Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00941/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00941-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAIYEZ AHMED,

 Plaintiff,

v.

M. MARTEL, et al., 

 Defendants.

Case No. 1:13-cv-00941-LJO-MJS (PC)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

TO GRANT IN PART AND DENY IN 

PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO 

DISMISS

(ECF No. 17)

FOURTEEN DAY OBJECTION 

DEADLINE

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil 

rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The matter proceeds against 

Defendants Cano, Combs, Davis, Martel, and Shannon on Plaintiff’s First Amendment 

retaliation claim. 

Before the Court is Defendants’ November 25, 2014 motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 

17.) Plaintiff filed an opposition. (ECF No. 19.) Defendants filed a reply. (ECF No. 20.)

The motion is deemed submitted. Local Rule 230(l).

II. LEGAL STANDARD – MOTION TO DISMISS

A motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency 

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of a claim, and dismissal is proper if there is a lack of a cognizable legal theory or the 

absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Conservation Force 

v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1241-42 (9th Cir. 2011). In resolving a 12(b)(6) motion, a 

court’s review is generally limited to the operative pleading. Daniels-Hall v. Nat’l Educ. 

Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010).

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007)); Conservation Force, 646 F.3d at 1242; Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 

962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The Court must accept the factual allegations as true and draw 

all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Daniels-Hall, 629 F.3d at 

998. Pro se litigants are entitled to have their pleadings liberally construed and to have 

any doubt resolved in their favor. Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 

2012); Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 

F.3d 1090, 1101 (9th Cir. 2011); Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010).

III. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS

The relevant allegations in Plaintiff’s first amended complaint (ECF No. 11) may 

be summarized essentially as follows.

On February 16, 2012, Plaintiff appeared before an Institutional Classification 

Committee (“ICC”), at which Defendants Martel, Davis, Shannon, Cano, and Combs 

agreed to release Plaintiff from solitary confinement to the general population. 

Defendants told Plaintiff that upon his release he should stop appealing a grievance he 

had filed regarding the lack of process he received at the prior ICC hearing. Plaintiff 

continued to pursue his appeal and was transferred to another, more dangerous 

institution on February 28, 2012. Defendants Martel, Davis, Shannon, Cano and Combs

authorized the transfer. These defendants knew there was a risk of harm to Plaintiff at 

the new institution and transferred him in retaliation for pursuing his appeal and also in 

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retaliation for a hunger strike Plaintiff previously engaged in. There was no legitimate 

penological reason for the transfer.

IV. ARGUMENTS

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s allegations fail to state a cognizable First 

Amendment claim and, alternatively, that they are entitled to qualified immunity on any 

such claim. They further argue that Plaintiff’s claims against them in their official 

capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. (ECF Nos. 17, 20.) Their arguments 

are discussed in greater detail below.

Plaintiff argues that his allegations state a claim for the reasons set out in the 

Court’s screening order, and that Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity. He 

does not address Defendants’ argument regarding his official capacity claims. He asks 

for leave to amend any deficiencies found by the Court. (ECF No. 19.)

V. ANALYSIS

A. First Amendment Retaliation

1. Prior Screening Order

As noted, to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain 

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 

face. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 

This is the same standard the Court applies in screening a prisoner’s complaint to 

determine whether it states a cognizable claim. Indeed, it is the very standard the Court 

applied in evaluating Plaintiff's complaint, and which lead to the Court's conclusion that 

the complaint stated cognizable claims. That is, the Court found that Plaintiff alleged

claims which, when accepted as true for pleading purposes, would survive a Rule 

12(b)(6) motion.

Nothing has since changed.

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Nevertheless, Defendants argue that the very pleading which this Court found 

stated a cognizable claim does not state a cognizable claim and should be dismissed 

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). The Court would prefer not to duplicate its efforts and explain 

again why it reached the conclusions it did on screening, but the present motion to 

dismiss effectively asks it to do so. Accordingly, the Court will herein address the 

substantive issues presented by Defendants’ motion.

2. Legal Standard – Retaliation

“Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails 

five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action 

against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such 

action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action 

did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 

F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005). 

The second element focuses on causation and motive. See Brodheim v. Cry, 584 

F.3d 1262, 1271 (9th Cir. 2009). A plaintiff must show that his protected conduct was a 

“‘substantial’ or ‘motivating’ factor behind the defendant’s conduct.” Id. (quoting 

Sorrano’s Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989). Although it can 

be difficult to establish the motive or intent of the defendant, a plaintiff may rely on 

circumstantial evidence. Bruce, 351 F.3d at 1289 (finding that a prisoner established a 

triable issue of fact regarding prison officials’ retaliatory motives by raising issues of 

suspect timing, evidence, and statements); Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 267-68 (9th 

Cir. 1997); Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 808 (9th Cir. 1995) (“timing can properly be 

considered as circumstantial evidence of retaliatory intent”). 

