Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03973/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03973-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

---

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-3973

___________

Abdel Elnashar, *

*

Plaintiff/Appellant, *

*

v. *

* Appeal from the United States

Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, * District Court for the District

* of Minnesota.

Defendant/Appellee, *

*

United States Department of Justice; *

Federal Bureau of Investigation, *

Minneapolis Office; Nancy Schuster, *

Special Agent in Charge, *

*

Interested Parties/ *

Appellees. *

___________

Submitted: October 12, 2005

Filed: May 3, 2006 

___________

Before BYE, BEAM, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

___________

BEAM, Circuit Judge.

Abdel Elnashar appeals a discovery order. We dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

Appellate Case: 04-3973 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/03/2006 Entry ID: 2040320
1

We note that Speedway SuperAmerica's motion for summary judgment was

granted on September 22, 2005. However, we have previously rejected the doctrine

of "cumulative finality" which would grant this court jurisdiction to hear a

prematurely filed appeal once final judgment has been entered. Miller v. Special

Weapons, L.L.C., 369 F.3d 1033, 1035 (8th Cir. 2004). This case presents no reason

to change our stance.

-2-

I. BACKGROUND

Elnashar sued his former employer, Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, alleging,

among other things, that he was subjected to a hostile work environment and

wrongfully disciplined because of his religion and national origin. In connection with

this lawsuit, Elnashar sought testimony from a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

agent and unredacted FBI reports in an effort to learn the name of an unidentified

informant. Elnashar argued that the information was relevant to his employment

claims, because he believed that the informant was a Speedway SuperAmerica

employee, and that the evidence would show discriminatory intent. The court denied

Elnashar's motions to compel the production of FBI documents and the appearance of

an FBI witness and to review the FBI's decision not to release information. Elnashar

brought this appeal, prior to final judgment.1

II. JURISDICTION

Federal appellate jurisdiction is statutorily circumscribed. United States v.

Haley, 541 F.2d 678 (8th Cir. 1974). This is an appeal from an interlocutory order,

which is appealable only in very narrow circumstances. 

In general, an interlocutory order may not be appealed

unless it includes the grant or denial of an injunction, §

1292(a)(1); or the district court has certified a controlling

issue of law under § 1292(b); or the court has directed entry

of a partial final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the

Appellate Case: 04-3973 Page: 2 Date Filed: 05/03/2006 Entry ID: 2040320
-3-

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; or the order is appealable

as a final order under the judicially created collateral order

doctrine.

Borntrager v. Cent. States, Se. and Sw. Areas Pension Fund, 425 F.3d 1087, 1090 (8th

Cir. 2005). Elnashar contends that his appeal involves either a partial final judgment

or the collateral order doctrine, "under which an interlocutory order is immediately

appealable if it conclusively 'resolve[s] an important issue completely separate from

the merits of the action' and is 'effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final

judgment.'" Id. at 1092 (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468

(1978)). We disagree with Elnashar's contention.

First, Elnashar argues that he is appealing from the district court's "summary

judgment" in favor of the FBI. He likens his case to an appeal from a final judgment

in an action against a government agency filed "pursuant to the APA [Administrative

Procedure Act], challenging the federal government's refusal to disclose the

information he seeks." Mak v. FBI, 252 F.3d 1089,1091 (9th Cir. 2001). While we

assume, without deciding, that Elnashar need not file a separate action under the APA

against the FBI to conduct discovery, he nonetheless cannot appeal the discovery

order. Unlike Mak, no final judgment had been entered at the time of Elnashar's

interlocutory appeal. Therefore, this court lacks jurisdiction to consider the appeal.

Second, Elnashar states that this court has jurisdiction over the discovery order

as an order confirming a review of a final agency decision, citing In re SEC ex rel.

Glotzer, in which the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) sought a writ of

mandamus to prevent the district court from compelling its attorneys to testify. 374

F.3d 184, 185-86 (2d Cir. 2004). Again, we disagree. Elnashar is not seeking a writ,

which was appropriate in Glotzer, because "the district court's order [was] not

immediately appealable." Id. at 188. Further, in Glotzer, the SEC attorneys' only

option, absent a writ, was to be held in contempt, then appeal, which implicated

Appellate Case: 04-3973 Page: 3 Date Filed: 05/03/2006 Entry ID: 2040320
-4-

separation of powers issues. Id. at 187-88. Elnashar's appeal does not implicate any

separation of powers issues. Further, the instant discovery order, which denied

disclosure and can be reviewed after final judgment, does not present the same

exigency as an order compelling disclosure of privileged testimony which cannot be

undisclosed after final judgment.

Third, Elnashar argues that we should follow, Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. City

of Burlington, 351 F.2d 762 (D.C. Cir. 1965), to find that we have jurisdiction, under

the collateral order doctrine. We disagree. While Westinghouse did involve a

discovery order, it involved information pertinent to tolling the statute of limitations

for the instant parties, as well as for potential parties in other circuits. Id. at 764-65.

The court analogized the case to the appealability of "an order quashing a subpoena

entered in a district other than the one in which the main case is pending," id. at 765,

and held that the appeal was appropriate because other defendants in other

jurisdictions would be affected and might not be afforded review if the instant

defendants did not appeal. Id. at 766. However, Elnashar has post-judgment control

to decide whether to appeal these issues, and thus, the collateral order doctrine does

not apply.

Finally, Elnashar points out that at least one other circuit has reviewed a

subpoena duces tecum served on a government agency as a third party. United States

EPA v. Gen. Elec. Co., 197 F.3d 592 (2d Cir. 1999), amended by 212 F.3d 689

(2000). The court reviewed an order quashing a subpoena, implicitly holding that it

had jurisdiction to review an interlocutory discovery matter. However, the court only

explicitly decided three issues: (1) a subpoena addressed to an agency need not have

the exact name of the officeholder correct, (2) agency actions are reviewable under the

APA, and (3) a litigant need not commence a separate lawsuit to gain judicial review.

Id. at 597-99. The court did not review the merits of the discovery order as an

interlocutory matter, but remanded to the district court after setting forth those

Appellate Case: 04-3973 Page: 4 Date Filed: 05/03/2006 Entry ID: 2040320
-5-

holdings. The court did not hold that a final agency decision affirmed by a discovery

order is reviewable before final judgment in the underlying matter. Neither do we. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

______________________________

Appellate Case: 04-3973 Page: 5 Date Filed: 05/03/2006 Entry ID: 2040320