Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00333/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00333-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Robert Michael Hollenback,

Petitioner, 

vs. 

Charles Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV 10-333-TUC-FRZ 

ORDER 

On June 3, 2010, Petitioner, Robert Michael Hollenback, an inmate confined in the 

Arizona State Prison Complex-Florence in Florence, Arizona, filed a pro se Petition for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody, pursuant to Title 28, U.S.C. § 2254, 

with exhibits A through E attached. (“Petition”). (Doc. 1.) Respondents have filed an 

answer to the Petition (“Answer”) with exhibits A through H attached. (Doc. 8.) 

Petitioner filed a reply (“Reply”) on April 19, 2011. (Doc. 9). For the reasons discussed 

below, the Court (1) dismisses grounds one and two of the Petition as procedurally 

defaulted, alternatively, denies relief for grounds one and two on the merits; (2) denies 

relief for ground three on the merits; and (3) grants relief on ground four of the Petition. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. Trial Court Proceedings 

On March 28, 2003, Petitioner was indicted by the grand jurors of Pima County in 

Arizona Superior Court, on charges of one count each of molestation of a child, sexual 

conduct with a minor under fifteen years of age, and luring a minor for sexual 

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exploitation. (Doc. 8, Ex. A, Indictment.). The State separately filed an allegation that all 

three counts as charged were offenses involving dangerous crimes against children, 

pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-604.01. (Id., Allegations.) The State also filed allegations of a 

predicate offense and prior conviction of attempted sexual conduct with a minor under 

fourteen. (Id.) 

A jury convicted Petitioner on all three counts, and, on March 29, 2004, the trial 

court sentenced Petitioner to the presumptive terms of imprisonment on all counts: 28 

years for count one; life imprisonment for count two; and 10 years for count three. (Id., 

Minute Entry 3/29/04.) The trial court ordered that all counts be served consecutively. 

(Id.) 

B. Appeal 

Petitioner filed a direct appeal of his conviction and sentence raising five grounds 

for relief: (1) A.R.S. § 13-3554 is inapplicable to conduct that does not involve producing 

pornographic material; (2) the trial court erred in enhancing Petitioner’s sentence using 

the State’s late-requested interrogatory that asked the jury to determine whether the 

victims were under 12 years old; (3) fundamental error occurred when the trial court 

sentenced Petitioner in count two under A.R.S. § 13-604.01 and not A.R.S. § 13-702.02; 

(4) fundamental error occurred when the trial court sentenced Petitioner to life when that 

was not required under A.R.S. § 13-604.01(B); and (5) fundamental error occurred when 

14 jurors deliberated. (Doc. 8, Ex. B.) The appellate court affirmed the convictions and 

sentences in an opinion filed on December 29, 2005. (Doc. 1, Ex. A). Petitioner’s petition 

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for review to the Arizona Supreme Court was denied without comment on September 26, 

2006. (Id., Ex. B). 

C. Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 

Petitioner’s notice of post-conviction relief was filed on November 2, 2006. (Doc. 

8, Ex. D.) Petitioner, through counsel, filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (“PCR”) 

on June 21, 2007. (Id.) Petitioner argued that trial counsel was ineffective for (1) failing 

to properly object to hearsay testimony; (2) failing to object to other act evidence; (3) 

failing to request a lesser included jury instruction of attempted molestation of a child; 

and (4) failing to call an expert witness on the effect of improperly conducted forensic 

interviews with children. (Id.) 

The trial court denied relief without an evidentiary hearing and dismissed the 

notice on December 20, 2007. (Doc. 1, Ex. C.) In his petition for review of the trial 

court’s decision to the court of appeals, Petitioner argued that trial counsel was 

ineffective for (1) failing to object to the State’s improper use of hearsay as substantive 

evidence; and (2) failing to request a lesser included jury instruction of attempted 

molestation of a child. (Doc. 8, Ex. E.) 

On September 5, 2008, in a memorandum decision, the Arizona Court of Appeals 

granted review, and denied relief. (Doc. 1, Ex. D.) Petitioner’s petition for review to the 

Arizona Supreme Court was denied without comment on June 1, 2009. (Id., Ex. E.) 

D. Federal Habeas Petition 

Petitioner’s habeas corpus petition, placed in the prison mailing system on May 

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19, 2010 (Id. at 11), raises four grounds in support of his request for habeas relief. In 

Ground One, Petitioner contends that his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process 

rights were violated because he was convicted of “luring a minor for sexual exploitation,” 

but the conduct in which he engaged—“the mere solicitation for oral sex”—is not 

conduct that violates Arizona Revised Statutes § 13-3554(A). In Ground Two, Petitioner 

asserts that his due process rights were violated because he was sentenced with an “under 

12” enhancement “without proper notice of such enhancement.” In Grounds Three and 

Four, Petitioner claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”), in violation 

of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review 

Because Petitioner filed his petition after April 24, 1996, this case is governed by 

the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) 

(“AEDPA”). 

B. Statute of Limitations 

 Under the AEDPA, a state prisoner must generally file a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus within one year from “the date on which the judgment became final by the 

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of time for seeking such review [.]” 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). The running of this one-year statute of limitations on habeas 

petitions for state convictions is tolled during any period when "a properly filed 

application for state post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the 

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pertinent judgment or claim is pending" in any state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

Thus, the statute of limitations is tolled during the pendency of a state court action for 

post-conviction relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

C. Exhaustion of State Remedies 

 A writ of habeas corpus may not be granted unless it appears that a petitioner has 

exhausted all available state court remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); see also Coleman v. 

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). To exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must “fairly 

present” the operative facts and the federal legal theory of his claims to the state's highest 

court in a procedurally appropriate manner. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 848 

(1999); Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277–

78 (1971). If a habeas claim includes new factual allegations not presented to the state 

court, it may be considered unexhausted if the new facts “fundamentally alter” the legal 

claim presented and considered in state court. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 260 

(1986). 

 In Arizona, there are two primary procedurally appropriate avenues for petitioners 

to exhaust federal constitutional claims: direct appeal and PCR proceedings. Rule 32 of 

the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure governs PCR proceedings and provides that a 

petitioner is precluded from relief on any claim that could have been raised on appeal or 

in a prior PCR petition. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a)(3). The preclusive effect of Rule 32.2(a) 

may be avoided only if a claim falls within certain exceptions (subsections (d) through 

(h) of Rule 32.1) and the petitioner can justify why the claim was omitted from a prior 

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petition or not presented in a timely manner. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d)-(h), 32.2(b), 

32.4(a). 

 A habeas petitioner's claims may be precluded from federal review in two ways. 

