Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_17-cv-01422/USCOURTS-azd-2_17-cv-01422-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 950
Nature of Suit: Constitutionality of State Statutes
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

On May 8, 2017, Plaintiffs, individual criminal-defense lawyers, investigators, and

non-profit organization Arizona Attorneys for Criminal Justice, initiated this action (the 

“Original Complaint”) challenging the constitutionality of Ariz. Rev. Stat. (“A.R.S.”) § 13-

4433(B), which prohibits criminal defense counsel from initiating contact with a victim. 

(Doc. 1) On June 26, 2017, the Attorney General of the State of Arizona (the “Attorney 

General”) moved to dismiss the Original Complaint, arguing that the Plaintiffs did not have 

standing to bring the lawsuit. (Doc. 31) On March 30, 2018, the Court granted the Attorney 

General’s motion to dismiss in part (the “Dismissal Order”). (Doc. 119) In granting the 

Attorney General’s first motion to dismiss, the Court found that the Plaintiffs failed to “offer 

plausible allegations from which the Court can conclude that their injury is traceable to the 

actions of the Attorney General or the ambit of his enforcement authority” or show that the 

relief requested under the Original Complaint would redress the Plaintiffs’ alleged injury. 

(Doc. 119 at 6–9) Based on the allegations in the Original Complaint, the Court found that 

Arizona Attorneys for Criminal Justice

et al,

 

Plaintiffs, 

vs. 

Ducey et al,

Defendants. 

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No. CV-17-01422-PHX-SPL

ORDER

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the Plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue their claims, but the Court provided the Plaintiffs 

with leave to amend the Original Complaint by a later deadline. (Doc. 119 at 9–11) 

On May 4, 2018, the Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint (the “First Amended 

Complaint”) seeking identical declaratory and injunctive relief that would prevent the 

Attorney General from enforcing A.R.S. § 13-4433(B). (Doc. 123) On May 25, 2018, the 

Attorney General filed a motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint (the “Second 

Motion to Dismiss”), arguing that the amended pleading still failed to allege facts sufficient 

to demonstrate that the Plaintiffs had standing to bring their claims. (Doc. 126) On March 

15, 2019, the Court granted the Attorney General’s second motion to dismiss (the “Second 

Dismissal Order”). (Doc. 147) In doing so, the Court found that the Plaintiffs still failed to 

“offer plausible allegations from which the Court can conclude that the Plaintiffs’ injury is

traceable to the actions of the Attorney General” or show that the relief requested under the 

First Amended Complaint would redress Plaintiff’s alleged injury. (Doc. 147 at 4–7) Based 

on the allegations in the First Amended Complaint, the Court found that the Plaintiffs still 

lacked standing to pursue their claims, but the Court provided the Plaintiffs with a second 

leave to amend the Original Complaint by a later deadline. (Doc. 147 at 7–8)

On April 26, 2019, Plaintiffs filed another amended complaint (the “Second 

Amended Complaint”) seeking identical declaratory and injunctive relief but adding the 

State Bar of Arizona (“State Bar”), its Chief Bar Counsel, Maret Vessella (“Vessella”), and 

the director of the Arizona Department of Public Safety, Colonel Frank Milstead 

(respectively “DPS” and “Milstead”) as defendants. (Doc. 150) On June 20, 2019, the State 

Bar and Vessella (“State Bar” and “Vessella”) filed their Motion to Dismiss the Second 

Amended Complaint, arguing lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim 

upon which relief can be granted (Doc. 162 at 1) (the “State Bar’s Motion to Dismiss”) and 

the Attorney General filed its Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint, arguing

lack of subject matter jurisdiction, failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, 

and failure to Join a Rule 19 Party (Doc. 164 at 3) (the “Attorney General’s Third Motion

to Dismiss”). Pending before the Court are the State Bar’s Motion to Dismiss and the 

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Attorney General’s Motion to Dismiss. The Motions were fully briefed. The Court’s ruling 

is as follows.

