Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-00020/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-00020-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RYAN CRAIG STEVENS,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner

of Social Security, 

Defendant.

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Case No. 1: 12-cv-00020-BAM

ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFF’S

SOCIAL SECURITY COMPLAINT AND

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR

COURT ORDER

(Docs. 20, 27)

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Ryan Stevens (“Plaintiff”) seeks judicial review of a final decision of the

Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner” or “Defendant”) denying his application for 

disability insurance benefits pursuant to Title XVI of the Social Security Act. The matter is 1

Carolyn W. Colvin became the Acting Commissioner of Social Security on February 14, 2013.

1

Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Carolyn W. Colvin should be substituted for Michael

J. Astrue as the defendant in this suit.

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currently before the Court on the parties’ briefs, which were submitted, without oral argument, to

Magistrate Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe. 

FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS2

Plaintiff filed an application for benefits on June 3, 2007, alleging disability beginning June

28, 2006. AR 169-172, 182-183. Plaintiff’s application was denied initially and on reconsideration. 

AR 93-103. Plaintiff failed to timely file a notice to appear before an Administrative Law Judge

(ALJ), but showed good cause, and the agency set a hearing for July 29, 2009. AR 43-60, 104-110.

On July 29, 2009, Plaintiff appeared before ALJ Robert Milton Erickson for a preliminary hearing. 

AR 43-60. On April 21, 2010, a second hearing was held before ALJ Benjamin F. Parks. AR

43-88. ALJ Parks subsequently issued an order denying benefits on June 18, 2010, finding Plaintiff

was not disabled. AR 21-30. This appeal followed. 

Medical Record

Plaintiff’s alleged disability stems from a 2006 on the job injury. While working for a

construction company, Plaintiff was run over by a forklift which crushed his legs, feet and pelvis. 

The entire medical record was reviewed by the Court. AR 279-480. The medical evidence will be

referenced below as necessary to this Court’s decision. 

2009 Hearing Testimony

ALJ Robert Milton Erickson held a preliminary hearing on July 29, 2009 in San Francisco,

California. AR 45. Plaintiff appeared pro se. AR 43-60. Plaintiff stated that he understood his

rights as to representation but that he wanted to proceed without a representative. AR 46. The ALJ

first asked Plaintiff about his 2006 workers’ compensation claim. AR 46. Plaintiff stated that as a

result of his injury and resulting worker’s compensation claim he has been to over 20 facilities. AR

47. Plaintiff requested that the ALJ proceed to a full hearing. AR 49. Expressing reluctance to

question Plaintiff further without the appropriate medical records, the ALJ informed Plaintiff that

he needed full and complete clinical records supporting Plaintiff’s doctor’s opinions. AR 51. 

The ALJ continued with the hearing and after being duly sworn, Plaintiff testified that he had

References to the Administrative Record will be designated as “AR,” followed by the appropriate

2

page number.

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not worked since June 28, 2006. AR 56. Plaintiff testified that he spends the majority of his time

using his computer to complete workers’ compensation letters. AR 56. Depending on his pain,

Plaintiff stated that he typically spends only five minutes on the computer before resting. AR 56. 

Plaintiff stated that he lives at home with his parents and the family dog. AR 57. Sometime after

his accident, Plaintiff would walk the dog but when doing so he experienced severe pain in his feet

and lower back. AR 58. Plaintiff has been unable to take his dog for a walk for over a year due to

this pain. AR 57. 

With respect to other daily activities, Plaintiff testified that he drove from Tehachapi to

Bakersfield for the hearing. AR 58. At the conclusion of the hearing, the ALJ asked Plaintiff to sign

a release for additional medical records. The ALJ notified Plaintiff that if necessary he would order

an additional hearing. AR 60. 

2010 Hearing Testimony

ALJ Benjamin F. Parks held a second hearing on April 21, 2010 in San Francisco, California. 

AR 63. Plaintiff restated he did not want representation. AR 63. Plaintiff testified that at the time

of the hearing he was 28 years old. He has his high school diploma as well as “quite a few college

credits.” AR 64. Before his disability onset date, Plaintiff last worked in construction building steel

buildings. AR 65. Plaintiff stated that he stopped working due to chronic pain in his feet, back, and

hips. AR 65-73. Plaintiff expressed that his pain stems from a 2006 severe industrial injury. While

on the job, Plaintiff was run over by a forklift which crushed his legs, feet and hip. AR 66. After

the accident, Plaintiff was hospitalized for a few months and then spent time in a nursing home. AR

78-79. Plaintiff testified that one of his physicians has recommended surgery. AR 70. However,

Plaintiff refuses the procedure because his doctor cannot guarantee that surgery will alleviate his

pain. AR 70. Plaintiff testified to alleviate his pain the onlymedication he takes is ibuprofen, stating

that workers’ compensation would not provide him with a treating physician. AR 73. Plaintiff

stated that without a primary treating physician, he cannot receive care or medication refills. AR 74. 

