Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00383/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00383-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Gala AZ holdings, Inc., d/b/a Del Taco, a 

California corporation, 

Defendant.

No. CV-11-00383-PHX-JAT

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s 

August 8, 2012 Order (Doc. 39). The Court now rules on the Motion. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 On May 8, 2012, the parties submitted a Joint Motion to Approve Consent 

Judgment (Doc. 37) to the Court. On August 8, 2012, the Court denied the Joint Motion 

to Approve Consent Judgment without prejudice to the parties re-filing without the 

language requiring the entry of an injunction. (See Doc. 38). 

 Specifically, the Court found that it could grant the consent decree if the following 

language was removed: 

Injunction 

 1. Defendant and its officers, agents, employees, successors, assigns and all persons in active concert or 

participation with them, are permanently enjoined for the 

duration of the decree from (a) discriminating against any employee on the basis of sex and gender and (b) retaliating against any employee because s/he (i) opposed discriminatory conduct believed to be unlawful under Title VII , (ii) reported 

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conduct to be unlawful under Title VII to managers of Defendant [sic] (iii) filed a charge or assisted or participated in the filing of a charge of sex or gender discrimination, or (iv) assisted or participated in an investigation or proceeding resulting from any of the preceding items. 

(Doc. 37-1 at 2:16-26). 

 In denying the injunction, the Court specifically found that “[t]he proposed 

injunction appears to enjoin activity that is already prohibited by federal employment law 

and, thus, the entry of an injunction would be duplicative and unnecessary.” (Doc. 38). 

 Plaintiff now seeks reconsideration of the Court’s Order. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

The Court will grant reconsideration of its prior non-appealable interlocutory 

order1

 if the party seeking reconsideration makes a showing that: 

1) There are material differences in fact or law from that 

presented to the Court and, at the time of the Court’s decision, 

the party moving for reconsideration could not have known of 

the factual or legal differences through reasonable diligence; 

(2) There are new material facts that happened after the 

Court’s decision; 

(3) There has been a change in the law that was decided or 

enacted after the Court’s decision; or 

(4) The movant makes a convincing showing that the 

Court failed to consider material facts that were presented to the Court before the Court’s decision. 

Motorola, Inc. v. J.B. Rodgers Mech. Contractors, 215 F.R.D. 581, 586 (D. Ariz. 2003). 

(emphasis added). 

 “A motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e) should not be granted, absent 

 

1

 The Court notes that, under certain circumstances, the denial of a consent 

judgment may be an appealable interlocutory order. See Sierra Club, Inc. v. Electronic 

Controls Design, Inc., 909 F.2d 1350, 1353 (9th Cir. 1990). If the denial of a consent 

judgment is an appealable interlocutory order, the Court applies the test set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59. If the denial of a consent judgment is not an appealable interlocutory order, the Court applies the test set forth in Motorola. Rather 

than specifying which standard it is moving under, Plaintiff has cited to cases applying both the Motorola and Rule 59(e) standards. In analyzing Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration, the Court will apply both standards. 

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highly unusual circumstances, unless the district court is presented with newly discovered 

evidence, committed clear error, or if there is an intervening change in the controlling 

law.” McDowell v. Calderon, 197 F.3d 1253, 1255 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation 

and citations omitted). 

III. ANALYSIS 

 Plaintiff argues that the Court’s rejection of the injunction language in the parties’ 

consent judgment is “not in accord with binding Ninth Circuit law.” (Doc. 39 at 2). 

Plaintiff specifically relies on the decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Equal 

Employment Opportunity Commission v. Goodyear Aerospace Corp., 813 F.2d 1539 (9th 

Cir. 1987) to support its position. 

 In Goodyear, an employee of Goodyear Aerospace Commission (“Goodyear”) 

filed a charge with the EEOC alleging racially discriminatory promotion practices. 813 

F.2d at 1541. The EEOC subsequently reached a settlement under which Goodyear 

promised to consider the employee for promotion without regard to her race and not to 

retaliate against her. Id. Thereafter, the employee filed a second EEOC charge alleging 

that Goodyear failed to promote her because of her race and in retaliation for her first 

EEOC charge. Id. After Goodyear refused to agree to a proposed consent decree, the 

EEOC filed a charge in federal district court. Id. Thereafter, the employee signed a 

settlement agreement, which provided that, in consideration for Goodyear’s promise not 

to retaliate, Goodyear was released from any and all actions and the employee requested 

that the EEOC dismiss the lawsuit. Id. at 1541-42. 

Goodyear then moved for summary judgment arguing that the settlement mooted 

the EEOC’s power to maintain the litigation. Id. at 1542. The district court granted 

Goodyear’s motion for summary judgment, finding that the settlement was fair and 

reasonable, private recovery beyond that obtained in the settlement was unavailable, an 

injunction against retaliation was unnecessary because Title VII provided that protection, 

summary judgment furthered Title VII’s policy favoring voluntary settlements, liability 

for discrimination was questionable, further litigation was not in the public interest and 

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would waste the court’s time, and summary judgment would permit the employee to 

pursue her career without the appearance of forced compliance with the promotion. Id. at 

1542. 

 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the EEOC’s right of 

action is independent of the employee’s private action rights. Id. at 1542. The Court of 

Appeals also reversed and remanded on the question of whether the requested injunctive 

relief should be entered. Id. at 1544. The Court of Appeals explained that permanent 

injunctions are available as relief under section 706(g) of Title VII, which provides in 

relevant part: 

If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful 

employment practice charged in the complaint, the court may 

enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful 

employment practice, and order such affirmative action as 

may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, 

reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay (payable by the employer, employment agency, or labor 

organization, as the case may be, responsible for the unlawful employment practice), or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate. 

