Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00079/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00079-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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28 1 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders these matters submitted on the

briefs. E.D. Cal. L.R. 78-230(h).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

JUDI JACKSON,

NO. CIV. S-05-79 FCD KJM

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

PLACER COUNTY, a political

subdivision of the State of

California, et al., 

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on a motion for summary

judgment, or alternatively, partial summary judgment brought by

defendants Placer County, Placer County Animal Control, Richard

Ward, Richard Stout, Evelyn Garrett and Brad Banner (collectively

“defendants”) and a cross-motion for partial summary judgment

brought by plaintiff Judi Jackson (“plaintiff”).1 By their

motion, defendants seek adjudication in their favor on

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2 The court does not address injunctive relief in the

instant order as such relief is only properly considered as a

remedy following trial not as a substantive cause of action for

determination on these motions for summary judgment.

2

plaintiff’s complaint, alleging claims for (1) violation of

plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983") based on the

seizure of her horses; (2) violation of plaintiff’s Fourteenth

Amendment substantive due process rights pursuant to Section 1983

based on the seizure of her horses; (3) violation of plaintiff’s

Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unlawful search and

seizure pursuant to Section 1983; (4) failure to train or

supervise pursuant to Section 1983; (5) intentional infliction of

emotional distress; (6) negligent infliction of emotional

distress; (7) conversion; (8) defamation; (9) injunctive relief;2

(10) fraud/misrepresentation; (11) violation of plaintiff’s

Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights pursuant to

Section 1983 based on the transfer of ownership of two of her

horses; and (12) violation of plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment

substantive due process rights pursuant to Section 1983 based on

the transfer of ownership of two of her horses. 

Plaintiff opposes defendants’ motion and filed a crossmotion for partial summary judgment on her Section 1983 claims

for violation of her Fourteenth Amendment procedural and

substantive due process rights based on the transfer of ownership

of two of her horses and violation of her Fourth Amendment rights

based on the seizure of her property; her conversion claim; her

defamation claim; and her fraud/misrepresentation claim.

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3 Where the facts are undisputed, the court cites to the

parties’ respective responses to the pertinent statement of

undisputed facts. Where the facts are disputed, the court

recounts the opposing party’s version of the facts as it must do

on a motion for summary judgment, citing the party’s respective

evidence giving rise to the triable issue of fact.

3

For the reasons set forth below, the court GRANTS in part

and DENIES in part defendants’ motion and DENIES plaintiff’s

cross-motion. 

BACKGROUND3

I. Plaintiff’s Move to California

Plaintiff operated a horse business in Louisiana prior to

November 1999. (Pl.’s Response to Defs.’ Stmt. of Undisputed

Facts [“PUF”], filed March 9, 2007 [Docket #104], ¶ 2). As part

of the business, plaintiff obtained horses through rescue, sale

or breeding and maintained them, up to 60 at a time, on rented

property. (PUF ¶ 2). In November 1999, plaintiff moved from

Louisiana to California with four horses. (PUF ¶ 3). Plaintiff

left 21 horses in Louisiana under the care of a fifteen year old

student and his father as a trade for services previously

provided to them by plaintiff. (PUF ¶ 3). 

In December 1999, after receiving a phone call from a local

deputy, plaintiff returned to Louisiana to find all of her 21

horses in poor condition. (PUF ¶ 4). Plaintiff moved 19 of the

horses to California in trailers. (PUF ¶ 6). The remaining two

horses were left in Louisiana under the care of the student and

his father. (PUF ¶ 7). Plaintiff was later informed of the

declining condition of the two horses in Louisiana and she

returned to move those horses to California as well. (PUF ¶¶ 8-

9).

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4

Plaintiff moved her horses to a rented property on CookRiolo Road in Roseville, California, which was zoned to allow

only seven horses. (PUF ¶ 11). Plaintiff moved her horses to

California to rehabilitate them and to train them for use in her

equine training facility. (Pl.’s MSJ, filed Feb. 23, 2007

[Docket #94-12], at 2).

II. Plaintiff’s Interaction with Placer County Animal

Control

Defendant Richard Stout (“Stout”), an employee of Placer

County Animal Control, visited plaintiff on August 23, 24, and

25, 2000. (PUF ¶ 12). Stout expressed concerns about the

underweight condition of 28 horses under plaintiff’s care during

his visits to plaintiff’s property. (PUF ¶ 12). Stout returned

to plaintiff’s property on September 7, 2000 after receiving a

written complaint from one of plaintiff’s neighbors about horses

on plaintiff’s property dying of starvation. (PUF ¶ 13). On

September 8, 2000, Stout issued a pre-seizure notice to

plaintiff. (PUF ¶ 14). Stout believed the notice was a notice

of correction which advised plaintiff to have a veterinarian

inspect the horses. (Defs.’ Reply to Pl.’s Stmt. of Undisputed

Facts in Supp. of MSJ [“DUF”], filed Mar. 9, 2007 [Docket #99-2],

¶ 24). Defendants contend the pre-seizure notice advised

plaintiff of a right to request a pre-seizure hearing. (PUF ¶

14). Plaintiff maintains that she did not see the option to

request a hearing on the pre-seizure notice. (PUF ¶ 14). The

pre-seizure notice form asked the animal owner to either request

a hearing or waive the right to a hearing by checking a box. 

(Decl. of Franklin G. Gumpert [“Gumpert Decl.”], filed Feb. 23,

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4 Ken Gentile was previously named as a defendant but was

voluntarily dismissed from this action by plaintiff on February

16, 2005. (Notice of Dismissal of Defendants Carter and Gentile,

filed Feb. 16, 2005).

5 Robert Carter was previously named as a defendant but

was voluntarily dismissed from this action by plaintiff on

February 16, 2005. (Notice of Dismissal of Defendants Carter and

Gentile, filed Feb. 16, 2005).

5

2007 [Docket #87], Ex. N-2). Plaintiff did not check either box. 

(Id.; PUF ¶ 39). 

Veterinarian Kris Bartow (“Bartow”) examined plaintiff’s

horses and sent a feed plan to Stout. (DUF ¶ 2). Stout mailed a

copy of the feed plan to plaintiff. (DUF ¶ 3). Plaintiff did

not agree with Bartow’s feed plan but she did not ask him to

modify it nor did she confer with another veterinarian regarding

the feed plan. (PUF ¶¶ 19-21). Plaintiff stopped following

Bartow’s feed plan on September 29, 2000. (PUF ¶ 23). 

On October 4, 2000, Ken Gentile (“Gentile”), Placer County

Animal Control employee, inspected plaintiff’s property and

discovered feed which violated Bartow’s feeding plan.4 (PUF ¶

24). Gentile ordered plaintiff to remove the offending feed from

her property and to adhere to Bartow’s feed plan. (PUF ¶ 24). 

Plaintiff asked Robert Carter (“Carter”), Placer County Animal

Control employee,5 on October 9, 2000, to relieve her of Bartow’s

feed plan. (PUF ¶ 25). Carter declined to do so and reaffirmed

that Animal Control would continue to monitor the health of

plaintiff’s horses. (PUF ¶ 25). 

