Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-00678/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-00678-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NORMAN RAMIL,

Petitioner,

 vs.

D.L. RUNNELS, Warden,

Respondent. 

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No C 04- 0678 JSW (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

INTRODUCTION

Norman Ramil, a prisoner of the State of California, has filed a pro se

petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Per order filed

on June 23, 2004, this Court found that the petition, liberally construed, stated

three cognizable claims under § 2254 and ordered respondent to show cause.

Respondent filed an answer on October 21, 2004. Petitioner filed a traverse to

the answer on June 29, 2005. This order denies the petition for writ of habeas

corpus on the merits.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The following facts are not contested by the parties: on March 16, 2000, a

Santa Clara County jury found Petitioner guilty of attempted grand theft. The

trial court found that Petitioner had sustained three convictions that qualified as

“strikes” under Cal. Penal Code § 667(b)-(I), and that he served a prior prison

term within the meaning of Cal. Penal Code § 667.5(b). On June 19, 2000, the

court sentenced Petitioner to a term of incarceration of twenty-five years to life

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and ordered Petitioner to pay $1,000 in attorney’s fees. 

On November 21, 2002, the California Court of Appeal, First District,

modified Petitioner’s judgment by deleting the attorney’s fee order, but otherwise

affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Court of California denied a petition for

review in 2003. Petitioner filed the instant matter on February 18, 2004.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

The facts, derived from the California Court of Appeal opinion, are

summarized as follows:

Grainger is an industrial wholesale supply company that

does not sell to the general public but only to businesses. One of

Grainger’s regular customers is Therma, an industrial construction

company that primarily installs plumbing and ducting. At 1:30

p.m. on June 4, 1999, a Grainger employee received a telephone

call from a man who claimed to work for Therma. When the

Grainger employee asked the man to spell his last name, the man

“stumbled” and hesitated before giving the name Brad Garrett. The

man ordered a number of items not normally purchased by Therma

in quantities of two. The man provided a purchase order number

so that the order could be billed [to] Therma, but the number was

inconsistent with the purchase order numbers that Therma usually

used. The total cost of the items ordered was $ 990.36. 

After the Grainger employee told the man that these items

would have to be picked up at Grainger’s San Jose facility, rather

than at its Mountain View facility, she could hear the man

discussing this with another man in the background. The phone

call took 15 to 20 minutes, which was unusually long for a Therma

order. The Grainger employee told the man that the order would

be ready for pickup in San Jose in 30 minutes.

After she completed her conversation with the man, she

contacted Therma to determine whether the order was legitimate. 

Therma confirmed that the order was not legitimate and asked the

Grainger employee to arrange for the police to be contacted when

the man came to pick up the order. The Grainger employee

contacted Tim Collins, the manager of Grainger’s San Jose facility,

gave him this information and electronically transmitted the order

to him. Collins also confirmed with Therma that the order was

fraudulent. He took the order and placed it in his office so that the

order could not be processed.

At about 3:30 p.m., Petitioner and John Gogue Rodriguez

entered Grainger’s San Jose facility. Petitioner approached

Stephen Leon, a Grainger employee, at the will-call counter. 

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Petitioner said he was from Therma, was there to pick up an order

and provided a purchase order number that matched the order that

Collins had placed in his office. Leon testified that Petitioner did

not show him a piece of paper. Leon went looking for the order

and could not find it. He radioed in search of the order, and

Collins responded to Leon, told him to stall Petitioner and called

the police. Leon apologized for the delay and told Petitioner the

order would be ready soon. Petitioner checked back with Leon

three or four times over the next half hour, and Leon continued to

stall him. Collins also came out once, apologized to Petitioner for

the delay and promised to get the order ready. After waiting for

half an hour, Petitioner and Rodriguez left.

Petitioner and Rodriguez got into a pickup truck, and

Petitioner drove across the street and parked in another parking lot. 

He then drove away but returned a few moments later and parked

in a different parking lot. Soon after that, at about 4:20 p.m., the

police arrived, and Petitioner quickly drove out of that parking lot. 

Collins pointed the truck out to the police, and the police pursued

the truck as it travelled “at a high rate of speed” for about a mile

before it pulled over. During this pursuit, Petitioner seemed to be

“going right around in a circle” and trying to evade the police.

