Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01219/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01219-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PAUL F. DUNN,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting

Commissioner of Social

Security,

Defendant. 

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Civil No. 13cv01219 MMA(RBB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 13]

AND GRANTING DEFENDANT'S

CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT [ECF NO. 14]

On May 22, 2013, Plaintiff Paul F. Dunn filed a Complaint

against Defendant Carolyn W. Colvin, Commissioner of Social

Security [ECF No. 1]. Plaintiff challenges the denial of his claim

for disability insurance benefits. (Compl. 2-3, ECF No. 1.) 

Defendant filed an Answer and the Administrative Record on

September 24, 2013 [ECF Nos. 9, 11]. 

Dunn's Motion for Summary Judgment was filed with a Memorandum

of Points and Authorities on December 11, 2013 [ECF No. 13]. 

Colvin filed a "Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and Opposition to

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment" on January 9, 2014, along

with a Memorandum of Points and Authorities [ECF No. 14]. On the

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same day, Defendant refiled the same document and attachment;

however, it was docketed as a "Motion for Summary Judgment in

Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No.

15]." 

This matter is suitable for decision without oral argument. 

See S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons set forth below,

the Court recommends that Dunn's Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF

No. 13] be DENIED and Colvin's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment

[ECF No. 14] be GRANTED. 

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 11, 2010, Plaintiff filed an application for

supplemental security income benefits alleging a disability onset

of February 1, 2006. (Admin. R. Attach. #2, 12, ECF No. 11.)1 The

Social Security Administration denied his claim on September 21,

2010, and again upon reconsideration on January 13, 2011. (Id.) 

On February 4, 2011, Dunn submitted a written request for a

hearing. (Id.)

A hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ")

James S. Carletti on May 18, 2012. (Id. at 28.) Dunn, his former

attorney David Shore, vocational expert Alan Cummings, and a

medical expert were present. (Id.) Judge Carletti heard testimony

from Plaintiff and the vocational and medical experts. (Id. at

29.) At the hearing, Cummings noted that Dunn had previous work

experience as a sales associate and as a "house worker." (Id. at

1 The administrative record appears on the Court's docket and

is filed as multiple attachments. The Court, however, cites the

administrative record using the page references contained on the

original document rather than the page numbers designated by the

Court's ECF system.

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54.) The ALJ asked for the vocational expert's opinion on the

following hypothetical:

Assuming we have a younger individual with a high school

education, prior work experience as you've indicated as

light and skilled and medium and unskilled, if there were

limitations to sedentary work as defined in the

regulations, but also limitation to simple, repetitive

tasks, either as a result of a emotional condition,

medications, or physical problems, and also a non-public

work environment, would the prior work activity be

available? And if not, would there be other work

activity that exists either nationally or locally that

could be performed?

(Id. at 55.) The expert testified that the individual could not

perform Plaintiff's past work. (Id.) Cummings did say, however,

that such a person could work as an "assembler," "inspector," or

"sorter." (Id.) He stated that there were 1,300 assembler jobs in

San Diego County and 229,000 in the national economy, and

referenced Dictionary of Occupational Titles ("DOT") code 706.684-

030, the code for atomizer assembler. (Id.) For the inspector

job, Cummings maintained that there were 3,200 positions in San

Diego County and 410,000 nationally, and identified DOT code

669.687-014 for dowel inspectors. (Id.) Finally, he explained

that there were 500 sorter jobs in San Diego County and 38,000

nationally, and cited DOT code 521.687-086, the designation for nut

sorter. (Id.)

II. THE ALJ'S DECISION

The administrative law judge issued a written decision on May

25, 2012, finding that Plaintiff had "HIV, depression, attention

deficit hyperactivity disorder and [a] cognitive disorder, not

otherwise specified." (Id. at 14 (citations omitted); id. at 21.) 

The claimant, however, did not have an impairment or combination of

impairments that met or equaled a listed impairment that would make

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him eligible for benefits. (Id. at 15.) ALJ Carletti concluded

that Dunn could "perform medium work . . . [and could] stoop and

crouch frequently and perform simple, repetitive tasks." (Id. at

16.) Relying on the testimony of the vocational expert, the ALJ

held that Plaintiff could work as an assembler, inspector, and

sorter. (Id. at 21.) He stated that these jobs existed in

"significant numbers in the national economy." (Id.)

