Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_15-cv-05171/USCOURTS-cand-5_15-cv-05171-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans w/ Disabilities Act (ADA)

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Case No. 15-cv-05171 NC

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD C. HENNING,

Plaintiff,

v.

THE COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA,

Defendant.

Case No. 15-cv-05171 NC 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART THE 

COUNTY’S MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. No. 30

Plaintiff Richard C. Henning asserts disability access claims under the Americans 

With Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and under various related California state 

laws. Defendant County of Santa Clara moves for summary judgment, seeking to dismiss 

Henning’s lawsuit in its entirety. The Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART

the County’s motion. The Court finds that Henning shows a genuine dispute of material 

fact as to his core disability access claims under federal and state law. But the Court limits 

Henning’s claim to the time period in which he establishes standing to sue. 

As a general matter, the Court finds Henning has standing to bring his claims both 

for injunctive relief and monetary damages, but limits standing to sue to the period after 

April 29, 2014. His standing to sue varies depending on the elements of each claim. As to 

Henning’s federal claims under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act, the Court finds that 

Henning raises a genuine issue of material fact, but that any denial of meaningful access to 

VMC services would not have occurred until after September 30, 2015, the date on which 

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Henning first complained to Customer Service about his struggle punching numbers into 

his phone. In addition, the Court finds Henning raises a genuine dispute of material fact as 

to intentional discrimination, but limits Henning’s standing to sue to the period after 

October 20, 2015. Also, to the extent Henning’s federal claims survive, so too do his state 

law claims. He has standing to bring his state law claims as of September 30, 2015. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. Facts 

Henning is a mobility impaired man suffering from neurodegenerative chronic 

distal symmetric polyneuropathy. Dkt. No. 16 at 2. Id. Henning is a Santa Clara County

resident who visits Santa Clara Valley Medical Center (VMC) 2 to 5 times a month. Id. at 

2-3. VMC is a hospital owned “and/or” operated by the County. Id. at 3. As relevant 

here, Henning’s limitations due to his symptoms include “tingling; stinging pain in the 

hands and feet; weak muscles; chronic pain; numbness in the hands and feet; [and] 

hypersensitivity to pain in points on the body.” Id. at 5. Henning discussed his difficulty

using telephones, and that even with “punch-tone telephones,” his usage was limited 

because of his lack of agility and the pain he feels in constantly having to press keys. Dkt. 

No. 34 (Henning Decl.) at 2. He states that pressing more than 40 keys during a single 

phone call to VMC is not uncommon. Id. at 3. Henning provided 28 phone numbers 

within VMC that he “frequently” calls. Id. at 3-4. According to Henning, he first 

complained to the VMC’s customer service department about the phone system on June 9, 

2010. Id. at 4. Documents provided by the County show that complaint was not about 

Henning’s difficulty punching numbers into phones, it was about his inability to get an 

earlier appointment. Dkt. No. 38 at 1.

According to Henning, he complained about the phone system numerous times to 

his diabetic nurse, Karen Belveal, who gave Henning her direct line to provide him with 

more direct service. Henning Decl. at 4. On September 30, 2015, Henning again 

complained to Customer Service about his difficulties using the phone system. Id. at 5. 

Henning complained once more on October 20, 2015, specifying in his written complaint 

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that he had problems using the phone system because his “hands are disabled,” he could 

not press keys, and the wait time was too long. Dkt. No. 31-1 at 36 (wait time “often” over 

30 minutes). His proposed remedy in that complaint was “to have handicap lines of 

communications to get through to various departments of Valley Med!” Id. The Customer 

Service case review shows VMC personnel considered this complaint “to be a general 

concern between patient and patient access via Valley Communication to desired 

departments,” and that they would close the case. Id. at 34. According to Henning, the 

current system was not replaced with voice-activated dialing. Henning Decl. at 5.

