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Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 

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\ ' 

P U B L I S H 

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE .TENTH .CIRCUIT AP~ 18 1990 

ROBERT t. HOECK.ER 

Clerk JONATHAN KEITH CARTER; THERESA JEAN ) 

CARTER; and DANNY RAY CARTER, all minors ) 

by and through their paternal ) 

grandmother and next-of-friend, ) 

Gertrude Carter, ) 

) 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) 

Cross-Appellees, ) 

) 

v 0 ) 

) 

UNIT RIG & EQUIPMENT COMPANY, ) 

a Texas corporation, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellee, ) 

Cross-Appellant. ) 

Nos. 84-2463 

84-2639 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. No. 81-A-1234) 

Alan Epstein, Hall & Evans, Denver, Colorado (L. Richard Musat, 

Hall & Evans, Denver, Colorado; David W. Griffith, Williams, 

Trine, Greenstein & Griffith, Boulder, Colorado, were also on the 

brief) for Plaintiffs-Appellants 

Michael T. McConnell, Long & Jaudon, Denver, Colorado, for 

Def endant-Appellee 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, McWILLIAMS and EBEL, Circuit Judges 

HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge 

Appellate Case: 84-2463 Document: 01019623011 Date Filed: 04/18/1990 Page: 1 
\ 

I 

Seeking damages :from· ·~the· .. defendant Unit .. ,_Rig -& Equipment 

Company ("Unit Rig" oro. the· "company!') and General Electric for the 

wrongful death of ·her son, Terry .. €art er,, 'plaint·if f Gertrude Carter 

commenced this product liability action as next friend on behalf 

of her three grandchildren on July 15, 1981. Originally both 

General Electric and Unit Rig were named as defendants. In March 

1984 the district court approved· a settlement pursuant to which 

General Electric paid $20,000 to the plaintiff and received a 

dismissal with prejudice. 

The defendant Unit Rig & Equipment Co. manufactured the truck 

in which Terry Carter was killed on July 18, 1979, in an accident 

at the Climax Mine in Colorado. The jury found Unit Rig liable 

for Terry's death and assessed damages in the amount of $366,667. 

Applying Colorado's comparative fault statute ("Section 406"), 1 

the jury found the decedent.Terry 88 percent responsible for the 

fatal accident and Unit Rig 12 percent responsible. After 

subtracting $20,000 from the $366,667 figure to reflect the 

settlement with General Electric, the district court entered a 

judgment of $41,600 (12% of $346,667) for the plaintiff • 2 

On appeal, plaintiff Gertrude Carter asserts two major claims 

of error. She argues that the district court (1) misconstrμed 

Colorado's comparative fault statute and improperly instructed the 

1 

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-406 (1980 & Supp. 1988) (Comparative 

Fault as Measure of Damages). 

2 

Total damages assessed: 

G.E. settlement: 

·Multiplied bi 12% 

Damages owed by Unit Rig: 

2 

$366,667.00 

- 20,000.00 

346 ,.667. 00 

x .12 

41,600.00 

Appellate Case: 84-2463 Document: 01019623011 Date Filed: 04/18/1990 Page: 2 
jury to-· consider .Terry's '-contr-ib.utory :ne.gligence .for ... purposes of 

apportioning·:.· responsibility ·for -the accident-;nand ( 2} erroneously 

refused to submit plaintiff's tendered- sudden. emergency 

instruction. Carter: asserts,'" moreover, that this,court should 

certify the issue of the construction of Section 406 to the 

Supreme Court of Colorado. 

In its cross-appeal Unit Rig challenges the district court's 

decision to make the $20,000 reduction from the $366,637 award to 

reflect the settlement with General Electric. The company argues 

that Colorado law mandates the reduction of $20,000 be made from 

the $44,000 (12% of the entire $366,667) figure for which the jury 

found Unit Rig liable in its special verdict regarding comparative 

fault. 

We do not agree that the trial judge misconstrued Section 

406. However, we are convinced the court erred in refusing to 

instruct the jury on the s~dden emergency doctrine as requested, 

and must remand for a new trial. We also provide that on remand, 

consideration be given to whether in the circumstances of this 

case any setoff should be allowed at all. 

