Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-00546/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-00546-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HUBERT DYMITR HARASZEWSKI,

 Plaintiff,

v.

LISA BRANNAN et al., 

 Defendants.

CASE NO. 10cv0546 LAB (PCL)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION RE:

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S FIRST

AMENDED COMPLAINT

(Doc. 29.) 

INTRODUCTION

Hubert Dymitr Haraszewski (“Plaintiff”), a California state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a First

Amended Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 15.) Plaintiff claims Defendants violated his

constitutional rights while he was held at the George Bailey Detention Facility (“GBDF”) and the Vista

Detention Facility (“VDF”). (Id. at 1.) Specifically, Plaintiff claims his placement in administrative

segregation and the actions occurring there violated his Due Process rights, his right of access to

counsel, and his Fourth Amendment protection from unlawful search and seizures. (Id. at 4-9.) 

Defendants Lisa Brannan, John Morgans, Harold Turner, Patricia Lavermicocca, and Carl Brewer filed a

motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state claims upon which relief can be granted.

(Doc. 29-1, at 2.) Having considered the motion and Plaintiff’s response, the Court recommends that the

motion be granted in part and denied in part. 

Case 3:10-cv-00546-LAB-PCL Document 41 Filed 08/11/11 Page 1 of 8
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On July 20, 2008, while Plaintiff was held as a pretrial detainee at GBDF, Defendant Brannan, a

police investigator, conducted a warrantless search of Plaintiff’s cell. (Doc. 15, at 7.) Plaintiff claimed

Defendant Lavarmicocca, Assistant District Attorney, and Defendant Morgans, D.A. investigator,

ordered the search with the intent to seize items related to the ongoing criminal investigation. (Id.)

Plaintiff alleged that Defendant Brannan’s supervisor, Defendant Sergeant Turner, led the search with

the assistance of Defendant Sergeant Brewer. (Id.) Plaintiff claimed all his personal items except for

food and hygiene items were seized, including letters, photographs, and drawings. (Id.) Although none

of the seized material was introduced at trial, Plaintiff alleged the search was outside customary GBDF

procedures and was meant to harass him because Defendant Brannan was notorious for his attitude

towards Plaintiff in interviews, court appearances, and sentencing hearings. (Id.)

On September 14, 2009, while Plaintiff was held as a pretrial detainee at VDF, Defendants Brannan

and Morgans searched his jail cell under the authority of Defendant Lavarmicocca. (Id.) Following the

search, a Vista Jail staff member and a supervisor – Defendants John Doe 2 and 4 – moved Plaintiff to a

segregation module for about three weeks. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff alleged the isolation was to prevent his

phone access because Defendant Lavarmicocca believed Plaintiff illegally contacted the prosecution’s

witnesses. (Id.) Plaintiff claimed he submitted multiple requests for an explanation for his isolation but

received no response from the jail officers. (Id.) 

Plaintiff claimed the retaliatory search of his cell and isolation were intended to punish him

because Defendant Morgans’ objective to protect the prosecution’s witnesses could have been achieved

without the isolation. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff claimed he was denied a due process hearing throughout his

three weeks in administrative segregation. (Id. at 5.) In addition, Plaintiff claimed he was denied access

to counsel because the isolation effectively ended communication with his attorney and destroyed his

attorney-client relationship and mutual trust. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff alleged that his attorney refused to

accept his calls for the three months leading up to a trial hearing, even after Plaintiff was returned to the

general population. (Id. at 8.) 

Around January 5, 2010, Plaintiff was placed in isolation again, segregated for twenty-three hours a

day with no interaction and remained there for two months. (Doc. 15, at 6.) Plaintiff claimed he

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submitted multiple grievances asking for an explanation for the confinement but did not receive a

response. (Id.) Plaintiff stated that he believed that the reasons behind his isolation were punitive,

rather than administrative, because the deputies wanted to punish him for being a “nuisance.” (Id.) 

After January 29, 2010, Plaintiff claimed he was told that his segregation was a result of his life

sentence that he had received but he otherwise was not given a hearing or an official explanation for his

time spent in administrative segregation in violation of Due Process and the Eighth Amendment. (Id.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b) expressly enumerates a list of six defenses that can be asserted in a motion to

dismiss, including for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,” FED. R. CIV. P.

12(b)(6). Under 12(b)(6), a complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a cognizable legal theory or

for failure to state sufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory. See Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729,

732 (9th Cir. 2001). In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint, the court must assume the truth of all

factual allegations and construe them in light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Thompson v.

Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002). The court may consider the facts alleged in the complaint,

documents attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in the complaint, and matters

of which the court takes judicial notice. U.S. v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9thCir. 2003). Additionally,

the court may hypothesize facts, “consistent with the complaint, that would make out a claim.” 

Graehling v. Village of Lombard, Ill., 58 F.3d 295, 297 (7th Cir. 1995). However, legal conclusions

need not be taken as true merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations. Roberts v.

Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 1987). Also, “when the allegations of the complaint are

refuted by an attached document, the Court need not accept the allegations as being true.” Roth v.

Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d 617, 625 n.1 (9th Cir. 1991). Furthermore, “[i]f the pleadings establish facts

compelling a decision one way, that is as good as if depositions and other expensively obtained evidence

on summary judgment establishes the identical facts.” Weisbuch v. County of Los Angeles, 119 F.3d

778, 783 n.1 (9th Cir. 1997). 

///

///

///

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DISCUSSION

1. Plaintiff Stated a Due-Process Claim re: Pretrial Detainment in Administrative Segregation. 

Plaintiff contends that during his pretrial detainment he was placed in administrative segregation

without an explanation or a due process hearing as a form of punishment for illegally contacting a

prosecution witness by mail. (Doc. 15, at 4-5, 7.) Defendants argue the segregation served a legitimate,

non-punitive objective of protecting witnesses and thus did not amount to punishment necessitating a

due process hearing to establish a factual and legal basis for the measure. (Doc. 29-1, at 5.) 

Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a pretrial detainee may not be

punished prior to an adjudication of guilt. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). While regulatory

and disciplinary restraints may be constitutionally imposed on a detainee prior to a determination of

guilt, punitive measures in advance of conviction may not be. Id. at 537. Importantly, a pretrial

detainee may not be subject to administrative segregation without a due process hearing to determine

whether a rule or policy was violated. Mitchell v. Dupnik, 75 F.3d 517, 524 (9th Cir. 1996).

Plaintiff argues he was placed in administrative segregation as punishment because the Defendants

believed he contacted prosecution witnesses by mail. Plaintiff also alleges that he was placed in

administrative segregation without a due process hearing to determine if he in fact violated a rule or

policy. Thus, Plaintiff put forth enough facts to suggest that his Fourteenth Amendment Due Process

rights may have been violated. Therefore, Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Due Process claim

regarding pretrial detainment should be DENIED.

2. Plaintiff Failed to State a Claim re: Postconviction Detainment in Administrative Segregation. 

Plaintiff alleges he remained in administrative segregation after his conviction without being given

a due process hearing or an official explanation for his placement there. (Doc. 15, at 6.) Also, Plaintiff

argues that his placement in administrative segregation amounted to a violation of the Eighth

Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. (Id.) Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed

to state a Due Process claim because he had no liberty interest in freedom from segregation once

convicted and that he did not allege sufficient facts to show that his placement in administrative

segregation gave rise to a serious risk of harm in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Doc. 29-1, at 6.) 

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The Due Process Clause protects prisoners against deprivations of liberty without due process of

law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). To state a cause of action under the Due Process

Clause, a plaintiff must first establish the existence of a liberty interest for which the protection is

sought. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005). Simply being placed in segregated confinement

without alleging atypical, significant deprivation does not give rise to a liberty interest protected by the

Due Process Clause. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 486 (1995); May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 565

(9th Cir. 1997) (finding that the Constitution does not give rise to a liberty interest in simply avoiding

transfer to more restricted conditions of confinement). Moreover, simply being held in administrative

segregation, without specific allegations that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to prison

conditions posing a serious risk of harm, does not amount to an Eighth Amendment violation. Jefferson

v. McDaniel, 324 Fed. Appx. 614, 615 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Plaintiff alleges he was placed in administrative segregation for approximately one month after his

conviction, confined to a cell for twenty-three hours a day. However, as Plaintiff has not submitted facts

claiming his confinement in administrative segregation imposed atypical and severe hardship, he has

failed to state a Due Process claim for his postconviction detainment in administrative segregation. 

Moreover, Plaintiff has also failed to state facts claiming that his time in administrative segregation

posed a serious risk of harm to which prison officials were deliberately indifferent. Thus, Defendants’

motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Due Process and Eighth Amendment claims regarding his postconviction

detainment should be GRANTED. 

