Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01020/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01020-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TOMMIE LEE BAKER,

 Plaintiff,

v.

J. ALVA, et al.,

 Defendant(s).

Case No. 1:14-cv-01020-AWI-MJS (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH 

LEAVE TO AMEND

(ECF No. 1)

AMENDED PLEADING DUE IN THIRTYDAYS 

ORDER DENYING APPOINTMENT OF 

COUNSEL

(ECF No. 7) 

Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action filed 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Before the Court are (1) the Complaint for screening, and (2) Plaintiff’s motion for 

appointment of counsel.

I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 

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§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has 

raised claims that are legally “frivolous, malicious,” or that fail to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is 

immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, 

or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any 

time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

II. PLEADING STANDARD

Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.”

Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990), quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method 

for vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 

393-94 (1989).

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) 

that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) 

that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. 

See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 1243, 

1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations 

are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009), citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 

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Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is 

plausible on its face.” Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the mere possibility that 

a defendant committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are accepted as true, 

legal conclusions are not. Id. at 667-68.

III. SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff names as Defendants: (1) Alva, Correctional Officer at the California 

Substance Abuse and Treatment Facility - Corcoran, California (“SATF”), (2) Mendoza, 

Correctional Officer - SATF, (3) Chan, Correctional Sergeant- SATF, (4) Franco, 

Correctional Officer - SATF, (5) Daniels, Correctional Officer - SATF, (6) Johnson, 

Correctional Lieutenant - SATF. 

Plaintiff is housed at SATF. Apparently he and his cell mate, a rival street gang 

member, were transferred together to a new cell. After the transfer, Plaintiff expressed 

concern for his safety in sharing a cell with his cellmate. He so advised Defendant 

Johnson. Defendants advised him that he and the cell mate would be separated only if 

they fought each other. Thus, Plaintiff claims, Defendants had and followed a plan to 

force him into a “gladiator match” with his cell mate.

After an undefined “incident”1, Defendant Chan told the other Defendants to 

retaliate against Plaintiff to prevent him from filing a lawsuit about that incident. Plaintiff 

subsequently was improperly transferred to a supermax 180 design facility.

Plaintiff seeks monetary damages. 

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Deliberate Indifference – Failure to Protect

The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from inhumane methods of 

 

1

It is not clear whether the “incident” was the cell transfer, a resulting fight or some other event.

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punishment and from inhumane conditions of confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 

F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006). Prison officials must provide prisoners with personal 

safety. See Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986), abrogated in 

part on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). 

However, only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life's 

necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation. 

Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992). In order to state a claim for a violation of the 

Eighth Amendment, the plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to support a claim that 

prison officials knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm. Farmer v. 

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994).

Where failure to protect is alleged, the defendant must knowingly fail to protect 

plaintiff from a serious risk of conditions of confinement where defendant had 

reasonable opportunity to intervene. Orwat v. Maloney, 360 F.Supp.2d 146, 155 (D.

Mass. 2005), citing Gaudreault v. Municipality of Salem, 923 F.2d 203, 207 n.3 (1st Cir.

1991).

Plaintiff claims Defendants intentionally staged a gladiator match by housing him 

with a rival cellmate. Such conduct can support an indifference claim. See Robinson v. 

Prunty, 249 F.3d 862, 866–67 (9th Cir. 2001) (intentional failure to respond to a known 

serious risk of harm from a gladiator-type scenario where prison guards knowingly 

released inmate onto the exercise yard with hostile inmates and watched the fighting 

between plaintiff and another inmate for five minutes before intervening). 

However, Plaintiff also alleges he had the same cellmate both before and after 

the cell transfer. None of the facts plead suggest how Defendants’ transfer of Plaintiff 

and his cellmate to a new cell reasonably lead to animosity and a fight between them.

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He identifies nothing which would suggest the relationship between the two changed, 

and became threatening, after the transfer and that Defendants were aware of the 

change and resulting threat or of any threat whatsoever.

Failure to protect an inmate from harm violates the Eighth Amendment only if 

deliberate indifference by prison officials effectively condones the attack by allowing it to 

happen. Borello v. Allison, 446 F.3d 742, (7th Cir. 2006); see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 

833–34 (if deliberate indifference by prison officials effectively condones the attack by 

allowing it to happen, those officials can be held liable to the injured victim).

Plaintiff does not allege facts to support a claim Defendants knowingly failed to 

protect him from harm. 

If Plaintiff chooses to amend, he must allege facts showing Defendants’ knowing 

disregard of a substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiff. He must describe the risk, 

explain how it arose and how Defendants were made aware of it, and how its threat 

grew into an actual risk of harm, and then harm, to Plaintiff.

B. Retaliation

This claim requires: (1) an assertion that a state actor took some adverse action 

against an inmate (2) because of (3) that inmate's protected conduct, and that such 

action (4) chilled the inmate's exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action

did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 

F.3d 559, 567–68 (9th Cir. 2005).

Plaintiff claims that, after the alleged gladiator match, Defendant Chan told the 

other Defendants to intimidate and retaliate against Plaintiff to prevent him from filing a 

lawsuit. However, Plaintiff does not allege any adverse action actually taken by 

Defendants in response to this information or otherwise in response to Plaintiff’s having 

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engaged in protected activity. See e.g., Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1271 (9th Cir.

