Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01839/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01839-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Lisa Ann Collins, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner 

of Social Security, 

Defendant.

No. CV13-01839-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

Plaintiff Lisa Ann Collins seeks review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the final 

decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“the Commissioner”), which denied her 

disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income under section 

1614(a)(3)(A) of the Social Security Act. Because the decision of the Administrative 

Law Judge (“ALJ”) is supported by substantial evidence and is not based on legal error, 

the Commissioner’s decision will be affirmed. 

I. Background. 

Plaintiff was born in August 1960. She has a high school education and 

completed three years of college. Her prior job history includes work as a bartender, 

flooring installer, and a deli manager. 

On May 20, 2011, Plaintiff applied for supplemental security income, alleging 

disability beginning December 30, 2010. Her application was denied initially on 

October 13, 2011, and upon reconsideration on May 18, 2012. On January 30, 2013, she 

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appeared with her attorney and testified at a hearing before the ALJ. A vocational expert 

also testified. 

On April 17, 2013, the ALJ issued a decision that Plaintiff was not disabled within 

the meaning of the Social Security Act. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request 

for review of the hearing decision, making the ALJ’s decision final. 

II. Standard of Review. 

The district court reviews only those issues raised by the party challenging the 

ALJ’s decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). The court 

may set aside the Commissioner’s disability determination only if the determination is 

not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 

625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, less than a 

preponderance, and relevant evidence that a reasonable person might accept as adequate 

to support a conclusion considering the record as a whole. Id. In determining whether 

substantial evidence supports a decision, the court must consider the record as a whole 

and may not affirm simply by isolating a “specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Id. 

As a general rule, “[w]here the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 

interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be 

upheld.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). 

III. The ALJ’s Five-Step Sequential Evaluation. 

To determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the Social Security 

Act, the ALJ follows a five-step process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). The claimant bears 

the burden of proof on the first four steps, but at step five the burden shifts to the 

Commissioner. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). 

At the first step, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is engaging in 

substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If so, the claimant is not 

disabled and the inquiry ends. Id. At step two, the ALJ determines whether the claimant 

has a “severe” medically determinable physical or mental impairment. § 404.1520(a) 

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(4)(ii). If not, the claimant is not disabled and the inquiry ends. Id. At step three, the 

ALJ considers whether the claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments meets 

or medically equals an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. Pt. 

404. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the claimant is automatically found to be disabled. Id. 

If not, the ALJ proceeds to step four. At step four, the ALJ assesses the claimant’s 

residual functional capacity (“RFC”) and determines whether the claimant is still capable 

of performing past relevant work. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If so, the claimant is not 

disabled and the inquiry ends. Id. If not, the ALJ proceeds to the fifth and final step, 

where the ALJ determines whether the claimant can perform any other work based on the 

claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If so, the 

claimant is not disabled. Id. If not, the claimant is disabled. Id. 

At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful 

activity since May 20, 2011. At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the following 

severe impairments: fibromyalgia; cervical and lumbar degenerative disc disease; 

headaches; and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. At step three, the ALJ 

determined that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that 

meets or medically equals an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. 

Pt. 404. At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the RFC to perform: 

[L]ight work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(b) except 

[Plaintiff] is limited to occasional push/pull with the bilateral 

upper extremities and occasional operation of foot controls 

with the bilateral lower extremities. [Plaintiff] should never 

climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds. Yet, she can occasionally 

climb ramps and stairs, as well as balance, stoop, crouch, 

kneel, and crawl. In addition, [Plaintiff] should avoid even 

moderate exposure to extreme cold and humidity. She should 

avoid concentrated exposure to pulmonary irritants, poorly 

ventilated areas, dangerous machinery with moving 

mechanical parts, and exposed, unprotected heights. 

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A.R. 18. The ALJ further found that Plaintiff is unable to perform any of her past 

relevant work. At step five, the ALJ concluded that, considering Plaintiff’s age, 

education, work experience, and RFC, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in 

the national economy that she could perform. 

