Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00377/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00377-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

MARQUES PHILLIPS and CYNTHIA

PHILLIPS,

NO. CIV. S-04-0377 FCD PAN

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CITY OF FAIRFIELD, CHIEF OF

POLICE WILLIAM GRESHAM,

OFFICER MARK SCHRAER, OFFICER

CHAD TIGERT, OFFICER STEVE

TROJANOWSKI, JR., OFFICER MIKE

BEATTY, OFFICER MATTHEW

THOMAS, OFFICER STEPHEN RUIZ,

OFFICER TROY OVIATT, OFFICER

JEREMY NIPPER, OFFICER FRANCO

CESAR, OFFICER CADE BECKWITH,

and DOES 1 through 13,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on plaintiff Marques

Phillips’ (“Phillips”) motion for reconsideration of the court’s

December 21, 2005, order granting defendant Chief William 

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Gresham’s (“Gresham”) summary judgment. For the reasons set

forth below, plaintiff’s motion is DENIED. 

BACKGROUND

On October 18, 2005, defendants filed a consolidated motion

for summary judgment. In his opposition to defendant Gresham’s

motion for summary judgment, Phillips contended that Gresham was

liable under § 1983 in his individual capacity for both his

actions and inaction. Specifically, plaintiff argued that

Gresham failed to train defendant officers, failed to supervise

defendant Trojanowski, and failed to discipline defendant

Trojanowski for citizen complaints of excessive force. In

support of his claims, plaintiff produced evidence that

Trojanowski had six citizen complaints against him for excessive

force. However, the evidence also demonstrated that Trojanowski

was investigated and exonerated for each claim and that

plaintiff’s civilian complaint was investigated and the officers

involved were exonerated. Plaintiff contended that the

investigation into their complaint was “less than cursory.” 

Based upon this showing, the court found that plaintiff did

not raise a triable issue of individual liability as to defendant

Gresham. The court specifically noted (1) that plaintiff did not

present any expert testimony that Gresham created or maintained a

policy whereby civilian complaints of excessive force are

meaningless; (2) that plaintiff did not present any evidence that

the investigations into the prior civilian complaints against

Trojanowski or the investigations into their own complaint

against the officers was cursory, inadequate, or meaningless; and

(3) that plaintiffs did not present evidence that Gresham

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1 Although the court’s grant of summary judgment resolved

all claims against defendant Gresham, it is not an appealable

final order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(a) (“‘Judgment’ as used in these

rules, includes any decrees or order from which an appeal

lies.”).

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condoned the use of excessive force. Thus, on December 21, 2005,

the court granted Gresham’s motion for summary judgment. 

However, defendants’ motion for summary judgment was granted in

part and denied in part.

On December 30, 2005, plaintiff filed a motion for

reconsideration of the court’s order granting defendant Gresham’s

motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff asserts that there is new

evidence that the Fairfield Police Departments Internal

Investigation into plaintiff’s claim was partial to the officers

and incomplete, that Gresham knew or should have known that the

Investigation was partial and incomplete, and that, in spite of

this information, Gresham absolved the involved officers of all

wrongdoing. Defendants oppose the motion. Defendants also give

notice that they intend to seek Rule 11 sanctions if plaintiff

does not withdraw his motion. 

STANDARD

An order that resolves fewer than all of the claims among

all of the parties “is subject to revision at any time before the

entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and

liabilities of all the parties.”1 Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); 18B

Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice &

Procedure § 4478 (2d Ed. 2005)(while authorized, reconsideration

of interlocutory orders disfavored). Where reconsideration of a

non-final order is sought, the court has “inherent jurisdiction

Case 2:04-cv-00377-FCD-EFB Document 172 Filed 02/10/06 Page 3 of 9
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2 While the standards applicable to motions for

reconsideration of final judgments or orders under Rules

59(e)(final judgments) and 60(b)(final judgments and orders)

technically do not delimit the court’s inherent discretion to

reconsider interlocutory orders, the court nonetheless finds them

to be helpful guides to the exercise its discretion.

