Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01274/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01274-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 720
Nature of Suit: Labor Management Relations Act
Cause of Action: 

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The Honorable Charles A. Shaw, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-1274

___________

Alfonso A. Waldron, Jr.; *

Richard J. Clark; Christopher *

Carmona; Darrell L. Frey; *

Mark A. White, *

* Appeal from the United States

Plaintiffs/Appellants, * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Missouri.

v. *

*

The Boeing Company, *

*

Defendant/Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: September 13, 2004

Filed: November 2, 2004

___________

Before BYE, BOWMAN, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

___________

BYE, Circuit Judge.

Five employees of Boeing brought suit against their employer under section

301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 185, alleging

Boeing breached the terms of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between

Boeing and the employees’ union. The district court1

 granted Boeing’s motion for

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judgment on the pleadings on the grounds that the employees failed to allege in the

complaint the union breached its duty of fair representation. We affirm.

 

We review de novo the district court’s entry of judgment on the pleadings.

Potthoff v. Morin, 245 F.3d 710, 715 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing Nat’l Car Rental Sys.,

Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 428 (8th Cir. 1993)). A motion for

judgment on the pleadings will be granted “only where the moving party has clearly

established that no material issue of fact remains and the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Id. In our evaluation of the motion, we accept all facts

pled by the nonmoving party as true and draw all reasonable inferences from the facts

in favor of the nonmovant. Franklin High Yield Tax-Free Income Fund v. County of

Martin, 152 F.3d 736, 738 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing Lion Oil Co. v. Tosco Corp., 90

F.3d 268, 270 (8th Cir. 1996)). 

The complaint alleges the following relevant facts: Boeing is in the business

of manufacturing aircraft and related products. The employees are mechanicelectrical/electronic (MEE) workers under the terms of a CBA between Boeing and

the union. In 1964, Boeing’s predecessor-in-interest, McDonnell Douglas

Corporation, entered into an agreement with the union which defined the work of

MEE employees and established guidelines limiting the circumstances under which

that work could be assigned to other classifications of employees. The agreement

was reaffirmed by Boeing and the union and remains in effect today. The complaint

alleges Boeing violated the terms of the agreement by assigning the work of MEE

employees to other classifications of employees under circumstances not permitted

by the agreement. The employees also pled that they fully exhausted the grievance

procedures under the CBA. 

The MEE employees contest the district court’s ruling that in order to bring a

suit directly against Boeing for breach of the CBA the MEE employees were required

to allege in the complaint the union breached its duty of fair representation.

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There are exceptions to this general rule. An employee is not limited to the

exclusive remedial provisions of the CBA when “the conduct of the employer

amounts to a repudiation of those contractual procedures.” Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S.

171, 185 (1967) (citations omitted). Another exception is where “the union has the

sole power under the contract to invoke the higher stages of the grievance procedure”

and “the employee-plaintiff has been prevented from exhausting his contractual

remedies by the union’s wrongful refusal to process the grievance.” Id. The MEE

employees do not contend either one of these exceptions applies. 

-3-

 

In Smith v. Evening News Ass’n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962), the Supreme Court held

an employee may file an individual suit that alleges breach of the CBA against his

employer under section 301 of the LMRA. The Supreme Court has also held when

the CBA provides exclusive grievance and arbitration procedures an employee is

generally required to try to exhaust the contractual grievance or arbitration procedures

before filing an individual suit directly against the employer. DelCostello v. Int’l

Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 163 (1983) (citing Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox,

379 U.S. 650 (1965)).2

 

The MEE employees’ complaint alleges they have exhausted the CBA

procedures. Once an employee has exhausted the contract procedures, the employee

generally is bound by the results of that process by the finality provision contained

in the CBA. Id. at 164 (citing W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local 759, 461 U.S. 757 (1983);

Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960)); Hines v.

Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 562-63 (1976). If an employee does not

agree with the results reached through the procedures of the CBA, the employee, in

order to bring an individual suit directly against the employer for breach of the CBA,

must allege and prove the union breached its duty of fair representation. See Bills v.

United States Steel L.L.C., 267 F.3d 785, 787 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing Carter v. Ford

Motor Co., 121 F.3d 1146, 1149 (8th Cir. 1997)); Trompeter v. Boise Cascade Corp.,

877 F.2d 686, 688 (8th Cir. 1989). This type of “hybrid” action requires the

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employee to show both the union breached its duty of fair representation and the

employer breached the CBA in order to prevail against the employer. Scott v. United

Auto., 242 F.3d 837, 839 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing Vaca, 386 U.S. at 186-87). 

The MEE employees argue the only prerequisite to sue Boeing directly is the

exhaustion of the grievance and arbitration procedures in the CBA because the Smith

opinion does not state an employee is required to prove a claim of breach of the duty

of fair representation against the union. In Smith, however, “[t]here was no grievance

arbitration procedure in the contract which had to be exhausted before recourse could

be had to the courts.” Smith, 371 U.S. at 196 n.1. Thus, the MEE employees’

argument ignores both the context in which the Smith opinion was written and the

relevant case law governing situations in which the contract procedures have been

exhausted. 

The judgment of the district court is affirmed. 

______________________________

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