Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-02922/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-02922-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Robert L. Berry )

)

Plaintiff, ) No. CIV 04-2922 PHX RCB

)

vs. ) O R D E R 

)

John E. Potter, Postmaster )

General, U.S. Postal Service )

)

Defendant. ) )

On December 17, 2004, Plaintiff filed suit against the United

States Postal Service (the "Postal Service"), alleging that he was

improperly denied a promotion either on the basis of his age or in

retaliation for previous complaints filed with the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") in violation of the Age

Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") and Title VII. Compl.

(doc. # 1). On July 15, 2005, the United States filed a Motion to

Dismiss for Improper Venue, or in the Alterative to Transfer Case

(doc. # 9), arguing that the proper forum for Plaintiff's Title VII

claim is the Northern District of Ohio, not the District of

Arizona. Plaintiff opposes transfer. Resp. (doc. # 10). Having 

Case 2:04-cv-02922-RCB Document 14 Filed 02/14/06 Page 1 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

carefully considered the arguments raised, the Court now rules.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, born 1952, Compl. (doc. #1) at 2, has apparently

been in the employ of the Postal Service for the past thirty years,

and becomes eligible for retirement in October 2007, Resp. (doc. #

10) at 3. He currently serves at a duty post in Glendale, Arizona

as the Manager of Remote Encoding Operations, a position he has

held since 1995. See id. at 2-3.

During his employment with the Postal Service over the years,

Plaintiff filed complaints with the EEOC. The most recent of these

complaints concerns his non-selection for a Plant Manager position

in Akron, Ohio, which is at the center of the present controversy. 

Compl. (doc. # 1) at 2; Resp. (doc. # 10) at 1-2. Following two

and a half years of additional training and work assignments,

Plaintiff was listed as "ready" to assume the responsibilities of

the position, but was ultimately passed over for the promotion in

favor of a thirty-five-year-old candidate who was listed as "not

ready." Compl. (doc. # 1) at 2. After exhausting administrative

remedies, Plaintiff filed the present action alleging that the

Postal Service improperly discriminated against him either on the

basis of his age or in retaliation for his previous EEOC complaints

in violation of the ADEA and Title VII.

II. DISCUSSION

The United States contends that Plaintiff's Complaint should

be dismissed for improper venue pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(3) because the District of Arizona is not a proper

forum for Plaintiff's Title VII claim. Mot. (doc. # 9) at 2-3. 

Alternatively, the United States petitions the Court to transfer

Case 2:04-cv-02922-RCB Document 14 Filed 02/14/06 Page 2 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 The Title VII venue statute explicitly recognizes the

possibility of venue transfers pursuant to sections 1404 and 1406.

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).

- 3 -

this case to the Northern District of Ohio pursuant to either 28

U.S.C. § 1406(a) or 1404(a).1 Id. at 3-5.

A. Motion to Transfer Venue

A transfer request pursuant to section 1406(a) necessarily

turns upon the same underlying issue as a motion to dismiss

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3)-- whether the action lays venue in the

wrong judicial district. The Court will therefore begin its

discussion by turning to the United States' request to transfer

venue pursuant to section 1406(a).

1. Transfer Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a)

Under section 1406(a), "a case laying venue in the wrong

division or district" must either be dismissed, "or if it be in the

interest of justice," transferred "to any division or district in

which it could have been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). Before

examining the propriety of venue in this District, however, the

Court will address the United States' pending request for leave to

file a sur-reply (doc. # 13) directed to that issue.

a. The United States' Request for Leave to File a Sur-Reply

Plaintiff has filed an unauthorized second response (doc. #

12) in which he argues that venue is appropriate in this District

under the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e). The United

States is correct in noting that a party is generally entitled to

only one responsive memorandum, and that Plaintiff should therefore

be barred from raising new arguments in his unauthorized second

response. See Mot. to Disregard Pl.'s Additional Resp. (doc. #

Case 2:04-cv-02922-RCB Document 14 Filed 02/14/06 Page 3 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

13). Alternatively, the United States petitions the Court for

leave to file a sur-reply. Id. 

