Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01137/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01137-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MINA LEAP TOR,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-03-1137 LKK PAN P

vs.

A.A. LAMARQUE, Warden,

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding in propria persona with an application for

a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges his September 21,

2000, conviction on numerous counts of lewd and lascivious acts on children under fourteen

years of age, CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 288, 647.6, one count of continuous sexual abuse of a child,

one count of annoying or molesting a child under 18, CAL. PENAL CODE § 288.5, CAL. PENAL

CODE § 647.6, one count of dissuading a witness, CAL. PENAL CODE § 136.1(b)(1), and one

count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, CAL. PENAL CODE § 12021(a). 

Petitioner appealed his convictions to the California Court of Appeal, Third

Appellate District which affirmed the majority of the convictions in its unpublished opinion filed

September 13, 2002. Petitioner then sought review by the California Supreme Court. Review

was denied summarily on November 26, 2002.

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 The facts are taken from the opinion of the California Court of Appeal for the Third 1

Appellate District in People v. Tor, No. C037022 (September 19, 2002) (hereinafter Opinion), a

copy of which is attached as Exhibit F to Respondent’s Answer, filed September 2, 2003.

 Following the jury verdict, the trial court in the 1989 case reduced [petitioner]’s 2

conviction for forcible rape to unlawful sexual intercourse under the authority of California Penal

Code § 1181. That section states:

When a verdict has been rendered or a finding made against the

defendant, . . . when the verdict or finding is contrary to the law or

evidence, but if the evidence shows the defendant to be not guilty

of the degree of the crime of which he was convicted, but guilty of

2

In this petition, filed May 28, 2003, petitioner raises four claims that his prison

sentence violates the United States Constitution. These claims relate to the same operative facts

dealt with in the opinion of the state appellate court. All claims have been exhausted.

 FACTS1

[Petitioner] lived with his girlfriend and her four daughters, who

were born in 1982, 1983, 1984, and 1991. From August 1995

through February 2000, [petitioner] committed a number of acts

involving substantial sexual contact with the three youngest girls. 

Sometimes, these acts occurred when one of the girls was at home

sick and [petitioner] sought to “examine” her. The youngest

daughter testified that [petitioner] committed numerous sexual

offense against her when she was as young as five years old.

At trial, medical experts testified that physical findings were

consistent with the described abuse. Counselors and police

officers described the girls as tearful, reluctant, embarrassed, and

nervous when reporting [petitioner]s’ [sic] acts.

[Petitioner] testified at trial and denied all charges. He asserted the

girls fabricated their claims, because they were mad at him and

wanted them out of their house.

Some of the trial testimony related to a conviction [petitioner]

sustained in 1989. At that time, T.P. was 15 years old and

[petitioner] was 20. They had gone out a few times. T.P. testified

that, on one occasion, [petitioner] tricked her into accompanying

him to his motel by claiming he needed to get something. When

they entered his room, T.P. went to the bathroom. She emerged to

find [petitioner] stripped down to his underwear. He grabbed her,

pushed her onto the bed, and had sex with her. The jury in that

case convicted [petitioner] of forcible rape, but the trial court

reduced the conviction to one for unlawful sexual intercourse, and

the jury in the present case was informed of this history pursuant to

a stipulation.[ ]

2

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a lesser degree thereof, or of a lesser crime included therein, the

court may modify the verdict, finding or judgment accordingly

without granting or ordering a new trial, and this power shall

extend to any court to which the case may be appealed.

CAL. PENAL CODE §1181(6). 

3

The jury convicted [petitioner] on 10 of the 12 charged counts, and

found charged enhancements to be true. 

(People v. Tor, slip op. at 2-4). 

Petitioner alleges that: (1) the trial court erred by introducing evidence of a prior

conviction in violation of the collateral estoppel doctrine and his Fifth Amendment right to be

free from double jeopardy; (2) the trial court abused its discretion by permitting the jury to

consider evidence of a prior conviction to assess petitioner’s credibility; (3) the trial court

violated petitioner’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by permitting inadmissible

character evidence; and (4) the trial court violated petitioner’s due process rights by admitting

testimony by documentary evidence of petitioner’s prior conviction.

ANALYSIS

I. Standards for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

Federal habeas corpus relief is not available for any claim decided on the merits in

state court proceedings unless the state court's adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Under section 2254(d)(1), a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly

established United States Supreme Court precedents if it applies a rule that contradicts the

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governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or if it confronts a set of facts that are materially

indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at different

result. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 7 (2002) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06

(2000)).

Under the “unreasonable application” clause of section 2254(d)(1), a federal

habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle

from the Supreme Court’s decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the

prisoner’s case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. A federal habeas court “may not issue the writ

simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court

decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that

application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 412; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63,

123 S.Ct. 1166, 1175 (2003) (it is “not enough that a federal habeas court, in its independent

review of the legal question, is left with a ‘firm conviction’ that the state court was ‘erroneous.’”)

The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state

court judgment. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002). 

II. Petitioner’s Claims

A. Collateral Estoppel and the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment

Petitioner’s first claim is that the admission of evidence of his prior conviction

violates the doctrine of collateral estoppel and the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. 

Petitioner contends that testimony about the specific events that led to his conviction in 1989 for

unlawful intercourse unconstitutionally permits relitigation of and resentencing for those acts. 

Petitioner argues that he should not have been forced to “run the gauntlet” a second time and

defend himself at this trial for his prior acts. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 190, 78 S.Ct.

