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Nature of Suit Code: 422
Nature of Suit: Bankruptcy Appeals Rule 28 USC 158
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 15-2048

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In re: O&S Trucking, Inc.

lllllllllllllllllllllDebtor

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O&S Trucking, Inc.

lllllllllllllllllllllAppellant

v.

Mercedes Benz Financial Services USA, doing business as Daimler Truck Financial

lllllllllllllllllllllAppellee

____________

Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy

 Appellate Panel for the Eighth Circuit

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 Submitted: November 17, 2015

 Filed: January 22, 2016

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Before COLLOTON, GRUENDER, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

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GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.

Appellate Case: 15-2048 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/22/2016 Entry ID: 4358609 
After the bankruptcy court confirmed a reorganization plan proposed by O&S

Trucking, Inc. (“O&S”), O&S appealed to the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (“BAP”).

The BAP dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We affirm.

I.

O&S owned and operated a fleet of commercial trucks. Many of these trucks

were financed or leased from various entities, including Mercedes Benz Financial

Services USA (doing business as “Daimler”). In May 2012, O&S filed a voluntary

Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. After Daimler filed a motion seeking adequate

protection of its secured interest, Daimler and O&S negotiated an agreed order in

which O&S promised to make protection paymentsto Daimler to cover, among other

things, the erosion in value of the Daimler trucks that O&S retained. The parties

calculated these protection payments based on their assessment of each truck’s value,

including $64,500 for each 2010 freightliner. O&S agreed to pay Daimler two

percent of each truck’s value each month.

After O&S filed a motion for determination of secured status, the bankruptcy

court concluded that Daimler had a secured claim and an unsecured claim. The court

calculated the secured-claim amount based on: (1) the value of the vehicle collateral

retained by O&S and (2) O&S’s net post-petition income from the Daimler trucks. 

The court assessed the present value of the vehicle collateral using the National

Automobile Dealers Association retail value of $62,100 for each 2010 freightliner. 

The court calculated the net income from the Daimler trucks as $51,909.40, a sum

that approximated O&S’s revenue less its expenses and the protection payments.

O&S moved for reconsideration of the court’s secured-status order, alleging

several errors. First, O&S contended that the bankruptcy court erred when it relied

on the present value of the trucks to calculate the vehicle-collateralsum. O&S argued

that Daimler had been afforded a double recovery because the court did not reduce

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Appellate Case: 15-2048 Page: 2 Date Filed: 01/22/2016 Entry ID: 4358609 
the present value based on the protection paymentsthat O&S already had made. O&S

also argued that the court erred by calculating the additional $51,909.40 net-income

figure because Daimler had waived the right to any proceeds in the agreed protection

order and because the relevant funds had been commingled with other funds in

O&S’s account. The bankruptcy court denied reconsideration.

O&S appealed the order and the denial of reconsideration, and the BAP

eventually dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction on September 15, 2014. 

However, while that appeal still was pending before the BAP, O&S proposed a new

plan ofreorganization to the bankruptcy court. This plan incorporated the bankruptcy

court’s secured-status order, stating that Daimler’s secured claim amounted to

$62,100 per truck in vehicle collateral plus $51,909.40 from net income. The plan

also stated that this sum was “subject to adjustment” based on “the final outcome of

the pending appeal of the Daimler Decision by Debtor and any subsequent appeal.” 

During the confirmation hearing, the court found that the vehicle-collateral

calculation was no longer relevant because O&S already had returned all of the

retained trucks to Daimler. Accordingly, the court concluded that Daimler’s secured

claim was limited to $51,909.40. The bankruptcy court then confirmed the

reorganization plan.

Following the plan’s confirmation, O&S appealed to the BAP. In this appeal,

O&S reiterated its argument that the bankruptcy court improperly had calculated the

amount of Daimler’s secured claim. O&S repeated its contention that the bankruptcy

court’s order afforded Daimler a double recovery for the vehicle collateral. O&S

further argued that the bankruptcy court erred when it supplemented the secured

portion of Daimler’s claim with an award of $51,909.40 as proceeds from the use of

the Daimler trucks. Finally, O&S argued that the bankruptcy court erred by denying

the motion for reconsideration. The BAP did not reach the merits of these claims,

instead concluding that it lacked jurisdiction over the appeal. O&S now appeals the

BAP decision to our court.

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Appellate Case: 15-2048 Page: 3 Date Filed: 01/22/2016 Entry ID: 4358609 
II.

We review de novo the BAP’s determination that it lacked jurisdiction over

O&S’s appeal. See GAF Holdings, LLC v. Rinaldi (In re Farmland Indus., Inc.), 567

F.3d 1010, 1016 (8th Cir. 2009). Though the BAP listed two grounds for its decision

to dismiss—mootness and lack of standing—we need only agree with one in order

to affirm. See McCarty v. Lasowski (In re Lasowski), 575 F.3d 815, 817 (8th Cir.

2009); Schwartz v. Kujawa (In re Kujawa), 323 F.3d 628, 629 (8th Cir. 2003).

