Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-01017/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-01017-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Charles E. Franklin, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of

Social Security, 

Defendant. 

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No. CIV-04-1017-PHX-MHM

ORDER

Plaintiff Charles E. Franklin seeks judicial review of the Administrative Law Judge's

("ALJ") decision denying his claims for benefits under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3).

I.

Procedural History

Plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the

Social Security Act on April 26, 2002 and for supplemental security income under Title XVI

of the Act. The applications were denied initially and on reconsideration. A hearing was

held before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") on June 26, 2003. On July 24, 2003, the

ALJ issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled. The decision became the final

decision of the Commissioner on April 15, 2004 when the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's

request for review.

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Having exhausted administrative review, Plaintiff timely filed his complaint for

judicial review in this Court on May 19, 2004. (Doc. 1). Defendant filed an answer on July

23, 2004. (Doc. 7). Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on September 22, 2004.

(Doc. 10, 12, 14), and Defendant filed a cross- motion for summary judgment on October 26,

2004. (Doc. 15, 16, 17). This Court heard argument on the parties' cross motions for

summary judgment on September 7, 2005. 

II.

Standard of Review

This Court must affirm the ALJ’s findings if they are supported by substantial

evidence and free from reversible legal error. Marcia v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 172, 174 (9th Cir.

1990). Substantial evidence means “more than a mere scintilla” and “such relevant evidence

as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v.

Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Clem v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 328, 330 (9th Cir. 1990).

In determining whether substantial evidence supports a decision, the Court considers

the record as a whole. Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401; Tylitzki v. Shalala, 999 F.2d 1411, 1413

(9th Cir. 1993). If there is sufficient evidence to support the ALJ’s determination, the Court

cannot substitute its own determination. Young v. Sullivan, 911 F.2d 180, 184 (9th Cir.

1990). Where evidence is inconclusive, “questions of credibility and resolution of conflicts

in the testimony are functions solely of the [Commissioner].” Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d

639, 642 (9th Cir. 1982). Therefore, if on the whole record before the Court, substantial

evidence supports the Commissioner’s decisions, this Court must affirm. Hammock v.

Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

An ALJ determines an applicant’s eligibility for disability benefits through the

following five stages:

(1) determine whether the applicant is engaged in “substantial gainful

activity";

(2) determine whether the applicant has a “medically severe impairment or

combination of impairments";

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(3) determine whether the applicant’s impairment equals one of a number

of listed impairments that the Commissioner acknowledges as so severe

as to preclude the applicant from engaging in substantial gainful

activity;

(4) if the applicant’s impairment does not equal one of the “listed

impairments,” determine whether the applicant is capable of performing

his or her past relevant work;

(5) if the applicant is not capable of performing his or her past relevant

work, determine whether the applicant “is able to perform other work

in the national economy in view of his [or her] age, education, and

work experience.”

Bowen v. Yucket, 482 U.S. 137, 140-41 (1987) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b)-(f)). See

20 C.F.R. § 416.920. At the fifth stage, the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner.

Penny v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 1993). 

III.

Background Facts

Plaintiff was 55 years of age at the time of the ALJ's decision. Plaintiff claimed to be

unable to work as of May 18, 1999 as a result of back and neck problems, high blood

pressure and degenerative joint disease and status post three knee operations. Plaintiff

claimed a disability onset date of September 29, 1999. Plaintiff holds a college degree in

Business Administration and has worked as an elementary and high school teacher, a

personnel coordinator, an assistant manager at WalMart, and as a computer lab attendant. 

(A) Plaintiff's medical history.

On January 10, 1996, Plaintiff was diagnosed with having severe degenerative

arthritis of the right knee. A January 29, 1998 x-ray revealed this condition as moderately

advanced. On October 12, 1999, Plaintiff sought medical care for left knee pain caused by

an on-the-job injury a few days before. Plaintiff, a teacher, had sustained injury while

restraining a student. Plaintiff was seen by D. Slaughter, M.D., at the Veterans

Administration ("VA") Medical Center for right knee pain and a recently-experienced

twisting injury to his left knee. Dr. Slaughter observed possible effusion of the right knee

and proposed a cortisone injection. An x-ray of the right knee revealed moderate

degenerative arthritic disease. An x-ray of the left knee showed minimal hypertrophic

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changes at the lateral aspect of the intercondylar notch, a newly discovered lesion and no

fractures. On October 18, 1999, Plaintiff complained at the VA of ongoing pain in both

knees. 

