Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-01931/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-01931-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

BOBBY C. RICHARDSON, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

BENICIA POLICE DEP’T, 

Defendant. 

No. 2:12-cv-1931 GEB AC PS 

FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS 

 On October 2, 2013, the court held a hearing on defendant’s July 12, 2013 motion to 

dismiss. Plaintiff Bobby Richardson appeared in pro per. Gregg Anthony Thornton appeared for 

the moving defendant, Benicia Police Department. On review of the motion, the documents filed 

in support and opposition, upon hearing the arguments of plaintiff and counsel, and good cause 

appearing therefore, THE COURT FINDS AS FOLLOWS: 

RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 1. Facts Underlying Litigation 

 Plaintiff, an African-American man, alleges that the Benicia Police Department violated 

his constitutional rights on two different occasions. Compl., ECF No. 1 at 2. The first violation 

took place on December 30, 2009 and the second on July 5, 2012. Id. 

 a. The 2009 Incident 

 On December 30, 2009, unnamed Benicia police officers detained plaintiff at a Starbucks 

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coffee shop in Benicia, California. Compl., ECF No. 1 at 2. Plaintiff was on his way home from 

a bar where he consumed one bottle of beer, and it was approximately 4:30 or 5:00 pm and dark 

outside. Id. Plaintiff claims that he was subjected to a “false arrest,” though he does not provide 

any details regarding the circumstances preceding the arrest. Id. Following his arrest, plaintiff 

was placed in a police car and taken to an unfamiliar wooden area where the officers stopped, 

exited the vehicle, and left plaintiff in the car while they stood in front of it. Id. Plaintiff felt 

frightened. Id. He claims that the police then “drag[ged]” him from the car. Id. Once on the 

ground, plaintiff attempted to run “for fear of [his] life” because “being a Southern born Black 

man this drive in the dark woods brought back memories of stories [his] grandfather would tell 

[him] about the old Jim Crow days.” Id. The police officers grabbed him and “started laughing 

hilariously.” Id. They then placed plaintiff in another car and drove him to the Fairfield jail. Id. 

Plaintiff was released the next day and later “found innocent.” Id. Plaintiff alleges that these 

actions of the Benicia Police Department violated his Eight Amendment rights. Id. 

 b. The 2012 Incident 

 On July 4, 2012, plaintiff had an argument with his estranged wife at her home. Compl., 

ECF No. 1 at 2. During the course of the argument, his wife threw keys at him and yelled that 

she was going to call the police. Id. Plaintiff tossed the keys back towards his wife and then left. 

Id. The next morning, two Benicia police officers, Greg Harris and Chris Bidou, came to the 

front door of plaintiff’s house and rang the door bell. Id. Plaintiff’s landlord came to the door 

and told the police officers that plaintiff was not at home. Id. The police officers then forced 

their way through the door, almost pushing the landlord to the ground. Id. They searched all 

through the house for plaintiff until finding him by the garbage area. Id. The police officers 

pointed a gun at plaintiff, and Officer Bidou told him to put his hands up. Id. Plaintiff complied 

and was escorted outside of the house. Id. Once outside, the police officers asked plaintiff if he 

threw keys at his wife and whether he had been drinking. Id. After plaintiff denied throwing 

keys and told the officers that he only had a couple of sips of beer, Officer Harris placed plaintiff 

under arrest. Id. Plaintiff was checked into jail and charged with misdemeanor domestic 

violence. Id. He was bailed out the next morning. Id. Plaintiff was told by his landlord that the 

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police officers knew that he was in the house because they “were peeping thr[ough] the window.” 

Id. He alleges that the Benicia Police Department’s actions violated his Fourth Amendment 

rights. Id. 

 2. Procedural Background 

 Plaintiff filed his Complaint on July 23, 2012, alleging violations of his Fourth and Eighth 

Amendment rights by the Benicia Police Department. Compl., ECF No. 1. Plaintiff claims that 

the Benicia Police Department’s repressive conduct requires appointment of a Review Board. He 

points out that Chris Bidou, one of the police officers who unlawfully arrested him on July 5, 

2012, is a brother of Andrew Bidou, Benicia’s Chief of Police, and a brother-in-law of Johnny 

Cateras, who was involved with infamous Riders group of police officers who “terroriz[ed] the 

Black community of Oakland around about the year of 2004.” 

