Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01040/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-01040-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED LEVAO, Civil No. 10-1040 W (NLS)

Petitioner,

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION RE

DENIAL OF PETITIONER’S MOTION

TO STAY PROCEEDINGS AND

PROVIDING PETITIONER WITH

OPTIONS TO AVOID DISMISSAL

[Docket No. 3.]

vs.

D.T. LEWIS, Warden,

Respondent.

I. Introduction

On May 13, 2010, Petitioner United Levao filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus (Pet.)

together with a motion to hold the petition in abeyance and stay the proceedings. (See Doc. nos.

1, 3.) In his petition, Petitioner alleges nine claims, four of which are exhausted and five of

which are unexhausted. Petitioner’s exhausted claims are: (1) his due process rights were

violated when inflammatory gang evidence was admitted under California Penal Code section

182.22(b)(5); (2) his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to sever Petitioner’s trial

from the co-defendant and failing to secure an eyewitness identification expert; (3) his Fourth

Amendment rights were violated when the trial court denied his motion to suppress his

statements; and (4) his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when the trial court

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1

 Petitioner was fifteen years old at the time of the crime.

2

 For ease of reference, the Court uses the page numbers assigned to the petition by the Court’s electronic

filing system. 

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refused to suppress involuntary statements he made to police.1 (Pet. at 7-10.2) Petitioner’s

unexhausted claims are: (1) his trial counsel was ineffective when he failed to conduct a

reasonable investigation, failed to prepare for trial and a hearing on the admissibility of certain

evidence, failed to allow Petitioner to testify at trial, failing to properly prepare for a hearing on

the motion to suppress evidence, failed to seek sanctions against the prosecutor for failing to

preserve crime scene evidence, failed to sufficiently prepare to ensure the admissibility of

evidence of a prosecution witness’s drug activity and gun possession, and failed to object to the

admission of photo identification evidence; he also alleges the cumulative effect of counsel’s

errors denied him the effective assistance of counsel; (2) the prosecutor failed to preserve

exculpatory evidence; (3) he was denied the right to present a complete defense due to the

limitations the trial court placed on cross-examination; (4) his trial and conviction violate the

United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child; and (5) he was denied the effective

assistance of appellate counsel. (See Pet. at 6-19; Motion to Stay at 1-4.)

In his motion for stay and abeyance, Petitioner asks this Court to stay his federal habeas

petition while he returns to state court to exhaust the five unexhausted claims in the petition.

(See Mot. for Stay.) On May 20, 2010, this Court ordered Respondent to file a Response to the

motion by June 10, 2010. (See doc. no. 5.) Respondent filed a Response in a timely manner.

(See Doc. no. 6.). Petitioner filed a Reply on July 9, 2010. (See doc. no. 8.)

II. Factual Background

According to the state appellate court’s opinion, Petitioner and his co-defendant Jordan

Potts were members of the Bloods street gang. The Crips are a rival gang to the Bloods. Bloods

members wear red to show gang affiliation and Crips wear blue. (Resp’ts Ex. D at 2.) On the

evening of April 31, 2004, victim Jesse Watson, his foster mother and two siblings, were moving

out of a condo within an area claimed by the Crips. Watson was hauling furniture into a truck

and was wearing blue, although he was not alleged to have been a gang member. (Id.) Petitioner

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approached Watson and fired a shotgun at him. Potts also fired multiple shots at Watson. One

of the shots fired by Potts hit Petitioner. Watson died at the scene. (Id. at 2-3.) 

Witnesses to the shooting saw the shooters flee in a red Nissan Sentra; the witnesses

recorded the license plate number. The Sentra was later found, abandoned. A jacket worn by

Petitioner, which had been discarded in some bushes by an elementary school, was later

recovered, along with the shotgun used in the murder. (Id. at 3.) The jacket and the Sentra

contained blood matching Petitioner’s DNA profile. 

After the shooting, Potts shot himself in the leg. He and Petitioner then told police they

had been in a drive-by shooting. Police connected Potts and Petitioner to Watson’s murder

based on witness’s descriptions of the shooters. (Id.) 

Maurice Christiansen, the driver of the Sentra, pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter

in exchange for a maximum sentence of four years in prison and truthful testimony at trial. (Id.)

III. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

Habeas petitioners who wish to challenge either their state court conviction or the length

of their confinement in state prison, must first exhaust their state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(b), (c); Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 133-34 (1987). Ordinarily, to satisfy the

exhaustion requirement, a petitioner must “fairly present[] his federal claim to the highest state

court with jurisdiction to consider it . . . or . . . demonstrate[] that no state remedy remains

available. Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Picard v. Connor, 404

U.S. 270, 275 (1971); Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982)). “[The Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)] aims to encourage the finality of sentences and

to encourage petitioners to exhaust their claims in state court before filing in federal court.”

