Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00008/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-00008-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1 11cv00008 IEG(RBB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RUBEN CHAVARRIA,

Petitioner,

v.

MATTHEW CATE et al., 

Respondent. 

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Civil No. 11cv00008 IEG(RBB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS

FIRST AMENDED PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS BASED ON

UNTIMELINESS [ECF No. 11]

Petitioner Ruben Chavarria, a state prisoner proceeding pro se

and in forma pauperis, submitted a Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus on December 25, 2010, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 [ECF Nos.

1, 3]. On January 7, 2011, the Court dismissed the Petition

without prejudice for failing to name a proper respondent and for

failing to allege exhaustion of state judicial remedies [ECF No.

3]. On January 28, 2011, Chavarria’s First Amended Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus was filed, and the case was reopened [ECF

Nos. 6-7]. In the Amended Petition, Chavarria argues that his

sentence enhancements were illegally imposed, in violation of the

rule announced in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 

(Am. Pet. 6, ECF No. 6.)

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1

 Although the Notice of Lodgment has not been filed,

Respondent has lodged with the Court all records bearing on

Respondent’s contention.

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On March 14, 2011, Kelly Harrington, the former warden,

attempted to file a Motion to Dismiss Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus Based on Untimeliness, along with a Notice of Lodgment [ECF

No. 9]. The Court struck the Motion and attachments because of

several deficiencies [ECF No. 10]. First, the Motion did not

address the First Amended Petition, which is the operative

pleading. (Mins., Mar. 16, 2011, ECF No. 10.) Second, the deputy

attorney general did not file the Motion in compliance with Civil

Local Rule 7.1(f)(1). (Id.) Third, Chavarria had properly named

the current warden of Kern Valley State Prison, Warden Biter, as a

Respondent in the First Amended Petition. (Id. (citing First Am.

Pet. 1, ECF No. 6).)

These errors were corrected, and Warden Biter filed a Motion

to Dismiss First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Based

on Untimeliness on March 17, 2011, along with a Notice of Motion

and a Memorandum of Points and Authorities [ECF No. 11].1 To date,

the Petitioner has not filed an opposition.

The Court finds the Motion to Dismiss suitable for resolution

on the papers, pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). See S.D.

Cal. Civ. R. 7.1(d)(1). The Court has reviewed the Amended

Petition as well as Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss and attachments. 

For the reasons stated below, the Motion to Dismiss should be

GRANTED.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On May 7, 2007, the San Diego County District Attorney filed

an amended information charging Chavarria with evading an officer

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causing serious bodily injury, driving under the influence of

alcohol causing injury, driving with a measurable blood alcohol,

and driving when privilege was suspended or revoked. (Lodgment No.

1, Clerk’s Tr. vol. 1, 8-11, May 7, 2007 (am. information).) The

information also accused Petitioner of having a prior prison term

conviction, a prior serious felony conviction, and one prior strike

conviction. (Id.)

On May 30, 2007, Chavarria entered into a plea agreement in

which he pleaded guilty to evading an officer and driving under the

influence of alcohol causing injury, and he admitted having a

prison conviction and a prior serious felony conviction. (Id. at

12, May 30, 2007 (plea of guilty).) Chavarria agreed to be

sentenced to twelve years and four months in state prison in

exchange for the dismissal of the remaining charges. (Id.) On

August 21, 2007, he was sentenced. (See id. at 63, Aug. 27, 2007

(notice of appeal).)

Chavarria filed a notice of appeal on August 27, 2007, but

abandoned it seven months later. (Id.; Lodgment No. 2, People v.

Chavarria, No. D051606 (Cal. Ct. App. filed Mar. 25, 2008)

(abandonment of appeal at 1).) On March 24, 2008, the California

Court of Appeal for the Fourth District, Division One, ordered that

the appeal be dismissed and the remittitur be issued immediately. 

(Lodgment No. 3, People v. Chavarria, No. D051606, slip op. at 1

(Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 24, 2008).) The remittitur was issued the same

day. (Lodgment No. 4, People v. Chavarria, No. D051606 (Cal. Ct.