Gregory Price, the Deputy Director of Ambulatory and Community Health Services 

for VMC manages the call center for primary care patients. Dkt. No. 32 at 1. According 

to Price, he oversaw an upgrade of VMC’s primary care phone system, which, as of July 

2016, included voice-activated dialing. Id. at 1-2. Price declared that “VMC has been 

taking steps to add this feature at least since September 2015.” Id. at 2.

B. Procedural History

Henning filed this case on November 11, 2015. Dkt. No. 1. The amended 

complaint alleges nine claims for relief under: (1) the California Unruh Civil Rights Act, 

Cal. Civ. Code § 51; (2) the California Disabled Persons Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 54; (3) Title 

II of the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131, et seq.; (4) Title III 

of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12181, et seq.; (5) § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973; (6) 

California Government Code § 11135; (7) the False Advertising Practices Act, Cal. Bus. & 

Prof. Code § 17500, et seq.; (8) California Unfair Business Practices Acts, Cal. Bus. & 

Prof. Code § 17200; and (9) declaratory relief. Dkt. No. 16. The County filed this motion 

for summary judgment on January 11, 2017. Dkt. No. 30. The parties attended a hearing 

on this motion on March 1, 2017. Both parties consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate 

judge. Dkt. Nos. 6, 10.

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II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment may be granted only when, drawing all inferences and 

resolving all doubts in favor of the nonmoving party, there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1863 (2014); 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A fact is material when, under 

governing substantive law, it could affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty 

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is genuine if “the 

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. 

Bald assertions that genuine issues of material fact exist are insufficient. Galen v. Cnty. of 

L.A., 477 F.3d 652, 658 (9th Cir. 2007).

The moving party bears the burden of identifying those portions of the pleadings, 

discovery, and affidavits that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving 

party must go beyond the pleadings, and, by its own affidavits or discovery, set forth 

specific facts showing that a genuine issue of fact exists for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); 

Barthelemy v. Air Lines Pilots Ass’n, 897 F.2d 999, 1004 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Steckl v. 

Motorola, Inc., 703 F.2d 392, 393 (9th Cir. 1983)). All justifiable inferences, however, 

must be drawn in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Tolan, 134 S. Ct. at 

1863 (citing Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255). 

III. DISCUSSION

The County seeks summary judgment on all of Henning’s claims. At the March 1, 

2017 hearing, Henning agreed to drop three of his claims. These claims are under (1) Title 

III of the ADA; (2) the False Advertising Practices Act, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500; 

and (3) California Unfair Business Practices Acts, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. This 

leaves six claims. Before addressing the merits, the Court will address the County’s sham 

affidavit argument against Henning’s January 25, 2017, declaration submitted in

opposition to summary judgment. Dkt. No. 34.

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A. Henning’s Declaration is Not A Sham Affidavit.

The County argues Henning’s declaration is a sham affidavit because it includes 

information he could not provide at his deposition and in written interrogatories. Dkt. No. 

36. Henning counters the declaration is not a sham affidavit because the County asked 

confusing questions in the deposition and in the interrogatories. Dkt. No. 43-2 at 6. In 

addition, Henning argues he lacked access to his phone records. Id.

A party may not “create an issue of fact by an affidavit contradicting his prior 

deposition testimony.” Kennedy v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 952 F.2d 262, 266 (9th Cir. 1991). 

“This sham affidavit rule prevents ‘a party who has been examined at length on deposition’ 

from ‘rais [ing] an issue of fact simply by submitting an affidavit contradicting his own 

prior testimony.’” Yeager v. Bowlin, 693 F.3d 1076, 1080 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting 

Kennedy, 952 F.2d at 266) (brackets in original). Yet because the Court may not make 

credibility determinations on summary judgment, the sham affidavit rule “should be 

applied with caution.” Yeager, 693 F.3d at 1080 (quoting Van Asdale v. Int’l Game Tech., 

577 F.3d 989, 998 (9th Cir. 2009)). “[I]nconsistency between a party’s deposition 

testimony and subsequent affidavit must be clear and unambiguous to justify striking the 

affidavit.” Van Asdale, 577 F.3d at 998-99. The non-moving party may “‘elaborate[e] 

upon, explain[] or clarify[] prior testimony elicited by opposing counsel on deposition

[and] minor inconsistencies that result from an honest discrepancy, a mistake, or newly 

discovered evidence afford no basis for excluding an opposition affidavit.’” Id. at 999 

(quoting Messick v. Horizon Indus., 62 F.3d 1227, 1231 (9th Cir. 1995)).

