Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-07014/USCOURTS-ca10-90-07014-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 

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... 

.. UNITED S'l'ATBS· COUR'l' OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

ANNA REDDING, as guardian for the ) 

person and estate of MARK ALLEN ) 

REDDING, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

PILED 

United SttreJ Cou,r of Appeals 

Tenth Cirruit 

OCT 2 6 1910 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. ) 

) 

JOHN H. MARSH, individually, and; .) 

No. 90-7014 

(E.D. Oklahoma) 

(D.C. No. 88-767-C) 

OTHER UNKNOWN EMPLOYEES, of the ) 

JACKIE E. BRANNON CORRECTIONAL ) 

CENTER and of the DEPARTMENT OF ) 

CORRECTIONS FOR THE STATE OF ) 

OKLAHOMA; MCALESTER REGIONAL ) 

HEALTH CENTER, doing business as ) 

McAlester Regional Hospital; ) 

DENNIS R. STAGGS, individually ) 

and in his official capacity, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGIIElrl'* 

Before ANDERSON, BALDOCK, _and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-7014 Document: 010110064885 Date Filed: 10/26/1990 Page: 1 
Plaintiff-appellant, Anna Redding, as guardian for the person 

and estate of Mark Allen Redding, appeals from an order of the 

district court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma granting 

defendants' motion for summary judgment in the 42 u.s.c. § 1983 

action Ms. Redding brought on behalf of Mark, a former inmate at 

the Jackie Brannon Correctional Center in McAlester, Oklahoma. 

Ms. Redding's suit alleged that defendants, John H. Marsh, M.D. 

and McAlester Regional Health Center d/b/a McAlester Regional 

Hospital, subjected Mark Redding to cruel and unusual punishment 

in violation of the Eighth Amendment by failing to provide 

appropriate and timely medical treatment for head injuries Mark 

sustained, which injuries have resulted in permanent and severe 

damage. 1 We affirm. 

Summary judgment is appropriately rendered if the evidence 

demonstrates that there is no genuine issue as to any material 

fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Martin v. Bd. of County Comm'rs., 

909 F.2d 402, 404 (10th Cir. 1990); Osgood v. State Farm Mut. 

Auto. Ins. Co., 848 F.2d 141, 143 (10th Cir. 1988); Maughan v. SW 

Servicing, Inc., 758 F.2d 1381, 1387 (10th Cir. 1985). We review 

the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 

Ewing v. Amoco Oil Co., 823 F.2d 1432, 1437 (10th Cir. 1987). 

In Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1977), the Supreme 

Court held that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel 

1 An additional defendant below was Dr. John Staggs, the head 

of the emergency room at McAlester Regional Hospital. Dr. Staggs 

settled his claim, leaving only Dr. Marsh and the Hospital as 

parties to this appeal. 

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Appellate Case: 90-7014 Document: 010110064885 Date Filed: 10/26/1990 Page: 2 
.. 

.. and unusual punishment can extend to the denial of medical treat- · 

ment to an inmate where the inmate establishes "acts or omissions 

sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to 

serious medical needs." While it is true that such deliberate 

indifference may be manifested by "intentionally denying or 

delaying access to medical care," id. at 104, "an inadvertent 

failure to provide adequate medical care" does not amount to 

medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 105. It 

is clear that "deliberate indifference" requires "a higher degree 

of fault than negligence, or even gross negligence." Berry v. 

City of Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489, 1495 (10th Cir. 1990). We have 

defined it as follows: "an official or municipality acts with 

deliberate indifference if its conduct . disregards a known or 

obvious risk that is very likely to result in the violation of a 

prisoner's constitutional rights." Id. at 1496 (citing W. Keeton, 

D. Dobbs, R. Keeton & D. Owen, Prosser & Keeton on the Law of 

Torts§ 34, at 213 (5th ed. 1984) (describing reckless conduct as 

conduct "in disregard of a known or obvious risk that was so great 

as to make it highly probable that harm would follow, and which 

thus is usually accompanied by a conscious indifference to the 

consequences." (footnotes omitted))). The facts of this case, 

which are recounted in the district court opinion, do not meet the 

standard for "deliberate indifference." Cf. Martin v. Bd. of 

County Comm'rs., 909 F.2d 402, 406 (10th Cir. 1990); Reed v. 

