Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-96-07270/USCOURTS-caDC-96-07270-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 720
Nature of Suit: Labor Management Relations Act
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 11, 1997 Decided November 7, 1997 

No. 96-7270

MADISON HOTEL,

APPELLEE

v.

HOTEL AND RESTAURANT EMPLOYEES, LOCAL 25,

AFL-CIO,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 96cv01433)

Mady Gilson argued the cause for the appellant. David 

M. Silberman and Francis R. Sheed were on brief.

Jonathan W. Greenbaum argued the cause for the appellee.

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Before: SENTELLE, HENDERSON and RANDOLPH, Circuit 

Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge RANDOLPH.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: Appellant Hotel and Restaurant Employees Local 25 (Union) seeks reversal of the district court's summary judgment vacating two 

awards of the Arbitrator in the Union's favor. Because we 

agree with the district court that the awards exceeded the 

scope of the Arbitrator's authority, we affirm the judgment.

The facts, as found by the Arbitrator, are undisputed. In 

July 1992 the Madison Hotel (Hotel) eliminated its food 

service bus positions and shifted bus responsibilities to its 

waiters. The Union, which represented a bargaining unit 

that included the Hotel's waiters and bus employees, filed a 

grievance on behalf of the laid-off employees. On July 24, 

1992 the grievance was submitted to arbitration pursuant to 

the collective bargaining agreement.

On January 2, 1994 the Arbitrator issued a decision in favor 

of the grievants. In the decision the Arbitrator framed the 

"issue" as follows:

Whether the Hotel violated the Agreement by its 

abolishment of the Bus Employee position, its transfer of 

the duties of the Bus Employees to other positions and 

its layoff of the Grievants in July 1992 and, if so, what is 

the appropriate remedy?

JA 19. The Arbitrator balanced the Hotel's management 

rights under the collective bargaining agreement 1against 

__________

1 The "Management Rights" provision of the agreement grants 

the Hotel "the sole right to direct and control the employees, 

including the right to layoff, promote and transfer." JA 32. Construing this language, the Arbitrator concluded "it properly may be 

implied in the absence of express restrictions elsewhere in the 

Agreement, that the Hotel can reassign duties from one position to 

another, even to the extent of completely eliminating one position." 

Id.

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"those provisions which are of great importance to the employees who have worked at the Hotel for many years, i.e. 

provisions which afford employees rights in the matters of 

seniority, classification, layoff projections, retention of seniority following a layoff, etc," JA 32.2 He concluded: "For the 

Hotel to take the drastic action of not just laying off employees during the period of slack business, as contemplated by 

the Agreement, but to instead completely eliminate their 

positions and reassign substantially all of their remaining 

duties to another position, the Hotel must demonstrate a 

legitimate business reason, i.e., a reason beyond mere 'slackness of business,' " a showing he determined the Hotel had 

not made. JA 32. Accordingly, the Arbitrator ordered the 

following remedy:

The Hotel is directed to reinstate the Grievants to 

their former positions and to make them whole for all 

losses, including seniority, attributable to their improper 

layoff. Pursuant to the Parties [sic] agreement to bifurcate this proceeding, the Parties are directed to attempt 

to resolve this matter and, if unsuccessful, either Party 

may return this matter to the Arbitrator for further 

proceedings with respect to the remedial aspects only.

JA 36.

__________

2 The Arbitrator specifically cited section 12.2(a) of the collective 

bargaining agreement which provides:

(a) It is recognized that the principle of seniority shall 

normally be followed when it becomes necessary to layoff [sic] 

employees due to slackness of business.

JA 78. Section 12.2(b) explains section 12.2(a):

(b) That is, normally, the employee on duty in the station in 

which the reduction is being made having a shorter period of 

continuous service shall be laid off before any other employee 

having a longer period of continuous service; and preference to 

laid off employees shall be given in reemployment within the 

particular station or category.

Id.

