Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01234/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01234-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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Civil No.: 13cv1234-JAH

Criminal No.: 10cr1862-JAH

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD LEE CRESS,

Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

Civil No.: 13cv1234-JAH

Criminal No.: 10cr1862-JAH

ORDER DENYING AS MOOT 

PETITIONER'S MOTION TO 

VACATE, SET ASIDE, OR 

CORRECT SENTENCE PURSUANT 

TO 28 U.S.C. § 2255

INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the Court on Petitioner Richard Lee Cress’s (“petitioner”) 

motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See Doc. 

No. 68. The motion has been fully briefed. See Doc. Nos. 84, 95, 97. Under Rule 4 of the 

Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings, this Court may dismiss a § 2255 motion if it “plainly 

appears” from the motion, attached exhibits, and the record of prior proceedings, that 

petitioner is not entitled to relief. See Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings; 

see also United States v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 1465 (9th Cir. 1994). Having thoroughly 

considered the parties’ briefing, the relevant record, and, in accordance with Rule 4, the 

Court finds oral argument unnecessary, and hereby DENIES petitioner’s motion.

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Civil No.: 13cv1234-JAH

Criminal No.: 10cr1862-JAH

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BACKGROUND

On September 30, 2011, petitioner, with the advice and consent of counsel, signed a 

plea agreement, admitting that he assaulted a Federal Officer in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 

111(a) and (b). See Doc. Nos. 36, 37. Specifically, petitioner admitted as “true and 

undisputed” that on or about April 14, 2010, at the San Ysidro Port of Entry to the United 

States, he recklessly, and with extreme indifference to human life, forcibly assaulted U.S. 

Customs and Border Protection Officer J. Aguirre by driving a vehicle in reverse at high 

speed in the direction of Officer Aguirre. See Doc. No. 37 at 3-4.

On October 6, 2011, this Court held a change of plea hearing. See Doc. No. 95-1.

During the hearing, petitioner affirmed that he discussed the plea agreement with his 

attorney, initialed every page of the plea agreement, and signed the plea agreement. Id. at 

117-18. Moreover, this Court inquired whether petitioner fully understood the agreement, 

had sufficient time to review the agreement, and understood all the terms of the plea

agreement. Id. at 18. Petitioner answered all of these questions in the affirmative. Id.

Following the Rule 11 colloquy, which included advisal of all constitutional rights, and the 

maximum penalties, and that he was giving up those rights, petitioner affirmed that he 

wanted to plead guilty. Id. 

On March 10, 2014, petitioner was sentenced to 57 months in custody followed by 

3 years of supervised release. See Doc. No. 29. Judgment was entered on March 13, 2014. 

See Doc. No. 30. Then, on May 19, 2014, petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed his motion to 

vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See Doc. No 31. 

Thereafter, on June 12, 2014, petitioner filed a supplemental brief in support. See Doc. No. 

33. On December 23, 2014, Respondent United States of America (“respondent”) timely 

filed a response in opposition. See Doc. Nos. 41, 42, 45.

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Civil No.: 13cv1234-JAH

Criminal No.: 10cr1862-JAH

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DISCUSSION

1. Legal Standard

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a federal prisoner may move the court to vacate, set aside, 

or correct his sentence on the ground that: (1) the sentence was imposed in violation of the 

Constitution or laws of the United States; (2) the court was without jurisdiction to impose 

such a sentence; (3) the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law; or (4) 

the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a); United States v. 

Speelman, 431 F.3d 1226, 1230 n.2 (9th Cir.2005).

Ineffective assistance of counsel is a grounds for § 2255 relief. See Massaro v. 

United States, 583 U.S. 500, 502 (2003). Under the Sixth Amendment, a criminal defendant 

is guaranteed the right to effective assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 

U.S. 668, 685 (1984) (“Strickland”). To demonstrate ineffective assistance, a petitioner 

must establish that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) the defendant was 

prejudiced as a result of that deficient performance. Id. at 687.

To establish deficient performance, a petitioner must show that “counsel made errors 

so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by 

the Sixth Amendment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Counsel’s representation must fall 

below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. at 687–88. There is a strong presumption 

that counsel's conduct falls within the “wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” 

Id. at 689.

To establish prejudice, a petitioner must show that “counsel’s errors were so serious 

as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 687. The petitioner has the burden of showing that “there is a reasonable probability 

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different.” Id. at 694-96. If the petitioner fails to meet its burden, or, if “it plainly appears” 

from the motion, attached exhibits, and record of prior proceedings that the prisoner is not 

entitled to relief, the district court may sua sponte dismiss the § 2255 motion. See Rule 4

of the Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings; Blaylock, 20 F.3d at 1465. Thus, when a

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“movant’s allegations, viewed against the record, either do not state a claim for relief or 

are so palpably incredible or patently frivolous as to warrant summary dismissal[,]” the 

“district court may deny a section 2255 motion without an evidentiary hearing.” See United 

States v. Mejia-Mesia, 153 F.3d 925, 931 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Burrows, 

872 F.2d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 1989). Moreover, “[i]f it is easier to dispose of an 

ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice,” a court may examine 

the prejudice component without determining whether counsel’s performance was 

deficient. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.

2. Analysis

As a threshold matter, the Court is aware that petitioner was released from Bureau 

of Prisons custody on June 6, 2014. Accordingly, petitioner’s motion to vacate, set aside, 

or correct his sentence must be DENIED AS MOOT. United States v. Kramer, 195 F.3d 

1129 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[A] defendant seeking relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 . . . must be 

in custody, [and] . . . claim the right to be released from custody.”). Nevertheless, even if 

petitioner was still in custody, this Court would DENY his claim for ineffective assistance 

of counsel for failure to meet his Strickland burden. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; McMann 

v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770-71 (1970).

