Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02302/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02302-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1 Petitioner previously filed another section 2254 petition in

the Court, docketed as 2:05 CV 0862, and assigned to the Honorable

John W. Sedwick. In that action Petitioner seeks relief from his

conviction in an Arizona criminal case docketed as CR 99-15313, his

convictions on charges of armed robbery, theft of a means of

transportation and unlawful flight from a law enforcement vehicle.

A Report and Recommendation in that matter, recommending that the

petition be denied and dismissed, was filed January 4, 2006, and

Petitioner filed objections to the Report and Recommendation on

January 17, 2006.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

ANDREW LUCKETT, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) CIV 05-2302 PHX SRB (MEA)

)

DORA B. SCHRIRO, ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ARIZONA ATTORNEY GENERAL, ) 

) 

 Respondents. ) 

_________________________________)

TO THE HONORABLE SUSAN R. BOLTON:

Mr. Andrew Luckett (“Petitioner”), who is incarcerated

by Respondents in Florence, Arizona, filed a pro se Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on August 2,

2005. Respondents filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Docket No. 14) on January 31, 2006,

and Petitioner filed a reply to Respondents’ answer on March 2,

2005.1

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I Background

On October 18, 1999, Petitioner was charged by the

State of Arizona with burglary in the third degree, a class 4

felony, and possession of burglary tools, a class 6 felony. See

Answer, Exh. B. Petitioner’s defense counsel was successful in

seeking a hearing on a motion to suppress the pre-trial

identification of Petitioner as the perpetrator of the alleged

crimes, pursuant to Arizona v. Dessureault, 104 Ariz. 380

(1969). Id., Exh. G. The hearing was conducted on March 7,

2000, and the motion to suppress was denied. Id., Exh. H.

A jury trial was conducted regarding the charges

against Petition in March of 2000. At Petitioner’s trial a

witness testified he saw Petitioner pry open the window of a van

and then enter the van. The witness testified he saw Petitioner

exit the van carrying a toolbox, which Petitioner then “sorted

through” with another individual. The witness alerted another

individual, and the police were summoned. Police officers

arrived on the scene and apprehended two individuals in

possession of the toolbox removed from the van; one of the

police officers testified at Petitioner’s trial that Petitioner

was one of the men apprehended in possession of the toolbox. 

Another police officer testified at Petitioner’s trial

that the initial witness of the burglary identified Petitioner

at the scene of the crime as the man he witnessed breaking into

the van. Yet another witness testified that the van belonged to

him, not to Petitioner, and that items found in Petitioner’s

possession at the time of his arrest belonged to the witness,

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2 The witness also testified at the Dessereault hearing on March

7, 2000.

3 Petitioner filed a supplemental motion for a new trial on

February 5, 2001, see Answer, Exh. AA, and sought reconsideration of

the decision denying a new trial on April 27, 2001. See id., Exh. CC.

These motions were denied on May 24, 2001. Id., Exh. DD.

4 Petitioner was charged with other crimes in 1999, in cases

docketed as CR 1999-016403-A, theft of a credit card, and, as

mentioned supra, in a case docketed as CR 99-15313, with armed

robbery, theft of a means of transportation and unlawful flight from

a law enforcement vehicle, with regard to events occurring on October

22, 1999. Petitioner was evidently released from custody after being

booked for the events of October 22, 1999, and was re-arrested on

November 9, 1999. See Answer, Exh. E at 24. 

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not to Petitioner. Id., Exh. J & Exh. P & Exh. OO.2 See also

Exh. FFF & Exh. GGG.

At the close of the prosecution’s case, Petitioner’s

counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Rule 20,

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id., Exh. OO at 3. The

motion was denied and the jury found Petitioner guilty of

burglary in the third degree and possession of burglary tools.

Id., Exh. N. Petitioner filed a pro per motion for a new trial,

asserting the verdicts were against the law and the weight of

the evidence presented at his trial. Id., Exh. O. The motion

was denied on August 2, 2000, because the trial court concluded

the verdict was consistent with the evidence presented at trial

and that the court had not committed reversible error. Id.,

Exh. T.3

Petitioner’s sentencing was continued until two other

criminal cases then pending against Petitioner were tried. Id.,

Exh. R.4 All three cases were then consolidated for the purpose

of sentencing Petitioner on all of the convictions. Id., Exhs.

