Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05577/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05577-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LEWIS C. NELSON SONS, INC., )

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)

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Plaintiff, )

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vs. )

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COUNTY OF FRESNO, )

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Defendant. )

)

)

No. CV-F-04-5577 REC/SMS 

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S

MOTION TO DISQUALIFY

MARSHALL C. WHITNEY, STEPHEN

E. CARROLL, AND McCORMICK,

BARSTOW, SHEPPARD, WAYTE &

CARRUTH AS COUNSEL

On September 13, 2004, the court heard plaintiff Lewis C.

Nelson Sons, Inc.'s motion to disqualify Marshall C. Whitney,

Stephen E. Carroll, and McCormick, Barstow, Sheppard, Wayte &

Carruth as counsel for defendant County of Fresno.

Upon due consideration of the record and the arguments of

the parties, the court denies this motion for the reasons set

forth herein.

On April 16, 2004, Lewis C. Nelson Sons, Inc. filed a

Complaint against the County of Fresno. Plaintiff alleged that

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it is a corporation engaged in business as a duly licensed

building contractor. The Complaint alleged that, on May 20,

2003, the County publicly advertised for bids for the

construction of the first phase of the Fresno Juvenile Justice

Center (the “Project”). Plaintiff submitted a bid, which bid was

opened on July 15, 2003. Plaintiff was the low bidder on the

Project, but plaintiff was not awarded the contract because the

County claimed that plaintiff did not accurately describe the

location of one of its proposed subcontractors and failed to

provide further information within 24 hours. The County

therefore found plaintiff’s bid non-responsive and awarded the

bid to a competitor, whose bid was higher than plaintiff’s. The

Complaint alleged that, on other publicly advertised

solicitations for bids for public contract construction work, the

County has not applied the same rules to the low bidder. 

Plaintiff alleges that the County has awarded the low bidder the

contract instead of finding the low bid to be non-responsive. 

The Complaint alleged that the County treated plaintiff

differently than other contractors in retaliation for exercising

its First Amendment right to petition the government for redress

of grievances and in violation of the due process and equal

protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 

By Order filed on August 31, 2004, the court granted in part

and denied in part the County’s motion to dismiss and to strike,

ruling that plaintiff could amend the Complaint to allege the

deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty interest

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without due process of law, that the Complaint alleged a claim

for denial of equal protection of the law because of disparate

enforcement of the law in retaliation for the exercise of a First

Amendment right, and that lost profits are recoverable as damages

in an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Plaintiff now moves the court to disqualify Marshall C.

Whitney, Stephen E. Carroll, and McCormick, Barstow, Shepard,

Wayte & Carruth, as counsel for the County of Fresno in this

action.

A. Factual Representations.

Dwight G. Nelson, president and sole shareholder of Lewis C.

Nelson and Sons, Inc. since its incorporation in 1979, avers in

pertinent part:

1. In 1985, Lewis C. Nelson and Sons, Inc.

began being represented by Oliver W. Wanger

of McCormick, Barstow ... By about 1987,

Marshall C. Whitney had become the principal

attorney at McCormick, Barstow ... for Lewis

C. Nelson and Sons, Inc., myself and my other

business interests. Marshall Whitney,

assisted by, Stephen E. Carroll and his firm

McCormick, Barstow ... were in essence, Lewis

C. Nelson and Sons, Inc.’s general counsel,

and general counsel for virtually all of my

business interests, and were my attorneys for

business, personal and family legal matters. 

Marshall Whitney would involve other

attorneys at McCormick, Barstow ... when

needed for their expertise, for example,

Steven Rau for certain business and corporate

matters, Mike Wilhelm for municipal law,

Hilton Ryder for bankruptcy, and Don Black

for real estate, and other attorneys. This

representation continued into 1996 with some

matters continuing into 1997.

4. Over the years that I and my companies

were represented by Marshall Whitney and

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McCormick, Barstow ..., I discussed with

Marshall Whitney and McCormick, Barstow ...

the most confidential and secret aspects of

my business and personal matters. He was my

counselor and confidant. The relationship

was very close. The relationship was so

close that Marshall Whitney also discussed

many of his private personal matters with me.

5. Marshall Whitney advised me and Charles

Fletcher regarding how to look at and

consider litigation and settlement, and the

methods and parts and pieces of legal

matters. We still do things as advised by

Marshall Whitney. There has been no

significant change in the corporate structure

of Lewis C. Nelson and Sons, Inc. since the

time when Marshall Whitney, Stephen Carroll

and McCormick, Barstow ... represented us.

6. Marshall Whitney and/or Stephen Carroll

advised and worked with me and, [sic] Charles

Fletcher, controller of Lewis C. Nelson and

Sons, Inc., regarding numerous bid protests

and claims involving public entities. 

Marshall Whitney counseled and represented

Lewis C. Nelson and Sons, Inc. as to issues

involving overhead and profit, and I

discussed with him confidential and secret

information regarding my and Lewis C. Nelson

and Sons, Inc.’s overhead and profit and

planned strategies regarding overhead and

profit. Overhead and profit are part of the

damages being sought by Lewis C. Nelson and

Sons, Inc. in this lawsuit.

7. During the years I was represented by

Marshall Whitney and McCormick, Barstow ...

formed [sic] at least nine companies for me

and one for my wife and myself. McCormick,

Barstow ... were also corporate counsel to

these corporations. During the course of his

representation of Lewis C. Nelson and Sons,

Inc., Marshall Whitney prepared me for

depositions and defended me in those

depositions. He prepared and defended me in

depositions in cases involving other business

interests of mine, and did so once in a case

involving a corporation owned by Kathy

Martin, the office manager of Lewis C. Nelson

and Sons, Inc.

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8. I placed the utmost trust and confidence

in Marshall Whitney and McCormick, Barstow

..., sharing with them my, Lewis C. Nelson

and Sons, Inc.’s, and my other businesses,

confidential and secret planning, strategies,

and litigation and settlement strategies and

decision making. I and other employees of

Lewis C. Nelson and Sons, Inc. disclosed

confidential and secret information regarding

profitability and accounting of Lewis C.

