Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_12-cv-08237/USCOURTS-azd-3_12-cv-08237-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Kenderick Begay, 

Movant, 

v. 

USA, 

Respondent.

No. CV-12-8237-PCT-DGC

No. CR-06-0626-PCT-DGC 

ORDER 

 After his conviction was affirmed on appeal, Movant Kenderick Begay filed a 

motion to vacate his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. CVDoc. 1; CRDoc. 111.1

 

At the conclusion of briefing, United States Magistrate Judge Michelle H. Burns issued a 

Report and Recommendation (“Original R&R”) recommending that the motion be 

denied. CVDoc. 8. Begay filed objections. CVDoc. 11. Shortly thereafter, Begay filed 

a motion to expand the record to include two documents: (1) an FBI report of an 

interview of Begay in 2002 during which he provided several pawn shop receipts, and 

(2) a pawn shop receipt for a Norinco SKS rifle pawned on January 5, 2012. CVDocs. 

12, 12-1, 12-2. The Court granted the motion to expand the record and referred the case 

to Judge Burns to consider the additional evidence. CVDoc. 15. Judge Burns permitted 

additional discovery, and Begay’s trial counsel was deposed. Begay then filed a motion 

to supplement two of his claims. CVDoc. 65. 

 

1

 Consistent with the R&R, documents filed in this case, CV-12-08237-PCT-DGC, 

will be referred to as “CVDoc,” and those filed in the related criminal action, CR-06-

0626-01-PCT-DGC, will be referred to as “CRDoc.” 

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 On November 7, 2014, Judge Burns issued a Supplemental R&R recommending 

that the § 2255 motion be granted and that Begay receive a new trial. CVDoc. 77. The 

government filed objections to the Supplemental R&R (CVDoc. 84) and a motion to 

strike parts of Begay’s supplemental response (CVDoc. 87). Neither party requested oral 

argument. For the reasons that follow, the Court will accept in part and reject in part the 

Original R&R, accept the Supplemental R&R, deny the government’s motion to strike, 

set aside the judgment of conviction, and grant Begay a new trial. 

I. Background. 

 Neither party objects to Judge Burns’ recitation of the facts in the Supplemental 

R&R. The Court will restate them here.2

 

 

 In the early morning hours of March 28, 2002, Begay left a party in 

Greasewood, Arizona driving his truck, with passengers Loren Clark, 

Jessica Lee, Emmanley Begay (no relation to Begay), and Begay’s sister 

Mecheryl Begay. Only Loren Clark and Jessica Lee testified in Begay’s 

trial (hereinafter “Lee” and “Clark”). According to Clark, around 2:00 

a.m., Begay drove past the victims, J.T. and O.C., driving in the opposite 

direction. Begay flashed his truck lights at their vehicle, and both vehicles 

pulled off of the highway and parked on a dirt side road. Begay got out of 

his truck and stood for a minute by the driver-side door of J.T. and O.C.’s 

vehicle. He then walked back to his truck, retrieved a rifle, walked back to 

the passenger side of the victim[s’] vehicle and fired eight or nine shots into 

the vehicle. Begay walked back to his vehicle and placed the gun under the 

back seat. As Begay walked back to his truck, Mecheryl began screaming 

and making horrible cries, asking him “What did you do?” or “Why did you 

do that?” Begay told his sister to be quiet. Clark was outside Begay’s 

vehicle, having exited to relieve himself, and asked Begay why he had shot 

the victims. Begay did not respond. Begay, Clark, and Mecheryl drove 

away, leaving Lee behind. Prior to the shooting, Lee was in the rear of 

Begay’s truck in a comatose state having consumed too much alcohol. The 

gunshots aroused her, at which point she exited the vehicle to vomit. As 

she walked away from the scene, Lee observed O.C. attempting to hold J.T. 

upright and that J.T. had blood on his shirt. 

 

2

 Judge Burns’ statement of facts is based largely on those recited in the Ninth 

Circuit’s en banc opinion affirming Begay’s conviction. See United States v. Begay, 673 

F.3d 1038, 1040-42 (9th Cir. 2011). 

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 O.C. drove to the home of Clark’s mother to seek help. By that 

time, J.T. was already dead. O.C. was thereafter transported to a local 

hospital before being transferred to a hospital in New Mexico. O.C. died 

from her wounds three days later. 

 The FBI and Navajo investigators began investigating the murders 

but initially failed to make any significant progress. Witnesses interviewed 

denied being out on the night of the homicides, and Begay told 

investigators that he was with his girlfriend the entire night. Investigators 

located the crime scene two weeks after the homicides and located glass 

and six .30 caliber shell casings on the ground. 

 Six months later, in the Fall of 2002, Lee contacted the FBI and told 

them (over the course of several months . . .), and later testified at trial, that 

she had been at a party that night with Begay, Mecheryl Begay, Clark, and 

Emmanley Begay. She admitted to drinking and that her memory had been 

impaired, but that she did remember leaving the party with the group. Lee 

stated that she had passed out in the vehicle, but awoke upon hearing 

gunshots. She saw the victims after they had been shot. Lee testified that a 

few days after the murders she asked Begay what she should tell the police 

about the murders, and Begay told her to blame it on two other men. Lee 

and Begay never spoke again. 

