Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-01688/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-01688-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:145 Patent Infringement

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1 05CV1688

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RANDALL W. ROBINSON,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 05CV1688 BTM (CAB)

ORDER RE: CLAIM

vs. CONSTRUCTION

ADVANCED DECOY RESEARCH, INC.,

GEORGE BRINT, AND PANIC MOUSE,

INC.,

Defendants.

Randall Robinson (“Plaintiff” or “Patentee”) received U.S. Patent No. 4,930,448 (“the

‘448 patent”) on June 5, 1990, for his invention entitled “Animal Toy.” The device consists

primarily of a motorized mechanism by which an object rotates about a stationary base via

an elongate rod. The basic idea is that an animal will be drawn to the spinning object and

have some sort of pleasant interaction with it.

On August 26, 2005, Mr. Robinson filed a complaint with this Court alleging

infringement of the ‘448 patent by Advanced Decoy Research, Inc. On April 13, 2006,

Plaintiff amended his complaint to include George Brint and Panic Mouse, Inc. as additional

defendants. 

Plaintiff and Defendants have filed briefs supporting their proposed constructions of

the claims of Patent ‘448. Pursuant to Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S.

370 (1996), the Court must construe the claims of the ‘448 patent as a matter of law. On

February 26, 2007, the court held a Markman hearing. Having considered the evidence

presented in the parties’ briefs and arguments at the hearing, the Court issues the following

order construing the claim language as a matter of law. 

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2 05CV1688

I. Legal Standard for Claim Construction

To ascertain the meaning of the claims, the court initially looks to three sources of

intrinsic evidence: the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history. Vitronics Corp.

v. Conceptronic Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“It is well-settled that, in

interpreting an asserted claim, the court should look first to the intrinsic evidence of record,

i.e., the patent itself, including the claims, the specification and, if in evidence, the

prosecution history.”). These sources form the public record of the patentee’s claim. Id. at

1583. If the meaning of a claim is unambiguous from the intrinsic evidence, a court may not

rely on extrinsic evidence in construing the claim. Key Pharms. v. Hercon Labs. Corp., 161

F.3d 709, 716 (Fed. Cir. 1998).

In construing the claims, the court first looks at the language of the claims. Markman

v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) aff’d 517 U.S. 370

(1996). There is a “heavy presumption” in favor of the ordinary and accustomed meaning

of claim language as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art. Johnson Worldwide

Assocs., Inc. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 989 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see also Phillips v. AWH

Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312-1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“We have made clear, moreover, that the

ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning that the term would have to

a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the

effective filing date of the patent application.”). Accordingly, a technical term used in a patent

is usually interpreted as having the meaning a person of ordinary skill in the field of the

invention would have understood it to have at the time of filing. However, a patentee is

entitled to “act as his own lexicographer to specifically define terms of a claim contrary to

their ordinary meaning.” Chef America, Inc. v. Lamb-Weston, Inc., 358 F.3d 1371, 1374

(Fed. Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). In these instances, a court should construe the term as

defined by the patentee. Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1357

(Fed. Cir. 1999).

In its initial examination of the intrinsic evidence, the court is also instructed to

“examine the prosecution history to determine whether the patentee has relinquished a

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3 05CV1688

potential claim construction in an amendment to the claim or in an argument to overcome or

distinguish a reference.” Bell Atlantic Network Services., Inc. v. Covad Communications

Group, 262 F.3d 1258, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citing Southwall Techs., Inc. v. Cardinal IG,

Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“The prosecution history limits the interpretation

of claim terms so as to exclude any interpretation that was disclaimed during prosecution.”)).

The prosecution history, or “file wrapper,” contains the complete record of all the proceedings

before the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”), including any express

representations made by the applicant regarding the scope of the claims. Bell Atlantic, 262

F.3d at 1268. In examining the prosecution history, however, the Court cannot “enlarge,

diminish, or vary” the limitations of the claims. Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co. v. Davis, 102

U.S. 222, 227 (1880).

If the meaning of the claim limitation is apparent from the intrinsic evidence alone, the

Court may not rely on extrinsic evidence other than that used to ascertain the ordinary

meaning of the claim limitation. Bell Atlantic, 262 F.3d at 1268-69. However, in the “rare

circumstance” that the meaning of the asserted claims cannot be ascertained after examining

the intrinsic evidence, the Court may look to extrinsic evidence to help resolve any lack of

clarity. Id. Extrinsic evidence consists of all evidence external to the patent and prosecution

history and includes such evidence as expert testimony, articles, and inventor testimony.

Markman, 52 F.3d at 980. It may be used only to assist the Court in determining the proper

understanding of the disputed limitation, rather than “to vary, contradict, expand, or limit the

claim language from how it is defined, even by implication, in the specification or file history.”

Bell Atlantic, 262 F.3d at 1269. While dictionaries fall within the category of extrinsic

evidence, the Court is free to consult them at any time “so long as the dictionary definition

does not contradict any definition found in or ascertained by a reading of the patent

documents.” Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1584 n.6. Dictionaries are preferred over opinion

testimony because they are objective and available to the public. Id. at 1585. This limited

use of extrinsic evidence comports with the principle that “[a]llowing the public record to be

altered or changed by extrinsic evidence . . . would make th[e] right [to design around the

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4 05CV1688

claimed invention] meaningless.” Id. at 1583. “Any other rule would be unfair to competitors

who must be able to rely on the patent documents themselves, without consideration of

expert opinion that then does not even exist, in ascertaining the scope of a patentee’s right

to exclude.” Southwall, 54 F.3d at 1578.

II. Construction of the Terms of the ‘448 Patent: Claim 1

The Court addresses the following twelve terms of Claim 1 of the ‘448 patent:

[1] A toy device for the amusement of pet animals, [2] comprising: [3] a

base member having a [4] lower surface for freely seating on a

substantially flat surface, the lower surface [5] having no projections for

connection to the seating surface; an [6] elongate, rod-like member [7]

rotatably mounted at one end on said base member and extending in an

upwardly and [8] radially outwardly arched path away from said base

member with its free end spaced radially outwardly from the outer [9]

periphery of said base member; a [10] single flexible connecting device

secured to the free end of said elongate member; an object attached to said

connecting device [11] opposite and directly below the free end of said

member; and [12] drive means on said base member for rotating said

elongate member to move said object in a path around said base for the

amusement of a pet unsecured to said base.

A. “a toy device for the amusement of pet animals”

The first disputed language, “a toy device for the amusement of pet animals,”

comprises the preamble of Claim 1. As a general rule, preambles are not construed as

limiting the claims except in those instances where they recite “essential structure” or where

they are “necessary to give life, meaning, and vitality to the claim.” Catalina Mktg. Int’l, Inc.

v. Coolsavings.com, 289 F.3d 801, 808 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). Thus, generally,

“a preamble is not limiting where a patentee defines a structurally complete invention in the

claim body and uses the preamble only to state a purpose or intended use for the invention.”

Id. (citation omitted). However, a patentee’s “clear reliance on the preamble during

prosecution to distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art transforms the preamble

into a claim limitation because such reliance indicates use of the preamble to define, in part,

the claimed invention.” Id. Thus, statements of intended use may limit the claims in those

instances where the patentee “clearly and unmistakably relied on those uses or benefits to

distinguish prior art.” Id. at 809. 

