Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-02781/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-02781-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 8:1446 Petition for Naturalization Hearing

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAM CLAYTON,

Plaintiff,

v.

MICHAEL CHERTOFF, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

No. C-07-2781 CW

ORDER DENYING

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND

GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

CROSS-MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Pro se Plaintiff Sam Clayton moves for [summary judgment on

his claim for] an order compelling Defendants to adjudicate his

application for adjustment of immigration status. Defendants

oppose Plaintiff’s motion and cross-move for summary judgment. The

matter was heard on September 27, 2007. Having considered the oral

argument and all of the papers filed by the parties, the Court

denies Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and grants

Defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment.

BACKGROUND

On August 14, 2006, Plaintiff submitted an I-485 application

with the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) seeking

Case 4:07-cv-02781-CW Document 29 Filed 10/01/07 Page 1 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 2

adjustment of his immigration status to lawful permanent resident. 

As part of its review of Plaintiff’s application, on August 22,

2006, the USCIS submitted Plaintiff’s name to the Federal Bureau of

Investigation (FBI) for a background security check. The FBI has

not yet completed this background check, and the USCIS has not

provided an estimate of when it expects the check will be

completed. Plaintiff’s application is currently pending, and will

be adjudicated once the USCIS receives the results of the FBI’s

background check.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is properly granted when no genuine and

disputed issues of material fact remain, and when, viewing the

evidence most favorably to the non-moving party, the movant is

clearly entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);

Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (9th Cir.

1987).

The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no

material factual dispute. Therefore, the court must regard as true

the opposing party’s evidence, if supported by affidavits or other

evidentiary material. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Eisenberg, 815

F.2d at 1289. The court must draw all reasonable inferences in

favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

587 (1986); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d

1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Where the moving party does not bear the burden of proof on an

Case 4:07-cv-02781-CW Document 29 Filed 10/01/07 Page 2 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 3

issue at trial, the moving party may discharge its burden of

production by either of two methods. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins.

Co., Ltd., v. Fritz Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1106 (9th Cir.

2000). 

The moving party may produce evidence negating an

essential element of the nonmoving party’s case, or,

after suitable discovery, the moving party may show that

the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an

essential element of its claim or defense to carry its

ultimate burden of persuasion at trial. 

Id. 

If the moving party discharges its burden by showing an

absence of evidence to support an essential element of a claim or

defense, it is not required to produce evidence showing the absence

of a material fact on such issues, or to support its motion with

evidence negating the non-moving party’s claim. Id.; see also

Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 885 (1990); Bhan v.

NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1991). If the

moving party shows an absence of evidence to support the non-moving

party’s case, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to

produce “specific evidence, through affidavits or admissible

discovery material, to show that the dispute exists.” Bhan, 929

F.2d at 1409. 

If the moving party discharges its burden by negating an

essential element of the non-moving party’s claim or defense, it

must produce affirmative evidence of such negation. Nissan, 210

F.3d at 1105. If the moving party produces such evidence, the

burden then shifts to the non-moving party to produce specific

evidence to show that a dispute of material fact exists. Id.

Case 4:07-cv-02781-CW Document 29 Filed 10/01/07 Page 3 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

The “Parties” section of the complaint refers only to

Defendants Chertoff, Aquire, Still, and Muller.

4

Where the moving party bears the burden of proof on an issue

at trial, it must, in order to discharge its burden of showing that

no genuine issue of material fact remains, make a prima facie

showing in support of its position on that issue. UA Local 343 v.

Nor-Cal Plumbing, Inc., 48 F.3d 1465, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994). That

is, the moving party must present evidence that, if uncontroverted

at trial, would entitle it to prevail on that issue. Id.; see also

Int’l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1264-65 (5th

Cir. 1991). Once it has done so, the non-moving party must set

forth specific facts controverting the moving party’s prima facie

case. UA Local 343, 48 F.3d at 1471. The non-moving party’s

“burden of contradicting [the moving party’s] evidence is not

negligible.” Id. This standard does not change merely because

resolution of the relevant issue is “highly fact specific.” Id.

