Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-00876/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-00876-24/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KARL STORZ ENDOSCOPY-AMERICA, 

INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

STRYKER CORPORATION, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 14-cv-00876-RS 

ORDER CONSTRUING CLAIMS

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff and patent owner Karl Storz Endoscopy-America, Inc. (“KSEA”) and defendants 

Stryker Corporation and Stryker Communications, Inc. (“Stryker”) compete to provide an array of 

medical products, including endoscopes and integrated operating room systems. Fresh off a crosscountry trip to the United States Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”), they now seek 

construction of nine terms pursuant to Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. 

Cir. 1995) (en banc). For the reasons set forth below, the disputed terms are construed as follows.

II. BACKGROUND

KSEA manufactures endoscopes, devices, and camera systems for medical and industrial 

applications. Stryker likewise manufactures an array of medical and surgical products, including 

endoscopes. On February 26, 2014, KSEA sued Stryker alleging infringement of four patents 

related to endoscopic devices and integrated operating room systems. Stryker denied the 

allegations and asserted counterclaims for noninfringement and invalidity. Stryker also averred 

KSEA’s claims were barred by a settlement agreement entered into to resolve previous litigation. 

See Karl Storz Endoscopy-Am., Inc. v. Stryker, Inc. et al., 09-cv-00355-WHA (“Karl Storz I”).

Over the ensuing months, KSEA added allegations that Stryker’s products infringe a fifth 

Case 3:14-cv-00876-RS Document 225 Filed 07/05/16 Page 1 of 18
CASE NO. 14-cv-00876-RS

2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

patent. KSEA then moved to dismiss Stryker’s counterclaims and to strike affirmative defenses 

arising out of alleged breaches of the Karl Storz I settlement agreement. KSEA’s motion to 

dismiss was granted on October 3, 2014. KSEA subsequently served supplemental infringement 

contentions and Stryker served its invalidity contentions.

The parties filed their respective opening claim construction briefs on February 13, 2015. 

Less than a week later, Stryker filed petitions for inter partes reexamination (“IPR”) of each of the 

five patents at issue in this litigation. Contemporaneous with its IPR petitions, Stryker moved to 

stay these proceedings. The stay was granted on March 30, 2015.

The PTAB (1) denied Stryker’s IPR petitions for U.S. Patent Nos. 7,471,310 (“’310 

patent”); 7,821,530 (“’530 patent”); 7,844,657 (“’657 patent”); and 8,439,821 (“’821 patent”), (2) 

granted Stryker’s IPR petitions for U.S. Patent No. 8,069,420 (“’420 patent”) on 42 of the 44 

challenged claims, and (3) denied Stryker’s IPR petitions for the ’420 patent on 2 of the 44 

challenged claims. KSEA disclaimed the 42 claims for which IPR had been instituted, and the 

PTAB granted KSEA’s request for adverse judgment and terminated the IPR proceedings. The 

stay was lifted on January 5, 2016. The parties have re-briefed the claim terms at issue in this 

proceeding.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Claim construction is a question of law to be determined by the Court. Markman, 52 F.3d 

at 979. “Ultimately, the interpretation to be given a term can only be determined and confirmed 

with a full understanding of what the inventors actually invented and intended to envelop with the 

claim.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting Renishaw PLC v. 

Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). Accordingly, a claim should 

be construed in a manner that “most naturally aligns with the patent’s description of the 

invention.” Id.

The first step in claim construction is to look to the language of the claims themselves. “It 

is a ‘bedrock principle’ of patent law that ‘the claims of a patent define the invention to which the 

patentee is entitled the right to exclude.’” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312 (quoting Innova/Pure Water, 

Case 3:14-cv-00876-RS Document 225 Filed 07/05/16 Page 2 of 18
CASE NO. 14-cv-00876-RS

3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). A disputed claim 

term should be construed in a manner consistent with its “ordinary and customary meaning,” 

which is “the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question 

at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date of the patent application.” Phillips, 

415 F.3d at 1312–13. The ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term may be determined 

solely by viewing the term within the context of the claim’s overall language. See id. at 1314 

(“[T]he use of a term within the claim provides a firm basis for construing the term.”). 

Additionally, the use of the term in other claims may provide guidance regarding its proper 

construction. Id. (“Other claims of the patent in question, both asserted and unasserted, can also be 

valuable sources of enlightenment as to the meaning of a claim term.”).

