Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-03033/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-03033-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MERCEDES M. HARRISON,

Plaintiff,

 v.

JO ANNE B. BARNHART,

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

 /

No. C 04-3033 CRB

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Plaintiff appeals the denial of her application for social security disability benefits.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural history

Plaintiff Mercedes Harrison filed an application for Social Security disability benefits

on July 6, 2001 alleging that she became disabled on June 6, 2000 due to left-sided pain,

weakness and numbness in her left fingers and arm, neck, shoulder, and leg. Following

denial of her application, plaintiff had an administrative hearing before an administrative law

judge (“the ALJ”). The ALJ found that plaintiff is not disabled because she can perform her

past relevant work. The Appeals Council affirmed the ALJ and this lawsuit followed.

B. The administrative record

1. Plaintiff’s education and work experience

Plaintiff is a high school graduate with two years of college, but no college degree. 
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She has approximately 19 years experience as a computer systems engineer, systems

administrator, computer support technician, systems analyst, and database administrator. 

2. Plaintiff’s medical history

Plaintiff awoke on the morning of June 6, 2000 with swelling in her left hand and

numbness in her left arm. She also had a black eye and a cut under her eye, but she does not

know what happened. (TR 159, 161, 188) Shortly thereafter she was seen by physicians at

Kaiser Permanente where she presented with marked pain and weakness in her left arm and

hand. (TR 158-161) A June 16, 2000, CT scan of her head was normal. (TR 166) During

that month she was seen several times in urgent care complaining of left hand and arm pain

and swelling. (TR 154) One physician noted that plaintiff was unable to bend her finger. 

(TR 156) Her physicians believed she may have a cervical radiculopathy (pinched nerve).

(TR 155, 156) A neurology consult did not reveal any neurological problems. (TR 160)

Plaintiff was seen at Alta Bates -Summit Medical Center on August 2, 2000 by Dr. C.

Whitmore. (TR 191) Plaintiff told Dr. Whitmore that she was not sleeping well and felt

imbalanced. She again reported cramping and stabbing pain in her left hand, especially her

fourth and fifth digits. (Id.) In October she saw a neurologist who did not have any

explanation for plaintiff’s symptoms and stated that she did not have anything to offer

plaintiff as far as neurological assessment or treatment. (TR 172, 189) A cervical, spine and

brain MRI were all negative. (TR 145, 189) An EMG study found that there “is no

evidence for nerve injury from entrapment neuropathy, brachial plexopathy or cervical

radiculopathy affecting the left arm.” (TR 174) She was referred for occupational and

physical therapy. (TR 189) 

Plaintiff saw Dr. Whitmore again in April 2001. Dr. Whitmore diagnosed plaintiff

with tendonitis/bursitis and prescribed motrin and physical therapy. She also recommended

that plaintiff work another month until she is released by orthopedics. (TR 187) X-rays of

plaintiff’s left shoulder, humerus and hand taken that same month were all normal. (TR 176-

77) Plaintiff followed up with Dr. Whitmore in June 2001. She again complained of leftside weakness and pain, but was having some success with physical therapy. Dr. Whitmore’s
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notes state that plaintiff is now diagnosed with neurovascular entrapment syndrome and that

the physical therapist believes that plaintiff could be back to work in three months. (TR 187) 

Dr. Oscar Espinas completed a Functional Capacity Evaluation for plaintiff on August

17, 2001. Dr. Espinas recommended that plaintiff return to work in a sedentary work

capacity-part time, light duty, lifting no more than 20 pounds. In November 2001, Dr.

Whitmore agreed with the evaluation, and stated that the light duty should extend for 2-3

months as a form of vocational rehabilitation. (TR 179) She concluded her letter by stating

that she hoped plaintiff’s reintroduction to the workforce will aid in her “recovery from her

illusive syndrome.” (Id.)

In January 2003, plaintiff saw nurse practitioner Ronces Reyes-Pugay complaining of

left arm pain. Reyes-Pugay found 5/5 left and right arm motor strength, 5/5 grip strength, 5/5

shoulder strength, normal reflexes, steady gait, and instact sensation. (TR 215) Later that

year plaintiff began being seen at the Alameda County Medical Center where she was

diagnosed with fibrolmyalgia. (TR 216-226). A September 2003 spinal cervical MRI found

“[q]uestionable central 1-2 mm herniation, but no cord impingement. (TR 233).

