Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01942/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-01942-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 450
Nature of Suit: Interstate Commerce
Cause of Action: 28:1441nr Notice of Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NATIONAL CITY PUPPY, LLC

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF NATIONAL CITY

Defendants.

Case No.: 19cv1942-LAB (BGS)

ORDER OF REMAND

Defendant City of National City removed this action from state court on the 

basis of federal question jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441. The Court

ordered the City to show cause why this action should not be remanded. (“Order 

to Show Cause,” Docket no. 3.) The City has now filed its response. (“Response,” 

Docket no. 9.)

Legal Standards

The Court is always obligated to inquire into its own jurisdiction, Chapman v. 

Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 954 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc), and must 

confirm its jurisdiction before deciding any issue on the merits. See Valdez v. 

Allstate Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 1115, 1116 (9th Cir. 2004), This is particularly true in 

removed actions, where the Court is obligated to remand if, at any time, jurisdiction 

is lacking. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); Smith v. Mylan Inc., 761 F.3d 1042, 1044 (9th Cir. 

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2014). There is a “strong presumption” against removal, and the removing party 

always bears the burden of showing that removal is proper. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 

980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir.1992) (citation omitted). “Federal jurisdiction must be 

rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.” Id. And 

in any action, federal jurisdiction is presumed to be lacking, until it is affirmatively 

established. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 n.3 (2006).

When determining whether federal question is present, the Court examines 

the complaint as it existed at the time of removal. See Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 

582 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2009). “The threshold requirement for removal under 

28 U.S.C. § 1441 is a finding that the complaint contains a cause of action that is 

within the original jurisdiction of the district court.” Id. (further citations omitted). 

Under the “well-pleaded complaint rule,” federal question jurisdiction is present 

only when a federal question is presented on the face of the face of the plaintiff’s 

properly pleaded complaint. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). 

The caveat that the complaint be well-pleaded or properly pleaded means that a 

plaintiff cannot avoid federal jurisdiction by “omitting from the complaint federal law 

essential to his claim, or by casting in state law terms a claim that can be made 

only under federal law.” Rains v. Criterion Sys., Inc., 80 F.3d 339, 344 (9th

Cir.1996) (further citations omitted). But otherwise, the plaintiff is master of its 

complaint, and may plead its claims in a way that avoids federal jurisdiction. 

California ex rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc., 375 F.3d 831, 838–39 (9th Cir. 2004).

As the Court’s Order to Show Cause pointed out, federal question jurisdiction 

is not present in every case involving an appeal to federal law or the U.S. 

Constitution. See Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 

U.S. 308, 314 (2005). Federal question jurisdiction is present only where a wellpleaded complaint shows either that federal law creates the cause of action, or the 

plaintiff’s right to relief “necessarily depends on a substantial question of federal 

law.” Armstrong v. N. Mariana Islands, 576 F.3d 950, 954–55 (9th Cir. 2009). A 

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right created by federal law “must be an element, and an essential one, of the 

plaintiff’s cause of action.” Dynegy, 375 F.3d at 838 (quoting Gully v. First Nat’l 

Bank in Meridian, 299 U.S. 109, 112 (1936)). “When a claim can be supported by 

alternative and independent theories—one of which is a state law theory and one 

of which is a federal law theory—federal question jurisdiction does not attach 

because federal law is not a necessary element of the claim.” Rains, 80 F.3d at

346.

The Complaint

The complaint brings two causes of action, each based on multiple theories. 

Some of the theories are federal in nature (see, e.g., Compl., ¶¶ 27 (Commerce 

Clause), 33 (Equal Protection Clause)), and some are based on California 

statutory law. (See, e.g., id., ¶¶ 36 (preemption by California Health & Safety Code 

§ 122354.5).) Some theories are alternatively federal and state (see id., ¶¶ 31 

(procedural due process under U.S. and California constitution); or are ambiguous

as to whether they arise under federal law, state law, or both. (See id., ¶ 28 (void 

for vagueness, ambiguous, arbitrary, and discriminatory).)1 The first claim seeks 

an injunction forbidding the ordinance from being enforced because it is 

“unconstitutional, invalid and unenforceable” (Compl., ¶ 25 and Prayer for Relief, 

¶ 1), and the second seeks a declaration that the ordinance is “unconstitutional 

and/or otherwise invalid and unenforceable[.]” (Id., ¶ 38 and Prayer for Relief, ¶ 2.)

 

1 In support of this argument, the Complaint does not cite either the U.S. or 

California Constitution, even indirectly. The substance of the argument is that the 

ordinance Plaintiff challenges should have been identified as criminal, civil, or 

administrative in nature, so that the public would know whether its violation would 

result in an administrative warning, a civil nuisance lawsuit, or a misdemeanor 

charge. A “void for vagueness” challenge can be brought under either the 

California constitution or the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. See 

People v. Toledo, 26 Cal.4th 221, 228–29 (2001) (discussing “void for vagueness” 

doctrine with reference to both the U.S. and California constitutions).

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Discussion

Although the Court directed the City’s attention to several issues that needed 

to be addressed, the City’s Response fails to do so. 

