Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-03922/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-03922-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 17:101 Copyright Infringement

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOEL TURTLE,

Plaintiff,

 v.

CASTLE RECORDS INCORPORATED, et

al.,

 

JONATHAN RICHMAN,

Plaintiff in Intervention

 v.

JOEL TURTLE, et al.,

Defendants in Intervention 

MATTHEW KAUFMAN,

Counterclaimant

 v.

JONATHAN RICHMAN,

Counterdefendant /

No. 03-3922 MMC 

ORDER DENYING

COUNTERDEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY ADJUDICATION; VACATING

HEARING

Before the Court is counterdefendant Jonathan Richman’s (“Richman”) motion for

summary adjudication, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as to

four counterclaims in the Answer to Complaint with Counterclaims (“Counterclaims”) filed

by Matthew Kaufman (“Kaufman”). Kaufman has filed opposition, to which Richman has

Case 3:03-cv-03922-MMC Document 166 Filed 05/17/05 Page 1 of 7
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1

The following facts are either undisputed or, if disputed, stated in the light most

favorable to Kaufman, the non-moving party.

2

In the Court’s prior order, the Court found that Kaufman offered sufficient evidence

to establish a triable issue of fact as to whether Modern Love Songs was a partnership

between Kaufman and Richman. As noted, for the purposes of the instant motion, all

disputed facts are stated in the light most favorable to Kaufman.

2

replied. Having considered the papers filed in support of and in opposition to the motion,

the Court deems the matter suitable for decision on the papers, VACATES the hearing

scheduled for May 20, 2005, and rules as follows.

BACKGROUND1

Richman wrote the words and music to the works “Dignified and Old” and “I’m

Straight” prior to 1975. (See Kaufman Decl. at 2:1-2.)

On July 24, 1975, Kaufman and Richman entered into an agreement described

therein as an “exclusive publisher/songwriter agreement between Jonathan’s Music . . . and

Jonathan Richman” (“Agreement”). (See id. Ex. A.) Jonathan’s Music (a.k.a. Modern Love

Songs) is a partnership between Kaufman and Richman, (see Order Denying Pl. in

Intervention’s Mot. for Summ. J., filed April 12, 2005, at 3:8-11),2

 and the partnership later

changed its name to Modern Love Songs, (see id. at 2:15 - 3:2).

The Agreement, in relevant part, provides as follows: “Richman does hereby

irrevocably and absolutely assign to Jonathan’s Music each and every and all rights and

interests, of every kind to all previous, present or future musical material which is or shall

become the subject matter of this agreement.” (See Kaufman Decl. Ex. A.)

Richman received royalties for “Dignified and Old” on various dates between April 1,

1998 and December 31, 2003. (See Weiss Decl. Exs. B, C.) Richman also received

royalties for “I’m Straight” on various dates between April 1, 1998 and December 31, 2004. 

(See id.) Richman never revealed to Kaufman that Richman was receiving royalties for

“Dignified and Old” and “I’m Straight.” (See Kaufman Decl. at 1:12-17.) In “mid June

2003,” Kaufman discovered that “Dignified and Old” and “I’m Straight” were included on a

“Sanctuary Record Group repackage of [ ] Richman works” and were attributed to a music

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3

Richman does not challenge the First Counterclaim, by which Kaufman seek a

declaration as to whether Kaufman or Richman owns certain copyright interests.

4

Richman does not argue that “Dignified and Old” and “I’m Straight” do not fall within

the scope of the works covered by the Agreement. Accordingly, the Court assumes,

without deciding, that such works are covered by the Agreement.

3

publisher other than Modern Love Songs. (See id. at 1:18-20.)

DISCUSSION

Richman argues that the Second through Fifth Counterclaims, all of which arise

under state law, are barred by the statute of limitations.3

Under California law, a counterclaim relates back to the filing of the original

complaint, see Trindade v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. App. 3d 857, 859-60 (1973), which, for

purposes of the instant motion, is Richman’s Complaint in Intervention. Richman’s

pleading was lodged on March 24, 2004 when Richman moved to intervene. Accordingly,

for relation-back purposes, the Counterclaims are treated as having been filed on March

24, 2004. See, e.g., In re Glacier Bay, 746 F. Supp. 1379, 1389 (D. Alaska 1990) (holding

filing date, for purpose of statute of limitations, was date plaintiff lodged proposed amended

complaint, not later date when district court granted plaintiff’s motion to amend).

The Court next turns to the issue of whether, as of March 24, 2004, the Second

through Fifth Claims are time-barred.

A. Second Counterclaim (Breach of Contract)

In the Second Counterclaim, alleging a claim for breach of contract, Kaufman

alleges that Richman breached the Agreement by “claiming a 100% ownership interest” in

“Dignified and Old” and “I’m Straight,” (see Counterclaims ¶ 29), resulting in Kaufman’s

suffering damages, (see Counterclaims ¶ 31).4

A breach of contract claim is subject to a four-year statute of limitations. See Code

Civ. Proc. § 337. Richman offers evidence that he claimed ownership of “Dignified and

Old” in 1975 and that he claimed ownership of “I’m Straight” in 1993. Richman argues that

the breach of contract claims accrued at such times and that, as a consequence,

Kaufman’s breach of contract claims were time-barred many years before May 24, 2000.

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Indeed, Richman offers no evidence that such claims of ownership were actually

communicated to Kaufman.

