Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02577/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02577-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

TO THE HONORABLE JAMES A. TEILBORG, SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

Movant Stephen Ross Raboy, who is confined in the Federal Correctional 

Institution in Terre Haute, Indiana, has filed a pro se Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or 

Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (CVDoc. 

7, CRDoc. 216).1

 

BACKGROUND 

 Following the robbery of several Phoenix area banking institutions between 

February and April of 2009, a federal grand jury indicted Movant of three felony counts 

on June 9, 2009. (CRDoc. 12.) A superseding indictment was returned against Movant 

and two co-defendants on August 4, 2009, charging Movant with a total of nine felony 

counts: one count of bank robbery (Count 1), three counts of conspiracy to comment 

 1

 Documents filed in CV-12-02577-PHX-JAT (SPL) will be referred to as 

“CVDoc.” while documents filed in the related criminal action, CR-09-00678-1-PHXJAT, will be referred to as “CRDoc.” 

United States of America, 

 

Respondent/Plaintiff, 

vs. 

Stephen Ross Raboy, 

 Movant/Defendant. 

 

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No. CV-12-02577-PHX-JAT (SPL)

(No. CR-09-00678-1-PHX-JAT) 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

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bank robbery (Counts 2, 4, and 10), three counts of armed bank robbery (Counts 3, 5, and 

11), one count of use of a firearm during a crime of violence (Count 12), and one count of 

felon in possession of a firearm (Count 16). (CRDoc. 30.) On July 30, 2010, Counts 2, 4, 

and 10 were dismissed. (CRDoc. 116.) 

 Jury trial commenced on September 14, 2010. (CRDoc. 148.) Following a 4-day 

trial, on September 17, 2010, the jury found Movant guilty of three counts of armed bank 

robbery, and aid and abet (Counts 3, 5, and 11), in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a), 

2113(d), and 2, and one count of use of a firearm during a crime of violence, and aid and 

abet (Count 12), in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) and 2. (CRDoc. 159.) The 

charges for bank robbery (Count 1) and felon in possession of a firearm (Count 16) were 

ultimately dismissed on motion of the government. (CRDoc. 153, 178, 179.) On 

December 2, 2010, the Court sentenced Movant to concurrent terms of life imprisonment 

for each count of armed bank robbery, and a consecutive 84-month term of imprisonment 

for use of a firearm. (CRDoc. 178, 179.) The Court further imposed a concurrent 5-year 

term of supervised release on each count. (Id.) 

 On December 3, 2010, Movant filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (CRDoc. 180.) 

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Movant’s convictions and sentences on 

October 25, 2011, and entered its formal mandate on December 1, 2011. (CRDoc. 212); 

United States v. Raboy, 454 Fed.Appx. 649, 2011 WL 5056460 (9th Cir. 2011). 

 On December 3, 2012, Movant timely filed the instant Motion to Vacate, Set 

Aside or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 

(CVDoc. 7, CRDoc. 216), to which Respondent filed a Response (CVDoc. 13). No reply 

was filed. 

DISCUSSION 

 In his Motion, Movant raises two grounds for relief. In Ground One, Movant 

alleges that he received ineffective assistance when trial counsel failed to investigate alibi 

witnesses. In Ground Two, Movant alleges that he received ineffective assistance when 

trial counsel failed to object to identification evidence. 

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I. Legal Standard 

Under § 2255, a person in custody may “move the court which imposed the 

sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence” on the grounds that “the sentence 

was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court 

was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of 

the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack.” 28 U.S.C. § 

2255(a). 

Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are “‘generally inappropriate on direct 

appeal’ and should be raised instead in habeas corpus proceedings.” United States v. 

Steele, 733 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Ross, 206 F.3d 896, 900 

(9th Cir. 2000). The Court reviews claims of ineffective assistance of counsel under the 

two-part test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Under 

Strickland, Movant must show: (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient, and (2) that 

counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense. 466 U.S. at 687. 

 To establish that counsel’s performance was deficient, Movant must show that 

“counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 688. 

There is a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of 

reasonable assistance. Id. Movant “must overcome the presumption that, under the 

circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’” Id.

(citing Michael v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)). “A fair assessment of attorney 

performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of 

hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to 

evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

689. 

 To establish prejudice from counsel’s errors, Movant must demonstrate that “there 

is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. A “reasonable probability” is “a 

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. The court need not 

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determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining whether 

prejudice resulted from the alleged deficiencies. See Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 286 

fnt.14 (2000). “If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack 

of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.” 

Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697). 

II. Analysis 

 A. Ground One 

 In Ground One, Movant argues that defense counsel was inadequate because he 

failed to investigate and present an alibi defense. Defense counsel has a “duty to make 

reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular 

investigations unnecessary.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. This includes a duty to 

investigate a defendant’s “most important defense.” Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 

1457 (9th Cir. 1994). While “counsel must investigate relevant defenses... counsel must 

reasonably select and present a defense.” Mickey v. Ayers, 606 F.3d 1223, 1236 (9th Cir. 

