Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_02-cv-01348/USCOURTS-cand-4_02-cv-01348-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DUNG THE PHAM,

Petitioner, No. C 02-1348 PJH

v. ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

C.A. TERHUNE, in his capacity as 

head of the California Department of 

Corrections,

Respondent.

_______________________________/

Before the court is the petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoner, Dung

The Pham (“Pham”), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Having reviewed the record and the

parties’ papers, and having carefully considered their arguments and the relevant legal

authorities, the court GRANTS the petition for the reasons that follow. 

BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

 Following a jury trial, Pham and Son Hoang Nguyen (“codefendant Nguyen”) were

convicted by a jury of first degree murder under California Penal Code §§ 187 and 189. 

Pham was sentenced to twenty-five years to life in prison. Both Pham and Nguyen

appealed to the California Court of Appeal, which affirmed their convictions. The California

Supreme Court subsequently summarily denied Pham’s petition for review. 

Pham then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with this court on March 19,

2002. On May 8, 2002, the court granted Pham’s request to hold the petition in abeyance

while he exhausted two unexhausted claims in state court. In accordance with this court’s

stay order, Pham filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the California Supreme

Court, which was summarily denied on February 11, 2003.

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Pham then filed an amended petition for writ of habeas corpus with this court on

March 2, 2003, raising three claims, including that: 1) his trial counsel rendered

ineffective assistance by failing to obtain criminalist Mario Soto’s lab notes and by failing to

retain his own expert witness regarding a gunshot residue (“GSR”) test that was conducted

on another suspect; 2) the state unconstitutionally suppressed Soto’s lab notes under

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); and 3) the jury instructions utilized by the trial court

were unconstitutional because they allowed the jury to convict Pham of first degree murder

without finding premeditation. On October 20, 2003, this court denied Pham’s petition and

also denied his request for discovery of Soto’s lab notes and raw data.

On November 20, 2003, this court granted Pham’s request for a certificate of

appealability (“COA”) on his Brady claim, but denied the COA as to the other two claims. 

Pham subsequently appealed the Brady claim to the Ninth Circuit. On March 7, 2005, the

Ninth Circuit reversed the decision on the Brady claim, holding that this court erred in

denying Pham’s request for discovery, and that the resolution of his Brady claim required

disclosure of the suppressed evidence, Soto’s lab notes. Pham v. Terhune, 400 F.3d 740,

743 (9th Cir. 2005). The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to this court to order disclosure

of the lab notes and “for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.” Id. 

Following remand, on April 8, 2005, the court issued an order reopening the case,

requiring the state to disclose Soto’s lab notes and raw data regarding his GSR analysis,

and requiring supplemental briefing on the Brady issue following disclosure. Pursuant to

that order, the state provided Pham with Soto’s lab notes and raw data. Pham filed an

opening supplemental brief and related exhibits on September 9, 2005. The state filed its

supplemental brief and related exhibits on January 13, 2006. After several extensions and

a mistake related to Pham’s addition of new counsel, Pham did not file his reply until May

12, 2006. 

In that May 12, 2006 reply, Pham requested further discovery. Specifically, he

sought disclosure of the gunshot residue sample itself for review and testing by his own

expert. Pham noted that Soto’s lab notes, which had been recently disclosed to him on

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remand, indicated that Soto had only tested 59% of the GSR sample. Pham sought

disclosure of the GSR sample so that he could employ an expert to test the sample in its

entirety. The state subsequently filed its May 19, 2006 surreply opposing Pham’s request

for production of the GSR sample, and arguing that Soto’s examination of 59% of the GSR

sample was in accordance with forensic practices. Pham filed a response to the surreply

on May 26, 2006.

On July 17, 2006, the court granted Pham’s request for production of the GSR

sample, and allowed him the opportunity for review and testing of the sample by his own

expert. The court also ordered another round of supplemental briefing following his

expert’s examination. Pham’s expert completed her testing of the GSR sample on October

6, 2006, and Pham filed his second supplemental brief on October 30, 2006. The state

filed its response on January 29, 2007. On March 8, 2007, Pham filed his reply. On March

9, 2007, the state filed a notice of withdrawal of an argument made in its January 29, 2007

supplemental brief.

B. Factual Background

On May 22, 1996, the victim, Tong Van Nguyen, was chased down and shot by two

gunmen in a cafe parking lot in San Jose, California. Both the state and Pham agree that

Tien Ha (“Mole”), who remains a fugitive, was one of the two gunmen. Pham was

convicted of being the other gunman but he contends that the other gunman was a former

suspect, another teenager at the scene of the crime, Tuan Hoang (“Hoang”).

The evidence at trial revealed that on the day of the shooting, a large group of

teenagers, many of whom were friends or acquaintances of Pham and codefendant

Nguyen (no relation to victim Tong Van Nguyen) (the “teenage acquaintances”), gathered

at the cafe. John Nguyen, the victim’s brother, and several other witnesses were also near

the cafe at the time of the shooting. Although the state concedes that many of the teenage

acquaintances lied about what they witnessed, both in pretrial statements and at trial, it

nevertheless argues that a consistent picture of events emerged from the evidence.

According to the state, Pham and Mole saw the victim and cursed at him the day

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Pham sought to introduce allegations of the victim’s gang activity at trial. The trial court

excluded those allegations from evidence, however, finding that they were more prejudicial

than probative. 

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The record is unclear as to what Pham actually said after the shooting. According to

the California Court of Appeal, Pham adopted Mole’s admission that he and Pham shot the

victim. 

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before the shooting.1

 The next day, codefendant Nguyen helped Pham and Mole procure

weapons, thus exposing himself to an aiding and abetting charge. Pham and Mole then

went to the cafe with some of the teenage acquaintances. At the cafe, Pham and Mole

saw the victim and began chasing him on foot in the parking lot. Pham, Mole, and the

victim then disappeared behind a parked van, after which several shots were fired,

apparently from two different guns. Upon hearing the shots, the cafe patrons ran outside,

entered their cars and quickly drove away. The victim died before the police arrived. 

During Pham’s trial, the state argued that he was guilty of first degree murder based

on one of two theories: that he was the direct perpetrator of a premeditated shooting; or, in

the alternative, that he aided and abetted an assault for which murder was a natural and

probable consequence. 

The state’s case was based primarily on eyewitness testimony. It offered testimony

from the victim’s brother and several of the teenage acquaintances as proof of Pham’s

guilt. At trial, John Nguyen, the victim’s brother, identified Pham as one of the gunmen. 

Exh. 2, Reporter’s Transcripts (“R.T.”), at 346:23-25. The state also introduced a

statement to police from Thanh Ha Nguyen (“Cindy”), that, following the shooting, at the

home of one of the teenage acquaintances, Pham and Mole admitted to the shooting.2

Exh. 1, Clerk’s Transcript (“C.T.”), at 875. In addition, the state offered other evidence, in

the form of taped statements given to the police, and testimony from some of the other

teenage acquaintances that Pham and Mole admitted to participating in the shooting, by

either stating so directly, or by adopting admissions made in their presence. C.T. 917; 923

925-926; 996-1008, 1014-1016; R.T. 1480, 1951-1957. The state also introduced

fingerprint evidence that established Pham’s presence in the cafe, R.T. 488-489, and

Mole’s presence inside of Pham’s car. R.T. 1736-1737.

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Pham was not arrested until much later, so no gunshot residue test was performed on

him.

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Soto also analyzed a second GSR test, taken from a suspect named Nhue Vy Giang,

at the time of Hoang’s test. R.T. 2403:13-15. 