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5 On August 17, 2001, Petitioner was sentenced to a term of 15.75

years imprisonment for his conviction for armed robbery, to 11.25

years imprisonment for his conviction for theft of means of

transportation, and to 5 years imprisonment for his conviction for

unlawful flight from a law enforcement vehicle. Petitioner’s

sentences on the first two counts were imposed as concurrent sentences

and the sentence for unlawful flight was imposed consecutively to the

other sentences.

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Z. On August 17, 2001, Petitioner was sentenced in CR 99-16403,

CR 99-14329, and CR 99-15313. Id., Exh. FF. 

Pursuant to his conviction for burglary in the third

degree, Petitioner was sentenced to the presumptive term of 10

years imprisonment, and he was sentenced to a concurrent and

presumptive term of 3.75 years imprisonment for his conviction

on the charge of possession of burglary tools. Id., Exh. FF at

11, GG.5

Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal on August

22, 2001. Id., Exh. HH. Petitioner asked the Arizona Court of

Appeals to sever the criminal cases which had been consolidated

for purposes of sentencing, and the motion was granted by the

Court of Appeals. Id., Exhs. JJ & KK. Petitioner was appointed

counsel to represent him in his appeal. Id., Exh. LL.

On February 1, 2001, Petitioner’s counsel filed a brief

stating that he could find no arguable, non-frivolous issue to

raise on Petitioner’s behalf with regard to his conviction for

burglary and possession of burglary tools. Id., Exh. LL.

Petitioner was given leave to file a pro per appellate brief.

Id., Exh. MM. Petitioner filed a brief asserting he was

entitled to relief because his state and federal constitutional

rights were violated by his conviction. Petitioner argued

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specifically that: (1) the burden of proof had been improperly

shifted to the defendant regarding an element of identification;

(2) the prosecutor improperly vouched for a witness’ credibility

by stating the witness had no reason to lie; (3) the

identification of Petitioner as the perpetrator of the crimes

was suggestive and fundamentally unfair; (4) the state did not

prove an element of the crime of burglary as charged, i.e.,

entry, pursuant to the Arizona statute defining burglary; (5)

the prosecution did not prove the requisite intent required by

the statute defining the crime of burglary in the third degree.

Id., Exh. NN.

The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s

convictions in a memorandum decision issued April 30, 2002.

Id., Exh. OO. Regarding the issue of identification, the Court

of Appeals stated: “after extensive testimony and argument, [the

trial court] reasonably concluded that the identification was

not unduly suggestive. Accordingly, a Dessureault instruction

was not required in this case.” Id., Exh. OO at 5. The Court

of Appeals further concluded the eyewitness’ testimony supplied

proof of the element of entry as required by the Arizona statute

defining burglary. Id., Exh. OO at 5-6. Regarding Petitioner’s

argument regarding a lack of evidence of his intent, the Court

of Appeals concluded “[t]he record reflects ample evidence from

which the jurors could have reasonably inferred the requisite

intent.” Id., Exh. OO at 6.

Petitioner filed a timely petition for review of this

decision by the Arizona Supreme Court, which denied review on

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August 9, 2002. Id., Exhs. QQ & SS.

Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction

relief in the Arizona trial court on January 13, 2003, alleging

he had been deprived of the effective assistance of trial and

appellate counsel. Id., Exh. WW. The trial court summarily

denied relief, finding Petitioner’s claims lacked merit and were

not sufficiently colorable to require a hearing. Id., Exh. ZZ.

Petitioner sought review of this decision by the Arizona Court

of Appeals, which declined review on August 5, 2004. Id., Exh.

EEE. 

Petitioner filed his federal habeas action on August 2,

2005, asserting he is entitled to relief because: (1) his right

to due process was violated because there was insufficient

evidence to support his conviction for the crime of burglary;

(2) the trial court erred in instructing the jury; (3) he was

deprived of the effective assistance of trial counsel; (4) he

was deprived of the effective assistance of appellate counsel.

