Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-01969/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-01969-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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26 This action is referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1

§ 636(b)(1)(B), Local General Order No. 262, and E.D. Cal. L.R. (“Local Rule”) 302.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DANIEL HARPER,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-09-1969 GEB KJN P

vs.

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS, et al.,

ORDER and

Defendants. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding without counsel, seeks relief pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 and requests leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.1

For the reasons set forth below, this court dismisses the instant complaint and recommends that

plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis be denied, that plaintiff hereafter be

prohibited from proceeding in forma pauperis pursuant to the “three strikes” bar of the Prison

Litigation Reform Act, and that plaintiff be granted leave to file an amended complaint together

with prepayment of the full filing fee.

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 Section 1915(g) was enacted as part of the 1996 Amendments to the PLRA, Pub. L. 2

No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321, § 804(d). 

 In forma pauperis status must be granted to a “three strikes plaintiff” who demonstrates

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that he or she is in “imminent danger of serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

Application of this exception requires that the complaint, liberally construed, plausibly alleges

that, at the time of filing the complaint, “prison officials continue with a practice that has injured

[plaintiff ] or others similarly situated in the past.” Andrews v. Cervantes, supra, 493 F.3d at

1055, 1056–1057 (citations omitted).

2

THE “THREE STRIKES” RULE

The “three strikes” provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”)

requires that a court deny in forma pauperis (“IFP”) status to a prisoner who “has, on 3 or more

prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a

court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or

fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent

danger of serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Thus, “[p]risoners who have 2

repeatedly brought unsuccessful suits may entirely be barred from IFP status under the three

strikes rule[.]” Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007). The purpose of this

rule is to further “the congressional goal of reducing frivolous prisoner litigation in federal

court.” Tierney v. Kupers, 128 F.3d 1310, 1312 (9th Cir. 1997); accord, Rodriguez v. Cook, 169

F.3d 1176, 1180 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Section 1915(g) does not prohibit prisoners from accessing the

courts to protect their rights. Inmates are still able to file claims – they are only required to pay

for filing those claims.”). 

The exception to this rule – authorizing in forma pauperis status to a three strikes

plaintiff who plausibly alleges imminent danger of serious physical injury at the time of filing a

complaint, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) – is neither alleged nor apparent in this case. 

3

Plaintiff has filed seventeen actions in this court, four of which have been 

dismissed for failure to state a claim, and the others have been dismissed for other deficiencies as

addressed below. The court has reviewed each of the cases plaintiff has filed in this court, for

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 See Fed. R. Evid. 201 (a court may take judicial notice of facts that are capable of 4

accurate determination by sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned). See also,

MGIC Indem. Co. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500, 505 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Wilson, 631

F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir. 1980) (court may take judicial notice of court records). 

 Because no defendant has been served in the instant action, the court has undertaken the 5

task of examining the records of this court rather than employ a burden-shifting approach

between the parties relative to plaintiff’s three-strike status. Cf. Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d at

1119-20.

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which it takes judicial notice. Those dismissed for failure to state a claim are: Harper v. Wilcox 4

(“Wilcox”), Case No. 2:07-cv-01158 LKK KJM P (filed June 15, 2007, dismissed January 28,

2008); Harper v. Costa et al. (“Costa”), Case No. 2:07-cv-02149 LKK DAD P (filed October 10,

2007, dismissed August 31, 2009); Harper v. Williams, et al. (“Williams”), Case No.

2:07-cv-02166 LKK GGH P (filed October 12, 2007, dismissed June 3, 2008); and Harper v.

Morgan (“Morgan”), Case No. 2:08-cv-02526 GGH (filed October 23, 2008, dismissed June 16,

2009).

The court has examined the orders and findings and recommendations supporting

dismissal in each of these cases. “[T]he district court docket records may be sufficient to show

that a prior dismissal satisfies at least one of the criteria under § 1915(g) and therefore counts as

a strike. However, in many instances, the docket records will not reflect the basis for the

dismissal. In these instances, the [court must examine] . . . court records or other documentation

that will allow [it] to determine that a prior case was dismissed because it was ‘frivolous,

malicious or fail[ed] to state a claim.’ § 1915(g).” Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1120 (9th

Cir. 2005). 

