Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-08-55037/USCOURTS-ca9-08-55037-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LOUISE VICTORIA JEFFREDO, JOYCE 

JEAN JEFFREDO-RYDER, CHRISTOPHER

L. RYDER, JEREMIAH S. RYDER,

JONATHAN B. RYDER, MICHAEL JOHN

JEFFREDO, ELIZABETH VILLINA

JEFFREDO, JACKIE M. MADARIAGA,

KELLY M. MADARIAGA, CARRIE

MADARIAGA, LAWRENCE No. 08-55037

MADARIAGA, WILLIAM A. HARRIS, D.C. No.

STERLING HARRIS, APRIL HARRIS, CV-07-01851-JFW

MINDY PHENEGER, RICHARD HARRIS; 

Petitioners-Appellants, ORDER AND

AMENDED

v. OPINION

MARK A. MACARRO, DONNA

BARRON, MARC CALAC, MARK

LUKER, ANDREW MASIEL, RUSSELL

BUTCH MURPHY, KENNETH PEREZ,

DARLENE AZZARELLI, CHRISTINE

LUKER;

Respondents-Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

John F. Walter, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

April 17, 2009—Pasadena, California

Filed December 22, 2009

Amended Opinion Filed March 22, 2010

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Before: Johnnie B. Rawlinson and N. Randy Smith,

Circuit Judges, and Claudia Wilken,* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge N.R. Smith;

Dissent by Judge Wilken

*The Honorable Claudia Wilken, United States District Judge for the

Northern District of California, sitting by designation. 

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COUNSEL

Paul Harris and Patrick Romero Guillory, Dolores Park Law

Offices, San Francisco, California, for the petitionersappellants. 

Frank Lawrence, Holland and Knight, Los Angeles, California, and John Schumacher, Law Office of John Schumacher,

LLC, Riverton, Wyoming, for the respondents-appellees. 

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ORDER

The opinion and dissent filed on December 22, 2009, and

reported at 590 F.3d 751 are hereby amended. An amended

opinion and dissent are filed concurrently with this order.

No petition for rehearing or rehearing en banc was filed

within the original time period, and that time period has now

expired. No subsequent petitions for rehearing or rehearing en

banc shall be filed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

OPINION

N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judge:

The Pechanga Band of the Luiseño Mission Indians

(“Pechanga Tribe”) disenrolled a number of its members

(“Appellants”) for failing to prove their lineal descent as

members of the Tribe. Federal courts generally lack jurisdiction to consider any appeal from the decision of an Indian

tribe to disenroll one of its members. See Santa Clara Pueblo

v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 n.32 (1978). Appellants, therefore, brought this petition for habeas corpus under 25 U.S.C.

§ 1303 of the Indian Civil Rights Act (“ICRA”), claiming

their disenrollment by members of the Pechanga Tribal Council (“Appellees”) was tantamount to an unlawful detention.

Despite the novelty of this approach and despite the potential

injustice of this situation, we nonetheless lack subject matter

jurisdiction to consider this claim, because Appellants were

not detained. Therefore, Appellants cannot bring their claims

under § 1303 of the ICRA and we must affirm the district

court. Only Congress can aid these appellants.

I. BACKGROUND

The Pechanga Tribe is a federally-recognized Indian tribe.

72 Fed. Reg. 13648, 13650 (Mar. 22, 2007). The Tribe’s ultiJEFFREDO v. MACARRO 4645

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mate governing authority consists of all of the adult members

of the Tribe (“General Membership”). On December 10,

1978, the Pechanga Tribe adopted the Constitution and

Bylaws of the Temecula Tribe of Luiseño Mission Indians

(“Pechanga Constitution”). Article II of the Pechanga Constitution provides: 

Membership is an enrolled member documented

in the Band’s Official Enrollment Book of 1979. 

Qualifications for membership of the Temecula

Band of Luiseno Mission Indians Are:

A. Applicant must show proof of Lineal

Descent from original Pechanga

Temecula people.

B. Adopted people, family or Band, and

non-indians cannot be enrolled. Exception: People who were accepted in the

Indian Way prior to 1928 will be

accepted. 

