Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_15-cv-02502/USCOURTS-cand-5_15-cv-02502-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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5:15-cv-02502-RMW

ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF MOT. IN LIMINE NO. 1 TO EXCLUDE EXPERT TESTIMONY AND DOCUMENTS

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

SHIOW-HUEY CHANG,

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 5:15-cv-02502-RMW 

ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION IN 

LIMINE NO. 1 TO EXCLUDE EXPERT 

TESTIMONY AND DOCUMENTS

Re: Dkt. No. 94

In this case involving allegations of excessive force by police officers during a traffic stop,

plaintiff Shiow-Huey Chang moves to exclude certain opinions of defendants’ police conduct 

expert Robert Fonzi. Dkt. No. 94. Defendants oppose. Dkt. No. 101. Plaintiff’s motion is 

GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as follows.

A. Fonzi’s Opinions 1 and 2 Regarding Reasonable Suspicion for the Traffic Stop 

and Probable Cause to Arrest Plaintiff

Plaintiff moves to exclude Fonzi’s opinions that defendants had reasonable suspicion to 

pull over plaintiff’s vehicle and probable cause to arrest her. Dkt. No. 94 at 3-4. “Expert testimony 

is admissible pursuant to Rule 702 if it is both relevant and reliable.” Mukhtar v. California State 

University, 299 F.3d 1053, 1063 (9th Cir. 2002), overruled on other grounds by Estate of Barabin 

v. AstenJohnson, Inc., 740 F.3d 457, 467 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). Plaintiff’s claims in the instant 

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ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF MOT. IN LIMINE NO. 1 TO EXCLUDE EXPERT TESTIMONY AND DOCUMENTS

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case involve excessive use of force; plaintiff does not assert that the traffic stop or arrest were 

themselves unconstitutional. Thus, the court agrees with plaintiff that Fonzi’s opinions on 

reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop and probable cause to arrest plaintiff are irrelevant. See 

Minter v. Galios, No. 12-cv-02905-JSC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36954, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 

2014) (excluding opinion on probable cause for traffic stop as irrelevant to excessive force claim).

Plaintiff’s motion to exclude these opinions is granted.

B. Fonzi’s Opinion 3 Regarding the Reasonableness of Defendants’ Use of Force

Plaintiff moves to exclude Fonzi’s opinion that Deputies Forest and Strickland used 

reasonable force to arrest plaintiff. Dkt. No. 94 at 4-5. Plaintiff argues that Fonzi is improperly 

opining on the ultimate issue that the jury must decide. An expert opinion “is not objectionable 

just because it embraces an ultimate issue.” Fed. R. Evid. 704(a). “However, an expert witness 

cannot give an opinion as to her legal conclusion, i.e., an opinion on an ultimate issue of law.” 

Mukhtar, 299 F.3d at 1065 n.10. Several district courts in the Ninth Circuit have precluded police 

conduct experts from opining on whether officers’ use of force was unreasonable or excessive. 

See, e.g., Jaramillo v. City of San Mateo, No.13-cv-00441-NC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8796, at *3 

(N.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2015); Martinez v. Davis, No. CV 05-5684 ABC (JEMx), 2011 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 15406, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2011); Jimenez v. Sambrano, No. 04cv1833-L(PCL), 2009 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67060, *8-9 (S.D. Cal July 31, 2009). 

Defendants assert that Fonzi does not intend to offer opinion testimony “on the legality of 

the defendants’ use of force, but should be able to offer testimony generally as to policies, 

procedures and uses of force in light of those policies and procedures.” Dkt. No. 101 at 3. 

In light of the authority cited above and defendants’ clarification, Fonzi’s opinions on 

whether defendants’ use of force was unreasonable or excessive are inadmissible. While it is not 

clear that specialized knowledge is necessary or helpful to understand the police policies and 

procedures that are at stake here, see Fed. R. Evid. 702(a), the court will allow Fonzi to testify 

regarding police policies on force in general.

