Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_03-cv-01180/USCOURTS-cand-5_03-cv-01180-17/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 29:201 Fair Labor Standards Act

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 Cintas initially moved for summary judgment against 88 plaintiffs. Seven of those 88

plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims. Accordingly, Cintas withdrew this motion as

against those individuals: Alex Davik, Andre Guidry, Donald Hugh Kelly, Jr., Ervin Kuhl,

James P. Metcalf, Cesar Pajares, and Raymond Richard Rishavy. [Dkt. No. 624, n.1] They

are, therefore, excluded from this Order.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

(Oakland Division)

PAUL VELIZ, et al, On behalf of

Themselves and All Others Similarly

Situated.

Plaintiffs,

vs.

CINTAS CORPORATION, an Ohio

corporation; PLAN ADMINISTRATOR

for the Cintas Partners’ Plan; and

DOES 1-25, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. C-03-01180 (SBA)

[E-FILING]

CLASS ACTION

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART CINTAS’ MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS AGAINST

CERTAIN PLAINTIFFS WHO HAVE BEEN

DETERMINED BY THE COURT TO HAVE

MADE ADMISSIONS, WHICH ARE

DISPOSITIVE OF THEIR CLAIM FOR

RELIEF

Defendant Cintas Corporation (“Cintas”) has submitted a Motion for Summary Judgment

Against Certain Plaintiffs Who Have Been Determined By The Court To Have Made

Admissions, Which Are Dispositive Of Their Third Claim For Relief [Docket No. 596]. After

reading and considering the papers presented, and the argument of counsel at the hearing hereon

held on April 3, 2007, for the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS in PART and DENIES in

PART Cintas’ Motion for Summary Judgment. 1

 

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SQUIRE, SANDERS &

DEMPSEY L.L.P.

One Maritime Plaza, Suite 300

SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94111-3492

PROPOSED ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART CINTAS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST

CERTAIN PLAINTIFFS WHO HAVE BEEN DETERMINED BY THE COURT TO HAVE MADE ADMISSIONS WHICH ARE

DISPOSITIVE OF THEIR THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF - CASE NO. C-03-01180 (SBA) 

2

A. BACKGROUND

This is a “collective action” brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) for the

alleged failure to pay overtime. Section 16(b) of the FLSA permits an employee to bring suit

against an employer “for and in behalf of himself . . . and other employees similarly situated.” 

29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Representative plaintiff Paul Veliz originally instituted such a collective

action against Cintas. The plaintiffs are former and current employees of Cintas. The performed

service and/or delivery functions that were allegedly not exempt from the overtime provisions of

the FLSA and the wage and hour laws of the various states where the plaintiffs are or were

employed. Cintas now moves for summary judgment against 81 litigating plaintiffs whose

claims it maintains are barred by virtue of admissions made in response to Cintas’ Requests for

Admissions. Cintas’ Motion for Summary Judgment against these 81 plaintiffs is based on one

or more of four different grounds. 

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SQUIRE, SANDERS &

DEMPSEY L.L.P.

One Maritime Plaza, Suite 300

SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94111-3492

PROPOSED ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART CINTAS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST

CERTAIN PLAINTIFFS WHO HAVE BEEN DETERMINED BY THE COURT TO HAVE MADE ADMISSIONS WHICH ARE

DISPOSITIVE OF THEIR THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF - CASE NO. C-03-01180 (SBA) 

3

B. ANALYSIS

1. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate if no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.Civ.P.56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The party moving for summary judgment must demonstrate that

there are no genuine issues of material fact. See Horphag v. Research Ltd. v. Garcia, 475 F.3d

1029, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007). An issue is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. 477 U.S.

242, 248 (1986); Rivera v. Philip Morris, Inc., 395 F.3d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 2005). An issue is

“material” if its resolution could affect the outcome of the action. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248;

Rivera, 395 F.3d at 1146.In responding to a properly supported summary judgment motion, the

non-movant cannot merely rely on the pleadings, but must present specific and supported

material facts, of significant probative value, to preclude summary judgment. See Matsushita

Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 n.11 (1986); Leisek v.

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SQUIRE, SANDERS &

DEMPSEY L.L.P.

One Maritime Plaza, Suite 300

SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94111-3492

PROPOSED ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART CINTAS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST

CERTAIN PLAINTIFFS WHO HAVE BEEN DETERMINED BY THE COURT TO HAVE MADE ADMISSIONS WHICH ARE

DISPOSITIVE OF THEIR THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF - CASE NO. C-03-01180 (SBA) 

4

Brightwood Corp., 278 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2002); Federal Trade Comm'n v. Gill, 265 F.3d

944, 954 (9th Cir. 2001). In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the

court views the evidence and draws inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving

party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Sullivan v. U.S. Dep't of the Navy, 365 F.3d 827, 832 (9th

Cir. 2004); Hernandez v. Hughes Missile Sys. Co., 362 F.3d 564, 568 (9th Cir. 2004).