 The next break in the investigation came four years after the 

shootings, in May 2006, when the FBI re-contacted Clark, and he 

implicated Begay for the first time. Although Lee only witnessed the 

shooting’s aftermath, Clark was the sole witness to testify to the events 

leading up to the shooting itself. Clark testified at trial that he had attended 

a party the night of the shootings with Begay and other friends. Clark, 

Begay and the friends left the party and got into a truck driven by Begay. 

Clark recalled Begay pulling his vehicle off the road, at which time Clark 

exited the vehicle to relieve himself. He stated that he observed Begay 

from a distance, appearing simply as a “black figure” in the night, walk 

initially to the victims’ car, stand by the car for a minute or two, then walk 

back to his truck and retrieve an object from the driver’s side, and then 

walk back to the victims’ car. He saw Begay lift the object he had retrieved 

from the truck up to his shoulder and then heard gunshots and saw sparks. 

Clark recognized the gunshots coming from a rifle that Begay had used on 

previous occasions when he and Clark had gone shooting together. 

 When the gunfire ceased, Clark asked Begay why he shot the 

victims, but Begay did not respond. Begay simply told Clark to get back 

into the truck. Later that night when Begay dropped Clark off at his house, 

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Begay told Clark to keep quiet. The next morning, Begay told Clark not to 

say anything to the FBI, and to “watch himself.” Begay also told Clark to 

“watch his back” several times after the shootings. 

 Begay proceeded to trial and, on June 26, 2007, was convicted of 

two counts of First-Degree Murder, and two counts of Using, Brandishing, 

or Discharging a Firearm in Relation to a Crime of Violence. Begay was 

sentenced to life imprisonment on the murder counts, to be followed by 

consecutive sentences of 120-months and 300-months, for a total of 35-

years for the firearm convictions. 

 Begay appealed his conviction and sentence. A three-judge panel 

reversed the murder convictions on the grounds of insufficient evidence, 

affirmed the firearms convictions, and found that the trial court did not err 

in admitting at trial evidence of Begay’s intimidation of witnesses Clark 

and Lee. The case was reheard en banc, and the panel affirmed Begay’s 

convictions. The panel reversed the 3-judge panel’s finding that there was 

insufficient evidence presented at trial of premeditation, and found without 

merit Begay’s claims that (1) the district court erred when it refused to 

instruct the jury on a lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter; 

(2) the evidence that Begay intimidated Clark and Lee was inadmissible 

under Federal Rules of Evidence 403 and 404(b); and (3) the prosecutor 

engaged in misconduct by misstating the elements of premeditation during 

closing argument. 

Doc. 77 at 3-6 (internal citations and footnotes omitted). 

II. Standard of Review. 

 The Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or 

recommendations made by a magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The Court 

must undertake a de novo review of those portions of the R&R to which specific 

objections are made. See id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 

F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). The Court need not review parts of the R&R to which 

neither party objects. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985). 

 The Original R&R addressed each of Begay’s eleven claims of error. Begay filed 

objections to Judge Burns’ findings on Error 1 (trial counsel failed to investigate an 

alternate shooter, Alfred Bennie Lee Jr.), Error 5 (trial counsel improperly conceded the 

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evidence did not support a jury instruction for a lesser offense of voluntary 

manslaughter), and Error 9 (trial counsel failed to investigate and present evidence that 

Begay did not have access to the type of weapon used in the murders). CVDoc. 11. 

Because the Supplemental R&R reexamined Errors 1 and 9, the Court will disregard 

Begay’s objections to the Original R&R’s treatment of those errors. The Court will first 

address Begay’s objection to the Original R&R’s treatment of Error 5, and then address 

the government’s objections to the Supplemental R&R’s treatment of Errors 1 and 9. 

III. Discussion. 

 All of Begay’s claims assert that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. 

The Supreme Court set out the test for ineffective assistance of counsel in Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). “To establish ineffective assistance of counsel under 

Strickland, a prisoner must demonstrate both: (1) that counsel’s performance was 

deficient, and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense.” Miles v. Ryan, 

713 F.3d 477, 486 (9th Cir. 2013) (emphasis in original) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

688-93). Courts must “indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within 

the wide range of reasonable professional assistance,” and attorneys are afforded “wide 

latitude . . . in making tactical decisions.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. The reasonableness 

of counsel’s performance is judged under an objective standard. United States v. Davis, 

36 F.3d 1424, 1433 (9th Cir. 1994). “[E]very effort [must] be made to eliminate the 

distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged 

conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Id. 

 “A defendant is prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance if ‘there is a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different.’” Clark v. Arnold, 769 F.3d 711, 725 (9th 

Cir. 2014) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). A reasonable probability is a 

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of a proceeding. Id. 

Begay “need not prove ‘counsel’s action more likely than not altered the outcome,’ but 

rather he must demonstrate that ‘[t]he likelihood of a different result [is] substantial, not 

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just conceivable.’” Id. (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 111-12 (2011). 

A. Error 1 – Lesser Offense Instruction. 

 Begay argues that trial counsel erred in conceding there was insufficient evidence 

to warrant a manslaughter instruction. Judge Burns disagreed. She correctly noted that it 

is the defendant’s burden to produce evidence tending to show the crime was an act of 

passion “before the burden shifts to the government to ‘prove beyond a reasonable doubt 

the absence of sudden quarrel or heat of passion.’” Doc. 77 at 10 (quoting Begay, 673 

F.3d at 1045). She also noted that no evidence was introduced at trial regarding Begay’s 

demeanor or his interaction with the victims. 