II Analysis

A. Exhaustion

Respondents contend two of Petitioner’s claims must be

dismissed because Petitioner did not fully exhaust these claims

in the state courts by presenting them as federal constitutional

claims in a procedurally correct manner to the Arizona Court of

Appeals or to the Arizona Supreme Court.

Prior to 1996, the federal courts were required to

dismiss a habeas petition which included unexhausted claims for

federal habeas relief. However, section 2254 now states: “An

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application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the

merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust

the remedies available in the courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(b)(2) (1994 & Supp. 2005). 

Because the Court concludes that all of Petitioner’s

claims may be denied on the merits, the Court will not examine

Respondents’ arguments regarding the exhaustion of some of

Petitioner’s claims. 

B. Standard of review regarding exhausted claims

The Court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus to a

state prisoner on a claim adjudicated on the merits in state

court proceedings unless the state court reached a decision

contrary to clearly established federal law, or one involving an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, or

unless the state court decision was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1994 &

Supp. 2005). 

A state court’s decision is “contrary to” our

clearly established law if it applies a rule

that contradicts the governing law set forth

in our cases or if it confronts a set of

facts that are materially indistinguishable

from a decision of this Court and

nevertheless arrives at a result different

from our precedent. 

Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 14, 124 S. Ct. 7, 10 (2003)

(internal citations and quotations omitted).

When reviewing a habeas claim, the federal courts must

afford great deference to the state court’s rulings with regard

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to issues raised in the petitioner’s federal habeas action. See

Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24, 123 S. Ct. 357, 359-60

(2002). With regard to claims of ineffective assistance of

counsel, “it is the habeas applicant’s burden to show that the

state court applied Strickland to the facts of his case in an

objectively unreasonable manner. An unreasonable application of

federal law is different from an incorrect application of

federal law.” Id., 537 U.S. at 25, 123 S. Ct. at 360 (internal

quotations omitted). “In other words, a federal court may grant

relief when a state court has misapplied a ‘governing legal

principle’ to ‘a set of facts different from those of the case

in which the principle was announced.’” Wiggins v. Smith, 539

U.S. 510, 123 S. Ct. 2527, 2535 (2003) (quoting Lockyer v.

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 123 S. Ct. 1166, 1175 (2003). See also

Brown v. Payton, 125 S. Ct. 1432, 1439-40 (2005) (“Even on the

assumption that [the state court’s] conclusion was incorrect, it

was not unreasonable, and is therefore just the type of decision

that AEDPA shields on habeas review.”).

C. Petitioner’s claims for relief

1. Petitioner contends that his Fifth Amendment right

to due process was violated because there was insufficient

evidence to support his conviction.

Petitioner contends he is entitled to federal habeas

relief because “none of the states witnesses could identify the

petitioner as the person who committed the crime.” Petitioner

asserts that the other individual apprehended at the scene of

the crime was the person who the witness saw break into the van

and that testimony to this allegation created reasonable doubt

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as to his guilty. Petition at 5.

Petitioner arguably properly exhausted this claim by

raising a claim regarding the sufficiency of the evidence in his

direct appeal, which claim was considered on the merits and

denied by the Arizona Court of Appeals.

“[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused against

conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every

fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is

charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S. Ct. 1068,

1073 (1970). To determine whether sufficient evidence existed

to support a habeas petitioner’s conviction, the Court must

decide if, “viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789

(1979). See also McMillan v. Gomez, 19 F.3d 465, 468-469 (9th

Cir. 1994). The Court may presume that the state court’s

conclusion that the conviction was supported by the evidence is

correct. See Crow v. Eyman, 459 F.2d 24, 25 (9th Cir. 1972).

Petitioner bears the burden of proving that the record is so

totally devoid of evidentiary support for the challenged

conviction as to violate due process. Id. Circumstantial

evidence is sufficient to support a petitioner’s guilty verdict.

Jackson, 442 U.S. at 324-325, 99 S. Ct. at 2792. 

Given the amount of evidence in the record, a

reasonable trier of fact could have concluded that Petitioner

was the individual who committed the offense of entering the

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van. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas

relief on the merits of this claim. 

