Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_13-cv-00734/USCOURTS-cand-5_13-cv-00734-12/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans w/ Disabilities Act (ADA)

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Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

ROBERT KALANI,

Plaintiff,

v.

STARBUCKS CORPORATION,

Defendant.

Case No.13-CV-00734-LHK 

FINDINGS OF FACT AND

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

This case centers on a dispute between Robert Kalani (“Plaintiff”) and Starbucks 

Corporation (“Defendant”) regarding the use of Defendant’s interior wheelchair accessible tables 

at Starbucks Coffee store number 6931 (“Store”). Plaintiff claims that Defendant’s orientation of 

the Store’s interior accessible tables violates 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (“Title III”) of the Americans with 

Disabilities Act (“ADA”) by requiring individuals in wheelchairs to be seated facing the wall with 

their backs to the inside of the Store. Particularly, Plaintiff claims the orientation of the interior 

accessible tables violates 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii), (iii) and 12182(b)(1)(B). Joint Pretrial 

Statement, (“JPS”), ECF No. 90 at 6. Plaintiff seeks attorney’s fees, costs, litigation expenses, and 

an injunction requiring Defendant to locate at least one interior accessible table such that an 

individual in a wheelchair can be seated facing the inside of the Store rather than the wall. JPS at 

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3. Defendant’s position is that the interior accessible tables do not violate any regulations set out 

by the Americans with Disabilities Act Accessibility Guidelines (“ADAAG”) and thus do not 

violate the ADA as a matter of law. JPS at 7; see also ECF No. 94, at 1–2 (“Defendant’s Trial 

Brief”).

The Court held a bench trial in this matter on June 25, 2015. Plaintiff served as his own 

witness at trial. Defendant’s witness at trial was expert Kim R. Blackseth. Based on the trial and 

the full record in this matter, the Court issues the following findings of fact and conclusions of

law. 

I. FINDINGS OF FACT

The parties stipulated to the following undisputed facts: 

1. Plaintiff, a resident of Ione, California, ECF No. 75-2 ¶ 15, (“Kalani Decl.”), is mobility 

impaired and uses a wheelchair, ECF. No. 75-6 at 2, (“Stipulation”).

2. On January 31, 2013, Plaintiff visited the Starbucks Coffee Store #6931, located at 1228 

Camden Avenue in Campbell, California (“Store”). Stipulation at 2.

3. Defendant operates the Store, located in Campbell, California. Stipulation at 2.

4. The Store is a public accommodation. Id.

5. “[Defendant] offers a variety of seating options to able-bodied patrons inside the 

Store.” JPS at 3. 

6. “Seating is one of the goods and services offered by [Defendant] to its patrons.” Id.

7. “There are two accessible tables in the interior of the Store located adjacent to each 

other. These two tables comply with all access requirements in terms of dimensions 

and approach for patrons who use a wheelchair. One table is identified with an 

“ISA” symbol. The other table is a bench style table that is not marked by an 

“ISA.” Id.

8. “Both interior accessible tables at the Store require an individual in a wheelchair to 

sit with his [or her] back to the Store’s interior and face a wall.” Id.

9. “Patrons who do not use wheelchairs are afforded seating which allows them to 

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look out at the ongoings of the Store, the Store’s décor, and provide a full view of 

other patrons and employees within the Store.” Id. at 4.

10. “[Defendant] encourages the consumption of food and drinks inside the Store by 

providing an inviting environment including Wi-Fi, music, and a nice décor. The 

Starbucks environment is part of the goods and services [Defendant] offers.” Id. 

11. “[Defendant] strives to provide a vibrant and inviting space for its customers.” Id.

12. “[Defendant] encourages a sense of community for patrons at its Store.” Id.

13. “[Defendant] offers a welcoming environment for individuals who wish to be part 

of a community, even when visiting the Store alone.” Id.

14. “[Defendant] brands itself as a place for people to come together and that it is a 

‘neighborhood gathering place.’” Id.

15. “[Defendant] markets that it offers not just coffee, but a ‘full and rewarding 

coffeehouse experience’ as part of its goods and services.” Id.

In addition to these stipulated, undisputed facts, the parties also stipulated to the 

admissibility and authenticity of four photographs. See id. The Court admitted the following 

exhibits into evidence at trial. 

16. Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1 “is a true and correct depiction of the two accessible tables at 

the Store (although only a portion of the second accessible “bench style” table is 

shown).” 

17. Plaintiff’s Exhibit 2 is “a true and correct depiction of the Store which was taken by 

Plaintiff’s expert and shows that on the day the photograph was taken, all patrons 

shown chose to sit with their backs to the wall, rather than facing the wall, which is 

a typical seating choice when individuals visit the Store alone.” Id.

