Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00079/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00079-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EMILYANN NICOLE RASMUSSEN,

Plaintiff,

v.

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

No. 2:15-cv-0079 DB

ORDER

This social security action was submitted to the court without oral argument for ruling on 

plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and defendant’s ex parte motion to remand for further 

proceedings pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

1

 For the reasons explained below, 

plaintiff’s motion is granted, defendant’s motion is denied, the decision of the Commissioner of 

Social Security (“Commissioner”) is reversed, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings 

consistent with this order.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On May 24, 2012, plaintiff filed an application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) 

under Title XVI of the Social Security Act (“the Act”), and an application for Child’s Insurance 

 

1 Both parties have previously consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction in this action pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (See Dkt. Nos. 9 & 11.)

Case 2:15-cv-00079-DB Document 26 Filed 01/30/17 Page 1 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

Benefits under Title II of the Act, alleging disability beginning on March 3, 1998. (Transcript 

(“Tr.”) at 15, 64-67, 274-83.) Plaintiff’s applications were denied initially and upon 

reconsideration. (Id. at 31-34, 36-41.) 

Thereafter, plaintiff requested a hearing and a hearing was held before an Administrative 

Law Judge (“ALJ”) on April 18, 2014. (Id. at 288-320.) Plaintiff was represented by counsel and

testified at the administrative hearing. (Id. at 288-89.) In a decision issued on June 2, 2014, the 

ALJ found that plaintiff was not disabled. (Id. at 28.) 

The ALJ entered the following findings:

1. Born on March 8, 1991, the claimant had not attainted age 22 as 

of May 24, 2012, the amended onset date (20 CFR 404.102, 

416.120(c)(4) and 404.350(a)(5)).

2

2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity 

since May 24, 2012, the amended onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et 

seq., and 416.971 et seq.).

3. The claimant has the following severe impairment: dysthymic 

disorder, panic disorder with agoraphobia, attention deficit 

hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and borderline intellectual 

functioning (BIF) (20 CFR 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)).

4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of 

impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of 

the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 

(20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 

and 416.926).

5. After careful consideration of the entire record, I find that the 

claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform a full range 

of work at all exertional levels but with the following nonexertional 

limitations: the claimant can perform simple routine repetitive tasks 

in a setting with a few work place changes; no work at a fixed 

productions rate pace; and no more than occasional interaction with 

the general public, coworkers, and supervisors. 

6. The claimant has no past relevant work (20 CFR 404.1565 and 

416.965).

7. The claimant was born on March 8, 1991 and was 21 years old, 

which is defined as a younger individual age 18-49, on the amended 

disability onset date (20 CFR 404.1563 and 416.963).

8. The claimant has at least a high school education and is able to 

communicate in English (20 CFR 404.1564 and 416.964).

 

2

 On April 21, 2014, plaintiff amended her alleged onset date to May 24, 2012. (Tr. at 15.)

Case 2:15-cv-00079-DB Document 26 Filed 01/30/17 Page 2 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

9. Transferability of job skills is not an issue because the claimant 

does not have past relevant work (20 CFR 404.1568 and 416.968). 

10. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, 

and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in 

significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can 

perform (20 CFR 404.1569, 404.1569(a), 416.969, and 416.969(a)).

11. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the 

Social Security Act, from May 24, 2012, the amended onset date, 

through the date of this decision (20 CFR 404.350(a)(5), 

404.1520(g) and 416.920(g)). 

(Id. at 17-28.)

On November 14, 2014, the Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s request for review of the 

ALJ’s June 2, 2014 decision. (Id. at 6-8.) Plaintiff sought judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 

405(g) by filing the complaint in this action on January 12, 2015. (Dkt. No. 1.)

LEGAL STANDARD

“The district court reviews the Commissioner’s final decision for substantial evidence, 

and the Commissioner’s decision will be disturbed only if it is not supported by substantial 

evidence or is based on legal error.” Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 2012). 

Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 

support a conclusion. Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2001); Sandgathe v. 

Chater, 108 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 1997).

“[A] reviewing court must consider the entire record as a whole and may not affirm 

simply by isolating a ‘specific quantum of supporting evidence.’” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 

466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 

1989)). If, however, “the record considered as a whole can reasonably support either affirming or 

reversing the Commissioner’s decision, we must affirm.” McCartey v. Massanari, 298 F.3d 

1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 2002). 

A five-step evaluation process is used to determine whether a claimant is disabled. 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520; see also Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2007). The five-step 

process has been summarized as follows:

/////

Case 2:15-cv-00079-DB Document 26 Filed 01/30/17 Page 3 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful activity? 

If so, the claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed to step 

two.

Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? If so, 

proceed to step three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is 

appropriate.

Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination of 

impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 

404, Subpt. P, App. 1? If so, the claimant is automatically 

determined disabled. If not, proceed to step four.

