Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-02705/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-02705-12/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GODFREY EVANS,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-04-2705 RRB KJM P

vs.

M. JIMENEZ, et al.,

Defendants. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Plaintiff is a California prisoner proceeding pro se with an action for violation of

civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants Jimenez, Harnden, Gamberg and Zills are either

employees or former employees of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation

(CDCR). Plaintiff alleges defendants knowingly subjected plaintiff to violence at the hands of

other prisoners, which caused plaintiff physical injury. Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment is before the court.

I. Summary Judgment Standards

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists “no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

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Under summary judgment practice, the moving party 

always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). “[W]here the

nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary

judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers

to interrogatories, and admissions on file.’” Id. Indeed, summary judgment should be entered,

after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that

party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See id. at 322. “[A] complete failure of proof

concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts

immaterial.” Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, “so long as

whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary

judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied.” Id. at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the

opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to

establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the

allegations or denials of its pleadings but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the

form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the

dispute exists. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The opposing party

must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome

of the suit under the governing law, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir.

1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

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return a verdict for the nonmoving party, see Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433,

1436 (9th Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party

need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the

claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing

versions of the truth at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the “purpose of summary

judgment is to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a

genuine need for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory

committee’s note on 1963 amendments).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

any. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed. See Anderson,

477 U.S. at 255. All reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the

court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. 

Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s obligation to

produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen

Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir.

1987). Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than simply

show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . . Where the record taken 

as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no

‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

On September 23, 2005 the court advised plaintiff of the requirements for

opposing a motion pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rand v.

Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1035 (1999);

Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988).

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II. Analysis

The allegations in plaintiff’s complaint are as follows, set forth here in a verbatim

transcription:

On June 17, 2003 a racially motivated assault and battery took

place at the maximum security High Desert State Prison “C”

exercise yard. A group of white inmates attacked a group of

African American inmates with inmate manufactured weapons. 

Prison officials had actual knowledge of the impending danger and

excessive risk to African American inmates safety and security, but

failed to respond reasonably to the imminent threat of danger. 

Officials stood by watching doing nothing, and failed to exercise

security procedures.

Correctional officer P. Zills, on June 17, 2003 during morning

exercise yard release received information, and evidence in the

form of an inmate manufactured weapon from a white inmate. The

white inmate according to the correctional incident report, handed

the defendant P. Zills the weapon and alerted him to the imminent

danger, and risk of racial violence. P. Zills failed to exercise the

institutions security procedures. As a result of the defendant’s

nonresponsiveness the plaintiff suffered some nerve damage from

severe laceration to the face, and disfigurement. A stab wound to

the back, pain and suffering, and mental and emotional distress.

Correctional sergents Jimenez, Harnden and Gamberg, on the

morning of June 17, 2003 were alerted to the fact that a white

inmate had handed a weapon to correctional officer P. Zills, and

that the inmate warned the officer of the impending danger. With

this information, and evidence given to them by correctional

officer Zills, the correctional sergents named above did nothing but

stand next to a wall on the exercise yard watching and waiting for

the vicious racial attack to take place. Correctional sergents

Jimenez, Harnden, and Gamberg, failed to exercise proper

supervisory authority or direction in order to remedy the substantial

risk of serious harm to the plaintiff. As a direct result of the

deliberate indifference the defendants showed, the plaintiff

suffered serious injuries in the form of: some nerve damage from a

severe laceration to the face and disfigurement. A stab wound to

the back, pain and suffering, and mental and emotional distress.

 

Compl., Attach. at 1-2.

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 Defendants do not describe the significance of the white inmates being fully clothed, 1

but the court assumes this fact would be of significance to correctional officers as an indication

that the white inmates might be hiding weapons, or assuming violence was going to occur and

using the clothing as a form of protection, or both. 

5

On May 5, 2005, the court found that, based upon these allegations, plaintiff states

claims upon which relief can be granted against defendants Jimenez, Harnden, Gamberg and

Zills under the Eighth Amendment. Therefore the court ordered service of process on these

defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

The following facts are not disputed for purposes of defendants’ motion. See

Defendants’ “Statement of Undisputed Material Facts” (DSUF), Fact Nos. 1-5, 8-13, 27-28, 30-

31, 36-41, 43-45 & Plaintiff’s Response. At all times relevant, plaintiff was housed at High

Desert State Prison. At High Desert, the CDCR houses some of the most dangerous inmates in

California. 

On July 17, 2003, around 9:30 a.m., defendant Zills was informed by inmate

Pitcocks, who was entering housing unit C-6 from the exercise yard where other inmates were

exercising, that white inmates were planning to attack black inmates with weapons. Pitcocks

surrendered a metal shank to Zills. In response to this, Zills immediately radioed defendant

Jimenez, the supervising sergeant, and Jimenez and Correctional Officer Freeman immediately

reported to Zills’s location. 

Based upon the information provided by Pitcocks, and the fact that 15 to 20 white

inmates gathered together on the exercise yard were fully clothed while most of the other inmates

were wearing shorts, Jimenez decided to confer with defendants Harnden and Gamberg. 

1

Jimenez informed Harnden and Gamberg of what he had learned from Pitcocks and discussed

with them whether they should order everyone on the exercise yard to the ground and conduct a

search for weapons and otherwise investigate whether a riot was imminent. 

