Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-01242/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-01242-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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At the time of this Order, Defendants Preciado, Guterrez, Davis, and Scribner were not served.

- 1 - 08-cv-1242-H (JMA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHARLES JOHNSON,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 08cv1242-H (JMA)

ORDER DENYING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS and STRIKING

MONETARY RELIEF AGAINST

DEFENDANTS IN THEIR

OFFICIAL CAPACITIES

vs.

A. FIGUEROA, Corrections Officer; T.

DAVIS, Corrections Officer; SGT.

PRECIADO, Corrections Sergeant;

ORDUNA, Registered Nurse; D. BELL,

Correctional Counselor; L. GUTERREZ; G.

STRATTON, Corrections Captain; R.

DELGADO, Associate Warden; N.

GRANNIS, Chief of Inmate Appeals Branch;

and L. SCRIBNER, Warden of Calipatria

State Prison,

Defendants.

On July 11, 2008, Charles Johnson (“Plaintiff”), a California prisoner proceeding pro

se and in forma pauperis, filed an action against Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). (Doc. No. 1.) On January 2, 2009, Defendants1

 moved to dismiss the

complaint, alleging that Plaintiff failed to exhaust state administrative remedies prior to filing

in federal court and that Defendants are immune from liability under the Eleventh Amendment

to the Federal Constitution. (Doc. No. 15.) On December 1, 2008, Plaintiff filed an Opposition

to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. No. 20.) 

Case 3:08-cv-01242-DHB-JMA Document 26 Filed 07/07/09 Page 1 of 7
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- 2 - 08-cv-1242-H (JMA)

The Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation on April 13, 2009

recommending that this Court grant in part and deny in part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.

(Doc. No. 22.) Plaintiff filed his Objection to the Report and Recommendation on May 4, 2009.

(Doc. No. 23.) Plaintiff included supplemental documents in his Objection to address the

recommended dismissal of one of his claims.

For the reasons below, the Court ADOPTS in part the Magistrate Judge’s Report and

Recommendation, DENIES Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, and STRIKES all monetary

damages against Defendants in their official capacities.

Background

A. Civil Rights Allegations.

Plaintiff alleges that he is hemiplegic with paralysis in his right should, arm, and hand.

(Doc. No. 1 at 3.) As a result of his medical condition, a medical order was issued on

December 5, 2007 that required the use of waist chains rather than handcuffs to transport

Plaintiff to and from therapy appointments. (Doc. No. 1 at 4.) On several occasions between

late November 2007 and early January 2008, Defendants Figueroa and Davis refused to use

waist chains and demanded that Plaintiff submit to handcuffs before being transported to

therapy, even though Plaintiff informed Defendants of the medical order requiring waist chains.

(Doc. No. 1 at 3.) Plaintiff submitted to handcuffs to get to his therapy appointments, but they

had to be removed due to pain. (Doc. No. 1 at 3.) Plaintiff alleges that he sought assistance

from Defendant Preciado, a correctional sergeant, but Defendant Preciado sided with

Defendants Figueroa and Davis.

Plaintiff filed an administrative appeal seeking accommodation under the Americans

with Disabilities Act (ADA) by requiring prison staff to use waist chains instead of handcuffs.

(Doc. No. 1 at 4.) The appeal was granted in full at the first level of review on December 20,

2007. (Doc. No. 1 at 4.) Plaintiff alleges that prison officials retaliated against him after the

appeal was granted by refusing him medical care and by transferring him to Kern Valley State

Prison. (Doc. No. 1 at 4.) Moreover, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Bell, Stratton, Delgado,

Grannis, and Scribner failed to accommodate his ADA appeal by refusing him medical care.

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- 3 - 08-cv-1242-H (JMA)

(Doc. No. 1 at 3.)

Plaintiff seeks $75,000 in damages and an injunction preventing Defendants from

denying him medical treatment, including transportation to and from physical therapy, and

preventing Defendants from harassing, punishing, or retaliating against him. (Doc. No. 1 at 7.)

Discussion

A. Claim 1 and Exhaustion of State Remedies.

Plaintiff’s first claim against Defendants is failure to provide medical care. Defendants

move for dismissal because state administrative remedies are supposedly not exhausted. The

Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), states that “[n]o action shall be

brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law,

by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison or other correctional facility until such administrative

remedies as are available are exhausted.” Inmate suits about prison life, including specific

instances of alleged abuse, fall under PRLA and are subject to the exhaustion requirement.

Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). PRLA’s exhaustion requirement is mandatory so

as to provide state correctional facilities the opportunity to internally address any complaints

before judicial involvement. Porter, 534 U.S. at 524. Failure to exhaust available

administrative remedies prior to filing suit is properly remedied through dismissal without

prejudice. Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1120 (9th Cir. 2003); McKinney v. Carey, 311

F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir. 2002). Because the exhaustion requirement constitutes an

affirmative defense, a defendant bears the burden of raising the defense and proving the absence

of exhaustion. Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119.

When pursuing state administrative remedies, prisoners are only required under PRLA

to exhaust those remedies that are readily available. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 736

(2001). If a remedy is no longer available, a prisoner does not need to pursue that

administrative course any longer. Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 935-36 (9th Cir. 2005). The

Ninth Circuit in Valoff noted that a prisoner “need not press on to exhaust further levels of

review once he has either received all ‘available’ remedies at an intermediate level of review

of been reliable informed by an administrator that no remedies are available.” 422 F.3d at 935.

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- 4 - 08-cv-1242-H (JMA)

Valoff further stated that an inmate might want to appeal every issue to the highest level to

avoid an exhaustion issue, but that “over-exhaustion” is not required once relief is no longer

“available.” 422 F.3d at 935. Other circuits are in accord with this approach. See Ross v.

County of Bernalillo, 365 F.3d 1181, 1187 (10th Cir. 2004) (noting that once a prisoner has

received all available relief under administrative procedures the administrative relief has been

exhausted); Abney v. McGinnis, 380 F.3d 663 (2d Cir. 2004) (observing that further exhaustion

attempts are unnecessary when if there no possibility of some relief).

Under California law, prisoners may appeal any departmental action, decision, condition,

or policy that is perceived to adversely affect an individual’s welfare, Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15,

§ 3084.1(a), or may appeal misconduct by correctional officials or officers, Cal. Code Regs. tit.

15, § 3084.1(e). The administrative process has several levels of appeal: (1) informal

resolution; (2) written appeal on Inmate Appeal Form 602; (3) subsequent appeal to the

institution’s head; and (4) final level of appeal to the Director of the California Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation. See Barry v. Ratelle, 985 F. Supp. 1235, 1237 (S.D. Cal. 1997).

The final level of appeal to the Department of Corrections Director is not further appealable,

and therefore state administrative remedies are exhausted at this point. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15,

§§ 3084.1(a) and 3084.5(e)(2).

Defendants have not carried their burden to show that Plaintiff failed to exhaust state

administrative processes. Defendants acknowledge that Plaintiff’s ADA appeal was granted

at the first level of review (Doc. No. 15 at 8; Declaration of D. Edwards at ¶8(a)), but

Defendants proceed to argue that even though Plaintiff’s appeal was granted at the first level,

Plaintiff still had an obligation to seek further review at the second or third level. (Doc. No. 15

at 8.) Defendant’s contention lacks merit. Valoff noted that a prisoner “need not press on to

exhaust further levels of review once he has either received all ‘available’ remedies at an

intermediate level of review of been reliable informed by an administrator that no remedies are

available.” 422 F.3d at 935. 

Plaintiff filed an appeal regarding his first claim for inadequate medical care, and the

appeal was granted in full at the first level of review. (Declaration of D. Edwards at ¶8(a)).

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- 5 - 08-cv-1242-H (JMA)

Defendants cannot show absence of exhaustion unless some relief remains available to the

Plaintiff at unexhausted levels of the grievance process. Valoff, 422 F.3d at 936-37. All relief

sought in the present appeal was granted, and therefore there was no further remedy or relief

that Plaintiff could have sought on a second or third level appeal. See Valoff, 422 F.3d at 935.

This is further supported by the Declaration of T. Emigh, Assistant Chief of the Inmate Appeals

Branch, which states, “A disability appeal is not necessarily rejected and screened-out because

a CDC-1824 has been deemed (granted) at the first level of review. If the inmate can

demonstrate that the alleged grant does not fully resolve the issues raised, the matter can be

further appealed.” (Dec. of Emigh at 5.) Defendants’ declarations indicate that a complaint can

be further appealed if the inmate can show that the granted relief does not entirely resolve the

issues raised, but in this case the first-level review granted everything that Plaintiff sought. This

result comports with the policy behind the PRLA, which is to allow state administrative

agencies the opportunity to internally correct errors before litigation proceeds in federal court.