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At trial, Pham denied admitting to the murder. He relied primarily on the defense of

mistaken identity, claiming that the second gunman was in fact Hoang, a former suspect

and another one of the teenage acquaintances. The police had arrested Hoang the night of

the shooting and initially charged him with the murder. Upon Hoang’s arrest, the police

performed a gunshot residue test on him, which was analyzed by Santa Clara County

criminalist, Mario Soto.3

 Soto’s report stated that the results of the GSR test were

inconclusive, and that although Hoang may have fired a weapon, Soto could not be sure.4

 

At trial, the defense did not present a GSR expert, but did call Soto as a witness.

The court qualified Soto as an expert on GSR. R.T. 2250:23-24. Soto testified that GSR

analysis is based on the presence of lead, barium, and antimony. R.T. 2252:14-28;

2263:9-10. He further testified that the presence of particles containing titanium and

antimony found on Hoang were inconsistent with GSR. R.T. 2258:8. Soto stated that he

considered a total of six particles in analyzing Hoang’s GSR test, R.T. 2404:9-28, and

determined that the GSR test on Hoang was inconclusive because the presence of

particles inconsistent with GSR indicated a possibility that the particles found on Hoang

came from other environmental sources. R.T. 2266:2-7. Additionally, Soto noted that even

if the particles were conclusively GSR, it would not conclusively prove that Hoang fired a

gun; it would only prove that Hoang had either been present when a gun was fired or

handled a gun that had been fired. R.T. 2421:12-14. Soto ultimately concluded that,

“particles that were consistent with but not unique to [GSR] were found, and that to me is

inconclusive.” R.T. 2410:16-17.

C. Post-Remand Evidentiary Submissions

1. First Round Supplemental Briefing (“1SB”)

Following remand from the Ninth Circuit, the state disclosed Soto’s lab notes to

Pham, which consisted of 53 pages and contained, among other things, the raw data for all

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particles taken from Hoang and analyzed by Soto. See Pham’s 1SB, Exh. A, AGO-01

through AGO-53. The parties then submitted their first supplemental briefs and supporting

declarations. In support of his 1SB, Pham submitted a declaration from Ken Moses, his

forensic expert, which consisted of Moses’ analysis of the raw data and his opinion

regarding Soto’s report and testimony. In response, the state submitted a declaration from

Robert Hinkley (“Hinkley Decl.”), the state’s forensic expert, which included Hinkley’s

opinions regarding the raw data contained in Soto’s notes, Moses’ qualifications and

Moses’ opinions, and Soto’s qualifications and opinions. 

In terms of his qualifications, Moses claims to have over 35 years experience in the

analysis of firearms evidence, which includes GSR collection and analysis. Moses Decl. ¶

1. He acquired GSR collection and analysis experience as an investigator with the San

Francisco Police Department Crime Laboratory and as a director of a company, Forensic

Identification Services. Id. ¶ 3. 

After reviewing the data contained in Soto’s lab notes, Moses offered his own

analysis of the scientific significance of the particles found on Hoang, and refuted Soto’s

conclusion that Hoang’s GSR test contained particles inconsistent with GSR. Moses

ultimately concluded, based on the data contained in Soto’s lab notes, that:

[T]he combination of heavy metals found . . . is an indication that the particles

were the result of gunshot residue and not environmental sources. Even

though each of these elements individually could be the result of

environmental sources, the finding of all these heavy metal particles together

leans more heavily toward the conclusion that the particles are gunshot

residue.

Id. ¶ 20. 

In response to Moses’ declaration, Hinkley asserted that Soto’s trial testimony was

correct, and challenged Moses’ qualifications, and the methods Moses utilized in reaching

his conclusion that the particles taken from Hoang were likely GSR. While Hinkley

acknowledged Moses’ expertise in fingerprint and crime scene analysis, he claimed that

Moses lacked training and/or experience in the type of particle analysis conducted as part

of Hoang’s GSR test. Specifically, Hinkley claimed that Moses lacked a background in

scanning electron microscopy and energy dispersive X-ray analysis, the method used by

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It is not clear to the court why Hartnett also tested Giang’s kit. Pham’s defense was

never that Giang was the other gunman, and Giang has never been at issue in conjunction

with this petition. Accordingly, Hartnett’s evaluation of and opinions regarding Giang’s GSR

test are not relevant to the issues currently before the court. 

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Soto testified at trial that if he had found those particular elements in his testing, then

he (like Hartnett) would have ruled out an environmental source for the GSR. 

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Soto in analyzing Hoang’s GSR test. 

Hinkley also refuted Moses’ conclusions regarding Soto’s lab notes. According to

Hinkley, Moses’ assertion that titanium or antimony from a firearm could be present in GSR

was scientifically inaccurate. Hinkley concluded, after completing his review of the lab

notes and Soto’s testimony and report, that Soto’s statements and conclusions were

accurate based on the raw data in the lab notes. 

However, because both Moses’ and Hinkley’s expert opinions, offered in conjunction

with the parties’ 1SBs, were based solely on Soto’s analysis of only 59% of the GSR

sample, they are of limited evidentiary value given the subsequent developments in this

case. 

2. Second Round Supplemental Briefing (“2SB”)

Following this court’s July 17, 2006 order granting Pham’s request for production of

the GSR samples, Pham employed Celia Hartnett to test 100% of the GSR sample, which

included the 59% tested by Soto and the other 41% not previously tested. Hartnett is a

forensic scientist and lab director at the Forensic Science Division at Forensic Analytical. 

She has over thirty-three years of experience in the field, and has previously testified as an

expert in the collection, analysis, and interpretation of GSR evidence in state court.

Hartnett tested the GSR kits collected by the SJPD for both Tuan Hoang and Nhue

Vy Giang.5 She concluded, contrary to Soto, that the sample collected from Hoang’s left

hand “contained molten particles comprised of lead, antimony, and barium,” which were

“highly specific to GSR,” or, in other words, “unique” to GSR. Hartnett Decl., Exh. B.6

 She

concluded that Hoang’s right hand “contained particles of lead only,” which is “consistent

with GSR.” 

The state does not dispute Hartnett’s findings and conclusions; nor has it challenged

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Because the state failed to properly authenticate the exhibits, the source of the articles

is not entirely clear to the court. In addition to failing to authenticate the exhibits, the state also

failed to explain how the particular exhibits support its position. The court notes that the state

is not alone in its violation of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Both parties have submitted

numerous exhibits with their supplemental briefs, which are simply attached to their briefs,

rather than to a declaration or a request for judicial notice. Although all improperly filed

exhibits should be stricken, given the ultimate result of this petition, the absence of prejudice

to either party, and the absence of objections by either party, the court has reviewed and

considered all exhibits. 

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her expertise or qualifications. Instead, the state challenges the reliability of Hoang’s GSR

sample, whether the materials were actually suppressed, and also reiterates several of its

prior arguments regarding the materiality and exculpatory nature of the evidence. In

support of its 2SB, the state submitted several unauthenticated exhibits that are simply

stapled to its brief, including what appears to be an article from a forensic science journal

(Exh. 5), an article from a science magazine (Exh. 7), and a portion of a transcript from

testimony that Hartnett gave in a state court criminal case (Exh. 6). 7 The state also

submitted declarations from two San Jose Police Department (SJPD) officers, one who was

present when Hoang and Giang were arrested, and another officer who took the GSR

sample from Hoang.

