Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02415/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02415-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 470
Nature of Suit: Civil (Rico)
Cause of Action: 18:1964 Civil Remedies: Racketeering (RICO) Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CLAUDINE OSGOOD, an individual,

and ANTON EWING, an individual,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 16cv2415-GPC(BGS)

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’

MOTION TO REMAND TO STATE

COURT

[Dkt. No. 12.]

v.

MAIN STREAT MARKETING, LLC,

a Utah limited liability company;

JERROD ROBKER, an individual aka

Jerrod McAllister; Does 1-100, ABC

Corporations 1-100, XYZ, LLC’s 1-

100,

Defendants.

Before the Court is Plaintiff Anton Ewing’s motion to remand to state court. 

(Dkt. No. 12.) An opposition and a reply was filed. (Dkt. Nos. 14, 18.) On November

7, 2016, Plaintiff Claudine Osgood filed a reply. (Dkt. No. 25.) Based on the

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reasoning below, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion to remand. 

Background

On August 15, 2016, Plaintiffs Claudine Osgood and Anton Ewing, proceeding

pro se, filed a state court complaint in the San Diego Superior Court for violation of

the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq (“TCPA”); violation

Because Plaintiffs are proceeding pro se, the Court liberallyconstruesPlaintiffs’

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pleadings and considers the arguments raised in Osgood’s reply even though she did

not file a motion to remand. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). 

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ofthe Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) etseq.

(“RICO”); and violation ofCalifornia PenalCode sections 632 and 637.2(a)-(b) against

Defendants Jerrod McAllister and Main Streat Marketing, LLC. (Dkt. No. 1-2,

Compl.) On or about August 16, 2016, Plaintiffs served the Complaint and Summons

on Defendant Main Streat and Defendant McAllister via mail with return receipt

requested sent to 333 Nth Main Street, Cedar City, UT 84721. (Dkt. No. 1-2, Notice

of Removal, Ex. A at 39, 41 .) 2

On September 26, 2016, Defendants filed a notice of removal. (Dkt. No. 1.) On

October 4, 2016, Plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint. (Dkt. No. 11.) 

Discussion

A. Motion to Remand

Plaintiffs move to remand the case to state court arguing that the notice of

removal was not timely filed as it was filed more than 30 days after Defendants were

served on August 16, 2016 contrary to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). Defendants argue they

timely complied with 30 day time requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) because in

California service of process is deemed complete 10 days after mailing pursuant to

California Code of Civil Procedure section 415.40 (“section 415.40"). 

A motion to remand isthe procedure to challenge removal of an action to federal

court. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). There is a presumption against removal and the defendant

always has the burden to demonstrate that removal was proper. Moore-Thomas v.

Alaska Airlines, Inc., 553 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1446, a notice of removal of a civil action must be filed

within 30 days after “the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise . . . .” 

28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). California Code of Civil Procedure section 415.40 provides, 

A summons may be served on a person outside thisstate in any manner

provided by this article or by sending a copy of the summons and of

the complaint to the person to be served by first-class mail, postage

prepaid, requiring a return receipt. Service of a summons by this form

of mail is deemed complete on the 10th day after such mailing. 

Page numbers are based on the CM/ECF pagination. 

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Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 415.40. According to this provision, service is deemed

complete on the 10th day after such mailing. Id.

A defendant’s time to remove is triggered by formal service of the summons or

complaint and “not by mere receipt ofthe complaint unattended by any formalservice.” 

Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 347-48 (1999). The

thirty-day period is “triggered” by “simultaneous service of the summons and

complaint” or by “receipt of the complaint ‘through service or otherwise’ after and

apart fromservice of the summons, but not by mere receipt ofthe complaint unattended

by any formal service.” Id. While not addressing whether service may be effectuated

pursuant to state law, courts have noted the Supreme Court’s reliance on state law

service of process to trigger a defendants’ removal obligations in Murphy. City of

Clarksdale v Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc., 428 F.3d 206, 210 n.6 (5th Cir. 2005) (noting

that Supreme Court examined the various state procedure for initiating a lawsuit and

the effect of these differences on the removal statutes); Perez v. Bank of America,

N.A., No. EP-13cv285-KC, 2013 WL 5970405, at *3 (W.D. Texas, Nov. 7, 2013)

(citing Murphy as it described official service with reference to “local law”); In re

Pharm. Indus. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 307 F. Supp. 2d 190, 195 (D. Mass.