First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted in federal court if it was actually raised in 

state court but found by that court to be defaulted on state procedural grounds. Coleman, 

501 U.S. at 729–30. Second, a claim may be procedurally defaulted if the petitioner failed 

to present it in state court and “the court to which the petitioner would be required to 

present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims 

procedurally barred.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n. 1; see also Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 

923, 931 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that the district court must consider whether the claim 

could be pursued by any presently available state remedy). If no remedies are currently 

available pursuant to Rule 32, the claim is “technically” exhausted but procedurally 

defaulted. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732, 735 n. 1; see also Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 

152, 161-62 (1996). 

 Because the doctrine of procedural default is based on comity, not jurisdiction, 

federal courts retain the power to consider the merits of procedurally defaulted claims. 

Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 9 (1984). However, the Court will not review the merits of a 

procedurally defaulted claim unless a petitioner demonstrates legitimate cause for the 

failure to properly exhaust the claim in state court and prejudice from the alleged 

constitutional violation, or shows that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result if 

the claim were not heard on the merits in federal court. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. 

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Cause is defined as a "legitimate excuse for the default," and prejudice is defined 

as "actual harm resulting from the alleged constitutional violation." Thomas v. Lewis, 945 

F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991); see Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (a 

showing of cause requires a petitioner to show that "some objective factor external to the 

defense impeded counsel's efforts to comply with the State's procedural rule"). Prejudice 

need not be addressed if a petitioner fails to show cause. Thomas, 945 F.2d at 1123 n.10. 

To bring himself within the narrow class of cases that implicate a fundamental 

miscarriage of justice, a petitioner "must come forward with sufficient proof of his actual 

innocence" Sistrunk v. Armenakis, 292 F.3d 669, 672-73 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted), which can be shown when "a petitioner ‘presents 

evidence of innocence so strong that a court cannot have confidence in the outcome of 

the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was free of nonharmless 

constitutional error.'" Id. at 673 (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316 (1995)). 

D. Standard of Review: Merits 

Petitioner's habeas claims are governed by the applicable provisions of the 

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 

320, 336 (1997). The AEDPA established a “substantially higher threshold for habeas 

relief” with the “acknowledged purpose of ‘reduc[ing] delays in the execution of state 

and federal criminal sentences.’” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 475 (2007) 

(quoting Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 206 (2003)). The AEDPA's “‘highly 

deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings' ... demands that state-court 

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decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 

(2002) (per curiam) (quoting Lindh, 521 U.S. at 333 n. 7). 

Under the AEDPA, a petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on any claim 

“adjudicated on the merits” by the state court unless that adjudication: 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 

Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination 

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 

proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The relevant state court decision is the last reasoned state decision 

regarding a claim. Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Ylst v. 

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803–04 (1991)); Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 664 

(9th Cir. 2005). 

 “The threshold question under AEDPA [is] whether [the petitioner] seeks to apply 

a rule of law that was clearly established at the time his state-court conviction became 

final.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390 (2000). Therefore, to assess a claim under 

subsection (d)(1), the Court must first identify the “clearly established Federal law,” if 

any, that governs the sufficiency of the claims on habeas review. “Clearly established” 

federal law consists of the holdings of the Supreme Court at the time the petitioner's state 

court conviction became final. Williams, 529 U.S. at 365; see Carey v. Musladin, 549 

U.S. 70, 74 (2006); Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003), overruled on 

other grounds by Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003). Habeas relief cannot be 

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granted if the Supreme Court has not “broken sufficient legal ground” on a constitutional 

principle advanced by a petitioner, even if lower federal courts have decided the issue. 

Williams, 529 U.S. at 381; see Musladin, 549 U.S. at 76-77; Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 

896, 907 (9th Cir. 2004). Nevertheless, while only Supreme Court authority is binding, 

circuit court precedent may be “persuasive” in determining what law is clearly 

established and whether a state court applied that law unreasonably. Clark, 331 F.3d at 

1069. 

 The Supreme Court has provided guidance in applying each prong of § 

2254(d)(1). The Court has explained that a state court decision is “contrary to” the 

Supreme Court's clearly established precedents if the decision applies a rule that 

contradicts the governing law set forth in those precedents, thereby reaching a conclusion 

opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a matter of law, or if it confronts a set 

of facts that is materially indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court but 

reaches a different result. Williams, 529 U.S. at 405–06; see Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 

8 (2002) (per curiam). In characterizing the claims subject to analysis under the “contrary 

to” prong, the Court has observed that “a run-of-the-mill state-court decision applying the 

correct legal rule to the facts of the prisoner's case would not fit comfortably within § 

2254(d)(1)'s ‘contrary to’ clause.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 406; see Lambert v. Blodgett,

393 F.3d 943, 974 (9th Cir. 2004). 

 Under the “unreasonable application” prong of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas 

court may grant relief where a state court “identifies the correct governing legal rule from 

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[the Supreme] Court's cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular ... 

case” or “unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a 

new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to 

a new context where it should apply.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 407. For a federal court to 

find a state court's application of Supreme Court precedent “unreasonable,” the petitioner 

must show that the state court decision was not merely incorrect or erroneous, but 

“objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409; Landrigan, 550 U.S. at 473; Visciotti, 537 U.S. at 

25. 

 Under the standard set forth in § 2254(d)(2), habeas relief is available only if the 

state court decision was based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts. Miller–El 

v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240 (2005) (Miller–El II ). A state court decision “based on a 

factual determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively 

unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.” Miller–El,

537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003) ( Miller–El I ); see Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999 (9th

Cir. 2004). In considering a challenge under § 2254(d)(2), state court factual 

determinations are presumed to be correct, and a petitioner bears the “burden of rebutting 

this presumption by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Landrigan,

550 U.S. at 473–74; Miller–El II, 545 U.S. at 240. 

III. ANALYSIS

A. Timeliness 

Petitioner had until one year after his conviction and sentence became final to file 

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his federal petition. Relying on the Ninth Circuit’s adherence to the “prison mailbox rule” 

Respondents concede (Doc. 8 at 5) and the Court finds that, pursuant to the AEDPA, the 

Petition, placed in the prison mailing system on May 19, 2010, (Doc. 1 at 11) and filed in 

this Court on June 3, 2010, is timely. See Huizar v. Carey, 273 F.3d 1220, 1222 (9th Cir. 

2001)(citing Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988)(a prisoner’s federal habeas petition is 

deemed filed when he hands it over to prison authorities for mailing to the district court)). 

B. Ground One 

Petitioner asserts in Ground One of the Petition that his Fifth and Fourteenth 

Amendment due process rights were violated because he was convicted of “luring a 

minor for sexual exploitation,” but the conduct in which he engaged—“the mere 

solicitation for oral sex”—is not conduct that violates Arizona Revised Statutes § 13-

3554(A). (Doc. 1 at 6). Respondents argue that Petitioner failed to fairly present Ground 

One as a constitutional claim to the state courts on direct appeal, and thus this claim is not 

exhausted. (Doc. 8 at 8-9). Respondents further contend that Ground One is procedurally 

defaulted because any attempt to return to state court to present that claim would be futile 

because it would be procedurally barred pursuant to Arizona law. (Id. at 10-11.) 

