Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02474/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-02474-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are derived from the exhibits submitted

with Doc. 13 – Respondents’ Answer.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Freddie Lee Ford, Jr., 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al.,

Respondents. 

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CIV 13-2474-PHX-DGC (MHB)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE DAVID G. CAMPBELL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT:

Petitioner Freddie Lee Ford, Jr., who is confined in the Arizona State Prison Complex,

filed a pro se Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254

(Doc. 6). Respondents filed an Answer (Doc. 13), and Petitioner filed a Reply (Doc. 13).

BACKGROUND1

The instant habeas petition involves Petitioner’s plea agreements in two cause

numbers: CR 2010-106247 and CR 2010-117471.

CR 2010-106247

On February 10, 2010, the Maricopa Grand Jury indicted Petitioner on Counts 1, 2,

and 8, aggravated assault, class 2 dangerous felonies; Counts 3, 4, and 5, aggravated assault,

class 3 dangerous felonies; Count 6, resisting arrest, a class 6 felony; and Count 7, assault,

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a class 3 misdemeanor. (Exh. A.) On August 20, 2010, Petitioner entered a plea agreement

in which he pled guilty to amended Counts 1 and 2, aggravated assault, both class 2 felonies

with one prior conviction; and amended Count 4, aggravated assault, a class 3 felony. (Exhs.

B and D.) The terms of the plea included that Petitioner would be sentenced to prison for

Counts 1 and 2, with no agreement regarding whether those sentences would be served

consecutively or concurrently. (Id. at 2.) Additionally, Petitioner agreed that he would be

placed on supervised probation for Count 4 upon physical release from prison on Counts 1

and 2. (Id.) The plea was contingent on Petitioner’s entry into, and the trial court’s

acceptance of, a plea agreement in cause number, CR 2010-117471. (Id. at 3.) In exchange,

the State agreed to dismiss the remaining counts, as well as the remaining prior felony

convictions and other sentence-aggravating allegations. (Id.)

As described by the Arizona Court of Appeals, the Petitioner’s convictions stemmed

from his “threatening two police officers and a third person with a pellet gun.” (Exh. T at 2.)

At the plea proceeding, Petitioner’s counsel described the factual basis as follows:

. . . Mr. Ford intentionally placed – it’s Officer Patrick Sullivan, who was at

the time a police officer acting in his official duties as such, in reasonable

apprehension of imminent physical injury, at which time Mr. Ford had

displayed – it turned out to be a pellet gun, but it would certainly classify as

a deadly weapon or simulated deadly weapon, but at any rate placed that

officer in reasonable apprehension of imminent physical injury.

As to Count 2, Your Honor, the same facts. It was another officer that

responded to the scene, at which time Mr. Ford also placed that officer, who

was David Dehority, again a police officer acting in his official duties as such,

in reasonable apprehension of imminent physical injury, again with the pellet

gun.

In both Counts 1 and 2, at that time Mr. Ford had previously been convicted

from an offense dated September 30th, 1995. It was an armed robbery

conviction, a class 2 felony. That was a conviction that was entered in the

Maricopa County Superior Court CR1995-09859. Conviction was entered on

June 18th, 1996, at which time Mr. Ford was represented by an attorney.

As to Count 4, again on February 2nd of 2010, within Maricopa County in the

jurisdiction of this court, Mr. Ford intentionally placed – it would be Nancy

Spencer in reasonable apprehension of imminent physical danger, again with

the same pellet gun, Your Honor.

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(Exh. E at 22-23.) Petitioner confirmed his attorney’s recitation of the facts. (Id. at 23-24.)

The presentence report also described in detail the events leading to the charges in CR

2010-106247:

On February 2, 2010, police responded to a call of a subject with a gun who

was pointing it at passersby in the area. Police officers Dehority and Sullivan

arrived and observed the defendant standing in a left hand turn lane on

Southern Avenue, holding a gun in his right hand and a beer in his left hand.

The defendant refused commands from police to drop the gun. The defendant

aimed the gun at a dog behind a nearby fence then pointed the gun at Officer

Sullivan. Police fired one shot at the defendant, causing him to fall to the

ground; however, the bullet did not strike him. The defendant stood up and

refused commands to get on the ground. The defendant aggressively resisted

arrest and it took five officers to take him into custody. Subsequent

investigation of the defendant’s actions revealed the defendant pointed his gun

at several people on the roadway. Victim Timothy Olsen confirmed the

defendant pointed a gun at him while Mr. Olsen was leaving a local merchant.

