Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01697/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01697-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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-1- 10cv1697

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT JAY MAXWELL, Civil No. 10cv1697-MMA (RBB)

Petitioner,

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION RE:

DENIAL OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS [ECF NO. 1]

vs.

MATTHEW CATE, Secretary, et al., 

Respondents.

I. INTRODUCTION

Robert Jay Maxwell (hereinafter “Maxwell” or “Petitioner”), is

a state prisoner proceeding by and through counsel with a Petition

for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 [ECF No.

1]. Maxwell challenges his San Diego County Superior Court

convictions for first degree robbery, assault with a semiautomatic

handgun, assault with a semiautomatic rifle, residential burglary,

false imprisonment by violence or menace, grand theft of personal

property, intimidating a witness by force or threat, and five

counts of tampering with electric, telephone and cable television

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lines. (See Pet. 2-4, ECF No. 1; see also Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s

Tr. vol. 1, 0179-86, Jan. 31, 2006 (consolidated amended

information); id. vol. 4, 0685-96, Feb. 14, 2006 (verdicts).) 

Petitioner contends his federal constitutional rights under the

Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments were violated due to

repeated incidents of prosecutorial misconduct, ineffective

assistance of trial and appellate counsel, and the cumulative

effect of those errors. (See Pet. 5-7, ECF No. 1; id. Mem. P. & A.

Supp. Pet. 14-39.)

Respondent Matthew Cate (hereinafter “Respondent”), answers

that habeas relief is not available because the prosecutorial

misconduct claims are procedurally defaulted due to trial counsel’s

failure to contemporaneously object to the alleged misconduct or

request curative jury instructions. (See Answer Attach. #1 Mem. P.

& A. 20-21, ECF No. 7.) Respondent also argues that habeas relief

is unavailable because the adjudication of Petitioner’s claims by

the state appellate court was neither contrary to, nor an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, and

was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. (Id.

at 21-49.)

Based upon a review of the pleadings and documents presented

in this case, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court

RECOMMENDS the Petition be DENIED. 

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 31, 2006, a thirteen-count consolidated amended

information was filed in the San Diego County Superior Court

charging Petitioner and two other individuals, Michael James Murphy

and Thomas Tyson Zingsheim, with first-degree robbery in violation

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1

 Codefendant Zingsheim was also charged with a second count of

residential burglary in violation of Penal Code section 459 (count

thirteen). (Id. at 0186.) Two other individuals, Tuesdae Ditmars and

Evan Baltsas, were charged in an earlier version of the information but

pleaded guilty prior to trial. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr. vol. 1,

0016-24, May 19, 2005 (amended information); Lodgment No. 22, People v.

Zingsheim, No. D049189, slip op. at 1 (Cal. Ct. App. July 10, 2008).)

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of California Penal Code (“Penal Code”) sections 211 and 212.5(a)

(count one); assault with a semiautomatic handgun in violation of

Penal Code section 245(b) (count two); assault with a semiautomatic

rifle in violation of Penal Code section 245(b) (count three);

residential burglary of an inhabited dwelling in violation of Penal

Code sections 459 and 460 (count four); false imprisonment by

violence, menace, fraud, or deceit in violation of Penal Code

sections 236 and 237(a) (count five); grand theft of personal

property in violation of Penal Code section 487(a) (count six);

dissuading a witness by force or threat in violation of Penal Code

section 136.1(c)(1) (count seven); and five counts of tampering

with electric, telephone, and cable television lines in violation

of Penal Code section 591 (counts eight through twelve). (Lodgment

No. 1, Clerk’s Tr. vol. 1, 0179-86 (consolidated amended

information).) The charging document alleged that on January 29,

2005, Maxwell personally used a firearm during the commission of

counts one through six, was vicariously armed during count seven,

and had a prior serious felony conviction within the meaning of

Penal Code sections 667(a)(1), 668 and 1192.7(c), which constituted

a “strike” within the meaning of Penal Code sections 667(b)-(i),

668 and 1170.12, California’s three-strikes law.1 (Id. at 0182-

87.) 

Following a jury trial, Maxwell was convicted on all twelve

counts. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr. vol. 4, 0685-96 (verdicts).) 

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The jury found that Petitioner had personally used a firearm during

the commission of counts one through six, and was vicariously

liable for an armed principal during the commission of count seven,

within the meaning of Penal Code sections 12022(a)(1) & 12022.5(a). 

(Id. at 0685-91.) Petitioner’s codefendants were also convicted on

all charges, with the exception of count eight (disabling an alarm

system), for which Maxwell alone was found guilty. (Lodgment No.

4, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 14, 2521-32, Feb. 15, 2006.)

Maxwell admitted the prior conviction allegation. (Id. at

2546.) The court struck the prior “strike” conviction so as to

prevent a mandated punishment under the three strikes law, and

sentenced Petitioner to a term of twenty-one years in state prison,

which included a six-year term on count one, concurrent or stayed

terms on the remaining counts, a ten-year enhancement for the

firearm use findings, and a five-year enhancement for his prior

conviction. (Id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 14, 2558-61, July 18, 2006;

Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr. vol. 4, 0851, July 18, 2006 (mins).)

Petitioner filed an appeal in the California Court of Appeal

for the Fourth Appellate District, Division One, in which he

raised, among other issues, the prosecutorial misconduct claims

presented as claim one here. (Lodgment No. 13, Appellant’s Opening

Brief, People v. Maxwell, No. D049189, slip op. (Cal. Ct. App. July

10, 2008).) While the appeal was pending, Maxwell filed a habeas

petition in the appellate court arguing that the five-year

enhancement for his prior felony conviction should be struck

because the conviction had been reduced to a misdemeanor before

trial. (Lodgment No. 16, In re Maxwell, No. D051961 (Cal. Ct. App.

filed Nov. 9, 2007) (petition).) The state appellate court

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consolidated Petitioner’s appeal with that of his codefendants, and

affirmed the convictions in all respects in an unpublished opinion. 

(Lodgment No. 22, People v. Zingsheim, No. D049189, slip op. at

75.) As discussed in detail below, the appellate court reached the

merits of the prosecutorial misconduct claims after first finding

they had been waived or forfeited due to a failure to properly

object or request curative instructions. (Id. at 32-39, 44-45, 48-

59.) With respect to Petitioner’s sentence, the appellate court

stuck the true finding regarding Petitioner’s prior conviction and

remanded for a new sentencing hearing. (Id. at 75.) On the same

day, the appellate court denied Maxwell’s habeas petition as moot

in light of the relief provided on direct appeal. (Lodgment No.

23, In re Maxwell, No. D051961, order (Cal. Ct. App. July 10,

2008).)

Petitioner thereafter filed a petition for review in the

California Supreme Court in which he presented the prosecutorial

misconduct claims raised here. (Lodgment No. 24, Petition for

Review, People v. Maxwell, No. SD2006802244 (Cal. filed Aug. 18,

2008).) The court consolidated that petition with the petitions

for review filed by Maxwell’s codefendants, and denied them all in

a single order without a citation of authority or a statement of

reasoning. (Lodgment No. 25, People v. Zingsheim, No. S165976,

order (Cal. Oct. 20, 2008).)

Maxwell was subsequently resentenced to a term of nineteen

years and four months in state prison. (Lodgment No. 28, Rep.’s

Tr. vol. 1, 9-13, Feb. 25, 2009.) He thereafter filed an appeal of

the resentencing which raised issues not relevant to this

proceeding. (Lodgment No. 29, Appellant’s Opening Brief, People v.

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2

 Maxwell filed a petition for review of the resentencing order in

the California Supreme Court which did not include claims relevant to

this federal proceeding. (Lodgment No. 36, Petition for Review, People

v. Maxwell, No. SD2009701780 (Cal. filed Mar. 5, 2010).) That petition

was denied without citation of authority or a statement of reasoning. 

(Lodgment No. 39, People v. Maxwell, No. S180700, order (Cal. Apr. 14,

2010).)

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Maxwell, No. D054785, slip op. (Cal. App. Ct. Jan. 26, 2010).) 

Petitioner filed a second appellate court habeas petition, which

included a request to consolidate it with the pending appeal, in

which he alleged, as he does in claim two here, that to the extent

his prosecutorial misconduct claims were forfeited due to the

failure to properly object at trial or request curative jury

instructions, relief was still available under a theory of

ineffective assistance of counsel. (Lodgment No. 30, In re

Maxwell, No. D055492 (Cal. Ct. App. filed July 15, 2009) (pet.).) 

Although the appellate court initially stated that it would

consolidate the habeas petition and appeal, it later vacated that

order and denied the habeas petition without prejudice to filing in

the superior court. (Lodgment No. 33, In re Maxwell, No. D055492,

order (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2009).) The appellate court affirmed

Petitioner’s new sentence.2 (Lodgment No. 35, People v. Maxwell,

No. D054785, slip op. (Cal. App. Ct. Jan. 26, 2010).) 

Maxwell filed a habeas petition in the superior court raising

the ineffective assistance of counsel claims and the cumulative

error claim presented here as claim two. (Lodgment No. 34, In re

Maxwell, No. HSC11113 (Cal. Sup. Ct. filed Jan. 25, 2010)

(petition).) The superior court denied the petition on the basis

that Petitioner had failed to make a prima facie showing for relief

as to any claim. (Lodgment No. 37, In re Maxwell, No. HSC11113,

order (Cal. Sup. Ct. Mar. 16, 2010).) 

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Maxwell thereafter filed a habeas petition in the appellate

court presenting the same claims raised in the superior court

petition. (Lodgment No. 38, In re Maxwell, No. D057039 (Cal. Ct.

App. Mar. 26, 2010) (petition).) The appellate court denied the

petition on the grounds that the court had already found there was

no reversible or cumulative error arising from the alleged

instances of prosecutorial misconduct upon which the ineffective

assistance of counsel and cumulative error claims were based. 

(Lodgment No. 41, In re Maxwell, No. D057039, order (Cal. App. Ct.

Apr. 30, 2010).)

Petitioner presented those same claims in a petition for

review filed in the California Supreme Court. (Lodgment No. 42,

Petition for Review, In re Maxwell, No. [S182412] (Cal. filed May

5, 2010).) That petition was denied without citation of authority

or a statement of reasoning. (Lodgment No. 43, In re Maxwell, No.

S182412, order (Cal. July 14, 2010).)

Maxwell, proceeding through counsel, filed a habeas corpus

Petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in this Court on August 12,

2010, with an attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities in

Support thereof [ECF No. 1]. Respondent filed an Answer to the

Petition on November 15, 2010, along with a Memorandum of Points

and Authorities in Support of the Answer [ECF No. 7]. Petitioner

filed a Traverse on December 7, 2010, along with a Memorandum of

Points and Authorities in Support thereof [ECF No. 11].

III. TRIAL PROCEEDINGS

Petitioner was jointly tried with codefendants Michael Murphy

and Thomas Zingsheim. All three were accused of crimes stemming

from a home invasion robbery at the residence of Ryan Guerrero;

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3

 Ditmars was sentenced to three years in prison. (Lodgment

No. 1, Clerk’s Tr. vol. 4, 729 (probation officer’s report).) 

Although that fact was not presented to the jury, two jurors

admitted reading a newspaper article which reported Ditmars’s

sentence. (Lodgment No. 4, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 12, 2200-07, Feb. 9,

2006.)

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Tuesdae Ditmars and Evan Baltsas, both of whom pleaded guilty

before trial, were also involved. In addition, Murphy and

Zingsheim were charged with another burglary that did not involve

Petitioner.

Tuesdae Ditmars, the first witness called, testified that she

had been continuously in custody since her arrest in this case.

(Lodgment No. 4, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 1, 109-10, Jan. 25, 2006.) She

was arrested several minutes after the Guerrero robbery while

riding in a car driven by Zingsheim and in possession of property

taken from the Guerrero residence. (Id.) Ditmars was convicted,

pursuant to a guilty plea, of robbery at the Guerrero residence and

residential burglary of the Leombrone residence. (Id. at 92;

Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr. vol. 4, 729, May 16, 2006 (probation

officer’s report).) Ditmars testified that she had no deal with

the prosecution regarding her testimony; she had wanted to invoke

her Fifth Amendment right and not testify but was told by her

attorney that she was not allowed to do so. (Lodgment No. 4,

Rep.’s Tr. vol. 1, 122; id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 3, 534, Jan. 26, 2006.) 

As part of her guilty plea, she admitted that she had been

vicariously armed at both residences and that Petitioner and Murphy

had been armed during the Guerrero robbery.3 (Id. Rep.’s Tr. vol.

1, 92-93, 121.) 

Due to Ditmars’s stated inability to remember clearly the

events of the Guerrero robbery, the prosecutor, only a few minutes

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into her testimony, asked her about statements she had made to a

probation officer in connection with her sentencing. (Id. at 96-

97.) The prosecutor had placed brief excerpts of the probation

officer’s report on defense counsels’ table before counsel arrived

on the morning trial began, and defense counsel informed the court

that they did not know its purpose until the prosecutor began

asking Ditmars about the report. (Id. at 98-109.) Following a

defense objection, the prosecutor conceded that he had committed a

discovery violation by failing to turn over the probation officer’s

report. (Id. at 98-99, 107.) 

Ditmars was declared a hostile witness due to her apparent

forgetfulness. (Id. at 124.) She testified that she met Ryan

Guerrero through a mutual friend a few months before the Guerrero

robbery. (Id. at 126.) Around that time she was involved in

sexual relationships with Evan Baltsas, with whom she lived, as

well as Jesse Valdez, who she saw “on the side.” (Id. at 124, 127-

28.) She stayed with Guerrero at his house from time to time in

order to get away from Baltsas due to the ups and downs in their

relationship; she was able to reach Valdez through Guerrero,

because she could not contact Valdez at his home. (Id. at 135-37.)

Ditmars said she had left Baltsas a few days before the

Guerrero robbery and stayed at a hotel in downtown San Diego for a

day or so, which was paid for by a friend. (Id. at 142-43.) She

had no money of her own at that time and supported herself by

selling methamphetamine. (Id. at 143-45.) She went to stay with

Guerrero for a few days and did not let Baltsas know where she was

because she was trying to end their relationship. (Id. at 146-47.) 

She slept alone in the downstairs bedroom while at Guerrero’s house

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and made it clear to Guerrero she was not interested in a sexual

relationship. (Id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 2, 267-68, Jan. 25, 2006; id.

Rep.’s Tr. vol. 2, 352, Jan. 26, 2006.) 

Ditmars testified that on the day before the robbery Guerrero

was working on the roof of the house while she remained inside. 

(Id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 1, 147-48.) She became distressed when she

was unable to check her voice mail because Baltsas had changed her

password. (Id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 2, 270-72.) She was so distressed

about her voice mail that she drank five or six shots of Jack

Daniels whiskey in about half an hour. (Id. at 271-72; id. Rep.’s

Tr. vol. 1, 150-52.)

Ditmars was nineteen years old at the time of the Guerrero

robbery; she testified that she used methamphetamine daily and had

used it off and on since she was seventeen. (Id. Rep.’s Tr. vol.

