Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-01257/USCOURTS-azd-2_15-cv-01257-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Juan Aurelio Sanchez,

Petitioner,

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-15-01257-PHX-JJT

ORDER

At issue is Petitioner Juan Aurelio Sanchez’s Petition under 28 U.S.C. §2254 for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1), to which Respondents Charles L. Ryan and the State of 

Arizona filed a Response (Doc. 8). Magistrate Judge John Z. Boyle issued a Report and 

Recommendation (“R&R”) (Doc. 10) recommending denial and dismissal of the Petition 

with prejudice, and Respondent Objected to that R&R (Doc. 11). 

Judge Boyle finds that the Petition was timely filed, and because Respondents 

filed no objection to that finding and recommendation, the Court may accept that 

recommendation without further review. United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003). The Court nonetheless has conducted its own review of the issue, 

and upon doing so, concludes that Judge Boyle’s application of the law to the facts of this 

matter are reasonable and correct. Nevertheless, for the substantive reasons set forth in 

the R&R, this Court will deny the Petition and the Motion, finding that Grounds I and II 

of the Petition both fail to state a cognizable basis for federal habeas relief, and that 

Ground I fails on the merits in any event.

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In his Objection, Petitioner argues that the R&R mischaracterized facts in the 

record below, and that mischaracterization renders the R&R’s conclusion flawed. This 

argument ignores the threshold issue Judge Boyle identified in the R&R—that Ground I 

raises a potential violation of the Constitution of the State of Arizona and thus is not 

cognizable on habeas review. See, e.g., Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991). The 

R&R notes, correctly, that Petitioner has tried to frame this state law question as a federal 

law issue by reference to the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 

States. This fails, for the reasons set forth in the R&R, and Petitioner’s citations to Crane 

v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986) and other cases for the broad proposition that a criminal 

defendant is entitled to a fair opportunity to defend against state charges do nothing to 

answer the point. Thus the Court need not reach the issue of whether the R&R 

mischaracterized evidence on the record in the state proceeding. But even if the Court 

were to reach the merits of Petitioner’s claim in Ground I, that claim would fail. As Judge 

Boyle correctly observed, a trial court’s decision to exclude evidence violates the 

Constitution only where the excluded evidence “is sufficiently reliable and crucial to the 

defense.” Trillo v. Biter, 769 F.3d 995, 1003 (9th Cir. 2014)(internal citations omitted).

Petitioner took issue with the R&R’s characterization of the evidence in state court as 

providing that Petitioner “admi[tted] to the 911 dispatcher that he killed the victim.” 

(Doc. 11 at 11.) Stated with more precision, the Court of Appeals related the facts to 

include that during an interview the day after the 911 calls and the victim’s death, 

Petitioner told an investigating officer “that he had told the 911 dispatcher that he had 

killed her.” State v. Sanchez, No. 1 CA-CR-10-1002, 2012 WL 2152819 at *1-2 (Ariz. 

Ct. App. June 14, 2012). Additionally, before police arrived at the scene of the victim’s 

death, Respondent called the victim’s niece; asked her to come and get the victim’s 

toddler son and “[t]ake care of him for the rest of his life,” stated that Petitioner had “f----

ed up,” and said he was sorry for what he had done. Id. Under either version of the first 

statement to law enforcement, and the statement to the victim’s niece, Magistrate Judge 

Boyle was correct in his conclusion. The hearsay statement Petitioner sought to introduce 

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at trial and the defense theory he would have it support—that the victim killed herself to 

avoid prison--was not corroborated by this other evidence; nor was it corroborated by the 

blood spatter evidence or the expert testimony interpreting it. Petitioner’s Ground I fails.

Judge Boyle also found correctly that Petitioner’s IAC claim in Ground II was not 

cognizable. Petitioner argues that Martinez v. Ryan provides that he has a right to 

effective assistance of counsel during PCR proceedings in his matter. 132 S. Ct. 1309, 

1315 (2012). But in so doing, Petitioner misses Judge Boyle’s point, which is that, even if 

Martinez provides such a right in initial PCR proceedings, PCR counsel has to have 

available some cognizable error below to prevail upon, and, presumably, to fail to raise or 

argue. Here, as set forth above, there was no underlying error on the part of the state trial 

court in precluding the challenged hearsay statement of the victim. In other words, there 

was no error for PCR counsel to raise in initial PCR review—and therefore, nothing for 

that counsel to fail to raise which would trigger IAC on PCR counsel’s part during that 

initial review. Thus there could be no Martinez violation.1

IT IS ORDERED adopting Magistrate Judge Boyle’s R&R (Doc. 11) in its 

entirety and incorporating same into this Order. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) and dismissing this matter with prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying a Certificate of Appealability and leave to 

proceed in forma pauperis on appeal in this matter because the dismissal of the instant 

Petition is justified by a plane procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the 

procedural ruling debatable.

Dated this 6th day of July, 2016.

Honorable John J. Tuchi

United States District Judge

 

1 The Court does not here decide whether Petitioner correctly construes the effect of Martinez on his rights in this matter as it is not necessary to the decision.

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