Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02199/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02199-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

3:18-cv-02199-LAB-JLB

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WARNER LIVINGSTON,

CDCR #D-64125,

Plaintiff,

vs.

D. UGBOR, Registered Nurse,

Defendant.

Case No.: 3:18-cv-02199-LAB-JLB

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT 

FOR FAILING TO STATE 

A CLAIM PURSUANT 

TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)

I. Procedural History

Warner Livingston (“Plaintiff”), currently incarcerated at California State Prison 

Solano in Vacaville, California, is proceeding pro se in this civil action filed pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Plaintiff prepaid the $400 filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) to commence 

a civil action at the time he submitted his Complaint on September 21, 2018. (See ECF 

No. 1-1, Receipt No. 104780.) Thus, unlike most pro se litigants, he is not proceeding in 

forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). However, the docket has yet to 

show that Plaintiff has requested that the Clerk issue a summons, “present[ed] a summons 

to the clerk for signature and seal” pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(b), or has executed 

service upon the Defendant. See Boudette v. Barnette, 923 F.2d 754, 757 (9th Cir. 1991) 

Case 3:18-cv-02199-LAB-JLB Document 2 Filed 01/11/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 8
2

3:18-cv-02199-LAB-JLB

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

(absent a specific request and court order that the U.S. Marshal effect service on their 

behalf pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 4(c)(3), persons who prepay civil filing fees “remain[] 

responsible for timely service.”); Omni Capital Int’l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 

97, 104 (1987) (“Before a . . . court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant, 

the procedural requirement of service of summons must be satisfied.”).

II. Screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A

A. Standard of Review

Regardless of service or IFP status, however, Plaintiff remains and was a prisoner 

at the time he filed his Complaint. “As used in this section, the term ‘prisoner’ means any 

person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced 

for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or conditions of 

parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program.” 42 U.S.C. § 1915A(c). See 

also Olivas v. Nevada ex rel. Dept. of Corr., 856 F.3d 1281, 1284 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(h), 1915A(c); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(h)). 

Section 1915A “mandates early review—‘before docketing [] or [] as soon as 

practicable after docketing’—for all complaints ‘in which a prisoner seeks redress from a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.’” Chavez v. 

Robinson, 817 F.3d 1162, 1168 (9th Cir. 2016). The mandatory screening provisions of 

§ 1915A apply to all prisoners, no matter their fee status, who bring suit against a 

governmental entity, officer, or employee. See, e.g. Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 446-

47 (9th Cir. 2000). “On review, the court shall ... dismiss the complaint, or any portion of 

the complaint,” if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief 

may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 

relief.” Olivas, 856 F.3d at 1283 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of 

§ 1915A is to ‘ensure that the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the

///

///

///

Case 3:18-cv-02199-LAB-JLB Document 2 Filed 01/11/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 8
3

3:18-cv-02199-LAB-JLB

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

expense of responding.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) 

(quoting Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).1

Section 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard applied in the context of failure 

to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 

F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint “contain sufficient 

factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 

680 F.3d at 1121. Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals 

of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not 

suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible 

claim for relief [is] ... a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on 

its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or 

“unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting 

this plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 

(9th Cir. 2009).

B. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff’s claims are brief and straightforward. On March 14, 2016, while he was 

incarcerated at Centinela State Prison in Imperial, California (“CEN”), D. Ugbor, a 

Registered Nurse employed by the prison, “refused to treat him” or to examine his right 

knee, which was “swollen from walking to the clinic” and causing him “serious pain.” 

(See Compl., ECF No. 1 at 3.) Instead, Plaintiff contends Ugbor directed him to complete 

a CDC 7362 medical request form, asked that a medical custody officer escort him back 

to his housing unit, and told him to come back the next day. (Id.) Plaintiff claims he 

“painfully limped away,” and reported his “medical situation” to a sergeant, who called 

the clinic at Plaintiff’s request. (Id.) Nurse Ugbor reported that Plaintiff had been 

 

1 A similar screening would be required if Plaintiff were proceeding IFP. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

Case 3:18-cv-02199-LAB-JLB Document 2 Filed 01/11/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 8
4

3:18-cv-02199-LAB-JLB

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

prescribed pain medication, and informed the sergeant he would be seen the following 

day. (Id.) 

Plaintiff contends Ugbor’s “refusal” on March 14, 2016 “caused more damage to 

both [his] knees” and that he now has “permanent damage as a result.” (Id.) He seeks 

$185,000 in general and punitive damages, and requests “proper physical therapy.” (Id. at 

5.)