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 While plaintiff appears to suggest that Zills could have received information on the 2

attack from Pitcocks earlier than 9:30 a.m., he does not provide any evidence to contradict

defendants’ evidence supporting the time of the report as 9:30 a.m. Pl.’s Ex. A ¶ 6; Pl.’s

Response to DSUF, No. 3; cf. Pl.’s Exs. D (Zills’s Incident Report) & F (Jimenez’s Incident

Report).

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At that time defendants Jimenez, Harnden and Gamberg noticed some unusual

activity by the white inmates grouped together. The inmates appeared to be looking at Jimenez,

Harnden and Gamberg intently and they appeared nervous.

At some point thereafter, the white inmates charged upon and then began

attacking black inmates. Jimenez, Freeman and others ordered all of the inmates on the yard to

the ground but the combatants ignored the orders of the officers. Jimenez also announced over

his radio that a riot was occurring. Eventually correctional officers stopped the riot by using

warning gunshots, pepper spray, tear gas, physical force and by firing projectiles other than

bullets. Of the 140 inmates that were on the yard, 77 participated in the riot. 

Plaintiff had been on the yard for about ten minutes when the riot started. 

Plaintiff suffered injuries to his face and back during the riot. 

None of the defendants in this case knew of the potential for a riot on July 17,

2003 at High Desert before inmate Pitcocks’ discussion with defendant Zills and Pitcocks’

surrender of his weapon. 

Plaintiff disputes defendants’ position with regard to the time of the attack and

certain events leading up to it. See Pl.’s Response to DSUF, Nos. 3, 20, 35, 45, 50-51, 54. 

However, none of the evidence plaintiff provides supports a chronology that differs significantly

from that outlined by defendants. Based upon the record before it, the court finds it cannot

reasonably be disputed that inmate Pitcocks disclosed the planned attack at approximately 9:302

a.m. and the riot occurring in “C” yard on July 17, 2003 commenced at about 9:35 or 9:37 a.m. 

Pl.’s Exs. D-Q; Def’ts’ Exs. B ¶ 30 & D ¶ 8.

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Defendants assert they are entitled to summary judgment with respect to

plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims because the facts show defendants were not deliberately

indifferent to plaintiff’s safety. The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual

punishment imposes on prison officials, among other things, a duty to “take reasonable measures

to guarantee the safety of the inmates.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1991) (quoting

Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984)). An inmate’s Eighth Amendment rights are

violated by a prison official if that official exposes an inmate to a “substantial risk of serious

harm,” while displaying “deliberate indifference” to that risk. Id. at 834. 

Nothing before the court suggests defendants were indifferent to plaintiff’s safety. 

Between the time inmate Pitcocks first told defendant Zills that white inmates were going to

attack black inmates and the time the riot actually started, which was approximately five to seven

minutes, the defendants discussed what to do and gathered more information. Nothing in the

record indicates defendants did these things for any reason other than to determine the best

course of action to confirm Pitcocks’ report and prevent a riot. 

Plaintiff asserts defendants were deliberately indifferent because they did not

immediately order everyone on the exercise yard to the ground. There are two problems with this

assertion. First, nothing before the court makes clear whether inmate Pitcocks told defendant

Zills or Jimenez that the attack was imminent. In his declaration, defendant Jimenez indicates

that Pitcocks told him the attack would take place within the next two hours. Def’ts’ Ex. B ¶ 15. 

Plaintiff questions the credibility of Jimenez’s declaration, noting that it provides details -- such

as Pitcocks’ name and the two hour time frame -- not contained in the initial Incident Reports. 

Plaintiff does not, however, provide evidence showing Pitcocks said the attack would start

immediately. Pl.’s Response to DSUF, No. 20. Second, even assuming Zills or Jimenez had the

power to put out the call to “take the yard down,” nothing in the record supports a conclusion

they should have done so without at least some investigation or consultation. Indeed, plaintiff

does not rebut defendants’ testimony that before acting on a single inmate’s report, it is in the

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interest of jail security to attempt to confirm the report. See Pl.’s Exs. L (Zills’ Response to RFA

No. 7) & N (Jimenez Response to RFA No. 9). 

The defendants may not have chosen the best course of action to protect the 140

inmates on the exercise yard at around 9:30 a.m. on July 17, 2003, but nothing indicates they

were in any way indifferent to the possibility that a riot might occur. 

As defendants assert, they also are entitled to summary judgment under the

doctrine of qualified immunity because there are no facts suggesting they were deliberately

indifferent to the possibility that a riot might occur on July 17, 2003 after having received

Pitcocks’ report. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). 

In light of the foregoing, the court will recommend that defendants’ motion for

summary judgment be granted. 

III. Discovery Motions

The court notes that plaintiff has two motions to compel discovery outstanding. 

In light of the foregoing and because it does not appear that, through discovery, plaintiff might

obtain evidence that he could use to defeat defendants’ motion, the court need not reach the

discovery motions at this time. For example, even if plaintiff successfully compelled documents

undermining Jimenez’s declaration regarding what he learned from Pitcocks about the timing of

the planned attack, it would not change the result recommended here.

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff’s motions

to compel discovery (#35 & #36) are denied.

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (# 42) be granted;

2. This case be closed. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

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objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: February 26, 2008. 

1

evan2705.57(a)

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