Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_22-cv-01773/USCOURTS-caed-2_22-cv-01773-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEVEN LEE MORTENSEN,

Plaintiff,

v. 

TARAH FOSTER, 

Defendant.

No. 2:22-cv-01773-DJC-CKD P

ORDER

Plaintiff is a former county inmate proceeding without counsel. Plaintiff seeks relief 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and is proceeding in forma pauperis. This proceeding was referred 

to this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Rule 302. 

Pending before the court are plaintiff’s amended complaint and defendant Foster’s motion 

to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure.1

 The court will screen plaintiff’s amended complaint and then address the pending 

motion to dismiss in light of the screening order. 

I. Screening Requirement

 As plaintiff was previously advised, the court is required to screen complaints brought by 

prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental 

1 Defendant Foster’s motion is alternatively plead as a motion for a more definite statement 

pursuant to Rule 12(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

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entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the 

prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from 

such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2).

II. Allegations in the Amended Complaint

At all times relevant to the allegations in the amended complaint, plaintiff was a prisoner 

in the Butte County Jail, although he does not indicate if he was a pretrial detainee or if he was 

serving a sentence. Named as defendants are Tarah Foster, the program manager of medical 

grievances for Wellpath Medical Group, and eight correctional officers employed at the jail. 

At the beginning of his amended complaint, plaintiff states the general legal standard for 

alleging a civil rights violation and then describes the permanent damage he sustained to his left 

wrist and arm while in custody.

In his first claim for relief, plaintiff asserts that defendant Foster denied him medical 

attention after speaking to his doctor as part of reviewing his medical grievance. She also falsely 

documented treatment that never happened and failed to conduct an investigation into his lack of 

treatment. 

Next plaintiff contends that defendants Hawk and Francesu tried to force him to go back 

to his housing unit after plaintiff told them that he had safety concerns with other inmates housed 

there. The amended complaint does not indicate whether plaintiff was returned to this housing 

unit. Instead, plaintiff’s right hand was forced behind his back by defendant Hawk as plaintiff 

was reaching for a razor blade. During this encounter, plaintiff sustained two cuts from the razor 

blade. Defendant Francesu was calling plaintiff names and taunting him about using the razor 

blade to commit suicide.

Defendant Freese did not report the misconduct committed by these officers and allowed 

defendant Francesu to transport plaintiff to an outside hospital even though he had verbally 

degraded plaintiff in the past. According to plaintiff, these actions amounted to professional 

misconduct by defendant Freese.

Next, plaintiff asserts that defendants Hoovey and Agurkis showed deliberate indifference 

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to his serious medical needs when they reviewed his medical grievances. Their professional 

misconduct caused plaintiff permanent physical damage. 

Defendant Brownfield opened plaintiff’s legal and medical documents on ten occasions in 

violation of jail policy that requires legal mail to be opened in the presence of the inmate. 

Plaintiff’s mail that was opened concerned staff misconduct complaints filed by plaintiff.

Lastly, plaintiff describes defendant Yee’s presence at two of his outside medical 

appointments. During the last appointment, plaintiff contends that defendant Yee transported him 

two hours late for his surgical appointment. It is not clear whether this appointment had to be 

rescheduled to a later date. Plaintiff also asserts that defendant Yee did not tell jail grievance 

officials the truth about what occurred at plaintiff’s outside medical appointments which caused a 

delay and denial in necessary medical treatment. 

III. Analysis 

Although the Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, a complaint must give fair 

notice and state the elements of the claim plainly and succinctly. Jones v. Cmty. Redev. Agency, 

733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity 

overt acts which defendants engaged in that support plaintiff's claim. Id. 

In this case, the allegations against defendant Foster, Hoovey, and Agurkis fail to state a 

claim because they are all based on their actions performed during the review of plaintiff’s 

administrative grievances. However, a prison official’s action in reviewing an inmate grievance 

cannot serve as a basis for liability under Section 1983. Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 

(8th Cir. 1993). 

