Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-00545/USCOURTS-casd-3_10-cv-00545-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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10CV545-BEN(JMA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRYAN D. SMITH,

Plaintiff,

v.

DOMINGO URIBE, Warden,

Defendants. 

 

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Case No. 10CV545-BEN (JMA)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

FOR ORDER DENYING MOTION TO

DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE AND

PROVIDING NOTICE REGARDING

POSSIBLE DISMISSAL OF PETITION

FOR FAILURE TO EXHAUST STATE

COURT REMEDIES 

On March 10, 2010, Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a Petition

for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2254, along with a Motion to

Proceed in forma pauperis. [Doc. No. 1.] On March 23, 2010, the Court granted

Petitioner’s Motion to Proceed in forma pauperis and advised Petitioner he failed to

allege exhaustion of his state court remedies as to all claims presented. [Doc. No. 4.] 

On April 13, 2010, Petitioner filed a First Amended Petition (“the Petition”) alleging

exhaustion of his state court remedies with respect to all claims presented. [Doc. No.

8.] On June 18, 2010, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss Petition contending

Petitioner failed to exhaust all four of his claims. [Doc. No. 11.]

The Court has reviewed the record and, for the following reasons,

RECOMMENDS United States District Judge Roger T. Benitez adopt the finding that

Petitioner has filed a “mixed” petition, that is, one that contains exhausted and

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unexhausted claims. The Court further RECOMMENDS Petitioner be notified that he

should inform the Court as to how he chooses to proceed with his mixed petition. 

Finally, the Court RECOMMENDS the Motion to Dismiss be DENIED without prejudice.

BACKGROUND

A jury convicted Petitioner of murder [Cal. Penal Code §187 (a)], found true the

robbery special circumstance allegation [Cal. Penal Code §190.2(a)(17)], and found true

the personal-arming allegation [Cal. Penal Code §12022.5(a)]. The trial court

sentenced Petitioner to life without the possibility of parole plus five years. [Lodgment

1, at 1-2, 830, 929.] The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division

One affirmed the judgment on August 27, 2009. [Lodgment 5, at 1.] The California

Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for review on December 17, 2009. 

[Lodgment 7.] 

DISCUSSION

Respondent’s primary argument in support of the motion to dismiss is the Petition

advances only unexhausted claims. Specifically, Respondent contends that in state

court, Petitioner did not raise grounds one and two as federal claims and never raised

grounds three and four. [Doc. No. 11, at 5.]

A state prisoner’s federal habeas petition may not be granted if state remedies

are unexhausted. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). In most instances, a claim is

exhausted once it is presented to a state’s highest court. (See Sandgathe v. Maass,

314 F.3d 371, 376 (9th Cir. 2002)). Federal courts cannot consider petitions that

contain both exhausted and unexhausted claims, often referred to as “mixed petitions.” 

(See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522). The filing of a mixed petition renders it subject

to dismissal. Id. A petitioner has satisfied the exhaustion requirement if he has “fairly

presented” his federal claim to the highest state court with jurisdiction to consider it....” 

(Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1996)). 

A claim is fairly presented to the highest state court if it is presented in the federal

habeas petition in a manner that is the “substantial equivalent” of how it was presented

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People v. Nelson, 43 Cal. 4th 1242 (2008); People v. Boysen, 165 Cal.App.4th 761

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in the state courts. (Pappageorge v. Sumner, 688 F.2d 1294, 1295 (9th Cir. 1982));

(Schiers v. California, 333 F.2d 173, 174 (9th Cir. 1964)). There are at most three

possible ways for a petitioner to exhaust a claim in state court. The petitioner must: (1)

reference specific provisions of the federal constitution or statutes (See Lyons v.

Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668, 670 (9th Cir. 2000) as modified by 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir.

2001)); (2) cite to federal case law (Id.); or (3) cite to pertinent state case law explicitly

applying federal law. (Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2003)). 

A. Ground One

Respondent contends the federal claim that was presented to the state courts

rested on a different factual theory than the claim presented here. [Doc. No. 11, at 5.] 

