Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-00455/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-00455-29/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHELLY LEMIRE, individually 

and as a personal 

representative for the 

ESTATE OF ROBERT ST. JOVITE; 

GERARD CHARLES ST. JOVITE; 

and NICOLE ST. JOVITE,

Plaintiffs,

v.

D.K. SISTO, JAMES NUEHRING, 

REBECCA CAHOON, and C. 

HOLLIDAY,

Defendants.

No. 2:08-cv-00455-GEB-EFB

ORDER RE: PLAINTIFFS’ MOTIONS IN 

LIMINE 

Plaintiffs move in limine (“MIL”) for a pretrial order 

precluding the admission of certain evidence at trial. Each 

motion is addressed below.

MIL No. 1

Plaintiffs seek to exclude any “testimony regarding the 

practice of understaffing . . . at night” in the building in 

which the Decedent was housed (“Building 8”), arguing “because 

[the Decedent] died in the afternoon, graveyard shift staffing 

practices are not relevant to the jury’s inquiry.” (Pls.’ MIL No. 

Case 2:08-cv-00455-GEB-EFB Document 232 Filed 07/30/15 Page 1 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

1 3:3-11, ECF No. 174.) Plaintiffs further argue: “[e]ven if 

relevant, . . . [such] evidence should be excluded” under Federal 

Rule of Evidence (“Rule”) 403 “because its limited probative 

value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 

prejudice to the plaintiff and confusion of issues.” (Id. at 

3:11-13.) 

Defendants rejoin:

Evidence of the [night shift] staffing 

levels is relevant because the amount of time 

the floor officers were absent from Building 

8 is a disputed fact the jury must 

decide. . . .

. . . . 

. . . The jury here need not accept 

Plaintiffs’ version of the facts, or find 

that the officers were absent from the 

housing unit for more than three hours.

. . . Based on [conflicting evidence], a 

jury can conclude that Building 8 was without 

floor officers any where from more than three 

and half hours to less than two hours.

. . . . 

If the jury finds that the floor 

officers were removed for about two hours, 

evidence of the [night shift] staffing levels 

is relevant to show that Defendants could 

reasonably conclude that it was safe to 

remove the floor officers because the 

conditions mirrored those to [night 

shift]. . . .

Nothing in Lemire[ v. Cal. Dep’t of 

Corr. & Rehab., 726 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 

2013)] stated that evidence of the [night 

shift] staffing level was irrelevant. Rather, 

the Court discussed the differences between 

the . . . shifts to show the existence of a 

disputed fact. A jury could find more 

similarities between the two shifts to 

conclude that Defendants did not create an 

unreasonable risk of harm to the inmates in 

Building 8 . . . . Thus, evidence of the 

[night shift] staffing levels is relevant and 

Case 2:08-cv-00455-GEB-EFB Document 232 Filed 07/30/15 Page 2 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

highly probative of the central issue of 

Plaintiffs’ [condition-of-confinement] claim 

against Nuehring and Sisto [for their alleged 

failure to provide sufficient supervision for 

inmates in Building 8.] 

(Defs.’ Opp’n to Pls.’ MIL No. 1 1:21-3:17, ECF No. 180.)

Plaintiffs have shown neither that evidence of the 

night shift’s staffing levels lacks probative value on their 

conditions-of-confinement claim, nor that Rule 403 considerations 

justify its exclusion. Therefore, this in limine motion is 

DENIED. 

MIL No. 2

Plaintiffs seek to exclude evidence or argument that 

Defendants Sisto and Neuhring “were unaware [of the 

Decedent’s] . . . mental health problems and therefore . . . 

could not . . . be liable for his death[,]” arguing such evidence 

is irrelevant and should be excluded under Rule 403. (Pls.’ MIL 

No. 2 1:24-2:4, 3:25-4:3, ECF No. 175.) Plaintiffs contend: 

[T]he Ninth Circuit determined [in Lemire] 

that the appropriate inquiry is whether 

Nuehring and Sisto . . . “were aware that 

removing all floor officers from Building 

8 . . . would pose a substantial risk of 

serious harm to someone in [the Decedent’s] 

situation, not simply whether they were 

subjectively aware of [the Decedent’s] 

specific medical needs.”

. . . Thus, it is the risk of harm to 

someone in [the Decedent’s] situation which 

the jury must examine. . . . 

. . . The Defendants’ . . . lack of 

knowledge of [the Decedent’s] mental health[, 

specifically,] adds nothing to the jury’s 

determination of liability so it should be 

excluded.

(Id. at 2:19-3:24 (emphasis in original) (quoting Lemire, 726 

F.3d at 1077-78) (citations omitted).)

