Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_16-cv-03628/USCOURTS-cand-5_16-cv-03628-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

STEVEN L. OWENS, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

RON DAVIS, Warden, 

 Respondent. 

Case No. 16-03628 EJD (PR) 

ORDER OF DISMISSAL 

Petitioner, a California prisoner, filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his continued confinement. Petitioner has paid 

the filing fee. (Docket No. 6.) 

BACKGROUND 

According to the petition, Petitioner was found guilty of kidnapping to commit a 

robbery by a jury in Alameda County Superior Court. (Pet. at 2.) Petitioner was sentenced 

to an indeterminate sentence of life with the possibility of parole on March 10, 1989. (Pet. 

Attach. at 2.) 

Petitioner filed state habeas petitions raising the claim in the instant petition in the 

state superior, appellate, and high courts without success. (Pet. Ex. 1.) The state high 

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court summarily denied the petition on May 11, 2016. (Id.) 

Petitioner filed the instant federal habeas petition on June 25, 2016. 

DISCUSSION 

A. Standard of Review 

 This court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person 

in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in 

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(a). 

 It shall “award the writ or issue an order directing the respondent to show cause 

why the writ should not be granted, unless it appears from the application that the applicant 

or person detained is not entitled thereto.” Id. § 2243. 

B. Legal Claims 

Petitioner claims that he has been confined passed his first eligible release date of 

August 1994, and that he is now serving a “disproportionate” sentence. (Pet. Attach. at 3.) 

In support of his claim, Petitioner only provides citations to state law. (Pet. at 6.) Because 

of his reference to disproportionality, the Court will liberally construe the claim as a 

violation of the Eighth Amendment. 

The Eighth Amendment contains a “narrow” proportionality principle. Graham v. 

Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59-60 (2010). This principle “‘does not require strict proportionality 

between crime and sentence’ but rather ‘forbids only extreme sentences that are grossly 

disproportionate to the crime.’” Id.; see Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983) 

(sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole for seventh nonviolent felony 

violates 8th Amendment). “[O]utside the context of capital punishment, successful 

challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences will be exceedingly rare.” Solem, 

463 U.S. at 289-90; see also Crosby v. Schwartz, 678 F.3d 784, 795 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(“Circumstances satisfying the gross disproportionality principle are rare and extreme, and 

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constitutional violations on that ground are ‘only for the extraordinary case.’”) (citing 

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 77 (2003)). 

Under this proportionality principle, the threshold determination for the court is 

whether petitioner’s sentence is one of the rare cases in which a comparison of the crime 

committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality. See 

Norris, 622 F.3d at 1290; United States v. Bland, 961 F.2d 123, 129 (9th Cir. 1992) 

(quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005); accord Ewing, 538 U.S. at 11-12 (applying 

Harmelin standard); see, e.g., Norris, 622 F.3d at 1292-96 (concluding that sentence of life 

without possibility of parole for conviction of first degree child molestation of 5-year-old 

girl, where touching was brief and over clothing, was not grossly disproportionate). 

Petitioner was convicted of kidnapping with the intent to commit a robbery under 

Penal Code section 209(b), which is a felony. Section 209(b) explicitly states that the 

punishment is “life with the possibility of parole.” Accordingly, Petitioner’s sentence was 

clearly within statutory limits. With respect to disproportionality, the Court is not 

persuaded that Petitioner’s sentence one of those “rare cases” in which there is an 

inference of gross disproportionality, especially when compared to Norris which involved 

a sentence of life without the possibility of parole for a serious felony that was found not 

grossly disproportionate. Id. Here, Petitioner’s crime was also a serious felony but he 

received a sentence with the possibility of parole. The fact that parole has not been granted 

does not per se state to a constitutional violation. Only where Petitioner was not afforded 

procedural protections, which entitles a prisoner to nothing more than a fair hearing and a 

statement of reasons for a parole board's decision, does he state a due process violation 

warranting federal habeas relief. See Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 220 (2011). 

Petitioner makes no such allegations in the instant petition. Accordingly, the petition is 

DISMISSED for failure to state a claim. 

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CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the petition is DISMISSED for failure to state a 

cognizable claim for federal habeas relief. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: _____________________ ________________________ 

EDWARD J. DAVILA 

United States District Judge

Order of Dismissal 

PRO-SE\EJD\HC.16\03628Owens_dism(ftsac) 

10/27/2016

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