Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_13-cv-00698/USCOURTS-cand-5_13-cv-00698-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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Case Nos. 13-CV-00698-LHK and 09-CR-00096-LHK 

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS, AND DIRECTING RESPONDENT TO ANSWER

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

NELSON ORELLANA,

Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

Case Nos. 13-CV-00698-LHK

 09-CR-00096-LHK 

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 

HABEAS CORPUS, AND DIRECTING 

RESPONDENT TO ANSWER

Before the Court is Petitioner Nelson Orellana’s (“Petitioner”) petition for habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (“Petition”). ECF No. 1. Petitioner is currently serving a 68-month 

sentence following his conviction for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, and 

possession with intent to distribute cocaine. Petitioner, acting pro se, argues in the Petition that he 

received ineffective assistance of counsel during a five-day bench trial before this Court, and as a 

result Petitioner requests that the Court vacate the judgment against him. Petition at 1. Petitioner 

also moves in his Petition for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence pursuant to Federal 

Rule of Criminal Procedure 33. Id. at 2, 5. The United States (“Respondent”) has filed an 

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opposition to the Petition. ECF No. 3291(“Opp’n”). Separately, Petitioner has filed a motion 

under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) for modification of Petitioner’s sentence. See ECF No. 328 (“Mot. 

Modify”). Having considered the submission of the parties, the record in this case, and the relevant 

law, the Court hereby DENIES the Petition, and ORDERS Respondent to answer Petitioner’s 

motion for modification of sentence, for the reasons stated below.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

On November 28, 2008, Petitioner met a confidential DEA informant (“CI”) in the parking 

lot of a local Wal-Mart. Opp’n, Ex. 4, at 24. Petitioner and the CI were acquaintances who had 

previously worked for the same construction company. Id. at 95; id. Ex. 5, at 297. The CI saw 

Petitioner leaving Wal-Mart with several televisions and asked where Petitioner had gotten the 

money to make the purchase. Id. Ex. 5, at 301. Petitioner responded that he received money from 

selling cocaine. Id. at 301-02. The CI then told Petitioner that the CI wanted to purchase cocaine. 

Id. Ex. 4 at 24. Petitioner invited the CI to Petitioner’s residence, and once there Petitioner took 

the CI to a shed behind the house. Id. Petitioner then showed the CI approximately two to four 

ounces of cocaine which appeared to be packaged for distribution. Id. When the CI asked if 

Petitioner could obtain five kilograms of cocaine, Petitioner responded in the affirmative, and 

stated that Petitioner had obtained that amount of cocaine before. Id. Ex. 5, at 310.

During a subsequent conversation, the CI and Petitioner discussed the price of cocaine. Id. 

at 318-19. Petitioner stated that the cocaine would cost $22,000 per kilogram, of which Petitioner 

would receive a cut of $2,000 for each kilogram sold. Id. at 319. 

On December 8, 2008, the CI went to meet with Petitioner’s source of cocaine in San 

Pablo, California. Id. Ex. 4, at 30; id. Ex. 5, at 321-22. Before driving to San Pablo, the CI first 

drove to Petitioner’s house, where Petitioner reaffirmed the price of the cocaine and suggested to 

the CI that the deal might facilitate a continuing relationship between Petitioner, the Petitioner’s 

 

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all subsequent docket references are to 09-CR-00096-LHK.

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source of the cocaine, and the CI. Id. Ex. 5, at 324-29. The CI then followed the Petitioner to a 

meeting with the source. Id. at 331. On that day, between 11:49 a.m. and 6:06 p.m., Petitioner, 

Petitioner’s source, and the CI placed 72 calls to one another. Id. Ex. 6, at 660-64. Petitioner 

initiated 35 of those calls. Id.

Petitioner, Petitioner’s source, and the CI arranged to consummate the cocaine transaction 

on December 10, 2008, in the parking lot of a local Lowe’s. Id. Ex. 4, at 39-40. Petitioner made 

multiple phone calls to the CI and to Petitioner’s source to facilitate the transaction. Id. at 40. 

However, Petitioner’s source failed to arrive at the Lowe’s on time, and the CI told Petitioner that 

the CI wanted to call off the deal. Id. Ex. 5, at 344. Petitioner tried to persuade the CI to wait. Id. 

at 345. Ultimately, the deal did not happen on December 10, 2008. Id. Ex. 4, at 40.

A few days after the failed transaction on December 10, 2008, Petitioner called the CI and 

said that Petitioner had another, more reliable source who could supply Petitioner with cocaine. Id.

at 41. In early January, Petitioner and the CI began discussing another transaction. Id. at 45. 

Petitioner and the CI met Petitioner’s new source at a job site in Sunnyvale, California on January 

10, 2009. Id. Ex. 4, at 153-54. During the conversation about a possible transaction, Petitioner 

stated he would relay the time and location of any transaction from the CI to the Petitioner’s 

source. Id. at 153-55. Petitioner subsequently called the source of cocaine to arrange for the CI to 

purchase three to four kilograms of cocaine at a local Lowe’s parking lot on January 13, 2009. Id. 

at 157.

On January 13, 2009, surveillance officers tailed Petitioner as he drove from Petitioner’s 

residence to the Lowe’s parking lot where the drug transaction would occur. Id. at 187-90. Shortly 

thereafter, the CI arrived and parked near Petitioner’s vehicle. Id. at 204. After 45 minutes passed,

and Petitioner’s source had not yet arrived with the cocaine, the CI stated that the CI was going to 

leave. Id. Ex. 5 at 356. Petitioner urged the CI to stay. Id. Petitioner proceeded to wait with the CI 

in the parking lot for two hours. Id. at 360. Petitioner’s source then arrived, and once the CI 

confirmed that cocaine was present, Petitioner, Petitioner’s source, and three other individuals 

who had accompanied Petitioner’s source, were taken into custody. Id. at 115-16. DEA agents 

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recovered approximately one kilogram of a substance containing cocaine from one of the vehicles 

at the scene. Id. at 117-21; id. Ex. 15.

