Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-01530/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-01530-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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The Clerk of Court filing date is March 4, 2019, but pursuant to the prison mailbox rule,

the date of filing is February 28, 2019, the date Petitioner certified it was placed in the prison

mailing system (Doc. 1 at 18). See 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Rule 3(d).

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Stanley Hall,

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents. 

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CV 19-01530-PHX-SRB (MHB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE SUSAN R. BOLTON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT:

On February 28, 2019, Stanley Hall, who is confined in the Arizona State Prison,

Rincon - Rincon Unit, Tucson, Arizona, filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (hereinafter “habeas petition”)1

. (Doc. 1.) On July 31, 2019,

Respondents filed a Limited Answer (Doc. 14), and on August 20, 2019, Petitioner filed a

Reply (Doc. 17). 

STATE PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner was charged by a State of Arizona, Maricopa County, Grand Jury with one

count of aggravated assault, a class 3 dangerous felony. (Doc. 14-1, Exh. B.) The facts and

relevant procedural history are set forth in the Arizona Court of Appeals Memorandum

Decision, issued on April 4, 2017:

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On February 5, 2015, Hall stabbed a man outside his apartment

complex. A neighbor overheard and recognized Hall’s voice at the time of the

stabbing; the neighbor stepped out of his apartment and saw Hall running

away.

When police officers arrived, Hall was gone and the back door of his

apartment was open. Both the victim and the neighbor identified Hall as the

assailant from a photographic lineup.

Officers discovered that Hall had purchased a bus ticket to San Antonio,

Texas the morning after the stabbing. He was arrested in Texas and returned

to Arizona to face an aggravated assault charge.

During an eight-day jury trial, the victim again identified Hall as his

assailant. Hall testified, claiming he was not at the apartment complex at the

time of the stabbing, and that he had been set up by the apartment

owner/manager, who wanted to evict him.

The jury convicted Hall as charged, and the court subsequently

sentenced him to 13 years in prison, with credit for 210 days of presentence

incarceration.

(Doc. 14-1 at 118-126, Exh. N.)

Prior to trial, Petitioner requested, and was granted, permission to represent himself.

The Arizona Court of Appeals summarized the circumstances surrounding that decision:

Shortly after his arrest, Hall requested that he be permitted to represent

himself. He cited Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), and noted that

he had a constitutional right to represent himself and that he was “knowingly,

intelligently, and voluntarily” forgoing counsel. He also filed a motion

requesting advisory counsel.

The court engaged in a short colloquy with Hall regarding his ability to

represent himself, as well as the potential dangers of doing so. Hall indicated

that he had represented himself before, and neither Hall’s appointed defense

counsel nor the State opposed the motion, although the prosecutor noted that

Hall had a previous guilty-except-insane conviction. The court then engaged

in the following exchange with Hall:

COURT: You understand sir, particularly if you’ve

previously represented yourself, you understand that unlike

yourself Mr. Davis [defense counsel] has goine to college, Mr.

Davis has goine to law school, Mr. Davis has now been

practicing I think . . .10 years . . . He’s been around. I’ve seen

him. I know that he does good work. I know that he’s prepared

and able to do things. Do you understand that he’s qualified?

HALL: I understand exactly what you’re saying, Judge.

The reason that I’m requesting to represent myself is basically

because from the point of arrest in this case to right now I have

received no evidence to support the manner in which this arrest

was based.

COURT: Okay.

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The court noted that individuals who represent themselves sometimes

get so focused on small issues “they forget to see the big picture.” The court

asked Hall if he understood that a lawyer “should be provided” to help him,

and Hall indicated that he did. The court then granted Hall’s request to

represent himself and appointed attorney Davis to serve as advisory counsel.

Hall subsequently filed several motions, some of which the court found

difficult to understand or unintelligible. Hall alleged repeatedly that staff

members at the county jail were thwarting his efforts at self-representation,

and that the court should allow him to conduct his defense elsewhere. He

apparently also believed that jail personnel were secretly filming him and that

they had been sneaking psychotropic medication into his food.

