Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-05072/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-05072-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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States District C

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JASON BROWNE, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

STEVEN GOSSETT, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 03-05072 CRB

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE:

MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs filed this action under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 against a number of

defendants arising out of a search and seizure as part of a marijuana cultivation and

possession investigation in Sonoma County. Plaintiffs allege defendants violated the First,

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution as well as the state constitution

and state law. Now before the Court are defendants’ motions for summary judgment as to all

remaining federal claims and plaintiffs’ cross-motion for summary judgment as to qualified

immunity. After carefully considering the parties’ briefs, and with the benefit of oral

argument, the Court hereby GRANTS summary judgment for defendants as to all claims and

DENIES plaintiffs’ motion. 

BACKGROUND

I. Procedural History

On July 14, 2004, the Court dismissed the federal defendants from the case and

granted plaintiffs leave to amend their remaining causes of action in light of defendants’

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previous motions to dismiss and within 30 days of a decision in Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S.Ct.

2195 (2005). Plaintiffs subsequently filed an amended complaint, and on October 7, 2005,

the Court dismissed plaintiffs’ federal due process claims as vague and conclusory and all

federal claims against the County of Sonoma and the City of Arcata for failure to state a

claim under Monell. The Court also dismissed the patient-only plaintiffs from the remaining

federal claims and stayed the state law claims until further notice. The remaining defendants

are Stephen Gossett and Andrea Salas, detectives in Sonoma County, and Bobby Lucas of the

Arcata Police Department. The remaining plaintiffs are Jason Browne, Jason Snider and

Brian Loucks. On November 18, 2005, defendants filed concurrent motions for summary

judgment as to the remaining federal claims, which include Fourth Amendment claims for a

wrongful search and seizure and excessive force, and First Amendment claims for a violation

of plaintiff Browne’s freedom of speech, right to petition, and access to the courts. The

Court held an oral argument on January 27, 2006.

II. Facts

In 2002, plaintiffs Jason Browne, Jason Snider, and Brian Loucks were operating a

medical marijuana garden at 4335 Bodega Avenue in Petaluma, California. Second

Amended Complaint (“SAC”) ¶ 33. Defendants Salas and Gossett, narcotics detectives in

Sonoma County, were initially tipped off to the Bodega Avenue property by a confidential

informant (“CI”) who alleged that marijuana cultivation was occurring on the property. 

Declaration of Andrea Salas, Ex. E. Defendants subsequently conducted an investigation,

which included: (1) a visit to the property; (2) a review of the Sonoma County Assessor’s

Office records for the address; (3) a search of the license plates of vehicles located on the

property, which revealed the identities of plaintiff Jason Browne and his father, Williams, a

former plaintiff in this action; (4) a computerized criminal history check of the California

Department of Justice records for Jason Browne, which revealed a line item for a 2001

incident in Arcata related to marijuana activities; (5) a request for information on any

investigations that occurred in Humboldt County, which was produced by defendant Lucas;

and (6) an inquiry with the Drug Enforcement Administration in San Francisco, which also

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possessed information about at least some of the plaintiffs. On June 12, 2002, Sonoma

County Superior Court Judge Allan D. Hardcastle issued a search warrant based on a

declaration from defendant Salas for PG&E subscriber and usage information at 4335

Bodega Avenue.

Defendant Salas obtained the PG&E records on June 21, 2002, a review of which she

interpreted to reveal an unusually high electrical since activation at an “off-peak agricultural”

rate three months prior. County Defs.’ Mot. at 5. The account was opened in the name of

Brian Loucks and listed as “dba LSB Gardens.” Upon submission of a second declaration

outlining her belief that probable cause existed as to the use of the property for the indoor

cultivation of marijuana, Sonoma County Superior Court Judge Rene A. Chouteau issued a

second search warrant on June 27, 2002, permitting a search for “notations and photography

of property and items thereon which tend to show that there is an indoor marijuana

cultivation operation” on the 4.87 acre parcel at 4335 Bodega Avenue. SAC ¶ 35. This

warrant permitted night entry onto the property but did not allow for entry into a structure. A

