Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01483/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01483-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Adrian Crihalmean,

Petitioner

-vsCharles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

CV-12-1483-PHX-JAT (JFM)

Report & Recommendation On Petition 

For Writ Of Habeas Corpus

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, incarcerated at the time in the Arizona State Prison Complex at 

Florence, Arizona,1filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2254 on July 10, 2012 (Doc. 1). On October 25, 2012 Respondents filed their Answer 

(Doc. 13). Petitioner filed a Reply (Doc. 14) and Memorandum (Doc. 15) on November 

13, 2012. On March 14, 2013, Respondents filed their Supplemental Answer (Doc. 20), 

and on June 12, 2013, Petitioner filed his Supplemental Reply (Doc. 21).

The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the 

undersigned makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation 

pursuant to Rule 8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil 

Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Responding to a suspicious vehicle complaint on June 26, 2008, police discovered 

 

1 On December 6, 2012, Petitioner filed a Notice of Change of Address (Doc. 16) 

indicating his release and relocation to California.

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Petitioner and 13 year old girl in a vehicle parked behind a closed business, with a used 

condom in the car. Upon investigation the victim and Petitioner both related engaging in 

16 to 17 acts of intercourse or oral sex between March 1, 2008 and March 31, 2008, as 

well as an instance on June 25, 2008 in a motel. Petitioner was 24 years old at the time.

(Exhibit E, Presentence Report at 1, 5.) (Exhibits to the Answer, Doc. 13, and 

Supplemental Answer, Doc. 20, are labeled sequentially and are referenced herein as 

“Exhibit ___.”)

B. PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

Petitioner was indicted in the Maricopa County Superior Court on five counts of:

sexual conduct with a minor, three counts of sexual abuse, and one count of child 

molestation. (Exhibit A, Indictment.) 

On October 17, 2008, Petitioner entered into a written plea agreement (Exhibit B), 

wherein he agreed to plead guilty to one count of attempted sexual conduct with a minor, 

and two counts of attempted sexual abuse, in exchange for dismissal of the remaining 

counts and stipulated lifetime probation on the attempted sexual abuse counts. He 

entered his guilty plea pursuant to the agreement on the same date. (Exhibit C, M.E. 

10/17/08.) On November 7, 2008, Petitioner was sentenced to five years in prison on the 

attempted sexual conduct with a minor, and upon release to concurrent terms of lifetime 

probation on the attempted sexual abuse counts. (Exhibit D, Sentence.)

C. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Petitioner did not file a direct appeal. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 2.)

D. PROCEEDINGS ON POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

On April 23, 2010, Petitioner file with the trial court a “Motion for Sentence 

Modification for Exceeding Subject Matter Jurisdiction” (Exhibit F), arguing that the 

lifetime probation was cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth 

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Amendment, and was a violation of equal protection under the Fifth and Fourteenth 

Amendments. On June 22, 2010, the trial court construed the motion as a Petition for 

Post-Conviction Relief and dismissed it as untimely under Ariz.R.Crim.Proc. 32.4(a). 

(Exhibit G, M.E. 6/22/10.)

Petitioner subsequently sought review by the Arizona Court of Appeals, which 

summarily denied review on February 10, 2012. (Exhibit H, Order 2/10/12.) 

Petitioner then sought review from the Arizona Supreme Court, which also 

summarily denied review on June 6, 2012. (Petition, Doc. 1, Exhibits, Order 6/6/12.) 

E. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition - Petitioner commenced the current case by filing his Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on July 10, 2012 (Doc.1). Petitioner’s 

Petition asserts two grounds for relief based on allegations that his lifetime probation (1) 

is cruel and unusual punishment, and (2) denies him equal protection. Petitioner argues, 

inter alia, that any untimeliness should be excused because of newly discovered 

evidence and because of his pro se indigent status and the limited legal resources 

available to him. (Doc. 1 at 9-9A.) 

Response - On October 25, 2012, Respondents filed their Response (“Answer”) 

(Doc. 13). Respondents argue that the Petition is barred by habeas statute of limitations, 

that Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling, and that Petitioner’s claims are 

procedurally defaulted.2

Reply - On November 13, 2012, Petitioner filed a Reply (Doc. 14) and supporting 

Memorandum (Doc. 15). Petitioner argues inter alia that the habeas statute of 

limitations may not properly be applied to a judgment issued without subject matter 

jurisdiction, and that the State failed to respond to his state PCR petition in a timely 

fashion, resulting in his entitlement to relief by default.

