Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00032/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cv-00032-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:205 Denial Social Security Benefits

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Cheryl Dianne White, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

Michael J. Astrue, Commissioner of Social 

Security, 

Defendant.

No. CV 10-032-TUC-FRZ (CRP)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

 

Cheryl White is 67 years old. She has a long work history, including owning and 

operating a Mexican restaurant for nearly twenty years. She last worked as a floral 

manager at a grocery store. 

 Ms. White suffers from serious foot problems. She began receiving treatment in 

the fall of 2006 for pain in the right Achilles tendon and ankle and swelling in the heel. 

She had foot surgery on December 27, 2006. Further surgery has been recommended, 

but Ms. White is without health insurance and cannot afford surgery or physical therapy. 

 Ms. White filed a claim for disability insurance benefits in July 2007, alleging to 

be disabled as of the date of her surgery. Doc. 13, Tr. 97-101. The claim was denied 

initially and on reconsideration. Tr. 58-59, 64-67, 71-73. A hearing before an 

administrative law judge (“ALJ”) was held on March 12, 2009. Tr. 24-57. The ALJ 

issued a decision on June 3, 2009, finding Ms. White not to be disabled within the 

meaning of the Social Security Act. Tr. 11-18. This decision became the 

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Commissioner’s final decision when the Appeals Council denied review. Tr. 1-3. 

Ms. White then brought this action for judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 405(g). Doc. 1. The issues have been briefed. Docs. 18, 19, 22. Oral argument has 

not been requested. For reasons stated below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the 

District Court, after its independent review, reverse Defendant’s decision and remand the 

case for an award of benefits. 

I. Standard of Review.

The Court has the “power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of record, a 

judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social 

Security, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The 

decision denying benefits “should be upheld unless it is based on legal error or is not 

supported by substantial evidence.” Ryan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 

(9th Cir. 2008). “This is a highly deferential standard of review: ‘Substantial evidence’ 

means more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance.” Valentine v. Comm’r 

Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 690 (9th Cir. 2009). In determining whether the decision 

is supported by substantial evidence, however, the Court “must consider the entire record 

as a whole and may not affirm simply by isolating a ‘specific quantum of supporting 

evidence.’” Ryan, 528 F.3d at 1198 (citation omitted). 

II. Discussion.

Whether a claimant is disabled is determined using a five-step evaluation process. 

To establish disability, the claimant must show she has not worked since the alleged 

disability onset date, she has a severe impairment, and her impairment meets or equals a 

listed impairment or her residual functional capacity (“RFC”) precludes her from 

performing past work. At step five, the Commissioner must show that the claimant is 

able to perform other work. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; Valentine, 574 F.3d at 689. 

Plaintiff has not worked since the alleged onset date. Tr. 13, ¶ 2. She has severe 

right foot impairments: Achilles tendonitis, Haglund’s deformity (a bony enlargement on 

the back of the heel), and ankle equinus (a structural abnormality of the ankle joint 

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limiting flexibility). Tr. 13-14, ¶ 3. Those impairments do not meet or equal a listed 

impairment. Tr. 14-15, ¶ 4. Plaintiff is not disabled, the ALJ found, because she has the 

RFC to perform the full range of sedentary work, including past work as a 

receptionist/telephone operator. Tr. 15-17, ¶¶ 5-6. 

Plaintiff asserts multiple errors in connection with the evaluation of medical 

evidence, her symptom testimony, and vocational factors. Doc. 18. Defendant contends 

that the decision denying benefits is free of legal error and supported by substantial 

evidence. Doc. 19. As explained more fully below, the Magistrate Judge concludes that 

the ALJ and the Appeals Council erred by failing to evaluate the opinions of a treating 

physician and the ALJ erred by discrediting the testimony of Plaintiff. Those errors 

require reversal of Defendant’s decision and, based on vocational expert testimony, a 

remand for an award of benefits. 

A. Treating Physician Ario Kiarash, M.D.

Dr. Ario Kiarash is a physician with Southwest Orthopaedic Surgery Specialists. 

