Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00958/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00958-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANITA TALEVSKI,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 13cv0958 JM(JMA)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

v.

REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY

OF CALIFORNIA,

Defendant.

Defendant Regents of the University of California (“Regents”) moves for

summary judgment on the Rehabilitation Act claim, the only viable claim stated by

Plaintiff. Plaintiff Anita Talevski opposes the motion. Pursuant to Local Rule

7.1(d)(1) the court finds the matters presented appropriate for resolution without oral

argument. For the reasons set forth below, the court denies summary judgment in part

on the Rehabilitation Act claim and grants partial summary judgment on the failure to

accommodate claim. 

BACKGROUND

On April 22, 2013, Plaintiff commenced this disability rights action by alleging

seven causes of action for (1) violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities

Act (“ADA”); (2) violation of §504 of the Rehabilitation Act; (3) violation of the

Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code §51; (4) violation of the Disabled Persons Act,

Cal. Civ. Code §54; (5) disability discrimination in violation of Cal. Gov. Code

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§11135; (6) disability discrimination in violation of Cal. Civ. Code §3345; and (7)

violation of the Unfair Business Practices Act, Bus. & Prof Code §17200. (Ct. Dkt. 1). 

On August 13, 2013, the court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss all claims except

the Rehabilitation Act, finding that the Eleventh Amendment barred the claims against

Regents. (Ct. Dkt. 7). 

Plaintiff’s claims arise from a series of events commencing in late 2011and

continuing until early 2012. “Plaintiffsuffered a traumatic brain injury early in life and

has been disabled ever since.” (Compl. ¶5). Plaintiff suffers from bi-polar disorder,

receives disability benefits from the State of California, and is a disabled individual

within the meaning of the ADA. Id.

In addition to educational programs, the University of California San Diego

(“UCSD”) also operates recreational programs open to the general public. Plaintiff

enrolled in UCSD’s Triathlon Program. The coaches in the program were aware of

“the nature of Plaintiff’s disability.” (Compl. ¶10). One day in late 2011 or 2012,

Coach Piszkin was running a workout on the track. While coaching Plaintiff, Coach

Piszkin allegedly touched Plaintiff in the midriff “in what Plaintiff perceived was an

inappropriately and unwelcome familiar manner.” (Compl. ¶11). During this same

period of time, Plaintiff stopped taking her medications, leading to “occasional

emotional outbursts or need for attention.” (Compl. ¶14). At about this same time,

Plaintiff developed “a harmless yet obsessive affection for another participant in the

program who happened to be a Navy Seal.” Id. Plaintiff attempted to contact the Navy

Seal by sending numerous emails to the Navy and the triathlon coaches.

On January 31, 2012, Plaintiff was informed by the Director of Recreation that

her behavior violated “the Athletes and Coaches Code of Conduct for the Masters

Sports Program” and was suspended from the program. (Compl. ¶16). The letter

provided to Plaintiff stated, among other things:

a. “You regularly blurted out comments during the workout that were

inappropriate and loud.

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b. You became angry at a fellow swimmer because you felt she spoke to you in

a degrading manner.

c. During the course of the workout you would randomly complain about

people in your life that were apparently bullying you.

d. You have, on a few occasions, had crying outbursts because of some of your

own personal struggles.

e. You had been excessively attempting to contact a fellow runner in one of the

workouts which allegedly included sending about 20 emailsto the Navy trying to track

him down. You sent the coaches several emails trying to get info about him. Your

constant emails to the coaches were a form of harassment.” (Compl. ¶17).

Plaintiff alleges that her conduct was “the result of a person with manicdepressive disorder as they were manifestations of the despair, irritability, insecurity,

and obsessive compulsive behavior that are among the classic symptoms of bi-polar

disorder.” On February 6, 2012, Plaintiff was expelled from the sports program. 

(Compl. ¶20).

Regents moves for summary judgment on the Rehabilitation Act claim, arguing

that Plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case and, even if she could, Regents had

a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for dismissing Plaintiff from the program - she

violated the Code of Conduct. Plaintiff opposes the motion.