At the state appellate level, Petitioner claimed the preaccusation delay denied him due

process of law and a fair trial in violation of the state and federal constitutions, “because

the delay caused significant prejudice that was not outbalanced by any justification for

the delay.” [Lodgment 2, at 24.] Petitioner further contended, “the delay in charging

appellant was done in reckless disregard of the circumstances known to prosecution

that a key witness for the defense...was homeless and that delay in charging the case

raised a heightened risk that he might become difficult to locate and unavailable to

testify.” [Lodgment 2, at 44.] Petitioner referred explicitly to the federal Constitution and

cited two state cases1

 which analyzed the federal issue of preaccusation delay to

support this contention. Id.

Petitioner again raised the unjustifiable and prejudicial preaccusation delay in the

California Supreme Court, alleging the delay was reckless and “denied appellant his

right to due process of law in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.” 

[Lodgment 6, at 18.] Petitioner contended the witness became unavailable and the

prosecution offered no justification for the delay. [See Lodgment 6, at 8,10.] Petitioner

cited People v. Nelson, 43 Cal. 4th 1242 (2008) and People v. Boysen, 165 Cal.App.4th

761 (2007) in his petition to the California Supreme Court, both of which analyzed two

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United States v. Marion (1971) 404 U.S. 307; United States v. Lovasco (1977) 431 U.S. 783.

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federal cases2 addressing the issue of preaccusation delay under the federal

Constitution and federal court decisions. The Nelson court concluded

[t]hus, Lovasco, supra, 431 U.S. 783, 97 S.Ct. 2044, and

Marion, supra, 404 U.S. 307, 92 S.Ct. 455, indicated that

delay undertaken to gain a tactical advantage over the

accused, or delay incurred in reckless disregard of

circumstances known to the prosecution suggesting that

delay might prejudice the defense, would violate due

process if the defendant demonstrates prejudice. 

Nelson, 43 Cal.4th at 1253. The Boysen court held, 

Even if California Constitution article I, section 28(d) required

we apply federal constitutional law in this context, there is no

controlling federal law on the subject. Two United States

Supreme Court cases, United States v. Marion (1971) 404

U.S. 307, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 and United States v.

Lovasco (1977) 431 U.S. 783, 97 S.Ct. 2044, 52 L.Ed.2d

752, have considered the question of preaccusation delay,

and while both cases note the prosecutorial concession that

deliberate delay to disadvantage a defendant would

constitute a denial of due process, neither holds that a

showing of deliberate delay is required before a prosecution

may be dismissed.

Boysen, 165 Cal.App.4th at 775.

Petitioner contends in ground one of the Petition, “[t]he 11 year delay in charging

appellant denied him due process of law and a fair trial in violation of the state and

federal constitutions because it caused significant prejudice from the loss of key eye

witnesses [sic] testimony and no justification outbalanced the prejudice.” [Doc. No. 8, at

6]. Respondent contends this claim was “purely a state-law claim in state court,” and

that in order to exhaust Petitioner must present the same factual basis and legal theory

as he did in state court. [Doc. No. 11, at 6.] Respondent concedes Petitioner

“exhausted a federal claim alleging reckless delay because the prosecution knew that

[the eyewitness] was homeless and might become unavailable,” but contends this

argument is not the one advanced in the Petition. [Doc. No. 11, at 5.] Respondent

contends the claim presented here is predicated on trial error in denying the motion to

dismiss which was based on the delay. The Court, which has a duty to liberally

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construe pro se filings, disagrees. 

Petitioner argues in ground one of the Petition that the eleven year delay in

charging him denied him due process of law in violation of the federal constitution

because it caused him significant prejudice. [Doc. No. 8, at 6.] Petitioner argued to the

California Supreme Court that reckless delay caused him prejudice in violation of his

due process rights. Therefore, ground one of Petitioner’s petition is based on a factual

basis and a legal theory which is substantially the same as those presented to the state

court. Petitioner claims his due process rights were violated by the government’s

preaccusation delay, because during that time a key witness became unavailable,

thereby prejudicing his case. 

Respondent’s remaining contention as to why Petitioner did not exhaust ground

one regards the terseness of Petitioner’s federal claim. Respondent contends the

federal claim “was made in one paragraph at the end of the brief,” “was basically a

throw away argument,”and, was presented “in a single sentence.” Respondent

therefore implies that brevity of a federal claim affects its exhaustion in the state courts.