II 

From Jtine 1970 until his death in July 1979, Terry Carter 

worked in various capacities for the Climax Molybdenum Company at 

its open pit mining site in Climax, Colorado. In May 1977, Terry 

completed the company truck driver training program and was 

permitted to operate trucks of 100 tons or more thereafter. 

Although it is not clear from the trial record precisely how much 

cumulative time Terry spent as a truck driver, it appears that he 

did not. work continuously·in that capacity, and that at the time 

of the accident he had only been driving the truck in which he was 

3 

Appellate Case: 84-2463 Document: 01019623011 Date Filed: 04/18/1990 Page: 3 
killed .. ,for ... one:- uninte·r:.r~u_I?ted·-week. ··.:.See .XXI. R ... ; de.fendant's 

exhibit CS. 

The truck Terry was. operating in July 1S79 was. the Lectra 

,ifaul · M-120,- ·manufactured by .Uni·t Rig. The t:ruck .is- over 34 feet 

long and weighs appro~imately 200 tons when fully loaded. The 

truck operator is situated 17 feet off of the ground. The vehicle 

was used to haul ore from the open pit molybdenum mine to a 

processing point some distance away. The M-120 is equipped with 

two braking systems. The first is a mechanical disc braking 

system which is roughly similar to those found in automobiles. 

The second is a specially-designed dynamic retarding technology 

that employs electrical energy to retard the movement of the M120 's wheels.3 

Climax drivers are instructed to use the mechanical brakes at 

speeds of three miles per hour or less and to use the dynamic 

retarder at higher speeds. The mechanical brakes are only to be 

used at speeds above three miles per hour in emergency situations 

3 

Dynamic retarding technology is cogently explained as follows 

in the Answer Brief of the Defendant: 

Dynamic retarding works by switching the electric wheel 

motors (which consume electricity} to electric 

generators (which produce electricity). Dynamic 

retarding was activated by pressing a foot pedal in the 

cab. When the truck was moving (i.e., the wheels were 

rotating} and the driver activated dynamic retarding, 

the moving wheel motors were switched to generators and 

began producing electric current. That electric current 

was routed to a large grid of electrical resistors which 

slowed the rotation of the wheels. 

Answer Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 4 (distillation of expert 

testimony of S. D. Buchanan, an electrical engineer, at Vol. XII, 

pp. 7-12). This description of the operation of the dynamic 

retarder also comports with that set forth in the testimony of 

· ... Richard Crawford, .. ,,;~~f.;gss:~x .. -·of Mechanical .Enginee.r ing, University 

of Colorado, VIII R. 19-20. 

4 

Appellate Case: 84-2463 Document: 01019623011 Date Filed: 04/18/1990 Page: 4 
·:because these brakes are- ruined at higher speeds ·and must ·be 

··~-"·replaced. if· so·,· .. ·used; · at· consi·derabl:·e ·expense to· the .Climax 

.. Company. In such· an emergency the ~mechanical brakes can 

theoretically· stop the·cefeh·icle· at· speeds ·UP to 30--miles per hour. 

When operating the M-120 on a downward grade, drivers are 

instructed never to allow the truck to coast, and never to allow 

the vehicle to travel at speeds of more than 15 miles per hour. 

If the truck exceeds 15 miles per hour, the M-120's dynamic 

retarder brakes are designed to engage automatically, at 

approximately 18 to 19 miles per hour, without any activation by 

the driver. 

There were no eyewitnesses to Terry's fatal accident on July 

18, 1979. However, it is undisputed that on that day, he was 

driving a fully-loaded M-120 down a ten percent grade when he 

informed his. dispatcher by radio· that he was "losing his 

dynamics," in those words or words to that effect. The radio 

transmission ceased, and the next contact ·with Terry occurred 

shortly thereafter when co-workers discovered the M-120 overturned 

at the bottom of the grade. Having sustained a basal skull 

fracture, Terry was pronounced dead on arrival at the Climax 

infirmary. 