1

I. Legal Standard

A. FRCP 12(b)(1) and Article III Standing

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) “allows litigants to seek the dismissal of an 

action from federal court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Kinlichee v. United States, 

929 F. Supp. 2d 951, 954 (D. Ariz. 2013) (citing Tosco Corp. v. Comtys. for a Better Env’t, 

236 F.3d 495, 499 (9th Cir. 2001)). Allegations raised under FRCP 12(b)(1) should be 

addressed before other reasons for dismissal because if the complaint is dismissed for lack 

of subject matter jurisdiction, other defenses raised become moot. Kinlichee, 929 F. Supp.

2d at 954. A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under FRCP 12(b)(1) 

may attack either the allegations of the complaint as insufficient to confer upon the court 

subject matter jurisdiction or the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact. Renteria v. 

United States, 452 F. Supp. 2d 910, 919 (D. Ariz. 2006) (citing Thornhill Publ’g Co., Inc. 

v. General Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir.1979)); Edison v. United States, 

822 F.3d 510, 517 (9th Cir. 2016). When the motion to dismiss attacks the allegations of 

the complaint as insufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction, all allegations of material 

fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 

Renteria, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 919 (citing Federation of African Amer. Contractors v. City of 

Oakland, 96 F.3d 1204, 1207 (9th Cir. 1996)). When the motion to dismiss is a factual 

attack on subject matter jurisdiction, however, no presumptive truthfulness attaches to the 

plaintiff’s allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial 

court from evaluating for itself the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact. Renteria, 

452 F. Supp. 2d at 919 (citing Thornhill, 594 F.2d at 733). A plaintiff has the burden of 

proving that jurisdiction does in fact exist. Renteria, 452 F. Supp. 2d at 919 (citing 

1 Because it would not assist in resolution of the instant issues, the Court finds the 

pending motion is suitable for decision without oral argument. See LRCiv. 7.2(f); Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 78(b); Partridge v. Reich, 141 F.3d 920, 926 (9th Cir. 1998).

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Thornhill, 594 F.2d at 733). Conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are 

insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss. Rosenbaum v. Syntex Corp., 95 F.3d 922, 926 

(9th Cir. 1996).

“To state a case or controversy under Article III, a plaintiff must establish standing.” 

Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 133 (2011); See also

Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 597–98 (2007). The doctrine of 

standing encompasses both constitutional requirements and prudential considerations. See

Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 

U.S. 464, 471 (1982). “The constitutional requirement of standing has three elements: (1) 

the plaintiff must have suffered an injury-in-fact—that is, a concrete and particularized 

invasion of a legally protected interest that is actual or imminent, not conjectural or 

hypothetical;2(2) the injury must be causally connected—that is, fairly traceable—to the 

challenged action of the defendant and not the result of the independent action of a third 

party not before the court; and (3) it must be likely and not merely speculative that the injury 

will be redressed by a favorable decision by the court.” Catholic League for Religious and 

Civil Rights v. City and County of San Francisco, 624 F.3d 1043, 1049 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992); Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 475–

76). 

The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the existence of a justiciable case or 

controversy, and “‘must demonstrate standing for each claim he seeks to press’ and ‘for 

each form of relief’ that is sought.” Davis v. Federal Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 734 

(2008) (quoting DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006)). “A plaintiff 

must establish standing with the ‘manner and degree of evidence required at the successive 

stages of the litigation.’” Carrico v. City and County of San Francisco, 656 F.3d 1002, 1006 

(9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561). “[A]t the pleading stage, the plaintiff must 

2

“The constitutional component of ripeness overlaps with the ‘injury in fact’ analysis 

for Article III standing. Whether framed as an issue of standing or ripeness, the inquiry is 

largely the same: whether the issues presented are ‘definite and concrete, not hypothetical 

or abstract.’” Wolfson v. Brammer, 616 F.3d 1045, 1058 (9th Cir. 2010); See also LSO, Ltd. 

v. Stroh, 205 F.3d 1146, 1154 (9th Cir. 2000) (discussing ripeness).

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clearly. . . allege facts demonstrating each element.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 

1547 (2016) (internal quotations omitted). 

B. Younger Abstention

Younger abstention is a jurisprudential doctrine rooted in overlapping principles of 

equity, comity, and federalism. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 460–73 (1974) 

(explaining the history and purposes of the doctrine); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43–

49 (discussing the jurisprudential background of abstention); Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 

F.3d 965, 970–75 (9th Cir.2004) (en banc) (tracing the Supreme Court’s application of the 

doctrine). Abstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is the exception, not the rule. 

Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). Absent 

significant countervailing interests, the federal courts are obliged to exercise their 

jurisdiction. Id.; County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 189 (1959). The 

Court must abstain under Younger if four requirements are met: (1) a state-initiated 

proceeding is ongoing; (2) the proceeding implicates important state interests; (3) the 

federal plaintiff is not barred from litigating federal constitutional issues in the state 

proceeding; and (4) the federal court action would enjoin the proceeding or have the 

practical effect of doing so, i.e., would interfere with the state proceeding in a way that 

Younger disapproves. Gilbertson, 381 F.3d at 978; AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Roden

(“ABC”), 495 F.3d 1143, 1149 (9th Cir.2007). “Although Younger itself involved potential 

interference with a state criminal case, the Supreme Court has extended the doctrine to 

federal cases that would interfere with state civil cases and state administrative 

proceedings.” San Jose Silicon Valley Chamber of Commerce Political Action Comm. V. 

City of San Jose, 546 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. 

Dayton Christian Sch., Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 627 (1986)). “There is no principled distinction 

between finality of judgments for purposes of appellate review and finality of state-initiated 

proceedings for purposes of Younger abstention.” Id. at 1093.

II. Analysis

Both the Attorney General and the State Bar Defendants seek dismissal of the case 

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under FRCP 12(b)(1), although based on slightly different arguments, as well as under 

FRCP 12(b)(6). The Attorney General also seeks dismissal under FRCP 12(b)(7). The Court 

addresses issues of subject matter jurisdiction first.

A. The Attorney General’s 12(b)(1) Argument

The Court notes that the Attorney General has raised issues of subject matter 

jurisdiction twice already, and more specifically issues of lack of Article III standing. (Docs. 

31 at 6–11; 126 at 4–7) The two previous arguments were facial challenges to subject matter 

jurisdiction and the Court reviewed the Original Complaint and the First Amended 

Complaint under the appropriate standard for such challenges. See Renteria, 452 F. Supp. 

2d at 919. The Attorney General’s Third Motion to Dismiss is based on a factual challenge 

to subject matter jurisdiction based on lack of Article III standing and specifically lack of 

redressability, one of the three requirements for Article III standing. (Doc. 164 at 1–2) 

However, the Court finds that it does not need to consider a factual challenge to the Second 

Amended Complaint because the Second Amended Complaint still fails to meet the 

traceability requirement for purposes of Article III standing under a facial challenge as more 

fully explained below. 

As set forth in both the Dismissal Order and the Second Dismissal Order, the Court 

already found that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged an injury-in-fact for purposes of 

Article III standing in their case against the Attorney General. (Docs. 119 at 5–6; 147 at 3–

4) The Attorney General is not challenging this standing requirement in its Third Motion to 

Dismiss.

In both the Dismissal Order and the Second Dismissal Order, the Court found that 

Plaintiffs had failed to offer plausible allegations that would satisfy the traceability 

requirement for Article III standing. (Docs. 119 at 6–9; 147 at 4–7) The Court notes that the 

Attorney General is not arguing a lack of traceability in its Third Motion to Dismiss. 

Because questions of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised by the Court sua sponte and 

at any time, see Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006), the Court now turns to 

the Second Amended Complaint to determine whether Plaintiffs have met their burden on 

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pleading traceability for their claim against the Attorney General.

The Court finds that Plaintiffs have made very little changes to the section laying out 

the basis for their claim against the Attorney General from the First Amended Complaint.

(Doc. 150 at 10–14) Plaintiffs removed any reference to court sanctions in the Second 

Amended Complaint, focusing on potential disciplinary proceedings. (Doc. 150 at 10–14) 

Plaintiffs removed a reference to “seek[ing] sanctions from the court” and “ask[ing] the 

court to advise the same” in paragraph 62 of the Second Amended Complaint. (Doc. 150 at 