The excessive force allegations against defendant Hawk suggest that he was attempting to 

maintain or restore discipline because plaintiff admits that he was reaching for a razor blade at the

time. Therefore, plaintiff has not established that defendant Hawk’s actions were done 

maliciously or sadistically to cause harm as required for an excessive force claim. See Hudson v. 

McMillan, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992). 

Similarly, the amended complaint does not state a failure to protect claim against 

defendants Hawk and Francesu under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments because plaintiff 

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does not indicate that he was ever returned to the housing unit which he feared. Thus, it does not 

appear that plaintiff was ever exposed to a sufficiently substantial risk of serious harm by other 

prisoners. 

The allegations of professional misconduct against defendants Freese and Agurkis do not 

rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Violating jail policy or professional regulations do 

not state a valid federal claim for relief. 

The isolated incidents of mail tampering by defendant Brownfield do not include 

allegations that they were done for an improper motive or resulted in the denial of plaintiff’s

access to the courts. Thus, they do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Smith v. 

Maschner, 899 F.2d 940, 944 (10th Cir. 1990). 

The claim against defendant Yee is not sufficient to state a claim of deliberate indifference 

under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments because there are no facts indicating that the delay 

in transport actually caused plaintiff to miss a medical appointment. The amended complaint 

states that plaintiff was transported to his outside medical appointment, he just arrived late. 

Furthermore, plaintiff fails to link defendant Erwin to any of the alleged constitutional 

violations in the amended complaint. For all these reasons, the amended complaint must be 

dismissed for failing to state a claim against any defendant. The court will, however, grant 

plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint. 

If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions 

complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v. 

Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). Also, the complaint must allege in specific terms how 

each named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there 

is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. 

Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); 

Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Furthermore, vague and conclusory 

allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient. Ivey v. Bd. of 

Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). 

 In addition, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to 

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make plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended 

complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a 

general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 

F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no 

longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original 

complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 

IV. Plain Language Summary for Pro Se Party 

The following information is meant to explain this order in plain English and is not 

intended as legal advice. 

The court has reviewed the allegations in your first amended complaint and determined 

that they do not state any claim against the defendants. Your amended complaint is being 

dismissed, but you are being given one last chance to fix the problems identified in this order. 

Although you are not required to do so, you may file a second amended complaint within 

30 days from the date of this order. If you choose to file an amended complaint, pay particular 

attention to the legal standards attached to this order that may apply to your claims. An amended 

complaint should include: 1) the name of defendant(s); 2) the action(s) performed or failed to be 

performed by defendant(s); 3) the date or timeframe of the action(s); 4) how the action(s) caused 

injury to you; and, 5) the specific constitutional provision violated by defendant(s). 

 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

1. Plaintiff’s first amended complaint is dismissed with leave to amend for failing to state 

a claim upon which relief may be granted. 

2. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file a second

amended complaint. 

3. If plaintiff chooses to file a second amended complaint, he is specifically directed to 

indicate whether he was in custody as a pretrial detainee or was serving a sentence at 

the time of the events giving rise to the complaint.

4. Failure to file a second amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in 

a recommendation that this action be dismissed.

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5. Defendant Foster’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 19) is stricken from the docket as 

prematurely filed.2 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 

Dated: October 25, 2023 

12/mort1773.14amd.new+mtd

2

 No response to the amended complaint was ordered by the court. If plaintiff chooses to file a

second amended complaint, no response is required unless and until the court screens the 

amended complaint and determines that plaintiff has stated a cognizable claim for relief that 

warrants service of process.

_____________________________________

CAROLYN K. DELANEY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Legal Standards 

The following legal standards are provided based on plaintiff’s pro se status as well as the 

nature of the allegations in the complaint. 

I. Linkage 

The civil rights statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the 

actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 

(1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects' another to the deprivation of a 

constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates 

in another's affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that 

causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th 

Cir. 1978) (citation omitted). In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, plaintiff must 

link each named defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of 

plaintiff's federal rights.

II. Deliberate Indifference

Denial or delay of medical care for a prisoner’s serious medical needs may constitute a 

violation of the prisoner’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 

97, 104-05 (1976). An individual is liable for such a violation only when the individual is 

deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s serious medical needs. Id.; see Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 

1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006); Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002); Lopez v. 

