Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_11-cv-02705/USCOURTS-cand-4_11-cv-02705-15/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

OAKLAND DIVISION 

PAUL MITCHELL, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

ROBERT W. FOX, Warden, 

Respondents. 

Case No. 11-cv-02705-SBA (PR) 

ORDER DENYING WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE PETITIONER’S MOTION 

TO STAY ACTION 

I. BACKGROUND 

Petitioner commenced the instant habeas action to challenge his state court criminal 

conviction and judgment. In an Order dated March 11, 2016, the Court granted 

Respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition as a mixed petition. The Court directed 

Petitioner to make an election regarding how he intended to proceed in light of the 

unexhausted claims. Dkt. 103 at 8. Petitioner was instructed to file a statement of his 

intent either: 

(1) to dismiss the unexhausted claims and go forward in this 

action with only the exhausted claims; (2) to terminate this 

action and return to state court to complete the exhaustion of 

Claims Four, Eleven and Twelve before returning to federal 

court to present all of his claims in a new petition; or (3) to 

request a stay of these proceedings while he exhausts his state 

judicial remedies. 

Id. Petitioner was further instructed as follows: “If Petitioner chooses option (3), he must 

show he satisfies the Rhines1 criteria (i.e. he explains why he failed to exhaust his 

unexhausted claims previously in state court and why the claims are potentially 

meritorious) or he must comply with the King2

/Kelly3 requirements . . . .” Id. (footnotes 

 1

 Rhines v. Webber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005). 

2

 King v. Ryan, 564 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2009). 

3

 Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Case 4:11-cv-02705-SBA Document 107 Filed 06/24/16 Page 1 of 4
2 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of California

added). 

 Petitioner has submitted a request “to be allowed to select 3[rd] option of the 3 the 

Court order advised [he] could select from.” Dkt. 105 at 1. However, he fails to explain 

how he satisfies the Rhines criteria or show that he complies with the Kelly/King 

requirements. 

II. DISCUSSION 

Prisoners in state custody who wish to challenge in federal habeas proceedings 

either the fact or length of their confinement are first required to exhaust state judicial 

remedies by presenting the highest state court available with a fair opportunity to rule on 

the merits of each and every claim they seek to raise in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(b), (c); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 515-16 (1982). If available state remedies 

have not been exhausted as to all claims, the district court must dismiss the petition. Id. at 

510; Guizar v. Estelle, 843 F.2d 371, 372 (9th Cir. 1988). A dismissal solely for failure to 

exhaust is not a bar to returning to federal court after exhausting available state remedies. 

See Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 586 (9th Cir. 1995). 

Petitioners may seek a stay of the petition pursuant to Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 

U.S. 408, 416 (2005), under which a prisoner may file a protective petition in federal court 

and request the court to stay federal habeas proceedings until all state remedies are 

exhausted. District courts have the authority to issue stays, notwithstanding the 

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). Rhines v. Webber, 

544 U.S. 269, 277-278 (2005). There are two kinds of stays available in a habeas action: 

the Rhines stay and the King/Kelly stay. A stay under Rhines, “is only appropriate when 

the district court determines there was good cause for the petitioner’s failure to exhaust his 

claims first in state court,” the claims are not meritless, and there are no intentionally 

dilatory litigation tactics by the petitioner. Id. Any such stay must be limited in time to 

avoid indefinite delay. Id. 

A King/Kelly stay provides an alternative method of addressing cases where a 

petitioner has some unexhausted claims he desires to present in his federal habeas action. 

Under the procedure outlined in Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2003), overruled 

Case 4:11-cv-02705-SBA Document 107 Filed 06/24/16 Page 2 of 4
3 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of California

on other grounds by Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2007), “(1) a petitioner 

amends his petition to delete any unexhausted claims; (2) the court stays and holds in 

abeyance the amended, fully exhausted petition, allowing the petitioner the opportunity to 

proceed to state court to exhaust the deleted claims; and (3) the petitioner later amends his 

petition and re-attaches the newly-exhausted claims to the original petition.” King v. 

