Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-04648/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-04648-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Order Granting In Part Motion to Dismiss; Directing D to file MSJ

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JERRY SMITH,

Plaintiff,

 v.

E. TOOTELL, et al.,

Defendants.

 

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No. C 14-01159 EJD (PR)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS; DIRECTING DEFENDANT

DELACRUZ TO FILE DISPOSITIVE

MOTION OR NOTICE REGARDING

SUCH MOTION

(Docket No. 25)

Plaintiff, a state prisoner at San Quentin State Prison (“SQSP”), filed three pro se

civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against SQSP medical officials. The

Court consolidated the three actions as they involved the same defendants and a

common set of facts. (Docket No. 4.) The Court found that, liberally construed,

Plaintiff stated a claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs in violation

of the Eighth Amendment, and ordered service of the complaint. (Docket No. 5.) 

Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. (Docket No. 25,

hereafter “Mot.”.) Plaintiff filed an opposition, and Defendants filed a reply. For the

reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and

DENIED IN PART.

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Case 5:14-cv-04648-EJD Document 26 Filed 09/21/15 Page 1 of 17
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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DISCUSSION

I. Statement of Facts

A. Case No. 14-01159 EJD (PR)

According to the complaint filed under Case No. 14-01159 EJD (PR), Plaintiff

claims he has had “dizziness/lighthead[ed]ness/hot flashes” throughout his life. (Docket

No. 1 at 3, hereafter “Compl. 1159”). In 2010, his “inner ear/dizziness” began to

trouble him more than usual. (Id.) Dr. Kolher at Correctional Training Facility

(“CTF”) ordered a work-up for possible anemia. (Id.) In 2011, Plaintiff was transferred

to San Quentin State Prison (“SQSP”) where Defendant Dr. Denise Reyes because his

primary care provider (“PCP”). In July 2013, Plaintiff was referred to Dr. Sassan

Farjami in hematology for a workup for chronic anemia. (Id. Attach. at 12-13.) Dr.

Farjami’s impression was that hypogonadism was a possible cause of the chronic

anemia, and he recommended a referral to an endocrinologist for a formal evaluation for

the possibility of primary or secondary hypogonadism and possible hormone

replacement. (Id.) 

On September 25, 2013, Plaintiff filed an inmate health care appeal (Log No. SQ

HC 13038508), complaining of various ailments, including lightheadedness/dizziness,

night cough and hot flashes. (Compl. 1159, Attach. at 1-4.) In the appeal, he requested,

among other things, to be seen by Dr. Reyes for his health issues and also that Dr.

Reyes be investigated for failing to refer him to an endocrinologist as recommended by

Dr. Farjami. (Id.) 

According to the Second Level Appeal response prepared by Defendant E.

Tootell, Chief Medical Executive at SQSP, (Compl. Attach. at 7-9), Plaintiff’s request

for an investigation and referral for an endocrinology specialist was denied “based on

the criteria set forth in the California Code of Regulations, Title 15, Section

3350(a)(b)(1)(4)(5), which states that the medical department shall provide medical

services for inmates based on medical necessity and supported by outcome data as

effective medical care.” (Id. at 9.) Defendant Tootell reviewed the recent care that

Case 5:14-cv-04648-EJD Document 26 Filed 09/21/15 Page 2 of 17
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Plaintiff had received which included the following: 1) on September 26, 2013, Plaintiff

discussed his dizziness, among other complaints, with Dr. Reyes who then prescribed

medication for the dizziness and a follow-up appointment in three to four months; 2) on

October 24, 2013, Plaintiff, complaining of dizziness and pain in his toes, was seen by

Defendant DeLaCruz who addressed his issues, after which Plaintiff was released back

to his unit in stable condition; 3) on October 31, 2013, Plaintiff again complained of

dizziness and pain in his toes, was seen by Defendant DeLaCruz, and then released back

to his unit in stable condition with no symptoms of acute distress; 4) on November 6,

2013, Plaintiff complained of pain in his toes, dizziness and coughing, was provided

with appropriate treatment, and then released back to his unit in stable condition; and 5)

on November 15, 2013, Plaintiff again complained of pain in his toes, dizziness and

coughing, and was provided with appropriate treatment. (Id. at 8-9.) The second level

decision found that Plaintiff’s medical care met “local community medical care

standards.” (Id.) 

