Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00623/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00623-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1 Maricopa County Board of Supervisors, Maricopa County Correctional Health

Services, Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office, Officer Potoff, and Officer Ortega.

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Leonard Deon Irvin, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Maricopa County Board of Supervisors, et

al.,

Defendants.

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No. CV 07-0623-PHX-RCB

ORDER

Before the Court are Defendant Champagne’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.

# 20) and the Maricopa County Defendants’1

 Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 39).

The motions are fully briefed (Doc. ## 50, 54, 55, 57, 59). Plaintiff has also filed a “Motion

for Court to Order Defendants to Provide Plaintiff with Copies of all Forthcoming Pleadings”

and a “Motion to Compel Jess Lorona to Produce Photographic Evidence” (Doc. ## 61, 63).

The Court will grant Champagne’s summary judgment motion, deny the Maricopa County

Defendants’ summary judgment motion, and deny Plaintiff’s motions.

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2 Plaintiff was initially represented by counsel but is now proceeding pro se (Doc.

# 32). 

3 The Court notes that the Complaint is somewhat inartfully drafted. But because

this Complaint was filed when Plaintiff was represented by counsel, the Court is relieved of

its duty to construe the pleading liberally. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th

Cir. 1992); Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990) (pro se

pleadings must be liberally construed).

4 Plaintiff does not articulate which Defendants acted with gross negligence. But the

claim is directed at the lack of treatment after Plaintiff sustained “the injuries” (Complaint

¶ 46). Because the Complaint makes claims of alleged excessive force, “the injuries” must

refer to Plaintiff’s alleged injuries he contends were caused by Officers Potoff and Ortega.

The Court construes this claim as being leveled against the same Defendants as Count I, the

staffs at the Maricopa County Correctional Health Services and the Maricopa County

Sheriff’s Office. 

5 The Court construes the “Governmental Defendants” as the Maricopa County

Board of Supervisors, the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office, and Maricopa County

Correctional Health Services.

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I. Background

This action was initially filed in the Superior Court of Maricopa County on January

30, 2007.2

 Plaintiff named (1) the Maricopa County Board of Supervisors, (2) Maricopa

County Correctional Health Services, (3) the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office, (4) Officer

Potoff, (5) Officer Ortega, and (6) Lloyd P. Champagne, M.D. as Defendants. Plaintiff

presented six claims for relief.3

 In Count I, Plaintiff alleged that the staffs at Maricopa

County Correctional Health Services and the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office rendered

negligent medical treatment to his broken finger (Doc. # 1, Ex. B, Complaint ¶¶ 38, 40). In

Count II, Plaintiff alleged that Defendants were grossly negligent in failing to reasonably

treat Plaintiff’s injury (id. ¶ 46).4

 In Count III, Plaintiff alleged that the “Governmental

Defendants” were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s medical needs, in violation of the

Eighth Amendment (id. ¶ 50).5

 In Count IV, Plaintiff alleged that Officers Potoff and Ortega

used excessive force against Plaintiff (id. ¶¶ 55, 56). He further claimed that the

Governmental Defendants compounded the constitutional harm against Plaintiff by failing

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to adhere to then-existing county policy (id. ¶ 57). In Count V, Plaintiff alleged that

Champagne committed malpractice by treating only one of the fractures to Plaintiff’s finger

and ignoring the second (id. ¶ 61). Finally, in Count VI, Plaintiff advanced a claim of

intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress (id. ¶¶ 64-65).

Defendants removed this action to this Court on March 22, 2007 (Doc. # 1). 

II. Motions for Summary Judgment

Champagne has now moved for summary judgment based on Plaintiff’s failure to

produce expert testimony as required by ARIZ.REV.STAT. § 12-2603. The Maricopa County

Defendants joined the motion (Doc. # 36). They argue that because Plaintiff certified that

expert testimony would be required to establish his state law negligence and medical

malpractice claims, his failure to produce expert opinion testimony requires dismissal of his

state law claims. 

Plaintiff responded to Champagne’s motion (Doc. # 50). He contended that

Defendants waived any argument pursuant to § 12-2603 when they removed this case to

federal court (Doc. # 50 at 2). Alternatively, Plaintiff alleges that if § 12-2603 is applicable

to this case, Plaintiff certifies that expert testimony is not required because Defendants’

negligence is so grossly apparent that a layman would have no difficulty identifying it (id.

at 13). Plaintiff also maintains that one of his claims is based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and not

state law, rendering § 12-2603 inapposite. Finally, Plaintiff presents argument on the merits

of his medical claims against Champagne and the Maricopa County Defendants. 

