Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_15-cv-00085/USCOURTS-azd-4_15-cv-00085-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Ty A. Trahan, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

JT Shartle, 

Respondent.

No. CV-15-00085-TUC-RCC (BPV)

AMENDED REPORT & 

RECOMMENDATION1

NUNC PRO TUNC 

 

 Pending before the Court is Petitioner’s pro se Petition under 28 U.S.C. ' 2241 for 

a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in Federal Custody (Doc. 1). Respondent has filed 

a Return and Answer combined with a Motion to Dismiss the Petition (Doc. 13). 

Petitioner did not file a reply. 

 Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was referred to the 

undersigned Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation. For the following 

reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after its independent 

review, grant Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss Petition (Doc. 13) and dismiss this action. 

 I. BACKGROUND

 Petitioner Ty A. Trahan, is currently confined at the U.S. Penitentiary in Tucson, 

Arizona. In October 2008, Petitioner was indicted in the District Court for the Western 

 

1

 The Report and Recommendation (Doc. 15) filed on December 21, 2015 is 

hereby amended to reflect the recommendation that Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss 

Petition (Doc. 13) should be granted. 

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District of Louisiana on five counts of receiving child pornography. (Doc. 13, p. 42). 

Upon entering a guilty plea to count one of the indictment, Petitioner was sentenced to 97 

months of imprisonment with credit for time served followed by supervised release for a 

term of life. (Doc. 13, Exh. B, Att. 7 at pp. 56-59). Petitioner “has a projected release 

date of April 25, 2016 via Good Conduct Time release.” (Doc. 13, Exh. B, Att. 10 at p. 

69; Doc. 13, Exh. B at &12). Expiration of Petitioner’s full term falls on November 3, 

2016. (Doc. 13, Exh. B, Att. 10 at p. 70). 

 As discussed in further detail below, Petitioner contends that the Bureau of Prisons 

(“BOP”) has failed to credit him for time he was in custody prior to imposition of his 

federal sentence. Respondent argues that Petitioner’s claim is without merit because he 

received all prior custody credit to which he is entitled. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. JURISDICTION

 “Federal courts are always ‘under an independent obligation to examine their own 

jurisdiction,’... and a federal court may not entertain an action over which it has no 

jurisdiction.” Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting 

FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990), overruled in part on other 

grounds by City of Littleton, Colo. v. Z.J. Gifts D–4, L.L.C., 541 U.S. 774 (2004)). With 

regard to habeas petitions, federal jurisdiction is dependent upon a proper 

characterization of the petition. Gay v. Winn, 2009 WL 275324, *2 (D.Ariz. Feb.5, 2009). 

 Generally, an action to contest the legality of a sentence must be filed pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2255, whereas an action to challenge the execution of a sentence must be 

filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Hernandez, 204 F.3d at 864. Petitioner does not 

claim that the sentencing court imposed an illegal sentence; instead, he challenges the 

manner, location, or condition of the execution of his sentence. Petitioner's claim is 

properly filed pursuant to ' 2241. Further, because Petitioner is incarcerated at the U.S. 

 

2

 Page numbers cited refer to the page numbers assigned to the document by the Court's electronic filing system (CM/ECF). 

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Penitentiary in Tucson, Arizona, this Court has jurisdiction over this matter. Francis v. 

Rison, 894 F.2d 353 (9th Cir.1990); Gay, 2009 WL 275324 at * 2. 

