Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-03012/USCOURTS-ca8-05-03012-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 950
Nature of Suit: Contitutionality of State Statutes
Cause of Action: 

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1

Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2), Terry Steinwand is substituted for Dean

C. Hildebrand. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-3012

___________

State of Minnesota, by its Attorney *

General, Mike Hatch; Collin Peterson; *

Starkey Grove; Charles Orvik, *

*

Plaintiffs-Appellants, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of North Dakota.

John Hoeven, in his Official Capacity *

as Governor of the State of North *

Dakota; Terry Steinwand1

, in his *

Official Capacity as Director of the *

North Dakota Game and Fish *

Department, *

*

Defendants-Appellees. *

___________

Submitted: March 24, 2006

Filed: August 3, 2006

___________

Before RILEY, BRIGHT, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

___________

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2

Attorney General, Mike Hatch, for the State of Minnesota, and Minnesota

residents Congressman Collin Peterson, Starkey Grove, and Charles Orvik.

3

John Hoeven, in his capacity as Governor of North Dakota, and Terry

Steinwand, in his capacity as Director of the North Dakota Game and Fish

Department.

4

Daniel L. Hovland, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the District

of North Dakota.

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BRIGHT, Circuit Judge.

North Dakota law drastically restricts hunting privileges of nonresidents as

compared to North Dakota residents. Some of those restrictions have come under

attack in this lawsuit as invalid under the United States Constitution. Representatives2

of the neighboring state of Minnesota (collectively “Minnesota”) brought this action

against defendants3

, officials of the State of North Dakota (collectively “North

Dakota”). The district court4

 rejected the Minnesota claims and granted summary

judgment of dismissal in favor of North Dakota. Minnesota appeals. We affirm the

judgment but do so in part on grounds other than those relied on by the district court.

I. BACKGROUND

Tourism ranks as the second-largest and fastest-growing industry in North

Dakota, contributing about $3 billion each year to the State’s economy. The North

Dakota Department of Tourism promotes the State’s “legendary hunting and fishing”

in its website and advertises through national print, radio, and television media.

About 52,000 nonresidents hunted in North Dakota in 2001, roughly thirtyseven percent of its hunters that year. During 2001, nonresident waterfowl hunters

took approximately 36,000 trips to North Dakota, spending an estimated 147,000 days

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there. While in North Dakota for the 2001-2002 season, nonresident waterfowl

hunters spent around $21 million in direct expenditures such as food, lodging, and

equipment. Nonresident hunters also generated an estimated 1,300 full-time jobs,

nearly $2 million in North Dakota tax collections, $79 million in gross business

volume, and $45 million in secondary economic effects.

In April 2001, an issue arose in the North Dakota Legislative Assembly

between resident hunters who wanted restrictions on the hunting of waterfowl by

nonresidents and business people who profit from the patronage of nonresident

hunters. The Assembly directed the legislative council to study this issue. The

assigned committee reported that the number of nonresident waterfowl hunters had

grown from about 5,500 hunters in 1990 to 30,000 hunters in 2001. The committee

further reported that resident hunters primarily complained about competition they

faced from nonresidents in access to hunting land. “[T]here is only so much good

hunting land that is available to be acquired for hunting access.” (Appellants’ J.A. at

430.) The committee recommended restricting nonresident hunting of waterfowl

within North Dakota.

Several restrictions on nonresident hunting followed the study, particularly in

the hunting of waterfowl. First, North Dakota excluded nonresidents from hunting

during the opening week of waterfowl season in “Amendment One to the 2003-2004

Small Game - Furbearer Proclamation,” which has the force of law. See N.D. Cent.

Code § 20.1-08-01. Second, North Dakota excluded nonresidents from all hunting,

including of waterfowl, during the first week of pheasant season on land owned by the

North Dakota Game and Fish Department, private land regulated by the Department

for hunting purposes, and land for which the Department provides “in lieu of tax”

payments. See N.D. Cent. Code § 20.1-08-04.9 (effective August 1, 2003);

Amendment One to the 2003-2004 Small Game - Furbearer Proclamation. Third,

North Dakota raised its license fees for nonresidents who must now pay $85 for a

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N.D. Cent. Code § 20.1-01-02(45) defines “small game” to include “all game

birds and tree squirrels.” Section 20.1-01-02(16) defines “game birds” to include “all

varieties of geese, brant, swans, ducks, plovers, snipes, woodcocks, grouse, sagehens,

pheasants, Hungarian partridges, quails, partridges, cranes, rails, coots, wild turkeys,

mourning doves, and crows.”

