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Nature of Suit Code: 870
Nature of Suit: Tax Suits
Cause of Action: 

---

FILED 

Uoited States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

MAR -11990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

SEVENTH ELECT CHURCH IN ISRAEL; ) 

and PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, ) 

) 

Plaintiffs, ) 

) 

V • ) 

) 

GERALD ROGERS; WESTLAKE INVESTMENT ) 

CORP.; MONARCH RECREATION CORP.; ) 

PERRIANDER CORPORATION; COMMERCIAL ) 

TIME SHARES, LTD., & ASSOCIATES; ) 

and AETNA SOUTHWEST INSURANCE & ) 

INVESTMENT, ) 

) 

Defendants, ) 

) 

and ) 

) 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Intervenor- ) 

Appellee, ) 

) 

V • ) 

) 

SEVENTH ELECT CHURCH IN ISRAEL; and ) 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, ) 

) 

Defendants-Intervenors- ) 

Appellees, ) 

) 

GERALD ROGERS; PRISCILLA ROGERS; and ) 

PERRIANDER CORPORATION, ) 

) 

Defendants-Intervenors, ) 

) 

SEYMOUR C. YUTER; and ELINOR V. YUTER, ) 

) 

Applicants in Intervention- ) 

Appellants. ) 

No. 89-1061 

(D.C. No. 88-Z-466) 

(D. Colo.) 

Appellate Case: 89-1061 Document: 01019965746 Date Filed: 03/01/1990 Page: 1 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before LOGAN, MOORE, Circuit Judges, and THOMPSON,** Chief Judge. 

**The Honorable Ralph G. Thompson, Chief Judge, United States 

District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, sitting by 

designation. 

Proposed intervenors Seymour C. and Elinor V. Yuter appeal 

the district court's order denying as un~imely their motion to 

intervene as of right pursuant to Colo. R. Civ. P. 24(a). They 

also appeal the trial court's denial of their motion for 

post-trial relief under Colo. R. Civ. P. 59. We affirm. 

I . 

We review only those facts which are relevant to this appeal. 

The Yuters seek intervention in United States v. Seventh Elect 

Church In Israel, et al., a case originally filed in Chaffee 

County District Court in Colorado but which was later removed to 

the United States District Court for the District of Colorado 

following the intervention of the United States. All parties, 

including the Yuters, previously obtained independent judgments 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

2 

Appellate Case: 89-1061 Document: 01019965746 Date Filed: 03/01/1990 Page: 2 
or, in the case of the United Btates, a _federal tax . lien, against 

Mr. Gerald L. Rogers, now a fugitive from justice. The underlying 

action seeks enforcement of those state court judgments. 

Appellees State of California (State) and Seventh Elect 

Church In Israel (Church) filed the Colorado action in 1983 

seeking enforcement of separate judgments they obtained in 

California and Washington state court against Mr. Rogers. Their 

consolidated suit alleged, inter alia, that Rogers fraudulently 

purchased stock in Monarch Recreation Company of Colorado 

(Monarch) in the name of Westlake Mortgage and Investment , S.A. 

(Westlake) in order to avoid creditors' attachment of the asset. 

Judgment was entered upon a finding that Westlake was the alter 

ego of Gerald Rogers. The company was served with a writ of 

garnishment in July, 1985. The answer to that writ, however, 

alleged the stock was previously transferred to the Perriander 

Corporation (Perriander), organized under the laws of the 

Netherland Antilles. Church and State then brought suit against 

Perriander. 

On February 21, 1986, the Chaffee County District Court 

issued a preliminary injunction ordering Perriander to deposit the 

Monarch stock certificates in the court registry to avoid further 

transfers. On December 21, 1987, the court entered its decision 

in the case, holding Perriander was also the alter ego of Gerald 

Rogers and ordering the stock be sold to satisfy Church and 

State's judgments. The court stayed execution of the order until 

final judgment entered, which occurred on January 28, 1988. 

3 

Appellate Case: 89-1061 Document: 01019965746 Date Filed: 03/01/1990 Page: 3 
---At that time, . the stock shar.e_s were released to the sheriff 

for sale at public auction with Church and State authorized to bid 

up to the amount of their judgment balances against Mr. Rogers. 

On March 4, 1988, the United States intervened in the case 

pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7424. 1 The sheriff's sale occurred on 

April 25, 1988, with Church and State purchasing the certificates, 

which constituted ninety-eight percent of outstanding Monarch 

stock. Church and State placed the certificates in the federal 

court registry pending resolution of the conflicting claims 

between them and the United States. 

The Yuters independently filed suit against Gerald Rogers in 

the United States District Court for the Southern District of New 

York in September, 1982. According to Yuters, they first heard 

abou t the Chaffee County District Court action on February 5, 

1988, when an article regarding the case appeared in the Los 

Angeles Daily Journal. At that point in time, Yuters's case had 

been inactive for seventeen months. Upon learning about the 

Monarch stock, Yuters obtained a default judgment against Mr. 

Rogers and made their motion to intervene and for post-trial 

relief. On January 31, 1989, the federal district court entered 

its final order denying Yuters's intervention motion on the basis 

that it was untimely. 