Here, Henning filed a declaration on January 25, 2017, detailing the phone numbers 

he would call at VMC and complaints he filed. Dkt. No. 34. The Court finds that his 

declaration did not contradict his deposition testimony or the interrogatories the County 

propounded. Indeed, the County could have filed a motion to compel if it objected to 

Henning’s answers to the interrogatories. See Dkt. No. 43-5. The Court notes the Ninth 

Circuit’s cautionary language regarding the application of the sham affidavit rule on 

summary judgment. Yeager, 693 F.3d at 1080. At the hearing and in its reply brief, the 

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County pointed out contradictions between the declaration and deposition. Yet such 

discrepancies are not so “clear and unambiguous” as to justify striking Henning’s 

declaration, and overall, Henning’s declaration served to elaborate on, explain, and clarify 

his deposition testimony. Van Asdale, 577 F.3d at 998-99. Thus, the Court finds that 

Henning’s declaration does not meet the Ninth Circuit’s standard as a sham affidavit.

B. Henning Has Standing to Request Injunctive Relief.

The County argues Henning lacks standing to request injunctive relief because his 

claims are moot, as the County already implemented voice-activated dialing at VMC. Dkt. 

No. 30 at 12.

The party invoking federal court jurisdiction has the burden of establishing 

standing. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). There are three elements 

of standing. Id. at 560. First, the plaintiff “must have suffered an ‘injury in fact’ . . . . 

Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained 

of . . . .’ Third, it must be ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will 

be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’” Id. at 560-61 (internal citations omitted). 

Relatedly, mootness has been described as “‘the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: 

The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation 

(standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness).’” Friends of the Earth, Inc. 

v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000) (quoting Arizonans for 

Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 68, n.22 (1997). As a private plaintiff may only 

bring a claim under the ADA for injunctive relief, the defendant’s “voluntary removal of 

alleged barriers prior to trial can have the effect of mooting a plaintiff’s ADA claim.” 

Oliver v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 654 F.3d 903, 905 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal citation 

omitted). Lastly, the burden of showing mootness lies with the party asserting the claim is 

mooted. Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 189 (internal citations and quotation marks 

omitted).

Here, the County does not contest that Henning originally had standing to pursue 

this case. Indeed, according to the declaration of VMC employee, Gregory Price, the 

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voice-activated dialing was not operational for the primary care phone system until July 

2016. Dkt. No. 32 at 1-2. However, the County argues the voice-activated dialing system 

is now operational, so all of Henning’s claims are moot. Dkt. No. 30 at 13. As of 

December 2016, Henning disputes that a voice-activated dialing system has been 

implemented at all, Henning Decl. at 5, and he pointed out that any voice-activated dialing 

would be limited to primary care and does not include the specialty clinics he utilizes. 

Dkt. No. 35 at 19. Thus, there is a dispute of fact between the parties regarding the 

implementation of a voice-activated dialing system, and it is not the place of the Court to 

resolve such a dispute on summary judgment. The County has not shouldered its “heavy 

burden” in persuading the Court that Henning’s claim for injunctive relief is moot. 

Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 189.

C. Henning Has Standing to Seek Monetary Damages Because He Alleged 

Evidence of Injury During the Limitations Period.

The County moves to dismiss Henning’s claims for monetary damages because he 

did not provide specific dates on which he was denied VMC services due to his difficulties 

with the phone system. Dkt. No. 30 at 14. Henning later filed a declaration providing 

phone numbers and dates that he complained about the phone system. Henning Decl. 

Those dates would put Henning’s claims within the applicable statute of limitations. 