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When it turned out that none of the grieving bus employees 

desired reinstatement,3the Hotel took the position that the 

dispute was at an end while the Union insisted that the 

Arbitrator's award required that the bus positions be reestablished and filled by new employees. On December 14, 1994 

the Union wrote the Arbitrator requesting "clarification" of 

the matter. After receiving a response from the Hotel, the 

Arbitrator decided by letter dated February 6, 1995 that, 

despite the mootness of the bus employees' grievance, the 

Hotel was required to reestablish the positions because his 

original decision treated the abolition of positions and the 

layoff of the grievants as separate elements in both the 

statement of the "issue," which characterized them as distinct 

violations of the agreement, and the remedy, which "necessarily" contemplated that the positions be reestablished before 

the employee grievants were reinstated. The Arbitrator then 

concluded:

At the point of offering each identified Grievant reinstatement to the restored Bus Employee positions, if any 

such offer to fill one of these restored positions is not 

accepted by a Grievant, such restored position becomes a 

vacancy subject to being filled in accordance with the 

applicable provisions of the Agreement. A restored position cannot be eliminated solely because a Grievant elected not to accept the offer to be reinstated in such 

position.

JA 39.

On April 18, 1995 the Union filed an action in the district 

court to enforce the Arbitrator's award. On February 13, 

1996 the district court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, concluding it was "not ripe for adjudication" because 

the Arbitrator had "not issued a final remedial order." 955 

F. Supp. at 2.

__________

3 Most of the grievants had accepted a monetary award in lieu of 

reinstatement pursuant to a settlement in an unrelated employment 

discrimination action against the Hotel. Other grievants had obtained employment on the Hotel's staff of waiters.

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On June 6, 1996 the Arbitrator issued a final remedial 

order, reaching the same conclusion as he had in the February 6, 1995 letter. The Arbitrator again asserted that his 

statement of the "issue" in his original (January 2, 1994) 

decision treated separately the abolition of positions and the 

layoff of the grievants. He then characterized the original 

remedy as "an attempt to recreate the status quo ante the 

Hotel's violation of the Agreement," namely "restaurant and 

Room Service facilities which operated with Bus Employees," 

JA 48, and observed that "the Hotel never has returned to 

the status quo ante," JA 49. The Arbitrator determined that 

his original decision had "necessarily found that the bargaining unit employees generally, as well as the specific individuals who filed the grievance, have a seniority right to have as 

many positions in the bargaining unit as possible in which to 

bump in the event of an economic layoff pursuant to the 

provisions of Article 12, Section 12.2(a)" of the collective 

bargaining agreement. JA 48. According to the Arbitrator, 

"[t]he Union, as the representative of all of the unit employees, has an interest in protecting the seniority rights of all of 

the unit employees and preserved its right to do so in this 

case by raising in this grievance the issue of the abolishment 

of the classification as well as the layoff of the particular 

Grievants." JA 48. Finally, the Arbitrator stated: "The 

Hotel ... has not identified any 'changed circumstances', 

other than the passage of time, nor has the Hotel identified 

any legitimate business reasons which occurred since the 

classifications improperly were abolished which after-theviolation business reasons, arguably, would mitigate against a 

remedial order requiring the Hotel to reinstate the classification and to fill it until such time as the Hotel has a proper 

justification for abolishing it." JA 49. The Arbitrator then 

issued the following final award:

The Hotel is directed to reinstate the Bus Employee 

classification for its restaurant outlets and for its Room 

Service operations and to fill the number of Bus Employee positions in each area which existed at the time of the 

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tions until it can demonstrate an appropriate basis, under 

the Agreement, to abolish such positions.

JA 49.

On June 20, 1996 the Hotel filed an action to vacate the 

Arbitrator's award and the Union counterclaimed for enforcement. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district 

court granted judgment in the Hotel's favor on December 17, 

1996, concluding that the Arbitrator "exceeded the scope of 

his jurisdiction, both by deviating from the issues submitted 

for arbitration and by issuing an award that does not draw its 

essence from the parties' agreement." Madison Hotel v. 

Hotel & Restaurant Employees Local 25, 955 F. Supp. 1, 3 

(D.D.C. 1996). The Union appeals the judgment. We conclude that the district court correctly held the Arbitrator's 

final award went beyond the scope of his authority, which was 

limited to arbitrating the laid-off bus employees' grievance.4

The "scope of review of an arbitrator's award interpreting a 

collective bargaining agreement is extremely narrow." 