2004) (“After Murphy Brothers, proper service of process under state law is required

to trigger a defendant’s removal obligations.”). “Although federal law requires the

defendant to file a removal motion within thirty days of service, the term ‘service of

process’ is defined by state law.” City of Clarksdale, 428 F.3d at 210; Usatorres v.

Marina Mercante Nicaraguenses, 768 F.2d 1285, 1286 n. 1 (11th Cir.1985) (“A federal

court may consider the sufficiency of process after removal and does so by looking to

the state law governing process.”). 

Even prior to Murphy, the Ninth Circuit has held that “the sufficiency of service

of process prior to removal is strictly a state law issue.” Lee v. City of Beaumont, 12

F.3d 933, 936-37 (9th Cir. 1993), overruled on other grounds, California Dept. of

Water Resources v. Powerex Corp., 533 F.3d 1087, 1096 (9th Cir. 2008)). In line with

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thisstatement, district courts have held that “[s]tate law determines when the defendant

first receives formal service of process.” Taylor Morrison of Cal., LLC v. First

Specialty Ins. Corp., Case No. SACV 15-1711 JVS(JCGx), 2015 WL 8215345, at *3

(C.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2015) (applying 10 days period in section 415.40 in calculating start

date of 30 day period for removal); Trust v. Staab, No. EDCV 15-1357 JVS(SPx), 2015

WL 8493925, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2015) (applying Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 415.56

to conclude that service becomes effective 10 days after posting and mailing under);

Watts v. Enhanced Recovery Corp., No. 10cv2606-LHK, 2010 WL 3448508, at *3

(Sept. 1, 2010) (“The sufficiency ofservice of process prior to removal fromstate court

is determined under state law.”); see Big B Automotive Warehouse Distribs., Inc. v.

Cooperative Computing, Inc., No SC 00-2602, 2000WL 1677948, at *4 (N.D. Cal.

Nov. 1, 2000) (applying ten day grace period under section 415.40 to determine

whether notice of removal was timely). Moreover, in Jimena v. Standish, 504 Fed.

App’x 632 (9th Cir. 2013), the Ninth Circuit held that the district court properly denied

Jimena’s motion to remand because defendants’ notice ofremoval wastimely and cited

to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) and Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 415.40. Id. at 634. 

Plaintiffs argue they served the summons and complaint pursuant to section

415.40 by mailing themregistered mail with return receipt. According to Plaintiffs, the

30 day period begins to run on the date of mailing, which was August 16, 2016. 

Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants received the summons and complaint on August

22, 2016, and Plaintiff Ewing emailed the summons and complaint to Defendant 3

McAllister on August 16, 2016. Therefore, Ewing argues that Defendants had notice

of the lawsuit as early as August 16, 2016 and aslate as August 22, 2016 and the notice

of removal is untimely based on either of these dates. In reply, Plaintiffs argue that the

10 day service rule in section 415.40 does not apply to 28 U.S.C. § 1446's 30 day

requirement. However, Plaintiffs’ argument is not supported by case law. As

Plaintiffs have not provided authority that email is a proper method of service

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in California. 

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discussed above, state law determines when service of process is effectuated prior to

removal. 

On August 16, 2016, Plaintiffs mailed copies of the summons and complaint to

each Defendant by “first-class mail, postage prepaid, requiring a return receipt.” (Dkt.

No. 1-2, Notice of Removal at 39, 41.) Pursuant to section 415.40, service was

completed ten days later on August 26, 2016. Therefore, Defendant had thirty days

from August 26, 2016 to file the notice of removal. Thirty days from August 26, 2016

was September 25, 2016, which was a Sunday. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1)(C), in

computing any time period if the “last day is a . . . Sunday . . the period continues to

run until the end of the next day that is not a . . . Sunday . . . .” Therefore, since

September 25, 2016 was a Sunday, the thirty day period to file a notice of removal was

Monday, September 26, 2016. Defendant filed its notice of removal on September 26,

2016. (Dkt. No. 1.) The notice of removal was timely under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), and

thus, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion to remand to state court. 

Conclusion

Based on the above, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion to remand to state

court. The hearing set for November 18, 2016 shall be vacated. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 15, 2016

HON. GONZALO P. CURIEL

United States District Judge

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