Petitioner did not work for Therma and was not authorized

to purchase anything from Grainger on Therma’s behalf. A

handwritten note was found in his pocket after his arrest. It

contained the purchase order number, a list of the items that had

been ordered and a note addressed to “John” about how the 

merchandise would be split

Petitioner was charged by information with attempted grand

theft (Pen. Code, § 484, 487, subd. (a), 664). The crime was

alleged as an “attempt to unlawfully take personal property,

miscellaneous tools and property, . . . the property of Grainger

Distributors.” It was further alleged that defendant had suffered

three prior serious felony convictions within the meaning of Penal

Code sections 667, subdivisions (b) to (I) and 1170.12 and served a

prison term for a prior felony conviction (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd.

(b)). The prior conviction and prison prior allegations were

bifurcated, and Petitioner waived his right to a jury trial on these

allegations.

Petitioner testified at trial. He stated that he did not know

there was anything illegitimate about the order, and he denied that

he had any intent to steal anything from Grainger at any time. He

testified that he had believed that Rodriguez had prepaid for the

tools. He gave a fairly detailed description of the events that

differed from the testimony given by the prosecution’s witnesses. 

Petitioner stated that he had known Rodriguez for a few months

and that Rodriguez telephoned him on June 4 and asked him for a

ride to Grainger to pick up some tools for his company. He agreed

and Rodriguez arrived at his house around 2:30 p.m. or 3:30 p.m. 

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Rodriguez told him that he would give him $ 40 to pick up the

tools with him and take the tools to “his job site” in Milpitas. 

Petitioner testified that Rodriguez claimed he was working for

Therma on a landscaping job.

When they arrived at Grainger and got out of the truck,

Rodriguez asked him to pick up the order for him because he had

been “drinking all night” and “was tired.” Rodriguez gave him a

piece of paper with the purchase order number on it and told him to

ask for that order. Petitioner testified that he did not read the piece

of paper and had no idea what kind of tools they were going to pick

up. They both entered the facility, and he went up to the counter

alone. He told Leon that he “was there for a friend to pick up some

tools.” When Leon asked what company the order was for,

defendant “told him Therma, because that’s what [Rodriguez] said

he worked for.” Petitioner testified that he showed Leon the piece

of paper with the purchase order number on it. After he and

Rodriguez had waited for a while for the order, he “decided I didn’t

have all day to wait for the tools,” and they left. He decided to

leave Grainger without the tools because he was “tired,” did not

“like to sit in one place too long doing nothing” and did not think it

was worth earning $ 40 if he was not “enjoying myself.”

He and Rodriguez got back in the truck, and he drove back

to his house. Rodriguez made a phone call, and Petitioner went

into the house and got himself a drink of water. Rodriguez told

him that his boss said the order was now ready and waiting, and

they should return to Grainger and pick it up. Petitioner drove

back toward Grainger, but Rodriguez asked him to park across the

street from Grainger “and wait for awhile.” He became impatient

and started to drive away, but Rodriguez convinced him to park in

another parking lot and wait a bit longer. Another five minutes

elapsed, and he “decided to leave because something wasn’t right.” 

When he suggested leaving, Rodriguez said “Okay, nevermind.

Let’s just go.” On the way back to his house, they were detained

by the police.

The sole dispute at trial was whether Petitioner harbored the

requisite intent. Defense counsel argued to the jury that Petitioner

was “not the swiftest fox in the woods.” The jury returned a guilty

verdict. The court found true the prior conviction and prison prior

allegations. The court refused to strike any of the prior conviction

findings or to reduce the offense to a misdemeanor, but struck the

punishment for the prison prior and imposed a state prison sentence

of 25 years to life. 

People v. Ramil, No. H021716, slip op. 2-10 (Cal. Ct. App. November 21, 2002)

(footnotes omitted).

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STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “in behalf

of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court only on the

ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). A district court may grant a petition

challenging a state conviction or sentence on the basis of a claim that was

“adjudicated on the merits” in state court only if the state court’s adjudication of

the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if

a state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme

Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than the

Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). “Under the ‘unreasonable application’

clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if a state court identifies the

correct governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions but

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Williams,

529 U.S. at 413. As summarized by the Ninth Circuit: “A state court’s decision

can involve an ‘unreasonable application’ of federal law if it either 1) correctly

identifies the governing rule but then applies it to a new set of facts in a way that

is objectively unreasonable, or 2) extends or fails to extend a clearly established

legal principle to a new context in a way that is objectively unreasonable.” Van

Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1150 (9th Cir. 2000) overruled on other

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grounds; Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-73 (2003) (citing Williams, 529

U.S. at 405-07). 

