Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01457/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01457-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOAQUIN MURRIETTA MARTINEZ,

Petitioner,

vs.

JEFFREY BEARD, Secretary,

Defendant.

Case No.: 13-cv-1457-BTM (WVG)

FINAL REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED 

STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE ON 

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS 

CORPUS

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Joaquin Murrietta Martinez (“Petitioner”), a California state prisoner 

proceeding pro se, has filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging his first 

degree murder conviction entered in San Diego County Superior Court. The case has been 

referred to this Court pursuant to Civil Local Rule 72.1(d)(4) for prepared findings of fact 

and recommendation for disposition. For the reasons discussed below, the Court 

RECOMMENDS that the petition be DENIED in its entirety WITH PREJUDICE. 

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II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Trial

This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact and presumes them to be 

correct; a habeas petitioner may rebut the presumption of correctness, but only by clear and 

convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). The following facts are taken from the 

California Court of Appeal slip opinion denying Petitioner’s direct appeal:

Martinez, a homeless drug addict, accepted an invitation from Hardoy 

to move into a house she leased in Oceanside, where several other previously 

homeless drug addicts also resided. Martinez and Hardoy had a sexual 

relationship for a few months, but that ended when Lisa Brown moved into 

the house and Martinez began having sex with her. Over the next several 

months, various drug addicts moved in and out, the atmosphere became 

increasingly negative and hostile, and the premises degenerated into a 

flophouse for persons addicted to methamphetamine or heroin. 

The financial situation of those living at Hardoy’s house also gradually 

deteriorated. When Hardoy exhausted her inheritance and could no longer 

pay the rent or other bills, Martinez began robbing banks with Brown, Joseph 

Cooper and others living at the house to pay the household bills and support 

their drug habits. Hardoy knew about these bank robberies, and she 

periodically argued with Martinez and threatened to report them to the police. 

The last of these arguments was overhead by Yesenia Green, an 

acquaintance of Martinez. Martinez left the house with Green and her friend 

because of the argument. When Green and her friend drove Martinez back to 

Hardoy’s house a few hours later, Green’s friend said to Martinez, “Okay. 

We’ll be back.” Martinez responded, “Okay. But by the time you guys get 

back, the bitch will be dead.”

A few days later, Martinez and Brown met Cooper and others at a 

motel. Cooper told Martinez they needed to go back to Hardoy’s house to 

retrieve some things, but Martinez told Cooper they could not go to the house 

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because Hardoy’s corpse was there. Martinez also said he needed Cooper to 

help him dispose of the corpse, and Cooper agreed to do so. 

Martinez then drove Cooper and Brown back to Hardoy’s house. 

Cooper testified that on the way there, Brown told him Martinez had 

“poisoned” Hardoy, but when Hardoy did not die right away Martinez 

smothered her with a pillow. [FN 1: Martinez testified at trial that he “[did]n’t 

remember ever hearing” Brown say he smothered Hardoy with a pillow; he 

also denied killing Hardoy, but admitted injecting her with heroin. 

Toxicological tests performed on Hardoy’s remains revealed 

methamphetamine and morphine, a metabolite of heroin. The tests were 

negative for the anticoagulants contained in poisons commonly used for pest 

control.] Brown also said Martinez killed Hardoy because she was a “rat” who 

had threatened “to call the cops.” [FN 2: On cross-examination, Martinez 

admitted Hardoy had “threatened to call the cops on [him]” and described her 

as a “yapping chihuahua.” He also testified that if he ever encountered a 

“snitch” in prison, he would stab the “snitch” in the neck.] According to 

Cooper, as Brown related these facts Martinez “didn’t do anything. He kept 

driving. He just kind of nodd[ed] his head and was kind of pretty serious 

about getting what had to be done, done, which was getting rid of the body.” 

When Martinez, Brown and Cooper arrived at Hardoy’s house, they 

went to a bedroom where Hardoy’s corpse lay across the bed. Martinez 

testified he wanted to dismember Hardoy’s corpse so that it could not be 

identified and traced back to the bank robberies. He therefore “took out the 

dental records” by bashing the corpse’s face with a baseball bat and using a 

machete “to be sure that the teeth were all knocked [out].” To eliminate 

fingerprints and footprints, Martinez used the machete to chop off Hardoy’s 

hands, and Cooper used it to chop off her feet. Martinez wrapped the 

dismembered hands and feet in plastic bags and stuffed them into a backpack; 

he and Cooper wrapped the rest of the Hardoy’s corpse in blankets and stuffed 

it into a duffel bag. Martinez and Cooper discarded the duffel bag in a 

dumpster in Escondido. Brown discarded the backpack in a dumpster in Vista. 

While Cooper was testifying at trial, the prosecutor asked him what 

Brown had told him during the ride from the motel to Hardoy’s house about 

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how Hardoy died. Martinez’s counsel objected the question for called for 

hearsay. The trial court overruled the objection, and Cooper testified as stated 

[above].

 

After Cooper testified at trial, Martinez’s counsel advised the court that 

Brown was available to testify and that he intended to call her as a witness the 

following day. The court stated that it did not know why Brown had not been 

charged in the case and that she would need an attorney to advise her about

testifying because her testimony might expose her to criminal liability. The 

prosecutor advised the court that Brown had been charged with being an 

accessory after the fact and had served a prison sentence for conviction on that 

charge. The prosecutor also stated that in doing research for the case, he had 

learned that someone may be charged with both being an accessory after the 

fact and aiding and abetting a murder. Martinez’s counsel agreed to arrange 

for Brown to meet with an attorney and to appear in court the following day.

 

Brown appeared in court the next day and, to the recommendation of 

her attorney, asserted her Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination. Based on this assertion, the trial court ruled Brown could not 

be called as a witness and excused her. Brown and her counsel exited the 

courtroom.

 

The trial court then allowed Martinez’s counsel “to make a record 

regarding [Brown].” Counsel argued the People’s decision to charge Brown 

with being an accessory after the fact and her service of the sentence for that 

crime estopped the People from subsequently charging Brown with Hardoy’s 

murder. He also argued Brown was “a vital witness for the defense.” 

Martinez’s counsel stated that his “understanding from the reports and from 

speaking to [his] investigator” was that Brown’s testimony “would have been 

radically different from what [Cooper] said.” According to counsel, Brown 

would deny she told Cooper that Martinez “said he smothered the victim... 

[or] poisoned the victim or anything of the sort”; would “attack [Cooper’s] 

statements about her being present at the time that the body was chopped up”; 

and would testify that Cooper “is a great big fat liar.” [FN 3: In his opening 

brief, Martinez also asserts: “Brown would also have confirmed just who was 

driving the car that night: Martinez, as Cooper claimed, or Brown herself, as 

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Martinez claimed. To the degree Brown would have confirmed Martinez’s 

version, his credibility would have been bolstered and Cooper’s diminished.” 

Martinez, however, does not provide any record citation in support of this 

assertion. Our review of the record revealed that in his offer of proof, 

Martinez’s trial counsel made no mention of any expected testimony from 

Brown as to who was driving the car.] Counsel concluded by asserting that 

Brown had given three or four interviews in which “she didn’t change her 

story” and “would have been a solid witness for the defense.”

In response to the arguments of Martinez’s counsel, the trial court stated 

that in light of the testimony introduced at trial, Brown “could have absolutely 

been charged as aiding and abetting the death of [Hardoy].” The court also 

noted that Brown could face criminal liability if she had lied in any of her 

statements to the police, and that “there are also some potential federal 

charges.” The court stated it “was not comfortable putting [Brown] on the 

stand without getting counsel to advise her regarding any Fifth Amendment 

aspects of her testimony.”

The prosecutor also made some statements for the record. He reminded 

the court there is no limitations period for murder. He also stated: “And the 

People are not precluded... from charging the crime in which the proof is the 

strongest first”; Brown “remains a suspect in this murder”; and “it’s not over. 

We’re just looking for one additional [piece of] corroborative evidence and 

charges could be filed. I just don’t know. It depends on the state of the 

evidence.”