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1

 Construction of the phrase “toy” is unnecessary as it would merely be redundant with

the inclusion of “amusement.”

American Heritage Dictionary defines “pet” as: “an animal kept for amusement or

companionship.” American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, available online at

http://education.yahoo.com/reference/dictionary.

5 05CV1688

In this instance Plaintiff clearly relied on use specified in the preamble to distinguish

from the Postings reference (U.S. Pat. #1,699,308) when, in a response to the USPTO

examiner’s initial rejection, he characterized Postings as an “exercising device” and noted

that the device in Postings “clearly has no ‘amusement’ value to the animals whatsoever.”

(Def’s Ex. B at 35-36 (emphasis and quotations in original).) Plaintiff thereby relied on the

“amusement” element of the preamble to define his claimed invention and to distinguish it

from a prior art reference. Thus the preamble must be construed as limiting inasmuch as the

claim requires an element of “amusement.”

Plaintiff argues, and at first glance it appears, that the preamble need not be

construed as limiting “amusement” to that of “pet animals.” In this instance, Patentee did not

argue during prosecution that his invention was patentably distinct from Postings based on

the fact that a pet was to be amused. Indeed, he could not have done so because the

Postings reference in fact discloses a device for the exercising of a pet (a dog). However,

the intended use specified in the preamble, and which the Patentee relied upon in the

prosecution history, is that of a “toy device for the amusement of pet animals.” Plaintiff has

cited no authority for the proposition that a preamble specifying the intended use of the

device should be dissected in the claim construction process to include only the single

distinguishing element. Such a dissection would be particularly odd in this instance where

the remaining phrase (“for the amusement”) is simply not logically cognizable without

reference to the “amusee.”

In light of the foregoing analysis, the Court will construe the preamble phrase “a toy

device for the amusement of pet animals” as “a device for the amusement of an animal

kept for pleasure or companionship, rather than solely for utility.”1

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2

 American Heritage Dictionary defines “base,” as used in the context of the ‘448

patent, as: “a supporting part or layer; a foundation.”

“Member,” in this context, is defined as: “a structural unit, such as a beam or wall.”

6 05CV1688

B. “comprising”

“Comprising” is a term of art in patent law which is construed to mean, as the parties

stipulate, “including but not limited to.” See SanDisk Corp. v. Memorex Products, Inc., 415

F.3d 1278, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2005).

As such, the Court construes “comprising” to mean “including but not limited to.”

C. “a base member”

Defendants cite to various other patents, which would have been prior art at the time

of the ‘448 application, for the proposition that “base member” means “an integral support

structure.” Because the patent specification is reasonably clear on the structure of this

element, and owing to the general presumption in favor of construing claim terms using

intrinsic evidence, reference to other patents or additional extrinsic evidence is unnecessary.

See Key Pharms, 161 F.3d at 716.

Plaintiff cites to the patent specification, in particular column 2 at line 19, for the

proposition that “base member” should be construed to mean a “housing.” However, that

sentence states that the device “basically comprises a base or housing,” thereby implying

that a base member is not a housing. In addition, while the patent specification appears to

use the two terms interchangeably in some places, it also clearly distinguishes between the

two in others. Compare Patent Abstract (“A toy device for a pet animal comprises a base

housing having an upper wall . . . .”) with Column 1, Line 27 (“The base preferably comprises

a housing in which the rotatable member and drive assembly are mounted . . . .”) (emphasis

added). Accordingly, the Court cannot find that the specification clearly defines the term

“base member” as a “housing.”

Rather, the implication present throughout the patent, and the Court’s understanding

of the plain meaning,2

 indicate that the term “base member” should be construed as

“supporting structural unit.”

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 American Heritage Dictionary defines “free,” the root of the word “freely,” as used in

the context of the ‘448 patent, as: “not bound, fastened, or attached.”

7 05CV1688

D. “having a lower surface for freely seating on a substantially flat surface”

Defendants suggest that this term should be construed to mean having a “flat lower

surface that rests directly onto a flat ground surface, in contact with the surface.” (Joint

Claim Construction Chart (“Claims Chart”), p. 2, section 1.3.) In support of this definition, the

Defendants propose that the remainder of the phrase implies that the lower surface must be

flat in order that it may “freely [sit] on a substantially flat surface.” However, the Court

believes this definition overreaches, in that the lower surface need not necessarily be flat to

enable it to rest on a flat surface. The surfaces of many objects are not flat - an upturned

bowl for example - yet those objects are quite capable of resting on a substantially flat

surface.

Plaintiff contends that the phrase should be construed to mean that the base member

is not secured to the flat surface, and cites to the prosecution history as evidence. During

prosecution, the Patentee was faced with a prior art rejection by the patent examiner, and

was forced to argue around the Postings reference. To avoid Postings, the Patentee argued

both the above-mentioned “amusement” angle, as well an argument that Postings disclosed

a device whereby the animal was tethered to the device and the device was secured to a

surface (generally, the ground) - thus ostensibly forcing the animal to run circles around a

stationary object. In contrast, Patentee argued, his invention describes a device in which the

animal is neither tethered to the device, nor is the device secured to the surface.

The Court finds Plaintiff’s argument persuasive. The prosecution history provides for

a definition of the phrase which is consistent with the language of the claims, specification,

and the plain meaning.3

 As such, the Court construes “having a lower surface for freely

seating on a substantially flat surface” to mean: “having a lower surface that sits on, but

is not secured to, a mostly flat surface.”

//

//

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8 05CV1688

E. “the lower surface having no projections for connection to the seating surface;”

Plaintiff contends that this phrase must be construed in light of the prosecution history

to mean “having no arms extend[ing] downwardly into the seating surface.” (Claims Chart,

p. 2, section 1.4.) In support of this construction, Plaintiff cites to the November 20, 1989

amendment in response to the examiner’s prior art rejections. In this response, Plaintiff was

forced to argue around the prior art disclosure of Postings and McMurry (U.S. Pat. #

2,831,457) when he stated: “[I]n both Postings and McMurry, the base member is physically

secured to the ground surface via projections from its lower surface . . . . It therefore is not

freely seated on the ground in either case. . . .” (Def’s Exh. B at 37.) In conjunction with this

argument, it appears that Plaintiff amended Claim 1 to include the above language, claiming

a negative element of “no projections.”

The Court does not agree with Plaintiff’s contention that the prosecution history should

be interpreted as limiting “no projections for connection to the seating surface” to “no arms

extend[ing] downwardly into the seating surface.” While Plaintiff’s intention when drafting the

amended claim may have been to only disclaim those projections which extended

downwardly, he did not do so. It is a fundamental axiom in patent law that a Court may not

redraft a claim, via construction, to encompass what the patentee intended to claim, or could

have claimed. In a situation very similar to this one, where the patentee was relying on

prosecution history to support construction of the term “permanently affixed” as meaning

“affixed to prevent movement in at least a horizontal plane,” the Federal Circuit stated:

To be sure, the prosecution history indicates that the applicant intended to

amend the claims to avoid the “detachable” connection of the Johnson skate.