“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision

applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that

application must also be unreasonable.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 411; accord

Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 436 (2004) (per curiam) (challenge to state

court’s application of governing federal law must not only be erroneous, but

objectively unreasonable); Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002) (per

curiam) (“unreasonable” application of law is not equivalent to “incorrect”

application of law). In deciding whether a state court’s decision is contrary to, or

an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, a federal court

looks to the decision of the highest state court to address the merits of the

Petitioner’s claim in a reasoned decision. LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663,

669 n.7 (9th Cir. 2000). Where the state court gives no reasoned explanation of

its decision on a Petitioner’s federal claim and there is no reasoned lower court

decision on the claim, a federal habeas court should conduct an independent

review of the record. See Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir.

2003). 

The only definitive source of clearly established federal law under 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is in the holdings of the Supreme Court as of the time of the

state court decision. Williams 529 U.S. at 412; Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062,

1069 (9th Cir. 2003). While the circuit law may be “persuasive authority” for

the purposes of determining whether a state court decision is an unreasonable

application of Supreme Court precedent, only the Supreme Court’s holdings are

binding on the state courts and only those holdings need be “reasonably” applied. 

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Id.

In his petition for writ of habeas corpus, Petitioner asserts three claims:

(1) the trial court denied Petitioner his due process rights because there was

insufficient evidence of theft by larceny and the jury was not instructed regarding

theft by false pretenses; (2) the trial court’s refusal to grant a two day

continuance to allow a key defense witness to testify violated Petitioner’s right to

due process; and (3) the trial court’s refusal to admit this witness’ statements

against penal interest deprived Petitioner of due process. 

DISCUSSION

1. Insufficient Evidence and Instructional Error

Petitioner alleges that he was denied his right to due process because there

was insufficient evidence of the elements of theft by larceny to sustain his

conviction. As discussed by the Court of Appeal denying Petitioner’s claim

under California law, the offense of theft by larceny is committed by every

person who (1) takes possession (2) of personal property (3) owned or possessed

by another, (4) by means of trespass and (5) with intent to steal the property and

(6) carries the property away. See People v. Davis, 19 Cal.4th 301, 305 (1998). 

Petitioner contends that the evidence in this case was insufficient to prove

that the property was obtained by means of trespass. Petitioner argues that

under California law, a trespass does not exist when the owner “freely and

unconditionally” consents to the taking of his property. Id. Petitioner argues that

because Grainger would have freely and unconditionally consented to giving its

property to him, proof of the element of trespass was not present in this theft.

Petitioner asserts that the only offense of which he was arguably guilty

was theft by false pretenses. The crime of theft by false pretenses consists of

three elements: (1) the making of a false pretense or representation by the

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defendant, (2) the intent to defraud the owner of his property, and (3) actual

reliance by the owner upon the false pretense in parting with his property. Perry

v. Superior Court, 57 Cal.2d 276, 283 (1962); People v. Ashley, 42 Cal.2d 246,

259 (1954). According to Petitioner, his conviction is unconstitutional because

the evidence showed only guilt of larceny by false pretenses, the trial court failed

to instruct the jury on the elements of that crime, and there was insufficient

evidence of theft by larceny. 

The California Court of Appeal rejected Petitioner’s argument, noting that

Petitioner was charged with and convicted of attempted theft, not

theft by larceny. Consequently, the state had to prove defendant possessed a

specific intent to commit theft by larceny and did a direct, unequivocal act

toward that end. See People v. Camodeca, 52 Cal.2d 142, 145 (1959). Relying

on California law, the state court found that the evidence established that

Petitioner had the specific intent to obtain the Grainger merchandise by “means

of trespass.” The court explained that under California law, “the act of taking

personal property from the possession of another is always a trespass unless the

owner consents to the taking freely and unconditionally or the taker has a legal

right to take the property.” Davis, 19 Cal.4th at 307 (emphasis added). 

