Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-97-05035/USCOURTS-caDC-97-05035-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

---

<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 9, 1997 Decided January 16, 1998 

No. 97-5033

DAVID LINDER,

APPELLANT

v.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

__________

Consolidated with

Nos. 97-5034, 97-5035, 97-5226

________

Appeals from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 94ms00146) 

(No. 94ms00147) 

(No. 94ms00149) 

(No. 94ms00150)

________

USCA Case #97-5035 Document #323905 Filed: 01/16/1998 Page 1 of 14
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Gabor Rona argued the cause for appellant. With him on 

the briefs were Jennifer M. Green, Beth Stephens, Michael 

Ratner and Jules Lobel.

John D. Bates, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause 

for appellees. With him on the brief were Mary Lou Leary,

U.S. Attorney, R. Craig Lawrence, W. Mark Nebeker, and 

Kimberly N. Brown, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: HENDERSON, RANDOLPH and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.

TATEL, Circuit Judge: The father of an American development worker tortured and killed by Nicaraguan contra soldiers appeals the district court's refusal to expand the scope 

of third-party subpoenas duces tecum issued to the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, the 

Department of Defense, and the State Department, as well as 

its refusal to order those agencies to provide additional 

information about their withholding of certain documents 

under claims of privilege, including the state secrets privilege. 

Because the district court has yet to issue final orders with 

respect to the State and Defense Departments' subpoenas, we 

dismiss those appeals. We affirm the district court's ruling 

that the CIA properly invoked its statutory privileges. Finding that the district court failed to make the relevance 

determination required by Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure, we reverse its order as to the scope of the 

CIA and FBI subpoenas.

I

After graduating from college in 1983, Benjamin Linder, a 

U.S. citizen and mechanical engineer, moved to Nicaragua to 

help bring electricity to the country's rural, undeveloped 

areas. Assisting in the building of dams and hydroelectric 

plants in the El Cua-San Jose de Bocay region, Linder began 

work on the construction of a weir, a small dam to measure 

water flow. On April 28, 1987, shortly after Linder and six 

other men arrived at the half-built dam, a Nicaraguan Democratic Force ("FDN") patrol, which had been waiting for 

USCA Case #97-5035 Document #323905 Filed: 01/16/1998 Page 2 of 14
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Linder and his co-workers since early morning, attacked 

them with grenades and machine guns. Initially immobilized 

by non-fatal wounds to his legs and arms and stabbed thirty 

to forty times in his face, Linder died when a contra soldier 

shot him in the temple from less than two feet.

Seeking compensatory and punitive damages, Linder's parents and siblings filed a wrongful death action in the U.S. 

District Court for the Southern District of Florida against 

three contra organizations operating out of southern Floridathe United Nicaraguan Opposition and the Nicaraguan 

Resistance, in addition to the FDNand four of their leaders, 

Adolfo Calero Portocarrero, Enrique Bermudez Varela, Aristides Sanchez Herdocia, and Indalecio Rodriguez Alaniz. 

Concluding that the Linders' action presented nonjusticiable 

political questions, the district court dismissed the complaint. 

Linder v. Calero Portocarrero, 747 F. Supp. 1452, 1457 (S.D. 

Fla. 1990). Although affirming the dismissal with respect to 

the three organizational defendants, the Eleventh Circuit 

directed the case to proceed against the four individuals as a 

tort action under Florida law. Linder v. Portocarrero, 963 

F.2d 332, 337 (11th Cir. 1992).

In their complaint, the Linders plead three alternative 

theories of liability. The first seeks to prove defendants' 

direct involvement in the torture and murder of Linder:

Defendant Bermudez, and upon information and belief, 

defendants Calero, Sanchez, and Rodriguez, as members 

of the civilian-military command, ordered, authorized, 

approved, directed and ratified the attack on the CuaBocay development project, and ordered, authorized, approved, directed, and ratified the murder of Benjamin 

Linder and two others, on April 28, 1987.

