Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_16-cv-00228/USCOURTS-alsd-1_16-cv-00228-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

AIR COMFORT CO., INC., et al., )

Plaintiffs, )

 ) 

v. ) CIVIL ACTION: 16-00228-KD-B

 )

CARRIER CORPORATION, )

Defendant. )

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s motion to remand (Doc. 14), Defendant’s 

Response (Docs. 24, 26) and Plaintiff’s Reply (Doc. 29). Upon consideration the Court finds 

the motion is due to be GRANTED.

I. Background

This matter was initiated in Alabama state court on March 23, 2011 against Carrier and 

several in-state defendants. (Doc. 1-1 at 1-33). On April 28, 2016, Air Comfort filed its third 

amended complaint alleging, inter alia, that Carrier had violated the Buy America Act, 49 U.S.C. 

§ 5323(j). (Doc. 1-8). Carrier removed the case based on federal jurisdiction on May 19, 

2016, and alleged that the Court had supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. (Doc. 

1). Carrier also noted that Carrier was the only remaining defendant. On May 24, 2016, 

Carrier filed a notice to amend the removal petition alleging diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1332. (Doc. 8). 

Thereafter, Air Comfort moved to amend the complaint to dismiss its claim that Carrier 

had violated the Buy America Act. (Doc. 15). The motion was granted upon response from 

Carrier that it did not object as long as the proposed complaint, which it had not seen, only 

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removed the Buy America Act claim. (Doc. 31). Accordingly, before the Court is the fourth 

amended complaint, which does not include the federal claim. (Doc. 30).

The Court finds that this case was properly removed on May 19, 2016, on the basis of 

federal question jurisdiction.1 However, now that the federal claim has been dismissed, the 

Court must determine whether the case should be remanded. 

Carrier correctly points out that voluntary dismissal of the sole federal claim does not 

deprive the district court of jurisdiction. Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225, 245, 127 S.Ct. 881, 166 

L.Ed.2d 819 (2007) (“Even if only state-law claims remained after resolution of the federal 

question, the District Court would have discretion, consistent with Article III, to retain 

jurisdiction[]”). However, the Court’s authority to retain the case in that scenario is based on its 

ability to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. When only state claims remain the Court has 

discretion whether to retain jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (“The district courts may 

decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if -- .... the 

district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction[]”). 

In exercising its discretion the Court is guided by the Supreme Court:

Under Gibbs, a federal court should consider and weigh in each case, and at every stage 

of the litigation, the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity in 

order to decide whether to exercise jurisdiction over a case brought in that court 

involving pendent state-law claims. When the balance of these factors indicates that a 

case properly belongs in state court, as when the federal-law claims have dropped out of 

the lawsuit in its early stages and only state-law claims remain, [] the federal court should 

decline the exercise of jurisdiction by dismissing the case without prejudice. Id., at 726–

727, 86 S.Ct., at 1139. As articulated by Gibbs, the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction thus 

is a doctrine of flexibility, designed to allow courts to deal with cases involving pendent 

claims in the manner that most sensibly accommodates a range of concerns and values.

Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988) (footnote omitted). It is clear that 

 1 On the face of the complaint there appeared to be a federal claim. This is not a determination as to whether the 

claim was due to be dismissed. That analysis is not necessary since the claim has been dismissed. 

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judicial economy, convenience, fairness to the parties and comity all favor remand. This case 

has been ongoing for five (5) years in state court. Significant discovery has occurred and the 

case was set for a trial in the state court for the Fall of 2016. The state court is exceedingly 

more familiar with the facts, the issues and the parties to this litigation. It would make no sense 

for this court to expend the resources necessary to attempt to get up to speed on this case. (The 

removal includes no less than 5,000 pages of documents). This case has made a detour to this 

Court for a mere three (3) months. All interests would be best served by remanding this case 

for its continuation in state court. Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit “ha[s] encouraged district 

courts to dismiss any remaining state claims when ... the federal claims have been dismissed 

prior to trial.” Raney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1086, 1089 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam).

See also United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 

218 (1966) (footnotes omitted) (“Needless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a 

matter of comity and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed 

reading of applicable law. [] Certainly, if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, even 

though not insubstantial in a jurisdictional sense, the state claims should be dismissed as 

well[]”); Mergens v. Dreyfoos, 166 F.3d 1114, 1119 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting L.A. Draper & 

Son v. Wheelabrator–Frye, Inc., 735 F.2d 414, 428 (11th Cir. 1984) (citing Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 

726, 86 S.Ct. 1130)) (“[T]his Court has noted that ‘if the federal claims are dismissed prior to 

trial, Gibbs strongly encourages or even requires dismissal of the state claims[]’”); also see

Enochs v. Lampasas County, 641 F.3d 155, 161-62 (5th Cir. 2011)(Our deference cannot stretch 

so far as to find no abuse of discretion[in denying remand] where, as is the case here, all federal 

claims were deleted at the infancy of the case and the balance of the statutory and common law 

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factors weighs heavily in favor of remand.)

