Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01576/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-01576-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DANIEL L. REAM,

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF KERN, KERN COUNTY

SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT, DEPUTY

JAMES NEWELL, SHERIFF MACK

WIMBISH, AND DOES 1 TO 100

INCLUSIVE,

Defendants.

 

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New Case No. 

1:05-cv-1576 TAG

SCHEDULING CONFERENCE ORDER

AND ORDER TRANSFERRING CASE

TO MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Discovery Cut-Off: 1/29/07

Non-Dispositive Motion

Filing Deadline: 2/15/07

Dispositive Motion Filing

Deadline: 2/28/07

Settlement Conference Date:

2/8/07 9:00 Ctrm. 8, Fresno

Pre-Trial Conference Date:

5/16/07 10:00 Bakersfield

Trial Date: 6/26/07 9:00

Bakersfield (JT-7 days)

I. Date of Scheduling Conference.

April 6, 2006.

II. Appearances Of Counsel.

Rodriguez & Associates by Charles R. Chapman, Esq., appeared

on behalf of Plaintiff. 

Andrew C. Thomson, Esq., Deputy County Counsel, appeared on

behalf of Defendants. 

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III. Summary of Pleadings. 

Plaintiff’s Factual and Legal Contentions

1. On or about December 20, 2004, Plaintiff Daniel Ream

was operating a 1986 Buick Century on Bodfish Canyon Road in

Bodfish, California. At said time and place, Defendant Newell

conducted a traffic stop on the vehicle being operated by

Plaintiff Daniel Ream. Daniel Ream had violated no law,

ordinance or regulation. Deputy Newell did not have any probable

cause to effectuate this traffic stop. Defendant Newell did not

have any probable cause to believe that a traffic violation had

occurred nor did he have any reasonable basis to suspect that

Plaintiff Daniel Ream had been involved in any criminal activity.

2. Upon stopping Plaintiff Daniel Ream’s vehicle,

Defendant Newell proceeded to arrest Daniel Ream. Defendant

Newell did not have any probable cause to arrest Daniel Ream. 

Defendant Newell did not have any warrant for the arrest of

Plaintiff Daniel Ream. The traffic stop, detention and arrest of

Plaintiff was pretextual and done for the purpose of harassing

and retaliating against Plaintiff.

3. In the process of arresting Plaintiff, taking Plaintiff

into custody and transporting Plaintiff to the Sheriff’s

substation, Defendant Newell used excessive and unreasonable

force. Plaintiff Daniel Ream’s wrists were handcuffed behind his

back by Defendant Newell. In so doing, Defendant Newell

unreasonably fastened the handcuffs so tight as to cause

Plaintiff Daniel Ream physical pain and injury. Defendant Newell

forcefully placed Plaintiff Daniel Ream into the rear of the

police car, in such a manner that Plaintiff Daniel Ream’s weight

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was pressed down on his wrists and handcuffs, causing Plaintiff

Daniel Ream additional pain and injury. Defendant Newell and/or

Does 1-100, refused repeated requests by Plaintiff Daniel Ream at

the scene of the arrest, during transport and/or at the Sheriff’s

substation, to adjust the handcuffs because of the pain and

injury they were causing.

4. As a direct and proximate result of the acts and

omissions by Defendant Newell and Does 1-100, Plaintiff Daniel

Ream suffered physical injuries to his body, and in particular to

his wrist, hand and arm, which caused him: (a) great physical

pain and suffering; (b) great mental pain; (c) to incur medical

expenses; (d) to incur lost past, present and future earnings,

and (e) to suffer physical, mental, and emotional pain, suffering

and/or disability in the future. 

5. The stopping of Plaintiff’s vehicle, Plaintiff’s

detention and warrantless arrest, and the use of excessive force

in arresting Plaintiff was unlawful and objectively unreasonable

because, inter alia, Defendant Newell and Does 1-100 were not in

possession of any facts that would reasonably cause them to

believe that: (1) Plaintiff had violated any traffic ordinance;

(2) Plaintiff was involved in any criminal activity; and/or (3)

Plaintiff was a danger to Defendant Newell or the general public.

Plaintiff’s Factual Issues:

1. Whether Deputy James Newell had probable cause to

effectuate this traffic stop.

2. Whether Deputy James Newell had probable cause to

believe that a traffic violation had occurred or if he had any

reasonable basis to suspect that Plaintiff Daniel Ream had been

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involved in any criminal activity.

3. Whether Deputy James Newell had probable cause to

arrest Daniel Ream.

4. Whether the traffic stop, detention and arrest of

Plaintiff was pretextual and done for the purpose of harassing

and retaliating against Plaintiff.

5. Whether Deputy James Newell used excessive and

unreasonable force.

6. Whether Deputy James Newell unreasonably fastened the

handcuffs so tight as to cause Plaintiff Daniel Ream physical

pain and injury.

7. Whether Deputy James Newell forcefully placed Plaintiff

Daniel Ream into the rear of the police car, in such a manner

that Plaintiff Daniel Ream’s weight was pressed down on his

wrists and handcuffs, causing Plaintiff Daniel Ream additional

pain and injury.

