Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-2_06-cv-02040/USCOURTS-arwd-2_06-cv-02040-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

---

Michael J. Astrue became the Social Security Commissioner on February 12, 2007. 1

Pursuant to Rule 25(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Michael J. Astrue has been

substituted for Commissioner Jo Anne B. Barnhart as the defendant in this suit.

Records indicate that plaintiff had previously applications for SSI in May 1994 and 2

August 1996. (Tr. 19). Based on his August 1996 application, plaintiff was found to be disabled

and was awarded benefits until April 2001, when he turned eighteen. (Tr. 19). 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FORT SMITH DIVISION

BRENDA GANN

O/B/O ERIC GANN PLAINTIFF

VS. CIVIL NO. 06-2040

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE , Commissioner 1

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION DEFENDANT

MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, Brenda Gann, brings this action on behalf of her son, Eric, seeking judicial review,

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), of the decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security

Administration (Commissioner), denying Eric’s application for childhood disability benefits and

supplemental security income (SSI) benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act.

I. Background:

Plaintiff protectively filed an application for childhood disability benefits and SSI on Eric’s

behalf on June 19, 2002, alleging that Eric is disabled due to severe obesity, seizures, right ankle 2

problems, osteoarthritis, borderline intellectual functioning (“BIF”), and depression. (Tr. 19, 20,

457, 467). An administrative hearing was held on July 22, 2003. (Tr. 604-650). Plaintiff was

present and represented by council. 

Case 2:06-cv-02040-RTD Document 11 Filed 02/27/07 Page 1 of 7 PageID #: <pageID>
2

At the time of the administrative hearing, Eric was twenty years old and, with the assistance

of a special education program, had obtained a high school education. (Tr. 20, 457). Records reveal

that Eric has no vocationally relevant past work experience. (Tr. 20, 473, 611-612).

The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), in a written decision dated October 23, 2003, found

that Eric’s impairments were severe. However, he concluded that Eric retained the residual

functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform a significant range of light work, limited by his need for a

sit/stand option; ability to only occasionally stoop, crouch, kneel, crawl, climb stairs, and balance;

and, inability to climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds or be exposed to hazards such as driving moving

and/or dangerous machinery. (Tr. 25). From a mental standpoint, the ALJ determined that Eric

could perform work requiring him to understand, remember, and carry out simple one and two step

tasks and involving no more than incidental contact with the general public. (Tr. 26). As such, the

ALJ determined that Eric’s impairments did not meet, medically equal, or functionally equal any

listed impairment. (Tr. 26-27). 

On March 21, 2006, the Appeals Council declined to review this decision. (Tr. 8-11).

Subsequently, plaintiff filed this action. (Doc. # 1). This case is before the undersigned for report

and recommendation. Both parties have filed appeal briefs, and the matter is now ready for decision.

(Doc. # 9, 10). 

II. Standard of Review:

The court’s review is limited to whether the decision of the Commissioner to deny benefits

to the plaintiff is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See Ostronski v.

Chater, 94 F.3d 413, 416 (8th Cir. 1996). Substantial evidence means more than a mere scintilla of

evidence, it means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support

Case 2:06-cv-02040-RTD Document 11 Filed 02/27/07 Page 2 of 7 PageID #: <pageID>
3

a conclusion. See Richardson v. Pearles, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). The court must consider both

evidence that supports and evidence that detracts from the Commissioner’s decision, but the denial

of benefits shall not be overturned even if there is enough evidence in the record to support a

contrary decision. Johnson v. Chater, 87 F.3d 1015, 1017 (8th Cir. 1996).

It is well-established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden of

proving his disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that has lasted at least one year

and that prevents him from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. Pearsall v. Massanari, 274

F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir. 2001); see 42 U.S.C. § § 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act defines

“physical or mental impairment” as “an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or

psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory

diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. § § 423(d)(3), 1382(3)(c). A plaintiff must show that his

disability, not simply his impairment, has lasted for at least twelve consecutive months.

The Commissioner’s regulations require her to apply a five-step sequential evaluation process

to each claim for disability benefits: (1) whether the claimant has engaged in substantial gainful

activity since filing her claim; (2) whether the claimant has a severe physical and/or mental

impairment or combination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment(s) meet or equal an

impairment in the listings; (4) whether the impairment(s) prevent the claimant from doing past

relevant work; and, (5) whether the claimant is able to perform other work in the national economy

given her age, education, and experience. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)- (f)(2003), 416.920. Only

if the final stage is reached does the fact finder consider the plaintiff’s age, education, and work

experience in light of his or her residual functional capacity. See McCoy v. Schwieker, 683 F.2d

1138, 1141-42 (8th Cir. 1982); 20 C .F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2003).

