Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-02196/USCOURTS-ca10-94-02196-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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F I L E J?A---~:.. "' •ted States Court o ~"~~' UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL~01 Tenth Circuit 

PUBLISH 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

CHRISTOPHER YPARREA, 

• SEP 01 1995 

PATRICK FISHER Cierl~ 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

v. No. 94-2196 

DONALD A. DORSEY, Warden, 

and ATTORNEY GENERAL OF 

NEW MEXICO, 

Respondents-App~llees. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. No. CIV-93-320-HB) 

Submitted on the briefs:* 

Kurt J. Mayer, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Office of 

the Federal Public Defender, Las Cruces, New Mexico, for 

Petitioner-Appellant. 

Tom Udall, Attorney General (Patricia A. Gandert with him on 

the brief), Office of the Attorney General, State of New 

Mexico, Santa Fe, New Mexico, for Respondent-Appellees. 

Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, McKAY and HENRY, Circuit Judges. 

HENRY, Circuit Judge. 

* After exam~n~ng the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause therefore is ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

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Appellate Case: 94-2196 Document: 01019276735 Date Filed: 09/01/1995 Page: 1 
New Mexico prisoner Christopher Eugene Yparrea appeals from 

the dismissal of his habeas corpus petition. He contends that the 

state subjected him to double jeopardy when it enhanced his 

sentence using two prior felonies, the first of which had already 

been used to establish the second. Additionally, he contends that 

it was double jeopardy to impose consecutive sentences for 

burglary and larceny on the same set of facts. For the reasons 

given below, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND 

Christopher Eugene Yparrea is a New Mexico prisoner currently 

serving a twelve and one-half year sentence for residential 

burglary, larceny, criminal damage to property under $1000, and 

making a false report. He was arrested after he broke into a 

house and stole a television, a videocassette recorder, and other 

electronic gear. He has two prior felonies: in 1986 he was 

convicted of receiving stolen property, and in 1988 he was 

convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The 1986 

conviction was used to establish his status as a felon in the 1988 

case. 

Mr. Yparrea's present sentence was enhanced by a total of 

eight years (two four-year enhancements on the burglary and 

larceny charges) under New Mexico's habitual criminal offender 

statute, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-18-17. He challenged the 

enhancement on double jeopardy grounds in state court, and lost. 

State v. Yparrea, 845 P.2d 1259 (N.M. App. 1992), cert. denied, 

845 P.2d 814 (N.M. 1993). 

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Appellate Case: 94-2196 Document: 01019276735 Date Filed: 09/01/1995 Page: 2 
Mr. Yparrea then filed a habeas petition, re-urging the 

enhancement issue and arguing additionally that conviction for 

burglary and larceny on the same set of facts was also double 

jeopardy. The case was assigned to a magistrate, who initially 

recommended dismissing the case without prejudice so that Mr. 

Yparrea could exhaust his state appeals on the new issue. The 

magistrate then amended his recommendation; he concluded that it 

was preferable to consider and dismiss the unexhausted claim at 

once because it failed to raise a colorable federal issue. See 

Miranda v. Cooper, 967 F.2d 392, 400 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 

113 S. Ct. 347 (1992). The district court adopted the amended 

recommendation and dismissed the petition with prejudice. The 

present appeal follows. 

DISCUSSION 

We review the district court's decision on both double 

jeopardy issues de novo, United States v. Raymer, 941 F.2d 1031, 

1037 (lOth Cir. 1991), and affirm. 

A. 

Mr. Yparrea's first contention is that his Fifth Amendment 

double jeopardy rights were violated when his 1986 conviction for 

receiving stolen property was used twice: once when he was 

convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm, and again 

when his current sentence was enhanced by a total of eight years. 

The Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits the state from imposing 

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Appellate Case: 94-2196 Document: 01019276735 Date Filed: 09/01/1995 Page: 3 
multiple punishments for the same offense. North Carolina v. 

Pearce, 395 u.s. 711, 717 (1969). 

Mr. Yparrea does not contend that sentencing enhancements in 

general are a second punishment for a prior offense. Like all 

such statutes, New Mexico's habitual offender statute does not 

multiply punishments for a prior crime, but simply increases the 

punishment for a new crime. See Yparrea, 845 P.2d at 1262. See 

generally Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 623 (1912). 

Because sentences enhanced under habitual offender statutes are 

not punishment for the prior offense, they do not normally raise 

double jeopardy issues. 

