Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02618/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02618-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

MATTHEW MELLO, individually and as 

Successor-in-Interest to AIRABELLA 

MELLO, deceased, 

Plaintiff, 

v.

COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO; COUNTY 

OF SACRAMENTO, DEPARTMENT OF 

HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES; 

COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, CHILD 

PROTECTIVE SERVICES; and DOES 1 

through 100 inclusive, 

Defendants.

No. 2:14-cv-02618-KJM-KJN 

ORDER 

Airabella Mello, plaintiff Matthew Mello’s daughter, was visiting her mother and 

grandmother when she drowned in an unguarded swimming pool. Mr. Mello alleges defendants 

County of Sacramento, the Department of Health and Human Services, and Child Protective 

Services are liable for her death because despite notice, they did not investigate her mother and 

grandmother’s alleged abuse and improper supervision, and dangerous conditions at their home. 

His complaint alleges several claims under both federal and state law. Defendants move to 

dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The parties presented their 

arguments at a hearing on February 27, 2015. John C. Miller appeared for Mr. Mello, and Taylor 

Case 2:14-cv-02618-KJM-KJN Document 20 Filed 03/10/15 Page 1 of 7
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W. Rhoan appeared for defendants. After considering the parties’ briefs and arguments at the 

hearing, the court GRANTS the motion with leave to amend. 

I. BACKGROUND 

The complaint includes the following allegations: Airabella was visiting her 

mother and grandmother’s home in Sacramento on May 1, 2014. Compl. ¶ 18, ECF No. 1. The 

complaint indicates she fell in the pool and drowned during that visit. See id. ¶¶ 18–19.

Defendants’ officers had visited the home several times in the past to investigate claims of abuse, 

of dangerous conditions including the swimming pool, and of a lack of supervision and care for 

Airabella. Id.

The complaint makes no further specific factual allegations. It does include many 

paragraphs alleging defendants’ failures in general terms. An example illustrates its general style: 

Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges that 

defendants have been engaging in far-reaching and improper 

procedures, policies and practices as it relates to the investigation of 

allegations of abuse of children, allegations of the failure to 

properly supervise and care for children and allegations to properly 

address the existence of dangerous conditions at locations at which 

minors reside, within their jurisdiction. Plaintiff is further informed 

and believes that such improper and/or lack of procedures, policies, 

customs, and practices has led to injuries and/or death[s] of 

numerous children in an unwritten policy, practice, procedure and 

custom of defendants. These procedures, policies, customs, and 

practices have been ratified by each of the defendants. 

Id. ¶ 19. Mello seeks relief on three legal bases: California Civil Code section 52.1(b), otherwise 

known as the Bane Act; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of Fourteenth Amendment rights; and 

common law negligence. 

Defendants advance five defenses: (1) the complaint inadequately pleads any 

underlying constitutional violation; (2) the complaint does not allege facts to show an official 

policy or custom as required by Monell v. New York Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 

694 (1978); (3) the complaint omits any allegations of threats, intimidation, or coercion as 

required by the Bane Act; (4) the complaint describes no facts to show defendants breached a

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duty; and (5) the Department of Health and Human Services and Child Protective Services are 

duplicatively named. 

In his opposition, Mello passes over the fifth argument, that municipal departments 

are not “persons” subject to liability under section 1983. See United States v. Kama, 394 F.3d 

1236, 1239–40 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Smith-Berch, Inc. v. Baltimore Cnty., Md., 68 F. Supp. 2d 

602, 626 (D. Md. 1999) (collecting cases to this effect). At hearing, counsel confirmed these 

defendants may be dismissed. Defendants’ motion is granted with prejudice as to the Department 

of Health and Human Services and Child Protective Services. 

After reviewing the legal standard applicable to this motion, the court addresses 

each claim in turn. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

A party may move to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The motion may be granted only if the complaint lacks a 

“cognizable legal theory” or if its factual allegations do not support a cognizable legal theory.

