Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02149/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-02149-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NATHAN CLARK,

Petitioner,

v.

L.S. MCEWEN, 

Respondent. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Civil No. 10cv02149 AJB(RBB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS AND ORDER

DENYING EVIDENTIARY HEARING

[ECF NO. 1]

Petitioner Nathan Clark, a state prisoner proceeding pro se

and in forma pauperis, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

on October 12, 2010, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 [ECF Nos. 1, 3].1

Clark alleges that officials at Calipatria State Prison

(“Calipatria”) issued three consecutive rules violations for the

same offense relating to job performance, which resulted in the

improper “stacking” of overlapping violations to enhance the

discipline. (Pet. 6-9, ECF No. 1) As a result, Clark was deprived

of a total of ninety days of good time and work credits — thirty

days for each violation. (Id. at 7.) Petitioner maintains that

1

 Because the Petition, Answer, and Traverse are not

consecutively paginated, the Court will cite to them using the page

numbers assigned by the electronic case filing system.

 1 10cv02149 AJB(RBB)

Case 3:10-cv-02149-AJB-RBB Document 10 Filed 02/28/12 Page 1 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the sixty-day credit loss for the subsequent violations constitutes

an “illegal sentence,” in violation of his rights to due process

and equal protection. (Id. at 6-8.) Clark also requests an

evidentiary hearing. (Id. at 1.)

On December 30, 2010, Respondent L.S. McEwen, warden, filed an

Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus as well as a Notice of

Lodgment [ECF No. 6]. There, McEwen contends that the Court should

deny federal habeas relief because Clark’s claims are procedurally

defaulted, and the Petition was not filed within the one-year

statute of limitations prescribed by the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). (Answer 6, ECF No. 6.) 

Alternatively, if the Court considers the Petition on its merits,

Respondent contends that Clark fails to state a cognizable federal

claim and does not allege a prima facie claim for relief. (Id.) 

The Petitioner filed a Traverse along with exhibits on January

28, 2011 [ECF No. 7]. Clark insists that his claims are not

procedurally defaulted, the Petition is not barred by AEDPA’s

one-year statute of limitations, and he sufficiently alleges a

federal question and states a prima facie case. (Traverse 14-16,

21, ECF No. 7.)

The Court has reviewed the Petition, Respondent’s Answer and

lodgments, and the Traverse. For the reasons discussed below,

Clark's Petition should be DENIED. 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

 Petitioner alleges that prison officials at Calipatria issued

three consecutive rules violation reports relating to his job

performance and imposed three separate credit forfeitures for the

same offense, which is against the California Department of

 2 10cv02149 AJB(RBB)

Case 3:10-cv-02149-AJB-RBB Document 10 Filed 02/28/12 Page 2 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) policy that prohibits

“stacking.” (Pet. 6-7, ECF No. 1.) Clark submits that he was

employed as a “3rd watch program office porter,” which is a paid

position. (Id. at 13; Traverse 4, ECF No. 7.) On July 20, 2005,

Petitioner was given a rules violation for failing to comply with

section 3041(a) of the California Code of Regulations. (Pet. 7,

13, ECF No. 1.) He was specifically cited for ignoring his

supervising officer’s orders to perform on four different

occasions. (Id. at 13.) In light of Clark’s job performance on

July 20, 2005, as well as his numerous other rules violations for

job performance, the reporting officer requested that Petitioner be

taken to “ICC” and removed from his job assignment. (Id.) 

The next day, on July 21, 2005, Clark received a second rules

violation, this one was for failing to report to work, in violation

of section 3041(a). (Id. at 14.) The citing officer noted that

Clark had received violations on February 6, and June 2, 2005, for

the same conduct. (Id.) Once again, the correctional officer

requested that Petitioner be taken to ICC and removed from his job

assignment. (Id.)

The following day, July 22, 2005, Clark received the third

rules violation, again, this one was for refusing to report for

work, in violation of section 3041(a). (Id. at 15.) Correctional

Officer Mejia noted that Clark had received violations on February

6, June 2, and June 21, 2005, for the same conduct. (Id.) Again,

the correctional officer requested that Petitioner be taken to ICC

and removed from his job assignment. (Id.)

On July 25, 2005, a hearing was held regarding the first rules

violation issued on July 20, 2005, for Clark’s refusal to perform

 3 10cv02149 AJB(RBB)

Case 3:10-cv-02149-AJB-RBB Document 10 Filed 02/28/12 Page 3 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

his job duties while at work. (Lodgment No. 2, Rules Violation

Report 2, July 25, 2005.) Although Petitioner pleaded not guilty,

he was ultimately found guilty of violating section 3041 for the

specific act of “performance,” a division “F” offense. (Id.) 

Clark was assessed a thirty-day forfeiture of credits, reprimanded

about program expectations, and advised of future behavioral

expectations. (Id. at 3.) 

On August 9, 2005, a hearing was held for the second rules

violation issued on July 21, 2005, for Clark’s refusal to report

for work. (Lodgment No. 3, Rules Violation Report 4, Aug. 9,

2005.) Petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge of violating

section 3041(a) due to his job “performance,” as a division “F”

offense. (Id.) He was assessed a thirty-day forfeiture of

credits, including thirty days of forfeited phone, yard, and

dayroom access. (Id.; see Pet. 7, ECF No. 1.) Clark was also

counseled about program and behavioral expectations. (Lodgment No.

3, Rules Violation Report 4.) The Petitioner was also “referred to

UCC with recommendation for: Removal from assignment and placement

[o]n C-STATUS: For Program Failure Review.” (Id.) 

Approximately ten minutes later on August 9, 2005, a

disciplinary hearing was held on the third rules violation issued

on July 22, 2005, also for Clark’s failure to report to work. 