221, 225 (1957).

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5

The last reasoned rejection of this claim is the decision on petitioner’s appeal to

the Court of Appeal for the State of California, Third Appellate District. The state appellate

court rejected this claim on the ground that:

The collateral estoppel doctrine precludes relitigation of an

ultimate fact that has been determined by a valid and final

judgment. (People v. Catlin, [(2001)], 26 Cal.4th at pp. 123-124.) 

Whether the 1989 offense was forcible or not was not an ultimate

fact to be determined in the present case involving crimes on three

other victims.

Moreover, both the United States and California Supreme Courts

have held that the collateral estoppel doctrine does not preclude the

admission of evidence, introduced in a trial that results in acquittal,

from being introduced for all purposes in a subsequent proceeding. 

(Dowling v. United States (1990) 493 U.S. 342, 348-350 [107

L.Ed.2d 708, 717-719]; People v. Catlin, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p.

124; see People v. Griffin, (1967) 66 Cal.2d 459, 464.) The earlier

acquittal means simply that that offense was not established

beyond a reasonable doubt; it does not mean that it did not occur. 

(People v. Catlin, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 124, People v. Griffin,

supra, 66 Cal.2d at p. 466, fn. 3.) “[A]n acquittal in a criminal

case does not preclude the Government from relitigating an issue

when it is presented in a subsequent action governed by a lower

standard of proof.” (Dowling v. United States, supra, 493 U.S. at

p. 349 [107 L.Ed.2d at p. 718.])

[Petitioner] asserts that, while that may be true when the prior case

involves an actual acquittal, a different rule should apply when an

implied acquittal is involved. This claim is illogical. If evidence

of a prior offense can be introduced when the defendant has been

acquitted of the offense, the same should also be true when a

defendant’s conviction is reduced to another offense pursuant to

Penal Code section 1181. The fact that [petitioner]’s rape

conviction was reduced to one for unlawful sexual intercourse

established only that the prosecution was unable to prove a forcible

act beyond a reasonable doubt. “In the present case, however, the

prosecution was not required to establish that fact beyond a

reasonable doubt or, indeed, to prove it at all.” (People v. Catlin,

supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 125.)

[Petitioner] essentially argues that it was unfair to permit the

prosecution to introduce evidence relating to a forcible assault on

T.P. However, this evidence was introduced to establish facts

relating to the offenses committed against three other victims, not

to relitigate [petitioner]’s responsibility for the offenses against

T.P. In keeping with the mandates of People v. Griffin, supra, 66

Cal.2d at page 265, the jury was informed that the trial court had

reduced [petitioner]’s rape conviction to one for unlawful sexual

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Federal Rule of Evidence § 404 reads:

3

(a) Character Evidence Generally. Evidence of a person's character

or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving

action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except:

6

intercourse, and in this trial [petitioner] suggested that the

reduction reflected adversely on T.P.’s credibility as a witness. 

Although [petitioner] contends the jury may have believed

[petitioner] was not sufficiently punished for the assault on T.P.

and therefore opted to punish him more severely in the present

case, such a claim is entirely speculative. (See People v. Catlin,

supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 126-127; see also Dowling v. United

States, supra, 493 U.S. at pp. 353-354 [107 L.Ed.2d at p. 721.])

[Petitioner]’s claims go to the weight, not the admissibility of the

evidence. “As long as the evidence properly was admitted, as we

have determined it was, the weight to be accorded the evidence

was for the jury to decide.” (People v. Catlin, supra, 26 Cal.4th at

p. 127)

(People v. Tor, slip op. at 17-20.)

The double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment incorporates the doctrine of

collateral estoppel. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 90 S.Ct 1189 (1970). Collateral estoppel

provides that “when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final

judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit.” Id.

at 443, 90 S.Ct. at 1194. However, the doctrine does not absolutely preclude the admission of

relevant and probative evidence at a subsequent proceeding simply because it relates to alleged

criminal conduct for which a defendant has been acquitted. Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S.

342, 348, 110 S.Ct. 668, 672 (1990).

One permissible basis upon which to admit evidence of prior misconduct is for the

purpose of proving intent, plan, motive or absence of mistake under Federal Rule of Evidence

404(b). Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 689, 108 S.Ct. 1496, 1501 (1988). Federal

Rule of Evidence § 404 generally precludes the admission of character evidence to show action

in conformity therewith and is virtually identical to California Rule of Evidence § 1101. 

3

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(1) Character of Accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character

offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or if

evidence of a trait of character of the alleged victim of the crime is

offered by an accused and admitted under Rule 404(a)(2), evidence

of the same trait of character of the accused offered by the

prosecution;

(2) Character of Alleged Victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of

character of the alleged victim of the crime offered by an accused,

or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a character

trait of peacefulness of the alleged victim offered by the

prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the alleged

victim was the first aggressor;

(3) Character of Witness. Evidence of the character of a witness,

as provided in rules 607, 608, and 609.

(b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Evidence of other crimes,

wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person

in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however,

be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,

opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or

absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the

accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable

notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses

pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of any

such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.

California Evidence Code section 1101 reads:

(a) Except as provided in this section and in Sections 1102, 1103,

1108, and 1109, evidence of a person's character or a trait of his or

her character (whether in the form of an opinion, evidence of

reputation, or evidence of specific instances of his or her conduct)

is inadmissible when offered to prove his or her conduct on a

specified occasion.