The speed at which Terry was traveling at the time of the 

tragedy is not known. Nor is it known when or if Terry used 

either or both of the M-120's braking systems; nor when, if, and/ 

or to what extent the vehicle's dynamic retarder system engaged 

automatically. Plaintiff Carter infers from the available facts 

that the accident.resulted from design defects in the M-120 and 

failure ,_,to. warn. M-120 drivers of ,t.h~ Jrnplicat.t-cms qf these design 

defects. It is argued that Carter had insufficient warning of the 

5 

Appellate Case: 84-2463 Document: 01019623011 Date Filed: 04/18/1990 Page: 5 
· <ly.namic. retarder's.·~ fai-lure. te·-slo.w the:·.:M-12Q.,,.,adequately. Unable 

.,. '" to rely on, ... the dynamic ·retarder,. ·and tlissu.aded .from using the 

mechanical brakes under ...ilny but .the most dir.e circumstances, it is 

\ 

infer red·.;either that. ( 1) .one or .. both .of.: the -.braki.ng systems failed 

or that (2) Terry inadvertently waited too long to engage the 

mechanical brakes (because the M-120 lacked any type of 

unambiguous indicator of the status of the dynamic retarder's 

operation), and the vehicle's momemtum rendered it unstoppable. 

Unit Rig infers from the same facts that Carter did have 

adequate warning of the functioning or failure of the dynamic 

retarder, because the engagement of the dynamic retarder could be 

felt and heard by a competent driver of the M-120. Unit Rig says 

the accident resulted not from any failure of design or warning, 

but from Terry's having negligently exceeded the 15 mile-per~hour 

speed limit and then having failed to remedy his negligent error 

in time ~y engaging the mechanical brakes. 

III 

Plaintiff Carter's Appellate Issues 

Comparative Fault 

As in Huffman v. Caterpillar Tractor Company, F. 2d 

(10th Cir. Nos. 86-2630 and 2658), decided today, plaintiff 

Carter's central argument on appeal is that the district court's 

jury instructions regarding the issue of comparative fault 

erroneously stated the law of Colorado under its comparative fault 

statute, C.R.S. § 13-21-406 (1980 & 1988 Supp.). 4 Plaintiff says 

that ordinary contributory negligence does not constitute "fault" 

4 

While we conclude .we must reverse on other grounds and remand 

for a.·new trial, we treat this comparative fault issue which will 

likely be present on retrial. 

6 

Appellate Case: 84-2463 Document: 01019623011 Date Filed: 04/18/1990 Page: 6 
·- in a strict product liability action. '-The: argument made by the 

· plaintiff .is: that the ·trial court· should not::have submitted the 

··· · iss·ue of Terry's comparative fault to the· jury because Terry's 

conduct, which plaintiff characterizes· as "ordinary contributory 

negligence," does not constitute "fault" as that term is employed 

in Section 406. For reasons similar to those given in our 

analysis of Section 406 in the Huffman opinion, we cannot agree. 

The relevant passage of C.R.S. § 13-21-406 reads as follows: 

Comparative fault as measure of damages. (1) In 

any product liability action, the fault of the person 

suffering the harm, as well as the fault of all others 

who are parties to the action for causing the harm, 

shall be compared by the trier of fact in accordance 

with this section. The fault of the person suffering 

the harm shall not bar such person, or a party bringing 

an action on behalf of such a person ... from recovering 

damages, but the award of damages to such person or the 

party bringing the action shall be diminished in 

proportion to the amount of causal fault attributed to 

the person suffering the harm. If any party is claiming 

damages for a decedent's wrongful death, the fault of 

the decedent, if any, shall be imputed to such 

party.**** 

§ 13-21-406 C.R.S. (1980 & 19fr8 Supp.) (emphasis added). 

On consid~ration of the statute's broad language and the 

legislative history of C.R.S. § 13-21-406,5 we are not persuaded 

to adopt the construction urged by the plaintiff Carter. The 

statute does not define the term "fault." We cannot find any 

indication that the General Assembly intended to exempt a 

plaintiff's contributory negligence from consideration as "fault" 

for purposes of determining damages. As we stated in Huffman, 

"the term 'fault,' as employed in C.R.S. § 13-21-406, is more 

plausibly construed as a general term encompassing a broad range 

5 

· ·See :gen-er ally;·.,· Tape Reco-rdi.ngs of :.Senate ·Busines.s Affairs and 

Labor Committee, Feb. 10, 16,.1981. 

