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Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 

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Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-50787

Summary Calendar

DUVAL WIEDMANN, L.L.C., 

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

INFOROCKET.COM, INC.; INGENIO,INC.,

Defendants - Appellees,

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 1:08-CV-28 

Before KING, STEWART, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Plaintiff–appellant moves to transfer this appeal to the Federal Circuit.

For the following reasons, we DENY the motion.

In January 2008, plaintiff–appellant DuVal Wiedmann, L.L.C.

(Wiedmann) brought a diversity suit against defendants–appellees

Inforocket.com and Ingenio (collectively, Ingenio) in federal court in Texas for

breach of contract. The suit arose out of a licensing agreement, under which

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

March 9, 2010

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

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No. 09-50787

Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 673 (1969) (holding, inter alia that “overriding 1

federal policies would be significantly frustrated if licensees could be required to continue to

pay royalties during the time they are challenging patent validity in the courts”).

2

Wiedmann agreed to license its patent to Ingenio in exchange for royalty

payments. Wiedmann and Ingenio had entered into a patent licensing

agreement in June 2001; the agreement was amended in March 2002. In April

2004, Ingenio requested that the United States Patent and Trademark Office

(PTO) evaluate Wiedmann’s patent. In December 2007, the PTO rejected a

significant number of the patent’s claims as “unpatentable” in light of prior art.

Sometime after June 2008, Wiedmann amended the patent in response to the

PTO’s reexamination and was granted a reexamination certificate in December

2008. However, in August 2004, Ingenio sent a letter stating that “pursuant to

. . . the [patent] licensing agreement, Ingenio hereby provides you with notice of

its termination of the License Agreement.” Wiedmann received this letter in

September 2004. 

In its complaint, Wiedmann sought a declaratory judgment as to the

parties’ rights under the licensing agreement, including if and when the

agreement had been terminated; alleged breach and anticipatory breach of

contract for failure to pay royalties under the agreement; and sought attorneys’

fees and costs, as provided under the licensing agreement, for its enforcement

expenses. Wiedmann did not present any patent claims or address any patentrelated issues in its complaint. Ingenio denied liability and raised affirmative

defenses, including that it did not infringe Wiedmann’s patent; that the patent

was invalid; and that it did not owe licensing payments, under the Lear

doctrine, while the patent was being challenged. Ingenio also counterclaimed 1

for fraud and negligent misrepresentation. 

Wiedmann moved for summary judgment on its claims and on Ingenio’s

counterclaims. Ingenio abandoned its claims for fraud and negligent

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No. 09-50787

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misrepresentation and moved for summary judgment as to Wiedmann’s contract

claims against it. The district court entered a declaratory judgment, concluding

that the patent licensing agreement terminated on November 29, 2004, because

Wiedmann had received proper notice of termination on September 30, 2004, and

the licensing agreement provided that the contract terminated 60 days after

notice was received. The district court also determined that Ingenio was

released from paying royalties from April 23, 2004 (when Ingenio requested

patent reexamination) through the date of termination, under the Lear doctrine.

The district court did not reach other patent-related defenses, concluding only

that Ingenio’s challenge to the patent’s validity had been “successful” for

purposes of the Lear doctrine. The district court also granted summary

judgment to Ingenio as to Wiedmann’s contract claims and entered final

judgment on July 29, 2009. 

Wiedmann appealed to this court, arguing, initially, that this court had

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. However, after Ingenio responded,

Wiedmann moved to transfer this appeal to the Federal Circuit, arguing that the

case presented a substantial question of federal patent law. Specifically,

Wiedmann urged that (1) patent licenses are subject to scrutiny under federal

law; (2) under state contract law, the existence of a valid and enforceable

contract is the first element to be proved in a breach of contract action and thus

patent validity is subsumed in a breach of contract claim; and (3) under state

contract law, “damages” is another element of a breach of contract action and

federal patent law significantly impacts the availability and manner of

calculating damages. Ingenio opposes transfer, arguing that jurisdiction is

proper in this court. 

