Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-95-01075/USCOURTS-ca10-95-01075-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

TAMMIE JOHNSON, ELIZABETH YORK, JUDY ) 

O'CONNOR, PATRICIA CAUDILL, ) 

) 

PUrlntUErAppellees, ) 

) 

~ ) 

) 

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS FOR THE ) 

COUNTY OF FREMONT; BOB CHEEK, in his ) 

official capacity, ) 

) 

Defendants. ) 

) 

CATHY GREER, THE LAW FIRM OF HALL & ) 

EVANS, ) 

) 

Movants-Appellants. ) 

. FILED 

Un1ted States Court or Appeals Tentb Circ:uit 

JUN -4 1996 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

No. 95-1075 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. Nos. 93-K-2465, 93-K-2466, 93-K-2467 and 93-K-2468) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Richard C. LaFond, Terry Clausen, and Arnold M. Woods, ofLaFond & Clausen, L.L.C., Denver, 

Colorado, for PlaintUErAppellees. 

Cathy H. Greer, Alan Epstein, and Josh Marks, ofHall & Evans, L.L.C., Denver, Colorado, for 

Movants-Appellants. 

Before BRORBY and BARRETI, Circuit Judges, and BRIMMER, • District Judge. 

• The Honorable Clarence A Brimmer, United States District Judge for the District of Wyoming, sitting 

by designation. 

Appellate Case: 95-1075 Document: 01019276461 Date Filed: 06/04/1996 Page: 1 
BRORBY, Circuit Judge. 

Attorney Cathy Greer and the law firm of Hall & Evans appeal from an order finding that 

Attorney Greer violated the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct by representing defendant Bob 

Cheek in his official capacity only. We affirm, although we apply a different analysis than the district 

court. 1 

L Factual & Procedural Background 

Mr. Cheek was at all relevant times sheriff of Fremont County, Colorado. While Mr. Cheek 

was serving as sheriff: four female employees of the Fremont County Sheriff's Department 

commenced actions against the Board of County Commissioners for the County of Fremont, claiming 

Mr. Cheek had sexually harassed them in violation of Title Vll of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The 

board answered, stating it had no legal responSibility for actions of the sheriff's department. 

Plaintiffs filed amended complaints adding Mr. Cheek as a defendant to their Title Vll claims. 

The caption listed Mr. Cheek as a defendant in his official capacity. Attorney Greer answered on 

behalf of Mr. Cheek in his official capacity as sheriff ofFremont County. On June 17, 1994, plaintiffs 

filed second amended complaints adding a claim under 42 U.S. C. § 1983, and naming Mr. Cheek as 

a defendant in both his official and individual capacities. These complaints alleged that Mr. Cheek's 

1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously to grant the 

parties' request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

2 

Appellate Case: 95-1075 Document: 01019276461 Date Filed: 06/04/1996 Page: 2 
actions were taken "both inside and outside the scope ofhis authority." Mr. Cheek filed answers in 

his official capacity, asserting as a defense that "[t]he actions complained ofby plaintifl[s] were not 

taken pursuant to any official custom[,] policy or practice." 

On July 29, 1994, Mr. Cheek in his individual capacity and prose, moved for an extension 

of time to answer because he was seeking declaratory relief from state court to determine whether 

the Board of County Commissioners would provide counsel to represent him in his individual 

capacity. The district court granted the extension. 

On September 16, 1994, because the state court had not yet ruled, Mr. Cheek moved for a 

second extension of time to file an answer in his individual capacity. The district court denied the 

motion and ordered Attorney Greer to "show cause in writing ... why all pleadings filed on behalf of 

Mr. Cheek should not be stricken and under what legal authority [she] presumes to enter a limited 

appearance on behalf of a party of record." 

