Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-00693/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-00693-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 1 - 10cv00693 JLS (WMc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DARYL KEITH WOODS,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 10-cv-00693 JLS (WMc)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED

STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE RE:

DENIAL OF PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

vs.

B.K. WONG, Warden,

Respondent.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Daryl Keith Woods (“Petitioner”), a California inmate proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis, challenges his convictions in San Diego Superior Court Case Nos. SCD200184 and

SCS214181 with a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”; Doc. No. 1) in this Court pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Currently, Petitioner is serving a state prison term of twenty-seven years

comprised of: (a) twenty-three years for five counts of robbery in Case No. SCD200184 (Lodgment

4 at p. 1), and (b) four years for two counts of robbery in Case No. SCD214181. (Lodgment 4 at p.

2). 

Petitioner claims the following: (1) he received ineffective assistance of trial and appellate

counsel; (2) his procedural due process rights were violated when he was not arraigned before a

Magistrate Judge within forty-eight hours; (3) his equal protection, procedural due process and state

law right were violated when police officers denied Petitioner’s request for counsel during a curbside

Case 3:10-cv-00693-JLS-WMC Document 7 Filed 03/10/11 Page 1 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 1

 All further references in this Report and Recommendation are to the California Penal Code,

unless otherwise noted.

- 2 - 10cv00693 JLS (WMc)

lineup, and violated administrative policies during the lineup and photographic display; (4) California

law was violated when the sentencing judge imposed the upper term on Count 1A; (5) he suffered

cruel and unusual punishment, Double Jeopardy violations, and a violation of California law when the

trial court failed to stay certain counts under California Penal Code section 654, and (6) there was

insufficient evidence of Petitioner’s mental competency to stand trial in violation of the Sixth and

Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge Janis L.

Sammartino pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule H.C.2 of the United States

District Court for the Southern District of California. After reviewing the Petition and Memorandum

of Points and Authorities in support thereof [Doc. No. 1-1], Respondent’s Answer [Doc. No. 5] and

Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support thereof [Doc. No. 5-1], Petitioner’s Traverse [Doc.

No. 6], and all of the supporting documents submitted by the parties, the Court recommends the

Petition be DENIED for the reasons stated below.

II.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. State Court Proceedings

1. Underlying Offenses

a. Case No. SCD200184

On July 14, 2006, the San Diego District Attorney’s office filed a Complaint charging

Petitioner with one count of robbery under California Penal Code section 211.1

 (Clerk’s Tr.;

Lodgment 1 at pp. 1-2.) In addition, the District Attorney alleged Petitioner had a prison prior under

section 667.5, subd. (b); twelve serious felony priors under section 667, subd. (a), and section 1192.7,

subd. (c), and eleven strike priors under section 667, subds. (b) through (i), section 1170.12, and

section 668. (Clerk’s Tr.; Lodgment 1 at pp. 2-5.) Petitioner was arraigned on July 14, 2006, and he

pled not guilty. (Clerk’s Tr.; Lodgment 1 at p. 55.)

On July 20, 2006, the District Attorney filed an Amended Complaint charging Petitioner with

Case 3:10-cv-00693-JLS-WMC Document 7 Filed 03/10/11 Page 2 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 - 10cv00693 JLS (WMc)

an additional six counts of robbery under section 211, and withdrew one of the serious felony priors.

(Clerk’s Tr.; Lodgment 1 at pp. 7-11.) Again, Petitioner was arraigned on the same day and pled not

guilty. (Clerk’s Tr.; Lodgment 1 at p. 56.) On September 13, 2006, the District Attorney filed a

Second Amended Complaint withdrawing two counts of robbery (Counts Two and Three).

After the state court judge set a trial date, a doubt arose as to Petitioner’s mental competence.

As a result, on May 16, 2007, the state court judge issued an order for: (1) a determination of

Petitioner’s mental competence to take place on May 25, 2007, and (2) a hearing to take place on June

11, 2007. (Clerk’s Tr.; Lodgment 1 at p. 63.) At the June 11, 2007 hearing, the state court judge

issued an order for a second mental competence evaluation (Lodgment 1 at p. 64), which Valerie Rice,

Ph.D., conducted on July 3, 2007. (Clerk’s Tr.; Lodgment 1 at pp. 22-26.) Based on her medical

findings, Dr. Rice concluded Petitioner was not suffering from a mental illness or disorder, and as a

result, Petitioner was competent to stand trial. (Clerk’s Tr.; Lodgment 1 at p. 26.) On July 18, 2007,

the state court judge found Petitioner mentally competent to stand trial. (Clerk’s Tr.; Lodgment 1 at

p. 27.) Petitioner posted a $500,000 bond on August 22, 2007, and was permitted to remain at liberty

until trial, which was set for October 25, 2007. (Clerk’s Tr.; Lodgment 1 at pp. 67-68.) 

b. Case No. SCS214181

On September 28, 2007, the District Attorney filed a new Complaint charging Petitioner with

two counts of robbery under section 211, and one count of possession of a controlled substance under

California Health and Safety Code section 11350, subd. (a). (Clerk’s Tr.; Lodgment 1 at pp. 77-79.)

Further, the Complaint contained special allegations that Petitioner committed each count while

released from custody on bail in violation of section 12022.1, subd. (b). (Clerk’s Tr.; Lodgment 1 at

pp. 77-79.) In addition, the District Attorney alleged twenty-one prior felonies for the purposes of

probation denial under section 1203, subd. (e)(4); eighteen prison priors for the purpose of

establishing Petitioner has not remained free of prison custody or free of the commission of a felony

for five years subsequent to his release from prison under section 667.5, subd. (b), and section 668;

seventeen serious felony priors under section 667, subd. (a)(1), section 668, and section 1192.7, subd.

(c); and seventeen strike priors under section 667, subds. (b) through (i), section 1170.12, and section

668. (Clerk’s Tr.; Lodgment 1 at pp. 80-83.)

Case 3:10-cv-00693-JLS-WMC Document 7 Filed 03/10/11 Page 3 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 - 10cv00693 JLS (WMc)

The same day, September 28, 2007, Petitioner was arraigned and pled not guilty. (Clerk’s Tr.;

Lodgment 1 at p. 98.) The state court judge remanded Petitioner back to custody and set bail at $1

million. (Clerk’s Tr.; Lodgment 1 at p. 98.) On November 28, 2007, a preliminary hearing was held

in Case No. SCS214181. (Lodgment 7.)

c. Petitioner’s Plea

As indicated above, Case No. SCS214181 arose before the state court heard Case No.

SCD200184. On November 6, 2007, after Petitioner was placed in custody for Case No. SCS214181,

the state court judge increased bail to $3 million and set a trial date for February 1, 2008 in Case No.

SCD200184. (Clerk’s Tr.; Lodgment 1 at p. 70.) 

On January 30, 2008, Petitioner informed the state court of his intent to change his not guilty

plea in both cases. (Clerk’s Tr.; Lodgment 1 at p. 74.) As a result, on January 30, 2008, state court

Judge Jeffrey F. Fraser presided over a Change of Plea and Immediate Sentencing hearing. (Lodgment

13.) 

In assessing Petitioner’s ability to understand the nature of the proceedings, the state court

judge asked Petitioner if he was impaired in a way that would preclude him from understanding court

proceedings. (Rep. Appeal Tr.; Lodgment 13 at p. 2:6-8.) Petitioner responded he was not impaired.

(Rep. Appeal Tr.; Lodgment 13 at p. 2:9.) Additionally, the judge asked Petitioner if he had sufficient

time to consult with his attorney about the charges against him and any potential defenses. (Rep.

Appeal Tr.; Lodgment 13 at p. 2:10-11.) Petitioner responded, “yes.” (Rep. Appeal Tr.; Lodgment

13 at p. 2:12.) 

Further, the judge advised Petitioner of his constitutional rights and asked Petitioner if he

waived those rights. (Rep. Appeal Tr.; Lodgment 13 at p. 2:13-18.) Petitioner voluntarily waived his

rights at the hearing. (Clerk’s Tr.; Lodgment 1 at p. 32, 88; Rep. Appeal Tr., Lodgment 13 at p. 2:19-

20.) The judge asked Petitioner if anybody coerced him into pleading guilty. (Rep. Appeal Tr.;

Lodgment 13 at p. 2:21-22.) Petitioner responded, “no.” (Rep. Appeal Tr.; Lodgment 13 at p. 2:23.)

Finally, the judge notified Petitioner of the maximum penalty in each case (Rep. Appeal Tr.;

Lodgment 13 at p. 2:24-3:2) and asked Petitioner whether he had initialed and signed each written plea

and understood the terms contained therein. (Rep. Appeal Tr.; Lodgment 13 at p. 3:7-9, 11-12.)

Case 3:10-cv-00693-JLS-WMC Document 7 Filed 03/10/11 Page 4 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 - 10cv00693 JLS (WMc)

Petitioner responded, “yes.” (Rep. Appeal Tr.; Lodgment 13 at p. 3:10-13.) 