Nelson and Sons, Inc., and the relationship

between myself and Lewis C. Nelson and Sons,

Inc. In representing Lewis C. Nelson and

Sons, Inc., Marshall Whitney prepared me and

we attended court settlement conferences. He

did the same for other business and personal

interests of mine. In once [sic] case not

directly involving Lewis C. Nelson and Sons,

Inc., Marshall Whitney discussed a [sic]

length and counseled my wife and I regarding

matters which were very upsetting to my wife

and I. Chuck Fletcher and I discussed in

detail with Marshall Whitney alter ego

arguments that had been raised. Marshall

Whitney and Stephen Carroll have confidential

information about me and Lewis C. Nelson and

Sons, Inc. and others at Lewis C. Nelson and

Sons, Inc. that they could use against Lewis

C. Nelson and Sons, Inc. in this case.

9. Confidential and secret information was

disclosed to Marshall Whitney and others at

McCormick, Barstow ... based on the trust and

confidence I had in Marshall Whitney. Based

on the years of representation and the close

and intense relationship, this information

could be used by Marshall Whitney in this

case against Lewis C. Nelson and Sons, Inc. 

I believe that Marshall Whitney, Stephen

Carroll and McCormick, Barstow ... have a

conflict of interest and should not be

allowed to represent the County of Fresno

against Lewis C. Nelson and Sons, Inc. in

this case.

Charles P. Fletcher, controller for Lewis C. Nelson and

Sons, Inc. and of other businesses owned by Dwight Nelson since

1987 or when they were formed, avers that his duties include

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finance, accounting, business and administration, including legal

matters. Mr. Fletcher further avers in pertinent part:

2. Lewis C. Nelson and Sons, Inc. is a

general construction contracting company

whose business is performing public works

building construction contracts, primarily in

the southern San Joaquin Valley; almost all

of its contracts are with state or local

public entities, and some with the federal

government. Lewis C. Nelson and Sons, Inc.’s

financial livelihood is dependent on bidding,

receiving and performing construction

contracts for public entities.

3. When I arrived at Lewis C. Nelson and

Sons, Inc. in 1987, Marshall Whitney of the

law firm McCormick, Barstow ... later

assisted by Stephen E. Carroll, acted in the

role of general counsel to Lewis C. Nelson

and Sons, Inc., to Dwight G. Nelson’s other

businesses, and to Dwight G. Nelson

personally, and continued as such until 1996. 

Marshall Whitney was assisted by Stephen E.

Carroll and other attorneys at McCormick,

Barstow ..., handled [sic] virtually all of

the corporate, counseling, litigation and

other legal matters of Lewis C. Nelson and

Sons, Inc., Dwight Nelson and Dwight Nelson’s

other business interests, many if not most of

which companies they incorporated. Marshall

Whitney’s representation on some matters

continued into 1997.

5. [sic] From 1987 until 1996, virtually all

legal matters of Lewis C. Nelson and Sons,

Inc., including bid protests and claims

against public entities were handled by

Marshall Whitney and/or Stephen E. Carroll of

McCormick, Barstow ... Sometimes Marshall

Whitney would have associates or other

attorneys at McCormick, Barstow ... became

[sic] involved, including Steven Rau, Michael

Wilhelm, Don Black, Hilton Ryder, Kenneth

Baldwin, John Leonard, Kent Hamlin, Curt

Vogt, David McNamara, Tim Jones, Lawrence

Artenian, Robert Hurlburt, Rachel Hill,

Patrick Foran, Jeffrey Reid, and W. Frederick

Docker. This representation occurred at a

particularly sensitive time because Lewis C.

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Nelson and Sons, Inc. was growing, increasing

from an annual gross revenue of about $5

million to $50 million during this period.

6. Since about 1987, in addition to letters,

faxes and telephone calls, and meetings on

specific matters, because of the

extensiveness of and number of matters

Marshall Whitney and his firm were handling,

we would have routine meetings with Marshall

Whitney at McCormick, Barstow ...’s offices,

usually about every six weeks. Marshall

Whitney was almost always at these meetings

and there would be other McCormick, Barstow

... attorneys there, depending on what was

going on at the time. Dwight G. Nelson,

myself, and Kathy Martin were almost always

present.

7. Marshall Whitney and Stephen Carroll of

McCormick, Barstow ... represented Lewis C.

Nelson and Sons, Inc. in connection with many

bid disputes on public works construction

projects including a women’s prison in Madera

...; a California Highway Patrol facility at

Felicity; a California Highway Patrol

facility at Coalinga ...; section 801 housing

at Castle Air Force Base; a housing project

for the City of Fresno; a project at

California State Prison - Avenal; and a

California Highway Patrol facility at

Atwater; they were involved in the bid itself

on the City of Fresno housing project. They

were counsel as to claims and/or potential

claims on construction contracts against the

Greenfield Union Elementary School District,

Clovis Unified School District, Selma Unified

School District, Panama-Buena Vista Union

School District, Greenfield Union School

District, Standard School District, and

Castle Air Force Base housing project. They

were involved in subcontractor matters and

disputes on numerous public works projects

including the above Greenfield, Selma, and

Clovis projects, and Hanford Elementary

School District.

8. In representing Lewis C. Nelson and

Sons, Inc., Marshall Whitney and Stephen

Carroll learned about the actual and

projected overhead of Lewis C. Nelson and

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Sons, Inc., and its profits and projected

profits and about its internal cost

accounting. Overhead and profit of Lewis C.

Nelson and Sons, Inc. was involved in almost

every representation by Marshall C. Whitney

and Stephen E. Carroll regarding construction

projects and disputes with public entities. 

Lewis C. Nelson and Sons, Inc.’s damages in

this lawsuit include its overhead and lost

profits.

9. McCormick, Barstow ..., principally

Marshall Whitney or other attorneys at

McCormick, Barstow ... through Marshall

Whitney, separately represented Lewis C.

Nelson and Sons, Inc. in dozens and dozens of

matters and represented Dwight Nelson and his

other business interests in hundreds more. 

During the course of his representation,

Marshall Whitney prepared me and defended me

at depositions in lawsuits for Lewis C.

Nelson and Sons, Inc., and for depositions

involving other of Dwight Nelson’s

businesses. Marshall Whitney, in

representing Lewis C. Nelson and Sons, Inc.

prepared Dwight Nelson and myself for court

settlement conferences as representatives of

Lewis C. Nelson and Sons, Inc. Marshall

Whitney, in representing other of Dwight G.

Nelson’s business interests, prepared Dwight

Nelson and myself for private mediation and

court settlement conferences.

10. Dwight G. Nelson and myself disclosed to

and discussed with Marshall Whitney and/or

Stephen Carroll all aspects of Lewis C.

Nelson and Sons, Inc., and Dwight G. Nelson’s

other businesses, including our thinking,

planning, business strategies, litigation

strategies, settlement thoughts, and the

concepts and strategies of Dwight G. Nelson,

and myself. In representing Lewis C. Nelson

and Sons, Inc., Marshall Whitney and Stephen

Carroll learned completely about the

organization, organizational structure and

decision making of Lewis C. Nelson and Sons,

Inc. Throughout their representation of

Lewis C. Nelson and Sons, Inc. and Dwight G.

