Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02404/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02404-28/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1. Defendants Campbell and Gibson refer to plaintiff’s supplemental “reply” as a “surreply.”

In the instant order, the court uses plaintiff’s terminology and refers to the document as a

supplemental reply. However, both terms refer to the same document.

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SACRAMENTO DIVISION

JEFFREY D. McDONALD,

Plaintiff,

v.

ROSEANNE CAMPBELL, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 2:06-CV-2404 RJT

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS

CAMPBELL AND GIBSON’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

The court, Judge Robert J. Timlin, has read and considered defendant Roseanne

Campbell (“Campbell”) and C. Gibson (“Gibson,” collectively “defendants”)’s Motion for

Summary Judgment (“MSJ”) and supporting documentation. The court has further read and

considered plaintiff Jeffrey D. McDonald (“McDonald” or “plaintiff”)’s opposition to the MSJ

and the documents attached to his opposition, defendants’ reply submitted in response to

plaintiff’s opposition, and plaintiff’s supplemental “reply” in opposition to defendant Campbell

and Gibson’s MSJ. Upon such consideration, the court rules as follows: 1/

I. Background

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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983"), plaintiff filed his original complaint in this

matter on October 31, 2006, alleging First and Eighth Amendment deprivations by defendants

California correctional officers C. Lewis (“Lewis”) and Jeffrey L. Baker (“Baker”) as well as the

instant moving defendants. At that time, plaintiff was incarcerated at Mule Creek State Prison

(“MCSP”) located in Ione, California. As the primary factual basis for plaintiff’s complaint, he

asserted, inter alia, that while housed at MCSP from mid-June 2005 through the end of 2005,

correctional officers Lewis and Baker subjected plaintiff to a series of sexually lewd and abusive

verbal threats, that defendant Baker physically assaulted plaintiff on at least two occasions, and

that defendant Gibson retaliated against plaintiff for making accusatory statements regarding

Lewis by placing plaintiff in administrative segregation and refusing to transfer plaintiff to

another building within MCSP. 

Pursuant to the screening requirements set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) with respect to

prisoner civil rights complaints, on April 12, 2007, the assigned magistrate judge concluded that

plaintiff’s complaint stated colorable claims against Baker and Gibson but dismissed plaintiff’s

claims as alleged against Lewis and Campbell. Plaintiff was provided with an opportunity to

amend his complaint and did so by filing an amended complaint on May 30, 2007. In screening

the amended complaint, the magistrate judge recommended that Lewis be dismissed from the

action and that the suit proceed against defendant Campbell only in her official capacity. The

findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge were approved and adopted by the district

court, the Honorable Morrison C. England, on May 28, 2008. 

Plaintiff’s amended complaint sets forth three claims entitled as follows: (1) “Violation of

Prisoners [sic] First and Eighth Amendment Right to be Free From Verbal Sexual Abuse, Verbal

Abuse; and Retiliation [sic] to Silence Victom [sic]; (2) “Violation of Prisoners [sic] Eight [sic]

Amendment Right [sic] to be Free From the Physical Insinuation of Sexual-Abuse; and (3)

Violation of Prisoners [sic] Eighth Amendment Right to Have Personal Safty [sic].” While

plaintiff divides his amended complaint into three discrete claims, the alleged facts with respect

to each claim heavily overlap, and as articulated above, each claim rests on the asserted

deprivation of plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment right. 

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As to the first claim, plaintiff asserts such claim against all three remaining defendants

Campbell, in her official capacity as warden of MCSP (“Warden Campbell”), Gibson, and Baker. 

As in the original complaint, claim one addresses sexually-charged insults allegedly directed at

plaintiff by correctional officer Lewis. The injury alleged primarily constitutes emotional and

mental distress. McDonald avers that Warden Campbell is liable for the alleged verbal abuse

because, as the acting warden of MCSP, she knew that Lewis would engage in such abusive

conduct. Furthermore, plaintiff contends that defendant Gibson is liable with respect to claim

one because Gibson could have had plaintiff transferred to another building within MCSP away

from Lewis, but instead, Gibson refused the transfer and also verbally threatened plaintiff with

placement in administrative segregation as retaliation because plaintiff stated he was going to

report Lewis’s conduct to the Inspector General of the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation (“CDCR”). Claim one further includes allegations of verbal abuse perpetrated by

correctional officer Baker against plaintiff. Plaintiff does not expressly reallege within this claim

the phsyical abuse perpetrated by Baker.

The second claim centers on the alleged physical abuse imposed on plaintiff by Baker. 

Specifically, plaintiff avers that while he was bending over to pick up a dustpan, Baker forcefully

poked plaintiff in the buttocks with Baker’s nightstick, which caused plaintiff to fall forward and

hit his head against a locker resulting in neck, head, and upper-back injuries. In addition,

McDonald alleges that Baker taunted McDonald with sexual insults and slapped McDonald’s

buttocks. Moreover, plaintiff alleges that as the acting warden of MCSP, defendant Campbell

was aware of Baker’s propensity to commit such lewd and physically injurious conduct but

nonetheless allowed Baker to maintain his assigned position as a correctional officers whose

duties involved personal interaction with inmates. Claim two makes no mention of defendant

Gibson.

 With respect to claim three, plaintiff alleges that he was deprived of his Eighth

Amendment right to personal safety as an inmate when Warden Campbell and other unknown

individuals “applied an institutional policy of transferring an inmate who has problems with staff

to a different prison without any consideration for the safety of the inmate.” Am. Compl, ¶ 56. 

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Specifically, plaintiff alleges that he was transferred to “New Folsom” (presumably, Folsom

State Prison [“FSP”]), and as a result, was subject to threats and physical attack by inmates at

FSP. As with claims one and two, plaintiff repeats his allegation that defendant Campbell, as the

acting warden at MCSP, is liable for his injuries pursuant to supervisorial liability. In addition,

plaintiff repeats his allegations that defendants Baker and Lewis directed verbal, sexually-based

insults at plaintiff and also physically injured him (a reference, this court assumes, to defendant

Baker’s alleged conduct). Plaintiff makes no express factual or legal allegations against

defendant Gibson by this claim. 

As to all three claims, plaintiff seeks injunctive relief “including but not limited to, an order

halting any adverse transfer away from M.C.S.P. that could be considered retaliation, or any

other retaliation instigated and/or ratified by any of the defendants.” See, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶ 62. 

In addition, he seeks compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs of suit. 

On December 11, 2008, this action was reassigned to the undersigned judge for all further

proceedings. 

On June 26, 2009, defendants Campbell and Gibson filed the instant MSJ. Defendants

submitted the following documents in conjunction with their MSJ: (1) their statement of

undisputed facts; (2) the declaration of defendants’ counsel, addressing plaintiff’s various

transfers regarding his locations of incarceration; (3) the declaration of defendant Gibson,

including the Administrative Segregation Unit Placement Notice Gibson filled out when he

placed plaintiff in administrative segregation after one of plaintiff’s confrontations with Lewis;

and (4) defendant Campbell’s declaration, which also includes various attached, internal MCSP’s

documents addressing plaintiff’s allegations of abuse by Lewis and Baker and investigations

conducted into those allegations (documents most of which are also attached to plaintiff’s

amended complaint). 

The court received plaintiff’s opposition on January 7, 2010. While plaintiff includes a

separate declaration, he also treats his memorandum of points and authorities in opposition to

defendants’ MSJ as a declaration by swearing under penalty of perjury that the facts contained

within the memorandum are true and by signing the memorandum. Plaintiff does not include a

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statement of undisputed facts or a statement of disputed facts. He does include over forty pages

of exhibits, including but not limited to his own declaration, his opposition to a separate

discovery motion currently pending before the court, many of the same internal MCSP

documents and reports submitted by defendants, declarations of various inmates incarcerated at

MCSP during the same time period as plaintiff, responses to interrogatories allegedly completed

by defendants, various other discovery requests and supplemental and further responses by

defendants, as well as a habeas corpus petition filed in state court and purported copies of

photographs of his MCSP cell. 

