Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-2_06-cv-00525/USCOURTS-alsd-2_06-cv-00525-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 463
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Alien Detainee
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (federa

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Bill Bateman is no longer the Warden of the Perry County

Correctional Center. Accordingly, pursuant to the provisions of

Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, David O.

Streiff, as Warden of that facility, is substituted for Bateman

as a proper Respondent in this action.

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Petitioner also employs the alias “Kabe Gaye.” (Doc. 14,

Ex. A-1).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

BATCH SAHO, : 

Petitioner, :

vs. : CIVIL ACTION 06-00525-WS-B 

DAVID O. STREIFF1

, et al., :

Respondents. :

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This is an action brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 2241 by Batch

Saho,2 a citizen and native of The Gambia, who is being detained by

the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs

Enforcement (“ICE”). (Doc. 1). This action has been referred to the

undersigned for report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C §

636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72.1(c) and is now ready for

consideration. The record is adequate to determine Saho’s claims;

thus, no evidentiary hearing is required. Following a careful

review of the record, it is recommended that the instant petition

be dismissed, without prejudice.

FINDINGS OF FACT

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1. Saho is a native and citizen of The Gambia, who entered the

United States illegally on December 14, 1994 via JFK International

Airport in New York, New York. (Docs. 1; 13, Ex. A-11).

2. On December 15, 1994, Petitioner was served with an ICE form

I-122, directing him to appear before the Executive Office

Immigration Review Judge in order to explain his presence in the

United States. Saho did not appear before the Immigration Judge,

and on April 15, 1996, he was ordered removed from the United States

in absentia. Saho did not appeal his final order of removal. (Doc.

14, Ex. A-1). 

3. On October 24, 1998, Saho represented to the Deportation Office

(“DO”) that he had left the United States after April 15, 1996, and

returned as a stowaway into Baltimore, Maryland. (Id.)

4. On April 28, 1999, Saho filed an application for asylum under

the name “Kabe Gaye.” (Id.)

5. On May 27, 1999, “Kabe Gaye” was served with a “recommend

removal” letter from asylum authorities contingent upon fingerprint

clearance by law enforcement. On April 21, 2001, “Kabe Gaye” was

directed to appear at the asylum office with his police record

clearance; however, “Gaye” never appeared. The “Kabe Gaye” file was

then referred to the New York ICE office, and subsequently, a

fingerprint comparison was made from imprints by “Gaye” and Saho,

which indicated that they were one and the same person. (Id.) 

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6. On April 9, 2003, Saho was taken into ICE custody for remaining

in the United States in violation of the order of removal. (Id.)

7. Thereafter, between May 29, 2003 and April 5, 2006, a series

of communications between Saho, ICE, and the Gambian consulate

occurred wherein Saho refused to cooperate with ICE in obtaining the

necessary documents to effect his deportation to The Gambia. 

a. On December 3, 2003 and January 6, 2004, Saho advised the

consulate that he wished to remain in the United States

and asked that the consulate not issue travel documents.

b. Between April 11, 2004 and October 6, 2004, ICE made

eight (8) requests of Saho to provide a letter to the

Consulate of The Gambia requesting travel documents; Saho

would not comply with these requests. (Doc. 14, Ex. A-2).

c. On December 9, 2004, the DO learned from the consulate

that, contrary to what Saho had indicated to ICE,

Petitioner had been calling the Gambian Embassy stating

that he did not wish to return to The Gambia. As a

result, the consulate suggested that The Gambia would not

issue travel documents unless Petitioner personally wrote

a letter requesting travel documents. (Id.)

d. On December 17, 2004, Saho refused to speak English in

the presence of a DO officer while being interviewed by

the consulate. (Id.) 

e. Between March 25, 2005 and March 10, 2006, ICE DO

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officers made bi-weekly requests of Saho to provide a

written request to the Gambian Consulate for the issuance

of travel documents, to no avail. (Id.)

f. On April 5, 2006, when asked by DO officers to write a

letter requesting travel documents, Saho refused and

stated that he would not write the letter because the

consulate would issue him a passport and he would have to

go home. (Id.) 

g. The record indicates that on at least 5 occasions (May

30, 2003; March 18, 2004; March 1, 2006; September 21,

2006; November 21, 2006), Saho was provided with an ICE

Form I-229(a) Warning for Failure to Depart, along with

an Instruction Sheet to Detainee Regarding Requirement to

Assist in Removal, detailing Petitioner’s obligation to

assist in effecting his removal from the United States.