C. If you have ever been enrolled or recognized in any other reservation you

cannot enroll in Pechanga. 

At issue here is subsection A, requiring applicants to “show

proof of Lineal Descent from original Pechanga Temecula

people.” In late 2002 and early 2003, the Enrollment Committee received information from its members alleging that a

number of Pechanga Tribe members were not lineal descendants from the original Pechanga Temecula people. Therefore, according to the Pechanga Enrollment Disenrollment

Procedure (“Disenrollment Procedures”), the Enrollment

Committee was required to investigate the allegations. Allegations surrounded five lines of descent that allegedly did not

qualify for membership under the Pechanga Constitution. 

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According to the Pechanga Disenrollment Procedure, disenrollment is “revoking a person’s membership when it is

found that they do not meet the requirements set forth on the

enrollment application which was approved by the Band.”

The Disenrollment Procedures were adopted by the Pechanga

Tribe (1) to correct mistakes that resulted when tribal membership was mistakenly approved and (2) to provide a process

that would allow a fair hearing in the disenrollment procedure. Under the Disenrollment Procedures, the Enrollment

Committee initiates a disenrollment process against those

individuals allegedly not qualifying for membership in the

Tribe. After the initiation of the disenrollment, the Enrollment

Committee must provide adequate notice to the individual to

be summoned to a meeting with the Enrollment Committee.

The notice must (1) state that the Enrollment Committee has

questions regarding enrollment; (2) stress the importance of

responding to the notice; and (3) request a meeting within

thirty days of the response. Unless the person receiving the

notice chooses to be automatically disenrolled, he or she must

respond. Once a response has been filed, the Enrollment

Committee has thirty days to set up a meeting. At that meeting, the Enrollment Committee must show specific evidence

that would prove that the documentation provided for enrollment does not provide evidence of lineal descent. If the

Enrollment Committee provides such evidence, the individual

then is allowed another thirty days to provide additional information to prove her or his lineal descent. If the individual provides further evidence that satisfies the Enrollment

Committee as to his lineal descent, the process is terminated

and the individual keeps his or her membership status. If the

Enrollment Committee is not satisfied by the further evidence,

the individual will be disenrolled and the Tribal Council is

notified of the disenrollment. 

If the Enrollment Committee fails to follow these steps or

is negligent in any way, the individual can appeal to the Tribal

Council for a fair hearing. At the hearing, the Tribal Council

only reviews the documentation that the Enrollment CommitJEFFREDO v. MACARRO 4647

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tee reviewed. The individual is not entitled to legal representation at the hearing. If the Tribal Council finds there was an

error, the Enrollment Committee reevaluates the case. If the

appeal is successful, membership will be reinstated. 

Disenrollment does not mean that a person is banished

from the Pechanga Reservation. The Pechanga Tribe instead

has specific procedures for exclusion and eviction. These

requirements are set forth in the “Exclusion and Eviction Regulations.” Under these regulations, the Pechanga Tribe may

exclude and or evict someone from the reservation for: “(1)

[v]iolating tribal laws and ordinances; (2) [c]reating conditions which pose a threat to the public health, safety and welfare; (3) [e]ngaging in criminal activities on the Pechanga

Reservation, by finding of the Tribal Council, or being convicted of one or more felony crimes; (4) [b]eing declared a

public nuisance by the Tribal Council; [or] (5) [c]reating a

breach of peace, including but not limited to public drunkenness.” The Exclusion and Eviction Regulations dictate the

procedure to evict and or exclude and the opportunity to

appeal such exclusion. 

In early 2003, the Enrollment Committee began addressing

the allegations regarding the lineal descent of certain members. On March 7, 2003, the Tribal Council issued a Notice

and Order regarding pending disenrollment matters. The

Notice and Order mandated that the Enrollment Committee:

(1) “use a fair and impartial decision by a majority of the

committee to review a file;” (2) follow Robert’s Rules of

Order; and (3) allow adequate time for presentation of evidence as required under the Disenrollment Procedures. 