 

2 Although cast by Respondents as procedural default, it appears that Petitioner’s federal 

claims were actually presented, but were disposed of by application of a procedural bar.

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Supplements – On January 7, 2013, the Court noted Petitioner’s arguments 

concerning the lack of legal materials available in his prison, and directed Respondents 

to supplement their response to address the effect of any such limits on the timeliness of 

the Petition, the availability of equitable tolling, cause to excuse a procedural default, 

and the merits of the Petition, in particular the waiver defense.

Supplemental Response – On March 14, 2013, Respondents filed their 

Supplemental Answer (Doc. 20) arguing that Petitioner’s allegations of an impediment 

are conclusory and that the legal resources provided in the prison system were adequate 

to allow the timely presentation of his claims. Respondents further argue that Petitioner 

has failed to show extraordinary circumstances preventing his timely filing and diligence 

in doing so. Finally, Respondents argue that the alleged deficiencies do not establish 

cause to excuse any procedural default and that Petitioner’s claim is without merit and 

therefore cannot establish prejudice.

Supplemental Reply – On June 12, 2013, Petitioner filed his Supplemental Reply 

(Doc. 21). Petitioner argues that the lack of access to case law, in particular Weems v. 

U.S., 217 U.S. 349 (1910), made discovery of his claims impossible, and was a state 

created impediment. He further argues that the prosecutor and defense counsel 

misrepresented the constitutionality of his sentence, creating an impediment to timely 

filing and justifying equitable tolling. Petitioner further argues the merits of his equal 

protection claim.

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. TIMELINESS

1. One Year Limitations Period

Respondents assert that Petitioner’s Petition is untimely. As part of the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Congress provided a 1-

year statute of limitations for all applications for writs of habeas corpus filed pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging convictions and sentences rendered by state courts. 28 

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U.S.C. § 2244(d). Petitions filed beyond the one year limitations period are barred and 

must be dismissed. Id.

2. Commencement of Limitations Period

Finality - The one-year statute of limitations on habeas petitions generally begins 

to run on "the date on which the judgment became final by conclusion of direct review or 

the expiration of the time for seeking such review." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).3 

For Arizona pleading defendants, their opportunity for direct review is an Arizona 

Rule 32 of-right post conviction relief proceeding. Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710 

(9th Cir. 2007). “Arizona's Rule 32 of-right proceeding for plea-convicted defendants is 

a form of direct review within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).” Summers v. 

Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 717 (9th Cir. 2007). “To bring an of-right proceeding under Rule 

32, a plea-convicted defendant must provide to the Arizona Superior Court, within 90 

days of conviction and sentencing in that court, notice of his or her intent to file a 

Petition for Post-Conviction Review.” Id. at 715 (citing Ariz. R.Crim. P. 32.4(a)). 

Here, Petitioner was sentenced on September November 17, 2008. (Exhibit D, 

Senence.) Petitioner did not file a direct appeal or a PCR petition of right. Indeed, the 

first post-conviction filing he made was his “Motion for Modification of Sentence” 

(Exhibit F), filed April 23, 2010, long after the expiration of the time for an “of right” 

PCR petition. Accordingly, excluding any time for certiorari review, Petitioner’s 

conviction became final 90 days after his sentence, or after February 17, 2009, when his 

time to file an “of right” PCR petition expired. 

Accordingly, Petitioner’s conviction was final and his one year limitations period 

began running on February 18, 2009, and barring any statutory tolling, expired on 

February 17, 2010.

 

3

In addition to the alternative commencement dates discussed hereinafter, the statute 

provides for later commencement of the one year when there has been a retroactive 

change in the law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The undersigned finds nothing in the 

record to suggest this might apply.

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Newly Discovered Evidence – Petitioner argues that a latter date should apply 

because his claims are based on newly discovered evidence. 

Although the conclusion of direct review normally marks the beginning of the 

statutory one year, section 2244(d)(1)(D) does provide an alternative of “the date on 

which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered 

through the exercise of due diligence.” Thus, where despite the exercise of due diligence 

a petitioner was unable to discover the factual predicate of his claim, the statute does not 

commence running on that claim until the earlier of such discovery or the elimination of 

the disability which prevented discovery. 