8. Whether Deputy James Newell and/or Does 1-100, refused

repeated requests by Plaintiff Daniel Ream at the scene of the

arrest, during transport and/or at the Sheriff’s substation, to

adjust the handcuffs because of the pain and injury they were

causing.

Plaintiff’s Legal Contentions:

1. Defendant County of Kern, Defendant Kern County

Sheriff’s Department (“KCSD”), Defendant Wimbish and Does 1-100,

inclusive, and each of them, are responsible for implementing,

maintaining, sanctioning and/or condoning a policy, custom or

practice under which Defendant Newell and other Defendants

committed the aforementioned illegal or wrongful acts. 

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Defendants, and each of them, maintained or permitted an official

policy or custom of knowingly permitting the occurrence of the

type of wrong set forth above, and based upon the principles set

forth herein.

2. Defendant County of Kern, Defendant KCSD, Defendant

Wimbish and Does 1-100 were objectively deliberately indifferent,

as elucidated in, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 841, 14

S.Ct. 1970, 1981, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994), City of Canton, Ohio v.

Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 396, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 1208, 103 L.Ed.2d 412

(1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part),

and Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1198, n.1 (9th

Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1106, 123 S.Ct. 872, 154

L.Ed.2d 775 (2003), to: (a) the practice of members of Defendant

Kern County Sheriff’s Department of making unlawful traffic

stops, (b) the practice of members of Defendant Kern County

Sheriff’s Department making unlawful arrests without probable

cause or warrant, (c) the practice of members of Defendant Kern

County Sheriff’s Department in using excessive and, objectively

unreasonable, force against suspects and members of the public,

and in particular the use of excessive and unreasonable force in

the handcuffing of persons; and (d) Plaintiff’s rights under the

Fourth Amendment to be safe and secure in his person.

3. Defendant County of Kern, Defendant KCSD, Defendant

Wimbish, and Does 1-100 had actual and/or constructive knowledge,

as elucidated in, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 841, 114

S.Ct. 1970, 1981, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994), City of Canton, Ohio v.

Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 396, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 1208, 103 L.Ed.2d 412

(1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part),

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and Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1186 (9th Cir.

2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1106, 123 S.Ct. 872, 154 L.Ed.2d

775 (2003), that it was: (a) the practice of members of Defendant

Kern County Sheriff’s Department to make unlawful traffic stops,

(b) the practice of members of Defendant Kern County Sheriff’s

Department to make unlawful arrests without probable cause or

warrant, and/or (c) the practice of members of Defendant Kern

County Sheriff’s Department to use excessive, and objectively

unreasonable force against suspects and members of the public,

and in particular use excessive and unreasonable force in the

handcuffing of persons.

4. Defendant County of Kern, Defendant KCSD, Defendant

Wimbish, and Does 1-100 had actual and/or constructive knowledge,

as elucidated in, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 841, 114

S.Ct. 1970, 1981, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994), City of Canton, Ohio v.

Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 396, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 1208, 103 L.Ed.2d 412

(1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part),

and Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1186 (9th Cir.

2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1106, 123 S.Ct. 872, 154 L.Ed.2d

775 (2003), that their policies regarding the discipline of

deputies accused of the aforementioned conduct, and/or other

violations of the Fourth Amendment were so inadequate that it was

obvious that a failure to correct them would result in further

similar incidents and violations of the Fourth Amendment.

5. Plaintiff believes, and upon such belief, alleges that

Defendant County of Kern, Defendant KCSD, Defendant Wimbish, and

Does 1-100, and each of them, are responsible for implementing,

maintaining, sanctioning and/or condoning a policy, custom or

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practice under which Defendant Newell and Does 1-100, committed

the aforementioned illegal or wrongful acts. Plaintiff believes

that the conduct of the Deputies of Defendant KCSD and, more

specifically, the acts of Defendant Newell and Does 1-100, were

consistent with the training and the policies set forth by

Defendant County of Kern, Defendant KCSD and Defendant Wimbish,

in that such conduct is ratified by Defendant County of Kern,

Defendant KCSD, and Defendant Wimbish.

6. Acting under color of law and pursuant to official

policy, practice and custom, Defendant County of Kern, Defendant

KCSD, Defendant Wimbish, and Does 1-100 intentionally, knowingly,

recklessly, and/or with objective deliberate indifference failed

to instruct, supervise, train, control and discipline, on a

continuing basis, members of Defendant KCSD in their duties to

refrain from violating the Fourth Amendment by: (1) making

unlawful traffic stops, (2) making false arrests and/or (3) using

excessive and unreasonable force.

7. Plaintiff has a right to substantive due process

pursuant to the Fourth Amendment to the United States

Constitution. That right has been violated by Defendants, and

each of them, as a result of their failure to train, supervise

and discipline members of Defendant KCSD.

8. As a direct and proximate result of the acts and

omissions of Defendant County of Kern, Defendant KCSD, Defendant

Newell, Defendant Wimbish and Does 1-100, inclusive, Plaintiff

was deprived of his right to be free from an unlawful search and

seizure, as well as his right to be free from the imposition of

excessive and objectively unreasonable force. By reason of the

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Defendants’, and each of their, conduct Plaintiff was denied his

rights to substantive due process, in violation of his rights

under the laws and Constitution of the United States, in

particular the Fourth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff

is entitled to recover damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and

California Civil Code § 52.1.

