Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01467/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01467-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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The three officers are County Sheriff’s Department Sergeants E. Broughton (“Sgt. Broughton”) and Kathy 1

Carreiro (“Sgt. Carreiro”) and County Sheriff’s Department Deputy Sheriff Robert Carey (“Deputy Carey”). The County,

Sheriff Pierce, Sgts. Broughton and Carreiro and Deputy Carey will be referred to collectively as “defendants”).

Plaintiffs are Terry Hillblom (“Mr. Hillblom”), Sandra Hillblom (“Ms. Hillblom”) and Michael L., a minor

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for whom Mr. and Ms. Hillblom are guardians ad litem and legal guardians. Mr. and Ms. Hillblom and Michael L. will be

referred to collectively as “plaintiffs.”

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TERRY HILLBLOM, et al., CASE NO. CV F 07-1467 LJO SMS

Plaintiffs, ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ F.R.Civ.P. 12

MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND FOR MORE

vs. DEFINITE STATEMENT 

COUNTY OF FRESNO, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

INTRODUCTION

Defendants County of Fresno (“County”), former County Sheriff Richard Pierce (“Sheriff

Pierce”) and three County Sheriff’s Department officers seek F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) dismissal of 1

plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“section 1983”) and related claims on grounds that the claims fail to allege 2

necessary elements. Defendants pursue an alternative F.R.Civ.P. 12(e) motion for a more definite

statement as to plaintiffs’ section 1983 illegal arrest and tort in essence claims. Plaintiffs contend that,

for the most part, their complaint satisfies requirements to plead necessaryelements oftheir claims. This

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Court considered the defendants’ alternative motions to dismiss and for a more definite statement on the

record and VACATES the February 7, 2008 hearing, pursuant to Local Rule 78-230(h). For the reasons

discussed below, this Court GRANTS defendants F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and F.R.Civ.P. 12(c) reliefin part

and ORDERS plaintiffs, no later than February 25, 2008, to file a first amended complaint consistent

with and in compliance with this order.

BACKGROUND3

Mr. Hillblom’s Arrest

Mr. and Ms. Hillblom are married and are Michael L.’s maternal grandparents. Mr. Hillblom

is an inactive attorney. Sgts. Broughton and Carreiro and Deputy Carey are peace officers with the

County Sheriff’s Department (“Department”).

 On April 25, 2006 at about 8 p.m., Kimberly L., Michael L.’s mother and daughter of Mr. and

Ms. Hillblom, dialed 911 to report that Michael L., then age 14, was at Mr. and Ms. Hillblom’s Parlier

home and refused to return with Kimberly L. to her Sanger home. Mr. and Mrs. Hillblom were unaware

that Kimberly L. had called 911. Kimberly L. sought law enforcement assistance to compel Michael L.

to leave with her although Michael L. had resided at Mr. and Mrs. Hillbloom’s home during the prior

four weeks pursuant to a court order. Kimberly L. had lost custody of her then five-year-old daughter

and had what plaintiffs’ characterize as “a well-documented and significant history of drug abuse and

arrests for domestic violence and Health and Safety Code violations.” 

Deputy Carey arrived at Mr. and Ms. Hillblom’s home at around 8:40 p.m. and entered the home

at Kimberly L.’s invitation although Deputy Carey knew she did not live in the home and, as plaintiffs’

describe, “did not have consent to his entry.” After Michael L. did not respond to Kimberly L.’s

attempts to summon him and with Kimberly L.’s permission, Deputy Carey proceeded further down a

hallway toward a den. Mr. Hillblom, unaware Kimberly L. had summoned law enforcement, requested

Deputy Carey to leave the home and offered to accompany Deputy Carey outside to discuss “whatever

business” had brought Deputy Carey to the home. Mr. Hillblom informed Deputy Carey that Kimberly

L. did not reside in the house, lacked authority to invite Deputy Carey inside, and was present only for

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a supervised court-ordered visit with her daughter.

After telling Mr. Hillblom to sit down, Deputy Carey advanced within inches of Mr. Hillblom,

who demanded that Deputy Carey leave. Deputy Carey responded by slamming Mr. Hillblom into a

nearby fireplace, jerking Mr. Hillblom’s arms behind Mr. Hillblom’s back and handcuffing Mr.

Hillblom. Deputy Carey shoved Mr. Hillblom out of the house and locked Mr. Hillblom into Deputy

Carey’s patrol car. 

Mr. Hillblom suffered bruises and cuts to his left forearm and wrist, and his insulin pump was

pulled off his belt. Mr. Hillbloom, an insulin-dependent diabetic who wears an insulin pump constantly,

asked Deputy Carey to reinsert the pump. Deputy Carey responded: “I don’t care.” Mr. Hillbloom

remained locked in the patrol car for about 40 minutes without insulin.

Mrs. Hillbloom and Michael L. were present and observed Mr. Hillbloom’s arrest, bleeding,

ripping out of his insulin pump, and remaining locked in the patrol car.

Mr. Hillblom’s Citation

After Sgt. Broughton arrived at the home, Mrs. Hillbloom informed him of Mr. Hillbloom’s

disconnected insulin pump and bleeding wrist. Mr. Hillbloom was uncuffed, treated for his bleeding

wrist, and permitted to check his blood glucose and to place a new infusion set into his body. 

Sgt. Broughton and Deputy Carey issued Mr. Hillblom a citation for violation of California Penal

Code section 148(a)(1) (resisting, obstructing or delaying a peace officer). Sgt. Broughton and Deputy

Carey transported Mr. Hillblom to the Reedley Police Department (20 minutes away) where Mr.

Hillblom was processed and detained until approximately midnight. 

Deputy Carey prepared a crime report which made false statements regarding Mr. Hillbloom and

which was approved by Sgt. Carreiro, whom plaintiffs allege on information and belief knew or should

have known that claims of Mr. Hillbloom’s criminal conduct were false.

 The Fresno County District Attorney’s office filed a criminal complaint to charge Mr. Hillblom

with violation of California Penal Code section 148(a)(1) (resisting, obstructing or delaying a peace

officer). After a suppression motion hearing, the prosecuting deputy attorney moved to dismiss the

charge against Mr. Hillblom. Mr. and Mrs. Hillbloom claim they incurred legal expenses “to defend

against the malicious prosecution triggered by Carey’s false report.”