18. Defendant’s Exhibit A is “a true and correct depiction of one of the two accessible 

tables at the Store. This table is identified by the International Symbol of 

Accessibility (‘ISA’) (indicia depicting an individual in a wheelchair)” Id.

19. Defendant’s Exhibit B is “a true and correct depiction of the other accessible table 

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that offers bench style seating.” Id.

Moreover, the Court also makes the following findings of fact based on the 

testimony presented at trial. 

20. Plaintiff has returned to the Store on at least four occasions since his first visit on January 

31, 2013. See Trial Transcript in Kalani v. Starbucks Corporation, No. 13-CV-00734-LHK 

at 26:3–5, 33:21–22, (“Trial Tr.”).

21. Plaintiff was accompanied by his wife on each of his visits to the Store. Id. at 26:11–12.

22. Plaintiff enjoys people watching and conversing with strangers. Id. at 16:8–17:10; 19:4–

17.

23. Plaintiff wishes to “commune and interact with other people” when Plaintiff visits the 

Store with his wife. Id. at 32:1–6.

II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

In their joint pretrial statement and at trial, the parties agreed that the only legal dispute

was whether Title III of the ADA requires Defendant to locate at least one interior accessible table 

such that an individual in a wheelchair is not required to sit facing the wall with his or her back to 

the interior of the Store. JPS at 6–7. The Court begins with a discussion of the underlying purposes 

of Title III before turning to Plaintiff’s standing to bring a Title III claim. The Court will then 

address whether (1) Plaintiff must show an ADAAG violation; and (2) Defendant violated Title 

III’s Sections 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii), (iii) or 12182(b)(1)(B). Finally, the Court will turn to Plaintiff’s 

request for injunctive relief.

A. Americans with Disabilities Act

1. Title III

The ADA was enacted in response to a “compelling need” for a “clear and comprehensive 

national mandate” to eliminate discrimination against disabled individuals. PGA Tour, Inc. v. 

Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 675 (2001). “To effectuate its sweeping purpose, the ADA forbids 

discrimination against disabled individuals in major areas of public life, among them employment 

(Title I of the Act), public services (Title II), and public accommodations (Title III).” Id. (internal 

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citations omitted). Title III establishes a “[g]eneral rule” that:

No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of 

disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, 

facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of 

public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases 

to), or operates a place of public accommodation.

42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). Specifically, Title III prohibits places of public accommodation from 

providing disabled individuals with “goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or 

accommodations” that are not equal to, or are different or separate from those provided to other 

individuals. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii), (iii). Title III also requires “[g]oods, services, 

facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations” be provided to individuals with a 

disability “in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of the individual.” Id.

§ 12182(b)(1)(B). As the Ninth Circuit explained in Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 

F.3d 939, 945 (9th Cir. 2011), 

The concept of “discrimination” under the ADA does not extend 

only to obviously exclusionary conduct—such as a sign stating that 

persons with disabilities are unwelcome or an obstacle course 

leading to a store’s entrance. Rather, the ADA proscribes more 

subtle forms of discrimination—such as difficult-to-navigate 

restrooms and hard-to-open doors—that interfere with disabled 

individuals’ “full and equal enjoyment” of places of public 

accommodation.

Indeed, the plain meaning of Title III’s language is “that whatever goods or services the place 

provides, it cannot discriminate on the basis of disability in providing enjoyment of those goods 

and services.” Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Congress tasked the Attorney General with the responsibility of promulgating Title III’s 

implementing regulations. See 42 U.S.C. § 12186(b) (directing the Attorney General to “issue 

regulations . . . to carry out the provisions of” Title III). The resulting ADAAG, often referred to 

as the guidelines, specify the “technical structural requirements” of public accommodations and 

are applicable “during the design, construction, and alteration of such buildings and facilities . . . 

under the [ADA].” Fortyune v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 364 F.3d 1075, 1080–81 (9th Cir. 2004).

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2. Standing

Although the ADA’s purpose is “sweeping,” and its mandate “comprehensive,” the 

statute’s reach is “not unlimited.” Chapman, 631 F.3d at 946 (citation omitted). A plaintiff 

claiming discrimination under Title III must “satisfy the case or controversy requirement of 

Article III by demonstrating his [or her] standing to sue at each stage of the litigation.” Id. Because 

injunctive relief is the only available remedy under Title III, a plaintiff claiming discrimination 

under Title III “must not only demonstrate the familiar requirements for standing—injury-in-fact, 

traceability, redressability—but also ‘a sufficient likelihood that he [or she] will be wronged again 

in a similar way.’” Ervine v. Desert View Reg’l Med. Ctr. Holdings, LLC, 753 F.3d 862, 867 (9th 

Cir. 2014) (quoting Fortyune, 364 F.3d at 1081). In other words, a plaintiff must face a “real and 

immediate threat of repeated injury.” Id. Courts are to take a “broad view of constitutional 

standing in civil rights cases, especially where, as under the ADA, private enforcement suits ‘are 

the primary method of obtaining compliance with the Act.’” Doran v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 524 F.3d 

1034, 1039–40 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 

(1972)).