Rhines v. Webber, 544 U.S. 265, 276-277 (2005).

AEDPA also applies a one-year statute of limitations also to federal habeas corpus

petitions. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D) (West Supp. 2002). Thus, a petitioner who wishes

to challenge his state court conviction in federal court via a habeas corpus petition must file

within one year of his conviction becoming final. The statute of limitations does not run while

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a properly filed state habeas corpus petition is pending. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see Nino v.

Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999). But see Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000)

(holding that “an application is ‘properly filed’ when its delivery and acceptance [by the

appropriate court officer for placement into the record] are in compliance with the applicable

laws and rules governing filings.”). However, absent some other basis for tolling, the statute of

limitations does run while a federal habeas petition is pending. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167,

181-82 (2001). 

AEDPA has two main purposes: “(1) to reduce delays in executing state and federal

criminal sentences, and (2) to streamline federal habeas proceedings by increasing a petitioner’s

incentive to exhaust all claims in state court.” Wooten v. Kirkland, 540 F.3d 1019, 1024 (9th Cir.

2008). The Supreme Court has therefore held that when a petitioner files a petition containing

both exhausted and unexhausted claims, a district court has limited discretion under Rhines to

grant a stay and abeyance of the mixed petition if: (1) “the petitioner had good cause for his

failure to exhaust”; (2) “his unexhausted claims are potentially meritorious”; and (3) “there is

no indication that the petitioner engaged in intentionally dilatory litigation tactics.” Rhines, 544

U.S. at 278. The Supreme Court made clear in Rhines, however, that because staying a federal

habeas petition frustrates AEDPA’s objective of encouraging finality by allowing a petitioner

to delay the resolution of federal proceedings and undermines AEDPA’s goal of streamlining

federal habeas proceedings by decreasing a petitioner’s incentive to first exhaust all his claims

in state court, “stay and abeyance should be available only in limited circumstances.” Rhines,

544 U.S. at 277. 

B. Petitioner’s Allegations and Respondent’s Response

In his motion for stay, Petitioner argues that good cause exists for his failure to exhaust

his state court remedies because: (1) his trial counsel did not send him his file until March 19,

2010, fifteen months after he first requested it; and (2) he was denied access to his legal papers

from November 5, 2008 until April 22, 2009. (Motion for Stay at 2-6.) He also argues his

claims are meritorious and that he has acted as diligently as he could. (Id.) Specifically, he

states that he filed a habeas corpus petition seeking to exhaust the five unexhausted claims in the

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San Diego Superior Court on May 6, 2010. (Id. at 4.) In his Reply, Petitioner also claims that,

despite his diligent efforts to exhaust his unexhausted claims, he was prevented from doing so

because: (1) his family was unable to raise the twenty-thousand dollar retainer for counsel; (2)

he did not learn that he could raise the unexhausted claims in federal petition or how to do so

until he spoke to a “jailhouse lawyer” who so advised him; and (3) he did not learn of the basis

for his fourth claim, that his conviction violates the United Nations Convention on the Rights

of the Child, until April of 2010. (Pet’rs Reply at 3-4.) 

Respondent contends that Petitioner has not established good cause for his failure to

exhaust because he did not begin exhausting his claims until after the statute of limitations for

filing his federal habeas petition had expired. (Resp’ts Opp. at 6-7.) Moreover, Respondent

argues that Petitioner has not established why his counsel’s failure to turn over his case file or

his lack of access to his legal papers made it impossible for him to exhaust his unexhausted

claims. (Id. at 8-11.) Respondent also claims that Petitioner’s unexhausted claims are meritless.

(Id. at 9.)

C. Analysis

The Supreme Court did not define the good cause standard in Rhines. In the Ninth

Circuit, good cause is, without further clarification, a standard less stringent than the

“extraordinary circumstances” standard for equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. See

Jackson v. Roe, 425 F.3d 654, 656 (9th Cir. 2005). District courts within the Ninth Circuit have

more narrowly defined the standard. Some have required the showing of “some objective factor

external to the petitioner” that prevented timely exhaustion. Hernandez v. Sullivan, 397 F.

Supp.2d 1205, 1207 (C.D. Cal. 2005). Others have equated the good cause standard to

“excusable neglect.” See Corjasso v. Ayers, 2006 WL 618380, 1 (E.D. Cal. 2006). The latter

interpretation considers such factors as prejudice to the non-moving party, length of the delay

and its effect on efficient court administration, and whether the delay was caused by factors

beyond the control of the movant and good faith. Id. at 1. 