Here, Petitioner couches his delay in terms of “newly discovered 

evidence/material facts.” (Petition, Doc. 1 at 9.) To the extent that Petitioner refers to 

recently discovered evidence, such evidence is not the “factual predicate” of his claims, 

it is the evidence of those facts. See Flanagan v. Johnson, 154 F.3d 196, 198-99 (5th 

Cir.1998) (receipt of trial counsel’s affidavit irrelevant where knowledge of facts 

supporting claim ineffectiveness previously known to defendant). Moreover, the facts 

cited by Petitioner in support of his claims, i.e. the imposition of lifetime probation, have 

been known to him since sentencing.

Indeed, Petitioner does not specify any facts (or even evidence) of which he was 

unaware. To the contrary, Petitioner simply points to his limited legal resources. 

However, section 2244(d)(1)(D) does not extend to a lack of knowledge of law, unless it 

constitutes a decision in Petitioner’s own case. Shannon v. Newland, 410 F.3d 1083, 

1088 (9th Cir. 2005) (distinguishing between discovery of changes or clarifications in 

state law and discovery of “factual predicate”). 

State Created Impediment – Petitioner asserts that his limited legal resources 

precluded him from identifying his federal claims, and thus amount to a state created 

impediment. Petitioner bolsters the argument by asserting that the Arizona prisons have 

removed much of the legal resources it once provided to inmates (a fact well known to 

this Court).

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Indeed, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B) provides for a latter start date of “the date on 

which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the 

Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from 

filing by such State action.” For this provision to apply, the impediment must amount to 

a violation of federal law.

Right of Access – Petitioner suggest that the limited legal resources were a denial 

of access to the courts. Petitioner argues that the provided materials exclude all case 

law, and it was only through his diligent search through non-prison resources that he was 

able to discover the legal basis to his claim, in particular his proposition under Weems v. 

U.S., 217 U.S. 349 (1910).

Respondents argue that the resources made available to prisoners (e.g. a defined 

set of statutes (with limited portions annotated), guidebooks, forms, etc. and access to a 

paralegal (precluded form offering legal advice) to assisting in filling out initial 

pleadings) is sufficient to meet their obligation of providing access to the courts, under 

the explications of that right under Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996), and its progeny.

The undersigned is prepared to presume,4for purposes of this Report and 

Recommendation, that the lack of any access to case law or other meaningful assistance 

in identifying his claims precluded Petitioner from discovering his Eighth Amendment 

and Equal Protection claims. For example, assuming one had access to the Eighth 

Amendment means little, if one does not have available the case law to, for example, 

discover that it applies to the states. See eg. Ughbanks v. Armstrong, 208 U.S. 481, 487

(1908) (“6th and 8th Amendments do not limit the powers of the states”); and State of 

La. ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 462 (1947) (assuming “without so 

deciding, that violation of the principles of the...Eighth Amendments, as to...cruel and 

 

4 While beyond being merely conclusory, Petitioner’s allegations and Respondents’ 

responses do leave a variety of questions unanswered, e.g. whether the prison provided 

guidebooks contained sufficient information to allow Petitioner to identify his claims 

(i.e. “The Law and Policy of Sentencing and Corrections, 7th” might suggest a cruel and 

unusual punishment arguments). (See Exhibit L, ADOC Manual at Attachment A, Legal 

Texts.) 

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unusual punishment, would be violative of the due process clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment”). Nor would the text of the Eighth Amendment suggest to any but the 

brightest legal scholars that it embodied a requirement for proportionality such as the 

Weems Court divined.

However, the right of access does not extend to the discovery of claims, but is 

limited to insuring a prisoner’s “capability of bringing contemplated challenges to 

sentences or conditions of confinement before the courts.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 

343, 356 (1996). The Lewis Court held that it relied only upon the “right to bring to 

court a grievance that the inmate wished to present,” and that it disclaimed any 

suggestion “that the State must enable the prisoner to discover grievances.” Id. at 354. 

“To demand the conferral of such sophisticated legal capabilities upon a mostly 

uneducated and indeed largely illiterate prison population is effectively to demand 

permanent provision of counsel, which we do not believe the Constitution requires.” Id.

Petitioner proffers nothing to suggest that, having once discovered Weems or 

other authority that alerted him to a claim he then desired to bring, that he was then 

stymied in bringing that claim. At most, Petitioner makes assertions that he was unable 

to discover his claim. Consequently, the undersigned cannot find that Petitioner’s right 

of access has been violated.