 On July 12, 2013, defendant filed a motion to dismiss. ECF No. 20. On August 15, 2013, 

plaintiff filed an opposition. ECF No. 21. 

LEGAL STANDARDS 

 1. Motion to Dismiss 

 The purpose of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 

is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint. N. Star Int’l v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, 720 F.2d 

578, 581 (9th Cir. 1983). “Dismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the 

absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police 

Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). A plaintiff is required to allege “enough facts to state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 

(2007). Thus, a defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the court’s ability to grant any relief 

on the plaintiff’s claims, even if the plaintiff’s allegations are true. 

 In determining whether a complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, the 

court accepts as true the allegations in the complaint and construes the allegations in the light 

most favorable to the plaintiff. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Love v. 

United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Rodriguez v. Panayiotou, 314 F.3d 

979, 983 (9th Cir. 2002). A court is not “required to accept as true allegations that are merely 

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conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden 

State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). 

 If a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is granted, “[the] district court should grant leave to amend even 

if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not 

possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 

2000) (en banc). That is, leave to amend need not be granted where amendment would be futile. 

Gompper v. VISX, Inc., 298 F.3d 893, 898 (9th Cir. 2002). 

 2. Rule 8 Pleading Standard 

 A complaint must “contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). The “short and plain” statement must give the 

defendant “fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Walsh 

v. Nev. Dep't of Human Res., 471 F.3d 1033, 1036 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 

355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] party need not plead specific legal 

theories in the complaint, so long as the other side receives notice as to what is at issue in the 

case.” Sagana v. Tenorio, 384 F.3d 731, 737 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Am. Timber & Trading Co. 

v. First Nat'l Bank, 690 F.2d 781, 786 (9th Cir. 1982)). Courts have a “duty ... to construe pro se 

pleadings liberally.” Zichko v. Idaho, 247 F.3d 1015, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001); Hughes v. Rowe, 449 

U.S. 5, 9 (1980). The pleadings of pro se litigants are “held to less stringent standards than 

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 386 (2003) (quoting 

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). “However, ‘a liberal interpretation of a [pro se] 

complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.’” Peterson 

v. Cal. Dep't. Of Corr. & Rehab., 451 F.Supp.2d 1092, 1099 (D.Cal. 2006) (quoting Pena v. 

Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir. 1992)). 

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DISCUSSION 

 1. State Law Claims1

 a. California Government Tort Claims Act 

 Defendant first argues that plaintiff failed to file a government tort claim with the Benicia 

Police Department before bringing his suit as required by the California Tort Claims Act and, 

therefore, all state law tort claims that plaintiff intends to bring must be dismissed with prejudice. 

Def.’s Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 20-1 at 4. Plaintiff did not allege in either his complaint or the 

opposition that he filed any claims pursuant to the Tort Claims Act. At the hearing on the instant 

motion, plaintiff admitted that he never in fact filed such claims as to either incident. 

 A plaintiff seeking to bring tort claims against a government entity must first present those 

claims to the public entity within the limitations period, either six months or one year, depending 

on the nature of the tort alleged: 

A claim relating to a cause of action for death or for injury to 

person or to personal property or growing crops shall be presented 

as provided in Article 2 (commencing with Section 915) not later 

than six months after the accrual of the cause of action. A claim 

relating to any other cause of action shall be 

presented as provided in Article 2 (commencing with Section 915) 

not later than one year after the accrual of the cause of action. 

Cal. Gov’t. Code § 911.2(a). The term “injury” means “death, injury to a person, damage to or 

loss of property, or any other injury that a person may suffer to his person, reputation, character, 

feelings, or estate, of such nature that it would be actionable if inflicted by a private person.” Cal. 

Gov’t. Code § 810.8; Ovando v. County of Los Angeles, 159 Cal. App. 4th 42, 63 n.7 (2008). 

 Until a claimant has properly presented a claim to a public entity, and the public entity has 

acted on it or it is deemed rejected in accordance with the Act, the claimant may not file suit 

against that entity. Cal. Gov’t. Code § 945.4; California v. Super. Ct., 32 Cal. 4th 1234, 1239 

(2004). The failure to timely present a claim bars a person from filing a lawsuit against that 

 

1

 The complaint consists of a one-page narrative that does not expressly allege state law claims, or 

specify any causes of action. Defendants move to dismiss any putative state law claims that are 

intended by the allegations. 

