Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01254/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01254-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

I. Screening Requirement and Standard

Plaintiff Jack Webb (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in 

this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff’s complaint, filed on August 12, 2013, 

is currently before the Court for screening. 

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 

1915A(a). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous or 

malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief 

from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2); 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

JACK WEBB,

 Plaintiff,

v.

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF 

CORRECTIONS, et al., 

Defendants.

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Case No.: 1:13-cv-01254-BAM (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH 

LEAVE TO AMEND 

(ECF No. 1)

THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE

Case 1:13-cv-01254-BAM Document 8 Filed 12/23/14 Page 1 of 13
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A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 

entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but 

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, 

do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s 

allegations are taken as true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. 

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). 

To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires sufficient 

factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. 

United States Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant 

acted unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the 

plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 

F.3d at 969.

II. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff is currently housed at Sierra Conservation Center (“SCC”), where the events in the 

complaint are alleged to have occurred. Plaintiff names the following defendants: (1) Jeffrey Beard, 

Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”); (2) Margo 

Wilkerson, Community Resource Manager, SCC; (3) Heidi Lackner, SCC Warden; (4) Chaplain 

Littlejohns; (5) M. Baldwin, Appeals Coordinator; (6) Kathleen Dickinson, Director of Adult 

Institutions; (7) Doe #1, SCC Mailroom Supervisor; (8) Doe #2 Religious Review Committee; (9) 

Frank Chavez; and (10) CDCR. Defendants are sued in their individual and official capacities. 

Plaintiff’s complaint concerns allegations that Defendants have hindered his practice of his 

Asatru/Odinic faith. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that a Chaplain did not show up to allow Plaintiff to 

practice his religion on December 9, 2008. 

Case 1:13-cv-01254-BAM Document 8 Filed 12/23/14 Page 2 of 13
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On December 29, 2008, Chaplain Littlejohns received a 602 grievance for delivery, but refused 

to accept or sign any documents. Chaplain Littlejohns instructed the practitioners to address the issues 

to Defendant Wilkerson. 

On January 6, 2009, members of the Asatru/Odinic faith met with Defendant Wilkerson

regarding issues of chapel times, calendar dates, recognition as a religious group, outdoor land and the 

failure to ducat practitioners for meetings and special events. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant 

Wilkerson either denied the requests or failed to act on the requests. 

On February 9, 2009, the request for an outdoor worship area was denied due to safety and 

security of the institution. 

On March 9, 2009, a book order was resubmitted. The books were ordered twice by 

Defendant Littlejohns because of the “discriminatory practices of Defendants to non-traditional faiths . 

. . . (ECF No. 1, p. 13.) Plaintiff alleges that other faiths do no experience such routine 

inconveniences. 

On March 9, 2009, Lt. Knoig heard a citizen’s complaint against Defendant Wilkinson. Lt. 

Knoig would not allow an inmate minister for the Asatru/Odinic practitioners in violation of California 

regulations. Plaintiff argues that this was discrimination against him because other similarly situated 

persons are allowed inmate ministers. 

On April 11, 2009, Defendant Wilkerson, Captain Gibbs and Chaplain Littlejohns interviewed 

Inmate Stien in connection with a 602 request for outdoor land use for religious purposes. The 602 

was partially granted, but no action was taken to conform the requested land use. 

On May 11, 2009, a book order arrived. The order was sent to the lower yard and inmates on 

C-Facility (Tuolumne yard) received used books from the lower yard. Plaintiff alleges that this is the 

type of discrimination done by Chaplain Littlejohns, Defendant Wilkerson and other staff. 

On May 11, 2009, Defendant Baldwin screened out a 602 appeal because too much time had 

elapsed. Plaintiff contends that time limits are not mandatory and this denial was another event to 

deprive the Asatru/Odinic practitioners their right to freely practice their faith. 

On June 1, 2009, Chaplain Littlejohns stated that there would not be a meeting on June 9,

2009, or a banquet on June 21, 2009, because there was no sponsor. Plaintiff alleges that custody 

Case 1:13-cv-01254-BAM Document 8 Filed 12/23/14 Page 3 of 13
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could have been assigned to oversee the banquet and that Asatru/Odinic practitioners do not require a 

church sanctioned person to oversee their functions. 

On October 10, 2009, practitioners had a discussion with Chaplain Littlejohns regarding the 

use of a lighter to burn sage and other incense. Chaplain Littlejohns denied the request.