However, Respondent provides no authority in support of this conclusion. A related rule

is that a petitioner does not exhaust state remedies by generally appealing to a broad

constitutional provision alone. (See Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 163 (1996)

(citing Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7 (1982) (per curiam)); (Shumway v. Payne,

223 F.3d 982, 987 (9th Cir. 2000)). However, Petitioner here claims the eleven year

delay was reckless and caused him significant prejudice from the loss of key eyewitness

testimony. This claim is not merely a general appeal to a broad constitutional provision, 

but rather a specific claim made under the United States Constitution and federal and

state case law. 

In sum, this court finds Petitioner fairly presented his federal claim to the state

courts and has, therefore, exhausted ground one of his Petition.

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B. Ground Two

Petitioner’s second ground for habeas corpus relief is the trial court erred by

admitting hearsay testimony of the unavailable witness to remedy the prejudice caused

to Petitioner’s case by the witness’s unavailability. [Doc. No. 8, at 7.] Petitioner neither

presented this claim in state court as a federal constitutional issue, nor cited federal

legal authority to support the contention. The state court case Petitioner cited in support

of this claim did not analyze federal authority on the issue. Consequently, Petitioner did

not fairly present his second ground for habeas relief to the state courts as a federal

issue. Petitioner, therefore, did not exhaust ground two of his Petition.

C. Grounds Three and Four

Petitioner’s third and fourth grounds for habeas corpus relief are also

unexhausted. In ground three, Petitioner contends the trial court erred when it admitted

one witness’s testimony (Yolanda Fisher) because it was prejudicial and inadmissible

under California Evidence Code §§ 352 and 1101. Although Petitioner did claim his

case was prejudiced when the trial court admitted that witness’s testimony, he did not

cite any federal constitutional provision or law to support that claim. [Lodgment 6, at

20.] Ground three, therefore, is unexhausted. In ground four, Petitioner contends

“cumulative error warrants reversal of [his] conviction.” [Doc. No. 8, at 9.] Petitioner

asserts this claim for the first time in the Petition. Ground four of the Petition is

therefore unexhausted. 

Thus, having determined the Petition is mixed and contains unexhausted claims,

the Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner be notified of the possible dismissal of the

Petition and his options, as set forth below.

PETITIONER’S OPTIONS

To avoid the Court dismissing the Petition on its own accord, Petitioner may

choose one of the following options.

I) First Option: Demonstrate Exhaustion

Petitioner may file further papers with this Court to demonstrate that he has in

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28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d) provides:

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of--

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State

action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court

and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could

have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgement or claim is pending

shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.

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fact exhausted the claims the Court has determined are unexhausted. 

ii) Second Option: Voluntarily Dismiss the Petition

Petitioner may move to voluntarily dismiss his entire federal Petition and return to

state court to exhaust his unexhausted claims. Petitioner may then file a new federal

petition containing only exhausted claims. See Rose, 455 U.S. at 510, 520-21 (stating

that a petitioner who files a mixed petition may dismiss his petition to “return to state

court to exhaust his claims.”). 

Petitioner is cautioned that any new federal petition must be filed before

expiration of the one-year statute of limitations. Ordinarily, a petitioner has one year

from when his conviction became final to file his federal petition, unless he can show

that statutory or equitable “tolling” applies. (Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 176

(2001)); (28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)).3

 The statute of limitations does not run while a properly

filed state habeas corpus petition is pending. (28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)); (See Nino v.

Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999)). (But see Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8

(2000) (holding that “an application is ‘properly filed’ when its delivery and acceptance

[by the appropriate court officer for placement into the record] are in compliance with the

applicable laws and rules governing filings.”)); (Bonner v. Carey, 425 F.3d 1145, 1149

(9th Cir. 2005) (holding that a state application for post-conviction relief which is

ultimately dismissed as untimely was neither “properly filed” nor “pending” while it was

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28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) provides that a claim presented in a second or successive habeas

corpus application under § 2254 shall be dismissed unless: 

(A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made

retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously

unavailable; or 

(B) (I) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered previously

through the exercise of due diligence; and 

(ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a

whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for

constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the

underlying offense. 