(Lodgment No. 4, Rules Violation Report 2, Aug. 9, 2005.) The

Petitioner pleaded guilty to violating section 3041(a) for his

“performance” and was assessed an additional thirty-day forfeiture

of credits as a division “F” offense; this included a thirty-day

loss of phone, yard, and dayroom access. (Id.) Clark was also

lectured about program expectations. (Id.) 

 4 10cv02149 AJB(RBB)

Case 3:10-cv-02149-AJB-RBB Document 10 Filed 02/28/12 Page 4 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

On January 10, 2010, nearly five years after the disciplinary

hearings were held, Clark submitted an inmate grievance asserting

that the sixty-day credit loss for the July 21 and 22, 2005

violations was the result of improper “stacking” for the same

offense. (See Pet. 8, 28, ECF No. 1.) This grievance was screened

out as untimely on January 12, 2010, pursuant to section 3084.6(c)

of the California Code of Regulations. (Id. at 27.) The appeals

coordinator indicated that if Petitioner would like to pursue the

matter further, he must submit an explanation and supporting

documentation describing why he did not or could not file his

grievance in a timely manner. (Id.) 

The Petitioner resubmitted the same grievance, received one

week later, on January 20, 2010, along with an excuse for the more

than four-year lapse between the 2005 hearing and his appeal. (Id.

at 28, 32; see Traverse 9, ECF No. 7.) Clark explained that he had

been unaware of CDCR’s policy against “stacking” until the time

that he filed his initial grievance. (Pet. 32, ECF No. 1.) He

alleged that the hearing officer should have recognized the

improper “stacking” and concluded that time bars do not apply to

challenges of unauthorized sentences. (Id.) Petitioner’s appeal

was screened out at the second level on January 20, 2010, as

untimely. (Id. at 30.) The appeals coordinator wrote, “Your

response has been noted, however, your appeal remains untimely, and

will not be accepted. Please do not resubmit.” (Id.) Clark did

not submit this claim to the third level of review.

//

//

//

 5 10cv02149 AJB(RBB)

Case 3:10-cv-02149-AJB-RBB Document 10 Filed 02/28/12 Page 5 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On February 18, 2010, Clark filed a petition for writ of

habeas corpus with the California Superior Court for the County of

Imperial, alleging due process violations arising from prison

officials’ “stacking” of the three instances of rules violations. 

(Id. at 44.) The court denied the petition on March 19, 2010,

because it was untimely, and Clark failed to account for the

significant delay in filing the state petition. (Id. (citing In re

Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750, 855 P.2d 729, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 509 (1993)).) 

Next, Clark filed a petition with the California Supreme

Court, which was summarily denied on August 18, 2010. (Id. at 42.) 

The court cited In re Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th 770, 780, 959 P.2d 311,

317, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 152, 159-60 (1998), and In re Dexter, 25 Cal.

3d 921, 603 P.2d 35, 160 Cal. Rptr. 118 (1979). (Id.)

Clark filed this federal Petition on October 12, 2010 [ECF No.

1].

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”),

28 U.S.C.A. § 2244 (West 2006), applies to all federal habeas

petitions filed after April 24, 1996. Woodford v. Garceau, 538

U.S. 202, 204 (2003) (citing Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326

(1997)). AEDPA sets forth the scope of review for federal habeas

corpus claims:

“The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge,

or a district court shall entertain an application for a

writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the

ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”

 6 10cv02149 AJB(RBB)

Case 3:10-cv-02149-AJB-RBB Document 10 Filed 02/28/12 Page 6 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(a) (West 2006); see also Reed v. Farley, 512

U.S. 339, 347 (1994); Hernandez v. Ylst, 930 F.2d 714, 719 (9th

Cir. 1991). Because Clark’s Petition was filed on October 12,

2010, AEDPA applies to this case. See Woodford, 538 U.S. at 204. 

In 1996, Congress “worked substantial changes to the law of 

habeas corpus.” Moore v. Calderon, 108 F.3d 261, 263 (9th Cir.

1997). Amended § 2254(d) now reads:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf

of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a

State court shall not be granted with respect to any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court

proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim

--

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined

by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d) (West 2008). 

 To present a cognizable federal habeas corpus claim, a state

prisoner must allege that his conviction was obtained “in violation

of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(a). A petitioner must allege that the state court

violated his federal constitutional rights. Hernandez, 930 F.2d at

719; Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 1990); Mannhalt

v. Reed, 847 F.2d 576, 579 (9th Cir. 1988).

A federal district court does “not sit as a ‘super’ state

supreme court” with general supervisory authority over the proper

application of state law. Smith v. McCotter, 786 F.2d 697, 700

(5th Cir. 1986); see also Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780

(1990) (holding that federal habeas courts must respect a state

 7 10cv02149 AJB(RBB)

Case 3:10-cv-02149-AJB-RBB Document 10 Filed 02/28/12 Page 7 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

court’s application of state law); Jackson, 921 F.2d at 885

(explaining that federal courts have no authority to review a

state’s application of its law). Federal courts may grant habeas

relief only to correct errors of federal constitutional magnitude. 

Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395, 1400 (9th Cir. 1989)

(stating that federal courts are not concerned with errors of state

law unless they rise to level of a constitutional violation). 

 The Supreme Court, in Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003),

stated that “AEDPA does not require a federal habeas court to adopt

any one methodology in deciding the only question that matters

under § 2254(d)(1) -- whether a state court decision is contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law.” (Id. at 71) (citation omitted). In other words, a

federal court is not required to review the state court decision de

novo. (Id.) Rather, a federal court can proceed directly to the

reasonableness analysis under § 2254(d)(1). (Id.) 

The “novelty” in § 2254(d)(1) is “the reference to ‘Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.’” 

Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 869 (7th Cir. 1996) (en banc), rev’d

on other grounds, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). Section 2254(d)(1)

“explicitly identifies only the Supreme Court as the font of

‘clearly established’ rules.” (Id.) “[A] state court decision may

not be overturned on habeas corpus review, for example, because of

a conflict with Ninth Circuit-based law.” Moore, 108 F.3d at 264. 

“[A] writ may issue only when the state court decision is ‘contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of,’ an authoritative

decision of the Supreme Court.” (Id.) (citing Childress v.

Johnson, 103 F.3d 1221, 1225 (5th Cir. 1997); Devin v. DeTella, 101

 8 10cv02149 AJB(RBB)

Case 3:10-cv-02149-AJB-RBB Document 10 Filed 02/28/12 Page 8 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

F.3d 1206, 1208 (7th Cir. 1996); Baylor v. Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321,

1325 (9th Cir. 1996).) 

Furthermore, with respect to the factual findings of the trial

court, AEDPA provides:

In a proceeding instituted by an application for a

writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to

the judgment of a State court, a determination of a

factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to

be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of

rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and

convincing evidence.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)(1).

IV. DISCUSSION

In his Petition, Clark maintains that his second and third

rules violations should have been dismissed under the CDCR policy

against stacking. (Pet. 6-9, ECF No. 1) Petitioner concedes that

the thirty-day forfeiture of time and work credit was appropriate,

but he argues that the sixty-day credit loss that was imposed for

the second and third violations was “illegal” and violated his

rights to due process and equal protection. (Id. at 6-8.) He also

requests an evidentiary hearing. (Id. at 1.)

Warden McEwen contends that Clark is not entitled to federal

habeas relief because his claims are procedurally defaulted and

untimely. (Answer 6, ECF No. 6.) Even if the Court considered the

Petition on its merits, Respondent alleges, it should be denied

because Clark has not stated a cognizable federal claim and does

not allege a prima facie claim. (Id.) 

A. One-Year Statute of Limitations

The Respondent maintains that Clark’s Petition is barred by

the one-year statute of limitations set forth in § 2244(d). (Id.

at 8.) The CDCR’s administrative grievance procedures require that

 9 10cv02149 AJB(RBB)

Case 3:10-cv-02149-AJB-RBB Document 10 Filed 02/28/12 Page 9 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

inmates file a grievance within fifteen working days of the event

giving rise to the complaint. (Id. at 9 (citing Cal. Code Regs.

tit. 15, § 3084.6(c) (amended 2011)).) Because Petitioner

challenges the sanctions resulting from the disciplinary hearings

on August 9, 2005, McEwen maintains that Clark learned about the

loss of custody credits the same date of the hearings. (Id. at 8-

9.) For habeas petitions that challenge administrative decisions,

AEDPA states that a petition must be filed within one year from the

date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review, or the expiration of the time for seeking such review. 

(Id. at 8 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)).) Therefore, Respondent

asserts that the statute of limitations for Clark’s claim began to

run on August 30, 2005, when the time to seek review expired, which

was fifteen working days after he was advised of the loss of

credits. (Id. at 9, n.7.) The limitations period expired one year

later on August 30, 2006. (Id. at 9.) Thus, McEwen contends that

Clark filed his federal Petition on October 12, 2010, or 1,499 days

after the statute had run. (Id.) 

In his Traverse, Petitioner insists that his claim is not

barred by AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations because it

challenges an “illegal sentence,” and it is therefore not subject

to the statute. (Traverse 15, ECF No. 7 (citation omitted).) 

Clark also maintains that he was diligent because once he learned

of the newly discovered evidence from another inmate, he filed an

administrative grievance. (See id.)

The statute of limitations for federal habeas corpus petitions

is set forth in § 2244(d), which provides in relevant part:

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an

application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in

 10 10cv02149 AJB(RBB)

Case 3:10-cv-02149-AJB-RBB Document 10 Filed 02/28/12 Page 10 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of --

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by

the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of

the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an

application created by State action in violation of

the Constitution or laws of the United States is

removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing

by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right

asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme

Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the

Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to

cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the

claim or claims presented could have been discovered

through the exercise of due diligence.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(d)(1).

It is appropriate to dismiss a federal petition for writ of

habeas corpus with prejudice when it was not filed within the

AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations. Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d

478, 483 (9th Cir. 2001). Statute of limitations issues must be

resolved before the merits of individual claims. White v.

Klitzkie, 281 F.3d 920, 921-22 (9th Cir. 2002).

1. Start Date

AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations applies to habeas

petitions challenging administrative decisions. Mardesich v. Cate,

2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 3362, at *17 (9th Cir. Feb. 21, 2012); Shelby

v. Bartlett, 391 F.3d 1061, 1063 (9th Cir. 2004); Redd v. McGrath,

343 F.3d 1077, 1080 n.4 (9th Cir. 2003). Specifically, subsection

(D) of § 2244(d)(1) governs petitions attacking administrative

disciplinary rulings. Mardesich, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 3362, at

*18; Shelby, 391 F.3d at 1066 (quoting Redd, 343 F.3d at 1081-83). 

In these cases, the statute of limitations begins to run on “the

 11 10cv02149 AJB(RBB)

Case 3:10-cv-02149-AJB-RBB Document 10 Filed 02/28/12 Page 11 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence.” 28 U.S.C.A § 2244(d)(1)(D); see Mardesich, 2012 U.S.

App. LEXIS 3362, at *19; Shelby, 391 F.3d at 1066; Redd, 343 F.3d

at 1081-83. The statute may be tolled under 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(2). 

[T]he date of the “factual predicate” for [petitioner's]

claim under § 2244(d)(1)(D) is not determined by asking

when [petitioner] satisfied AEDPA’s exhaustion

requirement; rather it is determined independently of the

exhaustion requirement by inquiring when [petitioner]

could have learned of the factual basis for his claim

through the exercise of due diligence.

