Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02414/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02414-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 All Parties and Counsel of Record 1 09cv2414

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ARTEMUS BLANKENSHIP,

Petitioner,

v.

MATTHEW CATE,

Respondent.

 

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Civil No. 09cv2414 W (PCL) 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

GRANTING RESPONDENT’S MOTION

TO DISMISS

(Doc. 7.) 

I.

INTRODUCTION

On October 27, 2009, Artemus Blankenship (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se,

filed a Petition For Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1.) On March 1, 2010,

Respondent Matthew Cate (“Respondent”) filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition. (Doc. 7.) Respondent seeks dismissal of the Petition because it is barred by the statute of limitations. Petitioner claims

that his Petition is not statutorily time barred and seeks to have the Court determine whether his Petition

is entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. (Doc. 8.) For the reasons discussed below,

the Court recommends granting Respondent’s motion to dismiss. 

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II.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 2004, Petitioner waived jury trial and was convicted by the San Diego Superior Court of

residential robbery (Cal. Pen. Code §§ 211, 212.5, subd. (a)), burglary (§ 459), and petty theft with a

prior theft conviction (§§ 666, 484). He admitted to two prior serious felony convictions (§§ 667, subd.

(A)(1), 668) and to three prior strikes (§§ 667, subds.(b)-(i), 1170.12). The court sentenced him to

prison for 60 years to life, including 25 years to life for burglary with two prior strikes, with a consecutive term of 25 years to life for burglary with two prior strikes, enhanced by two five-year terms for the

prior serious felony convictions. The court stayed the sentence on the petty theft conviction with a prior

(§ 654). (Lodgment 1, at 1-2.) 

Petitioner raised one claim on direct appeal – that there was insufficient evidence to support his

conviction for burglary. (Lodgment 2.) On March 11, 2005, the California Court of Appeal affirmed

the judgment in a reasoned opinion. (Lodgment 1.) Petitioner’s appellate attorney did not see a basis for

appealing his case to the California Supreme Court, but advised Petitioner that he had the right to file

the appeal himself on or before April 19, 2005. (Doc. 8-2, at 2.) Petitioner did not further pursue direct

appeal in the California Supreme Court. (Doc. 7-1, at 3.) 

On February 14, 2006, Petitioner filed his first state habeas petition in the San Diego Superior

Court, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that the trial court violated his Sixth

Amendment right by conducting a bench trial. (Lodgment 4, at 1.) The petition was denied partly on

the merits and partly for lack of evidentiary support on April 6, 2006. (Id.) 

 Petitioner next filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal court on June 2, 2006. (See case

number 06cv1178 JAH (CAB).) The district court dismissed the petition without prejudice on June 23,

2006 because Petitioner failed to exhaust his state remedies as to any claim. (Lodgment 5.) The court

advised Petitioner that he needed to present his claims first to the state appellate and supreme courts

before returning to federal court. (Id. at 2.) 

Petitioner returned to the San Diego Superior Court and filed another habeas petition with three

claims: ineffective assistance of counsel, court error in failing to approve a plea agreement, and an

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unfair bench trial conducted by a judge with knowledge of his prior guilty plea. The petition was denied

on the merits on March 27, 2007. (Lodgment 6.) 

Petitioner presented these three claims to the California Court of Appeal in a habeas petition

filed on May 10, 2007. (Lodgment 7.) The court denied the petition on August 2, 2007 because

Petitioner failed to provide reasonably available documentation supporting his claims. (Lodgment 8.) 

In September 2007, Petitioner raised the same three claims in a signed petition submitted to the

state court of appeal and included a copy of the rescinded plea agreement. (Lodgment 9.) On January

30, 2008, the court denied the petition on the merits. (Lodgment 10.) 

On October 6, 2008, Petitioner again filed a habeas petition raising the same three claims in the

California Court of Appeal. (Lodgment 12.) The court rejected the contentions as repetitive and

successive of Petitioner’s prior petitions and likewise denied this petition on November 6, 2008. 

(Lodgment 13.) 

On March 11, 2009, Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the California Supreme Court raising the

same three claims. (Lodgment 14.) The California Supreme Court summarily denied the petition on

August 12, 2009. (Lodgment 15.) 

The instant federal petition was filed on October 27, 2009. The same three claims for relief were

presented: ineffective assistance of counsel, unfair bench trial in violation of the Sixth Amendment, and

unfair rescission of the plea agreement in violation of due process. (Doc. 1, at 6-15.) Respondent filed

a motion to dismiss the Petition as untimely. (Doc. 7.) 

III.

DISCUSSION

The Court will review Respondent’s motion to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds pursuant

to its authority under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. See Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d

1039 (9th Cir. 2001). 

