Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00225/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00225-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FELIPE GARCIA,

Plaintiff,

v.

J. GRIMM, et al.,

Defendants. 

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Civil No. 06cv0225-WQH (PCL)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

DENYING IN PART AND GRANTING

IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS (Doc. No. 70.) 

I. INTRODUCTION

On May 30, 2006, Felipe Garcia (“Plaintiff”), currently incarcerated at Mule Creek State Prison,

proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. No. 29.) Defendant John T. Lonsdale (“Lonsdale”) filed a motion to dismiss

Plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). After reviewing Plaintiff’s

complaint, Lonsdale’s motion, Plaintiff’s opposition, Lonsdale’s reply and all accompanying documents, the Court recommends that Lonsdale’s motion be DENIED in part and GRANTED in part. The

Court further recommends that Plaintiff be GRANTED leave to amend his complaint.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that on May 1, 2005, he suffered an “inhumane beating” by several San Diego

County Sheriff’s Deputies (“Deputies”) while being detained at San Diego County Central Jail awaiting

retrial. (Doc. No. 29 at 3.) On that day, Plaintiff was held in a cell within module 8-E and was involved

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Defendants describe this “defense object” as a “shank.” (Doc. No. 32 at 2.) The district court

describes it as a sharp instrument. (Doc. No. 52 at 2.)

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Plaintiff seems to imply that Lonsdale was somehow connected to the emergency calls. Plaintiff

asserts that Deputies responded to emergency calls “as Defendant Lonsdale assigned to control tower

8th floor was aware of security emergency incident in progress as to follow sheriff policy procedures.” 

(Doc. No. 29 at 7). But Plaintiff is unclear about Lonsdale’s role with regards to the calls.

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in a heated argument with a cellmate. (Id. At 8, 3) Due to the heated argument, Plaintiff feared an

attack from him. (Id.) As a result, Plaintiff contends, he stood near his cell door and prevented it from

closing – presumably to escape should his cellmate attack him. (Doc. No. 29 at 6.) Furthermore, he

held a “defense object”1

 in his hand. (Id.) Additionally, he wore “protective jailhouse” armor made of

books and magazines wrapped around his upper torso to deflect or lessen the impact of stab attempts. 

(Id.) At some point, Plaintiff ran out of his cell toward the module door. Plaintiff says it was to avoid

confrontation. (Id.) Deputies guarding the module door noticed Plaintiff sprinting toward them. They

exited the module and attempted to close the module door. Plaintiff stuck his foot into the doorway to

prevent the door from closing. (Id.) An inmate within the module pulled Plaintiff away from the

module door, which allowed Deputies to close it. (Id. at 6.) While these events unfolded, Plaintiff

claims that Lonsdale was in the control tower recording the incident with a security camera. (Id. at 14.) 

As a result of Plaintiff’s dash, other Deputies responding to “EMERGENCY CALLS”2

 arrived at

the scene in an area between the module door and the cell hall within the module. (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff

contends that Deputies pushed his hands through the module door’s tray slot while he held his defense

object. (Id.) Once his hands were stuck in the tray slot, one of the Deputies ordered Plaintiff to drop his

defense object. (Id.) When he complied, Deputies handcuffed him. Then, some Deputies bound ankle

restraints on him. At the same time, Plaintiff claims that other Deputies punched, kicked and twisted

Plaintiff’s various body parts and tore his clothes off to remove his “protective jailhouse armor.” (Id. at

8.) Meanwhile, the Deputies told Plaintiff to “stop resisting.” (Id.) Plaintiff maintains that at this point,

he was not resisting and was following the Deputies’ instructions. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that, despite his

obedience, Deputies dragged him out of security camera view, (id. at 9), and continued beating him. (Id.

at 8.) The beating continued until one of the Deputies yelled, “that’s enough.” (Id. at 9.) Plaintiff

claims that while this entire fracas manifested between him and Deputies, Lonsdale was aware that

Deputies were using physical force against Plaintiff. (Id. at 7.)

