Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00150/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00150-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 540
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Mandamus and Other
Cause of Action: 28:2241fd Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (federal)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

CLEMENTE HUERTA-JIMENEZ, et al., 

Petitioners,

v. 

NEILSEN, et al., 

Respondents.

 Case No.: 19cv150-MMA (BLM) 

ORDER SUMMARILY DISMISSING 

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS 

CORPUS; 

[Doc. No. 1] 

DENYING AS MOOT 

PETITIONERS’ MOTION TO STAY 

[Doc. No. 2] 

 Petitioners Clemente Huerta-Jimenez (“Huerta”), a citizen of Mexico, and his wife, 

Ermelinda Perez (“Perez”), have filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2241, challenging the validity of an order issued by the Department of 

Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), directing Huerta’s 

expedited removal from the United States. See Doc. No. 1. Petitioners also move to stay 

the execution of the removal order pending the outcome of these proceedings. See Doc. 

No. 2. For the reasons set forth below, the Court summarily DISMISSES the petition for 

lack of jurisdiction and DENIES AS MOOT the motion to stay. 

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DISCUSSION

 “Federal courts are authorized to dismiss summarily any habeas petition that 

appears legally insufficient on its face.” McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856 (1994). 

Pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, the Court is required to 

make a preliminary review of each petition for writ of habeas corpus.1

 “If it plainly 

appears from the face of the petition . . . that the petitioner is not entitled to relief,” the 

Court must dismiss the petition. Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases; see also 

Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Petitioners argue that they received ineffective assistance of counsel during the 

process of Huerta applying for Lawful Permanent Resident (“LPR”) status. Huerta 

traveled across the international border to attend an immigrant visa interview at the 

United States Consulate in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico. According to Petitioners, their 

attorney failed to advise Huerta that departing the United States would render him 

inadmissible for a period of ten years.2

 Petitioners contend that execution of the 

expedited removal order would violate the Suspension and Due Process Clauses of the 

United States Constitution. Before considering the merits of Petitioners’ claims, the 

Court must determine whether it has the authority to exercise jurisdiction over the 

petition. 

As an initial matter, a petitioner must be “in custody” at the time he or she files a 

petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). The “in custody” requirement is jurisdictional. See 

Bailey v. Hill, 599 F.3d 976, 978 (9th Cir. 2010). Petitioners do not contend that Perez is 

                                               

1

 The Rules Governing § 2254 Cases can be applied to petitions other than those brought under § 2254 

at the Court’s discretion. See Rule 1(b) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. 

2

 On November 15, 2018, Petitioner allegedly climbed the United States/Mexico International Boundary 

fence near the Tecate, California Port of Entry, where he was apprehended by a Border Patrol agent, and 

admitted that he was a citizen of Mexico without immigration documents that would allow him to enter 

or remain in the United States legally. See Complaint, Doc. No. 1, 18mj22839-KSC. Petitioner was 

charged with one count of misdemeanor illegal entry pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1325. Petitioner pleaded 

not guilty and has been released on bond. 

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in custody. Huerta acknowledges that he was released on his bond in his criminal 

proceedings but claims to be in ICE’s “constructive custody.” Petition ¶ 7. However, to 

establish constructive custody, a petitioner must show that his movements are “restrained 

by authority of the United States.” Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 

206, 213 (1953). Huerta simply states that he “will be apprehended at the courthouse 

upon completion of the criminal proceedings.” Petition ¶ 7 (emphasis added). This is 

insufficient to establish constructive custody. 

Furthermore, Congress has stripped district courts of habeas jurisdiction over final 

orders of deportation or removal, and vested jurisdiction to review such orders 

exclusively in the courts of appeals. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5) (“[A] petition for review 

filed with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this section shall be the sole 

and exclusive means for judicial review of an order of removal entered or issued under 

any provision of this chapter . . ..”). Circuit courts are the “sole” judicial body with the 

statutory authority to review challenges to final orders of deportation, exclusion, or 

removal. Alvarez-Barajas v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005). A single 

exception is set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2), which provides: 

[A] person in expedited removal proceedings may file a habeas petition in 

federal district court to contest three DHS determinations: whether the person 

is a noncitizen, whether he was ordered removed via expedited removal, and 

whether he is a lawful permanent resident or has another status exempting him 

from expedited removal. Review of whether a petitioner was ordered removed 

is limited to whether such an order in fact was issued and whether it relates to 

the petitioner. There shall be no review of whether the alien is actually 

inadmissible or entitled to any relief from removal. 

Thuraissigiam v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., ___ F.3d ___, No. 18-55313, 2019 WL 

1065027, at *4 (9th Cir. Mar. 7, 2019) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)) (internal citations and 

quotations omitted). Here, Petitioners do not challenge that (1) an expedited removal 

order has been issued, and (2) it relates to Huerta. As such, Section 1252(e)(2) “does not 

authorize jurisdiction over the petition.” Id. at *5. 

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Moreover, Petitioners seek habeas relief on the grounds of ineffective assistance of 

counsel, arising out of erroneous legal advice obtained during the process of applying for 

LPR status for Huerta. There is no right to counsel – much less competent counsel – 

outside the context of formal immigration proceedings. See Lara-Torres v. Ashcroft, 383 

F.3d 968, 975 (9th Cir. 2004) (“We reject the Petitioners’ attempt to cast such an 

expansive and amorphous Fifth Amendment due process right that encompasses legal 

assistance removed from the actual [removal or deportation] process itself.”); BalamChuc v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 1044, 1051 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Lara-Torres) (“Although 

the failings of Balam-Chuc’s attorney in this case have resulted in terrible consequences 

for him and his family, the Fifth Amendment simply does not apply to the preparation 

and filing of a petition that does not relate to the fundamental fairness of an ongoing 

proceeding.”). Setting that aside, district courts generally do not have habeas jurisdiction 

over ineffective assistance of counsel claims. See, e.g., Alfaro-Mejia v. Holder, No. 13-

795 JAK (AJW), 2013 WL 599876, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2013) (distinguishing Singh 

and finding that the court did not have jurisdiction over a petitioner’s ineffective 

assistance of claims). And despite framing their ineffective assistance of counsel claim 

as a constitutional violation, Petitioners “challenge[] the procedure and substance of an 

agency determination that is ‘inextricably linked’ to the order of removal, [which] is 

prohibited by section 1252(a)(5).” 3 Martinez v. Napolitano, 704 F.3d 620, 623 (9th Cir. 

2012). 

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 The Ninth Circuit’s recent holding in Thuraissigiam does not direct otherwise. First, the petitioner in 

that case properly invoked the Court’s habeas jurisdiction based on his custodial status. Second, the 

Ninth Circuit held that Section 1252(e)(2) unconstitutionally suspended the writ of habeas corpus based 

on its specific application to the petitioner, based on circumstances which are wholly inapposite to this 

case. 

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CONCLUSION

 Based on the foregoing, the Court summarily DISMISSES the petition for writ of 

habeas corpus based on lack of jurisdiction and DENIES AS MOOT Petitioners’ motion 

for a stay of these proceedings. The Clerk of Court is instructed to enter judgment 

accordingly and close the case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATE: March 14, 2019 _______________________________________ 

 HON. MICHAEL M. ANELLO 

 United States District Judge 

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