1, 154; id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 2, 382.) She said she was an alcoholic

who has experienced blackouts, after which she would not be able to

remember what had happened while drinking. (Id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 2,

370-71.) She was used to drinking Jack Daniels, however, and said

she was able to drink a half pint in an evening and still remember

what she had been doing when she passed out. (Id. at 369.)

Ditmars said that she was high on methamphetamine around the

time of the events; it had been over a year since the incident, and

she is now clean and sober and did not want to remember or even try

to remember what happened. (Id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 1, 157.) She also

said that most of her testimony was based on her memory being

refreshed by having recently read a transcript of a statement she

gave to the police when she was high and told lies to cover

herself. (Id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 2, 364-65.) The prosecutor

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presented evidence that no transcript was found in a search of her

jail cell. (Id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 7, 1446-47, Feb. 2, 2006.) The

following day, the attorney who represented Ditmars in her criminal

case testified that she had reviewed the transcript with Ditmars

many times and twice had shown her a video recording of her police

interview. (Id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 8, 1494-97, Feb. 3, 2006.) 

Ditmars testified that she and Guerrero smoked methamphetamine

together on the day of the robbery, and the last thing she

remembered was “flashing” Guerrero about sundown by pulling up her

shirt and exposing her breasts. (Id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 1, 155; id.

Rep.’s Tr. vol. 2, 273-74.) She testified on direct examination

that Guerrero mixed some of her drinks that day, but on crossexamination, she said that Guerrero did not mix any of her drinks,

although he had access to her bottle of Jack Daniels which had been

sitting open on the bar for days. (Id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 1, 125,

155-56; id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 2, 378-79.)

Ditmars said that the next thing she remembered after flashing

Guerrero was waking up in bed with him, both of them naked, at

about 4:00 a.m. (Id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 1, 158-59; id. Rep.’s Tr.

vol. 2, 273, 276, 354.) She testified that Guerrero raped her that

night, although she admitted she never told the police she had been

raped. (Id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 1, 122-23.) When she woke up, she saw

cigarettes and a lighter fresh from the store. (Id. at 276.) She

put on her clothes, got a soda, ate some cold pizza, called

Baltsas, and then slept for a while in her bedroom. (Id. at 159-

60; id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 2, 276, 354.) She testified that she

called Baltsas to come get her because she missed him and felt

something improper had happened with Guerrero. (Id. Rep.’s Tr.

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vol. 2, 278.) She did not tell Baltsas she had been raped, but

told him that she had awoken in Guerrero’s bed without any clothes

and thought he had taken advantage of her. (Id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 1,

160-61.) Ditmars gave Baltsas directions to Guerrero’s house, and

he told her he would be over as soon as he could. (Id. at 161-62.) 

Ditmars fell asleep; when she awoke, she called Baltsas again. 

(Id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 2, 279.) He told her he had just picked up

Zingsheim and was on his way over. (Id.) She called Baltsas a

third time a little later and then waited in the garage where

Guerrero’s father’s Lincoln Navigator was parked. (Id. Rep.’s Tr.

vol. 1, 162-63; id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 2, 280-81.)

Baltsas arrived with Zingsheim in a grey Volvo about fortyfive minutes to an hour after Ditmars first called. (Id. Rep.’s

Tr. vol. 2, 281.) Although there was room in the driveway, they

parked the Volvo two houses away. (Id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 1, 163-64.) 

Ditmars put her personal items in the Volvo along with an X-Box

video game and other items she intended to steal from Guerrero. 

(Id. at 171-72; id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 3, 477-78.) Baltsas and

Zingsheim went into the garage and sat in the Navigator. (Id.

Rep.’s Tr. vol. 1, 173.) Baltsas surprised and angered Ditmars

when he drove off alone in the Navigator, apparently abandoning her

after she had turned to him for help, so she left with Zingsheim in

the Volvo. (Id. at 173, 178-79; id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 2, 413-14.)

Ditmars testified that Zingsheim drove them to Valdez’s house,

and along the way she smoked methamphetamine and discussed robbing

Guerrero to get even with him. (Id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 1, 180-81; id.

Rep.’s Tr. vol. 2, 394.) Ditmars was upset with Baltsas for

driving away and leaving her; she and Zingsheim came up with the

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idea to rob Guerrero. (Id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 2, 303, 414.) Valdez

was not home so they drove to Petitioner’s house. (Id. Rep.’s Tr.

vol. 1, 182.) 

Maxwell, who lived in Imperial Beach, was home and Murphy was

with him. (Id. at 182-83.) They all gathered in Petitioner’s

garage where Ditmars told Maxwell, Murphy, and Zingsheim what had

happened to her and that she wanted to go back and rob Guerrero to

get even with him. (Id. at 184-86.) Murphy and Maxwell each had a

gun at that time. (Id. at 184-85.) Ditmars denied leaving any of

her possessions at Guerrero’s house and said she wanted to go there

to take Guerrero’s property. (Id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 2, 400.) She

said that Maxwell suggested taking her to the hospital. (Id. at

401.) 

Ditmars smoked methamphetamine while in Petitioner’s garage,

and said that she, Maxwell, Murphy, and Zingsheim all got high on

methamphetamine. (Id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 1, 188; id. Rep.’s Tr. vol.

2, 333-34, 341.) Petitioner told Ditmars that he was going to go

to Guerrero’s house and “kick his ass.” (Id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 1,

185.) Ditmars testified that she was aware that Maxwell had beaten

Guerrero up on a previous occasion. (Id. at 188.)

Petitioner drove Ditmars to Guerrero’s house in his Toyota 4

Runner while Zingsheim and Murphy drove there in the Volvo. (Id.

at 187, 193.) On their way to Guerrero’s house, Ditmars and

Petitioner discussed the items she wanted to take. (Id. Rep.’s Tr.

vol. 2, 207.) When they arrived, Ditmars went straight to

Guerrero’s bedroom, where he was still sleeping, and took his cell

phone so he could not use it to call for help. (Id. Rep.’s Tr.

vol. 1, 193-94.) She then went downstairs and began unplugging

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stereo equipment to steal, as Maxwell and Murphy went into

Guerrero’s bedroom. (Id. at 194-96.)

Ditmars eventually went back upstairs and saw Guerrero, who

was bleeding, sitting on a couch being watched by Murphy, and she

began removing a flat-screen television from the wall. (Id. at

197-98; id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 2, 205.) Ditmars testified that she

did not see Maxwell or Murphy with guns while they were in

Guerrero’s house. (Id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 1, 192.) She admitted she

told the police that Murphy had a gun in his hand while he was

watching Guerrero, but at trial, she testified that she could not

remember whether Murphy had a gun at the time. (Id. Rep.’s Tr.

vol. 2, 227.) Ditmars said she went through the closets and

drawers in the three downstairs bedrooms, and carried clothes, wine

bottles, a framed picture, and a stereo out to the Volvo. (Id. at

207-08.) She saw all three men carry items out of the house. (Id.

at 209.) Ditmars left with Zingsheim in the Volvo at the same time

that Maxwell and Murphy left in Petitioner’s Toyota. (Id. at 209-

12, 214.) 

Ditmars said she remembered “flashing” Guerrero by showing him

her breasts the previous evening and recalled telling a police

officer that she thought their sex was consensual, but she also

told the officer she was unsure how to feel about not being able to

remember having sex. (Id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 2, 215-16.) She told

the police that she woke up in the middle of the night and did not

think anything was wrong; she felt safe with Guerrero but felt bad

that she had betrayed Baltsas. (Id. at 217-18.) Ditmars heard a 

gunshot during the robbery and heard a window shatter at the same

time. (Id. at 220-21.)

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A short video excerpt from an interview Ditmars gave to the

police the day she was arrested was played for the jury, regarding

matters she could not remember during her testimony. (Id. at 248,

250.) After watching the excerpt, Ditmars testified that Maxwell

had a gun underneath a jacket when he left his house to go to

Guerrero’s house and that Zingsheim and Baltsas put items in the

Lincoln Navigator before leaving Guerrero’s house. (Id. at 250-

51.) The entire interview, which lasted several hours, was played

for the jury. (Id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 3, 539-41; id. Rep.’s Tr. vol.

3, 542-46, Jan. 27, 2006.) A transcript of the interview is in the

record. (Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr. vol. 1, 0048-141

(transcript).) 

Ditmars provided a statement to a probation officer prior to

her sentencing in which she stated that she had been staying with

Guerrero for a week prior to the robbery and that the night before

the robbery she was drinking whiskey and Bloody Marys, and was

smoking methamphetamine with Guerrero. (Lodgment No. 4, Rep.’s Tr.

vol. 2, 308; Id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 3, 504.) She told the probation

officer that she awoke at 4:00 a.m. in bed with Guerrero, noticed

she was naked, assumed she had been raped, and called Baltsas to

pick her up. (Id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 2, 308; id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 3,

504-05.) She told the officer that Baltsas showed up with

Zingsheim, and they took Guerrero’s Lincoln Navigator. (Id. Rep.’s

Tr. vol. 2, 308; Id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 3, 505.) 

Ditmars testified that she did not remember telling the

probation officer that she had decided stealing the car was not

enough for her or that she had asked Zingsheim to drive her to

Maxwell’s house where they decided to steal Guerrero’s personal

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belongings and “kick his ass.” (Id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 2, 308; id.

Rep.’s Tr. vol. 3, 505-08.) She told the probation officer that

“when they arrived at [Guerrero]’s house, the guys cut the phone

lines and pointed their guns at [Guerrero].” (Id. Rep.’s Tr. vol.

2, 308; Id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 3, 507.) She also said that Zingsheim

loaded stolen items into the vehicles and that she heard gunfire

and was told to pick up a bullet casing before she left the house. 

(Id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 2, 308; id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 3, 507.)

Ditmars said she told the probation officer that she was sorry

for what happened; she should have called the police in the morning

and reported the rape; and if she had, she would not be in jail. 

(Id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 2, 308; id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 3, 507-08.) 

Bruce Langdon, Murphy’s neighbor, testified that he turned a

backpack over to the police which had been given to him by Murphy. 

(Id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 3, 574, 587.) The backpack contained two

handguns, a revolver, and a semiautomatic. (Id. at 595-96.) In an

attempt to refresh Langdon’s memory, the prosecutor questioned

Langdon about a conversation he had with the prosecutor and a

detective sometime during the week of the trial. (Id. at 582.) A

defense objection was sustained based on the prosecutor’s failure

to notify the defense of that conversation, and the prosecutor was

admonished for the discovery violation and ordered not to inquire

further about the conversation. (Id. at 582-84.)

Ryan Guerrero testified that he lived in Arizona but had a

family summer vacation home in Coronado, California, in the

Coronado Cays development. (Id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 5, 1005-07, Jan.

31, 2006.) Guerrero was doing remodeling work at the home in

January 2005; he visited it about once a month for that purpose,

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staying two to three weeks at a time depending on what type of work

he was doing at the home. (Id. at 1006-07.) He met Tuesdae

Ditmars, who he knew as Tuesdae Mars, through a friend about three

months before the robbery. (Id. at 1005, 1007.) He and Ditmars

were friends who discussed relationship problems she had with her

boyfriend Evan Baltsas, including Ditmars wanting to end the

relationship and calling Baltsas a controlling “psycho.” (Id. at

1007-08; id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 6, 1220-21.) 

Guerrero testified that in January 2005, he was acquainted

with Maxwell and his codefendants Murphy and Zingsheim, although he

did not know Maxwell or Zingsheim’s names at that time, and he

identified them all in court. (Id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 5, 1008-10.) 

Guerrero had met Murphy about a month earlier through Jesse Valdez,

who worked for the stucco and plastering business owned by the

Guerrero family and had done some work at the summer home. (Id. at

1010-11.) Guerrero admitted that he had lied when he initially

told the police that he did not know Maxwell and Murphy. (Id.

Rep.’s Tr. vol. 7, 1307.) 

Guerrero testified that he had met Maxwell only once prior to

the robbery, when Valdez had brought him to the house. (Id. Rep.’s

Tr. vol. 5, 1012.) On that occasion, Guerrero opened the door to

his garage, saw Maxwell, who stuck out his hand to shake Guerrero’s

hand and punched Guerrero in the face. (Id.; id. Rep.’s Tr. vol.

7, 1310.) Guerrero said he attacked Maxwell in response, got on

top of him and punched him twice, and told him to get the hell out. 

(Id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 7, 1311.) Guerrero testified that Maxwell

picked up a hammer, which Guerrero took away, and Maxwell told him

that the next time Maxwell saw him, “I’ll regret it, and I will pay

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for what had just happened.” (Id. at 1311-12.) Guerrero thought

that altercation resulted because Valdez and Maxwell were upset

that Ditmars was staying at Guerrero’s home. (Id. Rep.’s Tr. vol.

5, 1012.) Ditmars left with Valdez and Maxwell right after that

incident. (Id. at 1013.) Guerrero said he had met Zingsheim only

once or twice before January 29, 2005, though their mutual friend

John Gary. (Id.) 

On January 28, 2005, Guerrero finished a job at the summer

home with a crew of five guys from Arizona who worked for a week

fixing a roof leak and redoing two exterior walls. (Id.) Ditmars

had been staying at the home for several days that week, while the

workmen stayed at a motel in Imperial Beach about ten or fifteen

minutes away. (Id. at 1014, 1016-17.) Guerrero said he and

Ditmars had not had sex at that time, but had flirted a little. 

(Id. at 1016, 1019.)

Guerrero testified that he drank about three beers while

working alone on the roof on January 28, 2005, the day before the

robbery, while Ditmars, the only other person in the house, was

inside drinking Jack Daniels whiskey she had brought with her. 

(Id. at 1017-18, 1023.) When Guerrero finished work for the day,

he and Ditmars “kissed a little bit,” and she “flashed” Guerrero by

lifting her shirt to show him her breasts. (Id. at 1018-19.) 

Guerrero asked her to do it again and she obliged. (Id. at 1019.) 

They shared a mutual kiss, and Ditmars then performed oral sex on

Guerrero. (Id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 7, 1324.) Guerrero carried her up

the two steps to his bedroom from the bar area and they had

intercourse. (Id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 5, 1019; id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 6,

1140.) Guerrero said he did not mix any of Ditmars’s drinks,

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denied drugging Ditmars or forcing her to have sex, and said that

she appeared to be in control of herself and gave no indication she

did not want to have sex. (Id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 5, 1018-20.)

After they had sex, Guerrero went to an Imperial Beach pizza

shop where he ate a salad while he waited for a pizza to be

prepared, and returned home about forty-five minutes later. (Id.

at 1021.) He stopped at a liquor store on the way back and

purchased cigarettes for Ditmars. (Id. at 1022.) Ditmars was

still in Guerrero’s bed when he returned with the pizza, and he

unpacked and set up a new plasma screen television in the bedroom. 

(Id. at 1025-26.) Guerrero joined Ditmars in bed and they had sex

again, with Ditmars participating and responding, after which they

fell asleep with her head on his shoulder. (Id. at 1026-28.)