The same history, however, indicates that the applicant chose to add the

term “permanently” to the claims in order to achieve this result. That the

applicant could possibly have added terms other than “permanently” to create

a patentable distinction with the asserted prior art is simply irrelevant to our

claim construction task. Courts do not rewrite claims; instead, we give effect

to the terms chosen by the patentee. See, e.g., Texas Instruments Inc. v.

International Trade Comm'n, 988 F.2d 1165, 1171, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)

1018, 1023 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“[T]o construe the claims in the manner

suggested by TI would read an express limitation out of the claims. This, we

will not do because ‘[c]ourts can neither broaden nor narrow claims to give

the patentee something different than what he has set forth’” (quoting

Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 181 Ct. Cl. 55, 384 F.2d 391, 396, 155

U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 697, 701 (Ct. Cl.1967).).

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4

 American Heritage Dictionary defines “projection,” as used in the context of the ‘448

patent, as: “a thing or part that extends outward beyond a prevailing line or surface.”

“Connect,” the root of the word “connection,” is defined as: “to join or fasten together.”

5

 American Heritage Dictionary defines “elongate,” as used in the context of the ‘448

patent, as: “having more length than width; slender.”

9 05CV1688

K-2 Corp. v. Salomon S.A., 191 F.3d 1356, 1364-65 (Fed. Cir. 1999).

Just as the court in K-2 refused to expand the scope of the phrase beyond that which

was claimed, so must this Court. The distinction that the claim amendment here was a

negative one, or specifically negating an element of the claim, does not distinguish K-2 from

the present case. In this instance, reading “downwardly” into the claim would serve to

expand the scope of Plaintiff’s claim, because the claim would then encompass all

projections not protruding “downwardly” - just as reading “permanently” to mean “affixed to

prevent movement in at least a horizontal plane” would expand the scope of the K-2 claim

to include fixation in methods outside the commonly understood definition of “permanently.”

Though a patentee is entitled to be his own lexicographer, “‘the words of a claim will be given

their ordinary meaning, unless it appears that the inventor used them differently.’” K-2, 191

F.3d at 1364 (quoting Hoganas AB v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 9 F.3d 948, 951 (Fed. Cir.

1993). In this instance, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the language used in the

prosecution history is sufficient to overcome the ordinary meaning of the phrase.4

As such, “the lower surface having no projections for connection to the seating

surface” shall be construed as “the lower surface having no parts extending outwardly for

attachment or fastening to the seating surface.”

F. “an elongate, rod-like member”

Plaintiff proposes that this phrase be construed as a “shaft having a length.” The

Court finds that such a construction would be unhelpful to a jury, as it remains quite vague

in its employment of the phrase “having a length.” Defendants’ proposal of “a long, slender

rod-like structure” appears to be supported by the patent specification and the dictionary

definition of elongate,5

 and it also gives some additional definition to the phrase. Accordingly,

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“an elongate, rod-like member” shall be construed as “a long, slender rod-like structure.”

G. “rotatably mounted at one end on said base member”

The parties stipulate that the term “rotatably mounted” means “connected such that

it rotates.” The Court shall construe it as such.

H. “extending in an upwardly and radially outwardly arched path away from said

base member”

The parties stipulate that “radially outwardly” means “away from center.” The Court

shall construe it as such.

I. “with its free end spaced radially outwardly from the outer periphery of said base

member;”

The parties stipulate that “periphery” means “the edge.” The Court shall construe it

as such.

J. “a single flexible connecting device secured to the free end of said elongate

member;”

Defendants assert that the term “flexible connecting device” connotes a means-plusfunction element, thereby falling within the purview of 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6, and limiting the

element to structures delineated in the specification.

Under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6, “[a]n element in a claim for a combination may be

expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of

structure, material, or acts in support thereof.” The statute states that these types of claims

are not construed to cover all possible means for performing the stated function, but are

“construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the

specification and equivalents thereof.” 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6; see O.I Corp v. Tekmar Co.,

115 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1997).

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In identifying which claims shall be read as means-plus-function, courts have

construed those claims using the term “means” as creating a rebuttable presumption that §

112 ¶ 6 applies, while not including the term “means” creates a rebuttable presumption that

§ 112 ¶ 6 does not apply. Lighting World, Inc. v. Birchwood Lighting, Inc., 382 F.3d 1354,

1358 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Thus, “[t]he use of the term ‘means’ is central to the analysis,

because the term ‘means,’ particularly as used in the phrase ‘means for,’ is part of the classic

template for functional claim elements, and has come to be closely associated with meansplus-function claiming.” Id. (citations omitted). This presumption stems largely from the idea

that § 112 ¶ 6 “provides that an element in a claim for a combination ‘may be expressed’ as

a means for performing a function, which indicates that the patentee is afforded the option

of using the means-plus-function format. The question then is whether, in the selection of

claim language, the patentee must be taken to have exercised that option.” Greenberg v.

Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 91 F.3d 1580, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (quoting § 112 ¶ 6).

The presumption against construing an element of a claim as invoking § 112 ¶ 6,

absent the term “means,” may be rebutted “if it is demonstrated that the claim term fails to

recite sufficiently definite structure or else recites function without reciting sufficient structure

for performing that function.“ Lighting World, 382 F.3d at 1358 (citations omitted). However,

it must be understood that the presumption against § 112 ¶ 6 treatment is “a strong one, that

is not readily overcome.” Id.

In Lighting World, the Federal Circuit explained the test for determining whether a

claim element lacked sufficient structure, thereby overcoming the presumption. In that case,

however, the court found that the term “connector assembly” did provide sufficient structure,

and thus did not fall within § 112 ¶ 6. Id. at 1360-63. The court stated:

In considering whether a claim term recites sufficient structure to avoid

application of section 112 ¶ 6, we have not required the claim term to denote

a specific structure. Instead, we have held that it is sufficient if the claim term

is used in common parlance or by persons of skill in the pertinent art to

designate structure, even if the term covers a broad class of structures and

even if the term identifies the structures by their function.

Id. at 1359-60. The court continued: “‘[T]he fact that a particular mechanism . . . is defined

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in functional terms is not sufficient to convert a claim element containing that term into a

‘means for performing a specified function’ within the meaning of section 112(6).’” Id. at 1360

(quoting Greenberg, 91 F.3d at 1583). In concluding that “connector assembly” did not fall

within the purview of § 112 ¶ 6, the court noted:

[W]hile it is true that the term “connector assembly” does not bring to mind

a particular structure, that point is not dispositive. What is important is

whether the term is one that is understood to describe structure, as opposed

to a term that is simply a nonce word or a verbal construct that is not

recognized as the name of structure and is simply a substitute for the term

“means for.”

382 F.3d at 1360.

The Lighting World court also distinguished “connector assembly” from the “lever

moving element” which was found to be means-plus-function element in Mas-Hamilton Group

v. LaGard, Inc., 156 F.3d 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1998). In Mas-Hamilton, the court found that “lever

moving element” did not define structure, in that it did not have a well understood structural

meaning in the art. 156 F.3d at 1213-14. Lighting World distinguished Mas-Hamilton on the

ground that “connector assembly” did in fact have an understood structural definition in the

art, as defined by the patent specification, dictionaries, and expert testimony. 382 F.3d at

1363.