8 10CV545-BEN(JMA)

under consideration by the state court, and therefore does not toll the statute of

limitations, as amended 439 F.3d 993). However, absent some other basis for tolling,

the statute of limitations continues to run while a federal habeas petition is pending. 

(Duncan, 533 U.S. at 181-82).

iii) Third Option: Formally Abandon Unexhausted Claim

Petitioner may formally abandon his unexhausted claims and proceed with his

exhausted ones. See Rose, 455 U.S. at 510, 520-21 (stating that a petitioner who files

a mixed petition may “resubmit[] the habeas petition to present only exhausted claims”). 

Petitioner is cautioned that once he abandons his unexhausted claims, he may

lose the ability to ever raise them in federal court. (See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S.

473, 488 (2000) (stating that a court’s ruling on the merits of claims presented in a first §

2254 petition renders any later petition successive)); (see also 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (a)-

(b)).4

iv) Fourth Option: File a Motion to Stay the Federal Proceedings

Petitioner may file a motion to stay this federal proceeding while he returns to

state court to exhaust his unexhausted claims. There are two methods available to

Petitioner, the “stay and abeyance” procedure and the “withdrawal and abeyance”

procedure.

If Petitioner wishes to use the “stay and abeyance” procedure, he should ask the

Court to stay his mixed petition while he returns to state court to exhaust. Under this

procedure he must demonstrate there are arguably meritorious claim(s) which he

wishes to return to state court to exhaust, that he is diligently pursuing his state court

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remedies with respect to those claim(s), and that good cause exists for his failure to

timely exhaust his state court remedies. (Rhines v. Webber, 544 U.S. 269, 277-78

(2005)). 

If Petitioner wishes to use the “withdrawal and abeyance” procedure, he must

voluntarily withdraw his unexhausted claim(s), ask the Court to stay the proceedings

and hold the fully-exhausted petition in abeyance while he returns to state court to

exhaust, and then seek permission to amend his petition to include the newly exhausted

claim(s) after exhaustion is complete. (King v. Ryan, 564 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. May 5,

2009)). Although under this procedure Petitioner is not required to demonstrate good

cause for his failure to timely exhaust, the newly exhausted claim(s) must be either

timely under the statute of limitations or “relate back” to the claim(s) in the

fully-exhausted petition, that is, they must share a “common core of operative facts” with

the previously exhausted claim(s). (King, 564 F.3d at1143, quoting Mayle v. Felix, 545

U.S. 644. 659 (2005)).

In consideration of the petition containing unexhausted claims and the Court’s

instruction to Petitioner for a response as to how he intends to proceed with this mixed

petition, it is premature to recommend the petition be dismissed. Therefore, the Court

recommends the motion to dismiss be denied without prejudice.

CONCLUSION

The Court RECOMMENDS District Judge Benitez DENY the motion to dismiss

without prejudice; adopt the undersigned’s findings that the petition is mixed with

exhausted and unexhausted claims; notify Petitioner he has filed a petition that contains

both exhausted and unexhausted claims that, therefore, is subject to dismissal; and,

allow Petitioner to choose a course of action from the four options enumerated above. 

The Court further RECOMMENDS Petitioner be permitted 30 days from the date of

entry of the District Judge’s order to notify the Court which option he chooses and to file

his responsive pleading. Respondent should be permitted 45 days to file a reply. If

Petitioner fails to respond to the notification, the Court will recommend to the District

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Although the dismissal would be “without prejudice,” Petitioner is again cautioned that any later

federal petition may be barred by the statute of limitations. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)-(2); see also

footnote four of this Report and Recommendation.

K:\COMMON\Adler\HABEAS\OPEN\Smith v. Uribe\r&r.wpd 10 10CV545-BEN(JMA)

Judge assigned to this case that the Petition be dismissed without prejudice.5 See

Rose, 455 U.S. at 522.

The undersigned submits this Report and Recommendation to District Judge

Benitez pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). IT IS ORDERED that no later than

November 17, 2010, any party to this action may file written objections with the Court

and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections to

Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the

Court and served on all parties no later than November 24, 2010. The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to

raise those objections on appeal of the Court's order. (Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153

(9th Cir.1991)).

DATED: November 9, 2010

Jan M. Adler

U.S. Magistrate Judge

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