Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-02120/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-02120-14/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

KENNY LYNN WARREN, 

Petitioner, 

vs. 

DOMINGO URIBE, JR., 

Respondent. 

No. 2:10-cv-2120-MCE-EFB P 

ORDER AND FINDINGS AND 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

 Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel with a petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He moves to set aside a judgment entered on 

August 26, 2013, denying his petition. That petition challenged his 2006 conviction on two 

counts of assault on a peace officer with a semiautomatic weapon while personally discharging a 

firearm, one count of false imprisonment by violence while personally using a firearm, one count 

of child endangerment, and one count of possession of a controlled substance. Among other 

claims, petitioner sought habeas relief on the grounds that: (1) the evidence introduced at his trial 

was insufficient to support his convictions for assault on a peace officer; (2) he received 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel; and (3) the prosecutor committed misconduct in 

introducing testimony that he should have known was false. 

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 Now before the court is petitioner’s motion for “fraud upon the court,” styled as a motion 

brought pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3), (4), and (6). For the following reasons, the court 

recommends that petitioner’s motion be denied.1

I. Background

 In its unpublished memorandum and opinion affirming petitioner’s judgment of 

conviction on appeal, the California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District provided the 

following summary of the facts underlying petitioner’s convictions. 

At the time of trial, defendant and his wife P. had been married for 

14 years and had been a couple for 25 years. They have two 

children, including one teenaged son K. 

In May 2005, P. had a temporary restraining order against 

defendant that required he stay at least 100 yards away from her 

and move out of their apartment. In early June 2005, the court 

dissolved the restraining order because neither defendant nor P. 

appeared at a court hearing. Still, P. changed the locks on the 

apartment because she and defendant were having marital 

problems. 

On June 13, 2005, K. woke P. to tell her there was a broken 

window in the kitchen. Defendant then came into P.'s bedroom and 

demanded to know why she had changed the locks. P. called 911. 

About 1:55 a.m. that morning, Chico Police Officer Jeff Durkin 

responded to a domestic disturbance call. The dispatcher said that a 

male was breaking items inside the apartment and there might be a 

restraining order violation. Officers Robert Ponce and Matthew 

Nowicki also responded to the call. 

Officer Durkin was the first officer to arrive at the apartment 

complex. He heard a man and a woman arguing, saw a door with a 

broken window pane, and came across a woman (P.) in the 

apartment complex corridor who seemed distraught and who told 

the officer in a low agitated voice that “he was inside the residence 

breaking items and she wanted him to leave.” Officer Durkin went 

to the front of the apartment and through the open door saw a man 

(defendant) standing inside the living room. Defendant was 

agitated and “moving around quite a bit.” While using profanity, he 

 1

 Petitioner’s motion for fraud upon the court was filed on August 28, 2014. By order 

dated September 5, 2014, petitioner was informed that documents filed by him after the closing 

date of this action would be disregarded. On September 29, 2014, petitioner filed an appeal of the 

September 5, 2014 order. By order dated February 27, 2015, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 

construed petitioner’s motion as a timely request for relief pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). The 

court vacated the September 5, 2014 order and remanded the matter to this court for further 

proceedings. 

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refused the officer's repeated requests to come outside and talk with 

him about “the alleged domestic disturbance.” 

Officer Durkin decided to go inside the apartment and detain 

defendant. When the officer stepped inside, defendant ran out of 

the living room. Officers Durkin and Nowicki chased defendant 

down a hallway and stood at the threshold of a poorly-lit bedroom 

in which defendant was standing. Defendant appeared agitated and 

aggressive and was in a “fighting stance” “directed towards [the 

officers].” He had “his fists out in front of him and a bladed sort of 

stance,” looking as though he was “preparing for [the officers] to 

engage in some kind of physical type altercation.” Officer Durkin 

went for his pepper spray but then heard Officer Nowicki say that 

he was going to use his Taser gun. Defendant reached under his 

shirt for a handgun that was in the waistband of his pants. 

Officer Durkin yelled “gun, gun, gun” and ran into the bathroom for 

cover. Officer Nowicki retreated toward the door. When Officer 

Durkin reached the bathroom, defendant fired several shots in rapid 

succession from the bedroom area. Officer Durkin returned fire and 

radioed for help. 

Officer Nowicki decided to re-enter the apartment with Officer 

Ponce. As they ran inside, defendant fired directly at them from the 

bedroom. Both officers “hit the ground.” Officer Nowicki fired 

four shots, temporarily stopping defendant's fire. Officer Nowicki 

pointed a flashlight toward the bedroom door. Defendant fired 

another shot toward the officers. 

