Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-3_04-cv-03074/USCOURTS-arwd-3_04-cv-03074-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 865
Nature of Suit: Social Security - RSI (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

HARRISON DIVISION

HERSCHELL L. HENNESSEE PLAINTIFF

vs. Civil No. 04-3074

JO ANNE B. BARNHART,

Commissioner, Social Security Administration DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Factual and Procedural Background:

Herschell L. Hennesee (hereinafter "Plaintiff"), has appealed the final decision of the

Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (hereinafter "Commissioner"), denying his

application for disability insurance benefits, (hereinafter "DIB"), pursuant to §§ 216(i) and 223

of Title II of the Social Security Act (hereinafter "the Act"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i) and 423. In

this judicial review, the Court must determine whether there is substantial evidence in the

administrative record to support the Commissioner’s decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

Both parties have filed appeal briefs (Doc. #7 & 8). The history of the administrative

proceedings is contained in the respective appeal briefs and will not be recounted herein, except

as is necessary. 

Plaintiff alleges that he is disabled due to: arthritis; diabetes mellitus; neuropathy; post

traumatic stress disorder; recurrent blackouts (loss of consciousness); pain; fatigue; impaired

vision; loss of memory; muscle spasms; asthma; numbness; seizure disorder; numerous

functional limitations; pain and arthritis in his shoulders, arms, wrists, hands, back, hips, knees,

ankles and feet; and, obesity. The issue before this Court is whether the decision of the

Commissioner is supported by substantial record evidence. The Plaintiff asserts that the

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Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter "ALJ"), erred in rendering a decision finding Plaintiff

not disabled (Doc. #1 & 7). 

The Plaintiff’s administrative hearing was conducted on June 10, 2004 (T. 26-78). The

ALJ issued his final written decision denying Plaintiff’s applications for benefits on July 6, 2004

(T. 14-23). Plaintiff then sought review by the Appeals Council (T. 8). The Appeals Council

denied Plaintiff’s request for review on September 15, 2004 (T. 3-7), thereby making the

decision of the ALJ the final decision of the Commissioner.

From this adverse decision, the Plaintiff appeals (Doc. #1, 9). This matter is before the

undersigned by consent of the parties (Doc. #2).

Relevant Law:

Our role on review is to determine whether the Commissioner's findings are supported

by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See Prosch v. Apfel, 201 F.3d 1010, 1012 (8th

Cir. 2000); see also Craig v. Apfel 212 F.3d 433, 435-436 (8th Cir. 2000). Substantial

evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support the

Commissioner's conclusion. See Haggard v. Apfel, 175 F.3d 591, 594 (8th Cir. 1999). In

considering whether existing evidence is substantial, we consider evidence that detracts from

the Commissioner's decision as well as evidence that supports it. See Prosch, 201 F.3d at 1012.

We may not reverse the Commissioner's decision merely because substantial evidence exists in

the record that would have supported a contrary outcome. See id.; Woolf v. Shalala, 3 F.3d

1210, 1213 (8th Cir. 1993). Even if this Court might have weighed the evidence differently, the

decision of the ALJ may not be reversed if there is enough evidence in the record to support the

decision. Browning v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 817, 822 (8th Cir. 1992). 

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The Commissioner has established, by regulation, a five-step sequential evaluation for

determining whether an individual is disabled.

The first step involves a determination of whether the claimant is involved in substantial

gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b). If the claimant is so involved, benefits are denied; if

not, the evaluation goes to the next step.

Step two involves a determination, based solely on the medical evidence, of whether

claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments. Id., § 416.920(c); see 20

C.F.R. § 416.926. If not, benefits are denied; if so, the evaluation proceeds to the next step.

The third step involves a determination, again based solely on the medical evidence, of

whether the severe impairment(s) meets or equals a listed impairment which is presumed to be

disabling. Id., § 416.920(d). If so, benefits are awarded; if not, the evaluation continues.

Step four involves a determination of whether the claimant has sufficient residual

functional capacity, despite the impairment(s), to perform past work. Id., § 416.920(e). If so,

benefits are denied; if not, the evaluation continues.

The fifth step involves a determination of whether the claimant is able to perform other

substantial and gainful work within the economy, given the claimant’s age, education and work

experience. Id., § 404.920(f). If so, benefits are denied; if not, benefits are awarded.

In addition, whenever adult claimants allege mental impairment, the application of a

special technique must be followed at each level of the administrative review process. See 20

C.F.R. § 416.920a(a).

The Commissioner is then charged with rating the degree of functional limitation, and

applying the technique to evaluate mental impairments. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920a(d). 

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Application of the technique must be documented by the Commissioner at the ALJ hearing and

Appeals Council levels. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920a(e). 

Discussion:

On appeal, Plaintiff makes the following arguments for reversal of the Commissioner’s

decision to deny his application for DIB benefits: the ALJ erred in relying on erroneous and

unsubstantiated vocational expert (hereinafter "VE") testimony; the ALJ erred by failing to

conduct proper analysis of Plaintiff’s nonexertional impairments; and, the ALJ erred by failing

to properly analyze Plaintiff’s alleged failure to followed prescribed treatment regimens (Doc.