Here, while Defendant did not explicitly raise a standing challenge at trial, Defendant did 

contest Plaintiff’s standing to seek injunctive relief at the summary judgment stage. The Court 

previously determined that Plaintiff satisfied the requirements for standing in its order on the 

parties’ cross motions for summary judgment. See ECF No. 82 at 21, (“MSJ Order”). First, 

Defendant did not dispute that Plaintiff has satisfied the Article III standing requirements of 

injury-in-fact, traceability, and redressability. See ECF No. 78 at 3; MSJ Order at 19. Second, the 

Court concluded that Plaintiff had put forth evidence showing that Plaintiff is likely to suffer 

future injury. See MSJ Order at 20–21. Specifically, Plaintiff has provided evidence that he 

intends to return to the Store, Kalani Decl. ¶ 17, and frequently visits the area where the Store is 

located in order to meet with his attorney, visit family, and attend a yearly “Abilities Expo,” id. ¶ 

15. See MSJ Order at 20–21 (citing Doran, 524, F.3d at 1037–38; D’Lil v. Best W. Encina Lodge 

& Suites, 538 F.3d 1031, 1037 (9th Cir. 2008)). At trial, Plaintiff provided further testimony 

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indicating that he enjoys visiting Defendant’s stores and discussed his prior visits to the particular 

Store at issue. See also Trial Tr. at 32:3–6; 33:1–3, 21–24 (Plaintiff’s testimony regarding his prior 

“four or five” visits to the Store and his fondness of Defendant’s products and stores). The Court 

finds that Plaintiff has put forth evidence showing injury-in-fact, causation, redressability, and a 

likelihood of future injury. Plaintiff thus has standing to bring a claim under Title III and to seek 

injunctive relief. 

B. Plaintiff’s Title III claims

To establish a discrimination claim under Title III, Plaintiff must show that (1) he is 

disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) Defendant is a private entity that owns, leases, or 

operates a place of public accommodation; and (3) the Plaintiff was denied full and equal 

treatment by Defendant because of his disability. Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 730 

(9th Cir. 2007). There is no dispute in the instant case that Plaintiff is disabled within the meaning 

of the ADA or that Defendant is a private entity that operates a place of public accommodation. 

The Court must therefore determine whether Plaintiff was denied full and equal treatment by 

Defendant because of his disability.

1. ADAAG and ADA Claims

Defendant’s primary argument at trial was that Plaintiff must show an ADAAG violation 

in order to maintain a claim of discrimination under Title III. See JPS at 7; Trial Tr. at 56:2–5 

(direct examination of Defendant’s expert witness: Q. Is there any federal access requirement that 

covers the placement of a disabled seat that you’re aware of? A. Only that it would be an 

integrated setting. Other than that, I don’t recall there’s any requirement.”); Defendant’s Trial 

Brief at 1–2 (requesting the Court sua sponte dismiss action as there was no applicable ADAAG 

regulation). In addition to eliciting expert testimony on the issue of whether any accessibility 

guidelines governed the location or orientation of accessible tables, Defendant also argued that 

“the most important stipulation” was that the “table that’s offered at this location do[es] comply 

with access regulations . . . . that’s where the Court’s inquiry ends . . . .” Trial Tr. at 66:11–15.

Indeed, Defendant moved for a nonsuit during trial based on the absence of an applicable ADAAG 

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guideline. Trial Tr. at 34:22–35:9 (“[T]he defense would like to move for a non-suit pursuant to 

Rule 52, subsection (c).”)

The parties do not dispute that the interior accessible tables do not violate any accessibility

standards set out by the ADAAG. See Trial Tr. at 9:22–10:1. Instead, the operative issue is 

whether Plaintiff’s inability to identify a particular regulation governing the orientation of the 

interior accessible table precludes Plaintiff from asserting a discrimination claim under Title III of 

the ADA. For the reasons discussed below, the Court concludes that Defendant’s position is 

incorrect as a matter of law, and that Plaintiff may state a discrimination claim under Title III 

under the circumstances presented in the instant case.

Here, the Court finds that the Ninth Circuit has previously rejected Defendant’s position. 