B. EXHAUSTION

 Federal prisoners are generally required to exhaust available administrative 

remedies before filing a habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See Tucker 

v. Carlson, 925 F.2d 330, 332 (9th Cir.1991); Martinez v. Roberts, 804 F.2d 570, 571 (9th

Cir.1986). The failure to satisfy the exhaustion requirement applicable to section 2241 

proceedings is not jurisdictional. Brown v. Rison, 895 F.2d 533, 535 (9th Cir.1990) 

overruled on other grounds by Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 54–55 (1995). Thus, where a 

federal prisoner fails to properly exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing a ' 2241 

petition, “the district court must determine whether to excuse the faulty exhaustion and 

reach the merits, or require the petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies before 

proceeding in court.” Id. The district court may exercise its discretion to excuse the 

exhaustion requirement if the administrative remedy is inadequate, ineffective, or if 

attempting to exhaust would be futile or cause irreparable injury. Fraley v. United States 

Bureau of Prisons, 1 F.3d 924, 925 (9th Cir.1993); United Farm Workers of America v. 

Arizona Agr. Emp't. Relations Bd., 669 F.2d 1249, 1253 (9th Cir.1983). Factors weighing 

in favor of requiring exhaustion include whether: (1) agency expertise makes agency 

consideration necessary to generate a proper record and reach a proper decision; (2) 

relaxation of the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the administrative 

scheme; and (3) administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct is own 

mistakes and to preclude the need for judicial review. Noreiga–Lopez v. Ashcroft, 335 

F.3d 874, 880–81 (9th Cir.2003) (citing Montes v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 531, 537 (9th

Cir.1990)). See also Ruviwat v. Smith, 701 F.2d 844, 845 (9th Cir.1983) (recognizing that 

requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies “will aid judicial review by allowing the 

appropriate development of a factual record in an expert forum; conserve the court's time 

because of the possibility that the relief applied for may be granted at the administrative 

level; and allow the administrative agency an opportunity to correct errors occurring in 

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the course of administrative proceedings.”).

 The BOP has established an Administrative Remedy Program which requires the 

prisoner to proceed through a four-tier review process comprised of: (1) an informal 

resolution process with institutional staff, see 28 C.F.R. § 542.13; (2) a formal written 

Administrative Remedy Request to the warden, see 28 C.F.R. § 542.14; (3) an appeal to 

the BOP Regional Director, see 28 C.F.R. § 542.15; and (4) an appeal to the BOP 

General Counsel, see id. (“Appeal to the General Counsel is the final administrative 

appeal.”). Additionally, formal administrative remedy requests regarding initial decisions 

that did not originate with the Warden, or his/her staff, may be initially filed with the 

Bureau office which made the original decision, and appealed directly to the General 

Counsel. 28 C.F.R. § 542.14(d)(5). The regulation is clear that “[t]he purpose of the 

Administrative Remedy Program is to allow an inmate to seek formal review of an issue 

relating to any aspect of his/her own confinement.” 28 C.F.R. § 542.10(a). 

 Respondent asserts that Petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies prior 

to filing the instant Petition. (Doc. 13, pp. 7-9). Petitioner counters that his request to 

prison staff for forms to commence exhaustion of administrative remedies was denied 

and he was, instead, directed to go to “Records” about his claim. (Doc. 1-1, pp. 8-9). He 

further states that he did not receive a response to the request he filed with Records Staff. 

(Id. at p. 9). According to Petitioner, the actions of prison staff prevented him from 

complying with the administrative remedy procedure and further pursuit of administrative 

remedies would be futile. (Id. at pp. 7-9). 

 Respondent has submitted an unsworn statement from Unit Counselor Stacy Smith 

indicating that “[a]lthough [she] did not deny Mr. Trahan the Administrative Remedy 

Process,” when Petitioner requested the form to initiate administrative remedies to seek 

“an adjustment on his jail credit time”, she “simply suggested he first speak to Records to 

try to resolve this issue. I added, if he was dissatisfied with the response from Records to 

come back and see me so we could start the Administrative Remedy Process....Mr. 

Trahan has made no attempt to contact me about this issue since that conversation....” 

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(Doc. 13, Exh. A, Att. 4 at p. 30). Respondent also submits an unsworn statement from 

Unit Manager Sharon Bowers who states that she never denied Petitioner an 

administrative remedy and if he had requested “one, I would have directed him to his 

Counselor or given it to him myself.” (Id. at p. 31). 

