Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-04690/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-04690-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JERRY CHAVEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

CLARK E. DUCART,

1 Warden,

Respondent.

Case No. 13-cv-04690-YGR (PR)

ORDER DENYING WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE RESPONDENT’S MOTION 

TO DISMISS PETITION AS UNTIMELY 

AND SETTING BRIEFING SCHEDULE

Petitioner Jerry Chavez, a state prisoner, filed the instant pro se petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

Before the Court is Respondent’s motion to dismiss on the ground that it is time-barred 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), the statute of limitations set by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). Dkt. 15. Petitioner filed an opposition to the motion. Dkt. 16. 

Respondent filed a reply. Dkt. 18.

Having considered all of the papers filed by the parties, the Court DENIES Respondent’s 

motion to dismiss without prejudice to refiling it and addressing the equitable tolling issue below.

BACKGROUND

On November 8, 2010, in Santa Clara County Superior Court Case No. CC768276, 

Petitioner pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter with personal use of a firearm in exchange for the 

dismissal of a charge of felony murder. Dkt. 1 at 4. On March 11, 2011, he was sentenced to 

twenty-one years in state prison, consecutive to his other pending case. Dkt. 1, Ex. F. In Santa 

Clara County Superior Court Case No. 211398, Petitioner pled guilty to conspiracy to sell drugs, 

conspiracy to transport drugs, and participation in a criminal street gang. Dkt. 1 at 6. Also on 

March 11, 2011, he was sentenced to five years and eight months. Dkt. 1, Ex. G. Petitioner did 

not appeal the aforementioned convictions.

On July 17, 2012,2Petitioner filed his first state habeas petition in the California Supreme 

 

1 Clark E. Ducart, the current warden of the prison where Petitioner is incarcerated, has 

been substituted as Respondent pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

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Court, which was denied on November 14, 2012. Dkt. 15, Ex. 1 (Case No. S204213). 

On September 13, 2012, Petitioner filed a second state habeas petition in the California 

Supreme Court, which was denied on November 14, 2012, with a citation to In re Dexter, 25 Cal.

3d 921, 925-926 (1979) (petitioner must exhaust administrative remedies for claim). Dkt. 15; Ex. 

2 (Case No. S205377). 

On October 25, 2012, Petitioner filed a motion to modify the restitution fines in the Santa 

Clara County Superior Court, which was denied on October 29, 2012, as waived, untimely, and 

for lack of jurisdiction. Dkt. 1, Ex. N.

On December 12, 2012, Petitioner filed a state habeas petition in the California Court of 

Appeal, which was denied on January 18, 2013. Dkt. 15, Ex. 3 (Case No. H039100). 

On March 14, 2013, Petitioner filed his third state habeas petition in the California 

Supreme Court, which was denied on May 15, 2013. Dkt. 15, Ex. 4 (Case No. S209369).

On December 30, 2013, Petitioner filed another habeas petition in the California Court of 

Appeal, which was denied on February 21, 2014. Dkt. 15, Ex. 5 (Case No. H040507). The denial 

order noted that to the extent Petitioner was claiming he was improperly validated as a gang 

member, the petition was denied without prejudice to allow him to exhaust administrative 

remedies. Id.

On September 4, 2013,

3

Petitioner filed the instant federal petition, alleging in part that the 

trial court improperly imposed restitution fines in his two cases and breached the terms of the plea 

agreement, and that his attorney was ineffective for failing to object to the restitution fines. Dkt. 1 

at 4-6.4

 

2 A pro se federal or state habeas petition is deemed filed on the date it is delivered to 

prison authorities for mailing. See Saffold v. Newland, 250 F.3d 1262, 1268 (9th Cir. 2001), 

vacated and remanded on other grounds, Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002) (holding that a 

federal or state habeas petition is deemed filed on the date the prisoner submits it to prison 

authorities for filing, rather than on the date it is received by the court). Petitioner signed his first

state supreme court petition and his federal habeas petition on July 17, 2012 (Dkt. 15 at note 1) 

and September 4, 2013 (Dkt. 1 at 7), respectively. For the purposes of this discussion, the Court 

deems those petitions as filed on those dates. See Saffold, 250 F.3d at 1268.

3

See supra note 2.

4

Page number citations refer to those assigned by the Court’s electronic case management 

filing system and not those assigned by Petitioner.

