Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_12-cv-00125/USCOURTS-almd-2_12-cv-00125-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

JOEY RAY SMITH, AIS # 170129, )

 )

Plaintiff, )

 )

v. ) CASE NO. 2:12-CV-125-WKW

 ) [WO]

KIM T. THOMAS, et al., )

 )

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the court are Defendants John R. Cooper, John Adams, Eddie Gregory,

and Johnny Purifoy’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 15) and Defendants Kim T. Thomas,

Richard Allen, and Pete Allen’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 21), which is supported

by a brief (Doc. # 22).1

 Plaintiff Joey Ray Smith filed responses in opposition to both

motions (Docs. # 23 & 26). ADOT Defendants replied to Plaintiff’s response (Doc.

# 25). The court will also consider Plaintiff’s Motions for Leave to Amend (Doc.

# 23, at 8; Doc. # 26, at 10). After careful consideration of the arguments of counsel

and the relevant law, the court finds that Defendants’ motions are due to be granted

and Plaintiff’s motions are due to be granted.

1

 Defendants John R. Cooper, John Adams, Eddie Gregory, and Johnny Purifoy are

current or former employees of the Alabama Department of Transportation and will be referred

to as “ADOT Defendants” throughout this opinion. Defendants Kim T. Thomas, Richard Allen,

and Pete Allen are current or former employees of the Alabama Department of Corrections and

will be referred to as “ADOC Defendants” throughout this opinion.

Case 2:12-cv-00125-WKW-WC Document 27 Filed 07/26/12 Page 1 of 12
I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

Subject matter jurisdiction is exercised pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1343, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–02. Personal jurisdiction and venue

are not contested, and there are adequate allegations in support of both.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of the complaint against

the legal standard set forth in Rule 8: “a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). When

evaluating a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court must take “the

factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff.” Pielage v. McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir.

2008). However, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations

contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129

S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal,

129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 

“Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a

context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial

2

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experience and common sense.” Id. at 1950 (citation omitted). “[F]acial plausibility”

exists “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The standard also “calls for enough fact to raise

a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” of the claim. Twombly,

550 U.S. at 556. While the complaint need not set out “detailed factual allegations,”

it must provide sufficient factual amplification “to raise a right to relief above the

speculative level.” Id. at 555; see also James River Ins. Co. v. Ground Down Eng’g,

Inc., 540 F.3d 1270, 1274 (11th Cir. 2008) (Twombly formally retired “the

often-criticized ‘no set of facts’ language previously used to describe the motion to

dismiss standard.”).

III. BACKGROUND

Accepting as true the factual allegations in the complaint, the court finds the

following facts:

Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at the Decatur Community Based Facility (an

extension of the Alabama Department of Corrections (“ADOC”)) in Decatur,

Alabama. Plaintiff is enrolled in a work-release program, through which he is hired

by the Alabama Department of Transportation (“ADOT”). Plaintiff was incarcerated

at Camden Community Based Facility in Camden, Alabama, during the time of the

3

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incidents. On or about February 10, 2010, Plaintiff injured himself with a chainsaw

while working for ADOT’s Greenville facility, cutting his leg as he fell from a rocky

slope under a bridge. Plaintiff did not receive any training in the use of a chainsaw

nor was he provided with any safety equipment. Plaintiff maintains that “as an inmate

on minimum out custody, [he] does not have the option of refusing assignments and

was forced to do whatever he was told to do. If [Plaintiff] refused to do a work

assignment, he would have received a disciplinary citation.” (Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 38.) 

Plaintiff has repeatedly been forced to use a chainsaw without any safety equipment

since the accident and still has not received any training in the use of the chainsaw. 

On or about April 14, 2010, Plaintiff was again on work release to ADOT.

Plaintiff was forced to stand in the middle of the inside lane on Interstate 65 with a

hand flag to direct traffic while his supervisor did road work ahead of him. No signs

were put up to alert oncoming traffic that there was road work ahead. Plaintiff voiced

his safety concerns about the situation, but they were dismissed by his supervisor who

later issued two disciplinary citations to Plaintiff for insubordination. Plaintiff was

acquitted on both citations at a hearing, but was not allowed to go back to work at the

Greenville ADOT facility due to a “conflict of interest.” (Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 49.)

On February 9, 2012, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants. Plaintiff brought

claims alleging that his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated

4

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(Counts 1 and 2),2

 a claim titled Neglect to Prevent Conspiracy under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1985(3) and 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (Count 3), a claim titled Intentional Infliction of

Emotional Distress with Invidiously Discriminatory Animus under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1985(3) (Count 4), and a claim of wantonness under state law (Count 5). Plaintiff

is seeking compensatory and punitive damages, a declaratory judgment, and an

injunction so that he will no longer have to endure unsafe working conditions.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Individual Capacity Claims Against ADOT and ADOC Defendants

ADOT Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not made any claims against ADOT

Defendants in their individual capacities, an argument that ADOC Defendants echo. 

