Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-03993/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-03993-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Product Liability

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

PETER TUCKER, 

Plaintiff,

vs. 

POST CONSUMER BRANDS, LLC, 

Defendant. 

CASE NO. 19-cv-03993-YGR 

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS

Re: Dkt. Nos. 24, 38 

Plaintiff Peter Tucker brings this putative class action alleging that the branding and 

packaging of defendant Post Consumer Brands, LLC’s “Honey Bunches of Oats” cereal falsely 

and deceptively conveyed that honey was a primary or significant sweetener, when in fact, refined 

substances were the primary sweeteners. The operative complaint alleges three causes of action 

for violations of the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1750 et seq. 

(“CLRA”); California False Advertising Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500 et seq. (“FAL”); 

and California Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq. (“UCL”). 

Pending before the Court is defendant’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant 

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Having carefully considered the pleadings in this 

action and the papers submitted, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES the motion.

I. BACKGROUND

Defendant manufactures and markets varieties of breakfast cereals known as “Honey 

Bunches of Oats.” These cereals are sold to the public in rectangular boxes containing 13 ounces 

or more of cereal and individual serving “to go” cups containing 2.25 ounces of cereal. The front 

of each package is materially identical. As shown below, the package depicts a large yelloworange circle simulating a radiating sun, emblazoned with the words “HONEY BUNCHES OF 

OATS” and showing a wooden honey dipper dripping honey, and towards the bottom of the 

package is the outline of a bee trailing a broken line indicating flight: 

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Plaintiff alleges the branding and packaging of the cereal convey to consumers that honey 

is a primary or significant sweetener, as compared to sugar and other refined substances that are 

perceived as unhealthy. In support of its claim, plaintiff points to an August 2019 survey of more 

than 400 consumers, in which 68% of respondents believed honey was the cereal’s primary 

sweetener and 79.5% believed honey was one of the cereal’s three main ingredients based on the 

front packaging. Plaintiff alleges that in fact, the product is sweetened using various combinations 

of white sugar, brown sugar, corn syrup, malted barley syrup, molasses, and honey, with honey 

consistently being the least or second-least prominent sweetener. 

Plaintiff most recently purchased Honey Bunches of Oats on January 16, 2019. He alleges 

that he purchased and consumed the cereal based on the branding and packaging, which led him to 

believe the cereal was primarily or exclusively sweetened with honey and that honey was one of 

the top three ingredients in the cereal. Plaintiff alleges that he would consider purchasing the 

cereal again if the labeling were accurate. 

Plaintiff filed his initial complaint in this action on July 11, 2019. On August 16, 2019, the 

Court entered a joint stipulation to stay the case pending a decision on a motion to dismiss filed in 

Lima v. Post Consumer Brands, LLC, No. 1:18-cv-12100-ADB (D. Mass.), which the parties 

agreed would “resolve some or all of the claims in this case, or, at a minimum, [would] be 

instructive and helpful to resolving the similar factual and legal claims in this case.” The Lima

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court dismissed the complaint with prejudice. Lima v. Post Consumer Brands, LLC, No. 1:18-CV12100-ADB, 2019 WL 3802885 (D. Mass. Aug. 13, 2019), reconsideration denied, No. 1:18-CV12100-ADB, 2019 WL 4889599 (D. Mass. Oct. 2, 2019). On September 11, 2019, plaintiff filed 

an amended complaint in this case. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), an action may be dismissed for “failure to 

state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Dismissal is appropriate where the complaint 

lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri

v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). The complaint must allege “more 

than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not 

do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). When considering a motion to 

dismiss, a court must accept all material allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in 

the light most favorable to plaintiff. NL Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Claims alleging fraud must also meet the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b). Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 9(b). Rule 9(b) requires “an account of the time, place, and specific content of the false 

representations as well as the identities of the parties to the misrepresentations.” Swartz v. KPMG 

LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 764 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). To comply with the 

Rule 9(b) pleading standard, allegations of fraud “must be specific enough to give defendants 

notice of the particular misconduct which is alleged to constitute the fraud charged so that they can 

defend against the charge and not just deny that they have done anything wrong.” Id. (quoting 

Bly-Magee v. Cal., 236 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001)). 