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Deputy Carey’s Prior History

Plaintiffs claim Deputy Carey has a volatile temper and history of excessive force and related

personnel complaints, steroid use, and arrests for violence.

Plaintiffs’ Claims

Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges the following claims subject to defendants’ challenge:

1. A (first) cause of action under section 1983 for illegal warrantless arrest in that the

County, Deputy Carey and Sgts. Broughton and Carreiro’s acts and omissions deprived

Mr. Hillblom of rights secured by the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to

subject him to excessive and unreasonable force, unjustifiable denial of liberty,

deprivation of necessary medical care, and conspiracy to cover up defendants’

misconduct by commencement of a fraudulent criminal proceeding;

2. A (third) cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”) that the

unlawful conduct of Deputy Carey and Sgt. Broughton “subjected all of the plaintiffs to

mental suffering and emotional distress”;

3. A (fourth) cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) that

the actions of Deputy Carey and Sgt. Broughton “constituted outrageous conduct,

undertaken with the intention of causing, or the reckless disregard of the probability of

causing, emotional distress”;

4. A (fifth) false arrest and false imprisonment cause of action that Deputy Carey and Sgt.

Broughton, with neither a warrant nor probable cause and on the County’s behalf,

“recklessly and unlawfully detained, arrested and jailed” Mr. Hillbloom;

5. A (sixth) torts in essence cause of action that the County, Deputy Carey and Sgts.

Broughton and Carreiro breached non-consensual duties arising out of mandatory

California Penal Code sections 118, 118.1, 125, 127, 137(c), 148.5, 149 and 182(2) and

“assaulted, battered, injured, falsely arrested and filed false crime reports” against Mr.

Hillblom; and

6. A (seventh) negligent employment, training and supervision cause of action that the

County, Sheriff Pierce and Sgts. Broughton and Carreiro “failed to provide policies and

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The complaint also alleges Mr. Hillbloom’s (second) assault and battery cause of action that Deputy Carey

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assaulted and battered Mr. Hillbloom to violate California Penal Code sections 149 and 245 in the “immediate presence” of

Mrs. Hillbloom and Michael L. The assault and battery cause of action further alleges that Mr. Hillbloom suffered an illegal

and unjustifiable loss of liberty in that he was taken into custody without warrant, justification or probable cause. Deputy

Carey does not challenge the assault and battery cause of action with the instant motions. 

5

procedures to ensure meaningful reporting, monitoring and investigation of the misuse

and abuse of authority by Fresno County Sheriff’s deputies, and failed adequately to

supervise personnel as to their duties and obligations under the law, policy and practice.”

Sheriff Pierce is specifically identified as a defendant in only the (seventh) negligent employment,

training and supervision cause of action.4

Defendants contend that the above causes of action fail to allege necessary elements or facts for

defendants’ liability and that Sheriff Pierce, Sgts. Broughton and Carreiro and Deputy Carey are

redundantly named in their official capacities. Alternatively, defendants seek a more definite statement

of the (first) section 1983 and (sixth) torts in essence causes of action in that they are vague and

ambiguous.

DISCUSSION

F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) Motion To Dismiss Standards

A F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is a challenge to the sufficiency of the pleadings set

forth in the complaint. “When a federal court reviews the sufficiencyof a complaint, before the reception

of any evidence either by affidavit or admissions, its task is necessarily a limited one. The issue is not

whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to

support the claims.” Scheurer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683 (1974); Gilligan v. Jamco

Development Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 249 (9 Cir. 1997). A F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper where th

there is either a “lack of a cognizable legal theory” or “the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a

cognizable legal theory.” Balisteri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9 Cir. 1990); Graehling th

v. Village of Lombard, Ill., 58 F.3d 295, 297 (7 Cir. 1995). F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper th

when “plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief,”

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-102 (1957), and when “no relief could be granted

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under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations.” Hishon v. King & Spalding,

467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229 (1984). 

In resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must: (1) construe the complaint in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff; (2) accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true; and (3) determine

whether plaintiff can prove any set of facts to support a claim that would merit relief. Cahill v. Liberty

Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-338 (9th Cir. 1996). “However, conclusory allegations of law and

unwarranted inferences are not sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Pareto v. F.D.I.C., 139 F.3d

696, 699 (9 Cir. 1998). A court need not permit an attempt to amend a complaint if “it determines that th

the pleading could not possibly be cured by allegation of other facts.” Cook, Perkiss and Liehe, Inc. v.

N. Cal. Collection Serv. Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9 Cir. 1990). th

F.R.Civ.P. 12(e) Motion For More Definite Statement Standards

 Defendants (except Sheriff Pierce) pursue an alternative motion for a more definite statement

pursuant to F.R.Civ.P. 12(e), which permits a party to seek “a more definite statement of a pleading to

which a responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot

reasonably prepare a response.”

A motion for a more definite statement is proper if “defendant cannot frame a responsive

pleading.” Famolare, Inc. v. Edison Bros. Stores, Inc., 525 F.Supp. 940, 949 (E.D. Cal. 1981); see

Boxall v. Sequoia Union High School District, 464 F.Supp. 1104, 1114 (N.D. Cal. 1979). A F.R.Civ.P.

12(e) motion is designed to strike unintelligibility rather than lack of detail. See Woods v. Reno

Commodities, Inc., 600 F.Supp. 574, 580 (D. Nev. 1984); Nelson v. Quimby Island Reclamation Dist.,

491 F.Supp. 1364, 1385 (N.D. Cal. 1980). A F.R.Civ.P. 12(e) motion should be denied if the pleading

provides a “short and plain statement” of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Virgen

v. Mae, 2007 WL 1521553, *2 (E.D. Cal. 2007) (citing F.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)).

With these standards in mind, this Court turns to defendants’ challenges to plaintiffs’ claims.

Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 Claims

Official Capacity

Sheriff Pierce, Sgts. Broughton andCarreiro and Deputy Carey contend that they are redundantly

named in their official capacities to warrant dismissal of the (first) section 1983 cause of action against

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them in their official capacities. The complaint’s opening “Parties and Capacities” paragraphs name

Sheriff Pierce in his official capacity and Sgts. Broughton and Carreiro and Deputy Carey in their

individual and official capacities. Defendants argue that if the County remains as a defendant, Sheriff

Pierce, Sgts. Broughton and Carreiro and Deputy Carey should be dismissed as “redundant defendants.”

Official-capacity suits represent a means to plead an action against an entity of which an officer

is an agent. Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690, n. 55, 98 S.Ct. 2018

(1978). Local government officials sued in their official capacities are “persons” under section 1983 in

cases where a local government would be suable in its own name. Monell, 436 U.S. 658, 690, n. 55,

98 S.Ct. 2018. “For this reason, when both an officer and the local government entity are named in a

lawsuit and the officer is named in official capacity only, the officer is a redundant defendant and may

be dismissed.” Luke v. Abbott, 954 F.Supp. 202, 203 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (citing Vance v. County of Santa

Clara, 928 F.Supp. 993, 996 (N.D.Cal.1996)).

“[I]t is no longer necessary or proper to name as a defendant a particular local government officer

acting in official capacity.” Luke, 954 F.Supp. at 204. As the district court in Luke, 954 F.Supp. at 204,

explained:

A plaintiff cannot elect which of the defendant formats to use. If both are named, it is

proper upon request for the Court to dismiss the official-capacity officer, leaving the

local government entity as the correct defendant. If only the official-capacity officer is

named, it would be proper for theCourt upon request to dismiss the officer and substitute

instead the local government entity as the correct defendant.

Plaintiffs note that in “an excess of caution,” they brought the (first) section 1983 cause of action

against the County and its employees in their official capacities. Plaintiffs seek to amend to name

Sheriff Pierce, Sgts. Broughton and Carreiro and Deputy Carey in their individual capacities only. As

such, dismissal is proper of the (first) section 1983 cause of action against Sheriff Pierce, Sgts.

Broughton and Carreiro and Deputy Carey in their official capacities. 

The County’s Section 1983 Liability

The County faults the (first) section 1983 cause of action for failure to allege liability based on

the County’s actions given that the County is not “directly liable for the acts of its employees.” The

County notesthat the section 1983 cause of action “appearsto be based on a theory of vicarious liability”

for violation of Mr. Hillbloom’s Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights upon Mr. Hillbloom’s

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warrantless arrest. The County points to the absence of an alleged custom or policy to hold the County

“directly liable for the acts of its employees.”

Plaintiffs respond that the County’s section 1983 liability flows from its deliberate indifference

in policies to hire officers known to be unfit and inadequately to train, discipline or reassign unfit

officers. Plaintiffs seek to amend their complaint “to clarify the County’s liability for violation of their

civil rights.”

A local government unit may not be held liable for the acts of its employees under a respondeat

superior theory. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691, 98 S.Ct. 2018; Davis v. Mason County, 927 F.2d 1473, 1480

(9 Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 899, 112 S.Ct. 275 (1991); Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d th

1439, 1443 (9 Cir. 1989). “[A] municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a th

tortfeasor.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 691, 98 S.Ct. at 2018. The local government unit “itself must cause

the constitutional deprivation.” Gilette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346 (9 Cir. 1992), cert. denied,

th

510 U.S. 932, 114 S.Ct. 345 (1993). Because liability of a local governmental unit must rest on its

actions, not the actions of its employees, a plaintiff must go beyond the respondeat superior theory and

demonstrate that the alleged constitutional violation was the product of a policy or custom of the local

governmental unit. City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385, 109 S.Ct. 1197 (1989); Pembaur

v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 478-480, 106 S.Ct. 1292 (1986). To maintain a section 1983 claim

against a local government, a plaintiff must establish the requisite culpability (a “policy or custom”

attributable to municipal policymakers) and the requisite causation (the policy or custom as the “moving

force” behind the constitutional deprivation). Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-694, 98 S.Ct. 2018; Gable v. City

of Chicago, 296 F.3d 531, 537 (7 Cir. 2002). th

“In addition, a local governmental entity may be liable if it has a ‘policy of inaction and such

inaction amounts to a failure to protect constitutional rights.’” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668,

681 (9 Cir. 2001) (quoting Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9 Cir. 1992)). A local government th th

entity may be liable under section 1983 “if its deliberate policy caused the constitutional violation

alleged.” Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 484 (9 Cir. 2007). As to failure to train th

employees, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained:

The custom or policy of inaction, however, must be the result of a “conscious,” . . . or “

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‘deliberate choice to follow a course of action . . . made from among various alternatives

by the official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the

subject matter in question.’ ” . . .

A local governmental entity's failure to train its employees can also create § 1983

liability where the failure to train “amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of

persons” with whom those employees are likely to come into contact. . . . “[F]or liability

to attach in this circumstance the identified deficiency in a [local governmental entity's]

training program must be closely related to the ultimate injury.” . . . In other words, a

plaintiff must show that his or her constitutional “injury would have been avoided” had

the governmental entity properly trained its employees. . . .

Lee, 250 F.3d at 681 (citations omitted.)

A section 1983 plaintiff alleging a policy of failure to train peace officers must show: (1) he/she

was deprived of a constitutional right; (2) the local government entity had a training policy that amounts

to deliberate indifference to constitutional rights of persons’ with whom its peace officers are likely to

come into contact; and (3) his/her constitutional injury would have been avoided had the City properly

trained those officers. Blankenhorn, 485 F.3d at 463.

The County’s challenge to the (first) section 1983 cause of action hangs on a respondeat superior

theory. Plaintiffs indicate that they proceed on a deliberate indifference/failure to train theory and seek

to amend their section 1983 claims against the County. The above legal authorities support a deliberate

indifference/failure to train claim. As such, this Court dismisses the complaint’s (first) section 1983

cause of action against the County with leave to amend.