#7, p. 2). The Commissioner argues that the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial

evidence and that Plaintiff’s arguments are without merit (Doc. #8).

The undersigned has thoroughly reviewed the administrative record and the briefs of the

parties. The record reflects that the ALJ found that the medical evidence established that

Plaintiff suffered from impairments which were severe, but did not meet the criteria of any listed

impairment (T. 17). The ALJ properly noted that the relevant time period for Plaintiff’s DIB

claim began with his alleged onset date of disability, December 31, 1996, and ends with the date

Plaintiff was last insured, December 31, 1998 (T. 15).

 Throughout his decision, the ALJ singularly considered some of Plaintiff’s alleged

impairments, with single sentences or paragraphs being devoted to the analysis of each

impairment (T. 16-23). In doing so, the ALJ discussed Plaintiff’s alleged impairment at issue,

in conjunction with Plaintiff’s treatment for same. However, he failed to consider the

combined effect of these, and other documented conditions. For instance, the ALJ mentioned

Plaintiff’s allegations depression (T. 16), post-traumatic stress disorder (T. 16), hyperlipidemia

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(T. 17), diabetes mellitus (T. 17), glaucoma (T. 17), fatigue (T. 17), muscle spasms (T. 17),

asthma (T. 17), and arthritis (T. 17) singularly, but never considered the combined effect of the

impairments he found to be severe. Nor did the ALJ consider the combination of Plaintiff’s

impairments in conjunction with the allegations of pain (T. 55, 139, 163, 182, 267) and

numbness (T. 46, 47, 55, 102, 117, 134, 136, 278). Likewise, the ALJ failed to acknowledge the

Plaintiff’s receipt of disability benefits from the Veteran’s Administration (hereinafter "VA")(T.

16-23, 278). The ALJ also failed to include the PRT analysis of Plaintiff’s alleged mental

impairments, depression and post-traumatic stress disorder, within the decision.

20 C.F.R. § 423 (d)(2)(B) provides:

In determining whether an individual's physical or mental impairment or

impairments are of a sufficient medical severity that such impairment or

impairments could be the basis of eligibility under this section, the

Commissioner of Social Security shall consider the combined effect of all of the

individual's impairments without regard to whether any such impairment, if

considered separately, would be of such severity. If the Commissioner of Social

Security does find a medically severe combination of impairments, the combined

impact of the impairments shall be considered throughout the disability

determination process.

The ALJ is required to consider all impairments he finds to be severe. Likewise, he is

required to consider the combined effect of all impairments he finds to be severe. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 1382c(a)(3)(F); See also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1523. 

Despite the ALJ’s solitary statements as to each alleged impairment, including the

impairments which represent severe impairments, he failed to otherwise consider the issue of

whether this severe combination of impairments, together with the alleged pain result in a

finding of disability. The apparent failure to consider these subjective allegations in relation to

what he deemed to be severe impairments necessarily leads to the conclusion that the ALJ failed

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in his duty to consider the combined effect of all of Plaintiff’s impairments. 

The ALJ must consider the impairments in combination and not fragmentize them in

evaluating their effects. Delrosa v. Sullivan, 922 F.2d 480, 484 (8th Cir. 1991), citing Johnson

v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 872 F.2d 810, 812 (8th Cir. 1989). In the present case,

therefore, the ALJ was obligated to consider the combined effect of [Plaintiff]'s physical

impairments. Id. at 484, citing Reinhart v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 733 F.2d 571,

573 (8th Cir. 1984) and Wroblewski v. Califano, 609 F.2d 908, 914 (8th Cir. 1979). As has

been noted, the Plaintiff alleged numerous impairments. Under these circumstances, the Social

Security Act requires the Commissioner to consider all impairments without regard to whether

any such impairment, if considered separately, would be of sufficient medical severity to be

disabling. Cunningham v. Apfel, 222 F.3d 496, 501 (8th Cir. 2000). 

A thorough review of the record also indicates that the ALJ failed to properly analyze

Plaintiff’s subjective allegations. In determining whether the ALJ properly disregarded

Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, such as pain, the Court must determine if the ALJ properly

followed the requirements of Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir. 1984)

(subsequent history omitted), in evaluating his pain and credibility. 

The absence of an objective medical basis which supports the degree of severity

of subjective complaints alleged is just one factor to be considered in evaluating

the credibility of the testimony and complaints. The adjudicator must give full

consideration to all of the evidence presented relating to subjective complaints,

including the claimant's prior work record, and observations by third parties and

treating and examining physicians relating to such matters as:

1. the claimant's daily activities;

2. the duration, frequency and intensity of the pain;

3. precipitating and aggravating factors;

4. dosage, effectiveness and side effects of medication;

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5. functional restrictions.

The adjudicator is not free to accept or reject the claimant's subjective complaints

solely on the basis of personal observations. Subjective complaints may be

discounted if there are inconsistencies in the evidence as a whole. 

Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d at 1322 (emphasis in original).

Thus, in addition to the requirement that the ALJ consider the Plaintiff’s allegations of

pain, he also has a statutory duty to assess the credibility of plaintiff. Nelson v. Sullivan, 966

F.2d 363, 366 (8th Cir. 1992). The ALJ may discredit subjective complaints of pain

inconsistent with the record as a whole. Ownbey v. Shalala, 5 F.3d 342, 344 (8th Cir. 1993). 

Further, in evaluating the Polaski factors, the ALJ must "discuss" those factors in the

hearing decision. Herbert v. Heckler, 783 F.2d 128, 131 (8th Cir.1986)(citing Polaski v.

Heckler, 751 F.2d 943, 9580-950 (8th Cir.1984)). 

"While the claimant has the burden of proving that the disability results from a medically

determinable physical or mental impairment, direct evidence of the cause and effect relationship

between the impairment and the degree of claimant's subjective complaints need not be

produced." Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d at 1322. 

To determine whether the ALJ properly applied the factors listed in Polaski, we must

determine whether the ALJ took into account all the relevant evidence, and whether that

evidence contradicted the claimant's own testimony so that the ALJ could discount the

testimony for lack of credibility. Benskin v. Bowen, 830 F.2d 878, 882 (8th Cir.1987). The

ALJ's credibility assessment must be based on substantial evidence. Rautio v. Bowen, 862 F.2d

176, 179 (8th Cir.1988). 

In this case, the ALJ made reference to Polaski (T. 16). However, he failed to recite the

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requirements of Polaski or to comply with the dictates of Polaski. In fact, following his

reference to the Polaski case, the ALJ changes the subject entirely and begins to recite the

Plaintiff’s medical history (T. 16). Without discussing any of the Polaski factors, the ALJ made

a specific determination of Plaintiff’s credibility, finding him less than credible (T. 14-23). 

With respect to Plaintiff’s subjective allegations and nonexertional limitations, the ALJ failed to

state his specific findings as to any of the Polaski factors (T. 14-23). 

 Implicit in the ALJ’s task of making a credibility determination is the requirement that

he "discuss" the Polaski factors. Herbert v. Heckler, 783 F.2d at 130 (the Polaski cases and the

Social Security Disability Reform Act of 1984 require that the Commissioner set forth the

inconsistencies in the objective medical evidence presented and discuss the factors set forth in

the Polaski settlement when making "credibility" determinations concerning claimant’s

subjective complaints of pain).

Here, the ALJ failed to meaningfully examine or discuss any of the Polaski factors. This

is error. The ALJ must discuss and point out the inconsistencies in the record, in order to make

a credibility determination. Cline v. Sullivan, 939 F.2d 560, 565 (8th Cir.1991) ("it is not

enough that inconsistencies may be said to exist, the ALJ must set forth the inconsistencies in

the evidence presented and discuss the factors set forth in Polaski when making credibility

determinations"); Herbert v. Heckler, 783 F.2d at 131 (even though evidence with respect to

Polaski factors is in the record, those factors must be discussed in the decision). The ALJ failed

to conduct a proper analysis of Plaintiff’s allegations and evidence pursuant to Polaski.

The parties are each reminded of their duty to fully and fairly develop the record upon

remand. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has stated numerous times

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that it is the ALJ who has the duty to fully and fairly develop the record, even if a plaintiff is

represented by counsel. Wilcutts v. Apfel, 143 F.3d 1134, 1137-38 (8th Cir.1998). The

Commissioner acknowledges that it is her " 'duty to develop the record fully and fairly, even if

... the claimant is represented by counsel.' " Boyd v. Sullivan, 960 F.2d 733, 736 (8th Cir.1992)

(quoting Warner v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 428, 431 (8th Cir.1983)). This is so because an

administrative hearing is not an adversarial proceeding. Henrie v. Dept. of Health & Human

Serv., 13 F.3d 359, 361 (10th Cir. 1993). "[T]he goals of the Secretary and the advocates

should be the same: that deserving claimants who apply for benefits receive justice."

Battles v. Shalala, 36 F.3d 43, 44 (8th Cir.1994). Upon remand, the records of Dr. Cook should

be obtained. 

Further, upon remand, the testimony of the witnesses, as well as any physician

opinion[s] should pertain to Plaintiff’s relevant time period for purposes of DIB. The relevant

time period was determined to be December 31, 1996, through December 31, 1998. Plaintiff

did not challenge the accuracy of these dates on appeal. Additionally, the Commissioner is

encouraged to produce a vocational expert who is prepared with the proper documentation to

support his/her testimony. 

Conclusion:

Accordingly, we conclude that the decision of the Commissioner denying benefits to the

Plaintiff is not supported by substantial evidence and should be reversed. In light of the

decision to remand this matter, all other issues raised by Plaintiff are rendered moot. This

matter should be remanded to the Commissioner for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

ENTERED this 31st day of October, 2005.

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/s/Bobby E. Shepherd 

Honorable Bobby E. Shepherd 

 United States Magistrate Judge 

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