3. Hearing testimony

Plaintiff testified that she can keyboard at a computer for only 15 to 20 minutes before

she starts experiencing pain in her shoulders, neck and hands, so she generally avoids

keyboarding. She further stated that she can sit and concentrate on a screen, such as a

computer screen, for about 30 to 45 minutes before she has to change positions. Plaintiff

explained that she might be able to work a day or two a week, but that she could not work

full time because it takes her a day or two to recover when she does too much.

A vocational expert also gave testimony. Based on a hypothetical posed by the ALJ,

the expert opined that the individual could not perform plaintiff’s past relevant work.

II. THE ALJ’S DECISION

In considering whether a claimant is entitled to benefits, an ALJ conducts a five-step

sequential inquiry. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. At the first step, the ALJ considers if the claimant

is engaged in substantial gainful activity; if the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful
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activity, the second step asks if the claimant has a severe impairment (i.e. an impairment that

has a significant effect on the claimant’s ability to function); if the claimant has a severe

impairment, the third step asks if the claimant has a condition which meets or equals the

conditions outlined in the Listings of Impairments in Appendix 1 of the Regulations (the

“Listings”); if the claimant does not have such a condition, the fourth step asks if the

claimant is capable of performing his past relevant work; if the claimant is not capable of

performing his past relevant work, the fifth step asks if the claimant is capable of performing

other work which exists in substantial numbers in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1520(b)-404.1520(f)(1).

Here, the ALJ found that plaintiff had not been engaged in substantial gainful activity. 

He next determined that plaintiff suffers from a medically determinable disorder of the

muscles, ligament as fascia, and that the impairment is severe. He also found that her alleged

depression is not a severe impairment. At step 3, he found plaintiff does not suffer from an

impairment which meets or equals the conditions outlined in the Listing of Impairments. 

Finally, the ALJ found plaintiff could perform her past relevant work and therefore was not

entitled to benefits.

The ALJ based his finding on the lack of any objective evidence of a medical

condition as all of plaintiff’s tests and scans were negative. He also found that plaintiff’s

physical examinations showed only inconsistent or intermittent findings of left extremity

weakness, and that her complaints simply do not make sense. The ALJ rejected the opinions

of Dr. Whitmore, plaintiff’s treating physician and Dr. Espinas, both on the ground that their

opinions were not supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory techniques and

are at variance with the record as a whole. The ALJ also found plaintiff’s statements not

credible. 

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court’s jurisdiction is limited to determining whether the Social Security

Administration’s denial of benefits is supported by substantial evidence in the administrative

record. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A district court may overturn a decision to deny benefits only if
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it is not supported by substantial evidence or if the decision is based on legal error. See

Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995); Magallenes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d

747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989). The Ninth Circuit defines substantial evidence as “more than a

mere scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1039. 

Determinations of credibility, resolution of conflicts in medical testimony and all other

ambiguities are to be resolved by the ALJ. Id; Magallenes, 881 F.2d at 750. The decision of

the ALJ will be upheld if the evidence is “susceptible to more than one rational

interpretation.” Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1040.

Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the ALJ’s decision was not based on substantial

evidence or that the ALJ’s decision was based on legal error. See generally Andrews, 53

F.3d at 1039; Magallenes, 881 F.2d at 750.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Residual Functional Capacity

The ALJ found that plaintiff could perform “light” work and therefore could perform

her sedentary past relevant work. Plaintiff challenges this finding, and, in particular, the

ALJ’s rejection of the limitations set forth by her treating physician and his refusal to

consider the opinions of two of plaintiff’s physical therapists. She also complains about his

rejection of her own testimony as to her pain and abilities.

1. Rejection of physicians’ opinions

In November 2001, Dr. Whitmore wrote plaintiff’s disability insurer carrier: “I agree

with the Functional Capacity Evaluation performed on August 17, 2001 and the

recommendation that Mrs. Harrison return to work in a sedentary work capacity-part time,

light duty, lifting no more than 20 pounds.” (TR 179) Attached to the letter was the

Functional Capacity Evaluation which had been completed by Dr. Espinas. (TR 180-81) The

ALJ rejected both physicians’ opinions.

Ninth Circuit social security caselaw distinguishes among three types of physicians:

“(1) those who treat the claimant (treating physicians); (2) those who examine but do not
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treat the claimant (examining physicians); and (3) those who neither examine nor treat the

claimant (nonexamining physicians).” Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995).

