Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-05609/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-05609-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TIM ADAMS,

Plaintiff,

v.

JEFFERSON UNION HIGH SCHOOL 

DISTRICT,

Defendant.

Case No. 19-cv-05609-PJH 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 

MOTION TO DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 6

Defendant Jefferson Union High School District’s (named in the complaint as 

“Board of Trustees of the Jefferson Union High School District”) motion to dismiss came 

on for hearing before this court on December 4, 2020. Plaintiff Tim Adams appeared 

through his counsel, Stanley Apps. Defendant appeared through its counsel, Alexi OffillKlein. Having read the papers filed by the parties and carefully considered their 

arguments and the relevant legal authority, and good cause appearing, the court hereby 

rules as follows.

Plaintiff Tim Adams is a tenured teacher at Terra Nova Nova High School and a 

former coach of the school’s varsity football team. This lawsuit arises out of his removal 

as the high school football coach. Plaintiff pleads three causes of action against 

defendant Board of Trustees of the Jefferson Union High School District: (1) Retaliation 

for protected speech in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) Deprivation of due process 

rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (3) Unpaid wages in violation of California 

Labor Code § 204.2. See First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), Dkt. 1-2.

/ / / 

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DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests for the legal sufficiency of the claims 

alleged in the complaint. Ileto v. Glock, 349 F.3d 1191, 1199–1200 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, which requires that a complaint include a “short 

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 8(a)(2), a complaint may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) if the plaintiff fails to state a 

cognizable legal theory, or has not alleged sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal 

theory. Somers v. Apple, Inc., 729 F.3d 953, 959 (9th Cir. 2013).

While the court is to accept as true all the factual allegations in the complaint, 

legally conclusory statements, not supported by actual factual allegations, need not be 

accepted. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009). The complaint must proffer 

sufficient facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 558–59 (2007). 

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows 

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 

alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court 

to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it 

has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 8(a)(2)). Where dismissal is warranted, it is generally without prejudice, unless it is 

clear the complaint cannot be saved by any amendment. Sparling v. Daou, 411 F.3d

1006, 1013 (9th Cir. 2005).

B. Analysis

Defendant moves to dismiss each cause of action.

1. First and Second Causes of Action, Asserted Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Plaintiff’s first and second causes of action allege violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

That statute provides that “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, 

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United States District Court

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subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person 

within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 

secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at 

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress[.]” 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 

(emphasis added). “[A] State is not a person within the meaning of § 1983,” although “a 

municipality” is. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 62, 64 (1989). More 

specifically, “local government units which are not considered part of the State for 

Eleventh Amendment purposes” are persons under § 1983, but “States or governmental 

entities that are considered ‘arms of the State’ for Eleventh Amendment purposes” are 

not. Id. at 70; accord Gilbreath v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 931 F.2d 1320, 1327 (9th Cir. 

1991). The same rule generally applies, with some exception, to suits against individuals 

in their official capacities, because “a suit against a state official in his or her official 

capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office.” 

Will, 491 U.S. at 71.

School districts in California are “arms of the State” for Eleventh Amendment 

purposes, and are therefore not “persons” within the meaning of § 1983. See, e.g., 

Belanger v. Madera Unified Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 248, 251 (9th Cir. 1992) (school district 

“is a state agency for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment . . . . because a judgment 

against the school district would be satisfied out of state funds. Moreover, under 

California law, the school district is a state agency that performs central governmental 

functions.”); Kirchmann v. Lake Elsinore Unified Sch. Dist., 83 Cal. App. 4th 1098, 1115

(2000) (“In view of the extensive control of the state over the fiscal affairs and political 

status of school districts, the Ninth Circuit in Belanger correctly determined a California 

school district should be considered an arm of the state for purposes of the Eleventh 

Amendment.”); C.W. v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 784 F.3d 1237, 1247 (9th Cir. 

2015) (“It is well-established that a school district cannot be sued for damages under 

§ 1983.”); Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560, 1577 (N.D. Cal. 1993)

(“California school districts are arms of the state for purposes of Eleventh Amendment 

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immunity and are therefore immune from liability under section 1983.”); Bratton v. Bd. of 

Educ. of Emery Unified Sch. Dist., Case No. 92-cv-4510-FMS, 1997 WL 797943, at *2 

(N.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 1997) (“California school districts are considered ‘arms of the State.’

