Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01304/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01304-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Kini M. Seawright; et al., 

 Plaintiff, 

v. 

State of Arizona; et al., 

 Defendants. 

No. CV 11-1304-PHX-JAT 

ORDER 

 

 Pending before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss certain claims by 

Plaintiffs. (Doc. 63). Plaintiffs have filed a Response (Doc. 68), and Defendants have 

filed a Reply (Doc. 69). 

I. BACKGROUND 

On November 24, 2009, Dana Seawright (“Dana”) was committed to the Arizona 

Department of Corrections (“ADOC”) to serve a twelve year sentence related to various 

felony charges. (Doc. 63 at 2). On July 2, 2010, Dana was housed at the Stiner Unit on 

Housing Unit 2-F Run, at Arizona State Prison Complex-Lewis (ASPC-Lewis). (Id.) On 

that day, gang leaders at ASPC-Lewis ordered Dana to seriously harm another inmate at 

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ASPC-Lewis and Dana refused to comply with the order. (Doc. 53 at 4). 

 On July 3, 2010, Dana was moved to Housing Unit 2-D Run. (Id.) In apparent 

retaliation for refusing gang leader’s orders, on the morning of July 3, 2010, at some 

point between 07:22 and 07:56 a.m., Dana was beaten and stabbed by fellow inmates and 

left in his cell. (Id. at 5-6). The housing unit where Dana was housed and where he was 

beaten was unsupervised during this time period. (Id.) An officer found Dana in his bed, 

unconscious, lying face down and bleeding at 07:56 a.m. (Id. at 6). At approximately 

08:06 a.m., Dana received medical attention for the first time. (Id. at 8). Buckeye, 

Arizona, Paramedics were called to the scene and made the determination that Dana 

needed to be transported via helicopter to St. Joseph’s Hospital in Phoenix, a Level 1 

Trauma Unit. (Id). At 10:00 a.m., Dana was admitted to St. Joseph’s Hospital. (Id.) 

Dana never regained consciousness following the beating. (Id.) On July 7, 2010, Dana 

was removed from life support systems and died. (Id. at 9). The cause of death was 

blunt force trauma to Dana’s head. (Id.) 

Plaintiffs are the Estate of Dana Seawright (the “Estate”) and Kini Seawright. 

Kini Seawright is the mother of Dana. Plaintiffs originally filed a complaint on June 30, 

2011. (Doc. 1). On October 12, 2011, Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint. (Doc. 

19). On June 18, 2012, Plaintiffs filed the Second Amended Complaint at issue. (Doc. 

53). Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint (the “Complaint”) brought this action 

against various Defendants including, the State of Arizona, Charles L. Ryan, the Director 

of the ADOC, and individual Corrections Officers that were on duty in Housing Unit 2-D 

Run when Dana was beaten. (Id. at 1). In the Complaint, Plaintiffs allege five counts 

against Defendants. (Id. at 9-22). Defendants filed the pending Motion to Dismiss on 

August 7, 2012. (Doc. 63). 

II. DISCUSSION 

 In Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Defendant Charles L. Ryan (“Ryan”) has 

moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims against him in the Complaint under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b), for failure to sufficiently plead a cause of action against Ryan. 

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(Doc. 63 at 1). Additionally, Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims for 

punitive damages for state law claims, Plaintiffs’ claims for pain and suffering under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983”), the Estate’s claim for tort or statutory damages, and the 

Estate’s ability to maintain any claims due to lack of representation. (Id. at 11-15). 

 The Court may dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for two reasons: 1) lack of a cognizable legal theory and 2) 

insufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police 

Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 

 To survive a 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim, a complaint must meet 

the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2). Rule 8(a)(2) requires a 

“short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” so 

that the defendant has “fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it 

rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)(quoting Conley v. 

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 

 Although a complaint attacked for failure to state a claim does not need detailed 

factual allegations, the pleader’s obligation to provide the grounds for relief requires 

“more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause 

of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations omitted). The factual 

allegations of the complaint must be sufficient to raise a right to relief above a 

speculative level. Id. Rule 8(a)(2) “requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, 

of entitlement to relief. Without some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see 

how a claimant could satisfy the requirement of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of the 

nature of the claim, but also ‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.” Id. (citing 5 C. Wright 

& A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §1202, pp. 94-95 (3d ed. 2004)). 