Nelson, Marshall Whitney and Stephen Carroll

became intimately familiar with how we think,

plan, and strategize, how we look at bids and

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at litigation. Dwight Nelson and I had

lengthy discussions with Marshall Whitney

about claims and/or potential claims

involving corporate alter ego. Marshall

Whitney and Stephen Carroll have confidential

and secret information adverse to Lewis C.

Nelson and Sons, Inc. in this lawsuit.

11. The firm of McCormick, Barstow ... was

paid some $2,000,000 for representation of

Dwight G. Nelson and his business interests

between 1986-1996, of which approximately

$1,000,000 was regarding Lewis C. Nelson and

Sons, Inc.

12. In late 1997 and early 1998, McCormick,

Barstow ... released its internal files

regarding Lewis C. Nelson and Sons, Inc.,

Dwight G. Nelson and his other entities; I

estimate there were some 100 boxes of

documents.

13. Marshall Whitney and Stephen Carroll

have a right to earn a living as lawyers, and

Fresno County should be able to chose who it

wants to represent them; however, based on

the long and intimate relationship between

Lewis C. Nelson and Sons, Inc. and its owner

and president, Dwight G. Nelson, with

Marshall Whitney and Stephen Carroll, and the

confidential information shared with Marshall

Whitney and his firm, and the confidence we

had in Marshall Whitney, I believe that

Marshall Whitney, Stephen Carroll and their

law firm, have a conflict in this case

representing the County against Lewis C.

Nelson and Sons, Inc.

Kathleen A. Martin, office manager for plaintiff since 1980,

avers in pertinent part:

2. On September 24, 1985, Dwight G. Nelson,

the president of Lewis C. Nelson and Sons,

Inc., and I met with Oliver Wanger of

McCormick, Barstow ... regarding his

representing Lewis C. Nelson and Sons, Inc. 

He agreed and began representing Lewis C.

Nelson and Sons, Inc. Shortly thereafter, he

brought in Marshall C. Whitney ... who about

a year later assumed the role of our primary

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counsel at McCormick, Barstow ....

3. Beginning about 1987, we had routine

meetings about every six weeks with Marshall

Whitney regarding the numerous matters he and

his firm were handling for Lewis C. Nelson

and Sons, Inc. and other businesses owned by

Dwight G. Nelson.

4. Most of the correspondence through this

office went through me as office manager. 

There was a constant flow of paper work to

and from McCormick, Barstow ... until 1996

when the amount of representation by

McCormick, Barstow ... diminished, ending in

1997.

5. Normally, Dwight Nelson, Charles Fletcher

and myself would attend these meetings. 

Marshall Whitney would have other attorneys

at McCormick, Barstow ... attend, depending

on what matters he may have involved those

attorneys. I felt the relationship with

Marshall Whitney was close.

6. In addition to representing Lewis C.

Nelson and Sons, Inc., Marshall Whitney,

beginning about 1987-1988, represented a

small construction company that I owned,

Shar-Lyn Construction, Inc., until 1996. 

Marshall Whitney, assisted by Stephen

Carroll, represented Shar-Lyn Construction,

Inc. in a lawsuit against a city on a public

works construction contract, and with respect

to a claim for overhead costs against a

hospital district, and other matters. I

freely and frankly discussed with Marshall

Whitney all matters regarding the cases,

including litigation, strategy, and possible

settlement of disputes, my concerns and

problems, in the same was done [sic] with

Marshall Whitney regarding Lewis C. Nelson

and Sons, Inc., and Dwight G. Nelson.

Marshall Whitney has filed the following declaration in

opposition to this motion to disqualify:

2. It is my recollection that various

attorneys in my law firm have represented

Lewis C. Nelson and Sons (‘LCN’) ... from

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approximately 1985 through 1995. In

approximately 1997 at the request of LCN and

its president, Dwight G. Nelson, we

surrendered to LCN and Mr. Nelson, all of our

files reflecting our representation of Mr.

Nelson, Lewis C. Nelson and Sons, and other

companies in which Mr. Nelson has an

ownership interest.

3. In early 2000 at the request of Mr.

Nelson, we destroyed all copies of our

records reflecting our representation of LCN,

Mr. Nelson, and companies with which Mr.

Nelson was affiliated. Accordingly, I do not

have in my possession or control records to

review which would reflect information that

was imparted to my law firm by Mr. Nelson

during our representation of him. Therefore

this declaration is submitted based upon my

present recollection.

4. It is consistent with my recollection

that in 1985 the Honorable Oliver W. Wanger,

formerly of our law firm, began representing

LCN. Some time around late 1986 or early

1987, I became the principal contact at my

law firm for LCN and Mr. Nelson.

5. Over the course of the approximate ten

year period that my firm represented LCN and

Mr. Nelson, I was my firm’s principal contact

with LCN and Mr. Nelson. Based upon my

contacts with LCN and Mr. Nelson, I was

generally aware that my firm handled most of

Mr. Nelson’s and LCN’s litigated and

transactional matters during this time frame;

however, we never received a retainer and I

do not recall discussing that our firm was

LCN’s general counsel.

6. In approximately, the late summer of 1995

I commenced the process of terminating the

attorney-client relationship between my law

firm and Mr. Nelson, LCN and his other

companies. By the fall of 1995, LEWIS C.

NELSON AND SON, INC. [sic], had identified

substitute counsel for all of their active

files and to the best of my recollection,

McCormick, Barstow ... was substituted out of

all of LEWIS C. NELSON AND SON, INC.’s [sic]

litigation matters during that time frame. 

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It is my recollection that any significant

construction cases of LEWIS C. NELSON AND

SON, INC. [sic] was [sic] transferred to his

current counsel, Robert Leslie of McInerney &

Dillon, at that time. Formal termination of

our representation occurred in late 1995 or

early 1996. It is my recollection that in

one matter for another entity owned by Mr.

Nelson, our representation was not formally

concluded until some time in 1996 or 1997.

7. Since the fall of 1995, I do not recall

receiving any new engagements or assignments

from LCN, Mr. Nelson or any of his companies. 

In fact, during that time frame a dispute

arose between my law firm and Mr. Nelson and

his various companies concerning a payment

for services and corresponding claims of

alleged professional negligence.

8. On or about November 27, 1996, LCN and

Mr. Nelson and other affiliated companies

filed a Complaint against my firm, your

declarant and other members of the firm, and

in response my firm filed a Cross-Complaint

against Mr. Nelson and certain of his

companies seeking to recover fees for

services rendered which had not been paid.

9. This lawsuit was settled in or about

February of 2000. Shortly thereafter, as

indicated above, my firm destroyed all

records, to the extent if had any, arising

from our attorney-client relationship with

Mr. Nelson, LCN and his other companies.