Victims Nancy Spencer and Ed Metzner, riding together as Animal Control

Officers, also confirmed the defendant pointed a gun at them as well as the

dog. Police determined the gun involved was an air gun. While the defendant

was being treated at Maricopa County Medical Center, he spat on a security

guard.

(Exh. I at 2.)

On January 7, 2011, after considering aggravating and mitigating factors, the trial

court sentenced Petitioner to an aggravated term of 18.5 years of imprisonment for Count 1;

to another aggravated term of 18.5 years of imprisonment for Count 2, to be served

consecutively to the sentence imposed in Count 1; and to the probationary period for Count

4 per the plea agreement. (Exh. F at 27-30; G.) Petitioner was advised orally, and additionally

signed a written notice, of his post-conviction rights of review. (Exhs. F at 31; G; H.)

On February 2, 2011, Petitioner filed a timely notice of post-conviction relief (PCR),

and on February 7, 2011, the trial court appointed PCR counsel. (Exhs. J and K.) On July 20,

2011, Petitioner’s PCR counsel filed a notice of completion of review, indicating that, after

reviewing the record, counsel found no “claims for relief to raise in post-conviction

proceedings.” (Exh. L at 1.) On July 27, 2011, the trial court entered an order permitting

Petitioner to file a pro per PCR petition. (Exh. M.) On September 14, 2011, Petitioner filed

a timely pro per PCR petition, raising the following issues: 1) ineffective assistance of

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counsel (IAC) for failure to “explain contents of plea agreements to defendant;” and 2) the

trial court improperly aggravated his sentences and also improperly ordered them to be

served consecutively. (Exh. N at 6-8.) Treating the PCR as timely filed, on September 26,

2011, the trial court ordered the State to respond, and the State did on October 31, 2011.

(Exhs. O and P.) On November 7, 2011, the trial court ordered that Petitioner be permitted

to reply within 15 days, and Petitioner filed a reply on November 23, 2011. (Exhs. Q and R.)

On January 11, 2012, the trial court denied Petitioner’s PCR petition because it was “without

any merit.” (Exh. S.)

On January 19, 2012, Petitioner filed a petition for review of the trial court’s denial

of his PCR in the Arizona Court of Appeals, raising four issues for review: 1) whether his

plea was legal because he was on “psychotropic narcotic drugs while pleading guilty before

the judge;” 2) whether his sentence was properly aggravated with a prior conviction; 3)

whether the imposition of consecutive sentences was proper; and 4) IAC (generally and

relating to acceptance of his plea). (Doc. 6 at 31-46.) On May 30, 2013, the court of appeals

denied the petition for review, concluding:

On review, Ford essentially repeats his arguments below, expanding on some

them. He maintains the trial court abused its discretion in accepting his guilty

plea while he was on psychotropic medication and trial counsel was ineffective

because he allowed Ford to plead guilty while on that medication.FN He further

contends the court erred in imposing enhanced sentences because the

conviction upon which the enhanced sentence was based was “not committed

within the four to ten year[s] immediately proceeding [sic] the date of the new

offenses.” He again asserts that the court could not impose consecutive

sentences because the convictions arose from “one single act.”

FN Ford also alleges on review that counsel “guaranteed” him “that he would

only receive 10.5 years to sign the plea agreement and plea[d] guilty.” Below

he merely asserted, as part of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, that

counsel had “le[]d” him “to understand that there would be just one combined

plea agreement with the consequences ranging from 9 years to the aggravating

max of 18.5.” This court will not consider for the first time on review issues

that have neither been presented to, nor ruled on by, the trial court. State v.

Ramirez, 616 P.2d 924, 928 (Ariz. App. 1980); see also Ariz. R. Crim. P.

32.9(c)(1)(ii) (petition for review shall contain “[t]he issues which were

decided by the trial court and which the defendant wishes to present” for

review).