Conversely, in Mass. Inst. of Tech. (“MIT”) v. Abacus Software, the Federal Circuit

determined that the term “colorant selection mechanism” did not connote sufficient structure

to a person of ordinary skill in the art to avoid § 112 ¶ 6 treatment. 462 F.3d 1344, 1354

(Fed. Cir. 2006). In doing so, the court noted that generic structural terms such as “means,”

“element,” or “device” do not recite sufficient structure to avoid § 112 ¶ 6, but that “[c]laim

language that further defines a generic term like ‘mechanism’ can sometimes add sufficient

structure to avoid 112 ¶ 6.” Id. However, in that instance the Court found that the phrase

“colorant selection” did not add sufficient structure to define the term “mechanism” so as to

avoid § 112 ¶ 6. Id.

In making its determination, the MIT court first looked to the prosecution history of the

patent and noted that the patentee used “mechanism” and “means” as synonyms. Id. The

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court also looked disfavorably upon the fact that the term “colorant selection,” which modified

“mechanism,” was not defined in the patent specification or in dictionaries, nor did it have a

generally understood meaning in the art. Id. The court thus found that the phrase did not

recite sufficient structure to one of ordinary skill in the art, and was therefore limited by § 112

¶ 6. Id.

In this instance, the phrase “flexible connecting device” does not fit neatly into the

standard means-plus-function analysis. Obviously the phrase does not contain the term

“means,” thus the strong presumption against § 112 ¶ 6 is applicable in this case. However,

that presumption may be rebutted upon a showing of a lack of structural specificity or a

recital of function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function. Lighting

World, 382 F.3d at 1358. Facially, it does not appear that the phrase “flexible connecting

device” connotes any particular structure, and could be interpreted as describing a device

according to the function that it performs. However, it is clear that neither the delineation of

a specific structure, nor the identification of structure distinct from its function, is required to

escape § 112 ¶ 6. Id. at 1359-60. What is required to escape § 112 ¶ 6 is that the phrase

be used in common parlance or by persons of skill in the pertinent art to designate structure,

even if the structure described is of a broad or amorphous class.

This Court believes that Lighting World controls and that “flexible connecting device”

does in fact connote such a structure. This Court cannot distinguish between the “connector

assembly” of Lighting World and the “flexible connecting device” of the present case. Just

as that court found that “connector” had a reasonably understood meaning as a name for

structure (noticeably, not a structure), despite the fact that this structure was defined in terms

of the function that it performs, so does this Court find “connecting device” to connote

structure. Admittedly, there is a distinction in the terms, in that the term “connector” is a noun

whereas “connecting” is an adjective describing the function of the generic phrase “device,”

however the Court finds this to be a distinction without difference. Absent any evidence on

the issue, this Court cannot see any substantial difference between a person of ordinary skill

in the art of lighting fixtures describing something as a “connector assembly” and a person

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of ordinary skill in the art of small motorized devices describing something as a “connecting

device.”

Additionally, the factors present in MIT, which the Federal Circuit relied upon to

construe “colorant selection mechanism” as a means-plus-function element, are not present

in this instance. The prosecution history of the ‘448 patent lacks any synonymous usage of

the terms “device” and “means,” and the term “connecting” (which modifies “device”) is

clearly defined in common knowledge and dictionaries. Thus, the term “connecting device,”

in the context of this patent, connotes a sufficient degree of structure to one of ordinary skill

in the art so as to avoid § 112 ¶ 6.

Furthermore, this Court gives consideration to the fact that the presumption against

construing an element as means-plus-function stems from the premise that § 112 ¶ 6 affords

the patentee the option of using the means-plus-function format. Greenberg, 91 F.3d at

1584. In light of this fact, an important distinction within the patent becomes apparent. Claim

10 is dependent upon Claim 1, and further limits the “flexible connecting device” of Claim 1:

[W]herein said connecting device comprises an elongate flexible member,

first flexible connecting means at one end of said flexible member for flexibly

connecting it to the free end of said elongate member, and second

connecting means at the opposite end of said flexible member for connecting

it to the object to suspend it below the free end of said elongate member.

(‘448 patent, column 4, line 50-57.) It is clear from Claim 10 that the patentee was indeed

familiar with the means-plus-function terminology, and the method of exercising his option

to invoke § 112 ¶ 6, as he added the limitations of a “first flexible connecting means” and a

“second connecting means.” It seems to this Court that if the patentee wished to exercise

this option in claim 1, he would have done so in the same manner. In light of this

inconsistency, the Court does not believe that the patentee exercised his option to invoke §

112 ¶ 6 in this element of Claim 1.

As the Court has determined that § 112 ¶ 6 does not apply, and the words of the

phrase are commonly understood, the Court does not believe that “flexible connecting

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 Defendants have requested that “single” be construed as “only one.” However, the

Court finds that the word “single” is readily understood and requires no further definition.

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device” requires any additional construction.6

K. “an object attached to said connecting device opposite and directly below the

free end of said member;”

The Court finds that the words used in describing the placement of the object do not

require any definition. The Court construes the phrase “opposite and directly below the

free end of said member” to simply mean “on the opposite side of the connecting device

from the elongate member, and also directly below the free end of said member.”

L. “drive means on said base member for rotating said elongate member to move

said object in a path around said base for the amusement of a pet unsecured to said base;”

The parties stipulate that this is a means-plus-function element, and it shall be

construed as such. In Cardiac Pacemakers, the Federal Circuit synthesized the law

governing construction of means-plus-function elements as follows:

Construction of a means-plus-function limitation involves two steps. First, the

court must identify the claimed function. Telemac Cellular Corp. v. Topp

Telecom, Inc., 247 F.3d 1316, 1324, 58 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1545, 1549 (Fed.

Cir. 2001) (citing Kemco, 208 F.3d at 1361, 54 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) at 1610);

Micro Chem., Inc. v. Great Plains Chem. Co., Inc., 194 F.3d 1250, 1258, 52

U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1258, 1263 (Fed. Cir. 1999). The court must construe the

function of a means-plus-function limitation to include the limitations

contained in the claim language, and only those limitations. Lockheed Martin, 249 F.3d at 1324, 58 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) at 1678. It is improper to narrow the

scope of the function beyond the claim language. Id. It is equally improper to

broaden the scope of the claimed function by ignoring clear limitations in the

claim language. Id. Ordinary principles of claim construction govern

interpretation of the claim language used to describe the function. Id.

After identifying the claimed function, the court must then determine what

structure, if any, disclosed in the specification corresponds to the claimed

function. Id. In order to qualify as corresponding, the structure must not only

perform the claimed function, but the specification must clearly associate the

structure with performance of the function. Medtronic, 248 F.3d 1303, 1311,

58 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1607, 1614 (quoting B Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott

Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1424, 43 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1896, 1900 (Fed. Cir.

1997)). This inquiry is undertaken from the perspective of a person of

ordinary skill in the art. Atmel Corp. v. Info. Storage Devices, Inc., 198 F.3d

1374, 1378-79, 53 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1225, 1227-28 (Fed. Cir. 1999).

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28 7

 Plaintiff has indicated that any claim of infringement with respect to Claim 2 is

withdrawn and, therefore, no construction is necessary. [See Doc. #60, Ex. A at 5.]

