Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00814/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00814-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1442 Petition for Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

FRANCIS HORN, an individual,

NO. CIV. S 05-0814 MCE KJM

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

STATE OF CALIFORNIA;

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS; ASSOC. WARDEN

K.M. CHASTAIN, individually;

CHIEF DEPUTY WARDEN STILES,

individually; CORRECTIONAL

OFFICE J. GRADY, individually;

MTA W. VAN SANDT,

individually; RN T. MEEKS,

individually; RN G. LAUCIRICA,

individually; RN J. MARSTON,

individually; FRANK CHRISTIAN,

individually, and DOES 1

through 250, inclusive,

Defendant.

----oo0oo----

By Memorandum and Order signed August 10, 2005, this Court

granted Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, in part, and permitted

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In addition to the State of California and California 1

Department of Corrections (hereinafter referred to collectively

as “State” or “State of California”), individual defendants

include Associate Warden K.M. Chastain (“Chastain”), Chief Deputy

Warden Stiles (“Stiles”), Correctional Officer J. Grady

(“Grady”), MTA W. Van Sandt (“Van Sandt”), RN T. Meeks (“Meeks”),

RN G. Laucirica (“Laucirica”), RN J. Marston (“Marston”), and

inmate Frank Christian (“Christian”). This motion is brought on

behalf of all defendants except for Laucirica and Christian. 

Unless noted to the contrary, the term “Defendants” will refer to

the moving defendants.

All further references to “Rule” or “Rules” are to the 2

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless otherwise specified.

The facts as stated in this section are taken directly from 3

Plaintiff’s complaint.

2

Plaintiff Francis Horn (“Plaintiff”) to amend her complaint. 

Plaintiff thereafter filed her Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”)

on August 30, 2005. Defendants now again move to dismiss 1

portions of that amended pleading for failure to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 2

BACKGROUND3

On or about January 11, 2003, Plaintiff’s son, Gilbert M.

Salazar (“Salazar”), died while an inmate at the California State

Prison in Sacramento. Salazar’s death was ruled a suicide by the

California Department of Corrections.

Plaintiff alleges that Salazar was in fact beaten to death

by his cellmate, Defendant Christian. According to Plaintiff,

Defendants Chastain and Stiles, as members of the prison

classification committee, violated applicable standards and

regulations by deciding to house Salazar with Christian given

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their knowledge of prior altercations and violence involving the

two men. Plaintiff goes on to allege that Salazar actually

complained about the mistreatment he received from Christian,

which purportedly included both mental and physicial abuse. 

Plaintiff claims that those complaints, as well as Salazar’s

requests that he accordingly be transferred, were ignored by

Defendants.

Plaintiff’s complaint states that Defendant Christian, at

some unspecified time before Salazar’s death, was seen hitting

Salazar with such force that his “head was bouncing off the

concrete.” (SAC, ¶ 29). Salazar was subsequently discovered

lying in a pool of blood in his cell. Although Plaintiff admits

that correctional staff, including Defendant Grady, attempted as

assist Salazar upon that discovery, she claims that failure of

staff to carry personal alarms somehow delayed medical attention

to Salazar and led to his death. Id. In addition, Plaintiff

states that certain unidentified personnel working in the prison

control tower were inattentive as a result of “playing dominoes

or some other recreational activity”. She alleges that because

of that activity those personnel also did not respond quickly

enough to the emergency posed by Salazar’s discovery. Finally,

Plaintiff maintains that to compound matters further, “medical

staff [including defendants Van Sandt, Meeks and Marston] did not

provide adequate or proper medical treatment to Salazar when they

did receive notice of [his] emergency situation” and that Salazar

died as a result. Id. at ¶ 30. Plaintiff does not offer any

further details as to how medical care given to Salazar, after

his discovery lying in a pool of blood, was somehow below the

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standard of care. In fact, Plaintiff claims elsewhere in her

complaint that Defendant Christian killed Salazar, then “made it

look like suicide by cutting Salazar’s arm.” (SAC, ¶ 28).

Plaintiff finally alleges that the remaining defendants also

“engaged in a fraudulent cover-up to rule Salazar’s death as a

suicide when they, and each of them, knew that he had been killed

by Defendant Christian.” Id. 

