Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-03706/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-03706-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Labor/Mgmnt. Relations

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 Although the Industrial Welfare Commission (IWC) was defunded

by the California Legislature effective July 1, 2004, its orders

remain in effect. Bearden v US Borax, Inc, 138 Cal App 4th 429, 434

(2006).

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DOUGLAS O’CONNOR,

Plaintiff,

v

STARBUCKS CORP,

Defendant. /

No C 06-3706 - VRW

ORDER

Plaintiff alleges that defendant’s policy of requiring

its California-based employees to launder their work aprons

violates Title 8 of the California Code of Regulatins, § 11070

9(A), which provides that “[w]hen uniforms are required by the

employer to be worn by the employee as a condition of employment,

such uniforms shall be provided and maintained by the employer.” 

Doc #1 at ¶¶1, 34. 

Based on the Industrial Welfare Commission’s (IWC)1

“explanation” of subsection 9(a), the court understands the crux of

the dispute in this case to be whether the aprons issued by

defendant require either: 

Case 3:06-cv-03706-VRW Document 58 Filed 07/17/07 Page 1 of 3
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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(a) “minimal time for care, e g, uniforms made of a material

requiring only washing and tumble or drip drying” or 

(b) “ironing or dry cleaning or * * * special laundering 

* * *” 

Doc #52, ¶1, Ex A. If the former, defendant owes plaintiff no

obligation under subsection 9(a); if the latter, defendant must

“maintain or provide a maintenance allowance for” its aprons. See

id.

Pursuant to FRCP 23, plaintiff moved for class

certification on June 7, 2007, seeking certification of the

following class:

All persons who are/were employed by Starbucks

Retail, Inc in one or more of Starbucks California

retail stores and who were required to maintain

Starbucks issued uniforms at any time between May

9, 2002 and the present. 

Doc #43 at 7

Defendant opposes certification, contending that the

proposed class is neither adequately defined nor clearly

ascertainable because it includes many employees who are not

entitled to relief. See Doc #48 at 12:14-16 (asserting that

plaintiff “seeks to certify a class so broadly, and which bears no

relation to his only colorable claim, that 99.99% of its members

will be entitled to no relief even if [plaintiff] establishes

liability on the merits”). The court agrees. Even if subsection

9(a) obliges defendant to “maintain” its employees’ aprons, only

employees who engaged in compensable conduct (i e, ironed, dry

cleaned or specially laundered their apron) would be entitled to

relief. 

//

Case 3:06-cv-03706-VRW Document 58 Filed 07/17/07 Page 2 of 3
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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To the court it appears that the bulk of the controversy

concerning the proposed class would be eliminated by defining the

class as follows: 

All persons who are/were employed by Starbucks

Retail, Inc in one or more of Starbucks California

retail stores, who were required to maintain a

Starbucks issued uniform at any time between May 9,

2002 and the present and who ironed, dry cleaned or

specially laundered their uniform. 

Rather than expending effort quarreling over plaintiff’s

overbroad class definition, the court invites the parties to direct

their arguments to the court’s proposed class definition. 

Accordingly, the court ORDERS the parties to SHOW CAUSE on or

before July 20, 2007, why the court should not certify the class

proposed above. The court also CONTINUES the class certification

hearing date to July 25, 2007, at 2:00 pm. 

As guidance, the court notes that many of the parties’

arguments are appropriately presented in a motion for summary

judgment, not one for class certification. If plaintiff “has

demonstrated no cognizable injury,” as the parties debate in their

class certification briefs, see Doc #48 at 19; Doc #54 at 4, the

court will entertain a motion for summary judgment.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

Case 3:06-cv-03706-VRW Document 58 Filed 07/17/07 Page 3 of 3