2. Petitioner asserts his conviction was improper

because the trial court erred in instructing the jury by failing

to give the jury an instruction regarding a defense and by

failing to properly instruct the jury on reasonable doubt.

Petitioner contends that his right to due process was

violated because, he asserts, the trial court did not properly

instruct the jury regarding his defense of mistaken “identity.”

Petitioner arguably raised this issue in his direct appeal, and

the issue was considered and rejected on the merits by the

Arizona Court of Appeals. 

There is no specific federal constitutional right

governing criminal pretrial identification procedures or

subsequent in-court identifications. See Manson v. Brathwaite,

432 U.S. 98, 104-07, 97 S. Ct. 2243, 2249-50 (1977). The

standard to be applied on habeas review of this type of claim is

that of “fairness” in a criminal proceeding, required by the

federal right to due process. Id. If the reviewing court may

properly conclude that the identification of the defendant as

the perpetrator of the alleged acts was not “unduly suggestive”

given the “totality of the circumstances,” then the criminal

proceeding was not rendered unfair by the identification and the

defendant’s right to due process was not been violated. Id. 

Prior to his trial, Petitioner challenged a proposed

in-court identification of him as the perpetrator of the alleged

crimes. Pursuant to state law, the trial court conducted a

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6 Arizona v. Dessureault, 104 Ariz. 380, 384, 453 P.2d 951, 955

(1969).

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“Dessureault”6 hearing to determine if the proposed

identification of Petitioner as the perpetrator of the alleged

crimes was unduly suggestive, i.e., if it was likely that the

procedure had caused a witness to misidentify the defendant. At

the hearing, the trial court was required to examine the

totality of the circumstances surrounding the proposed

identification of Petitioner, unless the prosecution proved by

clear and convincing evidence that the procedure regarding the

identification was not unduly suggestive. See Arizona v. Smith,

146 Ariz. 491, 496 (1985). 

The Arizona Court of Appeals determined, on review of

the merits of this issue, that “after extensive testimony and

argument” the trial court had “reasonably concluded that the

identification was not unduly suggestive.” Answer, Exh. OO.

The state court’s findings with regard to whether the

identification procedure was unduly suggestive and violated

Petitioner’s rights is entitled to deference by this Court. See

Bean v. Calderon, 163 F.3d 1073, 1087 n.3 (9th Cir. 1998);

Abrams v. Barnett, 121 F.3d 1036, 1042 (7th Cir. 1997). The

Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision that the identification of

Petitioner was not unduly suggestive in violation of his right

to due process was not clearly contrary to, nor an unreasonable

application of federal law. See Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 104-07

& n.8; Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384, 88 S. Ct.

967, 971 (1968). Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to

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federal habeas relief on his claim that his right to due process

was violated by the pretrial and in-court identification of

Petitioner as the perpetrator of the alleged crimes and the

failure of the trial court to give the jury an instruction

regarding the identification of Petitioner as the perpetrator of

the crimes.

Petitioner also contends the jury was wrongly guided

regarding reasonable doubt because the jury was instructed that

they must be “firmly convinced” of guilt to convict, an

instruction Petitioner argues changed the burden from reasonable

doubt to a showing of guilt by clear and convincing evidence.

Petitioner arguably exhausted this claim by raising in his

direct appeal, wherein Petitioner argued that the jury

instruction regarding intent unconstitutionally allowed the jury

to presume criminal intent with regard to the burglary element

of entry. The Arizona Court of Appeals concluded that jurors

were permitted to make reasonable inferences, i.e., regarding

intent, based upon the facts presented at trial. Answer, Exh.

OO. Noting a state case standing for the proposition that a

jury may infer the intent element of burglary from the fact that

the defendant gained entry by force, the Court of Appeals

concluded that “[n]o constitutional violation occurred here.”

Id.

 The Due Process Clause requires proof of guilt beyond

a reasonable doubt, and a jury instruction may not shift or lift

the burden of proof by allowing the jury to accept an

unwarranted presumption. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S.

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510, 520-21, 99 S. Ct. 2450, 2457-58 (1979). When reviewing a

jury instruction regarding reasonable doubt, a habeas court must

determine “whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the

jury [] applied the challenged instruction in a way that

violates the Constitution.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62,

72, 112 S. Ct. 475, 482 (1991). See Leavitt v. Arave, 383 F.3d

809, 818 (9th Cir. 2004). 