Ryan, 564 F.3d 1133, 1135 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Kelly, 315 F.3d at 1070-71). A 

petitioner seeking to avail himself of the Kelly three-step procedure is not required to show 

good cause as under Rhines, but rather must eventually show that the amendment of any 

newly exhausted claims back into the petition satisfies both Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 

659 (2005), by sharing a “common core of operative facts” and Duncan v. Walker, 533 

U.S. 167 (2001), by complying with the statute of limitations. King, 564 F.3d at 1141. 

Here, though not entirely clear, it appears that Petitioner seeks a stay pursuant to 

Rhines. See Dkt. 105. As explained above, under Rhines, a mixed petition may be stayed 

only if: “(1) the petitioner has ‘good cause’ for his failure to exhaust his claims in state 

court; (2) the unexhausted claims are potentially meritorious; and (3) there is no indication 

that the petitioner intentionally engaged in dilatory litigation tactics.” Wooten v. Kirkland, 

540 F.3d 1019, 1023 (9th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). Good cause does not require 

“extraordinary circumstances.” Id. at 1024. However, the failure to exhaust based on 

reasons such as the petitioner believed that his counsel included all of the issues raised 

before the California Court of Appeal in his petition to the California Supreme Court does 

not constitute good cause. Id. Such a broad interpretation of “good cause” would allow 

routine stays of mixed petitions and would undermine the goals of AEDPA, which 

authorizes stays of habeas petitions only in “limited circumstances.” Id. The burden is on 

the petitioner to demonstrate good cause for his failure to exhaust state court remedies, to 

show that the unexhausted claims are not “plainly meritless,” and to demonstrate that he 

has not engaged in abusive litigation tactics. Jackson v. Roe, 425 F.3d 654, 662 (9th Cir. 

2005). 

Here, the Court previously granted Petitioner a lengthy stay pursuant to Rhines— 

from February 19, 2013 through the date the stay was lifted on April 14, 2015—affording 

Case 4:11-cv-02705-SBA Document 107 Filed 06/24/16 Page 3 of 4
4 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of California

him a total of two years to exhaust Claims Four, Eleven and Twelve. Dkt. 48. Petitioner 

has not shown good cause for a second stay. See Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277. 

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Petitioner has not met the Rhines 

requirements for a second stay. Accordingly, Petitioner’s request for a second Rhines stay 

is DENIED. However, in the interests of justice, the denial is without prejudice to filing a 

renewed motion for a stay so that Petitioner may show whether he complies with the 

Kelly/King requirements outlined above. As an alternative to filing a renewed motion for 

a stay, Petitioner may instead move to dismiss his unexhausted claims and move forward 

on the exhausted claims, as explained below. 

III. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons stated above, 

1. Petitioner’s motion for a stay is DENIED without prejudice. Dkt. 105. No 

later than twenty-eight (28) days from the date of this Order, Petitioner may file a 

renewed motion for a stay which explains how he complies with the King/Kelly 

requirements. 

2. If Petitioner does not file a renewed motion for a stay, then no later than 

twenty-eight (28) days from the date of this Order, he may file a motion to dismiss his 

unexhausted claims (Claims Four, Eleven and Twelve) and move forward with his 

remaining exhausted claims. 

3. Petitioner must file either a renewed motion for a stay or a motion to dismiss 

his unexhausted claims within twenty-eight days from the date of this Order. If Petitioner 

fails to do so by the twenty-eight-day deadline, this action will be dismissed without 

prejudice to filing a new federal habeas action containing a petition with only exhausted 

claims. 

4. This Order terminates Docket no. 105. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 6/23/16 ______________________________ 

SAUNDRA BROWN ARMSTRONG 

Senior United States District Judge 

P:\PRO-SE\SBA\HC.11\Mitchell2705.DenyRhinesStay-afterELECTION_KFFrev.docx 

Case 4:11-cv-02705-SBA Document 107 Filed 06/24/16 Page 4 of 4