Plaintiff visited Dr. Kiarash in September 2007 to obtain a second opinion concerning 

chronic pain and numbness following her foot surgery, which consisted of a partial 

excision of the calcaneus (heel bone), an Achilles tendon repair, and a gastrocnemius 

(calf muscle) recession. Tr. 290, 338. Dr. Kiarash ordered x-rays and provided Plaintiff 

with an adjustable heel lift and a CAM walker boot. Tr. 339. The x-rays showed postoperative changes at the recession site, and Plaintiff was “most tender to palpation” at 

that site and the Achilles tendon attachment site. Tr. 342. 

Two months later, an MRI of the right ankle and calf showed Achilles tendinosis 

with cystic degeneration and a proximal tear of the gastroc tendon. Tr. 343, 346-47. Dr. 

Kiarash found two “major problems” in Plaintiff’s ankle and calf: “incomplete gastroc 

recession” and “tendinosis of the Achilles tendon distally.” He recommended another 

surgery, opining that Plaintiff “is best treated by revision gastroc recession, and repair of 

chronic tear of Achilles tendon[.]” Tr. 343. 

Dr. Kiarash treated Plaintiff again in April 2009, noting that she has “chronic 

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severe pain in her calf to the heel that is constant and consistent” and a “difficult time 

with swelling to the point that she needs to keep her foot elevated a lot of the time.” 

Dr. Kiarash further noted that Plaintiff “cannot keep her leg in a dependent position 

because of swelling and she would have problems in sitting.” He ultimately opined that 

Plaintiff would have “great difficulty in doing any type of sustained activity because of 

the chronic severe pain and swelling in her leg.” Tr. 205. 

The medical records concerning Dr. Kiarash’s evaluation of Plaintiff in late 2007 

were part of the record before the ALJ. Tr. 338-49. In support of her request for review 

of the ALJ’s decision denying benefits (Tr. 6), Plaintiff provided the Appeals Council 

with the disability opinion Dr. Kiarash gave in May 2009 (Tr. 4, 205). The Court may 

“consider [that] opinion, which was rejected by the Appeals Council, to determine 

whether, in light of the record as a whole, the ALJ’s decision was supported by 

substantial evidence and free of legal error.” Taylor v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,

659 F.3d 1228, 1232 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Ramirez v. Shalala, 8 F.3d 1449, 1451-54 

(9th Cir. 1993)). 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ and the Appeals Council erred in failing to give due 

consideration to the opinions of Dr. Kiarash. Doc. 18 at 16-17. She is correct. 

The law is clear: the social security adjudicator “must consider all medical 

opinion evidence.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008). The 

regulations explicitly provide that, “[r]egardless of its source, we will evaluate every 

medical opinion we receive.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). Indeed, the “adjudicator is 

required to evaluate all evidence in the case record that may have a bearing on the 

determination or decision of disability, including opinions from medical sources about 

issues reserved to the Commissioner.” SSR 96-5p, 1996 WL 374183, at *3 (July 2, 

1996). 

The opinions of Dr. Kiarash clearly are material to the question whether Plaintiff 

is disabled. As Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Kiarash is “employed to cure and has a 

greater opportunity to know and observe [Plaintiff] as an individual.” McCallister v. 

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Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 602 (9th Cir. 1989). His opinions regarding the severity and 

limiting effects of Plaintiff’s impairments may be disregarded only for “specific, 

legitimate reasons” that are themselves based on “substantial evidence in the record.” 

Ramirez, 8 F.3d at 1453 (quotation marks and citations omitted). 

The Appeals Council gave no reason – “let alone a ‘specific, legitimate’ reason 

based on substantial evidence” – for disregarding the opinion of Dr. Kiarash. Id. 

Contrary to Defendant’s assertion (Doc. 19 at 14), the Appeals Council made no specific 

finding that Dr. Kiarash’s opinion does not provide a basis for changing the ALJ’s 

decision. The Appeals Council never mentions the opinion of Dr. Kiarash, but instead 

summarily denies the request for review in a form letter. Tr. 1-4. 

