Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-05459/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-05459-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARYLON BOYD, ET AL.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO,

ET AL.,

Defendants.

___________________________________/

No. C-04-5459 MMC (JCS)

ORDER DENYING SAN FRANCISCO

DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE’S

MOTION TO QUASH PLAINTIFFS’

SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM [Docket No.

43]

I. INTRODUCTION

On December 27, 2004, Plaintiffs Marylon Boyd, Isabel Gonzalez, and Kanani Boyd filed a

complaint against Defendants City and County of San Francisco, San Francisco Police Department

Chief Heather Fong, and a number of San Francisco Police Department Officers, alleging civil rights

violations and wrongful death in connection with the May 5, 2004 shooting death of Cammerin

Boyd. On January 17, 2006 Plaintiffs issued a subpoena duces tecum to the San Francisco District

Attorney’s Office (“District Attorney”), requesting production of materials related to Cammerin

Boyd, his prior arrests, and the May 5 shooting. The District Attorney brought a Motion to Quash

Plaintiffs’ Subpoena Duces Tecum (“the Motion”). The Court finds that the Motion is suitable for

disposition without oral argument, pursuant to Local Rule 7-1(b). Accordingly, the hearing on the

Motion scheduled for May 5, 2006 at 9:30 a.m. is vacated. For the reasons stated below, the

Motion is DENIED.

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II. BACKGROUND

A. Facts

Plaintiffs allege in their Complaint that on May 5, 2004, Cammerin Boyd, who was an

African-American man and a double amputee with prosthetic legs below the knee, was shot to death

by officers of the San Francisco Police Department. Complaint at ¶ 17, 20. According to Plaintiffs,

Cammerin Boyd, who was being pursued in his car by police, stopped and exited his car on a

residential street to surrender. Id. at ¶¶ 17, 19. While he was attempting to surrender, he was shot

by police. Id. at ¶ 17. Plaintiffs allege that a number of patrol cars and several police officers were

present at the time of the shooting. Id. at ¶ 18. Plaintiffs’ complaint names as defendants the City

and County of San Francisco, San Francisco Police Chief Heather Fong, and San Francisco Police

Officers William Elieff, Gregory Kane, James O’Malley, Timothy Paine, and Steven Stearns, as well

as 10 unnamed defendants. Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs assert federal law claims under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 and the Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq.), as well as state

law claims for wrongful death (Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 377.60), negligence and negligent hiring,

supervision and retention. Plaintiffs are the mother and children of Cammerin Boyd, pursuing this

case on their own behalf and as successors in interest of Cammerin Boyd’s causes of action, under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 and California Code Civ. Proc. § 377.34. 

On January 17, 2006, Plaintiffs issued a Subpoena for Documents Pursuant to Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure Rule 45 (the “Subpoena”) directed to the Custodian of Records for the District

Attorney for the City and County of San Francisco. See Motion, Exh. A. The Subpoena demanded

production of the following documents:

1. The complete case file maintained by YOU for Cammerin Boyd.

2. Any and all documents which mention, discuss, pertain to, outline, narrate, and/or

describe Cammerin Boyd.

3. Any and all documents which mention, discuss, pertain to, outline, narrate, and/or

describe the police shooting involving Cammerin Boyd which occurred on May 5,

2004.

Id. at 4.

On February 9, 2006, the San Francisco District Attorney’s Office filed a motion to quash

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Plaintiffs’ Subpoena. According to the District Attorney, at the time of the Motion, 

discussions between the parties had led to a narrowing of the document request. As a result, the

request now covered only the following documents:

1) All reports, including reports created by any law enforcement or government agency,

statements, interviews (transcripts, audio, video), medical reports, documents filed

with the Court, photographs, etc, for any case involving Cammerin Boyd. This

includes any of Mr. Boyd’s priors as well as the incident where he was fatally

wounded by officers from the San Francisco police department.

2) All documents which reflect the disposition of any case involving Cammerin Boyd.

Motion at 3 & Ex. B. 

In their Opposition to the Motion, filed April 14, 2006, Plaintiffs reported that as a result of

additional meet and confer, the range of documents they seek through the subpoena has been further

reduced. Opposition at 3. In particular, the District Attorney and Plaintiffs have reached the

following agreements: 1) the District Attorney will provide any documents that have been disclosed

to the City Attorney, including numerous recorded witness statements that were not included in the

homicide file; 2) Plaintiffs will not, for the time being, seek documents revealing the impressions

and opinions of attorneys at the District Attorneys’ office, as these documents are primarily relevant

to Plaintiffs’ Monell claims, which have been stayed; and 3) based on representations that the

majority of Cammerin Boyd’s files involving incidents that are not the subject of this lawsuit are

available from public records, Plaintiffs do not seek documents related to other criminal cases

involving Cammerin Boyd. Id. at 3. 