Meanwhile, K. escaped from the apartment through a window. Not 

realizing K. had escaped, defendant called out to K. and when his 

son did not respond, defendant yelled at the officers that they had 

killed K. Defendant told them to “‘Bring it on,’” because he had 

“‘two more clips.’” All three officers “‘hunkered down.’” 

Officer Durkin, who still was in the bathroom, struck up 

conversation with defendant, who remained in the bedroom. When 

the officer told defendant that his son was okay, defendant and 

Officer Durkin developed a “rapport.” During their four-hour 

conversation, defendant told the officer he would free him in 

exchange for a beer or soda. The officers told defendant they could 

not do the exchange “right then.” 

Eventually, a hostage negotiation team was called in, tear gas 

deployed, and Officer Durkin was able to escape by “thr[owing] 

[him]self outside the window.” After a long struggle, defendant 

was detained. 

ECF No. 40-1 at 1-5. 

 One of the claims raised by petitioner in his habeas petition was that his trial counsel 

rendered ineffective assistance in failing to effectively cross-examine Officer Nowicki about his 

trial testimony that petitioner was “standing in the bedroom facing [the two officers] in the 

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doorway.” ECF No. 1 at 44; see also Reporter’s Transcript on Appeal (RT) at 272. Petitioner 

argued that this testimony was inconsistent with a police report contained in the record which 

quotes Officer Nowicki as saying that he saw petitioner “turned away from him” when he first 

saw him in the bedroom, but that he then “turned to face” the officers. ECF No. 1 at 44; Clerk’s 

Transcript on Appeal (CT) at 193. Petitioner argued that it was “exactly at this point, while 

petitioner was facing away from these officers that he was shot first from behind, through both of 

his legs, by Officer Durkin.” ECF No. 1 at 44. Petitioner argued that it was crucial to elicit the 

information that Officer Nowicki initially told investigating police officers that petitioner was 

facing away from him when he first encountered him, because this would bolster petitioner’s 

defense that he was shot from behind and that he shot back at the officers only in self-defense. 

ECF No. 45 at 11. Petitioner argued, “this statement was crucial because petitioner has two 

gunshot wounds to the back of his legs and this is exactly when he received those wounds.” Id. 

Petitioner also argued that cross-examination on this subject was relevant to impeach Officer 

Nowicki’s credibility. ECF No. 1 at 44. 

 In another claim raised in his habeas petition, petitioner claimed that his trial counsel 

rendered ineffective assistance in failing to impeach Officer Durkin with the inconsistency 

between his testimony at the preliminary hearing that he didn’t remember whether he had 

anything in his hands when he first made contact with petitioner, and his trial testimony wherein 

he stated that he did not have anything in his hands when he first made contact with petitioner. 

Id. at 45. See CT at 58, RT at 177. Petitioner compares Durkin’s testimony with the preliminary 

hearing and trial testimony of Officer Nowicki wherein Nowicki stated Officer Durkin told 

petitioner “there’s going to be a lot more pointed at you if you don’t come out and deal with the 

issue.” ECF No. 1 at 45. See CT at 84, RT at 265. Petitioner argued that all of this testimony 

implied that Officer Durkin had a gun in his hand when he first approached petitioner, and that 

this provides support for petitioner’s defense that Officer Durkin shot petitioner before petitioner 

shot him. In the traverse, petitioner argued that the above-described testimony makes it 

“obvious” that officer Durkin “was pointing his weapon at petitioner.” ECF No. 45 at 12. 

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 In another claim raised in his habeas petition, petitioner argued that his trial counsel 

rendered ineffective assistance in failing to tell the jury in his opening statement “and/or” during 

closing argument that petitioner was “shot first by officers from behind,” and to support that 

argument with evidence that petitioner’s “entry wounds” were to “the back of both his legs.” 

ECF No. 1 at 48. Petitioner contended that this argument “would have changed the verdict in 

petitioner’s favor.” Id.2

 

 In another claim raised in his habeas petition, petitioner argued that his trial counsel 

rendered ineffective assistance in failing to introduce into evidence two shell casings that were 

found under some furniture in the bedroom of petitioner’s apartment after the authorities 

concluded their crime scene investigation. Id. at 49. He argued that these shell casings were “.40 

caliber” and that, because of where they were found, they would have “proven that Officer 

Durkin shot petitioner at the bedroom doorway, and that Durkin fired two more shots than he 

testified to.” Id. Petitioner explained in the traverse that he saw these shell casings when they 

were smuggled into the prison by his former wife. ECF No. 45 at 18. 