4

A breach of contract claim accrues when the plaintiff incurs “appreciable harm” as a

result of the breach. See April Enterprises, Inc. v. KTTV, 147 Cal. App. 3d 805, 823-24

(1983). Additionally, under the “discovery rule,” if breaches of contract are “committed in

secret,” the claim accrues when the “harm flowing from those breaches [is] reasonably

discoverable.” See id. at 832. Here, Kaufman offers evidence he incurred appreciable

harm when Richman began accepting royalties that, under the Agreement, should have

been paid to Modern Love Songs. To the extent such action on the part of Richman

occurred before March 24, 2000, however, Kaufman has offered evidence he was unaware

of such activity until 2003, thereby establishing a triable issue of fact as to the application of

the discovery rule.5 See id.

Accordingly, Richman is not entitled to summary judgment as to the Second

Counterclaim.

B. Third Counterclaim (Fraud - Intentional Misrepresentation)

In the Third Counterclaim, Kaufman alleges a claim of fraud by intentional

misrepresentation.

A fraud claim is subject to a three-year statute of limitations. See Code Civ. Proc.

§ 338(d). Under the discovery rule, however, a fraud claim does not accrue “until the

discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting the fraud.” See id. Richman

argues that although Kaufman does not plead when he learned of the fraud, Kaufman must

have obtained such knowledge more than three years before March 24, 2001. In

opposition, Kaufman argues that he learned of the fraud in 2003.

Although denominated a claim of fraud by intentional misrepresentation, the Third

Counterclaim is, in essence, a claim of fraud by promise without intent to perform. 

Specifically, Kaufman alleges that when Richman executed the Agreement in 1975,

Richman “represented that he would assign his copyright renewal in the copyrighted works,

which were subject to the [Agreement],” (see Counterclaims ¶ 38), that Richman knew such

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6

Richman does not argue that Kaufman lacks sufficient evidence to prove Richman

entered into the Agreement with the intent not to perform it.

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representation was “false,” (see id. ¶ 40), that Kaufman relied on the representation when

he provided “consideration,” (see id. ¶ 42), and that Kaufman has suffered “damages” as a

result of the misrepresentation, (see id. ¶ 43). The Agreement, however, does not provide

that Richman “would” assign but rather effectuates an immediate assignment, i.e., the

Agreement itself constitutes the assignment. (See Kaufman Decl. Ex. A) (“Richman does

hereby . . . assign . . . .”) Thus, a claim of fraud by promise without intent to perform cannot

be based on a “promise” to assign, such promise having been performed upon execution of

the Agreement.

If, however, this Counterclaim is intended to allege a claim based on the ancillary

promise not to “furnish or dispose of any musical compositions . . . or rights therein to

anyone other than Jonathan’s Music,” (see id.), a triable issue of fact exists as to when

Kaufman learned that Richman did not intend to keep such promise. Specifically, Kaufman

offers evidence he was not aware until 2003 that Richman had allowed a music publisher

other than Modern Love Songs to make use of musical compositions the rights to which

Richman had previously transferred to Modern Love Songs. See Code Civ. Proc. § 338(d)

(providing fraud claim does not accrue until discovery of facts constituting fraud).6

Accordingly, Richman is not entitled to summary judgment as to the Third

Counterclaim.

C. Fourth Counterclaim (Fraud - Concealment)

In the Fourth Counterclaim, alleging a claim of fraud by concealment, Kaufman

alleges that although “Dignified and Old” and “I’m Straight” fall within the scope of the

Agreement, Richman “intentionally concealed these works from [Kaufman]” when Richman

executed the Agreement in 1975, thereby causing damage to Kaufman. (See

Counterclaims ¶ 47, 49, 54.) In his opposition, Kaufman explains that the damage

occurred because Kaufman, being unaware that Modern Love Songs had obtained from

Richman the copyright in such works, has not sought to collect royalties thereon.

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The Court GRANTS both parties’ requests that the Court take judicial notice of the

fact Richman obtained a copyright for “Dignified and Old” in 1972. (See Richman’s Req. for

Jud. Notice, filed April 15, 2005; Weiss Decl., filed May 1, 2005, at 1:14-16 and Ex. E.)

6

In his motion, Richman does not argue that he did not owe a duty to disclose the

names of the two subject works. Rather, Richman argues that because Richman obtained

a registered copyright for “Dignified and Old” in 1972,7

 Kaufman was on constructive notice

of the existence of that work when the Agreement was executed in 1975. With respect to

“I’m Straight,” Richman argues that because Richman obtained a registered copyright for

said work in 1993, (see Counterclaims ¶ 26; Answer ¶ 26), Kaufman was on constructive

notice of the existence of that work as of 1992.

As noted, Kaufman offers evidence that he was unaware of “Dignified and Old” and

“I’m Straight” until 2003. For the reasons discussed above, such evidence is sufficient to

create a triable issue of fact as to application of the discovery rule.

Accordingly, Richman is not entitled to summary judgment as to the Fourth

Counterclaim.

D. Fifth Counterclaim (Punitive Damages)

In his Fifth Counterclaim, Kaufman seeks punitive damages on all of the abovereferenced counterclaims. (See Counterclaims ¶ 57.)

Punitive damages are not available as a remedy on Kaufman’s breach of contract

claim, but are available as a remedy on Kaufman’s fraud claims. See Code Civ. Proc.

§ 3294(a) (“In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is

proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of . . . fraud,

. . . the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of

example and by way of punishing the defendant”).

As discussed above, Kaufman has established a triable issue of fact with respect to

his Third and the Fourth Counterclaims. Accordingly, Richman is not entitled to summary

judgment as to the Fifth Counterclaim.

//

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CONCLUSION

 For the reasons discussed above, Richman’s motion for summary adjudication is

hereby DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 17, 2005 /s/ Maxine M. Chesney 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

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