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Alternative embodiments may disclose different corresponding structure, and

the claim is valid even if only one embodiment discloses corresponding

structure. See Ishida Co. v. Taylor, 221 F.3d 1310, 1316, 55 U.S.P.Q.2D

(BNA) 1449, 1452-53 (Fed. Cir. 2000). If, however, this inquiry reveals that

no embodiment discloses corresponding structure, the claim is invalid for

failure to satisfy the definiteness requirement of § 112, P 2. Budde v. HarleyDavidson, Inc., 250 F.3d 1369, 1376, 58 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1801, 1806 (Fed.

Cir. 2001) (citing In re Dossel, 115 F.3d 942, 945, 42 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA)

1881, 1884 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).

Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Medical, Inc., 296 F.3d 1006, 1113-14 (Fed. Cir. 2002).

In this instance, the first step of construction, identifying the claimed function, is clear.

Claim 1 states the function is “for rotating said elongate member to move said object in a

path around said base for the amusement of a pet unsecured to said base.” (‘448 patent,

column 4, line 12-15.) Defendants’ contention that the function should be construed as

requiring that the object be dragged on the ground, relying on language in the specification,

is mistaken. The function is clearly defined in the language of the claim, and this Court “must

construe the function of a means-plus-function limitation to include the limitations contained

in the claim language, and only those limitations.” Cardiac Pacemakers, 296 F.3d at 1113.

The second step in construction is similarly clear. From column 2, line 67 to column

3, line 20, and in Figure 4, the patent delineates the corresponding structural components

of the drive means: a power supply 27, a switch 26, a motor 32, reduction gears 36, and a

shaft 18. The specification clearly associates the structure with performance of the function

in that the paragraph describing the drive means begins: “The drive assembly 24 is illustrated

in more detail in FIG. 4.” (‘448 Patent, column 2, line 67.)

As such, the phrase “drive means” shall be construed to mean “a power supply, a

switch, a motor, reduction gears, and a shaft.”

III. Construction of the Terms of the ‘448 Patent: Claim 37

Claim 3 is dependent upon, and incorporates all of the elements of, Claim 1. The

Court addresses the following term of Claim 3 of the ‘448 patent:

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The device as claimed in claim 1, wherein said elongate member comprises

a pliable wire.

The parties stipulate that “pliable” means “bendable.” The Court shall construe it as

such.

IV. Construction of the Terms of the ‘448 Patent: Claim 4

Claim 4 is dependent upon, and incorporates all of the elements of, Claim 1. The

Court addresses the following three terms of Claim 4 of the ‘448 patent:

The device as claimed in claim 1, wherein said drive means comprises a power

supply, a drive motor mounted in said base, [1] circuit means connecting said

power supply to said drive motor, [2] a rotatable member rotatably mounted

on said base, said elongate member being releasably secured to said rotatable

member, and [3] transmission means connecting said drive motor to said

rotatable member.

A. “circuit means connecting said power supply to said drive motor”

The parties stipulate that this is a means-plus-function element, thereby invoking §

112 ¶ 6. As such, the Court applies the Cardiac Pacemakers two-step construction method

whereby the first step is identifying the claimed function, and the second step is determining

what corresponding structure is identified in the patent specification. 296 F.3d at 1113-14.

In this instance, the parties stipulate that: 1) the function is to connect said power

supply to said drive motor; and 2) the corresponding structure disclosed in the specification

is a switch and a speed control.

The Court adopts this construction, and shall construe the term “circuit means” as

“a switch and a speed control.”

B. “a rotatable member rotatably mounted on said base, said elongate member

being releasably secured to said rotatable member”

The parties stipulate that “rotatable member” means “a shaft that rotates for

connection to the elongate member.” The Court shall construe it as such. The Court also

deems it necessary to construe the term “rotatably mounted” as that term is not one often

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8

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found in common parlance. As “rotatably” is an adverb form of the word “rotate,” the Court

shall construe “rotatably mounted” to mean, “mounted in a way such that it is capable of

being rotated.”

C. “transmission means connecting said drive motor to said rotatable member.”

The parties stipulate that this is a means-plus-function element, thereby invoking §

112 ¶ 6. In this instance, the parties stipulate that: 1) the function is to connect the drive

motor to said rotatable member; and 2) the corresponding structure disclosed in the

specification is a reduction gear. 

The Court modifies this construction slightly, in that the specification discloses multiple

reduction gears (‘448 patent, column 3, lines 4-7), and shall construe the term “transmission

means” as “reduction gears.” For further clarification, it is useful to define “reduction gears,”

which may be defined as “gearing that reduces an input speed to a slower output speed.”8

Thus, the Court construes the phrase “transmission means” as “reduction gears that

operate to reduce an input speed to a slower output speed.”

V. Construction of the Terms of the ‘448 Patent: Claim 5

Claim 5 is dependent upon, and incorporates all of the elements of, Claim 4 (and

thereby Claim 1). The Court addresses the following two terms of Claim 5 of the ‘448 patent:

The device as claimed in claim 4, wherein said circuit means includes [1]

switch means for controlling connection of the power supply to the motor, said

switch means including [2] an actuator externally mounted on said base for

controlling operation of said switch means.

A. “switch means for controlling connection of the power supply to the motor”

The parties stipulate that this is a means-plus-function element, thereby invoking §

112 ¶ 6. In this instance, the parties stipulate that: 1) the function is for controlling connection

of the power supply to the motor; and 2) the corresponding structure disclosed in the

specification is a switch.

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9

 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 2 states: “The specification shall conclude with one or more claims

particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards

as his invention.”

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The Court adopts this construction, and shall construe the term “switch means” as

“a switch.”

B. “said switch means including an actuator externally mounted on said base for

controlling operation of said switch means”

The parties stipulate that “actuator externally mounted on said base” means “a

switch button on the outside of the base.” The Court shall construe it as such.

VI. Construction of the Terms of the ‘448 Patent: Claim 6

Claim 6 is dependent upon, and incorporates all of the elements of, Claim 4 (and

thereby Claim 1). The Court addresses the following term of Claim 6 of the ‘448 patent:

The device as claimed in claim 4, wherein said circuit means includes variable

speed control means for controlling the speed of rotation of said rotatable

member.

The parties stipulate that this is a means-plus-function element, thereby invoking §

112 ¶ 6. As such, the Court applies the Cardiac Pacemakers two-step construction method

whereby the first step is identifying the claimed function, and the second step is determining

what corresponding structure is identified in the patent specification. 296 F.3d at 1113-14.

If no corresponding structure is found in the specification, the claim is invalid for failure to

satisfy the definiteness requirement of § 112 ¶ 2.9 Id. (citing Budde v. Harley-Davidson, Inc.,

250 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). The determination of whether the specification

adequately delineates a corresponding structure is made from the viewpoint of one skilled

in the art. Budde, 250 F.3d at 1376. Additionally, because the claims of a patent are

afforded a statutory presumption of validity, the finding that a means-plus-function claim is

invalid for indefiniteness must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Id. “Thus, a

challenge to a claim containing a means-plus-function limitation as lacking structural support

requires a finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that the specification lacks disclosure

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10 While Plaintiff did not provide evidence supporting the proposition that one of

ordinary skill in the art would recognize the structure of a variable speed control, an internet

search for the term “variable speed control” returned many references to small electronic

components capable of varying the speed of an assortment of motorized devices. See, e.g., IMS’s variable speed control products, shown at http://www.imshome.com/osc.html.