Sometime before March 7, 2003, the Enrollment Committee determined that the first three lines of descent met the

membership criteria. Then it turned its attention to those

members who claimed a lineal descent through Paulina

Hunter. On May 3, 2005, after a proper vote, the Enrollment

Committee summoned Appellants and notified them that the

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Enrollment Committee believed there were grounds to initiate

the disenrollment process. The summonses (1) notified Appellants that the disenrollment procedures had been initiated, (2)

requested additional information concerning Appellants’ family history, and (3) notified Appellants that they were required

to set up an Initial Meeting with the Enrollment Committee.

Meetings were held with Appellants in June of 2005. The

Enrollment Committee provided Appellants with a copy of all

factual records in its possession. The Enrollment Committee

then stated its concerns about each Appellant’s claim of lineal

descent. Appellants were also notified that they had thirty

days to submit information supporting their claim of lineal

descent. The Enrollment Committee emphasized that Appellants’ enrollment would be measured by the Pechanga Constitution’s requirements. The Enrollment Committee advised

each Appellant that no decision would be made until it

received all additional information. 

On March 16, 2006, the Enrollment Committee (after

review of the full record) disenrolled Appellants for failure to

prove lineal descent from an original Pechanga Temecula person. Appellants exercised their right to appeal to the Tribal

Council. The Tribal Council held hearings on July 21, 2006.

The Tribal Council affirmed the Enrollment Committee,

“finding: (1) there was no evidence of unfair or partial treatment of Appellants by the Enrollment Committee; (2) there

was no evidence of negligence in the handling of Appellants’

case by the Enrollment Committee; and (3) there was insufficient proof that the Enrollment Committee violated the disenrollment procedures.” 

Appellants then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in

the Central District of California. Appellants moved for summary judgment. Appellees filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant

to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

claiming that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdicJEFFREDO v. MACARRO 4649

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tion. The district court granted the Motion to Dismiss. Appellants appealed the district court decision.

II. DISCUSSION

We review de novo dismissals for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). Carson Harbor Village, Ltd.

v. City of Carson, 353 F.3d 824, 826 (9th Cir. 2004). We also

review de novo a district court’s denial of a petition for writ

of habeas corpus under the ICRA. Selam v. Warm Springs

Tribal Corr. Facility, 134 F.3d 948, 951 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Ordinarily, federal courts lack jurisdiction to consider an

appeal from the decision of an Indian Tribe to disenroll one

of its members. “A tribe’s right to define its own membership

for tribal purposes has long been recognized as central to its

existence as an independent political community.” Santa

Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 72 n.32; Cherokee Intermarriage

Cases, 203 U.S. 76 (1906)). Because of this precedent, Appellants did not directly appeal the Tribe’s decision. Instead, they

petitioned the court for a writ of habeas corpus under the

ICRA to collaterally challenge their disenrollment.

[1] Section 1303 of the ICRA provides: “The privilege of

the writ of habeas corpus shall be available to any person, in

a court of the United States, to test the legality of his detention by order of an Indian tribe.” 25 U.S.C. § 1303. The term

“detention” in the statute must be interpreted similarly to the

“in custody” requirement in other habeas contexts. See Moore

v. Nelson, 270 F.3d 789, 791 (9th Cir. 2001) (“There is no

reason to conclude that the requirement of ‘detention’ set

forth in the Indian Civil Rights Act § 1303 is any more lenient

than the requirement of ‘custody’ set forth in the other habeas

statutes.” (citation omitted)). Further, “[g]iven the often vast

gulf between tribal traditions and those with which federal

courts are more intimately familiar, the judiciary should not

rush to create causes of action that would intrude on these delicate matters.” Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 72 n.32.

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Therefore, an ICRA habeas petition is only proper when the

petitioner is in custody. Id. at 791 (explaining the custody

requirement). 

We have also held that a litigant must first exhaust tribal

remedies before properly bringing a petition for writ of

habeas corpus. Selam, 134 F.3d at 953-54 (explaining the

exhaustion requirement); see also Felix S. Cohen, Handbook

of Federal Indian Law § 9.09 (2005). Even when a federal

court has jurisdiction over a claim, if the claim arises in

Indian country, the court is required to “stay its hand” until

the party has exhausted all available tribal remedies. Cohen,

Handbook of Federal Indian Law § 7.04 (citing Iowa Mut.

Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 16 (1987); Nat’l Farmers

Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 857 (1985)).

“The Supreme Court’s policy of nurturing tribal selfgovernment strongly discourages federal courts from assuming jurisdiction over unexhausted claims.” Selam, 134 F.3d at

953. There is authority for relaxing the exhaustion requirement where the party can show that exhaustion would be

futile or that tribal courts offer no adequate remedy. See id.

at 954.

[2] Therefore, “all federal courts addressing the issue mandate that two prerequisites be satisfied before they will hear

a habeas petition filed under the IRCA: [(1)] The petitioner

must be in custody, and [(2)] the petitioner must first exhaust

tribal remedies.”). Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law

§ 9.09 & § 9.09 n.280. We therefore have no jurisdiction to

hear a petitioner’s claim for habeas corpus, unless both of

these conditions are met. Any expansion of this jurisdiction

must come from Congress, not by decision of this court.

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I. Appellants do not meet the requirements for the court

to have jurisdiction under § 1303 of the ICRA. 

A. Appellants were not detained/in custody. 

Appellants contend that (1) the actual restraints, (2) the

potential restraints, and (3) their lost Pechanga identity all

amount to detention under § 1303. We do not agree.

1.

[3] Appellants contend that, because they have been denied

access to the Senior Citizens’ Center, cannot go to the health

clinic, and their children can no longer go to tribal school,

they have been detained. We disagree. Jones v. Cunningham

requires that “conditions and restrictions . . . significantly

restrain [one’s] liberty” in order to invoke § 1303 jurisdiction.

371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963). The Second Circuit has said that

“under Jones and its progeny, a severe actual or potential

restraint on liberty” is necessary for jurisdiction under § 1303.

See Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d

874, 880 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Shenandoah v. Halbritter,

275 F. Supp. 2d 279, 285 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (quoting Poodry

for the same proposition). We agree with our colleagues on

the Second Circuit and hold that § 1303 does require “a

severe actual or potential restraint on liberty.” Poodry, 85

F.3d at 880. 

[4] In the case before us, the denial of access to certain

facilities does not pose a severe actual or potential restraint on

the Appellants’ liberty. Appellants have not been banished

from the Reservation. Appellants have never been arrested,

imprisoned, fined, or otherwise held by the Tribe. Appellants

have not been evicted from their homes or suffered destruction of their property. No personal restraint (other than access

to these facilities) has been imposed on them as a result of the

Tribe’s actions. Their movements have not been restricted on

the Reservation. Faced with a similar situation, the Second

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Circuit also determined that less severe restraints such as loss

of one’s “voice” in the community, loss of health insurance,

loss of access to tribal health and recreation facilities, loss of

quarterly distributions to tribal members, and loss of one’s

place on the membership roles of the tribe are simply “insufficient to bring plaintiffs within [the] ICRA’s habeas provision.” Shenandoah v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 159 F.3d 708,

714 (2d Cir. 1998). 

[5] Appellants contend that the denial of access to these

facilities is similar to the restraint found in Poodry. This is not

Poodry. In Poodry, the petitioners were convicted of treason,

sentenced to permanent banishment, and permanently lost any

and all rights afforded to tribal members. See Poodry, 85 F.3d

at 876, 878. Appellants have not been convicted, sentenced,

or permanently banished. We therefore hold that the limitation of Appellants’ access to certain tribal facilities does not

amount to a “detention.”

2.

[6] Appellants contend that, as non-members of the tribe,

they are “under a continuing threat of banishment/exclusion.”

No court has held that such a threat is sufficient to satisfy the

detention requirement of § 1303. 

The custody requirement of the habeas corpus statute

is designed to preserve the writ of habeas corpus as

a remedy for severe restraints on individual liberty.

Since habeas corpus is an extraordinary remedy

whose operation is to a large extent uninhibited by

traditional rules of finality and federalism, its use has

been limited to cases of special urgency, leaving

more conventional remedies for cases in which the

restraints on liberty are neither severe nor immediate. 

Hensley v. Mun. Court, 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973). Applying

this principle, we previously held that a threat of confinement

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is not severe nor immediate enough to justify the writ.