Dunham, 893 F.2d 285, 287 (10th Cir. 1990). 

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Appellate Case: 90-7014 Document: 010110064885 Date Filed: 10/26/1990 Page: 3 
The judgment of the district court granting summary judgment 

to defendants and dismissing Ms. Redding's section 1983 claim, as 

well as her pendent state law claims for negligence, is AFFIRMED. 2 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Stephen H. Anderson 

Circuit Judge 

2 The district court also held that defendant Marsh was 

entitled to qualified immunity. While normally we would address 

an immunity claim before reaching the merits, because immunity in 

this case would apply only to one of the two defendants, it was 

necessary to reach the merits. Having concluded that Ms. 

Redding's claim fails on the merits, we do not address further the 

claim of immunity for Dr. Marsh. 

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Appellate Case: 90-7014 Document: 010110064885 Date Filed: 10/26/1990 Page: 4 
.. .._ . 

IH TJIB UHITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

ANNA REDDING, as guardian for the ) receiY~ 

person and estate of Mark Allen ) [.3-/s:-pf 

Redding, ) 

) 

Plaintiff, ) F.IL:ED ) 

v. ) No. 88-767-C 

) 

JOHN H. MARSH, et al., ) MAR f 3 1990 

) 

Defendants. ) WILLIAM •. OUTHllla 

Cler1l, U,S. C.l•e;• Ceutt 

••= ;;.{/;.,o..,. ORDER 

This is an action brought under the authority of 42 u.s.c. 

§19831 by plaintiff, Anna Redding, on behalf of Mark Allen Redding 

(Redding), a former inmate incarcerated at the Jackie Brannon 

Correctional Center (JBCC), McAlester, Oklahoma. Defendants are 

John H. Marsh (Marsh) , a physician employed by the Oklahoma 

Department of Corrections to serve the JBCC; McAlester Regional 

Health Center d/b/a McAlester Regional Hospital (MRH); and Dennis 

R. Staggs (Staggs), the physician who diagnosed and treated Redding 

at MRH. Plaintiff maintains that defendants, while acting under 

color of state law, subjected Redding to cruel and unusual 

punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United 

States Constitution by not providing him appropriate and timely 

42 u.s.c. §1983 provides: 

"Every person who, under color of any statute, 

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any 

State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be 

subjected, any citizen of the United States or 

other person within the jurisdiction thereof 

to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, 

or immunities, secured by the Constitution and 

laws, shall be liable to the party injured in 

an action at law, suit in equity, or other 

proper proceeding for redress." 

1 

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treatment. 1 It is plaintiff's contention that the motivation for 

the alleged lack of proper and timely treatment was Redding' s 

status as an inmate. 

Before the court are various motions to dismiss and/or motions 

for sWDJDary judgment filed by the parties. Having reviewed the 

voluminous briefs and attachments in support of the respective 

motions, the court finds that there are no genuine issues as to any 

material facts concerning plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim and 

that defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law for the 

reasons stated below. 

FACTUAL BACKGROQND3 

On May 11, 1987, Redding was an inmate of the Oklahoma 

Department of Corrections incarcerated at the JBCC in McAlester, 

Oklahoma. At approximately 8:00 p.m. on the evening of May 11, 

1987, Redding was struck in the head by a softball while he was 

participating in a softball game at the JBCC. After he was struck 

in the head by the softball, Redding fell to the ground and was 

unconscious for a period of four to five minutes. He had also 

suffered a cut to his lip during the fall and was bleeding both 

from his mouth and nose. The recreational program supervisor, 

Billy Taylor (Taylor), attended to Redding and told another officer 

to notify the facility's medical center to determine what should 

be done with Redding. After regaining consciousness, Redding was 

1 Plaintiff also makes pendent state clai~s of negligence 

against Marsh and Staggs. 

