Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01123/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01123-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 29:1001 E.R.I.S.A.: Employee Retirement

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CINDY L. CURLIS,

Plaintiff(s),

CASE NO. 15cv1123-LAB (JLB)

ORDER PERMITTING

SUPPLEMENTATION OF 

RESPONSE RE: VENUE

vs.

LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF

NORTH AMERICA, et al.,

Defendant(s).

Plaintiff Cindy Curlis filed a complaint naming both the Life Insurance Company of

North America (CIGNA) and her employer, Cricket Communications, LLC, as Defendants.

The complaint, however, made only a few factual allegations regarding Cricket, none of

which attempted to show Cricket's liability. Nor did the complaint seek any relief from Cricket

individually.1

 Rather, all allegations and claims were made against CIGNA. The only

allegation concerning Cricket was that the plan under which Curlis was denied benefits was

"sponsored and administered" by Cricket. (Compl., ¶ 9.) The complaint went on, however,

to allege that CIGNA was the administrator, and supported this allegation with lengthy,

specific, and substantial allegations showing that CIGNA, rather than Cricket, made the

decision to deny benefits. The complaint also named Cricket Communications, Inc. Long1

 The complaint seeks relief against all Defendants collectively, but the allegations

suggest any benefits to be paid would be paid at CIGNA’s direction, out of Plan funds, and

any costs or fees would be paid by CIGNA and not Cricket.

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Term Disability Plan as a Defendant, but made no allegations concerning where it was

located or could be found. 

This presented a venue question, because neither Curlis nor CIGNA are located in

this District. Nor did it appear the Plan was administered here, nor that the decision to deny

benefits was made here, nor that benefits would or should have been paid here. Although

the complaint alleges that Cricket has its principal place of business in this District, no

allegations showed that CIGNA is subject to personal jurisdiction here, nor that any

Defendant did anything in this District giving rise to Curlis' claims.

The Court therefore ordered Curlis to file a response explaining why venue is proper

here, cautioning her that if she failed to show cause within the time permitted, the case would

be dismissed. The order also permitted her to identify another district where she thought this

case should be transferred, if venue were found to be improper here. 

Curlis filed her response, but it fails to address venue problems adequately. In

particular, the response does not explain why Cricket, though named in the caption as a

Defendant, is in fact a proper Defendant. See, e.g., Smith v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 2014 WL

1330936, slip op. at *2–3 (N.D.Al., Mar. 31, 2014) (where defendant merely named disability

plan as a defendant without identifying any wrongdoing on its party, the plan was not a

proper defendant). The Court’s order pointed out this problem, but the response did not

address it. But even worse — the response attaches a document showing that Cricket’s

principal place of business is not, in fact, in this District, but rather is in Atlanta, Georgia. (See

Response, Ex. 1.)

With regard to CIGNA, the response cites old case law whose holdings have more

recently been explained further. It quotes Varsic v. U.S. District Ct. for Central Dist. of Cal.,

607 F.2d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1979), as follows:

In view of the legislative history of the ERISA venue provision, as well as

Congress' very choice of the word, we conclude that Congress intended that

"found," as used in section 1132(e)(2), has the same broad application as it

does in cases involving the antitrust and copyright venue provisions.

Therefore, if personal jurisdiction is properly asserted over the [defendant], it

is "found" there.

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The response argues that because both CIGNA and Cricket "may be found" in California,

venue is proper here. Leaving aside the question about Cricket’s status as a proper

Defendant, the response does not show that personal jurisdiction over either CIGNA or

Cricket is proper in this District, and thus fails to show that either Defendant may be "found

in" this District for venue purposes.

The Supreme Court in 2011 and again in 2014 explained when exercise of personal

jurisdiction (specifically, over a company) is proper. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, ___ U.S.,

134 S.Ct. 746, 751 (2014) (citing Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564

U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011)) (explaining that general personal jurisdiction over a

defendant is proper where the party’s affiliations with the venue "are so constant and

pervasive ‘as to render [it] essentially at home" there).2

 With regard to CIGNA, Curlis merely

alleges it has numerous contacts with California; the response does not identify its contacts

with this District. But more importantly, Daimler makes clear that a company is not "at home"

in a forum simply because it is a large company with sales and operations there. In Daimler,

a subsidiary, Mercedes-Benz, USA, LLC (MBUSA), was incorporated and had its principal

place of business outside California but imported Mercedes vehicles to dealers in California,

where 10% of all sales of new vehicles in the US took place. Daimler, 134 S.Ct. at 752. It had

multiple facilities in California, including a regional office, a vehicle prepration center, and a

"Classic Center." The Supreme Court held that, even attributing MBUSA's California contacts

to Daimler, Daimler was still not "at home" in California. Id. at 761–62. The Court noted with

disapproval that such an "exorbitant exercise[ ] of all-purpose jurisdiction" would cause a

defendant to be at home in every state in which its sales were sizable. Neither the complaint

nor the response pleads facts to show that CIGNA is "at home" or "may be found" in this

District.

/ / /

2

 The complaint does not allege that either Cricket or CIGNA did anything in this

District that gave rise to Curlis’ claims, so specific personal jurisdiction is not viable as an

alternative theory. See Goodyear, 131 S.Ct. at 2851 (discussing standard for exercise of

specific jurisdiction).

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The response also shows that the complaint’s allegation regarding Cricket's principal

place of business being in this District is inaccurate. The response attaches an exhibit

showing its headquarters are in Atlanta, Georgia. (Response, Ex. 1.) While it mentions that

Cricket "maintains more than 80 retail stores in San Diego County" and supports this

allegation with a map (Response at 3:8–10 and Ex. 2), neither the complaint nor response

identify the relationship between Cricket and the stores it "maintains." For example, it does

not say whether the stores are owned independently or by Cricket. See Daimler, 134 S.Ct.

at 751 (noting MBUSA delivered Daimler-manufactured vehicles to independent dealerships

in California). Even if the response had explained why Cricket was a proper Defendant in this

case, it did not explain why Cricket’s contacts with this District rendered it "at home" here,

in light of Daimler and Goodyear.

Curlis declined to identify any district to which this case might be transferred, or to

explain why venue was proper there.

Because Curlis filed her response so quickly, well before the deadline the Court set, 

it may be that she misunderstood the Court’s concerns about venue. If Curlis wishes to

supplement her response by June 15, 2015, she may do so. Otherwise, she should assume

the Court will find venue improper in this District. Because she did not show why transfer was

preferable to outright dismissal, or to which other district(s) this case could properly be

transferred, this case would be dismissed, rather than transferred. Any supplement she files

must not exceed seven pages, excluding any appended or lodged materials.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 9, 2015

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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