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DISCUSSION

The AEDPA, which became law on April 24, 1996, imposes a statute of limitations on 

petitions for a writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners. Petitions filed by prisoners 

challenging non-capital state convictions or sentences must be filed within one year of the latest of

the date on which: (A) the judgment became final after the conclusion of direct review or the time 

passed for seeking direct review; (B) an impediment to filing an application created by 

unconstitutional state action was removed, if such action prevented petitioner from filing; (C) the 

constitutional right asserted was recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right was newly 

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactive to cases on collateral review; or (D) the 

factual predicate of the claim could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D). 

A state prisoner with a conviction finalized after April 24, 1996, such as Petitioner, must 

satisfy the AEDPA statute of limitations. See Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Beeler), 128 

F.3d 1283, 1286 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled in part on other grounds by Calderon v. United States 

Dist. Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc).

The one-year period generally runs from “the date on which the judgment became final by 

the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2244(d)(1)(A). If a petitioner could have sought review by the state court of appeals or the state 

supreme court, but did not, the limitation period will begin running against him the day after the 

date on which the time to seek such review expired. See Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809, 812-13 

(9th Cir. 2002) overruled on other grounds by Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); 

see also Cal. Rule of Court 8.308(a) (providing that appeal from criminal judgment must be filed 

within sixty days after rendition of judgment or making of order being appealed) (formerly Cal. 

Rule of Court 31). 

As a threshold matter, once a petitioner is notified that his petition is subject to dismissal 

based on the AEDPA’s statute of limitations and the record indicates that the petition falls outside 

the one-year time period, he bears the burden of demonstrating that the limitations period was 

sufficiently tolled under statutory and/or equitable principles. See Smith, 297 F.3d at 814.

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In the present case, the statute of limitations started running on May 10, 2011, when his 

judgment became final sixty days after his March 11, 2011 sentencing. See § 2244(d)(1)(A); Cal. 

Rule of Court 8.308(a). Thus, Petitioner had one year or until May 10, 2012 to file his federal 

habeas petition. Because he did not file the present petition until September 4, 2013—almost a

year and four months after the limitations period had expired—the petition is untimely unless he 

can show that he is entitled to statutory or equitable tolling. In addition, Petitioner seems to argue 

that he is entitled to a delayed commencement of the limitations period, as further discussed 

below.

I. STATUTORY TOLLING

AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations is tolled under section 2244(d)(2) for the “time 

during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with 

respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Tolling 

applies to one full round of collateral review. Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 223 (2002). 

Here, the record shows that Petitioner started his round of state collateral review by filing 

his first state supreme court petition on July 17, 2012. However, as mentioned above, the oneyear limitations period had expired two months earlier—on May 10, 2012. A state habeas petition 

filed after the AEDPA’s statute of limitations ended cannot toll the limitations period. See 

Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[S]ection 2244(d) does not permit the 

reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended before the state petition was filed,” even if the 

state petition was timely filed). Section 2244(d)(2) cannot “revive” the limitations period once it 

has run (i.e., restart the clock to zero); it can only serve to pause a clock that has not yet fully run. 

Once the limitations period has expired, “collateral petitions can no longer serve to avoid a statute 

of limitations.” Rashid v. Kuhlmann, 991 F. Supp. 254, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 

Accordingly, Petitioner’s state habeas petitions filed in 2012 and 2013 do not revive the 

limitations period that has already run. Because Petitioner did not meet the one-year requirement 

for filing the instant federal habeas petition and he is not entitled to statutory tolling, his petition is 

barred as untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) unless he can show that he is entitled to a 

delayed commencement of the limitations period or equitable tolling.

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II. DELAYED COMMENCEMENT OF THE LIMITATIONS PERIOD

As mentioned above, a petitioner may attempt to justify the late filing of his habeas 

petition by demonstrating his eligibility for a delayed commencement of the limitations period 

under either subheadings (B), (C) or (D) of section 2244(d)(1). Here, Petitioner asserts that he 

was not able to discover the alleged “error” that was the “factual basis” of his claims, i.e., that 

restitution fines had been improperly imposed, until the date his sentencing transcripts were 

mailed to him on August 5, 2013. Dkt. 16 at 7-8. Thus, the court assumes Petitioner seeks a 

delayed onset of the limitations period under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D), which provides that the 

limitations period may run from the date on which “the factual predicate of the claim presented 

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). 

