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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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PRECEDENTIAL 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

_____________ 

No. 14-2938 

_____________ 

BRYAN M. SANTINI, 

Appellant 

v. 

COLONEL JOSEPH R. FUENTES; TROOPER J.L. 

FUHRMANN; TROOPER R.H. SICKLES; STATE OF 

NEW JERSEY; JOHN DOE 1-10 (a fictitious name); 

JOHN ROE SUPERVISING OFFICER (a fictitious name); 

ABC CORP. 1-10 

_______________ 

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of New Jersey 

 (D.C. Civil No. 3-11-cv-00639) 

District Judge: Honorable Joel A. Pisano 

_______________ 

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 

June 23, 2015 

Before: CHAGARES, KRAUSE and VAN ANTWERPEN, 

Circuit Judges. 

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(Filed: August 4, 2015) 

Frank A. Santini, Esq. 

Suite 1600 

200 Central Avenue 

St. Petersburg, FL 33701 

Counsel for Appellant

Vincent J. Rizzo, Jr., Esq. 

Office of Attorney General of New Jersey 

P. O. Box 112 

25 Market Street 

Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex 

Trenton, NJ 08625 

Counsel for Appellees 

______________ 

OPINION OF THE COURT 

______________

VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judge. 

 Appellant Bryan M. Santini appeals from two final 

decisions of the District Court for the District of New Jersey: 

(1) its September 18, 2013 decision granting summary 

judgment against him and (2) its May 6, 2014 decision 

denying his motion seeking reconsideration of the court’s 

September decision. Santini v. Fuentes, Civ. Act. No. 11-639-

JAP, 2013 WL 5554257, at *6 (D.N.J. Sept. 18, 2013); 

Santini v. Fuentes, Civ. Act. No. 11-639-JAP, 2014 WL 

1789545, at *4–5 (D.N.J. May 6, 2014). Appellant challenges 

only one key ruling of the District Court. Because we believe 

there are outstanding issues of material fact, we are 

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compelled to vacate in part the decisions of the District Court 

and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with 

this opinion. 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL 

HISTORY

1. Santini’s Version of the Facts 

 Because we are reviewing an order granting summary 

judgment in favor of Defendants-Appellees and a motion to 

reconsider that order, the following factual summary is based 

on the facts as averred by Plaintiff-Appellant Bryan Santini 

(“Santini”).1

 This appeal arises from an altercation between 

Santini and several members of the New Jersey State Police 

that took place on February 3, 2009. (Deposition of Bryan 

Santini (“Santini Dep.”) 54:14–17). On that day, Santini was 

working at his family’s dairy farm in Harmony Township, 

Warren County, New Jersey, where he milked cows in the 

farm’s milk house. (Santini Dep. 58:19–59:1). Between 5:00 

and 5:30 pm that evening, a fight broke out in the farm’s milk 

house between two women—Tiffany Drake and Crystal 

Knighton. (Id. at 54:21–55:7). Santini witnessed the fight. (Id.

at 56:12–13). There were approximately ten other witnesses 

to the fight. (Id. at 57:25–58:2). One of those witnesses called 

the police to report the incident. (Id. at 57:22–24). 

 1

 Santini’s account is primarily drawn from his sworn 

deposition, response to interrogatories, and his plea colloquy, 

all of which have been sworn to or submitted under oath. 

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 Shortly thereafter, police officers from Greenwich 

Township, Lopatcong Township, and the state police arrived 

at the Santini family farm. (Id. at 59:17–60:1). Santini 

estimates that approximately twenty officers were present; 

three to five of those officers were from the state police. (Id.

at 60:5–13). By the time the police arrived, the fight between 

Drake and Knighton had ended. (Id. at 60:18–23). Ms. Drake 

told the police that Santini had recorded the fight on his cell 

phone. (Deposition of Trooper J. Fuhrmann (“Fuhrmann 

Dep.”) 39:5–12).2

 Santini—standing outside of the milk 

house—then spoke with an officer from Greenwich Township 

to describe what he had witnessed. (Santini Dep. 61:17–21). 

