Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-01426/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-01426-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VINCENT HALL,

Petitioner,

 v.

RALPH M. DIAZ, Warden, 

Respondent.

 /

No. C 13-1426 TEH (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS; DENYING

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Vincent Hall, a state prisoner, has filed this pro se

petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

Respondent was ordered to show cause why the petition should not be

granted. Respondent has filed an answer, and Petitioner has filed a

traverse. For the reasons set forth below, the petition is DENIED.

I

On February 4, 2009, a San Francisco County jury found

Petitioner guilty of second degree murder with personal use of a

weapon, two counts of selling oxycodone, and possession of oxycodone

for sale. Clerk’s Transcript (“CT”) at 810-13, 1339. Petitioner

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1

 This summary is presumed correct. Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d

1132, 1135 n.1 (9th Cir. 2002); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

2

was found not guilty of first degree murder and two drug-related

counts. CT at 813, 921-23 The trial court found that Petitioner

suffered three prior strike convictions, had one prior serious

felony conviction, and served four prior prison terms. CT at 815. 

He was sentenced to 78 years to life in state prison. CT at 817-22.

Petitioner appealed his conviction in the California Court

of Appeal. On September 28, 2011, the California Court of Appeal

filed an unpublished opinion affirming the judgment. People v.

Hall, No. A124490, 2011 WL 4499245 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 28, 2011). 

On January 4, 2012, the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s

petition for review. Answer, Ex. 7. 

II

The following factual background is taken from the order

of the California Court of Appeal.1

1. June 1, 2007 Sale of Oxycodone and June 13, 2007 Sale

of Oxycodone and Possession of Oxycodone for Sale

On June 1, 2007, and June 13, 2007, as part of an ongoing

narcotics investigation in the Tenderloin area of San

Francisco, Police Inspector John Keane, acting undercover,

purchased four oxycodone pills for $160 from Hall on each

date. As to both encounters, Keane denied telling Hall

that he was in pain and a veteran who needed drugs because

of a war injury. Keane described Hall's appearance at the

time of each sale. On the first occasion, Hall had hair

that was visible about midway to his ears under a beanie

cap, and the sale took place in the lobby of a building;

on the second occasion, Hall had a shaven head under a

baseball cap and the sale took place while Hall was

straddling a bicycle. By the time of trial, Hall's

appearance had changed: he was wearing glasses and he may

have lost a little weight. FN2 Keane was sure that Hall

was the seller on both occasions even though Keane could

not recall if Hall had facial hair on either occasion. 

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Keane was able to recognize a person by focusing on the

person's eyes, albeit he could see the person's face

unavoidably in his field of vision. Keane recalled Hall's

head hair on the first occasion because “it was sticking

out.”

FN2. Hall testified that since 2006, his weight had

fluctuated as much as fifty or sixty pounds because

while he was in prison he was a vegetarian, and when

he was on the street he would eat everything and his

weight would build up. He weighed no more than 240

pounds when he was arrested in August 2007. At the

time of the trial, Hall testified he was 40 years old

and described himself as six feet five inches tall

and weighing “about 241” pounds.

Hall was arrested after the second sale to Keane. Before

the arrest, one of the arresting officers saw Hall and a

woman acquaintance of Hall. As a marked police car

approached, Hall appeared to notice its presence and moved

his bicycle away from the woman. Another arresting

officer saw Hall get off his bicycle and throw on the

ground a large plastic bag that contained, among other

drugs, 31 tablets of Percocet (a different name for

oxycodone), and 7 capsules of oxycodone. After his

arrest, Hall was found in possession of $160 in marked

city funds, $1,772 in United States currency, a cell

phone, and a pill bottle with Hall's name on it containing

150 tablets of oxycodone. An expert on street sales of

oxycodone testified that the different types and large

amounts of drugs found in Hall's possession on June 13

were possessed for sale.

2. June 2, 2007 Murder of Devin Marzullo

On the evening of June 2, 2007, at about 9:00 p.m., Jacob

Lee and his friend Devin Marzullo drove from Castro Valley

to the Tenderloin area in San Francisco. Marzullo wanted

to buy methadone pills to end his oxycodone addiction. 

During the evening, Lee saw Marzullo in the middle of the

sidewalk standing face-to-face with the man that killed

him. The killer was standing next to his bicycle; Lee did

not hear any words exchanged between the two men. 

Marzullo was unarmed, had his hands at his side, and was

not making any aggressive gestures towards the killer. 

The killer walked his bicycle to the wall of a nearby

building and leaned the bicycle against the wall. The

killer then turned around, made a lunge forward, like a

leap, and stabbed Marzullo in his chest as Marzullo was

backing up. Lee did not actually see the knife in the

killer's hand. After the stabbing Lee saw Marzullo's body

jerk backward and blood squirted from the left side of

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Marzullo's chest. Marzullo ran into the street and then

turned around, rapidly walked away, and ultimately

collapsed on the street. Marzullo was taken to the

hospital where he was pronounced dead at 10:47 p.m. An

autopsy revealed that at the time of his death Marzullo

had both oxycodone and methadone in his blood, suggesting

the recent ingestion of those drugs.

Lee spoke with a police officer at the scene. According

to the police officer, Lee said his friend had “a bad

habit” he had “been trying to kick,” and his friend had

been “poked” by a person from whom he was trying to buy

pills. Lee described the person as a large

African–American male, in his early 30's, about six feet

two inches tall, weighing about 240 pounds, with bushy

hair. The man was on a bicycle and had left the area on

the bicycle. At trial, Lee, who described himself as six

feet two inches or six feet three inches tall, testified

that he recalled telling the police that the killer was a

“large” man, “somewhere around 6'3, 240, 250,” with a

wide-set face, wearing a beanie cap with hair around the

top of his ears, and a hood over the cap. The killer had

some facial hair, both a beard and mustache, of maybe two

or three weeks of growth. There was sufficient light for

Lee to get “a good frontal vision” of the killer as he

“was getting away.” Lee could not see facial markings

because the killer was wearing a hood, but Lee could see

“like a frontal view of—from his eyes, his nose, and he's

got a beard.” Lee could see “a little above the eyebrows,

the nose, the mouth, around the cheek bones.” Lee

recalled seeing the killer in the area about four months

before the stabbing. Lee had a previous pill addiction

and he used to go regularly to the area to purchase pills. 

On three or four previous occasions Lee had seen the

killer riding his bicycle in the neighborhood bound by the

streets Jones, Leavenworth, Turk, and Golden Gate. The

killer was always on a bicycle and appeared to be “pushing

a product” or “selling pills.”

A few days after the murder, Lee worked with a police

sketch artist who generated a sketch based on Lee's

description of the killer. The sketch was shown to the

jury. When asked if the sketch looked like the killer,

Lee testified: “This is the best description that I can

give so the sketch artist can pick my brain to draw this. 