 Petitioner also claimed in his habeas petition that his trial counsel rendered ineffective 

assistance in failing to utilize an expert witness on ballistics to demonstrate that petitioner was 

shot from behind at close range by Officers Durkin and Nowicki. ECF No. 1 at 61. Petitioner 

argued that his trial counsel should have retained a ballistics expert to test the powder burns on 

his clothing and the bedroom door in order to establish that petitioner was shot by police officers 

before he shot them, that the officers shot immediately instead of attempting to use non-lethal 

force first, and that petitioner was actually the victim of a crime and not the perpetrator of a 

crime. Id. at 61, 65. Petitioner asserted that: (1) Officers Durkin and Nowicki employed pepper 

spray and a taser gun, even though he had not initiated any physical contact with the officers; (2) 

 2

 A review of the state court record reflects that petitioner’s trial counsel did argue in his 

closing argument that the officers had their guns out from the beginning of the incident and fired 

first, notwithstanding the officers’ testimony to the contrary. See RT at 663-70. Trial counsel 

argued that Officers Nowicki and Durkin were not telling the truth when they testified they did 

not shoot petitioner first, and that petitioner was merely “defending himself” against the officers. 

Id. at 663-69. Counsel argued, “They shot at him with a gun and he shot back to defend himself.” 

Id. at 670. 

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he was shot by the officers from behind; (3) he responded by pulling out his own gun and 

shooting back; and (4) he was “facing away from the officers when he was shot first, by officers, 

from behind.” Id. at 65. Petitioner argued that he was “the actual victim of an assault with a 

deadly weapon, by Chico Police Officers Durkin and Nowicki.” Id. at 57-58. 

 Petitioner also claimed in his habeas petition that the prosecutor committed misconduct in 

eliciting the testimony of Officers Durkin and Nowicki, knowing that their testimony was false 

and was simply an attempt to cover up what actually happened at his apartment. ECF No. 1 at 

66-70; ECF No. 45 at 27. Among other things, petitioner argued that “any reasonable prosecutor” 

would have known that Officers Durkin and Nowicki were “committing perjury” when they 

testified that Officer Durkin “did not have a gun in his hand and pointed at petitioner at the front 

door to his residence before making entry, among other things.” ECF No. 45 at 29. Petitioner 

argued that even though the prosecutor knew the correct facts, he proceeded with his case in order 

to protect the officers from the consequences of “the wrongful shooting and unlawful entry in to 

the petitioner’s residence.” Id. 

 Finally, petitioner requested an evidentiary hearing on his habeas claims before this court. 

 All of these claims and petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing were denied by the 

district court. 

II. Petitioner’s Rule 60(b) Motion

A. Petitioner’s Arguments

 In the motion now before the court, petitioner argues that the judgment of conviction in 

his criminal case--not the judgment entered in this action denying his petition--was obtained by 

fraud. He first argues that the prosecutor committed a “fraud upon the court” when he failed to 

introduce evidence at the preliminary hearing that petitioner was “shot from behind” by the police 

officers. ECF No. 75 at 1, 2. Petitioner notes that the only mention of the location of his gunshot 

wounds occurred on the second day of trial, when the parties stipulated to the admission into 

evidence of photographs taken earlier that day, which showed bullet wounds on the backs of 

petitioner’s legs. Id. at 3; see CT at 409-410, 589. Petitioner argues this evidence should have 

been presented at the preliminary hearing. 

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 Petitioner also argues his trial counsel committed a “fraud upon the court” in failing to 

question any trial witnesses about his “being shot from behind” or to “present evidence and argue 

that petitioner was shot from behind by police officers.” ECF No. 75 at 2. Petitioner faults his 

trial counsel for arguing that he was defending himself against pepper spray and a taser. Id. He 

contends counsel should have argued petitioner was defending himself from gunshots. Petitioner 

argues that his counsel and the prosecutor failed to “focus[] on the material exculpatory evidence 

that petitioner was shot from behind first by police officer[s].” Id. 

 Petitioner also argues that his trial counsel and the prosecutor failed to properly question 

the prosecutor’s “trajectory expert” and “expert D.O.J. criminalist” about the trajectory of bullets 

through petitioner’s legs, in order to demonstrate that petitioner must have been shot from behind 

by the officers at close (“point blank”) range. Id. at 3-4. As he did in his habeas petition, 

petitioner contends this evidence would have supported his defense that he shot at the officers 

only in self-defense and that he was therefore the victim of a crime and not the perpetrator of a 

crime. 

 Petitioner argues his trial counsel was essentially acting in collusion with the prosecutor to 

present false evidence to the trial court with respect to who fired the first shots. He argues his 

trial counsel acted as an ‘agent of the state” and committed a “travesty of justice” in presenting a 

defense that petitioner was only “defending himself against pepper spray and/or taser” instead of 

from bullets from the officers’ weapons. Id. at 4, 5. In short, petitioner argues that evidence he 

was shot from behind “was withheld or essentially suppressed and not presented by petitioner’s 

counsel” or by the prosecutor at his trial. Id. at 7. Petitioner also argues that the failure of 

respondent to alert this court in connection with his federal habeas petition to evidence that he 

had bullet wounds on the back of his legs constituted a “fraud” upon this court. Id. 