9. As a direct and proximate result of the acts and

omissions of Defendant County of Kern, Defendant KCSD, Defendant

Newell, Defendant Wimbish, and Does 1-100, inclusive, Plaintiff

suffered general and special damages as described hereinabove in

an amount according to proof at trial.

10. In performing the acts alleged above, the individual

Defendant Newell and Does 1-100, inclusive, acted recklessly,

with callous indifference, and in the face of a perceived risk

that their actions would violate Plaintiff’s rights under the

Fourth Amendment to be secure in his person. As a result,

Plaintiff requests that said individual Defendants each be

required to pay damages by way of example and punishment.

11. Pursuant to the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and

California Civil Code § 52.1, Plaintiff is entitled to and

demands an award of reasonable attorney fees and costs attendant

to prosecuting this cause of action in an amount to be determined

according to proof after trial.

12. Defendants Newell and Does 1-100, and each of them,

owed a duty to Plaintiff to avoid causing him to be subject to

being placed in fear of force used against his person without

cause or provocation or sufficient investigation.

13. Defendants Newell and Does 1-100, and each of them,

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breached their duty to Plaintiff by negligently, carelessly,

recklessly and/or intentionally causing Plaintiff to be

physically touched and injured. Plaintiff was improperly and

unreasonably put in fear of physical touching and/or was

unreasonably touched and assaulted by law enforcement officers of

the Kern County Sheriff’s Department including, but not limited

to, Defendant Newell and Does 1-100.

14. Defendants Newell and Does 1-100, and each of them,

used threats, force, unwanted touching and violence upon

Plaintiff on and about his body in a willful, malicious,

reckless, negligent and unlawful manner and without just cause or

provocation and with the intent to do bodily harm and/or with the

conscious disregard of the consequences to Plaintiff, thereby

causing his severe injuries for which Plaintiff has a claim.

15. In doing the acts alleged above, Defendants Newell and

Does 1-100, and each of them, acted with the intent to make

contact with Plaintiff’s person.

16. At no time did Plaintiff consent to any of the acts of

Defendants alleged above.

17. As a direct and proximate result of the acts and

omissions of Defendants, and each of them, Plaintiff suffered

severe physical and emotional injuries and general and special

damages as alleged hereinabove.

18. In performing the acts alleged above, the individual

Defendants, Defendant Newell and Does 1-100, inclusive, acted

with malice within the meaning of California Civil Code § 3294

because they engaged in despicable conduct which was carried out

by them with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or

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safety of others, including Plaintiff. In addition, the

individual Defendants were guilty of oppression within the

meaning of California Civil Code § 3294 because they engaged in

despicable conduct that subjected persons, including Plaintiff,

to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of their

rights. Therefore, pursuant to California law, Plaintiff seeks

exemplary damages in the maximum amount allowed by law and

sufficient to serve the purposes of such damages for the conduct

giving rise to this cause of action and to deter such conduct in

the future.

19. By the acts and omissions of Defendants Newell and Does

1-100, inclusive, and each of them, as set forth hereinabove,

Plaintiff was caused to be confined of his person and deprived of

his liberty. 

20. The confinement and restraint of Plaintiff by

Defendants Newell and Does 1-100, and each of them was without

proper complaint or authority.

21. As a direct and proximate result of the acts and

omissions of Defendants, and each of them, Plaintiff suffered

severe physical and emotional injuries and general and special

damages as alleged hereinabove.

22. In performing the acts alleged above, the individual

Defendants, Defendant Newell and Does 1-100, inclusive, acted

with malice within the meaning of California Civil Code § 3294

because they engaged in despicable conduct which was carried out

by them with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or

safety of others, including Plaintiff. In addition, the

individual Defendants were guilty of oppression within the

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meaning of California Civil Code § 3294 because they engaged in

despicable conduct that subjected persons, including Plaintiff,

to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of their

rights. Therefore, pursuant to California law, Plaintiff seeks

exemplary damages in the maximum amount allowed by law and

sufficient to serve the purposes of such damages for the conduct

giving rise to this cause of action and to deter such conduct in

the future.

23. Defendant Newell negligently and carelessly carried out

his duties in the manner in which he handled the aforementioned

traffic stop, detention and arrest of Plaintiff Daniel Ream. 

Defendant Newell was not in possession of any facts that would

reasonably cause him to believe that Plaintiff was subject to

detention and/or arrest. Defendant Newell negligently and

carelessly used an excessive amount of force against Plaintiff’s

will and without reasonable cause in the manner in which he

handcuffed Plaintiff and placed him into the patrol vehicle. 

Defendant Newell negligently and carelessly refused to loosen the

handcuffs when repeatedly requested to do so by Plaintiff because

of the injury and pain being caused by the handcuffs and the

manner in which Plaintiff was placed in the patrol vehicle.

