Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00916/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00916-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 367
Nature of Suit: TORTS - Personal Injury - Health Care/Pharmaceutical Personal Injury/Product Liability
Cause of Action: 42:1983cv Civil Rights Act - Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights

---

1

17-CV-916-JLS (WVG)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LANCE R. MARTIN,

Plaintiff,

v.

R. PATEL, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 17-CV-916-JLS (WVG)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

AND DISMISSING WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE PLAINTIFF’S 

COMPLAINT

(ECF No. 2)

Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Lance R. Martin’s Motion to Proceed In 

Forma Pauperis (“IFP”). (“IFP Mot.,” ECF No. 2.)

IFP MOTION

All parties instituting any civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$400. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to prepay 

the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). A federal court 

Case 3:17-cv-00916-JLS-WVG Document 7 Filed 08/03/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 5
2

17-CV-916-JLS (WVG)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

may authorize the commencement of an action without the prepayment of fees if the party 

submits an affidavit, including a statement of assets, showing that he is unable to pay the 

required filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).

In the present case, Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit indicating that his average 

monthly income during the past year is $500. (IFP Mot. 1.1) However, he indicates that he 

has no savings, no assets, and that his monthly expenses exceed his income by $56. (See 

generally id.) Plaintiff further claims he often “comes up short” and has to borrow money 

from family members. (Id. at 5.) Given the foregoing, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s 

application demonstrates he is unable to pay the requisite fees and costs. Accordingly, the 

Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP.

Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b)

The Court must screen every civil action brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

and dismiss any case it finds “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief 

may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from relief.” 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) 

(“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”); Lopez v. 

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) 

“not only permits but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint 

that fails to state a claim”).

As amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 

mandates that the court reviewing an action filed pursuant to the IFP provisions of § 1915 

make and rule on its own motion to dismiss before directing the Marshal to effect service 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(c)(3). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3); Navarette 

v. Pioneer Med. Ctr., No. 12-cv-0629-WQH (DHB), 2013 WL 139925, at *1 (S.D. Cal. 

Jan. 9, 2013).

 

1 Pin citations to docketed material refer to the CM/ECF numbers electronically stamped at the top of each 

page.

Case 3:17-cv-00916-JLS-WVG Document 7 Filed 08/03/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 5
3

17-CV-916-JLS (WVG)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

All complaints must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 

required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007)). “[D]etermining whether a complaint 

states a plausible claim is context-specific, requiring the reviewing court to draw on its 

experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663–64 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

556). 

“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their 

veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement of relief.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. “[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court 

must accept as true all allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light 

most favorable to the plaintiff.” Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000); see 

also Andrews v. King, 393 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2005); Barren v. Harrington, 152 

F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (“The language of § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) parallels the 

language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).”).

“While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not.” Hoagland 

v. Astrue, No. 1:12-cv-00973-SMS, 2012 WL 2521753, at *3 (E.D. Cal. June 28, 2012) 

(citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Courts cannot accept legal conclusions set forth in a 

complaint if the plaintiff has not supported her contentions with facts. Id. (citing Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 679).

Plaintiff filed a Complaint under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking to 

hold several Defendants liable for their alleged deficient medical care of Plaintiff. (See 

generally Compl., ECF No. 1.) Specifically, Plaintiff claims that these Defendants failed 

to properly treat him for two medical injuries: first, an alleged cervical injury causing 

extreme pain and suffering and partial paralysis; second, an internal injury causing constant

/ / /

/ / /

Case 3:17-cv-00916-JLS-WVG Document 7 Filed 08/03/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 5
4

17-CV-916-JLS (WVG)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

and bloody urine and abdominal pain. (Id. at 7.) For these alleged wrongs Plaintiff seeks

“declaratory judgment [that] defendants committed medical malpractice on Plaintiff” and 

damages (including punitive) of $2 million. (Id. at 4.)

The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against any of these 

Defendants for two reasons. First, Plaintiff cannot bring a § 1983 claim against these 

Defendants because they did not act under color of state law, which is a requirement for 

bringing suit under this Section. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (providing a private right of action 

for a deprivation of constitutional rights where the alleged offender acts “under color of 

any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District 

of Columbia”). To be sure, Plaintiff, in conclusory fashion, states that all of these 

Defendants operated under color of state law during the course of their treatment. (Compl. 

2.) But the Court cannot accept as true Plaintiff’s legal conclusions. Nor does Plaintiff 

provide any factual allegations that plausibly suggest these Defendants were acting under 

color of state law during these events. For instance, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Patel 

was his examining doctor at “Neighborhood Clinic-El Cajon,” (id. at 7), but he does not

explain how Patel’s status at a doctor at this facility subjects him to suit under § 1983.

Second, without a viable § 1983 claim against these Defendants, Plaintiff fails to 

explain how this Court has jurisdiction over what ultimately appear to be state-law claims 

for medical malpractice. (See id. at 12 (requesting that the Court declare “defendants have 

committed medical malpractice on Plaintiff, and are deliberately indifferent towards 

Plaintiff[’]s serious medical needs, and have violated Plaintiff[’]s legal rights under 

existing medical malpractice laws”).) 

The Court therefore finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief, as 

required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE 

Plaintiff’s Complaint.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

Case 3:17-cv-00916-JLS-WVG Document 7 Filed 08/03/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 5
5

17-CV-916-JLS (WVG)

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court: 

1. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to § 1915(a), (ECF No. 2);

and

2. DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s Complaint, (ECF No. 1).

Plaintiff MAY FILE an amended complaint within thirty (30) days of the date on which 

this Order is electronically docketed. Should Plaintiff fail to file an amended complaint

within the time provided, the Court may enter a final order dismissing this civil action with 

prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 3, 2017

Case 3:17-cv-00916-JLS-WVG Document 7 Filed 08/03/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 5