Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_03-cv-00464/USCOURTS-azd-4_03-cv-00464-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Alan N. Ariav, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Mesch, Clark & Rothschild, P.C.,

Defendant. 

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No. CV03-0464-PHX-MHM

ORDER

Currently, before the Court are Defendant's Motion for Decision on the Issue of

Subject Matter Jurisdiction. (Dkt.#140); Plaintiff's Motion for Rule 16 Scheduling

Conference (Dkt.#141); Plaintiff's cross-Motion for Ruling on the Issue of Subject Matter

Jurisdiction. (Dkt.#144) and Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions. (Dkt.#145). After reviewing

the pleadings, the Court issues the following Order.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff Alan Ariav is an attorney who was a shareholder at the law firm of Mesch,

Clark & Rothschild, P.C., until April 28, 2003, when he was terminated with pay and benefits

through May 31, 2003. In this lawsuit, Plaintiff alleges that the termination and other related

conduct by Defendant Mesch, Clark & Rothschild, P.C., violated his rights under the Family

and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. 

On September 12, 2003, Defendant Mesch, Clark & Rothschild, P.C., moved to

dismiss the lawsuit pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

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arguing that the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") does not apply to the law firm,

because the law firm employed fewer than 50 employees during the relevant time period. 

By its Order filed July 15, 2004, this Court converted the Motion to dismiss into a

Motion for summary judgment and granted Plaintiff a Rule 56(f) continuance to allow

Plaintiff to obtain discovery on the limited issue of whether Defendant employed 50 persons

for the time period between January 1, 2002, and April 28, 2003. (Dkt.#18). On September

20, 2004, the Court concluded Plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence to prevent

judgment as a matter of law on the issue of whether Defendant employed 50 employees for

20 weeks or more during this time period. (Dkt.#39).

On October 6, 2004, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter

Jurisdiction, arguing Plaintiff must establish the jurisdictional threshold of 50 employees for

the Court to have subject matter jurisdiction over his claims. (Dkt.#42). On February 8,

2005, an evidentiary hearing was held regarding the issue of whether Defendant employed

50 employees for 20 weeks or more during the time period from January 1, 2002 through

April 28, 2003. Prior to the evidentiary hearing, the Court determined the issue of a covered

employee or covered employer under the FMLA presents a mixed issue of merits and

jurisdiction and should be determined under Rule 56 standards. (Dkt.#90). At the conclusion

of the February 8, 2005 hearing, the Court took under advisement Defendant's Motion to

Dismiss. (Dkt.#95). The Court entered its order on September 29, 2005 denying without

prejudice Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction. (Dkt.#121).

The Court relied on its previous September 20, 2004 Order finding that Plaintiff had

presented sufficient evidence to prevent judgment as a matter of law and found persuasive

the Amicus brief submitted by the Government in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., then pending

before the Supreme Court, arguing that statutory employee thresholds merely relate to the

merits of the employee’s claims and are not jurisdictional. The Court stated that Motions

relating to whether Defendant employed 50 or more employees for 20 weeks or more could

be reurged "at the close of full discovery and/or upon direction from the Supreme Court in

Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp. The Court also set the relevant time period regarding this inquiry

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to span from January 1, 2002 through December 31, 2003. The Court then set the matter for

a Rule 16 hearing to be held on October 20, 2005. On October 27, 2005 a Scheduling

Conference was held and the parties articulated their positions regarding Defendant's Motion

to Stay pending the resolution of Defendant's Interlocutory Appeal of the Court's September

29, 2005 Order. On November 8, 2005 the Court granted Defendant's Motion to Stay

pending the outcome of its Interlocutory Appeal. (Dkt.#139). 

On March 20, 2006 the Mandate from the Ninth Circuit was issued dismissing

Defendant's Interlocutory Appeal for lack of jurisdiction. (Dkt.#146). In the interim the

Supreme Court rendered its decision in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 126 S.Ct. 1235 (Feb. 22,

2006). Defendant now relies on Arbaugh in support of its third Motion before the Court

regarding a lack of subject matter jurisdiction based upon the number of employees

employed by Defendant in light of the FMLA's employee numerosity requirement.

Conversely, Plaintiff relies on the holding in Arbaugh as further support of his position that

the numerosity requirement does not relate to jurisdiction but to the merits, thus mandating

that this case push forward with a Rule 16 Scheduling Order. Additionally, Plaintiff seeks

sanctions against Defendant for its filing of the present Motion to dismiss. 