With respect to his activities of daily living, Plaintiff testified that on an average day he

wakes up at 5:30 am, goes to Bakersfield Junior College from Monday through Thursday and spends

the afternoon doing homework on his laptop in bed. AR 74-76. Plaintiff does his own shopping,

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cooking, and cleaning, and usually goes to bed around 10:00 pm. AR 76-77. Plaintiff stated he no

longer visits friends because he cannot sit too long. AR 75, 77. 

With respect to his other physical impairments, Plaintiff stated he had problems sleeping. 

AR 77. At the hearing, the ALJ noted that most of Plaintiff’s records stopped in 2007 and requested

that Plaintiff provide him with copies of any records after May 2007. AR 79-81.

Thereafter, the ALJ elicited testimony from Vocational Expert, Linda Ferra. AR 81. The

VE testified that Plaintiff previously worked in positions classified as construction worker (DOT

869.687-026), machinist (DOT 600.380-18), yard worker (DOT 211.462-014) and cashier/checker

(DOT 211.462-014). AR 82. 

The VE was asked to consider four hypothetical questions posed by the ALJ. AR 83. First,

VE Ferra was asked to consider jobs a hypothetical person could complete assuming a hypothetical

worker of Plaintiff’s age, education, and work experience capable of light work with occasional

stooping, crawling, bending, no foot pedals and uneven surfaces. VE Ferra indicated such an

individual could perform Plaintiff’s past relevant work as a cashier/checker. AR 83. Plaintiff could

also perform work as a cashier II and a packaging line worker. AR 83. 

In a second hypothetical, VE Ferra was asked to consider the same individual, capable of

light work with occasional stooping, crawling and bending, no foot pedals and uneven surfaces, but

this person could sit for six hours and stand for two hours. AR 83. VE Ferra indicated such an

individual could perform the full range of sedentary work including representative jobs as an

assembler (DOT 734.687-018) and order clerk (DOT 209.567-014). 

In a third hypothetical, VE Ferra was asked to consider the same individual, capable of

sedentarywork with occasional stooping, crawling and bending, no foot pedals and uneven surfaces,

but this person could sit for six hours and stand and walk less than two hours. AR 83. VE Ferra

indicated such an individual could not perform any work as it exists in the national economy. AR

84. 

In the final hypothetical, VE Ferrawas asked to consider the same individual, capable of light

work with occasional stooping, crawling and bending, no foot pedals and uneven surfaces, but this

person could sit for six hours and stand for two hours with a mental RFC of mild activities of daily

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living, and mild for social functioning and moderately impaired for concentration, persistence and

pace, and the person would be off task 40 to 50 percent if given detail and complex instructions as

well as 40 to 50 percent on simple, repetitive tasks and would be incapable of an “on production”

schedule. AR 84. VE Ferra indicated such an individual could not perform any work as it exists in

the national economy. AR 85. 

ALJ’s Findings

Using the Social Security Administration’s five-step sequential evaluation process, the ALJ

determined that Plaintiff did not meet the disability standard. AR 21-30. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520

(2011). At Step One, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not worked since the alleged onset date. AR

24. At Step Two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had severe impairments including traumatic injury to

pelvis and lower extremities with residual pelvic nonunion and status post right peroneal nerve

decompression and transfer and right foot drop. AR 24-25. At Step Three, the ALJ found that

Plaintiff’s pelvic fracture met the criteria for Listing 1.06, 20 C.F.R. 404.1520(d). 

The ALJ determined that Plaintiff was under a disability, as defined by the Act, from June

28, 2006 through August 31, 2008. AR 25. However, using the eight-step evaluation process the

ALJ determined that Plaintiff experienced a medical improvement as of September 1, 2008. Based

on his review of the entire record, the ALJ determined that beginning September 1, 2008, Plaintiff

retained the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform light work limited to occasional stooping,

crawling, and bending. Plaintiff cannot perform work on uneven surfaces and can only sit for 6

hours in an 8-hour work day, and stand/walk for 2 hours in an 8-hour work day. AR 26. Given this

RFC, Plaintiff could perform work as an assembler and order clerk. AR 29. The ALJtherefore found

that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Social Security Act. AR 29.

SCOPE OF REVIEW

Congress has provided a limited scope of judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision to

deny benefits under the Act. In reviewing findings of fact with respect to such determinations, this

Court must determine whether the decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial

evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g). Substantial evidence means “more than a mere scintilla,”

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971), but less than a preponderance. Sorenson v.