2. Summary Judgment is Appropriate Against Plaintiffs Who Have

Admitted That They Did Not Work More Than 40 Hours In A Workweek While

Employed As A Cintas SSR

Plaintiffs concede that 50 individuals who admit they never worked more than 40 hours

in a workweek cannot prevail on their claim alleging Cintas failed to pay them overtime under

the FLSA. “[N]o employer shall employ any of his employees who in any workweek [works]

longer than forty hours unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in

excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate

at which he is employed.” 29 U.S.C.A. § 207(a)(1). Thus, where, as here, it is established (a)

that the employee never worked more than 40 hours in a workweek during a certain period and

(b) that the employee terminated employment prior to the end of that period, the individual has

no claim for unpaid overtime under the FLSA. As the moving party, Cintas has established, and

Plaintiffs have conceded that each individual listed below ended their employment prior to

June 1, 2002 and admitted never working in excess of 40 hours while employed by Cintas prior

to that date. Accordingly, Cintas’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED against the

following individual plaintiffs:

LAST NAME FIRST NAME

Delossantos Michael

Medina Jose

Molo Ron

Moore David

Whitted Richard

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SQUIRE, SANDERS &

DEMPSEY L.L.P.

One Maritime Plaza, Suite 300

SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94111-3492

PROPOSED ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART CINTAS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST

CERTAIN PLAINTIFFS WHO HAVE BEEN DETERMINED BY THE COURT TO HAVE MADE ADMISSIONS WHICH ARE

DISPOSITIVE OF THEIR THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF - CASE NO. C-03-01180 (SBA) 

5

[Dkt. No. 598, Kelly Decl. Exs. 13, 52, 55, 57, and 83; Dkt. No. 600, Abramovich Decl.,

¶¶1-3, Ex. 1.]As the moving party, Cintas has also established and Plaintiffs have conceded that

each individual listed below ended their employment prior to June 1, 2003 and admitted never

working in excess of 40 hours while employed by Cintas prior to that date. Accordingly, Cintas is

also entitled to summary judgment against these individuals:

LAST NAME FIRST NAME

Barnard James Lee

Boone Henry L.

Brandis Dustin

Brown Christopher

Crosby Reginal

Czekaj Roger

Davis Todd

Fletcher Stephen Shane

Fox Steven

Frankowski Thomas S.

Franks Chris

Fudge Lloyd

Gilmore Robert

Goree Douglas

Hendrick Robert

Hopper Anthony

Isherwood Jason A.

Jaffee Sol

Jessup Mitchell

Jones Bobby

Klocek Steven

Kramer Robert

Lee Theodis

Leggio Vincent

Lloyd Noel

Long Russell

Machala Gregory W.

McNail Michael

Meyer John F.

Plascencia Jose

Pongchit Sai

Reaves Keith

Schwall Jeffrey

Serrano Lorenzo J.

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LAST NAME FIRST NAME

SQUIRE, SANDERS &

DEMPSEY L.L.P.

One Maritime Plaza, Suite 300

SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94111-3492

PROPOSED ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART CINTAS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST

CERTAIN PLAINTIFFS WHO HAVE BEEN DETERMINED BY THE COURT TO HAVE MADE ADMISSIONS WHICH ARE

DISPOSITIVE OF THEIR THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF - CASE NO. C-03-01180 (SBA) 

6

Sherman Marvin S.

Shropshire Jerome

Smith Roger

Stumpf Kevin L.

Van Williams Ryal

Walsh Paul

Whitlock Leslie

Whitlow Cory

Wilson Roland

Wooten Robert (Scott)

Worful Scott

[Dkt. No. 598, Kelly Decl. Exs 1, 6-10, 12, 15-21, 24, 26, 28-30, 33, 36-37, 40-41, 43-44, 46, 51,

54, 61-63, 67-71, 73, 77, 79-81, and 85-87; Dkt. No. 600, Abramovich Decl. ¶¶1-3, Ex. 1 and

Dkt. No. 599, RJN Exs. 7-9 (Dkt. Nos. 176 p. 33, 334-2 p. 65, and 187-2 p. 36).] Like the

foregoing listed plaintiffs, Timothy Monahan and Johnny Terrell admitted that they did not work

more than 40 hours per week while employed by Cintas prior to June 1, 2003. Cintas also

presented evidence that Mr. Monahan’s employment termination date was May 25, 2001 and Mr.