10. During the course of my representation

of LCN and Mr. Nelson, we worked directly

with Mr. Nelson and certain of his staff

including Charles P. Fletcher and Kathleen A.

Martin. For the most part, during the first

5-7 years of my representation of LCN, Mr.

Nelson and his companies, I represented Mr.

Nelson and LCN in connection with

construction disputes with various owners and

sub-contractors. However, by approximately

1992-1993, my representation for Mr. Nelson

shifted to unrelated matters involving his

automobile dealerships. During that time

frame Stephen E. Carroll took on a more

dominant role in handling construction

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disputes for Mr. Nelson. Other lawyers in

the firm also represented Mr. Nelson and his

companies for other matters as indicated by

Mr. Nelson.

11. It is consistent with my recollection

that Dwight Nelson and I did have several

confidential conversations regarding a host

of matters, and that our relationship evolved

into a close working relationship over the

course of years. However, we never had a

social relationship per se, although my

memory is that on at least one and perhaps

more occasions I was invited to his company

Christmas party.

12. When I began representing LCN and Mr.

Nelson, I did learn that Mr. Nelson had been

represented by a number of different

attorneys over the years and was experienced

in matters of litigation and settlement. 

Without waiving any attorney-client

communication privileges that may exist, if

any, and in response to Mr. Nelson’s

declaration at ¶ 5, I did advise and consult

with Charles Fletcher, Dwight Nelson and from

time to time, Kathleen Martin concerning

various lawsuits, claims and settlements, and

recommended courses of conduct. I do not

recall ever developing with Mr. Nelson or LCN

any specific, generally applicable litigation

strategy that would be of uniform application

to subsequent cases other than the common

sense strategy of attempting to evaluate the

costs, benefits and risk associated with any

disputes, in order to achieve a fair and

reasonable compromised result, where

compromise is reasonably feasible.

13. With respect to the issues presented to

this Court in this action, I can represent

that from time to time in the early 1990's I

did consult with LCN concerning issues

relating to sub-contractor replacement, and

on one, and perhaps two occasions, bid

protests involving LCN’s bids on public

construction projects. I have no memory of

the names of those projects or what the

specific issues were involving those cases. 

I do not recall any of them involving

litigation. Moreover, I have no recollection

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of ever representing LCN, Mr. Nelson or any

of his companies in connection with any

constitutional challenges to the actions of a

public entity.

14. I have no recollection of ever analyzing

LCN’s overhead and profit on any particular

job and am unaware of any ‘planned strategies

regarding overhead and profit.’ In fact, it

is my recollection that when I was

principally handling LCN’s litigated matters,

a large percentage of our cases for LCN were

in defense of claims filed by subcontractors. To the extent LCN had

affirmative claims against sub-contractors or

owners, I do not recall ever preparing an

analysis of LCN’s overhead and profit back in

the 1980's and early 1990's either as to any

project or generally.

15. I have no recollection or knowledge of

what LCN’s overhead and profit were on any

project in any litigated matter that I

handled on their behalf. I do not believe

information relating to their overhead and

profit was ever reviewed and analyzed by me

or anyone at my office on behalf of LCN. I

do not know whether or not their overhead and

profit varied from project to project or what

its components were. Further, I have not

acquired nor have I had access to any

information whatsoever regarding LCN’s

overhead and profit since late 1995. I am

not aware of any facts suggesting and I have

no reason to believe that what little

financial information or data that may have

been available to my law firm in the 1980's

and early 1990's would have any bearing on

the financial condition of LCN today, its

efficiencies, its overhead or profit on the

subject project or otherwise.

16. Mr. Nelson suggest that LCN still does

things as I advised them (Nelson Declaration

¶ 5) I have no idea to what he refers, but I

can represent to this Court that LCN did sue

my firm, me and my partner Stephen Carroll

and asserted, among other things that our

representation of LCN and the legal advice we

provided them fell below the standard of

care. Our actions and recommendations were

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challenged by LCN’s present attorney, Robert

L. Leslie, who holds himself out as a

specialist in construction litigation.

17. In response to ¶ 7 of Mr. Nelson’s

Declaration, it is consistent with my memory

that I did prepare him for deposition and on

occasion defended him in these depositions,

but it is also my recollection that those

depositions involved legal and factual issues

that have no bearing whatsoever on the

constitutional issues associated with LCN’s

claims asserted herein relative to the

subject juvenile detention center project. 

Likewise, my representation of Mr. Nelson in

connection with his non-construction

businesses had no bearing whatsoever on the

construction activities of LCN which would in

any way have any relevance to the claims LCN

has asserted in this case.

18. With respect to ¶ 8 of Mr. Nelson’s

Declaration, Mr. Nelson and LCN and I did

have a close attorney-client relationship

which disintegrated in the Fall of 1995. 

Prior to that time I represented Mr. Nelson

and LCN in a variety of contexts and it is

consistent with my memory that I attended

various court hearings for him, settlement

conferences, depositions, and business

meetings. I also handled one or more

personal matters involving Mr. Nelson and his

wife which I do not feel I am at liberty to

delve into. I can represent to this Court

that none of those matters of a personal

nature have any relevance whatsoever to the

legal or factual issues raised by LCN’s

Complaint in this case. They did not involve

construction projects, public bidding, or

constitutional claims on LCN’s overhead or

projected project profits.

19. I disagree with Mr. Charles Fletcher’s

Declaration at ¶ 8 wherein he implies that we

obtained overhead and profit and projected

profit analysis in almost every

representation we conducted on LCN. I have

no recollection of ever receiving any

detailed analyses of that information during

my representation of LCN. In fact, during my

active representation of LCN there were very

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few instances in which it took a position

adverse to a public entity, since during that

time, LCN’s disputes on public projects

typically were with its subcontractors and

suppliers. I do have a general and vague

recollection that in the last year or two of

our representation of LCN it began pursuing

claims for delay damages and extended

overhead and lost profits which were handled

by Stephen Carroll of this office. I do not

know to what extent Mr. Carroll was provided

information in that regard or when he was

provided with such information.

21. I have no recollection of what LCN’s

overheard, expenses, income, profits, profit

margins or methods of allocating such

overhead and expenses to any particular

project. I do not even know if LCN’s

analysis of such matters was undertaken

manually or by computer. Today I certainly

do not know anything about its profitability

generally or as to any particular project ro

LCN’s methods of calculating or allocating

the same generally or as to any particular

project.

22. I have no knowledge of what the current

organizational structure or chain of command

might be at LCN. At this juncture, I have no

knowledge of who the current employees are of

[LCN], except to the extent that that

information has been disclosed in the

declarations that have been filed in support

of the subject Motion.

