Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_04-cv-02740/USCOURTS-cand-5_04-cv-02740-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Order Denying Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARIO A. IRIAS,

Petitioner,

 vs.

JEAN S. WOODFORD, Warden,

Respondent.

 

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No. C 04-02740 JW (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner, a California prisoner currently incarcerated at Pleasant Valley

State Prison, filed a pro so petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §

2254, challenging his state conviction. Petitioner raised the following claims: 1) the

trial court erred in admitting improper opinion testimony which violated petitioner’s

rights to a jury trial and due process; 2) the trial court erred in failing to give limiting

jury instructions which violated petitioner’s rights to a jury trial and due process; 3)

ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to request limiting jury instructions;

4) the unconstitutional effect of CALJIC No. 2.20.1; 5) prosecutorial misconduct; 6)

ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to move to strike improper portions

of petitioner’s cross-examination; and 7) cumulative error. This Court found the

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claims, liberally construed, were cognizable and ordered respondent to show cause

why a writ of habeas corpus should not be granted. Respondent has filed an answer

to the order to show cause, and petitioner has not filed traverse.

BACKGROUND

The California Court of Appeal set forth the following procedural

background: 

An information filed on May 11, 2000, in Alameda County

Superior Court charged [petitioner] with engaging in three or more

acts of substantial sexual conduct with a child under the age of 14

in violation of Penal Code section 288.5, subdivision (a).

[Petitioner] pleaded not guilty and the matter came up for a jury

trial on March 7, 2001. The jury deadlocked, and the court

declared a mistrial. A second jury trial began a month later. 

Following three days of testimony, the case was submitted to the

jury at 3:33 p.m. on May 10, 2001. In deliberations that extended

over three days, the jury made four requests for transcripts,

exhibits, or instructions and reached a verdict of guilty on the

afternoon of May 14, 2001. 

At a sentencing hearing on July 24, 2001, the trial court

imposed the upper term of 16 years in state prison. Appellant filed

a timely notice of appeal. 

People v. Irias, No. A095796, slip op. 1 (Cal.Ct.App. Jan. 31, 2003) (Resp’t Ex. G).

The following facts are taken from the state appellate court opinion:

[Petitioner] immigrated to this country from Honduras in 1993

and secured employment in the construction industry. In 1995, he met

Maria A., who had recently moved to Northern California where her

sisters lived, leaving her two children with their father in New York.

[Petitioner] and Maria soon began living together and were later

married in 1998. Maria’s oldest child, her daughter Wendy, joined the

household in 1996, and her son, Jose, arrived two years later. 

About the time she met [petitioner], Maria A. acquired a close

friend, Aridel F., who had a daughter, Hazzell, the same age as

Wendy. The two girls became best friends, and their mothers

exchanged childcare duties. Maria sometimes left Wendy with Aridel

before leaving for work on weekdays, and Aridel left Hazzell with

Maria on the weekends. 

Sometime in 1996 or 1997, Aridel first received a report 

through her daughter, Hazzell, that [petitioner] touched Wendy in an 

inappropriate way. The girls were then six or seven years old. 

According to Hazzell, Wendy told her that [petitioner] touched her in 

her private part. Aridel did not take any action on this report. 

Maria A. testified to receiving a similar report directly from

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Wendy in 1997. When she told the child not to let anyone touch her,

Wendy replied, “Mario touches me.” Maria immediately called

[petitioner] into the room and confronted him with the statement. 

[Petitioner] denied touching the girl and left the house for a week. 

After [petitioner] rejoined the household, Maria continued to ask her

daughter about inappropriate touching and Wendy consistently denied

that it occurred. Maria recalled, however, that Wendy had once

complained in 1996 that her vagina hurt. 

Late in 1998, Aridel F. asked Wendy if her stepfather continued

to touch her. She testified that the child tearfully responded in the

affirmative. Aridel called the child’s school to report abuse but did not

give her name. Officer Fajardo of the Oakland Unified School District

Police Department investigated the anonymous report on December 2,

1998, but he found no indication of abuse after interviewing Wendy,

her brother and their mother. 