In light of the above, the remaining issue before the Court is whether the District Attorney is

required to produce the following categories of documents: 1) documents which reveal the identity

and contact information of witnesses, including “reluctant witnesses,” to the events which are the

subject of the lawsuit; and 2) statements or narratives describing what those witnesses observed. Id.

at 1. Plaintiffs report having offered to enter into a protective order which would limit dissemination

of these documents, but they claim that the District Attorney has nonetheless refused to produce the

requested documents. Id. at 3.

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B. The Motion

In the Motion, the District Attorney argues that it should not be compelled to produce the

documents sought by Plaintiffs because Plaintiffs do not have a substantial interest in those

documents. The District Attorney distinguishes Doubleday v. Ruh, 149 F.R.D 601 (C.D. Cal. 1993),

in which a federal district court held that the district attorneys’ prosecution files were discoverable in

a subsequent civil action for malicious prosecution. According to the District Attorney, the files at

issue here, unlike those in Doubleday, are not those of the plaintiff in the subsequent action but

rather, the investigatory files of the Officer Involved Shooting (“the OIS files”). The OIS files, the

District attorney asserts, differ from the closed investigatory files at issue in Doubleday because: 1)

Plaintiffs have a less substantial interest in such files; and 2) because of the lack of statute of

limitations, such files are never “closed.” The District Attorney argues further that these

prosecutorial files would be entitled to protection under state law, and therefore, in the interest of

comity, the files should not be discoverable. Finally, the District Attorney invokes the Official

Information Privilege, a federal common law privilege that protects from disclosure official

information where the potential harm that might result from disclosure outweighs the potential

benefits.

In response, Plaintiffs argue that Doubleday supports disclosure of the documents sought. 

Plaintiffs assert that under Doubleday, the work product doctrine does not apply to the District

Attorney’s files and even if it did, any protection is outweighed by the plaintiff’s substantial need to

obtain the documents. Plaintiffs argue that the witness statements they seek go to the heart of their

case and that any potential detriment of production can be addressed through a protective order. 

Plaintiffs also reject the District Attorney’s reliance on state law and the Official Information

Privilege, which Plaintiffs assert do not apply here.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Choice of Law

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 501, assertions of privilege in federal question cases 

are governed by federal law, while state privilege law applies to purely state claims brought in

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federal court pursuant to diversity jurisdiction. Fed.R.Evid. 501. State law claims that are pendent to

federal question cases, however, are governed not by state law but by federal privilege law. Wm. T. 

Thompson, Co. v. General Nutrition Corp., Inc., 671 F.2d 100, 104 (3rd Cir.1982); Perrignon v.

Bergen Brunswig Corp., 77 F.R.D. 455, 458-459 (N.D.Cal.1978). 

The work product doctrine is not a privilege but a qualified immunity that is governed by

federal law. Doubleday, 149 F.R.D. at 605 n. 3 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)). 

B. Doubleday and the Work Product Doctrine

The District Attorney asserts that under the reasoning of Doubleday, the documents sought

by Plaintiffs should be protected from discovery. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, assert that Doubleday

supports disclosure. The Court concludes that Plaintiffs have the stronger argument.

In Doubleday, the plaintiff brought a malicious prosecution action in federal court after she

was the subject of a criminal prosecution by the Sacramento County District Attorney’s Office in

which she was found not guilty of assault and battery on a peace officer. 149 F.R.D. at 604. In the

action, she sued the County Sheriff’s Department and various officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and

state law, alleging that they had conspired to use excessive force and to coerce the district attorney’s

office into prosecuting her criminally. Id. By subpoena, the plaintiff sought to obtain from the

district attorney the criminal file used to prosecute her in the prior criminal case. The district

attorney brought a motion to quash, which the court denied. Id. First, the Court rejected the district

attorney’s reliance on the work product doctrine, concluding that the work product doctrine did not

apply because the documents sought were not created by or for a party to the subsequent litigation. 