III. DISCUSSION

Defendant moves to dismiss all three claims on the grounds that: (i) the branding and 

packaging at issue comply with the Federal Drug Administration (“FDA”)’s flavor labeling and 

misbranding regulations, and thus, plaintiff’s claims are preempted; (ii) no reasonable consumer 

would understand the Honey Bunches of Oats packaging to make a representation about the 

amount of honey in the cereal; and (iii) plaintiff lacks standing to seek injunctive relief because he 

does not plausibly allege that he will be deceived in the future. Defendant also argues that even if 

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the Court finds plaintiff has stated a claim for relief under the CLRA, his FAL and UCL claims 

fail because plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law. 

 The Court addresses each argument in turn. 

A. Preemption 

The Supremacy Clause grants Congress the power to preempt state law. Crosby v. 

National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000). The Supreme Court has identified 

two cornerstones of its preemption jurisprudence: first, “the purpose of Congress is the ultimate 

touchstone in every pre-emption case,” and second, “[i]n all pre-emption cases, and particularly in 

those in which Congress has legislated in a field which the States have traditionally occupied, we 

start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by 

the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” Wyeth v. Levine, 555 

U.S. 555, 565 (2009) (citation and internal marks omitted). Where there is a “plausible alternative 

reading,” courts “accept the reading that disfavors pre-emption.” Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 

544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005). 

The Food Drug and Cosmetics Act (“FDCA”) established a comprehensive federal scheme 

of food regulation to ensure food safety and proper labeling in an effort to avoid misleading 

consumers. 21 U.S.C. § 341, et seq. In 1990, Congress amended the FDCA by enacting the 

Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990 (“NLEA”). The FDCA, as amended by the NLEA, 

expressly preempts state laws to the extent they differ from federal law, providing that “no State 

. . . may directly or indirectly establish . . . any requirement for the labeling of food . . . that is not 

identical to” the FDCA’s requirements. 21 U.S.C. § 343-1(a)(3). Under this provision, state 

consumer protection laws are preempted when they are used to impose requirements that 

contravene or are inconsistent with the FDCA’s requirements. See Durnford v. MusclePharm 

Corp., 907 F.3d 595, 601-03 (9th Cir. 2018). 

Defendant argues that plaintiff’s claims are preempted by 21 C.F.R. section 101.22(i), 

which permits labels to make either “direct or indirect representations with respect to the primary 

recognizable flavor(s)” “by word, vignette, e.g., depiction of a fruit, or other means.” Defendant 

contends that honey is a “primary recognizable flavor” in its cereals and use of the word “honey” 

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and associated images are thus permitted by section 101.22(i). Plaintiff counters that honey is a 

sweetener, not a flavor, and neither section 101.22(i) nor any other federal statute or regulation 

address labeling for sweeteners. Plaintiff further argues that even if honey is a “primary 

recognizable flavor,” defendant cannot shield itself from claims regarding deceptive sweeteners 

because it arguably complied with a flavor labeling regulation.1

Defendant primarily argues that this Court should follow the District of Massachusetts’ 

holding in Lima because it is a substantially similar case. In Lima, the court considered the 

application of section 101.22(i) to claims that Honey Bunches of Oats’ packaging was misleading 

regarding the amount of honey in the cereal. The Lima court concluded that “[i]f Post’s use of the 

word ‘honey’ and the associated imagery reflects that honey is a primary recognizable flavor as 

well as an ingredient, then [section 101.22(i)] clearly permit[s] the use of the word ‘honey’ and the 

associated imagery.” Id. at *5. With respect to the Lima plaintiffs’ allegations regarding honey as 

a sweetener, the court noted that plaintiffs seemed to “understand that honey is both a sweetener 

and a flavoring agent, yet they d[id] not explain why they concluded that the word honey and the 

associated imagery necessarily meant that honey was the primary sweetener, rather than referring 

to the flavor of the cereal.” Id. The court thus held that given the labeling was permitted under 

federal regulations on flavors, “where honey is a flavor as well as a sweetener, [p]laintiffs ha[d] 

not plausibly alleged that Post’s use of the word ‘honey’ and the images of a sun, bee, and honey 

dipper” were false or misleading under the FDCA. Id. at *6. 

