Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01442/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01442-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Breach of Contract

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Sandra Bronick, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 

Company, 

Defendant. 

No. CV-11-01442-PHX-JAT (NVW)

ORDER 

Before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion to Recuse the Honorable James A. Teilborg 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 144 and 28 U.S.C. § 455 (Doc. 76). Plaintiff moves to recuse 

Judge Teilborg from this case on that grounds that Judge Teilborg’s relationship with a 

witness in the case could cause an objective observer to question his impartiality. For the 

following reasons, the Motion will be denied. 

I. Substantive Legal Standard 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 144, if “the judge before whom the matter is pending has a 

personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party, . . . [he] 

shall proceed no further . . . .” Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), “[a]ny . . . judge . . . shall 

disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be 

questioned.” Under both recusal statutes, the substantive standard is “Whether a 

reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge’s 

impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Pesnell v. Arsenault, 543 F.3d 1038, 1043 

(9th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Hernandez, 109 F.3d 1450, 1453 (9th Cir. 1997)). 

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As a result, “[t]he substantive standard for recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 144 and 28 U.S.C. 

§ 455 is the same.” United States v. McTiernan, 695 F.3d 882, 891 (9th Cir. 2012). 

II. Procedural Requirements § 144 

The principle difference between the two sections is thus that the procedural 

requirements for § 144 are much more demanding. Recusal is mandatory pursuant to § 

144 “whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely and 

sufficient affidavit . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 144. As a result, § 144 is “unusual because it 

requires that the district judge accept the affidavit as true even though it may contain 

averments that are false and may be known to be so to the judge.” In re Martinez-Catala, 

129 F.3d 213, 218 (1st Cir. 1997). In light of the automatic nature of relief, and because 

§ 144 “expressly conditions relief upon the filing of a timely and legally sufficient 

affidavit,” United States v. Sibla, 624 F.2d 864, 867 (9th Cir. 1980), courts have been 

exacting in their requirement of a facially sufficient affidavit and that the movant follow 

the procedural prerequisites. As a result, a party must strictly follow the precise 

procedural steps in order to obtain disqualification under § 144. When a party fails to file 

the required affidavit, that party is not entitled to recusal under §144. United States v. 

Sammons, 918 F.2d 592, 598 (6th Cir. 1990). Similarly, when a party fails to accompany 

the affidavit with the required “certificate of counsel of record stating that [the affidavit] 

is made in good faith,” 28 U.S.C. § 144, a motion for recusal under § 144 is insufficient. 

United States v. Barnes, 909 F.2d 1059, 1072 (7th Cir. 1990). 

In this case, Plaintiff’s attorney first filed “affidavit” in support of her Motion to 

recuse, unsigned by Plaintiff herself. (Doc. 77.) Motions under § 144 are subject to 

dismissal when the attorney, rather than a party, submits the affidavit in question. In re 

Cooper & Lynn, 821 F.2d 833, 838 (1st Cir. 1987). Here, therefore, that procedural error 

alone would be sufficient to deny the Motion under § 144 because courts “need consider 

only the affidavit filed with [a party’s] first motion.” United States v. Balistrieri, 779 

F.2d 1191, 1200 (7th Cir. 1985). 

The Court has considered Plaintiff’s corrected affidavit as well, however, and it 

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too is procedurally deficient. Though the first affidavit contained the required certificate 

of counsel (Doc. 78), the corrected affidavit contained no certificate of counsel stating 

that the corrected affidavit was made in good faith. Like the failure to file the first 

affidavit on behalf of Plaintiff, the lack of a certificate of counsel is alone grounds to 

reject the Motion under § 144. Morrison v. United States, 432 F.2d 1227, 1229 (5th Cir. 

1970). Combined, these procedural errors are especially prominent. In order to obtain 

relief under § 144, a party must show strict compliance with the procedural requirements 

of that section. Plaintiff has failed on two occasions to comply with those requirements, 

and so her Motion will be denied under § 144. 

