Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-02006/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-02006-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 720
Nature of Suit: Labor Management Relations Act
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Labor/Mgmnt. Relations

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 All facts cited herein are taken from Defendants’ moving papers and are properly

supported by the deposition testimony and/or exhibits and supplementary declarations

submitted in support of these motions. As Plaintiff has presented no contrary evidence, they

are accepted by the Court as undisputed.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FRANCISCO LOPEZ and JAIME L.

QUINTERO,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 05cv2006 BTM (BLM)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY

vs. JUDGMENT

BUD OF CALIFORNIA (DOLE),

TEAMSTERS, DOES 1-20,

Defendant.

Currently pending before the Court are motions for summary judgment filed by

Defendants Bud Antle, Inc. dba Bud of California (“Bud”) and Teamsters Local 890 (“Local

890”). For the reasons discussed below, Defendants’ motions are GRANTED.

I. Factual Background

Plaintiffs Francisco Lopez and Jaime Quintero are former employees of Defendant

Bud and former members of Defendant Local 890 whose employment was terminated on

November 10, 2003 and June 10, 2004 respectively.1

 Plaintiff Lopez was terminated in

November 2003 after he refused to transfer locations based on his low seniority. Instead,

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he insisted on remuneration for room and board in his new location, despite having the

second lowest seniority and the fact that no other driver received room and board. Plaintiff

Quintero was suspended for time card fraud in March 2004. In accordance with the

collective bargaining agreement which governed Plaintiffs’ employment, Plaintiffs’ union,

Local 890, filed grievances protesting Lopez’s termination and Quintero’s suspension.

While the union originally filed a grievance with respect to Lopez, it ultimately decided

not to arbitrate the grievance. Lopez was informed that the union was no longer going to

pursue his claim by February 2004. After the union filed a grievance protesting Quintero’s

suspension, Bud investigated the incident and decided to terminate Quintero’s employment

on June 10, 2004. After deciding to proceed to arbitration on Quintero’s grievance, the union

ultimately entered into a settlement agreement with Bud in December 2004. The agreement

provided for Quintero’s reinstatement, without any loss of seniority, but without backpay for

the period of his suspension. Quintero refused to return to work as provided for in the

settlement agreement and so he was terminated in late December 2004.

Unhappy with the results the union achieved, Plaintiffs filed the instant lawsuit in

October 2004 in California Superior Court. While the complaint is extremely lacking in detail,

Plaintiffs apparently allege claims of wrongful termination and breach of contract. Once

served with the complaint in September 2005, Defendant Bud promptly removed the case

to this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 on the ground that Section 301 of the Labor

Management Relations Act (29 U.S.C. § 185) completely pre-empts any state law claims

sounding in contract or tort brought by an aggrieved union member against his former

employer and union representatives.

Pursuant to an order of Magistrate Judge Major, all discovery, other than expert

discovery, was to be complete by July 14, 2006. Defendants filed the instant motions for

summary judgment on July 10 and 11, 2006.

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II. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party demonstrates that “the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56©)); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A fact is material when, under the governing substantive

law, it could affect the outcome of the case. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Freeman v.

Arpaio,125 F.3d 732, 735 (9th Cir. 1997). A dispute is genuine if a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

A party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial burden of establishing the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Although the

nonmoving party bears the burden of proof on a matter at trial, the moving party need only

demonstrate to the Court that there is insufficient evidence to support the nonmoving party’s

case. Id. at 325. The moving party can satisfy this burden in two ways: (1) by presenting

evidence that negates an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case; or (2) by

demonstrating that the nonmoving party failed to establish an essential element of the

nonmoving party’s case on which the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof at trial. See

Id. at 322-23. “Disputes over irrelevant or unnecessary facts will not preclude a grant of

summary judgment.” T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626,

630 (9th Cir. 1987).

Once the moving party establishes the absence of genuine issues of material fact, the

burden shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth facts showing that a genuine issue of

disputed fact remains. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 314. The nonmoving party cannot rest on

the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but must “go beyond the pleadings and by

his own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file’

designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 324 (citing

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56©)). When making this determination, the court must view all inferences

drawn from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See

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2

 Plaintiffs also may have attempted to make a claim, through statements made in

their depositions, that Defendant Bud violated the collective bargaining agreement by

allegedly subcontracting union work and that Defendant Teamsters did not act to stop it.