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waterfowl license (up from $10) and another $85 for a small game5

 license (up from

$75) if they also wish to hunt pheasants and grouse. See N.D. Cent. Code § 20.1-03-

12 (amended in 2003). By contrast, residents do not have to buy a separate license to

hunt waterfowl together with pheasants and grouse, but must only purchase one small

game license costing $6. See id.; N.D. Cent. Code § 20.1-03-03. Finally, even before

2003, North Dakota exempted residents and any member of the resident’s family

residing with the resident to hunt in season without a license on land they own or

lease. See N.D. Cent. Code §§ 20.1-03-03, -04(1).

Minnesota filed this action seeking declaratory judgment and to enjoin these

hunting laws to the extent they favor North Dakota residents. Minnesota’s amended

complaint, filed April 12, 2004, alleged among other things that each of these laws

violates the Commerce Clause, Art. I, § 8 of the United States Constitution. Further,

Minnesota alleged that N.D. Cent. Code §§ 20.1-03-03, -04(1), permitting residents

and any member of the resident’s family residing with the resident to hunt in season

without a license on land they own or lease, violates the Privileges and Immunities

Clause, Art. IV, § 2 of the United States Constitution.

On January 27, 2005, Minnesota filed a motion seeking summary judgment on

its Commerce Clause claim. On February 25, 2005, North Dakota filed a crossmotion seeking summary judgment on the merits of Minnesota’s claims under the

Commerce Clause and Privileges and Immunities Clause.

Further, on May 12, 2005, North Dakota filed a motion to dismiss Minnesota’s

Commerce Clause claim as moot based on the “Reaffirmation of State Regulation of

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The States of South Dakota, Alaska, Colorado, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska,

Nevada, Utah, and Wyoming have jointly filed an amicus curiae brief in support of

North Dakota. These states are among the many states, including Minnesota, which

extend residents preferred access to hunting and fishing opportunities. See, e.g.,

Alaska Stat. § 16.05.255(d) (Michie 2004) (granting preference to residents in the

taking of moose, deer, elk and caribou); Ariz. Admin. Code § R12-4-114 (2005)

(restricting hunting of buffalo and bighorn sheep by nonresidents); Cal. Fish & Game

Code §§ 331(a), 332(b) (2005) (limiting licenses for antelope and elk to residents

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Resident and Nonresident Hunting and Fishing Act of 2005,” Section 6063 of House

Bill 1268, approved by the United States Congress and signed into law on May 10,

2005.

On June 8, 2005, the district court denied Minnesota’s motion for summary

judgment, granted North Dakota’s cross-motion for summary judgment, and denied

North Dakota’s motion to dismiss. Minnesota ex rel. Hatch v. Hoeven, 370 F. Supp.

2d 960, 962, 973 (D.N.D. 2005). On Minnesota’s Commerce Clause claims, the court

reasoned that North Dakota does not regulate “persons in commerce” or activity

“substantially affect[ing] interstate commerce.” Id. at 969, 971. The court considered

it “unnecessary to address the merits of North Dakota’s Motion to Dismiss other than

to note that Congressional interpretation of what is and is not interstate commerce is

not controlling on the judicial branch.” Id. at 973 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514

U.S. 549, 557 n.2 (1995)). 

On Minnesota’s Privileges and Immunities Clause claim, the court considered

“the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court . . . in Baldwin [v. Fish & Game

Commission of Montana, 436 U.S. 371 (1978)] . . . equally applicable to the current

dispute,” id. at 967, and dismissed this Minnesota contention. 

On July 7, 2005, Minnesota filed a notice of appeal “from the final judgment

. . . granting Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and denying Plaintiffs’

Motion for Summary Judgment.”6

 

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only); 2 Colo. Code Regs. § 406-2 (2006) (limiting licenses for nonresident hunters

to no more than ten percent of available moose, bighorn sheep, and mountain goat

licenses); Fla. Admin. Code Ann. r. 68A-5.005 (2006) (limiting nonresidents to ten

percent of special-opportunity hunting permits); Idaho Code § 36-408(2) (Michie

2005) (authorizing Fish and Game Commission to limit or prohibit nonresidents from

participation in controlled hunts); Ill. Admin. Code tit. 17, § 670.20 (2005) (limiting

the number of nonresident archery deer permits); Iowa Code Ann. §§ 483A.7, 483A.8

(West 2006) (limiting the number of nonresident turkey and deer permits); Kan. Stat.