DISCUSSION

Legal Standards

A motion for summary judgment shall be granted where “there is no genuine

issue asto any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Prison Legal News v. Lehman, 397 F.3d 692, 698 (9th

Cir. 2005). The moving party bears the initial burden of informing the court of the

basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the file which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). There is “no express or implied requirement in Rule 56 that

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the moving party support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating

the opponent’s claim.” Id. (emphasis in original). The opposing party cannot rest on

the mere allegations or denials of a pleading, but must “go beyond the pleadings and

by [the party’s] own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for

trial.’” Id. at 324 (citation omitted). The opposing party also may not rely solely on

conclusory allegations unsupported by factual data. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040,

1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 

The court must examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962). Any doubt

asto the existence of any issue of materialfact requires denial of the motion. Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). On a motion for summary judgment,

when “‘the moving party bears the burden of proof at trial, it must come forward with

evidence which would entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence were

uncontroverted at trial.’” Houghton v. South, 965 F.2d 1532, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992)

(emphasis in original) (quoting International Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally's, Inc., 939 F.2d

1257, 1264-65 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1059 (1992)).

The Prima Facie Case

To state a claim under the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must allege “(1) he is

an individual with a disability; (2) he is otherwise qualified to receive the benefit; (3)

he was denied the benefits of the program solely by reason of his disability; and (4) the

program receives federal financial assistance.” O’Guinn v. Lovelock Correctional

Center, 502 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Duvall v. County of Kitsap, 260

F.3d 1124, 1135 (9th Cir.2001)); 29 U.S.C. §794(a). Once Plaintiff establishes a prima

facie case, the McDonnell Douglasframework applicable to Rehabilitation Act claims

shifts the burden to Defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for

its action with the burden shifting back to Plaintiff to prove that the proffered

legitimate reason is a pretext for discrimination. Smith v. Barton, 914 F.2d 1330, 1339-

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40 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Applying the evidence to the Rehabilitation Act claim, the court concludes that

genuine issues of material fact prevent entry of summary judgment on the prima facie

case. The parties do not dispute the first and third elements, Plaintiff is an individual

diagnosed with a recognized disability, Bipolar Disorder Type 1, (Talevski Decl. ¶3),

and UCSD receives federal financial assistance. The parties dispute whether Plaintiff

was otherwise qualified to participate in the recreational program. Under the

Rehabilitation Act, a qualified individual is “one who is able to meet all of a program’s

requirementsin spite of[her] handicap,” with or without accommodation. Southeastern

Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 406 (1979).

UCSD’s Recreation Department provides recreation programs for students,

faculty, staff, and the community at large. One program, called the Master Sports

Program (“Program”), provides running, swimming, and triathlon training. (Koch

Decl. ¶2). The Program offered group classes, and did not offer one-on-one coaching. 

The group workout sessions consist of about 50 participants each class, with some

sessions numbering 100 athletes. On average, approximately 400 individuals

participate in the Program each quarter and may attend any of 27 different workout

sessions during the week. (Marcikic Decl. ¶4). The personnel in the Program consists

of two full-time coaches (Ronald Marcikic and Terry Martin) and about 16 other parttime assistant coaches.

The high number of participants in the programs requires that the coaches

“remain alert and focused on potential safety issues.” (Marcikic Decl. ¶5). Marcikic

providesthe example where 1-2 coaches would be responsible for a swimming session

with 85 participants. “With so many participants in the pool pushing themselves to

their physical limits, it is of critical importance for the coach to be fully focused on

monitoring the athletes, and avoiding distractions during practice whenever possible.” 

Id. 

In order to participate in the Program, each participant wasrequired to read, sign,

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and abide by the Athlete and Coaches Code of Conduct (“Code”). The Code required

participants to “be courteous and polite during all scheduled workouts,” “treat each

other with respect and courtesy,” refrain from “unreasonable loud, abusive, negative

or foul language,” refrain from “anger directed at another athlete or coach,” refrain

from “physical or emotional outbursts during scheduled workouts,” and refrain from

any kind of harassment directed toward another athlete or coach.” (Kock Decl. ¶4,

Exh. 3). When Plaintiff commenced the program in 2009, and again every quarter

throughout her participation in the Program, Plaintiff acknowledged that she would

abide by the Code. (Talevski Depo., 196:12-197:10). 