Step four: Is the claimant capable of performing his past work? If 

so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step five.

Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional capacity 

to perform any other work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If 

not, the claimant is disabled.

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995).

The claimant bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential evaluation 

process. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n. 5 (1987). The Commissioner bears the burden 

if the sequential evaluation process proceeds to step five. Id.; Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 

1098 (9th Cir. 1999). 

APPLICATION

In her pending motion plaintiff’s sole argument is that the ALJ erred in determining that 

plaintiff “did not meet listing 12.05C.” (Pl.’s MSJ (Dkt. No. 16) at 8-12.

3

) In this regard, 

plaintiff argues that the “evidence establishes plaintiff’s severe impairments meet listing 12.05C” 

and, therefore, this matter should be remanded for the payment of benefits. (Id. at 12-13.) 

Defendant “agrees with Plaintiff that remand is necessary” but argues that this matter should be 

remanded for “more fact-finding . . . .” (Def.’s Mot. Remand (Dkt. No. 22) at 1-2.)

At step three of the sequential evaluation, the ALJ must determine whether a claimant’s 

impairment or impairments meet or equal one of the specific impairments set forth in the Listings. 

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 416.920(a)(4)(iii). The physical and mental conditions 

contained in the Listings are considered so severe that “they are irrebuttably presumed disabling, 

 

3

 Page number citations such as this one are to the page number reflected on the court’s CM/ECF 

system and not to page numbers assigned by the parties.

Case 2:15-cv-00079-DB Document 26 Filed 01/30/17 Page 4 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

without any specific finding as to the claimant’s ability to perform his past relevant work or any 

other jobs.” Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 (9th Cir. 1995). The Listings were “designed to 

operate as a presumption of disability that makes further inquiry unnecessary.” Sullivan v. 

Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 532 (1990); see also Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 512 (9th Cir. 2001). If 

a claimant shows that his impairments meet or equal a Listing, she will be found presumptively 

disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1525-404.1526, 416.925-416.926.

The claimant bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case of disability under the 

Listings. See Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 955 (9th Cir. 2002). To “meet” a listed 

impairment, the claimant must establish that her condition satisfies each element of the listed 

impairment. See Zebley, 493 U.S. at 530; Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1099 (9th Cir. 1999). 

To “equal” a listed impairment, the claimant “must establish symptoms, signs, and laboratory 

findings” at least equal in severity and duration to each element of the listed impairment. Id.

Listing 12.05C provides as follows:

12.05 Mental Retardation: Mental retardation refers to significantly 

subaverage general intellectual functioning with deficits in adaptive 

functioning initially manifested during the developmental period; 

i.e., the evidence demonstrates or supports onset of the impairments 

before age 22. The required level of severity for this disorder is 

met when the requirements in A, B, C, or D are satisfied.

* * *

C. A valid verbal, performance, or full scale IQ of 60 through 70 

and a physical or other mental impairment imposing an additional 

and significant work-related limitation of function; . . . . 

20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 12.05.

Here, the ALJ found that plaintiff’s “full scale IQ was 68 and she has a valid full scale IQ 

of 60 through 70 . . . .” (Tr. at 19.) Thus, according to the ALJ’s decision, plaintiff met the first 

prong of Listing 12.05C. The ALJ then found that plaintiff “has no physical or other mental 

impairment imposing an additional and significant work-related limitation of function.” (Id.) 

As quoted above, however, at step two of the sequential evaluation the ALJ found that 

plaintiff’s “severe impairments” included “dysthymic disorder, panic disorder with agoraphobia, 

attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and borderline intellectual functioning . . . .” (Id.

Case 2:15-cv-00079-DB Document 26 Filed 01/30/17 Page 5 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

at 17.) Moreover, the ALJ found that plaintiff’s severe impairments limited her to “simple 

routine repetitive tasks in a setting with few work place changes . . . and no more than occasional 

interaction with the general public, coworkers, and supervisors.” (Id. at 20.) 

“[A]n impairment imposes a significant work-related limitation of function when its effect 

on a claimant’s ability to perform basic work activities is more than slight or minimal.” Fanning 

v. Bowen, 827 F.2d 631, 633 (9th Cir. 1987). In this regard, the ALJ’s decision clearly found that 

plaintiff had a physical or other mental impairment that imposed an additional and significant 

work-related limitation of function. See Markle v. Barnhart, 324 F.3d 182, 188 (3rd Cir. 2003) 

(“Several courts of appeals have held that a finding of a severe impairment establishes the second 

prong of § 12.05C”); Jones v. Colvin, 149 F.Supp.3d 1251, 1261 (D. Or. 2016) (“The ALJ’s 

finding at step two that Plaintiff has several severe impairments including a cochlear implant, 

anxiety disorder, affective disorder, and a history of reticular dysgenesis satisfies the work-related 

limitation requirement of Listing 12.05C.”); Pedro v. Astrue, 849 F.Supp.2d 1006, 1015 (D. Or. 