2010). This Court’s inquiry is not on what “defense counsel could have presented, [but] 

whether counsel’s actions were reasonable.” Turner v. Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 877 (9th 

Cir. 2002). See also Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 127 (2009); Hart v. Gomez, 

174 F.3d 1067, 1070 (9th Cir. 1999). 

 Here, Movant claims that defense counsel “did not make any attempt to 

investigate and interview the alibi witnesses, whose names Mr. Raboy had provided to 

him... Mr. Raboy’s alibi claim involves witness testimony that the trial jury did not have 

before it. The testimony proffered would have shown that [Movant] was someplace other 

than the scene of the crimes at the time of the crimes.” (CVDoc. 7 at 19) (emphasis in 

original). This claim consists of nothing more than a vague assertion that is unsupported 

by the record. Movant does not develop any facts to support his claim, nor does he point 

to any portion of the record which corroborates his allegation. Movant has not identified 

the alleged alibi witness, his location at the time of the crime, or when and how he 

informed counsel of the purported alibi. Thus, without more, Movant has not negated the 

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strong presumption that counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable 

assistance. Mere conclusory allegations are insufficient to prove that counsel was 

ineffective. Shah v. United States, 878 F.2d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 1989). Movant bears the 

burden to show that counsel’s conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness 

and, but for his counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 

Here, Movant has done neither. 

 Accordingly, because Movant does not assert a viable claim and fails to satisfy the 

Strickland standard, the Court will recommend that Ground One be denied. 

B. Ground Two 

 Next, in Ground Two, Movant argues that trial counsel provided ineffective 

assistance because he failed to challenge the government’s identification evidence and 

object to the testimony of witnesses who identified him at trial. As Respondent 

demonstrates in its response, however, the record shows no support for this claim. 

 Here, nothing suggests that trial counsel’s performance was objectively 

unreasonable. Prior to trial, defense counsel did, in fact, move to suppress both the outof-court photographic line-up in which Movant was identified and any in-court 

identification of him at trial. (CRDoc. 103.) Counsel argued that the photographic line-up 

shown to the witnesses was “unduly suggestive,” and therefore all identifications or 

testimony pertaining to identifications must be suppressed. (Id.; CRDoc. 111 at 2.) On 

September 2, 2010, the District Court denied counsel’s motion, reasoning: 

As stated in Nash, this Court must consider the totality of the surrounding circumstances in determining whether the out-of- court identification was so impermissibly suggestive that it tainted any subsequent identification testimony (concerning either the photo lineup or the in-court identification by the witness). Nash, 946 at 681.4 In this case, all of the men have 

similar skin color, similar hair color, similar facial hair, and 

are approximately the same age. Further, while Defendant 

Raboy appears to have long hair pulled back into a ponytail, a viewer cannot be certain that other men do not have long hair. Given how similar the pictures are, and to the extent the hair 

length can be seen as a difference, the Court finds that the 

photospread is not impermissibly suggestive. Thus, neither the out-of-court identification nor the in-court identification 

will be suppressed. 

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(CRDoc. 140 at 2.)2 

 Although four different witnesses identified Movant at trial (see CRDoc. 201 at 

25, 106, 196; CRDoc. 202 at 24), Movant only specifically challenges “his trial counsel’s 

failure to object to, and attempt to preclude, the identification by Melissa Gordon.” (Doc. 

7 at 23.) Yet, while Gordon identified Movant in a photographic lineup, she did not make 

an in-court identification of him at trial. (CRDoc. 201 at 157-158; CVDoc. 7 at 14.) 

Q. I want you to take a look around the courtroom, Miss 

Gordon, just take a moment and look around and see if you see the person who was at the teller counter that day. If you 

need to stand up you can to see around the room. 

A. I don't think so. 

Q. Okay. 

A. No. 

(CRDoc. 201 at 128.) Further, as recited by Movant, on cross-examination by defense 

counsel, Gordon “admitted that the description she originally gave law enforcement was 

not the same as what she was shown on the security video, since there was no black hat 

and the robber’s shirt was not as dark as she had described.” (Doc. 7 at 14.) 

Consequently, defense counsel’s performance cannot be said to be objectively 

unreasonable, because there was no in-count identification made by Gordon to which 

counsel could have objected to, and he otherwise challenged the credibility of her out-ofcourt identification. 

 Further, Movant fails to show that he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s alleged 

failure to present a defense. For the same reasons cited by the Ninth Circuit Court of 

Appeals on direct appeal,3

 the Court agrees that both out-of-court and in-court 

 2

 Citing United States v. Nash, 946 F.2d 679, 681 (9th Cir. 1991). 