Ann. § 32-937(l) (2005) (limiting the number of nonresident deer permits); Me. Rev.

Stat. Ann. tit. 12, §§ 11152(3), 11154(2) (West 2006) (limiting the number of

nonresident licenses for antlerless deer and moose); Md. Code Ann. Nat. Res.

§§ 10-604(f), 10- 605(d), 606(e) (2006) (restricting hunting of waterfowl by

nonresidents); Minn. Stat. § 97A.475(1)-(3) (2006) (limiting moose, elk, and prairie

chicken licenses to residents only); Mont. Code Ann. § 87-2-506(2) (2005) (limiting

nonresidents to ten percent of big game licenses when applications exceed the number

to be issued); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 37-447(5) (2006) (authorizing deer hunting permits

for nonresidents after preference has been given to resident hunters); Neb. Rev. Stat.

§§ 37.450 (2006) (restricting elk permits to residents); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 502.147

(2005) (limiting the number of nonresident deer tags); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 502.250

(2005) (establishing different fees for resident and nonresident hunting; for example,

a resident deer tag costs $30 while a nonresident deer tag costs $240); N.H. Code

Admin. R. Ann. Fish 301.09(1)(2)(f) (2006) (limiting the number of nonresident

moose permits); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 17-3-16 (2006) (limiting nonresidents to twentytwo percent of the licenses for hunting on public lands); N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law §

11-0913 (McKinney 2006) (authorizing resident preference for deer permits); Or. Rev.

Stat. § 497.112(1), (7), (8), (9) (2005) (limiting number of nonresident tags in

controlled hunts for mountain goat, mountain sheep, black bear, cougar, antelope, elk,

and deer and establishing different tag fees for residents and nonresidents); S.D.

Codified Laws § 41-6-18.1 (2005) (limiting ten-day nonresident waterfowl licenses

to four thousand per year); S.D. Codified Laws § 41-6-18.4 (2005) (restricting areas

in which nonresidents may hunt with three-day waterfowl licenses); S.D. Codified

Laws § 41-6-19.3 (2005) (granting preference to certain resident landowners and

lessees for deer and antelope permits); 2005 Utah Big Game Proclamation (restricting

nonresident hunting permits as compared to residents and charging greater permit

fees), available at http://www.wildlife.utah.gov/proclamations/2005_biggame/; Vt.

Stat. Ann. tit. 10 § 4081(g)(2) (2005) (limiting nonresidents to ten percent of antlerless

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deer permits); W. Va. Code § 20-2-42n (2006) (establishing different fees for hunting

of antlerless deer by residents and nonresidents); Wis. Stat. §§ 29.164(3), 29.177(5)

(2005) (establishing resident preference categories for awarding deer and wild turkey

licenses); Wyo. Admin. Code Game Hunt Ch. 6 § 5 (2005) (establishing quotas for

nonresident deer licenses). 

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Minnesota on its appeal raises two issues: (1) that North Dakota’s waterfowl

hunting restrictions violate the dormant Commerce Clause, Art. I, § 8, of the United

States Constitution (Appellants’ Op. Br. at 25), and (2) North Dakota’s authorizing

residents to hunt in season on land they own or lease without a license denies

nonresident landowners the same use and enjoyment of their property in violation of

the Privileges and Immunities Clause, Art. IV, § 2, of the United States Constitution

(Appellants’ Op. Br. at 16, 20-21). 

North Dakota in response rejects the dormant Commerce Clause contentions

and separately denies the Privileges and Immunities Clause claim. North Dakota

asserts that an enactment by the United States Congress, House Bill 1268, in May

2005, renders the dormant Commerce Clause claim constitutionally moot. North

Dakota in this appeal also asserts that Minnesota has waived the Privileges and

Immunities Clause claim, and alternatively that Minnesota’s claim does not impinge

on a privilege or immunity protected by Article IV, Section 2 of the United States

Constitution. 