(Doc. 14, Ex. A-1, A-2, A-4 to 7).

8. On September 5, 2006, Saho filed the instant petition for writ

of habeas corpus, seeking his immediate release from ICE custody on

the ground that his continued detention by ICE amounts to an

indefinite period of detention in violation of federal law as

interpreted by the United States Supreme Court in Zadvydas v. Davis,

533 U.S. 678, 121 S.Ct. 2491 (2001). (Doc. 1). According to Saho,

he has cooperated fully with ICE; however, the Government has been

unable to remove him to The Gambia. (Doc. 1, p. 5). Petitioner

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Saho filed a Notice of Change of address which reflects

that he was transferred to Elizabeth, New Jersey in November

2006. (Doc. 11).

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asserts that there is no significant likelihood he will be removed

to The Gambia in the reasonably foreseeable future and seeks to be

released under an order of supervision. (Id.)

9. Respondents assert that Saho remains detained because of his

own actions. (Doc. 14). More specifically, Respondents allege that

Saho’s repeated obstructionist acts, including giving ICE false

information concerning his discussions with the consulate, using a

false identity, and his refusals to personally write a letter to the

consulate requesting travel documents, have thereby effectively

prevented his removal to The Gambia. Respondents further assert

that the removal period is tolled if the alien fails or refuses to

cooperate with removal and that in light of Saho’s attempts to

thwart the deportation process, his confinement is proper, and this

action should be dismissed. 

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

As a preliminary matter, the undersigned finds that this Court

has jurisdiction over Petitioner’s case notwithstanding the fact

that he has been transferred out of this District3. The record

reflects that at the time Petitioner filed his petition, he was

being detained at the Perry County Correctional Center, which is

located in this District. (Doc. 1). The proper defendant in a

habeas case is generally the petitioner’s “immediate custodian,”

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that is, the warden of the facility in which the petitioner is

incarcerated or detained at the time he files the habeas petition.

Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 439, 124 S. Ct. 2711, 159 L. Ed.

2d 513 (2004). Based upon a reading of the Supreme Court’s Padilla

decision, it does not appear that Padilla alters the well-settled

rule that if a district court properly acquires jurisdiction when

the case is filed, then the petitioner’s subsequent removal to

another judicial district does not destroy the court’s jurisdiction.

542 U.S. at 440, 124 S. Ct. at 2721, 159 L. Ed. 2d at 531, relying

on Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 306, 65 S. Ct. 208, 89 L. Ed. 243

(1944). Thus, jurisdiction attaches upon the initial filing of the

§ 2241 petition and will not be destroyed by a petitioner’s

subsequent Government-effectuated transfer and accompanying change

in physical custodian. Tang v. Gonzales, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93572

(N.D. Fla. 2006)(citing Mujahid v. Daniels, 413 F.3d 991, 994 (9th

Cir. 2005)).

In Tang, the court observed that the petitioner had been

previously detained in three other facilities before being

transferred to that district and that the petitioner’s case was a

good example of the difficulty that would be caused if jurisdiction

shifted whenever a petitioner was transferred. According to the

court in Tang, “[i]f a § 2241 petition must be transferred every

time the petitioner is transferred, it is doubtful that the case

would ever be decided.” Id. at *6. In this case, the evidence is

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 8 U.S.C. § 1231, entitled “Detention and Removal of Aliens

to be removed,” states in pertinent part:

(a) Detention, release, and removal of aliens ordered

removed

(1) Removal period

(A) In general

Except as otherwise provided in this section,

when an alien is ordered removed, the

Attorney General shall remove the alien from

the United States within a period of 90 days

(in this section referred to as the “removal

period”).