After the jury found him guilty, Martinez renewed and expanded his 

arguments concerning the need for Brown’s testimony in a motion for new 

trial. He argued the trial court “erred in the decision of [a] question of law 

arising during the course of the trial” when it excused Brown from testifying 

based on her assertion of her Fifth Amendment privilege. (§ 1181, subd. 5.) 

Martinez also asserted, without supporting factual or legal analysis, that the 

court “should have either ordered the [P]eople to grant [Brown] immunity or 

suggested the use of her hearsay statements in this case.” The People, of 

course, opposed the new trial motion; and the court denied it. 

(Doc. No. 22-22 at 2-7.)

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B. Direct Appeal

On August 4, 2011, Petitioner filed a direct appeal of his conviction in the California 

Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One. (Doc. No. 22-20.) Petitioner 

challenged his conviction on four grounds, each related to Brown’s unavailability as a 

witness. First, Petitioner argued that the trial court erred in permitting Brown to invoke 

the Fifth Amendment and refuse to testify. (Id.) Second, Petitioner argued that the 

prosecutor committed misconduct by threatening to charge Brown with murder but not 

granting her use immunity. (Id.) Third, Petitioner argued that the trial court should have 

granted Brown “judicial immunity.” (Id.) Finally, Petitioner argued that his trial counsel 

was ineffective for not seeking to admit the statements Brown made to a defense 

investigator under California Evidence Code Section 1202, an exception to the California 

hearsay rule. (Id.) The state appellate court affirmed Petitioner’s conviction in a fully 

reasoned opinion issued on September 6, 2012. (Doc. No. 22-22.) Petitioner filed his 

Petition for Review in the California Supreme Court on October 15, 2012. (Doc. No. 22-

23.) That court denied the Petition for Review in a summary decision issued on December 

19, 2012. (Doc. No. 22-24.)

C. Federal Habeas Corpus Petition

On June 24, 2013, Petitioner filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in federal 

court seeking relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. No. 1.) The District Court dismissed the 

Petition on July 8, 2013, for failure to satisfy the filing fee requirement, failure to name a 

proper respondent and failure to allege exhaustion of state court remedies. (Doc. No. 2.)

Petitioner filed his First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“FAP”) on August 

19, 2013. (Doc. No. 3.) Petitioner also filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis, which 

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the District Court granted. (Docs. No. 4 and 5). Respondent answered the FAP on 

December 27, 2013. (Doc. No. 21.) 

On January 2, 2014, this Court notified Petitioner that the FAP was subject to 

dismissal because it contained both exhausted and unexhausted claims. (Doc. No. 23.) 

Petitioner did not remedy this defect, and, on May 20, 2014, this Court issued a Report and 

Recommendation (“R&R”) which recommended that the FAP be dismissed without 

prejudice to Petitioner refiling an amended petition which contained only exhausted claims. 

(Doc. No. 33.) On August 19, 2014, Petitioner filed a Motion to Amend (“MTA”) asserting 

five additional claims and a Motion for Stay and Abeyance. (Docs. No. 37 and 39.) 

On October 16, 2014, the District Court issued an order declining to adopt the R&R.

(Doc. No. 40.) In its order, the District Court noted that this Court had not addressed 

Respondent’s contention that the unexhausted claims in the FAP should be denied with 

prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). (Id. at 3.) The District Court also noted that this 

Court had not addressed whether the claims not raised in state court should be considered 

technically exhausted because any further state filings would be procedurally barred. (Id.) 

On December 30, 2014, the District Court issued an Order granting Petitioner’s

MTA. To avoid delay, the District Court consolidated the FAP and the MTA and ordered 

that these two documents constituted the operative pleading in this action.1(Doc. No. 50 

at 2.) The Court denied Petitioner’s Motion for Stay and Abeyance as moot, finding that 

the claims not presented on direct appeal were technically exhausted and procedurally 

 

1 On February 17, 2015, Petitioner filed a Second Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, which, 

with the exception of the the cover sheet, was an exact duplicate of the MTA and did not add any new 

claims. (Doc. No. 55.) 

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defaulted due to Petitioner’s failure to present them to the state court in a timely manner. 

(Id.) 

On March 18, 2015, Respondent answered the claims asserted in the MTA. (Doc.

No. 60.) Petitioner did not file a traverse. 

IV. PETITIONER’S CONTENTIONS

Petitioner asserts eight grounds for relief. The first three grounds for relief were 

presented in the FAP. (Doc. No. 3.) The remaining five grounds for relief were asserted in 

the MTA. (Doc. No. 37.)

First, Petitioner claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek the 

admission of Brown’s statement to a defense investigator under California Code of 

Evidence section 1202. (Doc. No. 3 at 6.) Petitioner incorporates by reference, and relies 

entirely on, the first section of his argument in the Petition for Review filed in the California 

Supreme Court. (Doc. No. 22-23, at 14-33.)

Second, Petitioner claims that his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments 

were violated by the trial court’s failure to grant Brown immunity. (Doc. No. 3 at 7.) 

Petitioner incorporates by reference, and relies entirely on, the second section of his 

argument in the Petition for Review filed in the California Supreme Court. (Doc. No. 22-

23, at 34-38.)

Third, Petitioner claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by 

failing to make use of letters allegedly provided to counsel by Petitioner purportedly 

showing that “several people made false claims [or] recanted outright!” (Doc. No. 3 at 8-

9.) 

Fourth, Petitioner claims that his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were violated 

because the jury was shown a videotaped statement he made to the police and because he 

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was forced to take the stand at trial to respond to that statement. (Doc. No. 37, at 3-5.)

Fifth, Petitioner claims that his appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance by

failing to raise the Fifth and Sixth Amendment claims identified in Petitioner’s fourth 

ground for relief. (Id. at 6.)

Sixth, Petitioner argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek the 

admission of medical records documenting a stroke that Petitioner suffered at age eight. 

(Id. at 6.)

Seventh, Petitioner argues that statement he made to Homero Hernandez were

inadmissible hearsay and that their admission violated his rights under the Confrontation 

Clause of the Sixth Amendment. (Id. at 8.)

Eighth, Petitioner argues that his prosecution was arbitrary and discriminatory. (Id.

at 9.)

V. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub.L. No. 

104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996), applies to all habeas corpus petitions filed in federal court 

after April 24, 1996. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997). This Petition was filed 

after that date and so is governed by AEDPA. 

Under AEDPA, a federal court may grant relief to a state prisoner “only on the 

ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United 

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). A habeas petition will not be granted with respect to any 

claim “adjudicated on the merits” in state court unless that adjudication “(1) resulted in a 

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) 

resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light 

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of the evidence presented at the state court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A state court 

decision is “contrary to” federal law only “if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite 

to that reached by [the Supreme Court] on a question of law or if the state court decides a 

case differently than [the Supreme Court] has on a set of materially indistinguishable 

facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). A state court decision is an 

“unreasonable application” of federal law only if the state court identified the governing 

legal principles from Supreme Court decisions but unreasonably applied those principles 

to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. To warrant habeas relief, a state court’s 

decision must be more than merely erroneous or incorrect—it must be “objectively 

unreasonable.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003); Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 

694 (2002). 

When the state supreme court denies a prisoner’s claim in a summary opinion, the 

federal habeas court “looks through” to the last “reasoned decision” in state court denying 

the prisoner’s claim and evaluates that decision under the Section 2254(d) standards. 

Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S.Ct. 2269, 2276 (2015) (citing Johnson v. Williams, 133 S.Ct. 

1088, 1094, n. 1 (2013), and Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 806 (1991)). However, a 

state court need not cite Supreme Court precedent when resolving a habeas corpus claim 

and the failure of the state courts to explain why they have denied the prisoner relief does 

not extinguish the presumption that the state courts have adjudicated the claim on the 

merits. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99 (2011); Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). 

The only source of “clearly established federal law” under AEDPA is “the holdings, 

as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court’s] decisions as of the time of the relevant 

state-court decision.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. Circuit precedents may in some cases 

function as “persuasive authority,” but only “for purposes of determining whether a state 

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court decision is an ‘unreasonable application’” of clearly established Supreme Court law. 

Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600-01 (9th Cir. 1999). 

The prisoner has the burden of proving the facts underlying his claims by the 

preponderance of the evidence. Silva v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 825, 835 (9th Cir. 2002). 