More specifically, the Ninth Circuit rejected the argument that “ADA plaintiffs must prove the 

defendant contravened a ‘specific requirement of the ADAAG,” to establish a violation of the 

ADA.” Fortyune, 364 F.3d at 1085. Instead, the Ninth Circuit identified two groups of Title III 

claims: those “involving the design of public accommodation” and those “concern[ing] a public 

accommodation’s policy regarding the use of that design.” Id. at 1085. Claims regarding the 

design of public accommodation, e.g., claims involving design elements controlled by the 

ADAAG, require a showing of an ADAAG violation. See id. at 1084–85 (finding that it is 

“necessary” to look to the ADAAG guidelines for claims involving the design of public 

accommodation); see also Kohler v. In-N-Out Burgers, No. CV 12-5054-GHK JEMX, 2013 WL 

5315443, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2013) (“A facility that adheres to the [ADAAG] Standards . . .

will not be subject to liability under the ADA for any architectural elements covered by the 

Standards.”). In contrast, for claims regarding a public accommodation’s policies or practices with 

respect to the “use” or “operation” of a design element, such as seating, “the task of defining a 

plaintiff’s burden under the ADA is handled by 42 U.S.C. § 12182.” Fortyune, 364 F.3d at 1085.

This distinction between claims governed by the ADAAG and those governed by § 12182 

accords with the wider purposes of the ADA as well as the ADAAG. In order to give the ADAAG 

meaning and provide an incentive for public accommodations to abide by its standards, there is a 

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need for a safe-harbor from ADA claims implicating regulated design elements. See, e.g., Kohler, 

2013 WL 5315443, at *3 (“Full compliance with the ADA Standards, on the other hand, ‘act[s] as 

a safe harbor’ . . . for any architectural elements covered by the Standards.” (quoting Indep. Living 

Res. v. Or. Arena Corp., 982 F. Supp. 698, 727 (D. Or. 1997)). This does not, however, address 

those situations where an ADA plaintiff may encounter discrimination with respect to aspects of 

public accommodations that are not specifically governed by an ADAAG regulation. 

Contrary to Defendant’s position, mere compliance with applicable ADAAG regulations 

does not preclude the possibility that a place of public accommodation may deny an individual the 

“full and equal enjoyment” of the goods or services the public accommodation provides. For 

instance, in Fortyune, the Ninth Circuit rejected the defendant movie theatre’s argument that a 

violation of a specific ADAAG regulation is a prerequisite to an ADA claim. 364 F.3d at 1085. In 

Fortyune, the plaintiff, confined to a wheelchair, was unable to watch a film next to his spouse 

because the “companion” seat located next to a wheelchair space was occupied by a “noncompanion.” Id. at 1079. The Fortyune plaintiff did not dispute that the defendant complied with 

the ADAAG requirement that a “companion” seat exist. See ADAAG Rule 221.3 (“Companion 

Seats. At least one companion seat complying with 802.3 shall be provided for each wheelchair 

space required by 221.2.1.”). Instead, the plaintiff challenged the defendant’s policy of not 

relocating moviegoers when screenings were sold out, as that policy prevented the plaintiff from 

being seated next to his spouse. Id. The Ninth Circuit explicitly rejected the defendant’s argument 

that the plaintiff needed to “establish that the Theater fails to comply with the specific 

requirements of the ADAAG.” Id.

Moreover, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the plaintiff’s claim was not aimed at a

regulated aspect of a design or architectural element, e.g., the existence or number of “companion” 

seats, but rather at the defendant’s use of or policy regarding the seats. Id. at 1085. The Ninth 

Circuit further held that “in cases . . . which concern a public accommodation’s policy regarding 

the use of that design . . . the provisions of the ADAAG are not controlling.” Id. Accordingly, the 

court held that “the defendant discriminated against the plaintiff based upon the plaintiff’s 

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disability by (a) failing to make a requested reasonable modification that was (b) necessary to 

accommodate the plaintiff’s disability.” Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182(a), (b)(2)(A)(ii)); see also 

Celano v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., No. C 05-4004 PJH, 2008 WL 239306, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 

2008) (citing Fortyune and finding that “plaintiffs’ ADA claim may go forward as a general ADA 

anti-discrimination claim in the absence of specific ADAAG standards or other DOJ 

implementing regulations.”).

Similarly, in Baughman v. Walt Disney World Company, 685 F.3d 1131, 1135 (9th Cir. 

2012), the Ninth Circuit looked beyond the ADAAG’s requirements,1concluding that “[p]ublic 

accommodations must start by considering how their facilities are used by non-disabled guests and 

then take reasonable steps to provide disabled guests with a like experience.” In Baughman, the 

plaintiff challenged Disneyland’s policy of banning two-wheeled vehicles such as the Segway that 

the plaintiff claimed she needed to move about the park. As the plaintiff’s claim related to the 

Park’s policy rather than a design or architectural element, the Baughman court, like the court in 

Fortyune, considered whether the defendant discriminated against the plaintiff under 

§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) by failing to make a requested reasonable modification that was necessary to 

accommodate the plaintiff’s disability. 364 F.3d at 1134–37. In doing so, the Ninth Circuit held 

that “[t]he ADA guarantees the disabled more than mere access to public facilities; it guarantees 

them ‘full and equal enjoyment.’” Id. at 1135 (citing Oregon Paralyzed Veterans of America v. 

