Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00575/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00575-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALEJANDRO ALVE, Civil No. 14cv575-BEN (JLB)

Petitioner,

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION RE

MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

[ECF No. 17]

v.

W.L. MONTGOMERY, Warden,

Respondent.

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Alejandro Alve (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has

filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (“Petition”)

challenging the Board of Parole Hearing’s December 18, 2013 decision denying him

parole. Petitioner contends federal habeas relief is proper because (1) the California 1

Court of Appeal’s “decision to deny Petitioner’s Petition was without any basis in

fact; not supported by any evidence and in violation of the First Amendment (U.S.

Const.)” and “was so arbitrary and capricious as to constitute an Eighth Amendment

violation;” (2) the Superior Court of California’s “deference to the Board’s judgment

The Petition does not challenge the underlying criminal judgment that resulted in Petitioner’s 1

incarceration.

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without examining each of the Board’s reasons for denying parole to evaluate the

reasonableness of the Board’s decision necessarily violated Petitioner’s protected

‘Liberty Interest’ under state law;” and (3) “the Board’s decision denying parole was

an unreasonable application of California’s ‘some evidence’ requirement and was

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented.” (ECF No. 1 at 7.) Respondent W.L. Montgomery, acting Warden of

Calipatria State Prison (“Respondent”), moves to dismiss the Petition. (ECF No. 17.) 

Respondent argues the Petition must be dismissed because it does not set forth a

cognizable claim for federal habeas corpus relief. (Id. at 3.) 

The undersigned has reviewed the Petition (ECF Nos. 1 through 1-6),

Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 17), and Petitioner’s Opposition to the

Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 20). Based on the pleadings and for the reasons set

forth below, the undersigned RECOMMENDS Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss be

GRANTED and the Petition be DISMISSED with prejudice.

II. PERTINENT BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS

The following facts are drawn in large part from the Superior Court of

California’s Order denying Petitioner’s state petition for writ of habeas corpus, which

Petitioner attached to the Petition in this case. (ECF No. 1-1 at 21-25.)

In 1976, Petitioner was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and

simple assault, and was sentenced to death. (Id. at 21.) Petitioner’s first appeal

resulted in reduction of the death sentence to a sentence of life in prison, and a retrial

with respect to his sanity. (Id.) A second jury found petitioner was sane at the time

of the commission of each of the offenses. That judgment was affirmed on appeal. 

(Id.)

Petitioner’s minimum eligible parole date was November 8, 1982, and on

December 18, 2012, a subsequent parole consideration hearing was conducted at the

Calipatria State Prison. (Id.) At the conclusion of the hearing, Petitioner was denied

parole for ten years because the Board of Parole Hearings found Petitioner was not

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suitable and would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society or a threat to public

safety if released from prison. (Id.) One basis, among many, for the denial was that

Petitioner had not developed a written “relapse prevention plan” despite having been

advised previously that one would be required. (ECF No. 1-5 at 14, and 1-6 at 26.)

Petitioner challenged this decision in a habeas petition filed on April 24, 2013,

in the Superior Court of California, which denied relief in a reasoned memorandum

on June 12, 2013. (ECF No. 1-1 at 21-25.) Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the

California Court of Appeal challenging the same Board decision. (ECF No. 1-1 at

27-28.) The Court of Appeal denied relief in a reasoned memorandum filed on

August 5, 2013. (Id.) There is nothing in the record to suggest that Petitioner filed a

habeas petition with the California Supreme Court.

Petitioner filed the instant Petition on March 3, 2014. (ECF No. 1.) On April

3, 2014, the court issued a Notice Regarding Possible Failure to Exhaust and OneYear Statute of Limitations. (ECF No. 9.) On July 24, 2014, Respondent moved to

dismiss the Petition on the ground that it fails to state a cognizable claim for federal

relief. (ECF No. 17.) Petitioner filed opposition to the motion to dismiss on August

6, 2014. (ECF No. 20.) 

III. ANALYSIS

A. Exhaustion of State Court Remedies

A state prisoner’s section 2254 habeas petition may not be granted if state

remedies are unexhausted. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); McMonagle v. Meyer, 766

F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir. 2014) (“A habeas petitioner must exhaust all available state

remedies before seeking review in a federal district court.”). Exhaustion requires that

the petitioner must have raised the claim in the state’s highest court as a federal claim,

not merely as a state law equivalent of that claim. See Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S.

364, 365-66 (1995). The petitioner must give the state courts a full opportunity to

resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the state’s

established appellate review process, which includes seeking discretionary review. 

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See O’Sullivan v. Boerkel, 526 U.S. 838, 841-47 (1999); Farmer v. Baldwin, 497 F.3d

1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 2007). Thus, in California, habeas petitioners are required to

exhaust their claims in a petition for review to the California Supreme Court. Gatlin

v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 1999).

Here, the Petition is comprised of Petitioner’s answers to a form petition for

writ of habeas corpus, a memorandum containing argument attached to the form

petition, and lodgments reflecting the pertinent state court, prison, and parole board

proceedings. (ECF Nos. 1 through 1-6.) Petitioner left blank the portions of the form

petition directed to whether he exhausted his claims in state court. (See ECF No. 1 at

2-4.) In his memorandum attached to the form petition, Petitioner complains about,

among other things, decisions by the Court of Appeal and the Superior Court of

California concerning his state habeas corpus petitions. (See ECF No. 1 at 11-27.) 

The lodgments include reasoned decisions denying Petitioner habeas relief issued by

the Court of Appeal and the Superior Court of California. Based on the record, the

Court has no reason to infer that Petitioner presented his claims in a habeas petition

for review to the California Supreme Court. 

