Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02610/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02610-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID F. SUEN,

Plaintiff,

v.

T. RYAN, et al.,

Defendant.

Case No.: 3:15-cv-02610-AJB-JMA

ORDER DISMISSING ACTION 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915A

David F. Suen (“Plaintiff”), a state inmate currently incarcerated at Corcoran State 

Prison located in Corcoran, California, and proceeding pro se, has filed an action brought 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In his Complaint, Plaintiff claims his constitutional rights 

were violated over a two year period while he was housed at Centinela State Prison. (See 

Compl., ECF No. 1, at 1.) Plaintiff names thirty six (36) defendants and seeks 

unspecified amount of compensatory and punitive damages. (Id. at 1-4, 8.)

Plaintiff has prepaid the initial civil filing fee required to commence a civil action 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a).

I. Initial Screening per 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)

Even though Plaintiff paid the filing fee, the Court can conduct a sua sponte review 

of Plaintiff’s Complaint because he is “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] is 

accused of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the 

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terms or conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program.” 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A(a), (c). Section 1915A, enacted as part of the Prison Litigation Reform 

Act (“PLRA”), requires sua sponte dismissal of prisoner complaints, or any portions 

thereof, which are frivolous, malicious, or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 446-47 (9th Cir. 2000). 

A similar screening provision of the PLRA would apply to Plaintiff’s Complaint even if 

he successfully moved to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). See 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 

A. Rule 8

As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s entire Complaint fails to comply with Rule 8 of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), requires a 

complaint to contain: “(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s 

jurisdiction,” . . . (2) a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to 

relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1)-(3). And while Rule 

8 “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ . . . it [does] demand[] more than an 

unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 

Here, a review of Plaintiff’s Complaint contains handwriting that is so small, it is simply 

not legible in many areas. Moreover, this pleading contains very little factual support for 

broad allegations. If Plaintiff chooses to file an amended pleading, his handwriting must 

be more legible and he must provide more specific factual allegations to support his 

claims against each Defendant.

B. Heck Bar

Plaintiff appears to challenge the validity of his criminal conviction. He claims his 

criminal defense counsel, California Appellate Court Justices and California Supreme 

Court Justices have tried to “secretly, sneaky and slyly sabotage, destroy and ruin my 

appeal from being overturned.” (Compl. at 5.) However, it is clear that Plaintiff may not 

use the Civil Right Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to seek the reversal of a criminal conviction. 

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See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973) (holding that a writ of habeas corpus 

is “explicitly and historically designed” to provide a state prisoner with the “exclusive” 

means to collaterally “attack the validity of his confinement” in federal court). “Suits 

challenging the validity of the prisoner’s continued incarceration lie within ‘the heart of 

habeas corpus,’ whereas ‘a § 1983 action is a proper remedy for a state prisoner who is 

making a constitutional challenge to the conditions of his prison life, but not to the fact or 

length of his custody.’” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 856 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting 

Preiser, 411 U.S. at 498-99). 

Second, even if Plaintiff were to seek damages against the Defendants, who are his 

appointed trial and appellate counsel, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, based on alleged violations 

of his constitutional rights, his claims would nevertheless amount to an attack on the 

validity of his underlying criminal conviction, and as such, would not be addressable 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, unless he also alleged his conviction has already been 

invalidated. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994); Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 855-

56 (“Absent such a showing, ‘[e]ven a prisoner who has fully exhausted available state 

remedies has no cause of action under § 1983 . . . .’”) (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 489). 

Heck holds that “in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional 

conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness 

would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a section 1983 plaintiff must prove that the 

conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, 

declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into 

question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-

87. A claim challenging the legality of a conviction or sentence that has not been so 

invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. Id. at 487; Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 

643 (1997).

In Heck, the Supreme Court held that: 

when a state prisoner seeks damages in a section 1983 suit, the district court 

must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily 

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imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint 

must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or 

sentence has already been invalidated. But if the district court determines 

that the plaintiff’s action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the 

invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the 

action should be allowed to proceed.

Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 (emphasis added). An action barred by Heck should be dismissed 

for failure to state a claim without prejudice to Plaintiff’s right to file a new action if he 

succeeds in invalidating his conviction. Edwards, 520 U.S. at 649.

Here, to the extent Plaintiff intends to raise claims of ineffective assistance of 

counsel, such claims “necessarily imply the invalidity” of his criminal conviction and 

continued incarceration. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. In other words, were Plaintiff to succeed 

in showing that he was provided ineffective assistance of either trial or appellate counsel, 

an award of damages would “necessarily imply the invalidity” of his conviction and/or 

sentence. Id.; see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (to succeed on 

ineffective assistance claim petitioner must show that counsel’s performance fell below 

objective standard of reasonableness and that but for counsel’s errors the result of the trial 

would have been different).

Thus, even if Plaintiff were to seek damages based on allegedly unconstitutional 

criminal proceedings, a section 1983 claim for damages could not yet proceed because he 

has not alleged that the conviction or sentence which forms the basis of his suit has 

already been invalidated. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 489-90.

In addition, even if Plaintiff could show that his conviction has already been 

invalidated, to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he must also allege that his 

appointed trial and appellate counsel acted “under color of state law” to deprive him of a 

right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 

42, 48 (1988). A person “acts under color of state law [for purposes of § 1983] only when 

exercising power ‘possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the 

wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.’” Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 

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312, 317-18 (1981) (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)). 