B. Procedural History

Petitioner was subsequently indicted and charged with conspiracy to possess with intent to 

distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(B)(ii), and 

possession with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and

841(b)(1)(B)(ii). ECF No. 189. At a March 9, 2012 status conference, Petitioner waived his right 

to a jury trial and elected to proceed with a bench trial. Before Petitioner waived his right to a jury 

trial, Petitioner’s attorney James Vaughns (“Mr. Vaughns”) informed the Court, “I don’t think he 

[Petitioner] wants a jury trial. . . . I think he understands, I think, the benefits I’ve explained to him 

of a court trial versus a jury trial.” ECF No. 301, at 3. The Court then conducted a colloquy with 

Petitioner through an interpreter which began:

THE COURT: Do you want to have a trial by a jury, or do you want to have a trial 

just by me, the judge?

THE DEFENDANT: I’m going to do it with you.

THE COURT: All right. Do you have any hesitation about waiving your right to a 

jury trial?

THE DEFENDANT: Could you repeat that, please?

THE COURT: Do you have any hesitation in giving up your right to have a trial by 

a jury?

THE DEFENDANT: No, no. I’m not concerned.

Id. at 3-4. The colloquy also contained the following exchange:

THE COURT: Okay. Have you had enough time to discuss the benefits and 

disadvantages of going by way of a bench trial versus a jury trial with your 

attorney, Mr. Vaughns? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 

THE COURT: Has Mr. Vaughns been able to answer all your questions about 

whether you should have a jury trial versus a bench trial? 

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THE DEFENDANT: Yes, he answered everything. 

THE COURT: Okay. Has anyone made any promises or made any threats against 

you in order to get you to waive your right to a trial by a jury? 

THE DEFENDANT: No, no. 

THE COURT: Okay. Have you taken any medication or any drugs that affect your 

ability to think clearly, understand what is happening, and make decisions? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes. Well, yes. Sometimes I take stuff for my headache. I 

suffer from headaches. . . . 

THE COURT: And so is that affecting your ability today to think clearly and 

understand what is happening? 

THE DEFENDANT: Oh, no, no. No, that’s not it. . . .

THE COURT: Okay. Are you thinking clearly today? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes. All the time I’ve been thinking clearly. 

THE COURT: Okay. You understand what’s happening today? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, of course. 

THE COURT: All right. And you’re of clear mind to make a decision today? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, that’s fine.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Orellana, was this stipulation and court approval for a 

waiver of jury trial form translated into Spanish for you with the assistance of a 

Spanish interpreter? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 

THE COURT: Do you understand this stipulation for waiver of jury trial? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, yes, I do understand. 

THE COURT: All right. Have you had enough time to discuss this stipulation for 

waiver of trial form with your attorney, Mr. Vaughns? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, he gave me time to talk about it. 

THE COURT: All right. And was Mr. Vaughns able to answer all of your questions 

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about this stipulation and court approval for waiver of jury trial form? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: All right. Are you satisfied with the services of your attorney, Mr. 

Vaughns, in advising you regarding this stipulation and court approval for waiver 

of jury trial form? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, yes. 

Id. at 4-8. The Court also confirmed that Petitioner understood he had a right to a jury trial:

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Orellana, you do understand that you have the right to be 

tried by 12 jurors? Do you understand that, sir? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Do you give up that right to be tried by a jury?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

Id. at 4-8. Subsequently, after Petitioner, Mr. Vaughns, Respondent, the Court, and the interpreter 

signed the waiver of jury trial form, the Court had the following exchange with Petitioner:

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Then I’ve signed this form, which means, Mr. 

Orellana, that I will try your case, or I’ll be the decision maker in your case and not 

a jury of 12 citizens. Do you understand that, sir?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I understand.

Id. at 4.

Petitioner was then tried in a five-day bench trial. ECF Nos. 247, 248, 249, 250 & 251. 

During trial, Respondent called multiple witness, including DEA agents, two of Petitioner’s codefendants, and the CI. See Opp’n at 3. Respondent also introduced recordings of phone calls and 

meetings between Petitioner and the CI, and records of phone calls. Id. at 4. Petitioner testified as 

the only witness on Petitioner’s behalf. Id. At trial, Petitioner testified that the CI pressured 

Petitioner to participate in the drug transaction of January 13, 2009, and that Petitioner felt he had 

“no way out.” Opp’n Ex. 6, at 479-82, 496-98; see also id. at 528 (Petitioner testifying that the CI 

pushed Petitioner to participate in the drug transaction and “[i]t came to a point where my mind 

shut down and, well, everything he [the CI] told me I would do.”). Petitioner also testified that he 

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did not know at the time of the drug transaction that selling drugs was illegal, and Petitioner 

further stated that he did not participate in the transaction for money. Id. at 496, 507.

On March 20, 2012, the Court found Petitioner guilty on both counts charged. Id. Ex. 8. In 

advance of Petitioner’s sentencing hearing, the U.S. Probation Department submitted a PreSentence Report (“PSR”). The PSR concluded that, because the amount of cocaine recovered from 

the January 13, 2009 transaction was 993.8 grams, Petitioner’s base offense level was 26, which is 

the base offense level for more than 500 grams but not more than two kilograms of cocaine. PSR 

¶ 33. The PSR added a two-level adjustment for obstruction of justice, based on Petitioner’s trial 

testimony. Id. ¶ 37. This resulted in a total offense level of 28. Id. ¶ 42. With no criminal 

convictions, Petitioner was in Criminal History Category I. Id. ¶ 46. Based on a total offense level 

of 28, and a Criminal History Category I, the advisory Guidelines range was 78 to 97 months’ 

imprisonment. Id. ¶ 66. The PSR also stated that Petitioner’s convictions carried a 60-month 

minimum sentence. Id. ¶ 65.

With respect to the recommended two-level adjustment for obstruction of justice, the PSR 

stated that Petitioner’s testimony during his trial in support of an entrapment defense “clearly 

supports a 2-level increase for Obstruction of Justice, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.” Id. ¶ 28. 