Thus, Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254 should be dismissed for failure to exhaust state court remedies.

B. Petitioner Fails to Raise a Colorable Federal Claim

A district court may deny an entire petition on the merits without first requiring

exhaustion “only when it is perfectly clear that the applicant does not raise even a

colorable federal claim.” Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 623-24 (9th Cir. 2005);

see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes

that it is perfectly clear that Petitioner does not raise a colorable federal claim and

recommends dismissal on this ground.

1. Habeas Review of the Substantive Bases for Petitioner’s

Denial of Parole is Not Appropriate

The text of the habeas statute unambiguously provides that a federal court may

issue a writ of habeas corpus to a state prisoner “only on the ground that he is in

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custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(a). Thus, a writ of habeas corpus “is unavailable for alleged error in

the interpretation or application of state law.” Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083,

1085 (9th Cir. 1985); Hubbart v. Knapp, 379 F.3d 773, 779 (9th Cir. 2004).

In this case, Petitioner challenges only the substantive basis for the Board’s

decision denying him parole. For example, he argues “that the Board’s parole denial

was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts not supported by the

prerequisite ‘Some evidence.’” (ECF No. 1 at 6.) Petitioner’s challenges are

foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Swarthout v. Cook, 562 U.S. 216, 131

S. Ct. 859, 178 L. Ed. 2d 732 (2011) (per curiam) (holding that “the responsibility for

assuring that the constitutionally adequate procedures governing California’s parole

system are properly applied rests with California courts, and is no part of the Ninth

Circuit’s business”).2

After the Supreme Court’s holding in Swarthout, the Ninth Circuit explained

that “[d]ue process is satisfied as long as the state provides an inmate seeking parole

with ‘an opportunity to be heard and . . . a statement of the reasons why parole was

denied.’” Roberts v. Hartley, 640 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 2011). Petitioner does

not argue that he was denied an opportunity to be heard or a statement of the reasons

why parole was denied. And the record, including the transcripts Petitioner lodged of

his lengthy parole hearing, conclusively establishes that Petitioner was given an

opportunity to be heard and a statement of the reasons why parole was denied. 

Because the federal constitution requires nothing more in the parole context, the

Petition should be dismissed.

/ / /

/ / /

Petitioner points this Court to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Hayward v. Marshall, 603 F.3d 2

546 (9th Cir.2010) (en banc) as authority, but Hayward was reversed by the United States Supreme

Court in Swarthout.

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2. Petitioner’s First Amendment Claim is Without Merit

Petitioner claims that his First Amendment rights were violated because his

parole was denied, in part, because he did not have a substantial relapse prevention

plan, and such a plan would be based on participation in Alcoholics Anonymous, a

program with a religious component. (ECF No. 1 at 15.) 

The Ninth Circuit has recognized that for the “government to coerce someone

to participate in religious activities strikes at the core of the Establishment Clause of

the First Amendment.” Inouye v. Kemna, 504 F.3d 705, 712 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Whether there has been a constitutional violation based upon government religious

coercion turns on a three part analysis: “‘first, has the state acted; second, does the

action amount to coercion; and third, is the object of the coercion religious rather than

secular?’” Id. at 713 (quoting Kerr v. Farrey, 95 F.3d 472, 479 (7th Cir. 1996)).

The record does not support Petitioner’s implicit assertion that the Parole

Board denied him parole as a consequence of not participating in Alcoholics

Anonymous, and thus exercised coercion by punishing him for not engaging in a

religious activity. In this case, Petitioner did have an established history of

participating in Alcoholics Anonymous (though not sustained participation),

including active participation as the secretary of his Alcoholics Anonymous meetings

at the time of the parole hearing. (See, e.g., ECF No. 1-1 at 12; ECF No. 1-4 at 4-5,

ECF No. 1-6 at 32.) This was acknowledged by the Parole Board. (ECF No. 1-6 at

12, 26.) 

The basis for the Parole Board denying him parole was, among other things,

that Petition had “no relapse prevention plan” despite having been advised previously

that a written plan would be required. (ECF No. 1-6 at 26 (emphasis added).) 

Nothing in the record indicates that Petitioner’s relapse prevention plan had to

include participation in Alcoholic’s Anonymous or any program with a religious

component. In fact, the Parole Board defined a relapse prevention plan for Petitioner,

and that definition did not require participation in a Alcoholics Anonymous:

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[The relapse prevention plan consists of] first identifying what the

triggers are, internal and external. And then it talks about what --

developing plans for when those things happen out there that you have in

place to address that; to gain the skill sets in here that when you get

there, you have the skill sets, the connections and everything. It's

pre-planning. You aren't pre-planning. You said it. You wait until it

happens and then you said you cannot confront something until it's

before you right now. That's when you develop your plan. That's too

late.

(ECF No. 1-5 at 16-17.)

Petitioner has failed to establish that he was denied parole based upon his

refusal to participate in a religious-based program and thus has failed to establish that

participation in a religious-based program was compulsory. Petitioner’s First

Amendment claim is without merit because he has not established state coercion. 

IV. CONCLUSION

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United States District

Judge Roger T. Benitez under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 72.1(d)(4)

of the United States District Court for the Southern District of California.

In addition, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court issue an order:

(1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation, and (2) granting the

motion to dismiss (ECF No. 17), and dismissing the Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus with prejudice (ECF Nos. 1 through 1-6).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than January 20, 2015 any party to this action

may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The

document should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed

with the Court and served on all parties no later than January 30, 2015. The parties

are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the

right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 

/ / /

/ / /

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158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir.

1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 2, 2015

_________________________

JILL L. BURKHARDT

United States Magistrate Judge

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