Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01659/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01659-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Perry Cain, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v.

City of St. Johns, et al.,

Defendants. 

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No. CIV 05-1659-PCT-SMM

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Notice of Service

of Acceptance of Offer of Judgment/Acceptance of Offer of Judgment, Response to

Plaintiffs' Acceptance of Offer of Judgment and Request for Expedited Hearing. (Dkt. 78 )

In an Order issued on February 22, 2007, the Court denied Defendants' Request for

Expedited Hearing and ordered Plaintiffs to file a response to Defendants' Motion to Strike.

(Dkt. 79) The Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Notice of Service of Acceptance of Offer of

Judgment/Acceptance of Offer of Judgment is now fully briefed and ready for disposition.

BACKGROUND

The facts relevant to the matter now pending before the Court are summarized as

follows. Defendants served Plaintiffs with an Offer of Judgment on February 6, 2007 (the

"February 6th Offer"). On February 12, 2007, Defendants filed notice indicating that they had

revoked the February 6th Offer (Dkt. 72) and served Plaintiffs with another Offer of Judgment

(the "February 12th Offer") (Dkt. 73). The critical difference between the offers is that the

Case 2:05-cv-01659-SMM Document 82 Filed 04/02/07 Page 1 of 3
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February 6th Offer did not limit costs, which in a civil rights case includes attorneys' fees; the

February 12th Offer of Judgment, however, did limit costs and attorneys' fees. Plaintiffs

notified the Court on February 16, 2007, that they had accepted Defendants' February 6th

Offer. (Dkt. 76) 

DISCUSSION

General principles of contract law apply to Rule 68 offers of judgment with one

exception: any waiver or limitation of attorneys' fees in settlements of § 1983 cases must be

clear and unambiguous. Erdman v. Cochise County, 926 F.2d 877, 880 (9th Cir. 1991). Rule

68 if silent as to whether a defendant can revoke an offer of judgment and courts considering

this question have been divided. Compare e.g. Richardson v. National R.R. Passenger

Corp., 49 F.3d 760, 765 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that a Rule 68 offer "is simply not

revocable during the 10-day period); with e.g. Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236

(4th Cir. 1989) (holding that a Rule 68 offer could be revoked if it is discovered that the

offeree's fraudulent behavior induced the settlement offer). Plaintiffs contend that the Ninth

Circuit previously held in Erdman that a Rule 68 offer is irrevocable. The Court disagrees.

Most significant for purposes of resolving the instant motion is the fact that Erdman did not

provide that Rule 68 offers are irrevocable for a period of ten days after the offer. Moreover,

Erdman did not involve a situation, like the one presently before this Court, where a Rule 68

Offer was made and subsequently revoked prior to Plaintiff's acceptance. In Erdman, the

issue before the Ninth Circuit was whether defendant's offer could be withdrawn after

plaintiff's acceptance based on defendant's failure to expressly limit costs and attorney fees.

926 F.2d at 879. To date, the Ninth Circuit has not held that Rule 68 Offers are irrevocable

for a period days after the offer is made. Therefore, the Court finds that the instant motion

can be resolved by relying on basic contract principles. 

Here, Defendants filed and served Plaintiffs with notice that the February 6th Offer had

been revoked on February 12, 2007. Nonetheless, Plaintiffs accepted the February 6th Offer

four days later- on February 16, 2007-- knowing that Defendants had revoked the offer. It

is a well settled principle of contract law that an "offeree's power of acceptance is terminated

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when the offeree receives from the offeror a manifestation of an intention not to enter into

the proposed contract." Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 42 (1981). Moreover,

"[u]nilateral mistake is recognized as a ground for recission of an unexecuted contract.

United States v. Jones, 176 F.2d 278, 286 (9th Cir. 1949). Plaintiffs power to accept the

February 6th Offer terminated as soon as Defendants expressly communicated their intent to

revoke the offer on February 12, 2007. Thus, Plaintiffs acceptance of the February 6th Offer

is invalid as a matter of law.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Notice of

Service of Acceptance of Offer of Judgment/Acceptance of Offer of Judgment (Dkt. 78) is

GRANTED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties shall consult the Court's Order dated

February 26, 2007, (Dkt. 79) for upcoming deadlines concerning pretrial filings. 

DATED this 2nd day of April, 2007.

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