Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02512/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02512-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TRUDI KELSEY,

Plaintiff,

 v.

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, Commissioner 

of Social Security,

Defendant. /

No. C 05-02512 WHA

ORDER DENYING 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 

TO ALTER OR 

AMEND JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

In this social security appeal, plaintiff Trudi Kelsey moves to alter or amend the

judgment against her pursuant to FRCP 59(e). This order finds that plaintiff has not established

entitlement to this extraordinary remedy. Plaintiff’s motion, therefore, is DENIED.

STATEMENT

The facts underlying this litigation are discussed in more detail in the Court’s order

dated December 23, 2005, granting defendant Commissioner of Social Security’s motion for

summary judgment. In brief, on November 18, 2002, plaintiff Trudi Kelsey applied for

disability insurance benefits for the third time, alleging she had been disabled since July 27,

1998, due to allergies to metals including palladium, muscle spasms and joint pain. On

December 17, 2003, plaintiff had a hearing before ALJ Richard P. Laverdure. The ALJ

Case 3:05-cv-02512-WHA Document 15 Filed 02/06/06 Page 1 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

rendered a decision on November 10, 2004, finding that plaintiff’s prior application would not

be reopened and that she was not disabled. Plaintiff filed an action before this Court on June

21, 2005, seeking judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 405(g).

At the hearing before the ALJ, plaintiff testified that she had an undergraduate education

in film making and had taken classes towards a master’s degree. Prior to the alleged onset of

her disability, plaintiff worked as a teller and a manager in the banking industry. After July

1998, plaintiff worked sporadically from her apartment, primarily doing freelance research and

assembling multimedia presentations. Plaintiff testified that she could perform basic household

chores such as cooking and vacuuming by working slowly and for limited intervals. Plaintiff

also reported spending time researching her medical conditions and handling her social-security

matter.

Plaintiff described that during her period of alleged disability she suffered from an

inability to adjust to environments outside of her apartment. Plaintiff explained that anytime

she left her apartment, she subsequently became incapacitated for periods of up to one week. 

In addition to her hypersensitivity to environmental stimuli, plaintiff suggested that the bouts of

incapacity were brought on by her hypothyroidism.

In the ALJ’s decision, he analyzed medical evidence from numerous sources. Among

the important parts of the medical evidence, the San Francisco State Student Health Center

found that plaintiff had a history of hypothyroidisim. Dr. Eugene McMillan, M.D. concluded

that plaintiff had no physical, postural or environmental limitations or limitations on walking,

lifting or sitting. Dr. Victor Rosenor, M.D. concluded that plaintiff was fit for a sedentary

occupation that did not involve lifting more than twenty pounds. Dr. Pedro Avila, M.D.

concluded that plaintiff had a sensitivity to the palladium, but suggested that plaintiff seek

psychiatric counseling to determine if her symptoms were psychosomatic, which plaintiff

rejected . Dr. Michael Dietrick, M.D. found that plaintiff did not have any significant

psychiatric disorder. Finally, Dr. Georgeanna Farren, M.D. concluded that plaintiff had

hypothyroidism and suffered from sensitivity to chemicals within closed spaces. Based on the

Case 3:05-cv-02512-WHA Document 15 Filed 02/06/06 Page 2 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

purported cumulative effect of plaintiff’s ailments, Dr. Farren concluded that plaintiff was

unable to work regularly.

The December order reviewed the ALJ’s application of the five-step inquiry for

disability claims required by 20 C.F.R. 404.1520. The order found that the ALJ had a

substantial basis for his conclusion at step four of the analysis that plaintiff was capable of

performing her past relevant work and thus was not disabled. The December order rejected

plaintiff’s alleged grounds of error: (1) that the ALJ improperly weighed the medical evidence,

in particular the opinion of treating physician Dr. Farren, (2) that the ALJ errantly determined

plaintiff could perform past relevant work at step four, (3) that the ALJ improperly applied the

grids in alternatively denying plaintiff’s claim at step five, (4) that her due process rights were

violated by the ALJ’s failure to reopen plaintiff’s prior disability applications. Judgment was

entered accordingly with the December order. Plaintiff now moves to alter or amend that

judgment. 

ANALYSIS

Relief under FRCP 59(e) is “an extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the

interests of finality and conservation of judicial resources.” Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934,

945 (9th Cir. 2003). A motion under FRCP 59(e) “should not be granted, absent highly unusual

circumstances, unless the district court is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed

clear error, or if there is an intervening change in the controlling law.” Morever, such a motion

“may not be used to raise arguments or present evidence for the first time when they could

reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation.”

Plaintiff identifies eight alleged errors with the December order: (1) finding the ALJ

justified in failing to consider plaintiff’s hypothyroidism, (2) finding that opinions of Dr.

Rosenor and Dr. McMillan were inconsistent with Dr. Farren’s opinion, (3) finding that the

record provided no supporting medical evidence for Dr. Farren’s opinion, (4) finding the ALJ

justified in not trusting plaintiff’s self-assessment, (5) agreeing with the ALJ that Dr. Farren did

not support her opinion with objective data, (6) removing internal citations from a quotation to a

Ninth Circuit opinion, (7) affirming the ALJ’s failure to address plaintiff’s subjective analysis

Case 3:05-cv-02512-WHA Document 15 Filed 02/06/06 Page 3 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

of her pain as a result of her palladium sensitivity and (8) refusing to reopen plaintiff’s prior

applications.