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to modify, alter or revoke it.” United States v. Martin, 226

F.3d 1042, 1048-49. (9th Cir. 2000)

Absent “highly unusual circumstances,” reconsideration of a

final judgment is appropriate only where (1) the court is

presented with newly-discovered evidence, (2) the court committed

“clear error or the initial decision was manifestly unjust,” or

(3) there is an intervening change in the controlling law.2

School Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County, Or. v. AcandS Inc., 5 F.3d

at 1263; Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934, 945 (9th Cir. 2004). 

A motion for reconsideration “may not be used to raise arguments

or present evidence for the first time when they could reasonably

have been raised earlier in the litigation.” Kona Enter., Inc.

v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000). The

party moving for reconsideration based on allegations of newlydiscovered evidence bears the burden of demonstrating that the

evidence: “(1) is truly newly-discovered; (2) could not have been

discovered through due diligence; and (3) is of such material and

controlling nature that it demands a probable change in the

outcome.” United States v. Wetlands Water District, 134 F. Supp.

2d 1111, 1131 n.45 (E.D. Cal. 2001) (internal citations omitted).

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff argues that the court should reconsider the

December 21, 2005 order granting defendant Gresham’s motion for

summary judgment on the grounds of newly-discovered evidence that

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would preclude such a ruling. Plaintiff’s new evidence is a

declaration from his expert witness, Tommie E. Phillips, Sr.,

that the Fairfield Police Departments Internal Investigation into

plaintiff’s claim was partial to the officers and incomplete,

that Gresham knew or should have known that the Investigation was

partial and incomplete, and that, in spite of this information,

Gresham absolved the involved officers of all wrongdoing. (Decl.

of Mister Phillips’ in Supp. of Pl.’s Mot. for Recons. (“M.

Phillips Decl.”), filed Dec. 30, 2005). Plaintiff asserts that

this evidence was not presented at the time of defendants’

summary judgment motion because it was to be part of a larger

study of Fairfield Police Department Internal Affairs

Investigations which was not complete at the time of the motion

because defendants did not produce the necessary Internal Affairs

Investigation files until the week that plaintiff’s opposition

papers were due. (Id.) 

To the extent that plaintiff has presented an expert

declaration in support of his claims against defendant Gresham,

this evidence is “new”; plaintiff did not present such a

declaration in opposition to defendants’ motion for summary

judgment. However, this declaration is based upon facts known to

plaintiff at the time of the summary judgment motion, some of

which were actually referenced and argued in plaintiff’s

opposition to the motion. To this extent, plaintiff’s expert

declaration is not truly newly-discovered. 

Plaintiff’s expert bases his conclusions, in part, upon the

memoranda from Chief Gresham approving the Report and

Recommendations which exonerated the defendant officers. 

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3 Plaintiff objects to the court’s consideration of this

evidence because plaintiff was not given an opportunity to crossexamine the witness at the deposition. However, the court is not

considering this evidence for its truth. Rather, the deposition

testimony demonstrates that plaintiff had access to the expert

and the expert’s opinions regarding defendant Gresham’s potential

liability well before the opposition to defendants’ summary

judgment motion was due.

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(Declaration of Expert Witness Tommie E. Phillips in Supp. of

Pl.’s Mot. for Recons. (“T. Phillips Decl.”), filed Dec. 30,

2005, at 4). These same memoranda were submitted as evidence in

plaintiff’s opposition to defendants’ summary judgment motion. 

(Exh. D to Pl.’s Stmt. of Undisputed Facts in Opp’n to Def.’s

Mot. for Summ. J., filed Nov. 4, 2005). Plaintiff’s expert also

bases his conclusions on the Fairfield Police Department’s

Internal Affairs Report. (T. Phillips Decl. at 2). Plaintiff

and plaintiff’s expert had possession of this document prior to

September 8, 2005; plaintiff’s expert reviewed and discussed it

in his supplemental expert witness statement. (Declaration of

Jennifer C. Addams in Supp. of Def.’s Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for

Recons. (“Addams Decl.”), filed Jan 24, 2006, Exhs. C-D. 