 Begay asserts that had trial counsel properly prepared, he could have introduced 

evidence demonstrating adequate provocation. See United States v. McGee, 465 F. 

App’x 592, 593 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Under federal law, ‘[i]f the defendant killed with the 

mental state required for murder . . . , but the killing occurred in the ‘heat of passion’ 

caused by adequate provocation, then the defendant is guilty of voluntary 

manslaughter.’” (quoting United States v. Paul, 37 F.3d 496, 499 (9th Cir. 1994))). 

Begay fails to demonstrate, however, that any such evidence existed. There were only 

two witnesses to the murders, Jessica Lee and Loren Clark. Neither overheard an 

argument between Begay and the victims, nor did they testify that Begay said anything 

during or after the interaction. In fact, the record is largely devoid as to what transpired 

before the shootings. Begay’s claim that such evidence exists is speculative. Begay has 

failed to meet his burden of showing deficient performance under the first prong of 

Strickland. 

B. Error 5 – Alternate Shooter Defense. 

 Begay argues that trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to investigate 

evidence that another individual was responsible for the murders and did not present the 

evidence to the jury. Judge Burns agreed. 

 1. Evidence Available Prior to Trial. 

 On August 26, 2006, private investigator Reuben Martinez prepared a 

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memorandum describing his telephone conversation with Dorasita Begay, a Navajo 

Nation police officer. CVDoc. 14-2. Dorasita stated that she was familiar with the 

shootings of the two teenagers and that she had been a friend of Jessica Lee her entire 

life. She told Martinez that Jessica Lee’s grandfather is Albert Bennie Lee, Sr., who “is 

the biggest bootlegger on the Navajo Nation.” Id. at 1. She also said that Jessica worked 

for her grandfather in the past, and that Lee Sr. would often accept firearms in lieu of 

money and would sell them to people on the reservation. Dorasita stated that Jessica “is 

known to be a liar especially when placed under pressure.” Id. at 2. In fact, she has seen 

Jessica “lie to get out of trouble with her teachers, parents and friends.” Id. 

At one point during the interview, Dorasita mentioned that she would like to speak 

with Martinez about the case in person and was “disappointed that [he] was not available 

to talk to her.” Id. When pressed by Martinez, she told him the following: 

Two weeks ago she was involved in a high speed chase involving Alfred 

Benn[ie] Lee Jr. She advised that [Lee Jr.] had two occupants in the 

vehicle who told her that during the chase, [Lee Jr.], the driver, attempted to 

load a handgun he had. She was told that the occupants took the weapon 

away from [Lee Jr.] so he would not do anything stupid if and when he was 

confronted by the police. 

She advised that she handcuffed [Lee Jr.], who she indicated was drunk, 

and placed him in her patrol car. When [Lee Jr.] complained that the 

handcuffs were too tight, she attempted to loosen them. [Lee Jr.] broke 

away from her, and she was eventually able to re-arrest him after a foot 

chase. 

[Lee Jr.], who suffers from a heart condition, then told her that he was tired 

of running. He asked her if she remembered the shooting of those two 

people. She told him that she did. [Lee Jr.] then told her that he was the 

one that shot them. He told her that he used a 30.06 rifle to shoot them, and 

that the shooting was over a drug deal that went bad. He indicated that he 

was owed $100.00 for drugs he had sold them. [Lee Jr.] asked her if 

[Kenderick Begay] was okay, as he knew that [Begay] was being charged 

with the murders. 

[Dorasita] advised that she told [Lee Jr.] that he was drunk and that he had 

better stop talking. 

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Id. 

A month later, retired Special Agent (“SA”) John Charles Jones and SA 

McDonald Rominger of the FBI interviewed Dorasita at the Navajo Department of Public 

Safety, her place of employment. CVDoc. 14-3. When asked about her knowledge of 

the murders, Dorasita stated that she heard about the incident from Jessica Lee and 

Philbert Edgewater. Id. at 1. She mentioned that neither Jessica nor Philbert said that 

they attended a party that night or witnessed the shooting. Id. She also reaffirmed her 

belief regarding Jessica’s truthfulness and denied that Jessica ever mentioned that she 

witnessed the murders. Dorasita did mention, however, that “[b]efore Jessica moved to 

Texas, [she] heard through her aunt, Leona Lee that Jessica had considered collecting the 

reward which was offered for information on the shooting but she never heard anything 

further about it.” Id. at 2. Dorasita confirmed that Alfred Bennie Lee Sr. is her 

grandfather, as well as Jessica’s, and that he was a bootlegger who accepted guns in 

exchange for alcohol. Id. In addition, she confirmed that Alfred Bennie Lee Jr. is her 

and Jessica’s uncle. She also recalled her encounter with Lee Jr.: 

Approximately one month ago, she was dispatched to a disturbance call at 

her grandfather’s house. Another officer was also dispatched to the call. 