IV. Analysis. 

Plaintiff argues the ALJ’s decision is defective for three reasons: (1) the ALJ 

misinterpreted evidence to her detriment; (2) the ALJ erroneously weighed medical 

source evidence; and (3) the ALJ failed to afford her due process. The Court will address 

each argument below. 

A. Interpreting Evidence. 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ contradicted herself by simultaneously finding that 

Plaintiff is severely impaired by fibromyalgia and that there is no documented diagnosis 

or objective test findings of Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia. Doc. 15 at 5. Although the ALJ’s 

opinion is not a model of clarity, the Court does not find legal error. At step two of the 

five-step analysis, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had a number of severe impairments, 

including fibromyalgia. A.R. 17. At step four, the ALJ found that the fibromyalgia was 

not disabling. A.R. 20 (the medical record does not support Plaintiff’s claim “that she 

has been unable to work due to fibromyalgia”). As is clear from the sequential analysis 

itself, a conclusion that an impairment is severe does not mean that it is disabling. 

Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff suffers from fibromyalgia 

moots the ALJ’s attempt to discount Dr. Rosenberg’s restrictive opinion. Doc. 21 at 1. 

Again, Plaintiff is incorrect. Although the ALJ found that Plaintiff was afflicted with 

fibromyalgia, the ALJ did not commit legal error or otherwise contradict herself by 

finding that Plaintiff was not disabled by the disorder. 

B. Weighing of Medical Source Evidence. 

Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ improperly weighed the medical opinions of her 

treating physicians Drs. Woodall and Rosenberg, and the opinion of consultative 

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examiner Dr. Jones. The Court will address the ALJ’s treatment of each opinion below. 

1. Legal Standard.

The Ninth Circuit distinguishes between the opinions of treating physicians, 

examining physicians, and non-examining physicians. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 

830 (9th Cir. 1995). Generally, an ALJ should give greatest weight to a treating 

physician’s opinion and more weight to the opinion of an examining physician than to 

one of a non-examining physician. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1040-41 (9th 

Cir. 1995); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)-(6) (listing factors to be considered when 

evaluating opinion evidence, including length of examining or treating relationship, 

frequency of examination, consistency with the record, and support from objective 

evidence). If it is not contradicted by another doctor’s opinion, the opinion of a treating 

or examining physician can be rejected only for “clear and convincing” reasons. Lester, 

81 F.3d at 830 (citing Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 422 (9th Cir. 1988)). A 

contradicted opinion “can only be rejected for specific and legitimate reasons that are 

supported by substantial evidence in the record.” Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31 (citing 

Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1043). 

An ALJ can meet the “specific and legitimate reasons” standard “by setting out a 

detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his 

interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403, 1408 (9th 

Cir. 1986). But “[t]he ALJ must do more than offer [her] conclusions. [She] must set 

forth [her] own interpretations and explain why they, rather than the doctors’, are 

correct.” Embrey, 849 F.2d at 421-22. 

2. Charles J. Woodall, M.D. 

Plaintiff’s treating physician, Charles J. Woodall, M.D., specializes in family 

medicine. On February 1, 2012, Dr. Woodall opined that Plaintiff was “unable to work 

on a consistent basis” due to herniated discs in her neck and back that caused chronic 

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pain and required the use of narcotics. A.R. 511. The opinion contained no functional 

restrictions. A.R. 511. The ALJ accorded Dr. Woodall’s opinion little weight. A.R. 22. 

Dr. Woodall’s medical opinion was contradicted by the opinion of Dr. Sallu 

Jabati, M.D., who is an examining physician, and the opinions of Drs. James J. Green, 

M.D. and Donald Robins, M.D., who are reviewing physicians. These physicians each 

opined Plaintiff had greater abilities than those identified in Dr. Woodall’s opinion. 

A.R. 21-22. The ALJ could therefore discount Dr. Woodall’s opinion for specific and 

legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31. 

