Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-05748/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-05748-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

C.T.,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

 LOS ALTOS SCHOOL DISTRICT,

CALIFORNIA OFFICE OF HEARINGS ET AL,

Defendant. /

No. C06-05748 MJJ

ORDER RE PLAINTIFF’S EX PARTE

MOTION FOR A TRO

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Ex Parte Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order to

Enjoin Defendants from Proceeding with an Administrative Hearing on September 26, 2006 through

September 29, 2006 (Doc. #8). Defendant Los Altos Elementary School District has filed an Opposition

(Doc. #16). For the following reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion. 

I. Overview

Plaintiff is an eleven-year-old child with autism disorder who has been diagnosed with mental

retardation. (Mot. at 2.) Plaintiff resides within the education jurisdiction of the Los Altos School

District, and is eligible for special education services under the federal Individuals with Disabilities

Education Act (“IDEA”). (Id.) The facts pertinent to the instant Motion are summarized as follows.

In June 2005, Plaintiff filed for an administrative due process hearing under the IDEA with the

California Special Education Hearing Office. (Id.) Plaintiff alleged that he had been denied a free

appropriate public education (“FAPE”) under the IDEA because certain services that he received from

an agency known as “I Can Too!” were inadequate. (Id.) Specifically, Plaintiff asserted that I Can Too!

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used aversive behavior techniques and failed to implement Plaintiff’s Individualized Education Plan

with respect to social skills, training, functional communication, behavior management. (Id.) Plaintiff

alleged that the District, as the responsible education agency, failed to provide adequate oversight,

supervision, and monitoring of its contracts, I Can Too!. (Id.) According to Plaintiff, the administrative

hearing request alleged that the failure to provide a FAPE occurred during the extended school year

2002, the 2002-03 school year, the extended school year for 2003, the 2003-04 school year, and the

extended school year for 2004. (Id. at 2-3.) 

Before Plaintiff filed the administrative hearing request, Plaintiff and the District had been

involved in another IDEA administrative due process case concerning whether the District had failed

to provide Plaintiff a FAPE in prior years. (Id. at 3.) On August 8, 2003, the parties executed a

settlement agreement in that matter containing a release, which provided:

Parties agree to waive any and all special education, including financial,

issues and claims to date with the exception of the IEP process for the

2003-2004 school year, concerning District’s provision of free

appropriate public education pursuant to Individuals with Disabilities

Education Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and any

claims for damages for failure of free appropriate public education under

the IDEA. 

(Id.) 

With respect to Plaintiff’s claims in the June 2005 due process hearing regarding I Can Too!,

the California Office of Administrative Hearings (“OAH”) set the matter for hearing on September 26

through 29, 2006. (Id.) On August 31, 2006, the District filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claims

relating to the extended school year 2002 through the 2002-03 school year and the extended school year

2003 through August 8, 2003. (Id.) According to Plaintiff, Defendant argued that, pursuant to the

release in the August 8, 2003 settlement agreement, Plaintiff had waived all known and unknown claims

prior to August 8, 2003. Plaintiff opposed the Motion to Dismiss, arguing that because the settlement

agreement did not waive unknown claims and did not contain a waiver of unknown claims under

California Civil Code § 1542, the release did not preclude Plaintiff from asserting claims based on

services he received “dating from summer of 2002 through the summer of 2003 through August 8,

2003.” (Id. at 4.) Particularly, Plaintiff’s parent filed a declaration stating that “the family was unaware

of the special education claims in the implementation of the ‘I Can Too!’ program until after August 8,

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2003 and when they were already well into the 2003-2004 school year.” (Id.) 

On September 15, 2006, the OAH issued an order granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.

Specifically, the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) found that “the specific language in the Agreement

constitutes a waiver of all Petitioner’s special education claims against the District that occurred on or

before August 8, 2003 in exchange [sic] the terms set forth in the Agreement.” (Varma Decl., ex. 5.)

On September 19, 2006, Plaintiff filed this instant lawsuit appealing the ALJ’s ruling on

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. Concurrently, filed the instant Motion for a TRO seeking to enjoin the

administrative hearing before the OAH until this case is resolved. On September 22, 2006, Plaintiff’s

lawsuit and Motion were assigned to this Court. 

II. Legal Standard

To prevail on a motion for a temporary restraining order, Plaintiff must show: (1) a strong

likelihood of success on the merits, (2) the possibility of irreparable injury to Plaintiff if preliminary

relief is not granted, (3) a balance of hardships favoring Plaintiff, and (4) advancement of the public

interest (in certain cases). See Rodde v. Bonta, 357 F.3d 988, 994 (9th Cir. 2004). Alternatively, the Court

may grant injunctive relief if the plaintiff merely “demonstrate[s] . . . a combination of probable success

on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury.” Id.

III. Discussion

As detailed above, Plaintiff seeks to enjoin the OAH and the District from proceeding with an

administrative hearing on the remaining claims in Plaintiff’s pending due process complaint until

Plaintiff obtains a ruling on the appeal from the ALJ’s ruling presented in this case. As Plaintiff

explains: 

As it stands now [P]laintiff would have to move forward with a partial

claim against the District on September 26, 2006. The remaining claims

are foundationally based in the time period and the claims that were

dismissed pursuant to the September 15, 2006 order. Without these

foundational claims, [P]laintiff’s case would be seriously jeopardized.