The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt because defendant had the specific intent to obtain the

merchandise by “means of trespass” in that Petitioner intended to obtain the

merchandise from Grainger by obtaining their “conditional release of the

merchandise pending payment by Therma”:

The evidence demonstrated that defendant was well aware that he

did not have the legal right to take the Grainger merchandise. The jury

clearly rejected his testimony that he believed that Rodriguez had the right

to take the merchandise. Substantial evidence also established that

defendant did not believe that Grainger would freely and unconditionally

consent to his taking of the merchandise. The prosecution proved that

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defendant’s planned theft involved Grainger parting with the merchandise

on the condition that Therma pay Grainger for the merchandise. His

scheme could not succeed in the absence of this condition. Hence,

defendant acted with the intent to obtain the merchandise from Grainger

by means of a trespass, that is, Grainger’s conditional release of the

merchandise pending payment by Therma. While, unbeknownst to

defendant, Grainger and Therma were cooperating to snare him, that fact

was irrelevant because the sole issue regarding trespass in a prosecution

for attempted theft is the perpetrator’s state of mind. Substantial evidence

supports the jury’s verdict.

Ramil, slip op. 11-12. 

In California, the common law crimes of larceny, embezzlement,

obtaining money by false pretenses and kindred offenses have been consolidated

by the provisions of Cal Pen Code § 484. See Callan v. Superior Court of San

Mateo County, 204 Cal App 2d 652 (1962). Under Cal Pen Code § 484, there is

simply one consolidated crime of theft. Id. The jury may therefore enter a

verdict of guilty upon any theory of theft, as long as there sufficient evidence of

an unlawful taking. People v. Counts, 31 Cal App 4th 785, 793 (1995). 

A. Legal Standard

A state prisoner who alleges that the evidence in support of his conviction

cannot fairly be characterized as sufficient to have led a rational trier of fact to

find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt states a constitutional claim, which, if

proven, entitles him to federal habeas relief. Jackson v Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,

321 (1979). A federal court reviewing collaterally a state court conviction does

not determine whether it is satisfied that the evidence established guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt. Payne v Borg, 982 F.2d 335, 338 (9th Cir 1992). 

The federal court “determines only whether, after viewing the evidence in

the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have

found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.

(quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). If confronted by a record that supports

conflicting inferences, a federal habeas court “must presume -- even if it does not

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affirmatively appear on the record -- that the trier of fact resolved any such

conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.” Jackson,

443 U.S. at 326. Only if no rational trier of fact could have found proof beyond

a reasonable doubt may a writ of habeas corpus be granted. Jackson, 443 U.S. at

324.

A writ of habeas corpus is available under § 2254(a) "only on the basis of

some transgression of federal law binding on the state courts." Middleton v.

Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107,

119 (1982)), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1021 (1986). It is unavailable for violations

of state law or for alleged error in the interpretation or application of state law. 

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); Engle, 456 U.S. at 119; Peltier v.

Wright, 15 F.3d 860, 861-62 (9th Cir. 1994); see, e.g., Little v. Crawford, 449

F.3d 1075, 1082 (9th Cir. 2006) (claim that state supreme court misapplied state

law or departed from its earlier decisions does not provide a ground for habeas

relief).

A state trial court's refusal to give an instruction does not alone raise a

ground cognizable in a federal habeas corpus proceedings. See Dunckhurst v.

Deeds, 859 F.2d 110, 114 (9th Cir. 1988). The error must so infect the trial that

the defendant was deprived of the fair trial guaranteed by the Fourteenth

Amendment. See id. Whether a constitutional violation has occurred will

depend upon the evidence in the case and the overall instructions given to the

jury. See Duckett v. Godinez, 67 F.3d 734, 745 (9th Cir. 1995). 

The omission of an instruction is less likely to be prejudicial than a

misstatement of the law. See Walker v. Endell, 850 F.2d at 475-76 (citing

Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 155 (1977)). Thus, a habeas petitioner whose

claim involves a failure to give a particular instruction bears an "'especially

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heavy burden.'" Villafuerte v. Stewart, 111 F.3d 616, 624 (9th Cir. 1997)

(quoting Henderson, 431 U.S. 145, 155). Additionally, the instruction may not

be judged in artificial isolation, but must be considered in the context of the

instructions as a whole and the trial record. Id. Even if it is determined that the

instruction violated the Petitioner’s right to due process, a petitioner can only

obtain relief if the unconstitutional instruction had a substantial influence on the

conviction and thereby resulted in actual prejudice under Brecht, 507 U.S. at

637. 