In this case, there is a three-year statute of limitations for the Title II claim. Sharkey 

v. O’Neal, 778 F.3d 767, 773-75 (9th Cir. 2015) (applying Cal. Gov’t Code § 11135(b)’s 

three year statute of limitations —the most analogous California state law claim—to 

California Title II claims). A plaintiff may not sue for an injury that occurred outside of 

the limitations period. Pickern v. Holiday Quality Foods Inc., 293 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th 

Cir. 2002). This case is about the lack of voice-activated dialing, not about wait times or 

Henning having to speak to different people each time he calls VMC. Dkt. No. 16 at 2. 

Henning argued at the hearing that his claims are not time-barred and that the Court 

should find the statute of limitations began to run once Ms. Belveal began helping 

Henning. Henning did not provide a date on which Ms. Belveal began helping him. 

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Henning Decl. at 4. However, in his deposition, Henning described an April 29, 2014, 

telephone encounter note regarding his frustration calling clinic lines as having arisen from 

his difficulty punching in numbers on his phone. Dkt. No. 33-11; Dkt. No. 33-2 at 2. In 

this complaint, he complained he was unable to get through “due to long wait time, each 

time his phone batteries ran out.” Dkt. No. 33-2 at 2. It is unclear if Ms. Belveal knew of 

Henning’s difficulty punching the numbers into his telephone, and the note says nothing 

about that issue. Henning’s testimony suggests she knew, and this is the first date on 

which the Court has a record of Henning having complained to anyone about this issue.

On the County’s summary judgment motion, the Court must draw all justifiable inferences 

in the light most favorable to Henning. Tolan, 134 S. Ct. at 1863. Thus, the Court finds 

the earliest date that Henning has shown he had standing to file suit against the County was 

April 29, 2014. This is within the three year statute of limitations period because Henning 

filed his complaint in November 2015. 

This does not mean Henning had any damages as of April 2014, as he has not 

shown the County knew of his struggle or that he was denied any access to VMC services. 

Furthermore, it is important to note that the first time the Court has any testimony that

Henning filed a complaint to Customer Service regarding his issues punching numbers into 

the phone was on September 30, 2015.12 Dkt. No. 33-11 at 29-30. Further, the first time 

the Court has documentary evidence in the form of a written complaint of Henning having 

notified VMC of his difficulty using the phone system due to his disability is October 20, 

2015. Dkt. No. 33-7 at 2-4.

 

1 See Dkt. No. 33-13 at 2 (February 23, 2011 review of complaint filed by Henning 

regarding a wait time on hold of “over an hour”); Dkt. No. 33-14 (April 14, 2011 review of 

complaint by Henning regarding not getting phone calls returned).

2 The Court notes that the October 1, 2015, case review of Henning’s complaint said 

nothing about his difficulties punching numbers into his phone. Dkt. No. 31-1 at 30-31. 

However, for purposes of summary judgment, the Court accepts Henning’s testimony as 

true.

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D. Henning Raised a Dispute of Material Fact as to Whether He Was Denied 

Meaningful Access to VMC Services For After September 30, 2015.

The parties dispute whether Henning was denied meaningful access to VMC 

facilities due to his difficulties using the phone system.

1. Legal Standard

Title II of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act, § 504 claims are governed by the same 

test. Duvall v. Cty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1135 (9th Cir. 2001), as amended on denial 

of reh’g (Oct. 11, 2001). To show a public program or service violates Title II of the ADA

or § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act “a plaintiff must show: (1) he is a ‘qualified individual 

with a disability’; (2) he was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of 

a public entity’s services, programs or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by 

the public entity; and (3) such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by 

reason of his disability.” Weinreich v. Los Angeles Cty. Metro. Transp. Auth., 114 F.3d 

976, 978 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12132) (emphasis omitted). For claims 

under § 504, there is an additional element, that the program receives federal financial 

assistance. Id. The County contests that it satisfies the second and third element of this 

test.3 Dkt. No. 30 at 17. 