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

To qualify for disability benefits under the Social Security

Act, an applicant must show two things: (1) He or she suffers from

a medically determinable impairment that can be expected to last

for a continuous period of twelve months or more, or would result

in death; and (2) the impairment renders the applicant incapable of

performing the work that he or she previously performed or any

other substantially gainful employment that exists in the national

economy. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), (2)(A) (West 2011). An

applicant must meet both requirements to be classified as

"disabled." Id.

The Social Security Act allow applicants whose claims have

been denied by the Social Security Administration to seek judicial

review of the Commissioner's final agency decision. 42 U.S.C.A. §§

405(g) (West 2011); id. at 1383(c)(3) (West Supp. 2013). A

district court should affirm the decision unless "it is based upon

legal error or is not supported by substantial evidence." Bayliss

v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1214 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing

Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 1999)).

"Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support [the ALJ's]

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conclusion[,]" considering the record as a whole. Webb v.

Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Richardson v.

Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). It means "'more than a mere

scintilla but less than a preponderance'" of the evidence. 

Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1214 n.1 (quoting Tidwell, 161 F.3d at 601). 

"'[T]he court must consider both evidence that supports and

evidence that detracts from the ALJ's conclusion . . . .'" Frost

v. Barnhart, 314 F.3d 359, 366–67 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Jones v.

Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985)).

To determine whether a claimant is "disabled," the Social

Security regulations use a five-step process outlined in 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520. If an applicant is found to be "disabled" or "not

disabled" at any step, there is no need to proceed further. Ukolov

v. Barnhart, 420 F.3d 1002, 1003 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Schneider

v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 223 F.3d 968, 974 (9th Cir. 2000)). 

Although the ALJ must assist the applicant in developing a record,

the applicant bears the burden of proof during the first four

steps. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 & n.3 (9th Cir.

1999). If the fifth step is reached, however, the burden shifts to

the Commissioner. Id. at 1098. The steps for evaluating a claim

are as follows:

Step 1. Is the claimant presently working in a

substantially gainful activity? If so, then the claimant

is "not disabled" within the meaning of the Social

Security Act and is not entitled to disability insurance

benefits. If the claimant is not working in a

substantially gainful activity, then the claimant's case

cannot be resolved at step one and the evaluation

proceeds to step two.

Step 2. Is the claimant's impairment severe? If not,

then the claimant is "not disabled" and is not entitled

to disability insurance benefits. If the claimant's

impairment is severe, then the claimant's case cannot be

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resolved at step two and the evaluation proceeds to step

three.

Step 3. Does the impairment "meet or equal" one of a

list of specific impairments described in the

regulations? If so, the claimant is "disabled" and

therefore entitled to disability insurance benefits. If

the claimant's impairment neither meets nor equals one of

the impairments listed in the regulations, then the

claimant's case cannot be resolved at step three and the

evaluation proceeds to step four.

Step 4. Is the claimant able to do any work that he

or she has done in the past? If so, then the claimant is

"not disabled" and is not entitled to disability

insurance benefits. If the claimant cannot do any work he

or she did in the past, then the claimant's case cannot

be resolved at step four and the evaluation proceeds to

the fifth and final step.

Step 5. Is the claimant able to do any other work?

If not, then the claimant is "disabled" and therefore

entitled to disability insurance benefits. If the

claimant is able to do other work, then the Commissioner

must establish that there are a significant number of

jobs in the national economy that claimant can do. There

are two ways for the Commissioner to meet the burden of

showing that there is other work in "significant numbers"

in the national economy that claimant can do: (1) by the

testimony of a vocational expert, or (2) by reference to

the Medical–Vocational Guidelines at 20 C.F.R. pt. 404,

subpt. P, app. 2. If the Commissioner meets this burden,

the claimant is "not disabled" and therefore not entitled

to disability insurance benefits. If the Commissioner

cannot meet this burden, then the claimant is "disabled"

and therefore entitled to disability benefits.

Id. at 1098–99 (footnotes, citations, and emphasis omitted); see

also Bustamante v. Massanari, 262 F.3d 949, 954 (9th Cir. 2001)

(giving an abbreviated version of the five steps).

Section 405(g) permits the court to enter a judgment

affirming, modifying, or reversing the Commissioner's decision. 42

U.S.C.A. § 405(g). The matter may also be remanded to the Social

Security Administration for further proceedings. Id. After a case

is remanded and an additional hearing is held, the Commissioner may

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modify or affirm the original findings of fact or the decision. 

Id.