23. I have no confidential knowledge of

LCN’s litigation or claims experience during

the past ten years.

24. Mr. Fletcher states in ¶ 10 of his

Declaration that he and Dwight Nelson and I

had discussions about claims and/or potential

claims involving corporate alter ego. Without

waiving the attorney-client privilege, if any

remains, it is my recollection that those

conversations were of a superficial nature

and that I do not recall analyzing the issue

with respect to LCN. I further represent to

this Court that I am unaware of any claim or

potential claim that alter ego allegations

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have any bearing whatsoever to LCN’s claim

against the County of Fresno in this case.

25. Kathleen Martin’s Declaration regarding

my representation of Shan-Lyn Construction is

consistent with my recollection. I do recall

that Shan-Lyn Construction was in a contract

dispute with a public entity and did have a

damage claim which I assume included its

project costs and overhead. In my

representation of Kathleen Martin and ShanLyn Construction we did discuss the various

items she refers to; however, I am unaware of

any facts or circumstances which would

suggest that Shan-Lyn Construction’s profits,

overheard, or construction costs generally,

or allocable to that particular project, have

any bearing whatsoever on LCN’s present claim

against the County of Fresno.

26. Mr. Nelson suggests that I and Stephen

Carroll ‘have confidential information about

me and Lewis C. Nelson and Sons, and others

at Lewis C. Nelson and Sons that they could

use in this case.’ As previously indicated,

all I or my law firm have at this time is in

our memories since all records of our long

past representation of LCN and Mr. Nelson

have been destroyed. I do not have in my

possession, custody, control, or in my memory

any confidential information pertaining to

Mr. Nelson or LCN relating to any information

relevant to the subject matter of this

action, including but not limited to any

information relating to the financial

condition of LCN, its profits or losses, its

projected overhead on this project, its

projected profits, its current business

planning or strategies relating to this

project or otherwise, or its mode or method

of calculating its alleged losses in this

case or any other. I am also unaware of any

‘confidential’ information that I presently

have or had access to when I represented LCN

10 years ago that would even be germane to

any issues presented by this case.

27. Moreover, there never was any uniform

strategy, protocol, or procedure employed

during my representation of Mr. Nelson or LCN

regarding the prosecution and/or settlement

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of claims, because it is my recollection that

each claim, whether assertive or defensive,

was evaluated and dealt with on a case by

case basis.

28. Since I have not represented Mr. Nelson

for close to 10 years and have no documentary

evidence of his business affairs or those of

LCN, I neither have access to nor possess any

confidential information relating to LCN, its

financial condition, its overhead, its

profits or losses generally, how it computes

or allocates such expenses to a project, or

its projected profits on the subject juvenile

detention center.

29. I respectfully submit that any financial

information, litigation strategies or any

‘confidential [sic] that we had or may have

discussed with Mr. Nelson, Mr. Fletcher,

Kathleen Martin and/or LCN and its employees

10 to 20 years ago is no longer of any

significance or materiality because of the

substantial passage of time and the probable

significant changes in LCN’s financial

dealings and structure during that period.

Stephen E. Carroll also has filed a declaration in opposition to

this motion to disqualify, averring in pertinent part:

3. I have been employed by McCormick,

Barstow ... since 1984. Since January of

1990, I have been a partner of McCormick,

Barstow ... Prior to late 1992, I had only

sporadic involvement in any of the legal

affairs of LCN ... Prior to that time, my

only involvement in the representation of LCN

was in connection with occasional research

assignments involving issues assigned to me

by my partner, Marshall C. Whitney. Starting

in early 1993, I began to receive files

directly from LCN for which I was

responsible. My involvement in the

representation of LCN continued until the

summer of 1995 at which time I made the

decision to discontinue my representation of

LCN.

4. By the fall of 1995, LCN had identified

substitute counsel for all of their active

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files and to the best of my recollection,

McCormick, Barstow ... was substituted out of

all of LCN’s litigation matters during that

time frame. It is my recollection that any

significant construction cases of LCN was

[sic] transferred to his current counsel,

Robert Leslie of McInerney & Dillon, at that

time.

5. The vast majority of the legal services

which I provided to LCN involved actions in

which LCN was engaged in litigation with one

of its subcontractors on a project. Although

the projects which gave rise to the

litigation in which I was representing LCN

typically involved a public improvement,

there were very few instances in which LCN

took a position adverse to a public entity,

at least during the period in which I was

representing them. I can recall only two

matters in which the possibility of a claim

against a public entity arose, neither of

which were in a bidding context. In

connection with a contract between LCN, the

claim against Greenfield Unified School

District was pending at the time that I

concluded my representation of LCN. In a

second instance, the possibility of a claim

against the Clovis Unified School District

was under consideration by LCN, toward the

end of my representation of them. This

matter was referred to Mr. Leslie and the law

firm of McInerney & Dillon, who I am given to

understand eventually filed a claim against

the Clovis Unified School District and

pursued it to final judgment.

6. Any suggestion on the part of LCN that I

acquired an intimate knowledge of its

business operations, and in particular its

financial affairs, is simply wrong. During

the course of my representation of LCN, I was

very much kept on a need-to-know basis with

regard to information and access to its

files. During the course of my

representation of LCN I never even visited

its offices. Instead, I would receive,

typically through Chuck Fletcher, copies of

those documents which LCN chose to give me

which related to the litigation being

referred to me.

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7. Even during the course of the preparation

of the above-referenced claims against the

Greenfield Unified School District and the

Clovis Unified School District in 1994, I did

not personally review the financial records

of LCN in an attempt to establish the scope

of its claim. Rather, in both instances, an

outside consultant was retained by LCN to

review the records provided to him by Mr.

Fletcher in an effort to calculate the

damages to be claimed by LCN.

8. Today I have no recollection of what

records were reviewed in the course of the

preparation of those claims, the methodology

that was employed, the profitability or

overhead of LCN, or even the records of LCN

that were available and that bore on the

issue of profitability or overhead at LCN. 

Other than in connection with those two

claims, I have no recollection of having ever

participated in any representation of LCN in

which the issues of profitability or overhead

ever evolved past being theoretical issues.

9. At this time, I have no recollection of

any specific facts, records, documents or

information which in any way pertain to the

business practices of LCN, the policies of

LCN, the financial condition of LCN, or the

particulars of the profitability or overhead

of LCN. I have no knowledge of what the

current organizational structure or chain of

command might be at LCN. At this juncture, I

have no knowledge of who the current

employees are of LCN, except to the extent

that that information has been disclosed in

the declarations that have been filed in

support of the subject Motion.

