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Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

LARRY YOUNG, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

UNITED AUTOMOBILE WORKERS -

LABOREMPLOYMENTAND 

TRAINING CORP., 

Defendant-Appellee. 

No. 95-4069 

FILED 

lJDited Statea Court o1 Appeals Tnab Clrcult 

SEP 1 o 1996 

PATRICK FISHER 

Cerk 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 

(D.C. No. 93-CV-942) 

HAROLD DUNNE, Esq., Livonia, Michigan, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

WILLIAM T. PAYNE (Margo A. Feinberg with him on the briefs), Schwartz, Steinsapir, 

Dohrmann & Sommers, Los Angeles, California, for Defendant-Appellee. 

Before BRORBY, EBEL, and HENRY, Circuit Judges. 

HENRY, Circuit Judge. 

Defendant-appellee United Auto Workers - Labor Employment and Training 

Appellate Case: 95-4069 Document: 01019279332 Date Filed: 09/10/1996 Page: 1 
Corporation ("UAW-LETC") is a nonprofit, federally funded, corporation that provides 

automotive training to disadvantaged young men and women. On November 22, 1991, 

plaintiff-appellant Larry Young was terminated from his position as a job developer at 

UAW-LETC's Clearfield, Utah facility. Mr. Young contested his discharge through the 

procedure provided in the collective bargaining agreement between his union, the UA WLETC Staff Council ("Union"), and UA W -LETC. On March 25, 1993, an arbitrator 

upheld Mr. Young's discharge on two grounds: poor work performance and dishonesty. 

Subsequently, Mr. Young brought an action under section 301 of the Labor Management 

Relations Act of 1947, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §185(a), claiming that his termination was 

unlawful because the Union had failed to provide him with fair representation during his 

termination procedure. The United States District Court for the District of Utah granted 

UAW-LETC's motion for summary judgment against Mr. Young's claim. We exercise 

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1291 and affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND 

We construe the facts favorably to Mr. Young, as our standard of review on 

summary judgment requires. The significant facts are these: On October 31, 1991, Mr. 

Young engaged in a private conversation with Jim Mumey, the Department of Labor 

Project Manager for the Clearfield facility ofUAW-LETC. In this conversation, Mr. 

Young told Mr. Mumey that a UAW-LETC employee was "pilfering" materials from the 

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program and selling them for profit. Mr. Young alleged that a local newspaper was 

running advertisements placed by the suspected UAW-LETC employee for the sale of the 

pilfered materials. Believing that his conversation with Mr. Mumey was confidential and 

legally protected under the Job Training Partnership Act's whistle-blower protection 

provisions, see 29 U.S.C. § 1579(a); 20 C.P.R.§ 636.2, Mr. Young denied ever having 

the conversation when asked by the management ofUAW-LETC. 

After being terminated, Mr. Young called Earnest Johnston, the Union's head 

representative, and asked him to file a grievance with UA W -LETC protesting his 

discharge. Although Mr. Young's local Union representative was Andy Carter, Mr. 

Young selected Mr. Johnston to handle his grievance. Mr. Young also requested that 

Gene Leonard, a union representative not affiliated with Mr. Young's Union, be allowed 

to assist Mr. Johnston, and the Union agreed. 

In his affidavit, Mr. Johnston states that prior to Mr. Young's hearing before 

UAW-LETC's personnel committee, he contacted Rene Jorgensen, an independent 

auditor, who was conducting an audit ofUAW-LETC programs for the Department of 

Labor Office of the Inspector General. Mr. Jorgensen told Mr. Johnston that no 

Department of Labor official would talk to him about the then ongoing audit ofUAWLETC. Mr. Johnston also called Mr. Mumey and Peter Rell, National Director of the Job 

Corps, but they never returned his calls. Mr. Young has offered nothing in the way of 

depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions or affidavits to suggest that Mr. 

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Johnston did not place these calls. The Department of Labor did not make public the 

results of their investigation ofUA W-LETC until March 1, 1993. 

UAW-LETC's personnel committee upheld Mr. Young's termination, and Mr. 

Johnston pressed the Union for arbitration. The Union agreed to arbitration, and Mr. 

Johnston participated in the selection of an arbitrator. Mr. Young gave Mr. Johnston and 

Mr. Leonard various materials to help them prepare for the arbitration hearing. These 

materials included a deposition given by Mr. Young in which he states: "If a member of 

the UAW-LETC staff informed Jim Marney [sic] that a UAW-LETC employee was 

pilfering parts and/or tools from the program and selling them for profit, that member of 

the UAW-LETC staffwas not me." Aplt's App. vol. II at 544. Mr. Johnston also 

attained Mr. Young's personnel file from the UAW-LETC. Mr. Johnston and Mr. 

