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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

FRANCES SNIDER, 

Plaintiff-Appellee/ 

Cross-Appellant, 

v. 

CIRCLE K CORPORATION, a Texas 

corporation, 

Defendant-Appellant/ 

Cross-Appellee. 

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FI LED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

JAN 7 1991 

ROBERT L. I"10ECKER 

Clerk 

Nos. 88-2044 

88-2905 

88-2915 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Oklahoma 

(D.C. No. CIV-87-1185-W) 

Hugh D. Rice (H. D. Binns, Jr. and James N. Atkins with him on the 

briefs) of Rainey, Ross, Rice & Binns, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, 

for defendant-appellant/cross-appellee. 

Terry T. Wiens, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for plaintiff-appellee/ 

cross-appellant. 

Before LOGAN and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges, and SAFFELS, District 

Judge.* 

LOGAN, Circuit Judge. 

* The Honorable Dale E. Saffels, Senior United States District 

Judge for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 88-2905 Document: 010110012926 Date Filed: 01/07/1991 Page: 1 
Plaintiff, Frances Snider, upon being terminated by her 

employer, Circle K Corporation, filed the instant action alleging 

violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, breach of 

contract, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The 

Title VII claim was determined by the judge, who found in favor of 

Circle K; the other claims were determined by a jury, which 

awarded Snider a lump sum of $20,000 actual damages on the 

contract and emotional distress claims (without differentiating 

between the two), and $5,000 punitive damages on the emotional 

distress claim. See II R. Supp. 351-52. Circle K has appealed 

the jury award, and Snider cross-appeals the Title VII ruling in 

favor of Circle K. 

Snider was an employee-at-will in Circle K's accounting 

department. In the course of her employment, Snider became 

involved in an office dispute in which she supported an Hispanic 

employee against perceived discrimination by other workers and 

management. Snider filed a charge with the Oklahoma Human Rights 

Commission and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), 

alleging that Circle K was discriminating against her because she 

had criticized the company's discriminatory policies. 

Circle Kand Snider signed an agreement settling her Title 

VII claim. The agreement provided in pertinent part: 

"2. In exchange for satisfactory fulfillment by [Circle 

K] of the promises contained of [sic] Paragraph (3) of 

this Agreement, [Snider] agrees not to institute a 

lawsuit with respect to [her Title VII complaint]. 

3. In exchange for the promises of Frances A. Snider 

contained in Paragraph (2) of this Agreement, The Circle 

K Corporation agrees: 

a. If Ms. Snider is terminated at any time in the 

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Appellate Case: 88-2905 Document: 010110012926 Date Filed: 01/07/1991 Page: 2 
future, the only information that will be given in 

a reference is her date of hire and date of 

termination. 

b. To not discriminate or take any adverse action 

against Ms. Snider (i.e., with respect to 

eligibility for salary increases, promotions, 

benefits or any other terms and -conditions of 

employment) because she filed the above referenced 

charge." 

IR. tab 48, exh. B (General Release Agreement). 

After this agreement was executed, Circle K sought a new 

manager for the office in which Snider worked. Although Snider 

was qualified for the position, Circle K hired someone from 

outside the office. The company explained that it chose an 

outsider to prevent the factionalization that might occur if it 

promoted someone involved in the earlier office dispute. 

Shortly after Circle K hired the new office manager, Snider 

was transferred to a new department. After working less than a 

week in the new department, Snider arranged to have a letter from 

her doctor delivered to Circle K. The letter explained that 

Snider was suffering from job related stress and that she could 

not return to work. 

Snider then filed a second complaint with the EEOC alleging 

that because she had filed the previous EEOC complaint, she had 

been denied a promotion, written up, demoted, and harassed. Upon 

receiving a right to sue letter, she filed the instant action. 

Following a jury verdict for Snider on the breach of contract and 

tort claims, and the district court's judgment for Circle Kon 

Snider's Title VII claim, both parties appealed. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2905 Document: 010110012926 Date Filed: 01/07/1991 Page: 3 
I 

Circle K argues that because the litigants in a Title VII 

action are not entitled to a jury trial, the district court erred 

in submitting Snider's action for breach of the settlement 

agreement to the jury. 

