Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_06-cv-01084/USCOURTS-azd-3_06-cv-01084-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Joan G. Uhl, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Lake Havasu City; et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 06-1084-PHX-JAT

ORDER

Defendants have filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #44). The Court now

rules on the motion.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Joan Uhl worked for Lake Havasu City as a City Prosecutor from July 2000

until October 2004. Ms. Uhl’s boss was City Attorney Maureen George. Ms. George made

the decision to fire Ms. Uhl. 

Ms. Uhl argues Ms. George terminated her in retaliation for discussing with Ms.

George: 1) that the City had awarded money to a social services agency headed by Richard

Miers, who had a prior conviction for embezzlement; and (2) that Finance Director Mike

Ashley had misused his City credit card. Ms. Uhl sued under §1983 for violation of her First

Amendment rights. Ms. George undisputedly had nothing to do with hiring or funding the

Miers agency and had no authority to take any action regarding alleged credit car misuse by

Mr. Ashley. 

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Ms. Uhl claims that she first raised her concern regarding the Miers conviction in

2001. She allegedly discussed the Miers issue again with Ms. George in 2003 and July of

2004. By July of 2004, the local newspaper had widely publicized the Miers conviction. Ms.

Uhl admits that she never went to the Lake Havasu City Counsel or the City Manager or the

public at large regarding Miers. Ms. Uhl admits that Ms. George had praised her in

performance reviews for raising the Miers issue.

Ms. George claims she first mentioned Ashley’s alleged credit card misuse in 2003

and again in 2004. Ms. Uhl allegedly told Ms. George in 2003 that Ms. Uhl had heard

Ashley was misusing his City credit card, and Ms. Uhl commented again in 2004 that she

couldn’t believe Ashley was still misusing his credit card. Ms. Uhl never discussed the

alleged misuse with the City Council, a City Manager, or the public at large. Ms. George

herself approached four different City Managers about Ashley. By the time of Ms. Uhl’s

termination, the City police were discussing Mr. Ashley’s use of his credit card. 

Ms. Uhl alleges two adverse employment actions – withholding of an annual

evaluation and her ultimate termination. In the summer of 2004, Ms. George failed to give

Ms. Uhl her annual performance evaluation. Ms. Uhl had to have the performance evaluation

to receive her annual raise. Ms. Uhl alleges that Ms. George withheld the performance

evaluation in retaliation for Ms. Uhl’s comments about Miers and Ashely. Ms. George

claims that she did not fill out the performance evaluation on time because she was very busy

with a project at work. Ms. George apologized for the delay and reassured Ms. Uhl that she

would receive any pay increase retroactive to July 2004. 

Ms. George terminated Ms. Uhl on October 7, 2004. Ms. George argues that she

terminated Ms. Uhl because of a few citizen complaints and because of Ms. Uhl’s behavior

on the job. Ms. Uhl’s written notice of termination did not list a reason for the termination.

Ms. Uhl alleges that Ms. George told her that she was being terminated because they just

weren’t getting along. 

In this case, Ms. George has maintained that she fired Ms. Uhl because of: (1) a

citizen complaint from a couple who attended a criminal proceeding with their daughter; (2)

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another citizen complaint from a person with whom Ms. Uhl had an encounter regarding his

driving in front of the Police Department; and (3) a phone call with a City Council member

that Ms. George believed presented a potential ethical problem. At approximately the same

time she terminated Ms. Uhl, Ms. George reported the City Council phone call to the Arizona

State Bar. The Bar did not take any disciplinary action regarding the incident.

At one point, Ms. Uhl went to the EEOC and indicated she believed that Ms. George

fired her because of her gender. Later, she claimed that Ms. George terminated her in

retaliation for talking with a City Council member about alleged sexual harassment from a

City Manager. Ms. Uhl then filed this action on April 18, 2006, based on retaliation for the

two comments previously discussed. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary

judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56©. Thus, summary judgment is mandated,

"...against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof

at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). 