Hall’s defense focused, in part, on an alleged conspiracy against him by

his landlord and law enforcement officials. Hall testified to his belief that the

manager of his apartment complex had, on multiple occasions, snuck into his

apartment and laced his food with psychotropic medication. He believed that

this medication “create[d] the desire for a person to use illicit drugs.”

According to Hall, the manager did this in the hopes that Hall would break the

law and thus enable her to evict him. Hall testified that the night of the

stabbing he had gone to a local grocery store to buy Gatorade, which would

help him fight off the effects of these drugs, and that he was not present at his

apartment.

Twice during trial, Hall revealed information about his mental health

history. First, before jury selection began, he suggested that he had previously

been through Rule 11 competency proceedings. [fn 2, omitted]. Second, Hall

testified about time he spent in a state mental hospital. After this second

incident, the court excused the jury and warned Hall about the risk of

discussing his mental health history in front of the jury. The court held a brief

meeting in chambers with Hall’s advisory counsel and the prosecutor

regarding the proper course of action, and ultimately warned Hall that he

should focus his testimony on the events of the night of the stabbing:

Mr. Hall, when you and I first met it was that first initial

pretrial conference and by then you had filed a large number of

motions, many of which . . . demanded you be allowed to

represent yourself. You and I talked about the representation

and I allowed you to represent yourself.

At that time I did not know that you may have had a stay

in our state hospital. I did not know that you had been found

guilty except insane. I did not know that. Sir, I granted you the

opportunity to represent yourself and today I’m still questioning

that and what we should do . . .

[The prosecutor and advisory counsel] both agree they

have no suggestions for me. I’m in a position where I have

authorized you to be your own lawyer and I’m trying to make

sure that you understand that these jurors are watching you and

paying attention, but they also want to know what happened on

February 5.

Hall assured the court he would skip a number of questions and get to

the point. The court then said:

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Mr. Hall, are we on the same page for a little while? Are

you ready to be your own lawyer again and do the things that

you can do because I’ve told you a couple of times, I’ve

watched you and you really do know what you’re doing. But

I’m concerned when I hear you wanting to tell these jurors about

your stay at the state hospital when no one else could ever bring

that out.

After Hall affirmed that he was going to focus on the events of February

5, the court reiterated: “I watch you at times and you are very good at asking

questions, but sometimes I wonder about you and I’m trying to make this

decision There’s nothing I’m going to do except start the trial back up. But my

encouragement to you is stay focused on February 5.” Hall did not mention

his mental health history again.

(Id. at 120-23.) 

On July 32, 2015, Petitioner was convicted by the jury as charged, and the jury found

as aggravating factors that the crime was a dangerous offense and caused physical, emotional

or financial harm to the victim. (Docs. 14-1 at 19; 1-1 at 4.) The trial court thereafter

sentenced Petitioner to 13 years in prison, with 210 days of presentence incarceration credit.

(Doc. 1-1 at 8.)

Petitioner appealed his judgment and sentence, asking again for permission to

represent himself. (Doc. 14-1 at 29-30, Exh. F.) The Arizona Court of Appeals remanded

to the trial court for a “Faretta-like” determination. (Id.) Petitioner completed an Affidavit

in Support of Waiver of Appellate Counsel, and after holding a hearing, the trial court

accepted Petitioner’s waiver, but appointed the Office of Public Defense Services to act in

an advisory capacity. (Id. at 36-37, Exh. H.) Petitioner later withdrew his request, and the

Court of Appeals appointed advisory counsel as his counsel to represent Petitioner in all

further proceedings. (Id. at 43, Exh. J.) 

Petitioner’s appointed counsel raised three issues on appeal: (1) “[w]hen the court

discovered that [Petitioner] had serious competency issues, it abused its discretion by

accepting and proceeding with an earlier Faretta waiver because that prior waiver was not

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made,” (2) the court “erred in failing to assure

[Petitioner]’s competency at all stages of the proceedings,” and (3) that “the appellate court

should adopt a higher standard of competency” for self-represented defendants. (Doc. 14-1

at 46, Exh. K.) 