On October 21, 1999, Plaintiff presented to R. Richard Maxwell, M.D., an

orthopaedic surgeon, with complaints of right knee pain and joint disease. Plaintiff, who was

using a cane, reported that his right knee had been injured when he was in the military. Dr.

Maxwell recommended glucosamine injections into the right knee and attention to the left

knee. A November 10, 1999 MRI of Plaintiff's left knee showed a torn meniscus (fibrous

cartilage within the knee joint) and a focal arthritic change involving the lateral femoral facet

of the patellofemoral joint. Dr. Maxwell recommended arthroscopic surgery of Plaintiff's left

knee. On November 24, 1999, Dr. Slaughter at the VA Medical Center recommended that

Plaintiff be placed on light duty until his knee problems were resolved. 

On December 29, 1999, Dr. Maxwell performed surgery on Plaintiff's left knee to

repair a torn medial meniscus. Dr. Maxwell prescribed post-surgery physical therapy. On

January 12, 2000, Dr. Maxwell examined Plaintiff's right knee and observed decreased range

of motion with flexion at 0-60 degrees and progressive changes and recommended total right

knee arthroplasty. On March 28, 2000, Plaintiff was fitted with a hinged neoprene knee

sleeve. On May 22, 2000, Dr. Maxwell indicated that Plaintiff may have permanent

restrictions with his left knee.

On May 15, 2000, at the request of his employer's insurer, Plaintiff was examined by

Irwin Shapiro, M.D. Plaintiff, who was using a cane, complained of left knee pain and that

his knee locked and buckled. Plaintiff's medications included ibuprofen, Vioxx

(intermittently) and glucosamine. Dr. Shapiro observed no effusion, heat or erythema in

Plaintiff's left knee and the range of motion was 0-120 degrees. Other tests were negative.

Dr. Shapiro recommended that Plaintiff continue physical therapy twice a week for four more

weeks. Dr. Shapiro opined that Plaintiff was capable of a sedentary type job with the

avoidance of prolonged time on his feet or squatting, kneeling or climbing.

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"Valgus" refers to a deformity in which an anatomical part is turned outward away

from the body's midline to an abnormal degree.

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On November 9, 2000, Dr. Shapiro found that Plaintiff's left knee was stationary and

that he had a 20% permanent impairment of his left lower extremity due to the earlier

industrial accident. Plaintiff had obvious valgus deformities of both knees,1

 slightly greater

on the right compared to the left. Both knees showed 1+ effusions without heat or erythema.

Both knees had a range of motion of 5-120 degrees. Dr. Shapiro recommended supportive

medical care, including nonsteroidal anti-inflammatories, occasional intra-articular steroid

injections, and a series of Hyalgan injections. Plaintiff at the time was using a cane in both

the right and left hands. Dr. Shapiro reported that Plaintiff could return to gainful

employment but could not perform a job that required squatting, kneeling, climbing, walking

up stairs or prolonged walking. Dr. Shapiro further reported that within these limitations

Plaintiff could work eight hours a day, 40 hours a week. 

On November 21, 2000, Dr. Maxwell reported that Plaintiff had a 25 to 30 percent

permanent injury of the left lower extremity due to the previous work-related injury. Dr.

Maxwell noted restrictions on walking, lifting, stooping, kneeling and climbing. 

In March and November 2001, Dr. Maxwell administered injections (Lidocaine,

Marcaine and Aristospan) in Plaintiff's left knee. In March 2001, Dr. Maxwell observed a

trace of effusion in Plaintiff's left knee but by November 2001 there was no left-knee

effusion and the knee straightened out well.