10. I have no recollection of ever having

represented LCN in connection with a bid

protest whether in the role of defending the

awarding of the bid to LCN, or objecting to

the award of a contract to another bidder in

competition with LCN. In particular, I do

not recall ever having filed any actions on

behalf of LCN against any public entities in

connection with a bidding dispute, or even

having submitted a bid protest on behalf of

LCN.

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11. I do not have any files of LCN and to my

knowledge neither does anyone at McCormick,

Barstow ... It is my understanding that

copies of all documents were destroyed as

part of the litigation between LCN and

McCormick ... and your declarant, among

others, which is referenced in the

Declaration of Marshall C. Whitney ....

B. Merits of Motion to Disqualify.

This court has adopted the standards of professional conduct

required by members of the State Bar of California and contained

in the State Bar Act, the Rules of Professional Conduct of the

State Bar of California and decisions of any Court applicable

thereto. Rule 83-180(e), Local Rules of Practice.

Of importance to the resolution of this motion are the

standards articulated by the Ninth Circuit in Trone v. Smith, 621

F.2d 994 (9 Cir. 1980): th

The relevant test for disqualification is

whether the former representation is

‘substantially related’ to the current

representation ... The interest to be

preserved by preventing attorneys from

accepting representation adverse to a former

client is the protection and enhancement of

the professional relationship in all its

dimensions. It is necessary to preserve the

value attached to the relationship both by

the attorney and by the client. These

objectives require a rule that prevents

attorneys from accepting representation

adverse to a former client if the later case

bears a substantial connection to the earlier

one ... Substantiality is present if the

factual contexts of the two representations

are similar or related. 

Perhaps the most important facet of the

professional relationship served by this rule

of disqualification is the preservation of

secrets and confidences communicated to the

lawyer by the client. If there is a

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reasonable probability that confidences were

disclosed which could be used against the

client in later, adverse representation, a

substantial relation between the two cases is

presumed. Confidentiality, however, is not

the only aspect of the professional tie

preserved by the disqualification rule.

Both the lawyer and the client should expect

that the lawyer will use every skill, expend

every energy, and tap every legitimate

resource in the exercise of independent legal

judgment on behalf of the client and in

undertaking representation on the client’s

behalf. That professional commitment is not

furthered, but endangered, if the possibility

exists that the lawyer will change sides

later in a substantially related matter. 

Both the fact and the appearance of total

professional commitment are endangered by

adverse representation in related cases. 

From this standpoint it matters not whether

confidences were in fact imparted to the

lawyer by the client. The substantial

relationship between the two representations

is itself sufficient to disqualify.

The rule we state is necessary to implement

the following canons of professional ethics:

Canon 1 (maintaining integrity and confidence

in the legal profession); Canon 4 (preserving

confidences and secrets of a client); Canon 5

(exercise of independent professional

judgment); Canon 6 (representing a client

competently); Canon 7 (representing a client

zealously with the bounds of the law); Canon

9 (avoiding even the appearance of

professional impropriety).

As we have stated, the underlying concern is

the possibility, or appearance of the

possibility, that the attorney may have

received confidential information during the

prior representation that would be relevant

to the subsequent matter in which

disqualification is sought. The test does

not require the former client to show that

actual confidences were disclosed. That

inquiry would be improper as requiring the

very disclosure the rule is intended to

protect ... The inquiry is for this reason

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restricted to the scope of the representation

engaged in by the attorney. It is the

possibility of the breach of confidence, not

the fact of the breach, that triggers

disqualification. 

621 F.2d at 998-999. Furthermore, Rule 3-310(E), California2

Rules of Professional Conduct, provides in pertinent part:

A member shall not, without the informed

written consent of the ... former client,

accept employment adverse to the ... former

client where, by reason of the representation

of the ... former client, the member has

obtained confidential information material to

the employment. 

The California Courts impose essentially the same standards

articulated by the Ninth Circuit in Trone v. Smith in determining

whether a motion to disqualify pursuant to Rule 3-310(E) should

be granted. See In re Marriage of Zimmerman, 16 Cal.App.4th 556

(1993):

... ‘It is well settled that an attorney is

prohibited from doing either of two things

after severing a relationship with a former

client. “‘ ... He may not do anything which

will injuriously affect his former client in

any [matter] in which he formerly represented

him nor may he at any time use against his

former client knowledge or information

acquired by virtue of the previous

relationship.’” ... The purpose of the rule

is to protect both confidential

communications and the enduring confidential

relationship between attorney and client.

....

Where ... a motion for disqualification is

predicated upon a claimed breach of

confidentiality or conflict of interest, the

trial court must undertake a cautious

balancing of competing interests. ‘The trial

court must weigh the combined effect of a

party’s right to counsel of choice, as

attorney’s interest in representing a client,

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the financial burden of a client of replacing

disqualified counsel and any tactical abuse

underlying a disqualification proceeding

against the fundamental principle that the

fair resolution of disputes within our

adversary system requires vigorous

representation of parties by independent

counsel unencumbered by conflicts of interest

....

Thus, ‘a former client may seek to disqualify

a former attorney from representing an

adverse party by showing that the former

attorney possesses confidential information

adverse to the former client ... The former

client need not establish that the attorney

actually possesses confidential information

... ‘It is the possibility of the breach of 

confidence, not the fact of an actual breach

that triggers disqualification ... Under the

‘substantial relationship’ test, subsequent

representation is proscribed on the theory

that its substantial relationship to the

former representation ‘places the attorney in

a situation where he or she could breach the

duty of confidentiality to the former

client.’ ... Possession of confidential

information is presumed where ‘”’a

substantial relationship has been shown to

exist between the former representation and

the current representation, and when it

appears by virtue of the nature of the former

representation or the relationship of the

attorney to his former client confidential

information material to the current dispute

would normally have been imparted to the

attorney ....’”’ ... If the substantial

relationship test is satisfied by the former

client, ‘”... the discussion should

ordinarily end. The rights and interests of

the former client will prevail. Conflict

would be presumed; disqualification will be

ordered....”’ ....

16 Cal.App.4th at 562-563. See also Civil Service Com. v.

Superior Court, 163 Cal.App.3d 70, 79-80 (1984):

While the concept of confidentiality may be

the touchstone of adverse prior

representation analysis, other considerations

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are relevant as well. Courts have long been

concerned about the prospect of a swearing

contest between the attorney and the former

client as to whether the attorney had access

to confidential information in the course of

the prior representation. To avoid this

problem, the ‘substantial relationship’ test

was developed: ‘[T]he former client need show

no more than that the matters embraced within

the pending suit wherein his former attorney

appears on behalf of his adversary are

substantially related to the matters or cause

of action [where] the attorney previously

represented him, the former client. The

Court will assume that during the course of

the former representation confidences were

disclosed to the attorney bearing on the

subject matter of the representation. It

will not inquire into their nature and

extent. Only in this manner can the lawyer’s

duty of absolute fidelity be enforced and the

spirit of the rule relating to privileged

communications be maintained. 