(b) Nothing in this section prohibits the admission of evidence that

a person committed a crime, civil wrong, or other act when

relevant to prove some fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent,

preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or

accident, or whether a defendant in a prosecution for an unlawful

sexual act or attempted unlawful sexual act did not reasonably and

in good faith believe that the victim consented) other than his or

her disposition to commit such an act.

(c) Nothing in this section affects the admissibility of evidence

offered to support or attack the credibility of a witness.

7

The issue of ultimate fact determined at a criminal trial and to which the doctrine of collateral

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estoppel applies is guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. However, the lower standard of

admissibility required for evidence of prior bad acts at trial makes the collateral estoppel

component of the double jeopardy clause inapplicable. Dowling, 493 U.S. at 348-349, 110 S.Ct.

at 672; see also United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 361-362, 104

S.Ct. 1099, 1104 (1984)(“It is clear that the difference in the relative burdens of proof in the

criminal and civil actions precludes application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel.”)

The Supreme Court has clearly determined that, under federal law, evidence from

prior acquittals is admissible in a subsequent criminal prosecution when that evidence is

employed to show motive, intent, absence of mistake or for a similar, permissible reason. The

Supreme Court of California has reached the same conclusion. People v. Catlin, 26 Cal.4th 81

(Cal.2001)(“[T]he collateral estoppel doctrine does not prohibit the admission of evidence that

has been introduced in a trial resulting in an acquittal from being admitted for all purposes in a

subsequent proceeding.”). The trial court’s admission of [petitioner]’s previous criminal activity

was a proper exercise of its discretion and cannot be considered contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, controlling principles of United States Supreme Court precedent. 

Given the lower standard of admissibility when compared to guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt, it is of no consequence that petitioner was acquitted of forcible rape when his

conviction was reduced by the trial court to unlawful sexual intercourse. Collateral estoppel is

concerned with successive prosecutions, not their outcomes. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 167,

fn. 6, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 2226, fn. 6 (1977)(“noting that the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars

“successive prosecutions”); Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 500 fn. 9, 104 S.Ct. 2536, 2541, fn. 9

(1984). The double jeopardy clause protects against multiple prosecutions for the same offense;

however, “the introduction of relevant evidence of particular misconduct in a case is not the same

thing as prosecution for that conduct.” United States v. Felix, 503 U.S. 378, 387, 112 S.Ct 1377,

1383 (1992).

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9

In the present case, the Court of Appeal correctly concluded that testimony by T.P.

concerning the forcible rape for which petitioner was originally convicted prior to its reduction to

unlawful intercourse was introduced, not to prosecute petitioner a second time for his 1989

actions, but rather, to establish similarities between the prior act and the charged offenses. These

similarities included details offered to establish petitioner’s modus operandi, including the fact

that “the victims were all young” and “they all had a trusting relationship with the [petitioner].” 

(RT 86.) 

The court did not abuse its discretion in permitting evidence of petitioner’s prior

sexual assault. The lower standard of admissibility for evidence relating to prior bad acts makes

the doctrine of collateral estoppel under the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment

inapplicable. As a result of the fact that the burden for the admission of evidence is less than

beyond a reasonable doubt, petitioner’s acquittal for forcible rape is of no significance, regardless

of its source. Petitioner’s first claim for relief should be denied.

B. Evidence of a Prior Conviction to Impeach Petitioner’s Credibility

Petitioner’s second claim is that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of his

prior conviction for the purpose of permitting the jury to assess his credibility. Petitioner

contends that his previous conviction was not for a crime of moral turpitude and therefore it

could not be used to attack the veracity of his testimony. He also argues that it was unrealistic to

expect the jury to limit their analysis of T.P.’s testimony solely to assess petitioner’s credibility. 

The California Court of Appeal addressed this claim as follows:

[Petitioner] contends the court erred in admitting his 1989

conviction for impeachment purposes, because the offense for

which he was convicted, unlawful sexual intercourse, is not a

crime of moral turpitude. We disagree.

Initially, we note that the Attorney General asserts the prosecutor

never asked [petitioner] whether he had been convicted of a felony. 

The record demonstrated otherwise. In her final three questions to

[petitioner] during recross-examination, the prosecutor asked

whether [petitioner] had been convicted of a felony on November

18, 1989, whether that felony had occurred in San Joaquin County,

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and whether that felony involved T.P. [Petitioner] responded

affirmatively to each of these inquiries.

This impeachment was proper.

Under [California Evidence Code] section 788, “a defendant who

testifies may be impeached with a prior conviction of any felony

evincing moral turpitude, defined as ‘general readiness to do evil.’

[Citation.] Only if ‘the least adjudicated elements of the

conviction necessarily involve moral turpitude’ is the conviction

admissible for impeachment. [Citation.]

“The ‘least adjudicated elements’ test means that ‘from the

elements of the offense alone – without regard to the facts of the

particular violation – one can reasonably infer the presence of

moral turpitude.’ [Citations.] In other words, a court need not

determine that a criminal statute could be violated only with evil

intent in order to find that a conviction under that statute evinces

moral turpitude, because it is possible to imagine a set of

circumstances under which almost any statute might be violated

without evil intent; only a ‘“substantial assurance that the

credibility of a witness is adversely affected by his having suffered

[a] conviction”’ for a given offense is required.” (People v.

Campbell, supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at p.1492, italics omitted.)

