Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01715/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01715-13/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:4332 Environmental Policy - Coop of Agency Reports

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANDRE RHODES,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-06-1715 MCE EFB PS

vs.

ELECTRONIC DATA SYSTEMS 

CORPORATION, 

ORDER & FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

Defendant. 

 /

This action, in which plaintiff is proceeding in propria persona, was referred to this court

under by Local Rule 72-302(c)(21), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

Plaintiff’s “Motion for Discovery Hearing & Motion for Sanctions” was noticed for

hearing on February 28, 2007. That motion was submitted without appearance or oral argument

pursuant to Local Rule 78-230(h). As set forth more fully herein, plaintiff’s motion is denied. 

I. Plaintiff’s Motion(s)

Plaintiff seeks an order compelling Electronic Data Systems Corporation (“EDS”)

employee, Alton Moore, to respond to interrogatories. Plaintiff served interrogatories on Mr.

Moore, to which EDS supplied responses on January 8, 2007. Those responses were verified by

Bharat Vashi (EDS “Director-Claims Operation”). Plaintiff, dissatisfied that EDS selected

someone other than Mr. Moore to provide responses to the interrogatories, has filed the present

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1

 Curiously, defendant points out that plaintiff has not made any further attempts to

depose Mr. Moore, despite defendant’s efforts to make Mr. Moore available, and despite

plaintiff’s earlier and adamant attempts to depose Mr. Moore at defendant’s expense. 

2

 To the extent plaintiff believes that the court “ordered” EDS to have Mr. Moore provide

responses to interrogatories, he is wrong. Notwithstanding any discussion between the court and

the parties during the December 20, 2006, hearing the formal order on this matter is clear. Nor

does such discussion constitute legal advice to plaintiff. The court cannot, and will not, inject

itself into the adversary process on behalf of plaintiff. See Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362,

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motion, in addition to a “Proposed Order Granting Plaintiffs Application for an Order to Show

Cause & Motion to Compel Statement of One Alton Moore,” which seeks essentially the same

relief. 

Defendant opposes the motion and the “proposed order.” Defendant cites Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 33, which provides that “any party may serve upon any other party written

interrogatories . . . to be answered by the party served or if the party served is a public or private

corporation . . . by any officer or agent., who shall furnish such information as is available to the

party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a). The party serving the interrogatories on a corporation has no right

to select the particular officer or agent to respond to the interrogatories. See Holland v

Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 28 F.R.D. 595 (D. Colo. 1961); Wirtz v I. C. Harris &

Co., 36 F.R.D. 116, 117 (E.D. Mich. 1964) (Parties serving interrogatories may not select

particular person and direct that interrogatories be answered by such person where such person is

not a party); Law v NCAA, 167 F.R.D. 464, 475-76 (D. Kan. 1996) (Under FRCP 33(a), although

interrogatories must be served on party, party served has discretion in selecting officer or agent

who is to answer them and verify answers; it is clear that whoever answers interrogatories,

answers must include whatever information is available to party.). 

In the present case, only Mr. Rhodes and EDS are parties. Mr. Moore is not a party.

Accordingly, the defendant cannot be compelled to provide answers to interrogatories directed at

non-party, Mr. Moore.1

 Therefore plaintiff’s “Motion for Discovery Hearing & Motion for

Sanctions” is denied 2

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1365 (9th Cir. 1986). Plaintiff is directed to read and follow the court’s formalized, written

orders, which issue post-hearing. The court also again directs plaintiff to read and comply with

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Rules prior to filing any documents with this

court.

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II. Defendant’s Motion for Sanctions 

As noted above, defendant’s opposition to plaintiff’s discovery motion is well-taken. 

The court now addresses defendant’s accompanying request for monetary sanctions and/or

dismissal. 

Defendant requests monetary sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4)(B) for plaintiff’s

“misuse of the Court’s processes.” Rule 37(a)(4)(B) provides as follows: “If the motion is

denied, the court . . . shall . . . require the moving party . . . to pay to the party who opposed the

motion the reasonable expenses incurred in opposing the motion, including attorney’s fees,

unless the court find that the making of the motion was substantial justified or that other

circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4)(B) (emphasis

added). 

Here, it does not appear that plaintiff made the motion for the purpose of harassing or

annoying defendant, but rather due to his genuine confusion over discovery methods available to

him. Although the court denies defendant’s motion for monetary sanctions on this basis, the

court again cautions plaintiff that despite his pro se status, he is required to read and comply with

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993)

(“[W]e have never suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be

interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel.”). 

The court likewise recommends that defendant’s request for dismissal sanctions be

denied. Defendant correctly argues that courts are vested with authority to impose a broad range

of sanctions against parties for “bad faith” litigation conduct. See L.R. 11-110; Chambers v.

NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 42-45 (1991); Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v. Lakewood Engineering &

Mfg. Corp., 982 F.2d 363, 368 (9th Cir. 1992); accord Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Natural Beverage

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Distributors, 69 F.3d 337, 348 (9th Cir. 1995) (recognizing inherent power to dismiss

counterclaim for concealing discovery documents); Winn v. Associated Press, 903 F. Supp. 575,

580 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (imposing monetary sanctions for deliberately impeding discovery and

willful noncompliance with document production).

However, “[d]ismissal is a harsh penalty and is to be imposed only in extreme

circumstances.” Malone v. United States Postal Service, 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Normally, a court will consider five factors in determining whether to dismiss a case for failure

to comply with a court order: “(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2)

the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public

policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic

sanctions.” Id., at 130. In the present case, however, plaintiff has not violated any court order

by filing the present motion. As discussed above, plaintiff’s filing of the present discovery

motion appears to have been caused by genuine confusion, and not posed for any improper

purpose. Even if it had been, penalizing a party “for dilatory conduct during discovery

proceedings” is discretionary. Bollow v. Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 650 F.2d

1093, 1102 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4)). Here, although defendant was

burdened with the extra time and costs required to oppose plaintiff’s motion, the court finds that

it will suffer no prejudice by denial of its request for dismissal sanctions and proceeding with

litigation on the merits. The court has already imposed monetary sanctions on plaintiff, and does

not at this point find additional sanctions to be warranted. Accordingly, the court recommends

that defendant’s motion for dismissal as a sanction be denied. 

III. Conclusion

In accordance with the foregoing, IT IS ORDERED that: 

1. Plaintiff’s “Motion for Discovery Hearing & Motion for Sanctions” is denied; and

2. Defendant’s motion for monetary sanctions is denied.

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Further, IT IS RECOMMENDED that defendant’s motion for dismissal as a sanction be

denied. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within ten (10)

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten (10) days after service of the objections. The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the

District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst,

951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: March 19, 2007.

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