In Reply, Champagne contends that the only claim leveled against him is a state law

claim for medical negligence, which is barred by § 12-2603. Champagne reiterates that

Arizona law is applicable to Plaintiff’s case despite the fact that it was removed to federal

court. Finally, Champagne contends that any attempt by Plaintiff to assert a federal civil

rights claim against him is untimely and procedurally improper (Doc. # 54). The Maricopa

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6 The Maricopa County Defendants did not join Champagne’s contention that § 12-

2603 only applies to Champagne. 

7 Notice required pursuant to Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962 (9th Cir. 1998)

(en banc). 

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County Defendants joined Champagne’s Reply (Doc. # 55).6 

The Maricopa County Defendants have also moved for summary judgment, arguing

that they are entitled to qualified immunity. They specifically contend that no excessive

force involving Officer Potoff took place on October 19, 2005, because the Maricopa County

Jail’s video recording of the incident demonstrates that Plaintiff’s allegations are false (Doc.

# 39). Plaintiff was informed of his right and obligation to respond to both summary

judgment motions (Doc. ## 44-45).7

 

Plaintiff responded to the Maricopa County Defendants’ summary judgment motion

as to the October 19, 2005 incident involving Potoff (Doc. # 57). Plaintiff reiterated his

claim that Potoff caused Plaintiff to fall and re-injure his right small finger. Plaintiff further

claimed that Potoff excessively forced Plaintiff’s hands behind his back and twisted his right

small finger, causing extreme pain and injury. 

In Reply, the Maricopa County Defendants maintain that they are entitled to qualified

immunity and that the video recording of the October 19, 2005 incident demonstrates the

absence of excessive force. They also claim that the excessive force claims against Ortega

are without basis because the Maricopa County Review of Force Board determined that

Ortega’s conduct was justified (Doc. # 59).

III. Legal Standards 

A. Summary Judgment

A court must grant summary judgment if the pleadings and supporting documents,

viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, “show that there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). Under

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summary judgment practice, the moving party bears the initial responsibility of presenting

the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record, together with affidavits,

which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp.,

477 U.S. at 323. If the moving party meets its initial responsibility the burden then shifts to

the opposing party who must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact

that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is

such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. at 250; see

Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D. Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 1995). The opposing

party need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor; it is sufficient that

“the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’

differing versions of the truth at trial.” First Nat’l Bank of Arizona v. Cities Serv. Co., 391

U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968).

When considering a summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,

if any. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The evidence presented by the parties must be admissible.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). And the evidence of the non-movant is “to be believed, and all

justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. 

IV. Analysis

A. Champagne’s Motion

Champagne contends that ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-2603 required Plaintiff to disclose

by November 1, 2007 a preliminary expert witness affidavit with respect to his state law

claims of medical malpractice and negligence (Doc. # 20 at 2). Champagne further contends

that Plaintiff’s failure to comply with § 12-2603 compels dismissal of his state law

malpractice and negligence claims pursuant to § 12-2603(F). The Maricopa County

Defendants join the motion with respect to the state law medical negligence claims leveled

against them (Doc. # 36). In response, Plaintiff maintains that § 12-2603 is not applicable

to this case because it was removed to federal court. Alternatively, Plaintiff alleges that if

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8 This determination has no bearing on Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim

articulated in Count III. Although a plaintiff has the burden of proof on breach of the

standard of care, which generally requires expert testimony, there is no federal procedural

requirement that a plaintiff must present expert witness testimony during initial discovery as

to a federal claim of deliberate indifference. 

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§ 12-2603 is applicable to his action, he now certifies that expert testimony is not required.

The state law negligence and medical malpractice claims pending before the Court arising

from Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendants failed to properly treat his injured finger are

Counts I, II, V, and VI.8

 

Section 12-2603 requires that a “claimant . . . shall certify in a written statement . . .

whether or not expert opinion testimony is necessary to prove the health care professional’s

standard of care or liability for the claim.” If expert opinion testimony is required, a

preliminary expert opinion affidavit must be served with the claimant’s initial disclosure.

Id. Further, § 12-2603(F) provides that a court must dismiss a claim against a health care

professional if the claimant fails to file an expert testimony affidavit after certifying that such

an affidavit is necessary. In his Complaint, Plaintiff did certify that expert opinion testimony

is necessary to prove his state law negligence and medical malpractice claims (Complaint ¶

44). Pursuant to the Court’s Scheduling Order, Plaintiff’s expert witness disclosure was due

no later than November 1, 2007 (Doc. # 13). Plaintiff did not disclose an expert witness or

any expert opinion testimony. Consequently, his state law malpractice and negligence claims

are ripe for dismissal pursuant to § 12-2603.