American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal 

Serv., 52 F.3d 359, 361 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (citing United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567 

(1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf 

Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 

593, 597 (1960)). " '[A] labor arbitration award must be 

enforced if the arbitrator acts within the confines of his 

jurisdiction and his award draws its essence from the parties' 

collective bargaining agreement; this is so even when a 

reviewing court disagrees with the arbitrator's judgment on 

the merits.' " United States Postal Serv. v. National Ass'n of 

Letter Carriers, 810 F.2d 1239, 1241 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (quoting 

Northwest Airlines v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 808 F.2d 76, 78 

__________

4 Because we affirm on this ground we need not address the 

district court's alternative holding, that the award did not draw its 

essence from the collective bargaining agreement. Nor do we 

express any opinion on the merits of the Arbitrator's interpretation 

of the contract based on the rights of the Union and non-bus 

employees.

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(D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1014 (1988)). Nevertheless, " 'arbitration is a matter of contract and a party 

cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which 

he has not agreed so to submit.' " AT&T Technologies, Inc. 

v. Communications Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986) 

(quoting United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 

582); see Davis v. Chevy Chase Fin. Ltd., 667 F.2d 160, 165 

(D.C. Cir. 1981) (citing United Steelworkers v. Warrior &

Gulf, 363 U.S. at 582) ("[A]rbitration is, however, a matter of 

contract, and the contours of the arbitrator's authority in a 

given case are determined by reference to the arbitral agreement."). Thus, "[t]here is no duty to arbitrate matters not 

subject to the arbitration agreement, and no authority on the 

part of arbitrators to consider matters not necessary to the 

resolution of disputes actually submitted." Williams v. E.F. 

Hutton & Co., 753 F.2d 117, 119 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (citing 

Davis, 667 F.2d at 165). "In determining the scope of an 

arbitrator's authority we look to two sources: the collective 

bargaining agreement, and the submission of the parties to 

the arbitrator." Washington-Baltimore Newspaper Guild, 

Local 35 v. Washington Post Co., 442 F.2d 1234, 1236 (D.C. 

Cir. 1971); see also Piggly Wiggly Operators' Warehouse, 

Inc. v. Piggly Wiggly Operators' Warehouse Indep. Truck 

Drivers Union, Local No. 1, 611 F.2d 580, 584 (5th Cir. 1980) 

("However, once the parties have gone beyond their promise 

to arbitrate and have actually submitted an issue to an 

arbiter, we must look both to their contract and to the 

submission of the issue to the arbitrator to determine his 

authority."). Accordingly, we now examine the arbitration 

provisions in the collective bargaining agreement and the 

grievance as submitted by the Union to the Arbitrator to 

determine the intended scope of the arbitration.

We first consider the parties' agreement. "[T]he question 

of arbitrabilitywhether a collective-bargaining agreement 

creates a duty for the parties to arbitrate the particular 

grievanceis undeniably an issue for judicial determination. 

Unless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise, the question of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate 

is to be decided by the court, not the arbitrator." AT&T 

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Technologies, 475 U.S. at 649. The agreement here provided 

only very generally for arbitration of "a grievance or misunderstanding aris[ing] out of and during the term of [the] 

agreement" provided the grievance is not first resolved by the 

"joint grievance subcommittee." Collective Bargaining 

Agreement § 17.1 (filed July 9, 1996 in district court as 

attachment 1 to defendant's Answer & Counterclaim). The 

issue the Arbitrator ultimately resolved belowwhether the 

Union or its non-busing members have a right to reestablishment of the bus positionsseems to come within the broad 

class of subjects arbitrable under the agreement. We must 

next look at the grievance as submitted by the parties to the 

Arbitrator to determine how it further limits the scope of the 

arbitration.

