Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-96-05280/USCOURTS-caDC-96-05280-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 11, 1998 Decided July 24, 1998

No. 96-5280

Clarence E. Blair-Bey,

Appellant

v.

Margaret Quick, Chairperson,

District of Columbia Board of Parole, et al.,

Appellees

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 96cv01593)

Thomas L. Cubbage, III, appointed by the Court, argued

the cause for appellant Clarence E. Blair-Bey, with whom

Timothy C. Hester was on the briefs.

Mary L. Wilson, Assistant Corporation Counsel, argued

the cause for the District of Columbia appellees, with whom

John Ferren, Corporation Counsel, and Charles L. Reischel,

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Deputy Corporation Counsel, were on the briefs. Jo Anne

Robinson, Principal Deputy Corporation Counsel, entered an

appearance.

William F. Gould, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the cause for appellee United States Parole Commission, with whom Wilma A. Lewis, United States Attorney,

John R. Fisher, Elizabeth Trosman, and Silvia Gonzalez

Roman, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief.

Before: Wald, Williams and Tatel, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Wald.

Wald, Circuit Judge: This case is one of three companion

cases that we decide today; the three cases address interrelated issues bearing on prisoner litigation.

In this action, Clarence Blair-Bey, a prison inmate in the

custody of the D.C. Department of Corrections, filed a habeas

corpus petition challenging the procedures by which he was

denied parole, on due process and ex post facto clause

grounds. He named as defendants (among others) the D.C.

Board of Parole and the United States Parole Commission.

The district court dismissed Blair-Bey's petition, finding that

the federal courts are precluded by a provision of the D.C.

Code, section 16-1901, from entertaining habeas corpus petitions filed by D.C. prisoners, and that Blair-Bey's claims also

failed on their merits. Blair-Bey appealed these two rulings.

In this court, the District defends those rulings, and also

contends that Blair-Bey is required, under the filing-fee

provisions of the recently-enacted Prison Litigation Reform

Act ("PLRA"), 28 U.S.C. s 1915(d), to pay a partial filing fee

before his appeal may proceed. The United States Parole

Commission agrees with the District on the grounds for

dismissal but not as to the applicability of the PLRA's filingfee provisions; it also asserts that it should be dismissed as a

party.

We conclude that Blair-Bey's action, as a habeas corpus

petition, is not subject to the PLRA's filing-fee requirements;

that this court has jurisdiction to entertain Blair-Bey's petition; that the United States Parole Commission is not a

proper defendant; and that although Blair-Bey's due process

claim is meritless, his ex post facto claim might have merit if

certain facts are shown, and must be remanded to the district

court for further consideration.

I. Background

Blair-Bey was born in 1958. Between the ages of thirteen

and fifteen, he committed a number of serious offenses,

including rape, receiving stolen property, destruction of property, and two counts of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle.

As a result, he spent much of his youth at the District of

Columbia's juvenile detention facility, Cedar Knoll. BlairBey also had psychological and substance-abuse problems

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during this period, and so was confined part of this time at St.

Elizabeths Hospital. In 1975, at the age of sixteen, he

escaped from Cedar Knoll and committed a murder. Appendix ("App.") at 31, 44. Blair-Bey pleaded guilty to a D.C.

Code offense of second-degree murder, and was given a

sentence of from ten years to life. In 1980, while serving his

sentence, he killed another inmate; he pleaded guilty to

second-degree murder in violation of 18 U.S.C. s 1111, and

was sentenced to a term of ten years to life to be served

consecutively with his prior sentence. He was then transferred to a federal correctional facility and began to serve his

second (U.S. Code) sentence.

In 1991, the United States Parole Commission ("USPC")

held a parole hearing on Blair-Bey's federal offense, denied

parole, and scheduled another hearing for 1993. The USPC

said in its order that at the next proceeding Blair-Bey would

also receive a parole hearing for his D.C. Code offense. The

USPC and the D.C. Board of Parole ("DCBOP") have an

arrangement under which the USPC conducts parole hearings (under D.C. parole rules) for those D.C. Code offenders

being held in federal prison.

Blair-Bey finished serving the federal portion of his sentence on October 5, 1991, and was transferred back to a D.C.

prison in 1993. Apparently in error, a USPC hearing examiner nevertheless conducted a parole hearing for him at the

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D.C. Jail on September 8, 1993. The examiner found that

Blair-Bey had a favorable score under the D.C. scoring

system (a "point assigned grid score," or PAGS, of 2, which

corresponds to "parole shall be granted"), but nevertheless

recommended to the USPC that Blair-Bey be denied parole.

The hearing examiner cited the seriousness of Blair-Bey's

crimes, his lack of remorse, his drug use while in prison, and

lies he told about his movements while on work-release. App.

at 34-36. The examiner recommended that Blair-Bey receive a rehearing in September 1995.

Before the USPC could formally adopt these recommendations, the USPC and DCBOP decided that it was in fact the

DCBOP that had jurisdiction over Blair-Bey. The USPC

sent a copy of its file and recommendations to the DCBOP,

which conducted a de novo parole hearing on October 29,

1993. Unlike the USPC, the DCBOP found that Blair-Bey

had an unfavorable score under the D.C. system, giving him a

PAGS score of 4, which corresponds to denying parole. (The

DCBOP seems to have counted Blair-Bey's numerous juvenile offenses in making its calculation, App. at 47-48; the

USPC did not count these offenses.) Citing his use of drugs,

work-release misconduct, and diagnosis (while in prison) of

paranoid schizophrenia, the hearing examiner decided that

Blair-Bey was a threat to the community. He recommended

that parole be denied, and that no new hearing be scheduled

until October 29, 1998. This represented a five-year "set-off,"

or delay until Blair-Bey's next hearing, longer than the usual

set-off of twelve months (or less) provided for in the D.C.

guidelines. See D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 28, s 104.2, 35 D.C. Reg.

455 (1988). The DCBOP adopted this recommendation in

full, noting (through checkmarks on a form) that Blair-Bey's

convictions reflect "on-going criminal behavior" and that

Blair-Bey "has engaged in repeated or extremely serious

negative institutional behavior." The DCBOP's form also

noted that "[t]he set-off is outside the guidelines for the same

countervailing factors checked below." App. at 56.