Id. at 606. In particular, the court held, looking to California law, that the County was not a party to

the prior criminal litigation, nor could the County be considered to be the district attorney’s client

such that the doctrine might apply. Id. (citing Shepard v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 17

Cal. 3d 107, 122 (1976)). The Court went on to conclude that even if the work product doctrine

applied, the documents had to be produced because the plaintiff had shown substantial need for the

documents as well as an inability to obtain them without undue hardship. Id. at 607. The Court also

rejected the district attorneys’ reliance on the California Government Code § 6254(f) and the

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doctrines of Governmental Decision Maker Immunity and Official Government Information

Privilege. Id. at 607-612.

Here, as in Doubleday, the files at issue are prosecutorial files maintained by the District

Attorney. The District Attorney is not a party to this litigation and therefore, the work product

doctrine does not apply. See id.; see also In re Cal. Pub. Utility Comm'n, 892 F.2d 778, 781 (9th

Cir.1989) (holding that “[Rule 26(b)(3) ], on its face, limits its protection to one who is a party . . . to

the litigation in which the discovery is sought”). 

Even if the work product doctrine did apply, however, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs

have shown, as in Doubleday, that they are entitled to the documents because they have a substantial

interest in the documents and they will be unable to obtain the information from other sources

without under hardship. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 400 (1981) (holding that

qualified work product – that is, work product that protects an attorney’s factual investigations – is

subject to disclosure if party seeking discovery can show that “substantial need” and that it will be

unable to obtain information from other sources). This case involves allegations that police officers

used excessive force against Cammerin Boyd when they shot him. If these allegations are true, the

identities and contemporaneous statements of witnesses are likely to provide the best evidence of

excessive force. See Doubleday, 149 F.R.D. at 608. Further, Plaintiffs may not be able to obtain

this information in any other way. Therefore, the Court concludes that the work product doctrine

does not protect from disclosure the documents Plaintiffs seek.

C. The Official Government Information Privilege

The District Attorney asserts that the documents Plaintiffs seek are also protected under the

Official Government Information Privilege. The Court concludes, however, that the District

Attorney has failed to meets its burden as to this privilege.

Federal common law recognizes a qualified privilege for official information. Kerr v. United

States District Court for the Northern District of California, 511 F.2d 192, 197 (9th Cir. 1975). To

determine whether the information sought is privileged, courts must conduct a case-specific

balancing, weighing the potential benefits of disclosure against the potential disadvantages. Sanchez

v. City of Santa Ana, 936 F.2d 1027, 1033 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 957 (1991) (citing

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Kerr, 511 F.2d at 198). Among the factors courts consider in conducting this balancing are the

following:

1) The extent to which disclosure will thwart governmental processes by discouraging

citizens from giving the government information.

2) The impact upon persons who have given information of having their identities disclosed.

3) The degree to which government self-evaluation and consequent program improvement

will be chilled by disclosure.

4) Whether the information sought is factual data or evaluative summary.

5) Whether the party seeking the discovery is an actual or potential defendant in any criminal

proceeding either pending or reasonably likely to follow from the incident in question.

6) Whether the police investigation has been completed.

7) Whether any intradepartmental disciplinary proceedings have arisen or may arise from the

investigation.

8) Whether the plaintiff's suit is non-frivolous and brought in good faith.

9) Whether the information sought is available through other discovery or from other

sources.

10) The importance of the information sought to the plaintiff's case.

Frankenhauser v. Rizzo, 59 F.R.D. 339 (E.D. Pa. 1973). 

In order to invoke the Official Government Information Privilege, the entity asserting the

privilege must make a “substantial threshold showing.” Kelly v. City of San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 653,

669 (N.D. Cal. 1987). In particular, the entity must provide a declaration or affidavit from a

responsible official in the agency involved, based on personal knowledge, that: 1) attests that the

agency involved generated or collected the information sought and has maintained its

confidentiality; 2) states that the official has reviewed the materials in question personally; 3)

identifies specifically the governmental or privacy interests that would be harmed by disclosure; 4)

describes how disclosure subject to a carefully crafted protective order would still risk harm to those

interests; and 5) projects the level of harm to those interests if disclosure would be made. Id. 

The District Attorney has failed to meet its burden on two levels. First, it has failed to meet

its threshold burden by providing the affidavit described above. There is no declaration by any

official stating that the official has reviewed the files at issue or identifying any specific

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governmental or privacy interest raised by Plaintiffs’ request for documents in this case. Nor has the

District Attorney addressed why any potential harm of disclosure cannot be adequately addressed

through a protective order. 