As the Order to Show Cause pointed out, neither of Plaintiff’s claims arises 

under state law, and federal law is not an essential element of either claim. Both 

are based on a variety of theories, some federal and some state. Plaintiff could 

prevail on both claims and obtain all the relief it is seeking without any reference 

to federal law at all. By way of example, a court could determine that the ordinance 

in question violated procedural due process under the California constitution 

(without reaching the federal due process question), or that it was preempted by 

California Health & Safety Code § 122354.5, and could enjoin the ordinance and 

declare it invalid on either of these grounds alone. While a court could reach federal 

questions in order to decide all claims in Plaintiff’s favor, it need not do so. Because 

it need not reach questions of federal law, federal law is not an essential element 

of either of the claims.

The Order to Show Cause also pointed out that the Complaint did not identify

federal law as creating either claim. The Response does not point to any federal 

statute that would authorize the claims Plaintiff is bringing, and none is apparent.

For example, neither claim can reasonably be construed as a claim under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983, because each relies on both state and federal rights. See Ove v. 

Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817, 824 (9th Cir. 2001) (§ 1983 claim can only be based on 

violation of federal law).

The complaint as it stands is probably not properly pled under California law. 

See Allen v. City of Sacramento, 234 Cal. App. 4th 41, 65–66 (Cal. App. 3 Dist. 

2015) (holding that claim for an injunction forbidding the enforcement of an 

ordinance was not, by itself, a cause of action). But the Court looks to the 

Complaint as pled, not as Plaintiff might have pled it. See Rains, 80 F.3d at 344. 

Any pleading error could be corrected without creating federal question jurisdiction, 

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because Plaintiff did not rely on any federal law (such as § 1983) as creating its 

claims, and because federal law is not an essential element of either claim.

The Complaint makes clear Plaintiff believes the ordinance violates several 

of Plaintiff’s rights, and Plaintiff wants it enjoined and declared unenforceable. The 

Complaint treats various rights as theories, not separate claims. Plaintiff is not, for 

example, seeking separate damages for violations of particular rights, or treating 

violation of each right as a separate cause of action. Rather, Plaintiff wants only 

an injunction forbidding the ordinance’s enforcement and a declaration that the 

ordinance is unenforceable for at least one of the reasons identified in the 

complaint. In the Complaint as it stands now, Plaintiff’s right to relief does not 

depend on the construction or application of federal law. Plaintiff can prevail and 

obtain everything the Complaint is asking for solely on the basis of California law.

The City’s Response ignores issues that the Court’s Order to Show Cause 

raised. It also ignores both the language of the Complaint and its substance, even 

though the Order to Show Cause pointed out state law theories just as this order 

has done, supra. The Order to Show Cause made clear it was construing Plaintiff’s 

separately-enumerated claims for an injunction and declaration as claims, and 

arguments in favor of each as theories, not separate claims (see Order to Show 

Cause at 1:21–23, 2:2–4, 2:18), but the Response without explanation dismisses 

the Court’s construction and treats each of Plaintiff’s theories as if it were a 

separate claim. 

Attorneys commonly confuse claims with theories in this analysis. See 

Tanner v. Kaiser, 2015 WL 6081771, at *4 (N.D. Cal., Oct. 15, 2015) (citing Rains) 

(pointing out plaintiff’s conflation of theories with claims). That said, once the Court 

pointed out the difference, the City should have looked more closely and 

addressed this issue. If the Court had misconstrued the Complaint, this was the 

City’s opportunity to point that out. Instead, the Response stubbornly avoids the 

question, baldly asserting that the claims are based solely upon rights secured by 

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the U.S. Constitution, and calling them the “crux” and “heart” of the Complaint. 

(See Response at 3:20–21; 4:17–19.) It all but ignores state law theories, and 

sidesteps the question of whether they provide a sufficient basis for Plaintiff’s 

claims.

The Response also confuses federal question jurisdiction with supplemental 

jurisdiction, citing Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 349 (1988) and 

City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156 (1997) as controlling. Those 

cases, however, dealt with complaints that included both federal and state claims. 

Plaintiff might have drafted its complaint to include both types of claims, and if it 

had done so, the Court could have exercised jurisdiction over them. But Plaintiff 

was not required to plead its claims this way, and did not.

Finally, the Response asserts that federal courts “routinely” exercise 

jurisdiction over challenges to ordinances like this one, and string-cites six cases 

from other courts, as well as one other previously-filed case in this District. The 

City apparently did not look at the complaints in those cases, however. Had it done 

so, it would have seen that in every case, at least one claim arose under federal 

law, and adjudication of that claim would have required the courts to decide a 

substantial question of federal law. The Complaint in this case looks nothing like 

the complaints in those cases. 

Conclusion and Order

The City has failed to show that this Court can exercise jurisdiction over the 

removed action, and thus has failed to meet its burden of showing that removal 

was proper, or to overcome the “strong presumption” against removal. See Gaus, 

980 F.2d at 566. Because the Court cannot reach the merits of the case, all 

pending motions are DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE and all pending dates or 

deadlines are VACATED. This action is REMANDED to the Superior Court of 

California for the County of San Diego. 

/ / /

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But the Court retains jurisdiction over the issue of the propriety of removal, 

and this order does not prevent Plaintiff from seeking costs or sanctions based on 

improper removal.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 25, 2019

Honorable Larry Alan Burns

Chief United States District Judge

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