42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (emphasis added). 

 The Court of Appeals held that the district court erred because the district court 

assumed liability for the purposes of the summary judgment order. Goodyear, 813 F.2d 

at 1544. Because a finding on liability was necessary before the Court could grant or 

deny the injunction, the Court of Appeals remanded for the district court to make a 

finding on liability. Id. at 1545. The Court of Appeals instructed that, if the district court 

made a finding that Goodyear was liable for discrimination and retaliation, it should enter 

the requested injunction. Id. 

 The Court of Appeals also found that the district court erred in finding that an 

injunction against retaliation was superfluous because Title VII already prohibits that 

conduct. Id. at 1544. In reasoning that an injunction was not superfluous, the Court of 

Appeals found that: 

An injunction would (1) instruct Goodyear that it must 

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comply with federal law, (2) subject it to the contempt power of the federal courts if it commits future violations, and (3) 

reduce the chilling effect of its alleged retaliation on its employees’ exercise of their Title VII rights. Section 706(g) 

specifically gives courts the power to enjoin an “unlawful employment practice.” 

Id. In support of its decision that the district court could enjoin conduct already made 

unlawful under Title VII, the Court of Appeals also relied on cases enjoining specific 

employment practices, not already specifically prohibited by the law, such as an 

injunction against the use of sex-segregated annuity tables. Id.

 In this case, Plaintiff relies on the Court of Appeals’ reasoning in Goodyear to 

support its contention that this Court must enter the injunction to which the parties in this 

case have consented. The Court disagrees. 

 “[A] federal court is more than ‘a recorder of contracts’ from whom parties can 

purchase injunctions; it is ‘an organ of government constituted to make judicial decisions 

. . . .’” Local No. 93, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, C.L.C., 478 U.S. 501, 525 

(1986) (ellipsis in original) (internal citation omitted). In evaluating whether to enter an 

injunction pursuant to a consent judgment, this Court has a duty to consider the 

implications and the Court’s own enforcement power of such an injunction. The Court is 

not obligated to blindly enter an injunction without the Court’s and the parties’ 

understanding of the parameters of such an injunction. 

Goodyear is distinguishable from this case because, in that case, the Ninth Circuit 

Court of Appeals remanded for the district court to determine Goodyear’s liability for 

discrimination and retaliation and, if the district court found such liability, it was to then 

enter the injunction. This outcome comports with the plain language of 706(g) which 

allows for an injunction “[i]f the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged 

in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the 

complaint.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (emphasis added). In this case, the Court has 

made no such finding and the parties have not stipulated to such a finding. In fact, the 

proposed consent judgment in this case specifically notes that Defendant denies the 

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EEOC’s allegations that Defendant subjected its employee to unlawful sexual harassment 

and retaliation, including termination in violation of Title VII. (See Doc. 37-1 at 1-2). In 

such a circumstance, the Court questions the necessity and the propriety of entering an 

injunction. 

 Further, in Goodyear, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals did not address this 

Court’s primary concern in entering an injunction that does not differ from current 

federal law. Because the injunction is precisely duplicative of federal law, it appears that 

enforcement of the injunction could give this Court jurisdiction over all future cases 

alleging that Defendant Gala AZ Holdings, Inc. d/b/a Del Taco discriminated against any 

employee on the basis of sex or gender or retaliated against any employee who opposed 

discriminatory conduct, reported unlawful conduct, filed a charge or participated in filing 

a charge of sex or gender discrimination, or assisted or participated in an investigation or 

proceeding resulting from any of the preceding items. 

 It is not clear from the injunction, as currently proposed, whether any future 

employee of Defendant would be deprived of his/her right to choose the jurisdiction in 

which to bring his/her case or if he/she would be forced to bring such an employment 

action in this Court. Such an inequitable result would certainly violate many public 

policy considerations in favor of allowing would-be plaintiffs to choose their own forum 

and could possibly implicate issues of personal jurisdiction and venue. Further, this 

Court simply does not have the resources to assert jurisdiction over all allegations of 

discriminatory conduct against Defendant, who conducts business in more than ten states. 

 Moreover, even if the injunction did not purport to give this Court jurisdiction 

over all future cases of discriminatory conduct by Defendant, it is unclear from the 

injunction, as currently proposed, whether Defendant has consented to multiple 

proceedings on the issue of whether Defendant has violated Title VII in a particular 

instance. Further, it is unclear to the Court what the effect on the litigation would be if 

there were inconsistent results arising from a contempt decision in this Court and a merits 

decision in another Court. It is with these policy considerations in mind that the Court 

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refused the original request for an injunction in the consent judgment and these 

considerations have not been alleviated by the Court of Appeal’s decision in Goodyear. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, 

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s 

August 8, 2012 Order (Doc. 39) is granted in part and denied in part as follows: 

 If the parties choose to resubmit their Joint Motion to Approve Consent Judgment 

with language requiring this Court to enter an injunction, such proposed injunction shall 

address the considerations set forth herein. 

 Otherwise, the parties may resubmit their Joint Motion to Approve Consent 

Judgment as set forth in the Court’s Order of August 8, 2012 (Doc. 38). 

 Dated this 27th day of August, 2012 

 

 

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