If I can give you a visual out of my mind, it wouldn't

look like this. Not completely.” However, Lee conceded

the sketch was “not much” different from what he had

described regarding the suspect's hair, the beanie cap on

the suspect's head above the ears, and the facial hair,

“kind of scraggly,” with a “slight mustache.” Lee told

the sketch artist that the drawing looked quite a bit like

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the suspect.

Police Inspector Herman Jones testified that Lee was also

shown six photo lineups (each containing six photos) in an

effort to establish the identities of the killer and

another person that may have been a witness to the murder. 

The photo lineups were shown to the jury. In the first

lineup he viewed on June 5, 2007, Lee pointed to one

person as most resembling the killer, but Lee said the

killer was “not that old.” FN3 Lee did not identify any

one in the next four photo lineups he viewed on June 19,

2007. On August 20, 2007, Lee was shown a sixth photo

lineup containing six photos from a databank of persons

arrested in San Francisco, including Hall's photo. Police

Inspector Edward Wynkoop prepared the photo lineup using a

computer-generated photo of Hall taken after his August 7,

2007 arrest, and five other computer-generated photos

chosen by Wynkoop. Wynkoop did not notice the background

of Hall's photo was darker than the backgrounds of the

other photos. Wynkoop recognized that the men in the five

filler photos were centered in the photo frame, while

Hall's image was “kind of almost closer to the camera,

taking up more space.” However, Wynkoop was not able to

change the borders of the photos, or move the person's

image towards the top or the sides of the photo frame. 

Wynkoop did the best he could given the limits of the

technology.

FN3. At trial, Lee did not recall identifying a

person in the first lineup as someone who most looked

like the suspect who stabbed Marzullo but was “too

old.” When asked to look at the person in the lineup

in court, Lee denied that the person depicted in the

photo looked like the person who stabbed his friend.

Before showing the sixth lineup to Lee, the police

inspectors read, and Lee recalled being told, certain

admonitions: Lee was about to see a group of photographs,

that his judgment should not be influenced by the fact

that a police agency was showing the array, that the

person who committed the crime might or might not be in

the photos, that Lee was in no way obligated to identify

anyone, that Lee was to study each photo carefully before

making any comments because the photos could be old or

new, hair styles changed, persons could alter their

identities by growing or shaving facial hair and gaining

or losing weight, and skin color could be lighter or

darker due to the photographic process. Lee was not given

any information about the men in the lineup. He was not

told the height or the weight of the men, or if any man

exclusively commuted by bicycle or happened to also sell

oxycodone. Lee was not told to draw no suggestion from

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the fact that Hall's head took up almost the entire

photographic frame of his image and touched on the margin

of the photo. Within a matter of seconds, Lee picked out

the photo of Hall, who was depicted with a shaved head and

no facial hair. Lee did not identify Hall as the killer. 

Lee only said that “out of all the photos” he had seen,

Hall's photo “seems to be most accurate,” and that Hall

“must have cut [his] hair.” On the written instruction

sheet for the lineup, Lee handwrote that the person in

position two (Hall) “looks like the suspect” that stabbed

his friend Marzullo.

When asked if he recognized anyone in the courtroom, Lee

replied that Hall had a “striking similarity” to the

killer. When asked what about Hall looked “very similar,”

Lee replied: “His frontal view of the frontal of his face,

around his eyes, that area appears to be very striking. 

His eyebrow area and his nose, his cheek bones....” When

asked to describe how Hall's appearance in court was

different from the killer, Lee testified Hall did not have

facial or head hair. Hall's height was very similar to

that of the killer, but Hall appeared in court to weigh a

lot less than the killer. The jury was shown a video that

was taken by a security camera on a nearby building on the

evening of June 2, 2007. While watching the video for the

first time in court, Lee was able to identify himself,

Marzullo, and the killer. However, the video quality was

insufficient to allow anyone to identify the killer by his

face.

3. August 7, 2007 Uncharged Assault and Battery on Charles

Fore

On August 7, 2007, at about 7:30 p.m., Hall assaulted and

battered Charles Fore on Turk Street near the corner with

Leavenworth. Officer Lawrence McDevitt and Police Officer

William Clinton were on routine foot patrol and saw the

incident. FN4 Hall and Fore were having a conversation,

and without warning or provocation, Hall punched Fore in

his face with a closed fist, causing Fore to fall to the

ground. Hall then used the bottom of his right foot to

stomp on Fore's head several times. Fore tried to protect

himself with his arms and by rolling over and facing the

ground. The officers ran towards the men, announced they

were police officers, and told Hall to stop and that he

was under arrest. As the officers got closer, Hall looked

up and ran away. The officers pursued Hall as he ran into

a laundromat and grabbed a bicycle. McDevitt caught Hall

as he was trying to get his leg over the bicycle. 

McDevitt struck Hall with a baton on his shoulder to make

him stop. After being taken into custody, Hall was “very

stoic ... not showing any emotion.” The officers returned

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to Fore who was still on the ground. Fore's face was very

bloody. Fore sustained a broken jaw, a laceration above

his right eye, a “deformity” to his nose, an abrasion to

the mouth, and a missing tooth. The officers found a

green pill, suspected to be oxycodone, “right next to Mr.

Fore's body,” “not quite underneath him. Maybe an inch or

two in the mid-body area, near the hip and the hand.”

FN4. Although Officer McDevitt had seen Hall the day

before, the officer did not immediately recognize

Hall because there were other men of his stature,

size, height, and weight, in the area.

The arresting officers took Hall's sneakers and a

folding-blade knife with a wood-type handle that was found

in his front pant pocket. An expert in “blood pattern

evidence” testified it was not surprising that Hall's

sneakers had no traces of blood on them because some time

during the attack Fore attempted to cover his face and it

could not be determined when Fore started to bleed during

the attack. Another expert testified that Hall's knife

could not be ruled out as the murder weapon in the June 2

killing because it was consistent in size, dimension, and

features of the type of weapon used to stab Marzullo.

Fore could not remember anything about the two weeks prior

to the assault or the assault itself. However, he

testified he used oxycodone from the fall of 2006 until

the time of the assault in August 2007. Fore recognized

Hall as a person from whom he purchased OxyContin

(concentrated version of oxycodone) on 10 to 20 occasions

in the Tenderloin Area. At the time of those drug sales,

Hall always had a backpack and rode a bicycle. Sometimes

Hall had facial hair, and on some occasions he wore his

head hair in braids or a short Afro underneath a beanie or

baseball cap. Fore was shown the police sketch of the

suspect in the Marzullo murder. Fore indicated the sketch

looked like the man who sold him oxycodone, whom he

identified as Hall.