Guerrero testified that he awoke about daybreak and saw Murphy

and Maxwell in his bedroom. (Id. at 1029.) Petitioner was holding

an assault rifle, and Murphy was holding a handgun. (Id. at 1033-

34, 1037.) Maxwell showed Guerrero that the rifle was loaded by

removing the clip and displaying the bullets, and then cocking the

gun and chambering a round. (Id. at 1134-35.) The house is

equipped with an alarm system with three buttons marked “fire,”

“medical,” and “police.” (Id. at 1031.) Guerrero eventually

learned that the wires had been cut where they enter the house, and

the alarm system disabled. (Id. at 1031-32.) He testified that he

did not usually set the alarm when he was staying at the house, and

the alarm wires could have been cut anytime after he arrived on

January 25th. (Id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 7, 1319-20.)

Guerrero asked Maxwell and Murphy, “What the fuck are you

doing in my house?” (Id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 5, 1035.) Before he

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could say anything else, Murphy jumped on the bed and they were

both “in [his] face.” (Id.) Guerrero said he grabbed the barrel

of Maxwell’s rifle as Murphy tried to kick him. (Id. at 1036-37.) 

Petitioner hit Guerrero with the butt of the rifle, and Murphy hit

Guerrero in the head with the butt of the handgun. (Id. at 1036-

38.) Guerrero saw the bedroom window shatter and, as he was naked,

asked permission to put on clothes. (Id. at 1039-40.) He asked

them if this was about his previous altercation with Maxwell, but

they told him that it was about “doing more with a girl than she

wants to do.” (Id. at 1040-41.) They also told him he was lucky

they did not shoot him in his genitals. (Id. at 1041.)

Guerrero said he tried to talk sense into Murphy and Maxwell,

and told them they were a little old to be just taking a woman’s

word that she was raped. (Id. at 1042.) Petitioner said something

like, “She better not have been fucking lying to us.” (Id.) 

Maxwell left the bedroom as Ditmars entered wearing Guerrero’s cell

phone clipped to her skirt, and Murphy asked her to look for a

bullet casing. (Id. at 1043-44; id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 6, 1204.) 

Ditmars found the bullet casing, and Murphy put it in his pocket. 

(Id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 5, 1044.) Guerrero said to Ditmars, “This is

because of you, you fucking bitch.” (Id.) Ditmars replied by

saying something like, “All I know, I passed out, and when I woke

up, I felt really weird, and I was naked.” (Id.)

Guerrero testified that Murphy ordered him at gunpoint into

the living room/kitchen area and onto a couch. (Id. at 1044-46;

Id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 6, 1133.) Guerrero said that Zingsheim was

wearing long socks on his hands rolled up to his elbows and was

taking televisions and telephones off the walls. (Id. Rep.’s Tr.

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vol. 5, 1047-48.) Guerrero testified that Murphy held him at

gunpoint for about half an hour while Zingsheim and Ditmars carried

off his possessions. (Id. at 1050, 1052; id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 6,

1133-34.) Guerrero did not know where Petitioner was during the

time he was being held on the couch, but Guerrero heard rummaging

noises coming from downstairs during that time. (Id. Rep.’s Tr.

vol. 5, 1051; id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 6, 1133-34.) Murphy drank a few

beers and ate some pizza during that time, and Guerrero heard

Maxwell, Murphy, and Zingsheim discuss disabling the alarm system. 

(Id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 6, 1156-62.) All the telephones in the house

were taken during the robbery, and Guerrero’s father’s Lincoln

Navigator was missing from the garage. (Id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 5,

1053-54.)

 As they were all leaving, Murphy told Guerrero, “If you call

the cops, they may catch all of us, but they are not going to catch

one, and the one they don’t catch is going to kill your ass, so

don’t call the fucking cops, . . . .” (Id. at 1056-57.) Guerrero

followed all four robbers out of the house and watched them walk

down his driveway. (Id. at 1057.) He saw Zingsheim and Ditmars

drive away in a grey Volvo, which had been parked in the garage,

and saw Murphy and Maxwell drive away in a Toyota, which had been

parked on the street. (Id. at 1058-59.) 

Guerrero called the police from a neighbor’s house after

unsuccessfully attempting to activate the alarm in the garage. 

(Id. at 1059-60.) He gave a statement to a responding police

officer and was subsequently treated for a cut on his head at the

hospital; Guerrero had suffered some injuries to his arm and back. 

(Id. at 1061-62; Id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 6, 1138-39, 1171-75.) A

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police officer who responded to the scene observed a bullet hole in

Guerrero’s bedroom window. (Id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 4, 719, Jan. 30,

2006.)

Guerrero admitted at trial that he had smoked methamphetamine

with Ditmars while she was staying with him and admitted that he

had lied to a police detective when he denied doing so. (Id.

Rep.’s Tr. vol. 7, 1389-91.) He admitted he had testified

untruthfully under oath at the preliminary hearing when he said he

had not lied to the detective. (Id. at 1393-96.) Guerrero

admitted he had lied to the jury during the trial when he said that

he had not spoken with anyone from the police or district

attorney’s office prior to testifying. (Id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 6,

1209-12, 1270-71; id. Rep.’s Tr. vol 7, 1429-30.) 

A Coronado Police Officer testified that he received a radio

dispatch regarding a home invasion robbery at Guerrero’s residence

and observed a grey Volvo sedan matching the description of a

vehicle involved in the robbery. (Id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 4, 659-61.) 

The vehicle was stopped and the driver, Zingsheim, and passenger,

Ditmars, were taken into custody. (Id. at 663-65.) Items

belonging to Guerrero were in the car. (Id. at 747-54; Id. Rep.’s

Tr. vol. 6, 1187-94.) Guerrero’s father’s Lincoln Navigator was

found parked outside Baltsas’s motel two days later, and the

vehicle’s registration and other records were found inside

Baltsas’s room. (Id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 4, 697-98; Id. Rep.’s Tr.

vol. 5, 919-20.) 

A police officer testified that in an interview with the

police, Murphy said that on the morning of the Guerrero robbery, he

had just gotten back from hitting golf balls to find Ditmars crying

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and saying Guerrero had raped her in her sleep. (Id. Rep.’s Tr.

vol. 5, 904.) Murphy told the officer that he believed Guerrero

had tried something with Ditmars once before when Valdez was there. 

(Id.) The officer testified that Murphy said he went along with

the others in order to scare the hell out of Guerrero because his

mom and sister had been raped, and although he no longer thought

Ditmars was telling the truth, he believed it at the time because

“[s]he put on a pretty good act.” (Id. at 904.) Murphy told the

police that he did not know that the others intended to rob

Guerrero, and he took nothing himself but just hit Guerrero once

with the handgun that went off accidentally and shot a hole in the

window. (Id. at 907-08.) He told the officer he threw the gun in

the ocean because he was scared. (Id. at 909.)

Petitioner’s neighbor, Mike Vendetti, testified that he ran

into Maxwell on the morning of the robbery, and Maxwell told him

“there was a problem with a woman getting raped, and he was going

to defend her honor . . . .” (Id. at 994-95, 999.) “He was going

to kick his ass.” (Id. at 995.) The defense called Bradley

Russell, another neighbor of Maxwell’s, who testified that after

someone broke into his garage and stole tools, Maxwell purchased

some of the stolen tools and returned them after seeing Russell’s

name engraved on them. (Id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 8, 1473-75.) Russell

saw Maxwell about 6:20 a.m. on January 29, 2005, driving his Toyota

4 Runner, and he asked Petitioner if he was doing a landscaping job

and planning to borrow tools that day. (Id. at 1475-77.) Maxwell

told him yes but that he had to go out to Coronado Cays real quick

to retrieve some property that belonged to a friend. (Id. at 1477,

1483.) At 6:53 a.m. that same morning, Maxwell backed his Toyota

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into Russell’s driveway, and Russell put the tools in the back of

the vehicle, which was empty. (Id. at 1478.) Russell said there

was a passenger in Maxwell’s Toyota that he did not get a good look

at, but he told an investigator it was probably Murphy. (Id. at

1479, 1489.) Russell, who had three felony convictions on his

record, said Maxwell did not seem upset at that time. (Id. at

1479, 1482.)

Petitioner testified on his own behalf. He testified that in

January 2005 he lived with his mother in his parent’s house in

Imperial Beach and was good friends with his codefendant Mike

Murphy. (Id. at 1499-1500.) He met Jesse Valdez in 2003 and said

Valdez was a friend of a friend. (Id. at 1500.) Valdez worked for

Guerrero for a brief time in 2004; and Maxwell met Guerrero through

Valdez. (Id. at 1500-01.) Maxwell knew Tuesdae Ditmars as

Valdez’s girlfriend. (Id. at 1501.)

Maxwell denied ever owning an assault weapon or semiautomatic

rifle, although he had inherited some firearms his mother was

forced to sell in 1995 after he was convicted of a felony. (Id. at

1504-05.) No assault-type weapon was found in a search of

Maxwell’s house. (Id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 5, 943.) He told the jury

that his prior felony involved violence but had been reduced to a

misdemeanor in 1998. (Id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 8, 1604.) On direct

examination, Maxwell testified that he had, in the past, tried to

sell an assault weapon, a semiautomatic rifle. (Id. at 1505.) A

friend of his named Sierra was moving to Mexico and asked Maxwell

if he could help him sell the semiautomatic rifle. (Id. at 1505-

06.) Although Maxwell could not find a buyer, he said he had

described the firearm in detail over the telephone to Valdez and

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Guerrero when those two were working in Arizona. (Id. at 1505-09.) 

Maxwell stated that he never had the weapon in his possession. 

(Id. at 1506.) 

In mid-December of 2005, Petitioner and Valdez went to

Guerrero’s home in the Coronado Cays one morning at about 8:00 a.m.

to pick up Ditmars. (Id. at 1509-13.) Valdez had received a call

from her asking to be picked up because Guerrero would not give her

a ride back to Valdez’s home. (Id. at 1513.) Petitioner rang

Guerrero’s doorbell and yelled for Ditmars as Valdez stayed in the

car. (Id. at 1513-15.) Guerrero appeared at the utility door to

the garage and told Petitioner Ditmars was not there. (Id. at

1514.) Maxwell, walking with a crutch as a result of a dirt bick

accident, went halfway into the garage and saw Ditmars. (Id. at

1510, 1514-15.) Guerrero took a swing at Maxwell, who swung back

but fell to the ground when his knee gave out. (Id. at 1515.) 

Petitioner said Guerrero kicked the crutch out of his hand and then

kicked him in the back and ribs. (Id.) As Guerrero went back

inside the house, Ditmars came out and joined Valdez in the car and

Maxwell followed. (Id. at 1516.) Petitioner denied grabbing a

hammer or threatening Guerrero in any way on that occasion. (Id.) 

He saw Guerrero twice in passing after that incident but did not

threaten to get even with him. (Id. at 1518-19.)

Maxwell said he got up early and hit golf balls with Murphy on

January 29, 2005; they also intended to do some yard work at

Murphy’s house that day. (Id. at 1519.) Each had a couple of

beers while hitting the balls. (Id. at 1574-75.) He and Murphy

returned to Petitioner’s parents’ house to prepare for work. (Id.

at 1521.) Soon thereafter, Ditmars arrived in a Volvo, wearing a

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one-piece nightgown; she looked as though she had been crying and

said she had been raped by Guerrero. (Id. at 1523-25.) Petitioner

asked her why she went back to Guerrero’s house and what had

happened. (Id. at 1526.) She told him she woke up next to

Guerrero naked. (Id.) Maxwell asked her what she wanted to do,

and she told him, “I want to get my stuff back.” (Id.) Maxwell

talked Ditmars into going to the hospital, but she told him she had

left her purse and identification at Guerrero’s house. (Id. at

1527.) 

Ditmars used the bathroom and then told Petitioner that she

had really wanted to go to Valdez’s house but he was not home. 

(Id. at 1529.) Maxwell told her that Valdez was in custody at that

time for a probation violation. (Id.) Ditmars then asked

Petitioner to take her back to Guerrero’s house, and she told him

she was afraid that Guerrero would not let her leave again if she

went back. (Id. at 1530.) Maxwell told her that if he took her

back, she was going to have to wake Guerrero and tell him that she

was there to get her things, including her identification, and then

go to the hospital. (Id. at 1530, 1542.) Maxwell denied that he

and Ditmars discussed stealing anything from Guerrero or going

there to kick his ass. (Id. at 1530.) Rather, he said he wanted

to diffuse the situation. (Id.) Petitioner testified that

Guerrero had initiated the violence during their previous

encounter, and Ditmars was concerned that if she returned to

Guerrero’s house he might become aggressive and not allow her to

leave. (Id. at 1530-31.)

Maxwell drove Ditmars to Guerrero’s house in his Toyota while

Murphy, who Maxwell knew to be a friend of Guerrero’s, went there

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in the Volvo with Zingsheim, whom Maxwell had never met. (Id. at

1532, 1534.) They left for Guerrero’s residence at 5:30 a.m. and

were back in forty-five minutes. (Id. at 1535.) Petitioner denied

taking a weapon of any type and denied discussing whether to kick

Guerrero’s ass or rob him. (Id. at 1532-33.) He said his neighbor

Russell came up just as he was leaving, and the two of them had a

very brief conversation about borrowing some tools. (Id. at 1535-

37.) 

When they arrived at Guerrero’s house, Maxwell dropped Ditmars

off in the driveway and parked his Toyota about five or six houses

away. (Id. at 1538.) Maxwell, Murphy, and Ditmars entered the

house through the garage and went directly to Guerrero’s bedroom. 

(Id. at 1539-39.) Petitioner set his keys down on the bar along

the way. (Id. at 1540.) Ditmars woke up Guerrero by grabbing his

arm. (Id. at 1541-42.) Maxwell told Ditmars to tell Guerrero they

were there to get her belongings and then go to the hospital. (Id.

at 1542-43.) Guerrero got upset, called Ditmars a bitch and lunged

at her. (Id. at 1543.) Petitioner said he put himself between

Guerrero and Ditmars, preventing Guerrero from touching Ditmars,

and pushed Guerrero back. (Id. at 1543-44.) Maxwell told Ditmars

to gather her things and she left the room. (Id. at 1544.) 

Maxwell testified that he told Guerrero to chill out and that

he had better worry about what he was going to tell the police when

they arrived, or save his story for the police, because he intended

to report the rape at the hospital. (Id. at 1544, 1615.) Guerrero

tried to explain what happened, but Petitioner told him he did not

want to hear what he had to say and left the room. (Id. at 1545.) 

Maxwell denied having a firearm or any type of weapon and denied

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kicking or punching Guerrero. (Id. at 1545.) He said he did not

hear a gunshot and never saw Murphy with a gun. (Id. at 1547,

1571-72.)

Petitioner observed Ditmars leaving with items he believed did

not belong to her and noticed the house looked ransacked. (Id. at

1547-48, 1550.) He then told Ditmars, “Fuck this. I don’t know

what the hell’s going on here. I don’t want any fucking part of

this.” (Id. at 1548.) Petitioner went to his truck to leave but

realized he did not have his keys. (Id. at 1548-49.) When he went

back into the house and picked up his keys, he saw Murphy,

Guerrero, and Ditmars in the family room. (Id. at 1549.) Guerrero

was siting on a couch, and Murphy was standing next to a fireplace

drinking a beer and smoking a cigarette. (Id. at 1549, 1614.) 