When they arrived they were told by [Lee Sr.] that [Lee Jr.], Raymond 

Begay, Norbert Begay, and Monica Begay were all at his residence and 

were fighting but they had left just before they arrived in Raymond Begay’s 

red Dodge pickup. Dorasita and the other officer drove around the area and 

she passed the truck on Indian Route 15. Dorasita did a u-turn and pursued 

the truck in order to pull it over but the truck pulled away at a high rate of 

speed. As she pursued, the truck passed several other vehicles in a very 

unsafe manner. Dorasita backed off and kept the truck under observation 

because she did not want the pursuit to cause an accident. Dorasita 

observed the truck exit the main road and on to a dirt road and then another 

dirt road. Dorasita continued to follow but the other unit got separated 

from them on the dirt roads. Dorasita realized they were going to Raymond 

Begay’s house and was close enough to them to see the pickup stop and see 

[Lee Jr.] get out of the driver’s side and run around to the back of the 

house. Dorasita pursued and found [Lee Jr.] sitting down behind the house 

and handcuffed him then placed him in the back of the patrol car. Norbert 

Begay and Monica Begay were still in the truck and Raymond had gone 

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into the house. Monica Begay showed Dorasita a gun that was in the truck 

and stated that [Lee Jr.] was trying to load it while they were being pursued. 

Dorasita took the gun and later booked it as evidence. Dorasita did not 

think it was safe to attempt a field sobriety check on [Lee Jr.] and she knew 

he had a heart condition and she would not be able to book him into the jail 

as the Navajo Nation has a policy of not accepting prisoners with health 

issues so she cited him for reckless driving and no driver’s license. 

Dorasita then drove [Lee Jr.] back to his residence in Greasewood Springs. 

Dorasita said on the way back to the residence [Lee Jr.] started complaining 

about the handcuffs being too tight. Dorasita stopped and got out of the 

patrol car to loosen the cuffs and as she was doing so, [Lee Jr.] was able to 

get away and run to the other side of the road. Dorasita pursued and caught 

[Lee Jr.] just as he reached the side of the road. Because of [Lee Jr.’s] heart 

condition, he could not run far or fast. After [Lee Jr.] was again secured in 

the vehicle, he stated that he was tired of running and wanted to talk to the 

FBI or a Criminal Investigator (CI), someone he could trust. [Lee Jr.] 

started crying and rambling saying he was the one who shot those kids. 

Dorasita said she told him she would arrange to have a CI talk to him but 

she did not want to get involved. [Lee Jr.] continued to talk saying, “it was 

me, I shot him with a 30.06; I didn’t mean to shoot the girl.” [Lee Jr.] did 

not say how many times he shot he just held his arms up simulating that he 

had a rifle and she assumed he only shot once. [Lee Jr.] also asked if 

[Kenderick Begay] was okay. After making these comments, Dorasita told 

[Lee Jr.] he was drunk and to stop talking. Dorasita said when she got [Lee 

Jr.] to the house, his wife, Colleen was there and after she got him in the 

house, she forgot to get him to sign the citation. Dorasita said she never did 

talk to a CI about the statements [Lee Jr.] made nor did she attempt to 

contact anybody with the FBI. 

Id. at 3-4. 

Dorasita mentioned that the reason she was disappointed that Martinez could not 

speak with her in person is because she thought he was a FBI agent and would “follow 

up” with Lee Jr. She also confirmed that Lee Jr. sold marijuana in the Greasewood 

Springs area since she was in high school and that Lee Jr. often “fights when he drinks.” 

Id. at 4. At the time of the interview, Dorasita was on paid administrative leave for a 

public intoxication arrest and was later fired. She never prepared a report of the incident 

with Lee Jr. CRDoc. 91 at 109. 

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 In December 2006, SA Jones and SA Rominger interviewed Lee Jr. at the Navajo 

County Jail. CVDoc. 14-4. Lee Jr. recalled the incident with Dorasita, stating that he 

was “drunk and driving past ‘Norbert’s house’ when he realized that there was a pursuing 

Navajo Police vehicle behind him.” Id. at 1. “At some point in the vicinity of Norbert’s 

house, he pulled over, jumped out of the car, and sat down.” Id. Lee Jr. stated that 

“because of his intoxicated state and his level of frustration with the Navajo Police, he 

did recall stating to Dorasita Begay, ‘Why don’t you just take me to jail for killing those 

kids,’ or words to that effect.” Id. Lee Jr. also stated that he said something like “You’re 

always harassing me; you’re always trying to convict me of something; so why don’t you 

just take me to jail for killing those kids?” Id. SA Rominger reported that “[Lee Jr.] 

indicated, without hesitation or equivocation, that he had nothing to do with ‘killing those 

kids’ and that he did not know who was responsible for killing those kids.” Id. The 

agents read the statement Lee Jr. provided in 2003 and confirmed that the statement was 

still true. 

 2. Trial Counsel’s Performance.

 Begay’s trial counsel was deposed on June 17, 2014. He said in his deposition 

that Begay told him from the beginning of the representation that he was innocent. 

CVD0c. 71-1 at 19. Although trial counsel obtained the services of an investigator to aid 

in preparing the defense, he never had the investigator interview Dorasita, Lee Jr., or any 

other witnesses. CRDoc. 23; CVDoc. 27 at 5; CVDoc. 71-1 at 51. Nor did trial counsel 

interview Dorasita or Lee Jr. 

 During his opening statement at trial, counsel told the jury that “at the conclusion 

of the trial . . . it’s going to be clear that a couple of other people, yes, Mr. Alfred 

Benn[ie] Lee Jr. was responsible for this murder[.]” CRDoc. 91 at 24-25. Later, when 

cross-examining SA Jones, counsel attempted to introduce evidence of Lee Jr.’s 

confession, but the Court sustained the government’s hearsay objection. Id. at 107-100. 