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To present a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant

must show that counsel’s performance was deficient under prevailing

professional norms and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); State v. Ysea, 956 P.2d

499, 504, ¶ 15 (1998). “A colorable claim of post-conviction relief is ‘one that,

if the allegations are true, might have changed the outcome.’” State v. Jackson, 97 P.3d 113, 114, ¶2 (Ariz. App. 2004), quoting State v. Runningeagle, 859

P.2d 169, 173 (Ariz. 1993). And “a defendant may seek relief from a

conviction on the basis that counsel’s ineffective assistance induced a guilty

plea.” State v. Donald, 10 P.3d 1193, 1198, ¶ 10 (Ariz. App. 2000).

Ford makes several allegations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, most

of them sufficiently vague or unsupported that we cannot meaningfully address

them. He does assert, however, that counsel was ineffective in relation to his

acceptance of the plea agreement. But, despite his claims that he was unable

to understand the plea agreement or what was happening as his change-of-plea

hearing, the record below shows that the trial court asked Ford about what

medications he was taking and if they affected his ability to “think clearly.”

Ford clearly and unambiguously state “No.” And the remainder of the

transcript shows Ford responding appropriately to questions directed to him.

To state a colorable claim, Ford must do more than simply contradict what the

record plainly shows. See State v. Jenkins, 970 P.2 947, 952, ¶ 15 (Ariz. App.

1998) (defendant’s claim he was unaware sentence “must be served without

possibility of early release” not colorable when “directly contradicted by the

record”). Because he merely contradicts the record, Ford has not established

prejudice arising from counsel’s actions in relation to Ford’s use of

medication. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding this

claim without merit. See State v. Salazar, 707 P.2d 944, 955 (Ariz. 1985) (if

defendant fails to make sufficient showing on either element of Strickland test,

court need not determine if other element established).

For the same reason, we reject Ford’s claim that his due process rights were

violated by the court’s failure “to make [an] on-record determination of

voluntarines[s] given [Ford’s] admitted use of medication at the county jail by

doctors.” In support of this argument Ford relies on Miles v. Stainer, 108 F.3d

1109, 1112 (9th Cir. 1997), in which the Ninth Circuit determined that “[d]ue

process requires a trial court to hold a competency hearing sua sponte

whenever the evidence before it raises a reasonable doubt whether a defendant

is mentally competent.” But in this case, a competency evaluation pursuant to

Rule 11, Ariz. R. Crim. P., already had taken place. And, nothing in the

transcript of the change-of-plea hearing supports a conclusion that the court

had before it evidence to raise a doubt about Ford’s competence.

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The trial court also correctly denied relief on Ford’s sentencing claims. A

defendant is properly sentenced as a “category two repetitive offender” if he

or she “stands convicted of a felony and has one historical prior felony

conviction.” A.R.S. § 13-105(22)(b). In calculating the ten-year period, “[a]ny

time spent . . . incarcerated is excluded.” Id. According to his own sentencing

memorandum, Ford was incarcerated for five years after his conviction in 1996

for crimes committed in September 1995 and subsequently was imprisoned

after being convicted of felonies in 2001 and 2007. The events giving rise to

the charges at issue here occurred in February 2010. Thus, on the record before

us, the prior conviction used to enhance Ford’s sentence was committed within

ten years of the current offenses when calculated according to § 13-105(22)(b).

The trial court did not, therefore, abuse its discretion in denying relief on the

claim.

Ford’s claim that consecutive sentences were barred because they arose from

the same actions is likewise without merit. Section 13-116, A.R.S., provides

that an act may be punished under “different sections of the laws,” but that “in

no event may sentences be other than concurrent.” But “§ 13-116 does not

apply to sentences imposed for a single act that harms multiple victims.” State

v. Riley, 992 P.2d 1135, 1142, § 21 (Ariz. App. 1999), citing State v. Gordon, 778 P.2d 1204 (Ariz. 1989). All three assaults here were committed against

different victims. Thus consecutive sentences were not unlawful, and the trial

court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the claim.

For all these reasons, although we grant the petition for review, we deny relief.

(Exh. T at 3-6.) On June 10, 2013, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Arizona

Supreme Court, and on September 16, 2013, that court denied review. (Exhs. U and V.) On

October 30, 2013, the court of appeals issued its mandate. (Exh. W.)