A claim should also be construed in a manner that is consistent with the patent’s 

specification. See Markman, 52 F.3d at 979 (“Claims must be read in view of the specification, of 

which they are a part.”). Typically the specification is the best guide for construing the claims. 

See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315 (“The specification is . . . the primary basis for construing the 

claims.”); see also Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996) 

(“[T]he specification is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is 

dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.”). In limited

circumstances, the specification may be used to narrow the meaning of a claim term that otherwise 

would appear to be susceptible to a broader reading. See SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced 

Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316. 

Precedent forbids, however, a construction of claim terms that imposes limitations not found in the 

claims or supported by an unambiguous restriction in the specification or prosecution history. 

Laitram Corp. v. NEC Corp., 163 F.3d 1342, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[A] court may not import 

limitations from the written description into the claims.”); Comark Commc’ns., Inc. v. Harris 

Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1186 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[W]hile . . . claims are to be interpreted in light of 

the specification, it does not follow that limitations from the specification may be read into the 

claims.”); SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en 

Case 3:14-cv-00876-RS Document 225 Filed 07/05/16 Page 3 of 18
CASE NO. 14-cv-00876-RS

4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

banc) (“It is the claims that measure the invention.”) (emphasis in original). A final source of 

intrinsic evidence is the prosecution record and any statements made by the patentee to the United 

States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) regarding the scope of the invention. See Markman, 

52 F.3d at 980.

Courts may also consider extrinsic evidence, such as expert testimony, dictionaries, or 

technical treatises, especially if such sources are “helpful in determining ‘the true meaning of 

language used in the patent claims.’” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318 (quoting Markman, 52 F.3d at 

980). Ultimately, while extrinsic evidence may aid the claim construction analysis, it cannot be 

used to contradict the plain and ordinary meaning of a claim term as defined within the intrinsic 

record. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1322–23.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. The ’310 & ’530 Patents (Camera Patents)

The ’310 and ’530 patents are entitled “Intelligent Camera Head.” The patents are related 

and share a common specification.1

By way of background, video cameras can be separated into two basic categories based 

upon their physical configurations. First, there are “all-in-one units,” such as camcorders, where 

the portion that captures video images is combined in the same housing with the portion that 

controls operation and processes the images to create video. Second, there are video cameras in 

which physically separate, individual units achieve these respective functions. In these 

“separated” systems, the capturing portion is called a “camera head,” while the control and 

processing portion is called a “camera control unit” (“CCU”). The camera head and CCU 

typically are connected to each other through a cable. The ’310 and ’530 patents fall into the 

“separated” category. That is, each contains claims that recite three components: a camera head, a 

CCU, and a cable connecting the two.

The inventions relate to the interchangeability of camera heads with CCUs. Specifically, 

 

1

The ’530 patent is a continuation of the ’310 patent.

Case 3:14-cv-00876-RS Document 225 Filed 07/05/16 Page 4 of 18
CASE NO. 14-cv-00876-RS

5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

in previous systems, timing signals (which synchronize electronic components) were generated in 

the CCU and transmitted to the camera head, but this limited which camera heads could be 

connected to each particular CCU because the technical features had to match. The camera 

patents improve interchangeability by generating timing signals in the camera head and 

transmitting them to the CCU—as opposed to the other way around. They also improve 

interchangeability by employing a memory device within the camera head to store information. 

The disputed claim terms relate to these various features.

1. “video imaging system”

Stryker maintains this term is non-limiting and does not require construction. KSEA 

agreed at oral argument and subsequently withdrew its proposed construction. The term “video 

imaging system” accordingly will not be further construed. 

2. “camera head”

The term “camera head” appears in virtually all claims of the ’310 and ’530 patents.2 

KSEA would construe it as an “endoscopic video camera, i.e., a video camera that includes or is 

adapted to be connected to an endoscope,” whereas Stryker proposes “a device that generates an 

uninterrupted sequence of data that represents moving visual images.”