DISCUSSION

I. Proper Parties to This Action

In addition to the United States, the caption of Plaintiff’s

complaint names five individuals and three federal agencies as

Defendants in this action: Michael Chertoff, Secretary of the U.S.

Department of Homeland Security (DHS); Eduardo Aquire, Director of

the USCIS; David Still, Deputy District Director of the USCIS’s San

Francisco Office; Robert Mueller, Director of the FBI; the Attorney

General of the United States; and the DHS, USCIS and FBI

themselves.1 Defendants argue that as the head of the DHS, the

agency within which the USCIS is located, Secretary Chertoff is the

Case 4:07-cv-02781-CW Document 29 Filed 10/01/07 Page 4 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 5

only appropriate defendant in this case. 

In support of their argument, Defendants cite only two cases,

Konchitsky v. Chertoff, 2007 WL 2070325 (N.D. Cal.), and Dmitriev

v. Chertoff, 2007 WL 1319533 (N.D. Cal.). As here, both cases

involve challenges to lengthy delays in the USCIS’s processing of

I-485 applications. Contrary to Defendants’ assertions, Kochitsky

actually works against their argument that Secretary Chertoff is

the only proper defendant. In that case, the court allowed the

plaintiff to maintain his claims not only against Secretary

Chertoff, but also against the director of the USCIS and the acting

director of the USCIS’s California Service Center. 2007 WL 2070325

at *7. Equivalent USCIS officers are named as Defendants here.

While Dmitriev did dismiss the director of the USCIS,

retaining only Secretary Chertoff as a defendant, it did so with

little discussion and without citing any legal authority. 2007 WL

1319533 at *4. The case is also at odds with the Administrative

Procedure Act (APA), which provides that an action for judicial

review of an agency’s action “may be brought against the United

States, the agency by its official title, or the appropriate

officer.” 5 U.S.C. § 703. Kochitsky and other cases have

permitted actions to go forward against more than one of these

defendants at a time. See, e.g., Dong v. Chertoff, 2007 WL 2601107

(N.D. Cal.); Fu v. Gonzales, 2007 WL 1742376 (N.D. Cal.); see also

Computerware, Inc. v. Knotts, 626 F. Supp. 956, 960 (E.D.N.C. 1986)

(“When an instrumentality of the United States is the real

defendant, the plaintiff should have the option of naming as

defendant the United States, the agency by its official title,

Case 4:07-cv-02781-CW Document 29 Filed 10/01/07 Page 5 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 6

appropriate officers, or any combination of them.”) (quoting the

House Report on the 1976 amendment of 5 U.S.C. § 703).

Here, Plaintiff names as Defendants the United States and two

of its agencies with responsibility for acting on his I-485

application: the USCIS and its parent agency, the DHS. He also

names three officers within these agencies: Michael Chertoff,

Eduardo Aquire, and David Still. While the APA does not specify in

detail who the “appropriate officer” is in a challenge to an agency

action, the Court finds that these officers, as higher-level

administrators, fall within the statute’s ambit.

All of the DHS/USCIS Defendants are therefore proper parties

under the APA. While suing more than one of them may serve no

practical purpose in this case, allowing the action to go forward

against multiple instrumentalities of the United States will not

prejudice the government, either. The Court is not persuaded by

the arguments in favor of dismissing any of these parties, and

Defendants’ motion is denied with respect to them.