In Case No. SCD200184, Petitioner: (1) entered a plea of no contest to five counts of robbery

under section 211 (Counts One, Four, Five, Six and Seven); (2) admitted one serious felony prior

under section 667, subd. (a), and eleven strike priors under section 667, subd. (b) through (i), and

section 1170.12; and (3) requested immediate sentencing. (Clerk’s Tr.; Lodgment 1 at p. 74.) After

the state court judge granted the District Attorney’s motion to dismiss any remaining counts and to

strike any remaining allegations, the judge sentenced Petitioner to a determinate term of twenty-three

years. (Clerk’s Tr.; Lodgment 1 at p. 74.) The judge recited the twenty-three term as follows: Count

One, an upper term of ten years; Counts Four through Seven, a one-third middle term of two years for

each count consecutively; and the serious felony prior under section 667, subd. (a)(1), five years

consecutively. (Clerk’s Tr.; Lodgment 1 at p. 74.) 

In Case No. SCS214181, Petitioner: (1) entered a plea of no contest to two counts of robbery

under section 211, including a special allegation of committing a felony while on probation in Count

One; and (2) admitted eleven strike priors under section 667, subd. (b) through (i), and section

1170.12. (Clerk’s Tr.; Lodgment 1 at p. 104.) Again, after the state court judge granted the District

Attorney’s motion to dismiss any remaining counts and to strike any remaining allegations, the judge

sentenced Petitioner to a determinate term of four years to run consecutively to Petitioner’s sentence

in Case No. SCD200184. (Clerk’s Tr.; Lodgment 1 at p. 104.) The judge recited the four-year term

as follows: Count One, including the enhancement, one-third middle term of two years; and Count

Two, one-third middle term of two years consecutively. (Clerk’s Tr.; Lodgment 1 at p. 104.)

d. Appeal

On March 19, 2008, Petitioner filed: (1) a notice of appeal challenging the validity of the plea

based on the sentence or other matters occurring after the plea and (2) a request for certificate of

probable cause in San Diego Superior Court. (Clerk’s Tr.; Lodgment 1 at pp. 48-49.) On March 27,

2008, the state court judge denied Petitioner’s request for a certificate of probable cause. (Clerk’s Tr.;

Lodgment 1 at p. 53.) 

On June 30, 2008, Petitioner, by and through his appellate counsel, filed an appeal with the

California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, requesting the Court of Appeal

Case 3:10-cv-00693-JLS-WMC Document 7 Filed 03/10/11 Page 5 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 - 10cv00693 JLS (WMc)

review the trial court record for error as required under People v. Wende, 25 Cal. 3d 436 (1979) and

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). (Lodgment 2 at p. 4.) In his brief to the Court of Appeal,

Petitioner’s counsel failed to affirmatively allege any arguable issue, but suggested to the court a

possible issue to consider in conducting its independent review of the record: whether Petitioner’s

pleas were constitutionally valid. (Lodgment 2 at pp. 4-5.) 

Accepting Petitioner’s counsel’s ostensible concession that no arguable issues could be found,

the Court of Appeal granted Petitioner thirty days to file a supplemental brief containing an arguable

appellate issue. (Lodgment 3.) Petitioner failed to file a supplemental brief. (Lodgment 4 at p. 2.)

On August 28, 2008, after conducting a Wende review, the Court of Appeal found the record

“disclosed no reasonably arguable appellate issue,” and affirmed the trial court’s judgment.

(Lodgment 4 at p. 3.) Petitioner did not file an appeal to the California Supreme Court. 

2. Collateral Review

On April 1, 2008, before Petitioner filed his Wende appeal on direct review, Petitioner filed

his first petition for writ of habeas corpus in San Diego Superior Court. (Lodgment 6.) In the petition,

Petitioner set forth two claims: (1) violation of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the

U.S. Constitution, the Sixth Amendment, the California Constitution, and California Penal Code

section 825 for failure to be brought before a Magistrate Judge within forty-eight hours of his arrest,

and (2) violation of Petitioner’s “due process, right to testify or to be heard and right to a trial” under

the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments and the California Constitution for the trial court’s failure

to hear Petitioner’s motions. (Lodgment 6 at pp. 3-5.) On May 21, 2008, the superior court denied

the petition because the court lacked jurisdiction due to Petitioner’s then pending appeal on direct

review. (Lodgment 8 at p. 2:18-19.) 

On November 5, 2008, Petitioner filed his second petition for writ of habeas corpus in San

Diego Superior Court. (Lodgment 7.) In the petition, Petitioner set forth six claims by re-alleging the

first claim from the first petition, omitting the second claim from the first petition, and alleging five

new claims. Petitioner raised the following six claims: (1) violation of procedural due process under

the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and the California Constitution for

Case 3:10-cv-00693-JLS-WMC Document 7 Filed 03/10/11 Page 6 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 - 10cv00693 JLS (WMc)

failure to be arraigned before a Magistrate Judge within forty-eight hours of his arrest; (2) willful

violation of procedural due process at the curbside photo-line up; (3) violation of Sixth Amendment

rights for imposition of the upper term on Count 1A without allowing a jury to determine the

aggravating factors; (4) violation of Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights for failure to impose a

stay on Counts 4A, 5A, 6A, 7A, 1B and 2B under section 654; (5) violation of Sixth Amendment right

to trial due to insufficient evidence of Petitioner’s competency to stand trial, and (6) ineffective

assistance of counsel. (Lodgment 7.) 

On December 30, 2008, the San Diego Superior Court denied Petitioner’s second petition on

the ground that Petitioner failed to meet his burden of setting forth a prima facie statement of facts that

would entitle him to relief. (Lodgment 8 at p. 3:9-10.) In addition, after review of the record, the

court made the following findings: (a) Petitioner was duly arraigned following his arrests; (b)

Petitioner’s due process rights at the curbside line-up were not deprived; (c) sufficiency of the

evidence claims are not cognizable on collateral review; (d) Petitioner may not be heard on a

sentencing error claim because Petitioner’s negotiated plea significantly reduced his prison term; (e)

absence of a sentencing error, and (f) Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim lacked merit

because Petitioner: (i) provided no evidence supporting his claim, (ii) read and understood the terms

set forth in the plea agreement, into which he knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily entered and (iii)

failed to show prejudice. (Lodgment 8 at pp. 3:16-4:24.)

On March 3, 2009, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Court

of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One. (Lodgment 9.) In this petition, Petitioner alleged

the same six claims raised in his second petition in San Diego Superior Court. (Lodgment 9.) On

May 6, 2009, in a one-page opinion, the Court of Appeal adopted the San Diego Superior Court’s

reasoning and denied the petition. (Lodgment 10.)

On June 11, 2009, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California

Supreme Court alleging the same six claims raised in both the San Diego Superior Court and the Court

of Appeal. (Lodgment 11.) On November 10, 2009, the California Supreme Court denied the petition.

(Lodgment 12.)

/ / / 

Case 3:10-cv-00693-JLS-WMC Document 7 Filed 03/10/11 Page 7 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 2

 For a complete recitation of the relevant facts of the underlying offenses see the California

Court of Appeal’s decision denying Petitioner’s appeal on direct review. (Lodgment 4 at p. 2.)

- 8 - 10cv00693 JLS (WMc)

B. Federal Court Proceedings

On April 1, 2010, Petitioner filed the instant Petition asserting the same six claims raised on

collateral review in state court. (Pet.; Doc. No. 1.) On June 16, 2010, Respondent filed an Answer

with a Memorandum and Points and Authorities in support thereof denying each and every allegation

in the Petition. (Ans.; Doc. No. 5 at pp. 2:12-3:16.) Respondent concedes the claims currently before

this Court appear to be exhausted and timely. (Ans.; Doc. No. 5 at p. 2:8.) On July 9, 2010, Petitioner

filed a Traverse in which he re-alleges the arguments raised in his petition. (Trav.; Doc. No. 6 a p.

2.)

III.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The facts of the underlying offenses are not pertinent to Petitioner’s claims because “a guilty

plea represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in the criminal process.” Tollett

v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973). To the extent Petitioner seeks federal habeas relief based

on constitutional errors preceding the plea and sentencing immediately thereafter, the facts of the

underlying offenses are irrelevant to the Court’s analysis because “[a] plea of guilty and the ensuing

conviction comprehend all of the factual and legal elements necessary to sustain a binding, final

judgment of guilt and a lawful sentence.” U.S. v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569 (1989). 

Thus, the dispositive factual context of this case is constituted by the limited facts surrounding

the plea, including the state court judge’s notice and Petitioner’s waiver of his constitutional rights.

The pertinent facts as they relate to the plea are contained in the procedural history of this Report and

Recommendation.2

 See Section II.A.1, supra, at pp. 2:17-6:12. 

IV.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Title 28, United States Code section 2254 and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), codified at Title 28, United States Code section 2254,

subpart(d)(1), sets forth the following scope of review for federal habeas corpus claims:

Case 3:10-cv-00693-JLS-WMC Document 7 Filed 03/10/11 Page 8 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 - 10cv00693 JLS (WMc)

(a) The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall

entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. [. . .] 

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the

adjudication of the claim–

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court

of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), (d)(1)-(2).

When determining what constitutes “clearly established federal law” under section

2254(d)(1), federal courts look to U.S. Supreme Court holdings at the time of the state court’s

decision. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72 (2003) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.

362, 412) (2000)); Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 974 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Andrade to

explain clearly established federal law is the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the

U.S. Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision). In addition, Ninth Circuit law

may be considered for its “persuasive authority in applying Supreme Court law.” Lewis v. Mayle,

391 F.3d 989, 995 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1154 (9th Cir.

2000)), overruled in part on other grounds by Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003)); see also Clark v.

Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting while circuit law may be persuasive

authority, “only the [U.S.] Supreme Court’s holdings are binding on the state courts and only those

holdings need be reasonably applied”). 

The “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” clauses contained in section 2254(d)(1)

have independent meaning. Williams, 529 U.S. at 404-05; Lambert, 393 F.3d at 974; Van Lynn v.

Farmon, 347 F.3d 735, 738 (9th Cir. 2003). A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly

established federal law as determined by the U.S. Supreme Court if (1) the state court applies a

rule different from the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or (2) the state court

confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a Supreme Court case, but still

reaches a different result. Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06, 412; Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694

(2002); Andrade, 538 U.S. at 73; Lambert, 393 F.3d at 974; Clark, 331 F.3d at 1067. A state court

Case 3:10-cv-00693-JLS-WMC Document 7 Filed 03/10/11 Page 9 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 10 - 10cv00693 JLS (WMc)

is not required to even be aware of clearly established applicable Supreme Court cases, so long as

“neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts them.” Early v. Packer,

537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002).

A state court decision involves an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law if (1) the

state court identifies the correct governing rule, but unreasonably applies the rule to a new set of

facts, or (2) “the state court either unreasonably extends a legal principle from our precedent to a

new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new

context where it should apply.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 407; Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520

(2003); Andrade, 538 U.S. at 76; Lambert, 393 F.3d at 974; Clark, 331 F.3d at 1067. For a state

court decision to be an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, the state court

decision must be more than simply incorrect or erroneous; instead, the state court’s decision must

be “objectively unreasonable.” Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 380 (2009) (citing Wiggins, 539

U.S. at 520-21); Williams, 529 U.S. at 409; Vasquez, 572 F.3d 1029, 1035 (citing Andrade, 538

U.S. at 75); see also Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1140 (9th Cir. 2002) (federal habeas

courts determine the reasonableness of the state court’s decision, not its reasoning). Thus, this

Court will not disturb the decisions of the California state courts with respect to Petitioner’s claims

unless the state courts’ resolutions of those claims were “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court.” 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d); see also Ramirez v. Castro, 365 F.3d 755, 762 (9th Cir. 2004). 

 Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, the Court “looks

through” to the last reasoned state court decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-06

(1991); Plascencia v. Alameida, 467 F.3d 1190, 1198 (9th Cir. 2006); Vasquez, 572 F.3d at 1035;

Van Lynn, 347 F.3d at 738. If, however, the relevant state court decision does not provide an

adequate explanation or a discernable basis for its reasoning on a particular claim, the federal court

must conduct “an independent review of the record to determine whether the state court’s decision

was objectively unreasonable.” Richter v. Hickman, 578 F.3d 944, 951 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d on

other grounds, Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733 (2011) (quoting Sass v. Cal. Bd. of Prison Terms,

461 F.3d 1123, 1127 (9th Cir. 2006)); accord Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir.

Case 3:10-cv-00693-JLS-WMC Document 7 Filed 03/10/11 Page 10 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 11 - 10cv00693 JLS (WMc)

2003); Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000).

V. 

DISCUSSION

A. Ineffective Assistance of Trial and Appellate Counsel

1. Summary of Claim

Petitioner contends his trial and appellate counsel “failed to inform Petitioner of the fact

that, sentencing that imposes the upper term with out [sic] a jury’s verdict is unconstitutional.”

(Pet.; Doc. No. 1 at p. 6.) Further, Petitioner contends trial counsel negotiated an “unconstitutional

plea agreement,” which resulted in the “imposition of the upper term sentence [of five years that]

violated Petitioner’s 6th Amendment rights”. (Pet.; Doc. No. 1 at p. 6.) In short, Petitioner claims

he should have received the “statutory maximum” sentence - the middle term of 3 years - rather

than the upper term sentence of five years, which Petitioner agreed to in his plea agreement.

2. Respondent’s Rebuttal

Respondent argues the California courts rejected Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance

of trial counsel and the decisions of those courts are entitled to deference because they are not

contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, U.S. Supreme Court precedent on the facts

presented. (Ans.; Doc. No. 5 at p. 2:12-15.) Specifically, Respondent contends: (1) the plea

agreement informed Petitioner he had the right to a jury trial, and, because of the plea agreement,

Petitioner would be giving up that right; (2) Petitioner signed the agreement indicating he read and

understood the agreement, and (3) counsel also signed the agreement, indicating he had discussed

the agreement with Petitioner. (Mem. P. & A., Doc. No. 5-1 at p. 4:16-21; Clerk’s Tr., Lodgment

1 at pp. 32-34.) Further, Respondent argues the trial court, in accepting the plea, informed

Petitioner he had the right to a jury trial if he pled guilty or no contest, and the court asked

Petitioner if he gave up that right. (Rep. Appeal Tr.; Lodgment 13 at p. 2:19.) Petitioner said

“yes.” (Rep. Appeal Tr.; Lodgment 13 at p. 2:20.) 

Additionally, Respondent argues Petitioner knowingly and intelligently waived his right to

a jury trial on the imposition of the upper term because he negotiated and received the benefit of a

specified prison term, evidenced by his initials next to the waiver of his jury trial right set forth in

Case 3:10-cv-00693-JLS-WMC Document 7 Filed 03/10/11 Page 11 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 12 - 10cv00693 JLS (WMc)

the plea agreement. (Mem. P. & A.; Doc. No. 5-1 at p. 9:19-23.) 

Finally, Respondent argues Petitioner cannot show prejudice as required under Strickland

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). (Mem. P. & A.; Doc. No. 5-1 at p. 9:24.) In exchange for his

twenty-seven year sentence, Petitioner avoided a sentence of over 100-years-to-life. (Mem. P. &

A.; Doc. No. 5-1 at p. 9:24-25.) Moreover, the trial court had ten prior strikes with which to

properly impose an upper term without a jury. (Mem. P. & A.; Doc. No. 5-1 at p. 10:5.) 

3. Relevant Law

a. Strickland Standard - Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides “[i]n all criminal

prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his

defense.” U.S. CONST. Amend. VI. The clearly established United States Supreme Court law

governing ineffective assistance of counsel claims is set forth in Strickland v. Washington, supra.. 

See Knowles v. Mirzayance, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1419 (2009) (“[T]his Court has repeatedly applied

[the Strickland] standard to evaluate ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims where there is no

other Supreme Court precedent directly on point”); Moore v. Czerniak, 574 F.3d 1092, 1100 (9th

Cir. 2009), rev’d on other grounds sub nom., Premo, supra, 131 S. Ct. 733 (2011) (stating the rule

set forth in Strickland is “clearly established federal law” under AEDPA); Sims v. Brown, 425 F.3d

560, 584 (9th Cir. 2005); see also People v. Gamache, 48 Cal. 4th 347, 391 (Cal. 2010)

(describing the Strickland standard as a “settled standard” in assessing ineffective assistance of

counsel claims in California).

For an ineffective assistance of counsel claim to provide a basis for habeas relief, Petitioner

must satisfy both prongs of the two-prong test laid out in Strickland. First, he must show

“counsel’s performance was deficient.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. “This requires showing that

counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the

defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. In other words, counsel’s performance must fall below

an “objective standard of reasonableness.” Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003). Further,

judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance “must be highly deferential” pursuant to a strong

presumption that counsel’s conduct “falls within the wide range of reasonable professional

Case 3:10-cv-00693-JLS-WMC Document 7 Filed 03/10/11 Page 12 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

 Here, Petitioner pled “no contest” in both cases. (Rep. Appeal Tr.; Lodgment 13 at p. 4:8-14,

19-27.) A plea of no contest has the same legal effect as plea of guilty. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1016

(Deering 2011) (“[A] plea of nolo contendre shall be considered the same as a plea of guilty . . . . The

legal effect of such a plea, to a crime punishable as a felony, shall be the same as that of a plea of

guilty for all purposes.”); Ortberg v. Moody, 961 F.3d 135, 137-38 (9th Cir. 1992) (applying Tollett

to no contest pleas); see also Miller v. McCarthy, 607 F.2d 854, 856 (9th Cir. 1979) (explaining

federal constitutional principles governing guilty pleas in California apply equally to no contest pleas.)

- 13 - 10cv00693 JLS (WMc)

assistance,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, where all significant decisions made by counsel are

presumed to have been made in the “exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Id. at 690.

Second, Petitioner must show counsel’s deficient performance “prejudiced the defense.” 

Id. at 687. To satisfy this prong, Petitioner must demonstrate there is a “reasonable probability

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the [pretrial] proceeding would have

been different.” Smith v. Spisak, 130 S. Ct. 676, 685 (2010) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). 

In the context of a plea bargain, a showing of “prejudice” must demonstrate “counsel’s

ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea process.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52,

58 (1985). In particular, Petitioner must show “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Premo, 131 S.

Ct. at 745 (quoting Lockhart, 474 U.S. at 59); Womack v. McDaniel, 497 F.3d 998, 1002 (9th Cir.

2007). 

Failure to establish either prong of the Strickland test requires a finding that counsel’s

performance was not constitutionally ineffective. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.

b. Guilty Pleas

A guilty plea3

 is valid if it is both intelligent and voluntary. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395

U.S. 238, 242 (1969) (in addition to the plea being intelligent and voluntary the record must

affirmatively disclose the defendant’s intelligence and voluntariness); Brady v. Alabama, 397 U.S.