Mrs. Hillbloom and Michael L.’s Lack Of Standing

Defendants argue that Mrs. Hillbloom and Michael L. lack standing to pursue section 1983

claims for unreasonable arrest and excessive force in that the complaint alleges that Mr. Hillbloom alone

was subject to unreasonable force and unlawful arrest. Mrs. Hillbloom and Michael L. respond that they

pursue cognizable Fourth Amendment invasion of privacy claims and that the complaint alleges facts

for such claims. Plaintiffs note allegations that Michael L. had been living at Mr. and Mrs. Hillbloom’s

home and that Mrs. Hillbloom and Michael L. were present during and observed Deputy Carey’s

“unwarranted invasion of the Hillbloom home and violent arrest of Terry Hillbloom.” In their reply

papers, defendants demonstrate a better understanding of Mrs. Hillbloom and Michael L.’s Fourth

Amendment claims, which defendants note are limited to “unlawful entry.”

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Standing to pursue a Fourth Amendment claim for unreasonable search and seizure turns on “a

determination of whether the disputed search and seizure has infringed an interest of the defendant which

the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect.” Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 139, 99 S.Ct. 421

(1978). The United States Supreme Court has further explained that “as a general proposition, the issue

of standing involves two inquiries: first, whether the proponent of a particular legal right has alleged

‘injury in fact,’ and, second, whether the proponent is asserting his own legal rights and interests rather

than basing his claim for relief upon the rights of third parties.” Rakas, 439 U.S. at 139, 99 S.Ct. 421.

“Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which, like some other constitutional rights may not be

vicariously asserted.” Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 230, 93 S.Ct. 1565 (1973). 

Turning to peace officer entry of a home, the Ninth Circuit has explained:

As the officers doubtless knew, physical entry into the home is the “chief evil

against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.” United States v. United

States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972); see also

Murdock v. Stout, 54 F.3d 1437, 1440 (9th Cir.1995) (“[P]rotection of individuals from

unreasonable government intrusion into their houses remains at the very core of the

Fourth Amendment.”). To safeguard the home, we normally require a warrant before the

police may enter. “The right of privacy was deemed too precious to entrust to the

discretion of those whose job is the detection of crime and the arrest of criminals. . . .

And so the Constitution requires a magistrate to pass on the desires of the police before

they violate the privacy of the home.” McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56,

69 S.Ct. 191, 93 L.Ed. 153 (1948); see also Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 560, 124

S.Ct. 1284, 157 L.Ed.2d 1068 (2004). 

Frunz v. City of Tacoma, 468 F.3d 1141, 1142-1143 (9 Cir. 2006). th

In their opening papers, defendants appear to misinterpret Mrs. Hillbloom and Michael L.’s

claims to address unlawful search and seizure. The complaint does not allege that Mrs. Hillbloom and

Michael L. were searched or seized. As currently pled, Mrs. Hillbloom and Michael L.’s Fourth

Amendment claims are limited to invasion of privacy. The complaint adequately alleges Mrs. Hillbloom

and Michael L.’s right of privacy claims for which they have standing to pursue. Defendants are not

entitled to dismissal of such claims, and this Court cannot dismiss claims which are not pled by Mrs.

Hillbloom and Michael L. 

Sgts. Broughton And Carreiro’s Lack Of Direct Participation And Supervision

Sgts. Broughton and Carreiro fault the (first) section 1983 cause of action’s failure to allege

“material facts establishing cause or personal participation necessary to form the basis of a Fourth

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Amendment unreasonable arrest violation.” Sgt. Broughton argues that the complaint alleges only that

he assisted to transport Mr. Hillbloom to jail. Sgt. Broughton claims that he was not directly involved

in Deputy Carey’s alleged Fourth Amendment violations. Sgt. Carreiro contends that the complaint

alleges only that she approved Deputy Carey’s crime report.

Plaintiffs respond that the constitutional violations of Sgts. Broughton and Carreiro address

unlawful denial of liberty after arrest and generation of a malicious prosecution. Plaintiffs argue that

the complaint alleges facts that Sgt. Broughton directly and integrally participated unnecessarily to

extend Mr. Hillbloom’s unlawful detention. Plaintiffs note that the complaint alleges that Sgt. Carreiro

knew or should have known that the substance of Deputy Carey’s report was untrue.

“Section 1983 imposes two essential proof requirements upon a claimant: (1) that a person

acting under color of state law committed the conduct at issue, and (2) that the conduct deprived the

claimant of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the United

States.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 632-633 (9 Cir. 1988). “Section 1983 creates a cause of action th

based on personal liability and predicated upon fault; thus, liability does not attach unless the individual

defendant caused or participated in a constitutional deprivation.” Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 991 (7

th

Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1230, 117 S.Ct. 1822 (1997); see Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045

(9 Cir. 1989) (“Liability under section 1983 arises only upon a showing of personal participation by the th

defendant.” ) “The inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the duties and

responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused the

constitutional deprivation.” Leer, 844 F.2d at 633.

A plaintiff cannot hold an officer liable “because of his membership in a group without a

showing of individual participation in the unlawful conduct.” Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 935 (9

th

Cir. 2002) (citing Chuman v. Wright, 76 F.3d 292, 294 (9 Cir. 1996)). A plaintiff must “establish the th

‘integral participation’ of the officers in the alleged constitutional violation.” Jones, 297 F.3d at 935.

“‘[I]ntegral participation’ does not require that each officer’s actions themselves rise to the level of a

constitutional violation.” Boyd v. Benton County, 374 F.3d 773, 780 (9 Cir. 2004). Integral th

participation requires “some fundamental involvement in the conduct that allegedly caused the

violation.” Blankenhorn, 485 F.3d at 481, n. 12.

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The complaint alleges at least some fundamental involvement of Sgts. Broughton and Carreiro

in conduct that allegedly caused Mr. Hillbloom’s constitutional violations. Sgts. Broughton and

Carreiro’s arguments raise factual issues not suitable for resolution on their F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion.

Plaintiffs correctly note their evidentiary burden to support their claims against Sgts. Broughton and

Carreiro. Sgts. Broughton and Carreiro fail to substantiate dismissal of Mr. Hillbloom’s section 1983

claims at this early pleading stage.

In their reply papers, Sgts. Broughton and Carreiro raise for the first time “their roles as a [sic]

supervisors” and argue the complaint lacks sufficient allegations to impose section 1983 supervisory

liability on them. Sgts. Broughton and Carreiro appear to refer to an introductory allegation that Sgts.