At sidebar, counsel stated that “our contention is going to be that Alfred Benn[ie] Lee Jr. 

confessed to these murders at that particular time” and that “this is the heart of our 

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case[.]” Id. at 107. Counsel argued that the statements were admissible to demonstrate 

SA Jones’ “mental state as to what he then [did in his investigation],” but the Court 

disagreed. Id. at 108. 

 Later in the trial, counsel asked Jessica Lee if she was aware of Lee Jr.’s 

confession, but the government’s hearsay objection was sustained. Id. at 56-57. 

Ultimately, no evidence of Lee Jr.’s confession was presented at trial. 

 3. Counsel’s Explanation. 

 Trial counsel stated in his deposition that he was aware of Lee Jr.’s confession, he 

discussed it with Begay, and he “wanted to get it before the jury.” Doc. 71-1 at 22-23. 

He was concerned, however, that the government might “counterpunch” and “disprove 

what [he] was going to put out there.” Id. at 23. Therefore, his strategy was to get Lee 

Jr.’s confession “out there to raise reasonable doubt” without giving the government the 

opportunity to disprove it. Id. When asked why Lee Jr. was not on the final witness list, 

counsel stated that he “wanted to get as much mileage as [he] could without having to 

call [Lee Jr.] in because [he did not] expect for him to get on the stand and confess to a 

double homicide.” Id. at 47-48. He also did not want to bring in Dorasita Begay because 

counsel expected “a very efficient response” from the government. Id. 

 Counsel was also questioned regarding his investigation of the confession. 

Although he knew that Begay’s previous attorney had hired Martinez, he did not recall 

speaking with Martinez or attempting to obtain his interview reports. Id. at 20, 52. As 

already noted, counsel’s court-appointed investigator did not interview any witnesses. Id.

at 51 (noting that the CJA Form 21 showed that the investigator conducted no 

interviews). Instead, counsel opted to speak with potential witnesses “by trying to grab 

folks” outside the courtroom at Begay’s sister’s trial. Id. at 50-51. 

 4. Duty to Investigate. 

 “[C]ounsel must, at a minimum, conduct a reasonable investigation enabling him 

to make informed decisions about how best to represent his client.” Sanders v. 

Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1456 (9th Cir. 1994) (emphasis in original). When appropriate, 

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this also requires articulating “a reasonable decision that makes particular investigation 

unnecessary.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. Thus, counsel is ineffective when he “neither 

conducted a reasonable investigation nor demonstrated a strategic reason for failing to do 

so.” Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 1995). 

 In Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003), the Supreme Court held that an 

attorney’s failure to investigate the defendant’s background and present mitigating 

evidence during sentencing violated the Sixth Amendment. Counsel began the 

sentencing proceeding by telling the jury that it should “consider not just what [the 

defendant] ‘is found to have done,’ but also ‘who [he] is.’” Id. at 526. She also told the 

jury that it would “‘hear that [the defendant] has had a difficult life,’ [but] never followed 

up on that suggestion with details of [the defendant’s] history.” Id. In addition, counsel 

abruptly ended her investigation into the defendant’s background after receiving the presentence report, which contained some background information. Id. at 527. Although 

she received funds from the Public Defender’s office to retain a forensic social worker, 

“counsel chose not to commission such a report.” Id. at 524. The Supreme Court found 

that counsel’s failure to investigate was the result of unreasonable professional judgment 

and led to an uninformed decision not to present a mitigation case. Id. at 534. 

 In Sanders, the Ninth Circuit found counsel’s performance unreasonable for 

failing to “fulfill his duty to investigate [the defendant’s] most important defense: that 

[the defendant’s brother] was the shooter.” 21 F.3d at 1457. After the defendant was 

arrested, his brother confessed to the attorney and his mother. Id. at 1450. After a 

mistrial, the defendant hired another attorney. Id. The mother told the new attorney 

about the confession and the brother showed up at court to testify. Id. The defendant’s 

attorney, however, ordered the brother to leave. Id. Although counsel argued at trial that 

the brother, not the defendant, was the shooter, he never called the brother to testify. Id. 

The Ninth Circuit found counsel’s conduct unreasonable because he failed to interview 

the defendant’s brother, failed to call the brother to testify at trial, did not attempt to 

introduce the confession via other means, and refused to listen to the defendant’s mother 

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and brother when they showed up at his office. Id. at 1456. The Ninth Circuit noted that 

“whatever decision [counsel] might have made about calling [the brother] as a witness 

was not an informed one and thus could not be deemed ‘strategic.’” Id. at 1457 

(emphasis in original). “[Counsel] failed to do what any competent lawyer would do 

when a witness indicates directly or indirectly that he, and not the lawyer’s client, is 

guilty. He did not attempt to obtain a statement from [the witness] confirming his 

admission of guilt.” Id. 

 5. The Investigation in this Case. 

 As already noted, the Court must evaluate trial counsel’s actions with a high 

degree of deference. Even with that deference in mind, however, the Court concludes 

that trial counsel’s investigation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. 

Trial counsel knew of (1) Begay’s consistent assertion of his own innocence, 

(2) Dorasita’s statement to Martinez describing Lee Jr.’s confession, (3) Dorasita’s 

statement to the FBI describing Lee Jr.’s confession in very similar terms, and (4) Lee 

Jr.’s statement to the FBI admitting that he made a reference to the killings in his 

conversation with Dorasita. Counsel nevertheless failed to interview Dorasita or Lee Jr. 

or have his investigator do so. As in Wiggins, counsel obtained funds for an investigator, 

but no witnesses were interviewed. As in Sanders, counsel failed to investigate Begay’s 

most important defense – that Lee Jr. was the shooter. 