"If the evidence can reasonably support either affirming or

reversing the Secretary's conclusion, the court may not substitute

its judgment for that of the Secretary." Flaten v. Sec'y Health &

Human Servs., 44 F.3d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1995) (citations

omitted). The court must uphold the denial of benefits if the

evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation,

one of which supports the ALJ's decision. Burch v. Barnhart, 400

F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).

IV. DISCUSSION

In his Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff contends that

the ALJ erred by relying on unsupported, inaccurate vocational

expert testimony. (Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 3-4, 6-7,

ECF No. 13.) Dunn argues that job figures from the Bureau of Labor

Statistics, using the North American Industry Classification System

(NAICS), establish that the data provided by the vocational expert

was "erroneous." (Id. at 4-5, 7.) This argument was not made at

the administrative hearing or to the Appeals Council. (See Admin.

R. Attach. #2, 1-5, 28-82, ECF No. 11.) In her Cross-Motion for

Summary Judgment, Colvin argues that Cummings's testimony

constituted substantial evidence supporting ALJ Carletti's

decision. (Cross-Mot. Summ. J. & Opp'n Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 3,

ECF No. 14.)

"Administrative law judges are responsible for reviewing the

evidence and making findings of fact and conclusions of law." 20

C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(2) (2013). Generally, conflicts in the

evidence should be resolved by the Commissioner, not the courts. 

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See Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1230 (9th Cir. 1987). The ALJ

is the final arbiter of ambiguities in the medical evidence. 

Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041-42 (9th Cir. 2008). The

Commissioner's decision must be upheld when the evidence would

support more than one rational interpretation. Havrylovich v.

Astrue, Civil No. 09-1113-HA, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7187, at *4 (D.

Or. Jan. 25, 2011) (citing Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954

(9th Cir. 2002)).

Dunn requests that this matter be reversed and remanded "for

the correction of the legal errors." (Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #1

Mem. P. & A. 8, ECF No. 13.) The Ninth Circuit has articulated the

standard district courts must apply when deciding whether to remand

a matter for further proceedings:

Remand for further administrative proceedings is

appropriate if enhancement of the record would be useful. 

Conversely, where the record has been developed fully and

further administrative proceedings would serve no useful

purpose, the district court should remand for an

immediate award of benefits. More specifically, the

district court should credit evidence that was rejected

during the administrative process and remand for an

immediate award of benefits if (1) the ALJ failed to

provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting the

evidence; (2) there are no outstanding issues that must

be resolved before a determination of disability can be

made; and (3) it is clear from the record that the ALJ

would be required to find the claimant disabled were such

evidence credited.

Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 593 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations

omitted); see Strauss v. Comm'r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 635 F.3d

1135, 1138 (9th Cir. 2011) (applying the standard outlined in

Benecke). "A claimant is not entitled to benefits under the

statute unless the claimant is, in fact, disabled, no matter how

egregious the ALJ's errors may be." Strauss, 635 F.3d at 1138

(citation omitted).

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A. Whether the ALJ Erred by Relying on the Vocational Expert's

Testimony

Dunn alleges that Judge Carletti relied on "deficient

vocational testimony" when he found that a significant number of

jobs existed that Plaintiff was capable of performing. (Mot. Summ.

J. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 3, ECF No. 13.) Dunn states that the

vocational expert did not describe the method he used to determine

how many jobs existed. (Id. at 4.) He continues, "Unfortunately

the numbers of jobs which the vocational expert identifies do not

exist and are contradicted by the relevant Bureau of Labor

Statistics (BLS) data." (Id.) Plaintiff maintains that according

to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 870 atomizer-assembler jobs,

2,680 dowel-inspector jobs, and 5,640 nut-sorter jobs exist in the

national economy. (Id. at 4-6 (citing id. Attach. #2 at 1-3).) 

These positions total 9,200 jobs, which is not a significant

number. (Id. at 7.) In light of this information, Dunn argues

that the vocational expert's uncorroborated testimony is not

supported by substantial evidence. (Id. at 8.)

Plaintiff relies on Farias v. Colvin, 519 F. App'x 439 (9th

Cir. 2013), a recent, unpublished case where the Ninth Circuit

considered reports from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. (Mot.

Summ. J. Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 4, ECF No. 13.) According to

Dunn, Farias concluded that the ultimate question was "whether a

reasonable person could accept the testimony of the vocational

expert when that testimony diverges so radically from the published

sources cited in cases." (Id. at 8.) Because "the vocational

expert did not volunteer on what [sic] methodology the vocational

expert based his opinion or what data sources were used[,]"

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Plaintiff argues that the testimony is not substantial evidence

supporting the ALJ's decision, so the case should be reversed and

remanded. (Id.)