According to the Director’s Level Decision prepared by Defendant L. D.

Zamora, Chief of California Correctional Health Care Services Office of Third Level

Appeals-Health Care, Plaintiff’s appeal was denied because his medical condition was

evaluated and he was receiving treatment deemed medically necessary. (Id.) The

decision included information that on September 26, 2013 and December 3, 2013,

Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Reyes for his various complaints, including

dizziness/lightheadedness and anemia. (Id. at 5-6.) Plaintiff’s dizziness was

determined not to be due to anemia or sleep disturbances (snoring, coughing). (Id.) 

The symptoms were diagnosed as “benign paroxysmal positional vertigo (a disorder

arising in the inner ear; symptoms are repeated episodes of positional vertigo, that is, of

a spinning sensation caused by changes in the position of the head). (Id.) Plaintiff had

been prescribed meclizine to address the symptoms. (Id.) Plaintiff had not complained

of dizziness in the last two months. (Id.) Furthermore, Dr. Reyes evaluated Plaintiff for

his anemia, and noted that he did not warrant referral to an endocrinologist because

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Plaintiff was fully functional and independent in his activities of daily living, the

anemia was mild, and there was no confirmed reason for it. (Id.) 

Plaintiff claims that Defendants E. Tootell, Dr. Reyes and L. D. Zamora were

aware of his condition and did not make the referral to the endocrinologist. (Id.) 

Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief and injunctive relief for his repeated episodes of

dizziness and lightheadedness and a referral to an endocrinologist for evaluation. (Id. at

3-4.)

B. Case No. 14-01438 EJD (PR)

According to the complaint filed under Case No. 14-01438 EJD (PR), Plaintiff

claims that his dizzy spells were bringing him more discomfort than usual “since around

August 2013.” (Docket No. 1 at 3, hereafter “Compl. 1438.”) Plaintiff claims that he

informed Defendant Nurse DeLaCruz “for months about how when I get up in the

morning I have this ring[]ing in my inner ear than [sic] get dizzy/lightheaded when I try

to sit up.” (Id.) 

On September 12, 2013, Plaintiff filed an inmate appeal (Log No. SQ HC

13038273), accusing Defendant Nurse DeLaCruz of violating “clear[ly] established

Rules and Regulations 3354(e)” by failing to respond to his several requests for medical

attention for his dizziness/lightheadedness. (Compl. 1438, Attach. at 1-4.) He alleged

that during August 2013 and September 2013, he filed several requests for health

services (CDC Form 7362) which were not answered. When he asked Defendant

DeLaCruz why his first request on August 3, 2013 was not responded to, “‘She stated

she screened them out.’” (Id. at 2.) 

According to the First Level Appeal decision, Plaintiff was interviewed by

Defendant Nurse M. Ogren on October 3, 2013, concerning his appeal. (Id. at 7.) 

During the interview, Plaintiff told her about his discomfort, and that “some nights

unable to sleep because of the dizzyness [sic].” (Compl. 1438 at 3.) After reviewing

Plaintiff’s electronic unit health record, Defendant Ogren found no record of a request

for health services on August 3, 2013, and August 5, 2013 as Plaintiff claimed. (Id.,

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Attach. at 7.) There was a record of a request filed on August 7, 2013, by which

Plaintiff was seen by a nurse on the same day. (Id.) However, another request made on

August 17, 2013, went unanswered. (Id.) Defendant Ogren informed Plaintiff that

medical staff would be educated on the scheduling process. The appeal was partially

granted at the first level. (Id.) 