• In setting forth the factual background of this action, the 

court is mindful of the requirement that all factual inferences 

must be viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff and against 

defendants in relation to defendants' motions for sWDJDary judgment. united states y, Diebold, Inc,, 369 u.s. 654 (1962); Mustang Fuel 

corp, v, Youngstown sheet, Tube co,, 516 F.2d 33 (10th cir. 1975): Conaway Y, Smith, 853 F.2d 789 (10th Cir. 1988). 

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taken to the Oklahoma State Penitentiary (OSP) m~dical center at 

McAlester under his own power. 

Once at the medical center, Redding was preliminarily examined 

by the nursing staff. At approximately 8:30 p.m., nurse Mary Sue 

Sisco (Sisco) called Harrell Franklin, the physician's assistant 

on call. Sisco informed Franklin of Redding•s vital signs and 

general condition. At 9:05 Franklin arrived to treat Redding. 

Franklin noted a decreased sensorium in Redding. Franklin 

conducted a comprehensive visual and physical examination of 

Redding and cleaned, anesthetized, and sutured Redding's lip. At 

the conclusion of the suturing, Franklin noticed a slight slurring 

of Redding•s speech. As a result of the slurred speech, Franklin 

again conducted a comprehensive examination of Redding. 

At 10:05 p.m. Franklin initially consulted by telephone with 

Marsh, who was at home, and informed Marsh of what had transpired 

involving Redding and of Redding's condition. After discussing 

Redding's condition with Marsh, Franklin asked to transport Redding 

to Central State Hospital ( CSH) • Marsh approved Frankl in' s request 

to send Redding to CSH ·and Franklin called CSH to make 

arrangements. While Franklin was making the arrangements in his 

office, someone came into his office and informed him that Redding 

had vomited blood. Franklin observed Redding after he had vomited 

and questioned him further. Franklin could not determine whether 

the vomiting was the result of blood Redding had swallowed from his 

cut lip or if it was due to some other internal injury. Shortly 

thereafter, at . approximately 10: 15 p.m., Marsh, having further 

reflected on the matter, called back and directed that Redding 

initially be taken to MRH for x-rays, as a precautionary measure 

and diagnostic tool. Marsh called Staggs, who was the attending 

emergency room physician at MRH, and informed him that Redding was 

coming and of the incident involving Redding and of Redding• s 

condition. 

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At 10:27 p.m. a driver logged into the prison medical unit to 

take custody ot Redding and at 10:31 p.m. Redding was transported 

to MRH's emergency room. Between 10:45 p.m. and 11:00 p.m. Redding 

arrived at MRH's emergency room. Redding•s vital signs were 

obtained and Staggs documented Redding's history which included 

head trauma and a loss of consciousness. Staggs conducted a 

complete physical examination and x-rays were taken. Staggs noted 

an abnormally low heart rate, decreased sensorium, and slow 

response to verbal stimuli. Redding was further monitored and 

observed during the examination and throughout his stay in the 

emergency room. He was catheterized and medications and other 

solutions were administered. Lab work was obtained and various 

measures to lower intracranial pressure were undertaken. The xrays revealed a skull fracture and Staggs recommended that Redding 

be taken by helicopter to Oklahoma Memorial Hospital (OMH) in 

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. Staggs informed Marsh of his 

recommendation by telephone at approximately 11:30 p.m. Marsh 

agreed with the recommendation and Staggs made arrangements to 

transfer Redding to OMH. 

Sometime before midnight, arrangements were completed to 

transfer Redding to (OMH). A Medi-Flight Helicopter Service in 

Oklahoma City was notified and agreed to send a helicopter to MRH 

to pick up Redding. The helicopter arrived shortly after 1:00 a.m. 

on May 12, 1987. Redding was given additional medications to lower 

his swelling and to treat seizures he was experiencing. He was 

stabilized and secured in the transport gurney with additional 

medical apparatus readied and available. Redding arrived at OMH 

for treatment and care, but unfortunately, his condition had 

deteriorated to the point where his injuries caused permanent 

quadrapelgia and other associated permanent ailments. 