Defendant Evelyn Garrett (“Garrett”), an Animal Control

Officer, met with plaintiff on October 10, 2000. (PUF ¶ 27). 

Garrett told plaintiff she wanted to discuss Bartow’s feed plan

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6

but plaintiff said she would not speak with Garrett unless

Garrett would relieve her from Bartow’s feed plan. (PUF ¶ 27). 

Garrett had reviewed Bartow’s feed plan and believed plaintiff

could be confused about whether or not her horses should be

“free-fed.” (DUF ¶ 13-14). 

III. The Seizure of Plaintiff’s Property

On November 1, 2000, Garrett applied for a search warrant to

seize plaintiff’s horses and to obtain records related to the

horses including their feeding and veterinarian care. (PUF ¶

32). Plaintiff contends that the application omitted relevant

information including Garrett’s concerns about plaintiff’s

knowledge and understanding of the feed plan. (DUF ¶ 20). 

Defendants maintain that Garrett no longer had concerns about

plaintiff’s understanding of the feed plan because Bartow assured

her that plaintiff understood that her horses should be free-fed. 

(DUF ¶ 20). Garrett’s “Affidavit in Support of Search Warrant”

was reviewed by the Deputy District Attorney and then authorized

by the Placer County Superior Court. (PUF ¶¶ 33-34). The

warrant was served several days later, on November 6, 2000,

because it took several days to arrange the logistics of the

seizure including transportation for the horses. (PUF ¶ 35). 

Twenty-eight horses, cats, a German Shepard, chickens, and a

filing cabinet were seized from plaintiff. (PUF ¶¶ 40-42). 

Plaintiff was arrested and served a Notice of Post-Seizure

Hearing. (PUF ¶ 44).

Defendants seized every horse on plaintiff’s property

regardless of physical condition. (DUF ¶ 119). Two horses

seized were not dangerously thin at the time of the seizure. 

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7

(DUF ¶ 120). Garrett executed a “Return on Search Warrant” on

November 6, 2000, which included a list of the horses and

property seized. (PUF ¶ 43). 

IV. Post-seizure Hearing and Related Court Proceedings

Plaintiff requested and received a post-seizure hearing. 

(PUF ¶ 45). Plaintiff was represented by an attorney, Dirk

Amara, at a hearing before Placer County Superior Court

Commissioner John Ross. (PUF ¶ 45). Starting on November 13,

2000, testimony was taken and arguments were presented over the

course of several days. (PUF ¶ 45). Before the commissioner’s

ruling, on December 5, 2000, a Felony Complaint was filed against

plaintiff for animal cruelty. (PUF ¶ 46). On December 15, 2000,

Commissioner Ross issued an order which found the seizure of

plaintiff’s horses was proper, the seized horses were

underweight, and the horses would be forfeited by plaintiff if

she were found guilty of animal cruelty. (PUF ¶ 47). 

Furthermore, the commissioner ordered a hearing to determine if

the horses should be returned to plaintiff. (PUF ¶ 47). The

commissioner indicated that if the horses were returned to

plaintiff, she would bear the costs of their care while in county

custody. (PUF ¶ 47). 

Plaintiff, along with a second attorney, Hill Snellings,

challenged the December 15, 2000 order. (PUF ¶ 48). Plaintiff

filed a Petition for Writ of Prohibition and Mandate in the

California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District. (PUF ¶ 48). 

The court denied relief to plaintiff because she did not first

seek relief in the superior court. (PUF ¶ 48).

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6 Plaintiff objects to this statement asserting “the

evidence as cited is not part of a request for judicial notice as

stated by defendants.” (PUF ¶ 53). Federal Rule of Evidence 201

permits a court to take judicial notice of an adjudicative fact

“not subject to reasonable dispute,” in that the fact is either

“(1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the

trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by

resort to sources whose accuracy cannot be reasonably

questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). The court can take judicial

notice of matters of public record, such as pleadings in another

action and records and reports of administrative bodies. See

Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1198 (9th Cir. 1988). 

A court may take judicial notice of a fact which is the proper

subject of judicial notice whether a party has requested it or

(continued...)

8

Plaintiff next filed a Petition for Writ of Administrative

Mandate in the Placer County Superior Court. (PUF ¶ 49). 

Superior Court Judge Gaddis heard testimony on the issue and 

denied the Petition for Mandate, thereby upholding Commissioner

Ross’ order. (PUF ¶ 49). Subsequently, plaintiff appealed the

superior court’s decision to the third district court of appeal. 

(PUF ¶ 50). After receiving full briefing on the merits of the

case, the court affirmed the superior court’s decision. (PUF ¶

50). The court found substantial evidence to support immediate

seizure of the horses. (PUF ¶ 50). Plaintiff did not seek

review in the California Supreme Court. (PUF ¶ 51). 

Defendants contend that on January 26, 2001, Placer County

Superior Court Judge Roeder issued an order precluding plaintiff

from owning or controlling any horses. (PUF ¶ 52). Plaintiff

maintains Judge Roeder’s order applied only to new ownership of

horses. (PUF ¶ 52). Later, on July 20, 2001, Judge Roeder,

after a contested hearing, issued an order precluding plaintiff

from having any horses on her premises and prohibiting her from

owning, controlling, or possessing any horse.6

 (PUF ¶ 53).

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6(...continued)

not. Fed. R. Evid. 201(c). As such, the court takes judicial

notice of Judge Roeder’s order. 

7 The original Felony Complaint filed against plaintiff

was amended to include the charges of perjury and presenting

false evidence in an administrative hearing. (PUF ¶ 54).

9

V. Plaintiff’s Criminal Trial

The Placer County Superior Court heard the criminal trial

against plaintiff on charges of animal cruelty, perjury, and

presenting false evidence in an administrative hearing.7 (PUF ¶

54). Plaintiff was represented by counsel during the jury trial. 

(PUF ¶ 54). On November 21, 2001, the jury returned a verdict of

guilty on all three felony charges brought against plaintiff. 

(PUF ¶ 54). 

Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial in February 2002,

asserting ineffective assistance of counsel on the grounds her

counsel failed to provide or request a jury instruction regarding

the defense of entrapment for the felony charges of perjury and

presenting false evidence. (Sec. Am. Compl. [hereinafter,

“Compl.”], filed June 30, 2006, ¶ 39). In her motion, plaintiff

also asserted that the trial judge erroneously failed to grant a

motion to dismiss on the ground that the prosecution did not meet

its burden of proof on any of the charges. (Compl. ¶ 39). Judge

Cosgrove of the Placer County Superior Court granted plaintiff’s

motion on May 11, 2002. (Compl. ¶ 40). 

On July 25, 2002, Placer County filed an appeal of Judge

Cosgrove’s order in the third district court of appeal. (Compl.

¶ 41). The court affirmed the trial court’s grant of a new trial

and found that entrapment was a viable affirmative defense. 