2009), citing Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 568); see also Soranno's Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 

F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989) (a plaintiff must show that his protected conduct was a 

“substantial” or “motivating” factor behind the defendant's conduct). Plaintiff alleges that 

he was improperly transferred to a supermax 180 design facility. He does not, however, 

allege facts suggesting the transfer was motivated by his having engaged in some 

protected activity and that it lacked legitimate penologic purpose. 

Plaintiff does not allege facts sufficient to show Defendants retaliated against him 

for his protected activity.

If Plaintiff chooses to amend he must allege facts demonstrating that specific 

Defendants, without a legitimate penologic purpose, took adverse action against him

because he undertook constitutionally protected conduct. He must specify the adverse 

action, what protected activity motivated it, and his basis for alleging it did not have a 

valid custodial purpose.

C. Appointment of Counsel

Plaintiff seeks appointment of counsel on grounds he lacks funds to pay counsel; 

his repeated efforts to retain counsel have been unsuccessful; he has limited knowledge 

of the law; he has limited access to the law library; and his placement in administrative 

segregation limits his ability to locate witnesses and litigate this complex case involving 

conflicting testimony and requiring discovery.

1. Legal Standard

Plaintiff does not have a constitutional right to appointed counsel in this action, 

Rand v. Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th Cir. 1997), partially overruled on other 

grounds, 154 F.3d 952, 954 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998), and the Court cannot require an 

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attorney to represent him pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Mallard v. United States 

District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989). In certain 

exceptional circumstances the Court may request the voluntary assistance of counsel 

pursuant to section 1915(e)(1). Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525. However, without a reasonable 

method of securing and compensating counsel, the Court will seek volunteer counsel 

only in the most serious and exceptional cases. In determining whether “exceptional 

circumstances exist, the district court must evaluate both the likelihood of success of the 

merits [and] the ability of the [plaintiff] to articulate his or her claims pro se in light of the 

complexity of the legal issues involved.” Id. Neither of these factors is dispositive and 

both must be viewed together before reaching a decision on request of counsel under 

section 1915(d). Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986); Palmer v. 

Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009).

The burden of demonstrating exceptional circumstances is on the Plaintiff. See 

Palmer, 560 F.3d at 970 (plaintiff “has not made the requisite showing of exceptional 

circumstances for the appointment of counsel”); accord, Alvarez v. Jacquez, 415 F. 

App’x 830, 831 (9th Cir. 2011) (plaintiff “failed to show exceptional circumstances”); 

Simmons v. Hambly, 14 F. App’x. 918, 919 (9th Cir. 2001) (same); Davis v. Yarborough, 

459 F. App’x 601, 602 (9th Cir. 2011) (plaintiff “did not show the ‘exceptional 

circumstances' required to appoint counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1).”).

2. Appointment of Counsel Denied 

There are not exceptional circumstances supporting appointment of counsel. The 

Court cannot make a determination at this early stage of the litigation that Plaintiff is 

likely to succeed on the merits. The claims alleged do not appear to be novel or unduly

complex. The facts alleged to date appear straightforward and unlikely to involve any 

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extensive investigation and discovery. Even if it is assumed that Plaintiff is not well 

versed in the law and that he has made serious allegations which, if proved, would 

entitle him to relief, his case is not exceptional. This Court is faced with similar cases 

almost daily.

The papers filed by Plaintiff in this case reflect an appreciation of the legal issues 

and standards relating to deliberate indifference and retaliation and an ability to express 

same adequately in writing. The Court does not find that at present he cannot 

adequately articulate his claims pro se.

Finally, Plaintiff makes no showing that he has exhausted diligent efforts to 

secure counsel. His lack of funds and efforts to date do not demonstrate that further 

efforts to secure counsel necessarily would be futile.2

V. CONCLUSIONS AND ORDER

Plaintiff does not demonstrate exceptional circumstances for the appointment of 

counsel. The Complaint fails to state any cognizable claim. The Court will provide 

Plaintiff with an opportunity to file an amended complaint curing the deficiencies 

identified by the Court in this Order. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir.

1987).

If Plaintiff opts to amend, his amended complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 

8(a), but must state what each named Defendant did that led to the deprivation of 

Plaintiff's constitutional or other federal rights, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78, consistent with 

this Order. Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to 

raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 

Further, Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims 

 

2

See e.g., Thornton v. Schwarzenegger, 2011 WL 90320, *3–4 (S.D. Cal. January 11, 2011) (cases 

cited). 

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in his amended complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). 

Finally, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint, Forsyth v. 

Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 

(9th Cir. 1987), and must be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or 

superseded pleading.” Local Rule 220.

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for appoint of counsel (ECF No. 7) is DENIED without 

prejudice, 

2. The Clerk's Office shall send Plaintiff (1) a blank civil rights amended 

complaint form and (2) a copy of his Complaint filed June 30, 2014, 

3. Plaintiff's § 1983 Complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED for failure to state 

a claim upon which relief may be granted, 

4. Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint within thirty (30) days from 

service of this Order, and 

5. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this Order, 

the undersigned will recommend the action be dismissed, with prejudice, 

for failure to state a claim and failure to prosecute, subject to the “three 

strikes” provision set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 

F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2011).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 5, 2014 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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