Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-00806/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-00806-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 42:1981 Civil Rights

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05cv0806

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ESSIE L. SAINTS,

Plaintiff,

v.

DONALD C. WINTER, SECRETARY

OF THE NAVY, 

Defendant. 

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Civil No. 05CV0806 JAH (RBB)

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS

[Doc. No. 30]

INTRODUCTION

On August 13, 2007, Defendant Donald C. Winter’s (“Defendant”) motion to dismiss

second amended complaint or in the alternative for summary judgment, came on regularly for

oral argument. Dennis M. Grady, appeared for Essie L. Saints (“Plaintiff”), along with Cindy

Cipriani on behalf of Defendant. This Court, after hearing the oral argument of counsel,

ordered that the parties provide supplemental briefing, which was filed on August 20, 2007 by

Plaintiff and August 24, 2007 by Defendant. After careful consideration of the pleadings and

relevant exhibits, this Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss second amended

complaint. 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, appearing pro se, filed this action on April 15, 2005, under Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and breach of contract common law claims. Plaintiff

alleged racial discrimination and EEO retaliation, as well as breach of a previous settlement

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agreement. Cplt. at 2.

On February 7, 2006, this Court issued an order to show cause for dismissal under

Civ.LR 41.1. Doc. No. 4. No action had taken place since Plaintiff’s filing of a return of

service of summons on June 17, 2005. Doc. No. 3. Plaintiff personally appeared at the

hearing, and explained why she had not proceeded further on her case. This Court, after

hearing Plaintiff’s arguments, found good cause, and allowed Plaintiff an extension of time to

determine how to properly proceed further in the case. Doc. No. 5.

On May 9, 2006, Plaintiff requested entry of default in the matter. The Clerk of Court

denied Plaintiff’s request, finding service of the summons and complaint improper. Doc. No.

7. On September 11, 2006, Plaintiff renewed her request for entry of default in the matter.

Doc. No. 13. The Clerk of Court again denied Plaintiff’s request, citing that the summons and

complaint continued to be improperly served. Doc. No. 13. On September 12, 2006, Donald

C. Winter, substituting for Defendant Gordon England, filed a “Notice to the Court Regarding

Plaintiff’s Failure to Accomplish Proper Service on Defendant.” Doc. No. 12. In the notice,

Defendant asked this Court to dismiss the action for failure to prosecute. Id. at 3. This Court

denied Defendant’s request, and allowed Plaintiff an additional extension to properly serve her

complaint. Doc. No. 15. 

On September 28, 2006, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint, naming Donald C.

Winter as defendant. Doc. No. 16. Plaintiff subsequently personally served the United States

Attorney, the Attorney General, as well as the Secretary of the Navy, and filed affidavits of

service on October 12, 2006. Doc. Nos. 18-20. This Court vacated its order to show cause

hearing on October 20, 2006. Doc. No. 21.

On December 4, 2006, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the first amended complaint.

Doc. No. 22. Plaintiff did not file a response to Defendant’s motion. A hearing on Defendant’s

motion to dismiss took place on February 1, 2007. Doc. No. 23. At the hearing, the Court

granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s appeal to the

MSPB ruling and Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claim. The Court also found that, as a matter

of law, the Court could not grant Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s breach of contract

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claim because the record was not complete as to the settlement agreement at issue. Finally, the

Court ordered Defendant to provide supplemental briefing to this Court regarding the issue of

equitable tolling as to Plaintiff’s Title VII claims. 

On February 16, 2007, Defendant provided this Court with a supplemental brief on the

equitable tolling issue, as well as a complete copy of the settlement agreement. Doc. No. 2;

Exhibit I to Defendant’s original Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff filed an opposition on March 2,

2007. Doc. No. 25. Defendant filed a reply on March 7, 2007. Doc. No. 26. This Court

entertained oral argument on March 15, 2007, on the supplemental brief issues only. Doc. No.

27. 

On March 23, 207, this Court entered order granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.

Doc. No. 28. The Court dismissed Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1981, appeal of the MSPB ruling,

and Title VII claims with prejudice. This Court dismissed Plaintiff’s breach of claim without

prejudice, granting Plaintiff leave to amend her breach of contract claim only. Plaintiff’s request

for attorney fees was denied. The Court held that if Plaintiff’s amended complaint fails to

establish jurisdiction for this Court, it will be dismissed with prejudice and without any further

leave to amend. 

Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint (“SAC”) for 1) breach of contract; 2) specific

performance; 3) reinstatement of 00cv2210 IEG (AJB). Case number 00cv2210 IEG (AJB)

was previously filed by Plaintiff, settled pursuant to a settlement agreement signed by Plaintiff

on April 13, 2001, and dismissed with prejudice on April 20, 2001. This Court will not

entertain Plaintiff’s Title VII claim as it was dismissed with prejudice on March 23, 2007. Doc.

No. 28. 

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard

A. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)

“A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction may either attack the

allegations of the complaint or may be made as a ‘speaking motion’ attacking the existence of

subject matter jurisdiction in fact.” Thornhill Publishing Co. v. General Tel & Elect., 594 F.2d

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730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). 

“Unlike a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a Rule 12(b)(1) motion can attack the substance of a

complaint’s jurisdictional allegations despite their formal sufficiency, and in doing so rely on

affidavits or any other evidence properly before the court.” St. Clair v. City of Chico, 880 F.2d

199, 201 (9th Cir. 1989). Thus, the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the

trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims. Id.

Defendants bring this motion as a “speaking motion” presenting a factual challenge to

subject matter jurisdiction. Therefore, this Court may consider extrinsic evidence on whether

jurisdiction exists and may resolve factual disputes if necessary. Thornhill, 594 F.2d at 733.

Because plaintiff bears the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction, no presumption

of truthfulness attaches to the allegations of plaintiff’s complaint and the Court must presume

it lacks jurisdiction until plaintiff establishes jurisdiction. Stock West, Inc. v. Confederated

Tribes, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989).

B. Motion to Dismiss - 12(b)(6)

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency

of the complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Dismissal of a claim

under this Rule is appropriate only where “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove

no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355

U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Navarro, 250 F.3d at 732. Dismissal is warranted under Rule 12(b)(6)

where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,

749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984); see Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1989)

(“Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a court to dismiss a claim on the basis of a dispositive issue of law.”).

Alternatively, a complaint may be dismissed where it presents a cognizable legal theory yet fails

to plead essential facts under that theory. Robertson, 749 F.2d at 534. 

In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must assume the truth

of all factual allegations and must construe them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). However, legal

conclusions need not be taken as true merely because they are cast in the form of factual

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allegations. Roberts, 812 F.2d at 1177; Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624

(9th Cir. 1981). When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court may consider the facts alleged

in the complaint, documents attached to the complaint, documents relied upon but not

attached to the complaint when authenticity is not contested, and matters of which the Court

takes judicial notice. Parrino v. FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 705-06 (9th Cir. 1998) (overruled

on other grounds); Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 453-54 (9th Cir. 1994) (overruled on other

grounds); MGIC Indem. Co. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500, 504 (9th Cir. 1986).

II. Analysis

Defendant argues that 1) this Court lacks jurisdiction of Plaintiff’s breach of contract

claim, derivative specific performance and reinstatement of prior action claims because the

promises alleged by Plaintiff are not contained in the settlement agreement, 2) the second

amended complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and 3) summary

judgment is proper because Plaintiff cannot prove the essential elements of a breach of contract

claim. However, it is not necessary for this Court to rule on the third contention because of the

Court’s dismissal on grounds 1 and 2 above. 

A. Written Settlement Agreement is Crucial to the Breach of Contract Claim

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim fails as a matter of law, and

should be dismissed. Defendant states that the unambiguous terms of the settlement

agreement do not support Plaintiff’s claims, and therefore, extrinsic evidence cannot be

considered. Defendant further states that even if extrinsic evidence was considered, Plaintiff’s

claim regarding any agreement outside the four corners of the settlement agreement is not

binding on the Defendant. Plaintiff once again alleges in the SAC that she was to remain a

Program Analyst for the remainder of her career under the supervision of Craig Horton, “absent

her non-performance of the duties of that position” and regardless of the agency’s

organizational needs. SAC at 5-6. 