VI. DISCUSSION

A. Ground One: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

The Court first considers Petitioner’s claim that his trial attorney was ineffective for

failing to seek the admission under California Code of Evidence section 1202 of Brown’s 

statement to a defense investigator. This ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”) claim 

was rejected by the California courts on direct appeal. To prevail on this claim, therefore, 

Petitioner must show that the California courts’ rejection of this claim was contrary to or 

an unreasonable application of the clearly established federal law as determined by the 

Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Early, 537 U.S. at 7-8.

As an initial matter, this Court finds that Petitioner fairly presented this IAC claim 

to the California Supreme Court and in his habeas corpus filings in this Court. Respondent 

contends that Petitioner “abandoned” this IAC claim in the California Supreme Court and 

points out that the Petition for Review “reli[ed] entirely on state law” and “fail[ed] to cite 

the federal constitution or other federal authorities.” (Doc. No. 60-1.) As Respondent 

frames it, this claim raises only a state law point of evidence, and therefore fails to state a 

federal claim cognizable under AEDPA. 

This Court disagrees with Respondent’s framing of this claim and finds that 

Petitioner asserted a federal IAC claim in both his Petition for Review in the California 

Supreme Court and in the FAP. The Petition for Review filed in the California Supreme 

Court does indeed focus on the Court of Appeal’s ruling on the state law evidentiary 

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question that underlies the IAC claim. However, the Petition for Review makes clear that 

Petitioner’s appeal lay from the Court of Appeal’s ruling rejecting the IAC claim as well 

as from the subsidiary reasoning addressing the scope of Section 1202:

The Court of Appeal rejected [Petitioner’s] claim that his counsel provided 

ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to argue the admissibility of 

Brown’s statements under section 1202. In so ruling, the Court of Appeal 

reasoned that 1) section 1202 does not apply to adoptive admissions ... 2) 

section 1202 does not apply because it references the testimony of the 

‘declarant’...; and 3) the defense did not need the statements of Brown ... In 

what appellant believes to be a question of first impression, he challenges as 

erroneous each of the court’s conclusions. 

(Doc. No. 22-23 at 17-18) (emphasis added). Petitioner also provided a detailed factual and 

procedural basis for the claim, including the express contention that his trial attorney never 

sought the admission of Brown’s statement. It is true that Petitioner does not specify the 

federal nature of his IAC claim. However, the standards governing IAC claims under 

California and federal law are identical, Cal. Const., Art. 1, § 24, and, as such, the failure 

to cite federal authorities is not fatal. This Court accordingly finds that this IAC claim has 

been exhausted through fair presentation to California’s highest court and properly raised 

in the instant habeas corpus proceeding. 

Turning to the merits, however, it is clear that relief is not warranted on this IAC 

claim. Petitioner contends that Brown’s statement was admissible under California 

Evidence Code section 1202 as an exception to the rule against hearsay and that counsel’s 

failure to offer this statement in evidence constituted ineffective assistance. The California 

Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s Petition for Review in a summary opinion. This Court

therefore looks through to the opinion of the California Court of Appeal to determine 

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whether that decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established 

federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court. Brumfield, 135 S.Ct. at 2276. 

The Court of Appeal held that “Brown’s statements to the defense investigator 

contradicting those Cooper said she made concerning Hardoy’s murder were not 

admissible under Evidence Code section 1202” and that “Martinez’s trial counsel therefore 

was not ineffective in failing to seek their admission on that basis.” (Doc. No. 22-22 at 28.)

The court’s determination regarding the scope of Section 1202 is purely a state law matter

and so is not before this Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (a state prisoner is entitled to federal 

habeas relief “only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or 

laws or treaties of the United States”); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) 

(“[F]ederal habeas relief does not lie for errors of state law.”).

The second part of the court’s ruling, on the other hand, is an adjudication of the 

merits of Petitioner’s federal IAC claim, and this Court reviews that decision to determine 

whether it was either contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established 

federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The clearly established law for federal IAC claims is the 

two step analysis outlined by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 

668 (1984), and its progeny. Under Strickland, a prisoner asserting an IAC claim must 

show (1) that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, 

under prevailing norms of practice, and (2) that the defendant was prejudiced, in the sense 

that he would have received a more favorable result but for counsel’s unprofessional errors. 

Id. at 687. Review of counsel’s performance is highly deferential and a petitioner must 

overcome the strong presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of 

reasonable representation. Yarbrough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5-6 (2003).

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In this case, the Court of Appeal’s denial of Petitioner’s IAC claim was a reasonable 

application of Strickland. The court’s ruling that Brown’s statement was not admissible 

under Evidence Code section 1202 and the absence of contrary precedent2strongly 

indicates that any attempt by trial counsel to admit Brown’s statement under Evidence 

Code section 1202 would have been futile. At the very least, the failure to make an 

argument which was later rejected by the Court of Appeal and which, even ex ante, lacked 

a solid basis in the law of evidence, cannot be said to be objectively unreasonable. See

Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1445 (9th Cir. 1996) (counsel’s failure to take futile action 

is not deficient performance); Shah v. United States, 878 F.2d 1156, 1162 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Applying the deferential standard mandated by AEDPA, this Court finds that the Court of 

Appeal’s denial of Petitioner’s IAC claim was a reasonable application of Strickland. 

For these reasons, this Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s claim that his trial 

counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to seek the admission under California 

Code of Evidence section 1202 of Brown’s statement to a defense investigator be DENIED 

WITH PREJUDICE. 

B. Ground Two: The Trial Court’s Failure to Grant Immunity to Brown 

The Court next considers Petitioner’s argument that the trial court’s failure to grant 

Brown immunity violated Petitioner’s right to a fair trial. (Doc. No. 3 at 7, 46-50.) Because 

 

2 Notably, Petitioner’s Petition for Review in the California Supreme Court concedes that Petitioner’s 

argument concerning the scope of Evidence Code section 1202 presents “a question of first impression” 

in that court. (Doc. No. 22-23, at 18.) The Petition for Review also allows that the two California appellate 

decisions, People v. Corella, 122 Cal.App.4th 461 (2004), and People v. Baldwin, 189 Cal.App.4th 991 

(2010), cited to bolster Petitioner’s expansive reading of Evidence Code section 1202 support Petitioner’s 

argument only by “parity of reasoning.” (Id. at 19.) This Court has examined these two cases and they are, 

indeed, not directly on point. 

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the California Supreme Court denied review in a summary opinion, this Court looks 

through to the Court of Appeal’s fully reasoned decision rejecting this claim to determine 

whether that decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established 

federal law. Brumfield, 135 S.Ct. at 2276. 

The Court of Appeal rejected Petitioner’s argument, finding that there was “no 

California statute or case authorizing a trial court to grant immunity to a witness when not 

requested to do so by the prosecutor.” (Doc. No. 3 at 72.) The court noted that even if the 

court had the inherent power to grant immunity, this case would not meet the criteria 

because Brown’s expected testimony was neither clearly exculpatory nor essential. (Id. at 

74.) The court noted that even when a witness’s testimony is clearly exculpatory and 

essential, a court may not grant use immunity if “strong governmental interests... 

countervail against a grant of immunity” and the record here supports legitimate reasons 

for not granting Brown use immunity. (Id. at 75.) The court found that “the trial court had 

no power to grant Brown use immunity even if Martinez had asked it do so, and would 

have had to deny any motion requesting such immunity.” (Id. at 76.) 

Respondent is correct that there is no Supreme Court authority addressing whether 

and in what circumstances a trial court must compel the prosecution to grant immunity to 

a defense witness. Petitioner identifies several federal Court of Appeals decisions 

indicating that prosecutorial misconduct may, in limited circumstances, require a court to 

grant a witness immunity. (Doc. No. 3 at 46-50, citing United States v. Westerdahl, 945 

F.2d 1083, 1086-87 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Anguilo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1190-92 (1st 

Cir. 1990); United States v. Herrera-Medina, 853 F.2d 565, 568 (7th Cir. 1988)). However, 

the only source of clearly established federal law under AEDPA are the decisions of the 

Supreme Court. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. Petitioner does not identify, and this Court is 

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not aware of, any Supreme Court precedent establishing the constitutional right that 

Petitioner asserts. This being the case, this claim must fail.