STANDARD

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under

Rule 12(b)(6), all allegations of material fact must be accepted

as true and construed in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336,

337-38 (9 Cir. 1996). A complaint will not be dismissed for th

failure to state a claim “‘unless it appears beyond doubt that

plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of her claim that

would entitle her to relief.’” Yamaguchi v. Dep’t of the Air

Force, 109 F.3d 1475, 1480 (9 Cir. 1997) (quoting Lewis v. Tel. th

Employees Credit Union, 87 F.3d 1537, 1545 (9 Cir. 1996). th

If a motion to dismiss is granted for failure to state a

viable claim, the Court must then determine whether to grant

leave to amend. Generally, leave to amend should be denied only

if it is clear that the deficiencies of the complaint cannot be

cured by amendment. Broughton v. Cutter Labs., 622 F.2d 458, 460

(9 Cir. 1980). th

//

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ANALYSIS

Defendants’ initial motion to dismiss focused primarily on

issues pertaining to Plaintiff’s standing to bring the claims

asserted in her complaint. With respect to the substance of the

claims themselves, the only deficiency identified through

Defendants’ initial motion, and repeated in the motion now before

the Court, concerns the adequacy of Plaintiff’s claim for

intentional infliction of emotional distress. The additional

grounds for dismissal now cited by Defendants concern the

viability, in whole or in part, of Plaintiff’s First Cause of

Action, for Medical Malpractice, the Second Cause of Action, for

Failure to Furnish Medical Care, and the Third Cause of Action,

for Failure to Provide Adequate Medical Personnel Facilities. In

addition, Defendant State of California claims that the Fourth

and Twelfth Causes of Action, for failure to discharge certain

mandatory duties, fail because Plaintiff does not specifically

identify the statutory bases for such duties. Defendant State

also claims that it is immune from liability for wrongful death

as alleged in the Tenth Cause of action. Finally, Defendants 

contend that Plaintiff cannot state any claim for abuse of

process (as alleged in the Eleventh Cause of Action) under the

circumstances of this case.

Each of these alleged deficiencies will now be addressed.

//

//

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1. Medical Malpractice.

Defendants claim that the First Cause of Action fails to the

extent that it asserts a claim for medical malpractice against

all defendants. While Defendants are correct in asserting such a

claim cannot be pursued against non-medical defendants, the SAC

in fact makes it clear that the First Cause of Action is directed

only to “all Health Care Defendants”. Because the SAC makes it

clear that only Defendants Van Sandt, Meeks, and Marston so

qualify (as either a medical technician or registered nurses, see

¶¶ 10, 11 and 13, respectively), Defendants’ argument concerning

the First Cause of Action is simply incorrect. The Motion to

Dismiss as to that claim is hence denied. 

2. Failure to Furnish Medical Care.

Plaintiff’s Second Cause of Action, for Failure to Furnish

Medical Care, is based on violation of California Government Code

§ 845.6, which states in pertinent part as follows:

“Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for

injury proximately caused by the failure of the employee to

furnish or obtain medical care for a prisoner in his

custody; but... a public employee, and the public entity

where the employee is acting within the scope of his

employment, is liable if the employee knows or has reason to

know that the prisoner is in need of immediate medical care

and he fails to take reasonable action to summon such

medical care...”

Consequently, to state a claim for violation of § 845.6,

Plaintiff must show that Defendants knew or had reason to know

that Salazar was in need of immediate medical care, but failed to

act reasonably in summoning such care. Unless Plaintiff can

demonstrate that Defendants’ alleged inaction comes within this

limited exception to the general rule of non-liability, no viable

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claim under § 845.6 can be stated. See Watson v. State, 21 Cal.

App. 4 836, 841-42 (1993). th

Plaintiff’s SAC fails to make factual allegations sufficient

in this regard. In fact, ¶ 29 states that upon discovering

Salazar lying in a pool of blood in his cell, Defendant Grady and

others entered the cell and attempted to assist him. There is no

allegation that medical care was delayed at that point. 

Plaintiff nonetheless appears to claim that Defendants’ failure

to reasonably summon care is rooted in their failure to carry

personal alarms, and to being distracted by virtue of being

engaged in other activities. Those alleged failures, however,

even if true, do not translate into an awareness of the need for

immediate medical care, as required by the statute. There is no

allegation that Defendants were aware of the need for such

immediate care until Salazar’s body was actually discovered, and

there is nothing in the SAC as presently constituted to suggest

that care was not provided at that time. Consequently Plaintiff

has not pled a viable claim for violation of § 845.6, and

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Second Cause of Action will be

granted. 