(Doc. # 15 ¶ 4; Doc. # 21 ¶ 1.) ADOT Defendants point out that “[a] review of all the

counts in [Plaintiff’s] complaint reflects that the counts are brought against

[Defendants] in their official capacities only.” (Doc. # 15 ¶ 3.) Plaintiff responds that

the caption plainly states that all Defendants are being sued in their official and

individual capacities. (Doc. # 23, at 4; Doc. # 26, at 4.) ADOT Defendants reply that

“[Plaintiff] failed to put this Court or [ADOT Defendants] on notice as to what the

individual claims against them are. Instead, [Plaintiff] referenced . . . the caption of

2

 Counts 1 and 2 appear to be attempts to plead claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

5

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the Complaint but described the actions as official capacity claims in the numbered

paragraphs.” (Doc. # 25 ¶ 4.) 

Plaintiff cannot rely on the caption to establish a claim of individual capacity. 

A similar situation arose in Marsh v. Butler County, Alabama, 268 F.3d 1014 (11th

Cir. 2001). The plaintiffs in that case, prisoners at Butler County jail, filed a

complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Sheriff Diane Harris and Butler County,

Alabama, to recover for injuries sustained when they were beaten by other prisoners. 

Id. at 1023. The caption and complaint created an ambiguity as to the capacity in

which Sheriff Harris was being sued, an ambiguity that the Eleventh Circuit addressed

on appeal:

In this case, that part of the complaint which purports to state the

claim against Harris does specifically address the capacity in which the

Sheriff is sued. It says these words about capacity: “Defendant Diane

Harris is sued in her official capacity as Sheriff of Butler County.” Thus,

the complaint’s “statement of a claim” does not purport to make a claim

against the Sheriff in her individual capacity.

The caption to the complaint contains these words: “Diane Harris,

Sheriff of Butler County, in her individual and official capacity.” But

the caption of the complaint is not part of the statement of the claim

under Rule 8. The caption is something apart, being mandated by a

different rule: Fed.R.Civ.P. 10. The caption is chiefly for the court’s

administrative convenience. It may, however, sometimes be useful to

look at the caption – when the Rule 8 statement of a claim is ambiguous

about a party’s capacity – to settle pleading ambiguities. See Hobbs v.

E.E. Roberts, 999 F.2d 1526, 1529–30 (11th Cir. 1993) (using several

factors, including caption, to resolve ambiguity of whether official sued

in official or individual capacity). To use the Rule 10 caption to create

6

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an ambiguity when the statement of the claim is itself not ambiguous is

incorrect.3

Id. at 1024 n.4. At this early stage of the proceedings, there are neither sufficient

allegations in the complaint nor a course of proceedings to establish that Defendants

are sued in their individual capacities. 

There are, however, indications that Plaintiff may have intended to sue

Defendants in their individual capacities, such as the use of the phrase “under color

of state law” throughout the complaint and the fact that Defendants were sued for

monetary damages. In Jackson v. Georgia Department of Transportation, 16 F.3d

1573 (11th Cir. 1994), the Eleventh Circuit urged district courts to require plaintiffs

to “identify the capacity in which they sued” the defendants “to ensure a more

effective use of judicial resources.” Id. at 1576. In accordance with Jackson, Plaintiff

3

 In Marsh, the Eleventh Circuit decided the case as if the claims were brought against

Sheriff Harris in both her individual and official capacities because the course of proceedings

indicated that Sheriff Harris was being sued in both capacities. Sheriff Harris advanced the

qualified immunity defense, which only applies to individual capacity claims, and Sheriff Harris

did not challenge the capacities in which she was sued. Marsh, 268 F.3d at 1014 n.4; see

Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.14 (1985) (“In many cases, the complaint will not

clearly specify whether officials are sued personally, in their official capacity, or both. The

course of proceedings in such cases typically will indicate the nature of the liability sought to be

imposed.” (internal citations omitted)). In this case, Plaintiff devotes much of his responses to

arguing that Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity. In their reply, ADOT Defendants

note that they “did not raise qualified immunity as a defense as they were sued in their official

capacities only. If the [ADOT Defendants] respond to the qualified immunity argument, they

will in effect have impliedly consented to the claims, as if they had been raised in the pleading.” 

(Doc. # 25 ¶ 6 (internal citations omitted).) Unlike in Marsh, Defendants have challenged the

sufficiency of the complaint to establish claims against them in their individual capacities.

7

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is advised that he has not made it clear in the complaint whether he intended to sue

Defendants in their individual capacities. Plaintiff will be given leave to amend his

complaint. Plaintiff should bear in mind that the caption alone is not enough to

establish an individual capacity claim. See Marsh, 268 F.3d at 1024 n.4; see also

Hobbs v. E. E. Roberts, 999 F. 2d 1526, 1529–30 (11th Cir. 1993) (“We note that the

caption of pleadings, or even of judgments, shows, by itself, little about the capacity

in which defendants are sued in a case.” (citing Lundgren v. McDaniel, 814 F.2d 600,

604 n.2 (11th Cir. 1987))).