In her Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant asserts

that the vocational expert's testimony constituted substantial

evidence supporting the ALJ's decision. (Cross-Mot. Summ. J. &

Opp'n Attach. #1 Mem. P. & A. 3, 5, ECF No. 14.) She submits that

the administrative law judge reasonably determined that a

significant number of jobs existed that Dunn could perform. (Id.

at 5.) "Plaintiff is not a vocational expert and provides no

explanation why the court should favor his vocational information

over the testimony of the VE, whose 'recognized expertise provides

the necessary foundation for his or her testimony,' and, therefore,

'no additional foundation is required.'" (Id. at 6 (citation

omitted).) Additionally, vocational experts are not required to

disclose their methodology. (Id.) Defendant further claims that

the source for the data provided by Dunn is not among those that

the ALJ will judicially notice for "'reliable job information.'" 

(Id. at 7 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566(d)).) The Plaintiff's

occupational reports were not provided to the ALJ for analysis;

even if they had been, Colvin contends that Judge Carletti was not

required to accept them. (Id. at 8.) Notably, Defendant ignores

Farias, the case on which Plaintiff chiefly relies. (See generally

id. at 3-8.)

Prior to Farias, case law was reasonably well settled that

administrative law judges are entitled to rely on vocational expert

testimony regarding the number of jobs that exist in the economy. 

The testimony of a vocational expert constitutes substantial

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evidence supporting an ALJ's decision. Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240

F.3d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1218

("A VE's recognized expertise provides the necessary foundation for

his or her testimony. Thus, no additional foundation is

required."). An ALJ's determination should be affirmed "[w]here

the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational

interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ's decision." Thomas,

278 F.3d at 954 (citation omitted); see Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d

503, 509 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Hunt v. Colvin, No. EDCV 12-1117

AN, 2013 WL 1969401, at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 13, 2013); Engrave v.

Colvin, No. EDCV 12-2021 JC, 2013 WL 1661754, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Apr.

17, 2013); Gonzales v. Colvin, No. CV 12–3501–PJW, 2013 WL 1614937,

at *1-2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2013); McCaleb v. Colvin, No. EDCV

12–01428–JEM, 2013 WL 1516259, at *4-6 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2013).

Vocational experts are not required to disclose their

methodology. Merryflorian v. Astrue, No. 12-CV-2493-IEG (DHB),

2013 WL 4783069, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2013). Claimants are

also typically represented by counsel at administrative hearings,

who may cross-examine the vocational expert and challenge any

discrepancies in the expert's testimony. See Solorzano v. Astrue,

No. ED CV 11–369–PJW, 2012 WL 84527, *6 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2012)

("Counsel are not supposed to be potted plants at administrative

hearings. They have an obligation to take an active role and to

raise issues that may impact the ALJ's decision while the hearing

is proceeding so that they can be addressed.").

Plaintiff had ample opportunity to cross-examine the

[vocational expert] on his methodology for determining

the number of available jobs, but declined to do so. 

Moreover, Plaintiff has not established that [her source]

is the only source of job data or superior to others. 

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Nor does Plaintiff support her interpretation of raw

numbers included in [the alternate source of] data with

any analysis or explanation from a [vocational expert].

Hunt, 2013 WL 1969401, at *3 (internal citations omitted). Dunn's

case suffers from the same flaws. Additionally, even if

Plaintiff's belated data is considered, because the evidence is

susceptible to a reasonable interpretation that supports the ALJ's

decision, his conclusion must be upheld. See Thomas v. Barnhart,

278 F. at 954. For these reasons, the court will not second guess

the ALJ's reliance on vocational expert testimony.

On May 20, 2013, the Ninth Circuit issued an unpublished

opinion in Farias, 519 F. App'x 439.2 In that case, the vocational

expert opined that the claimant could work as a "head dance hall

hostess," and 3,600 positions existed locally and 342,000 jobs

nationally. Id. at 440. The court held that "no reasonable mind"

could accept that number of jobs. Id. It stated:

The most plausible explanation appears to be that the VE

properly testified that a person with Farias'

characteristics and RFC could perform the job

requirements of head dance hall hostess but erroneously

provided employment data for restaurant hostess -— an

occupation that exists in far larger numbers. Notably,

the employment numbers reported by the Bureau of Labor 

2 Under Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3, unpublished Ninth Circuit

opinions have "only persuasive rather than authoritative or

precedential value." Johnson v. Nevada ex rel. Bd. of Prison

Com'rs, No. 3:11–cv–00487–HDM–VPC, 2013 WL 5428423, at *7 (D. Nev.