Hartmann v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1122 (9th Cir. 2013). The court 

assumes these factual allegations are true and draws reasonable inferences from them. Ashcroft v. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 

A complaint need contain only a “short and plain statement of the claim showing 

that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), not “detailed factual allegations,” 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). But this rule demands more than 

unadorned accusations; “sufficient factual matter” must make the claim at least plausible. Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 678. In the same vein, conclusory or formulaic recitations of a cause’s elements do 

not alone suffice. Id. Evaluation under Rule 12(b)(6) is a context-specific task drawing on 

“judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. And aside from the complaint, district 

courts have discretion to examine documents incorporated by reference, Davis v. HSBC Bank 

Nevada, N.A., 691 F.3d 1152, 1160 (9th Cir. 2012); affirmative defenses based on the complaint’s 

allegations, Sams v. Yahoo! Inc., 713 F.3d 1175, 1179 (9th Cir. 2013); and proper subjects of 

judicial notice, W. Radio Servs. Co. v. Qwest Corp., 678 F.3d 970, 976 (9th Cir. 2012). 

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III. DISCUSSION 

A. Section 1983 

Municipalities may be held liable as “persons” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but not for 

the unconstitutional acts of their employees based solely on a respondeat superior theory.

Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. Rather, a plaintiff seeking to impose liability on a municipality under 

§ 1983 is required “to identify a municipal ‘policy’ or ‘custom’ that caused the plaintiff's injury.” 

Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997). To sufficiently plead a Monell claim 

and withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, allegations in a complaint “may not simply 

recite the elements of a cause of action, but must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts 

to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively.” AE ex rel. 

Hernandez v. Cnty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 

1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011)). A Monell claim may be stated under three theories of municipal 

liability: (1) when official policies or established customs inflict a constitutional injury; (2) when 

omissions or failures to act amount to a local government policy of deliberate indifference to 

constitutional rights; or (3) when a local government official with final policy-making authority 

ratifies a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct. Clouthier v. Cnty. of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 

1232, 1249–50 (9th Cir. 2010). Here, Mello argues all three theories apply. 

A plaintiff may establish municipal liability by demonstrating “the constitutional 

tort was the result of a ‘longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the standard operating 

procedure of the local government entity.’” Price v. Sery, 513 F.3d 962, 966 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(quoting Ulrich v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 308 F.3d 968, 984–85 (9th Cir. 2002)). To establish 

liability for governmental entities under this theory, a plaintiff must show (1) that the plaintiff 

“possessed a constitutional right of which [he or she] was deprived; (2) that the municipality had 

a policy; (3) that this policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional 

right; and, (4) that the policy is the moving force behind the constitutional violation.” Plumeau v. 

Sch. Dist. No. 40 Cnty. of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted). 

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A municipality’s failure to train its employees may amount to a policy of 

deliberate indifference. See Price, 513 F.3d at 973. To state a claim for failure to train, a plaintiff 

must show (1) “the existing training program” is inadequate “in relation to the tasks the particular 

[employees] must perform”; (2) the officials have been deliberately indifferent “to the rights of 

persons with whom [employees] come into contact”; and (3) the inadequacy of the training 

“actually caused the deprivation of the alleged constitutional right.” Merritt v. Cnty. of L.A.,

875 F.2d 765, 770 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see also 

Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1359 (2011). 

Finally, a plaintiff may claim Monell liability where an “official with final policymaking authority ratifie[s] a subordinate’s unconstitutional decision or action and the basis for it.” 

Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346–47 (9th Cir. 1992). A policymaker’s “knowledge of an 

unconstitutional act does not, by itself, constitute ratification.” Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231, 

1239 (9th Cir. 1999). “[A] policymaker’s mere refusal to overrule a subordinate’s completed act 

does not constitute approval.” Id. Rather, ratification requires the authorized policymaker to 

make a “conscious, affirmative choice.” Gillette, 979 F.2d at 1347. Ratification “and thus the 

existence of a de facto policy or custom, can be shown by a municipality’s post-event conduct, 

including its conduct in an investigation of the incident.” Dorger v. City of Napa, No. 12–440, 

2012 WL 3791447, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2012); see also Henry v. Cnty. of Shasta, 132 F.3d 

512, 518 (9th Cir. 1997), amended on denial of reh’g, 137 F.3d 1372 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Here, the complaint does no more than recite one or another signal phrases, see,

e.g., Compl. ¶ 48 (“this violation . . . was part of a policy, custom and practice”), and claim 

simply that the County’s inaction “has led to injuries and/or death[s] of numerous children,” id.