O&S’s notice of appeal to the BAP listed three orders—the secured-status

order, the denial of reconsideration of the secured-status order, and the plan

confirmation. At oral argument, the parties agreed that the first two orders were

interlocutory and non-final when rendered. Such interlocutory orders merge into a

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plan confirmation. See Greenpoint Mortg. Funding, Inc. v. Herrera (In re Herrera),

422 B.R. 698, 707 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2010), aff'd & adopted sub nom. Home Funds

Direct v. Monroy (In re Monroy), 650 F.3d 1300, 1301 (9th Cir. 2011); cf. Bullard

v. Hyde Savings Bank (In re Bullard), 752 F.3d 483, 488 & n.8 (1st Cir. 2014), aff'd

sub nom. Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 575 U.S. ---, 135 S. Ct. 1686 (2015).

Accordingly, our standing analysis centers on O&S’s ability to appeal from the plan

confirmation. Greenpoint Mortg. Funding, Inc., 422 B.R. at 707.

The BAP concluded that O&S did not have standing to challenge the

bankruptcy court’s order confirming its proposed plan. Although the modern

Bankruptcy Code does not articulate a standard for appellate standing, our circuit

consistently has applied a “person aggrieved” standard derived from the Bankruptcy

Prior to the plan’s confirmation, O&S argued that the secured-status order and

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denial of reconsideration were final, appealable orders. O&S has abandoned this

position in its present appeal. We note that if the orders were indeed final when

rendered, we would lack jurisdiction to consider them now because O&S failed to

timely appeal fromthe BAP’s September 15 decision. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A).

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Act of 1898. See, e.g., Peoples v. Radloff (In re Peoples), 764 F.3d 817, 820 (8th Cir.

2014); accord Atkinson v. Ernie Haire Ford, Inc. (In re Ernie Haire Ford, Inc.), 764

F.3d 1321, 1325 (11th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom. Atkinson v. Ernie Haire

Ford, Inc., 577 U.S. ---, 136 S. Ct. 104 (2015). This standard is “more limited than

Article III standing or the prudential requirements associated therewith.” Harker v.

Troutman (In re Troutman Enterprises, Inc.), 286 F.3d 359, 364 (6th Cir. 2002). 

“The principal policy underlying the heightened ‘standing’ requirement is that

bankruptcy proceedings—often administratively and procedurally unwieldy—not be

prolonged by unnecessary appeals.” Spenlinhauer v. O’Donnell, 261 F.3d 113, 118

n.4 (1st Cir. 2001). Under the person-aggrieved doctrine, the appellant has the

burden to demonstrate that “the challenged order directly and adversely affect[ed] his

pecuniary interests.” Id. at 118; accord Fondiller v. Robertson (Matter of Fondiller),

707 F.2d 441, 442 (9th Cir. 1983) (explaining that a person is aggrieved if an order

of the bankruptcy court “diminish[ed] the debtor’s property, increase[d] his burdens,

or detrimentally affect[ed] his rights”).

Generally, under the person-aggrieved doctrine, a debtor lacks standing to

appeal a judgment rendered wholly in his favor. Houchin Sales Co. v. Angert, 11

F.2d 115, 119 (8th Cir. 1926). However, our court recognizes an exception “when

there has been some error prejudicial to [the debtor], or he has not received all he is

entitled to.” Id. at 118-19. When a debtor invokes this exception at the conclusion

of bankruptcy proceedings in order to appeal from a favorable plan-confirmation

judgment, the exception runsinto tension with the strong policy favoring finality. See

Trulis v. Barton, 107 F.3d 685, 691 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Once a bankruptcy plan is

confirmed, it is binding on all parties and all questions that could have been raised

pertaining to the plan are entitled to res judicata effect.”). Confronted with this

tension, our court outlined the procedure through which a debtor may seek review

from a confirmed plan in Zahn v. Fink (In re Zahn), 526 F.3d 1140 (8th Cir. 2008).

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In Zahn, we examined a case in which a Chapter 13 bankruptcy debtor sought

review of an adverse interlocutory ruling. Id. at 1141. The debtor appealed the

interlocutory order; however, the BAP dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction

because the panel concluded that the interlocutory ruling did not constitute a final,

appealable order. Id.; see Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Farmland

Industries, Inc. (In re Farmland Indus., Inc.), 397 F.3d 647, 649-50 (8th Cir. 2005)

(discussing the test for finality in bankruptcy proceedings). To obtain a final,

appealable order, the debtor proposed a plan incorporating the bankruptcy court’s

allegedly erroneous interlocutory ruling. In re Zahn, 526 F.3d at 1141. The debtor

then objected to her own plan, highlighting her opposition to this disputed provision. 

Id. at 1141-42. Over this objection, the bankruptcy court confirmed the debtor’s

proposed plan. Id. at 1142. The debtor then appealed to the BAP. Id. We held that

this procedure properly preserved the issue for appeal and demonstrated personaggrieved status. Id. at 1144. In sum, we concluded: “A debtor who objects to her

own plan may be an aggrieved party and have standing to appeal confirmation ofsuch

plan.” Id.