“[T]he Constitution does not require that any

particular form of words be used in advising the jury of the

government’s burden of proof. Rather, taken as a whole, the

instructions must correctly convey the concept of reasonable

doubt to the jury.” Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5, 114 S.

Ct. 1239, 1243 (1994). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has

instructed the reviewing habeas court to “determine whether

there was a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the

instruction to allow a conviction predicated on proof that was

insufficient to meet the requirements of due process.” Lisenbee

v. Henry, 166 F.3d 997, 999 (9th Cir. 1999).

The instruction given to Petitioner’s jury regarding

reasonable doubt states:

 The State has the burden of proving the

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

In civil cases, it is only necessary to prove

that a fact is more likely true than not or

that its truth is highly probable. In

criminal cases such as this, the State’s

proof must be more powerful than that. It

must be beyond a reasonable doubt.

 Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof

that leaves you firmly convinced of the

defendant’s guilt. There are very few things

in this world that we know with absolute

certainty, and in criminal cases the law does

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not require proof that overcomes every doubt.

If, based on your consideration of the

evidence, you are firmly convinced that the

defendant is guilty of the crimes charged,

you must find him guilty. If, on the other

hand, you think there is a real possibility

that he is not guilty, you must give him the

benefit of the doubt and find him not guilty.

 You must decide whether or not the State

has proven the defendant guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt. You must start with the

presumption that the defendant is innocent.

The State must then prove the defendant

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. This means

the State must prove each element of the

charges beyond a reasonable doubt. If you

conclude that the State has not met its

burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt,

then you must find the defendant not guilty

of those charges.

Answer, Exh. M.

The Arizona Court of Appeals’ conclusion that

Petitioner’s constitutional rights were not violated by the jury

instructions was not contrary to clearly established federal

law, and was not an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law. See Darnell v. Swinney, 823 F.2d 299,

302 (9th Cir. 1987). There is no reasonable likelihood that the

jury understood the instructions to allow conviction based on

proof insufficient to meet the requirements of due process and,

therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief

with regard to this claim. See, e.g., Ramirez v. Hatcher, 136

F.3d 1209, 1211 (9th Cir. 1998).

3. Petitioner asserts he was deprived of the effective

assistance of trial counsel and appellate counsel.

Petitioner asserts that his trial counsel made numerous

errors, including failing to interview witnesses, failing to

request a Willits instruction, failure to object to the

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admission of evidence, and that his attorney failed to properly

raise or investigate his identification defense. Petition at 7.

Petitioner arguably exhausted an ineffective assistance of

counsel claim in the state courts by raising this claim in his

timely action for post-conviction relief. In response to

Petitioner’s brief seeking post-conviction relief and alleging

ineffective assistance of trial counsel, the prosecution stated

that Petitioner was, through asserting an ineffective assistance

claim, “actually contesting the evidence regarding

identification, the conduct of his preliminary hearing, and the

admission of a 911 tape....Defendant may not raise these claims

at this point in the proceedings by attempting to disguise them

as claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Answer, Exh.

XX. The Superior Court concluded that Petitioner had failed to

state a colorable claim that his counsel was ineffective. Id.,

Exh. ZZ.

Respondent contends this claim was not fully exhausted

because Petitioner did not seek review of the Arizona Court of

Appeals’ decision denying post-conviction relief on his

ineffective assistance of counsel claim, arguing “Baldwin’s

restatement of the exhaustion requirement appears to overrule

the Ninth Circuit’s three-judge pronouncement, in Swoopes v.

Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999), that Arizona state

prisoners need not seek discretionary review by the Arizona

Supreme Court in order to exhaust their federal claims.” Answer

at 14. Because the claim may be denied on the merits, it is not

necessary to resolve whether Baldwin effectively overruled

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Swoopes, and whether Petitioner completely exhausted this claim.

To state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel,

a petitioner must show that his attorney’s performance was

deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the petitioner’s

defense. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104

S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). The petitioner must overcome the

strong presumption that counsel’s conduct was within the range

of reasonable professional assistance required of attorneys in

that circumstance. See id., 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at

2064. 

