Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_13-cv-08276/USCOURTS-azd-3_13-cv-08276-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Benjamin Lee Short, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

No. CV-13-08276-PCT-SPL (BSB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

 Petitioner Benjamin Lee Short has filed an Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Docs. 4, 5.) Respondents argue that Petitioner 

waived habeas corpus review by pleading guilty. (Doc. 11.) Respondents alternatively 

argue that Petitioner’s claims are procedurally defaulted, not cognizable on federal 

habeas corpus review, and lack merit. (Id.) Petitioner has filed a reply in support of his 

Amended Petition. (Doc. 12.) For the reasons below, the Court recommends that the 

Petition be denied. 

I. Procedural Background 

 A. Charges, Guilty Plea, and Sentencing 

 On August 4, 2011, Petitioner was charged by information with the following 

offenses: (1) aggravated assault of a police officer, a class four felony (Count One); 

(2) resisting arrest, a class six felony (Count Two); (3) criminal impersonation, a class six 

felony (Count Three); (4) criminal damage, a class two misdemeanor (Count Four); 

(5) possession of dangerous drugs, a class four felony (Count Five); (6) possession of a 

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narcotic drug, a class four felony (Count Six); and (7) two counts of possession of drug 

paraphernalia, class six felonies (Counts Seven and Eight). (Doc. 11, Ex. B.) 

 Petitioner was represented by counsel when the information was filed. (Doc. 11, 

Ex. C.) Petitioner was offered a plea agreement, which was later amended to include a 

criminal impersonation charge from another case, and in return the State did not file that 

case as a separate matter. (Doc. 11, Exs. D-K, L at 3.) On Petitioner’s request, the Court 

appointed Petitioner new counsel and the court granted Petitioner additional time to 

consult with counsel regarding his case. (Doc. 11, Exs. G-I.) 

 On January 23, 2012, Petitioner entered into a plea agreement with the State. 

(Doc. 11, Ex. K.) The plea agreement provided that Petitioner would plead guilty to the 

following renumbered counts: (1) aggravated assault on a police officer, a class four 

felony (Count One); (2) criminal impersonation, a class six designated felony (committed 

on July 29, 2011) (Count Two); (3) possession of dangerous drugs, a class four felony 

(Count Three); and (4) criminal impersonation, a class six felony (committed on July 23, 

2011) (Count Four). (Doc. 11, Ex. K.) The plea agreement provided that “each Class 4 

felony carries a presumptive sentence of 2.5 years; a minimum sentence of 1.5 

years . . . ; and a maximum sentence of 3 years (an aggravated sentence of 3.75 years).” 

(Doc. 11, Ex. K at 1-2) (emphasis in original). The plea agreement also provided that 

“each Class 6 felony carries a presumptive sentence of 1 year; a minimum sentence of .5 

year . . . ; and a maximum sentence of 1.5 years (an aggravated sentence of 2 years).” 

(Id.) (emphasis in original). 

 The plea agreement also set forth Petitioner’s four prior felony convictions. (Id. at 

4.) Petitioner initialed each page of the plea agreement and signed the agreement. 

(Doc. 11, Ex. K.) Paragraph six of the plea agreement provided that Petitioner waived 

“any and all motions, defenses, objections, or requests which [he] has made or raised or 

could assert hereafter to the Court’s entry of judgment against [him] and imposition of a 

sentence upon [him] consistent with this Plea Agreement.” (Id. at 4.) 

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 On July 23, 2012, the court held a change-of-plea hearing. (Doc. 11, Ex. L.) At 

the outset of the change of plea hearing, the court confirmed that the plea agreement was 

slightly revised from a prior plea offer. (Id. at 4-5.) The trial court clarified that the 

current plea offer included an additional charge. (Id.) The court also stated that under 

the prior plea offer, which did not include the additional charge, the court had intended to 

sentence Petitioner to three years’ imprisonment. (Id. at 5.) However, the plea 

agreement to which Petitioner was pleading guilty, included an additional charge. (Id.) 

 The court then discussed the plea agreement with Petitioner. Petitioner confirmed 

that he understood the court was not bound by the three-year sentence. (Id. at 6.) 

Petitioner stated that he read the plea agreement and discussed it with counsel before 

signing it, and that he understood and agreed with the plea agreement. (Id. at 6-7.) 

