Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-04307/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-04307-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Steven Christopher Crawley,

Plaintiff

-vsCity of Phoenix, et al.,

Defendants.

CV-16-4307-PHX-JJT (JFM)

Report and Recommendation 

on Screening of Amended Complaint

BACKGROUND

Issues – Plaintiff has filed a first, of-right Amended Complaint (Doc. 10) prior to 

service of an answer pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a). The Court is 

required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental 

entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised claims that are 

legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, 

or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(b)(1)–(2). The undersigned concludes that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint fails 

to adequately state a claim against some defendants, and therefore those defendants must 

be dismissed. This matter is heard by the undersigned on referral, and the conclusions 

reached herein would be dispositive as to those defendants. Accordingly, the 

undersigned makes this Report and Recommendation with regard to the Amended 

Complaint.

Original Complaint - On December 8, 2016, Plaintiff filed his original 

Complaint (Doc. 1) suing Maricopa County, the City of Phoenix, and City of Phoenix 

Police Officers Luis Mcanany, Henry Smith, Holeman, Morrissey, Conklin, Nealson, 

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Michael Naegelt, Holloway, Jane Does A-G, and John Does A-G. Count One alleged 

excessive force, and claims for various state law torts. Count Two alleged an Eight 

Amendment violation regarding medical care by Maricopa County in the care of his 

injuries received from the incident in Count One. In Count Three, Plaintiff alleged Eight 

and Fourteenth Amendment violations regarding medical care, asserting a policy and 

practice of denying medical care. The Court screened that Complaint and dismissed 

Count One and the various city and officer defendants because Plaintiff failed to identify 

specific defendants their specific conduct, and thus failed to adequately state a claim, and 

therefore the supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims was declined. 

Defendant Maricopa County was ordered to respond to Counts Two and Three. Plaintiff 

was ordered to provide service packets for service on Defendant Maricopa County.

AMENDED COMPLAINT

On February 13, 2017, Plaintiff filed his first, of-right Amended Complaint (Doc. 

10). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). This Amended Complaint consists of a single count 

alleging claims of excessive use of force in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth 

Amendments. The named defendants are limited to: (1) the City of Phoenix, Arizona; 

(2) the Phoenix Police Department; and Officers (3) Louis McAnany; (4) Henry Smith; 

(5) Holman; (6) Conklin; (7) Nelson; and (8) Morrissey. 

Effect on Omitted Claims/Defendants - Plaintiff does not include in his 

Amended Complaint Defendant Maricopa County or the claims in his prior Counts Two 

and Three. “It is hornbook law that an amended pleading supersedes the original, the 

latter being treated thereafter as non-existent.” Bullen v. De Bretteville, 239 F.2d 824, 

833 (9th Cir. 1956), overruled on other grounds by Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 

896 (9th Cir. 2012). . Thus, causes of action alleged in an original complaint which are 

not alleged in an amended complaint are waived. King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th 

Cir. 1987). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint effectively disposes of his 

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claims in his prior Counts Two and Three, and terminates Defendant Maricopa County 

from this action. Accordingly, the Clerk should be directed to not forward service on 

Defendant Maricopa County to the U.S. Marshals Service. 

Standard on Screening – A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement 

of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) 

(emphasis added). While Rule 8 does not demand detailed factual allegations, “it 

demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a 

cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.

“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for

relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its

judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific

factual allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess 

whether there are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 681.

But as the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has instructed, 

courts must “continue to construe pro se filings liberally.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 

342 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se prisoner] ‘must be held to less 

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. 

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)).

Revised Count One - With regard to the revised Count One in the Amended 

Complaint, the Court observes that Plaintiff does not again include his state law claims, 

but only makes claims based on constitutional violations for excessive use of force. In 

disposing of this claim from the original Complaint, the Court concluded that “Plaintiff 

has only made vague and conclusory allegations against a group of Defendants, without 

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any factual specificity as to what any particular Defendant did or failed to do.” (Order 

2/2/17, Doc. 8 at 6.) Plaintiff now makes specific allegations as follows: While 

Plaintiff was handcuffed, controlled, and cooperating in his arrest, Defendants McAnany 

and Smith acted to “forcefully slam, shove, push and violently position [Plaintiff] against 

the patrol car” (Doc. 10 at 5); Defendant Holman joined in the assault, “kicking 

[Plaintiff’s] feet and legs and throwing punches to the Plaintiff’s upper body, shoulder 

and head area as he was handcuffed” and “did a standing knee drop onto the Plaintiff’s 

chest” (id. at 6); Officers Conklin, Nelson and Morrissey “observed the beating and did 

nothing to stop it” (id. at 6); the failure to intervene “encouraged the violence toward the 

Plaintiff.” 

Claims of excessive force in the course of an authorized arrest or detention 

“should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its ‘reasonableness' standard.” 

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). Whether a particular seizure is reasonable 

must be “judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene,” id. at 396, 

and “requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, 

including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate 

threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or 

attempting to evade arrest by flight,” id.

“[P]olice officers have a duty to intercede when their fellow officers violate the 

constitutional right of a suspect or other citizen.” Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 

1289 (9th Cir.2000). “[T]he constitutional right violated by the passive defendant is 

analytically the same as the right violated by the person who strikes the blows.” United 

States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1447 n. 25 (9th Cir.1994) aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 518 

U.S. 81 .(1996). An officer who fails to intervene when his fellow officers use excessive 

force to effect a seizure would be responsible, like his colleagues, for violating the 

Fourth Amendment. Id. However, officers are liable for a breach of this duty only if they 

had “a realistic opportunity” to intercede. Cunningham, 229 F.3d at 1289. 