Mr. Ypa~rea nonetheless urges that his particular 

enhancements are impermissible under State v. Haddenham, 793 P.2d 

279 (N.M. App. 1990), cert. denied, 792 P.2d 49 (N.M. 1990). 

There the court held that it was double jeopardy to use a single 

prior conviction to establish that the defendant ~as a felon in 

possession of a firearm (a felony under N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-7-16) 

and then to enhance the resulting sentence. Id. at 283. The 

court reasoned that while the habitual offender statute did not 

expressly prohibit the use of the same offense both to convict and 

to enhance the resulting sentence, the legislature did not intend 

such double use to occur. Mr. Yparrea argues from Haddenham that 

the use of his 1986 conviction once to establish the 1988 felony, 

and again to enhance his current sentenc[Be, is likewise double 

jeopardy. 

Whether punishments are "multiple" is essentially a question 

of legislative intent. Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 499 (1984). 

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Appellate Case: 94-2196 Document: 01019276735 Date Filed: 09/01/1995 Page: 4 
• 

To determine the intent of a state legislature we turn to state 

court decisions. Mansfield v. Champion, 992 F.2d 1098, 1100 (lOth 

Cir. 1993). In this case, we need not go far. Despite Mr. 

Yparrea's statement to the contrary, the New Mexico court that 

heard his appeal correctly distinguished Haddenham and determined 

that his enhancement did not violate legislative intent. Yparrea, 

845 P.2d at 1261-62. We accept that determination as dispositive. 

!L. 

Mr. Yparrea also argues that his convictions and consecutive 

sentences for burglary and larceny violated double jeopardy 

because they were based on the same underlying transaction or 

conduct. He argues first that the two charges arose from the same 

transaction, and second that in this case larceny was a "lesser 

included offense" of burglary. Nonetheless, the magistrate judge 

concluded that this was not a colorable claim, and so recommended 

dismissal under Miranda v. Cooper, supra. 

We agree that this was not a colorable claim. First, the 

pure "same transaction" test for double jeopardy, although 

defensible on policy grounds, see Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 

453-54 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring), has never been the law. 

It is true that Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 510 (1990), created 

a similar but narrower test in the context of multiple 

prosecutions, finding double jeopardy wherever an element of the 

second crime is established by proving conduct that was part of a 

previously prosecuted offense. But Grady was overruled by United 

States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2860 (1993). After Dixon, the 

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• 

correct test is the one first set forth in Blockburger v. United 

States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932): double jeopardy does not occur 

as long as each punished offense requires proof of a fact that the 

other does not. See Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2856. 

Blockburger also precludes Mr. Yparrea's second argument, 

that his sentence violates double jeopardy because larceny is a 

lesser included offense of burglary. See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 

161, 169 (1977) (holding that the Fifth Amendment forbids 

cumulative punishment for greater and lesser included offenses) . 

Larceny is not a lesser included offense of burglary. Each crime 

includes an element not contained in the other. Burglary requires 

entry into a dwelling, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-16-3; larceny does 

not, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-16-1. Larceny requires an actual 

taking, id.; burglary does not. Thus, a separate sentence for 

each survives the Blockburger test. 

Nor do the crimes of burglary and larceny "merge" in New 

Mexico. Burglary is in a sense a crime of attempt; an element of 

common law burglary surviving in most statutory schemes is that 

the dwelling be entered "with the intent to commit any felony or 

theft therein." N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-16-3. See generally 2 

Wayne R. LaFave and Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law 

§ 8.13(e) (1986). Once the defendant enters the dwelling with the 

requisite intent, the burglary is complete. Thus, burglary and 

larceny did not merge at common law, see King v. Vandercomb, 2 

Leach. 708, 717, 168 Eng. Rep. 455, 460 (K.B. 1796) (allowing 

prosecution for breaking and entering with intent to steal after 

dismissal of previous prosecution for breaking and entering and 

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stealing); Morgan v. Devine, 237 U.S. 632, 639 & n.1 (1915) 

(reviewing cases and commentary), and do not merge in New Mexico, 

State v. McAfee, 428 P.2d 647, 650 (N.M. 1967); State v. Deats, 

487 P.2d 139, 144 (N.M. App. 1971). As above, we look to state 

court decisions to define merger for double jeopardy purposes. In 

light of such clear state precedent, we perceive no error in the 

magistrate's conclusion that this is not a colorable claim. 

The district court's order dismissing the habeas petition 

with prejudice is AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

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