(B) Beginning of period

The removal period begins on the latest of

the following:

(I) the date the order of removal becomes

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undisputed that Petitioner was incarcerated within this District at

the time he filed his § 2241 petition. (Doc. 1). Accordingly, the

undersigned finds that this Court has jurisdiction over Petitioner’s

case notwithstanding the fact that he was transferred out of this

District following the filing of his petition. 

As noted supra, Saho is challenging his continued detention

pending removal. Specifically, Saho asserts that his detention,

since 2003, constitutes an “indefinite detention” not authorized by

8 U.S.C. § 1231(a). Section 1231(a) provides that ordinarily “when

an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General shall remove the

alien from the United States within a period of 90 days.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1231(a)(1)(A). In interpreting § 12314, the Supreme Court, in

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 administratively final.

 

 (ii) If the removal order is judicially

reviewed and if a court orders a stay of the

removal of the alien, the date of the court’s

final Order.

(iii) If the alien is detained or confined

(except under an Immigration process), the

date the alien is released from detention

or confinement.

(C) Suspension of period

The removal period shall be extended beyond a

period of 90 days and the alien may remain in

detention during such extended period if the

alien fails or refuses to make timely

application in good faith

for travel or other documents necessary to

the alien’s departure or conspires or acts to

prevent the alien’s removal subject to an

order of removal.

8 U.S.C. § 1231.

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While Zadvydas considered the detention of legal permanent

aliens beyond the 90-day removal period, the Court, in Clark v.

Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 386 (2005), extended its interpretation

of 1231(a)(6) to inadmissible aliens under 8 U.S.C. § 1182. See

also Benitez v. Wallis, 402 F.3d 1133 (11th Cir. 2005) (relying

on Clark to hold that an inadmissible alien can no longer be

detained beyond the 90-day removal period where there was no

significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable

future). But see Powell v. Ashcroft, 194 F. Supp. 2d 209

(E.D.N.Y. 2002) (finding Zadvydas inapplicable because it did not

address the constitutionality of § 1231(a)(1)(C) and the tolling

of the period of removal due to an alien’s non-cooperation and

noting that Zadvydas was concerned with aliens who were in

“deportation limbo” because their countries of origin refused to

allow them entry).

Zadvydas v. Davis, held that the statute “limits an alien’s postremoval period detention to a period reasonably necessary to bring

about that alien’s removal from the United States. It does not

permit indefinite detention.” 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001).5 The

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Zadvydas Court further stated, however, that “an alien may be held

in confinement until it has been determined that there is no

significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable

future.” Id. at 701. The Court addressed constitutional concerns

by concluding that “once removal is no longer reasonably

foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized by

statute.” Id. at 699. The Court went on to hold that “the

presumptive period during which the detention of an alien is

reasonably necessary to effectuate his removal is six months”

pursuant to § 1231. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 378 (2005).

However, an exception to this requirement, as previously set out,

exists in § 1231(a)(1)(C), and allows for a petitioner’s detention

period to be extended “if the alien fails or refuses to make timely

application in good faith for travel or other documents necessary

to the alien's departure or conspires or acts to prevent the alien's

removal subject to an order of removal.”

In other words, the period of time during which an alien is

uncooperative or acts to hinder his removal tolls the six-month

presumptive period of removal pursuant to Zadvydas. See, e.g., Wang

v. Carbone, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24499 (D.N.J. Oct. 17, 2005)

(calculating presumptive period excluding period of noncooperation). Therefore, in considering whether there appears to

be no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably

foreseeable future, this Court must consider whether Saho’s removal

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Scant evidence has been demonstrated of such efforts. The

Petitioner only provides two specific examples in his petition of

assisting ICE in obtaining travel documents wherein he states

that he “applied three times for travel documents with his

embassy, petitioner has provided necessary biographical

information and all identity documents” and “[o]n or about

December 9, 2005, Petitioner was taken to Washington, DC, in his

embassy in order to apply for travel documents.” (Doc. 1, pp. 3,

5). However, Petitioner does not provide evidence in support of

his contentions.

