Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-14-02083/USCOURTS-ca8-14-02083-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 14-2083

___________________________

Tracy L. Reid, individually, and on behalf of M.A.R.

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

BCBSM, Inc., doing business as Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Minnesota

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

Michael Rothman, in his capacity as Commissioner of the Minnesota Department

of Commerce

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant

Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Minnesota Medical Plan, Group No. 4G175-00

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of Minnesota - Minneapolis

____________

 Submitted: February 11, 2015

 Filed: May 28, 2015

[Published] 

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Before GRUENDER, SHEPHERD, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

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Appellate Case: 14-2083 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/28/2015 Entry ID: 4279445 
PER CURIAM.

The issue in this case is whether the district court erred in refusing to grant

vacatur. We remand to provide the district court an opportunity to explain its

decision.

I.

This case arises from a dispute about Tracy Reid’s health insurance coverage. 

Reid worked as an attorney in Minnesota and received health insurance from Blue

Cross and Blue Shield of Minnesota through her law firm. In 2008, her son M.A.R.

was diagnosed with autismspectrumdisorder. One ofthe treatments M.A.R. received

for his diagnosis was behavioral therapy. Reid’s Blue Cross policy initially covered

this treatment. In 2012, however, Blue Cross informed Reid her policy would

exclude coverage for behavioral therapy beginning in 2013. Reid, on behalf of

herself and M.A.R., subsequently brought suit in the district court, seeking to enjoin

Blue Crossfrom excluding behavioral therapy. Blue Cross moved to dismiss Reid’s 1

complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The district court granted

the motion in part and denied the motion in part, dismissing most of Reid’s claims but

allowing her claims under the Minnesota Human Rights Act (“MHRA”) and the

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) to proceed. 

We refer to BCBSM, Inc. and Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Minnesota

1

Medical Plan, Group No. 4G175-00, collectively as “Blue Cross.” Reid also sued her

previous insurer, HealthPartners Insurance Company, as well as the Minnesota

Department of Commerce and Michael Rothman, in his capacity as Commissioner of

the Minnesota Department of Commerce. The district court dismissed Reid’s claims

against these additional defendants and further discussion of them is unnecessary.

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Appellate Case: 14-2083 Page: 2 Date Filed: 05/28/2015 Entry ID: 4279445 
On October 31, 2013, Reid moved to Arizona;she lost her BlueCross coverage

some time thereafter. Although the parties dispute exactly when Reid’s Blue Cross

coverage stopped, they do not dispute that once it did, her prayer for injunctive relief

became moot. Accordingly, Blue Cross filed a motion requesting that the district

court (1) dismiss the case as moot and (2) vacate its Rule 12(b)(6) ruling. Reid

similarly moved to dismiss the case as moot, but she urged the district court not to

vacate its Rule 12(b)(6) ruling. The district court then entered an order granting

Reid’s motion to dismiss, granting Blue Cross’s motion to the extent it sought

dismissal, and denying Blue Cross’s motion to the extent it sought vacatur. In its

order, the district court provided no explanation for its denial of vacatur. Blue Cross

now appeals, arguing it was error for the district court not to vacate its Rule 12(b)(6)

ruling once it dismissed the case as moot.

II.

Before we consider the district court’s vacatur determination, we address the

threshold issue of our jurisdiction. Reid argues we lack jurisdiction under both 28

U.S.C. § 1291 and Article III of the Constitution. Specifically, she contends that the

district court’s order denying vacatur is not a final decision under section 1291 and

that no Article III case or controversy remains because the district court dismissed the

case as moot.

First, we possess jurisdiction under section 1291, which generally grants us

“jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Here, the district court’s order dismissing the case as

moot and declining to grant vacatur is a final decision for section 1291 purposes. See

Alpine Glass, Inc. v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co., 531 F.3d 679, 681 (8th Cir. 2008) (“A

district court’s order is a ‘final decision’ for the purposes of § 1291 if it ‘ends the

litigation on the merits and leaves nothing more for the [district] court to do but

execute the judgment.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala.

