Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00552/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00552-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

MARCO CELAYA, 

 Petitioner, 

v. 

SUPERIOR COURT OF 

CALIFORNIA 

 Respondent. 

 Case No.: 17CV552 JAH (BGS) 

AMENDED ORDER OVERRULING 

PETITIONER’S OBJECTIONS; 

ADOPTING THE MAGISTRATE 

JUDGE’S REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION; GRANTING 

RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO 

DISMISS; DISMISSING PETITION 

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 

AS UNTIMELY; AND DENYING 

CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY 

INTRODUCTION 

 Petitioner, Marco Celaya (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner proceeding through counsel, 

filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus (“petition”) pursuant to Title 28, United States 

Code, Section 2254, challenging his conviction in state court following his guilty plea. 

Respondent filed a motion to dismiss. The Honorable Bernard G. Skomal, United States 

Magistrate Judge, issued a Report and Recommendation (“report”) recommending this 

Court grant the motion to dismiss the petition. Petitioner filed objections to the report. After 

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careful consideration of the entire record in this matter, and for the reasons set forth below, 

this Court OVERRULES Petitioner’s objections; ADOPTS Judge Skomal’s Report; 

GRANTS Respondent’s motion to dismiss; and DISMISSES the Petition for writ of 

habeas corpus as untimely and procedurally barred. 

BACKGROUND1

On or about June 29, 2013, Petitioner was arrested. Lodg. at Ex. 7-3 at 2. On July 2, 

2013, Petitioner was arraigned on the following counts for a violation of: (1) Penal Code 

(“PC”) § 273a(a), child abuse/endangerment, (2) California Vehicle Code (“VC”) § 

23152(a), driving under the influence of alcohol/drugs, a misdemeanor, and (3) VC § 

23152(b) driving while having a measurable blood alcohol level of .08% or more, a 

misdemeanor. Id. The Petitioner plead guilty to Counts 1 and 2 and the Superior Court 

dismissed Count 3. Petitioner was sentenced on July 15, 2013. Lodg. at Ex. 7-2 at 4-5. 

Because Petitioner did not file an appeal, his conviction became final on September 13, 

2013. Doc. 6-1 at 6. 

Petitioner filed his first writ of habeas corpus in the Superior Court of San Diego, 

Central Division on June 3, 2014. Lodg. at Ex. 7-3 at 1. The court denied the petition on 

July 28, 2014. Lodg. at Ex. 7-4 at 4. Petitioner filed a writ of habeas corpus in the California 

Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One on August 26, 2016. Lodg. at Ex. 

7-5 at 20. On September 7, 2016, the court denied the second petition. Lodg. at Ex. 7-6 at 

1. Petitioner also filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the Supreme Court of 

California where the Court denied Petitioner’s request with no comment. Lodg. at Ex. 7-

10 at 1. 

Petitioner filed the instant petition on March 20, 2017, asserting his right to effective 

assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and 

Article I, § 15 of the California Constitution was violated because he plead guilty without 

 

1 The underlying facts set forth in the report are adopted in toto and referenced as if fully set forth herein. 

This Court provides only a brief procedural background.

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prior knowledge of the consequences of his plea and was, therefore, prejudiced. Doc. No. 

1. 

Respondents filed a motion to dismiss on June 6, 2017, on the grounds that the 

petition is untimely and is procedurally barred. Doc. No. 6. Petitioner filed an opposition 

to Respondent’s motion to dismiss on August 15, 2017. Doc. No. 10. On February 28, 

2018, Judge Skomal filed a Report and Recommendation. Doc. No. 11. Petitioner filed 

objections to the report on March 15, 2018. Doc. No. 12. Respondent did not file a reply. 

DISCUSSION 

I. Standard of Review 

The district court’s role in reviewing a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation 

is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Pursuant to this statute, the district court “shall make 

a de novo determination of those portions of the report . . . to which objection is made,” 

and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations 

made by the magistrate judge.” Id. It is well-settled, under Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure, that a district court may adopt those parts of a magistrate judge’s report 

to which no specific objection is made, provided they are not clearly erroneous. Thomas v. 

Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 153 (1985). 