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8 Plaintiff objects to this statement asserting “the

evidence as cited is not part of a request for judicial notice as

stated by defendants.” As discussed above, the court may and

does properly take judicial notice of Judge Cosgrove’s order. 

9 Plaintiff objects to this statement asserting “the

evidence as cited is not part of a request for judicial notice as

stated by defendants.” As discussed above, the court may and

does properly take judicial notice of Judge Cosgrove’s order.

10

(Compl. ¶¶ 42-43). Following the appellate court’s decision, the

Placer County District Attorney offered plaintiff a plea bargain

agreement. (Compl. ¶ 44). On March 15, 2004, plaintiff entered

a plea of no contest to two misdemeanors of destroying or

concealing evidence. (PUF ¶ 59). Plaintiff served her sentence

by completing community service, paying a fine and serving

probation. (PUF ¶ 60).

VI. Other Court Orders Pertaining to Plaintiff’s Horses

After a contested hearing on March 21, 2002, during which

plaintiff was represented by an attorney, Placer County Judge

Cosgrove issued an order prohibiting plaintiff from having any

contact with horses, including teaching or giving lessons.8 (PUF

¶ 55). On August 19, 2002, after another hearing in which

plaintiff was represented by counsel, Judge Cosgrove issued an

order precluding plaintiff from owning a horse and from being

involved in any feeding plans or the feeding or care of any other

person’s horses.9 (PUF ¶ 56). On May 3, 2004, Judge Cosgrove

ruled that the seizure of plaintiff’s horses was done under Penal

Code § 597.1 rather than Penal Code § 597, such that plaintiff

was responsible for the costs of care of the horses while they

were in the custody of the county. (PUF ¶ 57). On May 17, 2005,

Commissioner Ross issued an order requiring return of the horses

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10 The court assumes that Judi Spencer is plaintiff’s

maiden name. 

11

to plaintiff upon payment of a specified monetary lien. (PUF ¶

58, 96).

VII. Plaintiff’s Property in Custody of Animal Control

Defendants stored the documents and the filing cabinet

seized from plaintiff in a trailer at the animal shelter. (DUF ¶

79). Plaintiff claims that all employees and volunteers of the

animal shelter had access to her documents while they were stored

by defendants in the trailer. (DUF ¶ 87). The “Return on the

Warrant” indicates hay receipts were found and seized from

plaintiff. (DUF ¶ 109). However, there were no hay receipts

seized from plaintiff’s property. (DUF ¶ 108).

The cats, German shepherd and chickens seized from plaintiff

were returned to her after an agreement was made between

plaintiff and Carter. (PUF ¶ 66).

Four of the horses seized by defendants died of natural

causes or were euthanized while in defendants’ possession. (DUF

¶ 124). 

After the horses were seized from plaintiff, Carolyn Harris

(“Harris”), neighbor of animal control volunteer Odette Parker

(“Parker”), wrote to the Arabian Horse Association to inquire

about the breeding history of one of the seized horses,

Baybandee. (PUF ¶¶ 74-75). Harris learned Baybandee was

registered to Beverly Marx (“Marx”) and was at one time

previously registered to Judi Spencer.10 (PUF ¶ 75-76). Parker,

who fostered Baybandee after the horse was seized, also

communicated with Marx and asked her to give a declaration

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11 It is not clear from the parties’ motion papers whether

Atchafalaya was ever returned to plaintiff. 

12 It is not clear from either defendants’ or plaintiff’s

motion papers what specific role, if any, defendants Ward and

Banner played in the subject incidents. In the complaint, Ward

(continued...)

12

stating she is the registered owner of Baybandee. (PUF ¶ 79, DUF

¶ 150). In addition, Garrett contacted Marx to request

registration papers and proof of ownership for three of the

seized horses, Nartane’s Mandate, Baybandee and Atchafalaya. 

(PUF ¶ 84, DUF ¶ 128). Garrett informed Deputy District Attorney

Scott Owens that plaintiff was not the registered owner of three

of the seized horses and discussed the legal ownership of the

horses with him as well. (PUF ¶ 85, DUF ¶ 156). Subsequently,

Marx transferred Baybandee to Carolyn Harris (“Harris”), who has

possessed the horse since October 7, 2002. (PUF ¶ 88). Marx

transferred ownership of a second horse, Nartane’s Mandate, to

Amy Jo Hamilton (“Hamilton”), who had no affiliation with animal

control. (PUF ¶¶ 89, 91). 

Plaintiff paid fees to the county in June or July of 2005

per Commissioner Ross’s May 17, 2005 order and twenty-two of the

seized horses were returned to her. (PUF ¶ 106). Plaintiff

claims defendants Placer County and Animal Control informed her

in a letter that Baybandee would be returned to plaintiff upon

payment of the lien. (DUF ¶ 137). Defendant maintains it was

Val Flood, an attorney at the Office of County Counsel, and not

Placer County or Animal Control, who wrote the letter. (DUF ¶

137). Baybandee and Nartane’s Mandate were never returned to

plaintiff.11 (PUF ¶¶ 96-98).12 

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12(...continued)

is alleged to be a “supervisory employee” at Animal Control and

Banner is alleged to be a “management employee” of the county

with decision-making authority for Animal Control. (Compl., ¶s

10, 13.) On their motion, defendants did not specifically move

to dismiss these defendants for lack of involvement in the

relevant incidents, and as such, the court makes no specific

findings herein as to these defendants’ role, if any, in the

relevant conduct.

13 Amy Jo Hamilton gave Nartane’s Mandate to David Meanor.

(DUF ¶ 131). 

13

VIII. Plaintiff’s Civil Lawsuits 

Plaintiff filed her complaint in this action on January 13,

2005. She filed an amended complaint on July 11, 2005 and a

second amended complaint on June 30, 2006.

On October 19, 2006, plaintiff filed a complaint in Placer

County Superior Court against Carolyn Harris, Amy Jo Hamilton and

David Meanor13 seeking damages for conversion of Baybandee and

Nartane’s Mandate. (PUF ¶ 107). 

STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that

there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144,

157, 90 S. Ct. 1598, 1608 (1970). 

When parties submit cross-motions for summary judgment, the

court must review the evidence submitted in support of each

cross-motion and consider each party’s motion on its own merits. 

Fair Housing Council of Riverside County, Inc. v. Riverside Two,

249 F.3d 1132, 1136 (9th Cir. 2001). The court must examine each

set of evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving

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party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).

The moving party “always bears the initial responsibility of

informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and

identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the moving party meets its

initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing

party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact

actually does exist. Matsushita Elec. Indust. Co., Ltd. v.

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-87 (1986); First Nat'l Bank

of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-289 (1968). 

Genuine factual issues must exist that “can be resolved only by a

finder of fact, because they may reasonably be resolved in favor

of either party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

256 (1986). 

In judging evidence at the summary judgment stage, the court

does not make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting

evidence. See T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec.

Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630-31 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.