Case 2:06-cv-02040-RTD Document 11 Filed 02/27/07 Page 3 of 7 PageID #: <pageID>
4

III. Discussion:

Of particular concern to the undersigned in the ALJ’s RFC determination. RFC is the most

a person can do despite that person’s limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). A disability claimant

has the burden of establishing his or her RFC. See Masterson v. Barnhart, 363 F.3d 731, 737 (8th

Cir.2004). “The ALJ determines a claimant’s RFC based on all relevant evidence in the record,

including medical records, observations of treating physicians and others, and the claimant’s own

descriptions of his or her limitations.” Eichelberger v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 584, 591 (8th Cir. 2004);

Guilliams v. Barnhart, 393 F.3d 798, 801 (8th Cir. 2005). Limitations resulting from symptoms

such as pain are also factored into the assessment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3). The United States

Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has held that a “claimant’s residual functional capacity is a

medical question.” Lauer v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 700, 704 (8th Cir. 2001). Therefore, an ALJ’s

determination concerning a claimant’s RFC must be supported by medical evidence that addresses

the claimant’s ability to function in the workplace.” Lewis v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 642, 646 (8th Cir.

2003). 

In the present case, the medical evidence reveals that Eric is obese, weighing approximately

350 pounds. (Tr. 631-632). In addition, he has undergone pinning of a slipped capital femoral

epiphysis in both hips and sustained an injury to his right ankle in 1997. (Tr. 99, 358, 431). X-rays

of his lumbar spine show a mild dextrocurvature of the lumbar spine with small scattered focal end

plate compressions. (Tr. 519). Further, a physical examination has revealed reduced lateral and

forward bending in the lumbar spine, reduced dorsiflexion and plantar flexion in the right ankle,

inversion/eversion on the right of about half of the normal left side, and decreased sensation in the

right lower extremity. (Tr. 521). 

Case 2:06-cv-02040-RTD Document 11 Filed 02/27/07 Page 4 of 7 PageID #: <pageID>
5

The only evidence addressing Eric‘s ability to function in the workplace during the relevant

time period is an RFC assessment completed by Dr. Robert Redd, a non-examining, consultative

physician. (Tr. 524-533). After reviewing plaintiff’s medical records, he concluded that plaintiff

could lift less than ten pounds frequently; lift ten pounds occasionally; stand and walk two hours

during an eight-hour workday; sit six hours during an eight-hour workday; and, occasionally climb,

balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. (Tr. 525-526). This assessment was affirmed by a second

non-examining physician on January 31, 2003. (Tr. 533). 

In spite of the fact that the record contains no evidence to suggest that plaintiff is capable of

performing light work, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff can perform a significant range of light work,

limited by his need for a sit/stand option; ability to only occasionally stoop, crouch, kneel, crawl,

climb stairs, and balance; and, inability to climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds or be exposed to

hazards such as driving moving and/or dangerous machinery. (Tr. 25). See id. As such, we do not

find substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s determination and believe that remand is necessary

to allow the ALJ to reevaluate plaintiff’s physical RFC. 

We also note that none of plaintiff’s treating physicians have completed an RFC assessment

for the time period in question. See Vaughn v. Heckler, 741 F.2d 177, 179 (8th Cir. 1984) (If a

treating physician has not issued an opinion which can be adequately related to the disability

standard, the ALJ is obligated to address a precise inquiry to the physician so as to clarify the

record). Accordingly, on remand, the ALJ is directed to address interrogatories to the physicians

who have treated plaintiff, asking the physicians to review plaintiff’s medical records; to complete

a physical and mental RFC assessment regarding plaintiff’s capabilities during the time period in

question; and, to give the objective basis for their opinions, so that an informed decision can be made

Case 2:06-cv-02040-RTD Document 11 Filed 02/27/07 Page 5 of 7 PageID #: <pageID>
6

regarding plaintiff’s ability to perform basic work activities on a sustained basis during the relevant

time period in question. Chitwood v. Bowen, 788 F.2d 1376, 1378 n.1 (8th Cir. 1986); Dozier v.

Heckler, 754 F.2d 274, 276 (8th Cir. 1985). 

Further, there also appears to be some question as to whether Eric sustained a broken ankle

requiring surgery. Although Eric testified that his ankle was broken and that he had undergone more

than one surgery to correct this problem, the record alludes to this possibility but does not contain

medical records to evidence the alleged surgical procedures. (Tr. 613-614). Accordingly, on

remand, the plaintiff is directed to provide the ALJ with any and all medical records pertaining to

said injury. 

The record is also unclear as to the reason Eric was awarded benefits in 1997 and the reason

said benefits were terminate in 2001. While it appears as though Eric originally obtained benefits

due to his father’s disability with cessation in 2001 upon his graduation from high school, statements

made at the administrative hearing also suggest that Eric was awarded child SSI benefits in 1997

based upon his own disability, with said benefits terminating in 2001when he turned 18. The record

does not, however, contain any documentation of the granting or termination of said benefits. As

such, on remand, the ALJ is also directed to resolve this issue and make clear whether Eric’s 2001

cessation of benefits is under reconsideration with the present application.

IV. Conclusion:

Accordingly, we conclude that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence,

and therefore recommend that the denial of benefits be reversed and this matter be remanded to the

Commissioner for further consideration pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The

parties have ten days from receipt of our report and recommendation in which to file written

Case 2:06-cv-02040-RTD Document 11 Filed 02/27/07 Page 6 of 7 PageID #: <pageID>
7

objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely objections may result

in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties are reminded that objections

must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the district court.

DATED this 27th day of February 2007.

/s/ J. Marschewski

HON. JAMES R. MARSCHEWSKI

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 2:06-cv-02040-RTD Document 11 Filed 02/27/07 Page 7 of 7 PageID #: <pageID>