¶ 18. But a complaint must include “sufficient factual matter” to make the claim at least 

plausible. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. It cannot suffice to allege only, for example, that “Defendants 

failed to properly train [their] employees,” “failed to properly supervise and discipline [their] 

subordinates,” and “fail[ed] to provide adequate training reflect[ing] a deliberate and conscious 

choice.” Compl. ¶ 48. These are no more than recitations of the elements of a cause of action

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and give no notice of Mello’s theory of liability in this case. The motion is granted with leave to 

amend as to this claim. 

B. Bane Act 

The Bane Act prohibits any person from interfering by “threats, intimidation or 

coercion . . . with the exercise or enjoyment by any individual . . . of rights secured by the 

Constitution . . . .” Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(a). Following a recent California Court of Appeal 

decision, Shoyoye v. County of Los Angeles, 203 Cal. App. 4th 947 (2012), federal district courts 

have reached different results in trying to answer the question whether a plaintiff bringing a Bane 

Act claim ultimately must introduce independent evidence showing threats, intimidation, or 

coercion, in addition to showing a constitutional violation. See Davis v. City of San Jose,

___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2014 WL 4772668, *6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2014) (collecting cases). One 

group of decisions has concluded intentional conduct or excessive force claims suffice alone. Id.

The other has held “something more than an inherently coercive violation is required to state a 

claim under the Bane Act.” Id. At least in the Fourth Amendment context, this court to date has 

sided with the first camp. See Johnson v. Shasta Cnty., No. 14-01338, 2015 WL 75245, at *13 

(E.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2015) (“‘Where Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure or excessive force 

claims are raised and intentional conduct is at issue, there is no need for a plaintiff to allege a 

showing of coercion independent from the coercion inherent in the seizure or use of force.’” 

(quoting Dillman v. Tuolumne Cnty., No. 13-00404, 2013 WL 1907379, at *21 (E.D. Cal. 

May 7, 2013)). 

However the intracircuit split may be resolved, the complaint here includes no 

allegations of expressly or inherently coercive actions. It does not describe how anyone was 

coerced to do anything. The complaint’s theory in fact appears to be at odds with any allegation 

of coercion: it claims defendants’ inaction, bad policy, and poor training led to tragic oversights 

by its agents. The motion is granted with leave to amend as to this claim, if amendment 

consonant with Rule 11 is possible. 

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C. Negligence

“It is well-settled that there is no common law tort liability for public entities in 

California; instead, such liability must be based on statute.” Cardinal v. Buchnoff, No. 06-0072, 

2010 WL 3609489, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2010) (citing Miklosy v. Regents of Univ. of Cal.,

44 Cal. 4th 876, 899 (2008)). Nevertheless, statutory law makes a public entity vicariously liable 

for the injuries an employee causes within the scope of his or her employment unless the 

employee is immune from liability. Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 815, 815.2. “The elements of a cause of 

action for negligence are well established. They are (a) a legal duty to use due care; (b) a breach 

of such legal duty; and (c) the breach as the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury.” 

Ladd v. Cnty. of San Mateo, 12 Cal. 4th 913, 917 (1996) (internal quotation marks, citations, and 

alterations omitted). 

Here, the complaint alleges that “defendants had been to the Subject Property on 

numerous occasions to investigate claims of abuse of the Decedent, to investigate defective and 

dangerous conditions present at the Subject Property, including without limitation an unguarded 

swimming pool, and to investigate the failure to properly supervise and care for the Decedent by 

occupants of the Subject Property, including Decedent’s mother and grandmother.” Compl. 

¶¶ 51, 58. These allegations alone cannot survive a motion to dismiss. They tell at most a 

patchwork story of vicarious liability, omitting even a specific allegation of the date Airabella 

died. This claim is dismissed, with leave to amend. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

The motion to dismiss, ECF No. 7, is GRANTED WITH PREJUDICE as to the 

Department of Health and Human Services and Child Protective Services. In all other respects, 

the motion is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. The plaintiff may file an amended 

complaint within 21 days. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 10, 2015. 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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