 

 During that conversation, an officer from the state 

police, Trooper J.L. Fuhrmann (“Fuhrmann”), called Santini 

over. (Id. at 61:7–24). As Santini began to describe what he 

had witnessed to Fuhrmann, the Trooper yelled at Santini to 

take his hands out of his pockets. (Id. at 62:1–5). Santini 

maintains that he complied and explained that his hands were 

cold because he had been working in water all day milking 

cows. (Id. at 62:7–9). Fuhrmann responded: “I don’t care. 

Keep them where I [can] see them.” (Id. at 62:9–10). Santini 

continued his story; however, after Santini’s hands “went 

back in [his] pockets,” Fuhrmann again told Santini to keep 

his hands where the Trooper could see them. (Id. at 62:11–

18). Santini maintains that he again immediately complied 

and apologized, saying: “I’m sorry, I only have my cell phone 

and my wallet.” (Id. at 62:18–20). 

 2

 Ms. Drake subsequently denied telling the officers 

that Santini recorded the incident. However, numerous other 

sources corroborate her original story. 

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 Santini continued his story. However, while he was 

speaking, he pulled his hands into the sleeves of his 

sweatshirt. (Id. at 62:25–63:4). Santini maintains that he 

pulled his hands into his sleeves on instinct alone because his 

hands were cold. (Id. at 63:12–14). At that point, Fuhrmann 

yelled at Santini about his hands for the fourth time. (Id. at 

63:4–5; 64:20–21). In response, Santini told Fuhrmann that 

he was going to return to work because he had already told 

the other officers his story. (Id. at 64:20–24). Santini then 

began to walk back to the milk house. (Id. at 64:23–24). At 

that point, Fuhrmann said “[c]ome here” and grabbed 

Santini’s right wrist. (Id. at 65:1–13). The two men fell to the 

ground, where Santini landed on his side and then rolled onto 

his stomach. (Id. at 65:14–21). As Santini struggled to return 

to his feet, one officer—who Santini believes was 

Fuhrmann—jumped on top of Santini and told him to put his 

hands behind his back because he was under arrest. (Id. at 

65:23–66:3). 

 As that officer spoke, other officers were on top of 

Santini, punching him and beating him with nightsticks. (Id.

at 66:3–6). At the time, Santini’s hands were pinned beneath 

his body. (Id. at 66:7–10). While Santini was facedown, the 

officers surrounding him instructed Santini to stop resisting. 

(Id. at 67:21–24). Santini understood that their instruction 

meant for him to remove his hands from beneath his stomach. 

(Id. at 67:25–68:9). In his deposition, Santini states that he 

was unable to remove his arms because of the weight of the 

officers on top of him. (Id.). However, in Santini’s plea 

colloquy, he admitted that he resisted arrest. (Santini Plea 

Colloquy3

 8:22–9:8). 

 3

 Santini’s Plea Colloquy begins at page 79 of the 

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 An officer then sprayed Santini with pepper spray. 

(Santini Dep. 67:10–12; 68:12–22).4

 Santini states that he was 

sprayed for thirty seconds to one minute and that two bottles 

of spray were used. (Id. at 68:15–22). After the pepper spray 

was used, the officers were no longer on top of Santini, he 

was able to free his arms, and he was subsequently 

handcuffed. (Id. at 68:20–22). After handcuffing Santini, the 

officers ceased punching, kicking, hitting with batons, and 

pepper spraying him. (Id. at 69:10–16). Santini was then 

taken to Warren County Jail. (Id. at 78:22–23). There, Santini 

was treated with Tylenol and eye drops. (Id. at 79:5–6). He 

maintains that he had “marks everywhere” after the incident. 

(Id. at 79:2). However, his medical records from the incident 

reveal no permanent or lasting injuries. (See generally App. 

125–45). 

2. The Troopers’ Version of the Facts 

 The Troopers’ story differs from Santini’s in three 

ways.5

 First, they maintain that Santini was not cooperative 

 

Appendix. 

4

 Santini cannot identify exactly which officers 

punched him, hit him with batons, or pepper sprayed him. 

(Santini Dep. 66–67). 

5

 The Troopers’ account is primarily drawn from the 

depositions of Troopers Fuhrmann and Sickles, both of which 

have been sworn to or submitted under oath, and also from 

the Supplemental Investigations Report prepared by each 

Trooper. 

