Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06856/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-06856-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CION ADONIS PERALTA,

Petitioner,

v.

JEANNE WOODFORD, DIRECTOR,

Respondent.

 /

CV F 03-6856 AWI SMS HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

[Doc. 1]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner is in custody of the California Department of Corrections (CDC) pursuant to a

valid judgment and conviction for murder in Los Angeles County Superior Court. (Respondent’s

Exhibit A, Abstract of Judgment, Court Doc. 18.) Petitioner was sentenced to a term of twentyfive years to life, with possibility of parole. (Id.) 

On June 5, 2001, Petitioner was placed in Avenal State Prison. (Respondent’s Exhibit

B.) He was transferred to Folsom State prison on July 30, 2003, and then to California State

Prison, Lancaster, on June 24, 2004. (Id.)

Petitioner received a rules violation report on July 5, 2002. (Respondent’s Exhibit D,

Rules Violation Report, Part C.) At a disciplinary hearing on July 25, 2002, Petitioner was found

guilty as charged of a Division D offense and assessed a loss of privileges. (Id.)

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 Although contested by Petitioner, this information is derived from the Rules Violation Report and

supporting documentation. See Respondent’s Exhibit C, Rules Violation Report, pp. 1-2, attached to Court Doc. 18.

2

On August 8, 2002, Petitioner filed an administrative appeal. (Respondent’s Exhibit E.) 

Given the nature of the appeal, the first formal level of review was bypassed. (Id.) On October

9, 2002, the appeal was denied at the second level of review. (Respondent’s Exhibit F.) On

January 6, 2003, the Director’s level denial was issued. (Respondent’s Exhibit G.) 

On January 31, 2003, the Kings County Superior Court denied Petitioner’s petition for

writ of habeas corpus. (Respondent’s Exhibit H.) 

On February 13, 2003, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the

California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District. (Respondent’s Exhibit I.) The Court

summarily denied the petition on February 20, 2003. (Id.)

 Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court on

March 5, 2003. (Respondent’s Exhibit J.) The petition was denied on October 15, 2003. 

(Respondent’s Exhibit K.) The Court’s denial referenced the decision of In re Dexter, 25 Cal.3d

921 (1979) [which holds in relevant part than an inmate will not be afforded judicial relief unless

he has exhausted available administrative remedies.] 

Petitioner filed the instant federal petition for writ of habeas corpus on December 15,

2003. By order of July 2, 2004, the Court directed Respondent to file a response to the petition. 

Respondent filed its answer on September 2, 2004. Petitioner filed a traverse on September 15,

2004. 

STATEMENT OF FACTS1

On July 3, 2002, Petitioner failed to comply with a correctional officer’s order to return to

his cell. (Respondent’s Exhibit C, Rules Violation Report, pp. 1-2, attached to Court Doc. 18.)

Once handcuffed, Petitioner resisted the correctional officer’s order to walk to the Program

Office. (Id.) Petitioner then tried to break free from the correctional officer, jumping into the air

and twisting his body. (Id.) Petitioner then dropped to his knees. (Id.) These events were

witnessed by the reporting employee, Officer M. Gonzales, and a percipient witness, Correctional

Officer Baer. (Respondent’s Exhibit D, Rules Violation Report, Part C.) 

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DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws

or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362, 375, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1504, n.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered

violations of his rights as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. The challenged conviction arises

out of a disciplinary hearing at Corcoran State Prison, California, which is located within the

jurisdiction of this Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 2241(d). If a constitutional violation has resulted

in the loss of time credits, such violation affects the duration of a sentence, and the violation may

be remedied by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Young v. Kenny, 907 F.2d 874, 876-

78 (9th Cir. 1990). 

B. Standard of Review

This Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The AEDPA altered the standard of review that a federal habeas court must apply with

respect to a state prisoner's claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court. Williams v.

Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1518-23 (2000). Under the AEDPA, an application for habeas corpus

will not be granted unless the adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States;” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade,123 S.Ct.1166 (2003) (disapproving of

the Ninth Circuit’s approach in Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2000)); Williams v.

Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000). “A federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply

because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision

applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Lockyer, at 1175 (citations

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omitted). “Rather, that application must be objectively unreasonable.” Id. (citations omitted). 

