Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cv-00183/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cv-00183-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:1383 Review of HHS Decision

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Mohamed Alenizi, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of 

Social Security Administration 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-11-183-TUC-JGZ-DTF

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Mohamed Alenizi brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and

1383(c)(3), seeking judicial review of a final decision by the Commissioner of Social

Security (Commissioner). This case presents three issues on appeal: whether the

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) erred in concluding, without the assistance of a vocational

expert, that Alenizi could perform other work in the economy; whether the ALJ erred in

finding that Alenizi could learn and remember detailed instructions; and whether the ALJ

erred in evaluating lay witness testimony. Before the Court are Alenizi’s Opening Brief,

Respondent’s Response and a Reply. (Docs. 15, 19, 22.) Based on the pleadings and the

administrative record submitted to the Court, the Magistrate Judge recommends the District

Court, after its independent review, remand to the ALJ.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Alenizi filed an application for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) on September 14,

2007. (Administrative Record (AR) 93.) Alenizi alleged disability from January 1, 2005. (Id.)

Alenizi’s application was denied upon initial review (AR 68-71) and on reconsideration (AR

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73-75). A hearing was held on September 15, 2009 (AR 35-64), after which ALJ Larry E.

Johnson found, at Step Five, that Alenizi was not disabled (AR 23-31). The Appeals Council

denied Alenizi’s request to review the ALJ’s decision. (AR 13.)

FACTUAL HISTORY

Alenizi was born on April 25, 1964, making him 40 at the alleged onset date of his

disability. (AR 93.) He entered the United States as a refugee from Kuwait on April 26, 2001;

he had been removed from that country because he was an undocumented bedouin. (AR 57-

59, 93, 100.) He attended elementary education in Kuwait (AR 56) and never worked

because he was undocumented (AR 57). After coming to the United States, he worked as a

dishwasher from 2001 to 2003, earning approximately $8000 the first two years and $4000

the final year. (AR 105, 114.) He stopped working on August 1, 2003, when he was fired due

to his problems with other workers. (AR 47, 113.)

The ALJ found that Alenizi had three severe impairments, diabetes mellitus type II,

hypertension and bipolar disorder. (AR 25.) The ALJ concluded that Alenizi had no

exertional impairments and could perform the full range of work for all exertional levels with

certain nonexertional impairments: he does not speak English well, must work in a setting

with few social contacts, and he can learn and remember detailed instructions. (AR 27.) The

ALJ found Alenizi unable to perform his past relevant work as a dishwasher because it

required frequent social contacts. (AR 30.) The ALJ found that Alenizi’s ability to perform

work at all exertional levels was effected only minimally by his nonexertional limitations and

those limitations did not significantly erode the potential occupational base. (AR 30-31.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Commissioner employs a five-step sequential process to evaluate SSI claims. 20

C.F.R. § 416.920; see also Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 460-462 (1983). To establish

disability the claimant bears the burden of showing he (1) is not working; (2) has a severe

physical or mental impairment; (3) the impairment meets or equals the requirements of a

listed impairment; and (4) claimant’s residual functional capacity (RFC) precludes him from

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performing his past work. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4). At Step Five, the burden shifts to the

Commissioner to show that the claimant has the RFC to perform other work that exists in

substantial numbers in the national economy. Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071, 1074 (9th

Cir. 2007). If the Commissioner conclusively finds the claimant “disabled” or “not disabled”

at any point in the five-step process, he does not proceed to the next step. 20 C.F.R.

§ 416.920(a)(4).

In this case, Alenizi was denied at Step Five of the evaluation process. The Step Five

determination is made on the basis of four factors: the claimant’s RFC, age, education and

work experience. Hoopai, 499 F.3d at 1074. “The Commissioner can meet this burden

through the testimony of a vocational expert or by reference to the Medical Vocational

Guidelines.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 955 (9th Cir. 2002).

“The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical

testimony, and for resolving ambiguities.” Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir.