 Counsel’s deposition explanations do not justify his failure to investigate. He 

testified that he did not want to call Lee Jr. to testify at trial because he did not think Lee 

Jr. would confess to a double homicide in court and he thought Lee Jr.’s testimony 

“would remove all doubt.” Doc. 84-1 at 24. Presumably counsel is suggesting that Lee 

Jr. would have convincingly testified that he did not commit the murders and did not 

confess to them. But how was counsel to form any view on the content or effectiveness 

of Lee Jr.’s testimony without having interviewed him? The Court cannot conclude that 

counsel acted reasonably in failing to interview a man who reportedly had confessed to 

the very crime with which his client was charged because counsel assumed the man 

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would deny committing the crime and would be a good witness at trial. Without an 

interview, counsel was entirely unable to judge Lee Jr.’s credibility, evaluate his 

explanation of the supposed confession, hear his denial of being the shooter, or assess his 

susceptibility to cross-examination. 

In addition, counsel was aware of information that could bolster the credibility of 

Lee Jr.’s confession. Although intoxicated when he gave the alleged confession, Lee Jr. 

mentioned that the “two kids” were shot with a 30.06 rifle, that the shooting resulted 

from a drug deal gone bad, that the victim owed him $100, and that he did not mean to 

shoot “the girl.” These statements correctly identified the kind of rifle used in the 

murders and the fact that young woman did not appear to be the intended victim. The 

statements were also consistent with Lee Jr. reportedly selling marijuana, and with his 

father often receiving firearms in exchange for alcohol – firearms Lee Jr. allegedly 

resold. Moreover, Lee Jr. did not deny entirely the statements he made to Dorasita – he 

confirmed to the FBI that he did mention the murders when speaking with her. 

Counsel’s reason for not calling Dorasita was the government’s ability to 

“counterpunch” – to discredit her testimony. Doc. 84-1 at 24. Counsel recalled that 

Dorasita had encountered problems with her employment in the Navajo police 

department and had a friendship with Begay. Id. at 65-66. The government’s objection 

provides additional reasons that Dorasita would not have been a good witness: Dorasita 

did not jail Lee Jr. as a result of his evading police; she failed to report the confession to 

her superiors or the FBI; she went drinking with Lee Jr. two weeks after the incident; she 

was a friend of Begay and his sister; she helped Begay wash his spray-painted name from 

the pavement after it had been put there as a result of suspicion in the community; and 

she was on administrative leave for public intoxication when she was interviewed by the 

FBI and was later fired. Doc. 84 at 14-15. 

 The Court cannot conclude that these possible issues justified counsel’s failure to 

interview Dorasita. Her favorable treatment of Lee Jr. and her family relationship with 

him tend to bolster the credibility of her statements regarding his confession. A favorable 

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relationship with Lee Jr. would make it less likely, not more likely, that she would falsely 

accuse him of confessing to the murders. Although it is true that cross-examination about 

her favorable relationship with Begay could have suggested a motive to point the finger 

at Lee Jr., and that her employment problems might have called her reliability into 

question, the Court cannot conclude that the risks from such cross-examination were so 

great as to justify never interviewing Dorasita. 

 Other factors bolstered the believability of Dorasita’s account of Lee Jr.’s 

confession. Although her statements to the investigator and the FBI were taken over a 

month apart, they were consistent and detailed. In addition, as already noted, Lee Jr.’s 

statements were consistent with facts relating to the murder, his own drug dealing, and 

his access to weapons. In addition, Dorasita took steps to cover up the confession. She 

told Lee Jr. to stop talking, failed to write a report of the incident, failed to report the 

confession to her superiors or the FBI, and failed to arrange for an investigator to talk 

with Lee Jr. as he had requested. These actions can be viewed as consistent with her 

family relationship with Lee Jr. and her belief that the confession was true. 

Trial counsel’s failure to investigate Lee Jr.’s confession led to poor decisions 

during trial. As already noted, trial counsel told the jury during opening statements that 

they would hear evidence of Lee Jr’s guilt. But his efforts to introduce such evidence 

were entirely ineffective. He knew that testimony by SA Jones about statements Dorasita 

made to Jones, regarding statements Lee Jr. made to Dorasita, was double hearsay. Any 

testimony by Jessica Lee would likely have been even further removed. And yet 

counsel’s apparent strategy was to attempt to get this hearsay into evidence as a passing 

reference during the testimony of two witnesses who never heard the confession – to 

“plant the satchel and run.” During trial, counsel was unable to articulate any reasonable 

argument as to why the testimony by SA Jones and Jessica Lee about the confession was 

admissible. Like counsel in both Wiggins and Sanders, counsel began trial by planting 

the central defense in the mind of the jury and then failed to present evidence in support. 

 In summary, the Court concludes that counsel’s failure to investigate evidence at 

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the heart of Begay’s defense was objectively unreasonable. Not only did it deprive 

counsel of first-hand information with which to evaluate Lee Jr. and Dorasita as 

witnesses, it also deprived him of other evidence that an investigation of the confession 

might have produced. And it resulted in poor and uninformed decisions during trial. 