Plaintiff’s evidence showsthatshe successfully participated in the Programfrom

2009 “until at least the latter part of 2011 when she started to experience a depressive

episode.” (Oppo. at p.10:11-13). Plaintiff informedCoaches Martin and Piszkin about

her disability as soon as she enrolled in the Program. (Talevski Decl. ¶3). During this

two and one half year period, the evidence submitted by Defendant shows that

Plaintiff’s “condition manifested itself in several minor ways” through inappropriate

comments, following coaches during practice, engaging coaches in personal

conversations while coaching other participants, and sending numerous emails to the

coaches. (Martin Decl. ¶9; Piskin Decl. ¶3). Notwithstanding these “minor,” as

characterized by Defendant, disruptions in the Program attributable to Plaintiff’s

disability, Plaintiff was able to successfully participate in the Program, including

general compliance with the Code. Such evidence is sufficient to establish a prima

facie case, and Plaintiff meets her burden by establishing a prima facie case.

In an attempt to rebut the prima facie case, Defendant submits evidence to show

that Plaintiff displayed erratic behavior at the end of 2011 and into 2012 when she

stopped taking her medication and began consuming alcohol and marijuana to selfmedicate. (Talevski ¶22; Depo. at p.90:6-19). As explained by Plaintiff, when she

“fall[s] into a depression and [has] a manic episode [she] become[s] needy and

impulsive.” Id. While Defendant argues that Plaintiff could not comply with the Code

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because of her disability, this evidence, and related argument, is insufficient to

conclusively rebut Plaintiff’s prima facie case. At a minimum, there is a question of

fact as to whether Defendant’s evidence rebuts the prima facie case.

In sum, the court denies Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on whether

Plaintiff has established a prima facie case.

Non-Discriminatory Reasons for Plaintiff’s Termination From the Program

Defendant argues that it had a legitimate reason for terminating Plaintiff’s

participation in the Program because she violated the Code. Plaintiff does not dispute

that the Code is an integral aspect of the Program. (Oppo. at p.13:17-18). Rather,

Plaintiff disputes that her conduct violated the Code or that Defendant accommodated

her disability.

Unlike the circumstances described in the authorities cited by the parties

(Rehabilitation Act claims arising in the context of elementary or secondary education

and employment situations), the Program is self-funded and provides about 27 group

classes per week. Class sizes average about 50 participants with one to two coaches

per class. Plaintiff participated in approximately 5 classes per week, four swimming

and one running class. Each participant in the Program is required to abide by the

Code. The Code requires participants to “be courteous and polite during all scheduled

workouts,” “treat each other with respect and courtesy,” refrain from “unreasonably

loud, abusive, negative or foul language,” refrain from “anger directed at another

athlete or coach,” refrain from “physical or emotional outbursts during scheduled

workouts,” and refrain from “any kind of harassment directed toward another athlete

or coach.” (Koch Dec. ¶ 4; Marcikic Dec. ¶ 6; Exh. 3). Failure to abide by the Code

may lead to discipline, and about 5-7 participants have been dismissed for failure to

follow the Code. (Koch Dec. ¶ 5; Marcikic Dec. ¶ 6; Exh. 3).

With this background in mind, the court turns to the evidence submitted by the

parties. From 2009 through late 2011, Plaintiff participated in the Program without a

major incident. Early on, coaches Ms. Martin and Mr. Piszkin were informed by

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Plaintiff that she suffered from bipolar disorder. Ms. Martin, the head coach, received

numerous emails from Plaintiff, frequently referring to personal matters. Ms. Martin

declares that she knew Plaintiff “was struggling in her life, and thought the extra care

and attention might be helpful. The problem wasthat the more attention I gave her, the

more attention she would demand. Still, it was hard to stop caring or helping her. She

would often tell me that I was her ‘guardian angel,’ and that I was the only person who

could calm her down, so I was determined to help her.” (Martin Decl. ¶4). Ms. Martin

also assisted Plaintiff during non-work hours. She provided financial arrangementsfor

Plaintiff to remain in the program and provided free training tips, advice, and other

support. 

Prior to December 2011, Plaintiff “would often blurt out inappropriate

comments, yell at others, and disrupt practice.” (Martin Decl. ¶8). Such conduct

violated the Code and Ms. Martin informed Plaintiff of her inappropriate conduct. 

Plaintiff’s conduct became more disruptive after this point in time when Plaintiff

became depressed, began consuming alcohol, and stopped taking her medications. 

(TalevskiDepo. 60:9-62:15, 82:10-12, 90:2-91:1, 95:11-97:10, 117:16-118:16, 119:16-

22, 130:24-131:12, 195:9-14). 