 Petitioner further argues that his trial counsel and the prosecutor committed a “fraud upon 

the court” in suppressing, or failing to introduce, pretrial statements by Officer Nowicki to the 

effect that petitioner was initially turned away from the officers when they first saw him and that 

Nowicki did not see a gun in petitioner’s hand. Id. at 5. Petitioner argues these statements would 

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have demonstrated that petitioner must have been shot “from behind while he was turned facing 

away from the officers before anything was in his hands.” Id. 

 Petitioner also repeats claims he made in his habeas petition that his trial counsel rendered 

ineffective assistance, which petitioner describes as “fraud upon the court,” when he failed to 

have two shell casings and one bullet fragment, which were found by his wife after the shooting 

incident, introduced into evidence and tested by a “ballistics expert.” Id. at 6. Petitioner argues 

such testing would have supported his claim that he was “shot from behind.” He also argues this 

court erred in suggesting these shell casings came from petitioner’s weapon. Id. at 6-7. 

 Petitioner contends that all of the above-described instances of “fraud upon the court” 

prevented him from “fully and fairly presenting his case.” Id. at 7. He argues that the actions of 

the prosecutor, his trial counsel, and respondent’s counsel in suppressing this information 

rendered it impossible for the trial court and this court to “perform in the usual manner its 

impartial task of adjudging cases that are presented for adjudication.” Id. at 5. Petitioner argues 

trial counsels’ actions in failing to “use the fact that petitioner was shot twice from behind” were 

“unreasonable” and not “tactical.” Id. Petitioner also argues that respondent’s counsel committed 

a “fraud” on this court in taking the position in his answer to petitioner’s habeas petition that there 

was no evidence that petitioner was shot from behind, when there was evidence in the record that 

he had scars on the back of his legs. As he did in his habeas petition, petitioner requests an 

evidentiary hearing on these claims. Id. at 7-8. 

 B. Respondent’s Arguments and Petitioner’s Reply

 Respondent argues that petitioner’s Rule 60(b) motion is, in essence, a second or 

subsequent habeas petition and is not properly brought pursuant to Rule 60(b). He contends that 

petitioner is simply repeating many of the same claims and arguments he presented in his habeas 

petition. ECF No. 87 at 4. Respondent argues that petitioner has not proved that any fraud was 

perpetrated on any court, but is simply attempting to “re-present the discovery and counsel-based 

claims this Court has already reviewed.” Id. 

 In his reply, petitioner denies that his Rule 60(b) motion is a successive petition. He 

contends that this court was not able to address his habeas claims “on the merits” because it failed 

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to hold an evidentiary hearing on his claim that he was shot in the back of his legs. Id. He also 

argues the court’s failure to hold such a hearing constitutes a “defect in the integrity of the 

proceedings and is assailable under Rule 60(b).” Id. at 3. 

 Petitioner also claims the judgment against him is “void” because this court never 

determined that he was shot “from behind.” Id. He explains his arguments as follows: 

Petitioner is attacking the integrity of his original habeas hearing in 

federal district Court and the Court’s failure to reach the merits on 

the most critical issue in Petitioner’s federal application for habeas 

relief – the fact that he was attacked and shot from behind while 

facing away from officers and unarmed. This court never reached 

the merits of this vital issue and this violated Petitioner’s Due 

Process Rights. Furthermore most of Petitioner’s other claims that 

this Court did reach the merits on, are erroneous because they are 

directly connected to the issue of Petitioner being shot from behind 

at point blank range, which the court never determined. 

Id. at 2. 

 Petitioner argues that the facts of this case constitute an “extraordinary circumstance” 

under Rule 60(b)(6) because he was “deprived of any reasonable opportunity to support his claim 

of being shot from behind.” Id. at 4. Petitioner also repeats that respondent’s failure to concede 

that he was shot from behind, in light of evidence that he had wounds on the back of his legs, 

constituted a “fraud on the court” because it prevented this court from finding that he was shot 

from behind by the police officers before he returned fire. Id. at 5. He argues this conduct by 

respondent constitutes dishonesty, which is a form of fraud on the court. Id. 

 Petitioner argues that his trial counsel and the prosecutor “were both fully aware that 

Petitioner was shot twice from behind and both committed fraud on the court” in failing to bring 

this fact to the attention of the trial court and to this court. Id. at 6-7. He contends that his 

allegations demonstrate a “carefully planned scheme.” Id. at 6. Petitioner complains that he has 

never received a fair hearing in any court because it was never established that he was “shot from 

behind.” According to petitioner, this situation resulted from deliberate acts by his trial counsel, 

the prosecutor, and respondent’s counsel. 