On November 2, 2009, an inmate filed a 602 grievance against the appeals coordinator for not 

properly processing grievances concerning the Asatru/Odinic faith.

On March 15, 2010, Plaintiff alleges that another inmate was placed in administrative lock-up 

in retaliation for filing grievances related to establishment of an Asatru/Odinic religious program at 

SCC.

On March 20, 2010, Chaplain Littlejohns escorted members of the Asatru/Odinic faith to the 

facility visiting room for an indoor Blot (congregational ceremony). Plaintiff alleges that denial of an 

outdoor ceremony, which is an essential part of Asatru/Odinic practice, caused a deprivation of his 

rights.

On April 3, 2010, ducats were issued to Asatru/Odinic practitioners, but SCC staff refused to 

honor them. 

On April 5, 2010, Chaplain Littlejohns warned Asatru/Odinic members that if they continued 

to curse during services, then he would no longer be their sponsor. Plaintiff complained that this 

denied him freedom of expression and caused an unreasonable burden on his freedom of speech. 

On April 17, 2010, CDCR issued a “Notice of Change to Regulations.” The change required 

custody and staff to all practitioners excused time off. However, SCC did not allow excused time off 

without a threat of retaliation, such as losing a job or being passed over for promotions. Plaintiff 

alleges that this forced practitioners to choose between a job and the practice of faith.

On April 18, 2010, Defendant Lackner, while at Mule Creek State Prison, received a request

for a job position to be created. Defendant Lackner had knowledge regarding the needs of nontraditional faiths from her previous employment, but Plaintiff alleges that he was denied the 

opportunity to practice his faith by those under Defendant Lackner’s supervision.

On April 19, 2010, Asatru/Odinic members requested supplies from Chaplain Littlejohns, but 

no supplies were issued. 

Case 1:13-cv-01254-BAM Document 8 Filed 12/23/14 Page 4 of 13
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In June 2010, SCC issued a supplement to its Operations Manual. However, Plaintiff alleges 

that the supplement excluded a great deal of Asatru/Odinic practitioners’ needs and did not allow for 

an outdoor area. Plaintiff alleges that Warden Chavez failed to research sacred artifacts.

On December, 20, 2010, Chaplain Littlejohns issued a memorandum regarding oils from Azure 

Green supply company. According to Plaintiff, the memorandum was ambiguous and any order of 

sacred oils and herbs would likely be denied.

On November 22, 2010, Defendant Wilkerson received a proposal regarding guidelines for 

ordering spiritual packages from the Men’s Advisory Committee. The proposal was denied, along 

with special orders for religious purchases. 

On June 6, 2011, Defendant Baldwin refused to process a grievance concerning Asatru/Odinic 

religious rights, including the use of a sacred outdoor religious area. Defendant Baldwin screened out 

the appeal and refused to allow exhibits explaining the necessity of the outdoor area. 

On July 20, 2011, Defendant Wilkerson responded to a grievance regarding denial of an 

outdoor area for Asatru/Odinic practitioners. Defendant Wilkerson indicated that there was an outdoor 

area on C facility to accommodate various groups that require outdoor religious activities. Defendant 

Wilkerson also denied a request for a fire pit due to safety and security concerns. Defendant 

Wilkerson also indicated that Asatru/Odinic practitioners were not being denied state and federal 

funds to purchase religious items. On September 15, 2011, Defendant Lackner responded to the 

grievance at the Second Level and found that first level appeal was conducted properly. 

On October 25, 2012, Defendant Dickinson issued a memorandum to Community Resource 

Managers regarding religious personal property and religious grounds. The memorandum reportedly 

prohibited the establishment of new outdoor worship areas.

On January 31, 2013, Defendant Doe #1, a mailroom supervisor, refused to process legal mail 

addressed to Defendant Wilkerson. 

On February 11, 2013, Defendant Baldwin refused to process a grievance concerning the 

mailroom’s processing of mail addressed to Defendant Wilkerson and Deacon Lewis.

On March 4, 2013, Defendant Wilkerson refused to process a request for religious items that 

were allowed Asatru/Odinic practitioners and Plaintiff. Defendant Wilkerson indicated that the 

Case 1:13-cv-01254-BAM Document 8 Filed 12/23/14 Page 5 of 13
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requested items were not allowed at SCC. However, Plaintiff claims that these items were allowed 

and were contained on a property matrix provided by Defendant Wilkerson.