Regal Cinemas, Inc., 339 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003)). 

In the instant case, like the cases discussed above, Plaintiff does not challenge Defendant’s 

compliance with ADAAG governed elements of a building’s design, but instead challenges

Defendant’s prevention of the plaintiff’s “full and equal enjoyment,” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a), of the 

 

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The Ninth Circuit did note that “[o]ur conclusion is supported by regulations recently 

promulgated by the” DOJ. 685 F.3d at 1136. Those regulations governing mobility devices 

requires public accommodations to make “reasonable modifications in its policies, practices, or 

procedures to permit the use of other power-driven mobility devices” unless there are “legitimate 

safety requirements.” 28 C.F.R. § 36.311. The Court notes that this additional support was not 

necessary to the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that the plaintiff could state a claim under 

§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) in Baughman. 

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goods and services that Defendant offers. See Fortyune, 364 F.3d at 1085; Baughman, 685 F.3d at 

1135. Although Plaintiff’s claim involves a regulated design element in so far as the ADAAG 

prescribes certain height and width requirements for accessible tables, Plaintiff’s claim is not 

about the design of the accessible tables, but rather Defendant’s operational use of those tables. 

Like the plaintiffs in Baughman and Fortyune, Plaintiff claims that Defendants’ use, policy, and 

practice with respect to its interior accessible tables prevent Plaintiff from having “full and equal 

enjoyment,” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a), of Defendant’s goods and services by depriving Plaintiff of an 

“experience comparable to that of able-bodied patrons,” Baughman, 685 F.3d at 1135; see Trial 

Tr. at 78:24–79:4. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff does not need to show a violation of the 

ADAAG to state a claim under the ADA. See Fortyune, 364 F.3d at 1085; Baughman, 685 F.3d at 

1135. Instead, Plaintiff may state claims under the antidiscrimination provisions of Title III of the 

ADA. See Celano, 2008 WL 239306, at *14.

2. Statutory ADA violation

The Court now turns to the specific statutory provisions under which Plaintiff brings his 

claims against Defendant. Plaintiff claims that Defendant’s use of the interior accessible tables 

violates 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii), (iii), and 12182(b)(1)(B). See JPS at 6; ECF No. 99 at 5, 

(“Plaintiff Trial Br.”). The Court addresses these statutory provisions below. 

a. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii)

Title III states that “[i]t shall be discriminatory to afford an individual or class of 

individuals, on the basis of a disability . . . with the opportunity to participate in or benefit from a 

good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation that is not equal to that afforded to 

other individuals.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). This prohibits public accommodations from 

providing an experience that is not “functionally equivalent” to that afforded to non-disabled 

patrons. See Celano, 2008 WL 239306, at *14. 

The parties in the instant case have stipulated that Defendant’s goods and services include 

seating, the “Starbucks environment,” and a “full and rewarding coffeehouse experience.” JPS at 

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3–4. Defendant has also stipulated to the fact that the only accessible seating in the Store requires 

individuals in wheelchairs to sit with their backs to the interior of the Store. See id. at 3. The Court 

therefore addresses whether Defendant has provided an “opportunity to participate in or benefit 

from [the “Starbucks environment,” “coffeehouse experience,” and seating] . . . that is not equal to 

that afforded to other individuals.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii).

In order to determine whether Defendant provided disabled patrons with an opportunity to 

participate in or benefit from Defendant’s goods or services that was functionally inequivalent to 

those afforded to non-disabled patrons, the Court must consider how non-disabled patrons use the 

Store. See Baughman, 685 F.3d at 1135. Here, Defendant has stipulated that the “Starbucks 

experience” includes the Store’s décor and an opportunity “to be part of a community, even when 

visiting the Store alone.” JPS at 4. Defendant “brands itself as a place for people to come together” 

and encourages its patrons to use the Store as a “neighborhood gathering place.” Id. at 4. One of 

the benefits of such a social hub is undoubtedly the ability to see and interact with others in the 

community. The parties have also stipulated that non-disabled patrons are able to sit such that they 

“look out at the ongoings of the Store, the Store’s décor, and . . . other patrons and employees 

within the Store,” and that Defendant “encourages a sense of community for patrons.” Id. The 

photograph in Plaintiff’s Exhibit 2, while only a snapshot of the Store and its patrons on a 

particular day, depicts four patrons at the Store, all of whom are voluntarily seated facing the 

interior of the Store with their backs to the wall. Id. at 4. 

