Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-07-56127/USCOURTS-ca9-07-56127-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

TARA SHENEVA WILLIAMS,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

DEBORAH K. JOHNSON, Warden of

the Central California Women’s

Facility in Chowchilla,

Respondent-Appellee.

No. 07-56127

D.C. No.

CV-03-02691-GW

OPINION

On Remand from the United States Supreme Court

Filed May 27, 2016

Before: Stephen Reinhardt and Alex Kozinski, Circuit

Judges, and Ronald M. Whyte,* Senior District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Kozinski;

Dissent by Judge Reinhardt

* The Honorable Ronald M. Whyte, Senior District Judge for the U.S.

District Court for the Northern District of California, sitting by

designation.

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2 WILLIAMS V. JOHNSON

SUMMARY**

Habeas Corpus

On remand from the United States Supreme Court, the

panel affirmed the district court’s order denying habeas relief

to Tara Williams, who asserted that the trial court’s dismissal

of a holdout juror during deliberations in her California

murder trial violated her Sixth Amendment rights.

The panelreviewed the Sixth Amendment claim under the

standard set forth in AEDPA. 

The panel held that because the trial court’s evidentiary

hearing focused on the issue of juror bias, not on the nature

of the jury’s division, the process employed by the trial judge

was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of,

Supreme Court authority.

The panel held that Williams is not entitled to habeas

relief on the theory that there is a reasonable probability the

juror was excused because of his views as to guilt or

innocence, where Williams has not cited any Supreme Court

case imposing the rule set forth in United States v. Symington,

195 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 1999) – that the dismissal of a juror

violates the Sixth Amendment when it is reasonably possible

that the impetus for the juror’s dismissal came from her

position on the merits of the case – and the panel is unaware

of such a Supreme Court case.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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WILLIAMS V. JOHNSON 3

The panel held that the state appellate court’s finding that

the juror was biased because he would not follow the law was

not an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the state court proceeding. The panel

explained that the fact that the state appellate court’s finding

may have departed from those of the trial court is irrelevant.

Dissenting, Judge Reinhardt wrote that the state appellate

court’s finding that the trial court dismissed the holdout juror

for being unwilling to follow the law was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts and thus warrants

relief under AEDPA. 

COUNSEL

Kurt David Hermansen, Law Office of Kurt David

Hermansen, San Diego, California, and Steven M. Klepper,

Kramon & Graham, P.A., Baltimore, Maryland, for

Petitioner-Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General of California, Gerald

Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters,

Senior Assistant Attorney General, Xiomara Costello and

Stephanie C. Brenan, Deputy Attorneys General, Los

Angeles, California, for Respondent-Appellee.

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4 WILLIAMS V. JOHNSON

OPINION

KOZINSKI, Circuit Judge:

During deliberations in the California murder trial of Tara

Williams, the court dismissed a juror who was holding out for

acquittal. An alternate juror was seated, and the jury

convicted. We consider whether Williams is entitled to

habeas relief on the ground that the dismissal of the holdout

juror violated her Sixth Amendment rights.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In the fall of 1993, Williams drove two of her friends

around Long Beach, casing stores for a potential robbery. 

Williams eventually stopped at a liquor store. While

Williams and her infant son waited in the car, her two friends

went inside, murdered the store owner and robbed the cash

register of $6 and food stamps. Williams was later charged

with felony murder.

After the jury retired, the foreman sent a note claiming

that one juror had “expressed an intention to disregard the

law.” Judge Richard R. Romero and counsel questioned

Juror 6, who admitted he had discussed jury nullification and

the severity of the charge during deliberations. Judge

Romero then questioned the other jurors, many of whom

reported that Juror 6 had exhibited an unwillingness to follow

the law because he disagreed with the felony murder rule and

with the principle of vicarious liability. After hearing brief

arguments from each side, Judge Romero said: “I’m going to

dismiss [Juror 6], but not because he’s not deliberating and

not because he’s not following the law.” Although Judge

Romero stated that Juror 6 was “dismissed without any

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WILLIAMS V. JOHNSON 5

question in my mind as a biased juror,” he also stated that

“not following the law is not a basis for his dismissal.” Judge

Romero found that Juror 6 was biased because he was

dishonest, was concerned with the severity of the charge and

was “add[ing] his own words to the court’s instructions as to

what the law is.” The judge then seated an alternate and the

jury convicted the following day. Williams was sentenced to

life in prison without the possibility of parole.

Williams argued on direct appeal that the dismissal of

Juror 6 violated both her Sixth Amendment rights and the

state statute governing juror dismissals. See Cal. Penal Code

§ 1089. The California Court of Appeal affirmed and the

Supreme Court of California denied review. Williams

unsuccessfully sought habeas relief in the California courts

and eventually in federal district court.

