Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00497/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00497-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Other Contract

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

Otashe Golden, M.D.,

Plaintiff,

v.

SOUND INPATIENT PHYSICIANS 

MEDICAL GROUP, INC., and DOES 1-

10, inclusive,

Defendants.

No. 2:14-cv-00497-TLN-EFB

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTIONS TO DISMISS

This matter is before the Court pursuant to Defendant Sound Inpatient Physicians Medical 

Group, Inc.’s (“Defendant”) Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 34.) Plaintiff Otashe Golden, M.D. 

(“Plaintiff”) filed an Opposition to Defendant’s motion. (ECF No. 44.) The Court has reviewed 

and considered the arguments in Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and Reply, along with Plaintiff’s 

Opposition. The Court hereby GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss with leave to amend. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff is the majority shareholder in California Hospitalist Physicians, Inc. (“CHP”). 

(ECF No. 34 at 6.) In 2009 CHP contracted with Dameron Hospital Association (“DHA”) to 

provide hospitalist services. (ECF No. 34 at 6.) The contract expired on April 4, 2012. (ECF 

No. 34 at 6.) Defendant was chosen to replace Plaintiff as the new hospitalist group for DHA. 

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(ECF No. 34 at 6.) DHA asked community physicians to work with Defendant. (ECF No. 34 at 

6.) 

In the Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) Plaintiff alleges that on April 4, 2012, she 

entered into agreements with several doctors to provide hospitalist services for their patients. 

(ECF No. 33 at ¶ 7.) 

Plaintiff allegedly provided a list to Defendant that contained the doctors that designated 

Plaintiff as the hospitalist for their patients. (ECF No. 33 at ¶ 8.) This list was posted in the 

Emergency Room. (ECF No. 33 at ¶ 9.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s Medical Director, 

Case Manager, and Hospitalist routinely instructed hospital staff to ignore the designation list and 

admit Plaintiff’s patients as Defendant’s patients. (ECF No. 33 at ¶ 10.) 

Plaintiff initially filed a complaint on February 18, 2014. (ECF No. 1.) The 

aforementioned complaint was dismissed because Plaintiff failed to specify proper jurisdiction. 

(ECF No. 13.) Plaintiff then filed the First Amended Complaint on April 28, 2014. (ECF No. 

14.) The First Amended Complaint again failed to plead Plaintiff’s citizenship and was 

dismissed. (ECF No. 32.) 

Plaintiff filed the Second Amended Complaint and Demand for a Jury Trial on July 29, 

2014, alleging interference with a prospective economic advantage, violation of California 

Business and Professions Code section 17200, and interference with the right to practice a 

profession. (ECF No. 33.) 

Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint is both factually and 

legally deficient, and thus moves this Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint 

with prejudice, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 34.) 

II. STANDARD OF LAW 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a pleading contain “a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009). Under notice pleading in federal court, the complaint must “give the 

defendant fair notice of what the claim . . . is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic 

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotations omitted). “This simplified notice 

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pleading standard relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define 

disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 

534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002). 

On a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true. 

Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). A court is bound to give plaintiff the benefit of every 

reasonable inference to be drawn from the “well-pleaded” allegations of the complaint. Retail 

Clerks Int’l Ass’n v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). A plaintiff need not allege 

“‘specific facts’ beyond those necessary to state his claim and the grounds showing entitlement to 

relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads 

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). 

Nevertheless, a court “need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of 

factual allegations.” United States ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 

1986). While Rule 8(a) does not require detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an 

unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A 

pleading is insufficient if it offers mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the 

elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 

(“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements, do not suffice.”). Moreover, it is inappropriate to assume that the plaintiff “can prove 

facts that it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not 

been alleged[.]” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 

459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). 

Ultimately, a court may not dismiss a complaint in which the plaintiff has alleged “enough 

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 697 (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Only where a plaintiff fails to “nudge[] [his or her] claims . . . across 

the line from conceivable to plausible[,]” is the complaint properly dismissed. Id. at 680. While 

the plausibility requirement is not akin to a probability requirement, it demands more than “a 

sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678. This plausibility inquiry is “a 

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context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and 

common sense.” Id. at 679. 