Respondents also contend that Petitioner’s argument is not cognizable on habeas corpus 

review. (Id. at 15.) 

1. Procedural Default 

Petitioner contends that he was convicted in Count 3 of the Indictment pursuant to 

a statute, A.R.S. § 13-3554, which did not apply to Petitioner’s alleged conduct, in 

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violation of his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. (Doc. 1 at 6.) 

Petitioner argues that the appellate courts’ interpretation of A.R.S. § 13-3554 is 

untenable; Petitioner asserts that, in order to convict under A.R.S. § 13-3554, the State is 

required to present evidence that Petitioner “intended to or did photograph, film, or 

otherwise create any visual item depicting the minor engaging in sexual conduct” 

contrary to the appellate court’s interpretation. (Id.) 

Respondents assert that Petitioner's federal claims are procedurally defaulted and 

barred from habeas corpus review. Petitioner argued in the first claim of his direct appeal 

that the trial court erroneously denied his motion for judgment of acquittal. Petitioner 

argued the court erred for two reasons. First, because the offense of luring a minor for 

sexual exploitation requires some sort of intent to photograph or otherwise record a 

minor’s image. Second, as an alternative ground for relief, Petitioner argued that the 

motion was denied because there was insufficient evidence to establish guilt in Count 3, 

in violation of his right to due process and a fair trial: “Alternatively, insufficient 

evidence existed to support [Count 3] because the [S]tate failed to prove that Hollenback 

intended to photograph, or otherwise visually depict sexual conduct. Thus, the State’s 

evidence was wholly insufficient to establish guilt in Count 3, which also violated 

Petitioner’s right to due process and a fair trial. U.S. Const., Amends. 5, 6, and 14; Ariz. 

Const., art. 2, §§4 and 24.” (Doc. 8, Ex. B at 8-9). The appellate court found that one of 

Petitioner’s victims, Z., who was eight at the time of the offenses, testified that 

Hollenback had asked him repeatedly on multiple occasions to participate in oral sex, and 

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thus, substantial evidence supported this charge. (Doc.1, Ex. A at ¶ 8.) The Court 

reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence argument under an abuse of discretion standard, 

citing State v. Carlos, 199 Ariz. 273 (App. 2001)(court reviews a trial court’s denial of a 

Rule 20 motion for an abuse of discretion and will reverse a conviction only if there is a 

complete absence of substantial evidence to support the charges). (Id.) Although 

Petitioner mentioned, in passing, “due process” and a “fair trial,” the abuse of discretion 

standard was in fact the appropriate standard of review set forth by Petitioner for 

reviewing his alternative claim. (Doc. 8., Ex. B at 5.) 

 Petitioner's passing reference to “his federal rights,” was not sufficient to fairly 

present a federal claim to the State courts. General appeals to broad constitutional 

principles, such as due process, equal protection, and the right to a fair trial, are 

insufficient to establish a fair presentation of a federal constitutional claim. Lyons v. 

Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669 (9th Cir.2000), amended on other grounds, 247 F.3d 904 

(9th Cir. 2001); Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987 (9th Cir. 2000) (insufficient for 

prisoner to have made “a general appeal to a constitutional guarantee,” such as a naked 

reference to “due process,” or to a “constitutional error” or a “fair trial”). Likewise, a 

mere reference to the “Constitution of the United States” does not preserve a federal 

claim. Gray, 518 U.S. at 162–63 (1996). 

 Petitioner failed to fairly present Ground One as a federal claim in state court. If 

Petitioner were to return to state court now to litigate this claim it would be found waived 

and untimely under Rules 32.2(a)(3) and 32.4(a) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal 

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Procedure because it does not fall within an exception to preclusion. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 

32.2(b); 32.1(d)-(h). This claim is technically exhausted but procedurally defaulted. 

Petitioner presents no cause for the default nor has he demonstrated that a fundamental 

miscarriage of justice would occur if federal review of this claim is barred. Accordingly, 

this claim is properly dismissed. 

 Nonetheless, regardless of exhaustion, the Court considers the claim and finds, it 

should be denied on the merits. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (allowing denial of 

unexhausted claims on the merits); see also Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277 (2005). 

2. Merits 

Petitioner’s due process argument is without merit. Petitioner challenges the 

appellate court’s determination that there was sufficient evidence presented at trial to 

support his conviction. Pursuant to Jackson v. Virginia, in determining a due process 

claim based on the sufficiency of the evidence, “the critical inquiry ... is whether, after 

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of 

fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

443 U.S 307, 318 (1979). “When we undertake collateral review of a state court decision 

rejecting a claim of insufficiency of the evidence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), 

however, our inquiry is even more limited; that is, we ask only whether the state court's 

decision was contrary to or reflected an unreasonable application of Jackson to the facts 

of a particular case.” Emery v. Clark, 643 F.3d 1210, 1213–14 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Juan 

H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1274–75 (9th Cir. 2005)). 

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Initially, to the extent Petitioner raises a state-law claim, the Arizona Constitution 

affords Petitioner no relief in this federal habeas corpus proceeding. Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 

U.S. 764, 780 (1990) (“[F]ederal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state 

law[.]”) (citations omitted); Hicks on Behalf of Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 630 & n.3 

(1988) (recognizing that the federal habeas court is “not at liberty to depart from state 

appellate court’s resolution of...issues of state law...” where the state supreme court 

denied review of the underlying state case at bar.). “[A] state court's interpretation of state 

law ... binds a federal court sitting in habeas corpus” unless the state court's decision 

presents a violation of the Constitution or the laws or treaties of the United States. 

Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 75 (2005); see Swarthout v. Cooke, ––– U.S. ––––, 131 

S.Ct. 859 (2011) (extent of liberty interest in parole is a question of state law, which is 

reviewable by a federal court only for a violation of the Due Process Clause). “Our 

deference to the [state court] is suspended only upon a finding that the court's 

interpretation is untenable or amounts to a subterfuge to avoid federal review of a 

constitutional violation.” Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1989). 