Citing People v. Flanagan (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 764 and People

v. Fulcher (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 749, [petitioner] asserts the

appellate courts are divided on the question of whether unlawful

sexual intercourse is a crime of moral turpitude. The people, too,

refer to a split of authority on this issue. While the two cited cases

answer that question differently, the cases are easily reconciled. 

There is no difference of opinion.

In Flanagan, the defendant’s prior conviction for statutory rape

preceded People v. Hernandez (1964) 61 Cal.2d 529, 535-536, in

which the California Supreme Court recognized as a defense to

statutory rape a defendant’s mistaken, but reasonable and good

faith belief that the victim was at least 18 years of age. (People v.

Flanagan, supra, 185 Cal.App.3d at p. 772) The Flanagan court

concluded that the defendant might therefore have a reasonable and

good faith belief that the victim was more than 18. (Id. at pp. 772-

773.) “It is important to note that a violation of the statute did not

require that the defendant be aware of the female’s age. It is the

absence of this culpable mental state as a necessarily adjudicated

element of statutory rape that persuades us defendant’s prior

conviction did not involve moral turpitude.” (Id. at p. 772.)

The Flanagan decision was expressly predicated on the fact that

the prior conviction antedated Hernandez. A different result was

reached in People v. Fulcher, supra, 194 Cal.App.3d at pp. 753-

754, because the prior conviction occurred after Hernandez.

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The Fulcher court noted that the crime of statutory rape was

repealed and reenacted as “unlawful sexual intercourse” in Penal

Code section 261.5, which provides: “Unlawful sexual intercourse

is an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a female not the

wife of the perpetrator, where the female is under the age of 18

years.” (People v. Fulcher, supra, 194 Cal.App.3d at p. 753.)

Fulcher explained: “And added to this definition by [Hernandez] is

the holding that a defense to such a charge exists where the

accused had held, in good faith, a reasonable belief that the

prosecutrix has attained the age of consent, i.e., 18 years. People v.

Hernandez also states, referring to statutory rapes as defined by the

court: ‘The object and purpose of the law are too plain to need

comment, the crime too infamous . . . to bear discussion’ [citation],

and that ‘[t]here can be no dispute that a criminal intent . . . exists

when the perpetrator proceeds with utter disregard of, or in the lack

of grounds for, a belief that the female has reached the age of

consent[.]’” (People v. Fulcher, supra, 194 Cal.App.3d at p. 753,

italics omitted.)

Therefore, Fulcher stated, for convictions since 1964, “the Penal

Code, as interpreted by People v. Hernandez, supra, proscribed

sexual intercourse with a female under the age of 18 years by one

without a good faith and reasonable belief that the female was of

the age of consent, and that such is an ‘infamous’ crime. [¶] Under

the Penal Code and under People v. Hernandez, supra, we hold

that the crime of ‘statutory rape’ or ‘unlawful sexual intercourse’

indicates a ‘general readiness to do evil,’ and that it is thus

necessarily a crime involving ‘moral turpitude.’” (People v.

Fulcher, supra, 194 Cal.App.3d at pp. 753-754.)

Here, [petitioner]’s prior conviction for unlawful sexual

intercourse occurred in 1989, 25 years after Hernandez was

decided. [Petitioner]’s conviction necessarily established that the

proscribed act occurred without a good faith and reasonable belief

that the victim was over the age of consent. Had the evidence been

otherwise, [petitioner] could have presented that as a defense and

the jury would not have convicted him. While [petitioner] focuses

his attention on the dissenting opinion in Fulcher, we believe the

majority’s assessment is correct: The crime of unlawful sexual

intercourse, as defined by the Penal Code and Hernandez, is a

crime of moral turpitude. (See also People v. Massey (1987) 192

Cal.App.3d 819, 822-823.)

[Petitioner] contends that, if this prior conviction was admissible

for impeachment purposes, the court should have sanitized it and

permitted reference only to an unspecified felony conviction. 

[Petitioner]’s claim is entirely academic. We cannot pigeon-hole

this particular complaint and view it in isolation. The facts relating

to [petitioner]’s prior conviction were admissible under sections

1108 and 1101. Once the court decided to admit this evidence,

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[petitioner] himself sought to introduce evidence that the court

reduced the rape conviction to one for unlawful sexual intercourse. 

In fact, [petitioner] first raised the possibility in a written motion

filed before the motions in limine were even decided. [Petitioner] 

agreed to the stipulation outlining the prior jury verdict and

subsequent reduction to unlawful sexual intercourse. He then used

this history to emphasize that T.P. was not a credible witness. 

Under these circumstances, [petitioner] cannot now assert that the

prior conviction should have been sanitized.

The trial court properly permitted [petitioner] to be impeached with

his prior conviction for unlawful sexual intercourse. (See People

v. Kwolek (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1521, 1532-1534.)

(People v. Tor, slip op. at 12-17.)

In this second claim, petitioner has simply not alleged any violation of his federal

rights. While the paragraph discussing the concept of the “least adjudicated elements” test may

herald future ambiguities in the decisional law of the state of California, the California rule at the

time relevant to this case was that petitioner’s prior conviction was a conviction which could

properly be offered for impeachment purposed. A federal habeas court has no authority to review

challenges to state-court determinations of state-law questions. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62,

68, 112 S.Ct. 475, 480 (1991). Habeas review is limited to determining whether a conviction

violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2241; Rose v.

Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21, 96 S.Ct. 175, 177 (1975). A federal court deciding a habeas petition

challenging a state conviction “cannot review questions of state evidence law” and may only

consider “whether the petitioner’s conviction violated constitutional norms.” Henry v. Kernan,

197 F.3d 1021, 1031 (9th Cir. 1999).

Petitioner has not made any showing that the admission of evidence concerning

his prior felony conviction violated due process or his right to a fair trial. The testimony of T.P.

was a small part of the total evidence against petitioner at trial. Each of the victims testified

about the acts of molestation committed by the accused upon them. In addition, the girls

provided corroborative details to reinforce their testimony as well as the testimony of the other

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victims. Investigators confirmed these corroborative details in addition to providing other

incriminating evidence, including evidence of prior statements that were used to impeach

petitioner’s testimony. The medical evidence in the case was consistent with the alleged abuse.

Additionally, the trial court properly instructed the jury about the permissible uses

to which T.P.’s testimony could be put. (RT 1071.) There is no reason to think that jurors failed

to understand or follow this instruction. It must be presumed that the jurors utilized the

challenged evidence solely for the purposes for which it was admitted, which included

impeachment of petitioner’s testimony. See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 324 n.9, 105 S.Ct.

1965 (1985)(“The court presumes that jurors, conscious of the gravity of their task, attend closely

to the particular language of the trial court’s instructions in a criminal case and strive to

understand, make sense of, and follow the instructions given them.”)

The evidence concerning petitioner’s prior conviction was a small part of an

extensive and compelling case against petitioner. Petitioner has failed to make the requisite

showing that the admission of evidence concerning his prior conviction, or the trial court’s

determination that his crime was one of moral turpitude, was such a grievous error that it

rendered his trial fundamentally unfair or resulted in a complete miscarriage of justice. See

Jammal, 926 F.2d at 919. Petitioner’s second claim for relief should be denied.

C. Admission of Prior Act to Show Common Plan 

Petitioner’s third claim is that the trial court’s admission of evidence of the prior

conviction for the purpose of showing some relevant fact such as preparation or plan violates the

Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution by prejudicially introducing evidence of

character to prove conduct on a specific occasion. As in his first claim for relief, petitioner

argues that T.P.’s testimony about his prior acts is inadmissible character evidence under

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 See supra note 2 for California Evidence Code § 1101. The court notes that petitioner 4

refers to § 1101(b) as the basis to exclude impermissible character evidence. The more

applicable section is 1101(a). The court analyzes petitioner’s argument based upon the

assumption that he intended to cite § 1101(a). 

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California Evidence Code § 1101. Petitioner argues that evidence relating to this prior act was

4

impermissibly offered to show his character and disposition to perform such acts in general. 

The California Court of Appeal addressed this claim as follows:

The trial court also admitted challenged evidence relating to

[petitioner]’s prior offense under [California Evidence Code]

section 1101, and informed the jury that this evidence could be

used to show intent, common plan, or scheme. [Petitioner]

contends this ruling was erroneous. There was no prejudicial error.

Section 1101, subdivision (a) precludes the use of character

evidence to prove conduct on a specified occasion. But

subdivision (b) of that statute provides in relevant part: “Nothing in

this section prohibits the admission of evidence that a person

committed a crime . . . when relevant to prove some fact (such as

. . . intent . . . [or] plan, . . .) other than his or her disposition to

commit such an act.”

[Petitioner] contends the court erred in instructing that evidence of

the 1989 incident could be considered when determining

[petitioner]’s intent. He asserts that, if the jury disbelieved his

denial that the acts occurred and instead believed the victims’

testimony, intent was not at issue. We agree.

A similar situation arose in People v. Balcom (1994) 7 Cal.4th 414. 

In that case, the victim testified that defendant forced her to engage

in sex, but the defendant asserted the victim consented. (Id. at p.

422.) The Supreme Court noted: “These wholly divergent

accounts create no middle ground from which the jury could

conclude that defendant committed the proscribed act of engaging

in sexual intercourse with the victim against her will by holding a

gun to her head, but lacked criminal intent because, for example,

he honestly and reasonably, but mistakenly, believed she

voluntarily had consented. [Citation.] On the evidence presented,

the primary issue for the jury to determine was whether defendant

forced the complaining witness to engage in sexual intercourse by

placing a gun to her head. No reasonable juror considering this

evidence could have concluded that defendant committed the acts

alleged by the complaining witness, but lacked the requisite intent

to commit rape.” (Ibid.)

The court concluded: “Defendant’s plea of not guilty put in issue

all of the elements of the offenses, including his intent [citation],

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and evidence that defendant committed uncharged similar offenses

would have some relevance regarding defendant’s intent in the

present case. But, because the victim’s testimony that defendant

placed a gun to her head, if believed, constitutes compelling

evidence of defendant’s intent, evidence of defendant’s uncharged

similar offenses would be merely cumulative on this issue.

[Citation.] Accordingly, we conclude that the limited probative

value of the evidence of uncharged offenses, to prove intent, is

outweighed by the substantial prejudicial effect of such evidence.” 

(People v. Balcom, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 422-423.)

The same analysis applies here. If the jury believed the victim’s

testimony that the charged acts occurred, there could have been no

dispute as to [petitioner]’s intent in committing those acts. 