In terms of the third prerequisite, filing a grievance is a protected action under the 

First Amendment. Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1138 (9th Cir. 1989). 

With respect to the fourth prong, “[it] would be unjust to allow a defendant to 

escape liability for a First Amendment violation merely because an unusually 

determined plaintiff persists in his protected activity . . . .” Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v. 

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Mendocino Cnty., 192 F.3d 1283, 1300 (9th Cir. 1999). The correct inquiry is to 

determine whether an official’s acts would chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness 

from future First Amendment activities. Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 568-69 (citing Mendocino 

Envtl. Ctr., 192 F.3d at 1300).

With respect to the fifth prong, a prisoner must affirmatively allege that “‘the 

prison authorities’ retaliatory action did not advance legitimate goals of the correctional 

institution or was not tailored narrowly enough to achieve such goals.” Rizzo v. Dawson, 

778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir. 1985).

3. Discussion

a. Adverse Action

Defendants first argue that Plaintiff’s transfer from Pleasant Valley State Prison 

(“PVSP”) to California State Prison, Solano (“SOL”) did not constitute adverse action. 

Defendants’ primary argument in this regard is that they had discretion to transfer 

Plaintiff to another institution, and such discretionary transfers generally do not give rise 

to a constitutional cause of action. 

Defendants are correct that prison inmates do not have a constitutional right to 

be incarcerated at a particular correctional facility or to be transferred from one facility to 

another. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224-25 (1976); see also Olim v. Wakinekona, 

461 U.S. 238, 244-45 (1983). However, it is well settled that prison officials may not 

“transfer an inmate to another prison in retaliation for the inmate’s exercise of his First 

Amendment right[s.]” Pratt, 65 F.3d at 806. Defendants’ arguments to the contrary are 

without merit.

Plaintiff’s allegation that he was transferred to an institution housing inmates who 

intended to cause Plaintiff harm is sufficient to allege adverse action. 

b. Causation

Defendants next argue that Plaintiff’s transfer was not initiated “because of” his 

protected conduct. They contend that Plaintiff’s protected conduct, i.e., his

administrative grievance and hunger strike, occurred after the decision to transfer 

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Plaintiff. Records attached to Plaintiff’s first amended complaint do not support 

Defendants’ contentions. 

Plaintiff appeared before an ICC on January 26, 2012. (ECF No. 11 at 17.) 

Therein, Plaintiff’s transfer was discussed. The committee elected to transfer Plaintiff to

California Medical Facility (“CMF”), or alternatively California Medical Center (“CMC”). 

(Id.) This transfer was characterized as an “adverse transfer.” (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that he began his hunger strike four days later, on January 30, 

2012. (Id. at 6, 18.) On February 8, 2012, Plaintiff submitted a grievance contesting the 

January 26, 2012 ICC decision. (Id. at 21-23.) 

Plaintiff’s exhibits reflect that the decision to transfer him to SOL did not occur 

until February 14, 2012. (Id. at 22.) Plaintiff was transferred to SOL on February 29, 

2012. (Id. at 25.)

Plaintiff’s claim of retaliation is not predicated on the decision to transfer him, 

generally, but on the decision to transfer him to SOL, an institution which, Plaintiff 

alleges, houses inmates who are hostile to Plaintiff. Based on the allegations and 

exhibits contained in the first amended complaint, this decision did not occur until after

Plaintiff engaged in protected conduct. Indeed, the decision to change Plaintiff’s 

proposed transfer from CMF or CMC to SOL was made almost immediately following 

Plaintiff’s protected conduct, and therefore is sufficient to give rise to an inference that 

the decision was retaliatory.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s first amended complaint sufficiently alleges a causal nexus 

between his protected conduct and the adverse action.

c. Chilling Effect

Defendants argue that the decision to transfer Plaintiff would not chill a person of 

ordinary firmness because (1) Plaintiff consented to the transfer, and (2) the transfer 

was motivated by concerns for Plaintiff’s safety.

Defendants’ contention that Plaintiff consented to the transfer is founded upon 

the ICC members’ statement, in the January 26, 2012 ICC report, that Plaintiff 

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“acknowledged his understanding of and agreement with committee’s action.” (ECF No. 