First, the ALJ did not fail to consider plaintiff’s thyroid condition. On the contrary, the

ALJ listed the condition as one of plaintiff’s severe ailments (AR 17). After properly weighing

the medical evidence, however, the ALJ determined that plaintiff’s thyroid condition, even

when considered in conjunction with plaintiff’s other ailments, did not render her unable to

perform past relevant work. Substantial evidence existed for the ALJ to make such a finding.

Second, the December order did not clearly err that certain medical evidence was

inconsistent with Dr. Farren’s ultimate conclusion that plaintiff could not work at all. Both Dr.

Rosenor and Dr. McMillan concluded that plaintiff could work, the latter doctor deeming that

plaintiff could perform work without limitations. Plaintiff would skate over this inconsistency

by stating that Dr. Farren’s opinion was based on analysis done after the opinions of Dr.

Rosenor and Dr. McMillan were issued. This is contrary to plaintiff’s adamant arguments that

she is entitled to receive benefits back to 1998. If Dr. Farren only based her conclusory

statement on analysis performed between 2001 and 2003, after Dr. McMillan examined

plaintiff, then plaintiff’s alleged disability-onset date cannot be accurate. As noted above, Dr.

Farren based her conclusion of plaintiff’s inability to work on plaintiff’s cumulative symptoms

during her five-year history with plaintiff. Finally, Dr. Rosenor examined plaintiff up until

January 2003, only two months before Dr. Farren stop examining plaintiff. Plaintiff cannot

realistically maintain that Dr. Farren’s conclusion was based solely on analysis performed

during those two months.

Third, the Court did not commit clear error in finding that no other medical evidence in

the record supported Dr. Farren’s conclusion that plaintiff could not work. Plaintiff labels this a

“post ad-hoc rationalization” running afoul of the principle that a reviewing court determine the

propriety of agency’s decision based on the grounds articulated by the agency itself. The ALJ,

however, did rely on the fact that no other physician who ever met with plaintiff agreed with Dr.

Farren’s suggestion that plaintiff could not work. “Other medical specialists, including

Case 3:05-cv-02512-WHA Document 15 Filed 02/06/06 Page 4 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

allergy/immunology specialists at UCSF, such as Dr. Avila, did not corroborate such findings”

(AR 23). This was a reasonable grounds for the ALJ to discount Dr. Farren’s opinion.

Fourth, the December order did not commit clear error in finding that the ALJ was

justified in deeming plaintiff’s self-assessment untrustworthy. Plaintiff argues that this case

cannot be distinguished from Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 593–94 (9th Cir. 2004), which

ruled that the ability to perform routine tasks is a insufficient ground standing alone, to discount

a plaintiff’s self-assessment. The December order emphasized the language from the ALJ

opinion that showed it was not the mere performance of basic activities that led the ALJ to

discount’s plaintiff’s self-assessment. The ALJ specifically noted that “[t]he record indicates

that claimant was a dance major, lived on a hill, walked to and from the hill to the bus and had a

full range of motions and no postural limitations” (AR 22–23). These are not simply basic

activities or routine tasks. 

Fifth, the ALJ properly discounted Dr. Farren’s “treating physician” opinion. The ALJ

did not simply discount the opinion on the grounds he found Dr. Farren’s opinion lacking in

objective support. The December order agreed with the ALJ that Dr. Farren’s opinion reeked of

advocacy, rather than medical analysis. It was not clear error to discount a treating physician’s

opinion on these grounds. See Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin, 359 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th

Cir. 2004).

Sixth, plaintiff contends that the Court committed “a notice violation of the Fifth

Amendment” by omitting internal citations when quoting from the Batson opinion (Order at

10). Plaintiff maintains that this purported “slight of hand” makes it impossible to determine

the legal standard applied in the order. The standard from Batson as quoted is clear and is the

law in our circuit. The removal of internal citations to minimize clutter in a judicial opinion is a

routine precaution to improve the accessibility of judicial opinions, rather than to diminish

them. See, e.g., City of L.A. v. David, 538 U.S. 715, 719 (2003) (per curiam).

Seventh, the ALJ did not ignore plaintiff’s self-assessment of her pain, but properly

discounted it based on substantial evidence. The ALJ’s determination comported with Benecke,

379 F.3d at 593–94, as noted in the fourth alleged error, supra.

Case 3:05-cv-02512-WHA Document 15 Filed 02/06/06 Page 5 of 6
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

Eighth, the December order did not clearly error in refusing to reopen plaintiff’s prior

applications. The order was extremely lenient in even assuming that plaintiff presented a

“colorable constitutional challenge.” Beyond presenting such a colorable challenge, however,

plaintiff needed to satisfy one of four factors for good cause for failing to timely appeal the

earlier rulings. Soc. Sec. Ruling 91-5p. Plaintiff contends her mental state constituted good

cause. As explained in the December order, though, the record demonstrated that plaintiff did

not have any substantial psychological impairments.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s motion to alter or amend judgment is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 6, 2006 WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:05-cv-02512-WHA Document 15 Filed 02/06/06 Page 6 of 6