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Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 13, 2018 Decided January 28, 2020 

No. 18-5020 

CARLOS LOUMIET, ESQUIRE, 

APPELLEE

v. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

APPELLEE

MICHAEL RARDIN, ET AL., 

APPELLANTS

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:12-cv-01130) 

Tyce R. Walters, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, 

argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were 

Jessie K. Liu, U.S. Attorney, and Mark B. Stern, Attorney. 

Carlos Loumiet, pro se, argued the cause for appellee. On 

the brief was Andrés Rivero. 

Before: GARLAND, Chief Judge, KATSAS, Circuit Judge, 

and WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge. 

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge KATSAS. 

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KATSAS, Circuit Judge: In Bivens v. Six Unknown 

Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 

(1971), the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment 

creates an implied damages action for unconstitutional 

searches against line officers enforcing federal drug laws. In 

this case, we consider whether the First Amendment creates an 

implied damages action against officials in the Office of the 

Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) for retaliatory 

administrative enforcement actions under the Financial 

Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 

(FIRREA). Consistent with the Supreme Court’s marked 

reluctance to extend Bivens to new contexts, we hold that the 

First Amendment does not create such an implied damages 

action. 

I 

In 1999, the OCC began an investigation of Hamilton 

Bank and three of its executives for the allegedly fraudulent 

concealment of some $22 million in loan losses. The bank 

retained an outside law firm to investigate the charges. Carlos 

Loumiet, then a partner at the law firm, prepared two reports. 

The first one, made for the bank’s auditing committee and 

shared with the OCC, was issued in November 2000. It found 

no convincing evidence that the executives had fraudulently 

concealed the losses. The OCC was skeptical and provided 

Loumiet with additional evidence. In response, Loumiet 

prepared a second report, issued in March 2001. It concluded 

that the disputed transactions were poorly handled but still 

found insufficient evidence to conclude that the executives had 

fraudulently concealed the losses. The OCC disagreed and 

placed the bank into a receivership. Later, the executives were 

indicted. Two of them pleaded guilty; the third, Hamilton’s 

former chairman and chief executive officer, was convicted 

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and sentenced to thirty years of imprisonment. United States 

v. Masferrer, 514 F.3d 1158 (11th Cir. 2008). 

According to Loumiet, OCC officials engaged in various 

forms of misconduct during the investigation. The alleged 

misconduct included lying to Hamilton officers, threatening to 

retaliate against its lawyers, and making racist statements. In 

March and April 2001, Loumiet raised these allegations with 

the Secretary of the Treasury, the Inspector General of the 

Treasury Department, and the Comptroller. In June 2001, 

Loumiet met with an attorney in the Inspector General’s Office 

to discuss his allegations. In July 2001, the Inspector General 

concluded that there was no basis to investigate them any 

further. Nonetheless, Loumiet represented the bank in suing 

the OCC for alleged civil-rights violations. The bank 

voluntarily dismissed its suit in 2002. Order of Dismissal, 

Hamilton Bank, N.A. v. Comptroller, No. 01-4994 (S.D. Fla. 

Oct. 16, 2002), ECF Doc. 64. 

In 2006, after the Hamilton executives were convicted, the 

OCC brought an administrative enforcement action against 

Loumiet, one of his partners, and his law firm. The OCC 

proceeded under FIRREA, which allows it to seek civil 

penalties from “any institution-affiliated party” who breaches 

a fiduciary duty to a federally-insured bank and thereby 

“causes or is likely to cause more than a minimal loss” to the 

bank. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(2)(B). In turn, FIRREA defines an 

“institution-affiliated party” to include “any attorney” who 

“knowingly or recklessly participates in” a breach of fiduciary 

duty that “caused or is likely to cause more than a minimal 

financial loss to, or a significant adverse effect on” the bank. 