App. Mar. 24, 2008) (remittitur).) There is no record that

Chavarria filed any petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the

San Diego Superior Court or the California Supreme Court, prior to

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filing his federal Petition. (Lodgment No. 5, Declaration of Manny

Martinez at 1; Lodgment No. 6, http://appellatecases.

courtinfo.ca.gov (select “Supreme Court”; then search by party).) 

Chavarria filed this Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on

January 3, 2011 [ECF No. 1]. Twenty-eight days later, on January

31, 2011, he filed a habeas petition with the California Court of

Appeal. (Lodgment No. 7, Chavarria v. Cate, No. D059057 (Cal. Ct.

App. filed Jan. 31, 2011) (petition for writ of habeas corpus).) 

His state petition was summarily denied on March 2, 2011. See

http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov (select “Appellate District,

Fourth Appellate District Div 1”; enter court of appeal case

number, then “Disposition.”

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Chavarria is subject to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996 because he filed his Petition after

April 24, 1996. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244 (West 2006); Woodford v.

Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 204 (2003) (citing Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S.

320, 326 (1997)). AEDPA sets forth the scope of review for federal

habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a justice thereof, a circuit

judge, or a district court shall entertain an

application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws of the United

States.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(a) (West 2006); see also Reed v. Farley, 512

U.S. 339, 347 (1994); Hernandez v. Ylst, 930 F.2d 714, 719 (9th

Cir. 1991).

To present a cognizable federal habeas corpus claim, a state

prisoner must allege his conviction was obtained in violation of

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the Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C.A. §

2254(a). In other words, a petitioner must contend that the state

court violated his federal constitutional rights. Hernandez, 930

F.2d at 719; Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 1990);

Mannhald v. Reed, 847 F.2d 576, 579 (9th Cir. 1988).

 A federal district court does “not sit as a ‘super’ state

supreme court” with general supervisory authority over the proper

application of state law. Smith v. McCotter, 786 F.2d 697, 700

(5th Cir. 1986); see also Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780

(1990) (holding that federal habeas courts must respect state

court’s application of state law); Jackson, 921 F.2d at 885

(concluding that federal courts have no authority to review a

state’s application of its law). Federal courts may grant habeas

relief only to correct errors of federal constitutional magnitude. 

Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1989).

In 1996, Congress “worked substantial changes to the law of

habeas corpus.” Moore v. Calderon, 108 F.3d 261, 263 (9th Cir.

1997). Amended section 2254(d) now reads:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgement

of a State court shall not be granted with respect to

any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State

court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim 

-- 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

the evidence presented in the state court

proceeding.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d).

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In Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003), the Supreme Court

stated, “AEDPA does not require a federal habeas court to adopt

any one methodology in deciding the only question that matters

under section 2254(d)(1) -- whether a state court decision is

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law.” Id. at 71 (citation omitted). A

federal court is therefore not required to review the state court

decision de novo, but may proceed directly to the reasonableness

analysis under § 2254(d)(1). Id.

The “novelty” in § 2254(d)(1) is “the reference to ‘Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.’” 

Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 869 (7th Cir. 1996) (en banc), rev’d

on other grounds, 521 U.S. 320 (1997) (emphasis in original

deleted). Section 2254(d)(1) “explicitly identifies only the

Supreme Court as the font of ‘clearly established’ rules.” Id.

“[A] state court decision may not be overturned on habeas corpus

review, for example, because of a conflict with Ninth Circuitbased law.” Moore, 108 F.3d at 264. “[A] writ may issue only

when the state court decision is ‘contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of,’ an authoritative decision of the

Supreme Court.” Id. (citing Childress v. Johnson, 103 F.3d 1221,

1224-26 (5th Cir. 1997); Devin v. DeTella, 101 F.3d 1206, 1208

(7th Cir. 1996)); see Baylor v. Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th

Cir. 1996).