Whether or not a non-disabled patron will normally choose to sit facing the interior of the 

Store, Defendant cannot contest that it offers non-disabled patrons the choice of whether to 

capitalize on the opportunity to be part of the community that the “Starbucks environment” 

provides. In contrast, Defendant denies patrons in wheelchairs that same choice, as Plaintiff was 

forced to turn his back on the Store. Defendant therefore placed Plaintiff in “a distinctly unequal 

situation.” Celano, 2008 WL 239306, at *14 (finding ADA violation where defendant provided 

golf carts for non-disabled patrons but failed to do so for mobility impaired golfers). While nondisabled patrons may sit facing their fellow patrons and enjoy the sense of community that is 

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expected from the “full and rewarding coffee house experience,” id., Plaintiff was forced to face 

the wall. Defendant therefore discriminated against Plaintiff by providing Plaintiff an opportunity 

to participate in and benefit from the “Starbucks environment” that was not equal to that afforded 

to other individuals. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii).

Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not been afforded an unequal opportunity because 

Plaintiff may sit with his spouse and thus has not been “excluded from any conversation” and 

forced to sit in isolation. Trial Tr. at 13:3–7; see also id. at 24:4–6, 26:11–12, 64:24–65:11. This, 

however, is irrelevant. Defendant has stipulated that the “Starbucks environment” may be enjoyed 

both alone and with company. See JPS at 4 (stipulating that Defendant “offers a welcoming 

environment for individuals who wish to be part of a community, even when visiting the Store 

alone”) (emphasis added). The ability to sit with one’s spouse thus cannot be said to encompass all 

that the “Starbucks environment” has to offer. 

In another store “environment” case, the Ninth Circuit concluded that a physical barrier 

which prevented disabled customers from “having the experience of non-disabled customers of 

fully participating in the selection and preparation of their order at the food preparation counter . . . 

subject[ed disabled patrons] to a disadvantage that non-disabled customers do not suffer.” 

Antoninetti v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 643 F.3d 1165, 1173 (9th Cir. 2010). While 

Antoninetti dealt with an ADAAG regulation requiring a public accommodation to provide 

“equivalent facilitation” for certain counter heights, the crux of the plaintiff’s claim was that nondisabled patrons were afforded the opportunity to “enjoy the ‘Chipotle experience,’” whereas 

disabled patrons “could not see and evaluate the various available foods and decide which or how 

much of each” they might want. Id. at 1174. Relying on the ADAAG requirement that defendant 

provide a “substantially equivalent” experience, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the defendant’s 

provision of an unequal experience violated the ADA. Id. Here, as in Antoninetti, there is no 

dispute that Defendant’s provision of a specific type of store experience is an integral part of the 

goods or services that Defendant provides. See id. at 1174; JPS at 3–4. Plaintiff, like the 

Antoninetti plaintiff, “wants to be about to have the ‘[Starbucks] experience’ . . . [and] enjoy the 

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same experience that other non-disabled [Starbucks] customers could have.” See Antoninetti, 643 

F.3d at 1175. Defendant’s decision to orient the interior accessible tables such that non-disabled 

patrons are unable to “fully participat[e]” in the “Starbucks experience” is a “disadvantage that 

non-disabled customers do not suffer.” Id. at 1173.

In conclusion, the Court finds that Defendant, through the orientation and positioning of its 

interior accessible tables, has afforded Plaintiff an opportunity to both participate in and benefit 

from the abovementioned goods and services that was “not equal to that afforded to other 

individuals.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). This constitutes discrimination under Title III of the 

ADA. See id.

b. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182(b)(1)(A)(iii) and 12182(b)(1)(B)

As part of the joint pretrial statement, Plaintiff cited §§ 12182(b)(1)(A)(iii) and 

12182(b)(1)(B) as additional bases for his ADA claim against Defendant.2The Court addresses 

Plaintiff’s ADA claim pursuant to these two provisions below.

Under § 12182(b)(1)(A)(iii), it is discriminatory to provide an individual, on the basis of a 

disability, with a good or service “that is different or separate from that provided to other 

individuals, unless such action is necessary to provide the individual . . . with a good, service, 

facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation, or other opportunity that is as effective as that 

provided to others.” Title III further mandates that “[g]oods, services, facilities, privileges, 

advantages, and accommodations shall be afforded to an individual with a disability in the most 

integrated setting appropriate to the needs of the individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(B). In other 

words, goods and services must be provided in “a setting that enables individuals with disabilities 

to interact with non-disabled persons to the fullest extent possible.” Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. 

Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 592 (1999) (quoting 28 C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A (1998)). Indeed, “[p]roviding 

 

2 While cited in the Joint Pretrial Statement, the Court notes that Plaintiff did not identify this 

particular statutory provision as a basis for Plaintiff’s claim when questioned at trial. See Trial Tr. 

at 42:4–24 (agreeing that Plaintiff’s claims relied on 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) and 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12182(a). In the interest of thoroughness, however, the Court addresses Plaintiff’s claims under 

these provisions.