This Court therefore RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s claim that his right to a fair 

trial was violated by the trial court’s failure to grant Brown immunity be DENIED WITH 

PREJUDICE.

C. Ground Three: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In his third ground for relief, Petitioner raises an IAC claim in which he contends 

that trial counsel failed to make appropriate use of letters allegedly showing that “several 

people made false claims [or] recanted outright!” (Doc. No. 3 at 8-9.) Respondent argues

that this IAC claim is unexhausted and entirely without merit. (Doc. No. 60-1, at 12-13).

1. Procedural Default

This IAC claim is procedurally defaulted because Petitioner has not exhausted his 

state court remedies in regard to this claim and a return to state court would now be barred 

by California’s rule against untimely petitions. Petitioner has not shown cause for his 

default and prejudice, or, alternatively, that failure to review this claim will cause a

fundamental miscarriage of justice. This IAC claim is therefore procedurally barred.

“An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant 

to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that the applicant has 

exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). A

state prisoner exhausts his remedies by “fairly present[ing] his claim in each appropriate 

state court ... thereby alerting that court to the federal nature of the claim.” Baldwin v. 

Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004). This “rule of comity reduces the friction between the state 

and federal court systems by avoiding the unseemliness of a federal district court’s 

overturning a state court conviction without the state courts having had an opportunity to 

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correct the constitutional violation in the first instance.” O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 

838, 845 (1999).

Where a federal claim has not been exhausted in the state courts and where no further

state remedies are available due to the action of an adequate and independent state 

procedural rule, the prisoner’s claim is considered technically exhausted. Gray v. 

Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162 (1996) (noting that the exhaustion requirement “refers only 

to remedies still available at the time of the federal petition [and] is satisified if it is clear 

that the habeas petitioner’s claims are now procedurally barred under state law”); Cassett 

v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 621 n. 5 (9th Cir. 2005). A federal habeas court, however, will

generally not grant relief on a claim that would be barred in state court on independent and 

adequate state procedural grounds. Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 920 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Accordingly, “[t]he same procedural bar that exhausted [the prisoner’s] claims (by making 

it impossible for him to fairly present his federal claims in state court) also renders the 

federal claims unavailable for [federal court] review.” Id. at 921. This rule is subject to 

exceptions in cases in which the prisoner demonstrates cause for the procedural default and 

resulting prejudice, or that failure to consider the claim will result in a fundamental 

miscarriage of justice. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991). 

California’s timeliness rule constitutes an independent and adequate state procedural 

rule that generally prevents a federal court from reaching the merits of a prisoner’s claim. 

Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. 307, 311 (2011). Unlike most states, California does not 

employ fixed time limits for the filing of collateral relief applications. Instead, the 

California Supreme Court has instructed that “a [habeas] petition should be filed as 

promptly as the circumstances allow.” In re Clark, 5 Cal.4th 750, 765 n. 5 (1993). In noncapital cases, prisoners seeking habeas relief have “the burden of establishing either (i) 

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absence of substantial delay, as measured from the time the [prisoner] or counsel knew, or 

reasonably should have known, of the information offered in support of the claim and the 

legal basis for the claim, (ii) good cause for the delay, or (iii) that the claim falls within an 

exception to the bar of untimeliness.” In re Robbins, 18 Cal.4th 770, 780 (1998).

Exceptions to the bar of untimeliness occur in the case of a “fundamental miscarriage of 

justice,” which, under California law, occurs where (i) an error of constitutional magnitude 

led to a trial that was so fundamentally unfair that, absent the error, no reasonable judge or 

jury would have convicted the petitioner; (ii) the petitioner is actually innocent of the 

crimes of which he or she was convicted; (iii) the death penalty was based on a profile of 

the petitioner so grossly misleading that, absent the error or omission, no reasonable judge 

or juror would have imposed the sentence of death; or (iv) the petitioner was convicted or 

sentenced under an invalid statute. Id. at 780-81.

Petitioner never presented this IAC claim in state court and over four and a half years 

have now elapsed from the date on which Petitioner first knew of the basis for this claim.

3

This four and a half year delay constitutes “substantial delay” under California law. See

Walker, 52 U.S. at 317 (noting that it was “altogether plain that [petitioner’s] delay of 

nearly five years ranked as ‘substantial’”); see also In re Tsaturyan, 2002 WL 1614107 *3 

(Cal.App., July 23, 2002) (delay of 16 months barred claim). Further, Petitioner cannot 

show good cause for this delay. Petitioner asserts that he is “special ed” and has difficulty 

 

3 The basis of this IAC claim is that Petitioner’s trial counsel did not investigate or make use of certain 

letters allegedly provided to him by Petitioner. Accordingly, Petitioner had knowledge of the factual basis 

for this claim at the time of his trial, which concluded with Petitioner’s sentencing on January 28, 2011. 

Petitioner’s “time to file” clock under California law started to run no later than that date. See Robbins, 

18 Cal.4th at 780. 

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reading and spelling. (Doc. No. 3, at 5.) But while Petitioner’s filings in this matter 

demonstrate some difficulty with spelling, Petitioner has not documented a learning 

disability that would render him unable to understand or meet filing deadlines. Cf. Yow 

Ming Yeh v. Martel, 751 F.3d 1075, 1078 (9th Cir. 2014) (noting that to constitute an 

extraordinary circumstance justifying equitable tolling of the AEDPA statute of limitations 

a prisoner’s mental impairment must render the prisoner unable to understand the 

importance of a timely filing or unable to prepare and effectuate a filing). Petitioner also 

asserts that certain claims raised in his petition were not raised on direct appeal due to 

ineffective assistance of counsel. (Doc. No. 37, at 10.) Even assuming that Petitioner’s 

appellate counsel was ineffective, however, this would not explain Petitioner’s failure to 

raise this IAC claim, as well as the claim that his appellate counsel was ineffective, in a 

state collateral proceeding. Petitioner accordingly has not shown good cause to excuse this 

delay. Finally, this IAC claim does not fall within any of the exceptions to the California 

timeliness bar in that Petitioner has made no showing of actual innocence or that absent 

the asserted constitutional error no reasonable jury could have convicted him, nor has 

Petitioner argued that he was sentenced under an invalid statute. Robbins, 18 Cal.4th at 

780-81. This IAC claim therefore satisfies the technical requirements of exhaustion. 

However, the state untimeliness rule that prevents Petitioner from raising his federal claims 

in state court also acts as an independent and adequate procedural bar that causes 

Petitioner’s claims to be defaulted—and therefore unreviewable—in this Court. 

Petitioner’s state procedural default can only be excused in this Court if Petitioner 

shows cause for the default and prejudice as a result, or that failure to consider the claim 

will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. “Cause for a procedural default exists 

where ‘something external to the petitioner, something that cannot fairly be attributed to 

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him[,]... impeded [his] efforts to comply with the State’s procedural rule.” Maples v. 

Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 922 (2012). To demonstrate prejudice, a prisoner must show that 

he suffered “actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law.” Coleman, 

501 U.S. at 750.

Here, Petitioner has not established cause to excuse his procedural default. As 

already discussed, Petitioner attempts to explain his procedural default by asserting that he 

is “special ed” and has difficulty reading and writing and by asserting that his appellate 

counsel was ineffective. The unsupported assertion of “special ed” status, however, is 

insufficient to establish cause for Petitioner’s substantial delay in bringing this matter 

before the state courts. See Schneider v. McDaniel, 674 F.3d 1144, 1153-54 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(neither illiteracy nor mental defect with an adverse effect no more severe than illiteracy 

will excuse procedural default). Petitioner’s conclusory assertion of an IAC claim also fails 

to establish cause because any deficiency attributed to Petitioner’s appellate counsel would 

not explain Petitioner’s failure to exhaust through state collateral proceedings both this 

underlying IAC claim and the claim that his appellate counsel was ineffective. See Edwards 

v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451 (2000) (holding that an IAC claim may only used to 

establish cause for a procedural default if it has been presented to the state courts in the 

manner that state law requires). Denial of relief on this IAC claim also will not result in a 

fundamental miscarriage of justice because, as discussed below, this IAC claim is wholly 

without merit.