Misrepresentation – Petitioner argues in his Supplemental Reply that he was 

“subjected to a conspiracy of silence by legal professionals who knew or should have 

known, and should have disclosed that a sentence of lifetime probation is constitutionally 

unsound.” (Supp. Reply, Doc. 21 at 2.) Petitioner argues that he relied upon the 

prosecutor and defense counsel to “state and disclose the law correctly.” (Id.) 

Petitioner cites various contract law authorities, e.g. Fraud-Misrepresentation of 

Law, 15 Tex. L. Rev. 133 (1936), for the proposition that the prosecution had the 

obligation to disclose the unconstitutionality of the sentence. (See Supp. Reply, Doc. 21 

at 2, n.2.) However, it is not any law whose violation justifies application of the delayed 

commencement under § 2244(d)(1)(B). Rather, the statute is limited to a “violation of 

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the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Petition points to no federal law creating 

an obligation on the prosecution to disclose legal defenses (as opposed to factual ones) to 

the defense. The undersigned knows of none.

Moreover, even those contract law authorities clarify that they only apply where 

there is a knowing misrepresentation. See e.g. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 526 

(1977) (requiring inter alia knowledge or belief of falseness). Petitioner points to 

nothing to suggest that the prosecutor actually “knew” Petitioner’s lifetime probation 

was illegal. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 545 (1977) (opinions on law not 

ordinarily actionable); Miller v. Yokohama Tire Corp., 358 F.3d 616, 621 (9th Cir. 2004) 

(same). 

On the other hand, any misrepresentation by defense counsel would not have been 

a state created impediment. Defense counsel, regardless if employed or paid by the state, 

was Petitioner’s agent, not the state’s. Such incompetence, assuming it occurred, “is not 

the type of State impediment envisioned in § 2244(d)(1)(B).” Lawrence v. Florida, 421 

F.3d 1221, 1226 (11th Cir. 2005), affirmed on other grounds 549 U.S. 317 (2007).

Moreover, Petitioner proffers nothing to show that the sentence was indeed 

invalid. Petitioner wrongly relies upon Weems for the proposition that lifetime probation 

is always cruel and unusual. Weems simply held that such a sentence was 

disproportionate and therefore cruel and unusual when applied to a crime of falsifying 

two entries in a government pay record. That is qualitatively different from Petitioner’s 

crime of attempting to engage in sexual conduct with a 13 year old minor. The Ninth 

Circuit has found a sentence of lifetime probation appropriate for a sex offender. See 

e.g. U.S. v. Williams, 636 F.3d 1229 (9th Cir. 2011). Cf. U.S. v. Moriarty, 429 F.3d 1012, 

1025 (11th Cir.2005) (“[A] lifetime term of supervised release is not grossly 

disproportionate to [the defendant's] child pornography offenses....”).

No Impediment to Filing - Finally, § 2244(d)(1)(B) itself is limited to 

impediments to “filing an application.” Here, Petitioner’s complaint is not that he could 

not file his claim, but that he did not know he had one, whether because of a lack of legal 

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resources, or a failure by involved attorneys to tell him he had a claim. Those limitations 

are not on filing, but on discovery, and thus don’t activate § 2244(d)(1)(B). See Shannon 

v. Newland, 410 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 2005) (petitioner “was free to file such a 

petition at any time,” and thus erroneous state court decision was not impediment).

Summary re Commencement – Petitioner’s one year commenced running on 

February 18, 2009, and barring any statutory tolling, expired on February 17, 2010.

3. Statutory Tolling

The AEDPA provides for tolling of the limitations period when a "properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral relief with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Such tolling only results from 

state applications that are “properly filed,” and an untimely application is never 

“properly filed” within the meaning of § 2244(d)(2). Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 

(2005).

Here, Petitioner had no state application pending during the time his one year was 

running, e.g. February 18, 2009 through February 17, 2010. Indeed, his first state court 

application following his sentence was his April 23, 2010 motion to modify his sentence. 

(Exhibit F, Motion.) Once the habeas statute has run, a subsequent post-conviction or 

collateral relief filing does not reset the running of the one year statute. Jiminez v. Rice, 

276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Moreover, Petitioner’s first PCR proceeding was dismissed as untimely. (Exhibit 

G, M.E. 6/22/10.) As such, it was not “properly filed” within the meaning of § 

2244(d)(2), and Petitioner would not have been entitled to any statutory tolling for its 

pendency.