The analysis is different when it comes to the FBI and its

director, Robert Mueller. Although the FBI is responsible for

conducting Plaintiff’s background check, it is not housed within

the DHS or the USCIS, which are charged with acting on Plaintiff’s

I-485 application. Konchitsky noted that courts squarely

addressing the issue have “overwhelmingly concluded” that the APA

does not confer jurisdiction over the FBI in connection with an

action for judicial review of the USCIS’s failure to act on an

adjustment of status application. 2007 WL 2070325 at *6. Thus,

the court dismissed Director Mueller as a defendant while

Case 4:07-cv-02781-CW Document 29 Filed 10/01/07 Page 6 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 7

permitting the action to continue against the DHS and USCIS

defendants. The Court finds the reasoning in Konchitksy

persuasive, and dismisses the claims against Defendant Mueller and

the FBI.

Similarly, although the U.S. Attorney General formerly bore

responsibility for implementing the Immigration and Nationality

Act, this responsibility has resided in the Secretary of the

Department of Homeland Security since March 1, 2003. See 6 U.S.C.

§§ 271(b)(5), 557. As with Director Mueller, the Attorney General

has no statutory obligation or authority to adjudicate Plaintiff’s

I-485 petition. Therefore, the claims against the Attorney General

are dismissed as well.

II. The Court’s Power to Compel Defendants to Act

Defendants argue that the Court may not force them to act on

Plaintiff’s I-485 application because adjustment of status is a

discretionary, non-discrete action that cannot be compelled under

either the federal mandamus statute or the APA.

The standard for relief under the Mandamus Act and § 706 of

the APA is for all practical purposes the same. R.T. Vanderbilt

Co. v. Babbitt, 113 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 1997). Mandamus is

an extraordinary remedy pursuant to which a court may compel an

officer of the government “to perform a duty owed to the

plaintiff.” 28 U.S.C. § 1361. The Ninth Circuit has held that

mandamus is available when: “(1) the plaintiff’s claim is clear and

certain; (2) the defendant official’s duty is ministerial and so

plainly prescribed as to be free from doubt; and (3) no other

adequate remedy is available.” Idaho Watersheds Project v. Hahn,

Case 4:07-cv-02781-CW Document 29 Filed 10/01/07 Page 7 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 8

307 F.3d 815, 832 (9th Cir. 2002).

Under § 706(1) of the APA, a court may “compel agency action

unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). 

The APA further provides that agencies must conclude matters before

them “within a reasonable time.” 5 U.S.C. § 555(b). In Norton v.

South Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004), the Supreme

Court held that a plaintiff states a claim for relief under

§ 706(1) when he “asserts that an agency failed to take a discrete

agency action that it is required to take.”

Defendants correctly note that the Immigration and

Naturalization Act (INA) gives the Secretary of the DHS the

discretion to adjust an applicant’s status, and that neither the

Act nor applicable regulations impose a particular time-frame on

his decision. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a); 8 C.F.R. § 245 et seq.

However, even though the outcome and procedural underpinnings of an

I-485 adjudication are left to the discretion of the Secretary, a

number of courts in this District have held, and Defendants

apparently acknowledge, that the Secretary does not have the

discretion to refuse to adjudicate the application altogether. See

Toor v. Still, 2007 WL 2028407 at *1 (N.D. Cal.) (collecting

cases). Put simply, “there is a difference between the [USCIS’s]

discretion over how to resolve an application and the [USCIS’s]

discretion over whether it resolves an application.” Singh v.

Still, 470 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1068 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (emphasis in

original). Plaintiff does not seek an order mandating that his

status be adjusted; he requests only that the Court compel the

Secretary to discharge his duty to adjudicate Plaintiff’s

Case 4:07-cv-02781-CW Document 29 Filed 10/01/07 Page 8 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 9

application without unreasonable delay.

Similarly, while Defendants argue that the FBI must be allowed

to exercise discretion in determining the way in which it conducts

background checks, granting summary judgment in Plaintiff’s favor

would not amount to dictating to the FBI how to conduct those

checks. Indeed, the Court has already concluded that the FBI

Defendants are not proper parties to this action, and any potential

order would bind only the DHS/USCIS Defendants. It would be up to

these Defendants to determine how best to comply with an order

compelling them to fulfill their obligations under the INA.