“sneak and peek” search of the property around midnight on July 2, 2002, revealed a motion

sensor that protected the barn, and also confirmed that a fan acted intermittently within the

structure and that bright lights could also be seen from outside the barn. On July 12, 2002,

upon a further declaration by defendant Salas outlining her reasons that there was probable

cause to believe that marijuana cultivation was transpiring within a barn on the property,

Sonoma County Superior Court Judge Dean Beaupre issued a third search warrant for the

4335 Bodega Avenue property that included permission to seize a number of items

associated with marijuana cultivation and distribution. On July 18, 2002, detective Salas,

along with detective Gossett, other representatives of the Sonoma County Sheriff’s

Department, agents from the DEA, and a representative from the Sonoma County District

Attorney’s office executed on the July 12 warrant. Id. ¶ 37. During the search, plaintiffs

were handcuffed and questioned for several hours about the marijuana garden they found in

the barn. The representative from the District Attorney’s office, upon reviewing authorizing

documentation regarding the marijuana, determined on site that no prosecution would arise

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out of the search. Federal agents seized some items from the property, which were held by

the Sonoma County Sheriff’s Department. On July 30, 2002, defendant Salas filed a Return

to the search warrant in Superior Court, noting that no state officer seized any items during

the search. See Salas Decl., Ex. G.

LEGAL STANDARDS

I. Summary Judgment

A principle purpose of the summary judgment procedure is to isolate and dispose of

factually unsupported claims. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). A

party moving for summary judgment that does not have the ultimate burden of persuasion at

trial has the initial burden of producing evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claims or showing that the non-moving party does not have enough evidence

of an essential element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial. See Nissan Fire &

Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). 

If the moving party does not satisfy its initial burden, the non-moving party has no

obligation to produce anything and summary judgment must be denied. If, on the other hand,

the moving party has satisfied its initial burden of production, then the non-moving party

may not rest upon mere allegations or denials of the adverse party’s evidence, but instead

must produce admissible evidence that shows there is a genuine issue of material fact for

trial. See Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 210 F.3d at 1102. A genuine issue of fact is one

that could reasonably be resolved in favor of either party. A dispute is “material” only if it

could affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. See Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). 

II. Qualified Immunity

The defense of qualified immunity protects “government officials . . . from liability

for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The rule of qualified immunity “provides ample

protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law;”

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defendants can have a reasonable, but mistaken, belief about the facts or about what the law

requires in any given situation. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). 

A court considering a claim of qualified immunity must first determine whether the

plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right, then proceed to

determine if the right was “clearly established.” See Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 290

(1999). The threshold question must be: Taken in the light most favorable to the party

asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional

right? See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. If no constitutional right would have been violated

were the allegations established, there is no necessity for a further inquiry. See id. On the

other hand, if a violation could be made out on the allegations, the next sequential step is to

ask whether the right was clearly established. See id. The relevant, dispositive inquiry in

determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable

officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted. Id. If the law is

determined to be clearly established, the next question is whether, under that law, a

reasonable official could have believed his conduct was lawful. See Act Up!/Portland v.

Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 871-72 (9th Cir. 1993).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs’ remaining federal causes of actions are three section 1983 claims: A) a

Fourth Amendment claim based on lack of probable cause for the search and a defective

search warrant; B) a Fourth Amendment claim for use of excessive force during the search

and seizure; and C) First Amendment claims of freedom of speech, right to petition, and

access to the courts based on allegations that the search and seizure at issue was in retaliation

for, and an effort to chill, plaintiffs’ political speech concerning medical marijuana. The

Sonoma County defendants (Salas and Gossett) and the Arcata defendant (Lucas) have filed

summary judgment motions on all claims on the ground that no reasonable trier of fact could

find a constitutional violation in this situation. In the alternative, defendants argue they at

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least benefit from qualified immunity. Plaintiffs oppose summary judgment as to all claims

and cross-move for summary judgment denying qualified immunity to defendants.

