Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-02613/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-02613-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

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The caption has been amended to reflect the dismissal of 1

Defendant David Girard. (See Docket No. 68.)

This matter is deemed suitable for decision without oral 2

argument. E.D. Cal. R. 230(g).

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL THORNBROUGH,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

WESTERN PLACER UNIFIED SCHOOL

DISTRICT, SCOTT LEAMAN, KATHY

ALLEN, ROBERT NOYES 

 Defendants.1

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2:09-cv-02613-GEB-GGH

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO STAY2

On July 16, 2010, Defendants Western Placer Unified School

District, Scott Leaman, Kathy Allen and Robert Noyes (“Defendants”)

moved to stay this case until Plaintiff’s writ of mandate challenging

his termination, which was filed in California Superior Court, is

resolved. Defendants argue the outcome of Plaintiff’s writ proceeding

“will greatly affect the issues of discovery, any dispositive motions

and issues to be determined at . . .[t]rial” in Plaintiff’s federal

case and “[s]taying the [f]ederal action pending the outcome or final

determination of the [s]tate action w[ill] result in judicial economy

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and avoidance of prejudice . . . .” (Not. of Mot. to Stay 2:3-9.) 

Plaintiff did not file an opposition to Defendants’ stay motion. 

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges federal and state claims

related to his termination from employment with the Western Placer

Unified School District. Plaintiff’s claims stem from his allegations

that Defendants improperly initiated administrative proceedings

against him based on false charges, and wrongfully terminated him in

retaliation for his reporting of improper spending by, and

mismanagement within, the Western Placer Unified School District. 

Plaintiff was terminated after an administrative proceeding held

before a hearing officer, who issued findings and recommendations on

April 26, 2009, recommending that the Governing Board of the Western

Placer Unified School District terminate Plaintiff from employment. 

(Docket No. 68 9:24-28.) The hearing officer’s findings and

recommendations were adopted by the Western Placer Unified School

District Board on April 28, 2009 and Plaintiff was terminated. (Id.

10:1-3.) 

Prior to initiating this federal action, Plaintiff filed a

petition for writ of mandate in the California Superior Court in

Placer County, challenging the propriety of the hearing officer’s

findings and Plaintiff’s termination. (Henderson Decl. Feb. 22, 2010

¶ 13.) The state court writ proceeding remains pending at this time. 

Defendants’ counsel declares that he has been informed that the Placer

County Superior Court has scheduled a hearing on Plaintiff’s writ of

mandate for September 17, 2010. (Tonon Decl. 3:17-21.)

Defendants argue the federal court should exercise its

inherent power and stay this action under either the “Younger” or

“Colorado River” abstention doctrines. (Mot. to Stay 4-7.) 

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Defendants argue a stay would conserve judicial resources and avoid

duplicitous litigation since:

the final determination of the Petition for Writ

of Mandate filed in the Placer County Superior

Court . . . will affect the federal action. If

the Placer County Superior Court affirms the

Administrative Law Findings then the School

District Defendants have the argument pursuant to

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, . . . available

to them. If the Placer County Superior Court

grants the Plaintiff’s Petition for Writ of

Mandate, then the Plaintiff, . . . has a better

argument and another opportunity to prove that he

was wrongfully discharged. Either way waiting for

the resolution of the Petition for Writ of Mandate

in the Placer County Superior Court will define

the issues to be addressed in [the federal]

action.

(Id. 7:1-13.) Defendants, however, have not shown that either Younger

v. Harris, 401 U.S 37 (1971), or Colorado River Water Conservation

Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976) are applicable to this

case and warrant granting their stay motion. 

The aim of Younger abstention “is to avoid unnecessary

conflict between state and federal governments.” United States v.

Morros, 268 F.3d 695, 707 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v.

Composite State Bd. of Med. Examiners, 656 F.2d 131, 136 (5th Cir.

Unit B Sept. 1981)). Younger abstention, however, is not applicable

here because there is no ongoing “state-initiated proceeding”;

Plaintiff initiated the state court writ proceeding at issue. San

Jose Silicon Valley Chamber of Commerce Political Action Comm. v. City

of San Jose, 546 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating that the

presence of an ongoing “state-initiated proceeding” is one of four

requirements necessary for invoking Younger abstention).