The ALJ provided four reasons for giving Dr. Woodall’s opinion little weight. 

First, Dr. Woodall’s opinion stated that Plaintiff was unable to work, which is an issue 

that is reserved to the Commissioner. A.R. 22. The Commissioner is responsible for 

determining whether a claimant meets the statutory definition of disability and does not 

give significance to a statement by a medical source that the claimant is “disabled” or 

“unable to work.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d). Thus, Dr. Woodall’s opinion that Plaintiff 

was unable to work was not entitled to any deference and was properly evaluated in light 

of the evidence as a whole. See McLeod v. Astrue, 640 F.3d 881, 884 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(“Although a treating physician’s opinion is generally afforded the greatest weight in 

disability cases, it is not binding on an ALJ with respect to the existence of an 

impairment or the ultimate issue of disability.”). 

Second, the ALJ asserted that Dr. Woodall’s opinion is inconsistent with the 

medical record. A.R. 22. The ALJ’s statements regarding the weight she accorded Dr. 

Woodall’s opinion are found on page 9 of her decision (A.R. 22), and her detailed 

discussion of the medical evidence is found primarily on pages 6-8 (A.R. 19-21). 

Although this organization is not ideal, the decision makes clear that the ALJ relied on 

record evidence to support all of the reasons listed in her discussion of Dr. Woodall’s 

opinion. The discussion of medical records on pages 6-8 addresses the ALJ’s findings in 

detail, with many citations to the record. The ALJ notes the following: x-rays from 

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September 2011 revealed moderate diffuse degenerative changes of the cervical spine 

with changes suggestive of muscle spasms and imaging of the lumbosacral spine was 

negative (A.R. 464); x-rays from October 2012 of the hips showed only mild 

degenerative changes (A.R. 584); x-rays showed no evidence of any nerve root 

impingement, severe stenosis, progressive neurological deficits, infections, tumors, or 

fractures (A.R. 464, 584); treatment for her condition was conservative with routine 

prescriptions for pain medications, which she reported were effective and enabled her to 

function (A.R. 402, 406, 418, 421, 424, 482-85, 487-99, 501-04, 506, 557-72, 586); 

Plaintiff regularly denied muscle weakness or joint swelling (A.R. 370, 373, 398); 

examinations demonstrated normal musculature without skeletal tenderness or joint 

deformity and neurological deficiency (A.R. 370-71, 373-74, 398, 402, 415, 418, 430, 

432, 482, 484, 488, 503, 560, 570); Plaintiff was not referred to a pain management 

specialist until late 2012 (A.R. 588); and there is no record evidence that Plaintiff has 

been hospitalized, treated at a pain clinic, received physical therapy, undergone surgery, 

or otherwise received treatment for her alleged pain. The Court finds the ALJ’s 

explanation to be sufficiently clear to understand the basis for her decision. 

Third, the ALJ noted that Dr. Woodall’s medical findings were “minimal in 

nature.” A.R. 22. In effect, the ALJ discounted Dr. Woodall’s opinion because it was 

conclusory and brief. This was not error. See Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 

(9th Cir. 2005) (“[W]hen evaluating conflicting medical opinions, an ALJ need not 

accept the opinion of a doctor if that opinion is brief, conclusory, and inadequately 

supported by clinical findings.”) (citation omitted). Dr. Woodall’s opinion does not state 

how or why Plaintiff is unable to perform work in a competitive environment; instead, it 

merely states that Plaintiff is unable to work due to back pain and accompanying 

medications. A.R. 511. The Court concludes that the ALJ was warranted in discounting 

Dr. Woodall’s opinion for this reason. See Young v. Heckler, 803 F.2d 963, 968 (9th Cir. 

1986) (finding that an ALJ need not accept a treating physician’s opinion which is “brief 

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and conclusory in form with little in the way of clinical findings to support [its] 

conclusion.”). 

Fourth, the ALJ asserted that Dr. Woodall’s opinion is inconsistent with his own 

medical notes, which indicate Plaintiff’s symptoms improve with medication. A.R. 22. 