Broughton and Carreiro “were supervisory officers and personnel, and in that capacity shared

responsibility with defendant PIERCE for the training and supervision of defendant CAREY.”

A moving party’s attempt to introduce new facts or different legal arguments in reply papers is

improper. See Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 894-895, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 3192

(1990)(court has discretion to disregard late-filed factual matters); but see also Glenn K. Jackson v. Roe,

273 F.3d 1192, 1201-1202 (9th Cir. 2001) (district court's discretion to consider issue raised for first

time in reply brief). Sgts. Broughton and Carreiro improperly delayed with their reply papers to attempt

to dismiss section 1983 supervisory claims to the extent such claims are alleged. As such, this Court is

not in a position to grant such relief. Moreover, there is a question that plaintiffs pursue such section

1983 claims given that the thrust of their supervisory claims appears in their (seventh) negligent

employment, training and supervision cause of action.

In her reply papers, Sgt. Carreiro raises for the first time her contention that she cannot be liable

“for malicious prosecution under Section 1983, as she, as a police sergeant, does not initiate criminal

prosecutions.” Again, Sgt. Carreiro improperly delayed to address this issue. The complaint makes a

fact-intensive claim that Sgt. Carreiro approved a crime report which she knew or should have known

contained false allegations. As this time, this Court is not in a position to pass on Sgt. Carreiro’s section

1983 liability pertaining to the criminal report and charges against Mr. Hillbloom. 

Fifth Amendment Violation

The (first) section 1983 cause of action alleges that defendants deprived Mr. Hillbloom of Fifth

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Amendment rights. Defendants note the absence of allegations of a coerced statement used against

plaintiffs in a criminal proceedings. Plaintiffs acknowledge that the Fifth Amendment reference was

inadvertent and request to delete it. Due to plaintiffs’ inadvertence, they are entitled to delete the Fifth

Amendment reference.

Fourteenth Amendment Violations

Defendants argue that plaintiffs are unable to pursue independent Fourteenth Amendment claims

based on allegations relating to their superceding Fourth Amendment claims.

“Section 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a method for

vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271, 114 S.Ct. 807,

811 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144, n. 3, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 2694, n. 3 (1979)). The

first step in any such claim is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright,

510 U.S. at 271, 114 S.Ct. at 811. “Where a particular Amendment “provides an explicit textual source

of constitutional protection” against a particular sort of government behavior, “that Amendment, not the

more generalized notion of ‘substantive due process,’ must be the guide of analyzing these claims.”

Albright, 510 U.S. at 273, 114 S.Ct. at 813 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395, 109 S.Ct.

1865, 1871 (1989). 

“Failure to observe the requirements of the fourth amendment will not support an independent

claim for a failure of due process, particularly in this case, where the facts supporting each claim are

identical.” Simons v. Marin County, 682 F.Supp. 1463, 1470 (N.D. Cal. 1987). “If the fourth

amendment, which specifically governs the standards of arrest has not been breached, neither will the

plaintiff be able to state a claim under the more general fourteenth amendment standard.” Simons, 682

F.Supp. at 1470. 

Plaintiffs, in particular Mr. Hillbloom, do not challenge meaningfully that Fourth Amendment

claims supersede Fourteenth Amendment claims. Plaintiffs point to liberty interest platitudes which are

distinct from their particular Fourth Amendment claims. Plaintiffs’ key rights at issue address

warrantless home entry, excessive force and wrongful arrest – matters subject to the Fourth

Amendment’s explicit textual source. The Fourth Amendment, not more generalized substantive due

process, guides analysis of plaintiffs’ claims.

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Defendants contend the complaint failsto state a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process

claim given that Mr. Hillbloom’s underlying criminal action was dismissed. Mr. Hillbloom claims that

he “has adequately alleged that defendants’ actions caused him to suffer a loss of liberty, and even

subjected him to incarceration, all without due process.”

“The Fourteenth Amendment does not protect against all deprivations of liberty. It protects only

against deprivations of liberty accomplished ‘without due process of law.’” Baker, 443 U.S. at 145, 99

S.Ct. at 2695. A “procedural due process claim challenges the procedures used in effecting a

deprivation.” Sierra Lake Reserve v. City of Rocklin, 938 F.2d 951, 957 (9 Cir. 1991). “The th

Constitution does not guarantee that only the guilty will be arrested.” Baker, 443 U.S. at 145, 99 S.Ct.

at 2695. 

Plaintiffs point to no precise allegations to support liberty deprivation without due process of law.

Again, plaintiffs’ allegations are grounded in the Fourth Amendment. 

Defendants contend that the complaint’s Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claims

fail in absence of “indication that any plaintiff suffered a deprivation of a recognized fundamental

interest (such as life, liberty, property, privacy, familial association, or pursuit of occupation)” or

“conscience shocking” conduct. Plaintiffs point to allegations of Deputy Carey’s excessive force as

deprivations of liberty “without due process of law” and which “shock the conscience.” 

“The concept of ‘substantive due process,’ semantically awkward as it may be, forbids the

government from depriving a person of life, liberty, or property in such a way that ‘shocks the

conscience’ or ‘interferes with rights implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’” Nunez v. City of Los

Angeles, 147 F.3d 867, 871 (9 Cir. 1998). The substantive component of the Due Process Clause is th

violated by executive action only when it “can properly be characterized as arbitrary, or conscience

shocking, in a constitutional sense.” Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 128, 112 S.Ct.

1061, 1070 (1992).

“The protections of substantive due process have for the most part been accorded to matters

relating to marriage, family, procreation, and the right to bodily integrity.” Albright, 510 U.S. at 272,

114 S.Ct. at 812. The Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause “provides heightened protection

against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests.” Washington v.

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Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721, 117 S.Ct. 2258 (1997). “There is no general liberty interest in being free

from capricious government action.” Nunez, 147 F.3d at 873. Substantive due process does not protect

individuals from all governmental actions that infringe liberty in violation of some law. Santiago de

Castro v. Medina, 943 F.2d 129, 130-131 (1 Cir. 1991). Courts must resist the temptation to augment st

the substantive reach of the Fourteenth Amendment, “particularly if it requires redefining the category

of rights deemed to be fundamental.” Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 109 S.Ct. 2333, 2341

(1989); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194-95, 106 S.Ct. 2841, 2846 (1986).