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with Fuhrmann during the exchange between the two men. 

(Fuhrmann Dep. 39:14–40:6). They maintain that Santini 

refused to look at Fuhrmann while Fuhrmann questioned him. 

(Id.). They also claim that Santini never mentioned that his 

hands were cold from milking cows. (Id. at 46:6–10). Second, 

the Defendants maintain that the physical altercation between 

Santini and Fuhrmann began when Santini resisted 

Fuhrmann’s attempt to remove Santini’s hands from his 

pockets. (App. 197). Notably, they assert that during the 

“grasping match” between the two men, Santini struck 

Fuhrmann with an open palm on the right shoulder. (Id.).6

Third and finally, the Defendants allege that as Santini 

resisted Fuhrmann’s attempts to control his hands, Santini 

tackled Fuhrmann and grabbed his right leg, bringing the two 

men to the ground. (Id.; Fuhrmann Dep. 51). 

 

3. State Court Proceedings Against Santini 

 As a result of his arrest, Santini was brought before a 

Grand Jury in Warren County, New Jersey on May 13, 2009. 

(App. 124). The Grand Jury returned a True Bill against 

Santini, and he was indicted for aggravated assault under 

N.J.S.A. § 2C:12-1b(5)(a). (Id.). In August of 2009—two 

days before a scheduled pretrial conference—the State 

brought two additional charges against Santini: obstruction of 

justice and resisting arrest. (Santini Plea Colloquy 3). On 

August 12, 2009, Santini pleaded guilty to the resisting arrest 

charge only; the aggravated assault and obstruction of justice 

charges were dismissed as part of his plea agreement. (Id. at 

3–4). During his plea colloquy, Santini admitted that while he 

 6

 Fuhrmann does not make any reference to this open 

palm contact in his deposition. 

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was on the ground with various officers on top of him, he 

resisted their efforts to pull his arms out from beneath him. 

(Id. at 8:22–9:8). 

4. Federal Proceedings 

On February 3, 2011, Santini filed a six-count 

Complaint in federal district court for the District of New 

Jersey alleging that his rights under the federal Constitution, 

the New Jersey state constitution, and New Jersey state law 

were violated by members of the Greenwich Township, 

Lopatcong Township, and New Jersey State police forces. 

Specifically, the Complaint alleged (1) violations of Santini’s 

Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, (2) a 

violation of N.J.S.A. § 10:6-2, (3) violations of the New 

Jersey state constitution, (4) false imprisonment, false arrest, 

and malicious prosecution, (5) civil conspiracy, and (6) a 

violation of the New Jersey Tort Claims Act (N.J.S.A. § 59:1-

1 et seq.). On September 12, 2011, the District Court 

dismissed some of the named defendants7

—leaving Troopers 

Fuhrmann and Sickles (together, “the Trooper Defendants”), 

Colonel Joseph R. Fuentes, and the State of New Jersey as the 

only remaining defendants. 

On September 18, 2013, the District Court issued a 

final order granting summary judgment in favor of the 

Trooper Defendants and the State of New Jersey and 

 7

 The following defendants were dismissed with 

prejudice: Defendants Greenwich Township, Sergeant David 

Voll, Patrolman Dennis Cahill, Chief Richard Guzzo, 

Lopatcong Township, Detective Michael Patricia, and Chief 

Scott Marinelli. 

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dismissing the case. Santini v. Fuentes, Civ. Act. No. 11-639-

JAP, 2013 WL 5554257, at *6 (D.N.J. Sept. 18, 2013). The 

District Court dismissed Santini’s federal claims8

 finding that 

(1) the claims were barred by the Eleventh Amendment; (2) 

no individual defendant was a “person” under §§ 1983, 1985; 

(3) defendants could defeat Santini’s claims for malicious 

prosecution, false arrest, and false imprisonment; (4) § 1983 

precludes recovery solely on the basis of respondeat superior; 

and (5) the Trooper Defendants were entitled to qualified 

immunity. Id. at *4–5 & n.3. The District Court then declined 

to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Santini’s remaining 

state law claims (Counts II, III, and VI). Id. at *5. 

