Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_17-cv-02265/USCOURTS-cand-3_17-cv-02265-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 362
Nature of Suit: Medical Malpractice
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RONALD TURNER,

Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED STATES, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 17-cv-02265-WHO 

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 

LEAVE TO FILE MOTION FOR 

RECONSIDERATION AND DENYING 

MOTION TO CERTIFY ORDER FOR 

INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL

Re: Dkt. No. 116

Defendants have filed a Motion for Leave to File Motion for Reconsideration pursuant to 

Local Rule 7-9(b)(3), or in the alternative, a Motion to Certify Order for Interlocutory Appeal 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ¶ 1292(b). Defendants argue that I misapplied Ewing v. Northridge 

Hospital Medical Ctr., 120 Cal.App.4th 1289 (2004) in my order denying defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment. [Dkt. No. 113].

Civil Local Rule 7-9(a) provides, “No party may notice a motion for reconsideration 

without first obtaining leave of Court to file the motion.” A motion for leave to file a motion for 

reconsideration may only be granted if the moving party shows:

(1) That at the time of the motion for leave, a material difference in fact or law 

exists from that which was presented to the Court before entry of the interlocutory 

order for which reconsideration is sought. The party also must show that in the 

exercise of reasonable diligence the party applying for reconsideration did not 

know such fact or law at the time of the interlocutory order; or

(2) The emergence of new material facts or change of law occurring after the time 

of such order; or

(3) A manifest failure by the Court to consider material facts or dispositive legal 

arguments which were presented to the Court before such interlocutory order.

Civ. L.R. 7-9(b). 

Case 3:17-cv-02265-WHO Document 118 Filed 10/29/18 Page 1 of 3
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Defendants rely on the third basis for permitting a motion for reconsideration, arguing that 

the facts in Ewing are distinguishable and that I have also misapplied the law as articulated in 

Ewing. They cite no cases on point in support of their position. While the facts in Ewing are 

different than those here, that does not change the application of the legal principle that “[t]he 

mind-set of a therapist can be evaluated by resort to common knowledge without the aid of expert 

testimony” since such testimony is not essential for determination of an obvious fact 

and“[w]hether the duty to warn arises is a question of fact, not law.” 120 Cal.App.4th at 1303-04. 

The factual dispute here is whether Mr. Turner communicated a serious threat of physical violence 

against a reasonably identifiable victim. Immunity under California Civil Code section 43.92(b)

arises only when such a threat has been made. Defendants have failed to meet their burden for 

reconsideration under the Civil Local Rules. I DENY their motion for leave to file a motion for 

reconsideration.

With regards to defendants’ alternative motion to certify the order for interlocutory appeal, 

the final judgment rule holds that courts of appeals may review only final decisions of district 

courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (“The courts of appeals . . . shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all 

final decisions of the district courts . . . .”). A limited exception to the final judgment rule is found 

in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), which invests in the district court the discretion to certify an order for 

interlocutory appeal in any civil action if: (1) the order involves a controlling question of law; (2) 

there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion; and (3) an immediate appeal from the order 

may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b); In re 

Cement Antitrust Litig., 673 F.2d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 1982). The party seeking the certification 

order has the burden of demonstrating that the statutory requirements are met and/or that 

certification is otherwise justified in the exercise of the Court’s discretion. Fukuda v. County of 

Los Angeles, 630 F.Supp. 228, 299 (C.D. Cal. 1986). 

This case is set for trial on January 28, 2019. The trial would be substantially delayed by 

an interlocutory appeal. Moreover, further proceedings may moot the issue raised by defendants: 

the scope of expert testimony may be considered at the Pre-trial conference, and defendants may 

prevail at trial. In any event they will not lose their opportunity to present it to the Ninth Circuit if 

Case 3:17-cv-02265-WHO Document 118 Filed 10/29/18 Page 2 of 3
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

they do not prevail. This is not an appropriate case for interlocutory appeal. I DENY the motion 

for certification of an interlocutory appeal.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 29, 2018 

William H. Orrick

United States District Judge

Case 3:17-cv-02265-WHO Document 118 Filed 10/29/18 Page 3 of 3