Porter, 534 U.S. at 524. Plaintiff filed an internal appeal in this case, and the prison

acknowledged and corrected the error at the first level of review, thus removing any need for

further internal review. 

Defendants’ further argue that the appeal letter indicating that the appeal had been

granted contained language indicating that Plaintiff could appeal the issue to a second level of

review if desired. (Doc. No. 15, App. B.) Since Plaintiff received relief at the first level of

review, there was no need or desire to appeal to higher levels of review.

Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Claim 1 due to

unexhausted state administrative remedies.

B. Claim 2 and Exhaustion of State Remedies.

Plaintiff’s second claim against Defendants is that they retaliated against Plaintiff for

filing his medical appeal by transferring him to another prison. (Doc. No. 1 at 3.) Defendants

move to dismiss based on failure to exhaust state administrative remedies. (Doc. No. 15 at 8-9.)

The Magistrate Judge recommended dismissal because the record at the time the Report and

Recommendation was issued showed that Plaintiff had failed to file an appeal regarding his

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2

In his administrative appeal, Plaintiff requested that his current medical status be rescinded

and that his transfer be reconsidered based on current medical evaluation forms. (Doc. No. 23, App.

A at 6.)

- 6 - 08-cv-1242-H (JMA)

retaliation claim through the prison grievance system. (Doc. No. 22 at 7-8.) Plaintiff in his

Objection provided further documentation in support of his contention that he had properly

exhausted the retaliation claim, but the Magistrate Judge did not have this information available.

(Doc. No. 23.)

Plaintiff’s Objection demonstrates that he exhausted his state administrative remedies

for this retaliation claim. Plaintiff filed a CDC-1824 Form on February 16, 2008 that was

formally received on February 21, 2008 and assigned log number CAL-I-08-00280. (Doc. No.

23, App. A at 1-2.) Defendants’ records confirm that this appeal was received. (Doc. No. 15,

Declaration of D. Edwards, App. C.) Plaintiff included his CDC-1845 and CDC-7410 medical

forms with the appeal. (Doc. No. 23, App. A at 3-4.) Plaintiff’s complaint was resolved at the

second level on March 13, 2008 when the appeal was granted.2

 (Doc. No. 23, App. A at 6; Doc.

No. 15, Declaration of D. Edwards, App. C.) On May 8, 2008, the Inmate Appeals Branch

screened-out Plaintiff’s appeal from the third level of review because the appeal form should

have been completed through the second level of review prior to a being submitted for a thirdlevel review. (Doc. No. 23, App. A at 8.)

Valoff noted that a prisoner “need not press on to exhaust further levels of review once

he has either received all ‘available’ remedies at an intermediate level of review of been reliable

informed by an administrator that no remedies are available.” 422 F.3d at 935. Plaintiff filed

his transfer complaint, which was answered at the second level of review. Plaintiff’s third-level

appeal was later screened-out. Plaintiff has shown that he went through the state administrative

process to have his complaint addressed, and that the state did address his retaliation complaint

through its internal processes.

Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the retaliation claim.

///

///

///

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B. Eleventh Amendment Immunity.

Defendants contend that they are immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment to

the Federal Constitution. (Doc. No. 15 at 4-6.) Suits against officials acting in their official

capacity are essentially suits against the state, and therefore monetary damages sought against

an official acting in his official capacity are barred by immunity. Will v. Michigan Dept. Of

State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). The Eleventh Amendment, however, allows civil actions

seeking injunctive relief against state officials, and actions seeking monetary damages from an

official in his personal capacity. Will, 491 U.S. at 71; Romano v. Bible, 169 F.3d 1182, 1186

(9th Cir. 1999). (Doc. No. 1 at 1-3; Doc. No. 20 at 4-5.) Accordingly, the Court strikes any

request for monetary damages against Defendants in their official capacities. The Court notes,

however, that Plaintiff is suing all Defendants in their official and personal capacities, and that

Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief. Damages sought in their personal capacities and injunctive

relief remain available.

Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the Court ADOPTS in part the Magistrate Judge’s Report

and Recommendation, the Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, and the Court

STRIKES any monetary damages against Defendants in their official capacities.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 7, 2009

_______________________________

MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

COPIES TO:

All parties of record.

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