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Petitioner indicates that, if released, he will reside at

1563 Metropolitan Avenue, Apt MA, Bronx, New York 10462. (Doc.

1).

8

In Seretse-Khama, the Court rejected respondent’s argument

that because Petitioner told his consulate that he did not wish

to return to his country of origin, he was hindering his removal.

The court noted that Petitioner had not “refused to request

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has been delayed or extended by his own efforts. 

In his petition, Saho avers that he has cooperated with efforts

by ICE to repatriate him.6

 While it is true that Saho has been

interviewed by the Gambian consulate on multiple occasions and has

provided the Court with an address of where he would live if

released7, the evidence, when taken in its entirety, shows that Saho

has obstructed the removal process and that his actions have led to

his continued detention. Specifically, Saho does not dispute that

he advised the consulate that he wished to remain in the United

States and asked that the consulate not issue travel documents.

While Petitioner’s truthful statement that he did not wish to return

to his country of origin alone may not be sufficient grounds for

extending post-removal detention, Seretse-Khama v. Ashcroft, 215 F.

Supp.2d 37, 50-53 (D.D.C. 2002)8, he also took the affirmative step

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travel documents or refused to be interviewd by Liberian

officials.” During an interview with the consulate, the

petitioner truthfully answered questions and “honestly told the

Consul that he did not want to return to Liberia in light of his

lack of family in or ties to Liberia, which he left ... when he

was only eight years old.” The court concluded that such a

statement, without more, does not amount to “bad faith failure to

cooperate.” 215 F. Supp. 2d 37, 51 (D.D.C. 2002). In contrast to

Seretse-Khama, Saho, who was 34 years old when he entered the

United States, has not alleged a lack of family or ties to The

Gambia, and he has, in fact, refused to write a letter requesting

travel documents from the consulate. (See Doc. 14, Ex. A-11).

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of calling the consulate, without ICE’s knowledge, in order to ask

the consulate not to issue travel documents. Further, Saho does not

dispute that he has repeatedly refused to write a personal letter

to the consulate requesting said travel documents. In other words,

Saho’s communications go beyond simply stating that he does not wish

to return to The Gambia. He has attempted to thwart the deportation

process. Jian Bin Tang v. Gonzales, 2006 Dist. LEXIS 93576, at *25

(N.D. Fla. Oct. 13, 2006); see also Baghdasaryan v.Chertoff, 2007

WL 2127724, *1 (N.D. Ga. July 25, 2007) (“When an alien acts to

prevent his or her removal, the government may continue to detain

the alien.”); Rodriguez v. Gonzales, 2007 WL 1655604 (N.D. Fla. June

4, 2007) (denying alien’s habeas petition where alien failed to

establish that he had made any effort to assist in his removal or

that he had done all that he was capable of doing to assist ICE);

Lema v. INS, 341 F.3d 853, 856-7 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that “when

an alien refuses to cooperate fully and honestly with officials to

secure travel documents from a foreign government, the alien cannot

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meet his or her burden to show there is no significant likelihood

of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.”); Pelich v.

I.N.S., 329 F.3d 1057, 1060 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Zadvydas does not save

an alien who fails to provide requested documentation to effectuate

his removal. The reason is self-evident: the detainee cannot

convincingly argue that there is no significant likelihood of

removal in the reasonably foreseeable future if the detainee

controls the clock.”). In Pelich v. I.N.S., the Ninth Circuit Court

of Appeals addressed this issue in a similar case and held the

following:

The risk of indefinite detention that motivated the

Supreme Court's statutory interpretation in Zadvydas does

not exist when an alien is the cause of his own

detention. Unlike the aliens in Zadvydas, Pelich has the

“keys [to his freedom] in his pocket” and could likely

effectuate his removal by providing the information

requested by the INS.