The Second Level Appeal decision by Defendant Tootell found that the first

level of review provided Plaintiff with a comprehensive and appropriate response. 

(Compl. 1438, Attach. at 9-10.) It noted that Plaintiff was seen by his PCP on

September 26, 2013, regarding his dizziness, among other complaints. (Id.) 

Subsequently, Plaintiff was seen on October 24, 2013, October 31, 2013, and November

6, 2013, in response to his request for health services for dizziness, and each time he

was assessed and released back to his unit in stable condition. (Id.) The second level

decision found that Plaintiff’s medical care met local community medical care

standards. (Id.) 

The Director’s Level Decision by Defendant Zamora denied his appeal, finding

no intervention was necessary as Plaintiff’s medical condition had been evaluated and

he was receiving treatment deemed medically necessary. (Compl. 1438, Attach. at 5-6.)

Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief and injunctive relief, i.e., to be seen by an

endocrinologist for his dizziness, lightheadedness and hot flashes, a work-up for his

anemia and a follow-up evaluation by an hematologist. (Id. at 3-4.) 

C. Case No. 14-02567 EJD (PR)

The complaint filed under Case No. 14-02567 EJD (PR), makes identical

allegations against Defendant DeLaCruz as in Plaintiff’s inmate appeal discussed above,

i.e., Log No. SQ HC 13038273. See supra at 4; (Docket No. 1 at 3, hereafter “Compl.

2567”). Plaintiff got so lightheaded while walking on August 1, 2013 and then again

the next day, that he had to stop and sit down. (Compl. 2567 at 3.) On August 3, 2013,

Plaintiff sent Defendant Nurse DeLaCruz an inmate medical request. (Id.) When he

got no response, he sent another request on August 5, 2013, and then another on August

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7, 2013. (Id.) On August 9, 2015, Plaintiff was finally seen by Defendant DeLaCruz,

who stated that she had screened Plaintiff’s medical requests out and did not call him

cause they had “talked about the issue before.” (Id.) She stated, “You look fine to me

now.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff’s complaint against Defendant DeLaCruz in his inmate appeal were

converted into a staff complaint, and assigned Log No. SQ SC 14000303. (Compl.

2567, Attach. at 5.) According to the Director’s Level Decision, the staff complaint was

referred for a “Staff Complaint Inquiry,” which involved interviews of Plaintiff and

Defendant DeLaCruz and a review of Plaintiff’s electronic Unit Health Record and the

Health Care Appeals Risk Tracking System. (Id. at 7.) The supervisor’s conclusion

was that Defendant DeLaCruz did violate CDCR policy, specifically Inmate Medical

Services Policies and Procedures Volume 4, Chapter 4 Access to Care and SQ

Operating Procedure #03-040: Access to Primary Care. (Id.) 

Plaintiff claims that he sent Defendant E. Tootell a request for an interview on

August 5, 2013, regarding Defendant DeLaCruz’s indifference to his medical needs. 

(Id.) Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief and damages. (Compl. 2567 at 3.) 

 Plaintiff filed the three actions against Defendants Dr .Reyes, Tootell, Zamora,

Ogren and DeLaCruz based on the above allegations. Liberally construed, the Court

found he stated a cognizable claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs in

violation of the Eighth Amendment.

II. Motion to Dismiss

A. Standard of Review

Dismissal for failure to state a claim is a ruling on a question of law. See Parks

School of Business, Inc., v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). “The issue

is not whether plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether he is entitled to offer

evidence to support his claim.” Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th

Cir. 1987). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” “Specific facts are

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not necessary; the statement need only give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . .

claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93

(2007) (citation and internal quotations omitted). The complaint is construed in the

light most favorable to the non-moving party and all material allegations in the

complaint are taken to be true. Sanders v. Kennedy, 794 F.2d 478, 481 (9th Cir. 1986).

