Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01835/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01835-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 445
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Employment
Cause of Action: 28:451 Employment Discrimination

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Kevin Glass, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Intel Corporation, Inc., 

Defendant. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV-07-1835-PHX-MHM

ORDER

Currently pending before the Court is Defendant Intel Corporation’s Motion for

Attorney’s Fees, (Dkt.#58). After reviewing the record and determining oral argument

unnecessary, the Court issues the following Order. 

In Sum, the instant motion is premised on Defendant’s successful defense of Glass’

claims for discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42

U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., the Americans with Disability Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et

seq., the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 623 et seq., and

various state claims. Under Title VII, the Court, in its discretion, “may allow the prevailing

party . . . a reasonable attorney's fees (including expert fees) as part of the costs . . ..” 42

U.S.C. 2000e-5(k). In Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421-22 (1978),

the Supreme Court promulgated the standards to guide the Court when determining whether

to award a prevailing defendant attorney’s fees:

Case 2:07-cv-01835-MHM Document 63 Filed 11/20/09 Page 1 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

[A] district court may in its discretion award attorney's fees to

a prevailing defendant in a Title VII case upon a finding that the

plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without

foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith.

In applying these criteria, it is important that a district court

resist the understandable temptation to engage in post hoc

reasoning by concluding that, because a plaintiff did not

ultimately prevail, his action must have been unreasonable or

without foundation. This kind of hindsight logic could

discourage all but the most airtight claims, for seldom can a

prospective plaintiff be sure of ultimate success.

Id. The standard under Christiansburg has been expanded to include actions brought

under the ADA. See Brown v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 246 F.3d 1182, 1190 (9th Cir. 2001)

(applying the Christiansburg standard to the attorneys’ fee provision of the ADA). 

Furthermore, while the ADEA does not provide for attorney’s fees for a prevailing

defendant, an award of attorney’s fees may be warranted as a sanction under the district

court’s inherent power or 28 U.S.C. § 1927. This is because the district court retains the

inherent power to order an award of fees “when the losing party has acted in bad faith,

vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.” See Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v.

Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 258-59 (1975) (quotation omitted). Attorney’s fees may

also be awarded under § 1927 against “[a]ny attorney . . . who so multiplies the proceedings

in any case unreasonably and vexatiously.” 28 U.S.C. § 1927. 

Here, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without

foundation. In light of the history of Mr. Glass’ litigation against Intel, his former employer,

the Court tends to agree with Defendant’s conclusion. Intel notes that this is the third

unsuccessful lawsuit that Mr. Glass has brought against it, all for claims of discrimination,

harassment, and retaliation filed under Title VII, the ADA, the ADEA, along with several

supplemental state claims. Each of these suits were properly dismissed with prejudice. See

Glass v. Intel Corp., et al., Case No. 08-15715 (9th Cir. Sept. 3,2009) (affirming summary

judgment in favor of Intel in U.S. District Court Case No.CV-06-00671-PHX-MHM); Glass

v. Intel Corp., No. CV-06-1404-PHX-MHM, 2009 WL 649787 (D. Ariz. Mar. 11, 2009)

(granting Intel summary judgment on all claims). As the Court noted, in the present case,

Case 2:07-cv-01835-MHM Document 63 Filed 11/20/09 Page 2 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

“[t]he claims in this case are substantively identical to the ones made in [Case No.

CV06-1404] . . . .” Order (doc. 55), at 1 – 2. None of these three suits, including the instant

one, came even remotely close to presenting a meritorious claim for relief. The Court will

not go through the tedious history of Glass’ long running and frivolous dispute with Intel and

his various supervisors. It is, however, worth noting that Intel claims that it spent over

$100,000 defending Glass’ three federal lawsuits. (See Dkt. 58, at p. 4.) Given what

transpired in these three cases, the Court has determined that these fees represent a

reasonable amount of costs that have been incurred by Intel throughout its litigation with

Glass. See e.g., Glass v. Intel Corp., No. CV-06-1404-PHX-MHM, Dkt.#56, Motion to

Dismiss Case Pursuant to Rules 16(f) and 37(d) (explaining how Glass and his attorney failed

to comply with the Court’s rules of procedure, and failed to comply with direct orders from

this Court, all concerning Glass’ attempts to evade being deposed by Intel). 

Although Intel’s legal expenses exceed $100,000, it requests no more than $10,000

in fees from Mr. Glass. Intel has stated such an award would both deter Glass from filing

subsequent frivolous lawsuits against it, yet would recognize that the amount of fees awarded

to a defendant in a civil rights actions should not be so high as to deter more meritorious

claims from being pursued. 

The Court agrees with Defendant’s logic. The Court further notes that as per Local

Rule 54.2(b)(3), Glass had 15 days after service of Intel’s memorandum in support of its

motion for attorney’s fees to file a responsive brief in opposition. Intel filed the instant

motion on October 9, 2009. Glass failed to respond to Intel’s motion, and the time frame in

which he would have been permitted to do so has long since passed. 

As such, the Court will grant Intel’s motion and levy an award of attorney’s fees in

the amount of $10,000. However, rather than making Kevin Glass solely responsible for this

award, the Court will also award fees against Glass’ attorney, Mr. David J. Duchrow. The

Court notes that Mr. Duchrow represented Glass in all three of these now dismissed frivolous

federal cases. In the Court’s estimation, Mr. Duchrow played a critical role in enabling the

continuation of Glass’ litigation—which amounted to a tremendous waste of both the Court’s

Case 2:07-cv-01835-MHM Document 63 Filed 11/20/09 Page 3 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

time and the funds of Intel’s shareholders. Mr. Duchrow’s action is therefore sanctionable

under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the Court’s inherent power. 

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED granting Defendant Intel’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees,

(Dkt.#58).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing Mr. Kevin Glass to pay Defendant Intel

$5,000 in attorney’s fees.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing Mr. David J. Duchrow to pay Intel $5,000

in attorney’s fees. 

DATED this 20th day of November, 2009.

Case 2:07-cv-01835-MHM Document 63 Filed 11/20/09 Page 4 of 4