Sept. 26, 2013) (footnote omitted); see Gray v. Astrue, No. CV

11–294–C–REB, 2012 WL 4097762, at *9 (D. Idaho Sept. 17, 2012)

(footnote omitted). Furthermore, "a three judge panel may not

overrule [binding precedent] absent intervening Supreme Court or en

banc authority . . . ." United States v. Rodriguez-Lara, 421 F.3d

932, 943 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Obrey v. Johnson, 400 F.3d 691,

699-701 (9th Cir. 2005); H & D Tire & Automotive-Hardware, Inc. v.

Pitney Bowes, Inc., 227 F.3d 326, 330 (5th Cir. 2000) ("When panel

opinions appear to conflict, we are bound to follow the earlier

opinion.") (footnote omitted). Farias does not conflict with

existing precedent recognizing the role of vocational expert

testimony.

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Statistics for the occupation of restaurant host/hostess

are very similar to the numbers the VE proffered for the

job of head dance hall hostess.

Id. (citations omitted). The Ninth Circuit concluded that the

vocational expert provided employment data for the wrong job; the

ALJ's determination regarding the number of jobs in the national

economy was therefore not supported by substantial evidence. 

Accordingly, the case was remanded. Id.

To date, only a handful of courts have interpreted Farias.3

In Darling v. Colvin, No. EDCV 13–266 JC, 2013 WL 4768038, at *5

(C.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2013) (internal citation omitted), the court

construed Farias as standing for the proposition that "although a

vocational expert's testimony may, without more, constitute

substantial evidence of the number of jobs that exist in the

national economy, remand may be appropriate where the record

reflects that the vocational expert's testimony was fundamentally

flawed." The court explained:

[T]he Job Browser Pro reports suggest that the

employment numbers the vocational expert provided at

the hearing may have erroneously pertained to entire

Occupational Employment Survey ("OES") statistical

groups rather than the individual representative

occupations encompassed therein. For example, the

vocational expert testified that there were 47,000

positions in California and 434,000 nationally for

the individual occupation of inspector (DOT §

727.687–066), and 40,000 positions in California and

400,000 nationally for packager (DOT § 559.687–074). 

The Job Browser Pro reports, however, reflect

significantly fewer positions for all of OES group

No. 51–9061 (i.e., 47,720 for California and 434,170

nationally)—the OES group that encompasses both the

3

 Post-Farias, some courts have not addressed Farias when

presented with similar issues. See Merryflorian v. Astrue, 2013 WL

4783069, at *4-8; Solano v. Colvin, No. SA CV 12–01047 RZ, 2013 WL

3776333, at *1-2 (C.D. Cal. July 16, 2013); Villareal v. Colvin, No. EDCV 12–01640–JEM, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85811, at *8-16 (C.D.

Cal. June 18, 2013); Valenzuela v. Colvin, No. CV 12–0754–MAN, 2013

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73439, at *6-14 (C.D. Cal. May 23, 2013). 

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inspector and packager occupations, and which

contains a total of "782 specialty occupations

(unique DOT codes)." Similarly, the vocational

expert testified that for the individual assembler

occupation (DOT § 731.687–034) there were 20,000

positions in California and 235,000

nationally—virtually the same numbers as for all of

OES group No. 51–9399 (i.e., 20,190 in California,

235,910 nationally) the OES group that encompasses

the assembler occupation and which contains a total

of 1587 individual occupations.

(Id. (internal citations omitted).) Because the vocational expert

likely provided data for the wrong job, the case was remanded. 

(Id. at *6.)

In a more recent case, Direaux v. Colvin, No. EDCV 13-61-OP,

2013 WL 6239327, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2013), Farias was

construed as authorizing a remand where the vocational expert's

testimony was "fundamentally flawed." The plaintiff provided

evidence from the Bureau of Labor Statistics that conflicted with

the vocational expert's unexplained testimony regarding the number

of available jobs. Id. at *2-3. The court could not "confidently

conclude" that the ALJ's decision was supported by substantial

evidence; the matter was remanded for "further clarification and

testimony from the [vocational expert]." Id. at *3. In Vera v.

Colvin, No. CV 12-7078-SS, 2013 WL 6144771, at *25 n.36 (C.D. Cal.

Nov. 21, 2013), however, the court interpreted Farias narrowly,

inferring that it was only applicable if the vocational expert

clearly provided data for the wrong job. The court in Vera

affirmed the ALJ's decision. Id. at 25.

