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Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Decided July 25, 1995

No. 93-5083

MICHAEL JACKSON, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

CULINARY SCHOOL OF WASHINGTON, LTD., ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 91cv00782)

-

On Remand from the United States Supreme Court

-

Before: WALD, SILBERMAN and RANDOLPH, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WALD.

WALD, Circuit Judge: This case is returned to us from the Supreme Court, which vacated

and remanded our initial opinion in this case, Jackson v. Culinary School of Washington, 27 F.3d 573

(D.C. Cir. 1994), and asked us to reconsider the issues presented in light of Wilton v. Seven Falls

Co., 63 U.S.L.W. 4544 (June 12, 1995). See Jackson v. Washington Culinary School, 63 U.S.L.W.

3889 (U.S. June 19, 1995).

I.

The facts of this case are laid out in detail in our original opinion. In brief, appellants are 59

students of the former Culinary School of Washington who seek declaratory and injunctive relief

against the enforcement of their student loans because of alleged fraud and breach of contract by the

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school, which is now apparently judgment-proof. All parties are willing to assume that appellants

have valid fraud and breach of contract claims against the school, but they dispute whether those

claims have any effect on appellants' obligations to repay their loans to the third-party lenders,

guaranty agencies, and the Secretary of Education. Appellants argue that the school's misconduct

relieves them of their duty to repay the loans under both federal and District of Columbia law and

seek declaratory and injunctive relief on this basis.

The district court ruled on the merits of all the claimed defenses and held that none afforded

appellants relief. When the case originally came to us on appeal, we questioned the appropriateness

ofthe district court's decision to render declaratoryjudgment on the state law claims because complex

and speculative choice of law issues made it far from clear whether or to what degree District of

Columbia law would, in fact, apply to the appellants' claims. Holding (erroneously as it turned out)

that the district court's decision to grant declaratory judgment is reviewed de novo, we found only

the single claimed defense arising from federal law suitable for declaratory resolution and held that

it afforded appellants no relief. We found the remaining claimed defenses arising from state law

inappropriate for declaratory relief.

In Wilton, the Supreme Court confirmed that a district court has discretion to deny

declaratory relief but held that the district court's decision whether to grant declaratory judgment is

reviewed for abuse of discretion rather than de novo. After carefully reviewing Wilton, we find that

part of our initialdecision addressing the merits of appellants' claimed federal defense unaffected and,

accordingly, order part II.B. of the original decision reinstated. See Jackson, 27 F.3d at 582-86. As

to the state law claims, we are unable to determine whether the district court's decision to grant

declaratory relief on these claims was an abuse of discretion because the district court offered no

explanation of its decision to proceed to the merits. Although the issue of the appropriateness of

declaratory judgment was not raised by the parties below, the considerations counseling against

declaratory judgment in this case, which we discussed at length in our original opinion, see Jackson,

27 F.3d at 580-82, and repeat in a briefer form below, are sufficiently grave that we find it prudent

to remand the case so that the district court has the opportunity to exercise its discretion in

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accordance with the factors made relevant in Wilton, thereby providing a basis for appellate review

under the appropriate standard.

II.

Appellants' claimed state law defenses are based on several District of Columbia consumer

protection statutes and on a common law principle. They argue that (1) two provisions of the District

of Columbia Consumer Credit Protection Act, § 28-3807 and § 28-3809, make their school-based

defenses applicable to third-party lenders and their assignees, (2) the Federal Trade Commission

("FTC") holderrulewhich requiressellers of goods orservices who take or receive consumer credit

contracts to include notice in the instruments that all consumer defenses will be preserved against

subsequent holders of the loanmust be implied into their loan contracts under state common law

principles, and (3) the school's failure to provide notice in accordance with the FTC holder rule

violates another provision of the D.C. Consumer Protection Act, § 28-3904(r) as well as the D.C.

Proprietary Schools Regulations. The first and last of these claims presume the applicability of

District of Columbia law to the appellants' loan disputes and present complex questions of the scope

of federal preemption; the second requires a choice-of-law analysis to determine which state's

common law controls. All of the claims require interpretation of state law on matters of first

impression.

In Wilton, the Supreme Court affirmed the uniquely discretionary nature of the Declaratory

Judgement Act: It is " "an enabling Act, which confers a discretion on the courts rather than an

absolute right upon the litigant.' When all is said and done ... "the propriety of declaratory relief in

a particular case will depend upon a circumspect sense of its fitness informed by the teachings and

experience concerning the functions and extent of federal judicial power.' " 63 U.S.L.W. at 4547

(quoting Public Serv. Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 241, 243 (1952)). "In the declaratory

judgment context," then, "the normal principle that federal courts should adjudicate claims within

their jurisdiction yieldsto consideration of practicality and wise judicial administration." Id. at 4548.

Finally, while appellate courts may review the district court's exercise of this "wise judicial

administration" only for abuse of discretion, id., thisreview is not without meaning. To the contrary,

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the Court assured that such review would not be " "tantamount to no review' at all." Id.

Applying the teaching of Wilton, we find it impossible to assess whether the district court

abused its discretion by granting declaratory judgment in this contextor, indeed, whether it was

aware it enjoyed as wide a discretion as Wilton pronounced in that regard. As we explained in our

initial opinion, a declaration of District of Columbia law on the current record of this case borders

dangerously on an advisory opinion. It is not at all clear how many, if any, appellants District of

Columbia law would govern in their loan disputes. Though some appellants reside in the District of

Columbia, others now span the country from Maryland to Utah. And even as to the District of

Columbia residents, the record does not inform whether District of Columbia law would necessarily

apply. Certain of the loans, for instance, have express choice-of-law provisions specifying that

Virginia law controls. The primary lenders and guaranty agencies are based in Virginia, Ohio,

Nebraska, Wisconsin, and Texas, and the loan agreements were approved outside the District of

Columbia. As the current record leaves it quite uncertain whether District of Columbia law would

apply to any of these appellants, it is unclear whether declaration of that law would serve any useful

purpose. See EDWINBORCHARD,DECLARATORYJUDGMENTS 307 (2d ed., 1941) ("[T]he declaration

is an instrument of practical relief and will not be issued where it does not serve a useful purpose.").

In face ofsuch uncertainty, we believe it essential for the district court to give explicit consideration

to whether the case is appropriate for declaratoryjudgment. The Supreme Court in Wilton took great

pains to emphasize the singular breadth of the district court's discretion to withhold declaratory

judgment. Given the glaring concerns raised by declaratory judgment in this case and the intervening

reminder that declaratory judgment is a matter of practicality rather than absolute right, we find that

a remand ofthe case is necessary so that the district court has an opportunity to exercise its discretion

and we, in turn, have the ability meaningfully to review its decision for abuse of discretion.

Remanded.

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