If [P]laintiff were to wait to appeal the dismissal until after the September

26, 2006 hearing and he [was] successful, the parties would then have to

go back to OAH to have another administrative hearing on the claims that

were dismissed. Therefore, [P]laintiff moves for the instant Temporary

Restraining Order to enjoin the hearing set for September 26, 2006 from

proceeding until this [C]ourt has had an opportunity to consider this

appeal. 

(Mot. at 4-5.) Thus, according to Plaintiff, allowing the underlying administrative hearing to proceed

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without affording him an appeal to this Court of the dismissal would result in irreparable harm and

subject the parties to multiple lawsuits. 

The District opposes Plaintiff’s Motion. First, the District contends that Plaintiff’s Complaint

seeks to appeal an interlocutory order relating to certain issues in a pending due process hearing. The

District asserts that 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A), which Plaintiff cites as conferring jurisdiction in this

matter, does not confer jurisdiction in such a situation. Rather, the District contends that Plaintiff must

await until the due process hearing concludes and all issues are resolved before he can avail himself of

the statutory appeal process. Alternatively, the District contends that, even assuming jurisdiction exists,

Plaintiff has failed to establish the elements necessary to secure a TRO. 

The Court has considered the parties’ competing arguments, and agrees with the District that

Plaintiff has failed to adequately demonstrate the requisite elements for a TRO. 

The Court first looks at Plaintiff’s probability of success on the merits. Plaintiff argues that the

ALJ incorrectly determined that the release in the settlement agreement was a special release, rather than

a general release. Particularly, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ misapplied Larsen v. Johannes, 7 Cal. App.

3d 491, 504-505 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970), and attempts to distinguish the release at issue in that case from

the release in the settlement agreement at issue here. The District, however, maintains that the ALJ

correctly found that the provision in the settlement agreement is a special release. Even presuming that

Plaintiff can show a likelihood of succeeding on his claim, Plaintiff cannot demonstrate the other

requisite elements to justify issuance of a TRO. 

To succeed on his Motion, Plaintiff must demonstrate that he will suffer irreparable harm in the

absence of injunctive relief. Reviewing Plaintiff’s Motion, he has failed to make this showing. Plaintiff

contends that without the TRO, he will be required to prosecute his remaining claims in the due process

hearing set for September 26 through 29, and should this Court reverse the ALJ’s ruling on Defendant’s

Motion to Dismiss, would then have to return to the OAH to litigate the previously-dismissed claims.

While this hypothetical scenario would extend resolution of Plaintiff’s FAPE challenges, Plaintiff has

failed to articulate what irreparable harm he would suffer as a result. Notably, the claims that the ALJ

dismissed concern educational programs in place prior to August 2003; the claims do not concern

present or prospective education plans that will affect Plaintiff in the immediate future or jeopardize his

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immediate education. Accordingly, the Court finds no evidence of impeding irreparable injury should

the Court deny Plaintiff’s Motion. 

Examining the balance of hardships, as Defendant correctly notes, even accepting Plaintiff’s

argument that allowing the hearing to proceed as scheduled creates the possibility of bifurcated litigation

of Plaintiff’s claims, this potential scenario affects both parties equally. 

With respect to the public interest component, Plaintiff argues that adjudicating all related claims

together in one lawsuit rather than in piecemeal fashion promotes judicial economy, preserves resources,

and prevents multiple lawsuits and inconsistent decisions. Thus, Plaintiff asserts that public policy

favors granting the TRO. The Court is unpersuaded by Plaintiff’s argument. Although Plaintiff claims

that enjoining the pending due process proceeding to allow him an opportunity to appeal the ALJ’s

ruling promotes judicial economy, Plaintiff overlooks the fact that enjoining the proceeding also delays

resolution of the remaining claims and allows a plaintiff to forestall the hearing process to take up

appeals of isolated, potentially peripheral rulings adverse to the plaintiff. Furthermore, as Defendant

points out, it is questionable whether 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A) of the IDEA contemplates appeals from

interlocutory orders, such as the one Plaintiff is bringing in this case. Accordingly, the Court finds that

the public interest favors allowing the hearing process to proceed and the ALJ to resolve the remaining

claims, rather than staying the action to allow Plaintiff to appeal certain issues that have previously been

determined. 

Taking the foregoing factors into consideration, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to

adequately show that he is entitled to a TRO in this case. Even assuming Plaintiff has presented a

colorable argument in his appeal from the ALJ’s ruling on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, he has failed

to demonstrate that he faces a risk of irreparable harm if the Court declines to enjoin the pending

administrative hearing. Further, the balance of hardships does not tip in Plaintiff’s favor, and the public

interest militates in favor of allowing the ALJ to resolve all of the claims presented by Plaintiff’s

complaint, rather than allow sporadic appeals of preliminary rulings in the administrative process.

Consequently, the Court holds that Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that a TRO

is appropriate in this case. 

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IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining

Order (Doc. #8). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 9/25/2006 MARTIN J. JENKINS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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