However, Carrier also argues that the case cannot be remanded because diversity

jurisdiction is present. Carrier cites Cuevas v. Bac Home Loans Servicing, LP, 648 F.3d 242 

(5th Cir. 2011), for its argument. In Cuevas, the court held that the fact that the defendant had 

waived it right to a federal forum based on diversity jurisdiction by failing to timely remove was 

irrelevant to the determination of whether the district court can or should remand the action. Id. 

at 248. Moreover, the court held that the exercise of diversity jurisdiction by the district court 

was not discretionary. Id. While it is against the undersigned’s better instincts to ever disagree 

with Circuit Judge Prado, in this case it must. 

With regard to removal on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3) 

states:

Except as provided in subsection (c), if the case stated by the initial pleading is not 

removable, a notice of removal may be filed within 30 days after receipt by the 

defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order 

or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has 

become removable.

28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3). 

Subsection (c)(1), referenced above, states:

A case may not be removed under subsection (b)(3) on the basis of jurisdiction conferred 

by section 1332 more than 1 year after commencement of the action, unless the district 

court finds that the plaintiff has acted in bad faith in order to prevent a defendant from 

removing the action.

28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(1) (emphasis added). Thus any removal based on diversity jurisdiction

would have been required to occur on or before March 23, 2012 (within a year of the filing of the 

initial pleading). 

Upon consideration of subsection (c)(1) quoted above, the Court finds that exercising 

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jurisdiction on the basis of diversity, which was asserted more than a year after commencement 

of the action, would run afoul of the plain language of the statute.2 The court acknowledges that 

this is a procedural defect and not a jurisdictional defect. However, the plaintiff has timely 

objected to the untimely removal. Thus, the amended notice of removal is ineffective to invoke 

diversity jurisdiction. 

The court disagrees with the decision in Cuevas for two reasons. First, Congress has 

conferred on plaintiff the right to object to procedural defects in removal. And, if the objection 

is well taken and filed within 30 days of removal, Congress has said the case should be 

remanded. If the court exercised diversity jurisdiction in this case, in spite of a timely and 

correct procedural objection, this would ignore plaintiff’s right to object. Plaintiff’s right to 

object to an untimely assertion of diversity jurisdiction is not abrogated simply because the case 

is initially brought to federal court on federal question jurisdiction. 

 Second, to exercise diversity jurisdiction in the situation at bar would circumvent 

Congress’ intent to procedurally restrict when Article III jurisdiction is properly invoked. 

In 1988, Congress amended this statute to prohibit the removal of diversity cases 

more than one year after their commencement. This change was intended to 

encourage prompt determination of issues of removal in diversity proceedings, 

and it sought to avoid the disruption of state court proceedings that might occur 

when changes in the case made it subject to removal. 

Report to the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States House of Representatives § 103, at 

15, H.R. 112–10 (2011). Effective January 6, 2012, the Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue 

Clarification Act of 2011, Pub.L. No. 112–63, 125 Stat. 760, 762 (“JVCA”), added a bad-faith 

exception to the one-year limitation. This was codified at 28 U.S.C. §1446(c)(1). This is the only 

exception, outside of waiver by the plaintiff, to removal of a case after one year based on 

 2 There is no basis to find that Air Comfort has acted in bad faith.

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diversity of citizenship. The court declines to add an additional exception. 

Moreover, “[f]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and there is a presumption 

against the exercise of federal jurisdiction, such that all uncertainties as to removal jurisdiction 

are to be resolved in favor of remand.” Russell Corp. v. Am. Home Assur. Co., 264 F.3d 1040, 

1050 (11th Cir. 2001). 

In sum, the Court finds that diversity jurisdiction has not been properly invoked and that 

exercising supplemental jurisdiction at this late stage in the litigation is not warranted. 

Accordingly, the motion to remand (Doc. 14) is GRANTED and this matter is REMANDED to 

the Circuit Court of Mobile County, Alabama.

DONE and ORDERED this 20th day of July 2016.

/s/ Kristi K. DuBose

KRISTI K. DuBOSE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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