Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01827/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01827-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANGELICA MARTINEZ, et al., CASE NO. CV F 06-1827 LJO TAG

Plaintiffs, ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS

vs. (Doc. 33.)

COUNTY OF KERN,

Defendants.

 /

INTRODUCTION

In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“section 1983") and related action alleging wrongful death of a foster

care child, defendants Moss Beach Homes, Inc., MBH, Inc. and Aspira Foster and Family Services

(collectively “MBH”) seek to dismiss plaintiffs Angelica Martinez and Fernando Ybarra’s (collectively

“plaintiffs’”) section 1983 cause of action on grounds that MBH is not a state actor for section 1983

purposes. This Court considered MBH’s motion to dismiss on the record and VACATES the April 13,

2007 hearing, pursuant to this Court’s Local Rule 78-230(h). For the reasons discussed below, this

Court DISMISSES plaintiffs’ First Cause of Action for Deprivation of Familial Relationship in

Violation of the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against

MBH.

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Kern County and its Departments of Human Services and Child Protective Services will be referred to 1

collectively as the “Kern Defendants.”

2

BACKGROUND

MBH is a private, non-profit, public benefit corporation and is a California licensed foster family

agency which locates foster homes for court dependent children. Plaintiffs are parents of infant FYM

who died while in foster care after he had been involuntarily removed from plaintiffs and adjudicated

a dependent of the Kern County Juvenile Court.

Plaintiffs proceed on their first amended complaint which alleges that MBH, under color of law

for section 1983 purposes, placed FYM and his two siblings in the foster home of defendant Shirley

Francisco (“Ms. Francisco”) where FYM died. The first amended complaint also names as defendants

Kern County, its Departments of Human Services and Child Protective Services and social workers 1

Helen Jenkins (“Ms. Jenkins”) and Jenee Morris (“Ms. Morris”). The first amended complaint alleges

that MBH and the Kern defendants breached duties and violated California regulations as to

investigation, supervision, training and monitoring of Ms. Francisco, Ms. Jenkins and Ms. Morris. 

More specifically, the first amended complaint alleges against all defendants a first cause of

action entitled “Deprivation of Familial Relationship in Violation of the First Amendment and Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988.” According to

plaintiffs, the first cause of action states a claim for deprivation of plaintiffs’ familial relationship with

FYM to violate theFirst Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The first cause

of action alleges MBH and the Kern defendants:

. . . knew or should have known that their training, policies, customs, and practices

regarding the custody, care and protection of dependent minors such as Decedent were

so inadequate that the failure to correct them would result in future incidents of injuries

to, or the death of, dependent minors, such as Plaintiff.

The first cause of action further alleges that MBH and the Kern defendants:

. . . authorized and/or acquiesced in . . . training, policies, customs and practices and the

commission of the type of acts by their employees agents similar to those which are

alleged herein to have caused injuries to Plaintiffs and Decedent. Furthermore, said

Defendants were deliberately indifferent to the probability of the occurrence of such acts

and failed to correct said training, policies, customs and practices, thereby causing the

damages alleged herein.

Furthermore, the first cause of action alleges that MBH and the Kern defendants “maintained or

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permitted an official policy, custom or practice of knowingly permitting the occurrence of the type of

wrongs” alleged by plaintiffs and “were objectively indifferent . . . to the practice of subordinates,

employees and/or agents of said Defendants of being objectively and subjectively indifferent to the

health and safety of dependent minors such as Decedent.”

The first amended complaint alleges a (second) negligence/wrongful death cause of action

against all defendants, including MBH, and a (third) battery/wrongful death cause of action against Ms.

Francisco.

MBH pursues a F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the first cause of action on grounds MBH

neither acted under color of law nor deprived plaintiffs of rights secured under the Constitution or

federal laws. MBH contends that the first amended complaint “fail[s] to state any constitutional

violation attributable to MBH” in that:

1. MBH is not vicariously liable for allegations solely attributable to Kern County;

2. The first amended complaint lacks factual contentions against MBH on which to base a

constitutional violation; and

3. The first amended complaint’s allegations of state law violations fail to support

constitutional violations.