1995) (citing Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989)). The findings of the

Commissioner are meant to be conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C.

§ 405(g). Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance.”

Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d

1016, 1018 (9th Cir. 1992)). The court may overturn the decision to deny benefits only

“when the ALJ’s findings are based on legal error or are not supported by substantial

evidence in the record as a whole.” Aukland v. Massanari, 257 F.3d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir.

2001). This is so because the ALJ “and not the reviewing court must resolve conflicts in the

evidence, and if the evidence can support either outcome, the court may not substitute its

judgment for that of the ALJ.” Matney, 981 F.2d at 1019 (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402

U.S. 389, 400 (1971)); Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1198 (9th Cir.

2004). The Commissioner’s decision, however, “cannot be affirmed simply by isolating a

specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Sousa v. Callahan, 143 F.3d 1240, 1243 (9th Cir.

1998) (citing Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989)). Reviewing courts must

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consider the evidence that supports as well as detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusion.

Day v. Weinberger, 522 F.2d 1154, 1156 (9th Cir. 1975).

DISCUSSION

Alenizi contends the ALJ erred at Step Five by determining that his limited ability to

speak English and need to work in a setting with limited social contacts had only a slight

effect on the occupational base of available work. Second, he argues the ALJ’s finding that

he could learn and remember detailed instructions was error. Third, he argues the ALJ erred

in rejecting the lay testimony of Alenizi’s niece, Sheikha Alenizi.

Step Five Decision

Alenizi argues his occupational base is significantly impacted by several adverse

vocational factors or nonexertional limitations: that he speaks Arabic almost exclusively and

very little English, is illiterate, and can only work in a setting requiring few social contacts.

He argues that the ALJ erred in making the Step Five decision without the testimony of a

vocational expert.

During the Step Five analysis, an ALJ looks to the Medical-Vocational Guidelines,

or grids, when evaluating what other work in the national economy a claimant can perform.

When the claimant has solely nonexertional limitations, these grids do not govern the

disability finding; however, the accompanying rules must be considered in evaluating the

claimant’s ability to do other work. It’s not error for an ALJ to use the grids without a

vocational expert, even with a claimant who has non-exertional impairments. Hoopai v.

Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071, 1075 (9th Cir. 2007). However, if the non-exertional limitations are

“sufficiently severe,” such that they significantly limit the work available, the grids are not

applicable. Id.

Here, the ALJ considered the rules that accompany the grids to the extent applicable

to Alenizi’s non-exertional limitations. (AR 30.) Because he could perform work at any

exertional level, the ALJ found Alenizi’s potential occupational base was large and not

significantly eroded by his limitations. (AR 30-31.) The ALJ relied upon section 204.00 of

the guidelines and SSR 85-15.

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Alenizi argues that SSR 85-15 does not support but undermines the ALJ’s

determination. He notes that a purpose of SSR 85-15 is to emphasize that “the potential job

base for mentally ill claimants without adverse vocational factors is not necessarily large.”

However, the SSR goes on to say, “unless their remaining mental capacities are sufficient to

meet the demands of at least unskilled, competitive, remunerative work on a sustained basis.”

SSR 85-15. The ALJ concluded Alenizi had the mental capacities for such work, thus, this

stated purpose does not drive any particular result in this case.

Alenizi also relies upon hypothetical three from SSR 85-15, where the claimant was

found disabled based on the following factors: closely approaching retirement age (50-54),

limited education or less, and did unskilled work for 30 years as a cafeteria server but a

severe mental impairment now precludes frequently dealing with the public. Plaintiff argues

that, although he is classified as a “younger individual,” he is illiterate and unable to

communicate in English, which is a significantly lower educational level than the

hypothetical. Further, he only worked for three years in contrast to the 30 years of the person

in the hypothetical. In light of that comparison, he argues that he, too, should be found

disabled. The guidelines treat a younger person with unskilled experience and no experience

the same; thus, Alenizi’s work history is treated equivalently with the person in the

hypothetical. More importantly, SSR 85-15 notes that the outcome of the hypothetical would

not necessarily be the same for a younger person. Although relevant to consider, this

hypothetical is not outcome determinative.