[Petitioner]’s intent was apparent from the nature of the acts

committed, and evidence of the 1989 offense was cumulative on

this issue. The prejudicial effect of this evidence outweighed its

limited probative value on the question of intent, and it should not

have been admitted for that purpose. (People v. Balcom, supra, 7

Cal.4th at pp. 422-423.)

However, as in People v. Balcom, supra, 7 Cal.4th at page 423, the

fact that the 1989 evidence was admitted is not prejudicial, because

despite [petitioner]’s claim to the contrary, it was properly

admitted to prove the existence of a common design or plan.

“This distinction, between the use of evidence of uncharged acts to

establish the existence of a common design or plan as opposed to

the use of such evidence to prove intent...is subtle but significant. 

Evidence of intent is admissible to prove that, if the defendant

committed the act alleged, he or she did so with the intent that

comprises an element of the charged offense. ‘In proving intent

the act is conceded or assumed; what is sought is the state of mind

that accompanied it.’. . . 

“Evidence of a common design or plan is admissible to establish

that the defendant committed the act alleged. Unlike evidence

used to prove intent, where the act is conceded or assumed, ‘[i]n

proving design, the act is still undetermined . . . .’” (People v.

Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 394, fn. 2.)

The Ewoldt court further explained: “To establish the existence of

a common design or plan, the common feature must indicate the

existence of a plan rather than a series of similar spontaneous acts,

but the plan thus revealed need not be distinctive or unusual . . .

[E]vidence that the defendant has committed uncharged criminal

acts that are similar to the charged offense may be relevant if these

acts demonstrate circumstantially that the defendant committed the

charged offense pursuant to the same design or plan he or she used

in committing the uncharged acts. [T]he plan need not be unusual

or distinctive; it need only exist to support the inference that the

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defendant employed that plan in committing the charged offense.”

(People v. Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 403.)

[Petitioner] contends that the 1989 offenses and the charged

offense are too dissimilar to establish a common plan or scheme. 

We disagree. As we discussed previously, in both cases,

[petitioner] preyed on young girls, used subterfuge to commit

sexual offenses, and abused a position of trust. These similarities

are sufficient to warrant a jury’s inference that [petitioner]

employed the same plan in committing the sexual offenses against

these victims as he utilized in 1989.

[Petitioner] also argues that the 1989 evidence was inadmissible

for another purpose allowed under section 1101, subdivision (b),

namely, to demonstrate the absence of any reasonable belief that

the victims consented to the sexual acts. As the court did not

instruct the jury that the prior offense could have been used for this

purpose, we do not discuss this claim further.

(People v. Tor, slip op. at 8-12.)

Under Ninth Circuit law, the admission of “other acts” evidence violates the

Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process only if there were no permissible inferences

the factfinder could have drawn from the evidence. See McKinney v. Rees, 993 F.2d 1378, 1381

(9th Cir. 1993) (question is “whether any inferences relevant to a fact of consequence may be

drawn from each piece of the evidence, or whether they lead only to impermissible inferences

about the defendant's character”); Jammal, 926 F.2d at 920 ("[e]vidence introduced by the

prosecution will often raise more than one inference, some permissible, some not; we must rely

on the jury to sort them out in light of the court's instructions"). See also United States v.

LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1027 (9th Cir. 2001) (evidence of prior similar crimes “will only 

sometimes violate the constitutional right to a fair trial, if it is of no relevance, or if its potential

for prejudice far outweighs what little relevance it might have”). 

In LeMay the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held there is nothing fundamentally

unfair about allowing propensity evidence so long as protections, such as those provided under

Federal Rule of Evidence 403, remain in place to ensure that devastating evidence of little

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 Fed. R. Evid. 403 provides: “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 5

probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the

issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless

presentation of cumulative evidence.”

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 probative value will not reach the jury. LeMay, 260 F.3d at 1026. There is no exclusive list of 5

factors that courts should evaluate in determining whether to admit evidence of a defendant’s

prior acts of sexual misconduct. Rather, judges should consider factors relevant to individual

cases, such as (1) the similarity of the prior acts to the acts charged; (2) the closeness in time of

the prior acts to the acts charged; (3) the frequency of the prior acts; (4) the presence or lack of

intervening circumstances and (5) the necessity of the evidence beyond the testimony already

offered at trial. LeMay, 260 F.3d at 1028; Doe ex rel. Rudy-Glanzer v. Glanzer, 232 F.3d 1258,

1268 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing United States v. Guardia, 135 F.3d 1326, 1330 (10th Cir. 1998)). “A

court should pay 'careful attention to both the significant probative value and the strong

prejudicial qualities' of that evidence." LeMay, 260 F.3d at 1027 (quoting Glanzer, 232 F.3d at

1268). 

The prior crimes evidence against petitioner clearly was relevant to the charged

crimes and, as noted by the appellate court, had a tendency to show similar modus operandi. 

(People v. Tor, slip op. at 11-12.) For this reason, there was a rational inference the trial court

could draw from the challenged evidence that was not constitutionally impermissible. In

addition, like the trial court, the appellate court factored the relative timeliness of the prior

misconduct, noting that petitioner began his subsequent criminal acts only “four years” after

completing his imprisonment for the prior misconduct. Id. at 6. Finally, while petitioner’s

conviction for forcible rape was nullified by the trial judge, the prior crimes evidence did involve

an actual conviction for unlawful intercourse, increasing its reliability. See id. at 1029 (“the

extent to which an act has been proved is a factor that district courts may consider in conducting

Rule 403 inquiry”).