 Santini filed a motion asking the District Court to 

reconsider granting summary judgment in favor of the 

Trooper Defendants in their individual capacities as to Counts 

I–III of the Complaint.9 Santini v. Fuentes, Civ. Act. No. 11-

639-JAP, 2014 WL 1789545, at *1 (D.N.J. May 6, 2014). 

Santini argued that questions of material fact existed as to 

whether excessive force was used against Santini. Id. at *2. 

The District Court denied that motion in an Order dated May 

 8

 The District Court characterized three counts as 

federal: Count I (alleging violations of civil rights under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth 

Amendments), Count IV (alleging false imprisonment, false 

arrest, and malicious prosecution), and Count V (alleging 

civil conspiracy). 

9

 Santini did not mention the State of New Jersey in his 

motion for reconsideration. Santini v. Fuentes, Civ. Act. No. 

11-639-JAP, 2014 WL 1789545, at *1 n.1 (D.N.J. May 6, 

2014). 

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6, 2014. Id. at *4–5. This timely appeal followed. On appeal, 

Santini’s arguments mirror those found in his motion for 

reconsideration—namely that summary judgment against the 

Trooper Defendants in their individual capacities was 

inappropriate because there are genuine issues of material fact 

related to Santini’s claim that excessive force was used 

against him by the Trooper Defendants. 

II. DISCUSSION10

1. Standard of Review 

 This Court exercises plenary review over a district 

court order granting summary judgment. Bushman v. Halm, 

798 F.2d 651, 656 (3d Cir. 1986). Therefore, our review is 

identical to the review performed by the district court. Id.

Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is 

“material” under Rule 56 if its existence or nonexistence 

might impact the outcome of the suit under the applicable 

substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 

242, 248 (1986). A dispute over a material fact is “genuine” if 

“a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving 

party.” Id. 

 

 10 The District Court had jurisdiction to hear Santini’s 

federal claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 

1343(a)(3). It had jurisdiction over his state law claims 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. We have jurisdiction to review 

final orders of the district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

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 The moving party bears the burden of identifying 

specific portions of the record that establish the absence of a 

genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 

U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the moving party meets its burden, 

the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to go beyond the 

pleadings and “come forward with ‘specific facts showing 

that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. 

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) 

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). When determining a motion 

for summary judgment, we must construe all evidence in the 

light most favorable to the nonmoving party. United States v. 

Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962). We are also mindful 

that “the judge’s function is not himself to weigh the evidence 

and determine the truth of the matter but to determine 

whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. 

at 249. 

 

 We review the denial of a motion for reconsideration 

for abuse of discretion. Max’s Seafood Café ex rel. Lou-Ann, 

Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 673 (3d Cir. 1999). 

 2. Background: Qualified Immunity 

 Santini argues on appeal that the District Court erred in 

finding that the Trooper Defendants were entitled to qualified 

immunity with respect to his federal claims. Santini’s federal 

claims primarily arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which 

provides a cause of action to any individual who has been 

deprived of his rights under the Constitution or other federal 

laws by a person acting “under color of law.” Curley v. Klem, 

499 F.3d 199, 206 (3d Cir. 2007). “Police officers, 

embodying the authority of the state, are liable under § 1983 

when they violate someone’s constitutional rights, unless they 

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are protected by qualified immunity.” Id. The doctrine of 

qualified immunity shields government officials who perform 

discretionary functions “from liability for civil damages 

insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established 

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person 

would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 

(1982). The purpose of qualified immunity is to “avoid 

excessive disruption of government and permit the resolution 

of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment.” Id. 

 This Court performs a two-step inquiry to determine 

whether a particular government official is entitled to 

summary judgment based on qualified immunity. First, we 

ask whether the facts—taken in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party—show that a government official violated a 

constitutional right. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 

(2001). Second, we ask whether that right was clearly 

established at the time of the official’s actions. Id. This twostep process has more particularized requirements in an 

excessive force case such as this one. 

 In an excessive force case, we determine whether a 

constitutional violation has occurred using the Fourth 

Amendment’s objective reasonableness test. Graham v. 

Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989); Curley, 499 F.3d at 206–

07. To determine objective reasonableness, we must balance 

the “nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s 

Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing 

governmental interests at stake.” Graham, 390 U.S. at 396 

(quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985)) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

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 While this inquiry is highly individualized and fact 

specific, the Supreme Court has provided three factors to 

guide us through it: (1) the severity of the crime at issue, (2) 

whether the suspect poses an imminent threat to the safety of 

the police or others in the vicinity, and (3) whether the 

suspect attempts to resist arrest or flee the scene. Graham, 

390 U.S. at 396; see also Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 

822 (3d Cir. 1997) (providing additional factors including 

“the possibility that the persons subject to the police action 

are themselves violent or dangerous, the duration of the 

action, whether the action takes place in the context of 

effecting an arrest, the possibility that the suspect may be 

armed, and the number of persons with whom the police 

officers must contend at one time”). We evaluate objective 

reasonableness from the perspective of the officer at the time 

of the incident and not with the benefit of hindsight. 

Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 85 (1987). In sum, we 

employ a “totality of the circumstances” approach for 

evaluating objective reasonableness. Curley, 499 F.3d at 207. 

 

 During the second step of the Saucier inquiry, we 

inquire whether—even though an officer violated an 

individual’s constitutional right—immunity should still 

protect that officer from liability. Curley, 499 F.3d at 207. To 

answer that question, we must determine whether the right 

violated by the officer was clearly established at the time of 

the violation. Id. (citing Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202). To make 

that determination, we engage in another reasonableness 

inquiry: “whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer 

that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” 

Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. Like the reasonableness inquiry 

conducted in step one, this inquiry is objective and fact 

specific. Despite these similarities, the step two inquiry is 

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distinct from the inquiry conducted in step one. Id. at 205. 

Saucier highlighted this distinction by noting that the purpose 

of the step two inquiry is to acknowledge the reality that 

“reasonable mistakes can be made as to the legal constraints 

on particular police conduct.” Curley, 499 F.3d at 207 

(quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205) (internal quotation mark 

omitted). Put another way, 

 

[T]he first step of the analysis addresses whether the 

force used by the officer was excessive, and therefore 

violative of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, or 

whether it was reasonable in light of the facts and 

circumstances available to the officer at the time. This 

is not a question of immunity at all, but is instead the 

underlying question of whether there is even a wrong 

to be addressed in an analysis of immunity. The 

second step is the immunity analysis and addresses 

whether, if there was a wrong, such as the use of 

excessive force, the officer made a reasonable mistake 

about the legal constraints on his actions and should . . 

. be protected against suit[.] 

Curley, 499 F.3d at 207. 

Saucier mandated that its two-step inquiry be 

performed in sequential order, Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 

which created “perplexing logical and practical” issues for the 

lower courts, Curley, 499 F.3d at 208. The Supreme Court 

remedied those issues in Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 

236 (2009). After Pearson, district and appellate courts have 

discretion to perform the Saucier inquiry in the order we 

deem most appropriate for the particular case before us. Id. 

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 3. The District Court’s Decision 

 Here, the District Court made only a fleeting reference 

to qualified immunity in its September 18, 2013 Opinion: 

It should be noted that, in finding Plaintiff’s 

constitutional rights were not violated, Troopers 

Fuhrmann and Sickles are entitled to qualified 

immunity on Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims. However, 

the Court need not analyze this issue[, qualified 

immunity,] because for the reasons set forth above, 

Defendants’ [sic] are already entitled to judgment on 

Plaintiff’s federal constitutional claims. 

Santini, 2013 WL 5554257, at *5 n.3 (citation omitted).11 It 

addressed qualified immunity in more detail in its May 6, 

2014 Opinion denying Santini’s motion for reconsideration. 

In that opinion, the District Court found that Santini did not 

satisfy the first step of the Saucier inquiry: establishing that a 

constitutional violation occurred. Santini, 2014 WL 1789545, 

at *3–4. Based on that finding, the court did not proceed to 

 11 This footnote demonstrates the District Court’s 

initial misunderstanding as to the scope of two of its findings: 

(1) that § 1983 cannot override the Eleventh Amendment’s 

prohibition of suits against government officials in their 

official capacity and (2) that government officials acting in 

their official capacity are not “persons” under § 1983. Both of 

these findings extend only to government officials acting in 

their official—as opposed to individual—capacity. Santini’s 

Complaint explicitly stated that he was bringing charges 

against the Trooper Defendants in their official and individual 

capacities. (Complaint ¶¶ 2–4).