742, 747 n. 4 (1970) (same). Petitioner bears the burden of establishing his guilty plea was

unintelligent and involuntary. Little v. Crawford, 449 F.3d 1075, 1080 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing

Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 31-34 (1992)). 

A plea is intelligent and voluntary only if the defendant enters into the plea “fully aware of

the direct consequences of his plea . . .”. Id. at 1080 (quoting U.S. v. Amador-Leal, 276 F.3d 511,

514 (9th Cir. 2002)); see Torrey v. Estelle, 842 F.2d 234, 236 (9th Cir. 1988) (a “direct”

Case 3:10-cv-00693-JLS-WMC Document 7 Filed 03/10/11 Page 13 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 14 - 10cv00693 JLS (WMc)

consequence is a result representing a “definite, immediate and largely automatic effect on the

range of the defendant’s punishment”). Thus, “[b]efore a court may accept a defendant’s guilty

plea, the defendant must be advised of the range of allowable punishment that will result from his

plea.” Little, 449 F.3d at 1080 (quoting Torrey, 842 F.2d at 235). “The essential ingredient is

notice of ‘the maximum possible penalty provided by law.’” U.S. v. Barrios-Gutierrez, 255 F.3d

1024, 1027 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)). 

Further, to be valid, the guilty plea must be free of coercion, misrepresentation, or

improper promises. See U.S. v. Anderson, 993 F.2d 1435, 1437 (9th Cir. 1993); Doe v. Woodford,

508 F.3d 563, 570 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Iaea v. Sunn, 800 F.2d 861, 866 (9th Cir. 1986) (“[a]

guilty plea is coerced where a defendant is ‘induced by promises or threats which deprive [the

plea] of the nature of a voluntary act.’”). The Ninth Circuit accords great weight to the

defendant’s statements made in open court contemporaneously with his plea agreement. Id. at

1438 (citing Chizen v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 560, 562 (9th Cir. 1986)); see Blackledge v. Allison, 431

U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977) (representations of the defendant and his lawyer at the plea hearing, as well

as any findings made by the judge accepting the plea, constitute a “formidable barrier in any

subsequent collateral proceedings. Solemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption

of verity.”). 

The voluntariness of a criminal defendant’s plea can be determined “only by considering

all of the relevant circumstances surrounding it.” Brady v. U.S., 397 U.S. 742, 749 (1970); see

Woodford, 508 F.3d at 570 (relevant circumstances include the defendant’s “subjective state of

mind” and the “constitutional acceptability” of the external forces inducing the guilty plea). If a

defendant does not understand “the nature of the constitutional protections he is waiving,” or if he

has too incomplete an understanding of the charge such that his plea will not qualify as “an

intelligent admission of guilt,” a guilty plea may be involuntary. Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S.

637, 645 n. 13 (1976). 

The intelligent character of a defendant’s plea must indicate “sufficient awareness of the

relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” Brady, 397 U.S. at 748. A defendant must have

notice of the nature of the charges against him, and he must understand the nature of the

Case 3:10-cv-00693-JLS-WMC Document 7 Filed 03/10/11 Page 14 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 15 - 10cv00693 JLS (WMc)

constitutional protections waived by his plea, including the right to a jury trial, the right to

confront his accuser and cross-examine all witnesses, the privilege against self-incrimination, and

the right to present evidence. See Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 183 (2005); Boykin, 395

U.S. at 243-44. 

The Supreme Court has held “[w]hen a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open

court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise

independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the

entry of the guilty plea.” Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267; see also Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283,

288 (1975) (“The Brady trilogy announced the general rule that a guilty plea, intelligently and

voluntarily made, bars the later assertion of constitutional challenges to the pretrial proceedings.

This principle was reaffirmed in Tollett v. Henderson . . .”). Thus, as a general matter, one who

intelligently and voluntarily pleads guilty to a criminal charge “may not subsequently seek federal

habeas corpus relief on the basis of pre-plea constitutional violations.” Moran v. Godinez, 57 F.3d

690, 700 (9th Cir. 1994), superseded on other grounds by statute, AEDPA, Pub. L. No. 104-132,

110 Stat. 1214, as stated in McMurtrey v. Ryan, 539 F.3d 1112, 1119 (9th Cir. 2008); see U.S. v.

Caperell, 938 F.2d 975, 977 (9th Cir. 1991) (“[A] guilty plea generally waives all claims of

constitutional violation occurring before the plea . . .”)

Accordingly, Petitioner may seek to establish ineffective assistance of counsel with respect

to the plea agreement. Petitioner, however, “may only attack the voluntary and intelligent

character of the guilty plea by showing that the advice he received from counsel was not within the

range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” Moran, 57 F.3d at 700 (quoting

Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267). 

4. Recommendation

In this case, the California Court of Appeal “adopt[ed] the superior court’s reasoning to

deny the petition.” (Lodgment 10.) In denying Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel

claim, the Superior Court properly applied Strickland, the applicable federal law in ineffective

assistance of counsel claims, including claims involving guilty pleas. The Superior Court

concluded:

Case 3:10-cv-00693-JLS-WMC Document 7 Filed 03/10/11 Page 15 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 16 - 10cv00693 JLS (WMc)

 Finally, Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim lacks merit. 

To show that trial counsel was ineffective, Petitioner must show, 1) his counsel’s

representation was deficient in that it fell “below an objective standard of

reasonableness . . . under prevailing professional norms”, and 2) his counsel’s

deficient performance prejudiced his defense. (Strickland v. Washington (1984)

466 U.S. 668, 688; People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 216.)

[. . .]

 [T]he record shows that Petitioner signed the no contest pleas indicating that

he had read the pleas and understood the terms set forth therein. The record also

shows that Petitioner’s no contest pleas were knowingly and intelligently made. 

There is no evidence that Petitioner was pressured to enter into the no contest pleas. 

The Court of Appeal [on direct review] in fact found that the no contest pleas were

constitutionally valid.

 Additionally, Petitioner makes no showing whatsoever that he suffered

prejudice as a result of his trial counsel’s alleged ineffective assistance, and does

not show a reasonable probability exists that, but for his trial counsel’s failings, the

result of his case would have been favorable to him. Accordingly, this Court need

not reach the issue of whether Petitioner’s trial counsel’s assistance fell outside the

range of reasonable professional assistance. Thus, Petitioner has not made a prima

facie showing that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

(Lodgment 8 at pp. 3:24-28, 4:14-24.)

The state court properly invoked Strickland and applied Strickland’s prejudice prong to

deny Petitioner’s claim. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 (courts may consider either prong of the

Strickland test first and need not address both prongs if petitioner fails on one); Weaver v.

Palmateer, 455 F.3d 958, 966 (9th Cir. 2006). Accordingly, the Court concludes the state court’s

decision finding Petitioner failed to establish prejudice under Strickland, was neither contrary to,

nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. 

Further, the state court decision was not an unreasonable application of the facts. First,

Petitioner voluntarily and intelligently entered his no contest plea. In addition, Petitioner presents

no evidence showing his counsel or the court failed to adequately advise him about the plea

agreement and the constitutional rights forfeited therein. The following series of exchanges

between the sentencing judge and Petitioner during Petitioner’s Change of Plea and Immediate

Sentencing Hearing demonstrate Petitioner’s failure to establish his trial counsel’s ineffective

assistance:

COURT: Have you had enough time to talk to your lawyer about the charges and any

potential defenses?

Case 3:10-cv-00693-JLS-WMC Document 7 Filed 03/10/11 Page 16 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 17 - 10cv00693 JLS (WMc)

DEFENDANT: Yes.

COURT: Do you understand you have the following constitutional rights: the right to

a speedy and public jury trial, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses,

remain silent, and present evidence. Do you understand those rights?

DEFENDANT: Yes.

COURT: Do you waive those rights?

DEFENDANT: Yes.

COURT: Anybody force you to get you to plead guilty today?

DEFENDANT: No.

COURT: Do you understand the penalty in case ending 184 is 150 years to life and a

$10,000 fine? That’s the maximum. 

DEFENDANT: Yes.

COURT: In the case ending 181, the maximum is 60 years to life and a $10,000 fine?

DEFENDANT: Yes.

[. . .]

COURT: In each [case] . . . I’m holding up two change of plea forms. Are these your

initials and signature on each document?

DEFENDANT: Yes.

COURT: Do you understand each and every thing in each document?

DEFENDANT: Yes, I do.

(Rep. Appeal Tr.; Lodgment 13 at p. 2:10-3:2, 3:7-13) (Emphasis added.)

The record indicates when given the opportunity, Petitioner failed to raise any concerns

about the content of his plea agreements, counsel’s assistance when entering into the plea

agreements, or the rights waived as a result. In fact, Petitioner affirmatively indicated on his

written and signed pleas that his trial counsel explained to him the possible consequences of his no

contest plea. Petitioner also stated at the January 30, 2008 sentencing hearing he knew and

understood that, by making a plea, he waived his right to a jury trial. Accordingly, it was

unnecessary for a jury to determine the applicability of an upper term sentence because in his plea

Case 3:10-cv-00693-JLS-WMC Document 7 Filed 03/10/11 Page 17 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

 In his claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, Petitioner specifically alleges “trial attorney

Michael Pedretti and appellate counsel Stephen M. Hinkle: failed to inform Petitioner of the fact that,

sentencing that imposes the upper term with out [sic] a jury’s verdict is unconstitutional.” (Pet.; Doc.