On January 30, 2002, X-rays taken at the VA Medical Center showed marginal spur

formation, subchondral cystic changes and moderate narrowing of the joint compartments

as to Plaintiff's right knee. The radiologist's impression was moderate degenerative arthritis

of the right knee. Steroid injections were recommended. 

On March 25, 2002, Plaintiff was examined at the VA clinic for a rating on a serviceconnected injury to the right knee. Plaintiff's right knee had been rated a 20% service

connected disability in April 2000. Plaintiff's major complaints during the examination were

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worsening stiffness, constant swelling and difficulty walking. Plaintiff at the time was using

a cane. The examining physician observed that Plaintiff's right knee demonstrated a 10 to

60 degree range of motion, his patella was slightly laterally subluxed (dislocated) and

nontender on handling, and there was subpatellar crepitation (crackling). Other tests were

negative. Plaintiff had some moderate limitation of the right knee but no more functional

loss was expected. The examining physician opined that any type of excessive walking,

squatting or climbing stairs would cause severe pain. 

On May 14, 2002, Plaintiff requested a disability rating increase (VA) for his right

knee. Plaintiff at the time was receiving social services from the VA that included bus tickets,

housing referrals and money for a new inner tube for his bicycle. Plaintiff received steroid

injections into his right knee on July 8, 2002 and October 3, 2002. 

On July 10, 2002, Plaintiff was examined by Malcolm McPhee, M.D., a specialist in

physical medical and rehabilitation. X-rays of Plaintiff's right knee showed mild

compartment spurring. An x-ray showed degenerative disc changes at multiple levels in the

mid- and lower cervical spine. Plaintiff reported that he had been using a cane since his left

knee surgery. He also reported a worsening of his condition following an accident two

months earlier when he was hit by a van while riding his bicycle. Dr. McPhee observed that

Plaintiff could walk without his cane in the examining room but could not tandem walk.

Plaintiff could bend forward to where his fingertips reached his mid-tibia but he refused to

bend further because of his knees. Plaintiff squatted to about 20% normal range. Plaintiff

could side-bend 20 degrees bilaterally and could remove his shoes and socks and transfer

onto the examining table. Dr. McPhee observed that Plaintiff's deep tendon reflexes were

1+ bilaterally and sensation was intact to touch and pinprick in all four limbs. Dr. McPhee

was not convinced of any focal motor weakness in Plaintiff's ankle and knee groups.

Plaintiff had a range of motion of 0 to 45 degrees in his right knee and 0 to 85 degrees in his

left knee. Plaintiff restricted further motion due to pain. Plaintiff had normal range of

motion of his shoulders, elbows, hands, wrists, hips and neck. Plaintiff was resistant to some

of the examination which Dr. McPhee attributed to Plaintiff's fear of pain.

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Dr. McPhee expressed the opinion that Plaintiff could lift and/or carry 20 pounds

occasionally and 10 pounds frequently. He could stand or walk at least two hours in an

eight-hour workday; sit for six hours in an eight-hour workday with usual rest breaks; and,

occasionally stoop, balance or crouch. Plaintiff was not limited in his upper extremities. Dr.

McPhee opined that Plaintiff should avoid climbing, kneeling and crawling. 

Two state agency physicians reviewed Plaintiff's medical records. Based on his July

24, 2002 review, Murray Schreiber, D.O., a state agency consultative physician, opined that

Plaintiff could occasionally lift 20 pounds and frequently lift 10 pounds, could stand and/or

walk at least two hours in an eight-hour workday, and sit about six hours in an eight-hour

workday. Plaintiff could occasionally climb ramps or stairs, balance, stoop and crouch but

should never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds, kneel or crawl. Dr. Schreiber found Plaintiff's

complaints partially credible and that Plaintiff was not using narcotics for pain. Plaintiff

could ambulate without a cane (even though Plaintiff used a cane).

