Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-00083/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-00083-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THOMAS JEFFERSON CARES,

No. 2:08-CV-00083-MCE-GGH

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DEBRA BOWEN, in her official

capacity as California

Secretary of State; EDMUND G.

BROWN, in his official

capacity as California

Attorney General, et. al.,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

This matter came before this Court on January 31, 2008. 

Plaintiff Thomas Jefferson Cares appeared on his own behalf. 

Nathan Barankin, Deputy Attorney General, represented Defendants.

Plaintiff Thomas Jefferson Cares brings this action and the

accompanying application for temporary restraining order against

various California public officials and agencies including the

Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and the Registrars or

Clerks of all 58 California counties. 

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Plaintiff alleges that the Official Ballot Title and Official

Ballot Summary for Proposition 93 - both of which were drafted by

the Attorney General for the State of California - are

intentionally misleading and will cause election results counter

to the actual will of the electorate of the State of California. 

Plaintiff asserts that the manner in which Proposition 93 has

proceeded is unconstitutional and denies due process. Plaintiff

seeks a pre-election temporary restraining order enjoining the

enforcement of Proposition 93 - a measure which has not, and may

not, be enacted.

BACKGROUND

Current California law provides that an individual may serve

no more than two (2) four-year terms in the California Senate and

three (3) two-year terms in the California Assembly. The net

result is that no individual may serve more than fourteen (14)

years in the California Legislature. Cal. Const., Art. 4, § 2.

Proposition 93 proposes amendments to California law that

provide that a California legislator could serve a maximum of

twelve (12) years in the California Legislature without regard to

the house in which the legislator serves those twelve years. 

Proposition 93 also proposes amendments such that state

legislators in office at the time of enactment would be allowed

to continue serving for up to twelve years in the house in which

they currently serve, regardless of prior service in the other

house.

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The Official Ballot Title for Proposition 93 is: "LIMITS ON

LEGISLATORS' TERMS IN OFFICE. INITIATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL

AMENDMENT." The Official Summary reads: 

• Reduces the total amount of time a person may

serve in the state legislature from 14 years

to 12 years.

• Allows a person to serve a total of 12 years

either in the Assembly, the Senate, or a

combination of both.

• Provides a transition period to allow current

members to serve a total of 12 consecutive

years in the house in which they are currently

serving, regardless of any prior service in

another house.

California law requires the Attorney General "prepare a

summary of the chief purposes and points of the proposed

measure." Cal. Elec. Code § 9004. Further, "[i]n providing the

ballot title, the Attorney General shall give a true and

impartial statement of the purpose of the measure in such

language that the ballot title shall neither be an argument, nor

be likely to create prejudice, for or against the proposed

measure." Id. at § 9051.

California elections law provides for a 20-day public

display period for the Attorney General's title and summary. Id.

at § 9092. During this period, voters may review the ballot

materials and file suit challenging the ballot materials. Id. 

Plaintiff sought a writ of mandate in Sacramento Superior Court

challenging the ballot title and summary. 

Case 2:08-cv-00083-MCE -GGH Document 28 Filed 02/04/08 Page 3 of 9
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Following oral argument on the matter, the writ was denied. 

Plaintiff then filed a "Motion to Stay Ballot Pamphlet Printing

Pending Appeal" with the Third District Court of Appeal. That

motion was denied. Plaintiff then filed a "Petition for Review

with Request for Stay" with the California Supreme Court. That

petition, too, was denied. Plaintiff now comes before this Court

seeking a temporary restraining order invalidating Proposition 93

and requiring defendants: discontinue issuing ballots which offer

a vote on Proposition 93 and disregard any votes cast for or

against Proposition 93. At oral argument, Plaintiff withdrew his

requests that related to the ballots and counting of votes. The

issue remaining before this Court is Plaintiff’s request for a

temporary restraining order invalidating Proposition 93 and

restraining its enforcement should the California electorate

enact the proposition. For a myriad of reasons, the Court finds

this issue, and with it Plaintiff’s entire complaint, is nonjusticiable. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s

request is DENIED and this matter is TERMINATED.

STANDARD

Issuance of a temporary restraining order, as a form of

preliminary injunctive relief, is an extraordinary remedy, and

plaintiffs have the burden of proving the propriety of such a

remedy by clear and convincing evidence. See Granny Goose Foods,

Inc. v. Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 442 (1974). In order to warrant

issuance of such relief, certain prerequisites must be satisfied. 

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Under the so-called “traditional” standard, an injunction may be

had if the court determines that (1) the moving party will suffer

the possibility of irreparable injury if the relief is denied;

(2) there is a strong likelihood that the moving party will

prevail on the merits at trial; (3) the balance of potential harm

favors the moving party; and (4) the public interest favors

granting relief. Johnson v. Cal. State Bd. of Accountancy, 72

F.3d 1427, 1430 (9th Cir. 1995) Under the “alternative”

standard, an injunction properly issues when a party demonstrates

either: (1) a combination of probable success on the merits and

the possibility of irreparable injury if relief is not granted;

or (2) the existence of serious questions going to the merits

combined with a balancing of hardships tipping sharply in favor

of the moving party. Id., see also Idaho Sporting Congress, Inc.

v. Alexander, 222 F.3d 562, 565 (9th Cir. 2000); Earth Island

Institute v. U.S. Forest Service, 442 F.3d 1147, 1158 (9th Cir.

