Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-11-17484/USCOURTS-ca9-11-17484-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

---

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

STATE OF ARIZONA; TERRY L.

GODDARD, Attorney General for the

State of Arizona; ARIZONA

DEPARTMENT OF LAW, Civil Rights

Division,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

ANGELA AGUILAR,

Intervenor-Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.

ASARCO LLC,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 11-17484

D.C. No.

4:08-cv-00441-

MWB

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Mark W. Bennett, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

June 12, 2013—San Francisco, California

Filed October 24, 2013

 Case: 11-17484, 10/24/2013, ID: 8834319, DktEntry: 45-1, Page 1 of 24
2 STATE OF ARIZONA V. ASARCO

Before: Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain and Andrew D. Hurwitz,

Circuit Judges, and James K. Singleton, Senior District

Judge.*

Opinion by Judge O’Scannlain;

Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge Hurwitz

SUMMARY**

Employment Law / Punitive Damages

The panel vacated the district court’s award of punitive

damages in a Title VII sexual harassment suit where the jury

awarded no compensatory damages and only one dollar in

nominal damages.

The panel held that although the degree of

reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct supported a

substantial punitive damages award, and the district court’s

$300,000 award matched the Title VII damages cap, the

award was constitutionally excessive in light of the fact that

the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages was 300,000

to 1. The panel held that the highest punitive award

supportable under due process was $125,000 because it was

the highest award that maintained the required “reasonable

relationship” between compensatory and punitive damages,

* The Honorable James K. Singleton, Senior District Judge for the U.S.

District Court for the District of Alaska, sitting by designation.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

 Case: 11-17484, 10/24/2013, ID: 8834319, DktEntry: 45-1, Page 2 of 24
STATE OF ARIZONA V. ASARCO 3

and nonetheless was on the order of the damages cap in Title

VII and proportional to the reprehensibility of the defendant’s

conduct. The panel ordered that on remand, the district court

could order a new trial unless the plaintiff accepted a

remittitur to $125,000.

Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Judge Hurwitz

agreed with the majority that the defendant’s conduct was

reprehensible and warranted punitive damages. He also

agreed with the majority that a single-digit ratio between

punitive and compensatory damages was not constitutionally

mandated. Judge Hurwitz wrote that he nonetheless would

affirm the district court’s judgment in its entirety because the

punitive damages award fell within the statutory cap on

damages in Title VII.

COUNSEL

David T. Barton, Quarles & Brady LLP, Phoenix, Arizona,

argued the cause and filed a brief for the appellant. With him

on the briefs were Eric B. Johnson and Brian A. Howie,

Quarles & Brady LLP, Phoenix, Arizona.

Jenne S. Forbes, Waterfall, Economidis, Caldwell, Hanshaw

& Villamana, P.C., Tucscon, AZ, argued the cause and filed

a brief for appellees. With her on the briefs were Thomas C.

Horne, Ann Hobart and Leslie Ross, Assistant Attorneys

General, Phoenix, Arizona.

 Case: 11-17484, 10/24/2013, ID: 8834319, DktEntry: 45-1, Page 3 of 24
4 STATE OF ARIZONA V. ASARCO

OPINION

O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge:

We must decide whether the Constitution permits a sixfigure punitive damage award in a sexual harassment suit

where the jury awarded no compensatory damages and only

one dollar in nominal damages.

I

ASARCO is a large copper mining and refining company. 

One of its many facilities is the Mission Mine Complex,

located in Sahuarita, Arizona, about thirty miles south of

Tuscon. This facility includes both a mine and a mill, where

copper ore is crushed, filtered and refined.

Angela Aguilar began working at the Mission mill facility

on December 19, 2005. Including a leave of absence, Aguilar

worked at the mill facility until November 8, 2006. During

that time, Aguilar alleges that she was subjected to sexual

harassment, retaliation, and constructive discharge.

A

The first alleged occurrence of sexual harassment began

on March 19, 2006, when Aguilar became a car loader at the

filter plant. Her supervisor in this role was Wayne Johnson. 