In the order granting Defendant’s motion to dismiss entered on March 23, 2007 (Doc

No. 28), this Court found that the settlement agreement which was attached to Defendant’s

pleadings (Doc. No. 24) can be considered within a 12(b)(6) motion because the first amended

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complaint refers to the document, the document is central to Plaintiff’s claim and no party

questioned the authenticity of the settlement agreement. Branch, 14 F.3d at 454. The SAC

likewise refers to the settlement agreement. The agreement is crucial to Plaintiff’s claim, and

neither party raises any issue relating to its authenticity. Accordingly, the Court will consider

the settlement in view of Plaintiff’s breach of contract claims in the SAC. 

Plaintiff makes the same allegations in the SAC as she did in the first amended complaint

with respect to certain oral representations Plaintiff claims were included in the settlement

agreement. See Doc. No. 29, at 12, 18 and Declaration to Plaintiff’s Supplemental

Opposition. As this Court previously ruled, the settlement agreement does not support

Plaintiff’s breach of contract claims. A thorough review of the agreement reveals no reference

to the re-assigning of Plaintiff or to the supervision of Mr. Horton, or granting her permanent

employment. As such, this Court finds that Plaintiff’s breach of contract claims are not

supported by the four corners of the settlement agreement. 

B. Settlement Agreement is Clear and Unambiguous and Extrinsic Evidence

Cannot be Considered

The interpretation of contracts where the government is a party is governed by Federal

law. O’Neill v. U.S., 50 F.3d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 1995), citing Kennewick Irr. Dist. v. U.S., 880

F.2d 1018, 1032 (9th Cir. 1989). Whether terms outside the written agreement should be

included in the contract is a question of law. Greco v. Department of the Army, 852 F.2d 558,

560 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Whether the contract is clear and unambiguous is also a question of law.

U.S. v. Sacramento Municipal Utility Dist., 652 F.2d 1341, 1344-45 (9th Cir. 1981).

In determining whether a contract is ambiguous, this Court looks to the terms of the agreement

itself. Greco, 852 F.2d at 560. Extrinsic evidence can be considered only if there is an

ambiguity in the contract. Greco, 852 F.2d at 560. 

The settlement agreement and release of claims executed by the parties (Ex. I to

Defendant’s original motion) is clear and ambiguous. Therefore, extrinsic evidence cannot be

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1

 The Court notes that the Plaintiff’s Exhibit B dated March 1, 2001, supports the Defendant’s

position that two promises were made, which are contained in the settlement agreement. First, payment

of $12,000 and second, cooperation with Plaintiff’s workers compensation. There is no claim by

Plaintiff that Defendant breached these terms. Exhibit A is a letter dated a month prior, February 2,

2001, signed by an unidentified person which contains an offer to transfer Plaintiff to a GS9 program

analyst position under Craig Horton. There are no further statements regarding permanency or any other

consideration. It is undisputed that this transfer occurred.

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considered.1

C. Court Does Not Have Jurisdiction Under the Tucker Act

Plaintiff claims this court has jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. §1491. The

Secretary of the Navy is not a proper defendant under the Tucker Act, or even the Little Tucker

Act, 28 U.S.C. §1346(a)(2), which give the district courts original jurisdiction concurrent with

the United States Court of Federal Claims to render judgments against the United States

founded either upon the Constitution or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive

department. Suits under the Tucker Act are permitted only against the United States, not its

agencies. See U.S.C. §§ 1346 (a)(2) and 1491(a)(1); Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545,

552-53 (1989). The Court therefore finds that Plaintiff’s Tucker Act claim is not viable.

D. Court’s Jurisdiction is Limited to Enforcement of Settlement Agreement

At best, the only basis supporting this Court’s jurisdiction as asserted in Plaintiff’s SAC

is the stipulation for dismissal with prejudice and order thereon entered in case no 00cv2210

on April 20, 2001. SAC ¶1. The order entered in that case states in relevant part: 

Notwithstanding the entry of a dismissal herein, the parties hereby stipulate that

the magistrate of the District Court shall maintain jurisdiction to enforce the

terms of this compromise settlement. 

The jurisdiction contemplated by the parties extends only to the enforcement of the terms

contained in the written settlement agreement and release of claims attached to Doc. No. 24.

Accordingly, this Court’s continuing jurisdiction extended only to the enforcement of the terms

included in the settlement agreement and release of claims and does not extend to alleged oral

promises outside the settlement agreement. 

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CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s motion to

dismiss is GRANTED with prejudice as to Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim and the second

amended complaint is DISMISSED. 

DATED: August 29, 2007

HON. JOHN A. HOUSTON

United States District Judge

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