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After the alleged beating, Plaintiff recalled several Deputies saying, “you are in big trouble[.]

[Y]ou assaulted [three] deputies; help us and we will get you medical attention.” (Id. at 12.) Then,

several Deputies conducted interviews with him to get statements about the beating. (Id. at 14.) 

Lonsdale also recorded these interviews. (Id.) As a result of the reports from these interviews, Plaintiff 

insists that he was falsely charged with assaulting various jail staff members and “suffered retaliatory

punishments because of these charges.” (Id. at 23.) 

Additionally, Plaintiff asserts that after the beating, the jail’s physician examined him. (Id. at

17.) According to Plaintiff, the physician concluded that Plaintiff had suffered fractures and required a

follow up examination in addition to proper medical care. (Id.) However, Plaintiff contends he did not

receive further medical attention. (Id.)

III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, claiming the defendants named in the SAC violated

his Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights during separate incidents occurring between May 1,

2005 and May 5, 2005. (Doc. No. 29 at 3.) Plaintiff initially named twelve defendants to the case, 

(id.), and has amended his complaint to clarify the identities of the defendants. (Compare Doc. No. 1 at

5-6 with Doc. No. 29 at 7.) Ten of the defendants are allegedly San Diego County Sheriff’s Deputies,

and Plaintiff asserts that they used “blatant exag[g]erated unnecessary force” against him in violation of

his Eighth Amendment rights. (Doc. No. 29 at 3, 7.) Plaintiff also claims that the jail’s physician,

identified as Jane Doe, denied him proper medical treatment after the beating. (Id. at 5, 17.) Moreover,

Plaintiff alleges that Lonsdale, also a deputy, witnessed the beating in the control tower and recorded the

altercation with a security camera. (Id. at 7, 9, 14.) Finally, Plaintiff asserts that the defendants

conspired to “cover up” the beating. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief and compensatory and

punitive damages. (Id. at 25-26.)

As aforementioned, Lonsdale filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6). 

(Doc. No. 70.) He argues that Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed with prejudice because the SAC

failed to state any viable 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against him. (Id. at 3.) 

Plaintiff, in his opposition, retorts that Lonsdale conspired to violate his constitutional rights. 

(Doc. No. 74 at 4.) Plaintiff further argues that Lonsdale had an affirmative duty to help Plaintiff when

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he witnessed the beating, and his failure to do so violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. (Id. at 5.) 

Finally, Plaintiff argues that it “would serve justice” for Lonsdale to be at trial because he witnessed the

incident. (Id. at 5-6.) 

Lonsdale, in turn, has filed a reply to Plaintiff’s opposition. He insists that Plaintiff failed to

plead essential facts. (Doc. No. 80 at 3.) In addition, Lonsdale maintains that Plaintiff wants to keep

him in the case for the sole purpose of having him as a witness. (Id. at 4.)

IV. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO 12(b)(6)

A. Standard of Review per FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6) 

Lonsdale seeks to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against him on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. A motion to

dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of the claims within a

complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Thus, a complaint or a claim within a

complaint may be dismissed under this rule if it is insufficient. A claim is insufficient if it lacks a

cognizable legal theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984);

see Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326 (1989) (“Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a court to dismiss a claim

on the basis of a dispositive issue of law.”). Alternatively, a claim may also be insufficient if it presents

a cognizable legal theory yet fails to plead essential facts under that theory. Robertson, 749 F.2d at 534. 

If a claim is dismissed because the complaint fails to allege essential facts, then leave to amend

the complaint should be granted along with the dismissal “unless the district court determines that the

pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Bly-Magee v. California, 236

F.3d 1014, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted); Chang v. Chen, 80 F.3d 1293, 1296

(9th Cir. 1996). Therefore, dismissing a claim with prejudice under this rule is appropriate only where

“it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would

entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Navarro, 250 F.3d at 732. In fact, a

motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is generally “viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted.” 

Gilligan v. Jamico Develop. Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 249 (9th Cir. 1997). 