In subsequent cases before bankruptcy courts, debtors have complied with this

procedure in order to demonstrate standing as persons aggrieved by their plans’

confirmations. See, e.g., Fisette v. Keller (In re Fisette), 455 B.R. 177, 180 (B.A.P.

8th Cir. 2011), as revised (Nov. 11, 2011); Timothy v. Anderson (In re Timothy), 442

B.R. 28, 29, 31 & n.14 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2010). Though Zahn involved a Chapter 13

debtor, we note that Zahn applies equally in Chapter 11 proceedings because the

person-aggrieved standing requirement extends to proceedings under both chapters. 

See Sears v. U.S. Tr. (In re AFY), 734 F.3d 810, 824 (8th Cir. 2013) (applying the

person-aggrieved doctrine in a Chapter 11 case), cert. denied sub nom. Sears v.

Badami, 572 U.S. ---,134 S. Ct. 2315 (2014). Thus, we hold that a debtor in Chapter

11, like a debtor in Chapter 13, “can obtain meaningful relief . . . [by] objecting to her

own amended plan and appealing the amended plan’s confirmation.” In re Zahn, 526

F.3d at 1143.

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Appellate Case: 15-2048 Page: 6 Date Filed: 01/22/2016 Entry ID: 4358609 
As the BAP recognized, O&S did not follow the Zahn procedure because O&S

failed to object to its proposed plan. The court thus did not have before it an

objection from O&S when it confirmed the plan, and O&S did not obtain an adverse

ruling along with the bankruptcy court’s favorable confirmation judgment. Cf.

Weston v. Mann (In re Weston), 18 F.3d 860, 864 (10th Cir. 1994) (stating that a

creditor must raise an objection to attain person-aggrieved status); Matter of Schultz

Mfg. Fabricating Co., 956 F.2d 686, 690 (7th Cir. 1992) (same); In re Szostek, 886

F.2d 1405, 1413 (3d Cir. 1989) (stating that, as a general rule, the absence of an

objection indicates acceptance of a plan’s terms). The BAP found this omission fatal

to O&S. On the facts of the present case, we agree.

On appeal to our court, O&S argues that it had standing despite its failure to

comply with Zahn because the confirmed plan included a provision stating that the

amount of Daimler’s secured claim was “subject to adjustment” based on “the final

outcome of the pending appeal of the Daimler Decision by Debtor and any

subsequent appeal.” We recognize that parties may use such language in a

reorganization plan to condition the amount of a claim based on the outcome of thenpending litigation related to an interlocutory order. See In re Farmland, 397 F.3d at

650. And we note that this provision properly conditioned the amount of Daimler’s

claim on the outcome of the appeal from the secured-status order that had been

pending before the BAP at the time of the plan’s submission—an appeal that the BAP

ultimately dismissed in a decision that O&S did not appeal to our court.

However, we conclude that the imprecise language used by O&S was

insufficient to meet Zahn’s requirement that a debtor object to a plan in order to

demonstrate person-aggrieved status. The reservation did not articulate O&S’s

objection to the plan, nor did itspecifically reference O&S’s intent to appeal fromthe

plan confirmation on the basis of the secured-status order incorporated therein. In

light of the strong policy favoring finality in bankruptcy proceedings, we find that the

language in the confirmed plan was not sufficient to reserve O&S’s right to appeal

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Appellate Case: 15-2048 Page: 7 Date Filed: 01/22/2016 Entry ID: 4358609 
from the plan confirmation or to place the bankruptcy court and creditors on notice

that O&S would seek such relief. Cf. D & K Properties Crystal Lake v. Mut. Life 2

Ins. Co. of New York, 112 F.3d 257, 261 (7th Cir. 1997) (refusing to enforce a broad

reservation in a confirmed plan because “hold[ing] otherwise would eviscerate the

finality of a bankruptcy plan containing such a reservation, a result at odds with the

very purpose of a confirmed bankruptcy plan”); Travelers Prop. Cas. Ins. Co. of Am.

v. Nat’l Union Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 735 F.3d 993, 1002 (8th Cir. 2013) (noting

that, under Missouri law, ambiguities in contract are construed against the drafter);

Fieber’s Dairy, Inc. v. Purina Mills, Inc., 331 F.3d 584, 587 (8th Cir. 2003) (citing

favorably to Hillis Motors, Inc. v. Hawaii Auto. Dealers’ Ass’n, 997 F.2d 581, 588

(9th Cir. 1993), for the proposition that Chapter 11 plans are construed as contracts,

which are interpreted under the governing state’s law). We therefore conclude that

the BAP correctly held that O&S failed to carry its burden to demonstrate standing.

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III.

For the foregoing reasons, we agree that the BAP lacked jurisdiction over the

appeal from the confirmation order, and we affirm.

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We need not determine whether other, more specific language would have 2

been an appropriate substitute for Zahn’s objection requirement. It is enough to say

that the imprecise language employed here did not suffice.

Because we affirm based on standing, we do not reach the BAP’s mootness

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determination.

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