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STANDARD 

Having moved for summary judgment in their favor, defendants 

are required to show the absence of a genuine issue of material 

fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Their initial burden is to show the 

absence ot evidence to support plaintiff's case. Celotex y, 

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Defendants must identify those 

portions of "the pleadings, depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, and ad.missions on file, together with the 

affidavits, it any," which establish the absence of any genuine 

issue of material fact. I.g. at 323. Defendants need not negate 

plaintiff's claim or disprove plaintiff's evidence, but rather, 

defendants' burden is to show that there is no evidence in the 

record to support plaintiff's claim. Plaintiff, as the nonmoving 

party, must go beyond the pleadings and by way of affidavits or 

"depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file" 

designate "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 

trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). 

Summary judgment is not appropriate if there exists a genuine 

material factual issue such that a reasonable jury could return a 

verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v, Liberty Lobby. Inc,, 

477 U.S. 242, 249-51 (1986). In this regard, all evidence of the 

nonmoving party is deemed true and all reasonable inferences are 

drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. This court's function is 

not "to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter 

but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." .Id. 

at 249. With these standards in mind, the court turns to the 

merits ot defendants' motions. 

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Appellate Case: 90-7014 Document: 010110064885 Date Filed: 10/26/1990 Page: 9 
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EIGHTH AMENDMENT CRUEL AND tJNUSUAL PUNISHMENT CLAIM 

The underlying basis of plaintiff's claim is the Eighth 

Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, as 

made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. 

Plaintiff claims that under the standard set forth in Estelle v, 

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) defendants were "deliberately 

indifferent" to Redding's serious medical needs. Each defendant 

has moved the court for summary judgment in its favor on the 

grounds that the undisputed facts establish that they have not 

violated Redding•s Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and 

unusual punishment. Defendants contend that their conduct falls 

woefully short of conduct amounting to the "deliberate 

indifference" to the serious medical needs of prisoners. 

Consequently, they argue that under the "deliberate indifference" 

standard of Estelle and other related cases, they are entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law. The court agrees. 

In Estelle, the Supreme Court addressed the applicable 

standard for an Eighth Amendment claim by a prisoner alleging that 

he had been denied medical treatment and, therefore, subjected to 

cruel and unusual punishment. The Court noted .that due to the 

deprivation of their liberty, prisoners must rely on the government 

to meet their medical needs, but that not every claim of inadequate 

medical treatment amounts to a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim. 

~. at 104-105. The Court held that: 

an inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care 

cannot be said to constitute "an unnecessary and wanton 

infliction of pain" or to be "repugnant to the conscience 

of mankind." Thus, a complaint that a physician has been 

negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition 

does not state a valid claim of medial mistreatment under 

the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not 

become a constitutional violation merely because the 

victim is a prisoner. In order to state a cognizable 

claia, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions 

sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference 

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Appellate Case: 90-7014 Document: 010110064885 Date Filed: 10/26/1990 Page: 10 
to serious medical needs. It is only such indifference 

that can offend "evolving standards of decency" in 

violation of the Eighth Amendment • 

.151. at 105-106 (footnote omitted). 

The tacts ot this case fail to approach the level ot 

•deliberate indifference" to Redding•s serious medical needs. The 

undisputed evidence establishes that Redding was provided immediate 

medical diagnosis, care, and treatment by the prison medical staff 

and by Staggs and the MRH staff. After being struck by the 

softball, Redding was taken to the prison medical center without 

undue delay where he was evaluated and cared for by both the 

nursing staff and physician's assistant on duty. More importantly, 

Marsh, who consulted by phone and was not present at the prison 

medical center, took the precautionary and diagnostic step of 

referring Redding to MRH for x-rays to determine the full extent 

of Redding'& injuries. Marsh based his decision on the briefing 

he received from Franklin concerning Redding's condition after 

Franklin had completed a thorough visual and physical examination 

of Redding. After Redding arrived at MRH, he was cared for and 

treated by the MRH staff and Staggs, who made arrangements to 

transfer Redding to OMH once it was discovered (by way of x-rays) 

that Redding had a skull fracture. The transfer to OMH was 

necessary to treat Redding further because OMH, unlike MRH, is a 

facility with neurosurgical capabilities. During the course of 

his stay at MRH, Redding was monitored and observed and various 

measures, in the form of medications, catherization, and 

ventilation, were undertaken to treat Redding and control the 

complications which were manifesting themselves. 