B. Defense

Hall asserted an entrapment defense to the drug sales he

admittedly made to Keane on June 1, 2007, and June 13,

2007. Starting in the summer of 2006 until his arrest on

August 7, 2007, Hall took oxycodone for pain in his lower

back and feet caused by a spinal injury. Hall acquired

oxycodone pills through valid and fraudulent

prescriptions, and by buying pills on the street. Hall

had “loaned” oxycodone pills to other people and later

gotten pills back, but he never sold any pills except to

Keane. As to the first sale, Hall felt sorry for Keane,

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who had promised to both pay Hall for the pills and return

four pills to him once Keane filled his own prescription

for oxycodone. As to the second sale, Hall claimed Keane

had played on Hall's sympathy by begging for pills for

pain, giving a reasonable excuse for his failure to return

four pills, and agreeing to return eight pills and any

extras he could get below the average price. FN5 Hall

contended the pills found on the street at the time of his

June 13, 2007 arrest belonged to an acquaintance who was

with him at that time.

FN5. On rebuttal, Keane testified he never told Hall

that he would give him pills for those he had

purchased from Hall. As an undercover officer Keane

purchased drugs but he did not have access to drugs

to give to sellers.

Hall denied killing Marzullo. At the time of the murder,

Hall lived in the East Bay and came to San Francisco to

buy bicycles for his bicycle business. Although Hall “was

somewhere in the proximity of San Francisco” on the day of

the killing based on his cell phone records, he did not

independently recall where he was at or near the time of

Marzullo's killing, noting he was not charged with the

murder until November 15, 2007. FN6 A defense expert

witness testified that Hall's knife, with a thumb stud on

the side of the blade, was very common; such a knife was

available from many vendors. To counter the prosecution's

argument that Hall had shaved his head and facial hair to

avoid apprehension after the murder, Hall testified and

presented evidence and witnesses to demonstrate that for

various reasons he had routinely changed his head and

facial hair styles before the murder.

FN6. An evaluation of calls to and from Hall's cell

phone indicated that on June 2, 2007, there were

several incoming and outgoing calls that used San

Francisco cell towers, consistent with Hall being in

or around the Tenderloin area at the time of murder. 

On the evening of June 2, 2007, at 10:21 p.m., a

phone call was placed on Hall's cell phone using a

tower in San Francisco, and there were no calls until

11:05 p.m. when a phone call was placed using a tower

in Oakland.

Hall testified he never assaulted Fore and never sold

drugs to Fore. Hall claimed that on August 7, 2007, he

witnessed several assaults on Fore in the Tenderloin area. 

At about noon, Fore was struck in the face by an

unidentified patron of a restaurant, and at 7:00 p.m. 

Fore was attacked on two occasions: once by an

unidentified Hispanic man, and then, 15 minutes later, by

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an unidentified African–American man. The last incident

was apparently seen by police officers. Hall called

witnesses to challenge the credibility of Fore and the

police officers who had seen the incident. Hall's

treating podiatrist, also qualified as an expert,

testified that Hall's physical condition would have made

it extremely difficult for him to attack Fore by stomping

his foot as described by the police officers.

Hall, 2011 WL 4499245, at *1-5.

III

This Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas

corpus “in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of

a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation

of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(a); Rose v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21 (1975). 

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(“AEDPA”) amended § 2254 to impose new restrictions on federal

habeas review. A petition may not be granted with respect to any

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the

state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision

that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court

of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d). Additionally, habeas relief is warranted only if the

constitutional error at issue had a “substantial and injurious

effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Penry v.

Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 795 (2001) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

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“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court

may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion

opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law

or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court

has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams

(Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). “Under the

‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant

the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal

principle from [the] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that

principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. 

“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply

because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the

relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal

law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also

be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. A federal habeas court making the

“unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the state

court’s application of clearly established federal law was

“objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409. Moreover, in conducting

its analysis, the federal court must presume the correctness of the

state court’s factual findings, and the petitioner bears the burden

of rebutting that presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). As the Court explained: “[o]n federal habeas

review, AEDPA ‘imposes a highly deferential standard for evaluating

state-court rulings’ and ‘demands that state-court decisions be

given the benefit of the doubt.’” Felkner v. Jackson, 131 S. Ct.

1305, 1307 (2011). 

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Section 2254(d)(1) restricts the source of clearly

established law to the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. “[C]learly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States” refers to “the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of

[the Supreme] Court’s decisions as of the time of the relevant

state-court decision.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. “A federal court

may not overrule a state court for simply holding a view different

from its own, when the precedent from [the Supreme Court] is, at

best, ambiguous.” Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 17 (2003).

When applying these standards, the federal court should

review the “last reasoned decision” by the state courts. See Ylst

v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804 (1991); Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d

1085, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 2005). When there is no reasoned opinion

from the state’s highest court, the court “looks through” to the

last reasoned opinion. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 804. 

With these principles in mind regarding the standard and

scope of review on federal habeas, the Court addresses Petitioner’s

claims. 

IV

A

Petitioner first contends that the trial court erred when

it permitted the prosecution to introduce evidence of the separately

charged assault of Charles Fore. The state appellate court denied

this claim as follows:

Over defense objection, the trial court granted the

prosecution's motion to admit evidence of the August 7,

2007 assault and battery on Fore on the issue of a common

plan or scheme. In so ruling, the trial court relied on

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pertinent portions of our Supreme Court's decision in

People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal. 4th 380, 399–404. In

evaluating the prejudicial effect of the other crimes

evidence, the trial court found there was a strong

tendency that the evidence demonstrated a common design

or plan; the evidence of the Fore incident was

independent of the evidence of the charged murder

offense; the results of the prior trial on the Fore

incident would be presented to the jury to limit the

prejudicial impact of the other crimes evidence, pursuant

to People v. Griffin (1967) 66 Cal.2d 459, 465; the

evidence of the Fore incident was no more inflammatory

than the evidence of the charged murder offense; and both

incidents were “close in time and close in location.”

Before the first witness testified on the issue, the

court advised the jury it was going to hear testimony

concerning an alleged assault and battery on Fore that

occurred on August 7, 2007. The evidence was being

offered to assist the jury in determining whether

Marzullo's killing was part of a scheme, design, or plan,

for the illegal sale of prescription pills by Hall. The

court admonished the jurors that “if, from all of the

evidence in this case, you believe that the existence of

such a scheme, plan, or design has not been proven ... to

your satisfaction, you are not to consider ... the

evidence concerning the Charles Fore incident for any

purpose.” The court further explained that the jurors

were to consider as evidence the following stipulated

facts: The circumstances of the Fore incident had been

heard in another jury trial in May to June of 2008. Hall

had been charged with attempted murder, assault with

great bodily injury, and battery with serious bodily

injury. The jurors in that case found Hall was not

guilty of attempted murder, but they were unable to reach

a unanimous verdict on the assault and battery charges. 

The People had refiled assault and battery charges

against Hall, those charges were “still active” and

pending “elsewhere in this building,” and were not before

the jury in this case.

