Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-1_13-cv-00248/USCOURTS-almd-1_13-cv-00248-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

TERRY LEE ROBINSON, # 246309, ) 

 )

Petitioner, )

 )

v. ) Civil Action No. 1:13cv248-WHA

 ) (WO) 

WALTER MYERS, et al., )

 )

Respondents. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

In this petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 filed on March 20,

2013, petitioner Terry Lee Robinson (“Robinson”) challenges the 2006 judgment of the

Circuit Court of Houston County, Alabama, revoking his state probation. The respondents 1

argue that Robinson’s petition is time-barred by the one-year federal limitation period in 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d). The court concludes that the petition is untimely and should be denied

without an evidentiary hearing.

II. DISCUSSION

Controlling Statute of Limitations

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) provides the statute of limitations for federal habeas

petitions and states:

Robinson, proceeding pro se, filed his petition – by submitting it to prison authorities for 1

mailing on March 20, 2013 – in the United States District Court for the Southern District of

Alabama. That court transferred the petition to this court on April 17, 2013.

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(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ

of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for

seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an

application created by State action in violation of the

Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the

applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted

was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has

been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim

or claims presented could have been discovered through the

exercise of due diligence.

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of

limitation under this subsection.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 

Relevant State Court Proceedings

In February 2005, Robinson pled guilty in the Houston County Circuit Court to

breaking and entering a motor vehicle and second-degree theft of property. He was sentenced

to consecutive terms of ten and five years’ imprisonment. The sentences were suspended and

he was placed on probation.

On February 28, 2006, the Houston County Circuit Court entered an order directing

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Robinson to appear for a hearing on March 30, 2006, to show cause why his probation should

not be revoked based on his failure to pay fines, court costs, and restitution. Robinson failed

to appear for that hearing, and on March 30, 2006, the Houston CountyCircuit Court entered

an order revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his sentence of consecutive terms

of ten and five years’ imprisonment. Robinson took no appeal fromthe revocation judgment.

On May 25, 2012, Robinson filed a petition for post-conviction relief under

Ala.R.Crim.P. 32 in the trial court arguing that his probation was improperly revoked in

March 2006. The trial court denied the Rule 32 petition on June 15, 2012, finding it was

untimely under the applicable limitation period. See Ala.R.Crim.P. 32.2(c). Robinson

appealed, and in an unpublished memorandum opinion issue on October 26, 2012, the

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment. Robinson applied

for rehearing, which was overruled on November 12, 2012. He then filed a petition for writ

of certiorari with the Alabama Supreme Court, which that court denied on February 15, 2013. 

A certificate of judgment was entered that same date.

Application of Federal Limitation Period

Because Robinson took no appeal from the Houston County Circuit Court’s March

30, 2006, revocation judgment, that judgment became final 42 days later, on May 11, 2006,

when the time for appeal under Alabama law expired. See Ala.R.App.P. 4(b)(1). Under 28

U.S.C. § 2244(a)(1)(A), Robinson then had until May 11, 2007, to file a federal habeas

petition considered timely, absent any periods of statutory or equitable tolling.

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Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) provides that “[t]he time during which a properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward” the federal limitation period. 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Although Robinson filed a Rule 32 petition in the Houston County

Circuit Court in May 2012 challenging the 2006 revocation judgment, that Rule 32 petition

(which was denied as untimely filed) had no tolling effect under § 2244(d)(2), because the

one-year federal limitation period expired long before the petition was filed. See Tinker v.

Moore, 255 F.3d 1331, 1333 (11 Cir. 2001) (where the state court application for th

post-conviction relief is filed after the one-year statute of limitations has expired, it does not

toll the statute because no time remains to be tolled).

Robinson argues that § 2244(d)(1)(D) provides the applicable start date for the

limitation period in his case, and that under that provision, his § 2254 petition is timely.