For the same reason, even if Petitioner were entitled to a delayed commencement 

of his limitations period until he had managed to formulate his federal claims (and was 

thus able to present them to the state courts), his Petition would still be untimely. The 

statute would have continued to run after such discovery (i.e. no later than April 23, 2010

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when his PCR was filed) until it expired a year later (i.e. April 22, 2011) and his Petition 

would have still been almost 15 months delinquent.

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to any statutory tolling, and his one year 

expired on February 17, 2010.

4. Timeliness of Petition

Here Petitioner’s Petition (Doc. 1) was filed on July 10, 2012. Under the prison 

mailbox rule, filings are deemed “filed” at the time they are delivered to prison officials 

for mailing. See Stillman v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2003). Because it does 

not affect the outcome, the undersigned presumes that the prison mailbox rule applies 

and that Petitioner delivered his petition to prison officials for mailing on the date he 

signed the Petition, July 5, 2012. (See Petition, Doc. 1 at 9.) At that time, Petitioner’s 

one year had been expired for almost 29 months.

Accordingly, Petitioner’s petition is untimely.

5. Equitable Tolling

"Equitable tolling of the one-year limitations period in 28 U.S.C. § 2244 is 

available in our circuit, but only when ‘extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner's 

control make it impossible to file a petition on time' and ‘the extraordinary circumstances 

were the cause of his untimeliness.'" Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 

2003). 

To receive equitable tolling, [t]he petitioner must establish two 

elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) 

that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way. The 

petitioner must additionally show that the extraordinary 

circumstances were the cause of his untimeliness, and that the 

extraordinary circumstances ma[de] it impossible to file a petition 

on time.

Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal citations and quotations 

omitted). “Indeed, ‘the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] 

is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.’ ” Miranda v. Castro,292 F.3d 1063, 

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1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir.). 

To establish grounds for equitable tolling, Petitioner points to his untrained, pro 

se status and the limitations on legal resources complained of above.

A prisoner's “proceeding pro se is not a ‘rare and exceptional’ circumstance 

because it is typical of those bringing a § 2254 claim.” Felder v. Johnson, 204 F.3d 168, 

171 (5th Cir. 2000). Indeed, outside the realm of capital punishment, it is being 

represented in filing a federal habeas petition that is extraordinary.

Moreover, "ignorance of the law, even for an incarcerated pro se petitioner, 

generally does not excuse prompt filing." Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 714 (5th 

Cir.1999). ). See also Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (“a pro 

se petitioner's lack of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary circumstance 

warranting equitable tolling”).

It is true that the inadequacies of a prison law library and lack of notice of the 

AEDPA may be extraordinary circumstances. See Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146 

(9th Cir. 2000). Arguably, Petitioner’s lack of access to case law or other means to 

discover his claim could qualify as such an extraordinary circumstance

However, even if extraordinary circumstances prevent a petitioner from filing for 

a time, equitable tolling will not apply if he does not continue to diligently pursue filing 

afterwards. “If the person seeking equitable tolling has not exercised reasonable 

diligence in attempting to file after the extraordinary circumstances began, the link of 

causation between the extraordinary circumstances and the failure to file is broken, and 

the extraordinary circumstances therefore did not prevent timely filing.” Valverde v. 

Stinson, 224 F.3d 129, 134 (2nd Cir. 2000). But see Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918 (9th 

Cir. 2002), McKeown, J. dissenting (arguing that equitable tolling should work a 

stoppage of the clock, with a resulting extension of the deadline). Ordinarily, thirty days 

after elimination of a roadblock should be sufficient. See Guillory v. Roe, 329 F.3d 

1015, 1018, n.1 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Petitioner proffers nothing to show that he showed diligence in filing his federal 

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petition in the face of his limited training and resources. He was able to layout his 

claims at least as of April, 2010 when he filed his state PCR petition (“Motion for 

Sentence Modification”) (Exhibit F), and yet he failed to file his federal habeas petition 

until 26 months later.

Even if it were assumed that Petitioner was diligently searching for his claims 

since his conviction became final and did not discover them until April, 2010, and 

assuming he were deemed to be diligent while he pursued his state remedies, he failed to 

file his habeas petition until July 10, 2012, five months after the Arizona Court of 

Appeals denied his Petition for Review. (See , Exhibit H, Order 2/10/13.) Petitioner 

proffers no explanation for that additional five month delay. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 

544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005) (diligence not shown were petitioner delayed five months after 

state proceeding, assuming equitable tolling available during pendency of state claims).