12) (compared to paragraph 51 of the First Amended Complaint which is identical besides 

the removed language, see Doc. 123 at 11) Plaintiffs also removed a reference to “seek[ing]

court sanctions or pursue potential criminal prosecution” and “making the risk of . . . such 

sanctions much more likely” in paragraph 63 of the Second Amended Complaint. (Doc. 150 

at 13) (compared to paragraph 52 of the First Amended Complaint which is identical besides 

the removed language, see Doc. 123 at 12) Finally, Plaintiffs removed the paragraphs which 

set forth Plaintiffs’ arguments as to why an injunction granted against the Attorney General 

would be proper. (Doc. 123 at 13, ¶¶ 59–61) Based on those findings, the Court concludes 

that the Second Amended Complaint still fails to offer plausible allegations from which the 

Court can conclude that the Plaintiffs’ injury is traceable to the actions of the Attorney 

General. The Court already discussed at length its reasoning regarding traceability in the 

Second Dismissal Order and it is still fully applicable to the Second Amended Complaint, 

with the exception of the reasoning related to the imposition or prosecution of criminal 

charges on page 6 of the Second Dismissal Order. (Doc. 147 at 4–7). The few modifications 

made in the Second Amended Complaint’s section regarding the Attorney General fail to 

cure the defect related to traceability for purposes of Article III standing. The revised 

allegations are still not enough to show the necessary causation and traceability between the 

disciplinary process Plaintiffs are challenging as unconstitutional and the actions, and 

powers, of the Attorney General.

Accordingly, the Court will grant the Attorney General’s Third Motion to Dismiss 

without leave to amend because it finds that it would be futile to allow Plaintiffs to amend 

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their complaint for a third time.3

B. The State Bar of Arizona’s Eleventh Amendment Immunity Argument

The State Bar argues that as an agency of the state of Arizona, it is immune from suit 

under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Doc. 162 at 7–9) The 

Court agrees.

“Under the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, neither a 

state nor its agencies may be sued in federal court without the state’s consent.” Cleveland 

v. Pinal County Superior Court, No. CV 12-1942-PHX-DGC (SPL), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

148494, at *7-8, 2012 WL 4932657 (D. Ariz. Oct. 16, 2012) (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & 

Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984)). “A state bar operates as the investigative 

arm of its state supreme court, and thus, is an agency of the state; as an agency of the state, 

the Eleventh Amendment renders state bars immune from suit in federal court.” Id. at *8 

(citing Gilchrist v. Arizona Supreme Court, 10 Fed. Appx. 468, 470 (9th Cir. 2001)); see 

also O'Connor v. State of Nev., 686 F.2d 749, 750 (9th Cir. 1982). Thus, Plaintiffs’ direct 

claims against the State Bar are precluded. Furthermore, Plaintiffs themselves in their 

response to the State Bar’s Motion to Dismiss wrote that they “do not object to dismissing 

the State Bar without prejudice.” (Doc. 170 at 2) Plaintiffs do not have the choice as to the 

type of dismissal. The State Bar of Arizona is immune from suit under the Eleventh 

Amendment, any amendment to the complaint would be futile, and a dismissal without 

prejudice is therefore not a possible avenue. Taking these realities into account, no possible 

set of factual allegations could be pleaded in a proposed Third Amended Complaint that 

would cure the aforementioned deficiencies. See In re Apollo Group, No. CV-10-1735-

PHX-JAT, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124781, at *66, 2011 WL 5101787 (D. Ariz. Oct. 27, 

2011) (quoting Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127) (noting that leave for amend should be granted 

3 Because the Court finds that Plaintiffs failed to satisfy the second requirement for 

Article III standing and it is dispositive of the claims against the Attorney General based on 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Court does not address the other arguments raised in 

the Attorney General’s Second Motion to Dismiss. See Giddings v. Vision House Prod., 

Inc., 584 F.Supp.2d 1222, 1225 (D. Ariz. 2008).

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when dismissing “unless the court determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured 

by the allegations of other facts”); McGlinchy v. Shell Chem. Co., 845 F.2d 802, 818 (9th 

Cir. 1988). Accordingly, the Court will grant the State Bar’s Motion to Dismiss based on 

immunity under the Eleventh Amendment and the case against the State Bar of Arizona will 

be dismissed with prejudice.4

C. Defendant Vessella’s Argument that Plaintiffs Lack Article III Standing

Defendant Vessella argues that Plaintiffs’ case against her should be dismissed 

because of lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on Article III standing and failure to 

state a claim. 

