Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-03360/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-03360-21/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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For the Northern District of California

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States District C

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For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

C. FAHEEM R. HARDEMAN,

Plaintiff,

 v.

AMTRAK/CALTRAIN RAILROAD,

Defendant.

 /

No. C 04-03360 SI

ORDER GRANTING I N PART

DEFENDANT’SMOTIONFORLEAVE TO

FILEMOTIONFORRECONSIDERATION

Defendant Amtrak/Caltrain Railroad has filed a motion for leave to file motion for

reconsideration of the Court’s order granting in part defendant’s motion for summary judgment. For the

following reasons, and for good cause shown, the Court GRANTS IN PART defendant’s motion for

leave to file.

In the Northern District of California, no motion for reconsideration may be brought without

leave of court. See Civil L.R. 7-9(a). Civil Local Rule 7-9(b) provides, in pertinent part:

The moving party must specifically show: 

(1) That at the time of the motion for leave, a material difference in fact or law exists

from that which was presented to the Court before entry of the interlocutory order for

which the reconsideration is sought. The party must also show that in the exercise

of reasonable diligence the party applying for reconsideration did not know such fact

or law at the time of the interlocutory order; or 

(2) The emergence of new material facts or a change of law occurring after the time

of such order; or 

(3) A manifest failure by the Court to consider material facts or dispositive legal

arguments which were presented to the Court before such interlocutory order. 

 

See Civil L.R. 7-9(b). Moreover, the motion may not repeat any oral or written argument made by the

moving party in support of or opposition to the interlocutory order of which the party seeks

Case 3:04-cv-03360-SI Document 212 Filed 12/18/06 Page 1 of 3
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reconsideration. See Civil L.R. 7-9(c).

Defendant bases its motion for leave on three points which it argues the Court failed to consider;

only the second point warrants reconsideration. 

Defendant’s first point is that the racist comments allegedly made by Joe Deely occurred over

ten years prior to plaintiff’s termination and are therefore too remote in time, as a matter of law, to be

relevant. In the underlying proceedings, defendant presented this argument in one sentence in its

objections to plaintiff’s evidence, and did so without citing any caselaw. See Docket No. 109 at 24:11-

13. The Court considered defendant’s brief argument, and properly rejected it. Reconsideration based

on this argument is therefore inappropriate. See Civil L.R. 7-9(b)(3).

Second, defendant argues that the Court failed to consider that plaintiff presented no evidence

that Mr. Deely knew plaintiff’s race, and therefore there can be no inference of discriminatory intent.

See DeHorney v. Bank of Amer., 879 F.2d 459, 468 (9th Cir. 1989). Defendant raised this argument for

the first time in its summary judgment reply brief. See Reply at 15:5-10. The Court agrees with

defendant that this issue warrants reconsideration. The Court previously found that evidence that Mr.

Deely was a decision-maker, and evidence that he had made racist statements in the past, was sufficient

evidence of pretext to defeat summary judgment. If, as defendant argues, Mr. Deely had no knowledge

of plaintiff’s race at the time he allegedly made decisions regarding plaintiff, then his past statements

would be irrelevant. See DeHorney, 879 F.2d at 468. In order to survive summary judgment, plaintiff

therefore must present some evidence that Mr. Deely knew plaintiff’s race.

Third, defendant argues that the Court failed to consider the fact that defendant disciplined a

Caucasian crew-member for the 2002 derailment along with plaintiff, and did not discipline another

African-American employee involved in the derailment. This fact does not negate the evidence provided

by plaintiff that a similarly situated Caucasian engineer received less-severe punishment for a similar

incident in 2003. Defendant also argues that the Court ignored evidence that the Caucasian engineer was

not responsible for the incident in 2003, and therefore cannot be compared to plaintiff. There is a

genuine issue of fact as to whether plaintiff was any more or less at fault than the Caucasian engineer

in 2003. See, e.g., Breda Decl. ¶¶ 3-5. Defendant’s third argument therefore does not justify

reconsideration.

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For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART defendant’s motion for leave to file

motion for reconsideration. Plaintiff shall file a response to Section III(A)(2) of defendant’s [proposed]

motion for reconsideration (Erlewine Decl., Ex. B at 7-8), addressing the issue of whether Mr. Deely

knew plaintiff’s race at the time he allegedly participated in the decision to terminate plaintiff, on or

before Wednesday, December 20, 2006. (Docket No. 210)

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 18, 2006 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

Case 3:04-cv-03360-SI Document 212 Filed 12/18/06 Page 3 of 3