The prohibition against discrimination is “understood as a requirement to provide 

‘meaningful access.’” Lonberg v. City of Riverside, 571 F.3d 846, 851 (9th Cir. 2009). An 

organization receiving “federal funds violates § 504 if it denies a qualified individual with 

a disability a reasonable accommodation that the individual needs in order to enjoy 

meaningful access to the benefits of public services.” Mark H. v. Hamamoto, 620 F.3d 

1090, 1097 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 301-02 & n. 21 

(1985). The “meaningful access” requirement also applies under Title II. K.M. ex rel. 

Bright v. Tustin Unified Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 1088, 1102 (9th Cir. 2013). To determine 

what “meaningful access” means in a given circumstance, the Court looks to relevant 

regulations interpreting Title II. Id. Title II regulations at 28 C.F.R. part 35, as to 

 

3 The County has neither admitted nor denied that VMC receives federal funding, and the 

Court notes that the issue was not raised in the motion for summary judgment.

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“program accessibility, existing facilities, and communications” are consistent with those 

under the Rehabilitation Act, § 504 at 28 C.F.R. part 39. Id. at 1099. Thus the analysis of 

the County’s compliance with those regulations is applicable under the ADA and § 504.

Neither party provided the Court with much in the way of regulations to look to. 

The County cited an inapposite regulation, and the Court here looks to 28 C.F.R. § 35.160 

regarding communications. Subsection (a)(1) requires a public entity to “take appropriate 

steps to ensure that communications with . . . members of the public . . . with disabilities 

are as effective as communications with others.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.160(a)(1). Subsection (b) 

provides that: 

(1) A public entity shall furnish appropriate auxiliary aids and 

services where necessary to afford individuals with disabilities, 

including . . . members of the public, an equal opportunity to 

participate in, and enjoy the benefits of, a service, program, or 

activity of a public entity.

(2) The type of auxiliary aid or service necessary to ensure 

effective communication will vary in accordance with the 

method of communication used by the individual; the nature, 

length, and complexity of the communication involved; and the 

context in which the communication is taking place. In 

determining what types of auxiliary aids and services are 

necessary, a public entity shall give primary consideration to the 

requests of individuals with disabilities.

28 C.F.R. § 35.160(b). The definition of “auxiliary aid” is illustrative, not exhaustive. 28 

C.F.R. § 35.104 (“Auxiliary aids and services includes . . . and . . . Other similar services 

and actions.”). Though the examples provided in the definition specify aids for people 

who are “deaf or hard of hearing” and those who are “blind or have low vision,” the 

language of § 35.104, and § 35.160(b) shows auxiliary aids should vary according to the 

disabled person’s needs. The determination of whether a defendant provided the plaintiff 

“with ‘meaningful access’ or an equal opportunity to gain the same benefit as her 

nondisabled peers is a fact intensive inquiry.” Poway Unified Sch. Dist. v. K.C. ex rel. 

Cheng, No. 10-cv-897 GPC DHB, 2014 WL 129086, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2014).

2. Application to Henning’s Claims

Henning has not shown he was denied meaningful access to VMC’s services while 

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Ms. Belveal assisted him. As Henning admitted, Ms. Belveal helped him “in making 

appointments and refilling prescriptions.” Dkt. No. 35 at 26. He received better access to 

VMC than his non-disabled peer who called VMC and would be put on hold because he 

had his nurse. Even if the County did not order Ms. Belveal to help Henning, the fact 

remains that while she helped him, until December 2015 or January 2016, he was not 

denied “an equal opportunity to participate in, and enjoy the benefits of” VMC. 28 C.F.R. 

§ 35.160(b)(1), see Dkt. No. 33-11 at 12. 

Furthermore, during the time Ms. Belveal helped Henning, there is no evidence 

anyone—other than possibly Ms. Belveal—knew of his struggle with punching numbers 

into his telephone. Thus, while it is true that VMC was required to “give primary 

consideration to the requests of individuals with disabilities,” when determining what types 

of auxiliary aids and services are required, 28 C.F.R. § 35.160(b)(2), as far as Henning 

declared and the documentary evidence provides, he never actually requested a voiceactivated dialing system be implemented. See e.g., Dkt. No. 31-1 at 36 (October 20, 2015, 

customer service complaint requesting a specific telephone line for disabled people). He 

never testified that he requested voice-activated dialing in his deposition. 