More weight is given to a treating physician’s opinion than to the opinion of a nontreating

physician because a treating physician “is employed to cure and has a greater opportunity to

know and observe the patient as an individual.” See Magallenes, 881 F.2d at 751 (quoting 

Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1230 (9th Cir.1987)). “[W]here the treating doctor’s

opinion is not contradicted by another doctor, it may be rejected only for ‘clear and

convincing’ reasons.” Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. “Even if the treating doctor’s opinion is

contradicted by another doctor, the Commissioner may not reject this opinion without

providing ‘specific and legitimate reasons’ supported by substantial evidence in the record.” 

Id.

When the opinion of a plaintiff’s treating physician is contradicted, and the opinion of

a nontreating source is based on independent clinical findings that differ from those of the

treating physician, the opinion of the nontreating source may itself be substantial evidence; it

is then solely the province of the ALJ to resolve the conflict. See Magallenes, 881 F.2d at

751; see also Batson v. Commissioner of Social Security, 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004

(holding that “[w]hen the evidence before the ALJ is subject to more than one rational

interpretation,” the court must defer to the ALJ). The Ninth Circuit has consistently held that

“[t]he ALJ is responsible for determining credibility and resolving conflicts in medical

testimony.” Magallenes, 881 F.2d at 750; see also Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 580 n.1

(9th Cir. 1985) (“questions of credibility and resolutions of conflicts in the testimony are

functions solely for the Secretary”). The ALJ’s credibility assessment of a plaintiff’s

testimony also impacts upon the weight given to a treating physician’s opinion: when an ALJ

properly discounts the plaintiff’s subjective complaints, the ALJ may properly disregard the

opinion of a treating physician which is premised upon those complaints. See Fair v. Bowen,

885 F.2d 597, 605 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Here, the ALJ’s rejection of Dr. Whitmore’s opinion was not erroneous. The ALJ

properly determined that Dr. Whitmore’s November 2001 opinion was contradicted by her
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other findings; namely, her October 2000 finding of 4/5 left upper extremity strength with

questionable effort, (TR 190), and her September 2002 statement that plaintiff “is convinced

there is medical problem despite intensive negative work-up,” and that the onset of her

condition is not consistent with “a physical etiology and that she [Dr. Whitmore] has tried to

convince [plaintiff] to see a psychiatrist to get at the cause.” (TR 124) In other words, Dr.

Whitmore offered no explanation for her November 2001 opinion in light of her finding that

there is no objective medical evidence to support plaintiff’s complaints. See Saelee v.

Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 522 (9th Cir. 1996) (concluding that substantial evidence supported the

ALJ’s determination that the claimant was not disabled where “numerous medical

examinations failed to disclose any underlying medical cause of the ailments of which [the

claimant] complained”). Indeed, in the same letter in which Dr. Whitmore adopted the

Functional Capacity Evaluation performed by Dr. Espinas, Dr. Whitmore repeated that

plaintiff’s syndrome is “illusive.” (TR 179)

Dr. Whitmore’s November 2001 opinion was also inconsistent with other medical

evidence in the record. In January 2003, nurse practitioner Reyes-Pugay examined plaintiff

and found 5/5 left and right arm motor strength, 5/5 grip strength, 5/5 shoulder strength,

normal reflexes, steady gait, and intact sensation. (TR 215) And, as Dr. Whitmore herself

noted, all of plaintiff’s laboratory tests, x-rays and scans have been negative. Dr.

Whitmore’s opinion was also contradicted by Camille Williams, M.D., a non-examining

State agency physician. Dr. Williams reviewed the medical records and concluded in

October 2001 that plaintiff could perform light work. See Saelee, 94 F.3d at 522 (holding

that the findings of a non-examining physician can amount to substantial evidence as long as

other evidence in the record supports those findings).

Finally, the ALJ properly determined plaintiff was not credible (see section A(2)

below). Therefore, to the extent that Dr. Whitmore’s November 2001 opinion was premised

on plaintiff’s self-reported symptoms, the ALJ could properly discount the opinion of Dr.

Whitmore.
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Plaintiff also challenges the ALJ’s rejection of Dr. Espinas’s Functional Capacity

Evaluation. This, too, was not error. Dr. Espinas did not examine plaintiff. See TR 181

(“This evaluation is based solely upon the clinical evaluations, objective medical evidence

and diagnostic test results in the medical records at the time this form was completed. The

reviewer did not examine the patient”). He offers no explanation for how he developed his

opinion despite plaintiff’s “intensive negative work up.” (TR 124)

Given the apparent inconsistencies between Dr. Whitmore’s various opinions, as well

as the inconsistency of her November 2001 opinion and Dr. Espinas’s opinion with the

medical record as a whole, it was solely within the province of the ALJ to make credibility

determinations and resolve the conflicts. In his decision, the ALJ provided specific and

legitimate reasons for rejecting Dr. Whitmore’s and Dr. Espinas’s opinions and those reasons

were supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Finally, the ALJ’s decision not to give any weight to the physical therapists’ opinions

was legally permissible. Such opinions are not considered medical sources and are not given

controlling weight. See 20 C.F.R. § 1527(d)(2); Barret v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1065, 1067 (7th

Cir. 2004). The ALJ sufficiently explained why he found their opinions unpersuasive.