For present purposes, the Court can conclude that Plaintiff's

argument under section 1391(e) would fail without inviting any

further response from the United States. The appropriate venue for

Plaintiff's Title VII claim must be determined based on 42 U.S.C. §

2000e-5(f)(3), not 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e). This is because the

general venue statute upon which Plaintiff relies is only operative

"except as otherwise provided by law," and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(f)(3) provides otherwise for Title VII claims. Accordingly, the

United States' motion (doc. # 13), construed as a request for leave

to file a sur-reply, shall be denied and dismissed as moot.

b. Proper Venue for Plaintiff's Title VII Claim

The fora available to Plaintiff for his Title VII claim must

be determined in view of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) and its

interpretive case law. Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), a Title

VII claim may be brought in any judicial district in a state "in

which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been

committed, . . . in which the employment records relevant to such

practice are maintained and administered, or . . . in which the

aggrieved person would have worked but for the alleged unlawful

employment practice." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3); Johnson v.

Payless Drug Stores, N.W. Inc., 950 F.2d 586, 587 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Otherwise, the action may be brought in any judicial district where

the defendant keeps its principal office. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(f)(3). The Ninth Circuit has held that, in failure-to-promote

cases under Title VII, "venue is proper in both the forum where the

employment decision is made and the forum in which that decision is

Case 2:04-cv-02922-RCB Document 14 Filed 02/14/06 Page 4 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

implemented or its effects are felt [by the plaintiff]." 

Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Prods., 212 F.3d 493, 506

(9th Cir. 2000).

In Passantino, a plaintiff who worked in Tacoma, Washington

alleged that she had been repeatedly passed over for several

promotions because of her gender. Id. at 499-500. The defendant

argued that New Jersey was the only permissible venue because that

was where the promotional decision was actually made. Id. at 504. 

The Ninth Circuit observed that such a narrow reading of the venue

rule would lead to the perverse result that, while other Title VII

complainants could sue where they were employed, those complaining

of a failure to promote would be required to litigate in far-away

places any time an adverse promotional decision was made in a more

distant office. See id. at 505. The court noted that the

increased burden of litigating in a federal court on the other side

of the country would be "inconsistent with the beneficent purposes

of Title VII. Id. Because "[p]laintiffs unlawfully denied a

promotion, like those discharged, feel the effects of their injury

where they actually work," the court concluded that venue was

proper in the Western District of Washington. Id.

In the instant case, the United States maintains that venue is

not appropriate in this District primarily because (1) the alleged

unlawful employment practice-- presumably the adverse promotional

decision-- was committed by officials in Akron, and (2) Plaintiff

would have worked in Akron but for the adverse promotional

decision. See Mot. (doc. # 9) at 3. Both of these arguments fail.

It is clear from Passantino that the seat of power from which

an employer makes its employment decisions is not dispositive on

Case 2:04-cv-02922-RCB Document 14 Filed 02/14/06 Page 5 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 The declaration attached to the United States' motion alludes

to Plaintiff's past work in Cleveland, Ohio, but does not specify the

time period of his tenure at that office. See Mot. (doc. # 9), Ex.

A ("Breault Decl.") ¶ 5 (anticipated testimony of Michael B. Potts

concerning Plaintiff's work at the Processing and Distribution Center

in Cleveland, Ohio). Without a more specific reference to time, and

in the absence of any challenge to Plaintiff's assertion that he has

worked in Arizona for the past ten years, the Court must conclude

that the United States concedes that Plaintiff was employed in

Arizona during that time.

- 6 -

the issue of venue in Title VII cases when the aggrieved employee

works in a different state than the powers that control the

employee's advancement. While an unlawful employment practice may

literally occur at a decision making level in another office, it

will also be deemed to occur for venue purposes where the plaintiff

works and suffers injury. Therefore, even if the decision not to

promote Plaintiff was made by officials in Akron, that only

establishes the Northern District of Ohio as one possibility for

venue. Another forum contemplated by Passantino is any judicial

district in the state in which Plaintiff was working at the time

the adverse promotional decision was made-- in this case, Arizona.

Plaintiff's response reflects that he was working in Glendale,

Arizona at the time he was most likely passed over for promotion. 

Plaintiff maintains that he has been working as the Postal

Service's Manager of Remote Encoding Operations in Glendale for the

past ten years. See Resp. (doc. # 10) at 2-3. The United States

does not refute Plaintiff's assertion that he has been working in

Arizona for this period and, in fact, acknowledges his present

employment there.2 See id. at 3. Although the decision not to

offer Plaintiff the promotion may have been made in Akron,

Plaintiff would have felt the effect of his injury in Arizona where

Case 2:04-cv-02922-RCB Document 14 Filed 02/14/06 Page 6 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

he was apparently working when the decision was made. Therefore,

under Passantino, both the Northern District of Ohio and the

District of Arizona are appropriate venues for the Title VII claim.

Because venue appears to be proper in this District based on

the arguments raised, the United States' motion to transfer venue

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) must be denied at this time. 

However, because venue would also be appropriate in the Northern

District of Ohio, the Court must consider whether transfer is

appropriate under section 1404(a).

2. Transfer Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)

Under section 1404(a), "a district court may transfer any

civil action to any other district . . . where it might have been

brought" when "the convenience of parties and witnesses" or "the

interest of justice" so requires. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The

decision of whether to transfer a case is within the broad

discretion of the district court. Jones v. GNC Franchising, Inc.,

211 F.3d 495, 498 (9th Cir. 2000). Such decisions require

"individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience and

fairness." Stewart Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988)

(citation omitted). Based on the parties' arguments, the factors

most relevant to the analysis of the present motion (doc. # 9)

include (1) Plaintiff's choice of forum; (2) public interest in

local adjudication of local controversies; (3) convenience of the

parties and witnesses; (4) the availability of compulsory process

to compel attendance of unwilling non-party witnesses; (5) the

differences in the costs of litigation in the two forums; and (6)

ease of access to sources of proof. See Jones 211 F.3d at 498. 

While these factors derive from the law of forum non conveniens,

Case 2:04-cv-02922-RCB Document 14 Filed 02/14/06 Page 7 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 -

section 1404(a) provides for greater flexibility and discretion. 

See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 253 (1982).

The moving party bears the burden of establishing that the

balance of conveniences favors transfer. Commodity Futures Trading

Comm'n v. Savage, 611 F.2d 270, 279 (9th Cir. 1979). "The

defendant must make a strong showing of inconvenience to warrant

upsetting the plaintiff's choice of forum." Decker Coal Co. v.

Commonwealth Edison Co., 805 F.2d 834, 843 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Moreover, transfer must alleviate rather than merely shift

inconvenience to another party. Id.

1. Plaintiff's Choice of Forum

Great weight is generally accorded a plaintiff's choice of

forum. Lou v. Belzberg, 834 F.2d 730, 739 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing 

Tex. E. Transmission Corp. v. Marine Office-Appleton & Cox Corp.,

579 F.2d 561, 567 (10th Cir. 1978)). This is particularly so in

cases arising under Title VII, which is governed by a venue statute

generally perceived as expanding the fora available to plaintiffs. 

Cf. Passantino, 212 F.3d at 504 (finding that Title VII's broad

venue provision "was necessary to support the desire of Congress to

afford citizens full and easy redress of civil rights grievances")

(citation omitted). When a more permissive venue statute applies,

the Ninth Circuit has held that the plaintiff's choice of forum is

entitled to greater deference as a matter of law. See, e.g., Sec.

Investor Prot. Corp. v. Vigman, 764 F.2d 1309, 1317 (9th Cir. 1985)

(because the securities laws afford many options for venue,

defendants would have to make a stronger showing in order to

disturb the plaintiffs' choice of forum).

Although Plaintiff's choice of forum for his Title VII claim

Case 2:04-cv-02922-RCB Document 14 Filed 02/14/06 Page 8 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

 The Court is aware that personal jurisdiction disputes and

venue disputes often turn on different issues. However, where the

public interest of a state has led courts to conclude that the

exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant would

comport with due process, this fact is illuminating as to the similar

public interest considerations raised by section 1404(a). See

Passantino, 212 F.3d at 505, n.8 ("Although we recognize that the

issues involved in personal jurisdiction disputes are different from

the issues involved in venue disputes, it is clear that if exercising

- 9 -

may be similarly entitled to greater deference as a matter of law,

this view must be tempered by the fact that Plaintiff's ADEA claim,

which is governed only by the general venue statute, would not

command the same level of deference. Nevertheless, for the reasons

explained more fully below, the Court is satisfied that the United

States has made a sufficiently strong showing that the conveniences

warrant transfer, notwithstanding the greater level of deference

contemplated by Passantino and Vigman.