3

 “Section 2255... is not designed to provide criminal defendants multiple opportunities to challenge their sentence.” United States v. Johnson, 988 F.2d 941, 945 

(9th Cir. 1993). An issue raised and decided on direct appeal is binding and precludes relitigation of the issue in a subsequent § 2255 proceeding. United States v. Scrivner,189 

F.3d 825, 828, n. 1 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing United States v. Redd, 759 F.2d 699, 701 (9th 

Cir. 1985) and United States v. Currie, 589 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1979)). On direct 

appeal, Movant argued “that the photo lineup was impermissibly suggestive and tainted 

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identifications were sufficiently reliable, and other substantial evidence offered a trial 

supported his convictions. 

Even were the pre-trial identification procedure[s] impermissibly suggestive, the totality of the circumstances indicates that the eyewitness identifications of Raboy had sufficient aspects of reliability. See United States v. Bagley, 772 F.2d 482, 492 (9th Cir.1985) (“If under the totality of the circumstances the identification is sufficiently reliable, 

identification testimony may properly be allowed into 

evidence even if the identification was made pursuant to an unnecessarily suggestive procedure.”); see also Manson v. 

Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 106, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 53 L.Ed.2d 140 

(1977). All three bank robberies occurred during the daytime. The five witnesses had ample opportunity to view Raboy, one-on-one, at close range, for the entire duration of the 

respective robberies. Further, all of the witnesses provided specific details about Raboy's facial features and body type that were consistent with Raboy’s overall appearance. 

The subsequent in-court identifications were also reliable. 

Four of the five witnesses identified Raboy at trial without expressing hesitation, and there is no evidence to suggest that the witnesses based their in-court identifications on anything other than their independent memories or recollections of the 

incidents. 

Finally, there was significant circumstantial evidence 

supporting the conviction. This evidence includes DNA 

evidence linking Raboy to the robberies and items seized 

from his residence such as two-way radios, a list of police and medical scanner frequencies, and a note that read “Bomb. Big bills. No dye-no GPS, no alarms, or else.” Thus, any potential error in admitting the testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 15, 

119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) (stating that constitutional error must be harmless beyond a reasonable 

doubt). 

(CRDoc. 212); United States v. Raboy, 454 Fed.Appx. at 650-651. 

 Movant has not demonstrated that counsel unreasonably failed to present a defense 

or any other basis to conclude that counsel’s performance was deficient. Movant likewise 

fails to show that but for counsel’s alleged deficiency, the outcome of his proceedings 

 the subsequent in-court identification testimony.” (CRDoc. 212-1 at 2.) Thus, the Court agrees with Respondent that because the underlying basis of Movant’s ineffective assistance of claim has already been decided by the Ninth Circuit, he cannot relitigate the matter here. Nonetheless, in an abundance of caution, the Court addresses the claim on its 

merits. 

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would have been different. In light of these considerations, the Court concludes that 

Movant has failed to satisfy the Strickland standard for this ineffective assistance claim, 

and will therefore recommend that Ground Two be denied. 

III. Evidentiary Hearing 

 The Court concludes that Movant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his 

claims because “the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that 

[he] is entitled to no relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b). The testimony of Movant or his trial 

counsel would add little or nothing to record before the Court. “Section 2255 itself 

‘recognizes that there are times when allegations of facts outside the record can be fully 

investigated without requiring the personal presence of the prisoner.’” Watts v. United 

States, 841 F.2d 275, 277 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 

487, 495 (1962)). Although the Court recognizes “that when the issue is one of 

credibility, resolution on the basis of affidavits can rarely be conclusive... this is one of 

those cases in which an issue of credibility may be conclusively decided on the basis of 

documentary testimony and evidence in the record.” See Watts v. United States, 841 F.2d 

at 277 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted) (noting “[w]hen section 2255 

motions are based on alleged occurrences entirely outside the record, which if true would 

support relief, the court must conduct a hearing on those allegations ‘unless, viewing the 

petition against the record, its allegations do not state a claim for relief or are so patently 

frivolous or false as to warrant summary dismissal.’”) Here, because there is no evidence 

to support Movant’s claims and the evidence in the record is contrary to his allegations, 

this Court “is able to determine without a hearing that the allegations are without 

credibility.” United States v. Navarro-Garcia, 926 F.2d 818, 822 (9th Cir. 1991). 

CONCLUSION 

 For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the claims presented in the Motion 

fail on the merits. Movant has not raised facts or issues that entitle him to an evidentiary 

hearing on his claims. Accordingly, the Court will recommend that the Motion to Vacate, 

Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

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2255 be denied. Accordingly, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct 

Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (CVDoc. 7, 

CRDoc. 216) be DENIED and that CV-12-02577-PHX-JAT (SPL) be DISMISSED. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because Movant has not made 

a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The 

parties shall have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(b) and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days within which to file 

a response to the objections. 

 Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the 

District Court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of 

the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of 

the findings of fact in an order of judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s 

recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 16th day of December, 2013. 

 

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