Defendants filed their reply on February 2, 2010. Defendants do not include further

documentary evidence with their reply. However, defendants submit evidentiary objections to

plaintiff’s exhibits A through H attached to his opposition, recognizing that there are no exhibits

labeled “E” or “G.” Plaintiff then submitted to the court a supplemental “reply” in opposition to

defendants’ MSJ dated February 28, 2010. Defendants moved to strike the supplemental reply

on March 24, 2010. On that same date, defendants also filed with the court a stipulation between

themselves and plaintiff regarding defendant Campbell’s previous suspensions of defendant

Baker. 

II. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). 

When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the facts and draw

any reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. T.W. Elec. Serv.,

Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630-31 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Matsushita

Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986)); Chevron

Corp. v. Pennzoil Co., 974 F.2d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, the court cannot make

credibility determinations or weigh conflicting evidence at this stage. T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d

at 630-31. While the moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating an absence of a

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genuine issue for trial, it need not fully disprove the other party’s case. Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

323-25, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986). For example, when the non-moving party bears the burden of

proof on a particular claim or defense, the moving party can meet its burden by demonstrating

that the non-moving party has failed to present any genuine issue of material fact. Musick v.

Burke, 913 F.2d 1390, 1394 (9th Cir. 1990). In addition, the materiality of facts is determined by

the parties’ pleadings. However, absent prejudice to the opposing party, the court may, in its

discretion, consider unpled theories or facts raised by a party’s claims or defenses on a summary

judgment motion. See, e.g., Ahmad v. Furlong, 435 F.3d 1196, 1201-02 (10th Cir. 2006);

Miranda de Villalba v. Coutts & Co. (USA) Intern., 250 F.3d 1351, 1353 (11th Cir. 2001). 

After the moving party makes the requisite showing, the “opposing party may not rely

merely on allegations or denials in its own pleading; rather, its response must - by affidavits or as

otherwise provided in [Rule 56] - set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. If the

opposing party does not so respond, summary judgment should, if appropriate, be entered against

that party.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)(2); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49. In addition, a party cannot

establish a genuine issue of material fact by merely making assertions in its legal papers. Instead,

there must be specific, admissible evidence identifying the basis for the parties’ dispute. S.A.

Emprese de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense v. Walter Kidde & Co., Inc., 690 F.2d 1235, 1238 (9th

Cir. 1980). That is, the evidence set forth by the non-moving party must be sufficient, taking the

record as a whole, to allow a rational jury to find for the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec.

Indus., 475 U.S. at 587. As the Supreme Court has stated, “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of

evidence...will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find

for [the non-moving party].” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.

III. Discussion

A. Evidentiary Objections

Defendants object to plaintiff’s exhibits A through H, arguing that such documents have not

been properly authenticated, lack foundation, contain improper opinion testimony and/or hearsay,

are irrelevant, and are otherwise conclusory, citing FED. R. EVID. 401-403, 602, 701, 802, and

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901. Defendants properly note “that unauthenticated documents cannot be considered on a

motion for summary judgment. Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d

1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 1990) (document may be authenticated by declaration of individual having

personal knowledge of matters set forth in document and creation of document); see also, Beyene

v. Coleman Sec. Serv., Inc., 854 F.2d 1179, 1182 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting U.S. v. Dibble, 429

F.2d 598, 602 (9th Cir. 1970) (“A writing is not authenticated simply by attaching it to an

affidavit....The foundation is laid for receiving a document in evidence by the testimony of a

witness with personal knowledge of the facts who attests to the identity and due execution of the

document and, where appropriate, its delivery.”). With the above rules and standards in mind,

the court hereby rules as follows regarding defendants’ evidentiary objections.

1. Exhibit A, Declaration of Darius Sims - Objection sustained;

2. Exhibit D, portion of CDC 114D (Administrative Segregation Placement Notice - 

Objection overruled;

3. Portion of CDC 115 (Rule Violation Report dated Dec. 12, 2005, Log. No. B12/05-045)

- Objection sustained;

4. “Unidentified copies of envelopes and documents” - While the court recognizes that

plaintiff includes occasional copies of photographs and/or copies of envelopes, defendants’

objections makes it unclear to which “documents” attached to plaintiff’s opposition they

object, for example, by referring to a page number. While the court will not rely on any

inadmissible evidence in ruling on the instant motion (including unauthenticated and

irrelevant copies of envelopes, copies of photographs, or other miscellaneous documents),

defendants’ objections are also rather vague. Therefore, at present, the court cannot

properly rule on such objections;

5. One-page excerpt copy of McDonald’s Writ of Habeas Corpus Petition, filed in Lassen

County on April 23, 2001 - Objection sustained;

6. Exhibit F (miscellaneous letters from McDonald and non-party inmates): McDonald’s

March 15, 2008 letter and declaration of Floyd Akles - Objections overruled; declarations

of Trivon Lockett, Frank Bracamonte, and Sammy Norman - Objections sustained;

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7. CDC 115 (Rules Violation Report, Log. No. B07/05-057) - Objection overruled;

8. Black and white copies of photos that appear to depict inmate cells and property -

Objection sustained;

9. Exhibit H (“Respondent’s Supplemental Return” from McDonald’s Writ of Habeas

Corpus filed in Lassen County) - Objection sustained. 

 The court informs all parties that it will not consider inadmissible evidence in ruling on the

instant motion. However, defendants fail to clearly raise their objections to any documents

labeled Exhibits B and C. Therefore, the court refrains from ruling on such objections unless

those documents become pivotal to a ruling on the substantive merits of the MSJ.

On March 24, 2010, defendants Warden Campbell and Gibson filed a motion to strike

plaintiff’s supplemental reply (“motion to strike”), reasserting many of the same evidentiary

objections made with respect to plaintiff’s opposition as to allegations contained in the

supplemental reply and asking the court not to consider the supplemental reply when ruling on

the instant MSJ. As such, the court addresses the motion to strike here. More specifically,

defendants argue that the court should strike plaintiff’s supplemental reply because: (1) it does

not comply with the local rules of the Eastern District of California; (2) plaintiff has violated the

terms of the February 9, 2010 telephonic status conference by filing the supplemental reply; (3)

plaintiff has also violated a protective order entered into between plaintiff, the instant moving

defendants, and defendant Baker by filing the supplemental reply, see Doc. No. 105; (4)

plaintiff’s supplemental reply does not comply with a myriad of federal evidentiary and

procedural rules; and (5) plaintiff’s supplemental reply is otherwise without any substantive

merit. 

The court will deny defendants’ motion to strike. As to defendants’ first three arguments,

those arguments demonstrate that the court may, but is not required, to strike plaintiff’s

supplemental reply. First, E.D. LOCAL R. 230(l), pertaining to motions in prisoner cases, does

not actually speak to the filing of a surreply (defendants’ characterization of plaintiff’s

supplemental reply). Therefore, that local rule does not actually foreclose plaintiff from filing

supplemental briefing or otherwise lay out the procedure for filing additional briefing, even

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though one might infer that the wisest course would be to seek court approval before filing any

additional briefing. Regarding the February 9, 2010 telephonic status conference, defendants

correctly note that the court asked plaintiff if he intended to file a supplemental opposition based

on recently disclosed documents, and he stated that he did not so intend. However, the court did

not inform plaintiff that if he changed his position, he would need to first seek permission from

the court to then file a supplemental brief. Again, plaintiff’s wisest course of action would have

been to seek court permission, but as a pro se litigant, he was not expressly informed that he must

seek such court permission. Finally, regarding any violation of the protective order between

plaintiff and all remaining defendants, defendant Baker has since moved the court to seal the

supplemental reply and that motion has been granted. Thus, any resulting prejudice to defendant

Baker or the instant moving defendants due to a violation of the protective order has been greatly

minimized. Rather than rely on these three arguments as bases to strike the supplemental reply

without considering its contents, the court finds the more judicious course (especially in light of

plaintiff’s pro se status) to be to consider the supplemental reply in the event that it in fact

demonstrates there is a triable issue of material fact regarding plaintiff’s claims for relief. 