574, 587 (1986)). The evidence presented by the parties must be

admissible. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Conclusory, speculative

testimony in affidavits and moving papers is insufficient to

raise genuine issues of fact and defeat summary judgment. See

Falls Riverway Realty, Inc. v. City of Niagara Falls, 754 F.2d

49, 57 (2d Cir. 1985); Thornhill Publ’g Co., Inc. v. GTE Corp.,

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594 F.2d 730, 738 (9th Cir. 1979).

ANALYSIS

I. Statute of Limitations

Defendants argue plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims for

violation of her Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process

rights, relating to her failure to receive pre-seizure notice or

a hearing before her horses were seized, and for violation of her

Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unlawful search and

seizure are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. 

(Defs.’ MSJ, filed Feb. 23, 2007 [Docket #76] at 11; Defs.’ Opp’n

to Pl.’s MSJ, filed March 9, 2007 [Docket #99-1], at 4). 

Section 1983 actions must be brought within the statute of

limitations for personal injury tort actions in the forum state. 

Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985). The current statute

of limitations for personal injury claims in California is two

years. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1 (Deering 2007). Before

January 1, 2003, the applicable statute of limitations was one

year. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 340(3) (West 1982), amended and

redesignated by 2002 Cal. Stat. ch. 448 § 3. The limitations

period generally begins to run when the plaintiff knows, or

should have known of the injury that is the basis of her cause of

action. Fink v. Shelder, 192 F.3d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 1999).

Several of plaintiff’s claims are based on the same

underlying event, the search and seizure of her property by

Animal Control on November 6, 2000. Plaintiff knew or should

have known that she would not receive notice or a pre-seizure

hearing no later than that date. Accordingly, the court finds

that plaintiff’s procedural due process claim and her corollary

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14 Defendants have not clearly, separately moved for

summary judgment with regard to plaintiff’s fourth claim for

relief for failure to train or supervise. However, they have

generally sought summary judgment as to plaintiff’s complaint

against them. Because the failure to train or supervise claim is

factually connected to the procedural due process claim,

defendants’ argument that plaintiff’s procedural due process

claim is barred by the statute of limitations is equally

applicable to the failure to train or supervise claim, and

therefore, the court construes defendants’ motion as moving for

judgment as to this claim on the basis of the statute of

limitations as well. 

16

failure to train/supervise claim14 accrued on the date of the

search and seizure, November 6, 2000. Likewise, plaintiff’s

Fourth Amendment unlawful search and seizure claim accrued on

that date as well. 

In November of 2000, the applicable statute of limitations

was one year; therefore, plaintiff had until November 6, 2001 to

file the aforementioned claims. However, plaintiff filed her

claims in federal court on January 13, 2005, well after the

statute of limitations expired. 

Plaintiff argues nonetheless that her procedural due process

and unlawful search and seizure claims are not barred by the

statute of limitations because her ongoing criminal prosecution

gave “rise to additional issues regarding the process which was

due [her] at the time of the alleged wrongdoing by defendants.” 

(Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ MSJ, filed Mar. 9, 2007 [Docket #103], at

12; Pl.’s Reply, filed Mar. 16, 2007 [Docket #108], at 3). 

However, plaintiff does not cite to any legal precedent, nor is

the court aware of any, which supports the conclusion that a

criminal trial tolls the statute of limitations for a Section

1983 claim. 

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15 Defendants did not argue that plaintiff’s Section 1983

procedural due process claim based on the transfer of ownership

of two of her horses (her eleventh claim for relief) is barred by

the statute of limitations. However, the court notes that any

such argument would have been unavailing. Plaintiff alleges in

her complaint that she became aware of the transfer in May 2004. 

(Compl. ¶ 50). In 2004, the statute of limitations applicable to

Section 1983 actions was two years. Plaintiff filed a motion to

amend her complaint and filed a draft amended complaint which

included her procedural and substantive due process claims based

on the transfer of the horses on March 14, 2006, and therefore,

they were timely filed before the deadline of May 2006. See

Schillinger v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 425 F.3d 330, 334-35 (7th

Cir. 2005) (holding that courts should look to the date the party

filed the motion to amend rather than the date the amended

pleading was filed to determine if the statute of limitations has

run). 

17

Accordingly, defendants’ motion for summary judgment with

respect to plaintiff’s first claim for relief for violation of

plaintiff’s procedural due process rights, plaintiff’s third

claim for relief for unlawful search and seizure and her fourth

claim for relief for failure to supervise or train is GRANTED.15

Plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment on her unlawful

search and seizure claim is DENIED. 

II. Substantive Due Process

Plaintiff’s second and twelfth claims for relief are founded

on alleged violations of her substantive due process rights. 

The Fourteenth Amendment confers substantive due process

rights. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992); United

States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987); Daniels v. Williams,

474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986). 

However, the use of substantive due process to extend

constitutional protection to economic and property

rights has been largely discredited. See generally

Gerald Gunther, Constitutional Law at 432-65. Rather,

recent jurisprudence restricts the reach of the

protections of substantive due process primarily to the

liberties “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and 

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16 Plaintiff has not fully explained how defendants

deprived her of her chosen career as a horse trainer by seizing

twenty-eight of her horses without due process. The court

assumes plaintiff is alleging she could not pursue a career as a

horse trainer because she was not in physical possession of the

horses she intended to train. 

18

tradition.” Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503

(1977). 

Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1318-19 (9th Cir. 1996).

Further, “[w]here a particular Amendment ‘provides an explicit

textual source of constitutional protection’ against a particular

source of government behavior, ‘that Amendment, not the more

generalized notion of substantive due process’ must be the guide

for analyzing these claims.” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266,

273 (1994) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).

A. Plaintiff’s Second Claim for Relief

Plaintiff’s claim appears to arise out of the allegation

that defendants seized her horses without due process and then

maintained custody of them which deprived her of a “liberty”

interest by preventing her from pursuing a career as a horse

trainer.16 (Compl. ¶¶ 80-83). The deprivation of property

without a hearing is the type of government conduct for which the

procedural due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

provides explicit limitations. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.

319, 332 (1976). The United States Supreme Court has

affirmatively held that where explicit text of a Constitutional

provision addresses the type of conduct challenged by a

plaintiff’s claims, that provision, rather than the more general

substantive due process protections guaranteed by the Fourteenth

Amendment, must govern the plaintiff’s claim. Albright, 510 U.S.

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at 273; Graham, 490 U.S. at 395; see Armendariz, 75 F.3d at 1321. 

As such, because the conduct plaintiff alleges is the type of

government action that the procedural due process clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment addresses, her substantive due process claim

is precluded. Therefore, defendants’ motion for summary judgment

regarding plaintiff’s second claim for relief is GRANTED.

B. Plaintiff’s Twelfth Cause of Action

Similarly, in her twelfth claim for relief, plaintiff

alleges that the transfer of two of the horses seized by Animal

Control to private owners violated her substantive due process

rights. (Compl. ¶¶ 176-77). As discussed above, plaintiff

cannot bring this claim as a substantive due process claim

because the procedural due process clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment is the Constitutional provision which specifically

addresses the behavior plaintiff is challenging. Albright, 520

U.S. at 273; Graham, 490 U.S. at 395; see Armendariz, 75 F.3d at

1321. Accordingly, defendants’ motion for summary judgment

regarding plaintiff’s twelfth cause of action is GRANTED. 

