Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01259/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01259-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1346t Tort Claim

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WENDY HASTINGS,

Plaintiff,

v.

THE UNITED STATES POSTAL 

SERVICE and THE UNITED STATES 

OF AMERICA,

Defendants.

Case No.: 16cv1259 JM (JLB)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS

The United States Postal Service (“the Postal Service”) and the United States of 

America (“the United States”) (collectively, “Defendants”) move to dismiss the first 

amended complaint (“FAC”) of Plaintiff Wendy Hastings for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. (Doc. No. 10.) Plaintiff opposes the motion. 

The court finds the matter suitable for decision without oral argument pursuant to Civil 

Local Rule 7.1(d)(1) and, for the following reasons, grants Defendants’ motion.

BACKGROUND

On September 15, 2015, Plaintiff fell while visiting a San Diego post office, 

fracturing her kneecap and arm. (See generally Doc. No. 8.) About two months later, 

and pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), Plaintiff filed an administrative 

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claim with the Postal Service for injuries incurred as a result of that fall. (See id. at 3, 

¶ 9.) The Postal Service denied the claim on April 27, 2016. (See Doc. No. 10-3 at 6–7.) 

Thereafter, in May 2016, Plaintiff initiated this action, filing a complaint (“the original 

complaint”), again pursuant to the FTCA, against the Postal Service. (Doc. No. 1.)

Plaintiff did not name the United States as a defendant in the original complaint. (See id.

¶ 3.) Plaintiff served the Postal Service, (see Doc. No. 5), but there is no record on the 

docket, or allegations in the FAC, that Plaintiff personally delivered, hand delivered, or

physically mailed process (i.e., the original complaint and summons) to either the United 

States Attorney’s Office or Attorney General. While the United States Attorney’s Office

received an automatic, court-generated notice of electronic filing (“NEF”)1for both the 

original complaint and summons,

2

the Attorney General did not receive an NEF for

either. 

On May 8, 2017, the Postal Service moved to dismiss the original complaint for 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Four days later, Plaintiff filed the FAC, adding the 

United States as a defendant for the first time. (See Doc. No. 8.) Defendants filed the 

instant motion two weeks later.

LEGAL STANDARDS

Defendants move to dismiss the FAC under two different provisions of Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 12.

I. Rule 12(b)(1) – Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction 

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. “Without jurisdiction the court 

cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it 

ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and 

 

1 An NEF is an email giving notice of the electronic filing; it is not the actual filed 

document. Instead, the party receiving the email may download the filed document from 

a link contained in the email.

2 The court grants Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice of the NEFs and case docket. 

(Doc. No. 13.)

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dismissing the cause.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 94 

(1998). A party may make either a facial or factual attack on subject matter jurisdiction. 

See, e.g., Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc., 328 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2003). 

In resolving a facial challenge, as Defendants make here, the court considers whether 

“the allegations contained in [the] complaint are insufficient on their face to invoke 

federal jurisdiction.” Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 

2004). The court must accept the allegations as true and must draw all reasonable 

inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 2004), 

but ultimately, as the party putting the claims before the court, Plaintiff bears the burden 

of establishing jurisdiction, Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 

377 (1994). 

II. Rule 12(b)(6) – Failure to State a Claim

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) challenges the 

legal sufficiency of the pleadings. To overcome such a motion, the complaint must 

contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the 

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that 

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009). Facts merely consistent with a defendant’s liability are insufficient to survive a 

motion to dismiss because they establish only that the allegations are possible rather than 

plausible. Id. at 678–79. The court must accept as true the facts alleged in a well-pled 

complaint, but mere legal conclusions are not entitled to an assumption of truth. Id. The 

court must construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the non-moving 

party. Concha v. London, 62 F.3d 1493, 1500 (9th Cir. 1995).

DISCUSSION

The court will first address Plaintiff’s claim against the Postal Service before 

turning to Plaintiff’s claim against the United States.

///

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I. Plaintiff’s Claim Against the Postal Service

The FAC, which asserts a single claim under the FTCA, names both the United 

States and the Postal Service as defendants. Defendants argue that only the United States 

is properly within the court’s jurisdiction. The court agrees.

Although FTCA claims can arise from the acts or omissions of United States 

agencies, see 28 U.S.C. § 2671, a federal agency is not subject to suit under the FTCA, 

see 28 U.S.C. § 2679(a)–(b)(1); Allen v. Veterans Administration, 749 F.2d 1386, 1388 

(9th Cir. 1984) (“Individual agencies of the United States may not be sued [under the 

FTCA].”). Instead, the “FTCA is the exclusive remedy for tortious conduct by the 

United States, and it only allows claims against the United States.” F.D.I.C. v. Craft, 157 

F.3d 697, 706 (9th Cir. 1998); Lance v. United States, 70 F.3d 1093, 1095 (9th Cir. 1995) 

(“The United States is the only proper defendant in an FTCA action.”); Kennedy v.