As noted by defendants, emotional health claims do not warrant substantive due process

protection. See Santiago de Castro, 943 F.2d at 131 (employment supervisor’s verbal harassment);

Pittsley v. Warish, 927 F.2d 3, 7 (1 Cir. 1991) (emotional injury from verbal harassment insufficient st

to constitute invasion of protected liberty interest); Emmons v. McLaughlin, 874 F.2d 351, 353 (6 Cir. th

1989) (policeman’s “I’m going to get you” threat “not an actual infringement of constitutional right”);

Collins v. Cundy, 603 F.2d 825, 827 (10 Cir. 1979) (verbal harassment including sheriff’s threat to th

“hang” prisoner states no constitutional deprivation).

This Court is not in a position to augment plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claims within the

Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive reach. Again, plaintiffs’ allegations support Fourth Amendment

claims, not Fourteenth Amendment claims. Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claims are dismissed.

Mr. Hillbloom’s NIED Claim

Defendants argue that Mr. Hillbloom’s (third) NIED cause of action fails in that Mr. Hillbloom

is “the alleged injury victim,” not a bystander. Plaintiffs acknowledge that Mr. Hillbloom was a “direct

victim” of Sgt. Broughton and Carreiro and Deputy Carey’s breaches of constitutional and statutory

duties and suffered injury as a direct and proximate cause of such breaches.

NIED is a form of the tort of negligence, to which the elements of duty, breach of duty, causation

and damages apply. Huggins v. Longs Drug Stores California, Inc., 6 Cal.4th 124, 129, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d

587 (1993). California law recognizes that “there is no independent tort of negligent infliction of

emotional distress” in that “[t]he tort is negligence, a cause of action in which a duty to the plaintiff is

an essential element.” Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 6 Cal.4th 965, 984, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 550

(1993). The existence of a duty is a question of law. Marlene F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Medical

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Clinic, Inc., 48 Cal.3d 583, 588, 257 Cal.Rptr. 98 (1989).

NIED includes “at least two variants ofthe theory” – “bystander” cases and “direct victim” cases.

Wooden v. Raveling, 61 Cal.App.4th 1035, 1037, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 891, 892 (1998). “The distinction

between the 'bystander' and the 'direct victim' cases is found in the source of the duty owed by the

defendant to the plaintiff.” Burgess v. Superior Court, 2 Cal.4th 1064, 1072, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 615 (1992).

“Bystander” claims are typically based on breach of a duty owed to the public in general (Christensen

v. Superior Court, 54 Cal.3d 868, 884, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 79 (1991)), whereas a right to recover for emotional

distress as a “direct victim” arises from the breach of a duty that is assumed by the defendant or imposed

on the defendant as a matter of law, or that arises out of the defendant's preexisting relationship with the

plaintiff (Burgess, 2 Cal.4th at 1073-1074, 9 Cal.Rptr. 615; Marlene F., 48 Cal.3d at 590, 257 Cal.Rptr.

98). “[B]ystander liability is premised upon defendant’s violation of a duty not to negligently cause

emotional distress to people who observe conduct which causes harm to another.” Burgess, 2 Cal.4th

at 1073, 9 Cal.Rptr. 615.

“‘Bystander’ cases are cases in which the plaintiff was not physically impacted or injured, but

instead witnessed someone else being injured due to defendant’s negligence.” Wooden, 61 Cal.App.4th

at 1037, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d at 892. “‘Direct victim’ cases are cases in which the plaintiff’s claim of

emotional distress is not based upon witnessing an injury to someone else, but rather is based upon the

violation of a duty owed directly to the plaintiff.” Wooden, 61 Cal.App.4th at 1038, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d at

893-894. In “direct victim” cases, “well-settled principles of negligence are invoked to determine

whether all elements of a cause of action, including duty, are present in a given case.” Burgess, 2

Cal.4th at 1073, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 615. “[U]nless the defendant has assumed a duty to plaintiff in which the

emotional condition of the plaintiff is an object, recovery is available only if the emotional distress arises

out of the defendant’s breach of some other legal duty and emotional distress is proximately caused by

that breach of duty.” Potter, 6 Cal.4th at 985, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 550.

Although the (third) NIED cause of action by itself appears to plead bystander claims of Mrs.

Hillbloom and Michael L., the cause of action incorporates all prior paragraphs, including alleged

breaches of duties directed to Mr. Hillbloom. Defendants’ direct victim arguments fail, and in particular,

defendants’ unsupported assertion that Sgt. Broughton and Deputy Carey’s mere response to the scene

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did not create a “special relationship” with Mr. Hillbloom. Sgt. Broughton and Deputy Carey offer

nothing pertinent to support an attempt to disavow duties to Mr. Hillbloom. The (third) NIED cause of

action passes F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) scrutiny.

IIED Claims Against Sgt. Broughton And Deputy Carey

Sgt. Broughton and Deputy Carey argue that Mrs. Hillblom and Michael L.’s (fourth) IIED cause

of action fails in the absence of allegations that Sgt. Broughton and Deputy Carey’s conduct was directed

toward Mrs. Hillbloom and Michael L. Plaintiffs respond that the alleged “egregious conduct directed

at plaintiff Terry Hillbloom, and which occurred in the immediate presence of plaintiffs Sandra

Hillbloom and Michael L.” is sufficient to plead IIED claims for Mr. Hillbloom and Michael L.

The elements of a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress are: (1)

defendant’s outrageous conduct; (2) defendant’s intention to cause, or reckless disregard of the

probability of causing, emotional distress; (3) plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress;

and (4) an actual and proximate causal link between the tortious (outrageous) conduct and the emotional

distress. Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 47 Cal.3d 278, 300, 253 Cal.Rptr. 97, 110

(1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1007, 109 S.Ct. 1644 (1989);Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist., 43

Cal.3d 148, 155, n. 7, 233 Cal.Rptr. 308 (1987). The “[c]onduct to be outrageous must be so extreme

as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” Davidson v. City of

Westminister, 32 Cal.3d 197, 209, 185 Cal.Rptr. 252 (1982) (quoting Cervantez v. J.C. Penney Co., 24

Cal.3d 579, 593, 156 Cal.Rptr.198 (1979)). Conduct is extreme and outrageous when it is of a nature

which is especially calculated to cause, and does cause, mental distress. Liability does not extend to

mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities. Fisher v. San Pedro

Peninsula Hosp., 214 Cal.App.3d 590, 617, 262 Cal.Rptr. 842, 857 (1989).