 Rule 8’s pleading standard demands more than “an unadorned, the defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)(citing 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A complaint that offers nothing more than naked assertions 

will not suffice. To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient 

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factual matter, which, if accepted as true, states a claim to relief that is “plausible on its 

face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Facial plausibility exists if the pleader pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged. Id. Plausibility does not equal “probability,” but plausibility 

requires more than a sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully. Id. “Where a 

complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent’ with a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops 

short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’” Id. (citing 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 

 In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must construe the 

facts alleged in the complaint in the light most favorable to the drafter of the complaint 

and the court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. See Shwarz v. 

United States, 234 F.3d 428, 435 (9th Cir. 2000). Nonetheless, courts do not have to 

accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation. Papasan v. Allain, 478 

U.S. 265, 286 (1986). 

A. Representation for the Estate 

 The Court initially addresses Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Estate’s claims 

because no personal representative for the Estate has been appointed. Defendants argue 

that Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint should be dismissed because Kini Seawright 

has not been appointed the personal representative for the Estate and therefore cannot 

maintain any claims on behalf of the Estate. (Doc. 63 at 11). In their Response, 

Plaintiffs argued that Kini Seawright would soon be formally appointed as a personal 

representative of the Estate, and requests the Court allow the Estate to move forward with 

its claims. (Doc. 68 at 5). In their Reply, Defendants stated that if Kini Seawright was 

properly appointed as the personal representative then Defendants would withdraw this 

argument from their Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 69 at 8). 

 On November 6, 2012, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appointment with the Court 

showing that Kini Seawright had been appointed the personal representative of the Estate 

by the Maricopa County Superior Court. (Doc. 70). Accordingly, the Court denies this 

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part of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss because it is moot. 

B. § 1983 Claims Against Defendant Ryan 

 Next Defendants argue that the Court should dismiss the two claims against Ryan. 

(Doc. 63 at 4). Plaintiffs have made two § 1983 claims against Ryan in Counts One and 

Two of the Complaint. (Doc. 53 at 9, 12). Section 1983 is not a source of substantive 

rights on its own. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393 (1989). Section 1983 “merely 

provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Id. at 394 

(quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144, n. 3 (1979)). “To make out a cause of 

action under section 1983, plaintiffs must plead that (1) the defendants acting under color 

of state law (2) deprived plaintiffs of rights secured by the Constitution or federal 

statutes.” Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Smith v. 

Cremins, 308 F.2d 187, 190 (9th Cir. 1962)). “The first inquiry in any § 1983 suit” is “to 

isolate the precise constitutional violation with which [the defendant] is charged.” Baker, 

443 U.S. at 140. 

 1. Count One 

Count One alleges all individual Defendants, including Ryan, violated § 1983 by 

depriving Dana of his Constitutional rights under the Fourth and Eighth Amendments by 

deliberate indifference to Dana’s health, safety, and medical needs through their policies, 

practices, and procedures. (Doc. 53 at 9-12). Plaintiffs have fulfilled their first 

requirement for a § 1983 claim against Ryan by alleging that Ryan was acting under the 

color of state law as the Director of ADOC. (Doc. 53 at 2, 9). 

The Court must now determine if Plaintiffs have alleged enough “factual matter” 

to show that Ryan “plausibly” deprived Dana of his Constitutional rights guaranteed by 

the Fourth and Eighth Amendments. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Plaintiffs argue that 

Dana had the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment and free from excessive 

force by or authorized by police officers. (Doc. 53 at 11 ¶ 61). The Eighth Amendment 

protects against cruel and unusual punishment. See U.S. Const. amend. VIII. The Fourth 

Amendment protects arrestees and pretrial detainees against the use of excessive force by 

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or authorized by police officers. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 395. 

In Graham v. Conner, the Supreme Court established a timeline, from prior to 

arrest through conviction, for the proper constitutional analysis of claims of excessive 

force. Id. at 395 n. 10. “After conviction, the Eighth Amendment ‘serves as the primary 

source of substantive protection . . . in cases . . . where the deliberate use of force is 

challenged as excessive and unjustified.’” Id. (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 

327 (1986)). 

Dana was neither an arrestee nor a pretrial detainee at the time of the allegations 

in Counts One. Dana’s claims arose after his conviction. Consequently, the Court must 

dismiss Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim in Count One for failure to state a claim 

upon which relief can be granted. 