On February 5, 2013, Defendant Baldwin refused to process a grievance directed to Defendant 

Wilkerson. 

On January 18, 2013, Prison Guard Miller took Plaintiff’s hammer, which was used in 

ceremony. Defendant Miller wrote a receipt for the confiscated property, but refused to return the 

hammer. 

On June 22, 2013, while holding a Blot on the Tuolumne yard, Prison Guard Hanson referred 

to Plaintiff’s faith as a “bunch of non-sense.” Hanson indicated that he was going to put an end to 

Blots on the yard. 

Prior to January 19, 2013, Plaintiff applied for supplies and requested a book order. Chaplain 

Littlejohns failed to identify the ordered books and ignored the request for supplies. On January 25, 

2013, Defendant Wilkerson indicated that the order was submitted, but final approval had not been 

authorized. Defendant Wilkerson suggested that practitioners contact Chaplain Littlejohns for a copy 

of the order. When approached, Chaplain Littlejohns suggested patience. Plaintiff alleges that the 

request for office supplies again was ignored.

Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant Doe #1, the mailroom supervisor, refused to process the 

civil complaint in this action.

Plaintiff asserts the following causes of action: (1) violation of the Establishment Clause 

against all defendants in their official and individual capacities; (2) violation of the Equal Protection 

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against all defendants in their official and individual capacities; 

(3) violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment; (4) violation of the Religious Land 

Use and Institutional Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) against CDCR and all defendants in their individual 

and official capacities; and (5) violation of the California Constitution against CDCR and all 

defendants in their individual and official capacities. 

Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, along with damages. 

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III. Discussion

1. Linkage Requirement

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 

citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 

secured by the Constitution ... shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit 

in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between the 

actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by Plaintiff. See Monell v. 

Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611; Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 96 

S.Ct. 598, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the 

deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, 

participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do 

that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th 

Cir. 1978).

Here, Plaintiff fails to link Defendant Jeffrey Beard and Doe #2 to any constitutional violation. 

If Plaintiff amends his complaint, he must allege what each individual did or failed to do that resulted 

in a violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

To the extent Plaintiff seeks to bring suit against Defendant Beard and Defendant Lackner

based on their roles as supervisors, he may not do so. Supervisory personnel may not be held liable 

under section 1983 for the actions of subordinate employees based on respondeat superior or vicarious 

liability. Crowley v. Bannister, 734 F.3d 967, 977 (9th Cir. 2013); accord Lemire v. California Dep’t 

of Corr. and Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1074–75 (9th Cir. 2013); Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 

896, 915–16 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). “A supervisor may be liable only if (1) he or she is personally 

involved in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) there is a sufficient causal connection between the 

supervisor's wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” Crowley, 734 F.3d at 977 (internal 

quotation marks omitted); accord Lemire, 726 F.3d at 1074–75; Lacey, 693 F.3d at 915–16. “Under 

the latter theory, supervisory liability exists even without overt personal participation in the offensive 

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act if supervisory officials implement a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of 

constitutional rights and is the moving force of a constitutional violation.” Crowley, 734 F.3d at 977

(citing Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2. Official Capacity and Eleventh Amendment

The Eleventh Amendment prohibits suits for monetary damages against a State, its agencies, 

and state officials acting in their official capacities. Aholelei v. Dep’t of Public Safety, 488 F.3d 1144, 

1147 (9th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff may not bring suit against the CDCR. Plaintiff also may not bring a 

suit for monetary damages against defendants in their official capacities. 

3. Establishment Clause of the First Amendment

The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment “prohibits the enactment of a law or official 

policy that ‘establishes a religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.’” Newdow v. Lefevre, 598 F.3d 

638, 643 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678, 104 S.Ct. 1355 (1984)). The 

clause applies to official condonement of a particular religion or religious belief, and to official 

disapproval or hostility towards religion. American Family Ass’n, Inc. v. City and County of San 

Francisco, 277 F.3d 1114, 1120-21 (9th Cir. 2002) (quotation marks and citations omitted).

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ denial of religious items and denial of funds to support the 

Asatru/Odinic religion violate the Establishment Clause by favoring mainstream religions. However, 

Plaintiff’s allegations do not demonstrate that the defendants are endorsing any other religion over his 

Asatru/Odinic faith. Plaintiff’s allegations related to mainstream religions are, at best, generalized and 

conclusory. 