Mr. Piszkin, an assistant running and triathlon coach, declares that Plaintiff

informed him about the traumatic brain injury she suffered as a child and, that he “felt

sympathy” for Plaintiff. (Piszkin Decl. ¶¶2-3). During Plaintiff’s participation in the

Program, he declares that Plaintiff

often acted like a child. She was self-absorbed in practice, and anyone

who did not agree with her was a challenge or a nuisance she had to deal

with. She also needed to be the center of attention, and would often

interrupt group training sessions or blurt out inappropriate comments,

which would detract from the training I could provide other athletes. I

sometimes got frustrated with her, but understood the challenges of her

medical condition and was determined to provide as much patience with

her as possible.

(Piskin Decl. ¶3). 

/ / /

/ / /

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Mr. Piszkin declares that Plaintiff 

became obsessed with a member of my workout group, Anthony

Donohue. Ms. Talevski became convinced that Mr. Donohue was her

soul mate, but that the other people in the workout group were conspiring

against their relationship. Ms. Talevski was certain one woman in the

group was "vexing" her. Mr. Donohue did not feel the same way about

Ms. Talevski and was bothered by her conduct. He did not tell Ms.

Talevski his real name, but instead, referred to himself as Donnie. 

Even though Donnie tried to make it clear he was not interested in

Ms. Talevski, she became even more obsessed. Donnie informed me Ms.

Talevski had tracked down his battalion (Donnie was in the Navy), called

his squadron, and tried to make contact with Donnie. This unnerved him.

He expressed to me that while he did not think he was in physical danger,

he was worried that she was so attached to him, and was uncomfortable

being around her. He stated he was considering not continuing in the

Program because her stalking behavior made him uncomfortable. 

Donnie ultimately stopped coming to my workout group in late

2011. At that point, Ms. Talevski began bothering me constantly about

Donnie, trying to track him down, and any information I could provide.

She also started asking about other Program participants who might have

information about Donnie. When I refused to help her track down

Donnie, Ms. Talevski became extremely angry.

(Id. ¶¶6-8).1

Mr. Koch, the Director of Recreation at UCSD, declares that the Code is

essential to the Programbecause most ofthe group workoutsectionsinvolve one coach

overseeing the workouts of about 50 participants. (Koch Decl. ¶3). Mr. Koch has

dismissed 5-7 participants because of failure to comply with the Code. In January

2012, he met with Ms. Martin and Mr. Marcikic and they informed him that Plaintiff

had been a participant in the Program for about three years. They informed Mr. Koch

that Plaintiff’s presence in the Program had been tumultuous and that she had violated

the Code. The coaches explained “that they gave second chances for many of these

rule violations because they felt bad for her, but they expressed concern that the

incidents were becoming more frequent and more severe.” (Koch Decl. ¶6). The

coaches provided several specific instances of misconduct:

Plaintiff objects to the testimony of Piszkin regarding the hearsay statment of 1

Donahue. While the statement is hearsay, the court considers the evidence not for the

truth of the statement but for the limited purpose that Piszkin had knowledge that

Plaintiff had improper interactions with her co-participants in the Program.

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Ms. Talevski had bullied other participants in the pool by shouting at

them until they left the lane open for her to swim. The coaches reported

that Ms. Talevski had stalked at least two Program participants (both

male), following one man to his home and work, and making extensive

efforts to track the second (a Navy Seal), including sending numerous

emails and phone calls to the Navy to learn his whereabouts. Both

participants had expressed to the coaches that they were uncomfortable

continuing in the Program. Further, the coaches described a number of

incidents where they had perceived Ms. Talevski to be disruptive in

practices, including blurting out inappropriate comments, demanding

attention of the coaches, and interrupting workouts. In each instance, the

coaches were forced to interrupt the workout to deal with Ms. Talevski,

and often could not focus on monitoring the safety of workouts because

of her actions. In addition, the coaches reported Ms. Talevski was

bombarding Mr. Piszkin and Ms. Martin, with several lengthy emails each

day, she would demand special attention from the coaches outside of

workout hours, and she was becoming increasingly hostile when coaches

would not give her attention outside of workout hours. It appeared Ms.

Talevski was also beginning to stalk Ms. Martin. 

