Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00448/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00448-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 42:6901 Environmental Cleanup Expenses

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* This matter was determined to be suitable for decision

without oral argument. L.R. 78-230(h).

1 All references to “Rules” are to the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure.

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RAMOS OIL RECYCLERS, INC. dba )

RAMOS ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES, )

) 2:07-cv-00448-GEB-DAD

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) ORDER*

)

AWIM, INC.; JULIE C. NELSON; GERRI )

SHERMAN; and DOES 1-100, inclusive,)

)

Defendants. )

)

)

AND RELATED ACTIONS. )

)

Plaintiff and Counter-defendant (“Plaintiff”) moves to

strike portions of Defendants and Counter-claimants Julie Nelson

(“Nelson”) and AWIM’s (collectively “Defendants”) Answer. Plaintiff

also moves for a more definite statement of certain affirmative

defenses and counterclaims contained in Defendants’ Answer and

Counterclaim under Rule 12(e); and, for dismissal of several of

Defendants’ counterclaims under Rule 12(b)(6).1 Defendants oppose the

motions.

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BACKGROUND

Plaintiff and Defendants dispute the contents of water

Plaintiff obtained from AWIM. Plaintiff collects, transports, and resells used oil and waste water. (Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 6.) AWIM generated

oily water and Nelson hired Plaintiff, on behalf of AWIM, to remove

and dispose of this water. (Id. ¶¶ 7, 8.)

Plaintiff alleges it pumped the water into its tanker truck

and then transported the water to its facility where it was pumped

into a large holding tank. (Id. ¶ 10.) Plaintiff further alleges

that Nelson represented in writing that the oily water contained no

polychlorinated biphenyls (“PCBs”); however, Plaintiff alleges the

water actually contained a very high concentration of PCBs and

contaminated Plaintiff’s tanks and vehicles. (Id. ¶¶ 8, 13.) 

Plaintiff alleges it tested samples from AWIM’s water tanks and

determined AWIM was the source of the PCB contamination in Plaintiff’s

tanks and vehicles. (Id. ¶¶ 12-14.) 

DISCUSSION

I. Standards

A. Motion to Strike

Rule 12(f) prescribes “the court may order stricken from any

pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial,

impertinent, or scandalous matter.” “Motions to strike are generally

viewed with disfavor, and will usually be denied unless the

allegations in the pleading have no possible relation to the

controversy, and may cause prejudice to one of the parties.” Campbell

v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 2007 WL 841694, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar.

20, 2007). “The key to determining the sufficiency of pleading an

affirmative defense is whether it gives plaintiff fair notice of the

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defense.” Hernandez v. Balakian, 2007 WL 1649911, at *1 (E.D. Cal.

June 1, 2007) (citing Wyshak v. City Nat’l Bank, 607 F.2d 824, 827

(9th Cir. 1979)). 

B. Motion for a More Definite Statement

A Rule 12(e) motion for a more definite statement may be

made where the Complaint “is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot

reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading.” “[A] motion

for a more definite statement must be considered in light of the

liberal pleading standards of Rule 8(a) [which provides that] a

Complaint need only be a ‘short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]’” Bureerong v.

Uvawas, 922 F. Supp. 1450, 1461 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (citations omitted). 

Moreover, it is well-settled that a Rule 12(e) motion is not a proper

method for obtaining evidentiary material. Cmax, Inc. v. Hall, 290

F.2d 736, 738 (9th Cir. 1961). “[W]here the information sought by the

moving party is available and/or properly sought through discovery the

motion should be denied.” Famolare, Inc. v. Edison Bros. Stores,

Inc., 525 F. Supp. 940, 949 (E.D. Cal. 1981).

C. Motion to Dismiss

Dismissal is appropriate under Rule 12(b)(6) if a pleading

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted by either (1)

failing to present a cognizable legal theory, or (2) failing to plead

sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory. Robertson v.

Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 533-34 (9th Cir. 1984). 

When deciding the motion, the court must accept as true all material

allegations and construe them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); Cahill v.

Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). The nonCase 2:07-cv-00448-GEB-DAD Document 27 Filed 08/16/07 Page 3 of 12
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moving party is given the benefit of every reasonable inference that

can be drawn from its allegations. Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n v.

Shermahorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). 

