Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02423/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02423-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Steve Arthur Martinez, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-13-02423-PHX-DLR

ORDER 

Pending before the Court is Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus, (Doc. 

1), United States Magistrate Judge Eileen S. Willett=s Report and Recommendation 

(AR&R@), (Doc.13), and Petitioner’s Objection to the Report and Recommendation, (Doc. 

14). The Magistrate Judge recommended that the Court deny the petition and that it be 

dismissed with prejudice because it is barred by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act’s (“AEDPA”) statute of limitations. Additionally, the Magistrate Judge 

found that Grounds One, Two, Three and Five, as well as a portion of Ground Six are 

barred under the Procedural Default Doctrine. Finally, the Magistrate Judge found that 

the remaining grounds, Ground Four and a portion of Ground Six, should be denied on 

the merits. Petitioner objected to all of the Magistrate Judge’s findings. (Doc. 14.) 

I. Factual Background

The R&R summarized the factual background, (Doc. 13 at 2–4), and the Petitioner 

did not object to this history, (Doc. 14). The Court adopts the R&R’s history. 

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Specifically, in 2008 Petitioner was convicted of the following crimes: (i) burglary 

in the second degree (a class 3 felony); (ii) kidnapping (a class 2 felony); (iii) aggravated 

assault (a class 4 felony); and (iv) sexual assault (a class 2 felony). (Doc. 10-8 at 65–66.) 

The trial court imposed sentences resulting in 30.5 years, which Petitioner is serving at 

the Arizona State Prison Complex in Florence, Arizona. (Doc. 13 at 2.) The R&R 

recounted a summary of the facts underlying Petitioner’s convictions: 

 In the early morning hours on June 18, 2006, an 88 

year old woman named Sally called and asked her daughter, Patricia, to come over to her house. (Doc. 10-3 at 49). Sally was “very upset” and was “having trouble talking.” (Id.). 

When Patricia arrived at Sally’s house, she noticed that the 

glass on the kitchen door had been broken and saw a rock 

inside the door that had been used to smash the glass. (Id. at 

53–54, 57). Sally was still very upset, was shaking, and was 

holding her left elbow. (Id. at 57). Patricia saw blood on the 

collar area of Sally’s pajamas. (Id. at 60). Patricia then 

searched the house for an intruder, while Sally followed behind. (Id. at 59–60). 

 When Patricia completed the search, she contacted the 

police. (Id. at 65–66). While on the phone, Patricia saw blood on the back of Sally’s pajamas that she did not see before as Sally had been following her throughout the house. (Id. at 66). Seeing the blood, Patricia exclaimed to the police dispatcher “[O]h, my God, there’s blood all over the back of 

her pajamas.” (Id. at 69–70). Sally then turned to Patricia 

and yelled “I’ve been raped.” (Id. at 70). 

 Paramedics arrived and treated Sally, who sustained a 

fracture of the olecranon (the bone at the tip of the elbow where the joint comes together). (Id. at 41–42). Sally was also examined by registered nurse Shawn Bonner. (Doc. 10-4 

at 25, 31–33). Nurse Bonner noted numerous contusions and 

abrasions on Sally’s chin, left arm, left and right wrists, legs, and one of her breasts. (Id. at 34–46). In addition, Nurse 

Bonner performed a genital and anal exam and found multiple injuries. (Id. at 46–64). 

 Nurse Bonner’s examination included swabbing 

multiple areas of Sally’s body for DNA. (Id. at 45, 66–67, 

75, 81–83, 100). A forensic scientist at the City of Phoenix Police Department determined that the DNA profile from Sally’s right breast was a hundred percent match with 

Petitioner’s known DNA. (Doc. 10-5 at 99, 149). The 

scientist also determined that the DNA profile taken from Sally’s left fingernail could not have come from anyone other than Petitioner. (Doc. 10-5 at 154). Moreover, Petitioner 

could not be excluded from the DNA mixture taken from 

Sally’s left thigh. (Doc. 10-5 at 155–56). 

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(Doc. 13 at 2–3) 

 The R&R recounted the procedural history: 

 Following his 2008 conviction and sentence, Petitioner 

appealed to the Arizona Court of Appeals. In its October 1, 2009 decision, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed. (Doc. 10-8 at 214–28). On March 16, 2010, the Arizona Supreme Court denied review of Petitioner’s appeal. (Doc. 10-9 at 3). 

