Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-01565/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-01565-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JUAN GONZALES,

Petitioner,

 v.

C.A. TERHUNE,

Respondent. /

No. C 03-1565 TEH

ORDER GRANTING IN PART RULE

59 MOTION

This matter comes before the Court on Petitioner’s timely Motion For New Trial,

or to Amend Judgment Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). In particular,

Petitioner contends that the Court erred in denying his requests for an evidentiary

hearing and discovery, and in denying his claim for habeas relief under Brady v.

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Respondent contends that the motion is barred in its

entirety because it constitutes a successive habeas petition, and that even if it is not, the

motion should be denied on the merits. Having carefully considered the parties’ papers,

the governing law, and the record herein, the Court finds that the motion is not

procedurally barred and it grants the motion in part and orders a limited evidentiary

hearing as set forth below. 

A. Whether Petitioner’s motion is procedurally barred

Respondent raises the threshold issue of whether Petitioner’s Rule 59(e) motion is

barred under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 28

U.S.C. § 2244(b). Under AEDPA, habeas petitioners cannot file a second or successive 

Case 3:03-cv-01565-TEH Document 39 Filed 06/28/06 Page 1 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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petition in federal district court without first obtaining a certification from the appellate

court that the petition meets certain stringent criteria. Respondent contends that

Petitioner’s Rule 59(e) motion should be treated as a second or successive petition and

therefore dismissed since Petitioner has not obtained the requisite appellate certification. 

In support of this argument Respondent relies on Gonzalez v. Crosby, 125 S.Ct.

2641 (2005), which holds that Fed R. Civ. P. 60(b) motions that “attack[] the federal

court’s previous resolution of a claim on the merits” constitute a second or successive

habeas petition for purposes of AEDPA. Id. at 2648 (emphasis in original). The Court

distinguishes Rule 60(b) motions that do not address the merits but instead challenge a

ruling that prevents the court from reaching the merits or address “some defect in the

integrity of the federal habeas proceedings.” Id. This holding is consistent with

AEDPA’s intent to preclude habeas petitioners from filing repetitive or multiple petitions

on the merits except in very limited circumstances. 

Respondent argues that Petitioner’s Rule 59(e) motion seeks to revisit this Court’s

resolution of his habeas petition on the merits, and therefore it should be barred as a

second or successive petition under the logic of Gonzalez. While this Court agrees that

Petitioner’s motion does, in effect, challenge the Court’s decision on the merits, the

Court concludes that Gonzalez does not govern this particular motion.

First, as Petitioner notes, a timely motion under Rule 59 suspends the finality of

the judgment for purposes of appeal. F.D.I.C. v. Lugli, 813 F.2d 1030, 1033 (9th Cir.

1987) (citing 11.C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2812 at 85

(1973)); Tripati v. Henman, 845 F.2d 205, 206 (9th Cir. 1988) (notice of appeal filed

before disposition of Rule 59(e) motion is a “nullity”). Since a Rule 59(e) motion

suspends the finality of the judgment, it may not, as a technical matter, qualify as a

“successive” or second petition.

Technicalities aside, however, the fundamental purpose of the successive petition

rule, which informed the Gonzalez decision, does not apply in this instance. One of the

purposes of Rule 59(e) is to provide district courts the opportunity to correct significant

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United States District Court

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1 The Court did, however, intend to implicitly deny Petitioner’s request for

discovery set forth in footnote 12 of his Traverse. Further, Petitioner fails to identify

any manifest error of fact or law with respect to this issue; rather, he simply rehashes

the arguments previously made. Thus, to the extent that Petitioner’s Rule 59(e) motion

on this issue is considered a motion on the merits, the motion must be rejected as a

successive claim. See Post v. Bradshaw, 422 F.3d 419, 424-25 (6th Cir. 2005)

(holding that motions for discovery are successive because they involve steps that lead

inexorably to a merits-based attack). Even assuming arguendo, however, that this

aspect of Petitioner’s motion was not barred as successive, the Court would deny it.

Petitioner clearly has access to Mr. Sakasegawa and has already obtained information

from him on the relevant issue: what he saw on the day in question. Thus, it is unclear

that the discovery sought would provide any information that is not already available

to Petitioner or would not be largely cumulative. The Court thus rejects the argument

that this case is “identical” to Pham v. Terhune, 400 F.3d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 2005) in

which the government failed to turn over “essential” forensic evidence exclusively

within its possession.

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errors of fact or law that are brought to their immediate attention, and thus spare the

parties and appellate courts the burden of unnecessary appeals. See e.g. Charles v.

Daley, 799 F.2d 343, 348 (7th Cir. 1986); Steigerwald v. Bradley, 229 F. Supp. 2d 445,

447 (D. MD. 2002). Effectuation of this purpose does not in any way undermine

AEDPA’s intent to avoid repetitive or multiple petitions. Certainly this Court can

discern no policy or purpose of AEDPA that would be furthered by depriving judges of

the ability to correct manifest errors of law or fact that are promptly brought to their

attention within 10 days of the disposition of the action. Accordingly, the Court rejects

Respondent’s position that every Rule 59(e) motion that is addressed to the merits

necessarily constitutes a second or successive petition for purposes of AEDPA. 

