Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-00279/USCOURTS-cand-5_05-cv-00279-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 29:201 Fair Labor Standards Act

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1 The holding of this court is limited to the facts and the particular circumstances

underlying the present motion.

2 All further references herein to “Rules” are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

unless expressly stated otherwise.

ORDER, page 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

YUE ZHOU, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

WANG’S RESTAURANT,

Defendant.

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Case No.: C 05-0279 PVT

ORDER GRANTING ATTORNEY ADAM

WANG’S MOTION TO INTERVENE;

CONTINUING HEARINGS ON MOTION TO

DETERMINE FAIRNESS AND MOTION FOR

ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS; AND

DESIGNATING CASE E-FILING CASE 

On October 10, 2006 the parties and attorney Adam Wang appeared for hearings on:

1) attorney Adam Wang’s motion to intervene; 2) the motion for determination of fairness of

settlements; and 3) attorney Adam Wang’s motion for award of attorney fees and costs.1 Based on

the briefs, testimony and arguments submitted, and the file herein,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that attorney Adam Wang’s motion to intervene is GRANTED.

Permissive intervention is within the court's discretion under Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure 24(b).2 Rule 24(b) provides, in relevant part: “Upon timely application anyone may be

permitted to intervene in an action . . . when an applicant's claim or defense and the main action have

a question of law or fact in common.” In exercising its discretion the court must consider whether

the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties. 

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ORDER, page 2

See FED.R.CIV.PRO. 24(b). In the present case, attorney Wang’s claim for fees and Plaintiffs’ claims

for overtime have questions of law and fact in common because both arise out of Plaintiffs’ asserted

rights to overtime pay under the FLSA. Allowing intervention here will not unduly delay or

prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties. The motion for attorney fees and costs

can be addressed expeditiously.

Defendant argues that Adam Wang did not comply with the prerequisites of Rule 24 because

he purportedly did not timely file his application and did not accompany it with a separate pleading

setting forth his claim. The court disagrees. Timeliness of the motion applies not to whether the

application met the notice requirements of this court’s Local Rule 7-2, but rather whether the

application was timely in the context of the litigation. Mr. Wang filed his motion to intervene less

than 3 weeks after this court issued its order deeming Plaintiffs’ attempted dismissals to be motions

to determine the fairness of the settlement of claims under the Fair Labor Standard Act (“FLSA”) 29

U.S.C. § 201 et seq. The court finds the motion was timely. 

The separate “pleading” requirement is met by the motion for attorney fees and costs filed by

Mr. Wang. Rule 8(a) provides that:

“A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original claim,

counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall contain (1) a short and plain

statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends, unless the court

already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new grounds of jurisdiction to support

it, (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to

relief, and (3) a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader seeks. Relief in the

alternative or of several different types may be demanded.”

Mr. Wang’s motion meets all of those requirements. No statement of the court’s jurisdiction

is required because the court already has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331 (federal question

jurisdiction) and the FLSA. The motion states the basis on which Mr. Wang claims entitlement to

relief, to wit the mandatory attorneys fees provision of the FLSA. See Maddrix v. Dize, 153 F.2d

274, 276 (4th Cir. 1946) (noting that FLSA endows a plaintiff’s attorney with a direct interest in the

claim for attorneys fees). And the motion requests an award of attorneys fees and costs, which is

essentially a demand for judgment for the relief he seeks. See FED.R.CIV.PRO. 54 (providing that the

term judgment includes “any order from which an appeal lies”).

The court also finds unpersuasive Defendant’s argument that attorney Wang is somehow

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3 This scheduling conflict should have been brought to the court’s attention before the

hearing.

4 Dismissal by stipulation pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1) is not available to the parties in this

case. Rule 41(a)(1) expressly states that it is subject to, among other things, “any statute of the United

States.” FLSA claims cannot be waived without court approval. See Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight

Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 740 (1981). The order approving the settlement will be an appealable order,

and thus will be a “judgment.” See FED.R.CIV.PRO. 54(a).

ORDER, page 3

estopped from litigating his right to fees in federal court, or that he agreed to limit any fee dispute

with Defendant to arbitration pursuant to his fee agreement with his client. Defendant is not a party

to Mr. Wang’s fee agreements with his clients; those agreements apply only to fee disputes between

Mr. Wang and his clients. And estoppel would require a showing of detrimental reliance by

Defendant on the fee agreement. See, e.g., Toscano v. Greene Music, 124 Cal.App.4th 685, 692

(2004). No such showing has been made, and Defendant cites no legal authority for applying

estoppel concepts to a fee dispute between a plaintiff’s attorney and a defendant under the FLSA. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, due to Kurt Miller’s scheduling conflict,3 the hearing on

the motion to determine the fairness of the settlement with Plaintiff Zhou is CONTINUED to 9:00

a.m. on October 27, 2006 and, if additional time is necessary, 9:00 a.m. on October 31, 2006. (The

court concurrently herewith issues an order regarding Mr. Kuo’s “Notice of Dismissal.”)

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion for attorneys fees is continued to 10:00 a.m. on

December 12, 2006. If the parties wish, the court will refer Defendant and intervener Wang to a

settlement conference with regard to the attorneys fees issue. It appears that at least a partial award

of reasonable attorneys fees will be warranted for work done while attorney Wang was retained by

Plaintiff Zhou. Assuming this court approves the settlement, and issues a judgment of dismissal

thereon under Rule 41(a)(2),4 an award of attorneys fees will be mandatory under the FLSA. 

However, in determining the amount of the award, the court may take into account the fact that the

parties settled, and that there appears to have been a triable issue of fact as to whether or not Plaintiff

Zhou was “exempt.” See, Saizen v. Delta Concrete Prods. Co., 448 F.3d 795, 801-02 (5th Cir. 2006)

(court may reduce award where disputed FLSA claim is settled); see also e.g., McCullough v.

Aramark Educational Services, Inc., 2004 WL 813005 (M.D.N.C. 2004) (whether sous chef was

exempt under FLSA was triable issue of fact). 

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ORDER, page 4

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s belated request for discovery regarding the

attorneys fees issue is DENIED. Any such request should have been filed before the original date set

by this court for hearing the motion for attorneys fees. Moreover, the question of how much of a fee

is reasonable in this matter is not entirely dependent on the number of hours actually spent, but will

include evaluation of the hours reasonably necessary for the work.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, because Plaintiff Kuo is now represented by counsel (Kurt

Miller), this case shall be designated an electronic filing case.

Dated: 10/11/06

 

PATRICIA V. TRUMBULL

United States Magistrate Judge

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