Leonard discussed these materials and conferred frequently with Mr. Young in 

preparation for the arbitration hearing. 

The evening prior to the arbitration hearing, Mr. Johnston, Mr. Leonard, and Mr. 

Young met and discussed their strategy. Mr. Johnston brought Merle Hill, a former cite 

director for UA W-LETC's Clearfield facility familiar with job performance requirements, 

to testify on Mr. Young's behalf. Union representative Andy Carter, UA W -LETC 

employee Charlie Tijerina, Mr. Tijerina's wife, and Mr. Young's wife were also present. 

Mr. Hill was chosen to testify. 

At the arbitration hearing, Mr. Leonard examined Mr. Hill, who testified to Mr. 

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Young's good work performance. Other evidence was introduced to show Mr. Young's 

good work performance, and objections were made to the introduction of certain evidence 

by UAW-LETC. Consistent with Mr. Young's belief that his statements to Mr. Mumey 

were confidential, Mr. Young planned to deny making the statements. However, the 

UAW-LETC's representative called Mr. Mumey, who testified via telephone that Mr. 

Young had in fact accused an employee at UAW-LETC of pilfering $80,000 of materials. 

Confronted with this testimony, Mr. Young conferred with his representatives and 

telephoned attorney Harold Dunne, Mr. Young's counsel for the present litigation. 

Following this consultation, Mr. Young decided to admit that he made the statements. 

Mr. Johnston and Mr. Leonard prepared a thorough post-hearing brief for the 

arbitrator. They defended Mr. Young's good work performance. As for the statements to 

Mr. Mumey, they argued that Mr. Young believed that federal whistle-blower protections 

insured the confidentiality of his statements. Even if his statements were not protected, 

they contended, his actions were meant to protect UA W -LETC from the wrongful acts of 

certain employees and therefore could not be construed as dishonest. They further argued 

that UAW-LETC's failure to investigate Mr. Young's statements suggests that UAWLETC 's management knew the statements were true and was trying to cover up the 

wrongdoing in order to protect UAW-LETC's image and federal funding. 

On March 25, 1993, an arbitrator denied Mr. Young's grievance, concluding that 

UAW-LETC had sufficient reason to discharge Mr. Young for two reasons: (1) poor 

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performance and (2) dishonesty. The arbitrator stated that Mr. Young had been dishonest 

when he told UAW-LETC management that he had not contacted Mr. Mumey and when 

he told Mr. Mumey that employees were pilfering from UAW-LETC. 

On October 20, 1993, Mr. Young filed his original complaint against UA W -LETC 

and its president, Bruce Lee. UAW-LETC filed a motion for summary judgment or, in 

the alternative, for dismissal. In response to this motion, Mr. Young filed an amended 

complaint on February 15, 1994, dropping Bruce Lee as a defendant and restating the 

claim under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, as amended, 29 

U.S.C. § 185(a). Mr. Young alleged that he had been discharged in violation of the 

collective bargaining agreement between UA W -LETC and the Union because he was not 

fairly represented by the Union prior to and during the arbitration hearing. On March 22, 

1994, the district court denied UAW-LETC's first motion for summary judgment as moot 

because it was directed toward Mr. Young's withdrawn, original complaint. UAW-LETC 

subsequently moved again for summary judgment, contending that there was no material 

dispute as to whether the Union breached its duty of fair representation. The district court 

granted UAW-LETC's motion for summary judgement, stating: 

This case falls woefully short of providing genuine issues of material fact 

that are in dispute that go to the point of was there a failure to provide fair 

representation, especially applying the standard as I must of arbitrary and 

bad faith or capricious conduct on the part of Mr. Johnston .... 

It is so far from a legitimate lawsuit in federal court to allege a 

breach of the duty to provide fair representation that to me it borders on 

sanctionable .... 

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... [The issue is] whether you have enough facts to show that [Mr. 

Johnston's] representation was so deficient as in the words of[Air Line 

Pilots Ass'n v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 67 (1991)], that it was so far outside of 

a wide ranged reasonableness as to be irrational. And when I look at the 

affidavits of Mr. Johnston and Mr. Leonard and all of the other evidence 

that was submitted in this case, I would be remiss if I said ... some 

reasonable fact finder could find that this violated the duty to provide fair 

representation. 

Aplt's App. vol. II at 593-95. Mr. Young now appeals the district court's order granting 

UAW-LETC's motion for summary judgment. 

II. DISCUSSION 

A. Standard of Review 

This court reviews the district court's order granting summary judgment de novo 

and must apply the same standards applied by the district court. Summary judgment is 

granted if there is no genuine issue of material fact for trial. Considine v. Newspaper 

Agency Corp., 43 F.3d 1349, 1356 (lOth Cir. 1994). A party who moves for summary 

judgment under Rule 56 "is not required to provide evidence negating an opponent's 

claim. Rather, the burden is on the nonmovant, who 'must present affirmative evidence 

in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment."' Committee for 

the First Amendment v. Campbell, 962 F.2d 1517, 1521 (lOth Cir. 1992) (citation 

omitted) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242,257 (1986)). 

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B. The Duty of Fair Representation and Its "Wide Range of Reasonableness" 

Mr. Young's claim is a "hybrid" federal labor claim. In order to prevail Mr. 

Young must prove (1) that the Union breached its duty of fair representation and (2) that 

UAW-LETC discharged Mr. Young in violation of its collective bargaining agreement 

with the Union. See Chauffeurs. Teamsters & Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry. 494 U.S. 

558, 564 (1990); Mock v. T.G.&Y. Stores Co., 971 F.2d 522, 530-31 (lOth Cir. 1992). 

The sole issue raised by UAW-LETC's motion for summary judgment is whether the 

Union breached its duty of fair representation under federal labor law. As both parties 

correctly state, "[a] union breaches its duty of fair representation if its conduct toward a 

member is 'arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith."' Aguinaga v. United Food & 

Commercial Workers Int'l Union, 993 F.2d 1463, 1470 (lOth Cir. 1993) (quoting Vaca v. 

Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967)), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 880 (1994). Mr. Young argues 

that the Union's conduct Wat arbitrary .

1 "[A] union may not arbitrarily ignore a 

meritorious grievance or process it in perfunctory fashion .... " Vaca, 386 U.S. at 191. 

The Supreme Court recently stated that "a union's actions are arbitrary only if, in light of 

Mr. Young has not argued that the Union's conduct was discriminatory or in bad 

faith. Although Mr. Young states in his brief that the Union's actions were "arbitrary, 

capricious, and in bad faith," Aplt's Br. at 29, at no other place has he developed a bad faith 

argument. Rather, he has focused on the lack of investigation and preparation by Mr. Johnston 

and Mr. Leonard. Bad faith requires a showing of fraud or deceitful or dishonest action. Mock, 

971 F .2d at 531. Mr. Young has not argued that the Union intentionally provided poor 

representation because of the statements to Mr. Mumey or for any other reason. We will not 

make additional arguments for Mr. Young and will focus our attention on the argument he has 

presented-- that the Union's representation was arbitrary. 

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the factual and legal landscape at the time of the union's actions, the union's behavior is 

so far outside a 'wide range of reasonableness,' as to be irrational." Air Line Pilots 

Ass'n. Int'l v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 67 (1991) (citation omitted) (quoting Ford Motor Co. 

v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953)); see also Considine, 43 F.3d at 1357. "[T]his 

involves more than demonstrating mere errors in judgment. Petitioners are not entitled to 

relitigate their discharge merely because they offer newly discovered evidence that the 

charges against them were false and that in fact they were fired without cause. The 

grievance processes cannot be expected to be error-free." Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight. 

Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 571 (1976). By insuring the effectiveness of collective action, this 

deferential standard is essential to the collective bargaining system, International Bhd. of 

Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 51 (1979), and in accordance with this deference, 

"mere negligence ... [will] not state a claim for breach of the duty of fair representation," 

United Steelworkers v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362,372-73 (1990); see also Le'Mon v. NLRB, 

952 F.2d 1203, 1205 (lOth Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 830 (1992). 

In O'Neill, the Supreme Court held that the Air Line Pilot's Association owed its 

members the same duty of fair representation during contract negotiations as it did in all 

other union activity. 499 U.S. at 67. The Court described the duty of fair representation 

in the context of contract negotiation as follows: 

Congress did not intend judicial review of a union's performance to permit 

the court to substitute its own view of the proper bargain for that reached by 

the union. Rather, Congress envisioned the relationship between the courts 

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and labor unions as similar to that between the courts and the legislature. 

Any substantive examination of a union's performance, therefore, must be 

highly deferential, recognizing the wide latitude that negotiators need for 

the effective performance of their bargaining responsibilities. For that 

reason, the final product of the bargaining process may constitute evidence 

of a breach of duty only if it can be fairly characterized as so far outside a 

"wide range of reasonableness" that it is wholly "irrational" or "arbitrary." 

Id. at 78 (citations omitted) (quoting Ford Motor Co., 345 U.S. at 338). 

The Ninth Circuit has held that it will not attempt to second-guess a union's good 

faith, nondiscriminatory judgment "'in evaluating the merits of a grievance ... or in 

presenting the grievance at an arbitration hearing."' Stevens v. Moore Business Forms. 

Inc., 18 F.3d 1443, 1447-48 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Peterson v. Kennedy, 771 F.2d 

1244, 1254 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1122 (1986)); see also Conkle v. Jeong, 

73 F.3d 909, 916 (9th Cir. 1995), petition for det. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3780 (U.S. May 6, 

1996). The NLRB also refuses to second-guess a union's assessment ofthe merits of a 

grievance "so long as it exercises its discretion in good faith and with honesty of purpose 

. . . . Mere negligence, poor judgment, or ineptitude in grievance handling are insufficient 

to establish a breach of the duty of fair representation."' Service Employees Int'l Union. 

Local No. 579, 229 N.L.R.B. 692, 695 (1977)). We endorse the view taken by the Ninth 

Circuit and the NLRB, and we will not substitute for our own the Union's good faith, 

nondiscriminatory judgment in assessing and presenting its members' grievances. Of 

course, to enjoy this deference the Union must show that it did indeed exercise its 

judgment and did not act arbitrarily. See Stevens, 18 F.3d at 1447-48. 

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C. Application of the O'Neill Standard 

Ifthere is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Mr. Young received fair 

representation, we must affirm the district court's order granting UAW-LETC's motion 

for summary judgment. To fulfill the Union's duty, the representation provided by Mr. 

Johnston and Mr. Leonard need only avoid being arbitrary, that is, "so far outside [the] 

'wide range of reasonableness' [accorded union representatives] as to be irrational." 

O'Neill, 499 U.S. at 67. To breach this duty the union must "arbitrarily ignore a 

meritorious grievance or process it in perfunctory fashion." Vaca, 386 U.S. at 191. 

The Union did not disregard Mr. Young's grievance, nor did the Union process it 

in a perfunctory fashion. On the contrary, Mr. Johnston requested, and the Union 

accepted, arbitration. An employee does not have the absolute right to arbitrate every 

grievance. See Vaca 386 U.S. at 194-95. Mr. Young argues that it was irrational to bring 

Mr. Leonard into the case only two weeks prior to the arbitration. However, the decision 

to bring Mr. Leonard into the case at all was a concession to Mr. Young; the collective 

bargaining agreement between the Union and the UAW-LETC does not provide for 

outside representation. 

In an attempt to minimize Mr. Leonard's contributions, Mr. Young argues that the 

ultimate responsibility to provide fair representation fell upon Mr. Johnston, the 

representative provided by the Union. We cannot overlook Mr. Leonard's contributions 

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so easily. Mr. Johnston and Mr. Leonard discussed Mr. Young's case on several 

occasions, and both conferred frequently with Mr. Young. Mr. Leonard actively 

participated in the arbitration hearing: making objections to evidence offered by UA WLETC, examining Mr. Hill, and cross-examining a witness offered by UAW-LETC. Mr. 

Leonard contributed greatly to the fairness ofMr. Young's grievance procedure. 

Turning to the first substantive basis for Mr. Young's discharge, Mr. Young 

cannot refute that he was fairly represented with regard to his work performance, 2 the 

principal battleground upon which both Mr. Young and Mr. Johnston determined to make 

their stand. Mr. Johnston brought in and prepared an outside witness, Mr. Hill, who 

testified to Mr. Young's good work performance under the direct examination of Mr. 

Leonard at the arbitration hearing. Mr. Johnston and Mr. Leonard objected to various 

materials that were introduced by UAW-LETC to prove Mr. Young's poor work 

performance, and Mr. Leonard cross-examined a UAW-LETC witness who testified to 

Mr. Young's poor work performance. These efforts by Mr. Johnston and Mr. Leonard 

2 With respect to work performance, the Codes of Conduct for Staff found in 

Article VIII ofthe collective bargaining agreement between UAW-LETC and the Union 

provides: 

A. Infractions (Minor) 

Committing any of the following may subject employees to disciplinary 

action or discharge: 

I. Careless or inefficient performance of duties, including failure to 

maintain acceptable standards of workmanship or productivity. 

Aplt' s App. vol. I at 161. Although poor work performance is a minor infraction, the language 

of the agreement makes clear that an employee may be discharged based on such conduct alone. 

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were quite reasonable even if unsuccessful. It is true that Mr. Johnston and Mr. Leonard 

failed to offer evidence of how Mr. Young's sick leaves adversely affected his monthly 

performance reports. However, the failure to present a particular argument is insufficient 

to create a genuine issue of material fact in light of the other efforts made by Mr. 

Johnston and Mr. Leonard. To conclude otherwise would allow the Union's good faith, 

nondiscriminatory judgment to be substituted by that of this court, which we are 

unwilling to do. See Stevens, 18 F.3d at 1447-48; Service Employees Int'l Union. Local 

No. 579, 229 N.L.R.B. at 695. 

With respect to the second ground cited for Mr. Young's termination-- dishonesty3 

--"the factual ... landscape at the time of the union's actions" forecloses the conclusion 

that the Union's representation of Mr. Young was irrational. ~O'Neill, 499 U.S. at 67. 

Up to the time of the arbitration hearing, Mr. Young had denied ever speaking with Mr. 

Mumey concerning the alleged pilfering at UAW-LETC when asked by UAW-LETC 

management. Assuming, as we must, that Mr. Young told Mr. Johnston and Mr. Young 

about the statements prior to the arbitration hearing, it was reasonable for them to focus 

on the issue they felt mattered most -- work performance. This plan accommodated Mr. 

Young's intention to continue to deny the statements during the arbitration hearing. Mr. 

3 "Making malicious, false or derogatory statements that may damage the integrity 

or reputation ofUA W-LETC, its products, performance, or staff' is listed as a major infraction 

of the Codes of Conduct for Staff in Article VIII of the collective bargaining agreement between 

UAW-LETC and the Union. Aplt's App. vol. I at 162. 

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Mumey's testimony at the arbitration hearing came as a surprise. Mr. Johnston and Mr. 

Leonard objected, but the arbitrator allowed Mr. Mumey to testify via telephone. 

Confronted with his testimony, Mr. Johnston and Mr. Leonard fell back on the next line 

of defense, the post-hearing brief. In their brief, Mr. Johnston and Mr. Leonard argued 

that Mr. Young's statements to Mr. Mumey were confidential under the whistle-blower 

protections provided under the Job Training Partnership Act, see 29 U.S.C. § 1579(a); 20 

C.F.R. § 636.2. Based on his belief that his statements were confidential, Mr. Young 

offered information to the government that was meant to benefit UAW-LETC by 

exposing a potentially grave problem. Mr. Johnston and Mr. Leonard argued that this 

conduct was not dishonest; if anything Mr. Young's willingness to speak to government 

officials proved him to be honest and forthright. These arguments are not so arbitrary as 

to be irrational. 

That Mr. Johnston and Mr. Leonard did not track down all the newspaper ads 

placed by UA W-LETC employees and had not interviewed Mr. Mumey nor other UAWLETC employees concerning the alleged wrongdoing prior to the arbitration hearing is 

insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. Mr. Johnston and Mr. Leonard 

believed that dishonesty would not be an issue during the discharge proceedings, and 

prepared accordingly. Mr. Young also believed the statements would not be an issue and 

planned to continue to deny them if asked. Likewise, the failure of Mr. Johnston and Mr. 

Leonard to attain an advance copy of the Department of Labor's audit of the UAW-LETC 

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program fails to defeat the UAW-LETC's motion for summary judgment. Mr. Johnston 

called Mr. Jorgensen and was told that no Department of Labor official would comment 

on the then ongoing investigation ofUAW-LETC. Mr. Johnston and Mr. Leonard's 

approach may not have been wise in retrospect, but it was certainly within the wide range 

of reasonableness that we must afford them. 

III. CONCLUSION 

In short, it is easily possible to dissect Mr. Johnston's and Mr. Leonard's 

performances, finding discrete actions that hindsight would suggest changing. But we 

must agree with the district court that under O'Neill's "irrational" standard, the appellant 

is "far from a legitimate lawsuit in federal court." See Aplt's App. vol. II at 593. 

Therefore, we AFFIRM the order of the district court. 

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