Blair-Bey filed a habeas corpus petition in D.C. Superior

Court, claiming that the DCBOP acted illegally in denying

him parole and in establishing a five-year set-off. The SupeUSCA Case #96-5280 Document #369769 Filed: 07/24/1998 Page 4 of 26
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rior Court denied the petition, and the D.C. Court of Appeals

summarily affirmed. Blair-Bey v. Quick, No. 96-1593, slip

op. at 1 (D.C. Sept. 28, 1995). Blair-Bey then filed a similar

petition in federal district court, listing as defendants the

warden of Occoquan, the chair of the DCBOP, his DCBOP

hearing examiner, and the USPC.

The district court dismissed Blair-Bey's petition sua sponte

for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that, under D.C. Code

s 16-1901, only the courts of the District of Columbia have

jurisdiction over petitions like Blair-Bey's. In the alternative, the district court found that Blair-Bey's claims failed on

their merits, as he had no constitutional right to release on

parole.

Blair-Bey appealed, challenging both of these conclusions.

Blair-Bey's appeal was argued together with two other appeals brought by prison inmates, Anyanwutaku v. Moore, No.

96-7259, and Crowell v. Walsh, No. 96-7192, because they

raised related issues; we decide all three of these cases (in

separate opinions) today. The District asserts, first, that

Blair-Bey's appeal is subject to the filing-fee requirements of

the PLRA, and that Blair-Bey should therefore be required

to pay a (partial) filing fee before we proceed. We reject this

claim, finding that Blair-Bey's action, as it is a habeas

petition, is outside the filing-fee provisions of the PLRA.

Second, the District contends that the district court was

correct in concluding that the federal courts lack jurisdiction

over Blair-Bey's petition; again, Blair-Bey wins the day.

Finally, as to the merits of Blair-Bey's claims, we find that

his due process claim is meritless, but that his ex post facto

claim requires further development on remand.

II. Analysis

At the outset, it is clear that the United States Parole

Commission is not a proper party to this action. "[T]he

appropriate defendant in a habeas action is the custodian of

the prisoner." Chatman-Bey v. Thornburgh, 864 F.2d 804,

810 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en banc). When a prisoner seeks to

challenge parole-related decisions, the warden of the prison

and not the United States Parole Commission is the prisoner's "custodian." See id. at 810-11 (citing Guerra v. Meese,

786 F.2d 414, 416 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). Thus, the USPC, the

DCBOP, and their officers and employees are not proper

parties to this action; only John S. Henderson, the warden of

Occoquan, is a proper party.1

A. The Prison Litigation Reform Act

In 1996, Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform

Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134 (1996), which made a number of

changes in the law governing prison-related litigation. The

portion of the PLRA that concerns us here is section 804,

which amended the statute governing proceedings in forma

pauperis ("IFP") to require that, "if a prisoner brings a civil

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action or files an appeal in forma pauperis," he must pay the

fee over time; payments are deducted from the plaintiff's

prison account. 28 U.S.C. s 1915(b)(1)-(3). (A prisoner will

not, however, be prevented from filing suit simply because he

has no assets. 28 U.S.C. s 1915(b)(4).)

We have found, following numerous other circuits, that

Congress did not intend for this installment-payment provision to apply to actions brought under 28 U.S.C. s 2254 or

s 2255. See United States v. Levi, 111 F.3d 955, 956 (D.C.

Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (citing eight opinions of other circuits); In re Smith, 114 F.3d 1247, 1250 (D.C. Cir. 1997). As

we explained in In re Smith, the courts have "uniformly

concluded" that habeas corpus proceedings--and their cousins, section 2255 proceedings--are not "civil actions" for

purposes of the PLRA's filing-fee provision. See id.; see also

Smith v. Angelone, 111 F.3d 1126, 1129-30 (4th Cir.), cert.

denied, 118 S. Ct. 2 (1997) (s 2254); United States v. Simmonds, 111 F.3d 737, 742 (10th Cir. 1997) (s 2255).

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1 Blair-Bey was confined at Occoquan when he filed his petition;

while this appeal was pending, he was transferred to a prison in

Ohio. "Notwithstanding [Blair-Bey]'s transfer during the course of

this litigation" to the Ohio prison, "habeas jurisdiction as a general

matter continues to be in the district where the prisoner was

incarcerated at the time the habeas petition was filed." See id. at

806 n.1.

The District argues, however, that we should apply Levi

only to those habeas corpus petitions that challenge the

validity of the petitioner's conviction or sentence, and not to

petitions, like this one, that are based on other grounds. As

authority, it cites Newlin v. Helman, 123 F.3d 429 (7th Cir.

1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 707 (1998), in which the Seventh

Circuit distinguished between (1) petitions attacking the prisoner's conviction or sentence, which it said were not "civil

actions" for PLRA purposes because they are "functional

continuations of the criminal prosecution," and (2) "[c]omplaints about denial of parole, revocation of parole, and the

like," which "do not affect the validity of the criminal sentence" and hence may be treated as "civil actions." Id. at

437-38. Blair-Bey and the United States Parole Commission

urge us not to follow Newlin.

At least one other circuit has already rejected Newlin (or

rather a pre-Newlin case, Thurman v. Gramley, 97 F.3d 185,

187 (7th Cir. 1996), which laid out Newlin 's approach in

dicta). See McIntosh v. United States Parole Commission,

115 F.3d 809, 811-12 (10th Cir. 1997) (finding that a habeas

corpus challenge to a parole revocation proceeding was not

subject to the PLRA). We agree with McIntosh: we see no

reason to make an exception from our general rule that the

PLRA does not apply to actions properly brought in habeas

corpus.

By its terms, the PLRA only applies when "a prisoner

brings a civil action or files an appeal in forma pauperis." 28

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U.S.C. s 1915(b)(1).2 The courts have generally found habeas corpus petitions not to be "civil actions" for purposes of

this provision. "Though habeas proceedings are technically

civil actions, the Supreme Court has long recognized that the

label is ill-fitting and that habeas is in fact a unique creature

of the law." Martin v. Bissonette, 118 F.3d 871, 874 (1st Cir.

1997) (citing Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 293-94 (1969)).