Terrell’s employment termination date was December 29, 2002. [Dkt. No. 598, Kelly Decl., Exs.

56 and 74 and Dkt. No. 600, Abramovch Decl., Ex. 1]. Thus, Cintas as the moving party met its

initial burden of showing the Court the basis for its motion, and of identifying those portions of

the pleadings and discovery responses that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265, 106 S. Ct. 2548

(1986).Cintas having met its burden on this motion, it was up to Plaintiffs to set forth specific

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial in order to defeat the motion. See Anderson,

477 U.S. at 250. Regardless of whether plaintiff or defendant is the moving party, each party

must "establish the existence of the elements essential to [its] case, and on which [it] will bear

the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. Plaintiffs did not object to or challenge

Cintas’ business records with any material evidence outside of the pleadings. They merely

referred to the unsworn consents-to-sue for Mr. Monahan and Mr. Terrell that reflect dates other

than those contained in Cintas’ business records. [Dkt. No. 619, Plaintiffs’ Opposition at

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SQUIRE, SANDERS &

DEMPSEY L.L.P.

One Maritime Plaza, Suite 300

SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94111-3492

PROPOSED ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART CINTAS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST

CERTAIN PLAINTIFFS WHO HAVE BEEN DETERMINED BY THE COURT TO HAVE MADE ADMISSIONS WHICH ARE

DISPOSITIVE OF THEIR THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF - CASE NO. C-03-01180 (SBA) 

7

8.]Plaintiffs failed to provide either of the referenced consent-to-sue forms to the Court in their

opposition to Cintas’ motion. Nor did Plaintiffs specify where the forms could be found in the

record. It is not the task of this Court to scour the record in search of a genuine issue of triable

fact. In addition, Plaintiffs, as the non-moving party, must present specific and supported

material facts of significant probative value to defeat summary judgment. Plaintiffs have not

presented specific and supported material facts on the final dates of employment of Mr. Monahan

or Mr. Terrell. At most, Plaintiffs have only referred to their otherwise unsupported assertions in

the consent-to-sue forms. See Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1278-79 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Accordingly, summary judgment is also granted against both Timothy Monahan and Johnny

Terrell.

3. Summary Judgment is Appropriate Against Plaintiffs Who Have

Admitted That They Were Never SSRs

Eighteen plaintiffs admitted that they never worked as SSRs for Cintas. Their admission

that they “have never been employed with Cintas as an SSR at any time” [Dkt. No. 598, Kelly

Decl. Exs. 5, 8, 13, 21, 30-31, 34, 36, 47, 52, 64, 68-70, 80, 83, 87 and 88] prohibits them from

being a plaintiff in this putative collective action. Contrary to Plaintiffs’ argument, the definition

of “SSR” Cintas used in the Requests for Admission properly included persons who worked as

“a route driver and/or otherwise performed a service and/or delivery function.” Id. This

definition comports with the definition used in the facilitated notice allowed by this Court and

thus the individuals’ admissions that they do not fall within that definition are fatal to their

claims in this action. [Compare Dkt. No. 121, Order on Facilitated Notice at 10:4-7 and Dkt. No.

519-1, Second Amended Complaint at ¶3.] Moreover, Plaintiffs have offered no evidence that

any of the individuals against whom Cintas is moving on this basis did, in fact, fall into the

category of “SSR”. Thus, there is no actual dispute as to whether or not these individuals belong

in this action.This Court finds no basis to limit its grant of summary judgment to be “without

prejudice,” or to include further equitable tolling. These individuals were not entitled to join this

action and not properly before this Court. Plaintiffs offered no facts on the record for why Cintas

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SQUIRE, SANDERS &

DEMPSEY L.L.P.

One Maritime Plaza, Suite 300

SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94111-3492

PROPOSED ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART CINTAS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST

CERTAIN PLAINTIFFS WHO HAVE BEEN DETERMINED BY THE COURT TO HAVE MADE ADMISSIONS WHICH ARE

DISPOSITIVE OF THEIR THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF - CASE NO. C-03-01180 (SBA) 

8

is not entitled to exactly the relief Cintas requested. Accordingly, Cintas’ motion is GRANTED

against the following individuals:

LAST NAME FIRST NAME

Blackford Denise Cecile

Brown Christopher

Delossantos Michael

Goree Douglas

Jessup Mitchell

Jeter David

Joseph Arthur

Klocek Steven

Mallari Paul Viray

Medina Jose

Rios Mark

Serrano Lorenzo J.