Redd, 343 F.3d at 1084. “Time begins when the prisoner knows (or

through diligence could discover) the important facts, not when the

prisoner recognizes their legal significance.” Hasan v. Galaza,

254 F.3d 1150, 1154 n.3 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Owens v. Boyd, 235

F.3d 356, 359 (7th Cir. 2000)). 

Here, the disciplinary hearings for the July 21 and 22, 2005

rules violations took place on August 9, 2005. (Lodgment No. 3,

Rules Violation Report 4; Lodgment No. 4, Rules Violation Report

2.) The Petitioner did not file an administrative grievance

challenging the August 9, 2005 decisions until January 10, 2010,

nearly five years later, when Clark allegedly learned of the prison

policy against “stacking.” (Pet. 8, 28, ECF No. 1.) That

grievance was screened out as untimely on January 12, 2010,

pursuant to section 3084.6(c) of the California Code of

Regulations, although Clark was permitted to submit an explanation

and documentation describing the reason for the delay. (Id. at

27.) Clark resubmitted the same grievance with an attached excuse

for the delay, which was received by the appeals office on January

 12 10cv02149 AJB(RBB)

Case 3:10-cv-02149-AJB-RBB Document 10 Filed 02/28/12 Page 12 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

20, 2010. (Id. at 28, 32.) Petitioner’s resubmitted appeal was

screened out again on January 20, 2010, as untimely, and Clark was

informed that he should not resubmit the appeal. (Id. at 30.) 

The Court must determine when the factual predicate for

Clark’s improper stacking claim could have been discovered through

the exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(d)(1)(D). In

cases where the petitioner timely submits an administrative appeal

challenging the disciplinary decision, the factual predicate is

usually the day that the administrative decision becomes final,

subject to the petitioner receiving proper notice. Shelby, 391

F.3d at 1066 (holding that the statute of limitation did not begin

to run until the petitioner’s administrative appeal had been

denied); Redd, 343 F.3d at 1084 (stating that the parole board’s

denial of the inmate’s administrative appeal was the “factual

predicate” that triggered the commencement of the limitations

period); Bridges v. Adams, No. S-08-2316 JAM GGH P, 2009 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 16100, at *2-3 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2009); Perez v. Sisto, No.

S-07-0544 LKK DAD P, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77509, at *10 (E.D. Cal.

Oct. 18, 2007). The Ninth Circuit recently held, “As a general

rule, the state agency’s denial of an administrative appeal is the

‘factual predicate’ for such habeas claims.” Mardesich, 2012 U.S.

App. LEXIS 3362, at *19 (footnote omitted). There is no indication

that the petitioner in Mardesich did not timely submit his

administrative appeal. See id. at *2-3, 23-24 (applying the rules

set forth in Shelby and Redd, which dealt with timely

administrative appeals). 

 Unlike the cases where the petitioner timely appealed the

parole board’s decision, Clark did not timely appeal the two

 13 10cv02149 AJB(RBB)

Case 3:10-cv-02149-AJB-RBB Document 10 Filed 02/28/12 Page 13 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

disciplinary rulings that each imposed a thirty-day credit loss. 

Therefore, the inquiry is whether the one-year statute of

limitations commenced on August 9, 2005, the date the disciplinary

hearings were held and rulings were made, or January 20, 2010, the

date Clark’s administrative grievance was ultimately screened out

as untimely. 

The Ninth Circuit has not expressly addressed when the factual

predicate for a claim could have been discovered if the petitioner

did not timely submit a grievance challenging the administrative

ruling. See Redd, 1084 n.11 (citing id. at 1081 n.6). 

Nonetheless, many courts have held that the factual predicate under

this circumstance is the date that the administrative decision was

issued. Kimbrell v. Cockrell, 311 F.3d 361, 363 (5th Cir. 2002)

(finding that because the petitioner did not timely file a

grievance after the administrative decision, the limitations period

began to run on the date that the decision was made, not when the

untimely appeal was ruled on); Edwards v. Small, No. 10CV918-

JM(JMA), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27448, at *6-7, 11-12 (S.D. Cal.

Feb. 18, 2011) (stating that the limitations period commenced on

the date of the disciplinary hearings because petitioner’s

grievance was ultimately screened out as untimely and was therefore

never administratively reviewed); see also Duke v. Marshall, No. CV

09-05888-GHK(SH), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50071, at *9-10 n.8 (C.D.

Cal. Mar. 9, 2010) (filing superior court petition before

administrative appeal became final); Hecker v. Hubbard, No. S-07-

1511 FCD GGH P, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76126, at *7-8 (E.D. Cal.

Aug. 27, 2008) (using latest rejection date as “untimely” to

trigger limitations); Strack v. Campbell, No. S-07-0580 RRB DAD P,

 14 10cv02149 AJB(RBB)

Case 3:10-cv-02149-AJB-RBB Document 10 Filed 02/28/12 Page 14 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93232, at *16-17 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2007)

(same); Somers v. Schwartz, No. S-05-1454 LKK DAD P, 2007 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 74991, at *21-23 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2007) (holding that

petitioner timely appealed, so the date he received a screening

notice improperly dismissing his appeal as untimely triggered the

limitations period); but see Waiwaiole v. Kane, No. C 04-3790

SI(pr), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10052, at *5 (N.D. Cal. May 9, 2005)

(acknowledging that the limitations period would have started on

the date that the parole decision became final because that was the

factual predicate for the habeas claim). 

The disciplinary hearings Clark challenges were never

administratively reviewed. See Edwards, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

27448, at *11-12. The Petitioner knew that he was beig assessed a

sixty-day credit forfeiture for the two rules violations for

refusing to report to work on August 9, 2005, the date of the

hearings. See Kimbrell, 311 F.3d at 364. Although the timely

pendency of administrative grievance procedures would have tolled

the one-year limitations period, Clark did not file his first

grievance until nearly five years after the disciplinary hearings. 

