Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05767/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05767-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LARNETTE COLTAR,

Plaintiff,

v.

J. JACINTO, et. al.,

Defendants.

 /

CV F 04 5767 AWI LJO P 

THIRD ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND (Doc. 19.)

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO

SEND PLAINTIFF BLANK CIVIL RIGHTS

FORM 

 Larnette Coltar (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner currently incarcerated at Valley State

Prison for Women (“VSPW”) and proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights

action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On October 24, 2005, the Court screened Plaintiff’s

complaint and found that it did not state a cognizable claim for relief. The Court dismissed the

Complaint and granted Plaintiff leave to amend. On November 28, 2005, Plaintiff filed an

Amended Complaint. The Court dismissed this Complaint on December 16, 2005, finding that

Plaintiff had failed again to link any of the named Defendants to the alleged violations. Plaintiff

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28 Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint consists of one hundred ninety (190) pages. 1

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filed a Second Amended Complaint on February 1, 2006.1

A. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding,

467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also Palmer v.

Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass'n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing a

complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in

question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the

pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor. 

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). 

B. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT

The allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint concern the diagnosis and treatment of Plaintiff’s

medical condition concerning a lump found in her left breast. Plaintiff’s statement of the facts,

however, span 15 pages and are too lengthy to restate here. The Court has examined the Second

Amended Complaint in detail and finds it does not allege claims sufficient to state a claim for

relief under Section 1983. The Court will address Plaintiff’s allegations in detail below. 

C. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

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1. Linkage Requirement

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between

the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

(1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a

constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates

in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that

causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th

Cir. 1978). In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, plaintiff must link each named

defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of plaintiff’s

federal rights.

2. Eighth Amendment Claim

A prisoner’s claim of inadequate medical care does not constitute cruel and unusual

punishment unless the mistreatment rises to the level of “deliberate indifference to serious

medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). The “deliberate indifference”

standard involves an objective and a subjective prong. First, the alleged deprivation must be, in

objective terms, “sufficiently serious.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citing

Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second, the prison official must act with a

“sufficiently culpable state of mind,” which entails more than mere negligence, but less than

conduct undertaken for the very purpose of causing harm. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 837. 

A prison official does not act in a deliberately indifferent manner unless the official “knows of

and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. 

In applying this standard, the Ninth Circuit has held that before it can be said that a

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prisoner’s civil rights have been abridged, “the indifference to his medical needs must be

substantial. Mere ‘indifference,’ ‘negligence,’ or ‘medical malpractice’ will not support this

cause of action.” Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980), citing

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06. “[A] complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or

treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the

Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely

because the victim is a prisoner.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 106; see also Anderson v.

County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995); McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1050

(9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136

(9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). Even gross negligence is insufficient to establish deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs. See Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir.

1990). 

After reviewing Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, the Court finds it necessary to

dismiss the Complaint yet again. Plaintiff provides at least fifteen pages of pure narrative

describing every encounter she had with numerous individuals over the course of three years.

Although Plaintiff separately lists each Defendant, she only provides information as to what that

person’s job is at the prison. This is not sufficient to “link” any of the named Defendants to an

act or omission giving rise to the alleged constitutional violation. 

Plaintiff later sets apart a section titled “Eighth Amendment” and alleges that “all of the

Defendants” named were responsible for the constitutional violations. Plaintiff then

“incorporates by reference” all of the facts set out in the numerous pages before. The mere

statement that one is “incorporating by reference” is not sufficient to state a claim for relief. It is

not the job of the Court to read Plaintiff’s story and then make a determination that certain facts

give rise to constitutional claims for relief. This is the job of the Plaintiff who is attempting to

gain monetary damages for alleged wrongdoings. It is not too difficult a task to give only those

facts that show a violation occurred and ensure that these facts connect the each person named as

a Defendant. The Court has examined Plaintiff’s allegations four times now and each time has

given her specific information as to what the defects in the Complaint are and how she can cure

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them. The Court can be no more clear. The Court will afford Plaintiff one more time to attempt

to cure the deficiencies as this case has been pending since May of 2004. Plaintiff is advised that

in amending her Complaint for the third time, she must briefly give only the facts showing that a

particular person named as a Defendant violated her rights under the U.S. Constitution. Plaintiff

may not provide a simple statement for each Defendant saying that they violated her rights. She

must specifically and briefly say how that person violated her rights. 

The Court notes further that Plaintiff has included numerous incidents and contacts that

arose after she initiated this action on May 24, 2004. Plaintiff may not include these incidents as

they predate the initiation of this action. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) of

1995, “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983],

or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility

until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The

Section 1997e(a) exhaustion requirement applies to all prisoner suits relating to prison life. 

