Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_01-cv-04282/USCOURTS-cand-3_01-cv-04282-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

REDWOOD CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS, 

Plaintiff,

 v.

COUNTY OF ALAMEDA, et al.,

Defendants. 

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No. C-01-4282 SC

ORDER DENYING

PLAINTIFF'S RENEWED

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT

AS A MATTER OF LAW

AND MOTION FOR NEW

TRIAL

I. INTRODUCTION

Presently before the Court is a renewed motion by Plaintiff

Redwood Christian Schools ("Plaintiff" or "Redwood") for judgment

as a matter of law on Defendants' strict scrutiny defense under

Rule 50(b) and a motion for a new trial under Rule 59 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Docket No. 416. Defendants

County of Alameda and Alameda County Board of Supervisors

("Defendants" or "County") opposed the motion and Plaintiff filed

a reply. See Docket Nos. 424, 426.

For the reasons discussed herein, Plaintiff's motion for

judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial is DENIED.

II. BACKGROUND

The Court has issued numerous orders in this case explaining

the relevant facts; familiarity with those orders is assumed. In

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short, Redwood applied to the County for a Conditional Use Permit

("CUP") to build a 650-student combined junior-senior high school

on property located in an unincorporated area of Alameda County. 

The property, in the Palomares Canyon area of Castro Valley, was

comprised of several individual parcels of land that Redwood had

purchased in a series of transactions. Pursuant to local zoning

ordinances, Redwood needed a CUP to develop the site. After the

Alameda County Municipal Advisory Committee, Planning Commission,

and Board of Supervisors all denied the application, Redwood sued

in federal court. 

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:

If the court does not grant a motion for judgment as a matter

of law made under subdivision (a), the court is considered to

have submitted the action to the jury subject to the court's

later deciding the legal questions raised by the motion. The

movant may renew its request for judgment as a matter of law

by filing a motion no later than 10 days after the entry of

judgment . . . 

Under Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:

(a) Grounds. A new trial may be granted to all or any of the

parties and on all or part of the issues (1) in an action in

which there has been a trial by jury, for any of the reasons

for which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions

at law in the courts of the United States . . .

IV. DISCUSSION

At trial, the Court submitted two causes of action to the

jury under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons

Act ("RLUIPA"): Plaintiff's RLUIPA Substantial Burden claim, 42

U.S.C. § 2000cc(a), and Plaintiff's RLUIPA Equal Terms claim, 42

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U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1). The jury returned a unanimous verdict in

favor of Defendants. Redwood's motion only addresses the RLUIPA

Substantial Burden claim, Redwood does not seek judgment as a

matter of law or a new trial on its Equal Terms claim. 

Redwood's motion also does not address whether the County's

denial of the CUP imposed a substantial burden on Redwood's

exercise of religion, an issue on which Redwood bore the burden of

proof at trial. Under RLUIPA, if Redwood had proven its

substantial burden case by a preponderance of the evidence, the

County would then have to prove that (1) the County was furthering

a compelling governmental interest, and (2) it was doing so by the

least restrictive means. See San Jose Christian College v. City

of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2004). 

The jury instructions provided a step-by-step description of

how to arrive at the verdict in this case. The instructions were

crafted after the Court considered the voluminous submissions of

both parties, who agreed on only a page or two out of thirty pages

of instructions. See Docket No. 364, Exs. 1-18. In addition, the

Court's verdict form was written after hearing debate on whether

Plaintiff's or Defendants' form should be used. Plaintiff

submitted a general jury verdict form, listing its various causes

of action and asking the jury whether it found for Plaintiff on

each claim. See Docket No. 425, Kent Decl., Ex. H. Defendants

submitted a detailed verdict form, walking through the elements of

each cause of action. See id., Ex. G. At trial, the Court used a

general verdict form. See Docket No. 412. In short, Plaintiff

requested a general verdict form and now seeks to reverse the

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unanimous jury verdict because the form does not indicate the

basis for the jury's ruling.

A. Renewed Judgment as a Matter of Law

At the close of the case, Redwood moved for judgment as a

matter of law. In the present motion, Redwood renews that motion

and asks the Court to rule that the County's affirmative defense

under RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1)(A) and (B), fails as a

matter of law. Redwood asserts that when the County denied

Redwood's CUP application, the County's stated interests were not

compelling and the County failed to use the least restrictive

means of furthering its interests. Contrary to Redwood's

contentions, the County presented substantial and convincing

evidence that it acted in furtherance of compelling governmental

interests and used the least restrictive means of furthering those

interests. The Court finds that the issues raised by Plaintiff

are not sufficient to invalidate the jury verdict. Rule 61

instructs the Court to vacate an order or judgment in the event it

is inconsistent with substantial justice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 61. 

None of the issues raised by Redwood demonstrate that the jury

verdict is inconsistent with substantial justice and thus the

Court denies Redwood's motion.