Johnson was a large man—6'2" and about 350 pounds—and

according to Aguilar he made it known “at the start” that he

was romantically interested in her. Aguilar testified that

Johnson asked her out in some fashion “every day” and

refused to train or to help her when she rejected him. Aguilar

also claimed at trial that Johnson, when she asked for help,

 Case: 11-17484, 10/24/2013, ID: 8834319, DktEntry: 45-1, Page 4 of 24
STATE OF ARIZONA V. ASARCO 5

would “stand[] right on top” of her and press up against her. 

She claimed that she was afraid that Johnson might rape her.1

According to Aguilar, her complaints about Johnson

initially fell on deaf ears. She stated at trial that she

complained to ASARCO’s Human Resources Department

(“HR”) about Johnson’s behavior several times and was told

that there “is nothing [ASARCO] could do” and that Aguilar

had to “handle it [herself].” The mill manager, Sam

Lawrence, acknowledged that Aguilar complained to him

about Johnson. Lawrence stated that he told Johnson to end

his advances, and a week later, upon learning that Johnson

had not stopped, threatened him with disciplinary action and

the loss of his job. To “get away from” Johnson, Aguilar

eventually bid for, and received, a promotion to another crew,

where she started working on April 23, 2006.

B

While Aguilar was working at the filter plant, there was

no functioning women’s restroom in the building. ASARCO

had rented a portable toilet, a “porta-potty,” for Aguilar’s use. 

According to Aguilar, immediately after the toilet was put up,

it was vandalized with pornographic graffiti directed at her. 

Even after the toilet was replaced, the graffiti was apparently

replicated on the replacement. Aguilar claimed that she

reported the graffiti to the HR department, to mill supervisor

1 ASARCO characterizes Aguilar’s interactions with Wayne Johnson

quite differently. It highlights that, when Aguilar met with HR about

Johnson, contemporaneous notes of that meeting reveal that Aguilar told

HR that Johnson “ha[dn’t] touched her” and was “a complete gentlemen.” 

It also points out that Aguilar wrote, in December 2006 notes, that

Johnson’s behavior was a “small problem.”

 Case: 11-17484, 10/24/2013, ID: 8834319, DktEntry: 45-1, Page 5 of 24
6 STATE OF ARIZONA V. ASARCO

Gary Schwartzberg, and to mill manager Sam Lawrence. 

There is no evidence that the situation was promptly

remedied and photos show that visible pornographic graffiti

remained on the toilet as late as 2007.2

C

On June 18, 2006, Aguilar became a rod and ball mill

person, which took her from the filter plant to the main mill

building. In Aguilar’s crew was Julio Esquivel, a

“distributed control systems operator.” Although he was not

her direct supervisor, Aguilar reported to him and he

maintained some authority over her day-to-day work.

Before Aguilar even had started in her new position,

Esquivel warned, “your ass is mine” and told her that he

would be spending more time with her than his “lady.” 

According to Aguilar, Esquivel was often giving her

conflicting orders, snapping his fingers at her, telling her to

“watch herself,” yelling at her, and threatening her with

termination. ASARCO responded to this testimony at trial by

attempting to show that, as awful as Esquivel was toward

Aguilar, it was not motivated by her sex but instead by his

general boorishness.

As a result of Esquivel’s reputation as a “rude bully” who

“yelled at everybody,” at least one manager at ASARCO did

not feel the need to act in response to Aguilar’s complaints. 

In July, Aguilar asked for a leave of absence to deal with

personal problems relating to the custody of her children. 

She took that leave in September of 2006 and did not return

2 The graffiti in the 2007 photographs is pornographic, but it is partially

painted over and does not appear to be the graffiti described by Aguilar.

 Case: 11-17484, 10/24/2013, ID: 8834319, DktEntry: 45-1, Page 6 of 24
STATE OF ARIZONA V. ASARCO 7

until November 1st. When she returned, she was placed on

a different crew. Aguilar worked four more days and then

quit ASARCO for good.