Judge Wilner, in Daniels v. Colvin, No. CV 13-654 MRW, 2014 WL

794498, at *2-6 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2014), relied on Farias, in

part, and remanded the case because the vocational expert's

testimony about the total number of available jobs was based on an

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unexplained conclusion "that roughly one-third of all people

employed in the broad "Counter and Rental Clerks category of jobs

served as photofinishing counter clerks." Id. at *5. The court

stated that Farias stood for the proposition that "[a] reasonable

mind need not accept obvious errors in a vocational expert's

testimony that lead to implausible results." Id. at *3 (citing

Farias, 519 F. App'x at 440).

Like the courts in Darling and Direaux, this Court interprets

Farias to allow a district court to remand a case when the

vocational expert's testimony is "fundamentally flawed." See

Direaux, 2013 WL 6239327, at *3; Darling, 2013 WL 4768038, at *5. 

This is a high bar to overcome. If the testimony is not

fundamentally flawed, it constitutes substantial evidence

supporting the ALJ's decision. Cf. Gutierrez v. Comm'r of Soc.

Sec., 740 F.3d 519, 527 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Thomas, 278 F.3d at

960–61) (noting that in Thomas, the administrative law judge's

determination of the number of jobs in the relevant region was

supported by substantial evidence because it was based on

vocational expert testimony).

Here, the vocational expert determined that 38,000 nut-sorter

jobs, 410,000 dowel-inspector jobs, and 229,000 atomizer-assembler

jobs existed in the national economy. (Admin. R. Attach. #2, 55,

ECF No. 11.) "All that is required for a nondisability finding at

step five is a single job that exists in substantial numbers that

the claimant can perform." Coelho v. Astrue, No. C 10–02102 JSW,

2011 WL 3501734, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2011) (emphasis added)

(citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566(b)). The Ninth Circuit recently held

that 25,000 jobs, nationally, and 2,500 jobs in the State of

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California, each constitutes a significant number of jobs in the

economy. Gutierrez, 740 F.3d at 528-29.

The jobs identified by the vocational expert in this case

therefore exist in significant numbers in the national economy. 

Cummings's testimony regarding the identified jobs is not

fundamentally flawed, so the ALJ's determination should be upheld. 

See Yelovich v. Colvin, 532 F. App'x 700, 702 (9th Cir. 2013)

(finding harmless error where the ALJ relied on vocational

testimony that incorrectly referenced two jobs but also accurately

identified a third position for which 900 regional jobs existed --

a significant number); Allison v. Astrue, 425 F. App'x 636, 640

(9th Cir. 2011) (noting that ALJ's error in finding that claimant

could work as a small-parts assembler was harmless because other

jobs identified by the vocational expert existed in significant

numbers); Green v. Colvin, No. C13-0749-JCC, 2014 WL 688953, at *7

(W.D. Wash. Feb. 21, 2014) ("[A]ny error in relation to the

dishwasher and hand packager positions can be deemed harmless given

the identification of a significant number of motel/hotel

housekeeper jobs."); Nelson v. Colvin, No. C12-5540 RJB, 2014 WL

372496, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2014) ("The ALJ found that

plaintiff was not disabled because he could perform representative

unskilled jobs including night cleaner and polisher. The polisher

job exists in significant numbers in the national economy, and thus

any error related to the night cleaner job is harmless."); Veteto

v. Colvin, No. 6:13-cv-00298-MO, 2014 WL 412414, at *6 (D. Or. Feb.

3, 2014) (affirming ALJ's decision where there was insufficient

evidence that the claimant could work as a small products assembler

and security guard, but the administrative law judge properly found

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that the claimant could work as a postage machine operator, a job

that existed in significant numbers); Turner v. Colvin, No. CV

12-9111-JPR, 2013 WL 5817558, at *19 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2013)

(finding harmless error where the ALJ incorrectly determined that

the claimant could work as a hand packager and kitchen helper, but

correctly found that he could work as a food service worker, a job

that existed in significant numbers).