D. Pham’s Trial Counsel’s Requests for Soto’s Lab Notes and Raw Data

 In its October 20, 2003 order denying Pham’s petition and request for discovery,

this court considered whether Pham had shown good cause for discovery of Soto’s lab

notes under Federal Habeas Rule 6(a). In determining that Pham had not shown good

cause, the court stated that it “would be inclined to grant Pham’s request for discovery” if

the request had not arisen in the context of a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Order at

13. The court noted that because this was a habeas case, it was not entitled to substitute

its judgment for that of the state court, and instead “was required to afford more stringent

deference to the state appellate court, which upheld suppression of the lab notes, than that

of an appellate court reviewing the decision of a trial court on direct appeal.” Id.

It is undisputed that prior to trial, the prosecution provided both Pham’s trial counsel,

Schwartz, and codefendant Nguyen’s trial counsel, Morales, with copies of Soto’s report. 

See Resp. 2SB, Exh. 2, June 5, 1996 Report. However, on appeal of this court’s order

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denying discovery of the lab notes, a factual issue arose regarding whether or not Pham’s

counsel requested disclosure of the lab notes from the trial court, and whether or not the

trial court had ruled on the issue. This confusion appears to have been invited, at least in

part, by Pham’s counsel, who misrepresented the state court record in response to a

question from a Ninth Circuit judge at the oral argument on appeal. The relevant colloquy

regarding the lab notes is as follows:

JUDGE 1: Now he [trial counsel] asked for them [lab notes] informally. The

district judge here say[s] that he sought – unsuccessfully sought a court

order. But I saw nothing in the record to show that he sought a court order.

MR. GARDNER: And that’s right. The district judge just made a blunder on

that. I don’t think counsel will argue anything differently.

JUDGE 1: I saw the informal request in the record, and I see nothing beyond

that in the sense of attempt to get a court order. I think it just didn’t happen. 

In his later affidavit when he [trial counsel] says, “It’s not in the file. That

probably means I never got it.” And he makes no mention of having tried to

get a court order.

MR. GARDNER: The district court’s error comes from a declaration I

submitted. And in explaining the course of my attempts to get it I said I asked

for it after my informal request.

JUDGE 1: I see so she just flipping who —

MR. GARDNER: She just flipped —

JUDGE 1: — asked for what?

MR. GARDNER: Exactly, Your Honor.

September 17, 2004 Ninth Circuit Oral Argument Transcripts, at 8 (emphasis added).

The Ninth Circuit appears to have relied on petitioner’s counsel’s misrepresentation

of the record, and in its remand order, stated:

Under the misapprehension that the state court had refused to issue an order

requiring disclosure of the notes, the district court concluded that it was

required ‘to afford more stringent deference to the state appellate court, which

upheld suppression of the lab notes, than that of an appellate court reviewing

the decision of a trial court on appeal.’ The district court erred in applying this

“stringent deference” to Pham’s Rule 6(a) claim because there was no state

court decision refusing to order production of the notes. Pham’s trial counsel

informally requested the notes from the state both before and after trial but

never sought a court order to obtain them.

400 F.3d at 742-43 (emphasis added). 

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Pham’s version of the relevant facts shifts from his opening 2SB to his 2SB reply. In

his opening 2SB, Pham asserted that the Ninth Circuit “got it right” in concluding that his

trial counsel simply asked the prosecution for Soto’s notes but did not seek a court order to

obtain them when the state refused to provide them. Opening 2SB at 18. He then argues

that his counsel’s failure to use “court process to obtain the notes” when the state did not

turn them over pursuant to his letter constituted deficient performance. 

However, in his 2SB reply, Pham sets forth a lengthy history of the pretrial and trial

proceedings, and admits that his trial counsel, Schwartz, did indeed file a motion with the

trial court seeking disclosure of Soto’s notes, a position that is contrary to his position

before the Ninth Circuit that this court “blundered.” 2SB Reply at 9. This is confirmed by

review of the record.

The record before this court previously demonstrated and continues to demonstrate

that Pham’s trial counsel, Schwartz, first requested disclosure of Soto’s notes in a

September 10, 1997 informal pretrial letter request pursuant to California Penal Code §§

1054 et seq . Subsequently, on October 27, 1997, codefendant Nguyen’s trial counsel,

Morales, also requested material relevant to the GSR tests, and advised the prosecution

that he would seek a subpoena for the information if it was not disclosed. On October 29,

1997, the prosecution provided both Schwartz and Morales with an expert witness list that

included Soto’s name. 

Presumably, the state did not disclose Soto’s notes to either Schwartz or Morales in

response to their respective September and October 1997 letters. On or around November

3, 1997, Morales sought a subpoena duces tecum for Soto’s notes. Unfortunately, neither

the prosecutor, Soto, nor Morales have any recollection regarding whether Soto ultimately

turned over his notes to Morales. Morales similarly has no recollection whether, if provided

with the notes, he turned them over to Pham’s trial counsel, Schwartz.

Unlike Morales, Pham’s trial counsel, Schwartz, did not seek a subpoena duces

tecum, but instead, on November 14, 1997, filed his motions in limine with the trial court, in

which he requested a number of discovery items, pursuant to Brady and California Penal

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Code § 1054.1, including “all reports, notes, and statements of experts the prosecution

intends to call” and “what each expert bases his/her opinion upon.” C.T. 479. The trial

court heard the parties’ motions in limine on November 18, 1997, prior to trial.

At that hearing, regarding Pham’s motion for discovery, the court asked the

prosecution “Now with respect to the Brady reference, is there any exculpatory evidence at

all to be elicited that you haven’t given to the defendant?,” to which the prosecution replied,

“No.” R.T. 17. The court then asked Schwartz whether “discovery [was] complete as far as

you’re concerned.” Id. Schwartz stated that the prosecution “was kind enough to provide

some of the discovery on his [motions in limine] list yesterday.” Schwartz then indicated

some confusion regarding who the state was calling as expert witnesses, though. It is

unclear how that confusion was resolved because the trial court then addressed Morales’

motion to sever on Nguyen’s behalf (which it denied), and afterward, simply stated that “the

witness lists are out of the way now.” R.T. 22.

The trial court subsequently confirmed that the expert “reports” (not necessarily the

underlying notes or raw data) had been submitted to counsel, including those of the Santa

Clara County Crime Lab, where Soto worked. Id. The court also asked defense counsel

whether there was any problem with the information disclosed, to which Morales and

Schwartz both replied “no.” Id. 

Thereafter, in state habeas proceedings, Pham sought an order from the California

Supreme Court requiring the state to disclose the lab notes. See Exh. 12 at 25; Amend.

Pet. Ex. B at 3. Specifically, Pham, in his petition for writ of habeas corpus, asked for an

order requiring disclosure of the lab notes and for an additional 60 days to file an amended

state court petition. See Ex. 12 at 25. The California Supreme Court summarily denied

Pham’s habeas petition and refused to order disclosure of the lab notes.

In sum, careful review of the record demonstrates that Pham’s trial counsel did

indeed seek disclosure of Soto’s reports, notes, and statements before the trial court – in

addition to his informal request for the documents in a letter to the prosecution. See C.T.

479. However, the record remains unclear regarding whether the trial court explicitly ruled

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on the issue, and if so, what that ruling was. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that

Pham’s trial counsel did not seek court-ordered disclosure of Soto’s notes is contradicted

by Pham as well as the record evidence, but not its related conclusion that there was no

state court decision refusing to order production since it is unclear from the record how and

if the state court ruled on Pham’s request. As discussed subsequently in this order, the

state now suggests that a trial court ruling on the issue may have been unnecessary

because, for the first time ever, it contends that Soto did indeed disclose his lab notes.