Defense counsel interjected and informed the court that Petitioner had some concerns 

about his sentencing exposure under the plea agreement. (Id. at 7.) Specifically, he was 

“concerned whether or not the court [was] going to stack his July 29th offenses or if the 

court [was] still going to give him three on that and consecutive sentence on the new 

charge.” (Id.) 

 The court responded: 

I don’t know is the answer to that, Mr. Short. The criminal 

impersonation case is one that I don’t have any knowledge of that we’re going — we’re going to get a presentence report in this case now, and I don’t blame you for being confused and so I don’t know anything about that. I can tell you I believe my sentencing options are completely open at this time. That’s why I placed that on the record, and the reason for that 

is that the County Attorney, you remember the last time we 

were here, [the prosecutor] was here, pulled the plea and we were done. He didn’t think that that was an appropriate plea for you. The County Attorney’s Office is able to do that at 

anytime that they like. I don’t have any control over whether 

or not or what plea they offer you. The fact that there is a new charge on here, class six designated felony, causes me 

some concern that there is another charge out there and I have 

not yet considered the fact that there was another charge out there. Do I think that these will all be aggravated and stacked? No, I don’t. But beyond that, I can’t really tell you exactly what it is that I plan to do. I want to see the 

presentence report. I want to know more about this — this 

new count and what exactly the circumstances were 

surrounding that. That’s the best that I can do for you now. 

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This is a completely different plea agreement than the one 

that was offered prior to now. 

(Doc. 11, Ex. L at 8.) 

 The court recited the charges to which Petitioner was pleading guilty, advised 

Petitioner of his sentencing exposure, and of the constitutional rights and appeal rights he 

was waiving by pleading guilty. (Id. at 10-13.) Petitioner affirmed that he understood 

the charges and his potential sentences and that he agreed to waive his rights and plead 

guilty. (Id.) Petitioner confirmed that no promises had been made to him other than 

those contained in the plea agreement, and that he was not forced or threatened to enter 

the plea agreement. (Id. at 11-12.) Petitioner then provided a factual basis for the guilty 

plea. (Id. at 16-18.) The trial court found that Petitioner entered the guilty plea 

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily and accepted the guilty plea. (Id. at 14.) At the 

conclusion of the hearing, Petitioner stated that he did not have any questions. (Id. at 18.) 

 Before sentencing, a sentencing report was prepared. (Doc. 11, Ex. N.) On 

February 14, 2012, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. (Doc. 11, Ex. O.) During 

the sentencing hearing, the State recommended consecutive, aggravated terms on all 

offenses (1) because of “Petitioner’s extensive criminal history,” including a 2007 

aggravated assault during which Petitioner pointed a loaded gun at a man’s head, and 

(2) because the presentence report indicated that Petitioner was a high risk to reoffend, 

that he did not express any remorse for his actions, and he considered law enforcement 

officers “obstacles to him committing further crimes.” (Doc. 11, Ex. O at 3-5.) The State 

also noted Petitioner’s “Fuck Cops” tattoos on the back of his legs in relation to the case 

before the court. (Id. at 4.) 

 Defense counsel acknowledged that the plea agreement included a three-year floor 

for sentencing and asked the court to impose concurrent sentences for the counts related 

to conduct that occurred on July 29th. (Id. at 6-8.) Alternatively, defense counsel argued 

that if the court were considering imposing consecutive sentences, it should still impose 

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concurrent sentences for the July 29th counts, but order that the sentence for the July 23d 

count run consecutive to the sentences for the July 29th counts. (Id.) 

 Before sentencing Petitioner, the court considered letters that Petitioner submitted, 

the presentence report, and statements by the State and defense counsel. (Id. at 10.) The 

court stated that it did not doubt that Petitioner was not taught how to live a responsible 

life, however, the court noted that Petitioner had been “given opportunity after 

opportunity after opportunity and he [had] done nothing except continue to live a life of 

crime.” (Id. at 10-12.) The court noted that Petitioner’s tattoos also indicated that he 

lived a life of crime. (Id. at 10.) The court noted Petitioner’s lack of remorse, that he had 

been in juvenile prison, he had adult offenses, and that he had committed the offenses at 

issue three months after his release from prison for a conviction for aggravated assault 

with a deadly weapon. (Id. at 11.) The court stated that it “intended to keep [the] 

community safe.” (Id.) 