7 

Appellate Case: 84-2463 Document: 01019623011 Date Filed: 04/18/1990 Page: 7 
-·~of ··culpable ' behav~ior-- i~ncluding,. but-:; not l·imibed to negligence." 

·.-·· Hu·ffman, slip op.-at 14,:(footnotes·: omitted) • 6 ·As we noted in 

Huf·fman ;-··s·1~ip op. at 8-9, Colorado decisions ear lier did not apply 

···-comparative negligence:··-J;fr inciples- in strict ·liability suits, ~ .g_ .• 

Kinard v. Coates, 553 P.2d 835, 837-38 (Colo.App. 1976), but we 

are convinced that the broad terms of the 1981 comparative fault 

statute of Colorado employed in C.R.S. 13-21-406 effected a change 

and its terms encompass a broad range of culpable behavior 

including, but not limited to, negligence. In Huffman we noted 

the breadth of the term "fault" by reference to its common meaning 

reflected in dictionary definitions. Huffman, slip op. at 13, n. 

12 (definitions of fault include, ~.g_., "neglect," "failing," "a 

failure to do· something required by law or the doing of something 

forbidden by law"). 

There is some merit to the plaintiff's point that the 

doctrine of contributory negligence has been superseded by 

6 

As noted in Huffman, slip op. at 14 n. 15, we find support 

for our approach to the comparative fault statute in the analysis 

of the Colorado Supreme Court Committee on Civil Jury Instructions 

in its Special Note to Colorado Civil Jury Instruction 14:30: 

The Committee recognizes that the General Assembly left 

unanswered many issues posed by the "comparative fault" 

statute (C.R.S. Sec. 13-21-406) and that the appellate 

courts have not yet had an opportunity to rule on these 

issues. The Committee's intent' in drafting these 

instructions is not to resolve these issues but to 

provide the Bench and Bar with a basic structure from 

which to work in formulating appropriate instructions 

for the jury. *** 

CJI-CIV.2d 14:30 (1980 & 1988 Supp.). 

In Huffman, we also cited legislative history and other 

support £or our interpretation of the comparative fault statute as 

covering a broad range of culpable conduct, including but not -~··'·limired to·, ·negligence. :::see·Huf·fman, .sJ:ip,op •. at···l4, nn. 16 and 

17. 

8 

Appellate Case: 84-2463 Document: 01019623011 Date Filed: 04/18/1990 Page: 8 
.Colorado'.s,;.adoption of a .. compa-rative fauJ:t regime. Th.is is true 

.. -:in ,'.the · sense that at .common :law; contributory · negl.igence was an 

affirmative defense=that could.bar any recovery by a plaintiff who 

was - found- .to, have~ ~egligently .conbributed. ·to hi~own injury. 

Comparative fault regimes such as that set forth in Section 406 

reject the harsh common law doctrine of contributory negligence as 

a complete bar and instead direct juries to discount a plaintiff's 

recovery by the percentage of fault that can be attributed to the 

plaintiff's culpable conduct. 

Nevertheless the fact that the traditional contributory 

negligence doctrine has been superseded does not mean that 

Colorado juries ar~ precluded from considering the negligent 

behavior of a plaintiff for purposes of apportioning damages in 

product liability cases. As stated in Huffman, we are persuaded 

that it was the intention of the General Assembly that the 

negligence of product liability plaintiffs , should be considered 

under C.R.S. § 13-21-406, and that damage awards are to be reduced 

to the extent that a plaintiff is found to have been responsible 

for his own injury. Huffman, slip op. at 15. 

Plaintiff Carter argues that the question of construction of 

Colorado's comparative fault statute should be certified for 

determination by the Supreme Court of Colorado. We do not agree. 

In light of the substantial support we find for the statutory 

interpretation made by the district court, which we uphold, we 

decline the request to certify the question and affirm the 

statutory construction made below for the reasons we have stated 

in Huffman and here. 

