Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01842/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01842-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Petition for Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOEL M. CRAM, MINH D. NGUYEN, and

ROES 1 through 10, individually, and on

behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 07cv1842-LAB (NLS)

ORDER OVERRULING

OBJECTIONS TO MAGISTRATE

JUDGE'S DENIAL OF MOTION

TO COMPEL DISCOVERY 

[Dkt No. 65]

vs.

ELECTRONIC DATA SYSTEMS

CORPORATION, a Delaware

corporation, and DOES 1 through 100,

inclusive,

Defendants.

By Order entered December 19, 2007, this court denied plaintiffs' Motion For Remand

in this putative class action alleging violations of California law associated with defendant

Electronic Data Systems Corporation's ("EDS") practices regarding the payment of overtime

compensation to its employees, among other things. Dkt No. 55. The issue presented in

the Motion To Remand was whether EDS, as the removing party, could demonstrate it is

more likely than not the amount in controversy exceeds the $5 million jurisdictional threshold

required before this court can exercise original federal jurisdiction pursuant to the Class

Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) ("CAFA"). Magistrate Judge Nita L.

Stormes had authorized limited, expedited discovery solely on the amount in controversy

Case 3:07-cv-01842-LAB-NLS Document 74 Filed 01/14/08 Page 1 of 7
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issue associated with the Motion To Remand, limited to the propounding of ten (10)

interrogatories per side. Dkt No. 18. EDS provided plaintiffs with responses and

supplemental responses to their interrogatories. Plaintiffs remained dissatisfied with EDS'

responses to plaintiffs' Interrogatory Nos. 9 and 10. 

Please describe in the greatest detail possible the basis, if any,

for EDS’ contention that the amount in controversy in the abovecaptioned civil action exceeds Five Million Dollars

($5,000,000.00). At a minimum, please show EDS’

calculations, and explain the underlying factualbasis forthe

numbers utilized by EDS in performing such calculations.

Interrogatory No. 9 (emphasis added).

Please identify by name, business address, and job title, each

person who may have knowledge of the factual basis, if any, for

EDS' contention that the amount in controversy in the abovecaptioned civil action exceeds Five Million Dollars

($5,000,000.00).

Interrogatory No. 10.

Plaintiffs moved to compel further responses to those two interrogatories. Dkt No. 34.

In an Order entered December 12, 2007, Judge Stormes denied their motion on grounds

the additional responses sought information beyond the scope of the authorized expedited

discovery and were unnecessary to inform the question whether the jurisdictional threshold

amount in controversy appeared to be satisfied. Dkt No. 52. She determined EDS' factual

showing, based on computations of back overtime damages and waiting penalties alone,

demonstrated the Complaint placed in controversy an amount in excess of the CAFA

jurisdictional threshold, so that compelling EDS to provide further calculations of additional

damages associated with plaintiffs' equitable relief theories was unnecessary. 

In consideration of plaintiffs' moving papers in support of remand, EDS' Opposition

to the remand motion, the parties' filings associated with the Motion To Compel, and the

grounds for Judge Stormes' denial of that motion, this court concluded EDS carried its

burden to demonstrate CAFA removal jurisdiction, irrespective of any argument plaintiffs

could attempt to make to the contrary in a Reply brief. Without recourse to any other

damages valuation under any other theory of recovery, upon de novo review of the amount

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1

 Relying on a district court case from the Third Circuit, plaintiffs argue this court improperly

relied on the magistrate judge's ruling in excess of her authority because remand is "the functional

equivalent of a dispositive order." Dkt No. 65 8:10-17. However, the magistrate did not decide the

Remand Motion. This court decided the Remand Motion, including de novo review of the amount

in controversy issue. Moreover, plaintiffs identify authority from the Ninth Circuit which undercuts its

"jurisdictional" theory. Dkt No. 65, 8:21-26, citing MacLeod v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, 886

F.Supp. 16, 18 (D.Or. 1995) ("In this case, Magistrate Judge Stewart . . . had the authority to enter

an order of remand, a non-dispositive pretrial matter, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b0(1)(A)")

(emphasis added). 

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in controversy issue as illuminated by the authorized interrogatory responses, this court

concurred with Judge Stormes' finding the amount placed in controversy by the Complaint

more probably than not exceeds $5 million and denied the Motion To Remand. Dkt No. 55.

Plaintiffs filed, then withdrew applications for reconsideration of the Order denying remand.

Dkt Nos. 59-62, 66.

On December 21, 2007, plaintiffs filed Objections to Judge Stormes' Order denying

their Motion To Compel supplemental responses to Interrogatory Nos. 9 and 10. Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 72 provides, in pertinent part, that when a magistrate judge

has decided a nondispositive matter:1 

Within 10 days after being served with a copy of the magistrate

judge's order, a party may serve and file objections to the order.