24. Defendants County of Kern, Kern County Sheriff’s

Department, Mack Wimbish and Does 1-100, and each of them, and

their employees and/or agents, did negligently, carelessly and/or

recklessly conduct themselves so as to permit Plaintiff to suffer

an unwanted touching and otherwise failed and/or refused to

remove or loosen the handcuffs on Plaintiff’s wrists while

Plaintiff was within their custody, thereby directly and

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proximately causing Plaintiff’s injuries.

25. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants, County of Kern, Kern

County Sheriff’s Department, Mack Wimbish and Does 1-100, and

each of them, acted negligently and carelessly in that they

failed to properly direct, control, maintain and supervise the

duties and activities of their Deputies, including but not

limited to Defendant Newell, in order to prevent unlawful

detentions, assaults, unwanted touching, harassment and the use

of unreasonable physical force on persons without cause or

provocation.

26. The negligence on the part of Defendants County of

Kern, Kern County Sheriff’s Department, Mack Wimbish and Does 1-

100, and each of them, is not limited to those aforementioned

negligent acts or omissions on the part of the known and unknown

public employees, but also includes the negligent hiring,

retaining, appointing, selecting, training, disciplining and/or

supervising of their employees and/or agents.

27. As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing acts

and omissions of Defendants, and each of them, Plaintiff suffered

severe physical and emotional injuries, general and special

damages as alleged hereinabove.

28. Pursuant to the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1988,

Plaintiff is entitled to and demands an award of reasonable

attorneys’ fees and costs attendant to prosecuting this action in

an amount to be determined according to proof at trial.

Defendants’ Factual and Legal Contentions:

1. On or about December 20, 2004, at or around 7:58 p.m.,

Kern County Sheriff’s Deputy James Newell (hereinafter “Newell”),

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in the course of his employment, was operating a marked patrol

vehicle on Lake Isabella Boulevard. At that time Plaintiff

Daniel Ream (hereinafter “Plaintiff”) was operating a 1986 Buick

Century on Bodfish Canyon Road in Bodfish, California. Newell

witnessed Plaintiff begin to slow his vehicle for a posted stop

sign as the vehicle approached the intersection of the two roads. 

However, Plaintiff’s vehicle failed to stop for the sign and

Newell initiated a traffic stop.

2. During the traffic stop, Newell found Plaintiff to be

the driver of the vehicle and requested Plaintiff’s driver’s

license and registration. Plaintiff responded that both the

license and registration were not in his possession but were at

his residence. When Plaintiff determined that Newell could check

on his license by a radio call, Plaintiff conceded that his

license was suspended. The suspension was confirmed by Newell

during the radio check and Plaintiff was informed that he was

going to be arrested. Plaintiff exited his vehicle and began to

speak with Newell. During this conversation Newell noticed that

Plaintiff “displayed objective symptoms of central nervous system

stimulant use.”

3. Newell checked Plaintiff for drug use and noticed that

Plaintiff had extremely constricted pupils for the lighting

conditions, his speech was very fast and Plaintiff was stuttering

his words. Plaintiff had difficulty maintaining control of his

hands and fingers, and Plaintiff was unable to stand still. 

During the testing, Newell also noticed that Plaintiff had

difficulty estimating time (estimated thirty seconds had passed

while seventy-seven seconds had passed). Plaintiff had a visible

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body sway and had a pulse rate of one hundred twenty beats per

minute.

4. During the discussion Plaintiff volunteered that “I

know what it looks like, but Albuterol is the same as

methamphetamine.” Plaintiff also informed Newell that “[m]y

doctor told me that Albuterol was a prescription version of

methamphetamine and it displayed the same symptoms of being under

the influence of meth.” 

5. Newell placed Plaintiff in handcuffs and transported

him to the Kern Valley Substation for further evaluation. After

arrival at the substation, Newell completed a drug evaluation

worksheet on Plaintiff. Newell additionally obtained a sample of

Plaintiff’s urine which was placed in a drug urine kit and later

forwarded to the District Attorney’s Crime Laboratory for

analysis. That same evening Plaintiff was released from the

substation on his promise to appear. The District Attorney’s

Toxicology Report indicated that the specimen was positive for

amphetamines.

6. On or about April 20, 2005, the charges of being under

the influence, driving on a suspended license and having no proof

of insurance were dismissed in the “furtherance of justice” when

Plaintiff pleaded guilty to failing to stop at a stop sign.

7. Newell had probable cause to stop the vehicle since

Plaintiff pleaded guilty to the traffic violation. Newell also

had probable cause to take Plaintiff into custody based upon the

testing for drugs and the urine sample evidence. At no time

during the process of taking Plaintiff into custody and

transporting him to the substation did Newell use excessive force

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on Plaintiff, especially since there appeared to be no

confrontation or animosity between Newell and Plaintiff. At no

point during the evening was Newell aware that Plaintiff believed

that the handcuffs were too tight nor was any such pain ever

articulated to him.

8. Was Plaintiff subjected to a use of force greater than

the amount necessary to take him into custody and place him in

restraints?

Defendants’ Factual Issues:

1. Does Deputy Newell have qualified immunity.

2. Had Plaintiff attempted to evade law enforcement

personnel on prior occasions.

3. Had Plaintiff failed to appear at court hearings as

promised.

4. Did Plaintiff file a California Tort Claims Act claim

with the County of Kern.