See id. Petitioner discovered the factual predicate of his claims

arising from these two hearings on August 9, 2005, the date that

both hearings were held. See Edwards, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27448,

at *11. AEDPA’s statute of limitations therefore commenced on

August 30, 2005, and expired one year later on August 31, 2006. 

See id. Because Clark did not file a state habeas corpus petition

until February 18, 2010, his claim is untimely by more than three

years. 

 15 10cv02149 AJB(RBB)

Case 3:10-cv-02149-AJB-RBB Document 10 Filed 02/28/12 Page 15 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The Petitioner is also not entitled to a delayed accrual date

under § 2244(d)(1)(D). Hasan, 254 F.3d at 1154 n.3 (discussing

that the limitations period commences when the petitioner knows, or

through diligence could discover, the important facts, not when the

petitioner understands their legal import); Flanagan v. Johnson,

154 F.3d 196, 198-99 (5th Cir. 1998) (noting that § 2244(d)(1)(D)

does not permit an extended delay while a prisoner gathers “every

possible scrap of evidence” that could support his contentions);

see also Waiwaiole, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10052, at *8 n.2. Clark

knew on August 9, 2005, that he was being assessed a sixty-day

forfeiture of credit on top of his initial thirty-day forfeiture,

and he knew what had occurred during the two disciplinary hearings. 

See Waiwaiole, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10052, at *8 n.2. The

Petitioner’s subsequent acquisition of information that was helpful

to his claim does not justify a later start date of the limitations

period. Id.

2. Statutory Tolling

McEwen asserts that Clark is not entitled to statutory tolling

because he did not file his state habeas petitions until long after

the statute of limitations had run. (Answer 9, ECF No. 6.) 

According to Respondent, Petitioner delayed more than four years

from the disciplinary hearings before filing his state habeas

petition on February 18, 2010. (Id. at 10.) The state supreme

court denied a subsequent habeas petition as untimely. (Id.) 

Moreover, Clark’s federal habeas petition was mailed to the Court

on October 7, 2010, which is 1,499 days after the statute of

limitation expired. (Id.) Petitioner does not address whether he

is entitled to statutory tolling. 

 16 10cv02149 AJB(RBB)

Case 3:10-cv-02149-AJB-RBB Document 10 Filed 02/28/12 Page 16 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The statute of limitations under AEDPA is tolled during

periods in which a “properly filed” habeas corpus petition is

“pending” in the state court. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(d)(2). The

statute specifically provides, “The time during which a properly

filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral

review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending

shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this

subsection.” Id.; see also Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 410

(2005). “[A]n application is ‘properly filed’ when its delivery

and acceptance are in compliance with the applicable laws and rules

governing filings.” Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000)

(explaining that typical filing requirements include all relevant

time limits). 

The interval between the disposition of one state petition and

the filing of another may be tolled under “interval tolling.” 

Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 223 (2002). “[T]he AEDPA statute

of limitations is tolled for ‘all of the time during which a state

prisoner is attempting, through proper use of state court

procedures, to exhaust state court remedies with regard to a

particular post-conviction application.’” Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d

1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Barnett v. Lamaster, 167 F.3d

1321, 1323 (10th Cir. 1999)); see also Carey, 536 U.S. at 219-22. 

The statute of limitations is tolled from the time a petitioner’s

first state habeas petition is filed until state collateral review

is concluded, but it is not tolled before the first state

collateral challenge is filed. Thorson v. Palmer, 479 F.3d 643,

646 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006). 

 17 10cv02149 AJB(RBB)

Case 3:10-cv-02149-AJB-RBB Document 10 Filed 02/28/12 Page 17 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

In this case, the disciplinary hearings in question took place

on August 9, 2005, and Clark did not file his habeas petition with

the superior court until February 18, 2010. The petition was

therefore filed four and one-half years after the disciplinary

hearings on August 9, 2005, and three and one-half years after

AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations expired on August 31, 2006. 

A subsequently filed petition for state collateral relief cannot

revive an expired statute of limitations. Pace, 544 U.S. at 417;

see also Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d at 482; Green v. White, 223 F.3d

1001, 1003 (9th Cir. 2000). Therefore, the statute of limitations

for Clark was not tolled for the period between August 31, 2006,

the date the limitations period expired, and February 18, 2010, the

date the first state habeas petition was filed. See Pace, 544 U.S.

at 417. 

3. Equitable Tolling

The Respondent also submits that Clark is not entitled to

equitable tolling. (See Answer 10-12, ECF No. 6.) McEwen concedes

that Petitioner appears to be arguing that equitable tolling

applies because California law allows courts to correct an

“unauthorized sentence” at any time. (Id. at 11.) According to

Respondent, this argument is misplaced because Clark is appealing

prison disciplinary action, not a criminal sentence. (Id.) 

Further, Petitioner provides no authority to support his contention

that state law trumps the federal statute of limitations. (Id.) 

McEwen challenges Clark’s alternative argument that he was unaware

of the prison policy against “stacking” until he reviewed another

inmate’s rules violation dated August 11, 2008. (Id. at 11-12.) 

Respondent argues that it is unclear when he reviewed this

 18 10cv02149 AJB(RBB)

Case 3:10-cv-02149-AJB-RBB Document 10 Filed 02/28/12 Page 18 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

violation, or why he waited until October 7, 2010, to file his

Petition. (Id. at 12.) 