Third Am. Compl. ¶ 39(a). Alleging that defendants participated in a conspiracy to murder, the second and third theories rely, in contrast, on circumstantial evidence of the nature, 

policies, and practices of the contra organizations, as well as 

defendants' roles in them. Under the second theory, the 

Linders seek to prove that defendants were the leaders of the 

contra organizations; that in those hierarchical organizations, 

USCA Case #97-5035 Document #323905 Filed: 01/16/1998 Page 3 of 14
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

soldiers in the field obeyed orders from their leaders; that 

the organizations, as a matter of policy established or approved by their leaders, tortured and killed foreign development workers and prisoners of war; and that Linder's torture 

and killing resulted directly from those policies. Id. ¶ 39(b). 

The third theory alleges that defendants led the hierarchical 

organizations; that defendants knew that the FDN tortured 

and executed defenseless and wounded individuals; that defendants failed to stop such practices, thus placing their 

imprimatur on them; and that Linder's killing resulted from 

those practices. Id. ¶ 39(c). Of significance to one of the 

issues before usthe scope of the subpoenasthe district 

court and the Eleventh Circuit approved the inclusion in the 

complaint of all three theories. See Order Den. in Part and 

Granting in Part Defs.' Mot. to Strike Second Am. Compl. 

and Granting Pls.' Mot. for Att'y's Fees at 5; Linder, 963 

F.2d at 336-37.

Failing to obtain relevant documents from the two surviving defendants (Calero and Rodriguez), the Linders served 

third-party subpoenas duces tecum on the FBI, CIA, Defense 

and State Departments, and two other federal agencies, the 

National Security Agency and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Each subpoena requested an extensive list of 

documents relating to Benjamin Linder, the April 28 attack, 

other similar attacks in the area, defendants' role in orchestrating such attacks, and the structure, organization, finances, 

policies, and practices of the three contra organizations. 

When the agencies refused to comply, claiming both burden 

and privilege, the Linders filed separate motions to compel 

against each agency in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The district court quashed the NSA 

subpoena, agreeing with the agency that the Linders' 

request was unduly burdensome, Linder v. 

Calero-Portocarrero, Misc. No. 94-148 (D.D.C. June 28, 

1995), aff'd sub nom. Linder v. NSA, 94 F.3d 693 (D.C. Cir. 

1996), and denied the motion to compel against the INS 

because that agency had already complied, Linder v. CaleroPortocarrero, Misc. No. 94-151 (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 1994). In an 

August 2, 1994, memorandum order, the district court agreed 

with the other agencies that the subpoenas imposed substanUSCA Case #97-5035 Document #323905 Filed: 01/16/1998 Page 4 of 14
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

tial burdens, denied the motions to compel, and ordered the 

parties to meet and explore modifying the subpoenas.

Unable to reach agreement, the parties submitted separate 

proposals. Slightly narrowing the range of their request, the 

Linders demanded documents concerning the attack in which 

Linder was killed and defendants' role in it, as well as 

documents containing general information about the contra 

organizations' structures and human rights policies and practices. The agencies proposed limiting the search to information about Benjamin Linder, the April 28 attack, another 

attack on a nearby hydroelectric plant, the El Cua-San Jose 

de Bocay region generally, and the four individual defendants. 

In a December 12, 1994, order, the district court adopted the 

agencies' proposal, specifically excluding from the scope of 

the searches general information on the contra organizations' 

structures, policies, and practices.

During the next eight months, the agencies furnished the 

Linders with a number of documents responsive to the modified subpoenas. Claiming privilege, the agencies redacted 

some documents while completely withholding others.

Arguing that the agencies submitted insufficient information about the withheld documents and their claims of privilege, the Linders filed a "motion for further relief," asking 

the district court to order Vaughn indices and to review the 

documents in camera. Their motion for further relief also 

asked the court to expand the scope of the searches, claiming 

that the modified subpoenas failed to produce certain relevant 

information such as documents concerning contra policies 

towards civilians, foreigners, and other non-military targets. 

In opposition, the agencies filed declarations describing their 

compliance with the modified subpoenas, their reasons for 

withholding information, and their estimates of the time and 

effort the additional searches would require.