In ruling upon a motion to dismiss, the court may consider only the complaint, any 

exhibits thereto, and matters which may be judicially noticed pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Evidence 201. See Mir v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp., 844 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1988); Isuzu 

Motors Ltd. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1042 (C.D. Cal. 

1998).

If a complaint fails to state a plausible claim, “‘[a] district court should grant leave to 

amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading 

could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.’” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 

1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 484, 497 (9th Cir. 1995)); 

see also Gardner v. Marino, 563 F.3d 981, 990 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding no abuse of discretion in 

denying leave to amend when amendment would be futile). Although a district court should 

freely give leave to amend when justice so requires under Rule 15(a)(2), “the court’s discretion to 

deny such leave is ‘particularly broad’ where the plaintiff has previously amended its 

complaint[.]” Ecological Rights Found. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 713 F.3d 502, 520 (9th Cir. 

2013) (quoting Miller v. Yokohama Tire Corp., 358 F.3d 616, 622 (9th Cir. 2004)). 

III. ANALYSIS 

Plaintiff alleges interference with a prospective economic advantage (Count I), a violation 

of California Business and Professions Code section 17200 (Count II), and interference with the 

right to practice a profession (Count III). (ECF No. 33.) The Court dismisses Count I, Count II, 

and Count III with leave to amend. The Court addresses each of Plaintiff’s Causes of Action 

separately below. 

a. Interference with a Prospective Economic Advantage (Count I) 

Plaintiff’s first cause of action alleges interference with a prospective economic 

advantage. The elements for such a claim are as follows: (1) an economic relationship between 

the plaintiff and some third party, with the probability of future economic benefit to the plaintiff; 

(2) the defendant’s knowledge of the relationship; (3) intentional acts on the part of the defendant 

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designed to disrupt the relationship; (4) actual disruption of the relationship; and (5) economic 

harm to the plaintiff proximately caused by the acts of the defendant. Korea Supply Co. v. 

Lockheed Martin Corp., 29 Cal. 4th 1134, 1153 (2003); Buckaloo v. Johnson, 14 Cal. 3d 815, 827 

(1975). Defendant asserts that: (1) Plaintiff failed to establish an economic relationship between 

herself and a third party with the probability of future economic benefit; (2) Defendant has not 

alleged to have nor has committed any intentional act; and (3) Defendant has not interfered with 

any existing relationship between Plaintiff and a third party. (ECF No. 34 at 2.) 

The Court finds that Plaintiff has met elements (2), (4) and (5) 1and thus, focuses its 

analysis on elements (1) and (3). 

i. Economic relationship between plaintiff and some third party with the probability of 

future economic benefit to the plaintiff 

Defendant alleges that Plaintiff has not established an economic relationship or probability 

of future relationship. (ECF No. 34 at 2). Plaintiff bases her claim upon agreements she alleges 

she entered into with several doctors. (ECF No. 33 at ¶ 7.) 

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claim for interference with a prospective economic 

advantage fails because Plaintiff failed to establish intentional interference based upon a contract 

and because Plaintiff failed to attach or allege the substance of the contract. (ECF No. 34 at 10.) 

In order to establish intentional interference based upon a contract, a party is required to: (1) set 

out the written contract in verbatim in the complaint; (2) attach the contract as an exhibit; or (3) 

plead in full in accordance with the contract’s legal effect. Staples v. Arthur Murray, 253 Cal. 

App. 2d 507, 513 (1967). Defendant incorrectly argues that Plaintiff was required to have a 

legally binding contract. However, interference with a prospective economic advantage, a tort 

that similarly compensates for the loss of an advantageous economic relationship, does not 

require the existence of a legally binding contract. Reeves v. Hanlon, 33 Cal. 4th 1140, 1152 

(2004). Thus, Plaintiff was not required to have a legally binding contract to bring this particular

 

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 The Court finds that Plaintiff has properly pleaded the following: (2) that there was knowledge of the relationship 

(ECF No. 33 at 13); (4) there was an actual disruption of the relationship (ECF No. 33 at ¶ 15); and (5) that Plaintiff 

suffered economic harm as a result of Defendant allegedly instructing staff to ignore the designation list. (ECF No. 

33 at ¶¶ 10 &16.) 

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claim. 