I. Wrongful Search and Seizure

Plaintiffs present two primary theories of defendants’ liability for violations of the

Fourth (and Fourteenth) Amendment(s). First, plaintiffs assert that the warrant to search the

Bodega property was improper because there was no probable cause that a crime was being

committed there and because the warrant was defective. Second, plaintiffs contend that

defendants misrepresented or omitted facts in the supporting affidavit for the search warrant

and thereby violated the Fourth Amendment pursuant to Franks v. Delaware. 

A. Lack of Probable Cause/Defective Search Warrant

Under Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), probable cause to issue a search warrant

exists when “given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit ... there is a fair probability

that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Id. at 238. “It is

well-settled that the determination of probable cause is based upon the totality of the

circumstances known to the officers at the time of the search.” United States v. Bishop, 264

F.3d 919, 924 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 238). A magistrate judge may issue

a warrant for a residence if a “reasonable nexus” exists between the residence and the

evidence sought; that is, the magistrate “need only find that it would be reasonable to seek

the evidence there.” United States v. Chavez-Miranda, 306 F.3d 973, 978 (9th Cir. 2002)

(citation omitted). In making this determination, the magistrate may consider a number of

factors, including “the type of crime, the nature of the missing items, [and] the extent of the

suspect’s opportunity for concealment,” United States v. Lucarz, 430 F.2d 1051, 1055 (9th

Cir. 1970), but in the end the judge must make a “practical, common-sense” decision. Gates,

462 U.S. at 238.

1. Defendants Salas and Gossett

Defendants Salas and Gossett commenced the investigation at issue here after

receiving information from a confidential informant that included the address of the property,

a map of the property, and the probable owner of the property where marijuana activities may

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Plaintiffs assert (but provide no supporting evidence) that the information from the

informant was stale and unreliable. Yet this was contemplated by the issuing judge, who

expressly confirmed that the informant had given the Sheriff’s Department other tips that proved

correct during the same time period, and added by hand a finding to that effect to the declaration.

See Salas Decl., Ex. E at PC-2.

2Because a state-issued search warrant is at issue here, state law applies. Thus, the

Supreme Court’s decision in Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S.Ct. 2195 (2005), does not permit state law

enforcement agents to ignore the requirements of the CUA. 

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be occurring.1 The Sheriff’s Department deputies visited the property and confirmed the

information provided by the informant, and also purported to “smell the odor of growing

marijuana, hear a fan working and ... see lights working” in a barn-like structure. Id. at PC2-PC-3. Defendants’ subsequent investigation included the following: a review of plaintiffs’

criminal history, including police reports from other investigations into activities related to

the cultivation of marijuana in nearby counties; a review of PG&E records in the name of

plaintiff Brian Loucks and obtained pursuant to the first warrant, which ultimately revealed

an unusually high electrical usage; and a “sneak and peek” search around midnight on July 2,

authorized by a second warrant, which confirmed that a light was emanating from the barn

and fans were intermittently activating. Id. at PC-3A. Based on the totality of the

circumstances outlined here, the declaration supporting the affidavit which persuasively

explained the importance and context of this information, and the experience and training of

the affiant, defendant Salas, the Court concludes that no reasonable juror could find that the

magistrate judge’s finding of probable cause to issue the warrant violated the Constitution.

Plaintiffs make several objections to a finding of probable cause, none of which,

however, create a genuine dispute of a material issue. Plaintiffs first make a blanket

argument that, given their status as medical patients and primary caregivers under the

California Compassionate Use Act (“CUA”), defendants did not have probable cause to

believe that illegal cultivation or possession of marijuana was taking place at the Bodega

Avenue property.2 Plaintiffs rely on People v. Mower, 28 Cal. 457 (Cal. 2002), yet they

overstate its holding. Mower held that law enforcement must consider a suspect’s status

under the CUA in determining whether probable cause exists. Id. At 469. Yet Mower

addresses probable cause in the context of an arrest, not merely a search warrant as exists

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Plaintiffs do not dispute that the state-level government officers did not seize any

property of theirs. All seized property was taken by federal agents, who were previously

dismissed from this case.