Pham’s trial counsel’s efforts to obtain the lab notes, including counsel’s motion in

limine filed with the trial court, are highly relevant to Pham’s ineffective assistance of

counsel claim, and specifically to an evaluation of the deficient performance prong of the

Supreme Court’s test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). For

this reason, the court has addressed the erroneous characterization of the record that

Pham’s counsel invited on appeal. 

Because the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion based on Mr. Gardner’s mischaracterization

of the record is clearly a factual, as opposed to a legal conclusion, the law of the case

doctrine does not apply and does not require this court to adhere to those mischaracterized

facts on remand. See Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 816

(1988). Nor is this court collaterally estopped from re-evaluating the factual issue since

there has been no final adjudication of the issue. 

ISSUES

As noted, Pham’s March 2, 2003 amended petition, denied by this court on October

20, 2003, raised three claims: 1) that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by

failing to obtain Soto’s lab notes and by failing to retain his own expert witness regarding

the GSR tests; 2) the state unconstitutionally suppressed Soto’s lab notes under Brady v.

Maryland; and 3) the jury instructions utilized by the trial court were unconstitutional

because they allowed the jury to convict Pham of first degree murder without finding

premeditation. 

Additionally, as noted, this court previously granted Pham’s request for a COA to

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appeal only the Brady claim. Pham subsequently filed a motion with the Ninth Circuit to

expand the COA to include his claims for ineffective assistance of counsel and for violation

of his due process rights based on the jury instruction issue. In its March 7, 2005 remand

order, the Ninth Circuit expanded the COA to include this court’s denial of Pham’s motion

for discovery under Rule 6(a), but declined to reach his motion to expand the COA to

include the ineffective assistance and jury instruction claims. It noted that its “failure to

reach these motions at this time is without prejudice to their being made at a later time.” 

400 F.3d at 743.

The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to this court to permit discovery of Soto’s lab

notes. That discovery, and subsequent evidentiary developments, impact the court’s

resolution of both Pham’s Brady claim and his claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. 

Accordingly, the court addresses both claims in this order. However, the court’s analysis

and resolution of Pham’s jury instruction claim, as set forth in the court’s October 20, 2003

order, remains unaffected by the post-remand discovery and related proceedings. The

court therefore will not revisit its denial of jury instruction claim.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

Previously, in the October 2003 order denying Pham’s petition, the court applied

what has been referred to as a “relaxed” deferential standard to the California Supreme

Court’s postcard denial of Pham’s Brady and ineffective assistance of counsel claims. 

Because the state court did not articulate the rationale for its determination and did not

analyze either claim under federal constitutional law, this court was unable to fulfill its

obligation to review the state court’s application of clearly established federal law. See

Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 981-82 (9th Cir. 2000). The court noted that it was

accordingly required to conduct an independent review of the record and the relevant

federal law to determine whether the state court’s decision was “contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of” clearly established law. Id. at 982.

However, given the evidentiary development that has occurred post-remand and

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following the two rounds of supplemental briefing, the court concludes that review of

Pham’s ineffective assistance of counsel and Brady claims should be de novo. See

Monroe v. Angelone, 323 F.3d 297-99 & n. 19 (4th Cir. 2003) (noting that where state

disclosed Brady material for the first time on federal habeas review, it was not possible to

defer to state court adjudication “because no state court considered all of the Brady

material considered here”); cf. Holland v. Jackson, 542 U.S. 649, 653 (2004) (in habeas

case involving ineffective assistance of counsel claim, noting Fourth Circuit’s decision in

Monroe, but declining to reach the issue regarding standard of review). 

 Although the Ninth Circuit has yet to rule on this particular issue, it has indicated

under similar circumstances that de novo review is appropriate. See Killian v. Poole, 282

F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2002). In Killian, the habeas petitioner argued that his conviction

should be set aside based on the prosecution’s knowing use of perjured testimony. Id. 

The district court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the issue. Id. On appeal, the Ninth

Circuit held that it was required to review the perjury claim de novo, and could not afford

AEDPA’s deference to the state court decision because the state court did not have the

evidence of perjury, elicited at the federal court evidentiary hearing, before it at the time it

reached a decision on the merits. Id.

Similarly, here the California Supreme Court did not have the information contained

in Soto’s raw data and notes before it at the time of its decision. Nor did the state court

have the results of Hartnett’s subsequent GSR analysis or her conclusions. Thus, this court

reviews the claims de novo.

II. Brady Claim

A. Legal Standard

“[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon

request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to

punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Brady, 373 U.S.

at 87. A Brady claim has three components: “[t]he evidence must be favorable to the

accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must

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have been suppressed by the state, either wilfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have

ensued.” Strickler v. Green, 527 U.S. 263, 281-282 (1999); see Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S.

668, 691 (2004). Once constitutional error has been found under Brady, it cannot

subsequently be found harmless; the conviction must be set aside. See Kyles v. Whitley,

514 U.S. 419, 436 (1995).

For the first component of the claim, evidence is exculpatory if it is “merely favorable

to the accused.” Gantt v. Roe, 389 F.3d 908, 912 (9th Cir. 2004). The evidence does not

have to affirmatively prove the defendant innocent; but must instead satisfy the “low,

favorable to the accused standard.” Id. Both exculpatory and impeachment evidence may

be favorable to the accused under the Brady standard. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S.

667, 676 (1985); Benn v. Lambert, 283 F.3d 1040, 1052 (9th Cir. 2002). In addition,

exculpatory evidence includes evidence whose value allows a defendant to attack the

thoroughness and good faith of an investigation, albeit typically in cases where the

suppressed evidence is needed to impeach a government witness. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at

445; see, e.g., Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676-677 (government suppressed evidence that witness

received a promise that he would not be prosecuted in exchange for testimony); Benn, 283

F.3d at 1053 (state suppressed impeachment evidence of prosecution witness); Paradis v.

Arave, 240 F.3d 1169, 1175 (9th Cir. 2001) (state suppressed inadmissible handwritten

notes that could be used to impeach expert opinion). 

For the second component, the state has no good faith or inadvertence defense to a

Brady claim; whether nondisclosure was negligent or by design, it is the responsibility of the

prosecutor. Gantt, 389 F.3d at 912. In addition, the prosecution has a duty to learn of any

exculpatory evidence known to others acting on the government's behalf. See Kyles, 514

U.S. at 437-438. The obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence under Brady and its

progeny “is the obligation of the government, not just the obligation of the prosecutor.” 

United States v. Blanco, 392 F.3d 382, 393 (9th Cir. 2004). However, there is no

suppression where the government discloses all information necessary for the defense to

discover alleged Brady material on its own. United States v. Bracy, 67 F.3d 1421, 1428-29

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(9th Cir. 1995). Nonetheless, the fact that the defense failed to discover favorable

evidence when it could or should have done so does not mean that such evidence has not

been "suppressed." Gantt, 389 F.3d at 912-913.

The terms “material” and “prejudicial” are used interchangeably to describe the third

component. Bailey v. Rae, 339 F.3d 1107, 1116 n. 6 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Benn, 283

F.3d at 1053 n. 9 (“Evidence is not ‘material’ unless it is ‘prejudicial,’ and not ‘prejudicial’

unless it is ‘material’”). “Prejudice” and “materiality” are interchangeable because the Brady

standard for materiality is the same as the standard for determining prejudice in ineffective

assistance of counsel claims. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434 (court adopted “reasonable

probability” standard for Brady claims from Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694); Bagley, 473 U.S.

at 682 (Strickland formulation is sufficiently flexible to cover cases of prosecutorial failure to

disclose favorable evidence); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (appropriate standard to

determine ineffective assistance of counsel prejudice is rooted in the test for materiality of

exculpatory information not disclosed to the defense); see also Downs v. Hoyt, 232 F.3d

1031, 1038 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Strickland and Kyles for the ineffective assistance of

counsel “reasonable probability” standard); Benn, 283 F.3d at 1053 (Brady claim evaluated

using the same standard as ineffective assistance of counsel claims). 

