Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00285/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00285-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1331pr Fed. Question: Federal Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

DAVID B. TURNER, 

 Plaintiff,

v. 

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, 

 Defendant.

 Case No.: 17cv285-WQH-MDD 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED 

STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

RE: DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO 

DISMISS 

[ECF No. 4] 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States 

District Judge William Q. Hayes pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local 

Civil Rule 72.1(c) of the United States District Court for the Southern 

District of California. For the reasons set forth herein, the Court 

RECOMMENDS that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED. 

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

 Plaintiff David B. Turner, who is proceeding without the assistance of 

counsel, brings this action against the County of San Diego, California. (ECF 

No. 1). On February 13, 2017, Plaintiff filed his Complaint pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. It sets forth four claims alleging violations of his civil rights 

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by the County of San Diego. (Id.). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges Fourth, 

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment violations stemming from various 

altercations which took place from December 2015 to February 2016.1 On 

April 3, 2017, Defendant, County of San Diego, filed this motion to dismiss all 

counts. (ECF No. 4-1). 

 Defendant contends that: (1) Plaintiff’s claims are insufficient to impute 

liability against a municipality per the requirements set forth in Monell v. 

New York City Dept. of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) or City of Canton v. 

Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989); (2) Plaintiff’s first claim is time barred; and (3) 

Plaintiff’s second claim fails to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment 

because he does not allege facts sufficient to support the objective 

requirement for a civil rights claim for cruel and unusual punishment. (ECF 

No. 4-1 at 2). 

 Plaintiff opposes the motion to dismiss on the grounds that: (1) the 

statute of limitations has not run on Claim 1, and the claim was not properly 

answered as required by Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) 

the allegations in Claim 2 are predicated on the “policies on sexual 

harassment, and policies on human dignity and respect during visual cavity 

searches conducted by County of San Diego employees that showed deliberate 

indifference to [Plaintiff’s] constitutional, and ‘personal rights;’” (3) Claim 3 

was not properly answered pursuant to Rule 55, and “deal[s] with policies on 

sexual harassment, human dignity and respect during service of the morning 

meal by County of San Diego employees. . .that policy was the moving force 

 

1 Plaintiff’s complaint numbers his claims as follows: 1 (pg. 3), 1A (pg. 4), 2 (pg.17), and 3 

(pgs. 17 and 87). For the purposes of this Report and Recommendation the claims shall be 

numbered 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. 

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behind the constitutional violations in [the] count;” and (4) “the County of 

San Diego’s policies. . .[are] the mov[ing] force behind the civil rights 

violations that cause[d] Turners [sic] injury.” (ECF No. 7 at 4). 

 Defendant replies that Plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to support 

his claims against the County by failing to identify a policy or pattern as 

required to impute liability to a municipality. (ECF No. 8). 

II. BACKGROUND FACTS

 The facts are taken from Plaintiff’s Complaint and are not to be 

construed as findings of fact by the Court. 

 The Complaint alleges the County violated Plaintiff’s constitutional 

rights on four separate occasions while he was in custody. (ECF No. 1). The 

only named defendant is the County. There are no individually named 

defendants in this action.2 The first incident took place on December 12, 

2015, when Plaintiff was placed in “overly tight hand-cuffs” and attacked by a 

“crazy inmate,” whom the deputies mistakenly allowed to be placed in the 

same holding cell as Plaintiff. (ECF No. 1 at 3).3 The second incident 

occurred on January 22, 2016, when Plaintiff asked another inmate for a 

“hot-tray,” to which Deputy Tillman replied, “You can get a peace [sic] of this 

dick.” (ECF No. 1 at 17).4 The third incident happened on February 12, 

2016, when, “in the scope of his employment deputy Johnson unreasonab[ly] 

perform[ed] a[n] unreasonably [sic] cavity search on [the Plaintiff] by jaming 

[sic] his thumb or finger into [Plaintiff’s] rectal cavity, and sqeezing [sic] 

 

2 “As a general rule, the use of "John Doe" to identify a defendant is not favored.” Gillespie 

v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing Wiltsie v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 406 F.2d 

515, 518 (9th Cir. 1968)). 