II. Motion to Strike Analysis

A. Answer to Legal Allegations in Complaint

Plaintiff moves to strike Defendants’ statements in their

Answer that Defendants were not required to answer conclusions of law,

arguing Defendants are required to answer both factual and legal

allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint under Rule 8(b). (Pl.’s Mot. at

4:26). Defendants rejoin that they are only required to answer

factual allegations and not conclusions of law and therefore, their

statements should not be stricken. (Defs.’ Opp’n at 7:13.) Since

Plaintiff has not shown why this matter should be stricken or that it

is prejudiced by the manner in which Defendants have responded, this

portion of Plaintiff’s motion is denied.

B. “Does Not Recall”

Throughout Defendants’ Answer, Nelson asserts she “does not

recall” signing the waste profile sheet Plaintiff references in its

Complaint. Plaintiff seeks to strike each of these assertions arguing

that copies of this sheet were sent to Defendants’ attorney and that

parties are “deemed bound by the acts of [their] lawyer-agent.” 

(Pl.’s Mot. at 15:8-17.) Defendants counter that an attorney cannot

be charged with knowledge of a document that his client disputes. 

(Defs.’ Opp’n at 20:14-15.) Defendants further assert the

authenticity of these documents is disputed. (Id. at 20:25-26.)

Assuming arguendo that Defendants’ attorney received copies

of the disputed waste profile sheet, Plaintiff has not shown that the

existence of a copy of the waste profile sheet means that Nelson

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remembers signing it. Plaintiff has not shown why Nelson’s statements

that she does not recall signing the sheet should be stricken. 

Accordingly, this portion of Plaintiff’s motion is denied.

C. First & Second Affirmative Defenses

Plaintiff moves to strike portions of Defendants’ first and

second affirmative defenses, arguing that they violate Rule 8(e)

because “they contain prolix matter, legal conclusions and evidentiary

facts.” (Pl.’s Mot. at 6:13-15.) Defendants rejoin Plaintiff has not

identified “which portions must be struck or what . . . legal basis to

strike” exists. (Defs.’ Opp’n at 7:20-22.) Since Plaintiff has not

shown why this matter should be stricken, this portion of Plaintiff’s

motion is denied.

D. Seventeenth Affirmative Defense

Plaintiff moves to strike Defendants’ seventeenth

affirmative defense, arguing it improperly “seeks to shift the burden

to [Plaintiff] to test the contents of products it transports” because

statutory law allows Plaintiff to rely on Nelson’s representations

about the quality of the oily water instead of testing the water

before transporting it. (Pl.’s Mot. at 8:13-24.) Defendants counter

there is sufficient evidence that Plaintiff knew “or, a reasonable

person, acting in the circumstances and exercising reasonable care,

would have [known] that the information provided” was incorrect. 

(Defs.’ Opp’n at 11:13-17.) 

Defendants’ seventeenth affirmative defense states that

under the circumstances of this case, Plaintiff should have taken

precautions to investigate the accuracy of Nelson’s representations

that the oily water did not contain PCBs. (Defs.’ Answer, Affirmative

Defenses ¶ 17.) The merits of this affirmative defense turns on

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whether Plaintiff had reason to believe the information regarding PCBs

given by Nelson was inaccurate. Under 49 C.F.R. § 171.2(f): 

Each carrier who transports a hazardous

material in commerce may rely on

information provided by the offeror of

the hazardous material or a prior

carrier, unless the carrier knows or, a

reasonable person, acting in the

circumstances and exercising reasonable

care, would have knowledge that the

information provided by the offeror or

prior carrier is incorrect.

The parties dispute what Plaintiff knew or should have known about the

material. This factual dispute cannot be resolved on a motion to

strike. Therefore, this portion of the motion is denied.

E. Eighteenth Affirmative Defense

Plaintiff moves to strike Defendants’ breach of oral

contract affirmative defense, arguing the parties had a written

contract. (Pl.’s Mot. at 8:25-26.) Defendants rejoin the parties had

an oral contract regardless of whether the parties had a written

contract and the breach of that contract forms the proper basis for an

affirmative defense. (Defs.’ Opp’n at 11:20-25.)

Plaintiff fails to show why the alleged existence of a

written contract forecloses the simultaneous existence of an oral

contract. Therefore, this portion of Plaintiff’s motion is denied.

F. Fifth & Sixth Counterclaims

Plaintiff also moves to strike paragraph 46 of Defendants’

Counterclaims and Defendants’ fifth and sixth counterclaims, arguing

they refer to an oral contract between the parties and a written

contract existed. (Pl.’s Mot. at 11-12). This portion of Plaintiff’s

motion is denied since Plaintiff has not shown that the alleged

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existence of a written contract forecloses the existence of an oral

contract. 