Petitioner has presented his unexhausted claims in detail and with specific factual

allegations and thus, the Court cannot conclude, on the record before it, that the claims are not

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3 Respondent contends Petitioner’s federal habeas petition was constructively filed on May 11, 2010, and

his state habeas petition was filed on May 26, 2010, and not May 6, 2010 as Petitioner alleges because the prison

mail log shows that he mailed his federal petition on May 11, 2010 and “he did not mail anything to the San

Diego Superior Court until May 26, 2010.” (Resp’ts Ex. A.) The “mailbox rule,” however, provides that a pro

se prisoner’s federal or state habeas petition is deemed filed at the moment the prisoner delivers it to prison

authorities for forwarding to the clerk of court because the prisoner is unable to control the time of delivery.

Anthony v. Cambra, 236 F.3d 568, 575 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988).

Petitioner states he handed both his federal habeas petition and his state habeas petition to prison authorities on

May 6, 2010. (Pet. at 21; Mot. for Stay at 3.) It is Petitioner’s statement, and not the prison mail log, that controls

here. See Huizar v. Carey, 273 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 2001)(holding that mailbox rule applies even if document is

never actually filed as long as prisoner diligently follows up once he has failed to receive a disposition from the

court). This also calls into question Respondent’s contention that Petitioner filed his state habeas petition after

his federal statute of limitations expired.

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“potentially meritorious.” See Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 624 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that

a claim is colorable within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) unless it is “perfectly clear

that petitioner has not hope of prevailing”). Petitioner is not entitled to a stay, however, because

he has not demonstrated good cause for his failure to exhaust under either of the above

interpretations nor has he shown he has not “engaged in intentionally dilatory tactics.” Rhines,

544 U.S. at 278. 

The California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for review on February 11,

2009. (Resp’ts Ex. C.) Petitioner did not file his federal habeas corpus petition, nor did he begin

to exhaust the unexhausted claims in state court, until May 6, 2010,3

 over a year after his

conviction became final and six days before AEDPA’s statute of limitations expired on May 12,

2010. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d)(1). Petitioner claims that his trial counsel’s failure to provide

him with his case file and his inability to access his legal papers explain why he waited so long

to file his state and federal habeas petitions. According to Petitioner, he asked trial counsel for

his case file in December of 2008, but did not receive the file until March of 2010. (Mot. for

Stay at 5.) Petitioner has not explained, however, why he needed his attorney’s case file in order

to prepare his state and federal habeas corpus petition or the two month delay between when he

received the case file and when he filed his petitions. Further, the factual basis for all of the

unexhausted claims have been available to Petitioner since his conviction became final because

they are all based on events which occurred at trial. (See Pet. at 11-22.) Petitioner also claims

the delay in exhaustion was caused by the prison denying him access to his legal papers from

November 5, 2008 until April 9, 2009. (Id.) Petitioner has not explained why it took him

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thirteen months between when he received his legal papers on April 9, 2009, and the filing of

the state and federal petitions on May 6, 2010. 

In his Reply, Petitioner asserts two new reasons for the delay in exhaustion. First,

Petitioner states the delay was caused by his family’s inability to raise the money to hire an

attorney and the fact that he did not know he could file a federal petition containing the

unexhausted claims. (Pet’rs Reply at 3-4.) These facts also do not rise to the level of “good

cause” under either standard enunciated by the Ninth Circuit. See Hernandez, 397 F. Supp.2d

at 1207; Corjasso, 2006 WL 618380, 1. Petitioner is not entitled to counsel on collateral review,

and the unexhausted claims outlined by Petitioner — ineffective assistance of counsel, failure

to preserve evidence, restricted cross-examination, his trial and conviction violate the United

Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and ineffective assistance of appellate counsel

— are not so legally complex as to require appointment of counsel. See McClesky v. Zant, 499

U.S. 467, 495 (1991) (citing Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987) and stating there

is no constitutional right to counsel in federal habeas corpus proceedings) ; Chaney v. Lewis, 801

F.2d 1191, 1196 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that “[i]ndigent state prisoners applying for habeas relief

are not entitled to appointed counsel unless the circumstances of a particular case indicate that

appointed counsel is necessary to prevent due process violations”); see also Knaubert v.

Goldsmith, 791 F.2d 722, 728 (9th Cir. 1986). Further, Petitioner states in the declaration he

attached to his motion for stay that he learned he could raise claims in federal court that were not

raised in state court from a fellow inmate, Francisco Olivares, in June of 2009, eleven months

before he began exhausting his claims in state court. (See Mot. for Stay, Pet’rs Dec. at 5-6.)

Petitioner has not established either “some objective factor external to the petitioner” that

prevented timely exhaustion, Hernandez, 397 F. Supp.2d at 1207, or “excusable neglect,”

Corjasso, 2006 WL 618380 at 1. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the Court

RECOMMENDS the motion for stay and abeyance be DENIED.