The term “camera head” shall be construed to mean “endoscopic video camera, i.e., a 

video camera that includes or is adapted to be connected to an endoscope.” Stryker’s principal 

argument is that “camera head” is not expressly defined. The specification may not contain a 

textbook example of what it looks like to define a term, but it is still highly persuasive where it 

states “Endoscopic video cameras (hereinafter referred to as ‘camera heads’) are most 

advantageously small and lightweight . . . .” Dkt. No. 176, Ex. 1 at 1:18–20. It goes on to use 

“camera head” in a manner that supports this definition, see, e.g., id. at 1:40–41 (“Similar to the 

camera head itself, it is advantageous that cables be small in diameter and lightweight.”), which 

 

2

The claims asserted in the ’310 patent include 1-5, 15-16, 19, 21-22, and 25. The claims asserted 

in the ’530 patent include 1-2 and 4-6.

Case 3:14-cv-00876-RS Document 225 Filed 07/05/16 Page 5 of 18
CASE NO. 14-cv-00876-RS

6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

makes sense given the background states “the present invention generally relates” to “the field of 

video endoscopy,” id. at 1:11–12. 

The PTAB reached the identical conclusion and, though Stryker submits it erred, the 

opinion does not evince the defects Stryker articulates. The PTAB said it reached its construction 

“in light of the specification,” and from that statement, Stryker draws the negative inference the 

PTAB did not consider the prosecution history. See Stryker Corp. v. Karl Storz Endoscopy-Am., 

Inc., IPR2015-00672, Paper 9, 2015 WL 5190755, at *6 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 1, 2015). That the PTAB

said little about the prosecution history does not mean it refused wholly to consider it. More to the 

point, the PTAB emphasized the specification because it found the background section defined 

“camera head” explicitly. Id. Nor is it clear, as Stryker asserts, the PTAB applied an incorrect

legal standard, as the authority Stryker submits states “claims should always be read in light of the 

specification.” Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2015).

In any event, turning with fresh eyes to the prosecution history here, it appears the patentee 

argued in part prior art references were not directed toward use with endoscopes or in medical 

procedures. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 176, Ex. 9.4 at 5 (“Ikeda et al. is not directed toward use with an 

endoscope.”); Id. at 12, 13 (noting Koide is unsuitable during “a medical procedure” as “a doctor” 

needs a continuous video stream). While prior art may eventually have been overcome using 

different arguments, KSEA need not respond with this particular contention to rebuff every 

advance of the examiner, as Stryker contends.

Lastly, while five of the embodiments illustrate “a video imaging system,” and two 

illustrate “an endoscopic system,” the first five include a camera head, which the specification 

defines reasonably and with deliberate choice to be endoscopic. See Abbott Labs. v. Syntron 

Bioresearch, Inc., 334 F.3d 1343, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (noting lexicography must appear “with 

reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision”). All told, the record supports KSEA’s 

contention the term “camera head” should be construed to mean “endoscopic video camera, i.e., a 

video camera that includes or is adapted to be connected to an endoscope.”

Case 3:14-cv-00876-RS Document 225 Filed 07/05/16 Page 6 of 18
CASE NO. 14-cv-00876-RS

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

3. “a memory device, accessible by said processor, containing camera head 

information”

The term “a memory device, accessible by said processor, containing camera head 

information” appears in the independent claims of the ’310 patent (1, 9, 15, and 21), and claim 1 

of the ’530 patent. The memory device itself is a component contained within the camera head 

that stores information that is accessed subsequently by the CCU. The memory device helps 

achieve interchangeability of camera heads with CCUs by permitting this information storage and 

retrieval process to take place.

The crux of the dispute concerns the meaning of “camera head information.” The 

specification provides some guidance on the topic. It explains “[s]oftware executing on the 

programmable CCU verifies connection to the camera head and retrieves camera head information

relating specifically to that camera head. Camera head information may include command and 

control data comprising: software programs, operating information, timing signal data, camera 

head identification information, camera use information and the like.” Dkt. No. 176, Ex. 1 at 3:62–

4:1 (emphasis added).

Stryker’s construction adds limitations that speak to the function of the memory device. It 

proposes: “a device that stores information specific to a type of camera head where the 

information is (1) common among other camera heads of the same type but different from camera 

heads of a different type, (2) accessible by said processor, and (3) retrieved by the camera control 

unit after software executing on the camera control unit verifies connection to the camera head.”3 

KSEA’s position is the phrase does not require construction. If it must be construed, 

KSEA proposes substitutions drawn from the specification. KSEA would read “memory device” 

as a “a device that stores data,” and “camera head information” as “information relating to the 

camera head, such as software programs, operating information, timing signal data, camera head 

identification information, camera use information or the like, but excluding video data.” 

 

3

Stryker indicated at oral argument it was comfortable dropping part three of its construction.