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Appellate Case: 14-2083 Page: 3 Date Filed: 05/28/2015 Entry ID: 4279445 
v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 86 (2000))); Roller v. Worthen Nat’l Bank of Nw. Ark. (In

re Roller), 999 F.2d 346, 347 (8th Cir. 1993) (stating that the district court entered a

“final judgment” when it dismissed a case as moot).

Second, while we cannot consider the merits of Reid’s MHRA and ADA

claims, Article III does not bar us from considering the issue of vacatur on appeal. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (“[C]ourt[s] of appellate jurisdiction may affirm, modify,

vacate, set aside or reverse any judgment, decree, or order of a court lawfully brought

before it for review, and may remand the cause and direct the entry of such

appropriate judgment, decree, or order, or require such further proceedings to be had

as may be just under the circumstances.”); U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall

P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 20-22 (1994) (holding that Article III does not prevent federal

appellate courts from exercising their section 2106 powers after a case becomes

moot); Great W. Sugar Co. v. Nelson, 442 U.S. 92, 93 (1979) (per curiam) (granting

certiorari and ordering vacatur in a case the Tenth Circuit had already dismissed as

moot); cf. United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 40 (1950) (citing 28

U.S.C. § 2106) (“Denial of a motion to vacate could bring the case here. Our

supervisory power over the judgments of the lower federal courts is a broad one.”).

III.

Having established our power to hear the case, we now address the district

court’s vacatur determination. Although Blue Cross never specified which Rule it

sought vacatur under, we treat its motion for vacatur as a motion under Rule 60(b),

which is the Rule that allows a district court to consider vacatur requests. See Fed.

R. Civ. P 60(b) (“On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal

representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding . . . .”). Thus we review

the district court’s denial of vacatur for an abuse of discretion. See Noah v. Bond

Cold Storage, 408 F.3d 1043, 1045 (8th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (reviewing ruling on

Rule 60(b) motion for abuse of discretion).

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Appellate Case: 14-2083 Page: 4 Date Filed: 05/28/2015 Entry ID: 4279445 
“[T]he determination [of whether to grant vacatur] is an equitable one . . . .” 

U.S. Bancorp, 513 U.S. at 29. And it will depend heavily on the circumstances

involved in each case. See id. Here, the district court declined to grant vacatur. Yet

it provided no explanation for doing so. As we have observed in another context,

“[a]lthough the district court may have reached the proper conclusion, it is hard to tell

without an explanation for the action taken.” Twin City Constr. Co. of Fargo v.

Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians, 911 F.2d 137, 139 (8th Cir. 1990)

(discussing ruling on Rule 59(e) motion). Accordingly, because we do not know the

district court’s reason for denying vacatur, we decline to answer whether the district

court abused its discretion. In these specific circumstances, we cannot conduct a

meaningful review without an explanation from the district court.2

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we remand the case to the district court with

instructions that the district court provide an explanation for its decision.

3

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We note one of Blue Cross’s suggestions is that “[a]s long as [the Rule 2

12(b)(6) ruling] stands unvacated, other parties can potentially cite it against Blue

Cross as stare decisis.” Appellant Br. 8 (emphasis removed). However, the district

court’s Rule 12(b)(6) ruling cannot be used as stare decisis because “[a] district court

decision binds no judge in any other case, save to the extent that doctrines of

preclusion (not stare decisis) apply.” Gould v. Bowyer, 11 F.3d 82, 84 (7th Cir.

1993); see also ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 547 F.3d 109, 112 & n.4

(2d Cir. 2008) (“District court decisions, unlike the decisions of States’ highest courts

and federal courts of appeals, are not precedential in the technical sense: they have

collateral estoppel, resjudicata, and ‘law of the case’ effects, but create no rule of law

binding on other courts.” (footnotes omitted)).

We deny Reid’s motion to strike statementsin Blue Cross’s opening and reply 3

briefs because the factual statements Reid objects to are not relevant on appeal. 

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Appellate Case: 14-2083 Page: 5 Date Filed: 05/28/2015 Entry ID: 4279445