Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-01286/USCOURTS-ca10-90-01286-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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FlL~D 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEA~iaited ~0>~1d.LAi~ 

' 'Tenfu OIT~ 

GEORGE GOODWIN, 

Plaintiff-Appel lee, 

vs. 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

CHARLES CROCKETT, Individually 

and as Undersheriff of Fremont 

County, Colorado, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

MJ\R2 51992 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 90-1286 

(D.C" No. 88-C-179) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Lawrence J. Simons, Pueblo, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Carl B. Lucas, Canon City, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before SEYMOUR and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges, and BRATTON, District 

Judge** 

* This,order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

** Honorable Howard c. Bratton, Senior District Judge of the 

United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, 

sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 90-1286 Document: 010110239047 Date Filed: 03/25/1992 Page: 1 
Defendant-Appellant Charles Crockett appeals after a jury 

found that he and his co-defendant, William A. DeBekker, deprived 

plaintiff George Goodwin of his first amendment rights when they 

terminated him from his employment as a deputy sheriff of Fremont 

County, Colorado. The jury awarded both compensatory and punitive 

damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The issue presented to us is 

whether defendant Crockett, the undersheriff, possessed the 

statutory authority under Colorado law to terminate a deputy 

sheriff. We hold he did not possess that authority, and he 

therefore cannot be liable for depriving plaintiff of his federally 

protected rights. 1 

In this appeal, we do not attempt to resolve any disputed 

questions of fact. The appellant has not provided us with a record 

of the trial, and thus we accept the jury verdict that plaintiff 

was discharged for exercising his first amendment rights. 2 We 

resolve only the legal issue of whether the undersheriff can be 

held liable under the undisputed facts. 3 This issue was presented 

to the district court in defendants' motion for directed verdict 

1 Plaintiff did not allege a conspiracy between Crockett and 

DeBakker. Accordingly, for Crockett to be liable he must have 

independently caused plaintiff's constitutional deprivation. 

2 The evidence apparently showed that the plaintiff supported 

the sheriff',s opponent in an upcoming election. 

3 Because of our resolution, and in view of the appellant's 

decision not to provide us with the trial record, we do not address 

appellant's other arguments that he is entitled to qualified 

immunity, that the trial court should not have given the issue of 

punitive damages to the jury, and that the jury should have 

assessed punitive damages individually against each defendant. 

2 

Appellate Case: 90-1286 Document: 010110239047 Date Filed: 03/25/1992 Page: 2 
and motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 

summarily denied both motions. 

The court 

The facts surrounding plaintiff's discharge are as follows: 

Plaintiff was discharged on November 5, 1986. At the time, Sheriff 

DeBekker was on vacation. Before he left town, the sheriff 

instructed Undersheriff Crockett to draft a termination letter 

discharging plaintiff because he called the sheriff an expletive. 

The undersheriff drafted the letter listing completely different 

reasons for the termination and gave this letter to the plaintiff 

during the sheriff's absence. 

Plaintiff concedes that Sheriff DeBekker "ordered" his 

termination and that it was the sheriff's statutory duty to appoint 

deputies and revoke those appointments. However, he argues that 

the undersheriff is liable because he drafted the letter of 

termination, providing his own reasons for the discharge, and 

because he was empowered by statute to assume the sheriff's duties 

when the sheriff was out of the county. 

Our review of the relevant Colorado statutes, case law, and 

the Colorado Constitution, convinces us that only Sheriff DeBekker 

had the power to terminate a deputy sheriff. Colorado law states 

clearly it is the sheriff's duty to appoint his deputies and that 

he may revoke those appointments. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 30-2-106 , 

(1986) ("[u]ndersheriffs and deputy sheriffs shall be appointed by 

the sheriffs of their respective counties"); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 30-

10-506 (1986) ("[e]ach sheriff may appoint as many deputies as he 

may think proper . and may revoke such appointments at his 

3 

Appellate Case: 90-1286 Document: 010110239047 Date Filed: 03/25/1992 Page: 3 
pleasure"); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 30-10-510 (1986) (" [e)very 

appointment of an undersheriff or of a deputy sheriff, and every 

revocation of such appointment, shall be in writing, under the hand 

of the sheriff"). 