As to it, MBH characterizes the first amended complaint as a state tort claim for wrongful death.

Plaintiffs argue that dismissal of the first cause of action “would serve no purpose other than to

prematurely and unnecessarily adjudicate a novel cause of action before necessary, inevitable and

unavoidable discovery against MBH was conducted.” MBH responds that it “should not be forced to

engage in burdensome and costly discovery regarding claims that cannot be stated against MBH.”

DISCUSSION

F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) Motion To Dismiss Standards

MBH seeks dismissal of the first cause of action under F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted. A F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is a challenge to the

sufficiency of the pleadings set forth in the complaint. A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim

should not be granted unless it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts to support

the claim to entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229

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(1984) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99 (1957)); see also Palmer v. Roosevelt

Lake Log Owners Ass’n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9 Cir. 1981). When addressing a motion to dismiss,

th

a court must accept as true the complaint’s allegations in question, Hospital Bld. Co. v. Rex Hospital

Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740, 96 S.Ct. 1848 (1976), construe the pleading in light most favorable to the

party opposing the motion, and resolve all doubts in the pleader’s favor, Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S.

411, 421, 89 S.Ct. 1843, reh’g denied, 396 U.S. 869, 90 S.Ct. 35 (1969). The rule of liberal construction

is “particularly important in civil rights cases.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9 Cir.), cert. th

denied, 506 U.S. 915, 113 S.Ct. 321 (1992); Johnson v. State of Calif., 207 F.3d 650, 653 (9 Cir. 2000). th

“When a federal court reviews the sufficiency of a complaint, before the reception of any

evidence either by affidavit or admissions, its task is necessarily a limited one. The issue is not whether

a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the

claims.” Scheurer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683 (1974); Gilligan v. Jamco Development

Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 249 (9 Cir. 1997). A F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper where there is either th

a “lack of a cognizable legal theory” or “the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal

theory.” Balisteri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9 Cir. 1990); Graehling v. Village of th

Lombard, Ill., 58 F.3d 295, 297 (7 Cir. 1995). th

As discussed below, plaintiffs have failed to establish via the first amended complaint that MBH

is a state actor for section 1983 purposes or that a constitutional violation is attributable to MBH. 

State Actor

Section 1983 provides:

Every person who, under the color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or

usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United

States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or

other proper proceedings for redress . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

To state a section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must plead that: (1) a defendant acted under color of

state law at the time the complained of act was committed; and (2) a defendant deprived plaintiff of

rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Gibson v.

United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9 Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1054, 107 S.Ct. 928 (1987). th

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Municipalities and other local government units are persons to whom section 1983 applies.

Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018 (1978); see also Board of County

Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 1387-1388 (1997); Van Ort v. Estate of Stanewich,

92 F.3d 831, 835 (9 Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 950 (1997); Hervey v. Estes, 65 F.3d 784, 791 th

(9 Cir. 1995). A defendant has acted under color of state law when he or she has “exercised power th

‘possessed by virtue ofstate law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with authority

of state law.’” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49, 108 S.Ct. 2250 (1988) (quoting United States v. Classic,

313 U.S. 299, 326, 61 S.Ct. 1031 (1941)); Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 317-318, 102 S.Ct. 445

(1981); Johnson v. Knowles, 113 F.3d 1114, 1117 (9 Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 559 (1997); Vang th

v. Xiong, 944 F.2d 476, 479 (9 Cir. 1991); Shah v. County of Los Angeles, 797 F.2d 743, 746 (9 Cir. th th

1986). Generally, private parties are not acting under color of state law. See Price v. Hawaii, 939 F.2d

702, 707-708 (9 Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 938, 112 S.Ct. 1479 (1992). “Only in rare th

circumstances can a private party be viewed as a ‘state actor’ for section 1983 purposes.” Harvey v.

