Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05365/USCOURTS-caed-1_03-cv-05365-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MANGO WATTS,

Plaintiff,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et

al.,

Defendants.

 

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1:03-cv-5365 OWW DLB P

ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S

RULING RE: ATTORNEY’S FEES

This case is before the Court on the Motion for

Reconsideration of the Magistrate Judge’s ruling awarding

attorneys’ fees to Plaintiff as a result of a settlement of the

case. 

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis,

who brought a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1997e(d)(1)

and 1983 alleging the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) hair length grooming standards violated

his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the

United States Constitution and the Religious Land Use and

Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”). 

Defendant moved for summary judgment and was granted relief

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on all grounds except Plaintiff’s request for expungement of

grooming standards rules violation reports contained in his

central file. Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim, monetary damage

claims under the Equal Protection Clause and the RLUIPA and for

permanent injunctive relief were barred or rendered moot. The

case settled on the parties’ stipulation to the expungement of

the Plaintiff’s grooming standards rules violations from his

central file and agreement the RVRs would not be used in the

future against Plaintiff. 

The Magistrate Judge found Plaintiff was the prevailing

party and entitled to attorneys’ fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1997e(d)(1) and 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and reduced the claimed fees

by 50%. The Defendants acknowledge that the basis for the

Magistrate Judge’s award of attorneys’ fees was that while

Plaintiff was not 100% successful on all of his claims, due to

counsel’s efforts, he did succeed in having his disciplinary

record related to grooming standards removed from his central

file and reached agreement the RVRs would not be used in the

future, after defeating Defendants’ motion for summary judgment

on Plaintiff’s Equal Protection and RLUIPA claims. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW AND ANALYSIS

A motion for reconsideration is appropriate only where the

District Court (1) is presented with newly discovered evidence;

(2) committed clear error or the initial decision was manifestly

unjust; (3) if there was an intervening change in controlling

law. School Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County v. ACandS, Inc., 5

F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993). A reconsideration motion should

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not merely present arguments raised, or which could have been

raised in the initial motion. See Backlund v. Barnhart, 778 F.2d

1386, 1388 (“The motion was probably denied here because it

presented no arguments that had not already been raised in

opposition to summary judgment.”); United States v. Navarro, 972

F.Supp. 1296, 1299 (E.D. Cal. 1997) (“[M]otions to reconsider are

not vehicles permitting the unsuccessful party to ‘rehash’

arguments previously presented . . . Nor is a motion to

reconsider justified on the basis of new evidence which could

have been discovered prior to the court’s ruling . . . . 

Finally, ‘afterthoughts’ or ‘shifting of ground’ do not

constitute an appropriate basis for reconsideration.”) (The

underlying decision on the merits, United States v. Navarro, 959

F.Supp. 1253 (E.D. Cal. 1997), was reversed by United States v.

Navarro, 160 F.3d 1254 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct.

2354 (1999). The reversal did not address the issue of the

reconsideration standard. 

Defendants argue that in the absence of a constitutional

violation, an award of attorneys’ fees based upon the expungement

of Plaintiff’s grooming standards RVRs, “where none of the

cognizable relief sought, either compensatory or injunctive, is

obtained is clearly erroneous and contrary to the law.” 

Defendants rely on Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture,

478 F.3d 985, 999 (9th Cir. 2007) and Mateyko v. Felix, 924 F.2d

824, 828 (1990) for the proposition that a Plaintiff who succeeds

on a state claim, but on none of her constitutional claims, is

not a “prevailing party” under § 1988. In Engquist, the Circuit

Court reversed the award of attorneys’ fees and remanded to the

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District Court to determine damages and any attorneys’ fees

award, expressing no opinion as to whether Engquist is entitled

to attorneys’ fees under Oregon law. Id. at p. 999, FN 10. 

Plaintiffs rely on Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540,

548 (9th Cir. 1994) which established, in a challenge to prison

conditions case, that the second element of the Slaben test for

determining whether Plaintiffs have obtained catalytic relief

does not require the District Court to determine whether the

relief was required by the U.S. Constitution or Federal law. 

Rather, the test requires only that the relief be related to a

claim that is not frivolous, unreasonable or groundless. “This

test sensibly keeps the District Court from having to address,

during the attorneys’ fees litigation, the merits of resolved

disputes to determine whether the relief obtained would have been

obtainable by judgment.” Doty, 37 F.3d at 548. 

In LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1461 (9th Cir. 1993) an

inmate challenging the conditions of his imprisonment in a

disciplinary segregation unit failed on most of his claims, but

success on a few of the claims altered the legal relationship of

the parties and he could be deemed a prevailing party under

§ 1988. “While the limited nature of this success does not

deprive LeMaire of his prevailing status, it does effect the

reasonable amount of fees his attorneys may receive.” 12 F.3d at

1461. 

To determine whether a claimant’s litigation was the

catalyst for changes ultimately obtained in a consent decree, the

Court proceeds as follows: first, the Court “must determine what

Plaintiffs sought to accomplish in bringing the lawsuit and then

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determine whether the lawsuit was causally linked to the relief

actually obtained.” Steinke v. Washington County, 903 F.Supp.