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The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s conviction, and after analyzing

the claims, concluded:

Given Hall’s acknowledgment that the initial determination that he was

competent to represent himself was not error, and given affirmative evidence

of his ability to do so, he has not established a basis for setting aside his

conviction. Hall’s mental illness was not so severe that he was “unable to

carry out the basic tasks needed to present his own defense without the help of

counsel.” Edwards, 554 U.S. at 175-76. And although the superior court

expressed some misgivings about Hall’s self-representation, the court noted on

several occasions that Hall appeared to know what he was doing. Given the

deference owed to the court’s first-hand assessment of a defendant’s

continuing ability to represent himself, we cannot say that the court abused its

discretion by not sua sponte ordering a competency proceeding and by

allowing Hall to continue to represent himself.

(Doc. 14-1 at 125-26, Exh. N.)

Petitioner did not petition the Arizona Supreme Court for review. (Id. at 128, Exh. O.)

On April 14, 2017, Petitioner’s appellate counsel filed a Notice of Post-Conviction

Relief, providing notice that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel would be raised and

thus requesting that new counsel be appointed to represent Petitioner in post-conviction

proceedings. (Doc. 14-1 at 130-132, Exh. P.) On April 20, 2017, the court appointed new

counsel to represent Petitioner. (Id. at 140, Exh. R.) Appointed counsel thereafter filed a

Notice of Completion of Post-Conviction Review, in which he stated that he had

“communicated with Petitioner, reviewed the transcripts and all relevant documents . . ., and

is unable to discern any colorable claim [to raise].” (Id. at 2, Exh. S.) 

The court ordered that counsel remain in an advisory capacity and that Petitioner file

a pro per PCR petition by July 27, 2017. (Doc. 14-2 at 5, Exh. T.) In his pro per PCR

petition, Petitioner raised the following issues: (1) ineffective assistance of advisory trial

counsel, appellate counsel, and advisory PCR counsel, (2) prosecutorial misconduct and

selective prosecution, and (3) sixty-five arrest procedure, pre-trial and trial errors. (Id. at 8-

25, Exh. U.) The trial court analyzed Petitioner’s claims, and denied relief:

In this matter, Mr. Hall decided to represent himself and adamantly

rejected any encouragement to allow counsel to represent him. Additionally,

although advisory counsel was assigned to assist, Mr. Hall pursued a course

of conduct independent of his counsel’s advice. In the petition for postconviction relief, Mr. Hall complains that his advisory counsel was ineffective.

In State v. Russell, 175 Ariz. 529, 858 P.2d 674 (App. 1993), the court found

that “after waiving his right to counsel at trial, the defendant has no

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Respondents explain that the exhibit was obtained directly from the Arizona Court

of Appeals, and that no clearer copy could be located. (Doc. 14 at 11 fn 2.) Petitioner did

not attach a copy to his habeas petition.

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constitutionally protected right to challenge the advice or service provided by

advisory counsel.” Absent a specific claim under the Rule 32, a petitioner

cannot raise a claim for ineffective assistance. In the present petition, Mr. Hall

claims that there were errors by his advisory counsel related to 1) whether

there was a second 911 call, 2) information regarding an “open back door”, 3)

Mr. Hall’s bus trip to San Antonio, 4) whether there was entrapment or

obstruction, 5) regarding a video of his arrest, and 6) regarding the photograph

used in the lineup. As to each, Mr. Hall fails to articulate a specific set of acts

to support the issues. Further, Mr. Hall fails to identify the legal analysis or

basis for the claim. Here, the generalized and unsupported statements are

contradicted by the trial testimony and statements made on the record. Mr.

Hall’s petition fails as to claims of ineffective assistance as to his advisory

counsel. 

Mr. Hall argues that his appellate counsel was ineffective by failing to

raise issues on his appeal. However, an appellate counsel is “not ineffective

for selecting some issues and rejecting others.” See State v. Herrera, 183 Ariz.

642, 647, 905 P.2d 1377 (App. 1995). To prevail on a claim, the petitioner

must establish that there is a reasonable probability that but for appellate

counsel’s deficient performance; the outcome of the appeal would have been

different. Mr. Hall’s conclusory and deficient statements regarding the record

fails to raise sufficient information for the court to consider or conclude that

a reasonable probability of success exists. The actual record does not support

Mr. Hall’s claims and therefore, the petition is denied regarding the ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel.