III. MATTER OF PUBLIC CONCERN

In order to prevail on a claim for First Amendment retaliation, an employee must

show: “(1) that he or she engaged in protected speech; (2) that the employer took ‘adverse

employment action;’ and (3) that his or her speech was a ‘substantial or motivating’ factor

for the adverse employment.” Coszalter v. City of Salem, 320 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2003)

(quoting Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 675 (1996)). The First

Amendment protects an employee’s speech if the speech addresses “‘a matter of legitimate

public concern.’” Id. (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 571 (1968)). If the

employee did not speak on a matter of public concern, then the employee has no First

Amendment cause of action based on the employer’s reaction to the speech. Garcetti v.

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Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1958 (2006). The Court decides as a matter of law

whether the employee’s speech involved a matter of public concern. Connick v. Myers, 461

U.S. 138, 148 n.7 (1983).

The Court must determine whether an employee’s speech addresses a matter of public

concern by reviewing the “content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by

the whole record.” Id. at 147-48. Although the Court considers the content of the speech

first and foremost, form and context also inform the Court’s decision regarding whether

speech is protected. Ulrich v. City and County of San Francisco, 308 F.3d 968, 979 (9th Cir.

2002). Ms. Uhl bases her retaliation claim on her two statements in 2004 regarding the Miers

issue and the Ashley issue. The Court therefore will analyze the content, form, and context

of those statements.

Ms. Uhl’s 2004 statements about Mr. Miers, a convicted embezzler who headed a

social services agency receiving contracts from the City, and Mr. Ashley, a City Finance

Director who allegedly mis-used his City credit card, involved alleged possible misuses of

City funds. Courts have found that the misuse of public funds is a topic of public interest.

Keyser v. Sacramento City Unified School Dist., 265 F.3d 741, 747 (9th Cir. 2001). But the

mere fact that an employee’s speech relates to public monies does not, by itself, qualify that

speech as touching on a matter of public concern. Rahn v. Drake Center, Inc., 31 F.3d 407,

412 (6th Cir. 1994) (“The mere fact that public monies and government efficiency are related

to the subject of a public employee’s speech do not, by themselves, qualify that speech as

being addressed to a matter of public concern.).

While the content of Ms. Uhl’s speech involves a topic of public interest, the form and

context of her comments belie any “public nature.” Her remarks in 2004 were comments to

a co-worker, who also happens to be her supervisor, regarding topics of general interest – for

instance, “I can’t believe he is still misusing his card.” The Court must consider the context

and form of the statements to avoid turning a water cooler conversation into an actionable

constitutional violation. Weeks v. Bayer, 246 F.3d 1231, 1235-36 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating,

“This was mere every-day conversation between government employees. To protect this

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single comment would go a long way toward rendering actionable every job-related

conversation between government employees. Water cooler conversation would become the

stuff of First Amendment claims, and casual remarks about work would be elevated to

constitutional complaints.”).

“The form and context of the speech may help to characterize it as relating to a matter

of [public concern] if, for example, the forum where the speech activity takes place is not

confined merely to the public office where the speaker is employed.” Holder v. City of

Allentown, 987 F.2d 188, 195 (3d Cir. 1993). Although a matter can be of public concern

even when the employee speaks only privately on a matter, Connick, 461 U.S. at 146, an

employee’s attempt to reach the general public is relevant. Havekost v. U.S. Dep’t of Navy,

925 F.2d 316, 318-19 (9th Cir. 1991) (“One critical inquiry is whether the employee spoke

in order to bring wrongdoing to light . . .”).

Ms. Uhl had approached Ms. George regarding the Miers and Ashley issues in

previous years. Ms. Uhl never attempted to communicate with the public or with anyone

who had power over City contracts or Mr. Ashley. By the time she made the comments she

relies on in this suit, the Miers issue had appeared in the paper. Further, her comment

regarding Mr. Ashley – that she could not believe Ashley was still mis-using his credit card

(DSOF ¶17), does not indicate an attempt “to bring wrongdoing to light.” Both remarks were

nothing more than comments made to a co-worker that happened to concern topics of general

interest. The Court therefore will not extend First Amendment protection to Ms. Uhl’s

comments as matters of public concern. Because Ms. Uhl has not satisfied the first element

of a First Amendment retaliation claim, the Court will not analyze the remaining elements.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED GRANTING Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.

#44).

DATED this 12th day of March, 2008.

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