4

Plaintiffs further assert, also without supporting evidence, that the true address of the

barn is 4333 Bodega Avenue, and that the incorrect address is cause to void the warrant. Yet

a PG&E electricity account was initiated by Brian Loucks for 4335 Bodega Avenue, and its

usage was found to be unusually high relative to its previous use and the use of other normal

residences. The Court is therefore unpersuaded by this conclusory assertion.

5The Court assumes without deciding that plaintiffs’ expert, Chris Conrad, is qualified

as an expert on marijuana cultivation matters.

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here, and notes that where law enforcement has reason to believe that a patient or caregiver

does not possess or cultivate the substance “for the personal medical purposes of the patient,”

probable cause may exist.

The distinction between a search and an arrest or prosecution outlined in Mower is

vital to a proper disposition of this case. Law enforcement personnel may have probable

cause to believe that the cultivation and distribution of marijuana at a particular place even if,

as plaintiffs allege here, the suspects are known to be protected under the CUA. See People

v. Urziceanu, 132 Cal. App. 4th 747, (Cal Ct. App. 2005) (holding that the Compassionate

Use Act “prohibits qualified patients and their caregivers from joining together to pool

efforts to collectively cultivate and/or obtain medical marijuana for their own personal

medical uses”). Where, as here, law enforcement personnel have reason to believe that

unprotected activities are taking place–perhaps in addition to protected activities–probable

cause may exist despite the protections of the CUA. Once a suspect can document that her

marijuana-related activities are protected, the prosecution should then be terminated. That is

precisely what happened here.3 After the officers conducted the search and interviewed

plaintiffs, the Sonoma County District Attorney’s Office representative declared that

plaintiffs would not be arrested or prosecuted. Thus, the fact that plaintiffs were medical

patients and primary caregivers does not, without more, refute a proper finding of probable

cause to search the property.4

In addition, plaintiffs present a declaration from a “court-qualified cannabis expert”5

that disputes the assertion that defendants or others could smell an odor of marijuana

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emanating from the barn on plaintiffs’ property. Although plaintiffs’ expert, Chris Conrad,

could not say for certain that a detectable odor could not have emanated from the barn, the

Court assumes arguendo that Mr. Conrad is correct. Therefore, in order to determine

whether the dispute involves a material fact, the Court will purge that information from

Salas’ declaration and determine whether the magistrate judge would still have a substantial

basis for concluding that probable cause exists without that information. See United States v.

Grandstaff, 813 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1987). The Court concludes that this information is

superfluous to a finding of probable cause. A tip from a proven, reliable informant,

combined with the lights, fan, and unusually high electrical bill, as well as prior marijuanarelated investigations involving plaintiffs, satisfies the probable cause requirement.

2. Defendant Lucas

It is undisputed that defendant Lucas neither conducted the investigation regarding

plaintiffs nor submitted a declaration or affidavit seeking a search warrant of plaintiffs’

property. Therefore, Lucas cannot be subject to an assertion of lack of probable cause or a

defective warrant. Plaintiffs’ only Fourth Amendment claim against defendant Lucas lies

under Franks v. Delaware.

B. Misrepresentation/Omission under Franks v. Delaware

In Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), the Court held that when “a false

statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included

by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement is necessary to the

finding of probable cause,” the search warrant is void and improper. Franks, 438 U.S. at

155-156. The Ninth Circuit has subsequently extended Franks violations to omissions as

well as misrepresentations. In United States v. Stanert, 762 F.2d 775 (9th Cir. 1985),

amended by 769 F.2d 1410 (9th Cir. 1985), the court held that deliberate or reckless

omissions of facts that mislead can negate a facial showing of probable cause. See Lombardi

v. City of El Cajon, 117 F.3d 1117, 1122 (9th Cir. 1997). To do so requires a “substantial

showing that the affiant intentionally or recklessly omitted facts required to prevent

technically true statements in the affidavit from being misleading.” Stanert, 762 F.2d at 781.