Edmunds v. Won Bae Chang, 509 F.2d 39, 40-41 (9th Cir.

1975) (denying habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2254).

In Edmunds, the petitioner was subject to a court-imposed

fine, which could be enforced by jail time. Id. at 41. The court

held, however, that until confinement is imminent (like the

confinement in Hensley) there can be no justification for use

of the habeas corpus remedy. Id. We see no reason not to

analogize to the court’s construction of the criminal habeas

corpus provisions in Edmunds. Therefore, we hold that the

potential threat of future eviction is not sufficient to satisfy

the detention requirement of § 1303.

[7] Appellants argue that, while no such procedures have

been commenced to exclude or evict Appellants, there is a

potential that they could be excluded. Under the Pechanga

Non-Member Reservation Access and Rental Ordinance

“[a]ccess to and residency within the Reservation is a privilege which may be granted or denied to an individual upon

proper authority of the Pechanga Band.” However, the

Pechanga Tribe enacted exclusion and eviction regulations

that provide a process for eviction in an effort to protect law

and order on the reservation and to provide uniform procedures for exclusion and eviction. These provisions apply

equally to those who have been disenrolled and those who are

current members of the tribe. Appellants admit they have

never been subjected to exclusion or eviction proceedings.

3.

[8] Appellants lastly contend that disenrollment, stripping

them of their Pechanga citizenship, is enough of a significant

restraint on their liberty to constitute a detention. While we

have the most sympathy for this argument, we find no precedent for the proposition that disenrollment alone is sufficient

to be considered detention under § 1303. While “Congress’

authority over Indian matters is extraordinarily broad . . . the

role of courts in adjusting relations between and among tribes

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and their members [is] correspondingly restrained.” Santa

Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 71. Further, “[a] tribe’s right to

define its own membership for tribal purposes has long been

recognized as central to its existence as an independent political community.” Id. at 71 n.32 (citing Roff v. Burney, 168

U.S. 218 (1897); Cherokee Intermarriage Cases, 203 U.S.

76). We have also noted that “[a]n Indian tribe has the power

to define membership as it chooses, subject to the plenary

power of Congress.” Williams v. Gover, 490 F.3d 785, 789

(9th Cir. 2007). Thus (while Congress may have authority in

these matters) in the complete absence of precedent, we cannot involve the courts in these disputes.

[9] This court is without jurisdiction to review direct

appeals of tribal decisions regarding disenrollment of members. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 72 n.32. We

cannot circumvent our lack of jurisdiction over these matters

by expanding the scope of the writ of habeas corpus to cover

exactly the same subject matter. At its heart, this case is a

challenge to disenrollment of certain members by the tribe. It

is precisely because we lack jurisdiction to hear such claims,

however, that Appellants brought this case under habeas corpus law. We find (and the parties direct us to) nothing in the

legislative history of § 1303 that suggests the provision

should be interpreted to cover disenrollment proceedings.

Because nothing in the legislative history suggests otherwise

and because binding precedent precludes review of disenrollment proceedings, we cannot accept Appellants’ invitation to

expand habeas corpus here. 

[10] Appellants contend that their disenrollment is analogous to denaturalization. We disagree. Appellants cite Trop v.

Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), to support this proposition. The

court in Trop was confronted with the constitutionality of a

statute that revoked United States citizenship for desertion

during wartime even if the desertion was unrelated to any

actions on behalf of a foreign government. Id. at 87-88. Trop

is inapposite to this case. In Trop the statute left the defendant

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stateless. Id. Further, the statute was penal in nature. Id. at 96.

Here Appellants have not been left stateless, and nothing in

the record indicates that the disenrollment proceedings were

undertaken to punish Appellants. Therefore, Trop is not controlling.