The Union commenced the arbitration on July 24, 1992, 

filing with the Arbitrator a letter addressed to the Hotel's 

Managing Director which stated that the Union was "opposing and taking to arbitration the action taken by your establishment against the above captioned employee." Arbitration 

Letter (filed Sept. 12, 1997) (emphasis added.) The caption 

identified the grievant "employee" as "Bus employees/Local 

25 members." Id. Thus, the letter manifests that the grievance was taken to arbitration only on behalf of the bus 

employees in Local 25 and not on behalf of the Union itself or 

of non-bus employees, as the district court concluded.5

The Union contends the letter is irrelevant because it is an 

"informal" document largely ignored by the parties themselves. The Arbitrator, however, apparently considered the 

letter of significance, describing the nature of the grievance 

by reference to it and noting in the first sentence of his 

original decision that its filing on July 24, 1992 was "on behalf 

of" each of the individually named grieving bus employees. 

JA 18. Nevertheless, even without the letter we would be 

bound to conclude, based on the Arbitrator's decisions, that 

arbitration was sought on behalf of the named individual 

__________

5 The arbitration letter was filed with this court after oral argument and was not before the district court.

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grievant bus employees only and that its scope was limited 

thereby.

If there is in fact no written submission to the Arbitrator 

specifying the issue to be resolved, the scope of arbitration 

must be determined from the conduct of the parties. Matteson v. Ryder Sys. Inc., 99 F.3d 108, 114 (3d Cir. 1996); 

International Chem. Workers Union, Local No. 566 v. Mobay 

Chem. Corp., 755 F.2d 1107, 1110 (4th Cir. 1985); Ficek v. 

Southern Pac. Co., 338 F.2d 655, 656 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. 

denied, 380 U.S. 988. Here the parties' conduct in pursuing 

the arbitration, insofar as it is discernible from the Arbitrator's determinations, manifests an intent, at least at the time 

of the submission and original hearing, to limit arbitration to 

a resolution of the individual grievants' rights.

The Arbitrator's original decision plainly recites that the 

grievance was "filed ... on behalf of" the eight named 

grievants, as we noted above, and that each grievant "was 

employed as a Bus Employee at the Madison Hotel." JA 18. 

In the decision the Arbitrator identified the abolition of 

positions and the layoffs (as well as the transfer of duties) as 

a single "issue" for which he needed to ascertain a single 

"appropriate remedy," JA 19. He resolved the issue by 

recourse to the reasonable expectation of a classification's 

laid-off employees (here the bus employees) that they would 

be recalled when business improved and the frustration of the 

expectation "if the classifications completely are eliminated at 

the time of the layoff." JA 33. Significantly, however, the 

decision made no mention of the rights or expectations of 

employees in other classifications not subject to layoff and 

elimination, such as the non-bus unit employees here on 

whose rights the Arbitrator based his determination in his 

final remedial order that the remedy remained in force 

despite the departure of all of the grieving bus employees. 

Finally, the remedy the Arbitrator originally fashioned simply 

directed the Hotel "to reinstate the Grievants to their former 

positions and to make them whole for all losses, including 

seniority, attributable to their improper layoff." JA 36 (emphasis added). In short the entire focus of the decision was 

the grievance of the laid-off bus employees. Nothing in the 

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original decision suggests that the Arbitrator or the parties 

intended the arbitration to extend beyond settling that grievance and fashioning a remedy, if appropriate, for the grievants.

Despite the undisputed and limited scope of his original 

decision, the Arbitrator purported to construe its language 

post hoc to expand the arbitration to encompass the relief 

granted in his final award. As noted above, he reinterpreted 

the statement of issue in the original decision to make reestablishment of busing positions and layoff of the grievants 

separate issues. In addition, the Arbitrator's February 6, 

1995 letter decision concluded that the original remedy "necessarily intended that the Hotel reinstate the Bus Employee 

classification for the requisite number of positions equivalent 

to the number of Bus Employee positions which existed 

before the improper elimination of the classification and the 

subsequent layoff of the incumbent Bus Employees." JA 39. 

The June 6, 1996 final order went further and, as we stated 

earlier, characterized the original decision as having "necessarily found" that "the bargaining unit employees generally"not only the laid-off bus employees on whose behalf the 

grievance was expressly broughthad seniority rights in the 

abolished positions and that the Union, "as the representative 

of all of the unit employees," had an interest in protecting 

those rights through arbitration. JA 48. This broad construction of the arbitration's scope is at odds with the Arbitrator's original view that it was limited to the bus employees' 

grievancea view he acknowledged in his later two decisions.