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entity. See Shirk v. Vista Unified Sch. Dist., 42 Cal. 4th 201, 209 (2007) (stating that timely 

claims presentation is a condition precedent to, and an element of, any claim against a public 

entity or its employees). In federal court, the failure to allege facts that either demonstrate or 

excuse compliance with the Government Claims statutes will subject a state law claim to 

dismissal. Karim–Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep't, 839 F.2d 621, 627 (9th Cir. 1988); 

Mangold v. California Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 67 F.3d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir. 1995). 

 Here, assuming plaintiff’s putative tort claims arose on December 30, 2009 and July 5, 

2012, he had until July 2009 to file a claim regarding December 2009 incident and until January 

5, 2013 regarding July 2012 incident. However, plaintiff did not present any evidence that he 

either filed these claims within the statutory time limits or that he filed an application for leave to 

present a late claim “within a reasonable time not to exceed one year after the accrual of the cause 

of action” as allowed under section 911.4(b). Cal. Gov’t. Code § 911.4(b). At this time the 

statutory time limits to file a claim and the latest date to apply for leave to present a late claim 

have passed and, therefore, any state law tort claims that plaintiff intends to bring are barred by 

the California Tort Claims Act. See Shirk, 42 Cal. 4th at 209. 

 It should be noted that plaintiff is equally precluded from bringing state tort claims against 

individual police officers because California Government Code section 950.2 mandates that “a 

cause of action against a public employee . . . . for injury resulting from an act or omission in the 

scope of his employment as a public employee is barred unless a timely claim has been filed 

against the employing public entity.” Fowler v. Howell, 42 Cal. App. 4th 1746, 1750 (1996). 

 Accordingly, plaintiff’s putative state tort law claims should be dismissed under section 

California Government Code section 945.4 without leave to amend. 

 b. California Government Code § 815 

 Defendant further argues that plaintiff's common law causes of action against defendant 

are barred by California Government Code § 815. Def.’s Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 20-1 at 7-8. 

Section 815 “abolishes common law tort liability for public entities.” Miklosy v. Regents of 

Univ. of Cal., 44 Cal. 4th 876, 899 (2008); see Cal. Gov’t Code § 815(a) (“Except as otherwise 

provided by statute: (a) A public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of 

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an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person.”). Because the 

Benicia Police Department is a public entity (or subdivision of a public entity), its liability as to 

common law claims is precluded by section 815. 

 Accordingly, plaintiff is barred from asserting any common law claims against Benicia 

Police Department. 

 2. Civil Rights Claims Under 42 U.S.C. §1983 

 In order to sue a local government entity or its employees in a federal court for civil rights 

violations, a plaintiff must rely on statutory provisions that permit individuals to seek relief in 

federal court. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides in pertinent part: 

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 

custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of 

Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the 

United States . . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or 

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to 

the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 

proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 “creates a cause of action against a person who, acting under 

color of state law, deprives another of rights guaranteed under the Constitution.” Henderson v. 

City of Simi Valley, 305 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2002). “In order to allege a claim upon which 

relief may be granted under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that he or she has been deprived of a 

‘right secured by the Constitution and . . . . law of the United States’ and that the deprivation was 

‘under color’ of state law.” Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1028 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Flagg 

Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983)). Here, plaintiff 

alleges Fourth and Eighth Amendment violations. 

 a. The Statute of Limitations Applicable to 42 U.S.C. §1983 Claims 

 Defendant asserts first that all of plaintiff’s claims arising out of the December 30, 2009 

incident are time-barred because plaintiff filed his Complaint outside of the applicable two-year 

statute of limitations. See Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 954 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating that 

California’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions applies to § 1983 suits in 

federal court); Cal. Civ. Pro. Code § 335.1. 

 While state law provides the applicable statute of limitations, federal law controls the 

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question of when a claim accrues. Johnson v. California, 207 F.3d 650, 653 (9th Cir. 2000). In § 

1983 false arrest cases, the statute of limitations “begins to run at the time the claimant becomes 

detained pursuant to legal process.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 397 (2007). Here, plaintiff 

filed his Complaint on July 23, 2012, two years, six months and twenty three days after the claim 

accrued, the date of the alleged arrest. This is six months and twenty three days after the two year 

statute of limitation has run. 