9 

Appellate Case: 84-2463 Document: 01019623011 Date Filed: 04/18/1990 Page: 9 
·· ·Refusal of. the Sudden~Emergency· Instruction 

The 0 ·plaintiff furthe-r-argues·:that ~there was·= ·evid'en·ce on which 

··"the jury cou1d · have found that Terry Carter was confronted with 

--crrcumsi;ances amounting to·,a sudden· emergency; it was, therefore, 

reversible error for the trial court to refuse to give the 

plaintiff's sudden emergency instruction.7 

"The rule of sudden emergency is applicable when, without 

tortious conduct on his part, one is suddenly and unexpectedly 

placed in a perilous situation requiring instant action without 

the exercise of deliberate judgment." Hopkins v. Metcalf, 435 

F.2d 123, 124 (10th Cir. 1970) (applying Oklahoma law). Stated 

another way, 

one who without fault on his part, is suddenly and 

unexpectedly placed in a perilous situation, so as to be 

compelled to act instantly and without an opportunity 

for the exercise of deliberate judgment, is not 

chargeable with negligence if in attempting to escape 

from the peril or to avoid or minimize the ·threatened 

injury he acts as a person of. reasonable prudence would 

or might have acted in the same or a similar situation. 

Annotation, Instructions on Sudden Emergency in Motor Vehicle 

Cases, 80 A.L.R.2d 5, 12 (1961). 

The district judge's order denying Carter's motion for a new 

trial, II R. at 162, 166, stated the basis for his refusal of the 

sudden emergency instruction as follows: 

7 

The specific instruction tendered by the plaintiff read as 

follows: 

A person who, through no fault ·of his own, is 

placed in a sudden emergency, is not chargeable with 

fault if he exercises that degree of care which a 

reasonably careful person would have exercised under the 

same or similar circumstances. 

T.R •... Vol •. I .at 94 ... This is verba.tim the sudden emergency charge 

·as stated in the: Colorado Jury Instructions. CJI-CIV2d 9:10 

(Footnote contin~ed·on next page) 

10 

Appellate Case: 84-2463 Document: 01019623011 Date Filed: 04/18/1990 Page: 10 
'.·. 

-The doctrine.··-O·f. sudden· emergency ·W0Uld .not· apply oin this 

case. Evidence revealed that the speed limit on Ceresco .... _.·:: Ridge Road· :.[--where·-the~ ·accident- occurred}.:::was 15 m.p.h. 

Also, evidence was introduced to show that several 

seconds lapsed between the time the truck's brakes 

failed and the time the truck became "runaway." No 

other -vehicles· were·-.on the· road in the vicinity ·of Terry 

Carter's truck. I think this situation is not one in 

which "instantaneous" action must be taken without any 

exercise of deliberate judgment. Therefore, the Court's 

failure to give plaintiff's sudden emergency instruction 

was ·not improper. 

II R. at 166 (emphasis added) •. 

We must disagree with the action of the trial judge in 

rejecting the requested instruction. The judge noted that there 

was evidence of brake failure and that only "several seconds" 

lapsed before the truck became "runaway." In light of the 

testimony and reasonable inferences from it, there was sufficient 

evidence to call for submission of the issue. In ruling as he 

did, the trial judge in effect determined a factual issue 

sufficiently raised to call for resolution by the jury, with 

proper submission of the issue. 

Our research has revealed no Colorado authority for the 

proposition that there is a meaningful difference between an 

"instant" and "several seconds" for purposes of applying the 

sudden emergency doctrine. What is clear from the Colorado cases 

we have reviewed is that where there is some evidentiary basis for 

finding a sudden emergency to have existed, the question is one 

for the finder of fact. See ~, Tracy v. Graf, 550 P.2d 886, 

890 (Colo. App. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 568 P.2d 467 (Colo. 

1977) (en bane), ("it was for the jury to determine, under the 

(Footnote continued): 

(1980); see also Cudney v. Moore, 428 P.2d 81, 82 (Colo. 1967) 

:t·appr-oved'·:,by the ·Co,lorado·:·Supreme. Cour..t:. .· of a ~.similarly phrased 

·sudden emergency instr_!Jction). 