Plaintiff’s references to the Comerford Patent (US Patent No. 6,892,675) were unilluminating

in regard to the element of a variable speed control because the referenced section

describes a timing device, and not a speed control.

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of structure sufficient to be understood by one skilled in the art as being adequate to perform

the recited function.” Id. at 1376-77.

In this case, the function of the element is clear from the language of the claim in that

it is “for controlling the speed of rotation of said rotatable member.” However, the parties

disagree as to the corresponding structure disclosed in the specification. Defendants argue

that no corresponding structure is disclosed and thus the claim is invalid for indefiniteness

under § 112 ¶ 2. In opposition, Plaintiff points to column 3, line 11 of the specification which

states, “a variable speed control 38 may be provided to allow the speed of movement of

object 22 to be varied, for example from 5 to 25 r.p.m.” The speed control is also illustrated

as item 38 in the schematic drawing of Figure 4.

The Court finds enough structure in the specification’s use of the term “variable speed

control,” taken in context with Figure 4, and in light of the expected level of ordinary skill in

the art, to satisfy Section 112. Though the ‘448 patent somewhat clumsily defines the

means-plus-function element of “variable speed control means” as “a variable speed control,”

the fact that the speed control is depicted in Figure 4 as being part of the circuit connecting

the power supply to the motor impliedly limits the structure of the speed control to an

electronic device. Therefore, Defendants’ contention that no structure is disclosed in the

specification is incorrect. Additionally, there is some evidence suggesting that a speed

control is a fungible electronic device that may be acquired from numerous distributors in the

small electronic device market.10 Thus, in light of the presumption of validity, this Court holds

that Defendants have not provided clear and convincing evidence that the structure provided

in the specification, though admittedly sparse, is inadequate to a degree which would render

the claim invalid.

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As such, the Court shall construe “variable speed control means” as “an electronic

device capable of varying the speed of an object.”

VII. Construction of the Terms of the ‘448 Patent: Claim 7

Claim 7 is dependent upon, and incorporates all of the elements of, Claim 6 (and

thereby Claims 1 and 4). The Court addresses the following term of Claim 7 of the ‘448

patent:

The device as claimed in claim 6, including control means for intermittently

varying the speed of said rotatable member.

The parties stipulate that this is a means-plus-function element, thereby invoking §

112 ¶ 6. The function of this element is clear from the language of the claim: “for

intermittently varying the speed of said rotatable member.” However, the parties disagree

as to the corresponding structure disclosed in the specification. Defendants argue that no

corresponding structure is disclosed and thus the claim is invalid for indefiniteness under

Section 112 ¶ 2. In opposition, Plaintiff points to column 3, line 16, of the specification, which

states: “Also illustrated in FIG. 4 is an optional timer 40 for periodically turning the motor on

and off, so the object 22 will be stopped and re-started periodically, for example at 5, 10, or

15 minutes.” Plaintiff argues that this timer is the corresponding structure which serves the

function of intermittently varying the speed of the rotatable member. It appears to the Court

that this assertion is incorrect, and is better made in regard to Claim 8, as Claim 7 deals with

intermittently varying the speed and not intermittently turning the device on and off. The

Court finds that the structure corresponding to the language of Claim 7 is found in column

3, line 13, which states: “[The variable speed control] may be manually operated by a suitable

external control, or a timer for automatically varying the speed periodically may be included.”

Though Plaintiff has put forth no evidence suggesting that a person of ordinary skill in the art

would be familiar with the structure of a timer or suitable external control for intermittently

varying the speed, the Court finds that such a person in this instance would be able to

understand the disclosed structures. It is apparent that one of ordinary skill in the art of small

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motorized devices would be familiar with timers or other external components for periodically

varying the speed of the device, in conjunction with the variable speed control of Claim 6.

Again, in construing the terms of a patent there is a presumption of validity and, in this

instance, Defendants have not provided clear and convincing evidence that the structures

provided in the specification are inadequate to a degree which would render the claim invalid.

As such, the Court shall construe the phrase “control means” as “a timer or external

control.”

VIII. Construction of the Terms of the ‘448 Patent: Claim 8

Claim 8 is dependent upon, and incorporates all of the elements of, Claim 6 (and

thereby Claims 1 and 4). The Court addresses the following term of Claim 8 of the ‘448

patent:

The device as claimed in claim 6, including control means for intermittently

turning said motor on and off and for varying the speed of said rotatable

member at varying intervals.

The parties stipulate that this is a means-plus-function element, thereby invoking §

112 ¶ 6. The function is clear from the language of the claim: “for intermittently turning said

motor on and off and for varying the speed of said rotatable member at varying intervals.”

Defendants again argue that no corresponding structure is disclosed in the specification.

However, as was discussed above in reference to Claim 7, this is not the case. For the

function of “varying the speed of said rotatable member at varying intervals,” the

corresponding structure is that described above - an “external control, or a timer.” (Column

3, line 14.) The disclosed structure corresponding to the function of “intermittently turning

said motor on and off” is found in the next sentence of the specification (Column 3, line 16)

which states: “Also illustrated in FIG. 4 is an optional timer 40 for periodically turning the

motor on and off, so the object 22 will be stopped and re-started periodically, for example at

5, 10, or 15 minutes.” Again, though Plaintiff has failed to set forth evidence tending to show

that a person of ordinary skill in the art of small motorized devices would understand the

structure of such a timer, the Court finds it obvious that such a person would so understand.

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28 11 Claim 9 has not been briefed and appears not to be in issue. Accordingly, the Court

determines that no construction is necessary.

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Defendants have not provided clear and convincing evidence that the structures provided in

the specification are inadequate to a degree which would render the claim invalid.

As such, the Court shall construe the phrase “control means” in the context of Claim

8 to mean “two timers or a timer and external control.”

IX. Construction of the Terms of the ‘448 Patent: Claim 1011

Claim 10 is dependent upon, and incorporates all of the elements of, Claim 1. The

Court addresses the following two terms of Claim 10 of the ‘448 patent:

The device as claimed in claim 1, wherein said connecting device comprises

an elongate flexible member, [1] first flexible connecting means at one end

of said flexible member for flexibly connecting it to the free end of said elongate

member, and [2] second connecting means at the opposite end of said

flexible member for connecting it to the object to suspend it from the free end

of said elongate member.

A. “first flexible connecting means at one end of said flexible member for flexibly

connecting it to the free end of said elongate member”

The parties stipulate that “first flexible connecting means” is a means-plus-function

element, thereby invoking § 112 ¶ 6. The function of the element is clear from the language

of the claim: “for flexibly connecting [one end of said flexible member] to the free end of said

elongate member.” Once again, the dispute arises in regard to the corresponding structure

disclosed in the specification. Plaintiff suggests that the disclosed structure is “releasably

attaching the end of the connecting device to the elongated member (column 2, line 45).”