Plaintiff’s protestations do not change this result. The fact that Defendants removed

this action does not alter § 12-2603’s applicability to this case. Moreland v. Barrette, 2006

WL 3147651, *3 (D. Ariz. October 31, 2006). Moreover, Plaintiff’s attempt to circumvent

§ 12-2603 by claiming in his response to summary judgment that expert testimony is not

necessary is unavailing. Plaintiff previously certified that expert testimony would be

necessary to prove his claims, and Plaintiff failed to produce that testimony or withdraw that

certification before the deadline for expert disclosure. In the Ninth Circuit, the general rule

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is that a party cannot avoid summary judgment by contradicting his prior statements. See

Radobenko v. Automated Equipment Corp., 520 F.2d 540, 543-44 (9th Cir. 1975) (affirming

the grant of summary judgment in an action for breach of fiduciary duty and fraud where the

non-moving party claimed in his deposition that he was offered employment, agreed to a

leave of absence with pay, and that he quit his job but made completely contradictory

statements in his affidavit in opposition to summary judgment); Kennedy v. Allied Mut. Ins.

Co., 952 F.2d 262, 266 (9th Cir. 1991) (party cannot create an issue of fact by contradicting

his prior deposition testimony; Hambelton Bros. Lumber Co. v. Balkin Enterprises, Inc., 397

F.3d 1217 (9th Cir. 2005) (“sham” deposition corrections are akin to “sham” affidavits).

Plaintiff’s state law malpractice and negligence claims must be dismissed. Champagne’s

motion, and the Maricopa County Defendants’ joinder thereto, will be granted. Counts I, II,

V, and VI will be dismissed. 

B. Maricopa County Defendants’ Motion

The Maricopa County Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim of

excessive force against Potoff (Doc. # 39). They claim that they are entitled to qualified

immunity because the jail’s video recording of the October 19, 2005 incident precludes a

finding of excessive force. Specifically, the Maricopa County Defendants contend that each

of Plaintiff’s allegations in his Complaint are disproved by the video recording and that

Potoff’s actions were reasonable. 

In his Response, Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit and statement of facts (Doc. #

58). Plaintiff alleges that on October 19, 2005, Potoff caused Plaintiff to fall and re-injure

his right small finger (Doc. # 58, Pla.’s Affidavit ¶ 6). Plaintiff further alleged that Potoff

picked him up off the ground by his injured right hand and jammed his hands behind his

back, while bending Plaintiff’s fingers (id.). Finally, Plaintiff avers that after he was escorted

outside the view of the video camera, Potoff continued to assault him by jamming his hands

behind his back and bending his fingers in opposite directions (id.).

If a defendant claims qualified immunity, the court must make two distinct inquires,

the “constitutional inquiry” and the “qualified immunity inquiry.” See Estate of Ford v.

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Ramirez-Palmer, 301 F.3d 1043, 1049 (9th Cir. 2002). The “constitutional inquiry” asks

whether, when taken in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the facts alleged

show that the official’s conduct violated a constitutional right. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S.

194, 201 (2001). If so, a court turns to the “qualified immunity inquiry” and asks if the right

was clearly established at the relevant time. Id. at 201-02. This second inquiry “must be

undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.”

Id. at 201.

The Court has reviewed the videotape submitted by Defendants. This video tends to

support Defendants’ claim that no excessive force was used in front of the camera. But this

video recording is insufficient to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact

for two reasons. First, Plaintiff has specifically alleged that he was subjected to excessive

force after being taken outside of the view of the camera. Obviously, the video recording

does not show what happened after Plaintiff was taken outside its view. Second, and more

importantly, Potoff has not submitted an affidavit to counter Plaintiff’s allegations that force

was used after he was escorted outside the camera’s view. Weighing of the evidence and

credibility determinations are not permitted in a summary judgment analysis. Anderson, 477

U.S. at 255. The evidence must be construed in Plaintiff’s favor, and all inferences drawn

from the underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. See

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Potoff

has not addressed Plaintiff’s contention in his response that excessive force was used after

he was escorted outside the camera’s view. And indeed, when a defendant does not object

to a plaintiff’s declarations or otherwise controvert the matters described therein in a reply

memorandum, those facts are deemed undisputed. 10A Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller

& Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2722, at 384-85 (3d ed. 1998) (“[a]s

is true of other material introduced on a summary judgment motion, uncertified or otherwise

inadmissible documents may be considered by the court if not challenged”) (footnotes

omitted). Here, because Defendants have submitted no evidence to counter Plaintiff’s

allegation of excessive force outside the view of the camera, the Court finds that disputed

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issues of fact remain regarding whether Potoff used excessive force against Plaintiff. Indeed,

“[s]ummary judgment or judgment as a matter of law in excessive force cases should be

granted sparingly.” Lolli v. County of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 415-16 (9th Cir. 2003)

(quoting Santos v. Gates, 287 F.3d 846, 853 (9th Cir. 2002)). 