We reversed. Williams v. Cavazos, 646 F.3d 626, 653

(9th Cir. 2011). Because the state appellate court had focused

on the state statute and did not address the merits of

Williams’s Sixth Amendment claim, we held that the federal

claim had not been “adjudicated on the merits in State court”

for the purposes of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act (AEDPA). Id. at 636 (quoting 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)). We therefore reviewed the federal claim de novo

and held that the dismissal of Juror 6 violated Williams’s

Sixth Amendment rights. Id. at 642–52.

The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, “[w]hen a state

court rejects a federal claim without expressly addressing that

claim, a federal habeas court must presume that the federal

claim was adjudicated on the merits.” Johnson v. Williams,

133 S. Ct. 1088, 1096 (2013). The Court concluded that “the

restrictive standard of review set out in § 2254(d)(2)”—not de

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6 WILLIAMS V. JOHNSON

novo review—“applies, and that under that standard

[Williams] is not entitled to habeas relief.” Id. at 1092.

On remand, we entered a brief order affirming the district

court’s denial of the habeas petition, as the Supreme Court

had instructed. Williams v. Johnson, 720 F.3d 1212, 1212

(9th Cir. 2013) (per curiam). But see id. at 1212 (Reinhardt,

J., concurring); id. at 1214 (Kozinski, C.J., concurring). The

Supreme Court vacated our order and instructed us to review

the merits of Williams’s Sixth Amendment claim “under the

standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).” Williams v.

Johnson, 134 S. Ct. 2659, 2659 (2014) (per curiam). So here

we are.

DISCUSSION

Under AEDPA, we may not grant habeas relief unless the

last reasoned opinion of the state courts1either “(1) resulted

in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented

in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Williams advances three Sixth Amendment theories,

which we consider in turn.

1 As the Supreme Court has indicated, the last reasoned decision of the

state courts is the January 13, 2002 decision of the California Court of

Appeal. Johnson, 133 S. Ct. at 1097–98; see Ylst v. Nunnemaker,

501 U.S. 797, 804 (1991).

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WILLIAMS V. JOHNSON 7

I

Williams first argues that the trial court’s inquiry into

potential juror bias violated the Sixth Amendment by

impermissibly intruding on jury deliberations. Williams cites

two Supreme Court cases holding that a trial judge may not

recall the jury from its deliberations to inquire about the

nature and extent of its division. Brasfield v. United States,

272 U.S. 448, 449–50 (1926); Burton v. United States,

196 U.S. 283, 307–08 (1905). Neither case is on point. The

trial court’s evidentiary hearing in this case focused on the

issue of juror bias, not on the nature of the jury’s division. 

The Supreme Court has expressly endorsed the use of

evidentiary hearings to ferret out juror bias. See Smith v.

Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215 (1982). The process employed by

the trial judge was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable

application of, Supreme Court authority. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1); see also Bell v. Uribe, 748 F.3d 857, 866–67

(9th Cir. 2014) (denying a similar claim for habeas relief).

II

Next, Williams argues that there is a reasonable

probability that Juror 6 was excused because of his views as

to guilt or innocence. Our previous opinion granted relief on

this theory. Cavazos, 646 F.3d at 646–47. We relied on

United States v. Symington, a Ninth Circuit case holding that

the dismissal of a juror violates the Sixth Amendment when

it is “reasonably possible that the impetus for [the juror’s]

dismissal came from her position on the merits of the case.” 

195 F.3d 1080, 1088 (9th Cir. 1999).

Because the Supreme Court has held that AEDPA

governs this case, we may not rely on circuit precedent when

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8 WILLIAMS V. JOHNSON

adjudicating Williams’s federal claim. See Glebe v. Frost,

135 S. Ct. 429, 431 (2014) (per curiam). Instead, we may

grant relief only if the state court’s decision “was contrary to,

or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court

of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (emphasis

added). Williams has not cited any Supreme Court case

imposing (or even hinting at) the Symington rule. Nor are we

aware of such a case. See Johnson v. Williams, 133 S. Ct. at

1098 (noting that Symington “do[es] not bind” the California

courts “when [they] decide[] a federal constitutional

question”). Williams is not entitled to habeas relief on this

theory. See Brewer v. Hall, 378 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir.

2004) (holding that a habeas petitioner’s reliance on

Symington was “misplaced” because “Symington is not a

Supreme Court case” and because Symington’s analysis was

based on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure rather than

the Sixth Amendment).