We do not wish to minimize the impact of the Tribe’s

membership decision on Appellants. Indeed, we recognize

that Appellants have suffered a significant loss. Nevertheless,

such loss is simply not equivalent to detention. This is not the

first time that we have noted that we do not have jurisdiction

to review membership decisions, even when the results of

such decisions appear unfair. In Lewis v. Norton, 424 F.3d

959 (9th Cir. 2005), the plaintiff-appellants likewise sought

judicial review of a tribal membership decision. We stated,

“[a]lthough [plaintiffs’] claim to membership appears to be a

strong one, as their father is a recognized member of the tribe,

their claim cannot survive the double jurisdictional whammy

of sovereign immunity and lack of federal court jurisdiction

to intervene in tribal membership disputes.” Id. at 960. In

Lewis we further noted that our jurisdiction in these matters

may prevent us from intervening even when fairness may

seem to dictate otherwise. There we said, “[w]e agree with the

district court’s conclusion that this case is deeply troubling on

the level of fundamental substantive justice. Nevertheless, we

are not in a position to modify well-settled doctrines of sovereign immunity. This is a matter in the hands of a higher

authority than our court.” Id. at 963.

B. Appellants have not exhausted their tribal remedies in

order to challenge a claim of banishment from the

reservation.

[11] Appellants argue that disenrollment is similar to banishment and that they are therefore detained. However, Appellants have not been banished from the Reservation. The

Pechanga Tribe has established uniform Exclusion and Eviction Regulations for excluding both members and nonmem4656 JEFFREDO v. MACARRO

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bers of the tribe from the Reservation. The Exclusion and

Eviction Regulations also establish the procedures for appealing one’s exclusion or eviction. Appellants have not been subjected to any exclusion or eviction proceedings. Therefore,

they have not exhausted their claims for exclusion from the

reservation or denial of access to it as established in the

Exclusion and Eviction Regulations. We thus lack jurisdiction

over any of Appellants’ claims for exclusion or eviction.

III. CONCLUSION

[12] The district court properly dismissed Appellants’

action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Appellants were

not detained and did not exhaust their tribal remedies. Therefore, they cannot get relief under the habeas corpus provision

of the ICRA. Accordingly, we affirm the district court. 

AFFIRMED

WILKEN, District Judge, dissenting:

Appellants, enrolled members of the Pechanga Tribe since

birth, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under the

Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) asserting that their Tribal

Council violated the due process, equal protection, free

speech and cruel and unusual punishment clauses of the Act

when it stripped them of membership in the Tribe. The membership criteria that the Tribal Council applied were not established until 1979; the procedures it used to disenroll Tribal

members were not established until 1988; and the Tribal

Council did not begin disenrolling large numbers of members

until recently, when the Tribe’s casino profits became a major

source of revenue.1 Appellants allege that they are victims of

the Tribal Council’s greed associated with these casinos. 

1At the time of Appellants’ disenrollment, every adult Pechangan

received a per capita benefit of over $250,000 per year. 

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The majority concludes that the district court properly dismissed Appellants’ petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Appellants (1) were not detained and (2) did not

exhaust their Tribal remedies. I respectfully dissent and

address each argument in turn.

I. Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA)

Beginning in 1961, through hearings and surveys, Congress

commenced an investigation into the conduct of tribal governments due to abuses that some tribal members were enduring

at the hands of tribal officials. In 1968, Congress enacted

ICRA to protect against such abuses by imposing restrictions

upon tribal governments similar to those contained in the Bill

of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment. The enforcement

mechanism Congress provided was that of habeas corpus in

federal courts. The statute at issue, 25 U.S.C. § 1303, provides, “The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall be

available to any person, in a court of the United States, to test

the legality of his detention by order of an Indian tribe.” A

central purpose of ICRA was to “ ‘secur[e] for the American

Indian the broad constitutional rights afforded to other Americans,’ and thereby to ‘protect individual Indians from arbitrary and unjust actions of tribal governments.’ ” Santa Clara

Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 61 (1978) (quoting S. Rep.

No. 841, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 5-6 (1967)).

A. Detention

“Detention” by order of an Indian tribe is the sole jurisdictional prerequisite for federal habeas review. The requirement

in § 1303 that an individual be “detained” is akin to the “in

custody” and “detention” requirement in other habeas statutes.

Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874,

891 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1041 (1996)

(“Congress appears to use the terms ‘detention’ and ‘custody’

interchangeably in the habeas context.”). The habeas statutes

analogous to § 1303 refer to “detention” as well as “in custo4658 JEFFREDO v. MACARRO

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dy” throughout. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2242, 2243, 2245, 2249,

2253 and 2255. “There is no reason to conclude that the

requirement of ‘detention’ set forth in the Indian Civil Rights

Act § 1303 is any more lenient than the requirement of ‘custody’ set forth in the other federal habeas statutes.” Moore v.