CR 2010-117471

On April 16, 2010, the Maricopa County Grand Jury indicted Petitioner with one

count of aggravated assault, a class 5 felony. (Exh. X.) As described in the presentence

report, the facts underlying this charge are as follows:

On November 4, 2009, while an inmate in the Maricopa County Jail Central

Intake, the defendant exhibited strange behavior while in a holding cell.

Detention officers contacted the defendant and instructed him to exit the cell.

The defendant refused to comply, moved to the south side of the cell, lay on

the ground and grabbed another inmate’s leg; the defendant grabbed the door,

reached up and grabbed Sergeant Scheffner by the neck. The defendant refused

numerous verbal commands to stop. Officers deployed a taser gun at the

defendant on two occasions to subdue him. Sergeant Scheffner suffered

scratches on his neck and was taken for medical evaluation.

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A couple of months later, when the defendant was interviewed by jail

investigators, the defendant stated he recalled the incident. When investigators

asked the defendant to explain his erratic behavior at the time of the offense,

the defendant reported he believed the officers wanted to put his head into a

toilet. The defendant stated prior to his arrest and transport to the jail, he had

been consuming alcohol all day and confirmed he was not on his psychiatric

medication at the time of his arrest.

(Exh. I at 1.) The facts reiterated by defense counsel, and confirmed by Petitioner, at the plea

proceeding. (Exh. E at 20-21.)

On August 20, 2010, Petitioner entered a plea agreement in which he agreed to plead

guilty to an amended count of aggravated assault, a class 5 felony, and be placed on

supervised probation upon physical release from serving the prison sentences imposed in

cause number CR 2010-106247. (Exhs. Y and Z.) On January 1, 2011, pursuant to the plea

agreement, the trial court placed Petitioner on probation, to be served concurrently with the

probation imposed on Count 4 in CR 2010-106247. (Exh. AA.) Petitioner signed a notice of

rights of review on January 1, 2011, alerting him to his post-conviction rights and deadlines.

(Exh. BB.) Petitioner did not seek post-conviction review in this cause number.

In the instant habeas petition, Petitioner raises three grounds for relief: (1) Petitioner

received ineffective assistance of counsel, in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth

Amendments, when counsel failed to “group plea’s” and adequately investigate his mental

history and alleged prior, (2) the trial court improperly aggravated his sentence and

Petitioner’s aggravated sentence violates his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, and (3)

Petitioner’s sentence was excessive, in violation of the Fifth Amendment.

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DISCUSSION

In their Answer, Respondents contend that Grounds One and Three are procedurally

defaulted, and Ground Two fails to state a basis for federal habeas relief. As such,

Respondents request that the Court deny and dismiss Petitioner’s habeas petition with

prejudice.

A. Exhaustion and Procedural Default

A state prisoner must exhaust his remedies in state court before petitioning for a writ

of habeas corpus in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) and (c); Duncan v. Henry, 513

U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995); McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 833 (9th Cir. 1991). To

properly exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must fairly present his claims to the state’s

highest court in a procedurally appropriate manner. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S.

838, 839-46 (1999). In Arizona, a petitioner must fairly present his claims to the Arizona

Court of Appeals by properly pursuing them through the state’s direct appeal process or

through appropriate post-conviction relief. See Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th

Cir. 1999); Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1994).

Proper exhaustion requires a petitioner to have “fairly presented” to the state courts

the exact federal claim he raises on habeas by describing the operative facts and federal legal

theory upon which the claim is based. See, e.g., Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275-78

(1971) (“[W]e have required a state prisoner to present the state courts with the same claim

he urges upon the federal courts.”). A claim is only “fairly presented” to the state courts

when a petitioner has “alert[ed] the state courts to the fact that [he] was asserting a claim

under the United States Constitution.” Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987 (9th Cir. 2000)

(quotations omitted); see Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 830 (9th Cir. 1996) (“If a petitioner

fails to alert the state court to the fact that he is raising a federal constitutional claim, his

federal claim is unexhausted regardless of its similarity to the issues raised in state court.”).