In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint, the court must assume the truth of all factual

allegations and construe them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Thompson v. Davis,

295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002); Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). 

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The court may consider the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached to the complaint,

documents incorporated by reference in the complaint, and matters of which the court takes judicial

notice. United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003); Parrino v. FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699,

705-06 (9th Cir. 2003); Thompson, 295 F.3d at 895. In addition, a court may hypothesize facts,

“consistent with the complaint, that would make out a claim.” Graelhing v. Village of Lombard, Ill., 58

F.3d 295, 297 (7th Cir. 1995). However, legal conclusions need not be taken as true merely because

they are cast in the form of factual allegations. Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir.

1987); Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981).

In addition, while the above-stated guidelines “apply equally as well to civil rights complaints

brought by pro se plaintiffs,” such pleadings are held to an even “less stringent standard than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 640 (9th Cir. 1980). Thus, federal

courts are particularly liberal in construing “inartful pleadings” by parties appearing pro se. Huges v.

Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980). Naturally, pro se plaintiffs should be given “an opportunity to amend

[their] complaint[s] to overcome any deficiency unless it clearly appears...that the deficiency cannot be

overcome by amendment.” Id. (emphasis added); see Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839

F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Robertson 749 F.2d at 541 (court remanded district court’s

granting of a motion to dismiss because while the plaintiff had not alleged essential facts necessary to

establish his claim in the complaint, the record had nothing that clearly showed he was unable to plead

such facts through an amended complaint).

B. Analysis of Plaintiff’s Claims

1. Breach of Duty Claim

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a person is liable for deprivation of another’s constitutional right “if he

does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is

legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588

F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978) (emphasis added). Since generally, a law enforcement officer acting

within the scope of their duties has a common law duty to exercise ordinary care “with respect to the

safety and well being of persons in their custody,” 63 C.J.S. Munccorp § 492 (2007), a corrections

officer has an affirmative duty to reasonably intervene on behalf of a prisoner if other officers are

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violating that prisoner’s constitutional rights in his presence or if he knows that the prisoner’s rights are

being violated. Robins v. Meecham, 60 F.3d 1436, 1442 (9th Cir. 1995) (court held that a prison official

could violate a prisoner’s 8th Amendment rights by failure to intervene); Byrd v. Brishke, 466 F.2d 6,

11 (7th Cir. 1972); see also Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781, 788 (5th Cir. 1968) (court held that negligence

nonfeasance was a proper basis for imposition of tort liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). In other words,

an officer has a duty to act reasonably on behalf of a prisoner if he knows or can reasonably infer that

other officers are using excessive force against that prisoner. 

However, there must be a causal link between an officer’s inaction and the plaintiff’s injuries or

deprivation of a constitutional right. Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743; see Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 181

(1961) (Court held that “[42 U.S.C. § 1983] should be read against the background of tort liability that

makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his actions.”) Usually, for cause to be

established against defendants who failed to act in presence of an alleged use of excessive force by other

officers, factors such as whether the defendant had reasonable time to intervene, and whether the

defendant had tacitly collaborated with the officers using force should be considered. O'Neill v.

Krzeminski, 839 F.2d 9, 11 (2d Cir.1988). More simply put, “officers can be held liable for failure to

intercede only if they had an opportunity to intercede.” Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1289 (9th

Cir. 2000). 

Given that Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and filing a civil rights complaint, the Court should

construe his pleading liberally, Thompson, 295 F.2d at 895, and in a light most favorable to him. 

Gillespie, 629 F.2d at 640. Since Plaintiff maintains that Lonsdale was aware of the altercation taking

place on May 1, 2005, then clarifies his grievance in his opposition by asserting that Lonsdale violated

42. U.S.C. § 1983 when he failed to interfere on his behalf, he has adequately articulated a cognizable

legal theory based on a breach of duty on Lonsdale’s part. Thus, the question that remains is whether

Plaintiff pleaded essential facts to establish his theory.