There is, however, a significant difference between Lima and this case. Here, the amended 

complaint leaves no doubt that the crux of plaintiff’s claims is that Honey Bunches of Oats’ 

labeling is deceptive as to the use of honey as a sweetener. That is, plaintiff alleges that 

defendant’s branding and packaging conveys that honey, a sugar substitute that is preferable to 

1

 The Court GRANTS defendant’s request for judicial notice of the FDA consumer update 

regarding flavoring and labels. Harris v. Cty. of Orange, 682 F.3d 1126, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(quoting in part Fed. R. Evid. 201) (noting that courts may take judicial notice of documents or 

information that “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot 

be questioned,” including “undisputed matters of public record”). All other requests for judicial 

notice are DENIED as moot. 

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consumers, “is the primary sweetener, or at the very least is a significant sweetener,” when in fact, 

“the cereals are sweetened primarily with sugar, corn syrup, and other refined substances” shown 

to cause negative health effects. The amended complaint includes just one paragraph mentioning 

flavoring, alleging that defendant’s branding and packaging “deceptively conveys that honey is the 

primary recognizable flavor or the characterizing flavor,” when in fact other ingredients, “such as 

molasses, brown sugar, nuts, and dried fruit,” have more prominent flavor characteristics. Thus, 

plaintiff explicitly rejects the contention that honey is the “primary recognizable flavor” in Honey 

Bunches of Oats. In contrast, the Lima complaint “implicitly acknowledge[d] that honey has a 

distinctive flavor that is responsible for the honey taste of Honey Bunches of Oats.”2

At this juncture, the Court cannot find, as a matter of law, that honey is the “primary 

recognizable flavor” in defendant’s cereals, such that the labeling at issue is permitted under 

section 101.22(i) and plaintiff’s claims are preempted.3 Nor can the Court conclude, based on 

plaintiff’s allegations alone, that honey is a sweetener in the cereals. Whether honey is a “primary 

recognizable flavor,” sweetener, or both is a factual determination not appropriate for resolution 

on a motion to dismiss. See Ivie v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., No. 12–cv–2554 RMW, 2013 WL 

685372, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2013) (“[T]he factual determinations of whether [the 

ingredients are] used as a sweetener and/or . . . a flavoring agent in this particular product, and 

2

 The Lima court reached this conclusion based on the allegation that “[t]he branding and 

packaging of ‘Honey Bunches of Oats’ cereals is not accurate or justifiable on the basis that honey 

is the primary or characterizing flavor.” 

3

 Red v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 754 F. Supp. 2d 1137 (C.D. Cal. 2010) is in accord. There, 

consumers alleged that the labeling of “Honey Maid Graham Crackers” caused them to believe the 

product was sweetened primarily with honey, when in fact, its predominant sweeteners were sugar 

and high fructose corn syrup. On motion to dismiss, the court “decline[d] to construe these usages 

as mere representations of ‘characterizing flavor,’” and in doing so, noted the difficulty of 

analyzing preemption in the context of flavor labeling regulations: 

Who gets to decide whether a product labeling claim is a ‘characterizing flavor’ 

claim or a claim about the product’s ingredients, or an implicit claim that a product 

is healthful because it contains a particular ingredient? If a ‘flavor’ claim suggests 

health benefits (especially in conjunction with other labeling claims), are 

[p]laintiffs barred from alleging that it is misleading? 

