Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_05-cv-00636/USCOURTS-almd-2_05-cv-00636-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1346 Breach of Contract

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

JANIE L. KINSEY and C.H. KINSEY, )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:05CV636-F

) [WO]

C. LANCE GOULD, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This matter is before the court on defendant C. Lance Gould’s [“Gould”] Motion to

Dismiss (Doc. # 11) the plaintiffs’ [“Kinseys”] complaint and amended complaint pursuant

to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court entered an Order

requiring the Kinseys to show cause why Gould’s motion should not be granted (Doc. # 13),

and the Kinseys responded (Doc. # 15). Having reviewed the parties’ submissions, the

Magistrate Judge recommends that the motion be granted, and the Kinseys’ claims against

Gould should be dismissed without prejudice. 

DISCUSSION

The Kinseys filed this law suit pro se by completing a form complaint and attaching

a list of monetary demands along with a copy of a letter they had previously sent to the court

Clerk (Doc. # 1). Although hardly clear, these documents, when considered together,

establish that the Kinseys had retained Gould as their legal counsel for the purpose of filing

a lawsuit against the other defendants in this case [“Banks”] . According to the letter

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attached to the form complaint, “When [the Banks] agree [sic] to make a settlement . . . Mr.

Gould stated we have option [sic] take [sic] the settlement or proceed this [sic] case in court.

We explain [sic] to him we [sic] prefer a case in this situation [sic] to the judge and jury, so

he dismiss [sic] himself from” the case (Doc. # 1, p. 5-6). 

In subsequent filings that this court has construed collectively as an amended

complaint, the Kinseys allege that Gould delayed in responding to their initial refusal to settle

and then withdrew as their counsel prior to trial (Docs. # 9, 10). His actions, they allege,

deprived them of a fair trial, were discriminatory, and amounted to negligence, fraud,

trespass, oppression, and wantonness (Docs. # 1, 9, 10).

In his memorandum in support of his motion, Gould contends that an attorney’s

withdrawal from a client’s case does not give rise to a cause of action under either federal

or state law (Doc. # 12, pp. 3-4). Gould also contends that the Kinseys have done nothing

more than “label” their claims without alleging any supporting facts (Doc. # 12, pp. 5-6).

Finally, Gould contends that the attorney-client relationship is “governed by the Alabama

Legal Services Liability Act” and, regardless, the Kinseys have failed to allege that Gould

“violated the standard of care applicable to legal service providers” (Doc. # 12, pp. 6-7). 

The Kinseys responded with no legal arguments and simply restated their belief that

by informing them of their option to decline the settlement offer in favor of a jury trial and

then withdrawing from representation when they decided to exercise that option, Gould

legally wronged them (Doc. # 14). They also appear to contend that Gould had no right to

withdraw from representation without a court order unless they posed a threat to him, though

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they have provided no legal authority in support of this position. Id.

Countered by the exceedingly light burden imposed upon plaintiffs in asserting their

legal claims, FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a), motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim are

infrequently successful. St. Joseph’s Hosp., Inc. v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 795 F.2d 948, 953

(11th Cir. 1986) (“Although authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the liberal

rules as to the sufficiency of a complaint make it a rare case in which a motion on this ground

should be granted”). Gould’s potential success at this stage is further complicated by the

liberal reading the court must afford pleadings submitted by parties acting pro se, see, e.g.,

Tannenbaum v. U.S., 148 F.3d 1262, 1264 (11th Cir. 1998). 

In determining whether to dismiss the Kinseys’ complaint, the court must accept their

allegations as true and may not grant dismissal “unless it appears beyond doubt” that they

“can prove no set of facts in support of [their] claim[s] which would entitle [them] to relief.”

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957), quoted in St. Joseph’s Hosp., 795 F.2d at 953;

see also U.S. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 345 F.3d 866, 880 (11th Cir. 2003); Blackston v. State of

Alabama, 30 F.3d 117, 120 (11th Cir. 1994). 

Although the court offers no opinion regarding the sufficiency of the state law claims

the Kinseys attempt to allege, clearly they have failed to state a federal constitutional or

statutory claim against Gould. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc.

Svcs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989) (stating that the due process clause of the Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution exist to limit the government’s

power and do not offer protection from private actors); see also Diaz v. Sheppard, 85 F.3d

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1502, 1505-05 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that the federal district court lacked jurisdiction over

the plaintiff’s legal malpractice claims); Gonzalez v. Arana, 45 F.3d 423, 1995 WL 32644,

at *1 (1st Cir. 1995) (table) (“In the absence of a specific statute creating a federal cause of

action, the traditional right to relief for legal malpractice is rooted in state law”; citing

O’Melveny & Myers v. F.D.I.C., 512 U.S. 79, 87-89 (1994)). 

The Kinseys’ complaints regarding Gould, sufficient or not, essentially concern legal

malpractice and are, as Gould contends, governed by Alabama law. ALA. CODE §§ 6-5-570

et seq. (2004). In the absence of an allegation of diversity jurisdiction - and in view of its

impropriety in this case - this court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the

Kinseys’ claims against Gould. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332 (2004); see also FED. R. CIV.

P. 12(h)(3) (“Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court

lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action.”). 

Therefore, Gould’s motion should be granted, and the Kinseys’ claims against Gould

should be dismissed without prejudice. See, e.g., Ga. Advocacy Office, Inc. v. Camp, 172

F.3d 1294, 1299 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing to Crotwell v. Hockman-Lewis Ltd., 734 F.2d 767,

769 (11th Cir. 1984) for the proposition that dismissal without prejudice is the proper remedy

when subject matter jurisdiction is lacking).

CONCLUSION

Therefore, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that Gould’s

motion be GRANTED and that the Kinseys’ claims against Gould be DISMISSED

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WITHOUT PREJUDICE. It is further 

ORDERED that the parties are DIRECTED to file any objections to the said

Recommendation on or before 28 November, 2005. Any objections filed must specifically

identify the findings in the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation objected to. Frivolous,

conclusive or general objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties are

advised that this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not

appealable. 

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in the

Magistrate Judge’s report shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the District

Court of issues covered in the report and shall bar the party from attacking on appeal factual

findings in the report accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of plain

error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982). See Stein

v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of

Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (adopting as binding precedent all of the

decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on 30

September 1981). 

DONE this 14 day of November, 2005. th

/s/ Vanzetta Penn McPherson

VANZETTA PENN MCPHERSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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