Regarding the last two objections, those objections essentially address the merits of

plaintiff’s supplemental reply. In other words, defendants have not articulated why the court

should refrain from addressing the arguments in the supplemental reply by, in the first instance,

not considering the supplemental reply. Instead, these arguments demonstrate that even if the

court examines plaintiff’s arguments as articulated in the supplemental reply, plaintiff still has

not presented admissible, probative evidence showing that there is a triable issue of material fact

regarding any of his alleged claims for relief. Thus, the court does not construe these latter two

objections by defendants as requests for the court to strike the supplemental reply in the first

instance. Instead, the court fully addresses the merits of the supplemental reply in Footnote 12,

infra.

B. Undisputed Facts

Defendants submitted a Statement of Undisputed Facts (“SUF”) with their moving papers as

required by local rules. 

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Eastern District Local Rule 260(b) states that “[a]ny party opposing a motion for summary

judgment or summary adjudication shall reproduce the itemized facts in the Statement of

Undisputed Facts and admit those facts that are undisputed and deny those that are disputed,

including with each denial a citation to the particular portions of any pleading, affidavit,

deposition, interrogatory answer, admission or other document relied upon in support of that

denial.” (emphasis added). In addition, “[t]he opposing party may also file a concise ‘Statement

of Disputed Facts,’ [“SDF”] and the source thereof in the record, of all additional material facts

as to which there is a genuine issue precluding summary judgment or adjudication.” Id. 

Plaintiff failed to file a required SUF or a permissive SDF. As such, defendants argue that

this court should grant summary judgment for them because plaintiff has failed properly to

contest that the facts they submitted as undisputed are disputed. Further, in conjunction with

defendants’ assertion that plaintiff only provides inadmissible evidence in support of his

opposition, defendants also contend that plaintiff’s opposition briefing does not make clear how

any of his attached exhibits and their content create a genuine issue of fact as to any of the claims

in the amended complaint. 

The court is mindful that a pro se litigant’s pleadings must be liberally construed. Eldridge

v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1987). Furthermore, at the summary judgment stage, the

court “treat[s] the opposing party’s papers more indulgently than the moving party’s papers.” 

Lew v. Kona Hosp., 754 F.2d 1420, 1423 (9th Cir. 1985). Yet, “[p]ro se litigants must follow the

same rules of procedure that govern other litigants.” King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir.

1987). While plaintiff’s failure to submit a SUF or to otherwise clearly cite to particular parts of

his submitted attachments as admissible evidence supporting his opposition counsels in favor of

granting defendants’ MSJ, the court will not proceed to grant defendants’ MSJ without itself

wading through plaintiff’s submissions and determining if there are indeed triable issues of

material fact. As such, the court provides an analysis of what facts are disputed and undisputed.

The following facts are undisputed material facts supported by admissible evidence:

Defendant Warden Campbell worked for the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) from October 15, 1974, until her retirement on December 26, 2007. 

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2. As stated supra, the facts relating to defendant Warden Campbell’s suspension of

defendant Baker were provided to the court through a stipulation of the parties filed March 24, 2010.

3. 15 Calif. Code of Reg. § 3391(a) states: “Employees shall be alert, courteous, and

professional in their dealings with inmates, parolees, fellow employees, visitors and members of the

public. Inmates and parolees shall be addressed by their proper names, and never by derogatory or

11

She was the acting warden at MCSP from October 2004 through December 2006. She currently

provides the CDCR with assistance on certain projects on an as-needed basis but in her limited

employment, has no authority to respond to a court-ordered injunction. 

Plaintiff McDonald submitted a written complaint to defendant Warden Campbell

indicating that he had been subjected to verbal abuse by correctional officers Lewis, defendant

Baker, and defendant lieutenant Gibson and to physical abuse by Baker. Such abuse, as reported

by plaintiff, involved obscene and inappropriate sexual comments and conduct. Plaintiff

requested that the misconduct be investigated. On or about November 23, 2005, defendant

Campbell, in her position as the acting MCSP warden, ordered MCSP’s Investigative Services

Unit (“ISU”) to complete a fact-finding investigation regarding plaintiff’s allegations. While

plaintiff clearly contests the ultimate determination by ISU, the Acting Investigative Lieutenant,

D. Starnes, found that plaintiff’s allegations were not sustained. 

On February 10, 2006, defendant Warden Campbell completed a Second Level Appeal

Response informing plaintiff that upon a second level of review, his allegations against Baker,

Lewis, and Gibson were found to be unsubstantiated. On June 5, 2006, the Inmate Appeals

Branch issued a Director’s Level Appeal Review Decision informing plaintiff that his allegations

against the aforementioned individuals had been reviewed and evaluated by administrative staff,

that a fact-finding investigation had been completed, and that plaintiff’s appeal was denied. 

Again, although plaintiff disputes the ultimate determination that no abuse took place, plaintiff

was provided with such responses by MCSP and CDCR staff.

Although not as a result of the allegations against defendant Baker by plaintiff McDonald,

defendant Campbell, as the acting warden at MCSP, suspended defendant Baker from September

12, 2005 to September 19, 2005 (six days), and from October 3, 2005 to October 10, 2005 (six

days) for violations of the California Code of Regulations, Title 15, Sections 3391(a), 3400, 2/ 3/ 4/

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slang reference. Prison numbers shall be used only with names to summon inmates via public

address systems. Employees shall not use indecent, abusive profane, or otherwise improper language

while on duty. Irresponsible or unethical conduct or conduct reflecting discredit on themselves or

the department, either on or off duty, shall be avoided by all employees.”

4. 15 Calif. Code of Reg. § 3400 state: “Employees must not engage in undue familiarity

with inmates, parolees, or the family and friends of inmates or parolees. Whenever there is a reason

for an employee to have personal contact or discussions with an inmate or parolee or the family and

friends of inmates and parolees, the employee must maintain a helpful but professional attitude and

demeanor. Employees must not discuss their personal affairs with any inmate or parolee.” 

5. 15 Calif. Code of Reg. § 3413(a)(2) states: “Employees of the department shall not engage

in any other employment or activity inconsistent or incompatible with employment by the

department. Conduct deemed to fall in such categories includes, but is not limited to the

following:...Employment or participation in any activity of an illegal nature.” 

12

and 3413(a)(2). Defendant Baker’s suspensions were the result of a settlement stipulation 5/

entered into between defendant Baker, his counsel for proceedings before the California State

Personnel Board, and staff counsel for the CDCR, before Administrative Law Judge Kimberly

M. Pipkin, on January 4, 2006.

Defendant Gibson was employed by CDCR as a correctional lieutenant at MCSP from May

2005 until he retired from the CDCR in October 2006. As a lieutenant, Gibson’s work

responsibilities included interviewing inmates suspected of improper or illegal conduct to

determine how to handle such situations, including whether to place the inmates in

administrative segregation pursuant to Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations. Inmates

may be placed in administrative segregation when they threaten the safety of CDCR staff or the

security of the institution. When an inmate is placed in administrative segregation, it was

defendant Gibson’s usual practice to complete a CDC 114-D form (Administrative Segregation

Unit Placement Notice) in order to advise the inmate of the reasons for his placement in

administrative segregation and to inform the inmate that the Institution Classification Committee

will thereafter determine the inmate’s appropriate housing and program placements.

On July 24, 2005, correctional officer Lewis conducted a search of plaintiff’s cell that was

initiated while plaintiff was away from his cell. The stated reason for the search was that officer

Lewis and another officer suspected that plaintiff had inmate-manufactured alcohol in his

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6. Plaintiff does not dispute that the officers contended he had pruno. Instead, he disputes

that what the officers thought was pruno - i.e., a plastic bag with a fruit product that was wrapped

in a blanket - was instead just fruit crisp from the previous night’s dinner that plaintiff was planning

to give to another inmate. Plaintiff was not formally reprimanded for having pruno based on this

incident.

7. Plaintiff does dispute the veracity of Lewis’s statement. That is, plaintiff avers that Lewis

was not being truthful in making assertions that he feared for his safety and contends that officer

Lewis could not reasonably have feared for his safety. However, plaintiff does not clearly dispute

in his declaration or in any submitted evidence that such statements were made and further does not

dispute that defendant Gibson was informed that officer Lewis feared for his safety.