Because Petitioner has not shown cause and prejudice or that denial of this claim on 

procedural grounds will cause a fundamental miscarriage of justice, this Court finds that 

this claim is procedurally barred and Petitioner is not entitled to relief.

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2. Merits

Relief on this unexhausted and procedurally defaulted IAC claim is also not 

warranted for the further reason that “it is perfectly clear that [Petitioner] does not raise 

even a colorable federal claim.” Cassett, 406 F.3d at 614; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). Petitioner 

alleges that he provided letters to trial counsel showing that “several people made false 

claims [or] recanted outright!” (Doc. No. 3 at 8-9.) Petitioner claims that his counsel “never 

[used]... the [investigators] or interviewed one and heard or spoke that I was not the actual 

suspect. All this said information was discarded and not allowed to enter said trial or prelim 

[sic] after repeated [requests] to counsel that said it was unimportant.” (Doc. No. 3 at 9.) 

The clearly established Supreme Court standard for ineffective assistance of counsel 

claims requires a habeas petitioner to establish two prongs: (1) that counsel’s performance 

fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, under prevailing norms of practice, and 

(2) that the defendant was prejudiced, in the sense that he would have received a more 

favorable result but for counsel’s unprofessional errors. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 

Further, Strickland requires that “[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance... be highly 

deferential.” Id. at 689. There is a “strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within 

a wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at 686-87. 

To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a petitioner must make a 

sufficient factual showing to substantiate the claims. United States v. Schaflander, 743 F.2d 

714, 721 (9th Cir. 1984). A petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief based solely on 

conclusory allegations which are unsupported by a statement of specific facts. James v. 

Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994). Vague and speculative assertions of counsel’s 

ineffectiveness are insufficient. United States v. Taylor, 802 F.2d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 

1986). Furthermore, in order to show ineffective assistance of counsel based on the failure 

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to call witnesses, the defendant must show that the particular witness was willing to testify, 

what his or her testimony would have been, and that his or her testimony would have been 

sufficient to create a reasonable doubt as to guilt. See Alcala v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 862, 

872-73 (9th Cir. 2003) (indicating that, to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel based upon a failure to call witnesses, a habeas petitioner not only must identify 

the witness in question but also must describe specifically the testimony those witnesses 

would have given and how such testimony would have altered the trial’s outcome); Bragg 

v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082, 1088 (9th Cir.), amended by 253 F.3d 1150 (2001) (petitioner’s 

mere speculation that, had a witness been interviewed, he might have given helpful 

information, is not enough to establish ineffective assistance); United States v. Harden, 846 

F.2d 1229, 1231-32 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Dow v. Woods, 211 F.3d 480, 486 (9th Cir. 

2000) (rejecting an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on trial counsel’s failure 

to interview or call an alibi witness when there was no evidence that this witness would 

have testified favorably for the defense); United States v. Berry, 814 F.2d 1406, 1409 (9th 

Cir. 1987); Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520, 532 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Petitioner’s IAC claim, as presented, is wholly deficient. Petitioner has not identified 

the witness or witnesses who could have testified or described the exculpatory testimony 

they could have provided. An independent review of the record, however, indicates that 

Petitioner believes that an individual named Cesar Sidon can prove that Petitioner did not 

kill Hardoy. (Doc. No. 22-18, at 18.) Nevertheless, Petitioner has not demonstrated that

Sidon or any other witnesses with exculpatory information were available and willing to 

testify on his behalf at trial. Petitioner has not provided or even described the letters, 

whether from Sidon or anyone else, that he says prove that certain people made false claims 

or recanted. Petitioner has not submitted an affidavit from his trial counsel regarding his 

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knowledge of these letters. Petitioner has, in short, provided no detail whatsoever, and it is 

therefore “perfectly clear” that this ground for relief “does not raise even a colorable federal 

claim.” Cassett, 406 F.3d at 614.

Because this claim is procedurally defaulted, and because it is perfectly clear that 

Petitioner does not raise even a colorable federal claim, this Court RECOMMENDS that 

this claim be DENIED WITH PREJUDICE. 

D. Ground Four: Fifth Amendment Claim

In his fourth ground for relief, Petitioner argues that his Fifth and Sixth Amendment 

rights were violated when a videotaped statement he made to the police was shown to the 

jury and because he was forced to take the stand at trial to respond to that statement. (Doc.

No. 37 at 3.) Respondent argues that this claim is untimely and procedurally barred. 

Respondent also argues that the claim fails on the merits because Petitioner was advised of 

his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), including his right to remain 

silent, and that he voluntarily waived those rights and spoke to the police. (Lodgment No. 

1 at 301-02.) Petitioner did not move to suppress this statement at trial or object to the 

admission of the DVD video of his interrogation. 

1. The AEDPA Statute of Limitations

This claim was asserted in the MTA, which was filed on August 19, 2014, and is 

therefore governed by AEDPA. As amended by the AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) provides:

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ 

of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State 

court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of–

(A) the date on which the judgement became final by the 

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such 

review; 

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(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application 

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United 

States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State 

action; 

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was 

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly 

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases 

on collateral review; or 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims 

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment 

or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under 

this subsection.

 

In this case, Petitioner has not asserted that his filing of this claim was impeded “by 

State action in violation of the Constitution or law of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1)(B). This claim is also not premised on a newly recognized constitutional right 

and does not rely on a factual predicate that could not have been discovered during the 

pendency of Petitioner’s direct appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C)-(D). Accordingly, the 

statute of limitations on this claim began to run on the date that Petitioner’s conviction 

became final on direct review. 

Unless a prisoner files a petition for writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court, his 

conviction becomes final on the first non-holiday weekday ninety days after the state 

supreme court denies the prisoner relief. Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 

2002). In this case, the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for review on 

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December 19, 2012, and Petitioner’s conviction became final 90 days later, on March 19, 

2013. (Lodgment No. 7.)

Petitioner did not file the MTA, which contained this claim, until August 4, 2014, 

some five months after the expiration of the limitations period. (Doc. No. 37.) Petitioner’s 

claim is therefore untimely unless Petitioner can establish that he is entitled to statutory 

tolling under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), equitable tolling under Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 

631 (2010), that the relation-back doctrine applies to this claim, Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 

644, 657 (2005), or that failure to consider this claim will result in a fundamental 

miscarriage of justice, McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S.Ct. 1924, 1934 (2013). 

Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling of this claim. AEDPA provides for 

tolling of the its one year statute of limitations for “[t]he time during which a properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). The pendency of a federal habeas 

petition, however, does not trigger statutory tolling under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Duncan 

v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 181-82 (2001). Nothing in the record before this Court indicates 

that Petitioner has ever filed an application for collateral review in the state courts. 

Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).

Nor is Petitioner entitled to equitable tolling. “[A] litigant seeking equitable tolling 

bears the burden of establishing two elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights 

diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way.” Holland, 560 

U.S. at 655 (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)). Under circuit 

precedent, “equitable tolling is available ... only when extraordinary circumstances beyond 

a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time.” Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 

1092, 1097 (9th Cir. 2010) (emphasis in original). Petitioner’s only explanation for his 

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delayed filing of this claim is his assertion that he is “special ed” and has difficulty with 

reading and spelling. However, “[l]ow literacy levels, lack of legal knowledge, and need 

for some assistance to prepare a habeas petition are not extraordinary circumstances to 

warrant equitable tolling.” Baker v. California Dept. of Corrections, 484 Fed.Appx. 130, 

131 (9th Cir. 2012). Moreover, Petitioner’s claim that he was unable to file this claim in a 

timely fashion because of his self-declared “special ed” status is undermined by the fact 

that Petitioner did file a timely habeas petition in this Court containing the grounds for 

relief already discussed. Petitioner’s failure to bring forward the additional claims 

presented in the MTA until after the expiration of the limitations period bespeaks a lack of 

diligence, not a lack of ability. Accordingly, “Petitioner’s unsupported allegation that he 

had a learning disability that prevented him from filing sooner does not establish 

‘extraordinary circumstances’ justifying equitable tolling.” Whitney v. Hedgpeth, 2009 

WL 3194085 *12 (S.D. Cal., Sept. 29, 2009).