However, the Court finds Petitioner’s argument for a delayed commencement to August 5, 2013 to 

be unavailing because the record shows that almost a year earlier—on October 25, 2012—

Petitioner filed a motion for modification of restitution fines. Dkt. 1 at 70. Thus, Petitioner was 

clearly aware that restitution fines had been imposed by at least October 25, 2012. Moreover,

Petitioner had access to information which indicates that he should have been aware of the 

possible restitution fines long before 2012. The record shows that Petitioner had access to 

restitution fine recommendations filed in both cases by Probation Officer Christina Manuto, which 

were both dated February 4, 2011. Id. at 44, 46. Thus, during his March 11, 2011 sentencing, 

Petitioner should have been aware of the possibility of the imposition of restitution fines based on 

the probation officer’s recommendations. As Respondent correctly contends, Petitioner was 

present at sentencing and should have been aware of the facts underlying his claims, even though 

he may not have realized the legal significance until later. Dkt. 18 at 3; see also Hasan v. Galaza, 

254 F.3d 1150, 1154 n.3 (9th Cir. 2000) (The time begins “‘when the prisoner knows (or through 

diligence could discover) the important facts, not when the prisoner recognizes their legal 

significance.’”).

In addition, Petitioner has not shown that he exercised due diligence in discovering the 

factual predicate of his claims. “Due diligence does not require the maximum feasible diligence, 

but it does require reasonable diligence in the circumstances.” Ford v. Gonzalez, 683 F.3d 1230, 

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1235 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotations and citations omitted). A petitioner need only 

demonstrate when a reasonable investigation would have uncovered the “newly discovered” facts. 

See United States v. Battles, 362 F.3d 1195, 1198 (9th Cir. 2004) (section 2255 petition) (even 

though petitioner did not have access to trial transcripts, the facts supporting claims which 

occurred at the time of his conviction could have been discovered if he “at least consult[ed] his 

own memory of the trial proceedings;” because he did not do so, he did not exercise due diligence 

and was not entitled to a delayed start of the limitations period under section 2255(4)). Here, even 

if Petitioner claims he was not aware the restitution fines were imposed at the time of his 

sentencing, he has not shown that he was diligent in determining after sentencing whether such 

fines would be imposed, especially in light of the fact that the probation officer recommended the 

imposition of such fines. Accordingly, the Court finds that Petitioner is not entitled to a delayed 

commencement of the limitations period under section 2254(d)(1)(D).

III. EQUITABLE TOLLING

The Supreme Court has determined that AEDPA’s statute of limitations is subject to

equitable tolling in appropriate cases. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010). “When 

external forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a timely 

claim, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may be appropriate.” Miles v. Prunty, 187 

F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). Equitable tolling, however, is unavailable on most cases because 

extensions of time should be granted only if “extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner’s 

control make it impossible to file a petition on time.” Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1288 (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted). The prisoner must show that “the ‘extraordinary 

circumstances’ were the cause of his untimeliness.” Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 

2003) (citations omitted). The petitioner bears the burden of showing he is entitled to equitable 

tolling, and the determination of whether such tolling applies is a fact-specific inquiry. Id. Thus, 

petitioner bears the burden of showing that this “extraordinary exclusion” should apply to him, 

Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002), and that “the extraordinary 

circumstances were the cause of his untimeliness and that the extraordinary circumstances made it 

impossible to file a petition on time,” Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal 

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quotation marks and citations omitted). Another statement of the standard is that a litigant seeking 

equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing his 

rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way,” preventing 

timely filing. Holland, 560 U.S. at 655 (quoting Pace, 544 U.S. at 418); accord Rasberry v. 

Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 2006).

Where a prisoner fails to show “any causal connection” between the grounds upon which 

he asserts a right to equitable tolling and his inability to timely file a federal habeas application,

the equitable tolling claim will be denied. Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034-35 (9th Cir. 

2005). He must, furthermore, show that his untimeliness was caused by an external impediment 

and not by his own lack of diligence. Bryant v. Ariz. Att’y Gen., 499 F.3d 1056, 1061 (9th Cir. 

2007). 

Finally, a development of the record may be required before a district court can determine 

whether a petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling. For example, in Laws v. Lamarque, the Ninth 

Circuit reversed the district court’s order granting a motion to dismiss because it failed to develop 

the record in response to Law’s claim of mental incompetency. 351 F.3d 919, 924 (9th Cir. 2003). 