Turning to Plaintiffs’ other claims in Count One, “the treatment a prisoner 

receives in prison and the conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny 

under the Eighth Amendment.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-33 (1994) (citing 

Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993)). The Eighth Amendment imposes “duties 

on [prison] officials, who must provide humane conditions of confinement; prison 

officials must ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical 

care, and must ‘take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.’” Id. 

(quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526–527 (1984)). “In particular, as the lower 

courts have uniformly held, and as we have assumed, ‘prison officials have a duty . . . to 

protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners.’” Id. (quoting Cortes–

Quinones v. Jimenez–Nettleship, 842 F.2d 556, 558 (1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 

U.S. 823 (1988)). 

It is not, however, every injury suffered by one prisoner at 

the hands of another that translates into constitutional liability 

for prison officials responsible for the victim’s safety. Our 

cases have held that a prison official violates the Eighth 

Amendment only when two requirements are met. First, the 

deprivation alleged must be, objectively, sufficiently serious, a 

prison official’s act or omission must result in the denial of the 

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minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities. For a claim 

(like the one here) based on a failure to prevent harm, the 

inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions 

posing a substantial risk of serious harm. 

The second requirement follows from the principle that 

only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain implicates 

the Eighth Amendment. To violate the Cruel and Unusual 

Punishments Clause, a prison official must have a sufficiently 

culpable state of mind. In prison-conditions cases that state of 

mind is one of deliberate indifference to inmate health or 

safety. 

Id. at 834 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 

 Accordingly, Plaintiffs must objectively show that Ryan’s actions deprived Dana 

of something “sufficiently serious.” See Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th 

Cir. 2010) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). The facts clearly show Dana was killed by 

a savage attack at the hands of other inmates. Plaintiffs allege this was the result of 

Ryan’s actions. (Doc. 53 at 11). The Court finds this more than qualifies as sufficiently 

serious. 

 Plaintiffs, however, must “make a subjective showing that the deprivation 

occurred with deliberate indifference to [Dana’s] health or safety.” Thomas, 611 F.3d at 

1150 (quoting Foster v. Runnels, 554 F.3d 807 (9th Cir. 2009). This subjective showing 

is done by proving Ryan had the requisite culpable state of mind. As the Farmer Court 

explained, that state of mind is proven by showing Ryan was deliberately indifferent to 

Dana’s health and safety. 

 Plaintiffs have made the claim that Ryan was deliberately indifferent to Dana’s 

safety. (Doc. 53 at 9). But Plaintiffs must give “more than labels and conclusions.” 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. In Farmer, the Supreme Court established a test for deliberate 

indifference in order to determine if a prison official had violated an inmate’s rights 

under the Eighth Amendment. The Supreme Court explained that, 

a prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth 

Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of 

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confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an 

excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both 

be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn 

that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also 

draw the inference. . . . But an official’s failure to alleviate a 

significant risk that he should have perceived but did not, 

while no cause for commendation, cannot under our cases be 

condemned as the infliction of punishment. 

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. 

 In applying this explanation from Farmer, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has 

employed a two part inquiry to determine deliberate indifference. As the Court of 

Appeals explained, 

First, the inmate must show that the prison officials were 

aware of a “substantial risk of serious harm” to an inmate’s 

health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. This part of our 

inquiry may be satisfied if the inmate shows that the risk 

posed by the deprivation is obvious. See id. at 842 (“[A] 

factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a 

substantial risk [to a prisoner’s health] from the very fact that 

the risk was obvious.”). Second, the inmate must show that 

the prison officials had no “reasonable” justification for the 

deprivation, in spite of that risk. See id. at 844 (“[P]rison 

officials who actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate 

health or safety may be found free from liability if they 

responded reasonably.”). 

Thomas, 611 F.3d at 1150-51 (footnotes omitted). Consequently, the Court looks to 

whether Plaintiffs alleged facts to show Ryan was subjectively aware of the substantial 

risk of serious harm to Dana on the morning of July 3, 2010. If Ryan was aware of the 

substantial risk, the Court will then look to whether Ryan had a reasonable justification 

for not acting to mitigate that risk. 

 Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint alleges no facts that 

address any issues concerning Ryan’s deliberate indifference to inmate on inmate 

violence. (Doc. 63 at 5). Plaintiffs devote one sentence in their Response to showing 

how their Second Amended Complaint alleges facts that Ryan was deliberately 

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indifferent. Plaintiffs merely state, the “Second Amended Complaint alleges seven pages 

and fifty (50) paragraphs solely devoted to specific allegations of Ryan’s knowledge of an 

deliberate indifference to the unconstitutional acts committed by his staff against ASPC 

inmates.” (Doc. 68 at 3) (emphasis in original). The rest of Plaintiffs’ Response to this 

issue is devoted to proving that deliberate indifference is the test to determine if a 

supervisor is liable for violating the Constitutional rights of an inmate. (Id. at 3-5). On 

this point the Court agrees with Plaintiffs—deliberate indifference is the test. The central 

question, however, is how deliberate indifference is determined and whether the 

allegations against Ryan fulfill this determination. 

 The Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals clearly explained how 

deliberate indifference is determined in Farmer and Thomas. Consequently, the Court is 

left to cull Plaintiffs’ “seven pages and fifty (50) paragraphs” of allegations to determine 

if Plaintiffs have shown Ryan was aware of the substantial risk of serious harm to Dana. 

Plaintiffs “may establish [Ryan’s] awareness by reliance on any relevant evidence.” 

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 848. But, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that Ryan was plausibly aware 

of a substantial risk to Dana and not just possibly aware. 

 Viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs fail to 

state a single fact establishing that Ryan was aware of a substantial risk of serious harm 

to Dana on the morning of July 3, 2010. Plaintiffs’ statement of facts begins on page 4 of 

the Second Amended Complaint. Allegations 20-57 are pertinent to all Plaintiffs’ claims 

for relief. (Doc. 53 at 4). Not a single one of these allegations mentions Ryan or could 

be construed to imply that Ryan was aware of what was happening at ASPC-Lewis. Nor 

do any of these allegations show that Ryan’s actions or deprivations made substantial 

risks of serious harm to Dana obvious to Ryan. 

 Plaintiffs include Ryan in Count One of their claims for relief. (Id. at 9). 

Allegations 58-69 support Count One. However, the allegations that concern Ryan here 

are nothing more than a series of conclusory statements and repeated accusations against 

him. Even the parts that mention Ryan by name, allegations 60, 63, 64, 65, and 68, are 

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conclusions couched as factual allegations with respect to Ryan. By way of example, 

Plaintiffs’ allegations include statements like, “all individual Defendants herein, . . . 

RYAN, . . . demonstrated deliberate indifference . . . through their policies, practices, and 

procedures, including,” “[k]nowing in advance of the planned ‘beat down,’” and 

“[f]ailing to properly train COs . . .” (Id. at 9-10 ¶ 60). Further, Plaintiffs claim, “official 

policies, procedures, longstanding customs and practices of Defendants RYAN . . . , 

evinced a deliberate indifference to constitutional rights. This indifference was 

manifested by the failure to change, correct, or revoke or rescind said policies, 

procedures, customs and practices before DANA was beaten and left for dead.” (Id. at 12 

¶ 68). These are conclusions. These are not specific facts that sufficiently allege that 

Ryan plausibly deprived Dana of his constitutional rights. 

 Plaintiffs allege three different times, in allegations 60, 62, and 67, that 

Defendants knew the beating was going to take place and allowed it to happen but make 

no allegation that Ryan himself knew, who told him, or how he came by the information. 

None of these allegations can be reasonably intended to imply that Ryan, himself, 

actually knew the beating was going to take place. Further, these allegations against 

Ryan, that he knew of the beat down, are clearly contradicted by allegation 22, where 

Plaintiffs state only “ADC Corrections Officers and their supervisor working in the Stiner 

Unit . . . were informed and knew that Dana was going to get a ‘beat-down’ the morning 

of July 3, 2010.” (Id. at 4 ¶ 22). There is no mention of Ryan in this factual allegation. 

 Plaintiffs do allege that Defendants, including Ryan were deliberately indifferent 

for failing to adequately staff all housing units and collapsing the units. (Id. at 10 ¶ 60). 

Plaintiffs, however, have not shown that Ryan knew of this deprivation or that a 

substantial risk of serious harm was or should have been obvious to Ryan by this 

deprivation. These deficiencies are indicative of the rest of the allegations Plaintiffs 

made in Count One. 