 The record supports Petitioner’s claim that he was initially directed to Records 

instead of given the necessary form to pursue the administrative remedy process. 

However, Petitioner does not allege that after Records staff failed to respond to him, he 

further attempted to pursue administrative remedies. Nonetheless, the Court declines to 

recommend that this matter be remanded for Petitioner to pursue administrative remedies 

given that review of Respondent's Answer supports the conclusion that there is no 

possibility that the relief applied for may be granted at the administrative level. Thus, 

there is no need to provide the administrative agency an opportunity to correct errors in 

hope of precluding the need for judicial review given Respondent’s assertion that no error 

was made and as discussed infra, Respondent is correct that Petitioner's claims are 

meritless. Although the Court does not condone Petitioner’s bypass of the administrative 

exhaustion requirements, the Court will review the merits of Petitioner's claim despite 

Petitioner's failure to exhaust administrative remedies. See Fraley, 1 F.3d at 925. See also 

Parsons v. Sanders, 2010 WL 5676523, *1 (D.Ariz. Dec.20, 2010) (court need not 

address exhaustion where claim is without merit), adopted by 2011 WL 320913 (D. Ariz. 

Jan. 30, 2011). 

 C. PETITIONER’S REQUEST FOR RELIEF 

 Petitioner points out that his Current Program Review form dated September 25, 

2014 indicates that his sentence began on October 22, 2009, which was the date he was 

sentenced. (Doc. 1-1, p. 3; see also Doc. 1, Exh. 3 at p. 13). Petitioner contends his 

sentence calculation improperly fails to take into account time he spent in custody prior 

to imposition of the sentence. (See e.g. Doc. 1-1, p. 3 (arguing that the sentence did not 

begin in 2009, but upon detention for the same charge); Doc. 1-1, p. 6 (arguing that the 

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sentence “actually began when he was arrested on...December 20, 2007[]” on the state 

charges.)). 

 The record reflects that Petitioner was arrested by Louisiana state police officers 

on December 20, 2007 on state charges of pornography involving juveniles. (Doc. 13, p. 

4; Doc. 13, Exh. B, Att. 1). He was detained at the Lafayette Parish County Jail on the 

state charges until January 4, 2008, when he was released on bond. (Doc. 13, p.4; Doc. 

13, Exh. B, Att. 2). On September 9, 2008, the state declined to prosecute Petitioner. 

(Doc. 13, p. 5; Doc. 13, Att. B at &8). 

 On October 14, 2008, the federal indictment alleging five counts of receiving child 

pornography was filed and Petitioner was arrested by the U.S. Marshal on the federal 

charges on October 20, 2008. (Doc. 13, Exh. B, Att. 3; Doc. 1, Exh. 4 at p. 14). On 

October 22, 2008, the District Court for the Western District of Louisiana ordered 

Petitioner’s further detention pending trial. (Doc. 13, Att. B, at & 7; see also Docs. 15, 18 

filed in United States v. Ty Anthony Trahan, CR 08-280-01 (W.D. La.)). Thereafter, 

Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to count one of the indictment and counts two through 

five were dismissed. (See Doc. 1, Exh. 5 at p. 15). On October 22, 2009, the federal 

court sentenced Petitioner to a term of imprisonment of 97 months with credit for time 

served followed by supervised release for a term of life. (Doc. 13, Exh. B, Att. 7 at pp. 

56-59). 

 “After a district court sentences a federal offender, the Attorney General, through 

the BOP, has the responsibility for administering the sentence.” United States v. Wilson, 

503 U.S. 329, 336 (1992) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3621(a)); see also Allen v. Crabtree, 153 

F.3d 1030, 1033 (9th Cir. 1998). The statute governing calculation of a term of 

imprisonment provides that a federal sentence commences on the date the defendant is 

received in custody to begin service of his sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a). Section 3585 

also provides for credit for prior custody as follows: 

A defendant shall be given credit toward the service of a term of 

imprisonment for any time he has spent in official detention prior to the 

date the sentence commences— 

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(1) as a result of the offense for which the sentence was imposed; or 

(2) as a result of any other charge for which the defendant was arrested 

after the commission of the offense for which the sentence was imposed; 

that has not been credited against another sentence. 