Specifically, the PSR noted that Petitioner testified implausibly that: (1) he did not know drug 

trafficking was illegal; (2) the CI pressured Petitioner to sell drugs and that Petitioner’s mind “shut 

down” under the CI’s influence; and (3) Petitioner did not engage in the January 13, 2009 

transaction for money. Id. The PSR further stated that based on Petitioner’s testimony, Petitioner 

“has failed to accept responsibility for his criminal conduct by denying his involvement in the 

instant offense and by providing false testimony during his trial.” Id. ¶ 29.

On December 5, 2012, one week prior to Petitioner’s sentencing, Respondent submitted a 

sentencing memorandum recommending that the Court sentence Petitioner to 78 months 

imprisonment. ECF No. 278, at 2. Respondent’s recommendation was based on Petitioner’s failure

to accept responsibility for his crime, and the contention that Petitioner’s false testimony at trial 

supported a two-level increase for obstruction of justice. Id. at 4. Petitioner, in his own sentencing 

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memorandum, requested the mandatory minimum sentence of 60 months. ECF No. 277, at 5.

On December 12, 2012, the Court held a sentencing hearing at which the Court stated that 

the Court did not believe Petitioner’s convictions justified a sentence of 78 months because 

Petitioner was “not an experienced drug dealer” and “in fact . . . seemed quite naïve and quite 

unsophisticated in how he went about this offense.” ECF No. 307, at 3. The Court also found that 

Petitioner had no criminal history; that Petitioner had a long verified work history as a 

construction worker; that Petitioner suffered from an injury in 2007 that placed him under 

financial pressure; that Petitioner was supposed to obtain four kilograms of cocaine but only 

obtained one; and that Petitioner had to support four young children, some of whom had medical 

needs. Id. a 3-4, 10. However, the Court also found that a sentencing enhancement was appropriate 

because Petitioner “did obstruct justice by testifying untruthfully during his trial on a number of 

issues.” Id. at 9. Specifically, the Court found that Petitioner’s claimed ignorance that drug 

trafficking was illegal; Petitioner’s claim that “his mind just shut down under the influence of the 

[CI]”; and Petitioner’s claim that “he did not engage in these drug transactions for money when 

the tapes clearly said he was hoping to get paid $2,000 per kilo,” all supported an obstruction of 

justice enhancement. Id. The Court also found that the evidence during trial showed that Petitioner 

was the “glue that brought these various individuals . . . together to these drug transactions.” Id. at 

8. Moreover, after Petitioner stated at the hearing that he got “involved here in the United States 

with something that other people got me involved in,” the Court found it troubling that Petitioner 

was “saying he got pulled into this. That does not sound consistent with acceptance of 

responsibility.” Id. at 7-8. The Court ultimately sentenced Petitioner to 68 months, eight months

above the mandatory minimum of 60 months. Id.

On December 26, 2012, Petitioner timely appealed his conviction and sentence to the 

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. ECF. No. 283. On June 27, 2014, the Ninth Circuit affirmed 

Petitioner’s conviction and sentence. ECF No. 320.

On January 4, 2013, Petitioner filed the instant Petition. On August 15, 2014, the Court 

issued an Order to Show Cause setting a briefing schedule regarding the Petition. No. 13-CVCase 5:13-cv-00698-LHK Document 6 Filed 08/06/15 Page 8 of 23
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00698, ECF No. 2. On December 1, 2014, the Court vacated and reset the briefing schedule at the 

request of Respondent. No. 13-CV-00698, ECF No. 4. Respondent filed its Opposition to the 

Petition on January 15, 2015, as well as seventeen supporting exhibits. See Opp’n. Petitioner did

not file a reply. 

Separately, Respondent filed a motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) for modification of 

sentence on December 22, 2014. See Mot. Modify. Respondent has not yet filed a response to this 

motion.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A Section 2255 motion to set aside, correct or vacate a sentence of a person in federal 

custody entitles a prisoner to relief “[i]f the court finds that . . . there has been such a denial or 

infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment vulnerable to 

collateral attack.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b). Under Section 2255, “a district court must grant a hearing 

to determine the validity of a petition brought under that section, [u]nless the motions and files and 

records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.” United States v. 

Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 1465 (9th Cir. 1994) (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted). A court 

need not hold an evidentiary hearing where the prisoner’s allegations, when viewed against the 

record, either do not state a claim for relief or are so palpably incredible as to warrant summary 

dismissal. United States v. McMullen, 98 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. 

Howard, 381 F.3d 873, 877 (9th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, an evidentiary hearing is required only 

if: (1) a petitioner alleges specific facts, which, if true would entitle him to relief; and (2) the 

petition, files, and record of the case cannot conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no 

relief. Howard, 381 F.3d at 877. 

III. DISCUSSION

In his Petition, Petitioner raises two claims: ineffective assistance of counsel, and a motion 

for new trial. As to the first claim, Petitioner asserts five grounds for claiming ineffective 

assistance of counsel. First, Petitioner argues that his counsel, Mr. Vaughns, failed to meet with 

Petitioner to discuss Petitioner’s appeal until December 24, 2012, and that Mr. Vaughns “did not 

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file the appeal as promised.” Petition at 3-4. Second, Petitioner contends that Mr. Vaughns “failed 

to raise an entrapment defense” during the trial, even though Petitioner told Mr. Vaughns that 

Petitioner was “forced, pressured and induced” into the cocaine distribution conspiracy. Id. at 3-4. 

Third, Petitioner argues that Mr. Vaughns failed to object to the drug amount attributed to the 

Petitioner. Id. at 4; see also id. at 3 (contending that the court “erred in the sentencing scheme to 

the movant [sic] that did not have any drugs contributed to him.”). Fourth, Petitioner contends that 

Mr. Vaughns failed to argue a minimal or minor role for the Petitioner. Id. at 3. Fifth and finally, 

Petitioner argues that Mr. Vaughns failed to provide advice on Petitioner’s waiver of a jury trial 

and decision to proceed with a bench trial. Id. at 5. 