(Id. ¶7). Mr. Koch considered Plaintiff’s conduct a serious violation of the Code “but

each interruption by Ms. Talevski required coaches to provide her with individualized

attention at the detriment of the safety and training of every other participant.” (ID.

¶8). 

In late January 2012, Mr. Koch met with Dr. Calfas, the Executive Director of

Student Health at UCSD, Ms. Martin and Mr. Marcikic, Director of the Program. Mr.

Koch had indicated that Plaintiff’s repeated violations of the Code warranted dismissal

from the Program but he was concerned, given her bipolar disorder, how she would

react to the dismissal and whether there were any other ways the Program might

accommodate her presence. Dr. Calfas agreed that Plaintiff’s conduct warranted

dismissal from the Program:

The primary concern wasthe amount of time Ms. Talevski required of the 

coaching staff. Specifically, it was reported that she would demand

individualized attention during group workouts, distract and interrupt the

coaches to the point where instruction of the group had to be stopped,

bully other participants, and harass the coaches during non-work hours,

including sending email barrages(often several emails per day) discussing

personal matters with her coaches and visiting her coaches at the

worksites of their other jobs. In fact, it appeared to me that Ms. Talevski

relied on Ms. Martin to calm her down, help her with her personal

problems, and be her friend. This was inappropriate for Ms. Talevski to

expect so much from a coach. It was also reported that Ms. Talevski had

developed an unwanted romantic interest in another Program participant,

a Navy Seal, and had followed him, sent numerous emails to the Navy

(including pictures of herself) so the Navy could find him, and delivered

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correspondence and packages to the Navy for him. The incidents were

violations of the Code of Conduct and warranted dismissal.

(Id. ¶4).

During the meeting, the individuals also discussed whether there were anymeans

to help or further accommodate Plaintiff and, if not, how best to notify her of the

dismissal. Even though Plaintiff had never requested any type of accommodation, the

parties discussed the issue and determined that dismissal was appropriate. Dr. Calfas

believe that the staff had

bent over backwards for three years to try and keep Ms. Talevski in the

Program, including giving her second chances on her numerous rule

violations, giving her all the attention and assistance in practice that she

demanded, engaging her outside of work hours to help her with her

personal problems, and generally trying to be supportive of her triathlon

hobby. To me, it appeared our coaching staff was required to fill the role

of Ms. Talevski' s full time counselor rather than coach. It was also

apparent that the coaching staff, especially Ms. Martin, was emotionally

exhausted from accommodating Ms. Talevski. Ms. Talevski' s conduct

was also having a negative impact on other participants, and the

monopolization of the coaches by Ms. Talevski came at the detriment of

the other paying participants who complained about it.

(Id. ¶5). Furthermore, asmore fully discussed below, the only possible accommodation

identified by Plaintiff’s exert, Dr. Heidenfelder, “is that Ms. Talevski could have been

referred to a mental health counseling unit or program.” (Heidenfelder Decl. ¶5).

The court concludes that Defendant has met its burden in demonstrating that

Plaintiff’s numerous Code violations established a legitimate basis for Plaintiff’s

discharge from the Program. The court notes that this case does not deal with the

accommodation of a disability in the context of fundamental rights such as primary and

secondary education or in employment. Rather, the Program is open to the public and

provides group classes for participants who desire to improve their physical fitness. 

Given the group nature ofthe classes (approximately 50 participants per class with one,

possibly two, coaches), Plaintiff’s disruptive conduct undermined the ability of the

coaches to provide effective group coaching. 

Having satisfied its burden, the burden shifts to Plaintiff to come forward with

evidence to show that the proffered reasons were a pretext for disability discrimination. 

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Plaintiff argues that there is a question of fact as to whether she violated the Code. 

Plaintiff declares that she “never followed any athlete from the program outside of

practice and never heard anyone complaining about me following them or contacting

the police about me following themoutside of the program.” (Talevski Decl. ¶7). With

respect to sending emails to her coaches, Plaintiff declares that Ms. Martin “acted like

she was my friend [and] she never told me to stop talking to her or to stop sending

emails. We had a normal coach/athlete relationship that had developed into a casual

friendship.” (Id. ¶12). Plaintiff denies yelling at any people swimming in her lane and

“never yelled at another athlete and I never said I intimidated people to keep them out

of my swim lane.” She also denies interrupting any coach during workouts. With

respect to the Navy Seal participant named Donnie, Plaintiff indicates that she spoke

with him on only two occasions and when Donnie stopped coming to the Program she

did contact the Navy. She was worried that “he had been sent overseas or had been

hurt or was missing.” When she called the Navy, the recruiter she spoke with asked her

to lunch. She also denies stalking an editor from a magazine. She also declares that

Mr. Piszkin would repeatedly tease her and make fun of her. (Id. ¶22). In her

deposition, Plaintiff acknowledged thatshe spoke with Donnie after she was dismissed

from the Program, after Donnie reported her conduct to the police. (Talevski Depo.