D

On March 21, 2008, Arizona filed suit in Pima County

Superior Court against ASARCO on behalf of Aguilar and the

state. Aguilar later filed her own suit, alleging sexual

harassment under Title VII, retaliation and constructive

discharge, relying on the same underlying facts. These

proceedings were consolidated and removed to the United

States District Court for the District of Arizona.

Aguilar’s allegations were tried over eight days. The jury

found ASARCO liable on the sexual harassment claims but

not on the constructive discharge or retaliation claims. 

Critically, the jury did not find any compensatory damages

for Aguilar, instead awarding her one dollar in nominal

damages for the sexual harassment claim. The jury also

awarded her $868,750 in punitive damages.

ASARCO moved for judgment as a matter of law or, in

the alternative, for a new trial, arguing that the punitive

damages awarded were statutorily and unconstitutionally

excessive.3 The district court ordered that the punitive

damages be reduced to $300,000, which is the statutory

maximum under Title VII for an employer of ASARCO’s

size. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(D). However, the district court

3 ASARCO also raised several other issues on appeal, which we address

in a memorandum disposition filed concurrently with this opinion. In that

memorandum disposition, we also address whether the district court erred

in awarding attorneys fees to Aguilar.

 Case: 11-17484, 10/24/2013, ID: 8834319, DktEntry: 45-1, Page 7 of 24
8 STATE OF ARIZONA V. ASARCO

held that these damages were not constitutionally excessive,

and declined to reduce them any further.

ASARCO timely appealed.

II

In 1996, the seminal Supreme Court case BMW of North

America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996), changed the

landscape of the law of punitive damages. Gore held that a

punitive damages award which was grossly excessive could

violate “[e]lementary notions of fairness enshrined in our

constitutional jurisprudence.” Id. at 574. In Gore, the

Supreme Court laid out three “guideposts” for determining

excessiveness: (1) “the degree of reprehensibility of the

defendant’s conduct”; (2) “[the] ratio to the actual harm

inflicted on the plaintiff”; and (3) “civil or criminal penalties

that could be imposed for comparable misconduct.” Id. at

575–83. These guideposts need not be “rigidly or exclusively

applied”; they merely provide a framework and must be

viewed in the context of the case. In re Exxon Valdez,

472 F.3d 600, 613 (9th Cir. 2006). Our analysis in this case

is further guided both by the only other Ninth Circuit case to

address the Gore guideposts where the jury had only awarded

nominal damages, Mendez v. County of San Bernardino,

540 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2008), and by cases which have

considered the Gore guideposts in the context of

discrimination suits.

We review the district court’s application of these

principles to the jury’s award de novo. Id. at 1120. The

district court’s findings of fact, however, are reviewed for

clear error. Id.

 Case: 11-17484, 10/24/2013, ID: 8834319, DktEntry: 45-1, Page 8 of 24
STATE OF ARIZONA V. ASARCO 9

A

“Perhaps the most important indicium of the

reasonableness of a punitive damages award is the degree of

reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct.” Gore, 517 U.S.

at 575. In determining the reprehensibility of conduct, the

Court has instructed lower courts to consider whether:

the harm caused was physical as opposed to

economic; the tortious conduct evinced an

indifference to or a reckless disregard of the

health or safety of others; the target of the

conduct had financial vulnerability; the

conduct involved repeated actions or was an

isolated incident; and the harm was the result

of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or

mere accident.

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408,

419 (2003). On appeal, ASARCO attempts to run through

each State Farm “subfactor” and to demonstrate that each one

militates toward reduced reprehensibility. In evaluating these

factors, we are cognizant that the goal is to place ASARCO’s

conduct “along a scale, with acts and threats of violence at the

top . . . and finally, [with] acts of omission and mere

negligence [at the bottom].” Mendez, 540 F.3d at 1120

(quoting Swinton v. Potomac Corp., 270 F.3d 794, 818 (9th

Cir. 2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In making

this determination, we are bound by the district court’s

findings of fact unless clearly erroneous. See Mendez,

540 F.3d at 1120.

On the first subfactor, ASARCO argues that the lack of

damages indicates that its conduct caused no harm, much less

 Case: 11-17484, 10/24/2013, ID: 8834319, DktEntry: 45-1, Page 9 of 24
10 STATE OF ARIZONA V. ASARCO