Separate from Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Petitioner also moves 

for a new trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 based on newly discovered 

evidence. Petition at 2, 5. The Court will first address Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim, then Petitioner’s motion for new trial.

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

A petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is governed by the two-part test set 

forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To prevail on an ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim, a petitioner must show that: (1) counsel’s representation fell below the 

range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases, and (2) there is a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 

Id. The first prong of the Strickland test, deficient performance, requires a showing that counsel’s 

performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 688. A habeas petitioner 

has the burden of showing through evidentiary support that a counsel’s performance was deficient. 

Toomey v. Bunnell, 898 F.2d 741, 743 (9th Cir. 1990). Counsel’s performance must be judged “on 

the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

690. The test is “highly deferential” as there is a “strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls 

within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at 689. In particular, “strategic

choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are 

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virtually unchallengeable.” Id. at 690. The second prong of the Strickland test, prejudice, requires 

the petitioner to show a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the 

result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability 

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694. Courts may address the prongs in 

whichever order is most efficient, and need not address one if the other is lacking. Id. at 697.

With these standards in mind, the Court now turns to each of the five grounds for 

Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

1. Failure to file a notice of appeal

As his first grounds for ineffective assistance of counsel, Petitioner claims that after the 

Court advised Petitioner at his December 12, 2012 sentencing that Petitioner had 14 days in which 

to file a notice of appeal, Petitioner “request[ed] for the attorney to file the appeal notice for him,”

but that Petitioner did not “see the attorney again until Christmas [E]ve.” Petition at 3. Petitioner 

also claims that Mr. Vaughns “did not file the appeal as promised.” Id. at 4.

The Court finds that the first ground for ineffective assistance of counsel is without merit.

The record in this case shows that Petitioner’s counsel, Mr. Vaughs, filed a timely notice of appeal 

on December 26, 2012. ECF No. 283. The Ninth Circuit considered the merits of Petitioner’s 

appeal and affirmed Petitioner’s conviction and sentence on June 27, 2014. ECF No. 320. 

Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim that Mr. Vaughns “did not file the appeal as promised” is 

controverted by the record. Petition at 4. Petitioner also acknowledges that Petitioner met with Mr. 

Vaughns before Petitioner’s notice of appeal was due. See Petition at 3 (referencing a meeting 

with Petitioner’s counsel on December 24, 2012). To the extent that Petitioner attempts to argue 

that the meeting with Mr. Vaughns on December 24, 2012 fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness, Petitioner provides no support for such a contention. See Toomey, 898 F.2d at 743 

(burden on habeas petitioner to show through evidentiary proof that counsel’s performance was 

objectively deficient). For these reasons, the Court finds Petitioner’s first ground for ineffective 

assistance of counsel to be meritless, and accordingly Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this 

ground.

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2. Failure to present an entrapment defense

Petitioner next argues that his counsel was ineffective because of Mr. Vaughns’ alleged 

“failure to present the entrapment defense.” Petition at 2; see also id. at 1 (stating that “a[n] 

entrapment defense should have been raised by my counsel”). In his Petition, Petitioner further 

states that Petitioner “told his counsel that he was trapped . . . [m]eaning that he was forced, 

pressured and induced into introducing the government informant to his Boss.” Id. at 3. 

The Court finds that this argument for ineffective assistance of counsel is also without 

merit. In cases where a counsel’s failure to pursue a defense constituted deficient performance, 

counsel generally overlooked the defense altogether, see, e.g., Phillips v. Woodford, 267 F.3d 966, 

983 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding petitioner raised a colorable claim of ineffective assistance when his 

counsel failed to identify a viable alternative defense), or failed to reasonably investigate the 

defense, see, e.g., Siedel v. Merkle, 146 F.3d 750, 755-57 (9th Cir. 1998) (counsel’s failure to 

investigate client’s psychiatric history, despite evidence that client suffered from mental illness, 

was deficient performance). Here, in contrast, the record shows that Mr. Vaughns argued or 

otherwise sought to support an entrapment defense throughout his representation of Petitioner. For 

instance, before trial on December 15, 2011, Respondent filed a motion in limine to preclude 

Petitioner from raising an entrapment defense at trial, ECF No. 177, a motion which Mr. Vaughns

opposed on December 20, 2011, ECF No. 183. The Court, in its January 24, 2012 pre-trial order,

agreed with Petitioner and denied Respondent’s motion in limine to preclude an entrapment 

defense. ECF No. 207, at 2. The Court also approved court instructions which contained the Ninth 

Circuit Model Criminal Jury Instructions regarding an entrapment defense. ECF No. 246, at 41-42. 

Furthermore, the record shows that entrapment was a major theme of Petitioner’s defense 

at trial. For instance, at the close of the Respondent’s case in chief, Mr. Vaughns moved for a 

judgment of acquittal pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 and specifically referred 

to “the burden on the government’s part to disprove, so to speak, the entrapment issue, that there’s 

no predisposition and that there was no inducement to commit this crime.” Opp’n, Ex. 6, at 465; 

see also id. at 468 (Petitioner’s counsel arguing that the CI is “making it up because he did entrap 

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Mr. Orellana. It didn’t happen the way he said.”). 

In addition, the record shows that Mr. Vaughns put on evidence of an entrapment defense 

through the testimony of Petitioner. For instance, on direct examination Mr. Vaughns elicited 

testimony from Petitioner that when Petitioner encountered the CI at Wal-Mart on November 28, 

2008, it was the CI who brought up the topic of selling drugs, that the Petitioner responded that he 

had “no experience” and didn’t “know anybody involved in that,” and that the CI subsequently 

pressured Petitioner to participate in a drug transaction. Id. at 479-82. Petitioner subsequently 

testified that he “didn’t want to have anything to do with [drugs]” but that Petitioner felt he had 

“no way out.” Id. at 498. Petitioner further testified that Petitioner “wasn’t doing [the transaction] 

for the money.” Id. at 507. Finally, Petitioner also stated on re-direct examination that the CI 

pushed Petitioner to participate in the January 13, 2009 drug transaction and “[i]t came to a point 

where my mind shut down and, well, everything he [the CI] told me I would do.” Id. at 528.