 The deposition transcript is rife with testimony documenting instances in which 

Henning did speak over the phone with VMC personnel from 2014 to early 2015. Dkt. 

No. 33-11. In addition, in the several months before his May 26, 2016, deposition, 

Henning volunteered that he had been given “an inside number” for filling his 

prescriptions. Dkt. No. 33-11 at 10-11. Thus, while Ms. Belveal assisted Henning, he was 

not “excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of” VMC’s services, nor was he 

“otherwise discriminated against by” VMC because of his disability. Weinreich, 114 F.3d 

at 978.

The earliest VMC knew of Henning’s struggle using the telephone system was 

September 30, 2015. This was the date the Court first has evidence of Henning 

complaining to VMC Customer Service about his difficulty punching in numbers. 

Henning presented no evidence that he complained about this specific issue before, though 

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he had complained about wait times. September 30, 2015, is the earliest date on which 

Henning raised a dispute of material fact sufficient to support a claim for disability 

discrimination against the County. Thus, the Court DENIES summary judgment against 

Henning on his ADA and § 504 claims, but limits this claim to the period after September 

30, 2015. 

The Court cautions against reading this holding too broadly. For example, there is a 

question of fact as to when Ms. Belveal stopped helping Henning make phone calls. There 

is also a question as to what voice-activated dialing features the County put into effect, and 

whether the changes made were sufficient under the ADA and § 504’s implementing 

regulations. The answers to these questions will influence the contours of Henning’s 

claims for the alleged denial of meaningful access. It is not for the Court to define these 

contours on summary judgment, as they would necessarily require fact-finding. 

E. Monetary Damages May Be Available to Henning.

The parties dispute whether Henning can show the County intentionally 

discriminated against him because such a showing would allow Henning to seek monetary 

damages. See Dkt. Nos. 30 at 23-24, 35 at 28-31.

The same remedies are available for violations of Title II and § 504. Lovell v. 

Chandler, 303 F.3d 1039, 1056 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12133). “To recover 

monetary damages under Title II of the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must

prove intentional discrimination on the part of the defendant.” Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1138. 

The deliberate indifference standard applies to prove intentional discrimination. Id. 

Proving “[d]eliberate indifference requires both knowledge that a harm to a federally 

protected right is substantially likely, and a failure to act upon that likelihood.” Id. at 1139 

(citation omitted). The first element requires the public entity have notice that an 

accommodation is required. Lovell, 303 F.3d at 1056 (citing Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1139). 

The second element is met “if the entity’s ‘failure to act [is] a result of conduct that is more 

than negligent, and involves an element of deliberateness.’ Under the second element, ‘a 

public entity does not ‘act’ by proffering just any accommodation: it must consider the 

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particular individual’s need when conducting its investigation into what accommodations 

are reasonable.’” Lovell, 303 F.3d at 1056 (quoting Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1139). 

As to the first element, the Court finds VMC was unaware that an accommodation 

might be required until Henning’s complaint of September 30, 2015. While it is true that 

Ms. Belveal may have known of Henning’s struggle with punching numbers into his 

phone, and may have helped him as early as April 2014, there is no indication VMC was 

made of aware of Henning’s struggle. Complaints about the lack of voice-activated dialing 

were not stated in the earlier doctor’s notes or telephone call notes in the record. To the 

contrary, as discussed above, those earlier complaints were about wait times while on hold

or Henning having to wait too long to see a doctor.

Regarding the second element, the evidence does show that Henning specifically 

complained about his difficulty punching numbers into his phone on October 20, 2015. 