At the outset, the Court notes that Defendant Vessella joined in the Attorney 

General’s argument regarding redressability and Younger abstention. (Doc. 162 at 3, fn.1) 

It also notes that Defendant Vessella makes an argument that any prior holding of the Court 

regarding standing should be disregarded and argued anew because neither the State Bar of 

Arizona nor Vessella was a party to this case until Plaintiffs made a claim against them in 

their Second Amended Complaint. (Docs. 162 at 10; 179 at 3–4) With one exception, the 

Court agrees with that argument as to the newly named Defendants State Bar and Vessella 

are entitled to their day in court and to be heard: the exception is the Court’s finding that 

Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled an injury-in-fact for purposes of Article III standing and 

surviving a motion to dismiss. (Docs. 119 at 5–6; 147 at 3–4) The Court’s reasoning and 

findings about injury-in-fact are still applicable and did not depend on the name of the 

Defendant but instead, on the injury alleged by Plaintiffs, and whether they sufficiently pled 

the injury under a motion to dismiss standard of review. (Doc. 147 at 4) However, the 

Article III standing requirements of traceability and redressability are directly dependent on 

who the defendant is in this case. The Court now turns to the issues of traceability and 

4 Similarly to the disposition of the Attorney General’s Second Motion to Dismiss in 

Section II(A). of this Order, because the Eleventh Amendment is dispositive of the State 

Bar’s Motion to Dismiss, the Court does not address the remaining arguments raised by the 

State Bar in its Motion as they relate to dismissal of the State Bar alone and not Defendant 

Vessella.

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redressability for purposes of Article III standing as applied to Plaintiffs’ claims against 

Defendant Vessella.

With regards to the issue of traceability or causation, the Court first notes that 

Plaintiffs are challenging A.R.S. § 13-4433(B) but not the rules of professional conduct, 

which are truly the source of any potential sanction they might suffer if they violate the 

victim contact rules set forth in A.R.S. § 13-4433(B).

5 This is an interesting case where the 

challenged statute itself does not provide for an enforcement mechanism but might be 

enforced through other rules which are not challenged by the Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs argue that 

Arizona Rule of the Supreme Court 42, Ethical Rule (“ER”) 8.4 provides that it is 

professional misconduct for an attorney “to engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the 

administration of justice.” (Doc. 150 at 9, ¶ 40) Plaintiffs add that enforcing A.R.S. § 13-

4433(B) would be done under ER 8.4. (Doc. 150 at 9, ¶41-42) Defendant Vessella relies on 

Section 3531 of Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure (3d ed. 2019) for her 

argument that Plaintiffs failed to establish traceability to her. (Docs. 162 at 14–15; 179 at 

8–9) 

In this case, there is an additional, non-named party, the Arizona Supreme Court 

Disciplinary Commission (the “Commission”), which would make the decision to impose 

sanctions on an attorney for violating the ethical rules promulgated by the Arizona Supreme 

Court. (Doc. 119 at 7) See also Wolfson, 616 F.3d at 1056–57. “The Arizona Chief Bar 

counsel is charged with overseeing and directing the prosecution of discipline cases 

involving members of the bar....” (Doc. 119 at 7) Id. Plaintiffs have alleged they fear that 

5 The Victims’ Rights Implementation Act (“VRIA”) itself contains no civil or 

criminal penalties for violations of its provisions, nor provides for a private cause of action 

to be brought against a violating party. See Lindsay R. v. Cohen, 343 P.3d 435, 437 (Ariz. 

Ct. App. 2015) (“neither the [Victims’ Bill of Rights (“VBR”)] nor the VRIA gives victims 

a right to control the proceedings, to plead defenses, or to examine or cross-examine 

witnesses; the VBR and the VRIA give victims the right to participate and be notified of 

certain criminal proceedings.”); State ex rel. Montgomery v. Padilla, 364 P.3d 479, 485 

(Ariz. Ct. App. 2015) (the VRIA provides a victim with standing to seek an order in the 

defendant’s trial or appellate proceeding to enforce a right or to challenge an order denying 

a right) (citing A.R.S. § 13–4437(A)); (Doc. 31 at 9).