The “touchstone of materiality is a ‘reasonable probability’ of a different result.”

Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434. This reasonable probability is “shown when the government's

evidentiary suppression ‘undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.’” Id. (quoting

Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678). Thus, “[a] showing of materiality does not require demonstration

by a preponderance that disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have resulted

ultimately in the defendant's acquittal,” but must only establish that “the favorable evidence

could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine

confidence in the verdict.” Id. at 434-435; see also United States v. Golb, 69 F.3d 1417,

1430 (9th Cir. 1995) (the ultimate question is whether there is a reasonable probability that,

had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been different

such that confidence in outcome is undermined); Bailey, 339 F.3d at 1118 (suppression of

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“linchpin” evidence left little confidence in outcome of trial). The ultimate question for

materiality is thus whether “disclosure of the suppressed evidence to competent counsel

would have made a different result reasonably probable.” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 441. 

Whether a "reasonable probability" exists may not be based on mere speculation

without adequate support. See Wood v. Bartholomew, 516 U.S. 1, 6-8 (1995); see also

Downs, 232 F.3d at 1037 (rejecting as speculative an argument that withheld

material–namely, police leads, including pictures and names of suspects–might have led to

some admissible evidence that might have been sufficiently favorable to meet the Brady

standard); Coleman v. Calderon, 150 F.3d 1105, 1117 (9th Cir. 1998) (failure to disclose

evidence of other suspects in the crime not material because there was no direct or

circumstantial evidence linking the third persons to the perpetration of the crime). 

A determination of materiality under the Brady standard requires the evidence to be

considered collectively. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434. In addition, the materiality of the

suppressed evidence is considered with the evidence admitted at trial. See United States

v. Ross, 372 F.3d 1097, 1107-1108 (9th Cir. 2004); see also United States v. Agurs, 427

U.S. 97, 112 (1976) (materiality of suppressed evidence must be evaluated in the context

of the entire record). The materiality of suppressed evidence requires the court to gauge

the collective impact of the withheld evidence in terms of the strength of the prosecution's

case. See Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1100 (9th Cir. 2005). Thus, to determine

materiality, the exculpatory evidence must be considered with the evidence that was

actually considered at trial to determine whether or not the trial, in the absence of the

suppressed evidence, resulted in a verdict “worthy of confidence.” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434.

B. State’s Suppression of Soto’s Notes and Raw Data

1. Actual Disclosure

In its 2SB, the state significantly shifts its position on a key factual issue, and now

argues that Pham has no Brady claim because it did not suppress Soto’s raw data and

notes as it originally conceded that it did. The state asserts that it is “duly embarrassed” by

the late discovery, but claims that a recent re-reading of Soto’s trial testimony “calls into

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question the previously made assumption that the raw data and notes were not provided.” 

2SB at 3-4. In support, the state points to Pham’s codefendant’s trial counsel, Morales’

direct examination of Soto. R.T. 2255-56. 

At trial, Morales called Soto as a defense witness. Schwartz, Pham’s trial counsel,

did not conduct any examination of Soto. During Morales’ direct examination of Soto, he

questioned Soto regarding information that even Pham concedes was not contained in

Soto’s lab report, which was indisputably provided to both defense counsel. The

information, however, can be found in Soto’s notes and raw data. 

The state argues that Morales’ questions demonstrate that he possessed detailed

information available only from Soto’s raw data and notes – as opposed to Soto’s lab

report. The state also notes that during Soto’s cross-examination, Soto referred to his own

notes “at least five times before responding to [the prosecution’s] questions.” 2SB at 5. 

The state then argues that Morales must have had a copy of Soto’s notes because a trial

lawyer would not have allowed a witness to refer to notes of which he did not have a copy.

Pham concedes in his reply that Morales’ examination of Soto demonstrates that

Morales was aware of facts outside of those contained in Soto’s report. However, Pham

does not concede that Morales therefore had Soto’s notes and raw data. Pham notes that

although Soto and Morales both admit to having met before Soto testified, neither can

recall whether Soto provided Morales with the notes and raw data. Pham additionally

argues that even if Morales possessed Soto’s notes and data, that does not mean that his

trial counsel, Schwartz, had Soto’s notes. Pham contends that it is not relevant what

Morales knew since his codefendant, Nguyen, is not seeking federal habeas relief in this

action.

Pham also argues that the record demonstrates that the state did not disclose Soto’s

notes and raw data to his trial counsel, Schwartz. First, he notes that the state has not

pointed to any evidence that the information was indeed disclosed. He also notes that Soto

cannot recall whether his notes were provided to Schwartz, and that Schwartz has no

recollection of receiving the notes. Furthermore, Pham points out that Schwartz’s file did

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not contain Soto’s notes. Pham also asserts that the state has not explained why “if indeed

it disclosed Soto’s notes before the 1997 trial, it steadfastly refused the courtesy of

providing a duplicate copy through both the state and federal court system for nearly six

years.”

Pham further refutes the state’s suggestion that the fact that Soto referred to his

notes during his testimony requires a conclusion that he must have provided Morales with a

copy of those notes. He argues that all kinds of things happen during a “real trial,” and that

it is not inconceivable that Morales never saw the notes to which Soto referred.

Finally, Pham argues that the state should not be allowed to change its position on a

concession that it made both before this court and before the Ninth Circuit, and that such a

shift is prohibited by both the law of the case and judicial estoppel doctrines. Pham further

notes that if the state had properly disputed the factual issue years ago before the state

courts, he would have been entitled to an evidentiary hearing at that time.

This court has not undertaken any prior analysis with respect to this issue since the

state previously conceded in its briefs filed with this court, in its briefs filed with the Ninth

Circuit, and during its oral argument before the Ninth Circuit, that it had not disclosed Soto’s

raw data and notes. Although the trial court’s inquiry at the pretrial hearing whether there

were any problems remaining with the expert disclosures and trial counsel’s negative

response, suggest both that the court ordered such disclosure and that the notes had been

disclosed, the fact that state habeas counsel immediately sought disclosure of the notes

during habeas proceedings suggests the opposition conclusion. This latter factor, along

with all those pointed out by petitioner, as well as this court’s own review of the record,

have persuaded the court that a clear answer to whether the notes were actually disclosed

cannot be found in the record. The court thus elects to rely on equitable principles to

determine whether the state may now take a position (that it disclosed the notes) contrary

to the position (that it did not disclose the notes) that it has maintained for years.

Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine that “is most commonly applied to bar a

party from making a factual assertion in a legal proceeding which directly contradicts an

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earlier assertion made in the same proceeding or a prior one.” Russell v. Rolfs, 893 F.2d

1033, 1037 (9th Cir. 1990). It not only prevents a party from gaining an advantage by

taking inconsistent positions, but is also intended to protect the integrity of the judicial

system and to prevent a party from playing “fast and loose with the courts.” Hamilton v.

State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 270 F.3d 778, 782 (9th Cir. 2001). There are three factors

that a court may consider in determining whether to apply the doctrine of judicial estoppel. 

Id. First, a party’s later position must be “clearly inconsistent” with its earlier position. Id. 