Id. § 1813(u)(4). The law firm and Loumiet’s partner settled 

with the OCC and agreed to pay $750,000 in fines. Loumiet 

contested the charges against him. An Administrative Law 

Judge recommended their dismissal on the ground that Loumiet 

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had not breached any fiduciary duty. Recommended Decision, 

In re Loumiet, OCC-AA-EC-06-102 (June 18, 2008). The 

Comptroller disagreed, but nonetheless dismissed on the 

alternative ground that Loumiet had not caused the bank any 

harm. Final Decision & Order, In re Loumiet, OCC-AA-EC06-102 (July 27, 2009). 

Loumiet sought fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act 

(EAJA). In pertinent part, EAJA allows a prevailing private 

party in an administrative adjudication to recover “fees and 

other expenses” unless the adjudicator “finds that the position 

of the agency was substantially justified.” 5 U.S.C. 

§ 504(a)(1). The OCC denied fees, but we reversed on the 

ground that there was no substantial justification for the OCC’s 

position that Loumiet could have significantly harmed the 

bank. Loumiet v. OCC, 650 F.3d 796 (D.C. Cir. 2011). We 

reasoned that even if Loumiet’s false exoneration of the 

executives caused the bank to “retain the dishonest officers,” 

there was no evidence that this harmed the bank. Id. at 800. 

On remand, Loumiet was awarded $675,000. 

Loumiet then filed this lawsuit against the United States 

and four OCC officials. He asserted Bivens claims against the 

officials as well as various tort claims. The Bivens claims rest 

on the theory that the officials caused the OCC enforcement 

action in retaliation for Loumiet’s protected speech criticizing 

the OCC investigation, in violation of the First and Fifth 

Amendments of the Constitution. The district court held that 

the Bivens claims were untimely, and it dismissed the tort 

claims on other grounds. Loumiet v. United States, 65 F. Supp. 

3d 19 (D.D.C. 2014). We reversed both rulings. Loumiet v. 

United States, 828 F.3d 935 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 

On remand, the district court declined to dismiss the First 

Amendment Bivens claims. Loumiet v. United States, 255 

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F. Supp. 3d 75, 83–96 (D.D.C. 2017). The court reasoned that 

prior decisions had already “recognized the existence of a 

Bivens implied cause-of-action for retaliatory prosecution in 

violation of the First Amendment.” Id. at 84. Likewise, the 

court concluded that the procedural and remedial protections 

provided under FIRREA do not counsel against recognizing an 

implied damages action. See id. at 85–90. The court further 

held that the complaint plausibly stated First Amendment 

claims against the OCC officials who allegedly “induce[d] an 

enforcement action against Plaintiff in reprisal for critical 

statements that he made against them and the OCC more 

generally.” Id. at 95. And it denied those officials qualified 

immunity on the ground that the “First Amendment right to be 

free from retaliatory prosecution” was clearly established long 

before 2006. Id. at 93 (quotation marks omitted). Finally, the 

court held that the Fifth Amendment count did not state a claim, 

converted the tort claims against the individual defendants into 

claims against the United States, and dismissed some but not 

all of the tort claims. Id. at 97–100. 

After the Supreme Court decided Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 

S. Ct. 1843 (2017), the officials moved for reconsideration. 

The district court denied the motion. Loumiet v. United States, 

292 F. Supp. 3d 222 (D.D.C. 2017). In light of Abbasi, the 

court assumed that Loumiet was seeking to extend Bivens into 

a “new context.” Id. at 229. But the court concluded that the 

“special factors counselling hesitation” in Abbasi, which 

involved programmatic actions undertaken by high-ranking 

officials in response to terrorist attacks, were not present in this 

case. Id. at 227 (quotation marks omitted); see id. at 229–31. 

Finally, the court discounted the significance of EAJA in its 

special-factors analysis because that statute was not enacted as 

part of FIRREA. Id. at 232–38. 

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The OCC officials now seek review of the district court’s 

refusal to dismiss the First Amendment claims against them. 