Case 3:14-cv-00876-RS Document 225 Filed 07/05/16 Page 7 of 18
CASE NO. 14-cv-00876-RS

8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

The term “a memory device, accessible by said processor, containing camera head 

information” shall be construed as “a device that stores data and that is accessible by said 

processor, containing information relating to the camera head.” Stryker’s construction is 

unjustifiably narrow, and could exclude appropriate information. That is, while some camera head 

information may be “specific to a type of camera head,” as the specification explains, other 

information that still meets the definition may not be specific to a type of camera head. See

Juergens Decl. ¶ 19 (naming “serial number[s],” “camera use information,” and “bad pixel data”). 

The illustrative list KSEA would append, however, generates its own unwarranted complexity, 

and adding those words runs the risk of implying bounds that should not be imported from the 

specification. See Laitram, 163 F.3d at 1347. The elected construction adequately captures the 

customary meaning the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art.

4. “a timing generator, generating a timing signal particular to said camera head, 

the timing signal actuating said imager and sent to said camera control unit”

The phrase “a timing generator, generating a timing signal particular to said camera head, 

the timing signal actuating said imager and sent to said camera control unit,” appears in claims 1-

14 of the ’310 patent and claim 3 of the ’530 patent. KSEA insists the claim does not require 

construction, whereas Stryker’s proposal adds clarifications drawn from the component’s function. 

A timing signal is a signal used to synchronize electronic components. In previous 

systems, timing signals were generated in the CCU and transmitted to the camera head, but this 

limited which camera heads could be connected to each particular CCU because the technical 

features had to match. Once again, the camera patents allegedly fix this interchangeability 

problem, at least in part, by generating timing signals in the camera head and transmitting them to 

the CCU—as opposed to the other way around.

Stryker’s construction hones in on this innovation by adding certain clarifying limitations, 

including that the timing signal be “unique to the type of camera head,” “not [be] derived from a 

source external to the camera head,” and “differ from the timing signal requirements of other types 

Case 3:14-cv-00876-RS Document 225 Filed 07/05/16 Page 8 of 18
CASE NO. 14-cv-00876-RS

9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

of camera heads that may be connected to a common CCU.”4 If construed, KSEA proposes “ a 

device that generates one or more timing signals in said camera head, one or more signals 

generated by the timing generator is utilized by the imager to develop video data and the signal is 

sent to the camera control unit.”

The disputed phrase shall be construed to mean “a device in the camera head that generates 

a periodic signal used to synchronize electronic components, where the signal (a) is unique to the 

type of camera head, (b) is not derived from a source external to the camera head, (c) actuates the 

imager in the camera head, and (d) is sent from the camera head to the camera control unit.” 

KSEA’s proposal ignores the claim language “particular to said camera head,” which supports the 

first component of Stryker’s proposed construction. As Stryker points out, the specification also 

distinguishes between different “types of camera heads” based on “each having differing timing 

signal requirements.” Dkt. No. 176, Ex. 1 at 1:48–49. Next, though KSEA submits the timing 

signal can be derived from a source external to the “video imaging system,” the specification and 

prosecution history support that the signal is not derived externally from the camera head. The 

patent describes as a disadvantage of prior art that timing signals were generated in the CCU. See 

id. at 1:50–59 (noting this feature detracts from interchangeability). The applicant also told the

European Patent Office “[t]he provision of timing signals from the camera head is what allows 

many different types of camera heads to be attached to and controlled by the camera control unit.” 

Dkt. No. 176, Ex. 12 at KS038395. Likewise, the applicant told the PTO that Yokoyama, a prior 

art reference, failed to teach the timing signal being “particular to said camera head” because the 

timing signal was derived from an external source. Id. Ex. 9 at KS043925. The final two 

components of the proffered construction are drawn directly from the claim language. Part three 

 

4

Parts four and five of Stryker’s construction reiterate the claim language. Stryker proposes in 

full “a device in the camera head that generates a periodic signal used to synchronize electronic 

components, where the signal (1) is unique to the type of camera head, (2) is not derived from a 

source external to the camera head, (3) differs from the timing signal requirements of other types 

of camera heads that may be connected to a common camera control unit, (4) actuates the imager 

in the camera head, and (5) is sent from the camera head to the camera control unit.”