A “general appeal to a constitutional guarantee,” such as due process, is insufficient

to achieve fair presentation. Shumway, 223 F.3d at 987 (quoting Gray v. Netherland, 518

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U.S. 152, 163 (1996)); see Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1003 (9th Cir. 2005)

(“Exhaustion demands more than drive-by citation, detached from any articulation of an

underlying federal legal theory.”). Similarly, a federal claim is not exhausted merely because

its factual basis was presented to the state courts on state law grounds – a “mere similarity

between a claim of state and federal error is insufficient to establish exhaustion.” Shumway,

223 F.3d at 988 (quotations omitted); see Picard, 404 U.S. at 275-77.

Even when a claim’s federal basis is “self-evident,” or the claim would have been

decided on the same considerations under state or federal law, a petitioner must still present

the federal claim to the state courts explicitly, “either by citing federal law or the decisions

of federal courts.” Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668 (9th Cir. 2000) (quotations omitted),

amended by 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001); see Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32 (2004)

(claim not fairly presented when state court “must read beyond a petition or a brief ... that

does not alert it to the presence of a federal claim” to discover implicit federal claim).

Additionally, under the independent state grounds principle, a federal habeas court

generally may not review a claim if the state court’s denial of relief rests upon an

independent and adequate state ground. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731-32

(1991). The United States Supreme Court has explained:

In the habeas context, the application of the independent and adequate state

ground doctrine is grounded in concerns of comity and federalism. Without the

rule, a federal district court would be able to do in habeas what this Court

could not do on direct review; habeas would offer state prisoners whose

custody was supported by independent and adequate state grounds an end run

around the limits of this Court’s jurisdiction and a means to undermine the

State’s interest in enforcing its laws.

Id. at 730-31. A petitioner who fails to follow a state’s procedural requirements for

presenting a valid claim deprives the state court of an opportunity to address the claim in

much the same manner as a petitioner who fails to exhaust his state remedies. Thus, in order

to prevent a petitioner from subverting the exhaustion requirement by failing to follow state

procedures, a claim not presented to the state courts in a procedurally correct manner is

deemed procedurally defaulted, and is generally barred from habeas relief. See id. at 731-32.

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 A state procedural default rule is “independent” if it does not depend upon a federal

constitutional ruling on the merits. See Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002).

3

 A state procedural default rule is “adequate” if it is “strictly or regularly followed.”

Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 587 (1988) (quoting Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255,

262-53 (1982)).

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Claims may be procedurally barred from federal habeas review based upon a variety

of factual circumstances. If a state court expressly applied a procedural bar when a petitioner

attempted to raise the claim in state court, and that state procedural bar is both

“independent”2

 and “adequate”3 – review of the merits of the claim by a federal habeas court

is barred. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801 (1991) (“When a state-law default

prevents the state court from reaching the merits of a federal claim, that claim can ordinarily

not be reviewed in federal court.”) (citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87-88 (1977)

and Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485-492 (1986)).

Moreover, if a state court applies a procedural bar, but goes on to alternatively address

the merits of the federal claim, the claim is still barred from federal review. See Harris v.

Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264 n.10 (1989) (“[A] state court need not fear reaching the merits of

a federal claim in an alternative holding. By its very definition, the adequate and independent

state ground doctrine requires the federal court to honor a state holding that is a sufficient

basis for the state court’s judgment, even when the state court also relies on federal law. ...

In this way, a state court may reach a federal question without sacrificing its interests in

finality, federalism, and comity.”) (citations omitted); Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 580

(9th Cir. 2003) (“A state court’s application of a procedural rule is not undermined where, as

here, the state court simultaneously rejects the merits of the claim.”) (citing Harris, 489 U.S.

at 264 n.10).

A procedural bar may also be applied to unexhausted claims where state procedural

rules make a return to state court futile. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735 n.1 (claims are barred

from habeas review when not first raised before state courts and those courts “would now

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find the claims procedurally barred”); Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1230-31 (9th Cir.

2002) (“[T]he procedural default rule barring consideration of a federal claim ‘applies only

when a state court has been presented with the federal claim,’ but declined to reach the issue

for procedural reasons, or ‘if it is clear that the state court would hold the claim procedurally

barred.’”) (quoting Harris, 489 U.S. at 263 n.9).