. . . The district judge to whom the case is assigned shall

consider such objections and shall modify or set aside any

portion of the magistrate judge's order found to be clearly

erroneous or contrary to law.

Rule 72(a).

The undersigned district judge's Standing Order in Civil Cases provides: "A party

objecting to a Magistrate Judge's [non-dispositive] order shall file objections as provided in

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72. Upon receipt of objections the Court will issue a briefing

schedule and set a hearing date, if appropriate." Standing Order ¶ 9(a). For the reasons

discussed below, the court finds neither additional briefing nor a hearing is required to

address and overrule plaintiffs' Objections for failure to demonstrate any portion of Judge

Stormes' Order is clearly erroneous or contrary to law.

Plaintiffs object: (1) the discovery Order "erroneously concluded that EDS' own

interrogatory responses rendered complete discovery responses 'unnecessary'; and, to the

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2

 Plaintiffs sought leave to "conduct pre-hearing discovery directed to the basis, if any, for

EDS' contention as to the amount in controversy." Dkt No. 9, 3:22-24. EDS opposed the ex parte

application on grounds it was "ill founded, and substantively baseless" for the reasons identified in

the opposition and was a misuse of the ex parte process, suggesting sanctions would be

appropriately imposed against plaintiffs for those reasons. Dkt No. 12, 8:2-3. In her

October 3, 2007 Order granting the ex parte application for limited pre-hearing discovery, Judge

Stormes implicitly rejected EDS' sanctions request by not addressing the issue. Dkt No. 18. On

January 8, 2008, Judge Stormes granted EDS' request for attorneys' fees incurred to successfully

oppose plaintiffs' ex parte Application To Compel additional interrogatory responses. Dkt No. 72.

The award of those fees and costs is not a proceeding in the nature of a sanction, but rather is an

application of the provisions of Rule 37(A)(4)(B), which provide: "If the motion [to compel discovery]

is denied, the court . . . shall, after affording an opportunity to be heard, require the moving party or

the attorney filing the motion or both of them to pay the party . . . who opposed the motion the

reasonable expenses incurred in opposing the motion, including attorney's fees, unless the court

finds that the making of the motion was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an

award of expenses unjust."

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extent the discovery Order might be interpreted to contain a finding regarding amount in

controversy, same was erroneous and in excess of the magistrate judge's jurisdiction"

(Obj. 6:16-19 (upper case modified)); and (2) "the Discovery order itself indicates that it may

constitute a predicate to an award of monetary sanctions" (Obj. 5:13-15, citing Discovery

Order, 6:14-7:8, discussing Rule 37(a)(4)(B) awards of fees and costs incurred to

successfully oppose motions to compel discovery). The second Objection is simply

inchoate and moot.2

The first objection is without merit. Once EDS demonstrated the amount in

controversy more likely than not exceeds the CAFA jurisdictional threshold predicated on

certain of the theories of recovery advanced in the Complaint, any additional valuations

predicated on other Complaint theories would serve only to increase the amount in

controversy to sums in even greater excess of the jurisdictional limit. The objective

underlying preliminary jurisdictional discovery is not to establish what plaintiffs' recovery

might actually be, but rather to ascertain whether the minimum amount placed in controversy

by the Complaint allegations likely satisfies the jurisdictional threshold. The removing party

is not required at this phase to make a dispositive showing definitively establishing the actual

damages plaintiffs are likely to recover if they prevail. The purpose of the expedited

discovery responses was solely to resolve the parties' dispute over the likely minimum

valuation of the Complaint claims for purposes of the remand motion, a purpose satisfied

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without the need for recourse to additional calculations under other of the Complaint

theories. Plaintiffs may seek the additional information they desire in the normal course of

the discovery process. 

In addition, this court conducted a de novo review of the evidence in denying remand

to independently conclude that it is more likely than not the Complaint places in controversy

an amount in excess of $5 million based on the overtime and penalty wages calculations

alone. That process disposes of plaintiffs' jurisdictional challenge to the same finding by

Judge Stormes in denying their Motion To Compel a second supplemental response to

Interrogatory No. 9. This court did not simply adopt Judge Stormes' finding on the issue of

amount in controversy as demonstrated in the EDS responses to Interrogatory No. 9 nor give

it "preclusive effect." See Singer v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 373, 376 (9th Cir.