Furthermore, with respect to the factual findings of the

trial court, AEDPA provides:

In a proceeding instituted by an application for a

writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to

the judgement of a State court, a determination of a 

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2

 Page thirteen from Chavarria’s original Petition was not

included in his Amended Petition, but presumably, he intends to

make the same argument. (Compare Pet. 1-13, ECF No. 1, with Am.

Pet. 1-13, ECF No. 6.) Because the original Petition is not

consecutively paginated, the Court will cite to it using the page

numbers assigned by the electronic case filing system.

3

 Respondent clarifies that although Chavarria filed his

Petition on January 3, 2011, he should be deemed to have filed it

seven days prior, on December 28, 2010, pursuant to the mailbox

rule. (Id.)

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factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to

be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of

rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and

convincing evidence.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)(1).

III. DISCUSSION

Chavarria claims that in light of Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466, the

superior court judge wrongfully relied on facts that were not

proven to a jury when he imposed an upper-term sentence. (Am. Pet.

6, ECF No. 6.) In his original Petition, Chavarria argued that in

Apprendi, the Supreme Court held that any fact increasing the

penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum must be submitted

to the jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. (Pet. 13 (citing

Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466, ECF No. 1).)2

Respondent Biter moves to dismiss the Amended Petition because

Chavarria’s claim is barred by the statute of limitations set forth

in 28 § U.S.C. 2244(d). (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #2 Mem. P. & A. 4,

ECF No. 11.) Biter contends that AEDPA’s one-year limitations

period commenced on October 20, 2007, giving Petitioner until

October 19, 2008, to file his federal petition, which he did not

file until December 28, 2010. (Id.)3

 Because neither statutory

nor equitable tolling applies to this case, Respondent asserts the

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Amended Petition should be dismissed with prejudice. (Id. at 6-8;

see id. Attach. #1 Notice Mot. Dismiss 2.)

The Petitioner did not file an opposition to Respondent’s

Motion to Dismiss. Although Civil Local Rule 7.1(f) provides that

the failure to oppose a motion may constitute consent to granting

the motion, this Court will evaluate the merits of Respondent’s

arguments. S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 7.1(f)(3)(c).

A. The One-Year Statute of Limitations

Biter maintains that the time period for Chavarria to seek

direct review of his conviction was sixty days after the state

superior court proceedings ended. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #2 Mem. P.

& A. 4, ECF No. 11 (citing Cal. R. Ct. 8.308(a)).) Because

Petitioner filed an appeal and abandoned it, Biter argues that

Chavarria failed to appeal the judgment within sixty days. (Id.) 

Thus, the conviction became final on October 20, 2007, sixty days

after the August 21, 2007 sentencing. (Id.) Biter argues that

Chavarria had until October 19, 2008, to file a federal habeas

petition, but he did not do so until December 28, 2010. (Id.) 

Respondent concludes that Petitioner’s Apprendi claim is time

barred because he did not seek federal habeas review until more

than two years after the one-year statute of limitations had

expired. (Id.)

The statute of limitations for federal habeas corpus petitions

is set forth in AEDPA. As amended, § 2244(d) provides:

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an

application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of --

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by

the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of

the time for seeking such review;

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(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an

application created by State action in violation of

the Constitution or laws of the United States is

removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing

by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right

asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme

Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the

Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to

cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the

claim or claims presented could have been discovered

through the exercise of due diligence. 

28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(d)(1).

When computing any time period indicated in a statute that

does not specify a method of computing time, courts are to apply

the guidelines of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 6(a); see also Civil Local Rule 7.1(c) (applying Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 6 for all computation of time). When a

statute’s time period is stated in days, the first day of the event

that triggers the period is excluded. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1)(A).

Chavarria was sentenced on August 21, 2007. (Lodgment No. 1,

Clerk’s Tr. vol. 1, 63 (notice of appeal).) He sought direct

review on August 27, 2007, and later abandoned the appeal. (Id.;

Lodgment No. 2, People v. Chavarria, No. D051606 (abandonment of

appeal at 1).) On March 24, 2008, the appellate court ordered that

Chavarria’s appeal be dismissed, and the remittitur was issued. 