 On August 10, 2010, Petitioner’s appellate counsel filed an untimely notice of post-conviction relief (“PCR”). 

(Doc. 10-9 at 5–8). Counsel claimed that the untimely PCR filing was due to “ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.” 

(Id. at 6–7). The Superior Court allowed the untimely PCR filing to proceed, but stated that the “allowance does not 

constitute any expression of opinion that defendant has met 

the requirements to file an untimely petition, or on the merits of any such claim, or that any claims raised in the petition are not procedurally precluded.” (Id. at 11–12). The court also 

appointed the Office of the Legal Advocate to represent Petitioner in his PCR matter. (Id. at 12). 

 After PCR review, Petitioner’s PCR counsel did not 

find any claims for relief to raise in PCR proceedings. (Id. at 

16–17). On February 11, 2011, the Superior Court granted Petitioner 45 days in which to file a pro per PCR petition. (Id. at 20). After multiple deadline extensions, on July 5, 2011, Petitioner filed a PCR petition that raised five claims. 

(Id. at 25–95). On November 14, 2011, the Superior Court denied his petition, finding that four of the five issues are “all 

matters that could have been raised on direct appeal under Rule 31, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, and/or a posttrial motion under Rule 24, Arizona Rules of Criminal 

Procedure” and are therefore precluded from postconviction 

relief under Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. 

(Id. at 109). As to the final issue, which alleged the ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court found that 

Petitioner failed to demonstrate a colorable claim. (Id. at 

109–10). 

 After the denial for PCR relief, Petitioner filed a 

petition for review with the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Id. at 

122–30). On June 24, 2013, the Arizona Court of Appeals denied relief, explaining that Petitioner failed to comply with Rule 32.9 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, which 

requires a petitioner to present issues and material facts 

supporting a claim in a petition for review. (Id. at 144–45). 

The Court also found that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in denying post-conviction relief. (Id.). On 

November 13, 2013, the Arizona Supreme Court denied 

Petitioner’s petition for review. (Id. at 170). 

(Doc. 13 at 3–4.) 

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II. R&R 

 On January 22, 2015, the Magistrate Judge issued an R&R recommending that the 

Court deny the Petition on a number of grounds. 

A. The Petition is Time-Barred by the AEDPA. 

 The R&R explained that the AEDPA provides a one year statute of limitations for 

state prisoners to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal court, (Doc. 13 at 10), 

that AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations begins to run when the time to file a U.S. 

Supreme Court petition for writ of certiorari regarding a conviction has expired, (id. 

(citing Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1158–59 (9th Cir. 1999)), and that time expires 90 

days after entry of an order by the state court of last resort denying discretionary review, 

(id. (citing Supreme Court Rule 13)). The R&R found that, because the Arizona 

Supreme Court denied review of Petitioner’s appeal on March 26, 2010, the one-year 

statute of limitations began to run on June 14, 2010, and expired on June 14, 2011. (Doc. 

13 at 10.) Although the R&R found that Petitioner had not argued that tolling applies, the 

Magistrate Judge reviewed the facts and determined that, under these facts, tolling does 

not apply. As to equitable tolling, the R&R found that Petitioner failed to meet his 

burden of showing that extraordinary circumstances made it impossible for him to file a 

timely federal petition. Because the Petition was filed on November 26, 2013, more than 

two years after the statute of limitations expired, the R&R found that the Petition is timebarred. 

 B. Grounds One, Two, Three, Five, and a Portion of Ground Six are 

 Barred under the Procedural Default Doctrine. 

In the R&R, the Magistrate Judge recommended a finding that Grounds One and 

Two are barred by the Procedural Default Doctrine because they were presented in 

Petitioner’s July 5, 2011, PCR Petition, (id. at 12–13), which the Superior Court found 

were precluded from PCR relief because they “could have been raised on direct appeal . . 

. or a post-trial motion . . .”, (id. at 12–13). The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the 

trial court and also denied relief on the grounds that Petitioner failed to comply with Rule 

32.9 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure 32.2(a)(3). (Id. at 13.) The Magistrate 

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Judge found that the state court findings constitute “adequate and independent” state 

grounds for denying review. (Id. at 14 (citing Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S.856, 860 

(2002)).) 