Maxwell told Murphy, “This bitch has got us into a bunch of fucking

mess now.” (Id. at 1550.) Petitioner then said to Guerrero, “You

know exactly why I came here, what my part in this was.” (Id.) He

told Murphy, “I’m leaving now, if you want a ride.” (Id.) 

Maxwell and Murphy returned to Maxwell’s house in the Toyota. 

(Id.) Along the way they stopped at Russell’s house to pick up

tools. (Id. at 1551.) They then went to Murphy’s house and worked

on installing a sprinkler system. (Id. at 1554-55.) Petitioner

said he did not see Murphy take anything from Guerrero’s house and

that nothing from the house was put into his Toyota. (Id. at 1550-

51.) As Maxwell was leaving, he saw Zingsheim getting out of the

Volvo, but he did not see Zingsheim take anything from the house or

load anything into the Volvo. (Id. at 1577.) Petitioner denied

telling his neighbor, Mike Vendetti, that he was on his way to

///

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Coronado to kick someone’s ass, but he told Vendetti that he had to

take care of something for a friend in Coronado. (Id. at 1582.)

Maxwell said he was at a friend’s house about 11:00 p.m. that

evening when his house was raided by a SWAT team. (Id. at 1555,

1568-69.) He spoke to his mother the next day, who told him the

police were looking for assault rifles. (Id. at 1583.) Petitioner

said he knew he did not have any guns at his house, but because he

was on probation he called a lawyer, a family friend, and was told

the lawyer would not be in his office until Monday. (Id. at 1556,

1583-84.) Maxwell went to see the lawyer on Monday. (Id. at

1556.) He planned on turning himself in but was apprehended at

gunpoint by a fugitive task force in El Cajon. (Id. at 1557.)

Maxwell testified that, on the advice of counsel, he did not

speak to the El Cajon police officers who arrested him. (Id. at

1559-60.) After he was transferred to the custody of the Coronado

police, however, he told an officer, “This is what you get for

helping a girl get away from an estranged guy.” (Id. at 1560.) A

Coronado police officer had previously testified that when

Petitioner was arrested he made the following statement: “You don’t

know the half of it. That’s what happens when you help a

girlfriend help a boyfriend.” (Id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 4, 705.) 

A medical expert testified regarding the effects of

methamphetamine use and abuse. (Id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 9, 1695-1725,

Feb. 6, 2006.) The expert testified that persons using

methamphetamine could suffer paranoid delusions with memories based

on distorted information, and people taking methamphetamine

together could have shared delusions. (Id. at 1702-10.) The

expert also stated that it was possible for a person using

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methamphetamine in the morning after an alcoholic blackout the

night before to become delusional about what had happened the

previous night. (Id. at 1710-11.) 

On February 7 and 8, 2006, the jury heard closing arguments,

were instructed, and began their deliberations. (Id. Rep.’s Tr.

vol. 10, 1962-2040, Feb. 7, 2006; id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 11, 2048-

2197, Feb. 8, 2006; id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 12, 2208-85, 2293-2339,

Feb. 9, 2006.) 

After deliberating a little over two and one-half days, the

jury found Maxwell guilty on all charges and found true the

allegation that he had personally used a firearm. (Id. Rep.’s Tr.

vol. 12, 2339, 2346; id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 12, 2347-48, Feb. 10,

2006; id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 14, 2511-13, Feb. 14, 2006; id. Rep.’s

Tr. vol. 14, 2514-20, Feb. 15, 2006; Lodgment No. 1, Clerk’s Tr.

vol. 4, 0685-96 (verdicts).) Petitioner’s codefendants were also

convicted on all charges, with the exception of count eight

(disabling an alarm system), for which Maxwell alone was found

guilty. (Lodgment No. 4, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 14, 2521-32.) 

Petitioner waived his right to a jury trial regarding the

prior conviction allegation and admitted it was true. (Lodgment

No. 4, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 14, 2537-38, 2546.) The prior conviction

was dismissed in order to avoid a mandatory term under the three

strikes law, although it was used to enhance the sentence, and

Maxwell was sentenced to twenty-one years in state prison. (Id. at

2558-61.) His sentence was later reduced to nineteen years and

four months. (Lodgment No. 28, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 1, 9-13, Feb. 25,

2009.)

///

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IV. PETITIONER’S CLAIMS

Under the umbrella of three major claims, Maxwell raises

multiple interrelated subclaims in his Petition. In claim one, he

argues that four instances of prosecutorial misconduct violated his

right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United

States Constitution. (See Pet. 5-6, ECF No. 1; Mem. P. & A. Supp.

Pet. 14-30, ECF No. 1.) He contends the prosecutor improperly

questioned him about his silence at previous court proceedings,

asked unfounded questions to Ditmars regarding her fear of

retaliation from Petitioner, questioned Petitioner about a

photograph of a firearm which had been excluded in a pretrial

order, and presented his personal belief of guilt in his final

argument to the jury. (Id.) 

In claim two, Maxwell alleges that, to the extent the Court is

precluded from reaching the merits of claim one due to a procedural

bar imposed as a result of the failure to contemporaneously object

at trial to the instances of prosecutorial misconduct, he is

nevertheless entitled to habeas relief because he received

ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal in

violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments due to

counsels’ failure to preserve the claims. (Pet. at 6-7, ECF No. 1;

id. Mem. P. & A. Supp. Pet. 37-38.) Although not specifically

identified as a separate claim in the Petition, Maxwell argues that

the cumulative impact of all of these errors denied him a fair

trial. (See Pet. 7, ¶ 16, ECF No. 1; id. Mem. P. & A. Supp. Pet.

38-39.) 

///

///

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V. DISCUSSION

 A. Scope of Review

Title 28, United States Code, § 2254(a), as amended by the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”),

Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, sets forth the following scope

of review for federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit

judge, or a district court shall entertain an application

for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on

the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(a) (West 2006) (emphasis added).

As amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) reads:

 (d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of

a State court shall not be granted with respect to any 

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court

proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim –

(1) resulted in a decision that was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts

in light of the evidence presented in the State

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d)(1)-(2) (West 2006) (emphasis added).

A state court’s decision may be “contrary to” clearly

established Supreme Court precedent (1) “if the state court applies

a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the

Court’s] cases[]” or (2) “if the state court confronts a set of

facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of

[the] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from

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[the Court’s] precedent.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06

(2000). A state court decision may involve an “unreasonable

application” of clearly established federal law, “if the state

court identifies the correct governing legal rule from this Court’s

cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular

state prisoner’s case.” Id. at 407. An unreasonable application

may also be found “if the state court either unreasonably extends a

legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context

where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that

principle to a new context where it should apply.” Id.

“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply

because the court concludes in its independent judgment that the

relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal

law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must be

objectively unreasonable.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76

(2003) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Clearly

established federal law “refers to the holdings, as opposed 

to the dicta, of [the United States Supreme] Court’s decisions

. . . .” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. In order to satisfy

§ 2254(d)(2), a federal habeas petitioner must demonstrate that the

factual findings upon which the state court’s adjudication of his

claims rest are objectively unreasonable. Miller-El v. Cockrell,

537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).

The Supreme Court has indicated that “[a] state court’s

determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas

relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the

correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. Richter,

562 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v.

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Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004).) The Court in Harrington, in

interpreting section 2254(d)(1), explained:

As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal

court, a state prisoner must show that the state court’s

ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was

so lacking in justification that there was an error well

understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any

possibility for fairminded disagreement. 

Id. at 786-87. 

“If this standard is difficult to meet, that is because it was

meant to be.” Id. at 786. “It preserves authority to issue the

writ in cases where there is no possibility fairminded jurists

could disagree that the state court decision conflicts with this

Court’s precedents.” Id.

B. Analysis

1. Claim One: Prosecutorial Misconduct

In claim one, Maxwell alleges that his right to due process

under the Fourteenth Amendment was violated as a result of the four

instances of prosecutorial misconduct identified above. (See Pet.

5-6, ECF No. 1; id. Mem. P. & A. Supp. Pet. 14-30.) Respondent

replies that Petitioner’s prosecutorial misconduct claims are

procedurally defaulted because the state court found the claims had

been forfeited due to a failure to contemporaneously object and/or

to request the jury be admonished to disregard the alleged

misconduct. (Answer Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 20-21, ECF No. 7.) 

Alternately, Respondent argues the that adjudication of claim one

by the state appellate court was neither contrary to, nor involved

an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law and

was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. (Id.

at 21-44.)

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Maxwell raised his claims of prosecutorial misconduct in a

petition for review filed in the California Supreme Court on direct

appeal. (Lodgment No. 24, Petition for Review, People v.

Zingsheim, No. SD2006802244.) That court denied the petition

without a citation of authority or a statement of reasoning. 

(Lodgment No. 25, People v. Zingsheim, No. S165976, order.) 

Maxwell also presented the claims to the state appellate court on

direct appeal, and they were denied in an unpublished opinion after

that court consolidated his appeal with those of his codefendants. 

(See Lodgment No. 13, Appellant’s Opening Brief, People v. Maxwell,

No. D049189, slip op.; Lodgment No. 22, People v. Zingsheim, No.

D049189, slip op. at 27-48.) The appellate court found that

Maxwell had technically forfeited or waived the claims by failing

to properly object at trial or request curative instructions, but

went on to deny them on their merits. (See Lodgment No. 22, People

v. Zingsheim, No. D049189, slip op. at 35-36, 38-39, 44-45, 57-58.)

In Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804 (1991), the Supreme

Court adopted a presumption which gives no effect to unexplained

state court orders but “looks through” them to the last reasoned

state court decision. Accordingly, this Court will look through

the silent denial by the state supreme court to the appellate court

opinion, which is the last reasoned state court opinion which

addresses the claims raised in claim one here. Id.

a. Procedural Default

Respondent first contends claim one is procedurally defaulted

because the appellate court found that the prosecutorial misconduct

claims had been forfeited due to the failure to contemporaneously

object at trial or request curative instructions. (Answer Attach.

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#1 Mem. P. & A. 20-21, ECF No. 7.) Respondent contends the Ninth

Circuit has recognized that California’s contemporaneous objection

rule is independent of federal law and consistently applied, and

cites authority to that effect. (Id. at 21.)

Petitioner replies that Respondent has failed to carry the

burden of establishing that the rule applied in this case has been

consistently applied in California. (Traverse Attach. #1 Mem. P. &

A. 2-5, ECF No. 11.) He contends the Ninth Circuit has drawn a

distinction between application of California’s contemporaneous

objection rule where a party has failed to make any objection to

the admission of evidence and where, as here, an objection was

made, “albeit imperfectly in stating grounds.” (Id. at 5.) 

Petitioner agrees that the Ninth Circuit has found the

contemporaneous objection rule to have been consistently applied in

California in the first situation but contends the Ninth Circuit

has found that the rule has not been consistently applied in the

second situation. (Id.) 

When a state court rejects a federal claim based upon a

violation of a state procedural rule which is adequate to support

the judgment and independent of federal law, a habeas petitioner

has procedurally defaulted his claim. Coleman v. Thompson, 501

U.S. 722, 729-30 (1991). A state procedural rule is “independent”

if it is not interwoven with federal law. LaCrosse v. Kernan, 244

F.3d 702, 704 (9th Cir. 2001). A state procedural rule is

“adequate” if it is “clear, consistently applied, and

well-established” at the time of the default. Calderon v. United

States District Court, 96 F.3d 1126, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). The

Court may still reach the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim

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if the petitioner can demonstrate cause for the procedural default

and actual prejudice resulting from the default, or if the failure

of the Court to review the claim would result in a fundamental

miscarriage of justice. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750.

Respondent has the initial burden of pleading as an

affirmative defense that Maxwell’s failure to satisfy a state

procedural bar forecloses federal habeas review. Bennett v.

Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 586 (9th Cir. 2003). Respondent has carried

that burden by pleading that Petitioner’s prosecutorial misconduct

claims were found to be forfeited due to defense counsel’s failure

to interpose a specific and timely objection at trial or request

curative instructions. (Answer Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 20-21, ECF

No. 7.) The fact that the state appellate court applied the

procedural bar and reached the merits of the claims does not bar

Respondent from pressing a procedural default argument. Harris v.

Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264 n. 10 (1989).

The burden has therefore shifted to Petitioner to challenge

the independence or adequacy of the procedural bar. Bennett, 332

F.3d at 586. If Petitioner makes a sufficient showing, the

ultimate burden of proof falls on Respondent. Id. Maxwell

attempts to shift the burden back to Respondent by arguing that

California’s contemporaneous objection rule is not consistently

applied where a contemporaneous objection was made but on

“imperfectly stated grounds.” (Traverse Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 2-

5, ECF No. 11.)

The Court need not determine whether Petitioner has made a

sufficient showing so as to shift the burden back to Respondent or

whether Respondent has carried the ultimate burden of demonstrating

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that California consistently applies the procedural bar at issue

here. The interests of judicial economy favor reaching the merits

of Maxwell’s prosecutorial misconduct claims regardless of the

adequacy of the procedural bar applied by the state court. The

Ninth Circuit has indicated that “[p]rocedural bar issues are not

infrequently more complex than the merits issues presented by the

appeal, so it may well make sense in some instances to proceed to

the merits if the result will be the same.” Franklin v. Johnson,

290 F.3d 1223, 1232 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Lambrix v. Singletary,

520 U.S. 518, 525 (1997) (“We do not mean to suggest that the

procedural-bar issue must invariably be resolved first; only that

it ordinarily should be.”)). District courts have applied the same

rationale. See Levi v. Almager, No. CV 08-4261-PSG (CW), 2011 WL

2672351, at *3 n.1 (C.D. Cal. May 6, 2011) (deciding merits of

delayed access to law library claim rather than resolving the

procedural-bar question first.)

The California Court of Appeal, in addition to holding that

the prosecutorial misconduct claims were forfeited, concluded that

they failed on their merits. This Court finds, for the reasons

discussed below, that the appellate court’s merits determination is

objectively reasonable within the meaning of § 2254(d). Thus,

addressing the procedural default would not change the outcome of

this proceeding. The state court denied the ineffective assistance

of counsel claims and the cumulative error claim on the basis that

the prosecutorial misconduct claims failed on their merits. 

Furthermore, this Court’s analysis of the ineffective assistance of

counsel claims necessarily requires addressing the state court’s

determination of the merits of the prosecutorial misconduct claims. 

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A similar determination would be required when examining whether

cause exists to excuse a procedural default due to ineffective

assistance of counsel. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488

(1986). Likewise, the merits of the prosecutorial misconduct

claims would need to be examined to determine whether prejudice

exists in the context of a procedural default. Coleman, 501 U.S.

at 750.

The Court must examine the merits determination of the

prosecutorial misconduct claims by the appellate court in any case. 

Judicial economy counsels reaching the merits of Maxwell’s

prosecutorial misconduct claims without a determination of whether

the state procedural bar applied in this case was clearly

established and had been consistently applied by the California

courts. See Levi v. Almager, 2011 WL 2672351, at *3 n.1. 

b. Doyle Error

Maxwell first contends the prosecutor committed misconduct

when he cross-examined Petitioner about his decision to invoke his

right to remain silent upon arrest and his decision not to testify

at the preliminary hearing. (Pet. 6, ECF No. 1; id. Mem. P. & A.