Plaintiff’s cross-motion on this claim is accordingly DENIED.

 III. Plaintiff’s Section 1983 Claim based on the Transfer of

Ownership of Two of Her Horses (Eleventh Claim for

Relief)

Plaintiff has not clearly plead her eleventh claim for

relief as either a claim based on lack of due process or a claim

based on a government taking under the Fifth Amendment. On one

hand, in her eleventh cause of action, plaintiff alleges the

transfer of two horses, Baybandee and Nartane’s Mandate, to new

owners by defendants violated her procedural due process rights. 

(Compl. ¶ 163). She further asserts that she was the owner of

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17 In their papers, defendants address this claim as if

it is a claim under the Fifth Amendment’s Just Compensation

Clause. Defendants move for summary judgment, arguing the claim

is not ripe for adjudication because plaintiff has not exhausted

the state’s own procedure for obtaining compensation for her

transferred horses. (Def’s MSJ, at 15). Defendants allege that

the California Constitution as well as the California Government

Tort Claims Act provide post-deprivation remedies for the

deprivation of property. (Id.) Defendants argue that because

plaintiff did not file suit in state court against any defendant

for compensation, she has not exhausted her state court remedies,

and therefore, her claim under Section 1983 must be dismissed. 

(Id. at 15-16.)

In plaintiff’s opposition to defendants’ motion for summary

judgment, she responds to defendants’ argument that her claims

are not ripe for adjudication. She argues that her claim is ripe

because she “filed a Government Tort Claim in compliance with

California Government Code sections 910, et seq. . . . .” (Pl.’s

Opp. to Defs.’ MSJ, at 18). Plaintiff does not argue in her

opposition that her eleventh claim for relief is based on a

violation of her due process rights rather than a “taking” under

the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment. However, in

her cross-motion for summary judgment, plaintiff alleges that she

is entitled to summary judgment on her eleventh cause of action

because defendants did not provide her with notice or a hearing

in conjunction with the transfer of her horses. Plaintiff

erroneously contends that she was denied due process in violation

of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Due

Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment applies to actions taken by

the federal government. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment applies to state actors and is the clause relevant in

this case. 

20

these two horses at the time of the transfer, and that the

transfer of the horses occurred without notice or a hearing,

suggesting a due process claim. (Compl. ¶¶ 165, 167). However,

plaintiff also describes the transfer as a “taking by defendants

as a government entity and actors” and asserts that she was not

compensated for the reasonable value of the horses.17 (Compl. ¶

167-68). 

Because of the confusion caused by the allegations in the

complaint as well as the way the parties have addressed this

claim in their papers, the court will address the claim as both a

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18 Defendants support their proposition that plaintiff’s

eleventh claim for relief is not ripe for adjudication with cases

holding that a plaintiff must establish that the government

(continued...)

21

claim under the Fifth Amendment’s Just Compensation Clause and a

claim for violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Procedural Due

Process Clause. 

A. Violation of Fifth Amendment’s Just Compensation

Clause

The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution states

in relevant part, “Nor shall private property be taken for public

use, without just compensation.” U.S. Const. Amend V (emphasis

added). The Fifth Amendment applies to the states through the

Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Williamson County Regional

Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 175, n.1

(1985). If private property is taken but not taken for public

use, the property owner does not have a claim for compensation

under the Fifth Amendment but may have a claim under Section 1983

for deprivation of property without due process of law under the

Fourteenth Amendment. Hernandez v. Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188,

2000, n. 26 (5th Cir. 1981).

Plaintiff has not alleged nor has she provided any evidence

that her horses were taken for public use. Indeed, she alleges

defendants transferred her horses to other private owners thereby

“taking” her interest in the horses. (Compl. ¶ 168). Because

plaintiff has not alleged, let alone demonstrated, that her

property was taken for public use, she does not have a viable

Section 1983 claim based on the violation of her Fifth Amendment

rights.18

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18(...continued)

reached a final decision regarding the taking and that she was

denied compensation by the government. (Def.’s MSJ, at 15). 

These cases are relevant to claims based on government takings of

real property for public use under the Fifth Amendment, and as

such, they are irrelevant here as plaintiff’s claim is based on a

purported taking of personal property which was not taken for

public use.

22

B. Violation of Fourteenth Amendment’s Procedural Due

Process Clause

“Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental

decisions which deprive individuals of ‘liberty’ or ‘property’

interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the

Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.

319, 333 (1976). The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment

applies to federal government actions. See, e.g., Public

Utilities Commission v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 461 (1952). The

Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause applies to the states. 

See, e.g., Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172-73

(1972). The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that

“some form of hearing is required before an individual is finally

deprived of a property interest.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333. The

specific procedures which are required will vary in each case

depending on the situation. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,

481 (1972). In Mathews, the Court set forth three factors to be

considered in determining whether or not a pre-deprivation

hearing is required. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. The three

factors are: the private interest which will be affected by the

action, the risk of erroneous deprivation, and the government’s

interest, including administration and financial burdens that the

additional procedures would require. Id. 

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19 The court notes that defendants did not otherwise

demonstrate in their affirmative motion or in opposition to

plaintiff’s motion, that there was an opportunity for a hearing

which plaintiff pursued or could have pursued either pre- or

post-deprivation with respect to the transfer of her horses.

While plaintiff apparently submitted a written claim to defendant

Placer County, in accordance with California Government Code 

§ 910, objecting to the taking of her horses and requesting

compensation, and received a “Notice of Rejection of Claim” from

the county in response, defendants did not argue that plaintiff’s

filing of said claim constituted a post-deprivation hearing

satisfying the due process requirement. 

20 Plaintiff specifically moved for summary judgment on

this claim in her motion, although relying on an incorrect

constitutional amendment. See n. 17, supra.

21 Although defendants did not specifically address this

claim in their motion, they otherwise provided evidence on other

claims adjudicated herein which is also relevant to this claim.

23

As recognized by the court in Hernandez, under these facts,

plaintiff can state a claim pursuant to Section 1983 based on

violation of her Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process

rights regarding the transfer of her horses. See e.g.,

Hernandez, 643 F.2d at 2000 n. 26. Defendants did not move for

summary judgment on this issue as they treated plaintiff’s

eleventh claim for relief as a claim under the Fifth Amendment’s

Just Compensation Clause. As such, the court cannot grant

summary judgment in their favor on this claim.19 

For other reasons, the court also cannot grant summary

judgment to plaintiff on this claim.20 While plaintiff proffers

evidence of her property interest in the transferred horses and

that she was neither given notice of the impending transfer nor

afforded a hearing on the issue before or after the transfer took

place, defendants proffer evidence, on the motions,21 to dispute

that plaintiff had an ownership interest in the subject horses. 

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(DUF ¶¶ 146-166). That dispute presents triable issues of fact

precluding an award of summary judgment to plaintiff on this

claim.

In sum, plaintiff’s eleventh claim for relief survives as a

procedural due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment

pursuant to Section 1983. No party is entitled to summary

judgment of that claim.

