Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00997/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00997-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 443
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Accommodations
Cause of Action: 42:405 Fair Housing Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 1 - 06cv0997

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

AKI FAMILY LIMITED

PARTNERSHIP, a Nevada Limited

Partnership, dba LAKEVIEW

MOBILE ESTATES,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 06 CV 0997 JM (AJB)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION

TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF

JURISDICTION

vs.

CITY OF SAN MARCOS, a

municipality,

Defendant.

Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”)

pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Defendant contends that the FAC is barred by res judicata and even if it were not so

barred, Plaintiff’s claim has not yet ripened into a live controversy. The court ordered

the motion submitted without oral argument pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). After

considering the parties’ papers, the court hereby GRANTS the motion for the reasons

set forth below.

Preliminarily, the court notes the following procedural wrinkle with respect to

the present motion. Defendant filed its motion on October 11, 2006 and sought

dismissal of the original complaint which, at that time, was the only complaint filed in

this case. Plaintiff then filed a timely opposition and concurrently therewith, the FAC.

Plaintiff contends that the FAC moots the present motion with respect to the ripeness

Case 3:06-cv-00997-JM-AJB Document 34 Filed 11/21/06 Page 1 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 - 06cv0997

issue, but does not address whether the res judicata issue is also rendered moot.

Defendant’s reply argues that the FAC does not moot the present motion and that the

FAC should be dismissed for the same or similar reasons the original complaint should

be dismissed as provided in Defendant’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities. The

court finds that the FAC does not moot the instant motion. The court disregards the

original complaint for purposes of deciding the motion, focusing solely on the

allegations contained in the FAC.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff AKI Family Limited Partnership (“Plaintiff”) owns a mobile park in San

Marcos, California. Plaintiff operates the park for senior citizens only, but now wants

to change it into an all-ages park. 

San Marcos Municipal Code § 16.04.070, enacted by popular vote as

“Proposition T” in 1996, requires a mobile park owner to obtain the consent of the

mobile park’s residents before changing, adding to, deleting, or modifying the mobile

park’s rules and regulations. See Defs. Request for Judicial Notice, Ex. D. Resolution

No. 2001-5721 outlines the specific procedures mobile park owners must follow in

order to comply with Section 16.04.070. Id., Ex. E. After the Ordinances were enacted,

Defendant filed a complaint pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 860 to

determine their validity. Id., Ex. F. After publication notice was duly made, no one

responded to the complaint and the state court entered judgment in favor of Defendants

declaring the Ordinances legal and binding. Id., Exs. G, H. 

On May 9, 2006, Plaintiff filed this complaint against defendant City of San

Marcos (“Defendant”) alleging that section 16.04.070 and Resolution No. 2001-5721

(together “the Ordinances”) violate and are preempted by federal and state law.

Defendant now moves to dismiss. 

II. STANDARD FOR A MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendant brings this motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)6. Rule

12(b)(1) allows a court to dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Case 3:06-cv-00997-JM-AJB Document 34 Filed 11/21/06 Page 2 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 - 06cv0997

A federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Article III’s Cases and

Controversies Clause when an action lacks sufficient ripeness to establish a concrete

case or controversy. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 579

(1985). 

Rule 12(b)(6) allows a court to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted. Such a dismissal can be based on either the lack of

a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable

legal theory. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988).

In applying this standard, the court must treat all of the plaintiff's factual allegations as

true. Experimental Eng'g, Inc. v. United Technologies Corp., 614 F.2d 1244, 1245 (9th

Cir. 1980). 

III. ANALYSIS 

Defendant argues that the FAC is barred by res judicata because a California

court has already entered judgment pursuant to an in rem validation proceeding under

California Code of Civil Procedure §§ 860-70 that the Ordinances are legal and valid.

 Defendant further argues that even if the FAC were not so barred, Plaintiff’s claims

lack the jurisdictional requirement of ripeness. This is so, Defendant contends, because

Plaintiff has not yet availed itself of municipal procedures which would allow it to

operate its mobile home park as an all-ages park so long as the incumbent residents

agree. The court now addresses each argument in turn.

A. Res Judicata

The doctrine of res judicata provides generally that once a claim has been

adjudicated on the merits and becomes final, it cannot be relitigated. A federal court

must give to a state court judgment the same preclusive effect as would be given that

judgment under the law of the State in which the judgment was rendered. Migra v.

Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984). 