31:9-32:5, 215:11-18). At her deposition, Plaintiff testified that she took efforts to

interact with Donnie and contacted the Navy about 20 times regarding Donnie.

In late December 2012, Plaintiff stopped taking her medications and began to

consume alcohol to self-medicate. In January 2012, she informed Ms. Martin that she

was planning to commit suicide. At about this same time (after Defendant determined

to dismiss Plaintiff from the Program), she alleged that Mr. Piszkin inappropriately

touched her during one of the classes. Even after Plaintiff received the dismissal

2

An investigation of the alleged incident by both UCSD and the San Diego

2

Police did not reveal any misconduct. Mr. Piszkin declares that he only touched

Plaintiff’s arm, shoulder, and side in front of the entire class for purposes of assuring

correct positioning. Plaintiff declares that she came from a conservative, religious

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letter, Plaintiff declares “no one ever mentioned the Code of Conduct and no one ever

said I was doing anything that violated the Code of Conduct.” (Id. ¶27). At her

deposition, Plaintiff testified that she quarterly signed a form acknowledging that she

read and understood the Code. She testified that she understood her conduct had to

comply with the Code. (Talevski Depo. 197:1-10). 

3

The court concludes that there is a genuine issue of material fact whether

Plaintiff violated the Code. While the overwhelming weight of the evidence favors

Defendant, factual determinations, particularly those turning on issues of credibility,

are better left to the trier of fact. 

Defendant also argues that Plaintiff never requested an accommodation related

to her disability and, even if she requested accommodation, Plaintiff fails to identify

any viable accommodation. Defendant concludes that it is entitled to summary

judgment on this portion of Plaintiff’s claim. Plaintiff’s expert, Dr. Heidenfelder,

M.D., declares that Defendant could have referred Plaintiff to a mental health

counseling unit as an accommodation. (Heidenfelder Decl. ¶5). Plaintiff, who has the

ultimate burden to show that Defendant failed to reasonably accommodate her

disability, only identifies a referral to a mental health expert as a possible

accommodation. Plaintiff also argues that Defendant could have suspended her and

later readmitted her once she stabilized and began taking her medications. Plaintiff’s 4

expert also opines that “[n]o one could have made Ms. Talevski take her medication

background and she found the touching inappropriate, even if the investigators found

her claim of sexual harassment without merit. (Talevski Decl. ¶24).

The court notes that it has not considered the declarations of Martin and

3

Marcikic about their conversations with the individuals who were purportedlyfollowed

by Plaintiff as inadmissible hearsay. As noted by Plaintiff, these declarants cannot

provide admissible statements about the truth of the statements by the non-declarants. 

The court rejects Plaintiff’s notion that Defendant should have accommodated 4

her disability by showing “caring, patience, and tolerance” when she was engaged in

a manic episode. (Talevski Depo. 123:21-124:18). Nebulous conduct such as “caring,

patience, and tolerance,” while laudable in spirit, is simply not an enforceable

accommodation. The court also notes that Plaintiff does not submit any evidence to

show that she reapplied for entry into the Program once her manic episodes subsided.

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if she refused to do so.” Id. The court grants partial summary judgment in favor of

Defendant on whether Defendant failed to reasonably accommodate Plaintiff’s

disability. It is undisputed that Plaintiff never requested any type of accommodation. 

Further, Plaintiff fails to identify or explain how a referral to a mental health

professional or an indefinite suspension would have accommodated her disability. 

Plaintiff’s expert, Dr. Heidenfelder declaresthat a specialist “could have suggested that

Ms. Talevski go back on medication to stabilize her condition.” Id. He further

declares, on February 5, 2015, that 

no one could have made Ms. Talevski take her medication if she refused

to do so, but the effort and suggestion could have and should have been

made. It is my medical opinion that if Ms. Talevski’s bipolar condition

is stabilized, with or without medication, there is nothing preventing her

from participating in activities such as the UCSD Masters Triathlon

Program.