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 The court originally instructed the jurors improperly, stating “[evidence admitted under 6

§ 1101] if believed may be considered . . . to prove the defendant is a person of bad character or

that he has a disposition to commit crime. (RT 1074:6-8.) Immediately thereafter, the court

caught its error and said, “wait a minute . . . I think I misread that,” and corrected the jury

instructions by properly instructing the jurors that “this evidence if believed may not be

considered by you to prove the defendant is a person of bad character or that he has a disposition

to commit crimes.” (Emphasis added)(RT 1074:10, 16-18.)

18

Furthermore, as discussed in detail below, the trial court adequately weighed the

evidence under California Evidence Code section 352 to determine that its probative value was

not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. The relatively short amount of time

between the acts and their similar modus operandi made admission of the disputed testimony

proper. 

In addition, as it did with impeachment, the trial court gave the proper jury

instruction relating to evidence admitted under California Evidence Code § 1101. (RT 1074-

75.) On this claim as well, petitioner provides no evidence to suggest that jurors failed to 6

understand or follow this instruction. The court should once again presume that the jurors

utilized the challenged evidence solely for the purposes for which it was admitted. See Francis,

471 U.S. at 324 n.9 (“The court presumes that jurors, conscious of the gravity of their task, attend

closely to the particular language of the trial court’s instructions in a criminal case and strive to

understand, make sense of, and follow the instructions given them.”)

 It was reasonable for the California Court of Appeal to conclude that the

admission of evidence of petitioner's prior sexual assault did not render petitioner's trial

fundamentally unfair. Accordingly, the state court's determination to that effect should stand. 

See Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 11 (2002); Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 43, 116 S.Ct.

2013 (1996). The admission of the “other crimes” evidence to show petitioner’s common plan

and modus operandi was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, controlling

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 This court also notes that the United States Supreme Court “has never expressly held 7

that it violates due process to admit other crimes evidence for the purpose of showing conduct in

conformity therewith, or that it violates due process to admit other crimes evidence for other

purposes without an instruction limiting the jury’s consideration of the evidence to such

purposes.” Garceau v. Woodford, 275 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 2001), overruled on other grounds

by Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202 (2003). In fact, the Supreme Court has expressly left

open this question. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 75 n.5 (1991) (“Because we need not

reach the issue, we express no opinion on whether a state law would violate the Due Process

Clause if it permitted the use of ‘prior crimes’ evidence to show propensity to commit a charged

crime”).

 California Evidence Code § 352 states that “[t]he court in its discretion may exclude 8

evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission

will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue

prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.”

19

principles of United States Supreme Court precedent. Petitioner’s third claim for relief should 7

be denied.

D. Weighing of Probative Value and Prejudicial Effect of Prior Act 

Petitioner’s fourth claim is that the admission of live witness testimony about the

conduct that led to petitioner’s prior conviction violates his due process rights by permitting

evidence whose probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. He argues

that the court erred in its weighing of the value of T.P.’s testimony under California Evidence

Code § 352. At a minimum, petitioner contends that the facts surrounding his prior conviction 8

should have been limited to documentary evidence only. 

The California Court of Appeal addressed this claim as follows:

Under [California Evidence Code] Section 1101, the prosecution

may not introduce evidence of other crimes to prove disposition to

commit a charged act. Section 1108, subdivision (a) is an

exception to this general rule, and provides: “In a criminal action

in which the defendant is accused of a sexual offense, evidence of

the defendant’s commission of another sexual offense is not made

inadmissible by Section 1101, if the evidence is not inadmissible

pursuant to Section 352.”

In enacting this statute, “the Legislature decided evidence of

uncharged sexual offenses is so uniquely probative in sex crimes

prosecutions it is presumed admissible without regard to the

limitations of . . . section 1101. [Citations.] The only restrictions

on the admissibility of such evidence are those contained in . . .

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section 352.” (People v. Yovanov (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 392, 405-

406; see also People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 911-922;

People v. Fitch (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 172, 181-183.)

Recognizing that his 1989 conviction is otherwise admissible

under section 1108, [petitioner] argues the trial court should have

excluded this evidence under section 352. There was no abuse of

discretion.

Under [California Evidence Code] section 352, “the trial court

enjoys broad discretion in assessing whether the probative value of

particular evidence is outweighed by concerns of undue prejudice,

confusion or consumption of time. [Citation.] Where, as here a

discretionary power is statutorily vested in the trial court, its

exercise of discretion ‘must not be disturbed on appeal except on a

showing that the court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary,

capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest

miscarriage of justice.’” (People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th

1060, 1124-1125.)

Citing People v. Harris (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 727, [petitioner]

contends evidence of the 1989 case was likely to confuse the jury. 

We do not agree. In Harris, the jury was presented with redacted

and skewed evidence of the prior offense, which was apt to confuse

the jury and lead them to punish defendant for the uncharged

offense. (Id. at pp. 733-736, 738-739.) Here, T.P. described the

incident with [petitioner], and the jury was told of the jury’s verdict

and [petitioner]’s conviction. T.P.’s testimony was brief, and there

was no likelihood the jury confused the incident with the charged

offense.

[Petitioner] asserts that the 1989 incident was of little probative

value because it was remote. The cases cited by [petitioner]

involved much longer periods of time than the 11 years involved

here. For example, in People v. Rodrigues, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th

at p. 739, the prior offense happened 23 years earlier. In People v.

