Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01731/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-01731-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Race)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

The request for oral argument is denied because the parties have fully briefed the

issues and oral argument will not aid the Court’s decision. See Mahon v. Credit Bur. of

Placer County, Inc., 171 F.3d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1999).

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Carolyn R. Watson, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Avondale Elementary School District #44,

Defendant. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV-06-1731-PHX-DGC

ORDER

Defendant has filed a motion for summary judgment. Dkt. #30. A response and reply

have been filed. Dkt. ##32-33. The Court will grant the motion.1

I. Background.

Defendant hired Plaintiff in November 2003. Plaintiff was assigned to Avondale

Middle School as a collaborative peer teacher (“CPT”) for the 2004-2005 school year.

A CPT assists teachers with their classroom skills. Plaintiff was reassigned to a classroom

teaching position at Desert Thunder School for the 2005-2006 school year. Plaintiff’s

employment with Defendant ended in June 2006.

Plaintiff filed a pro se complaint against Defendant on July 12, 2006. Dkt. #1. The

complaint explicitly asserts sexual harassment, racial discrimination, and retaliation claims

under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. Id. ¶¶ 9-10. Construed

Case 2:06-cv-01731-DGC Document 34 Filed 11/02/07 Page 1 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

liberally, the complaint also asserts disability and age discrimination claims. Id. ¶¶ 6-7.

II. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not created a genuine issue of material fact for trial

and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Dkt. #30. Defendant’s motion is

supported by a separate statement of facts. Dkt. #31. Plaintiff filed a memorandum in

opposition to the motion (Dkt. #32), but did not file a controverting statement of facts as

required by Local Rule of Civil Procedure 56.1(a). 

A. Summary Judgment Standard.

Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable

to the nonmoving party, “show[s] that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

“Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit . . . will properly preclude

the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

The disputed evidence must be “such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the

nonmoving party.” Id. at 248. Summary judgment may be entered against a party who “fails

to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s

case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 

B. Rules Governing Pro Se Litigation.

Pro se litigants “must be ensured meaningful access to the courts.” Rand v. Rowland,

154 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). In the context of a motion for summary

judgment, “[d]istrict courts are obligated to advise prisoner pro per litigants of Rule 56

requirements.” Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409, 411-12 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Hudson

v. Hardy, 412 F.2d 1091, 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1968)) (emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit has

declined, however, to extend this duty to all pro se litigants. See Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d

1362, 1364-67 (9th Cir. 1986) (declining to extend the Hudson rule because “pro se litigants

in the ordinary civil case should not be treated more favorably than parties with attorneys of

record”); Rand, 154 F.3d at 956 (observing that the court in Jacobsen “refused to apply the

Case 2:06-cv-01731-DGC Document 34 Filed 11/02/07 Page 2 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

[Hudson fair notice requirement] to pro se non-prisoners”); see also King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d

565, 567 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Pro se litigants must follow the same rules of procedure that

govern other litigants.”).

The Court will therefore apply the general summary judgment standard to Defendant’s

motion, construing Plaintiff’s pleadings liberally in her favor. See Eldridge v. Block, 832

F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1987) (“The Supreme Court has instructed federal courts to

liberally construe the ‘inartful pleading’ of pro se litigants.”) (citations omitted); see also

Semper v. JBC Legal Group, No. C04-2240L, 2005 WL 2172377, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 6,

2005) (“Although the rule requires that the allegations of a pro se complaint be liberally

construed when determining whether a viable claim has been asserted and that strict

compliance with procedural/technical rules will not be expected of pro se litigants, it does

not alter the summary judgment standard or otherwise give pro se non-prisoner litigants

multiple opportunities to present their evidence.”).

III. Analysis.

A. Sexual Harassment.

Title VII provides that an employer may not discriminate against an individual with

respect to the terms and conditions of employment because of her sex. 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-2(a)(1). A plaintiff may establish a sex discrimination claim under Title VII by

proving that sexual harassment created a hostile work environment. See Meritor Sav. Bank

v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66-67 (1986); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993).

The plaintiff must prove that she was subjected to verbal or physical conduct, that the

conduct was unwelcome, and that the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter

the terms and conditions of her employment and create an abusive work environment. See

Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc). The work

environment “must be both objectively and subjectively offensive, one that a reasonable

[woman] would find hostile or abusive, and one that the [plaintiff] in fact did perceive to

be so.” Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787 (1998).

Plaintiff’s sexual harassment claim is based on a single incident involving a coworker.