any physical harm. We reject this attempt to smuggle the

inquiry for the second Gore guidepost into the first. State

Farm’s direction to look at physical versus economic harm

calls for us to examine the type of conduct at issue, not the

magnitude of harm inflicted. In other words, State Farm’s

first prong stands for the uncontroversial prospect that a

defendant who has risked physical harm to a plaintiff has

generally committed more reprehensible conduct than one

who has risked only economic harm. When understood this

way, ASARCO’s conduct plainly falls into a more serious

category than mere economic harm. This court has

previously noted that “intentional discrimination” is a

“serious affront to personal liberty” and should be considered

high on the reprehensibility scale. Zhang v. Am. Gem

Seafoods, Inc., 339 F.3d 1020, 1043 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing

Romano v. U-Haul Int’l, 233 F.3d 655, 673 (1st Cir. 2000)

(finding that a plaintiff’s termination on the basis of her sex

was “more reprehensible than would appear in a case

involving economic harms only”)).

With regard to the second subfactor, ASARCO further

relies on the jury’s failure to award compensatory damages to

argue that the district court clearly erred in finding

“indifference or reckless disregard for Aguilar’s health and

safety.” But indifference or recklessness with regard to a risk

is entirely consistent with no damages, if that risk simply

failed to materialize. There is ample evidence in this case to

support the district court’s finding, such as Johnson’s daily

advances, the targeted pornographic graffiti, and Esquivel’s

verbal abuse. The evidence further supports the district

court’s observation that ASARCO repeatedly failed to

remedy these situations. Thus, we disagree that the lack of

damages renders the district court’s finding on this factor

clearly erroneous.

 Case: 11-17484, 10/24/2013, ID: 8834319, DktEntry: 45-1, Page 10 of 24
STATE OF ARIZONA V. ASARCO 11

ASARCO argues that the third State Farm

subfactor—financial vulnerability—has no relevance unless

ASARCO targeted Aguilar because of such vulnerability. 

This argument relies upon a misreading of In re Exxon

Valdez, 472 F.3d at 617. That case addressed Exxon’s

reprehensibility with regard to the 1989 Exxon-Valdez oil

spill. The court held that Exxon’s reprehensibility was not

increased by this factor simply because financially vulnerable

subsistence fishermen were affected. Id. at 616–17. As the

court stated, there must be “some element of intent to harm

particular individuals or categories of individuals.” Id. at

617. In this case Exxon’s requirement of “intent to harm” is

met. Aguilar was the target of intentional sexual harassment;

she was not a bystander affected by an outpouring of general

negligence like the fishermen in Exxon-Valdez. Indeed, in

order to award punitive damages under Title VII, the jury

necessarily found that ASARCO acted “with malice . . . [or]

with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of

[Aguilar].” ASARCO is right to a limited extent: Aguilar’s

financial vulnerability is not as significant as it would be if it

had been directly exploited, as in a fraud case. But it is still

relevant that Aguilar was an individual employee of limited

means subject to the recklessness or malice of a large

corporate bureaucracy. See Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator Co.,

513 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir. 2008) (considering financial

vulnerability prong in Title VII suit for racial discrimination

and retaliation); Bains LLC v. Arco Prods. Co., 405 F.3d 764,

775 (9th Cir. 2005) (considering financial vulnerability prong

in suit by Sikh-owned corporation for racial discrimination).

ASARCO challenges the district court’s conclusion, on

the fourth State Farm subfactor, that ASARCO’s conduct

“involved repeated actions,” alleging that the “three

incidents” involving different personnel are facially

 Case: 11-17484, 10/24/2013, ID: 8834319, DktEntry: 45-1, Page 11 of 24
12 STATE OF ARIZONA V. ASARCO

insufficient to “label a defendant a recidivist.” ASARCO

clouds the waters by characterizing this inquiry as being

about “recidivism”; State Farm makes clear that this subfactor goes to establishing the uncontroversial prospect that

“isolated incidents” are less reprehensible than “conduct

involv[ing] repeated actions.” State Farm, 538 U.S. at 419. 

