Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_20-cv-01096/USCOURTS-caed-1_20-cv-01096-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 362
Nature of Suit: Medical Malpractice
Cause of Action: 28:1402 Medical Malpractice

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHANDA DAVIS,

Plaintiff,

v.

SHERWIN YU YEE LOO, D.C., et al.,

Defendants.

No. 1:20-cv-01096-DAD-JLT

ORDER DISMISSING CLAIMS AGAINST 

DEFENDANT OMNI FAMILY HEALTH 

CENTER AND OMNI FAMILY HEATLH, 

INC. AND REMANDING THIS ACTION TO 

THE KERN COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT

(Doc. No. 3)

This matter is before the court on the unopposed motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claims 

brought against defendants Omni Family Health Center and Omni Family Health, Inc., 

(collectively “Omni Health”) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. (Doc. No. 3.) In moving to 

dismiss those claims, defendant United States argues that plaintiff did not complete the Federal 

Tort Claims Act’s (“FTCA”) administrative tort claims process before filing suit as is required.

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(Id.) Pursuant to General Order No. 617 addressing the public health emergency posed by the 

COVID-19 pandemic, the motion was taken under submission on the papers. (Doc. No. 4.) For 

the reasons set forth below, the court will grant the pending motion, dismiss plaintiff’s claims 

 

1 The United States is substituted as the party defendant in place of Omni Health pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2679(d)(2).

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against the United States, and remand this action to the Kern County Superior Court as to 

plaintiff’s claims against defendant Loo. 

BACKGROUND

On February 7, 2020, plaintiff Davis filed a complaint against defendants Omni Family 

Health Center and Omni Family Health Inc., (collectively “Omni Health”), and Sherwin Yu Yee 

Loo, D.C., in the Kern County Superior Court. (Doc. No. 1 at 4.) On August 6, 2020, the United 

States filed a Notice of Substitution in this action seeking to substitute itself as the defendant in 

place of Omni Health. (Doc. No. 1–2.) Defendants filed a Certificate of Scope of Employment 

through a designee of the United States Attorney certifying that Omni Health was acting within 

the scope of its employment with the Public Health Service at the time of the alleged incidents 

giving rise to plaintiff’s claim. (Doc. No. 1 at 14–15.) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(2), for 

any civil action commenced in state court, whereupon the Attorney General has certified that the 

defendant was acting within the scope of employment for the United States, such action may be 

removed to a district court at any time before trial. Meridian Int’l Logistics, Inc. v. United States,

939 F.2d 740, 743–45 (9th Cir. 1991). Further, the United States is substituted then as the party 

defendant in such case. Id. “‘The Attorney General’s certification is conclusive for purposes of 

removal, i.e., once certification and removal are effected, exclusive competence to adjudicate the 

case resides in the federal court, and that court may not remand the suit to the state 

court.’” Rodriguez v. Kwok, No. C 13-04976 SI, 2014 WL 889570, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 3,

2014) (quoting Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225, 231 (2007)). Certification may also be made by

the United States Attorney's Office for the district where the civil action is brought. 28 C.F.R. §

15.4; see, e.g., D.V. v. Thompson, No. 14-CV-02155-RMW, 2015 WL 5188126, at *1 (N.D. Cal.

Sept. 4, 2015). Here, David T. Shelledy, the Chief of the Civil Division of the United States 

Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of California filed a Certificate of Scope of Employment 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2679 and 28 C.F.R. § 15.4. Therein, he certifies that he read the 

complaint originally filed by plaintiff in the superior court. Attorney Shelledy further certifies 

that the named defendant, Omni Health, was acting within the scope of its employment with the 

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Public Health Service at the time of the alleged incidents giving rise to plaintiff's claims asserted 

in this action. (Doc. No. 1 at 15.)

On August 6, 2020, the United States removed this action from the Kern County Superior 

Court to this federal court on the basis of federal-question jurisdiction. (Doc. No. 1.) The FTCA 

‘“vests the federal district courts with exclusive jurisdiction over suits arising from the negligence 

of Government employees.’” Valdez-Lopez v. Chertoff, 656 F.3d 851, 855 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(quoting Jerves v. United States, 966 F.2d 517, 518 (9th Cir. 1992)); 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(b)(1). 

On August 13, 2020, the United States filed the pending motion to dismiss the claims against it

for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). (Doc. No. 

3.) Therein, defendant United States argues that plaintiff did not exhaust her administrative 

remedies prior to filing suit as is required. (Doc. No. 3-1.) Plaintiff did not file an opposition to 

the motion. The United States filed a reply on September 11, 2020, simply noting that plaintiff 

had not filed an opposition. (Doc. No. 5.) Thereafter, plaintiff filed a notice of non-opposition to 

the motion to dismiss on September 16, 2020. (Doc. No. 6.)