About a year later, Aridel F. decided to speak to the mother’s

sisters about the matter. She claims that she and one sister, Marlane,

decided to take the child to a clinic for examination without the

mother’s knowledge. For her part, Marlane claims that they took her

to the clinic for a stomach ailment. In any event, after [petitioner] took

the child to school on the morning of December 21, 1999, the two

women picked her up and took her to the Eastmont Health Center

where she was seen by Suzanne Schuster, a nurse practitioner. 

Schuster testified that she talked to the child in private, though she did

not have permission to engage in a physical examination. She

explained that she was “a mandatory reporter,” subject to a duty to

report all information indic[a]ting possible sexual abuse. On the basis

of information received from the child, she made a report to Child

Protective Services and referred the child for a medical examination at

Children’s Hospital. 

An emergency response worker in Child Protective Services,

Audra Dunning, came to the clinic shortly after the noon hour. After

talking to the two adult women, she interviewed Wendy for about 20

minutes. She then called the Oakland Police Department. Officer

Marvin Jackson responded to the call and spoke to Wendy at the clinic

in the presence of Dunning. He testified that he obtained a

“statement” from the child. Dunning then assumed protective custody

of the child, and over the protests of Aridel F. and Marlane A., took

her alone to Children’s Hospital for an examination. She testified that

it was important to get the child to the hospital “as soon as possible”

because “the last reported incident occurred within 72 hours.” The

record does not reveal from whom Dunning received this report. 

After taking the child to Children’s Hospital, Dunning made an

appointment for the child to be interviewed on videotape the next day

by a trained person at the Calico Center, which she described as a

“multi-disciplinary center for children who have been physically... or

sexually abused.” She also met with Officer Jackson who authorized a

physical examination of the child. Late in the day, she met Sharon

Levitt, a social worker from Child Protective Services, who assumed

responsibility for the case. 

At Children’s Hospital, Wendy was examined by Dr. Sangeeta

Chona, a doctor in the emergency room, who testified that the child

displayed “an abnormal hymen.” There was redness and a small tear

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in the lower portion of the hymen in a location providing “evidence for

penetration by finger or penis” rather than a “straddle injury” of the

sort that might occur in a bike accident or while playing on monkey

bars. After the exam, Dr. Chona referred Wendy to a further exam by

a specialist at the Child Protection Clinic.

Dunning arranged to have Wendy placed in a foster home after

the examination. Meanwhile, the police contacted her mother who had

arrived home from work to find her daughter missing. In testimony of

disputed relevance, the social worker, Sharon Levitt, testified that she

observed Wendy being interviewed the next day “at the Calico Center

where they interview children who have been abused” and then filed a

petition “for sexual abuse of Wendy by her stepfather.” Later, she

made arrangements for the child’s schooling while she was in a foster

home and scheduled a further medical examination by Dr. James

Crawford at the Center for Child Protection at Children’s Hospital.

Dr. Crawford examined Wendy on January 20, 2000. He

testified that she appeared for the appointment with “a parent and a

person from C.P.S.” He conducted the exam with an instrument called

a colposcope that provided light, magnification, and a camera to

document the exam. Dr. Crawford described the examination by

analogy to a clock having the hour 12 at the top of the vagina. He

found that between the “8:00 and 10:00, right on the side, there was

virtually no hymen present, which was abnormal.” In his opinion, the

abnormality provided “clear evidence... of a prior event where

something penetrated into her vagina, tore the tissue and caused the

injury... It could be a finger, could be a penis; could be a carrot... [But]

it’s not the type of injury that you see through normal activities, you

know, gymnastics, riding a bike, all those kinds of things.” Dr.

Crawford did not think the injury was a recent event. It could have

occurred at any time between three weeks or three years before the

initial examination by Dr. Chona at Children’s Hospital. 

