Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-00585/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-00585-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Eastern District of California 

Michael Huftile,

Plaintiff, No. Civ. S 03-0585 DFL PAN P

vs. Findings and Recommendations

Val G. Farmer,

Defendant.

-oOoPlaintiff, who proceeds without counsel, filed this action

as a civil detainee under California’s Sexually Violent Predator

(SVP) Act. He claims defendant, Val. G. Farmer, Ph.D. (Farmer),

a licensed psychologist, violated his civil rights by testifying

against him in his involuntary civil commitment trial in 2002. 

Plaintiff seeks damages and declaratory and injunctive relief. 

The court approved service of the June 4, 2004, amended

complaint, which is not verified, on Farmer, the sole defendant. 

Presently before the court are plaintiff’s June 8, 2005, motion 

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for preliminary injunctive relief and Farmer’s August 19, 2005,

motion to dismiss or for summary judgment.

The following facts are undisputed. 

From 1983 to 1992, Farmer was employed by the West River

Mental Health Center in Rapid City, South Dakota. In 1984,

plaintiff, represented by counsel, was the defendant in a

criminal child molestation trial in South Dakota. Plaintiff’s

attorney called Farmer as a witness at a mitigation and

sentencing hearing. Farmer testified he had become acquainted

with plaintiff in 1983 for counseling services, which were

terminated by mutual agreement. He testified he examined

plaintiff again in 1984 to prepare a report and psychological

evaluation (“report”) for the court, at the request of

plaintiff’s attorney. Farmer testified about the report in

response to questioning by the trial judge, the prosecutor and

defense counsel. 

In 2002 plaintiff was the subject of civil commitment

proceedings under the Sexually Violent Predators Act in the

Sacramento County Superior Court, People of the State of

California v. Huftile, Case Number 95F01023. A prerequisite of

California commitment proceedings is the decision of two

“evaluators” that the person sought to be committed “has a

diagnosed mental disorder so that he or she is likely to engage

in acts of sexual violence without appropriate treatment and

custody.” Welf. & Inst. Code § 6601(d). Plaintiff’s evaluators

were Dr. Miccio-Fonseca and Dr. Vognsen, both of whom testified

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for the state. Plaintiff did not permit these doctors to

interview him. The district attorney independently obtained

Farmer’s report and called him as a witness to testify about it. 

Farmer testified within the scope of the 1984 report, which was

submitted into evidence without any objection based on

psychotherapist-patient privilege. Farmer appeared voluntarily

and received witness fees and travel expenses. Farmer testified

without plaintiff’s consent. Plaintiff took the stand during

proceedings and faced questioning about admissions reflected in

Farmer’s report. 

Governing Legal Standards

In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.

P. 12(b)(6), the court must accept plaintiff’s allegations as

true, read the complaint most favorably to plaintiff, give

plaintiff the benefit of every reasonable inference that appears

from the pleading and argument of the case and dismiss the

complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted

under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the

allegations. Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 658 (1963);

Retail Clerks International Association, Local 1625, AFL-CIO v.

Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 754 n.6 (1963); Hishon v. King &

Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). The court may consider

documents attached to the complaint in evaluating a motion to

dismiss. Parks School of Business, Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d

1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995).

A party may move, without or without supporting affidavits,

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for a summary judgment and the judgment sought shall be rendered

forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)-(c). 

An issue is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the opposing party. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986). A fact is

“material” if it affects the right to recover under applicable

substantive law. Id. The moving party must submit evidence that

establishes the existence of an element essential to that party’s

case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at

trial. Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 

The moving party “always bears the initial responsibility of

informing the district court of the basis for its motion and

identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

the affidavits, if any’” that the moving party believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id.

at 323. If the movant does not bear the burden of proof on an

issue, the movant need only point to the absence of evidence to

support the opponent’s burden. To avoid summary judgment on an

issue upon which the opponent bears the burden of proof, the

opponent must “go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits,

or by the “‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

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admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there

is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 324. The opponent’s

affirmative evidence must be sufficiently probative that a jury

reasonably could decide the issue in favor of the opponent. 

Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Inc. v. Zenith Radio

Corporation, 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986). When the conduct alleged

is implausible, stronger evidence than otherwise required must be

presented to defeat summary judgment. Id. at 587.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) provides that “supporting and opposing

affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth

such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show

affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the

matters stated therein.” Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has

held that the opponent need not produce evidence in a form that

would be admissible at trial in order to avoid summary judgment. 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. Rather, the questions are (1) whether

the evidence could be submitted in admissible form and (2) “if

reduced to admissible evidence” would it be sufficient to carry

the party’s burden at trial. Id. at 327. Thus, in Fraser v.

Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 2003), objection to the opposing

party’s reliance upon her diary upon the ground it was hearsay

was overruled because the party could testify to all the relevant

portions from personal knowledge or read it into evidence as

recorded recollection.

A verified complaint based on personal knowledge setting

forth specific facts admissible in evidence is treated as an

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affidavit. Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454 (9th Cir. 1995);

McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1987). A verified

motion based on personal knowledge in opposition to a summary

judgment motion setting forth facts that would be admissible in

evidence also functions as an affidavit. Johnson v. Meltzer, 134

F.3d 1393 (9th Cir. 1998); Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918 (9th

Cir. 2004).

Application

Farmer contends plaintiff’s suit is barred by Heck v.

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). To recover damages for allegedly

unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm

caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or

sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must demonstrate the

conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal,

expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal

authorized to make such determination, or called into question by

a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Heck v.

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). A claim for damages bearing that

relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so

invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. Thus, when a state

prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must

consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff necessarily

would imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it

would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can

demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been

invalidated through other means such as a petition for habeas

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corpus. Id. 

Plaintiff filed a separate civil rights action against Dr.

Miccio-Fonseca, Huftile v. Miccio-Fonseca, Civ. S 03-1522 FCD DAD

P, seeking damages and declaratory and injunctive relief. This

court dismissed the action under Heck. The court of appeals

affirmed the dismissal of claims for damages and declaratory

relief, but remanded for consideration of injunctive relief. See

Huftile v. Miccio-Fonseca, 410 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2005)

(favorable termination rule of Heck generally applies to § 1983

suits challenging civil commitments under California’s Sexually

Violent Predators Act, and Huftile had standing to seek habeas

relief because a subsequent petition to recommit him could be

traced back, through preceding petitions, to his initial

confinement). The court determined a decision for plaintiff in

the civil rights action would necessarily imply the invalidity of

his commitment because Miccio-Fonseca was one of the requisite

evaluators who triggered the commitment proceedings.

The court of appeals reasoning in Huftile v. Miccio-Fonseca

is equally applicable here. Plaintiff claims Farmer conspired

with Miccio-Fonseca and Vognsen to fabricate evidence he suffers

a mental disability. Granting relief on that ground would

necessarily imply the invalidity of plaintiff’s commitment. 

Farmer is entitled to dismissal of claims for damages and

declaratory relief, but his claims for injunctive relief survive

the Heck analysis.

Farmer next argues he is not a state actor within the

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meaning of the civil rights statute. 

A civil rights plaintiff must show the defendant, acting

“under color of state law,” deprived him of a right secured by

the constitution or laws of the United States. West v. Atkins,

487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). On occasion, a civil rights claim can

proceed against a private party who is “a willful participant in

joint action with the State or its agents.” Dennis v. Sparks,

449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980). In assessing state action, the ultimate

question is whether the deprivation of federal rights alleged by

plaintiff is “fairly attributable” to the government. Kirtley v.

Rainey, 326 F.3d 1088, 1092 (9th Cir. 2002). A court can

identify state action under any of four standards: (1) the public

function test; (2) the joint action test; (3) the governmental

compulsion test; or (4) the governmental nexus test. Id. (citing

Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Med. Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 935-36

(9th Cir. 1999)). The state-action inquiry is necessarily factbound. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939 (1982).