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ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF MOT. IN LIMINE NO. 1 TO EXCLUDE EXPERT TESTIMONY AND DOCUMENTS

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C. Fonzi’s Opinion 4 on Whether Defendants’ Conduct Was Lawful and 

Whether Others Would Respond in the Same Manner

Plaintiff seeks to exclude Fonzi’s opinion that “Deputies Forest and Strickland followed 

appropriate law, department policies, and training as it relates to reasonable suspicion, probable 

cause, arrest, and the use of force.” Dkt. No. 94-2 at 6. Defendants concede that testimony 

regarding the legality of the deputies’ conduct is an improper legal conclusion, but defendants 

argue that testimony on Sheriff’s Department policies and training in general would be within the 

proper scope of expert testimony. Dkt. No. 101 at 3. As with the proffered testimony regarding 

reasonable use of force, the court will not allow Mr. Fonzi to testify regarding whether defendants’ 

actions were lawful or appropriate. He can, however, testify generally as to the factors an officer 

must take into consideration in the use of force and whether the County’s policies regarding the 

use of force are in accordance with sound police practices. 

Plaintiff also seeks to exclude Fonzi’s opinion that “such circumstances, if repeated, would 

predictably cause trained law enforcement personnel to respond and act in the same manner 

regardless of jurisdiction or agency.” Plaintiff points out that another court in this district has 

found a nearly identical opinion from Fonzi speculative. M.H. v. County of Alameda, No. 

11-cv-02868-JST, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 445, at *8 (N.D. Cal. January 2, 2015) (granting motion 

to preclude Fonzi from testifying that “[the] circumstances [of decedent Harrison’s intake and 

incarceration], if repeated, would predictably cause trained law enforcement personnel to respond 

and act in the same manner regardless of jurisdiction or agency”). Defendants’ opposition does not 

address this aspect of plaintiff’s motion. This court agrees that Fonzi’s proffered testimony is 

speculative, and plaintiff’s motion to exclude it is granted.

D. Fonzi’s Opinion On the Deputies’ Propensities for Violence and Racial Bias

Plaintiff seeks to exclude Fonzi’s opinion that defendants have no propensity for violence 

or racial bias on the grounds that Fonzi is not an expert on these subjects. Dkt. No. 94 at 6-7. 

Defendants’ opposition does not address this aspect of plaintiff’s motion. 

The court initially notes that “propensity” evidence is ordinarily inadmissible to prove that 

on a particular occasion, a person acted in accordance with their propensity. See Fed. R. Evid. 

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ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF MOT. IN LIMINE NO. 1 TO EXCLUDE EXPERT TESTIMONY AND DOCUMENTS

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404(a). If, however, plaintiff attempts to show that the County knew or should have known that 

defendants have propensities for violence and/or racial bias, defendants would be entitled to rebut 

those arguments.

The specific opinions that plaintiff seeks to exclude come from page 6 of Fonzi’s report:

Based on my review of Deputy Forrest’s and Strickland's personnel 

file and a comprehensive list of vehicle stops by Deputy Forest 

(statistical data encompassing 48 pages listing several hundred 

vehicle stops) it is clear that there is no pattern of behavior on the 

part of either deputy that is of concern. In fact, the documents 

support that there is no evidence that indicates a racial bias and/or a 

propensity for excessive force on the part of either deputy. There is 

no clear evidence that has been produced that will show that either 

deputy (Forest or Strickland) had a propensity to engage in 

excessive force.

Dkt. No. 94-2 at 6. Plaintiff’s only challenge to these opinions is that Fonzi is not qualified to 

provide them.1Fonzi’s report indicates that “[w]ith over 19 years of experience, [he has] trained 

approximately 10,000 law enforcement officers from all over the country” and that his “expertise 

is extensive in the use of force and police procedures.” Id. at 2. The court is satisfied that Fonzi

has sufficient experience and qualifications to analyze the records of defendants’ vehicle stops and 

form opinions on whether there is a pattern of racial bais and/or a propensity for excessive force, 

to the extent that these topics become relevant. Plaintiff’s motion to exclude this testimony is 

deferred. 

E. Fonzi’s Opinions on Collateral Matters

Finally, plaintiff moves to exclude Fonzi’s opinions on topics that are not set for trial, 

including: (1) that there was no need for the deputies to wait to arrest Chang until their supervisor 

arrived; and (2) that it was reasonable Deputy Forest did not have his lapel microphone on during 

 

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Testimony from a qualified expert is permissible if: 

(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the 

trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the 

testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of 

reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied the 

principles and methods to the facts of the case.

Fed. R. Evid. 702.

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ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF MOT. IN LIMINE NO. 1 TO EXCLUDE EXPERT TESTIMONY AND DOCUMENTS

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the incident. Dkt. No. 94 at 7. Plaintiffs’ motion to exclude testimony on these topics is granted as 

unopposed. Dkt. No. 101 at 2. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 18, 2016

______________________________________

Ronald M. Whyte

United States District Judge

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