Third, Mr. Hall presents several alternative versions of facts, many of

which are directly contradicted by the actual record, or are so unintelligible

that they fail to identify factual or legal theories for relief. This Court has

considered the record and it does not appear that any claim under the postconviction relief petition asserts sufficient facts or legal argument.

(Doc. 14-2 at 46-47, Exh. W.) 

Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc. 14-1 at

52-53, Exh. Y.) Although the writing on the petition is partly faded and unreadable2

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Petitioner claimed trial court error relating to: (1) a 911 call, (2) information relating to an

open back door, (3) Petitioner’s trip to San Antonio, (4) entrapment or obstruction, (5) the

video of his arrest, and (6) the photographic lineup. (Id.) Petitioner specifically noted that

he was”not arguing ineffective assistance of counsel.” (Id.) In his Reply, Petitioner disputed

the state’s claim that he had not raised ineffective assistance of counsel. (Doc. 1-2 at 2-4.)

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The basis of his purported ineffective assistance of counsel claim was not clear however. (Id.)

The Arizona Court of Appeals accepted review and denied relief. (Doc. 14-2 at 74-

75, Exh. AA.) “We have reviewed the record in this matter, the superior court’s order

denying the petition for post-conviction relief, the petition for review, the response and the

reply. We find that petitioner has not established an abuse of discretion.” (Id. at 75.)

Petitioner sought review in the Arizona Supreme Court, but on January 25, 2019, the Court

summarily denied review. (Doc. 14-2 at 77, Exh. BB.)

Petitioner timely filed his pro se habeas petition on March 4, 2019. (Doc. 1.) In his

petition, he raises the following claims:

1. The trial court violated Petitioner’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by

committing various pretrial and trial errors.

2. Petitioner’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights were violated when Texas and

Arizona jail officials took $572.00 from his inmate account during his transfer from

Texas to Arizona, and when Petitioner was subject to an unlawful arrest, and invalid

extradition proceedings.

3. Petitioner’s Eighth Amendment rights were violated by the presentation of false

testimony to the grand jury, by the denial of his right to impeach witnesses at the

grand jury and at trial, and by the setting of excessive pretrial bail.

4. The trial court violated his Fifth Amendment rights by allowing improper

impeachment of his testimony, by colluding with the prosecutor to ensure his

conviction, by precluding evidence of the violent nature of the apartment complex,

and by forcing him to testify at trial.

(Id. at 6-16.)

Respondent asserts that all of Petitioner’s claims are procedurally defaulted without

excuse. (Doc. 14.)

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DISCUSSION

Exhaustion and Procedural Default

A state prisoner must exhaust his remedies in state court before petitioning for a writ

of habeas corpus in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) and (c); Duncan v. Henry, 513

U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995); McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 833 (9th Cir. 1991). To

properly exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must fairly present his claims to the state’s

highest court in a procedurally appropriate manner. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S.

838, 839-46 (1999). In Arizona, a petitioner must fairly present his claims to the Arizona

Court of Appeals by properly pursuing them through the state’s direct appeal process or

through appropriate post-conviction relief. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th

Cir. 1999); Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994).

Proper exhaustion requires a petitioner to have “fairly presented” to the state courts

the exact federal claim he raises on habeas by describing the operative facts and federal legal

theory upon which the claim is based. See, e.g., Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275-78

(1971) (“[W]e have required a state prisoner to present the state courts with the same claim

he urges upon the federal courts.”). A claim is only “fairly presented” to the state courts

when a petitioner has “alert[ed] the state courts to the fact that [he] was asserting a claim

under the United States Constitution.” Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987 (9th Cir. 2000)

(quotations omitted); see Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 830 (9th Cir. 1996) (“If a petitioner

fails to alert the state court to the fact that he is raising a federal constitutional claim, his

federal claim is unexhausted regardless of its similarity to the issues raised in state court.”).