United States Postal Serv., 145 F.3d 1077, 1078 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Because the United

States is the only proper party defendant in an FTCA action, the district court correctly

dismissed [the] complaint as improperly filed against the Postal Service . . . .”).

Based on this clear authority, the court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss 

Plaintiff’s claim against the Postal Service, with prejudice, for lack of jurisdiction.

II. Plaintiff’s Claim Against the United States

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claim against the United States is time barred 

because: (1) the six-month limitations period to bring suit against the United States 

expired before Plaintiff filed the FAC, and (2) the FAC does not relate back to the

original complaint. The court agrees in both respects.

A. Plaintiff Filed the FAC Too Late

Under the FTCA, when a federal agency denies an administrative claim, a claimant

must file suit within six months from the date the agency mailed notice of final denial of 

the claim. See 28 U.S.C.S. § 2401(b); Adams v. United States, 658 F.3d 928, 933 (9th 

Cir. 2011). The letter denying Plaintiff’s claim was mailed on April 27, 2016;

accordingly, Plaintiff had until October 27, 2016, to file suit against the United States

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(the only proper defendant, as discussed above). Plaintiff missed the deadline by over six 

months. The FAC, which named the United States for the first time, was filed on May 

12, 2017. Thus, unless the FAC relates back to the original complaint, Plaintiff’s FTCA 

claim against the United States is now time barred.

B. The FAC Does Not Relate Back

1. The Rules on Relation Back

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) allows a plaintiff to amend a complaint, 

“after a statute of limitation period has run, to accurately name a defendant who was not 

correctly named in the pleading before the limitation period had run.” See G.F. Co. v. 

Pan Ocean Shipping Co., 23 F.3d 1498, 1501 (9th Cir. 1994). Generally, an amendment 

seeking to change a party “relates back” to the original pleading if the amendment asserts 

a claim that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out in the original 

pleading and, “within the time period provided by Rule 4(m) for serving the summons 

and complaint [90 days], the party to be brought in by amendment: (i) received notice of 

the action that it will not be prejudiced in defending on the merits; and (ii) knew or 

should have known that the action would have been brought against it, but for a mistake 

concerning the proper party’s identity.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C)(i)–(ii). This is often 

referred to as the “general notice provision.” See Miles v. Department of the Army, 881 

F.2d 777, 781 (9th Cir. 1989).

When a plaintiff seeks to add the United States as a defendant, an amended 

complaint will relate back to the original complaint if the plaintiff satisfies either the

general notice provision or the so-called “government notice provision” set forth in Rule 

15(c)(2). That government notice provision provides that when the United States is 

added as a defendant by amendment, subdivisions (i) and (ii) of the general notice 

provision are satisfied if, “during the stated period, process was delivered or mailed to the 

United States attorney or the United States attorney’s designee, to the Attorney General 

of the United States, or to the officer or agency.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(2) (emphasis 

added).

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2. Analysis

a. The Parties’ Positions

Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot satisfy either the general notice provision or 

the government notice provision. In her opposition, Plaintiff acknowledges that she “is 

not relying on the general notice provision to invoke the relation back doctrine but 

instead the government notice provision.” (Doc. No. 12 at 6.)3 Plaintiff claims that she 

satisfied the government notice provision when “[t]he summons and complaint were 

‘delivered’ and electronically ‘mailed’” to the United States Attorney by way of an

automatically generated NEF. Plaintiff’s argument, in a nutshell, is that an NEF, sent by 

the court to an email account maintained by the United States Attorney’s Office,

constitutes “process” that is “delivered” or “mailed” as the terms are used in Rule

15(c)(2). Defendants, in reply, contend that “[n]othing in Rule 15(c)(2) or the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure supports such a novel interpretation of the terms ‘delivered’ or 

‘mailed.’”

4

 

 

3 Plaintiff’s concession on this point is merited. To satisfy the general notice provision, 

the Ninth Circuit requires that both the United States Attorney and the Attorney General 

receive notice during the statutory period. See Miles, 881 F.2d at 782 (stating that “a 

plaintiff may substitute the United States as a defendant after the expiration of the statute 

of limitations only if both the U.S Attorney and the Attorney General received notice 

prior to the running of the statutory period”); Allen, 749 F.2d at 1390 (“Only if the 

United States Attorney and the Attorney General receive notice of the suit prior to the 

running of the statute of limitations will a plaintiff be allowed to substitute the United 

States as a defendant under Rule 15(c).”). Here, there is no allegation that the Attorney 

General received any notice of the original complaint, via an NEF or otherwise.

