Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02080/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02080-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

MARJORIE C. PINO,

individually, and as a

representative of the estate

of decedent RONNIE PINO,

NO. CIV. S-05-2080 WBS DAD

Plaintiffs,

v.

ORDER RE: 12(B)(6) MOTION TO

CITY OF SACRAMENTO, SACRAMENTO DISMISS COMPLAINT IN PART AND

COUNTY, ALBERT NAJERA, LOU 12(F) MOTION TO STRIKE 

BLANAS, PSYCHIATRIC SOLUTIONS, PORTIONS OF THE COMPLAINT

INC., and DOES 1 through 75, 

inclusive. 

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff Marjorie C. Pino, individually and on behalf

of her late son Ronnie Pino’s estate, alleges seven causes of

action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and California law against the City

of Sacramento, Sacramento County, Albert Najera, Lou Blanas,

Psychiatric Solutions, Inc., and Does 1 through 75. Defendant

City of Sacramento and City of Sacramento Police Chief Albert

Case 2:05-cv-02080-WBS-DAD Document 17 Filed 01/19/06 Page 1 of 6
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Najera (“defendants”) now move to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint,

in part, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),

and to strike portions of the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule

of Procedure Rule 12(f). 

I. Motion to Dismiss

On a motion to dismiss, the court must accept the

allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable

inferences in favor of the pleader. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.

232, 236 (1974); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972). The court may

not dismiss for failure to state a claim “unless it appears beyond

doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his

claim which would entitle him to relief.” Van Buskirk v. CNN,

Inc., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added); see also

Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). In addition,

“[a] motion to dismiss is generally ‘capable of determination’

before trial ‘if it involves questions of law rather than fact.’”

United States v. Nukida, 8 F.3d 665, 669 (9th Cir. 1993). 

Plaintiff seeks to recover on four different theories:

(1) for the wrongful death of her son; (2) for interference with

plaintiff’s familial relationship with her son; (3) for injuries

to her son; and (4) for injuries to herself. First, the complaint

sufficiently states a claim for the wrongful death of plaintiff’s

son. Plaintiff alleges that she “is the mother and personal

representative of the estate of decedent.” (Compl. ¶ 2.) The

court must accept this allegation, made in the complaint, as true. 

Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 236. Under California law, if there are no

surviving issue of the decedent, a cause of action for wrongful

death may be brought by the personal representative of the

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decedent on behalf of a person who would take by intestate

succession. C.C.P. § 377.60. The court cannot conclude beyond

doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts to establish that

she is entitled to decedent’s property by intestate succession. 

Therefore, her wrongful death claim is sufficiently alleged for

the purposes of this motion to dismiss. See Van Buskirk, 284 F.3d

at 980.

Second, the complaint sufficiently states a claim for

interference with plaintiff’s familial relationship with decedent. 

The Ninth Circuit has noted that Supreme Court precedent has

“rendered beyond dispute the proposition that parents have a

fundamental liberty interest in maintaining a relationship with

their children which is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.” 

Kelson v. Springfield, 767 F.2d 651, 654 (9th Cir. 1985); see also

Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981); Little v.

Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981); Strandberg v. Helena, 791 F.2d 744,

748 n.1 (9th Cir. 1986). Therefore, as decedent’s mother,

plaintiff has properly alleged a violation of her liberty interest

in maintaining her relationship with her child.

Third, the complaint sufficiently states a survival

claim for the injuries to decedent. “Survival actions” seek

compensation for the personal injuries the decedent suffered while

still living. See Martinez v. County of Madera, No. 104-5919,

2005 WL 2562715 at *3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2005). Section 1983 does

not address “the survival of civil rights actions under § 1983

upon the death of either the plaintiff or defendant.” Robertson

v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 589 (1978) (quoting Moor v. County of

Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 702 n.14 (1973)). When federal law does

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At oral argument, plaintiff admitted that she is 1

actually decedent’s successor in interest. Under California Code

of Civil Procedure § 377.32, a successor in interest who brings

an action on behalf of a decedent must file a sworn statement

regarding the decedent and the background of the case. Parsons

v. Tickner, 31 Cal. App. 4th 1513, 1523 (Feb. 2, 1995). 

