Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-03135/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-03135-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIE T. HILL,

Plaintiff,

 v.

ALAMEDA COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFF

D. JONES, Badge No. 1305,

Defendant. ______________________________

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No. C 05-3135 CW (PR)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(Docket no. 15)

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Willie T. Hill filed this pro se civil rights action

when he was incarcerated at the Santa Rita County Jail. According

to the allegations in the complaint, after an altercation on April

15, 2005 with another inmate at the jail he became afraid for his

life. He explained the situation to Defendant Deputy Sheriff D.

Jones, and asked to be moved to another housing pod because he

believed he was in imminent danger of being harmed. Defendant

Jones told Plaintiff he would move him, but failed to do so. As a

result, Plaintiff was assaulted by the other inmate's cousins and

friends who were returning from court. He suffered injuries to his

head, neck, back, ribs and thighs, as well as emotional distress. 

In an Order dated July 5, 2006, the Court found that

Plaintiff's allegations presented a cognizable claim for deliberate

indifference to safety. 

Defendant moves for summary judgment. Defendant claims that

Plaintiff's complaint constitutes a legal claim that has been

released through settlement. (Mot. for Summ. J. at 3.) He alleges

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 Plaintiff has been given two extensions of time to file an

opposition. The deadline to file his opposition was on July 8,

2007. In an Order dated September 7, 2007, the Court noted that it

had not received Plaintiff's opposition or any further

communication from him, and directed Plaintiff to file a notice of

his intent to prosecute. On September 19, 2007, Plaintiff

responded by writing a letter to the Court. While his letter is

difficult to decipher, the Court construes it as a notice of his

intent to prosecute this action and not as an opposition to

Defendant's motion for summary judgment.

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that Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim stemming from the April 15,

2005 incident is barred by the valid release signed by Plaintiff,

which extinguishes his cause of action. (Id.; Hillegass Decl., Ex.

B.) Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot prevail as a matter of

law on the sole cognizable claim in his complaint and, therefore,

he is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.

To date, Plaintiff has not filed an opposition.1 

For the reasons discussed below, Defendant's motion for

summary judgment is GRANTED.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is properly granted when no genuine and

disputed issues of material fact remain and when, viewing the

evidence most favorably to the non-moving party, the movant is

clearly entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.

56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);

Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1288-89 (9th Cir.

1987).

The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no

material factual dispute. Therefore, the Court must regard as true

the opposing party's evidence, if supported by affidavits or other

evidentiary material. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Eisenberg, 815

F.2d at 1289. The Court must draw all reasonable inferences in

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favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

587 (1986); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d

1551, 1558 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Material facts which would preclude entry of summary judgment

are those which, under applicable substantive law, may affect the

outcome of the case. The substantive law will identify which facts

are material. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986). Where the moving party does not bear the burden of proof

on an issue at trial, the moving party may discharge its burden of

showing that no genuine issue of material fact remains by

demonstrating that "there is an absence of evidence to support the

nonmoving party's case." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. The burden

then shifts to the opposing party to produce "specific evidence,

through affidavits or admissible discovery material, to show that

the dispute exists." Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409

(9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 994 (1991). A complete

failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving

party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

DISCUSSION

On May 11, 2005, Plaintiff filed a prison grievance with

Deputy J. Beauchamp stating the same allegations as the present

action. (Shaull Decl. ¶ 6; Ex. B.) On June 29, 2005, the

Grievance Unit investigating supervisor, Sergeant K. Martinez,

referred the grievance to Santa Rita Jail Administration for

review. (Shaull Decl. ¶ 7.) The appeals officer and commanding

officer's designee reviewed and concurred with Sergeant Martinez's

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decision. (Id.)

Plaintiff filed the present action on August 3, 2005.

Between September, 2005 and February, 2006, Plaintiff

discussed settling his claim against the County of Alameda with

Helen Guidry of Acclamation Insurance Management Services (AIMS),

who was responsible for handling this matter for the County. 

(Hillegass Decl. ¶ 2.) 

Ms. Guidry kept a call log sheet detailing the subject matter

of various telephone conversations she had with Plaintiff and his

mother, Gladys Anderson. (Hillegass Decl. ¶ 4; Ex. A.) Ms.

Guidry, along with her supervisor, determined that Plaintiff's

claim was worth $1,500.00. (Id. ¶ 5.) On December 5, 2005, Ms.

Guidry received a letter from Plaintiff giving his mother

permission to handle the settlement of his claim. (Id.; Ex. E.) 

On December 6, 2005, Ms. Guidry offered $1,500.00 to settle the

claim, and Plaintiff's mother orally accepted on his behalf. 

(Hillegass Decl. ¶ 5.) On that same date, Ms. Guidry mailed a

document entitled "Release of All Claims" to Plaintiff's mother,

and the record shows that Plaintiff signed the release on February

2, 2006. (Hillegass Decl. ¶ 6; Ex. B.) 

The release states that in consideration for $1,500.00,

Plaintiff agreed to "forever discharge" the County "from any and

all claims, actions, causes of action" which Plaintiff "now

has/have or which may hereafter accrue on account of or in any way

growing out of any and all known and unknown, foreseen and

unforeseen bodily and personal injuries and property damages and

consequences thereof resulting or to result from the accident,

casualty or event which occurred on or about the 15th day of April,

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2005 at or near the Santa Rita Jail in Santa Rita, California." 

(Hillegass Decl.; Ex. B.) 