Case 3:14-cv-00876-RS Document 225 Filed 07/05/16 Page 9 of 18
CASE NO. 14-cv-00876-RS

10

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

of Stryker’s construction appears redundant of part one, and therefore is unnecessary. 

B. The ’657 Patent (Central Control Patent)

The ’657 and ’821 patents concern systems and methods for the central control of medical 

devices in a surgical operating theater. By way of background, operating rooms typically contain 

both safety-related equipment (endoscopes, monitors, insufflators, pumps) and non-safety related 

equipment (air conditioning, telephones, picture archiving systems). The claims of these patents 

discuss different configurations for controlling these devices.

In the ’657 patent, the claimed configurations involve two “networks”: (1) a surgical 

network, and (2) an ancillary network. The two networks communicate through a translator. An 

operator is able to control devices on the ancillary network through an input device connected to 

the surgical network. In doing so, the input device sends a “medical command” (for example, a 

command from the surgeon for the camera to “zoom in”) to a controller. The controller, in turn, 

generates medical command data, which it sends to a translator. The translator takes that medical 

command data, translates it, and sends it to a medical device, which is connected to the ancillary 

network. The device receives the medical command, carries it out, and generates feedback data, 

which it sends back to the translator. 

5. “an input device, connected to said surgical network, which inputs a medical 

command”

The term “an input device, connected to said surgical network, which inputs a medical 

command” appears in the independent system claims of the ’657 patent. As detailed in the 

abstract, the input device is “for entering a medical command.” Dkt. No. 118, Ex. H. Thus, KSEA 

insists this term has its customary meaning and does not require construction. It submits in the 

alternative the term should be given the full measure of its ordinary meaning, and offers a number 

of proposed constructions to help achieve that effect. 

First, KSEA construes “input device” as “a device for sending medical commands to a 

medical device.” KSEA draws this construction from a putative definition appearing in the 

specification. Dkt. No. 118, Ex. H at 6:22–24 (“The input device can be any device by which an 

Case 3:14-cv-00876-RS Document 225 Filed 07/05/16 Page 10 of 18
CASE NO. 14-cv-00876-RS

11

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

operator can send commands to the devices of [the surgical and ancillary networks].”). Next, 

KSEA argues “connected” means “in electronic communication” because medical commands are 

communicated physically (e.g., Ethernet) and wirelessly (e.g. Bluetooth), both of which are 

electrical connections. Lastly, KSEA construes “medical command” as “an instruction for a 

medical device to perform a function.”5

Stryker, by contrast, construes a “medical command” as “an instruction for a medical 

device to take a particular action.” Stryker then adds the input device “introduces that instruction 

to the surgical network,” and “outputs” the medical command downstream to the ancillary device. 

Thus, by reading the claim language, Stryker concludes the input device is “a device within the 

surgical network that outputs an instruction for a medical device to take a particular action and 

introduces that instruction to the surgical network.” 

The term “an input device, connected to said surgical network, which inputs a medical 

command” shall mean “a device for sending medical commands to a medical device, in electronic 

communication to said surgical network, which introduces an instruction for a medical device to 

perform an action.” The first portion of this construction is drawn sensibly from the patent 

specification, Dkt. No. 118, Ex. H at 6:22–26, which also supports that “connected to” should be 

understood as “in electronic communication,” id. at 6:28–30, 5:50–53, 5:63–67. Stryker’s 

proposal to import the word “within” leverages one of KSEA’s constructions, but it is not 

supported by the plain language of the claim, id. at 8:32, or by the specification, id. at 6:20–37 

(indicating the input device can be remotely connected, permitting control “via a Local Area 

Network” or “from a distant location via the Internet”). See also Dkt. No. 176, Ex. 15.1 at 47:18–

48:8 (indicating a device connected to a network does not necessarily fall “within” that network).

Stryker next offers two dictionary definitions to vouch for the word “particular,” but neither 

 

5 KSEA indicated at oral argument it supported the words “an action” in place of “a function.” Its 

full proposal reads “a device for sending medical commands to a medical device, in electronic 

communication to said surgical network, which inputs an instruction for a medical device to 

perform a function.”