Attorney Greer filed a response. She explained that there is a distinction between individual 

and official capacity suits in that in an official capacity suit, the real party in interest is the 

governmental entity whereas in an individual capacity suit, liability is sought to be imposed against 

the individual governmental officer. She stated there are two separate defendants -- the government 

entity that employs Mr. Cheek (Mr. Cheek in his official capacity), and Mr. Cheek in his individual 

capacity. Further, as of January 1995, a successor to Mr. Cheek would be elected who would then 

hold the office of sheriff and be represented by counsel 

3 

Appellate Case: 95-1075 Document: 01019276461 Date Filed: 06/04/1996 Page: 3 
On October 3, 1994, Mr. Cheek, appearing pro se, answered the second amended complaints 

in his individual capacity. He adopted all of the assertions in the answer filed by Attorney Greer, and 

added the additional affirmative defense of qualified immunity with respect to the claim for relief 

under§ 1983.2 

On October 19, 1994, Attorneys Theodore Halaby and Robert Liechty attempted to enter 

appearances for Mr. Cheek in his individual capacity. At the hearing held that day, the district court 

struck all entries of appearances, including Attorney Greer's, and gave Mr. Cheek an additional thirty 

days to answer the second amended complaint, either pro se or with an attorney or attorneys 

representing him in both his capacities. 

In a subsequently issued published decision, the district court stated that, although a person 

may be sued in more than one capacity, that did not mean an attorney may limit his or her appearance 

to only one of those capacities. Johnson v. Board of County Comm'rs, 868 F. Supp. 1226, 1230 (D. 

Colo. 1994). Reasoning that a party with an attorney of record may appear only through that 

attorney, the district court determined that by entering an appearance on behalf of Mr. Cheek in his 

official capacity, Attorney Greer precluded him from appearing pro se or from retaining other counsel 

for the individual capacity claims. /d. at 1230. The court concluded that by representing Mr. Cheek 

only in his official capacity, Attorney Greer left him exposed on the claims against him in his 

individual capacity and therefore violated Colorado Rules ofProfessional Conduct, Rule 1.1, which 

2 Mr. Cheek later admitted to the district court that the documents he filed in his individual capacity and 

prose, although signed by him, were ghostwritten by the Fremont county attorney. 

4 

Appellate Case: 95-1075 Document: 01019276461 Date Filed: 06/04/1996 Page: 4 
' requires that a lawyer "provide competent representation to a client." /d. at 1231. While the court 

recognized that Colorado Rules ofProfessional Conduct, Rule 1.2(c) permits a lawyer to "limit the 

objectives of the representation if the client consents after consultation," it noted a client may not be 

asked to agree to representation so limited in scope as to violate Rule 1.1. /d. 

In reaching its conclusion Attorney Greer had not satisfied her obligations under the Colorado 

Rules of Professional Conduct, the district court also made the following findings: 

It is not clear who has requested Greer to represent Cheek. The record is silent on 

this matter. There is no indication that Cheek, whom Greer ostensibly represents, has 

demanded that his representation be bifurcated .... 

It is clear, however, that Greer has been instructed by someone not appearing 

before the court to represent Cheek only insofar as he holds the official title of Sheriff 

of Fremont County .... 

Whether Greer consulted with Cheek to obtain his consent to such limited 

representation is not apparent on the information of record. 

/d. at 1230-31.3 

The attorneys filed a petition for writ of mandamus challenging the order. We denied the 

petition. Cheekv. Kane, No. 94-1524 (lOth Cir. Nov. 29, 1994). The parties settled the underlying 

action, and the cases were dismissed with prejudice. The attorneys then filed this appeal We ordered 

the parties in this appeal to submit briefs addressing whether the appeal should be dismissed as moot 

3 The court was also critical of the practice of attorneys ghostwriting for prose litigants. However, 

Attorney Greer did not engage in that conduct, and this aspect of the court's ruling is not at issue in this appeal. 

5 

Appellate Case: 95-1075 Document: 01019276461 Date Filed: 06/04/1996 Page: 5 
based on the settlement of the underlying action. 

ll. Analysis 

A. Mootness 

We will dismiss an appeal as moot if it is impossible for this court to grant the appellant any 

effectualreliefwhatsoever. Jnre Material Witness Wa"ant Nichols, 77 F.3d 1277, 1279 (lOth Cir. 

1996). 