This claim also does not satisfy the relation-back doctrine. Under Rule 15(c)(2) of 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, made applicable to habeas corpus proceedings by 28 

U.S.C. § 2242, an amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading when the 

claim asserted in the amended pleading and the claim asserted in the original pleading 

“arose out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence.” In the habeas corpus context, 

new claims asserted in an amended pleading will relate back “only when the claims added 

by amendment arise from the same core facts as the timely filed claims, and not when the 

new claims depend upon events separate in ‘both time and type’ from the originally raised 

episodes.” Mayle, 545 U.S. at 657. Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment claim, which is based 

on an alleged Miranda violation at Petitioner’s interrogation, does not arise from the same 

core facts as any of the claims timely asserted in the FAP, each of which concerned the 

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actions of the attorneys and the court during Petitioner’s trial. This claim therefore does 

not relate back to the date of the FAP.

Finally, application of the statute of limitations to bar review of this claim would not 

result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. The fundamental miscarriage of justice 

exception to the statute of limitations is only available where the prisoner makes “a credible 

showing of actual innocence,” Mcquiggin, 133 S.Ct. at 1931, by showing that “it is more 

likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new 

evidence, id. at 1935 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)). In the claim 

currently under review, Petitioner challenges the admission into evidence of his videotaped statement. Even assuming that the admission of the video-tape was error, however, 

Petitioner does not come close to meeting the stringent miscarriage of justice standard. 

Notably, Petitioner’s video-taped statement did not include a confession to the murder and 

this Court’s review of the transcript of Petitioner’s trial indicates that Petitioner’s 

conviction rested on other direct and circumstantial evidence adduced at trial. Accordingly, 

it cannot be said that the constitutional violation asserted here resulted in the conviction of 

one who was actually innocent.

For these reasons, the Court finds that AEDPA’s statute of limitations bars relief on 

Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment claim. 

2. This Claim is Procedurally Barred

Petitioner never presented this claim to the California courts and therefore has failed 

to exhaust his state remedies in regard to this claim as required by 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(b)(1)(A). Indeed, no California court has ever ruled on this claim, because Petitioner 

did not move to suppress his statement or object to the admission of the DVD video of his 

interrogation. A return to state court, however, would be barred by California’s rule against 

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untimely petitions. Robbins, 18 Cal.4th at 780. This claim is therefore deemed technically 

exhausted but procedurally defaulted. Gray, 518 U.S. at 162; Casey, 386 F.3d at 920. As 

discussed in section IV(C)(1), above, at pages 16-18, Petitioner has not shown cause for 

his default and prejudice or that failure to review this claim will cause a fundamental 

miscarriage of justice. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. This claim is therefore procedurally 

barred, and, for this reason, should be denied. 

3. Merits

The Court has addressed the merits of Petitioner’s other unexhausted claims because 

a district court may deny even an unexhausted claim on the merits when “it is perfectly 

clear that [Petitioner] does not raise even a colorable federal claim.” Cassett, 406 F.3d at 

614. In this ground for relief, Petitioner claims that his Fifth Amendment rights were 

violated when the prosecution played to the jury a DVD video of his custodial interview 

that was obtained contrary to Petitioner’s specific request that the recording device be 

turned off. This claim is quite clearly untimely and procedurally barred, not least because 

Petitioner did not object at trial to the admission of the DVD. Procedural defects aside, 

however, the Court is not able to say that it is “perfectly clear” that this claim lacks merit. 

See Arnold v. Runnels, 421 F.3d 859 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that a suspect’s unambiguous 

statement that he does not want the interrogation to be recorded “preclude[s] the 

interrogator from turning on the tape during the interrogation.”); Hurd v. Terhune 619 F.3d 

1080, 1088 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[C]learly established law allows a suspect to refuse to be 

interviewed in a particular manner even if he has already waived that right with respect to 

the subject matter of the interrogation”). 

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Nevertheless, as discussed above, this claim is barred by AEDPA’s statute of 

limitations and is procedurally defaulted. This Court therefore RECOMMENDS that this 

claim be DENIED WITH PREJUDICE. 

E. Ground Five: Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

Next, Petitioner claims that his appellate attorney was ineffective for not raising the 

claims asserted in Ground Four. (Doc. No. 37 at 6.) Respondent argues that this claim is 

untimely under AEDPA, procedurally defaulted, and meritless because counsel is not 

ineffective for failing to present a futile argument. 

1. The AEDPA Statute of Limitations

This claim was asserted in the MTA, which was filed on August 19, 2014, and is 

therefore governed by AEDPA’s one year statute of limitations. Because Petitioner does 

not assert that his filing of this claim was impeded by unlawful state action and because 

Petitioner’s claim is not based on a newly recognized constitutional right or recently 

discovered facts, the limitations period on this claim started to run March 19, 2013, the 

date on which Petitioner’s conviction became final on direct appeal. Petitioner filed this 

claim on August 19, 2014, five months after the statute of limitations expired. This claim 

will therefore be deemed untimely unless Petitioner demonstrates an entitlement to 

statutory or equitable tolling, that the claim relates back to a timely asserted claim, or that 

failure to review this claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Petitioner 

has not made any such showing. Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling for the simple 

reason that Petitioner never presented this or any other claim in a state court application 

for collateral review. Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling because he has failed to 

show that “extraordinary circumstances beyond [his] control [made] it impossible to file a 

petition on time.” Bills, 628 F.3d at 1097; Baker, 484 Fed.Appx. at 1031. This IAC claim 

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also does not relate back to the date of the IAC claim timely asserted in the FAP because 

it arises from alleged deficiencies in the performance of Petitioner’s counsel on direct 

appeal whereas the earlier IAC claim arises from alleged deficiencies in the performance 

of Petitioner’s trial counsel. This claim is therefore “separate in ‘both time and type’” from 

IAC claim asserted in the FAP and the relation back doctrine does not apply. Mayle, 545 

U.S. at 657. Finally, as discussed below, this claim is without merit, and so failure to 

consider this claim will not result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, 

none of the statutory or equitable exceptions to the one year statute of limitations apply and 

this claim must be deemed untimely. 

2. Procedural Default

Petitioner never presented this claim to the California courts and therefore has failed 

to exhaust his state remedies in regard to this claim as required by 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(b)(1)(A). A return to state court, however, would now be barred by California’s rule 

against untimely petitions. Robbins, 18 Cal.4th at 780. This claim is therefore deemed 

technically exhausted but procedurally defaulted. Gray, 518 U.S. at 162; Casey, 386 F.3d 

at 920. As discussed in section IV(C)(1), Petitioner has not shown cause for his default and 

prejudice or that failure to review this claim will cause a fundamental miscarriage of 

justice. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. This claim is therefore procedurally barred and relief is 

not warranted.

3. Merits 

Relief on this procedurally defaulted and untimely IAC claim is also not warranted 

for the additional reason that “it is perfectly clear that [Petitioner] does not raise even a 

colorable federal claim.” Cassett, 406 F.3d at 614; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). Petitioner 

argues that his appellate counsel was ineffective for not arguing that his right against selfCase 3:13-cv-01457-BTM-WVG Document 84 Filed 09/14/15 Page 30 of 42
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incrimination was violated when his videotaped statement was played for the jury. (Doc.

No. 37 at 6.) Respondent counters that counsel is not ineffective for failing to present a 

meritless argument. (Doc. No. 60 at 20.) 

The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a criminal 

defendant the right to the effective assistance of counsel on his first appeal as of right. 

Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985); Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1431 (9th Cir. 

1989). Claims that appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance are evaluated using 

the two pronged Strickland analysis. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000). The 

party challenging the performance of appellate counsel must first show that appellate 

counsel performed deficiently by unreasonably failing to discover and assert nonfrivolous 

issues. Id. Second, the party seeking relief must show that he has suffered prejudice, which, 

in this context, means that his appeal would more likely than not have been granted had his 

attorney’s performance not been deficient. Id. Appellate counsel is not deficient simply 

because he or she declines to brief every conceivable claim of error. Miller, 882 F.2d at 

1434. Indeed, “the weeding out of weaker issues is widely recognized as one of the 

hallmarks of effective appellate advocacy.” Id. And, of course, “the failure to raise a 

meritless legal argument does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.” Shah, 878 

F.2d at 1162. 