329 F. 3d at 1060.(citing Parra v. Perryman, 172 F.3d 954, 958 (7th

Cir. 1999).

The Gambian consulate has not issued travel documents for Saho,

and it appears that The Gambia’s most recent decision not to grant

Saho travel documents was based almost entirely on Saho’s

representations that he did not wish to return to The Gambia and his

refusal to write a letter requesting travel documents. In fact, the

record reflects that The Gambian Embassy indicated it would not

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Respondents suggest that the Gambian consulate “wishes to

see Saho’s earnest request in writing, if for no other reason, to

protect themselves from claims of assisting in the wrongful

removal of Saho from this country against his wishes.” (Doc. 14).

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issue travel documents without a request from Saho; thus, a personal

letter from Saho requesting travel documents is all that is needed

to begin the process of issuing travel documents. (Doc. 14, Exs. A3, A-8, A-11)9

. Because of Saho’s refusal to write a letter

requesting the travel documents, ICE’s request for travel documents

for Saho have essentially been ignored by the Gambian consulate.

(Doc. 14, Ex. A-10). Clearly, Saho holds the “keys [to his

freedom] in his pocket” and could likely secure removal by providing

the letter requested by the Gambian consulate. Simply put, Saho has

caused the extended detention about which he now complains due to

his failure to cooperate. In light of such, Saho cannot demonstrate

that “there is no significant likelihood of removal in the

reasonably foreseeable future.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. Saho’s

non-cooperation with ICE has tolled the six-month removal period.

Accordingly, the undersigned finds that Saho has failed to establish

that his continued detention is improper under 8 U.S.C. §

1231(a)(1)(C).

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the undersigned recommends that this Court

dismiss, without prejudice, Saho’s petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

The attached sheet contains important information regarding

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objections to the report and recommendation of the undersigned

magistrate judge.

Done this the 9th day of June, 2008.

 /s/ SONJA F. BIVINS 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S EXPLANATION OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS

AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION

AND FINDINGS CONCERNING NEED FOR TRANSCRIPT

1. Objection. Any party who objects to this recommendation or anything

in it must, within ten days of the date of service of this document, file

specific written objections with the clerk of court. Failure to do so

will bar a de novo determination by the district judge of anything in the

recommendation and will bar an attack, on appeal, of the factual findings

of the magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)©); Lewis v. Smith, 855

F.2d 736, 738 (11th Cir. 1988). The procedure for challenging the

findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge is set out in more

detail in SD ALA LR 72.4 (June 1, 1997), which provides, in part, that:

A party may object to a recommendation entered by a magistrate

judge in a dispositive matter, that is, a matter excepted by

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), by filing a “Statement of Objection

to Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation” within ten days after

being served with a copy of the recommendation, unless a

different time is established by order. The statement of

objection shall specify those portions of the recommendation

to which objection is made and the basis for the objection.

The objecting party shall submit to the district judge, at the

time of filing the objection, a brief setting forth the

party’s arguments that the magistrate judge’s recommendation

should be reviewed de novo and a different disposition made.

It is insufficient to submit only a copy of the original brief

submitted to the magistrate judge, although a copy of the

original brief may be submitted or referred to and

incorporated into the brief in support of the objection.

Failure to submit a brief in support of the objection may be

deemed an abandonment of the objection.

A magistrate judge’s recommendation cannot be appealed to a Court

of Appeals; only the district judge’s order or judgment can be appealed.

2. Opposing party’s response to the objection. Any opposing party may

submit a brief opposing the objection within ten (10) days of being

served with a copy of the statement of objection. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72;

SD ALA LR 72.4(b). 

3. Transcript (applicable where proceedings tape recorded). Pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b), the magistrate judge finds

that the tapes and original records in this action are adequate for

purposes of review. Any party planning to object to this recommendation,

but unable to pay the fee for a transcript, is advised that a judicial

determination that transcription is necessary is required before the

United States will pay the cost of the transcript.

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