At trial, Wendy testified that [petitioner] first touched her when

she was five and a half. After a friend’s birthday party, she fell asleep

and he carried her to her mother’s bed, lifted her shirt, and touched her

private part. She said it happened “a lot” after that time, but in

response to further questions she appeared to say it was not a frequent

occurrence. [Petitioner] did not touch her for a year after the first

incident; he touched her “more than four” times in 1997, three or four

times in 1998, and the last time during the week before Christmas in

1999. He would “always” touch her in the early morning after her

mother had left for work; he would come into her room, lie down in

her bed, pull off her pants, and touch her. In response to a leading

question, she said he “used” fingers, his private part, and his mouth,

but she declined to provide any details. She remembered telling her

Mom about the touching and causing a fight between her Mom and

[petitioner]. She thought she might have also told Hazzell.

Taking the stand in his own defense, [petitioner] unequivocally

denied ever touching the child inappropriately. 

Id., slip op. at 2-5. 

Upon the guilty verdict, the trial court sentenced petitioner to the upper term

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1

 Petitioner was again sentenced to 16 years in state prison after the resentencing

hearing. Petitioner appealed the judgment, but the California Court of Appeal affirmed the

decision. See People v. Irias, No. A102660, slip op. 1 (Cal.Ct.App. Nov. 25, 2003).

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of sixteen years in state prison. Id., slip op. at 1. Petitioner filed a direct appeal and

a state habeas petition. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction on

direct appeal but remanded the case for resentencing on January 31, 2003.1

 On the

same day, the state appellate court denied petitioner’s state habeas petition. The

California Supreme Court denied review of both the direct appeal and the state

habeas petition on April 16, 2003. Petitioner then filed the instant federal habeas

petition on July 8, 2004. 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

This court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that

he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

The writ may not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated

on the merits in state court unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1)

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application

of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.” Id. § 2254(d).

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if

the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] 

Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the]

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Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529

U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). “Under the ‘reasonable application clause,’ a federal

habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing

legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle

to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. “[A] federal habeas court may not

issue the writ simply because the court concludes in its independent judgment that

the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously

or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. A

federal habeas court making the “unreasonable application” inquiry should ask

whether the state court’s application of clearly established federal law was

“objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409. 

A federal habeas court may grant the writ it if concludes that the state court’s

adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). The court must presume correct any

determination of a factual issue made by a state court unless the petitioner rebuts the

presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. 

§2254(e)(1). 

The only definitive source of clearly established federal law under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d) is in the holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of the Supreme Court as of the

time of the state court decision. Id. at 412; Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069

(9th Cir. 2003). While circuit law may be “persuasive authority” for purposes of

determining whether a state court decision is an unreasonable application of

Supreme Court precedent, only the Supreme Court’s holdings are binding on the

state courts and only those holdings need be “reasonably” applied. Id.

///

///

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B. Claims and Analysis

1. Admission of Opinion Testimony

Petitioner first claims that he was denied his rights to a jury trial and

due process by the state court’s improper admission of the opinion testimony of

Levitt, a social worker for Child Protective Services, over the objections of the

defense. Petitioner alleges that Levitt’s testimony implied an opinion that petitioner

actually molested the victim and that the jury convicted petitioner on reliance of

Levitt’s opinion without proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 

The admission of evidence is not subject to federal habeas review unless a

specific constitutional guarantee is violated or the error is of such magnitude that the

result is a denial of the fundamentally fair trial guaranteed by due process. See

Henry v. Kernan, 197 F.3d 1021, 1031 (9th Cir. 1999); Colley v. Sumner, 784 F.2d

984, 990 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 839 (1986). Failure to comply with state

rules of evidence is neither a necessary nor a sufficient basis for granting federal

habeas relief on due process grounds. See Henry,197 F.3d at 1031; Jammal v. Van

de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919 (9th Cir. 1991). While adherence to state evidentiary

rules suggests that the trial was conducted in a procedurally fair manner, it is

certainly possible to have a fair trial even when state standards are violated;

conversely, state procedural and evidentiary rules may countenance processes that

do not comport with fundamental fairness. See id. (citing Perry v. Rushen, 713 F.2d

1447, 1453 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 838 (1984)). The due process

inquiry in federal habeas review is whether the admission of evidence was arbitrary

or so prejudicial that it rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. See Walters v.

Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir. 1995); Colley, 784 F.2d at 990. But note that

only if there are no permissible inferences that the jury may draw from the evidence

can its admission violate due process. See Jammal, 926 F.2d at 920. 

In order to obtain habeas relief on the basis of an evidentiary error, a

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petitioner must show that the error was one of constitutional dimension and that it

was not harmless under Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993). He would

have to show that the error had “‘a substantial and injurious effect’ on the verdict.’”

Dillard v. Roe, 244 F.3d 758, 767 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at

623).

The California Court of Appeal summarized Levitt’s testimony as follows:

[...] Levitt identified herself as a child welfare worker for

Children’s Protective Services “specializing in sexual abuse.” She

explained that she was assigned Wendy’s case after the child was put

into a foster home and began to describe in general terms the nature

of a dependency investigation. At this point, defense counsel asked

to approach the bench. The court allowed the prosecution to

continue its examination and later overruled a renewed defense

objection. Following Levitt’s testimony, the court explained that it

overruled the defense objections on the grounds of relevancy

because it “believe[d] the witness’ testimony was relevant in the

sense of connecting the various elements of the time line... I would

permit the witness to testify on that limited basis of explaining how

the complaining witness got to Dr. Crawford.”

In a brief direct examination, the prosecution asked Levitt to

explain the context of Dr. Crawford’s examination of the child. She

testified that she scheduled the examination as “a follow-up from the

emergency room.” The purpose of the examination was to check on

medical cultures revealing possible infections and to do “a more

thorough medical examination.” The Center for Child Protection,

where Dr. Crawford worked, were “the experts.”

In addition, the prosecution asked Levitt a short series of

questions about the dependency proceeding. She testified that she

was responsible for “protection of Wendy so any abuse that had

occurred to her would not occur again.” She took Wendy to “the

Calico Center, where they interview children who have been

abused.” After observing this interview, she filed a petition “for

sexual abuse of Wendy by her stepfather.” Later, after Wendy was

placed in a foster home, she arranged schooling for the child and

visited her several times to see if she was “having any problems.”

 People v. Irias, No. A095796, slip op. at 5-6. 

After reviewing the evidence, the state appellate court found that the trial

court had not abused its discretion in admitting Levitt’s testimony to explain the

“time line” leading to Dr. Crawford’s examination. Id. However, the court found

that Levitt’s testimony about the dependency proceeding was neither relevant nor

necessary to establish the context of Dr. Crawford’s examination. Nevertheless, the

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court found that the error was neither prejudicial nor that the exclusion of Levitt’s

testimony would have led to a different result:

We note... that the testimony was brief, unembellished and

relatively colorless. Levitt never testified directly about the child’s

statements or offered an explicit opinion as to the child’s veracity. 

The jury was informed only that a county agency, Child Protective

Services, was taking action on the case. The testimony added little

to other evidence of official action to which no objection was raised. 

The emergency response worker, Audra Dunning, testified that she

contacted police, that she and the responding police officer thought

the child should be in protective custody, and that the child was

taken to a foster home. The police officer, Marvin Jackson, testified

that the child was taken into protective custody and that he requested

a sexual assault examination. The child’s mother testified that the

police arrived at her home at 4:30 that afternoon. 

While the record of a previous mistrial and somewhat

extended jury deliberation suggests that evidence of guilt presented a

close case, it does not follow that every error was prejudicial. We

see no reasonable possibility that the exclusion of the disputed

portion of Levitt’s testimony would have led to a different result. 

(People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) We have carefully

considered [petitioner’s] claim of federal constitutional error and

find that it is not supported by the facts of the case.

Id., slip op. at 7-8. 

