Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01561/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01561-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1331pi Fed. Question: Personal Injury

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CARLOS TINOCO, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

Lead Case No. 17-cv-2433-BAS-JLB

ORDER DENYING MOTIONS TO 

DISMISS

(1) 18cv1389, ECF No. 11; 

(2) 18cv1390, ECF No. 10; 

(3) 18cv1561, ECF No. 9; 

(4) 18cv1803, ECF No. 6; 

(5) 18cv1805, ECF No. 5; 

(6) 18cv1807, ECF No. 8; 

(7) 18cv1808, ECF No. 5.

v.

SAN DIEGO GAS & ELECTRIC 

CO., et al.,

Defendants.

AND CONDOLIDATED CASES

Eight plaintiffs filed nearly-identical complaints against Defendant San Diego 

Gas & Electric Company (“SDG&E”). SDG&E has moved to dismiss each 

complaint. On September 6, 2018, the Court denied SDG&E’s motion to dismiss 

Plaintiff Tinoco’s complaint. (17cv2433, ECF No. 15.) The Court then consolidated 

the eight cases, designating Tinoco v. SDG&E as the lead case. (17cv2433, ECF No. 

19.) Seven motions remain pending, all of which will be resolved in this Order. (See 

(1) 18cv1389 (“De La Rosa”), ECF No. 11; (2) 18cv1390 (“Alires”), ECF No. 10; 

(3) 18cv1561 (“Cruz”), ECF No. 9; (4) 18cv1803 (“Hansen”), ECF No. 6; (5) 

18cv1805 (“McMahon”), ECF No. 5; (6) 18cv1807 (“Vasquez”), ECF No. 8; (7) 

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18cv1808 (“Gonzalez Garcia”), ECF No. 5.)

The Court divides the complaints into two groups: those that allege only 

negligence, and those that allege negligence and negligence per se.

I. NEGLIGENCE COMPLAINTS

Like the complaint in Tinoco v. SDG&E, the majority of the complaints allege 

only negligence. (See Hansen; McMahon; Vasquez; Gonzalez Garcia.) The Court 

denied SDG&E’s motion to dismiss the Tinoco complaint. (17cv2433, ECF No. 7.) 

The Hansen, McMahon, Vasquez, and Gonzalez Garcia complaints allege no more 

additional facts than the Tinoco complaint. SDG&E makes the same arguments in 

its motions to dismiss these four complaints as it did in its motion to dismiss the 

Tinoco complaint. The Court makes the same findings here as it did in Tinoco. (See 

id.) The Court DENIES SDG&E’s motions to dismiss the four complaints: (1) 

18cv1803, ECF No. 6; (2) 18cv1805, ECF No. 5; (3) 18cv1807, ECF No. 8; (4) 

18cv1808, ECF No. 5.

II. NEGLIGENCE AND NEGLIGENCE PER SE COMPLAINTS

The other three complaints allege both negligence and negligence per se. (De 

La Rosa; Alires; Cruz.) Again, as to the negligence claim, the complaints allege no

more additional facts than the Tinoco complaint. SDG&E makes the same arguments 

in its motions to dismiss the cause of action as it did in the motion to dismiss Tinoco. 

The Court DENIES SDG&E’s motions to dismiss the negligence cause of action.

SDG&E moves to dismiss the negligence per se causes of action in the three 

complaints because negligence per se is not a separate cause of action. (See, e.g., 

18cv1389, ECF No. 11-1, at 19 (citing e.g., Das v. Bank of Am., N.A., 186 Cal. App. 

4th 727, 737–38 (2010)).) Plaintiffs agree negligence per se is not a cause of action, 

and there is no “claim” to be dismissed. Plaintiffs argue they “may nonetheless 

proceed with his negligence per se theories in relation to [their] negligence cause[s]

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of action.” (See e.g., 18cv1389, ECF No. 19.)1

In California, negligence per se is “a presumption of negligence [that] arises 

from the violation of a statute which was enacted to protect a class of persons of 

which the plaintiff is a member against the type of harm which the plaintiff suffered 

as a result of the violation of the statute.” Hoff v. Vacaville Unified Sch. Dist., 19 

Cal. 4th 925, 938 (1998) (citations omitted). “[A]n underlying claim of ordinary 

negligence must be viable before the presumption of negligence . . . can be 

employed.” Cal. Serv. Station & Auto. Repair Ass’n v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 62 

Cal. App. 4th 1166, 1178 (1998). “[I]t is the tort of negligence, and not the violation 

of the statute itself, which entitles a plaintiff to recover civil damages. In such 

circumstances the plaintiff is not attempting to pursue a private cause of action for 

violation of the statute; rather, he is pursuing a negligence action and is relying upon 

the violation of a statute, ordinance, or regulation to establish part of that cause of 

action.” Sierra–Bay Fed. Land Bank Ass’n. v. Superior Court, 227 Cal. App. 3d 318, 

333 (1991); see also Das, 186 Cal. App. 4th at 738 (holding the negligence per se

doctrine is utilized by borrowing a statute or regulation “to prove duty of care and 

standard of care”).

The Court does not find Plaintiffs plead negligence per se as a “separate cause 

of action” but instead their complaints make clear they are alleging negligence and 

relying on alleged violations of the Camp Pendleton Requirements (i.e., negligence 

per se) as a part of their negligence causes of action. Because Plaintiffs’ negligence 

cause of action may proceed, the Court does not dismiss the references to the 

negligence per se doctrine. Cf Waldo v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. CIV. S-13-0789 LKK, 

2013 WL 5554623, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2013) (holding “[w]hile [plaintiff] is free 

to allege the facts necessary to entitle her to the evidentiary presumption, she may 

not plead negligence per se as an independent cause of action” and dismissing cause 

 

1 The arguments made by SDG&E and by the three plaintiffs are identical in all three motions and 

responses. The Court refers only to 18cv1389 for ease of reference.

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of action with prejudice).

Finally, SDG&E argues Plaintiffs have not alleged a specific statute or 

regulation to support the negligence per se evidentiary presumption. (See, e.g., 

18cv1389, ECF No. 11-1, at 19.) Negligence per se is codified in California 

Evidence Code section 669. This statute provides that negligence is presumed if the 

plaintiff establishes four elements: (1) the defendant violated a statute, ordinance, or 

regulation of a public entity; (2) the violation proximately caused death or injury to 

person or property; (3) the death or injury resulted from an occurrence of the nature 

which the statute, ordinance, or regulation was designed to prevent; and (4) the 

person suffering the death or the injury to his person or property was one of the class 

of persons for whose protection the statute, ordinance, or regulation was adopted.

Cal. Evid. Code § 669. Here, Plaintiffs have identified alleged SDG&E violated 

various Camp Pendleton Requirements, which are plausibly regulations of a public 

entity. Thus, Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled negligence per se. The Court DENIES

SDG&E’s motions to dismiss the negligence per se causes of action.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motions to dismiss:

(1) 18cv1389, ECF No. 11; (2) 18cv1390, ECF No. 10; (3) 18cv1561, ECF No. 9; 

(4) 18cv1803, ECF No. 6; (5) 18cv1805, ECF No. 5; (6) 18cv1807, ECF No. 8; (7) 

18cv1808, ECF No. 5.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 21, 2018

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