The California Department of Education, the Emery Unified School District, and the 

School Board are therefore immune from suit under section 1983.”) (citation omitted).

In the face of this unambiguous precedent, plaintiff argues that he filed suit against 

individual members of the board of trustees, not the board itself. Accordingly, he argues 

that his claims under § 1983 should be construed as claims against the individual 

members of the Board of Trustees in their official capacities (to the extent the claims seek 

prospective, injunctive relief). He also argues that his claims against board members in 

their individual capacities are permissible under § 1983.

Plaintiff’s arguments suffer from the fatal flaw that his complaint names the “Board 

of Trustees of the Jefferson Union High School District” as the sole “Defendant.” See

FAC at p. 1. The operative complaint goes on to define the “Board,” referred to in the 

singular as “Defendant,” as “a local government entity organized and existing under the 

laws of the State of California.” Id. ¶ 3. Plaintiff alleges that the Board “is the responsible 

legal entity in regard to . . . claims against Terra Nova High School[.]” Id. No individual 

board member is named as a defendant or identified anywhere in the complaint. In fact, 

there is no plausible way to read any claim in the amended complaint as alleged against 

any individual at all, in any capacity. The complaint is clearly alleged exclusively against 

a body called the “Board of Trustees,” which plaintiff identifies as a discrete “legal entity.”

Accordingly, plaintiff’s first and second causes of action, asserted under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983, are DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. At the hearing, plaintiff indicated 

that he could amend his complaint to name two individuals as defendants in their 

individual capacities, or in their official capacities to the extent the claims seek 

prospective injunctive relief. Plaintiff may make such amendments on or before 

December 20, 2019.

/ / / 

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2. Third Cause of Action, Asserted Under California Labor Code § 204.2

Plaintiff’s third cause of action seeks unpaid wages pursuant to California Labor 

Code § 204.2. See FAC at p. 17. That statute provides:

Salaries of executive, administrative, and professional 

employees of employers covered by the Fair Labor Standards 

Act, as set forth pursuant to Section 13(a)(1) of the Fair Labor 

Standards Act of 1938, as amended through March 1, 1969, 

(Title 29, Section 213(a)(1), United States Code) in Part 541 of 

Title 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations, as that part now 

reads, earned for labor performed in excess of 40 hours in 

a calendar week are due and payable on or before the 26th 

day of the calendar month immediately following the month in 

which such labor was performed. However, when such 

employees are covered by a collective bargaining 

agreement that provides different pay arrangements, those 

arrangements will apply to the covered employees.

Cal. Lab. Code § 204.2 (emphasis added).

Plaintiff fails to state a cause of action under that statute for three reasons. First, 

the statute only concerns pay “earned for labor performed in excess of 40 hours in a 

calendar week[.]” Id. Yet, plaintiff has not alleged that he worked over 40 hours in any 

given week. Cf. FAC ¶¶ 11, 102, 109 (allegations regarding time worked, with no 

indication of how many hours were worked in any given week). Therefore, his complaint 

fails to plead a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Second, the statute specifies that it does not apply to “employees [who] are 

covered by a collective bargaining agreement that provides different pay arrangements[.]”

Cal. Lab. Code § 204.2. Here, the parties agree that plaintiff’s employment is governed 

by a collective bargaining agreement. See Contract Between Jefferson Union High 

School District and the American Federation of Teachers Local 1481, AFL-CIO, Dkt. 7-1 

(the “CBA”). Section 204.2 requires payment for certain work “on or before the 26th day 

of the calendar month immediately following the month in which such labor was 

performed,” but the CBA governing plaintiff’s employment explicitly provides “different 

pay arrangements.” Cal. Lab. Code § 204.2. For example, the CBA provides:

Teachers shall receive their monthly paycheck on the last 

working day of the month unless superseded by the County 

Office of Education pay date schedule, but no later than the last 

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calendar day of the month. The district shall publish a calendar 

of pay dates on the district website at the beginning of the fiscal 

year.

. . . . 