II 

We begin, as we must, with our jurisdiction. See Steel Co. 

v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998). We have 

jurisdiction to review “final decisions” of the district court. 28 

U.S.C. § 1291. Under the collateral-order doctrine, the “denial 

of a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on 

an issue of law, is an appealable ‘final decision’” within the 

meaning of section 1291. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 

530 (1985). We thus have jurisdiction to decide whether the 

OCC officials are entitled to qualified immunity on the First 

Amendment claims. 

We also have jurisdiction to decide whether the First 

Amendment confers upon Loumiet an implied cause of action 

for damages. Because “the recognition of the entire cause of 

action” is “directly implicated by the defense of qualified 

immunity,” both questions are “properly before us on 

interlocutory appeal.” Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 549 n.4 

(2007) (quotation marks omitted); see Liff v. Office of Inspector 

Gen. for U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 881 F.3d 912, 917–18 (D.C. Cir. 

2018). 

III 

In this court, the OCC officials contend that the First 

Amendment creates no implied cause of action for damages 

and that, in any event, they are entitled to qualified immunity 

on the facts alleged by Loumiet. We begin with the cause-ofaction question, which is antecedent to the question of qualified 

immunity. See Liff, 881 F.3d at 918 (“it is appropriate to 

determine the availability of a Bivens remedy at the earliest 

practicable phase of litigation”). 

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A 

The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment provides 

that “Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of 

speech.” Neither the First Amendment, nor any other provision 

of the Constitution, provides an express cause of action for its 

own violation. Congress has provided a statutory cause of 

action against state officials for violations of the federal 

Constitution, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but it has provided no such 

cause of action against federal officials. Nonetheless, Loumiet 

asks us to hold that the First Amendment, by its own force, 

creates an implied cause of action for damages against OCC 

and other federal officials for retaliatory enforcement activities. 

The Supreme Court first recognized an implied damages 

action under the Constitution in Bivens. There, the Court held 

that the Fourth Amendment creates an implied damages action 

against federal narcotics officers for unconstitutional searches 

and seizures. 403 U.S. at 389. Over the next decade, the 

Supreme Court recognized two more implied damages actions 

under the Constitution—one under the Fifth Amendment 

against members of Congress for employment discrimination 

on the basis of sex, Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 248–49 

(1979), and one under the Eighth Amendment against federal 

prison officials for failure to provide adequate medical care, 

Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19 (1980). 

Since Carlson, however, the Supreme Court has carefully 

circumscribed Bivens and “consistently refused to extend 

Bivens to any new context or new category of defendants.” 

Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1857 (quotation marks omitted). 

Recognizing an implied damages action “is a significant step 

under separation-of-powers principles.” Id. at 1856. Imposing 

personal liability on federal officers may promote important 

interests in deterring constitutional violations and redressing 

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injuries, but it also “create[s] substantial costs” for the officers, 

the government, and citizens who depend on the vigorous 

enforcement of federal law. Id. The Constitution itself is silent 

on how to balance these competing considerations in various 

contexts, and judges are not well-suited to do so. Rather, “[i]n 

most instances ... the Legislature is in the better position to 

consider if the public interest would be served by imposing a 

new substantive legal liability.” Id. at 1857 (quotation marks 

omitted). Moreover, in the decades since Bivens was decided, 

the Court has grown wary of creating implied damages actions 

in other contexts. See id. at 1855–56. For these reasons, 

“expanding the Bivens remedy is now a disfavored judicial 

activity,” so the Supreme Court demands “caution before 

extending Bivens remedies into any new context.” Id. at 1857 

(quotation marks omitted). 

Exercising this caution, the Supreme Court has not 

recognized a new Bivens action in the four decades since 

Carlson was decided. At the same time, the Court has declined 

to extend Bivens on ten separate occasions. Once, it declined 

to create a Bivens cause of action because Congress had made 

another remedy expressly exclusive. Hui v. Castaneda, 559 

U.S. 799, 805–07 (2010). Twice, it declined to extend Bivens

to areas where Congress had provided an alternative scheme of 

protections and remedies. Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 

424–29 (1988) (Social Security disability benefits); Bush v. 

Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 380–90 (1983) (federal employment). 

Three times, it declined to extend Bivens to sensitive areas. 

Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1860–63 (national security); United States 

v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 678–86 (1987) (military); Chappell v. 

Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 298–305 (1983) (military). Three 

times, it declined to extend Bivens to new categories of 

defendants. Minneci v. Pollard, 565 U.S. 118, 126–31 (2012) 

(private individuals); Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 

61, 70–74 (2001) (private corporations); FDIC v. Meyer, 510 

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U.S. 471, 484–86 (1994) (federal agencies). Once, it declined 

to extend Bivens simply because Congress is better positioned 

to evaluate when agency officials “push too hard for the 

Government’s benefit,” and what consequences should follow 

if they do so. Robbins, 551 U.S. at 562. 

After reviewing these precedents, Abbasi set out a two-part 

test to decide when to recognize implied damages actions under 

Bivens. First, we must consider whether the plaintiff seeks to 

extend Bivens into a “new context.” If so, we then must 

consider whether there are any “special factors counselling 

hesitation.” See 137 S. Ct. at 1857–60. 

B 

The new-context inquiry in this case is straightforward. 

According to the Supreme Court, “[t]he proper test for 

determining whether a case presents a new Bivens context is as 

follows. If the case is different in a meaningful way from 

previous Bivens cases decided by this Court, then the context 

is new.” Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1859. The Court has provided a 

non-exhaustive “list of differences that are meaningful enough 

to make a given context a new one”: 

the rank of the officers involved; the constitutional 

right at issue; the generality or specificity of the 

official action; the extent of judicial guidance as to 

how an officer should respond to the problem or 

emergency to be confronted; the statutory or other 

legal mandate under which the officer was operating; 

the risk of disruptive intrusion by the Judiciary into 

the functioning of other branches; or the presence of 

potential special factors that previous Bivens cases did 

not consider. 

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Id. at 1859–60. In addition, a “new context” is present 

whenever the plaintiff seeks damages from a “new category of 

defendants.” See id. at 1857 (quotation marks omitted); 

Meshal v. Higgenbotham, 804 F.3d 417, 424 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 

Under these criteria, “even a modest extension is still an 

extension,” and so “the new-context inquiry is easily satisfied.” 

Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1864–65. 

This case clearly presents a new Bivens context. First, the 

constitutional right at issue differs from the ones at issue in 

Bivens, Davis, and Carlson. Loumiet alleges a violation of the 

Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, but Bivens was a 

Fourth Amendment search-and-seizure case, 403 U.S. at 389; 

Davis was a Fifth Amendment sex-discrimination case, 442 

U.S. at 231; and Carlson was an Eighth Amendment medicalcare case, 446 U.S. at 16 & n.1. Although the Supreme Court 

twice has assumed that the First Amendment creates an implied 

cause of action for damages, see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 675 (2009) (Free Exercise Clause); Hartman v. Moore, 

547 U.S. 250, 256 (2006) (Free Speech Clause), it has “never 

held that Bivens extends to First Amendment claims,” Reichle 

v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 663–64 n.4 (2012). Abbasi removed 

any possible doubt on this point. There, the Supreme Court 

stressed that “three cases—Bivens, Davis, and Carlson—

represent the only instances in which the Court has approved 

of an implied damages remedy under the Constitution itself.” 