18 U.S.C. § 3585(b). 

 Section 3585(b) does not authorize a district court to compute the credit at 

sentencing. Wilson, 503 U.S. at 334; United States v. Lualemaga, 280 F.3d 1260, 1265 

(9th Cir. 2002). Instead, the Attorney General, acting through the BOP, has the 

responsibility to compute the credit allowed by section 3585(b). Wilson, 503 U.S. at 334–

35; see also Id. at 335 (“Because the offender has a right to certain jail-time credit under 

§ 3585(b), and because the district court cannot determine the amount of the credit at 

sentencing, the Attorney General has no choice but to make the determination as an 

administrative matter when imprisoning the defendant.”). “[T]he BOP [has] developed 

detailed procedures and guidelines for determining the credit available to prisoners.” Id.

at 335. See also Cruz v. Sanders, 2008 WL 5101021, *1 (C.D.Cal. Dec.2, 2008) (“The 

BOP's guidelines for computation of sentences are set forth in Program Statement 

5880.28, which expressly incorporates the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b).” (citing 

Program Statement 5880.28 at 1–14)); (Doc. 13, p. 6; Doc. 13, Exh. B at &10). The 

BOP's internal guidelines provided in the Program Statements are not entitled to the same 

deference as promulgated regulations, but they are nonetheless entitled to “some 

deference” if they are a permissible construction of the statute. See Reno, 515 U.S. at 61. 

See also Allen, 153 F.3d at 1033. 

 Respondent does not dispute that Petitioner was in custody, as a result of the 

offense for which he was sentenced by the federal court, from December 20, 2007 to 

January 4, 2008 (on the state charges) and from October 20, 2008, the date he was 

arrested on the federal charges through October 21, 2009, which the was the day prior to 

sentencing. (Doc. 13, pp. 4-5; Doc. 13, Exh. B at &12 (citing Att. 10)). Respondent 

points out that Petitioner’s sentence monitoring computation data, which was last updated 

in October 9, 2012, reflects that Petitioner received “jail credit” for December 20, 2007 

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through January 4, 2008 and October 20, 2008 through October 21, 2009, totaling 383 

days, thus resulting in an expiration full term date of November 3, 2016. (Doc. 13, Exh. 

B at &12; Doc. 13, Exh. B, Att. 10, at p. 70). Consequently, Respondent has established 

that Petitioner did, in fact, receive prior custody credit as allowed under ' 3585(b). (Id.). 

Therefore, Petitioner’s claim that he did not receive credit for such time is without merit 

and Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss Petition should be granted. 

III. CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATION

 Because the BOP has appropriately awarded Petitioner all prior custody credit to 

which he is entitled, Petitioner’s Petition is without merit. Accordingly, the Magistrate 

Judge recommends that the District Court, after its independent review grant 

Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss Petition (Doc. 13) and dismiss this action. 

 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b) and Rule 72(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure and LRCiv 7.2(e), Rules of Practice of the U.S. District Court for the District 

of Arizona, any party may serve and file written objections within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS

after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. A party may respond 

to another party’s objections within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy. 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). No replies to objections shall be filed unless leave is granted from 

the District Court to do so. If objections are filed, the parties should use the following 

case number: CV 15-85-TUC-RCC. 

 Failure to file timely objections to any factual or legal determination of the 

Magistrate Judge may be deemed a waiver of the party’s right to review. 

 The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to file this Report & Recommendation NUNC 

PRO TUNC as of December 18, 2015. 

 Dated this 22nd day of December, 2015. 

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