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the second Saucier step. Id. The District Court relied on two 

facts to find that Santini’s constitutional rights were not 

violated: “Here, Plaintiff does not dispute that he refused to 

take his hands out of his pockets despite Trooper Fuhrmann’s 

instructions to do so, and further admits the fact that he 

attempted to resist arrest.” Id. at *4. 

 For the reasons detailed below, we find that while the 

District Court stated the appropriate test to determine 

qualified immunity, it failed to properly construe all facts and 

inferences in Santini’s favor. As our analysis below shows, 

when all facts and inferences are taken in Santini’s favor, a 

reasonable factfinder could find that Santini’s constitutional 

rights were violated. Therefore, the District Court’s grant of 

summary judgment on that issue was inappropriate. We 

accordingly vacate in part the court’s decisions dated 

September 18, 2013 and May 6, 2014 and remand them for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

4. Analysis 

 At the outset, we emphasize that in reviewing an order 

granting summary judgment, we must construe all facts and 

inferences in favor of the nonmoving party—in this case: 

Santini. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 

(1962). 

 

 We have discretion to perform the two steps of the 

Saucier qualified immunity inquiry in the order we deem 

appropriate. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. We proceed first with 

the constitutional violation inquiry to remain consistent with 

the District Court’s May 6, 2014 Opinion. We employ the 

Graham totality of the circumstances test and begin with an 

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analysis of (1) the severity of Santini’s crime, (2) whether 

Santini posed an imminent threat to the safety of the police or 

others in the vicinity, and (3) whether Santini attempted to 

resist arrest or flee the scene. Graham, 390 U.S. at 396. 

 

 Construing all facts in Santini’s favor, a reasonable 

jury could find that the severity of crime factor weighs in his 

favor. The police arrived to the Santini family farm in order 

to investigate a fight between two women—not any sort of 

criminal activity on the part of Santini. Accordingly, Santini 

was initially only a witness to, not a suspect of, a crime. 

Nevertheless, after the altercation with Fuhrmann, Santini 

was charged with aggravated assault under N.J.S.A. § 2C:12-

1b(5)(a), a fourth degree crime in New Jersey. (App. 222).12

However, under Santini’s version of the facts, he did not 

commit that offense. (See Santini Dep. 65–66).13 Further, the 

 12 “Crimes are classified by degree. Degrees range 

from first to fourth degree offenses. A First degree crime 

carries the potential penalty of 10-20 years in prison. A 

Second degree crime carries a potential penalty of 5-10 

years. Defendants who are convicted of first and second 

degree crimes face a presumptive term of incarceration. It is 

assumed that they will be sentenced to serve time in prison. A 

Third degree crime may result in 3-5 years if convicted, 

while Fourth degree crimes carry a potential penalty of up to 

18 months in jail. There is a presumption of non-custodial 

sentences on 3rd and 4th degree offenses.” The Criminal 

Justice Process, NEW JERSEY COURTS, available at

http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/criminal/crproc.htm. 

13 The Eastern District of Michigan confronted a case 

with some similarities to Santini’s in Cervantes v. Torbett, 

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aggravated assault charge was subsequently dropped. (Santini 

Plea Colloquy 4). Ultimately, Santini pleaded guilty to one 

count of resisting arrest, a disorderly persons offense in New 

Jersey.14

 Under Santini’s averment of the facts, a reasonable 

jury could also find that the imminent threat factor weighs in 

his favor. We again emphasize that at the beginning of 

Santini’s encounter with the police, he was not suspected of 

criminal activity. Santini does admit that he did not obey 

Fuhrmann’s commands to keep his hands in plain sight. 