No. 1 at p. 6.) Petitioner was represented by two attorneys at the change of plea and sentencing

hearing: in Case No. SCS214181, Ms. Wolf, deputy public defender, and in Case No. SCD200184,

Mr. Pedretti, deputy alternate public defender. Mr. Pedretti did not sign the “Attorney’s Statement”

section of Petitioner’s written plea. 

- 18 - 10cv00693 JLS (WMc)

bargain, Petitioner waived his right to have a jury determine which term should be imposed. The

state court’s decision to deny Petitioner’s claim comports with this result. Moreover, Petitioner’s

counsel (Leslie Wolf4

) signed the “Attorney’s Statement” section of Petitioner’s written plea,

which states in part:

I, attorney for the defendant in the above-entitled case, personally read and

explained to the defendant the entire contents of this plea form and any addendum

thereto. I discussed all charges and possible defenses with the defendant, and the

consequences of this plea . . . I personally observed the defendant fill in and initial

each item, or read and initial each item to acknowledge his/her understanding and

waivers. 

(Clerk’s Tr.; Lodgment 1 at p. 90.)

Thus, when presented with the opportunity during the change of plea and immediate

sentencing hearing to voice any confusion with the plea agreement, Petitioner affirmatively

expressed: (1) he had enough time to talk with his counsel about the charges and any potential

defenses; (2) nobody, including his lawyer, forced him to enter the plea, and (3) his counsel

explained to him the possible consequences of entering a no contest plea. 

As a result, the Court finds Petitioner voluntarily and intelligently entered into the plea

agreement, and has failed to demonstrate the advice he received from counsel regarding the waiver

of the right to a jury trial fell outside the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal

cases. Accordingly, the Court finds the state court’s decision to deny Petitioner’s claim under

Strickland was not an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented.

In addition, Petitioner fails to demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Premo, 131 S.

Ct. at 745. The plea agreement allowed Petitioner to avoid a sentence of more than 200-years-tolife in exchange for a determinate twenty-seven-year sentence. Under these circumstances, the

California Court of Appeal reasonably denied Petitioner’s claim under Strickland’s prejudice

Case 3:10-cv-00693-JLS-WMC Document 7 Filed 03/10/11 Page 18 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 19 - 10cv00693 JLS (WMc)

prong.

Therefore, it is recommended federal habeas relief be DENIED on this claim.

B. Procedural Due Process Violation When Petitioner Was Not Arraigned Before a

Magistrate Judge Within Forty-Eight Hours

1. Summary of Claims

Petitioner claims his procedural due process rights were twice violated. First, Petitioner

alleges after being arrested for robbery on July 12, 2006, he was “not legally arraigned before a

magistrate judge within ‘48 hours’ of said arrest in error.” (Pet.; Doc. No. 1 at p. 9.) In particular,

Petitioner alleges he was held for “fifty-eight hours without counsel being notified and without

receiving a phone call,” and as a result he “suffered the loss of material and corroborating

witnesses” without which he “cannot receive a fair jury trial”. (Pet.; Doc. No. 1 at p. 9.)

Second, after again being arrested and detained on September 25, 2007, Petitioner alleges

he was “negligently arraigned sixty-two hours later”. (Pet.; Doc. No. 1 at p. 9.) Petitioner

contends “the erroneous delay between arrest and appearance before a magistrate judge” violates

his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments and California law. (Pet.; Doc. No. 1 at p.

9.)

In addition, Petitioner contends he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing, an “order to show

cause hearing,” or a “writ of probable cause hearing” on this issue because he has “legally and

lawfully stated a ‘Prima Facie’ showing”. (Pet.; Doc. No. 1 at p. 9.) Lastly, Petitioner claims he is

entitled to be “resentenced under a ‘sentence modification’ pursuant to the agreed upon plea

bargain agreement” and pursuant to California Penal Code § 1487(2). (Pet.; Doc. No. 1 at p. 9.)

2. Respondent’s Rebuttal

Respondent argues Petitioner cannot raise this claim after he intelligently and voluntarily

entered into the plea agreement because “[a] guilty plea and ensuing conviction comprehend all

the factual and legal elements necessary to sustain a binding final judgment of guilt and a lawful

sentence.” (Mem. P. & A.; Doc. No. 5-1 at p. 10:16-17.) As a result, Respondent continues,

Petitioner may only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the plea by and through a

Case 3:10-cv-00693-JLS-WMC Document 7 Filed 03/10/11 Page 19 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5 See Section V.A.3, supra, of this Report and Recommendation.

- 20 - 10cv00693 JLS (WMc)

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel relating to the plea advice,5 and he may not thereafter

raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred before the

entry of the plea. (Mem. P. & A.; Doc. No. 5-1 at p. 10:19-22.)

3. Relevant Law

As mentioned previously, “[w]hen a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open

court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise

independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the

entry of the guilty plea.” Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267. One who intelligently and voluntarily pleads

guilty to a criminal charge “may not subsequently seek federal habeas corpus relief on the basis of

pre-plea constitutional violations.” Moran, 57 F.3d at 700; Mitchell v. Superior Court, 632 F.2d

767, 769 (9th Cir. 1980) (same); see Caperell, 938 F.2d at 977 (“[A] guilty plea generally waives

all claims of constitutional violation occurring before the plea . . .”) After pleading guilty,

Petitioner “may only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea by showing

that the advice he received from counsel was not within the range of competence demanded of

attorneys in criminal cases.” Moran, 57 F.3d at 700 (quoting Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267). 

In addition, federal habeas corpus relief “does not lie for errors of state law.” Lewis v.

Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990); accord Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991); Matylinsky

v. Budge, 577 F.3d 1083, 1094 (9th Cir. 2010). “In conducting habeas review, a federal court is

limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United

States.” Estelle, supra, 502 U.S. at 67-68. 

Specifically, arraignment procedures are controlled by state law, and as such, federal

habeas claims involving arraignment delay fall outside the scope of federal habeas review. See

Ahlswede v. Wolff, 720 F.2d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (arraignment delay claim not

cognizable on federal habeas review because state law controls application of state statute on

arraignment), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 873 (1984); see also Hernandez v. Schneckloth, 425 F.2d 89,

91 (9th Cir. 1970) (per curiam) (although state court found unnecessary delay before arraignment,

absent a showing of prejudice, an illegal detention is not grounds for habeas relief). 

Case 3:10-cv-00693-JLS-WMC Document 7 Filed 03/10/11 Page 20 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 21 - 10cv00693 JLS (WMc)

4. Recommendation

Petitioner’s claim of unconstitutional arraignment delay was raised for the first time after

Petitioner entered his no contest plea. As mentioned previously, the law involving claims of preplea constitutional violations is clear: one who intelligently and voluntarily pleads guilty to a

criminal charge may not seek federal habeas relief for pre-plea constitutional violations, unless he

successfully attacks the voluntary and intelligent nature of the plea on ineffective assistance of

counsel grounds.

Here, as previously explained, Petitioner has not shown his plea was involuntary and

unintelligent. Nor has he shown his counsel’s performance adversely affected the plea process. In

exchange for receiving a more lenient sentence, Petitioner relinquished several enumerated

constitutional rights, as well as all claims arising before he entered the plea. As a product of

negotiation, Petitioner’s plea represents a clean break from the chain of events that began when he

was initially arrested and ended on the date of his plea and immediate sentencing. Thus, for this

reason alone, Petitioner’s claim must fail under Tollett.

Second, while Petitioner claims the alleged violation is federal in nature, the forty-eight

hour rule he references is a state law. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 825(a) (“the defendant shall in all

cases be taken before the magistrate without unnecessary delay, and, in any event, within 48 hours

after his or her arrest.”) As mentioned previously, federal habeas corpus relief “does not lie for

errors of state law.” Lewis, 497 U.S. at 780. Thus, Petitioner’s claim is not federally cognizable,

as a result, his claim fails on this ground as well.

Therefore, it is recommended federal habeas relief be DENIED on this claim.

C. Pre-Charge Identification Error

1. Summary of Claims

a. Photographic Line-Up

In Case No. SCS214181, Petitioner contends his “14th Amendment procedural due process

was willfully violated at the 6-pack photo lineup when the presumption of guilt was used as a

basic fact in the procedure.” (Pet.; Doc. No. 1 at p. 10.) Petitioner contends the state’s eyewitness

was only “sixty percent sure of the actual positive I.D. of the alleged suspect accused of the

Case 3:10-cv-00693-JLS-WMC Document 7 Filed 03/10/11 Page 21 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

 In his Petition, Petitioner claims the initial curbside lineup took place on September 12, 2007.

(Pet.; Doc. No. 1 at p. 10.) After review of record, there is no evidence indicating the curbside lineup

took place on September 12, 2007. The transcript of the November 28, 2007 preliminary hearing in

Case No. SCS212181, which is contained in Lodgments 7, 9 and 11, presents direct-examination and

cross-examination testimony of two witnesses and a police officer. Mr. Carrasco’s testimony indicates

Mr. Carrasco – the witness to the second robbery involving Petitioner at about 11 pm on September

25, 2007 – participated in a curbside lineup identification procedure within forty-five minutes of the

robbery. (Lodgment 7 at pp. 22:25-23:22, 25:16-19.) National City police officer Donald Geidel

testified similarly. (Lodgment 7 at pp. 34:23-35:11.) Further, Mr. Escoto testified he participated in

a photo identification on the morning of September 26, 2007. (Lodgment 7 at p.7:3-5, 10:20-22.) 