(Lodgment No. 3, People v. Chavarria, No. D051606, slip op. at 1;

Lodgment No. 4, People v. Chavarria, No. D051606 (remittitur).)

Under AEDPA, the statute of limitations begins to run the date

the judgment became final, which is the conclusion of direct review

or the expiration of the time for seeking such review. 28 U.S.C.A.

§ 2244(d)(1). California Rule of Court 8.308 provides, “[A] notice

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of appeal . . . must be filed within 60 days after the rendition of

the judgment or the making of the order being appealed.” Cal. R.

Ct. 8.308(a). An appellant may abandon an appeal at any time by

filing an abandonment of the appeal. Id. at 8.316(a). If an

appellant abandons the appeal, “[t]he reviewing court may dismiss

the appeal and direct immediate issuance of the remittitur.” Id.

at 8.316(b)(2). An appeal that is dismissed “on request or

stipulation” becomes final upon the filing of that dismissal. Id.

at 8.264(b)(2); see also Smith v. Herndon, No. 1:09-cv-00386-JLT

HC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20993, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2010). 

“[T]his is the chronology for most cases in which a petitioner does

not proceed to the California Supreme Court in his direct review.” 

Smith, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20993, at *7 (computing AEDPA’s oneyear limitation period under § 2244(d)(1)(A) from the date of

petitioner’s abandoned appeal in state court).

Chavarria was sentenced on August 21, 2007. (Lodgment No. 1,

Clerk’s Tr. vol. 1, 63 (notice of appeal).) He initiated his

direct appeal in the California Court of Appeal on August 27, 2007,

but he abandoned the appeal and the appellate court properly

dismissed it on March 24, 2008. (Lodgment No. 2, People v.

Chavarria, No. D051606 (abandonment of appeal at 1).) The

appellate court’s order following Chavarria’s abandonment indicated

that “the remittitur is ordered to issue immediately[,]” and the

remittitur stated that the “opinion or decision has now become

final.” (Lodgment No. 3, People v. Chavarria, No. D051606, slip

op. at 1; Lodgment No. 4, People v. Chavarria, No. D051606

(remittitur).) This judgment became final on March 24, 2008, the

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date the appeal was dismissed. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(d)(1);

Smith, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20993, at *7.

Once the court of appeal decision becomes final, a petition

for review with the California Supreme Court must be filed within

ten days. Cal. R. Ct. 8.500(e)(1). This ten-day period commenced

on March 25, 2008, and expired on April 3, 2008. See id.; see also

Smith, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20993, at *7. For purposes of AEDPA,

Chavarria’s judgment became final on April 3, 2008. Accordingly,

the one-year statute of limitation period commenced on April 4,

2008, and expired on April 3, 2009. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

6(a)(1)(A).

Chavarria did not file his federal Petition until January 3,

2011. Unless he is entitled to either statutory or equitable

tolling, his federal Petition is untimely and should be dismissed.

1. Statutory Tolling

A state prisoner in a federal habeas action must exhaust his

federal claims in state courts by “invoking one complete round of

the State’s established appellate review process” before bringing

the claims in a federal habeas petition. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel,

626 U.S. 838, 845 (1999). The petitioner must have “‘fairly

present[ed]’ his claim in each appropriate state court[,] . . .

thereby alerting that court to the federal nature of the claim.” 

Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (emphasis added).