Supp. Pet. 14-25, ECF No. 1) (citing Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610,

618-19 (1976) (holding that it is a violation of federal due

process for a prosecutor to use the post-arrest silence of a

defendant who has received Miranda warnings “to impeach an

explanation subsequently offered at trial[]”).) 

Respondent Cate answers that the state appellate court’s

determination that any Doyle error was not prejudicial is neither

contrary to, nor involves an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law, and was not based on an unreasonable

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determination of the facts. (Answer Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 29,

ECF No. 7.) Respondent also argues that in light of the

overwhelming evidence of Petitioner’s guilt, any Doyle error was

clearly harmless. (Id. at 29-32.)

Maxwell testified on direct examination that when his house

was raided by the police, he sought the advice of a lawyer named

Jack Phillips. (Lodgment No. 4, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 8, 1555-56.) He

said he planned on turning himself in, but was apprehended in El

Cajon before he could do so. (Id. at 1557.) He testified that, on

advice of counsel, he did not speak to the El Cajon police officers

upon his arrest. (Id. at 1559-60.) After he had been transferred

to the custody of the Coronado Police, however, he said he told an

officer, “This is what you get for helping a girl get away from an

estranged guy.” (Id. at 1560.)

The prosecutor’s cross-examination proceeded as follows:

Q. Now, sir, you told us, did you not, that your

attorney Jack Phillips told you not to talk to the

police; right? [¶] Didn’t you tell us - - that’s

what you testified on direct?

A. He told me I should invoke my Fifth Amendment

and tell them I retained counsel.

Q. And you followed his instructions; right?

A. Yes.

Q. Based on his instructions, you didn’t give a

statement to the police?

[Petitioner’s counsel]: Objection. Misstates the evidence.

The court: Sustained.

[Prosecutor]:

Q. Well, did you give a statement to the police

then?

A. I didn’t think it was a statement. It was more

of a comment.

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Q. Other than the comment that we are talking

about with Detective Hutchins, you didn’t

provide a statement; right?

A. No.

Q. Okay. You didn’t testify at the preliminary

hearing in your case, did you?

[Zingsheim’s counsel]: Your Honor, I object to this line

of inquiry. It’s a violation of his constitutional

rights.

The court: Sustained. 

[Prosecutor]:

Q Well, you were in court for your preliminary

hearing; right?

A. Correct.

Q. And you were - - you have been in court for all

your hearings; right?

A. Yes.

Q. And you’ve reviewed all the - - you’ve heard

the witnesses testifying at your various

hearings; right?

A. Yes.

Q. And you went through the discovery in your

case; right? [¶] In other words, you had a

chance to review the reports and things?

A. Yes.

Q. You went over that with your attorney prior to

testifying here; right?

A. Yes.

Q. And now you are telling your story to this

jury; right?

A. I am not telling a story. I am testifying to

the facts.

Q. I understand. [¶] But this has been your

opportunity to tell your story; right?

[Zingsheim’s counsel]: Objection. Argumentative.

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The court: Sustained.

[Prosecutor]:

Q. This is the first time you’ve told the facts;

right?

[Murphy’s counsel]: Speculation, Your Honor. Lack of

foundation.

The court: Sustained. 

[Prosecutor]:

Q. As far as it relates to court or law

enforcement; right? [¶] This is the first

time; right?

[Petitioner’s counsel]: Judge, I believe its going to

get into, again, what [Zingsheim’s Counsel]

previously made the same objection to. 

The court: Sustained.

[Prosecutor]:

Q. I’ll withdraw the question.

(Id. at 1604-07.)

At the beginning of the next court day, Petitioner’s counsel,

joined by Zingsheim’s counsel, requested a mistrial, arguing that

the prosecutor committed error under Griffin v. California, 380

U.S. 609, 613-15 (1965) (finding a Fifth Amendment violation, as

incorporated within the Fourteenth Amendment, arising from a

prosecutor asking a jury to infer guilt based on a defendant’s

decision not to testify) (Lodgment No. 4, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 9, 1690-

93.) The trial judge deferred ruling on the motion until a

transcript of Petitioner’s direct testimony had been prepared and

permitted a written motion to be filed. (Id. at 1693-94.)

Two days later, during a break in Maxwell’s counsel’s closing

argument, the prosecutor insisted upon a ruling on the mistrial

motion, arguing that the issue needed to be decided before a

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verdict was returned. (Id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 11, 2045-46.) Defense

counsel indicated that they had not had time to review the

transcript of Petitioner’s testimony, and the matter was put over

until after closing arguments. (Id. at 2048.) Maxwell’s counsel

provided the trial judge with a two-page synopsis of the Griffin

case and how it applied to the motion, which the trial judge

referred to as a two-page Griffin motion. (Id. at 2046-47; id.

Rep.’s Tr. vol. 12, 2243.)

Just prior to the jury receiving their instructions, the

parties discussed whether the jury should also be instructed

regarding Petitioner’s right to remain silent during court

proceedings. (Id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 12, 2243-46.) The jury was

instructed, prior to a ruling on the mistrial motion:

A defendant in a criminal proceeding can never be

compelled to testify. It is unusual and rare that a

defendant does testify at a preliminary hearing. Whether

a defendant does or does not testify at a preliminary 

hearing has no relevance to any issue in this case and

may not be considered by you.

(Id. at 2267.)

Immediately after the jury retired for deliberations, the

matter was taken up again. (Id. at 2340.) Petitioner’s counsel

added the following argument in support of the motion for a

mistrial:

I believe - - having reviewed the transcript, also, I

believe that the DA started questioning after Mr. Maxwell

stated that he had previously talked to his attorney.

His attorney advised him to invoke the Fifth, and

then he invoked his Fifth Amendment right, refused to

testify based on his constitutional rights at [the]

preliminary hearing.

And when the DA starting inquiring into that, that

is where I believe he stepped beyond the line and started 

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4

 Defense counsel’s reference to the leading questions referred to

another instance where the trial judge admonished the prosecutor after

sustaining an exacerbated defense counsel’s objection to the numerous

leading questions the prosecutor asked Guerrero. (Id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 6,

1197-1200.)

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questioning about his reasoning for not testifying at a

prelim, and I think that’s where he committed the error.

(Id. at 2341.)

The trial judge asked Petitioner’s counsel, “So at this point,

your position is that that was Giffin error, and you are also 

arguing that that deprived him of a fair trial?” (Id. at 2343.)

Petitioner’s counsel responded:

I believe it did taint the jury, because, Judge, any

time you lay the suggestion to a jury, “Why didn’t he

talk before?” Well, he must have been hiding something. 

So that’s probably his reason for not testifying

previously.” [¶] Every defendant has a right not to

testify in a trial. He also has a Fifth Amendment right

not to testify or not to speak to law enforcement. When

you start questioning about his invoking of his Fifth

Amendment right, the DA - -

And we are not talking about a new DA or one or two

years’ experience - - I believe, out of all of us, he

probably has the most number of years as far as

practicing, so he’s not new. He’s got at least 20 years

as a DA. [¶] So we are not talking about somebody

making a mistake because its his first or second trial. 

This is a clear error, just like the leading questions

that we have had.

And I am saying at that point he crossed the line. 

He ended up suggesting to a jury: “You had a chance to

tell your story in the past, you never did, so now you

are lying or coming up here and trying to tell a lie to

this jury now,” and yet questioning that area, he

violated [his] Fifth Amendment privilege and his right

not to testify.

(Id. at 2343-44.)4

The trial judge denied the motion for a mistrial, finding no

error. (Id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 12, 2344.) The judge also found that

any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under the totality

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of the circumstances, particularly in light of the special jury

instruction that the jury was presumed to follow and which cured

any taint. (Id.)

The appellate court analyzed Petitioner’s federal claim:

Here, because Maxwell chose to testify and not to

remain silent at trial, his claim of Griffin error is

technically inapplicable to his situation. (Portuondo, supra, 529 U.S. at p. 70; Jenkins, supra, 447 U.S. at p.

238.) Nonetheless, because the prosecutor’s line of

questioning Maxwell on cross-examination set forth above

attempted to use Maxwell’s exercise of his silence to not

testify at the preliminary hearing in a similar manner as

the use of the defendant’s postarrest silence in Doyle, supra, 426 U.S. at p. 618, i.e., to impeach him with the

failure to tell someone the story he was now telling the

jury, the prosecutor clearly committed Doyle error. 

[Footnote: The People in their respondent’s brief assert

that Doyle error was not possible based on Maxwell’s

trial testimony because he stated he never talked to the

police at the time of his arrest and they never told him

why he was arrested. . . . No evidence was presented

regarding whether or when Maxwell was advised of his

Miranda rights. We cannot presume as the People have

that none were given at any point of the process.] 

Maxwell’s counsel, however, only objected that the

prosecutor’s line of questioning generally violated

Maxwell’s constitutional rights and misstated the

evidence, both of which were sustained by the court. 

When counsel brought his mistrial motion the next court

day, he based it solely on Griffin error and did not

raise any objection or ask for a mistrial based on Doyle

error. Nor did counsel expand his subsequently filed

written motion to include Doyle error. Under these

circumstances, Maxwell has technically forfeited any

claim of Doyle error on appeal. In any event, we find

the error harmless in light of this record.

As noted above, the prosecutor’s objected-to line of

questioning of Maxwell on cross-examination was brief and

any impact of the question regarding his not testifying

at the preliminary hearing was ameliorated by the court

sustaining the objections interposed by defense counsel

and it giving the special instruction admonishing the

jury not to consider in its deliberations whether Maxwell

had testified at a preliminary hearing. 

Further, in addition to Maxwell himself initially

testifying about talking to an attorney and then invoking

his Fifth Amendment right not to talk with the police

because of that advisement, there was overwhelming

evidence of his guilt. Despite Maxwell’s claim that he

did not have knowledge that the others were going to

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steal items from Guerrero’s home and beat him up,

testimony from Ditmars and Guerrero, as well as Ditmars’

postarrest statement to the police show otherwise. The

evidence showed that Maxwell, armed with a gun, drove

Ditmars to Guerrero’s home, discussing on the way there

what they were going to do to Guerrero and what Ditmars

wanted from the home. Once there, Maxwell cut some

outside wires and inside telephone lines and then

confronted Guerrero in his bedroom with an assault rifle,

rushed him and tried to hit him with the end of the

rifle. Maxwell then went through drawers and cabinets

and carried items out of the house. He was present when

Murphy cautioned Guerrero not to call the police and his

conduct of hiding out and contacting an attorney after

leaving Guerrero’s house manifested his consciousness of

guilt. Under the totality of these circumstances, any

Doyle error related to the prosecutor’s questioning of

Maxwell about whether he had testified at his preliminary

hearing was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 

(Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. 18.)

(Lodgment No. 22, People v. Zingsheim, No. D049189, slip op. at 57-

59.)

Clearly established federal law is that “[t]he Fifth Amendment

prohibits a prosecutor from commenting on a defendant’s decision

not to testify.” Rhoades v. Henry, 598 F.3d 495, 510 (9th Cir.

2010)(citing Griffin, 380 U.S. at 615). In Anderson v. Nelson, 390

U.S. 523 (1968), the “Court announced that Griffin error is

reversible error only ‘in a case where such comment is extensive,

where an inference of guilt from silence is stressed to the jury as

a basis of conviction, and where there is evidence that could have

supported acquittal.’” Cook v. Schriro, 538 F.3d 1000, 1021 (9th

Cir. 2008) (quoting Anderson, 390 U.S. at 524). “Conversely, courts

will not reverse when the prosecutorial comment is a single,

isolated incident, does not stress an inference of guilt from

silence as a basis of conviction, and is followed by curative

instructions.” Lincoln v. Sunn, 807 F.2d 805, 809 (9th Cir. 1987).

///

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The appellate court correctly found there was no Griffin

error. Although the prosecutor continued his line of questioning

after a first, ambiguous objection was sustained, the questioning

was a single, isolated event in a three-week trial. See Lincoln,

807 F.2d at 809. In addition, there was no attempt to stress an

inference of guilt from Maxwell’s decision not to testify at the

preliminary hearing. Id. Rather, the prosecutor was clearly

attempting to suggest that Petitioner was tailoring his testimony

to the evidence presented by the other witnesses. Id.; see also

Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 64-65 (2000) (holding that

prosecutor’s comment in summation that the defendant had the

opportunity to hear the testimony of all the other witnesses and

tailor his testimony accordingly did not constitute Griffin error.) 

Finally, the curative instruction was specifically tailored to

Petitioner’s decision not to testify at the preliminary hearing. 

See Lincoln, 807 F.2d at 809. Accordingly, to the extent

Petitioner contends he is entitled to federal habeas relief based

on Griffin error, the appellate court’s determination that there

was no Griffin error was neither contrary to, nor involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, and

was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. 

Harrington, 562 U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 786-87; Miller-El, 537

U.S. at 340; Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13; Portuondo, 529 U.S. at

65-74; Anderson, 390 U.S. at 524; Lincoln, 807 F.2d at 809.

Clearly established federal law also provides that the use for

impeachment purposes of a defendant’s post-arrest silence, after

Miranda warnings, violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment. Doyle, 426 U.S. at 619. The state appellate court

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found Doyle error arising from the prosecutor’s attempt to impeach

Petitioner “with the failure to tell someone the story he was now

telling the jury, . . . .” (Lodgment No. 22, People v. Zingsheim,

No. D049189, slip op. at 58.) Respondent does not challenge the

finding of Doyle error. (Answer Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 21-32, ECF

No. 7.) Instead, he argues that the appellate court was correct in

finding no prejudice arising from the error and that any error was

harmless. (Id. at 21-32.) 

Griffin and Doyle errors are both subject to harmless error

analysis. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1983) (Griffin

error); Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 622 (1993) (Doyle

error). In Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112 (2007), the Court held that

a federal habeas court “must assess the prejudicial impact of

constitutional error in a state-court criminal trial under the

‘substantial and injurious effect’ standard set forth in Brecht,

whether or not the state appellate court recognized the error and

reviewed it for harmlessness under . . . Chapman.” Id. at 121-22

(citations omitted). For trial error, Brecht provides for habeas

relief where “the error resulted in ‘substantial and injurious

effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict[,]’ or . . .

the judge ‘is in grave doubt’ about the harmlessness of the error.” 

Medina v. Hornung, 386 F.3d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 2004) (alteration in

original) (citations omitted).

Maxwell contends the curative instruction focused only

generally on his failure to testify at the preliminary hearing and

did not address the prosecutor’s implication that Petitioner failed

to articulate his defense to the police or at any prior court

proceeding. (Traverse Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 6-7, ECF 11.) 

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Petitioner also disputes Respondent’s contention that there was

overwhelming evidence of his guilt. (Id. at 7.) Rather, he argues

that he was never found in possession of any stolen items, and he

provided a plausible, innocent reason for being at Guerrero’s

residence. (Id.) Maxwell contends the evidence against him was

primarily based on the testimony of Ditmars and Guerrero, both of

whom had credibility problems. (Id.)