As the Court explained in Harris, the characterization of

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2 The word "appeal" in the statute does not reach all appeals, but

only appeals in civil actions. See United States v. Simmonds, 111

F.3d 737, 744 (10th Cir. 1997); Martin v. United States, 96 F.3d

853, 854 (7th Cir. 1996).

habeas proceedings as "civil" is "gross and inexact." 394 U.S.

at 293-94. "Essentially, the proceeding is unique. Habeas

corpus practice in the federal courts has conformed with civil

practice only in a general sense." Id. at 294. More recently,

in O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432 (1995), the Court found

that it is error to apply standards of proof developed for civil

actions to a habeas corpus claim, because of "the stakes

involved in a habeas proceeding"; "although habeas is a civil

proceeding, someone's custody, rather than mere civil liability, is at stake." Id. at 440; see also Santana v. United

States, 98 F.3d 752, 754-55 (3d Cir. 1996) (listing numerous

circumstances in which habeas corpus proceedings are not

treated as civil actions). None of these cases draw any

distinction between different types of habeas petitions that

resembles the "criminal"/"civil" distinction made by Newlin,

and Newlin cited no authority for this distinction.

There is thus no evidence that Congress might have relied

on a preexisting distinction between "criminal" and "civil"

habeas corpus petitions when it enacted the PLRA. Nor is

there any indication that Congress itself intended to establish

any such distinction in the PLRA. The PLRA's legislative

history makes clear that Congress's principal intent was to

reduce frivolous litigation by prisoners challenging conditions

of their confinement. Although there was no committee

report on the PLRA, the floor statements of the bill's two

sponsors in the Senate, Senators Dole and Kyl, indicate that

prison conditions litigation is what they were targeting. All

examples of suits they hoped to squelch were prison conditions suits, including lawsuits challenging "insufficient storage

space, being prohibited from attending a wedding anniversary

party, and, yes, being served creamy peanut butter instead of

chunky." 141 Cong. Rec. S7498, S7524 (daily ed. May 25,

1995) (statement of Senator Dole); see also In re Smith, 114

F.3d at 1249 ("Congress enacted the PLRA primarily to

curtail claims brought by prisoners under 42 U.S.C. s 1983

and the Federal Tort Claims Act, most of which concern

prison conditions and many of which are routinely dismissed

as legally frivolous.") (quoting Santana, 98 F.3d at 755).

Nowhere in the PLRA's legislative history is there any

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reference to cases challenging the fact or duration of confinement.3 Indeed the PLRA contains several other provisions

directed specifically at prison conditions litigation, see, e.g.,

PLRA s 802 (relating to prison conditions consent decrees);

s 803(d) (requiring exhaustion in actions "with respect to

prison conditions"), but makes no specific reference anywhere

in the Act to challenges to the fact or length of confinement.

Just two days before enacting the PLRA, Congress enacted

a distinct statute, the Antiterrorism and Expedited Death

Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), Pub. L. No. 104-132 (1996), which

made extensive changes in the law governing habeas relief.

"This chronology strongly suggests that Congress intended to

make its changes to habeas proceedings via the AEDPA, and

to alter procedure in prisoner civil rights litigation in the

PLRA." Smith v. Angelone, 111 F.3d at 1130; see also In re

Smith, 114 F.3d at 1250. Although petitions attacking criminal convictions were the principal focus of the AEDPA, a

number of the AEDPA's provisions apply on their face to all

habeas petitions, and so would seem to reach petitions like

Blair-Bey's.

Treating one subset of habeas petitions as "civil actions" for

PLRA purposes would also have the effect of subjecting those

petitions to two separate regimes designed to deter repeat

plaintiffs--with anomalous results, given the nature of the

two regimes. Even before the AEDPA and PLRA were

enacted, 28 U.S.C. s 2244 limited "second or successive"

habeas corpus petitions; section 106 of the AEDPA adjusted

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3 The District notes that Senator Dole cited a study of the

increasing number of "due process and cruel and unusual punishment" complaints filed by prisoners, 141 Cong. Rec. S7498, S7524

(daily ed. May 25, 1995), and argues that some parole-related

habeas petitions are based on the due process clause (indeed, it is

one of the grounds for Blair-Bey's petition). But an article by the

author of that very study was appended to the floor statement of

Senator Kyl; it reveals that the study focused on due process

challenges to violations of prison regulations, not parole regulations.

See Walter Berns, Sue the Warden, Wall Street Journal (Apr. 24,

1995) (reprinted in 141 Cong. Rec. S7498, S7527 (daily ed. May 25,

1995) (statement of Senator Kyl)).

these limitations, and so recognized the existence of a repeatfiler regime directed specifically at habeas corpus petitions.

The PLRA has introduced a new repeat-filer provision, providing that a prisoner who has had three suits dismissed on

the ground that they were "frivolous, malicious, or fail[ed] to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted" will be

required to prepay filing fees in full in future civil actions or

appeals, unless the prisoner can show "imminent danger of

serious physical injury." 28 U.S.C. s 1915(g). This means

that there are now two distinct regimes for repeat filers, and

it seems to us that the PLRA's regime is singularly ill-suited

to habeas corpus petitioners. If habeas petitions count as

"civil actions" for PLRA purposes, then a penniless inmate 4

who has managed to incur three strikes would apparently

have no way of seeking a writ of habeas corpus--even if, for

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instance, prison officials arbitrarily declined to release him at

the end of his sentence. This would truly be a draconian

penalty, and "contrary to a long tradition of ready access of

prisoners to federal habeas corpus, as distinct from their

access to tort remedies." Anderson v. Singletary, 111 F.3d

801, 805 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting Martin v. United States, 96

F.3d 853, 855-56 (7th Cir. 1996)); see also O'Neal, 513 U.S. at

432, 440 (1995) (observing that the stakes in habeas proceedings are high, as custody over an individual is at issue). We

will not lightly assume that Congress intended such an extraordinary result.5

The District asserts that it can often be difficult to determine whether a prisoner's action is properly in habeas corpus,

and argues that an approach that does not limit the PLRA's

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4 That is, an inmate unable to pay the $5 filing fee for habeas

petitions (or, if the inmate loses in district court, the more daunting

$100 fee for filing an appeal).

5 By contrast, the AEDPA's comparable repeat-filer provision is

not nearly as restrictive. Its bar on successive habeas corpus

petitions would only apply if an inmate attempted to challenge the

same official act twice. As Newlin observed, "[s]uccessive challenges to the same parole decision or revocation of good-time

credits are rare if not nonexistent." Newlin, 123 F.3d at 438.

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exemption to hard-core habeas actions will compel courts to

make this decision very early, before necessary facts have

been developed. It is true that this line can be a hazy one,

and the Supreme Court has had to revisit it a number of

times in recent years. See, e.g., Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S.