8. In his opposition and/or his declaration in support of his opposition, plaintiff states as

follows: He informed Gibson that officer Lewis had been sexually harassing plaintiff and that

plaintiff asked to be transferred to another building. He told Gibson that plaintiff and his family

planned on reporting Lewis to the Inspector General. Defendant Gibson told plaintiff to forget about

his problems with Lewis. Defendant Gibson also told plaintiff that he either needed to return to his

building or that he would be placed in administrative segregation. Defendant Gibson refused to

transfer plaintiff to another building and placed plaintiff in administrative segregation. In his

opposition papers, plaintiff does not deny that defendant Gibson gave plaintiff the option to return

to his building or be placed in administrative segregation, and plaintiff admits that he said he would

rather go to administrative segregation than return to his building. Plaintiff, in his declaration,

speculates that Gibson placed plaintiff in administrative segregation as retaliation because plaintiff

said he was going to report officer Lewis to the Inspector General.

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possession, referred to as “pruno.” While Lewis was searching the cell, plaintiff returned to his 6/

cell. At that time, plaintiff informed the searching officers that he had a right to stay and witness

the search. Officer Lewis told plaintiff to leave the area while Lewis completed the search. 

Plaintiff refused to completely leave the area but instead sat at a table directly outside the cell. 

Plaintiff was placed in handcuffs by the searching officers and then escorted to the program

office where he was placed in a holding cell pending an interview with defendant Gibson

regarding the incident outside his cell.

Officer Lewis indicated to defendant Gibson that Lewis thought plaintiff was a threat to his

(Lewis’s) safety during the incident because plaintiff would not leave the cell area.7/

While at the program office, plaintiff told Gibson that plaintiff would rather go to “the hole”

(prison slang for administrative segregation) than return to his cell or building and deal with

officer Lewis. 

8/

Defendant Gibson filled out a CDC 114-D form with respect to this incident. The form

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9. Plaintiff does provide evidence that defendant Gibson participated in another RVR

charging plaintiff with conspiracy to introduce a controlled substance (methamphetamine) for

distribution. However, that incident is wholly unrelated to the allegations in the instant litigation.

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states the following:

On Tuesday, July 24, 2005 at approximately 0655 hours, you were found to be in

possession of a substance, which was suspected as being inmate manufactured alcohol. 

Officer Lewis ordered you to leave the area as he was conducting a search and you failed

to comply. It was necessary for you to be placed into mechanical restraints, escorted to

the program office and placed into a holding cell based on your refusal. You stated ‘I

want to go to the hole rather than go back over there and deal with that officer.” Officer

Lewis stated that he feels that you are a threat to his personal safety. The suspected

substance was not verified as pruno. Due to the aforementioned, you are now deemed a

threat to the safety and security of the Institution. You are being placed into

Administrative Segregation pending Administrative Review by Institutional

Classification Committee for appropriate program and housing needs. You will be seen

by the Institutional Classification Committee within 10 days of this order to establish

your current and future housing and program needs. Additionally, you will be issued a

Rules Violation Report (CDC-115), charging you with the Specific Act: Failure to obey

orders. Inmate MCDONALD is a participant in the Mental Health Delivery System at the

CCCMS Level of Care.

Gibson’s stated reasons for placing plaintiff in administrative segregation was pursuant to

Section 3335, Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations because Lewis expressed fear for

his safety. 15 Calif. Code of Reg. § 3335(a) (“When an inmate’s presence in an institution’s

general inmate population presents an immediate threat to the safety of the inmate or others,

endangers institution security or jeopardizes the integrity of an investigation of an alleged serious

misconduct or criminal activity, the inmate shall be immediately removed from general

population and be placed in administrative segregation.”). Plaintiff was kept in administrative

segregation for one day. 

Plaintiff received from defendant Gibson a Rules Violation Report (“RVR”) stemming from

the incident that charged him with failure to obey orders. Defendant Gibson did not participate

in the preparation for or disciplinary hearing regarding the RVR. Defendant Gibson was not a 9/

member of the Institutional Classification Committee (“ICC”) at MCSP and had no decisionmaking authority regarding plaintiff’s retainment in administrative segregation or plaintiff’s

housing and program placement.

Plaintiff currently is incarcerated at California State Prison, Los Angeles County (“CSPLAC”) at Lancaster. Prior to his placement at CSP-LAC and during the pendency of this

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litigation, plaintiff was transferred from MCSP to Salinas Valley State Prison. 

C. Defendant Campbell

In moving for summary judgment as to all claims asserted against defendant Warden

Campbell, she contends that: (1) she cannot be held liable under a theory of supervisorial liability

for any alleged verbal harassment of plaintiff by correctional officers Lewis and Baker; (2) as to

all claims, she cannot be held liable to plaintiff under a theory of respondeat superior liability or

supervisorial liability; (3) plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief as to her is moot because he is

no longer housed at MCSP, and she is no longer the acting warden; (4) defendant Campbell is

entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity; and (5) she is alternatively entitled to qualified

immunity.

At least one of Warden Campbell’s arguments clearly speaks to the fact that she remains in

this suit only in her official capacity. However, her decision to include certain additional

arguments and the framing of such arguments, in conjunction with plaintiff’s opposition, make it

clear to the court that plaintiff and Warden Campbell at least partially misunderstand the nature

of her continued involvement in this suit.

Both the magistrate judge’s initial, complete dismissal of plaintiff’s claims in his original

complaint against defendant Campbell with leave to amend as well as the magistrate judge’s later

findings with respect to the amended complaint against her and ultimate recommendation that the

suit proceed against Campbell only in her official capacity as warden of MCSP, demonstrate that

the district court judge found plaintiff’s pleadings inadequately alleged personal involvement by

Campbell in any deprivation of the constitutional rights of plaintiff.

Specifically with respect to the original complaint, the magistrate judge informed plaintiff

that Section 1983 “requires that there be an actual connection or link between the actions of the

defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff.” Hereinafter, first

Screening Order; Doc. No. 8, 4:11-12. In addition, the magistrate judge informed plaintiff that to

the extent he claimed Campbell’s involvement stemmed from her supervisorial position as a

warden, plaintiff needed to specifically allege “the causal link between [Campbell] and the

claimed constitutional violation....” Id. at 4:20-21. The magistrate judge concluded that

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McDonald, in the original complaint, failed to link Warden Campbell to any acts resulting in his

alleged constitutional injuries.

However, in screening the original complaint, the magistrate judge informed plaintiff that he

need not allege or prove personal involvement by Warden Campbell (either directly or due to her

supervisorial role) in the alleged rights deprivations to the extent he sought injunctive relief

against her in her official capacity. Id. at 5:4-8. Instead, plaintiff only need name an official who

could appropriately respond to a court ordered injunction if one was ultimately ordered by the

court as appropriate relief for a constitutional deprivation perpetrated by a different defendant. 

Furthermore, the magistrate judge made clear that official-capacity suits are merely an alternative

way of pleading an action against the entity of which the defendant is an officer. Hafer v. Melo,

502 U.S. 21, 25, 112 S. Ct. 358 (1991); Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165, 105 S. Ct. 3099

(1985). “As such, [official capacity suits are] no different from [suits] against the State itself. 

Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70, 109 S. Ct. 2304 (1989). In addition, the

magistrate judge advised plaintiff that because official-capacity suits are essentially claims

against the state, the plaintiff must plead and prove that a policy or custom of the state

governmental entity of which the official is an agent was the moving force behind the

constitutional deprivation. Hafer, 502 U.S. at 25; Graham, 473 U.S. at 166. Because plaintiff

had yet to allege a state policy or procedure, the magistrate judge also dismissed any claims in the

original complaint against Campbell that could be construed as official-capacity allegations.

 In issuing later findings and recommendations to the district court with respect to

plaintiff’s amended complaint (findings which were approved and adopted in full by the district

court), the magistrate judge again found that plaintiff failed to sufficiently plead a link between

defendant Warden Campbell and any resulting constitutional deprivation suffered by plaintiff. 