Finally, Mr. Vaughns raised the entrapment defense during closing argument, stating that 

Petitioner felt “increased pressure” and a “pattern of pressure, pressure, pressure.” Id. at 634-35. 

Mr. Vaughns further stated during closing argument that the government sought to “induce[]” 

Petitioner into participating in a drug transaction, and that the government laid “a trap for [an] 

unwary innocent person. That’s what I submit happened to you in this case.” Id. at 636-37.

In sum, the record demonstrates that Petitioner’s counsel, Mr. Vaughns, did not overlook 

or fail to investigate an entrapment defense. To the contrary, the record illustrates that Mr. 

Vaughns presented entrapment as a major theme in Petitioner’s defense before and during trial.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Petitioner’s second ground for ineffective assistance of counsel 

is without merit, and Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this ground.

3. Failure to object to and properly argue the drug amount attributed to Petitioner

Petitioner next appears to contend that Mr. Vaughns was ineffective because Mr. Vaughns

“failed to object to the drug amount contributed to the movant.” Petition at 4; see also id. (stating 

that counsel “failed to show that the movant is not responsible for any drug amount.”). Although 

the Petition does not otherwise detail the basis for this claim, the record from Petitioner’s trial 

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shows that the parties stipulated that the cocaine seized from the Lowe’s parking lot on January 

13, 2009 constituted 993.8 grams of cocaine. Opp’n, Ex. 15.

The Court finds that this ground for ineffective assistance of counsel is without merit. As 

previously discussed, in evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, courts are required 

to accord a “high level of deference” to counsel’s strategic decisions. Fairbank v. Ayers, 650 F.3d 

1243, 1252 (9th Cir. 2011). Furthermore, there is a strong presumption that challenged actions of 

an attorney were “sound trial strategy.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. In addition, “in some cases a 

trial attorney may find it advantageous to his client’s interests to concede certain elements of an 

offense or his guilt of one of several charges.” United States v. Swanson, 943 F.2d 1070, 1075-76 

(9th Cir. 1991); see also Martin v. Waddington, 118 F. App’x 225, 226 (9th Cir. 2004)

(unpublished decision) (“Conceding guilt of promoting prostitution was strategic because the 

charge was supported by overwhelming evidence, and the concession provided an avenue to gain 

credibility with the jury to more effectively argue that the State had not met its burden on the two 

more serious charges.”).

Accordingly where, as here, a petitioner raises an ineffective assistance of counsel claim 

based on counsel entering into a stipulation as to certain facts, courts treat such decisions as 

“[s]trategic choices as to how to defend a case” which are “‘virtually unchallengeable.’” Allerdice 

v. Ryan, 395 F. App’x 449, 451 (9th Cir. 2010) (unpublished decision) (quoting Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 690); see also Ruiz-Marin v. United States, No. CIV. 13-297 WBS, 2013 WL 6713302, at 

*4 (D. Idaho Dec. 18, 2013) (counsel’s decision to stipulate to the quantity of drugs recovered was 

a “tactical choice that he made in order to focus the defense on the claim that petitioner was not 

part of a conspiracy to distribute” narcotics). Furthermore, where a petitioner raises an ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim predicated on his counsel entering into a stipulation with the 

government, it is relevant whether petitioner’s counsel “also obtained stipulations from the state 

regarding defense exhibits, offered evidence, cross-examined witnesses, elicited favorable 

testimony, and presented a coherent if ultimately unsuccessful defense in closing argument.” 

Allerdice, 395 F. App’x at 451. Such facts, if present, weigh against finding ineffective assistance 

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of counsel. Id.

Here, although Petitioner’s counsel Mr. Vaughns stipulated as to the amount of cocaine 

seized from the January 13, 2009 transaction, the record discloses that Mr. Vaughns “offered 

evidence, cross-examined witnesses, elicited favorable testimony, and presented a coherent if 

ultimately unsuccessful defense in closing argument.” Id. Accordingly, Mr. Vaughn’s choice to 

stipulate to the amount of drugs recovered does not show that Mr. Vaughn’s performance was 

objectively unreasonable. See id. (finding “[c]ounsel was not ineffective” when counsel entered 

into stipulations with the government because the stipulations represented “[s]trategic choices” 

and counsel otherwise diligently argued the petitioner’s case); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 

(ineffective assistance of counsel claim requires that counsel’s conduct “fell below an objective 

standard of reasonableness”). 

Furthermore, the record in this case shows that there was substantial evidence supporting 

the allegation that the 993.8 grams of cocaine recovered from the January 13, 2009 transaction

was attributable to Petitioner. Specifically, evidence at trial demonstrated that Petitioner initiated 

the January 13, 2009 transaction when Petitioner called the CI in December 2008 to tell the CI that 

Petitioner had a reliable source who could supply the CI with cocaine. Opp’n, Ex. 4, at 40-42. The 

evidence also showed that on January 10, 2009, Petitioner accompanied the CI to a meeting with 

this source of cocaine at a job site in Sunnyvale, California. Id. at 153-54. During the January 10, 

2009 meeting, Petitioner stated that he would relay the time and location of any transaction from 

the CI to the Petitioner’s source. Id. at 153-55. Petitioner then met the CI in the parking lot of a 

local Lowe’s on January 13, 2009, where Petitioner waited with the CI for two hours for the 

transaction to be consummated. Id. Ex. 5, at 360. At one point, when the CI stated that the CI was 

going to leave because the Petitioner’s source failed to arrive in a timely fashion, Petitioner 

persuaded the CI to stay. Id. at 356. Subsequently, Petitioner’s source arrived at the parking lot 

with approximately one kilogram of cocaine, and once the CI confirmed the presence of the drugs,

law enforcement seized the drugs and arrested Petitioner, Petitioner’s source, and three other 

individuals. Id. Ex. 4, at 115-21. A forensic chemist subsequently tested the seized drugs and 

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found it to have a net weight of 993.8 grams of cocaine. Id. Ex. 15, at 1-2.