II. Discussion

A. The Impact of Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp. on the Present Case.

In Arbaugh the Supreme Court was presented with the issue of whether Title VII’s

numerosity requirement establishing a defendant’s "employer" status was an element of the

plaintiff former employee’s sexual harassment claim or a jurisdictional requirement that

could be questioned at any stage of litigation. Id. at 1238. The Court noted that under Title

VII it is unlawful "for an employer ... to discriminate" on the basis of sex. Id. (citing 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)). The Court also noted that Title VII’s jurisdictional provision

"empowers federal courts to adjudicate civil actions "brought under" Title VII." Id. (citing

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). Title VII defines an "employer" in its definition provision to

include only those having "fifteen or more employees." Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)).

Similar to the instant case, albeit in a Title VII context, the defendant argued that Title VII’s

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numerosity requirement spoke to a jurisdictional issue that could be raised at any time.

Conversely, the plaintiff argued that Title VII’s numerosity requirement related to the

elements or merits of the plaintiff’s claim. The Court rejected the defendant’s argument

relying on the statutory construction of Title VII. Specifically, the Court noted that Title

VII’s jurisdictional statement is absent of any threshold ingredient such as a minimum

number of employees; rather, the numerosity requirement appears in a wholly separate

provision. Id. at 1245. The Court stated in pertinent part:

Given the "unfair[ness]" and "waste of judicial resources"... entailed in tying

the employee-numerosity requirement to subject-matter jurisdiction, we think

it the sounder course to refrain from constricting § 1331 or Title VII’s

jurisdictional provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e(f)(3), and to leave the ball in

Congress’ court. If the Legislature clearly states that a threshold limitation on

a statute’s scope shall count as jurisdictional, then courts and litigants will be

duly instructed and will not be left to wrestle with the issue... But when

Congress does not rank a statutory limitation on coverage as jurisdictional,

courts should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character. (Emphasis

added).

Id.

Because Congress drafted Title VII to include the numerosity requirement within the

elements of the Title VII claim rather than in terms of a jurisdictional requirement, the court

determined defendant was not permitted to raise a jurisdictional challenge to plaintiff’s claim,

but only as to the merits. Id. at 1242. 

Plaintiff and Defendant apply the holding in Arbaugh in opposite manners. Defendant

argues that because the FMLA does include the numerosity requirement within the FMLA’s

jurisdictional provision that Congress intended that it be a jurisdictional issue. Conversely,

Plaintiff argues that the FMLA’s numerosity provision is virtually identical to that of Title

VII’s and encompasses an element of Plaintiff’s claim rather than a jurisdictional issue, thus

is not subject to a jurisdictional challenge, but rather relates to the merits. The Court finds

Plaintiff’s interpretation persuasive.

Like Title VII, the FMLA's numerosity requirement does not appear in the

jurisdictional provision of the FMLA. Rather, the provision appears in the definition section

of the FMLA and provides that the term "employer" "means any person engaged in

commerce or in any industry or activity affecting commerce who employs 50 or more

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employees for each working day during each of 20 or more calendar workweeks in the

current or preceding calendar year..." 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A). Had the Congress intended

to make this numerosity requirement jurisdictional it would have clearly stated so within the

jurisdictional provision. Id. at 1245 (emphasis added); see also Minard v. ITC Deltacom

Communications, Inc., _F.3d_, 2006 WL 1000572 (5th Cir. April 18, 2006) (finding that

FMLA’s numerosity requirement in light of holding in Arbaugh is a substantive element of

a plaintiff’s claim for relief, not a limitation on the federal court’s subject matter

jurisdiction). Defendant attempts to distinguish the FMLA from Title VII by arguing that

the FMLA’s numerosity requirement is implicated in the FMLA’s jurisdictional provision

with its use of the term "employer" when stating "[a]n action to recover the damages ... in

paragraph (1) may be maintained against any employer (including a public agency) in any

Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction..." 29 U.S.C.A. § 2617(a)(2). However, this

argument is misplaced in light of the fact that the reference to the term "employer" is not

jurisdictional. The FMLA, like Title VII applies to "employers" possessing the requisite

number of employees as defined by the respective Acts. Thus, even though Title VII, does

not reference the term "employer" within the jurisdictional provision of the Act, the

application is the same. In other words, the same argument could be made in a Title VII

case; specifically, that because these Acts apply to "employers" which is a term of art based

in part on the number of employees, that the numerosity requirement is actually

jurisdictional. In light of the holding in Arbaugh, such an argument carries no weight as the

FMLA’s numerosity requirement closely follows Title VII and other Acts that apply the

numerosity requirement as an issue going to the merits. See Morrison v. AmWay Corp., 323

F.3d 920, 928 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that FMLA’s requirement regarding number of

employees is intertwined with merits); Papa v. Katy Indus., Inc., 166 F.3d 937, 943 (7th Cir.

1999) (holding that few-employee exemption to Title VII, ADA and ADEA is not

jurisdictional in nature thus application of summary judgment standard regarding numerosity

issue is proper). Had Congress intended to make the FMLA's numerosity requirement

jurisdictional it would have clearly stated so within the language of the Act by setting forth

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the numerosity requirement within the language of the FMLA’s jurisdictional provision. 29

U.S.C.A. § 2617(a)(2). Thus, the FMLA’s numerosity requirement is not jurisdictional in

nature, but encompasses an element of Plaintiff’s claim on the merits. 

B. This Court is Not in a Posture to Resolve the Numerosity Element of

Plaintiff’s Claim at this Time.

This Court has already determined, with the benefit of limited discovery regarding the

original relevant period, that there is a genuine issue of material fact surrounding the issue

of whether Defendant satisfies the 50-employee requirement. (Dkt.#39). Moreover, the

Court affirmed this ruling with its September 29, 2005 Order denying without prejudice

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction with permission to

reurge Motions relating to the 50 employee requirement "at the close of full discovery and/or

upon the direction from the Supreme Court in Arbaugh v. Y & H. Corp." (Dkt.#139). Thus,

essentially, the holding in Arbaugh changes little with respect to the future handling of this

case. 

This case will proceed forward with the Court’s previous rulings that there is a

genuine issue of material fact surrounding the issue of whether Plaintiff has satisfied the 50-

employee requirement of the FMLA regarding the original relevant time period of January

1, 2002 through April 28, 2003. As discussed below, the actual relevant time period is from

January 1, 2002 through December 31, 2003 and there has been no discovery or

determination by the Court regarding the numerosity issue within the context of this new

relevant time period. Therefore, because there is a factual issue with respect to the original

relevant time period and there has not been full discovery regarding the latter portion of the

new relevant time period, the Court cannot make a determination as a matter of law whether

the numerosity element of Plaintiff's claim has been met based on the evidence submitted

thus far. However, at the conclusion of discovery, the parties may move to resolve the

numerosity issue upon summary judgment based upon the evidence submitted as well as any

additional evidence that plays out during discovery. If there is still a factual issue, the issue

will go to the jury for resolution.

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C. Relevant Time Period Revisited

Defendant also requests the Court to reconsider its position regarding its holding in

its September 29, 2005 Order defining the relevant time period for purposes of the

numerosity requirement as January 1, 2002 through December 31, 2003. The Court will

construe Defendant’s request as a motion for reconsideration. Motions for reconsideration

are disfavored and only appropriate if the court "(1) is presented with newly discovered

evidence, (2) committed clear error or the initial decision was manifestly unjust, or (3) if

there is an intervening change in controlling law." School Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County

v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 2742 (1994).

Motions for Reconsideration are not used to ask the Court to rethink what it has already

thought. Collins v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 252 F. Supp.2d 936, 938 (D. Ariz. 2003) (citing United

States v. Rezzonico, 32 F. Supp.2d 1112, 1116 (D.Ariz.1998). Accordingly, courts grant

such motions only in rare circumstances. See Sullivan v. Faras-RLS Group, Ltd., 795 F.

Supp. 305, 308-09 (D.Ariz.1992). 

Here, Defendant requests the Court to consider what it has already thought.

Accordingly, the Court will stand by its ruling regarding the relevant time period. Further,

as noted by Plaintiff, contrary to Defendant's argument, there are FMLA cases that support

the Court's determination of the relevant time period. Morehardt v. Spirit Airlines, Inc., 174

F. Supp.2d 1272, 1276 (M.D. Fla. 2001); Chavez v. Lawrence & Fredrick, Inc., 1999 WL

803374 at * 3 (N.D. Ill. 1999)(unpublished opinion). Additionally, the statutory language

of the ADEA and Title VII regarding the relevant time period is similar to that used in the

FMLA. Under both of those statutes, courts have found that the relevant time period is the

preceding calendar year as well as the calendar year of the relevant event. See Rogers v.