 However, the facts asserted by the plaintiff suggest that the statute of limitations might 

have been tolled. When not inconsistent with federal law, federal courts apply the law of the 

forum state regarding tolling of limitations periods. Johnson, 207 F.3d at 653. “In California, the 

statute of limitations for Section 1983 actions is tolled by Cal. Gov’t Code § 945.3 while criminal 

charges are pending.” Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 585 (9th Cir. 1995); see also 

Via v. City of Fairfield, 833 F. Supp. 2d 1189, FN3 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (noting that the statute of 

limitations on plaintiff’s § 1983 claims regarding his arrest was tolled under Cal. Gov’t Code § 

945 until the related criminal charges were dismissed). Section 945.3 reads: 

No person charged by indictment, information, complaint, or other 

accusatory pleading charging a criminal offense may bring a civil 

action for money or damages against a peace officer or the public 

entity employing a peace officer based upon conduct of the peace 

officer relating to the offense for which the accused is charged, 

including an act or omission in investigating or reporting the 

offense or arresting or detaining the accused, while the charges 

against the accused are pending before a justice, municipal, or 

superior court. 

Cal. Gov’t Code § 945.3. 

 Under this section, “criminal charges are ‘pending’ until the date of judgment.” McAlpine 

v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. App. 3d 1, 3 (1989), cited with approval in Torres v. City of Santa 

Ana, 108 F.3d 224, 226 (9th Cir. 1997). Presumably, charges are only pending after they are filed 

and before the judgment. See Geiche v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 08-cv-3233 JL, 2009 WL 

1948830 (N.D. Cal. July 2, 2009). 

 According to his Complaint, plaintiff was arrested on December 30, 2009, released the 

next day, and some unspecified time later found innocent. Thus, the statute of limitations on 

plaintiff’s respective § 1983 claims may have been tolled until the related criminal charges were 

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dismissed. However, the Complaint is silent as to the date on which plaintiff was charged and the 

date of the judgment. If the period between the date when plaintiff was charged and the date of 

the judgment was greater than six months and twenty three days, than plaintiff filed within the 

two-year time limit and his complaint would be timely in regard to December 30, 2009 incident. 

 Accordingly, plaintiff's § 1983 claims arising out of the December 30, 2009 incident 

should be dismissed with leave to amend. Plaintiff may amend the complaint if he can truthfully 

add facts sufficient to show that his criminal charges were not dismissed until at least July 24, 

2010 and that the statute of limitations was therefore tolled for at least six months and 23 days. 

 b. The Eight Amendment Claim (2009 Incident) 

 Plaintiff claims that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated in relation to the 2009 

arrest. Defendant contends that plaintiff’s claim is properly analyzed under the Fourth 

Amendment because the alleged violation occurred in the context of arrest. The court agrees. 

 Plaintiff’s allegations suggest two distinct constitutional violations: an unlawful arrest 

(“they. . . falsey arrested me”) and an unreasonable use or threat of force (the post-arrest detour 

into the woods that “scared the wits out of me”). See Compl., ECF No. 1 at 2. An arrest without 

a warrant or probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment and can support § 1983 liability. See 

Dubner v. City & County of San Francisco, 266 F.3d 959, 964-65 (9th Cir. 2001). The use of 

excessive force or an unreasonable show of force (including intimidation and threatening 

behavior) against an arrestee also constitutes an unlawful seizure in violation of the Fourth 

Amendment. See Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 878-79 (9th Cir. 2001). Both types of Fourth 

Amendment violation are subject to the same general standard: objective reasonableness. See 

Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985); Franklin v. Foxworth, 31 F.3d 873, 875 (9th Cir. 

1994); Motley v. Parks, 432 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc), overruled in part on other 

grounds, United States . King, 687 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). 

 The complaint alleges in conclusory fashion that plaintiff’s arrest was “false,” but does 

not state any facts supporting a conclusion that the arrest lacked probable cause. Indeed, plaintiff 

does not explain what he was arrested for or the circumstances resulting in his arrest. 