Petitioner was not denied a fundamentally fair trial guaranteed by due process

by the admission of Levitt’s testimony. See Henry, 197 F.3d at 1031. The state

appellate court correctly found that the trial court had not erred in admitting Levitt’s

testimony on the grounds that the evidence was relevant pursuant to Cal. Evid. Code

§ 350. People v. Irias, No. A095796, slip op. at 6. The trial court found that Levitt’s

testimony was necessary to explain the “time line” of how the victim came to be

examined by Dr. Crawford whose testimony was a crucial part of the prosecution’s

case in retrial. Id. It is more likely that Dr. Crawford’s testimony was the evidence

that made the difference in the retrial resulting in a guilty verdict rather than the

testimony of Levitt as petitioner contends. Dr. Crawford testified that the

abnormality he observed in the victim’s hymen presented “clear evidence... of a

prior event where something penetrated into her vagina, tore the tissue and cause the

injury... It could be a finger, could be a penis; could be a carrot... [But] it’s not the

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type of injury that you see through normal activities, you know, gymnastics, riding a

bike, all those kinds of things.” See supra at 4. Such graphic expert testimony no

doubt contributed much to the jury’s deliberations, more so than the allegedly

improper opinion testimony by Levitt. Because Levitt’s testimony was relevant to

lay the foundation for Dr. Crawford’s testimony, the admission of Levitt’s testimony

was neither arbitrary or so prejudicial that it rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. 

See Walters, 45 F.3d at 1357. 

This Court agrees with the state appellate court’s finding that although

Levitt’s testimony regarding the dependency proceeding was irrelevant and therefore

inadmissible, this error by the trial court was harmless under Brecht, 507 U.S. 619. 

In light of the compelling direct evidence from the victim, the expert testimony by

Dr. Crawford, and the brevity of Levitt’s testimony, petitioner has failed to show

that the error in admitting the irrelevant portion of Levitt’s testimony had “‘a

substantial and injurious effect’ on the verdict.’” Dillard, 244 F.3d at 767 n.7

(quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623).

The state court’s rejection of this claim was not contrary to, nor an

objectively unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent. See 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d). Petitioner’s claim has no merit and is DENIED.

2. Limiting Jury Instructions

Petitioner’s second claim is that the trial court failed to give limiting

instructions that Levitt’s testimony could not be used to prove abuse occurred or that

petitioner was guilty of the charged offenses, and thereby violated his rights to a jury

trial and due process. 

A state trial court’s failure to give an instruction does not alone raise a ground

cognizable in a federal habeas corpus proceedings. See Dunckhurst v. Deeds, 859

F.2d 110, 114 (9th Cir. 1988). The omission of an instruction is less likely to be

prejudicial than a misstatement of the law. See Walker v. Endell, 850 F.2d 470,

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475- 76 (9th Cir, 1987). Thus, a habeas petitioner whose claim involves a failure to

give a particular instruction bears an “‘especially heavy burden.’” Villafuerte v.

Stewart, 111 F.3d 616, 624 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S.

145, 155 (1977)). 

Here, petitioner’s trial counsel failed to ask the trial court for limiting

instructions. The Court finds that petitioner has not met the “heavy burden” that a

habeas petitioner must overcome when the claim involves a failure to give a

particular limiting instruction. Villafuerte, 111 F.3d at 624. Therefore, petitioner is

not entitled to federal habeas relief on this claim. Petitioner’s claim is DENIED.

3. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner next claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel

when his trial counsel failed to request limiting instructions on the use of the Levitt’s

testimony. 

In order to prevail on a Sixth Amendment ineffectiveness of counsel claim,

petitioner must establish two things. First, he must establish that trial counsel’s

performance was deficient, i.e., that it fell below an “objective standard of

reasonableness” under prevailing professional norms. Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. at 687-88 (1984). Second, he must establish that he was prejudiced by

counsel’s deficient performance, i.e., that “there is a reasonable probability that, but

for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.” Id. at 694. 

A court need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient

before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as the result of the alleged

deficiencies. See id. at 697; Williams v. Calderon, 52 F.3d 1465, 1470 & n.3 (9th

Cir. 1995) (applauding district court’s refusal to consider whether counsel’s conduct

was deficient after determining that petitioner could not establish prejudice), cert.

denied, 516 U.S. 1124 (1996).

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Petitioner’s claim is without merit as petitioner fails to show that he was

prejudiced by the allegedly deficient performance. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. 