Second, even if this procedural requirement were met, the District Attorney has failed to

establish that the disadvantages of disclosure in this case outweigh the Plaintiffs’ need for the

documents sought. While the District Attorney has identified potential perils that could result

generally from the disclosure of the OIS files, it has failed to provide specific information about the

governmental and privacy interests that would be jeopardized by the disclosure of the documents

sought in this case. For example, the District Attorney states that the OIS files are sensitive files

with long life-spans because there is no statute of limitations and therefore, the files are never

“closed.” The District also notes that “interference with ongoing investigations by tainting

witnesses is always a real possibility.” Yet the District Attorney does not state that the request seeks

documents that are being used in any active investigation. Rather, the District Attorney argues that

if new evidence is discovered, a file “may be reactivated” and that production of the files therefore

jeopardizes potential prosecutions. The District Attorney also suggests that it might face civil or

criminal liability for disclosure of private information. Yet the District Attorney does not identify

any specific documents that might raise the possibility of such liability. In short, while the concerns

raised are, in the abstract, significant ones, the District Attorney has failed to specifically address

how the governmental interest is jeopardized by disclosure in this case. On the other hand, the

documents sought may well be crucial to Plaintiffs’ case and the information sought is unlikely to be

available anywhere else. Accordingly, the Court concludes that District Attorney has failed to

establish that the Official Government Information privilege applies.

D. California Government Code § 6254(f)

The District Attorney argues that in the interests of comity, the Court should grant its Motion

based on California Government Code §6254(f). Section 6254 provides that “any investigatory or

security files” compiled by any state or local agency for law enforcement purposes are not required

to be disclosed, “except that state and local law enforcement agencies shall disclose the names and

addresses of persons involved in, or witnesses other than confidential informants” to an incident, as

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well as “statements of the parties involved in the incident, the statements of all witnesses, other than

confidential informants.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 6254(f). These records are to be disclosed “to the

victims of an incident, or an authorized representative thereof,” unless disclosure would “endanger

the safety of a witness” or “endanger the successful completion of the investigation.” Id. The Court

concludes that even if state law were applicable, this section would not support the District

Attorney’s position.

As noted, questions of privilege that arise in the course of the adjudication of federal rights

are governed by principles of federal common law. United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562 (1989);

Fed.R. Evid. 501. Even so, in ascertaining federal common law, the Court may “borrow” applicable

law not inconsistent with federal principles. Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 609 n. 2 (N.D.

Cal. 1995) (citing Pagano v. Oroville Hosp., 145 F.R.D. 683, 685 (E.D. Cal. 1993)). 

However, even assuming that § 6254(f) is consistent with applicable federal law in this case,

it would not bar disclosure in the present circumstances. First, § 6254 does not apply to discovery

sought in a civil action. ACLU v. Deukmejian, 32 Cal. 3d 440, 451 (1982) (noting that under Cal.

Gov. Code § 6260, § 6254 would not preclude discovery in a civil action).” Second, the District

Attorney has not established that the disclosure would endanger witnesses or an ongoing

investigation, as required under § 6254(f). See Williams v. Superior Court of San Francisco, 5 Cal.

4th 337, 349 (1993). In particular, the District Attorney has not claimed that the release of witness

information or statements would endanger those witnesses. It asserts only that disclosure might

have a chilling effect that would make future witnesses less likely to come forward. Yet the District

Attorney has not addressed why a carefully crafted protective order would not ameliorate these

problems. Further, the District Attorney has not stated that any investigation is ongoing, even

though it has raised the possibility that an investigation might be reopened. Therefore, § 6254 does

not bar disclosure.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the District Attorney’s Motion to Quash is DENIED. The

following documents sought by Plaintiffs shall be produced, subject to a protective order to be

negotiated by the Plaintiffs and the District Attorney: 1) documents which reveal the identity and

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contact information of witnesses, including “reluctant witnesses,” to the events which are the subject

of the lawsuit; and 2) statements or narratives describing what those witnesses observed. Plaintiffs

and the District Attorney are directed to meet and confer within fourteen (14) days of the date of this

order regarding a proposed protective order, which shall be submitted to the Court for approval no

later than twenty-one (21) days of the date of this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 1, 2006

___________________________ JOSEPH C. SPERO

United States Magistrate Judge

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