The ALJ notes that Dr. Kiarash recommended surgery to complete the gastroc 

recession and repair the Achilles tendon (Tr. 16), but does not further evaluate these two 

“major problems” or the effect they have on Plaintiff’s ability to work (Tr. 343). Instead, 

the ALJ adopts the RFC assessment of Dr. John Kurtin, which would permit Plaintiff to 

perform sedentary work. Tr. 16. Dr. Kurtin did not examine Plaintiff. He provided a 

“check-the-box” summary of Plaintiff’s functional capacity, as well as this brief finding: 

“Stand and/or walk 4 hours in a workday.” Tr. 318-25. 

The ALJ adopts that assessment on the ground that “[n]one of the other medical 

records submitted offer a contrary opinion to that of Dr. Kurtin as to [Plaintiff’s] 

limitations or ability to work.” The ALJ asserts that “[t]he only other mention of work 

related restrictions in the records are from the period of time that [Plaintiff] was 

recovering from surgery in early 2007.” Tr. 16. But Plaintiff never fully recovered from 

that surgery, and Dr. Kiarash therefore opined in late 2007 that Plaintiff should undergo 

further surgery to resolve the two “major problems” in her calf and ankle and otherwise 

relieve the “pain in the posterior calf as well as in the heel.” Tr. 343. The ALJ himself 

recognizes that Plaintiff “initially obtained some relief from the surgery, but a year post 

surgery was still experiencing the same symptoms.” Tr. 16. Nowhere in his decision, 

however, does the ALJ fairly evaluate the post-surgery opinion of Dr. Kiarash. 

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The ALJ notes (Tr. 16) that Plaintiff has expressed a desire to do desk work or 

answer the phone (Tr. 355). The desire to return work is to be lauded. It does not mean 

that the goal is attainable, nor does it negate the alleged disability. ALJs in general, and 

the one in this case (Tr. 45-56), rely on vocational expert testimony to determine whether 

the claimant has the RFC to perform past work or other work that exists in the national 

economy. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(g), 404.1560(c). Moreover, Plaintiff made clear 

that she has been “disabled by her right ankle,” that she has “never completely healed 

postoperatively,” and that the “last consultation with [her] orthopedic foot surgeon 

indicated that she needed to have a new surgery but she could not pay for it because it 

could potentially cost $13,000.” Tr. 355. Plaintiff’s mere desire to return to work 

provides no legitimate basis for disregarding the opinion of Dr. Kiarash. 

In short, the ALJ erred in disregarding the opinion of Dr. Kiarash without 

providing “specific, legitimate reasons” that are based on “substantial evidence in the 

record.” Ramirez, 8 F.3d at 1453. This Circuit has made clear that the assessment of a 

nonexamining physician, such as that of Dr. Kurtin, “cannot by itself constitute 

substantial evidence that justifies the rejection of the opinion of either an examining 

physician or a treating physician.” Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 831 (9th Cir. 1995) 

(emphasis in original); see also Ryan, 528 F.3d at 1202; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). 

Defendant proffers reasons to support the disregard of Dr. Kiarash’s opinion. 

Defendant first asserts that no other physician has opined that Plaintiff should elevate her 

leg (Doc. 19 at 14), but does not explain why this renders Dr. Kiarash’s opinion – which 

is based on his own independent clinical findings – unworthy of credence. Defendant 

further asserts that other evidence conflicts with Dr. Kiarash’s opinion that Plaintiff 

would have difficulty sitting. Doc. 19 at 14. But the Court is constrained to review the 

reasons the ALJ and the Appeals Council assert – not the post hoc contentions of 

Defendant. See Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2003). 

The fact that Dr. Kiarash treated Plaintiff “a total of three times in two years” 

(Doc. 19 at 14) does not preclude a finding that he is an acceptable treating source. See 

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20 C.F.R. § 404.1502 (defining treating source); Benton v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 1030, 

1035 (9th Cir. 2003) (Section 404.1502’s “language suggests that ‘a few times’ or contact 

as little as twice a year would suffice”). Moreover, even if Dr. Kiarash did not qualify as 

a treating source, his opinion still is deserving of due consideration. Opinions from any 

medical source, even on issues reserved to the Commissioner, “must never be ignored.” 

