Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-3_06-cv-03020/USCOURTS-arwd-3_06-cv-03020-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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Michael J. Astrue became the Social Security Commissioner on February 12, 2007. Pursuant to Rule 1

25(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Michael J. Astrue has been substituted for Commissioner Jo Anne

B. Barnhart as the defendant in this suit.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

 HARRISON DIVISION

KEITH V. MCFARLAND PLAINTIFF

VS. CIVIL NO. 06-3020

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE , Commissioner 1

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff, Keith McFarland, brings this action pursuant to § 205(g) of the Social Security Act

(“the Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of

the Social Security Administration denying his applications for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”)

and supplemental security income (“SSI”), under Titles II and XVI of the Act.

Background:

The applications for DIB and SSI now before this court were protectively filed on August 20,

2003, alleging an onset date of July 16, 2003, due to depression, a disorder of the back, and carpal

tunnel syndrome. (Tr. 52-54). An administrative hearing was held on November 18, 2004. (Tr.

342-360). Plaintiff was present and represented by counsel. 

At the time of the administrative hearing, plaintiff was 40 years old and possessed a high

school education. (Tr. 12). The record reveals that he had past relevant work (“PRW”) experience

as a trailer assembler, courier, frame carpenter, and roofer. (Tr. 12). 

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The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), rendered an unfavorable decision on August 31,

2005. (Tr. 11-20). He concluded that plaintiff’s impairments were severe but determined that they

did not meet or medically equal any of the impairments listed in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulation

No. 4. (Tr. 19). The ALJ then found that plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”)

to lift 25 pounds frequently and 40 pounds occasionally, sit for a total of four hours during an eighthour workday, and stand and walk for a total of six hours during an eight-hour workday. However,

the ALJ noted that plaintiff was unable to use both hands for fine manipulation. (Tr. 20). With the

assistance of a vocational expert, the ALJ then concluded that plaintiff could still perform work as

a fast food worker, motel maid/cleaner, and machine tender. (Tr. 20). 

On March 1, 2006, the Appeals Council declined to review this decision. (Tr. 3-5).

Subsequently, plaintiff filed this action. (Doc. # 1). This case is before the undersigned by consent

of the parties. Both parties were afforded the opportunity to file appeal briefs and plaintiff chose not

to do so. (Doc. # 8). The case is now ready for decision. 

Applicable Law:

This Court’s role is to determine whether the Commissioner’s findings are supported by

substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th Cir.

2002). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance but it is enough that a reasonable mind

would find it adequate to support the Commissioner’s decision. The ALJ’s decision must be

affirmed if the record contains substantial evidence to support it. Edwards v. Barnhart, 314 F.3d

964, 966 (8th Cir. 2003). As long as there is substantial evidence in the record that supports the

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Commissioner’s decision, the Court may not reverse it simply because substantial evidence exists

in the record that would have supported a contrary outcome, or because the Court would have

decided the case differently. Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001). In other words,

if after reviewing the record it is possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and

one of those positions represents the findings of the ALJ, the decision of the ALJ must be affirmed.

Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 2000).

It is well-established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden of

proving his disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that has lasted at least one year

and that prevents him from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. Pearsall v. Massanari, 274

F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir. 2001); see 42 U.S.C. § § 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act defines

“physical or mental impairment” as “an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or

psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory

diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. § § 423(d)(3), 1382(3)(c). A plaintiff must show that his

disability, not simply his impairment, has lasted for at least twelve consecutive months. Titus v.

Sullivan, 4 F.3d 590, 594 (8th Cir. 1993).

The Commissioner’s regulations require her to apply a five-step sequential evaluation process

to each claim for disability benefits: (1) whether the claimant has engaged in substantial gainful

activity since filing his claim; (2) whether the claimant has a severe physical and/or mental

impairment or combination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment(s) meet or equal an

impairment in the listings; (4) whether the impairment(s) prevent the claimant from doing past

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relevant work; and, (5) whether the claimant is able to perform other work in the national economy

given his age, education, and experience. See 20 C.F.R. § § 404.1520(a)- (f)(2003). Only if the final

stage is reached does the fact finder consider the plaintiff’s age, education, and work experience in

light of his or her residual functional capacity. See McCoy v. Schweiker, 683 F.2d 1138, 1141-42

(8th Cir. 1982); 20 C .F.R. § § 404.1520, 416.920 (2003).