Petitioner does not expressly argue that he is entitled to

equitable tolling or that any extraordinary circumstance precluded

his timely filing. He does, however, repeatedly assert that he did

not know of the illegality of the disciplinary decisions until

December 2009 or January 2010, when another inmate informed him of

the policy. (Compare Pet. 46, ECF No. 1 (indicating that he

learned of the illegality of stacking “[a]round January 2010"),

with Traverse 7, ECF No. 7 (stating that he was made aware of the

CDCR policy against stacking on December 3, 2009).) Clark alleges

that another prisoner showed him the inmate’s three similar rules

violations for job performance from August 2008, where the first

violation was adjudicated but the subsequent two were properly

dismissed pursuant to the prison’s anti-stacking policy. (Traverse

8, ECF No. 7.) Petitioner maintains that there was a smaller gap

in time between the three violations in his case than in the other

inmate’s. (Id.) Clark argues that after learning this, he

diligently pursued his claims through the state administrative

grievance process as well as the state courts. (Id. at 14.) 

Moreover, Petitioner asserts that his claim is not subject to

AEDPA’s statute of limitations because he is challenging an illegal

sentence. (Id. at 8, 15.) The Petitioner cites three California

cases, In re Birdwell, 50 Cal. App. 4th 926, 930, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d

244, 246 (1996), In re Harris, 5 Cal. 4th 813, 855 P.2d 391, 21

Cal. Rptr. 373 (1993), and In re Ward, 64 Cal. 2d 672, 414 P.2d

400, 51 Cal. Rptr. 272 (1966). 

 19 10cv02149 AJB(RBB)

Case 3:10-cv-02149-AJB-RBB Document 10 Filed 02/28/12 Page 19 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Equitable tolling of the statute of limitations is appropriate

when the petitioner can show “(1) that he has been pursuing his

rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance

stood in his way.” Holland v. Florida, __ U.S. __, __, 130 S. Ct.

2549, 2554 (2010); Pace, 544 U.S. at 418; see also Lawrence v.

Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 335 (2007); Rouse v. U.S. Dep’t of State,

548 F.3d 871, 878-79 (9th Cir. 2008). A petitioner is entitled to

equitable tolling of AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations where

“‘extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control made it

impossible’” to file a timely petition. Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d

796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Brambles v. Duncan, 330 F.3d

1197, 1202 (9th Cir. 2003)).

“‘[T]he threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling

[under AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.’” 

Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting

United States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir. 2000). 

The failure to file a timely petition must be the result of

external forces, not the result of the petitioner’s lack of

diligence. Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). 

“Determining whether equitable tolling is warranted is a

‘fact-specific inquiry.’” Spitsyn, 345 F.3d at 799 (quoting Frye

v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 2001)).

Clark argues that he was not aware of the CDCR policy against

stacking until another inmate informed him about it nearly five

years after the disciplinary actions at issue, at which time he

diligently submitted a grievance. Yet, a lack of understanding of

the law does not constitute the extraordinary circumstances

required for equitable tolling. Jones v. Turner, 2011 U.S. App.

 20 10cv02149 AJB(RBB)

Case 3:10-cv-02149-AJB-RBB Document 10 Filed 02/28/12 Page 20 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

LEXIS 19064, at *3 (9th Cir. Sept. 14, 2011); Raspberry v. Garcia,

448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (“[A] pro se petitioner’s lack

of legal sophistication is not, by itself, and extraordinary

circumstance warranting equitable tolling.”); see Perez v. Adams,

405 F. App’x 262, 263 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that petitioner was

not entitled to equitable tolling due to his lack of legal

sophistication, his appellate counsel’s abandonment of the case,

and other circumstances apparently out of his control); Marsh v.

Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir. 2000) (“[I]t is well

established that ‘ignorance of the law, even for an incarcerated

pro se petitioner, generally does not excuse prompt filing.’”).

Clark is not entitled to equitable tolling for his belated

awareness of CDCR’s anti-stacking policy because he has not shown

that extraordinary circumstances beyond his control prevented him

from timely filing a petition. See Waiwaiole, 2005 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 10052, at *7-8 (discussing petitioner’s claim that he did not

know of the illegality of the parole board’s decision until much

later, and finding that the belated discovery was insufficient to

warrant equitable tolling). Petitioner has not shown that he

exercised reasonable diligence in attempting to pursue

administrative or habeas relief after his disciplinary hearings. 

Clark additionally argues that he can bring an illegal

sentence claim at any time. (See Pet. 47-48, ECF No. 1; Traverse

15, ECF No. 7.) The primary case he cites in support of the

proposition, however, is a California case addressing a state

habeas petition challenging a criminal conviction, whereas Clark is

bringing a federal habeas petition that challenges two disciplinary

actions. See In re Birdwell, 50 Cal. App. 4th at 930, 58 Cal.

 21 10cv02149 AJB(RBB)

Case 3:10-cv-02149-AJB-RBB Document 10 Filed 02/28/12 Page 21 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Rptr. 2d at 246. In any event, federal courts routinely apply

AEDPA’s statute of limitations to claims that a petitioner was

given an illegal sentence. See Murphy v. Idaho, Case No. CV

07-230-C-MHW, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52279, at *3-10 (D. Idaho July

7, 2008); Pena v. Slaughter, No. CV 05-138-BLG-RWA, 2006 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 48739, at *9 (D. Mont. May 12, 2006); see also United States

v. Fiorillo, No. CR-94-427-JLQ, 2006 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 71332, at

*7, 29-32 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2006) (applying statute of

limitations to § 2255 petition).

For all of these reasons, Clark’s petition is time barred by

AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations. Neither statutory nor

equitable tolling apply to Petitioner’s case. Habeas relief should

be DENIED on this basis alone.

B. Procedural Default

Even if Clark’s Petition was not time barred, his claim is

procedurally barred. The warden contends that the state superior

court and the state supreme court expressly relied on adequate and

independent state procedural grounds – timeliness and

administrative exhaustion – when denying Clark’s habeas petitions. 