Further, Defendant argues that Plaintiff failed to establish an economic relationship 

between herself and an identifiable third party. (ECF No. 34 at 10.) However, Plaintiff 

specifically pleaded that she entered into a relationship with several doctors, who were third 

parties to Plaintiff’s relationship with Defendant. (ECF No. 33 at ¶ 7.) Defendant relies on the 

reasoning in Roth v. Rhodes, 25 Cal. App. 4th 530, 546 (1995). In Roth the court explained that a 

party cannot maintain a claim where the existing relationship is speculative. Id. However, 

Plaintiff alleged that she entered into a relationship with several named doctors, which was more 

than the speculative nature of the unknown patients in Roth. Plaintiff is not required to allege 

“‘specific facts’ beyond those necessary to state [her] claim.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. By 

stating that she entered into agreements with doctors, Plaintiff met the burden of providing the 

necessary facts to allege that she had an economic relationship between herself and the doctors.

Defendant relies on Westside Ctr. Assoc. v. Safeway Stores 23, Inc., 42 Cal. App. 4th 507, 

525 (1996) to argue that Plaintiff did not demonstrate “the existence of a specific economic 

relationship.” (ECF No. 34 at 9.) In Westside, the court described how the defendant’s tortious 

conduct must interfere with a specific existing relationship using the precedent set forth in 

Rickards v. Canine Eye Registration Fdtn., Inc., 704 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1983). Westside, 42 Cal. 

App. 4th at 525. In Rickards, the plaintiffs were veterinarians who could not acquire the 

certification necessary to perform eye examinations in order to list dogs in the defendant’s 

registry of canine eye diseases. Rickards, 704 F.2d at 1452. The plaintiffs alleged that the 

defendant’s establishment of the registry disrupted the veterinarians’ economic relationship with 

dog owners. Id. The court affirmed a directed verdict for the defendants stating that the evidence 

failed to establish “the existence of a specific economic relationship between [the plaintiff] and 

third parties . . . .” Id. at 1456 (emphasis added). The court concluded that the veterinarians had 

no specific relationship with potential registry clients, and their lack of certification did not 

interfere with an “ongoing business relationship” between the veterinarians and their regular 

clients, who continued to see them for other purposes. Id. According to the Rickards court, a 

defendant’s tortious conduct must interfere with a specific existing relationship, not simply with 

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the formation of one in the future. Id.; see also Westside Ctr. Assoc., 42 Cal. App. 4th at 525. 

Plaintiff specifically claimed that she had an economic relationship with the specified 

doctors. (ECF No. 33 at ¶ 12.) Plaintiff’s claim is distinguishable from an unknown group of 

speculative future patients with no actual agreement in place. The plaintiffs in the cases that 

Defendant cites only speculated about future economic relationships. See Westside Ctr. Assoc. v. 

Safeway Stores 23, Inc., 42 Cal. App. 4th 507, 525 (1996) (Plaintiff did not succeed where the 

economic relationship was purely hypothetical). However, here Plaintiff is alleging specific, 

current economic relationships with named doctors. 

Plaintiff also has the burden of proving that there was the probability of economic benefit 

with a third party. Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 29 Cal. 4th 1134, 1153 (2003); 

Buckaloo v. Johnson, 14 Cal. 3d 815, 827 (1975). Defendant argues that Plaintiff failed to 

identify a future economic benefit. (ECF No. 24 at 11.) The law precludes recovery for overly 

speculative expectancies by initially requiring proof the business relationship contained “‘the 

probability of future economic benefit to the plaintiff.’” Westside, 42 Cal. App. 4th at 522 (citing 

Youst v. Longo, 43 Cal. 3d 64, 71 (1987)). Though it is necessary to infer that there would have 

been some benefit to the Plaintiff but for Defendant’s interference, “the chance the expectancy 

otherwise would have occurred is necessarily a matter of some uncertainty.” Westside, 42 Cal. 

App. 4th at 522. 

Plaintiff stated that she entered into agreements with a group of doctors that would allow 

her to provide hospitalist services to their patients. (ECF No. 33 at ¶ 7.) Plaintiff further alleges 

that Defendant explicitly instructed hospital staff to ignore the designation list that provided that 

the specific doctors’ patients would be directed to Plaintiff. (ECF No. 33 at ¶ 10.) The Court 

could infer that but for Defendant’s alleged interference, Plaintiff would have had the opportunity 

to work with the doctors that she had entered into agreements with, thus receiving the economic 

advantage of more patients. However, this is not readily apparent. Plaintiff does not provide any 

details about what the agreements entail, such as whether they were exclusive or not. 