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Plaintiffs effectively admit that they have no admissible evidence to support this claim.

See Pls.’ Opp. at 14 (“The complaint makes it clear that Lucas provided highly misleading

information to other law enforcement officers to a criminal investigation.”). The Complaint, of

course, does not include admissible evidence.

7Because the Court finds that there is no Franks claim against Lucas, the Court need not

address whether a Franks claim can even lie against someone other than the affiant. 

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1. Defendant Lucas

In order for defendant Lucas to be liable under a Franks claim, plaintiffs must submit

admissible evidence supporting their allegation that he deliberately or recklessly omitted

information from the investigations he turned over to defendants Salas and Gossett. 

Plaintiffs assert, without any evidence in support, essentially that Lucas did not inform Salas

and Gossett about previous determinations in Arcata that the investigations conducted there

revealed that plaintiffs’ marijuana-related activities were permissible. In addition to the fatal

flaw that plaintiffs do not submit evidence supporting their assertions, the record further

indicates that plaintiffs’ accusations are false.6 

First, Salas and Gossett asked Lucas to send the reports pertaining to previous

investigations regarding plaintiffs to which they were alerted by a match from the California

Department of Justice. Plaintiffs do not assert that anything was omitted by Lucas from the

investigation file. Second, the investigation reports submitted by plaintiffs include

information pertaining to plaintiffs’ status as medical marijuana patients under the CUA. See

Declaration of William Simpich, Ex. 5 at CAS 0005. In fact, plaintiffs admit as much. See

Pls. Opp. at *19 (“Officer Lucas’ police report illustrates that he knew that all three of [the

plaintiffs] were patients.”). It is therefore apparent from the evidence that Lucas did not

shield their status as caregivers from Salas and Gossett. Accordingly, the Court finds that

defendant Lucas properly and truthfully responded to a request from another county’s

sheriff’s department and that no reasonable juror could find Lucas liable under Franks.

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2. Defendants Salas and Gossett

Plaintiffs’ Franks claim against Salas and Gossett revolves around two allegations. 

First, plaintiffs allege that the Salas declaration misrepresented that plaintiff Jason Browne

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was previously “arrested” and Browne, Loucks and Snider were “co-defendants in a prior

indoor cultivation of marijuana investigation,” neither of which is true. See Salas Decl., Ex.

E at PC-3, PC4. As defendants concede, plaintiffs were previously detained, not arrested,

and they were never co-defendants because they were never prosecuted. Neither error,

however, is sufficient to satisfy the Franks standard. 

Defendants included the prior arrest information based on a reading of the California

Department of Justice report on Jason Browne, which included the notation

“ARR/DET/CITE.” See Simpich Decl., Ex. 8. Below that line, the report further states

“DET ONLY,” which indicates he was only detained, not arrested. Id. To the extent that the

distinction matters, the mistake was not intentional and did not exhibit a “reckless disregard

for the truth;” rather, defendant Salas merely negligently included “arrest” instead of

“detained.” The same holds true for the use of the term “co-defendants,” which is actually

used–arguably improperly--to describe a “marijuana investigation,” not a marijuana

prosecution. Furthermore, the summation to defendant Salas’ declaration reveals that the

purpose of including this information was to alert the magistrate to “prior marijuana related

investigations” involving plaintiffs, not that they were previously arrested or prosecuted. See

Salas Decl, Ex. E at PC-6 (emphasis added). As a result, the Court does not find that these

errors alter the probable cause calculus because neither term--“arrest” and “co-defendants”--

is necessary to a finding of probable cause. 

