Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00061/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00061-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

LARRY CALDWELL,

NO. CIV. S-05-0061 FCD JFM

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ROSEVILLE JOINT UNION HIGH

SCHOOL DISTRICT; JAMES JOINER

and R. JAN PINNEY, in their

official capacities as members

of the Board of Education;

TONY MONETTI in his official

capacity as Assistant

Superintendent for Curriculum

and Instruction, DONALD

GENASCI in his official

capacity Deputy Superintendent

for Personnel and Chief

Compliance Officer; RONALD

SEVERSON in his official

capacity Principal of Granite

Bay High School; and Does 1

through 10.

Defendants.

______________________________/

----oo0oo----

Case 2:05-cv-00061-FCD-JFM Document 300 Filed 12/19/06 Page 1 of 5
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1 All further references to a “Rule” are to the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure.

2

This matter is before the court on plaintiff’s ex parte

application for a continuance of the court’s ruling on the

parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment to permit plaintiff

to conduct limited discovery pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 56.1

 On September 22, 2006, the court entered a

Pretrial Scheduling Order (“PSO”) in this matter. The PSO

reflected the agreements made in the parties’ delayed Joint

Status Report, filed September 20, 2006. Specifically, the PSO

provides that formal discovery is deferred until after the court

has ruled on the parties’ respective Rule 56 motions. On

November 1, 2006, the parties filed cross-motions for summary

judgement. On December 1, 2006, the court heard oral argument on

the matter. On December 4, 2006, as a result of comments made by

the court at the hearing, plaintiff filed an ex parte application

to file supplemental briefing and for the court to defer ruling

on the cross-motions for summary judgment until the plaintiff has

conducted limited discovery. However, plaintiff did not file the

requisite affidavit provided for in Rule 56(f). Therefore, the

court ordered plaintiff to resubmit his ex parte application with

the requisite supporting documents and granted defendants time to

oppose plaintiff’s application. Defendants oppose plaintiff’s

application.

When a party opposing a motion for summary judgment cannot

present “facts essential to justify his opposition” to the

motion, Rule 56(f) permits the party to submit an affidavit

setting forth the reasons and requesting that the court continue

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3

or deny the motion to permit the opposing party to discover those

essential facts. Garrett v. City and County of San Francisco,

818 F.2d 1515, 1518 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Hancock v.

Montgomery Ward Long Term Disability Trust, 787 F.2d 1302, 1306

(9th Cir. 1986)). The burden is on the party seeking the

continuance to demonstrate that the information sought exists,

and that it would raise an issue of material fact foreclosing

summary judgment. Nidds v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 113 F.3d

912, 921 (9th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted); Continental

Maritime of San Francisco, Inc. v. Pacific Coast Metal Trades

Dist. Council, 817 F.2d 1391, 1395 (9th Cir. 1987). However,

“where. . . no discovery whatsoever has taken place, the party

making a Rule 56(f) motion cannot be expected to frame its motion

with great specificity as to the kind of discovery likely to turn

up useful information, as the ground for such specificity has not

yet been laid.” Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R. Co. v. Assiniboine

and Sioux Tribes, 323 F.3d 767, 774 (9th Cir. 2003). 

The court should deny or defer summary judgment where the

opposing party demonstrates that it has not had sufficient time

to discover facts essential to justify the party’s opposition.

Rule 56(f) motions “‘should be granted almost as a matter of

course’ unless ‘the nonmoving party has not diligently pursued

discovery of the evidence.’” Wichita Falls Office Assoc. v. Banc

One Corp., 978 F.2d 915, 919 n.4 (5th Cir. 1992) (quoting

International Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257,

1267 (5th Cir. 1991)); Burlington, 323 F.3d at 773; see also

Qualls v. Blue Cross of California, 22 F.3d 839, 844 (9th Cir.

1994).

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2 However, the court admonishes plaintiff for his failure

to bring this motion prior to the hearing on cross-motions for

summary judgment. By his delay, plaintiff has not only

squandered both his and defendants’ time and resources through

the parties’ preparation and submission of lengthy briefs and

exhibits, but also wasted judicial resources and created a

circumstance that leads to vastly inefficient case management.

4

The Ninth Circuit has found that both “implication and logic

require that a Rule 56(f) motion be made prior to the summary

judgment hearing.” Ashton-Tate Corp. v. Ross, 916 F.2d 516, 520

(9th Cir. 1990). “[T]he process of evaluating a summary judgment

motion would be flouted if requests for more time, discovery, or

the introduction of supplemental affidavits had to be considered

even if requested well after the deadline set for the

introduction of all information needed to make the ruling has

passed.” Id. (citing Pfeil v. Rogers, 757 F.2d 850, 858 (7th

Cir. 1985). 

According to the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Ross,

plaintiff’s Rule 56(f) application is untimely. However, the

facts of this case pose a different circumstance than that in

Ross, namely because the parties agreed and the court ordered

formal discovery deferred until after the court ruled on the

parties’ Rule 56 motions. As such, plaintiff has had no

opportunity to conduct formal discovery in this case. Therefore,

the court will not bar plaintiff’s application as untimely.2

Plaintiff has met the requirements of Rule 56(f) by

submitting a declaration outlining three facts for which he would

requests to conduct discovery. (See Decl. of Larry Caldwell,

filed Dec. 7, 2006). These facts relate to whether plaintiff

complied with the notice requirement to place items on the agenda

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5

of school board meetings and whether defendants made admissions

regarding the exclusion of plaintiff’s policies in various fora

based on viewpoint. These facts are highly relevant to

plaintiffs’ claims. Further, the court is hesitant to rule on

dispositive motions in a case bearing on such fundamental rights

guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments without

allowing plaintiff at least the limited discovery he seeks

through this motion.

Therefore, plaintiff’s ex parte application under Rule 56(f)

is GRANTED. The parties have ninety (90) days from the date of

this order to conduct discovery. The parties shall submit any

supplemental briefing, not to exceed fifteen (15) pages, by April

13, 2007. The parties shall submit supplemental reply briefs,

not to exceed five (5) pages, by April 20, 2007. The court will

hold further hearing on this matter on April 27, 2007 at 10:00

a.m. All current dates as set in the PSO are hereby VACATED. 

The court shall reset the dates as needed after it issues its

ruling on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 18, 2006

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