 Given the totality of the allegations in Count One, Plaintiffs have not made the 

first claim for relief against Ryan, that he violated Dana’s Eighth Amendment rights, 

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plausible on its face. Therefore, the Court dismisses Count One against Ryan. 

 2. Count Two 

 Count Two alleges Ryan, among other supervisors, violated § 1983 by breaching 

his duty of “Supervisor Responsibility” and violating the rights of inmates under his care, 

guaranteed by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Doc. 53 at 12-19). Plaintiffs 

allege Ryan acted with deliberate indifference to the health and safety of inmates at all 

the jails he supervised in violation of their constitutional rights. (Id. at 13). Count Two is 

expressly based on Ryan’s alleged violation of inmates’ rights secured by the Fourth and 

Fourteenth Amendments. (Doc. 53 at 13 ¶ 71). 

 Plaintiffs have not explained what part of the Fourth Amendment Ryan has 

allegedly violated in Count Two. In analyzing Plaintiffs’ claim, the only possible 

application of the Fourth Amendment the Court sees is the protection against the use of 

excessive force by or authorized by police officers, the same claim Plaintiffs made in 

Count One. “In addressing an excessive force claim brought under § 1983, analysis 

begins by identifying the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed by the 

challenged application of force.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 394 (citing Baker, 443 U.S. at 

140). However, as the Court explained, this Fourth Amendment protection is for free 

citizens in the process of arrest from the excessive use of force by government actors. 

See id. at 395 n. 10. Dana and the inmates at the center of Plaintiffs’ claim in Count Two 

were not free citizens when the allegations occurred, they were incarcerated. “Since 

[neither Dana nor the inmates were] pre-trial detainee[s] at the time, Plaintiffs cannot 

assert a Fourth Amendment claim, rather, it is the Eighth Amendment that is implicated 

in excessive force claims by a convicted prisoner.” Dennis v. Thurman, 959 F. Supp. 

1253, 1264 n. 1 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 393-95 n. 10). Plaintiffs 

have not alleged Ryan violated the Eighth Amendment rights of inmates in Count Two. 

Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim against Ryan in 

Count Two for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Court is left 

with determining if Ryan violated the Fourteenth Amendment rights of inmates. 

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 Similar to Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim, Plaintiffs have not explained how 

the Fourteenth Amendment was violated by Ryan in Count Two. The Fourteenth 

Amendment guarantees more than a single right that the Court can automatically look to 

in this case. Pertinent to this case, “[t]he [Supreme] Court has held that the Fourteenth 

Amendment guarantees against infringement by the States the liberties of . . . the Fourth 

Amendment, . . . , [and] the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual 

punishments, . . .” Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 411-12 (1965) (emphasis added). In 

addition, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees additional 

rights under substantive due process. This is where the Fourteenth Amendment protects 

individuals from “arbitrary action of government” and conduct that “shocks the 

conscience.” County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998) (internal 

citations omitted). 

 Plaintiffs have not explained in their Second Amended Complaint, nor in their 

Reply, which analysis they want the Court to apply. For a § 1983 claim, the specific 

constitutional right allegedly infringed must be identified. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 394 

(citing Baker, 443 U.S. at 140). “Dismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable 

legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” 

Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Robertson 

v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 533-534 (9th Cir. 1984)). 

 By the wording of Count Two, where Plaintiffs state “[t]his action is brought 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments . . . ,” it would 

appear that Plaintiffs are alleging Ryan violated inmate’s Fourth Amendment rights 

guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. (Doc. 53 at 13 ¶ 71). If this in fact is what 

Plaintiffs intended to plead, as explained by the Court, the Fourteenth Amendment claim 

against Ryan should be dismissed because the Fourth Amendment does not apply to 

Count Two. 

 If Plaintiffs intended for their claim to be under the substantive due process rights 

guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, their claim did not give Defendant fair notice 

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of what the claim was and the grounds upon which it rested. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

555. This is evinced by the fact that no party addressed substantive due process claims in 

their pleadings. 

 Consequently, the Court dismisses Plaintiffs claims against Ryan in Count Two 

for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 

C. § 1983 Claims for Pain and Suffering 

Related to Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims under Counts One and Two, are Plaintiffs’ 

claims to recover damages for Dana’s pre-death pain and suffering. (Doc. 53 at 22 ¶ C). 

Defendants contend that such damages cannot be recovered by either Plaintiff under their 

§ 1983 claims. (Doc. 63 at 12). 