Attorneys who represent criminal defendants generally do not act under color of 

state law because representing a client “is essentially a private function . . . for which 

state office and authority are not needed.” Dodson, 454 U.S. at 319; United States v. De 

Gross, 960 F.2d 1433, 1442 n.12 (9th Cir. 1992). When attorneys perform as advocates, 

i.e., meet with clients, investigate possible defenses, present evidence at trial, or make 

arguments to a judge or jury, they do not act under color of state law for section 1983 

purposes. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 53 (1992); Dodson, 454 U.S. at 320-

25; Miranda v. Clark County, 319 F.3d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (finding that 

public defender was not a state actor subject to suit under § 1983 because, so long as she 

performs a traditional role of an attorney for a client, “h[er] function,” no matter how 

ineffective, is “to represent h[er] client, not the interests of the state or county.”).

C. Immunity

1. Judicial immunity

Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiff is seeking money damages against Appellate 

and Supreme Court Justices for their rulings in Plaintiff’s criminal matters, these

Defendants are absolutely immune. “Judges and those performing judge-like functions 

are absolutely immune from damage liability for acts performed in their official 

capacities.” Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986). Therefore, as 

Appellate and Supreme Court Justices for the State of California, these Defendants have

absolute immunity from civil proceedings relating to these actions, which were 

performed within their judicial discretion.

2. Eleventh Amendment

In addition, to the extent Plaintiff names the California Department of Corrections 

and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), Centinela State Prison, Centinela State Prison Mental 

Health System, Centinela State Prison Canteen Department and other related agencies as 

Defendants, his claims must be dismissed sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) 

for failing to state a claim and for seeking damages against a defendant who is immune. 

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The State of California’s Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and any state 

prison, correctional agency, sub-division, or department under its jurisdiction, are not 

“persons” subject to suit under § 1983. Hale v. State of Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1398-99 

(9th Cir. 1993) (holding that a state department of corrections is an arm of the state, and 

thus, not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983). And to the extent that Plaintiff seeks 

to sue the State of California itself, his claims are clearly barred by the Eleventh 

Amendment. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978) (per curiam) (“There can 

be no doubt . . . that [a] suit against the State and its Board of Corrections is barred by the 

Eleventh Amendment, unless [the State] has consented to the filing of such a suit.”). 

Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff seeks monetary damages against the CDCR, 

agencies of the CDCR, or any relief against the State of California itself, his Complaint is 

dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) & (2).

D. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claims

In his Complaint, while not entirely clear, it appears that Plaintiff is challenging a 

disciplinary conviction that led to housing in administrative segregation (“ad-seg”). 

While Plaintiff’s due process claims arising from his disciplinary hearing may or may not 

be barred by Heck, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim. “The 

requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interests 

encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty and property.” Board 

of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). State statutes and prison regulations may 

grant prisoners liberty interests sufficient to invoke due process protections. Meachum v. 

Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-27 (1976). However, the Supreme Court has significantly 

limited the instances in which due process can be invoked. Pursuant to Sandin v. 

Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483 (1995), a prisoner can show a liberty interest under the Due 

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment only if he alleges a change in confinement 

that imposes an “atypical and significant hardship . . . in relation to the ordinary incidents 

of prison life.” Id. at 484 (citations omitted); Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 827-28 (9th 

Cir. 1997). 

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In this case, Plaintiff has failed to establish a liberty interest protected by the 

Constitution because he has not alleged, as he must under Sandin, facts related to the 

conditions or consequences of his disciplinary hearing which show “the type of atypical, 

significant deprivation [that] might conceivably create a liberty interest.” Id. at 486. For 

example, in Sandin, the Supreme Court considered three factors in determining whether 

the plaintiff possessed a liberty interest in avoiding disciplinary segregation: (1) the 

disciplinary versus discretionary nature of the segregation; (2) the restricted conditions of 

the prisoner’s confinement and whether they amounted to a “major disruption in his 

environment” when compared to those shared by prisoners in the general population; and 

(3) the possibility of whether the prisoner’s sentence was lengthened by his restricted 

custody. Id. at 486-87. 

Therefore, to establish a due process violation, Plaintiff must first show the 

deprivation imposed an atypical and significant hardship on him in relation to the 

ordinary incidents of prison life. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483-84. Plaintiff has failed to 

allege any facts from which the Court could find there were atypical and significant 

hardships imposed upon him as a result of the Defendants’ actions. Plaintiff must allege 

“a dramatic departure from the basic conditions” of his confinement that would give rise 

to a liberty interest before he can claim a violation of due process. Id. at 485; see also 

Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1088-89 (9th Cir. 1996), amended by 135 F.3d 1318 (9th 

Cir. 1998). He has not; therefore the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to allege a 

liberty interest in remaining free of ad-seg, and thus, has failed to state a due process 

claim. See May, 109 F.3d at 565; Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 466; Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486.

II. Conclusion

For all the reasons set out above, IT IS ORDERED that:

Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§1915A(b). However, Plaintiff is granted forty five (45) days leave from the date this 

Order is “Filed” in which to file a First Amended Complaint which cures all the 

deficiencies of pleading noted above. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete 

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in itself without reference to the superseded pleading. See S.D. Cal. Civ. L. R. 15.1. 

Defendants not named and all claims not re-alleged in the Amended Complaint will be 

deemed to have been waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Further, if Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be 

granted, it may be dismissed without further leave to amend and may hereafter be 

counted as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 

1177-79 (9th Cir. 1996). 

The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a form civil rights complaint to Plaintiff.

Dated: November 23, 2015

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