Second, plaintiffs contend that the materials submitted to the magistrate judge omitted

information that plaintiffs are medical patients or primary caregivers. Yet the declaration

does include information regarding plaintiff Browne’s involvement with cannabis clubs,

including serving as a director of one. More importantly, to the extent that information is

insufficient to properly alert the magistrate to his status as a patient and caregiver, the Court

has already determined that that information alone is not sufficient to cast doubt over a

finding of probable cause. See supra at I.A.1. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ Franks claims fail and

the Court finds that the magistrate judge’s finding of probable cause was proper. 

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II. Excessive Force (Defendants Salas and Gossett only)

The standard for the lawful use of force by police under the Fourth Amendment is

objective reasonableness. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). The

reasonableness of the officer’s use of force is to be judged from the perspective of a

reasonable police officer on the scene, not after the fact. See id. at 396-97. The Ninth

Circuit has recognized an individual constitutional right to protection “under certain narrowly

defined circumstances.” United States v. Reese, 2 F.3d 870, 888 (9th Cir. 1993). In

particular, that right has been found when the state “assumes a ‘special relationship’ with a

particular person by taking him into its custody, or when the state affirmatively creates the

danger to which a person is exposed.” Id. (citing L.W. v. Grubbs, 974 F.2d 119, 121 (9th Cir.

1992); Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 938 (1990)).

It is undisputed that defendants were not part of the group of officers that awoke

plaintiffs and handcuffed them during the search. See Salas Decl. ¶ 19; Gossett Decl. ¶ 6. 

Plaintiffs further do not dispute that defendants Salas and Gossett only saw plaintiffs fully

clothed and with handcuffs in front of them. Plaintiffs contend that defendants heard

plaintiff Browne’s “complaints of great pain, yet failed to come to my aid.” Declaration of

Jason Browne ¶ 16. Other than this blanket assertion in a declaration, plaintiffs have

proffered no evidence that plaintiff Browne was actually hurt or injured, such as a medical

report, a declaration from a doctor, or other similar affidavit. Moreover, Browne’s

declaration avers that he complained of pain only when the handcuffs placed his arms behind

him. Id. ¶¶ 16, 17. Yet he does not dispute the declarations of Salas and Gossett, which

assert that they encountered Browne only after he was fully clothed with his handcuffs in

front of him. Finally, this is not one of the narrowly defined circumstances in which plaintiff

benefits from either the special relationship exception or the danger exception to the general

rule that police officers do not have an affirmative duty to aid. Though detained during

questioning, plaintiffs were not under the complete command or responsibility of law

enforcement nor were they placed in danger; rather, they were handcuffed during a routine

search and seizure. 

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8All parties concede that the three First Amendment claims–freedom of speech, right to

petition, and right of access to courts–require a similar inquiry.

9The Court does not hold that this is the proper analysis but will assume so for the

purposes of this motion.

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In short, plaintiffs’s excessive force claim fails as a matter of law for the following

reasons: First, plaintiffs have not submitted sufficient evidence to place defendants Salas

and Gossett on the scene when his allegations of excessive force took place. Second,

plaintiffs have not submitted any evidence that excessive force was actually used against

them. Finally, plaintiffs have not established that defendants had a duty to aid plaintiff while

he was sitting in a chair with handcuffs on his wrists in front of his body. Accordingly, the

Court finds that plaintiffs have failed to satisfy their burden of identifying a genuine dispute

with regard to the excessive force claim. The Court therefore GRANTS defendants motion

for summary judgment as to the Fourth Amendment causes of action.

III. First Amendment Claims (Plaintiff Browne only)

Plaintiffs allege that defendants violated the First Amendment by attempting to chill

his advocacy of the legalization of medical marijuana by retaliating against him for his

previous political speech.8 Plaintiffs urge the Court to adopt the analysis articulated in

Mendocino Env’tl. Ctr. v. County of Mendocino (II).

9

 192 F.3d 1283, 1300 (9th Cir. 1999)

(“In order to demonstrate a First Amendment violation, a plaintiff must provide evidence

showing that ‘by his actions [the defendant] deterred or chilled [the plaintiff’s] political

speech and such deterrence was a substantial or motivating factor in [the defendant’s]

conduct.”). If plaintiff’s First Amendment rights have been chilled, an analysis under this

standard focuses solely on whether defendants “intended to interfere with [plaintiff’s] First

Amendment rights.” Id. (emphasis added). Intent to inhibit speech can be demonstrated

either through direct or circumstantial evidence. Id. at 1301. 