 1. Estate’s § 1983 Claims Seeking Pain and Suffering 

 As one of the named Plaintiffs, Dana’s Estate is seeking damages for Dana’s predeath pain and suffering. A different judge in this Court has thoroughly addressed this 

very issue. In Gotbaum v. City of Phoenix, 617 F.Supp.2d 878 (D. Ariz. 2008), this Court 

put § 1983 in context and explained, 

Section 1983 was enacted after the Civil War to remedy 

widespread violations of civil rights in the South. The statute 

creates a civil cause of action for any person whose federal 

rights have been deprived by a person acting under color of 

law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute does not, however, 

specify the remedies available to such a person, nor does it 

address whether the cause of action survives the death of the 

injured person. Id. Congress instead has directed courts to 

“turn to ‘the common law, as modified and changed by the 

constitution and statutes of the [forum] State,’ as long as these 

are ‘not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the 

United States.’” Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 588, 

98 S.Ct. 1991, 56 L.Ed.2d 554 (1978) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 

1988). Courts thus look to forum state statutes for the 

remedies available under section 1983. Id. at 589, 98 S.Ct. 

1991. In doing so, however, courts must confirm that the 

forum state remedies comport with the Constitution and laws 

of the United States. “Of particular importance is whether 

application of state law ‘would be inconsistent with the federal 

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policy underlying the cause of action under consideration’”—

in this case, section 1983. Id. at 590, 98 S.Ct. 1991 (quoting 

Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 465, 95 

S.Ct. 1716, 44 L.Ed.2d 295 (1975)). 

617 F. Supp. 2d at 882-83. The court in Gotbaum found Arizona’s survival statute, 

A.R.S. § 14-3110, was the most closely analogous state law to provide a remedy for a § 

1983 claim by the decedent’s estate. Id. at 883. Arizona’s survival statute bars a 

decedent’s estate from recovering for a decedent’s pain and suffering. See A.R.S. § 14-

3110. The court was then tasked with determining whether Arizona’s survival statute 

was consistent with the federal policy underlying § 1983 and specifically whether 

damages for the decedent’s pre-death pain and suffering were also barred in a § 1983 

claim in Arizona. The court determined that damages for pre-death pain and suffering 

should not be barred in a § 1983 claim. Id. at 885. 

Gotbaum acknowledged that the Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit Court of 

Appeals have not decided the question of whether a survival statute baring recovery for 

the decedent’s pain and suffering was consistent with the federal policy behind § 1983. 

Gotbaum, 617 F.Supp.2d at 884. However, the court in Gotbaum recognized that a 

majority of federal cases had concluded “that when a violation of federal civil rights 

results in death of the victim, state statutes limiting the remedies of the victim’s estate 

and family members are not consistent with the purposes of section 1983.” Id. (citing 

Berry v. City of Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489, 1499-1507 (10th Cir. 1990); Bass by Lewis v. 

Wallenstein, 769 F.2d 1173, 1187-90 (7th Cir. 1985); Jaco v. Bloechle, 739 F.2d 239, 

241-45 (6th Cir. 1984); Gilbaugh v. Balzer, No. Civ-99-1576-AS, 2001 WL 34041889, at 

*5-7 (D.Or. June 7, 2001); Garcia v. Whitehead, 961 F.Supp. 230, 232-33 (C.D. Cal. 

1997); Guyton v. Phillips, 532 F.Supp. 1154, 1164-66 (N.D. Cal. 1981)). 

Gotbaum reached the same conclusion as the majority of other federal cases and 

explained, 

The legislative history of section 1983 makes clear that 

“Congress intended significant recompense when a 

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constitutional violation caused the death of the victim. The 

general legislative history of the 1871 act makes clear that 

death was among the civil rights violations that Congress 

intended to remedy.” Berry, 900 F.2d at 1501. . . . “[I]n both 

Houses [of Congress], statements of the supporters of [section 

1983] corroborated that Congress . . . intended to give a broad 

remedy for violations of federally protected civil rights.” 

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 685, 98 S.Ct. 

2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). . . . The Supreme Court has 

noted that section 1983’s “unique remedy make[s] it 

appropriate to accord the statute ‘a sweep as broad as its 

language.’” Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 272, 105 S.Ct. 

1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985) (quoting United States v. Price, 

383 U.S. 787, 801, 86 S.Ct. 1152, 16 L.Ed.2d 267 (1966)), 

superseded by statute on other grounds, 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a). 

