Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05466/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05466-18/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DONALD GLASS,

Plaintiff,

v.

R. BEER, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:04-cv-05466-OWW-SMS PC

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

TO COMPEL OR FOR SANCTIONS

(Doc. 142)

I. Order 

A. Procedural History

Plaintiff Donald Glass (“plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil rights

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action is proceeding on plaintiff’s complaint, filed March

22, 2004, against defendants Beer, Keener, Sloss, Morales, and Dill for violation of the Eighth

Amendment, and against defendants Beer, Keener, Sloss, Morales, Dill, Butts, Adkison, Gonzales,

Castillo, Buckley, Streeter, Marshall, and Lloren for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment.

(Doc. 20.) On November 16, 2006, the court issued a lengthy, detailed order granting in part and

denying in part plaintiff’s motion to compel. (Doc. 124.) Pursuant to the order, plaintiff’s motion

to compel production of four videotapes was granted, subject to the creation of a procedure that

would allow plaintiff to view the videotapes but preserve the safety and security of the institution.

(Doc. 124, 28:14-29:25.) Defendants’ counsel was provided with the opportunity to devise a

solution that would allow plaintiff to view the tapes. (Id.) On November 29, 2006, counsel notified

the court that the tapes would be kept in the Litigation Office and would be made available for

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 Plaintiff’s assertion that defendants’ opposition was untimely is baseless. Plaintiff’s motion was filed on 1

March 5, 2006, and defendants’ opposition was timely filed twenty-one days later. Local Rule 78-230(m). On the

other hand, plaintiff’s reply was untimely. Id. 

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plaintiff to review upon notice to counsel, who would then contact prison officials to schedule a

review. (Doc. 127.) In the notice, it was stated, without supporting evidence, that defendants’

inquiry revealed only two tapes. (Id.) 

On March 5, 2007, plaintiff filed a motion to compel production of two videotapes or for

sanctions in the amount of $25,000.00 if the tapes have been destroyed. (Doc. 142.) Defendants

filed an opposition on March 26, 2007, and plaintiff filed a reply on April 12, 2007. (Docs. 144, 1

147.) 

B. Motion to Compel or for Sanctions

Plaintiff’s position is that four videotapes relating to the incident of excessive force at issue

in this action were made. (Doc. 142.) Two tapes were made on October 23, 2001, one tape was

made on October 24, 2001, and one tape was made on December 28, 2001. (Id.) Defendants

produced a tape made on October 23, 2001, and a tape made on October 24, 2001. (Id.) Plaintiff

seeks the production of the other two tapes or sanctions if the tapes have been destroyed. (Id.) In

support of his motion, plaintiff submits documentary evidence in which it is stated that plaintiff’s

staff complaint interview was videotaped on December 28, 2001. (Id., court record pg. 17.)

Defendants’ position is that there exists a tape of the cell extraction made on October 23,

2001, and a tape of an interview made on October 24, 2001. (Doc. 114, Gonzalez Dec., ¶3.)

Although it had been thought that there was an interview tape from October 23, 2001, the equipment

malfunctioned and the interview was taped on October 24, 2001. (Id.) No tape of an interview on

December 28, 2001, was found, despite three searches. (Id., ¶¶3, 7.) 

The court cannot further compel defendants to produce videotapes they contend, under

penalty of perjury, do not exist. Both plaintiff and the court are required to accept defendants’

response that there exist only two tapes, absent evidence to the contrary. For this reason, plaintiff’s

motion to compel production of the two tapes must be denied.

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Turning to plaintiff’s motion for sanctions based on destruction, or spoliation, of evidence,

“as soon as a potential claim is identified, a litigant is under a duty to preserve evidence which it

knows or reasonably should know is relevant to the action.” Ameripride Svcs., Inc. v. Valley Indus.

Serv., Inc., No. CIV-S-00-113 LKK/JFM, 2006 WL 2308442, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2006) (citing

National Ass’n of Radiation Survivors v. Turnage, 115 F.R.D. 543, 566-67 (N.D. Cal. 1987)). The

court has inherent power to sanction parties or their attorneys for improper conduct, Chambers v.

Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43-46 (1991); Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 766 (1980);

Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.3d 989, 991 (9th Cir. 2001), which includes spoliation of evidence, World

Courier v. Barone, No. C 06-3072 TEH, 2007 WL 1119196, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2007);

Ameripride Svcs., Inc., 2006 WL 2308442, at *4. 

The imposition of sanctions under the court’s inherent authority is discretionary. Air

Separation, Inc. v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London, 45 F.3d 288, 291 (9th Cir. 1995). A court’s

inherent powers “are governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts

to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.”

Chambers, 501 U.S. at 43. Such inherent power “is not a broad reservoir of power, ready at an

imperial hand, but a limited source; an implied power squeezed from the need to make the court

function.” Id. at 42. “Because inherent powers are shielded from direct democratic controls, they

must be exercised with restraint and discretion.” Roadway Express, Inc., 447 U.S. at 764.

In order to sanction a litigant under the court’s inherent powers, the court must make a

specific finding of “bad faith or conduct tantamount to bad faith.” Fink, 239 F.3d at 994. Although

mere recklessness is insufficient to support sanctions under the court’s inherent powers,

“recklessness when combined with an additional factor such as frivolousness, harassment, or an

improper purpose” is sufficient. Id. at 993-94. 

Defendants have submitted evidence under penalty of perjury that (1) they conducted three

searches for the videotapes, (2) they located only two tapes, (3) the interview thought to be taped on

October 23, 2001, was taped on October 24, 2001, due to an equipment malfunction, and (4) they

were unable to locate a tape made on December 28, 2001. Although plaintiff describes defendants’

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 Although plaintiff contends that defendants have submitted nothing more than their word, defendants 2

submitted a declaration attesting to this fact. That constitutes evidence of the fact, and plaintiff tendered no legal

evidentiary objection to the declaration. 

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evidence as “sham” declarations and false, absent evidence of this, plaintiff and the court must

accept defendants’ response that only two tapes were found. 

Although plaintiff has submitted evidence supporting his contention that his inmate appeal

interview was taped on December 28, 2001, defendants were not able to locate that tape. Plaintiff

has submitted no evidence that defendants tampered with evidence, that the tape was intentionally

destroyed, or that defendants are lying that they did not locate the tape. Plaintiff may not conclude

that because he was interviewed on December 28, 2001, but no tape was found, defendants are lying

and/or are either hiding evidence or destroyed the evidence. There is simply no evidence in the

record to support such a conclusion. 

Further, defendants have submitted evidence that interview thought to be taped on October

23, 2001, was taped on October 24, 2001, due to an equipment malfunction. Plaintiff has submitted 2

no evidence that this statement is false. Common sense dictates that an equipment malfunction may

manifest itself in number of ways, and is not something that plaintiff would necessarily have been

aware of on October 23, 2001. For example, a review of the tape made after the interview might

have revealed that the tape was blank.

In this instance, there is no evidence that defendants destroyed the videotapes, knowingly or

otherwise. Therefore, plaintiff’s motion must be denied. 

C. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth herein, plaintiff’s motion to compel or for sanctions, filed March

5, 2007, is HEREBY DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 17, 2007 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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