III

Williams’s final argument is that the state appellate court

unreasonably approved the dismissal of Juror 6 for bias.

Supreme Court case law in the area of juror bias is sparse. 

Although we know that biased jurors may be dismissed from

deliberations without offending the Constitution, we don’t

know precisely what it means for a juror to be biased. See

United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 146 (1936) (noting that

“the Constitution lays down no particular tests” for juror

bias). However, we do know that a juror is biased if he is

unwilling to follow the law. See Wainwright v. Witt,

469 U.S. 412, 423 (1985) (noting that jurors lacking

impartiality may be excused as biased and defining an

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WILLIAMS V. JOHNSON 9

impartial juror as one “who will conscientiously apply the

law”); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961) (defining an

“impartial juror” as one who “can lay aside his impression or

opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence”).

Williams argues that she is entitled to relief under

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) because the state appellate court

unreasonably applied Supreme Court case law when it

concluded that Juror 6 was biased without finding that Juror

6 would not follow the law. We reject Williams’s argument

because the state appellate court did find that Juror 6 was

biased because he would not follow the law. As Williams

noted in her earlier briefing, “[t]heCalifornia Court of Appeal

made three factual findings” in affirming the trial court’s

decision that Juror 6 was biased. One of those findings was

that, “[a]ccording to most of the jurors, Juror No. 6 had either

explicitly said he would not follow the law or he had implied

as much.”

The state appellate court’s finding that Juror 6 was biased

because he would not follow the law was not “an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(2). During the evidentiary hearing, Jurors 2, 3, 5,

7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 told Judge Romero that Juror 6 had

expressed an unwillingness to follow the law. Jurors 3, 5, 10

and 11 said that Juror 6 was applying a burden of proof

higher than “beyond a reasonable doubt” when analyzing the

evidence. Considering these comments, it was not

unreasonable for the state appellate court to find that Juror 6

was biased. See Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24

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10 WILLIAMS V. JOHNSON

(2002) (per curiam) (AEDPA “demands that state-court

decisions be given the benefit of the doubt”).2

Williams argues in her supplemental briefing that the

state appellate court’s decision unreasonably determined the

facts because it “overlooked” or contradicted several of Judge

Romero’s statements. Williams notes that Judge Romero

expressly declined to find that Juror 6 would not follow the

law. She claims that the state appellate court “misunderstood

the trial court’s ruling” and is therefore not entitled to

AEDPA deference.

We do not review the state courts’ last reasoned decision

to ensure that it is consistent with the findings of the lower

state courts; rather, we review the last reasoned decision to

determine whether it reasonably determined the facts “in light

of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); see Uribe, 748 F.3d at 866 (denying

habeas relief under section 2254(d)(2) because “the

California Court of Appeal did not unreasonably interpret the

facts presented in the state court proceeding when issuing its

decision” on whether the removal of a juror violated the Sixth

2 The state appellate court also supported its finding of bias by noting

that Judge Romero “was entitled to consider Juror No. 6’s demeanor while

being examined, and could properly come to the conclusion that he had

been dishonest.” Our previous opinion concluded on de novo review that

the record did not support the finding that Juror 6 was dishonest. Cavazos,

646 F.3d at 651–52. We need not decide whether the state courts’ finding

that Juror 6 was dishonest constitutes an unreasonable determination of

the facts. Even if Juror 6 was honest, it was still reasonable for the state

appellate court to conclude that he was unwilling to follow the law. That

alone was a sufficient ground for finding Juror 6 biased. See supra pages

9–10. Thus, the state appellate court’s finding of bias is reasonable when

viewed in the context of “the record in total.” See Cook v. LaMarque,

593 F.3d 810, 826 (9th Cir. 2010).

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WILLIAMS V. JOHNSON 11

Amendment). AEDPA requires us to defer to state court

findings made for the first time by the appellate court, cf.

Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 547 (1981), even when such

findings contravene those of the trial court. See Amado v.

Gonzalez, 758 F.3d 1119, 1132–33 (9th Cir. 2014); Dickerson

v. Vaughn, 90 F.3d 87, 90 (3d Cir. 1996). The state appellate

court was entitled to make its own factual findings,

unconstrained by what the trial court did. Even if Judge

Romero did not find that Juror 6 was unwilling to follow the

law, the state appellate court did make such a finding. As we

have already explained, that finding was reasonable. Thus,

the fact that the state appellate court’s findings may have

departed from those of the trial court is irrelevant.3 Federal

habeas courts enforce reasonableness, not concordance.

* * *

We don’t approve of what the trial court did in this case. 