The Ninth Circuit found that the allegations of the verified state petition attached to Law’s 

traverse, stating that he was “deprived [] of any kind of cons[ci]ousness” during the period when 

his petitions should have been filed, may be treated as an affidavit in opposition to the motion to 

dismiss. Id. (citing McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 197-98 (9th Cir. 1987)). The Ninth Circuit 

determined that a district court should not require the petitioner to carry a burden of persuasion at 

the time he asserts equitable tolling to merit further investigation into the merits of his arguments 

for tolling. Id. at 924. Instead, Ninth Circuit cases require only that there be “circumstances 

consistent with [the] petitioner’s petition . . . under which he would be entitled to . . . equitable 

tolling” to trigger further factual development of the record. Id. (citing Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 

233 F.3d 1146, 1148 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (remanding case to district court for development 

of facts concerning whether AEDPA materials were unavailable in the prison law library and the 

legal significance of such a finding)). The Ninth Circuit found that the district court erred in 

granting judgment against Laws based upon the papers before it and that “[i]t [was] enough that 

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Laws ‘alleged mental incompetency’ in a verified pleading.” Laws, 351 F.3d at 924 (citations 

omitted). Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held that Laws was entitled to further factual development 

or an evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether he was precluded from filing his petition by 

reason of mental impairment. Id.

In the present case, upon liberally construing his verified opposition, Petitioner alleges that 

his lack of access to the law library contributed to his delay in filing his federal petition.5 Dkt. 16 

at 1-2. Petitioner claims that he was confined in the administrative segregation unit of North Kern 

State Prison (“NKSP”) from March 23, 2011 through May 15, 2012, during which he had no 

access to the law library. Id. Petitioner claims that on May 15, 2012, he was transferred to the 

California Correctional Institution and that “this was the first time [he] had regular access to the 

legal library and/or legal resource material to file with the courts.” Id. at 6.

Assuming arguendo that Petitioner could avail himself of equitable tolling during the 

aforementioned time period, the Court first determines whether it would save his petition from 

being untimely. If the statute of limitations had started to run on the date he regained law library 

access on May 15, 2012, then Petitioner would have had one year—or until May 15, 2013—to file 

his federal habeas petition. Petitioner could be entitled to statutory tolling because his first state 

supreme court petition was filed on July 17, 2012, prior to the limitations period expiring. Before 

filing his first state supreme court petition on July 17, 2012, the limitations period would have run 

unabated for a total of 63 days (from May 15, 2012 through July 17, 2012). Petitioner would have 

been entitled to statutory tolling during the almost four-month period during which his state

supreme court petition was pending from July 17, 2012 through November 14, 2012. The 

limitations period then would have begun to run again when the state supreme court denied his 

 

5

Petitioner also argues that he is entitled to equitable tolling because he is “proceeding 

pro se [and] has little education . . . .” Dkt. 16 at 9. However, ignorance of the law and lack of 

legal sophistication do not alone constitute extraordinary circumstances warranting equitable 

tolling. Rasberry, 448 F.3d at 1154 (cataloguing cases from other circuits and holding that “a pro 

se petitioner’s lack of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary circumstance”)); see 

also Hughes v. Idaho State Bd. of Corr., 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986) (illiteracy of pro se

petitioner insufficient cause to avoid procedural bar); United States v. Flores, 981 F.2d 231, 236 

(5th Cir. 1993) (pro se status, illiteracy, deafness and lack of legal training does not justify 

equitable tolling). Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling based solely on his pro 

se status and alleged lack of intelligence.

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petition on November 14, 2012, and it would run unabated for 294 more days until he filed his 

federal petition on September 4, 2013. Therefore, only 357 days (63 days plus 294 days) of the 

limitations period would have run before his federal petition was filed. Said another way, his 

federal petition could be timely because there was still 8 days (365 days minus 357 days) of the 

limitations period left when he filed it. Thus, if Petitioner could avail of equitable tolling due to 

lack of law library access, his federal petition could be timely filed based on the aforementioned 

calculation.

However, Respondent argues that Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling due to lack

of law library access because the record shows that Petitioner received a letter from his attorney on 

August 8, 2011, indicating that “all the necessary paperwork is enclosed,” and “all necessary legal 

documents are here to support [his] argument.” Dkt. 18 at 2. Respondent thus argues that 

Petitioner “demonstrated his ability to conduct legal research to prepare a claim during the 

relevant time period.” Id. at 3. 