Leo Kane, M.D., another state agency physician, reviewed Plaintiff's medical records

on September 19, 2002. Dr. Kane agreed with Dr. Schreiber's assessment of Plaintiff's

residual functional capacity. Dr. Kane noted that Plaintiff's gate was antalgic (a gait assumed

to avoid or lessen pain) but no cane had been prescribed. Dr. Kane commented that Plaintiff

rode a bicycle and concluded that the severity of Plaintiff's complaints was not supported by

physical findings.

(B) The hearing testimony.

Plaintiff testified that he had been unable to work since he was injured restraining a

student. Plaintiff testified that he lives in an apartment and has a driver's license. Plaintiff

cooks for himself, does the dishes and housework, and sometimes reads. Plaintiff plays chess,

rides a bicycle and has been doing reading and research toward an advanced degree. Plaintiff

does not go for walks but grocery shops alone. Plaintiff does not climb stairs, but he can stay

on his feet for 10 to 15 minutes and can sit for 30 to 40 minutes before having to change

position. Plaintiff can carry a gallon of milk, although he sometimes drops it. Plaintiff

testified that he cannot kneel or squat. Plaintiff complained of no cartilage on his knees and

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of bone grinding against bone. Plaintiff testified that he constantly takes 800 mg ibuprofen

or otherwise could not get around. Plaintiff also takes Vioxx and has received cortisone shots

for his knees. Plaintiff said he uses a cane all the time and a knee brace once or twice a

week. Plaintiff testified that he was fired from his job of three to four months as a personnel

coordinator when he began to miss work so he could go to the VA for knee therapy. 

The vocational expert ("VE") testified that he had reviewed the file and the relevant

definitions and could render an opinion in this case. The ALJ asked the VE the following

questions:

(1) Assuming claimant's testimony, can the claimant perform any of his past work?

The VE answered no, based in part on Plaintiff's testimony of missing work on a regular

basis. 

(2) Assuming a person can lift or carry 20 pounds occasionally, 10 pounds

frequently, stand or walk at least two hours during an eight-hour workday, sit for six hours

in an eight-hour workday with usual rest breaks, but had to avoid climbing, kneeling,

crawling, and can occasionally stoop, balance or crouch, essentially unlimited in upper

extremity activities, with no environmental restrictions, can the claimant perform his past

relevant work? The VE answered that Plaintiff could perform the position of personnel

coordinator, which is sedentary, semi-skilled work. Plaintiff could not perform work as a

teacher which is light-skilled work. 

(3) Has the claimant acquired skills in his past work as high school or elementary

teacher or graduate assistant that would transfer into other work at the sedentary level? The

VE answered that based on Plaintiff's teaching and coordination work (organization,

interaction and ability to analyze skills), his skills were transferrable to sedentary jobs such

as customer service representative (270,000 jobs available nationally - 10,000 in the county);

financial aid counselor (120,000 jobs available nationally - 1,300 in the county); clerk

(98,000 jobs available nationally - 700 in the county); and claims adjuster (20,000 jobs

available nationally - 3,000 jobs in the county), all of which are sedentary, semiskilled jobs.

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However, based on Plaintiff's testimony, the VE opined that Plaintiff would not be able to

perform these positions due to missed work.

(C) The ALJ's conclusions.

The ALJ reviewed Plaintiff's work and medical history and Plaintiff's testimony

relevant to his daily activities. The ALJ considered Plaintiff's testimony concerning his

subjective complaints and inability to work and found it less than fully credible, noting that

Plaintiff does not require narcotic pain medication and is capable of greater levels of physical

activity than claimed. Plaintiff's daily activities also demonstrated that he is capable of

greater levels of activity than alleged. The ALJ did not give great weight to the state agency

reviewing physicians (Drs. Schreiber and Kane) because they did not examine Plaintiff and

their opinions were not entirely consistent with the greater objective medical evidence of

record. The opinions of Drs. McPhee, Shapiro and Maxwell were given greater weight based

on the objective nature of their examinations, their consistency with the greater objective

record and their treating relationship with Plaintiff. The ALJ did not give less weight to the

VA medical records because of their overall consistency with the objective evidence of

record. 

