Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01723/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01723-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES G. DURAN,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 11cv1723 WQH (DHB)

ORDER

vs.

NANCY L. HARDY, Warden,

Respondent.

HAYES, Judge:

The matter before the Court is the Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 23) of the

Honorable Magistrate Judge David H. Bartick.

BACKGROUND

In 1974, Petitioner James G. Duran pled guilty to two counts of first degree murder and

was sentenced to seven years to life in California state prison, with the possibility of parole

after seven years. (ECF No. 1 at 8).

On October 1, 2008, the California Board of Parole Hearings (“Board”) denied

Petitioner’s request for parole for the fifteenth time. (ECF No. 1 at 8; ECF No. 8-1).

On August 1, 2011, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254 (“Petition”), asserting that the Board’s determination violated: (1) his right

to due process of law, (2) his right to equal protection under the law, and (3) the Eighth

Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. (ECF No. 1).

On October 3, 2011, Respondent Nancy L. Hardy filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant

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to Rule 4 of 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF No. 8). Respondent contends that Petitioner’s due

process claim, which challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the Board’s

decision, is foreclosed by the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Swarthout v. Cooke,

__ U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 859 (Jan. 24, 2011). Respondent contends that Petitioner fails to state

a claim for violation of the equal protection clause or the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on

cruel and unusual punishment. On April 2, 2012, Petitioner filed an Opposition. (ECF No.

21). 

On June 13, 2012, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation

recommending that the Petition be dismissed without leave to amend. (ECF No. 23).

On August 15, 2012, Petitioner filed objections to the Report and Recommendation. 

(ECF No. 26). Petitioner objects to the Magistrate Judge’s findings on the grounds that “the

Report misconstrues the applicable Federal Law and does not properly apply the law of

disproportionality to Petitioner’s case.” Id. at 2.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The duties of the district court in connection with a magistrate judge’s report and

recommendation are set forth in Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1). The district court must “make a de novo determination of those portions of the

report ... to which objection is made,” and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part,

the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate.” 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1); see also

United States v. Remsing, 874 F.2d 614, 617 (9th Cir. 1989). When no objections are filed,

the district court need not review the Report and Recommendation de novo. See Wang v.

Masaitis, 416 F.3d 992, 1000 n.13 (9th Cir. 2005); U.S. v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121-22 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). A district court may “accept, reject, or modify, in whole

or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

72(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

DISCUSSION

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases provides for summary dismissal of

a habeas petition “[i]f it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed

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to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.” Rule 4, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Petitioner has not objected to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge to dismiss

Petitioner’s equal protection claim. This Court has reviewed the record and the Report and

Recommendation in their entirety. The Court finds that the Magistrate Judge correctly

concluded that “Petitioner cannot state a claim for violation of his rights under the Equal

Protection Clause that would entitle Petitioner to federal habeas corpus relief” (ECF No. 23

at 5).

I. Petitioner’s Due Process Claim

In his objections to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Petitioner cites

numerous California state court cases and contends:

As argued above and supported by the cases cited therein, Petitioner’s denial of

parole is not based on an individualized inquiry, as is required by statutory

provisions, but on the basis of a policy that violates due process and does not

take proportionality into account; this practice has resulted in Petitioner serving

a term of confinement disproportionate to his “base term” violating the 8th and

14th Amendments to the United States Constitution and is contrary to the

Report’s findings.

(ECF No. 26 at 10) (emphasis in original).

“The habeas statute ‘unambiguously provides that a federal court may issue a writ of

habeas corpus to a state prisoner only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.’” Swarthout v. Cooke, ___ U.S. ___, 131

S.Ct. 859, 861 (2011) (quoting Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. ___, ___, 131 S.Ct. 13, 15 (2010)

(per curiam); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)). The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly stated

that “federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.’” Lewis v. Jeffers, 497

U.S.764, 780 (1990); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991); Swarthout, 131 S.Ct at 861. 

There is a two step analysis for determining whether the Due Process Clause has been

violated: “[w]e first ask whether there exists a liberty or property interest of which a person

has been deprived, and if so we ask whether the procedures followed by the State were

constitutionally sufficient.” Swarthout, 131 S.Ct. at 861 (citing Kentucky Dept. Of Corrections

v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989)). California law “creates a liberty interest in parole.” 

Swarthout, 131 S.Ct. at 862. “When ... a State creates a liberty interest, the Due Process

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Clause requires fair procedures for its vindication – and federal courts will review the

application of those constitutionally required procedures.” Id. In the context of parole, “... the

procedures required are minimal” under the federal Constitution. Id. A prisoner receives

adequate due process at a parole hearing when he is “allowed an opportunity to be heard and

[is] provided a statement of the reasons why parole [is] denied. ... ‘The Constitution ... does

not require more.’” Id. (quoting Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 16).