 After finding aggravating factors, prior felony convictions and prior violent felony 

convictions with weapons, the court sentenced Petitioner to consecutive maximum 

sentences of three years’ imprisonment on Counts One and Three, consecutive maximum 

terms of one-and-one-half years’ imprisonment on Counts Two and Four, with the 

sentences for Counts One and Three to run consecutive to the sentences for Counts Two 

and Four, for a total of nine years’ imprisonment on all counts, with 200 days presentence 

incarceration credit. (Id. at 12-13.) The court gave Petitioner a notice of his rights of 

review after conviction. (Doc. 11, Ex. P.) 

B. Post-Conviction Proceeding 

 On April 5, 2012, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief pursuant to 

Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32. (Doc. 11, Ex. Q.) The court appointed counsel. 

(Doc. 11, Ex. R.) On May 22, 2012, Petitioner’s counsel filed a petition for postconviction relief arguing that Petitioner’s guilty plea violated Arizona Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 17 because Petitioner relied on a promise — that he would not receive 

aggravated stacked sentences — and his sentence was inconsistent with that promise. 

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(Doc. 11, Ex. S.) On August 14, 2012, the court denied relief concluding that Petitioner 

was “not sentenced to aggravated stacked terms,” but rather “was sentenced to maximum 

stacked terms.” (Doc. 11, Ex. V.) 

 Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Arizona Court of Appeals raising the 

same claim and arguing that maximum sentences are aggravated under Arizona law. 

(Doc. 5 at 14-26.) The appellate court denied relief and found that the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in finding that Petitioner’s “guilty plea was knowing, voluntary, and 

intelligent.” (Doc. 11, Ex. Z.) 

C. Federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

 On May 27, 2014, Petitioner filed an amended petition for writ of habeas corpus in 

this Court. (Doc. 5.) Petitioner argues that his consecutive sentences violate the Double 

Jeopardy Clause and that the trial court improperly interpreted the permissible sentencing 

structure under state law. (Doc. 5 at 6-9.) 

II. Petitioner’s Claims Based on State Law are not Cognizable 

 Petitioner asserts that the trial court misinterpreted the permissible sentencing 

structure under Arizona law and that the court did not properly calculate Petitioner’s time 

served. (Doc. 5 at 6-7.) Petitioner also argues that his guilty plea was coerced by the 

trial court’s statements regarding the sentence it would impose, but does not cite federal 

law to support that claim. Respondents argue that these claims are not cognizable 

because they are matters of state law.1

 (Doc. 11 at 24-25.) 

 The United States Supreme Court has held that state-law claims are not cognizable 

on federal habeas corpus review. Estelle v. McQuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); see 

Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504, 507 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding a petitioner’s claim 

that the state court erred in imposing consecutive sentences was not cognizable in federal 

habeas); Hendricks v. Zenon, 993 F.2d 664, 674 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that “claim 

 

1

 Petitioner claims that the trial court violated 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2) by making a false statement regarding the sentence it would impose. This statute provides for criminal prosecution of false statements and does not provide a basis for federal habeas corpus relief. 

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regarding merger of convictions for sentencing is exclusively concerned with state law 

and therefore not cognizable in a federal habeas corpus proceeding.”); Gerlaugh v. Lewis, 

898 F. Supp. 1388, 1412-13, n.18 (D. Ariz. 1995) (declining to address a habeas 

petitioner’s claim that his sentence violated an Arizona statute because it was a matter of 

state law). 

 Petitioner’s challenges to his sentences and the calculation of presentence 

incarceration credit are based on the application of state law and, therefore, are not 

cognizable on federal habeas corpus review. See U.S.C. § 2254; Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-

68; Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1990) (federal court has no authority to review 

state application of state law); Miller v. Vasquez, 868 F.2d 1116, 1118–19 (9th Cir. 1989) 

(refusing to consider alleged errors in violation of state sentencing law). Accordingly, 

the claims of state-law sentencing error should be dismissed. Additionally, because 

Petitioner does not cite a federal basis for his challenge to the voluntariness of his guilty 

plea, he appears to rely on state law. A state law challenge to the voluntariness of his 

guilty plea is not cognizable on federal habeas corpus review. 