II. Analysis 

A. Statute of Limitations 

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) establishes a oneyear statute of limitations period for the filing of federal habeas corpus petitions by a person 

in custody pursuant to a state court judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). The limitations period 

applies not only to petitions challenging a state court judgment, but also to administrative 

decisions. See Shelby v. Bartlett, 391 F.3d 1061, 1063 (9th Cir. 2004). Under 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(1)(A), a Petitioner must file the federal petition within one year from the date of 

conviction, the Petitioner may be permitted to file on a later date depending on the 

circumstances. § 2244(d)(1)(B-D); Hasan v. Galaza, 254 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 2001). 

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Although AEDPA requires a state prisoner seeking federal habeas relief to file his 

petition within one year after his state conviction becomes final, it excludes from that 

period the time during which an application for state collateral review is pending. § 

2244(d)(2); Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002). However, no tolling occurs when the 

state habeas petition is filed after the one-year statutory period has expired. Green v. White, 

223 F.3d 1001, 1003 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Equitable tolling is generally appropriate where a Petitioner demonstrates two 

elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently and (2) that some 

extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 

(2005). “Indeed, ‘the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] is 

very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.’” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 

(9th Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 531 U.S. 878, 121 S. Ct. 188, 148 L.E.2d 130 (2000)). Additionally, a prisoner 

must show that the extraordinary circumstances were the but-for and proximate causes of 

his untimeliness. See Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003).

In the instant case, Respondents move to dismiss the petition on the grounds that the 

petition was untimely filed. Doc. No. 6. Respondent argues the limitation period lapsed 

after the Superior Court denied relief in 2014, and Petitioner is not entitled to a later start 

date. Id. at 6, 7. Respondent contends Petitioner knew or could have known of the factual 

basis for his plea before his conviction became final and, therefore, the limitations period 

began running on the day the judgment became final. 

Petitioner asserts that he did not have knowledge of the immigration consequences 

of pleading guilty and he is entitled to a later start date because he acted diligently under 

the circumstances. Doc. 10 at 4. Specifically, Petitioner maintains he “acted with diligence 

of a man who relied on his prior counsel, and thus had no reason to believe his guilty plea 

of child-endangerment was a mandatory-removal offense.” Id. at 3. 

In the report, Judge Skomal found, even if Petitioner was entitled to a later start date 

and with the benefit of statutory tolling while his petition was pending before the Superior 

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Court, the limitations period ended on July 28, 2015. Judge Skomal also noted that 

Petitioner failed to “assert any basis for equitable tolling in his petition or in his Opposition 

to the Motion to Dismiss,” and concluded that Petitioner failed to demonstrate diligence 

and makes no showing of any extraordinary circumstance that prevented Petitioner from 

pursuing his rights. Report at 12. Judge Skomal determined the federal petition filed more 

than a year and a half after the expiration of the limitations period should be dismissed as 

untimely. 

In his objections, Petitioner includes a new argument that he is entitled to statutory 

tolling for the time his applications for collateral review remained “pending” while he 

waited for a final order of deportation. This Court’s own research found no law supporting 

Petitioner’s argument. 

Petitioner also objects to Judge Skomal’s finding as to a later start date for the 

limitations period. He disagrees with the finding and reasserts the arguments made in his 

opposition to the motion to dismiss. This Court conducted a de novo review, and agrees 

with Judge Skomal’s finding that, even if Petitioner is entitled to a later start date, it is at 

the latest June 4, 2014, when Petitioner knew he was removable based on his conviction 

and charged with being ineligible for cancellation of removal. As noted by Judge Skomal, 

Petitioner need not be removed or have the order denying cancellation of removal in hand 

before demonstrating prejudice. “[H]e only needed to know the facts suggesting that ‘but 

for [his trial] counsel’s errors he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on 

going to trial’ or demanded a better deal.” Report at 14 (Citing Lee v. U.S., 137 S. Ct. 1958, 

1965 (2017)). Petitioner was aware of the facts suggesting he would not have pleaded guilty 

no later than June 4, 2014, when he knew he was removable based on his conviction. The 

Court overrules Petitioner’s objections and finds the petition untimely. 