B. Analysis

The California Court of Appeal’s rejection of Petitioner’s claim was not

contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See

Williams, 529 U.S. at 411. The question before this Court is whether the state

court’s finding that there was sufficient evidence proving Petitioner attempted to

commit an unlawful taking by trespass was contrary to, or an unreasonable

interpretation of, established federal law. In this case, the evidence establishes

that Petitioner committed an attempted theft by larceny. Sufficient evidence

supports the state court’s determination that Petitioner committed a trespass by

his intention to take possession of the merchandise owned by Grainger based on

their conditional release pending payment by Therma. Ramil, slip op. 11-12. It

cannot be said that the state court’s decision constitutes an unreasonable

interpretation of Jackson. Based on the evidence here, a reasonable jury could

convict Petitioner beyond a reasonable doubt of attempted theft by larceny. See

Borg, 982 F.2d at 338.

To the extent that Petitioner argues that the state courts incorrectly defined

trespass to include a taking under these circumstances, Petitioner does not state a

federal constitutional claim, but rather takes issue with the state court’s

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interpretation of state law. See, Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68; Little, 449 F.3d at

1082.

Petitioner’s challenge to the court’s instructions on attempted theft is also

without merit. Rather than instruct on another form of larceny, the court

instructed the jury on all the elements of attempted grand theft by larceny. 

Ramil, slip op. at 13. Petitioner does not allege that when the trial court did so it

inadequately defined the elements of grand theft by larceny. Rather, Petitioner’s

only challenges the court’s failure to also instruct on theft by false pretenses. But

as discussed above, there was substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdict of

guilt on the charge of attempted grand theft by larceny. Accordingly, it cannot

be said that the trial court’s failure to provide the false pretenses instruction

violated the Petitioner’s right to due process, much less resulted in actual

prejudice under Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. See Duckett, 67 F.3d at 745. 

2. Denial of Continuance

Petitioner argues that the trial court’s refusal to grant him a two-day

continuance in order to obtain the attendance of a defense witness Rodriguez

violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. Before trial, defense

counsel was granted a continuance on two separate occasions for the purpose of

serving Rodriguez with a subpoena. On March 3, 2000, just days before trial

commenced, Rodriguez was finally served with the subpoena. Ramil, slip op.

14-15.

During in limine motions, the prosecutor noted that, if Rodriguez testified,

he would introduce evidence of Rodriguez’s perpetration of another theft from

Grainger on June 3, 1999 to impeach Rodriguez’s credibility. The prosecutor

asserted that he could show that Petitioner was implicated in that earlier theft. 

The court ruled that if Rodriguez testified, the prosecution could introduce

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evidence of the June 3 incident in rebuttal. Id.

On March 13, 2000, with the prosecution’s case coming to a close,

defense counsel informed the court that Rodriguez “is failing to appear” on the

subpoena. Ramil, slip op. at 15. Defense counsel explained that Rodriguez had

called him after he was served with the subpoena and asked if there was any way

he could avoid appearing because he was about to start a new job. Id. Defense

counsel stated that Rodriguez agreed to be available within 12 hours upon notice

by telephone. Defense counsel said that he had telephoned Rodriguez repeatedly

and left three messages on an answering machine, but Rodriguez had not

contacted him. Defense counsel stated that he did not anticipate hearing from

him. Ramil, slip op. at 16. 

On the morning of March 14, Rodriguez did not appear. Id. Outside the

presence of the jury, the court offered to issue a body attachment for Rodriguez. 

Defense counsel accepted the offer. Ramil, slip op. at 17. He also requested the

court continue the trial until the morning of March 16. The court denied the

request. Id.

On the morning of March 15, defense counsel again requested a

continuance of the trial, this time requesting the trial to continue until the

morning of March 17. Id. Defense counsel informed the court that Rodriguez

had contacted the defense investigator at 8:00 p.m. on March 14. Id. Rodriguez

told the investigator that he had started a new job which required him to leave

town, and that he would not be available to testify until March 17. Id. The court

denied the continuance request, reasoning that there was no assurance that if the

court granted the continuance witness Rodriguez would appear. Ramil, slip op.

at 18. 

Rodriguez appeared and testified at Petitioner’s June 2000 sentencing

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hearing. He testified that he could not remember much about the June 1999

incident. He admitted that he knew Petitioner because they “did meth together.” 

Id. At one point, Rodriguez asked the court if he was obligated to answer the

prosecutor’s questions, and requested an attorney. The court directed him to

answer the prosecutor’s questions, noting that he had already been sentenced for

his participation in the June 1999 incident. Ramil, slip op. at 18-19.