A district court should grant a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff has not pled

“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to

provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations omitted). “[C]onclusory allegations of law

and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to

state a claim.” In re Syntex Corp. Sec. Litig., 95 F.3d 922, 926 (9th Cir. 1996). 

“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level

. . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (citations omitted). In addition, the pleading must not

merely allege conduct that is conceivable, but it must also be plausible. Id. at 570.

Review is limited to the contents of the complaint, see Clegg v. Cult Awareness

Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754 (9th Cir. 1994), including documents physically attached to

the complaint or documents the complaint necessarily relies on and whose authenticity

is not contested, see Lee v. County of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001). 

In addition, the court may take judicial notice of facts that are not subject to reasonable

dispute. See id. at 688–89 (discussing Fed. R. Evid. 201). 

Ultimately, a complaint survives a motion to dismiss where it “contain[s]

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on

its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at

570). Only where a plaintiff has failed to “nudge[ ] [his or her] claims . . . across the

line from conceivable to plausible” is the complaint properly dismissed. Id. at 680. 

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While the plausibility requirement is not akin to a probability requirement, it demands

more than “a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678. This

plausibility inquiry is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw

on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679.

If a complaint fails to state a plausible claim, “‘a district court should grant leave

to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that

the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.’” Lopez v.

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Doe v. United States, 58

F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995)); see also Gardner v. Marino, 563 F.3d 981, 990 (9th Cir.

2009) (finding no abuse of discretion in denying leave to amend when amendment

would be futile).

B. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Need

Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs violates the Eighth

Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. Estelle v. Gamble,

429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992),

overruled on other grounds by WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136

(9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). A serious medical need exists if the failure to treat a

prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the “unnecessary and

wanton infliction of pain.” Id. (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104). A prison official is

deliberately indifferent if he knows that a prisoner faces a substantial risk of serious

harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable steps to abate it. Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). In order for deliberate indifference to be

established, there must be a purposeful act or failure to act on the part of the defendant

and resulting harm. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060. Neither a finding that a

defendant’s actions are egregious nor that they resulted in significant injury to a

prisoner is required to establish a violation of the prisoner’s federal constitutional rights.

Id. at 1060–61 (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7–10 (1992)). Deliberate

indifference may be shown where access to medical staff is meaningless as the staff is

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not competent and does not render competent care. See Lolli v. County of Orange, 351

F.3d 410, 420–21 (9th Cir. 2003).

C. Analysis

Defendants argue generally that Plaintiff’s allegations in the three consolidated

cases do not state a claim for deliberate indifference because the pleadings and exhibits

demonstrate that Plaintiff’s health care providers actively treated, and continue to treat,

Plaintiff’s lifelong ailments of lightheadedness and dizziness. (Mot. at 6.) Defendants

assert that the pleadings show that Plaintiff was seen eleven times over a fourth month

period, and that far from being indifferent, Defendants have provided appropriate

ongoing care. (Id.) 

1. Defendant Dr. Reyes

Plaintiff claims that Dr. Reyes did not treat his complaints and failed to refer him

to an endocrinologist as recommended by Dr. Farjami. Contrary to his first claim, the

pleadings show that Plaintiff did in fact see Dr. Reyes on September 26, 2013 and

December 3, 2013 for his various complaints, including dizziness, lightheadedness and

anemia. See supra at 3. Furthermore, Plaintiff was diagnosed with benign paroxysmal

positional vertigo for which he receives medication. Id. Dr. Reyes also evaluated

Plaintiff for his anemia, and made the referral to Dr. Farjami. However, Dr. Reyes

decided that a referral to an endocrinologist was not warranted because Plaintiff was

fully functional and independent in his activities of daily living, the anemia was mild,

and there was no confirmed reason for it. Id. Plaintiff’s assertion that she is wrong and

that a referral is necessary is nothing more than a difference of opinion between a

prisoner-patient and prison medical authorities regarding treatment which does not give

rise to a § 1983 claim. Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981). 