“A fair assessment of attorney performance requires

that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of

hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s

challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s

perspective at the time.’” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.

Ct. at 2065. Indeed, “strategic choices made after thorough

investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are

virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after less

than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the

extent that reasonable professional judgments support the

limitations on investigation.” Id., 466 U.S. at 690-91, 104 S.

Ct. at 2066. Therefore, with respect to the performance prong

of the relevant test, the court must determine whether, in light

of the circumstances as they existed at the time of counsel’s

actions, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide

range of professionally competent assistance. See Mancuso v.

Olivarez, 292 F.3d 939, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). 

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[C]ounsel’s performance is deficient if he

fails to either conduct a reasonable

investigation or provide strategic reasons

for not doing so.... Deficient performance

alone, however, is not enough to render

counsel’s representation constitutionally

ineffective. [The petitioner] must also

establish prejudice, by “show[ing] that there

is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel's unprofessional errors, the result

of the proceeding would have been different.

A reasonable probability is a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome.”

Turner v. Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 873 (9th Cir. 2002), quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068.

The Court’s thorough review of the extensive record

submitted by Respondents indicates that trial counsel vigorously

defended Petitioner, and that counsel’s performance was not

deficient. Petitioner has not shown the behavioral deficiency,

pursuant to Strickland, for this Court to grant habeas relief

based on this claim. Additionally, given the amount of

admissible evidence against Petitioner, Petitioner has not shown

that any error of counsel was prejudicial to the outcome of his

case. 

4. Petitioner contends that his appellate counsel did

not raise meritorious claims in Petitioner’s direct appeal.

The same prejudice requirement applies to claims of

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel as trial counsel:

The Sixth Amendment right to effective

assistance of counsel includes the right to

effective appellate counsel. However,

appellate counsel need not advance every

possible argument, even those that are

non-frivolous, and should instead concentrate

his advocacy on winnowing out weaker

arguments on appeal and focusing on one

central issue if possible, or at most on a

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few key issues. The two-part Strickland

test, which the Court has used in evaluating

claims of ineffective assistance of trial

counsel, supra, also guides an analysis of

claims of ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel.

Davis v. Singletary, 853 F. Supp. 1492, 1549 (M.D. Fl. 1994)

(internal quotations and citations omitted).

To succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel

claim, the petitioner must establish that an argument was likely

to be successful in order to prove that he was prejudiced by his

counsel’s failure to raise the argument. See Van Tran v.

Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1156 (9th Cir. 2000). A defendant has

no constitutional right to compel counsel to raise particular

arguments if counsel, as a matter of professional judgment,

decides not to present those arguments. See Jones v. Barnes,

463 U.S. 745, 751, 103 S. Ct. 3308, 3312 (1983) (declining to

promulgate “a per se rule that the client, not the professional

advocate, must be allowed to decide what issues are to be

pressed”).

Petitioner raised in his pro se briefs, and the Arizona

state courts rejected, each of the claims Petitioner asserts

should have been raised by appellate counsel. The state courts’

conclusion that none of the claims provided a basis for relief

is an adequate basis for this Court to conclude that Petitioner

was not prejudiced by any alleged error of appellate counsel. 

III Conclusion

Regardless of Petitioner’s alleged failure to properly

and completely exhaust his federal habeas claims in the state

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courts, each of his federal habeas claims may be denied on the

merits. Petitioner was not deprived of his right to due process

with regard to either the identification of Petitioner as the

perpetrator of the alleged crimes or with regard to the

instructions given the jury. There was sufficient evidence

presented at trial to conclude that Petitioner’s conviction did

not violate his right to due process. Additionally, Petitioner

is not entitled to federal habeas relief with regard to his

claims that his trial and appellate counsel were

constitutionally ineffective.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Luckett’s Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from the date of

service of a copy of this recommendation within which to file

specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

parties have ten (10) days within which to file a response to

the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any

factual or legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be

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considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia,

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S.

900 (2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will constitute a

waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of

fact and conclusions of law in an order or judgment entered

pursuant to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. 

DATED this 10th day of March, 2006.

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