11 

Appellate Case: 84-2463 Document: 01019623011 Date Filed: 04/18/1990 Page: 11 
circumstanc.e.s . ., whether .an, unfor-eseen .eme.rgency .-existed, and. if so, 

· · · · ··.-Whether···def endant -.was· ·at ·fault ·for its.-_ creation."); ·Kaesik v. 

.Halbert, 513 P.2d 242, 244. (Colo.App. 1~7~); -Peek v. Forbes, 470 

· ·P • .2d 85, ·:·86 -(.Colo.App. 19.10·)' '("the exi-stence.· of.~an emergency is to 

be determined by the trier of fact if there is evidence from which 

it could be reasonably found that an emergency existed"); 

Bartlett v. Bryant, 442 P.2d 425, 427 (Colo. 1968); Cudney v. 

Moore, 428 P.2d 81, 83 (Colo. 1967). See also, Daigle v. Prather, 

380 P.2d 670, 672 (Colo. 1963) (finding sudden emergency 

instruction appropriate where there was evidence of brake 

failure); accord, Annotation, Instructions on Sudden Emergency in 

Motor Vehicle Cases, 80 A.L.R.2d 5, 47 (1961) ("a peril arising by 

reason of the defective condition or the malfunctioning of a 

vehicle may constitute an emergency"). Thus substantively there 

was evidence of circumstances which could be found to have been a 

sudden emergency under Colorado law. And, under federal 

procedure, a proper instruction being requested in a case where 

the evidence was sufficient to raise the issue, the instruction 

should have been given. Hopkins, 435 F.2d at 125. 

The precise circumstances which led to Terry Carter's death 

are unknown. The question is whether there was sufficient 

evidence presented at trial upon which the jury could have found 

that Terry was faced with a sudden emergency shortly before his 

death. See Kaesik v. Halbert, 513 P.2d 242, 244 (Colo. App. 1973) 

(jury properly instructed to consider both contributory negligence 

and sudden emergency where sudden emergency was raised as defense 

to alleged contributory negligence); Annotation, Instructions on 

Sudden Emergency in Motor Vehicle Cases, 80 A.L.R.2d 5, 20 (1961) 

('"·the [sudden] emergency rule may be invoked as a defense against 

12 

Appellate Case: 84-2463 Document: 01019623011 Date Filed: 04/18/1990 Page: 12 
·~ ·:,char-ge ·of either · primary ·or-• .:contr ibutor~y negligence at the 

·· ~·:.:instance of· either the ... plaintiff .or the ... ·. defendant")'; ·:·Where·· there 

is sufficient evidence for the jury to find that a sudden 

emergency confronted· a party, he is entitled to an instruction on 

that issue. Hopkins v. Metcalf, 435 F.2d 123, 124-25 (10th Cir. 

1970). And if the jury found that such a sudden emergency 

confronted Terry, it would exculpate the plaintiff from the large 

reduction of the judgment here. 

There was testimony by witness Acrey relating a radio 

communication he heard from Terry stating, "I am losing my 

.dynamics." VI R. 110. Eight to ten seconds later, Terry said, "I 

have lost my dynamics." VI R. 113. It sounded as though Terry 

was shouting over a noise. Id. Following advice then to "[g]et 

on your brakes," Terry replied, "I am on 'em." Id. at 114-15. 

The inference that Terry was confronted by an emergency was 

clearly justified. This situation is strikingly similar to that 

of the brake failure circumstances in Daigle v. Prather, 380 P.2d 

at 672, where a sudden emergency instruction was held proper. 

Moreover there was expert testimony by a mechanical 

engineering professor that, in his opinion, Terry lost his 

"dynamics" on the M-120 about the time he applied them, at 

"approximately 15 miles an hour; that they became disconnected." 

He said then that the mechanical brakes failed "approximately 2400 

feet from the curve down." X R. 48-49. Professor Crawford 

further testified that in his opinion the cause of Terry's 

accident was lack of a warning light or system to inform the 

driver he had "lost his dynamics" and was approaching a ~peed at 

~which _he_-.could. not .. contr:oL .his. sehicle, adding -'~be had very little· 

time to function or to make this analysis 

13 

II X R. 14. 