The court of appeals held that A.R.S. § 13-3554, the statute proscribing luring a 

minor for sexual exploitation, does not require intent to photograph or otherwise record a 

minor's image, notwithstanding Petitioner’s argument that Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-

3553, the statute proscribing sexual exploitation of a minor, defines that offense in terms 

of producing and distributing child pornography. The appellate court’s consideration of 

the issue was thorough, its reasoning was sound and logical, and the court relied on wellCase 4:10-cv-00333-FRZ Document 18 Filed 09/20/13 Page 15 of 38
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established tenets of statutory construction under Arizona law: See State v. Sepahi, 206 

Ariz. 321, ¶ 16 (2003) (“[A] statute's language is the most reliable index of its meaning”); 

State v. Brown, 204 Ariz. 405, (App.2003) (Howard, J., concurring) (“Had the legislature 

desired the facilitation portion of § 13–1805(I) to include a mens rea of intentionally, it 

most likely would have utilized precise language defined by statute.”); State v. Hauser, 

209 Ariz. 539, 542 (2005)( the heading of a statute is not part of the law and may only aid 

in clarifying ambiguity if such exists); see also A.R.S. § 1–212 (headings not part of the 

law, but merely for reference purposes). Since there is no evidence of state court 

unreasonableness or subterfuge, this Court will not re-examine the state court's 

interpretation of section 13-3554 as applied to Petitioner's conduct. 

Insufficient evidence claims are reviewed by looking at the elements of the offense 

under state law. Emery, 643 F.3d at 1214 (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n. 16; see also 

Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005) (in determining whether sufficient evidence 

supports a state law statutory enhancement, federal courts are bound by “a state court's 

interpretation of state law”).). At the time of Petitioner’s trial, the offense of luring a 

minor for sexual exploitation was committed “by offering or soliciting sexual conduct 

with another person knowing or having reason to know that the other person is a minor.” 

A.R.S. § 13-3554. The appellate court held that “One of Hollenback's victims, Z., who 

was eight at the time of the offenses, testified that Hollenback had asked him repeatedly 

on multiple occasions to participate in oral sex. Thus, substantial evidence supported this 

charge, and the trial court did not err in denying the Rule 20 motion.” (Doc. 1, Ex. A at ¶ 

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8.) Although Petitioner disagrees with the state court’s conclusion, this is not a case 

where the state court failed “to take into account and reconcile key parts of the record....” 

Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d at 1008. The record is clear that the state court considered 

and weighed the relevant evidence in applying the applicable state law in rendering its 

decision. Aside from the argument rejected by the state courts and not cognizable in this 

habeas review, that the State mischarged the offense under A.R.S. § 13-3554 and the state 

court’s misinterpreted that statute, Petitioner makes no argument that the prosecution 

failed to prove the elements of the offense of luring a minor for sexual exploitation under 

state law, as construed by the state courts. On such a record, the state-court decision was 

not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented 

in the state proceeding. 

C. Ground Two 

In Ground Two, Petitioner contends that his due process rights were violated 

because he was sentenced with an “under 12” enhancement “without proper notice of 

such enhancement.” (Doc. 1 at 7.) Respondents argue that Petitioner failed to fairly 

present Ground Two as a constitutional claim to the state courts on direct appeal, and thus 

this claim is not exhausted. (Doc. 8 at 9-10). Respondents further contend that Ground 

Two is procedurally defaulted because any attempt to return to state court to present that 

claim would be futile because it would be procedurally barred pursuant to Arizona law,. 

(Id. at 10-11.) Alternatively, Respondents argue that Ground Two is without merit. (Id. at 

15-18.) 

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1. Procedural Default 

Petitioner contends that he did not receive sufficient notice that, if convicted, he 

would be sentenced under A.R.S. § 13-604.01(A) or (B), in violation of his due process 

guarantee under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. (Doc. 1 at 

7; Memorandum at 5-6.) 

Petitioner argued in his opening brief to the Arizona Court of Appeals, that, under 

State v. Guytan, 192 Ariz. 514 (App.1998), when the state offers no excuse for an 

untimely sentence enhancement allegation, and when there is no citation in the 

indictment to the enhancement provision, it is error to sentence the defendant using the 

enhancement. (Doc. 8, Ex. B at 10-11.) 

Respondents assert that Petitioner's federal claims are procedurally defaulted and 

barred from habeas corpus review. As the appellate court found, Petitioner’s argument 

relied entirely on the state court of appeals case State v. Guytan, 192 Ariz. at 595-96, 

which held that permitting an amendment to the indictment to allege gang motivation as a 

potential sentence enhancement nine days after the jury had been impaneled was 

improper because the request to amend had been untimely under Rule 16.1, 

Ariz.R.Crim.P. After arguing at length how the indictment was insufficient under Guytan, 

supra, and Rule 16.1, Petitioner concluded his argument, mentioning in closing that: 

“The trial court abused its discretion in placing an interrogatory before the jury and using 

that finding to enhance [Petitioner’s] sentence under § 13-604.01’s more severe penalty 

provisions and violated Petitioner’s right to due process. U.S. Const., Amends. 5 and 14; 

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Ariz. Const., art. 2, §§1 and 4.” (Doc. 8, Ex. B at 13.) 

Petitioner's passing reference to “due process” is not sufficient to fairly present a 

federal claim to the state courts. Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d at 669; Shumway, 223 F.3d 

at 987. Petitioner failed to fairly present Ground One as a federal claim in state court. If 

Petitioner were to return to state court now to litigate this claim it would be found waived 

and untimely under Rules 32.2(a)(3) and 32.4(a) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal 

Procedure because it does not fall within an exception to preclusion. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 

32.2(b); 32.1(d)-(h). This claim is technically exhausted but procedurally defaulted. 

Petitioner presents no cause for the default nor has he demonstrated that a fundamental 

miscarriage of justice would occur if federal review of this claim is barred, accordingly, 

this claim is properly dismissed. 

Nonetheless, regardless of exhaustion, the Court considers the claim and finds it 

should be denied on the merits. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (allowing denial of 

unexhausted claims on the merits); see also Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277. 

 2. Merits

Petitioner’s due process argument is without merit. Petitioner challenges the 

appellate court’s determination that the State’s separate allegations that each offense was 

a dangerous crime against children, and the indictment which included a reference to § 

13-604.01, the dangerous crimes against children statute, which provides an enhanced 

penalty when a defendant is convicted of sexual conduct with a minor under twelve years 

of age, is adequate notice of the State’s intent to enhance Petitioner’s sentence under that 

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statute. The trial court granted the State’s request, over Petitioner’s objection based on 

insufficient notice, to include an interrogatory on the verdict form for Count 2 (sexual 

conduct with a minor) asking the jury to find whether the victim was under 12 years of 

age. (Doc. 8, Reporter’s Transcript (“R.T.” 2/20/04 at 67–69, 79.) After the jury made 

this finding, Petitioner was sentenced accordingly, and the state appellate court affirmed 

his enhanced sentence on count 2. (Doc. 1, Ex. A at ¶¶ 9- 11.) The state appellate court 

found: “Here, the state separately alleged each offense was a dangerous crime against 

children and each count of the indictment included a reference to § 13-604.01, the 

dangerous crimes against children statute, which provides an enhanced penalty when a 

defendant is convicted of sexual conduct with a minor twelve years of age or younger.” 