Indeed, the magistrate judge wholly recited that section of his first Screening Order finding that

plaintiff failed to demonstrate any causal connection between Warden Campbell and the alleged

constitutional rights deprivations, under any theory of liability, supervisorial or otherwise. As

such, the magistrate judge recommended that only the official capacity suit for an injunction be

allowed to go forward. Essentially, defendant Warden Campbell remained in the instant suit in

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10. Now FED. R. CIV. P. 25(d) and FED. R. APP. P. 43(c)(2).

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name only upon the district court’s approval and adoption of the magistrate judge’s finding and

recommendations with respect to the amended complaint.

Furthermore, because suits against state officials in their official capacity are essentially

suits against the state, “when officials sued in this capacity in federal court die or leave office,

their successors automatically assume their roles in the litigation.” Hafer, 502 U.S. at 25 (citing

FED. R. CIV. P. 25(d)(1) and FED. R. APP. P. 43(c)(1)). Indeed, FED. R. CIV. P. 25(d) makes 10/

clear that “[a]n action does not abate when a public officer who is a party in an official capacity

dies, resigns, or otherwise ceases to hold office while the action is pending. The officer’s

successor is automatically substituted as a party.” 

Thus, Warden Campbell confuses the issue when she argues that an injunction is

unavailable because she is no longer the acting warden at MCSP or, for example, when she

argues that she is entitled to qualified immunity, an immunity only available when an officer is

sued in his or her individual capacity. Furthermore, Warden Campbell’s broad assertion of

Eleventh Amendment immunity is misplaced as “the Eleventh Amendment does not bar actions

against state officers in their official capacities if the plaintiffs seek only a declaratory judgment

or [prospective] injunctive relief. Jackson v. Hayakawa, 682 F.2d 1344, 1350 (9th Cir. 1982).

Therefore, to the extent plaintiff can prove, inter alia, that a state policy or procedure led to a

deprivation of his constitutional rights, the currently acting warden is the properly named party

for purposes of seeking any prospective injunctive relief. 

Thus, the crux of the issue is whether plaintiff has presented any evidence that a state policy

or procedure was the moving force behind the alleged deprivation of his constitutional rights. 

Warden Campbell contends that plaintiff cannot make such a showing. Indeed, she asserts that

he has not even alleged a state policy or procedure. This later assertion is without merit. For

example, plaintiff’s amended complaint expressly raises a state policy or procedure in claim

three. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Warden Campbell “applied an institutional policy of

transfering [sic] an inmate who has a problmes [sic] with staff to a different prison without any

consideration for the safety of the inmate.” Am. Compl., ¶ 56. McDonald refers to his

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11. The court recognizes that it already ruled against the admissibility of the Sims

declaration based on defendants’ objections. However, by referring to the Sims declaration here,

the court merely highlights how plaintiff has failed to raise a triable issue of material fact by relying

on inadmissible evidence that, even if the court were to consider, would not change the outcome of

his action against defendants Gibson and Warden Campbell. Any reference to other declarations to

which the court has already sustained objections are included within the discussion section of this

order for the same reasons.

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temporary transfer to Folsom State Prison (“FSP”) in which he avers that he was subject to

physical abuse at FSP at the hands of FSP inmates. See also, Facts Section of Am. Compl. ¶ 30

(“It is common knowlage [sic] that there is a policy in the C.D.C.R. to transfer an inmate when

that inmate has trouble with staff. It is also common knowlage [sic] among the inmates on Ayard

New Folsom [i.e. FSP] that the yard was not considered as a sensitive needs yard due to attacks

on the SNY inmats [sic], that had happened about one year prior to McDonald’s transfer.”). 

Plaintiff contends that he was transferred to FSP in December 2006 and represents that he was

ultimately transferred back to MCSP on some later unidentified date. He also claims that in

March of 2007, he was beat up by three inmates at FSP who targeted him for being a “sensitive

needs” inmate. 

Plaintiff, however, has failed to present evidence suggesting the existence of a triable issue

of material fact as to claim three of the amended complaint against defendant Warden Campbell,

and particularly as to a policy or procedure applied by her (or other unidentified MCSP

employees) to deprive plaintiff of his Eighth Amendment right. With respect to his own transfer

to FSP, plaintiff provides the court with no probative evidence that the transfer was somehow

tied to his complaints against MCSP staff and was authorized by defendant Warden Campbell

pursuant to an institutional policy or procedure of the CDCR. Plaintiff has failed to produce a

scintilla of evidence that there is or was an institutional policy of transferring complaining

inmates out of MCSP to FSP. Moreover, he provides the court with no evidence demonstrating

retaliatory-motivated transfers by Warden Campbell or other MCSP officials against other MCSP

inmates because they exercised their constitutional rights under the First Amendment. Indeed,

the only declaration by another prisoner transferred out of MCSP, namely Darius Sims

(“Sims”), does not make clear if Sims contends he was transferred to another prison due to 11/

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complaints made by him regarding staff misconduct. Sims may be implying as much, but his

single, vague declaration in conjunction with McDonald’s conclusory, factually-deficient

assertion that such a policy exists, are not sufficient evidence of any institutional policy such as

to create a genuine issue of fact. 

As an alleged related institutional policy, plaintiff avers in his amended complaint that interprison transfers are effectuated by MCSP in accordance with an institutional policy or procedure

without any consideration for the safety of inmates and that it was common knowledge that FSP

was unsafe for prisoners like McDonald. However, these assertions too are not supported by any

admissible evidence. McDonald provides no evidence that institutional staff at MCSP failed to

consider his safety needs when transferring him to FSP or that staff systemically engages in such

lack of safety considerations when transferring other inmates. Furthermore, while McDonald

avers in the amended complaint that he was attacked at FSP, he has not submitted any admissible

evidence demonstrating that FSP is in fact an extremely violent institution or that “special needs”

transferees consistently are attacked at FSP and that such information is readily known to MCSP

or more generally, the CDCR. Thus, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that there is a triable

issue of material fact regarding his claim that a state policy was the moving force behind a

deprivation of his Eighth Amendment rights (i.e., the state’s transfer policies failed to keep

McDonald safe from violent FSP inmates) by Warden Campbell.

Finally, to the extent plaintiff in claims one and two of the amended complaint contends that

in 2005 there was an institutional policy at MCSP of disregarding prisoner complaints against

correctional officers and then subjecting such inmates to repeated exposure to known, dangerous

correctional officers, such an averment is premised solely on the alleged conduct of defendant

Warden Campbell as plaintiff avers, inter alia, that Warden Campbell knew correctional officer

Baker had harassed other inmates, including the use of verbal and physical sexual abuse, ignored

such problems, and allowed Baker to remain in contact with inmates. However, as stated above,

the district court, upon recommendation of the magistrate judge, has already determined that

plaintiff failed to sufficiently plead in his amended complaint a causal link between defendant

Warden Campbell’s alleged conduct and any alleged harm suffered by plaintiff and as a result

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12. With respect to defendant Campbell specifically, even if the court were to reconsider its

decision that plaintiff inadequately plead a connection between defendant Campbell’s conduct and

Baker’s alleged verbal and physical sexual abuse of plaintiff, plaintiff has still failed to present any

probative evidence raising a triable issue of material fact regarding Campbell’s knowledge of

Baker’s relevant, past misconduct. For example, during a February 9, 2010 telephone status

conference between all parties, the court asked plaintiff if he intended to file a supplemental

opposition to the instant MSJ based on recent documents produced to plaintiff by defendant Baker.

Plaintiff informed the court that he did not intend to file such a supplemental opposition. However,

defendants Campbell, Gibson, and plaintiff informed the court that they would instead provide the

court with a stipulation setting forth facts regarding certain suspensions of Baker by Campbell.

Plaintiff was ordered to file the stipulation with the court no later than March 2, 2010. See Doc No.