Appellate Case: 84-2463 Document: 01019623011 Date Filed: 04/18/1990 Page: 13 
·We are- convinced· that- there .was:-·sufficient-ev·idence so that 

the jury-.could ha.ve found ·that·.Terry was~ confronted .with a sudden 

-emergency. In such-circumstances the issue must be submitted to 

the jury. :~see· Sanchez v. Safeway Stores, Inc., · 451 P.2d 998, 1000 

(10th Cir. 1971); see also, Long v. Hank, 457 F.2d 40., 42-43 

(10th Cir. 1972); Hopkins v. Metcalf, 435 F.2d 123, 124-25 (10th 

Cir. 1970).As we held in Hopkins, "[w]e are convinced that the 

failure to give the requested instruction on sudden emergency was 

an error prejudicial to the plaintiff's substantial rights." 

Hopkins, 435 F.2d at 125. 

IV 

Unit Rig's Cross-Appeal 

The remaining issue is the proper setof f to be made due to 

the. $20,000 pretrial settlement payment made by General Electric 

to plaintiff Carter. The reversal we feel required to make for a 

new trial will set aside the judgment and setoff determination, 

but since this issue may arise again on the retrial of this case, 

we will discuss the setoff question. 

The issue raised in Unit Rig's cross-appeal concerns the 

extent to which plaintiff Carter's pretrial. settlement with 

General Electric should reduce the damages payable by Unit Rig. 

The trial judge determined that the $20,000 settlement paid by 

General Electric should be deducted from the total damage award by 

the jury of $366,667. Then, since Unit Rig was found to be 12 

percent at fault by the jury, the judge determined that Unit Rig's 

liability should be $41,600 (12% of $346,667). 

Unit Rig contends that the court erred in deducting the 

$20, 000 .. .settlement from the . full $366, 667 awar.d before the 

reduction for Terry's comparative fault. The proper course, Unit 

14 

Appellate Case: 84-2463 Document: 01019623011 Date Filed: 04/18/1990 Page: 14 
· . Rig .... says,. would ha.ve been to deduct the--$20 1 000 from. ,the ultimate 

determin-ation of ··:damages ··after the· · ·reduction for Terry's 

comparative fault. That amount was $44,000 (1~% of $366,667) and 

- - · ·.Unit: Rig argues that ·the-·$20, 000 .setoff :should ::.be · made to that 

$44,000 figure for a $24,000 final award. 

This setoff issue must be decided under the 1977 version of 

Colorado's Contribution Act, C.R.S. 13-50.5-101, et ~., rather 

than under the c·urrent version of the Contribution Act reflecting 

the 1986 amendments, C.R.S. 13-21-111.5(1) (1987); C.R.S. 

13-50.5-105.5(l)(a) (1987). Under Colorado law "[a] statute is 

presumed to be prospective in its operation." C.R.S. 2-4-202; 

C.R.S. 2-4-303 (1980 & 1989 Supp.) (liability incurred under a 

statute is not altered or extinguished by repeal or amendment of 

such statute unless amending or repealing statute expressly so 

provides); 7 J. MILLER, COLORADO PERSONAL INJURY PRACTICE, 

§§ 14. 28-14. 29. ( 1989) (in cases "commenced on or after July 1, 

1986," the 1986 amendments to the Contribution Act are 

applicable). Section 13-50.5-105 of the 1977 Colorado 

Contribution Act provided in part as follows: 

(1) When a release or covenant not to sue or not to 

enforce judgment is given in good faith to one of two or 

more persons liable in tort for the same injury or the 

same wrongful death: 

(a) It does not discharge any of the other 

tortfeasors from liability for the injury or wrongful 

death unless its terms so provide; but it reduces the 

claim against the others to the extent of any amount 

stipulated by the release or the covenant, or in the 

amount of the consideration paid for it, whichever is 

the greater " 

Under this statute there is a question in some instances 

whether any setoff should be allowed. In Kussman v. City and 

·-<County· of ·-Denver, · 706 P.2d 776, 782 (Colo. 1985) (en bane), the 

15 

Appellate Case: 84-2463 Document: 01019623011 Date Filed: 04/18/1990 Page: 15 
,,court" held that-"wher.e .. ,judgment is .. r.endered agacinst· ··"a·· tO'?'·b-·feasor 