III. Petitioner’s Double Jeopardy and Voluntariness Claims are Procedurally 

 Barred 

 In addition to challenging his sentence on state law grounds, Petitioner argues that 

his consecutive sentences violate the Double Jeopardy Clause and, liberally construing 

the Petition, he argues that his plea was involuntary. (Doc. 5 at 6-8.) As discussed 

below, these claims are procedurally barred from federal habeas corpus review. 

 Ordinarily, a state prisoner seeking federal habeas corpus relief must first exhaust 

available state remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). To exhaust state remedies, a 

petitioner must afford the state courts the opportunity to rule upon the merits of his 

federal claims by “fairly presenting” them to the state’s “highest” court in a procedurally 

appropriate manner.2

 Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004). 

 

2

 In Arizona, unless a prisoner has been sentenced to death, the “highest court” requirement is satisfied if the petitioner has presented his federal claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals either through the direct appeal process or post-conviction proceedings. 

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 In his petition for post-conviction review, Petitioner did not allege a double 

jeopardy violation or argue that his guilty plea was coerced in violation of federal law. 

(Doc. 11, Ex. S.) Although Petitioner challenged his plea, he based his claim on Arizona 

Rule of Criminal Procedure 17, arguing that he entered his guilty plea in reliance on a 

promise regarding his sentence that was unfulfilled. (Doc. 11, Ex. S.) Petitioner 

specifically stated that he “sought relief because his guilty plea violated Rule 17 . . . .” 

(Id. at 1.) With the exception of a single citation to a federal case, Brady v. United States, 

397 U.S. 732, 748 (1970), Petitioner based his arguments on state law, and the postconviction court resolved the issue on the basis of state law. (Doc. 11, Exs. S, U, V.) 

 Similarly, on appeal of the denial of post-conviction relief, Petitioner argued that 

the post-conviction court “abuse[d] its discretion when it dismissed [Petitioner’s] petition 

for post-conviction relief based on the court’s own violation of Rule 17, Arizona Rules of 

Criminal Procedure, by accepting his guilty plea, which was based on an unfulfilled 

promise that the Court made to the Defendant regarding the sentence he would receive.” 

(Doc. 5 at 15.) Although Petitioner again cited Brady, he otherwise relied entirely on 

state law. (Doc. 5 at 14-26.) A single citation to a federal case is not sufficient to present 

a federal claim when Petitioner specifically stated that he sought relief under Rule 17 and 

otherwise relied on state law to support his claim. See Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 

6, (1982) (per curiam) (to fairly present a federal claim, it is not enough that all the facts 

necessary to support the federal claim were before the state courts or that a “somewhat 

similar state law claim was made.”) Accordingly, Petitioner did not fairly present a 

double jeopardy claim or a federal challenge to this guilty plea in his petition for postconviction review. 

 It would be futile for Petitioner to return to the state courts to try to exhaust these 

claims because a successive petition for post-conviction relief would be untimely, and 

because these claims could have been raised in Petitioner’s prior post-conviction 

 Crowell v. Knowles , 483 F. Supp. 2d 925, 931-33 (D. Ariz. 2007) (discussing Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999)). 

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proceeding and so would be precluded from Rule 32 review. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 

32.2(a)(3) and 32.4(a); see also State v. Bennett, 146 P.3d 63, 67 (Ariz. 2006) (“As a 

general rule, when ineffective assistance of counsel claims are raised, or could have been 

raised, in a Rule 32 post-conviction proceeding, subsequent claims of ineffective 

assistance will be deemed waived and precluded.”) (internal quotation omitted). 

Accordingly, these claims are technically exhausted and procedurally barred from habeas 

corpus review. See McKinney v. Ryan, 730 F.3d 903, 913 n.6 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding 

claims procedurally defaulted because petitioner was barred from exhausting his claims 

in the first instance by Rules 32.2(a)(3) and 32.4(a)). 

 Because Petitioner’s double jeopardy claim and his challenge to the voluntariness 

of his guilty plea are procedurally defaulted, habeas corpus review is not available unless 

Petitioner establishes a fundamental miscarriage of justice or cause and prejudice. See 

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991) (A federal court may review the merits 

of procedurally defaulted claims if a petitioner establishes “cause for the default and 

actual prejudice as a result of the allegation violation of federal law, or demonstrate[s] 

that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.”). 