Id. at 1143. 

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whether a reasonable consumer would have thus been misled by the ‘no artificial sweeteners or 

preservatives’ label, are inappropriate for determination on a motion to dismiss.”); Engurasoff v. 

Coca-Cola Co., No. C 13-03990 JSW, 2014 WL 4145409, at *3-4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2014) 

(court “cannot make a factual determination upon a motion to dismiss as to whether phosphoric 

acid qualifies as an artificial flavor”); Gitson v. Trader Joe’s Co., No. 13-CV-01333-WHO, 2014 

WL 1048640, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2014) (“[W]hether sodium citrate, citric acid, and 

tocopherol function as artificial flavors, chemical preservatives, or both, is inappropriate to 

determine at this stage of the litigation.”).4 

At the pleading stage, the Court cannot second guess the truth of plaintiff’s allegation that 

he purchased defendant’s cereal because of the promise of honey as a sweetener.5 Thus, plaintiff’s 

claims are not preempted under section 101.22(i).6

4

 The cases cited by defendant do not compel a different result. In In re Quaker Oats 

Maple & Brown Sugar Instant Oatmeal Litig., No. CV161442PSGMRWX, 2018 WL 1616053, at 

*3-4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2018), the court held that section 101.22(i) preempted plaintiffs claim that 

labeling oatmeal with the words “Maple & Brown Sugar” and a related image was deceptive 

because the product did not contain maple syrup. In so holding, the court rejected plaintiffs’ 

contention that maple syrup was not a flavoring in part because maple appeared on the FDA’s list 

of “flavoring substances.” Id. at *3. The same does not apply to honey. Defendant also cites 

Dvora v. Gen. Mills, Inc., No. CV 11-1074-GW PLAX, 2011 WL 1897349, at *4 (C.D. Cal. May 

16, 2011), in which the court found plaintiff could not avoid preemption under § 101.22(i) by 

claiming cereal name “Total Blueberry Pomegranate” was misrepresentation about ingredients 

rather than flavor. There, however, the court found it “clear from the context of [d]efendant’s 

packaging that ‘Blueberry Pomegranate’ [wa]s a description of characterizing flavor.” Id. at *5. 

Here, defendant’s packaging does not resolve whether honey is a “primary recognizable flavor” 

and/or sweetener. 

5

 Even if honey is a “primary recognizable flavor” and defendant’s labeling complies with 

21 C.F.R. § 101.22(i), defendant does not offer any controlling authority holding that where an 

ingredient serves as both a flavor and a sweetener in a product, the product label need only comply 

with FDA regulations regarding flavor. 

6

 The amended complaint also argues that defendant’s labels violate 21 C.F.R. sections 

101.18(b) and 102.5(b), two federal labeling regulations. Defendant argues that plaintiff cites 

these irrelevant regulations only to escape federal preemption. In its opposition, plaintiff makes 

conclusory assertions that defendant violated section 101.18(b). Plaintiff does not address section 

102.5(b). Whatever the reason for plaintiff’s inclusion of these regulations in its amended 

complaint, the Court finds that they do not provide a plausible legal basis for plaintiff’s claims 

regarding sweetener labeling. Section 101.18(b) generally applies when a food’s common name—

here, “cereal”—“includes or suggests the name of one or more but not all” of its ingredients, 

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B. “Reasonable Consumer” 

Plaintiff’s claims under the CLRA, UCL, and FAL are governed by California law. The 

UCL prohibits any “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. and Prof. 

Code § 17200. The FAL prohibits any “unfair, deceptive, untrue, or misleading advertising.” Cal. 

Bus. and Prof. Code § 17500. The CLRA prohibits “unfair methods of competition and unfair or 

deceptive acts or practices.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1770. 