Harvey, 949 F.2d 1127, 1130 (11 Cir. 1988). th

“When Congress enacted as the statutory remedy for violations of the Constitution, it specified

that the conduct at issue must have occurred ‘under color of’ state law; thus, liability attaches only to

those wrongdoers ‘who carry a badge of authority of a State and represent it in some capacity, whether

they act in accordance with their authority or misuse it.’” Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Tarkanian,

488 U.S. 179, 191, 109 S.Ct. 454, 462 (1988) (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172, 81 S.Ct. 473,

476 (1961)). “The ultimate issue in determining whether a person is subject to suit under § 1983 is the

same question posed in cases arising under the Fourteenth Amendment: is the alleged infringement of

federal rights fairly attributable to the [government]?” Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Med. Ctr., 192

F.3d 826, 835 (9 Cir. 1999) (quoting Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838, 102 S.Ct. 2764 th

(1982)).

Four different criteria or tests are employed to identify state action: “(1) public function; (2) joint

action; (3) governmental compulsion or coercion; and (4) governmental nexus.” Sutton, 192 F.3d at

835-836. Satisfaction of one of the tests is sufficient to find state action if “no countervailing factor

exists.” Kirtley v. Rainey, 326 F.3d 1088, 1092 (9 Cir. 2003). th

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Public Function

“Under the public function test, when private individuals or groups are endowed by the State

with powers orfunctions governmental in nature, they become agencies or instrumentalities of the State

and subject to its constitutional limitations.” Lee v. Katz, 276 F.3d 550, 554 (9 Cir.) (internal th

quotations marks omitted), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 905, 122 S.Ct. 2358 (2002). The public function test

is satisfied only on a showing that the function at issue is “both traditionally and exclusively

governmental.” Kirtley, 326 F.3d at 1093.

MBH contends that the state does not exclusively find foster homes or provide foster care. MBH

notes that as a foster family agency, it finds homes “to provide day to day care for dependent children

of the court.” California Health and Safety Code section 1502(4) defines a foster family agency as “any

organization engaged in the recruiting, certifying, and training of, and providing professional support

to, foster parents, or in finding homes or other places for placement of children for temporary or

permanent care who require that level of care as an alternative to a group home. Private foster family

agencies shall be organized and operated on a nonprofit basis.” MBH contends that itsfunction to locate

and oversee foster homes is not exclusively a government function in that California statutes provide

for foster home recruitment and certification by private non-profit organizations. MBH notes that the

process to certify “foster homes by a private foster family agency is distinguishable in a number of ways

from the process of licensing of foster homes by the state.” 

Turning to foster care, MBH argues that a state does not exclusively “care for minors who are

adjudicated to be abused and neglected by their natural parents.” MBH notes that it is merely a

“placement option for the county social worker” and that potential caregivers of dependent children

include foster homes, close relatives and natural parents. MBH points to California Welfare &

Institutions Code section 361.2(e), which provides:

(e) When the court orders removal pursuant to Section 361 [dependent child of

court], the court shall order the care, custody, control, and conduct of the child to be

under the supervision of the social worker [in countywelfare department] who may place

the child in any of the following:

(1) The home of a noncustodial parent . . .

(2) The approved home of a relative.

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(3) The approved home of a nonrelative extended family member . . .

(4) A foster home in which the child has been placed before an interruption in

foster care, if that placement is in the best interest of the child and space is available.

(5) A suitable licensed community care facility.

(6) With a foster family agency to be placed in a suitable licensed foster

family home or certified family home which has been certified by the agency as

meeting licensing standards.

(7) A home or facility in accordance with the federal Indian Child Welfare Act.

(8) A child under the age ofsix years may be placed in a community care facility

licensed as a group home for children, or a temporary shelter facility, or a temporary

shelter care facility . . . (Bold added.)

MBH argues that since it certifies foster families but does not provide foster care it is not a state

actor in that foster parents and foster care facilities have been found not to be state actors. See Mabe v.