In its closing instructions, the court again advised the

jury as to how to evaluate the evidence of the Fore

incident. Using language in CALCRIM No. 375, the court

told the jury, in pertinent part: “If you decide that the

defendant committed the uncharged act against Charles

Fore, ... you may, but are not required to, consider that

evidence for the limited purpose of deciding whether or

not: [¶] The defendant had a common plan or scheme to

engage in violence as part of a scheme to illegally sell

prescription pills including Oxycodone. [¶] In

evaluating this evidence, consider the similarity or lack

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of similarity between the uncharged act and the charged

act. [¶] Do not consider this evidence for any other

purpose except for the limited purpose of determining a

common plan in this case. [¶] Do not conclude from this

evidence that the defendant has a bad character or is

disposed to commit a crime. [¶] If you conclude that

the defendant committed the uncharged act on August 7,

2007 regarding Charles Fore, that conclusion is only one

factor to consider along with all the other evidence. It

is not sufficient by itself to prove that the defendant

is guilty of murder. The People must still prove the

charged offense ... beyond a reasonable doubt.”

On appeal Hall challenges the trial court's ruling

allowing evidence concerning the Fore incident. He also

argues the evidence so infected the fairness of the

entire trial and so shored up the prosecution's weak case

for murder that this court should find its admission

violated his federal constitutional right to a fair

trial. He contends reversal is required because the

admission of the evidence was not harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S.

18, 24 [87 S.Ct. 824; 17 L.Ed.2d 705] (Chapman)) and

resulted in a miscarriage of justice (People v. Watson

(1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson)). We need not address

Hall's contentions as to the trial court's ruling

allowing evidence of the Fore incident. Even if the

evidence should not have been admitted, Hall has failed

to demonstrate prejudicial error requiring reversal under

either the Chapman or Watson standard of review.

Hall argues evidence of the Fore incident was prejudicial

because it unduly affected the fairness of the trial,

“making [the trial] about who he was, rather than what he

did or did not do in relation to the charged homicide,

and because the jur[ors] would have been encouraged to

punish him for the Fore attack as to which they could

perceive that he would otherwise escape punishment....” 

However, the prejudice of which Hall complains “is

inherent whenever other crimes evidence is admitted

[citation], and the risk of such prejudice was not

unusually grave here.” (People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th

349, 372.) The Fore incident was not “significantly more

inflammatory” than the Marzullo murder. (People v.

Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1150.) The jury was

specifically informed that a previous jury acquitted Hall

of attempting to murder Fore and failed to reach a

verdict on the assault and battery charges. “[P]roof of

an acquittal” tends “to weaken and rebut the

prosecution's evidence of the other crime.” (People v.

Griffin, supra, 66 Cal.2d at p. 465.) The jurors'

knowledge that Hall would be facing another trial

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regarding the Fore incident made it less likely they

would perceive that Hall would escape punishment for his

alleged attack against Fore unless the jury convicted him

of Marzullo's murder.

We are not persuaded by Hall's arguments regarding the

relative strength of the Fore incident as compared to the

charged murder offense. Regardless of the purported

weaknesses in the murder case, Hall does not argue the

evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for

murder. The rejection of first degree murder in favor of

second degree murder shows the jurors were focused on

Hall's criminal liability, if any, for the charged murder

offense, and not on punishing Hall for the Fore incident. 

Nor are we persuaded by Hall's contention that this was a

close case because of the length of deliberations. 

Unlike the situations in People v. Cadenas (1982) 31

Cal.3d 897, 907, and Bowen v. Ryan (2008) 163 Cal. App.

4th 916, 927, cited by Hall, the jurors in this case were

asked to consider the testimony of more than 40 witnesses

and more than 150 exhibits presented in 24 days over two

months. Thus, it is not surprising that deliberations

took four days and that the jury requested read backs of

testimony on four occasions. We therefore deem it

inappropriate to speculate that the jury found this was a

“close” case based on the length of deliberations.

Similarly unavailing is Hall's reliance on certain

statements in the prosecutor's closing argument, to which

no objections were made by defense counsel. The trial

court advised the jurors how to evaluate the evidence of

the Fore incident and told them to disregard any comments

by counsel that conflicted with the court's instructions. 

By the court's instruction that the Fore incident was

insufficient to prove Hall guilty of murder beyond a

reasonable doubt, the “jurors necessarily [understood]

that they must consider all of the other evidence before

convicting [Hall]” of murder. (People v. Reliford (2003)

29 Cal.4th 1007, 1015 (Reliford).) The jury was also

instructed as to the elements of murder in the first

degree and second degree, that a conviction required

proof beyond a reasonable doubt (CALCRIM Nos. 500, 520,

521), and that for each offense a guilty verdict required

a union or joint operation of act or conduct and

requisite intent (CALCRIM No. 252). “No reasonable juror

would believe those requirements could be satisfied

solely by proof of” Hall's commission of an assault and

battery against Fore. (Reliford, supra, 29 Cal.4th at

pp. 1013–1014.) The evidence of the Fore incident,

“while adverse to [Hall], was not of such overwhelming

force that it would have caused a reasonable juror to

abandon the trial court's instructions and presume

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defendant's guilt” of the charged murder offense. 

(People v. Quartermain (1997) 16 Cal.4th 600, 627.)

Accordingly, we conclude any purported error in admitting

evidence of the Fore incident did not result in a

miscarriage of justice as it is not reasonably probable a

result more favorable to Hall would have been reached

absent the purported error. (Watson, supra, 48 Cal.2d at

p. 836.) Nor is there any substantial likelihood that

evidence of the Fore incident was used by the jury for an

illegitimate purpose or otherwise rendered the trial

unfair. Consequently, any error was harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt. (Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24.)

Hall, 2011 WL 4499245, at *6-8 (footnotes omitted).

 A state court's procedural or evidentiary ruling is not

subject to federal habeas review unless the ruling violates federal

law, either by infringing upon a specific federal constitutional or

statutory provision or by depriving the defendant of the

fundamentally fair trial guaranteed by due process. See Pulley v.

Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984); Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918,

919-20 (9th Cir. 1991). Accordingly, a federal court cannot disturb

on due process grounds a state court's decision to admit evidence of

prior crimes or bad acts unless the admission of the evidence was

arbitrary or so prejudicial that it rendered the trial fundamentally

unfair. See Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir. 1995);

Colley v. Sumner, 784 F.2d 984, 990 (9th Cir. 1986). 

The Ninth Circuit has held that the admission of other

crimes evidence violates due process where there are no permissible

inferences the jury can draw from the evidence (in other words, no

inference other than conduct in conformity therewith). See McKinney

v. Rees, 993 F.2d 1378, 1384 (9th Cir. 1993); Jammal, 926 F.2d at

920. But it is generally upheld where: (1) there is sufficient

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proof that the defendant committed the prior act; (2) the prior act

is not too remote in time; (3) the prior act is similar (if admitted

to show intent); (4) the prior act is used to prove a material

element; and (5) the probative value of admitting evidence of the

prior act is not substantially outweighed by any prejudice the

defendant may suffer as a result of its admission. See McDowell v.