(Id. at ¶ 10.) The appellate court, relying on state supreme court precedent, held that the 

indictments’ reference to the number of the statute providing for enhanced punishment 

was adequate notice of the State’s intent to enhance the defendant’s sentence under that 

statute. (See Doc. 8, Ex. A, ¶ 11)(citing State v. Waggoner, 144 Ariz. 237, 239 (1985); 

State v. Barrett, 132 Ariz. 88, 89 (1982)(“Th[e] recital of A.R.S. § 13-604 [in the 

information] was sufficient to put [defendant] on notice that the prosecutor would seek an 

enhanced sentence.”), overruled on other grounds by State v. Burge, 167 Ariz. 25 

(1990)). 

First, it is the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Fifth Amendment that protects a 

person against deprivations of due process by a state. See U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1 

(“nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of 

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law.”); Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 399 F. 3d at 1002 n. 5 (9th Cir. 2005) (“The 

Fifth Amendment prohibits the federal government from depriving persons of due 

process, while the Fourteenth Amendment explicitly prohibits deprivations without due 

process by the several States.”). Because the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause does 

not provide a cognizable ground for relief regarding Petitioner's state court conviction, 

his allegations under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause should be dismissed. 

Next, as Respondents correctly note in their Answer, notwithstanding Petitioner’s 

denial that he has a “6th Amendment ‘Notice’ issue” (Doc. 9 at 5), Petitioner’s argument 

appears to allege a violation of his Sixth Amendment right “to be informed of the nature 

and cause of the accusation” against him. U.S. Const. amend. VI. It is clearly established 

federal law under the Constitution that a criminal defendant have “reasonable notice of a 

charge against him, and an opportunity to be heard in his defense.” In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 

257, 273 (1948); Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 201(1948); Gautt v. Lewis, 489 F.3d 

993, 1002 (9th Cir. 2007) (criminal defendant has fundamental right to notice of charges 

“to permit adequate preparation of a defense”). The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment renders this Sixth Amendment guarantee applicable to the states. Gautt v. 

Lewis, 489 F.3d at 1003; see also Cole, 333 U.S. at 201 (“No principle of procedural due 

process is more clearly established than that notice of the specific charge, and a chance to 

be heard in a trial of the issues raised by that charge, if desired, are among the 

constitutional rights of every accused in a criminal proceeding in all courts, state or 

federal.”). 

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 In determining whether a petitioner received fair notice of the charges against him, 

the court “begin[s] by analyzing the content of the information.” Gautt, 489 F.3d at 1003. 

Additionally, absent clearly established Supreme Court precedent on point, the court of 

appeals did not unreasonably apply federal law in relying on additional, noncharging 

sources to conclude that Petitioner received fair notice. See Wright v. Van Patten, 552 

U.S. 120, 125–26 (2008) (holding that state court could not have unreasonably applied 

federal law if no clearly contrary Supreme Court precedent existed); see also Gautt, 489 

F.3d at 1010 (assuming without deciding that other sources, such as jury instructions, 

may be examined for evidence of notice to a petitioner). 

 Petitioner argues that the indictment expressly alleged that the minor victim was 

“under 15”, a term of art implicating a lesser sentencing range, and thus, because of this 

express language in the indictment, he was put on notice that he could be sentenced only 

pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-604.01(C)(minor victims between the ages of twelve and 

fourteen) and not under A.R.S. §§ 13-604.01(A) or (B)(minor victims under the age of 

twelve), which were not specifically alleged. (Doc. 1, Memorandum at 5.) Contrary to 

Petitioner’s assertion that this language indicates a lesser sentencing range, the “under 

fifteen years of age” language in the indictment indicates that, under the substantive 

charging statute, A.R.S. § 13-1405(B), the defendant is charged with a class 2 felony 

offense, subject to the further sentencing enhancements of § 13-604.01. See A.R.S. § 13-

1405(B)(“Sexual conduct with a minor who is under fifteen years of age is a class 2 

felony and is punishable pursuant to § 13-604.01. Sexual conduct with a minor who is at 

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least fifteen years of age is a class 6 felony.”) The substantive offense classifies the 

felony no differently for an offense if the victim is under fifteen, or under twelve. Both 

are class 2 felony offenses. See A.R.S. § 13-1405(B). On the other hand, the sentencing 

enhancements under A.R.S. § 13-604-01, which was alleged both in the indictment and in 

the allegation of dangerous crimes against children, contain three specific subsections 

that apply to the substantive offense of sexual conduct with a minor, but distinguish 

between defendants who commit the offense against a minor who is under twelve years 

of age (A.R.S. §§ 13-604.01(A) and (B)) and defendants who commit sexual conduct 

with minors who are twelve, thirteen or fourteen years of age (A.R.S. § 13-604.01(C)). 

 In Gautt, the Ninth Circuit found a petitioner’s right to notice was violated when 

the petitioner was charged with a sentencing enhancement under one subdivision of a 

statute, but the jury was provided with verdict forms, and his sentence was enhanced 

under a different subdivision of the statute, which required additional elements and 

carried a much harsher penalty. 489 F.3d at 1008. The instant case is not like Gautt. The 

State did not allege the wrong subsection of the sentencing enhancement statute. As noted 

above, the references to the “under fifteen” language implicated the felony classification 

of the substantive offense which was a necessary prerequisite to determine which 

subsection of the sentencing enhancement statute to apply. Compare A.R.S. §§ 13-

604.01(A) and (B) with A.R.S. § 13-604.01(C). The State did not allege a particular 

subsection of the sentencing enhancement statute and mislead Petitioner, as in Gautt; 

rather the State alleged the sentencing enhancement statute generally, referring to no 

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subsection at all. The appellate court found that Petitioner’s indictment included citations 

to §13-604.01, and the state separately alleged each offense was a dangerous crime 

against children and each count of the indictment included a reference to § 13-604.01, the 

dangerous crimes against children statute, and that, under Arizona law, this was sufficient 

notice. The appellate court’s decision was not contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law under § 2254(d)(1). Nor, on this record, 

did the state court's proceeding result in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. 

D. Grounds Three and Four – IAC claim 

Petitioner contends in Ground Three that he received ineffective assistance of 

counsel in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments when his trial counsel 

failed to object to the State’s inappropriate use of hearsay evidence to impeach its own 

witness. (Doc. 1 at 8.) Respondents assert that because trial counsel was not obligated to 

object to the trial court’s proper admission of the statements, the appellate court 

reasonably determined that counsel’s failure to object was not deficient performance 

which fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. (Doc. 8 at 23.) 

Petitioner contends in Ground Four that that he received ineffective assistance of 

counsel in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments when his trial counsel 

failed to request a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of attempted child 

molestation in Count One. (Doc. 1 at 9.) Respondents argue that Petitioner cannot 

overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, counsel’s decision not to seek a 

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lesser included offense instruction might be considered sound trial strategy, and thus, the 

state court’s decision on his IAC claim was reasonable. (Doc. 8 at 25.) 