B. Procedural Bar

Respondent argues Petitioner is procedurally barred from receiving relief because 

the Court of Appeal found his claims barred by three separate independent and adequate 

procedural rules, (1) as untimely, (2) forfeited by failing to raise the claims in trial court, 

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and (3) not cognizable for failing to obtain the required certificate of probable cause. Doc. 

No. 6. Petitioner argues that he is not procedurally barred because his writ of habeas corpus 

was not untimely, he did not have sufficient knowledge of necessary information to 

withdraw his guilty plea for good cause, he is excused from obtaining a certificate of 

probable cause, and will suffer a fundamental miscarriage of justice if review is denied. 

Doc. No. 12. 

Judge Skomal found both California’s timeliness rule and the required certificate of 

probable cause under California Penal Code § 1237.5 independent and adequate bars and 

that Petitioner fails to demonstrate cause for his default. With regard to Respondent’s 

argument that the state court’s finding that Petitioner forfeited his claim by failing to 

withdraw his plea before the trial court, Judge Skomal found Respondent fails to meet his 

burden to demonstrate it is an adequate bar. Citing Smith v. Baldwin, 510 F.3d 1127, 1139 

(9th Cir. 2007), Judge Skomal determined Petitioner does not show the failure to consider 

his claims will result in a miscarriage of justice to overcome the default and recommends 

the Court dismiss the petition as procedurally barred. 

In his objections, Petitioner reiterates the same arguments he made in response to 

the motion to dismiss as to California’s timeliness rule, the assertion he forfeited his claim 

by failing to withdraw his plea, and his failure to obtain a certificate of probable cause. The 

Court conducted a de novo review and adopts Judge Skomal’s findings and analysis as to 

those issues. 

Petitioner also objects to Judge Skomal’s finding that he does not show failure to 

consider his claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. He argues he 

demonstrates a fundamental miscarriage of justice because he will be deprived of the 

opportunity to defend his rights and maintains there is more to consider than just whether 

he would be successful at trial. Petitioner fails to cite to any authority to support his 

argument. As noted by Judge Skomal, demonstrating a miscarriage of justice to overcome 

procedural default involves “extraordinary instances when a constitutional violation 

probably has caused the conviction of one innocent of the crime.” Smith, 510 F.3d at 1139 

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(quoting McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 113 L.Ed.2d 517 (1991). 

A petitioner “must show that, in light of all available evidence, it is more likely than not 

that no reasonable juror would convict him of the relevant crime.” Id. This Court agrees 

with Judge Skomal that Petitioner fails to show a fundamental miscarriage of justice will 

result if the Court does not consider his claims. 

This Court overrules Petitioner’s objections and adopts Judge Skomal’s findings and 

conclusion. 

III. Certificate of Appealability 

Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Rules following 28 U.S.C. section 2254, which was 

amended effective December 1, 2009, a district court now “must issue or deny a certificate 

of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” A state prisoner may 

not appeal the denial of a section 2254 habeas petition unless he obtains a certificate of 

appealability from a district or circuit judge. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A); see also United 

States v. Asrar, 116 F.3d 1268, 1269–70 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that district courts retain 

authority to issue certificates of appealability under AEDPA). A certificate of appealability 

is authorized “if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To meet this threshold showing, petitioner 

must show: (1) the issues are debatable among jurists of reason, (2) a court could resolve 

the issues in a different manner, or (3) the questions are adequate to deserve encouragement 

to proceed further. Lambright v. Stewart, 220 F.3d 1022, 1024–25 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing 

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983)). 

Based on this Court’s review of the report, the Court finds no issues are debatable 

among jurists of reason. This Court further finds no issues could be resolved in a different 

manner. Lastly, this Court finds no questions are adequate to deserve encouragement to 

proceed further. Accordingly, this Court DENIES Petitioner a certificate of appealability. 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER 

Based on the foregoing, the Court HEREBY ORDERS: 

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(1)Petitioner’s objections to the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendations are 

OVERRULED;

(2)The Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation is ADOPTED;

(3)Respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition as untimely and procedurally barred 

is GRANTED; 

(4)The instant petition is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; 

(5) Petitioner is DENIED a certificate of appealability. 

DATED: July 5, 2018 

 

 _________________________________ 

 JOHN A. HOUSTON 

 United States District Judge 

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