Here, Plaintiff alleges sufficient facts to show that the forced used against him 

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was unreasonable. Plaintiff alleges facts suggesting that he posed no immediate threat, 

was not actively assisting resisting arrest, or attempting to flee, and was instead already 

peacefully in custody when the assault occurred. . The alleged conduct and the 

seriousness of Plaintiff's alleged injuries, if taken as true, suggest that the quantum of 

force Defendants McAnany, Smith and Holman used was beyond that which was 

reasonable. And, Plaintiff sufficiently alleges that Defendants Conklin, Nelson and 

Morrissey observed the use of excessive force, had a realistic opportunity to intervene at 

the scene, but failed to do so.

On the other hand, Plaintiff fails allege sufficient facts to adequately state a claim 

against Defendants City of Phoenix and Phoenix Police Department. For each claim 

Plaintiff alleges, he must state the following: (1) the specific constitutional right which 

he believes was violated; (2) the individual Defendant whose conduct violated that right; 

(3) the specific conduct which violated the right; and (4) the connection between the 

Defendant=s conduct and a specific injury Plaintiff suffered as a result of the conduct. 

Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976). A local governmental unit may not 

be held responsible for the acts of its employees under a respondeat superior theory of 

liability. See Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997); Monell v. 

Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); and Fogel v. Collins, 531 F.3d 824, 834 

(9th Cir. 2008). Therefore, a plaintiff must go beyond the respondeat superior theory of 

liability and demonstrate that the alleged constitutional deprivation was the product of a 

policy or custom of the local governmental unit, because municipal liability must rest on 

the actions of the municipality, and not the actions of the employees of the municipality. 

See Brown, 520 U.S. at 403; Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91; and Fogel, 531 F.3d at 834. 

Here, Plaintiff makes no allegations that his injuries resulted from a policy or custom of 

the municipal defendants. Accordingly, Defendants City of Phoenix and Phoenix Police 

Department must be dismissed. 

Conclusions – Based upon the foregoing, the undersigned concludes that 

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Defendants City of Phoenix and Phoenix Police Department must be dismissed for 

failure to adequately state a claim, and that service of the Complaint on and an answer 

from Defendants McAnany, Smith, Holman, Conklin, Nelson and Morissey should be 

required. Further, service of the now moot original Complaint should be quashed.

RECOMMENDATIONS

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Defendants City of Phoenix and 

Phoenix Police Department be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to 

state a claims.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that service of the original Complaint and 

service on Defendant Maricopa County be QUASHED.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that service of the Amended Complaint 

(Doc. 10) on Defendants McAnany, Smith, Holman, Conklin, Nelson and Morrissey be 

ordered, and they be required to respond to the Amended Complaint by entry of an order 

that provides as follows:.

(1) The Clerk of the Court shall send Plaintiff a service packet including both 

summons and request for waiver forms for said Defendants. 

(2) Plaintiff shall complete and return the service packet to the Clerk of the Court 

within 20 days of the date of the filing of this Order. The United States Marshal will not 

provide service of process if Plaintiff fails to comply with this Order. 

(3) The United States Marshal shall retain the Summons, a copy of such amended 

complaint, and a copy of this Order for future use. 

(4) The United States Marshal shall notify said Defendants of the commencement 

of this action and request waiver of service of the summons pursuant to Rule 4(d) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The notice to Defendants shall include a copy of this 

Order. The Marshal shall file waivers of service of the summons or requests for waivers 

that were returned as undeliverable as soon as they are received. If a waiver of service of 

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summons is not returned by Defendants within thirty days from the date the request for 

waiver was sent by the Marshal, the Marshal shall: (a) Personally serve copies of the 

Summons, such amended Complaint and this Order upon Defendants pursuant to Rule 

4(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (b) Within ten days after personal 

service is effected, file the return of service for the Defendants, along with evidence of 

the attempt to secure a waiver of service of the summons and of the costs subsequently 

incurred in effecting service upon the Defendants. The costs of service shall be 

enumerated on the return of service form (USM-285) and shall include the costs incurred 

by the Marshal for photocopying additional copies of the Summons, such amended 

complaint, or this Order and for preparing new process receipt and return forms (USM285), if required. Costs of service will be taxed against the personally served Defendant 

pursuant to Rule 4(d)(2) and (5) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, unless 

otherwise ordered by the Court. 

(5) Defendants who agree to waive service of the Summons and such amended 

complaint shall return signed waiver forms to the United State Marshal, and not to 

Plaintiff. 

(6) Said Defendants shall answer such amended complaint or otherwise respond 

by appropriate motion within the time provided by the applicable provisions of Rule 

12(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

(7) Any answer or responsive pleading shall state the specific Defendant(s) by 

name on whose behalf it is filed. The Court may strike any answer, responsive pleading, 

or other motion or paper that does not identify the specific Defendant(s) by name on 

whose behalf it is filed. 

EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

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of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall have 

fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within 

which to file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the parties have 

fourteen (14) days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file 

objections to any findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be 

considered a waiver of a party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United 

States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute 

a waiver of a party's right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or 

judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. 

Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Dated: February 17, 2017

16-4307o Order 17 02 14 re MAmend.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

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