1. Exhaustion/Procedural Default 

 Respondents acknowledge that Petitioner presented an IAC claim in the state trial 

and appellate courts, which claim raised the same issue as those he raises in Grounds 

Three and Four of this habeas petition. (Doc. 8 at 20, 23.) The Court finds Petitioner has 

properly exhausted Grounds Three and Four, and addresses the merits of the claims 

below. 

2. Merits 

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Petitioner must satisfy 

two separate requirements: he must (1) show that counsel’s performance fell below 

objective standards of reasonableness and “outside the wide range of professionally 

competent assistance,” and (2) establish that counsel’s performance prejudiced Petitioner 

by creating “a reasonable probability that absent the errors the fact finder would have had 

a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–94 

(1984); see also Williams, 529 U.S. at 390; Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375 

(1986). Strickland is the clearly established law for IAC claims. See Harrington v. 

Richter, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 770, 780 (2011). 

Regarding the performance prong, a reviewing court engages a strong presumption 

that counsel rendered adequate assistance, and exercised reasonable professional 

judgment in making decisions. See id. at 690. “[A] fair assessment of attorney 

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performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of 

hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to 

evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 

815, 833 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). Moreover, review of 

counsel’s performance under Strickland is “extremely limited”: “The test has nothing to 

do with what the best lawyers would have done. Nor is the test even what most good 

lawyers would have done. We ask only whether some reasonable lawyer at the trial could 

have acted, in the circumstances, as defense counsel acted at trial.” Coleman v. Calderon, 

150 F.3d 1105, 1113 (9th Cir.), judgment rev’d on other grounds, 525 U.S. 141 (1998). 

Thus, a court “must judge the reasonableness of counsel’s challenged conduct on the 

facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct.” Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 690. 

If the prisoner is able to satisfy the performance prong, he must also establish 

prejudice. See id. at 691-92; see also Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000) (burden 

is on defendant to show prejudice). To establish prejudice, a prisoner must demonstrate a 

“reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A “reasonable 

probability” is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. A 

court need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining 

whether prejudice resulted from the alleged deficiencies. See Robbins, 528 U.S. at 286 

n.14. “If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of 

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sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.” 

Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697). 

In reviewing a state court’s resolution of an IAC claim, the Court considers 

whether the state court applied Strickland unreasonably: 

For [a petitioner] to succeed [on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim], 

... he must do more than show that he would have satisfied Strickland’s test 

if his claim were being analyzed in the first instance, because under § 

2254(d)(1), it is not enough to convince a federal habeas court that, in its 

independent judgment, the state-court decision applied Strickland

incorrectly. Rather, he must show that the [state court] applied Strickland to 

the facts of his case in an objectively unreasonable manner. 

Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 698-99 (2002) (citations omitted); see also Woodford v. 

Visciotti, 537 U.S. at 24-25 (“Under § 2254(d)’s ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a 

federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its 

independent judgment that the state-court decision applied Strickland incorrectly. Rather, 

it is the habeas applicant’s burden to show that the state court applied Strickland to the 

facts of his case in an objectively unreasonable manner.”) (citations omitted). 

Having reviewed the record, the Court finds that the state court did not 

unreasonably apply Strickland and denies Petitioner’s claim as asserted in Ground Three, 

but finds that the state court’s factual determination in Ground Four was unreasonable, 

and grants relief as to Ground Four. 

3. Trial Court Proceedings 

 During trial, Officer Wright testified that he had spoken with J. while investigating 

the claims of molestation. (Doc. 8, Ex. F, R.T. 2/18/04 at 155-57.) When the prosecutor 

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asked Wright what J. had told him, defense counsel objected because it was not clear at 

that point whether J. was going to testify at trial. (Id. at 173.) The trial court sustained the 

objection. (Id. at 174.) Later at trial J. testified that Hollenback had “tried” to touch him. 

(Doc. 8, Ex. G, R.T. 2/19/04 at 125.) He indicated that he had told the policeman about 

the incident. (Id. at 130.) He also remembered being interviewed the same night at a 

different location. (Id. at 117, 120.) 

 Throughout the prosecutor’s questioning, however, J. was unresponsive, did not 

acknowledge that Petitioner had actually touched him, and repeatedly stated he did not 

know or remember events. (Id. at 121-29.) The prosecutor called Detective Mann for 

purposes of impeaching J’s testimony. (Id. at 133.) Mann had interviewed J. at the 

Children’s Advocacy Center the day of Petitioner’s arrest. (Id. at 207.) Mann testified 

that J. had indicated through words and demonstration that Petitioner had touched J.’s 

groin with his hand over J.’s clothes using a squeezing motion. (Answer, Ex. H., R.T. 

2/20/04 at 21-24.) The prosecutor also recalled Officer Wright, and Wright testified that 

J. told him that Petitioner had “touched his pee-pee with his clothing on.” (Id. at 87.) 

Petitioner’s counsel did not object to the State’s use of Mann and Wright’s impeachment 

testimony. Defense counsel did, however, cross-examine both Mann and Wright on the 

statements they took. (Id. at 35-50, 88.) 

4. Ground Three 

 Petitioner argued in his PCR petition that defense counsel failed to properly object 

to Officer Wright and Detective Mann’s hearsay testimony, thus allowing the statements 

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which were admitted under the guise of impeachment evidence to be used as substantive 

evidence to support the charge of child molestation. (Doc. 8, Ex. D at 7-.) The trial court, 

ruling on the PCR petition, found that Mann’s and Wright’s impeachment testimony was 

admissible under Ariz. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(A) as evidence of J’s prior inconsistent 

statements. (Petition, Ex. C at 3-4.) Following Arizona law, the trial court also found that 

the prior inconsistent statement could be considered substantively as well as for 

impeachment. (Id.)(citing State v. Skinner, 515 P.2d 880, 887 (Ariz. 1973)). Further, 

using the five factors set forth in State v. Allred, 655 P.2d 1326, 1330 (Ariz. 1982), the 

court ruled that the probative value of the officers’ testimony was not substantially 

outweighed by the danger of prejudice. (Id.) Because the evidence was admissible, the 

trial court denied relief on Petitioner’s claim that counsel was ineffective for not 

objecting. (Id. at 5.) 

 In his petition for review to the appellate court, Petitioner conceded that the trial 

court was correct that Rule 801(d)(1)(A), Ariz.R.Evid., generally permits a party to 

impeach the party’s own witness with prior inconsistent statements, but argued that the 

court erred when it determined “the evidence was admissible under Rule 801(d)(1)(A) 

and was not unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403, [Ariz.R.Evid.].” (Answer, Ex. E. at 10.) 