Similarly, a showing of nothing more than a difference of medical opinion as to the

need to pursue one course of treatment over another is insufficient, as a matter of law, to

establish deliberate indifference, see Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058, 1059-60; Sanchez v.

Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989); Mayfield v. Craven, 433 F.2d 873, 874 (9th

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Cir. 1970). Accordingly, based on the allegations in the complaints, Plaintiff fails to

state an Eighth Amendment claim against Dr. Reyes. 

In opposition, Plaintiff asserts for the first time that Dr. Reyes told him that no

treatment is necessary for his dizzy spells and lightheadedness. (Opp. at 2.) “In

determining the propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a court may not look beyond the

complaint to a plaintiff’s moving papers, such as a memorandum in opposition to a

defendant’s motion to dismiss.” Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1026 (9th Cir. 2003)

(citing Schneider v. Cal. Dep’t. of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1998); see

also Clegg, 18 F.3d at 754–55 (in evaluating a motion to dismiss, the Court must limit

its review to the contents of the complaint). In evaluating the motion to dismiss, the

Court may only consider whether the facts alleged in the complaint state an Eighth

Amendment claim against Defendants and may not consider the new allegations made

by Plaintiff in the opposition. As discussed above, the facts alleged in the complaint do

not state an Eighth Amendment claim. 

Furthermore, Defendants point out that this new assertion is contradicted by the

allegations and documentation accompanying the three complaints. (Reply at 2.) The

documentation state that Plaintiff was prescribed the meclizine as needed to address the

symptoms. (Compl. 1159 at 10; Compl. Compl. 1438 at 8.) It was also noted that Dr.

Reyes had in fact prescribed medication to treat Plaintiff’s dizziness. See supra at 2. 

Accordingly, leave to amend with respect to his claim against Defendant Reyes with

this new allegation would be futile. 

For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiff fails to state a claim of deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs against Defendant Dr. Reyes. The claim against

her is DISMISSED. 

2. Defendants Tootell, Zamora and Ogren

Defendants assert that Defendants Tootell, Zamora and Ogren cannot be held

liable in as much as Plaintiff has not been denied appropriate medical care because their

sole involvement was in the processing of his administrative grievances. (Mot. at 7-8.)

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Defendants rely on Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2014), which they argue

held that deliberate indifference claims premised solely on defendants’ review of an

inmate’s administrative grievances do not adequately allege requisite personal

knowledge and are subject to dismissal. (Mot. at 8, citing Peralta, 744 F.3d at 1086-87.) 

The Court, however, finds that Peralta’s holding is narrower than Defendants argue, i.e.,

a prison medical officer without expertise in a specific field who denies an inmate

appeal for medical care after it was reviewed by two qualified medical officials does not

demonstrate a wanton infliction of unnecessary pain. 744 F.3d at 1086-87. It is unclear

whether Defendants are without expertise in the specific field at issue and whether they

relied solely on other qualified medical officials’ opinions in denying Plaintiff’s

appeals. Accordingly, it cannot be said that the claims against them must strictly be

dismissed under Peralta. 

Viewing the complaints in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds

that Plaintiff has failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants

Zamora, Tootell and Ogren because the pleadings do not indicate that they knew

Plaintiff faced a substantial risk of serious harm and disregarded that risk by failing to

take reasonable steps to abate it. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. At the Director’s Level

Decision, Defendant Zamora reviewed the relevant records and found that Plaintiff had

been diagnosed with vertigo and prescribed meclizine to treat the symptoms. See supra

at 3. Plaintiff also had not complained of dizziness in the last two months. Id.

Furthermore, Defendant Zamora noted that Plaintiff’s anemia was mild and being

monitored. Id. Accordingly, it cannot be said that Defendant Zamora was aware that

Plaintiff faced a substantial risk of serious harm and disregarded that risk by denying

the appeal matter. 