 In the R&R, the Magistrate Judge recommended a finding that Ground Three is 

barred by the Procedural Default Doctrine because it was presented in Petitioner’s July 

5, 2011, PCR Petition, (id. at 12–13), which the Superior Court denied, finding that 

Petitioner had failed to meet his burden of proof on the ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim, and that the sufficiency of the search warrant claim was precluded from PCR relief 

because it could have been raised on direct appeal or in a post-trial motion. (Id. at 14.) 

The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of relief. The Magistrate 

Judge further found that, because Petitioner had failed to challenge in Arizona state court 

the portion of his claim in Ground Three that his appellate counsel was ineffective for 

failing to move for an evidentiary hearing, it is procedurally defaulted. (Id. at 14 (citing 

Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002)).) 

 In the R&R, the Magistrate Judge recommended a finding that Ground Five is 

barred by the Procedural Default Doctrine because he presented it in his direct appeal as a 

question of state law, not federal law. The Magistrate Judge noted that in his 2008 

Appellant’s Opening Brief, Petitioner discussed Arizona law and made no reference to 

state law and found that Petitioner’s failure to alert the Arizona state court to the federal 

nature of the claim amounts to a failure to exhaust state remedies. (Id. at 15 (citing 

Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 366 (1995))). The Magistrate Judge further indicated 

that because Petitioner would be precluded from PCR relief on Ground Five under Rule 

32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, Ground Five is technically exhausted and 

deemed procedurally defaulted. (Id. at 15-16 (citing Beaty, 303 F.3d at 987)). 

 In the R&R, the Magistrate Judge recommended a finding that the equal protection 

portion of Ground Six is barred by the Procedural Default Doctrine because Petitioner did 

not alert the state court to the alleged federal claim of equal protection in his direct 

appeal. 

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C. Petitioner’s Procedural Default is Not Excused. 

In the R&R, the Magistrate Judge recommended a finding that Petitioner’s 

procedural defaults not be excused because Petitioner did not show cause and prejudice 

or, alternatively, a fundamental miscarriage of justice. (Id. at 16 (quoting Beaty, 303 F.3d 

at 987).) The Magistrate Judge noted in the R&R that Petitioner did not offer any reason 

to excuse the procedural defaults. The R&R further points out that Petitioner does not 

have a federal constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel during state postconviction proceedings, (id. at 17 (citing Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987); 

Bonin v. Vasquez, 999 F.2d 425, 430 (9th Cir. 1993))), and that the narrow exception set 

forth in Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1039 (2012) does not apply in this case because 

Petitioner cannot meet the “substantial” claim requirement of the four-part Martinez test, 

(id. at 17). 

D. Ground Four and a Portion of Ground Six Should be Denied on the 

 Merits. 

In the R&R, the Magistrate Judge recommended a finding that Petitioner’s Ground 

Four be denied on the merits because the Arizona Court of Appeals application of the 

relevant United States Supreme Court cases was not objectively unreasonable. (Id. at 18–

19). Specifically, the R&R found that Arizona court’s application of Crawford v. 

Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) and Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006), was 

objectively reasonable in its ruling that the victim’s statement “I’ve been raped” was 

spontaneous and nontestimonial, and its admission, therefore, did not violate the 

Petitioner’s confrontation rights. (Id. at 18–19). The R&R further found that, even if the 

admission of the statement was an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal 

law, the evidence at trial was so overwhelming that admission of the statement was 

harmless. (Id. at 20.) 

 The R&R, after summarizing the evidence at trial, and relying on Jackson v. 

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), recommended that Ground Six be denied on the merits 

because it could not be concluded that “no rational trier of fact could have found proof of 

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Id. at 21–22.) The R&R found that the Arizona Court 

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of Appeal’s rejection of Petitioner’s claim that he was subjected to a violation of the 5th

and 14th Amendments’ constitutional protections of due process and equal protection 

because the evidence was in fact insufficient to sustain guilty verdicts for aggravated 

assault was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of Jackson. (Id. at 22). 

III. Petitioner’s Objections 

 A. The Time Bar of the AEDPA/Procedural Default Doctrine. 

In his objections Petitioner blends the AEDPA statute of limitations argument with 

the procedural default argument, seeking relief from both on the ineffective assistance of 

counsel allegations. (Doc. 14 at 2–7.) The Court will address the issues separately. 