Because of the equitable nature of the remedies available in 

a Title VII action, Title VII claimants are not entitled to a jury 

trial. Skinner v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 859 F.2d 1439, 1443 

(10th Cir. 1988); ~ also Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 164 

(1981) (recognizing in dicta that there is no jury right in Title 

VII action); Comment, Beyond the Dicta: The Seventh Amendment 

Right to Trial by Jury Under Title VII, 38 u. Kan. L. Rev. 1003, 

1003 (1990) ("Every circuit. has held or noted in dictum that 

Title VII implicates no jury right."). To the best of our 

knowledge, however, no court has addressed directly whether an 

employee alleging breach of a Title VII settlement agreement is 

entitled to a jury trial. 1 

Although Title VII settlement agreements are contracts, they 

are inextricably linked to Title VII. Federal common law governs 

1 Although not addressing the right to a jury trial, the Ninth 

Circuit in Miller v. Fairchild Industries, Inc., 885 F.2d 498, 

507-08 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1524 (1990), 

reversed a district court's dismissal of an employee's suit for 

breach of a Title VII settlement agreement, concluding that the 

question whether the agreement contained an implied promise of 

continued employment should have been left to the jury. On the 

other hand, the Fourth Circuit in Perdue v. Roy Stone Transfer 

Corp., 690 F.2d 1091, 1095 n.8 (4th Cir. 1982), vaguely suggested 

that an employee might not be entitled to a jury trial in an 

action for breach of a Title VII settlement agreement. But see 

id. at 1098 (Widener, J., dissenting) ("So far as the [majority] 

may intimate ... that the breach of the settlement agreement is 

not triable to a jury, I do not agree."). 

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Appellate Case: 88-2905 Document: 010110012926 Date Filed: 01/07/1991 Page: 4 
the enforcement and interpretation of such agreements because the 

"rights of the litigants and the operative legal policies derive 

from a federal source." Fulgence v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 662 

F.2d 1207, 1209 (5th Cir. 1981). See also Brewer v. Muscle Shoals 

Bd. of Educ., 790 F.2d 1515, 1519 (11th Cir. 1986) (Title VII 

settlement agreements construed according to federal common law); 

Eatmon v. Bristol Steel & Iron Works, Inc., 769 F.2d 1503, 1516 

(11th Cir. 1985) (although state law provides the right and remedy 

for breach of settlement agreement action, such action arises 

under federal law since federal law controls agreement's 

enforcement and interpretation). Moreover, a number of courts 

have concluded that federal courts have jurisdiction over actions 

brought to enforce Title VII settlement agreements because such 

actions are "actions brought under" Title VII. 2 See,~, 

Eatmon, 769 F.2d at 1513; EEOC v. Henry Beck Co., 729 F.2d 301, 

305 (4th Cir. 1984); EEOC v. Liberty Trucking Co., 695 F.2d 1038, 

1044 (7th Cir. 1982). In Brito v. Zia Co., 478 F.2d 1200, 1204 

(10th Cir. 1973) we affirmed a district court's award of damages 

for breach of a Title VII settlement agreement without discussing 

the jurisdictional issue. Other courts, recognizing that Title 

VII settlement agreements are the product of EEOC action, have 

held that such agreements may not be enforced for breach of 

contract until Title VII administrative requirements are 

exhausted. Blank v. Donovan, 780 F.2d 808, 809-10 (9th Cir. 

2 Section 706(f)(3) of Title VII provides for federal 

jurisdiction over "actions brought under" Title VII. 

U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). 

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court 

See 42 

Appellate Case: 88-2905 Document: 010110012926 Date Filed: 01/07/1991 Page: 5 
1986); Parsons v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 741 F.2d 871, 874 

( 6th Cir. 19 84) . 

The linkage between Title VII settlement agreements and Title 

VII is particularly evident in the instant case. In her amended 

complaint, Snider seeks the equitable remedy of reinstatement--a 

remedy typically associated with Title VII actions--in connection 

with her cause of action for breach of the settlement agreement. 