4 Defendants also claim that the “only ‘process,’ i.e., summons and complaint, delivered 

or mailed to the United States Attorney or Attorney General in this case occurred on 

March 9, 2017 and March 15, 2017, respectively, almost 10 months after Plaintiff filed 

suit.” In support, Defendants attach the declaration of Mary C. Wiggins, Civil Process 

Clerk at the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of California. The 

court cannot consider Ms. Wiggins’s declaration on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, 

however. Rather, in deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court may consider only the face 

of the complaint, documents attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by 

reference in the complaint, or matters of judicial notice. United States v. Ritchie, 342 

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b. The Court’s View

The Ninth Circuit instructs that “Rule 15(c) is to be interpreted literally.” Miles,

881 F.2d at 782. Reading Rule 15(c)(2) literally, the court finds that it does not embrace

automatically generated email notifications of filings that allow the recipients of those 

emails to download the filings. To the contrary, a literal interpretation of the terms

“process,” “delivered” and “mailed” suggest that a copy of the complaint and summons 

must be personally or hand delivered, or put in the U.S. Mail. Indeed, in evaluating those

terms as they are used in other Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, numerous courts have 

determined the same. See, e.g., Magnuson v. Video Yesteryear, 85 F.3d 1424, 1431 (9th 

Cir. 1996) (stating that “mail” as used in Rule 5 means U.S. Mail); Rhodes v. U.S. I.R.S., 

2010 WL 5392636, at *4 (D. Ariz. Dec. 28, 2010) (stating that “delivery of the complaint 

and summons” as used in Rule 4(i)(1)(A) “means personal service” (citing Whale v. 

United States, 792 F.2d 951, 953 (9th Cir. 1986)); Gabriel v. United States, 30 F.3d 75, 

77 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that “delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint 

on the United States Attorney,” as stated in Rule 4, “require[s] that the United States 

Attorney be personally served”).

Moreover, as Defendants point out, if the promulgators of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure intended for Rule 15 to encompass electronic means, they could have 

said so. They certainly know how to make the distinction between “mailing” and

“delivering,” on the one hand, and “sending . . . by electronic means,” on the other—Rule 

5 does just that. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5 (allowing service by electronic means only if the

recipient consented in writing, and only for orders, pleadings “filed after the original 

 

F.3d 903, 907–08 (9th Cir. 2003); Gerritsen v. Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d 

1011, 1020 (C.D. Cal. 2015). Thus, instead of accepting the facts as declared by Ms. 

Wiggins, the court notes the absence of facts (in the form of allegations in the FAC) or 

even argument (in Plaintiff’s opposition) demonstrating that Plaintiff mailed or delivered 

process, in any manner other than an NEF, to the United States Attorney or Attorney 

General within the period provided by Rule 4(m).

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complaint,” discovery papers, motions, and other similar papers (emphasis added)). 

Unlike Rule 5, Rule 15 makes no mention of electronic means. 

Nor do the Advisory Committee Notes accompanying Rule 15 suggest that 

delivering or mailing process includes sending by electronic means. The 1966 

amendment of Rule 15, which added the government notice provision, refers to Rule 4: 

“[I]n the government cases[,] the first and second requirements [of the general notice 

requirement, Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(i)–(ii)] are satisfied when the government has been 

notified in the manner there described (see Rule 4(d)(4) and (5)).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 

advisory committee’s notes to 1966 Amendment, 39 F.R.D. 69, 83 (1966). The 

referenced provisions of Rule 4 (currently Rule 4(i)(1)–(2)) provide, in turn, that service 

on the United States Attorney is accomplished in one of two ways: by “(i) deliver[ing] a 

copy of the summons and of the complaint to the United States attorney for the district 

where the action is brought—or to an assistant United States attorney or clerical 

employee whom the United States attorney designates in a writing filed with the court 

clerk—or (ii) send[ing] a copy of each by registered or certified mail to the civil-process 

clerk at the United States attorney’s office.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i).