 Because the Petition was untimely filed, the first question to address is the 

question of tolling. The AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations is statutorily tolled for 

the “time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction relief or 

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending . . . .” 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Petitioner argues that the August 10, 2010, untimely filing of his 

PCR tolled the AEDPA time bar until June 13, 2013, when the Court of Appeals affirmed 

the trial court’s ruling that Petitioner’s PCR was procedurally barred. (Id. at 5–7.) 

 Petitioner has the burden of showing that the AEDPA’s statute of limitations 

period was sufficiently tolled. Zepeda v. Walker, 581 F.3d 1013, 1019 (9th Cir. 2009). 

For statutory tolling to occur, a PCR must be “properly filed.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

Because Petitioner’s notice of PCR was untimely, the R&R correctly found that his 

petition had no statutory tolling effect on the AEDPA’s statute of limitations. (Doc. 13 at 

11.) 

 Petitioner states that his PCR counsel, through no fault of Petitioner, missed the 

PCR filing deadline. (Doc. 14 at 3.) Although Petitioner does not label it as such, the 

Court will treat Petitioner’s statement as an argument for equitable tolling. An equitable 

tolling argument places upon Petitioner the burden to show that extraordinary 

circumstances beyond the Petitioner’s control made it impossible for him to file a timely 

federal petition. 

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 There was no secret that the notice of PCR filed by Petitioner’s counsel on August 

10, 2010, was untimely. (Doc. 10-9 at 5–8.) The face of the Petition states “This Notice 

of Post-Conviction Relief, therefore, is untimely filed . . . .” (Id. at 6.) Although the 

Superior Court allowed the untimely filing to proceed, the court expressly stated on 

October 11, 2010, that it was not finding that Petitioner “has met the requirements to file 

an untimely petition.” (Id. at 11–12). The fact that the Superior Court allowed the 

untimely PCR to proceed did not create an extraordinary circumstance beyond the 

Petitioner’s control that made it impossible to file a timely federal petition. It was clear 

from both the PCR itself and the Superior Court’s order that the PCR was untimely. The 

Court of Appeals, unsurprisingly, ruled that Petitioner’s PCR was untimely. Petitioner 

had one year after the time to file a petition for writ of certiorari expired, until June 14, 

2011, to file his federal petition. He still had ten months after the untimely filing of his 

August 10, 2010 PCR, which stated on its face it was untimely, to file his Petition. It 

might have been beyond Petitioner’s control that his counsel filed an untimely PCR, but 

the filing of a federal petition was not beyond Petitioner’s control. He filed it himself. 

Where, as here, the Petitioner was on notice that the PCR was untimely and still had 

nearly a year to file the federal petition before the AEDPA’s statute of limitations 

expired, the extraordinary circumstance beyond Petitioner’s control required for the 

operation of equitable tolling does not exist. 

 The Court understands Petitioner’s objection to the procedural bar determinations 

in the R&R to be that he should be excused from his failure to comply by the ineffective 

assistance of PCR and Appellate counsel. (Doc. 14 at 2–7.) He argues that ineffective 

assistance of counsel is proven by the Superior Court finding that the issues raised in the 

PCR should have been raised on direct appeal. (Id. at 4.) As the Court understands the 

objection, Petitioner argues that he made no “procedural defaults” and should not be 

bound by the mistakes of counsel. (Id. at 6.) Petitioner argues that the ineffective 

assistance of counsel is a “question for this court ripe for determination.” (Id. at 5 (citing 

Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1039 (2012)).) 

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 A prisoner may obtain federal review of a defaulted claim by showing cause for 

the default and prejudice from a violation of federal law. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 

U.S. 722, 750 (1991). Negligence on the part of a prisoner’s postconviction attorney 

does not qualify as “cause” because the attorney is the prisoner’s agent, and under “wellsettled principles of agency law” the principal bears the risk of negligent conduct on the 

part of his agent. Id. at 754–55. Under Martinez, a narrow and limited exception to the 

general rule that a prisoner is bound by his PCR attorney’s negligence where it is alleged 

that ineffective assistance of counsel in a post-conviction proceeding resulted in a failure 

to assert that there was ineffective assistance of counsel in trial proceedings. Martinez, 

132 S.Ct. at 1315; Hutton v. Sinclair, 732 F.3d 1124, 1128–29 (9th Cir. 2013.) 

 Because Grounds One, Two, Five and Six of the Petition do not allege ineffective 

assistance of counsel as the underlying claim, those counts do not meet the Martinez

exception. Ground Three alleges ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing “to 

secure an expert witness to confront, refute or explain inconsistencies as to DNA 

evidence.” That ground, however, fails to satisfy the Martinez requirement that the 

underlying claim was “substantial.” Martinez, 132 S.Ct. at 1318. The Petition does not 

show that there was an expert available that could have provided testimony helpful to 

Petitioner. There is no allegation of what the inconsistencies were or what evidence such 

an expert could have provided. Without such information, the Court is left with mere 

speculation, which is not sufficient for a finding of prejudice or that the underlying claim 

was substantial. 

