Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01789/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01789-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 540
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Mandamus and Other
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (federal)

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- 1 - 07cv1789 WQH (JMA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ISSAC ABDI HASHI,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 07cv1789 WQH (JMA)

ORDER

vs.

MICHAEL CHERTOFF, Secretary of the

Department of Homeland Security,

ALBERTO GONZALES, Attorney General,

ROBIN F. BAKER, Director of San Diego

Field Office, U.S. Immigration and Customs

Enforcement, JOHN A. GARZON, Officerin-Charge,

Respondents.

HAYES, Judge:

The matter before the Court is the Ex Parte Application for Temporary Restraining Order and

Order to Show Cause Re: Preliminary Injunction, filed by Petitioner Issac Abdi Hashi. (Doc. # 9).

Background

Petitioner is a native and citizen of Somalia. Habeas Petition, p. 2. In 1993, Petitioner 

entered the United States as a refugee and later adjusted to lawful permanent resident status. Id. at

2-3. On February 23, 2004, Petitioner was convicted of carjacking and sentenced to three years in

prison. Id. at Exhibit 3. Upon Petitioner’s release from prison, U.S. Immigration and Customs

Enforcement (“ICE”) placed him in removal proceedings in Florence, Arizona where an

Immigration Judge ordered him removed to Somalia. On February 8, 2007, his order of removal

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became final. Id. On July 7, 2007, Petitioner was transferred from the ICE detention facility

Florence, Arizona to Otay Mesa Detention Facility (“CCA”). 

On September 11, 2007, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. #1). Petitioner alleges in his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus that his

continued and indefinite detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231 is unlawful because Petitioner has

been detained beyond the presumptively reasonable period of six months after his removal order

became final, and there is no significant likelihood that he will actually be removed to Somalia in

the reasonably foreseeable future. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001). 

On September 27, 2007, the Court appointed counsel to assist Petitioner in his efforts to

seek relief from his detention through his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. §

2241. (Doc. #8). 

On October 2, 2007, Petitioner filed an Ex Parte Application for Temporary Restraining

Order (“Application for TRO”). (Doc. #9). Petitioner contends that Respondents intend to

imminently transfer him from CCA, where he is currently detained, to Columbia Care, a psychiatric

facility in South Carolina. Petitioner seeks to enjoin Respondents from transferring him out of the

Southern District of California during the pendency of his habeas proceedings. 

On October 5, 2007, the Court granted Petitioner’s Application for TRO and scheduled a 

hearing for October 10, 2007 to show cause why Respondents should not be enjoined during the

pendency of Petitioner’s habeas proceedings from transferring him out of the Southern District of

California. (Doc. # 15). At the October 10, 2007 hearing, Respondents introduced testimony by

the Director of Mental Health for the Western Region for the Division of Immigration and Health

Services, Dr. Scott Salvatore. 

Dr. Salvatore testified to the following facts to support his conclusion that there is a high

risk that Petitioner will commit suicide at CCA: Petitioner is diagnosed with post-traumatic stress

disorder and anti-social behavior disorder, which both increase the likelihood of his committing

suicide; research indicates a jail-like setting exacerbates suicidal tendencies; Petitioner has

attempted to commit suicide at CCA by preparing a noose with his clothing and by swallowing

large plastic objects; CCA has provided behavioral incentives and cognitive behavioral therapy

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which have had little to no effect on reducing Petitioner’s suicide risk; the likelihood that treatment

at CCA will reduce Petitioner’s suicide risk is poor because CCA is only set up to handle acute

situations, a shortage of staff at CCA precludes the possibility of intensive long-term care, and CCA

is a detention facility, not a psychiatric facility.

 Dr. Salvatore testified to the following facts to support his conclusion that treatment at

Columbia Care is necessary to reduce Petitioner’s risk of suicide, and there is not a closer facility

that can be utilized on a long-term care basis: Columbia Care is a psychiatric facility that provides

individual, group and spiritual therapy throughout the day; Columbia Care provides targeted

therapy, such as anger-management groups, which may benefit a person with an antisocial

personality; Columbia Care provides patients ready access to their attorneys through access to the

phone; it is necessary to transfer Petitioner to Columbia Care because Petitioner is at a continued

high risk for suicide in a jail setting, and Petitioner will receive intensive treatment, better

psychiatric monitoring and a have better potential outcome at Columbia Care; there is not a facility

closer than Columbia Care that Petitioner could be transferred to because CCA does not have any

contract for long-term care with Alvarado Parkway Institute, a local psychiatric hospital where

Petitioner was treated after his suicide attempts, or any other San Diego placements; a psychiatric

impatient hospital may cost $700 to $1,000 a day; Columbia Care, with a very intensive program,

charges $300 a day. 

Standard of Review

“The standard for granting a preliminary injunction balances the plaintiff’s likelihood of

success against the relative hardship to the parties.” Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. City of Los

Angeles, 340 F.3d 810, 813 (9th Cir. 2003). The Ninth Circuit has described two sets of criteria for

preliminary injunctive relief. Save Our Sonoran, Inc. v. Flowers, 408 F.3d 1113, 1120 (9th Cir.