Second, the party must have succeeded “in persuading a court to accept that party’s earlier

position, so that judicial acceptance of an inconsistent position would create the perception

[that the court was initially] misled.” Id. Finally, judicial estoppel is appropriate if the party

seeking to assert the inconsistent position would derive an unfair advantage or impose an

unfair detriment on the opposing party if not estopped. Id.

All three factors are present here. The state’s current position is indisputably

inconsistent. Second, both this court and the Ninth Circuit accepted the state’s prior

position. It is not necessary that the court have ruled on the precise issue to have “relied”

on it. See id. at 783 (citing Interstate Fire & Casuality Co. v. Underwriters, 139 F.3d 1234,

1239 (9th Cir. 1998)). Here, based on the state’s prior representations, neither this court

nor the Ninth Circuit conducted any inquiry into whether or not the state actually

suppressed the materials, but instead presumed that the issue should be resolved in

Pham’s favor. Finally, there can be no doubt that permitting a change of position would

result in undue prejudice to Pham. Had the state been diligent in its analysis of the record

six years ago when the case was before the state court on habeas review, Pham could

have requested an evidentiary hearing to resolve the issue then. The witnesses and

defense counsels’ memories would have been fresher at that time. 

2. State’s Duty to Disclose

In an argument misplaced in its discussion of the exculpatory nature of the evidence

in its 2SB, the state argues that even if the notes and raw data were in fact suppressed by

the prosecution, it was not required to disclose them as Brady material because Soto’s raw

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data and lab notes were capable of interpretation and analysis only by a highly qualified

scientific expert. It contends that the prosecutor would not have had actual or constructive

knowledge of the notes’ and data’s exculpatory value. The state is unable to cite any

authority in support of its position, and all of the authority that the court has located is to the

contrary. 

Ninth Circuit law is clear that Brady does not permit a good faith or inadvertence

defense. Gantt, 389 F.3d at 912. It applies even if the prosecution “fails to grasp the

significance” of the evidence. See id. Moreover, Brady applies to information that is not

even known to or in the prosecution’s possession. See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281. It simply

is not relevant for purposes of Brady that the prosecution in this case could not, or did not,

recognize the exculpatory value of the information contained in Soto’s notes and/or raw

data. This is particularly true where as here the defense did not simply request “Brady

material” but specifically requested the lab notes.

C. Exculpatory Nature of the Evidence

In both its 1SB and its 2SB, the state confuses two of the distinct Brady prongs - the

exculpatory nature of the evidence and the materiality of the evidence. In its 1SB, the

state addresses only the exculpatory nature of the evidence, and fails to address at all the

materiality of the evidence. It does so in spite of the fact that it is materiality that typically

lies at the center of most Brady disputes. See, e.g., Bailey, 339 F.3d at 1115 (materiality is

the “[c]ritical issue in any Brady claim”). However, upon closer review, many of the state’s

arguments regarding the exculpatory nature of the evidence actually concern the materiality

of the evidence. Accordingly, the court addresses these arguments below in conjunction

with the materiality prong.

Additionally, as discussed above, most of the parties’ arguments in their 1SB

regarding Moses’ and Hinkley’s expert opinions and their effect on the exculpatory nature

or materiality of Soto’s lab notes and raw data, are mooted by Hartnett’s subsequent

analysis of 100% of the GSR sample and related evidentiary developments in this case, as

set forth in the parties’ 2SB. 

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In its 2SB, the state argues that Soto’s raw data and lab notes are not in and of

themselves exculpatory because they required another step: that Pham have the samples

retested by Hartnett. In support, the state argues that it was it was scientifically correct for

Soto to test only 59% of the GSR samples based on the technology available to him in

1996.

In response, Pham notes that under Ninth Circuit law, this court should consider not

only the evidence actually suppressed, but “information the defendant reasonably could

acquire” after disclosure. He therefore contends that disclosure of Soto’s lab notes in this

case would have led to his discovery of the fact that Soto tested only 59% of the samples. 

That discovery would in turn have led to the conclusion that retesting of the entire sample

was appropriate, and the retesting would have resulted in the conclusion that Hoang had

GSR on his left hand. 

Contrary to the state’s arguments, the lab notes and raw data need not in and of

themselves prove Pham’s innocence. Bailey, 339 F.3d at 1115. As noted, there is a low

threshold for concluding that evidence is “exculpatory” under Brady. The evidence need

only be “favorable to the accused,” Gantt, 389 F.3d at 912, and includes evidence which

allows a petitioner to attack the thoroughness of an investigation. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at

445. Here, it is sufficient that Pham could have used the lab notes and raw data to

impeach Soto’s methods. See id. Furthermore, even if the state is correct that Soto was

following standard 1996 protocol in testing only 59% of the sample and could not have

been impeached on that basis, disclosure of the raw notes and data still could have led to

the discovery of other admissible, material evidence. See United States v. Kennedy, 890

F.2d 1056, 1059 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Finally, the lab notes allow Pham to challenge the thoroughness of the state’s

investigation, because Hartnett’s conclusion supports Pham’s theory that the police initially

had the correct person when they arrested Hoang, and that the investigation went the

wrong way after Pham was arrested. Hartnett’s conclusions unquestionably bolster Pham’s

assertion that Hoang, and not Pham, was the second gunman. For these reasons, the

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court concludes that the notes and data are exculpatory under Brady. 

D. Materiality/Prejudice

In his 1SB, Pham argues that the lab notes and raw data contained therein are

material because disclosure of the notes, when considered with other evidence of Hoang’s

involvement in the shooting, would have put the case in such a different light that their

suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial. In support, Pham points to

weaknesses associated with the evidence presented at trial, including the victim’s brother’s

identification of him as one of the gunmen; the testimony of the teenage acquaintances;

and the testimony of other witnesses to the shooting. 

Pham points first to his identification by the victim’s brother, John Nguyen (“John”). 

Pham notes that John initially stated that he didn’t get a good look at the second gunman,

R.T. 239:8, and even later identified codefendant Nguyen (instead of Pham) as the second

gunman. R.T.1808:17. In spite of his initial statements, at trial, John subsequently changed

his story and identified Pham as the second gunman. R.T. 359:6. 

Pham then notes witness statements provided to police during their investigation of

the shooting, which directly conflicted with the witnesses’ subsequent trial testimony. 

Specifically, Pham notes that teenage acquaintances Cindy, Vu Nguyen (“Vu”), Hung Tran

(“Hung”), and Hoang initially told police that Pham had admitted to the shooting the night it

occurred. See C.T. 875, 917; 923; 925-926; 996-1008; 1014-1016. However, they later

recanted their prior statements, and at trial testified that they had no knowledge of Pham’s

involvement in the shooting. See R.T. 790:27 (Mole was the only person Cindy was

positive about admitting to shooting); R.T. 1319:2 (Vu denied hearing any admissions about

the shooting); R.T. 1484:27 (Hung stated that Pham didn’t admit to the shooting). Pham

further argues that Vu and Hung gave false statements to the police to exculpate Hoang

and inculpate Pham, and notes that their statements are consistent with Hoang’s

involvement in the shooting. Id. at 7-8. 

In his 2SB, following Hartnett’s subsequent testing of Hoang’s GSR sample, Pham

notes that the lab notes and related testing reveal “an increased probability of Hoang’s

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having fired a gun,” which he asserts the Ninth Circuit implied would “not be immaterial”

under Brady. Significantly, as noted above, the state does not dispute Hartnett’s

qualifications or her conclusions. It simply argues that even considering her conclusions,

Pham cannot show prejudice because, when they are considered along with the rest of the

evidence at trial, there is not a reasonable probability that the result would have been

different. 