A. Absent Any Applicable Tolling, Petitioner’s Petition is Barred by the Statute of Limitations

Respondent argues that the Petition is barred by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty

Act’s (“the AEDPA”) statute of limitations. The provisions of the AEDPA apply to petitions for writs of

habeas corpus filed in federal court after the AEDPA’s effective date of April 24, 1996. Lindh v.

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Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 322-23 (1997). Therefore, because the original Petition was filed on October 27,

2009, the AEDPA applies to this case.

With enactment of the AEDPA, a state prisoner’s time frame for seeking federal habeas relief has

been dramatically limited. The AEDPA provides for a one-year limitation period for state prisoners to

file habeas corpus petitions in federal court. Section 2244(d)(1) states, in pertinent part:

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall

run from the latest of -

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created

by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States

is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized

by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on

collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(d)(1) (West Supp. 1998).

In California, if the petitioner does not file a direct appeal to the supreme court, then the

conviction becomes final 40 days after the court of appeal files its opinion. Delander v. Hubbard, 2008

WL 2622856 (S.D. Cal. July 1, 2008); see Cal. Rules of Court, Rules 8.264(b), 8.500(e)(1), 8.60. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), the one-year limitations period begins to run the following day. 

Moreover, the statute of limitations is not tolled from the time the conviction becomes final and the time

the first state collateral challenge is filed because there is no case “pending” during that interval. Nino v.

Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Petitioner’s judgment became final on April 20, 2005. Therefore, absent tolling under the

AEDPA, Petitioner had until April 20, 2006, to file his Petition For Writ of Habeas Corpus with this

Court. However, Petitioner did not file the instant federal habeas petition until October 27, 2009, over

three years beyond the due date. Absent sufficient statutory or equitable tolling, the instant petition is

barred by the statute of limitations.

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B. Petitioner is Not Entitled to Sufficient Statutory Tolling

The time spent pursing a habeas petition with unexhausted claims in federal court does not toll

the statute of limitations period. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 180 (2001). On the other hand, the

“time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with

respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward” the one-year

limitations period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Under California’s indeterminate timeliness rule, “[a]s long

as the prisoner filed a petition for appellate review within a ‘reasonable time,’ he c[an] count as

‘pending’ (and add to the one-year time limit) the days between (1) the time the lower state court

reached an adverse decision, and (2) the day he filed a petition in the higher state court.” Evans v.

Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 193 (2006). Interval tolling may also be available between the filing of successive petitions in the same state court so long as they were both properly filed and considered pending. 

See Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1037-38 (9th Cir. 2005). However, a time interval longer than

sixty days between the denial of one state petition and the filing of the next one would not be counted for

tolling purposes unless the prolonged delay is sufficiently justified by the petitioner. Chaffer v. Prosper,

592 F.3d 1046, 1048 (9th Cir. 2010). Absent a clear indication from the state court as to the timeliness

of a successive petition, the federal habeas court makes the determination as to the reasonableness of the

delay. Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. at 193. A petitioner’s lack of legal or procedural knowledge or limited

but available access to the law library are not sufficient justifications for statutory gap tolling purposes. 

See id. at 201.

In this case, the limitations period began on April 21, 2005, the day after his conviction became

final. When Petitioner filed his first state habeas petition on February 14, 2006, three-hundred days of

limitations period expired with sixty-five days remaining. The limitations period was tolled from

February 14, 2006 until April 6, 2006, the day the San Diego Superior Court denied Petitioner’s first

state habeas petition partly for lack of evidentiary support and partly on the merits. At this point,

Petitioner presumably did not file his next habeas petition in state court but rather proceeded in federal

court with a habeas petition filed on June 2, 2006 and dismissed on exhaustion grounds on June 23,

2006. Pursuant to Duncan v. Walker, Petitioner would not be entitled to tolling during the pendency of

this untimely federal petition. 

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While the record does not reflect any state habeas petition pending during the time Petitioner

proceeded in federal court, it does show that a second habeas petition filed in San Diego Superior Court

was denied on the merits on March 26, 2007. Respondent submits that the interval between the denial of

Petitioner’s first state petition and the filing of the second state petition should not be tolled because

Petitioner proceeded in a disorderly fashion by inappropriately filing a petition in federal court first and

unreasonably delaying the filing of his second state petition for several months. (Doc. 7, at 7-9.) In

contrast, Petitioner argues that the limitations period should be tolled from the time he filed his first

habeas petition on February 14, 2006 until the California Supreme Court denied his final petition on

August 12, 2009. (Doc. 8, at 4.) Petitioner also argues that any delay in filing a particular habeas

petition can be explained by his lack of legal knowledge and his limited access to the legal library where

prisoners had to be escorted shackled in groups of six for three-hour periods twice daily. (Doc. 8, at 5.) 