2005). “Under the ‘traditional’ criteria, a plaintiff must show ‘(1) a strong likelihood of success on

the merits, (2) the possibility of irreparable injury to plaintiff if preliminary relief is not granted, (3)

a balance of hardships favoring the plaintiff, and (4) advancement of the public interest (in certain

cases).” Johnson v. Cal State Bd. of Accountancy, 72 F.3d 1427, 1430 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Alternatively, “a court may grant the injunction if the plaintiff ‘demonstrates either a combination

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1

 Petitioner does not argue or introduce any evidence to demonstrate that transferring him to

Columbia Care would adversely affect the outcome of his habeas petition or otherwise give rise to the

possibility of irreparable harm. 

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of probable success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury or that serious questions

are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in his favor.’” Id. “These two formulations

represent two points on a sliding scale in which the required degree of irreparable harm increases as

the probability of success decreases. They are not separate tests but rather outer reaches of a single

continuum.” Baby Tam & Co. v. City of Las Vegas, 154 F.3d 1097, 1100 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Discussion

Petitioner contends that he has an established attorney-client relationship with Jennifer

Coon at the Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc., and that transferring him out of the Southern

District of California during the pendency of his habeas proceedings would interfere with this

attorney-client relationship. Petitioner also contends that transferring him to Columbia Care would

interfere with his right to meaningfully participate in his habeas proceedings because he would be

“hard-pressed” to collect evidence and review documents that he would be able to access if he

remained in the Southern District of California. Mot. for TRO, p. 8. Petitioner contends that

transferring him to Columbia Care is not necessary because he can receive any necessary

psychiatric treatment at CCA or at Alvarado. Petitioner contends that the balance of hardships tips

sharply in his favor.1

Respondents contend that Petitioner presents an elevated risk of suicide by staying at CCA,

and that transfer to Columbia Care will reduce this risk. Respondents contend that the decision to

transfer Petitioner to Columbia Care is based solely on medical considerations. Respondents

contend that Petitioner may suffer serious harm if he is not transferred to Columbia Care, that

Respondents may be exposed to liability for Petitioner’s potential suicide, and that Petitioner has

failed to demonstrate how transferring him to Columbia Care would hamper the progress of his

pending habeas case. Respondents contend that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the

balance of hardships tips sharply in Petitioner’s favor. 

On September 5, 2007, Jennifer Coon filed a notice of entry of appearance as Petitioner’s

attorney. Application for TRO, Exhibit C. On October 2, 2007, the Court appointed Petitioner

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2

 The cases Petitioner cites in support of his contention that interference with his attorneyclient relationship is grounds for enjoining his transfer out of the Southern District of California are

not on point. See 8 U.S.C. § 1362; Committee of Central American Refugees v. INS, 795 F.2d 1434,

1439 (9th Cir. 1986), amended by 807 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1986); Garcia-Guzman v. Reno, 65 F. Supp.

2d 1077, 1090 & n.13 (N.D. Cal. 1999); Louis v. Meissner, 530 F. Supp. 924, 926 (D.C. Fla. 1981).

These cases involve section 292 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which provides that

individuals subjected to exclusion proceedings have the right to counsel not at the government

expense. This case involves counsel appointed at the government expense in the context of habeas

proceedings, and therefore does not implicate the right to counsel as provided for in section 292. 

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counsel. (Doc. # 8). Petitioner fails to introduce evidence to support his claim that his transfer to

Columbia Care would interfere with his relationship with Jennifer Coon. Petitioner also fails to

rebut Dr. Salvatore’s testimony that patients at Columbia Care have ready access to their attorneys

through access to the phone.2 

Petitioner does not specify any documents and evidence necessary for his review at this

stage of his habeas proceedings. Petitioner fails to introduce evidence to support his claim that his

transfer to Columbia Care would interfere with his right to meaningfully participate in his habeas

proceedings because he would be unable to collect evidence and review documents that he would

be able to access if he remained in the Southern District of California. 

Dr. Salvatore testified that Petitioner presents a heightened risk of suicide, that research

indicates suicidal tendencies are exacerbated in a prison-like setting, that Petitioner has actually

attempted suicide while in custody at CCA, that CCA is only equipped to handle short-term, acute

situations, that Petitioner presents an elevated risk of suicide at CCA, that Columbia Care is

equipped to provide daily therapeutic care that will reduce the risk of Petitioner’s suicide and that

there is not a closer facility with appropriate care that Petitioner could be transferred to. Petitioner

presented no evidence to refute Dr. Salvatore’s testimony. There is no evidence in the record

demonstrating that Respondents were motivated by bad faith or any consideration other than

medical considerations in reaching the decision to transfer Petitioner to Columbia Care. 

After reviewing the entire record, the Court concludes that Petitioner has failed to

demonstrate that the decision to transfer him to Columbia Care was not based solely on medical

considerations, and that his transfer to Columbia Care would interfere with his relationship with his

attorney or his right to meaningfully participate in his habeas proceedings. Petitioner is not entitled

to a preliminary injunction under either test applied in the Ninth Circuit because Petitioner has

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failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that the balance of hardships tips sharply in his favor or

a possibility that he will suffer irreparable injury if injunctive relief is denied. 

Conclusion

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. #15) is 

vacated, and the Preliminary Injunction is DENIED. 

DATED: October 16, 2007

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

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