641 (1997). But Newlin 's line between "criminal" and "civil"

habeas petitions seems almost as elusive. (How should a

habeas corpus petition by a prisoner who is being held for

contempt be classified? Or one by a pretrial detainee?) Nor

do we think our reading imposes an inordinate taxonomic

burden on the district courts. The issue of whether an action

sounds in habeas corpus will often come up early in the case

anyway, for if an action by a state prisoner is truly in habeas

corpus, the petition is subject to threshold exhaustion requirements, see 28 U.S.C. s 2254. And many cases, such as

pure prison-conditions cases, will be easy to identify. Furthermore, if a prisoner joins a claim that clearly cannot be

heard in habeas corpus (such as a claim for damages) along

with a claim that arguably may be, the resulting "mixed"

petition will always be subject to the PLRA's filing-fee rules.

See In re Smith, 114 F.3d at 1250. For the rare suit that

raises truly bewildering issues of classification, it may be

appropriate for the district courts to conserve their resources

by deferring the (potential) application of the PLRA's

installment-payment provisions until the facts of the case can

be better developed.

There remains one other classification issue. It is possible

that habeas corpus might be available to challenge prison

conditions in at least some situations. The Court expressly

left this possibility open in Preiser v. Rodriguez, see 411 U.S.

475, 499 (1973); see also Brown v. Plaut, 131 F.3d 163, 168

(D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 66 U.S.L.W. 3750 (1998);

Abdul-Hakeem v. Koehler, 910 F.2d 66, 69-70 (2d Cir. 1990);

but cf. Gomez v. United States, 899 F.2d 1124, 1125-26 (11th

Cir. 1990). Such claims, if they are permissibly brought in

habeas corpus, would have to be subject to the PLRA's filingfee rules, as they are precisely the sort of actions that the

PLRA sought to address. See In re Smith, 114 F.3d at 1250

(D.C. Cir. 1997) ("[I]t would defeat the purpose of the PLRA

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if a prisoner could evade its requirements simply by dressing

up an ordinary civil action as a petition for mandamus or

prohibition or by joining it with a petition for habeas corpus.")

We thus reject the District's suggestion that we apply the

PLRA's filing-fee provisions to habeas petitions like the one

in this case, and now turn to the District's D.C. Code argument.

B. D.C. Code s 16-1901

The District asserts that we are without jurisdiction to hear

Blair-Bey's habeas petition, because such petitions may only

be brought in the courts of the District of Columbia. It bases

this argument on a provision of the D.C. Code, section

16-1901, which, it claims, divests the federal courts of jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus petitions filed by D.C. prisoners.

1. The problem

Some historical and statutory background is necessary to

parse the District's argument. Before 1970, the D.C. court

system did not exist in its present form, and many of the

cases now brought in the District's courts were instead heard

in federal court. In 1970, Congress passed the District of

Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act, Pub. L.

No. 91-358 (1970) ("DCCRCPA"), which created the present

dual court system.

In the course of creating this new dual system, the

DCCRCPA established a remedy analogous to 28 U.S.C.

s 2255 for prisoners sentenced in D.C. Superior Court who

wished to challenge their conviction or sentence. See D.C.

Code s 23-110. The DCCRCPA provided that, to the extent

that this remedy was available, it was an exclusive one:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a

prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion

pursuant to this section shall not be entertained by the

Superior Court or by any Federal or State court if it

appears that the applicant has failed to make a motion

for relief under this section [s 23-110] or that the Superior Court has denied him relief, unless it also appears

that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to

test the legality of his detention.

D.C. Code s 23-110(g). Thus, the DCCRCPA entirely divested the federal courts of jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus

petitions by prisoners who had a section 23-110 remedy

available to them, unless the petitioner could show that the

section 23-110 remedy was "inadequate or ineffective," an

exception that we will call the "safety valve." In Swain v.

Pressley, 430 U.S. 372 (1977), the Supreme Court upheld the

constitutionality of section 23-110(g) under the Suspension

Clause, opining that the safety valve "avoids any serious

question about the constitutionality of the statute." See id. at

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al remedy which is neither inadequate nor ineffective to test

the legality of a person's detention does not constitute a

suspension of the writ of habeas corpus." See id. (observing

that the same is true of 28 U.S.C. s 2255, which contains an

identical safety valve).

Blair-Bey's petition seeks his release, but does not challenge his conviction or sentence; thus, it could not be brought

under section 23-110. See Alston v. United States, 590 A.2d

511, 514 (D.C. 1991) ("Whatever their legal merit, these

contentions, like claims by other prisoners challenging the

computation of a sentence, may not be raised under s 23-110.

Because such contentions concern the executive department's

execution of sentence, not the trial court's imposition of

sentence, they must be raised in a habeas corpus petition.").

Because section 23-110(g) only bars us from hearing those

claims that could have been raised through section 23-110,

that section does not prevent us from entertaining BlairBey's habeas petition. The District, however, points to a

separate provision of the D.C. Code, which it claims does

preclude us from considering Blair-Bey's petition. That provision, D.C. Code s 16-1901, states:

(a) A person committed, detained, confined or restrained

from his lawful liberty within the District, under any

color or pretense whatever, or a person in his behalf,

may apply by petition to the appropriate court, or a

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judge thereof, for a writ of habeas corpus, to the end that

the cause of the commitment, detainer, confinement, or

restraint may be inquired into. The court or judge

applied to, if the facts set forth in the petition make a

prima facie case, shall forthwith grant the writ, directed

to the officer or other person in whose custody or

keeping the party so detained is, returnable forthwith

before the court or judge.

(b) Petitions for writs directed to Federal officers and

employees shall be filed in the United States District

Court for the District of Columbia.

(c) Petitions for writs directed to any other person shall

be filed in the Superior Court for the District of Columbia.

In its present form, this provision dates from the enactment

of the DCCRCPA. It sets forth a general habeas corpus

remedy for those confined in the District of Columbia, allowing prisoners to attack their confinement on any grounds

(other than those provided for in section 23-110).6 The

District contends that, because Blair-Bey is confined in the

District and because his petition is not directed to a federal

officer or employee, paragraph (c) of section 16-1901 directs

that he file his habeas corpus petition in D.C. Superior Court,

and bars him from filing it in federal district court. The

district court agreed with that argument and other cases in

this circuit have come to the same conclusion. See, e.g.,

Perkins v. Henderson, 881 F. Supp. 55 (D.D.C. 1995).