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 C. Applicable Law

 Rule 60(b) provides for relief from a judgment or order on the following grounds: 

(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly 

discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been 

discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) 

fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), 

misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the 

judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or 

discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been 

reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the 

judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other 

reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). This rule, like the rest of the Rules of Civil Procedure, applies in habeas 

corpus proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 only ‘to the extent that [it is] not inconsistent with’ 

applicable federal statutory provisions and rules.” Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 529 (2005) 

(footnote omitted) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 11 & Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(2)). A party may 

seek relief from judgment under this rule only in limited circumstances. Id. Motions seeking 

such relief are addressed to the sound discretion of the district court. Casey v. Albertson's Inc., 

362 F.3d 1254, 1257 (9th Cir. 2004). 

 To prevail on a motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3), the moving party must 

establish that a judgment was obtained by fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct, and that the 

conduct complained of prevented the moving party from fully and fairly presenting the case. 

Craig v. In re M/V Peacock, 809 F.2d 1403, 1404-05 (9th Cir. 1987). “The rule is aimed at 

judgments which were unfairly obtained, not at those which are factually incorrect.” Id. at 1405. 

The Ninth Circuit has held that that “a party bears a high burden in seeking to prove fraud on the 

court, which must “involve an ‘unconscionable plan or scheme which is designed to improperly 

influence the court in its decision.’” Abatti v. Comm'r, 859 F.2d 115, 118 (9th Cir.1988) (quoting 

Toscano v. Comm’r, 441 F.2d 930, 934 (9th Cir.1971)). A reviewing court considers “whether 

the integrity of the judicial process was itself harmed, such that the court cannot perform its 

regular task of fairly adjudicating disputes.” Examples typically involve “a scheme by one party 

to hide a key fact from the court and the opposing party.” Id. Pizzuto v. Ramirez, 783 F.3d 1171, 

1180 (9th Cir. 2015). See also Gumport v. China Int'l Trust & Inv. Corp. (In re Intermagnetics 

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Am., Inc.), 926 F.2d 912, 916 (9th Cir. 1991) (defining “fraud upon the court” as “that species of 

fraud which does or attempts to, defile the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the 

court so that the judicial machinery cannot perform in the usual manner its impartial task of 

adjudging cases that are presented for adjudication”). 

 Under Rule 60(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court “may relieve a 

party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding” if the Court finds that the “judgment is 

void.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4). A judgment is void only if the court that rendered it lacked 

subject matter jurisdiction or lacked jurisdiction over the parties, or if the court acted in a manner 

inconsistent with due process. Tomlin v. McDaniel, 865 F.2d 209, 210 (9th Cir. 1988) (overruled 

on other grounds as stated in Phelpe v. Alameida, 569 F.3d 1120, 1132 (9th Cir. 2009). A 

judgment is not void under Rule 60(b)(4) because of an error of law. Id. at 210; United States v. 

Holtzman, 762 F.2d 720, 724 (9th Cir.1985) (“A judgment is not void merely because it is 

erroneous.”) (citation omitted). 

 “Judgments are not often set aside under Rule 60(b)(6).” Latshaw v. Trainer Wortham & 

Co., Inc., 452 F.3d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 2006). The Ninth Circuit has observed that: 

Rule 60(b)(6) has been used sparingly as an equitable remedy to 

prevent manifest injustice. The rule is to be utilized only where 

extraordinary circumstances prevented a party from taking timely 

action to prevent or correct an erroneous judgment. 

United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 984 F.2d 1047, 1049 (9th Cir. 1993). To obtain 

relief under Rule 60(b)(6), “a party must demonstrate extraordinary circumstances which 

prevented or rendered him unable to prosecute his case.” Lal v. California, 610 F.3d 518, 524 

(9th Cir. 2010) (citation and internal punctuation marks omitted). Rule 60(b)(6) is reserved “only 

[for] truly ‘extraordinary circumstances.’” Aikens v. Ingram, 652 F.3d 496, 501 (4th Cir. 2011). 

See also Cox v. Horn, 757 F.3d 113, 120 (3d Cir. 2014) (Courts are directed to grant relief under 

Rule 60(b)(6) only in “extraordinary circumstances where, without such relief, an extreme and 

unexpected hardship would occur.”) (citing Sawka v. Healtheast, Inc., 989 F.2d 138, 140 (3d Cir. 

1993)). Rule 60(b)(6) “requires a showing of extraordinary circumstances that justify reopening a 

judgment.” Pizzuto, 783 F.3d at 1176. 