Incongruity between a doctor’s medical opinion and her treatment records or notes is a 

specific and legitimate reason to discount a doctor’s opinion. Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 

F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Each of these is a specific, legitimate, and permissible reason to discount Dr. 

Woodall’s opinion as to Plaintiff’s condition, and is supported by substantial evidence. 

The Court concludes that the ALJ’s decision was not legal error. 

3. Robert A. Rosenberg, M.D. 

Plaintiff’s treating physician, Robert A. Rosenberg, M.D., also specializes in 

family medicine. On May 23, 2012, Dr. Rosenberg completed a check-the-box form 

offering the following opinions: Plaintiff could continuously sit for a period of two hours 

and could sit less than three hours in an eight-hour work day; Plaintiff could continuously 

stand/walk for a single period of two hours and could stand/walk a total of less than three 

hours during an eight-hour work day; Plaintiff could occasionally lift 21 to 25 pounds and 

could occasionally carry 11 to 20 pounds; Plaintiff could never stoop, squat, crawl, climb, 

or reach; Plaintiff could occasionally grasp with her hands, never push/pull controls, and 

occasionally finely manipulate her hands; Plaintiff had mild restrictions as to unprotected 

heights, being around moving machinery, driving automobile equipment, and had a total 

restriction from exposure to dust, fumes, gases, and marked changes in temperature or 

humidity. A.R. 577-78. 

On October 15, 2012, Dr. Rosenberg completed a second check-the-box form 

offering the opinion that Plaintiff had the following symptoms of fibromyalgia that have 

persisted since 2006 and impair Plaintiff’s ability to do work-related activities: 

generalized pain, generalized tenderness, fatigue, 18/18 tender points, irritable bowel 

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syndrome, sleep disorder, cognitive dysfunction, memory impairments, anxiety, and 

depression. A.R. 573. Dr. Rosenberg also offered the following opinions: Plaintiff could 

continuously sit for a single period of 20 to 25 minutes at a time and could sit for a total 

of less than one hour in an eight-hour work day; Plaintiff could stand/walk continuously 

for a single period of one hour, and stand/walk for a total of less than one hour in an 

eight-hour work day; Plaintiff could occasionally lift six to ten pounds and could carry 

six to ten pounds; she could never stoop, squat, crawl, or climb, but that she could 

occasionally reach; Plaintiff could frequently grasp, push/pull with her hands, and 

occasionally finely manipulate with her hands; Plaintiff had mild restrictions as to 

unprotected heights, being around moving machinery, driving automobile equipment, and 

that she had a total restriction from exposure to dust, fumes, gases, and marked changes 

in temperature or humidity. A.R. 573-75. The ALJ accorded Dr. Rosenberg’s opinions 

little weight. A.R. 22. 

Dr. Rosenberg’s medical opinion was contradicted by the opinion of Dr. Jabati, 

and the opinions of Drs. Green and Robins. These physicians each opined Plaintiff had 

greater abilities than those identified in Dr. Rosenberg’s opinion. A.R. 21-22. The ALJ 

therefore could discount Dr. Rosenberg’s opinion for specific and legitimate reasons 

supported by substantial evidence. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31. 

The ALJ provided three reasons for discounting Dr. Rosenberg’s opinion. First, 

the ALJ asserted that Dr. Rosenberg’s opinions were inconsistent with the medical record 

and unsupported by Dr. Rosenberg’s own treatment notes. A.R. 22. In the ALJ’s 

discussion of the medical evidence, she noted “there is no documented diagnosis [of 

fibromyalgia]” or any “medical examinations that show at least 11 positive tender points 

bilaterally and above and below the waist as required by 1990 ACR Criteria and SSR 12-

2p.” A.R. 20. Plaintiff acknowledges that there is no objective evidence of fibromyalgia 

(Doc. 21 at 1), but argues that fibromyalgia is a “diagnosis of exclusion” (i.e. there is no 

objective testing for the malady), and that fibromyalgia can be properly diagnosed where 