Calderon, 107 F.3d 1351, 1366 (9th Cir.) (sentencer may rely on

prior criminal conduct not resulting in a conviction if the evidence

has “‘some minimal indicium of reliability beyond mere

allegation’”), amended, 116 F.3d 364 (9th Cir. 1997), vacated in

part by 130 F.3d 833, 835 (9th Cir.) (en banc); Walters, 45 F.3d at

1357-58 (upholding state admission of prior act on federal habeas

review); 

To the extent that Petitioner is arguing that the state

courts erroneously applied or interpreted state law with respect to

the admission of the evidence, no federal habeas relief is

available. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that federal

habeas writ is unavailable for violations of state law or for

alleged error in the interpretation or application of state law. 

See Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 222 (2011). Nor is there any

established Supreme Court authority that the admission of irrelevant

or overtly prejudicial evidence can justify habeas relief. Holley

v. Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Petitioner has also failed to demonstrate that the

admission of this evidence was arbitrary or so prejudicial that it

rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. As discussed by the

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California Court of Appeal, the jury was properly and repeatedly

instructed in the correct manner to consider the evidence, and there

were permissible inferences that the jury could have drawn from the

evidence. There was sufficient proof that Petitioner committed the

other crime, which was quite recent, and it was relevant to

demonstrate the similarities in both attacks and that there was a

common plan or scheme to attack unsuspecting buyers of the drugs. 

Accordingly, the state appellate court’s denial of the claim was not

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law. Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this

claim. 

B

Petitioner contends that the trial court violated his

right to a fair trial by denying his motion to sever the drug

charges. The state appellate court denied his claim as follows:

On appeal Hall argues the murder and drug counts were not

properly joined pursuant to section 954, and even if the

case qualified for joinder, the court abused its

discretion in denying his motion to sever and allowing a

joint trial in this case. We need not resolve these

issues. Even if the counts should not have been

consolidated, reversal is not required as Hall has failed

to show that the denial of his motion to sever and the

holding of a joint trial “‘actually resulted in “gross

unfairness” amounting to a denial of due process.’” 

(People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal. 4th 130, 162.)

Because “the consolidated offenses were factually

separable ... there was a minimal risk of confusing the

jury or of having the jury consider the commission of one

of the joined crimes as evidence of defendant's

commission of another of the joined crimes.” (People v.

Mendoza, supra, 24 Cal. 4th at p. 163.) It does “not

appear reasonably likely ... that the jury would be

influenced in determining [Hall's] guilt of ”murder by

its knowledge of the charged drug offenses. (People v.

Bean (1988) 46 Cal. 3d 919, 939.) Any doubts the jury

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might otherwise have had about the identity of Marzullo's

killer would not have been resolved by the evidence

concerning the charged drug offenses. (People v.

Balderas (1985) 41 Cal. 3d 144, 174.) Hall's contention

that the joint trial allowed the prosecution to join a

weak murder case with stronger drug cases is based on the

prosecutor's closing arguments to the jury, to which no

objection was made by defense counsel. We presume the

jurors treated the “prosecutor's comments as words spoken

by an advocate in an attempt to persuade” (People v.

Sanchez (1995) 12 Cal.4th 1, 70, disapproved on another

ground in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal. 4th 390, 421,

fn. 22), which could be “‘totally disregard[ed]’” (People

v. Morales (2001) 25 Cal. 4th 34, 47). Hall's reliance

on People v. Earle (2009) 172 Cal. App.4th 372 (Earle) is

similarly misplaced. Unlike the situation in Earle, in

this case the jurors' exposure to the charged drug

offenses would not have “had the potential to inflame the

jury against [Hall] in an unusual and peculiar manner.” 

(Id. at p. 401.) The strongest indication the jurors

were not unduly influenced by the prosecutor's closing

arguments or any possible spillover effect of joinder is

that after they heard several read backs of testimony,

the jurors acquitted Hall of first degree murder and

failed to reach a verdict on two drug counts, thereby

demonstrating that they viewed and evaluated the evidence

on each count separately. (See People v. Koontz (2002)

27 Cal. 4th 1041, 1075.)

Because Hall has failed to show the consolidated trial on

the murder and drug offenses violated his right to due

process or a fair trial, we conclude there is no basis

for reversal on the ground of misjoinder. (See People v.

Balderas, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 175 [even assuming the

trial court should have severed charges, reversal after

trial is required “only for a ‘miscarriage of justice’ 

(See Cal. Const., art. VI., § 13)”]; United States v.

Lane (1986) 474 U.S. 438, 446, fn. 8 [106 S.Ct. 725; 88

L.Ed.2d 814][“[i]mproper joinder does not, in itself,

violate the Constitution” but “[r]ather, misjoinder would

rise to the level of a constitutional violation only if

it results in prejudice so great as to deny a defendant

his Fifth Amendment right to a fair trial”].)

Hall, 2011 WL 4499245, at *8-9. 

Generally, the propriety of consolidating the trial of

counts “rests within the sound discretion of the state trial judge.” 

Featherstone v. Estelle, 948 F.2d 1497, 1503 (9th Cir. 1991). To

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prevail on a claim that a trial court erred in failing to sever

counts, a habeas petitioner must “demonstrat[e] that the state

court's denial of his severance motion rendered his trial

‘fundamentally unfair.’” See Grisby v. Blodqett, 130 F.3d 365, 370

(9th Cir. 1997); see also United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 446

n.8 (1986) (“Improper joinder does not, in itself, violate the

Constitution. Rather, misjoinder would rise to the level of a

constitutional violation only if it results in prejudice so great as

to deny a defendant his Fifth Amendment right to a fair trial.”).

A federal court reviewing a state conviction under 28

U.S.C. § 2254 does not concern itself with state law governing

severance or joinder in state trials. Grisby, 130 F.3d at 370. Nor

is it concerned with procedural right to severance afforded in

federal trials. Id.; see Collins v. Runnels, 603 F.3d 1127, 1131-32

(9th Cir. 2010) (finding that Supreme Court decisions addressing

severance under federal rules do not apply to analysis of whether

joinder in state courts was constitutional). Its inquiry is limited

to the petitioner's right to a fair trial under the United States

Constitution. Grisby, 130 F.3d at 370. To prevail, therefore, the

petitioner must demonstrate that the state court's joinder or denial

of his severance motion resulted in prejudice great enough to render

his trial fundamentally unfair. Id. In addition, the impermissible

joinder must have had a substantial and injurious effect or

influence in determining the jury's verdict. Sandoval v. Calderon,

241 F.3d 765, 772 (9th Cir. 2000).

There is a “‘high risk of undue prejudice whenever . . .