Furthermore, it is unclear whether the economic benefit would have resulted from the relationship 

with the third party doctors, or the speculative relationship with unknown future patients. 

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Therefore, given the facts presented by Plaintiff, the Court notes that it is unclear whether 

Plaintiff has met her burden of establishing that she has an economic relationship with a third 

party with the probability of a future economic benefit. 

ii. Intentional acts on the part of the defendant designed to disrupt the relationship 

Defendant alleges that Plaintiff has not proven that Defendant has committed any 

intentional wrongful act. (ECF No. 34 at 11.) The Court agrees. 

“[T]he act of interference with prospective economic advantage is not tortious in and of 

itself.” Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 29 Cal. 4th 1134, 1159 (2003). To state a 

claim for intentional interference under California law, a plaintiff must allege that “the defendant 

engaged in an independently wrongful act,” that is “wrongful by some legal measure other than 

the act of interference itself.” Korea Supply Co., 29 Cal. 4th at 1153 (citing Della Penna v. 

Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 11 Cal. 4th 376, 393 (1995)). This is understood as an act 

“proscribed by some constitutional, statutory, regulatory, common law, or other determinable 

legal standard.” Korea Supply Co., 29 Cal. 4th at 1159. In Korea Supply Co., Korea Supply 

Company satisfied the independent wrongfulness requirement by alleging that the defendant 

engaged in bribery and offered sexual favors to key Korean officials in order to obtain a contract 

from the Republic of Korea. Id. The specific bribery alleged was independently unlawful under 

the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Id. Here, Plaintiff has not alleged any independently unlawful 

act. 

Plaintiff claims that certain individuals were instructed to ignore the designation list in 

favor of Defendant. (ECF No. 33 at ¶ 7.) However, “an act must be wrongful by some legal 

measure, rather than merely a product of an improper, but lawful, purpose or motive.” Korea 

Supply Co., 29 Cal. 4th at 1159, n. 11. Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendant’s conduct was 

independently wrongful by a legal measure beyond the interference. For example, Plaintiff has 

not alleged that Defendant violated any constitutional, statutory, regulatory, common law, or 

other determinable legal standard. See Korea Supply Co., 29 Cal. 4th at 1159. 

Further, “[t]he tort of intentional interference with prospective economic advantage is not 

intended to punish individuals or commercial entities for their choice of commercial relationships 

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or their pursuit of commercial objectives, unless their interference amounts to independently 

actionable conduct.” Id. at 1158-59. Interference based on lawful competition is not actionable. 

See generally Bed Bath & Beyond of La Jolla, Inc. v. La Jolla Village Square Venture Partners, 

52 Cal. App. 4th 867 (1997) (finding that plaintiff did not have a claim for intentional 

interference with prospective advantage when defendant competitor competed successfully for a 

lease). As Defendant correctly argues, Plaintiff has not alleged that her agreement with the 

doctors was exclusive so as to prevent any lawful competition. (ECF No. 34 at 12–13.) 

Defendant operated competing hospitalist services. Plaintiff has not alleged any contract 

or exclusive agreement that would preclude Defendant from participating in lawful competition. 

Thus, because Plaintiff has not stated an independently wrongful act beyond that of tortious 

interference, her claim must be dismissed with leave to amend. 

b. Violation of California Business and Professions Code Section 17200 et seq. (Count 

II)

Plaintiff’s second cause of action alleges violation of California’s Unfair Competition 

Law (“UCL”) pursuant to California Business and Professions Code Section 17200. (ECF No. 33 

at ¶ 17–20.) Defendant asserts that the claim is derivative of the other claims made in the 

Complaint, and as the other claims fail, this claim fails as a matter of law. (ECF No. 34 at 2.) 

Defendant argues that this Claim must be dismissed because Plaintiff has failed to establish any 

independently actionable act to base the unfair competition claim upon. (ECF No. 34 at 14.) 

The UCL prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. § 

17200. “To bring a UCL claim, a plaintiff must show either an (1) unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent 

business act or practice, or (2) unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.” Lippitt v 

Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc., 340 F.3d 1033, 1043 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotations 

omitted); Gardner v. Am. Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc., 691 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1201 (E.D. Cal. 