Id. This evidentiary showing falls short of demonstrating that a referral to a mental

health professional would have effectivelyaccommodated Plaintiff’s disability. Unlike

a ramp for the mobility impaired, or a sign language interpreter for the hearing

impaired, that directly addresses and accommodatesthe disability, a referral to a mental

health professional accomplishes nothing. In other words, the simple referral to a

mental health professional, as opposed to treatment, would not have “made Ms.

Talevski take her medication if she refused to do so.” Id. There is simply no evidence

to show that if Plaintiff were referred to a medical health professional, she would

immediately be accommodated. Dr. Heidenfelder noted that, with treatment, Plaintiff’s

bipolar condition could be stabilized. Accordingly, it is not the referral to a mental

health professional that has the potential to accommodate Plaintiff’s bipolar condition. 

Rather, it is the treatment received from a mental health professional that would

address, treat, and accommodate Plaintiff’s condition. 

In reliance upon employment cases, Plaintiff argues that Defendant knew in late

2011 and early 2012 that Plaintiff was exhibiting obsessive-compulsive behaviors and

threatened to commit suicide. Plaintiff argues that her behavior placed the coaches on

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notice that they were under a mandatory obligation to refer her to mental health

professional. This argument is not persuasive. The interactive process contemplated

by the ADA 

is a mandatory rather than a permissive obligation on the part of the

employers under the ADA and this obligation istriggered by an employee

or an employee’s representative giving notice ofthe employee’s disability

and the desire for accommodation. In circumstances in which an

employee is unable to make such a request, if the company knows of the

existence of the employee’s disability, the employer must assist in

initiating the interactive process.

Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 1114 (9th Cir. 2000). Here, Plaintiff’s claim

does not arise under the ADA (although there is substantial overlap with the

Rehabilitation Act) nor in the context of employment. Unlike the Rehabilitation Act,

the ADA has several provisions specifically targeting employers. See 42 U.S.C.

§12115. 

Here, it is undisputed that Plaintiff never requested an accommodation. Further,

Defendant is not Plaintiff’s employer and, under the circumstances of this case, not

under a mandatory duty to engage in an interactive process as identified in Barnett. 

The authorities relied upon by Plaintiff deal with fundamental rights such as

employment and education. These fundamental rights are generally considered

indispensable to maintaining a productive and sustainable livelihood. In contrast,

attending and participating in a group exercise class, one of hundreds of thousands of

classes available in San Diego County, is a voluntary and discretionary activity. 

Plaintiff is one of many voluntary participants in a group exercise class with emphasis

on triathlon. Defendant is not under a sua sponte duty to employ mental health

professions, or to provide sufficient training to its coaches to become proficient in

recognizing debilitating mental health issues in participants in the Program, and then

refer that participant to a mental health professional who may or may not provide

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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successful treatment over weeks, months, or years. (Heidenfelder Decl. ¶5). Under 5

the circumstances of this case, Defendant was not under a duty to engage in a

mandatory interactive process. The coaches oversee about 27 classes per week, each

with about 50 participants each class. Plaintiff did not enroll in private classes where

she could obtain individualized attention, but in large group classes. Under the

circumstances of this case, the coaches, who are trainers and not mental health

professionals, were not under a mandatory obligation to identify and diagnose

Plaintiff’s mental health issues, refer Plaintiff for mental health treatment, provide

mental health treatment, or engage in an employer-type interactive accommodation. 

In sum, the court grants in part and denies in part Defendant’s motion for

summary judgment. The court denies the motion on whether Defendants violated the

Rehabilitation Act by dismissing Plaintiff from the Program. This liability issue, in

turn, will be determined by the question of whether Plaintiff violated the Code, the sole

remaining genuine issue of material fact following the court’s consideration of these

motion papers. The court also partially grants the motion to the extent Plaintiff claims

that Defendant failed to accommodate her disability.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 27, 2015

 Hon. Jeffrey T. Miller

 United States District Judge

cc: All parties

As set forth above, a referral to a mental health profession accommodates 5

nothing. The disability is not accommodated by referral to a mental health

professional. Rather, Plaintiff’s disability may be accommodated by the receipt of

mental health treatment provided over a period of time. 

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