Most courts have concluded that state statutes limiting 

civil remedies in cases where a constitutional violation has 

caused death to the victim simply are not consistent with the 

purposes of section 1983. Courts have noted that state laws 

“are not suitable to carry out the full effects intended for § 

1983 cases ending in death of the victim; they are deficient in 

some respects to punish the offenses.” Berry, 900 F.2d at 

1506. Courts have also noted the incongruity of applying a 

state law that would allow recovery for pain and suffering if 

the victim survived the assault, but not if the victim died as a 

result of it. . . . Courts have also noted the ever-changing 

patchwork of state survival and wrongful death statutes and 

the fact that adopting them will result in different section 1983 

remedies in different states, and differences even within a 

single state depending on the nature of the cases . . . 

the Supreme Court has not addressed this question. The 

Supreme Court did apply a state survival statute to a section 

1983 claim in Robertson, even though the state statute 

eliminated the claim after the victim died for reasons unrelated 

to the violation of his federal rights. 436 U.S. at 590-94, 98 

S.Ct. 1991. But the Supreme Court specifically noted that its 

decision was narrow and did not necessarily apply to cases 

where the civil rights violation caused the death of the victim . 

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Id. at 884-85. The court then concluded that, “[g]iven the broad intent of section 1983, 

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and particularly the fact that Congress sought to provide an effective remedy for 

unconstitutional killings,” the Arizona survival statute’s elimination of pain and suffering 

damages in cases where death is alleged would be contrary to the purposes of § 1983. Id. 

at 885. 

 In this case, Defendants argue that Arizona’s survival statute is consistent with § 

1983’s goal of awarding compensation to the party actually injured and that this Court 

should apply the survival statute as it stands, barring the Estate’s recovery for pre-death 

pain and suffering. (Doc. 63 at 13). Defendants invite this Court to adopt the reasoning 

used in Venerable v. City of Sacramento, 185 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1133 (E.D. Cal. 2002), 

and Cardinal v. Bushnoff, No. 06cv72, 2010 WL 1337489, at *2 (S.D. Cal. April 5, 2010) 

(both courts holding that state law barring an award of pre-death pain and suffering to the 

estate of a decedent was not inconsistent with a § 1983 claim and therefore state law 

should be applied unchanged). 

 This Court finds the opinion in Venerable v. City of Sacramento both logical and 

convincing and the Court is persuaded to agree with that opinion’s conclusion. However, 

the Court is persuaded that when faced with this question, the Ninth Circuit Court of 

Appeals will ultimately side with the result and reasoning in Gotbaum and a majority of 

other federal courts. Accordingly, to remain consistent with the intent of § 1983, Dana’s 

Estate should not be barred from recovering for Dana’s pre-death pain and suffering by 

applying A.R.S. § 14-3110. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Estate’s § 1983 claims 

for pain and suffering is denied. 

 2. Kini Seawright’s § 1983 Claims Seeking Pain and Suffering 

 As the other named Plaintiff, Kini Seawright is also seeking damages for Dana’s 

pre-death pain and suffering on her two § 1983 claims (Counts One and Two). 

Defendants argue that in order to bring this claim, Plaintiffs must meet the requirements 

to prove a substantive due process violation and show that Defendants’ conduct “shocks 

the conscience.” (Doc. 63 at 14). The Court grants this part of Defendants’ motion to 

dismiss. However, the Court need not and will not address Defendants’ arguments 

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because they completely miss the mark and are irrelevant to why Kini Seawright cannot 

seek damages for Dana’s pre-death pain and suffering on her § 1983 claims. Kini 

Seawright, in her individual capacity as Dana’s mother, cannot seek damages for her 

son’s pre-death pain and suffering because she must bring a wrongful death claim under § 

1983, not a survival claim. 

 As explained in Gotbaum, § 1983 merely “creates a civil cause of action for any 

person whose federal rights have been deprived by a person acting under color of law. 

The statute does not, however, specify the remedies available to such a person, nor does it 

address whether the cause of action survives the death of the injured person.” 617 F. 

Supp. 2d at 882 (internal citations omitted). The remedies of a § 1983 claim and whether 

the cause of action survives the death of the decedent come from the laws of the forum 

state, as long as these laws are consistent with the laws of the United States and the 

policy underlying § 1983. Id. at 883. 