Having considered both positions, the Court finds Respondent’s arguments more plausible and

persuasive. Although the record is not clear as to when Petitioner filed his second habeas petition in

state court, presumably more than sixty days elapsed between the denial of Petitioner’s first state habeas

petition and the filing of his second state petition, which was denied almost a year after the denial of his

first state habeas petition. Such a prolonged time interval cannot be used for tolling purposes absent

sufficient justification for the delay. Petitioner explains away any delay on his lack of legal knowledge

and his limited but available access to the law library, but, pursuant to Evans v. Chavis, these are not

sufficient justifications to make statutory interval tolling available to him in this instance. Thus, the

Court believes that the limitations period expired right around June 10, 2006 and that the instant petition

is untimely absent equitable tolling.

Even assuming that Petitioner is entitled to statutory interval tolling between the denial of his

first state habeas petition and the filing of his second state petition, Petitioner would also have to justify

other long gaps between the filings of his other state habeas petitions to be entitled to a sufficient amount

of statutory tolling. For instance, in September 2007, Petitioner filed a state habeas petition in the

California Court of Appeal, which denied the petition on the merits on January 30, 2008. Petitioner filed

his next state habeas petition on October 6, 2008 in that same court, which rejected it as repetitive and

successive of Petitioner’s prior petitions. In other words, Petitioner waited over eight months from the

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denial of one state petition to file his next petition, which the state court explicitly deemed untimely. 

Pursuant to Evans v. Chavis, the period of time from the court of appeal’s January 30, 2008 denial of

one of his habeas petitions and the October 6, 2008 filing of his next state habeas petition cannot be

counted for statutory interval tolling purposes because the state court explicitly deemed this petition

untimely and Petitioner has not justified the delay. Thus, even assuming the limitations period was

tolled from the February 14, 2006 filing of his first state petition until the court of appeal’s January 30,

2008 denial of one of his other habeas petitions, the limitations period would have expired sixty-five

days later on April 4, 2008 when no habeas petition was currently “pending.” Under this scenario, as

Petitioner did not file the instant federal habeas petition until October 27, 2009, it still would be

untimely absent equitable tolling. 

C. Petitioner is Not Entitled to Equitable Tolling 

Respondent argues that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate a basis for equitable tolling. (Doc. 7-

1, at 11.) Petitioner argues that he is entitled to equitable tolling because he has been pursuing habeas

relief diligently from final judgment until the filing of the instant petition. (Doc. 8, at 4.) He argues that

any instance of untimeliness can be attributed to his lack of legal knowledge and his limited access to the

legal library where prisoners had to be escorted shackled in groups of six for three-hour periods twice

daily. (Doc. 8, at 5.) 

The U.S. Supreme Court has established a two-part test to determine whether a petitioner is

entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. In Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005),

the Court held that a litigant seeking equitable tolling of the statute of limitations bears the burden of

establishing (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently and, (2) that some extraordinary

circumstance stood in his way. Id. at 418. Equitable tolling of the one-year statute of limitations is

available only when extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a

petition on time and the extraordinary circumstances were the cause of the untimeliness. Spitsyn v.

Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003). Institutional lockdowns resulting in restricted but available

access to the law library do not constitute extraordinary circumstances that warrant equitable tolling. 

See Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2009). Similarly, “‘ignorance of the law alone is not

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sufficient to warrant equitable tolling.’” Allen v. Yukins, 366 F.3d 396, 403 (6th Cir. 2004) (citation

omitted); see Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Here, although Petitioner has stated generally that prison lockdowns and his lack of legal

knowledge contributed to the delays in filing his various habeas petitions in state court and, ultimately,

the filing of the instant Petition, these difficulties do not excuse his failure to pursue his habeas filings in

a timely fashion. Because he has not shown with specificity that he faced any extraordinary impediment

that made it impossible for him to file any of his petitions in a timely and diligent manner, Petitioner is

not entitled to equitable tolling. Accordingly, the instant Petition must be dismissed as untimely. 

IV.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons outlined above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court issue an

Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation, and (2) directing that Judgment be

entered granting the motion to dismiss and dismissing the Petition with prejudice. The Court submits

this Report and Recommendation to United States Chief District Judge Thomas J. Whelan under 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 72.1(c)(1)(c) of the United States District Court for the

Southern District of California. 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than July 23, 2010, any party to this action may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court and

served on all parties no later than July 30, 2010. The parties are advised that failure to file objections

within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. 

See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th

Cir. 1991).

DATED: July 2, 2010

Peter C. Lewis

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

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