At the first step of the analysis, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not performed

substantial gainful activity since the onset date of disability. The ALJ determined at the

second step that Plaintiff's left knee injury status post surgery, status post right knee surgeries

times two, and his degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine were severe impairments

under the regulations. At the third step, the ALJ found that Plaintiff's medically determinable

impairments did not meet or medically equal one of the listed impairments for presumptive

disability, with special consideration given to Listing 1.03. The ALJ determined at the fourth

step that Plaintiff was unable to perform any of his past relevant work. The ALJ noted that

Plaintiff was an "individual of advanced age" with a college education and had transferrable

skills from skilled work previously performed. At the fifth step, based on the MedicalVocational Guidelines in conjunction with the VE's testimony, the ALJ found that there were

a significant number of jobs in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform. The ALJ

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concluded that Plaintiff was not under a "disability" at any time through the date of the

decision. 

IV.

Discussion

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in his conclusions at the third and fifth steps of

the sequential evaluation process and in rejecting Plaintiff's pain and fatigue testimony.

Plaintiff contends in his motion for summary judgment that this case should be remanded for

a finding of disability and benefits. At the hearing, Plaintiff's counsel argued in the

alternative that this case should be remanded for further proceedings and additional findings

on the relevant issues.

 (A) Plaintiff's claim of error at the third step of the sequential

evaluation.

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in making a conclusory finding that he did not

meet or equal a listed impairment. Plaintiff claims that his impairments meet or equal

Listings 1.02 or 1.03. Alternatively, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ should have considered

"medical equivalence" listings and that as to this determination, the signs and symptoms of

all impairments must be considered in combination with each other and in light of all

appropriate listed impairments. Plaintiff argues that in addition to Listings 1.02 and 1.03, the

ALJ should have considered Listing 1.08.

The record shows that the ALJ found that Plaintiff's impairments did not meet or equal

a Listed Impairment, giving special consideration to Listing 1.03. At the close of the

administrative hearing, Plaintiff through counsel argued that the evidence supported a finding

that Plaintiff's impairment met Listing 1.03. Plaintiff did not argue or refer to Listings 1.02

or 1.08. Plaintiff, however, is not precluded from raising his arguments relative to Listings

1.02 and 1.08 and equivalency in this Court even though the arguments were not raised

before the ALJ. "Social Security proceedings are inquisitorial rather than adversarial. It is

the ALJ's duty to investigate the facts and develop arguments both for and against granting

benefits." Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 111, 120 S.Ct. 2080, 2085 (2000). A Social Security

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claimant's failure to present an issue to the Appeals Council does not waive judicial review

of that issue. Kokal v. Massanari, 163 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1129 n.4 (N.D. Cal. 2001). 

A Listed Impairment ("Listing") is one that is considered severe enough to prevent a

claimant from performing substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1525, 416.925. If

a claimant's impairment meets or equals a Listing, the claimant will be found to be disabled

at step three of the sequential evaluation procedure. Marcia v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 172, 174

(9th Cir. 1990); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. The claimant bears the burden of proving

that his impairment or combination of impairments satisfies all criteria of a particular listing.

Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 530 (1990); Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1099 (9th Cir.

1999). An impairment that manifests only a portion of the requirements of a Listing, no

matter how severely, does not qualify as a Listed Impairment. Id.

According to Defendant, in order to meet either Listing 1.03 (reconstructive surgery

or surgical arthrodesis of a major weight-bearing joint) or Listing 1.02 (major dysfunction

of joints due to any cause), Plaintiff had to show, inter alia, that he could not "ambulate

effectively" because of his impairments, citing 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.

"Ineffective ambulation" means that an individual has insufficient lower extremity function

to permit independent ambulation without the use of a hand-held assistive device that limited

the functioning of both upper extremities. 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, 1.00

(A)(2)(b)(1). Plaintiff has referred the Court to 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1,

1.00(B)(2)(b), which states that to effectively ambulate, a person must be unable to walk a

block at a reasonable pace on rough or uneven surfaces or carry on routine ambulatory

activities, such as shopping and banking, and to climb a few steps at a reasonable pace with

the use of a single hand rail. 