‘To compel a client, in addition to

establishing that the subject of the present

adverse representation is related to the

former, the actual confidential matters

previously entrusted to the attorney and

their possible value in the present client

[sic] would tear aside the protective cloak

drawn about the lawyer-client relationship. 

For the Court to probe further and sift the

confidences in fact revealed would require

the disclosure of the very matters intended

to be protected by the [confidentiality]

rule.’ ....

Finally, in Jessen v. Hartford Casualty Ins. Co., 111 Cal.App.4th

698, 709-710 (2003), the court fine-tuned the substantial

relationship test:

[W]hether an attorney should be disqualified

in a successive representation case turns on

two variables: (1) the relationship between

the legal problem involved in the former

representation and the legal problem involved

in the current representation, and (2) the

relationship between the attorney and the

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former client with respect to the legal

problem involved in the former representation

... If the relationship between the attorney

and the former client is shown to have been

direct - that is, where the lawyer was

personally involved in providing legal advice

and services to the former client - then it

must be presumed that confidential

information has passed to the attorney and

there cannot be any delving into the

specifics of the communications between the

attorney and the former client in an effort

to show that the attorney did or did not

receive confidential information during the

course of that relationship. As a result,

disqualification will depend upon the

strength of the similarities between the

legal problem involved in the former

representation and the legal problem involved

in the current representation. This is so

because a direct attorney-client relationship

is inherently one during which confidential

information ‘would normally have been

imparted to the attorney by virtue of the

nature of [that sort of] former

representation,’ and therefore it will be

conclusively presumed that the attorney

acquired confidential information relevant to

the current representation if it is congruent

with the former representation ....

On the other hand, where the former attorneyclient relationship is peripheral or

attenuated instead of direct, then the

presumption will not be applied in the

absence of an adequate showing that the

attorney was in a position vis-a-vis the

client to likely have acquired confidential

information material to the current

representation. In these circumstances, the

relationship between the compared

representations shares equal billing with the

relationship between the attorney and the

former client and the two aspects of the

Ahmanson test are assessed in combination in

determining whether disqualification is

mandated.

1. Material Confidential Information.

Plaintiff argues that disqualification is required because

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Messrs. Whitney and Carroll obtained material confidential

information during their representation of plaintiff which can be

used to diminish plaintiff’s ability to prevail in this action. 

In so arguing, plaintiff is not relying on the substantial

relationship test described above and discussed in more detail

infra. Plaintiff asserts that the presumption that the former

attorneys possess confidential information where there is a

similarity between the representations is inapplicable where the

former attorneys admit that they possess confidential

information. Plaintiff contends that once the former attorneys

admit that they possess confidential information, all plaintiff

has to demonstrate is that if this confidential information is

used in the present litigation [it] would place the former client

at an unfair advantage. In so asserting, plaintiff cites to

Johnson v. Superior Court, 159 Cal.App.3d 573 (1984).

Plaintiff’s position is not well-taken. Johnson merely

articulates another version of the substantial relationship test. 

The decision notes that the record failed to establish any

substantial relationship between the two representations. It was

argued that a former client need not prove actual possession of

confidential information to obtain an attorney disqualification. 

However, the court noted that the possession of confidential

information will be presumed only where a substantial

relationship between the two representations has been shown and

where it appears that by virtue of that relationship confidential

information material to the current dispute would have been

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imparted to the attorney. The court then discussed and rejected

the assertion that disqualification is required if the former

attorney obtained special knowledge of his client’s affairs. In

rejecting this position, the court stated that “what must be

shown is that the attorney has obtained as a result of the

earlier representation knowledge of otherwise confidential

information that if used in the present litigation would place

the former client at an unfair advantage.” The court went on to

hold that this had not been shown in the case. Obviously, if it

is shown that McCormick Barstow obtained confidential information

directly relevant to issues before the court in this action,

whether or not the two representations were substantially related

goes by the boards. However, the fact that confidential

information was obtained during a prior representation does not

ipso facto require disqualification if that confidential

information has no relationship to the present representation. 

The purpose of the substantial relationship test is to protect

the confidence, so to speak, of that information. Otherwise, a

disqualification could be based on the fact that confidential

information was obtained during a patent lawsuit even though the

present representation involves a divorce.

Plaintiff that disqualification is required under this

standard because both Mr. Whitney and Mr. Carroll learned a great

deal of confidential information during their representation of

plaintiff, including matters involving plaintiff’s internal

organization structure, it’s personnel, areas of inquiry

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sensitive to plaintiff, who employed by plaintiff is likely to

possess facts about this lawsuit, how plaintiff keeps its records

and what might be in them, and what factors plaintiff relies on

in deciding whether to settle an action. 

However, as defendant contends, plaintiff’s legal

conclusions about confidentiality are of no value in resolving

this motion. As defendant argues, the “declarations offered in

support ... neither identify any legitimate factual or legal

similarities between the antecedent and current representations,

nor do they attempt to identify any rational connection or nexus

between the antecedent and current representations.” The fallacy

of plaintiff’s claim is demonstrated by the conclusory claim that

Mr. Whitney advised plaintiff “how to look at and consider

litigation and settlement, and the methods and parts and pieces

of legal matters” and that “[w]e still do things as advised by

Marshall Whitney.” Plaintiff sued McCormick, Barstow for legal

malpractice, being represented in that action by Mr. Leslie,

counsel for defendants in this action, a specialist in

construction litigation. As defendant asserts: “Surely Plaintiff

cannot accurately represent to the Court that it still follows

advice that it and its present attorney asserted was sufficiently

deficient to support a claim for malpractice.” Finally, the

confidences and secrets alluded to by plaintiff are irrelevant

to the present dispute and no material connection between the

former and present representations has been established. For

example, plaintiff’s averments concerning discussions on the

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issue of alter ego is not relevant to the plaintiff’s claims of

denial of equal protection and due process at issue in this

action. To the extent that plaintiff generally contends that

McCormick, Barstow was generally privy to information such as

litigation and settlement strategies and the organizational

structure of the various companies, defendant argues:

Entirely missing from this conclusory

analysis is any attempt by Plaintiff to draw

a connection between McCormick, Barstow’s

alleged knowledge of these policies gained

from the former representation (assuming such

policies in fact existed and were

communicated to McCormick Barstow) and its

materiality to the present dispute. The

reason for this omission ... is Plaintiff

cannot make any such connection. 