Burns (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 734, the court found a 20-year-old

conviction to meet “any reasonable threshold test of remoteness.” 

(Id. at p. 738.) In People v. Antick (1975) 15 Cal.3d 79, 99, the

prior convictions were 17 and 19 years old.

More importantly, although [petitioner] asserts he has led a

blameless life since 1989, he ignores the fact that the charged

offenses began in 1995, only four years after [petitioner] completed

his sentence for his earlier offense. Under these circumstances, the 

1989 offense cannot be deemed remote. (People v. Campbell

(1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1488, 1496-1497.)

[Petitioner] asserts that the probative value of the 1989 offense was

negligible, because that act was dissimilar to the charged offenses. 

He emphasizes that, in contrast to the present case, he and T.P.

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were in a dating relationship and close in age. We agree there are

clear difference between the two cases. But there are also clear

similarities. In both cases, [petitioner] preyed on young girls. In

both cases, [petitioner] used subterfuge to commit sexual offenses. 

And in both cases, [petitioner] held a position of trust, which he

abused.

Finally, [petitioner] contends that, if the 1989 offense was in fact

admissible under section 1108, the court should have allowed only

documentary evidence of that offense and should not have

permitted T.P. to testify. [Petitioner] did not seek such a limitation

in the trial court, and he is therefore precluded from doing so now. 

(People v. Hood (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 965, 970.)

We note, however, that section 1108 expressly contemplates the

introduction of testimony, not simply documentary evidence. 

Subdivision (b) of the statute requires the prosecution to disclose to

the defendant the evidence of other crimes that it intends to offer at

trial, “including statements of witnesses or a summary of the

substance of any testimony that is expected to be offered . . .”

And, as even a cursory review of cases under 1108 reveals,

evidence of other offenses is virtually always presented through the

testimony of the victims and/or other witnesses. (E.g., People v.

Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 909-910; People v. Harris, supra,

60 Cal.App.4th at pp. 734-735; People v. Yovanov, supra, 69

Cal.App.4th 392, 396-400; People v. Soto (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th

966, 990-992; People v. Fitch, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at pp. 176-

177.) There is no legal basis for the limitation [petitioner]

suggests.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that

evidence of [petitioner]’s 1989 offense was admissible under

section 1108.

(People v. Tor, slip op. at 4-8.)

As explained above in response to petitioner’s second claim, a state court's

evidentiary ruling is not subject to federal habeas review unless the ruling violates federal law,

either by infringing upon a specific federal constitutional or statutory provision or by depriving

petitioner of the fundamentally fair trial guaranteed by due process. See Pulley, 465 U.S. at 41;

Jammal, 926 F.2d at 919-20. Accordingly, a federal court should not disturb a state court's

decision to admit evidence on due process grounds unless the admission of the evidence was

“arbitrary or so prejudicial that it rendered the trial fundamentally unfair.” See Walters, 45 F.3d

at 1357; Colley, 784 F.2d at 990; see also Mancuso, 292 F. 3d at 956 (a writ of habeas corpus

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will be granted for an erroneous admission of evidence “only where the ‘testimony is almost

entirely unreliable and . . . the factfinder and the adversary system will not be competent to

uncover, recognize, and take due account of its shortcomings.’" (quoting Barefoot, 463 U.S. at

899)). In addition, in order to obtain habeas relief on the basis of evidentiary error, petitioner

must show that the error was not harmless under Brecht, 507 U.S. at 619. In order to grant relief,

the habeas court must find that the error had "'a substantial and injurious effect' on the verdict." 

Dillard, 244 F.3d at 767 n.7 (quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623). 

The admission of testimony about the facts that led to petitioner’s prior conviction

is neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal law and should not be set aside. 

The testimony challenged by petitioner was neither likely to confuse the jury nor without some

probative value. As the Court of Appeals noted, the brevity of T.P.’s testimony when compared

to the extensive testimony of the victims in this case, as well as the stipulation between the

parties describing the 1989 verdict and petitioner’s conviction, was sufficient to ensure that there

was no prejudicial effect through confusion of the issues. (People v. Tor, slip op. at 5-6.) 

Finally, receipt of the complained of testimony in court through a live witness as

opposed to documentary evidence was not improper. California Evidence Code § 1108

anticipates “statements of witnesses” about prior sexual offenses will be offered at trial. 

Furthermore, the court was under no obligation to sanitize the evidence of petitioner’s prior

conviction. The decision to admit testimony by T.P. describing the previous incident, as opposed

to introduction of documentary evidence about its occurrence, was solely within the discretion of

the trial court, well within the limits of normal practice, and did not violate any federal right

protected under the Constitution. See Bockting v. Bayer, 399 F.3d 1010, 1040 (9th Cir.

2005)(affirming admissibility of live witness testimony about prior sexual assault); LeMay, 260

F.3d 1018 (permitting testimony by mother to describe prior sexual misconduct by accused

committed on her daughters); Colley v. Sumner, 784 F.2d 984, 990 (9th Cir. 1986)(admitting

testimony by prior victim of sexual assault).

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The balancing of the evidentiary factors by the court and its determination that

petitioner’s previous conviction was admissible were neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable

application of, controlling principles of United States Supreme Court precedent. The state

court’s rejection of petitioner’s fourth claim for relief was a reasoned conclusion consistent with

the guarantees of due process. Petitioner’s fourth claim for relief should be denied.

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner's

application for a writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: September 6, 2006.

13

Tor1137.hc.rev

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