In the face of this evidence, Mr. Vaughns apparently made the strategic decision to 

stipulate to the quantity of cocaine recovered from the January 13, 2009 transaction, and not to 

challenge the amount of drugs attributable to Petitioner, in favor of focusing on an entrapment 

defense. Such a strategic choice is “virtually unchallengeable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. 

Moreover, Petitioner has not met his burden to show that this decision was objectively

unreasonable, especially given the “high level of deference” this Court must accord the strategic 

decisions of Petitioner’s counsel. Fairbank, 650 F.3d at 1252. Furthermore, although Petitioner 

may now disagree with Mr. Vaughn’s strategic decision, “[a] tactical decision by counsel with 

which the defendant disagrees cannot form the basis of a claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel.” Guam v. Santos, 741 F.2d 1167, 1169 (9th Cir. 1984) (per curiam). For these reasons, 

the Court finds Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails.

In the Petition, Petitioner separately contends that the Court erred in sentencing Petitioner 

because the “court has never determined the amount of drugs contributed to the movant.” Petition

at 3. However, at the conclusion of evidence, the Court made a finding in its verdict form that 

Petitioner “conspired to possess with intent to distribute cocaine weighing at least 500 grams or 

more,” and that Petitioner “possessed with intent to distribute cocaine weighing at least 500 grams 

or more” in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(B)(ii). Opp’n Ex. 8, at 1-2. 

Those statutes prohibit, inter alia, possession with intent to distribute, and conspiracy to possess 

with intent to distribute, 500 grams or more of a substance containing cocaine. See 21 U.S.C. 

841(a)(1) (prohibiting possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance); id.

§ 841(b)(1)(B)(ii) (providing for the sentencing of anyone found to possess 500 grams or more of 

a substance containing, inter alia, cocaine in violation of subsection (a)(1)); id. § 846 (providing 

for the punishment of attempt or conspiracy). The Court repeated this finding at the December 12, 

2012 sentencing hearing, where the Court applied the section of the sentencing guidelines that 

governed possession of more than 500 grams but less than two kilograms of cocaine. Id. Ex. 11, at 

8-9; see also U.S.S.G. § 2(D)1.1(c)(7) (providing for base offense level of 26 for possession of 

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“[a]t least 500 [grams] of but less than 2 [kilograms] of Cocaine”). Accordingly, Petitioner’s 

contention that the Court never determined the amount of drugs attributable to Petitioner is 

contradicted by the record.

For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that Petitioner’s third ground for ineffective 

assistance of counsel is without merit and Petitioner is entitled to no relief on this ground.

4. Failure to argue a minimal or minor participant adjustment

Petitioner’s fourth ground for ineffective assistance of counsel is Mr. Vaughn’s alleged 

failure to argue for a “four point reduction for the mitigating role as [Petitioner] was a minor 

participant.” Petition at 3. Petitioner appears to argue that Mr. Vaughns should have argued 

Petitioner was entitled to a four-level decrease because Petitioner was a “minimal participant” in 

the January 13, 2009 transaction, or a two-level decrease in offense level because Petitioner was a 

“minor participant” in that transaction. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(a) (a “minimal participant in any 

criminal activity” may receive a decrease in offense level by four levels); id. § 3B1.2(b) (a “minor 

participant in any criminal activity” may receive a decrease in offense level by two levels”).

The Court finds that Petitioner’s fourth ground for ineffective assistance of counsel lacks 

merit for two reasons. First, the Ninth Circuit has stated that “a downward adjustment under 

section 3B1.2” for minor or minimal participation “is to be used infrequently and only in 

exceptional circumstances.” United States v. Davis, 36 F.3d 1424, 1436 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit has “recognized that possession of a substantial amount of 

narcotics is grounds for refusing to grant a sentence reduction” under either § 3B1.2(a) as a 

minimal participant, or § 3B1.2(b) as a minor participant. United States v. Lui, 941 F.2d 844, 849 

(9th Cir. 1991) (possession of, inter alia, 497 grams of cocaine considered “substantial”). 

Accordingly, a petitioner who is convicted of possessing a “substantial amount” of narcotics does 

not raise a meritorious ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on counsel’s failure to argue 

for a downward adjustment under § 3B1.2. See United States v. Martin, 124 F.3d 214 (9th Cir. 

1997) (unpublished decision) (petitioner failed to raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim 

where petitioner was “found guilty of knowingly possessing 252 grams of cocaine base and 

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conspiring to distribute the drug” and subsequently argued he was entitled to a reduction in 

offense level as a minimal participant).

Here, based on the evidence presented at trial, the Court found Petitioner guilty of 

conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine weighing at least 500 grams or more, and 

possession with intent to distribute cocaine weighing at least 500 grams or more. ECF No. 255, at 

1-2. Accordingly, because Petitioner was found guilty of possessing a substantial amount of 

narcotics, the decision of Petitioner’s counsel to not argue for a downward adjustment as a

minimal or minor participant was not objectively unreasonable. See Liu, 941 F.2d at 849 

(possession of a “substantial amount of narcotics is grounds for refusing to grant a sentence 

reduction” pursuant to §§ 3B1.2(a) or 3B1.2(b)); see also Martin, 124 F.3d at 214 (affirming 

denial of ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on failure to argue for a downward 

adjustment pursuant to § 3B1.2(a) where the petitioner was found guilty of possessing 252 grams 

of cocaine base).

Second, extensive evidence presented at trial illustrated that Petitioner was not a minimal 

or minor participant in the crimes of which Petitioner was convicted. To the contrary, as the Court 

found at Petitioner’s sentencing, the evidence showed that Petitioner was the “glue” that brought 

Petitioner, the CI, and four other individuals together at a local Lowe’s parking lot on January 13, 

2009 to consummate a transaction involving almost a kilogram of cocaine. ECF No. 307, at 8. 