Plaintiff has submitted no evidence whatsoever supporting his assertion that his First

Amendment rights were chilled or violated. Even if that were the case, however, plaintiff

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fails to show that defendants intended to inhibit his First Amendment rights by conducting

this investigation and search.

It is undisputed that defendants Salas and Gossett never knew or heard of plaintiff

Browne before the investigation at issue. See Salas Decl. ¶ 22; Gossett Decl. ¶ 8. Plaintiff,

however, claims that after reading the reports sent by Lucas, they “put together an affidavit

designed to punish Mr. Brown by getting past the magistrate, ripping up the plants, hand (sic)

the ripped-up plants to the DEA, and bury the rest of the property in storage.” Pls. Opp. at

19. This conclusory assertion is purely speculative and is presented to the Court without any

supporting evidence. Moreover, the Court has already found that defendants properly

supplied the magistrate with probable cause to search the property. Conclusory allegations

about the impropriety of actions found to be lawful are insufficient to establish a genuine

dispute of material fact in this instance. Thus, the Court holds that no reasonable juror could

find that defendants Salas and Gossett intended to violate plaintiff’s First Amendment rights.

Similarly, plaintiff fails to present any nexus between defendant Lucas’ activities and

an alleged intent to chill plaintiff’s speech. Lucas merely responded fully, accurately, and

lawfully to a request from detectives in another county. Further, a closer look at the past

interactions between Browne and Lucas do not reveal any hints of an intent to inhibit

plaintiff’s First Amendment rights. As a result, these unsupported allegations of

circumstantial evidence, even if accepted as true, do not give rise to an inference of an intent

to chill plaintiff’s speech. In sum, plaintiff has provided nothing more than conclusory

allegations, unsupported by evidence, that defendant Lucas’ lawful actions were intended to

chill his First Amendment rights. The Court finds that no reasonable juror could arrive at

such a conclusion. As a result, the Court GRANTS defendants motion for summary

judgment on the First Amendment claims.

IV. Qualified Immunity

The Court’s inquiry into qualified immunity ends with the first prong of the analysis:

whether the defendants violated a constitutional right. Because the Court has already

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determined that defendants did not deprive plaintiffs of any constitutional rights, the Court

hereby GRANTS qualified immunity to all defendants. Plaintiffs’ partial motion for

summary judgment is hereby DENIED.

V. State Law Claims

The Court previously stayed the following state law claims: (1) false imprisonment

First Cause of Action) (2) First Amendment claims under the state constitution (Second

through Fourth Causes of Action); (3) Assault and Battery (Sixth Cause of Action); (4) Civil

Code ¶ 51.7 (Seventh Cause of Action); (5) Civil Code ¶ 52.1 (Eighth Cause of Action); (6)

Civil Code ¶ 51 et seq (Unruh Act) (Ninth Cause of Action); (7) Right to privacy under Art.

I, section 1 of California Constitution (Tenth Cause of Action); (8) Art. I, section 7 of the

California Constitution and Health & Safety Code ¶ 11362.5; (9) Conversion (Fourteenth

Cause of Action); (10) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (Fifteenth Cause of

Action); (11) Negligence (Sixteenth Cause of Action); (12) Art. III, section 3.5 of Cal.

Constitution (Nineteenth Cause of Action); (13) Taxpayer’s action (Twenty-First Cause of

Action). The Court hereby DISMISSES without prejudice all remaining state claims for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants motions for summary judgment are GRANTED. 

Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment is DENIED. The remaining state law claims

are DISMISSED without prejudice to pursuing those claims in the appropriate state court. 

Defendant Lucas’ motion for sanctions is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 27, 2006 

 

CHARLES R. BREYER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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