·. · ·for -no ·-:more than -its ·proportionate· share of ·-liability, it is not 

eligible .for deduction of . the settlement ~,...amouRt from the 

judgment." However .. ; we0,ar:e not-, pe-rsuaded that ~such a rule applies 

hereo In the Kussman case there were special circumstances in 

that the City's defense resulted in the liability for the 

plaintiff's injury being divided into "two independent 

components," the City's liability and liability of a driver 

imputed to the plaintiff. 706 P.2d at 780. As a result, 

liability was divided according to fault and judgment was rendered 

against the City for no more than its independent portion of the 

liability to the plaintiff. Hence, joint or several liability for 

the entire damages for the plaintiff's injury was. erased. 706 

P.2d at 780. Therefore, the condition for reduction of the claim 

pursuant to Section 13-50.5-105(l)(a), was erased and no setoff 

was allowed. The "common liability" giving_ rise to a right of 

contribution, and similarly under the setoff statute to a right of 

setoff, did not exist in Kussman. 706 P.2d at 780. 

We do not have such circumstances here. The pretrial 

settlement made by the plaintiff Carter with General Electric did 

not occur in a case where there was a determination of two 

independent components of liability for the wrongful death, the 

alleged liability of Unit Rig and alleged liability of General 

Electric. Instead, where the only injuries involved are those for 

which all tortfeasors are jointly or severally liable, the 

settlement amount or amount provided for in the settlement 

docum~nt, whichever is greater, must be deducted from the total 

judgment .against the remaining tortfeasors. 

Blessing, 706 P.2d 772, 775 (Colo. 1985) (en bane). 

16 

Perlmutter v. 

Appellate Case: 84-2463 Document: 01019623011 Date Filed: 04/18/1990 Page: 16 
. -.. ·.we are not -persuaded··;;:by · Un·i t Rig '-s·- .argument, and .instead we 

·<conclude ·that the trial judge here':properly made ·the :setoff from 

the entire~judgment. Unit Rig relies on Hauser v. Public Service 

Company of.Colorado,·797 .. F.2d 876'(10th Cir..1986). ·It is true 

that ·in Hauser the ultimate damage award approved by this court 

was arrived at with a setoff made after a reduction of the 

plaintiff's judgment for his comparative negligence. However, the 

argument Unit Rig makes here was not actually ruled on in Hauser. 

There the error found was that only a figure used for the 

calculation of interest was amended to reflect the $50,000 

settlement payment in that case. 797 F.2d at 880. The Hauser 

opinion cited Perlmutter v. Blessing, 706 P.2d 772, 776, and its 

interpretation that the phrase "dlaim against the other 

[tortfeasors]" in C.R.S. § 13-50.5-105(l)(a) as meaning "to 

comprise the entire judgment II whether or not the original 

defendants were jointly and severally liable. Id. at 880-81. 

We are satisfied that the trial judge made the proper setoff 

in conformity with the Colorado decisions construing the 1977 

statute which applies here, § 13-50.5-105. The Colorado Court 

does ·refer to "the entire judgment" in interpreting the "claim 

against the other tortfeasors" which the statute requires to be 

reduced by reason of the settlement payment. Perlmutter, 706 P.2d 

at 775, 776. Moreover, this same setoff interpretation made by 

the trial judge here was also made by another federal district 

judge in Alling v. American Tool and Grinding Co., Inc., 648 

F.Supp. 1344, 1348-49 (D.Colo. 1986). We feel that the setoff 

determination made by the trial judge here was proper under 

Colorado law. The.refore if_ a .plaintiff's verdict and a finding of 

comparative negligence by 1 the plaintiff result on retrial, the 

17 

Appellate Case: 84-2463 Document: 01019623011 Date Filed: 04/18/1990 Page: 17 
_ .. ,c$20:, 000 set off ·should, be-,.made agains-t .the entire original judgment 

for•the plaintiff before·the comparative negligence reduction. 

Accordingly, the judgment is REVERSED and the case is 

... REMANDED for fm:-ther. -proceedings in accord.with ,·this ,;opinion. 

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Appellate Case: 84-2463 Document: 01019623011 Date Filed: 04/18/1990 Page: 18