Petitioner argued that the trial court did not address the fact that J.’s out-of-court 

statements were the only evidence of Petitioner’s guilt on Count One of the indictment, 

thus, their introduction as impeachment evidence is prohibited by caselaw. (Id.)(citing 

State v. Cruz, 128 Ariz. 538 (1981); State v. Allred, 135 Ariz. 274 (1982); State v. 

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Thomas, 148 Ariz. 225 (1986); and State v. Allen, 157 Ariz. 165 (1988)). The Arizona 

Court of Appeals reviewed the trial court’s minute entry, finding that the order 

demonstrated the court was aware of and considered the appropriate factors in 

determining whether it would have permitted the testimony if counsel had objected, 

specifically applying the test set forth in Allred, supra. (Petition, Ex. D at 5) The 

appellate court agreed with the trial court’s analysis, finding that Detective Mann’s 

testimony was not the only substantive evidence of the offense; Z’s testimony provided, 

at the least, circumstantial evidence, and at best, direct, albeit equivocal, evidence. The 

appellate court concluded that counsel’s performance was not deficient, nor was it 

prejudicial. (Id. at 5-6.) 

 As indicated, in addressing this IAC claim, the state court found, assuming that 

counsel had performed deficiently, Petitioner was not prejudiced by counsel’s 

performance. (Petition, Ex. D. at 6) Specifically, the appellate court stated, “the court 

would not have abused its discretion by overruling an objection, had counsel made one. 

... Therefore, counsel’s performance was not deficient, nor was it prejudicial.” (Id.) 

(internal citation omitted). In making this determination, the court reasonably applied 

Strickland. Because the underlying issue was meritless, and the evidence was properly 

admitted, Petitioner cannot show that he was prejudiced by the manner in which counsel 

litigated this issue. See Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 375 (1986); Wilson v. Henry, 185 F.3d 

986, 990 (9th Cir. 1999) (counsel did not perform deficiently by failing to move for 

exclusion of defendant’s prior bad acts because the evidence “was almost certainly 

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admissible”). Petitioner is not entitled to relief on Ground Three. 

5. Ground Four 

 Petitioner argued to the trial court in his PCR petition that J.’s testimony supplied 

enough facts to warrant a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of attempted 

child molestation. (Doc. 8, Ex. D at 20-21.) Petitioner further asserted that he was 

prejudiced by trial counsel’s ineffectiveness in failing to request the lesser included 

offense. (Id.) The trial court conceded that the instruction would have been supported by 

J’s testimony, but found that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to request the 

instruction because it would have been entirely inconsistent with the defense theory that 

“Robert Hollenback did nothing” (Doc. 1, Ex. C at 5.) Given the theory of the defense 

that Petitioner was innocent of any crime, the trial court reasoned that it was within trial 

counsel’s discretion to not seek an instruction inconsistent with this defense, and thus 

trial counsel’s performance was not deficient. (Id.)(citing State v. Jerousek, 121 Ariz. 420 

(1979)). 

 Petitioner disagreed with the trial court’s ruling, arguing in his petition for review 

that requesting a lesser-included instruction would not have been inconsistent with the 

defense strategy. (Doc. 8, Ex. E at 16-17.) Petitioner argued that even if it were 

inconsistent, 

. . . the only way counsel’s failure to request the instruction could have 

been a legitimate strategic choice would be if the inconsistency would have 

been apparent to the jury, thus undermining the defense of actual 

innocence. This, of course, could not have happened. All argument by 

counsel regarding jury instructions takes place out of the presence of the 

jury. If defense counsel had believed the lesser-included instruction 

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undermined his defense strategy, he could have simply omitted any 

reference to it from his closing argument. The mere presence of the 

instruction could not possibly have tainted the defense in the eyes of the 

jury. 

(Doc. 8, Ex. E at 16.) Finally, Petitioner argued that defense counsel’s failure to ask for 

the lesser-included instruction was not a strategic choice. (Id.) 

 The appellate court rejected Petitioner’s argument, finding that the trial court 

believed counsel’s decision not to request the instruction was likely a reasonable tactical 

decision based on the asserted defense that nothing had occurred at all. (Doc. 1, Ex. D. at 

6-7)(citing State v. Webb, 164 Ariz. 348 (1990) (“Actions of defense counsel which 

appear to be trial tactics will not support an allegation of ineffective assistance of 

counsel.”). 

 Federal courts may only grant habeas relief in cases where the state court decision 

“was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); Taylor, 366 F.3d at 

999-1000 (stating that § 2254(d)(2) “applies most readily to situations where petitioner 

challenges the state court's findings based entirely on the state record”); see also Wood v. 

Allen, 588 U.S. 290, (2010) (noting that the appellate courts have split on whether a state 

court's factual determination should be reviewed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) or § 

2254(e)(1)). The Court finds that the state court's factual finding that trial counsel made a 

tactical decision in this case is “unreasonable.” 

 “[A] state-court factual determination is not unreasonable merely because the 

federal habeas court would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance.” 

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Wood, 558 U.S. at 301. However, “[a] decision cannot be fairly characterized as 

“strategic” unless it is a conscious choice between two legitimate and rational 

alternatives. It must be borne of deliberation and not happenstance, inattention, or 

neglect.” Id. at 307 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 526 

(2003) (concluding that counsel's “failure to investigate thoroughly resulted from 

inattention, not reasoned strategic judgment”); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690–91). As the 

Supreme Court stated in Strickland, and later reiterated in Wiggins, “strategic choices 

made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are 

virtually unchallengeable[.]” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91; Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 510. 

 The Court finds that the state court record is void of any evidence demonstrating 

that counsel's failure to request a lesser included instruction was the result of a deliberate 

decision. As the Supreme Court explained in Wood, “Whether the state court reasonably 

determined that there was a strategic decision under § 2254(d)(2) is a different question 

from whether the strategic decision itself was a reasonable exercise of professional 

judgment under Strickland or whether the application of Strickland was reasonable under 

§ 2254(d)(1).” 558 U.S. at 304. The trial court stated that “[g]iven the theory of the 

defense, that Petitioner was innocent of any crime, it was well within trial counsel’s 

discretion to not seek an instruction inconsistent with this defense.” (Doc. 1, Ex. C at 23.) 

The appellate court concluded based on this finding that the trial court believed counsel’s 

decision not to request the instruction was “likely a reasonable tactical decision based on 

the asserted defense that nothing had occurred at all.” (Id., Ex. D at 7.) 