Case 3:14-cv-00876-RS Document 225 Filed 07/05/16 Page 11 of 18
CASE NO. 14-cv-00876-RS

12

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

definition lends Stryker the support it seeks to invoke. Hargrave’s Communications Dictionary 

defines “command” generically as “an instruction for an action to take place.” Hargrave’s 

Communcations Dictionary 110 (2001) (emphasis added). Likewise, the Microsoft Computer 

Dictionary defines “command” as “[a]n instruction to a computer that, when issued by the user, 

causes an action to be carried out.” Microsoft Computer Dictionary 96 (4th ed. 1999) (emphasis 

added). Moving on, the claims indicate a medical command is an instruction for a device to 

perform an action. Id. at 8:40–43 (stating medical commands are received and “carrie[d] out” by 

devices). Lastly, KSEA is correct the word “input” deserves its ordinary meaning, but it is 

ambiguous as it appears in the claim. The word “introduces,” advanced by Stryker, clarifies the 

function of the device, and does so in a manner consistent with the ordinary meaning of the term

“input.”

6. “feedback data generated by said at least one ancillary medical device and 

communicated to said translator via said ancillary network”

The term “feedback data generated by said at least one ancillary medical device and 

communicated to said translator via said ancillary network” appears in claim 21. The parties’ 

constructions both contain the clause “which is sent to the translator via the ancillary network.” 

Accordingly, the only component requiring construction is the term “feedback data.” On that 

front, both parties state it is “data generated by the at least one ancillary medical device,” but 

whereas KSEA says “in response to a medical command,” Stryker says “in response to carrying 

out the medical command inputted by the input device.” 

The disputed term shall be construed to mean “data generated by the at least one ancillary 

medical device in response to carrying out the medical command, which is sent to the translator 

via the ancillary network.” KSEA submits the claims state clearly feedback data responds to the 

medical command—i.e., the instructions—but not necessarily to carrying out that command. That 

is not so. Claim 21 recites the input device “inputs a medical command” and the ancillary medical 

device “carries out the . . . medical command.” Dkt. No. 118, Ex. H at 9:32, 9:42 (emphasis 

added). It then recites “feedback data generated by said at least one ancillary medical device and 

Case 3:14-cv-00876-RS Document 225 Filed 07/05/16 Page 12 of 18
CASE NO. 14-cv-00876-RS

13

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

communicated to said translator via said ancillary network.” Id. at 9:44–46. Claim 61—a method 

claim—suggests the same. It recites “entering a medical command into the surgical network,” id. 

at 12:16, then “executing the corresponding medical command with the ancillary medical device,” 

id. at 12:24–25, then immediately recites “generating feedback data with the ancillary medical 

device,” id. at 12:26–27. Perhaps most compelling, the specification states “[t]he surgical 

controller communicates [the medical command data] to medical device, which executes the 

command. The medical device then generates feedback data, which it communicates back to the 

surgical controller.” Id. at 7:57–60 (emphasis added). Use of the word “then,” as Stryker points 

out, indicates the medical device generates feedback data in response to executing (i.e., carrying 

out) the medical command.

Stryker objects to KSEA’s construction because it reads “in response to a medical 

command,” which fails to recognize an antecedent basis for “the medical command.” The parties 

agreed to use of the word “the” instead of “a” at oral argument. Lastly, Stryker’s proposed 

addition of “inputted by the input device” adds needless redundancy and is therefore unwarranted. 

When reading claim 21 from start to finish there isn’t confusion as to the origination of the

medical command.

C. The ’821 Patent (Central Control Patent)

The configurations claimed in the ’821 patent focus on controlling safety and non-safety 

related devices using two separate controllers. In particular, the first controller can control only 

safety-related devices, such as endoscopes or monitors. The second controller can control only 

non-safety related devices, like air conditioning. The purpose of separating control is to prevent 

problems with the non-safety related devices from interrupting or interfering with the control of 

safety-related devices.

7. “controller”

The term “controller” appears in claims 1-3 and 8-11 of the ’821 patent. KSEA proposes it 

be construed as a “unit, including a processor or computer, directly controlling functions of at least 

one device.” Stryker counters the term should be construed as “a device for controlling the 

Case 3:14-cv-00876-RS Document 225 Filed 07/05/16 Page 13 of 18
CASE NO. 14-cv-00876-RS

14

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

operation of other devices.”