Further, Plaintiff’s allegations that certain items necessary to practice his faith have not been 

allowed or have been denied does not demonstrate that defendants are endorsing any other particular 

religion or belief. Restrictions are inherent in the prison setting. “[A] prisoner retains those First 

Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate 

penological objectives of the corrections system.” Ashker v. California Dep’t Of Corr., 350 F.3d 917, 

922 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Plaintiff’s belief that he is entitled to 

certain items that have been restricted does not suggest that Defendants are supporting any other 

particular religion or belief. 

Case 1:13-cv-01254-BAM Document 8 Filed 12/23/14 Page 8 of 13
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The Court therefore finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under the Establishment 

Clause. 

4. Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 

The Equal Protection Clause requires that all persons who are similarly situated should be 

treated alike. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (2001); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 

Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985). “The Equal Protection 

Clause entitles each prisoner to ‘a reasonable opportunity of pursuing his faith comparable to the 

opportunity afforded fellow prisoners who adhere to conventional religious precepts.’” Shakur v. 

Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 891 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321-22 (1972) (per

curiam)).

To state a claim, Plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to support a claim that prison officials 

intentionally discriminated against him on the basis of his religion by failing to provide him a 

reasonable opportunity to pursue his faith compared to other similarly situated religious groups. Cruz, 

405 U.S. at 321-22; Shakur, 514 F.3d at 891; Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003); 

Lee, 250 F.3d at 686.

Here, Plaintiff alleges that other religions have not been denied the same opportunities and 

materials as Plaintiff and those of his Asatru/Odinic faith. However, Plaintiff’s assertions regarding 

other mainstream religions are conclusory at best and lack supporting factual allegations. Plaintiff 

also has failed to allege sufficient facts to demonstrate that he was denied the same opportunities 

because of his religious beliefs. Plaintiff therefore has failed to state an Equal Protection Clause 

claim. 

5. Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment

“Inmates . . . retain protections afforded by the First Amendment, including its directive that no 

law shall prohibit the free exercise of religion.” O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 

(1987) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The protections of the Free Exercise Clause are 

triggered when prison officials substantially burden the practice of an inmate’s religion by preventing 

him from engaging in conduct which he sincerely believes is consistent with his faith. Shakur, 514 

F.3d at 884-85.

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Plaintiff appears to allege that his rights were violated by the denial of access to chapel times, 

an outdoor worship space and various items, including a lighter, a hammer, office supplies and a fire 

pit. 

Chapel Access

With regard to chapel access, Plaintiff’s allegations do not demonstrate a continuing denial of 

access. At best, Plaintiff alleges that a Chaplain did not show up on December 9, 2008, and there was 

no sponsor available for a meeting and a banquet in June 2009. There is no indication that the 

inability to attend chapel/services on these three dates substantially burdened Plaintiff’s ability to 

practice his religion. Further, Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendant Littlejohns warned them to stop 

cursing during services or the requirement of a sponsor are not sufficient to demonstrate a substantial 

burden on his ability to practice his faith. 

Outdoor Worship Space

Plaintiff alleges that denial of a sacred outdoor space caused a deprivation of his rights. 

However, Plaintiff’s own allegations establish that Defendants provided an outdoor area on C facility 

to accommodate groups that required outdoor religious activities. Plaintiff has not demonstrated how 

this is insufficient for the practice of his faith. 

Religious Items

With regard to religious items, Plaintiff first complains about book orders. However, it is 

evident from Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendant Littlejohns submitted the requested book orders. 

Plaintiff’s additional complaints about used books are not sufficient to state a Free Exercise claim. 

Additionally, Plaintiff’s complaints about the denial office supplies or interference with mail do not 

state a Free Exercise claim. 

Plaintiff also complains about denial of a hammer, outdoor fire pit and a lighter. However, 

these items are a threat to the safety and security of the institution. As noted above, a prisoner retains

only those First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the 

legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system. Ashker, 350 F.3d at 922.

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Plaintiff also complains about an anticipated denial of orders of sacred oils and herbs. 

However, Plaintiff has not alleged any actual denial of these items and that such denial prevented him 

from engaging in conduct that he sincerely believes is consistent with his faith. 