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In assessing whether the subject dismissals come within the “fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted” criteria of the three-strikes bar, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), the court

is guided by the Ninth Circuit’s observation that this phrase, “as used elsewhere in § 1915,

‘parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).’” Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d

at 1121, quoting Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). A “dismissal” of an

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action on the merits pursuant to an in forma pauperis screening mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A,

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c), also qualifies as a “dismissal” for failure to

state a claim within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). O’Neal v. Price, 531 F.3d 1146, 1155

(9th Cir. 2008); see also, Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989) (in forma pauperis

statute “accords judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably

meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual

allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless”). The court

is also guided by the Ninth Circuit’s assessment that, within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g),

“a case is frivolous if it is of little weight or importance: having no basis in law or fact,” and “[a]

case is malicious if it was filed with the intention or desire to harm another.” Andrews v. King,

398 F.3d at 1121 (citations and internal quotations omitted). 

The above-noted cases were dismissed for the following reasons. Wilcox was

dismissed as frivolous and for failing to state a claim, pursuant to the in forma pauperis screening

process, because the sole named defendant (plaintiff’s private investigator in his criminal case

who allegedly neglected to give plaintiff the form for filing an appeal) was not a state actor for

purposes of § 1983 liability. Harper v. Wilcox, Case No. 2:07-cv-01158 LKK KJM P (Dkt.

Nos. 5, 6). In Costa, the court found, pursuant to defendants’ motion to dismiss and with

extensive legal citations, that the complaint failed to state any cognizable claim for relief

pursuant to plaintiff’s allegations that defendants had violated his due process rights by bringing

a false rules violation charge against him. Harper v. Costa, et al., Case No. 2:07-cv-02149 LKK

DAD P (Dkt. Nos. 42, 54) (an appeal is pending). In Williams, the court granted plaintiff’s

application to proceed in forma pauperis and dismissed the initial complaint with leave to file an

amended complaint. Plaintiff filed two more complaints. In reviewing plaintiff’s last filed

amended complaint, the court concluded that plaintiff had failed to state a claim based on his

allegations that, inter alia, he had been wrongly denied time credits, citing Edwards v. Balisok,

520 U.S. 641 (1997), and that it did not appear that plaintiff could cure the pleading defects. 

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 Plaintiff has filed in this court: Harper v. Sacramento County Sheriff, et al., Case No. 6

2:07-cv-00748 ALA P (dismissed for failure to file an amended complaint); Harper v.

Sacramento County Sheriff, Case No. 2:07-cv-00845 JKS EFB P (dismissed for failure to file

trust acct information); Harper v. California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, et al.,

Case No. 2:07-cv-00851 GEB CMK P (dismissed for failure to submit in forma pauperis

application or filing fee); Harper v. Taylor, et al., Case No. 2:07-cv-01671 FCD DAD P

(dismissed for failure to submit in forma pauperis application or filing fee); Harper v. Williams et

al., Case No. 2:07-cv-2111 JAM GGH P (dismissed for failure to file Second Amended

Complaint); Harper v. Humphreys, et al., Case No. 2:07-cv-2131 MCE EFB P (dismissed for

failure to exhaust administrative remedies (on appeal)); Harper v. Costa, et al., Case No. 2:07-cv2148 LEW KJM P (dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies (appeal dismissed));

Harper v. Dion, et al., Case No. 2:07-cv-2150 GEB JFM P (dismissed for failure to exhaust

administrative remedies); Harper v. Kaiser, Case No. 2:07-cv-2167 FCD KJM P (dismissed for

failure to submit in forma pauperis application or pay filing fee); Harper v. Ward, Case No. 2:07-

cv-2239 LEW JFM P (dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies); Harper v.