In its 2SB, the state notes that Hartnett has not opined, based on her testing, that

Hoang fired a weapon “with a reasonable degree of scientific certainty.” According to the

state, that is because even if Hartnett can conclude with a reasonable degree of scientific

certainty that Hoang had GSR on his hands, he may have simply been in the vicinity of a

weapon when it was discharged or have come into contact with an object that contained

GSR. It argues that the odds were particularly high - greater than those for an “average”

person – that Hoang was simply exposed to GSR, arguing that he was a “wanna be” gang

member for whom exposure to firearms and ammunition was common. 

For the first time, in its 2SB, the state also challenges the reliability of Hoang’s GSR

sampling based on timing and potential contamination. It argues that Hoang’s GSR

sampling occurred approximately six hours after the shooting, making the tests less reliable

because they occurred at the “outer limit” permissible for testing. See, e.g., 2SB, Exh. 5,

Summary of the FBI Laboratory’s Gunshot Residue Symposium, 8 Forensic Science

Communications 3 (July 2006) (noting that GSR examiners vary in their opinions regarding

the acceptable time range for collecting sample following a shooting, and that the majority

agree that a four to six hour cut-off is appropriate). The state further argues that the

circumstances surrounding Hoang’s GSR sampling increased the possibility of its

contamination. It suggests that the sample could have been contaminated in a number of

ways, including Hoang’s contact with the actual gunman, by the fact that Hoang was a

possible passenger in the actual gunman’s getaway car, by Hoang’s transport in a squad

car, and by contact with arresting officers. In support, it notes that the GSR sampling was

not performed at the scene of the shooting, and has submitted declarations from SJPD

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officers Carpenter and Day in support of its contamination arguments. 

Officer Day was present when Hoang and Giang were arrested at approximately

10:45 p.m. the night of the shooting, May 22, 1996. He attests that neither Hoang nor

Giang had their hands “bagged” before they were handcuffed. He also attests that he

transported them to the police station, at which point they were required to enter separate

locked rooms. Officer Day then removed his firearm and placed it in a locker. He then

moved the suspects into another room. Day states that he was “unaware that [he] might

wash [his] hands after handling [his] firearm and before searching suspects for weapons, or

before giving them a GSR test,” but does not clarify whether or not he did in fact wash his

hands prior to searching Hoang and Giang.

Officer Carpenter, who also submitted a declaration with the state’s 2SB, took the

GSR sample from Hoang. He states that prior to the sampling, he secured his handgun in

a locker. He also asserts that officers are not trained to wash their hands prior to taking the

sample. Carpenter attests that the processing of suspects is done in an area called

“central supply where long and short guns are transferred to officers going on duty, and

[going to the] indoor shooting range.” 

In his reply 2SB, Pham argues that the fact that there are alternate explanations for

the GSR on Hoang’s hands does not undermine the materiality of the evidence. He notes

that at trial, the prosecution itself conceded that if GSR had conclusively been found on

Hoang’s hands, that fact would be extremely significant. 

Pham also contends that the state’s arguments regarding the possibility of

contamination are misleading. He notes that his codefendant Nguyen called Officer

Carpenter as a defense witness at trial, and that Morales, his codefendant’s attorney,

examined Carpenter regarding the circumstances surrounding Hoang’s GSR test. 

Significantly, Pham notes that the prosecution did not cross-examine Carpenter regarding

any of the potential contamination issues alluded to in Carpenter’s current declaration and

in the state’s 2SB. Pham further argues that any current suggestion that Carpenter did not

wash his hands or wear gloves prior to taking Hoang’s GSR sample is counter to

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Carpenter’s trial testimony. In support, Pham submitted the instructions to the GSR kit as

an exhibit to his 2SB, and notes that Carpenter testified at trial that he followed those very

instructions, which required Carpenter to wash his hands and to wear gloves.

Pham further asserts that the state is wrong regarding the timing of the GSR

sampling. He agrees that Hoang’s GSR sample was taken at 12:15 a.m. on May 23, 1996,

but argues that the shooting occurred closer to 7:30 p.m. May 22, 1996, than to 7:00 p.m.,

as the state asserts. Accordingly, Pham asserts that the sampling was conducted less

than five hours after the shooting, and would therefore have been in compliance with the

acceptable limits set by the FBI. See, e.g., 2SB, Exh. 5, Summary of the FBI Laboratory’s

Gunshot Residue Symposium, 8 Forensic Science Communications 3 (July 2006) (FBI

uses a five hour cut-off policy in accepting GSR samples). He further notes that the

sampling also must have taken place within the acceptable limits set by the Santa Clara

County crime lab, since that lab went ahead and performed the testing on the samples.

Both parties agree that because GSR particles are transferable, an expert cannot

definitively conclude based on GSR testing that the subject indeed fired a gun. See, e.g.,

2SB, Exh. 5, Summary of the FBI Laboratory’s Gunshot Residue Symposium, 8 Forensic

Science Communications 3 (July 2006). That is because GSR tests cannot rule out the

fact that one who tests conclusively for GSR picked up the GSR as a bystander at the

scene of the crime or from a surface that contained GSR. See id. Instead, GSR testing

measures the probability that the subject fired the gun. See id.

Here, Hartnett’s testing of Hoang’s entire GSR sample rules out the possibility that

Hoang had something other than GSR on his hands as a result of another type of

environmental contamination, e.g., contact with brake pads or another environmental

source. Accordingly, there can be no dispute that Hartnett’s conclusions undermine Soto’s

testimony at trial that it was “inconclusive” whether or not Hoang had GSR on his hands. 

While Hartnett is unable to definitively conclude that Hoang indeed fired the weapon -

because no GSR test can lead to such a conclusion – the results of Hartnett’s testing

undoubtedly reveal an increased probability that Hoang fired a weapon.

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8

At the September 7, 2004 oral arguments, the Ninth Circuit noted that even a

conclusive GSR test would not show that Hoang was the gunman, but that it would have

“upgraded the likelihood or the probability” that he was. See Transcripts at 19-20. The court

also considered the state’s argument regarding the transferability of GSR, and how it can be

transferred from a surface, like the actual gunman’s car, to a recipient such as Hoang. See

id. at 26. 

9

At oral argument, the court further noted that Pham’s trial was one 

where there’s all this conflicting evidence, where there is strong, at least

eyewitness testimony at the beginning, to the extent eyewitness testimony is

ever strong, to suggest that it was reasonable to believe that [Hoang] was the

shooter. Why wouldn’t that be a critical factor in the jury’s weighing of the

evidence[?].

Transcripts at 28.

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 The Ninth Circuit has already indicated that it found the suppressed information

would likely be material and prejudicial. In its order remanding the case for further

discovery, the Ninth Circuit noted that “a conclusive finding of GSR [would] not prove that

Hoang actually fired a gun.” 400 F.3d at 743.8

 However, it nevertheless concluded that

such a finding “would significantly bolster the defense theory of the case.” Id. The court

then stated that “[i]n light of the significant amount of other evidence tending to inculpate

Hoang, we cannot say that an increased probability of Hoang’s having fired a gun would be

immaterial under Brady.” Id. (emphasis added). In other words, the Ninth Circuit implicitly

found that there was significant evidence inculpating Hoang.9 Accordingly, although the

Ninth Circuit did not explicitly state that given the current GSR results, the suppressed

information is material, it strongly suggested that it is.

Following the latest developments, the court agrees that the suppressed information

is material. The post-remand discovery and further testing of Hoang’s GSR sample simply

could not have produced any more favorable results for Pham. The results of Hartnett’s

testing more directly implicate Hoang by conclusively demonstrating that he had GSR on

his left hand. Additionally, Hartnett’s testing clearly undermines Soto’s conclusion and

methods.