1 The right to intervene 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(l). 

was 

4 

unconditional pursuant to 

Appellate Case: 89-1061 Document: 01019965746 Date Filed: 03/01/1990 Page: 4 
II. 

The Yuters initially filed their motion to intervene in state 

court pursuant to Colo. R. Civ. P. 24(a). The language of that 

rule is identical to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a). 2 Under either, we can 

reverse only if the district court's denial constitutes an abuse 

of discretion. Sanguine, Ltd. v. United States Dep't of Interior, 

736 F.2d 1416, 1418 (10th Cir. 1984); In re Marriage of Guinn, 522 

P.2d 755, 756 (Colo. App. 1974). 

Timeliness is a threshold issue which must be addressed prior 

to considering the remainder of Rule 24(a). NAACP v. New York, 

413 U.S. 345, 365 (1973); Diamond Lumber, Inc. v. H.C.M.C., Ltd., 

746 P.2d 76, 78 (Colo. App. 1987). In determining whether a 

motion to intervene is timely, three factors must be addressed 

including: (1) the stage of the proceeding at which an appellant 

seeks to intervene; (2) the prejudice to other parties; and (3) 

the reason for and length of the delay. Orange County v. Air 

Cal., 799 F.2d 535, 537 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 

946 (1987). Generally, courts disfavor allowing intervention 

2 Rule 24. Intervention 

(a) Intervention of Right. 

Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to 

intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of the 

United States confers an unconditional right to 

intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an interest 

relating to the property or transaction which is the 

subject of the action and the applicant is so situated 

that the disposition of the action may as a practical 

matter impair or impede the applicant's ability to 

protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest 

is adequately represented by existing parties. 

5 

Appellate Case: 89-1061 Document: 01019965746 Date Filed: 03/01/1990 Page: 5 
after judgment is entered. Spickard v. Civil .Serv. Comm'n of City 

& County of Denver, 523 P.2d 149, 151 (Colo. App. 1974); see also, 

F.T.C. v. American Legal Distribs., Inc., 890 F.2d 363, 365 (11th 

Cir. 1989)(motion to intervene filed four months after judgment 

entered and one month after court-ordered sale of assets is 

untimely). 

Here, although Yuters argue they moved quickly following 

discovery of the Colorado suit, we find the district court acted 

within its discretion in denying their motion. First, Yuters's 

motion was filed some six weeks after entry of final judgment. 

Second, allowing intervention at this juncture would prejudice the 

existing parties. Church and State spent five years and thousands 

of dollars to obtain judgments against Westlake and Perriander. 

They undertook expensive investigation to prove both cases. 

Allowing Yuters to intervene at this stage would delay the 

proceedings further and inject new issues in the case requiring 

additional litigation. For example, it is clear the 

enforceability of Yuters's default judgment against Gerald Rogers 

would be contested. Finally, Yuters took no action in their own 

lawsuit for seventeen months and only pursued a default judg~~n~-

after they learned about the Monarch stock. While we recognize 

the Yuters's unfortunate situation, the record before us does not 

support a finding that the district court abused its discretion. 

This finding is buttressed by our conclusion that regardless 

of the intervention issue, Yuters have no viable claim to the 

Monarch stock under Colorado law. Yuters argue Colo. R. Civ. P. 

102 sanctions their intervention and mandates proration of the 

6 

Appellate Case: 89-1061 Document: 01019965746 Date Filed: 03/01/1990 Page: 6 
Monarch proc_eeds. Contrary to ~his suggestion, Rule 102 relates 

to prejudgment attachments, not competing writs of execution, as 

are present here. The plain language of the rule is clear. 

Church and State had a prior writ of execution which takes 

priority over the later claim of the Yuters. 3 Further, even if we 

assume the attachment rule does apply, Yuters's claim is untimely 

under Colo. R. Civ. P. 102(k). 4 See Hartner v. Davis, 68 P.2d 

456, 457 (1937)(under precursor to Colo. R. Civ. P. 102, creditor 

seeking intervention must file within thirty days after the levy 

is made under the writ of attachment). In light of our findings, 

we need not reach the issue of Yuters's motion for post-trial 

relief. 

3 We also note that even under the language of the attachment 

rule, Church and State's writ of execution would have priority 

pursuant to Colo. R. Civ. P. 102(m), due to those parties' 

diligence in pursuing both Westlake and Perriander. 

4 

(k) No Final Judgment Until Thirty Days After 

Levy. 

(1) Creditors. No final judgment shall be 

rendered in a cause wherein an attachment writ has been 

issued and a levy made thereunder, until the expiration 

of thirty days after such levy has been made; and any 

creditor of the defendant making and filing within said 

thirty-day period an affidavit and undertaking, as 

hereinbefore required of the plaintiff, together with 

his complaint setting forth his claim against the 

defendant, shall be made a party plaintiff and have like 

remedies against the defendant to secure his claim as 

the law gives to the original plaintiff. 

7 

Appellate Case: 89-1061 Document: 01019965746 Date Filed: 03/01/1990 Page: 7 
Accordingly, the judgment of !:he United Sta_tes .District Court 

for the District of Colorado is AFFIRMED. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

PER CURIAM 

8 

Appellate Case: 89-1061 Document: 01019965746 Date Filed: 03/01/1990 Page: 8