On March 6, 2006, Ms. Guidry sent Plaintiff a check issued by

the County in the amount of $1,500.00 and wrote Plaintiff a letter

stating, "This is the final resolution of your claim against

Alameda County." (Hillegass Decl.; Exs. C, D.) On March 8, 2006,

check number 1084170 in the amount of $1,500.00 was endorsed with

the signature "Willie T. Hill" and cleared the County's account at

Union Bank of California. (Lee Decl. ¶ 5; Ex. A.)

Defendant has presented the Court with competent evidence that

Plaintiff signed the aforementioned release and received

compensation, and Plaintiff has failed to submit any evidence to

counter Defendant's claim. However, a release of claims under

§ 1983 is valid only if it results from a decision that is

voluntary, deliberate, and informed. See Boyd v. Adams, 513 F.2d

83, 87-88 (7th Cir. 1975). The conditions affecting the validity

of a release of significant federal rights are eminently a matter

of federal law, and the Court finds it unnecessary to examine

California authorities presented by Defendant. See id. at 87. 

"In the context of section 1983 waivers, several factors are

relevant: although both parties may agree on certain facts,

including the accuracy of the transcript of the claimed settlement

conference, summary judgment is precluded when conflicting

inferences might be drawn about a party's state of mind as

reflected by objective indications." Jones v. Taber, 648 F.2d

1201, 1204 (1981). Courts must be solicitous in ascertaining

whether the release of a civil rights claim is valid. See id. at

1204-05 ("The federal solicitude for claimants under section 1983

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is at least as great as that for seamen and in both situations the

claimant's dependence on potential defendants requires the release

to be examined with particular care."). 

In Jones, a county prisoner filed a § 1983 suit against county

officials based on a beating administered while he was

incarcerated. Id. at 1202. The district court granted summary

judgment for the defendants on the ground that Jones had, in

exchange for $500.00 paid to him, signed a release in favor of all

the defendants. Id. Reversing the grant of summary judgment, the

Ninth Circuit held that defendants who rely on § 1983 releases

signed by prisoners must meet the same standard of validity

applicable to maritime releases. Id. Furthermore, the court found

that the fact that Jones admitted that his signature on the release

was "voluntary" was not controlling and that there were objective

indications of coercive pressures and a lack of understanding

precluding summary judgment. Id. at 1204. The court stated that

on remand, one objective factor that must be considered is the

presence of a non-coercive atmosphere for the execution of the

release, or how significant is the absence of such an atmosphere. 

Id. at 1204-05 (citing Boyd, 513 F.2d at 88). The court elaborated

by stating:

Immediately after the beating and mistreatment were

sustained by Jones, he was put back into a special

segregation facility. The circumstances of the original

injury may thus be tied in a direct and proximate way to

the release in that they may have been inherently

coercive. Objective factors that might dissipate this

coercive atmosphere, such as the presence of an attorney

representing the releasing party or the opportunity for

Jones to consider the consequences of his actions in a

neutral environment, appear to have been absent. We do

not foreclose a finding of a voluntary release when the

release is entered into by a prisoner without presence

or assistance of counsel, but these circumstances must

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be weighed carefully.

Id. at 1205.

Jones is distinguishable from the present case. Plaintiff was

able to speak and consult with his mother during the whole

negotiation process. He was also able to write to Ms. Guidry

directly in November, 2005, when he first found out that she was

handling his case, and a month later, when he decided to give his

mother permission to handle settlement negotiations. (Hillegass

Decl.; Ex. E.) Furthermore, the record shows that Plaintiff was no

longer at the Santa Rita Jail during the negotiation process

because his letters were sent from San Quentin State Prison, where

he had been transferred. (Id.) Unlike Jones, Plaintiff had the

opportunity "to consider the consequences of his actions in a

neutral environment." Jones, 648 F.2d at 1205. Plaintiff has

failed to provide any evidence to the contrary as he did not file

an opposition to Defendant's motion for summary judgment. Upon

evaluating the validity of a release as set forth in Jones, the

Court finds that Plaintiff's release of his Eighth Amendment claim

stemming from the April 15, 2005 incident was voluntary. 

Accordingly, the Court GRANTS summary judgment for Defendant

on the ground that Plaintiff had, in exchange for $1,500.00 paid to

him, voluntarily signed a release in favor of Defendant.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows:

1. Defendant's motion for summary judgment (docket no. 15) is

GRANTED.

2. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in favor of

Defendant, terminate all pending motions and close the file.

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P:\PRO-SE\CW\CR.05\Hill3135.MSJ.frm 8

3. This Order terminates Docket no. 15.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: 9/26/07 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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P:\PRO-SE\CW\CR.05\Hill3135.MSJ.frm 9

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HILL,

Plaintiff,

 v.

JONES et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV05-03135 CW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District

Court, Northern District of California.

That on September 26, 2007, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said

envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle

located in the Clerk's office.

Brendan Kenny

Andrada & Associates

180 Grand Avenue

Suite 925

Oakland, CA 94612

Willie T. Hill V-79683

Alameda County Santa Rita Jail

5325 Broder Blvd

Dublin, CA 94568

Willie T. Hill

C/O Gladys H. Anderson

1717 California Drive, Apt. 105

Vacaville, CA 95687

Dated: September 26, 2007

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Sheilah Cahill, Deputy Clerk

Case 4:05-cv-03135-CW Document 27 Filed 09/26/07 Page 9 of 9