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 In Gonzalez, the United States Supreme Court held that a self-styled Rule 60(b) motion 

that includes new claims or seeks to present new evidence in support of existing claims should be 

construed as a successive habeas petition and not as a Rule 60(b) motion. The court noted that a 

purported Rule 60(b) motion “can also be said to bring a ‘claim’ if it attacks the federal court’s 

previous resolution of a claim on the merits, since alleging that the court erred in denying habeas 

relief on the merits is effectively indistinguishable from alleging that the movant is, under the 

substantive provisions of the statutes, entitled to habeas relief.” Id. at 532. See also United States 

v. Buenrostro, 638 F.3d 720 (9th Cir. 2011) (Rule 60(b) motion, in which petitioner sought to 

bring a new claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, construed as a successive petition). The 

court in Gonzalez recognized, however, that a “defect in the integrity of the federal habeas 

proceedings,” such as “fraud on the habeas court,” might justify reopening a habeas petition 

under Rule 60(b). Id. at 532 & n.5. 

 Following Gonzalez, the Ninth Circuit has explained that “a legitimate Rule 60(b) motion 

‘attacks . . . some defect in the integrity of the federal habeas proceedings,’ while a second or 

successive habeas corpus petition ‘is a filing that contains one or more claims.’” Jones v. Ryan, 

733 F.3d 825, 834 (9th Cir. 2013). On the other hand, “motions that allege fraud on the federal 

habeas corpus court . . . are properly brought under Rule 60(b).” Pizzuto, 783 F.3d at 1176. 

 D. Analysis 

 After a careful review of petitioner’s Rule 60(b) motion and reply brief, it appears to this 

court that petitioner is essentially repeating many of the same arguments he made in connection 

with his habeas petition, to wit: that the prosecutor committed misconduct and his trial counsel 

rendered ineffective assistance in failing to utilize existing evidence to demonstrate that petitioner 

was “shot from behind” by police officers before he shot back in self-defense. Petitioner’s 

arguments appear to be in the nature of an appeal of the district court’s ruling on his habeas 

motion. However, a Rule 60(b) motion may not be utilized to “bring the entire underlying 

judgment up for review,” Harmon v. Harper, 7 F.3d 1455, 1458 (9th Cir. 1993), and cannot be 

used as a substitute for appeal. Title v. United States, 263 F.2d 28, 31 (9th Cir. 1959) (“Rule 

60(b) was not intended to provide relief for error on the part of the court or to afford a substitute 

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for appeal”); Plotkin v. Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Co., 688 F.2d 1291, 1293 (9th Cir. 

1982) (affirming district court’s denial of rule 60(b) motion because “[l]egal error does not by 

itself warrant the application of 60(b)”). 

 Petitioner also appears to be attempting to raise additional claims of ineffective assistance 

of trial counsel and prosecutorial misconduct that were not contained in his habeas petition. To 

the extent petitioner is raising additional claims in the instant motion, the motion is a successive 

habeas petition. Petitioner may not prosecute a successive habeas petition until he moves in the 

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for an order authorizing the district court to 

consider the application pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3).3

 Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 531 (“using 

Rule 60(b) to present new claims for relief from a state court’s judgment of conviction – even 

claims couched in the language of a true Rule 60(b) motion – circumvents AEDPA’s requirement 

that a new claim be dismissed unless it relies on either a new rule of constitutional law or newly 

discovered facts”); Thompson v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 1998) (“In most cases 

when the factual predicate for a Rule 60(b) motion also states a claim for a successive petition 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b), as it does in this case, the Rule 60(b) motion should be treated as a 

successive habeas petition”). Thus, it appears that many, if not all, of petitioner’s arguments are 

more appropriately raised in an appeal or a second habeas petition. 

 Assuming arguendo that petitioner’s motion is properly brought pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 60(b), he is not entitled to relief. Petitioner’s arguments involve acts of alleged “fraud” 

committed by the prosecutor and counsel at his state court trial proceedings, not in the proceeding 

 

3

 Title 28 U.S.C. § 2255(4) provides, in part, that: 

A second or successive motion must be certified as provided in 

section 2244 by a panel of the appropriate court of appeals to 

contain - - 

(1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in light of 

the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear 

and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have 

found the movant guilty of the offense; or 

(2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on 

collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously 

unavailable. 

