Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-00845/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-00845-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 210
Nature of Suit: Land Condemnation
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE RAMON R. VALENCIANO,

et al.,

Plaintiffs, No. C 07-0845 PJH

v. ORDER GRANTING 

MOTION TO DISMISS

CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN 

FRANCISCO,

Defendant.

_______________________________/

Defendant’s motion to dismiss the first cause of action came on for hearing on

October 16, 2007, before this court. Defendant appeared by its counsel Andrew Gschwind,

and plaintiffs appeared by their counsel John G. Hamlin. Having read the parties’ papers

and carefully considered their arguments and the relevant legal authority, and good cause

appearing, the court hereby GRANTS the motion. 

BACKGROUND

This is a case alleging a federal claim of taking private property in violation of the

Fifth Amendment, and also alleging state law claims. 

Plaintiffs Jose Ramon R. Valenciano and Johanna D. Valenciano own residential

property located on Ulloa Street in San Francisco. Plaintiffs’ only means of egress from the

property to the public street is through two driveways on the front of the property. The two

driveways are separated by a 10-foot length of curb, which is painted red, and which has a

“Tow-Away No Parking” sign in the middle of the ten-foot curb. 

Defendant City and County of San Francisco (“CCSF”) operates a public transit

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 The allegations in the complaint are not clear, but this was apparently a claim under

the California Tort Claims Act, California Government Code §§ 810, et seq. See Cal. Gov’t .

Code § 945.4 (presentment of a written claim to the applicable public entity is required before

a “suit for money or damages may be brought against a public entity”).

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agency known as the Municipal Transportation Agency, which includes the San Francisco

Municipal Railway (“MUNI”). Plaintiffs allege that MUNI buses frequently block one or both

of the driveways, as well as the 10-foot space in between, and that San Francisco Police

Department vehicles, as well as private vehicles, frequently park illegally in the 10-foot

space. 

Plaintiffs assert that CCSF refuses to tow the illegally stopped or parked vehicles or

even to respond to complaints regarding those vehicles. They claim that they have written

numerous letters since 2005 informing the San Francisco Department of Parking and

Traffic (“DPT”) of the need for enforcement of parking regulations. They allege that DPT’s

failure to enforce parking regulations has resulted in a taking of their property because they

are sometimes prevented from using their driveways to enter or exit the property. 

On July 19, 2006, plaintiffs filed a claim with CCSF based on “interference with

property, denial of property rights and inverse condemnation.” On August 8, 2006, they

filed a revised claim. Plaintiffs assert that CCSF denied the claim on August 17, 2006.1

Plaintiffs filed the present action on February 9, 2007, asserting a Fifth Amendment

claim of taking of property without just compensation, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and also

asserting claims of taking of property without just compensation, in violation of Article 1,

Section 19 of the California Constitution; inverse condemnation; nuisance; negligence; and

intentional infliction of emotional distress. They seek damages and attorney’s fees.

CCSF now seeks an order dismissing the first cause of action pursuant to Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). CCSF asserts that the Fifth 

Amendment claim is not ripe for federal court adjudication because plaintiffs have not yet

sought compensation for this alleged taking through a state court action for inverse

condemnation, or other action, as required by Williamson County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v.

Hamilton Bank of Johnson County, 473 U.S. 172 (1985). 

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DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standards

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Unlike state courts, they have no

“inherent” or “general” subject matter jurisdiction. They can adjudicate only those cases

which the Constitution and Congress authorize them to adjudicate – those involving

diversity of citizenship or a federal question, or those to which the United States is a party. 

Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 380-81 (1994). 

Federal courts are presumptively without jurisdiction over civil actions, and the

burden of establishing the contrary rests on the party asserting jurisdiction. Id. at 377. 

Lack of subject matter jurisdiction is never waived, and may be raised by either party or the

court at any time. Attorneys Trust v. Videotape Computer Prods., Inc., 93 F.3d 593, 594-95

(9th Cir. 1996). 

Even where subject matter jurisdiction requirements are met, various doctrines may

preclude a case from proceeding in federal court. These include both jurisdictional and

“prudential” limitations on the exercise of federal jurisdiction, such as the case-orcontroversy requirement, standing, mootness, ripeness, and the existence of political

questions. See Schwarzer, Tashima & Wagstaffe, Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial

(2007) § 2:1200.

“Ripeness is more than a mere procedural question; it is determinative of

jurisdiction.” Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 922 F.2d 498, 502 (9th Cir.

1990). The ripeness doctrine prevents premature adjudication. It is aimed at cases that do

not yet have a concrete impact upon the parties. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods.

Co., 473 U.S. 568, 580 (1985). The ripeness doctrine is “drawn both from Article III

limitations on judicial power and from prudential reasons for refusing to exercise

jurisdiction.” Nat’l Park Hospitality Ass’n v. Dep’t of the Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 808 (2003). 

B. CCSF’s Motion

This case initially presented the court with some difficulty, primarily because it is not

clear that the complaint states a federal takings claim. Rather than first addressing this

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basic issue, however, CCSF chose to argue that the first cause of action is not ripe

because plaintiffs have not pursued compensation for the City’s alleged taking in state

court. CCSF asserts that pursuant to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Williamson, a takings

claim is not ripe for adjudication in federal court until a plaintiff has sought compensation

through all available state procedures, including a state court lawsuit. 

