Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01557/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01557-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 17:0101 Copyright Infringement (definitions)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SCORPIO MUSIC (BLACK 

SCORPIO) S.A. and CAN’T STOP 

PRODUCTIONS, INC.,

Plaintiff,

 vs.

VICTOR WILLIS,

Defendant.

Case No.: 11cv1557 BTM(RBB)

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 

VACATE THE VAN WYCK 

JUDGMENT

VICTOR WILLIS,

Counterclaimant,

 vs.

SCORPIO MUSIC (BLACK 

SCORPIO) S.A., CAN’T STOP 

PRODUCTIONS, INC. and HENRI 

BELOLO,

Counterclaim-Defendants

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I. INTRODUCTION

Intervenor Karen L. Willis has filed a motion to vacate the state court 

judgment obtained by Michael E. Moore and Jason Rodenbo against Victor Willis 

in the amount of $250,975.08.1 This judgment was later assigned by Moore and 

Rodenbo to Van Wyck, Inc. In an order filed on September 15, 2015, the Court 

determined that Van Wyck has a valid judgment lien under California law. For the 

reasons discussed below, the motion to vacate is DENIED.

II. DISCUSSION

Mrs. Willis seeks to void the state court judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) 

and (d). She contends that the state court judgment was fraudulently obtained by 

Moore and Rodenbo because the fee agreement that formed the basis of their 

lawsuit against Victor Willis (“Willis”) was entered into by Moore and Rodenbo’s 

professional corporations, not Moore and Rodenbo as individuals. According to 

Mrs. Willis, because the fee agreement was between Willis and the respective 

professional corporations, Moore and Rodenbo lacked standing to bring suit

against Willis for breach of contract, and, therefore, the judgment should not stand.

 

1 Victor Willis has joined in the motion.

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Even if Rule 60 were a proper vehicle to seek the relief requested by Mrs. 

Willis,2the Court concludes that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Mrs. Willis’s 

claim that the state court judgment is void due to fraud on the court. Under the 

Rooker-Feldman3 doctrine, a losing party in state court is forbidden “from filing suit 

in federal district court complaining of an injury caused by a state court judgment, 

and seeking federal court review and rejection of that judgment.” Bell v. City of 

Boise, 709 F.3d 890, 897 (9th Cir. 2013). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars 

forbidden de facto appeals from state court – i.e., “when the plaintiff in federal 

district court complains of a legal wrong allegedly committed by the state court, 

and seeks relief from the judgment of that court.” Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 

1163 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Mrs. Willis argues that Rooker-Feldman does not apply here because she is 

not alleging that the state court committed legal error but that Moore and Rodenbo 

committed fraud upon the court by failing to disclose that they lacked standing to 

 

2

 Courts have held that Rule 60(b) does not apply to state court judgments. See

Holder v. Simon, 384 Fed. Appx. 669 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Rule 60(b) does not provide a basis for 

subject matter jurisdiction over a claim for relief from a state court judgment.”); De Mol v. 

Grand Canyon Title Agency, 2010 WL 4269534, at * 1 (D. Ariz. Oct. 25, 2010) (holding that 

Rule 60(b) is not the appropriate mechanism for challenging the validity of a state court 

judgment). In her reply, Mrs. Willis explains that she is relying on Rule 60(d), not Rule 60(b). 

However, Mrs. Willis does not identify any authority that Rule 60(d) can be used to void a state 

court judgment. 

 

3 The doctrine takes its name from Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) 

and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). 

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bring their claims against Willis. Mrs. Willis relies on the following language from 

the Noel decision: 

We believe that the following general formulation describes the 

distinctive role of the Rooker–Feldman doctrine in our federal system: 

If a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly erroneous 

decision by a state court, and seeks relief from a state court judgment 

based on that decision, Rooker–Feldman bars subject matter 

jurisdiction in federal district court. If, on the other hand, a federal 

plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly illegal act or omission by 

an adverse party, Rooker–Feldman does not bar jurisdiction. 

Noel, 341 F.3d 15 1164. 

Mrs. Willis claims that Moore and Rodenbo misled the court, but her ultimate 

argument is that the judgment should be voided because Moore and Rodenbo 

lacked standing to bring their claims. See Menna v. Radmanesh, 2014 WL 

6892724, at * 8 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2014) (explaining that although the plaintiff 

protested that the defendants engaged in wrongdoing that resulted in the state 

court judgments, plaintiff’s theory was that the courts lacked jurisdiction, rendering 

his action a de facto appeal). Although Mrs. Willis places the blame on Moore and 

Rodenbo, she contends that the judgment was entered in error and should 

therefore be set aside.

Furthermore, the injury claimed by Mrs. Willis is injury to Mr. Willis and 

herself from the state court judgment, not some independent harm. See GASH 

Associates v. Village of Rosemont, 995 F.2d 726, 729 (7th Cir. 1993) (“[T]he injury 

of which GASH complains was caused by the judgment, just as in Rooker, 

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Feldman, and Ritter. GASH did not suffer an injury out of court and then fail to get 

relief from state court; its injury came from the [state court] judgment . . . .”) Mrs. 

Willis explains that “Van Wyck with use of its Judgment against Willis actively 

seeks to infringe upon Intervenor’s interests in Willis’s judgments and copyrights 

stemming from Scorpio v. Willis.” (Doc. 283 at 3:20-22.) 

“Reduced to its essence, Rooker held that when a losing plaintiff in state 

court brings a suit in federal district court asserting as legal wrongs the allegedly 

erroneous legal rulings of the state court and seeks to vacate or set aside the 

judgment of that court, the federal suit is a forbidden de facto appeal.” Noel, 341 

F.3d at 1156. This is precisely what Mrs. Willis is doing here. Therefore, the Court 

lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Mrs. Willis’s claim. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, Mrs. Willis’s motion to vacate the state 

court judgment is DENIED.

Dated: January 4, 2016

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