A preliminary point: At the time the district court issued

its order, Blair-Bey was imprisoned at the District's Occoquan facility, which is not within the territorial limits of the

District. But the term "within the District" in section

16-1901 is one of art. In McCall v. Swain, 510 F.2d 167

(D.C. Cir. 1975), we read that phrase to encompass "individu-

__________

6 Its relationship to D.C. Code s 23-110 is thus much like the

relationship, for federal prisoners, of 28 U.S.C. s 2241 and 28

U.S.C. s 2255: the former provides a broad habeas corpus remedy,

the latter a specific instrument for attacking a conviction or sentence.

als confined within the District's correctional facilities located

outside the District limits." Id. at 177. For purposes of

section 16-1901, then, Blair-Bey was "within the District" at

the time the district court issued its order.

It may seem curious that the question of whether the

federal courts can entertain a habeas corpus petition by a

D.C. prisoner who does not seek to challenge his conviction or

sentence should have remained unanswered in the decades

since the DCCRCPA was enacted. But it has, and today we

answer it. We find that section 16-1901 does not bar the

federal courts from entertaining habeas corpus petitions filed

by D.C. prisoners under 28 U.S.C. s 2241. Sections

16-1901(b) and (c) only set forth the proper place in which to

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file those habeas corpus petitions that are brought pursuant

to section 16-1901(a). They do not speak to the question of

where persons may file habeas petitions that are brought

under other sources of authority, such as section 2241.

In deciding whether Congress intended to restrict the

availability of federal habeas corpus when it enacted the

present section 16-1901, we tread carefully. As reviewed

above, there is a "long tradition of ready access of prisoners

to federal habeas corpus," Anderson, 111 F.3d at 805, and we

are most reluctant to find that Congress has deprived an

entire category of prisoners of access to an Article III habeas

remedy without very clear evidence of congressional intent.

As section 23-110(g) demonstrates, Congress certainly knew

how to express itself clearly on the exclusivity of a remedy

when it wanted to do so.

2. The statutory text

We begin with the statutory text. In contrast to section

23-110(g), section 16-1901 does not express in any form an

intent to eliminate federal habeas corpus jurisdiction. Nor

does section 16-1901 include a "safety valve" such as provided

for in section 23-110, strongly suggesting that Congress did

not think that section 16-1901 raised the same constitutional

issues that it foresaw in section 23-110. Yet without a safetyvalve, there would indeed be serious questions as to whether

section 16-1901 violates the Constitution's Suspension Clause

if it is interpreted to foreclose any access to an Article III

court however "inadequate or ineffective" the local court

proceedings. See Swain, 430 U.S. at 381 (noting that the

safety-valve "avoids any serious question about the constitutionality" of section 23-110); see also Weaver v. United States

Information Agency, 87 F.3d 1429, 1436 (D.C. Cir. 1996), cert.

denied, 117 S. Ct. 2407 (1997) ("A statute must be construed,

if fairly possible, so as to avoid not only the conclusion that it

is unconstitutional but also grave doubts upon that score.").

The most natural construction of sections 16-1901(b) and

(c) is that they are venue provisions applicable only to petitions for habeas corpus made under section 16-1901 itself.

Sections (b) and (c) both set forth the courts in which

"petitions for writs" may be filed, but do not specify what

types of writs are meant. Given that the immediately preceding section, 16-1901(a), grants authority for persons held

within the District of Columbia to petition for a writ of habeas

corpus, it is appropriate to assume that subsections (b) and

(c) refer to writs under that section. Broader alternative

interpretations of those two subsections bring in their wake a

host of problems. It seems unlikely for instance that those

subsections are intended to refer to any kind of petitions for

writs, including petitions for writs of mandamus, prohibition,

and so forth. Nor is there any obvious textual reason to read

subsections (b) and (c) to reach some types of petitions other

than those made under section 16-1901(a), but not others--

for instance, petitions under sections 2241 and 2254, but not

mandamus petitions.

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3. The history of section 16-1901

The limited available evidence as to the history of section

16-1901 confirms--or at least fails to contradict--our view

that sections 16-1901 and 2241 are properly conceived of as

distinct, equally available avenues by which D.C. petitioners

may seek habeas corpus. A version of section 16-1901 existed long before the DCCRCPA; indeed, a predecessor was

enacted in the course of Congress's 1901 recodification of the

D.C. Code. See 31 Stat. 1372 (1901). The earlier section

largely tracked the language of what is now section

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16-1901(a), but with a reference to "the United States District Court for the District of Columbia" where that section

now refers to "the appropriate court." Before the enactment

of the DCCRCPA, section 2241 contained no territorial restriction that would have precluded its invocation by petitioners within the District of Columbia; it permitted (and still

permits) "the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district

courts and any circuit judge" to grant writs of habeas corpus

"within their respective jurisdictions." 28 U.S.C. s 2241.

Nor did the former text of section 16-1901 say that it was the

exclusive remedy for D.C. habeas corpus petitioners. Although the caselaw does not explain the relationship between

the two sections in any detail, it suggests that petitioners

could choose to proceed under either or under both. See, e.g.,

Stewart v. Overholser, 186 F.2d 339, 403 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (as

to a prisoner at St. Elizabeths, citing the general federal

habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. s 2241 et seq., and saying

that the court has "considered also the statutes of the District

of Columbia [citing what is now s 16-1901]," and found,

"[a]ssuming them to be in effect," that they "do not require a

different result"); Dorsey v. Gill, 148 F.2d 857, 867 (D.C. Cir.

1945) (describing the requirements of what are now

s 16-1901 and 28 U.S.C. s 2241 et seq. as "equivalent and

synonymous").

Our conclusion that before the DCCRCPA was enacted

petitioners could ordinarily choose to proceed under either or

both of the two provisions is strengthened by section 16-1909

of the D.C. Code (enacted in 1963), which says: "This chapter

[ss 16-1901--16-1909] does not affect any provision of chapter 153 [Habeas Corpus] of title 28, United States Code." The

accompanying Revision Note states:

Section is new, and is inserted for the purpose of construction.

Chapter 153 of Title 28, United States Code, also relates to habeas corpus and applies to Federal courts

generally, including the United States District Court for

the District of Columbia. Upon the reenactment of the

provisions carried into this chapter, they will constitute a

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later enactment than Title 28, United States Code, which

was enacted in 1948. Considering the local character of

the provisions carried into this chapter, there should not

arise, as a general rule, even without this section, any

question of conflict. However, this section is inserted as

a precautionary measure.