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Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119, n. 10 (9th Cir. 1975). It is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401. The record

as a whole must be considered, weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that

detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusion. Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). 

In weighing the evidence and making findings, the Commissioner must apply the proper legal

standards. E.g., Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1988). This Court must uphold

the Commissioner’s determination that the claimant is not disabled if the Secretary applied the

proper legal standards, and if the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence. 

See Sanchez v. Sec’y of Health and Human Serv., 812 F.2d 509, 510 (9th Cir. 1987). 

 REVIEW

In order to qualify for benefits, a claimant must establish that he is unable to engage in

substantial gainful activitydue to a medicallydeterminable physical or mental impairment which has

lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C.

§ 1382c (a)(3)(A). A claimant must show that he has a physical or mental impairment of such

severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work, but cannot, considering his age,

education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists

in the national economy. Quang Van Han v. Bowen, 882 F.2d 1453, 1456 (9th Cir. 1989). The

burden is on the claimant to establish disability. Terry v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1273, 1275 (9th Cir.

1990).

At the outset, the Court notes that the majority of Plaintiff’s claims are incomprehensible and

devoid of merit. In a list of twenty-two issues—many unsupported by analysis or legal argument—

Plaintiff generally argues that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence. Under

a liberal construction of Plaintiff’s briefing, the Court ascertainsthat Plaintiff’s individual challenges

can be separated into four distinct issues. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in (1) evaluating the

medical evidence in the record supporting the ALJ’s finding of medical improvement; (2) assessing

his credibility; and (3) relying on the vocational expert’s flawed testimony. Finally, Plaintiff argues

that his case should be remanded to consider new evidence submitted to the Appeals Council. 

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A. Physician’s Opinion Evidence 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJimproperly evaluated the medical evidence in the record. (Doc.

20). Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in crediting the opinion of his treating physician

Dr. Gart over the opinion of his other treating physician, Dr. Lewis who opined that Plaintiff must

lie down to alleviate pain. Defendant responds that the ALJ’s consideration of the medical opinion

evidence was proper.

Where the issue of continued disability or medical improvement is concerned, “a

presumption of continuing disability arises” in the claimant’s favor once that claimant has been

found to be disabled. Bellamy v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 755 F.2d 1380, 1381 (9th Cir.

1985) (citing Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 500 (9th Cir. 1983)). The Commissioner has the

“burden of producing evidence sufficient to rebut [the] presumption of continuing disability.” Id.;

see also Murray, 722 F.2d at 500 (“The Secretary . . . has the burden to come forward with evidence

of improvement.”). However, a reviewing court will not set aside a decision to terminate benefits

unless the determination is based on legal error or is not supported by substantial evidence in the

record as a whole. Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1984); accord Bellamy, 755 F.2d 3

at 1381.

In this case, the ALJ reviewed the record as a whole and determined that Plaintiff

experienced a period of disability from June 28, 2006 through August 31, 2008. AR 22. Relying

on the medical evidence however, the ALJ found that on September 1, 2008, medical improvement

occurred as it related to the ability for Plaintiff to perform light work, except he could not work with

foot pedals, or uneven surfaces, could only occasionally stoop, crawl, and bend, could sit for 6 hours

in an 8 hour day, and could stand and walk for 2 hours in an 8 hour day. AR 26. 

Cases in this Circuit distinguish among the opinions of three types of physicians: (1) those

“Substantial evidence means more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is such

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relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Bray v. Comm’r of Soc.

Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1222 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995));

accord Valentine v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 690 (9th Cir. 2009). “Where the evidence as a whole

can support either a grant or a denial, [the court] may not substitute [its] judgment for the ALJ’s.” Bray, 554 F.3d at

1222 (citing Massachi v. Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 2007)); see also Ryan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528

F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008) (“‘Where evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation,’ the

ALJ’s decision should be upheld.”) (quoting Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005)).

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who treat the claimant (treating physicians); (2) those who examine but do not treat the claimant

(examining physicians); and (3) those who neither examine nor treat the claimant (nonexamining

physicians). As a general rule, more weight should be given to the opinion of a treating source than

to the opinion of doctors who do not treat the claimant. Winans v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 643, 647 (9th

Cir. 1987). At least where the treating doctor’s opinion is not contradicted by another doctor, it may

be rejected only for “clear and convincing” reasons. Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1396 (9th

Cir. 1991). Even if the treating doctor’s opinion is contradicted by another doctor, the

Commissioner may not reject this opinion without providing “specific and legitimate reasons”

supported by substantial evidence in the record for so doing. Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 502

(9th Cir. 1983). This can be done by setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and

conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings. Magallanes v.

Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir.1989). The ALJ must do more than offer his conclusions. He

must set forth his own interpretations and explain why they, rather than the doctors’, are correct. 

Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 421-22 (9th Cir.1988). Therefore, a treating physician’s opinion

must be given controlling weight if it is well-supported and not inconsistent with the other

substantial evidence in the record. Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir. 2007).

Here, the ALJ gave the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating physician Dr. Gart great weight. Dr.

Gart, who routinely examined Plaintiff during his recovery, found Plaintiff achieved maximum

medical improvement as of June 20, 2008. AR 331-332, 350-351, 370-384, 386. As seen below, the

ALJ’s decision to credit Dr. Gart’s opinion over Dr. Lewis’s opinion is based on substantial

evidence. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) (Treating physician opinions are generally given even

more weight.)

1. Dr. Avrom Gart 

On June 21, 2007, treating physician Avrom Gart, M.D., evaluated Plaintiff. AR 331-332.

Dr. Gart noted Plaintiff has been on total temporary disability. AR 331. On examination, Plaintiff

had mild tenderness in the thoracic paravertebral region, full range of motion of the lumbar spine and

weakness in the right ankle. AR 331. Dr. Gart recommended continued physical therapy 3 times

a week for the next 6 weeks and prescribed Plaintiff Vicodin for pain. AR 331. Dr. Gart

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recommended further testing before deciding on surgical intervention. AR 331-332.

On August 7, 2007, Dr. Gart wrote another progress report from an evaluation of Plaintiff. 

AR 350-351. Dr. Gart recommended discontinuing physical therapy so Plaintiff could rehabilitate

with at least a year of exercise at a gym. AR 350. Dr. Gart noted he believed Plaintiff would be

totally temporarily disabled for another six weeks. AR 350.

In January and March 2008, Dr. Gart conducted further examinations of Plaintiff. AR 

370-377. Plaintiff had a nerve decompression and transfer performed in November 2007 and

reported he was doing better. AR 372. Plaintiff’s gait continued to be normal with no tenderness

in the spine, hips or knees. AR 376. Furthermore, records from March 2008 noted no ankle

instability or swelling present. AR 376-377.

A July 29, 2008 examination from Dr. Gart stated that Plaintiff’s orthopedic report of his

spine was normal, that Plaintiff had a 1 centimeter leg length discrepancy, but he had reached

maximum medical improvement and could perform sedentary work. AR 384. Dr. Gart noted an

orthopedists’ recommendation that Plaintiff be released to sedentary work activities but Plaintiff

wished to make a case for total disability. AR 384. Dr. Gart noted that during his 50-minute visits

with Plaintiff, Plaintiff was able to sit on the examination table without any complaints with regard

to his back. AR 384. Giving Plaintiff the benefit of the doubt, Dr. Gart noted that although

investigative photographs showed Plaintiff carrying a large wooden armoire with another man

without difficulties, Plaintiff is unable to perform significant lifting in an occupational setting. AR

382. According to Dr. Gart, Plaintiff could return to work, but should be limited to sedentary jobs. 

AR 384. 

2. Dr. Marshal Lewis 

After the administrative hearing on April 21, 2010, Plaintiff submitted a May 25, 2010,

one-page check list report from Marshal S. Lewis, M.D, a treating physician. In the report, Dr.

Lewis states Plaintiff had limitations including a need to have work requiring that he mostly sit down

and work that allows him to“lye [sic] down.” AR 265, 467. 

When presented with conflicting medical evidence, including medical opinions, it is solely

the ALJ’s responsibility to resolve the conflict. See Morgan v. Comm’r, 169 F.3d 595, 601 (9th Cir.

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1999) (“Where medical reports are inconclusive, ‘questions of credibility and resolution of conflicts

in the testimony are functions solely of the [ALJ]’”); Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 750 (“The ALJ is

responsible for determining credibility and resolving conflicts in medical testimony”). “[A]n ALJ

may discredit treating physicians' opinions that are conclusory, brief, and unsupported by the record

as a whole, or by objective medical findings.” Batson v. Comm’r of the SSA, 359 F.3d 1190, 1195

(9th Cir. 2004) (citing Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001)); See 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1527(d)(3) (“The more a medical source presents relevant evidence to support an opinion,

particularly medical signs and laboratory findings, the more weight we will give that opinion.”).

“Generally, the more consistent an opinion is with the record as a whole, the more weight [the ALJ]

will give to that opinion.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(4).