“Controller” shall be construed as “a device for controlling the operation of other 

devices.” Claim 1 recites “a first controller” and “at least one medical device having safetyrelated functions controlled by said first controller.” Dkt. No. 176, Ex. 4 at 7:7–9 (emphasis 

added). It further recites “a second controller” and “at least one device having non-safety related 

functions controlled by said second controller.” Id. at 7:10–13 (emphasis added). The claim 

language thus establishes a “controller” is “a device for controlling the operation of other 

devices.” What is more, the abstract states the invention “relates to a system for the central 

control of devices,” as does the field of the invention and the stated object of the invention. See id.

at 1:18–20, 2:1–3 (emphasis added).

The parties’ disagreement appears to stem from the phrase “at least one medical device 

having safety-related functions controlled by said first controller.” Id. at 7:12–13 (emphasis 

added). While KSEA thinks “controlled” modifies the word “functions,” “controlled” actually 

modifies the word “device.” As such, the claims do not indicate, as KSEA suggests, the controller 

controls only the “functions” of devices. Rather, the claims indicate the controller controls 

“devices” which either have safety- or non-safety related functions. 

KSEA also submits the specification refers to a controller as a “control unit” or “computer 

unit,” see id. at 4:25, 5:22, meaning the controller can be understood as a “unit, including a

processor or computer.” As Stryker points out, however, neither “computer” nor “processor” 

appears in the claim language, and they seem to describe only possible embodiments in the 

specification. Their mere mention does not require their appearance in the construction, and the 

specification otherwise supports Stryker’s proposal. 

Stryker insists—correctly—there is no support for limiting “controller” to “directly” 

controlling functions of devices. Direct control implies the existence of “indirect control,” yet 

neither concept appears in the patent. Finally, though KSEA submits “operation” invokes a 

medical procedure, its use in this construction is not confusing, as it comports with basic common 

sense in the context of the patent. 

Case 3:14-cv-00876-RS Document 225 Filed 07/05/16 Page 14 of 18
CASE NO. 14-cv-00876-RS

15

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

8. “can only control devices that do not have safety-related functions”

The term “can only control devices that do not have safety-related functions” refers to the 

role of the second controller in the invention. The term appears in independent claims 1 and 10.

Helpfully, the specification defines “safety-related systems” expressly: “In this case it is 

assumed that the mentioned medical devices may be divided into two different groups, namely 

safety-related systems on one hand, as for example endoscopic devices (insufflators, pumps, or 

RF-surgery and so on), op-table-control etc., namely devices or systems which may be lifethreatening for a patient in the event of a breakdown or failure, and non-safety-related systems on 

the other hand, like picture archiving, material management systems, telephone remote control 

etc.” Dkt. No. 176, Ex. 4 at 1:54–62.

In light of that definition, the PTAB construed the phrase “can only control devices that do 

not have safety-related functions” to mean “wherein said second controller can only control 

devices whose breakdown or failure during a medical procedure are not life-threatening for a 

patient.” Stryker Corp. v. Karl Storz Endoscopy-Am., Inc., IPR2015-00679, Paper 9, 2015 WL 

5190758, at *4 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 1, 2015). Stryker’s construction differs only in the way it 

describes what it means to “control” a device. To Stryker, “can only control” means “can issue 

control commands only to [certain devices].”6 KSEA, by contrast, draws from the specification 

and proposes the term means “is not programmed to directly control devices which have functions 

for which a breakdown or failure thereof during a medical procedure may be critical or lifethreatening for the patient including, e.g., functions of endoscopic devices, operating table 

controls, insufflators, pumps, or RF-surgery devices.”

The term “can only control devices that do not have safety-related functions” shall be 

construed as “can issue control commands only to devices whose breakdown or failure is not lifethreatening to a patient and cannot issue control commands to devices whose breakdown or failure 

 

6

Stryker’s full proposal is “can issue control commands only to devices whose breakdown or 

failure is not life-threatening to a patient and cannot issue control commands to devices whose 

breakdown or failure may be life-threatening to a patient.”

Case 3:14-cv-00876-RS Document 225 Filed 07/05/16 Page 15 of 18
CASE NO. 14-cv-00876-RS

16

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

may be life-threatening to a patient.” KSEA insists nothing in the intrinsic record restricts the 

concept of “control” to issuing a “control command,” but Stryker’s construction of “control” finds 

direct support in the claim language. See, e.g., id. at 7:21–24. For instance, claim 1 recites “a 

touch panel that communicates a control command associated with said at least one medical 

device having safety-related functions and a control command associated with said at least one 

device having non-safety-related functions.” Dkt. No. 176, Ex. 4 at 7:16–20 (emphasis added). 