 Petitioner does not allege, and has not established, a “fundamental miscarriage of 

justice” to overcome the procedural bar to review of his defaulted claims. (Docs. 5, 12.) 

Additionally, Petitioner does not assert cause to excuse his procedural default of his 

challenge to the voluntariness of his guilty plea. (Id.) 

 However, as cause for his failure to raise a double jeopardy claim to the state 

courts, Petitioner argues that his counsel “should have known the double jeopardy claim 

was a federal issue.” (Doc. 12 at 5.) Liberally construing Petitioner’s reply, he alleges 

that post-conviction counsel was ineffective for failing to assert that Petitioner’s 

consecutive sentences violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. 

 Ineffective assistance of counsel may constitute cause for failing to properly 

exhaust claims in state court and excuse procedural default. Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 

923, 932 (9th Cir. 1998). However, ordinarily, to meet the “cause” requirement, the 

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ineffective assistance of counsel must amount to an independent constitutional violation. 

Id. Accordingly, when no constitutional right to an attorney exists (such as in a postconviction proceeding), ineffective assistance will not amount to cause excusing the state 

procedural default. Id. The Supreme Court has held that “[t]here is no constitutional 

right to an attorney in state post-conviction proceedings. Consequently, a petitioner 

cannot claim constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in such proceedings.” 

Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991) (citations omitted). Thus, in Coleman,

the Court held that the ineffectiveness of post-conviction counsel also could not establish 

cause to excuse a failure to properly exhaust state remedies and procedural default on a 

claim. Id. 

 However, in Martinez v. Ryan, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1315 (2012), the 

Supreme Court established a limited exception to this general rule. The Court held that 

the ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel “at initial-review collateral review 

proceedings” — while not stating a constitutional claim itself — may establish cause to 

excuse procedural default of claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel when a postconviction proceeding represents the first opportunity under state law for a petitioner to 

litigate such claims. Id. at 1315. In Nguyen v. Curry, 736 F.3d 1287, 1296 (9th Cir. 

2013), the Ninth Circuit held that the Martinez standard for cause applies to all Sixth 

Amendment ineffective-assistance claims that have been procedurally defaulted by 

ineffective counsel in the initial-review state-court collateral proceeding. (Id.) 

 Because the Martinez cause standard applies only to defaulted ineffective 

assistance of counsel claims, it does not apply to Petitioner’s double jeopardy claim. 

Accordingly, Petitioner cannot rely on Martinez and he has not shown cause for his 

failure to properly present his double jeopardy claim to the state courts. Therefore, the 

Court does not consider whether Petitioner can establish prejudice. See Smith v. Murray, 

477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986) (stating that the court does not need to consider prejudice when 

the petitioner does not demonstrate cause). Thus, Petitioner has not established a basis to 

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overcome the procedural bar to federal habeas corpus review of his double jeopardy 

claim and his claim that his guilty plea was involuntary. 

IV. Merits Review of Challenge to Voluntariness of Guilty Plea 

 Even if Petitioner’s challenge to his guilty plea were properly before this Court, it 

would fail on the merits. To be valid, a guilty plea must be knowing, voluntary, and 

intelligent. United States v. Brady, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). Liberally construing the 

Petition, Petitioner contends that his guilty plea was involuntary because the trial court 

represented that it would not impose aggravated and stacked sentences, but imposed 

sentences that were inconsistent with that promise. 

 The plea agreement provided that “each Class 4 felony carries a presumptive 

sentence of 2.5 years; a minimum sentence of 1.5 years . . . ; and a maximum sentence of 

3 years (an aggravated sentence of 3.75 years).” (Doc. 11, Ex. K at 1-2) (emphasis in 

original). The plea agreement also provided that “each Class 6 felony carries a 

presumptive sentence of 1 year; a minimum sentence of .5 year . . . ; and a maximum 

sentence of 1.5 years (an aggravated sentence of 2 years).” (Id.) (emphasis in original). 