Under RLUIPA, the jury would only reach the County's

statutory defense if Redwood proved that the County imposed a

substantial burden on its exercise of religion. See San Jose

Christian, 360 F.3d at 1034. The first concern of the jury in

following the Court's instructions was the "substantial burden on

religious exercise" issue. That issue was conclusively determined

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by the jury in their general verdict for the Defendants. At the

time the verdict form and jury instructions were discussed,

Redwood wanted the instructions to include pages on the compelling

governmental interest and least restrictive means analysis. Now

that the jury has found in Defendants' favor, Plaintiff asks the

Court to determine these issues in its favor. The Court will not

vacate the jury verdict on this basis because there is substantial

evidence to support Defendants' theory that it denied the CUP

after considering its compelling interests in promoting

consistency of land use, preserving open space, curbing noise,

regulating traffic, facilitating public transportation, and

preserving historic structures. Testimony from members of the

Board of Supervisors and documents contained in the administrative

record established that the County had legitimate and compelling

interests related to Redwood's proposal.

Redwood also asserts that the County failed to use the least

restrictive means of furthering its interests. Redwood argues

that the County used the most restrictive means, not the least,

because the County denied the permit instead of approving one

conditioned upon lower enrollment at the school. However,

Redwood's CUP application called for a 650-student school and

Redwood never changed its application or stated that it would

accept a lower number. Indeed, the County presented evidence

during the cross-examination of Gus Enderlin and Bruce Johnson

that Redwood failed to compromise during the application process. 

See Kent Decl., Ex. A, 124:12-21; Ex. B, 51:11-14. 

Defendants presented substantial and convincing evidence that

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they used the least restrictive means. The evidence showed that

on October 4, 2001, the County Board of Supervisors heard and

denied Redwood's appeal from the Planning Commission's rejection

of Redwood's CUP application. See id., Ex. J, AR 5434. Prior to

that meeting, the Board considered at least seven alternatives,

four of which accommodated 650 students, and three of which

planned for reduced enrollments of 425, 225, and 80 students. See

id. At the October 4 hearing, Peter Smith, speaking on behalf of

Redwood, stated that only Option 2-A with over 100,000 square feet

of facilities and 650 students was acceptable. See Kent Decl.,

Ex. K. Redwood never told the Board of Supervisors that it was

willing to compromise on the enrollment for the proposed school. 

See id., Ex. A, 124:12-21; Ex. B, 51:11-14. In light of the

substantial evidence that Redwood would not accept anything less

than a school with 650 students and over 100,000 square feet of

space, the County used the least restrictive means to further its

interests by carefully considering the options before denying

Redwood's CUP application. The Court will not rule in Redwood's

favor because Redwood abdicated its responsibility to negotiate

with the County. The Court would have found what the jury found,

if the jury reached the affirmative defense instructions- the

County used the least restrictive means in furtherance of its

compelling governmental interests. 

B. Motion for a New Trial

Plaintiff also moves for a new trial under Rule 59. Redwood

argues that "[s]ince the jury instructions allowed the jury to

return a verdict in favor of the County based upon a strict

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scrutiny defense that should have been rejected as a matter of

law, Redwood was prejudiced, and the verdict is infirm." Pl.'s

Mot., 3. In support, Redwood cites the general rule that "a

general jury verdict will be upheld only if there is substantial

evidence to support each and every theory of liability submitted

to the jury." Portland Feminist Women's Health Center v.

Advocates for Life, Inc., 62 F.3d 280, 285-86 (9th Cir. 1994)

(internal quotation omitted). As discussed earlier, there is

substantial evidence to support Defendants' theories that it had

compelling governmental interests and used the least restrictive

means to further those interests. Furthermore, there is

substantial evidence to support Defendants' theory that it did not

impose a substantial burden on Redwood's religious exercise by

denying the CUP application. See Kent Decl., Ex. A, 131:10-15;

Ex. B, 91:17-19; Ex. C, AR 5122; Ex. D, RCS 020897; Ex. E, RCS

017640-41; Ex. F, RCS 007228-29. The evidence showed that

Redwood's current site was adequate for education and prayer, the

school did not face an imminent threat of closure, and alternative

school sites were available for lease or purchase. 

Redwood now argues that the RLUIPA affirmative defense was

improperly submitted to the jury because it should have been

decided by the Court as a matter of law. However, prior to and

during trial, the parties argued that there were material factual

disputes as to whether the County had compelling interests and

whether the County used the least restrictive means in furtherance

of those interests. For instance, there was dispute as to the

existence and severity of traffic, noise, and other zoning

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considerations at the site. In addition, there was dispute as to

whether Redwood or the County had ruled out the numerous

alternative plans presented to the Board of Supervisors. Thus,

the theory of liability submitted to the jury under RLUIPA was

proper. 

Having considered the submissions of both parties and the

trial testimony and evidence, the Court would have found what the

jury found, that the County's denial of Redwood's CUP application

did not impose a substantial burden on Redwood's religious

exercise. Redwood is capable of engaging in religious exercise at

its current site, which is also located in Alameda County. 

Moreover, even if Redwood demonstrated a substantial burden, the

County presented substantial evidence that it used the least

restrictive means of furthering its compelling interests.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed herein, Plaintiff's motion for

judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 9, 2007 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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