Chapter 153, of course, includes section 2241 and the other

general federal habeas corpus provisions. Congress's express

reference to "the United States District Court for the District

of Columbia" indicates that Congress intended that section

2241 should continue to remain available in the federal courts

in the District, despite the existence of section 16-1901.7 See

also McCall 510 F.2d at 182 (saying that section 16-1909

"specifies that the District habeas provisions are not to be

construed to restrict the general federal habeas provisions").

But if sections 16-1901(b) and (c) only set forth the venue

for those habeas corpus petitions filed under section

16-1901(a), why--one may ask--the reference to petitions

"directed to Federal officers and employees" in section

16-1901(b)? Here again, history is of some help. At the time

the DCCRCPA was enacted, there were a large number of

persons in the D.C. prisons who had been tried in federal

district court. As we explained in McCall, subsection (b)

ensured that any petitions that they filed under section

16-1901 would be heard in federal court. This is so because

the local prison officials who were their custodians were

"deemed to be 'Federal officers or employees' within the

meaning of 16 D.C. Code s 1901" because they had custody

over a federal prisoner. McCall, 510 F.2d at 180. When a

prisoner is convicted and sentenced by the Superior Court,

this logic does not apply, and exclusive jurisdiction over

__________

7 The USPC argues that section 16-1909 is only intended to make

clear that prisoners convicted in the District and then transferred

to prisons elsewhere are not within section 16-1901. But this is

already obvious from the text of section 16-1901 itself (which only

applies to prisoners "in the District"). This reading is also inconsistent with the Revision Note.

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actions under section 16-1901 is vested in the Superior

Court.8 Because sections 16-1901(b) and (c) serve this narrower function, there is no need to read them as broadly as

the District proposes, to allocate jurisdiction under all habeas

corpus statutes between the federal and D.C. courts.

Portions of the legislative history of the DCCRCPA do

suggest that Congress thought that the federal courts would

not be able to entertain any habeas corpus petitions brought

by persons convicted in the newly-created D.C. courts. For

example, the report of the Senate Committee on the District

of Columbia said that after the effective date of the

DCCRCPA, "the U.S. District Court for the District of

Columbia shall no longer have jurisdiction over local civil

actions in the nature of quo warrento, suits to acquire title,

and actions regarding change of name, contractors' bonds,

restitution of real property, replevin of personal property,

habeas corpus, and commitment of narcotics users...."

S. Rep. No. 91-405, at 19 (1969); see also id. at 23; H.R. Rep.

No. 91-901 at 136 (1970) (saying that as of the effective date

of the Act the Superior Court will have jurisdiction over a

range of matters, including "writs of habeas corpus to persons

other than Federal officers and employees"); Staff of the

Senate Committee on the District of Columbia, 91st Cong.,

Statement of the Managers On the part of the Senate 5-6

(Comm. Print 1970) (saying that the Superior Court is to have

"exclusive, general jurisdiction over all local matters, civil and

__________

8 Sections (b) and (c) also have the effect of preventing the courts

of the District of Columbia from entertaining section 16-1901

petitions brought against federal officials.

The USPC cites to isolated passages of McCall which it claims

support its reading of section 16-1901. For example, it points to a

statement in a footnote in which, after outlining the structure of

section 16-1901 and its allocation of authority between the Superior

Court and federal district court, the court said: "Thus habeas

jurisdiction within the District of Columbia is exclusively vested in

one court or the other." 510 F.2d at 170 n.3. In context, it is clear

that this dictum was a reference only to habeas corpus jurisdiction

under section 16-1901 itself, not necessarily to jurisdiction under

some other statute.

criminal," and listing "habeas corpus" as an example). The

DCCRCPA's legislative history, however, almost universally

refers to "habeas corpus" generally, without distinguishing

those petitions that attack the petitioner's conviction or sentence and are given over exclusively to the local courts under

section 23-110(g) from other habeas petitions which that

section does not encompass. We confess that we can discern

no obvious reason for Congress to deny the federal courts

jurisdiction over one type of petition but permit jurisdiction

over the other. Congress's description of "habeas corpus"

petitions as "local" in character, S. Rep. No. 91-405, at 19

(1969), seems to fit both types of petition equally well (with

one possible exception, discussed below).

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diction over those section 2241 actions that do not attack the

petitioner's conviction or sentence, that jurisdiction necessarily continues in effect. This is plain from Felker v. Turpin,

116 S. Ct. 2333 (1996), in which the Supreme Court found that

although the AEDPA bars habeas corpus petitioners who are

denied leave to file a second or successive petition from

challenging this decision through certiorari, see AEDPA

s 106(b)(3)(E), it does not withdraw the Court's authority to

entertain original habeas corpus petitions under 28 U.S.C.

ss 2241 and 2254. This was so even though a petitioner may

be able to use the latter route to circumvent Congress's

apparent intent in enacting the AEDPA to bar all review of

such decisions. The rule that "[r]epeals by implication are

not favored," Felker, 116 S. Ct. at 2338, and the principle that

the withdrawal of habeas corpus jurisdiction is subject to

especial scrutiny, dates back over a hundred years; in Ex

parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1869), the Court similarly

declined to conclude that Congress had implicitly stripped it

of jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus actions under the forerunner of section 2241.

Congress's intent in enacting the DCCRCPA is if anything

less clear than it was in Felker. This is so because reading

sections 16-1901(b) and (c) to bar us from exercising jurisdiction over all D.C. habeas petitions that are not directed at

federal officials, as the District urges, might yield anomalous

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results in some cases. For example, Crowell, the petitioner

in one of the companion cases, was convicted in the state

courts of Virginia but is now being held in D.C.'s prison

system. His habeas corpus petition must be directed to his

custodian, who is either a D.C. official, or perhaps (under the

principle of McCall ) constructively an official of Virginia.

Either way, Crowell's custodian is not a federal official, so

that, under the District of Columbia's proposed reading of

section 16-1901, exclusive jurisdiction over Crowell's petition

would be in D.C. Superior Court. See s 16-1901(c) ("Petitions for writs directed to any other person shall be filed in

the Superior Court of the District of Columbia."). Yet, had

Crowell been transferred to a prison anywhere else in the

nation, he would have had a remedy in an Article III court.

Cf. McCall, 510 F.2d at 182 (citing the anomaly of denying

access to a federal habeas corpus remedy to only those

federal prisoners convicted in the District of Columbia in

concluding that section 16-1901 permits such prisoners to file

their petitions in federal court). And Crowell's action, which

involves the good time credit rules of the Commonwealth of

Virginia, does not seem to be the type of "local civil action"

that Congress had in mind when it enacted section 16-1901.