2

Section 2244(d)(1)(D) runs the statute-of-limitations clock from “the date on which the

factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the

exercise of due diligence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). Robinson insists that he did not 3

Robinson does not argue for application of the statutory tolling provisions of §

2

2244(d)(1)(B) or (C). In any event, there is no evidence that an unconstitutional or illegal state action

impeded him from filing a timely § 2254 petition, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B), and he presents

no claim that rests on an alleged “right [that] has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and

made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review,” see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C).

Subsection (D) can only apply where the factual predicate of the claim was not known and 3

could not have been known in the exercise of reasonable diligence until sometime after the judgment

at issue became final for purposes of subsection (A). See Mattern v. Secretary for Dep't of Corr.,

494 F.3d 1282, 1286 (11 Cir. 2007). th

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discover the factual predicate for his claims until April 20, 2012, when he says he received

his inmate summary sheet from the Alabama Department of Corrections (“ADOC”) and

learned, for the first time, “that his probation in Houston County had certainly been revoked

and [he] was going to be required to serve those sentences.” Doc. No. 1 at 22. Because he

filed his § 2254 petition on March 20, 2013, less than a year after he says he discovered his

probation revocation and its consequences, he contends his petition is timely under §

2244(d)(1)(D). Id.

Robinson’s suggestion that he did not learn of the March 2006 revocation judgment

until he examined his ADOC inmate summary sheet in April 2012 is belied by his own

representations in several pleadings and documents he filed in the state courts well before

April 2012. For instance, in January 2008, Robinson sent a letter to Houston CountyCircuit

Judge Lawson Little in which he indicated his awareness of the March 30, 2006, proceeding

that resulted in his revocation. Doc. No. 24-1 at 23. In September 2008, Robinson again sent

a letter to Judge Little in which he stated, “there seems to be a question [as] to whether I’ve

been revoked of probation.” Id. at 61. On October 31, 2008, Robinson filed in the Houston

CountyCircuit Court a pro se “Motion for Service of Transmittal of Record/Motion to Begin

Execution of Sentence” in which he recognized that “[a]t the March 30, 2006, hearing, the

court, in absentia, revoked the previously imposed probation and ordered the execution of

the full term previously imposed.” Id. at 66. On December 22, 2008, Robinson filed a pro

se “Motion for Review of Sentence Nunc Pro Tunc” with the circuit court, in which he again

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recognized that “on March 30, 2006 Houston County Courts revoked petitioner’s probation

and [he] was ordered to serve previous sentence immediately.” Id. at 74. These pleadings

and documents filed by Robinson demonstrate that as early as January 2008, he was aware

that his probation had been revoked in March 2006, and shows that no later than October

2008, he was fully aware that his probation revocation resulted in the trial court’s ordering

him to serve his full, originally imposed sentences.

Robinson seems to suggest that the factual predicate for his claims should be his

awareness of the significance of his probation revocation – specifically, that he would be

required to serve his full, previously imposed sentences as a result of the revocation – and

that he only discerned the consequences of his probation revocation when examining his

ADOC inmate summary sheet in April 2012. However, as noted, Robinson’s pleadings filed

in the state courts in 2008 reflect that he was well aware, no later than October 2008, that had

been ordered to serve his full original sentences when his probation was revoked. In any

event, this court finds that the fact of Robinson’s probation revocation, rather than all the

consequences flowing therefrom, constitutes the operative “factual predicate” for purposes

of § 2244(d)(1)(D).

“[I]t should go without saying that a factual predicate must consist of

facts. Conclusions drawn from preexisting facts, even if the conclusions are

themselves new, are not factual predicates for a claim.” Rivas v. Fischer, 687

F.3d 514, 535 (2d Cir. 2012). The “factual predicate” also has been referenced

as the underlying “vital facts” of a petitioners claim. See, e.g., Ford v.