In his February 6, 1995 letter, the Arbitrator expressly 

recognized that "[t]he remedy set forth in the [January 2, 

1994] Opinion contemplated reinstatement of, and a make 

whole award to, the identified Grievants only." JA 39 (emphasis in original). In the same letter the Arbitrator also 

confirmed that the intent of the parties to the arbitration had 

been to provide a remedy for the grievant employees alone. 

See JA 39 ("[N]othing in this Arbitration proceeding raised, 

or was intended to resolve, any issue with respect to any 

potential remedy to any individuals other than the identified 

Grievants."). JA 39. Similarly, in his June 6, 1996 order, the 

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Arbitrator acknowledged that "in finding the violation, [he] 

balanced Management's right to manage, including the right 

to determine staffing, against the Grievants' seniority rights," 

not the rights of other employees. JA 48 (emphasis added). 

It is clear, then, that throughout the proceeding the Arbitrator adhered to the view that he and the parties conducted the 

arbitration, at least up through the time of the original award, 

as limited to resolving the grievance filed on behalf of the 

laid-off bus employees. Given his undisputed perception of 

the arbitration's limited scope at the time of the initial award, 

we cannot credit the Arbitrator's subsequent usurpation of 

authority to arbitrate the rights of non-bus (non-grieving) 

employees, and through them of the Union itself, and to issue 

a remedy for the breach of those rights. Such a remedy 

necessarily exceeds the scope of the arbitration brought and 

maintained on behalf of the laid off bus employees, as the 

Arbitrator himself perceived it.

We are aware that an arbitrator's interpretation of the 

scope of the submission generally receives the same deference accorded his interpretation of the collective bargaining 

agreement. See El Dorado Technical Servs., Inc. v. Union 

General De Trabajadores de P.R., 961 F.2d 317, 321 (1st Cir. 

1992); Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. v. Transportation Communications Int'l Union, 973 F.2d 276, 280 

(4th Cir. 1992); Pack Concrete, Inc. v. Cunningham, 866 F.2d 

283, 285 (9th Cir. 1989); High Concrete Structures, Inc. of 

N.J. v. United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers of Am., Local 

166, 879 F.2d 1215, 1219 (3d Cir. 1989); Cement Divs., Nat'l 

Gypsum Co. v. United Steelworkers of Am., Local 135, 793 

F.2d 759, 765 (6th Cir. 1986). And we have, accordingly, 

accepted the Arbitrator's original view, as he consistently 

characterized it throughout, that the arbitration was brought 

on behalf of and to provide a remedy for the named grievants 

onlya view that accords with the text of the submission 

letter and which we must assume reflects the intent of the 

parties as expressed in their briefs and at the hearing. 

"Judicial deference to arbitration, however, does not grant 

carte blanche approval to any decision an arbitrator might 

make." Piggly Wiggly Operators' Warehouse, Inc., 611 F.2d 

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at 583. "[T]he courts are neither entitled nor encouraged 

simply to 'rubber stamp' the interpretations and decisions of 

arbitrators." Matteson, 99 F.3d at 113. They can and do 

decline enforcement of awards if an arbitrator exceeds his 

authority by arbitrating issues not submitted by the parties. 

See, e.g., Matteson, 99 F.3d at 113-15; Hardin's Bakery, Inc. 

v. Retail, Wholesale, & Dep't Store Union, 877 F.2d 1541, 

1544-45 (11th Cir. 1989); John Morrell & Co. v. Local Union 

304a of the United Food & Commercial Workers, 913 F.2d 

544, 559-61 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 905; Bowater Carolina Co. v. Rock Hill Local Union No. 1924, 871 F.2d 

23 (4th Cir. 1989); Courier-Citizen Co. v. Boston Electrotypers Union No. 11, 702 F.2d 273, 280-82 (1st Cir. 1983); cf. 

Davis v. Chevy Chase Fin. Ltd., 667 F.2d 160, 164-68 (D.C. 