2011) (“Cases interpreting Fanning and the new regulations conclude that if an ALJ finds an 

impairment to be ‘severe’ at step two of the disability analysis, ‘that impairment necessarily has 

more than a slight or minimal effect on claimant's ability to perform basic work activities.’”); 

Gomez v. Astrue, 695 F.Supp.2d 1049, 1062 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (“The ALJ found that plaintiff had 

severe physical and mental impairments consisting of diabetes mellitus with retinopathy and an 

affective mood disorder. Therefore, under both Ninth Circuit law and the Commissioner’s newer, 

more demanding regulatory standard, plaintiff has ‘a physical or other mental impairment 

imposing an additional and significant work-related limitation of function’ within the meaning of 

section 12.05.”).

Accordingly, the court finds that plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment on her claim 

that the ALJ erred in determining that plaintiff did not meet listing 12.05C.

CONCLUSION

With error established, the court has the discretion to remand or reverse and award 

benefits. McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 1989). A case may be remanded 

under the “credit-as-true” rule for an award of benefits where: 

Case 2:15-cv-00079-DB Document 26 Filed 01/30/17 Page 6 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

(1) the record has been fully developed and further administrative 

proceedings would serve no useful purpose; (2) the ALJ has failed 

to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, whether 

claimant testimony or medical opinion; and (3) if the improperly 

discredited evidence were credited as true, the ALJ would be 

required to find the claimant disabled on remand.

Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1020 (9th Cir. 2014). Even where all the conditions for the 

“credit-as-true” rule are met, the court retains “flexibility to remand for further proceedings when 

the record as a whole creates serious doubt as to whether the claimant is, in fact, disabled within 

the meaning of the Social Security Act.” Id. at 1021; see also Dominguez v. Colvin, 808 F.3d 

403, 407 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Unless the district court concludes that further administrative 

proceedings would serve no useful purpose, it may not remand with a direction to provide 

benefits.”); Treichler v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin.,, 775 F.3d 1090, 1105 (9th Cir. 

2014) (“Where . . . an ALJ makes a legal error, but the record is uncertain and ambiguous, the 

proper approach is to remand the case to the agency.”).

Here, defendant argues that this matter should be remanded so that the ALJ can consider 

“whether the evidence demonstrates or supports onset of the impairment before age twenty-two.” 

(Def.’s Mot. Remand (Dkt. No. 22) at 3-4.) However, plaintiff’s valid full scale IQ score of 68 

was obtained on May 6, 2013, (Tr. at 220, 225), less than two months after her 22 birthday. (Id.

at 26.) In this regard,

... there is a presumption that mental retardation is a condition that 

remains constant throughout life. Therefore . . . a claimant need not 

present evidence that she manifested deficits in adaptive 

functioning prior to the age twenty-two, when she presented 

evidence of low IQ test results after the age of twenty-two.

Hodges v. Barnhart, 276 F.3d 1265, 1266 (11th Cir. 2001); see also Talavera v. Astrue, 697 F.3d 

145, 152 (2nd Cir. 2012) (“We agree with the majority of our sister Circuits that it is reasonable 

to presume, in the absence of evidence indicating otherwise, that claimants will experience a 

fairly constant IQ throughout their lives.”); Muncy v. Apfel, 247 F.3d 728, 734 (8th Cir. 2001) 

(“a person’s IQ is presumed to remain stable over time in the absence of any evidence of a change 

in a claimant’s intellectual functioning”); Forsythe v. Astrue, No. 1:10-cv-1515 AWI GSA, 2012 

WL 217751, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2012) (“this Court is persuaded by the reasoning in those 

Case 2:15-cv-00079-DB Document 26 Filed 01/30/17 Page 7 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

cases that support a rebuttable presumption that a valid adult IQ score is evidence of impairment 

during the claimant’s developmental phase”). Moreover, the defendant has not referred to any 

persuasive evidence that would rebut this presumption nor was the court able to find any such 

evidence in the record. 

Thus, it appears certain and unambiguous from both the record and the ALJ’s opinion that 

plaintiff met listing 12.05C. Further proceedings, therefore, would serve no useful purpose. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 16) is granted;

2. Defendant’s ex parte motion for voluntary remand (Dkt. No. 22) is denied;

3. The Commissioner’s decision is reversed; and

4. This matter is remanded with instructions to award benefits.

.Dated: January 30, 2017

DLB:6

DLB1\orders.soc sec\rasmussen0079.ord

Case 2:15-cv-00079-DB Document 26 Filed 01/30/17 Page 8 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

Case 2:15-cv-00079-DB Document 26 Filed 01/30/17 Page 9 of 9