Nelson, 270 F.3d 789, 791 (9th Cir. 2001). Nor is there any

reason to conclude that the requirement of “detention” in

§ 1303 is any more strict than the requirement of “custody”

or “detention” in the other federal habeas statutes. 

The custody or detention requirement may be met if the

habeas petitioner is not physically confined. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 239-40 (1963); see Dow v. Court of

the First Circuit Through Huddy, 995 F.2d 922, 923 (9th Cir.

1993) (per curiam) (holding that a requirement to attend fourteen hours of alcohol rehabilitation constituted custody;

requiring petitioner’s physical presence at a particular place

“significantly restrain[ed] [his] liberty to do those things

which free persons in the United States are entitled to do”),

cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1110 (1994).

The detention requirement is designed to limit the availability of habeas review “to cases of special urgency, leaving

more conventional remedies for cases in which the restraints

on liberty are neither severe nor immediate.” Hensley v. Mun.

Court, 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973). Therefore, the inquiry into

whether a petitioner has satisfied the jurisdictional prerequisite for habeas review requires a court to judge the “severity”

of an actual or potential restraint on liberty. 

The combination of the current and potential restrictions

placed upon Appellants and the loss of their life-long

Pechanga citizenship constitute a severe restraint on their liberty. The majority analyzes each of these grounds separately,

instead of collectively, and determines that none amounts to

a detention. I respectfully disagree with this approach. 

When Tribal members are disenrolled, they become “nonmembers” of the Tribe and lose all rights associated with

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being a Pechanga citizen. One of those rights is access to the

Pechanga Reservation. The Pechanga Non-Member Reservation Access and Rental Ordinance (Reservation Access Ordinance) states, “The custom, tradition and practice of the

Pechanga Band has always been, and remains, that the

Pechanga Reservation is closed to non-members. Access to

and residency within the Pechanga Reservation is a privilege

which may be granted or denied to an individual upon proper

authority of the Pechanga Band.” 

Elsewhere, the Reservation Access Ordinance provides,

“Use by non-members of roads within the Pechanga Reservation is . . . by permission of the Tribal Council and is subject

to revocation at any time and for any reason.” The Ordinance

establishes that a non-member may enter the Pechanga Reservation only upon invitation by the Tribal Council or by an

enrolled member of the Pechanga Band. Otherwise, access to

the Pechanga Reservation by non-members is prohibited. 

Since being disenrolled, Appellants have been excluded

from the school, the health clinic and the senior citizens’

facilities on the Reservation. Some of the Appellants live on

the Reservation. Although they may enter the Reservation and

travel to their homes, any Tribal Ranger can take away that

liberty at any moment. 

Pechanga Tribal Rangers have the authority and discretion

summarily to exclude non-members from the Pechanga Reservation for up to seven days for any of the following reasons:

(1) suspicion that a non-member has committed a

violation of any applicable tribal, state or federal law within the Pechanga Reservation;

(2) suspicion that a non-member is a danger to

himself, herself or others;

(3) a finding by a Tribal Ranger that a non-member

is a public nuisance; or

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(4) any behavior which is suspicious or not consistent with a legitimate visit either to a tribal

enterprise for business or patronage purposes,

or to the home of a resident of the Pechanga

Indian Reservation by invitation and in compliance with the Non-Member Reservation Access

and Rental Ordinance.

Thus, a parent could, without warning, be barred from

going home for a week by a Tribal Ranger who observes “any

behavior that is suspicious.” That Appellants have not been

removed thus far does not render them free or unrestrained.

Appellants may currently be able to “come and go” as they

please, cf. Hensley, 411 U.S. at 351, but their current status

as non-members living on the Pechanga Reservation means

that at any point they may be compelled to “go,” and be no

longer welcome to “come.” That is a severe restraint to which

the members of the Pechanga Band are not generally subject.

See id.

