Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_02-cv-02250/USCOURTS-cand-3_02-cv-02250-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ZACHERY DUFFY,

Plaintiff,

v

SAN FRANCISCO POLICE DEPARTMENT

et al,

Defendants.

 /

No C-02-2250 VRW

ORDER

After defendants removed this case to federal court on

May 8, 2002, plaintiff filed a second amended complaint (SAC)

against the San Francisco Police Department (SFPD), the City and

County of San Francisco (“City”) and ten individual police

officers, alleging that the officers beat him and arrested and

jailed him without probable cause because he was black. Doc #34. 

The SAC included federal claims for deprivation of constitutional

rights under 42 USC § 1983 and five state-law causes of action, to

wit, false arrest, assault, battery and intentional and negligent

infliction of emotional distress. Id.

//

Case 3:02-cv-02250-VRW Document 83 Filed 03/01/06 Page 1 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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The court then dismissed the claims for intentional and

negligent infliction of emotional distress (Doc #42 at 8), and for

reasons spelled out in an order filed on April 29, 2005, dismissed

the claims against the individual police officers pursuant to FRCP

12(b)(5) because plaintiff failed to exercise reasonable diligence

in serving the officers. Doc ##60, 76. These orders left only the

SFPD and the City as defendants —— putting aside any issue whether

these are separate entities against which relief may be sought.

On September 1, 2005, the SFPD and the City moved for

partial summary judgment on plaintiff’s 42 USC § 1983 claims under

Monell v Dep’t of Soc Servs, 436 US 658 (1978), for compensatory

and punitive damages, and on his claims for punitive damages under

state law. Doc #77. Plaintiff did not file an opposition, but

instead on November 14, 2005, filed an ex parte motion to extend

the time to respond to the City’s motion. Doc #80.

For the reasons stated below, the court DENIES

plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time and GRANTS the City’s

motion for partial summary judgment. Because no federal claims

remain, the court REMANDS this case to San Francisco county

superior court.

Without providing any specific reasons, plaintiff’s

counsel, Stanley G Hilton, claims that he “was not aware that the

[summary judgment] motion was being heard and so failed by mistake

and inadvertence to respond to the motion,” and that “[t]he

simplest method to remedy this situation is to allow an extension

of time to permit counsel for plaintiff to respond to this motion.” 

Id at 2.

//

Case 3:02-cv-02250-VRW Document 83 Filed 03/01/06 Page 2 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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The court declines to provide an extension. FRCP 6(b)

permits the court upon a showing of cause to extend an alreadyexpired deadline “where the failure to act was the result of

excusable neglect.” But here, Hilton’s claim that he was “not

aware” of the hearing is not credible, and his failure to act is

not excusable. Hilton was present in person at the May 31, 2005,

case management conference, which noticed hearing for October 6,

2005, on defendants’ Monell summary judgment motion. Doc #65. The

court clerk e-filed a minute entry for the meeting, thereby

notifying Hilton at five e-mail addresses: frog727@aol.com,

mscarver@aol.com, loucasloukas@yahoo.com, chaffeej@pacbell.net and

stavros3589@aol.com. Doc #82, Ex A at 2-3. Hilton was also

notified at the same e-mail addresses when, on September 1, 2005,

defendants timely filed their summary judgment motion. Id at 4-5. 

And when the court continued the hearing date, the clerk filed a

notice on September 12, 2005, notifying Hilton again at the same email addresses. Id at 6-7. The court does not believe —— and

Hilton does not contend —— that he failed to receive these e-mails. 

In fact, in another case filed on August 12, 2005, Hilton elected

to receive electronic notices at these same five e-mail addresses. 

See Arikat et al v Chase Visa et al, C-05-3302 JW.

Additionally, this is not the first time in this nearly

four-year old case that Hilton has failed to file papers on time or

timely request an extension. Nearly five months after the deadline

to file an amended complaint had passed, Hilton claimed that he

“did not receive notice of the order dated August 13, 2002, of

Judge Vernon [sic] Walker that placed a deadline of until September

3, 2002, to file an amended complaint.” Doc #11. The court

Case 3:02-cv-02250-VRW Document 83 Filed 03/01/06 Page 3 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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extended this deadline, but ordered Hilton to attend a training

course on e-filing on or before August 29, 2003, and “to e-file a

declaration confirming his attendance.” Doc #18. But instead of

attending the training course, Hilton filed a paper letter

requesting an extension because he claimed he would be unable to

attend before the deadline. Doc #19. The record does not indicate

whether Hilton ever attended the course.