See S. Rep. No. 91-405, at 19 (1969) (saying that the

DCCRCPA would give the Superior Court exclusive jurisdiction over all "local civil actions," including proceedings in

habeas corpus). In short, not only does the text of section

16-1901 fail to divest the federal courts of jurisdiction under

section 2241, but the underlying intent of Congress in enacting that provision is far from clear. Thus, we now find that

Congress has not extinguished Blair-Bey's section 2241 remedy.

C.The Merits of Blair-Bey's Action

In one of the companion cases, Crowell v. Walsh, No.

97-7192, we conclude that cases filed before the AEDPA was

enacted are governed by the preexisting certificate of probable cause requirement, not by the new certificate of appealability requirement. Blair-Bey's action was filed before the

AEDPA was enacted; thus, we will consider whether he is

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entitled to a certificate of probable cause under our preAEDPA standards.

Blair-Bey makes claims under the Due Process Clause and

under the Ex Post Facto Clause. Blair-Bey is not entitled to

a certificate of probable cause as to his due process claim,

because it is painfully clear that he cannot make any successful claim of Fifth Amendment violation. As to his ex post

facto claim, however, we grant the certificate of probable

cause, and remand to permit Blair-Bey to develop his claim

further.

1. Due Process Clause

Blair-Bey cannot make out a due process claim because he

cannot point to a constitutionally protected liberty interest of

which he has been deprived without due process. Liberty

interests are of two types: those issuing directly from the

Constitution and those created by state law. Blair-Bey does

not, of course, have a direct constitutional liberty interest in

parole. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979). As to liberty interests

created by state law, mandatory language in applicable state

laws and regulations may suffice to create a liberty interest.

See, e.g., Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 471-72 (1983).9 But

Blair-Bey cannot point to any such mandatory language here;

the applicable D.C. parole regulations say only that "reconsideration shall ordinarily occur within twelve (12) months."

D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 28, s 104.2, 35 D.C. Reg. 455 (1988)

(emphasis added), and add that "[n]otwithstanding any other

provision of this section, the Board may order a parole

reconsideration date it determines to be appropriate." Id.,

s 104.11. The D.C. Court of Appeals has found the applica-

__________

9 In Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), the Supreme Court

adjusted the Hewitt analysis in considering a prisoner's challenge of

his placement in disciplinary segregation. In Ellis v. District of

Columbia, 84 F.3d 1413 (D.C. Cir. 1996), we found that Sandin only

alters the liberty-interest analysis applicable to claims relating to

"the day-to-day management of prisons," and that it does not apply

to parole-related claims. See id. at 1418. Thus, Blair-Bey's action

is not subject to Sandin.

ble regulations not to create a liberty interest, see Stevens v.

Quick, 678 A.2d 28, 31-32 (D.C. 1996) (a case also involving a

five-year setoff), and we agree.

Blair-Bey does point to a set of guidelines established by

the Parole Board to guide its set-off decisions. The guidelines do not appear in the record; they are, however, quoted

extensively in the D.C. Court of Appeals's Hall v. Henderson

opinion, 672 A.2d 1047 (1996), which also involved a challenge

by a D.C. inmate to a five-year set-off.10 The guidelines list a

series of "aggravating" and "mitigating" factors for the Board

to consider in making set-off decisions. The D.C. Court of

Appeals observed that the guidelines do require the DCBOP

to have "some" basis for deviating from the normal set-off

period. Nevertheless, the court found that the guidelines do

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not create a liberty interest, because they do not limit which

factors the DCBOP can consider, or how to weigh them. Id.

at 1054. We agree that so discretionary and open-ended a

document cannot be construed to give rise to a liberty interest.11

__________

10 We assume that the same set of guidelines was applied to

Blair-Bey. Although we have no way to be sure of this, he has not

suggested that the applicable guidelines have changed.

11 Blair-Bey also argues that the Board's conduct was so arbitrary as to violate the due process clause even in the absence of an

identifiable liberty interest. There is some authority for the proposition that exceptionally arbitrary governmental conduct may in

itself violate the due process clause, whether or not a liberty or

property interest is at stake. See, e.g., Burkett v. Love, 89 F.3d

135, 139-40 (3d Cir. 1996) (denial of parole in retaliation for an

inmate's successful habeas petition); see also Perry v. Sindermann,

408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972). But the record in this case is devoid of

any evidence that might meet so high a standard. Blair-Bey

asserts that the Board relied on his juvenile record in making its

decision, and claims that this violated applicable municipal regulations. Even supposing that this is true (a point that is far from

clear), such reliance would not be so irrational or arbitrary as to

violate the due process clause.

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2. Ex Post Facto Clause

Blair-Bey has a more substantial claim that the rules

governing the District's parole system were made stricter

after he committed his crimes, and that the present rules as

applied to his case amount to a prohibited ex post facto law.

D.C. law provides:

Whenever it shall appear to the Board of Parole that

there is a reasonable probability that a prisoner will live

and remain at liberty without violating the law, that his

release is not incompatible with the welfare of society,

and that he has served the minimum sentence imposed or

the prescribed portion of his sentence, as the case may

be, the Board may authorize his release on parole upon

such terms and conditions as the Board shall from time

to time prescribe.

D.C. Code s 24-204 (1981). Before 1987, the DCBOP's implementing regulations simply mirrored this provision, requiring only that in exercising its discretion the Board consider a

list of factors, including the inmate's offense, prior history of

criminality, personal and social history, physical and emotional health, institutional experience, and availability of community resources. 9 D.C.R.R. s 105.1(a)-(f) (1981).

In 1987, the Board of Parole promulgated new regulations

that provided for the use of "salient factor scores" in making

parole determinations. This scheme takes into account factors much like those considered under the preexisting regulations, but provides a scoring system for weighing those

factors. Once a score has been calculated for a particular

inmate, the new regulations indicate whether parole should

ordinarily be granted or denied. D.C. Mun. Regs., tit. 28,

s 204.1, 204.4-204.18. Under the regulations, the Board still

retains discretion in making individualized parole determinations; the scoring system is intended "to guide the Board in

making the decision whether to grant or deny parole." Davis

v. Henderson, 652 A.2d 634, 635 (D.C. 1995) (describing the

transition from the old to the new parole system).

