Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-02420/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-02420-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TEDDY LEROY WILSON, Jr.

CDCR #–78443,

Civil No. 06-2420 WQH (BLM)

Plaintiff,

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

EX PARTE MOTION FOR

APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

PURSUANT TO 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1)

[Doc. No. 18]

vs.

ISMAEL BRIZYELA, El Cajon Parole

Agent; HECTOR RUBIO, El Cajon Parole

Agent; EL CAJON POLICE OFFICE;

DENISE JOHNSON, Supervisor, 

El Cajon Police Officers,

Defendants.

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis (“IFP”) with a Second Amended civil

rights Complaint (“SAC”) filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and currently incarcerated at

California Rehabilitation Center (“CRC”) in Norco, California, has submitted an ex parte Motion

for Appointment of Counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) [Doc. No. 18]. 

Plaintiff requests appointment of counsel because he is indigent, and thus, is “unable to

afford counsel.” (Pl.’s Mot. at 1.) Plaintiff further requests the appointment of counsel “so that

[his] interests may be protected by ... professional assistance.” (Id.) 

“There is no constitutional right to appointed counsel in a § 1983 action.” Rand v.

Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Storseth v. Spellman, 654 F.2d 1349, 1353

(9th Cir. 1981)); see also Hedges v. Resolution Trust Corp. (In re Hedges), 32 F.3d 1360, 1363

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(9th Cir. 1994) (“[T]here is no absolute right to counsel in civil proceedings.”) (citation omitted).

Thus, federal courts do not have the authority “to make coercive appointments of counsel.”

Mallard v. United States District Court, 490 U.S. 296, 310 (1989); see also United States v.

$292,888.04 in U.S. Currency, 54 F.3d 564, 569 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Districts courts have discretion, however, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), to “request”

that an attorney represent indigent civil litigants upon a showing of “exceptional circumstances.”

 See Agyeman v. Corrections Corp. of America, 390 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004); Rand, 113

F.3d at 1525. “A finding of the exceptional circumstances of the plaintiff seeking assistance

requires at least an evaluation of the likelihood of the plaintiff’s success on the merits and an

evaluation of the plaintiff’s ability to articulate his claims ‘in light of the complexity of the legal

issues involved.’” Agyeman, 390 F.3d at 1103 (quoting Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328,

1331 (9th Cir. 1986)); see also Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991).

Plaintiff first requests the appointment of counsel because he cannot afford to hire an

attorney. See Pl.’s Mot. at 1. While indigence is one prerequisite to any request for appointment

of counsel, under section 1915(e)(1), Plaintiff must also plead facts which show he has an

insufficient grasp of his case or the legal issue involved and an inadequate ability to articulate

the factual basis of his claim. Id. Plaintiff has not made such a showing. In fact, this Court has

already determined that Plaintiff’s pro se SAC alleges excessive force claims sufficient to

survive the initial screening required by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and has directed

the U.S. Marshal to effect service on Plaintiff’s behalf. (See June 12, 2007 Order [Doc. No. 14]

at 5.) Moreover, Plaintiff’s claims of excessive force against El Cajon parole officials are not

particularly “complex” or unique. Cf. Agyeman, 390 F.3d at 1103.

Second, while Plaintiff claims his case would benefit from “professional assistance,”

(Pl.’s Mot. at 1), the Court agrees that any pro se litigant “would be better served with the

assistance of counsel.” Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525 (citing Wilborn, 789 F.2d at 1331). However,

so long as a pro se litigant, like Plaintiff in this case, is able to “articulate his claims against the

relative complexity of the matter,” the “exceptional circumstances” which might require the

appointment of counsel do not exist. Id. (finding no abuse of discretion under 28 U.S.C.

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§ 1915(e) when district court denied appointment of counsel despite fact that pro se prisoner

“may well have fared better-particularly in the realms of discovery and the securing of expert

testimony.”). 

Conclusion and Order

For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES without prejudice Plaintiff’s ex parte

Motion for Appointment of Counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) [Doc. No. 18]. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 10, 2007

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

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