A teacher may elect to receive his/her salary in either ten (10) 

or twelve (12) monthly payments. Teachers who elect twelve 

(12) monthly payments understand that under current law all 

payroll deductions must be made over ten (10) months. 

Whichever option teachers are now under will remain in effect 

unless otherwise requested in writing by August 15.

CBA at pp. 61 & 63.

Accordingly, Section 204.2 does not apply to plaintiff, and he cannot assert a claim 

under it given the facts he has pled. The statute’s inapplicability cannot be cured by 

amendment of the complaint.

Third, plaintiff’s § 204.2 claim is preempted by Section 301 of the Labor 

Management Relations Act (“LMRA”). In order to assess LMRA preemption, the court 

first inquires “into whether the asserted cause of action involves a right conferred upon an 

employee by virtue of state law, not by a CBA.” Burnside v. Kiewit Pac. Corp., 491 F.3d 

1053, 1059 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 212 

(1985)). Second, if “the right exists independently of the CBA, we must still consider 

whether it is nevertheless ‘substantially dependent on analysis of a collective-bargaining 

agreement.’ If such dependence exists, then the claim is preempted by section 301; if 

not, then the claim can proceed under state law.” Id. at 1059–60 (citations omitted).

At the first step, plaintiff appears to concede that his § 204.2 claim seeks to 

enforce a right conferred upon him by the CBA. He argues:

In this instance, Adams’ claim is based on the substantive 

requirement of the applicable Collective Bargaining Agreement 

at Article XIX: Salary subsection D(1), stating that payment for 

work performed during the Zero Period before the school day 

commences must be paid at a pro rata hourly pay rate of 1/6 of 

FTE (full time equivalent) pay. [Cite to CBA at p. 61]. This 

straightforward pay rate [in the CBA] requires no interpretation; 

it merely establishes a substantive right to receive one-sixth of 

Plaintiff’s daily pay, in addition to his regular salary, for each 

Zero Period in which Plaintiff taught the weight training class. 

Adams seeks to enforce his substantive right to pay for the Zero 

Period weight training class through Labor Code § 204.2, 

because the additional pay he was entitled to for teaching 

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during the Zero Period was never paid to him[.]

Opp. at 9 (citation omitted). 

Even if plaintiff’s § 204.2 cause of action only involved a right conferred upon him 

by virtue of state law—and not by a CBA—his claim would be preempted under the 

second step of the Burnside analysis because it requires analysis of the CBA.

Section 204.2 applies only to pay “earned for labor performed in excess of 40 

hours in a calendar week,” so plaintiff’s claim would require the court to calculate what, if 

any, pay plaintiff is due specifically for the time he worked beyond 40 hours in each week. 

Cal. Lab. Code § 204.2.

The CBA’s terms govern plaintiff’s pay rate, regardless of how many hours he 

worked in a week. Under a section entitled “Hourly Pay Rate,” the CBA provides that 

“0 periods shall be pro rata (1/6 FTE).” CBA at 61. So, in order to calculate the pay 

owed to plaintiff for any week he worked more than 40 hours that included “0 periods,”

the court would have to determine how many “0 periods” plaintiff worked in such a week, 

and multiply that number by 1/6 of his “FTE” wage rate. But the CBA provides no 

indication as to what a “0 period” is. The court can identify no way to determine, based 

on a mere look to the language of the CBA, whether the weight training classes plaintiff 

allegedly taught qualify as “0 periods.” Such a determination would require the court to 

construe the term “0 period” as used in the agreement. For that reason, determining the 

amount of pay owed for time worked beyond 40 hours in a week would require analysis 

of the CBA, and cannot be accomplished merely by looking to it.

1

 As such, plaintiff’s 

§ 204.2 claim is preempted by the LMRA at the second Burnside step, and plaintiff would 

not be able to alter that result by amending his complaint.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s first and second causes of action are 

 

1 This analysis assumes that the court could identify or calculate plaintiff’s FTE rate by 

merely looking to the appendices to the CBA, although plaintiff has not offered any 

guidance on the feasibility of even that more basic endeavor.

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DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. His third cause of action is DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE, as amendment would be futile. Plaintiff may file an amended complaint, 

consistent with this order, on or before December 20, 2019.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 12, 2019

/s/ Phyllis J. Hamilton

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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