 During the change of plea hearing, Petitioner inquired about his possible sentence 

based on the court’s “previous commitment to three years” (before the plea was changed 

to include a new charge), and asked whether the sentence for the new charge would be 

stacked. (Doc. 11, Ex. L at 7.) The trial court told Petitioner that it did not know “the 

answer to that [question].” (Doc. 11, Ex. L at 6.) The court emphasized that its 

“sentencing options were completely open . . . .” (Id.) The court stated that it was 

concerned about the new charge, because it had “not yet considered the fact that there 

was another charge out there.” (Id.) The court stated that it did not “think” that the 

sentences would be “aggravated and stacked,” but “beyond that, [the court couldn’t] 

really tell [Petitioner] what it [planned] to do.” (Id.) The court explained that it was a 

completely different plea agreement than the one that had been offered before, and it 

wanted to see the presentence report to learn more about the new count and the 

circumstances surrounding that count. (Id.) After the trial court’s statement, Petitioner 

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said, “all right,” and defense counsel told the court they were ready to proceed. (Id. at 8-

9.) 

 As discussed in Section I.A, during the plea colloquy, Petitioner indicated that he 

understood his sentencing exposure, no one had forced or threatened him to enter the plea 

agreement, and that there were no promises other than those contained in the plea 

agreement. (Id. at 12.) Petitioner’s “solemn declarations in open court carry a strong 

presumption of verity.” United States v. Rubalcaba, 811 F.2d 491, 494 (9th Cir. 1987) 

(rejecting claim of involuntariness of guilty plea). 

 At the sentencing hearing, the court sentenced Petitioner to maximum consecutive 

sentences of three years’ imprisonment on Counts One and Three, maximum consecutive 

terms of one-and-one-half years’ imprisonment on Counts Two and Four, with the 

sentences for Counts One and Three to run consecutive to the sentences for Counts Two 

and Four, and with 200 days presentence incarceration credit. (Id. at 12-13.) 

 The record reflects that the trial court did not make a specific promise regarding 

sentencing. Although the court indicated that it did not “think” it would aggravate and 

stack the sentences, it clarified that its sentencing options were open, and that it wanted to 

see the presentence report before determining Petitioner’s sentences. Additionally, the 

court imposed sentences that were consistent with the plea agreement. (Doc. 11, Ex. K.) 

Moreover, the court did not did not impose the aggravated sentences that were available 

(an aggravated sentence of five years was available for the class four felonies and an 

aggravated sentence of 3.75 years was available for the class six felonies).3

 (Doc. 11, 

Ex. K at 1-2.) Petitioner did not object to his sentences at the time of sentencing. See 

United States v. Mims, 928 F.2d 310, 312 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that a lack of objection 

 

3

 On post-conviction review, the state court concluded that the court sentenced 

Petitioner to stacked maximum terms, not aggravated stacked terms. (Doc. 11, Ex. V.) 

The court explained that if Petitioner had been sentenced to aggravated stacked terms, his sentence would have been 11.5 years. (Id.) The court, however, sentenced Petitioner to 

maximum stacked sentences, which resulted in a sentence of nine years. (Id.) On habeas 

corpus review, this Court is bound by the state court’s interpretation of state sentencing laws. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691 (1975) (stating that, except in “extreme circumstances,” a federal court is bound by state court’s construction of state law); 

Gentry v. MacDougall, 685 F.2d 322, 323 (9th Cir. 1982) (same). 

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at sentencing suggests that a plea was knowing and voluntary) (citing United States v. 

Lunsford, 787 F.2d 465, 466 (9th Cir. 1986)). Therefore, the Court finds that Petitioner’s 

guilty plea was knowing and voluntary and he is not entitled to relief on this claim. 

V. Conclusion

 Because Petitioner’s challenge to his sentences and his guilty plea based on 

Arizona law are not cognizable on federal habeas corpus review, and because his double 

jeopardy claim and his claim that his guilty plea was involuntary claims are procedurally 

barred from federal habeas corpus review or lack merit, the Court recommends that the 

Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and does not reach Respondents’ 

alternative arguments. 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

(Doc. 5) be DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the 

Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and reasonable jurists would not find the 

procedural ruling debatable and because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of 

the denial of a constitutional right. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 4(a)(1), should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The 

parties have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 and 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within 

which to file a response to the objections. Failure to file timely objections to the 

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the District Court’s 

acceptance of the Report and Recommendation without further review. See United States

v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to file timely objections to 

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any factual determination of the Magistrate Judge may be considered a waiver of a 

party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered 

pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 6th day of February, 2015. 

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