The prior judgment at issue here was brought by Defendant pursuant to

California Code of Civil Procedure § 860, which provides in full:

Case 3:06-cv-00997-JM-AJB Document 34 Filed 11/21/06 Page 3 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 - 06cv0997

A public agency may upon the existence of any matter which

under any other law is authorized to be determined pursuant to this chapter, and for 60 days thereafter, bring an action in the

superior court of the county in which the principal office of the public agency is located to determine the validity of such matter. The action shall be in the nature of a proceeding in rem.

Actions brought pursuant to section 860 are referred to as “validation proceedings” or

“validation actions.” The main purpose for such proceedings are that they “limit the

extent to which delay due to litigation may impair a public agency’s ability to operate

financially . . . [the validation action facilitates] a public agency’s financial transactions

with third parties by quickly affirming their legality.” Friedland v. City of Long Beach,

62 Cal. App. 4th 835, 843 (1998).

Section 870(a) describes the res judicata effect of a final judgment in a validation

proceeding:

The judgment, if no appeal is taken, or if taken and the judgment is affirmed, shall, notwithstanding any other provision of law including, without limitation, Sections 473 and 473.5, thereupon become and thereafter be forever binding and conclusive, as to all matters therein adjudicated or which at that time could have been

adjudicated, against the agency and against all other persons, and the judgment shall permanently enjoin the institution by any

person of any action or proceeding raising any issue as to which the judgment is binding and conclusive.

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 870. Defendants argue that since a prior judgment pursuant to

section 860 has already been entered deeming the Ordinances legal in all respects,

Plaintiffs are barred pursuant to section 870 from bringing the instant complaint.

Neither party disputes that the prior judgment here has become final. 

Friedland, supra, explains the operation of section 870 under facts similar to the

facts here. The city in Friedland filed a validation action to determine the validity of

bonds issued to finance construction of a new aquarium. Publication notice of the

action was made pursuant to court order. No one answered or otherwise inquired about

the complaint and the court thereafter entered judgment in favor of the city. Later,

individual plaintiffs sued the city, contending that the bond issue violated the California

Case 3:06-cv-00997-JM-AJB Document 34 Filed 11/21/06 Page 4 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 - 06cv0997

Constitution. The trial court sustained the city’s demurrer without leave to amend on

the ground that plaintiffs could have litigated their issues in the prior validation

proceeding, and therefore section 870 barred their claim. The Court of Appeal

affirmed, holding that “as to matters which have been or which could have been

adjudicated in a validation action, such matters–including constitutional

challenges–must be raised within the statutory limitations in section 860 et seq. or they

are waived.” Friedland, 62 Cal. App. 4th at 846-47.

Applying Friedland here, the court finds that Plaintiff’s claim is also barred. Like

in Friedland, Defendant gave publication notice of the validation proceeding in

conformance with a court order. Defs. Request for Judicial Notice, Ex. G at 2. Like in

Friedland, no one responded to the complaint and default judgment was thereafter

entered and became final. As in Friedland, there is no suggestion from the pleadings

that Plaintiff’s contentions could not have been litigated in the original validation

proceeding. To the extent Plaintiff argues that changed “legal conditions” mean that

his claim could not have been brought earlier, see Supp. Oppo. at 6, the court is

unpersuaded. Plaintiff rests its argument on its own changed conditions–i.e., that while

it did not desire changing the park’s rules and regulations back when the validation

proceeding took place, it has since changed its mind–and not on new legal conditions.

 On the other hand, Friedland can be distinguished because there, the city advised

the state court that viable legal arguments could be made against the constitutionality

of the bond issue in that case. Friedland, 62 Cal. App. 4th at 845. This fact, which is

not present here, arguably made the Friedland court more likely to bar the plaintiffs’

claim. Id. at 846 (“We note that in briefing legal issues in the Validation Action, City

raised the constitutional issue Friedland now relies on and advised the trial court that

an argument could be made that the [city’s action] were unconstitutional gifts of funds

in violation of article XVI, section 6 of the California Constitution.”). However, this

distinguishing aspect of Friedland is immaterial because the court provided that “[e]ven

if City had not placed this constitutional issue before the trial court, the judgment in the

Case 3:06-cv-00997-JM-AJB Document 34 Filed 11/21/06 Page 5 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 - 06cv0997

Validation Action would nonetheless have been conclusive” since § 870 forecloses

relitigation of matters which could have been litigated in the validation proceeding. Id.