Given the undisputed treatment above outlined, no arguable 

Eighth Amendment claim can be recognized by the court. At best, 

plaintiff can only claim that the treatment provided amounted to 

a difference in aedical judgment as to proper measures which should 

have been taken to diagnose and care for Redding's injuries. This 

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Appellate Case: 90-7014 Document: 010110064885 Date Filed: 10/26/1990 Page: 11 
is not a case where medical personnel took no action to treat an 

injured prisoner. Rather, the evidence conclusively establishes 

that Marsh and Staggs acted in accordance with the exercise of 

their best medical judgment in diagnosing and treating Redding's 

injuries. While other physicians may have undertaken to handle 

Redding•• situation differently, the court is only concerned with 

the actions or inaction of Marsh and Staggs and the question of 

alternative procedures is a question directed towards a negligence 

claim. •Deliberate indifference", not negligence, is the 

applicable criterion for plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim. A 

mere difference of opinion over the adequacy of medical treatment 

provided cannot provide the basis for an Eighth Amendment claim. 

El'Amin v, Pearce, 750 F.2d 829 (10th cir. 1984); Jones v, 

McCracken, 562 F.2d 22 (10th Cir. 1977); Smart v, Villar, 437 F.2d 

112 (10th cir. 1976); Coppinger v. Townsend, 398 F.2d 392 (10th 

Cir. 1968). As stated by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals: 

We need not decide whether denial of medical care to 

prisoners in reasonable need thereof is sufficient to 

sustain a claim under §1983 because in the instant case 

the allegations of the complaint show that medical care 

has been furnished. The allegation that the needed 

medication has been "cancelled" shows that a difference 

of opinion exists between the lay wishes of the patient 

and the professional diagnosis of the doctor. The 

prisoner's right is to medical care - not to the type or 

scope of medical care which he personally desires. A 

difference of opinion between a physician and a patient 

does not give rise to a constitutional right or sustain 

a claim under §1983. 

is1. at 394. Courts do not sit to evaluate and find fault with the 

medical judgments and decisions made by prison medical 

professionals in diagnosing and treating prisoners. Inmates of 

Allegheny county Jail v, Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 763 (3rd. cir. 

1979) • Consequently, to the extent that plaintiff is alleging that 

the treatment Redding received was constitutionally deficient, the 

court finds that plaintiff has failed to show that there are any 

genuine issues of material fact for trial and defendants are 

entitled to summary judgment in their favor. 

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Plaintiff, however, argues that this is not an action based 

on a constitutional analysis of the quality or type of treatment 

provided Redding, but rather, that the timing of the treatment 

provided made the otherwise adequate treatment constitutionally 

deficient. It is plaintiff's contention that the decisions 

concerning where to transfer Redding, so that he could receive 

proper medical care, were based on his status as an inmate. 

Plaintiff claims that Redding's medical condition dictated that he 

should have been transferred to a facility closer to the OSP 

medical center than was OMH. Specifically, plaintiff claims that 

the hospital in Muskogee, Oklahoma, is approximately one hour 

closer than OMH to the OSP medical center. Further, plaintiff 

claims defendants made the decision to transfer Redding to OMH 

without regard for his medical condition and with full knowledge 

that it would take twice as long for him to receive the necessary 

treatment. Plaintiff maintains that these status based decisions 

rendered the treatment · Redding received untimely and therefore 

violative of the Eighth Amendment's "deliberate indifference" 

standard. The court does not agree. 

Plaintiff cites a recent Tenth Circuit case arising out of 

this court, Reed y, Dunham, 893 F. 2d 285 (10th cir. 1990), to 

support the claim of untimely treatment. Reed was an inmate who 

filed a §1983 claim alleging, among other things, that he was 

denied proper and speedy medical treatment following an attack by 

other inmates which resulted in Reed receiving four stab wounds. 