Defendant argues that Plaintiff did not present medical evidence showing that he is

unable to ambulate effectively. In support of this argument, Defendant refers to Dr. McPhee's

observation in 2002 that Plaintiff could walk in the examining room. According to Plaintiff's

testimony, he rides a bicycle, grocery shops and does light housekeeping. He also drives a

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car. Defendant also argues that Plaintiff's use of a cane was not prescribed by any of his

treating physicians. 

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ did not identify these facts in support of the

determination at step three. In addition, the ALJ failed to consider Listing 1.02 or Listing

1.08. As to the latter, Defendant contends that Listing 1.08 deals with soft tissue injury, such

as a burn, that was under continuing surgical management as required by that specific

Listing. 20 C.F.R Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Plaintiff responds that Listing 1.08 is

not confined to burn injuries. Plaintiff also complains that the ALJ did not consider the issue

of medical equivalency. 

The Court has reviewed the findings of the ALJ and notes that no specific factual

findings were set forth in support of the specific conclusion that Plaintiff's medically

determinable impairments do not meet or equal any of the listed impairments in the

regulations. The ALJ's conclusions are stated as follows:

3. The claimant's left knee injury status post surgery, status post

right knee surgeries x 2, and degenerative disc disease of the

cervical spine are severe impairments, based upon the

requirements in the Regulations (20 CFR §§ 404.1521 and

416.921).

4. These medically determinable impairments do not meet or

medically equal any of the listed impairments in Appendix 1,

Subpart P, Regulation No. 4, with special consideration given

section 1.03 of the Listings.

(Doc. 7A at 23-24). Similar language is set forth in the body of the ALJ's opinion. (Doc. 7A

at 19). It further does not appear that the ALJ considered Listings 1.02 or 1.08 in the

determination at step three. Without specific findings stated in the record as to these

Listings, the Court cannot determine whether the ALJ's decision at step three is supported

by substantial evidence. See Marcia v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 172, 176 (9th Cir. 1990)(ALJ must

adequately explain why claimant's impairments did not meet or equal Listed impairments).

The Court notes in this regard that the ALJ's findings included the following: "[Plaintiff] can

sit for eight hours a day, stand and walk for two hours a day with the use of a cane, and lift

and carry ten pounds. ... He must avoid repetitive walking, lifting, stooping, kneeling,

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climbing, walking up stairs, and prolonged walking, ..." (emphasis added). As discussed

above, however, Defendant has pointed out that Plaintiff's use of a cane was not prescribed

by the treating physicians. The dispute in this case concerns to some degree Plaintiff's ability

to ambulate effectively. The ALJ did not set forth any specific findings on this issue in the

context of the identified Listings. 

"'If additional proceedings can remedy defects in the original administrative

proceeding, a social security case should be remanded." Marcia, 900 F.2d at 176 (quoting

Lewin v. Schweiker, 654 F.2d 631, 635 (9th Cir. 1981)). Remand is particularly appropriate

where additional findings or explanation will elucidate the rationale for the ALJ's decision.

See Pratts v. Chater, 94 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 1996). The Court therefore remands this case

to the ALJ for further consideration as to the reasons why Plaintiff's impairments do not meet

or equal Listing 1.03 and for more specific findings on the issue. In addition, the ALJ

should consider whether Plaintiff''s impairments meet or equal Listings 1.02 or 1.08. The

ALJ also should consider whether a combination of Plaintiff's medical impairments establish

medical equivalence. 

(B) Plaintiff's other claims of error.

The Court has considered Plaintiff's other claims of error and notes the following as

relevant to the remand decision. Plaintiff contends that the ALJ's determination at step four

that Plaintiff cannot perform his past relevant work should not be disturbed on appeal.