Our rule in Symington is preferable. But this is not a direct

appeal, and we are not permitted to second-guess state-court

judges because we might have reached a different result in the

first instance. Given AEDPA’s preternaturally deferential

3 There may not be any meaningful difference between Judge Romero’s

statement that he was not dismissing Juror 6 “because he is not following

the law,” and the state appellate court’s determination that Juror 6 “had

either explicitly said he would not follow the law or he had implied as

much.” Judge Romero’s list of reasons for concluding that Juror 6 was

biased included Juror 6’s concern or disagreement with the burden of

proof, the severity of punishment and the felony murder rule. Judge

Romero appears to have concluded that, although Juror 6 had not yet done

so, he had a propensity to disregard the law where it conflicted with his

opinions. The findings of the state trial and appellate courts can thus be

read in harmony: Both courts could reasonably have concluded that, had

Juror 6 been permitted to return to deliberations, he would not have

followed the law.

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12 WILLIAMS V. JOHNSON

standard of review, the district court’s order denying habeas

relief must be AFFIRMED.

REINHARDT, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

Tara Williams is in prison for life following her

conviction of murder after a California state trial judge

dismissed a lone holdout juror who favored acquittal, and the

state appellate court affirmed that dismissal. The majority

now affirms, holding that the state appellate court’s finding

that the trial judge dismissed the holdout juror for being

unwilling to follow the law was not subject to reversal under

§ 2254 of AEDPA.

There is one problem, however—the trial court did not

dismiss Williams for being unwilling to follow the law. To

the contrary, the trial court’s reasoning is plain: “I’m going to

dismiss the juror, but not because he’s not deliberating and

not because he’s not following the law” (emphasis added). 

Although the trial judge explicitly stated that he did not

dismiss the juror for being unwilling to follow the law, and

although there is no reason to doubt this statement, the state

appellate court found the direct opposite—that the trial court

dismissed the holdout juror for being unwilling to follow the

law—and based its affirmance primarily on that finding. The

appellate court’s finding was clearly “based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts” and thus warrants

reversal under AEDPA. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).

Despite the clear factual error, the majority has been

persuaded that it must deny relief. The majority analyzes

testimony from various other jurors that it contends shows

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WILLIAMS V. JOHNSON 13

that the holdout juror was unwilling to follow the law. The

trial court, however, clearly did not agree. Although it had

the benefit of hearing directly all of the evidence that the

majority cites, it unequivocally refused to find that the

holdout juror was unwilling to follow the law. That the trial

court could have come to a different conclusion does not cure

the state appellate court’s unreasonable finding as to the trial

court’s reason for removing the holdout juror.

Recognizing the conflict between the state appellate and

trial court’s findings, the majority contends that, under

AEDPA, “the appellate court was entitled to make its own

factual findings, unconstrained by what the trial court did”

and that “the fact that the state appellate court’s findings may

have departed from those of the trial court is irrelevant.” In

other words, the majority holds that, under AEDPA, it was

not unreasonable for the appellate court to make the factual

finding that the trial judge dismissed the holdout juror for

being unwilling to follow the law, and we should therefore

defer to the appellate court’s finding, contrary as it was to the

trial judge’s unambiguous statement.

The majority is wrong. Although AEDPA, as interpreted

by the Supreme Court, may create its own topsy-turvy world

of constitutional reality, it does not go so far as to allow

words to have the direct opposite meaning of what they are

commonly understood to have and of the meaning that was

clearly intended by the speaker. Here, the key word is

“not”—that is, the trial judge explicitly stated that he was not

removing the holdout juror because he was unwilling to

follow the law. Contrary to what the state appellate court

found, “not” simply does not mean its opposite—the

affirmative. AEDPA, however puzzling it may be from a

constitutional standpoint, does not transform judges into

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14 WILLIAMS V. JOHNSON

HumptyDumpties; we cannot make a word “mean[] just what

[we] choose it to mean . . . .” Lewis Carroll, Alice in

Wonderland and Through the Looking Glass 238 (1994). No

matter how “very clever [a Court of Appeal may be] at

explaining words,” id. at 239, there is simply no way an

appellate court can reasonably find that the trial judge did

what he clearly did not do.

The majority next contends that, under AEDPA, we owe

deference to the factual findings of the state appellate court

even when those findings directly contradict the trial court’s. 