In responding to Alenizi’s argument about the hypothetical, it is helpful to look at

some of the provisions that accompany the vocational grids. For example, one of the rules

provides:

For individuals who are under age 45, age is a more advantageous factor for

making an adjustment to other work. It is usually not a significant factor in

limiting such individuals’ ability to make an adjustment to other work,

including an adjustment to unskilled sedentary work, even when the

individuals are unable to communicate in English or are illiterate in English.

20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, App. 2, 201.00(h)(2). Thus, the guidelines give significant

weight to the age of the claimant. A person of Alenizi’s age, who is unskilled and unable to

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communicate in English, are generally considered able to perform other work, even when the

person is limited to sedentary work. 

Although Alenizi is restricted from working in a setting requiring a lot of interaction,

he has no physical exertional limitations. As reflected in the section of the appendix upon

which the ALJ relies, “[A]n impairment which does not preclude heavy work (or very heavy

work) would not ordinarily be the primary reason for unemployment, and generally is

sufficient for a finding of not disabled, even though age, education and skill level of prior

work experience may be considered adverse.” 20 C.F.R. §404, Subpart P, App. 2, 204.00.

Further, an inability to communicate in English is least significant for unskilled work, which

tends to require working with objects rather than people; similarly, lack of relevant work

experience is not significant to unskilled work. 201.00(h)(4)(i). “[T]he functional capability

for a full range of sedentary work represents sufficient numbers of jobs to indicate substantial

vocational scope for those individuals age 18-44 even if they are illiterate or unable to

communicate in English.” Id. In light of the fact that unskilled work most commonly involves

working with objects, a restriction to limited social contact should be accommodated by a

sufficient number of unskilled positions. Under the guidelines discussed above, there are

sufficient jobs for younger unskilled persons unable to communicate in English solely in the

sedentary sector. Because Alenizi can perform work at all exertional levels, the ALJ’s finding

is well-founded under the guidelines.

SSR 85-15 provides that:

The basic mental demands of competitive, remunerative, unskilled work

include the abilities (on a sustained basis) to understand, carry out, and

remember simple instructions; to respond appropriately to supervision,

coworkers, and usual work situations; and to deal with changes in a routine

work setting. A substantial loss of ability to meet any of these basic workrelated activities would severely limit the potential occupational basis.

The ALJ found, based on the medical source opinions of record, that Alenizi did not have

more than a moderate impairment as to these abilities.

Alenizi’s non-exertional limitations are not sufficiently severe such that the ALJ was

required to obtain testimony from a vocational expert. The rules do not require it. While it

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would have been helpful for the ALJ to obtain testimony from a vocational expert, which

would have provided more detailed information about the work Alenizi could perform, it was

not required. The ALJ did not commit legal error in concluding that Alenizi’s non-exertional

limitations did not significantly limit the range of work otherwise available to him, in light

of the absence of any exertional limitations.

RFC

The ALJ found that Alenizi could learn and remember detailed instructions. (AR 27.)

Alenizi argues this finding was error because the ALJ failed to explain the contradictory

opinions in the record regarding Alenizi’s abilities in this area.

In reaching his RFC findings, the ALJ stated that he gave great weight to Dr. Andrew

Jones, examining psychologist, and Dr. Eugene Campbell, consulting non-examining

psychologist. (AR 29.) Dr. Jones noted that it was difficult to complete typical questions of

concentration and memory due to the language barrier but that Alenizi evidenced no

difficulties with immediate or remote recall. (AR 226.) However, Dr. Jones noted that Alenizi

reported being forgetful and that he had not progressed in English classes after four years.