2. Public Interest in Adjudication of Local Controversies

When an incident takes place within a judicial district,

courts often find there is a public interest in hearing the case

locally. Residents within the Northern District of Ohio would

assuredly take a keen interest in staffing matters at the Postal

Service's Processing and Distribution Center in Akron. However,

the Court must also remain sensitive to the interest of Arizona in

providing a forum for the protection of its residents including

Plaintiff. Cf. Haisten v. Grass Valley Med. Reimbursement Fund,

784 F.2d 1392, 1399 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that jurisdiction was

proper even though the defendant had absolutely no physical contact

with the forum state, because the defendant's policies had effects

in the state, and because the state had an interest in providing a

forum for the protection of its residents).3

 Accordingly, the

Case 2:04-cv-02922-RCB Document 14 Filed 02/14/06 Page 9 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

personal jurisdiction over a particular defendant would comport with

due process, this fact provides support for reading an otherwise

ambiguous venue statute in harmony with the jurisdictional rule.").

- 10 -

Court concludes that the local interest in hearing this case in the

Northern District of Ohio, on its own, is insufficient to supersede

both the countervailing public interest of Arizona and the great

deference accorded Plaintiff's choice of forum.

3. Convenience of the Witnesses

The majority of the Postal Service's anticipated fact

witnesses reside or work within or near the Northern District of

Ohio. Prospective witnesses with personal knowledge of the

circumstances surrounding the selection process for the Akron Plant

Manager position include the following Postal Service employees: 

• Kenneth F. Winters Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

• Susan L. Marsh Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

• David M. Patterson Buffalo, New York

• Thomas F. Kelley Columbus, Ohio

• Phillip R. Sindelar, Jr. Painseville, Ohio

• Christopher H. Smith Warrendale, Pennsylvania

Breault Decl ¶ 5. However, as each remains in the Postal Service's

employ, their location does not mandate transfer. The Court

presumes the Postal Service can compel their attendance at trial in

Arizona. See STX, Inc. v. Trils Stik, Inc., 708 F. Supp. 1551,

1556 (N.D. Col. 1988) (citing Galonis v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 498 F.

Supp. 789, 793 (D. N.H. 1980)) (discounting inconvenience to

party's employee-witnesses who can be compelled to testify).

In addition, the United States anticipates calling the

following former Postal Service employees:

Case 2:04-cv-02922-RCB Document 14 Filed 02/14/06 Page 10 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 11 -

• Norman M. Callhoun Indianapolis, Indiana

• Sernia P. Richardson Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

• Gary McCurdy Cranberry Township, Pennsylvania

• Judson Zernechel Canton, Ohio

• Michael B. Potts Copely, Ohio

Id. Because these individuals are no longer employees of the

Postal Service, they cannot be compelled to appear at trial. On

the other hand, transfer would bring at least two of the

prospective nonparty witnesses, Zernechel and Potts, within the

subpoena power of the Northern District of Ohio. See Fed. R. Civ.

P. 45(c)(3)(B)(iii).

Plaintiff in turn emphasizes four prospective witnesses whom

he contends are important to his case-- an argument he raises for

the first time in an unauthorized second response. See Second

Resp. (doc. # 12) at 2. He fails, however, to indicate the names

of any of his prospective witnesses, the basis of their knowledge,

the anticipated subject matter of their testimony, or their

affiliation, if any, with the Postal Service. See id. Even if the

Court were to consider Plaintiff's untimely argument, the scant

information he has provided tends more to support transfer than to

demonstrate any significant value in retaining venue in this

District. At least two of his prospective witnesses reside outside

Arizona, see Second Resp. (doc. # 12) at 2, placing them beyond the

reach of compulsory process in this Court if they were indeed

nonparty witnesses, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(3)(B)(iii). 