Plaintiff makes no argument as to why this court should not follow Friedland.

Instead, Plaintiff argues that the public interest exception to res judicata should apply

here, citing Bates v. Jones, 131 F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 1997). Defendant makes no

argument in response.

B. The Public Interest Exception to Res Judicata

Bates involved a constitutional attack in federal court on California’s Proposition

140, which imposed lifetime term limits for state legislators and certain state officers.

The Bates defendants argued that plaintiffs’ action was barred by res judicata because

the California Supreme Court had already held, in an earlier case that was not a

validation proceeding, that Proposition 140 did not violate those plaintiffs’ federal

constitutional rights. See id. at 845-46. The Ninth Circuit found no such bar because

California recognizes an exception to res judicata when “the issue previously litigated

involves an issue of public importance and there are unusual circumstances favoring

reexamination of the issue, California does not apply preclusive effect to the prior

determination.” Id. at 845 (citing Kopp v. Fair Political Practices Comm’n, 11 Cal. 4th

607 (1995)). Since it determined that California would apply the exception to the case

at bar, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Bates plaintiffs were not foreclosed from

bringing their action. Id. Among the circumstances justifying invocation of the

exception in Bates were that the earlier decision had been issued pursuant to a petition

for writ of mandamus, thereby depriving the California Supreme Court the benefit of

a lower court record; that at the time the earlier decision was rendered, the case law

surrounding the validity of term limits was not well developed; and that after the

judgment was entered the United States Supreme Court had decided two significant

cases that shed light on the issues raised in the prior litigation. Id. at 845-46.

Guided by Bates, the court finds that the public interest exception applies here.

Under Bates, a court should consider the procedural circumstances of the prior

Case 3:06-cv-00997-JM-AJB Document 34 Filed 11/21/06 Page 6 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 - 06cv0997

judgment and whether a record was developed. Here, the validation proceeding

judgment was obtained by default, and so no factual record was developed. The parties

do not address whether the relevant case law surrounding the issue in this case (whether

laws such as the Ordinances are preempted) is meager or not. In addition, Plaintiff

argues that the legality of the Ordinances under federal and state housing law is an issue

of prime public importance. See Supp. Oppo. at 5-6. The court finds this consideration

weighs in favor of invoking the exception, since housing laws affect the day-to-day life

of every individual. Although the public importance of a city’s indebtedness in

Friedland did not prevent the court in that case from giving preclusive effect to the

validation proceeding judgment, Friedland never addressed the public interest

exception. Finally, California’s main rationale for validation proceedings–to allow

cities to secure financial commitments from third parties in order to finance municipal

projects–is absent here. Friedland, 62 Cal. App. 4th at 843. 

On the other hand, California clearly has a policy as embodied in section 870 of

insulating validation proceedings, once they have reached final judgment, from

subsequent attack. However, California has also expressed, in its adoption of the public

interest exception itself, a flexible policy with regard to res judicata when important

public matters are at stake. Kopp, 11 Cal. 4th at 621.

On balance, the court finds the considerations above weigh in Plaintiff’s favor.

Accordingly, the court holds that California would apply the public interest exception

in this case and therefore the prior state judgment does not bar Plaintiff’s claim. The

next question becomes whether Plaintiff’s claim is ripe for adjudication.

C. Ripeness

An action is unripe, and therefore has not matured into a proper subject for

adjudication, when it involves contingent future events that may or may not occur.

Thomas, 473 U.S. at 580-81. The ripeness doctrine’s rationale “is to prevent the courts,

through premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract

disagreements[.]” Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967), abrogated

Case 3:06-cv-00997-JM-AJB Document 34 Filed 11/21/06 Page 7 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 Section 16.04.070 requires Plaintiff to submit the proposed change to the park’s Rules

and Regulations Committee (the “Committee”), which is comprised of park residents,

for approval. Defs. Request for Judicial Notice, Ex. D. If the Committee rejects the

proposed change, Plaintiff may appeal that decision by petitioning all of the park’s

residents; if a majority of residents reverse the Committee’s decision to reject, then the

proposed change is deemed approved. Id. 

- 8 - 06cv0997

on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977). 