A plaintiff’s claims under these California statutes are governed by the “reasonable 

consumer” test. Williams v. Gerber Prods. Co., 552 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 2008) (citations 

omitted). Under the reasonable consumer test, a plaintiff must “show that ‘members of the public 

are likely to be deceived.’” Freeman v. Time, Inc., 68 F.3d 285, 289 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting 

Bank of the West v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 4th 1254, 1267 (1992)). “‘Likely to deceive’ implies 

more than a mere possibility that the advertisement might conceivably be misunderstood by [a] 

few consumers viewing it in an unreasonable manner.” Lavie v. Procter & Gamble Co., 105 

Cal.App.4th 496, 508, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 486 (Cal. App. 2003). Whether a reasonable consumer 

would be deceived “will usually be a question of fact not appropriate for decision” at the pleading 

stage. Williams, 552 F.3d at 938. 

Here, plaintiffs allege that the brand name “Honey Bunches of Oats” and the images on the 

cereal’s packaging deceptively convey that honey is a primary or significant sweetener in the 

cereal. There is no dispute that the cereal contains some honey, and in that sense, certain aspects 

of the packaging could be considered accurate. In applying the reasonable consumer standard, 

however, the packaging must be considered in context. That is, the image of a radiating sun, the 

words “HONEY BUNCHES OF OATS,” and the honey dipper dripping honey occupy about twothirds of the front of the packaging. Although the package does not make any objective 

representations about the amount of honey in the cereal, a reasonable consumer could see the 

prominent honey-related words and imagery and be deceived into thinking the cereal contained 

relatively less refined sugar and more honey. If so misled, the reasonable consumer is not 

which is not the case here. 21 C.F.R. § 101.18(b). Section 102.5(b) likewise regulates a product’s 

common or usual name (“cereal”), not its brand name (“Honey Bunches of Oats”). 

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expected to pick up the product and examine the fine print on the ingredient list. See Williams, 

552 F. 3d at 939-40 (“We do not think that the FDA requires an ingredient list so that 

manufacturers can mislead consumers and then rely on the ingredient list to correct those 

misinterpretations and provide a shield for liability for the deception.”). 

Finally, while the consumer survey described in the amended complaint cannot, on its 

own, satisfy the reasonable consumer test,7 it provides further support for plaintiff’s position. At 

this stage of the proceedings, the Court must accept plaintiff’s allegations as true and must not 

engage in the weighing of the evidence. The survey suggests that a significant portion of 

reasonable consumers, upon viewing the Honey Bunches of Oats packaging, likely would believe 

that honey was the primary sweetener or one of the three main ingredients in defendant’s cereal. 

Accordingly, defendant’s motion to dismiss the claims on the ground that no reasonable 

consumer would understand the Honey Bunches of Oats packaging to make a representation about 

the amount of honey in the cereal is denied. 

C. Standing to Seek Injunctive Relief 

A party seeking injunctive relief from a federal court must allege not only that he has 

“suffered or [is] threatened with a concrete and particularized legal harm” but also that there is “a 

sufficient likelihood that [he] will again be wronged in a similar way.” Bates v. United Parcel 

Serv., Inc., 511 F.3d 974, 985 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Defendant argues that plaintiff has not established standing to seek injunctive relief because he 

does not provide details regarding a concrete plan to purchase the cereal, which would support a 

claim of actual or imminent future injury, and further, plaintiff has not adequately pleaded that 

would be misled by the labeling in the future. 

In the amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that he “would consider purchasing the cereal 

again if the labeling were accurate.” Plaintiff argues that this is sufficient to establish standing 

under Davidson v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 889 F.3d 956, 969 (9th Cir. 2018), in which the Ninth 

Circuit held that “a previously deceived consumer may have standing to seek an injunction against 

7

 See Becerra v. Dr Pepper/Seven Up, Inc., 945 F.3d 1225, 1231 (9th Cir. 2019). The 

request for leave to submit Becerra as a supplemental authority is GRANTED. (Dkt. No. 38.) 