Plaintiff must allege facts that show Lonsdale knew or could reasonably infer that Plaintiff’s

rights were being violated on May 1, 2005. Byrd, 466 F.2d at 11. In other words, his assertions must

show that Lonsdale could have reasonably interpreted the Deputies’ conduct during their engagement

with Plaintiff as more than just a good faith effort to prevent an inmate from escaping. Additionally, he

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Plaintiff mentions that Deputies responded to emergency calls and that these calls might be

connected to Lonsdale. (Doc. No.29 at 7) However, Plaintiff does not state who made the emergency

calls. In construing the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that Plaintiff is

maintaining that Lonsdale did not make the calls.

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must plead facts which show that his inaction is causally linked to Plaintiff’s injuries. Johnson, 588

F.2d at 743. 

Construing the facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, the Court finds that

Plaintiff has asserted enough facts to show that Lonsdale could have been aware that Plaintiff’s rights

were being violated. Plaintiff maintains that Lonsdale was aware that Deputies were using what

Plaintiff describes as “ blatant exag[g]erated unnecessary force” against him during the incident on May

1, 2005. (Doc. No. 29 at 7.) Plaintiff asserts that several Deputies began punching, kicking and twisting

Plaintiff after he had been contained in an area between the module door and cell hall and after he had

dropped his defense object. (Id.) Meanwhile, nothing on the record shows that Plaintiff tried to hit

Deputies back, even for self protection against the punches and kicks. In fact, Plaintiff states that “at

this point,” he was not resisting. (Id. at 8.) Thus, construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff,

multiple Deputies appeared to have been hitting a prisoner who was not resisting. Hence, it would also

be consistent to hypothesize that on May 1, 2005, Lonsdale saw that Deputies were hitting a compliant

and passive Plaintiff. Therefore, Lonsdale could have known that Deputies were using excessive force

against Plaintiff.

By similar reasoning, the Court may infer that Lonsdale’s inaction could be causally connected

to Plaintiff’s injuries. Plaintiff claims that Deputies beat him in an area between the module door and

the cell hall. (Doc. No. 29 at 7.) Plaintiff also claims he suffered a second beating after Deputies

dragged him away from security camera view. (Id. at 9.) Meanwhile, Lonsdale presumably saw the

altercation taking place in a control tower through a security camera. (Id. at 14.) The Court may

reasonably infer that Lonsdale had communication equipment in the control tower and should have

called other officers 

to stop the beating3

. The Court may also infer that the entire altercation did not happen instantaneously:

it lasted long enough for Deputies to beat Plaintiff, remove his “protective jailhouse armor,” and to drag

him away from the view of the security camera. Thus, if Lonsdale had called other officers, they might

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have been able to arrive at the scene in time to stop Deputies and mitigate Plaintiff’s injuries. Therefore,

construing the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that Lonsdale could of had a

reasonable opportunity to intercede on behalf of Plaintiff.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court recommends that Lonsdale’s motion as to Plaintiff’s first

claim be DENIED. 

2. Conspiracy Claim

A civil conspiracy occurs when “the parties have reached a unity of purpose or a common 

design and understanding, or a meeting of the minds in an unlawful arrangement.” Transgo Inc. v. Ajac

Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001, 1020 (9th Cir. 1985). In other words, a civil conspiracy is “a

combination of two or more persons acting in concert to commit an unlawful act or to commit a lawful

act by unlawful means, the principal element of which is an agreement between the parties to inflict the

harm or injury upon another.” Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600, 620-21 (7th Cir. 1979); Rotomound

v. U.S. Steel Corp., 474 F.2d 1139, 1145 (8th Cir. 1973). However, an agreement to commit a civil

wrong alone is insufficient. Generally, one of the conspirators must also commit an overt act in

furtherance of the agreement, and a plaintiff must suffer an injury as a result of some act done in

carrying out the agreement in order for there to be a cause of action for civil conspiracy. 16 AM. JUR. 2D

Conspiracy § 51 (2007). Thus, specifically, to have an action for conspiring to violate 42 U.S.C. §

1983, “there must be a showing that the defendants conspired or acted jointly or in concert and that

some overt act was done in furtherance of the conspiracy, which resulted in plaintiff being deprived of

the constitutional right.” Hafner v. Brown, 983 F.2d 570, 577 (4th Cir. 1992).