As discussed in petitioner’s first claim involving inadmissible evidence, there was

such strong evidence against petitioner that it is doubtful that Levitt’s testimony had

“‘a substantial and injurious effect’ on the verdict.’” Dillard, 244 F.3d at 767 n.7. 

The victim child gave direct evidence regarding the molestation and an expert

medical witness gave compelling testimony on his examination of the child. See

supra at 9. It cannot therefore be said that there was a reasonable probability that,

but for trial counsel’s failure to request limiting instructions on the use of the social

worker’s testimony, the result of the proceedings would have been different. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Accordingly, the state court’s rejection of this claim

was not contrary to, nor an objectively unreasonable application of, Supreme Court

precedent. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Petitioner’s claim has no merit and is

DENIED.

4. CALJIC No. 2.20.1

Petitioner claims that CALJIC No. 2.20.1 is unconstitutional because it

“invades the jury’s province, unfairly bolstered Wendy’s credibility, and impaired

[petitioner’s] ability to impeach Wendy’s credibility by telling the jury not to

consider a child witness’ level of cognitive development - her inability to perceive,

understand, remember, or communicate - as indications she was not believable,

though such factors are relevant to assessing an adult witness’ credibility.” (Pet. at

13.) 

An instruction telling the jury that “[e]very witness is presumed to speak the

truth” and explaining ways in which that presumption might be overcome does not

violate due process, however undesirable and erroneous it may be. Cupp v.

Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 142 (1973). In light of Cupp, the Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals held that jury instruction CALJIC No. 2.20.1, provided in a child sexual

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abuse case, does not clearly violate clearly established Supreme Court law. See

Brodit v. Cambra, 350 F.3d 985, 990-91 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Petitioner’s claim is without merit. The Ninth Circuit Court has specifically

ruled that CALJIC 2.20.1 does not clearly violate clearly established Supreme Court

law. Id. Accordingly, the state court’s rejection of this claim was not contrary to,

nor an objectively unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent. See 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d). Petitioner’s claim is DENIED.

5. Prosecutorial Misconduct

Petitioner alleges that the prosecution engaged in misconduct during

closing argument when the prosecution “unfairly bolstered Wendy’s credibility

when he argued to the jury that the difference between Wendy’s demeanor and

Hazzell’s showed that Wendy had been sexually abused.” (Pet. at 20.) Petitioner

claims this misconduct violated his right to due process and right to confront

witnesses against him. 

Prosecutorial misconduct is cognizable in federal habeas corpus. The

appropriate standard of review is the narrow one of due process and not the broad

exercise of supervisory power. See Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181

(1986). A defendant’s due process rights are violated when a prosecutor's

misconduct renders a trial “fundamentally unfair.” See id.; Smith v. Phillips, 455

U.S. 209, 219 (1982) (“the touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged

prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the

prosecutor”). Under Darden, the first issue is whether the prosecutor’s remarks were

improper; if so, the next question is whether such conduct infected the trial with

unfairness. Tan v. Runnels, 413 F.3d 1101, 1112 (9th Cir. 2005). See, e.g., Comer

v. Schriro, 463 F.3d 934, 961 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding that while prosecutor’s

remarks, calling petitioner a “monster,” “filth,” and a “reincarnation of the devil”

were improper, they did not rise to the level of a due process violation because the

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prosecutor did not misstate or manipulate the evidence, the jury instructions

provided by the court were adequate, and there was strong evidence of petitioner’s

guilt.) A prosecutorial misconduct claim is decided “‘on the merits, examining the

entire proceedings to determine whether the prosecutor’s remarks so infected the

trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’” 

Johnson v. Sublett, 63 F.3d 926, 929 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). 

The California Court of Appeal summarized the court record with respect to

the claim of prosecutorial misconduct:

[...] Referring to the testimony of the child’s friend, Hazzell,

the prosecutor sought to make an incriminating comparison: “Now,

there was no testimony from psychologists; but you had an

opportunity to observe two children, the same age. You had an

opportunity to observe Wendy get on the stand; Wendy who is

damaged because at the tender age of five years old, a full grown

man began having sexual relations with her; Wendy, who is quiet,

and withdrawn and juxtapose her to her friend, Hazzell, who hasn’t

been molested, who can sit up forthright and talk about stuff and –.”