In a similar action in which the plaintiffs requested an order

compelling the USCIS to process their I-485 applications promptly,

this Court recently concluded that issuing such an order would not

impermissibly interfere with the agency’s discretion. Yu v.

Chertoff, 2007 WL 1742850 (N.D. Cal.). In that decision, the Court

rejected arguments similar to the ones Defendants now make,

including that the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over

the petition because adjustment of status is committed to the DHS

Secretary’s discretion as a matter of law. The Court acknowledged

that some courts outside this District have found that the speed

with which the USCIS adjudicates I-485 applications is

discretionary and not subject to judicial review. Id. at *2. But

the Court aligned itself with other courts within the District that

have concluded that they could compel the government to process an

unreasonably delayed immigration petition. Id.; see also, e.g.,

Quan v. Chertoff, 2007 WL 1655601 (N.D. Cal.); Baker v. Still, 2007

WL 1393750 (N.D. Cal.). Defendants cite no precedent sufficient to

Case 4:07-cv-02781-CW Document 29 Filed 10/01/07 Page 9 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 10

persuade the Court to take a different position here than it did in

Yu.

Defendants’ point that they are not statutorily obligated to

adhere to any particular time-frame in adjudicating I-485

applications is well-taken. It is true that the USCIS’s discretion

to set the procedures by which it adjudicates these applications

gives it some flexibility in determining the timing of a decision. 

Nonetheless, each adjudication must ultimately be completed within

a reasonable amount of time. To accept Defendants’ argument that

timing is always a matter of discretion beyond the Court’s power to

intervene would enable them to avoid judicial review even of

adjudications that were postponed indefinitely. This would

eviscerate § 706(1) of the APA, which clearly gives the Court the

power to “compel agency action . . . unreasonably delayed.”

As explained in Yu v. Brown, 36 F. Supp. 2d 922, 932 (D.N.M.

1999), “although neither [governing] statute specifies a time by

which an adjudication should be made, we believe that by necessary

implication the adjudication must occur within a reasonable time. 

A contrary position would permit the INS to delay indefinitely. 

Congress could not have intended to authorize potentially

interminable delays.” Accordingly, the Court finds that it has the

authority under the Mandamus Act and the APA to compel Defendants

to adjudicate promptly Plaintiff’s petition for adjustment of

status.

Defendants also argue that the Court may not grant Plaintiff’s

requested relief because the action he seeks to compel is not

“discrete.” They assert that he asks the Court to compel “multiple

Case 4:07-cv-02781-CW Document 29 Filed 10/01/07 Page 10 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 11

actions, including completion of his name check by the FBI and the

pace at which USCIS issues a decision once his name check is

complete.” This argument is not persuasive. It is true that

multiple steps are involved in the course of adjudicating an

application for adjustment of status. Yet just as matter can be

split down to the atom, any agency action can be cast as the sum of

smaller parts.

Norton, upon which Defendants exclusively rely in support of

their argument, merely precludes a plaintiff from bringing a “broad

programmatic attack” on an agency under § 706(1) of the APA. 542

U.S. at 64. Plaintiff does not seek wholesale reform of the

process by which USCIS adjudicates I-485 petitions; he merely seeks

an adjudication of his individual application. His claim meets

Norton’s requirement that it be directed “against some particular

‘agency action’ that causes [him] harm.” Accordingly, the Court

finds that the action Plaintiff seeks to compel is sufficiently

“discrete” to be subject to review under § 706 of the APA.

III. Reasonableness of Defendants’ Delay

As discussed above, the Court finds that USCIS has a nondiscretionary duty to process Plaintiff’s I-485 application within

a reasonable amount of time. The question then becomes whether

USCIS’s delay of more than one year is reasonable under the

circumstances.