 Accordingly, the false arrest claim must be dismissed with leave to amend. 

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 Plaintiff does state specific facts regarding alleged acts of intimidation during 

transportation to the jail. He alleges that the arresting officers stopped the car in an unfamiliar 

wooded area, dragged plaintiff out of the car, tackled him when he attempted to run, and laughed 

at his fear. To state a claim under the Fourth Amendment, the allegations must establish that the 

officer’s conduct was unreasonable under all the circumstances. See Fontana, 262 F.3d at 880. 

Because this incident did not involve deadly force or physical blows, plaintiff must plead facts 

that demonstrate “harassing and abusive behavior that rises to the level of ‘unreasonable 

seizure.’” Id. at 879. Construing the allegations of the complaint with the liberality due the pro 

se litigant, Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 2004), plaintiff’s facts may be 

sufficient to state a claim that the officers gratuitously attempted to terrorize him. Because leave 

to amend will be granted in any case, plaintiff will have the opportunity to supplement his facts in 

support of this claim. 

 Finally, the court notes that the complaint does not identify the officers involved in this 

incident or name them as defendants. As the court explains more fully below, the proper 

defendants on a § 1983 claim are the individuals who violated plaintiff’s rights. Police officer 

defendants are often identified from the police report of the incident at issue. See Dubner, 266 

F.3d at 965-66 (noting problems of proof caused when report does not identify arresting 

officers).2

 For all these reasons, plaintiff’s false arrest and excessive force claim, improperly pled as 

a cruel and unusual punishment claim, must be dismissed. Plaintiff should be granted leave to 

amend in order to clarify the grounds of his incipient Fourth Amendment claim(s). Specifically, 

plaintiff should be permitted to amend the complaint if he can allege additional facts supporting 

his claim of false arrest and/or name the offending officers. Plaintiff should also be permitted to 

 

2

 No federal statute or rule expressly permits the naming of a fictitious defendant or “John Doe” 

defendant in a federal pleading, see Fifty Assocs. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 446 F.2d 1187, 

1191 (9th Cir. 1970), and so-called “Doe pleading” is disfavored in the Ninth Circuit. See 

Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980). Nonetheless, naming Doe defendants 

may be appropriate where the plaintiff has stated a valid claim, but requires discovery to identify 

the proper defendant. See Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999). 

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supplement his allegations regarding the objectively unreasonable conduct of the arresting 

officers. 

 c. Fourth Amendment Claim (2012 Incident) 

 The complaint alleges that the Benicia Police violated plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment 

rights on July 5, 2012. Compl., ECF No. 1 at 2. Plaintiff recounts the events of July 5, 2012, 

which culminated in his arrest, but does not specify what actions of the arresting officers violated 

his Fourth Amendment rights. In an action under § 1983 plaintiff may seek redress only for 

violations of his own rights, not violations of the rights of others such as his estranged wife or her 

landlord. See Elk Grove Unified School Dist. V. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 17-18 (2004). The court 

is unable to identify a cognizable Fourth Amendment violation from the allegations of the 

complaint. To the extent that plaintiff means to allege that his arrest was unlawful in some way, 

the complaint must contain specific facts demonstrating the illegality. 

 Although plaintiff identifies in the body of the complaint the officers involved in this 

incident, the only named defendant is the Benicia Police Department. Defendants argue that the 

complaint fails to state a claim against Bencia under Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 

U.S. 658, 693 (1978), and must be dismissed on that ground. The court turns next to that issue, 

which applies to plaintiff’s claims arising from the 2009 incident as well as the 2012 incident. 

Because the plaintiff’s claim arising from the 2012 incident must be dismissed for the reasons 

explained below, and because leave to amend is appropriate, plaintiff will have an opportunity to 

clarify the factual basis of this claim. 

 d. Municipal Liability 

 Defendant argues that plaintiff’s claim(s) against Benicia Police Department under section 

1983 should be dismissed because plaintiff “fails to set forth a single allegation regarding any 

policy, custom or practice of the Benicia Police Department [and] fails to establish that the 

alleged unconstitutional action was anything more than a possible single, isolated incident, which 

occurred in the absence of any unconstitutional municipal policy.” Def.’s Mot. Dismiss, ECF No. 

20-1. 