The court agrees. In Farris v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 119

Cal.App.4th 671 (2004), the Court of Appeal discussed a prior

decision, Jessen v. Hartford Casualty Insurance Company, supra.

Both of these cases were substantial relationship cases. In

Jessen, the court had stated that successive representations will

be substantially related “when the evidence before the trial

court supports a rational conclusion that information material to

the evaluation, prosecution, settlement or accomplishment of the

former representation given its factual and legal issues is also

material to the evaluation, prosecution, settlement or

accomplishment of the current representation given its factual

and legal issues.” Jessen, 111 Cal.App.4th at 712. In Farris,

the Court of Appeal explained in pertinent part:

... Jessen did not adopt the so-called

‘playbook’ approach ... To create a conflict

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requiring disqualification, Jessen mandates

that the information acquired during the

first representation be ‘material’ to the

second; that is, it must be found to be

directly at issue in, or have some critical

importance to, the second representation. 

Thus, for example, the attorney’s acquisition

during the first representation of general

information about the first client’s ‘overall

structure and practices’ would not of itself

require disqualification unless it were found

to be ‘material’ - i.e., directly at issue or

of critical importance - in the second

representation ... The same is true about

information such as the first client’s

‘litigation philosophy’ or ‘key decision

makers.’ Our reference to these and other

factors in Jessen did not establish any one

of them, singly or in any particular

combination, as a litmus test; we simply

identified some of the categories of

information that might be found to be

‘material’ and therefore relevant to a

determination whether the attorney ought to

be disqualified. For these reasons, we do

not regard Jessen as creating a lifetime

prohibition against representation adverse to

a former client, treating the former client

in the same fashion as a current client, or

automatically mandating disqualification

where the two compared matters are entirely

unrelated.

Farris, 199 Cal.App.4th at 630. Defendant argues:

... Plaintiff has failed to provide any

specifics whatsoever regarding the former

representations so as to allow the Court to

assess whether the present lawsuit is

substantially related to those past

representations. Thus, Plaintiff’s wholesale

reliance on the ‘playbook’ approach - without

any showing how such knowledge of 10 to 20

year old ‘strategies’ similarly relate to the

antecedent and current representations - is

legally ineffective. This failure of proof

renders it absolutely impossible for

Plaintiff to establish that McCormick

Barstow’s alleged acquisition of Plaintiff’s

litigation philosophies, identity of key

decision makers and overall corporate

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structure is in any way material to the

present action.

Consequently, the court concludes that plaintiff has not

established that Mr. Whitney and Mr. Carroll obtained material

confidential information during their representation of plaintiff

which can be used to diminish plaintiff’s ability to prevail in

this action.

2. Substantial Relationship Test.

Plaintiff further argues that the substantial relationship

test mandates the granting of this motion, noting that the courts

consider three factors in making this determination: “(1) the

factual similarities between the current and former

representations, (2) the similarities in the legal questions

posed, and (3) the nature and extent of the attorney’s

involvement with the former representation.” Dieter v. Regents

of University of California, 963 F.Supp. 908, 912 (E.D.Cal.

1997).

It is undisputed that both Mr. Whitney and Mr. Carroll had a

direct relationship with plaintiff. 

Plaintiff contends that the basis of this lawsuit is that

defendant retaliated against plaintiff for the exercise of

plaintiff’s First Amendment right to petition the government. 

Plaintiff argues that there are “factual connections” between

this lawsuit and the prior representations by Mssers Whitney and

Carroll. Plaintiff asserts that Messers Whitney and Carroll

received confidential information from it regarding government

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contracts and government bidding cases and represented plaintiff

in matters involving government bidding disputes and

subcontractor disputes on numerous public works projects. In

addition, plaintiff notes that Mr. Carroll represented plaintiff

in litigation with other governmental entities. Plaintiff

contends that both the current representation and the prior

representations concerned the overhead and profit of LCN,

including how LCN calculates overhead and its profit margins on

contracts, confidential information relevant to LCN’s calculation

of damages in this case. Plaintiff argues:

[LCN’s] historical overhead and profit were

involved in many cases where [LCN] was

represented by ... Whitney and ... Carroll in

claims and disputes with public entities ...

[LCN’s] damages in this lawsuit include its

lost future overhead and lost future profits

from work denied to it ... Calculation of

future damages are typically based on prior

performance, confidential communications of

which are held by Mr. Whitney, Mr. Carroll

and McCormick, Barstow.

Plaintiff also argues that Mr. Whitney repeatedly advised LCN on

how to look at and consider litigation and settlement and “the

methods and parts and pieces of legal matters.” Plaintiff

contends that its still does some things as advised by Mr.

Whitney. Plaintiff contends that Messers. Whitney and Carroll

are familiar with the factors LCN employs in deciding whether to

settle litigation and are familiar with LCN’s litigation

philosophy, LCN’s overall organization structure and practices,

and know the identity of the key decision-makers at LCN. 

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Plaintiff further argues that there are similar legal issues

between the past and current representations because this case

involves public bidding and whether the County of Fresno

considered improper factors in denying plaintiff’s bid.

However, as defendant argues, the constitutional dispute at

issue before the court is not substantially related to McCormick

Barstow’s former representation of Plaintiff. The action before

the court is not a bid protest involving the challenge or defense

of public contract bid requirements. Plaintiff concedes in its

complaint that its bid was not in compliance. Nor does this

action involve the performance of a public contract or the

performance by subcontractors. The court concurs with defendant

that the only relationship between this action and the prior

representation of plaintiff is the fact that underlying this

constitutional challenge to the decision by defendant is an

unsuccessful public contract bid. Plaintiff’s argument that the

substantial relationship test is satisfied because Mr. Whitney

and Mr. Carroll gave advice to plaintiff concerning the

litigation of government contract cases and participated in cases

in which the formulation and calculation of overhead and lost

profits were made is not persuasive given the substantial amount

of time that has elapsed since the prior representation ceased. 

The court agrees with defendant that financial information from

dating before the prior representation ceased is not even

tenuously related to plaintiff’s present claim for lost profit

damages and overhead. 

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Consequently, the court concludes that the factors relevant

to a resolution of the substantial relationship test for

disqualification of prior counsel do not mandate disqualification

of Mr. Whitney and Mr. Carroll from defending the County of

Fresno in the instant action.

ACCORDINGLY:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion to Disqualify Marshall C. Whitney,

Stephen E. Carroll, and McCormick, Barstow, Sheppard, Wayte &

Carruth as Counsel is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 7, 2005 /s/ Robert E. Coyle 

668554 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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