In this opinion, we briefly discuss the dormant Commerce Clause issue and

determine that United States Congressional action has made Minnesota’s contention

constitutionally moot. We reach and discuss the Privileges and Immunities Clause

and determine its provisions do not provide Minnesota any relief. Thus, we will

affirm the judgment of dismissal.

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II. DISCUSSION

We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment. Donovan v.

Harrah’s Md. Heights Corp., 289 F.3d 527, 528 (8th Cir. 2002). Summary judgment

shall be granted “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 

A. Commerce Clause, Art. I, § 8

Minnesota claims that North Dakota’s preference for residents over

nonresidents in its hunting laws violates the Commerce Clause, Art. I, § 8, of the

United States Constitution. The Commerce Clause provides, “Congress shall have

Power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States,

and with the Indian Tribes.” U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8. 

Although the Commerce Clause reads as an affirmative grant of regulatory

power to Congress, the Supreme Court has read into this language a “negative” or

“dormant” component that grants courts the power to invalidate state laws that

discriminate against interstate commerce. See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v.

Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 571-72 (1997). A dormant Commerce Clause

analysis asks whether the state’s law discriminates against interstate commerce and

whether sufficient justification exists for the burden imposed. See Smithfield Foods,

Inc. v. Miller, 367 F.3d 1061, 1065 (8th Cir. 2004). 

The record in this case clearly shows nonresident hunting means big business

for North Dakota and its residents. However, we need not reach the merits of

Minnesota’s claim that North Dakota’s restrictions on nonresident hunting violate the

dormant Commerce Clause. 

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On May 10, 2005, the President signed into law House Bill 1268, the

“Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror,

and Tsunami Relief, 2005.” Although seemingly unrelated to the general thrust of the

legislation, Section 6063 of House Bill 1268 specifically addresses the issue raised in

this appeal, providing:

(a) SHORT TITLE. – This section may be cited as the “Reaffirmation of

State Regulation of Resident and Nonresident Hunting and Fishing Act

of 2005”. 

(b) Declaration of Policy and Construction of Congressional Silence –

(1) IN GENERAL. – It is the policy of Congress that it is in the public

interest for each State to continue to regulate the taking for any purpose

of fish and wildlife within its boundaries, including by means of laws or

regulations that differentiate between residents and nonresidents of such

State with respect to the availability of licenses or permits for taking of

particular species of fish or wildlife, the kind and numbers of fish and

wildlife that may be taken, or the fees charged in connection with

issuance of licenses or permits for hunting or fishing.

(2) CONSTRUCTION OF CONGRESSIONAL SILENCE. – Silence on

the part of Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier under

clause 3 of Section 8 of Article I of the Constitution (commonly referred

to as the “commerce clause”) to the regulation of hunting or fishing by

a State or Indian tribe.

In Schutz v. Thorne, 415 F.3d 1128, 1130, 1137-38 (10th Cir. 2005), the Tenth

Circuit considered the effect of Section 6063 on a dormant Commerce Clause

challenge to Wyoming giving residents preferred access to recreational hunting. The

court concluded Section 6063 made the claim constitutionally moot, which results

“‘when the issues presented are no longer “live” or the parties lack a legally

cognizable interest in the outcome.’” Id. at 1138 (quoting County of Los Angeles v.

Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979)). The court explained that “[t]he essential element

of a successful dormant Commerce Clause claim is congressional inaction, so when

Congress does act, the dormancy ends, thus leaving the courts obliged to follow

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We do not decide whether North Dakota should have cross-appealed the denial

of its motion to dismiss this claim as moot. As Schutz observed, “the case and

controversy ‘must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the

complaint is filed.’” 415 F.3d at 1138 (quoting Arizonans for Official English v.

Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 67 (1997)). We also note that prior to the enactment of House

Bill 1268, courts had disagreed on whether restricting nonresident hunting in favor of

residents discriminates against interstate commerce. Compare Conservation Force,

Inc. v. Manning, 301 F.3d 985, 988, 1000 (9th Cir. 2002) (concluding Arizona’s

restrictions on nonresident hunting substantially affected and discriminated against

interstate commerce and remanding for the district to decide whether the restrictions

had the requisite justification) with Schutz v. Wyoming, No. 02-CV-165-D (D. Wyo.