“Under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a), the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction

of an appeal where the district court’s jurisdiction was based, in whole or in part,

on 28 U.S.C. § 1338.” Natec, Inc. v. Deter Co., 28 F.3d 28, 29 (5th Cir. 1994) (per

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 The Federal Circuit has also suggested, pre-Christianson, that it “will not have 2

jurisdiction over an appeal from a district court judgment where the district court’s

jurisdiction was based solely on diversity, even though the case may involve interpretation,

viability, and applicability of a patent license contract, and those determinations may require

consideration of defenses raising patent validity and infringement issues.” In re Innotron

Diagnostics, 800 F.2d 1077, 1080 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (citing references). 

4

curiam). Section 1338 provides, in relevant part, that “[t]he district courts shall

have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress

relating to patents . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a); accord Natec, 28 F.3d at 29. Thus,

whether the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction “turns on whether this is

a case ‘arising under’ a federal patent statute, for if it is then the jurisdiction of

the [d]istrict [c]ourt was based at least ‘in part’ on § 1338.” Christianson v. Colt

Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 807 (1988); see also Holmes Group v.

Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 829 (2002). “The well-pleaded

complaint rule . . . focuses on claims, not theories, . . . and just because an

element that is essential to a particular theory might be governed by federal

patent law does not mean that the entire . . . claim ‘arises under’ patent law.”

Christianson, 486 U.S. at 811. “[A] case raising a federal patent-law defense

does not, for that reason alone, ‘arise under’ patent law, even if the defense is

anticipated . . . and even if both parties admit that the defense is the only

question truly at issue in the case,” id. at 809 (internal quotation marks

omitted), and a defendant’s counterclaim cannot serve as the basis for a district

court’s arising under jurisdiction. See Holmes, 535 U.S. at 830. 

“It is well settled that if the patentee pleads a cause of action based on

rights created by a contract, . . . the case is not one ‘arising under’ the patent

laws.” Jim Arnold Corp. v. Hydrotech Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 1567, 1572 (Fed. Cir.

1997) (collecting cases). “[A] suit to enforce a patent licensing agreement does 2

not arise under federal patent law [and t]he presence of a federal defense . . . is

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No. 09-50787

 Even pre-Christianson it was well-settled that claims arising out of a patent contract 3

did not necessarily arise under § 1338. See, e.g., Royal v. Leading Edge Prods., Inc., 833 F.2d

1, 5 (1st Cir. 1987) (“After all, suits which seek royalties or the enforcement of remedies in

respect of contracts permitting the use of patents have frequently been held not to ‘arise under’

§ 1338(a) in a jurisdictional sense.” (collecting cases)); Combs v. Plough, Inc., 681 F.2d 469, 470

(6th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (“[W]here an action is brought to enforce, set aside, or annul a

contract, the action arises out of the contract, and not under the patent laws, even though the

contract concerns a patent right.”).

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irrelevant to jurisdiction.” Scheiber v. Dolby Labs., Inc., 293 F.3d 1014, 1016

(7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, J.).

3

 Because Wiedmann’s complaint solely presented contract claims arising

under the license agreement and did not raise any patent claims or present

substantial patent questions, it does not present claims that “arise under”

§ 1338. Cf. Christianson, 486 U.S. at 810–13 (concluding that, where plaintiff

could have supported its antitrust claims with any of several theories having

nothing to do with patents, its claims did not “arise under” patent law);

ExcelStor Tech. v. Papst Licensing GMBH & Co. KG, 541 F.3d 1373, 1376 (Fed.

Cir. 2008) (determining that a claim of “patent exhaustion” that was actually

based on whether a licensing agreement allowed for collection of two royalties

did not involve a substantial question of federal patent law); Scheiber, 293 F.3d

at 1016 (diversity suit to enforce patent licensing agreement did not “arise

under” the patent laws); Jim Arnold, 109 F.3d at 1572, 1576 (concluding that a

complaint that included a variety of state-law claims and one patent

infringement claim was actually premised on “state-law based . . . claims arising

out of alleged breaches of . . . assignment agreements”). Accordingly, the Federal

Circuit would not have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to § 1295(a), and

jurisdiction is proper in this court. Holmes, 535 U.S. at 829; Christianson, 486

U.S. at 807. We thus DENY Wiedmann’s motion to transfer the appeal. 

MOTION DENIED. 

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