Reed claimed that he was not afforded treatment for his wounds for 

nearly two hours. The Tenth Circuit found that Reed's complaint 

asserted a claim based on the prison's delay in furnishing medical 

care and not a claim based on difference of opinion over the 

quality or type of care provided. The Court found that Reed's 

allegation was credible and that it should not have been dismissed 

as frivolous under 28 u.s.c. §1915(d). The Court found that the 

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Appellate Case: 90-7014 Document: 010110064885 Date Filed: 10/26/1990 Page: 13 
two hour delay had not been adequately explained and cited various 

cases providing for Eighth Amendment claims based on the timeliness 

of providing adequate medical treatment. 

~ provides no solace for plaintiff under the facts herein. 

First, it should be noted that~ involved a decision on a motion 

to dismiss the complaint as frivolous under §1915(d). In fact, the 

Court noted the distinction between a such a motion to dismiss and 

a motion for summary judgment and did not discount the availability 

of a dispositive motion for summary judgment under the proper 

circumstances • .IJ1. at 287 n.2. Second, taking the allegations of 

Reed's complaint as true and based on the record before it, the 

Court could only find that there did indeed exist an unexplained 

two hour absence of any medical treatment. In the instant case, 

however, the record conclusively establishes that Redding was 

provided medical care throughout the entire period of time he was 

under the control of the defendants. 

Plaintiff's attempt to generate a fact issue out of the 

decision to transfer Redding to OMH as opposed to a closer hospital 

with neurosurgical capabilities is without merit. Again, this 

decision evinces no "deliberate indifference" to Redding•s serious 

medical needs. The undisputed facts are that a decision was made 

to transfer Redding to a facility where he could receive the 

necessary medical attention his then existing condition warranted. 

Any argument made by plaintiff, which has as its foundation the 

requirement of the utilization of the closest medical facility, is 

in reality an argument finding support only under a negligence 

theory. This is especially true in this case where the nature, 

quality, and availability of the treatment at the Muskogee hospital 

was unknown to defendants. Plaintiff would have the court sanction 

a legal theory whereby prison medical officials are not only 

required to make a decision concerning a particular procedure or 

course of treatment, but also that they make the right decision as 

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L 

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subsequent events may later dictate. No construction of the Eighth 

Amendment so requires. 

The undisputed evidence before the court establishes that 

Redding was provided medical treatment and that the decisions made 

by Marsh and Staggs concerning the course and scope of Redding's 

treatment do not amount to "deliberate indifference" to Redding's 

medical needs. Accordingly, the court finds that there are no 

genuine issues of material facts as to plaintiff's Eighth Amendment 

claim and that all defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law. 

QUALIFIED IMMUNITY 

Marsh also claims qualified immunity. The affirmative defense 

of qualified immunity is available to all government officials. 

Harlow v, Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). This immunity is an 

immunity from suit and not merely a defense to liability. Pueblo 

Neighborhood Health centers v, Losavio, 847 F.2d 642, 644-45 (10th 

Cir. 1988) and England v, Hendricks, 880 F.2d 281 (10th cir. 1989), 

cert, denied, 110 s.ct. 1130 (1990). The question of whether a 

defendant is entitled to qualified immunity is a legal question for 

the court. Losavio, 847 F.2d at 646. The test the court must 

apply is an objective one which inquires into the objective 

reasonableness of the official •s actions. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 816. 

Government officials performing discretionary functions will not 

be held liable for their conduct unless their actions violate 

"clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which 

a reasonable person would have known." lg. at 818. In this 

context, the law to be examined is the law existing at the time of 

the official's actions. lg. 

It is plaintiff's burden to show that the law was clearly 

established. Lutz Y, Weld County School Dist,, 784 F.2d 340, 342-

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,. \ . 

... 

43 (10th Cir. 1986). The Tenth Circuit Court of A~peals has stated 

that "the test of what is 'clearly established law' should be 

determined in a particularized sense, that is, that the 'contours 

of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official 

would understand that what he is doing violates that right. '" 

Garett v. Rader, 831 F.2d 202, 204 (10th cir. 1987) (quoting 

Anderson y, Creighton. 483 u.s. 635, 640 (1987)). The rule for 

evaluating the factual correspondence between the established law 

and the case at hand, is one "requiring some but not precise 

factual correspondence and demanding that officials apply general, 

well developed legal principles." Garcia v, Miera, 817 F.2d 650, 

657 (10th cir. 1987), cert. denied. 485 u.s. 959 (1988). 