To support an IIED claim, the conduct must be more than “intentional and outrageous. It must

be conduct directed at the plaintiff, or occur in the presence of a plaintiff of whom the defendant is

aware.” Christensen v. Superior Court, 54 Cal.3d at 903, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 79 (1991). The California

Supreme Court has further explained: 

“The law limits claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress to egregious conduct

toward plaintiff proximately caused by defendant.” . . . The only exception to this rule

is that recognized when the defendant is aware, but acts with reckless disregard, of the

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plaintiff and the probability that his or her conduct will cause severe emotional distress

to that plaintiff. . . . Where reckless disregard of the plaintiff's interests is the theory of

recovery, the presence of the plaintiff at the time the outrageous conduct occurs is

recognized as the element establishing a higher degree of culpability which, in turn,

justifies recovery of greater damages by a broader group of plaintiffs than allowed on a

negligent infliction of emotional distress theory. . . .

Christensen, 54 Cal.3d at 905-906, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 79 (citations omitted.)

Mrs. Hillbloom and Michael L. rest their IIED claims on witnessing Deputy Carey’s alleged

invasion of their home, throwing Mr. Hillbloom against a wall, tearing away his insulin pump, and

marching Mr. Hillbloom to a patrol car where he was locked. Although the complaint does not allege

Deputy Carey’s conduct was directed at Mrs. Hillbloom and Michael L., the complaint alleges Deputy

Carey’s conduct occurred in Mrs. Hillbloom and Michael L.’s presence and that Deputy Carey was so

aware. Mrs. Hillbloom and Michael L. proceed on a reckless disregard of their interests theory to avoid

F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) dismissal of their IIED claims.

False Arrest And False Imprisonment Claims Against Sgt. Broughton And Deputy Carey

Sgt. Broughton and Deputy Carey contend that their probable cause to arrest Mr. Hillbloom

dooms Mr. Hillbloom’s (fifth) false arrest and false imprisonment cause of action against them and that

the complaint supports probable cause by alleging that Mr. Hillbloom impeded Deputy Carey’s

investigation because Mr. Hillbloom requested and demanded Deputy Carey to leave his residence.

Plaintiffs respond that the complaint alleges “that Mr. Hillbloom exercised his constitutional right not

to have [Deputy] Carey in his home without his consent, or a warrant, or exigent circumstances.”

Plaintiffs suggest that the issue of probable cause cannot be determined at the pleading stage. 

“The ‘reasonableness’ and hence constitutionality of a warrantless arrest is determined by the

existence of probable cause.” Barry v. Fowler, 902 F.2d 770, 772 (9 Cir. 1990). The “question of th

whether a reasonable officer could have believed probable cause (or reasonable suspicion) existed to

justify a search or an arrest is ‘an essentially legal question’ that should be determined by the district

court at the earliest possible point in the litigation.” Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 873 (9

th

Cir. 1993) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2815 (1985)). 

The “crucial inquiry” is whether there was “probable cause to make the arrest.” Barry, 902 at

772; see McKenzie v. Lamb, 738 F.2d 1005, 1007 (9 Cir. 1984). “Law enforcement officers may make th

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warrantless arrests where there are ‘reasonable grounds to believe’ that a crime has been committed and

the person arrested has committed the offense.” Tachiquin v. Stowell, 789 F.Supp. 1512, 1518 (E.D.

Cal. 1992) (quoting Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 80 S.Ct. 168 (1959)). “Probable cause for a

warrantless arrest arises when the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge are sufficient

to warrant a prudent person to believe ‘that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to

commit an offense.’” Barry, 902 F.2d at 773 (quoting Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37, 99 S.Ct.

2627, 2632 (1979)).

This Court disagrees with Sgt. Broughton and Deputy Carey’s probable cause analysis. The

complaint alleges sufficient facts to vitiate the reasonableness of Deputy Carey’s actions, including entry

into and traverse through the home and exercise of force on Mr. Hillbloom. Mr. Hillbloom’s purported

crime arose from Deputy Carey’s alleged illegal acts to negate reasonable grounds to believe Mr.

Hillbloom committed or had committed a crime. The complaint suggests that had Deputy Carey

remained outside the home, probable cause would not have become an issue. Mr. Hillbloom’s (fifth)

false arrest and false imprisonment cause of action is not subject to dismissal at the pleading stage.

Torts In Essence Claims

Defendants contend that plaintiffs’ (sixth) torts in essence cause of action “is not cognizable” to

warrant its dismissal. As an alternative to dismissal, defendants request that plaintiffs replead the torts

in essence cause of action with greater specificity. Plaintiffs respond that the torts in essence cause of

action is not subject to F.R.Civ.P. 12 disposition because “it is a mixed question of fact and law, and

depends on a factual showing . . . that the statutes in question were violated, that the plaintiffs suffered

injury and that their injury is ‘one of the consequences the [Legislature] sought to prevent through

imposing the alleged mandatory duty’ prescribed in the statutes in question.”

As a reminder, the (sixth) torts in essence cause of action alleges that the County, Deputy Carey

and Sgts. Broughton and Carreiro breached non-consensual duties arising out of mandatory California

Penal Code sections 118, 118.1, 125, 127, 137(c), 148.5, 149 and 182(2) and “assaulted, battered,

injured, falsely arrested and filed false crime reports” against Mr. Hillblom. To support their torts in

essence cause of action, plaintiffs cite Willis v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Fed. Appx. 283, 289 (9 Cir. th

2002), where the Ninth Circuit upheld a defense favorable summary judgment of a torts in essence claim

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in “that the statutes cited do not create private rights of action.” Plaintiffs also cite Duplessis v. City of

Los Angeles, 32 Fed.Appx. 835, 836 (9 Cir. 2002), where the Ninth Circuit upheld dismissal of a torts th

in essence claim because plaintiff did not demonstrate that a statutory violation “caused an injury of the

type the statute was intended to prevent.”