Moreover, Hilton’s carelessness has not been confined to

this case. In Miller v City and County of San Francisco, C-98-0692

WHA, Hilton apparently claimed that although he received the City’s

motion for judgment on the pleadings, he did not file an opposition

because “he did not receive papers in the ordinary course of

business and that his office lost or misplaced mail.” Doc #82, Ex

B. Judge Alsup granted an extension but “ordered [Hilton] to

organize his office and the circulation of mail within his office

in such a manner that does not interfere with the ordinary course

of this case.” Id.

While sometimes unfortunate, “[i]f an attorney makes a

mistake in the course of [his] representation of [his] client, the

client must accept the consequences of that mistake.” Moran v

Burbine, 475 US 412, 462 (1986) (Stevens, J, dissenting). Hilton’s

failure to oppose the summary judgment motion appears to be but

another instance of such unfortunate consequences. Accordingly,

the court DENIES plaintiff’s motion for an extension of time to

file an opposition.

//

//

//

Case 3:02-cv-02250-VRW Document 83 Filed 03/01/06 Page 4 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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A party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of

showing that there is no material factual dispute. Celotex Corp v

Catrett, 477 US 317, 322-23 (1986). But when the moving party does

not bear the burden of persuasion on an issue at trial, the moving

party may discharge its burden of production by demonstrating “that

the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an essential

element [of its claim] to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion

at trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins Co v Fritz Cos, 210 F3d 1099,

1102 (9th Cir 2000).

Section 1983 Monell claims require showing that municipal

defendants have an official policy or custom causing a

constitutional injury. Monell, 436 US at 690. “A plaintiff cannot

demonstrate the existence of a municipal policy or custom based

solely on a single occurrence of unconstitutional action by a

non-policymaking employee.” McDade v West, 223 F3d 1135, 1141 (9th

Cir 2000). “Instead, it is when [the] execution of a government’s

policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose

edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy,

inflicts the injuries that [make] the government as an entity * * *

responsible under § 1983.” Monell, 436 US at 694.

Here, defendants allege that “plaintiff lacks evidence to

support his allegation that the San Francisco Police Department had

an official policy of stopping, detaining and beating African

Americans.” Doc #77 at 1. The court agrees. Even if plaintiff

could prove that the officers who detained and arrested him did so

without cause, hurled racial epithets at him and beat him, he has

not provided any evidence that the officers did so pursuant to an

official policy or custom of doing any of these things. Because

Case 3:02-cv-02250-VRW Document 83 Filed 03/01/06 Page 5 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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plaintiff has no evidence to support this essential element of his

claim, the court GRANTS summary judgment for the SFPD and for the

City on plaintiff’s § 1983 Monell claim.

Moreover, because public entities in California, as a

matter of law, cannot be liable for punitive damages on state law

claims, Cal Gov Cod § 818, the court GRANTS summary judgment for

the SFPD and for the City on plaintiff’s claim for punitive

damages.

Accordingly, the court DENIES plaintiff’s motion for an

extension of time and GRANTS defendants’ motion for partial summary

judgment. Because there are no longer any federal claims in this

case, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

whatever state law claims remain and REMANDS the case to San

Francisco county superior court. The clerk is DIRECTED to close

the file and TERMINATE all pending motions.

Furthermore, in contemplating whether Hilton’s actions ——

or perhaps more accurately his inactions —— warranted the attention

of the court’s committee on professional conduct, the court

discovered that Hilton is not listed in the court’s attorney roll

as a member of the bar of this court. This was surprising as

Hilton has appeared numerous times before the undersigned, who has

also heard many of his colleagues recount episodes of Hilton

appearing before them.

Civil L R 11-1 provides that except for attorneys

employed or retained by the United States, attorneys appearing pro

hac vice and certain certified law students, “only members of the

bar of this Court may practice in this Court.” And Civil L R 11-8

provides:

Case 3:02-cv-02250-VRW Document 83 Filed 03/01/06 Page 6 of 7
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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A person who exercises, or pretends to be entitled

to exercise, any of the privileges of membership in

the bar of this Court, when that person is not

entitled to avail themselves of such membership

privileges, shall be subject to sanctions or other

punishment, including a finding of contempt.

Accordingly, Hilton is ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE in writing by March

17, 2006, either (1) that he is a member of the bar of this court

or (2) if he is not a member, why he should not be sanctioned and

found in contempt of court. No extensions will be forthcoming.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

Case 3:02-cv-02250-VRW Document 83 Filed 03/01/06 Page 7 of 7