1. Nut-sorter job

The vocational expert opined that 38,000 nut-sorter jobs

existed in the national economy. (Admin. R. Attach. #2, 55, ECF

No. 11.)4 This number is substantially less than the estimates he

provided for the two other available positions. (Id. (finding

410,000 dowel-inspector jobs and 229,000 atomizer-assembler jobs

nationally).) A survey of recent cases shows that vocational

expert estimates vary widely regarding the number of nut-sorter

jobs that exist nationally -- ranging from 1,100 to 600,000

positions. See Prince v. Colvin, Case No. 3–12–CV–05609–LB, 2013

WL 5371917, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2013) (stating that

vocational expert opined that 467,000 jobs existed nationally); Ray

v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:12–cv–01173–SAB, 2013 WL 4852481, at

*3 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2013) (14,000 jobs); Kelly v. Astrue, No.

2:11–cv–2534–KJN, 2012 WL 5868595, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2012)

4 A nut sorter performs the following tasks:

Removes defective nuts and foreign matter from bulk

nut meats: Observes nut meats on conveyor belt, and

picks out broken, shriveled, or wormy nuts and foreign

matter, such as leaves and rocks. Places defective nuts

and foreign matter into containers. May be designated

according to kind of nut meat sorted as Almond Sorter. 

Dictionary of Occupational Titles 521.687-086, available at 1991 WL

674226. 

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(5,000 jobs); Antico v. Astrue, No. 1:11–cv–640, 2012 WL 4473157,

at *11 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 26, 2012) (12,951 jobs); Brannon v. Astrue,

C/A No. 1:11–1568–SVH, 2012 WL 3842572, at *5 (D. S.C. Sept. 4,

2012) (64,000 jobs); Lewis v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., Civil Action No.

09–0932, 2010 WL 5103776, at *3 (W.D. La. Oct. 13, 2010) (9,342

jobs); De La Cruz v. Astrue, No. 1:09cv01222 DLB, 2010 WL 3069272,

at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2010) (1,100 jobs); Minner v. Astrue, 741

F. Supp. 2d 591, 598 (D. Del. 2010) (600,000 jobs); Calderon v.

Astrue, No. 1:08–cv–01015 GSA, 2009 WL 3790008, at *2 (E.D. Cal.

Nov. 10, 2009) (15,000 jobs). 

Cummings testified that 38,000 sorter positions were available

nationally. This figure is significantly larger than numbers

identified in other cases and approved by the courts. While Farias

created an opening for courts to examine an ALJ's reliance on

vocational expert testimony, it is a narrow opening. The estimate

provided by the vocational expert in this case falls well within

the range of estimates accepted in other cases. Reasonable minds

clearly differ on the number of nut-sorter positions that exist in

the national economy. Moreover, Plaintiff does not argue that the

vocational expert provided data for the wrong job or category of

jobs. See Farias, 519 F. App'x at 440; Vera, 2013 WL 6144771, at

*25 n.36; Darling, 2013 WL 4768038, at *5.

The data supplied by Dunn is unaccompanied by an analysis or

explanation from a vocational expert. See Newsome v. Colvin, No.

EDCV 12-0371 AN, 2013 WL 800699, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2013). 

"At most, the data Plaintiff submitted raised a potential

conflict." Id. "Any such conflict [regarding the numbers of

relevant jobs] does not prevent the vocational expert's testimony

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from constituting substantial evidence to support the

administrative decision, however." Bradley v. Astrue, No. CV 12-

3361-E, 2012 WL 5902349, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2012).

In this case, Cummings gave his expert opinion. "'The expert

is only required to state his opinion as to the number of jobs

available in the national economy to a person with the applicant's

residual functional capacity, age, work experience, and education.' 

The ALJ decision, then, was consistent with Ninth Circuit authority

and free of legal error." McCaleb v. Colvin, 2013 WL 1516259, at

*6 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).

The Court does not find the testimony of Alan Cummings, the

vocational expert, "fundamentally flawed." Accordingly, the ALJ's

determination based on the vocational expert's testimony must be

upheld for the reasons explained above. See Osenbrock, 240 F.3d at

1163; Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1218.

2. Dowel-inspector positions

The vocational expert testified that there were 410,000

inspector jobs5 nationally. (Admin. R. Attach. #2, 55, ECF No.

11.) For the dowel-inspector position, there is a wide variance in

the number of dowel-inspector jobs that vocational experts have

opined existed nationally -- from 2,500 to 649,130. See Pentecost

v. Astrue, No. 3:12–0154, 2013 WL 2434987, at *6 (M.D. Tenn. June

4, 2013) (stating that vocational expert testified that 64,000

dowel-inspector jobs existed nationally); McIntyre v. Astrue, No.

6:11–cv–00800, 2012 WL 7660420, at *20 (S.D. W. Va. Dec. 18, 2012)

5

 A dowel inspector "[i]nspects dowel pins for flaws, such as

square ends, knots, or splits, and discards defective dowels." 