Cir. 1981) (holding that arbitrator exceeded authority under 

limited arbitration clause in employment contract). We do so 

here. We cannot defer to the Arbitrator's ultimate assertion 

that the arbitration encompassed the abolition of the classification apart from the rights of the named grievants and that 

his original award "necessarily" contemplated remedies for 

non-grievants. The Arbitrator's post hoc position cannot be 

"rationally derived" from his contemporaneous view of the 

parties' submission as limited to the grievants' rights and 

remedies. See Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R.,

973 F.2d at 280; High Concrete Structures, 879 F.2d at 1219.

Because the Arbitrator exceeded the arbitral authority 

conferred by the parties, the judgment of the district court 

vacating the February 6, 1995 and June 6, 1996 arbitral 

awards is

Affirmed.

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RANDOLPH, Circuit Judge, dissenting: My colleagues believe the arbitrator's remedythe hotel shall restore the 

classification it unilaterally abolishedwas outside the scope 

of the arbitration. In support, they point to the union's letter 

starting the arbitration, and to the arbitrator's initial opinion. 

I have five points in opposition.

First, the union's letter signaling the beginning of arbitration tells us nothing of particular significance. It states that 

"pursuant to our collective bargaining agreement," the union 

"is opposing and taking to arbitration the action taken by 

your establishment against the above-captioned employee." 

Letter from Richardson to Jacques of 7/24/92, at 1 (italics 

added). Now we know that the grievance was not just for 

one employee, so right from the start the letter loses any 

claim to being the definitive guide to the scope of the arbitration that eventually followed.

Little wonder then that the union treats its letter as 

unimportant. The hotel did so too, and said as much at oral 

argument. The letter was not before the district court, it was 

not part of the record before us, and when my colleagues 

asked for a copy during argument, the parties were not at all 

sure they could find one.

The complaint, according to the union's letter, is merely 

"Improper Layoff." Id. There is no elaboration, no citation 

to any part of the labor contract, nothing. How then can one 

say on the basis of this letter that the arbitrator misinterpreted the scope of the issues? The arbitrator listened to the 

parties, he read their submissions, he heard their evidence. 

And he presumably knew the customary manner in which 

union and management treat such informal proceedings. We 

decidedly do not.

Second, considerations such as those just mentioned are 

partly behind the settled law that an arbitrator's interpretation of the scope of the issues submitted to him for arbitration 

gets the same deep judicial bow as an arbitrator's interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement. See, e.g., Sheet 

Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n Local Union No. 359 v. Madison 

Indus., 84 F.3d 1186, 1190 (9th Cir. 1996); El Dorado TechniUSCA Case #96-7270 Document #307861 Filed: 11/07/1997 Page 13 of 16
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cal Servs. v. Union General de Trabajadores de Puerto Rico,

961 F.2d 317, 321 (1st Cir. 1992); Lattimer-Stevens Co. v. 

United Steelworkers of America, Dist. 27, Sub-Dist. 5, 913 

F.2d 1166, 1170 (6th Cir. 1990); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Independent Oil Workers Union, 679 F.2d 299, 302 (3d Cir. 1982); 

Waverly Mineral Products v. United Steelworkers of America Local No. 8290, 633 F.2d 682, 685-86 (5th Cir. 1980). 

This rule of deference also rests on federal labor policy, 

judicial economy, and the Supreme Court's directive that 

"when the subject matter of a dispute is arbitrable, 'procedural' questions which grow out of the dispute and bear on its 

final disposition are to be left to the arbitrator." United 

Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, 484 U.S. 29, 40 (1987) 

(citing John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 

557 (1964)).

If an arbitrator's interpretation gets the "greatest deference imaginable," Utility Workers Union of America, Local 

246, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 39 F.3d 1210, 1216 (D.C. Cir. 1994), 

I see no plausible ground for setting aside this arbitrator's 

view of what was before him. Certainly the grievance letter 

cannot shoulder such a heavy load.