Dkt. No. 31-1 at 36. Yet the Customer Service complaint review does not show that any 

effort to accommodate him was made. Id. at 34. Even though Henning did not request 

voice-activated dialing, on that date, the County was on notice of Henning’s specific 

communication issue and opted to close the case as a “general concern between patient and 

patient access.” Id. The type of language in this review raises the question of whether 

Customer Service simply opted not to do anything about Henning’s complaint or 

accommodate his needs. Lovell, 303 F.3d at 1056. The Court cannot guess. Thus, as of 

October 20, 2015, for purposes of summary judgment, the County met both elements of 

the deliberate indifference test, opening itself up to a claim for monetary damages.

F. Henning’s Remaining Claims Survive Summary Judgment. 

Henning’s complaint includes claims under the Unruh Civil Rights Act, California 

Disabled Persons Act, and California Government Code § 11135, in addition to a claim for 

declaratory relief. Dkt. No. 16. The parties agree that Henning’s California law claims are 

dependent on the viability of his ADA and § 504 claims. See Dkt. Nos. 30 at 24-26, 35 at 

31-32. A violation of an individual’s rights under the ADA is also a violation of the Unruh 

Civil Rights Act. Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f). Similarly, a violation of the ADA is a violation 

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of the California Disabled Persons Act. Cal. Civ. Code § 54(c); see also Moeller v. Taco 

Bell Corp., 816 F. Supp. 2d 831, 848 (N.D. Cal. 2011). As to the Government Code § 

11135 claim, the statute is “coextensive with the ADA because it incorporates the 

protections and prohibitions of the ADA and its implementing regulations,” and “is 

identical to the Rehabilitation Act except that the entity must receive State financial 

assistance rather than Federal financial assistance.” Bassilios v. City of Torrance, CA, 166 

F. Supp. 3d 1061, 1084 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (citing Cal. Gov’t Code § 11135(b) and quoting

D.K. ex rel. G.M. v. Solano Cty. Office of Educ., 667 F. Supp. 2d 1184, 1191 (E.D. Cal. 

2009). If a public entity violates the ADA or § 504, it also violates § 11135 if the entity 

receives state funding. Id. There is no dispute as to whether VMC receives state funding, 

and the County has neither admitted nor denied that the state helps fund VMC.

Lastly, the claim for declaratory relief is dependent on the viability of Henning’s 

federal claims. Fiedler v. Clark, 714 F.2d 77, 79 (9th Cir. 1983); Gov’t Employees Ins. 

Co. v. Dizol, 133 F.3d 1220, 1222 (9th Cir. 1998). Because the federal claims survive, so 

too does the claim for declaratory relief. 

Thus, because the Court found a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the 

County violated his rights under the ADA and § 504, the Court DENIES summary 

judgment as to the remaining claims to the extent it denied summary judgment on the 

federal claims. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

IV. CONCLUSION

Because the Court finds Henning raised a genuine dispute of material fact as to his 

ADA, § 504, and related state law claims, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN 

PART the County’s motion for summary judgment, subject to limitations. The Court 

grants summary judgment for the County as to the three dropped claims. The Court limits 

Henning’s claims as follows: 

1. Henning has standing sue the County on all of his remaining claims for 

monetary damages after April 29, 2014, the date the Court first has record of his 

complaining to Ms. Belveal about his struggle punching numbers into his phone.

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2. Henning may not sue for violations of his rights under the ADA and § 504 

that occurred before September 30, 2015, the date he first complained to Customer Service 

about his difficulties punching numbers into his phone. 

3. Henning may not sue the County for intentional discrimination for events 

occurring before October 20, 2015, the date on which Henning first raised a dispute of 

material fact as to whether the County treated him with deliberate indifference.

4. Henning may sue for violations of his rights under the Unruh Civil Rights 

Act, California Disabled Persons Act, and California Government Code § 11135, and for

declaratory relief, but may not allege that such violations occurred before September 30, 

2015, the date he first complained to Customer Service about his difficulties punching 

numbers into his phone. 

These limitations are discussed in full above. The Court also finds Henning has 

standing to request injunctive relief and monetary damages.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 17, 2017 _____________________________________

NATHANAEL M. COUSINS

United States Magistrate Judge

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