G. Other Immaterial, Redundant, and/or Scandalous Allegations in

Counterclaims

Plaintiff argues paragraphs 6-10, 12-15, 17-26, 29, 31-33,

35, 39-40, 49, and 51 in Defendants’ Counterclaims, and Defendants’

eighth, eleventh, and thirteenth counterclaims, should be stricken

because they contain words and arguments that are immaterial,

redundant, impertinent, or scandalous. (Pl.’s Mot. at 9-12). 

Defendants counter that “[Plaintiff] offers little if any clear legal

basis or any sufficient degree of particularity in its request to

strike” and “[n]owhere does [Plaintiff] demonstrate how the language

is ‘immaterial,’ or ‘redundant’ or ‘scandalous.’” (Defs.’ Opp’n at

12:16-17, 27-28.) Since Plaintiff has failed to provide any specific

argument as to why these paragraphs and/or counterclaims should be

stricken, this portion of Plaintiff’s motion is denied. 

III. Motion for a More Definite Statement Analysis

A. Affirmative Defenses

Plaintiff seeks a more definite statement of Defendants’

second, third, sixth, eighth, and tenth affirmative defenses. (Pl.’s

Mot. at 7:5-23.) Rule 12(e) provides “[i]f a pleading to which a

responsive pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party

cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, the

party may move for a more definite statement before interposing a

responsive pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e) (emphasis added). Since

no responsive pleading is permitted to an affirmative defense, this

portion of Plaintiff’s motion is denied.

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B. Third Counterclaim

Plaintiff seeks a more definite statement of Defendants’

third counterclaim, arguing it appears to be an unclear claim for

indemnity. (Pl.’s Mot. at 7:25-26.) Defendants rejoin this

counterclaim is for indemnity “as stated by the caption” and that

“[t]his needs no further clarification or detail.” (Defs.’ Opp’n at

10:5-8.) Since Defendants’ third counterclaim is clearly labeled

“Indemnity,” Plaintiff has not shown it is not sufficiently on notice

of what Defendants seek. (Defs.’ Answer, Counterclaims ¶ 42.) 

Accordingly, this portion of Plaintiff’s motion is denied.

C. Seventh Counterclaim

Plaintiff also seeks a more definite statement of

Defendants’ seventh counterclaim, which is based upon a violation of

California’s Unfair Competition Act (“UCA”), arguing it is unclear

what Defendants mean when they allege the “aforesaid conduct” violates

the UCA. (Pl.’s Mot. at 8:1-7.) Defendants rejoin that the seventh

counterclaim is based on the allegations preceding this counterclaim

and that this is clear from the pleadings since it states

“[Defendants] re-allege and incorporate by reference Paragraphs 1-56

of this Counterclaim,” and the other paragraphs of this counterclaim

“plead additional and necessary prima facie elements of this cause of

action.” (Defs.’ Opp’n at 10:10-15.) Plaintiff has not shown that it

has insufficient notice of this claim. Therefore, this portion of

Plaintiff’s motion is denied.

IV. Motion to Dismiss Analysis

A. First Counterclaim

Plaintiff seeks dismissal of Defendants’ first counterclaim,

for response costs under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,

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Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”), arguing AWIM is a

Potentially Responsible Party (“PRP”) under CERCLA § 107(a)(3), and

therefore cannot recover CERCLA clean up costs from Plaintiff. (Pl.’s

Mot. at 12:15-20). Defendants rejoin they have “sufficiently plead

their innocence” and therefore, this claim is “legitimately plead.” 

(Defs.’ Opp’n at 17:24-25.) Since Plaintiff has not shown this

counterclaim must be dismissed, this portion of Plaintiff’s motion is

denied.

B. Second Counterclaim

Plaintiff also seeks dismissal of Defendants’ second

counterclaim, arguing it does not specify the code section under which

Defendants seek indemnity. (Pl.’s Mot. at 13:2-3.) Defendants

respond Plaintiff “is on sufficient notice of the claim sought.” 

(Defs.’ Opp’n at 18:3-5.) 

Defendants’ second counterclaim states they seek

“Contribution under CERCLA and [the Resource Conservation and Recovery

Act].” (Defs.’ Answer, Counterclaims ¶ 37.) Rule 8(a) requires only

“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief.” Accordingly, this portion of Plaintiff’s motion

is denied.

C. Third Counterclaim

Plaintiff seeks dismissal of Defendants’ third counterclaim

on the grounds that it is vague and duplicative of Defendants’ second

counterclaim. (Pl.’s Mot. at 13:8-10.) Defendants counter, “a claim

for Contribution is different than a claim for indemnity” and

therefore, this indemnity claim should not be dismissed. (Defs.’