Next, Stryker’s construction of “safety-related” finds direct exposition in the specification.

Id. at 1:54–62. KSEA’s construction, by contrast, is far less enticing on this front. KSEA argues 

the construction must include “safety-critical functions” given the specification states “the first 

computer unit serves at least for the control of medical devices, which carry out safety-related and 

safety critical functions, respectively.” Dkt. No. 176, Ex. 4 at 5:22–24 (emphasis added). Because 

“safety-critical” never appears in the claims, however, and use of the word “respectively” suggests 

“safety-critical” is different from “safety-related,” there is an insufficient foundation to import the 

term “safety-critical” into the construction. 

Lastly, KSEA believes the specification indicates the difference between the two 

controllers is driven in part by the software or programming therein. Specifically, as to the second 

controller, the specification provides “no tasks are allowed to run” that “serve to control safetyrelated devices.” Id. at 6:16–19. KSEA submits one skilled in the art would understand the second 

controller therefore “is not programmed to directly control” safety-related devices. KSEA’s

additional details, however, would add unwarranted complexity and confusion, and rely merely on 

disclosed embodiments and expert testimony. This foundation, though relevant, is insufficient to 

import this limitation into the term in this instance.

9. “wherein said second controller communicates the control command associated 

with said at least one medical device having safety related functions received from 

said touch panel to said first controller”

The final term appears in claim 1 and refers to what the second controller does when it 

receives a command for a safety-related device, even though it controls only non-safety-related 

Case 3:14-cv-00876-RS Document 225 Filed 07/05/16 Page 16 of 18
CASE NO. 14-cv-00876-RS

17

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

devices. In essence, the second controller sends the command to the first controller, so the first 

controller can carry it out. That concept is captured by providing the second controller 

“communicates the control command” to the first controller. The parties disagree as to the 

particular meaning of the word “communicates.”

The disputed phrase, however, will not be further construed. Taken in context, alongside 

the other claim components, the phrase is not unclear and would be well understood by a person of 

ordinary skill in the art. Indicative of that point, Stryker’s construction merely changes 

“communicates” to “simply passes . . . on,” and replaces “control command” with “instruction to 

perform a particular action.” KSEA’s proposal merely changes “command” to “instruction” and 

“panel” to “screen.” This substitution of synonyms does not provide additional clarity. 

Stryker disagrees, and responds the word “communicates” is inherently ambiguous. To 

Stryker, it is unclear why the second controller is said to be controlling non-safety-related devices 

when it “communicates” control commands to devices that it controls, yet it is not controlling 

safety-related devices when it “communicates” control commands to the first controller. Stryker 

submits its construction eliminates the ambiguity: when the second controller receives a control 

command for a safety-related device, it “simply passes the [control command] on to the first 

controller” to execute. Dkt. No. 201 at 24:25–26. Stryker also notes the applicants stressed during 

prosecution “[t]he second controller is simply a pass-through for information,” Dkt. No. 176, Ex. 

20.4 at KS045664, and insists the specification describes the first controller as a “closed system,” 

suggesting the second controller must pass on its instructions. Dkt. No. 176, Ex. 4 at 2:4–12, 2:23–

25. As KSEA notes, however, Stryker’s construction appears unduly limiting in light of the 

specification, see id. at 5:11–15 (describing communication as “exchanging data”), and in any 

event is not supported unambiguously by the cited prosecution history, see id. Ex. 20.4 at 045664 

(suggesting communication could involve translation). See also id. Ex. 19 at 102:7–115:8 

(suggesting “communicates” is a broad term that encompasses in some instances more than 

“passing on” information). There is no inherent ambiguity when reading the phrase in the context 

of the other claims. The appropriate course of action is to leave this particular claim untouched.

Case 3:14-cv-00876-RS Document 225 Filed 07/05/16 Page 17 of 18
CASE NO. 14-cv-00876-RS

18

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

V. CONCLUSION

The disputed claim terms of the patents-in-suit are construed as set forth above. A further 

Case Management Conference shall be held on August 11, 2016, at 10:00 a.m. in Courtroom 3, 

17th Floor, United States Courthouse, 450 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, California. The 

parties shall file a Joint Case Management Statement at least one week prior to the Conference.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 5, 2016

______________________________________

RICHARD SEEBORG

United States District Judge

Case 3:14-cv-00876-RS Document 225 Filed 07/05/16 Page 18 of 18