In Arizona, claims not previously presented to the state courts via either direct appeal

or collateral review are generally barred from federal review because an attempt to return to

state court to present them is futile unless the claims fit in a narrow category of claims for

which a successive petition is permitted. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d)-(h), 32.2(a) (precluding

claims not raised on appeal or in prior petitions for post-conviction relief), 32.4(a) (time bar),

32.9(c) (petition for review must be filed within thirty days of trial court’s decision). Arizona

courts have consistently applied Arizona’s procedural rules to bar further review of claims

that were not raised on direct appeal or in prior Rule 32 post-conviction proceedings. See,

e.g., Stewart, 536 U.S. at 860 (determinations made under Arizona’s procedural default rule

are “independent” of federal law); Smith v. Stewart, 241 F.3d 1191, 1195 n.2 (9th Cir. 2001)

(“We have held that Arizona’s procedural default rule is regularly followed [“adequate”] in

several cases.”) (citations omitted), reversed on other grounds, Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S.

856 (2002); see also Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 931-32 (rejecting argument that Arizona

courts have not “strictly or regularly followed” Rule 32 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure); State v. Mata, 185 Ariz. 319, 334-36, 916 P.2d 1035, 1050-52 (Ariz. 1996)

(waiver and preclusion rules strictly applied in post-conviction proceedings).

The federal court will not consider the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim unless

a petitioner can demonstrate that a miscarriage of justice would result, or establish cause for

his noncompliance and actual prejudice. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995);

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750-51; Murray, 477 U.S. at 495-96. Pursuant to the “cause and

prejudice” test, a petitioner must point to some external cause that prevented him from

following the procedural rules of the state court and fairly presenting his claim. “A showing

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of cause must ordinarily turn on whether the prisoner can show that some objective factor

external to the defense impeded [the prisoner’s] efforts to comply with the State’s procedural

rule. Thus, cause is an external impediment such as government interference or reasonable

unavailability of a claim’s factual basis.” Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1052 (9th Cir.

2004) (citations and internal quotations omitted). Ignorance of the State’s procedural rules

or other forms of general inadvertence or lack of legal training and a petitioner’s mental

condition do not constitute legally cognizable “cause” for a petitioner’s failure to fairly

present his claim. Regarding the “miscarriage of justice,” the Supreme Court has made clear

that a fundamental miscarriage of justice exists when a Constitutional violation has resulted

in the conviction of one who is actually innocent. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 495-96.

Neither Ground One, nor Ground Three, was properly presented to the state court by

being timely raised in Petitioner’s PCR petition or in his petition for review to the Arizona

Court of Appeals. (Exh. N; Doc. 6 at 31-46.) While Petitioner raised differing IAC claims

his PCR petition and petition for review, both pleadings failed to mention any failure to

investigate or “group plea’s” issue, but instead argued IAC generally and relating to the

acceptance of his plea and failure to explain the contents of his plea. (Id.) Further, Petitioner

made no claim in his PCR petition or petition for review arguing that his sentence was

constitutionally excessive or “absurd” as set forth in his habeas petition. (Id.) Thus, Grounds

One and Three were not fairly presented to the state courts, and Petitioner would no longer

have a remedy if he returned to state court. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a) (precluding claims

not raised on appeal or in prior petitions for post-conviction relief), 32.4(a) (time bar). As a

result, Grounds One and Three are procedurally defaulted.

Petitioner has also not established grounds to excuse the procedural default by a

showing of cause and prejudice, and he has not argued a fundamental miscarriage of justice.

And, as stated previously, ignorance of the State’s procedural rules or other forms of general

inadvertence or lack of legal training and a petitioner’s mental condition do not constitute

legally cognizable “cause” for a petitioner’s failure to fairly present his claim.