110. As of March 2, 2010, the court had not received any stipulation. Instead, without authorization

from the court, plaintiff provided the court with a supplemental “reply” in opposition to defendants’

MSJ, dated February 28, 2010, and received by the court on March 8, 2010. By that reply, plaintiff

again attempts to set forth that Campbell, by reason of her personally suspending Baker, knew of

multiple instances in which Baker was reprimanded for improper behavior, including sexual

harassment of inmates, prior to Baker’s alleged abuse of plaintiff. On March 24, 2010, defendants

Warden Campbell and Gibson filed a motion to strike plaintiff’s supplemental reply and also filed

the stipulation regarding Warden Campbell’s suspensions of Baker.

Regarding the stipulation, the stipulation alone does not demonstrate that defendant Warden

Campbell knew of past relevant misconduct by Baker that should have put her on notice that Baker

would likely deprive plaintiff of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual

punishment. The stipulation merely informs the court of the particular code sections that formed the

bases for Warden Campbell’s past suspensions of Baker. However, the parties do not stipulate to

the underlying conduct by Baker resulting in the violations of those code sections. Furthermore, the

rather broad language of the code sections, as quoted supra, does not provide the court with a means

to determine what kind of inappropriate conduct defendant Baker likely engaged in and of which

defendant Warden Campbell was on notice due to her resulting suspensions of Baker. At most, the

court might infer that defendant Baker used inappropriate language with other inmates in the past,

as two of the cited code sections explicitly address appropriate boundaries regarding verbal

communications between correctional officers and inmates. However, none of the code sections

expressly addresses physical sexual abuse perpetrated by officers against inmates. Plaintiff has been

informed multiple times that lewd, verbal sexually-based comments, while objectionable, do not

arise to Eighth Amendment deprivations. Thus, the stipulation does not evidence a causal

connection between defendant Warden Campbell’s conduct and plaintiff’s alleged physical sexual

abuse by defendant Baker. 

With respect to the supplemental reply, as stated supra, the court will deny defendants’

motion to strike the supplemental reply and instead proceeds to address the merits of the

supplemental reply. However, analyzing the merits of the supplemental reply, plaintiff still does not

provide the court with any documentary evidence which he contends supports his assertions that

Baker was investigated and reprimanded for misconduct by, inter alia, defendant Campbell that

should have put her on notice that defendant Baker would likely deprive plaintiff of his Eighth

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allowed Warden Campbell to remain as a defendant in her official capacity only. As such

Campbell’s alleged conduct cannot be imputed to the state as evidence of an unconstitutional

state policy or procedure. 

12/

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Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. The court is cognizant of the fact

that pursuant to its October 27, 2009 discovery order, the court ordered Baker to produce certain

documents to plaintiff by only allowing plaintiff to take notes regarding the content of such

documents but not allowing plaintiff to obtain actual photocopies of such documents. However,

plaintiff does not provide the court with his notes of the content of those documents, and he does not

cite to the bates-stamped documents the court ordered defendant Baker to produce to plaintiff, which

might provide the court with an explanation of why actual documents were not produced in

conjunction with his initial opposition or supplemental reply. Further, plaintiff provides no other

admissible evidence in support of his assertions that defendant Warden Campbell allowed Baker to

continue to supervise and interact with inmates although she was aware of his personal

characteristics rendering him dangerous and abusive to inmates. Plaintiff has signed his

supplemental reply under penalty of perjury but nevertheless plaintiff has not made clear that he has

any personal knowledge of the events he details in the reply, either because he personally reviewed

certain documents or because he obtained such information through deposing the defendants or

propounding interrogatories. A party cannot rely only on assertions in his briefing to oppose

summary judgment. As stated supra, plaintiff must come forward with the appropriate probative

evidence demonstrating that there is a genuine issue of material fact. Finally, plaintiff does not make

clear if Baker was ever previously charged by inmates with verbal sexual and/or physical sexual

abuse. As plaintiff has already been informed, verbal sexual harassment likely does not constitute

an Eighth Amendment deprivation of which Campbell had notice and should have protected

plaintiff. Thus, not only has plaintiff proceeded without court permission to file a supplemental

reply, but the additional reply nonetheless fails to affect the outcome of the instant MSJ. 

13. The court includes reference to the Bracamonte declaration for the same reasons

articulated in footnote 11.

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Furthermore, plaintiff provides no other admissible evidence demonstrating that Baker was

known by MCSP to be a physical, sexual threat to inmates prior to the subject incident between

him and Baker, that other authorities at MCSP systemically failed to respond appropriately to

inmate complaints, or that MCSP consistently places inmates under the control of violent

correctional officers when it is on notice of the officers’ violent proclivities. Indeed, the only

additional evidence submitted with respect to correctional officer Baker is the declaration of

Frank Bracamonte. Bracamonte states that while he was an inmate at MCSP between 2002 and 13/

2004, he witnessed Baker sexually harass and abuse other inmates. However, the declaration

does not speak to any inmate complaints made against Baker or the failure of MCSP to

adequately respond to such complaints, if any. As such, plaintiff has failed to raise a triable issue

of material fact with respect to any state policy or procedure causing him to be sexually abused

by Baker, either verbally or physically. In addition, the declaration of inmate Sims, which

contains only general allegations that defendant Warden Campbell ignored inmate complaints

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regarding staff misconduct, is far too vague to create a triable issue of material fact. Thus, the

court concludes that plaintiff has failed to produce significant probative evidence creating a

triable issue of material fact regarding whether a state policy or procedure resulted in a

deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights under the Eighth Amendment by defendant Warden

Campbell. 

The court, however, notes that it is somewhat unclear if a state policy or procedure must be

implicated when the relief sought is prospective injunctive relief against a state official in his or

her official capacity. Clearly the requirements of Section 1983 must be met, including the

establishment of a constitutional deprivation warranting the sought for injunctive relief. 

However, both Hafer and Graham dealt with damages suits against state officers and included

discussions regarding the distinction between official-capacity and individual-capacity (also

referred to as personal-capacity) suits seeking damages relief. In acknowledging that officialcapacity suits require “more” - i.e., proving a state policy or procedure was the moving force

behind the deprivation - the Supreme Court relied on the seminal Monell v. Dep’t of Social

Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S. Ct. 2018 (1978), similarly imposing an “official policy or custom

requirement” to the establishment of municipal liability under Section 1983. However, Monell’s

policy or custom requirement does not apply when Section 1983 plaintiffs only seek prospective

declaratory or injunctive relief against a municipality or its officers. Truth v. Kent Sch. Dist., 542

F.3d 634, 644 (9th Cir. 2008); Chaloux v. Killeen, 886 F.2d 247, 250-51 (9th Cir. 1989). Thus,

though the issue is rather confused, with the Hafer and Graham Court relying heavily on Monell,

one might argue that the state policy or procedure requirement also does not apply when a

plaintiff sues state officers for only prospective injunctive relief.

However, even if plaintiff need not prove a state policy or procedure to obtain prospective

injunctive relief against an official sued only in his/her official capacity, he nonetheless has failed

to establish that he can obtain the type of injunctive relief set forth in his amended complaint. 

Again, plaintiff seeks an injunction preventing his transfer out of MCSP “that could be

considered retaliation, or any other retaliation instigated and/or ratified by any of the defendants.” 

See, e.g., Am. Compl., ¶ 45:6-7. Defendants argue that plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief is

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14. While none of the parties in their briefing on the instant motion informs the court of

exact dates of plaintiff’s transfer within the CDCR, the admissible evidence shows that plaintiff was

transferred to Salinas Valley State Prison (“SVSP”) during the course of the present litigation and

now resides at California State Prison, Los Angeles County (“CSP-LAC”). Specifically, plaintiff

informed the court on July 3, 2008, that he was transferred to SVSP, slightly under two years from

the date of the original complaint. Doc. No. 31. Furthermore, plaintiff notified the court with a

document dated August 8, 2009, that he had been transferred from SVSP to CSP-LAC. Doc. No.

85. These dates are far removed from the facts underlying the amended complaint. Further,

defendant Warden Campbell stepped down as acting warden in December 2007, and defendant

Gibson retired in October 2006. These facts undermine plaintiff’s conclusory allegations that any

transfer of him from MCSP likely resulted from retaliation by the named defendants Warden

Campbell and Gibson. 