“What constitutes an unreasonable delay in the context of

immigration applications depends to a great extent on the facts of

the particular case.” Gelfer v. Chertoff, 2007 WL 902382 at *2

(N.D. Cal.) (quoting Yu v. Brown, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 932). In

Case 4:07-cv-02781-CW Document 29 Filed 10/01/07 Page 11 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 12

determining whether there has been unreasonable delay in processing

an application for adjustment of immigration status, courts

typically look “to the source of the delay - e.g., the complexity

of the investigation as well as the extent to which the defendant

participated in delaying the proceeding.” Singh, 470 F. Supp. 2d

at 1068.

Many of the cases in which summary judgment has been granted

in favor of a plaintiff seeking adjudication of an I-485

application involve facts similar to those here. In nearly every

case, the delay in processing the application was due to an

uncompleted FBI background check. Courts in this district have

found that, under normal circumstances, a delay of approximately

two years due to an uncompleted FBI background check is

unreasonable as a matter of law. See Dong, 2007 WL 2601107; Huang

v. Chertoff, 2007 WL 1831105 (N.D. Cal.).

Defendants assert that the background check is a complex

process that is vital to maintaining national security. They also

point to the FBI’s limited resources and maintain that the USCIS is

making every effort to address the delay. The Court accepts that

these considerations rightly factor into an evaluation of the

reasonableness of Defendants’ delay. However, Defendants cannot

simply point to a pending FBI background check to establish that

any delay in processing an I-485 application is reasonable. 

National security interests and the complexity of the background

check process can only excuse reasonable delay. Defendants have

provided no particularized facts to suggest that these concerns

apply with special force to Plaintiff’s application or that his

Case 4:07-cv-02781-CW Document 29 Filed 10/01/07 Page 12 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

Formerly, one of these criteria was met when an applicant

filed a federal lawsuit seeking mandamus or similar relief. (Id.

at ¶ 16.)

13

name check is otherwise subject to special circumstances. 

Moreover, the USCIS is not without the power to speed up the

adjudication of Plaintiff’s application. Indeed, the agency

maintains a policy whereby it may request that the FBI expedite a

particular name check if certain criteria are met. (Yuen Decl.

¶ 18.)2 This suggests that promptly completing the adjudication of

Plaintiff’s application is not the difficult task Defendants

portray it to be.

Still, while these considerations weigh against granting

Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff’s application was submitted just over

one year ago. The Court is not aware of any case in which a delay

of this length has been found unreasonable as a matter of law. The

delay may very well become unreasonable if Defendants do not act

upon Plaintiff’s application in the foreseeable future. However,

based on precedent and the record before it, the Court cannot

conclude that Plaintiff is presently entitled to an order

compelling Defendants to act immediately. The Court therefore

denies Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and grants

Defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff is

advised, however, that he may file another action seeking similar

relief should Defendants’ delay extend beyond the bounds of

reasonableness.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for summary

Case 4:07-cv-02781-CW Document 29 Filed 10/01/07 Page 13 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 14

judgment is DENIED and Defendants’ cross-motion for summary

judgment is GRANTED. Judgment for Defendants shall enter

accordingly. Each party shall bear its own costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

10/1/07

Dated: ________________________ 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

Case 4:07-cv-02781-CW Document 29 Filed 10/01/07 Page 14 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 15

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAM CLAYTON,

Plaintiff,

 v.

SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT OF

HOMELAND SECURITY et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV07-02781 CW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District Court,

Northern District of California.

That on October 1, 2007, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said

envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle located

in the Clerk's office.

Ila Casy Deiss

United States Attorney’s Office

450 Golden Gate Avenue

P.O. Box 36055

San Francisco, CA 94102

Sam Clayton

1049 Market St. #203

San Francisco, CA 94103

Dated: October 1, 2007

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Sheilah Cahill, Deputy Clerk

Case 4:07-cv-02781-CW Document 29 Filed 10/01/07 Page 15 of 15