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joinder of counts allows evidence of other crimes to be introduced

in a trial of charges with respect to which the evidence would

otherwise be inadmissible.’” United States v. Lewis, 787 F.2d 1318,

1321 (9th Cir. 1986) (omission in original). This risk is

especially great when the prosecutor encourages the jury to consider

the two sets of charges in concert, e.g., as reflecting a modus

operandi even though the evidence is not cross admissible, and when

the evidence of one crime is substantially weaker than the evidence

of the other crime. Bean v. Calderon, 163 F.3d 1073, 1084-85 (9th

Cir. 1998). But joinder generally does not result in prejudice if

the evidence of each crime is simple and distinct (even if the

evidence is not cross admissible), and the jury is properly

instructed so that it may compartmentalize the evidence. Id. at

1085-86; see, e.g., Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 638-39 (9th

Cir. 2004) (denial of motion to sever trial of capital and

noncapital charges based on separate incidents not a violation of

due process because evidence was cross-admissible, the weight of

evidence with respect to each incident was roughly equal, the

evidence as to each incident was distinct, and the jury was properly

instructed). Similarly, joinder generally does not result in

prejudice if the jury did not convict on all counts because it

presumably was able to compartmentalize the evidence. Park v.

California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1149-50 (9th Cir. 2000).

The state appellate court’s denial of this claim was not

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law. The record supports the findings that the drug charges

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were factually distinct from the murder charge so there was little

risk that the jury would be confused. While the prosecutor argued

that the crimes were connected, it was not likely that the jury was

influenced in determining the murder charge because of knowledge of

the drug offenses. This is supported by the jury verdict which

acquitted Petitioner of first degree murder, and by the jury’s

failure to reach a verdict on two drug counts. See Park, 202 F.3d

at 1149-50 (joinder generally does not result in prejudice if the

jury did not convict on all counts because it presumably was able to

compartmentalize the evidence). Petitioner has failed to

demonstrate that the state court's denial of his severance motion

resulted in prejudice great enough to render his trial fundamentally

unfair. Habeas relief is denied on this claim.

C

Petitioner next argues that the trial court erroneously

permitted introduction of testimony that witness Jacob Lee

identified Petitioner from a photographic lineup. The state

appellate court denied the claim as follows:

Before trial Hall filed a motion to exclude any testimony

regarding Lee's identification of Hall as Marzullo's murderer

on the ground that any in-court identification would be

tainted by an unduly suggestive police-arranged six-photo

lineup shown to Lee on August 20, 2007. The trial court

denied the motion after finding that the photo lineup was not

unduly suggestive even though Hall's image in his photo was

more prominent than the images of the men in the other five

photos. On appeal Hall argues the trial court erred by

permitting Lee's identification testimony. He also contends

the introduction of Lee's identification evidence, which was

not otherwise reliable, violated his right to a fair trial. 

We conclude Hall's contentions are unavailing.

“[C]onvictions based on eyewitness identification at trial

following a pretrial identification by photograph will be set

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aside on that ground only if the photographic identification

procedure was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a

very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.” 

(Simmons v. United States (1968) 390 U.S. 377, 384 [88 S. Ct.

967; 19 L.Ed. 2d 1247].) “We independently review ‘a trial

court's ruling that a pretrial identification procedure was

not unduly suggestive.’” (People v.. Avila (2009) 46 Cal. 4th

680, 698–699.) After our independent review of the photos in

the lineups shown to Lee, we conclude that Hall's photo in the

lineup was not so impermissibly suggestive so as to give rise

to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable

misidentification.

Hall does not attack the appearance of the men in the photo

lineup. Each color photo was generated by a computer and

depicts men that appear to be African–Americans with

essentially the same skin tone and wearing identical orange

shirts. Five of the men are bald or have hair very close to

their scalps (including Hall), and one man has a receding

hairline with a short-cropped full head of hair. The men have

varying degrees of facial hair.

We agree with the observations made by both defense counsel at

trial and the trial court that Hall's image is more prominent

than the other five men, which could well be a function of how

close he was to the camera when his photo was taken. However,

a photo lineup is not considered “unconstitutional” merely

because one suspect's photo “is much more distinguishable from

the others in the lineup.” (People v. Brandon (1995) 32 Cal.

App. 4th 1033, 1052.) Hall's suggestion that his photo

appears to have been generated from a source different from

the other five photos is not supported by evidence or a

visible observation of the photos. Nor can we conclude that

Hall's photo was improperly highlighted by being placed in

“the top center position.” “[N]o matter where in the array a

defendant's photograph is placed, he can argue that its

position is suggestive. [Citation.]” (People v. Johnson

(1992) 3 Cal. 4th 1183, 1217, citing People v. DeAngelis

(1979) 97 Cal. App. 3d 837, 841 [court upheld lineup despite

claim of strategic placement of defendant's photo toward

center of display].)

We also see no merit to Hall's contention that the photo

lineup was unduly suggestive based on the distinctiveness and

placement of his photo, coupled with the following facts:

“[T]he homicide occurred two and a half months earlier and the

officers had shown Lee five lineups within two weeks,

including several on June 19. There had been no other lineups

until August 20, also indicating that something had occurred

to invite the officer's interest in one of the people in the

lineup.” “Anyone asked to view a lineup would naturally

assume the police had a suspect.” (People v. Carpenter (1997)

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15 Cal. 4th 312, 368.) There is no evidence that Lee was told

or knew that Marzullo's killer had been arrested and his photo

would appear in the lineup. When Lee was shown the lineup, he

was specifically informed that the person who committed the

crime might not be present and he was not required to identify

anyone. As the trial court commented, the fact that Lee had

viewed similar lineups in which a person's image appeared more

prominent than other images and failed to make an

identification made it less likely that Lee would place any

significance on the prominence of Hall's image or the

placement of his photo in the lineup. Hall has failed to

demonstrate that Lee was impermissibly pressured “to

acquiesce” in any suggestion that he select Hall's photo. 

FN10 (Manson v. Brathwaite (1977) 432 U.S. 98, 116 [97 S. Ct.

2243; 53 L.Ed. 2d 140] [addressing single photo display].) 

Because the photo lineup was not unduly suggestive, we need

not address Hall's argument that Lee's identification was

unreliable under the totality of the circumstances. “Only if

the challenged identification procedure is unnecessarily

suggestive is it necessary to determine the reliability of the

resulting identification.” (People v. Yeoman (2003) 31

Cal.4th 93, 125.)

FN10. Indeed, as noted in defense counsel's closing

argument, despite the purported suggestiveness of the

photo lineup, Lee did not “to his credit ... take the

bait,” because Lee only said Hall “looks like” the

killer.