According to the evidence presented at trial, Petitioner originally arranged for the CI to purchase 

five kilograms of cocaine on December 10, 2008. See Opp’n, Ex. 4, at 30. When that deal failed to 

happen, the evidence showed that Petitioner contacted the CI to tell the CI that Petitioner had a 

more reliable source who could supply the CI with cocaine. Opp’n, Ex. 4, at 40-42. On January 

10, 2009, Petitioner accompanied the CI to a meeting with this more reliable source of cocaine at a 

job site in Sunnyvale, California. Id. at 153-54. During the January 10, 2009 meeting, Petitioner

actively participated in the negotiations by stating, among other things, that Petitioner would relay 

the time and location of any transaction from the CI to the Petitioner’s source. Id. at 153-55. 

Petitioner then met the CI in the parking lot of a local Lowe’s on January 13, 2009, where 

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Petitioner waited with the CI for two hours for the transaction to be consummated. Id. Ex. 5, at 

360. Furthermore, when the CI stated that he was going to leave because the Petitioner’s source 

had not arrived on time with the cocaine, Petitioner persuaded the CI to stay. Id. at 356.

Petitioner’s source arrived thereafter with approximately one kilogram of cocaine, and once the CI 

confirmed the presence of the drugs, law enforcement seized the drugs and arrested Petitioner, 

Petitioner’s source, and three other individuals. Id. Ex. 4, at 115-21. A forensic chemist 

subsequently tested the seized drugs and found it to have a net weight of 993.8 grams of cocaine. 

Id. Ex. 15, at 1-2.

Subsequently at trial, when Petitioner attempted to testify that he played a minor role in the 

January 13, 2009 transaction—by, for instance, testifying that he was ignorant of certain details of 

the transaction—the Court found Petitioner’s testimony to be untruthful and adjusted Petitioner’s 

offense level at sentencing for committing obstruction of justice. ECF No. 307, at 9. Accordingly, 

Mr. Vaughn’s decision to forego any argument that Petitioner deserved a decrease in offense level 

for being a minimal or minor participant was not objectively unreasonable. See Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 688 (ineffective assistance of counsel claim requires that counsel’s conduct “fell below an 

objective standard of reasonableness.”).

For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that Petitioner’s fourth basis for his

ineffective assistance of counsel claim is without merit, and accordingly Petitioner is entitled to no 

relief on this ground.

5. Waiver of right to jury trial

Finally, Petitioner argues that his counsel was ineffective because Mr. Vaughns allegedly 

told Petitioner that it would be “better for a bench trial.” Petition at 3. Petitioner also states that 

Petitioner did not know he had a constitutional right to a jury trial, and further contends that he

was prejudiced by not having the opportunity to have a jury trial. Id.

Again, the Court finds that this ground for Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim is without merit. As a preliminary matter, the record in this case shows that it was Mr. 

Vaughns, Petitioner’s counsel, who first raised the prospect of waiving the right to a jury trial and 

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proceeding with a bench trial at a March 8, 2012 hearing prior to jury selection. ECF No. 300, at 

10-11. Respondent initially did not consent to a bench trial, and instead requested time to consider 

it. Id. Subsequently that same day, the parties filed a status report stating that Petitioner and 

Respondent agreed to waive their right to a jury trial and proceed with a bench trial. ECF No. 223. 

The parties then executed a stipulation waiving the right to a jury trial at a March 9, 2012 status 

conference. ECF No. 301. Accordingly, one day elapsed between when Petitioner first raised the 

prospect of waiving the right to a jury trial, and when Petitioner waived his right.

To the extent that Petitioner now argues that Mr. Vaughns did not fully inform Petitioner 

of the right to a jury trial, or of the advantages and disadvantages of a bench trial versus a jury 

trial, Petitioner’s argument is contradicted by Petitioner’s own statements at the March 9, 2012 

status conference. At that conference, before Petitioner waived his right to a jury trial, the Court 

conducted an extensive colloquy with Petitioner during which Petitioner affirmed that Petitioner

had “had enough time to discuss the benefits and disadvantages of going by way of a bench trial

versus a jury trial” with Mr. Vaughns. ECF No. 301, at 5. When the Court asked Petitioner if Mr. 

Vaughns was “able to answer all your questions about whether you should have a jury trial versus 

a bench trial,” Petitioner responded, “Yes, [Mr. Vaughns] answered everything.” Id. Petitioner 

also affirmed that Petitioner had “had enough time to discuss this stipulation for waiver of trial 

form with [Petitioner’s] attorney,” and that Petitioner’s attorney was able to answer all of 

Petitioner’s questions about the stipulation. Id. at 7. When the Court asked Petitioner if Petitioner 

was “satisfied with the services of your attorney, Mr. Vaughns, in advising you regarding this 

stipulation and court approval for waiver of jury trial,” Petitioner responded, “Yes, yes.” Id. at 7-8. 

In short, the record discloses that Petitioner did discuss the benefits and disadvantages of 

proceeding with a bench trial versus a jury trial with Petitioner’s attorney, that Petitioner’s 

attorney answered all of Petitioner’s questions on the issue, and that Petitioner was satisfied with 

the services of Mr. Vaughns. See id. at 5-8; see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977) 

(“Solemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity.”). Accordingly, the 

Court finds Petitioner’s current contention that Mr. Vaughns failed to advise Petitioner of the 

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benefits and disadvantages of a jury trial versus a bench trial to be without merit.

To the extent that Petitioner now argues that Petitioner was not aware of his right to a jury 

trial, and therefore did not validly waive this right, such an argument is also belied by the record. 