C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

“To establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must show both (1) deprivation of a right 

secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) that the deprivation 

was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 

698 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2012). 

Plaintiff claims Defendant Ugbor was employed by the California Department of 

Corrections and acted in her official and individual capacity as a registered curse at CEN 

when she allegedly refused to treat his knee on March 14, 2016. See Compl., ECF No. 1

at 2-3; Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1068 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that while there 

is no “‘rigid formula’ for determining whether a state or local law official is acting under 

color of state law ...[,] [s]tate employment is generally sufficient to render the defendant 

a state actor.”) (citations omitted). 

Therefore, the Court need only consider whether Plaintiff’s Complaint “contain[s] 

sufficient factual matter” to demonstrate that Ugbor “through [her] own individual 

actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676, 678.

D. Eighth Amendment Claim

Plaintiff claims Nurse Ugbor acted with “deliberate indifference to [his] medical 

treatment/care” when she “refused to treat him” in the medical clinic in response to his 

swollen right knee and complaints of “serious pain.” (See Compl., ECF No. 1 at 3.) But 

this is a legal conclusion—and one that is not entitled to the assumption of truth unless it 

is further supported by factual allegations that state a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 678-79.

Case 3:18-cv-02199-LAB-JLB Document 2 Filed 01/11/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 8
5

3:18-cv-02199-LAB-JLB

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Where a prisoner’s constitutional claim is one for inadequate medical care, he must 

allege “acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to 

serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Jett v. Penner, 439 

F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006). The plaintiff must first establish a “serious medical need 

by demonstrating that [the] failure to treat [his] condition could result in further 

significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 

1096 (citation omitted). A medical need is serious “if the failure to treat the prisoner’s 

condition could result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton 

infliction of pain.’” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting 

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104), overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 

F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997).

Next, plaintiff must show that the defendant’s response to his objectively serious

medical need was deliberately indifferent. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096. To establish deliberate 

indifference, a prisoner must allege facts to show: (1) a purposeful act or failure to 

respond to the prisoner’s pain or possible medical need; and (2) harm caused by the 

indifference. Id. “Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 

F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2004). “Under this standard, the prison official must not only 

‘be aware of the facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of 

serious harm exists,’ but that person ‘must also draw the inference.’” Id. at 1057 (quoting 

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 828, 837 (1994)). “If a prison official should have been 

aware of the risk, but was not, then the official has not violated the Eighth Amendment, 

no matter how severe the risk.” Id. (quoting Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nevada, 290 

F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002).

Here, even assuming Plaintiff’s swollen knee and complaints of pain are sufficient 

to show he suffered a serious medical need on March 14, 2016, when he presented 

himself to Nurse Ugbor in CEN’s medical clinic, he has failed to allege further facts 

sufficient to show Ugbor ignored—let alone purposefully ignored—that need. See Jett, 

439 F.3d at 1096. Instead, Plaintiff concedes that after he reported “serious pain in his 

Case 3:18-cv-02199-LAB-JLB Document 2 Filed 01/11/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 8
6

3:18-cv-02199-LAB-JLB

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

right knee” to Ugbor, she directed him to complete a CDC 7362 medical request form, 

and arranged for him to return to the clinic for a follow-up examination on the following 

day. (See Compl., ECF No. 1 at 3.) Plaintiff further admits that while he had “painfully 

limped” to and from the clinic, he was nevertheless prescribed pain medication in the 

interim. (Id.)

Thus, as currently alleged, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to contain 

“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true” to plausibly show Ugbor deliberately ignored 

his serious medical needs. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. At most, Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges 

either negligence or a difference of opinion between him and Ugbor as the emergent 

nature of his condition or the appropriate course of treatment. Neither scenario plausibly 

supports an Eighth Amendment violation. See Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058 (“[A] mere 

difference of medical opinion ... [is] insufficient, as a matter of law, to establish 

deliberate indifference.”) (internal citation omitted); Reed v. Marshall, 1993 WL 372255, 

at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 1993) (“[A] difference of opinion, or even negligence in 

providing medical care, does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation.” 

(internal citation omitted)).

Simply put, Plaintiff’s belief that he should have received a more immediate 

intervention and/or a different course of orthopedic treatment does not give rise to an 

Eighth Amendment claim. See Vaught v. Miranda, 2012 WL 525573, at *11 (E.D. Cal. 