At this point defense counsel objected that the argument

assumed facts not in evidence. The court overruled the objection but

cautioned the jury as follows: “Ladies and gentlemen, I’m going to

overrule the objection but with this comment, and that is: that I told

you on more than one occasion that statements by counsel, including

the statements made during argument are not themselves evidence. 

Counsel are not permitted to make arguments when there is no

evidence to support the argument; but counsel are permitted to argue

things which can be drawn as inferences, conclusions which can

reasonably be drawn from the evidence. It’s up to you to decide

whether the facts are there to support these arguments or not.” 

Apparently unsatisfied with this judicial intervention, defense

counsel protested the unfairness of the prosecution’s comparison of

the two girls’ demeanor in his argument to the jury. 

People v. Irias, No. A095796, slip op. at 12. 

Petitioner’s claim is without merit. Even assuming the prosecution’s

statements during closing argument rose to the level of misconduct, the defense

counsel’s objections, the trial court’s cautionary instructions and defense counsel’s

rebuttal statements in his own closing argument make it doubtful that the misconduct

so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of

due process. See Johnson, 63 F.3d at 929. It cannot be said that the alleged

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misconduct rendered the trial “fundamentally unfair.” Darden, 477 U.S. at 181. 

Accordingly, the state court’s rejection of this claim was not contrary to, nor an

objectively unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent. See 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d). Petitioner’s claim is DENIED.

6. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance

by failing to move to strike a bulk of petitioner’s cross-examination wherein the

prosecutor repeatedly forced petitioner “to either admit having molested Wendy or

call her a liar.” (Pet. at 14.) Petitioner alleges that trial counsel made belated

objections to the prosecution’s repeated use of the word “lying” and that when his

objections were finally sustained, trial counsel then failed to strike the improper

testimony which the jury requested to have read back during deliberations. 

As discussed in petitioner’s first claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,

see supra at 11-12, this claim is without merit as petitioner fails to show that he was

prejudiced by the allegedly deficient performance. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. 

The fact that the jury requested a readback of petitioner’s cross-examination is not

sufficient to show that the disputed portion had a “substantial and injurious effect”

on the jury’s deliberations, especially since the jury requested and received

readbacks of all of Dr. Crawford’s testimony and all of Wendy’s testimony as well. 

(Resp’t Ex. B at 366-371.) As discussed above, there was such strong evidence

against petitioner, including the testimonies of the victim child and the expert

medical witness, that it is doubtful that trial counsel’s allegedly deficient

performance with respect to petitioner’s cross-examination had “‘a substantial and

injurious effect’ on the verdict.’” Dillard, 244 F.3d at 767 n.7. It cannot be said that

there is a reasonable probability that, but for trial counsel’s failure to move to strike

the offending portions of the testimony from the record, the result of the proceedings

would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Accordingly, the state

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court’s rejection of this claim was not contrary to, nor an objectively unreasonable

application of, Supreme Court precedent. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Petitioner’s

claim has no merit and is DENIED. 

7. Cumulative Error

Petitioner lastly claims that the constitutional errors result in

cumulative prejudice against him, depriving him of a fair trail. See Alcala v.

Woodford, 334 F.3d 862, 893-95 (9th Cir. 2003) (reversing conviction where

multiple constitutional errors hindered defendant’s efforts to challenge every

important element of proof offered by prosecution). However, where there is no

single constitutional error existing, nothing can accumulate to the level of a

constitutional violation. See Mancuso v. Olivarez, 292 F.3d 939, 957 (9th Cir.

2002). Petitioner has no basis for claim of cumulative error because his petition

failed to raise even a single constitutional error that had a prejudicial effect. See

Mancuso, 292 F.3d 939 at 957. The state court’s rejection of this claim was not

contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. See 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d). Petitioner’s claim is DENIED. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is

DENIED.

DATED: 

JAMES WARE

United States District Judge 

September 26, 2007

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