Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00844/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00844-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL JOHN McGLOTHIN,

 Plaintiff,

v.

T. PEREZ, et al., 

 Defendants.

Case No. 1:14-cv-00844-MJS (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING ACTION WITH 

PREJUDICE FOR FAILURE TO STATE 

A CLAIM (ECF No. 14)

DISMISSAL COUNTS AS STRIKE 

PURSUANT TO 28 USC § 1915(g)

CLERK TO TERMINATE ALL PENDING 

MOTIONS AND CLOSE CASE

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil 

rights action filed on June 4, 2014 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He has consented to 

magistrate judge jurisdiction.

The Court dismissed Plaintiff’s original Complaint (ECF No. 1) without prejudice 

for failure to state a claim. (ECF No. 9). His First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 14) is 

before the Court for screening. 

I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 

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§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has 

raised claims that are legally “frivolous, malicious,” or that fail to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is 

immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

II. PLEADING STANDARD

Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.”

Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990), quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method 

for vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 

393-94 (1989).

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) 

that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) 

that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. 

See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cty., 811 F.2d 1243, 

1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations 

are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 

Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is 

plausible on its face.” Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the mere possibility that 

a defendant committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are accepted as true, 

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legal conclusions are not. Id., at 667-68.

III. SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff names as Defendants: (1) Perez, Warden, Corcoran State Prison 

(“CSP”), (2) Neal, Accountant, CSP, and (3) Slimp, Investigative Services Unit (“ISU”)

Officer, CSP. 

Plaintiff claims that Defendants, on four occasions, allowed a third party to 

fraudulently withdraw a total of $1,932.18 from Plaintiff’s CSP inmate trust account. He 

claims that several such withdrawals occurred after he put Defendants on notice of the 

first unauthorized withdrawal.

Plaintiff also claims that Defendants improperly handled his related administrative 

appeal(s) by canceling, rejecting and denying same.

Plaintiff seeks restitution of the money taken from his account

IV. DISCUSSION

Of the claims Plaintiff was given leave to amend in the first screening order,

Plaintiff has re-alleged only his due process claim in the amended complaint. (ECF No. 

14, at 4). As the Court explained in its first screening order (ECF No. 9), “only the most 

egregious official conduct” is sufficiently arbitrary to violate substantive due process, 

Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998), and neither negligent nor 

unauthorized intentional deprivations of property by state employees violate procedural 

due process where there is an adequate post-deprivation remedy. Hudson v. Palmer, 

468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). Because the facts Plaintiff has set forth allege at most a 

negligent deprivation of property, and because California’s post-deprivation remedies 

are adequate, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable due process claim. The court explains 

its reasoning in more detail below.

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A. Substantive due process

An individual’s right to substantive due process protects him against arbitrary 

government action. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846 (1998); Sylvia Landfield Tr. v. City of Los 

Angeles, 729 F.3d 1189, 1195 (9th Cir. 2013); Bingue v. Prunchak, 512 F.3d 1169, 

1173 (9th Cir. 2008). Both legislation and misconduct by an individual government 

employee may violate substantive due process. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846. Individual 

misconduct must be “egregious,” however, to be unconstitutional, id., and the “alleged 

deprivation must ‘shock the conscience and offend the community’s sense of fair play 

and decency.’” Sylvia Landfield Tr., 729 F.3d at 1195 (quoting Marsh v. Cty. of San 

Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2012)(publication of toddler’s autopsy photos 

could violate relatives’ due process rights)); see also, e.g., Porter v. Osborn, 546 F.3d 

1131, 1141-1142 (9th Cir. 2008)(police officer’s fatal shooting of motorist during traffic 

stop could violate due process); Tennison v. City and Cty. of San Francisco, 570 F.3d 

1078, 1088-1089 (9th Cir. 2008)(due process violated where investigators withheld 

exculpatory information, causing two innocent men to be incarcerated wrongfully for 

thirteen years).

Here, Defendants’ alleged oversight, enabling a third party to withdraw money 

fraudulently from Plaintiff’s trust account, is simply not comparable to the above cases. 

Although perhaps worthy of criticism, Defendants’ alleged acts do not “shock the 

conscience.” Therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a substantive due process claim.

B. Procedural Due Process

The Due Process Clause also guarantees “procedural fairness” and protects 

prisoners from being deprived of property without due process of law. Wolff v. 

McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). Prisoners have a protected interest in their 

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personal property, including “funds held in prison accounts. Thus, inmates are entitled 

to due process with respect to any deprivation of this money”. Vance v. Barrett, 345 

F.3d 1083, 1088 n.6 (9th Cir. 2003)(citing Reynolds v. Wagner, 128 F.3d 166, 179 (3d 

Cir. 1997)).

Not every deprivation of a protected property interest, however, violates federal 

procedural due process. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986)(affirming that the

Fourteenth Amendment is not “a font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever 

systems may already be administered by the States”); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 

533 (1984). “Where a government official’s act causing injury to... property is merely 

negligent, ‘no procedure for compensation is constitutionally required.” Daniels, 474 

U.S. at 333 (citing Paratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 548 (1981)(POWELL, J., concurring)).

Even an “unauthorized, intentional deprivation of property by a governmental employee”

does not violate procedural due process “if a meaningful post-deprivation remedy for the 

loss is available.” Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533; Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816-817 

(9th Cir. 1994). 

There is an adequate post-deprivation remedy under California law. Blueford v. 

Prunty, 108 F.3d 251, 256 (9th Cir. 1997); Barnett, 31 F.3d at 816-817. Where a 

plaintiff seeks damages for the alleged negligent or wrongful conduct of a state 

employee, he may file suit in state court under the California Tort Claims Act. CAL.

GOV’T. CODE §§ 810 et seq.; Barnett, 31 F.3d at 816-817. The Act requires plaintiffs 

suing “for money or damages” to first present their claims to the Victim Compensation 

and Government Claims Board. CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 945.4. Claim presentation may not 

be required, however, for plaintiffs whose “property [was] lost and cannot be returned 

due to the government’s own negligence” and who only seek “specific recovery of his 

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personal property or its value.” Escamilla v. CDCR, 141 Cal. App. 4th 498, 509-513 

(Cal. Ct. App. 2006)(prisoner whose personal effects had been discarded by prison staff 

was not required to present claim, even though he would be recovering value of

possessions, not possessions themselves); accord City of Stockton v. Super. Ct., 171 

P.3d 20, 28-29 (Cal. 2007); Holt v. Kelly, 574 P.2d 441, 444 (Cal. 1978); Minsky v. City 

of Los Angeles, 520 P.2d 726, 733 n. 14 (Cal. 1974). This latter category of plaintiffs 

can seek redress directly by filing a petition for a writ of mandamus. See Escamilla, 141 

Cal. App. 4th at 511-512.

Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants allowed a third party to make multiple 

fraudulent withdrawals from his prison trust account. He also alleges that Defendants’ 

conduct was not authorized under CSP Operating Procedures. These allegations 

establish, at most, negligence on the part of Defendants in allowing the withdrawals, 

and thus do not state a procedural due process violation. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330-331. 

Even if authorization of the fraudulent withdrawals had been intentional, however, there 

would still be no due process violation because Plaintiff has adequate redress under 

California law. See Barnett, 31 F.3d at 816-817.

C. Supplemental Jurisdiction over any Viable State Claims

The court will not address the viability of Plaintiff's state tort claims, or whether, 

under Escamilla, he would be exempt from the claim presentation requirement of the 

Tort Claims Act, because the Court will not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any 

state law claim absent a cognizable federal claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Herman 

Family Revocable Trust v. Teddy Bear, 254 F.3d 802, 805 (9th Cir. 2001); Brown v. 

Lucky Stores, Inc., 246 F.3d 1182, 1189 (9th Cir. 2001). “When . . . the court dismisses 

the federal claim leaving only state claims for resolution, the court should decline 

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jurisdiction over the state claims and dismiss them without prejudice.” Les Shockley 

Racing v. National Hot Rod Ass'n, 884 F.2d 504, 509 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Here, Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable federal claim, so the court declines 

to exercise jurisdiction over possible state claims.

V. CONCLUSIONS AND ORDER

Plaintiff’s first amended complaint fails to state a cognizable claim. He was 

previously advised of pleading deficiencies and afforded the opportunity to correct them. 

He failed to do so. No useful purpose would be served by once again pointing out the 

deficiencies and giving another opportunity to correct them. Further leave to amend 

would be futile and is denied. 

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 14) is DISMISSED for failure 

to state a claim;

2. This action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim; 

dismissal shall count as a strike pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Silva v.

Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1098 (9th Cir. 2011); and

3. Any and all pending motions shall be terminated and the Clerk of Court 

shall CLOSE this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 3, 2015 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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