3. Failure to Provide Medical Facilities and Equipment.

For her Third Cause of Action, Plaintiff pleads a violation

of California Government Code § 855:

(a) A public entity that operates or maintains any medical

facility that is subject to regulation by the State

Department of Health Services, Social Services,

Developmental Services, or Mental Health is liable for

injury proximately caused by the failure of the public

entity to provide adequate or sufficient equipment,

personnel or facilities required by any statute or any

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While Defendants’ Motion also seeks to dismiss all non- 4

public entity defendants as parties to this claim given § 855's

clear limitation to public entities, the heading to the Third

Cause of Action specifically limits the claim to “All Public

Entity Defendants”. Hence there is no claim against the

individual defendants in the Third Cause of Action and the Motion

to Dismiss is not well taken in that regard.

8

regulation of the State Department of Health Services,

Social Services, Developmental Services, or Mental Health

prescribing minimum standards for equipment, personnel or

facilities, unless the public entity establishes that it

exercised reasonable diligence to comply with the applicable

statute or regulation.

The statute hence requires, as a prerequisite for liability, that

a public entity fail to provide medical equipment, facilities or

personnel required by specific statute or regulation. 

Plaintiff’s SAC, however, states only in the most general of

terms that the public entity defendants “failed to provide

adequate or proper medical treatment to Salazar when they did

receive notice of [his] emergency situation.” (SAC, ¶ 30). 

There is no reference to any specific equipment, facilities or

personnel required by statute or regulation, as mandated by §

855. The SAC complaint does not specify what statutes and/or

regulations are implicated. Without additional facts in this

regard, the Third Cause of Action fails and is accordingly

subject to dismissal on that basis. 

4

4. Failure to Specify Alleged Mandatory Duties.

Both the Fourth and Twelfth Causes of Action are premised on

Defendants’ alleged failure to discharge mandatory duties under

California Government Code § 815.6. That section provides:

Where a public entity is under a mandatory duty imposed by

an enactment that is designed to protect against the risk of

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a particular kind of injury, the public entity is liable for

an injury of that kind proximately caused by its failure to

discharge the duty unless the public entity establishes that

it exercised reasonable diligence to discharge the duty.

 In order to state a claim under § 815.6, then, an

enactment must impose a mandatory, and not a discretionary duty. 

The underlying enactment must also protect against the kind of

injury invoked as a basis for liability, and breach of the

mandatory duty set forth by the enactment in question has to be a

proximate cause of the injury suffered. See Walt Rankin &

Assoc., Inc. v. City of Murrieta, 84 Cal. App. 4th 605, 614

(2000).

Plaintiff here has failed to specify any enactment imposing

a mandatory duty on the State of California as the public entity

at issue. It is not sufficient to argue, as Plaintiff does, that

the SAC somehow “infers” that the requisite enactment flows from

the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, or that the identity of

such enactment can simply be obtained through discovery. 

(Opposition, 17:18-25). Without more factual specificity,

Plaintiff’s Fourth and Twelfth Causes of Action plainly fail to

state a viable claim. 

5. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.

In the Fifth Cause of Action, Plaintiff asserts a claim for

intentional infliction of emotional distress as to Salazar in her

representational capacity on his behalf. The cause of action

makes it clear that Plaintiff is not alleging that she was

personally subjected to the extreme and outrageous conduct that

is required to state a cause of action for infliction of such

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distress. See, e.g., Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric

Medical Clinic, Inc., 48 Cal. 3d 583, 593-94 (1989). 

Consequently, in assessing Plaintiff’s claim, only conduct

directed expressly to Salazar need be considered.

Stripped to its essence, that conduct as to Salazar (at

least as currently stated in the SAC) amounts only to an

allegation that Salazar was wrongfully housed with Defendant

Christian, despite the fact that Salazar had asked to be moved to

another cell or a different institution. While the SAC states

generally that “Salazar also complained about Defendant

Christian’s mistreatment towards him, including physical abuse

and mental abuse” (SAC, ¶ 26), no specifics as to the nature of

such abuse are identified. In addition, the remainder of

allegations made in the SAC pertain either to conduct not

directed specifically to Salazar (like failure to wear a personal

alarm) or conduct of which Salazar would necessarily have been

unaware (such as any delay in obtaining adequate medical care

after Salazar was presumably discovered unconscious, or any

alleged “cover-up) after Salazar’s death). Those allegations

would not appear to relate to any conduct especially calculated

to cause Salazar serious mental distress.