Plaintiff’s counsel stated in oral argument that he would file a

affidavit by plaintiff that she is decedent’s successor in

interest. Defendants informed the court at oral argument that

they were satisfied by the assurance given by plaintiff’s counsel

that he would file a sworn statement. However, the court’s

analysis for the purposes of a motion to dismiss is unchanged by

plaintiff’s admission – again, the court is required to accept

what plaintiff averred in her complaint as true. 

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not resolve an issue in the context of a federal civil rights

action, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 points courts to “the common law, as

modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the

[forum] State,” for answers. Moreland v. Las Vegas Metro. Police

Dep’t, 159 F.3d 365, 369 (9th Cir. 1998). California law

authorizes a personal representative to bring survival actions. 

C.C.P. § 377.20 (“[A] cause of action that survives the death of

the person entitled to commence an action . . . may be commenced

by the decedent’s personal representative . . . .”). Therefore,

plaintiff’s allegations that she is decedent’s personal

representative are sufficient to establish that she has capacity

to bring a survival action on decedent’s behalf for the purposes

of defendants’ motion to dismiss.1

Fourth, the complaint sufficiently alleges a claim for

injuries to plaintiff herself. Plaintiff alleges that her Fourth

Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures was violated

when one of the defendants threatened to tase her with a stun gun. 

(Compl. ¶ 15.) When plaintiff attempted to explain to police

officers that tasing her son with a stun gun could be fatal, a

female officer responded, “Back off, or I will tase you, too.” 

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(Id.) At the time, the police officer had her stun gun drawn. 

(Id.) These allegations satisfy the definition of a seizure. See

Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991) (“Only when [an]

officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in

some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that

a ‘seizure’ has occurred.” (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19

n.16 (1968)). Whether this seizure was reasonable depends upon

the circumstances surrounding the officer’s conduct and involves a

question of fact that is not capable of determination on a motion

to dismiss. Nukida, 8 F.3d at 669. Therefore, plaintiff has

sufficiently alleged a violation of her own Fourth Amendment

rights. 

Plaintiff also asserts claims against Police Chief

Najera and prays for general, special, and punitive damages as a

remedy against all defendants. (Compl. ¶¶ 28-31, 60.) Under 42

U.S.C. § 1983, individual state officials can be sued for money

damages. Hill v. Shelander, 924 F.2d 1370, 1374 (7th Cir. 1991). 

Therefore, the court declines to dismiss plaintiff’s claims

against defendant Najera. 

Although individual public officers may be liable for

punitive damages, municipalities are not subject to punitive

damage awards. Compare Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 35 (1983)

(concluding that “[i]t was likewise generally established that

individual public officers were liable for punitive damages for

their misconduct on the same basis as other individual

defendants”), with City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453

U.S. 247, 271 (1981) (holding that “a municipality is immune from

punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983”). Therefore, plaintiff’s

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claim for punitive damages as against the City of Sacramento will

be stricken.

II. Motion to Strike

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), a court may

strike any “immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” 

However, such motions are disfavored, and even immaterial or

redundant allegations need not be stricken unless the defendants

can show prejudice or an inability to gain a full understanding

upon reading the complaint as a whole. Bloombury Woolen Co. v.

Moosehead Woolen Mills, 109 F.Supp. 804, 806 (D. Me. 1953). 

Defendants have failed to show prejudice or impairment of the

“full understanding” that would emerge from reading the complaint

as a whole. The court therefore denies the motion to strike the

remaining portions of the complaint identified by defendants.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ motion to

dismiss the complaint be, and the same hereby is, DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants’ motion to strike

be, and the same hereby is, DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s claim for

punitive damages as against the City of Sacramento be, and the

same hereby is, STRICKEN. 

DATED: January 19, 2006

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