(Id.) Dr. Jones concluded that Alenizi had moderate difficulties with memory based on his

self-reporting. (AR 227.) Also based on self-report, Dr. Jones found that Alenizi had mild to

moderate difficulties with concentration. (Id.) In contrast, Dr. Campbell found that Alenizi

was not significantly limited in his ability to understand and remember detailed instructions.

(AR 230.) However, he did find that Alenizi had moderate difficulties in maintaining

concentration, persistence or pace. (AR 244.) The ALJ provided no rationale for his finding

that Alenizi could learn and remember detailed instructions.

Defendant argues that the ALJ’s finding was not contradicted by Dr. Jones’s opinion.

In particular, he points out that Dr. Jones noted no difficulty with recall and found it difficult

to fully examine Alenizi’s memory and concentration. Although true (AR 226), Dr. Jones

credited Alenizi’s reports of being forgetful, acknowledged that he had not progressed in

English class for four years, and concluded that Alenizi had moderate difficulties with

memory (AR 226-27). Further, although Dr. Jones did not respond to a specific question about

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Alenizi’s ability to remember instructions, his general finding of moderate limitations in

memory and concentration are related. The Court finds there is a conflict in the evidence

regarding Alenizi’s ability to learn and remember instructions, and the ALJ adopted the

opinion of Dr. Campbell.

The ALJ was required to provide “specific and legitimate reasons,” supported by

substantial evidence, to reject the opinion of examining physician Jones. Lester v. Chater, 81

F.3d 821, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1995). The ALJ did not explain the conflict or his reason for

rejecting Dr. Jones’s opinion. Defendant argues that a medical opinion can be rejected when

it is based primarily upon the claimant’s self-report, as he contends was the circumstance of

Dr. Jones’s opinion. This is irrelevant because, although the ALJ acknowledged that Dr. Jones

took note that Alenizi’s limitations were self-reported (AR 29), the ALJ did not reject Dr.

Jones’s opinion for that reason. Rather, he said he gave both Dr. Jones’s and Dr. Campbell’s

opinions great weight, when in fact he rejected part of Dr. Jones’s opinion with no

explanation. In addition to Dr. Jones’s opinion and Alenizi’s testimony (AR 133), Alenizi’s

niece stated that he had problems with concentration and memory and could not remember

directions. (AR 151.)

Defendant also argues that this particular finding had no bearing on the ALJ’s ultimate

disability determination. Because unskilled work requires only that a person be able to

remember and carry out simple instructions, he contends that ability would not be impaired

by moderate difficulties with memory. Here, Defendant finds himself in the position of trying

to justify the ALJ’s decision after the fact. It is not this Court’s province to now assess

whether moderate difficulties with memory would erode the occupational base of unskilled

work. That is the role of the ALJ. See Pinto v. Massanari, 240 F.3d 840, 847-48 (9th Cir.

2001) (Court cannot affirm decision of ALJ on a ground not invoked by the ALJ).

The ALJ erred in rejecting Dr. Jones’s opinion without explanation. This case should

be remanded for him to obtain any necessary additional evidence on Alenizi’s RFC and to

address the conflict in the evidence.

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Lay Witness Testimony

Plaintiff submitted two Function Reports by his niece, Sheikha Alenizi. In the

September 22, 2007 report, she reported that he does not sleep well due to nervousness, she

needs to remind him to take his medication, he sometimes cannot control his anger with his

family, he was fired for arguing with his co-workers, and he does not handle change or stress.

(AR 120-26.) In her later, July 1, 2008 report, she reiterated these same observations and

noted some changes since the prior report. For example, she indicated that he needed help

ironing and preparing his clothes and cleaning his apartment, that someone had to cook for

him, that she arranged and transported him to all of his appointments, that he did not like to

be around anyone, and he was nervous and paranoid. (AR 146-52.) She also stated that he did

not get along well with authority figures because he could not follow everything they said.