Again, there is no mention of electronic means. And in fact, it was only in 1993 

that Rule 4 was amended “to permit the United States attorney to be served by registered 

or certified mail.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 advisory committee’s notes to 1993 Amendment

(emphasis added). Since common sense suggests that this amendment aimed to make 

service less burdensome on plaintiffs, rather than more, and since service by electronic 

means is explicitly provided for in other circumstances but is absent from Rule 4, there is 

no reason to believe that Rule 4 has at any time, then or now, included electronic means.5 

 

5 A contrary result would allow plaintiffs in the Southern District of California to rely on 

the NEF to serve process on the United States Attorney whenever they file a case against 

a federal government agency. That would nullify not only the requirements of Rule 4, 

but also the requirements of the court’s own local rules. See CivLR 4.1.a; see also e.g., 

Mares v. United States, No. 13-cv-6187-CJS, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77465, *6–7

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Thus, the court agrees with Defendants that “if the terms ‘delivery’ or ‘mail’ in Rule 4(i)

do not include delivery or mail by electronic means and instead require hard copy mailing

or delivery of the summons and complaint, the same should hold true for Rule 15(c)(2),” 

especially considering the Advisory Committee’s own citation to Rule 4. See Magnuson 

v. Video Yesteryear, 85 F.3d 1424, 1431 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Nor, on a practical level, does 

it make sense to adopt an approach that interprets the term ‘mail’ differently for the 

purposes of different rules within the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”).

In short, the plain text of Rule 15(c)(2), its contrast with Rule 5, and the Advisory 

Committee’s guidance all indicate that the government notice provision cannot be 

satisfied by means of an NEF.

Furthermore, it bears noting that Plaintiff’s interpretation of Rule 15(c)(2) 

implicates the United States’ sovereign immunity, and the court must strictly construe 

any waiver by the United States of its sovereign immunity. As the Supreme Court 

proclaimed in United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111 (1979), “We should also have in 

mind that the [FTCA] waives the immunity of the United States and that in construing the 

statute of limitations, which is a condition of that waiver, we should not take it upon 

ourselves to extend the waiver beyond that which Congress intended.” Id. at 117–18; see 

also United States v. Nordic Vill. Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 34 (1992) (“[T]he traditional 

principle [is] that the Government’s consent to be sued must be construed strictly in favor 

of the sovereign, and not enlarged beyond what the language requires.” (internal 

quotations and alterations omitted)); Eno v. Jewell, 798 F.3d 1245, 1252 (9th Cir. 2015) 

(stating that the Ninth Circuit “strictly construe[s] waivers of sovereign immunity”).

 

(W.D.N.Y. June 5, 2014) (rejecting argument that service on the United States Attorney

was accomplished through the court’s electronic case filing system where the United 

States Attorney’s Office in the Western District of New York was a registered user and 

stating that an “initial pleading in a lawsuit cannot be served electronically and must be 

served in the manner specified by Rule 4”). 

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If the court were to find that an NEF constitutes mail or delivery of process—

something no other court appears to have done—it would broaden the scope of the 

relation back doctrine, which would broaden the FTCA’s limited waiver of sovereign 

immunity, which would run counter to Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit authority. The 

court therefore declines to take that step. Cf. Rio Properties, Inc. v. Rio Int'l Interlink, 

284 F.3d 1007, 1018 (9th Cir. 2002) (“leav[ing] it to the discretion of the district court to 

balance the limitations of email service against its benefits in any particular case” while 

noting that “except for the provisions recently introduced into Rule 5(b), email service is 

not available absent a Rule 4(f)(3) court decree”).

In sum, Plaintiff does not allege that she mailed or delivered process in compliance 

with Rule 15(c)(2) within the time permitted.

6

 Consequently, the FAC does not relate 

back to the original complaint, and the court must grant Defendants’ motion. Plaintiff’s 

claim against the United States is dismissed without prejudice. If Plaintiff can plausibly 

allege that she mailed or delivered process on either the United States Attorney or the 

Attorney General in accordance with Rule 15(c)(2) and the principles laid out in this 

order, she may filed a second amended complaint within fourteen days.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court grants Defendants’ motion. Plaintiff’s claim

against the Postal Service is dismissed with prejudice and without leave to amend. 

Plaintiff’s claim against the United States is dismissed with leave to amend. Plaintiff

may filed a second amended complaint within fourteen days of this order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 10, 2017 

JEFFREY T. MILLER

United States District Judge

 

6 Although Plaintiff served the original complaint on the Postal Service, that service does 

not satisfy Rule 15(c)(2) under Ninth Circuit precedent. See Williams v. United States, 

711 F.2d 893, 898 (9th Cir. 1983) (“However, we will not impute the knowledge of a 

government agency to the U.S. Attorney or the U.S. Attorney General.”).

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