Feb. 16, 2012), aff’d, 502 Fed. Appx. 709 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Plaintiff’s belief that he 

should have received a MRI is no more than a difference of opinions between plaintiff 

and the defendants who provided and/or reviewed his medical treatment.”); Estelle, 429 

U.S. at 107 (“A medical decision not to order an X-ray, or like measures, does not 

represent cruel and unusual punishment.”); Lively v. Tovar, 2012 WL 838483, at *5 (S.D. 

Cal. Feb. 14, 2012) (“Even if [p]laintiff’s self-diagnosis were correct, this would not 

amount to deliberate indifference.”). Thus, without more, Plaintiff’s allegations are 

insufficient to show that Ugbor’s chosen treatment plan—pain medication and a followup visit the next day, as opposed to some other unidentified course of action—was 

Case 3:18-cv-02199-LAB-JLB Document 2 Filed 01/11/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 8
7

3:18-cv-02199-LAB-JLB

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

medically unacceptable under the circumstances, and was implemented in conscious 

disregard of an excessive risk to Plaintiff’s health. See Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058; see 

also Chavira v. Olukanmi, No. LACV157371PAJCG, 2018 WL 1779349, at *2-3 (C.D. 

Cal. Mar. 14, 2018) (finding no deliberate indifference where prisoner alleged to have 

been treated with non-steroidal anti-inflammatory medication for knee pain, but was 

denied a requested MRI), report and recommendation adopted, No. 

LACV157371PAJCG, 2018 WL 1787511 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2018).

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a plausible 

Eighth Amendment inadequate medical care claim against Defendant Ugbor, and that 

therefore, it is subject to sua sponte dismissal in its entirety pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(b)(1). See Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121.

E. Leave to Amend

Because Plaintiff is proceeding without counsel and it is not “absolutely clear that 

the deficiencies of [his] complaint could not be cured by amendment,” the Court will

grant him leave to fix them, if he can. See Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 

2012) (“‘Before dismissing a pro se complaint the district court must provide the litigant 

with notice of the deficiencies in his complaint in order to ensure that the litigant uses the 

opportunity to amend effectively.’”) (quoting Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 

(9th Cir. 1992)).2

 

2 Because Plaintiff is not proceeding IFP, he is further cautioned that he ultimately remains 

responsible for effecting personal service in this case should he elect to file an Amended 

Complaint and should that pleading survive the sua sponte screening required by 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(1). However, Plaintiff need not serve his Amended 

Complaint before the Court has an opportunity to conduct its mandatory § 1915A review;

and the Court will toll Rule 4(m)’s service clock while it conducts that screening. See Butler 

v. Nat’l Cmty. Renaissance of California, 766 F.3d 1191, 1204 n.8 (9th Cir. 2014) (noting 

that “[o]ther federal circuit courts of appeals have held that the [90]–day service period is 

tolled until the court screens a plaintiff’s in forma pauperis complaint and authorizes 

service of process”) (citing Robinson v. Clipse, 602 F.3d 605, 608 (4th Cir. 2010); Urrutia 

v. Harrisburg Cnty. Police Dep’t, 91 F.3d 451, 459 (3d Cir. 1996)).

Case 3:18-cv-02199-LAB-JLB Document 2 Filed 01/11/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 8
8

3:18-cv-02199-LAB-JLB

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

III. Conclusion and Order

For the reasons explained, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint for failing 

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), 

and GRANTS him forty-five (45) days leave from the date of this Order in which to file 

an Amended Complaint which cures the deficiencies of pleading noted. 

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be entitled as his Amended Complaint, 

contain Civil Case No. 3:18-cv-02199-LAB-JLB in its caption, and be complete by itself 

without reference to his original pleading. Any Defendant not named and any claim not 

re-alleged in the Amended Complaint will be considered waived. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 

15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th 

Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 

693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend 

which are not re-alleged in an amended pleading may be “considered waived if not 

repled.”).

If Plaintiff fails to file an Amended Complaint within 45 days, the Court will enter 

a final Order dismissing this civil action based both on Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim 

upon which relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), and his failure to 

prosecute in compliance with a court order requiring amendment. See Lira v. Herrera, 

427 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005) (“If a plaintiff does not take advantage of the 

opportunity to fix his complaint, a district court may convert the dismissal of the 

complaint into dismissal of the entire action.”).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 11, 2019

Hon. Larry Alan Burns

United States District Judge

Case 3:18-cv-02199-LAB-JLB Document 2 Filed 01/11/19 PageID.<pageID> Page 8 of 8