Porter v. Nussle, 435 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). Prisoners must complete the prison’s administrative

process, regardless of the relief sought by the prisoner and regardless of the relief offered by the

process, as long as the administrative process can provide some sort of relief on the complaint

stated. Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001). "All 'available' remedies must now be

exhausted; those remedies need not meet federal standards, nor must they be 'plain, speedy, and

effective." ' Porter, 534 U.S. at 524 (citing Booth, 532 U.S. at 739 n. 5). Exhaustion must occur

prior to filing suit. McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199-1201 (9th Cir.2002). Thus,

plaintiff may not exhaust while the suit is pending. McKinney, 311 F.3d at 1199-1201.

Plaintiff’s inclusion of incidents arising after she filed this action are necessarily

unexhausted for purposes of the PLRA because she could not have exhausted them prior to filing

suit on May 24, 2004. Thus, in amending her complaint, Plaintiff should refrain from including

claims arising after May 24, 2006. 

Plaintiff should also refrain from attaching including exhibits and evidence. It is

inappropriate to attach exhibits to a complaint. See Rule 8, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

Further, the Court cannot serve as a repository for the parties' evidence. Originals or copies of

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evidence (i.e., prison or medical records, witness affidavits, etc.) should not be submitted until

the course of litigation brings the evidence into question (for example, on a motion for summary

judgment, at trial, or when requested by the court). At this point, the submission of evidence is

premature as the Plaintiff is only required to state a prima facie claim for relief. 

Finally, with regard to Doe Defendants. The term “doe” references a person who

‘s identity is unknown to the Plaintiff. If Plaintiff knows the name of the person, then they cease

to be a Doe Defendant and she should not refer to them as a “Doe Defendant.” As in the cases

where a defendant’s name is known, Plaintiff must link her facts to each and every Doe she seeks

to hold liable. Thus, if Plaintiff names 5 Doe Defendants, she must state individual and specific

facts showing that Doe #1 or Doe #1 violated her federal constitutional rights. Again, Plaintiff

may not simply state that Does 1-10 violated her rights, she must allege specific facts. Plaintiff

should not tell a lengthy story and expect the Court to figure it out. If Plaintiff is alleging an

Eighth Amendment claim, she must give the Court facts showing how each Defendant named,

including Does, violated her rights under the Eighth Amendment. The law provided is only to

inform the Plaintiff that an Eighth Amendment violation requires a showing that an individual

knew of and disregarded a serious risk to the Plaintiff’s health. Thus, Plaintiff must allege facts

showing a Defendant named “knew” of and “disregarded” a serious risk to her health. She may

not simply repeat the phrase and state a claim.

3. Supervisory Liability

Plaintiff again names Jeanne Woodford, Director of Corrections as a Defendant but

alleges no facts indicating that Woodford either: personally participated in the alleged

deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them; or

promulgated or “implemented a policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of

constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation.’” Hansen v. Black,

885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040,

1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Although federal pleading standards are broad, some facts must be alleged

to support claims under section 1983. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Unit, 507

U.S. 163, 168 (1993). Thus, she again fails to state a claim against Defendant Woodford. 

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D. CONCLUSION

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint does not state any claims

upon which relief can be granted under § 1983 against any of the Defendants. The Court will

provide Plaintiff with ONE FINAL opportunity to cure these defects by filing a Third Amended

Complaint. 

Plaintiff must demonstrate in the Third Amended Complaint how the conditions

complained of resulted in a deprivation of her constitutional rights. See, Ellis v. Cassidy, 625

F.2d 227 (9 Cir. 1980). The Third Amended Complaint must specifically state how each th

defendant is involved. Further, there can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is

some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. 

Rizzo v. Goode, 423, U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9 Cir. 1980); th

Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9 Cir. 1978). th

Finally, Plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 15-220 requires that an Amended Complaint

be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, an Amended

Complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9 Cir. th

1967). Once an Amended Complaint is filed, the original Complaint no longer serves any

function in the case. Therefore, in an Amended Complaint, as in an original Complaint, each

claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. The Amended

Complaint should be clearly and boldly titled “THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT,” reference

the appropriate case number, and be an original signed under penalty of perjury. 

E. ORDER

The Court HEREBY ORDERS: 

1. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to SEND Plaintiff a blank civil rights

complaint form;

2. The Second Amended Complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend. Within

THIRTY (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff SHALL: 

a. File a Third Amended Complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the

Court in this Order, or

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b. Notify the Court in writing that she does not wish to file a Third Amended

Complaint and pursue the action but instead wishes to voluntary dismiss

the case. 

Plaintiff is forewarned that his failure to comply with this Order may result in a

Recommendation that the complaint be dismissed pursuant to Local Rule 11-110.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 17, 2007 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

b9ed48 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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