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objective testing is negative and there are a sufficient number of tender points upon 

testing (Doc. 15 at 5; Doc. 21 at 1). As noted by the ALJ, however, no diagnosis of 

fibromyalgia is “supported by any credible medical opinion or objective laboratory test 

findings.” A.R. 20. Although Dr. Rosenberg opined that Plaintiff had 18/18 tender 

points, his opinion is undercut by the following facts noted by the ALJ: Dr. Rosenberg is 

not a rheumatologist, see 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(5) (“We generally give more weight to 

the opinion of a specialist about medical issues related to his or her area of specialty than 

to the opinion of a source who is not a specialist.”); Dr. Jones found only 4/18 tender 

points (A.R. 21, 466); and Dr. Rosenberg’s treatment notes failed to provide any basis for 

his opinion that Plaintiff suffered from fibromyalgia or has 18/18 tender points (A.R. 20). 

As the ALJ also noted, Dr. Rosenberg opined that his fibromyalgia findings dated back to 

2006, but he did not begin treating Plaintiff until 2012. A.R. 22. In addition, he had not 

treated or diagnosed Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia before submitting his medical opinion. A.R. 

22; see 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(2)(ii) (ALJ must consider whether the source has 

provided treatment for the impairment in question); see also 20 C.F.R. 416.927(c)(2)(i) 

(ALJ should consider whether a treating source has seen a claimant “a number of times 

and long enough to have obtained a longitudinal picture” of the claimant’s impairment). 

Because Dr. Rosenberg’s treatment notes do not disclose on what basis he reached this 

diagnosis of fibromyalgia and its accompanying restrictions, the ALJ properly discounted 

his opinion. See Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at1041 (finding that incongruity between a 

doctor’s medical opinion and her treatment records is a specific and legitimate reason to 

discount her opinion). 

Second, the ALJ noted that Dr. Rosenberg’s opinion is “quite conclusory, 

providing little explanation of the evidence relied on in forming [his] opinion.” A.R. 22. 

This is a specific and legitimate reason for discounting Dr. Rosenberg’s opinion. See 

Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1216. Dr. Rosenberg’s check-the-box forms do not explain what 

clinical findings he relies upon to conclude Plaintiff is functionally restricted by her 

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fibromyalgia. The ALJ was warranted in discounting Dr. Woodall’s opinion for this 

reason. See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[An] ALJ may 

permissibly reject check-off reports that do not contain any explanation of the bases of 

their conclusions.”) (internal punctuation and citations omitted). 

Third, the ALJ asserted that Dr. Rosenberg uncritically relied on Plaintiff’s 

subjective complaints. A.R. 22. Although this reason to discount Dr. Rosenberg’s 

opinion overlaps significantly with the ALJ’s other reasons, it is a specific and legitimate 

reason. Thomas, 278 F.3d at 957 (“The ALJ need not accept the opinion of any 

physician, including a treating physician, if that opinion is brief, conclusory, and 

inadequately supported by clinical findings.”). 

The Court concludes that the ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons for 

discounting Dr. Rosenberg’s opinion, supported by substantial evidence. The decision 

therefore was not legal error. 

4. Monte L. Jones, M.D. 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed legal error by improperly discounting the 

opinion of consultative examiner, Monte L. Jones, M.D. Doc. 15 at 7. On October 8, 

2011, Dr. Jones completed a check-the-box form offering the following opinions: 

Plaintiff can occasionally lift and/or carry 20 pounds and can frequently lift and/or carry 

10 pounds; Plaintiff has no limitations in standing and/or walking; Plaintiff has no 

limitations in sitting; Plaintiff is not restricted in her ability to see, hear, or speak; 

Plaintiff can occasionally climb ramps and stairs, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl; 

Plaintiff can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; Plaintiff has no limitations with 

respect to reaching; Plaintiff has no limitations with respect to handling, fingering, or 

feeling with her left hand; and Plaintiff can only occasionally handle, finger, and feel 

with her right hand. A.R. 470. The ALJ assigned Dr. Jones’ opinion “great weight,” 

except for the limitations on Plaintiff’s ability to handle, finger, and feel with the right 

hand. A.R. 21-22. 