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2000). 

 In the Ninth Circuit, the test for deliberate indifference consists of two parts. Jett, 439 

F.3d at 1096, citing McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050 (9th Cir. 1991), overruled on other 

grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). First, the 

plaintiff must show a “serious medical need” by demonstrating that “failure to treat a prisoner’s 

condition could result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of 

pain.’” Id., citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. “Examples of serious medical needs include ‘[t]he 

existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of 

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comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an 

individual’s daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain.’” Lopez, 203 F. 3d 

at 1131-1132, citing McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059-60. 

 Second, the plaintiff must show the defendant’s response to the need was deliberately 

indifferent. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. This second prong is satisfied by showing (a) a purposeful act 

or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the 

indifference. Id. Under this standard, the prison official must not only “be aware of facts from 

which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,” but that person 

“must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). This “subjective 

approach” focuses only “on what a defendant’s mental attitude actually was.” Id. at 839. A 

showing of merely negligent medical care is not enough to establish a constitutional violation. 

Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1130 (9th Cir. 1998), citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-106. A 

difference of opinion about the proper course of treatment is not deliberate indifference, nor does 

a dispute between a prisoner and prison officials over the necessity for or extent of medical 

treatment amount to a constitutional violation. See, e.g., Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058 

(9th Cir. 2004); Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). Furthermore, mere delay of 

medical treatment, “without more, is insufficient to state a claim of deliberate medical 

indifference.” Shapley v. Nev. Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). 

Where a prisoner alleges that delay of medical treatment evinces deliberate indifference, the 

prisoner must show that the delay caused “significant harm and that Defendants should have 

known this to be the case.” Hallett, 296 F.3d at 745-46; see McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060. 

III. Excessive Force

The Eighth Amendment prohibits prison officials from inflicting cruel and unusual 

punishment on inmates which has been defined as “the unnecessary and wanton infliction of 

pain.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). “[W]henever prison officials stand accused 

of using excessive physical force in violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the 

core judicial inquiry is... whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore 

discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S. 1, 7 

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(1992). The court’s inquiry into an excessive force claim focuses on the extent of the prisoner’s 

injury, the need for application of force, the relationship between that need and the amount of 

force used, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials, and any efforts made to 

temper the severity of a forceful response. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7 (1992) (quotation marks and 

citations omitted). While the absence of a serious injury is relevant to the Eighth Amendment 

inquiry, it does not end it. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. The malicious and sadistic use of force to 

cause harm always violates contemporary standards of decency in violation of the Eighth 

Amendment. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 327. 

Unlike a convicted prisoner who must bring an excessive force claim under the Eighth 

Amendment, a pretrial detainee brings an excessive force claim under the Fourteenth 

Amendment. Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1067-68 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). 

To state an excessive force claim, plaintiff must allege that the officer's use of force was (1) 

deliberate (in other words, purposeful or knowing); and (2) objectively unreasonable. Kingsley v. 

Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2472 (2015). With respect to the first element, an officer's 

negligent or accidental use of force is not sufficient. Id. As to the second element, objective 

reasonableness turns on the facts of each case, such as “the relationship between the need for the 

use of force and the amount of force used; the extent of the plaintiff's injury; any effort made by 

the officer to temper or to limit the amount of force; the severity of the security problem at issue; 

the threat reasonably perceived by the officer; and whether the plaintiff was actively resisting.” 

Id. at 2473. Objective reasonableness is assessed based on the information known to the officer 

at the time. Id. at 2474. 