An allegation that a private person conspired with a state

official satisfies the requirement that a defendant act under

color of state authority. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398

U.S. 144 (1970); United Steelworkers of America v. Phelps Dodge

Corp., 865 F.2d 1539, 1540 (9th Cir. 1989). Plaintiff makes a

colorable showing Miccio-Fonseca and Vognsen acted as state

agents or officials, and defendant offers nothing to rebut that

showing. For purposes of the present motion, plaintiff satisfies

the state action test.

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Farmer next argues he is entitled to absolute witness

immunity and the immunity extends to allegations he conspired to

submit false evidence. This argument has merit. Franklin v.

Terr, 201 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2000). The court finds civil

commitment proceedings under California SVP statute are the type

of adversary proceeding that bring witness immunity doctrines

into play. Nevertheless, defendant’s entitlement to witness

immunity does not resolve plaintiff’s injunctive relief claims. 

Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984) (absolute immunity does not

bar claims for injunctive relief).

Farmer is entitled to summary judgment on the merits of

injunctive relief claims concerning psychotherapist-patient

privilege. Construing the pleading in favor of plaintiff and

based on a review of South Dakota statues, plaintiff states a

claim that Farmer’s testimony revealed material subject to

psychotherapist-patient privilege under South Dakota law and any

waiver effected in the 1984 criminal trial and sentencing was

limited to those proceedings. See South Dakota Evidence Code §§

19-13-7, 19-2-3.2, 19-2-3. Even so, plaintiff’s consent to

disclosure of privileged information can be implied by his

failure to assert psychotherapist-patient privilege during the

2002 commitment trial. See California Evidence Code § 912;

People v. Combs, 34 Cal. 4th 821 (2004). Through his silence in

California proceedings, he has waived the right to assert the

privilege in the future. Thus, Farmer is entitled to summary

judgment on plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief concerning

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breach of the psychotherapist-patient privilege in future

California proceedings.

The court must next address plaintiff’s claim for 

injunctive relief prohibiting Farmer from conspiring with state

agents in the future to fabricate evidence plaintiff has a mental

disorder. Plaintiff produced no evidence of a conspiracy, and

Farmer declared in moving for summary judgment he never spoke to

the evaluators. It is far better the claim be raised in future

state commitment proceedings, should events warrant it, rather

than for this court to cling to such a weak jurisdictional

thread. Abstention is proper.

Defendant urges the court to dismiss supplemental state law

claims, to the extent plaintiff alleges any. The pleading

broadly invokes the court’s jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367,

but does not plead any causes of action under state law. Because

no such claims are alleged, it is unnecessary for the court to

consider whether to dismiss them.

In his June 8, 2005, motion for a preliminary injunction, 

plaintiff seeks an order prohibiting Farmer from breaching the

psychotherapist-patient privilege in the future. For reasons

stated above, Farmer is entitled to summary judgment on claims

related to the privilege. Therefore, plaintiff’s motion for a

preliminary injunction should be denied. 

Accordingly, the court hereby recommends that:

1. Defendant’s August 19, 2005, motion to dismiss and for

summary judgment be granted.

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2. Plaintiff’s claims for damages and declaratory relief be

dismissed for failure to state a claim. See Heck v. Humphrey.

3. Summary judgment for Farmer be entered on plaintiff’s

claims for injunctive relief based on breach of psychotherapistpatient privilege.

4. The court abstain from hearing and dismiss plaintiff’s

claim for injunctive relief prohibiting Farmer from conspiring

with state agents in the future to fabricate evidence plaintiff

has a mental disorder.

5. Plaintiff’s June 8, 2005, motion for a preliminary

injunction be denied. 

Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l), these

findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States

District Judge assigned to this case. Written objections may be

filed within 20 days of service of these findings and

recommendations. The document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The district

judge may accept, reject, or modify these findings and

recommendations in whole or in part.

Dated: February 9, 2006. 

 /s/ Peter A. Nowinski 

 PETER A. NOWINSKI

 Magistrate Judge

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