The same is true of Defendant Tootell. In the Second Level of Review decision,

Defendant Tootell noted that Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Reyes on September 26, 2013, at

which time his complaint of dizziness, among other things, was addressed. See supra at

3. It was also noted that Plaintiff requested and received health care services for his

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dizziness, among other complaints, on four separate occasions during October 2013 and

November 2013. Id. Each time the record showed that Plaintiff was treated

appropriately and then released back to his unit in stable condition. Id. Accordingly, it

cannot be said that Defendant Tootell was aware that Plaintiff faced a substantial risk of

serious harm and disregarded that risk by denying the appeal at the second level of

review. 

Lastly, the pleadings show that Defendant Nurse Ogren’s only involvement in

this matter was interviewing Plaintiff for the purposes of his inmate appeal, Log No. SQ

HC 13038273, wherein he accused Defendant Nurse DeLaCruz of violating policy

when she “screened out” his health care requests. See supra at 4. Plaintiff told Nurse

Ogren about his discomfort and that he could not sleep some nights because of the

dizziness. Id. However, this discomfort and a few sleepless nights are not indicative of

“a serious medical need” which could result in further significant injury or the

“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” if Nurse Ogren failed to treat Plaintiff’s

condition. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. In addition, there is no allegation that Nurse Ogren

was aware that Plaintiff faced a substantial risk of serious harm and that she

disregarded that risk; in fact, she told Plaintiff that she would speak with staff about

following procedure. See supra at 4. 

In light of the foregoing, Defendants’ motion to dismiss the claims against

Defendants Zamora, Tootell and Ogren is GRANTED. 

3. Defendant Nurse DeLaCruz

Defendants make no specific argument with respect to the claims against

Defendant Nurse DeLaCruz other than to assert generally that the combined pleadings

and exhibits demonstrate that Plaintiff’s health care providers were and are actively

treating his lifelong ailment of lightheadedness and dizziness, and continue to monitor

the condition. (Mot. at 6.) 

Viewing the complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds

that Plaintiff has pled enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. 

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Because the Court finds that no constitutional violation occurred with respect

to Plaintiff’s claim against Defendants Reyes, Zamora, Tootell, and Ogren, it is not

necessary to reach the qualified immunity argument for these Defendants. 

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Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In August 2013, Plaintiff sent Nurse DeLaCruz several requests

for health care services for his dizziness and lightheadedness which she ignored. See

supra at 5-6. The conclusion of the “Staff Complaint Inquiry” was that Nurse

DeLaCruz did violate CDCR policy regarding Plaintiff’s access to care. Id. Deliberate

indifference may be shown in the way in which prison officials provide medical care,

including failure to respond to a delay in treatment. See, e.g., McGuckin, 974 F.2d at

1062 (delay of seven months in providing medical care during which medical condition

was left virtually untreated and plaintiff was forced to endure “unnecessary pain”

sufficient to present colorable § 1983 claim). Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to

dismiss the claim against Nurse DeLaCruz is DENIED.

D. Qualified Immunity

Defendants also argue that Nurse DeLaCruz is entitled to qualified immunity.1

The defense of qualified immunity protects “government officials... from liability for

civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person should have known.” Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). In Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), the

Supreme Court set forth a two-pronged test to determine whether qualified immunity

exists. First, the court asks: “Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting

the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional

right?” Id. at 201. If no constitutional right was violated under the facts as alleged, the

inquiry ends and defendants prevail. See id. If, however, “a violation could be made

out on a favorable view of the parties’ submissions, the next, sequential step is to ask

whether the right was clearly established. . . . ‘The contours of the right must be

sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing

violates that right.’ . . . The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right

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is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct

was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Id. at 201-02 (quoting Anderson v.

Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). Although Saucier required courts to address the

questions in the particular sequence set out above, courts now have the discretion to

decide which prong to address first, in light of the particular circumstances of each case. 

See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).