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false advertising or labeling, even though the consumer now knows or suspects that the advertising 

was false at the time of the original purchase, because the consumer may suffer an ‘actual and 

imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical’ threat of future harm.” Specifically, “the threat of 

future harm may be the consumer’s plausible allegations that she will be unable to rely on the 

product’s advertising or labeling in the future, and so will not purchase the product although she 

would like to.” Id. at 969-70. The threat of future harm also “may be the consumer’s plausible 

allegations that she might purchase the product in the future, despite the fact it was once marred by 

false advertising or labeling, as she may reasonably, but incorrectly, assume the product was 

improved.” Id. at 970. 

Here, plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that he was deceived by the front of the Honey 

Bunches of Oats packaging and that he may purchase the cereal again in the future if the label is 

accurate. Absent injunctive relief, plaintiff would not know whether honey is in fact a significant 

sweetener in defendant’s product based on the front of the cereal box. Nor is the onus on plaintiff 

to consult the ingredient list to try to discern this fact. See Arora v. GNC Holdings, Inc., No. 19-

CV-02414-LB, 2019 WL 6050750, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2019) (“[E]ven if the asterisk links 

to a disclaimer, the plaintiffs’ claim of confusion is predicated on a non-compliant back-panel 

disclaimer.”); Shank v. Presidio Brands, Inc., No. 17-cv-00232-DMR, 2018 WL 1948830, at *5 

(N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2018) (rejecting argument that the plaintiff could read labels in the future to 

determine whether products were “all natural”). Plaintiff’s inability to rely on the honey-related 

words and images prominently featured on the front and top of the cereal box constitutes an 

ongoing injury for which plaintiff may seek injunctive relief. As such, defendant’s request to 

dismiss plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief is denied. 

D. Adequate Remedy at Law 

Finally, the Court considers whether plaintiff’s FAL and UCL claims should be dismissed 

because the CLRA provides plaintiff with an adequate remedy at law. 

With respect to the UCL, the Court previously considered this issue in Luong v. Subaru of 

Am., Inc., 2018 WL 2047646 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2018). There, like here, the defendant argued that 

plaintiffs’ CLRA and UCL claims were subject to dismissal to the extent they sought equitable 

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relief because plaintiffs already had an adequate remedy at law. Id. at *7. The Court disagreed, 

holding that “those decisions allowing claims for equitable relief to proceed as an alternative 

remedy, at the pleading stage, [are] more persuasive, based upon the broad remedial purposes of 

the California consumer protection statutes.” Id. The Court further noted that Business & 

Professions Code section 17205 expressly provides that remedies available for a UCL violation 

are “cumulative to each other and to the remedies or penalties available under all other laws of this 

state.” Id. (citing Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 17 Cal. 4th 553, 566, 950 P.2d 

1086, 1094 (1998)). 

The FAL, although not at issue in Luong, contains a parallel provision to Business & 

Professions Code section 17205. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17534.5. Thus, the availability of 

monetary damages does not preclude a claim for equitable relief under the FAL based upon the 

same conduct. See Joseph v. J.M. Smucker Co., No. CV 17-8735 FMO (KSX), 2019 WL 

1219708, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2019) (“[T]he court has no difficulty rejecting defendant’s 

final ground for dismissal, i.e., that plaintiff’s UCL, FAL and restitution claims fail because they 

seek injunctive relief, and monetary damages are adequate”). 

Accordingly, plaintiff’s FAL and UCL claims are not subject to dismissal on the ground 

that plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law under the CLRA. 

IV. CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, defendant’s motion to dismiss is DENIED. Defendant shall 

respond to the amended complaint within twenty-one (21) days of this order. Further, a case 

management conference shall be set for Monday, July 20, 2019 at 2:00 p.m. in the Federal 

Building, 1301 Clay Street, Oakland in Courtroom 1. 

This Order terminates Docket Numbers 24 and 38. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 

 YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

April 21, 2020

Case 4:19-cv-03993-YGR Document 42 Filed 04/21/20 Page 11 of 11