Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00903/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00903-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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14cv903-JAH (MDD)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DANIEL U. ACEDO,

Plaintiff,

v.

ERNEST PINEDO, police officer, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 14cv903-JAH (MDD)

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES 

(Doc. No. 216)

INTRODUCTION

Pending before the Court is Defendant Ernesto Pinedo’s (“Defendant”) motion for 

attorney’s fees (“Motion”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). See Doc. No. 216. Plaintiff

Daniel U. Acedo (“Plaintiff”) filed a response in opposition. See Doc. No. 222. The

Motion is fully briefed. After careful consideration of the pleadings filed by both parties, 

and for the reasons set forth below, the Motion (Doc. No. 216) is DENIED.

BACKGROUND1

On March 9, 2017, the Court issued an Order overruling Plaintiff’s objections (Doc. 

No. 206); adopting the Magistrate Judge’s Report (Doc. No. 197); granting Defendants’ 

 

1 The Court addressed the case’s prior factual and procedural history in its Order granting Defendants’ 

motion for summary judgment. See Doc. No. 214. 

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motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 116); and denying Plaintiff’s related evidentiary 

motions (Doc. Nos. 147, 149, 151). On March 30, 2017, Defendant filed a motion to be 

determined prevailing party and an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988(b). 

See Doc. No. 216. Plaintiff filed a response in opposition on April 12, 2017. See Doc. No. 

222.

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard

This Court has discretion to award attorney’s fees in § 1983 cases pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. 1988(b). See 42 U.S.C. 1988(b). Attorney’s fees are appropriate when the action 

is considered “unreasonable, frivolous, meritless, or vexatious.” Vernon v. City of Los 

Angeles, 27 F.3d 1385, 1402 (9th Cir. 1994).

II. Analysis

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s action against Defendant is frivolous because 

Defendant “had nothing to do” with Plaintiff. Doc. No. 216-1 at pg. 11. Defendant asserts 

that he did not arrest or search Plaintiff. Id. Defendant claims that he did not have an 

exchange of words with Plaintiff and never made physical contact with Plaintiff. Id. 

Defendant asks for $20,738.50 in attorneys’ fees. Id. at pg. 12.

In response, Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s entry and reentry of 799 Ada St. was 

unreasonable. Doc. No. 222 at pg. 4. Plaintiff asserts that this reentry and secondary search 

violated Plaintiff’s rights under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at pg. 1. Plaintiff contends 

that there was “prospect of success” in his complaint. Id. at pg. 5. Plaintiff argues here, it 

would be unreasonable to declare his complaint “frivolous”. Id. at pg. 4. Plaintiff argues 

there is a strict standard for attorney’s fees, and such fees should only be awarded in 

exceptional cases. Id. at pg. 5. Plaintiff argues that this situation does not constitute an 

exceptional case to warrant attorney’s fees. Id. at pgs. 4-8. 

The Court agrees. The Ninth Circuit has determined that attorneys’ fees in §1983 

cases are only appropriate when the Plaintiff’s action is frivolous, unreasonable, or without 

foundation. Vernon, 27 F.3d at 1402. Further, the Ninth Circuit has defined ‘frivolous’ as 

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“when the result is obvious” or “wholly without merit.” Id. (citing McConnell v. 

Critchlow, 661 F.2d 116, 118 (9th Cir. 1981)). The Court has previously ruled that 

Defendants, police officers, had probable cause to arrest and search Plaintiff because 

Defendants had reasonable grounds to believe that Plaintiff stabbed Ms. Chacon at a trolley 

station. Doc. No. 214 at pgs. 8-10. Although Defendant did not participate in the initial 

arrest, he was later present at the scene of the arrest and conducted a secondary search. 

Doc. No. 216-1 at pg. 9; Doc. No. 222 at pg. 1. In addition, this Court’s finding made 

Plaintiff’s objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report & Recommendation moot. Id. 

However, the Court does not find that Plaintiff’s complaint was unreasonable or without 

foundation. Plaintiff is pro se and warrantless search did occur. Plaintiff had reason to 

suspect that his rights under the Fourth Amendment were in jeopardy. Thus, the Court 

finds that Plaintiff’s complaint was not “wholly without merit.” See Vernon, 27 F.3d at 

1402. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees (Doc. No. 

216) is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 1, 2019

 

_________________________________

JOHN A. HOUSTON

United States District Judge

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