We reject Hall's suggestion that his trial was unfair because

the court allowed evidence regarding Lee's identification of

Hall's photograph as being the most accurate photograph

depicting the person that looked like the man who stabbed

Marzullo. (People v. Alexander (2010) 49 Cal. 4th 846, 903.) 

Lee's observation and description of the killer was sufficient

to allow the jury to evaluate its probative value, and if

appropriate, disregard his testimony that Hall looked like the

killer. (People v. Dominick (1986) 182 Cal. App. 3d 1174,

1197.) “The circumstances of the [photo lineup]

identification were disclosed to the [jury], they were the

subject of thorough cross-examination, and the jury was able

to evaluate the reliability of [Lee's] identification by

comparing the [lineup] photographs to the composite drawing

[of the suspect] and to [Hall's] current appearance at trial.” 

(People v.. Alexander, supra, 49 Cal. 4th at p. 903.) Hall's

cross-examination of the police witnesses and closing

arguments “‘expose[d] to the jury the ... potential for

error’” in the police-arranged lineup procedures. (People v.

Bethea (1971) 18 Cal. App. 3d 930, 938.) The trial court's

instructions “‘sufficiently focused the jury's attention on

the People's burden of proof on the issue of identity,’” and

“g[a]ve the jury a focal point for considering

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cross-examination and arguments as to the credibility and

reliability of” Lee's identification. (People v. Hurley

(1979) 95 Cal. App. 3d 895, 901.) “[E]vidence with some

element of untrustworthiness is customary grist for the jury

mill. Juries are not so susceptible that they cannot measure

intelligently the weight of identification testimony that has

some questionable feature.” (Manson v. Brathwaite, supra, 432

U.S. at p. 116; see People v. Alexander, supra, 49 Cal. 4th at

p. 903; People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal. 4th 92, 170.)

Hall, 2011 WL 4499245, at *9-10.

Due process may require suppression of eyewitness

identification evidence where the identification procedure used was

suggestive and unnecessary. Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716,

718 (2012); Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 107-09 (1977); Neil

v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 196-98 (1972). However, improper state

conduct in arranging unnecessarily suggestive pretrial

identification procedures alone does not require exclusion of

in-court identification testimony; the reliability of the eyewitness

testimony is the “linchpin” in determining its admissibility. 

Manson, 432 U.S. at 100-14; see United States v. Drake, 543 F.3d

1080, 1089 (9th Cir. 2008). Identification testimony is

inadmissible as a violation of due process only if (1) a pretrial

encounter is so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very

substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification, and (2) the

identification is not sufficiently reliable to outweigh the

corrupting effects of the suggestive procedure. Van Pilon v. Reed,

799 F.2d 1332, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986).

After reviewing the photographic lineup viewed by the

witness, the trial court and the California Court of Appeal found

that the lineup was not unduly suggestive. The courts also noted

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that the witness had viewed several other lineups with similar

discrepancies in the pictures, but he did not make an identification

in those lineups. Petitioner has failed to show that the California

Court of Appeal’s decision was an unreasonable application of

Supreme Court authority. 

While Petitioner’s image in the lineup was more prominent

than the images in the other photographs, the witness had viewed

other lineups with one image more prominent than others without

identifying any suspect. Moreover, the witness had a good

opportunity to view the suspect during the incident and had seen

Petitioner on several other occasions. Reporter’s Transcript (“RT”)

at 1363-68, 1375-78. He also provided a description to the police

on the night of the murder. RT at 1375. Because Petitioner cannot

show an unreasonable application of Supreme Court authority in the

state court’s denial of this claim, he is not entitled to habeas

relief.

D

Petitioner argues that the trial court erroneously allowed

the prosecution to impeach him with statements he made to jail

personnel. The state appellate court denied the claim as follows:

Before Hall testified, the prosecutor requested permission to

introduce into evidence statements made by Hall to Sheriff's

Deputy George Coviello while Hall was in jail. The prosecutor

informed the court that if allowed, Coviello would testify

that (a) on November 23, 2008, Hall stated: “I will be out in

January and will see you all out on the streets. I'm going to

beat my second murder. I don't care if you are out with your

wife or your kids, you will regret seeing me. Then we will

see how tough you all are”; and (b) on November 25, 2008, as

Hall passed and glared at Coviello, Hall said: “It's just you

and me now. I'll see you soon. Better be ready.” Then Hall

apparently smiled. As to Hall's statement, “ ‘I'm going to

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beat my second murder,’” the prosecutor sought its

introduction as “an admission,” to be used “for

cross-examination as well as substantively proving it through

the [d]eputy.” The trial court did not immediately rule on

the prosecution's request, and Hall did not request a ruling

before he chose to testify.

During direct examination, defense counsel asked Hall why he

did not complain when he was arrested for assaulting Fore. He

responded: “I've learned that any incidence [sic] with the

police officers, you don't say nothing to any of them at any

time. They have these accidents, you know, and these

accidents happen in custody. It's not isolated to San

Francisco. Houston, New York, Atlanta.” The prosecutor

interrupted at this point, stating: “You said ‘Accidents'?” to

which Hall replied: “Yeah, they have accidents. They just had

an accident in the BART station in Fruitvale, an accident, and

I don't want to have another accident. So, I learned to be

quiet because they have these accidents that happen.”

After Hall's direct examination, the prosecutor renewed his

request to admit Hall's statements made to Coviello. The

trial court granted the request, after noting that the

prosecution had not opened the door to Hall's testimony

regarding his reasons for remaining “stoic” during his arrest

but that Hall's expanded testimony referring to a recent BART

shooting opened the door to the proposed evidence. In

response to Hall's specific challenge to the use of his

statement about “beating his second murder” as an admission,

the court ruled it would allow Hall's entire statement, citing

to portions of People v. Sapp (2003) 31 Cal. 4th 240, 275,

People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal. 4th 800, 846, and People v.

Cummings (1993) 4 Cal. 4th 1233, 1290, in which our Supreme

Court upheld the admission of a defendant's statement or

admission relating to the charged offenses in those cases.

During cross-examination, the prosecutor questioned Hall about

his encounters with Coviello while Hall was incarcerated in

jail awaiting trial. Hall specifically denied making the

statements as set forth in the prosecutor's offer of proof. 

During the first encounter, Hall recalled that he had gotten

angry when Coviello refused to allow him to finish a telephone

call for which Hall had paid five dollars. Hall responded by

disrespecting the deputy and calling him a bitch. When

Coviello said Hall should not come to jail if he did not like

the accommodations, Hall responded, “You shouldn't arrest me

on false, bogus charges. You shouldn't file murder charges on

me.” Hall also said he was going to get acquitted and be out

in January just like he got acquitted of attempted murder in

the Fore case. Two days later Hall had another encounter with

Coviello. Hall recalled saying to the deputy something like,

“Okay, Coviello, I'm waiting on you any time.” Hall said it

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in a “friendly way,” because the deputy said he was going to

run into Hall's cell and “do all these heroic acts.”