Sherman Marvin S.

Shropshire Jerome

Whitlock Leslie

Whitted Richard

Worful Scott

Zoankowski Matthew

4. Summary Judgment is Appropriate Against Plaintiffs Who Have

Admitted They Were Paid on an Hourly Basis

Ten plaintiffs admitted that they were paid on an hourly basis. [Dkt. No. 598, Kelly

Decl., Exs. 13, 21, 30, 34, 47, 69, 70, 80, 83 and 87.] The relevant requests for admission asked

the plaintiffs to “[a]dmit that during the relevant time period Cintas did not pay you a fixed

salary but paid you by the hour, including overtime pay.” This Court’s operative definition of

who has made and may make claims in this lawsuit is limited to individuals who were paid on a

non-hourly basis. As hourly employees, they fall outside the definition of SSR discussed in the

Second Amended Complaint and this Court’s Order on Facilitated Notice. [Dkt. No. 121at ¶3;

Dkt. No. 519-1 at 10:6.] Thus, Cintas is entitled to summary judgment against the following

individuals:

LAST NAME FIRST NAME

Delossantos Michael

Goree Douglas

Jessup Mitchell

Joseph Arthur

Mallari Paul Viray

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LAST NAME FIRST NAME

SQUIRE, SANDERS &

DEMPSEY L.L.P.

One Maritime Plaza, Suite 300

SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94111-3492

PROPOSED ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART CINTAS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST

CERTAIN PLAINTIFFS WHO HAVE BEEN DETERMINED BY THE COURT TO HAVE MADE ADMISSIONS WHICH ARE

DISPOSITIVE OF THEIR THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF - CASE NO. C-03-01180 (SBA) 

9

Sherman Marvin S.

Shropshire Jerome

Whitlock Leslie

Whitted Richard

Worful Scott

5. Summary Judgment is Not Appropriate At this Time Based Solely on

the Requests For Admissions Regarding the Motor Carrier Act Exemption

Finally, Cintas seeks summary judgment on the Third Claim for Relief with respect to 28 of the

plaintiffs subject to this motion because each admitted facts that Cintas argues demonstrated that

they are exempt from the provisions of the FLSA under the Motor Carrier Act exemption (“MCA

exemption”) in effect during their employment with Cintas. 29 U.S.C. §213(b)(1). Each of these

28 plaintiffs admitted that “during the relevant time period” they engaged in conduct that Cintas

argues would satisfy the MCA exemption. [Dkt. No. 598, Kelly Decl. Exs. 2-5, 14, 22, 25, 27,

30, 32, 38, 42, 45, 48-50, 56, 58-59, 64, 66, 72, 74-76, 78, 82 and 84.] This Court does not here

reach the question raised by Plaintiffs regarding the proper time period for determining whether

the MCA exemption applies, but does find that these Requests for Admission have ambiguity

with respect to whether admission of them means the individual was engaging in the admitted

conduct throughout the relevant time period or only at some discrete point(s) in time within the

relevant time period. Based on this ambiguity in these Requests for Admission, in the context of

the parties’ positions on the MCA exemption, this Court DENIES Cintas’ motion for summary

judgment.Mindful that the individuals against whom Cintas moved for summary judgment on

this basis have, by Plaintiff counsels’ own repeated admission, refused to communicate with

them and to respond to discovery, the Court shall entertain a motion from Cintas for dismissal

for failure to prosecute as to the remaining 23 individuals against whom this Court has not,

elsewhere in this Order, entered summary judgment.

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SQUIRE, SANDERS &

DEMPSEY L.L.P.

One Maritime Plaza, Suite 300

SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94111-3492

PROPOSED ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART CINTAS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST

CERTAIN PLAINTIFFS WHO HAVE BEEN DETERMINED BY THE COURT TO HAVE MADE ADMISSIONS WHICH ARE

DISPOSITIVE OF THEIR THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF - CASE NO. C-03-01180 (SBA) 

10

C. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, Cintas’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED in PART and

DENIED in PART, as more fully set forth herein. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 4/13/07 ________________________________

SAUNDRA BROWN

ARMSTRONG

United States District Judge

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SQUIRE, SANDERS &

DEMPSEY L.L.P.

One Maritime Plaza, Suite 300

SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94111-3492

PROPOSED ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART CINTAS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST

CERTAIN PLAINTIFFS WHO HAVE BEEN DETERMINED BY THE COURT TO HAVE MADE ADMISSIONS WHICH ARE

DISPOSITIVE OF THEIR THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF - CASE NO. C-03-01180 (SBA) 

1

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