Moreover, transfer to the Northern District of Ohio would most

likely alleviate any inconvenience for Plaintiff's prospective

witness or witnesses located in Washington, D.C.

Case 2:04-cv-02922-RCB Document 14 Filed 02/14/06 Page 11 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 12 -

In short, Plaintiff belatedly suggests that the convenience of

his prospective witnesses should discourage transfer, but provides

no information about these individuals or their anticipated

testimony. In contrast, the evidence before the Court demonstrates

that the individuals identified by the United States can testify to

the merits of Plaintiff's claims based on their personal knowledge

of the selection process for the Plant Manager position in Akron. 

See Williams v. Bowman, 157 F. Supp. 2d 1103, (N.D. Cal. 2001)

(similarly finding that although both parties identified witnesses

in both districts, defendants identified individuals that would

likely testify to the merits of the lawsuit, indicating this factor

weighed in defendants' favor); see also Tel. Mgmt. Corp. v.

Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 5 F. Supp. 2d 896, 898 (transferring

venue in a contract case to the district where individuals who

worked on the contract at issue were located, including retired

individuals no longer subject to compulsory trial attendance). 

Furthermore, for all that appears, the transfer sought by the

United States would most likely alleviate any inconvenience to

Plaintiff's prospective witness or witnesses located in Washington,

D.C. Finally, while only Kelley, Potts, Sindelar, and Zernechel

reside in Ohio, the Court finds it would be more convenient for the

other individuals to travel to Ohio in lieu of Arizona. See Int'l

Comfort Prods. v. Hanover House Indus., Inc., 739 F. Supp. 503, 506

(D. Ariz. 1989) (transferring suit to Pennsylvania where

defendants' witnesses resided primarily there and in New York).

Accordingly, the Court concludes that the convenience of the

witnesses weighs heavily in favor of the transfer sought by the

United States. See id. at 507 ("The most critical factor to review

Case 2:04-cv-02922-RCB Document 14 Filed 02/14/06 Page 12 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 13 -

is the convenience of the witnesses.") (citing L.A. Mem'l Coliseum

v. Nat'l Football League, 89 F.R.D. 497 (C.D. Cal. 1981)).

4. Availability of Compulsory Process

Of the five prospective nonparty witnesses identified by the

United States, none reside in Arizona. Breault Decl. ¶ 5. Because

all of these individuals would fall outside the subpoena power of

any court in this District, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(3)(B)(iii),

this factor offers no justification for this Court to retain venue.

Although the United States acknowledges that three of its five

prospective nonparty witnesses currently reside in Pennsylvania and

Indiana, it is apparent that the remaining two individuals would at

least be subject to compulsory process in the Northern District of

Ohio. See Breault Decl. ¶ 5; Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(3)(B)(iii). 

Finally, at least two of Plaintiff's prospective witnesses reside

outside Arizona, see Second Resp. (doc. # 12) at 2, and would lie

beyond the reach of compulsory process in this Court if they were

nonparty witnesses, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(3)(B)(iii). 

Therefore, on balance, this factor favors transfer.

5. Costs of Litigation

The most significant witnesses-- those with personal knowledge

of the selection process for the Akron Plant Manager position-- all

reside in and around the Northern District of Ohio. See Breault

Decl. ¶ 5. Although Defendant would have to spend more money to

discover evidence and to secure the attendance of these witnesses

were the case to be tried in this Court, so too may Plaintiff whose

prospective witnesses reside not only in Arizona, but also in

Colorado and Washington, D.C. See Second Resp. (doc. # 12) at 2. 

On the other hand, Plaintiff contends that he would deplete a

Case 2:04-cv-02922-RCB Document 14 Filed 02/14/06 Page 13 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

 The United States correctly notes that the Title VII venue

statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3), is only concerned with those

records relating to the alleged unlawful employment practice. See

Reply (doc. # 11) at 3. However, under section 1404(a), the Court

must consider the ease of access to all relevant sources of proof.

In this instance, although Plaintiff's employment files and EEOC

filings are incapable of establishing venue, they may nevertheless

become relevant for other purposes at trial.