San Bernardino County Dept. of Social Services, 237 F.3d 1101, 1109, n. 3 (9 Cir. 2001); Rayburn ex th

rel. Rayburn v. Hogue, 241 F.3d 1341, 1348 (11 Cir. 2001); Robert S. v. Stetson School, Inc., 256 F.3d th

159, 168, n. 9 (3 Cir. 2001). To bolster its contention that MBH does not engage in state action or rd

conduct, MBH points out that only peace officers and social workers are authorized to remove children

involuntarily from homes. See Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 305, 306. MBH correctly argues in its reply

papers that the state possesses custody, control and responsibility to place a child who is removed from

his/her parents by court order. MBH correctly points out that its power is limited to locate and certify

foster homes under California Health and Safety Code section 1502.

Plaintiffs characterize MBH’s activities as “placement” of minors who have been removed from

their parents and seized by the state. Plaintiffs contend that such placement “is an activity that is

traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state.”

Plaintiffs rely on Donlan v. Ridge, 58 F.Supp.2d 604, 610 (E.D. Pa. 1999), where the

Pennsylvania district court observed that “the forcible removal of [a] child from his homes by the foster

care agency was exclusively the prerogative of the state, because only the state could remove children

from their homes.” Plaintiffs also point to Harris ex rel. Litz v. Lehigh County Office of Children &

Youth Services, 418 F.Supp.2d 643, 651 (E.D. Pa. 2005), where the Pennsylvania district court again

focused on “removal” of children to note that foster care agencies perform an exclusive state prerogative

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“namely the removal of children from their homes.”

Removal of children is distinguishable from placement of children already removed from a

parental home by state authorities. MBH’s statutory powers are limited to child placement, not child

removal. Plaintiffs acknowledge that MBH did not seize FYM. Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate that foster

care placement of already removed children amounts to a traditionally and exclusively governmental

function. The authority on which plaintiffs rely fails to substantiate as much. As MBH notes, its role and

function is that of a private non-profit organization, not the state. 

Joint Action

Under the joint action test, a court considers whether “the state has so far insinuated itself into

a position of interdependence with the private entity that it must be recognized as a joint participant in

the challenged activity. This occurs when the state knowingly accepts the benefits derived from

unconstitutional behavior.” Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1486 (9 Cir. 1995). th

Courts examine whetherstate officials and private parties have acted in concert in effecting a particular

deprivation of constitutional rights. Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 445 (9 Cir. 2002). “A plaintiff may th

demonstrate joint action by proving the existence of a conspiracy or by showing that the private party

was ‘a willful participant in joint action with the State or its agents.’” Franklin, 312 F.3d at 445 (quoting

Collins v. Womancare, 878 F.2d 1145, 1154 (9 Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1056, 110 S.Ct. 865 th

(1990). The Ninth Circuit has been careful “to require a substantial degree of cooperation before

imposing civil liability for actions by private individuals that impinge on civil rights.” Franklin, 312

F.3d at 445.

MBH argues that plaintiffs fail to allege facts of joint action or substantial cooperation between

MBH and the state to satisfy the joint action test. Plaintiffs do not meaningfully challenge the absence

of joint action. As such, MBH cannot be found a state actor based on joint action. 

Compulsion Test

The compulsion test considers whether the “coercive influence” or “significant encouragement”

of the state effectively converts a private action into government action. Kirtley, 326 F.3d at 1094.

MBH argues that the first amended complaint fails to allege that the state compelled MBH’s actions or

has coercive influence on those actions. MBH concludes that its alleged unconstitutional actions were

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not transformed into state action due to government compulsion or coercion. Although plaintiffs assert

that MBH was “pervasively entwined” with state policy, plaintiffs fail to claim a requisite state coercive

influence or significant encouragement. MBH is a not a state actor based on the compulsion test. 

Nexus

The nexus test, arguably the most vague of the four approaches, asks whether “there is such a

close nexus between the State and the challenged action that the seemingly private behavior may be

fairly treated as that of the State itself.” Kirtley, 326 F.3d at 1095 (quoting Brentwood Acad. v.

Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295, 121 S.Ct. 924 (2001)). As noted by MBH,

the first amended complaint offers several bases that MBH is a state actor in that MBH: (1) is state

regulated; and (2) exercises delegated regulatory and enforcement functions and power to take

involuntarily custody, supervision, control and possession of a child. Plaintiffs argue there is a

sufficiently close nexus between the state and MBH in that MBH: (1) places and assigns minors

delivered to it because they had been involuntarily seized by and were in legal custody of the state; and

(2) has state delegated responsibility to supervise and monitor such placement. 

As to state regulation, the U.S. Supreme Court has observed that the “mere fact that a business

is subject to state regulation does not by itself convert its action into that of the State.” Jackson v.

Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351, 95 S.Ct. 449, 453 (1974). Assuch, MBH correctly points

out that its regulation by California does not transform it into a state actor.

To address the allegation that it exercises delegated regulatory and enforcement functions, MBH

notes that the California Department of Social Services investigates complaints, files accusations and

enforces statutes and regulations. MBH observes that it oversees homes it certifies for compliance with

foster care regulations and statutes. MBH analogizes its overseeing conduct to a building contractor who

follows building codes to construct a building. MBH claims that it has not been delegated authority to

enforce statutes and regulations. 

Turning to delegated authority to involuntarily seize minors, MBH again notes that its lacks such

authority in that applicable California statutes empower the state, not foster care agencies like MBH, to

seize minors. According to MBH, there is no support that when the county places a child in an MBH

home, all responsibility for the child, including custody, supervision, control and possession, is

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transferred to MBH, a private agency. MBH notes that the decision where to place a dependent child

rests with a state social worker, not MBH. See Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code, § 361.2(e). MBH points out

that it receives involuntarily removed children seized by child protective services or police, not MBH,

and that MBH does not forcibly detain minors in a locked facility. MBH concludes that the “nexus”

analysis fails because MBH was not delegated state duties to detain and involuntarily remove children.

MBH is correct that there is an absence of a close nexus between the state and the challenged

action to treat seemingly private behavior as that of the state. Again, MBH’s role and function is not

broad enough to construct an nexus to state actor status. In the foster care process, powers amounting

to state action rest with others, not MBH. MBH’s limited statutory role does not create the necessary

nexus to impose state actor status on it. 

Countervailing Factors

As noted by the Ninth Circuit in Kirtley, 326 F.3d at 1095, the United States Supreme Court has

challenged lower courts by stating that even facts that, standing alone, would require a finding of state

action “may be outweighed in the name of some value at odds with finding public accountability in the

circumstances.” Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 303, 121 S.Ct. 924. In an attempt to clarify confusion, the

Ninth Circuit has explained: “Although we have recognized several tests to determine where state action

lies, the central question remains whether ‘the alleged infringement of federal rights [is] fairly

attributable to the government.’” Kirtley, 326 F.3d at 1096 (quoting Sutton, 192 F.3d at 835). 

Countervailing factors do not support that MBH is a state actor in that the alleged infringement

is not attributable to a private non-profit agency, such as MBH.

Constitutional Violation Attributable To MBH

MBH contends that the first amended complaint fails to allege conduct of MBH to constitute a

constitutional violation. MBH argues that plaintiffs “toss in” MBH to allegations against the Kern

defendants. MBH points out that social workers Ms. Jenkins and Ms. Morris are not MBH

employees/agents whose conduct creates MBH liability. According to MBH, the first amended

complaint improperly attempts to impose vicarious liability on MBH based on Kern County policies

customs or practices. 

Plaintiffs counter that MBH had affirmative regulatory duties to supervise Ms. Francisco, to

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investigate her fitness as a foster parent, and to monitor her performance. Plaintiffs contend MBH was

obligated to “‘look’ for the truth” as to Ms. Francisco to determine her unfitness for foster care.

Plaintiffs ask this Court to “hold that a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against a private entity acting under color

of law can be based on vicarious liability.” Plaintiffs concede that “the majority of courts that had

considered the issue have held that a private corporation, like amunicipality, maynot be held vicariously

liable under section 1983.” 