2. Plaintiff’s testimony

The ALJ also properly determined that plaintiff’s statements regarding her pain and

other symptoms were not “particularly convincing or credible.” Ordinary techniques of

credibility evaluation apply to disability hearings. See Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 604 (9th

Cir.1989). The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1039,

and the ALJ may disregard self-serving statements made by claimants if he or she finds them

to be incredible on other grounds. See Rashad v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1229, 1231 (9th

Cir.1990); Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989) (“An ALJ is not required to

believe every allegation of disabling pain or else disability benefits would be available for the

asking”). Relevant factors can include the plaintiff’s engagement in activities inconsistent

with a claim of disability, an unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment,

or other ordinary methods of credibility determination. See Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d
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341, 346 (9th Cir.1991). When the decision of an ALJ rests on a negative credibility

evaluation, the ALJ must make findings on the record and must support those findings by

pointing to substantial evidence in the record. See Ceguerra v. Secretary of Health and

Human Services, 933 F.2d 735, 738 (9th Cir. 1991). 

“In deciding whether to accept a claimant’s subjective symptom testimony, an ALJ

must perform two stages of analysis: the Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403 (9th Cir. 1991)

analysis and an analysis of the credibility of the claimant’s testimony regarding the severity

of her symptoms.” Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 1996). The Cotton

standard requires the claimant to produce medical evidence of an underlying impairment

which is reasonably likely to be the cause of the alleged symptoms. Id. “Once a claimant

meets the Cotton test and there is no affirmative evidence of malingering, the ALJ may reject

the claimant’s testimony regarding the severity of her symptoms only if he makes specific

findings stating clear and convincing reasons for doing so.” Id. at 1284. 

The ALJ gave clear and convincing reasons for his rejection of plaintiff’s testimony. 

He first noted the limited medical findings, that is, the fact that no physician or test had been

able to identify a cause for plaintiff’s complaints. See Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d at 601. He

next identified her failure to receive any medical treatment from late 2001 through 2002 even

though she contends her condition did not improve during this period. Finally, he observed

that while she reported that her pain medication causes drowsiness and mental confusion, her

medical records do not demonstrate that she ever reported such symptoms to her health care

providers. These findings are sufficiently specific to counter plaintiff’s contention that the

ALJ committed legal error by finding plaintiff not credible.

B. Plaintiff’s Depression

The ALJ’s finding that plaintiff suffered from, at most, mild depression, but that such

depression was not “severe” was supported by substantial evidence. As the ALJ noted,

plaintiff never sought any treatment for depression and the evidence did not support a finding

that her depression impaired her ability to work. See Saelee, 94 F.3d at 522.

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G:\CRBALL\2004\3033\order.wpd 10

C. Demands of Plaintiff’s Past Relevant Work

Finally, plaintiff complains that the ALJ did not consider all the requirements of her

past relevant work when he determined that she could perform such work; specifically, she

argues that he ignored the state consulting physician’s opinion that she is limited to only

“occasional” fingering. (TR 208) As the Secretary points out, however, plaintiff’s past

relevant work, namely, as a systems administrator/technician, computer systems analyst, and

data base administrator, requires only occasional reaching, handling, and fingering. See

Dictionary of Occupational Titles, #169.167-030, 161.167-010. And, as previously

explained, the ALJ’s rejection of Dr. Whitmore’s and Dr. Espinas’s more severe fingering

limitations was not in error.

The vocational expert’s testimony does not contradict the ALJ’s finding that plaintiff

could perform her past relevant work. The expert did not testify that if plaintiff were limited

to “occasional” fingering she could not perform her past relevant work. Both of the ALJ’s

hypotheticals assumed that the claimant was limited to no more than minimal fine finger

manipulation with the left upper extremity. (TR 264, 267) 

IV. CONCLUSION

The ALJ did not commit legal error in reaching his decision. Rather, the ALJ made

legitimate credibility determinations based on substantial evidence in the record and properly

concluded that plaintiff is not disabled under the Act.

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED and

the defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 30, 2005 

CHARLES R. BREYER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE