Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02578/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02578-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 480
Nature of Suit: Consumer Credit
Cause of Action: 15:1681 Fair Credit Reporting Act

---

1 

15-cv-2578-DHB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

GILLIAN BROWN, on behalf of herself 

and all others similarly situated, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

22ND DISTRICT AGRICULTURAL 

ASSOCIATION, a State entity; and 

DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, a State 

entity, 

Defendant.

22ND DISTRICT AGRICULTURAL 

ASSOCIATION, a State entity, 

 Third Party Complainant 

v. 

SOLAR ON SET, LLC, and ROES 1 

through 20, inclusive, 

 Third Party Defendant.

 Case No.: 15-cv-2578-DHB 

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' 

MOTION FOR FINAL APPROVAL 

OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT 

AND GRANTING MOTION FOR 

INCENTIVE AWARDS [ECF Nos. 39 

AND 42] 

 

Case 3:15-cv-02578-DHB Document 47 Filed 05/17/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 34
2 

15-cv-2578-DHB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

BACKGROUND 

A. Facts and Procedure 

In July 2015, Plaintiff used her credit card to make a purchase at the Del Mar 

Fairgrounds during the County Fair. (ECF No. 39-2 at ¶ 2.) The entire expiration date of 

Plaintiff’s credit card was printed on the receipt generated and provided to Plaintiff by the 

Association at the point of sale. (Id.) 

On September 30, 2015, Plaintiff Gillian Brown (“Plaintiff”) commenced this class 

action against Defendant 22nd District Agricultural Association (the “Association” or 

“Defendant”) in California Superior Court, County of San Diego, seeking relief for 

violations of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transaction Act, itself an amendment to the Fair 

Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq. (“FACTA”). (ECF No. 1-2 at 10-18.) 

Specifically, the Complaint alleges that the Association violated FACTA, 15 U.S.C. § 

1681c(g), by printing a receipt containing the expiration date of Plaintiff’s credit card used 

at the point of sale during the 2015 San Diego County Fair (“County Fair”). (Id. at ¶¶ 16, 

28-40.) Plaintiff sued on behalf of consumers who were issued an electronically printed 

debit and/or credit card receipt which was not FACTA complaint at the Del Mar 

Fairgrounds, located in Del Mar, California. (Id. at ¶ 17.) 

On November 16, 2015, the Association filed its answer denying specifically and 

generally each and every allegation in the Complaint and asserting several distinct 

affirmative defenses. (See ECF No. 2.) The same day, the Association filed a Crossclaim 

against Cross-defendant Solar On Set, LLC (“Solar”) alleging the following causes of 

action: (1) Breach of Contract; (2) Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair 

Dealing; (3) Express Contractual Indemnity; (4) Comparative Indemnity; (5) Equitable 

Indemnity; and Declaratory Relief. (See ECF No. 2-1.) The Association further alleges 

that, had any FACTA violations occurred at the County Fair, which it expressly denies, 

such violations were a direct result of actions and omissions by Solar. (See id.) After 

seeking leave of the Court, the Association later filed a Third Party Complaint against Solar 

Case 3:15-cv-02578-DHB Document 47 Filed 05/17/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 34
3 

15-cv-2578-DHB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

alleging the same causes of action as its Crossclaim on February 8, 2016. (ECF Nos. 7, 9, 

10.) Solar denies all material allegations in the Third Party Complaint. (ECF No. 19.) 

 Following many months of litigation and attending the Court’s Early Neutral 

Evaluation Conference, the parties have reached a proposed settlement of this matter 

(“Settlement”). (Class Action Settlement Agreement and Release (“Settlement 

Agreement”) (ECF No. 39-1 at 24 ¶ 1.12.) On September 7, 2016, Plaintiff filed an 

unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement. (ECF No. 33.) 

The Court granted preliminary approval on December 13, 2016. (ECF No. 38.) The Court 

set a final approval hearing for May 11, 2017 at 3:30 p.m. On January 25, 2017, Plaintiff 

filed a Motion for Award of Reasonable Attorneys’ Fees and Costs and Class 

Representative Enhancement. (ECF No. 39.) On April 21, 2017, Plaintiff filed a Motion 

for Final Approval of Class Settlement. (ECF No. 42.) The Association has not opposed 

either motion. 

B. The Certified Class 

 The Court provisionally certified a class for the purpose of settlement as follows: 

[T]hose persons who were issued an electronically printed debit and/or credit 

card receipt during the San Diego County Fair at the Del Mar Fairgrounds in 

violation of the truncation requirements of FACTA at any time between 

September 30, 2010 and December 13, 2016 (the date of preliminary 

approval of [the Settlement]). (ECF No. 35 at 2.) 

The number of Class Members, while not precisely known, is likely more than 100,000 

based on an analysis used by the Parties. (ECF No. 39-1 at 28 ¶ 2.31.) 

C. The Settlement Agreement 

The Economic Relief 

 Each admission entrance fee for the 2017 San Diego County Fair (subject to a 

$750,000 total reduction cap) shall be reduced fifty (50) cents from the then-current fair 

market value of such admission prices as determined by the Neutral Expert or as otherwise 

agreed upon between Class Counsel and the Association and the Association’s counsel. 

Case 3:15-cv-02578-DHB Document 47 Filed 05/17/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 34
4 

15-cv-2578-DHB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

To the extent the reduction cap has not been met through the 2017 San Diego County Fair 

fee reduction, each admission entrance fee for the 2018 San Diego County Fair (subject to 

a $750,000 total reduction cap, inclusive of the previous year reduction) shall be reduced 

pro rata based on a calculation of the expected 2018 attendance and the remaining amount 

under the reduction cap. The Neutral Expert shall conduct its analysis and provide its 

recommendations no later than the Opt-Out and Objection Deadline, and the final agreed 

upon pricing for the 2017 San Diego County Fair shall be submitted to the Court in 

connection with the Motion. (Id. at 36.) 

 The Common Fund 

 The Association and Solar shall also pay a Common Fund of exactly $175,000 

($170,00 by the Association and $5,000 by Solar) which shall be used to compensate (1) 

the Settlement Administrator for its services in providing publication and website notice 

and other settlement administration services (as detailed herein), (2) Plaintiff Gillian 

Brown for an incentive award (subject to Court approval), (3) Class Counsel for their 

attorneys’ fees and costs (subject to Court approval), and (4) the Neutral Expert described 

above. Neither the Association shall oppose the requests made from the Common Fund, 

so long as they do not exceed the amounts set forth in Section 2.20 above. Any unawarded 

or unrequested portion of the Common Fund shall be paid to a privacy protection-related 

cy pres recipient to be proposed to the Court in connection with the Motion for Final 

Approval. (Id. at 36-37.) 

 Attorneys’ Fees and Costs to Class Counsel 

 Class Counsel may move the Court for an award of attorneys’ fees and expenses 

paid from the Common Fund, not to exceed $150,000. Neither the Association nor Solar 

shall oppose any request which does not exceed $150,000. The amount of attorneys’ fees 

and costs approved by the Court shall be paid from the Common Fund Settlement 

Administrator to Class Counsel’s Client Trust Account, as directed by written instructions 

Case 3:15-cv-02578-DHB Document 47 Filed 05/17/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 34
5 

15-cv-2578-DHB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

from Class Counsel. This payment shall be made no later than the Funding Date1

. Court 

approval of attorneys’ fees and costs, or their amount, will not be a condition of Settlement. 

In addition, no interest will accrue on such amounts at any time. (Id. at 33.) 

 Payment to Class Representative 

 The Class Representative may ask the Court to award her an incentive payment, not 

to exceed $5,000, for the time and effort she has personally invested in this Action. Neither 

the Association nor Solar shall oppose any request which does not exceed $5,000. The 

amount of the incentive payment approved by the Court shall be paid from the Common 

Fund Settlement Administrator to the Class Representative no later than the Funding Date. 

In addition, no interest will accrue on such amounts at any time. (Ibid.) 

DISCUSSION 

A. Final Approval of Parties’ Settlement

 Rule 23(e)(1)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the court 

“approve any settlement.” Approval under Rule 23(e) involves a two-step process “in 

which the [c]ourt first determines whether a proposed class action settlement deserves 

preliminary approval and then, after notice is given to class members, whether final 

approval is warranted.” Nat’l Rural Telecomm. Coop. v. DIRECTV, Inc. (“NRTC”), 221 

F.R.D. 523, 525 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (internal citation omitted). The Ninth Circuit has noted 

that, in considering whether to finally approve a class settlement, “there is a strong judicial 

policy that favors settlements, particularly where complex class action litigation is 

                                               

1

 “Funding Date” means the date, which is no later than twenty-five (25) calendar days after the 

Effective Date, on which the Association and Solar shall make payments to the recipients of the 

Common Fund pursuant to Section 9.2 of this Agreement. (ECF No. 39-1 at ¶ 2.18.) “Effective Date” 

means the fifth (5th) business day after the last of the following dates: (A) All Parties, Association’s 

Counsel, Class Counsel and Solar’s Counsel have executed this Agreement; (B) If no objections to the 

Settlement are filed, the date the Court has entered without material change, the Final Approval Order; 

and (C) If one or more objections to the Settlement are filed, subject to the Court having entered, 

without material change, the Final Approval order, the final disposition of any related appeals therefrom, 

and in the case of no appeal or review being filed, expiration of the applicable appellate period. (Id. at ¶ 

2.12.) 

Case 3:15-cv-02578-DHB Document 47 Filed 05/17/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 34
6 

15-cv-2578-DHB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

concerned.” In re Syncor ERISA Litigation, 516 F.3d 1095, 1101 (9th Cir. 2008); Officers 

for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 688 F.2d 615, 625 (9th Cir. 1982) (“[I]t must not be 

overlooked that voluntary conciliation and settlement are the preferred means of dispute 

resolution. This is especially true in complex class action litigation”), cert. denied, 459 

U.S. 1217, 103 S. Ct. 1219, 75 L.Ed.2d. 456 (1983). 

1. Notice 

 One aspect of the Court’s role is to ensure that all class members receive adequate 

notice of the proposed settlement. Class counsel contends the notice program here 

comports with accepted notice standards for class actions, particularly where the Class 

Members’ contact information is not readily available to the parties. (ECF No. 42 at 12.) 

Rule 23(e) requires that “notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise [of class 

action] shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs.” Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 23(e). The notice given must be “reasonably calculated, under all the 

circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them 

an opportunity to present their objections.” Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 

339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950); see also Manduhano v. Basic Vegetable Prods., Inc., 541 F.2d 

832, 835 (9th Cir. 1976) (“To comply with the spirit of [Rule 23(e)], it is necessary that the 

notice be given in a form and manner that does not systematically leave an identifiable 

group without notice”). 

 Under Rule 23(c)(2)(B), “the court must direct to class members the best notice that 

is practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can 

be identified through reasonable effort.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B). “[T]he mechanics of 

the notice process are left to the discretion of the court subject only to the broad 

‘reasonableness’ standards imposed by due process.” Grunin v. Int’l House of Pancakes, 

513 F.2d 114, 120 (8th Cir. 1975). The court’s role in reviewing a proposed settlement is 

to represent those class members who were not parties to the settlement negotiations and 

agreement. See San Francisco NAACP v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 59 F.Supp.2d 

1021, 1027 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (The purpose of Rule 23(e) is to protect “unnamed class 

Case 3:15-cv-02578-DHB Document 47 Filed 05/17/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 34
7 

15-cv-2578-DHB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

members from unjust or unfair settlements affecting their rights when the representatives 

become fainthearted before the action is adjudicated or are unable to secure satisfaction of 

the individual claims by a compromise”) (internal quotations omitted). 

 “Notice by publication is used when the identity and location of class members 

cannot be determined through reasonable efforts.” In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Wage and 

Hour Litigation, 2008 WL 1990806, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2008); see also In re 

Tableware Antitrust Litigation, 484 F.Supp.2d 1078, 1080 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (“Because 

defendants do not have a list of potential class members, the court agrees with plaintiffs 

that notice by publication is the only reasonable method of informing class members of the 

pending class action and the Lenox settlement”). 

 Because the Association does not have the mailing addresses of each County Fair 

patron who used debit or credit cards during the class period, the Court approved notice by 

means of publication. (ECF No. 38 at 16-17.) On December 13, 2016, the Court approved 

the proposed notice plan as it granted preliminary approval of the Settlement as follows: 

(1) publication on the Internet via a settlement website, (2) a link to the settlement website 

on the Association’s website, and (3) publication on two separate occasions in a regional 

newspaper in San Diego. (Id.) On December 19, 2016, Simpluris, Inc.2

 (“Simpluris”) 

received the Court-approved Legal Notice from Plaintiffs’ counsel. (ECF No. 42-2 at 2.) 

 The Legal Notice advised Class Members of their right to opt out from the 

Settlement, object to the Settlement, or do nothing, and the implications of each action. 

(Id. at 7.) The Legal notice advised Class Members of applicable deadlines and other 

events, including the Final Approval Hearing, and how Class Members could obtain 

additional information. (Id. at 7-12.) Simpluris also established and maintained a website

dedicated to this project (www.classactionsandiegocountyfair.com)

3

 to provide additional 

                                               

2

 Simpluris was appointed by the Court as Settlement Administrator to administer the settlement in 

accordance with the Settlement agreement. (ECF No. 42-2 at 2.)

3

 The website contained hyperlinks to: (1) the Settlement Agreement; (2) Motion for Preliminary 

Approval of Settlement; (3) the Preliminary Approval Order; (4) Notice of Lodging Settlement; (5) 

Case 3:15-cv-02578-DHB Document 47 Filed 05/17/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 34
8 

15-cv-2578-DHB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

information to the Class Members. (Id. at 3.) The website was operational on January 27, 

2017 and was accessible 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. (Ibid.) As of April 21, 2017, the 

website received 6,906 visits. (Ibid.) In addition, the short form Legal Notice was 

published in the Uptown San Diego Examiner on February 8 and 15, 2017, it was also 

published in the San Diego Business Journal on February 13 and 20, 2017. (Ibid.) 

 These forms of notice were the best notice practicable under the circumstances and 

fairly apprised Class Members of their options under the proposed settlement terms. As 

such, the Court finds the Class received adequate notice of the settlement and had an 

adequate opportunity to file a valid claim, opt out, or object to the settlement. Therefore, 

the Court finds that Rule 23(e)’s notice requirement has been satisfied. 

2. Fairness of the Proposed Settlement 

 Class counsel asserts that each of the relevant criteria supports final approval of the 

Settlement. (ECF No. 42 at 14-21.) 

 The court’s role, in reviewing “what is otherwise a private consensual agreement 

negotiated between the parties to a lawsuit, must be limited to the extent necessary to reach 

a reasoned judgment that the agreement is not the product of fraud or overreaching by, or 

collusion between, the negotiating parties, and that the settlement, taken as a whole, is fair, 

reasonable and adequate to all concerned.” Officers for Justice, 688 F.2d at 625. In making 

this assessment, the court balances: 

 “(1) the strength of the plaintiffs’ case; (2) the risk, expense, complexity, and likely 

duration of further litigation; (3) the risk of maintaining class action status throughout the 

trial; (4) the amount offered in settlement; (5) the extent of discovery completed and the 

stage of the proceedings; (6) the experience and views of counsel; (7) the presence of a 

governmental participant; and (8) the reaction of the class members to the proposed 

                                               

Notice of Motion and Unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement; (6) 

Declaration of Gillian Brown in Support of Final Approval; (7) Notice of Motion and Motion for Award 

of Reasonable Attorneys’ Fees and Costs; (8) Declaration of Daniel F. Gaines in Support of Unopposed 

motion for Preliminary Approval; (9) Declaration of Daniel F. Gaines in Support of Motion for Award 

of Reasonable Attorneys’ Fees and Costs; (10) Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief; and (11) 

the Legal Notice. (ECF No. 42-2 at 3.) 

Case 3:15-cv-02578-DHB Document 47 Filed 05/17/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 8 of 34
9 

15-cv-2578-DHB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

settlement.” Churchill Vill., L.L.C. v. Gen. Elec., 361 F.3d 566, 575 (9th Cir. 2004) 

(citing Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998)). 

 

This list of factors is not exclusive, “and different factors may predominate in different 

factual contexts.” Torrisi v. Tucson Elec. Power co., 8 F.3d 1370, 1376 (9th Cir. 1993). 

See also Churchill Vill., L.L.C., 361 F.3d at 576 n. 7 (“Because the settlement evaluation 

factors are non-exclusive, discussion of those factors not relevant to this case has been 

omitted”); Young v. Polo Retail, LLC, 2007 WL 951821, *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2007) 

(adding as relevant factors “(9) the procedures by which the settlements were arrived at, 

and (10) the role taken by the plaintiff in that process”) (internal citations omitted). 

a. Strength of Plaintiffs’ Case 

 FACTA provides that “no person that accepts credit cards or debit cards for the 

transaction of business shall print more than the last 5 digits of the card number or the 

expiration date upon any receipt provided to the cardholder at the point of the sale or 

transaction.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g)(1). The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) creates a 

private right of action for violations of FACTA and provides that plaintiffs can recover 

actual or statutory damages, as well as punitive damages, for “willful” violations. See 

Nelson v. Chase Manhattan Mort. Corp., 282 F.3d 1057, 1059 (9th Cir. 2002); see also 15 

U.S.C. § 1681n. Courts have concluded that a finding approving settlement is favored 

when there are triable issues as to willfulness under FACTA. See In re Toys R UsDelaware, Inc.—Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA) Litig., 295 F.R.D. 

438, 451 (C.D. Cal. 2014); see also In re Portal Software, Inc. Securities Litig., 2007 WL 

4171201, *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2007). 

 Although Plaintiff maintains that she would succeed at trial, Class counsel 

acknowledges that there is significant uncertainty concerning how to prove a “willful” 

violation of FACTA. (ECF No. 42 at 14-15.) For this reason, Class counsel contends that 

such uncertainty supports final approval of the Settlement as a good compromise for absent 

Class Members. (Id. at 15.) Questions of (1) whether the Association had knowledge of 

the violating receipts; (2) whether Solar’s management of the transactions at the County 

Case 3:15-cv-02578-DHB Document 47 Filed 05/17/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 9 of 34
10 

15-cv-2578-DHB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Fair cut off any liability which could be imputed to the Association; and (3) whether this 

error was ever communicated to an agent of the Association where intent could be imputed 

on the Association still linger unanswered. As such, the Court similarly concludes that this 

factor weighs in favor of final approval of the settlement. 

b. The Risk, Expense, Complexity, and Likely Duration of Further Litigation

 Final approval of settlement is favored when both sides face an all-or-nothing type 

prospect if settlement is not reached. In re Toys R Us, 295 F.R.D. at 452. “The expense 

and possible duration of the litigation should be considered in evaluating the 

reasonableness of [a] settlement.” Glass v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., 2007 WL 221862 (N.D. 

Cal. Jan. 26, 2007) (citing In re Mego Fin. Corp. Securities Litig., 213 F.3d 454, 458 (9th 

Cir. 2000)); see also Vasquez v. Coast Valley Roofing, Inc., 266 F.R.D. 482, 489 (E.D. Cal. 

2010) (in weighing the risk of future litigation, “a court may consider the vagaries of 

litigation and compare the significance of immediate recovery by way of the compromise 

to the mere possibility of relief in the future, after protracted and expensive litigation”) 

(internal quotation marks omitted)); Polo Retail, 2007 WL 951821, at *3 (“Because this 

litigation has terminated before the commencement of trial preparation, factor (2) also 

militates in favor of the settlement”). 

 Class counsel asserts that this factor weighs in favor of final approval of the 

Settlement as it avoids the complex and expensive interpretation of FACTA in the class 

action context, need for a contested class certification motion, and a lengthy trial or trials 

involving numerous witnesses and experts. (ECF No. 42 at 15.) Counsel also points out 

that, if the Court were to deny a future class certification motion, Class Members would be 

left without a group remedy and be forced to litigate individual cases in a costly and timeconsuming manner. (Ibid.) Class counsel claims continued litigation of this action against 

the Association would likely be complex and expensive, due to the size of the class and 

nature of the claims. (ECF No. 42 at 15.) The Court agrees. It is certain that a class 

certification motion would be contested and costly for Plaintiff to file, Defendant to oppose, 

and the Court to decide. Moreover, the Settlement provides immediate recovery for Class 

Case 3:15-cv-02578-DHB Document 47 Filed 05/17/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 10 of 34
11 

15-cv-2578-DHB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Members rather than the mere possibility of relief in the future. Accordingly, the Court 

finds this factor militates in favor of approval of the Settlement. 

c. The Risk of Maintaining Class Action Status Throughout Trial

Avoiding the risk of decertification, especially where there are doubts concerning 

the viability of the class, favors approval of the settlement. See McKenzie v. Fed. Exp. 

Corp., 2012 WL 2930201, *4 (C.D. Cal. July 2, 2012) (“[S]ettlement avoids all possible 

risk [of decertification]. This factor therefore weighs in favor of final approval of the 

settlement”); Catala c. Resurgent Capital Servs. L.P., 2010 WL 2524158, *3 (S.D. Cal. 

June 22, 2010) (“The avoidance of risk of maintaining class action certification throughout 

trial favors settlement of this action”); Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 2010 WL 9013059, *4 (N.D. 

Cal. Mar. 17, 2010) (“The risk that a class action may be decertified at any time generally 

weighs in favor of approving a settlement”) (internal citation omitted). 

 The Court finds this factor too weighs in favor of granting the Settlement as there is 

a risk of decertification in this case. 

d. The Amount Offered in Settlement 

 As the Ninth Circuit has noted, “it is the very uncertainty of outcome in litigation 

and avoidance of wasteful and expensive litigation that induce consensual settlements. The 

proposed settlement is [thus] not be judged against a hypothetical or speculative measure 

of what might have been achieved by the negotiators.” Officers for Justice, 688 F.2d at 

625 (emphasis original). Rather, “the very essence of a settlement is compromise, ‘a 

yielding of absolutes and an abandoning of highest hopes.’” Id. at 624. (Internal citation 

omitted). “The fact that a proposed settlement may only amount to a fraction of the 

potential recovery does not, in and of itself, mean that the proposed settlement is grossly 

inadequate and should be disapproved.” Linney v. Cellular Alaska Partnership, 151 F.3d 

1234, 1242 (9th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation and quotation marks omitted). 

 Class counsel contends the Settlement provides the Class with an immediate 

monetary benefit and avoids the risk of not succeeding at the liability phase. (ECF No. 42 

at 16.) This Court disagrees. As noted, the proposed settlement here awards a fifty (50) 

Case 3:15-cv-02578-DHB Document 47 Filed 05/17/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 11 of 34
12 

15-cv-2578-DHB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

cent reduction from the fair market value of each adult and children admission entrance fee 

for the 2017 San Diego County Fair (subject to a $750,000 total reduction cap).4

 Thus, the 

proposed settlement provides only a form of non-monetary relief and must be carefully 

scrutinized. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(2)(C)(h), Advisory Committee Note (“Settlements 

involving nonmonetary provisions for class members...deserve careful scrutiny to ensure 

that these provisions have actual value to the class”). 

Other courts have approved the use of gift cards or coupons in lieu of monetary 

compensation in class action suits. See Fernandez v. Victoria Secret Stores, LLC, 2008 

WL 8150856, *6-7 (C.D. Cal. July 21, 2008) (approving the use of gift cards, where they 

provided “significantly more than [each class member] would have earned had Victoria’s 

Secret paid her for her work”); Young, 2007 WL 951821, at *4 (approving the use of gift 

cards in large part because they are transferable; “this enables class members to obtain 

cash—something all class members will find useful”). The amount of the settlement 

weighs in favor of approval as long as the amount to be received would not be de minimus, 

considering the difficulties, risk and likelihood of proving actual damages and willfulness. 

See In re Toys R Us, 295 F.R.D. at 454 (finding a settlement amount representing 5% to 

30% of possible recovery weighed in favor of approval given plaintiffs would have been 

unable to prove willfulness and recover any damages at all); see also, e.g., In re Mego 

Financial Corp. Securities Litigation, 213 F.3d 454, 459 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that, 

given the difficulties inherent in complex litigation, a settlement that paid plaintiffs onsixth of their potential recovery was fair and adequate). 

Although the precise number of Class Members remains undetermined, Plaintiff 

projects the maximum exposure to the Association at up to $10,000,000.5

 (ECF No. 42-1 

at 5.) Hypothetically, if each Class Member sued the Association individually and proved 

                                               

4

 Based on a review of current economic research, the 2017 County Fair’s ticket prices would normally 

be confirmed as $18.50 for one adult ticket and $11.50 for one child ticket. (ECF No. 42-4 at 10.) 

5

 Total amount computed at the rate of $100 per allegedly defective receipt issued. (ECF No. 42-1 at ¶ 

17.) 

Case 3:15-cv-02578-DHB Document 47 Filed 05/17/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 12 of 34
13 

15-cv-2578-DHB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

that it acted willfully, then he or she could recover between $100 and $1,000 in statutory 

damages. 15 U.S.C. § 1681n. A fifty cent ($0.50) reduction in admission entrance fee, 

therefore, amounts to less than one percent of each Class Members’ possible recovery. 

Accordingly, the Court finds the Settlement award amount is de minimus. 

Careful scrutiny of the Settlement award amount illustrates that a significant 

discount is to be expected in exchange for avoiding the uncertainties, risks, and costs of 

further litigation. Class counsel asserts the Settlement’s proposed discount is reasonable 

and fair in light of the facts of the case, the litigation risks, the class certification risks, and 

other FACTA case settlements. (ECF No. 42 at 16.) Here, Class Members suffered no 

actual monetary loss as a result of the Association’s alleged conduct. The Association also 

maintains that Plaintiff could not prove “willful” conduct on the Association’s part as it 

did not discover the deficient receipts and hired Solar, a company the Association trusted 

was an expert in installing point of sale systems and certified that its system was legally 

compliant. (ECF Nos. 2 at 2; 42 at17.) Due to the lack of record maintenance, it would be 

impossible to put consideration directly into Class Members’ pockets without a 

substantially expensive claims process. Consequently, the parties agreed that a reduction 

in admission fee is most likely to yield the highest benefit to a potential Class Member – 

future fairgoers. The Court finds that a discounted settlement amount is warranted under 

the totality of the circumstances. 

The Court finds the amount of the proposed settlement does not weigh in favor of 

approval of the Settlement. As noted, there is no monetary benefit to the Class Members. 

The value of the award, which amounts to a fifty cent ($0.50) coupon, is de minimus. 

Moreover, the fifity cent ($0.50) reduction in fair admission fee is capped at $750,000, 

covering 1.5 million fairgoers. Of note, the County Fair attracted more than 1.6 million 

visitors in 2016, more than 1.5 million visitors the last two years, and has grown to 26 days 

in length. (ECF No. 42-4 at 3-4.) Consequently, it is likely that not all 2017 County 

fairgoers will receive the admission fee reduction benefit. Considering the de minimus

value of the settlement to Class Members and likelihood that not all members will even 

Case 3:15-cv-02578-DHB Document 47 Filed 05/17/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 13 of 34
14 

15-cv-2578-DHB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

enjoy the benefit, the Court finds the amount of the Settlement factor does not weigh in 

favor of approval. 

e. The Stage of the Proceedings and Extent of Discovery Completed 

“The extent of discovery may be relevant in determining the adequacy of the parties’ 

knowledge of the case.” NRTC, 221 F.R.D. at 527 (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). “A court is more likely to approve a settlement if most of the discovery is 

completed because it suggests that the parties arrived at a compromise based on a full 

understanding of the legal and factual issues surrounding the case.” Id (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted). The more the discovery completed, the more likely it is that 

the parties have “‘a clear view of the strengths and weaknesses of their cases.’” Young, 

2007 WL 951821, at *4 (quoting In re Warner Communications Sec. Litig., 618 F.Supp. 

735, 745 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)). 

Class counsel contends that the Parties negotiated the Settlement with ample 

knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses of this case and the amounts necessary to 

compensate Class Members for their estimated damages. (ECF No. 42 at 18.) Specifically, 

counsel states the Settlement was reached after the parties exchanged substantive 

information through discovery and apprised each other of their respective factual 

contentions, legal theories, and defenses. (Ibid.) Counsel also states, “The Parties engaged 

in extensive good-faith, arms-length negotiations, including a full-day early neutral 

evaluation session” before the Court. (Ibid.) Counsel notes that Defendant did not dispute 

that it in fact printed prohibited information on customers’ receipts but challenged class 

certification, willful conduct, and liability for statutory damages. (Ibid.) Counsel avers 

that, at the time of settlement, it was apparent that continued litigation presented numerous 

legal risks for Plaintiff to certify the class, prove liability, and defeat any appeals relating 

to liability, damages or class certification. (Id. at 19.) 

As such, notwithstanding an abbreviated discovery period, the Court concludes that 

the settlement was reached at a stage where the parties had a “clear view of the strengths 

and weaknesses of their cases.” See True v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 749 F.Supp.2d 1052, 

Case 3:15-cv-02578-DHB Document 47 Filed 05/17/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 14 of 34
15 

15-cv-2578-DHB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1078 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (finding that “discovery ha[d] been sufficient to permit the parties 

to enter into a well-informed settlement, and this factor weighs in favor of approval”). 

Likewise, the Court finds this factor also weighs in favor of approving the Settlement. 

f. The Presence of a Government Participant 

An order giving final approval of a proposed settlement may not be issued earlier 

than 90 days after of the dates on which the appropriate Federal official and the appropriate 

State official are served with notice. 28 U.S.C. § 1715(d). The Association notified the 

Attorney Generals of the United States and California on September 19, 2016. (ECF No. 

42-1 at 10.) More than 90 days have passed since notice was provided and the parties have 

received no objections from any state or federal official. (Ibid.) Therefore, the Court may 

issue an order approving this Settlement. 

g. The Experience and Views of Counsel 

“Parties represented by competent counsel are better positioned than courts to 

produce a settlement that fairly reflects each party’s expected outcome in litigation.” In re 

Pacific Enters. Sec. Litig., 47 F.3d 373, 378 (9th Cir. 1995). “The recommendations of 

plaintiffs’ counsel should be given a presumption of reasonableness.” Boyd v. Bechtel 

Corp., 485 F.Supp. 610, 622 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (citations omitted). However, the weight 

given to this factor is tempered somewhat by counsel’s “obvious pecuniary interest in 

seeing the settlement approved. Young, 2007 WL 951821, at *5. Courts still have 

concluded that counsel’s views weigh in favor of approving the settlement as it declines to 

discount the well-considered views of counsel entirely. See Fernandez 2008 WL 8150856, 

at *7 n. 32. 

In the Court’s Preliminary Approval order, it recognized that “Class Counsel ha[s] 

significant experience in handling class actions. For example, Class Counsel’s firm has 

been involved in over 100 class actions.” (ECF No. 38 at 15.) Counsel asserts they have 

significant experience in complex class litigation, including numerous FACTA and other 

privacy related class actions. (ECF No. 42 at 19.) Class counsel believe the Settlement to 

be an excellent result for the Class and opine that it is fair, adequate, reasonable, and in the 

Case 3:15-cv-02578-DHB Document 47 Filed 05/17/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 15 of 34
16 

15-cv-2578-DHB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

best interest of the Class. (Ibid.) Relying on counsel’s representations, the Court finds this 

factor weighs in favor of approving the Settlement. 

h. Class Members’ Reaction to the Settlement

In order to gauge the reaction of other class members, it is appropriate to evaluate 

the number of requests for exclusion, as well as the objections submitted. See In re Gen. 

Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 812 (3d Cir. 1995) 

(“In an effort to measure the class’s own reaction to the settlement’s terms directly, courts 

look to the number and vociferousness of the objectors”); Pallas v. Pac. Bell, 1999 WL 

1209495, *6 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 1999) (“The greater the number of objectors, the heavier 

the burden on the proponents of settlement to prove fairness”). Here, Simpluris received 

no requests for exclusion from or any objections to the Settlement. (ECF No. 42-2 at 3.) 

Accordingly, the Court interprets the complete non-opposition to the Settlement as a strong 

indication of the Class Members’ support.6

 For this reason, the Court finds the Class 

Members’ reaction weighs strongly in favor of approving the settlement. 

i. Other Factors 

As noted, two additional factors should be considered when determining the fairness 

of a proposed settlement: (1) the process by which settlement was achieved and (2) the 

involvement of the named plaintiffs in the process. Young v. Polo Retail, LLC, 2007 WL 

951821, *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2007) (adding as relevant factors “(9) the procedures by 

which the settlements were arrived at, and (10) the role taken by the plaintiff in that 

process”) (internal citations omitted). 

Here, the parties engaged in extensive good-faith, arms-length negotiations, 

including a full-day early neutral evaluation session conducted by the Court. Therefore, 

                                               

6

 As of the date of declaration, the Settlement website had been operational since January 27, 2017, 

accessible 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and received 6,906 visits. (ECF No. 42-2 at 3.) Thus, the 

Court reasons that the Class Members’ total non-opposition to the Settlement was not due to a lack of 

awareness that the Settlement existed. 

Case 3:15-cv-02578-DHB Document 47 Filed 05/17/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 16 of 34
17 

15-cv-2578-DHB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the Court finds that the process by which the Settlement was reached weighs in favor of 

approving the Settlement. 

Plaintiff, particularly Gillian Brown, the class representative, played an active role 

in the settlement process by communicating regularly with her attorneys regarding what 

would be a fair resolution. (ECF No. 39-2 at 3.) Brown also attended the full-day early 

neutral evaluation to try and settle the case. (Ibid.) Given this information, the Court 

concludes that Plaintiff was actively involved in settlement negotiations and that this factor 

weighs in favor of approval. 

j. Signs of Collusion 

The Ninth Circuit has explained that, in addition to evaluating the fairness of the 

settlement terms, the district court should be watchful for “subtle signs” that class counsel 

and the class representatives permitted self-interest to trump their obligation to ensure a 

fair settlement for the class as a whole. In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 

F.3d 935, 947 (9th Cir. 2011). In Bluetooth, the Ninth Circuit identified three possible 

signs of collusion: 

“(1) when the settlement terms result in class counsel receiving a disproportionate 

share of the settlement, or when the class receives no monetary compensation but counsel 

receive an ample award of attorneys’ fees; 

(2) the presence of a clear sailing agreement that carries the potential of enabling a 

defendant to pay class counsel excessive fees and costs in exchange for...accepting an 

unfair settlement; and 

(3) when the parties arrange for fees not awarded to revert to defendants, rather than 

being paid into the class fund.” Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted). 

The Ninth Circuit noted that this list is not exclusive, but offered it as guidance to lower 

courts regarding the type of provisions that require “greater scrutiny than ordinarily 

demanded” in assessing the overall fairness of the settlement. Id. at 949. 

 As to the first sign of collusion, other circuits have reversed settlements as troubling 

when a class representative and class counsel are essentially paid to go away and foreclose 

Case 3:15-cv-02578-DHB Document 47 Filed 05/17/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 17 of 34
18 

15-cv-2578-DHB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

other class members’ right to the benefits of aggregation in a class. See Crawford v. 

Equifax Payment Servs., Inc., 201 F.3d 877, 882 (7th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he fact that one class

member receives $2,000 and the other 200,000+ [get] nothing is quite enough to 

demonstrate that the terms should not have been approved”). Here, it is established above 

that the class is not receiving any monetary compensation. See The Amount Offered in 

Settlement section. The total value of the current Settlement package is $925,000, of which 

$175,000 is earmarked to compensate the Common Fund. (ECF No. 39 at 16.) This 

Common Fund is funded by the Association and Solar to compensate for “any attorneys’ 

fees and costs awarded to Class Counsel by the Court (not to exceed $150,000)...and any 

incentive award ordered by the Court to be paid to the Class Representative (not to exceed 

$5,000),” among other payments. (ECF No. 39-1 at 28, 36-37.) The proposed Settlement 

deems “all claims, causes of action, suits, obligations, debts, agreements, promises, 

liabilities, damages, losses controversies, costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees of any nature 

whatsoever” fully released as of the Effective Date. (ECF No. 39-1 at 43.) 

This Court believes the terms described above are indicative of the first sign of 

collusion. Essentially, the only two parties receiving cash value from the Settlement 

potentially are the class representative and class counsel. In addition, the Settlement 

forecloses unnamed class members from bringing a future claim. However, it unlikely that 

other class members would bring an individual claim for statutory damages due to the 

litigation risk. Moreover, it is further unlikely that other class members have maintained 

the 2015 County Fair receipt or could prove any actual damages. Class counsel have fought 

diligently for the class throughout this litigation and has achieved some form of benefit for 

the class. Thus, the Court cautiously finds the first sign of collusion does not exist here. 

 As to the second sign of collusion, “[I]n general, a clear sailing agreement is one 

where the party paying the fee agrees not to contest the amount to be awarded by the feesetting court so long as the award falls beneath a negotiated ceiling.” Weinberger v. Great 

N. Nekoosa Corp., 925 F.2d 518, 520 n. 1 (1st Cir. 1991). Clear sailing provisions are 

troubling on several levels. “[T]he very existence of a clear sailing provision increases the 

Case 3:15-cv-02578-DHB Document 47 Filed 05/17/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 18 of 34
19 

15-cv-2578-DHB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

likelihood that class counsel will have bargained away something of value to the class.” In 

re Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 948 (citation omitted). “Such a clause deprives the court of the 

advantages of the adversary process. The source of the proposed payment renders it 

improbable that class members will come forward to challenge the reasonableness of the 

requested fee. Meanwhile, the payor is bound by contract not to contest the application.” 

Weinberger, 925 F.2d at 525. Clear sailing agreements must be scrutinized to ensure that 

they do not result in unfair awards of attorneys’ fees. See Id. at 523 (“[T]he approval 

function has routinely been extended to embrace fees, whether or not pre-negotiated, in 

those cases where the plaintiffs’ attorneys are to be paid out of a common fund (and where, 

consequently, there is an inherent tension between the interests of the class and the interests 

of the lawyers)”). 

 Courts have concluded that a clear sailing provision is not fatal when the class stands 

to receive a monetary award greater than it might have received had the case proceeded to 

trial. See In re Toys R Us, 295 F.R.D. at 458 (“The absence of a “kicker provision”7

 in the 

parties settlement and the fact that the class is receiving reasonable value reduces the 

likelihood that the parties colluded to confer benefits on each other at the expense of class 

members.”). 

The parties’ agreement states: 

 “Class Counsel may move the Court for an award of attorneys’ fees and expenses 

paid from the Common Fund, not to exceed $150,000. Neither the Association nor Solar 

shall oppose any request which does not exceed $150,000.” (ECF No. 39-1 at 33.) The 

Court finds that this is a clear sailing provision. As anticipated, the Court was deprived of 

an adversarial discussion of the reasonableness of attorneys’ fees both in brief and at oral 

argument. Like In re Toys R Us, no “kicker provision” exists here and the class is receiving 

                                               

7

 A “kicker agreement” reverts unpaid attorneys’ fees to the defendant rather than to the class, this 

amplifies the danger of collusion already suggested by a clear sailing provision. In re Bluetooth, 654 

F.3d at 949. 

Case 3:15-cv-02578-DHB Document 47 Filed 05/17/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 19 of 34
20 

15-cv-2578-DHB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

a benefit, granted a nonmonetary benefit, it likely would not have received if members 

proceeded with further litigation. Accordingly, the provision similarly does not raise an 

inference of collusion that warrants invalidation of the Settlement as a whole. 

The third sign of collusion is absent in this case as the Settlement agreement contains 

a cy pres provision for any awarded or unrequested portion of the Common Fund to be paid 

to a privacy protection-related recipient. 

Nonetheless, the Court considers the nature of the attorneys’ fees provision below 

in evaluating the reasonableness of the fees sought, so as to ensure that class members have 

been afforded adequate relief, and that the fees their lawyers receive are proportionate to 

the value of the classes’ recovery. 

k. Balancing the Factors 

 The court’s determination [concerning the fairness and adequacy of a proposed 

settlement] is nothing more than an amalgam of delicate balancing, gross approximations 

and rough justice. Officers for Justice, 688 F.2d at 625 (citation omitted). “[I]t must not 

be overlooked that voluntary conciliation and settlement are the preferred means of dispute 

resolution. This is especially true in complex class action litigation.” Id. 

Having considered the relevant factors, the Court concludes that the settlement is 

fair and adequate after weighing all the relevant factors. In addition, the class certification 

requirements have remained satisfied since the Court provisionally certified the class on 

December 13, 2016. (ECF No. 38). Accordingly, the Court certifies the settlement class 

and GRANTS Class counsel’s motion to approve the Settlement (ECF No. 42). 

B. Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, Costs, and Incentive Awards 

The Court now turns to class counsel’s motion for fees, costs, and incentive 

payments. Rule 54(d)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure specifies that requests 

shall be made by motion “unless the substantive law governing the action provides for the 

recovery of...fees as an element of damages to be proved at trial,” the rule itself does not 

authorize the awarding of fees. In class actions, statutory provisions and the common fund 

exception to the “American Rule” provide the authority for awarding attorneys’ fees. In 

Case 3:15-cv-02578-DHB Document 47 Filed 05/17/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 20 of 34
21 

15-cv-2578-DHB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

re Toys R Us, 295 F.R.D. at 459 (citation omitted). Rule 23(h) authorizes a court to award 

“reasonable attorney’s fees and nontaxable costs that are authorized by law or by the 

parties’ agreement.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(h). Under normal circumstances, once it is 

established that a party is entitled to attorneys’ fees, “[i]t remains for the district court to 

determine what fee is reasonable.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). The parties’ Settlement agreement provides that the 

Association will not oppose an award of attorneys’ fees and costs, not to exceed $150,000. 

(ECF No. 39-1 at 33.) It further provides for the payment of an incentive award, not to 

exceed $5,000, to the class representative. (Id.) 

1. Attorneys’ Fees 

 Plaintiffs seeks a fee award under the percentage of the common fund method. (ECF 

No. 39 at 17-19.) The Court does not agree. See 28 U.S.C. § 1712, Class Action Fairness 

Act (“CAFA”). 

CAFA provides that attorneys’ fees awarded in connection with a class action 

coupon settlement must be based on the value to class members of redeemed coupons. See 

28 U.S.C. § 1712(a). “If a proposed settlement in a class action provides for a recovery of 

coupons to class members, and a portion of the recovery of the coupons is not used to 

determine the attorney’s fee to be paid to class counsel, any attorney’s fee award shall be 

construed to prohibit application of time class counsel reasonably expended working on 

the action.” Id. at § 1712(b)(1). A lodestar with a multiplier method can be used to 

determine attorney’s fees. Id. at § 1712(b)(2). However, lodestar fees may only be 

awarded if the class obtains non-coupon relief. In re HP Inkjet Printer Litig., 716 F.3d 

1173, 1185 (9th Cir. 2013). Where a settlement only provides for coupon relief for the 

class, the entire attorneys’ fee award is attributable to the awards of coupons. Id. at 1182. 

In such cases, “the court must determine a reasonable contingency fee based on the actual 

redemption value of the coupons awarded. Id. at 1184. Therefore, the Court finds that the 

percentage-of-the-fund method does not apply here. 

Case 3:15-cv-02578-DHB Document 47 Filed 05/17/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 21 of 34
22 

15-cv-2578-DHB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Here, the reduced admission price benefit is a coupon as it requires the Class to 

return to the County Fair and spend money in order to realize the settlement benefit. 

Browning v. Yahoo! Inc., 2007 WL 4105971, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2007); see Kearney 

v. Hyundai Motor Co., 2013 WL 3287996, at *7 n. 5 (C.D. Cal. June 28, 2013) (“A coupon 

settlement is one that provides benefits to class members in the form of a discount towards 

the future purchase of a product or service offered by the defendant”) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). “The distinction between a coupon and a voucher is that a coupon is a 

discount on merchandise or services offered by the defendant and a voucher provides for 

free merchandise or services.” Foos v. Ann, Inc., 2013 WL 5352969, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 

24, 2013) (emphasis in original). The Class here has no other option, such as a voucher or 

other cash-like benefit. See In re Online DVD-Rental Antitrust Litig., 779 F.3d 934, 949-

50 (9th Cir. 2015). The Settlement is therefore a coupon settlement as the Settlement 

provides Class Members no benefit unless they attend the 2017 County Fair. 

Accordingly, the Court is reluctant to award the requested lodestar method. 

Nonetheless, the Court has gone through the lodestar method analysis below and it could 

be applied if class counsel persuades the Court that the Class is due to receive some relief 

other than simply the specified fifty cent coupon. Grays Harbor Adventist Christian 

School v. Carrier Corp., 2008 WL 1901988, at *1 (“Because the attorneys’ fees will be 

paid separately by [defendant] without reducing the relief available to the Class, the 

lodestar method is appropriate”). Other circuits have rejected the majority view in HP 

Inkjet in holding instead that 28 U.S.C. 1712(a) “does not...prohibit the use of the lodestar 

method for coupon settlements.” See In re Sw. Airlines Voucher Litig., 799 F.3d 701, 708-

09 (7th Cir. 2015); In re HP Inkjet Printer Litig., 716 F.3d at 1187 (Berzon, J., dissenting) 

(“On my reading of the statute, CAFA allows the use of a lodestar to calculate attorney’s 

fees...whether the relief obtained for the class involves, in whole or in part, coupons, or 

whether it does not.”). The Court finds that the circumstances do not warrant rejecting the 

majority in HP Inkjet. 

Case 3:15-cv-02578-DHB Document 47 Filed 05/17/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 22 of 34
23 

15-cv-2578-DHB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The Court must determine whether a contingency fee award would be reasonable 

based on the actual redemption value of the coupons awarded. In re HP Inkjet Printer 

Litig., 716 F.3d at 1184. However, class counsel cannot submit the necessary evidence 

until after the 2017 County Fair. At the final approval hearing, class counsel did not agree 

that the Settlement should be characterized as a coupon settlement. For that reason, the 

parties agreed to submit further briefing to address the Court’s following questions: 

(1) Whether the Settlement should be characterized as a coupon settlement? 

(2) If this is a coupon settlement, whether the Court can determine a reasonable 

contingency fee without actual evidence of the value of the redemption? 

(3) Whether the Court can use the total reduction cap ($750,000) as the actual 

redemption value or the fifty cent ($0.50) reduction in admission price? 

(4) Whether there is a form of non-coupon relief the Class is due to receive which 

allows the Court to use the lodestar method to calculate attorneys’ fees under 28 U.S.C. § 

1712(b) and HP Inkjet? 

 Thus, the orders class counsel and defense counsel to file a renewed motion for 

attorneys’ fees8

 addressing the above issues on or before May 25th, 2017. 

a. Whether Class Counsel’s Attorneys’ Fees Request Is Reasonable 

 The lodestar figure is “the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation 

multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.” Hensly, 461 U.S. at 433. The lodestar 

“presumptively provides an accurate measure of reasonable attorney’s fees. See Harris v. 

Marhoefer, 24 F.3d 16, 18 (9th Cir. 1994); Clark v. City of Los Angeles, 803 F.2d 987, 990 

(9th Cir. 1986). A court may increase of decrease the lodestar amount in rare or exceptional 

cases. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 898-901 (1984); Harris, 24 F.3d at 18; Clark, 

803 F.2d at 990-91. The court in In re Bluetooth instructs as follows: 

“The court may adjust [the lodestar] upward or downward by an appropriate positive 

or negative multiplier reflecting a host of reasonableness factors, including the quality of 

                                               

8

 The Court also orders that the parties’ briefs are ten (10) pages maximum. 

Case 3:15-cv-02578-DHB Document 47 Filed 05/17/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 23 of 34
24 

15-cv-2578-DHB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

representation, the benefit obtained for the class, the complexity and novelty of the issues 

presented, and the risk of nonpayment. Foremost among these considerations, however, is 

the benefit obtained for the class. Thus, where the plaintiff has achieved only limited 

success, counting all hours expended on the litigation—even those reasonably spent—may 

produce an excessive amount, and the Supreme Court has instructed district courts to 

instead award only that amount of fees that is reasonable in relation to the results obtained.” 

In re Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 941-42. 

Here, class counsel’s fee award request is $145,130.29, based on counsel’s total 

proffered hourly rates of $93,070, and a multiplier of 1.56. (ECF No. 39 at 25.) 

1. Reasonableness of Counsel’s Hourly Rates 

 To assist the court in calculating the lodestar, a plaintiff must submit “satisfactory 

evidence...that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for 

similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation.” 

Blum, 465 U.S. at 895-96 n. 11. The relevant community is that in which the district court 

sits. See Schwarz v. Sec’y of Health and Human Serv., 73 F.3d 895, 906 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Declarations regarding the prevailing market rate in the relevant community suffice to 

establish a reasonable hourly rate. See Widrig v. Apfel, 140 F.3d 1207, 1209 (9th Cir. 

1998); Guam Soc’y of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Ada, 100 F.3d 691, 696 (9th Cir. 

1996) (noting that declarations from attorneys in the community can provide adequate 

proof of the reasonableness of counsel’s rates). Courts also use survey data to evaluate the 

reasonableness of attorneys’ rates. See Fish v. St. Cloud State Univ., 295 F.3d 849, 852 

(8th Cir. 2002) (“The parties presented two surveys of hourly rates, one reporting fees 

received by seven Twin Cities class action firms and the other reporting fees received by 

sixty-two firms doing a variety of work around the state. The court set individual hourly 

rate at the median of the class action survey and near the upper limit of the statewide survey, 

also taking into account the number of years an attorney had been admitted to practice”); 

Am. Petroleum Inst. V. United States EPA, 72 F.3d 907, 912 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“Petitioners 

have provided support for the reasonableness of their rates through affidavits and a survey 

of rates and we hold that these rates are reasonable”). 

Case 3:15-cv-02578-DHB Document 47 Filed 05/17/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 24 of 34
25 

15-cv-2578-DHB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 Class counsel contends his firm’s attorney’s hourly rates are reasonable and have 

been approved by many courts in the Los Angeles area, San Francisco Bay area, and other 

counties throughout California. (ECF No. 39 at 25.) Specifically, counsel seeks to have 

the Court approve Gaines & Gaines attorneys’ rates as follows: $650 per hour for Kenneth 

S. Gaines9

 (1970 graduate of UC Hastings College of Law); $300 per hour for third-year 

associate Evan S. Gaines (graduate of Michigan State University College of Law); $350 

per hour for fifth-year associate Sepideh Ardestani (2009 J.D. graduate of Whitter School 

of Law and 2010 L.L.M. graduate of Santa Clara School of Law); $450 per hour for the 

firm’s managing shareholder Daniel F. Gaines10 (2007 graduate of University of Virginia 

School of Law); and $500 per hour for Alex P. Katofsky11 (1999 graduate of University of 

the Pacific McGeorge School of Law). (Id. at 25-26.) 

 However, class counsel fails to proffer evidence that these rates are reasonable and 

merely cites two Ninth Circuit decisions to justify its lodestar calculation as reasonable. 

(ECF No. 39 at 25.) Specifically, class counsel cites Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 

523 F.3d 973, 979 (9th Cir. 2008), to contend that courts should apply rates commensurate 

with hourly rates for private attorneys conducting non-contingent litigation of the same 

type.12 (Id.) Yet, class counsel fails to note that, in Camacho, the Ninth Circuit held that 

the district court failed to identify the relevant community in awarding attorney’s fees and 

remanded the case to determine a reasonable hourly rate. Camacho, 523 F.3d at 979. The 

                                               

9

 Class counsel declares Kenneth S. Gaines rate of $650 per hour is based on his over four decades of 

practice, his vast litigation experience in complex litigation, and his involvement in class actions. (ECF 

No. 39-1 at 9.) 

10 Class counsel declares his rate of $450 per hour is reasonable and prevailing in the community for 

similar work performed by attorneys of comparable skill, experience, and reputation. (ECF No. 39-1 at 

9.) 

11 Class counsel declares Mr. Katofsky’s $500 hourly rate is reasonable because he is a highly skilled 

and experienced litigator with over 17 years of experience in high stakes litigation. (ECF No. 39-1 at 9.) 

12 Counsel also relies on Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 290 F.3d 1043, 1051 (9th Cir. 2002) to contend 

that reasonable hourly rates are based on each attorney’s current hourly rates. (ECF No. 39 at 25.) Class 

counsel’s reliance on Vizciano does not advance his argument here because, in the portion counsel cites, 

the Ninth Circuit was merely reviewing a district court’s application of the lodestar method as a crosscheck of the percentage method. Vizciano, 290 F.3d at 1050. 

Case 3:15-cv-02578-DHB Document 47 Filed 05/17/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 25 of 34
26 

15-cv-2578-DHB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Camacho court also instructed the district court to set a proper amount of fees by 

identifying facts and discussing declarations13 which helps the court determine an hourly 

rate that is comparable for attorneys with similar, skill, experience, and reputation. Id. at 

980. Of note, the Ninth Circuit recognized that “cases decided in the Northern District 

offer a wide spectrum of reasonable hourly rates, even for work performed by the same 

attorney.” Ibid. 

Unlike the fee applicant in Camacho14, class counsel here has not provided this Court 

with satisfactory evidence that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing for 

similar work in the relevant community, the Southern District of California. In fact, class 

counsel attempts to justify his attorney’s fee award request by contending that the proffered 

rates have been approved in other districts and counties. (ECF No. 39 at 25.) Class counsel 

only provides his declaration to support his motion for attorneys’ fees. (See ECF No. 39-

1.) In his declaration, class counsel asserts that it is difficult to determine an hourly rate of 

attorneys of similar skill and experience in the relevant community due to the scarcity of 

hourly fee paying clients in class action litigation. (Id. at 10.) Consequently, counsel avers 

that there is no customary billing rate, so the nature of class action work should be strongly 

considered. (Ibid.) Although the Court trusts that counsel is making a fair representation, 

it is hesitant to simply affirm class counsel’s representation regarding the reasonableness 

of the attorney’s hourly rate without corroborating evidence or declaration(s). The Court 

                                               

13 In Camacho, the Ninth Circuit instructs, “To inform and assist the court in the exercise of its 

discretion, the burden is on the fee applicant to produce satisfactory evidence—in addition to the 

attorney’s own affidavits—that the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for 

similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.” As we have 

noted, “[a]ffidavits of the plaintiff’s attorney[s] and other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the 

community, and rate determinations in other cases...are satisfactory evidence of the prevailing market 

rate.” Camacho, 523 F.3d at 980. 

14 In Camacho, Camacho filed declaration from her three attorneys and also submitted declarations from 

two other attorneys. One of those attorneys declared that the requested rates were within the range of 

prevailing market rates for attorneys with similar work experience in the Northern District. Similarly, 

the second attorney declared that Camacho’s attorneys’ rates were consistent, if not slightly lower than, 

the prevailing market rates for attorneys with comparable skill, qualifications, experience, and 

reputations. Camacho, 523 F.3d at 980. 

Case 3:15-cv-02578-DHB Document 47 Filed 05/17/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 26 of 34
27 

15-cv-2578-DHB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

recognizes that class counsel’s firm sits in the Central District of California, but it is 

possible for counsel to contact the Association’s local counsel for survey or declaration 

assistance. Moreover, class counsel’s representations do not mention a prevailing rate for 

similar work by attorneys of comparable skill and experience in the Southern District of 

California. To that extent, the Court orders class counsel to submit supporting declarations 

or survey data to establish the reasonableness of their requested rates on or before May 

25th, 2017. 

2. Reasonableness of Hours Expended 

A court may award attorneys’ fees only for the number of hours it concludes were 

reasonably expended on the litigation. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 (“[Counsel] should make 

a good faith effort to exclude...hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise 

unnecessary”). “[T]he fee applicant bears the burden of documenting the appropriate hours 

expended in the litigation and must submit evidence in support of th[e] hours worked...” 

Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439, 1449 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 

F.2d 1392, 1397-98 (9th Cir. 1992)); see Chalmers v. City of Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 

1210 (9th Cir. 1986) (“[C]ounsel bears the burden of submitting detailed time records 

justifying the hours claimed to have been expended”); Gucci Am., Inc. v. Pieta, 2006 WL 

4725707, at *2 (C.D. Cal. July 17, 2006) (holding that, although a fee applicant “is not 

required to record in great detail how each minute of [his] time was expended...[he must] 

list[ ] [the] hours and identity[ ] the general subject matter of [the] time expenditures”); 

Pac. W. Cable Co. v. City of Sacramento, 693 F.Supp. 865, 870 (E.D. Cal. 1988) (“The 

cases do not indicate that every minute of an attorney’s time must be documented; they do, 

however, require that there be adequate description of how the time was spent, whether it 

be on research or some other aspect of the litigation...”). 

 Class counsel reports that all attorneys have spent 198.7 hours on the case since prelawsuit interviews in late September 2015. (ECF No. 39-1 at 2, 71.) Specifically, class 

counsel, Daniel F. Gaines, has spent a total of 70.3 hours on this matter. (Id. at 8.) It is 

declared that other attorney spent time on this matter as follows: Kenneth S. Gaines (24.7 

Case 3:15-cv-02578-DHB Document 47 Filed 05/17/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 27 of 34
28 

15-cv-2578-DHB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

hours), Alex P. Katofsky (65.1 hours), Evan S. Gaines (13.6 hours), and Sepideh Ardestani 

(25.0 hours). (Id.) Class counsel attached an Attorney Time/Task Chart to his motion to 

reflect the work performed by each attorney in those hours.15 (Id. at 71.) 

 Daniel F. Gaines’ time record shows that he billed 70.3 hours on the inception of 

this case or about 3.5 hours per month. (Id. at 71.) Most of his time, approximately 37.6 

hours, was dedicated to pre-lawsuit interviewing, investigation and research, early neutral 

evaluation conference, and research and preparation of the Settlement. (Ibid.) He also 

spent 2.3 hours as he co-authored the Complaint, performed related research, and made 

related communications. (Ibid.) He then spent approximately 5.4 hours researching and 

performing work needed to file the preliminary approval motion, notice of lodging, and 

motion for attorneys’ fees. (Ibid.) 

The Court finds that the time counsel spent on this litigation, as detailed above, was 

reasonably expended. However, the Court acknowledges that counsel may have 

overestimated his time spent in the “[ESTIMATED]” row of the chart. (Ibid.) In that row, 

counsel estimates he will spend an additional twenty-five (25) hours “to reply to objections, 

if any, attend hearing on motion for final approval, class member communications, 

administration of settlement, close file.” (Ibid.) The Court finds this time estimation is 

unreasonable under the circumstances as he did not attend the final approval hearing, there 

are no objections to respond to, a coupon settlement such as this does not need to be 

administered, and, if it did, Simpluris has already been selected to provide notice to class 

members.16 (Ibid.) The Court estimates it should take six (6) hours to travel and attend the 

final approval hearing. Thus, the Court finds that 45.3 hours is a reasonable indication of 

the time spent on this case. 

                                               

15 The Court assumes class counsel’s time record accounts for time spent on the case since September 

30, 2015 as the chart he submitted does not illustrate any dates the work was performed. 

16 The Court recognizes that class counsel must travel from the Los Angeles area to San Diego for the 

final approval hearing, but the Court finds that traffic between the cities will not take counsel 25 hours 

even on the worst day. 

Case 3:15-cv-02578-DHB Document 47 Filed 05/17/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 28 of 34
29 

15-cv-2578-DHB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Similarly, the Court finds the overall number of hours provided by all other counsel 

are reasonable, except that each attorney’s “[ESTIMATED]” time is capped at a reasonable 

time necessary to close the file because Mr. Katofsky was the only attorney present at the 

final approval hearing. If counsel objects, they may be heard through supplemental 

briefing and submit detailed records indicating more future time was used in a reasonable 

manner on or before May 25th, 2017. 

 Katofsky’s time record reveals that he billed 65.1 hours since the inception of this 

case or about 3.25 hours per month. (Ibid.) It is reported that Katofsky spent 6.9 hours 

performing preliminary work up until the Complaint was filed. (Ibid.) Katofsky spent 17.8 

hours doing work related to the early neutral evaluation conference. (Ibid.) He then spent 

seven (7) hours performing work related to the Settlement. (Ibid.) The balance of his work 

time, approximately 8.4 hours, was spent preparing the preliminary approval order and the 

motion for attorneys’ fees. (Ibid.) Similar to Gaines, Katofsky estimated he would spend 

twenty-five (25) hours doing future work. (Ibid.) Unfortunately, Mr. Katofsky’s estimated 

time value needs to be cut to reflect a reasonable amount of time expended on this case, 

and the Court estimates his attendance at the final approval hearing should take six (6) 

hours total. Accordingly, the Court orders Mr. Katofsky to submit an updated time/task 

chart to provide a reasonable indication of the time spent on this case. 

 Given the overestimation of future time to be spent litigating this case, the Court 

finds 198.7 hours is unreasonable. 

3. Calculation of the Lodestar Figure 

For the reasons stated above, the Court concludes that the rates and hours requested 

by class counsel are unreasonable. Thus, a lodestar figure cannot be calculated at this time. 

4. Whether the Court Should Adjust the Fee Award 

Once the court has determined the lodestar, it should consider whether an award of 

that magnitude is reasonable, taking into account “‘the quality of representation, the benefit 

obtained for the class, the complexity and novelty of the issues presented, and the risk of 

nonpayment.’” In re Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 941-42 (quoting Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1029). 

Case 3:15-cv-02578-DHB Document 47 Filed 05/17/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 29 of 34
30 

15-cv-2578-DHB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

As the Ninth Circuit has made clear, the most important factor is the benefit obtained for 

the class. Id. at 942; see also McCown v. City of Fontana, 565 F.3d 1097, 1102 (9th Cir. 

2009) (the ultimate reasonableness of the fee “is determined primarily by reference to the 

level of success achieved by the plaintiff”); see also In re Omnivision Technologies, Inc., 

559 F.Supp.2d 1036, 1046 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (“The overall result and benefit to the class 

from the litigation is the most critical factor in granting a fee award”). 

 Currently, we have no lodestar figure to adjust. In this case, none of the factors 

favors either an upward or downward departure from the lodestar figure. The Settlement 

did not confer a monetary benefit on the Class. However, the Settlement does provide the 

Class with a benefit that the members likely would not have received had they pursed 

claims on an individual basis. In light of the outcome considering Plaintiff’s risk in further 

litigation, the Court declines to adjust the fee award downward. 

 b. Conclusion Regarding Attorneys’ Fees 

The Court will issue a separate discussing the merits of the attorneys’ fees after it 

receives supplemental briefing from the parties as instructed above. 

2. Whether Counsel’s Request for Expenses is Reasonable 

 The district court must also determine an appropriate award of costs and expenses. 

See Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(h) (“In a certified class action, the court may award reasonable 

attorney’s fees and nontaxable costs that are authorized by law or by the parties’ 

agreement”). “Expenses such as reimbursement for travel, meals, lodging, photocopying, 

long-distance telephone calls, computer legal research, postage, courier service, mediation, 

exhibits, documents scanning, and visual equipment are typically recoverable.” Rutti v. 

Lojack Corp., Inc., 2012 WL 3151077, at *12 (C.D. Cal. July 31, 2012). 

 Counsel seeks $4,869.71 in expenses. (ECF No. 39 at 28.) Counsel declares that 

the incurred costs included filing fees, travel expenses, parking fees, research fees, courier 

charges, mailing costs, and Federal Express charges. (Id. at 73.) The Court finds the 

expenses are reasonable and the supporting documentation adequately confirms the 

Case 3:15-cv-02578-DHB Document 47 Filed 05/17/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 30 of 34
31 

15-cv-2578-DHB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

expenditures. (ECF No. 39-1 at 73.) Thus, the Court approves the award for costs and 

expenses. 

3. Incentive Awards 

An individual who joins her claims with those of a class “disclaim[s] any right to a 

preferred position in the settlement [of those claims].” In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 1994 WL 

502054, *1 (N.D. Cal. June 18, 1994) (quoting Officers for Justice, 688 F.2d at 632). 

Nonetheless, it is well-established that the court may grant a modest incentive award to 

class representatives, both as an inducement to participate in the suit and as compensation 

for time spent in litigation activities, including depositions. See In re Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. 

Litig., 213 F.3d at 463 (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

awarding an incentive award to the class representatives); Matter of Cont’l Illinois Sec. 

Litig., 962 F.2d 566, 571 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that an incentive award in such amount 

“as may be necessary to induce [the class representative] to participate in the suit” is 

appropriate). 

 The Settlement provides Gillian Brown, the class representative, an incentive 

payment of $5,000. (ECF No. 39-1 at 36-37.) This proposed award is consistent with the 

amount courts typically award as incentive payments. See, e.g., In re Mego Fin. Corp., 

213 F.3d at 463 (approving a $5,000 incentive award for each class representative); 

Faigman v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 2011 WL 672648, *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2011) 

(approving an incentive payment of $3,333.33 for each of three class representative, and 

noting that $5,000 incentive payments are presumptively reasonable in that district); 

Dennis v. Kellogg Co., 2010 WL 4285011, *3 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2010) (preliminarily 

approving an incentive award of $5,000). 

Whether to authorize an incentive payment to a class representative is a matter within 

the court’s discretion. The criteria courts consider in determining whether to approve an 

incentive award include: 

 “(1) the risk to the class representative in commencing suit, both financial and 

otherwise; (2) the notoriety and personal difficulties encountered by the class 

Case 3:15-cv-02578-DHB Document 47 Filed 05/17/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 31 of 34
32 

15-cv-2578-DHB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

representative; (3) the amount of time and effort spent by the class representative; (4) the 

duration of the litigation[;] and [ ] (5) the personal benefit (or lack thereof) enjoyed by the 

class representative as a result of the litigation.” Van Vranken v. Atl. Richfield Co., 901 

F.Supp. 294, 299 (N.D. Cal 1995). 

a. The Risk to the Class Representative in Commencing Suit

When a class representative shoulders some degree of personal risk in joining the 

litigation, such as workplace retaliation or financial liability, an incentive award is 

especially important. See Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 977 (9th Cir. 2003). The 

record contains no information suggesting that Plaintiff risked retaliation. However, 

Plaintiff’s declaration indicates that she could be responsible for paying the attorneys’ fees 

and costs incurred by the Association if the Class lost the case. (ECF No. 39-2 at 3.) 

Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff shouldered some degree of personal risk in the form 

of financial liability risk. As such, this factor weighs in favor of an incentive award. 

b. The Notoriety and Personal Difficulties Encountered by the Class 

Representative 

There is no particular notoriety associated with this litigation, nor is there any 

indication that the named plaintiffs have been subjected to media attention as a result of 

their involvement in the case. See, e.g., Wilson v. Airborne, Inc., 2008 WL 3854963, *13 

(C.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2008). However, the fact that there was no media attention does not 

preclude approval of an incentive payment. See Razilov v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 2006 

WL 3312024, *4 (D. Or. Nov. 13, 2006). As no significant media attention or other 

difficulties have been identified, the Court finds this factor weighs against authorizing a 

large incentive payment. 

c. The Amount of Time and Effort Expended by the Class Representatives 

An incentive award is appropriate where the “class representatives remained fully 

involved and expended time and energy during the course of the litigation.” Razilov, 2006 

WL 3312024, at *4. This factor weighs in favor of making incentive awards when 

plaintiffs expended reasonable efforts on the litigation and were involved in the 

Case 3:15-cv-02578-DHB Document 47 Filed 05/17/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 32 of 34
33 

15-cv-2578-DHB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

proceedings. See In re Heritage Bond Litig., 2005 WL 15944403 *14 (C.D. Cal. June 10, 

2005) (activities such as “responding to discovery, preparing for, traveling to and attending 

their depositions and maintaining contact with Plaintiffs’ counsel to monitor the litigation” 

gave rise to an inference that class representatives were “actively involved in every aspect 

of...litigation”). Here, Plaintiff declares she assisted in the discovery and settlement 

process, communicated regularly with her attorneys to discuss a fair resolution, and 

attended the early neutral evaluation conference to try and settle the case. (ECF No. 39-2 

at 3.) For these reasons, the Court finds that she expended a fair amount of time and energy 

during the course of the litigation. The Court therefore finds this factor favors an incentive 

award. 

d. The Duration of the Litigation 

When litigation has been protracted, an incentive award is especially appropriate. 

See Van Vranken, 901 F.Supp. at 299 (finding that a class representative’s participation 

through “years of litigation” supported an incentive award). Here, Plaintiff filed her case 

in state court on September 30, 2015, and the case was later removed to this Court on 

November 17, 2015. Therefore, the case has been pending for approximately 18 months. 

Given the length of the litigation and Plaintiff’s involvement in it, the Court concludes that 

this factor is neutral. 

e. The Personal Benefit Enjoyed by the Class Representative as a Result of the 

Litigation 

An incentive award may be appropriate when a class representative will not gain any 

benefit beyond that she would receive as an ordinary class member. See Razilov, 2006 WL 

3312024, at *4 (approving an incentive payment award where the only benefit a class 

representative was going to receive from a settlement was the same statutory damages other 

class members would receive). Here, Plaintiff will receive no relief beyond that available 

to members of the class in general—fifty cents ($0.50) off the admission fee for the 2017 

San Diego County Fair. Absent an incentive award, Plaintiff will only receive a coupon 

Case 3:15-cv-02578-DHB Document 47 Filed 05/17/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 33 of 34
34 

15-cv-2578-DHB 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

essentially, assuming she attends the 2017 County Fair. Therefore, this factor also favors 

approval of an incentive award. 

f. Weighing the Factors 

Considering the relevant factors above, the Court concludes that an incentive award 

of $5,000 for Gillian Brown, the class representative, is “just and reasonable under the 

circumstances.” Van Vranken, 901 F.Supp. at 299. 

CONCLUSION 

For the reasons stated, the Court GRANTS the motion for final approval of the 

settlement, it awards Plaintiff Gillian Brown a $5,000 incentive award, and awards 

$4,869.71 in expenses, for a potential total of $759,869.71. 

The Court reserves its approval as it pertains to attorneys’ fees until after 

supplemental briefing and additional evidence is provided by counsel. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: May 15, 2017 

 _________________________ 

DAVID H. BARTICK 

 United States Magistrate Judge

Case 3:15-cv-02578-DHB Document 47 Filed 05/17/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 34 of 34