“Under Colorado River, considerations of wise judicial

administration, giving regard to conservation of judicial resources

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and comprehensive disposition of litigation . . . may justify a

decision by the district court to stay federal proceedings pending the

resolution of concurrent state court proceedings involving the same

matter.” Holder v. Holder, 305 F.3d 854, 867 (9th Cir. 2002)

(citations and quotations omitted). “But because generally, as

between state and federal courts with concurrent jurisdiction, the

rule is that the pendency of an action in the state court is no bar to

proceedings concerning the same matter in the Federal court having

jurisdiction, the Colorado River doctrine is a narrow exception to the

virtually unflagging obligation of the federal courts to exercise the

jurisdiction given to them.” Id. (quotations and citations omitted). 

Therefore, a stay under Colorado River requires that “exceptional

circumstances . . . be present.” Id. (quotations and citations

omitted). Defendants, however, have not shown that Plaintiff’s state

court writ proceeding is “substantially similar” to Plaintiff’s

federal case nor that “extraordinary circumstances” are present. 

Accordingly, a stay under Colorado River is not warranted.

Nonetheless, a district court has the “power to stay

proceedings” as part of its inherent authority to “control the

disposition of the cases on its docket with economy of time and effort

for itself, for counsel and for litigants.” Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299

U.S. 248, 254 (1936). A district court, therefore, “may, with

propriety, find it is efficient for its own docket and the fairest

course for the parties to enter a stay of an action before it, pending

resolution of independent proceedings which bear upon the case. This

rule applies whether the separate proceedings are judicial,

administrative, or arbitral in character, and does not require that

the issues in such proceedings are necessarily controlling of the

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action before the court.” Leyva v. Certified Grocers of California,

Ltd., 593 F.2d 857, 863-64 (9th Cir. 1979). However, “if there is

even a fair possibility that the stay will work damage to some one

else, the stay may be inappropriate absent a showing by the moving

party of hardship or inequity.” Dependable Highway Ex., Inc. v.

Navigators Ins. Co., 498 F.3d 1059, 1066 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting

Landis, 299 U.S. at 255). Further, “[a] stay should not be granted

unless it appears likely the other proceedings will be concluded

within a reasonable time in relation to the urgency of the claims

presented to the court.” Leyva, 593 F.2d at 864; see also Dependable

Highway, 498 F.3d at 1067 (holding that district court erred “by

issuing a stay without any indication that it would last only for a

reasonable time”).

A stay is warranted in this case until Plaintiff’s writ

proceeding is resolved by the state court. “The judgment in [a]

mandamus proceeding . . . operates as an estoppel or conclusive

adjudication as to such issues . . . as were actually litigated and

determined . . . .” Mata v. City of Los Angeles, 20 Cal. App. 4th

141, 149 (1993) (quotations and citations omitted). Therefore, the

state court’s decision on Plaintiff’s writ of mandate may collaterally

estop Plaintiff from litigating some of his claims in his federal case

and impact the necessary scope of discovery. See Selvitella v. City

of S. San Francisco, No. C 08-04388 CW, 2009 WL 2009, at *4 (N.D. Cal.

July 20, 2009) (finding that resolution of plaintiff’s writ of mandate

challenging his termination could “have a preclusive effect on [his] §

1983 claims” and staying discovery pending resolution of the writ “in

the interest of judicial economy and to defer costly and possible

unnecessary discovery”). Further, since Plaintiff has not opposed

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Defendants’ counsel declares that Plaintiff’s counsel “agreed 3

that requesting that the Court order an abstention-based stay . . .

would be beneficial to all parties and avoid any prejudice.” (Tonon

Decl. 2:11-15.) 

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Defendants’ motion to stay, it is assumed that he opines he will

suffer no harm if this action is stayed pending the resolution of his

writ proceeding in state court. Lastly, the stay will not last 3

indefinitely but only until Plaintiff’s writ proceeding is resolved. 

Defendants’ motion to stay, therefore, is granted. This

action shall be stayed until Plaintiff’s writ of mandate proceeding

currently pending in California Superior Court is decided. When the

writ of mandate proceeding is resolved, the parties shall notify the

district court and a status conference will be scheduled. The dates

in the January 14, 2010 scheduling order are vacated. A joint status

report shall be filed within seven days of the date on which any

decision on Plaintiff’s writ of mandate proceeding currently pending

in California Superior Court is filed.

Dated: August 20, 2010

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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