In Swarthout, the United States Supreme Court reviewed two cases involving California

state prisoners who asserted that they were denied parole in violation of their right to due

process. Swarthout, 131 S.Ct. at 859. At the parole hearings, each prisoner was given an

opportunity to speak and contest the evidence, and was notified as to why his request for parole

was denied. Id. at 862. The Court stated: “[t]hat should have been the beginning and the end

of the federal habeas courts’ inquiry into whether [the petitioners] received due process.” Id.

(finding that the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had “misapplied California’s ‘some

evidence’ rule”).

In this case, the Magistrate Judge stated: “Petitioner does not allege that he was not

afforded constitutionally adequate process as defined in Swarthout, that is, that he was denied

a meaningful opportunity to be heard or a statement of reasons why the Board denied him

parole.” Id. at 4. The Magistrate Judge stated: “To the contrary, the Petition plainly

demonstrates that ... Petitioner was given the opportunity to be heard at his October 1, 2008

parole consideration hearing, and he received a statement of the reasons why parole was

denied.” Id. The Magistrate Judge concluded: “Petitioner cannot state a claim for violation

of his rights under the Due Process Clause because, as his Petition and the exhibits attached

thereto plainly demonstrate, he was provided the minimum procedures required (i.e., an

opportunity to be heard and a statement of reasons why the Board denied him parole).” Id. at

5. 

The Magistrate Judge correctly found that the reasoning in Swarthout applies to this

case. The Magistrate Judge correctly found that “Petitioner does not allege that ... he was

denied a meaningful opportunity to be heard or a statement of reasons why the Board denied

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him parole.” Id. at 4. The Court finds that the Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that

Petitioner cannot state a claim for deprivation of due process under the federal Constitution.

II. Petitioner’s Eighth Amendment Claim

“A life-term sentence for murder is not cruel and unusual punishment.” United States

v. Van Winrow, 951 F.2d 1069, 1071 (9th Cir. 1991). “Generally, so long as the sentence

imposed does not exceed the statutory maximum, it will not be overturned on eighth

amendment grounds.” United States v. McDougherty, 920 F.2d 569, 576 (9th Cir. 1990). 

In Juarez v. Salinas, 2:11-CV-1811 KJM JFM, 2011 WL 6754008 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 23,

2011), the petitioner, who was serving a sentence of twenty-five years to life following a

California state court conviction of first degree murder, challenged the Board’s decision to

deny him parole on Eighth Amendment grounds. The federal district court stated that: 

... [T]he Board’s decision, while lengthening his physical term of confinement,

does not change his original sentence. As petitioner is serving an indeterminate

sentence, it is possible that he may be paroled, but it is also possible that he shall

remain incarcerated for the entire life term. Petitioner has not stated facts that

would entitle him to Federal habeas relief under the Eighth Amendment’s

prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. ...

Juarez, 2011 WL 6754008, at *17. 

In this case, the Magistrate Judge stated: “There is no right under the Federal

Constitution to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence, and the

States are under no duty to offer parole to their prisoners.” (ECF No. 23 at 6) (quoting

Swarthout, 131 S. Ct. at 862). The Magistrate Judge stated: “Generally, so long as the

sentence imposed does not exceed the statutory maximum, it will not be overturned on eighth

amendment grounds.” Id. at 7 (quoting United States v. McDougherty, 920 F.2d 569, 576 (9th

Cir. 1990)). The Magistrate Judge stated: “[T]he United States Supreme Court has upheld the

constitutionality of indeterminate life sentences with the possibility of parole after a specified

period of time.” Id. (quoting Branch v. Swarthout, 3:11-CV-00857 AJB, 2012 WL 256515,

*5 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2012) (citing Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003)). The Magistrate

Judge concluded that “as in Juarez, [i]n view of the pertinent state statutory scheme, it does

not appear that [P]etitioner could allege a tenable cruel and unusual punishment claim”

because “Petitioner’s sentence did not exceed the statutory maximum.” Id.

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The Magistrate Judge correctly found that indeterminate life sentences with the

possibility of parole are generally not in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The Magistrate

Judge correctly found that the reasoning of Juarez applies to this case because Petitioner’s

sentence did not exceed the statutory maximum. The Court finds that in this case, the

Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that Petitioner cannot allege facts sufficient to support

a claim for cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

A certificate of appealability must be obtained by a petitioner in order to pursue an

appeal from a final order in a Section 2254 habeas corpus proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. §

2253(c)(1)(A); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b). Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules Governing

Section 2254 Cases, “[t]he district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when

it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” 

A certificate of appealability may issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial

showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). It must appear that

reasonable jurists could find the district court’s assessment of the petitioner’s constitutional

claims debatable or wrong. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484-85 (2000). The Court

concludes that jurists of reason could not find it debatable whether this Court was correct in

denying the Petition. The Court denies a certificate of appealability.

CONCLUSION

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 23) is

adopted in its entirety. The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is DISMISSED without leave

to amend. The certificate of appealability is DENIED. 

DATED: September 18, 2012

WILLIAM Q. HAYES

United States District Judge

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