Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-00706/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-00706-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT AUSTIN JOHNSON, No. 2:13-cv-0706-CMK-P

Plaintiff, 

vs. ORDER

SIERRA CONSERVATION CENTER, et al.

Defendants.

 /

Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is plaintiff’s complaint (Doc. 1).

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or

malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief

from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover,

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “short and plain statement

of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This means

that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172,

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1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the

complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it

rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because plaintiff must allege

with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the

claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is

impossible for the court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague

and conclusory. 

I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff alleges in his complaint that the defendants have failed to protect him

against a potential serious threat of harm. He states that while housed at Sierra Conservation

Center, he was in an altercation with another inmate, Turcot. As a result of that altercation, both

plaintiff and inmate Turcot were reassigned and set to be transferred to another institution. 

Plaintiff states that he was told he would be transferred to “SADF” and that such a transfer would

place him in danger as inmate Turcot was also to be transferred there and he had friends in every

yard at that facility. He claims such a transfer would place him at substantial risk of serious

harm. Since filing this action, plaintiff has been transferred to California State Prison, Corcoran.

II. DISCUSSION

The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which the

prisoner is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel

and unusual punishment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); Farmer v. Brennan,

511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth Amendment “. . . embodies broad and idealistic concepts

of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102

(1976). Conditions of confinement may, however, be harsh and restrictive. See Rhodes v.

Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Nonetheless, prison officials must provide prisoners with

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“food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Toussaint v. McCarthy,

801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only

when two requirements are met: (1) objectively, the official’s act or omission must be so serious

such that it results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities; and (2)

subjectively, the prison official must have acted unnecessarily and wantonly for the purpose of

inflicting harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Thus, to violate the Eighth Amendment, a prison

official must have a “sufficiently culpable mind.” See id. 

Under these principles, prison officials have a duty to take reasonable steps to

protect inmates from physical abuse. See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1250-51 (9th Cir.

1982); Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833. Liability exists only when two requirements are met: (1)

objectively, the prisoner was incarcerated under conditions presenting a substantial risk of

serious harm; and (2) subjectively, prison officials knew of and disregarded the risk. See Farmer,

511 U.S. at 837. The very obviousness of the risk may suffice to establish the knowledge

element. See Wallis v. Baldwin, 70 F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1995). Prison officials are not

liable, however, if evidence is presented that they lacked knowledge of a safety risk. See Farmer,

511 U.S. at 844. The knowledge element does not require that the plaintiff prove that prison

officials know for a certainty that the inmate’s safety is in danger, but it requires proof of more

than a mere suspicion of danger. See Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Finally, the plaintiff must show that prison officials disregarded a risk. Thus, where prison

officials actually knew of a substantial risk, they are not liable if they took reasonable steps to

respond to the risk, even if harm ultimately was not averted. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844. 

Here, plaintiff stated he was going to be transferred to SADF. The court interprets

this to mean he was told he was to be transferred to California Substance Abuse Treatment

Facility and State Prison, Corcoran (SATF). Instead, it appears he has been transferred to

California State Prison, Corcoran (CSP-C). These are two separate facilities, both located in

Corcoran. However, plaintiff claims the risk to his safety lies at SATF, not at CSP-C where he

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was actually transferred to. Therefore, any potential risk to plaintiff’s safety did not come to pass

as he expected.

In addition, plaintiff’s claims of risk are too tenuous to be sufficient to state a

claim. Plaintiff was concerned he would be housed in a yard where inmate Turcot’s friends were

located. He claims he informed the defendants about the risk, providing them with full

knowledge, but the risk was ignored which would likely result in his assault. In order to state a

claim, plaintiff has to allege conditions presenting a substantial risk of serious harm. No such

situation is presented in plaintiff’s complaint. While there may have been a slight risk to plaintiff

if he had been transferred to the same prison as inmate Turcot and assigned to the same yard,

plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts of a substantial risk of harm. There is no indication that

inmate Turcot was likely to attack plaintiff, held plaintiff responsible for his transfer, or had

threatened plaintiff. Similarly, the possibility of transfer to the same prison as inmate Turcot’s

friends, who may or may not know about the altercation, is too speculative to show actual

substantial risk of harm. The mere possibility of harm is insufficient. 

As plaintiff has been transferred to another facility, not SATF where the

possibility harm was alleged to exist, there is no possibility that an amendment can cure the

defects in plaintiff’s complaint. 

III. CONCLUSION

Because it does not appear possible that the deficiencies identified herein can be

cured by amending the complaint, plaintiff is not entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of

the entire action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 

Plaintiff shall show cause in writing, within 30 days of the date of this order, why this action

should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff is warned that failure to respond to

this order may result in dismissal of the action for the reasons outlined above, as well as for

failure to prosecute and comply with court rules and orders. See Local Rule 110. 

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IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: June 6, 2014

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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