A grave doubt does not exist as to whether the prosecutor’s

questions regarding Petitioner’s decision to remain silent during

police interrogation and at the preliminary hearing had a

substantial or injurious effect or influence on the jury’s verdict. 

As the appellate court pointed out, evidence was presented by

Ditmars and Guerrero, at trial and through Ditmars’s prior

statements, that Maxwell took items from the house, cut the alarm

wires, and was armed during the robbery. Petitioner’s stated

reason for going to Guerrero’s house, to make sure Ditmars could

retrieve her identification safely so as to be able to go to the

hospital, was contradicted by Ditmars, who said she did not leave

any personal belongings behind. Maxwell’s testimony that he was

not armed during the robbery was contradicted by Guerrero. 

Although Petitioner’s neighbor testified that Maxwell’s Toyota was

empty a few minutes after the robbery, that witness was

impeached with his three felony convictions and his friendly

relationship with Petitioner. 

Maxwell is certainly correct that Guerrero and Ditmars had

credibility problems. They both admitted to smoking

methamphetamine around the time of the robbery and having lied to

the police. (Lodgment No. 4, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 1, 155; id. Rep.’s

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Tr. vol. 2, 364; id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 7, 1307, 1390-91.) Guerrero

admitted he lied to the jury, and admitted he testified

untruthfully at the preliminary hearing. (Id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 6,

1209-12, 1270-71; id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 7, 1393-96.) Ditmars

repeatedly was unable to remember the events until confronted with

her statements to the police. She testified that she was not sure

whether she had lied during her testimony. (Id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 3,

462-63.) And of course, Ditmars and Guerrero gave different

accounts of whether their sex was consensual.

Nevertheless, Petitioner evinced a consciousness of guilt by

hiding out when the police were looking for him after his home had

been searched and his car impounded. The explanation he offered

during his direct testimony was that he delayed turning himself in

because he first wanted to consult a lawyer since he was on

probation. Thus, his testimony regarding the advice he received

from counsel served his defense by explaining why an innocent

bystander caught in a robbery perpetrated by Ditmars and Zingsheim

did not immediately go to the police. It was Petitioner who first

placed this information before the jury. The prosecutor’s

questioning did not touch on an area Maxwell had not already

brought to the jury’s attention. In addition, Maxwell and a police

officer both testified that Petitioner did not follow his

attorney’s advice to remain silent upon his arrest; Petitioner

spoke to the police shortly after being taken into custody. 

The prosecutor should not have attempted to use Petitioner’s

decision to follow his lawyer’s advice to remain silent against him

at trial, Doyle, 426 U.S. at 619, but was permitted to point out 

///

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this inconsistency in Petitioner’s testimony, Portuondo, 529 U.S.

at 73. 

A witness’s ability to hear prior testimony and to tailor

his account accordingly, and the threat that ability

presents to the integrity of the trial, are no different

when it is the defendant doing the listening. Allowing

comment upon the fact that a defendant’s presence in the

courtroom provides him a unique opportunity to tailor his

testimony is appropriate – and indeed, given the

inability to sequester the defendant, sometimes essential

– to the central function of the trial, which is to

discover the truth.

Portuondo, 529 U.S. at 73. In any case, the prosecutor’s line of

questioning in this area was brief, and the objections to it were

sustained, reducing the possibility the jury drew an impermissible

Doyle inference. 

Furthermore, Maxwell’s statement to the police that he was

just trying to help a girl get away from an estranged boyfriend

diminished any potential the jury would draw an improper inference

that his silence was a result of guilt, and increased the

likelihood the jury drew a proper inference that Petitioner was

waiting for all the evidence to come in before tailoring his story

to the evidence presented at trial. 

Petitioner is asking the Court to make an independent

determination of the state court’s finding that the error was

harmless. (Pet. Mem. P. & A. 24-25, ECF No. 1.) The jury was

instructed that it was unusual for a defendant to testify at a

preliminary hearing, and the decision whether to do so was

irrelevant to any issue in the case and could not be considered. 

Fair-minded jurists can disagree that any taint arising from the

prosecutor’s questions was slight and was diminished further by the

instruction. See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 324 n.9 (1985)

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(“The Court presumes that jurors, conscious of the gravity of their

task, attend closely the particular language of the trial court’s

instructions in a criminal case and strive to understand, make

sense of, and follow the instructions given them.”) In this case,

however, the Court concurs with the state court that any Doyle

error was harmless.

The adjudication of this aspect of claim one by the state

appellate court was neither contrary to, nor involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law and

was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the state court proceedings. 

Fry, 551 U.S. at 121-22; Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340; Williams, 529

U.S. at 412-13; Portuondo, 529 U.S. at 65-74. 

c. Questioning of Ditmars

Petitioner next contends the prosecutor committed misconduct

when he asked Ditmars unfounded questions regarding her fear of

retaliation from Maxwell, and asked her if she was looking at

Petitioner during her testimony. (Pet. 6, ECF No. 1; id. Mem. P. &

A. 25-28.) Cate responds that the appellate court’s denial of this

aspect of claim one was objectively reasonable, as the record

reflects that the prosecutor did not suggest any improper

inferences and was merely seeking to elicit relevant and admissible

evidence. (Answer Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 36-37, ECF No. 7.) 

Respondent also contends any error was clearly harmless. (Id. at

37.) 

The prosecutor questioned Ditmars on redirect:

Q. This, did you ever look over at Mr. Maxwell

while your were testifying?

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[Petitioner’s counsel]: Objection. Relevance.

The court: Overruled.

A. Yes.

[Prosecutor]:

Q. And why were you looking at Mr. Maxwell?

[Petitioner’s counsel]: Again, relevance.

The court: Overruled.

A. Because I can.

[Prosecutor]:

Q. Did you attempt to mouth a word to him?

A. No, I didn’t.

Q. Now, you don’t want to be a snitch; right?

A. Of course I don’t.

Q. You don’t want to have a snitch jacket; right?

A. Of course I don’t.

Q. It’s important for you to know that these three

defendants don’t think you are here testifying

on your own accord; right?

[Petitioner’s counsel]: Objection. Calls for 

 speculation. [¶] Argumentative.

The court: Sustained.

[Prosecutor]:

Q. Ma’am, are you afraid that if these three guys

determine that your [sic] testifying

voluntarily, that you can be in a lot of

trouble?

[Petitioner’s counsel]: Objection. Relevance.

The court: Overruled.

[Zingsheim’s counsel]: Objection. Vague as to what he 

means by “a lot of trouble.” It assumes there is 

somehow a threat to her, which is not in evidence.

The court: Sustained.

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[Prosecutor]:

Q. You believe if these guys think that you are

testifying voluntarily, you would be in some

danger?

[Petitioner’s counsel]: Objection. Calls for speculation 

on “these three guys.”

[Prosecutor]: Her belief as it affects her testimony.

[Murphy’s counsel]: Compound, Your Honor.

The court: Sustained as compound.

[Prosecutor]:

Q Are you afraid that if these three guys find

out or believe that you are testifying

voluntarily, that you are in some danger?

[Zingsheim’s counsel]: Your Honor, it the same objection 

I made before. Improper question. It’s irrelevant,

immaterial, and frankly is designed to convey some 

intent to the jury.

[Petitioner’s counsel]: It’s also argumentative.

[Murphy’s counsel]: And it’s compound.

[Prosecutor]: It’s her belief.

The court: You have to take it as to each individual.

Q. Are you afraid, if Zingsheim thinks you are up

here voluntarily, that you would be in some

danger at some future date?

A. I am not up here voluntarily. I had no choice.

Q. Are you afraid if he thought you were up her

voluntarily?

A. I don’t know what he thinks.

Q. You wouldn’t want him to think you were up

there voluntarily; right?

[Petitioner’s counsel]: Objection. Argumentative.

The court: Overruled.

[Murphy’s counsel]: Irrelevant, Your Honor.

The court: Overruled. [¶] Ask the question again, please.

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[Prosecutor]:

Q. You wouldn’t want Zingsheim to think you were

up there voluntarily, would you?

A. No.

Q. You wouldn’t want Maxwell to think that, would

you?

A. No.

Q. And you wouldn’t want Murphy to think that,

would you?

A. Of course not.

Q. Why not?

A. I don’t know. Why would I?

Q. That’s what I’m asking. Why not?

A. I don’t understand. If I am already in prison

doing my thing, why I should have to come down

here and do this voluntarily?

Q. Are you afraid there could be some retaliation

if word got out if you were here voluntarily?

[Zingsheim’s counsel]: Objection. This is irrelevant 

and highly prejudicial, and if it continues, I am 

going to move for a mistrial.

[Prosecutor]: It affects her willingness to testify 

 truthfully, which I think is pretty clear with all

 the “I don’t knows,” “I don’t remember,” and “I lied 

 then, I am not lying now.”

[Murphy’s counsel]: None of these questions, Your Honor, 

bear on her truthfulness. None of them do.

(Lodgment No. 4, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 3, 453-56.)

A sidebar was then held where the prosecutor indicated he was

simply attempting to explore Ditmars’s motive for not testifying

truthfully. (Id. at 457-58.) Petitioner’s counsel argued that the

line of questioning was irrelevant, went beyond exploring Ditmars’s

credibility, and implied that the defendants were threatening her. 

(Id. at 459-60.) The prosecutor explained that the jury should be

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provided with an alternative explanation as to why Ditmars had so

much trouble remembering the events aside from her drug use, i.e.,

she was afraid of testifying against the defendants. (Id. at 460-

61.)

The trial judge ruled that the prosecutor could ask Ditmars if

she was afraid of getting a “snitch jacket,” provided he laid the

foundation by asking if she had lied during her testimony. (Id. at

460-62.) Ditmars then testified that she did not know if she had

lied to the jury, but acknowledged she was concerned about getting

a “snitch jacket.” (Id. at 462-63.) After covering other topics,

the prosecutor returned to whether Ditmars was looking at Maxwell

during her testimony:

Q. Did you tell Maxwell you were going to steal

stuff?

A. I don’t remember.

Q. You remembered yesterday, right, or was that

just the transcript?

[Zingsheim’s counsel]: Objection. Argumentative.

[Petitioner’s counsel]: Objection. Argumentative.

The court: Overruled.

[Prosecutor]:

Q. I am asking which one it was. You keep looking

over there. [¶] What do you keep - -

A. I can look wherever I want.

Q. You are looking at Maxwell. [¶] Is there a

reason?

A. I can’t even see him from sitting right here.

[Murphy’s counsel]: Your Honor, I think the record 

should reflect that often she is looking at me.

The court: I have no way of knowing who she is 

looking at.

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[Petitioner’s counsel]: If the record may reflect, 

the court reporter is sitting directly in the 

line of sight, plus from that angle I think the 

court’s bench is also covering her line of sight

over to Mr. Zingsheim and Mr. Maxwell.

[Zingsheim’s counsel]: And, Your Honor, my objection - -

that’s not a question. And the jury is charged 

with the duty of watching the demeanor of a witness.

[¶] It’s not for the prosecutor to comment on. 

It’s for the jury to make interpretations based on 

what they are seeing.

The court: Mr. Przytulski [the prosecutor], move on.

(Id. at 481-82.)

The state appellate court denied this claim:

Maxwell’s counsel did not make a specific objection on

the ground of prosecutorial misconduct to either of the

questions asking Ditmars about looking at Maxwell, nor

did he or the other defendants ask for any admonishment

to the jury about the prosecutor’s above line of

questioning of Ditmars generally about her demeanor and

credibility. Although the defendants are correct that

the demeanor and credibility of a witness are solely the

province of the jury to determine, as we have noted

above, evidence of a witness’s fear of testifying, fear

of retaliation for testifying, as well as evidence about

the witness’s demeanor in testifying are relevant and

admissible as to the credibility of a witness and do not

constitute misconduct even if intentionally elicited by

the prosecutor. (Evid. Code, §§ 210, 351, 780, subd.

(a); Sanchez, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1449-1450.) 

The defendants’ claim of prosecutorial error based on the

prosecutor’s inquiries as to whether Ditmars was glancing

at Maxwell during trial are therefore technically waived

and without merit.

(Lodgment No. 22, People v. Zingsheim, No. D049189, slip op. at 38-

39.) 

Clearly established federal law provides that “[t]o constitute

a due process violation, the prosecutorial misconduct must be ‘“of

sufficient significance to result in the denial of the defendant’s

right to a fair trial.”’” Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765

(1987) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985). 

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The misconduct is reviewed in the context of the entire trial. 

Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974). “A

constitutional violation arising from prosecutorial misconduct does

not warrant habeas relief if the error is harmless.” Towery v.

Schriro, 641 F.3d 300, 307(9th Cir. 2010) (citing Sandoval v.

Calderon, 241 F.3d 765, 778 (9th Cir. 2000).

Petitioner contends the appellate court erred in rejecting

this claim with a generalization that questions about a witness’s

fear of testifying are relevant and admissible. (Pet. Mem. P. & A.

26, ECF No. 1.) Maxwell argues that there still must be a goodfaith basis for the questions, and here there was none. (Id. at

26-27.) He argues that Ditmars’s fear of obtaining a “snitch

jacket” in prison for testifying was not the same message the

prosecutor attempted to give the jury, that she was specifically

afraid of the defendants. (Id. at 28.)

Respondent contends the prosecutor did not imply something he

knew to be false or had strong reason to doubt. (Answer Attach. #1

Mem. P. & A. 36, ECF No. 7.) Rather, Ditmars admitted she looked

at Petitioner during her testimony and did not want any of the

defendants to think she was testifying voluntarily. (Id.) 

Respondent argues that her fear of testifying against Maxwell was

therefore relevant to her credibility. (Id. at 36-37.)

Maxwell replies that Ditmars’s fear of having a snitch jacket

in a women’s prison, or being labeled a cooperating witness, is not

evidence she was specifically afraid of the defendants. (Traverse

Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 9, ECF No. 11.) Petitioner argues that

evidence that Ditmars feared retaliation from the defendants, so

the prosecutor’s repeated questions about that subject over a twoCase 3:10-cv-01697-MMA-RBB Document 12 Filed 09/08/11 Page 58 of 80
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day period amounted to gross misconduct which, solely or in

connection with the Doyle error, infected the trial with

unfairness. (Id. at 8-10.)

Considering the prosecutor’s conduct in the context of the

entire trial, as this Court must, it is clear that the questions

regarding whether Ditmars was looking at Maxwell during her

testimony were not so significant as to affect the fairness of the

trial. Ditmars admitted she looked at Maxwell while she was

testifying, and answered defiantly about doing so. Moreover,

defense counsel interposed a speaking objection that it was for the

jury alone to determine the demeanor of a witness and make

interpretations of what the witness is looking at; the objection

was immediately followed by a curt direction from the trial judge

for the prosecutor to “move on.” (Lodgment No. 4,

Rep.’s Tr. vol. 3, 482.) The jury was later given instructions

consistent with defense counsel’s remark:

You alone must judge the credibility or

believeability of the witnesses. . . . [¶] In evaluating

a witness’s testimony, you may consider anything that

reasonably tends to prove or disprove the truth or

accuracy of that testimony. Among the factors you may

consider are: [¶] . . . What was the witness’s behavior 

while testifying. [¶] . . . What was the witness’s

attitude about the case or about testifying?