On appeal, the state appellate court concluded that the trial court did not

abuse its discretion in denying Petitioner a continuance in order to obtain the

attendance of witness Rodriguez. The court reasoned as follows:

The trial court’s denial of defendant’s continuance motion

was based on its assessment that it was not reasonably likely that

Rodriguez would appear on March 17. The court’s ruling is

supported by the record. It was obviously time consuming just to

locate and serve Rodriguez in the first place. He was immediately

unwilling to submit to the subpoena and sought to avoid appearing

on March 6. Having agreed just a week earlier to appear within 12

hours upon telephonic notice, he ignored repeated telephone

messages over a period of more than 48 hours demanding his

appearance. After a body attachment warrant issued, he still

declined to appear as requested. Instead, as he had earlier, he

asked that his appearance be delayed. The trial court reached a

reasonable conclusion based on this history that it was unlikely that

Rodriguez would appear on March 17 and therefore that a

continuance was not merited. Since the record supports its

conclusion, and the unlikelihood of Rodriguez’s appearance

justifies the denial of the continuance motion, the trial court did not

abuse its discretion. Similarly, since the trial court’s decision was

not arbitrary but eminently reasonable, it did not violate

defendant’s federal constitutional right to due process.

Ramil, slip op. 20-21.

A. Legal Standard

The Supreme Court of the United States has noted that there are no

specific tests for deciding when a denial of a continuance is so arbitrary as to

violate due process. Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 (1964). The Court has

stated, however, that in deciding whether to grant a continuance, the trial judge

must be afforded broad discretion, Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1983);

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Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940), and that the trial court’s “answer

must be found in the circumstances present in every case, particularly in the

reasons present to the trial judge at the time the request is denied.” Sarafite, 376

U.S. at 589. 

For denial of a continuance to form the basis of a petition for writ of

habeas corpus there must be not only an abuse of discretion, but any resulting

error must be "so arbitrary and fundamentally unfair that it violates constitutional

principles of due process." Bennett v. Scroggy, 793 F.2d 772, 774-75 (6th Cir.

1986) (citation omitted). Moreover, the improper denial of a requested

continuance warrants habeas relief only if there is a showing of actual prejudice

to petitioner's defense resulting from the trial court's refusal to grant a

continuance. See Gallego v. McDaniel, 124 F.3d 1065, 1072 (9th Cir. 1997);

Martel v. County of Los Angeles, 56 F.3d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc). 

B. Analysis

The California Court of Appeal’s rejection of Petitioner’s claim was not

contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. See

Williams, 529 U.S. at 411. The state courts found that it was unclear whether a

continuance would serve a useful purpose because Petitioner was unable to show

that Rodriguez could be obtained as a witness, even if the continuance was

granted. Rodriguez had attempted to avoid service. He ignored a subpoena

issued by defense counsel. He reneged on his agreement to cooperate and to

remain available on telephone stand-by. He neglected to return defense

counsel’s repeated phone messages. And he was unmotivated to appear even

after the trial court issued a body attachment warrant. Given Rodriguez’s history

of disregarding defense counsel’s requests and court orders to appear, the trial

court had reason to distrust Rodriguez’s statement to defense counsel that he

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would appear and to deny the motion to continue. On this record, it simply

cannot be said the trial court’s denial of the continuance was so arbitrary as to

violate due process. See Sarafite, 376 U.S. at 589. 

But even if the denial of the continuance amounted to constitutional error,

Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief because he has not established prejudice

from his failure to call Rodriguez as a trial witness. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623. 

Petitioner was able to present evidence of his defense that he lacked the requisite

intent to steal the merchandise through his own testimony (RT 375-376). Cf.

United States v. Pope, 841 F.2d 954, 958 (9th Cir. 1988) (denial of a continuance

violated due process where it prevented the defendant from introducing the only

testimony that could have supported his defense theory). As the Court of Appeal

noted, “[t]he jury clearly rejected his testimony that he believed Rodriguez had

the right to take the merchandise.” Ramil, slip op. 21. Petitioner is therefore not

entitled to relief on this claim.

3. Exclusion of Evidence

Petitioner argues that the trial court’s exclusion of Rodriguez’s out-ofcourt statements violates his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. 

After Rodriguez failed to appear, defense counsel sought to admit hearsay

statements Rodriguez made to the defense investigator. Rodriguez made the

statements over the course of two interviews, while serving a jail sentence for the

June 3, 1999 Grainger theft. Defense counsel asserted that the statements

qualified for admission under the declarations against penal interest exception. 

See Cal. Evid. Code § 1230.