IR. tab 48 at 4. Moreover, under Snider and Circle K's 

settlement agreement, Circle K promises little more than to 

refrain from violating Title VII in the future. Id., exh. B ("The 

Circle K Corporation agrees: . To not discriminate or take any 

adverse action against Ms. Snider ... because she filed [her 

original EEOC complaint.]")·. Finally, the EEOC is a signatory to 

the agreement. In fact, the agreement provides that the "EEOC 

agrees to terminate the investigation which it has begun and not 

to use [Snider's original EEOC complaint] as the jurisdictional 

base for a civil action under Title VII." Id. (emphasis added). 

We therefore conclude that Snider was not entitled to a jury trial 

in her action for breach of the settlement agreement. 

Accordingly, the district court erred in submitting Snider's 

breach of settlement agreement claim to the jury. 

This holding does not mean Snider's breach of settlement 

agreement claim was entirely subsumed by the Title VII claim 

decided against her by the judge. Circle K cites Kirby v. Dole, 

736 F.2d 661, 664 (11th Cir. 1984), for the proposition that an 

employee 

and the 

may not seek both the benefit of a settlement agreement 

opportunity to pursue the underlying charge of 

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discrimination she agreed to settle. Unlike the employee in 

Kirby( however, Snider's second EEOC complaint does not reinstate 

her original EEOC complaint. The original complaint alleges that 

between October 22, 1985, and November 27, 1985, Circle K 

discriminated against Snider because she llcomplain[ed] about 

discrimination against an Hispanic who had filed an EEOC charge 

against [Circle K]." IR. tab 48, exh. A. Snider's second EEOC 

complaint alleges that between February 17, 1986, and March 26, 

1986, Circle K discriminated against Snider because she filed her 

original EEOC complaint. Id., exh. C. The two complaints allege 

two separate sets of discriminatory acts distinct in time and 

underlying motivation. 3 

Neither does the settlement agreement implicitly limit 

Snider's recourse in the event of breach to reinstating her 

original EEOC complaint, as Circle K argues. Upon breach of a 

Title VII settlement agreement, an employee undoubtedly may bring 

an action for breach of that agreement. See 2 A. Larson & 

L. Larson, Employment Discrimination§ 48.24 at 9A-119 (1990) ("A 

negotiated [Title VII] settlement agreement is a contract, and a 

private party to such a contract may sue to enforce it like any 

3 We note that Snider's second EEOC complaint challenges two 

allegedly discriminatory acts occurring before the settlement 

agreement became effective. The agreement was executed on 

February 27, 1986, and Snider's second EEOC complaint alleges that 

discriminatory acts occurred on February 17, 1986, and February 25, 1986. See IR. tab 48, exh. C. But in the settlement 

agreement, Snider only promises "not to institute a lawsuit with 

respect to [her original EEOC complaint.]" IR. tab 48, exh. B 

,r 2. In her original EEOC complaint, she only challenges 

allegedly discriminatory acts occurring between October 22, 1985, 

and November 27, 1985. Thus, her second EEOC complaint does not 

reinstate any claims settled by the parties' settlement agreement. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2905 Document: 010110012926 Date Filed: 01/07/1991 Page: 7 
other contract.");TM also EEOC v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 714 F.2d 

567, 573-74 (5th Cir. 1983) (rejecting argument that exclusive 

recourse upon breach of Title VII settlement agreement is suit to 

establish underlying charge of discrimination), cert. denied, 467 

U.S. 1204 (1984); Kirby, 736 F.2d at 664 (noting that the employee 

could have brought an action for breach of the settlement 

agreement had he not first reinstated his original EEOC 

complaint). 

II 

Circle K next argues that the district court erred in 

allowing Snider to amend her complaint shortly before trial to add 

a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. We will 

reverse a district court's decision to grant or deny leave to 

amend a complaint only for an abuse of discretion. Stichting 

Mayflower Recreational Fonds v. Newpark Resources, Inc., 917 F.2d 

1239, 1249 (10th Cir. 1990). The record does not indicate that 

the court's decision either notably 

prejudiced it in making its defense. 

not abuse its discretion in allowing 

complaint. 

surprised Circle K or 

We hold that the court did 

Snider to amend her 

Circle K alternatively argues that the district court should 

not have submitted Snider's intentional infliction of emotional 

distress claim to the jury because Snider failed to introduce 

evidence of truly outrageous conduct. See Eddy v. Brown, 715 P.2d 

74, 76-77 (Okla. 1986) (requiring evidence of extreme and 

outrageous conduct before claim for infliction of emotional 

distress is submitted to jury). Once again, we review the 

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district court's decision under an abuse of discretion standard. 