B. Official Capacity Claims for Monetary Damages Against ADOT and 

ADOC Defendants

Plaintiff asserts federal and state law claims against Defendants in their official

capacities. “Under the Eleventh Amendment, state officials sued for damages in their

official capacity are immune from suit in federal court.” Jackson, 16 F.3d at 1575; see

also Kentucky, 473 U.S. at 166 (stating that “an official-capacity suit is, in all respects

other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity”). ADOT and ADOC

employees are state officials and are entitled to immunity under the Eleventh

Amendment in their official capacities on federal and state law claims.4

 Accordingly,

4

 Additionally, Defendants, in their official capacities, are not “persons” for purposes of

§ 1983 monetary relief. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70–71 (1989). 

8

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all claims for monetary damages against ADOT and ADOC Defendants in their

official capacities are due to be dismissed with prejudice.5

C. Official Capacity Claims for Injunctive Relief Against ADOT and ADOC 

Defendants

1. ADOT Defendants

ADOT Defendants assert that Plaintiff has not properly pleaded any claims

seeking injunctive relief, adding that “the state actors can only be sued under § 1983

for monetary damages, and [that] the claims for injunctive and declaratory relief have

not been pled through § 1983.” (Doc. # 15 ¶ 5.) ADOT Defendants, however, fail to

cite any specific allegation in the complaint or any legal authority to support their

argument. First, ADOT Defendants are incorrect that state actors can only be sued

under § 1983 for monetary damages. The Supreme Court has held for over a century

that state actors can be sued in their official capacities for injunctive relief. See Ex

parte Young, 28 U.S. 123 (1908). Second, Counts 1 and 2 of Plaintiff’s complaint

appear to be attempts to plead claims pursuant to § 1983, and both include a prayer

for injunctive relief. (Pl.’s Compl. ¶¶ 85 & 96.) 

5

 This dismissal is pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

See Seaborn v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 143 F.3d 1405, 1407 (11th Cir. 1998) (“An assertion of

Eleventh Amendment immunity essentially challenges a court’s subject matter jurisdiction . . .

.”).

9

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In his amended complaint, Plaintiff should bring any claims for violations of

his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments pursuant to § 1983. ADOT

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss will be granted without prejudice as to Plaintiff’s

official capacity claims for injunctive relief, as Plaintiff will be given leave to amend

his complaint.

2. ADOC Defendants

ADOC Defendants argue that Plaintiff lacks standing to seek injunctive relief. 

ADOC Defendants explain that Plaintiff has not worked for the Greenville District

Department of Transportation or any other ADOT employer since 2010 and that he

is unlikely to do so in the future.6

 (Doc. # 21 ¶ 3.) In his response, Plaintiff simply

asserts that he is an inmate with ADOC, which has never been in dispute, and that he

is asking this court “to order ADOC to stand by and enforce ADOC’s regulations

pertaining to the failure of any employers to provide a safe work environment to

inmates in the work release program.” (Doc. # 26, at 8).

Plaintiff’s complaint contains contradictory allegations as to Plaintiff’s present

affiliations with ADOT. Plaintiff admits he no longer works at the Greenville ADOT

facility, but it is unclear whether he has been hired by another ADOT facility. (Pl.’s

6

 In Plaintiff’s prayer for relief, he requests that the court “[e]nter a permanent injunction

against the Defendants that they cannot continue to disregard the safety rules and regulations in

regards to the Plaintiff’s work release assignments.” (Pl.’s Compl., at 19.)

10

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Compl. ¶ 49.) If, however, Plaintiff is no longer working for ADOT, the claims for

injunctive relief against ADOT Defendants would likely be dismissed for lack of

standing. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105–106 (1983). 

Furthermore, the complaint does not indicate that any ADOC official had knowledge

that any work-release employers were not providing safe work environments, and the

complaint does not specifically request the court to order ADOC to enforce its

regulations pertaining to the failure of any employers to provide a safe work

environment to inmates in the work release program. Plaintiff will be given leave to

amend his complaint to specify Plaintiff’s current employment status and to clarify his

allegations seeking injunctive relief against ADOC.

V. CONCLUSION

It is ORDERED that Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (Docs. # 15 & 21) are

GRANTED, and that

(1) Plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages against Defendants in their

individual capacities are DISMISSED without prejudice; 

(2) Plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages against Defendants in their

official capacities are DISMISSED with prejudice; and

(3) Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief against Defendants in their official

capacities are DISMISSED without prejudice.

11

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It is further ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motions to Amend (Doc. # 23 at 8; Doc.

# 26 at 10) are GRANTED, subject to the limitations of this opinion, summarized as

follows:

Plaintiff may allege claims against Defendants in their individual capacities if

there is a sufficient basis in fact and law to do so. Plaintiff should bring his

constitutional violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff should also specify

his current employment status in the allegations of his amended complaint and make

separate allegations in seeking injunctive relief against ADOT and ADOC. 

Plaintiff is ORDERED to file his Amended Complaint on or before

August 10, 2012. Failure of Plaintiff to file an amended complaint by this deadline

will result in dismissal of this action.

DONE this 26th day of July, 2012.

 /s/ W. Keith Watkins 

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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