The California Court of Appeal opinion discussing Rodriguez’s

statements to the defense investigator during the two interviews is as follows: 

Rodriguez stated that defendant “has done nothing wrong.” 

He also said “they felt they had not done anything wrong.” 

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Rodriguez’s description of the June 4 incident differed

significantly from both the prosecution’s trial evidence and

defendant’s trial testimony. 

Rodriguez described how he had been asked by “Pedro” on

June 3 to pick up an order from the San Jose Grainger facility. 

Rodriguez had met “Pedro” through “Brad” when Rodriguez was

seeking “under-the-table work.” Because Rodriguez did not have a

truck and a truck was needed to pick up the Grainger order,

Rodriguez asserted that he telephoned defendant, who he knew had

a truck, on the morning of June 4. He said he had not seen

defendant for three or four months prior to that date. Rodriguez

then went over to defendant’s house and asked him to take him to

Grainger to pick up a will-call order. Defendant agreed to do so. 

Rodriguez told defendant that defendant would be paid “under the

table money” for his assistance. He showed defendant a piece of

paper that had the purchase order number on it and some other

information. They left defendant’s house in his truck at about 2:00

p.m.

Rodriguez claimed that, when they arrived at Grainger, both

of them went to the counter to pick up the order. He did not claim

that he gave the piece of paper with the purchase order number on

it to defendant, but he “guessed” that defendant somehow “had”

the piece of paper. He claimed that he told defendant to provide

the purchase order number and the name “Brad Garrett” to the

Grainger employee. After defendant and Rodriguez had both

waited at the counter for about 20 minutes, they went outside and

smoked a cigarette. Rodriguez claimed that he then spoke to

another Grainger employee and asked if they could return for the

order later if it was not yet ready. This employee said “fine.” 

Defendant and Rodriguez discussed how this “was maybe a bad

deal” because it was taking so long, and they left. Before they

reached defendant’s house, Rodriguez asked defendant to go back

to Grainger “to see if there were any cops or anything.” Defendant

agreed to do so. They parked across the street from Grainger “to

see if any cops were ‘going to roll up.’” Eventually they drove

away and were stopped by the police two miles away. During a

second interview on October 27, Rodriguez again attempted to

exculpate defendant, but Rodriguez made no statements

inculpating himself.

Ramil, slip op. at 23-26. The Court of Appeal began its review of Petitioner’s

claim by discussing the application of Cal. Evid. Code Section 1230. The court

stated, “[e]vidence of a statement by a declarant having sufficient knowledge of

the subject is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the declarant is

unavailable as a witness and the statement, when made, . . . so far subjected him

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to the risk of civil or criminal liability . . . that a reasonable man in his position

would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true.” Ramil, slip

op. at 26 (citing Evid. Code, § 1230). 

The court noted, however, that “a hearsay statement that is partially

inculpatory and partially exculpatory does not qualify for admission as a

statement against penal interest.” Ramil, slip op. at 26 (citing People v. Duarte,

24 Cal.4th 603, 610-611 (2000)). The court explained that “one of the most

effective ways to lie is to mix falsehood with truth, especially truth that seems

particularly persuasive because of its self-inculpatory nature.” Id. (citing

Williamson v. U.S. 512 U.S. 594, 599-600 (1994). 

Applying this reasoning, the court found that the trial court did not err in

excluding Rodriguez’s hearsay statements. The court stated that although

Rodriguez admitted to having an intent to “earn money under the table money,”

“to a large extent, Rodriguez’s statements appeared to be aimed at exculpating

both himself and defendant and shifting the blame to ‘Pedro” and ‘Brad.’” 

Ramil, slip op. at 27-28. The court conclude that “Rodriguez’s minimization of

his own role and his attempt to exculpate both defendant and himself did not lend

any trustworthiness to his statements and did not establish that the statements

were ‘so far’ against his penal interest that he would not have made them if they

were not true. Ramil, slip op. at 28. 

A. Legal Standard

A district court may not review collaterally a state court’s evidentiary

ruling unless it violates federal law, either by violating a specific constitutional

provision or by infringing upon the due process right to a fair trial. Pulley v.

Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984). The erroneous exclusion of critical,

corroborative defense evidence may violate both the Fifth Amendment due

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process right to a fair trial and the Sixth Amendment right to present a defense. 

See Depetris v. Kuykendall, 239 F.3d 1057, 1062 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing

Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973)). 