The second step of the Saucier analysis requires Defendants to demonstrate that the

alleged excessive force against Plaintiff did not violate clearly established constitutional law.

Defendants’ qualified immunity argument wholly fails to address this second step. They

contend that Potoff’s actions were reasonable and therefore “immunity must attach and the

allegations against Potoff and the other Defendants . . . must be dismissed in their entirety”

(Doc. # 39 at 5). This argument goes only to the constitutional inquiry and it rests on

disputed facts being construed in Defendants’ favor. “Where the officers’ entitlement to

qualified immunity depends on the resolution of disputed issues of fact in their favor, and

against the non-moving party, summary judgment is not appropriate.” Wilkins v. City of

Oakland, 350 F.3d 949, 956 (9th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, Defendants’ request for qualified

immunity will be denied.

V. Remaining Claims

The Maricopa County Defendants have not sought summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s

claim of deliberate indifference in Count III. Regarding Plaintiff’s claim of excessive force

by Ortega in Count IV, the Maricopa County Defendants merely state in their reply in

support of their summary judgment motion, “the excessive force claims against Office [sic]

Ortega are similarly without basis. Although there is no known footage of that incident, the

incident was reviewed by Maricopa County’s review of force board. The reviewer found

Officer Ortega’s conduct justified and dismissed the complaint” (Doc. # 59 at 2). This

conclusory reference to Plaintiff’s claim against Ortega is patently insufficient to warrant

summary judgment for two reasons. First, the Court will not consider an argument to which

Plaintiff has not had the opportunity to respond. See Cedano-Viera v. Ashcroft, 324 F.3d

1062, 1066 n. 5 (9th Cir. 2003) (declining to consider an issue raised for the first time in a

reply brief). Second, even if presented properly, Defendants introduce no evidence to

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support the contention that Ortega’s conduct was reasonable. Defendants are reminded that

the moving party bears the initial responsibility of presenting the basis for its motion and

identifying those portions of the record, together with affidavits, which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

Defendants have made no effort to attempt to establish the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact for trial as to Plaintiff’s claim of excessive force by Ortega. The Maricopa

County Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on either Count III or Count IV.

In view of the foregoing, the following claims remain: (1) Count III against the

Maricopa County Board of Supervisors, the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office, and Maricopa

County Correctional Health Services and (2) Count IV against Officers Potoff and Ortega,

the Maricopa County Board of Supervisors, the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office, and

Maricopa County Correctional Health Services.

VI. Plaintiff’s Motions

Plaintiff has filed two motions (Doc. # 61, 63). First, Plaintiff seeks an Order

directing Defendants to provide Plaintiff with copies of all forthcoming pleadings. Plaintiff

specifically alleges that he did not receive a copy of Champagne’s reply in support of his

summary judgment motion. Champagne has notified the Court that his failure to mail a copy

of the reply was inadvertent and has since forwarded the reply to Plaintiff. Consequently,

this motion will be denied as moot.

Plaintiff has also filed a second motion to compel, arguing that his former counsel,

Jess Lorona, has still not forwarded copies of photographs taken by Jeff Bachtle on June 16,

2006 (Doc. # 63). Plaintiff has acknowledged, however, that he did receive the compact

discs Lorona sent to Plaintiff after his March 24, 2008 motion to compel. The Court will

deny Plaintiff’s motion. Lorona has previously responded to Plaintiff’s request and averred

that he has sent Plaintiff copies of all photographs and evidence in his possession (Doc. #

53). Moreover, Plaintiff does not explain how the June 16, 2006 photographs are any more

probative than the photographs he already possesses. As a result, the Court will deny

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Plaintiff’s motion to compel (Doc. # 63).

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

(1) Champagne’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 20) and the Maricopa

County Defendants’ Joinder thereto (Doc. # 36) are granted.

(2) Counts I, II, V, and VI are dismissed.

(3) Champagne is dismissed with prejudice.

(4) The Maricopa County Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 39) is

denied.

(5) Plaintiff’s Motion for Court to Order Defendants to Provide Plaintiff with Copies

of All Pleadings (Doc. # 61) is denied as moot. 

(6) Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel (Doc. # 63) is denied.

(7) The following claims remain: (1) Count III against the Maricopa County Board

of Supervisors, the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office, and Maricopa County Correctional

Health Services and (2) Count IV against Officers Potoff and Ortega, the Maricopa County

Board of Supervisors, the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office, and Maricopa County

Correctional Health Services

DATED this 8th day of August, 2008.

.

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