SSR 96-5p, 1996 WL 374183, at *3. 

In summary, the failure on the part of the ALJ and the Appeals Council to properly 

evaluate the opinions of Dr. Kiarash constitutes legal error. See Ramirez, 8 F.3d at 1454 

(finding that both the ALJ and the Appeals Council improperly disregarded the opinion 

of a treating physician); Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1037 & n.10 (9th Cir. 

2007) (the ALJ erred where he only briefly mentioned one treating physician’s opinion 

and ignored another opinion that the claimant was disabled); Robinson v. Barnhart, 

469 F. Supp. 2d 793, 797-98 (D. Ariz. 2006) (the ALJ’s decision was in error and not 

supported by substantial evidence where he ignored aspects of a doctor’s opinion). 

Given the clear requirement that every medical opinion be evaluated, see 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1527(d), the Magistrate Judge cannot “confidently conclude” that the silent 

disregard of Dr. Kiarash’s opinion is harmless. Stout v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 

F.3d 1050, 1056 (9th Cir. 2006). 

B. Plaintiff’s Testimony.

 A claimant’s subjective complaints, including pain, must be considered when 

making a disability determination. 20 C.R.F. § 404.1529. “Pain of sufficient severity 

caused by a medically diagnosed ‘anatomical, physiological, or psychological 

abnormality’ may provide the basis for determining that a claimant is disabled.” Light v. 

Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). “Once a claimant 

produces objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment, an ALJ may not reject 

a claimant’s subjective complaints based solely on lack of objective medical evidence to 

fully corroborate the alleged severity of pain.” Moisa v. Barnhart, 367 F.3d 882, 885 

(9th Cir. 2004); see Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1282 (9th Cir. 1996); 20 C.F.R. 

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' 404.1529(c)(2); SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *1 (July 2, 1996). 

 Plaintiff testified that she has pain in her right hip, leg, and foot. Tr. 33. She 

cannot stand on her right leg very long before needing to sit down. Tr. 35, 155-56. She 

must “elevate [her] leg a lot,” up to seven times a day to relieve swelling and pressure. 

When not elevated, her leg begins to hurt in about a half hour. She suffers pain, 

cramping, and a feeling like “electricity” throughout the leg. Tr. 35, 40. Because 

narcotic pain medication makes her nauseous, Plaintiff takes Ibuprofen. Tr. 33, 43. She 

lost her health insurance when she was unable to return to work at the grocery store and 

cannot afford the surgery recommended by Dr. Kiarash. Tr. 41. 

The ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s testimony using the two-step analysis established by 

the Ninth Circuit. See Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1281. Applying the test of Cotton v. Bowen, 

799 F.2d 1403 (9th Cir. 1986), he determined that Plaintiff’s medically determinable 

impairments reasonably could cause her alleged symptoms. Tr. 15. Given this 

conclusion, and because he found no evidence of malingering, the ALJ was required to 

present “specific, clear and convincing reasons” for finding Plaintiff’s testimony not 

credible. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1281. This standard is “the most demanding required in 

Social Security cases.” Moore v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 278 F.3d 920, 924 

(9th Cir. 2002). 

 Plaintiff argues that the reasons the ALJ provides for finding her symptom 

testimony not credible are neither convincing nor supported by substantial evidence. 

Doc. 18 at 20-25. The Magistrate Judge agrees with respect to the physical impairments. 

The ALJ first discusses certain medical evidence that is consistent with the 

impairments found to be severe. The ALJ states that Plaintiff began to have foot 

problems and ankle pain about one year before the alleged onset date, that she was 

diagnosed with right Achilles tendinopathy, Haglund’s deformity, and plantar fasciitis, 

that she underwent surgery in December 2006, and that another surgery is needed 

because she is “still experiencing the same symptoms.” Tr. 16. The ALJ does not 

explain, and it otherwise is not clear to the Magistrate Judge, how those findings 

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undermine Plaintiff’s symptom testimony. In short, the ALJ’s discussion of medical 

evidence does not constitute a clear and convincing reason for discrediting Plaintiff’s 

testimony concerning the effects of her physical impairments. 