Blair-Bey contends that under the new salient factor scoring system his criminal history will always produce a score

that invokes a presumptive denial of parole, irrespective of

any rehabilitation he may undergo in prison. He asserts that

he would have fared better under the more open-ended parole

system that was in effect in 1975 and 1980 (when he committed the two murders that led to his incarceration): under the

earlier regulations he would not have been subject to any

presumptive denial of parole. He says that subjecting him to

the post-1987 parole rules amounts to imposing an ex post

facto law in his case, in violation of Article I, s 10 of the

Constitution ("No State shall ... pass any ... ex post facto

Law ...").

The constitutional bar on the enactment of ex post facto

laws means that "[l]egislatures may not retroactively alter the

definition of crimes or increase the punishment for criminal

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acts." Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 43 (1990). BlairBey argues that the 1987 adjustment to the District of

Columbia's parole system increases the "punishment" attached to his crime.

The circuit caselaw poses something of a problem for BlairBey. In Warren v. United States Parole Commission, 659

F.2d 183 (D.C. Cir. 1981), we rejected a claim by a prison

inmate that the 1976 revision of the federal parole system was

an ex post facto law. Before 1976, the federal parole system

had also been highly discretionary; the 1976 revision established a "salient factor score" system that structured this

exercise of discretion. The 1976 revision thus effected a

change much like (but, as we observe below, not necessarily

exactly like) the 1987 revision in the D.C. parole system that

Blair-Bey protests. Warren concluded that the 1976 revision

could not be said to increase the "punishment" of prospective

parolees, and hence was not an ex post facto law. Warren

reasoned that the Parole Commission retained discretion to

ignore its own guidelines; that the guidelines had been based

on a statistical survey of past parole practice, so that in the

aggregate they "embody what may well have been the

Board's practice anyway," id. at 193 (emphasis omitted); that

under the old system it would always be difficult to predict

how any particular inmate would have been treated; and

finally that, at most, the new parole system reduced the

likelihood that an inmate would be paroled either much

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earlier or much later than average, a change that could not be

characterized as "worsen[ing]" the inmate's position. Id. at

193-94. See also Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 434 (1987)

(in the course of deciding another case, seemingly assuming

that Warren and similar cases in other courts of appeals

upholding the 1976 revisions in the parole system were correctly decided).

Because the district court dismissed Blair-Bey's petition

sua sponte, Blair-Bey had no opportunity to develop arguments and present evidence below. It is therefore impossible

to determine whether or not his claim falls under the Warren

rationale. In particular, we do not know what evidence

Blair-Bey and the DCBOP might present as to the purpose

and effect of the 1987 revision of the D.C. parole system. If

the 1987 revision undertook to codify past parole practices, in

the way that the 1976 federal revision did, and if the DCBOP

in practice retains discretion to ignore the guidelines, then his

case will fall under Warren. But Blair-Bey may be able to

present evidence distinguishing his case from Warren, in any

of three ways. First, he may be able to show that the

revisions to the DCBOP scheme impose a sufficiently great

risk of disadvantaging a particular category of inmates as to

violate the ex post facto clause. See California Department

of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 509 (1995) (declining

to decide what degree of risk is "sufficient," but finding that

the "speculative and attenuated" risk of harm in the case at

bar did not suffice). Second, if he can show that the 1987

revision was motivated by a punitive desire to extend the

incarceration of a particular category of inmates, see Miller,

482 U.S. at 433-34 (finding that a statute whose "sole reason"

was to "punish sex offenders more heavily" violated the ex

post facto clause), his case will be strengthened. And third, if

the DCBOP does not in practice ever ignore its own guidelines, this too may lead to the conclusion that the broad

discretion relied upon in Warren is absent here. Cf. Warren,

659 F.2d at 197 n.57 (leaving open the question of whether

evidence that the Board generally engaged in a "mechanical

administrative application of the Guidelines ... could implicate the ex post facto clause"). One of these factors, or a

combination of them, could suffice to establish that Blair-Bey

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has been deprived of his "entitlement to have [the Parole

Board's] discretion exercised," id. at 196; we need not decide

now what kind of showing would suffice.12

The D.C. Court of Appeals has already rejected an ex post

facto challenge to the 1987 revisions to the D.C. parole

system. See Davis, 652 A.2d at 636. Davis found no ex post

facto violation because "[t]he new District of Columbia parole

guidelines ... merely formalize the manner in which the

Board exercises the discretion conferred upon it by the

governing provision in effect when Davis was sentenced." Id.

We are bound to follow interpretations of D.C. law by the

D.C. Court of Appeals, and hence must defer to that court's

ruling to the extent that it interprets D.C. law; for instance,

we defer to the ruling that the D.C. parole guidelines "merely

formalize the manner in which the Board" exercises its discretion. But we are not bound to follow the D.C. Court of

Appeals's analysis of federal law, and so need not defer to

Davis's reading of what the ex post facto clause requires on

the facts of a particular case. Moreover, it appears that the

plaintiff in Davis did not raise any of the grounds that we

have identified as potentially distinguishing this case from

Warren. Thus, should Blair-Bey present evidence on any of

these points, the specific holding of Davis would not necessarily control even the district court's interpretation of D.C. law

(although Davis's methodology would of course guide its

analysis).

III. Conclusion

In sum, we conclude that this case is not subject to the

filing-fee rules of the PLRA, and that the district court erred

__________

12 There is also a question whether parole regulations count as

"laws" at all for purposes of the constitutional prohibition on "ex

post facto laws." Compare Flemming v. Oregon Board of Parole,

998 F.2d 721 (9th Cir. 1993) (Oregon's parole regulations are "laws"

for ex post facto purposes) with Bailey v. Gardebring, 940 F.2d

1150, 1156 (8th Cir. 1991) (Minnesota's are not); see also Bailey,

940 F.2d at 1157 (reviewing cases addressing this issue). Warren

declined to resolve this issue, see 659 F.2d at 197 n.57, and so do we

at so early a stage in the litigation.

in finding that D.C. Code section 16-1901 barred the federal

courts from considering Blair-Bey's habeas corpus petition.

We also find that the United States Parole Commission

should be dismissed as a party to this action. On the merits,

we find that Blair-Bey's due process claim is without foundation. However, because it is possible that Blair-Bey may be

able to make out an ex post facto claim, we remand that part

of his case for reconsideration in accordance with the principles set forth in this opinion.

So ordered.

USCA Case #96-5280 Document #369769 Filed: 07/24/1998 Page 26 of 26