With respect to the first prong, Defendant has failed to establish that there was no

constitutional violation because the facts alleged in the complaints show that Nurse

DeLaCruz violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights by failing to respond to his

requests for health care services. See supra at 5-6. Secondly, at the time of the incident

it was clearly established that prison officials may be acting with deliberate indifference

by failing to respond or delaying treatment. See, e.g., McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1062. 

Defendants have failed to establish that no reasonable medical official would have

known that failing to respond to repeated requests for treatment violated the Eighth

Amendment. Accordingly, Nurse DeLaCruz has failed to establish her entitlement to

qualified immunity. The motion based thereon is DENIED. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court orders as follows:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss is DENIED with respect to the Eighth

Amendment claim against Defendant DeLaCruz, but GRANTED with respect to the

claims against Defendants Reyes, Zamora, Tootell and Ogren.

The Clerk shall terminate Defendants Reyes, Zamora, Tootell and Ogren from

this action. 

2. No later than sixty (60) days from the date of this order, Defendant

DeLaCruz shall file a motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion with

respect to the Eighth Amendment claim against her. 

a. Any motion for summary judgment shall be supported by adequate 

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factual documentation and shall conform in all respects to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure. Defendant is advised that summary judgment cannot be granted,

nor qualified immunity found, if material facts are in dispute. If Defendant is of the

opinion that this case cannot be resolved by summary judgment, he shall so inform the

Court prior to the date the summary judgment motion is due. 

b. In the event Defendant files a motion for summary judgment,

the Ninth Circuit has held that Plaintiff must be concurrently provided the

appropriate warnings under Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 963 (9th Cir. 1998)

(en banc). See Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d 934, 940 (9th Cir. 2012). 

3. Plaintiff’s opposition to the dispositive motion shall be filed with the

Court and served on Defendant no later than twenty-eight (28) days from the date

Defendant’s motion is filed. 

Plaintiff is also advised to read Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (holding party opposing summary

judgment must come forward with evidence showing triable issues of material fact on

every essential element of his claim). Plaintiff is cautioned that failure to file an

opposition to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment may be deemed to be a

consent by Plaintiff to the granting of the motion, and granting of judgment against

Plaintiff without a trial. See Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53-54 (9th Cir. 1995) (per

curiam); Brydges v. Lewis, 18 F.3d 651, 653 (9th Cir. 1994). 

4. Defendant shall file a reply brief no later than fourteen (14) days after

Plaintiff’s opposition is filed. 

5. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is due. 

No hearing will be held on the motion unless the Court so orders at a later date. 

6. All communications by the Plaintiff with the Court must be served on

Defendant, or Defendant’s counsel once counsel has been designated, by mailing a true

copy of the document to Defendant or Defendant’s counsel.

7. Discovery may be taken in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil

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Procedure. No further court order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(a)(2) or

Local Rule 16-1 is required before the parties may conduct discovery.

8. It is Plaintiff’s responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep

the court informed of any change of address and must comply with the court’s orders in

a timely fashion. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to

prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).

9. Extensions of time must be filed no later than the deadline sought to be

extended and must be accompanied by a showing of good cause.

This order terminates Docket No. 25.

DATED: 

EDWARD J. DAVILA

United States District Judge 

9/18/2015

Case 5:14-cv-04648-EJD Document 26 Filed 09/21/15 Page 16 of 17
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JERRY SMITH,

Plaintiff,

 v.

E. TOOTELL, et al.,

Defendants. /

Case Number: CV14-01159 EJD 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District

Court, Northern District of California.

That on , I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the

attached, by placing said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s)

hereinafter listed, by depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into

an inter-office delivery receptacle located in the Clerk's office.

Jerry Eugene Smith H-44485

San Quentin State Prison

San Quentin, CA 94964

Dated: 

Susan Y. Soong, Clerk

By: Elizabeth Garcia, Deputy Clerk

9/21/2015 9/21/2015 /s/

Case 5:14-cv-04648-EJD Document 26 Filed 09/21/15 Page 17 of 17