Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cv-00200/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cv-00200-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KATHRYN ANN ELLIS,

Petitioner,

v.

WARDEN OF CENTRAL CALIFORNIA 

WOMEN’S FACILITY,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:19-cv-200-LJO-JDP

ORDER GRANTING IN PART 

PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO 

FILE SURREPLY

ECF No. 18

Petitioner Kathyrn Ann Ellis, a state prisoner represented by counsel, seeks a writ of 

habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. ECF No. 1. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss, ECF 

No. 11, petitioner filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss, ECF No. 13, and respondent filed 

a reply, ECF No. 17. On September 4, 2019, petitioner filed a “request to file a rejoinder” to 

respondent’s reply brief.1 ECF No. 18. Respondent did not object to petitioner’s request. The 

court construes petitioner’s request as a motion for leave to file a surreply.

Neither the Local Rules of this court nor the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide the 

right to file a surreply. Local Rule 230 provides for a motion, an opposition, and a reply. The 

court “generally views motions for leave to file a surreply with disfavor.” Garcia v. Biter, 195 F. 

 

1 Petitioner is directed to label any future request as a “motion.” If petitioner has any questions 

regarding proper filing procedures, she may contact the clerk’s office.

Case 1:19-cv-00200-DAD-HBK Document 20 Filed 02/04/20 Page 1 of 2
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Supp. 3d 1131, 1134 (E.D. Cal. 2016). A district court may allow a surreply to be filed, but only 

“where a valid reason for such additional briefing exists, such as where the movant raises new 

arguments in its reply brief.” Hill v. England, No. CV-F-05-869 REC/TAG, 2004 U.S. Dist. WL 

3031136, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2005) (citing Fedrick v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 366 F.

Supp. 2d 1190, 1197 (N.D. Ga. 2005).

Here, petitioner first asks to respond to respondent’s “characterization of Jackson v. 

Superior Court, 189 Cal.App.4th 1051 (2010) as germane to Petitioner’s judicial estoppel 

argument.” ECF No. 18 at 1. The Jackson case was first raised and relied upon in petitioner’s 

opposition to the motion to dismiss, ECF No. 13 at 14, and respondent distinguished Jackson

from the instant case in her reply, ECF No. 17 at 3. Because Jackson was first raised by 

petitioner, not respondent, the court denies petitioner’s request for additional briefing on the case.

Second, petitioner moves to respond to respondent’s description of “the Superior Court’s delay in 

serving the August 24, 2015 order as relevant to Petitioner’s equitable tolling argument.” ECF 

No. 18 at 1. Petitioner argued that she should be afforded equitable tolling for the superior 

court’s delayed service of the August 24, 2015 order in her opposition brief. ECF No. 13 at 18. 

Respondent argued in response that petitioner should not be afforded equitable tolling because the 

circumstance was not extraordinary and petitioner did not act with diligence. ECF No. 17 at 7. 

Additional briefing from petitioner will likely clarify the circumstances of the superior court’s 

delay in service. Therefore, we will grant petitioner leave to file a surreply that addresses the 

superior court’s delay in service.

Order

Petitioner’s motion, ECF No. 18, is granted in part. Petitioner may file a surreply within 

seven days of the date of service of this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 3, 2020 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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