Opp’n at 18:10.) Since Plaintiff has not shown this counterclaim is

insufficient, this portion of Plaintiff’s motion is denied.

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D. Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, & Ninth Counterclaims

Plaintiff seeks dismissal of Defendants’ fifth, sixth,

eighth and ninth counterclaims, arguing there was a written contract

between the parties rather than an oral contract and therefore,

Defendants’ counterclaims based on an oral contract must be dismissed. 

(Pl.’s Mot. at 13:12, 16, 14:3, 4.) Defendants rejoin these

counterclaims are “based on a valid oral contract as previously

established.” (Defs.’ Opp’n at 18:13, 17.) Plaintiff has not shown

that the alleged written contract forecloses the possibility of a

simultaneous oral contract. Accordingly, this portion of Plaintiff’s

motion is denied. 

E. Seventh Counterclaim

Plaintiff seeks dismissal of Defendants’ seventh

counterclaim, arguing that using the language “aforesaid conduct,”

rather than stating specific factual allegations, is insufficient. 

(Pl.’s Mot. at 13:20-21.) Defendants rejoin this “argument . . . is

without merit.” (Defs.’ Opp’n at 19:1-2.) Since Plaintiff has not

shown it lacks sufficient notice of what is claimed, this portion of

Plaintiff’s motion is denied.

Plaintiff also seeks dismissal of Defendants’ claim for

punitive and exemplary damages under the seventh counterclaim, arguing

these damages are not recoverable under the UCA. (Pl.’s Mot. at

13:24-25.) Defendants do not respond to this argument.

“No claim for compensatory or punitive damages can be

recovered in a UCA action.” State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Sup.

Ct., 45 Cal. App. 4th 1093, 1110 (1996). Therefore, this portion of

Plaintiff’s motion is granted and Defendants’ claim for punitive

damages under their seventh counterclaim is dismissed.

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F. Eleventh Counterclaim

Plaintiff seeks dismissal of Defendants’ eleventh

counterclaim, in which negligence per se is alleged, arguing “this

claim apparently relates to the first shipment of waste oil on August

17, 2006, but that shipment did not contain PCBs and was successfully

transported by [Plaintiff] without incident.” (Pl.’s Mot. at 14:8-

10.) Defendants rejoin Plaintiff was under a duty to test for

halogens and likely failed to do so and therefore, this counterclaim

should not be dismissed. (Defs.’ Opp’n at 19:18-25.) 

Defendants’ eleventh counterclaim alleges Plaintiff violated

a consent order when it did not test for halogens in the August 24,

2006 oily water pickup. (Defs.’ Answer, Counterclaims ¶¶ 84, 85.) 

Plaintiff has not shown this counterclaim should be dismissed. 

Accordingly, this portion of Plaintiff’s motion is denied.

G. Thirteenth Counterclaim

Plaintiff seeks dismissal of Defendants’ thirteenth

counterclaim, arguing it “fails to state with specificity multiple

elements of a RICO claim.” (Pl.’s Mot. at 14:16-17.) Defendants

rejoin the counterclaim “does allege specific injuries.” (Defs.’

Opp’n at 19:26-27.)

Defendants’ thirteenth counterclaim alleges Plaintiff

committed mail and wire fraud, and other racketeering acts in

violation of RICO. (Defs.’ Answer, Counterclaims, ¶¶ 96-102.) “Rule

9(b)’s requirement that ‘[i]n all averments of fraud or mistake, the

circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with

particularity’ applies to civil RICO fraud claims.” Edwards v. Marin

Park, Inc., 356 F.3d 1058, 1065-66 (9th Cir. 2004). Therefore, “the

pleader must state the time, place, and specific content of the false

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misrepresentations as well as the identities of the parties to the

misrepresentation.” Odom v. Microsoft Corp., 486 F.3d 541, 553 (9th

Cir. 2007).

Defendants do not plead the time with any specificity, nor

do they state the place of the alleged violations. (Defs.’ Answer,

Counterclaims ¶¶ 97-102.) Therefore, Defendants have not pled this

counterclaim with sufficient particularity as required by Rule 9(b). 

Accordingly, this portion of Plaintiff’s motion is granted.

CONCLUSION

For the stated reasons, Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss

Defendants’ thirteenth counterclaim and to dismiss Defendants’ claim

for punitive damages under the seventh counterclaim is granted. The

remainder of Plaintiff’s motions are denied. Defendants are granted

leave to amend their thirteenth counterclaim in accordance with this

order provided that the amended counterclaim is filed no later than

ten days from the date on which this order is filed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 15, 2007

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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