Here, Plaintiff asserts that there appeared to be “covering up” involved. Plaintiff recalls that

Deputies wanted him to change his story about the beating in order to receive medical treatment. (Doc.

No. 29 at 12.) Plaintiff states that several Deputies said, “help us, and we will get you medical

attention.” (Id.) Based on these observations, Plaintiff contends that a group of people planned the

cover up. Additionally, the Deputies’ alleged dialoging with the Plaintiff and falsifying of reports may

constitute overt acts since they were done in an effort to achieve the cover up. Hafner v. Brown, 938

F.2d at 577. Finally, there appears to be a deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights as a result of the attempted

cover up. Plaintiff’s ability to claim relief against excessive use of force is compromised by the

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allegedly falsified reports. Also, Plaintiff suffered “continuous indifferent retaliatory punishment” as a

result of the assault charges. (Id. at 23.)

However, Plaintiff has not asserted that Lonsdale was involved in the “cover up” along with the

other Deputies. For example, he has not alleged that Lonsdale agreed with the other Deputies to falsify

reports or that he acted in concert with other defendants in making up a story about what transpired on

May 1, 2005. Additionally, he has not asserted any facts which allows the court to reasonably infer that

there might have been an agreement between Deputies and Lonsdale to “cover up the beating.” The

only assertion Plaintiff has made with regards to the conspiracy claim is a legal conclusion that

“defendants conspired to cover up the beating.” Thus, based on the SAC alone, Plaintiff has not pleaded

any essential facts which makes Lonsdale liable to him for conspiracy.

3. Plaintiff Should be Given a Chance to Amend his Complaint 

With respect to the conspiracy claim, Plaintiff’s SAC is insufficient because he failed to allege

essential facts. Robertson, 749 F.2d at 534. As just discussed, Plaintiff does not allege facts which

show that Lonsdale agreed with the other deputies to cover up the beating. However, it is not plainly

clear that Plaintiff would not be able to assert these facts in an amended complaint. In other words, the

SAC’s insufficiencies might be curable through amendments. It is plausible that Plaintiff simply did not

know which facts he needed to allege in order to state a viable conspiracy claim against Lonsdale.

Hypothetically, Plaintiff might know some facts that connect Lonsdale to the “cover up,” but simply did

not include them in his complaint. 

While Plaintiff has amended his complaint twice, it appears that he did so only to clarify the

identities of the defendants he wanted to bring into the action. (Compare Doc. No. 1 with Doc. No. 29.) 

Given that Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, Gillespie, 629 F.2d at 640, and the record does not clearly

show the claim to be implausible, frivolous, or unprovable, the Court recommends that Lonsdale’s

motion with respect to the second claim be should GRANTED without prejudice.

//

//

//

// 

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V. CONCLUSION

In summary, the Court recommends DENYING Lonsdale’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s breach

of duty claim and GRANTING without prejudice Lonsdale’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s conspiracy

claim against him. As discussed above, while Plaintiff has sufficiently stated two cognizable legal

theories under which Lonsdale may be brought to this action, he has only asserted sufficient essential

facts for his breach of duty theory. Nevertheless, because the record does not clearly show that facts 

essential for Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim against Lonsdale either do not exist, can not be proved, or can

not be asserted in an amended complaint for any other reason, the failure to allege them is not an

uncorrectable deficiency. See Robertson 749 F.2d at 541. Thus, the Court also recommends GRANTING Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint. Bly-Magee, 236 F.3d at 1019.

IT IS ORDERED that, no later than August 1, 2007, any party to this action may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” Any reply to objections shall be filed ON OR BEFORE August

15, 2007. The Parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the

right to raise objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th

Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: June 29, 2007

Peter C. Lewis

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

cc: The Honorable William Q. Hayes

 All Counsel of Record

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