A local government unit may not be held liable for the acts of its employees under a respondeat

superior theory. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018; Davis v. Mason County, 927 F.2d 1473, 1480

(9 Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 899, 112 S.Ct. 275 (1991); Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d th

1439, 1443 (9 Cir. 1989). The local government unit “itself must cause the constitutional deprivation.” th

Gilette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346 (9 Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 932, 114 S.Ct. 345 th

(1993). Because liability of a local governmental unit must rest on its actions, not the actions of its

employees, a plaintiff must go beyond the respondeat superior theory and demonstrate the alleged

constitutional violation was the product of a policy or custom of the local governmental unit. City of

Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385, 109 S.Ct. 1197 (1989); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475

U.S. 469, 478-480, 106 S.Ct. 1292 (1986). To maintain a section 1983 claim against a local

government, a plaintiff must establish the requisite culpability (a “policy or custom” attributable to

municipal policymakers) and the requisite causation (the policy or custom as the “moving force” behind

the constitutional deprivation). Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-694, 98 S.Ct. 2018; Gable v. City of Chicago,

296 F.3d 531, 537 (7 Cir. 2002). “[O]fficial policy must be ‘the moving force of the constitutional th

violation’ in order to establish the liability of a government body under § 1983.” Polk County v.

Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326, 102 S.Ct. 445 (1981) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018)); see

Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-377, 96 S.Ct. 598 (1976) (general allegation of administrative

negligence fails to state a constitutional claim cognizable under section 1983). 

Plaintiffs ask this Court to stretch section 1983 liability to impose vicarious liability on a private

entity, when such liability is not even imposed on municipalities subject to a section 1983 claim. This

Court will not engage in such judicial activism. Plaintiffs point this Court to no authority to do so, and

their reliance on law review commentary is insufficient to pass meaningful scrutiny for the great step

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In fact, Donlan, 58 F.Supp.2d at 608 (on which plaintiffs relies), mitigates plaintiffs’ point in that the court 2

observed that a statutory violation alone is insufficient to establish a necessary constitutional right violation to prevail on a

section 1983 claim.

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they ask of this Court. Moreover, plaintiffs fail to establish that MBH faces section 1983 liability

because it is subject to California foster care regulations. 

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Standing

MBH argues that plaintiffs lack standing to assert a claim for FYM’s seizure in that such claim

is personal to FYM only. “Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which . . . may not be

vicariously asserted.” Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174, 89 S.Ct. 961 (1969). “Thus, the

general rule is that only the person whose Fourth Amendment rights were violated can sue to vindicate

those rights.” Moreland v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dept., 159 F.3d 365, 369 (9 Cir. 1998). “While

th

a person has standing to challenge the seizure of his or her own person . . . a person does not have

standing to vicariously assert the Fourth Amendment rights of another person.” Osborne v. County of

Riverside, 385 F.Supp.2d 1048, 1052 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (citing Moreno v. Baca, 400 F.3d 1152, 1166 (9

th

Cir. 2005); Moreland, 159 F.3d at 369).

Despite MBH standing arguments, plaintiffs demonstrate that they allege claims personal to them

for deprivation of familial relationship with FYM. MBH’s standing argument is of no avail.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

In short, plaintiffs have failed to establish that MBH’s alleged conduct constitutes state action

to impose section 1983 liability on MBH. Plaintiffsfail to explain how or what further they could allege

to qualify MBH as a state actor to warrant a further attempt to amend their complaint. As such, on the

basis of good cause, this Court:

1. DISMISSES only the First Cause of Action for Deprivation of Familial Relationship in

Violation of the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment against defendants Moss Beach Homes, Inc., MBH, Inc. and Aspira Foster

and Family Services; and

2. ORDERS defendants Moss Beach Homes,Inc., MBH,Inc. and Aspira Foster and Family

Services, no later than April 25, 2007, to file a responsive pleading to plaintiffs’ second

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cause of action for Negligence Causing Wrongful Death Under California Law.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 6, 2007 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

66h44d UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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