137 S. Ct. at 1855. To the extent we suggested otherwise in 

Munsell v. Department of Agriculture, 509 F.3d 572, 587–88 

(D.C. Cir. 2007)—a case rejecting Bivens claims for failure to 

exhaust, see id. at 591—Reichle and Abbasi have displaced that 

dicta. And though we previously recognized First Amendment 

Bivens claims in Haynesworth v. Miller, 820 F.2d 1245, 1255 

(D.C. Cir. 1987), and Moore v. Valder, 65 F.3d 189, 196 n.12 

(D.C. Cir. 1995), those cases have been overtaken by Abbasi’s 

holding that the new-context analysis may consider only 

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Supreme Court decisions approving Bivens actions. See 137 

S. Ct. at 1859. 

Second, the legal mandate under which the OCC officials 

were operating is different from the ones in Bivens, Davis, and 

Carlson. The dispute here arose from the enforcement of 

federal banking laws under FIRREA, whereas Bivens involved 

the enforcement of federal drug laws, 403 U.S. at 389; Davis 

involved employment decisions by members of Congress, 442 

U.S. at 230; and Carlson involved the provision of medical care 

to federal prisoners, 446 U.S. at 16. 

Third, Loumiet seeks damages from a new category of 

defendants. The defendants here are OCC officials, whereas 

the defendants in Bivens were federal narcotics agents, 403 

U.S. at 389; the defendant in Davis was a former member of 

Congress, 442 U.S. at 230; and the defendants in Carlson were 

federal prison officials, 446 U.S. at 16. For each of these 

reasons, this case presents a new context. 

C 

We next consider whether special factors counsel 

hesitation. One factor stands out here: “if there is an alternative 

remedial structure present in a certain case, that alone may limit 

the power of the Judiciary to infer a new Bivens cause of 

action.” Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1858. Likewise, “when 

alternative methods of relief are available, a Bivens remedy 

usually is not.” Id. at 1863. Two Supreme Court cases—Bush

and Chilicky—illustrate these special factors. 

In Bush, the Court refused to extend Bivens to a federal 

employee allegedly demoted in retaliation for protected speech 

criticizing his employer. 462 U.S. at 368–69. As the Court 

explained, federal workers are “protected by an elaborate, 

comprehensive scheme that encompasses substantive 

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provisions forbidding arbitrary action by supervisors and 

procedures—administrative and judicial—by which improper 

action may be redressed.” Id. at 385; see also id. at 368 

(observing that the scheme affords “meaningful remedies 

against the United States”). The Court held that such an 

“elaborate remedial system that has been constructed step by 

step, with careful attention to conflicting policy 

considerations,” should not be “augmented by the creation of a 

new judicial remedy” for the claimed First Amendment 

violation. Id. at 388. 

In Chilicky, the Court refused to extend Bivens to 

individuals denied Social Security disability benefits, allegedly 

in violation of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. 487 

U.S. at 414. Applying Bush, the Court concluded that the 

“administrative structure and procedures of the Social Security 

system” was a special factor counselling hesitation. Id. at 424. 

That system established “federal standards and criteria” for the 

provision of benefits, created “elaborate administrative 

remedies” for claimants denied benefits, and provided for 

“judicial review, including review of constitutional claims.” 

Id. But it made “no provision for remedies in money damages 

against officials responsible for unconstitutional conduct that 

leads to the wrongful denial of benefits,” and the Court 

declined to recalibrate the scheme to add that remedy. Id. at 

424–25. 

On three occasions, we have applied Bush and Chilicky to 

reject Bivens claims. In Spagnola v. Mathis, 859 F.2d 223 

(D.C. Cir. 1988) (en banc), we confirmed that the Civil Service 

Reform Act bars First Amendment Bivens claims by 

individuals allegedly denied federal employment or promotion 

in retaliation for protected speech. See id. at 224–25, 229. We 

stressed that, under Bush and Chilicky, “it is the 

comprehensiveness of the statutory scheme involved, not the 

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‘adequacy’ of specific remedies extended thereunder, that 

counsels judicial abstention.” Id. at 227. In Wilson v. Libby, 

535 F.3d 697 (D.C. Cir. 2008), we held that the Privacy Act 

barred First and Fifth Amendment Bivens claims brought by a 

plaintiff alleging that her status as a covert agent had been 

unconstitutionally disclosed. See id. at 702–04. And we did so 

even though the Privacy Act, which authorizes private damages 

actions for willful violations, exempts the Offices of the 

President and the Vice President from coverage—and thus 

afforded no remedy against the defendants in the case. See id.

