Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01795/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01795-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL EDWARD TILTON, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

JAMES E. TILTON, et al., )

)

Respondents. )

____________________________________)

1:07-cv-01795-LJO-TAG HC

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WITHIN

THIRTY DAYS WHY THE PETITION

SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED FOR

VIOLATION OF THE ONE-YEAR

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

(Doc. 1)

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The instant federal petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed on

December 11, 2007. (Doc. 1). A preliminary review of the Petition, however, reveals that the

petition is untimely and should therefore be dismissed. 

DISCUSSION

A. Preliminary Review of Petition

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a petition

if it “plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is

not entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. 

The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 8 indicate that the court may dismiss a petition for writ of

habeas corpus, either on its own motion under Rule 4, pursuant to the respondent’s motion to

dismiss, or after an answer to the petition has been filed. Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039 (9th

Cir.2001).

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The Ninth Circuit, in Herbst v. Cook, concluded that a district court may dismiss sua sponte a

habeas petition on statute of limitations grounds so long as the court provides the petitioner adequate

notice of its intent to dismiss and an opportunity to respond. 260 F.3d at 1041-42. 

B. Limitation Period for Filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (AEDPA). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of habeas

corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063

(1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997). The instant petition was filed on th

December 11, 2007, and thus, it is subject to the provisions of the AEDPA. 

The AEDPA imposes a one year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a federal

petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, § 2244, subdivision (d)

reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall

not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

By accessing the California court system’s electronic database, the Court has determined that

the California Court of Appeal affirmed Petitioner’s conviction on October 9, 2003. Petitioner did

not file a petition for review. According to the California Rules of Court, a decision becomes final

thirty days after filing, and an appeal must be taken to the California Supreme Court within ten days

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In California, the Supreme Court, intermediate Courts of Appeal, and Superior Courts all have original habeas 1

corpus jurisdiction. See, Nino 183 F.3d at 1006, n. 2 (9 Cir. 1999). Although a Superior Court order denying habeas corpus th

relief is non-appealable, a state prisoner may file a new habeas corpus petition in the Court of Appeal. Id. If the Court of

Appeal denies relief, the petitioner may seek review in the California Supreme Court by way of a petition for review, or may

instead file an original habeas petition in the Supreme Court. See, id. 

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of finality. Rule 24(a), 28(b), Cal.R.Ct. Thus, Petitioner’s direct review would have become final

forty days after October 9, 2003, or on November 18, 2003. Petitioner would then have had one

year, or until November 18, 2004, within which to file the instant petition. As mentioned, the

petition was not filed until December 11, 2007, over three years after the one-year period expired. 

Thus, unless Petitioner is entitled to some form of tolling, the petition is untimely and should be

dismissed. 

C. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed application

for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward” the one year limitation period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In

Nino v. Galaza, the Ninth Circuit held that the “statute of limitations is tolled from the time the first

state habeas petition is filed until the California Supreme Court rejects the petitioner’s final collateral

challenge.” Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9 Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1846 1 th

(2000); see, also, Taylor v. Lee, 186 F.3d 557 (4th Cir. 1999); Barnett v. Lemaster, 167 F.3d 1321,

1323 (10th Cir. 1999). The Court reasoned that tolling the limitations period during the time a

petitioner is preparing his petition to file at the next appellate level reinforces the need to present all

claims to the state courts first and will prevent the premature filing of federal petitions out of concern

that the limitation period will end before all claims can be presented to the state supreme court. Id. at

1005. However, the limitations period is not tolled for the time such an application is pending in

federal court. Duncan v. Walker, 121 S.Ct. 2120, 2129 (2001); Fail v. Hubbard, — F.3d —, 2001

WL 1524503 (9 Cir.2001). th

Petitioner alleges that he filed several state habeas petitions in the California Supreme Court

and the Court of Appeal. By reviewing the state court database, the Court has determined that

Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, on September 14,

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2005 that was denied on December 15, 2005. The Court has also determined that Petitioner filed a

petition in the California Supreme Court on September 19, 2006 that was denied on April 11, 2007. 

Petitioner has not alleged any other state habeas petitions that would entitled him to statutory tolling. 

However, from the foregoing chronology, it does not appear that the two state habeas

petitions would be entitled to tolling since the one-year AEDPA period expired on November 18,

2004, well before Petitioner filed his state petition in the Fifth Appellate District on September 14,

2005. A petitioner is not entitled to tolling where the limitations period has already run prior to

filing a state habeas petition. Green v. White, 223 F.3d 1001, 1003 (9 Cir. 2000); see Webster v. th

Moore, 199 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11 Cir. 2000)(same); Jackson v. Dormire, 180 F.3d 919, 920 th

(petitioner fails to exhaust claims raised in state habeas corpus filed after expiration of the one-year

limitations period). Accordingly, he cannot avail himself of the statutory tolling provisions of the

AEDPA. 

However, even if, arguendo, he was entitled to tolling for those two petition, the period of

time tolled would not make the instant petition timely. The petition in the Fifth Appellate District

was pending for ninety-two days between September 14, 2005 and December 15, 2005. The petition

in the California Supreme Court was pending for 204 days between September 19, 2006 and April

11, 2007. The total time for those two tolled periods of 296 days. However, the petition was filed

on December 11, 2007, 1,118 days after the one-year period had expired. Thus, even if Petitioner

were entitled to tolling for those two petitions, the instant petition is still late by 822 days. 

D. Equitable Tolling

The limitations period is subject to equitable tolling if “extraordinary circumstances beyond a

prisoner’s control” have made it impossible for the petition to be filed on time. Calderon v. U.S.

Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 541 (9 Cir. 1998)(citing Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 th

F.3d 696, 701 (9 Cir. 1997)); (Beeler), 128 F.3d at 1288 (noting that "[e]quitable tolling will not be th

available in most cases, as extensions of time will only be granted if 'extraordinary circumstances'

beyond a prisoner's control make it impossible to file a petition on time"). "When external forces,

rather than a petitioner's lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a timely claim, equitable

///

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tolling of the statute of limitations may be appropriate." Id.; Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107

(9 Cir. 1999). th

Petitioner has not alleged such circumstances that would entitle him to equitable tolling under

the AEDPA. Accordingly, it appears that the petition is untimely and must be dismissed. However,

the Court will permit Petitioner to file a response to this Order to Show Cause in order to present any

further information he may possess regarding his entitlement to tolling under the AEDPA. Any

allegations of entitlement to statutory tolling must be accompanied by documentation supporting

such allegations, including, preferably, copies of all petitions filed in the state courts, the dates those

petitions were pending, and the orders denying those petitions. Unsupported allegations of fact will

not suffice. 

 ORDER

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY ORDERS: 

1. Petitioner is ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE within thirty (30) days of the date of service

of this Order why the Petition should not be dismissed for violation of the one-year

statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 

Petitioner is forewarned that his failure to comply with this order may result in Findings and 

Recommendations recommending that the Petition be dismissed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 18, 2008 /s/ Theresa A. Goldner 

j6eb3d UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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