That is not true, however, when the finding at issue is the trial

court’s reason for dismissing a juror. Under the Sixth

Amendment, the harm occurs when the judge violates the

integrity of the jury by removing without good cause a

holdout juror who favors acquittal. See Duncan v. Louisiana,

391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) (stating that the Sixth Amendment

was designed in part to protect the integrity of the jury against

an abuse of power by a “compliant, biased, or eccentric

judge”). Given that the factual question is why the trial court

dismissed a juror, it is unreasonable for an appellate court to

contradict the reason the trial court gave for that

dismissal—unless there is cause to suspect that the trial

court’s stated reason was pretextual. There is no cause for

such suspicion here, and no judge, even the majority, has

suggested that there is. Indeed, the trial court could not

possibly have had an ulterior motive for disclaiming the one

reason for dismissal that the Supreme Court has explicitly

endorsed—a juror’s unwillingness to follow the law. See

Maj. Opinion, supra, at 8–9; see also Wainwright v. Witt,

469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985).

The practical implications of the majority’s decision to

the contrary are truly remarkable. Under the majority’s

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WILLIAMS V. JOHNSON 15

theory, the trial judge could have announced to the entire

courtroom that he was removing the juror because the juror

was wrong to believe that the defendant was not guilty, and

it still would not have mattered as long as the appellate court

somehow found that such was not the reason for his doing so. 

This stretches the Sixth Amendment beyond all permissible

bounds, even in AEDPA land.

In sum, the state appellate court found that the state trial

court dismissed the holdout juror because he was unwilling

to follow the law even though the trial court expressly

rejected that reason. That is an unreasonable finding of fact.

* * *

I, like the majority, “don’t approve of what the trial court

did in this case.” In our prior unanimous opinion1, we

analyzed each of the possible reasons for the trial judge’s

removal of the holdout juror, and concluded that he did not

have any constitutionally valid reason for his action. The

Supreme Court reversed our decision, but not because it

found anything wrong with our analysis. Rather, it ordered

us not to analyze the trial court’s possible reasons de novo but

to look at them through the deferential lens of AEDPA. 

Looking through that lens, however, does not tell us whether

a constitutional violation occurred but only whether a state

court was unreasonable in deciding that it didn’t. Although

under AEDPA we are precluded from reversing a state court

in the absence of an unreasonable factual finding or an

unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme

Court law, we are not prohibited, even in the absence of those

1 Williams v. Cavazos, 646 F.3d 626 (9th Cir. 2011), rev’d sub nom.

Johnson v. Williams, 133 S. Ct. 1088 (2013).

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16 WILLIAMS V. JOHNSON

circumstances, from recognizing that a constitutional

violation occurred. We did so in our earlier opinion when we

held that there was no valid reason for the judge’s removal of

the juror, and that analysis remains correct today.

The California trial judge’s dismissal of a holdout juror

without cause is not an anomaly. In the last five years,

California appellate courts have repeatedly reversed trial

judges out of concern that the trial judge compromised the

integrity of the jury by removing a holdout juror without good

cause or pressuring a juror to change his view of the

evidence. See People v. Hughes, 2016 WL 298793 (Cal. Ct.

App., Jan. 25, 2016); People v. Siegfried, 2015 WL 9260925

(Cal. Ct. App., December 17, 2015); People v. Salazar, 2015

WL 1417034 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 26, 2015); People v.

Vasquez, 2013 WL 6154583 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2013);

People v. Perez, 2013 WL 5779040 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 25,

2013); People v. Olmos, 2011 WL 5041962 (Cal. Ct. App.

Oct. 25, 2011); People v. Barilo, 2011 WL 3242009 (Cal. Ct.

App. July 29, 2011); People v. Villa, 2011 WL 1366482 (Cal.

Ct. App. Apr. 12, 2011). Even under AEDPA’s

extraordinarily deferential standard of review, this court also

has found on a number of occasions over the past fifteen

years that a California trial judge improperly coerced or

removed a holdout juror. See, e.g., Sanders v. Lamarque,

357 F.3d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 2004); Smith v. Curry, 580 F.3d

1071, 1085 (9th Cir. 2009); Wilson v. California State

Attorney General, 120 Fed. App’x 658, 659 (9th Cir. 2004).

This trend is troubling. Although the vast majority of

California judges are fair and impartial, courts must not

without good cause remove holdout jurors in the midst of

deliberations. Even if a judge is convinced beyond all doubt

that a defendant committed a crime, we have made the

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WILLIAMS V. JOHNSON 17

fundamental choice that a jury of the defendant’s peers, and

that jury alone, retains the right to declare his guilt or

innocence. This choice is meaningless, however, when a

judge may frustrate the fundamental integrity of the jury

system by removing without cause the lone holdout juror

favoring acquittal. While trial judges have a legitimate

concern about efficiency on the basis of their heavy dockets,

such a concern must not override a defendant’s constitutional

rights. I fear that is what occurred here and that our decision

makes it more likely that it will happen again.

For the foregoing reasons I respectfully dissent.

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