May 29, 2003) (concluding the Ninth Circuit wrongly decided Conservation Force and

“the dormant Commerce Clause [did] not appl[y] to Wyoming’s big game statutes”).

 

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congressional will.” Id. “Thus, when Congress acted to confirm the rights of states

to regulate these activities, Schutz’s claim ended.” Id.

We agree with the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning. Minnesota’s dormant Commerce

Clause claim ended with the passage of the “Reaffirmation of State Regulation of

Resident and Nonresident Hunting and Fishing Act of 2005.”7

 See id.; also

Republican Party of Minn. v. Klobuchar, 381 F.3d 785, 790 (8th Cir. 2004) (“Federal

courts are not empowered to give opinions upon moot questions . . . .”) (internal

quotations omitted). 

The district court misread United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995),

reasoning “Congressional interpretation of what is and is not interstate commerce is

not controlling on the judicial branch.” See Hoeven, 370 F. Supp. 2d at 973. Lopez

did not challenge state law under the dormant Commerce Clause. Rather, Lopez

presented a “positive” Commerce Clause challenge, asking whether Congress

regulated beyond the scope of its authority in passing the Gun-Free School Zones Act

of 1990. See 514 U.S. at 551. On that question, the Supreme Court reasoned that

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Congress could not decide the outer limits of its power to regulate interstate

commerce. See id. at 556-58 & n.2. 

With respect to the dormant Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court has held, 

Our decisions do not, however, limit the authority of Congress to

regulate commerce among the several States as it sees fit. In the exercise

of this plenary authority, Congress may “confe[r] upon the States an

ability to restrict the flow of interstate commerce that they would not

otherwise enjoy.” If Congress ordains that the States may freely regulate

an aspect of interstate commerce, any action taken by a State within the

scope of the congressional authorization is rendered invulnerable to

Commerce Clause challenge.

 

Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 451 U.S. 648,

652-53 (1981) (internal citations omitted). The district court need not have reached

the merits of Minnesota’s claim under the dormant Commerce Clause. We make it

crystal clear that we do not reach nor decide the merits of the dormant Commerce

Clause issue in this case. 

Minnesota also contends that Section 6036 does not apply to migratory

waterfowl passing through North Dakota. This argument contradicts the plain

meaning of Section 6036, which states, “It is the policy of Congress that it is in the

public interest for each State to continue to regulate the taking for any purpose of fish

and wildlife within its boundaries . . . .” Further, Minnesota did not develop this

argument and define “boundaries” in a way that excludes migratory wildlife located

by hunters in North Dakota. Instead, Minnesota simply commented that North Dakota

does not “own” or “possess” migratory waterfowl. 

Finally, Minnesota argues Congress did not follow the regular authorization

process by attaching Section 6036 to an important appropriations bill. As part of an

appropriations bill, Minnesota argues that Section 6036 provided a temporary measure

that lasted for one fiscal year, at most. This argument loses force where, as here, the

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disputed section does not relate to appropriations and spending, which generally

occurs in a fiscal cycle. Cf. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Martin, 961

F.2d 269, 274 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (“[A] provision contained in an appropriations bill

operates only in the applicable fiscal year, unless its language clearly indicates that it

is intended to be permanent.”); United States v. Int’l Bus. Machines Corp., 892 F.2d

1006, 1008-09 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 

To bolster its argument, Minnesota observes that Section 6036 has not been

codified in the United States Code and the conference report on House Bill 1268

expressed a need for expedient action, stating “State fish and wildlife agencies will

soon be considering regulations for coming seasons, and it is important that questions

about their authority be resolved without unnecessary delay.” 151 Cong. Rec. H2997-

02, at 3023 (2005). However, we need not decide today whether Section 6036 will

forever preclude challenges to restrictions on nonresident hunting under the dormant

Commerce Clause. It is sufficient for this court to determine its application to this

litigation. 

We have no doubt Congress intended Section 6036 to apply here. Section 6036

arose in response to Conservation Force, Inc. v. Manning, 301 F.3d 985 (9th Cir.

2002). See 151 Cong. Rec. H2997-02, at 3023 (2005). The committee report

expressed concern that the Ninth Circuit’s decision “could have an effect on the

thinking of Federal courts across the country.” Id. 