In Williamson, a landowner/developer sued a Tennessee planning commission in

federal court for just compensation, claiming that the application of county land use

regulations was so onerous as to amount to a taking. Following a jury verdict in favor of

the landowner, the district court granted JNOV to the planning commission, finding that the

landowner had been unable to derive economic benefit from its property on a temporary

basis only, and that such temporary deprivation could not constitute a taking. The Court of

Appeals reversed, holding that a temporary denial of property could be a taking, and was to

be analyzed in the same manner as a permanent taking.

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the question whether federal,

state, and local governments must pay money damages to a landowner whose property

allegedly has been “taken” temporarily by the application of government regulations. 

Williamson, 473 U.S. at 185. The Court found, however, that the question was not properly

presented, because the planning commission’s claim was premature. Id.

 The Court held that a takings claim challenging the application of land-use

regulations is not ripe unless (1) “the government entity charged with implementing the

regulations has reached a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the

property at issue,” and (2) the claimant has sought “compensation through the procedures

the State has provided for doing so.” Id. at 186, 194.

The Court noted that under Tennessee law, a property owner may bring an inverse

condemnation action to obtain just compensation for an alleged taking of property under

certain circumstances, and that the Tennessee state courts have interpreted the relevant

state law to allow recovery through inverse condemnation where the taking is effected by

restrictive zoning laws or developmental regulations. Id. at 196. The Court found that the

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 In a second argument, plaintiffs assert that they have raised a separate substantive

due process claim, based on CCSF’s alleged refusal to enforce the parking regulations. The

Ninth Circuit has ruled that substantive due process claims based on governmental

interference with property rights are foreclosed by the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.

Squaw Valley Dev. Co. v. Goldberg, 375 F.3d 936, 949-50 (9th Cir. 2004). This prohibition

applies even to a disguised takings claim. Id. Thus, plaintiffs cannot maintain a substantive

due process claim based on CCSF’s alleged interference with their property rights. Moreover,

the complaint as currently pled does not actually allege a substantive due process claim. 

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landowner had not shown that the inverse condemnation procedure was unavailable or

inadequate, and concluded that until it had utilized that procedure, the taking claim was

premature. Id. at 196-97.

Here, CCSF argues that because California provides a state law cause of action for

inverse condemnation, and because Article 1, § 19 of the California Constitution prohibits

the taking of private property by the State and/or its subdivisions without just

compensation, plaintiffs must pursue a claim of inverse condemnation in state court before

they can file a Fifth Amendment claim in federal court. 

In a footnote, CCSF also asserts that the federal takings claim fails to state a takings

cause of action under the Fifth Amendment because plaintiffs do not allege that CCSF

actually condemned or occupied their property by eminent domain, and do not allege that

CCSF’s activities have diminished the value of the property to such an extent that it is as if

the property had been condemned. 

In opposition, plaintiffs argue that their claims are not based solely on inverse

condemnation, and submit that this action is ripe for review by a federal court. Plaintiffs

assert that their federal takings claim is ripe because CCSF issued a final decision denying

plaintiffs’ claims (referring to the Government Code § 945.5 claim). Plaintiffs also contend

that damages are unavailable to remedy a “temporary” regulatory taking, and that an

inverse condemnation action would therefore provide no relief. They claim that this rule

was followed in Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. v. City of Monterey, 920 F.2d 1496 (9th

Cir. 1990), where the court found that California’s compensation procedures were

inadequate because California law did not permit landowners to seek compensation for a

regulatory taking through an inverse condemnation proceeding.2

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In reply, CCSF reiterates that under Williamson, the case should be dismissed

because plaintiffs have not pursued an available state court inverse condemnation lawsuit

seeking compensation for the alleged taking. 

CCSF argues that plaintiffs cite no California or federal authority in support of their

claim that California law does not afford them an adequate remedy. CCSF contends that

an inverse condemnation action under California law affords relief to both permanent and

temporary takings, and both physical and regulatory takings; and asserts that it is wellestablished that under California law that an action for inverse condemnation can be based

on a claim of substantial impairment of the right of ingress and egress. In addition, CCSF

argues that plaintiffs’ reliance on Del Monte Dunes is misplaced because at the time the

alleged taking in that case occurred, California did not yet recognize an inverse

condemnation claim based on a temporary takings or on regulatory takings. 

The United States Constitution provides that “[n]o person shall be deprived of

property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use

without just compensation.” U.S. Const., Amend. V. While the Fifth Amendment does not

preclude the government from confiscating private property, it does impose two conditions

on the exercise of such authority – the taking must be for a “public use,” and “just

compensation” must be paid to the owner. Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216,

231-32 (2003). The Takings Clause is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth

Amendment. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 383 (1994). 