1997); Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 398, 404 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Plaintiffs also object they are entitled to an expanded damages valuation response,

in reliance on evidentiary objections and "best evidence" theories. The Verification by EDS

representative Suzy K. Arnold alludes to business records and employees of EDS as the

source of the materials used to calculate the likely number of employees, their salaries, their

overtime, and the like relevant to the Complaint's putative class allegations as those inform

the amount in controversy issue. Plaintiffs' argument that EDS' interrogatory responses are

"inadmissible" evidence for failure to provide supporting documentation is without merit.

Interrogatories are not a proper discovery device to obtain production of documents. Judge

Stormes limited the expedited jurisdictional discovery to ten (10) interrogatories per side.

Plaintiffs cannot unilaterally expand that discovery burden to encompass document

production on "best evidence" or any other theory. A propounding party may request copies

of supporting documentation identified in the response be attached to interrogatory answers,

but the responding party cannot be compelled by such a request to produce those

documents, and the viability of the interrogatory response is not compromised for failure to

attach copies of identified documents. Normally, a party may serve a Rule 34 request for

document production concurrently with the interrogatories. However, the narrow and

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3

 Similarly, Plaintiffs' reliance on FED. R. EVID. 1006 is unavailing. That rule addresses the

production of "the contents of voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs which cannot

conveniently be examined in court may be presented in the form of a chart summary or calculation,"

with the originals or duplicates required in that case to be "made available for examination or

copying, or both." Such a process is not consistent with the timing and purpose of the expedited

discovery Order at issue here, authorizing only interrogatory responses of limited scope.

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exceptional discovery at issue here was circumscribed by the court to a limited number of

interrogatories only. Nothing prevents plaintiffs in the normal course of discovery from

seeking document production.3

Plaintiffs also challenge the Interrogatory No. 9 responses as incompetent evidence

because Ms. Arnold describes the calculations provided as compiled based on "the materials

and records of [EDS] and the employees, agents and representatives of EDS," and the

"responses . . . [as] true to the best of her knowledge, information and belief." Dkt No. 65,

9:26-10:8. Plaintiffs' reliance for its evidentiary Objections on representations in EDS'

Opposition To Motion To Compel that "the tabulation of data [was] from multiple sources that

were not within the knowledge of any single individual" and "[n]o one witness had knowledge

as to the entire class or global amount in controversy," actually reinforces the adequacy of

EDS' responses at this preliminary stage of the litigation for purposes of ascertaining

whether it carried its burden to demonstrate the probability the amount in controversy is

satisfied. See Dkt No. 45, 8:13-18. In addition, plaintiffs' criticism of the Discovery Order for

failure to "expressly state that EDS' interrogatory responses were evidentiary in nature, or

that EDS had provided any matter by evidence" on grounds "[c]alculations are not evidence"

is without merit. Dkt No. 65 8:7-9. The call of Interrogatory No. 9, by its own terms,

requested as a minimum satisfactory response only "calculations" and an "explanation" of

the underlying factual basis, the very responses EDS provided. For all the foregoing

reasons, Plaintiffs' objections to Judge Stormes' Order denying their motion to compel a

supplemental response to Interrogatory No. 9 are OVERRULED as neither clearly erroneous

nor contrary to law, without the need for further briefing or hearing.

Plaintiffs fail to elaborate on what basis this court should find Judge Stormes clearly

erred or made a ruling contrary to law at this stage in the litigation in denying their motion to

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compel discovery of additional detail associated with EDS contact persons whose identities

and descriptions were solicited in Interrogatory No. 10. No witness interviews, depositions,

or other discovery is permitted as of course at the pre-Early Neutral Evaluation Conference

stage of the litigation. EDS was only required to produce underlying facts showing it is more

likely than not the amount in controversy threshold is met. Dkt No. 52, 5:26-28. EDS

responded twice to that interrogatory, providing names, while preserving its objection the call

of the question exceeded the authorized scope of the limited expedited discovery on the

narrow issue of amount in controversy. Both Judge Stormes and this court, respectively,

have independently determined EDS carried its burden adequately to avoid being compelled

to augment its interrogatory responses and to avoid remand at this time. This court

OVERRULES the objections to the Discovery Order result with respect to Interrogatory

No. 10, without the need for further briefing or hearing.

Finally, the court finds plaintiffs' request that this court "set aside the Discovery Order,

at least to the extent it might be construed to preclude Plaintiffs from litigating whether the

amount-in-controversy requirement for CAFA jurisdiction has been satisfied" (Dkt No. 65,

12:2-4) seeks speculative relief neither necessary nor appropriate. 

For all the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED plaintiffs' Objections to the

denial of their motion to compel additional interrogatory responses are OVERRULED in that

they identify no portion of the Discovery Order that is clearly erroneous or contrary to law in

the procedural posture of this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 10, 2008

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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