1403, 1407 (D. Or. 1995); citing Doty. Then, the Court “must

determine whether there is a legal basis for the Plaintiff’s

claim –- it must not be ‘frivolous, unreasonable or groundless.’” 

Here, Plaintiff’s lawsuit was causally related to the relief

sought - deletion of alleged violations of grooming standards

from Plaintiff’s central file. Here, Plaintiff sought

compensatory damages and injunctive relief with respect to the

enforcement of the grooming standards as to his appearance and

hair length and expungement from his central file of all

disciplinary reports relating to his non-compliance with the

grooming standards. Plaintiff, while acting pro se, obtained a

temporary restraining order prohibiting the enforcement of the

grooming standards with respect to himself, however, he was not

represented by counsel and is not entitled to attorneys’ fees for

obtaining the temporary restraining order. 

This case was concluded by a voluntary stipulation, without

admission of liability, but all disciplinary reports related to

Plaintiff’s grooming standards rules violations were be expunged

forthwith from Plaintiff’s central file, and as of the date of

the stipulation and order, Plaintiff’s classification score is to

be computed without regard to these RVRs. This is partial

success.

The Magistrate Judge found that Plaintiff was the

“prevailing” party and entitled to attorneys’ fees under 42

U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1). The court found that 50% of counsels’ time

was directly and reasonably incurred in proving an actual

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violation of Plaintiff’s rights, and that Plaintiff was entitled

to compensation for 48.5 hours at the rate of $138.00 per hour. 

Defendants were ordered to pay the total amount of $6,693.00

directly to Plaintiff’s counsel within 30 days of the order.

Attorneys’ Fees Under the PLRA.

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C.

§ 1997e(d)(1) attorneys’ fees are limited to those directly and

reasonably incurred in proving an actual violation of Plaintiff’s

rights protected by a statute under which a fee may be awarded. 

See 42 U.S.C. § 1988. 

Plaintiff alleged that the presence of unexpunged RVRs in

his central file violated his civil rights under the Equal

Protection Clause or the RLUIPA. Plaintiff argues that “the only

adverse effect the presence of the RVRs in the Plaintiff’s

central file could possibly have would be to increase Plaintiff’s

security classification.” The State then argues that “an inmate

has no constitutional right regarding his classification.” Myron

v. Terhune, 476 F.3d 716, 718-19 (9th Cir. 2007). 

The State’s analysis suffers from the same infirmity

recognized by Doty, where the Ninth Circuit expressly held and it

continues to be the law of the Circuit, that proof of a

constitutional violation is not required for attorneys’ fees,

under § 1988, where a case has been resolved by settlement, and

claims for violation of constitutional rights or Federal law, the

RLUIPA, were asserted and relief which altered the legal rights

of the parties was obtained. Here, the lawsuit achieved deletion

of all Plaintiff’s RVRs from his central file and the prohibition

against future use of those rules violation reports for any

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purpose. As in Doty, the test requires only that the relief

achieved be related to a claim that is not frivolous,

unreasonable, or groundless, not that the relief was “required by

the Constitution or Federal law.” 

CONCLUSION

Once the entitlement to attorneys’ fees is established, a

District Court should consider Plaintiff’s limited success and

the factors set forth in Gates v. Dukemejian, 987 F.2d 1392 (9th

Cir. 1992); and Harris v. Marhoefer, 24 F.3d 16 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Fee awards pursuant to § 1988 must be reasonable, both as to the

number of hours spent in advancing the successful claim and the

billing rate per hour. Calculating the Lodestar figure is the

starting point for determining the reasonable fee. Gates, 987

F.2d at 1397. Here, the statutory rate of $138.00 per hour was

utilized by the Court. This is substantially below prevailing

rates for civil rights lawyers practicing in the Fresno Division

of the Eastern District of California and is a reasonable rate

for attorneys’ fees. 

The relief achieved was only partial. The Plaintiff did not

succeed in changing the grooming standards, grooming policies, or

establish that there was a substantive Equal Protection and

RLUIPA violation. The settlement achieved, expunged any grooming

standards rules violation reports from Plaintiff’s central file

and prohibited future reference to those violations, which, in

substance, has the effect of permanent injunctive relief as to

the RVRs. Judgment was rendered moot by the parties’

stipulation. Plaintiff failed to obtain a decision that the

CDCR’s hair length grooming standards violated the Free Exercise

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of Religion Clause of the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the

Constitution, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized

Persons Act, and Plaintiff did not obtain any compensatory

damages. 

He did achieve the expungement and prohibition against

future use of his rules violations reports as a result of his

lawsuit. 

In reviewing the Magistrate Judge’s analysis, the success

achieved was more limited than the fee awarded reflects. In

effect, Plaintiff prevailed on one of his four claims and a

reduction to 25% of the hours incurred based on a statutory rate

of $138.00 for attorneys’ fees results in entitlement to

compensation for 25 hours at the rate of $138.00 or a net fee

award of $3,346.50. 

Defendants’ motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. 

Plaintiff’s attorney shall be awarded $3,346.50 for reasonable

and necessary attorney’s fees. 

SO ORDERED, this 14 day of June, 2007. th

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 14, 2007 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

emm0d6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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