However, the Court cannot interpret this phrase as connoting structure - a flexible connecting

means is not structurally defined by describing the type, and not structure, of attachment.

Defendants contend that the only corresponding structure disclosed in the specification is the

“rubber sleeve” (29) discussed at column 2, line 66. However, this rubber sleeve alone, in

the context of the patent, is not the first flexible connecting means as it is apparent that this

sleeve is a hollow tube that does not itself provide a means for connection. (See ‘448 Patent,

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Column 2, Lines 64-66: “Loop 28 was also a nylon soft cord secured to the free end of wire

20 within rubber sleeve 29.” (emphasis added).)

The Court finds the corresponding structure to be the loop (28) at the free end of the

elongate member as disclosed in column 2, lines 46 and 64. The loop works in conjunction

with the rubber sleeve to fasten the elongate member (wire) to the flexible member (string).

Accordingly, the Court construes the phrase “first flexible connecting means” as “a loop

and rubber sleeve.”

B. “second connecting means at the opposite end of said flexible member for

connecting it to the object to suspend it from the free end of said elongate member”

The parties stipulate that “second connecting means” is a means-plus-function

element, thereby invoking § 112 ¶ 6. Defendants assert, and the Court agrees, that no

corresponding structure is found in the specification for the “second connecting means” and

thus Claim 10 is invalid for indefiniteness under the Budde rationale. Plaintiff asserts that

“the corresponding structure disclosed in the patent specification for performing the function

is an object secured to the wire by a string (column 2, line 27) to hang below the end of the

elongated member.” Again, this reasoning is flawed. The corresponding structure for a

connecting means cannot be “an object secured to the wire by a string,” as the act of

securing an object by a string does not denote the structure on the flexible member (string)

for securing the object, such as exists with the loop 28 and rubber sleeve 29.

Simple arithmetic reveals that there are not enough elements disclosed in the

specification to provide a corresponding structure for the second connecting means. This

is because Claim 10 requires the connecting device to reference five elements: the elongate

member of Claim 1, an elongate flexible member, a first flexible connecting means for

connecting the flexible member to the elongate member, the object of Claim 1, and a second

connecting means for connecting the flexible member to the object. However, there are only

four structures disclosed regarding this facet of the invention: the elongate member, a string,

a loop/rubber sleeve, and the object. The elongate member and object of Claim 1 are clearly

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disclosed. As discussed above, the first flexible connecting means is the “loop and rubber

sleeve.” The flexible member is disclosed in the preferred embodiment as the “string” (23),

which must be distinguished from the “cord,” “rod,” or “wire” of the elongate member.

However, there are no structural elements remaining for specification as the second

connecting means. The argument that a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize

the language of column 2, lines 28-31 – “[a]n object 22 . . . is secured to the free end of the

wire 20 via a length of string 23" – as impliedly providing the structure of a knot in the string

is not enough to meet the requirements of § 112 ¶ 6 in conjunction with § 112 ¶ 2. This

disclosure not only fails to provide the requisite corresponding structure, but it also does not

clearly associate the structure with performance of the function. See Medtronic, Inc. v.

Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 248 F.3d 1303, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2001).

As such, the Court deems Claim 10 invalid for indefiniteness, in that no

corresponding structure is disclosed in the specification for the means-plus-function element

of a “second connecting means.”

X. Construction of the Terms of the ‘448 Patent: Claim 11

Claim 11 is an independent claim. Many of the terms therein have been construed

above, and require no further construction. The Court addresses the following five terms of

Claim 11 of the ‘448 patent:

A device [1] for the amusement of pet animals free and untethered to the

device, the device comprising: [2] a base member having a lower edge for

seating freely on the ground, the lower edge lying in a substantially flat

plane and having no protrusions projecting downward from said plane;

an elongate, pliable member having a first end rotatably mounted on said base

member, said elongate member extending in an arched path upwardly and

outwardly away from said base member with the free end of said elongate

member being spaced outwardly from the outer periphery of said base

member; [3] a connecting loop at the free end of said elongate member; a

connecting line secured at one end to said connecting loop; a toy object

secured to the opposite end of said connecting line for suspension [4] directly

downwardly from the free end of said elongate member; drive means in said

housing for rotating said one end of said elongate member to drive its free end

in a path around said base member, said drive means including a drive motor

and a switch means for controlling actuation of said drive motor; said switch

means including an [5] actuator on the outside of said housing for switching

said motor on and off; and transmission means for connecting said drive motor

to said one end of said elongate member.

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A. “A device for the amusement of pet animals free and untethered to the

device”

As discussed in regard to the preamble of Claim 1, Plaintiff relied upon the preamble

during prosecution to distinguish the claimed invention from the Postings and McMurry

references, thereby requiring deviation from the general rule against construing preambles

as limiting claim elements. See Catalina, 289 F.3d at 808-809. Statements of intended use

may limit the claims in those instances where the patentee “clearly and unmistakably relied

on those uses or benefits to distinguish prior art.” Id. at 809.

In this instance, Plaintiff clearly relied on the “free and untethered” clause of the

preamble to distinguish from the Postings and McMurry references when, in a response to

the USPTO examiner’s initial rejection, he stated:

[W]ith [the Postings] exercising device the dog is tethered to the device and

enticed with food or the like to run in a circle around the base. In contrast, no

such incentive is provided in McMurry, where one or more dogs are tethered

along arm 80 . . . . [T]he device in both Postings and McMurry is clearly not for

the free amusement of a pet unsecured to the device, but for the tethering and

forced or encouraged exercising of a dog.

(Def’s Ex. B at 35-37 (emphasis in original).) Thus, the Court will construe the preamble

phrase “a device for the amusement of pet animals free and untethered to the device”

as “a device for the amusement of an animal kept for pleasure or companionship, rather than

solely for utility, in which the animal is free and untethered to the device.”

B. “a base member having a lower edge for seating freely on the ground, the

lower edge lying in a substantially flat plane and having no protrusions projecting

downward from said plane”

In briefing their proposed constructions of this phrase, neither party appears to have

accounted for all of the differences in language employed in Claim 11, as opposed to Claim

1. The Court, however, feels that Patentee’s different choice of language to describe the

base member in Claim 11 is important and must be given effect in construing the claim. The

differences are subtle, but significant. To wit, in Claim 1, the base member has a lower

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12 American Heritage Dictionary defines “edge,” as used in the context of the ‘448

patent, as: “the line of intersection of two surfaces.”

13 WordNet 3.0, available at http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/plane and

American Heritage Dictionary. American Heritage Dictionary also defines “plane” as “a flat

or level surface,” though use of this definition seems inappropriate because it would render

Patentee’s inclusion of “flat” superfluous.

14 American Heritage Dictionary defines “flat” as: “having a horizontal surface without

a slope, tilt, or curvature.”

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surface for freely seating on a substantially flat surface; and that lower surface has no

projections for connection to the seating surface. In Claim 11, the base member has a lower

edge for freely seating on the ground; that lower edge lying in a substantially flat plane and

having no protrusions projecting downwardly from said plane.