The statute of limitations period under AEDPA is tolled during

periods in which a petitioner is properly seeking collateral review

of a pending state court judgment. Specifically, 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d) states, “The time during which a properly filed application

for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect

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to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted

toward any period of limitation under this subsection.” 28

U.S.C.A. § 2244(d)(2); see also Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408,

410 (2005). “[A]n application is ‘properly filed’ when its

delivery and acceptance are in compliance with the applicable laws

and rules governing filings.” Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8

(2000) (explaining that typical filing requirements include all

relevant time limits). “When a postconviction petition is untimely

under state law, ‘that [is] the end of the matter’ for purposes of

§ 2244(d)(2).” Pace, 544 U.S. at 414 (quoting Carey v. Saffold,

536 U.S. 214, 226 (2002)); see also Zepeda v. Walker, 581 F.3d

1013, 1018 (9th Cir. 2009).

The interval between the disposition of one state petition and

the filing of another may be tolled under “interval tolling.” 

Carey, 536 U.S. at 223. “[T]he AEDPA statute of limitations is

tolled for ‘all of the time during which a state prisoner is

attempting, through proper use of state court procedures, to

exhaust state court remedies with regard to a particular postconviction application.’” Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th

Cir. 1999) (quoting Barnett v. Lamaster, 167 F.3d 1321, 1323 (10th

Cir. 1999)); see also Carey, 536 U.S. at 219-22. The statute of

limitations is tolled from the time a petitioner’s first state

habeas petition is filed until state collateral review is

concluded, but it is not tolled before the first state collateral

challenge is filed. Thorson v. Palmer, 479 F.3d 643, 646 (9th Cir.

2007) (citing Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006).

Biter argues that Chavarria is not entitled to statutory

tolling of the limitation period. (Mot. Dismiss Attach. #3 Mem. P.

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& A. 5, ECF No. 11.) Although the Petitioner claims he filed a

state habeas petition in the superior court that was denied on

September 21, 2010, Respondent asserts there is no such habeas

petition in state court records. (Id. at 5.) Biter submits the

declaration of Manny Martinez, a court operations clerk for the San

Diego Superior Court, who searched the court’s computer database

and found no record of a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed

by Chavarria under his name or under the case number in the court’s

data system (SCD204457). (Lodgment No. 5, Declaration of Manny

Martinez at 1.)

Respondent maintains that even if Chavarria had properly filed

a state habeas petition that was denied on September 21, 2010, the

petition would have necessarily been filed in 2010. (Mot. Dismiss

Attach. #3 Mem. P. & A. 5, ECF No. 11.) Assuming the superior

court petition was filed on January 1, 2010, giving Chavarria the

benefit of the doubt, Biter asserts that it would still have been

well beyond the time limitation. (Id.)

Next, Respondent argues that although Petitioner states he

mailed a habeas petition to the California Supreme Court on October

25, 2010, Chavarria provides no case number, and there is no record

of any petition under Chavarria’s name in the court’s database. 

(Mot. Dismiss Attach. #3 Mem. P. & A. 5, ECF No. 11.) Assuming he

mailed a habeas petition to the state supreme court on October 25,

2010, Respondent contends that the petition would still have been

filed beyond the October 19, 2008 time limitation. (Id.)

Biter acknowledges that Chavarria filed a state habeas

petition with the California Court of Appeal, but it was not filed

until January 20, 2011, which was after he filed this federal

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Petition. (Id. at 6.) The Respondent argues that none of these

scenarios justifies statutory tolling because once the statute of

limitations has expired, a collateral action cannot revive it. 

(Id. at 5 (citing Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir.

2001)).)

The statute of limitations in this case expired on April 3,

2009. On January 3, 2011, one year and nine months beyond the

expiration of the statute of limitations, Chavarria filed this

federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Pet. 1, ECF No. 1.) 

His claims are therefore barred by AEDPA’s statute of limitations.

Even if the Court were to accept Petitioner’s recitation of

the procedural history, the result is the same. In his Amended

Petition, Chavarria asserts he filed a “Motion for Resentencing” in

the San Diego Superior Court, case number SCD204457. (Am. Pet. 3,

ECF No. 6.) He submits that he raised his claim under Apprendi,

530 U.S. 466, and his motion was denied on September 21, 2010. 

(Id.) Chavarria further states that on October 19, 2010, he mailed

a “Motion for Resentencing” to the California Court of Appeal,

advancing his Apprendi claim, but he is still awaiting a decision. 