3. Plaintiff Failed to State Sufficient Facts Supporting Violation of His Right of Access to Counsel.

Plaintiff alleges that his placement in administrative segregation as a pretrial detainee interfered

with his access to counsel as the prolonged isolation effectively ended communication with his attorney

and destroyed his attorney-client relationship. (Doc. 15, at 5.) Plaintiff alleges that his attorney refused

to accept his calls for the three months leading up to a trial hearing, even after Plaintiff was returned to

the general population. (Id. at 8.) Defendants contend that Plaintiff failed to state a claim for

interference with his right to counsel as Plaintiff had other avenues to communicate with his attorney

and he failed to allege that prejudice resulted from the alleged interference. (Doc. 29, at 7-8.) 

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“It is now established beyond doubt that prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the

courts.” Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977). The right of access to courts encompasses the right

of an inmate to talk in person and on the telephone with his attorney in confidential settings. Hydrick v.

Hunter, 500 F.3d 978, 999 (9th Cir. 2007) (overruled on other grounds). To state a denial of access

claim, the plaintiff must state facts that he suffered an actual injury, that the defendants’ actions

“hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996). 

Here, Plaintiff contends that “weeks of highly curtailed and irregular, unpredictable phone access

effectively ended phone contact” with his attorney while he was in administrative segregation. (Doc.

15, at 5.) However, Plaintiff fails to allege facts that Defendants’ actions specifically caused Plaintiff’s

attorney to end communication with him or that Defendants’ actions caused an actual injury and

hindered Plaintiff from pursuing his legal claim in court. Thus, as Plaintiff has failed to state sufficient

facts supporting a claim of denial of access to the courts, Defendants’ motion to dismiss this claim

should be GRANTED.

4. Plaintiff Failed to State a Claim Re: Illegal Search & Deprivation of Personal Property. 

Plaintiff argues that his prison cell was searched without a warrant in violation of the Fourth

Amendment and that his property was unlawfully seized for an illegitimate punitive purpose. (Doc. 15,

at 4, 7.) Defendants argue that Plaintiff as a detainee is not entitled to the Fourth Amendment right to

privacy and that unlawful intentional deprivation of Plaintiff’s personal property does not constitute a

Due Process violation as Plaintiff could avail himself of the California Tort Claims Act to obtain redress

for the loss. (Doc. 15, at 8.)

“[T]he Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches does not apply in prison cells.” 

Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984). Pretrial detainees have a similarly limited expectation of

privacy in their jail cells because “there is no basis for concluding that pretrial detainees pose any lesser

security risk to society than convicted inmates.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 n.28 (1979);

Mitchell v. Dupnik, 75 F.3d 517, 522 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that pretrial detainees have no reasonable

expectation of privacy in cells). Although a detainee does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy

in the prison cell and cannot avail himself of the protections provided under the Fourth Amendment for

undue harassment and destruction of personal property, the inmate may use state tort and common-law

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remedies to redress such conduct. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 530; Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816-17

(9th Cir. 1994) (finding that California law provides a postdeprivation remedy for any unlawful property

deprivations). However, “if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available” under state

law, such unauthorized intentional deprivation of personal property does not violate the Due Process

clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533. 

Plaintiff alleges Defendants Laravmicocca and Morgans initiated the warrantless search of his jail

cell at GBDF and VDF for the District Attorney’s office. (Doc. 15, at 7-8.) Plaintiff claims that the 

GBDF search was “intended to seize any items related to an ongoing criminal investigation” and that

both searches were intended to harass Plaintiff. (Id. at 7-8.) Plaintiff claims that all personal items were

seized, except for food and hygiene items. (Id. at 7.) Under these set of facts, Plaintiff has not stated a

Fourth Amendment claim as the Fourth Amendment does not protect Plaintiff from unreasonable

searches in prison cells. Neither has Plaintiff stated a Due Process claim because the California Tort

Claims Act provides the method whereby Plaintiff could obtain redress for any unlawful personal

property deprivation. Thus, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment and Due

Process claims regarding the illegal searches and the unlawful property losses should be GRANTED. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS the following:

1) that Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Due Process claim regarding pretrial detainment should

be DENIED;

2) that Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Due Process and Eighth Amendment claims

regarding his postconviction detainment should be GRANTED;

3) that Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim of denial of access to the courts should be 

GRANTED; and

4) that Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment and Due Process claims

regarding the searches and the unlawful property losses should be GRANTED.

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge Larry Burns,

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 72.1 of the United States District Court for the

Southern District of California.

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IT IS ORDERED that, no later than August 24, 2011, the parties may file written objections to

this Report and Recommendation. The document should be captioned “Objections to Report and

Recommendation.” Any reply to the Objections shall be filed on or before August 31, 2011. The

parties are advised that failure to file either of these documents within the specified time periods may

waive the right to raise objections to the magistrate judge’s findings of fact. See Turner v. Duncan, 158

F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 11, 2011

Peter C. Lewis

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

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