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moot because he has already been transferred to another custodial institution. See, e.g., Preiser 14/

v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 402-03 (1975); Johnson v. Moore, 948 F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 1991)

(per curiam) (when a prisoner challenges his conditions of confinement and seeks injunctive

relief, transfer to another prison typically renders the request for injunctive relief moot unless the

prisoner demonstrates that he will likely be transferred back). However, that line of case law is

not directly on point, because in those scenarios, the plaintiff obtained the actual relief sought,

i.e., a transfer from his current place of incarceration to another institution. Here, plaintiff was

trying to avoid transfer and has since been transferred. If the court were to infer that plaintiff still

means to pursue an injunctive remedy as requested in his amended complaint, it has to assume

that plaintiff now wishes to be transferred back to MCSP, as plaintiff seems to contend that he

was indeed transferred from MCSP in retaliation for airing his grievances against correctional

officer Lewis, among others. 

The real deficiency in plaintiff’s position is that plaintiff has failed to present any admissible

evidence linking his transfer to any alleged retaliatory conduct by defendants Warden Campbell

or Gibson, or any other MCSP or CDCR staff. That is, plaintiff has failed to present any

evidence suggesting a genuine issue of fact as to whether his transfer from MCSP deprived him

of his constitutional rights or that his exercise of his constitutional rights resulted in a retaliatory

transfer. Indeed, the facts regarding his ultimate transfer remain shrouded in mystery. In his

opposition, plaintiff does not submit any evidence as to when he was ultimately transferred by

MCSP, who authorized his transfer, or MCSP’s reason for the transfer. Any implied assertion

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15. Having failed to present any evidence regarding the circumstances of his transfer from

MCSP, the court also notes that “prisoners generally have no constitutionally-protected liberty

interest in being held at, or remaining at, a given facility.” Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th

Cir. 1995). In other words, the scope of injunctive relief sought by plaintiff far exceeds the

constitutional harms alleged. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) (“Prospective relief in any civil action

with respect to prison conditions shall extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of

the Federal right of a particular plaintiff....The court shall not grant or approve any prospective relief

unless the court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct

the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation

of the Federal right.”)

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that the transfer was retaliatory is wholly conclusory. While the court more fully discusses the

requirements of a retaliation claim, infra, with respect to defendant Gibson, plaintiff must prove

that he was retaliated against as punishment for the exercise of his constitutional rights and that

the retaliatory conduct did not serve any legitimate penological goals. As mentioned, plaintiff

has failed to produce any probative evidence pertaining to his ultimate permanent transfer out of

MCSP. Consequently, the court concludes that plaintiff has not submitted any evidence creating

a genuine issue of fact as to a link between his exercise of his constitutional rights and his

ultimate transfer by Warden Campbell, Gibson, or other officials of CDCR.15/

Based on the foregoing discussion, the court will grant summary judgment for defendant

Warden Campbell on plaintiff’s official capacity suit against defendant Warden Campbell or the

current, successor warden of MCSP for prospective injunctive relief preventing his transfer from

MCSP and, implicitly, seeking a transfer back to MCSP based on all claims in the amended

complaint against defendant Warden Campbell for deprivation of plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment

right. 

D. Defendant Gibson

As a preliminary matter, the court notes that plaintiff does not state factual allegations in his

amended complaint or submit evidence in conjunction with his opposition to the instant summary

judgment motion suggesting that defendant Gibson engaged in the conduct alleged in the second

or third claim of the amended complaint. Accordingly, the court will grant defendant Gibson

summary judgment as to the second and third claims of the amended complaint. 

The court now proceeds to address whether defendant Gibson is entitled to summary

judgment with respect to any deprivations of plaintiff’s constitutional rights alleged in claim one

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of the amended complaint. 

“[T]he treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is confined

are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31,

113 S. Ct. 2475 (1993). The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment and

“embodies the broad idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity and decency. 

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102, 97 S. Ct. 285 (1976). “No static ‘test’ can exist by which

courts determine whether conditions of confinement are cruel and unusual, for the Eighth

Amendment ‘must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the

progress of a maturing society.’” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346, 101 S. Ct. 2392

(1981) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101, 78 S. Ct. 590 (1958)).

“The Constitution ‘does not mandate comfortable prisons,’ but neither does it permit

inhumane ones....” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832, 114 S. Ct. 1970 (1994) (quoting

Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 349). In addition to placing restraints on the conduct of prison officials, the

Eighth Amendment also places affirmative duties on such officials. For example, “prison

officials must ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and

must ‘take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.’” Id. (quoting Hudson v.

Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27, 104 S. Ct. 3194 (1984).

However, to make out an Eighth Amendment violation, a plaintiff must prove that two

requirements are met. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. First, the alleged constitutional deprivation

objectively must be “sufficiently serious[.]” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298, 111 S. Ct. 2321

(1991). That is, “a prison official’s act or omission must result in the denial of ‘the minimal

civilized measure of life’s necessities.’” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at

347). When a Section 1983 plaintiff contends that a prison official failed to prevent harm, “the

inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious

harm.” Id.

As to the second requirement, an inmate must show that a prison official has a “sufficiently

culpable state of mind,” as “only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain implicates the

Eighth Amendment.” Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297 (internal quotations and citations omitted). In

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cases challenging the conditions of confinement, the state of mind standard is “‘deliberate

indifference’ to inmate health or safety.’” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at

302-03). In defining the deliberate indifference standard, the Supreme Court has held “that a

prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate

humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk

to inmate health or safety; the official must be aware of facts from which the inference could be

drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at

837.

As to the first claim, it appears plaintiff makes two contentions. First, defendant Gibson

deprived plaintiff of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment

when defendant Gibson refused to transfer plaintiff to another building but instead placed him in

administrative segregation (explained in more detail below). Second, plaintiff also contends that

defendant Gibson placed plaintiff in administrative segregation to punish plaintiff for speaking

out against correctional officer Lewis and reporting him to the Inspector General, i.e., an act of

retaliation. Hence plaintiff’s citation to the First Amendment as well as the Eighth Amendment

in claim one of the amended complaint.

Prisoners have protected “First Amendment rights to file prison grievances and to pursue

civil rights litigation in the courts.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 2005)

(internal citations and quotations omitted). As plaintiff was previously informed by the

magistrate judge in the first Screening Order, “[a] prisoner suing prison officials under [Section]

1983 for retaliation must allege that he [or she] was retaliated against for exercising his [or her]

constitutional rights and that the retaliatory action does not advance legitimate penological goals,

such as preserving institutional order and discipline.” Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 815-16

(9th Cir. 1994) ( per curiam) (citing Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir. 1985). 

Further, courts evaluate retaliation claims in light of the deference that must be accorded to

prison officials. Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995). The prisoner must submit

evidence demonstrating a link between the exercise of his constitutional rights and the

defendant’s allegedly retaliatory action. Id. And the prisoner must ultimately demonstrate that

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his First Amendment rights were chilled by the retaliatory action. Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d

443, 449 (9th Cir. 2000).

To the extent plaintiff alleges an Eighth Amendment deprivation claim against defendant

Gibson based on cruel and unusual punishment, he has not presented significant probative

evidence to create a genuine issue of fact that Gibson, in placing plaintiff in administrative

segregation, deprived plaintiff of the minimal civilized measures of life’s necessities or that such

incarceration was under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm to plaintiff and that

Gibson was deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s health and safety in doing so. Plaintiff contends

that he was harmed by Gibson because, without transfer to another building, he again was subject

to verbal harassment by Lewis. See Pl.’s Opp. at 4 (“Defendant Gibson knew there was a

dangerous situation evolving but did nothing to protect Plaintiff’s right to be free from violence

and personal safety, but instead Plaintiff was sent to Administrative Segregation....). However,

any harm to plaintiff associated with correctional officer Lewis’s verbal threats to plaintiff has

already been held by the court not to rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment deprivation. 

Therefore, subjecting plaintiff to continued verbal contact with Lewis by refusing to transfer

plaintiff did not as a matter of law deprive plaintiff of his Eighth Amendment right.