Petitioner’s ineffective assistance claims arise from two underlying grievances. See 

Doc. No. 97 at 2-3. First, from petitioner’s perception that counsel was disinterested in 

recovering his property seized by the government; and, second, because petitioner “felt 

pressured into signing the plea agreement.” Id. at 2, 5.

With respect to the property seized, petitioner contends that “over the course of 

several months[,] . . . counsel was difficult to contact[,] seldom visit[ed], [and] [i]n the few 

attorney/client consultations that took place . . . . neither Mr. Rexrode, [n]or Mr. Stewart 

showed any real interest in recovering Petitioner’s property[.]” See Doc. No. 97 at 2. 

Petitioner reaches this conclusion despite counsel’s assurance, “on more than one 

occasion[,]” that they were “looking into the property and money seized [by the 

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government].” Id. at 2. Petitioner has not shown how counsel’s performance was deficient 

on this issue.

With respect to signing the plea agreement under pressured conditions, petitioner

first alleges that—

Counsel for the defendant did not seriously investigate, explore 

or attempt to apprise Defendant as to all facts and law relevant to 

his decision to plead guilty. Had Mr. Cress be fully advised, and 

had counsel competently explained all options to Defendant and 

then exhaustively pursued all avenues besides advising 

Defendant into a plea agreement, there is a reasonable probability 

that Defendant would not have pled guilty and proceeded to trial. 

But for counsel’s unprofessional error(s), there is a reasonable 

probability that the outcome of the proceeding would have been 

different. Defendant will be more specific in his memorandum in 

support of 2255.

See Doc. No. 68 at 7. In a separate filing, petitioner elaborates that, on September 30, 2011, 

“at about 4:15 p.m.,” he was told that his attorney was waiting for him in the visiting room. 

Doc. No. 97 at 2. Upon entering the visiting room, counsel informed petitioner that the 

government extended a plea offer. Id. Petitioner recounts that counsel explained the plea 

agreement to him, and that he “briefly read each page.” Id. Thereafter, petitioner 

communicated his desire to “take the plea agreement and discuss it” with family, then 

discuss it again with counsel “on the following week.” Id. Counsel then informed petitioner 

that the government’s offer was conditioned upon his express agreement no later than 5:00 

p.m. that same day, otherwise, the offer would expire and the government would proceed 

with trial. Id. Petitioner felt pressured by this. Id. Ultimately, petitioner signed the 

agreement, but initialed several pages with the initials NA,1indicating that the information 

on those pages “was not applicable to my understanding.” Id.

 

1 Petitioner explains that he initialed pages 2 through 13 with the “NA” mark, 

specifically, because he did not want to waive his right to forfeiture and his appeal rights. 

See Doc. No. 97 at 3.

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After a careful review of the entire record on this matter, the Court finds that even if 

petitioner’s allegations are true, “such ‘pressure’ does not constitute constitutionally 

deficient performance.” See e.g. United States v. Kwon, 122 Fed. Appx. 351, 352 (9th Cir. 

2005) (holding that petitioner was not denied effective assistance of counsel as result of 

counsel’s alleged pressure on defendant to plead guilty, where alleged pressure consisted 

of telling defendant that it would be better for his family and that he would not prevail if 

he went to trial) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89).

Indeed, under Strickland, “a guilty plea cannot be attacked as based on inadequate 

legal advice unless counsel was not ‘a reasonably competent attorney’ and the advice was 

not ‘within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.’” 466 U.S. 

at 687 (quoting McMann, 397 U.S. at 770-71). In other words, a convicted defendant must 

show that, in light of all the circumstances, “counsel’s representation[s] fell below an 

objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 688. Furthermore, “judicial scrutiny of 

counsel’s performance must be highly deferential.” Id. Consequently, to overturn the 

“strong presumption” that counsel rendered constitutionally adequate assistance, 

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011), petitioner must demonstrate that the 

challenged action, inaction, or advice cannot reasonably be considered sound strategy 

under the circumstances. See Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 F.3d 1099, 1115 (9th Cir. 2006); 

Lord v. Wood, 184 F.3d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir.1999).

Here, petitioner offers only self-serving, after-the-fact, speculation that he would 

have rejected the offer presented he had been better advised and/or was provided more time 

to consider the government’s offer. See generally Doc. Nos. 68, 97. It is clear that petitioner 

told the Court, during the Rule 11 colloquy, that he had sufficient time to review the plea 

agreement and understood its terms. See Doc. No. 95-1 at 117-18. Additionally, petitioner 

does not present facts or circumstances to suggest that petitioner would have rejected the 

plea offer if he were advised to his satisfaction or was provided more time to consider it. 

Furthermore, petitioner would still have to convince the Court that either (1) the 

government would have offered, he would have accepted, and the Court would have 

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honored a plea agreement calling for a shorter term of imprisonment; or (2) petitioner 

would have gone to trial and the jury would have acquitted him, or at least been unable to 

reach a verdict. Petitioner attempts no such showing, and, therefore fails to show Strickland 

prejudice.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Petitioner’s motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence, [doc. no. 68], is 

DENIED AS MOOT;

2. Petitioner’s motion for updated an updated status on ECF. No. 68, [doc. no. 101], 

is DENIED AS MOOT.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 21, 2017

 

_________________________________

JOHN A. HOUSTON

United States District Judge

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