2010). “[A] practice is prohibited as ‘unfair’ or ‘deceptive’ even if not ‘unlawful’ or vice versa.” 

Cel-Tech Communs., Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Tel. Co., 20 Cal. 4th 163, 180 (1999). 

i. “Unlawful” under the UCL

“By proscribing ‘any unlawful’ business practice, ‘section 17200 “borrows” violations of 

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other laws and treats them as unlawful practices’ that the unfair competition law makes 

independently actionable.” Belton v. Comcast Cable Holdings, LLC, 151 Cal. App. 4th 1224, 

1233 (2007) (citing Cel-Tech Communs., Inc., 20 Cal. 4th at 180). “[A] violation of another law 

is a predicate for stating a cause of action under the UCL’s unlawful prong.” Berryman v. Merit 

Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 152 Cal. App. 4th 1544, 1554 (2007). Where a plaintiff cannot state a claim 

under the “borrowed” law, it cannot state a UCL claim either. See, e.g., Ingels v. Westwood One 

Broadcasting Servs., Inc., 129 Cal. App. 4th 1050, 1060 (2005). 

Defendant is not liable under Bus. and Prof. Code section 17200 for committing ‘unlawful 

business practices’ without having violated another law. Ingels, 129 Cal. App. 4th 1050 at 1060. 

In Ingels the plaintiff’s underlying Unruh Act claim was dismissed, so there was no ‘unlawful’ 

act upon which to base the derivative Unfair Competition claim. Id. Here, Plaintiff has not 

alleged any ‘unlawful’ act to base the Unfair Competition claim upon. Thus, Plaintiff’s UCL 

claim cannot rest upon the UCL’s unlawful component. 

ii. “Fraudulent” under the UCL

Additionally, Plaintiff has not shown that Defendant engaged in any fraudulent conduct. 

“Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), a plaintiff pleading a claim of fraud, or any claim 

that is ‘grounded in fraud’ must ‘state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or 

mistake.’” Tuck Beckstoffer Wines LLC v. Ultimate Distribs., 682 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1019 (N.D. 

Cal. 2010) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)). “That is, the plaintiff must set forth with particularity the 

‘who, what, when, where, and how of the misconduct charged.’” Tuck Beckstoffer Wines LLC, 

682 F. Supp. 2d at 1019 (quoting Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 

2003)). The plaintiff must also allege the misrepresentations themselves with particularity. 

Moore v. Kayport Package Exp., Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 540 (9th Cir. 1989). “A pleading is 

sufficient under rule 9(b) if it identifies the circumstances constituting fraud so that a defendant 

can prepare an adequate answer from the allegations.” Id. Here, Plaintiff has not stated with 

particularity any circumstances constituting fraud. Plaintiff did not allege fraud and therefore did 

not satisfy rule 9(b). Therefore, Plaintiff’s UCL claim cannot succeed on the basis of fraudulent 

conduct.

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iii. “Unfair” under the UCL

“When a plaintiff who claims to have suffered injury from a direct competitor’s ‘unfair’ 

act or practice invokes section 17200, the word ‘unfair’ in that section means conduct that 

threatens an incipient violation of an antitrust law, or violates the policy or spirit of one of those 

laws because its effects are comparable to or the same as a violation of the law, or otherwise 

significantly threatens or harms competition.” Cel-Tech Comm’cns, Inc., 20 Cal. 4th at 187.

Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s conduct “violated the prohibitions of Business and 

Professions Code section 17200 et seq.” (ECF No. 33 ¶ at 19.) Even with the Court liberally 

construing the facts that Plaintiff has alleged, these facts do not amount to unfair conduct. 

Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendant acted “unfairly” under the UCL. Further, Plaintiff has not 

alleged any conduct that approaches a violation of an antitrust law or the policy or spirit of 

antitrust laws. See also Stevenson Real Estate Services, Inc. v. CB Richard Ellis Real Estate 

Services, Inc., 138 Cal. App. 4th 1215, 1225 (2006) (holding that the plaintiff’s pleading was 

insufficient when he failed to allege conduct approaching a violation of an antitrust law or the 

policy or spirit of antitrust laws). By failing to allege the grounds for which Plaintiff brought her 

UCL claim, Plaintiff has failed to give Defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds 

upon which it rests. Therefore, Plaintiff cannot succeed under the “unfair” prong of the UCL. 