D. Petitioner’s Options

Because the petition is mixed, in that it contains both exhausted and unexhausted claims,

it is subject to dismissal. Rose v. Lundy 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982). To avoid the Court 

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dismissing the petition on its own accord, Petitioner may choose one of the following options:

i) First Option: File a Motion to Use the Withdrawal and Abeyance Procedure

A second method of staying a timely federal petition while a petitioner returns to state

court to exhaust unexhausted claims is the “withdrawal and abeyance” procedure. King v. Ryan,

 564 F.3d 1133, 1139-40 (9th Cir. 2009). Unlike the “stay and abeyance” procedure, a petitioner

seeking to use the “withdrawal and abeyance” procedure need not show good cause for his

failure to exhaust. Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2002). Under the “withdrawal

and abeyance” procedure, a petitioner may withdraw the unexhausted claims from his federal

petition, return to state court and exhaust those claims while the federal court holds the fully

exhausted claims in abeyance, then seek to amend the timely, stayed federal petition with the

newly exhausted claims. Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2002). The newly

exhausted claims, however, must either themselves be timely under the statute of limitations or

they must “relate back” to the claims in the fully-exhausted petition, that is, they must share a

“common core of operative facts” with the previously exhausted claims. Id. at 1142-43, quoting

Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644. 659 (2005). Petitioner is advised that it appears from the

documents filed so far in this case that AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations expired on

May 12, 2010. If this is so, and absent any equitable tolling to which he may be entitled, he

would be granted leave to amend his timely federal petition with the newly exhausted claims

only if he can demonstrate they relate back to the claims in his fully exhausted petition under

Mayle. If he is unable to demonstrate the claims relate back, he will be unable to litigate those

claims in this Court. 

If Petitioner chooses this option, the Court RECOMMENDS the district court order him

to file a request for withdrawal and abeyance no later than 30 days following the filing date of

the district court’s order. Respondent may file a reply 45 days after the filing date of the district

court’s order.

ii) Second Option: Voluntarily Dismiss the Petition

Petitioner may move to voluntarily dismiss his entire federal petition and return to state

court to exhaust his unexhausted claims. Petitioner may then file a new federal petition 

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4

28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d) provides:

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus

by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period

shall run from the latest of--

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State

action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the

applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized

by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and

made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could

have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other

collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgement or claim is pending shall not

be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.

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containing only exhausted claims. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 510, 520-21 (stating that

a petitioner who files a mixed petition may dismiss his petition to “return[] to state court to

exhaust his claims”). Petitioner is cautioned, however, that any new federal petition must be

filed before expiration of the one-year statute of limitations and in this case, as noted above,

it appears AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations expired on May 12, 2010. Duncan v.

Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 176 (2001); 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).4

 The statute of limitations does not run

while a properly filed state habeas corpus petition is pending. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see Nino

v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999). But see Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000)

(holding that “an application is ‘properly filed’ when its delivery and acceptance [by the

appropriate court officer for placement into the record] are in compliance with the applicable

laws and rules governing filings.”); Bonner v. Carey, 425 F.3d 1145, 1149 (9th Cir. 2005)

(holding that a state application for post-conviction relief which is ultimately dismissed as

untimely was neither “properly filed” nor “pending” while it was under consideration by the

state court, and therefore does not toll the statute of limitations), as amended 439 F.3d 993.

However, absent some other basis for tolling, the statute of limitations continues to run while

a federal habeas petition is pending. Duncan, 533 U.S. at 181-82.

If Petitioner chooses this second option, the Court RECOMMENDS the district court

order him to file dismissal papers no later than 30 days following the filing date of the district

court’s order. 

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5

28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) provides that a claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus

application under § 2254 shall be dismissed unless: 

(A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made

retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously

unavailable; or 

(B) (i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered previously

through the exercise of due diligence; and 

(ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a

whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for

constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of

the underlying offense. 

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iii) Third Option: Formally Abandon Unexhausted Claims

Petitioner may formally abandon his unexhausted claims and proceed with his exhausted

ones. See Rose, 455 U.S. at 510, 520-21 (stating that a petitioner who files a mixed petition may

“resubmit[] the habeas petition to present only exhausted claims”). If Petitioner chooses this

third option, he must file a pleading with this Court no later than 30 days following the filing

date of the district court’s order.

Petitioner is cautioned that once he abandons his unexhausted claims, he may lose the

ability to ever raise them in federal court. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 488 (2000)

(stating that a court’s ruling on the merits of claims presented in a first § 2254 petition renders

any later petition successive); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (a)-(b).5

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, this Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s motion for stay

and abeyance be denied and that Petitioner be given his options on how to proceed with this

case.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than August 19, 2010, any party to this action may file

written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the

Court and served on all parties no later than August 30, 2010. The parties are advised that

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failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections

on appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 29, 2010

Hon. Nita L. Stormes

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

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