Dictionary of Occupational Titles 669.687-014, available at 1991 WL

686074.

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(80,000 jobs); Woodard v. Astrue, No. 1:10–cv–327–DBH, 2011 WL

2580641, at *5 (D. Me. June 28, 2011) (13,167 jobs); McKillip v.

Astrue, Civil No. 09–2595–WQH (WVG), 2010 WL 5827491, at *8 (S.D.

Cal. Dec. 13, 2010) (98,000 jobs); Sessions v. Astrue, No.

08–CV–0724–A, 2010 WL 883697, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2010) (37,000

jobs); Schreier v. Astrue, No. 3:08–cv–00223–LRH (VPC), 2009 WL

4757242, at *2 (D. Nev. Dec. 10, 2009) (2,500 jobs); Mahoney v.

Astrue, Civil Action No. 3:09–CV–810–L, 2009 WL 3097334, at *5

(N.D. Tex. Sept. 25, 2009) (649,130 jobs); Maldonado v. Astrue, No.

07–CV–6439, 2008 WL 4682444, at *2 (W.D. N.Y. Oct. 21, 2008)

(144,000 jobs). 

Notably, vocational expert Cummings testified in another case

in this district that 40,000 dowel-inspector jobs existed

nationally. See Tudino v. Barnhart, No. 06-CV-2487-BEN (JMA), 2008

WL 4161443, at *6, 11 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2008) (citations omitted)

(stating that Tudino noted that Cummings opined that 40,000 dowelinspector jobs existed nationally). It is difficult for this Court

to reconcile a ten-fold increase in the number of dowel-inspector

jobs over a span of only a few years. If this was the only

position identified by Cummings, a remand for further evidence from

the vocational expert might be in order. But because other

positions were identified by the vocational expert, any error in

connection with the number of available dowel-inspector positions

is harmless. See Allison v. Asrue, 425 F. App'x at 640; Green v.

Colvin, 2014 WL 688953, at *7.

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3. Atomizer assemblers

Cummings also testified that 229,000 assembler6 positions were

available in the national economy, and 1,300 were available in San

Diego County. (Admin. R. Attach. #2, 55, ECF No. 11.) Again, Dunn

has provided the Court with data to show that there are fewer

atomizer-assembler positions than testified to by the vocational

expert. (See Mot. Summ. J. Attach. #3, 1-2, ECF No. 13.) Dunn's

information was not submitted to the ALJ or the Appeals Council,

and it does not include an analysis from a vocational expert. See

Newsome v. Colvin, 2013 WL 800699, at *2. Even if Plaintiff can

create a potential conflict, the ALJ may, nevertheless, rely on the

testimony of the vocational expert as substantial evidence

supporting the ALJ's decision. Bradley v. Astrue, 2012 WL 5902349,

at *7. Cummings's testimony concerning the number of atomizerassembler positions is not "fundamentally flawed" and constitutes

substantial evidence supporting Judge Carletti's decision. See

Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d at 1163; see also Bayliss, 427 F.3d at

1218 (holding that vocational expert's expertise is sufficient

foundation for his testimony). Dunn's attempt to show a conflict

between his data and Cummings's testimony does not entitle

Plaintiff to relief.

V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

"The decision of the Commissioner must be upheld if it is

supported by substantial evidence and if the Commissioner applied

the correct legal standards." Howard ex rel. Wolff v. Barnhart,

6 An atomizer assembler "[a]ssembles component parts of

perfume atomizers, such as stems, washers, springs, and plungers,

using handtools: Screws completed atomizers onto empty glass

containers and places them in boxes." Dictionary of Occupational

Titles 706.684-030, available at 1991 WL 679052.

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341 F.3d 1006, 1011 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Pagter v. Massanari,

250 F.3d 1255, 1258 (9th Cir. 2001)). If the AlJ's decision is not

supported by substantial evidence, remand or reversal is

appropriate. Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1457 (9th Cir.

1984). 

For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary

Judgment [ECF No. 13] should be DENIED, and Defendant's CrossMotion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 14] should be GRANTED. This

Report and Recommendation will be submitted to the United States

District Court Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any party may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties on or

before April 30, 2014. The document should be captioned

"Objections to Report and Recommendation." Any reply to the

objections shall be served and filed on or before May 14, 2014. 

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the district court's

order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: April 9, 2014 

RUBEN B. BROOKS

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Judge Anello

 All Parties of Record

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