On rebuttal, Coviello testified concerning his two encounters

with Hall, including the statements made by Hall as set forth

in the prosecutor's offer of proof, and documented in incident

reports. On the first occasion, Hall was “very belligerent,

very aggressive,” and the deputy understood the statements as

a threat that if Hall saw the deputy again, the deputy would

be his next victim and he would be acquitted of that crime

also. On the second occasion, Hall glared “menacingly” when

he spoke to the deputy. Coviello was concerned about the

statements made by Hall during the second encounter because of

Hall's earlier statements.

The parties stipulated that if Police Lieutenant Larry Dorsey

was called as a witness, he would testify as follows: He was

present during the second encounter between Hall and Coviello. 

After some verbal exchange between Dorsey and Hall, Hall

turned to Coviello and said, “How are you doing, Coviello?” 

Coviello replied, “I am fine. Thank you.” Hall replied,

“Yeah. Soon just me and you. And it ain't gonna be fine.” 

Hall was staring intently at Coviello. Dorsey ordered

Coviello to write an incident report documenting Hall's

statements during this second encounter because of Hall's

previous statements made to Coviello.

On appeal Hall argues the trial court committed prejudicial

error by allowing the prosecutor to present evidence regarding

his statements made to Coviello. We need not address Hall's

arguments regarding the admissibility of the evidence. Even

if the trial court should not have allowed the jury to

consider the evidence, we are not persuaded that the purported

error requires reversal.

“We do not reverse a judgment for erroneous admission of

evidence unless ‘the admitted evidence should have been

excluded on the ground stated and ... the error or errors

complained of resulted in a miscarriage of justice.’ 

[Citations.]” (People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal. 4th 826, 878;

see People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal. 2d at p. 836 [under our

state constitutional standard an error is harmless unless it

is “reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the

appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the

error”].) Contrary to Hall's contention, the evidence of his

statements made to Coviello did not result in “the

introduction of a large amount of inflammatory character

evidence and the consumption of a huge amount of time.” To

the extent Hall argues the prosecutor misused the evidence as

proof of Hall's bad character and guilt, we note there were no

objections to the prosecutor's references to the evidence in

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his closing arguments. If the prosecutor's closing arguments

were “susceptible of the interpretation [Hall] now asserts,

[defense] counsel likely would have objected at trial on this

basis. Such an omission suggests that ‘“the potential for

[prejudice] argued now was not apparent to one on the spot.”’

[Citation.]” (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal. 4th 1149, 1203.) 

The jurors were properly instructed as to how to evaluate

Hall's statements made to Coviello. We therefore conclude,

that any purported error in the admission of evidence of his

statements did not result in a miscarriage of justice. It is

not reasonably probable that a result more favorable to Hall

would have been reached in the absence of the alleged error. 

(People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal. 2d at p. 836.) Contrary to

Hall's contentions, any purported error did not so infect “the

fairness of this trial” as to result “in a conviction that is

unreliable and in violation of due process.”

Hall, 2011 WL 4499245, at *11-12 (footnote omitted).

 The admission of evidence is not subject to federal

habeas review unless a specific constitutional guarantee is violated

or the error is of such magnitude that the result is a denial of the

fundamentally fair trial guaranteed by due process. See Henry v.

Kernan, 197 F.3d 1021, 1031 (9th Cir. 1999). The Supreme Court "has

not yet made a clear ruling that admission of irrelevant or overtly

prejudicial evidence constitutes a due process violation sufficient

to warrant issuance of the writ." Holley, 568 F.3d at 1101.

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the admission of

this evidence resulted in the denial of a fair trial. During his

direct and cross-examination, Petitioner testified to his version of

events and what statements he made and denied that he had made the

statements attributed to him. The jury was properly instructed on

how to view the evidence:

Using language in CALCRIM No. 358, the trial court

advised the jury, in pertinent part: “You have heard

evidence that the defendant made oral ... statements

before or during the trial. You must decide whether or

not the defendant made any of these statements, in whole

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or in part. If you decide that the defendant made such

... statements, consider the statements, along with all

the other evidence, in reaching your verdict. It is up

to you to decide how much importance to give to such

statements. [¶] You must consider with caution evidence

of a defendant's oral statement unless it was written or

otherwise recorded.”

Hall, 2011 WL 4499245, at *12. 

Petitioner has failed to meet the heavy burden in showing

a due process violation based on the admission of these few

statements. He is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

E

Finally, Petitioner contends that the cumulative effect of

the errors described above deprived him of his right to a fair

trial. The state appellate court denied the claim stating, “[w]e

reject Hall's contention that cumulative error requires reversal. 

Either considered singly or in the aggregate, any assumed errors

were not prejudicial and did not deprive Hall of a fair trial or

reliable verdicts.” Hall, 2011 WL 4499245, at *13.

In some cases, although no single trial error is

sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal, the cumulative effect

of several errors may still prejudice a defendant so much that his

conviction must be overturned. See Alcala v. Woodford, 334 F.3d

862, 893-95 (9th Cir. 2003) (reversing conviction where multiple

constitutional errors hindered defendant's efforts to challenge

every important element of proof offered by prosecution). 

Cumulative error is more likely to be found prejudicial when the

government's case is weak. See, e.g., Thomas v. Hubbard, 273 F.3d

1164, 1179-80 (9th Cir. 2002), overruled on other grounds by Payton

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v. Woodford, 299 F.3d 815, 829 n.11 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that the

only substantial evidence implicating the defendant was the

uncorroborated testimony of a person who had both a motive and an

opportunity to commit the crime). However, where there is no single

constitutional error existing, nothing can accumulate to the level

of a constitutional violation. See Hayes v. Ayers, 632 F.3d 500,

524 (9th Cir. 2011). Similarly, there can be no cumulative error

when there has not been more than one error. United States v.

Solorio, 669 F.3d 943, 956 (9th Cir. 2012).

This Court has not found any constitutional errors let

alone multiple errors that cumulatively would allow for reversal. 

See Hayes, 632 F.3d at 524. Moreover, there was sufficient evidence

implicating Petitioner in the drug sales and the murder. This claim

is denied.

V

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of

habeas corpus is DENIED.

Further, a Certificate of Appealability is DENIED. See

Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. Petitioner

has not made “a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Nor has Petitioner

demonstrated that “reasonable jurists would find the district

court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” 

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Petitioner may not

appeal the denial of a Certificate of Appealability in this Court

but may seek a certificate from the Court of Appeals under Rule 22

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of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Rule 11(a) of the

Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. 

The Clerk is directed to enter Judgment in favor of

Respondent and against Petitioner, terminate any pending motions as

moot and close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED 05/04/2015 

THELTON E. HENDERSON

United States District Judge

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