(Id. at 4.) Finally, the Petitioner alleges that on October 25,

2010, he mailed a “Motion for Resentencing” to the California

Supreme Court raising the same grounds, but there has been “no

decision yet.” (Id.) Later in his pleading, Chavarria

characterizes his motion for resentencing as a “habeas corpus”

proceeding in the California Supreme Court. (Id. at 6.) The

Petitioner attaches the Kern Valley State Prison - Incoming/

Outgoing Legal Mail Record reflecting that on October 19, 2010, he

had out-going mail to the California Court of Appeal, Fourth

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Appellate District, and on October 25, 2010, he sent mail to the

California Supreme Court. (Id. at 13.)

Chavarria’s original Petition sheds light on the procedural

history. There, he attached a copy of his motion for resentencing

and modification as well as a copy of the superior court’s

September 21, 2010 order. (Pet. 13-15, ECF No. 1.) In that order,

Superior Court Judge Charles G. Rogers noted that on September 3,

2010, Chavarria filed “an ex parte motion asking that the court

‘remove’ certain of the consecutive terms and enhancements and

resentence him to a total term of three years.” (Id. at 15.) In

his Amended Petition, Chavarria attempts to incorporate exhibits by

reference by stating, “(see attached motion) filed on 1-3-2011[,]”

which he neglected to attach. (See Am. Pet. 6, ECF No. 6; see also

Pet. 1, 13-15, ECF No. 1.)

Assuming Chavarria’s ex parte motion could constitute a

petition for state collateral relief, it cannot revive a statute of

limitations that expired on April 3, 2009. The superior court

motion was not filed until September 3, 2010, one and one-half

years after the limitations period ended. See Pace, 544 U.S. at

417; see also Jiminez, 276 F.3d at 482; Green v. White, 223 F.3d

1001, 1003 (9th Cir. 2000). Consequently, statutory tolling does

not save Chavarria’s federal Petition.

2. Equitable Tolling

Equitable tolling of the statute of limitations is appropriate

when “‘extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make

it impossible’” to file a timely petition. Spitsyn v. Moore, 345

F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Brambles v. Duncan, 330 F.3d

1197, 1202 (9th Cir. 2003)); see also Stillman v. LaMarque, 319

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F.3d 1199, 1202 (9th Cir. 2003). “[A] litigant seeking equitable

tolling bears the burden of establishing two elements: (1) that he

has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some

extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace, 544 U.S. at

418 (citations omitted); see also Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S.

327, 335 (2007); Rouse v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 548 F.3d 871, 878-79

(9th Cir. 2008); Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021,

1026 (9th Cir. 2005).

“‘[T]he threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling

[under AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.’” 

Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting

United States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir. 2000). 

The failure to file a timely petition must be the result of

external forces, not the result of the petitioner’s lack of

diligence. Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). 

“Determining whether equitable tolling is warranted is a ‘factspecific inquiry.’” Spitsyn, 345 F.3d at 799 (quoting Frye v.

Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 2001)).

Respondent Biter argues that Chavarria’s Amended Petition

provides no basis to invoke equitable tolling. (Mot. Dismiss

Attach. #2 Mem. P. & A. 7, ECF No. 11.) According to Biter,

Chavarria’s claim that he was recently informed of Apprendi is

insufficient. (Id.) “Apprendi was in existence since 2000 and

Chavarria could have discovered that case at the time of his plea. 

Moreover, Chavarria knew of the factual predicate at the time of

his plea.” (Id.) Respondent additionally contends that Apprendi

is substantively inapplicable because Petitioner entered a guilty

plea and admitted having a prior serious felony and strike. (Id.) 

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Biter argues that Apprendi expressly held that the right to trial

by jury for facts increasing the sentence beyond the statutory

maximum does not apply to the fact of a prior conviction. (Id.) 