The ALJ notes that “[n]one of the other medical records submitted offer a contrary 

opinion to that of Dr. Kurtin as to [Plaintiff’s] limitations[.]” Tr. 16. The ALJ 

erroneously “imposed a burden on [P]laintiff she did not have under the governing Ninth 

Circuit law.” Battle v. Astrue, No. CV 09-2162-DTB, 2010 WL 2569235, at *4 (C.D. 

Cal. June 21, 2010). Once a claimant has presented medical evidence of an underlying 

impairment, as Plaintiff has done in this case, “the ALJ may not discredit the claimant’s 

testimony regarding subjective pain and other symptoms merely because the symptoms, 

as opposed to the impairments, are unsupported by objective medical evidence.” Perez v. 

Astrue, No. CV 09-4600-MLG, 2010 WL 1051128, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2010); see 

Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 884 (9th Cir. 2006). The ALJ himself 

recognizes that the credibility determination was necessary because Plaintiff’s 

“statements about the intensity, persistence, or functionally limiting effects of pain or 

other symptoms are not substantiated by objective medical evidence[.]” Tr. 15; see SSR 

96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *2. 

 The ALJ cites Plaintiff’s “own description of her functional abilities” as a reason 

for finding her not credible. This Circuit has made clear that “general findings are an 

insufficient basis to support an adverse credibility determination.” Holohan v. 

Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1208 (9th Cir. 2001). The ALJ “must specifically identify the 

testimony [he] finds not to be credible and must explain what evidence undermines the 

testimony.” Id.; see Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 1993). 

 The ALJ has not met his burden. He does not identify the “functional abilities” 

that purportedly are inconsistent with Plaintiff’s symptom testimony. To the extent the 

ALJ rejected the testimony based on Plaintiff’s limited daily activities (Tr. 36-45, 

154-56), the ALJ fails to make the requisite “specific finding” that the activities 

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“are transferrable to the work setting” and form a “substantial part” of Plaintiff’s day. 

Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989) (emphasis in original). In short, the 

ALJ fails to state “specifically which symptom testimony is not credible and what facts in 

the record lead to that conclusion.” Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284 (emphasis added). 

 The ALJ erroneously found that Plaintiff’s pain is “controlled by appropriate 

medication without any significant adverse side effects.” Tr. 15. Plaintiff is able to 

take only over-the-counter medication because stronger narcotic pain pills make her 

“deathly sick.” Tr. 43, 154-56. 

 The Magistrate Judge recognizes that questions of credibility are the province of 

the Commissioner. See Valentine, 574 F.3d at 693. Absent evidence of malingering, 

however, “‘the Commissioner’s reasons for rejecting the claimant’s testimony must be 

clear and convincing.’” Id. (citation omitted). Considering the entire record as a whole 

and in the proper context, see Ryan, 528 F.3d at 1198, the Magistrate Judge concludes 

that the reasons the ALJ provided for finding Plaintiff not credible are neither convincing 

nor supported by substantial evidence. 

III. Remedy.

 The decision to remand for further development of the record or for an award 

benefits is within the discretion of the Court. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). This Circuit has held 

that evidence is to be credited as true, and the case remanded for an award of benefits, 

where (1) the ALJ has failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting the 

evidence, (2) no outstanding issue remains that must be resolved before a determination 

of disability can be made, and (3) it is clear from the record that the ALJ would be 

required to find the claimant disabled were the rejected evidence credited as true. See 

Varney v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 859 F.2d 1396, 1401 (9th Cir. 1988) 

(“Varney II”); Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1292. 

 After applying the credit-as-true rule to the improperly rejected symptom 

testimony, it is clear that Plaintiff is disabled. The impartial vocational expert testified 

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that if a person, such as Plaintiff, needed to elevate her leg multiple times a day, then she 

would not be able to maintain any job in the national economy. Tr. 604. Defendant does 

not disagree with this conclusion. Based on Plaintiff’s testimony and that of the 

vocational expert, Plaintiff clearly is disabled. 