5. Does Kern County Sheriff Mack Wimbish have immunity.

6. Did Kern County Sheriff Mack Wimbish personally

participate in the incident.

7. Did Kern County Sheriff Mack Wimbish professionally

participate in the incident.

8. Was the complaint timely filed or is it barred by the

applicable statute of limitations.

9. Has Plaintiff attempted to mitigate his injuries.

10. Does Plaintiff’s statement of the issues attempt to

improperly enlarge the claims and allegations contained in the

complaint.

///

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Defendants’ Legal Contentions:

1. Defendants do not believe that Plaintiff was subjected

to excessive force but provide this section pursuant to the

court’s request. Inquiries of excessive force claims must begin

with recognition of the extreme difficulty and danger of police

work: “The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for

the fact that officers are often forced to make split-second

judgments - in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and

rapidly evolving - about the amount of force that is necessary in

a particular situation.” Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 109

S.Ct. 1865, 1881 (1989); see also Roy v. Inhabitants of Lewiston,

42 F.3d 691, 695 (1st Cir. 1994) (“whether substantive liability

or qualified immunity is at issue, the Supreme Court intends to

surround the police who make these on-the-spot [deadly force

decisions] in dangerous situations with a fairly wide zone of

protection in close cases”). The Supreme Court has emphasized

that this “deference to the judgment of the officer on the scene”

is required as to the merits of a Fourth Amendment excessive

force claim in addition to the deferential standard of qualified

immunity. Saucier, supra, 533 U.S. at 205, 206.

2. A Fourth Amendment claim of excessive force is analyzed

under the framework outlined by the Supreme Court in Graham v.

Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 104 L.Ed.2d 443, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (1989). 

All claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive

force in the course of an arrest must be analyzed under the

Fourth Amendment and its “reasonableness” standard. See Graham

v. Connor, 490 U.S. at 395; Ward v. City of San Jose, 967 F.2d

280, 284 (9th Cir. 1992).

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3. “It is clear that under Graham, excessive force claims

arising before or during arrest are to be analyzed exclusively

under the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard. . .” Reed

v. Hoy, 909 F.2d 324, 329 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 501 U.S.

1250, 115 L.Ed.2d 1053, 111 S.Ct. 2887 (1991). The Graham

analysis requires balancing the “nature and quality of the

intrusion” on a person’s liberty with the “countervailing

governmental interests at stake” to determine whether the use of

force was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. 

Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.

4. The Supreme Court has said that “the ‘reasonableness’

inquiry in an excessive force case is an objective one: the

question is whether the officer’s actions are ‘objectively

reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting

them[.]” Graham, 490 U.S. at 397. “The question is not simply

whether the force was necessary to accomplish a legitimate police

objective; it is whether the force used was reasonable in light

of all the relevant circumstances.” Hammer v. Gross, 932 F.2d at

846.

5. In Graham, the Supreme Court indicated that relevant

factors in the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry include

“[1] the severity of the crime at issue, [2] whether the suspect

poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or

others, and [3] whether he is actively resisting arrest or

attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. 

The Court did not, however, limit the inquiry to those factors. 

“Because the test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is

not capable of precise definition or mechanical application,” the

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reasonableness of a seizure must instead be assessed by carefully

considering the objective facts and circumstances that confronted

the arresting officers. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.

6. The determination of qualified immunity involves a twopart analysis: “1) Was the law governing the official’s conduct

clearly established? 2) Under that law, could a reasonable

officer have believed the conduct was lawful?” (Act up! Portland

v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 871 (9th Cir. 1993)). Newell is

entitled to qualified immunity unless Plaintiff can establish

that (1) he lacked probable cause to believe that Plaintiff posed

a threat of injury or death and (2) that no reasonable officer,

confronting the same circumstances, could believe his use of

force was lawful.

7. As to qualified immunity, the question is not whether

the conduct is clearly constitutional, but whether it is clearly

unconstitutional. Knox v. McGinnis, 998 F.2d 1405, 1409-10 (7th

Cir. 1993).

8. Qualified immunity is not a defense on the merits, but

an “entitlement not to stand trial.” It may be overcome only by

a showing that 1) a constitutional right was in fact violated,

and 2) based on fact-specific, analogous precedents, no

reasonable officer could believe Defendant’s actions were lawful. 

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-202, 121 S.Ct. 2151 (2001)

(officer must be “on notice” by pre-existing law that the alleged

conduct is unlawful); Jackson v. City of Bremerton, 268 F.3d 646,

651 (9th Cir. 2001); Sorrels v. McKee, 290 F.3d 965, 969 (9th

Cir. 2002). Absent a showing that “pre-existing” law clearly

proscribed the use of deadly force by Benson, Benson is “presumed

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to be immune from damages. . . .” Elder v. Holloway, 975 F.2d

1388, 1392 (9th Cir. 1991), reversed on other grounds, 114 S.Ct.

1019 (1994).

9. The burden to overcome qualified immunity is heavy. 

The Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed that qualified immunity

protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly

violate the law.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202 (quoting Malley v.

Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092 (1986)). It must have

been “obvious” to a reasonably competent officer that the conduct

was unlawful. Id. This deferential standard is necessary to

fulfill the purpose of the qualified immunity to prevent officers

from erring on the side of caution because they fear being used. 

Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228-229, 112 S.Ct. 534 (1991);

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 634, 638-639, 107 S.Ct. 3034

(1997). 

10. Finally, qualified immunity may not be overcome by

reference to Fourth Amendment principles that have doubtful or

unclear application to the facts of the case. Saucier, 533 U.S.

at 202-203. The inquiry “is whether it would be clear to a

reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation

he confronted.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. Officers “are not

required to anticipate subsequent legal developments,” even where

those developments constitute a “logical extension” of preexisting law. Somers v. Thurman, 109 F.3d 614, 621 (9th Cir.

1997).

11. The United States Supreme Court has held repeatedly

that whether an official acts as a policy maker for a county is a

question of state law. McMillian v. Monroe County, Ala., 520

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U.S. 781, 786 (1997); City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S.

112, 124, 126 (1988). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal agreed

in Nelson v. City of Irvine, 143 F.3d 1196, 1206-1207 (9th Cir.

1998). Since the California Supreme Court issued Venegas v.

County of Los Angeles, 32 Cal.4th 820 (2004) the issue has been

decided and federal courts are precluded from interpreting state

law and are bound to follow the California Supreme Court’s

interpretation of that law in determining whether a sheriff

involved in a law enforcement function is a state or county

policymaker. Venegas, supra, at 826, 839. In Venegas, the

California Supreme Court made clear that a sheriff acts as a

state agent when performing law enforcement functions. Venegas,

supra, at 836.

12. Plaintiff alleges that Wimbish, the County and the

Department negligently hired, trained, staffed and supervised. 

These actions are law enforcement actions and, as a State actor,

Wimbish has absolute immunity.

13. Wimbish did not complete any act while in his

individual capacities that resulted in the deprivation of

Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Plaintiff does not allege

that Defendant personally participated in any act that gave rise

to their alleged constitutional deprivation nor do they argue

that Wimbish improperly failed to act. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d

1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Plaintiff does not contend that

Wimbish was the direct supervisor of any of the Defendants. 

Plaintiff fails to identify any individual act by Wimbish, thus

Wimbish has no individual liability.

14. In Monell v. Dept. of Social Services of City of New

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York, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018 (1978) the Supreme Court

held that municipal liability pursuant to § 1983 could not be

based on any form of vicarious liability. Thus, only when “a

government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or

by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent

official policy, inflicts the injury that the government, as an

entity, is liable under § 1983.” Monell v. Dept. of Social

Services of City of New York, at 691.

15. A policy is a course of action consciously chosen among

various alternatives. Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808,

823, 105 S.Ct. 2427 (1985). A custom is a practice or usage so

frequent and widespread as to have the force of law. Bryan

County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997). 

16. A public entity cannot be directly liable under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 for a policy it lacks the power to make, control or

correct. Eggar v. City of Livingston, 40 F.3d 312, 316 (9th Cir.

1994) (“[a] municipality cannot be liable for [official] conduct

it lacks the power to require, control, or remedy, even if that

conduct parallels or appears entangled with the desires of the

municipality”).

17. California counties have no inherent powers and may

exercise through the board of supervisors only those powers

expressly granted by the State Constitution or by statute. Hicks

v. Board of Supervisors, (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 228, 242. The

question then becomes, how can the County, or the Board members

individually, be directly liable for exercising, or failing to

exercise, a power that they are prohibited by law from

exercising. Monell instructs that Defendants County and Board of

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Supervisors can only be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for their

own unlawful conduct. Counties are unable to control a sheriff

or the sheriff’s policies, and a sheriff or the State Attorney

General would be entitled to enjoin any attempt to directly, or

indirectly, exercise control in this area. Thus, Plaintiff

cannot sustain his burden to show that the County has

policymaking authority or control over the precise function at

issue.

18. First, it is the State Legislature that defines who may

use force and the amount of force that may be used. The power to

define a sheriff’s duties belongs exclusively to the Legislature. 

Cal. Const., Art. XI, § 1. Second, it is the State that funds

training, and a State commission, the Commission on Peace Officer

Training, that sets and promulgates training standards. Penal

Code §§ 13500-13519.8. Third, it is the State Attorney general

who alone has power to ensure that sheriffs comply with federal

and state standards for use of force. The State Attorney General

has exclusive constitutional and statutory authority to direct

the sheriff if there is any deficiency in how the sheriff’s

function is carried out. Cal. Const., Art. V, § 13; Government

Code § 12560 and Government Code § 12561.

19. In contrast, a county may not direct or control a

sheriff, who is an elected official, either directly or

indirectly, in the manner in which the sheriff’s statutory duties

are performed. Connolly v. County of Orange, (1992) 1 Cal.4th

1105, 1113, fn.9; Hicks v. Board of Supervisors, (1977) 69

Cal.App.3d 228, 242 (holding that a county may not control or

direct the manner in which a sheriff expends county funds);

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Government Code § 25303 (counties, through their governing body,

may not direct or control “independent and statutorily designated

investigative and prosecutorial functions of the sheriff . . .”);

Pitts v. County of Kern, (1998) 17 Cal.4th 340, 358-59 (observing

that counties have no law enforcement powers or duties).