III. Objective Standard Under § 455(a) 

Unlike § 144, § 455 contains no explicit procedural requirements. “The test for 

disqualification under section 455(a) is an objective one”; courts consider whether 

disqualification is required from the perspective of a reasonable person. United States v. 

Nelson, 718 F.2d 315, 321 (9th Cir. 1983). “The ‘reasonable person’ in this context 

means a ‘well-informed, thoughtful observer,’ as opposed to a ‘hypersensitive or unduly 

suspicious person.’” Clemens v. United States District Court for the Central District of 

California, 428 F.3d 1175, 1178 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting In re Mason, 916 F.2d 384, 385 

(7th Cir. 1990)). 

 To determine whether disqualification is warranted under § 455(a), courts “apply 

the general rule that questions about a judge’s impartiality must stem from extrajudicial 

factors, that is, from sources other than the judicial proceeding at hand.” Id. (citations 

and internal quotation marks omitted). Claims under § 455(a) are fact-driven, and must 

be decided based on “an independent examination of the unique facts and circumstances 

of the particular claim at issue.” Id. (citing United States v. Bremers, 195 F.3d 221, 226 

(5th Cir. 1999)). Because under § 455 courts consider all of the relevant facts, a motion 

to recuse under § 455 is not limited to the affidavit of a party as in § 144. The focus of an 

analysis under § 455(a) is thus whether a well-informed, thoughtful observer might 

question the judge’s impartiality, based on the unique facts and circumstances of the 

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particular claim. Whether a judge is in fact impartial is thus not dispositive of a claim for 

disqualification under this section; rather, § 455(a) requires disqualification for the 

appearance of partiality. 

IV. Analysis Under § 455(a) 

In this insurance case for breach of contract and bad faith claim handling, 

Defendant hired an independent medical examiner, Dr. Hartzler, to evaluate Plaintiff. 

Plaintiff bases her Motion for Recusal on the grounds that Judge Teilborg’s relationship 

with Dr. Hartzler, who will be an important witness in the case, raises questions about his 

impartiality. 

At a hearing on Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on May 15, 

2013, Judge Teilborg informed the parties that, in preparation for the hearing, he became 

aware that Dr. Hartzler was a potential witness in the case. In light of that, Judge 

Teilborg informed the parties that he had visited the practice group of which Dr. Hartzler 

was a member on three occasions to have x-rays read. On two of those occasions—one 

sometime in the last five years, and one sometime within the last few months—Dr. 

Hartzler read Judge Teilborg’s x-rays. Judge Teilborg had not seen Dr. Hartzler outside 

of those two occasions, and had no other relationship, social or otherwise, apart from 

those visits. Judge Teilborg informed the parties at that hearing that he did not believe 

those visits formed any basis for recusal. (Doc. 83 at 4.) 

In addition, Judge Teilborg’s former firm, Teilborg, Sanders and Park, had, in the 

past, hired Dr. Hartzler to complete a number of independent medical examination 

reports as part of their medical malpractice defense work. Plaintiff identified seven cases 

in which Dr. Hartzler was hired by Judge Teilborg’s previous firm, all but two of which 

took place long after Judge Teilborg had already left the firm. Judge Teilborg did not 

work directly on either case in which Dr. Hartzler had been hired while Judge Teilborg 

was still at the firm. 

Plaintiff argues that these two facts—that Judge Teilborg saw Dr. Hartzler twice 

as a patient, and that Judge Teilborg’s former firm hired Dr. Hartzler to perform 

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independent medical examinations—create the objective appearance of partiality in this 

case. A central part of Plaintiff’s case, she avers, will be to argue that Defendants acted 

in bad faith by hiring Dr. Hartzler to perform the independent medical examination. To 

do so, Plaintiff intends to attack Dr. Hartzler as inherently biased in performing 

independent medical examinations for Defendants in the past and to attack the credibility 

of the results of his exams. According to Plaintiff, a reasonable observer would question 

Judge Teilborg’s ability to be impartial when she attacks the credibility of a doctor on 

whose medical expertise Judge Teilborg has relied. 

