Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02361/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02361-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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1

 Unless otherwise indicated, the cited docket numbers are from the civil case that was

opened upon the filing of the motion to vacate.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America,

Plaintiff/Respondent, 

vs.

Robert Wilson Stewart, 

Defendant/Movant. 

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CR 03-0061-PHX-HDM

CV 10-2361-PHX-JAT (ECV)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE JAMES A. TEILBORG, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

Pending before the court is Movant’s pro se Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct

Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Doc. 1.1

BACKGROUND

On June 17, 2003, following a four day jury trial, the jury returned guilty verdicts on

all four counts alleged against Movant. Doc. 93-96 of CR 03-0061-PHX-HDM. Count 1

alleged Movant threatened to murder United States District Judge Roslyn O. Silver, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B); Counts II and III alleged Movant made material false

statements to government agents in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2); and Count IV

alleged that Movant solicited another person to commit the murder. U.S. v. Stewart, 420

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F.3d 1007, 1010 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005). On November 20, 2003, Movant was sentenced to 60

months in prison on each of Counts I, II and III, to run concurrently, and 232 months in

prison on Count IV, to run consecutively to the sentences for Counts I, II and III. Doc. 147

of CR 03-0061-PHX-HDM. The sentence was also ordered to run consecutively to the

sentence Movant was serving for a prior firearms conviction in CR 00-698-PHX-ROS. Id.

On November 26, 2003, Movant filed a timely Notice of Appeal. Doc. 150 of CR 03-

0061-PHX-HDM. On August 23, 2005, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in a reported

decision, affirmed the convictions on Counts I, II and IV, but reversed the conviction on

Count III and remanded the case for re-sentencing. Stewart, 420 F.3d at 1014-1021. Movant

was re-sentenced on June 15, 2006, to concurrent 60 month prison terms on each of Counts

I and II, and 232 months on Count IV, again to run consecutively to the sentences for Counts

I and II. Doc. 199 of CR 03-0061-PHX-HDM. Thus, Movant’s total sentence remained the

same at 292 months. Id. 

Movant again filed a direct appeal in the Ninth Circuit. Doc. 200 of CR 03-0061-

PHX-HDM. On October 7, 2009, in a Memorandum Decision, the Court affirmed the

convictions and sentences. Doc. 231 of CR 03-0061-PHX-HDM. The Court then issued the

Mandate on November 2, 2009. Id.

On November 1, 2010, Petitioner filed his motion to vacate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2255. Doc. 1. He alleges three grounds for relief in the motion: (1) that his attorney at trial

provided ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment when he

failed to challenge the validity of the duplicate audio recording presented to the jury by the

prosecution; (2) that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution because the

federal prison facility where the offenses occurred was on land leased from a private

landowner, not on federal land; and (3) that the District Court of Arizona was without subject

matter jurisdiction over this case because the property on which the prison sits is privately

owned. The United States filed a Response to Petition for Writ Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255

on February 11, 2011. Doc. 5. Movant then filed a Reply on March 4, 2011. Doc. 6.

DISCUSSION

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Respondent contends that Movant’s ineffective assistance claim should be denied

because Movant’s challenge to the audio recording was already rejected by the Ninth Circuit

in his direct appeal. Regarding the jurisdictional issue raised in grounds two and three,

Respondent argues that the district court’s jurisdiction over these offenses did not depend on

whether they occurred on federal land. 

A. Ineffective Assistance Claim

Movant contends that the defense copy of the audio recording on which he solicited

another person to kill a federal judge was different from the recording played to the jury in

that the defense copy was largely unintelligible. Movant states that he never heard the

altered version of the recording until it was played to the jury. He contends that his lawyer

provided ineffective assistance when he failed to challenge the fact that the original recording

was destroyed and only the altered version was submitted as evidence. Movant claims that

if the original had been played to the jury, it would have demonstrated his innocence.