Additionally, a federal habeas court generally may not review a claim if the state

court’s denial of relief rests upon an independent and adequate state ground. See Coleman

v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731-32 (1991). The United States Supreme Court has explained:

In the habeas context, the application of the independent and adequate state

ground doctrine is grounded in concerns of comity and federalism. Without the

rule, a federal district court would be able to do in habeas what this Court

could not do on direct review; habeas would offer state prisoners whose

custody was supported by independent and adequate state grounds an end run

around the limits of this Court’s jurisdiction and a means to undermine the

State’s interest in enforcing its laws.

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 A state procedural default rule is “independent” if it does not depend upon a federal

constitutional ruling on the merits. See Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002).

4

 A state procedural default rule is “adequate” if it is “strictly or regularly followed.” Johnson

v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 587 (1988) (quoting Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255, 262-53 (1982)).

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Id. at 730-31. Thus, in order to prevent a petitioner from subverting the exhaustion

requirement by failing to follow state procedures, a claim not presented to the state courts in

a procedurally correct manner is deemed procedurally defaulted, and is generally barred from

habeas relief. See id. at 731-32.

If a state court expressly applied a procedural bar when a petitioner attempted to raise

the claim in state court, and that state procedural bar is both “independent”3

 and “adequate”4

– review of the merits of the claim by a federal habeas court is ordinarily barred. See Ylst v.

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801 (1991) (“When a state-law default prevents the state court

from reaching the merits of a federal claim, that claim can ordinarily not be reviewed in

federal court.”) (citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87-88 (1977) and Murray v.

Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485-492 (1986)).

A procedural bar may also be applied to unexhausted claims where state procedural

rules make a return to state court futile. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n.1 (claims are barred

from habeas review when not first raised before state courts and those courts “would now

find the claims procedurally barred”); Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1230-31 (9th Cir.

2002) (“[T]he procedural default rule barring consideration of a federal claim ‘applies only

when a state court has been presented with the federal claim,’ but declined to reach the issue

for procedural reasons, or ‘if it is clear that the state court would hold the claim procedurally

barred.’”) (quoting Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263 n.9 (1989)).

Specifically, in Arizona, claims not previously presented to the state courts via either

direct appeal or collateral review are generally barred from federal review because an attempt

to return to state court to present them is futile unless the claims fit in a narrow category of

claims for which a successive petition is permitted. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d)-(h), 32.2(a)

(precluding claims not raised on appeal or in prior petitions for post-conviction relief),

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32.4(a) (time bar), 32.9(c) (petition for review must be filed within thirty days of trial court’s

decision). Arizona courts have consistently applied Arizona’s procedural rules to bar further

review of claims that were not raised on direct appeal or in prior Rule 32 post-conviction

proceedings. See, e.g., Stewart, 536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002) (determinations made under

Arizona’s procedural default rule are “independent” of federal law); Smith v. Stewart, 241

F.3d 1191, 1195 n.2 (9th Cir. 2001) (“We have held that Arizona’s procedural default rule is

regularly followed [“adequate”] in several cases.”) (citations omitted), reversed on other

grounds, Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856 (2002); see also Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 931-

32 (9th Cir. 1998) (rejecting argument that Arizona courts have not “strictly or regularly

followed” Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure); State v. Mata, 185 Ariz.

319, 334-36, 916 P.2d 1035, 1050-52 (Ariz. 1996) (waiver and preclusion rules strictly

applied in post-conviction proceedings).

The federal court will not consider the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim unless

a petitioner can demonstrate that a miscarriage of justice would result, or establish cause for

his noncompliance and actual prejudice. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995);

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750-51; Murray, 477 U.S. at 495-96. Pursuant to the “cause and

prejudice” test, a petitioner must point to some external cause that prevented him from

following the procedural rules of the state court and fairly presenting his claim. “A showing

of cause must ordinarily turn on whether the prisoner can show that some objective factor

external to the defense impeded [the prisoner’s] efforts to comply with the State’s procedural

rule. Thus, cause is an external impediment such as government interference or reasonable

unavailability of a claim’s factual basis.” Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1052 (9th Cir.