IV. Failure to Protect

Under the Eighth Amendment, “prison officials have a duty to protect prisoners from 

violence at the hands of other prisoners.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994) (internal 

quotation marks, ellipsis, and citation omitted). However, “not . . . every injury suffered by one 

prisoner at the hands of another . . . translates into constitutional liability for prison officials 

responsible for the victim’s safety.” Id. at 834. A prison official may be held liable for an assault 

suffered by one inmate at the hands of another only where the assaulted inmate can show that the 

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injury is sufficiently serious, and that the prison official was deliberately indifferent to the risk of 

harm. Id. at 834, 837. Thus, the relevant inquiry is whether prison officials, “acting with 

deliberate indifference, exposed a prisoner to a sufficiently substantial risk of serious damage to 

his future health.” Id. at 834 (internal quotation omitted). To be deliberately indifferent, the 

“official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial 

risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. 

To the extent that plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at the time of the alleged violation, his 

right to safety arises from the Fourteenth Amendment. Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 

1060, 1067-1068 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). A prison official's failure to protect a pretrial 

detainee is actionable if four conditions are met: 

1. The defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the 

conditions under which the plaintiff was confined; 

2. Those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering 

serious harm; 

3. The defendant did not take reasonable available measures to abate 

that risk, even though a reasonable officer in the circumstances 

would have appreciated the high degree of risk involved—making 

the consequences of the defendant's conduct obvious; and 

4. By not taking such measures, the defendant caused the plaintiff's 

injuries.

Id. at 1071. As to the third element, the defendant's conduct must be objectively unreasonable. 

Id. 

V. Mail Interference

Under the First Amendment, prisoners have a right to send and receive mail. Witherow v. 

Paff, 52 F.3d 264, 265 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). However, a prison may adopt regulations or 

practices for inmate mail which limit a prisoner’s First Amendment rights as long as the 

regulations are “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Turner v. Safley, 482 

U.S. 78, 89, (1987). “When a prison regulation affects outgoing mail as opposed to incoming 

mail, there must be a ‘closer fit between the regulation and the purpose it serves.’” Witherow, 52 

F.3d at 265 (quoting Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 412 (1989)). Courts have also 

afforded greater protection to legal mail than non-legal mail. See Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 413. 

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Isolated incidents of mail interference or tampering will not support a claim under section 1983 

for violation of plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 351 (2d. Cir. 

2003); Gardner v. Howard, 109 F.3d 427, 431 (8th Cir. 1997); Smith v. Maschner, 899 F.2d 940, 

944 (10th Cir. 1990); see also Crofton v. Roe, 170 F.3d 957, 961 (9th Cir. 1999) (emphasizing 

that a temporary delay or isolated incident of delay of mail does not violate a prisoner's First 

Amendment rights). Generally, such isolated incidents must be accompanied by evidence of an 

improper motive on the part of prison officials or result in interference with an inmate’s right of 

access to the courts or counsel in order to rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Smith, 

899 F.2d at 944. 

A prison’s interference with legal mail may also violate an inmate’s right of access to the 

courts which is protected by the First Amendment’s right to petition the government and the due 

process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Snyder v. Nolen, 380 F.3d 279, 290-291 (7th 

Cir. 2004) (discussing the development of cases concerning a prisoner’s right of access to the 

courts). Prison officials may not actively interfere with an inmate’s right to litigate. Silva v. 

Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1103 (9th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds by Richey v. Dahne, 

807 F.3d 1202, 1209 n. 6 (9th Cir. 2015). In order to state a claim for the denial of access to the 

courts, a plaintiff must allege he suffered an actual injury, which is prejudice with respect to 

contemplated or existing litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or present a nonfrivolous claim. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996). 

VI. Grievance Process

The existence of a prison grievance procedure establishes a procedural right only and 

“does not confer any substantive right upon the inmates.” Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 

(8th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted); see also Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(no liberty interest in processing of appeals because no entitlement to a specific grievance 

procedure). This means that a prison official’s action in reviewing an inmate grievance cannot 

serve as a basis for liability under Section 1983. Buckley, 997 F.2d at 495. “Only persons who 

cause or participate in the violations are responsible. Ruling against a prisoner on an 

administrative complaint does not cause or contribute to the violation. A guard who stands and 

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watches while another guard beats a prisoner violates the Constitution; a guard who rejects an 

administrative complaint about a completed act of misconduct does not.” George v. Smith, 507 

F.3d 605, 609-10 (7th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). 

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