In his opinion, the ALJ weighed Dr. Lewis’s opinion as follows: 

The undersigned gives less weight to the opinion of Dr. Lewis. In a report dated May

25, 2010, Dr. Lewis states the claimant can do mostly sit-down work, and needs to

be able to recline as needed to alleviate pain. However, Dr. Lewis’ opinion that the

claimant needs to recline is not supported by any treatment notes, and is inconsistent

with the overall evidence of record. The undersigned therefore gives this opinion

little weight. 

AR 27. 

In this case, there were conflicting opinions regarding Plaintiff’s capacity to work. The ALJ

gave the greatest weight to the opinion of Dr. Gart, who had treated Plaintiff, and examined Plaintiff

on numerous occasions. AR 27, 331-332, 350-351, 370-384, 386. Dr. Gart’s opinion that Plaintiff

at least could perform sedentary work was consistent with Plaintiff’s orthopedist, consultative

examiner Dr. Gurvey, and agencyD.D.S. physicians. Unlike Dr. Gart’s opinion, the form report from

Dr. Lewis failed to show support for the opinion. AR 27. Dr. Lewis’s opinion is also inconsistent

with the medical evidence in the record as Plaintiff failed to present any other treatment records

establishing treatment after August 2008. 

The ALJ was entitled to discredit Dr. Lewis’s medical opinion because it was not supported

by medical findings and it was inconsistent with the medical record. These were appropriate

reasons, and the ALJ was entitled to resolve the conflict between Dr. Lewis opinion and those of

every other doctor in favor of the conclusion supported by the bulk of the objective evidence,

including Plaintiff’s primary treating physician. Therefore, it was appropriate for the ALJ to find

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Dr. Lewis’s opinion unsupported by the treatment notes and inconsistent with the overall evidence

of the record. Accordingly, the Court will not reverse the ALJ’s decision for failure to properly

weigh medical opinion testimony. 

B. The ALJ Properly Found that Plaintiff was not Credible 

Plaintiff’s next set of arguments surrounds the ALJ’s credibility assessment. According to

Plaintiff, the ALJimproperlyrejected his testimonyabout the limitations caused byhis impairments. 

(Doc. 20 at 24). Defendant responds that the ALJ’s credibility finding is supported by substantial

evidence. (Doc. 24 at 10).

The ALJ made an adverse credibility finding because: (1) Plaintiff was prescribed only

conservative medical treatment; (2) Plaintiff’s activities of daily living were inconsistent with his

alleged degree of impairments; and (3) the objective medical evidence did not support Plaintiff’s

subjective statements. AR 27. An ALJ must make specific findings and state clear and convincing

reasons to reject a claimant’s symptom testimony unless affirmative evidence of malingering is

suggested in the record. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1283-84 (9th Cir. 1993); see also Valentine

v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 693 (9th Cir. 2009). A two step analysis applies at the

administrative level when considering a claimant’s subjective symptom testimony. Smolen v.

Chater, 80 F.3d at 1281. First, the claimant must produce objective medical evidence of an

impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce some degree of the symptom or pain

alleged. Id. at 1281-1282. If the claimant satisfies the first step and there is no evidence of

malingering, the ALJ may reject the claimant’s testimony regarding the severity of his symptoms

only if he makes specific findings that include clear and convincing reasons for doing so. Id. at

1281. The ALJ must “state which testimony is not credible and what evidence suggests the

complaints are not credible.” Mersman v. Halter, 161 F.Supp.2d 1078, 1086 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (“The

lack of specific, clear, and convincing reasons why Plaintiff’s testimony is not credible renders it

impossible for [the] Court to determine whether the ALJ’s conclusion is supported by substantial

evidence”); Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96-7p (ALJ’s decision “must be sufficiently specific to

make clear to the individual and to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the

individual’s statements and reasons for that weight”).

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An ALJ can consider many factors when assessing the claimant’s credibility. See Light v.

Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997). The ALJ can consider the claimant’s reputation

for truthfulness, prior inconsistent statements concerning his symptoms, other testimony by the

claimant that appears less than candid, unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek

treatment, failure to follow a prescribed course of treatment, claimant’s daily activities, claimant’s

work record, or the observations of treating and examining physicians. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d

at 1284; Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 638 (9th Cir. 2007).

The first step in assessingPlaintiff’s subjective complaints is to determine whetherPlaintiff’s

condition could reasonablybe expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged. Lingenfelter, 

504 F.3dat 1036. Here, the ALJidentified several of Plaintiff’s impairments as severe impairments. 

AR 25. He further found that:

After careful consideration of the evidence, the undersigned find that the claimant’s

medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to produce the

alleged symptoms; however the claimant’s statements concerning the intensity,

persistence, and limiting effects of these symptoms are not credible beginning on

September 1, 2008, to the extent they are inconsistent with the residual functional

capacity assessment. 