See Karns v. Emerson Elec. Co., 817 F.2d 1452, 1456 (10th Cir. 

1987) (district court's refusal to set aside jury verdict for lack 

of any competent evidence reviewed for manifest abuse of 

discretion). 

We cannot conclude that the district court abused its 

discretion in submitting Snider's intentional infliction of 

emotional distress claim to the jury. Snider and several other 

witnesses testified that the office atmosphere was cold and harsh, 

and that Snider was treated cruelly and with disrespect. See II 

R. Supp. 40, 45-47, 122, 128-29, 131-33, 151, 153, 168. Snider 

and witness Barbara Emerson both testified that unlike other 

workers, Snider had to ask ·permission to leave her desk and to go 

to the bathroom. Id. at 40, 132-33. Emerson testified that on 

one occasion, the office manager embarrassed and humiliated Snider 

in front of the whole office. Id. at 131. It also is undisputed 

that Snider's doctor recommended that she resign because of a 

stress related health disorder. See id. at 42, 49-50, 54-55, 145-

47. Accordingly, we will not conclude that the conduct of Circle 

K's agents amounted to no more than ordinary rudeness. 

III 

Snider cross-appeals the district court's denial of her Title 

VII claim. Pointing to the district court's finding that Circle K 

did not promote Snider to office manager because of her 

involvement in the earlier office turmoil, 4 Snider argues that we 

4 

be 

The district court found that although Snider was qualified to 

office manager, "Management did not consider [Snider] for the 

Continued to next page 

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must reverse the court's conclusion that Circle K presented a 

plausible nondiscriminatory explanation for its promotion 

decision. See IR. tab 118 at 11-12. We disagree. 

We review a district court's finding that an employer has 

successfully rebutted a prima facie case of discrimination under 

the clearly erroneous standard. Williams v. Colorado Springs, 

Colo. School Dist. #11, 641 F.2d 835, 843 (10th Cir. 1981). In 

light of the testimony that the office's opposing factions engaged 

in substantial bickering and fighting, and testimony .that Circle K 

hired an outsider to ease this situation, it was not clearly 

erroneous to conclude that Circle K's promotion decision was 

legitimate and nondiscriminatory and, thus, not in violation of 

Title VII. 

IV 

Despite our holding that the district court erred in 

submitting the alleged breach of the settlement agreement to the 

jury, we do not remand this case for a determination of that issue 

by the judge. The district court submitted the liability and 

damages issues to the jury on a particular verdict form that was 

not objected to by either party. II R. Supp. 349. The jury 

considered the liability issues on contract and tort separately, 

finding for Snider on both. Id. at 351. The verdict form, as 

read by the Clerk, then states, "Having found in favor of 

Plaintiff Snider and against Circle K Corporation on one or more 

Continued from previous page 

position because it was searching for a person who had not been 

involved in the office turmoil, whereas [Snider] had been involved 

therein." IR. tab 118 at 4. 

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( 

of Plaintiff's claims, we award actual damages to Plaintiff Snider 

in the amount of $20,000." Id. (emphasis added). Thus, under the 

verdict form the jury was instructed to find a single compensatory 

damages amount if it found for plaintiff upon either claim. 

Circle K did not seek a separation, made no objection to the form, 

and, indeed, made no argument on this issue on appeal. 

Accordingly, because we have upheld the verdict on the tort claim, 

we must affirm the damages amount found by the jury. Under the 

instruction the jury found the total damages; Snider could receive 

no further amount even if we remanded and.the district court found 

that Circle K violated the settlement agreement. Therefore, under 

the circumstances the court's error was harmless. 

Because the attorney's· fees award was based upon Oklahoma 

law, Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 936, permitting an award only to 

a "prevailing party" in an action to recover on a "contract ... 

for labor or services," we vacate that award. Under our analysis 

in Part I, we hold that a Title VII settlement agreement is not a 

contract for labor or services within the intended meaning of this 

statute, absent a promise of continued employment that would have 

taken Snider out of the employee-at-will category. 

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part. 

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