at 706–08. In Liff, we held that the “myriad statutes and 

regulations that provide remedies for contracting-related 

disputes,” which collectively afford a “spectrum of remedies,” 

bar the imposition of Bivens liability for claims arising out of 

federal government contracts. See 881 F.3d at 920–21. In each 

of these cases, we declined to question whether the remedial 

scheme at issue was the “best response” in the specific context 

at issue, “for Congress is the body charged with making the 

inevitable compromises required.” Spagnola, 859 F.2d at 228 

(cleaned up). 

Here, FIRREA’s administrative enforcement scheme is 

likewise a special factor counselling hesitation. This scheme 

permits the imposition of civil penalties only for defined 

offenses such as knowingly breaching a fiduciary duty or 

recklessly engaging in an unsound banking practice. 12 U.S.C. 

§ 1818(i)(2)(A)–(C). Any party subject to a penalty is entitled 

to advance notice and a hearing, id. § 1818(i)(2)(H), which 

must be conducted in accordance with the Administrative 

Procedure Act, id. § 1818(h)(1). Thus, the party is entitled to 

make arguments, cross-examine witnesses, and submit oral, 

documentary, and rebuttal evidence. 5 U.S.C. § 554(c)(1); id.

§ 556(d). Enforcement officials within the OCC bear the 

burden of proof and cannot participate or advise in the decision. 

Id. § 556(b) & (d). And the presiding official, if not the OCC 

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itself, must be a duly appointed ALJ, id. § 556(b), who must 

render a recommended decision on a closed record with a 

statement of reasons, id. § 557(c), and without any ex parte

contacts relevant to the proceeding, id. § 557(d). FIRREA also 

requires the OCC to augment these procedures with 

implementing regulations, 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(2)(K), under 

which administrative respondents are entitled to be represented 

by counsel, 12 C.F.R. § 19.35; seek summary disposition, id. 

§ 19.29; apply for document subpoenas, id. § 19.26; object to 

evidence, id. § 19.36(d); depose unavailable witnesses, id.

§ 19.36(f); and more. The ALJ’s recommended decision is 

then subject to further review by the Comptroller himself, 

5 U.S.C. § 557(b), and his decision in turn is subject to judicial 

review in a court of appeals, 12 U.S.C. § 1818(h)(2). Similar 

rules, protections, and review attend other exercises of OCC 

administrative enforcement, including the adjudication of 

cease-and-desist orders, id. § 1818(b), and the removal of 

affiliated individuals from participating in a bank’s affairs, id.

§ 1818(e). Together, these provisions afford regulated parties 

an “alternative, existing process for protecting [their] interest.” 

Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. at 1858 (quotation marks omitted). 

Moreover, the FIRREA enforcement scheme gives 

regulated parties a sword as well as a shield. Under EAJA, any 

party prevailing in a contested agency adjudication is entitled 

to “fees and other expenses incurred by that party in connection 

with that proceeding,” unless the ALJ “finds that the position 

of the agency was substantially justified or that special 

circumstances make an award unjust.” 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1). 

This stands in marked contrast to the American Rule, under 

which “the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to 

collect a reasonable attorneys’ fee from the loser.” Alyeska 

Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 

(1975). Fee awards under EAJA can be substantial, as 

evidenced by Loumiet’s own award of $675,000. The FIRREA 

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scheme thus affords “meaningful remedies against the United 

States,” Bush, 462 U.S. at 368, as a general matter and in this 

case. 

One more aspect of the scheme is important—judicial 

review, although available, is carefully circumscribed. 