Which brings me to my third point. All indications point 

in favor of the arbitrator's version of the scope of this 

arbitration. Even if we were on a level, no-deference playing 

field, I would find the arbitrator's view far more persuasive 

than the majority opinion's. Consider the context. The hotel 

did two things: it announced an across-the-board layoff of its 

bus employees and it abolished the bus classification. Both of 

the hotel's actions were therefore in play.

The "on behalf of" languageviewed by my colleagues and 

the district judge as criticalcomes from the first paragraph 

of the arbitrator's initial opinion. Now, it seems to me the 

person best situated to pronounce on the import of those 

words is not a judge, but the arbitrator who wrote them. 

And here is what the arbitrator thought. From the second 

paragraph of his opinion onward, the arbitrator treats the 

hotel's unilateral abolishment of the bus employee position as 

a chief topic of dispute between the parties. This is compelUSCA Case #96-7270 Document #307861 Filed: 11/07/1997 Page 14 of 16
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ling evidence of what the parties believed they were arbitrating. A court cannot rightly claim to be giving deference to an 

arbitrator when it reaches out so far to overturn him.

My fourth point is that to restrict the scope of arbitration 

to the union's opening grievance letter is to adopt a formal 

arbitration pleading requirement, judicially monitoredsomething like, "The scope of the union's first letter defines the 

scope of the arbitration." Yet I had thought informality was 

one of the hallmarks of this sort of non-judicial dispute 

resolution. The approach my colleagues adopt, if it were to 

have any lasting impact (I cannot imagine that it will), means 

that no longer will the arbitrator hear the parties out, consider the evidence they wish to present, and make a considered 

determination of the scope of the issues before him. Instead 

he will examine only the initial grievance letter, much in the 

manner of a common law judge in Blackstone's time. Such a 

regime, I can say with no exaggeration, flies in the face of, 

contradicts, deviates from, upsets, disregards, conflicts with, 

tosses aside, ignores and repudiates a large portion of the law 

of labor arbitration from the Steelworkers Trilogy on down.

Indeed, such a regime would impose upon arbitration practice procedural requirements even stricter than the more 

formal rules governing the trial of a federal civil case. Consider Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b): "When issues 

not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied 

consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as 

if they had been raised in the pleadings." Here the union 

and the hotel "tried" the issue of the classification abolishment and the arbitrator issued his findings and conclusions 

about that issue in his initial award. And so, if this had been 

a district court case, the union's grievance letterits "complaint"would be deemed to have raised that issue. It is 

utterly incomprehensible that arbitration proceedings should 

be more regimented.

This brings me to my fifth and final point. My colleagues 

say that the arbitrator's remedy of restoring the bus classification fell outside the issues the parties arbitrated and came 

about only "post hoc." This is doubly mistaken. In his initial 

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award the arbitrator held, for instance, that "the Hotel violated the layoff, seniority and classification provisions of the 

Agreement ... insofar as it eliminated completely the Bus 

Employee classification, laid off all of the Bus Employees and 

transferred the substantial remaining Bus Employee duties to 

the Waiters .... Consequently, the Hotel is directed to 

restore the Bus Employee position, to reinstate the laid off 

Bus Employees and to make them whole for all losses attributable to the improper layoff." J.A. 31. Having found, as an 

initial matter, that the hotel violated the contract by eliminating the classification, the arbitrator simply followed elementary logic in ordering the hotel to restore the classification. It 

is an old rule that the scope of the violation determines the 

scope of the remedy.

The majority's other error is in supposing that the arbitrator's rulings after his initial award may be dismissed as 

merely "post hoc." After the initial decision, the parties 

returned to the arbitrator for clarification. Parties sometimes do the same thing in this court. The arbitrator issued 

an opinion stating that the bus classification had to be restored. Even then the district court did not think the arbitration proceedings had ended and so, at the district court's 

direction, the parties returned to the arbitrator again for a 

final ruling and again the arbitrator ordered the hotel to 

restore the classification. The majority's post hoc rationale 

thus embodies a legal principlewhatever the arbitrator says 

first in the course of ongoing arbitration proceedings is all 

that counts. There is probably no need to point out that in 

all the annals of arbitration law, this marks the first appearance of such a legal principle. If there is something, anything 

to be said in favor of it, the majority has neglected to 

enlighten us.

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