C. Transfer of the Two Horses

In their motion for summary judgment, defendants argue,

generally, that they cannot be held liable, in any respect, for

the transfer of the horses because none of them “transferred

registered ownership of any horses to a third party.” (Defs.’

MSJ, at 14). Defendants explain that, according to the Arabian

Horse Association, Marx was the registered owner of the two

horses. (Defs.’ MSJ, at 14; PUF ¶ 75). Defendants allege that

Marx was contacted by private citizens about ownership of the

horses and it was Marx who transferred the registration papers to

these private citizens. (Defs.’ MSJ, at 14; PUF ¶¶ 76-77, 88,

91). Defendants concede only that Garrett attempted to gain

documentation to confirm that Marx was the registered owner but

they assert the other defendants “played no role in this process

whatsoever . . . .” (Defs.’ MSJ, at 14; PUF ¶ 83).

Defendants’ argument is unavailing. At the time the horses

were transferred to private owners, they were in the custody of

Placer County Animal Control. Although Marx may have been the

owner registered with the Arabian Horse Association, Placer

County Animal Control had the right of possession of the horses

at the time of the transfer pursuant to the search warrant. The

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22 Defendants also argued that the individual defendants

are entitled to qualified immunity with regard to their

activities undertaken pursuant to the court issued warrant and

for their failure to provide a pre-seizure hearing. (Defs.’ MSJ,

at 19). The court will not address these issues because summary

judgment has been granted on those claims because the statute of

limitations has run. 

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fact that Marx filed paperwork with the Arabian Horse Association

to change the registered ownership of the two horses does not

absolve defendants of their involvement in the transfer. 

Moreover, defendants admit Garrett spoke with District Attorney

Scott Owens about the legal issues regarding ownership of the

horses. (DUF ¶ 156). The jury may consider the fact that

Garrett sought out legal advice on this issue as evidence that

defendants were aware of the possibility that transferring the

horses to other persons might violate plaintiff’s rights. 

Ultimately, the transfer could not have taken place without the

involvement of Placer County and its employees because the county

had custody and control over the horses before the transfer

pursuant to the search warrant for plaintiff’s property. (PUF ¶

41). Therefore, defendants’ argument that the only parties to

the transfer are Marx and the two private parties is not

persuasive, and defendants’ role in depriving plaintiff of her

personal property is a triable issue of fact. 

D. Qualified Immunity

Defendants move for summary judgment on this claim as to the

individual defendants, arguing they are entitled to qualified

immunity with regard to their failure to prevent private parties

from transferring the two horses.22 (Defs.’ MSJ, at 19). 

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Public officials are entitled to qualified immunity for acts

that do not violate “clearly established . . . constitutional

rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Thus, when considering a

defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the ground of

qualified immunity, “[t]he threshold question . . . is whether,

taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting injury,

the facts alleged show that the officer’s conduct violated a

constitutional right.” Bingham v. City of Manhattan Beach, 329

F.3d 723, 729 (9th Cir. 2003), superceded by 341 F.3d 939 (citing

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). If a violation can

be made out, the next step is to determine whether the right

violated or the law governing the official’s conduct was clearly

established such that “it would be clear to a reasonable officer

that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” 

Id. (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202); Act Up!/Portland v.

Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 871 (9th Cir. 1993). Where a defendant’s

conduct violates constitutional rights and the law is clearly

established, the defendant may not claim qualified immunity.

Defendants argue that no clear legal precedent established

that the individual defendants owed a legal duty to “block the

transfer of registration papers and possession of animals between

private parties because someone else was disputing the ownership

or registration claims.” (Defs.’ MSJ, at 21). However, Placer

County Animal Control seized the horses from plaintiff pursuant

to the warrant, and therefore, Animal Control had custody and

possession of the horses. The appropriate inquiry is whether

there was clear legal precedent that Animal Control had a duty

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not to deprive plaintiff of whatever ownership interest she had

in the horses at the time of the seizure without providing either

a pre- or post-deprivation hearing. 

At the time, the law was clearly established that “some form

of hearing is required before an individual is finally deprived

of a property interest.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333

(1976). Thus, given the established state of the law at the time

in question, the individual defendants had “fair warning” that

depriving plaintiff of her alleged property interest without

either a pre- or post-deprivation hearing was unconstitutional. 

Accordingly, because there are triable issues of fact as to

whether the individual defendants violated plaintiff’s right to

due process, and because the individual defendants had fair

notice that their alleged conduct was unconstitutional, the court

cannot find, on summary judgment, that they are entitled to

qualified immunity and defendants’ motion is DENIED. Likewise,

plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on this issue is also

DENIED. 

IV. Defendant Placer County Animal Control

Defendants argue that plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims

against Placer County Animal Control should be dismissed because

Animal Control is one of several separate divisions of Placer

County Health and Human Services Department and is not “a person”

for purposes of bringing a claim under Section 1983. (PUF ¶

108). The court agrees. A plaintiff may not bring a separate

Section 1983 claim against a municipal department. Vance v.

County of Santa Clara, 928 F. Supp 993, 996 (N.D. Cal. 1996)

(holding that the term “persons” for Section 1983 purposes does

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not encompass municipal departments; specifically county

corrections department is not a “person” under Section 1983);

Fields v. District of Columbia Department of Corrections, 789 F.

Supp. 20, 22 (D. D.C. 1992) (holding that agencies and

departments within the District of Columbia government are not

“suable as separate entitites”); Stump v. Gates, 777 F. Supp.

808, 815 (D. Colo. 1991) (holding the police department and

coroner’s office are not “persons” against whom a Section 1983

action may be brought); Umhey v. County of Orange, 957 F. Supp.

525, 531-32 (S.D. N.Y. 1997) (holding that the Board of Ethics is

not a separate entity which may be sued under Section 1983). In

her opposition to defendants’ motion, plaintiff does not

challenge said case law or its application to this case. (Pl.’s

Opp’n to Defs.’ MSJ, at 23). Accordingly, the court finds that

Placer County Animal Control is a municipal department in Placer

County, and therefore, plaintiff does not have a viable Section

1983 claim against Animal Control. Defendants’ motion with

respect to this issue is GRANTED. 

V. Defendant Placer County

Defendants argue plaintiff does not have a viable cause of

action against Placer County under Monell and its progeny. 

Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)

(finding a municipality may be liable under Section 1983 as a

result of a governmental policy or custom). The Ninth Circuit

has recognized three ways that a municipality can be held liable

under Section 1983:

A section 1983 plaintiff may establish municipal liability

in one of three ways. First, the plaintiff may prove that a

city employee committed the alleged constitutional violation

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pursuant to a formal governmental policy or a longstanding

practice or custom which constitutes the standard operating

procedure of the local governmental entity. Second, the

plaintiff may establish that the individual who committed

the constitutional tort was an official with final policymaking authority and that the challenged action itself thus

constituted an act of official governmental policy. Whether

a particular official has final policy-making authority is a

question of state law. Third, the plaintiff may prove that

an official with final policy-making authority ratified a

subordinate’s unconstitutional decision or action and the

basis for it.

Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346-47 (9th Cir. 1992)

(internal citations and quotations omitted).

Plaintiff fails to establish municipal liability for Placer

County through any of the three modes described in Gillette. 

Even construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, only the

first theory is potentially applicable to plaintiff’s allegations

under Section 1983. In her opposition to defendants’ motion,

plaintiff states a municipality is liable under Section 1983 when

their “policy or custom” inflicts the injury. (Pl.’s Opp’n to

Defs.’ MSJ, at 24). Plaintiff, however, provides no evidence to

support her allegation that Placer County had a policy or custom

which inflicted injury upon her. As such, defendants’ motion

with respect to this issue is GRANTED; plaintiff’s Section 1983

claims against the County of Placer are dismissed. 

VI. Plaintiff’s State Law Claims

A district court has supplemental jurisdiction over state

law claims arising from the same case or controversy as a federal

claim providing original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a); City

of Chicago v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997). 

As one of plaintiff’s federal claims survives summary judgment,

the court exercises supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s

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state law claims. 

A. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Defendants argue that plaintiff’s claim for intentional

infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) should be dismissed

because defendants have not engaged in “outrageous” activity. 

(Defs.’ MSJ, at 28). To succeed on a claim of IIED, plaintiff

must demonstrate: 

(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the

intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the

probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the

plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress;

and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional

distress by the defendants’ outrageous conduct. 

Christensen v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. 3d 868, 903 (1991). 

“Outrageous conduct” requires that the conduct must be so extreme

“as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized

community.” Id. California courts have held that the question

of whether the conduct alleged in the complaint is sufficiently

“extreme and outrageous” is generally a factual issue for the

jury. See Angie M. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. App. 4th 1217,

1226 (1995). 

In her complaint, plaintiff alleges defendants’ conduct,

including failing to provide care for plaintiff’s horses after

they were seized and transferring multiple horses to private

individuals, was “undertaken intentionally or recklessly with the

design to injure plaintiff emotionally.” (Compl. ¶ 103). 

Plaintiff asserts defendants’ conduct caused her “extreme and

severe emotional distress . . . .” (Compl. ¶ 107). 

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1. Failure to care for horses after the seizure

Defendants maintain that plaintiff’s horses were underfed at

the time of the seizure and after plaintiff’s horses were seized

by Animal Control, “they were cared for thereafter by [county]

personnel and volunteer foster care families, that the weight and

body scores of every horse improved after seizure from

[p]laintiff, that none were gelded, and yet four died as a result

of either independent accidents or systemic illness without fault

of any [d]efendant.” (Defs.’ MSJ, at 28; PUF ¶¶ 31, 36, 41, 69-

72). Defendants assert that no named defendant is responsible

for the death of any of plaintiff’s horses, and therefore,

plaintiff does not have a viable claim for intentional infliction

of emotional distress based on this alleged conduct. (Defs.’

MSJ, at 28). 

Specifically, defendants proffer the declaration of Michael

McRae, D.V.M., a veterinarian with twenty-two years experience in

a general ambulatory equine practice, who explains the death of

each of the four underweight horses seized from plaintiff that

died while in defendants’ custody. Diablo, who was approximately

200 pounds underweight at the time of the seizure, was euthanized

by a veterinarian on May 4, 2001 after suffering a broken leg. 

(PUF ¶ 69). Marcie, who was underweight and not in good health

at the time of the seizure, was euthanized by a veterinarian on

June 22, 2003 after suffering neurological problems. (PUF ¶ 70). 

Flower was found dead on April 18, 2001. (PUF ¶ 71). Raiser was

euthanized by a veterinarian after suffering injuries as a result

of catching his left foot in a fence on January 1, 2003. (PUF ¶

72). With respect to all of the horses’ deaths, McRae concluded

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23 Plaintiff objects to this evidence on the grounds

McRae’s testimony is “uncorroborated and unsubstantiated.” 

Plaintiff’s objection is overruled. McRae is an experienced

veterinarian who provided testimony based on his extensive

professional experience and upon “review [of] documents

associated [with] the condition of [the] horses under

[plaintiff’s] control . . . prior to November 6, 2000, the

quality of care provided by her prior to that date, the condition

of the horses which were taken from her on that date, and issues

related to rehabilitation efforts [by defendants] with regard to

those horses, including four which subsequently died.” (McRae

Decl., at 2). McRae qualifies to provide expert testimony, and

his testimony is properly considered as such. Fed. R. Evid. 702.

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that their deaths were not attributable to any deficiencies or

negligence in the feeding, grooming or veterinary care of the

horses after seizure. (McRae Decl., filed Feb. 23, 2007 [Docket

#78]). As the moving party, based on said evidence,23 defendants

have met their burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine

issue of material fact on the issue of “outrageous conduct.” 

In response to defendants’ motion, plaintiff simply argues,

without citation to supporting evidence, that “the undisputed

evidence establishes that defendants allowed, if not directly

caused, the death of at least four (4) horses which they had

seized from plaintiff . . . .” (Pl.’s Opp. MSJ, at 27). 

Plaintiff does not, however, proffer any evidence to support this

argument. As plaintiff has wholly failed to meet her burden to

produce evidence to demonstrate a genuine issue for trial,

defendants’ motion as to this basis for plaintiff’s IIED claim

must be GRANTED. 

2. Transfer of horses to private owners 

Defendants assert that the horses’ registered owner, Marx, 

transferred ownership of the horses to private individuals and

that no named defendant is responsible for the transfer of any

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24 The court notes that defendants did not move for

summary judgment as to this claim on any other basis. As such,

the court does not consider the sufficiency of the evidence with

regard to plaintiff’s claimed “severe emotional distress” or

whether defendants’ conduct with respect to the transfer of the

horses caused plaintiff’s distress. 

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horse. (Defs.’ MSJ, at 28; PUF 73-104). As discussed

previously, defendants had custody of the horses after they were

seized from plaintiff, and therefore, the transfer of the horses

could not have occurred without some involvement by defendants. 

As defendants’ role in the transfer of the horses presents

triable issues of fact, their motion for summary judgment is

DENIED with respect to this claim as well.24 

B. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

In California, there is no independent tort of negligent

infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”). Potter v. Firestone

Tire & Rubber Co., 6 Cal. 4th 965, 984-85 (1993). Courts analyze

a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress as a claim

for the tort of negligence. Id. at 984. A plaintiff must set

forth each of the elements of negligence: 1) duty, 2) breach of

duty, 3) causation, and 4) damages. Huggins v. Longs Drug Stores

California, Inc., 6 Cal. 4th 124, 129 (1993); Burgess v. Superior

Court, 2 Cal. 4th 1064, 1072 (1992). “Whether a defendant owes a

duty of care is a question of law. Its existence depends upon

the foreseeability of the risk and upon a weighing of policy

considerations for and against imposition of liability.” Marlene

F. v. Affiliated Psychiatric Medical Clinic, 48 Cal. 3d 583, 588

(1989) (quoting Slaughter v. Legal Process & Courier Service, 162

Cal. App. 3d 1236, 1249 (1984)).