(Id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 12, 2256-57.)

Thus, Ditmars admitted looking at Maxwell, answered defiantly

about doing so, and stated that she did not want to be a “snitch.” 

This testimony was a sufficient foundation for the prosecutor’s

questions. Furthermore, the jury was instructed that they were the

judges of credibility and that witnesses’ demeanor and behavior

were appropriate considerations. The prosecutor brought a relevant

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factor to the jury’s attention; his questioning of Ditmars

regarding whether she was glancing at Maxwell during her testimony

did not amount to misconduct. Even if characterized as

prosecutorial misconduct, the state court reasonably concluded that

it was not “of sufficient significance to result in the denial of

the defendant’s right to a fair trial." Greer, 483 U.S. at 765.

Petitioner also contends the prosecutor committed misconduct

when he asked Ditmars whether she feared retaliation from Maxwell. 

(Pet. Mem. P. & A. 25-28, ECF No. 1.) As set forth above, Ditmars

never answered directly whether she was afraid that the defendants

might think she was testifying voluntarily. Rather, she testified

that she did not want the defendants to think she was testifying

against them voluntarily, and she did not want to be a snitch or

get a snitch jacket. The trial was not rendered unfair by the

prosecutor’s attempt to have the jury draw an inference from that

testimony that Ditmars was afraid of testifying against Maxwell. 

The prosecutor’s questions to the witness about whether she was

afraid of testifying against Petitioner, in context, even if

improper, were not of such significance as to deny him a fair

trial. 

This conclusion is particularly evident in light of the strong

evidence of Petitioner’s guilt other than Ditmars’s testimony,

including Guerrero’s testimony, which was cumulative to Ditmars’s

testimony in nearly every important aspect. This alleged instance

of misconduct did not, either by itself or in connection with any

Doyle error, render the trial unfair. Habeas relief is not

available with respect to this aspect of claim one because it is

not possible that “fairminded jurists could disagree that” the

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state court’s decision conflicts with United States Supreme Court

precedent. Harrington, 562 U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 786. 

Furthermore, for the same reasons, any error was clearly harmless. 

Fry, 551 U.S. at 121-22; Medina, 386 F.3d at 877.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the appellate court’s

determination that Petitioner was not deprived of a fair trial by

the prosecutor’s questioning of Ditmars regarding whether she was

looking at him or was afraid of retaliation from him was neither

contrary to, nor involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law and was not based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts. Harrington, 562 U.S. at ___, 131 S.

Ct. at 786; Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340; Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-

13; Greer, 483 U.S. at 765. The Court also finds that any error

was clearly harmless. Fry, 551 U.S. at 121-22; Medina, 386 F.3d at

877.

d. Photograph of Rifle

Petitioner next contends the prosecutor committed misconduct

when he questioned Maxwell about a photograph of a rifle which had

been excluded from evidence in a pretrial ruling. (Pet. 6, ECF No.

1; id. Mem. P. & A. 28-29.) Respondent argues that the question

did not infect the trial because the photograph was never admitted

into evidence, an objection to the prosecutor’s question was

sustained, the question was never answered, and the court

instructed the jury that questions are not evidence. (Answer

Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 41, ECF No. 7.) Respondent also argues

that even if a due process violation occurred, it was harmless due

to the overwhelming evidence of Petitioner’s guilt. (Id.)

///

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Ditmars testified that Maxwell had “a long gun,” as

distinguished from a handgun, with him in his garage, and he had it

underneath a jacket when they left to go to Guerrero’s house. 

(Lodgment No. 4, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 1, 113; id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 2,

250-51.) Guerrero testified that Petitioner was armed with a rifle

during the robbery. (Id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 5, 1033-34.) On direct

examination, Maxwell denied ever owning an assault weapon or

semiautomatic rifle. (Id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 8, 1505.) He testified

that a friend of his named Sierra asked him to help sell a rifle

once; he denied ever having possession of that gun and said he only

saw it when it was in the trunk of Sierra’s car. (Id. at 1505-09.)

Maxwell did not find a buyer but described it in detail to Valdez

and Guerrero. (Id. at 1507-08.) 

A photograph of an assault rifle was provided to the police by

Maxwell’s mother and was the subject of a motion in limine. (Id.

Rep.’s Tr. vol. 1, 5-6.) The photograph was excluded for lack of

foundation and because Guerrero had described the rifle used in the

robbery as having a clip, and apparently the rifle in the

photograph, although similar to the one described by Maxwell, had

no clip. (Id.) 

When the prosecutor asked Maxwell on cross-examination whether

he had ever taken a photograph of the rifle Sierra had asked him to

sell, Petitioner’s counsel’s objection was sustained, and a sidebar

was held without the question having been answered. (Id. Rep.’s

Tr. vol. 8, 1585.) At the sidebar, the prosecutor indicated he was

attempting to lay a foundation to determine whether the door had 

///

///

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been opened to reconsider the in limine ruling. (Id. at 1585-86.) 

Petitioner’s counsel responded:

Judge, may I make a comment on here? I believe

we’ve covered this in motions in limine. There is no

mention of photos. I did not discuss any photographs. 

If you recall his answer on there, he actually saw

the gun that he described to Mr. Guerrero, which was in

the trunk of Mr. Sierra. There is no reference at all to

a photograph. 

What good do we have of a judge making an order,

giving a ruling on motions in limine, giving a ruling on

multiple sidebars, if this DA doesn’t want to comply with

these rulings?

Judge, I am getting a dang irritated with this

because it seems to me, no matter what you do, doesn’t

matter, because he can do what he wants, and then he’ll

get this idea out to the jury anyways, because then the

judge will just say not to do it anymore. 

You are nothing but giving this information to a

juror that maybe there is photographs out there, that he

has these weapons, and none of that stuff was covered on

direct.

(Id. at 1586.)

When told by the trial judge that Petitioner’s counsel had

made a good point, the prosecutor asked if he could show Maxwell

the photograph and ask if it depicted the gun his friend had asked

him to sell, which he believed would not be a violation of the in

limine order. (Id. at 1587-88.) The trial judge responded to the

prosecutor’s inquiry:

Well, the court is concerned, number 1, that you

just blurted this out without seeking an advance ruling

by this court, understanding there was the in limine

ruling and, even before, going in that direction. It was

very clear from your question that you were going into

that direction. [¶] And so I don’t want things being

put in front of the jury that there were in limine orders

to exclude. And, clearly, you were already going in that 

///

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direction. And based on the proffer of the objection, it

is sustained. The in limine ruling will stand.

(Id. at 1589.)

The prosecutor persisted, indicating that he wanted to show

Maxwell the photograph and ask if it was his friend’s gun. (Id. at

1589-91.) The trial judge told the prosecutor, “There will be no

further mention of a photo.” (Id. at 1591.) Undaunted, the

prosecutor continued to argue that Maxwell had opened the door by

testifying that he had no rifles in his house at the time of the

crimes. (Id. at 1591-93.) Although the photograph was undated,

the prosecutor asked for the opportunity to establish that the

background of the photograph depicted the garage of Petitioner’s

mother’s house. (Id. at 1594-96.) The trial judge denied the

prosecutor’s request on the basis that such a line of questioning

would be more time-consuming and prejudicial than probative. (Id.

at 1597.)

This claim was raised on direct appeal and denied by the

appellate court, stating:

Although none of the defendants specifically used

the words of prosecutorial misconduct when making their

objections to the prosecutor’s question about whether

Maxwell had taken a photo of the gun he was going to try

to sell for his friend, it is clear from the record that

they were complaining about the prosecutor’s conduct in

allegedly trying to elicit evidence in violation of an in

limine ruling. However, no defense counsel asked that

the prosecutor’s question to Maxwell be stricken or

requested any admonition, which could have cured any

perceived error in the posing of the question. Because

the defendants again cannot show on this record that a

request for an admonition would have been futile or would

not have cured any possible error, this claim of

prosecutorial misconduct is also technically waived. 

(Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1202.) In addition,

because the photograph was never admitted and the

defendants essentially obtained the relief they sought by

their objections to the prosecutor’s photo question which

was never answered, and the jury was instructed that

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questions to witnesses are not evidence, it is difficult

to perceive any harm from the prosecutor’s conduct in

this regard.

(Lodgment No. 22, People v. Zingsheim, No. D049189, slip op. at 35-

36.)

The appellate court correctly observed that it is difficult to

perceive any harm from asking Petitioner if he had ever taken a

photograph of the rifle that he described to Valdez and Guerrero

and attempted to sell but never possessed. The question was never

answered, and the jury was never informed of the existence of any

photographs. The prosecutor showed a surprising amount of

impudence when, after the trial judge admonished him for raising

the issue without first addressing the in limine ruling and told

him unequivocally that there would be no further mention of a

photograph, he persisted in arguing that he might be able to

establish that the photograph was relevant and admissible. 

Nevertheless, the jury was not exposed to that exchange. Although

Maxwell certainly has a legitimate concern that the prosecutor was

out of line in asking the question without first seeking

clarification of the in limine ruling, the jury was instructed that

counsel’s questions are not evidence. 

You must decide what the facts are in this case. 

You must use only the evidence that was presented in this

courtroom. Evidence is the sworn testimony of witnesses,

the exhibits admitted into evidence, and anything else I

told you to consider as evidence. [¶] Nothing that the

attorneys say is evidence. In their opening statements

and closing arguments, the attorneys discuss the case,

but their remarks are not evidence. Their questions are

not evidence. Only the witnesses’ answers are evidence. 

The attorneys’ questions are significant only if they

help you to understand the witnesses’ answers. Do not

assume that something is true just because one of the

attorneys asked a question that suggested it was true. 

(Lodgment No. 4, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 12, 2252.)

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Petitioner admits the prosecutor’s question was not so

prejudicial as to warrant habeas relief on its own. (Traverse

Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 11-12, ECF No. 11.) Instead, he argues

that this incident of misconduct augments the cumulative prejudice

analysis. (Id.) Nevertheless, even if the question violated the

in limine order and amounted to misconduct, it could not have

affected the jury because the question was not answered, the jury

was not aware any photographs existed, and they were instructed

that unanswered questions were insignificant. In addition, any

possible taint could not measurably contribute to cumulative

prejudice from the other alleged acts of misconduct. There is no

possibility “fairminded jurists could disagree that” the state

court decision conflicts with clearly established federal law

regarding prosecutorial misconduct claims. Harrington, 562 U.S. at

___, 131 S. Ct. at 786. 

The appellate court’s determination that the prosecutor’s

question about a photograph of a rifle did not deprive Petitioner

of a fair trial was neither contrary to, nor involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law and

was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. 

Harrington, 562 U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 786; Miller-El, 537 U.S.

at 340; Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13; Greer, 483 U.S. at 765. The

Court also finds that any error was clearly harmless. Fry, 551

U.S. at 121-22; Medina, 386 F.3d at 877.

e. Closing Argument

The final claim of prosecutorial misconduct involves a

statement the prosecutor made during closing argument that

Petitioner alleges impermissibly presented the prosecutor’s

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personal belief in Maxwell’s guilt. (Pet. 6, ECF No. 1; id. Mem.

P. & A. 29-30.) The prosecutor stated, during his final closing

argument:

Let me explain to you how the lesser included offenses

work. Let me start out with robbery. Okay? That’s

another thing. You know, I think it was [Murphy’s

counsel] got up and said: Was there even a robbery in

this case? [¶] I didn’t do my job right if you don’t

believe, as you sit there, there was robbery in this

case, okay?

(Lodgment No. 4, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 12, 2233.)

Murphy’s counsel’s made an immediate objection on the basis of

improper argument, which was sustained. (Id.) The prosecutor

immediately stated, “Look, there is a lot of evidence to suggest -- 

to prove beyond any doubt there was a robbery in this case, all

right?” (Id.) 

Murphy’s counsel had previously stated during his closing

argument, “Now, I guess the first question, ladies and gentlemen,

is: Was there a robbery here at all?” (Id. Rep.’s Tr. vol. 11,

2155.) That statement was made after Murphy’s counsel had argued

that the most reasonable interpretation of the evidence was that

everyone went to Guerrero’s house that morning not to rob him, but

to confront him about having raped Ditmars and possibly to “kick

his ass.” (Id. at 2135-48.)

The appellate court denied this prosecutorial misconduct

claim:

The defendants assert the prosecutor’s comment that

he “didn’t do [his] job right if you don't believe, as

you sit there, there was a robbery in this case,”

constituted prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct. Again,

even construing the prosecutor’s remark as an improper

personal belief as to the defendants’ guilt rather than

an offhand comment on the state of the evidence, the

defendants did not request the jury be admonished about 

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such remarks, which would have cured any harm, and,

therefore, the issue is waived on appeal. (Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1201.)

Further, even assuming the defendants had not

forfeited this claim of error, they cannot prevail as

they have not shown a reasonable likelihood on this

record that the jury understood or applied the

prosecutor’s comments in an improper or erroneous manner

(see Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 970), and we presume

the jury followed the court’s instructions, which

included the advisement that the attorneys’ remarks

during closing argument were not evidence. (Jablonski, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 834.) Additionally, any

perceived error in the prosecutor’s brief remark is

harmless on this record, which included overwhelming

evidence that the defendants planned to steal property

from Guerrero before driving to his home in two separate

vehicles, disabling his telephone and alarm systems

before entering and confronting him with guns, and then

taking a large quantity of his property away from his

home in the vehicles.

(Lodgment No. 22, People v. Zingsheim, No. D049189, slip op. at 44-

45 (alteration in original).)

Respondent Cate argues there was no misconduct because the

comment was made in response to a question defense counsel posed to

the jury, was simply a comment on the evidence, and did not suggest

there was other evidence not disclosed to the jury. (Answer

Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 44, ECF No. 7.) He contends the jury was

properly instructed that comments of counsel were not evidence, and

any error was clearly harmless because the evidence against

Petitioner was overwhelming. (Id.)

Petitioner replies that the prosecutor’s comment, like his

question to Petitioner about the existence of a photograph, “may

not alone establish prejudice.” (Traverse Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A.

12, ECF No. 11.) Rather, he argues that this instance of

misconduct, when considered cumulatively with the other acts of

misconduct, demonstrates prejudice. (Id.) Maxwell disputes that

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it was merely a comment on the evidence, arguing that the

prosecutor stated his personal belief in Petitioner’s guilt, and

disagrees that the evidence against him was overwhelming. (Id.)

As quoted above, the state court found that the evidence

against Petitioner was overwhelming. Ditmars’s and Guerrero’s

testimony and Ditmars’s postarrest statements constituted

overwhelming evidence of Petitioner’s guilt. Although Petitioner

correctly observes that both Guerrero and Ditmars had credibility

problems, that was a matter for the jury to determine. The state

court correctly found there is no indication the jury perceived the

remark as anything other than a comment made in direct response to

a statement made by defense counsel. 

Moreover, even if the prosecutor’s statement is viewed as a

pronouncement that he personally believed Petitioner was guilty, he

immediately corrected himself by stating that he believed there was

sufficient evidence in the record to prove beyond a reasonable

doubt that a robbery occurred. In addition, the court instructed

the jury, “You must follow the law as I explain it to you, even if

you disagree with it. If you believe that the attorneys’ comments

on the law conflict with my instructions, you must follow my

instructions.” (Lodgment No. 4, Rep.’s Tr. vol. 12, 2249.) They

were further instructed:

You must decide what the facts are in this case. 