(AR 152.) The ALJ summarized her report1

 as “opin[ing] that the claimant has several

limitations with respect to his ability to function socially and to maintain concentration and

attention.” (AR 29.) He then stated that he considered this opinion but gave it little weight

because the witness is not medically trained, thus, her observations and the accuracy of her

input is questionable; she is not a disinterested third party in light of her familial relationship

with Alenizi; and he found it inconsistent with the preponderance of the medical opinions.

(AR 29-30.) 

ALJs must consider lay witness testimony and rejection of lay testimony requires

reasons specific to each witness. Stout v. Comm’r, Social Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1053

(9th Cir. 2006). The first two reasons provided by the ALJ for the rejection are legally

insufficient. The regulations provide that, when evaluating a claimant’s impairments and how

they affect his ability to work, the ALJ will consider evidence from non-medical sources, such

as family, caregivers and friends. 20 C.F.R. § 416.913(d)(4). The evidence cannot be rejected

because it is provided by the sources identified in the regulations, non-medical persons with

a relationship to the claimant. See Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 918-19 (9th Cir. 1993)

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(family members in a position to observe the claimant’s symptoms and activities are

competent to testify as to his impairments). Defendant concedes that the first two reasons the

ALJ provided for rejecting the testimony of Alenizi’s niece were erroneous.

 Alenizi argues that the ALJ’s third reason, that the opinion was inconsistent with the

medical opinions of record, was conclusory and the ALJ failed to identify any inconsistencies.

Defendant contends that just prior to rejecting the niece’s testimony, the ALJ had provided

a detailed discussion of the medical evidence used to support his decision and he was justified

in rejecting lay testimony to the extent inconsistent with that medical evidence. 

The two specific areas of the niece’s testimony that the ALJ acknowledged were

related to Alenizi’s limitations in social functioning and ability to maintain concentration and

attention. First, the ALJ found that Alenizi had limitations in social interactions and could

only work in a setting with limited social contact. Thus, he did not in fact reject that portion

of her testimony. Any error in stating that he did so was harmless. Second, the ALJ failed to

discuss any other record evidence regarding Alenizi’s memory and concentration. As

discussed above, the ALJ erroneously rejected without discussion Dr. Jones’s opinion that

Alenizi had moderate difficulties with his memory and concentration. Further, Dr. Jones and

Dr. Campbell acknowledged limitations in Alenizi’s concentration. Thus, there is not

substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s finding that the niece’s opinion was not consistent

with the medical opinions. Third, she also indicated that Alenizi did not handle stress or

change well. The ALJ failed to acknowledge that portion of her report entirely. Dr. Jones and

Dr. Campbell found that Alenizi was at least moderately limited in his ability to respond to

changes in the work setting. (AR 227, 231.) Again, it was error to reject this portion of the

niece’s opinion, which was consistent with the medical opinions of record, without

explanation.

The ALJ erred in rejecting Alenizi’s niece’s testimony on the grounds he cited. Upon

remand, he should reconsider her testimony.

REMEDY

The Court has discretion to remand for further development of the record or for an

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award of benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1173-74 (9th Cir.

2000). Plaintiff may not qualify for benefits under the governing standards but the Court is

unable to assess the ultimate issue because the ALJ’s decision is legally and factually

erroneous. As discussed above, remand for further proceedings is warranted because the ALJ

needs to re-assess the testimony of Dr. Jones and Alenizi’s niece. Further, Plaintiff requested

only a remand for additional administrative process not an award of benefits. In conducting

the review, the ALJ may need to revise his RFC finding and take vocational testimony.

RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends the District Court, after

its independent review, enter an order remanding the case to the ALJ for further consideration.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2), any party may serve and file

written objections within 14 days of being served with a copy of this Report and

Recommendation. If objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. The parties

are advised that any objections filed are to be identified with the following case number: CV11-183-TUC-JGZ.

DATED this 1st day of March, 2012.

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