A criminal defendant may not use a motion to vacate under section 2255 to relitigate

issues previously decided on direct appeal. United States v. Redd, 759 F.2d 699, 701 (9th Cir.

1985); Battaglia v. United States, 428 F.2d 957, 960 (9th Cir. 1970). “Section 2255 . . . is not

designed to provide criminal defendants multiple opportunities to challenge their sentence.”

United States v. Johnson, 988 F.2d 941, 945 (9th Cir. 1993).

 In its published opinion following the first direct appeal, the Ninth Circuit ruled that

the duplicate audio recording submitted by the prosecution was properly admitted. Stewart,

420 F.3d at 1021 n.13. The Court explained that no evidence was presented showing a

“genuine question” that the duplicate recording was altered or otherwise tainted. Id.

Because the admissibility of the duplicate recording has already been decided by the Ninth

Circuit, Movant cannot relitigate the issue simply by framing it as ineffective assistance of

counsel.

Moreover, even if the Ninth Circuit had not already determined the duplicate

recording was properly admitted, Movant’s ineffective assistance claim would fail. The twoprong test for ineffective assistance of counsel was established by the Supreme Court in

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Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To prevail on an ineffective assistance

claim, a convicted defendant must show: (1) that counsel's representation fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) that there is a reasonable probability that, but

for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. There is a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls

within the wide range of reasonable assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90. “A fair

assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the

distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged

conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Id. at 689.

Movant has not demonstrated that the result of the proceedings would have been

different even if his lawyer would have challenged the accuracy of the duplicate recording

played to the jury. Movant acknowledges that he did not know until the prosecution played

the recording for the jury that the copy submitted into evidence was different from what was

provided to his counsel. By that time, Movant concedes, the original had been destroyed.

Movant has presented no basis for this court to conclude that there is a reasonable probability

that the trial court would have excluded the duplicate recording based only on Movant’s selfserving assertions that the original would have shown his innocence.

For these reasons, this court finds that Movant has not shown he is entitled to relief

based on ineffective assistance of counsel. The court will therefore recommend that ground

one be denied.

B. Jurisdiction Claims

As Movant acknowledges in his motion, the issues in grounds two and three are

“closely linked” in that both challenge the federal court’s territorial jurisdiction over his

offenses. The court will therefore address them together. Movant argues that because the

federal prison where the offenses occurred is situated on land not owned by the United

States, the federal court was without jurisdiction to hear the case and impose the sentences

against him.

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“The federal court’s jurisdiction is not limited to federal crimes committed on federal

lands.” United States v. McCalla, 545 F.3d 750, 756 (9th Cir. 2008); see also United States

v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193, 200 (9th Cir. 1978) (federal jurisdiction over murders of postal

employees is not limited to those occurring on federal land). Under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, “[t]he

district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the

States, of all offenses against the laws of the United States.” Unless the situs is an element

of the offense, federal criminal statutes apply nationwide “equally to everyone everywhere

within the United States....” United States v. Begay, 42 F.3d 486, 499 (9th Cir. 1994).

As the above authority demonstrates, Movant’s territorial jurisdiction claims are

without merit. The fact that the offenses may have occurred on land not owned by the United

States is of no relevance to the court’s jurisdiction in this case. The court will therefore

recommend that grounds two and three be denied.

C. Conclusion

Having determined that all three grounds for relief should be denied, the court will

recommend that the motion to vacate be denied in its entirety.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED:

That Movant's Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence by a Person in

Federal Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Doc. 1) be denied.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED: 

That a Certificate of Appealability and leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal

be denied because the dismissal of the motion to vacate is justified by a plain procedural bar

and jurists of reason would not find the procedural ruling debatable, and because Movant has

not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. The

parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within

which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R.

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Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days within which to file a response

to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121

(9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party's right to appellate review of the

findings of fact in an order of judgement entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge's

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

DATED this 28th day of June, 2011.

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