The existence of an adequate law library does not provide for meaningful access to the 

courts if the prisoners are not allowed a reasonable amount of time to use the library. See 

Lindquist v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections, 776 F.2d 851, 858 (9th Cir. 1985). However, the 

Constitution does not guarantee a prisoner unlimited access to the law library. Prison officials of 

necessity must regulate the time, manner and place in which library facilities are used. Id. The 

fact that a prisoner must wait for a turn to use the library does not necessarily mean that he has 

been denied meaningful access to the courts. Id. Moreover, prisoners on lockdown or in the 

Security Housing Unit may face delays in accessing the law library, but so long as the delays are 

the product of prison regulations reasonably related to legitimate penological interests, such delays 

are not of constitutional significance, even where they result in actual injury. Lewis v. Casey, 518 

U.S. 343, 361-62 (1996). 

In the instant case, it is conceivable that equitable tolling might be warranted because 

Petitioner was prevented from preparing a timely petition due to his lack of access to the law 

library. The Court finds Respondent did not fully address this issue in his reply to Petitioner’s 

opposition. Respondent merely refers to an August 8, 2011 letter from Petitioner’s attorney and 

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states that it showed that Petitioner had the “ability to conduct legal research and prepare a claim 

during the relevant period.” Dkt. 18 at 3. Such an argument is conclusory, and Respondent fails 

to address Petitioner’s claim that his lack of access to the law library prevented him from filing a 

timely petition. In support of his claim, Petitioner alleges that while he was housed in 

administrative segregation at NKSP, “inmates didn’t have physical entry access into a facility law 

library for the purpose of using its legal resources.” Dkt. 16 at 2. As mentioned above, 

Respondent has failed to refute Petitioner’s allegations that he was denied law library access 

during that time.

In sum, the Court finds that Respondent has not addressed whether Petitioner is entitled to 

equitable tolling based on his lack of access to the law library. Accordingly, the Court DENIES 

Respondent’s motion to dismiss without prejudice to renewing the motion and addressing the 

aforementioned equitable tolling issue raised in Petitioner’s opposition.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, 

1. Respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition as untimely (Dkt. 15) is DENIED 

without prejudice to renewing the motion and addressing the equitable tolling issue set forth above 

no later than twenty-eight (28) days of the date of this Order. If Respondent chooses to file a 

renewed motion, Petitioner shall file an opposition, no later than twenty-eight (28) days of his 

receipt of the renewed motion, and Respondent shall file with the Court and serve on Petitioner a 

reply no later than fourteen (14) days of receipt of any opposition.

2. Should Respondent fail to file a renewed motion to dismiss within the twentyeight-day time frame, Respondent is directed to SHOW CAUSE why the petition should not be 

granted. Respondent shall file with this Court and serve upon Petitioner, no later than sixty (60) 

days of the date of this Order, an Answer conforming in all respects to Rule 5 of the Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Cases, showing cause why a writ of habeas corpus should not be issued. 

Respondent shall file with the Answer a copy of all portions of the state trial record that have been 

transcribed previously and that are relevant to a determination of the issues presented by the 

petition. 

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3. If Petitioner wishes to respond to the Answer, he shall do so by filing a Traverse 

with the Court and serving it on Respondent no later than sixty (60) days of his receipt of the 

Answer. Should Petitioner fail to do so, the petition will be deemed submitted and ready for 

decision sixty days after the date Petitioner is served with Respondent’s Answer. 

4. It is Petitioner’s responsibility to prosecute this case. Petitioner must keep the 

court informed of any change of address by filing a separate paper with the Clerk of the Court 

headed “NOTICE OF CHANGE OF ADDRESS,” and comply with any orders of the Court within 

the time allowed or ask for an extension of that time. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal 

of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). See 

Martinez v. Johnson, 104 F.3d 769, 772 (5th Cir. 1997) (Rule 41(b) applicable in habeas cases). 

5. Petitioner is reminded that all communications with the Court, whether by way of 

formal legal motions or informal letters, must be served on Respondent by mailing a true copy of 

the document to Respondent’s counsel. 

6. Extensions of time are not favored, though reasonable extensions will be granted. 

However, the party making a motion for an extension of time is not relieved from his or her duty 

to comply with the deadlines set by the Court merely by having made a motion for an extension of 

time. The party making the motion must still meet the deadlines set by the Court until an order 

addressing the motion for an extension of time is issued. Any motion for an extension of time 

must be filed no later than fourteen (14) days prior to the deadline sought to be extended.

7. This Order terminates Docket No. 15.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

______________________________________

YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

United States District Judge

February 20, 2015

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