Salazar’s placement in a cell with Christian does not itself

rise to the level of extreme or outrageous conduct especially

calculated to cause severe emotional distress, as it must to

state a cause of action for intentional infliction of such

distress. See Christensen v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. 3d 868, 903

(1991); see also Ochoa v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. 3d 159, 165 n.

5 (1985). While the SAC states that Salazar “complained” about

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abuse at the hands of Defendant Christian, it fails to indicate

to whom those complaints were directed, or the kind of abuse that

was inflicted.

The facts as pled in the SAC are simply insufficient in

identifying conduct rising to the level of outrageousness

required to sustain a cause of action for intentional infliction

of emotional distress. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as to the

Fifth Cause of Action is hence granted.

7. Wrongful Death

The next argument posited by Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

concerns the Tenth Cause of Action, for Wrongful Death. The

State of California contends that Plaintiff cannot maintain a

wrongful death claim against the State on immunity grounds.

Under California Government Code § 844.6(a)(2), a public

entity is not liable for “[a]n injury to any prisoner.” Because

injury is defined in the statutory structure as including death

(see Government Code § 810.8), wrongful death actions brought on

behalf of deceased prisoners like Salazar are generally precluded

by the immunity afforded by § 844.6(a)(2). Section 844.6(d),

however, provides an exception to that general rule by allowing

for a wrongful death action on a prisoner’s behalf if the

prisoner death is allegedly caused by a dangerous condition of

public property. Garcia v. State of California, 247 Cal. App. 2d

814, 817 (1967); May v. County of Monterey, 139 Cal. App. 3d 717,

721 (1983). That exception is limited to dangerous condition

claims, and does not extend to acts of other prisoners or acts of

prison employees. Id.

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Taking the allegations of the SAC as a whole, it appears

clear that Plaintiff alleges her son’s death was either caused by

his cellmate, Defendant Christian, and/or the inaction of prison

employees in failing to protect Salazar and to obtain medical

care on a timely basis. Immunity applies to either of those

scenarios under both Garcia and May. Plaintiff nonetheless

attempts to argue, in opposition to this motion, that she comes

within the exception to the general rule of wrongful death

immunity because her claim “is also predicated upon a dangerous

condition of public property.” (Opposition, 24:15-22). She

identifies the dangerous condition present here as “being housed

with a prisoner, whom the defendants knew had violent tendencies,

and with whom the decedent [Salazar] obviously did not get along

with.” Id.

Plaintiff’s argument lacks merit. The Garcia court states

unequivocally that “no liability is imposed upon a public entity

by reason of the death of a prisoner resulting from an act of the

prisoner himself, acts of other prisoners, acts of prison

employees, or acts or prison invitees, whether committed

negligently or wilfully.” 247 Cal. App. 2d at 817. As indicated

above, this holding applies squarely to Plaintiff’s allegations

here, and cannot be circumvented through argument that the

charges pertaining to Defendant Christian and to prison personnel

somehow also constitute a dangerous condition of public property. 

Because no dangerous condition of public property has been

alleged, Plaintiff’s Tenth Cause of Action fails as against

Defendant State of California. 

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6. Abuse of Process.

Defendants finally assert that the Eleventh Cause of Action,

for Abuse of Process, cannot stand. An abuse of process claim,

by definition, requires that legal process be improperly used to

accomplish a purpose contrary to that for which the process was

designed. See Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson, 110 Cal. App. 3d

868, 875-76 (1980). Where a proceeding does not emanate from or

rest on the authority or jurisdiction of the court, there can be

no cause of action for abuse of process. Meadows v. Bakersfield

Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 250 Cal. App. 2d 749, 753 (1967). According

to Defendants, although Plaintiff alleges that an abuse of

process occurred “in covering up Salazar’s death and ruling same

as a suicide” (SAC, ¶ 61), the SAC identifies no legal process or

proceeding that would support an abuse of process claim.

Plaintiff has not opposed Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as

to the Eleventh Cause of Action, and, because Defendants’

position appears correct, the abuse of process claim will be

dismissed.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is

DENIED as the First Cause of Action, but GRANTED as to the

Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Eleventh and Twelfth Causes of

//

//

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Because oral argument would not be of material assistance, 5

this matter was deemed suitable for decision without oral

argument. E.D. Local Rule 78-230(h).

14

 Action. The Motion is also GRANTED as to Defendant State of 5

California, only, with respect to the Tenth Cause of Action. 

Because it appears that some of the deficiencies of Plaintiffs’

complaint may yet be rectified through amendment, leave to amend

will be permitted one final time. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 16, 2005

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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