The exclusion of hearsay statements that are critical to the defense and

that bear “persuasive assurances of trustworthiness” may rise to the level of a due

process violation. See Chambers, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973); see also Chia v.

Cambra, 360 F.3d 997, 1003 (9th Cir. 2004); DePetris, 239 F.3d at 1062. A

court must ensure that the defendant has a full opportunity to defend himself

against the state’s accusations. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 294; Chia, 360 F.3d at

1003. That opportunity must not be frustrated by a mechanical application of

state evidentiary law. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302; Chia, 360 F.3d at 1006. The

state appellate court’s decision must be measured against these clearly

established principles of federal law.

In deciding whether the exclusion of the hearsay statements violates due

process under Chambers and its progeny, the Ninth Circuit balances the

following five factors: (1) the probative value of the excluded evidence on the

central issue; (2) its reliability; (3) whether it is capable of evaluation by the trier

of fact; (4) whether it is the sole evidence on the issue or merely cumulative; and

(5) whether it constitutes a major part of the attempted defense. Chia, 360 F.3d

at 1004. The court must also give due weight to the state interests underlying the

state evidentiary rules on which the exclusion was based. Chia, 360 F.3d at1006.

But even if exclusion of the evidence amounts to constitutional error, in

order to justify federal habeas relief, the erroneous exclusion must have had “a

substantial and injurious effect” on the verdict. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S.

619, 623 (1993). 

B. Analysis

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Analyzing Petitioner’s claim under the factors enumerated in Chia

establishes that the Court of Appeal’s decision was not an unreasonable

application of Supreme Court precedent. See Chia, 360 F.3d at 1004. While the

statements may have been capable of evaluation by the trier of fact, the

statements did not have significant probative value in Petitioner’s favor. See

Chia, 360 F.3d at 1004. Although Rodriguez’s statements corroborated his

defense that he lacked the specific intent to commit the offense, Rodriguez’s

statements conflicted with Petitioner’s testimony regarding his own actions

before and during the commission of the crime. Cf. id. (excluded hearsay

statements found to be probative because they were consistent with defendant’s

defense and would exonerate the defendant).

The excluded statements also lacked reliability. See id. Rodriguez’s

statements were not distinctly against his penal interests, but aimed to exculpate

himself and Petitioner. Cf. id. (hearsay statements were reliable because they

were self-inculpatory). Additionally, the circumstances in which Rodriguez

made the statements do not provide for considerable assurance of their

truthfulness. Rodriguez’s statements were largely exculpatory. Therefore, he

likely did not believe the statements could expose him to criminal liability.

The statements were not the sole evidence on the issue of Petitioner’s

intent at the time of the offense. See id. Petitioner testified at trial that he had no

idea that there was anything illegitimate about the transaction, and that he

believed Rodriguez had prepaid for the tools. Ramil, slip op. at 7; Cf. Chia, 360

F.3d at 1004 (the excluded hearsay statements were the best and only evidence

that defendant possessed to substantiate his claims).

The state had a substantial interest in excluding the statements. Chia, 360

F.3d at 1006. The trial court considered Rodriguez’s out-of-court statement in

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light of Cal. Evid. Code section 1230, and found that the statements did fall

under the exception and were inherently unreliable. The state has a substantial

interest in preserving orderly trials, judicial efficiency and in excluding

unreliable or prejudicial evidence. See Perry v. Rushen, 713 F.2d 1447 (9th Cir.

1983). 

A court could reasonably conclude that these factors outweighed those

that supported admission of the proffered evidence. It cannot be said that the

Court of Appeal’s decision was an “objectively unreasonable” application of

clearly established Federal law. See Taylor, 529 U.S. at 409.

Even if excluding Rodriguez’s statements was constitutional error, the

error was harmless. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. The exclusion of the evidence

did not result in actual prejudice. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. Rodriguez’s

statements conflicted with the videotape of the incident, all of the prosecution’s

witnesses’ testimony, Petitioner’s trial testimony and Rodriguez’s own prior

statements. In light of the overwhelming weight of evidence contradicting

Rodriguez’s statements, it cannot be said that the trial court’s exclusion had a

“substantial and injurious effect” on the verdict. See id. 

CONCLUSION

After a careful review of the record and pertinent law, the court is 

that the petition for writ of habeas corpus must be DENIED. The clerk shall

enter judgment in favor of respondent and close the file.

 IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 31, 2007

_______________________

JEFFREY S. WHITE

United States District Judge

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