Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01863/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01863-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HARRY LLOYD HOWARD, No. CIV S-06-1863-MCE-CMK-P

Plaintiff, 

vs. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

COUNTY OF ORANGE, et al.,

Defendants.

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Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is plaintiff’s first amended complaint (Doc. 8),

filed on October 3, 2006. 

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or

malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief

from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover,

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “. . . short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 

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Plaintiff states that he is bringing this action under 28 U.S.C. § 2201, which 1

permits this court to enter declaratory judgments. 

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This means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne,

84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are

satisfied if the complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds

upon which it rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because plaintiff

must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which

support the claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it

is impossible for the court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are

vague and conclusory. 

I. BACKGROUND

In the first amended complaint, plaintiff names the County of Orange, James

Tilton, the director of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”),

and R.K. Sisto, the acting warden of his prison, as defendants. 

Plaintiff states that he was convicted of first degree murder in 1990 and sentenced

to 25 years to life in state prison. In 2005 plaintiff filed an inmate grievance challenging his

prison classification as a “life-term” prisoner. Plaintiff claims that, during the course of

investigating his grievance, he discovered that “the Department of Corrections . . . and the Board

of Prison Terms, for many years now, misapplied the laws of this State to plaintiff, and have

redefined their jurisdiction over plaintiff in a manner that gives rise to a violation of plaintiff’s

Constitutional rights.” Plaintiff state that he is seeking a declaratory judgment as to his rights.1

Plaintiff is also seeking injunctive relief prohibiting “further misapplication” of state law. 

Plaintiff claims his due process and equal protection rights are being violated. 

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Under the determinate sentencing scheme, every offense carries with it an upper 2

term, a middle term, and a low term of imprisonment. The upper term is the statutory maximum

for any given offense. The trial court is empowered to find facts necessary to fix the sentence at

any particular term, up to the maximum. 

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Plaintiff asserts that the Board of Prison Terms’ “authority to fix terms was

repealed and not replaced” by enactment of California’s determinate sentencing law. Plaintiff 2

states that “[t]he misinterpretation and misapplication of the [determinate] sentencing statutes . . .

resulted in legal ambiguities and contradictions which have been repeatedly and intentionally

ignored by defendants. . . .” Additionally, plaintiff contends that defendants are “currently

denying plaintiff the receipt and application of Good Behavior and Participation Credits to

reduce his term of imprisonment. . . .” 

In essence, the gravamen of plaintiff’s claim is that he was sentenced under the

indeterminate sentencing law, which had been repealed at the time of his conviction, and should

have been sentenced under the determinate sentencing law. Plaintiff states that this error has

resulted in his being improperly classified as a “life-term” prisoner. A key component of

plaintiff’s claim is the allegation that repeal of the indeterminate sentencing law eliminated the

Board of Prison Terms’ authority to fix terms. He also claims that the sentencing judge

committed error by not sentencing him under the determinate sentencing law. Specifically,

plaintiff states:

Plaintiff contends that there was absolutely no provision of

statutory law which prohibited the sentencing court from fixing plaintiff’s

term, accounting for aggravating and mitigating circumstances. 

Plaintiff concludes that the determinate sentencing law makes parole mandatory after completion

of the fixed term. 

Finally, plaintiff specifically alleges: “Plaintiff herein does not attack the length

or duration of his confinement, nor does he contend in any manner through this lawful action,

that his guilt or innocence is in question.” However, plaintiff asks this court to, among other

things, declare that he should not have been sentenced under the indeterminate sentencing law

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If a § 1983 complaint states claims which sound in habeas, the court should not 3

convert the complaint into a habeas petition. See Trimble, 49 F.3d at 586. Rather, such claims

must be dismissed without prejudice. See Balisok, 520 U.S. at 649; Heck, 512 U.S. at 487;

Trimble, 49 F.3d at 585.

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and that the sentencing court is “re-vested” with the authority to re-sentence him under the

determinate sentencing law. 

II. DISCUSSION

The first amended complaint reveals that plaintiff’s action suffers from a fatal

defect. Specifically, plaintiff asks this court to declare that he was improperly sentenced. While

plaintiff is correct that this claim does not necessarily challenge the length of his confinement or

the fact of his guilt, if successful it would require this court to vacate a state court judgment. 

This is something the court can only do in the context of a request for habeas corpus relief and,

even then, only after all state court remedies have been exhausted. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411

U.S. 475, 500 (1973); Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 824 (9th Cir. 1997); Trimble v. City of

Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 586 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); see also Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S.

641, 646 (1987); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 483-84 (1994). Therefore, this action should

be dismissed without prejudice to seeking appropriate relief from the state courts.

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III. CONCLUSION

Because it does not appear possible that the deficiencies identified herein can be

cured by amending the complaint, plaintiff is not entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of

the entire action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that this action be

dismissed, without prejudice, and that the Clerk of the Court be directed to enter judgment and

close this file.

/ / /

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These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within ten days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge's

Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive

the right to appeal the District Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: October 24, 2006.

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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