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if they violate A.R.S. § 13-4433(B), the Chief Bar Counsel will investigate them for 

violations of the ethical rules which might ultimately result in sanctions. (Doc. 150 at 9)

This last part would be a decision made by the Arizona Supreme Court Disciplinary 

Commission. “To plausibly allege that the injury was not the result of the independent action 

of some third party, the plaintiff must offer facts showing that the government’s unlawful 

conduct is at least a substantial factor motivating the third parties’ actions.” Novak v. United 

States, 795 F.3d 1012, 1019 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Mendia v. Garcia, 768 F.3d 1009, 

1013 (9th Cir. 2014)) (internal quotations omitted); see also Mendia, 768 F.3d at 1013 (“[s]o 

long as the plaintiff can make that showing without relying on speculation or guesswork 

about the third parties’ motivations . . ., she has adequately alleged Article III causation.”) 

(citing Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1138, 1150, 185 L.Ed.2d 

264 (2013)) (internal quotations omitted).

The Court finds that Defendant Vessella’s position and duties of oversight and 

prosecution of ethical violations would be a substantial factor in the Commission’s 

decisions and actions. There is no doubt that absent an investigation and prosecution of 

Plaintiffs or other attorneys for a violation of A.R.S. § 13-4433(B) and ER 8.4, the 

Commission would not sanction an attorney for a violation of ethical rules. This is not to 

say that every investigation and prosecution by the Chief Bar Counsel and its office 

necessarily result in sanctions. But the Court finds that Plaintiffs have met their burden to 

establish traceability between their alleged injury-in-fact and Defendant Vessella as Chief 

Bar Counsel.

The Court now turns to the last requirement for Article III standing, redressability.

On this issue, the Court finds Wolfson particularly instructive and ultimately dispositive. In 

Wolfson, the Ninth Circuit, quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561–62 (1992), reasoned that “[i]f a 

plaintiff is an object of the [challenged action] ... there is ordinarily little question that the 

action or inaction has caused him injury, and that a judgment preventing or requiring the 

action will redress it.” Wolfson, 616 F.3d at 1056 (internal quotations omitted). In this case, 

Plaintiffs are clearly the object of the statute they challenge and of the actions, or potential 

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actions, of Defendant Vessella. They seek two forms of relief: a declaration that A.R.S. § 

13-4433(B) is unconstitutional and injunctive relief against Defendant Vessella to preclude 

enforcement of violations of the statute through ethical discipline. Defendant Vessella has

the power to investigate and prosecute Plaintiffs for ethical violations stemming from a 

violation of A.R.S. § 13-4433(B) and ER 8.4 and, if she is enjoined from enforcing the 

challenged provisions, Plaintiffs will have obtained redress in the form of freedom to engage 

in certain activities without fear of punishment. Without a possibility of the challenged 

statute being enforced through disciplinary actions under ER 8.4, the statute will no longer 

have a chilling effect on speech. Plaintiffs will thus be able to engage in the speech and 

expressive conduct they desire. The Court notes that ultimately, if the Court issued an 

injunction, it would be a narrow one: it would not preclude discipline based on violations 

of other ethical rules or reasons other than contacting a victim without going through the 

prosecutor’s office. There are many possible scenarios where the communications initiated 

by attorneys might still violate other statutes or ethical rules and an injunction in this case 

would not preclude the Chief Bar Counsel from undertaking an investigation and a 

prosecution of such violations. The Chief Bar Counsel would only be enjoined from seeking 

sanctions solely on the basis that defense counsel contacted a victim without going through 

the prosecutor’s office in violation of A.R.S. § 13-4433(B) and ER 8.4. Accordingly, the 

Court finds that Plaintiffs have met the redressability requirement for Article III standing in 

their case against Defendant Vessella.

D. Defendant Vessella’s Argument that Plaintiffs Failed to State a § 1983 Claim

Defendant Vessella argues that “for the same reasons that Plaintiffs have no Article 

III case or controversy as to [her], they have failed to state a § 1983 claim against her.” 

(Docs. 162 at 17; 179 at 11) Because the Court found that Plaintiffs have made a sufficient 

showing to allege Article III standing for their claims against Defendant Vessella and 

Defendant Vessella has not offered any other argument as to why Plaintiffs do not have a 

valid § 1983 claim, the Court finds that Defendant Vessella has failed to make an argument 

that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim under § 1983.