Sugar Tree Prods. 7 F.3d 577, 580 (7th Cir. 1993); abrogated on other grounds, (holding that

under the ADEA "[t]he current year is the year in which the alleged violation occurred, and

the applicable period does not cease on the date of the violation, but rather continues until

the end of the calendar year."); Komorowski v. Townline Mini Mart and Restaurant, 162

F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 1998) (concluding that under title VII, "'current calendar year' refers

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to the year in which the alleged violation occurred and includes the calendar year from

January 1 through December 31."); Slack v. Havens, 522 F.2d 1091, 1093 (9th Cir. 1975),

superseded on other grounds, (rejecting the argument that "current or preceding calendar

year" means "the prior calendar year and only those months of the current year preceding the

incident at issue" as incompatible with the plain language of Title VII.). Thus for the reasons

stated above, the Court affirms its decision defining the relevant time period spanning the

two full calendar years, January 1, 2002 through December 31, 2003. Moreover, the Court

notes that the parties should also focus discovery on the additional eight months in

investigating the issue of whether the numerosity element of Plaintiff’s claim has been met.

 See EEOC v. Hesco Parts Corp., 57 Fed.Appx. 518, 522 (3d Cir. 2003) (unpublished

opinion) (stating that defendant was a covered entity where it had stipulated that it had

employed more than the requisite number of employees in Title VII action for at least 20

weeks during the second half of 1994 where plaintiff was terminated on April 29, 2004). 

D. Rule 16 Scheduling Conference

The Court has now on three occasions denied Defendant's challenge to the Court's

jurisdiction based upon the numerosity requirement of the FMLA. Additionally, Defendant's

appeal has been dismissed by the Ninth Circuit. Moreover, with the recent ruling in Arbaugh

and this ruling, it is unequivocally clear that Defendant's challenge goes to the merits of

Plaintiff's claim and is not to a threshold jurisdictional issue. As noted above, this issue has

already been addressed upon the summary judgment standard with respect to the relevant

time period of January 1, 2002 through April 28, 2003 with the Court holding that there is

a genuine factual issue. The Court again affirms this holding as well as informs the parties

that they should also focus on the additional relevant period from April 28, 2003 through

December 31, 2003. Because these issues encompass the merits of Plaintiff's claim a

Scheduling Order is necessary to govern this case. The Plaintiff has submitted a proposed

Rule 16 Scheduling Order for the Court to consider, but apparently this proposed order is

submitted without any input from Defendant. The Court finds that the better course of action

is to hold another Rule 16 Scheduling Conference with both parties contributing to an

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updated Rule 26(f) Joint Case Management Plan and proposed Rule 16 Scheduling Order to

govern this case. 

E. Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions

1. Background

Plaintiff moves this Court to order sanctions against Defendant for filing its most

recent Motion to dismiss based upon the lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Specifically,

Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s Motion is essentially the same Motion that was the subject

of its initial Motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), which was denied upon a summary

judgment standard (Dkt.#39); Defendant’s Motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction pursuant to 12(b)(1) which was denied without prejudice (Dkt.#121); and

Defendant’s most recent appeal of the Court’s ruling to the Ninth Circuit, which was recently

dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. (Dkt.#146). In other words, Plaintiff argues that

Defendant has repeatedly filed the same motion based upon no new facts and no new law

which would alter the Court’s previous decisions, thus unreasonably delaying the progression

of this case in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Conversely, Defendant argues the absence of

any bad faith suggesting that sanctions would be appropriate and notes that the recent holding

in Arbaugh is the basis of its current Motion to dismiss and evidences Defendant’s good faith

effort to resolve what it believes to be the jurisdictional issue surrounding Plaintiff’s claim

grounded upon the FMLA. 

2. Sanctions Based Upon Defendant’s Most Recent Motion to Dismiss

 Are Not Called for at this Time.

28 U.S.C. § 1927 provides in pertinent part:

Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the

United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any

case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy

personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred

because of such conduct.