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4

 “Cause” is established under Martinez when: (1) the claim of “ineffective assistance

of trial counsel” was a “substantial” claim; (2) the “cause” consisted of there being “no

counsel” or only “ineffective” counsel during the state collateral review proceeding; (3) the

state collateral review proceeding was the “initial” review proceeding in respect to the

“ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim”; and (4) state law requires that an “ineffective

assistance of trial counsel [claim] ... be raised in an initial-review collateral review

proceeding.” Trevino v. Thaler, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 1911, 1918 (2013) (citing Martinez,

132 S.Ct. at 1318-19, 1320-21).

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Moreover, although “[i]nadequate assistance of counsel at initial-review collateral

proceedings may establish cause for a prisoner’s procedural default of a claim of ineffective

assistance at trial,” Martinez v. Ryan, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 1315 (2012), Petitioner

fails to argue “cause” for his default of Ground One pursuant to Martinez. In any event, in

his one-sentence argument, Petitioner has not provided citations to the law or the record to

support his assertions that counsel was ineffective for failure to “group plea’s” and

adequately investigate his mental history and alleged prior. His unsupported, conclusory

allegations are insufficient to support a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, see Jones

v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 204-05 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that conclusory allegations with no

reference to the record or other evidence do not warrant habeas relief), and, as such, are not

“substantial” and fail to establish “cause” under Martinez.

4

Because Petitioner has not established any basis to excuse his procedural default,

Petitioner’s claims asserted in Grounds One and Three are barred from habeas corpus review.

The Court will recommend that Grounds One and Three be denied and dismissed.

B. Non-Cognizable Claim

In Ground Two, Petitioner contends that the trial court improperly aggravated his

sentence and argues that his aggravated sentence violates his Fifth and Sixth Amendment

rights.

The Court can grant habeas relief “only on the ground that [a petitioner] is in custody

in violation of the Constitution or laws or treatises of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. §

2254(a). “[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court

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determinations on state-law grounds.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); see

Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 348-49 (1993) (“[M]ere error of state law, one that does

not rise to the level of a constitutional violation, may not be corrected on federal habeas.”);

Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990) (“[F]ederal habeas corpus relief does not lie for

errors of state law.”). And, a petitioner may not “transform a state law issue into a federal one

merely by asserting a violation of due process.” Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 584 (9th Cir.

1999) (quoting Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1996)); see Engle v. Isaac,

456 U.S. 107, 119-21 (1982) (“While they attempt to cast their first claim in constitutional

terms, we believe that this claim does no more than suggest that the instructions at

respondents’ trials may have violated state law.”).

Petitioner does not present a cognizable federal claim in Ground Two. Sentence

calculation and application of state sentencing statutes are matters of state law. See Beaty v.

Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 986 (9th Cir. 2002). Any such state-law error would not constitute a

cognizable ground for granting Petitioner federal habeas relief. See Lewis, 497 U.S. at 780

(rejecting petitioner’s claim that a state court misapplied its own aggravating circumstance

because “federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law....”); Cacoperdo v.

Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504, 507 (9th Cir. 1994) (concluding, where Nevada prisoner

challenged state trial court imposition of consecutive sentences without explanation, “[t]he

decision whether to impose sentences concurrently or consecutively is a matter of state

criminal procedure and is not within the purview of federal habeas corpus”); see also Isaac,

456 U.S. at 119 (“A writ of habeas corpus is available under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) only on the

basis of some transgression of federal law binding on the state courts.”); Poland, 169 F.3d

at 584 (“Federal habeas courts lack jurisdiction ... to review state court applications of state

procedural rules.”).

Moreover, the misapplication of state law results in a federal due process violation

only if the sentence is arbitrary and capricious, or fundamentally unfair. See Richmond v.

Lewis, 506 U.S. 40, 50 (1992); Christian v. Rhode, 41 F.3d 461, 469 (9th Cir. 1994).

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Petitioner has failed to make a showing of either. See, e.g., Souch v. Schaivo, 289 F.3d 616,

623 (9th Cir. 2002); Christian v. Rhode, 41 F.3d 461, 469 (9th Cir. 1994). Furthermore, the

Arizona Court of Appeals articulated how the trial court properly sentenced Petitioner

pursuant to applicable Arizona statutes and the plea agreement. (Exh. T at 5-6.)

In sum, Petitioner’s sentencing claim is not cognizable and, as such, the Court will

recommend that Ground Two be denied and dismissed.

CONCLUSION

Having determined that Grounds One and Three are procedurally defaulted, and

Ground Two fails to state a basis for federal habeas relief, the Court will recommend that

Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 6) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the Petition is

justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the procedural ruling

debatable.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen

days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure timely to file objections to the

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report

and Recommendation by the district court without further review. See United States v.

Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely to file objections to any

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factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right

to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the

Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 23rd day of April, 2015.

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