Plaintiff then contends that the ALJ erred at step five in the determination that there are other

jobs existing in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform. As part of this contention,

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in the assessment of Plaintiff's residual functional

capacity, in the assessment of Plaintiff's credibility and in the hypothetical questions posed

to the VE.

Defendant in its summary judgment memorandum notes that the ALJ found at step

four that Plaintiff could not perform his past relevant work while the VE testified that an

individual with Plaintiff's residual functional capacity could still perform his past work as a

personnel coordinator, which is sedentary work. Defendant goes on to argue that "even if

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there were errors at step five of the sequential evaluation procedure, a point not conceded by

the Commissioner, such errors were harmless because there is other reliable evidence which

shows that Plaintiff was not disabled at step four." (Doc. 17 at 4). In his response, Plaintiff

contends that Defendant is "now [arguing] that the ALJ's step four finding is incorrect, and

that the ALJ should have found that [Plaintiff] can perform his past work." (Doc. 26 at 4).

The record indicates that the VE expressed the opinion based on Plaintiff's testimony

that Plaintiff could not perform his past work or the identified sedentary positions available

in the national economy, noting Plaintiff's testimony that he missed work on a regular basis.

The VE also opined, in response to the second hypothetical question posed by the ALJ

incorporating certain identified limitations (lifting or carrying 20 pounds occasionally, 10

pounds frequently, stand or walk at least two hours during an eight-hour workday, sit for six

hours in an eight-hour workday with usual rest breaks, and avoiding climbing, kneeling,

crawling, but occasionally stooping, balancing or crouching, essentially unlimited in upper

extremity activities, etc.), that Plaintiff could perform his past position of personnel

coordinator, which is sedentary, semi-skilled work. 

The ALJ specifically determined that Plaintiff's testimony was less than credible. As

part of his findings, the ALJ stated that "[t]he undersigned considered the claimant's

testimony concerning his subjective complaints and inability to work and found it less than

fully credible." (Doc. 7A at 21). The ALJ further determined, however, that Plaintiff was

unable to perform his past relevant work. (Doc. 7A at 24). As discussed above, the VE's

opinion that Plaintiff could not perform his past work was based on Plaintiff's testimony.

The ALJ further determined that "[Plaintiff's] ability to perform all or substantially all of the

requirements for sedentary work is impeded by additional exertional and/or non-exertional

limitations." (Doc. 7A at 23). The ALJ nonetheless concluded that Plaintiff had the residual

functional capacity for sedentary work activity and that there were a significant number of

such jobs in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform. 

These findings do not seem entirely consistent, especially in the context of

Defendant's claim of "harmless error" at step five and possibly even step four. It is not clear

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to the Court if error, harmless or otherwise, occurred at step four and/or step five of the

sequential evaluation process. For example, it is not clear on what basis the ALJ determined

that Plaintiff was unable to perform his past work in light of the ALJ's other finding that

Plaintiff's subjective complaints and allegations of inability to work were "not totally

credible." (Doc. 7A at 24). It also is not clear on what basis the ALJ determined that Plaintiff

could perform a range of sedentary work given Plaintiff's limitations, in light of the VE's

opinion based on Plaintiff's testimony that Plaintiff could not perform the identified sedentary

jobs available in the national economy and in contrast to the medical evidence of record. 

If, on remand, this case proceeds to review at steps four and five of the sequential

evaluation, the ALJ should set forth specific findings on the issues raised and considered

relevant to the determination on each of these steps. The ALJ should further clarify any

findings relevant to the assessment of Plaintiff's credibility and as relevant to the ALJ's

reliance on the medical information and/or hearing testimony, including the VE's opinion

testimony, so the Court can ascertain the basis for each finding and conclusion reached.

 Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 10) is granted

in part and denied in part.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is

granted to the extent that Plaintiff seeks remand of this matter for further proceedings.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is

denied to the extent that he seeks reversal of the Commissioner's decision and payment of

benefits.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's cross motion for summary judgment

(Doc. 15) is denied.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case is remanded to the Commissioner for

further proceedings consistent with this Order. 

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DATED this 26th day of September, 2005.

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