Presumably because it cannot challenge the accuracy of the results of Hartnett’s

GSR testing, the state now challenges the reliability of the GSR sample based on timing of

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10Given that Pham did not refer to this claim in his reply 2SB after conceding that his

counsel had indeed sought a court order for the notes, the court could reasonably conclude

that Pham has abandoned this claim.

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collection and the possibility of contamination. Apparently, the state did not have the same

concerns with respect to the GSR samples at the time that Pham’s codefendant introduced

the GSR evidence at trial. During its cross-examination of SJPD Officer Carpenter, the

state did not raise any concerns regarding Carpenter’s procedure in taking the sample. Nor

did the state request a Daubert or evidentiary hearing prior to introduction of the evidence

at trial. Because the state did not challenge the reliability of the evidence at the time of

trial, this court declines to visit the issue more than ten years later in the context of postremand supplemental briefing on federal habeas review. Moreover, the court notes that, in

terms of timing, Pham is correct that the record shows that the GSR samples were taken

within five hours of the shooting, a time period that is in accordance with FBI guidelines.

Accordingly, for the above reasons, the court concludes that the lab notes and raw

data were material because the state’s suppression of the materials undermined

confidence in the outcome of the trial. Because the court has also concluded that the lab

notes and raw data were suppressed by the state and are exculpatory, the court GRANTS

Pham relief on his Brady claim.

III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim

As noted, Pham also raised an ineffective assistance of counsel claim that is closely

related to his Brady claim, contending that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance

by failing to obtain Soto’s lab notes and by failing to retain his own expert witness regarding

Hoang’s GSR tests. The state did not address the claim in either of its supplemental briefs,

asserting that this court’s post-remand order for supplemental briefing applied only to the

Brady claim.10

The state is correct that this court’s April 8, 2005 order reopening the case and

granting discovery pursuant to the Ninth Circuit’s remand order, ordered re-briefing only as

to petitioner’s Brady claim. It was unclear at the time the court issued that order, though,

what Soto’s lab notes would reveal. Nor was it apparent at that point that further testing of

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11This court’s July 17, 2006 order for supplemental briefing following Hartnett’s testing

of Hoang’s GSR sample was more general regarding the scope of supplemental briefing

following test completion than the court’s April 8, 2005 order.

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the GSR samples themselves would be appropriate, or what further testing would reveal.11 

There can be no question that the post-remand developments in this case impact

Pham’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. This is especially true given the fact that

this court’s analysis and resolution of the prejudice prong under the Strickland must be

identical to that with respect to Pham’s Brady claim. Accordingly, given the developments

in this case, the court finds it necessary to reconsider its October 20, 2003 order denying

Pham’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

A. Legal Standard

The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to assistance of counsel. U.S. Const.

amend. VI; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685. “[T]he right to counsel is the right to the effective

assistance of counsel.” Id. at 686 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771, n.

14 (1970)). “An ineffective assistance claim has two components: A petitioner must show

that counsel's performance was deficient, and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense.” 

Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). The court

is not required to find counsel’s performance deficient before considering whether the

performance prejudiced petitioner’s defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. If the petitioner

makes an insufficient showing of either component, the court does not have to consider the

other. Id. Specifically, "[i]f it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground

of lack of sufficient prejudice, . . . that course should be followed.” Id.

To establish deficient performance, a petitioner must demonstrate that counsel's

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Wiggins, 539 U.S. at

521. The Supreme Court has “declined to articulate specific guidelines for appropriate

attorney conduct and instead ha[s] emphasized that the proper measure of attorney

performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” Id. 

Thus, the reasonableness of counsel's conduct must be measured against the professional

norms prevailing at the time of counsel’s representation. See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S.

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374, 386-87 (2005) (citing American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice in

circulation at time of defendant's trial); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 522-23 (2003)

(citing American Bar Association professional standards and standard practice in capital

defense at pertinent time).

Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential, and review

must start with a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of

reasonable professional assistance. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. In addition, a

determination of the reasonableness of defense counsel’s conduct is based on facts of the

particular case viewed from the time of counsel’s conduct. Id., 466 U.S. at 690. Thus, the

relevant inquiry is not what defense counsel could have done, but rather whether the

choices made by defense counsel were reasonable. See Babbitt v. Calderon, 151 F.3d

1170, 1173 (9th Cir. 1998). Therefore, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires

an identification of the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged to have been

objectively unreasonable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.

As stated above, the same “reasonable probability” standard governs Strickland

“prejudice” and Brady “materiality.” Benn, 283 F.3d at 1053. In order to grant relief for

either type of claim, the court must determine that there is a reasonable probability that, but

for the constitutional violation, the result of the proceeding would have been different. See

e.g., Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (“a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different”); Kyles, 514

U.S. at 433 (“a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the

defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different”); Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682

(Strickland's reasonable probability standard appropriate for claims alleging suppression of

exculpatory evidence); see generally Strickler, 527 U.S. at 297-299 (Souter J.) (describing

the evolution of the Brady "reasonable probability" standard, noting that it originated in

Strickland, and further noting that Strickland cited Agurs, which involved a Brady claim, for

the “reasonable probability” standard); Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434 (Bagley Court adopted the

Strickland “reasonable probability” standard for Brady materiality). 

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B. Deficient Performance

Because this court has already concluded that the suppressed evidence is material

and prejudicial in conjunction with Pham’s Brady claim, it need not address prejudice in

conjunction with the instant claim because, assuming counsel’s performance was deficient,

the result would be the same.

Turning to Pham’s trial counsel, Schwartz’s performance, in his opening 2SB, Pham

argues that Schwartz “did nothing” after the state failed to disclose Soto’s notes as

requested by Schwartz’s letter to the prosecutor. Pham contends that Schwartz’s failure to

“follow through” and to seek a court order to obtain them was deficient. He asserts that

“[w]hen the state did not comply with counsel’s initial request, counsel should have sought

court process to obtain the notes.” 2SB Opening Br. at 18. 

However, as discussed in more detail above, Pham conceded in his reply 2SB, and

the record confirms, that his trial counsel did indeed file a motion in limine with the trial

court, which requested disclosure of Soto’s notes, among other things. Assuming that

Pham’s trial counsel did not receive Soto’s notes as a result of his informal request to the

prosecution and his motion filed with the trial court, it is unclear what more his trial counsel

could have done in an attempt to obtain Soto’s raw data and notes. Given the record in this

case, Schwartz’s performance, including his efforts to obtain the suppressed materials, was

objectively reasonable.

For these reasons, the court DENIES Pham’s claim for relief based on ineffective

assistance of counsel.

IV. Jury Instruction Claim

Because this court’s October 20, 2003 resolution of Pham’s jury instruction claim is

unchanged by the post-remand evidentiary development and re-briefing, the court declines

to reconsider the issue at this time.

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, the court GRANTS habeas relief on Pham’s Brady claim,

and DENIES relief as to Pham’s claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. The court

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declines to reconsider its prior October 20, 2003 order denying Pham habeas relief as to

his jury instruction claim. Because the court grants relief on Pham’s Brady claim, his

request for an evidentiary hearing is mooted.

Accordingly, Pham’s conviction is VACATED. The respondent shall release

petitioner from custody unless the state commences proceedings to retry petitioner within

120 days of the date of entry of judgment on this order. 

The clerk shall send an informational copy of this order to the district attorney of

Santa Clara County, in addition to the usual service on counsel of record. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 20, 2008

______________________________

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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