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services in the most integrated setting is a fundamental principle of the ADA.” House Report, Pt. 

II at 385. As the Department of Justice has described it:

Taken together, [§ 12182(b)(1)(A)(iii) and § 12182(b)(1)(B)] are 

intended to prohibit exclusion and segregation of individuals with 

disabilities and the denial of equal opportunities enjoyed by others, 

based on, among other things, presumptions, patronizing attitudes, 

fears, and stereotypes about individuals with disabilities.

28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. C (2011).

Here, the gravamen of Plaintiff’s argument is that “[p]roviding seating that faces a wall 

physically separates wheelchair patrons from the community promoted by Starbucks (indeed 

requires them to literally turn their backs on the community), deprives wheelchair patrons of the 

“Starbucks experience,” and is therefore not equivalent to the seating provided to non-disabled 

patrons.” JPS at 7. As discussed above, the “Starbucks environment,” a “full and rewarding 

coffeehouse experience,” and seating are all goods and services that Defendant provides. See JPS 

at 4. In defining discrimination as including the provision of unequal “different or separate” 

services, the ADA Committee Reports detail that the Act was instituted in part to address the 

concern that:

[P]ersons with disabilities have been relegated to separate and often 

inferior services. For example, seating for persons using wheelchairs 

is often located in the back of auditoriums. In addition to providing 

inferior seating, the patron in a wheelchair is forced to separate from 

family or friends during the performance. . . . The availability of a 

choice of seating is critical to assure that patrons with disabilities are 

not segregated from family or friends.

H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 102 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 385–86 (“House

Report, Pt. II”). Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s provision of “different or separate” goods or 

services also, in this context, necessarily entails a failure to provide goods or services that are 

“integrated and equal in quality to those provided to the general public.” 28 C.F.R. pt. 36 (2011). 

The Court agrees. 

In the instant case, Defendant has not contested that Plaintiff affirmatively wants the 

opportunity to experience and engage in the “Starbucks experience” in the same way that nondisabled patrons have the choice of doing. See Trial Tr. at 16:8–17:10; 19:4–17 (Plaintiff’s 

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testimony describing his desire to “people watch” and strike up conversations with strangers). As 

in Fortyune, where the court noted that moviegoers expect to sit with loved ones as an integral part 

of the movie viewing experience, see 364 F.3d at 1083, here the Court notes that the parties have 

stipulated to the undisputed fact that participating in the “full and rewarding coffeehouse 

experience” and the unique Starbucks community are integral to the goods and services that 

Defendant provides to its patrons. Like denying persons in wheelchairs an experience comparable 

to that expected and enjoyed by non-disabled moviegoers, here Defendant has denied Plaintiff the 

opportunity to enjoy the décor and sense of community expected from a “full and rewarding 

coffeehouse experience” and the “Starbucks environment,” which Defendant provides to nondisabled patrons. See id. By denying Plaintiff “[t]he availability of a choice of seating,” House 

Report, pt. II at 386, Defendant has provided a “different or separate” good or service than that 

which is provided to non-disabled patrons that are not “integrated and equal in quality to those 

provided to the general public.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(iii); 28 C.F.R. pt. 36.

3

Taking 

§§ 12182(b)(1)(A)(iii) and 12182(b)(1)(B) together, the Court finds that Defendant’s use of 

interior accessible tables in such a way that excludes disabled patrons from enjoying and 

interacting with the “Starbucks community” and “experience” constitutes discrimination under the 

ADA. 

In sum, the Court finds that Defendant’s operational use of the interior accessible tables in 

the Store, which forces disabled patrons to sit with their backs to the Store, constitute 

discrimination under 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182(b)(1)(A)(iii) and 12182(b)(1)(B). Plaintiff is a social 

individual who enjoys people watching and conversing with strangers. See Trial Tr. at 16:8–17:10;

19:4–17. Plaintiff wished to spectate and contribute to the “Starbucks environment” and 

“coffeehouse experience,” id. at 32:1–6, during his visits to the Store. See id. at 16:8–17:10; 19:4–

 

3

There is a narrow exception to Section 12182(b)(1)(A)(iii), where the provision of different or 

separate goods or services is permissible as long as there is (1) a separate arrangement or facility, 

which (2) is necessary for the disabled person, and (3) is “as effective as” that for which it was 

substituted. Lockett v. Catalina Channel Exp., Inc., 496 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Defendant did not argue that this exception applies, nor did Defendant put forth any evidence in 

support of such an exception.