AR 27.

This finding satisfied step one of the credibility analysis. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d at 1281-1282. 

Second, “in order to disbelieve a claim of excess pain, an ALJ must make specific findings

justifying that decision.” Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 601 (9th Cir. 1989). The findings must

convincingly justify the ALJ’s rejection of the plaintiff’s excess pain testimony. Id. at 602. 

However, an ALJ cannot be required to believe every allegation of disabling pain. “This holds true

even where the claimant introduces medical evidence showing that he has an ailment reasonably

expected to produce some pain.” Id. at 603.

Specifically, here ALJ Parks made the following findings: 

The claimant states that he takes ibuprofen because workers’ compensation will not

allow him other medication. The claimant states that his workers’ compensation case

is still open but they are not giving him any more medical treatment. 

...

The claimant testified that on a typical day he fixes breakfast and goes to school at

a junior college. He wants to work in agribusiness. After school he goes home and

does homework on a laptop while lying down on his bed. He does all of this own

shopping, cooking, and housecleaning. He has difficulty sleeping at night. The

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claimant stated that he has [been] see[ing] doctor[s] since 2007. 

After careful consideration of the evidence, the undersigned finds that the claimant’s

medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to produce the

alleged symptoms; however the claimant’s statements concerning the intensity,

persistence, and limiting effects of these symptoms are not credible beginning on

September 1, 2008, to the extent they are inconsistent with the residual functional

capacity assessment. 

In terms of the claimant’s alleged functional limitations due to pain, the undersigned

notes that claimant’s statements of disability are inconsistent with claimant’s stated

activities of daily living. The claimant has noted that he was able to hang Christmas

tree lights from the eaves of his house. He has also been able to carry a bucket of hay

to feed his horse. The claimant testified to doing his own shopping, cooking, and

housecleaning. All these activities are inconsistent with a finding that the claimant

is significantly limited in his ability to sit, stand, and walk. In addition, the claimant

is taking classes at junior college, which indicated the ability to sit, for a period of

time, maintain attention and concentration, and follow through on instructions. 

The undersigned notes that at the hearing the issue of more recent medical treatment

was discussed, as the file has no evidence of treatment after August 2008. At the

hearing, the claimant states that he had had further medical treatment and would

provide those records. The undersigned notes that the record was held open for 30

days. During that time the claimant submitted only one item of evidence, which was

a treating physician’s opinion. No records of treatment were submitted. 

AR 26, 27. (Citations omitted). 

The ALJ provided a number of clear and convincing reasons that are supported by the record

when concluding Plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony was not credible. First, the ALJ noted

that Plaintiff currently receives only conservative treatment, which involves taking ibuprofen when

he is in pain. AR 26, 73. Plaintiff testified he was not taking any prescription pain medication or

undergoing any other treatment for pain beyond September 2008, which casts serious doubt on his

allegations of disabling pain. Such conservative treatment is evidence that Plaintiff’s claims of

disability are not credible. See Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1113 (9th Cir. 1999) (subjective pain

complaints properly discredited where claimant received “minimal” and “conservative” treatment);

Burch, 400 F.3d at 681 (finding lack of consistent treatment “powerful evidence” that a plaintiff’s

claims of disability are not credible). While Plaintiff stated his workers’ compensation would not

give him any more treatment other than ibuprofen, (AR 26, 73) when the ALJ asked Plaintiff why,

Plaintiff did not have an explanation. AR 73-74. To the contrary, the record here shows Plaintiff

was given substantial treatment through his workers’ compensation. Indeed, Plaintiff testified at the

hearing that he has been to over 20 facilities. AR 55. Plaintiff was only treated with ibuprofen even

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though he testified the workers’ compensation process was still ongoing. AR 26, 74. Despite having

an open workers’ compensation case where Plaintiff had received treatment from numerous doctors,

since August 2008, the record shows Plaintiff receives only conservative treatment for his

impairment. This evidence is sufficient to sustain the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s claims of

disability are not credible.

Second, Plaintiff’s daily activities during the relevant time period were inconsistent with his

allegations of disabling symptoms. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i); Rollins v. Massanari, 261

F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001) (allegation of disability undermined by testimony about daily

activities). The ALJ found Plaintiff’s significant daily activities, including going to school 4 days

a week, inconsistent with Plaintiff’s claims that he could only sit for 10-15 minutes. AR 27. See

Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1112-1113 (9th Cir. 2012) (ALJ may consider “whether the

claimant engages in daily activities inconsistent with the alleged symptoms”). The ALJ also found

Dr. Gart’s observation that Plaintiff could sit at the examination table for 50 minutes without back

complaints inconsistent with Plaintiff’s claims of disability. AR 27, 384. The ALJ rationally

inferred that this evidence was inconsistent with disabling symptoms. AR 27; See Burch v.

Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 680-81 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[a]lthough the evidence of Burch’s daily activities

may also admit of an interpretation more favorable to Burch,” the ALJ’s decision must be upheld

where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation). 

Finally, the ALJ noted that there was sparse objective medical evidence to support Plaintiff’s

claims of disabling pain. An ALJ is entitled to consider whether there is a lack of objective medical

evidence to corroborate a claimant’s subjective symptoms, so long as it is not the only reason for

discounting the claimant’s credibility. Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 345 (9th Cir. 1991). Here,

the ALJ noted that “the file has no evidence of treatment after August 2008.” AR 27. The ALJ

further stated that even after holding the record open for 30 days, Plaintiff only submitted one

additional report from Dr. Lewis, which contained no treatment records. AR 27. In examining the

objective evidence, the ALJ detailed that all of the medical evidence for the relevant time period with

the exception of Dr. Lewis’s report indicated that Plaintiff was capable of performing at least

sedentary work, including Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Gart. 

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Given the considerations made by the ALJ, the ALJ properly made “a credibility

determination with findings sufficiently specific to permit the court to conclude the ALJ did not

arbitrarily discredit [the] claimant’s testimony.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958 (9th Cir.

2002). Consequently, the adverse credibility determination was proper.

C. The ALJ Did Not Err at Step Five 

Next, Plaintiff attempts to challenge the ALJ’s step five determination assertingthat the VE’s

testimony conflicts with the ALJ’s RFC. The ALJfound that Plaintiff could stand/walk for 2 hours

in an 8 hour day, and he could perform the requirements of representative jobs such as assembler,

DOT 734.687-018 and order clerk, DOT 209.567-014. Plaintiff disagrees, arguing that the 4

“packing line worker” job involves occasional standing and walking (up to one-third of the time). 

According to Plaintiff, it was error for the ALJ to find that he could complete the “packing line” job

because occasional standing and walking would require more walking/standing than 2 hours in an

8 hour day. Plaintiff’s argument is unpersuasive. Excluding “constantly” or “never,” there are

two words available for the ALJ’s use in an RFC to describe the ability of a claimant to perform

“exertional activities:” occasionally and frequently. See 1983 SSR LEXIS 30. The word

“occasionally” is defined as “occurring from very little up to one-third of the time,” while

“frequently” is defined as “occurring from one-third to two-thirds of the time.” 1983 SSR LEXIS

30; see also Sparkman v. Astrue, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70968, at * 8-9, n.1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 12,

2009). The ALJ found that Plaintiff had the ability to stand/walk for 2 hours in a day—an amount

well within the range covered by the word “occasionally.” Further, it is well established that an

ability to stand and walk for 2 hours is equivalent to sedentary work. AR 338. See, e.g., Blair v.

Astrue, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11954 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (finding ability to walk for no more than two

hours of an eight-hour day, is not inconsistent with a sedentary RFC); Cortes v. Astrue, 2013 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 15658 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (same). The VE listed two jobs that exist in significant

numbers in the national economy. AR 83-84. A review of these jobs show they are consistent with

the ALJ’s RFC as they mostly consist of sitting. Id. See DOT 209.567-014, 734.687-018. Given

Both jobs are classified in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles as sedentary.

4

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Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ did not err by relying on the vocational expert’s testimony concerning

Plaintiff’s ability to perform other work. Remand is not warranted on this issue. 

D. Additional Evidence Submitted to the Appeals Council 

Finally, Plaintiff argues that the Appeals Council erred by failing to provide any analysis or

relevant comment to the new evidence Plaintiff submitted after the ALJ rendered his decision.

Plaintiff alleges that because the Appeals Council did not properly “articulate its rational for denying

the request for review,” it cannot be determined whethersubstantial evidence supports the denial of

benefits.” (Doc. 20 at 14). Plaintiff also argues that his new evidence is material and warrants

remand of the ALJ’s decision. 

After the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s application for benefits, Plaintiff submitted to the Appeals

Council documentation from Drs. Moon and Schleusner. Plaintiff’s new evidence consists of a letter

from Dr. Moon recommending that Plaintiff be allowed to lie down periodically while working in

order to alleviate pain, and a letter from Plaintiff’s treating physician Dr. Schleusner again stating

that Plaintiff must lie down throughout the day. (Doc. 20 at 15). The Appeals Council “found no

reason under our rules to review the Administrative Law Judge’s decision” and denied Plaintiff’s

request for review. AR 10. The Council noted that it had “considered the reasons [Plaintiff]

disagrees with the decision and the additional evidence,” but it did not otherwise discuss the

evidence. See AR 10.