LEGAL STANDARD

“When a defendant moves to dismiss a complaint or claim for lack of subject-matter 

jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the court has jurisdiction to decide the 

claim.” Cannon v. Harco Nat’l Ins. Co., No. 09-cv-00026-MMA-JMA, 2009 WL 10725673, at 

*2 (S.D. Cal. July 16, 2009) (citing Thornhill Publ’n Co. v. Gen. Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 594 F.2d 

730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979)). A motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) “may be facial or factual. In a facial attack, the 

challenger asserts that the allegations contained in a complaint are insufficient on their face to 

invoke federal jurisdiction.” Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004) 

(citing White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000)). “The district court resolves a facial 

attack as it would a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6): [a]ccepting the plaintiff’s allegations 

as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, the court determines whether 

the allegations are sufficient as a legal matter to invoke the court’s jurisdiction.” Leite v. Crane 

Co., 749 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2014). As is true in evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the 

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court need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations. 

Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc., 328 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2003). “By contrast, in a 

factual attack, the challenger disputes the truth of the allegations that, by themselves, would 

otherwise invoke federal jurisdiction.” Safe Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039. Extrinsic 

evidence is heard on factual attacks and the court may review “any evidence, such as affidavits 

and testimony, to resolve factual disputes concerning the existence of jurisdiction.” McCarthy v. 

United States, 850 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731 (1947)).

ANALYSIS

In its pending motion, the United States argues that “[a]bsent a waiver, sovereign 

immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit.” (Doc. No. 3-1 at 3) (citing 

FDIC v. Meyers, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994)). The United States acknowledges that by enacting 

the FTCA, Congress waived the sovereign immunity of the United States with respect to tort 

liability. (Doc. No. 3-1 at 3) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)). Nonetheless, the United States asserts, 

“[a] federal court’s jurisdiction to hear damage actions against the United States is limited by 

section 2675(a) of the FTCA.” (Doc. No. 3-1 at 3) (quoting Shipek v. United States, 752 F.2d 

1352, 1353 (9th Cir. 1985)). Defendant points out that § 2675(a) requires that as a prerequisite to 

suing the United States a plaintiff must first present his or her claim to the appropriate federal 

agency and then receive a denial or await the passage of six months before filing suit. (Id.) 

(citing Title 18 U.S.C § 2675(a)). Accordingly, defendant argues that because plaintiff has not 

submitted nor exhausted an administrative tort claim to the United States Department of Health 

and Human Services, plaintiff’s claims against the United States must be dismissed for lack of 

subject-matter jurisdiction. (Id.)

Plaintiff does not oppose the pending motion. (Doc. No. 6.) In fact, as noted, plaintiff has

filed a notice of non-opposition to the pending motion to dismiss the United States without 

prejudice and has agreed that the remand of this action to Kern County Superior Court is 

appropriate to allow plaintiff to proceed on the claims asserted against defendant Loo. (Id.)

The court agrees that the FTCA bars claimants from bringing suit in federal court unless

they have exhausted their administrative remedies. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 

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113 (1993); see also Brady v. United States, 211 F.3d 499, 502–03 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The purpose 

of the FTCA’s administrative claim procedure is ‘to encourage administrative settlement of 

claims against the United States and thereby to prevent an unnecessary burdening of the courts.’”)

(quoting Jerves, 966 F.2d at 520). The exhaustion of administrative remedies is a jurisdictional 

requirement that must be strictly adhered to. Valdez-Lopez, 656 F.3d at 855; Brady, 211 F.3d at

502–03 (9th Cir. 2000). “[T]he Supreme Court has described the FTCA's exhaustion requirement 

as a ‘clear statutory command.’” Valdez-Lopez, 656 F.3d at 855 (quoting McNeil, 508 U.S. at

113). The court further agrees that plaintiff has not alleged nor shown that she submitted an 

administrative tort claim to the United States Department of Health and Human Services. (Doc. 

No. 3-2.) Consequently, under § 2675(a) of the FTCA this court does not have subject-matter 

jurisdiction based on federal question jurisdiction. See Title 18 U.S.C § 2675(a). Because 

plaintiff has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies prior to filing suit, the court will grant 

defendant United States’ motion to dismiss without prejudice. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above,

1. The Clerk of the Court is directed to update the docket to reflect that the United 

States has substituted in as defendant in place of Omni Family Health Center and 

Omni Family Health Inc.;

2. Defendant United States’ motion to dismiss this action for lack of subject-matter 

jurisdiction (Doc. No. 3) is granted without prejudice; 

3. This action is remanded to the Kern County Superior Court to proceed on 

plaintiff’s claims brought against defendant Loo; and 

4. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 9, 2020 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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