The majority analogizes the severe restraint Appellants

confront with that in a case involving a twenty-five dollar

fine. Edmunds v. Won Bae Chang, 509 F.2d 39, 41 (9th Cir.

1975). In that case, the court held that Edmunds was not subjected to a severe restraint because there was “no provision in

the sentence for his confinement in the case of non-payment.”

Id. The court generally observed that “a threat of incarceration

is implicit in any court-imposed fine, for jail is one of the

sanctions by which courts enforce their judgments and

orders.” However, in the circumstances of Edmunds, “confinement [was] no more than a speculative possibility — ‘the

unfolding of events may render the entire controversy academic.’ ” Id. (quoting Hensley, 411 U.S. at 352). Analogizing

the current and potential penalties involved in this case with

a twenty-five dollar fine and the speculative possibility that

failure to pay the fine may result in judicial proceedings leading to confinement trivializes the severity of Appellants’ situation. 

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Furthermore, Appellants have been stripped of their lifelong Pechanga citizenship, which by itself constitutes a severe

deprivation. A deprivation of citizenship is “an extraordinarily

severe penalty” with consequences that “may be more grave

than consequences that flow from conviction for crimes.”

Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 611-12 (1949). The

Supreme Court has found the penalty of denationalization of

a natural-born citizen, sought to be imposed after conviction

for military desertion, to be unconstitutional. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 104 (1958). 

It is a form of punishment more primitive than torture, for it destroys for the individual the political

existence that was centuries in the development.

. . . .

This punishment is offensive to cardinal principles

for which the Constitution stands. It subjects the

individual to a fate of ever-increasing fear and distress. He knows not what discriminations may be

established against him, what proscriptions may be

directed against him, and when and for what cause

his existence in his native land may be terminated.

He may be subject to banishment, a fate universally

decried by civilized people. . . . It is no answer to

suggest that all the disastrous consequences of this

fate may not be brought to bear on a stateless person.

The threat makes the punishment obnoxious.

Id. at 101-102. A “deprivation of citizenship does more than

merely restrict one’s freedom to go or remain where others

have the right to be: it often works a destruction of one’s

social, cultural, and political existence.” Poodry, 85 F.3d at

897. Although with disenrollment Appellants retain their

United States citizenship and will not be physically stateless,

they have been stripped of their life-long citizenship and identity as Pechagans. This is more than just a loss of a label, it

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is a loss of a political, ethnic, racial and social association.

William C. Canby, Jr., American Indian Law in a Nut Shell

§§ III.B-C (5th ed. 2009); Felix S. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law § 3.03 (2005). Such a loss constitutes a

restraint on liberty that, combined with the actual and potential restraints described above, satisfies the detention requirement under § 1303, in my opinion.

The majority, in dicta, implies that we may not hear Appellants’ ICRA claims because we generally do not have jurisdiction to review tribal membership decisions. Here,

Appellants are not directly challenging the merits of their disenrollment, i.e. whether they are direct descendants from the

original Pechanga Temecula people. Rather, Appellants challenge under ICRA the manner of their disenrollment. The former would be barred by tribal sovereign immunity, whereas

the latter is not.

B. Exhaustion

The majority concludes that we lack jurisdiction over any

claims for exclusion or eviction because Appellants have not

exhausted their Tribal remedies for such claims or demonstrated that exhaustion would be futile. But Appellants are not

asserting jurisdiction based on any exclusion or eviction from

the Pechanga Reservation. Rather, Appellants’ claim of jurisdiction is based on the restraints on their liberty arising from

being disenrolled and threatened with exclusion. Notably, the

parties agree that Appellants have completed the internal

Tribal appeal process for challenging disenrollment. Further,

there does not appear to be any remedy available to Appellants if they were to be given a seven-day exclusion without

warning. Appellants have exhausted their claims and their

habeas petition is ripe for adjudication.

II. Conclusion

When viewed together, the act of stripping Appellants’

Tribal citizenship and the current and potential restrictions

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placed upon Appellants constitute a severe restraint on their

liberty. Therefore, Appellants have been detained within the

meaning of § 1303. Accordingly, I would reverse and remand

to the district court to hear their petition for a writ of habeas

corpus on its merits. 

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