Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00130/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00130-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ONESIMO MARIN HARO, )

)

Petitioner, )

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v. )

)

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K. MENDOZA-POWERS, Warden, )

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Respondent. )

 )

1:06-CV-0130 AWI SMS HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

On January 17, 2006, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States

District Court for the Northern District of California. By order of the Court, the case was transferred

to the Eastern District of California and received in this Court on February 6, 2006. The petition

challenges a decision of the Board of Prison Terms denying Petitioner parole. 

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 8 indicate that the court may dismiss a petition for

writ of habeas corpus, either on its own motion under Rule 4, pursuant to the respondent’s motion to

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dismiss, or after an answer to the petition has been filed. See Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039 (9th

Cir.2001).

B. Exhaustion of State Remedies

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to collaterally challenge his conviction by a

petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). The

exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives the state court the initial

opportunity to correct the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501

U.S. 722, 731 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158,

1163 (9th Cir. 1988). 

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court with a

full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court. Duncan v.

Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88

F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court was given a full

and fair opportunity to hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the highest state court with the

claim's factual and legal basis. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365 (legal basis); Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504

U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 1719 (1992) (factual basis). 

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the state court that he was raising a

federal constitutional claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669

(9th Cir.2000), amended, 247 F.3d 904 (2001); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir.1999);

Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir.1998). In Duncan, the United States Supreme Court

reiterated the rule as follows: 

In Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 . . . (1971), we said that exhaustion 

of state remedies requires that petitioners "fairly presen[t]" federal claims to the 

state courts in order to give the State the "'opportunity to pass upon and correct 

alleged violations of the prisoners' federal rights" (some internal quotation marks

omitted). If state courts are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations 

of prisoners' federal rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners 

are asserting claims under the United States Constitution. If a habeas petitioner 

wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him the due 

process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must say so, not only 

in federal court, but in state court. 

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. The Ninth Circuit examined the rule further, stating:

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Our rule is that a state prisoner has not "fairly presented" (and thus 

exhausted) his federal claims in state court unless he specifically indicated to 

that court that those claims were based on federal law. See Shumway v. Payne, 

223 F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2000). Since the Supreme Court's decision in 

Duncan, this court has held that the petitioner must make the federal basis of the 

claim explicit either by citing federal law or the decisions of federal courts, even

if the federal basis is “self-evident," Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 889 

(9th Cir. 1999) (citing Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7 . . . (1982), or the 

underlying claim would be decided under state law on the same considerations 

that would control resolution of the claim on federal grounds. Hiivala v. Wood, 

195 F3d 1098, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 830-31 

(9th Cir. 1996); . . . .

In Johnson, we explained that the petitioner must alert the state court to 

the fact that the relevant claim is a federal one without regard to how similar the 

state and federal standards for reviewing the claim may be or how obvious the 

violation of federal law is. 

Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-669 (9th Cir. 2000) (italics added). 

Petitioner readily concedes he has not exhausted his state court remedies. He states he has

presented his claims to the California Supreme Court; however, the California Supreme Court has

yet to rule on the petition. Petitioner requests the Court excuse exhaustion, because “it is apparent

and obvious that the California Supreme Court will not provide any adequate, speedy remedy for

Petitioner.”

In 1996, Congress enacted the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. Pub.L. No

104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. Under the AEDPA, the Court can excuse exhaustion if “(i) there is an

absence of available State corrective process; or (ii) circumstances exist that render such a process

ineffective to protect the rights of the application.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B). In this case, there is

not an absence of an available State corrective process. The petition that is pending before the

Supreme Court is precisely that. Second, circumstances do not exist which render this process

ineffective to protect Petitioner’s rights. While the state process has proven to be slow, it is not

ineffective. There are not sufficient circumstances in this case for the Court to ignore the United

States Supreme Court’s admonishment that comity demands exhaustion.

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be

DISMISSED without prejudice. This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the United

States District Court Judge assigned to the case pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636

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(b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern

District of California. 

Within fifteen (15) days after being served with a copy of this Findings and

Recommendation, any party may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all

parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and

Recommendation.” Replies to the Objections shall be served and filed within ten (10) court days

(plus three days if served by mail) after service of the Objections. The Finding and Recommendation

will then be submitted to the District Court for review of the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified

time may waive the right to appeal the Order of the District Court. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153

(9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 17, 2006 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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