Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01704/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01704-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Kenneth W Lemberg, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Michael J Astrue, et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV-12-01704-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees under the Equal 

Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). Doc. 26. The motion is fully 

briefed and no party has requested oral argument. The Court will grant the motion and 

award Plaintiff attorneys’ fees in the amount of $7,024.45. 

I. Relevant Facts and Legal Standard.

 On August 20, 2013, the Court issued an order reversing Defendant’s denial of 

benefits. Doc. 22. The Court remanded the case to Defendant for further proceedings 

because the Administrative Law Judge erred in giving reduced weight to Dr. Porter’s 

treatment notes and by not providing legally sufficient reasons for discounting the 

testimony of Mrs. Lemberg concerning the intensity of Plaintiff’s limitations. Id. 

 Under the EAJA, the Court shall award attorneys’ fees to a prevailing party unless 

the United States shows that its position was “substantially justified or that special 

circumstances make an award unjust.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A); Gutierrez v. Barnhart, 

274 F.3d 1255, 1258 (9th Cir. 2001). “An applicant for disability benefits becomes a 

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prevailing party for purposes of the EAJA if the denial of her benefits is reversed and 

remanded[.]” Gutierrez, 274 F.3d at 1257. The EAJA “creates a presumption that fees 

will be awarded to prevailing parties.” Flores v. Shalala, 49 F.3d 562, 567 (9th Cir. 

1995). The “burden is on the Secretary” to overcome that presumption by showing that 

its “position was substantially justified.” Yang v. Shalala, 22 F.3d 213, 217 (9th Cir. 

1994). 

 “Substantially justified” means “justified in substance or in the main,” or in other 

words, “justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person.” Pierce v. 

Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988). A substantially justified position must have a 

reasonable basis both in law and fact. Id. The fact that the government did not prevail in 

court “does not raise a presumption that its position was not substantially justified.” Kali 

v. Bowen, 854 F.2d 329, 334 (9th Cir. 1988). Instead, the defendant’s position is 

substantially justified if a “reasonable person could think it correct, that is, if it has a 

reasonable basis in law and fact” or there if there is a “genuine dispute.” Underwood, 

487 U.S. at 565, 566 n.2. 

II. Analysis. 

 Defendant does not contend that an award of fees in this case would be unjust. 

Defendant does contend that its position was substantially justified. Doc. 27 at 1. 

 The Court noted in its order that Dr. Porter’s medical opinion was based on 

physical exams and MRIs that led him to opine that the objective medical evidence was 

consistent with Plaintiff’s complaints. Doc. 22 at 12. The Court also noted that the ALJ 

failed entirely to address or discount Dr. Porter’s January 2005 medical opinion that 

objective medical evidence confirmed Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. Id. The Court 

concluded that when a doctor’s opinion is supported by his own observations, an ALJ 

does not provide clear and convincing reasons for rejecting the doctor’s opinion by 

questioning the credibility of the patient’s complaints. Id. Because there is no genuine 

dispute as to whether the ALJ erred in discounting Dr. Porter’s opinion, the Court finds 

that Defendant’s position lacked substantial justification. 

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 The Court also found that the ALJ failed to provide germane reasons for 

discounting the testimony of Mrs. Lemberg. Id. at 18; Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 

919 (9th Cir. 1993) (“If the ALJ wishes to discount the testimony of [a] lay witness[], he 

must give reasons that are germane to each witness.”). The ALJ erroneously discounted 

Mrs. Lemberg’s testimony because of concern that she would likely be biased by her 

close relationship to Plaintiff. Tr. 596. Defendant argues that the ALJ’s decision to 

discount Mrs. Lemberg’s testimony was reasonable because her statements were not 

consistent with the objective medical evidence. Doc. 27 at 5; see Bayliss v. Barnhart, 

427 F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding that inconsistency with the medical record 

is a germane reason for discrediting lay witness testimony). The Court found, however, 

that the ALJ’s decision to discount Mrs. Lemberg’s testimony was legal error for two 

reasons. First, a lack of full corroboration with the objective medical evidence is not a 

sufficient reason to discount her observations of Plaintiff’s physical limitations. Second, 

the ALJ did not identify any specific objective evidence that was inconsistent with her 

stated limitations. The Court concludes that Defendant did not have a reasonable basis in 

law or fact to defend the ALJ’s decision and therefor lacked substantial justification for 

its position. Plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees. 

 Plaintiff’s counsel has filed an affidavit and an itemized statement of fees showing 

that he worked 37.7 hours on this case, with legal fees totaling $7,024.45. Doc. 26 

Exs. A-C.1

 Defendant does not contend that the time Mr. Slepian spent researching and 

drafting in this matter was excessive or should be reduced. Having reviewed the affidavit 

and the statement of fees, and having considered the relevant fee award factors, see 

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429-30 & n.3 (1983), the Court finds that the amount 

of the requested fee award is reasonable. 

IT IS ORDERED:

 1. Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees (Doc. 26) is granted. 

 

1

 In his reply, Plaintiff asserts that he is entitled to an additional $522.34 for the 

2.8 hours expended in drafting his reply. Doc. 28 at 10. No additional affidavit or 

documentation was submitted. Accordingly, the Court will not consider this request. 

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 2. Plaintiff is awarded $7,024.45 in attorneys’ fees. 

 Dated this 10th day of December, 2013. 

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