We held in G.J.B. & Assocs., Inc. v. Singleton, 913 F.2d 824, 827 (lOth Cir. 1990), that a 

sanctions order against an attorney currently of record is not immediately appealable as a final 

judgment where the underlying controversy is unresolved. Further, such an order is not appealable 

under the collateral order exception to the final judgment rule because it could be appealed by the 

attorney at the conclusion of the underlying case, even if the parties settle or elect not to appeal. !d. 

at 827-29. 

In United States v. Dickstein, 971 F.2d 446 (lOth Cir. 1992), we addressed whether an 

attorney who no longer was involved in the underlying action because his pro hac vice status had been 

revoked could take an immediate appeal from the revocation order, even though the underlying case 

had not been concluded. We held the attorney could not because the order was not a final judgment. 

ld at 448. Further, because the attorney was seeking an appeal only to vindicate his reputation, 

rather than to be allowed to continue representing his client, we saw no reason why the order could 

not effectively be reviewed on appeal from the final judgment. !d. at 451. Even the former client's 

6 

0 

Appellate Case: 95-1075 Document: 01019276461 Date Filed: 06/04/1996 Page: 6 
acquittal would not render the revocation order unreviewable at the conclusion of the underlying 

case. ld Thus, the order was not appealable under the collateral order exception to the final 

judgment rule. ld 

These cases establish that settlement of an underlying case does not preclude appellate review 

of an order disquaJUying an attorney from further representation insofar as that order rests on grounds 

that could harm his or her professional reputation. 4 We therefore conclude the appeal is not moot 

insofar as the district court's order found that Attorney Greer had violated the Colorado Rules of 

Professional Conduct. See Kirkland v. National Mortgage Network, Inc., 884 F.2d 1367, 1370 (11th 

Cir. 1989) (holding challenge to order disqualifying attorney was not moot, despite dismissal of 

underlying case, where order's 11brand of disqualification .. on grounds of dishonesty and bad faith 

could hang over attorney's name and career for years). That the underlying cases were dismissed 

pursuant to a stipulation for dismissal with prejudice has no effect on the attorneys' right to appeal 

becausetheywerenotpartiestothe stipulation. Cf Mockv. T.G. & Y. Stores Co., 971 F.2d 522, 526 

(lOth Cir. 1992). 

B. Merits 

Attorney Greer contends separate legal representation is required where there are claims 

against a public official in both his official and individual capacities that create a potential for 

conflicting defenses. 

4 An attorney would lack standing to challenge the order insofar as it affected only his or her client's 

rights. Uselton v. Commercial Lovelace Motor Freight, Inc., 9 F.3d 849, 854 (lOth Cir. 1993). 

7 

Appellate Case: 95-1075 Document: 01019276461 Date Filed: 06/04/1996 Page: 7 
When a governmental official is sued in his official and individual capacities for acts performed 

in each capacity, those acts are 11treated as the transactions of two different legal personages. 11 

Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 543 n.6 (1986) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Thus, a person sued in his official capacity has no stake, as an individual, in the outcome 

of the litigation. Id at 543-44. Personal or individual capacity suits 11Seek to impose personal liability 

upon a government official for actions he takes under color of state law, 11 while an official capacity 

suit is 11 only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent. 11 

Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted). 11As long as the 

government entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all 

respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity, 11 and not as a suit against the 

official personally, 11for the real party in interest is the entity. 11 /d at 166. 

The distinctions between suits against an official in his individual and official capacities give 

rise to differing and potentially conflicting defenses. Most notably, the government entity could 

defend itselfby asserting that the official whose conduct is in question acted in a manner contrary to 

the policy or custom of the entity. See id at 166. Also, an individual capacity defendant could assert 

the defense of qualified immunity. See Dunton v. County of Suffolk, 729 F.2d 903, 907 (2d Cir.) 

(explaining potential conflicts between defenses of municipality and its employees in § 1983 action). 

Given the potential conflict between the defenses available to a government official sued in 

his individual and official capacities, we have admonished that separate representation for the official 

in his two capacities is a 11wise precaution. 11 Medina v. Housing Auth. of San Miguel County, No. 

8 

Appellate Case: 95-1075 Document: 01019276461 Date Filed: 06/04/1996 Page: 8 
• 

• 91-2094, 1992 WL 218990 at *3 (lOth Cir. Sep. 4, 1992) (unpublished order and judgment). 