“A defendant may waive the constitutional right to a jury trial if the waiver is made voluntarily, 

knowingly, and intelligently.” Brown v. Burns, 996 F.2d 219, 221 (9th Cir. 1993). A waiver of a 

right is valid if “[a]n examination of the record indicates that [the petitioner] was fully aware of 

the scope of the right he was waiving and did so as a strategic decision.” Hensley v. Crist, 67 F.3d 

181, 185 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Here, Mr. Vaughns stated at the March 12, 2012 status conference that “I think [Petitioner] 

understands . . . the benefits I’ve explained to him of a court trial versus a jury trial.” ECF No. 

301, at 3. During the subsequent colloquy, the Court asked Petitioner if Petitioner wanted “to have 

a trial by a jury, or do you want to have a trial just by me, the judge?” Id. at 4. Petitioner 

responded, “I’m going to do it with you.” Id. Subsequently, the Court asked Petitioner, “You do 

understand that you have the right to be tried by 12 jurors? Do you understand that, sir?” Id. at 8. 

Petitioner responded, “Yes.” Id. The Court then asked if Petitioner was “giv[ing] up that right to 

be tried by a jury?” Id. Petitioner again responded, “Yes.” Id. Later during the same colloquy, the 

Court told Petitioner, “I’ve signed this form, which means, Mr. Orellana, that I will try your case, 

or I’ll be the decision[-]maker in your case and not a jury of 12 citizens. Do you understand that?” 

Id. Petitioner replied, “Yes, I understand.” Id.

Petitioner further stated during the colloquy that Petitioner had no hesitation in giving up 

the right to have a trial by jury; that no one had made any promises or threats against Petitioner to 

induce him to waive the right to a jury trial; that Petitioner was not taking any medication or drugs 

that affected his ability to think clearly; and that Petitioner’s waiver of jury trial form was 

translated into Spanish with the assistance of a Spanish interpreter. Id. at 4-7. Petitioner then 

executed a stipulation for waiver of jury trial, which stated that Petitioner “waives his right to a 

jury trial.” ECF No. 252, at 1. The stipulation was signed by Respondent, Petitioner, Petitioner’s 

counsel, the Court, and the interpreter who translated the stipulation into Spanish. Id. at 2. In sum, 

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the record demonstrates that Petitioner was aware of the right to a jury trial, and that Petitioner 

waived this right “voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.” Burns, 996 F.2d at 221.

For the reasons stated above, Petitioner’s final ground for ineffective assistance of counsel 

is without merit. Moreover, because the Court finds that all of the grounds for Petitioner’s 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim are without merit, Petitioner is entitled to no relief and the 

Court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing. See Howard, 381 F.3d at 877 (a court is only 

required to hold an evidentiary hearing if, inter alia, the petition, files, and record of the case 

cannot conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief).

B. Respondent’s Rule 33 Motion for New Trial

Separately from Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Petitioner also moves

in his Petition for a new trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 based on “newly 

discovered evidence.” Petition at 2; see also id. at 5 (moving for new trial because of “newly 

discovered evidence by the movant”). However, Petitioner does not identify any “newly 

discovered evidence,” or state why it would support a motion for a new trial.2See id.

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 allows a court to “vacate any judgment and grant a 

new trial if the interest of justice so requires.” Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 33(a). The burden of justifying 

a new trial rests with the defendant. See United States v. Shaffer, 789 F.2d 682, 687 (9th Cir.

1986). The decision to grant a new trial is within the sound discretion of the trial court. See United 

States v. Love, 535 F.2d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 847 (1976). Here, 

Petitioner cites no newly discovered evidence, and accordingly Petitioner fails to carry his burden 

to justify a new trial. See Schaffer, 789 F.2d at 687. Therefore, the Court finds that Petitioner is 

entitled to no relief on his Rule 33 motion.

 

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Petitioner also appears to incorporate some of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims into 

the Rule 33 motion for new trial. See Petition at 5 (moving for new trial under Rule 33 because 

Petitioner’s counsel allegedly failed to inform Petitioner of his right to a jury trial, and failed to 

raise an entrapment defense at trial). As previously discussed, the Court has found that Petitioner’s 

ineffective assistance of counsel claims are baseless. See Section III.A, supra. Accordingly, to the 

extent that Petitioner’s Rule 33 motion is based on ineffective assistance of counsel, the motion 

lacks merit.

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Case Nos. 13-CV-00698-LHK and 09-CR-00096-LHK 

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS, AND DIRECTING RESPONDENT TO ANSWER

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C. Motion for Modification of Sentence

On December 22, 2015, Petitioner filed a motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) in 

Petitioner’s criminal case, Case No. 09-CR-00096-LHK. In that motion, Petitioner seeks to reduce 

his sentence in accordance with Amendment 782 to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. See Mot. 

Reduce. Amendment 782 revised the Drug Quantity Table in section 2D1.1 of the U.S. Sentencing 

Guidelines and reduced the offense level applicable to many drug trafficking offenses, including 

those involving cocaine, by two levels. See United States v. Beasley, No. 89-CR-00602-THE-1, 

2014 WL 6694058, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2014). Respondent has not responded to Petitioner’s 

motion, but requests that if the Court denies the Petition, the Court grant Respondent an 

opportunity to address the motion for modification of sentence separately. Opp’n at 2.

Accordingly, the Court hereby ORDERS Respondent to file an answer to Petitioner's 

motion for modification of sentence. The answer shall not exceeding ten (10) pages in length, and

Respondent shall file the answer within thirty (30) days of the filing of this Order. Respondent 

shall file the answer in Petitioner’s criminal case, Case No. 09-CR-00096-LHK.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES the Petition with prejudice. No certificate 

of appealability shall issue, as Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). With respect to Petitioner’s civil case, 

Case No. 13-CV-00698-LHK, the Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment for Respondent 

and against Petitioner and close the file.

As for the motion for modification of sentence in Case No. 09-CR-00096-LHK, 

Respondent is hereby ORDERED to file an answer to the motion within thirty (30) days of the 

filing of this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 6, 2015

______________________________________

LUCY H. KOH

United States District Judge

Case 5:13-cv-00698-LHK Document 6 Filed 08/06/15 Page 23 of 23