This case therefore falls into the category of one in which a judge has a prior 

relationship with a witness. Judge Teilborg has already determined that he does not 

believe there is any basis for recusal because of his relationship with Dr. Hartzler. Under 

§ 455(a), however, the fact that Judge Teilborg does not have actual bias for or against 

any party or witness is not dispositive. Instead, the Court considers whether a thoughtful 

observer, knowing and understanding all the relevant facts and circumstances, could 

reasonably question Judge Teilborg’s impartiality in the case on the basis of his 

relationship with Dr. Hartzler. 

In general, a judge’s mere acquaintance or familiarity with a witness does not 

require disqualification. United States v. Sundrud, 397 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1233 (C.D. Cal. 

2005). Recusal is required, however, where a judge’s personal relationship with a 

witness rises to a level that is so friendly or antagonistic that it would lead a reasonable 

person to question the judge’s impartiality. As a general rule, the more insignificant the 

relationship and the greater the temporal distance between contacts, the less likely it is 

that a judge's impartiality can reasonably be questioned. 

Because of that general rule, Plaintiff’s contention that Judge Teilborg should be 

disqualified on the basis that his former law firm hired Dr. Hartzler is without merit. 

While Judge Teilborg was a member of the firm, more than 12 years ago, he did not 

directly work on any case in which Dr. Hartzler was hired. And when the firm hired Dr. 

Hartzler more recently, Judge Teilborg had already been on the bench for more than five 

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years. There was, in short, no meaningful contact between Judge Teilborg and Dr. 

Hartzler in his capacity as a lawyer at Teilborg, Sanders and Park. The subsequent 

contact between Dr. Hartzler and the firm after Judge Teilborg left the firm could not 

reasonably raise a question about Judge Teilborg’s impartiality. 

With respect to Judge Teilborg’s two visits to Dr. Hartzler as a patient to have xrays read, the parties have not cited any factually similar case which would dictate a 

result here. However, there are many cases in which a judge’s relationship with a witness 

was much closer than the one at issue in this Motion and where the judge properly did not 

recuse. For example, the Eighth Circuit found disqualification unnecessary even though 

the judge maintained a friendship of thirty-six years with a fact witness and remained a 

client of the witness’s law firm in an ongoing unrelated matter. Fletcher v. Conoco Pipe 

Line Co., 323 F.3d 661, 665 (8th Cir. 2003). There, the court held that a recusal claim 

should generally be denied when it “alleg[es] no more than a friendship between a judge 

and a witness. . . .” Id. 

Plaintiff contends, however, that Judge Teilborg’s relationship with Dr. Hartzler is 

more significant than a friendship because his visits to Dr. Hartzler as a patient 

demonstrate that he has a deeply personal and trusting relationship with Dr. Hartzler. 

According to Plaintiff, this is especially likely to cause an objective observer to question 

Judge Teilborg’s impartiality in this case because the doctor’s credibility as a physician 

will be attacked. The Court is not, however, persuaded that Judge Teilborg’s relationship 

with this witness would lead a reasonable, informed person to doubt his impartiality. 

Judge Teilborg’s relationship with Dr. Hartzler was limited to three visits for 

minor orthopedic issues. The visits were to Dr. Hartzler’s orthopedic group, and on one 

occasion Judge Teilborg visited a different member of the group. If this were a case in 

which Dr. Hartzler was Judge Teilborg’s general physician, or Dr. Hartzler had seen 

Judge Teilborg repeatedly over an extended period, disqualification would likely be 

necessary. But in this case, the visits were for isolated incidents separated by many 

years. There were no follow-up visits, and no indication that Judge Teilborg’s 

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relationship with Dr. Hartzler was at all personal. Especially when compared with the 

ongoing relationship between the judge and the witness’s law firm in Fletcher, Judge 

Teilborg’s relationship with Dr. Hartzler was limited, both in scope and temporally. As a 

result, a thoughtful observer, knowing and understanding all the relevant facts and 

circumstances, could not reasonably question Judge Tielborg’s impartiality in the case. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Recuse the Honorable 

James A. Teilborg Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 144 and 28 U.S.C. § 455 (Doc. 76) is denied. 

Dated this 11th day of July, 2013. 

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