Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00971/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00971-15/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

CALPHALON CORPORATION,

NO. CIV. S-05-0971 WBS DAD

Plaintiff,

v. ORDER RE: DEFENDANT’S REQUEST 

FOR RECONSIDERATION OF 

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S RULING AND 

PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR 

ATTORNEYS’ FEES

MEYER CORPORATION, U.S.,

Defendant.

 

MEYER CORPORATION, U.S. and

MEYER INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES

LIMITED,

Counterclaimants,

v.

CALPHALON CORPORATION,

Counterdefendant.

----oo0oo----

Currently before the court is defendant Meyer

Corporation’s request for reconsideration of the Magistrate

Judge’s ruling to deny defendant’s motion to modify the

protective order. 

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I. Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff Calphalon Corporation brought suit against

defendant based on allegations of infringement of a design patent

for a cookware handle. (Compl.) On November 14, 2005,

Magistrate Judge Drozd signed a protective order submitted and

stipulated to by the parties. (Nov. 14, 2005 Stipulated

Protective Order.) The stipulated protective order covers

confidential or proprietary information and specifies that

certain confidential information may only be seen by the

attorneys. (Id. at 4.) Pursuant to the terms of the order, a

party who seeks to challenge the protected nature of a document

bears the burden of persuasion in demonstrating that the document

should not be protected. (Id. at 7.) Magistrate Judge Drozd

signed the order based on a finding of good cause. (Id. at 13

(“FOR GOOD CAUSE SHOWN, IT IS SO ORDERED.”).)

On May 24, 2006, defendant filed a motion to modify the

protective order to allow previously-protected documents to be

shown to four of defendant’s employees. Magistrate Judge Drozd

heard argument on the motion on June 30, 2006. At that time, the

Magistrate Judge explained that defendant, as the moving party,

must demonstrate a reasonable need for the modification of the

order, likely referring to the burden of persuasion that was set

by the stipulated protective order. (Dickie Decl. Ex. 2 at 2:23-

24 (transcript of June 30, 2006 hearing).) Upon a showing of

need by defendant, plaintiff would bear the burden of showing

good cause for continued protection of the information. (Id. at

3:4-5.) Finally, if plaintiff met this burden, the court would

need to balance defendant’s need for the information against the

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risk of injury to plaintiff. (Id. at 3:5-8.)

Defendant initially indicated that the need for the

information was for the “purposes of evaluation of settlement

possibilities and then preparation of defenses.” (Id. at 6.) 

Defendant further contended that because the clients did not have

access to this limited financial information, it was difficult

for the clients to determine what potential damages would be and

whether to settle the case. (Id.) The Magistrate Judge noted

that the statements defendant made were vague, general

assertions, with the exception of a somewhat more detailed

request to see plaintiff’s financial documents in order to

prepare for settlement. (Id. at 3-4.) 

Plaintiff countered that defendant did not need the

information it sought in order to make a damages calculation,

because such a calculation would either come from a determination

of a reasonable royalty for licensing the invention or from

defendant’s profits. (Id. at 7.) Defendant would not need any

information from plaintiff to determine its profits, and

plaintiff represented to the court at that time that it had

previously disclosed the bulk of the financial documents that

defendant claimed it needed to determine what the rate of a

reasonable royalty would be. (Id. at 8-9.) Moreover, plaintiff

contended that it only minimally relied upon the confidential

financial information at issue in its own calculation of the

potential damages. (Id. at 7-8, 10.) 

Taking these arguments into consideration, the

Magistrate Judge concluded that because defendant had not made a

showing of its reasonable need for modification of the protective

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order, the motion should be denied. (Id. at 10.) Defendant now

moves the undersigned to reconsider the Magistrate Judge’s ruling

on the motion to modify the protective order.

II. Discussion

 A district court reviewing a magistrate judge’s ruling

on a non-dispositive motion should determine whether the decision

was “clearly erroneous” or “contrary to law”. 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1)(A); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). The Magistrate Judge issued

this protective order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

26(c). Rule 26(c) provides, in pertinent part, that “for good

cause shown, the court . . . may make any order which justice

requires to protect a party or person from annoyance,

embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense . . . .” 

Rule 26(c) also specifically lists trade secrets as an example of

an appropriate subject of a protective order. After a finding of

good cause, a court may enter “any order prohibiting the

requested discovery altogether, limiting the scope of the

discovery, or fixing the terms of disclosure.” Rivera v. NIBCO,

Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1063 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.

26(c)).

Based on the above standard, the undersigned cannot say

that the Magistrate Judge’s determination was clearly erroneous

or contrary to law. The protective order was issued upon a

determination of good cause having been shown. Defendant now

seeks exemption from the standards set in the protective order

stipulated to by the parties. Although defendant would have

plaintiff first bear the burden of showing good cause for

continued protection of the information at issue, the Magistrate

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Plaintiff requests attorneys’ fees in connection with 1

this motion based on defendant’s vexatious conduct. The court

does not conclude that defendant’s conduct rises to the level of

vexatiousness and therefore declines plaintiff’s request for

attorneys’ fees.

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Judge found that defendant failed to meet its initial burden of

persuasion imposed by the protective order. If defendant had met

its initial burden, the Magistrate Judge would have then

correctly imposed the burden of showing good cause for protection

on the plaintiff, who was the party seeking to protect the

information. However, as noted, the Magistrate Judge did not

need to reach this stage of the analysis given the facts before

him.

The court’s holding here does not decide whether

defendant could have met its burden of persuasion in its motion

to modify the protective order. Further, although discovery in

this case is closed and the matter is set for trial, the timing

of defendant’s renewed motion should not preclude the motion from

being heard.1

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant’s motion to

reconsider the Magistrate Judge’s ruling be, and the same hereby

is, DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to the right to seek relief before

the Magistrate Judge. Additionally, the Magistrate Judge shall

not regard a renewed motion on these grounds as untimely.

DATED: August 23, 2006

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