Morgan, Case No. 2:08-cv-0557 GEB EFB P (dismissed for failure to submit in forma pauperis

application or pay filing fee); Harper v. Harikian, Case No. 10-cv-673 KJM (dismissed without

prejudice to filing in instant action (makes same allegations)).

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Harper v.Williams, et al., Case No. 2:07-cv-02166 LKK GGH P (Dkt. Nos. 18, 19). In Morgan,

the court found that plaintiff failed to state a cognizable claim against the sole defendant based

on allegations that defendant had failed to ensure that plaintiff’s personal property reached its

intended destination outside the prison. Harper v. Morgan, Case No. 2:08-cv-02526 GGH (Dkt.

No. 15.) This case was affirmed on appeal by mandate issued October 7, 2009. See Order of

Court of Appeals filed Sept. 15, 2009, (id., Dkt. No. 25) (“A review of the record and the

opening brief indicates that the questions raised in this appeal are so insubstantial as not to

require further argument”). 

The other dozen cases filed by plaintiff in this court represent an amalgam of 6

filings and court directives relative to plaintiff’s need to submit a properly completed in forma

pauperis application or to pay the filing fee, or to comply with the requirements for asserting a

cognizable claim. This court has spent a significant amount of time reviewing plaintiff’s

multiple filings, most of which he has allowed to languish, likely because it is so easy to file

another case.

The dismissals of plaintiff’s filings in this court prior to the filing of the instant

case (even if the court excludes Costa, currently pending on appeal) satisfy the requirements for

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applying the PLRA’s “three strikes” bar to plaintiff’s instant and future in forma pauperis

applications. Plaintiff should therefore be required to prepay the filing fee in the instant action

and in any future action filed in this court absent a plausible allegation of imminent physical

harm. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

THE INSTANT ACTION

Plaintiff has filed five complaints in the present case, the first on July 17, 2009,

the most recent on April 9, 2010. (See Dkt. Nos. 1, 7, 11, 14, and 15.) All of the complaints

seek redress for the same alleged violation of constitutional rights, the withdrawal from his cell

of plaintiff’s personal property, including legal materials, while he was absent due to a court

appearance. Because none of these complaints have been served, the court in its discretion

herein screens only the most recently filed amended complaint (Dkt. No. 15). See Fed. R. Civ. P.

15(a)(2) (court should freely give leave to amend an unserved pleading when justice so requires). 

The court screens this complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. 

Plaintiff, who is currently confined in Pleasant Valley State Prison, sues one

defendant, L. Harikian, described as “the CC [Correctional Counselor] II of the State of

California . . . legally responsibly for the overall operation of the Department and each institution

under its jurisdiction, including South Sacramento Parole Office. [¶ ] Defendant is being sued

individually and in her official capacity. . . .” (Dkt. No. 15, at 2.) The factual allegations of the

amended complaint provide in full (id. at 2-3):

On April 7, 2008, Plaintiff Daniel Harper was released to Sacramento

County Sheriffs to go back to court for his case as showed in Exhibit A

and the plaintiff does come back to the custody of the California

Department of Corrections in 2009. And in Exhibit B on 6-2-09 I put in a

602 grievance to get my property back from High Desert State Prison since

that is the prison I left all of my property at to get told this, “Granted your

property was sent on 5/21/9 Fed Ex to Reg’l Sacramento on 5-22 -[08]”

and I start write every one that I can think of that will be able to get my

propert[y] back to me and to know where my property is to just get the run

around until January 28, 2010 when L. Harikian writes this to me, “Your

appeals have been reviewed. On January 27, 2010 I contacted the

Assistant Unit Supervisor of the Sacramento South Parole Unit. They

indicated they will overnight your property to you at P.V.S.P. Please

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forward all additional correspondence regarding this issue to the address

listed below” and still on 3-30-10 I still have not gotten this property back

in my possion (sic) at all.

Plaintiff alleges that he has been permanently deprived of his personal property in

violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. He seeks

declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as compensatory and punitive damages, and requests a

jury trial.

The Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment does

not protect against an inmate’s loss of possessions absent significant and intentional or calculated

harassment unrelated to prison needs. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 528, 530 (1984); Farmer

v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (deprivation must be objectively serious, unnecessary and

wanton). Plaintiff’s loss of property in the “normal course” of it being mailed by prison officials

does not state an Eighth Amendment claim.

Nor does it appear, based on the allegations of the current complaint, that plaintiff

states a cognizable claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 

It appears that plaintiff’s property has not been lost but remains in transit – i.e., he alleges that it

was initially mailed in May 2009 from High Desert State Prison to the Sacramento Regional

Parole Office, where it was then mailed in January 2010 to plaintiff at Pleasant Valley State

Prison. While plaintiff had not received this package by March 30, 2010, the current status of the

mailing is unknown, as well as the reasons for its delay. 

Even if the package was permanently lost, it is unlikely that plaintiff will be able

to state a cognizable federal constitutional claim. Neither the negligent nor intentional

deprivation of a prisoner’s property by a state prison official states a due process claim under §

1983 if the state provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy, e.g., as provided by the

California Tort Claims Act. See Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816-17 (9th Cir.1994) (citing 

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 Although some case law supports the principle that, even where the state provides an 7

adequate post-deprivation remedy, a deprivation of property that is both authorized and

intentional may constitute an actionable due process claim, see, e.g., Knudson v. City of

Ellensburg, 832 F.2d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 1987), the Ninth Circuit failed to make this distinction

in Barnett, 31 F.3d at 816-17 (finding no federal constitutional claim based on plaintiff’s

allegations both that he was deprived of property due to his reclassification to “grade B” (an

authorized deprivation), and “to the extent that Barnett claims that he was deprived of property

that he was entitled as a grade B inmate” (unauthorized deprivation)). 

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Cal. Govt. Code §§ 810-895), and cases cited therein. The availability of an adequate state 7

post-deprivation remedy, i.e., a state tort action, precludes federal civil rights relief because the

state remedy provides sufficient procedural due process. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 128. 

Thus, as framed, plaintiff’s claim based on the apparently negligent failure of prison officials to

forward his personal property does not state a federal constitutional claim.

Additionally, plaintiff fails to state a cause of action against defendant Harikian,

whom plaintiff characterizes as “legally responsible for the overall operation of the

Department...” (Dkt. No. 15, at 2.) “Under Section 1983, supervisory officials are not liable for

actions of subordinates on any theory of vicarious liability. A supervisor may be liable if there

exists either (1) his or her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a

sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional

violation.” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 645-46 (9th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted). Harikian

is not a proper defendant in this action absent allegations of her personal involvement or direct

causal connection in the deprivation of plaintiff’s cognizable federal constitutional right.

While plaintiff is presently unable to state a cognizable federal constitutional

claim, the court dismisses the complaint and recommends that plaintiff be granted leave to file a

further amended complaint subject to prepayment of the full filing fee. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s amended complaint filed April 9, 2010 (Dkt. No. 15) is dismissed;

and

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Further, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Pursuant to the “three strikes” rule of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28

U.S.C. § 1915(g), plaintiff should be barred, while incarcerated, from filing further civil rights

complaints in this court without prepayment of the full filing fee;

2. This bar should apply to the instant case and thus plaintiff’s application to

proceed in forma pauperis should be denied without prejudice to payment of the filing fee;

3. Plaintiff should be granted leave to file a further amended complaint in the

instant action (designated a “Second Amended Complaint”) within thirty days after the filing

date of the district judge’s order, provided plaintiff prepays the full filing fee; and

4. Failure of plaintiff timely to file a Second Amended Complaint and pay the

filing fee shall result in the dismissal of this action.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 21 days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, plaintiff may file written objections

with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings

and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the specified

time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153

(9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: June 7, 2010

_____________________________________

KENDALL J. NEWMAN

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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