11 at 17.) However, even if this statement by the ICC committee could be construed to 

accurately reflect Plaintiff’s consent, the transfer at issue at that time was Plaintiff’s 

transfer to CMF or CMC, not to SOL. In any event, Plaintiff’s appeal of the January 26, 

2012 ICC decision belies any inference that he agreed with the Committee’s action. 

Defendants’ contention that the transfer was motivated by concerns for Plaintiff’s 

safety is a matter of some factual dispute. Safety concerns clearly are documented in 

the ICC records. However, the first amended complaint and attached exhibits reflect 

Plaintiff’s belief that he safely could remain at PVSP. Plaintiff also clearly believed that a 

transfer to SOL would not enhance, but instead would impair, his safety. This 

disagreement cannot be resolved solely on the basis of Plaintiff’s complaint, and 

therefore it is not proper for resolution on a motion to dismiss.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to allege a chilling effect on future 

First Amendment activities.

d. Legitimate Correctional Goal

Finally, Defendants contend that the decision to transfer Plaintiff was supported 

by the legitimate correctional goal of improving safety for Plaintiff and the institution.

Maintaining the safety of inmates and the institution is unquestionably a 

legitimate correctional goal. However, as stated above, Plaintiff has alleged that no such 

safety concerns were present in his case and, in any event, safety was diminished by 

his transfer to SOL. Although the ICC documents attached to Plaintiff’s complaint 

represent that such safety concerns existed, the statements contained therein are 

essentially hearsay, and are not sufficient at the pleading stage to refute Plaintiff’s 

allegations.

4. Conclusion

Plaintiff’s allegations state a cognizable First Amendment retaliation claim, and 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should be denied.

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B. Qualified Immunity

1. Legal Standard

Government officials enjoy qualified immunity from civil damages unless their 

conduct violates “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 

reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). 

Resolving a claim of qualified immunity requires courts to determine whether the facts 

alleged, when taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, violated a constitutional 

right, and if so, whether the right was clearly established. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 

194, 201 (2001). While often beneficial to address in that order, courts have discretion 

to address the two-step inquiry in the order they deem most suitable under the 

circumstances. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).

“The principles of qualified immunity shield an officer from personal liability when 

an officer reasonably believes that his or her conduct complies with the law.” Pearson, 

555 U.S. at 244. Therefore, “[i]f the [defendant’s] mistake as to what the law requires is 

reasonable . . . the [defendant] is entitled to the immunity defense.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 

U.S. at 205. Qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who 

knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). 

2. Analysis

In light of the foregoing analysis, Defendants’ argument that they are entitled to 

qualified immunity cannot stand. Defendants first argue that they are entitled to qualified 

immunity because Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to show that a constitutional right 

was violated. This argument is without merit because, as discussed above, Plaintiff’s 

allegations state a cognizable claim.

Defendants next argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity because their 

conduct was reasonable in light of established law. However, as stated, Plaintiff had a 

clearly established constitutional right to be free from retaliatory prison transfers. Pratt, 

65 F.3d at 806. Whether Plaintiff’s transfer was retaliatory or motivated by legitimate 

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security concerns is a factual issue that cannot be determined on a motion to dismiss.1

Accordingly, the Court cannot determine at this stage of the proceedings that 

Defendants are entitled to summary judgment.

C. Official Capacity Claims

Plaintiff’s complaint names Defendants in their official and individual capacities. 

(ECF No. 11.) The Court’s screening order did not address Plaintiff’s official capacity 

claims. (ECF No. 13.)

Plaintiff cannot recover money damages from state officials in their official 

capacities. Aholelei v. Dept. of Public Safety, 488 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007) 

(citations omitted). Official capacity suits may seek only prospective relief. See Wolfson 

v. Brammer, 616 F.3d 1045, 1065-66 (9th Cir. 2010).

Here, although Plaintiff’s complaint sought injunctive relief, his claims for such 

relief do not appear related to his cognizable First Amendment retaliation claim. The 

Court’s screening order stated that the instant action properly proceeds as one for 

damages only. (ECF No. 13.) Because Plaintiff may not seek money damages against 

state officials in their official capacities, his official capacity claims should be dismissed. 

VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that Defendant’s 

motion to dismiss (ECF No. 17) be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

Specifically, the Court recommends that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants in their 

official capacities be dismissed. Defendants’ motion otherwise should be denied.

The findings and recommendation will be submitted to the United States District 

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

Within fourteen (14) days after being served with the findings and recommendation, the 

 

1 Defendants also argue that Defendant Cano is entitled to qualified immunity because his involvement 

was limited to documenting security concerns involving Plaintiff and he did not participate in the transfer 

decision. However, support for this assertion is not found in the first amended complaint or attached 

exhibits.

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parties may file written objections with the Court. The document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” A party may 

respond to another party’s objections by filing a response within fourteen (14) days after 

being served with a copy of that party’s objections. The parties are advised that failure 

to file objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. 

Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 

F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 28, 2015 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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