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 The Court finds no support for the state court's factual determination that counsel 

made a tactical or strategic choice to not request the lesser included jury instruction of 

attempted child molestation. Cf. Wood, 558 U.S. at 301-302 (“This evidence in the statecourt record can fairly be read to support the [state] court's factual determination that 

counsel's failure to pursue or present evidence of Wood's mental deficiencies was not 

mere oversight or neglect but was instead the result of a deliberate decision to focus on 

other defenses.”). First, the Court rejects the trial court’s attempts to characterize 

counsel’s choice as strategic simply because it was the only legitimate and rational choice 

counsel could have made because a lesser included jury instruction would have been 

inconsistent with an innocence defense. As Petitioner argued in his Petition, the evidence 

supported the jury instruction, and Petitioner would not have to draw attention to the 

instruction by arguing it to the jury. The Court finds no support for the trial court’s 

conclusion that innocence or insufficiency of the evidence theories of defense (see 

Answer, Ex. H, Reporter’s Transcript, 2/20/2004 at 141, ll. 23-25) are per se inconsistent 

with the lesser included instruction of attempted child molestation. See State v. Wall, 212 

Ariz. 1, 5-6 (2006)(there is no bright-line rule under Arizona law that a lesser-included 

offense instruction is never proper if a defendant has asserted an all-or-nothing defense). 

[A] lesser-included offense instruction is not appropriate “when the ‘defendant's theory of 

the case denies all involvement in the [offense], and [when] no evidence provides a basis

for [the lesser included offense], ... [and] the record is such that defendant is either guilty 

of the crime charged or not guilty.’ ” State v. Van Adams, 194 Ariz. 408, 414 

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(1999)(quoting State v. Salazar, 173 Ariz. 399, 408 (1992)). (emphasis added); see also 

State v. Whaley, 2011 WL 92990 (Ariz.App. 2011)(rejecting State’s argument that court 

correctly refused attempt instruction because defendant’s only defense was that he did not 

engage in any sexual misconduct whatsoever with child; noting that a defendant’s all-ornothing defense does not preclude a lesser-included offense instruction when the record 

contains evidence warranting the instruction). Second, the Court finds that there is no 

evidentiary basis in the state court record for such a finding: there was no PCR hearing in 

state court; counsel submitted no affidavit explaining his decision; and the transcripts 

submitted with this Petition contain no discussion that sheds any light on counsel’s 

decision-making process. The Court agrees with Respondents that, given the facts of the 

case, counsel might have made a tactical decision to pursue an all-or-nothing defense; 

that is, the absence of the instruction placed Petitioner’s jury in the position where it 

might acquit him rather than convict him of the completed offense. As compelling and 

reasonable as this might sound in hindsight, however, there is nothing in the record 

before this Court that suggests that counsel actually made this strategic decision. See 

Debarge v. Stewart, 39 Fed.Appx. 577 (9th Cir. 2002)(Defense counsel’s failure to 

request jury instruction on lesser included offenses to the charge of intentional child 

abuse was objectively unreasonable where failure to request the instructions was not a 

strategic choice, but the result of counsel’s failure to understand the law). An equally 

plausible strategic position, and the reason for the rule requiring instruction on lesserincluded offenses in Arizona, is that a jury will convict a defendant of a crime even 

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though the evidence “remains in doubt, simply because he “is plainly guilty of some 

offense.” Wall, 212 Ariz. at 4. (quoting Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 634 (1980)). The 

Court finds that the state court record is void of any evidence demonstrating that 

counsel's failure to request the lesser included jury instruction was the result of a 

deliberate decision, and finds the trial court’s finding an unreasonable factual 

determination based on flawed speculation that defense counsel actually made this 

reasoned decision. 

 To prevail in this action, however, Petitioner must demonstrate not only that 

Petitioner performed deficiently, but also that he was prejudiced as a result of the 

deficient performance. A lesser-included offense instruction is required if the jury could 

“find (a) that the State failed to prove an element of the greater offense and (b) that the 

evidence is sufficient to support a conviction on the lesser offense.” Wall, 212 Ariz. At 4 

(citing State v. Caldera, 141 Ariz. 634, 636-37 (1984). Because the trial court made a 

finding that the instruction would have been supported by J’s testimony, under Arizona 

law, and this finding is uncontested, there is no question that the lesser-included 

instruction would have been given if counsel had requested it. Thus, Petitioner was 

prejudiced by counsel’s failure to request the instruction. 

 Accordingly, the Court finds that the state court’s determination that trial 

counsel’s performance was not deficient was based on an unreasonable determination of 

facts. Because the trial court concedes that the instruction would have been given, the 

prejudice prong has been established. Because the jury necessarily found all the facts 

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essential to convict Petitioner for a violation of attempted child molestation when it found 

all the facts necessary to convict Petitioner of the completed offense, the state court can 

modify the judgment from a conviction of the completed offense, to reflect the conviction 

of the proven, lesser-included offense of attempt, and resentence accordingly. See e.g. 

State v. Gray, 227 Ariz. 424, 429 (App. 2011)(citing State v. Rowland, 12 Ariz.App. 437 

(1970); State v. Garcia, 138 Ariz. 211 (App. 1983). Accordingly, the proper remedy for 

this Court is to order that the state court immediately vacate Petitioner’s sentence, or to 

postpone such relief for a reasonable period to allow the state court to vacate the 

conviction on the completed offense and enter conviction of the attempted offense and 

resentence the Petitioner. See Douglas v. Jacquez, 626 F.3d 501, 505 (2010)(Where the 

state court “has the power to correct the constitutional error ... it should be given the 

opportunity to do so.”). 

IV. CONCLUSION

 The Court finds that Petitioner procedurally defaulted Grounds One and Two of 

his Petition. Nonetheless, considering the merits of the claim, the Court finds Grounds 

One and Two, as well as Petitioner’s IAC claim raised in Ground Three, are without 

merit and are denied with prejudice. The Court finds that Petitioner has raised a 

meritorious claim as to Ground Four, however, and grants relief as to this claim only. 

Accordingly, 

 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition (Doc. 1) is GRANTED IN PART 

AND DENIED IN PART. 

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 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Grounds One, Two and Three of the Petition 

(Doc. 1) are DENIED WITH PREJUDICE. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Ground Four of the Petition is GRANTED to 

the extent that the state court is DIRECTED to vacate Count 1 of Petitioner’s conviction, 

molestation of a child, under § 13-1410, unless, within 90 days from the entry of 

Judgment, the state court modifies the state court judgment and conviction by vacating 

the conviction of the completed offense of molestation of child in Count 1 and entering 

conviction of the attempted molestation of a child molestation and resentences Petitioner 

accordingly. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall enter Judgment 

accordingly. 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, if Petitioner appeals the denial of his petition 

for habeas relief, any request for certificate of appealability is denied based on the 

Court’s determination of the claims presented on the merits and that Petitioner has failed 

to make the requisite substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right on the 

grounds presented. See 28. U.S.C. § 2253(c) 

 Dated this 19th day of September, 2013. 

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