As the district court observed, Minnesota modeled its dormant Commerce

Clause claim after Conservation Force. See 370 F. Supp. 2d at 971. Then, while the

parties had motions for summary judgment on the issue pending before the district

court, the President signed Section 6036 into law as part of House Bill 1268. In this

context, the language of futurity contained in Section 6036 certainly applies. See

§ 6036(b)(1) (“It is the policy of Congress that it is in the public interest for each State

to continue to regulate the taking for any purpose of fish and wildlife within its

boundaries, including by means of laws or regulations that differentiate between

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8

We note that we address this issue, although not briefed by Minnesota in the

district court. Minnesota raised this Privileges and Immunities claim in its amended

complaint, North Dakota briefed the issue with its motion for summary judgment, and

the district court ruled on the claim. See Struempler v. Bowen, 822 F.2d 40, 42 (8th

Cir. 1987); Harrell v. 20th Century Ins. Co., 934 F.2d 203, 206 n.1 (9th Cir. 1991).

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residents and nonresidents of such State . . . .”) (emphasis added); § 6036(b)(2)

(“Silence on the part of Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier under

clause 3 of Section 8 of Article I of the Constitution (commonly referred to as the

‘commerce clause’) to the regulation of hunting or fishing by a State or Indian tribe.”)

(emphasis added). 

B. Privileges and Immunities Clause, Art. IV, § 2

Minnesota also claims that North Dakota’s statutes authorizing residents to hunt

without a license on land they own or lease violates the Privileges and Immunities

Clause, Art. IV, § 2, of the United States Constitution, which states, “The Citizens of

each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several

States.”8

 

Whether differential treatment of out-of-state residents violates this Clause

involves a two-part inquiry: (1) whether the state’s law discriminates against out-ofstate residents with regard to a privilege or immunity protected by the Clause, and (2)

if so, whether sufficient justification exists for the discrimination. See United Bldg.

& Constr. Trades Council of Camden County & Vicinity v. Mayor & Council of the

City of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 218, 221-23 (1984). We do not reach the second

prong. 

In Baldwin v. Fish & Game Commission of Montana, 436 U.S. 371 (1978), the

Supreme Court considered whether Montana’s preference for residents in access to

recreational elk hunting violated the Privileges and Immunities Clause. The Court

explained the limited reach of this constitutional provision, “Only with respect to

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those ‘privileges’ and ‘immunities’ bearing upon the vitality of the Nation as a single

entity must the State treat all citizens, resident and nonresident, equally.” Id. at 383.

The Court’s rationale and decision are instructive here, 

Elk hunting by nonresidents in Montana is a recreation and a sport. In

itself–wholly apart from license fees–it is costly and obviously available

only to the wealthy nonresident or to the one so taken with the sport that

he sacrifices other values in order to indulge in it and to enjoy what it

offers. It is not a means to the nonresident’s livelihood. The mastery of

the animal and the trophy are the ends that are sought; appellants are not

totally excluded from these. The elk supply, which has been entrusted

to the care of the State by the people of Montana, is finite and must be

carefully tended in order to be preserved.

Appellants’ interest in sharing this limited resource on more equal

terms with Montana residents simply does not fall within the purview of

the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Equality in access to Montana elk

is not basic to the maintenance or well-being of the Union. Appellants

do not–and cannot–contend that they are deprived of a means of a

livelihood by the system or of access to any part of the State to which

they may seek to travel. We do not decide the full range of activities that

are sufficiently basic to the livelihood of the Nation that the States may

not interfere with a nonresident’s participation therein without similarly

interfering with a resident’s participation. Whatever rights or activities

may be “fundamental” under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, we

are persuaded, and hold, that elk hunting by nonresidents in Montana is

not one of them.

Id. at 388. 

Just like Montana elk hunting, waterfowl hunting in North Dakota is a

recreation and a sport. Waterfowl hunting does not provide a means to the

nonresident’s livelihood. Equality in access to North Dakota waterfowl does not

constitute a fundamental right basic to the maintenance or well-being of the Union.

Minnesota recognizes Baldwin’s authority but seeks to distinguish the Court’s

precedent through a property rights’ analysis. Baldwin stated that the Privileges and

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Immunities Clause protects rights “in the ownership and disposition of privately held

property within the State.” 436 U.S. at 383 (citing Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239

(1898)). Minnesota contends that North Dakota interferes with nonresidents’ property

rights by preventing nonresidents who own or lease land in North Dakota from

hunting on their land on the same terms enjoyed by resident owners and lessees.