Specifically, FIRREA provides that “[j]udicial review” of any 

OCC administrative adjudication “shall be exclusively as 

provided” in FIRREA itself, which channels such review to the 

courts of appeals. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(h)(1) & (2). Likewise, 

FIRREA provides that, in any district-court action to enforce a 

civil penalty, “the validity and appropriateness of the penalty 

shall not be subject to review.” Id. § 1818(i)(2)(I)(ii). These 

provisions come close to foreclosing a Bivens action expressly, 

just as the exclusive-review provision at issue in Castaneda 

expressly foreclosed Bivens actions against officers of the 

Public Health Service. See 559 U.S. at 805–06. At a minimum, 

the precise nature of the available judicial review makes clear 

that Congress did not “inadvertently” omit a damages remedy 

from FIRREA, see Liff, 881 F.3d at 921; Wilson, 535 F.3d at 

708; Spagnola, 859 F.2d at 228, underscoring that the courts 

should not augment the scheme to supply one. See Abbasi, 137 

S. Ct. at 1865 (“legislative action suggesting that Congress 

does not want a damages remedy is itself a factor counseling 

hesitation”). 

Loumiet’s contrary arguments are all without merit. First, 

he contends that the procedural protections afforded in the 

FIRREA administrative process are not remedies at all. True 

enough, but they do help constrain the unconstitutional 

exercise of government power—unlike the largely or wholly 

unregulated search in Bivens, hiring decision in Davis, and care 

provision in Carlson. Moreover, as explained above, we rely 

not only on procedural protections, but also on the affirmative 

EAJA remedy and the channeled nature of the judicial review 

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provided. Second, Loumiet contends that EAJA cannot be 

considered because it is a separate statute from FIRREA. But 

in Liff, we assessed special factors by considering the full 

“constellation of statutes and regulations governing federal 

contracts, as well as the Privacy Act.” 881 F.3d at 920. There 

is no reason to disregard any of the statutes establishing the 

governing scheme. Third, Loumiet contends that he is not 

subject to the FIRREA scheme at all, because the Comptroller 

concluded that he is not an institution-affiliated party. But 

Loumiet—as an attorney for a federally-insured bank—was not 

wholly outside the regulatory scheme. To the contrary, the 

Comptroller concluded that Loumiet was not an institutionaffiliated party only because his conduct did not harm the bank. 

If it had, he might have been subject to a penalty. Compare

12 U.S.C. § 1813(u)(4) (definition of “institution-affiliated 

party”), with id. § 1818(i)(2)(A)–(C) (penalties for institutionaffiliated parties). Loumiet does not fall outside the FIRREA 

scheme simply because he won his individual case. Finally, 

Loumiet argues that the remedy afforded to him was 

insufficient. But Bush and Chilicky were decided on the 

premise that the available remedy in each of those cases—

setting aside an adverse personnel decision or denial of 

benefits—was less effective than would be an award of full 

damages for all consequential harms. See Chilicky, 487 U.S. at 

425. Moreover, we later held that, so long as the administrative 

scheme is comprehensive, a Bivens remedy is unavailable even 

if the plaintiff before the court is afforded no remedy at all. See 

Wilson, 535 F.3d at 709. 

We recognize that retaliatory enforcement actions can be 

hard to ferret out in administrative processes and can impose 

harms well beyond those remediable through EAJA. On the 

other hand, charges of a retaliatory motive are easy to make, 

hard to disprove, potentially crippling to regulators, and 

perhaps not unlikely in the context of hotly contested 

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adversarial proceedings. As in Abbasi, there is a hard “balance 

to be struck” in considering whether to create a damages 

remedy for the kind of claim that Loumiet seeks to press here. 

137 S. Ct. at 1863. That decision is best left to Congress. 

IV 

The First Amendment creates no implied damages action 

against OCC officials for inducing an allegedly retaliatory 

administrative enforcement proceeding. We therefore reverse 

the district court’s judgment and remand the case with 

instructions to dismiss Loumiet’s First Amendment claims. 

So ordered.

USCA Case #18-5020 Document #1825913 Filed: 01/28/2020 Page 17 of 17