Thus, Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling.

6. Actual Innocence

The Ninth Circuit has concluded that the statute of limitations is subject to an 

exception for claims of actual innocence. Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 2011). 

Petitioner makes no such claim in this proceeding.

7. Application of Statute to Jurisdictional Claims

Petitioner argues that the federal habeas statute of limitations does not apply to his 

claims because they are jurisdictional in nature, that his sentence is unconstitutional and 

thus “void ab initio.” (Reply, Doc. 14 at 2.) It is true that a claim of a lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction can generally be asserted at any time during the pendency of a matter. 

See e.g. Wright & Miller, Fed. Pract. & Proc. § 1393. Here, however, Petitioner’s 

criminal case is no longer pending, and this collateral habeas proceeding is not part of 

that prosecution. Petitioner cites no authority extending the proposition to collateral 

proceedings, nor to using it to avoid limitations bar to those collateral proceedings. The 

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undersigned knows of none. 

Moreover, Petitioner’s only basis for asserting a lack of subject matter jurisdiction 

is the imposition of what he concludes is an unconstitutional sentence. Assuming 

Petitioner’s sentence were unconstitutional, that would not strip the state court of subject 

matter jurisdiction over the underlying prosecution. By Petitioner’s reasoning, virtually 

any error in a proceeding would strip the court of jurisdiction, and any statute of 

limitations would become meaningless.

8. Default in State Proceedings

Finally, Petitioner argues that the statute of limitations should not apply because 

the state failed to timely respond in this PCR proceeding, and thus he is entitled to win 

by default. Assuming that the state was delinquent (or even failed to respond altogether) 

would not enable Petitioner to avoid the federal statute of limitations. First, no default 

was found or applied by the state court. Any applicable default rules would have been 

creatures of state law, and federal habeas relief cannot be had for errors of state law. 

Bains v. Cambra, 204 F.3d 964, 971 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Moreover, such rules would have only be inapplicable in Petitioner’s state 

proceeding. As noted herein above in connection with Petitioner’s jurisdictional claim, 

Petitioner’s criminal case is no longer pending, and this collateral habeas proceeding is 

not part of that prosecution. Petitioner cites no authority extending a purported default to 

collateral proceedings, nor to using it to avoid limitations bar to those collateral 

proceedings. The undersigned knows of none. 

9. Summary

Petitioner’s conviction was final and his one year limitations period began 

running on February 18, 2009, and barring any statutory tolling, expired on February 17, 

2010. Petitioner has failed to justify a later commencement date by showing a newly 

discovered factual predicate, or a state created impediment that was a violation of 

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Constitutional or other federal law. His only state petition was filed after the expiration 

of his one year, and did not revive the limitations period. He has failed to show 

diligence in the face of any hindrance caused by the lack of legal resources, and thus is 

not entitled to equitable tolling. Accordingly, his habeas Petition was filed almost 29 

months after the expiration of his limitations period, and must be dismissed as untimely.

B. OTHER DEFENSES

Respondents argue procedural default, and that the Petition is without merit. 

Because the undersigned finds the Petition plainly barred by the statute of limitations, 

these defenses are not reached.

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires 

that in habeas cases the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability 

when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in 

cases concerning detention arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a 

proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). 

Here, the Petition is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and challenges 

detention pursuant to a State court judgment. The recommendations if accepted will 

result in Petitioner’s Petition being resolved adversely to Petitioner. Accordingly, a 

decision on a certificate of appealability is required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability 

(“COA”) is whether the applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the 

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is 

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

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McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “When the district court denies a habeas petition 

on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a 

COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right 

and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in 

its procedural ruling.” Id.

Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the 

district court’s judgment, that decision will be on procedural grounds. To the extent that 

Petitioner’s claims are rejected on procedural grounds, under the reasoning set forth 

herein, the undersigned finds that “jurists of reason” would not “find it debatable 

whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Accordingly, to the 

extent that the Court adopts this Report & Recommendation as to the Petition, a 

certificate of appealability should be denied.

V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's Petition for Writ 

of Habeas Corpus, filed July 10, 2012 (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that to the extent the reasoning of this 

Report & Recommendation is adopted, that a certificate of appealability BE DENIED.

VI. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties 

shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

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within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any 

findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a 

party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's 

right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant 

to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-

47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Dated: July 1, 2013

12-1483r RR 12 12 21 on HC.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

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