“Here, what Chavarria is complaining about is that he had a right

to a jury trial on his prior convictions. He does not.” (Id. at

7-8.)

Next, the Respondent notes that in the recent habeas petition

he submitted to the California Court of Appeal, Chavarria states

that he is mentally disabled. (Id. at 8 (citing Lodgment No. 7,

Chavarria v. Cate, No. D059057 (petition for writ of habeas corpus

at 6)).) Biter asserts this allegation does not help Chavarria

because Petitioner filed that state petition with the help of an

aid. (Id.) “Therefore, his mentally [sic] disability was not the

cause of delay and he is not entitled to equitable tolling since he

could, and, in fact, did file a habeas petition.” (Id.)

Furthermore, the Petitioner has not described his mental

disability, when it occurred, and how it prevented him from filing

a timely federal petition. (Id.)

The allegations raised in Chavarria’s pending state habeas

petition to the California Court of Appeal, which was filed after

his federal Petition, do not make a case for equitable tolling. In

that petition, Chavarria contends that he was “just recently

informed” of the Apprendi decision, which he believes establishes

that his sentence enhancements were illegally imposed. (Lodgment

No. 7, Chavarria v. Cate, No. D059057 (petition for writ of habeas

corpus at 5).)

Apprendi was decided on June 25, 2000, seven years before

Chavarria pleaded guilty on May 30, 2007. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s

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Tr. vol. 1, 12 (plea of guilty).) “[A] pro se petitioner’s

confusion or ignorance of the law is not, itself, a circumstance

warranting equitable tolling.” Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556

F.3d 1008, 1013 n.4 (9th Cir. 2009); see Pace, 544 U.S. at 418;

Miles, 187 F.3d at 1107 (explaining that the failure to timely file

a petition must be due to external forces, not lack of a

petitioner’s diligence).

Moreover, as part of his plea agreement, Chavarria admitted

having one strike prior and one serious violence felony prior

conviction. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr. vol. 1, 12 (plea of

guilty).) The Respondent correctly observed that in Apprendi, the

Supreme Court explicitly held, “Other than the fact of a prior

conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond

the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and

proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490

(emphasis added). For this additional reason, Apprendi does not

affect Chavarria’s challenge to the five-year prison term

enhancement resulting from his prior conviction. Id.; (see

Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr. vol. 1, 65 (abstract of judgment)).

Finally, the reference to a mental impairment in Chavarria’s

January 20, 2011 state habeas petition adds little to the analysis. 

(See Lodgment No. 7, Chavarria v. Cate, No. D059057 (petition for

writ of habeas corpus at 6).) The state petition contains the

conclusory statement, “I am illiterate in the law and mentally

disabled (E.O.P.) ‘A.D.A.’” (Id.) Without more, this allegation

does demonstrate that Chavarria has pursued his rights diligently

and that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way. See

Pace, 544 U.S. at 418.

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The facts in the Amended Petition are insufficient to justify

the application of equitable tolling. Chavarria has not opposed

Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss and has not produced additional

facts showing that equitable tolling is appropriate. He has not

met his burden of establishing that he has been pursuing his rights

diligently and that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his

way. Pace, 544 U.S. at 418 (citations omitted). Thus, there is no

basis to equitably toll AEDPA’s statute of limitations. See id.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Chavarria did not file his

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus within AEDPA’s one-year statute

of limitations. The Petitioner is not entitled to either statutory

or equitable tolling. Accordingly, Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss

should be GRANTED.

This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to the United

States District Court Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C.A. § 636(b)(1). Any party may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties on or

before September 16, 2011. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.” Any reply to the

objections shall be served and filed on or before September 30,

2011. The parties are advised that failure to file objections 

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K:\COMMON\BROOKS\CASES\HABEAS\CHAVARRIA08\R&R re MTD.wpd20 11cv00008 IEG(RBB)

within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the

district court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th

Cir. 1991).

Dated: August 12, 2011 

 RUBEN B. BROOKS

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Judge Gonzalez

All parties of record

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