In this case, Petitioner’s Rule 59(e) motion has brought two errors to the Court’s

attention. First, the Court denied Petitioner’s Brady claim, in significant part, based on

the factual premise that confidential witness 2 (Greg Sakasegawa) was not sure about the

gender and length of hair of the driver of the truck at issue. Mr. Sakasegawa was, in

fact, however, sure about the length of the hair. Second, although the parties assumed

that the Court had implicitly denied without comment Petitioner’s separately filed

request for an evidentiary hearing, the Court, in fact, had overlooked this request at the

time it decided the habeas petition.1

 For the reasons discussed above, the Court

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28 2 Mr. Sakasegawa attempted to clarify this ambiguity in a declaration attached

to Petitioner’s Traverse but this declaration also contained some ambiguity.

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concludes that it may properly entertain Petitioner’s Rule 59(e) motion for the purpose of

considering the effect of these two errors. 

B. Merits of Petitioner’s Rule 59(e) Motion

Turning to Petitioner’s Brady claim, which is the focus of this motion, this Court

previously held that Petitioner had satisfied the first two prongs of the Brady test by

demonstrating that Respondent had (1) suppressed evidence that was (2) exculpatory, to

wit, the actual identity of confidential witness 2 (Mr. Sakasegawa). The Court

concluded, however, that Petitioner failed to satisfy the final element of Brady because

he had not demonstrated that the suppressed exculpatory evidence was “material” to his

case. See Anderson v. Calderon, 232 F.3d 1053, 1062, 1066-67 (9th Cir. 2000),

overruled in part on other grounds by Bittaker v. Woodford, 331 F.3d 715, 728 (9th Cir.

2003). In reaching this conclusion, the Court emphasized that Mr. Sakasegawa was not

sure of the gender or length of hair of the person he observed driving the truck in

question. See Jan. 12, 2006 Order at 32. This factual point was particularly significant

to the Court’s materiality analysis given that Mr. Sakasegawa’s proffered exculpatory

testimony was being viewed against “a backdrop of extensive evidence of guilt.” Id. 

Petitioner’s Rule 59(e) motion, however, has clarified for the Court that this

factual premise was in error. While Mr. Sakasegawa was unsure about the gender of the

driver of the truck he was, in fact, sure that the driver had long hair, notwithstanding the

ambiguous language utilized in the police report upon which the Court relied. See

Sakasegawa January 18, 2006 Decl. at ¶ 4.2

 It is also undisputed that the Petitioner had

short hair at the time in question and that Respondent argued at trial that Petitioner was

the driver of the truck. As noted above, the Court also inadvertently overlooked

Petitioner’s March 8, 2005 request for an evidentiary hearing, which proffered Mr.

Sakasegawa as a witness who could testify on factual matters raised in Petitioner’s

petition. 

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 In the event that Mr. Sakasegawa, or counsel for one or both parties is not

available at this date and time, counsel shall meet and confer as soon as practicable

and submit a proposed stipulation and order regarding alternative proposed date(s).

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Respondent contends that even assuming that Mr. Sakasegawa had testified that

he was sure that the driver of the truck had long hair that such testimony would not have 

sufficient import, in light of the rest of the record, to affect the Court’s materiality

analysis. Petitioner, on the other hand, contends that in light of Mr. Sakasegawa’s 

January 18, 2006 declaration correcting the record, the Court should find that

Respondent’s Brady violation was clearly material, dispense with any evidentiary

hearing, and grant Petitioner’s petition for relief based on the current record. 

The Court is not persuaded by either position. Rather, the Court concludes that it

is appropriate to grant an evidentiary hearing to further explore Mr. Sakasegawa’s

testimony which is the course it would have taken had Petitioner’s original request for

such a hearing not been overlooked. Mr. Sakasegawa’s testimony that the driver did not

have long hair, if credible, could have played a very significant role at trial given that

the backdrop of extensive culpatory evidence was largely circumstantial. Indeed, if

believed, the testimony would seriously undermine Respondent’s contention that

Petitioner was the driver of the truck in question. At the same time, Mr. Sakasegawa’s

declaration with respect to his observations the night in question is very brief. Further, a

paper declaration does not provide the Court with valuable information regarding the

credibility and likely impact of his testimony. In short, the Court is not prepared to

make a determination of materiality without the added benefit of an evidentiary hearing

which will enable the Court to directly assess Mr. Sakasegawa’s proferred testimony,

and thus more confidently evaluate whether it should alter the Court’s materiality

analysis.

Accordingly, and good cause appearing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that the Court

shall hold a short evidentiary hearing on Wednesday, July 19, 2006 at 3:00 p.m. limited

to the examination of Mr. Sakasegawa.3

 In particular, Petitioner and Respondent shall

each be permitted a maximum of 20 minutes which may be used solely for purposes of

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eliciting the testimony that would have been elicited had Mr. Sakasegawa been called to

testify at Petitioner’s trial. Thus, questioning shall be limited to matters relating to Mr.

Sakasegawa’s observations the night in question and the reliability or credibility of those

observations.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 28, 2006 

THELTON E. HENDERSON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT

JUDGE

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