C. Error 5 – Pawn Shop Evidence. 

 Judge Burns also found that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate 

and present evidence that Begay did not have access to the weapon Loren Clark said was 

used to commit the murders. Clark – the only eyewitness to the actual shooting who 

testified at trial – said that he saw Begay fire a rifle into the victims’ vehicle eight or nine 

times. CRDoc. 91 at 140-41. He testified that he recognized the weapon as a SKS rifle 

he had shot with Begay “three or four weeks” prior to the murders, and that he recalled 

the “popping sound.” CRDoc. 93 at 9. Clark stated that the SKS rifle had a “folding 

stock, a 30-round clip, and it had a bayonet.” CRDoc. 91 at 141. Further testimony 

established that the shells found at the scene were .30 caliber and compatible with a SKS 

rifle. CRDoc. 91 at 75. 

 Trial counsel was aware of two pieces of evidence prior to trial: (1) a May 13, 

2002, interview of Begay conducted by the FBI in which Begay presented several pawn 

receipts, and (2) a pawn shop receipt indicating Begay pawned a Norinco SKS rifle on 

January 5, 2002, almost three months before the murders. CVDocs. 12-1, 12-2. Instead 

of investigating the evidence and seeking to introduce it at trial, counsel opted to crossexamine Clark about Begay’s guns: 

Q: Now, the special agents also asked you on the 29th if you knew that 

[Begay] had some guns. Do you remember that question? 

A: Hmm, yeah. 

Q: And you told the officers that you thought he did but that he had 

pawned all of those guns. Isn’t that correct? 

A: Hmm, yeah. 

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Q: In fact, you went with [Begay] to pawn those weapons; isn’t that 

correct? 

A: Hmm, no. 

Q: So you didn’t go with [Begay] when he pawned the SKS rifle? You 

weren’t with him? 

A: No. 

Q: So when you state here that you went with [Begay] to pawn – at 

T&R’s to pawn those weapons in Gallup, the officer’s mistaken, the 

special agent’s mistaken when he writes that correct? 

A: No. 

CRDoc. 93 at 17. Counsel did not question Clark further, nor did he inquire about the 

pawned weapons on cross-examination of SA Jones. The pawn records were never 

placed in evidence. 

 At his deposition, counsel admitted that he did not investigate the pawn records 

because the evidence would only demonstrate “that [Begay] pawned an SKS, not 

necessarily the SKS.” CVDoc. 71-1 at 29 (emphasis added). Counsel was also 

concerned that the government would “counterpunch and show, I think through Mr. 

Clark, that we – that [Begay] went firing the SKS after this was pawned,” which could be 

a “devastating response.” Id. at 26. Counsel feared that the records would establish 

Begay’s familiarity with the weapon and that he had previously owned one. Id. at 63. 

 Like Judge Burns, the Court finds counsel’s failure to investigate the pawn records 

and present them at trial to be objectively unreasonable. Investigation could have 

revealed that Begay did pawn the SKS rifle and that the rifle had the same characteristics 

described by Clark, and might have shown whether Begay reacquired the rifle from the 

pawn shop. In addition, counsel’s “counterpunch” explanation makes little sense. Clark 

testified on the first day of trial that he saw Begay fire the familiar SKS rifle at the 

victims. Seeking to admit the records could not elicit more damaging evidence than had 

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already been presented. The pawn records were consistent with Clark’s statement in 

2002 that Begay pawned the gun before the shootings, and could have been used to 

undermine Clark’s credibility, considering he lied to the investigators immediately after 

the murders and did not come forward until four years later. The fact that Clark said he 

shot the SKS with Begay a few weeks before the murders appears to have been an 

approximation – investigation might have enabled counsel to credibly suggest that the 

shooting of the SKS occurred been before the weapon was pawned in January. 

 The government argues that counsel’s decision was reasonable because admission 

of the pawn records would confirm Clark’s credibility in stating that a gun was pawned. 

The government then would have relied on Clark’s testimony that he shot an SKS with 

Begay after the date of the supposed pawn to show that Begay had access to more than 

one SKS. This also would have shown, the government argues, that the SKS is Begay’s 

weapon of choice. 

 Although a closer question than the failure to investigate Lee Jr.’s confession, the 

Court concludes that trial counsel’s failure to investigate the pawning of the rifle and 

introduce the pawn records in evidence was objectively unreasonable. The key 

eyewitness in the case, Loren Clark, testified that Begay shot the victims with an SKS 

rifle that Clark had shot with Begay in the past. This was very specific and direct 

evidence of Begay’s guilt. It linked him directly to the murder weapon. Proof that Begay 

had actually pawned an SKS rifle three months earlier would have undercut this 

evidence. It certainly would have provided more concrete proof than trial counsel’s 

cross-examination of Clark as quoted above. Although the government would have 

responded with other arguments about how Begay could have used another SKS rifle, the 

government cites no evidence that such a rifle existed, and defense counsel could have 

argued, with the pawn receipt in hand, that the weapon about which Clark testified was 

not in Begay’s possession on the night of the murders. 

D. Prejudice. 

 As noted above, even if a petitioner demonstrates that counsel’s performance was 

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deficient, he must still show prejudice. Judge Burns found that Begay has established a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the case 

would have different. Doc. 77 at 16. The Court agrees. 