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leading to the judgment denying his habeas petition. Because petitioner is challenging a 

judgment from this court, Rule 60(b) would provide relief only if petitioner demonstrates that 

there was a fraud committed on this court, not the state court. Pizzuto, 783 F.3d at 1180.4

 With 

respect to the proceedings before this court, petitioner argues that the court was never informed 

that the trial record included photographs that showed petitioner had bullet wounds on the backs 

of his legs. He faults respondent for taking the position in his opposition to the habeas petition 

that there was no evidence petitioner was shot from behind, when there was “solid proof in the 

record.” ECF No. 75 at 7. He appears to be arguing that respondent’s counsel knew, but failed to 

inform this court, that petitioner was “shot from behind” and, in particular, failed to direct the 

court’s attention to the photographs introduced into evidence at his trial showing wounds on the 

back of his legs. 

 In his habeas petition, petitioner did not direct this court’s attention to the photographic 

exhibits introduced at his trial. However, he argued throughout his habeas petition that he was 

shot from behind. He also informed this court that he had wounds on the backs of his legs. The 

court was thus well aware that this argument was an important part, and even the centerpiece, of 

petitioner’s habeas allegations. In the May 30, 2013 findings and recommendations, this court 

specifically noted that petitioner’s trial counsel argued in his closing argument that the officers 

had their guns out from the beginning of the incident and fired first, notwithstanding their trial 

testimony to the contrary. ECF No. 54 at 34. The federal court was fully aware of petitioner’s 

argument that the evidence showed he was shot from behind, and that he shot back in selfdefense. Petitioner was not prevented from presenting his case to this court simply because 

///// 

///// 

 4

 In any event, the allegations of fraud are specious. The fact that petitioner had bullet 

wounds on the backs of his legs was known to the prosecutor, petitioner’s trial counsel, and the 

trial judge. As noted by petitioner, a stipulation was entered into by the parties allowing the 

introduction into evidence of photographs of petitioner’s wounds, and the prosecution 

investigator described the nature of those wounds on the record. CT at 410-13. Accordingly, 

there was no “fraud” on the trial court in withholding evidence that petitioner had bullet wounds 

on the backs of his legs. 

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neither petitioner nor respondent discussed or highlighted the photographic exhibits. Nor was the 

federal court prevented from reaching “the merits” of petitioner’s habeas claims or unable to 

perform its task of fairly adjudicating petitioner’s claims. 

 Petitioner has failed to meet his “high burden” to show entitlement to relief under Rule 

60(b)(3). There is no evidence that the judgment in this case was “unfairly obtained” or that 

respondent’s failure to highlight evidence showing petitioner sustained wounds on the backs of 

his legs during the altercation was an “unconscionable plan or scheme which is designed to 

improperly influence the court in its decision.” Craig, 809 F.2d at 1404; Abatti, 859 F.2d at 118. 

At most, respondent’s failure to cite this evidence was a “garden-variety nondisclosure,” which 

does not entitle petitioner to relief from judgment. See Piaauto, 783 F.3d at 1181. The court 

notes, in this regard, that “the state’s constitutional obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence to 

criminal defendants does not apply on collateral review.” Id. at 1180. 

 For all of these reasons, petitioner is not entitled to relief from judgment under Rule 

60(b)(3) because of “fraud on the court.”5

 Petitioner has also failed to show that the judgment of 

this court is “void” or that this case presents “exceptional circumstances.” Thus, petitioner is not 

entitled to relief pursuant to Rule 60(b) (4) or (6). 

III. Other Matters

A. Motion to Amend The Rule 60(b) Motion

 On April 13, 2015, petitioner filed a document entitled “Motion to Amend- Motion under 

Rule 60(b)(3) Fraud Upon the Court.” ECF No. 86. In that document, petitioner requests that his 

Rule 60(b)(3) motion also include requests for relief under Rules 60(b)(4) and (6). This court 

construed petitioner’s motion for relief from judgment to include arguments based on Rules 

 5

 Even if respondent had alerted this court to photographs showing that petitioner had 

received bullet wounds in the back of his legs during the altercation at his residence, the result of 

these federal habeas proceedings would not have been different. For all of the reasons set forth in 

the May 30, 2013 findings and recommendations, petitioner’s trial counsel did not render 

ineffective assistance and the prosecutor did not commit prejudicial misconduct. Moreover, 

photographs showing that petitioner received bullet wounds in the backs of his legs would not 

have established that petitioner did not commit the charged crimes. Contrary to petitioner’s 

assertion, under the circumstances of this case evidence that he has scars on the backs of his legs 

does not “exculpate” him. 

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60(b)(4) and (6). Accordingly, petitioner’s motion to amend is granted and those arguments have 

been considered. 

B. Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending Interlocutory Appeal

 On August 13, 2015, petitioner filed a motion to stay this action pending the resolution of 

his interlocutory appeal of this court’s July 6, 2015 order denying petitioner’s request that the 

undersigned be recused from these proceedings (ECF No. 96). On September 16, 2015, the U.S. 