While habeas corpus relief is an important instrument to assure that individuals are

constitutionally protected, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3391-3392

(1983); Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 1086 (1969), direct review of a

criminal conviction is the primary method for a petitioner to challenge that conviction. Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 633, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1719 (1993). In addition, the state court’s

factual determinations must be presumed correct, and the federal court must accept all factual

findings made by the state court unless the petitioner can rebut “the presumption of correctness

by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115

S.Ct. 1769 (1995); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 116 S.Ct. 457 (1995); Langford v. Day,

110 F.3d 1380, 1388 (9th Cir. 1997).

C. Procedural Default

Respondent argues that this Court is barred from reviewing the instant petition. 

Respondent reasons that the California Supreme Court’s citation to the decision of In re Dexter,

25 Cal.3d 921 (1979) suggests a failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and that finding

constitutes state grounds independent of any federal question which are sufficient to support the

judgment. Therefore, Petitioner has procedurally defaulted the claim he raises in the instant

petition and cannot proceed in this Court.

Federal courts “will not review a question of federal law decided by a state court if the

decision of that court rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal question and

adequate to support the judgment.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729, 111 S.Ct. 2546

(1991); LaCrosse v. Kernan, 244 F.3d 702, 704 (9th Cir. 2001). If the court finds an independent

and adequate state procedural ground, “federal habeas review is barred unless the prisoner can

demonstrate cause for the procedural default and actual prejudice, or demonstrate that the failure

to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Noltie v. Peterson, 9

F.3d 802, 804-805 (9th Cir. 1993); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750; Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146,

1150 (9th Cir. 2000). 

“For a state procedural rule to be ‘independent,’ the state law basis for the decision must

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not be interwoven with federal law.” LaCrosse v. Kernan, 244 F.3d 702, 704 (9th Cir. 2001)

(citing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41, 103 S.Ct. 3469 (1983)); Morales v. Calderon,

85 F.3d 1387, 1393 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Federal habeas review is not barred if the state decision

‘fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with federal law.’” (quoting

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735, 111 S.Ct. 2456)). “A state law is so interwoven if ‘the state has made

application of the procedural bar depend on an antecedent ruling on federal law [such as] the

determination of whether federal constitutional error has been committed.’” Park, 202 F.3d at

1152 (quoting Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 75, 105 S.Ct. 1087 (1985)). 

To be deemed adequate, the state law ground for the decision must be well-established

and consistently applied. Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 577 (9th Cir. 1999) (“A state

procedural rule constitutes an adequate bar to federal court review if it was ‘firmly established

and regularly followed’ at the time it was applied by the state court.”)(quoting Ford v. Georgia,

498 U.S. 411, 424, 111 S.Ct. 850 (1991)). Although a state court’s exercise of judicial discretion

will not necessarily render a rule inadequate, the discretion must entail “‘the exercise of

judgment according to standards that, at least over time, can become known and understood

within reasonable operating limits.’” Id. at 377 (quoting Morales, 85 F.3d at 1392). 

In Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 580 (9th Cir. 2003), the Ninth Circuit held that

although the California untimeliness rule as expressed in In Re Robbins was an independent state

procedural ground, the Court could not conclude that it was an adequate state procedural ground

on the basis of the record before it. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to

determine the issue of adequacy (whether the timeliness bar was sufficiently well-established and

consistently applied at the time the default occurred). Id. While the ultimate burden of proving

adequacy rests with the respondent, the petitioner must place the state’s affirmative defense of

independent and adequate state procedural grounds at issue “by asserting specific factual

allegations that demonstrate the inadequacy of the state procedure.” Id.

Although the California Supreme Court cited In re Dexter, 25 Cal.3d 921 (1979), which

holds in relevant part that an inmate will not be afforded judicial relief unless he has exhausted

available administrative remedies, it is unclear and Respondent does not set forth sufficient

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evidence to support the finding that Petitioner did not exhaust the available administrative

remedies. To the contrary, it appears that Petitioner has exhausted the available administrative

remedies. 

The California Department of Corrections has an administrative grievance system for

prisoner complaints. Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15 § 3084, et seq. "Any inmate or parolee under the

department’s jurisdiction may appeal any departmental decision, action, condition, or policy

which they can reasonably demonstrate as having an adverse effect upon their welfare." Id. at

3084.1(a). Four levels of appeal are involved, including the informal level, first formal level,

second formal level, and third formal level, also known as the "Director’s Level." Cal. Code

Regs. tit 15, § 3084.5 (2004). The Director’s Level is the final administrative level of review. 

See Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1116 (9th Cir. 2003). 

As Respondent acknowledges in its answer, Petitioner appealed the instant claim to the

third and final level of review and the Director’s level response was issued on January 6, 2003. 

(Respondent’s Exhibit G.) Petitioner availed himself of the available administrative remedies,

and Respondent does not advance any argument, beyond the California Supreme Court’s citation

to In re Dexter, that Petitioner did not, in fact, exhaust the administrative remedies. Thus,

because it appears based on the record before this Court that Petitioner has exhausted the

administrative remedies, the Court cannot find that the instant claim is procedurally defaulted

based on a failure to exhaust the administrative remedies. 

D. Review of Petitioner’s Claim

Petitioner contends that he was unjustly issued a rules violation report and that he was

medically incapable of performing the charged acts. In essence Petitioner’s claim is that there

was insufficient evidence to support the issuance of the rules violation report.

In reviewing prison disciplinary proceedings, district courts must apply the standard set

forth in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). In Wolff, the Supreme Court held that due

process requires procedural protections before a prison inmate can be deprived of a protected

liberty interest in good time credits. Id. at 563-567. Where a prison disciplinary hearing may

result in the loss of good time credits, Wolff held that the inmate must receive: (1) advance

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2

 The medical chrono merely indicates that due to Petitioner’s low back arthritis problems a lower bunk/tier

is required. (Exhibits Attached to Petition.) 

3

 As Petitioner acknowledges in his traverse, all procedural due process requirements were complied with

during the disciplinary hearing, which supports the finding that Petitioner was fully capable and did in fact present

his views to the hearing officer and Petitioner makes no such claim otherwise here.

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written notice of the disciplinary charges; (2) an opportunity, when consistent with institutional

safety and correctional goals, to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense;

and (3) a written statement by the factfinder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the

disciplinary action. Id. In addition, “revocation of good time does not comport with ‘the

minimum requirements of procedural due process,’ unless the findings of the prison disciplinary

board are supported by some evidence in the record.” Superintendent, Massachusetts

Correctional Institution, Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985), quoting Wolff, 418 U.S. at

558.

In the instant case, Petitioner does not challenge the prison disciplinary process, but rather

the sufficiency of the evidence to support the violation. Petitioner cites to a medical chrono that

was issued for the period of August 14, 2001 to August 14, 2002.2 (Exhibits Attached to

Petition.) Petitioner further cites to prison passes for physical therapy during the period of

December 2001, and March through May 2002. (Exhibits Attached to Petition.) 

 As previously mentioned, Petitioner was found guilty of resisting prison staff by uttering

abusive remarks and attempting to break free from the officer’s grip. (Respondent’s Exhibit C, at

2.) Petitioner argues that he is innocent of the charges, and, based on the medical evidence

submitted, he was incapable of performing the alleged acts. 

The hearing officer properly found the preponderance of evidence supported a finding of

guilt and “some evidence” supports this finding. The hearing officer had before him the rules

violation report drafted by correctional officer Gonzales and the supplemental report by officer

Baer. It was noted by the hearing officer that Petitioner pled not guilty, indicated he did not

resist, and he was medically incapable of doing the acts as stated.3 (Respondent’s Exhibit D.) 

The Supreme Court has held that when reviewing a prison disciplinary decision, this Court

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should not independently assess the credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evidence. Hill, 472

U.S. at 455-56. The record of the hearing demonstrates that the hearing officer considered all the

evidence and rejected Petitioner’s claim that he was medically incapable of performing the

alleged actions as to the other evidence presented. (Respondent’s Exhibit D.) As Respondent

submits, Petitioner’s assertion that he did not and could not commit the resistance described in

the disciplinary charge was properly viewed against the step-by-step account of such resistance

by the reporting officer and the percipient witness-officer. As some evidence supports the

issuance of the rules violation report, the petition for writ of habeas corpus must be denied. 

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus be DENIED; and

2. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of Respondent.

These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the assigned United States

District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-

304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of

California. Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after

service of the objections. The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951

F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 13, 2005 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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