2006). The requirement for showing a likelihood of irreparable

harm increases or decreases in inverse correlation to the

probability of success on the merits, with these factors

representing two points on a sliding scale. United States v.

Nutri-cology, Inc., 982 F.2d 394, 397 (9th Cir. 1992).

The propriety of a temporary restraining order, in

particular, hinges on a significant threat of irreparable injury

(Simula, Inc. Autoliv, Inc., 175 F.3d 716, 725 (9th Cir. 1999))

that must be imminent in nature. Caribbean Marine Serv. Co. v.

Baldridge, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988).

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ANALYSIS

The crux of Plaintiff's argument is that Proposition 93, if

enacted, will increase term limits and that the ballot title and

summary prepared by the Attorney General is misleading. 

Therefore, according to Plaintiff, Proposition 93 has proceeded

in such a way that its enactment can only be unconstitutional. 

Federal courts are not in the practice of policing state

elections. "There is no doubt that the right to vote is

fundamental, but a federal court cannot lightly interfere with or

enjoin a state election." Sw. Voter Registration Educ. Project

v. Shelley, 344 F.3d 914, 918 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Reynolds v.

Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555, 585 (1964)). "The decision to enjoin an

impending election is so serious that the Supreme Court has

allowed elections to go forward even in the face of an undisputed

constitutional violation." Id. (citations). "Interference with

impending elections is extraordinary ... and interference with an

election after voting has begun is unprecedented." Id. at 919. 

This is especially the case where, as here, an election has

already begun, almost one million voters have already cast their

votes, and the state has expended considerable time and resources

in reliance on the election proceeding as planned. Id. (holding

balance of hardships weighed in favor of denying postponement of

election where state had expended enormous resources to prepare

ballots and voter information packets and where hundreds of

thousands of absentee voters had already cast their votes). Such

"investments of time, money, and the exercise of citizenship

rights cannot be returned." Id. 

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Further, it is settled law that states are free to design

their own elections laws and procedures and these are political

questions beyond the reach of the federal courts. A federal

court may interfere only when a state election law denies equal

protection, abridges the freedom of speech, or violates a federal

statute. Federal courts must normally defer to the states'

regulatory interests when these federal rights are not

implicated. Bennett v. Yoshina, 140 F.3d 1218, 1225 (9th Cir.

1998) (citations). Plaintiff's complaint makes no mention of any

denial of equal protection, nor of any abridgment of free speech,

nor of any violation of a federal statute but rather points only

to an unarticulated denial of due process. Therefore, the issues

raised by this action fall squarely within the State's powers to

regulate its elections and this Court must defer to the State's

interests. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s application for temporary

restraining order is DENIED.

Moreover, the Court finds that this case is not justiciable. 

The relief requested - namely, the request to enjoin the

enforcement of a law that has not yet been enacted - raises

justiciability issues including, but not limited to, whether or

not the case is ripe and whether Plaintiff has standing to assert

the case at this juncture. 

Plaintiff has not yet suffered an "injury-in-fact." A

plaintiff must have suffered a concrete injury that is actual or

imminent, and not merely conjectural or hypothetical. Nat'l

Audobon Soc’y, Inc. v. Davis, 307 F.3d 835, 848 (9th Cir. 2002)

(citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561). 

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 Nor is this an irreparable harm sufficient to support the 1

issuance of a temporary restraining order.

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Here, Plaintiff asserts that the state electorate may be

dissuaded by the ballot summary and that the ballot summary may

cause electors to cast votes that are contrary to their actual

intent. This is not an actual or imminent injury. California 1

voters may defeat Proposition 93, in which case Plaintiff will

suffer no injury and the issues raised here will be moot. Should

that be the case, any decision this Court were to render on the

merits would be merely advisory. This Court is loathe to render

an advisory opinion. “Courts must refrain from deciding abstract

or hypothetical controversies and from rendering impermissible

advisory opinions with respect to such controversies.” Earth

Island Inst. v. Ruthenbeck, 490 F.3d 687, 694 (9th Cir. 2007)

(citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96 (1968)). This is 

particularly the case where, such as here, the issues raised are

purely state law matters. Further, should the California

electors enact Proposition 93, Plaintiff’s recourse is to

challenge that law via the California court system and not in the

federal courts. As such, Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue this

matter.

Further, a pre-election challenge to a proposed change in

the law is not a matter that is ripe for judicial review. In

determining whether a case is ripe for judicial review, a court

may consider: "(1) whether the issues are fit for judicial

resolution and (2) the potential hardship to the parties if

judicial resolution is postponed." 

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Nat'l Audobon Soc’y, 307 F.3d at 850 (citing Abbott Labs. v.

Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967)). Here, the issues are not fit

for judicial review. As discussed above, this case does not

present the sort of constitutional questions which generally

provide for federal review of state election laws. Additionally,

as also discussed above, the hardship to the parties of

postponing the resolution of this matter is negligible in that

Plaintiff is not barred from challenging the validity of

Proposition 93, should the voters of California adopt the

measure. As such, the case is not yet ripe and it is imprudent

for the Court to hear Plaintiff’s case at this time.

Because this Court finds that this case does not present a

justiciable issue, the Court does not address the remaining

points addressed in the parties’ papers. Based on the foregoing,

Plaintiff’s request for temporary restraining order is DENIED and

this matter is TERMINATED. The Clerk of the Court is directed to

close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 1, 2008

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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