On December 6, 1996, the district court denied in full the 

Linders' motion for further relief against the FBI and the 

State and Defense Departments and granted in part and 

denied in part the motion with respect to the CIA. Rejecting 

USCA Case #97-5035 Document #323905 Filed: 01/16/1998 Page 5 of 14
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

the Linders' request for in camera review as both excessive 

and unnecessary and examining each invocation of privilege, 

the court found that, except for two claims by the CIA, the 

claims fell within legitimate exemption categories under the 

Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994 & Supp. 

1996). Finding that the CIA's Directorate of Operations 

failed to describe or define seven documents that it completely withheld, and that its Directorate of Science and Technology failed to describe the content, general nature, creators, or 

copyright owners of three videotapes it withheld as well as 

the applicable copyright laws, the district court ordered the 

agency to submit more detailed documentation. As to the 

Linders' request for an expanded search, the district court 

applied FOIA analysis, finding that the agencies had made 

"reasonable" searches for the documents specified under the 

modified subpoena and that "the agencies cannot be compelled to execute additional searches simply because plaintiffs 

are unsatisfied with the results." The court also pointed out 

that in connection with its earlier modification of the scope of 

the subpoenas, it had held that "any information relevant to 

plaintiffs' case could be found by the more limited search[ ]." 

Concluding that the Linders failed to demonstrate a compelling need or evidence of clear bad faith required to justify 

additional searches that would impose an "onerous burden" 

on the agencies, the district court denied their request for an 

expanded search.

Responding to the December 1996 order, the CIA filed a 

redacted, ex parte declaration by William H. McNair, the 

information review officer of the Directorate of Operations, 

which explained the general types of information protected by 

the appropriate statutory privileges, the potential harm of 

disclosing such information, and the particular documents 

withheld. The agency also advised the court that it had 

offered the Linders' counsel access to the videotapes. After 

the Linders moved for leave to file out of time and for 

expedited consideration of both their objections to the 

McNair declaration and their request for production of documents, the district court, in an order dated June 24, 1997, 

denied the motion and denied with prejudice any further 

USCA Case #97-5035 Document #323905 Filed: 01/16/1998 Page 6 of 14
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

relief with regard to the CIA. Having reviewed the withheld 

CIA documents in camera "out of an abundance of caution," 

the court concluded that "the CIA's assertions are both 

soundly based and sufficient."

David Linder, the father, now appeals from the district 

court's December 1996 and June 1997 decisions. Although he 

originally appealed from the district court's December 1996 

order in February 1997, we dismissed the appeal with respect 

to the CIA because the district court had not finished its 

consideration of that agency's privilege claims. When Linder 

appealed the district court's June 1997 order regarding the 

CIA, we consolidated that appeal with the earlier appeals 

involving the FBI and the State and Defense Departments.

II

The FBI and the State and Defense Departments argue 

that we lack jurisdiction to hear the appeals in their cases, 

claiming that the district court's December 1996 order denying the Linders' motion for further relief was not a final order 

for purposes of appellate jurisdiction. Because the motion for 

further relief neither asked the district court to resolve the 

merits of the privilege claims nor requested production of the 

withheld documents, the agencies contend that these issues 

remain open in the district court, i.e., that the Linders may 

still seek production of specific documents and resolution of 

the privilege claims. Reviewing this jurisdictional claim de 

novo, see Board of Trustees of Hotel and Rest. Employees 

Local 25 v. Madison Hotel, Inc., 97 F.3d 1479, 1483 (D.C. Cir. 

1996), we agree with the government with respect to the 

State and Defense Departments, but not the FBI.

We have held that "[a]n order denying discovery in one 

district court's jurisdiction arising from litigation pending in 

another jurisdiction may be appealed without awaiting final 

judgment on the underlying litigation." Northrop Corp. v. 

McDonnell Douglas Corp., 751 F.2d 395, 399 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 

1984). Even in such cases, however, our jurisdiction remains 

limited to "appeals from all final decisions of the district 

courts of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994). As 

USCA Case #97-5035 Document #323905 Filed: 01/16/1998 Page 7 of 14
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

the Supreme Court has held, a district court order is final if it 

"ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the 

court to do but execute the judgment. Hence, ordinarily ... 

appellate review may be had only upon an order or judgment 

disposing of the whole case, and adjudicating all rights." 

Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945) (citation 

omitted).

To determine whether the district court's December 1996 

order is a final, appealable judgment with respect to the FBI 

and the State and Defense Departments, we begin by examining the relief the Linders sought in their motion for further 

relief. In that motion, the Linders asked the agencies to do 

three things:

(1) to supply plaintiffs with a list and description of 

documents withheld pursuant to claims of privilege and a 

declaration detailing the grounds for invoking the various 

statutory or other privileges; (2) to furnish to the Court 

for in camera review those documents withheld pursuant 

to claims of privilege and/or lack of relevance; and (3) to 

conduct a further search for documents concerning the 

policy and practice of defendants' forces toward civilians, 

wounded, prisoners of war and foreigners working in 

Nicaragua.

Mot. Further Relief at 1. Although the Linders sought and 

received final resolution of their third request (additional 

searches), neither the motion itself nor the supporting memorandum of law requested the district court to resolve the 

ultimate issue underlying their first two requestswhether 

the claimed privileges in fact protected the withheld documents from disclosureor even to order the documents' 

production. Contending instead that "the agencies did not 

supply complete information about the documents reviewed 

... [or] submit sufficient information about their reasons for 

claiming privilege," the Linders only sought information that 

would enable them to assess and, if necessary, to challenge 

the privilege assertions through additional motions to compel. 

The district court, moreover, denied the Linders only the 

specific relief they soughtVaughn indices and in camera

USCA Case #97-5035 Document #323905 Filed: 01/16/1998 Page 8 of 14
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

review. The court's order for each agency neither resolved 

the privilege claims nor determined whether the withheld 

documents should be produced.

Asserting that the district court has for all practical purposes rejected their claims, David Linder argues that nothing 

more would be gained by further proceedings in the district 

court. Although we agree with Linder that the district 

court's opinion certainly suggests that the agencies properly 

asserted their claims of privilege, we think that is insufficient 

to transform the orders into final, appealable judgments. 

Efficient judicial administration requires that a final judgment clearly appear from the relief a party seeks in its 

motion and the district court's response to that request in its 

order. Appellate courts should not have to sort through 

district court opinions to determine if they resolve all pending 

claims, especially where, as here, such resolution was never 

requested. By requiring the district court to "fully disassociate[ ] itself from a case or claim" before permitting a party 

to appeal, Trout v. Garrett, 891 F.2d 332, 335 (D.C. Cir. 1989), 

the final judgment rule avoids the "mischief of economic 

waste and of delayed justice" that can accompany piecemeal 

litigation. Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 

120, 124 (1945); see also Colonial Times, Inc. v. Gasch, 509 

F.2d 517, 523 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (final judgment rule usually 

precludes review of discovery orders).

In this case, the district court's December 1996 order, 

though hinting at the court's ultimate conclusion, fails to 

satisfy this bright-line test with respect to the FBI and the 

State and Defense Departments. The court never formally 

ruled on the merits of the privilege claims, neither ordering 

nor denying production of the withheld documents. Indeed, 

had the Linders challenged the validity of the State and 

Defense Departments' invocation of the state secrets privilege, as David Linder attempts to do in this court, the parties 

and the district court would have had much "to do." Catlin,

324 U.S. at 233. As required by Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 

F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1983)not FOIA, as the district court 

seemed to thinkthe court would have had to examine 

whether each challenged document's disclosure would threatUSCA Case #97-5035 Document #323905 Filed: 01/16/1998 Page 9 of 14
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

en national security. Id. at 57-58. Because the privilege "is 

not to be lightly invoked," the court would have had to ensure 

that each agency made a "formal claim of privilege, lodged by 

the head of the department which has control over the 

matter, after actual personal consideration by that officer." 