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28 25 Defendants did not argue that they owed no duty to

defendant. Accordingly, the court does not consider this issue. 

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Defendants did not separately address plaintiff’s NIED claim

in their motion for summary judgment but combined their

discussion of this cause of action with their discussion of

plaintiff’s IIED claim. As such, the same arguments defendants

made with respect to plaintiff’s IIED claim apply to this claim

as well.25 Thus, for the same reasons set forth above,

plaintiff’s NIED claim survives with respect to the transfer of

her horses to other persons. Accordingly, defendants’ motion for

summary judgment with respect to this claim is DENIED as to that

basis for plaintiff’s claim. 

C. Conversion 

Defendants move for summary judgment with respect to

plaintiff’s conversion claim, arguing four of plaintiff’s horses

died without fault on the part of defendants and two were

transferred to private owners by someone other than defendants. 

(Defs. MSJ, at 25). 

The tort of conversion is “any act of dominion wrongfully

exerted over another’s personal property in denial of or

inconsistent with his rights therein.” Iguaye v. Howard, 114

Cal. App. 2d 122, 126 (1952). The elements of a cause of action

for conversion of personal property are: “1) plaintiff[‘s]

ownership or right to possession of the property at the time of

the conversion; 2) defendants’ conversion by a wrongful act or

disposition of plaintiff[‘s] property rights; and 3) damages.” 

Baldwin v. Marina City Properties, Inc., 79 Cal. App. 3d 292, 410

(1978). Legal title to the property is not a requirement to

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bring a viable claim for conversion. Messerall v. Fulwider, 199

Cal. App. 3d 1324, 1329 (1988). A plaintiff must show only that

she was entitled to immediate possession of the item at the time

of the conversion. Id.

For the reasons set forth above, defendants have proffered

evidence to show they did not commit a wrongful act which caused

the death of plaintiff’s four horses. Plaintiff has not offered

any evidence in rebuttal. Accordingly, she cannot maintain a

cause of action for conversion based on the four horses that died

while in defendants’ custody. Defendants’ motion as to this

basis for plaintiff’s conversion claim must therefore be GRANTED;

plaintiff’s cross-motion on the issue is accordingly DENIED.

However, as to the transfer of plaintiff’s two horses to

other persons, for the reasons set forth above, triable issues of

fact remain as to whether defendants acted wrongfully in

facilitating and/or allowing the transfer to take place. 

Therefore, the court cannot grant summary judgment to either

party with respect to this basis for plaintiff’s conversion

claim; both parties’ motions for summary judgment are DENIED.

D. Defamation

Defendants argue summary judgment should be granted with

respect to plaintiff’s defamation claim because plaintiff

admitted in her deposition that none of the named defendants made

a defamatory statement about her. (Defs.’ MSJ, at 26; PUF ¶ 118;

Jackson Dep., at 425:11-426:21). The tort of defamation involves

the intentional publication of a statement of fact which is

false, unprivileged, and has a natural tendency to injure or

which causes special damage. Gilbert v. Sykes, 147 Cal. App. 4th

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26 In her opposition, plaintiff tries to dispute that she

admitted in her deposition that neither Garrett, Stout, Ward,

Carter or Gentile made comments detrimental to her reputation. 

(PUF ¶ 118). She argues when she said in her deposition that

none of the defendants made comments detrimental to her

reputation, she was referring only to comments made by defendants

after her conviction. (PUF ¶ 118). Plaintiff’s argument is

unavailing. In plaintiff’s complaint, she alleges defendants

made defamatory statements in October 2004 and within twelve

months prior to June 2005. (Compl. ¶¶ 129, 131). Plaintiff was

convicted in November 2001, and therefore, plaintiff has not

alleged defendants made defamatory statements about her before

her conviction. (PUF ¶ 54). In fact, plaintiff admits in her

opposition to the motion for summary judgment that the criminal

proceedings against plaintiff had concluded when defendants made

the alleged defamatory statements. (Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ MSJ,

at 26). 

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13, 27 (2007). “‘There can be no recovery for defamation without

a falsehood.’” Id. (citation omitted). 

In her opposition to defendants’ motion for summary

judgment, plaintiff does not persuasively dispute her deposition

testimony,26 and she otherwise fails to identify a specific

defamatory statement made by one of the defendants. As plaintiff

has offered no evidence supporting her allegation that defendants

made defamatory statements against her, defendants’ motion for

summary judgment on this claim is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s crossmotion for summary judgment on this claim is accordingly DENIED. 

E. Misrepresentation

Plaintiff alleges defendants represented to her that her

horses would be returned upon payment of a lien as to each horse

as set forth in the order signed by Placer County Court

Commissioner Ross on May 17, 2005. (Compl. ¶¶ 145-146, 151). 

Plaintiff claims she paid the specified fee for two of her

horses, Nartane’s Mandate and Baybandee, and those horses were

not returned to her. (Compl. ¶ 153). Further, plaintiff

contends defendants knew two of her horses would not be returned

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to her and therefore they intentionally made the

misrepresentation. (Compl. ¶ 153). 

Defendants move for summary judgment on this claim, arguing

plaintiff does not have a viable cause of action because she

cannot prove one of the elements of a claim for

misrepresentation--justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation.

(Defs.’ MSJ, at 29). The elements of a cause of action for

misrepresentation or fraud under California law are: “1) a

misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or

nondisclosure); 2) knowledge of falsity (or scienter); 3) intent

to defraud, i.e., to induce reliance; 4) justifiable reliance;

and 5) resulting damage.” Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. v. Dana

Corp., 34 Cal. 4th 979, 990 (2004). 

Defendants argue plaintiff concedes she was informed in May

2004 that four of her seized horses had died and two of them had

been transferred to other owners. (Defs.’ MSJ, at 29; Compl. 

¶¶ 49-50). Commissioner Ross’ order was issued in May 2005. 

(PUF ¶ 58). Thus, defendants contend plaintiff clearly knew

before she paid the liens that two of her horses had been

transferred to other persons. 

The court agrees. Indeed, plaintiff does not address this

argument in her opposition to defendants’ motion for summary

judgment. She has provided no evidence to support the essential

element of justifiable reliance on defendants’ representation

(even assuming the representation was made). Accordingly,

defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED on this claim. 

Plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment on this claim is

thus DENIED. 

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion for summary

judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Plaintiff’s

cross-motion for partial summary judgment is DENIED. In sum, the

following of plaintiff’s claims survive: (1) violation of

plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights

pursuant to Section 1983 based on the transfer of ownership of

two of plaintiff’s horses (against the individual defendants); 

(2) IIED based on the transfer of ownership of two of plaintiff’s

horses (against all defendants); (3) NIED based on the transfer

of ownership of two of plaintiff’s horses (against all

defendants); and (4) conversion based on the transfer of

ownership of two of plaintiff’s horses (against all defendants). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 15, 2007 

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