Ahhough we did not hold that the potential for conflict mandates separate representation, we did hold 

it was not error to allow separate representation. ld at *4. While some courts have held separate 

representation is required in the face of the potential conflict, see, e.g., Ricciuti v. New York City 

Transit Auth, 196 F. Supp. 84, 88 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Shadid v. Jackson, 521 F. Supp. 87, 90 (E.D. 

Tex. 1981), we decline to adopt a per se rule. We hold that when a potential conflict exists because 

of the different defenses available to a government official sued in his official and individual 

capacities, it is permissible, but not required, for the official to have separate counsel for his two 

capacities. See Silva v. Witschen, 19 F.3d 725, 732 (1st Cir. 1994); Richmond Hilton Assocs. v. City 

of Richmond, 690 F.2d 1086, 1089 (4th Cir. 1982); Clay v. Doherty, 608 F. Supp. 295, 303 (N.D. 

ill. 1985). Obviously, if the potential conflict matures into an actual material conflict, separate 

representation would be required. See Dunton, 729 F.2d at 907-08; Clay, 608 F. Supp. at 303; 

Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1. 7. 

Though separate representation is permisst'ble, an attorney may not undertake only the official 

capacity representation at his or her sole convenience. Under Colorado Rules of Professional 

Conduct, Rule 1.2( c), a lawyer may limit the objectives of her representation only "if the client 

consents after consuhation." In the case where an attorney has been hired to represent a government 

official in only his official capacity in a suit where the official is also exposed to liability in his 

individual capacity but has no representation in that capacity, this rule serves an important function. 

When adhered to properly, the rule ensures the defendant is adequately informed about the workings 

of 42 U.S. C. § 1983 and the potential conflict between the defenses he may have in his separate 

9 

Appellate Case: 95-1075 Document: 01019276461 Date Filed: 06/04/1996 Page: 9 
• 

• capacities. Above all else, the attorney and the district court should ensure the official is not under 

the impression that the official capacity representation will automatically protect his individual 

interests sufficiently. Courts have recognized a "need for sensitivity" to the potential for conflict in 

this area, and have advised that "[t]he bar should be aware of potential ethical violations and possible 

malpractice claims." Gordon v. Norman, 788 F.2d 1194, 1199 n.5 (6th Cir. 1986) (quotation 

omitted). In the service of these interests, we embrace the Second Circuit's procedure whereby 

counsel notifies the district court and the government defendant of the potential conflict, the district 

court determines whether the government defendant fully understands the potential conflict, and the 

government defendant is permitted to choose joint representation. See Kaunitz v. Slaatten, 901 

F. Supp. 650, 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). In addition, the defendant should be told it is advisable that he 

or she obtain independent counsel on the individual capacity claim We reinforce that, as with many 

issues relating to the relationship between attorney and client, the crucial element is adequate 

communication. 

In the instant case, the district court found: 

It is not clear who has requested Greer to represent Cheek. The record is silent on 

this matter. There is no indication that Cheek, whom Greer ostenSibly represents, has 

demanded that his representation be bifurcated .... 

It is clear, however, that Greer has been instructed by someone not appearing 

before the court to represent Cheek only insofar as holds the official title of Sheriff 

of Fremont County .... 

Whether Greer consulted with Cheek to obtain his consent to such limited 

representation is not apparent on the information of record. 

10 

Appellate Case: 95-1075 Document: 01019276461 Date Filed: 06/04/1996 Page: 10 
Johnson, 868 F. Supp. at 1230-31. 

Our review of the record confirms these observations. The district court concluded Attorney 

Greer "left Cheek exposed on those claims which can be sustained against him in his individual 

capacity." ld at 1231. Given that Attorney Greer has not demonstrated that she consulted with Mr. 

Cheek about the mechanics of§ 1983 and the exposure he was facing in his individual capacity or 

brought the matter to the district court's attention, we are not prepared to hold the district court erred 

in its finding Attorney Greer failed to satisfy her obligations to Mr. Cheek. 

The decision of the district court is AFFIRMED, but the reasoning and analysis in Johnson, 

868 F. Supp. 1226, are disapproved to the extent they conflict with our opinion. 

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