United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1953) (footnotes 

omitted). If the agencies had formally invoked their privileges, the court would have had to make sure that they either 

provided some form of detailed public explanation of "the 

kinds of injury to national security [they] seek[ ] to avoid and 

the reason those harms would result from revelation of the 

requested information," or indicated "why such an explanation would itself endanger national security." Or, if necessary, the court would have had to examine the privileged 

materials in camera to satisfy itself that invocation of the 

privilege was proper. Ellsberg, 709 F.2d at 63-64. The 

district court then would have had to make serious and 

substantive judgments about the government's claims:

[T]he more compelling a litigant's showing of need for 

the information in question, the deeper "the court should 

probe in satisfying itself that the occasion for invoking 

the privilege is appropriate." ... [T]he more plausible 

and substantial the government's allegations of danger to 

national security, in the context of all the circumstances 

surrounding the case, the more deferential should be the 

judge's inquiry into the foundations and scope of the 

claim.

Id. at 58-59 (quoting Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11) (footnotes 

omitted). Under all of these circumstances, the cases against 

the State and Defense Departments are far from final.

The appeal from the FBI order presents a different situation. Linder appeals only the district court's refusal to 

expand the scope of the search, effectively waiving, as counsel 

confirmed at oral argument, his challenge to the FBI's assertion of privilege. Because the district court resolved the 

scope issuei.e., it "fully disassociate[d] itself" from the 

question, Trout, 891 F.2d at 335the FBI case is now 

appealable.

USCA Case #97-5035 Document #323905 Filed: 01/16/1998 Page 10 of 14
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

III

For his substantive claims against the FBI, as well as the 

CIA, David Linder challenges the district court's December 

1996 denial of his family's request to expand the scope of the 

subpoenas to include documents concerning the policies and 

practices of the contra organizations regarding civilians, the 

wounded, prisoners of war, and foreigners working in Nicaragua. In denying the Linders' request for additional searches, 

the district court referred back to its earlier determination 

that a limited search was appropriate and stated that the 

Linders had provided no reason why the court should alter 

that decision: "The Court cannot justify the enforcement of 

such extensive, time-consuming searches without a showing of 

compelling need and clear bad faith on the part of the 

agencies." Because the district court enjoys wide latitude in 

resolving discovery issues, we review its determination of the 

scope of the subpoenas for abuse of discretion. Northrop 

Corp., 751 F.2d at 399. An abuse of discretion occurs when 

the court applies the wrong legal standard or relies on clearly 

erroneous facts. See Genesee Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewing 

Co., 124 F.3d 137, 142 (2d Cir. 1997).

Under Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 

parties to litigation may discover all relevant, non-privileged 

information. A party:

may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in 

the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or 

defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or 

defense of any other party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any 

books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any 

discoverable matter. The information sought need not 

be admissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of 

admissible evidence.

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). If a subpoena for relevant information imposes an "undue burden," the court may modify the 

USCA Case #97-5035 Document #323905 Filed: 01/16/1998 Page 11 of 14
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

subpoena or quash it altogether. FED. R. CIV. P.

45(c)(3)(A)(iv). The "burden of proving that a subpoena is 

oppressive is on the party moving to quash." Northrop, 751 

F.2d at 403. Whether a burdensome subpoena is reasonable 

"must be determined according to the facts of the case," such 

as the party's need for the documents and the nature and 

importance of the litigation. Id. at 407.

Applying these standards, we find two problems with the 

district court's December 1996 order. First, although the 

FBI submitted an affidavit estimating that the additional 

search would require up to 2142 person-hours, the district 

court simply assumed that the CIA, which provided no estimate of its own, would face a similar burden. Without 

evidence from the CIA describing the precise nature of its 

burden, however, we see no way for the district court to 

exercise its admittedly broad discretion or for us to review it. 

Because the agency has the burden of proving oppressiveness, the district court cannot assume that the burden on one 

agency will be the same as the burden on another.