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17; 32:1–6. By hindering Plaintiff’s ability to do so, the discriminatory use of the Store’s interior 

accessible tables significantly reduced Plaintiff’s ability to enjoy the “Starbucks environment,” 

“coffeehouse experience,” and seating Defendant provides. Thus, Defendant discriminated against 

Plaintiff on the basis of his disability in the “full and equal enjoyment of the goods” and services 

of the Store. Accordingly, Defendant violated Title III of the ADA.

C. Injunctive relief

Remedies under the ADA are available “to any person who is being subjected to 

discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of this subchapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1). 

The cited provision of the Civil Rights Act states that a “person aggrieved” by a violation of the 

ADA may bring “a civil action for preventive relief, including an application for a permanent or 

temporary injunction.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(a). The ADA states that, in Title III cases:

[I]njunctive relief shall include an order to alter facilities to make 

such facilities readily accessible to and usable by individuals with 

disabilities to the extent required by this subchapter. Where 

appropriate, injunctive relief shall also include requiring the 

provision of an auxiliary aid or service, modification of a policy, or 

provision of alternative methods, to the extent required by this 

subchapter.

42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). The ADA provides only for injunctive relief; “it does not authorize a 

claim for money damages.” Antoninetti, 643 F.3d at 1174.

In the instant case, Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief requiring Defendant to “locate at least 

one accessible table such that an individual in a wheelchair can be seated with a view of the Store 

and its patrons” rather than facing the wall. JPS at 3. As the Court has found that Defendant’s use 

of the interior accessible tables is discriminatory under Title III, Plaintiff is entitled to injunctive 

relief remedying Defendant’s discriminatory practice. See Long v. Coast Resorts, Inc., 267 F.3d 

918, 925–26 (9th Cir. 2001); Antoninetti, 643 F.3d at 1175–76 (“‘The standard requirements for 

equitable relief need not be satisfied when an injunction is sought to prevent the violation of a 

federal statute which specifically provides for injunctive relief.’” (quoting Silver Sage Partners, 

Ltd. v. City of Desert Hot Springs, 251 F.3d 814, 827 (9th Cir. 2001)). 

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The Court notes that Defendant has made vague remarks regarding space concerns and 

Plaintiff’s alleged failure to provide Defendant with a “workable” plan for how to alter the 

orientation of the interior accessible tables. Under the ADA, a public accommodation may be 

required to make reasonable modifications to its policies, practices, or procedures to mitigate any 

disparate impact upon persons with disabilities. 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(a); see also Celano, 2008 WL 

239306, at *18. At trial, Defendant argued that if it “were to move th[e] existing table forward, 

[Defendant] would have to provide the requisite five feet or whatever dimensions behind that 

location for a person to have the proper clearance space and other necessary items to get into that 

seat coming from that back approach.” Trial Tr. at 45:22–46:15. This, Defendant argues, would be 

unwieldy and “impede on the access that’s there.” Id. at 23:7. As Plaintiff noted, Defendant failed 

to raise this issue in the joint pretrial statement, and Plaintiff could have reasonably relied on 

Defendant’s failure to identify this as a disputed legal issue. See United States v. First Nat. Bank 

of Circle, 652 F.2d 882, 886 (9th Cir. 1981) (“Unless pretrial orders are honored and enforced, the 

objectives of the pretrial conference to simplify issues and avoid unnecessary proof by obtaining 

admissions of fact will be jeopardized if not entirely nullified. Accordingly, a party need offer no 

proof at trial as to matters agreed to in the order, nor may a party offer evidence or advance 

theories at the trial which are not included in the order or which contradict its terms.”).

Even assuming Defendant had properly raised the issue of reasonableness, the Court notes 

that Defendant’s own expert witness Mr. Blackseth testified that at least one of the interior 

accessible tables already has sufficient clearance space behind it to allow a patron in a wheelchair 

to maneuver behind the table. Trial Tr. at 57:18–25. This suggests that Defendant need only turn 

the table such that the accessible space is located where the companion seat is currently located 

and that accommodating Plaintiff’s request would not impose any particular hardship or cost on 

Defendant and is a feasible modification. Accordingly, the Court finds that the only evidence in 

the record indicates that the requested injunctive relief is reasonable.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that Plaintiff prevails on his claim that 

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Defendant has violated Title III of the ADA. Specifically, the orientation of the interior accessible 

tables in the Store violated 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii), (iii), and 12182(b)(1)(B). The Court 

therefore GRANTS Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief requiring Defendant to locate at least 

one interior accessible table, in compliance with all applicable regulations, guidelines, and 

statutes, such that an individual in a wheelchair can be seated facing the interior of the Store with 

his or her back to the wall. 

Plaintiff shall file any motion for attorney’s fees and costs within 30 days of this Order. 

Any opposition and reply shall be filed in accordance with the Civil Local Rules. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 28, 2015

______________________________________

LUCY H. KOH

United States District Judge

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