a response, the 

correspondence did not require defendant to be granted an opportunity to evaluate it. No 

evidence supported a conclusion that the correspondence had any effect on the conduct of the trial 

or the outcome of the case. The state court concluded that the “e-mails were harmless beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” Ortiz, 2012 WL 1652888 at *16.

C. Due Process: Recusal

“’The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment establishes a constitutional floor, 

not a uniform standard,’ for a judicial bias claim.” Hurles v. Ryan, 752 F.3d 768, 788 (2014) 

(quoting Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904 (1997)). “While most claims of judicial bias are

resolved by common law, statute, or the professional standards of the bench and bar, the floor 

established by the Due Process Clause clearly requires a fair trial in a fair tribunal before a judge 

with no actual bias against the defendant or interest in the outcome of the particular case.” 

Hurles, 752 F.3d at 788 (internal quotations omitted). “A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic 

requirement of due process.” Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136. Nonetheless, “most matters relating to 

judicial disqualification [do] not rise to a constitutional level.” Federal Trade Comm’n v. Cement 

Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 702 (1948).

Recusal is required in those circumstances “in which experience teaches us that the 

probability of actual bias on the part of the judge . . . is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.” 

Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 877 (2009). In making this analysis, a 

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court does not evaluate the actual judge harbored subjective bias but whether “the average judge 

in her position was likely to be neutral or whether there existed an unconstitutional potential for 

bias.” Hurles, 752 F.3d at 789. Put another way, the court must consider “whether ‘under a 

realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness, ‘ the [judge’s] interest ‘poses 

such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of 

due process is to be absolutely implemented.’” Id., citing Caperton, 556 U.S. at 883-84 (quoting 

Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)). The “risk of unfairness has no mechanical or static 

definition. It ‘cannot be defined with precision’ because ‘[c][ircumstances and relationships must 

be considered.” Hurles, 752 F.3d at 789 (quoting Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136).

Under this standard, reasonable jurists could differ on the question of whether the trial 

judge should have recused himself. Where reasonable jurists could reach different conclusions, 

this Court should not grant habeas relief.

D. Failure to Disclose E-mails Before Verdict

Disclosure of ex parte communications between a judge and juror is generally necessary 

when the communication relates to an aspect of the trial. Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 119 

(1983). In the absence of disclosure, the prejudicial effect “can normally be determined by a 

post-trial hearing. Id. “[T]he factual findings arising out of the state courts’ post-trial hearings 

are entitled to a presumption of correctness.” 28 U.S.C. §2254(d); Rushen, 464 U.S. at 120; 

Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 547 (1981).

Because the juror’s correspondence in this case did not relate to any aspect of the trial, the 

Rushen holding does not mandate disclosure. In any event, the trial court disclosed the 

communications following trial and conducted a hearing in response to Petitioner’s motion for a 

new trial. The state court’s resolution of that hearing is entitled to a presumption of correctness. 

This Court should not grant habeas relief based on the trial court’s determination to disclose the 

communications following return of the verdict.

VIII. Cumulative Error

If the Court agrees with the undersigned’s conclusion that none of Petitioner’s claims 

constitute error, it need not reach Petitioner’s claim of cumulative error.

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IX. Certificate of Appealability

A petitioner seeking a writ of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement to appeal a 

district court's denial of his petition, but may only appeal in certain circumstances. Miller-El v. 

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003). The controlling statute in determining whether to issue a 

certificate of appealability is 28 U.S.C. § 2253, which provides:

(a) In a habeas corpus proceeding or a proceeding under section 2255 

before a district judge, the final order shall be subject to review, on appeal, by 

the court of appeals for the circuit in which the proceeding is held.

(b) There shall be no right of appeal from a final order in a proceeding 

to test the validity of a warrant to remove to another district or place for 

commitment or trial a person charged with a criminal offense against the 

United States, or to test the validity of such person's detention pending 

removal proceedings.

(c) (1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of 

appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from—

 (A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the 

detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court; or

 (B) the final order in a proceeding under section 2255.

 (2) A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph (1) 

only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.

 (3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) shall 

indicate which specific issues or issues satisfy the showing required by 

paragraph (2).

If a court denies a habeas petition, the court may only issue a certificate of appealability 

"if jurists of reason could disagree with the district court's resolution of his constitutional claims 

or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to 

proceed further." Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 327; Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 

Although the petitioner is not required to prove the merits of his case, he must demonstrate 

///

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"something more than the absence of frivolity or the existence of mere good faith on his . . . 

part." Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 338.

Reasonable jurists would not find the determination that Petitioner is not entitled to 

federal habeas corpus relief to be debatable or wrong, or conclude that the issues presented 

required further adjudication. Accordingly, the Court should decline to issue a certificate of 

appealability.

X. Conclusion and Recommendation

The undersigned recommends that the Court deny the Petition for writ of habeas corpus 

with prejudice and decline to issue a certificate of appealability.

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C ' 636(b)(1). Within thirty 

(30) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, either party may file 

written objections with the Court. The document should be captioned AObjections to Magistrate 

Judge=s Findings and Recommendations.@ Replies to the objections, if any, shall be served and 

filed within fourteen (14) days after service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure

to file objections within the specified time may constitute waiver of the right to appeal the District 

Court's order. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 ((9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. 

Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 16, 2016 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto .

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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