In addition, the Charge Summary accompanying the District Attorney’s Information indicates the

robberies took place on September 25, 2007 (Clerk’s Tr.; Lodgment 1 at p. 78), and the District

Attorney’s Factual Basis of Plea states police officers stopped Petitioner in his car on September 25,

2007, a short distance away from the location of the robbery that same night. Considering this

information, the Court (1) concludes Petitioner made a mistake regarding the date of the curbside

lineup and (2) will use the September 25, 2007 date as the date of the lineup in question. 

- 22 - 10cv00693 JLS (WMc)

offense,” (Pet.; Doc. No. 1 at p. 10), but that Chula Vista police officers used “coercion,

intimidation, and threatening tactics against the alleged witnesses for testimony . . .”. (Pet.; Doc.

No. 1 at p. 10.) As a result, Petitioner claims a violation of his procedural due process and equal

protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and the California

Constitution. (Pet.; Doc. No. 1 at p. 10.)

b. Curbside Line-Up

Additionally, Petitioner contends National City police officers violated Petitioner’s

procedural due process and equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment when the

officers denied Petitioner’s request for counsel to be present at the initial curbside line-up on

September 25, 2007.6 (Pet.; Doc No. 1 at p. 10.) In addition, Petitioner contends the officers’

willful violation of “procedure, protocol, and administrative policies . . . [and] abuse of authority

and discretion,” violated Petitioner’s due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth

Amendment and the California Constitution. (Pet.; Doc. No. 1 at p. 10.)

2. Respondent’s Rebuttal

Respondent contends Petitioner cannot raise the claim that there was error in the curbside

line-up and photographic display because the alleged error occurred before Petitioner’s plea. 

(Mem. P. & A.; Doc. No. 5-1 at p. 11:11-13.) As a result, Respondent argues the Court must reject

Petitioner’s claim. (Mem. P. & A.; Doc. No. 5-1 at p. 11:14.)

3. Relevant Law

Case 3:10-cv-00693-JLS-WMC Document 7 Filed 03/10/11 Page 22 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 23 - 10cv00693 JLS (WMc)

As mentioned in the previous claim, one who intelligently and voluntarily pleads guilty to

a criminal charge “may not subsequently seek federal habeas corpus relief on the basis of pre-plea

constitutional violations.” Moran, 57 F.3d at 700. “When a criminal defendant has solemnly

admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not

thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred

prior to the entry of the guilty plea.” Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267; see Journigan v. Duffy, 552 F.2d

283, 287-88 (9th Cir. 1977) (explaining a guilty plea precludes federal habeas relief not because a

defendant thereby waives his right to seek it, but because a guilty plea admits factual guilt). 

Petitioner “may only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea by showing

that the advice he received from counsel was not within the range of competence demanded of

attorneys in criminal cases.” Moran, 57 F.3d at 700 (quoting Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267). 

With respect to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the U.S. Supreme Court has clearly

stated the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment attaches only “‘at or after the initiation of

adversary judicial criminal proceedings – whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing,

indictment, information, or arraignment.’” Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 226 (1977) (quoting

Kirby, supra, 406 U.S. at 689); see also Jordan v. Ducharme, 983 F.2d 933, 937 (9th Cir. 1993)

(“to determine whether a pretrial event implicates the right to counsel, a court must consider

whether cross-examination can reveal any improper procedures that occur in counsel’s absence.”). 

Thus, a pre-charge photographic lineup is not a critical stage in a criminal proceeding where

counsel’s presence is constitutionally required to (a) protect the defendant from unnecessarily and

unconstitutionally suggestive police tactics and (b) prevent a waiver of available defenses. See

U.S. v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 317 (1973); U.S. v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967) (in non-critical

stages “there is minimal risk that . . . counsel’s absence at such stages might derogate from [the]

right to a fair trial”). In short, “the Sixth Amendment does not grant the right to counsel at

photographic displays conducted by the Government for the purpose of allowing a witness to

attempt an identification of the offender.” Ash, 413 U.S. at 321; accord U.S. v. Barker, 988 F.2d

77, 78 (9th Cir. 1993). 

///

Case 3:10-cv-00693-JLS-WMC Document 7 Filed 03/10/11 Page 23 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7 See Section V.A.4, supra, of this Report and Recommendation.

- 24 - 10cv00693 JLS (WMc)

4. Recommendation

Petitioner’s conviction results from his no contest plea. Like the immediately preceding

claim, Petitioner raises the instant due process claim of unconstitutional curbside and photographic

line-up error after he entered his no contest plea. As noted above, the Supreme Court has made

clear when a defendant is convicted pursuant to a guilty or no contest plea, the defendant is barred

from obtaining collateral relief based on errors preceding the plea. Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267; see

also Broce, 488 U.S. at 569 (“[a] plea of guilty and the ensuing conviction comprehend all of the

factual and legal elements necessary to sustain a binding, final judgment of guilt and a lawful

sentence.”) Petitioner may attack only the voluntary and intelligent nature of the plea on

ineffective assistance of counsel grounds. Thus, because Petitioner’s claim relates to pre-plea

constitutional deprivations because he has failed to successfully attack the voluntary and

intelligent nature of the plea on ineffective assistance of counsel grounds,7

 the claim is barred

under Tollett. 

Specifically, Petitioner’s claim is barred under Tollett because the validity of Petitioner’s

conviction does not rest in any way on information produced by identification procedures that may

have been improperly administered. Rather, the validity of Petitioner’s conviction rests entirely on

Petitioner’s no contest plea, which constitutes an admission of factual guilt. See Journigan, supra,

552 F.2d at 287-88. Furthermore, in exchange for waiving the right to raise any and all pre-plea

constitutional violations, Petitioner received a determinate term of twenty-seven years instead of

the maximum sentence of 210-years-to-life. (Lodgment 13 at p. 2:24-3:1.) Like other claims

relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights, Petitioner’s instant due process claim involving

identification procedures is, therefore, barred under Tollett by virtue of Petitioner’s plea. See

Ortberg v. Moody, 961 F.2d 135, 136-38 (9th Cir. 1992) (guilty plea barred habeas claim alleging

an unlawful search); Moran, 57 F.3d at 700 (finding Tollett barred ineffective assistance of

counsel claim); see also U.S. v. Coffin, 76 F.3d 494, 498 (2d Cir. 1996) (ineffective assistance of

counsel claim based on counsel’s pre-plea conduct barred by Tollett).

Second, as mentioned previously, the California Court of Appeal on collateral review

Case 3:10-cv-00693-JLS-WMC Document 7 Filed 03/10/11 Page 24 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 25 - 10cv00693 JLS (WMc)

adopted the Superior Court’s reasoning and denied the petition in a one-page decision. The

Superior Court found Petitioner failed to allege sufficient facts to support his claim. The court

concluded:

Petitioner has not met his burden with respect to his second petition for writ of

habeas corpus. Petitioner provides no evidence that supports any of his claims in

his second petition. The documents attached to Petitioner’s second petition, e.g.,

the Reporter’s Transcript of the January 30, 2008 sentencing hearing, do not

support any of Petitioner’s claims. Petitioner’s own unsubstantiated self-serving

statements in his second petition do not provide a sufficient basis upon which to

prove his claims. [Citing In re Alvernaz, 2 Cal. 4th 924, 945 (1992)]. Thus,

Petitioner has not made a prima facie showing in support of his claims in his

second petition.

In addition, a review of the record discloses that . . . there was no

deprivation of Petitioner’s due process rights as to the line-up.

(Lodgment 8 at p. 3:9-17.)

 As explained previously, the Court’s review under the AEDPA is limited to whether the

state court decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal

law as determined by the U.S. Supreme Court. Here, because Petitioner’s instant claim was raised

after he entered his no contest plea, the clearly established federal law against which the

reasonableness of the state court decision must be measured is the Tollett rule. After review of the

record, the Court finds the state court’s decision to deny Petitioner’s claim did not run afoul of

Tollett because under Tollett, as explained above, Petitioner’s claim is barred. 

Third, absence of counsel at the curbside lineup does not violate Petitioner’s due process

rights because the curbside identification and photo display at issue in this case were conducted

before Petitioner was formally charged with the crimes. Thus, the right to counsel had not

attached at this point. Therefore, for this additional reason, Petitioner’s claim must fail under Ash,

supra.

Finally, to the extent Petitioner’s objections to the curbside identification are based on

violations of the California Constitution or violation of the National City Police Department’s

“procedure, protocol, and administrative policies,” Petitioner’s claim is not cognizable on federal

habeas corpus review.

Therefore, it is recommended federal habeas relief be DENIED on this claim.