(Answer 7, ECF No. 6.) McEwen maintains that because Petitioner

failed to submit a timely petition and exhaust administrative

remedies, Clark is barred from seeking relief in federal court. 

(Id. at 7-8.)

In response, Clark argues that his claims are not procedurally

defaulted because he properly presented all of his claims to the

necessary tribunals. (Traverse 14, ECF No. 7.) Petitioner alleges

that because he is challenging an illegal sentence, his claim can

never be untimely. (Id.) Just because the prison screened out his

 22 10cv02149 AJB(RBB)

Case 3:10-cv-02149-AJB-RBB Document 10 Filed 02/28/12 Page 22 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

grievance as untimely and the lower courts denied his state

petitions as untimely, it does not mean that he failed to exhaust

his remedies. (Id.) Clark maintains that his Petition is not

procedurally barred and should be considered on its merits. (Id.

at 14-15.) 

“A federal habeas court will not review a claim rejected by a

state court ‘if the decision of [the state] court rests on a state

law ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate

to support the judgment.’” Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. __, __, 130

S. Ct. 612, 614 (2009) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722,

729 (1991)). A habeas petitioner who has failed to comply with a

state’s procedural requirements for presenting federal claims has

deprived the state courts of an opportunity to address the claims. 

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732 (citing 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(b); Engle v.

Issac, 456 U.S. 107, 125-26, n.28 (1982)). “In order to constitute

adequate and independent grounds sufficient to support a finding of

procedural default, a state rule must be clear, consistently

applied, and well-established at the time of the petitioner’s

purported default.” Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d 1005, 1010 (9th Cir.

1994) (citing Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 424 (1991)). 

The respondent has the burden of pleading an adequate and

independent procedural bar as an affirmative defense in a habeas

case. See Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 585 (9th Cir. 2003). 

The burden of proof shifts to the petitioner to place that defense

in issue; the burden then shifts back to the respondent to prove

the bar is applicable. See id. at 586. “[A]bsent showings of

‘cause’ and ‘prejudice,’ federal habeas relief will be unavailable

when (1) ‘a state court [has] declined to address a prisoner’s

 23 10cv02149 AJB(RBB)

Case 3:10-cv-02149-AJB-RBB Document 10 Filed 02/28/12 Page 23 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

federal claims because the prisoner had failed to meet a state

procedural requirement,’ and (2) ‘the state judgment rests on

independent and adequate state procedural grounds.’” Walker v.

Martin, __ U.S. __, __, 131 S. Ct. 1120, 1127 (2011) (citations

omitted) (alteration in original).

A federal habeas court looks to the last reasoned state court

opinion to determine whether a petitioner’s claim is procedurally

barred. Vansickel v. White, 166 F.3d 953, 957 (9th Cir. 1999)

(citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991)). Here, the

superior court denied Clark’s habeas petition on March 19, 2010,

because it was untimely and failed to account for the significant

delay in filing. (Pet. 44, ECF No. 1 (citing In re Clark, 5 Cal.

4th 750, 855 P.2d 729, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 509).) He did not seek

habeas relief from the California Court of Appeal; instead, he

filed a habeas petition with the state supreme court. It summarily

denied Clark’s petition on August 18, 2010, citing cases indicating

that the bases for the denial were untimeliness and non-exhaustion. 

(Id. at 42 (citing In re Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th at 780, 959 P.2d at

317, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 159-60; In re Dexter, 25 Cal. 3d 921, 603

P.2d 35, 160 Cal. Rptr. 118).) Because the supreme court denied

the petitioner on state procedural grounds of timeliness and

exhaustion, Clark’s federal claims are barred if either the

timeliness or exhaustion rule is adequate and independent. 

1. Timeliness

a. Independence 

A state procedural rule is independent when the “state law

basis for the decision [is] not . . . interwoven with federal law.” 

La Crosse v. Kernan, 244 F.3d 702, 704 (9th Cir. 2001) (footnote

 24 10cv02149 AJB(RBB)

Case 3:10-cv-02149-AJB-RBB Document 10 Filed 02/28/12 Page 24 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

omitted); see Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 265 (1989). A state

law basis is interwoven with federal law when “‘the state has made

application of the procedural bar depend on an antecedent ruling on

federal law [such as] the determination of whether federal

constitutional error has been committed.’” Park v. California, 202

F.3d 1146, 1152 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S.

68, 75 (1985)). 

In 1998, the California Supreme Court made it clear that

California’s timeliness rule was independent of federal law. See

Bennett, 322 F.3d at 581-83; see also Townsend v. Knowles, 562 F.3d

1200, 1206-07 (9th Cir. 2009), abrogated on other grounds by

Walker, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 1120. Accordingly, when the

California Supreme Court summarily denied Clark’s petition in 2010

citing In re Robbins, it did so on an independent procedural

ground.

b. Adequacy 

“To qualify as an ‘adequate’ procedural ground, a state rule

must be ‘firmly established and regularly followed.’” Walker, __

U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 1127-28 (quoting Kindler, 558 U.S. at __,

130 S. Ct. at 612) (footnote omitted); see Hanson v. Mahoney, 433

F.3d 1107, 1112-13 (9th Cir. 2006). Prior to the Supreme Court’s

decision in Walker, the California timeliness rule, although

independent, was not an adequate state ground to bar federal habeas

relief. Townsend, 562 F.3d at 1208. In light of Walker, the law

is clear that California’s time bar is both adequate and

independent.

The Supreme Court recently held that the timeliness

requirement set forth in In re Robbins, the case cited by the state

 25 10cv02149 AJB(RBB)

Case 3:10-cv-02149-AJB-RBB Document 10 Filed 02/28/12 Page 25 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

supreme court when denying Clark’s petition as untimely, is an

adequate and independent state law ground to support a procedural

default. See Walker, __ U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 1124, 1130-31. 