20. The Legislature has exercised this power generally by

setting forth the sheriff’s duties in Government Code §§ 26600-

26778. The State Legislature, not the County, also controls and

regulates who may become a peace officer, the standards for

becoming a peace officer and the powers of a peace officer

(including the degree of force that may be used). Penal Code

§§ 830-851.85. The Legislature has given to sheriffs exclusive

authority to appoint their deputies. Government Code §§ 1190-

1194.

IV. Orders Re Amendments To Pleadings.

1. The Plaintiff does not anticipate filing any amendments

to the pleadings at this time. Plaintiff does reserve the right

to amend pleadings in the event discovery reveals the existence

of additional necessary Defendants. 

2. The Defendants, Does 1-100, inclusive, are DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE on the understanding that Plaintiff is fully

reserving the right to amend.

3. Defendants do not anticipate amending the pleadings

unless Plaintiff seeks to amend the complaint. 

V. Factual Summary.

A. Admitted Facts Which Are Deemed Proven Without Further

Proceedings. 

1. The Kern County Sheriff’s Department is, and at

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all times relevant to the complaint was, a law enforcement agency

organized under the laws of the State of California.

2. Sheriff Mack Wimbish was at all relevant times

employed by the County of Kern as the Sheriff of the Kern County

Sheriff’s Department. In that position, Sheriff Mack Wimbish

acted within the course and scope of his employment and under

color of law.

3. At all relevant times, Deputy James Newell was

employed by the Kern County Sheriff’s Department and the County

of Kern, and acted as a Sheriff’s Deputy for the Kern County

Sheriff’s Department. In that position, Deputy James Newell

acted within the course and scope of his employment and under

color of law.

4. On or about December 20, 2004, Deputy James Newell

conducted a traffic stop on the vehicle being operated by

Plaintiff Daniel Ream.

5. Thereafter, and on or about December 20, 2004,

Deputy James Newell placed handcuffs on Plaintiff Daniel Ream.

6. Plaintiff was placed under arrest and transported

to a Kern County Sheriff’s substation at Lake Isabella.

B. Contested Facts.

1. All remaining facts are contested.

VI. Legal Issues.

A. Uncontested.

1. Jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and

1343. Jurisdiction over supplemental state law claims is invoked

under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

2. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

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3. As to supplemental claims, the parties agree that

the substantive law of the State of California provides the rule

of decision. 

B. Contested. 

1. Whether there was a violation of the Plaintiff’s

Fourth Amendment right. 

2. Whether the traffic stop at issue was legally

justified. 

3. Whether Plaintiff’s arrest was legally justified.

4. Whether the force used during the traffic stop at

issue was legally justified.

5. Whether Deputy James Newell is entitled to

qualified immunity in that his conduct was objectively reasonable

at the time of the events alleged in the complaint to have

occurred in light of clearly established law.

6. Whether the County of Kern and/or Kern County

Sheriff’s Department are immune from liability as to the state

law torts. 

7. All other legal issues not otherwise enumerated

within the Joint Scheduling Conference Statement. 

8. Whether any Defendant used excessive force.

9. Whether the Sheriff of Kern County is entitled to

absolute immunity.

10. Whether the Sheriff can be individually liable

under the Civil Rights law.

11. Whether the County can be liable under any theory.

12. Whether and to what extent any vicarious liability

for supervisors and the Sheriff exist under State law. 

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13. Whether and to what extent the Kern County

Sheriff’s Department is a potentially liable Defendant under

vicarious liability or any other theory.

VII. Consent to Magistrate Judge Jurisdiction.

1. The parties have consented to transfer the case to the 

Magistrate Judge for all purposes, including trial. The case

shall, therefore, be transferred to Magistrate Judge Teresa A.

Goldner and the new case number that should be typed on all

future pleadings in this case is: 1:05–cv-1576 TAG. 

VIII. Corporate Identification Statement.

1. Any nongovernmental corporate party to any action in

this court shall file a statement identifying all its parent

corporations and listing any entity that owns 10% or more of the

party's equity securities. A party shall file the statement with

its initial pleading filed in this court and shall supplement the

statement within a reasonable time of any change in the

information. 

IX. Discovery Plan and Cut-Off Date.

1. The parties are ordered to complete all discovery on

or before January 29, 2007.

2. The parties are directed to disclose all expert

witnesses, in writing, on or before November 29, 2006. Any

supplemental expert disclosures will be made on or before

December 29, 2006. The parties will comply with the provisions

of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2) regarding their

expert designations. Local Rule 16-240(a) notwithstanding, the

written designation of experts shall be made pursuant to F. R.

Civ. P. Rule 26(a)(2), (A) and (B) and shall include all

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information required thereunder. Failure to designate experts in

compliance with this order may result in the Court excluding the

testimony or other evidence offered through such experts that are

not disclosed pursuant to this order.

3. The provisions of F. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) shall 

apply to all discovery relating to experts and their opinions. 

Experts may be fully prepared to be examined on all subjects and

opinions included in the designation. Failure to comply will

result in the imposition of sanctions. 