The Court finds that the difference between “edge” and “surface” is not significant.12

However, Claim 11's edge freely sits on the ground, not any substantially flat surface. The

ground, which is defined as the “solid surface of the earth,” while flat in places, can be

significantly uneven or irregular. Accordingly, as in Claim 1, the lower edge of the device

would not necessarily be flat itself. This construction, however, ignores the crucial additional

phrase of Claim 11: “the lower edge lying in a substantially flat plane.” Neither party has

briefed the meaning of this phrase. A plane is defined as “an unbounded two-dimensional

shape“ or “a surface containing all the straight lines that connect any two points on it.”13 As

it is a two-dimensional shape, it is perfectly regular and flat, though not necessarily

horizontal. A substantially flat plane, then, is one that is mostly horizontal.14 As the lower

edge lies in the plane, not on it, all of the points on the lower edge must be regularized and,

thus, the edge itself must be flat. The Court, therefore, finds that the lower edge must be a

flat surface that lies mostly horizontal on the ground.

Claim 11 also refers to the absence of any protrusions from the lower edge, which

would project downwardly from the mostly horizontal plane. Claim 1 referred to projections,

not protrusions – a distinction the Court considers immaterial – but also referred to the

purpose of the projections, i.e., for connection to the seating surface. No such limitation

exists in Claim 11. Accordingly, the device in Claim 11 does not contain any part that

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protrudes out from the lower edge of the device and proceeds downward, regardless of its

intended purpose.

The Court therefore construes “a base member having a lower edge for seating

freely on the ground, the lower edge lying in a substantially flat plane and having no

protrusions projecting downward from said plane” as “a supporting structural unit having

a flat lower edge for sitting on, unsecured to, the ground in a mostly horizontal position. This

unit shall have no parts extending downward from its lower edge.”

C. “a connecting loop at the free end of said elongate member”

Defendants suggest a construction of this term to require that the loop be “secured

to and extending from the outermost end of the elongate member,” and points to a statement

made by Plaintiff during prosecution as support: “Neither of the main references shows or

suggest a connecting loop at the free end of an elongate, pliable member, from which a toy

object is suspended via a connecting line.” (Def’s Ex. B at 40-41.) Since the claim already

includes the limitation “at the free end of said elongate member” – the language actually

employed in the prosecution history – the Court finds no need to construe the term as limiting

the connecting loop only to one placed at the “outermost end of the elongate member.”

Defendants’ contention that the prior art references disclosed an assortment of loops may

be true, but Plaintiff did not rely on his connecting loop to distinguish from these references,

except as mentioned above, and the claim is limited as such. Thus, the term will not be

construed with the limitation Defendants suggest.

D. “a toy object secured to the opposite end of said connecting line for suspension

directly downwardly from the free end of said elongate member”

Defendants suggest construing this term to mean “directly beneath the free end of the

elongate member.” The Court, however, finds that the phrase is readily understood. Thus,

the term shall not be construed.

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15 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 states: “An element in a claim for a combination may be

expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of

structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the

corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents

thereof.” (emphasis added).

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E. “an actuator on the outside of said housing for switching said motor on and off;”

The parties stipulate that “actuator” means “a switch button.” The Court shall

construe it as such.

XI. Construction of the Terms of the ‘448 Patent: Claim 12

Claim 12 is an independent method claim. Many of the terms therein have been

construed above and require no further construction. The Court addresses the following

three terms of Claim 12 of the ‘448 patent:

[1] A method for amusing pet animals, [2] comprising the steps of:

seating a base member freely on the ground surface; suspending a toy object

from the free end of an elongate pliable member with the other end rotatably

mounted to the base member; and driving the elongate member to rotate and

move the toy object [3] in a path around the base member to attract the

attention of a pet animal free and unsecured to the elongate member.

A. “A method for amusing pet animals”

The analysis of this preamble mirrors that of Claims 1 and 11, in that Plaintiff relied

upon the amusement element to avoid prior art references during prosecution, and shall be

limited by this. Accordingly, the preamble phrase “a method for amusing pet animals” shall

be construed as: “A method for the amusement of an animal kept for pleasure or

companionship, rather than solely for utility.”

B. “comprising the steps of: seating . . . ; suspending . . .; and driving . . . .”

Plaintiff argues that each of the three steps in this method claim (seating, suspending,

and driving) require specialized construction as step-for-function elements under 35 U.S.C.

§ 112 ¶ 6.15 The analysis of such elements is similar to that applied to means-plus-function

elements, and would be limited by the detail provided in the specification. Defendants

contend that these elements require no construction at all.

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Determining whether a claim invokes the step-for-function application of § 112 ¶ 6 has

been explained by the Federal Circuit accordingly:

Method claims necessarily recite the steps of the method, and the preamble

words that “the method comprises the steps of” do not automatically convert

each ensuing step into the form of § 112 P6. Nor does the preamble usage

“steps of” create a presumption that each ensuing step is in step-plusfunction form; to the contrary, the absence of the signal “step for” creates the

contrary presumption.

Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Medical, Inc., 381 F.3d 1371, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2004).

Accordingly, this Court determines that the inclusion of the phrase “comprising the steps of”

does not convert the elements of this method claim into steps-for-function. Thus, the steps

of the method (seating, suspending, and driving) are construed the same as any other claim

element. The Court finds that these words are readily understood and, therefore, no

construction is required.

C. “driving the elongate member to rotate and move the toy object in a path around

the base member”

Defendants cite to various passages of the specification for the proposition that this

step of Claim 12 should be construed as meaning “to drag the object on the ground in a path

around the base.” However, reading such a limitation into the claim language would mean

committing “‘one of the cardinal sins of patent law’ -- reading specific limitations in a

specification’s disclosed embodiment into the broader claim.” Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v.

St. Jude Medical, Inc., 418 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1029 (S.D. Ind. 2006) (citing Phillips, 415 F.3d

at 1320, 1323). It is clear that in the preferred embodiment of the device, and the

accompanying method, the object would be dragged along the ground. (See, e.g., ‘448

Patent Abstract (“object . . . is preferably arranged to be dragged along the ground”);

Summary of Invention at Column 1, Line 36 (“object may be directly secured to the free end

of the wire but is preferably secured to it by a length of string so that it is dragged along on

the ground”); Description of Preferred Embodiment at Column 2, Line 38 (“[t]he cord or wire

is of sufficient length to enable object 22 to be dragged along the ground”) and Column 3,

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Line 45 (“In order to operate the toy device, the motor is actuated and the wire 20 will then

be rotated, dragging object 22 on the ground in a path around housing 12.”) (emphasis

added).) However, it is equally clear that the “claim language, specification, and prosecution

history do not disclaim” all other embodiments of the device, or methods, in which the object

is not dragged along the ground. Cardiac Pacemakers, 418 F. Supp. 2d at 1029; see also

Phillips, 415 F. 3d at 1323 (“[W]e have expressly rejected the contention that if a patent

describes only a single embodiment, the claims of the patent must be construed as being

limited to that embodiment.”) The use of the phrase “preferably” would be rendered

superfluous if other possible arrangements (in which the object was not dragged on the

ground) were not included within the claimed invention. As such, the Court declines to

construe this element as requiring the object to be dragged on the ground.

XII. Conclusion

The terms of the ‘448 patent shall be construed as described above.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 19, 2007

Honorable Barry Ted Moskowitz

United States District Judge

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