Case 2:06-cv-01731-DGC Document 34 Filed 11/02/07 Page 3 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

Plaintiff asserts that Mr. Fernandez was present at the school on two occasions in

February 2005 in violation of restrictions imposed by Defendant, and that this “sent Plaintiff

into shock and caused her to become fearful and question whether she was in any impending

danger.” Dkt. #32 at 3. Plaintiff, however, has presented no evidence to support this

assertion.

- 4 -

In order for such an incident to be actionable under Title VII, it “ must be extremely severe.”

Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 926 (9th Cir. 2000). The plaintiff “must show

that she reasonably feared she would be subject to such misconduct in the future because the

[defendant] encouraged or tolerated the harassment.” Id. at 924.

Plaintiff described the incident in question as follows:

I was in the school office. And the school custodian, Mr. Augustine

Fernandez, . . . quietly walked up behind me and pressed his body into mine,

into my rear end and back. I was angry.

Dkt. #31-3 at 11, Pl.’s Dep. at 116:17-20; see Dkt. #1 ¶ 6(A). It is undisputed that following

Plaintiff’s complaint of harassment, Defendant barred Mr. Fernandez from the school and

directed that he not make contact with Plaintiff. Dkt. #31 ¶ 7. Defendant also investigated

the incident by interviewing Mr. Fernandez and the two employees who were present during

the alleged incident. Id. ¶¶ 6, 8. Defendant found no evidence of inappropriate conduct from

those interviews. Id. ¶ 17. Plaintiff indicated that she would not be interviewed in-person,

but would respond to written questions. Id. ¶¶ 9-11. Defendant sent Plaintiff a series of

questions regarding the alleged incident. Id. ¶ 15. Plaintiff did not respond. Id. ¶ 16.2

 

The Court concludes that Mr. Fernandez’s single instance of harassment was not

sufficiently severe to render Defendant liable under Title VII. In Brooks, the plaintiff’s

coworker placed his hand on the plaintiff’s stomach and commented on its “softness and

sexiness.” He also cornered the plaintiff and forced his hand underneath her sweater and bra

to fondle her breast, stating that she did not have to worry about cheating on her husband

because he would “do everything.” 229 F.3d at 921. The Ninth Circuit concluded that while

this conduct was egregious, it was not sufficiently severe to violate Title VII given the

defendant’s prompt remedial action. Id. at 926-27.

This case, like Brooks, involves a single incident of sexual harassment. Defendant,

Case 2:06-cv-01731-DGC Document 34 Filed 11/02/07 Page 4 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

like the employer in Brooks, promptly removed the harasser from the workplace and

investigated the incident. “No reasonable woman in [Plaintiff’s] position would believe that

[Mr. Fernandez’s] misconduct had permanently altered the terms or conditions of her

employment.” Brooks, 229 F.3d at 924; cf. Little v. Windermere Relocation, Inc., 301 F.3d

958, 967 (9th Cir. 2002) (distinguishing Brooks because the single episode of harassment

involved three violent rapes and the employer condoned the harassment); Al-Dabbagh v.

Greenpeace, Inc., 873 F. Supp 1105 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (distinguished by Brooks because the

harasser violently assaulted the plaintiff and forced her to have sex with him). The Court will

grant summary judgment on Plaintiff’s sexual harassment claim.

B. Race Discrimination.

Title VII makes disparate treatment based on race a violation of federal law.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). To establish disparate treatment under Title VII, the plaintiff

must first make a prima facie case of discrimination. She must show that she belongs to a

protected class, that she was qualified for her position, that she was subjected to an adverse

employment action, and that similarly situated individuals outside her protected class were

treated more favorably. If a prima facie case is made, the burden of production shifts to the

employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action. Then, in

order to prevail, the plaintiff must show that the employer’s stated reason was a mere pretext

for discrimination. See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993); Villiarimo

v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1062 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing McDonnell Douglas

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)).

Plaintiff asserts that she was the only African-American CPT employed by Defendant.

Dkt. #32 at 5. Plaintiff further asserts that at a meeting held on May 17, 2005, she was

informed that she would be demoted to a classroom teaching position for the 2005-2006

school year because she was not a “good fit” and was not a “happy person.” Id. at 4-5.

Plaintiff claims that Defendant discriminated against her because of her race by singling her

out for the meeting and demotion. Id. at 6-7. Defendant has presented evidence that it

reassigned Plaintiff to a teaching position as a result of Defendant’s restructuring and new

Case 2:06-cv-01731-DGC Document 34 Filed 11/02/07 Page 5 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

enrollment and budget information, and that other CPTs outside Plaintiff’s protected class

were also reassigned to teaching positions. Dkt. #31 ¶¶ 18-23, 30.

“[U]nder the McDonnell Douglas framework, ‘the requisite degree of proof necessary

to establish a prima facie case for Title VII on summary judgment is minimal and does not

even need to rise to the level of a preponderance of the evidence.’” Villiarimo, 281 F.3d at

1062 (citation omitted). In this case, however, Plaintiff has presented no evidence to

establish the fourth element of a prima facie case of race discrimination – that similarly

situated individuals outside her protected class were treated more favorably. Moreover,

Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a triable issue as to whether Defendant’s stated reasons for

reassigning her “were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.” Tex. Dep’t

of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Plaintiff has presented no direct

evidence of a discriminatory motive, nor has she presented substantial circumstantial

evidence showing that Defendant’s “‘proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.’”

Villiarimo, 281 F.3d at 1062 (citation omitted).

In response to Defendant’s well-supported motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff

was required to come forward with “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for

trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Plaintiff’s general allegations and denials are insufficient to

withstand summary judgment. See id.; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,

475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (“When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c),

its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the

material facts.”). The Court will grant Defendant’s motion with respect to Plaintiff’s race

discrimination claim. See Llamas v. Butte Cmty. Coll. Dist., 238 F.3d 1123, 1126-27 (9th

Cir. 2001) (affirming summary judgment where the plaintiff merely speculated as to the

defendant’s motive for discharging him); Vasquez v. County of L.A., 349 F.3d 634, 641-42

(9th Cir. 2004) (affirming summary judgment where the plaintiff presented no evidence

showing that the defendant’s reason for transferring him was pretextual).

C. Disability Discrimination.

The Americans with Disabilities Act “prohibits covered employers from discharging

Case 2:06-cv-01731-DGC Document 34 Filed 11/02/07 Page 6 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

otherwise qualified employees solely because they have a disability.” Broussard v. Univ. of

Cal., 192 F.3d 1252, 1255 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)). To prevail in an

employment termination case under the ADA, the plaintiff must show that she is a disabled

person within the meaning of the ADA, that she was qualified for her position – that is, she

was able to perform the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable

accommodation – and that the employer terminated her because of her disability. See id. at

1255-56 (citing Kennedy v. Applause, Inc., 90 F.3d 1477, 1481 (9th Cir. 1996)).

Plaintiff claims a disability due to the emotional and mental trauma caused by her

reassignment to a classroom teaching position. Dkt. #31 ¶ 32. In November 2005,

Defendant granted Plaintiff’s request for disability leave for the remainder of the 2005-2006

school year. Id. ¶ 33. When Plaintiff failed to provide Defendant with evidence of her

ability to return to work, Defendant decided not to offer Plaintiff a new contract for the 2006-

2007 school year. Id. ¶ 39.

Plaintiff asserts that Defendant did not give her sufficient time to submit evidence of

her medical condition. Dkt. #32 at 7. Even if true, however, this fact does not support a

disability discrimination claim. Plaintiff admits that she was unable to return to work and

perform the essential functions of her job with or without reasonable accommodation, and

that Defendant acted reasonably in not offering her a contract for the 2006-2007 school year.

Dkt. #31 ¶¶ 38-41, 43-46. There is thus no genuine issue of material fact as to whether

Plaintiff was a qualified individual under the ADA. The Court will grant summary judgment

on Plaintiff’s disability discrimination claim. See Kennedy, 90 F.3d at 1481 (affirming

summary judgment where the plaintiff was totally disabled and thus not able to perform her

job with or without reasonable accommodation).

D. Retaliation.

Title VII “prohibits retaliation against an employee ‘because [she] has opposed any

practice made an unlawful employment practice’” by Title VII. Nelson v. Pima Cmty. Coll.,

83 F.3d 1075, 1082 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)). A plaintiff makes a

prima facie case of unlawful retaliation by producing evidence that she engaged in activity

Case 2:06-cv-01731-DGC Document 34 Filed 11/02/07 Page 7 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 -

protected by Title VII, that the employer subjected her to a materially adverse action, and that

there was a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse action. See Vasquez,

349 F.3d at 642; Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2409 (2006).

Plaintiff engaged in protected activity when she complained to Defendant about the

alleged sexual harassment. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Plaintiff claims that she was

subjected to a materially adverse action when she was reassigned to a teaching position.

Dkt. #32 at 7. Defendant argues that Plaintiff has no evidence of a retaliatory motive behind

any of its actions, including the decision to reassign Plaintiff and the decision not renew her

contract. Dkt. #30 at 15.