Case 2:08-cv-00455-GEB-EFB Document 232 Filed 07/30/15 Page 3 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

Defendants “do not dispute that the Ninth Circuit’s 

decision . . . held that the proper inquiry on Plaintiffs’ Eighth 

Amendment claim against Defendants Sisto and Nuehring is whether 

Defendants were aware that removing all floor officers from 

Building 8 posed a substantial risk of serious harm to someone in 

[the Decedent’s] situation.” (Defs.’ Opp’n to Pls.’ MIL No. 2 

1:21-25, ECF No. 182.) Defendants rejoin, however, that “[t]his 

holding . . . does not preclude Defendants from presenting 

evidence or testifying that they were unaware of the medical or

mental-health condition of the inmates in Building 8, including 

[the Decedent].” (Id. at 1:25-27.) Defendants argue:

[It is] anticipate[d] that Plaintiffs will 

argue or seek to introduce evidence of the 

Coleman litigation to support their 

contention that the inmates in Building 8 

were mentally ill and required greater 

supervision than other general population 

inmates on the yard. Indeed, in Lemire, the 

Ninth Circuit, in dicta, pointed out that 

“the Coleman litigation was well known . . . 

to officials at CSP-Solano,” which in turn 

“alerted prison officials to the acute 

problem of inmate suicides in CDCR prisons, 

including CSP-Solano.” Lemire, 726 F.3d at 

1078. Defendants have a right to defend 

against these contentions and submit evidence 

about their knowledge of Coleman, the alleged 

suicide rates at the prison, and what 

distinguished inmates in Building 8 from 

other general-population inmates. This will 

necessarily require Defendants to testify 

about their knowledge of how and which 

inmates were classified as [Correctional 

Clinical Care Management System (“CCCMS”)], 

who made that determination, what information 

Defendants were provided about CCCMS, the 

housing and other needs of these inmates, and 

the level of supervision they required. Thus, 

evidence of Defendants’ knowledge of the 

medical and mental-health conditions of the 

inmates in Building 8, including [the 

Decedent], is highly relevant and admissible. 

(Id. at 2:1-14.) 

Case 2:08-cv-00455-GEB-EFB Document 232 Filed 07/30/15 Page 4 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

Plaintiffs reply:

While . . . knowledge of the fact that 

Building 8 was a unit housing CCCMS inmates 

is relevant to the danger posed to Building 

8’s inmates by the withdrawal of all 

supervisory floor staff . . . , knowledge or 

[the] lack thereof about [the Decedent’s 

mental health condition in] particular has no 

bearing on whether a jury infers that 

unsupervised mentally ill inmates housed 

together are more likely to harm themselves 

or others than are inmates in the regular 

prison population.

(Pls.’ Reply to MIL No. 2 4:5-15, ECF No. 203.)

Plaintiffs have shown neither that the referenced 

evidence lacks probative value on their conditions-of-confinement 

claim, nor that Rule 403 considerations justify its exclusion. 

Therefore, this in limine motion is DENIED. 

MIL No. 3

Plaintiffs move to exclude “any expert testimony” by 

Alfredo Noriega, M.D.; Dorothy Hicks, R.N.; Shabreen Hak, L.V.N.; 

and John M. Dusay, M.D. “that goes beyond the usual scope of 

treat[ing] medical provider[] testimony.” (Pls.’ MIL No. 3 3:7-

9, ECF No. 176.) Plaintiffs argue: “[w]hile each of these 

witnesses likely have relevant testimony, Plaintiffs move to 

preclude Defendants from putting on improper opinion testimony or 

expert testimony from any of these witnesses as they have not 

been properly disclosed pursuant to F.R.C.P. Rule 26.” (Id. at 

3:1-3.)

Defendants rejoin: 

Defendants timely and properly disclosed six 

non-retained experts, including the matters 

about which they would be testifying. All of 

the disclosed non-retained experts were, at 

one time, Defendants in this case, and all, 

Case 2:08-cv-00455-GEB-EFB Document 232 Filed 07/30/15 Page 5 of 6
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

but one, ha[ve] been deposed and provided 

testimony about their knowledge of the 

relevant events, the policies and procedures 

at issue, or their treatment of [the 

Decedent]. Although not deposed, Dr. Dusay 

provided detailed declarations of his 

treatment of [the Decedent] in connection 

with the parties’ summary-judgment motions. 

Despite having knowledge of the testimony 

Defendants’ non-retained experts are expected 

to provide, Plaintiffs failed to specify what 

testimony is objectionable, why it is 

improper, or how the disclosures failed to 

comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

Rule 26. The Court should therefore deny the 

motion.

(Defs.’ Opp’n to Pls.’ MIL No. 3 1:22-2:5, ECF No. 181.)

This motion lacks the preciseness and sufficient 

factual context required for a pretrial in limine ruling. See, 

e.g., Weiss v. La Suisse, Soc’y D’Assurances Sur La Vie, 293 F. 

Supp. 2d 397, 407-08 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (denying motion to exclude 

evidence for a “lack[] of specificity[,]” stating “[n]o 

particular documents or testimony have been identified in the 

motion”); Colton Crane Co., LLC v. Terex Cranes Wilmington, Inc., 

No. CV 08-8525 PSG (PJWx), 2010 WL 2035800, at *1 (C.D. Cal. May 

19, 2010) (stating “motions in limine should rarely seek to 

exclude broad categories of evidence, as the court is almost 

always better situated to rule on evidentiary issues in their 

factual context during trial”).

Dated: July 30, 2015

Case 2:08-cv-00455-GEB-EFB Document 232 Filed 07/30/15 Page 6 of 6