However, under our totality of the circumstances approach, 

this fact does not compel us to find against Santini. First, 

Santini maintains that he initially complied with each of 

Fuhrmann’s requests to show his hands. Moreover, he 

contends that he explained to Fuhrmann that he was only 

covering his hands because they were cold. His action of 

 

No. 08-14390, 2010 WL 743045 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 1, 2010) 

(unpublished). There, the district court found that the severity 

of crime factor weighed in favor of the plaintiff—who was 

also the nonmoving party on a motion for summary 

judgment—where she was charged with assaulting an officer, 

but, under her version of the facts, an assault never occurred. 

Cervantes, 2010 WL 743045, at *7. 

14 Disorderly persons offenses “carry less restrictive 

punishments upon conviction.” The Criminal Justice Process,

NEW JERSEY COURTS, available at

http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/criminal/crproc.htm. In New 

Jersey, a resisting arrest conviction carries with it a maximum 

of six months in prison and a $1,000 fine. (Santini Plea 

Colloquy 6). 

Case: 14-2938 Document: 003112035019 Page: 18 Date Filed: 08/04/2015
19 

balling his hands into his sleeves is consistent with that 

explanation. Finally, the police, including Fuhrmann, initially 

wanted to speak to Santini because they believed he had 

recorded the incident between Drake and Knighton on his cell 

phone. During their conversation, Santini informed Fuhrmann 

that he had his cell phone in his pocket. Therefore, to the 

extent that Fuhrmann observed a hard object in Santini’s 

pocket, a jury could find that an objectively reasonable officer 

in his position would have thought that object was Santini’s 

phone. This inference is further supported by the absence of 

other facts suggesting that Santini was armed or otherwise 

posed a threat to officer safety. 

 The final Graham factor—whether the suspect 

attempts to resist arrest or flee the scene—is somewhat 

inconclusive in this case. While Santini did admit to resisting 

arrest in his plea colloquy (Santini Plea Colloquy 8:22–9:8), 

his resistance was not violent.15 

 Under Graham, we ultimately weigh the invasion on 

Santini’s individual rights against the interests of the Trooper 

Defendants. Under Santini’s version of the facts, this balance 

 15 A reasonable jury could also find under Santini’s 

version of the facts that several of the Sharrar v. Felsing

factors weigh in Santini’s favor. For example, there was a 

limited possibility that Santini was violent, as he was only a 

witness to—rather than a suspect of—a crime. Further, by the 

time Fuhrmann was speaking with Santini, the fight between 

Drake and Knighton had ceased and the situation was calm. 

Trooper Fuhrmann had no other individuals to contend with 

other than witnesses, and there were multiple other officers at 

the scene. 

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20 

tips in his favor. Again, taking all facts and inferences in his 

favor, the infringement on Santini’s rights was great: he was 

grabbed, tackled, punched, kicked, and pepper sprayed. 

Conversely, there was only limited justification for the 

government’s actions as Santini was a witness to a crime, he 

did not threaten violence against the officer, the scene that the 

officers were confronted with was peaceful at the time of the 

Santini interaction, and there were many officers at the scene. 

 Therefore, material factual disputes exist as to whether 

Santini’s constitutional rights were violated. The existence of 

those disputes compels us to find that the District Court’s 

grant of summary judgment was inappropriate, as was its 

denial of Santini’s motion to reconsider that decision. See 

Curley, 298 F.3d at 278 (“Just as the granting of summary 

judgment is inappropriate when a genuine issue exists as to 

any material fact, a decision on qualified immunity will be 

premature when there are unresolved disputes of historical 

fact relevant to the immunity analysis.”). We also find that 

those factual issues must be resolved by a jury, not a judge. 

See id. (“[T]he existence of disputed, historical facts material 

to the objective reasonableness of an officer’s conduct will 

give rise to a jury issue.”). We accordingly vacate in part the 

decisions of the District Court and remand this case for 

further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. 

5. Santini’s State Law Claims 

 The District Court declined to exercise supplemental 

jurisdiction over Santini’s state law claims based on its 

dismissal of his federal claims. We instruct the court to 

reconsider that decision on remand based upon its resolution 

of Santini’s federal claims. 

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III. CONCLUSION

 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate in part the 

decisions of the District Court dated September 18, 2013 and 

May 6, 2014 and remand them for further proceedings 

consistent with this Opinion. 

Case: 14-2938 Document: 003112035019 Page: 21 Date Filed: 08/04/2015