Gonzalez, 683 F.3d 1230, 1235 (9 Cir. 2012) (“The ‘due diligence’ clock th

starts ticking when a person knows or through diligence could discover the

vital facts, regardless of when their legal significance is actuallydiscovered.”);

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Mathena v. United States, 577 F.3d 943, 946 (8 Cir. 2009) (“The factual

th

predicate of a claim could have been discovered when a petitioner knows or

should have known through due diligence the vital facts underlying the claim.”

(internal quotation marks omitted)); McAleese v. Brennan, 483 F.3d 206, 214

(3d Cir. 2007) (“Though the AEDPA does not define ‘factual predicate,’ we

have held that section 2244(d)(1)(D) provides a petitioner with a later accrual

date than section 2244(d)(1)(A) only if vital facts could not have been known.”

(second internal quotation marks and alteration omitted)); Owens v. Boyd, 235

F.3d 356, 359 (7 Cir. 2000) (“Section 2244(d)(1)(D) gives defendants the th

benefit of a later start if vital facts could not have been known by the date the

appellate process ended.”).

Cole v. Warden, Georgia State Prison, 768 F.3d 1150, 1155 (11 Cir. 2014). th

“The analysis of ‘factual predicate’ and “due diligence” in § 2244(d)(1)(D) is

symbiotic. The factual predicate first must be determined to give meaning to due diligence

in discovering the claim for a particular petitioner’s case.” Cole, 768 F.3d at 155. Even

assuming that Robinson did not receive notice when his probation was revoked in March

2006 and assuming he could not, until some later date, have discovered the fact of his

revocation through the exercise of due diligence, the record, as recounted above, shows that

the filing of his § 2254 petition on March 20, 2013, occurred anywhere from four to five

years after he was aware ofthe supposed factual predicate for his claims. Thus, assuming that

§ 2244(d)(1)(D) provides the applicable trigger date for the limitation period in Robinson’s

case, his § 2254 is nevertheless untimely.

The federal limitation period “may be equitably tolled” on grounds apart from those

specified in the habeas statute “when a movant untimely files because of extraordinary

circumstances that are both beyond his control and unavoidable with diligence.” Sandvik v.

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United States, 177 F.3d 1269, 1271 (11 Cir. 1999). See Holland v. Fla., 560 U.S. 631

th

(2010). “The burden of establishing entitlement to this extraordinary remedy plainly rests

with the petitioner.” Drew v. Dep’t of Corr., 297 F.3d 1278, 1286 (11th Cir. 2002). 

Robinson fails to set forth any facts that demonstrate “extraordinary circumstances” and the

exercise of due diligence to warrant equitable tolling of the limitation period. Consequently,

he is not entitled to equitable tolling.4

Under the circumstances set forth above, it is apparent that the one-year limitation

period in § 2244(d) expired well before Robinson filed his § 2254 petition. Consequently,

his petition is time-barred and this court may not address the merits.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION ofthe Magistrate Judge that the petition

for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 be DENIED with prejudice and this case

dismissed because the petition is time-barred by the one-year limitation period in 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d).

It is further

ORDERED that the parties shall file any objections to the said Recommendation on

or before December 29, 2014. Any objections filed must specifically identify the findings

in the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation to which the partyobjects. Frivolous, conclusive,

Were Robinson to assert the supposed lack of notice of his revocation in March 2006 as a

4

basis for equitable tolling, essentiallythe same analysis of his argument for applying § 2244(d)(1)(D)

would obtain. Certainly, Robinson did not act with diligence to assert his rights after learning, no

later than 2008, that his probation had been revoked in 2006.

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or general objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties are advised this

Recommendation is not a final order; therefore, it is not appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in the

Magistrate Judge’s report shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the District

Court of issues covered in the report and shall bar the party from attacking on appeal factual

findings in the report accepted or adopted by the District Court except upon grounds of plain

error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5 Cir. 1982). See Stein th

v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11 Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of th

Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11 Cir. 1981) (en banc), adopting as binding precedent all of the th

decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on

September 30, 1981.

DONE, this 11 day of December, 2014. th

/s/ Susan Russ Walker 

SUSAN RUSS WALKER

CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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