Plaintiffs do not defend meaningfully their torts in essence cause of action. Plaintiffs fail to

demonstrate how their cited California Penal Code sections create private rights of action and how

alleged violations of the statutes caused an injury of the type the statutes were intended to prevent.

Defendant correctly note that plaintiffs offer no authority that the cited California Penal Code sections

mandate a duty on defendants to support a tort claim. Plaintiffs provide no pertinent legal authority for

the torts in essence cause of action. This Court is not in a position to construct plaintiffs’ torts in essence

cause of action when they fail to do. In the absence of sufficient support, the torts in essence cause of

action is subject to dismissal. 

Negligent Employment, Training & Supervision Claims

Sheriff Pierce and Sgts. Broughton and Carreiro contend that the complaint fails to demonstrate

how they negligently failed to train, supervise and employ Deputy Carey to warrant dismissal of the

“vague and conclusory” (seventh) negligent employment, training and supervision cause of action.

Plaintiffs contend that the cause of action satisfies F.R.Civ.P. 8(a)’s requirement of “a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Plaintiffs note that the details of

the Department’s decision-making regarding Deputy Carey, especially given his violent history, is

subject to discovery, including production of Deputy Carey’s personnel file.

Plaintiffs are correct. Their negligent employment, training and supervision claims are fact

intensive and not subject to ready disposal at the pleading stage. The negligent employment, training

and supervision cause of action satisfies F.R.Civ.P. 8(a) to avoid dismissal. 

County’s Direct Tort Liability

The County contends that plaintiffs’ tort (third through seventh) causes of action fail to allege

a necessary statutory basis for the County’s direct tort liability. The County notes that plaintiffs’ tort

causes of action fail to identify a statutory basis to find the County “directly liable under tort principles.”

Plaintiffs acknowledge that their “claims against the County, per se, are restricted to the first [section

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1983] cause of action, alleging a Monell claim for policies resulting in failures properly to hire or

adequately to train Fresno County Sheriff’s deputies. Plaintiffs will amend to clarify remaining causes

of action.”

The California Tort Claims Act, Cal. Gov. Code, §§ 810, et. seq., does not provide that a public

entity is liable for its own conduct or omission to the same extent as a private person or entity. Zelig v.

County of Los Angeles, 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1128, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 709, 722 (2002). California Government

Code section 815(a) provides that a “public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises

out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person,” “[e]xcept as

otherwise provided by statute.” Certain statutes provide expressly for public entity liability in

circumstances that are somewhat parallel to the potential liability of private individuals and entities, but

the Tort Claims Act’s intent “is not to expand the rights of plaintiffs in suits against governmental

entities, but to confine potential governmental liability to rigidly delineated circumstances." Brown v.

Poway Unified School Dist., 4 Cal.4th 820, 829, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 679 (1993).

A court first determines whether a statute “imposes direct liability” on a defendant public entity.

Munoz v. City of Union City, 120 Cal.App.4th 1077, 1111, 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 521, 547 (2004). “[D]irect

tort liability of public entities must be based on a specific statute declaring them to be liable, or at least

creating some specific duty of care, and not on the general tort provisions of [California] Civil Code

section 1714.” Eastburn v. Regional Fire Protection Authority, 31 Cal.4th 1175, 1183, 80 P.3d 656

(2003). “[B]ecause under the Tort Claims Act all governmental tort liability is based on statute, the

general rule that statutory causes of action must be pleaded with particularity is applicable.” Lopez v.

So. Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 40 Cal.3d 780, 795, 221 Cal.Rptr. 840 (1985). Thus, “to state a cause of

action against a public entity, every fact material to the existence of its statutory liability must be pleaded

with particularity.” Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 60 Cal.App.3d 814, 819,131 Cal.Rptr.

854 (1960).

Plaintiffs appear to acknowledge that the County is not subject to direct liability for plaintiffs’

tort (third through seventh) causes of action. Plaintiffs point to no statute to declare the County liable

or to create a specific duty of care to subject the County to direct tort liability. As such, the tort (third

through seventh) causes of action improperly name the County as a defendant. 

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The fourth, fifth and seventh causes of action remain viable as to Sheriff Pierce, Sgts. Broughton and 5

Carreiro and Deputy Carey, as applicable, but not as to the County, which is dismissed from the causes of action. 

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CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons discussed above, this Court:

1. DISMISSES the (first) section 1983 cause of action against Sheriff Pierce, Sgts.

Broughton and Carreiro and Deputy Carey in their official capacities;

2. DISMISSES with leave to amend the (first) section 1983 cause of action against the

County;

3. DENIES defendants’ motion to dismiss Mrs. Hillbloom and Michael L.’s Fourth

Amendment right of privacy claims alleged in the (first) section 1983 cause of action;

4. DENIES defendants’ motion to dismiss Mr. Hillbloom’s claims against Sgts. Broughton

and Carreiro alleged in the (first) section 1983 cause of action;

5. ORDERS plaintiffs to omit from their amended complaint reference to a Fifth

Amendment claim;

6. DISMISSES with prejudice the Fourteenth Amendment claims alleged in the (first)

section 1983 cause of action;

7. DENIES defendants’ motion to dismiss Mr. Hillbloom’s (third) NIED cause of action;

8. DENIES defendants’ motion to dismiss Mrs. Hillbloom and Michael L.’s (fourth) IIED

cause of action;

9. DENIES defendants’ motion to dismiss Mr. Hillbloom’s (fifth) false arrest and false

imprisonment cause of action;

10. DISMISSES with prejudice the (sixth) torts in essence cause of action;

11. DENIES defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ (seventh) negligent employment,

training and supervision cause of action;5

12. DISMISSES with prejudice the tort (third through seventh) causes of action against the

County only; and

/ / /

/ / /

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13. ORDERS plaintiffs, no later than February 25, 2008, to file a first amended complaint

consistent with and in compliance with this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 4, 2008 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

66h44d UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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