 “To determine whether counsel’s errors prejudiced the outcome of the trial, we 

must compare the evidence that actually was presented to the jury with that which could 

have been presented had counsel acted appropriately.” Thomas v. Chappell, 678 F.3d 

1086, 1102 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotations omitted). “If the evidence could have 

been admitted, we must then ask whether there was a reasonable probability that it would 

have affected the outcome of the proceeding.” Cannedy v. Adams, 706 F.3d 1148, 1163 

(9th Cir. 2013). 

 The Court concludes that evidence of Lee Jr.’s confession to Dorasita could have 

been admitted at trial. If Lee was available to testify at trial, he could have been asked 

whether he committed the murders and made the confession to Dorasita. When he denied 

committing the murders and making the confession, as he most likely would, he could 

have been asked about his confession to Dorasita under Federal Rule of Evidence 613(a). 

Dorasita could have been called to testify about the confession under Rule 613(b), 

assuming Lee Jr. was afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the statement. 

 If Lee was not available to testify, or if he properly invoked his Fifth Amendment 

rights in response to questions about his commission of the murders or his confession, 

Dorasita’s testimony about the confession would likely be admissible as a statement 

against interest under Rule 804(b)(3). Admission to murder, particularly when made to a 

law enforcement officer, clearly is a statement against interest. In addition, the 

corroborating circumstances required by Rule 804(b)(3)(B) likely exist in this case. As 

noted above, Lee Jr.’s alleged confession included accurate details of the crime (that a .30 

caliber gun was used and the young woman was not the primary target) and facts that 

were consistent with Lee Jr.’s situation (a drug deal gone bad, when Lee Jr. apparently 

was involved in drug sales, and use of a weapon that Lee Jr.’s father might well have 

obtained in connection with his illicit business). In addition, the fact that the alleged 

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confession was made to a law enforcement officer, while Lee Jr. was in custody, and with 

no apparent benefit to himself, adds to its credibility. 

 With respect to the pawn shop evidence, counsel could have cross-examined SA 

Jones about Begay having provided him with the pawn shop receipts. Alternatively, 

counsel presumably could have secured records from the pawn shop that could have been 

admitted under Rule 803(6) through the testimony of a records custodian. 

 Significantly, the government does not argue that evidence of Lee Jr.’s alleged 

confession or the pawn shop receipts would not have been admissible in evidence. The 

government instead argues that the evidence would not have affected the outcome of the 

trial. The government emphasized that two eyewitnesses connected Begay to the crime 

scene, their testimony was consistent, and the physical evidence at the scene (the broken 

glass and shell casings) corroborated their accounts of what happened. Both witnesses 

also testified that they were afraid of Begay and that he urged them to implicate others in 

the murders. Although Jessica Lee did not come forward until almost two years after the 

homicides and Clark initially lied to investigators and did not come forward until four 

years later, both testified that they waited until they had moved away from their small 

community before implicating a community member. 

 As noted above, Begay must show a “reasonable probability” that, but for 

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 

Clark, 769 F.3d at 725. A reasonable probability is one sufficient to undermine 

confidence in the outcome of a proceeding. Id. The likelihood of a different result must 

be substantial, not merely conceivable. Id. 

 The errors of counsel in this case undermine confidence in the trial’s outcome. 

There was no physical evidence directly connecting Begay to the murders. The murder 

weapon was never recovered. The evidence established no motive for Begay to have shot 

the victims. One eyewitness did not actually see the shooting and was highly intoxicated. 

The other lied to the FBI before implicating Begay four years after the murders. 

 The Court cannot be confident that the jurors would have reached the same 

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unanimous guilty verdict had they learned that (1) another person in the community 

confessed to the murders, (2) the confession was made to a law enforcement officer, 

(3) the confession included facts consistent with the murder and with Lee Jr. as the 

possible shooter, and (4) Begay had pawned the SKS rifle that Clark claimed was used in 

the shooting. While the Court cannot say with certainty that the result in the trial would 

have been different, it can say that the likelihood of a different result is substantial, not 

merely conceivable. Clark, 769 F.3d at 725. Begay has met his burden in demonstrating 

prejudice under Strickland. 

IV. Motion to Strike. 

 The government has filed a motion to strike Begay’s amended response to the 

government’s objections to the Supplemental R&R. The response includes numerous 

exhibits. Because the Court did not consider any of the exhibits in its analysis, the 

motion to strike is denied as moot. 

 IT IS ORDERED: 

 1. The Court accepts in part and rejects in part the Original R&R (Doc. 8) 

and accepts the Supplemental R&R (Doc. 77) in its entirety. 

 2. Respondent’s motion to strike (Doc. 87) is denied. 

 3. Begay’s motion to vacate (Doc. 111 in CR-06-0626 PHX DGC) is granted. 

 4. The judgment in CR06-0626 PHX DGC is vacated. 

5. Begay is hereby granted a new trial in case number CR06-0626 PHX 

DGC. 

6. A status conference is set in case number CR06-0626 PHX DGC for 

April 27, 2015 at 4:00 p.m. 

7. Attorney Dana Carpenter is appointed to represent Defendant for all further 

proceedings in CR06-0626 PHX DGC 

8. Trial is set for May 12, 2015 at 9:00 a.m. 

9. The USMS is directed to transport the Defendant to the District Arizona for 

further proceedings. 

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10. Defendant shall remain in custody pursuant to the Order of Detention dated 

July 6, 2006 (Doc. 8). 

Excludable delay shall begin as of this date. 

 Dated this 31st day of March, 2015. 

cc: USMS 

 Dana Carpenter 

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