Baldwin did not address whether hunting constitutes a stick in the bundle of property

rights accompanying land ownership.

We look to North Dakota law in deciding whether the purchase or lease of land

within the State confers a property right to hunt on that land. See Bd. of Regents of

State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (“Property interests, of course, are

not created by the Constitution. Rather they are created and their dimensions are

defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such

as state law–rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support

claims of entitlement to those benefits.”); Clajon Prod. Corp. v. Petera, 70 F.3d 1566,

1575-76 (10th Cir. 1995) (reviewing Wyoming law on “whether a landowner has a

property right to hunt surplus game that may be found on his or her land”); State v.

Butler, 587 So. 2d 1391, 1392 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (“Whether there is a property

interest in wildlife is a matter of state law. See Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183

(1984).”).

“At common law, a landowner traditionally had the right to hunt wild animals

on his or her land.” Clajon, 70 F.3d at 1575. North Dakota, by contrast, commits the

hunting and taking of wildlife to State regulation for the public good. See N.D. Const.

Art. XI, § 27; N.D. Cent. Code § 20.1-01-03. The statutes prescribe a procedure by

which the State establishes the manner, places, and times in which each species of

wildlife may be taken or possessed and in what numbers. See N.D. Cent. Code §

20.1-08-04. Further, except under certain statutory exceptions, residents and

nonresidents may not hunt or fish within North Dakota without a statutorily prescribed

license. See N.D. Cent. Code. §§ 20.1-03-03, -07. 

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-16-

The Supreme Court of North Dakota has affirmed the authority of this statutory

scheme, which places hunting and fishing in the arms of the State. See State ex rel.

Stuart v. Dickinson Cheese Co., 200 N.W.2d 59, 61 (N.D. 1972) (“As sovereign, the

State has the power to determine when and under what conditions fish running wild

may be taken and thus reduced to ownership . . . .”); State v. Hastings, 41 N.W.2d

305, 308 (N.D. 1950) (“From a consideration of the foregoing statutes it is apparent

that no person in this state can acquire title to or the right to sell muskrat pelts unless

such pelts are those of animals taken in open season and that pelts of animals taken

out of season are subject to seizure by the state or are contraband as alleged in the

information.”).

We recognize that North Dakota Century Code § 20.1-03-04 provides, “Any

resident, or any member of the resident’s family residing customarily with the

resident, may hunt small game, fish, or trap during the open season without a license

upon land owned or leased by the resident.” However, this statute does not

discriminate against nonresidents with respect to a fundamental right existing in

property. Rather, it discriminates against nonresident participation in recreational

hunting, which the United States Constitution does not protect under Article IV, § 2.

The limited authorization to hunt without a license provided under this statute

comes as a matter of legislative grace in connection with the general prohibition

against residents hunting without a license. See N.D. Cent. Code § 20.1-03-03

(stating no resident may hunt without a license except as provided in § 20.1-03-04).

If the resident property owner violates certain laws, the State may revoke the

resident’s hunting privileges. See N.D. Cent. Code § 20.1-01-26 (stating hunting

privileges may be suspended upon conviction under this title [, Game, Fish, Predators,

and Boating]); § 20.1-01-26.1 (stating no person may hunt while the person’s hunting

privileges are suspended). Further, Section 20.1-03-04 confers no rights upon the

resident should North Dakota decide to revoke this exception and require a license for

all hunting within the State.

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9

As stated in the opinion, we did not address the merits of Minnesota’s dormant

Commerce Clause claim because of the mootness “safe harbor” resulting from action

of the United States Congress. The application of the “safe harbor” for the future also

has not been reached. In light of the uncertainties, the state officials in Minnesota and

North Dakota may well consider discussing the issue and seeking a satisfactory

resolution, rather than litigating further.

-17-

Minnesota refers us to Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 180 (1868); Corfield v.

Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230); and Blake v. McClung,

172 U.S. 239, 258 (1898). Consistent with Baldwin, these cases recognize that the

Privileges and Immunities Clause protects property rights. However, they do not

establish hunting constitutes a part of the bundle of property rights accompanying the

ownership or lease of land. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, we affirm the district court’s entry of judgment

for the defendants.9

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