Under the facts herein, it cannot be said that Marsh violated 

the clearly established rights of Redding.' The "deliberate 

indifference" standard of Estelle was clearly established at the 

time of Marsh's conduct. Redding clearly had the right to adequate 

medical treatment at the time of his injuries. Under Estelle, 

Redding was entitled to be free from cruel and unusual punishment 

in the form of exhibited "deliberate indifference" to his serious 

medical needs. Likewise, Redding was entitled to timely treatment. 

see generally cooper v, pyke, 814 F.2d 941 (4th cir. 1987); 

Aldridge Y, Montgomery. 753 F.2d 970 (11th Cir. 1985); Wood v, 

Worachek. 618 F.2d 1225 (7th Cir. 1980). Marsh's decision to have 

x-rays of Redding taken before he was transported to either CSH or 

OMH, or any other hospital, was objectively reasonable under the 

"deliberate indifference" standard. At the time Marsh made his 

decision Redding had been treated by the OSP staff and Franklin, 

and Marsh had been fully apprised of Redding•s condition by 

Franklin. Marsh exercised his medical judgment in sending Redding 

for x-rays and such a decision, even when evaluated in light of the 

' Staggs has not moved the court for an entry of summary 

judgment in his favor on the basis of qualified immunity and the 

court expresses no opinion in that regard. 

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....... 

... alternatives available to Marsh, did not violate Redding's clearly 

established right to adequate medical care. Even if Marsh sent 

Redding for x-rays, as opposed to some other treatment and 

diagnosis, solely because OSP required all inmates with head 

injuries to be sent to MRH, such affirmative action of providing 

treatment and diagnosis could hardly have been recognized as a 

violation of Redding's clearly established right to medical care. 

Additionally, even if it is assumed that Marsh dictated, in 

accordance with OSP poli~y, that Redding be taken to OMH as opposed 

to a closer hospital, Marsh's decision in this respect was also 

objectively reasonable in light of the acknowledged care Redding 

could receive at OMH. 

The court finds that Marsh is entitled to qualified 

immunity in that his conduct did not violate the clearly 

established constitutional rights of which reasonable persons would 

have known. 

PENDENT STATE CLAIMS 

Plaintiff has asserted pendent state claims of negligence 

against Marsh and Staggs. The court's decision to retain 

jurisdiction over a state law claim is discretionary where all 

federal claims have been dismissed and where an independent basis 

of jurisdiction, such as diversity of citizenship, does not exist. 

curtis Ambulance Y, Shawnee city Board of county commissioners, 811 

F.2d 1371, 1386 (10th cir. 1987): Key Financial Planning corp. v, 

ITT Life Insurance corp,, a28 F.2d 635, 643-44 (10th cir. 1987): 

Pitts v, Turner and Boisseau Chartered, 850 F.2d 650, 653 (10th 

cir.), cert, denied, 109 s.ct. 838 (1988). While dismissal of 

state law claims is not automatic where all federal claims have 

been dismissed before trial, Rosado y. Wyman, 397 u.s. 397 (1970), 

the court finds dismissal appropriate herein. Accordingly, 

plaintiff'• pendent state law claims against Marsh and Staggs are 

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. j 

... dismissed. 

CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing reasons, the court finds there are no 

genuine issues of material fact as to plaintiff's Eighth Amendment 

claim under §1983 and defendants are entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law on such claim. Also, the court finds Marsh is 

entitled to qualified immunity from suit. Finally, the court finds 

plaintiff's pendent state law claims for negligence should be 

dismissed.• 

IT IS SO ORDERED this IL /3 day of March, 1990. 

r 

Frank B. Seay 

On ted states District 

• The court has examined the various other bases asserted by 

defendants in support of their motions and finds that summary 

judgment and/or dismissal are inappropriate on those bases. 

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