Plaintiff’s claim for violations of the UCL cannot stand because Plaintiff has not alleged 

that Defendant has engaged in any unfair, fraudulent, or unlawful acts. Therefore, this claim is 

dismissed with leave to amend. 

c. Interference with the Right to Practice a Profession (Count III) 

Plaintiff’s third cause of action alleges Interference with the Right to Practice a 

Profession. In opposition, Defendant argues that (1) no such cause of action exists absent a 

complete prohibition on the right to practice a profession, and this cannot be alleged; and (2) 

Defendant has not and is not alleged to have committed any act that could be interpreted as 

interfering with Plaintiff’s right to practice in the medical profession. (ECF No. 34 at 2.) 

i. There must be a complete prohibition on the right to practice a profession to 

allege interference with the right to practice a profession 

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It is well established that a cause of action exists when “the right to pursue a lawful 

business, calling, trade, or occupation is intentionally interfered with either by unlawful means or 

by means otherwise lawful when there is a lack of sufficient justification.” Willis v. Santa Ana 

Cmty Hosp. Ass’n, 58 Cal. 2d 806, 810 (1962). A cause of action for intentional interference with 

the right to practice one’s profession “requires intentional and malicious acts designed to prevent 

the plaintiff from practicing her profession.” Love v. Permanente Med. Group, 2013 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 49750, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2013). There must be a complete prohibition on the right 

to practice a profession to allege interference with the right to practice a profession. See Love v. 

Permanente Med. Group, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49750, at *9-10 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2013) 

(holding that a motion to dismiss was appropriate when the plaintiff did not allege that the 

defendant had deprived her of other opportunities in her field); Feather River Anesthesia Med. 

Group v. Fremont-Rideout Med. Group, 2007 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 7004 (Cal. App. 3d Dist. 

Aug. 29, 2007) (holding that a claim for interference with the right to practice a profession can 

prevail where plaintiffs were unable to work in an entire geographical area). 

Plaintiff relies on the unpublished case Feather River Anesthesia Med. Group v. FremontRideout Med. Group, to argue that the claim of interference with the right to practice a profession 

is recognized as an independent claim in California. (ECF No. 44 at 5.) Defendant, however, 

correctly argues that Feather River is inapplicable because in order to successfully claim 

interference with the right to practice a profession there must be a complete prohibition on the 

right to practice a profession. (ECF No. 34 at 2.) 

The court in Feather River acknowledged that plaintiffs’ claim for interference with the 

right to practice a profession was sufficient. Feather River Anesthesia Med. Group v. FremontRideout Med. Group at *40. However, Feather River is distinguishable from this case. The 

plaintiffs in Feather River claimed that the defendants’ unlawful anticompetitive conduct caused 

them actual injury by preventing them from working in the entire citywide market. Id. at 40. 

Here, Plaintiff alleges that she was only prevented from practicing her profession at the named 

hospital. 

Further, in Love v. Permanente Med. Group, a motion to dismiss with leave to amend was 

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warranted when the plaintiff did not allege that the defendants deprived her of another 

opportunity to become employed in her field. Love, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49750, at *9-10. In 

Love, similar to here, the plaintiff’s allegations related solely to being deprived of the opportunity 

to work for her specific former employer. In the instant case, Plaintiff does not allege that 

Defendant interfered with Plaintiff’s right to practice medicine beyond the scope of the specific 

hospital in this case. Thus, this claim is dismissed with leave to amend. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to 

Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint as follows: 

1. COUNTS I, II, and III are DISMISSED with leave to amend. 

2. Plaintiff is granted 30 days from the date on which this Order is filed to file an amended 

complaint. 

3. Defendant shall file their responsive pleading within 21 days of service of the Third 

Amended Complaint. 

4. Plaintiff is further notified that this action may be dismissed with prejudice under Rule 

41(b) if she fails to file an amended complaint within the prescribed time period. 

5. If Plaintiff does not submit any amendments, this case will be closed. 

6. Plaintiff is notified that if the Third Amended Complaint cannot survive a 12(b)(6) 

motion, it will be dismissed with prejudice. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: March 13, 2015 

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