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claim is unripe because Plaintiff has not availed

itself of procedures outlined in the Ordinances which would allow it to change the

mobile home park into an all-ages park so long as the incumbent residents consent to

the change.1

 See Defs. Request for Judicial Notice, Exs. D, E. Defendant contends that

since Plaintiff has not yet used these procedures, it is not yet known whether Plaintiff

is prevented from changing his park into an all-ages park. Mot. at 1-2. Defendant

argues that the FAC does not cure this deficiency because although it is alleged that

88% of park residents oppose Plaintiff’s proposed change, the FAC does not allege that

it used the specific procedures described in the Ordinances. Reply at 4-5.

Plaintiff argues that to require it to follow the procedures is futile because the

park residents have already indicated that they would reject the proposed change.

Specifically, the FAC alleges that Plaintiff gave notice to all park residents of the

proposed change; thereafter, some residents served Plaintiff with a signed petition

showing that 88% of residents opposed the proposal. FAC ¶¶ 8, 10. The court rejects

Plaintiff’s futility argument because the FAC does not allege how the 88% disapproval

rate was procured. Therefore, it is not known whether using procedures prescribed in

the Ordinances would also result in a similar disapproval rate. More fundamentally,

since the FAC does not allege that Plaintiff has implemented the Ordinances’

procedures, there is also no allegation that Defendant has deprived Plaintiff of what it

wants. This is fatal to the FAC for ripeness purposes. 

Plaintiff argues it should not be required to use the procedures, and therefore this

Case 3:06-cv-00997-JM-AJB Document 34 Filed 11/21/06 Page 8 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 - 06cv0997

action is ripe, because such a requirement punishes him for simply trying to comply

with federal law. Supp. Oppo. at 4. The court rejects this argument for two reasons.

First, nothing in the FAC alleges that Defendant is punishing Plaintiff by requiring

compliance with the Ordinances. There is no suggestion that Defendant is singling out

Plaintiff by enforcing the Ordinances against it. Second, none of the cases cited by

Plaintiff support its argument. United States v. City of Parma, 661 F.2d 562 (6th Cir.

1981) involved an action brought by the U.S. Attorney General authorized by statute.

City of Parma was initially brought by several individuals and the NAACP, who were

subsequently dismissed for, inter alia, absence of a justiciable controversy. Id. at 564,

n.1. Here, plaintiff is bringing the action in his own name and must meet the

requirements of justiciability himself. Plaintiff also cites Stewart B. McKinney

Foundation, Inc. v. Town Plan and Zoning Comm’n, 790 F. Supp. 1197 (D. Conn.

1992). In that case, plaintiff sought to use a residence as affordable housing for HIVinfected individuals. The city became involved, resulting in the plaintiff being required

to apply for a special exception to housing laws which was not required of similarlysituated individuals. The McKinney court concluded that the requirement was

motivated by discriminatory animus against HIV-infected individuals and the city was

enjoined from requiring the special exception. Id. at 1222. Here, the Ordinances are

applicable to all mobile home park owners, not just Plaintiff, and so the facts are

different from those presented in McKinney. United States v. City of Hayward, 36 F.3d

832 (9th Cir. 1994) is also inapplicable here. In that case, the court found that the city’s

decision to force plaintiff mobile park owner to reduce rents when it changed its park

from an 18 years-or-older park to an all-ages park constituted unlawful

“interference”under the Fair Housing Amendments Act. However, in City of Hayward,

the city had already caused injury to the plaintiff by ordering the reduction in rents. Id.

at 834-35. By contrast, Defendant has not yet deprived Plaintiff of anything because

it is not yet known whether the Ordinances prevent Plaintiff from changing the park’s

regulations. 

Case 3:06-cv-00997-JM-AJB Document 34 Filed 11/21/06 Page 9 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 10 - 06cv0997

Finally, Plaintiff argues that to require him to comply with the Ordinances would

impose burdensome costs on him, but offers no reasons in support of the argument.

Supp. Oppo. at 1. Therefore, the court rejects this argument. 

IV. CONCLUSION

The court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss. Although Plaintiff’s claim

is not barred by res judicata, the FAC as alleged shows the controversy is not ripe.

Based on the facts alleged, it is unknown whether the complained-of injury–deprivation

of Plaintiff’s protected opportunity to convert its senior park into an all-ages park–will

or will not occur. Therefore, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the

complaint and the complaint is dismissed without prejudice. If Plaintiff wishes to file

a further amended complaint, Plaintiff must do so no later than twenty (20) days after

entry of this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 21, 2006

 Hon. Jeffrey T. Miller

 United States District Judge

cc: All Parties 

Case 3:06-cv-00997-JM-AJB Document 34 Filed 11/21/06 Page 10 of 10