 Ground Three also claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

“challenge the sufficiency for the states (sic) search warrant based on erroneous 

evidence.” (Doc. 1 at 8.) Again, the Petition leaves the Court with mere speculation. 

There is no showing that a motion to suppress would have been successful or, if it had 

been successful, that the outcome of the trial would have changed. 

 The Petition fails to provide the Court with anything other than speculation about 

trial counsel’s performance, whether it fell below the objective standards of 

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reasonableness, and whether, but for the alleged errors, the trial outcome would have 

been different, as required by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984). 

Without such a showing, Petitioner cannot establish that the failure of his PCR lawyer to 

raise these claims was ineffective, nor can he meet the Martinez requirement of showing 

that the claims are substantial. The procedural default determinations set forth in the 

R&R for Grounds One, Two, Three, Five, and a portion of Ground Six are not excused. 

 Petitioner next argues in his objection that he did alert the state court “as to the 

federal implication of his 14th Amendment Claim . . . by asserting the principle and 

violation of said right upon which he relies.” (Doc. 14 at 8–9.) However, the mere claim 

that he made such assertion does not establish anything. If the next paragraph in the 

Objection, which alleges Petitioner filed a timely reply and asks the Court to search the 

record for it, (id. at 9), is meant to support his position that he alerted the state court to his 

federal claim, the Court is left with nothing to consider. The Court does not know to 

what reply the objection refers or where to find it. 

 B. Ground Four and a Portion of Ground Six. 

Petitioner re-argues in his objection to the R&R’s finding on Ground Four that he 

was denied his right to confront his accuser when the trial court allowed admission of the 

victim’s statements, which he contends were testimonial and not spontaneous. (Id. at 9.) 

The Court agrees with the R&R’s analysis of Crawford and Davis. The Arizona Court of 

Appeals found that the victim’s statement, “I’ve been raped,” was spontaneous and 

nontestimonial and that its admission, therefore, did not violate defendant’s confrontation 

rights. The Court agrees with the R&R’s conclusion that the Arizona Court of Appeals’ 

application of Crawford and Davis to Petitioner’s Confrontation Clause challenge is 

objectively reasonable. The Court also agrees with the R&R’s conclusion that, even if 

the admission of the victim’s statement was an unreasonable application of Crawford, it 

is harmless. 

 As to Ground Six, Petitioner argues that because “no medical professional could 

attribute a cause for the fractured elbow” there was insufficient evidence that he was the 

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cause of the injury. (Doc. 14 at 10.) The Court agrees with the R&R’s analysis of the 

facts in light of Jackson, and the determination that there is sufficient evidence 

supporting a finding that Petitioner fractured the victim’s arm. Medical personal treating 

the victim found numerous injuries, in addition to the fractured elbow, including physical 

evidence of sexual assault. (Doc. 10-3 at 41–42; Doc. 10-4 at 34–64). Dr. Keller 

testified at trial that a fractured elbow could be sustained if a person is knocked down. 

(Doc. 10-3 at 44.) Further, Petitioner’s DNA was found on Sally’s body. (Doc. 10-5 at 

99, 149, 154–56.) The Court agrees with the R&R that it cannot be concluded that “no 

rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” The 

Arizona Court of Appeals’ reasoning is neither contrary to nor an unreasonable 

application of Jackson. 

IV. Conclusion 

Based on the foregoing, 

IT IS ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation, (Doc. 13), is accepted 

and adopted, the objections, (Doc. 14), are overruled, the Petition is denied with 

prejudice, and the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment accordingly. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, in the event Petitioner files an appeal, and 

pursuant to Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, the Court denies 

issuance of a certificate of appealability because dismissal of the Petition is based on a 

plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find this Court’s decision debatable 

or wrong, and because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right in his remaining claims for relief. 

 Dated this 19th day of March, 2015. 

Douglas L. Rayes 

United States District Judge

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