The Supreme Court has stated that temporal proximity between the defendant’s

knowledge of protected activity and a materially adverse action can constitute sufficient

evidence of causality to establish a prima facie case, but only if the temporal proximity is

“very close.” Clark County Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273-74 (2001); see

Villiarimo, 281 F.3d at 1065 (“‘[I]n order to support an inference of retaliatory motive, the

[adverse action] must have occurred fairly soon after the employee’s protected expression.’”)

(citation omitted).

In this case, Plaintiff first complained about the alleged sexual harassment on

December 13, 2004. Dkt. #31 ¶ 4. Construing the evidence in Plaintiff’s favor, as the Court

must at the summary judgment stage, Defendant decided to reassign Plaintiff to a teaching

position in April 2005 and decided not to renew her contract on May 18, 2006. Id. ¶¶ 22, 38-

39. The Court finds that the more than three-month period between Plaintiff’s protected

activity and Defendant’s decision to reassign Plaintiff is simply too long to constitute

sufficient evidence of causation to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. Cf. Stegall v.

Citadel Broad. Co., 350 F.3d 1061, 1069 (9th Cir. 2004) (nine days sufficient to infer

causation); Bell v. Clackamas County, 341 F.3d 858, 866 (9th Cir. 2003) (four days).

Similarly, the seventeen-month period between the protected activity and Defendant’s

decision not to renew Plaintiff’s contract “suggests, by itself, no causality at all.” Breeden,

532 U.S. at 274.

Case 2:06-cv-01731-DGC Document 34 Filed 11/02/07 Page 8 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 -

Moreover, even if the Court were to assume that Plaintiff can make a prima facie case,

she has presented no evidence showing that Defendant’s proferred reasons for its decisions

were mere pretexts for retaliation. The Court will grant summary judgment on Plaintiff’s

retaliation claim. See Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 646 (affirming summary judgment on the

plaintiff’s retaliation claim because “he failed to show a causal link”).

E. Age Discrimination.

Plaintiff alleges in her complaint that Defendant engaged in a pattern of discrimination

that adversely affected the terms and conditions of her employment by creating a hostile

work environment because of her age. Dkt. #1 ¶6. Defendant argues that this claim must be

dismissed as time barred because Plaintiff never filed a charge of age discrimination with the

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). Dkt. #30 at 15-16. Plaintiff does

not address this argument in her response. See Dkt. #32.

“Before bringing suit under Title VII, a plaintiff must exhaust the administrative

remedies available under [42 U.S.C. §] 2000e-5. The plaintiff must file a discrimination

charge with the [EEOC] and receive a right-to-sue letter from the [EEOC]. Failure to

observe these requirements renders a suit subject to dismissal[.]” Karim-Panahi v. L.A.

Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted); see EEOC v. Farmer

Bros. Co., 31 F.3d 891, 899 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[Plaintiff] was required to exhaust her EEOC

administrative remedies before seeking federal adjudication of her claims.”); Greenlaw v.

Garrett, 59 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 1994) (“In order to litigate a Title VII claim in federal

court, [plaintiff] must have exhausted her administrative remedies[.]”) (citations omitted).

In order for Plaintiff’s age discrimination claim to be timely, she had to file a charge

with the EEOC within 300 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); see Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 109

(2002) (“[Section] 2000e-5(e)(1) is a charge filing provision that ‘specifies with precision’

the prerequisites that a plaintiff must satisfy before filing suit.”) (citation omitted).

Construing the evidence in Plaintiff’s favor, the latest alleged act of discrimination occurred

on June 5, 2006 when Defendant decided not to renew Plaintiff’s contract. Dkt. #31 ¶ 39.

Case 2:06-cv-01731-DGC Document 34 Filed 11/02/07 Page 9 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 10 -

Plaintiff therefore was required to file a charge of age discrimination by April 2, 2007 –

that is, 300 days after June 5, 2006. Plaintiff testified in July 2007 that she had never filed

a charge of age discrimination with the EEOC. Dkt. #31-4 at 12, Pl.’s Dep. at 242:15-20.

Plaintiff’s age discrimination claim is therefore time barred. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1);

Morgan, 536 U.S. at 109 (“A claim is time barred if it is not filed within [the] time limits [of

§ 2000e-5(e)(1)].”). The Court will grant Defendant’s summary judgment motion with

respect to this claim. 

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. #30) is granted.

2. The Clerk is directed to terminate this action.

DATED this 2nd day of November, 2007.

Case 2:06-cv-01731-DGC Document 34 Filed 11/02/07 Page 10 of 10