X. Pre-Trial Motion Schedule.

1. All Non-Dispositive Pre-Trial Motions, including any

discovery motions, will be filed on or before February 15, 2007,

and heard on March 19, 2007, at 9:00 a.m. before Magistrate Judge

Teresa A. Goldner in Bakersfield, California. 

2. In scheduling such motions, the Magistrate

Judge may grant applications for an order shortening time

pursuant to Local Rule 142(d). However, if counsel does not

obtain an order shortening time, the notice of motion must comply

with Local Rule 251. 

3. All Dispositive Pre-Trial Motions are to be

filed no later than February 28, 2007, and will be heard on April

2, 2007, at 9:00 a.m. before the Honorable Teresa A. Goldner,

United States Magistrate Judge, in Bakersfield, California. In

scheduling such motions, counsel shall comply with Local Rule

230. 

XI. Pre-Trial Conference Date.

1. May 16, 2007, at 10:00 a.m. in Bakersfield, California,

before the Honorable Teresa A. Goldner, United States Magistrate

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Judge. 

2. The parties are ordered to file a Joint PreTrial Statement pursuant to Local Rule 281(a)(2). 

3. Counsel's attention is directed to Rules 281 

and 282 of the Local Rules of Practice for the Eastern District

of California, as to the obligations of counsel in preparing for

the pre-trial conference. The Court will insist upon strict

compliance with those rules.

XII. Trial Date.

1. June 26, 2007, at the hour of 9:00 a.m. in Bakersfield,

California, before the Honorable Teresa A. Goldner, United States

Magistrate Judge. 

2. This is a jury trial.

3. Counsels' Estimate Of Trial Time:

a. 7 days.

4. Counsels' attention is directed to Local Rules

of Practice for the Eastern District of California, Rule 285. 

XIII. Settlement Conference.

1. A Settlement Conference is scheduled for February 8,

2007, at 9:00 a.m. in Courtroom 8, 6th Floor, Fresno, California,

before the Honorable Lawrence J. O’Neill, United States

Magistrate Judge. 

2. Unless otherwise permitted in advance by the

Court, the attorneys who will try the case shall appear at the

Settlement Conference with the parties and the person or persons

having full authority to negotiate and settle the case on any

terms at the conference. 

3. Permission for a party [not attorney] to attend

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by telephone may be granted upon request, by letter, with a copy

to the other parties, if the party [not attorney] lives and works

outside the Eastern District of California, and attendance in

person would constitute a hardship. If telephone attendance is

allowed, the party must be immediately available throughout the

conference until excused regardless of time zone differences. 

Any other special arrangements desired in cases where settlement

authority rests with a governing body, shall also be proposed in

advance by letter copied to all other parties. 

4. Confidential Settlement Conference Statement. 

At least five (5) days prior to the Settlement Conference the

parties shall submit, directly to the Magistrate Judge's

chambers, a confidential settlement conference statement. The

statement should not be filed with the Clerk of the Court nor

served on any other party. Each statement shall be clearly

marked "confidential" with the date and time of the Settlement

Conference indicated prominently thereon. Counsel are urged to

request the return of their statements if settlement is not

achieved and if such a request is not made the Court will dispose

of the statement.

5. The Confidential Settlement Conference

Statement shall include the following: 

a. A brief statement of the facts of the 

case.

b. A brief statement of the claims and 

defenses, i.e., statutory or other grounds upon which the claims

are founded; a forthright evaluation of the parties' likelihood

of prevailing on the claims and defenses; and a description of

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the major issues in dispute.

c. A summary of the proceedings to date.

d. An estimate of the cost and time to be

expended for further discovery, pre-trial and trial.

e. The relief sought.

f. The parties' position on settlement,

including present demands and offers and a history of past

settlement discussions, offers and demands. 

XIV. Request For Bifurcation, Appointment Of Special Master, 

Or Other Techniques To Shorten Trial. 

1. The parties do not agree as to bifurcation of

liability and Monell issues. The parties do agree that the

amount, if any, of punitive damages may be tried in a second

phase before the same jury in a continuous trial. 

XV. Related Matters Pending.

1. There are no related matters.

XVI. Compliance With Federal Procedure.

1. The Court requires compliance with the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of Practice for the

Eastern District of California. To aid the court in the

efficient administration of this case, all counsel are directed

to familiarize themselves with the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure and the Local Rules of Practice of the Eastern District

of California, and keep abreast of any amendments thereto.

XVII. Effect Of This Order.

1. The foregoing order represents the best

estimate of the court and counsel as to the agenda most suitable

to bring this case to resolution. The trial date reserved is

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specifically reserved for this case. If the parties determine at

any time that the schedule outlined in this order cannot be met,

counsel are ordered to notify the court immediately of that fact

so that adjustments may be made, either by stipulation or by

subsequent scheduling conference. 

2. Stipulations extending the deadlines contained

herein will not be considered unless they are accompanied by

affidavits or declarations, and where appropriate attached

exhibits, which establish good cause for granting the relief

requested. 

3. Failure to comply with this order may result in

the imposition of sanctions. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 6, 2006 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

emm0d6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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