Case 3:10-cv-00693-JLS-WMC Document 7 Filed 03/10/11 Page 25 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 26 - 10cv00693 JLS (WMc)

D. Sentencing Error Regarding Imposition of the Upper Term on Count 1A

1. Summary of Claims

Petitioner contends he should have received the middle term of three years, not the upper

term of five years because he did not have a jury trial on the upper term aggravating factors. (Pet.;

Doc. No. 1 at p. 7.) By failing to provide Petitioner a jury trial for this purpose, Petitioner

contends the sentencing court violated California law and “willfully abuse[d] its authority and

legal discretion by illegally imposing the upper term of five years double to ten years on Count 1A

in error without any aggravating facts/factors proven to be true by a jury in error.” (Pet.; Doc. No.

1 at p. 7.) 

In particular, Petitioner contends “under the California’s (DSL) Determine Sentencing Law

the sentencing court is suppose [sic] to legally by law impose the med term of imprisonment

unless he or she finds by a preponderance of the evidence that there are mitigating and/or

aggravating facts that legally justifie [sic] a low med or high term of imprisonment . . .” (Pet.;

Doc. No. 1 at p. 7.)

2. Respondent’s Rebuttal

Respondent contends Petitioner’s claim should be rejected because the “trial court had 10

prior convictions with which to impose the upper term of five years based on recidivism, a well

recognized exception to the rule of a jury trial being required for imposing the upper term.” 

(Mem. P. & A.; Doc. No. 5-1 at p. 11:19-21.) Moreover, Respondent continues, Petitioner agreed

to a specific term. Thus, the sentence cannot be vindictive when it imposes the very sentence to

which Petitioner agreed. (Mem. P. & A.; Doc. No. 5-1 at p. 12:2-3.) Further, for the reasons set

forth in Section V.A.2, supra, of this Report and Recommendation, Respondent contends

Petitioner’s claim should be denied.

3. Relevant Law

“Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime

beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (emphasis added). The

Supreme Court has held the “statutory maximum” for increasing a penalty for a crime “is the

Case 3:10-cv-00693-JLS-WMC Document 7 Filed 03/10/11 Page 26 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 27 - 10cv00693 JLS (WMc)

maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict

or admitted by the defendant . . . ”. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004) (emphasis in

original). Specifically, the Supreme Court recently held the middle term, not the upper term, is the

“relevant statutory maximum” under California’s Determinate Sentencing Law (“DSL”), and an

upper term sentence could be imposed only if the trial judge found an aggravating circumstance. 

Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 288 (2007).

 In response to Cunningham, the California Legislature amended the DSL to eliminate the

requirement that trial judges find an aggravating circumstance before imposing an upper term

sentence. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(b); see also Butler v. Curry, 528 F.3d 624, 652 n.20 (9th

Cir. 2008), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 767 (2008) (“Following the decision in

Cunningham, the California legislature amended its statutes such that imposition of the lower,

middle, or upper term is now discretionary and does not depend on the finding of any aggravating

factors.”). Instead, “the choice of the appropriate term” now rests “within the sound discretion of

the court.” CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(b).

The Ninth Circuit has recognized the Supreme Court has not defined “the precise contours”

of the prior conviction exception and “Butler does not represent clearly established federal law as

determined by the Supreme Court.” See Kessee v. Mendoza-Powers, 574 F.3d 675, 677, 679 (9th

Cir. 2009). Thus, the Ninth Circuit has held a state court’s interpretation of the prior conviction

exception as being broader than that in Butler is neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable

application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the U.S. Supreme Court. See

Kessee, 574 F.3d at 679 (“[b]ecause the Supreme Court has not given explicit direction and

because the state court’s interpretation is consistent with many other courts’ interpretations, we

cannot hold that the state court’s interpretation was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, Supreme Court precedent.”).

4. Recommendation

Here, the circumstances used by the state court judge to impose Petitioner’s sentence,

including the imposition of the upper term on Count One in Case No. SCD200184, included

Petitioner’s admission, Petitioner’s plea of no contest, and Petitioner’s stipulation. Under

Case 3:10-cv-00693-JLS-WMC Document 7 Filed 03/10/11 Page 27 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 28 - 10cv00693 JLS (WMc)

Apprendi and Blakely, the trial judge properly imposed the statutory maximum consisting of the

upper term because the judge based his sentence on Petitioner’s admissions to prior convictions

and stipulated plea bargain. Relevant here are the following portions of Petitioner’s Change of

Plea and Immediate Sentencing transcript:

COURT: [Petitioner] has several prior strike convictions; correct?

ADA BENNETT: Yes.

COURT: Do you stipulate to that?

MS. WOLF: Yes, your honor.

MR. PEDRETTI: Yes, your honor.

COURT: In case ending 184, how do you plead in Count 1 to a violation of Penal Code

section 211?

DEFENDANT: No contest.

COURT: How do you plead in Counts 4, 5, 6, and 7 to a violation of each of those code

sections of Penal Code section 211?

DEFENDANT: No contest.

COURT: Do you admit the prison priors and strike priors which are alleged in the

Complaint slash Information?

DEFENDANT: Yes.

COURT: As to case ending 181, how do you plead in Counts 1 and 2 to a violation of

Penal Code section 211?

DEFENDANT: Yes.

COURT: No contest?

DEFENDANT: No contest.

COURT: Do you admit the additional allegation under Penal Code section 12022.1 (B)?

DEFENDANT: No contest.

[. . .]

COURT: . . . Do [sic] admit the strike prior under CR129146? Actually, there are 11 strike

priors from 1992. Just admit?

Case 3:10-cv-00693-JLS-WMC Document 7 Filed 03/10/11 Page 28 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 29 - 10cv00693 JLS (WMc)

DEFENDANT: Yes.

[. . .]

COURT: Do you admit [in Case No. SCD200184] the serious felony prior which is also

there?

DEFENDANT: Yes.

[. . .]

COURT: . . . Count 1 [in Case No. SCD200184], it is stipulated the defendant will be

sentenced to the upper term of 5 years. That will be doubled per the strike law for 10

years. Count 1 doubled per the strike law for 10 years.

(Rep. Appeal Tr.; Lodgment 13 at pp. 4:2-27, 5:2-4, 5:15-17, 6:4-7) (emphasis added). 

Here, on state collateral review, the trial court concluded, “. . . Petitioner may not be heard

on a sentencing error in that Petitioner obtained the total prison term of 27 years for both cases that

was agreed to under the plea bargain. . . . Also, a review of the record discloses no sentencing

error.” (Lodgment 8 at p. 3:20-23.) 

The Court notes the Supreme Court has not held Cunningham applies to sentences

resulting from plea bargains. This means two things relevant to the Court’s analysis. First, the

relevant statutory maximum under California’s DSL is not limited to the middle term. Second, the

rule articulated in Blakely still applies, namely “[w]hen a defendant pleads guilty, the State is free

to seek judicial sentence enhancements so long as the defendant either stipulates to the relevant

facts or consents to judicial factfinding.” Blakely, 542 U.S. at 310. 

Here, at sentencing Petitioner pled guilty to the charged offenses and stipulated to the

relevant facts of each case, particularly the prior strike convictions, the prison prior, and the

serious felony prior. Accordingly, the state court judge sentenced Petitioner to the upper term on

Count One in Case No. SCD200184, stating, “Count 1, it is stipulated the defendant will be

sentenced to the upper term of 5 years.” (Lodgment 13 at p. 6:4-5) (emphasis added.) As a result,

upper term imposition on Count One in Case No. SCD200184 was proper, and the Superior Court

reasonably denied Petitioner’s claim.

Therefore, it is recommended federal habeas relief be DENIED on this claim.

Case 3:10-cv-00693-JLS-WMC Document 7 Filed 03/10/11 Page 29 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 30 - 10cv00693 JLS (WMc)

E. The Trial Court’s Failure to Stay Certain Counts under California Penal Code section

654

1. Summary of Claims

Petitioner contends several counts fall under “possible consideration” of Penal Code

section 654 because “there was no physical evidence” or reliable eyewitness identification that

Petitioner committed the robberies. (Pet.; Doc. No. 1 at p. 8.) Further, Petitioner contends there

was no probable cause he was in possession of any stolen property from the robberies. (Pet.; Doc.

No. 1 at p. 8.) Since there was “only one alleged intent” as to Count 1A, Petitioner argues six

counts (4A, 5A, 6A, 7A, 1B, and 2B) must be stayed under Penal Code section 654. (Pet.; Doc.

No. 1 at p. 8.)

In addition, Petitioner contends section 654 “prohibits the court from punishing the

Petitioner more than once for the same alleged act or omission which would fall under the Double

Jeopardy Clause of U.S. Constitution.” (Pet.; Doc. No. 1 at p. 8.) Further, Petitioner contends the

trial court’s failure to stay under section 654 the previously mentioned counts was a “fundamental

miscarriage of justice” and grossly disproportional under the Eighth Amendment. (Pet.; Doc. No.

1 at p. 8.)

2. Respondent’s Rebuttal

Respondent contends Petitioner’s claim must be rejected because it is not a federal claim

for which relief may be granted. (Mem. P. & A.; Doc. No. 5-1 at p. 12:7.)

3. Relevant Law

As already mentioned, federal habeas corpus relief “does not lie for errors of state law.”

Lewis, 497 U.S. at 780; accord Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67; Matylinsky, supra, 577 F.3d at 1094. “In

conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the

Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68.