The Court “[does] not have jurisdiction to review a decision of the Appeals Council denying

a request for review of an ALJ’s decision, because the Appeals Council decision is a non-final

agency action.” Brewes v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 682 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing

Taylor v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 659 F.3d 1228, 1231 (9th Cir. 2011)). Thus, to the extent

Plaintiff asks this Court to reverse the Appeals Council’s denial of review because the Council failed

to provide its own independent discussion of the new evidence, the Court lacks jurisdiction to do so.

To the extent Plaintiff argues that the new evidence by itself warrants remand of the ALJ’s

decision, it does not. “New and material evidence” that is “submitted to and considered by the

Appeals Council is not new but rather is part of the administrative record properly before the district

court.” Brewes, 682 F.3d at 1164; see also Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097-98 (9th Cir. 1999).

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The Court therefore “must” consider that evidence “when reviewing the Commissioner’s final

decision for substantial evidence.” Brewes, 682 F.3d at 1163 (citing Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1097-98).

The additional letter’s from Drs. Moon and Schleusner were made part of the record by the Appeals

Council, and therefore the Court must consider it in “determin[ing] whether, in light of the record

as a whole, the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence.” Brewes, 682 F.3d at 1163.

The additional evidence from Plaintiff is not supported by treatment notes and is inconsistent

with the overall evidence of the record. Most critically, neither letter from Drs. Moon or Schleusner

indicate that Plaintiff was examined after August 2008. This evidence is insubstantial for the same

reason that the ALJ rejected the opinion of Dr. Lewis, in favor of Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr.

Gart. The ALJ rejected Dr. Lewis’s opinion as follows: 

The undersigned gives less weight to the opinion of Dr. Lewis. In a report dated May

25, 2010, Dr. Lewis states that the claimant can do mostly sit-down work, and needs

to be able to recline as needed to alleviate pain. However, Dr. Lewis’ opinion that

the claimant needs to recline is not supported by any treatment notes, and is

inconsistent with the overall evidence of the record. The undersigned therefore gives

this opinion little weight. 

AR 27. 

There are no treatment records from Drs. Moon or Schleusener after August 2008 supporting

these opinions. Both opinions simply state that it would be ideal if Plaintiff could lie down

throughout the work day. Due to the lack of objective evidence supporting their opinions, the ALJ

was free to rely on the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating physician. The ALJ noted that Dr. Gart had

seen Plaintiff numerous times and agreed that after June 2008, Plaintiff could return to work. 

Based on the review of the entire record, including the additional documents given to the

Appeals Council, the Court finds the ALJ’s decision is based on substantial evidence. The new

evidence before the Appeals Council does not indicate whether it relates to the relevant time period,

and more importantly it is not supported by objective clinical findings or treatment records. 

Therefore, the evidence does not provide a basis for reversing the ALJ’s decision. 

E. Plaintiff’s Request for Court Order 

On February 14, 2013, Plaintiff filed a “Motion for the Court to Order Dr. Gart to restate his

final opinion regarding Plaintiff’s work restrictions as it is unprofessional.” (Doc. 27). According

to Plaintiff, he has asked Dr. Gart to restate his July 31, 2008 opinion, but Dr. Gart has failed to do

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so. (Doc. 27 at 2). Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED. The ALJ made no finding that the evidence was

ambiguous or that the record was inadequate to allow for proper evaluation. See Mayes v.

Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 459-60 (9th Cir. 2001) (“An ALJ’s duty to develop the record further is

triggered only when there is ambiguous evidence or when the record is inadequate to allow for

proper evaluation of the evidence.”). In addition, as noted above, the ALJ kept the record open for

30 days to allow Plaintiff to submit additional evidence. AR 27; see Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1150

(ALJsatisfies dutyto develop record bykeeping the record open to allow supplementation). Further,

plaintiff has not shown that this Court has jurisdiction over Dr. Gart. Here, even assuming the Court

has jurisdiction over Dr. Gart, the record has been fully developed, and there is no need for

additional clarification from Dr. Gart. For these reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for a court order re Dr.

Gart is DENIED. (Doc. 27). 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial

evidence in the record as a whole and is based on proper legal standards. Accordingly, this Court

DENIESPlaintiff’s appeal from the administrative decision of the Commissioner of Social Security.

The Clerk of this Court is DIRECTED to enterjudgment in favor of Defendant Carolyn W. Colvin,

Commissioner of Social Security and against Plaintiff, Ryan Stevens.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: March 29, 2013 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe 

10c20k UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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