However, as this claim is not made in the Complaint and Plaintiffs have chosen not to

mention it in their opposition brief, the Court will not address the merits of such a claim in this

order.

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Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Fontana

v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 876 (9th Cir. 2001). The court must not weigh the evidence or

make credibility determinations in evaluating a motion for summary judgment. See

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.

III. Discussion

Plaintiffs’ claims, though ostensibly brought under state law, are governed by Section

301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), because they are founded

on rights conferred by a collective bargaining agreement and require its interpretation. See

Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 394 (1987). The only claim available to Plaintiffs

under this law is a “hybrid” action whereby a plaintiff: (1) alleges that his employer breached

the collective bargaining agreement governing his employment relationship; and (2) alleges

that his union breached its duty of fair representation. See DelCostello v. International

Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 163-65 (1983). The suit against the employer rests

on Section 301, while the suit against the union is implied under the scheme of the National

Labor Relations Act. Id. at 164. To prevail against either Defendant, Plaintiffs must

demonstrate a breach by both Defendants. Id. at 164-65.

Thus Plaintiffs’ complaint is recharacterized by this Court as a claim that Defendant

Bud breached the collective bargaining agreement in terminating their employment and that

Defendant Teamsters breached its duty to fairly represent them with respect to the

termination of their employment with Defendant Bud in November 2003 (Lopez) and June

2004 (Quintero).2

Plaintiffs’ claims are subject to a six-month statute of limitations. See DelCostello, 462

U.S. at 169-71. The claim regarding the termination of Plaintiff Lopez’s employment is

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barred by the statute of limitations because it was not filed within six months of the time

Defendant Local 890 informed Lopez that it would not proceed with the grievance on his

behalf. See Harris v. Alumax Mill Products, Inc., 897 F.2d 400, 403-4 (9th Cir. 1990). In

particular, Plaintiff Lopez was informed by February 2004 that the union was not proceeding

with his grievance and the instant complaint was not filed until October 2004, approximately

eight months later.

Both Plaintiff Lopez’s claim, even if not time-barred, and Plaintiff Quintero’s claim also

fail because Defendant Bud did not violate the collective bargaining agreement. The

evidence presented supports Bud’s contention that the terminations of both Plaintiffs were

done in accordance with the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. In addition,

Plaintiffs’ claims fail because they also do not state a breach of the duty of fair representation

because they amount to no more than second-guessing of Defendant Local 890’s handling

of its collective bargaining responsibilities and Plaintiffs have adduced no evidence of

discriminatory or bad-faith conduct. See Airline Pilots Association v. O’Neill, 499 U.S. 65,

78 (1991); Peterson v. Kennedy, 771 F.2d 1244, 1254 (9th Cir. 1985).

Plaintiffs’ late-filed opposition fails to present any genuine issues of material fact that

are in dispute. Rather than designating specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue

for trial or arguing that the cases cited by Defendants are inapplicable, Plaintiffs simply make

unsupported factual assertions and present arguments based upon broad principles without

reference to legal authority. Defendants’ moving papers sufficiently establish the absence

of a dispute as to any genuine issue of material, triable fact and demonstrate their entitlement

to judgment. Accordingly, the burden of production shifted to Plaintiffs and they have failed

to satisfy that burden.

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IV. Conclusion

Defendants’ motions for summary judgment [Docs. # 26, 35] are therefore GRANTED.

The clerk shall enter final judgment for both Defendants and against Plaintiffs in this matter.

Defendant Local 890 has also requested the Court to sanction Plaintiffs’ counsel for

his allegedly frivolous and bad-faith conduct during this litigation by awarding costs and fees

to Defendants. This request was made in Defendant’s reply brief. A reply brief, however,

is not the appropriate vehicle for making such a request and, accordingly, Defendant’s

request for sanctions is not properly before the Court at this time.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 22, 2007

Hon. Barry Ted Moskowitz

United States District Judge

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