In this case, the failure of Petitioner’s appellate counsel to assert that Petitioner was 

compelled to testify against himself in violation of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights 

does not raise a colorable IAC because Petitioner forfeited this argument by failing to 

object to the admission into evidence of the video tape. See Cal. Evid. Code § 353 (“A 

verdict or finding shall not be set aside ... by reason of the erroneous admission of evidence 

unless ... [t]here appears of record an objection to or a motion to exclude or to strike the 

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evidence that was timely made and so stated as to make clear the specific ground of the 

objection or motion.”); see also People v. Partida, 37 Cal.4th 428, 433-35 (2005). This 

failure to raise the issue with the trial court precluded Petitioner’s appellate counsel from 

raising the issue on appeal. Because the failure to raise a futile argument on appeal does 

not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, this claim is wholly without merit.4 

Because this IAC claim is untimely under AEDPA, procedurally defaulted, and 

because it is perfectly clear that this ground for relief does not raise a colorable federal 

claim, this Court accordingly RECOMMENDS that this claim be DENIED WITH 

PREJUDICE. 

F. Ground Six: Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel 

Next, Petitioner argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to make use of 

documents showing that he suffered a stroke when he was eight years old. (Doc. No. 37 at 

6.) This claim was raised for the first time in the MTA, and the medical records in question 

are attached to that document. (Doc. No. 37 at 29-70.) Respondent argues that this claim is 

untimely and procedurally barred. Respondent also argues that this claim fails on the merits 

because Petitioner did not show that he was affected by this medical condition at the time 

of the murder and because Petitioner did not show that his trial counsel’s decision not to 

present evidence of Petitioner’s childhood medical condition was anything other than a 

reasonable strategic choice. (Doc. No. 60 at 20.)

 

4 The only vehicle for appellate counsel to have raised this issue would have been through an IAC claim. 

Appellate counsel did not do so, and Petitioner does not challenge that decision. Even if this Court 

construed Petitioner’s IAC claim to reach the failure of appellate counsel to assert an IAC claim in regard 

to trial counsel’s failure to object to the admission of the video tape, relief would not be warranted because 

this IAC claim would be both untimely and procedurally barred. 

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1. The AEDPA Statute of Limitations

As this claim was asserted in the MTA, filed on August 19, 2014, it is governed by 

AEDPA’s one year statute of limitations. Because Petitioner does not assert that his filing 

of this claim was impeded by unlawful state action and because Petitioner’s claim is not 

based on a newly recognized constitutional right or recently discovered facts, the 

limitations period on this claim started to run March 19, 2013, the date on which 

Petitioner’s conviction became final on direct appeal. Petitioner filed this claim on August 

19, 2014, five months after the statute of limitations expired. This claim will therefore be 

deemed untimely unless Petitioner demonstrates an entitlement to statutory or equitable 

tolling, that the claim relates back to a timely asserted claim, or that failure to review this 

claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Petitioner makes no such showing. 

Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling because Petitioner never presented this or any 

other claim in a state court application for collateral review. Petitioner is not entitled to 

equitable tolling because he has failed to show that “extraordinary circumstances beyond 

[his] control [made] it impossible to file a petition on time.” Bills, 628 F.3d at 1097; Baker, 

484 Fed.Appx. at 1031. This IAC claim also does not relate back to the date of the IAC 

claim timely asserted in the FAP. That IAC claim centered on trial counsel’s failure to 

make use of letters purportedly showing that witnesses had recanted or offered false 

testimony, while this IAC claim centeres on trial counsel’s failure to seek the admission of 

evidence relating to Petitioner’s medical condition. This claim is therefore “separate in 

‘both time and type’” from IAC claim asserted in the FAP and the relation back doctrine 

does not apply. Mayle, 545 U.S. at 657. Finally, as discussed below, this claim is without 

merit, and so failure to consider this claim will not result in a fundamental miscarriage of 

justice. Accordingly, none of the statutory or equitable exceptions to the one year statute 

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of limitations apply and this claim must be deemed untimely and therefore denied. 

2. Procedural Default

Petitioner never presented this claim to the California courts and therefore has failed 

to exhaust his state remedies in regard to this claim as required by 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(b)(1)(A). A return to state court, however, would now be barred by California’s rule 

against untimely petitions. Robbins, 18 Cal.4th at 780. This claim is therefore deemed 

technically exhausted but procedurally defaulted. Gray, 518 U.S. at 162; Casey, 386 F.3d 

at 920. As discussed in section IV(C)(1), above, at pages 16-18, Petitioner has not shown 

cause for his default and prejudice or that failure to review this claim will cause a 

fundamental miscarriage of justice. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. This claim is therefore 

procedurally barred and should be denied.

3. Merits

This procedurally defaulted and untimely IAC claim should also be denied for the 

additional reason that “it is perfectly clear that [Petitioner] does not raise even a colorable 

federal claim.” Cassett, 406 F.3d at 614; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2).

The clearly established Supreme Court standard for ineffective assistance of counsel 

claims requires a habeas petitioner to establish (1) that counsel’s performance fell below 

an objective standard of reasonableness, under prevailing norms of practice, and (2) that 

the defendant was prejudiced, in the sense that he would have received a more favorable 

result but for counsel’s unprofessional errors. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Further, 

Strickland requires that “[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance ... be highly 

deferential.” Id. at 689. There is a “strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within 

a wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at 686-87. “[S]trategic choices 

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made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually 

unchallengeable.” Id. at 690.

Petitioner claims that his counsel should have made use of documents showing that 

he suffered a childhood stroke. This claim has no merit. First, Petitioner has not articulated 

any ground for the relevance and admissibility of these medical records and has not 

suggested how these medical records would have assisted him at trial. Notably, Petitioner 

did not offer a mental defense at trial, and the decision not to offer such a defense is 

precisely the kind of strategic decision that is entrusted to the reasonable discretion of trial 

counsel. See Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 124 (2009).

Second, this Court’s own review of the record indicates that Petitioner’s childhood 

stroke was indeed raised during Petitioner’s trial and that medical records relating to this 

stroke were lodged with the trial court prior to sentencing. To the point, Petitioner’s trial 

testimony on direct examination began with a discussion of how the stroke that he suffered 

at age eight had affected his life, including how Petitioner “had to be in special ed” and 

“had to learn how to walk, talk ... had to learn everything over again.” (Doc. No. 22-14, p. 

82.) Petitioner’s trial counsel also filed medical records documenting Petitioner’s 

childhood stroke with the clerk prior to sentencing. (Doc. No. 22-18, p. 14). In any event, 

the sentence imposed on Petitioner for his conviction of murder in the first degree was 

mandatory, Cal. Penal Code section 190(a), so any further work that Petitioner’s trial 

counsel may have done to investigate Petitioner’s medical condition as a mitigating factor 

would have been futile. This IAC claim accordingly has no merit. 

Because this claim is untimely under AEDPA and procedurally defaulted, and 

because it is perfectly clear that Petitioner does not raise even a colorable federal claim, 

this Court RECOMMENDS that this claim be DENIED WITH PREJUDICE. 

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G. Ground Seven: Admission of Petitioner’s Out-of-Court Statements

Next, Petitioner argues that statements he made to witness Homero Hernandez were 

inadmissible hearsay. (Doc. No. 37 at 8.) Respondent argues that this claim is untimely 

and procedurally barred. Respondent also argues that this claim asserts only a state law 

error and is therefore not cognizable under AEDPA.

1. The AEDPA Statute of Limitations

This claim was asserted in the MTA, which was filed on August 19, 2014, and is 

therefore governed by AEDPA’s one year statute of limitations. Because Petitioner does 

not assert that his filing of this claim was impeded by unlawful state action and because 

Petitioner’s claim is not based on a newly recognized constitutional right or recently 

discovered facts, the limitations period on this claim started to run March 19, 2013, the 

date on which Petitioner’s conviction became final on direct appeal. Petitioner filed this 

claim on August 19, 2014, five months after the statute of limitations expired. This claim 

will therefore be deemed untimely unless Petitioner demonstrates an entitlement to 

statutory or equitable tolling, that the claim relates back to a timely asserted claim, or that 

failure to review this claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Petitioner 

has not made any such showing. Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling as Petitioner 

never presented this or any other claim in a state court application for collateral review. 

Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling because he has failed to show that 

“extraordinary circumstances beyond [his] control [made] it impossible to file a petition on 

time.” Bills, 628 F.3d at 1097; Baker, 484 Fed.Appx. at 1031. This claim is also “separate 

in ‘both time and type’” from the claims, including the evidentiary claims, asserted in the 

FAP, and the relation back doctrine accordingly does not apply. Mayle, 545 U.S. at 657. 

Finally, as discussed below, this claim is wholly without merit, and so failure to consider 

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this claim will not result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, none of the 

statutory or equitable exceptions to the one year statute of limitations apply and this claim 

must be deemed untimely and should be denied.

2. Procedural Default

Petitioner never presented this claim to the California courts and therefore has failed 

to exhaust his state remedies in regard to this claim as required by 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(b)(1)(A). A return to state court, however, would now be barred by California’s rule 

against untimely petitions. Robbins, 18 Cal.4th at 780. This claim is therefore deemed 

technically exhausted but procedurally defaulted. Gray, 518 U.S. at 162; Casey, 386 F.3d 

at 920. As discussed in section IV(C)(1), above, at pages 16-18, Petitioner has not shown 

cause for his default and prejudice or that failure to review this claim will cause a 

fundamental miscarriage of justice. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. This claim is therefore 

procedurally barred and should be denied.

3. Merits

Relief on this procedurally defaulted and untimely IAC claim is also not warranted 

for the additional reason that “it is perfectly clear that [Petitioner] does not raise even a 

colorable federal claim.” Cassett, 406 F.3d at 614; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). Petitioner 

contends that the statements he made to Hernandez were hearsay inadmissible under 

Evidence Code section 1200. Petitioner also cites the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.

Petitioner does not elaborate on his constitutional claims, but his citation to People v. 

Thomas, 53 Cal.4th 771 (2012), alerts the Court to the presence of a claim that the 

admission of this evidence violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth 

Amendment. 

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As Respondent correctly notes, state law evidentiary error is not cognizable on

federal habeas corpus. Petitioner’s claim that Hernandez’s testimony regarding Petitioner’s 

out-of-court statement was inadmissible hearsay under Evidence Code section 1200 is a 

classically state law claim and, as such, is not one on which a federal habeas court may 

grant relief.5 Petitioner’s Confrontation Clause claim also fails as a criminal defendant’s 

own out-of-court statements are not testimonial and do not implicate the Confrontation 

Clause. See United States v. Crowe, 563 F.3d 969, 976 n. 12 (9th Cir. 2009); see also

United States v. Spencer, 592 F.3d 866, 878 (8th Cir. 2010). Finally, to the extent that 

Petitioner’s citation to the Fourteenth Amendment raises a due process claim, such a claim 

has no basis and is rejected.

Because this claim is untimely under AEDPA and procedurally defaulted, and 

because it is perfectly clear that this ground for relief does not raise even a colorable federal 

claim, this Court RECOMMENDS that this claim be DENIED WITH PREJUDICE. 

H. Ground Eight: Arbitrary and Discriminatory Prosecution 

In his final claim, Petitioner asserts that he has been subjected to arbitrary and 

discriminatory prosecution in violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment. (Doc. No. 37 at 9.) Respondent argues that this claim is untimely and 

procedurally barred. Respondent also asserts that this claim fails on the merits because 

Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proving this claim by a preponderance of evidence. 

(Doc. No. 60 at 22-23.) 

 

5 Petitioner’s statement to Hernandez was, in any case, the admission of a party, and therefore was 

admissible under Evidence Code section 1220.

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1. The AEDPA Statute of Limitations

This claim was asserted in the MTA, which was filed on August 19, 2014, and is 

therefore governed by AEDPA’s one year statute of limitations. Because Petitioner does 

not assert that his filing of this claim was impeded by unlawful state action and because 

Petitioner’s claim is not based on a newly recognized constitutional right or recently 

discovered facts, the limitations period on this claim started to run March 19, 2013, the 

date on which Petitioner’s conviction became final on direct appeal. Petitioner filed this 

claim on August 19, 2014, five months after the statute of limitations expired. This claim 

will therefore be deemed untimely unless Petitioner demonstrates an entitlement to 

statutory or equitable tolling, that the claim relates back to a timely asserted claim, or that 

failure to review this claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Petitioner 

has not made any such showing. Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling as Petitioner 

never presented this or any other claim in a state court application for collateral review. 

Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling because he has failed to show that 

“extraordinary circumstances beyond [his] control [made] it impossible to file a petition on 

time.” Bills, 628 F.3d at 1097; Baker, 484 Fed.Appx. at 1031. This claim is also does not 

relate back to any claim timely asserted in the FAP as it is “separate in ‘both time and 

type’” from those claims. Mayle, 545 U.S. at 657. Finally, as discussed below, this claim 

is wholly without merit, and so failure to consider this claim will not result in a fundamental 

miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, none of the statutory or equitable exceptions to the one 

year statute of limitations apply and this claim must be deemed untimely. 

2. Procedural Default

Petitioner never presented this claim to the California courts and therefore has failed 

to exhaust his state remedies in regard to this claim as required by 28 U.S.C. § 

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2254(b)(1)(A). A return to state court, however, would now be barred by California’s rule 

against untimely petitions. Robbins, 18 Cal.4th at 780. This claim is therefore deemed 

technically exhausted but procedurally defaulted. Gray, 518 U.S. at 162; Casey, 386 F.3d 

at 920. As discussed in section IV(C)(1), above, at pages 16-18, Petitioner has not shown 

cause for his default and prejudice or that failure to review this claim will cause a 

fundamental miscarriage of justice. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. This claim is therefore 

procedurally barred.

3. Merits 

Relief on this procedurally defaulted and untimely equal protection claim is also not 

warranted for the additional reason that “it is perfectly clear that [Petitioner] does not raise 

even a colorable federal claim.” Cassett, 406 F.3d at 614; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). Petitioner 

claims that his prosecution was arbitrary and discriminatory. As Respondent points out, 

however, Petitioner has offered no evidence that the decision to prosecute him was based 

on an illegitimate motive. 

The government has “broad discretion” to decide whom to prosecute. Wayte v. 

United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985). “[S]o long as a prosecutor has probable cause to 

believe that the accused committed a crime defined by statute, the decision whether or not 

to prosecute ... generally rests entirely in [the prosecutor’s] discretion. Bodenkircher v. 

Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978). Nevertheless, selectivity in the enforcement of criminal 

laws is subject to constitutional constraints, including those of the the Equal Protection 

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 

(1996); see also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886). To demonstrate 

impermissible discriminatory or selective prosecution, the petitioner must demonstrate that 

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others similarly situated have not been prosecuted and that the prosecution is based on an 

impermissible motive. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 565.

Petitioner offers no evidence that the decision to prosecute him was based on 

anything other than the considerable direct and circumstantial evidence of his guilt that was 

adduced at trial. Petitioner does not identify an illegitimate motive underlying his 

prosecution, much less point to evidence showing that similarly situated persons have not 

been prosecuted. In short, Petitioner’s claims of arbitrary and discriminatory prosecution 

are entirely conclusory and without merit.

Because this claim is untimely under AEDPA and procedurally defaulted, and

because it is perfectly clear that this ground for relief does not raise even a colorable federal 

claim, this Court RECOMMENDS that this claim be DENIED WITH PREJUDICE. 

V. CONCLUSION

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United States District Judge 

Barry Ted Moskowitz under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 72.1(d)(4) of the 

United States District Court for the Southern District of California. 

Further, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court issue an order: (1) 

approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation, and (2) directing that Judgment 

be entered DENYING the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than October 23, 2015, any party to this action may 

file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should 

be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the 

Court and served on all parties no later than November 20, 2015. The parties are advised 

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those 

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objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th 

Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 14, 2015

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