Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-5_16-cv-00079/USCOURTS-ared-5_16-cv-00079-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS 

PINE BLUFF DIVISION 

ROY DAVID KING PLAINTIFF 

v. No. 5:16-CV-00079-SWW-JTR 

NANCY A. BERRYHILL,1

Acting Commissioner, 

Social Security Administration DEFENDANT 

RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION 

The following Recommended Disposition (“Recommendation”) has been sent 

to United States District Judge Susan Webber Wright. You may file written 

objections to all or part of this Recommendation. If you do so, those objections must: 

(1) specifically explain the factual and/or legal basis for your objection; and (2) be 

received by the Clerk of this Court within fourteen (14) days of this 

Recommendation. By not objecting, you may waive the right to appeal questions of 

fact. 

I. Introduction 

Roy David King (“King”) applied for social security disability benefits with 

an alleged onset date of May 15, 2005. (R. at 296). His claim was initially denied by 

the administrative law judge (“ALJ”). (R. at 198). The Appeals Council remanded 

                                                            

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Berryhill is now the Acting Commissioner and is automatically substituted as Defendant pursuant 

to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).

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for further proceedings. (R. at 203–04). After a second hearing, the ALJ again denied 

his applications. (R. at 61). The Appeals Council denied review. (R. at 556). 

King appealed to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 

Arkansas. (R. at 563–65). While the appeal was pending, the Commissioner moved 

to remand so that an ALJ could further evaluate King’s obesity, residual functional 

capacity (“RFC”) and past work. The Court granted the motion, remanding “for 

further administrative proceedings.” (R. at 568–69). The Appeals Council then 

remanded the case to an ALJ to, inter alia, “further evaluate the nature and severity 

of the claimant’s impairment of obesity in accordance with Social Security Ruling 

02-1p.” (R. at 572-73). 

On December 11, 2015, the ALJ denied King’s applications a third time. (R. 

at 464-79). Because King did not file exceptions to the ALJ’s decision and the 

Appeals Council declined to review the decision on its own motion, the ALJ’s 

decision became the Commissioner’s final decision.2

 King has filed a Complaint 

(Doc. 2) appealing the Commissioner’s decision to this Court. 

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When a case is remanded by a federal court for further consideration, the ALJ’s decision 

after that remand becomes the Commissioner’s “final decision ... unless the Appeals Council 

assumes jurisdiction of the case.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.984(a) & (d), § 416.1484(a) & (d). The Appeals 

Council may assume jurisdiction: (1) if the claimant files exceptions disagreeing with the ALJ’s 

decision; or (2) the Appeals Council decides, on its own motion, to review the decision. Id. § 

404.984(b) & (c), § 416.1484(b) & (c). 

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For the reasons discussed below, the Court recommends that the 

Commissioner’s decision be affirmed. 

II. Analysis 

 A. The Commissioner’s Decision 

The ALJ found that King had the severe impairments of degenerative disk 

disease with radiculopathy, bilateral paresthesia, diabetes, hypertension, vertigo, and 

obesity. (R. at 470). The ALJ determined that these impairments left King with the 

RFC to perform light work, except that he: could occasionally work overhead; could 

not perform constant fingering or grasping; could not work around hazards such as 

unprotected heights or dangerous machinery; could not have concentrated exposure 

to temperature extremes, humidity, strong odors, dust, fumes, chemicals, or other 

pulmonary irritants; and could perform simple, routine tasks with occasional 

changes in a routine work setting. (R. at 472). The ALJ took testimony from a 

vocational expert (“VE”) and determined that King could not return to his past 

relevant work but that he could successfully adjust to other jobs existing in 

significant numbers in the national economy, such as price marker or poultry picker. 

(R. at 477-78). The ALJ accepted this testimony from the VE and held that King was 

not disabled. (R. at 479). 

 B. Discussion 

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The Court’s function on review is to determine whether the Commissioner’s 

decision is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole and whether 

it is based on legal error. Miller v. Colvin, 784 F.3d 472, 477 (8th Cir. 2015); see 

also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). While “substantial evidence” is that which a reasonable 

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, “substantial evidence on the 

record as a whole” requires a court to engage in a more scrutinizing analysis: 

“[O]ur review is more than an examination of the record 

for the existence of substantial evidence in support of the 

Commissioner’s decision; we also take into account 

whatever in the record fairly detracts from that decision.” 

Reversal is not warranted, however, “merely because 

substantial evidence would have supported an opposite 

decision.” 

Reed v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 917, 920 (8th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). 

King primarily argues that the ALJ failed to follow the Appeals Council’s 

instructions, on remand, to evaluate King’s obesity. This argument requires the 

Court to address whether an ALJ’s failure to follow the instructions of the Appeals 

Council is reviewable on appeal. 

In Combs v. Berryhill, No. 5:15-CV-00370 (E.D. Ark. Feb. 6, 2017), United 

States Magistrate Judge Beth Deere reviewed the decisions of other courts that have 

taken up this issue. Some of those courts have held that an ALJ’s alleged failure to 

comply with the Appeals Council’s directions on remand is a reviewable issue. See, 

e.g., Godbey v. Colvin, 2014 WL 4437647 (W.D. Ky. 2014); Cabibi v. Colvin, 50 

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F.Supp.3d 213, 229 (E.D.N.Y. 2014); Salvati v. Astrue, 2010 WL 546490, *7 (E.D. 

