Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00970/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00970-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Employment Discrimination

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

KATHLEEN BALL,

NO. CIV. S 04-0970 MCE PAN

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

LOS RIOS COMMUNITY COLLEGE 

DISTRICT, EUNYOUNG HWANG, 

MARISSA SAYAGO, RICHARD 

BOOTH, BRUCE WERNER, and 

DOES 1 to 1000,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Defendants Los Rios Community College District, Eunyoung

Hwang, Marissa Sayago, Richard Booth, and Bruce Werner

(collectively “Defendants”) have asked the Court to dismiss the

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (hereinafter “§ 1983”) claim filed by Kathleen

Ball (hereinafter “Plaintiff”). Additionally, Defendants have

asked the Court to strike certain portions of Plaintiff’s second

amended complaint relating to punitive damages. For the reasons

discussed below, Defendants’ motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED

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 This matter was deemed suitable for decision without oral 1

argument as Plaintiff failed to file opposition. Local Rules 78-

230(h) and 78-230(c).

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in part. 

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BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, who suffers from Hepatitis-C, worked as an

adjunct art professor for Los Rios Community College District

(hereinafter “the District”). Her employment began in December

1999 and continued until March 2001. In March 2001, the District

laid-off Plaintiff because there were not enough classes for her

to teach. In January 2002, the District’s teaching needs changed

and Plaintiff was rehired for the same position. 

Six months later, in July 2003, Plaintiff’s medical

condition worsened and she was required to undergo intensified

drug therapy. Her therapy resulted in a significant loss of

energy and stamina. As a result of her reduced energy and

stamina, in the Fall of 2003, Plaintiff requested work

accommodations, which included the following: 1) storage space

for art supplies, 2) authorization to teach all classes at one

campus, 3) to be informed of all required meetings by telephone,

4) no Saturday and evening teaching requirements, and 5)

appropriate time off as required by her medical condition.

The District denied these requests and four months later, on

November 6, 2003, terminated Plaintiff’s employment, citing her

excessive number of absences as its reason. The District

allegedly refused to negotiate the situation and denied Plaintiff

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 Unless otherwise stated, all further references to a 2

“Rule” or “Rules” are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

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access to her personnel file. 

Plaintiff recently filed a second amended complaint, which

states an additional cause of action against Defendants in their

official and individual capacities, as applicable, under § 1983

for depravation of civil rights. Additionally, in her second

amended complaint, Plaintiff failed to remove her various prayers

for punitive damages against the District, which the Court

ordered stricken from her first amended complaint.

STANDARD

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), all allegations of 2

material fact must be accepted as true and construed in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut.

Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). A complaint will

not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears

beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support

of his [or her] claim that would entitle him [or her] to relief. 

Yamaguchi v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 109 F.3d 1475, 1480 (9th

Cir. 1997) (quoting Lewis v. Tel. Employees Credit Union, 87 F.3d

1537, 1545 (9th Cir. 1996). Pursuant to Rule 12(f), “the court

may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or

any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” 

If a court grants a motion to dismiss a complaint, it must

then decide whether to grant leave to amend. Under Rule 15(a),

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when there is no futility, undue delay, prejudice, bad faith, or

dilatory motive on the part on the part of the movant, leave to

amend a complaint is to be “freely given when justice so

requires.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Fed. R.

Civ. P. 15(a). Generally, leave to amend is denied only if it is

clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured

by amendment. Broughton v. Cutter Labs., 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th

Cir. 1980).

ANALYSIS

A. Motion to Dismiss

Under the Eleventh Amendment, dependent agencies of the

state, such as community college districts, are immune from

private suits, regardless of the relief sought. Pennhurst State

School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984) (holding

that the Eleventh Amendment proscribes suit against state

agencies “regardless of the nature of the relief sought”);

Cerrato v. San Francisco Community College District, 26 F.3d 968,

972 (9th Cir. 1994); Mitchell v. Los Angeles Community College

Dist., 861 F.2d 198, 201 (9th Cir. 1988) (“California state

colleges and universities are “dependent instrumentalities of the

state”). Thus, under the Eleventh Amendment, Los Rios Community

College District (hereinafter “the District”) is immune from

civil liability under § 1983. The Court, therefore, dismisses

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against Los Rios Community College

District with prejudice. 

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Likewise, under the Eleventh Amendment, Plaintiff cannot sue

state officials in their official capacities in order to recover

monetary damages or non-prospective injunctive relief. Will v.

Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989);

Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 102-03 (“a suit against state officials

that is in fact a suit against a State is barred regardless of

whether it seeks damages or injunctive relief.”). However, in

some cases, state officials may be sued in their official

capacity for prospective injunctive relief when they act outside

the bounds of their authority. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,

662-68 (1974) (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908));

Cerrato, 26 F.3d 968, 972-73 (9th Cir. 1994).

Consequently, the Court dismisses, with prejudice,

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims for monetary damages and injunctive

relief against the following defendants sued in their official

capacities: Eunyoung Hwang, Marissa Sayago, Richard Booth, and

Bruce Werner. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512

(2002). However, to the extent that Plaintiff is seeking some

form of specific prospective injunctive relief, Plaintiff is

granted twenty (20) days leave to amend in accordance with this

order and Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence. 

The Eleventh Amendment does not bar federal suits against

state officials in their individual capacities, regardless of the

relief sought. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 238 (1974);

Ashker v. California Dept. Of Corrections, 112 F.3d 392, 394 (9th

Cir. 1997). Here, Plaintiff has based her § 1983 claim on the

depravation of an alleged property right, specifically,

“continued employment absent just cause for termination.” 

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(Compl. at 9:18-20.) Plaintiff bases this alleged property right

on Article 27 (Section 27.1.1) of the collective bargaining

agreement between the District and the Los Rios College

Federation of Teachers, Local 2279, as well as various alleged

verbal assurances that she “would not be terminated arbitrarily.” 

(Compl. at 9:6-10; 9:5-6.)

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient

to state a § 1983 claim under Rule 8(a)in that they give the

defendants fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. This

simplified notice pleading standard relies on liberal discovery

rules and summary judgement motions to define disputed facts and

issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims.”) (citations and

quotations omitted). 

Acknowledging Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth,

408 U.S. 564, 576-58 (1972), the Court finds that the question of

whether or not Plaintiff has a legitimate claim of entitlement to

her asserted property interest is a question for summary judgment

and not a motion to dismiss. Consequently, Defendants’ motion to

dismiss Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against Defendants under Roth is

denied.

B. Motion to Strike

On January 28, 2005, the Court ordered Plaintiff to strike

from her first amended complaint all references to punitive

damages against the District pursuant to Section 818 of the

California Civil Code. (Order at 6:6-18.) In filing her second

amended complaint, Plaintiff has included a claim for punitive

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damages. The court has previously ruled on this issue and all

references to punitive damages are stricken from the first

amended complaint. The court cautions plaintiff that if there is

a further reference to punitive damages, it may result in

sanctions for failure to follow this court’s order.

CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, Defendant’s motion to

dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Defendants’

motion to strike is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 24, 2005

___________________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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