Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-07824/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-07824-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PATRINA HARRISON,

Plaintiff,

 v.

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. and

NICHOLAS PACUMIO, 

Defendants. /

No. C 18-07824 WHA

ORDER ON MOTION FOR

LEAVE TO FILE AN AMENDED

COMPLAINT AND VACATING

HEARING

In this race-discrimination action, pro se plaintiff Patrina Harrison moves for leave to

amend her Title VI claim. This order follows full briefing. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b),

this order finds the motion suitable for submission without oral argument and hereby VACATES

the hearing scheduled for September 26.

Prior orders have detailed the background of the instant action (Dkt. Nos. 42, 57). In

brief, according to the proposed amended complaint, plaintiff applied for a federal home loan

with defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Dkt. No. 63-1 ¶ 1). In June 2018, plaintiff brought

certain documents, which Wells Fargo requested to support her application, to the Wells Fargo

branch located at 1183 Ocean Avenue, San Francisco (id. ¶¶ 1–2). Branch manager defendant

Nicholas Pacumio, however, kicked plaintiff out of the bank allegedly on account of her race

before she could present those documents (id. ¶¶ 5–8). Her application was subsequently

denied (id. ¶ 9).

Case 3:18-cv-07824-WHA Document 80 Filed 09/11/19 Page 1 of 3
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Section 601 within Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 states that “No person in the

United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from

participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program

or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” A prior order dated May 13 dismissed

plaintiff’s Title VI claim with leave to amend (and let other claims go through) where she

merely alleged that defendants “ ‘refus[ed]’ her ‘service while serving under [the] color of law,

in the defendants[’] capacity serving as an agent of the federal government, processing federal

home loan[] applications,’ thereby ‘inflict[ing] emotional distress injuries’ ” (Dkt. No. 42 at 9

(citing Dkt. No. 1 at 4)). That order found that plaintiff did not allege sufficient facts as to

whether Wells Fargo is part of a “program or activity receiving federal financial assistance”

within the meaning of Title VI, noting that simply because Wells Fargo participated in certain

federal programs did not necessarily mean that it received or used any federal funding, much

less for the particular loan at issue (ibid.). 

A later order dated June 18 denied plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend her Title VI

claim, finding that plaintiff merely “regurgitate[d] the deficiencies noted in the prior order dated

May 13” (Dkt. No. 57 at 5). Plaintiff’s most recent proposed complaint attached to the instant

motion fares no better. While this order must construe plaintiff’s pleadings liberally, it “is not

required to accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those conclusions

cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged.” Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d

752, 754–55 (9th Cir. 1994). The conclusory allegation that “Wells Fargo Bank is part of a

‘program or activity receiving federal financial assistance’ within the meaning of Title VI” is

insufficient to support a Title VI claim at this stage, as plaintiff still pleads no other facts from

which this order may reasonably draw such a conclusion (see Dkt. No. 63-1 ¶¶ 3, 12). As

defendants point out, plaintiff still does not even identify the particular loan at issue but instead

speaks only in general, conclusory terms.

Accordingly, plaintiff’s second motion for leave to amend the Title VI claim is DENIED. 

See Nunes v. Ashcroft, 375 F.3d 805, 808 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Futility alone can justify the denial

of a motion for leave to amend.”). The prior order dated June 18 allowed plaintiff to seek leave

Case 3:18-cv-07824-WHA Document 80 Filed 09/11/19 Page 2 of 3
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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to amend her Title VI claim but warned her to “plead her best case” (Dkt. No. 57 at 7). As

such, plaintiff’s Title VI claim is DISMISSED without further leave to amend. No more motions

for leave to amend the complaint will be entertained. The parties are reminded that the nonexpert discovery must be completed by November 22 and the last day to file dispositive motions

is February 27, 2020 (Dkt. No. 48 ¶¶ 3, 9).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 11, 2019. WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:18-cv-07824-WHA Document 80 Filed 09/11/19 Page 3 of 3