Furthermore, no where in his amended complaint or opposition does plaintiff challenge the

conditions of his one-day confinement in administrative segregation. Thus, plaintiff has

presented no evidence suggesting that the conditions of administrative segregation at MCSP fell

below the irreducible minimum of decency required by the Eighth Amendment. See, e.g.,

LaReau v. MacDougall, 473 F.2d 974, 978 (2d Cir. 1972) (inmate’s possession of prohibited

rope made from towels or bed sheets did not warrant five-day continuous confinement in a strip

cell that remained in almost total darkness day and night and contained no sanitary facilities other

than a “Chinese toilet,” i.e. a hole in the floor at the corner of the cell; holding confinement

violated cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment). Therefore, plaintiff

has failed to create a triable issue of material fact regarding whether placement in administrative

segregation for one day resulted in a deprivation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from

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16. The court also notes that plaintiff states in his declaration and opposition (though not

clearly in his amended complaint) that defendant Gibson told defendant Baker to retaliate against

plaintiff. However, this conclusory assertion is not supported by any admissible evidence and is not

part of the operative pleadings. In other words, plaintiff does not state that he has personal

knowledge of any statements made by Gibson to Baker and does not present any evidence

surrounding the interactions between Gibson and Baker. Plaintiff contends that the factual

allegations section of his amended complaint sets forth that Gibson asked Baker to retaliate against

plaintiff. However, the section of the amended complaint to which plaintiff refers describes how

Baker called plaintiff “Slick” instead of “McDonald” and then Baker implied that Gibson may have

referred to plaintiff as “Slick.” Am. Compl., ¶ 26. These limited allegations in the amended

complaint in conjunction with the lack of admissible evidence, do not establish that there is a triable

issue of material fact regarding whether Gibson asked Baker to sexually assault plaintiff. 

17. See e.g., Am. Compl., First Claim for Relief ¶ 40 (“McDonald is informed and believes,

and thereon allages [sic] that defendant Lt. Gibson is in a position of authority such that he could

arrange, or could have ordered to be arranged, a transfer for McDonald away from building 9 where

McDonald was subjected to retaliation and was fearful for his well-being and safty [sic]. McDonald

is further informed and believes, and thereon alleges that in fact Lt. Gibson heard and knew of

McDonald’s request for a transfer, of the alleged abuse and retaliation and of McDonald’s transfer

and instead tryed [sic] to make him forget his request for a building transfer by using his own

threats.”)

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cruel and unusual punishment.16/

With respect to the retaliation basis of plaintiff’s first claim for relief against Gibson, i.e.,

Gibson placed plaintiff in administrative segregation because plaintiff was exercising his First

Amendment right to express a complaint in the form of an administrative grievance against

Lewis, plaintiff also has failed to present any probative evidence creating a triable issue of

material fact. As a preliminary matter, the court acknowledges that the amended complaint does

not clearly allege that Gibson retaliated against plaintiff by placing him in administrative

segregation. Indeed, the allegations of retaliation in the first claim for relief are rather minimal

and vague. While plaintiff uses the term “retaliation” in the first claim, the allegations with

respect to Gibson center on Gibson’s alleged refusal to transfer plaintiff and assert that plaintiff

was harmed because Gibson refused to transfer plaintiff to another building. However, likely 17/

in response to the defendants’ framing of the issue in their MSJ, plaintiff’s opposition now

contends that claim one is really about Gibson’s retaliatory conduct of placing plaintiff in

administrative segregation as punishment for plaintiff’s statements that he was going to report

officer Lewis to the Inspector General. In light of the liberal construction of pro se pleadings, the

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court proceeds to address whether there is a triable issue of material fact that Gibson retaliated

against plaintiff by placing plaintiff in administrative segregation when plaintiff told Gibson

about plaintiff’s intent to report officer Lewis’s harassing conduct. 

The critical deficiency regarding plaintiff’s retaliation claim against Gibson is that there is

no factual dispute that Gibson gave plaintiff the option to either return to his building or be

placed in administrative segregation. Plaintiff has failed to present evidence demonstrating that

he had a right to an immediate transfer from his building due to his antagonistic relationship with

Lewis. As such, with plaintiff having been given a choice to either return to his building or be

placed in administrative segregation, there is no reasonable inference from the undisputed

evidence that Gibson’s alleged retaliatory animus was the but for cause of plaintiff’s placement

in administrative segregation. Instead, plaintiff chose to go into administrative segregation rather

than return to his building. See Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161, 1166 (5th Cir. 1995) (“To state a

claim of retaliation an inmate must allege the violation of a specific constitutional right and be

prepared to establish that but for the retaliatory motive the complained of incident...would not

have occurred.”), relied on in Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1289 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Furthermore, none of the admissible evidence discloses that during his encounter with

Gibson, defendant Gibson foreclosed plaintiff’s option to return to his building or that plaintiff

finally agreed to return to his building but then defendant Gibson required plaintiff to be placed

in administrative segregation nonetheless. Indeed, the Facts Section of plaintiff’s amended 

complaint states as follows:

McDonald also told Lt. Gibson that he was reporting C/O Lewis to the Inspector General. 

Lt. Gibson tells McDonald that he is following the wrong course of action and, “You

need to leave all this alone and go back to your building.” McDonald requested to be

moved to another building so he would not have to be subjected to C/O Lewis’ [sic]

abuse anymore. Lt. Gibson tells McDonald, “You can go back to your building or you

can go to the hole.” McDonald said, “I would rather go to the hole than return to that

buildimg [sic] and have to deal with that officer’s shit.” McDonald was then told he

would be going to the hole. 

Am. Compl., ¶¶ 24-25. 

By the factual allegations in his amended complaint, plaintiff admits that he was given a

choice to either return to his building or be placed in administrative segregation. Plaintiff’s

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18. While not relevant to the inquiry of whether plaintiff was sent to administrative

segregation in response to his complaints against Lewis, the court acknowledges that plaintiff

appears to represent in his opposition, declaration, and amended complaint that he was in fact

transferred to another building upon his release from the one-day administrative segregation as he

requested (though again, his statements with respect to a building transfer are rather vague).

However, he does not inform the court of any additional facts with respect to that transfer. 

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declaration and opposition support the undisputed fact that he was given a choice by defendant

Gibson to return to his (plaintiff’s) building. Instead, plaintiff explains in his opposition why he

said he would rather go to administrative segregation, i.e., because he was afraid to return to his

assigned building. But, plaintiff does not present evidence that he was never given the option to

return to his building. See Pl.’s Decl., ¶ 9 (“...and the only reason Plaintiff express [sic] going to

Administrative Segregation, because Plaintiff was afraid to return to the building with Lewis.”);

see also Pl.’s Opp. at 3 (After plaintiff informed Gibson that plaintiff and his family were going

to report Lewis “...Gibson told plaintiff just forget about all of this and to go back to the building

with Mr. Lewis because Gibson was ready to send Plaintiff to Administrative Segregation. 

Plaintiff told Gibson that Plaintiff was afraid and could not go back to the building with Mr.

Lewis fearing more harrassment [sic], and plaintiff did not wat [sic] to deal with the harassment

of Mr. Lewis. Plaintiff begged to be sent to a different building. Gibsons stated that he was

going to send plaintiff to the hole instead of to a different building. Plaintiff told Gibson that he

[would] rather go to the hole instead [of] having to go back to the building.”). Thus, plaintiff 18/

has not presented evidence establishing a triable issue of material fact suggesting that Gibson

placed plaintiff in administrative segregation as retaliation for plaintiff’s stated intention to report

officer Lewis to higher administrative authorities. 

 The court will grant defendant C. Gibson’s motion for summary judgment on the first

claim of the amended complaint 

//

//

//

//

//

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IV. Disposition

For the foregoing reasons, the court orders that the summary judgment motion of defendants

C. Gibson and Roseanne Campbell, in her official capacity as warden of MCSP, be granted as to

plaintiff Jeffrey D. McDonald’s amended complaint and each and every claim therein. 

Dated: April 2, 2010 /s/ Robert J. Timlin 

U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

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