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit dismissed petitioner’s interlocutory appeal for lack of 

jurisdiction. Accordingly, the motion to stay is moot. 

C. Motion for Recusal

 On September 28, 2015, petitioner filed another, nearly identical, motion requesting 

recusal of the undersigned because of rulings the undersigned has made in this action. ECF No. 

100. Title 28 U.S.C. § 455 requires recusal if the judge’s alleged bias or prejudice “stems from 

an extrajudicial source and not from conduct or rulings made during the course of the 

proceedings.” Toth v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 862 F.2d 1381, 1388 (9th Cir. 1988). “A 

judge’s previous adverse ruling alone is not sufficient bias.” Mayes v. Leipziger, 729 F.2d 605, 

607 (9th Cir. 1984). Petitioner’s request for recusal is based on his disagreement with rulings 

made during the course of these proceedings in this court, and not from any extrajudicial source. 

Therefore, the request for recusal is denied. 

D. Request for Judicial Notice

 On May 26, 2015, petitioner filed a document entitled “Request for Judicial Notice of 

Adjudicative Facts – Under Federal Rules of Evidence – Rule – 201” ECF No. 91. Therein, 

petitioner asks this court to take judicial notice of the following: 

(1) that claim No. 9 in Petitioner’s application for federal habeas 

corpus relief was ineffective assistance of Appellate Counsel for 

failing to raise I.A.C. claim against trial counsel on the issues that 

are now pending before this court; and No. (2) that the entry 

wounds to the back of Petitioner’s legs, described in the stipulation 

at C.R.T. pages 409-413 establishes that Petitioner was shot from 

behind while facing away; and No. (3) that Officer Nowicki stated 

in his interview (See C.T. page 193) less than two days after the 

incident that “the suspect was turned away from them (officers) 

when he (Nowicki) first saw him (suspect) in the bedroom.” And 

that this is consistent with Petitioner being shot from behind while 

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facing away. And that his interview statement clearly conflicts with 

his trial testimony on this material fact. At trial his (Nowicki’s) 

testimony was that Petitioner “was facing him in a bladed stance 

with his fists in front of him.” - When he arrived at the bedroom 

door; and No. (4) That the entry wound (see CRT page 413) under 

“the crease behind the left knee” and the “exit wound lower by his 

(Petitioner’s) ankle.” establishes a very steep downward trajectory 

only achievable at near or point blank range, which conflicts with 

officer’s testimony of not having a gun in his hand or firing it at the 

bedroom doorway; and No. (5) that Petitioner’s 15 year old son 

gave the following statement the morning after the incident. (See 

C.T. page 140) Q. And he told you that he heard his dad say 

something to the effect, quote “why do you have a gun out and 

pointed at me,” correct? A. Yes. – the relevance of this is that it is 

consistent with the officer still having his gun in his hand when he 

arrived at the bedroom doorway when Petitioner was shot while 

facing away, from behind. The officer also claimed he did not have 

a gun pointed at Petitioner. 

Id. at 2. 

 Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence sets forth the information that can be judicially 

noticed. Specifically, “[a] judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in 

that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) 

capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot 

reasonably be questioned.” The “facts” suggested by petitioner do not fall within the category of 

facts which may be judicially noticed. They are, rather, the same arguments petitioner has made 

repeatedly in his habeas petition and in subsequent filings in this case. Some of these “facts” are 

also subject to reasonable dispute and are, in fact, disputed by the respondent. Accordingly, the 

court will not take judicial notice of the information offered by petitioner. The court has, 

however, read the submitted information and concludes that even if judicially noticed, the 

information offered would not aid petitioner or establish that he is entitled to relief on his habeas 

petition or his Rule 60(b) motion. 

IV. Conclusion

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that: 

1. Petitioner’s April 13, 2015 “Motion to Amend” (ECF No. 86), requesting that 

petitioner’s Rule 60(b)(3) motion also include requests for relief under Rules 60(b)(4) and (6), is 

granted; 

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2. Petitioner’s August 13, 2015 motion to stay this action pending the resolution of his 

interlocutory appeal (ECF No. 96) is denied as moot; 

3. Petitioner’s September 28, 2015 motion to recuse the undersigned (ECF No. 100) is 

denied; and 

4. Petitioner’s May 26, 2015 “request for judicial notice” (ECF No. 91) is denied. 

Further, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s motion for “fraud upon the 

court” pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (ECF No. 75) be denied. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections 

shall be served and filed within fourteen days after service of the objections. Failure to file 

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 

Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 

1991). In his objections petitioner may address whether a certificate of appealability should issue 

in the event he files an appeal of the judgment in this case. See Rule 11, Rules Governing Section 

2254 Cases (the district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a 

final order adverse to the applicant). 

DATED: December 7, 2015. 

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