3 Claim 1 

4 Claim 3 

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[Plaintiff’s] genitals.” (ECF No. 1 at 47).5 The final incident occurred on 

February 21, 2016, when Plaintiff, while nude, was cavity searched in the 

outside yard at night. (ECF No. 1 at 4). Plaintiff alleges a deputy taking 

part in the search remarked, “I seen a lot of ass tonight” and told Plaintiff to 

“open up wider.” (ECF No. 1 at 4).6

 During this time Plaintiff filed a number of Prisoner Grievance Reports 

regarding each incident, all of which appear to have been acknowledged by 

prison officials. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff included the Prisoner Grievance 

Reports and subsequent replies in the Complaint presumably to show he 

exhausted his administrative remedies. 

III. LEGAL STANDARD 

“A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of a claim.” Navarro 

v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). “Under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a short and plain statement of the 

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009) (internal quotations omitted). The pleader must 

provide the Court with “more than an un-adorned, the-defendant-unlawfully 

harmed-me accusation.” Id. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 

U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of 

action, supported by mere conclusory statements will not suffice.” Id. 

“Although for the purposes of a motion to dismiss [a court] must take all of 

the factual allegations in the complaint as true, [a court is] not bound to 

accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Id. 

(internal quotations omitted). 

 

5 Claim 4 

6 Claim 2 

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A pro se pleading is construed liberally on a defendant’s motion to 

dismiss for failure to state a claim. Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 

(9th Cir. 2002) (citing Ortez v. Washington Cnty., 88 F.3d 804, 807 (9th Cir. 

1996)). The pro se pleader must still set out facts in his complaint that bring 

his claims “across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. 

at 570. 

A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of deficiencies in the complaint and 

an opportunity to amend, unless the complaint’s deficiencies cannot be cured 

by amendment. See Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987). 

IV. DISCUSSION 

A. Municipal Liability under Monell 

"To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential 

elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United 

States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a 

person acting under the color of State law." Long v. County of Los Angeles, 

442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006). 

The Supreme Court held in Monell, that "municipalities are not 

completely immune from suit under § 1983." 436 U.S. 658 at 701. 

Nevertheless, “a municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs 

a tortfeasor—or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under 

§1983 on a respondeat superior theory." Id. at 691 (emphasis in original); see 

also Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997). 

Consequently, “[a] municipality is responsible for a constitutional 

violation, ... , only when an ‘action [taken] pursuant to [an] official municipal 

policy of some nature’ caused the violation.” Castro v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 

797 F.3d 654, 670 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 691). “Official 

municipal policy includes the decisions of a government’s lawmakers, the acts 

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of its policymaking officials, and practices so persistent and widespread as to 

practically have the force of law.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 

(2011). A policy “promulgated, adopted, or ratified by a local governmental 

entity’s legislative body unquestionably satisfies Monell’s policy 

requirement.” Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9th Cir. 

1989), overruled on other grounds by Bull v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 

595 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). 

In the absence of an explicit policy, a plaintiff may establish a 

municipal liability claim by showing the existence of a permanent and wellsettled practice or custom of the municipality which gave rise to the alleged 

constitutional violation. See City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 

(1988); Navarro v. Block, 72 F.3d 712, 6 714-15 (9th Cir. 1996); Thompson, 

885 F.2d at 1444 (9th Cir. 1989). Allegations of random acts, or single 

instances of misconduct, however, are insufficient to establish a municipal 

custom. See Navarro, 72 F.3d at 714; Thompson, 885 F.2d at 1444. But, once 

the plaintiff has demonstrated that a custom existed, the plaintiff need not 

also demonstrate that “official policy-makers had actual knowledge of the 

practice at issue.” Navarro, 72 F.3d at 714-15; see Thompson, 885 F.2d at 

1444. But see Blair v. City of Pomona, 223 F.3d 1074, 1080 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(Municipalities attempting to defeat a Monell claim bear the burden of 

showing “that the custom was not known to the policy-makers.”). 