You must use only the evidence that was presented in this

courtroom. Evidence is the sworn testimony of witnesses,

the exhibits admitted into evidence, and anything else I

told you to consider as evidence. [¶] Nothing that the

attorneys say is evidence. In their opening statements

and closing arguments, the attorneys discuss the case,

but their remarks are not evidence. 

(Id. at 2252.)

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Thus, there is no indication in the record that the

prosecutor’s remark rendered the trial unfair, either by itself or

cumulatively with the other instances of misconduct pled by

Petitioner. It is also clear that any error was harmless. Fry,

551 U.S. at 121-22; Medina, 386 F.3d at 877.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the appellate court’s

determination that Petitioner was not deprived of a fair trial by

the prosecutor’s comment was neither contrary to, nor involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law and

was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. 

Harrington, 562 U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 786; Miller-El, 537 U.S.

at 340; Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13; Greer, 483 U.S. at 765. The

Court also finds that any error arising from misconduct by the

prosecutor was clearly harmless. Fry, 551 U.S. at 121-22; Medina,

386 F.3d at 877.

In sum, the Court RECOMMENDS reaching the merits of claim one

without ruling on Respondent’s contention that the claim is

procedurally defaulted, and RECOMMENDS denying habeas relief as to

claim one.

2. Claim Two: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In claim two, Maxwell alleges that his right to the effective

assistance of counsel under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth

Amendments was violated by trial counsel’s failure to properly

object to the four instances of prosecutorial misconduct alleged in

claim one. (See Pet. 6-7, ECF No. 1; id. Mem. P. & A. 37-38.) He

further alleges that his appellate counsel rendered ineffective

assistance by failing to argue on appeal, as an alternative to

prosecutorial misconduct, that the forfeiture of those claims

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caused by trial counsel’s failure to properly object amounted to

ineffective assistance. (Pet. 6-7, ECF No. 1.) Petitioner argues

that the cumulative impact of the errors identified in the Petition

denied him a fair trial. (Id. Mem. P. & A. Supp. Pet. 38-39.)

Respondent answers that the denial of this claim by the state

appellate court is neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Supreme Court law governing

ineffective assistance of counsel claims and was not based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented. (See Answer Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 45-49, ECF No. 7.)

Petitioner replies that there was no reasonable basis for

counsel not to object at trial, and therefore the failure to object

showed a lack of professional judgment. (Traverse Attach. #1 Mem.

P. & A. 12-13, ECF No. 11.) He contends the failure to object was

prejudicial for the same reasons the prosecutorial misconduct was

prejudicial, undermining confidence in the outcome of his trial. 

(Id. at 13.) 

Maxwell raised this claim in a petition for review filed in

the California Supreme Court. (Lodgment No. 42, Petition for

Review, In re Maxwell, No. [S182412].) The petition was denied

without a citation of authority or statement of reasoning. 

(Lodgment No. 43, In re Maxwell, No. S182412, order.) The claim

had been presented to the state appellate court in a habeas

petition. (Lodgment No. 38, In re Maxwell, No. D057039

(petition).)

The appellate court denied the claim:

In this petition Maxwell contends “[t]rial counsel

failed to properly object to instances of prosecutorial

misconduct and appellate counsel did not argue, as an

alternative to arguments that the claims were preserved,

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that these failures to properly object were instances of

ineffective assistance of counsel and thus insure review

on the merits of the claims.” Maxwell points to four

specific instances of claimed prosecutorial misconduct 

. . . and cumulative error. This court addressed each of

the above claims of prosecutorial misconduct on the

merits and found no reversible or cumulative error. 

Maxwell has not shown that had trial counsel raised the

proper objection of prosecutorial misconduct at trial, or

that had appellate counsel raised the claim of

ineffective assistance of trial counsel, he would have

achieved a better result. (Strickland v. Washington

(1984) 466 U.S. 668, 697; In re Jackson (1992) 3 Cal.4th

578, 604.) 

(Lodgment No. 41, In re Maxwell, No. D057039, order at 1

(alterations in original).)

The clearly established United States Supreme Court law

governing ineffective assistance of counsel claims is set forth in

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). See Baylor v.

Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1323 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[Strickland] has long

been clearly established federal law determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States.”). For ineffective assistance of

counsel to provide a basis for habeas relief, Petitioner must

demonstrate two things. First, he must show that counsel’s

performance was deficient. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. “This

requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel

was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by

the Sixth Amendment.” Id. Second, he must show counsel’s

deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Id. This requires

showing that counsel’s errors were so serious they deprived

Petitioner “of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” 

Id. 

To satisfy the prejudice prong, Petitioner must demonstrate a

reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have

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been different absent the error. Williams, 529 U.S. at 406;

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (“The result of a proceeding can be

rendered unreliable, and hence the proceeding itself unfair, even

if the errors of counsel cannot be shown by a preponderance of the

evidence to have determined the outcome.”) The prejudice inquiry

is to be considered in light of the strength of the prosecution’s

case. Luna v. Cambra, 306 F.3d 954, 966 (9th Cir.), amended, 311

F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2002).

“Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.” 

Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. ___, ___, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485

(2010). As relevant here, the Supreme Court has cautioned:

An ineffective-assistance claim can function as a way to

escape rules of waiver and forfeiture and raise issues

not presented at trial, and so the Strickland standard

must be applied with scrupulous care, lest “intrusive

post-trial inquiry” threaten the integrity of the very

adversarial process the right to counsel is meant to

serve.

Harrington, 562 U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 788 (quoting Strickland,

466 U.S. at 689-90.) In the context of federal habeas review,

“[t]he standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both

‘highly deferential,’ . . . and when the two apply in tandem,

review is ‘doubly’ so.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at

788 (citations omitted). 

a. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

Because Maxwell is unable to demonstrate prejudice arising

from trial counsel’s performance, there is no need to determine

whether counsel was deficient in failing to raise the proper

objections at trial. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 694 (holding

that both deficient performance and prejudice must be shown to

prevail on an ineffective assistance claim). Where the petitioner

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cannot satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland analysis, the

court need not address whether counsel’s performance was deficient.

Id. at 697. 

In order to demonstrate prejudice, Maxwell must show a

reasonable probability that confidence in the outcome of his trial

is undermined by defense counsel’s failure to raise the proper

objections or request curative instructions. Id. at 694. 

Petitioner argues that this standard has been met for the same

reasons he relied upon in claim one to demonstrate he was

prejudiced by the prosecutor’s misconduct. (Traverse Attach. #1

Mem. P. & A. 13, ECF No. 11.)

As discussed above in connection to claim one, Maxwell’s

catalogue of the prosecutor’s misconduct, either singularly or

cumulatively, did not rise to the level of a due process violation

because they did not render the trial unfair. The state court’s

determination to that effect was objectively reasonable. For the

same reasons, and particularly in light of the strength of the

prosecution’s case, Petitioner cannot demonstrate prejudice from

his trial counsel’s failure to properly object or request curative

instructions. He cannot demonstrate a reasonable probability that

confidence in the outcome of his trial is undermined by trial

counsel’s performance. Williams, 529 U.S. at 406; Strickland, 466

U.S. at 694. The state court’s determination to that effect is

objectively reasonable. When viewed under the doubly deferential

lens required for federal habeas review, there is no possibility

“fairminded jurists could disagree that” the state court decision

conflicts with clearly established federal law as announced in 

///

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Strickland. Harrington, 562 U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 786;

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

The Court finds that the appellate court’s denial of this

aspect of claim two was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. Harrington,

562 U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 786; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

b. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

Petitioner next alleges that his federal constitutional right

to the effective assistance of appellate counsel was violated

because counsel failed to argue on appeal that Maxwell received

ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on the failure to

raise the proper objections. (Pet. 6-7, ECF No. 1.) Respondent

replies that there is no reasonable probability Petitioner would

have achieved a more favorable result had appellate counsel raised

the ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims. (Answer

Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 49, ECF No. 7.) Respondent observes that

failing to raise meritless claims on appeal does not constitute

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. (Id.) 

Strickland also sets forth the clearly established United

States Supreme Court law governing ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel claims. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285

(2000). As discussed above, Maxwell is unable to demonstrate

prejudice arising from trial counsel’s performance. Consequently,

Petitioner cannot establish deficient performance by appellate

counsel for failing to raise claims of ineffective assistance of

trial counsel. The failure to raise meritless or untenable claims

on appeal does not constitute ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel. Featherstone v. Estelle, 948 F.2d 1497, 1507 (9th Cir.

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1991) (“[T]rial counsel’s performance, although not error-free, did

not fall below the Strickland standard. Thus, petitioner was not

prejudiced by appellate counsel’s decision not to raise issues that

had no merit.”) (footnote omitted); Gustave v. United States, 627

F.2d 901, 906 (9th Cir. 1980) (“There is no requirement that an

attorney appeal issues that are clearly untenable.”); see also

Baumann v. United States, 692 F.2d 565, 572 (9th Cir. 1982)

(stating that trial attorney’s failure to raise meritless legal

argument does not constitute ineffective assistance). 

Neither is Maxwell able to demonstrate prejudice as a result

of appellate counsel’s failure to raise ineffective assistance of

trial counsel. Petitioner contends that appellate counsel should

have argued that “Imperfectly objected claims [of prosecutorial

misconduct] are always reviewable on the merits in the state courts

on constitutional issues . . . .” (Pet. 7, ECF No. 1.) 

Furthermore, any waiver resulting from the failure to properly

preserve the record was caused by constitutionally ineffective

assistance of trial counsel. (Id.) Even so, the prosecutorial

misconduct claims were adjudicated on their merits by the state

courts. Therefore, Petitioner suffered no prejudice as a result of

appellate counsel’s decision not to present an ineffective

assistance of trial counsel claim. Robbins, 528 U.S. at 285-86

(holding that prejudice in this context requires a petitioner to

“show a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel’s [error],

he would have prevailed on his appeal[]”) (citing Strickland, 466

U.S. at 694). 

The Court finds that the state appellate court’s denial of the

ineffective assistance of counsel aspects of claim two was neither

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5 Petitioner initially presented his cumulative error claim to the

appellate court in his second habeas petition filed in that court. 

(Lodgment No. 30, In re Maxwell, No. D055492 (petition) at 22.) That

petition was denied without prejudice to present the claim to the trial

court. (Lodgment No. 33, In re Maxwell, No. D055492 (order.)

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contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law. Harrington, 562 U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct.

at 786; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 

c. Cumulative Error

Petitioner’s final claim is that the cumulative impact of the

prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel

resulted in the denial of a fair trial, particularly in light of

the fact that the prosecution’s case rested on the testimony of

Ditmars and Guerrero, two witnesses with serious credibility

problems. (Pet. Mem. P. & A. 38-39, ECF No. 1.) Maxwell presented

this claim to the state supreme court in the same petition for

review that included his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. 

(Lodgment No. 42, Petition for Review, In re Maxwell, No.

[S182412].) The petition was denied without a citation of

authority or statement of reasoning. (Lodgment No. 43, In re

Maxwell, No. S182412, order.) The claim was also presented to the

state appellate court in the third habeas petition Maxwell filed in

that court. (Lodgment No. 38, In re Maxwell, No. D057039

(petition).) The appellate court indicated that it had previously

determined that the four instances of prosecutorial misconduct did

not cumulate to prejudice Petitioner, but the prior order did not

address the impact of the instances of ineffective assistance of

counsel.5 (Lodgment No. 41, In re Maxwell, No. D057039, order.) 

Petitioner also presented the claim to the trial court in a

habeas petition. (Lodgment No. 34, In re Maxwell, No. HSC11113

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(petition) at 18-19.) The trial court addressed the merits of the

claim and denied the petition. (Lodgment No. 37, In re Maxwell,

No. HSC11113, order.) The Court will look through the silent

denials by the state supreme and appellate courts to the last

reasoned decision on this claim, the trial court’s order. Ylst,

501 U.S. at 804. The trial court denied the claim:

The court has already found the Petition failed to

make a prima facie showing that either trial or appellate

defense counsel provided ineffective assistance of

counsel regarding each of the aforementioned individual

claims discussed infra. The court now finds that the

Petition fails to make a prima facie showing for relief

based upon the combined or cumulative effect of any

prosecutorial misconduct, or that Petitioner was

otherwise denied due process or a fair trial. (People v.

Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 845; People v. Kronemyer

(1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 314, 349.)

(Lodgment No. 37, In re Maxwell, No. HSC11113, order at 20.)

“The Supreme Court has clearly established that the combined

effect of multiple trial court errors violates due process where it

renders the resulting criminal trial fundamentally unfair.” Parle

v. Runnels, 505 F.3d 922, 927 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Chambers v.

Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 298, 302-03 (1973).) Where “no single

trial error examined in isolation is sufficiently prejudicial to

warrant reversal, the cumulative effect of multiple errors may

still prejudice a defendant.” United States v. Frederick, 78 F.3d

1370, 1381 (9th Cir. 1996). Where “there are a number of errors at

trial, ‘a balkanized, issue-by-issue harmless error review’ is far

less effective than analyzing the overall effect of all the errors

in the context of the evidence introduced at trial against the

defendant.” Id. (quoting United States v. Wallace, 848 F.2d 1464,

1476 (9th Cir. 1988).) “[W]here the government’s case is weak, a

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defendant is more likely to be prejudiced by the effect of

cumulative errors.” Frederick, id.

Here, the government’s case was not as weak as Maxwell

suggests. Two eyewitnesses testified that Petitioner was an armed

principal in the Guerrero robbery. There was other evidence that

pointed to Maxwell’s guilt. Petitioner’s defense, which was

contradicted by Ditmars, was that he went along merely to help

Ditmars safely collect her identification and purse so that she

could go to the hospital. Although a review of the trial

transcript exposes numerous instances where the prosecutor

overstepped the bounds of propriety, Petitioner has not established

prejudice, individually or cumulatively, arising from the

misconduct or the ineffective assistance of counsel. 

Even if this Court disagreed with the assessment of the

California courts, that is not the test for federal habeas relief.

Even if “fairminded jurists could disagree” with the state court

decision, Maxwell is not entitled to federal habeas relief. See

Harrington, 562 U.S. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 786. The Court finds

that the state superior court’s denial of this aspect of claim two

was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Supreme Court law. Harrington, 562 U.S. at ___;

131 S.Ct. at 786; Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13; Parle, 505 F.3d at

927. 

VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation denying all

claims in the Petition to United States District Judge Michael M.

Anello under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the

United States District Court for the Southern District of

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California. For the reasons outlined above, IT IS HEREBY

RECOMMENDED that the district court issue an order (1) approving 

and adopting this Report and Recommendation and (2) directing that

judgment be entered denying the Petition. 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than September 30, 2011, any party

to this action may file written objections with the Court and serve

a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall

be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than

October 14, 2011. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise

those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v.

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951

F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: September 8, 2011.

 _____________________________

 Ruben B. Brooks

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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