Since then, the Ninth Circuit has applied Walker to pending cases

and held that “denial of habeas relief by the California Supreme

Court on the ground that the application for relief was filed

untimely was an independent and adequate state procedural ground

requiring denial of a subsequent habeas petition in federal court .

. . .” Alvarez v. Wong, No. 09-15547, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 6976,

at *2 (9th Cir. Apr. 5, 2011); see Haynes v. Haviland, No. 08-

17755, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 11607, at *1-2 (9th Cir. June 7, 2011)

(same); see also Martinez v. McGrath, No. CIV S-02-0159 KJM GGH P,

2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23664, *8 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2011)(applying

Walker).

The California courts signal that a habeas petition is

untimely by citing the controlling cases, such as In re Clark, 5

Cal. 4th 750, 855 P.2d 729, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 509 (1993) and In re

Robbins. See Walker, __ U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 1124. The three

leading decisions outlining California’s time bar are In re

Robbins, In re Gallego, 18 Cal. 4th 825, 959 P.2d 290, 77 Cal.

Rptr. 2d 132 (1998), and In re Clark. See Walker, __ U.S. at __,

131 S. Ct. at 1125. “Those decisions instruct habeas petitioners

to ‘alleg[e] with specificity’ the absence of substantial delay,

good cause for delay, or eligibility for one of four exceptions to

the time bar.” Id. at 1128 (citations omitted). 

Although Clark’s charges became final in August 2005, when the

disciplinary hearings took place, he did not file his state habeas

petition in superior court until February 2010, and his subsequent

 26 10cv02149 AJB(RBB)

Case 3:10-cv-02149-AJB-RBB Document 10 Filed 02/28/12 Page 26 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

petition was not denied by the supreme court with a citation to In

re Robbins. California courts were regularly applying the time bar

long before Clark should have raised his claim with the California

courts. At the time Petitioner filed his first habeas petition

with the superior court in 2010 and the supreme court denied his

petition that same year, the timeliness rule had been consistently

applied by state courts. See Martinez, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

23664, at *9, 9 n.4 (construing Walker as finding the timeliness

bar an adequate and independent state ground since 2002).

The petitioner in Walker filed a habeas petition in the

California Supreme Court in March 2002, and it was denied in

September 2002. Walker, __ U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 1126. The

Supreme Court examined California’s time bar in 2002 and proximate

years and concluded that as of that time, the rule was consistently

applied. Id., __ U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 1131; see also

Martinez, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23664, at *11 (finding no change in

the time bar from 2002 to 2004). The timeliness rule was therefore

both independent and adequate at the time of Clark’s default. See

Cox v. Small, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 25695, at *2 (9th Cir. Dec. 19,

2011).

Accordingly, the Petitioner is procedurally barred from

raising this claim in federal court because California’s timeliness

rule is an adequate and independent state doctrine. 

c. Cause and prejudice

A habeas petitioner who has failed to comply with a state rule

must establish cause and prejudice in order to obtain habeas relief

under federal law. Review of a petitioner’s claim is precluded

unless he “can demonstrate cause for the default and actual

 27 10cv02149 AJB(RBB)

Case 3:10-cv-02149-AJB-RBB Document 10 Filed 02/28/12 Page 27 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or

demonstrate that failure to consider the claim[] will result in a

fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 749-50

(citing Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485 (1986)); see also High

v. Ignacio, 408 F.3d 585, 590 (9th Cir. 2005). “[C]ause for a

procedural default on appeal ordinarily requires a showing of some

external impediment preventing counsel from constructing or raising

the claim.” Murray, 477 U.S. at 492; see McCleskey v. Zant, 499

U.S. 467, 493 (1991) (discussing cause under abuse of writ

doctrine); see also Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753. 

Clark argues that his Petition is not procedurally barred

because he is challenging an illegal sentence, which can be

reviewed at any time. First, the sixty-day credit forfeiture is

not equivalent to a sentence imposed after a criminal conviction. 

Second, Clark has not established that actual prejudice will result

from a constitutional violation or that the failure to consider his

claim on the merits will result in the fundamental miscarriage of

justice. See Edwards, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27448, at *28. The

Petitioner has not met his burden of showing that the cause and

prejudice exception should apply, and habeas relief should be

DENIED for this additional reason. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. 

C. Evidentiary Hearing

Finally, Clark requests an evidentiary hearing. (Pet. 1, ECF

No. 1.) He does not present any facts that would warrant an

evidentiary hearing. See Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 670

(9th Cir. 2005) (stating that the petitioner must demonstrate he

failed to develop the factual basis of his claims in state court);

Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 313 (1963) (requiring the

 28 10cv02149 AJB(RBB)

Case 3:10-cv-02149-AJB-RBB Document 10 Filed 02/28/12 Page 28 of 29
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

petitioner to establish that one of the six factors applies to his

case). Clark’s request for an evidentiary hearing is therefore

DENIED. 

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Clark did not file his

federal Petition within AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations. 

The Petitioner is not entitled to a later start date or tolling. 

Additionally, Clark is procedurally barred from brining his claim,

and he has not established that the cause and prejudice exception

applies to his case. Clark’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

should be DENIED. The request for an evidentiary hearing is

DENIED. 

This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to United

States District Court Judge Anthony J. Battaglia, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties on or

before March 26, 2012. The document should be captioned,

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.” Any reply to the

objections shall be served and filed on or before April 9, 2012. 

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the district court’s

order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: February 28, 2012 ____________________________

RUBEN B. BROOKS

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Judge Battaglia

 All parties of record

 29 10cv02149 AJB(RBB)

Case 3:10-cv-02149-AJB-RBB Document 10 Filed 02/28/12 Page 29 of 29