Second, nothing in the December 1996 order indicates that 

the court considered the relevance of the requested information to the second and third theories of the Linders' case, 

theories approved by both the Florida district court and the 

Eleventh Circuit. Although the district court acknowledged 

these theories when ordering compliance with the modified 

subpoenas in December 1994, it concluded that "to the extent 

that defendants, in their capacities as leaders of the contra 

organizations, approved or otherwise ratified the activities 

relating to the attack that caused Linder's death, or ratified 

directives issued to any persons concerning the attack, such 

documents will be identified in the searches proposed by the 

agencies." But the Linders seek to discover more than direct 

information about whether the individual defendants approved or ratified Benjamin Linder's killing. To prove their 

second and third theories, they seek general information 

about the organizations' policies and practices toward civilians, foreigners, prisoners of war, and the wounded, information they claim was not produced in the search for documents 

directly linking the defendants to the killing. According to 

USCA Case #97-5035 Document #323905 Filed: 01/16/1998 Page 12 of 14
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

David Linder, such information may very well provide the 

"building blocks" his family needs to prove its case.

We thus reverse the district court's decision to limit the 

scope of the FBI and CIA subpoenas. On remand, the 

district court should assess the relevance of the requested 

information to all three of the Linders' theories. To the 

extent such information satisfies Rule 26's broad definition of 

relevance, the district court may decline to order the agencies 

to search for that information only if the agencies satisfy their 

heavy burden of proving oppressiveness or establish some 

other recognized ground for modifying or quashing subpoenas 

for relevant information.

IV

This brings us finally to David Linder's challenge to the 

district court's acceptance of the CIA's claims of privilege 

with respect to seven documents originating from the agency's Directorate of Operations. The CIA withheld the documents based on statutory protections for information that 

would reveal intelligence sources and methods, 50 U.S.C. 

§ 403-3(c)(5) (1994) (now codified at 50 U.S.C.A. § 403-3(c)(6) 

(1991 & Supp. 1997) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 104-293, 110 

Stat. 3461 (1996)), as well as information concerning the 

agency's personnel, including their functions, names, and 

official titles, id. § 403g. Because judges "have little or no 

background in the delicate business of intelligence gathering," 

courts must give "great deference" to the Director of Central 

Intelligence's determination that a classified document could 

reveal intelligence sources and methods and endanger national security. CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 176, 179 (1985).

In upholding the CIA's claims of privilege, the district 

court relied on very detailed information contained in the ex 

parte declaration of William McNair. Paragraphs 10-31 of 

the declaration explain the potential harms to national security from the disclosure of intelligence sources, intelligence 

methods, location of covert CIA field installations, CIA employee names and organizational data, and cryptonyms and 

pseudonyms. Paragraph 35, redacted from the public version 

USCA Case #97-5035 Document #323905 Filed: 01/16/1998 Page 13 of 14
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

of the declaration, specifically discusses six of the withheld 

documents, and paragraph 36 explains that their release 

would reveal the names of CIA employees and employee 

numbers, internal organizational data, locations of CIA installations, and cryptonyms. Describing the seventh document 

as a "source-identifying cable that accompanied an intelligence report that is a part of the releasable group of documents," paragraph 37 states that the "document does not 

contain any substantive information on the Linder incident" 

and that its disclosure would reveal an intelligence source, 

internal organizational data, location of CIA foreign installations, and cryptonyms.

In addition to reviewing the McNair declaration in camera,

the district court examined the withheld documents. Given 

the detailed information contained in the McNair declaration 

and the district court's own review of the documents, we find 

no abuse of discretion in the court's determination that the 

CIA properly justified its statutory claims of privilege over 

the seven withheld documents. See Linder, 94 F.3d at 695-

98 (accepting a similar declaration as justifying the NSA's 

invocation of privilege under section 6 of the National Security Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-36, 73 Stat. 63, 64, quoted in 50 

U.S.C. § 402 note (1994)); United States v. Koreh, 144 F.R.D. 

218, 222 (D.N.J. 1992) (upholding a CIA claim of statutory 

privilege after reviewing a similar declaration from a CIA 

information review officer as well as the withheld documents 

themselves).

V

We dismiss the appeals with respect to the State and 

Defense Departments and affirm the district court's approval 

of the CIA's privilege claims. We reverse the denial of the 

Linders' request to expand the scope of the CIA and FBI 

subpoenas and remand for further proceedings consistent 

with this opinion.

So ordered.

USCA Case #97-5035 Document #323905 Filed: 01/16/1998 Page 14 of 14