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E. Defendant Vessella’s Argument that Younger Requires Abstention

The Court notes that in her joint motion to dismiss with the State Bar Defendant, 

Defendant Vessella joined in the Attorney General’s arguments based on Younger 

abstention. (Doc. 162 at 3, fn.1) Defendant Vessella did not make any argument in addition 

to the ones of the Attorney General on this issue and accordingly, the Court looks at the 

Attorney General’s arguments in support of the application of the Younger doctrine to 

resolve this argument.

Younger abstention is only proper if the four requirements are met. San Jose, 546 

F.3d 1087, 1092; see also Gilbertson, 381 F.3d at 978. Turning to the first of those 

requirements, that a state-initiated proceeding is ongoing, the Court finds that Defendant 

Vessella, relying exclusively on the arguments of the Attorney General, has failed to prove 

that such proceedings are ongoing. Defendant Vessella has not pointed to any pending 

disciplinary proceedings against Plaintiffs based on violation of A.R.S. §13-4433(B) and 

ER 8.4 but instead relied on the fact that Plaintiffs are currently representing some criminal 

defendants in pending state court proceedings. (Doc. 164 at 10) This is not enough to meet 

the first requirement for Younger abstention; indeed, if disciplinary proceedings were 

pending, the Court would likely conclude that the required ongoing state-initiated 

proceedings were present. See Canatella v. California, 404 F.3d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005) 

(holding that “California’s attorney discipline proceedings are judicial in character for 

purposes of Younger abstention . . . . [s]uch proceedings commenced when the State Bar of 

California issued the notice of disciplinary charges against Bendel”) (internal quotations 

omitted). The Court finds the fact that Plaintiffs are currently representing criminal 

defendants in state court and that they might violate A.R.S. § 13-4433(B), which might 

trigger disciplinary proceedings under ER 8.4, involves too many contingencies to satisfy 

the state-initiated ongoing proceedings prong of the Younger inquiry. Accordingly, because 

Defendant Vessella, through the arguments of the Attorney General, failed to prove the first 

prong of the Younger doctrine and she is required to prove all four prongs, the Court does 

not reach the remaining arguments she raised under Younger and it will not abstain based 

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on Younger.

F. Issues of Standing for Plaintiffs’ Claim Against the Director of DPS

Although Defendant Milstead did not file any motion to dismiss based on lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction, our duty to review the presence or lack thereof still mandates 

that the Court analyze whether such subject matter jurisdiction is present over the case 

Plaintiffs made against Milstead.

 One of the Plaintiffs, Rich Robertson, is a private investigator who works with 

criminal-defense attorneys on capital and non-capital cases throughout the State of Arizona 

and who holds a private investigator license granted by DPS. (Doc. 150 at 5) He is also a 

member of the Arizona Attorneys for Criminal Justice organization. (Doc. 150 at 5) 

For the same reasons that other Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled the three 

requirements for purposes of Article III standing for their claims against Defendant 

Vessella, the Court finds that Robertson and the Arizona Attorneys for Criminal Justice 

have met their burden of proof with regards to their claims against Milstead. The injury-infact is similar to the one alleged by the attorneys, namely a self-censorship based on a fear 

of disciplinary actions; the traceability requirement is also similar because Milstead 

administers all aspects of private investigator licensing and discipline like the Chief Bar 

Counsel does for attorneys; and finally, the redressability requirements is again similar 

because an injunction directed at Milstead and prohibiting enforcement of disciplinary 

actions based on a violation of A.R.S. § 13-4433(B) by private investigators would redress 

some of the harm suffered by Plaintiff Robertson and other similarly situated private 

investigators. Accordingly, the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claim 

against Milstead.

IT IS ORDERED:

1. That the Attorney General’s Third Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 164) is granted

in full and with prejudice because any amendment would be futile;

2. That the State Bar of Arizona and Defendant Vessella’s Motion to Dismiss 

(Doc. 162) is granted in part, only dismissing the State Bar of Arizona with prejudice 

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based on Eleventh Amendment immunity.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall terminate this action

with respect to the Attorney General and the State Bar of Arizona defendants and enter 

judgment accordingly as to those two defendants only.

Dated this 27th day of February, 2020.

Honorable Steven P. Logan

United States District Judge

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