Lastly, the plaintiff may establish a municipal liability claim by 

alleging constitutional violations caused by a failure to train municipal 

employees adequately. See City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388-91; Price v. Sery, 

513 F.3d 962, 973 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Such a showing requires three elements: (1) the training program must 

be inadequate “‘in relation to the tasks the particular officers must perform;’” 

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(2) the city officials must have been deliberately indifferent “‘to the rights of 

persons with whom the [local officials] come into contact;’” and (3) the 

inadequacy of the training “must be shown to have ‘actually caused’ the 

constitutional deprivation at issue.” Merritt v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 875 F.2d 

765, 770 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted). 

B. Pleading Standard under Monell

 To state a claim for municipal liability against an entity defendant, a 

plaintiff must allege that the entity itself caused the violation through a 

constitutionally deficient policy, practice or custom. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. 

The Supreme Court held in Twombly and Iqbal that conclusory statements 

that merely recite the elements of a claim are insufficient for the purpose of 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 

(“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.”); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (“a 

plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ 

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the 

elements of a cause of action will not do”). “A plaintiff must identify the . . . 

policies [or customs] . . . , explain how such policy [or custom] was deficient, 

and explain how such a deficiency caused harm to the plaintiff. Young v. City 

of Visalia, 687 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1149-50 (E.D. Cal. 2009). “In other words, a 

plaintiff must allege ‘specific facts giving rise to a plausible Monell claim’ 

instead of ‘formulaic recitations of the existence of unlawful policies, customs, 

or habits.’” Austen v. Cty. of Los Angeles, Case No. 15cv7372-DDP-FFM, 2017 

WL 1364579, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2017) (quoting Warner v. Cty. of San 

Diego, Case No. 3:10cv1057 BTM (BLM,) 2011 WL 662993, at *3 (S.D. Cal. 

Feb. 14, 2011)). Accordingly, a conclusory allegation regarding the existence 

of a policy or custom unsupported by factual allegations is insufficient. 

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C. Plaintiff’s Monell Claims 

Plaintiff fails to explicitly allege a policy or custom in his complaint. 

(ECF No. 1 at 3, 4, 47). He also fails to allege any relationship between the 

alleged violations and a policy or custom. (ECF No. 1 at 3, 4, 47). The only 

allegation containing any suggestion of a pattern is found in Claim 3, when it 

states Plaintiff was an “ongoing target of sexual abuse, harassment and 

intimidation by San Diego County and there [sic] employee’s [sic].” (ECF No. 

1 at 17) (emphasis added). The mere use of the word “ongoing” is insufficient 

to allege an express policy, a widespread practice, or involvement by a final 

policymaker. See Ayla v. KC Envtl. Health, 426 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1095 (E.D. 

Cal. 2006), aff’d, 262 Fed. Appx. 27 (9th Cir. 2007) (“A plaintiff can establish 

a ‘policy or custom’ by showing: (1) an express policy that, when enforced, 

causes a constitutional deprivation; (2) a widespread practice that, although 

not authorized by written law or express municipal policy, is so permanent 

and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with force of law; or (3) an 

allegation that the constitutional injury was caused by a person with final 

policymaking authority.”). Further, an "improper custom may not be 

predicated on isolated or sporadic incidents; it must be founded upon 

practices of sufficient duration, frequency and consistency that the conduct 

has become a traditional method for carrying out policy." Trevino v. Gates, 99 

F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir.1996). Here, Plaintiff’s Monell claim hinges on one 

word in one count in the complaint, which alone is too distended to support 

extrapolation of a policy or custom. A court may not “supply essential 

elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 

F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Finally, a court cannot consider as allegations 

facts Plaintiff asserts for the first time in his opposition. See Schneider v. 

Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998) (“In determining 

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the propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a court may not look beyond the 

complaint to a plaintiff’s moving papers, such as a memorandum in 

opposition to a defendant’s motion to dismiss.”) (emphasis in original)). 

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ Motion to 

Dismiss all of Plaintiff’s claims be GRANTED and all counts as to Defendant 

County of San Diego be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 

V. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED that: 

1) Defendant’s Motion be GRANTED as to all of the claims set forth in 

his complaint. 

This Report and Recommendation will be submitted to the United 

States District Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party may file written objections with the court and 

serve a copy on all parties by July 24, 2017. The document shall be 

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” Any reply to the 

objections shall be served and filed by July 31, 2017. 

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the 

specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the 

court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: July 7, 2017

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