 Because section 1983 does not provide for vicarious liability, local governments “may not 

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be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents.” Monell, supra,

436 U.S. at 693. Instead, local government entities can be directly liable under § 1983 for 

monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief only if the allegedly unconstitutional actions were 

taken pursuant to a “policy statement, ordinance, or decision officially adopted and promulgated 

by that body's officers.” Neveu v. City of Fresno, 392 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1171 (E.D. Cal. 2005) 

(quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 659, 690). Alternatively, local government entities can be liable for 

adopting an unconstitutional custom, even if such custom has not received formal approval 

through the body's official decision-making channels. Id. (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-691). 

“A single decision by a municipal policymaker may be sufficient to trigger section 1983 liability 

under Monell, even though the decision is not intended to govern future situations.” Haughn v. 

Brosseau, 351 F.3d 372 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1347 (9th 

Cir. 1992)) (citing Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480-81 (1986)). The local 

government will be found responsible if it can be established that “the individual who committed 

the constitutional tort was an official with final policymaking authority and that the challenged 

action itself was an act of official governmental policy.” Sepatis v. City & County of San 

Francisco, 217 F. Supp. 2d 992, 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 

 The only allegation that might be construed as referring to such authority is that one of the 

arresting officers, Chris Bidou, has a close family relation with Benicia’s Chief of Police. But 

this is hardly enough. Such allegations lack factual content from which one could plausibly infer 

Monell liability. See e.g., Palermo v. Town of N. Reading, 370 Fed. Appx. 128, 131 n.4 (10th 

Cir. 2010) (dismissing a Monell claim when “the complaint as a whole contained no factual 

assertions whatsoever regarding Town policy”); Telles v. City of Waterford, No. 1:10–cv–00982 

AWI SKO, 2010 WL 5314360, at 4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2010) (same); Young v. City of Visalia,

687 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1149-50 (E.D. Cal. 2009). 

 Accordingly, given the insufficiency of plaintiff's allegations, his Monell claim should be 

dismissed with leave to amend. 

 e. Claims Against Individual Defendants 

 Although the complaint names only the police department as a defendant, the allegations 

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appear intended to state claims against individual police officers. Individual local government 

officers can be named as defendants either in their personal or official capacities. A suit against 

an individual officer in his or her official capacity is “only another way of pleading an action 

against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 365 (9th 

Cir. 2004) (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985)). Accordingly, to state a claim 

against an individual officer in his official capacity, a plaintiff must allege an unconstitutional 

“policy statement, ordinance, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's 

officers.” Neveu, 392 F. Supp. 2d at 1171 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 659, 690). As discussed 

above, plaintiff failed to allege any facts about existence of such policy. 

 In contrast, a claim against an individual local government officer acting in his or her 

personal capacity is quite different from a Monell claim against a local government entity. A 

plaintiff suing an individual officer in his or her personal capacity is not required to establish any 

connection between the alleged unlawful act and a governmental “policy or custom.” Instead, the 

plaintiff must specify how each individual defendant participated in the violation of plaintiff’s 

rights. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 

1980). A person deprives another of a constitutional right, “within the meaning of § 1983, ‘if he 

does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative act, or omits to perform an act which 

he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.’” Preschooler 

II v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 

588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). 

 Although plaintiff did not name any individual officers as defendants, he named them in 

the body of the Complaint in regard to the July 5, 2012 arrest. Accordingly, plaintiff may amend 

the complaint to add these officers as defendants if he can provide factual allegations that 

plausibly indicate that his July 5, 2012 arrest was in violation of the Fourth Amendment or other 

federally protected rights. Moreover, as noted above, if plaintiff elects to amend his claim(s) 

arising from the 2009 incident, he may also identify and name as defendants the officers who 

allegedly violated his rights on that occasion. 

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CONCLUSION 

 Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 

 1. Defendant’s June 12, 2013 motion to dismiss (ECF No. 20) be granted in part as set 

forth above; 

 2. Plaintiff’s complaint be dismissed; 

 3. Plaintiff be granted thirty days from the date of this order to file and serve an amended 

complaint. 

 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the 

objections shall be filed and served within fourteen days after service of the objections. The 

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to 

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: October 7, 2013 

/ew;rich1931.mtd 

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