Plaintiff’s expert testified about the Internal Affairs Report at

his deposition on September 21, 2005.3 (Id. at Exhs. E-F). 

Finally, plaintiff’s expert relies upon Recommendations by

Captain Giugni. (T. Phillips Decl. At 2). While it is unclear

when plaintiff had access to this particular document, this

evidence is not “truly new” because defendant Gresham followed

these same Recommendations in absolving the officers. (T.

Phillips Decl. at 4). Plaintiff submitted Gresham’s Memoranda

accepting the Recommendations to the court with his opposition to

the motion for summary judgment. 

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Plaintiff fails to meet his burden of demonstrating that

this evidence could not have been presented in opposition to

defendants’ motion with the exercise of due diligence. Plaintiff

possessed expert statements and deposition testimony from Tommie

E. Phillips prior to defendants’ filing of the motion for summary

judgment. These statements and deposition testimony referenced

and discussed the Internal Affairs Reports and the adequacy of

the investigation. However, none of these materials was

submitted to the court by plaintiff. Plaintiff presented no

evidence at all relating to or prepared by any expert. Further,

plaintiff proffers no reason why the expert could not have

prepared the declaration submitted with the current motion as

evidence in opposition to defendants’ motion for summary

judgment. 

Plaintiff states that defendants did not produce the

necessary Internal Affairs Investigation files until the week the

opposition papers were due. (M. Phillips Decl. at 2). 

Defendants produce evidence that the police officers’ records

were available to plaintiff to copy on October 11, 2005. 

(Declaration of Kimberly E. Colwell in Supp. of Def.’s Opp’n to

Pl.’s Mot. for Recons. (“Colwell Decl.”), filed Jan 24, 2006, ¶

4). Defendants also produce evidence that copies were available

for the plaintiff to pick up on October 19, 2005. However, due

to conflicts between the attorneys regarding copying

arrangements, payment, and receipt of the documents, plaintiff’s

attorney did not actually pick up the documents until November 1,

2005. (Id. ¶¶ 14-19). The evidence presented by defendants

demonstrates a lack of diligence by plaintiff in obtaining the

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records. 

Plaintiff argues that no declaration was submitted because

the expert’s larger study regarding the adequacy of the Fairfield

Police Department’s citizen complaint process was not completed. 

(Pl.’s Reply to Def.’s Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for Recons., filed Feb

4, 2006, at 4-5). However, this argument does not explain why

plaintiff did not submit a declaration by his expert regarding

the adequacy of the investigation into plaintiff’s complaint. It

is unclear how the police records were integral and necessary to

the opinions proffered by plaintiff’s expert in his declaration. 

The expert never mentions the police officers’ records in his

declaration. Further, the expert declaration does not address a

larger study. (T. Phillips Decl.) Rather, Tommie E. Phillips’

declaration focuses on the inadequacies of Sergeant Grace’s

investigation into plaintiff’s complaint and in preparing the

Internal Affairs Report. These inadequacies were previously

discussed by the expert in his September 21, 2005 deposition. 

Plaintiff failed to present expert deposition testimony or

declarations as evidence in his opposition to defendant Gresham’s

motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff had access to the expert,

the documents relied upon by the expert, and conclusions made by

the expert that implicated the potential liability of defendant

Gresham. For whatever reason, plaintiff did not present this

evidence in opposition to defendants’ motion for summary

judgment. Plaintiff cannot now, after failing to raise a triable

issue of fact as to defendant Gresham’s liability, attempt to

reclassify this previously known evidence as “newly-discovered”

evidence for the purposes of reconsideration merely by preparing

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an expert declaration. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing analysis, plaintiff’s motion for

reconsideration of the court’s December 21, 2005 order granting

summary judgment for all claims against defendant Chief William

Gresham is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 10, 2006

/s/ Frank C. Damrell Jr. 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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