The Colorado Supreme Court has stated that sections 30-2-106 

and 30-10-506 11 indicate that the General Assembly intended to grant 

the sheriff exclusive power to appoint deputies." Tihonovich v. 

Williams, 582 P.2d 1051, 1055 (Colo. 1978). That court has also 

adopted the rule that "powers and duties of officers are prescribed 

by the Constitution or by statute •.. and must be executed in the 

manner directed and by the officer specified," and that those 

duties cannot be assumed by other officers. Skidmore v. O'Rourke, 

383 P.2d 470, 474 (Colo. 1963). 

Thus, since the Colorado legislature has specified that the 

sheriff may revoke his appointments of deputies and has not 

conferred such authority on the undersheriff or any other officer, 

that power is exclusive and may not be assumed by the undersheriff. 

Plaintiff has directed our attention to two statutes he claims 

gave the undersheriff the power to effect plaintiff's termination. 

Section 30-10-505 provides that "[w)hen a vacancy occurs in the 

office of sheriff of any county, the undersheriff of such county 

shall in all things execute the office of sheriff until a sheriff , is appointed or elected and qualified." Colo. Rev. Stat. § 30-10-

505 (1986). Section 30-10-106 provides that 

[w)hen any coroner is required to act as sheriff, or any 

other officer in this state is required to perform any 

duties belonging to any other office, for the time being, 

he shall have the same powers in respect to that duty as 

4 

Appellate Case: 90-1286 Document: 010110239047 Date Filed: 03/25/1992 Page: 4 
are given by law to the officer whose duties he performs, 

and shall be entitled to receive the same compensation 

for his services. 

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 30-10-106 {1986). 

Section 30-10-505 does not apply to the situation before us. 

Section 30-10-105 lists eight events which cause a county office to 

become vacant. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 30-10-105 (1986). A vacation 

out of the county is not one of those reasons. Id. Accordingly, 

Undersheriff Crockett was not executing the office of sheriff when 

plaintiff was terminated. 

Section 30-10-106 does not apply because the undersheriff is 

not an "officer." Article XIV, Section 8, of the Colorado 

Constitution lists eight county officers, including the sheriff and 

the coroner; the undersheriff is not included. Furthermore, the 

statute provides for the officer performing the duties to receive 

the same compensation as the sheriff. Undersheriff Crockett could 

not have been paid the sheriff's salary simply because the sheriff 

was on vacation in another county. 4 

In sum, on November 5, 1986, there was no vacancy in the 

office of the sheriff of Fremont County. Only Sheriff DeBekker had 

the authority to discharge, terminate, or revoke the appointment of 

4 See also Seeley v. Board of County Comm' rs for La Plata 

County, 654 F. Supp. 1309, 1313 (D. Colo. 1987). In Seeley. the 

district court held that a deputy sheriff was a county employee 

and not an officer within the meaning of the Colorado Constitution 

because he did not serve for a specific term, was appointed by the 

sheriff, and his appointment could be revoked by the sheriff "at 

his pleasure." See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 30-10-506 (1986). Section 

30-10-504 provides that the undersheriff is also appointed by the 

sheriff and serves "during the pleasure of the sheriff." Colo. 

Rev. Stat. § 30-10-504 (1986). Therefore, the undersheriff should 

also be considered an employee, not an officer. 

5 

Appellate Case: 90-1286 Document: 010110239047 Date Filed: 03/25/1992 Page: 5 
his deputy sheriff, George Goodwin. As a matter of law, Charles 

Crockett, the undersheriff, is not liable for depriving plaintiff 

of his first amendment rights. The judgment of the United States 

District Court for the District of Colorado entered against 

defendant Crockett is REVERSED and the case is REMANDED for 

proceedings consistent with this order and judgment. 

, 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Per Curiam. 

6 

Appellate Case: 90-1286 Document: 010110239047 Date Filed: 03/25/1992 Page: 6