Discussion:

Of particular concern to the undersigned is the ALJ’s mental RFC assessment. RFC is the

most a person can do despite that person’s limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). A disability

claimant has the burden of establishing his or her RFC. See Masterson v. Barnhart, 363 F.3d 731, 737

(8th Cir.2004). “The ALJ determines a claimant’s RFC based on all relevant evidence in the record,

including medical records, observations of treating physicians and others, and the claimant’s own

descriptions of his or her limitations.” Eichelberger v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 584, 591 (8th Cir. 2004);

Guilliams v. Barnhart, 393 F.3d 798, 801 (8th Cir. 2005). Limitations resulting from symptoms such

as pain are also factored into the assessment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3). The United States Court

of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has held that a “claimant’s residual functional capacity is a medical

question.” Lauer v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 700, 704 (8th Cir. 2001). Therefore, an ALJ’s determination

concerning a claimant’s RFC must be supported by medical evidence that addresses the claimant’s

ability to function in the workplace.” Lewis v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 642, 646 (8th Cir. 2003). 

The evaluation of a mental impairment is often more complicated than the evaluation of a

claimed physical impairment. Andler v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1389, 1393 (8th Cir. 1996). Evidence of

symptom-free periods, which maynegate the finding of a physical disability, do not compel a finding

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that disability based on a mental disorder has ceased. Id. Mental illness can be extremely difficult

to predict, and remissions are often of “uncertain duration and marked by the impending possibility

of relapse.” Id. Individuals suffering from mental disorders often have their lives structured to

minimize stress and help control their symptoms, indicating that theymay actually be more impaired

than their symptoms indicate. Hutsell v. Massanari, 259 F.3d 707, 711 (8th Cir.2001); 20 C.F.R.

Pt. 404, Subpt. P., App. 1, § 12.00(E) (1999). This limited tolerance for stress is particularly relevant

because a claimant’s residual functional capacity is based on their ability to perform the requisite

physical acts day in and day out, in the sometimes competitive and stressful conditions in which real

people work in the real world.” McCoy v. Schweiker, 683 F.2d 1138, 1147 (8th Cir. 1982)

(abrogated on other grounds). 

In the present case, plaintiff has been diagnosed with severe depression, personality disorder

not otherwise specified, and chronic pain. (Tr. 209-212, 213-220, 256-259). In December 2004,

Dr. Jeanne McAllister, assessed plaintiff with a Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) score

of 40. (Tr. 211-212). Then, in January 2005, Dr. Christopher Winslow noted plaintiff’s GAF to be

47, stating that his highest GAF over the past year was likely between 55 and 60. (Tr. 258). 

On April 7, 2005, Dr. Robert Hudson evaluated plaintiff and completed a mental RFC

assessment. (Tr. 219-220). He determined that plaintiff had only a fair ability to relate to coworkers, deal with the public, deal with work stresses, function independently, and relate predictably

in social situations. Dr. Hudson also found plaintiff to have a good to fair ability to understand,

remember, and carry out complex job instructions. 

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We note that a GAF of 47 is indicative of severe symptoms or any serious impairment in

social, occupational, or school functioning. DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL

DISORDERS IV 34 (4th ed. Revised 2000). The ALJ, however, misstated plaintiff’s RFC, stating that

it was between 55 and 60, which, as he noted, is suggestive of only moderate symptoms. (Tr. 15).

As such, he concluded that plaintiff had no restrictions with regard to performing activities of daily

living; moderate difficulties in maintaining social functioning; and, no difficulties in maintaining

concentration, persistence, or pace. (Tr. 15). Given the fact that plaintiff’s GAF is actually 47,

which is suggestive of severe symptoms, and Dr. Hudson’s findings that plaintiff had only fair

abilities in a number areas, we believe that remand is necessary to allow the ALJ to reevaluate

plaintiff’s mental impairments. 

In addition, we also note that the record does not contain a physical RFC assessment from

any of plaintiff’s treating physicians. As such, on remand, the ALJ should address interrogatories

to plaintiff’s treating physicians, asking the physicians to review plaintiff's medical records, to

complete an RFC assessment regarding plaintiff's mental and physical capabilities during the time

period in question, and to give the objective basis for their opinions, so that an informed decision

can be made regarding plaintiff's ability to perform basic work activities on a sustained basis during

the relevant time period in question. Chitwood v. Bowen, 788 F.2d 1376, 1378 n.1 (8th Cir. 1986);

Dozier v. Heckler, 754 F.2d 274, 276 (8th Cir. 1985). 

Conclusion:

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Based on the foregoing, we reverse the ALJ’s decision and remand this case to the

Commissioner for further consideration pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

DATED this 06th day of March 2007.

/s/ J. Marschewski

HON. JAMES R. MARSCHEWSKI

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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