Tenn. 2010). Other courts have held that the question is an internal agency matter 

that is not reviewable. See, e.g., Sanders v. Astrue, 2013 WL 1282330, *11 (E.D. 

Mo. 2013) (the issue of the ALJ’s alleged failure to follow earlier instructions of the 

Appeals Council is moot after the Appeals Council later declines to review the case, 

thereby accepting the ALJ’s decision as its own); see also Poyck v. Astrue, 414 Fed. 

Appx. 859, 860–61 (7th Cir. 2011); Dishman v. Astrue, 2009 WL 2823653, *11 

(E.D. Tenn. 2009). The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has not specifically 

addressed this question, but it has indicated that other non-final decisions of the 

Commissioner are not reviewable. Efinchuk v. Astrue, 480 F.3d 846, 848 (8th Cir. 

2007). 

Relying on Efinchuk and Sanders, Judge Deere held that an ALJ’s alleged 

failure to comply with directions given by the Appeals Council in remanding a case, 

is not reviewable. Combs, No. 5:15-CV-00370 at *6. The Court also relied on 42 

U.S.C. § 405(g), which only authorizes the courts to review final agency decisions. 

The undersigned Magistrate Judge agrees with Judge Deere’s analysis and concludes 

that the ALJ’s alleged failure to comply with the Appeals Council’s directions to 

address King’s obesity is an internal agency issue that became moot when the 

Appeals Council later declined to review the ALJ’s allegedly “flawed” decision. 

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On the merits, King contends that, in determining his RFC, the ALJ failed to 

properly account for his obesity and the work-related limitations that it imposed on 

him.3

 As a result, King argues that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial 

evidence. Finally, King argues that the ALJ improperly relied on the VE’s testimony 

that King’s RFC would allow him to perform the job of poultry picker, testimony 

that the VE later recanted on cross-examination. 

In evaluating King’s obesity, the ALJ noted that King was 5 feet, 7 inches tall 

and weighed 240 pounds. This resulted in King having a body mass index (“BMI”) 

of 37.59, which classified him with class 2 obesity. (R. at 475). The ALJ noted that 

obesity can adversely impact other impairments and result in an individual suffering 

greater limitations than those caused by the other impairments alone and stated that 

“[t]hese considerations have been taken into account in reaching the conclusions 

herein.” (R. at 475). This led the ALJ to find that obesity was one of King’s severe 

impairments. (R. at 470). 

King points to no medical opinion establishing that his obesity results in 

greater impairments than those identified by the ALJ in his determination of King’s 

RFC. The record itself contains only general advice from one of King’s providers to 

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Of course, a claimant can still argue that the ALJ’s alleged failure to comply with the 

directions of the Appeals Council, in remanding the case, is relevant to one of the claimant’s 

substantive grounds for seeking to reverse the ALJ’s decision. Thus, in this case, the Court has 

considered King’s argument to the extent it may be relevant to whether the ALJ properly evaluated 

King’s obesity in arriving at his RFC. 

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lose weight and reduce his BMI. (See, e.g., R. at 761, 763, 769, 815–16, 817, 825, 

829). No physician ever imposed any physical limitations on King related to his 

obesity. King has not explained what the ALJ allegedly missed in his consideration 

of King’s obesity or how the ALJ’s RFC determination should have changed to 

better account for King’s obesity. See Robson v. Astrue, 526 F.3d 389, 393 (8th Cir. 

2008) (finding no error where an ALJ did not include obesity in a hypothetical to a 

VE and the plaintiff did not explain how including obesity would have changed the 

hypothetical). Thus, the Court concludes that the ALJ properly considered and 

accounted for King’s obesity in arriving at his RFC. 

Next, King argues that the ALJ erred in listing poultry picker as an occupation 

that he could perform. In responding to the ALJ’s question, the VE testified that 

King’s RFC allowed him to work as a poultry picker. (R. at 521). However, on crossexamination, the VE acknowledged that the limitations associated with King’s RFC 

would not allow him to perform that job. (R. at 529). Thus, in his decision, the ALJ 

should not have identified poultry picker as a job that King could perform. 

This mistake by the ALJ is at most a harmless error because the VE went on 

to testify that King’s RFC also allowed him to perform the job of price marker. Thus, 

even if the ALJ had properly excluded the job of poultry picker, he still would have 

held that King was not disabled because his RFC allowed him to perform the job of 

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price marker. Because this was a harmless error, it does not warrant reversal of the 

ALJ’s decision. Byes v. Astrue, 687 F.3d 913, 917 (8th Cir. 2012).

III. Conclusion 

It is not the task of this Court to review the evidence and make an independent 

decision. Neither is it to reverse the decision of the ALJ because there is evidence in 

the record which contradicts his findings. The test is whether there is substantial 

evidence in the record as a whole which supports the decision of the ALJ. Miller, 

784 F.3d at 477. The Court has reviewed the entire record, including the briefs, the 

ALJ’s decision, and the transcript of the hearing. The Court concludes that the record 

as a whole contains ample evidence that “a reasonable mind might accept as 

adequate to support [the] conclusion” of the ALJ in this case. Richardson v. Perales,, 

402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). The Court further concludes that the ALJ’s decision is not 

based on reversible error. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Commissioner’s decision be 

AFFIRMED and that the case be DISMISSED, with prejudice. 

DATED this 24th day of February, 2017. 

 ____________________________________ 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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