 As discussed above, Arizona’s survival statute, A.R.S. § 14-3110, is the most 

closely analogous state law to provide a remedy for a § 1983 claim by the decedent’s 

estate. However, the most closely analogous state law to provide a remedy for a § 1983 

claim by the decedent’s parent is Arizona’s wrongful death statute, A.R.S. § 12-611. 

A wrongful death claim and a survival claim are separate claims arising from the 

same incident. Barragan v. Superior Court of Pima County, 470 P.2d 722, 724 (Ariz. Ct. 

App. 1970) (holding that a claim under the survival statute permits recovery for the 

wrong to the injured person, and the wrongful death statute confines recovery to the loss 

suffered by the beneficiaries). The survival statute provides for recovery of damages 

sustained by the decedent from the time of injury until his death. Id. The claim passes 

from the decedent to the personal representative, and becomes an asset of the estate. Id. 

The purpose of the survival statute is “to prevent the tortfeasor’s liability from ceasing 

upon the injured person’s death.” Id. The survival statute, A.R.S. § 14-3110, does not 

create a new claim, but rather allows the personal representative to enforce the decedent’s 

claim. Id. While the survival statute explicitly bars recovery by the estate for the 

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decedent’s pre-death pain and suffering, as discussed above, to do so in a § 1983 claim 

would be inconsistent with the intent of § 1983. 

 A wrongful death claim, on the other hand, is neither a continuation of the 

decedent’s claim, nor a continuation of the survival claim under A.R.S. § 14-3110. Id. A 

wrongful death claim compensates statutory beneficiaries for their injuries, such as loss 

of companionship, as opposed to a survival claim which compensates the decedent’s 

estate. Id. The damages available in a wrongful death action do not include damages for 

injury to the decedent, such as the decedent’s pain and suffering. “In an action for 

wrongful death, the jury shall give such damages as it deems fair and with just reference 

to the injury . . . to the surviving parties who may be entitled to recover.” A.R.S. § 12-

613. In other words, the damages are for the injury to the party bringing the wrongful 

death claim, such as a parent. 

 Consequently, the damages Kini Seawright seeks must be for injury to her, not for 

injury to her son. Dana’s pre-death pain and suffering is an injury to him, properly 

sought here by Dana’s estate under § 1983. Dana’s mother cannot also seek damages for 

Dana’s pain and suffering on her wrongful death claim under § 1983. Therefore, 

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Kini Seawright’s § 1983 claims for Dana’s pain and 

suffering is granted. 

D. Estate’s Claim for Tort and Statutory Damages 

Defendants argue that the Estate’s claim for tort and statutory damages should be 

dismissed because they are not recoverable. (Doc. 63 at 14). The Estate demands relief 

in the form of lost wages, income, medical expenses and all other economic losses, and 

general damages. (Doc. 53 at 22 ¶ B-C). Plaintiffs concede that the “Estate does not 

have state law/gross negligence claims to assert.” (Doc. 68 at 7). Accordingly, the 

Court grants Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Estate’s claims for tort and statutory 

damages. 

E. Punitive Damages for State Law Claims 

Defendants argue that punitive damages cannot be awarded against the State of 

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Arizona under a state law claim. (Doc. 63 at 14-15) (citing A.R.S. § 12-820.04). 

Plaintiffs seek punitive damages under their state law claims against the State of Arizona 

in Counts Three, Four, and Five. (Doc. 53 at 19-22). Plaintiffs concede Defendants 

argument and admit that punitive damages are not available against the State. (Doc. 68 at 

7). Therefore, the Court grants Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiffs’ claims for 

punitive damages against the State of Arizona in Counts Three, Four, and Five. 

III. CONCLUSION 

 Based on the foregoing, 

IT IS ORDERED Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is granted in part and denied in 

part. (Doc. 63). Specifically, the Court denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss all § 1983 

claims against all Defendants because no personal representative for the Estate has been 

appointed. The Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count One and Count Two 

against Defendant Charles L. Ryan. The Court denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss the 

Estate’s § 1983 claims for pain and suffering. The Court grants Defendants’ motion to 

dismiss Kini Seawright’s § 1983 claims for pain and suffering. The Court grants 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Estate’s claim for tort and statutory damages. Finally, 

the Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss punitive damages against the State of 

Arizona on Counts Three, Four, and Five. 

 Dated this 6th day of February, 2013. 

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