"The imposition of sanctions under section 1927 requires a finding that counsel acted

"recklessly or in bad faith," Barnd v. City of Tacoma, 664 F.2d 1339, 1343 (9th Cir.1982);

see also Heary Bros. Lighting Protection Co., Inc., v. Lighting Protection Institute, 287 F.

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Supp.2d 1038, 1082 (D. Ariz. 2003) (stating that "sanctions must be supported by a finding

of subjective bad faith, which is present when an attorney knowingly or recklessly raises a

frivolous argument.") (citing B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dep't, 276 F.3d 1091, 1107 (9th

Cir.2002). This Court cannot say that Defendant’s present Motion to dismiss is the product

of bad faith.

Plaintiff’s argument that Defendant repeatedly has filed essentially the same motion

after each time the Court has denied it is too simplistic a description of the procedural history

of this case. For instance, in this Court’s September 29, 2005 order the Court, in denying

Defendant’s Motion to dismiss, stated "[m]otions related to the issue of whether Defendant

employed 50 employees for 20 weeks or more during the relevant time period may be

reurged, as appropriate, at the close of full discovery and/or upon the direction from the

Supreme Court in Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp." (Emphasis added). Subsequent to the Supreme

Court’s decision in Arbaugh, Defendant filed the present Motion on the basis that Arbaugh,

while establishing that the numerosity requirement is an element of the merits in Title VII

actions, demonstrates that in FMLA actions the numerosity requirement is wholly

jurisdictional. Misplaced as this argument may be, Defendant’s argument is not simply the

same motion advanced on previous occasions before this Court, but is one based upon recent

precedent which Defendant believes is favorable to Defendant’s position. Therefore,

Plaintiff’s argument that Defendant is simply refiling the same motion with the same

arguments is too simplistic an interpretation. Moreover, the Court cannot say that the present

Motion was filed with any degree of bad faith to delay the progression of this case. As such,

sanctions against Defendant are not warranted at this time. 

While sanctions are not warranted now, the Court does expect that this matter will

now proceed on a standard track as dictated by the deadlines established at the Rule 16

Scheduling Conference, without any further motions to dismiss based upon a lack of subject

matter jurisdiction due to the Plaintiff’s alleged failure to meet the numerosity requirement.

This issue has been squarely addressed. At the conclusion of discovery, the Court will

revisit the issue with the parties motions for summary judgment, if any, based upon the entire

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new relevant period and will determine if this issue can be resolved as a matter of law. If not,

then the issue will go to the jury for a determination. 

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED granting in part and denying in part Defendant's Motion

for Decision on the Issue of Subject Matter Jurisdiction. (Dkt.#140). Defendant's Motion is

granted to the extent that it seeks a ruling on this issue of Subject Matter Jurisdiction.

Defendant's Motion is denied to the extent that it seeks the Court to find that the FMLA's

numerosity requirement is jurisdictional. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for a Rule 16 Scheduling

Conference is granted in part and denied in part. (Dkt.#141). Plaintiff's Motion is granted

to the extent that Plaintiff seeks the Court to order a Scheduling Conference. Plaintiff's

Motion is denied to the extent that Plaintiff seeks the Court to adopt Plaintiff's Proposed

Scheduling Order without any Scheduling Conference and input from Defendant. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a Rule 16 Scheduling Conference is scheduled

for Thursday, May 11 at 4:00 p.m. The parties shall submit an updated Rule 26(f) Joint Case

Management Plan and revised proposed Rule 16 Scheduling Order on or before May 4, 2006.

 The revised proposed Scheduling Order shall provide for the close of discovery no later than

September 1, 2006 and dispositive motions due no later than September 30, 2006. The

parties should take notice, extensions of time will not be granted absent compelling good

cause. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's cross-Motion for Ruling on the issue

of Subject Matter Jurisdiction is granted in part and denied in part. (Dkt.#144). Plaintiff's

Motion is granted to the extent that Plaintiff seeks a ruling from the Court that the FMLA's

numerosity requirement goes to the merits of Plaintiff's claim. Plaintiff's Motion is denied

to the extent that he seeks the Court to find as a matter of law that Defendant is a covered

"employer" under the FMLA. However, this issue may be revisited at the conclusion of

discovery.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions against

MCR’s Counsel. (Dkt.#145). 

DATED this 26th day of April, 2006.

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