Because the ALJ would be required to find Plaintiff disabled, see Benecke v. 

Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 593-95 (9th Cir. 2006), the Magistrate Judge concludes that the 

case should be remanded for an award of benefits. See Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 640 

(9th Cir. 2007) (remanding for an award of benefits where it was “‘clear from the record 

that the ALJ would be required to determine the claimant disabled’”) (citation omitted); 

D’Angelo v. Astrue, No. CV-06-3055-PHX-EHC, 2007 WL 4617186, at *9 (D. Ariz. 

Dec. 27, 2007) (exercising discretion to remand for an award of benefits where the ALJ 

erred at step four and the vocational expert testified that the claimant’s limitations would 

preclude all work). 

Defendant asserts that application of the credit-as-true rule violates the 

Appropriation Clause of the United States Constitution (Doc. 19 at 16), but cites no legal 

authority in support of this assertion. Contrary to Defendant’s assertion, a remand for an 

award of benefits in this case does not constitute a non-Congressional authorization of the 

payment of Treasury funds. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Congress has granted 

district courts the “power to reverse or modify an administrative decision without 

remanding the case for further proceedings.” Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th 

Cir. 2000). Stated differently, district courts have discretion under the Social Security 

Act to “remand a case for immediate payment of benefits in connection with a reversal of 

the Commissioner’s denial of benefits[.]” Id.; see Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 728 

(9th Cir. 1998). 

 Defendant further asserts that the credit-as-true rule is inconsistent with principles 

of administrative law. Doc. 19 at 17. But even if this were true, the Ninth Circuit held 

in Varney II that where it is clear from the administrative record that the ALJ would 

be required to award benefits if the claimant’s symptom testimony were credited, and 

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where there are no outstanding issues that must be resolved, the case should not be 

remanded “solely to allow the ALJ to make specific findings regarding that testimony.” 

859 F.2d at 1401; see also Harman, 211 F.3d at 1179 (noting that where the three-part 

“Smolen test” is met, “then remand for determination and payment of benefits is 

warranted regardless of whether the ALJ might have articulated a justification for 

rejecting [the doctor’s] opinion”) (emphasis in original). On many occasions since 

Varney II and Smolen, the Ninth Circuit has reaffirmed appropriate application of the 

credit-as-true rule. See Robinson v. Barnhart, 469 F. Supp. 2d 793, 802 (D. Ariz. 2006) 

(citing cases); Vasquez v. Astrue, 547 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2008). 

 The Magistrate concludes, on the present record, that Plaintiff’s testimony of 

disabling symptoms should be credited and the case remanded for an award of benefits. 

The ALJ acknowledges that his credibility determination was “based on a consideration 

of the entire case record.” Tr. 15. Plaintiff’s testimony is consistent with the opinion of 

Dr. Kiarash, her treating physician. Tr. 205. The vocational expert made clear, and 

Defendant does not dispute, that a disability finding would be required if Plaintiff’s 

testimony is credited. Tr. 604. Thus, “a remand for further proceedings would serve no 

useful purpose.” Reddick, 157 F.3d at 730. 

 Defendant cites Harman for the proposition that a remand for an award of benefits 

is not warranted because the disability opinion of Dr. Kiarash (Tr. 205) was not before 

the ALJ. Doc. 19 at 14. The decision to remand for an award of benefits is based not 

solely on the opinions of Dr. Kiarash, but also on the testimony of Plaintiff – which, of 

course, was before the ALJ (Tr. 24-57). Moreover, in Harman, unlike in this case, there 

was no testimony from the vocational expert that the improperly discredited evidence 

would render the claimant disabled. 211 F.3d at 1180. 

IV. Recommendation.

 The administrative decision denying benefits is neither free of legal error nor 

supported by substantial evidence. The Magistrate Judge recommends that the decision 

be reversed and the case remanded for an award of benefits. 

Case 4:10-cv-00032-FRZ Document 25 Filed 02/21/12 Page 12 of 13
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