- 14 -

year's worth of annual leave, thus impairing his retirement plans,

if he were to continue proceeding pro se after a transfer to the

Northern District of Ohio. Resp. (doc. # 10) at 3. Because the

transfer sought by the United States would merely shift rather than

eliminate the inconvenience of litigation costs, this factor

neither favors nor disfavors transfer. See Decker Coal Co., 805

F.2d at 843.

6. Ease of Access to Sources of Proof

In assessing the relative inconvenience to the parties in

gaining access to relevant sources of proof, the Court recognizes

that documentary evidence is substantially less costly to produce

than witness testimony. In the present case, however, none of the

documentary evidence referenced in the parties' briefs is located

in this District. The books and records concerning the selection

process for the Plant Manager position in Akron are maintained and

administered in the Postal Service's Eastern Area offices in

Pittsburgh. Breault Decl. ¶ 3. In addition, Plaintiff's

employment files and the files related to his previous EEOC

complaints are kept in Denver, Colorado and Ashburn, Virginia.4

See Resp. (doc. # 10) at 2. Although the various records are all

located outside the Northern District of Ohio, the Court finds that

they would be more conveniently transported to that venue in lieu

Case 2:04-cv-02922-RCB Document 14 Filed 02/14/06 Page 14 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 15 -

of Arizona. Moreover, in the case at hand, transfer would most

likely improve rather than impede Plaintiff's access to the stated

sources of proof. For example, should the EEOC filings become

relevant to Plaintiff's Title VII claim of retaliation, transfer

would actually alleviate any inconvenience to Plaintiff of locating

and transporting the appropriate files from Virginia, which is much

nearer to the Northern District of Ohio than to this District. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that this factor also favors transfer.

In sum, the Court begins from a position affording great

deference to Plaintiff's choice of forum on account of the more

permissive venue provisions of Title VII. However, this deference

can be overcome by a particularly strong showing that the

conveniences favor transfer, and the Court finds that the United

States has met this heavy burden here. From the evidence

presented, the Court concludes that the convenience of the

witnesses, the availability of compulsory process, and the ease of

access to sources of proof all point toward the Northern District

of Ohio as the most appropriate venue for this case. Therefore,

the United States' motion to transfer (doc. # 9) will be granted.

B. Motion to Dismiss for Improper Venue

Also before the Court is the United States' motion to dismiss

(doc. # 9) pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, which allows a party to seek dismissal of a complaint if

the action was initiated in an improper venue. Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(3). As discussed above at Part II.A.1.b, supra, the evidence

before the Court shows that the District of Arizona is a proper

venue for Plaintiff's Title VII claim, a fact which would support a

denial of the Rule 12(b)(3) motion on its merits. In light of the

Case 2:04-cv-02922-RCB Document 14 Filed 02/14/06 Page 15 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 16 -

Court's order transferring this case to the Northern District of

Ohio pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), however, the Rule 12(b)(3)

motion must be denied as moot.

III. CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing analysis, the Court finds that venue

would be proper in the District of Arizona as well as the Northern

District of Ohio for both the ADEA claim and the Title VII claim of

Plaintiff's Complaint. However, the Court concludes that, pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), the case should be transferred to the

Northern District of Ohio for, inter alia, the convenience of the

witnesses. Therefore,

IT IS ORDERED that the United States' Motion to Dismiss for

Improper Venue, or in the Alternative to Transfer Case (doc. # 9)

is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the United States' motion to

transfer venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (doc. # 9) is

GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the United States' motion to

dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) (doc.

# 9) is DENIED as moot.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the United States' Motion to

Disregard Plaintiff's Additional Response to Defendant's Motion to

Dismiss (doc. # 13) is construed as a request to file a sur-reply

to Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Second Motion to Dismiss or

Transfer Case to Ohio (doc. # 12) and is DENIED as moot.

IT IS FINALLY ORDERED directing the Clerk of the Court to

. . . 

Case 2:04-cv-02922-RCB Document 14 Filed 02/14/06 Page 16 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 17 -

transfer this action to the Northern District of Ohio.

DATED this 10th day of February, 2006.

Copies to counsel of record and plaintiff pro se

Case 2:04-cv-02922-RCB Document 14 Filed 02/14/06 Page 17 of 17