The various governmental activities that might interfere with or damage property

interests can be divided into two categories – those that cause a physical invasion or

interference with property rights by a condemnation proceeding or a physical appropriation

(“physical takings”), and those that cause damage by excessive or improper restriction on

property rights by regulation or other improper conduct by a public agency (“regulatory

takings”). See Levald, Inc. v. City of Palm Desert, 998 F.2d 680, 684 (9th Cir. 1993); see

also Brown, 538 U.S. at 233. 

The Fifth Amendment distinguishes between physical takings and regulatory takings

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by the fact that it requires the payment of compensation whenever the government

acquires private property for a public purpose, whether the acquisition is the result of a

condemnation proceeding or a physical appropriation, but contains no comparable

reference to regulations that prohibit a property owner from making certain uses of her

private property. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency,

535 U.S. 302, 321-22 (2002).

The “clearest sort of taking” occurs when the government physically takes

possession of an interest in property for some public purpose; it involves the government’s

encroachment upon or occupation of private land for its own proposed use. Palazzolo v.

Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001); see also Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S.

498, 522 (1998) (physical takings claim is the “classic taking” in which the government

directly appropriates private property for its own use) (citation and quotation omitted). 

By contrast, a “regulatory taking” occurs when the value or usefulness of private

property is diminished by a regulatory action that does not involve a physical occupation of

the property. Hotel & Motel Ass’n of Oakland v. City of Oakland, 344 F.3d 959, 965 (9th

Cir. 2003. Neither a physical appropriation nor a public use is a necessary component of a

regulatory taking. Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 326. 

Here, the complaint does not clearly allege either a regulatory or a physical taking,

and CCSF did not move for an order dismissing the first cause of action for failure to state

a takings claim, of either type. CCSF argues in a footnote in its reply brief that the

complaint does not allege a regulatory taking of plaintiffs’ property, but rather a physical

taking, and asserts that cases that discuss regulatory takings are therefore not relevant to

this action. Williamson, however, was a case that involved a regulatory taking, and CCSF

relies on Williamson in arguing that plaintiffs’ takings claim is not ripe for adjudication.

Thus, based on CCSF’s failure to seek an order dismissing the first cause of action

for failure to state a federal takings claim, the court will assume without deciding the issue

that the complaint does state a claim. The only question remaining, then, is whether

Williamson requires that the first cause of action be dismissed.

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At the hearing, the court asked plaintiffs’ counsel whether plaintiffs were asserting a

physical taking or a regulatory taking, but he was unable to say. He referred to the claim

as a “hybrid,” involving both a physical taking and a regulatory taking. This concept is

unfamiliar to the court, and the court has located no reference in any Supreme Court or

Ninth Circuit decision to a “hybrid” takings claim. The court also asked counsel for CCSF to

provide some authority for extending Williamson to a physical takings claim, given his

insistence that other regulatory takings cases were inapplicable to the present case, but

counsel was unable to do so. He simply asserted that Williamson applies in all federal

takings cases, regardless of the type of taking being alleged. 

Upon further research following the hearing, the court located Ninth Circuit authority

stating that while the first Williamson requirement – a final decision by the responsible

agency or other entity – applies only in regulatory takings cases, the second requirement –

that the property owner must have sought compensation for the alleged taking through

available state procedures – applies in all takings cases. See Daniel v. County of Santa

Barbara, 288 F.3d 375, 382 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Vacation Village, Inc. v. Clark County,

Nev., 497 F.3d 902, 912-13 (9th Cir. 2007). 

A landowner who files a takings claim in federal court before seeking compensation

under the procedures provided by the state “bears the burden of establishing that the state

remedies are inadequate.” Austin v. City & County of Honolulu, 840 F.2d 678, 680 (9th Cir.

1988). A state’s procedures for obtaining compensation are considered adequate under

the requirements of Williamson unless it can be shown that “the state courts establish that

landowners may not obtain just compensation through an inverse condemnation action

under any circumstances.” Id. at 681. 

California provides a state law cause of action for inverse condemnation. Under

California law, an inverse condemnation results from the invasion or appropriation of some

valuable property right under the auspices of a public agency or a private entity with the

power of eminent domain, which directly and specifically injures the property owner. Selby

Realty Co. v. City of San Buenaventura, 10 Cal. 3d 110, 119 (1973). California courts have

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 Plaintiffs’ argument that they satisfied the “exhaustion” requirement by filing a

Government Code § 945.4 claim with CCSF is without merit. The California Tort Claims Act

requirements apply to state law tort claims asserted against public entities in California, and

are independent of the requirements of federal claims. 

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recognized that action for inverse condemnation can be based on a claim of substantial

impairment of the right of ingress and egress. See Border Business Park, Inc. v. City of

San Diego, 142 Cal. App. 4th 1538, 1551 (2006), cert. denied, 127 S.Ct. 2280 (2007).

Accordingly, because plaintiffs have not sought compensation from CCSF for the

alleged taking through available state procedures – specifically by filing an action for

inverse condemnation in state court – the court finds that the first cause of action is not ripe

for decision and must be dismissed, notwithstanding the court’s stated intention at the

hearing to deny the motion.3

 In addition, the court declines to exercise jurisdiction over the

remaining state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). 

CONCLUSION

In accordance with the foregoing, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 17, 2007 ______________________________

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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