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Dr. Jones’s medical opinion was contradicted by the opinion of Dr. Jabati, and the 

opinions of Drs. Green and Robins. These physicians each opined Plaintiff had greater 

abilities than those identified in Dr. Jones’ opinion. A.R. 21-22. The ALJ therefore 

could discount Dr. Jones’s opinion for specific and legitimate reasons supported by 

substantial evidence in the record. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31. 

The ALJ provided two reasons for discounting the limitations on Plaintiff’s ability 

to handle, finger, and feel with her right hand. First, the ALJ asserted that there is no 

support for these limitations in the record, not even from Dr. Jones’ own examination of 

Plaintiff’s right hand. A.R. 21. In his examination, Dr. Jones found that Plaintiff’s right 

hand had normal sensitivity, range of motion, and was sufficiently strong to function 

properly. A.R. 467. Dr. Jones’ examination notes reveal no basis for the manipulative 

restriction. This incongruity between Dr. Jones’ treatment notes and his medical opinion 

is a specific and legitimate reason for discounting his opinion. Tommasetti, 533 F.3d 

at1041. Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ committed legal error because other state agency 

physicians found similar manipulative restrictions. Doc. 15 at 7. Plaintiff is incorrect. 

Although the ALJ stated in her decision that Drs. Green and Robins had opined that 

Plaintiff had manipulative restrictions with her right hand (A.R. 22), the ALJ was 

incorrect. Neither doctor found Plaintiff to have such restrictions in her right hand. 

A.R. 79, 101. 

Second, the ALJ asserted that Dr. Jones relied “quite heavily on [Plaintiff’s] 

subjective complaints.” A.R. 21. Although this reason to discount Dr. Rosenberg’s 

opinion overlaps significantly with the ALJ’s other reason, it is a specific and legitimate 

reason. Thomas, 278 F.3d at 957 (“The ALJ need not accept the opinion of any 

physician, including a treating physician, if that opinion is brief, conclusory, and 

inadequately supported by clinical findings.”). Plaintiff does not argue that clinical 

findings support Dr. Jones’ opinion. Given that the record contains no other objective 

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findings supporting a manipulative restriction, the ALJ’s conclusion that Dr. Jones’ 

limitation was based on Plaintiff’s incredible subjective complaints was reasonable. 

The Court concludes that the ALJ provided specific and legitimate reasons, 

supported by substantial evidence, for discounting Dr. Jones’ opinion. The decision was 

not legal error. 

B. Due Process of Law. 

After Plaintiff’s hearing, the ALJ sent interrogatories to a vocational expert. 

Doc. 15 at 8; A.R. 306. The ALJ posed only one RFC hypothetical based on the RFC 

that she would adopt in her decision. Id. The ALJ based her step-five analysis on the 

vocational expert’s response. 

Plaintiff asserts that she was denied Due Process of law because the ALJ refused 

to send additional interrogatories to the vocational expert that included a more restrictive 

RFC. Id. Plaintiff argues that “[b]y accepting the opinion of the [vocational expert] 

without allowing for any additional input from the claimant, the ALJ did not fully and 

fairly develop the record.” Id. at 9. 

Because an ALJ is required to include only those limitations that she finds 

supported by the record in her hypothetical questions to the vocational expert, Plaintiff’s 

constitutional claim is meritless. Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 886 (9th 

Cir. 2006) (“[I]n hypotheticals posed to a vocational expert, the ALJ must only include 

those limitations supported by substantial evidence.”) (citation omitted). 

IT IS ORDERED that the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

is affirmed. The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly and terminate this case. 

Dated this 3rd day of June, 2014. 

Case 2:13-cv-01839-DGC Document 22 Filed 06/03/14 Page 13 of 13