6. Religious Land Use and Institutional Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) 

A claim under RLUIPA may proceed only for injunctive relief against defendants acting within 

their official capacities. Wood v. Yordy, 753 F.3d 899, 904 (9th Cir. 2014) (RLUIPA does not 

contemplate liability of government employees in individual capacity); Alvarez v. Hill, 667 F.3d 1061, 

1063 (9th Cir. 2012) (money damages not available for RLUIPA claim against defendants sued in 

their official capacity); Graddy v. Ding, 2014 WL 6634580, *3 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2014). 

To state a claim for violation of RLUIPA, Plaintiff must allege facts plausibly showing that the 

challenged policy and the practices it engenders impose a substantial burden on the exercise of his 

religious beliefs; Plaintiff bears the initial burden of persuasion on this issue. Hartmann v. California 

Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted).

“Courts are expected to apply RLUIPA’s standard with due deference to the experience and 

expertise of prison and jail administrators in establishing necessary regulations and procedures to 

maintain good order, security and discipline, consistent with consideration of costs and limited 

resources.” Id. (citing Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 723, 125 S.Ct. 2325 (2003)) (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

As discussed above, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that any of the issues complained of 

have imposed a substantial burden on the practice of his faith, particularly when giving deference to 

prison procedures for maintaining order, security and discipline. Plaintiff therefore fails to state a 

claim under RLUIPA. 

7. State Law 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), in any civil action in which the district court has original 

jurisdiction, the district court “shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims in the action 

within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III,” 

except as provided in subsections (b) and (c). “[O]nce judicial power exists under § 1367(a), retention 

of supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims under 1367(c) is discretionary.” Acri v. Varian 

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Assoc., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1997). “The district court[] may decline to exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if . . . the district court has dismissed all 

claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). The Supreme Court has 

cautioned that “if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, . . . the state claims should be dismissed 

as well.” United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).

Here, Plaintiff contends that Defendants violated Article 1, Section 4 of the California 

Constitution, which provides for the free exercise and enjoyment of religion without discrimination

and prohibits the establishment of religion. Analysis of a free exercise claim under the California 

Constitution is the same as that under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Vernon v. 

City of Los Angeles, 27 F.3d 1385, 1392 (9th Cir. 1994). Similarly, analysis of an establishment of 

religion claim under the California Constitution is the same as that under the Establishment Clause of 

the First Amendment. McCollum v. State of California, 2006 WL 2263912, *7 (N.D. Cal. 2006). For

the same reasons that Plaintiff has failed to state Establishment Clause or Free Exercise Clause claims, 

Plaintiff fails to state a claim under the California Constitution.

Plaintiff may amend this claim. However, if Plaintiff fails to allege a cognizable federal claim 

in his amended complaint, then the Court will not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law 

claim, even if he cures the deficiency and states a claim based on the California Constitution. 28 

U.S.C. § 1367(a); Herman Family Revocable Trust v. Teddy Bear, 254 F.3d 802, 805 (9th Cir. 2001).

7. Grievance Process

Plaintiff cannot pursue any claims against staff relating to their involvement in the 

administrative review of his inmate appeals. The existence of an inmate appeals process does not 

create a protected liberty interest upon which Plaintiff may base a claim that he was denied a particular 

result or that the appeals process was deficient. Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003); 

Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). To state a claim under section 1983, Plaintiff 

must demonstrate personal involvement in the underlying violation of his rights, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

677; Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002), and liability may not be based merely on 

Plaintiff’s dissatisfaction with the administrative process or a decision on an appeal, Ramirez, 334 

F.3d at 860; Mann, 855 F.2d at 640.

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IV. Conclusion and Order

Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a cognizable section 1983 claim. The Court will grant 

Plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint and cure the identified deficiencies to the extent that 

he is able to do so in good faith. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Plaintiff’s amended complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but it must state what each 

named defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

678-79, 129 S.Ct. at 1948-49. Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be 

[sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555

(citations omitted). 

Additionally, Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims 

in his amended complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no “buckshot” 

complaints). 

Finally, Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. 

Lacey, 693 F.3d at 927. Therefore, Plaintiff’s amended complaint must be “complete in itself without 

reference to the prior or superseded pleading.” Local Rule 220. 

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that: 

1. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a complaint form; 

2. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed with leave to amend; 

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file a first 

amended complaint; and 

4. If Plaintiff fails to file a first amended complaint in compliance with this order, this 

action will be dismissed for failure to obey a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 22, 2014 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:13-cv-01254-BAM Document 8 Filed 12/23/14 Page 13 of 13