Specifically, a claim in federal court that multiple punishment violates Penal Code section

654 fails to state a federal question. See Watts v. Bonneville, 879 F.2d 685, 687 (9th Cir. 1989)

(holding petitioner’s claim that the state court violated Penal Code section 654 was not cognizable

under AEDPA); see also Christian v. Rhode, 41 F.3d 461, 469 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Absent a showing

Case 3:10-cv-00693-JLS-WMC Document 7 Filed 03/10/11 Page 30 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 31 - 10cv00693 JLS (WMc)

of fundamental unfairness, a state court’s misapplication of its own sentencing laws does not

justify federal habeas relief”); Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504, 507 (9th Cir. 1994)

(petitioner’s claim of state court error in imposing consecutive sentences was not cognizable);

Hendricks v. Zenon, 993 F.2d 664, 674 (9th Cir. 1993) (petitioner’s claim that the state court was

required to merge his convictions was not cognizable).

According to the California Supreme Court, section 654 allows “multiple punishments for

separate crimes of violence committed against separate victims.” Morris v. Scribner, 2009 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 108236, 16 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (citing People v. Price, 1 Cal. 4th 324, 492 (1991)); see

also People v. Beamon, 8 Cal. 3d 625, 638 n.10 (1973) (“the Legislature could not have intended

that section 654 be applicable where the course of conduct results in acts of violence which

constitute separate violations as to separate individuals.”). “Robbery is violent conduct warranting

separate punishment for the injury inflicted on each robbery victim.” People v. Hall, 83 Cal. App.

4th 1084, 1090 (2000) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Federal courts defer to the

state courts’ construction of state sentencing statutes. Morris, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108236, 17

(citing Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368 (1983).

4. Recommendation

Here, Petitioner’s claim concerns a violation of California Penal Code section 654. 

Specifically, the Ninth Circuit has held Petitioner’s claim fails to state a federal question

appropriate for the Court to entertain on federal habeas review. See Watts, supra, 879 F.2d at 687. 

As a result, Petitioner’s claim is not cognizable under the Court’s review. 

Further, Petitioner pled guilty to committing several robberies, which involved several

separate victims. Because each robbery warrants separate punishment under section 654,

Petitioner’s sentence does not run afoul of section 654. Thus, the Superior Court’s decision that “a

review of the record discloses no sentencing error,” (Lodgment 8 at p. 3:22-23), was not

objectively unreasonable. As a result, Petitioner’s claim must fail.

Therefore, it is recommended federal habeas relief be DENIED on this claim.

///

///

Case 3:10-cv-00693-JLS-WMC Document 7 Filed 03/10/11 Page 31 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 32 - 10cv00693 JLS (WMc)

F. Insufficient Evidence Regarding Mental Competency to Stand Trial

1. Summary of Claims

Petitioner contends the court ordered him to a “mental psychiatric examination treatment”

and he was given “antipsychotic medications” for “bizarre behavior, delusions actions [sic].” 

(Pet.; Doc. No. 1 at p. 11.) Petitioner contends he was “medically diagnosed with various forms of

paranoia, schizophrenia, and antisocial personality disorder,” and as a result, was “medically

incompetent to stand trial and/or agree to a plea bargain,” which violated his Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights to a “fair impartial trial by jury”. (Pet.; Doc. No. 1 at p. 11.) In addition, by

trying him for the offenses, Petitioner contends the trial court violated his procedural due process

rights and California Penal Code section 1367(a).

2. Respondent’s Rebuttal

Respondent argues Petitioner’s claim must fail because he raises it after he entered into a

plea agreement. (Mem. P & A.; Doc. No. 5-1 at p. 12:15-16.) Additionally, Respondent contends

nothing in the record indicates Petitioner was incompetent or misunderstood the proceedings. 

(Mem. P. & A.; Doc. No. 5-1 at p. 13:6-7.) In fact, Respondent continues, the trial court asked

Petitioner a series of questions to which Petitioner appropriately responded. (Mem. P. & A.; Doc.

No. 5-1 at p. 13:5-6) (citing Rep. Tr.; Lodgment 13 at pp. 1-5.) As a result, Respondent argues

Petitioner’s claim must be denied. (Mem. P. & A.; Doc. No. 5-1 at p. 13:24-26.)

3. Relevant Law

Trial or conviction of an incompetent defendant violates the due process clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment. Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 170 (2008); Godinez v. Moran, 509

U.S. 389, 396 (1993); Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 439 (1992); Drope v. Missouri, 420

U.S. 162, 171 (1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966); Bishop v. U.S., 350 U.S. 961

(1956). The competency standard to plead guilty is the same as that to stand trial. Doe v.

Woodford, 508 F.3d 563, 571 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Miles v. Stainer, 108 F.3d 1109, 1112 (9th

Cir. 1997); see Godinez, 509 U.S. at 398 (rejecting the notion that “competence to plead guilty . . .

must be measured by a standard that is higher than (or even different from) the Dusky standard.”).

As a general matter, the due process standard for competency requires a defendant to have

Case 3:10-cv-00693-JLS-WMC Document 7 Filed 03/10/11 Page 32 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 33 - 10cv00693 JLS (WMc)

the “capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with

counsel, and to assist in the preparation of his defense.” Drope, supra, 420 U.S. at 171; see Dusky

v. U.S., 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam) (“the test must be whether he has sufficient present

ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding – and whether

he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.”). 

The due process standard for competency involving a guilty plea is whether “mental illness

has substantially impaired his or her ability to make a reasoned choice among the alternatives

presented and to understand the nature and consequences of the waiver.” Chavez v. U.S., 656 F.2d

512, 518 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing U.S. v. Moore, 599 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1979)). In addition, when

evidence before the trial court raises a “bona fide doubt” regarding a defendant’s competency

either before or during trial, the judge sua sponte must order a competency hearing. Pate, supra,

383 U.S. at 385; see U.S. v. Lewis, 991 F.2d 524, 527 (9th Cir. 1993) (“A good faith doubt about a

defendant’s competence arises if there is substantial evidence of incompetence.”) (citing Chavez,

supra, 656 F.2d at 517).

Under California law, a criminal defendant is incompetent and may not be “tried or

adjudged to punishment” if “as a result of mental disorder or developmental disability, the

defendant is unable to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in the

conduct of the defense in a rational manner.” CAL. PENAL CODE § 1367(a) (Deering 2010).

California Penal Code section 1368 requires a competency hearing “[i]f, during the pendency of an

action and prior to judgment, a doubt arises in the mind of the judge as to the mental competence

of the defendant . . .”. 

4. Recommendation

Petitioner’s alleged incompetency at the time of plea is unsupported by the record. First, as

mentioned previously, Valerie Rice, Ph.D., a San Diego County certified psychiatric examiner

appointed by the trial court to assess Petitioner’s competency for trial, concluded Petitioner was

neither suffering from a mental illness nor incompetent to stand trial. (Clerk’s Tr.; Lodgment 1 at

p. 25-26.) Based upon her medical findings, including a forty-five minute personal examination of

the Petitioner, Dr. Rice affirmatively concluded Petitioner was competent to stand trial. (Clerk’s

Case 3:10-cv-00693-JLS-WMC Document 7 Filed 03/10/11 Page 33 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 34 - 10cv00693 JLS (WMc)

Tr.; Lodgment 1 at p. 26.) 

Second, during the change of plea hearing, the trial court judge asked Petitioner a series of

questions related to competency and the waiver of certain constitutional rights, and Petitioner

answered the questions appropriately. (Rep. Appeal Tr.; Lodgment 13 at p. 2:6-20.) Relevant

here is the following portion of the colloquy, some of which was referred to in Section V.A.4,

supra, of this Report and Recommendation:

COURT: Sir, have you had any alcohol or drugs within the last 24 hours which would

impair your ability to understand what is going on in court?

DEFENDANT: No.

COURT: Have you had enough time to talk to your lawyer about the charges and any

potential defenses?

DEFENDANT: Yes.

COURT: Do you understand you have the following constitutional rights: the right to a

speedy and public jury trial, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, remain

silent, and present evidence. Do you understand those rights?

DEFENDANT: Yes.

COURT: Do you waive those rights?

DEFENDANT: Yes.

COURT: Anybody force you to get you to plead guilty today?

DEFENDANT: No.

(Rep. Appeal Tr.; Lodgment 13 at p. 2:6-23.)

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds the state courts’ decision to uphold the trial judge’s

determination that Petitioner understood the nature of the criminal proceedings was neither

objectively unreasonable nor contrary to the competency standard as articulated by the U.S.

Supreme Court in Dusky v. U.S., supra and repeated in Drope v. Missouri, supra. Additionally,

the record indicates the state court judge ordered a competency hearing when a bona fide doubt

regarding Petitioner’s mental competency arose in his mind, as required by Pate v. Robinson, 

///

Case 3:10-cv-00693-JLS-WMC Document 7 Filed 03/10/11 Page 34 of 35
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 35 - 10cv00693 JLS (WMc)

supra. As a result, Petitioner’s claim is without merit must be denied.

Therefore, it is recommended federal habeas relief be DENIED on this claim.

VI.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

For all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED the Court issue an

Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation, and (2) denying the Petition.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than April 1, 2011, any party to this action may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court

and served on all parties no later than April 22, 2011. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the

Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951

F.2d 1553, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 10, 2011

Hon. William McCurine, Jr.

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

Case 3:10-cv-00693-JLS-WMC Document 7 Filed 03/10/11 Page 35 of 35