2004) (citations and internal quotations omitted). The petitioner must also show actual

prejudice, not just the possibility of prejudice. U.S. v. Braswell, 501 F.3d 1147, 1150 (9th

Cir. 2007).

 Regarding the “miscarriage of justice,” the Supreme Court has made clear that a

fundamental miscarriage of justice exists when a Constitutional violation has resulted in the

conviction of one who is actually innocent. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 495-96. Additionally,

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pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2), the court may dismiss plainly meritless claims regardless

of whether the claim was properly exhausted in state court. See Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S.

269, 277 (2005) (holding that a stay is inappropriate in federal court to allow claims to be

raised in state court if they are subject to dismissal under § 2254(b)(2) as “plainly meritless”).

Claims One through Four.

All of Petitioner’s claims are unexhausted, as each claim relates to pre-trial and trial

error and was not raised on direct appeal. On appeal, Petitioner raised one claim, and that

claim related only to the question of Petitioner’s competency to represent himself at trial.

Claims not raised in an opening brief are generally waived. See State v. Guytan, 968 P.2d

587, 593 ¶ 15 (App. 1998). And, the time for Petitioner to file an appeal raising these new

issues has long passed. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.2(a)(2) (defendant must appeal within 20

days of sentence or order).

In his PCR petition, Petitioner raised claims of ineffective assistance of advisory trial

counsel and appellate counsel. He does not raise those claims in his habeas petition.

Petitioner also complained, in his PCR petition, of numerous factual errors, but the trial court

found most of the claims unintelligible, and that any intelligible claim did not rise to a factual

or legal challenge cognizable in PCR proceedings. 

Any attempt now by Petitioner to return to the trial court and raise his habeas claims

in PCR proceedings would fail, as he did not raise these claims on appeal, and has not raised

claims that would exempt them from the timeliness requirements. See

Ariz.R.Crim.P.32.2(a)(1) (precluding claims not raised on appeal), 32.4(b)(3)(a) (a PCR

petition must be filed within 90 days after sentencing or within 30 days of issuance of

mandate on appeal), 32.4(b)(3)(B) (claims raised pursuant to rule 32.1(b) through (h) must

be raised within a reasonable period of time after discovery), 32.1(b) through (h) (claims of

newly discovered material facts that would have changed the judgment or sentence,

significant change in the law, actual innocence, sentence expiration). Petitioner’s habeas

claims are procedurally defaulted as he can not now return to state court to exhaust his

claims.

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Petitioner asserts various excuses for his procedural default. As to his failure to raise

his claims on appeal, he alleges that his appellate counsel “used pysic medication in food and

harmful deseases [Petitioner] suffered to much to be focused.” (Doc. 1 at 6.) In Petitioner’s

Reply, he also claims that his custody prejudiced his defense,” that he has suffered from

“high blood pressure and heart problems,” and that his appellate rights have been

“sabataged,” as the prison does not have a “Federally required law library.” (Doc. 17 at 5-6.)

Petitioner provides no factual support for these allegations. Petitioner also claims that the

“new evidence” outlined in his habeas claims makes it “more likely than not that no juror

would have convicted him.” (Id. at 3.) Petitioner’s claimed excuses lack substance, and his

claim that he does not have access to a law library is belied by the legal citations and

argument set forth in his habeas briefing. Additionally, Petitioner does not identify what

“new evidence” exists, much less establish the new evidence would establish his innocence.

Petitioner does not establish cause for his procedural default, or a miscarriage of

justice as a result of his conviction. As all of Petitioner’s claims are procedurally defaulted

without excuse, this Court will recommend that his habeas petition be denied and dismissed

with prejudice. 

CONCLUSION

Having determined that Petitioner’s claims in his habeas petition are procedurally

defaulted without excuse, the Court will recommend that Petitioner’s habeas petition be

denied and dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the Petition is

justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the procedural ruling

debatable.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

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Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen

days within which to file a response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of

Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, objections

to the Report and Recommendation may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. Failure

timely to file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result

in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the district court without further

review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure

timely to file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be

considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order

or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 72,

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 16th day of March, 2020.

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