There was nothing “isolated” about the conduct here, which

involved repeated harassment by Wayne Johnson,

pornographic graffiti which was not addressed, and cruel

treatment by Esquivel over a lengthy period. Aguilar made

repeated complaints which, as the district court found, went

repeatedly unaddressed.

Finally, ASARCO even attempts to argue that its conduct

did not involve “intentional malice, deceit, or trickery.” This

argument is in the face of the jury’s finding, noted above, that

ASARCO acted “with malice . . . [or] with reckless

indifference to the federallyprotected rights of [Aguilar]” and

the district court’s finding that “ASARCO acted with a higher

level of indifference, if not malice.” ASARCO again relies

on Exxon-Valdez, where the court concluded that Exxon’s

reckless conduct “did not result in intentional damage to

anyone” and that this subfactor “militate[d] against viewing

Exxon’s misconduct as highly reprehensible.” In re ExxonValdez, 472 F.3d at 618. But, as the district court’s findings

reveal, ASARCO’s conduct toward Aguilar was targeted,

worse than reckless, and served no possible productive

purpose. See Bains, 405 F.3d at 775 (“An Exxon oil tanker

that performs a socially valuable task can accidently run

aground . . . . By contrast there can be no excuse for

intentional, repeated [] harassment.”). Exxon-Valdez does not

help ASARCO. This factor also supports substantial

damages.

 Case: 11-17484, 10/24/2013, ID: 8834319, DktEntry: 45-1, Page 12 of 24
STATE OF ARIZONA V. ASARCO 13

Our analysis of each subfactor reveals that the district

court did not err in concluding that ASARCO’s conduct

supports the imposition of a very large punitive award. 

Indeed, many other cases involving lengthy periods of

harassment and discrimination have noted that similar

conduct is highly reprehensible along these dimensions. See,

e.g., EEOC v. AutoZone, Inc., 707 F.3d 824, 839 (7th Cir.

2013) (weighing all five subfactors against employer who

discriminated against disabled employee); Bains, 405 F.3d at

775; Goldsmith, 513 F.3d at 1283 (concluding employer

conduct “was sufficiently reprehensible to support an award

of punitive damages because the harm suffered by [plaintiff]

was not purely economic, [plaintiff] was financially

vulnerable, and the racially offensive comments and conduct

were not isolated.”); Zhang, 339 F.3d at 1044 (“We have no

trouble concluding that the corporate defendants’

discrimination against Zhang was sufficiently

reprehensible.”); Swinton, 270 F.3d at 818 (“In sum, we have

no trouble concluding that the highly offensive language

directed at Swinton, coupled by the abject failure of Potomac

to combat the harassment, constitutes highly reprehensible

conduct.”). We conclude that substantial punitive damages

are constitutionally acceptable in this case.

B

We next turn to the second Gore factor. And although we

concluded that ASARCO’s arguments regarding its

reprehensibility are without merit, its arguments about this

Gore factor stand on stronger ground. The Supreme Court

has noted that “[punitive] damages must bear a reasonable

relationship to compensatory damages.” Gore, 517 U.S. at

580 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Further,

the Court has stated that “few awards exceeding a single-digit

 Case: 11-17484, 10/24/2013, ID: 8834319, DktEntry: 45-1, Page 13 of 24
14 STATE OF ARIZONA V. ASARCO

ratio between punitive and compensatory damages . . . will

satisfy due process.” State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425. 

Nonetheless, the Court has steadfastly refused to create a

bright-line ratio and has emphasized that a higher ratio is

justified when “a particularly egregious act has resulted in

only a small amount of economic damages.” Id.

The district court in this case approved a punitive award

with a ratio of 300,000 to 1.

4

If allowed, it would surely be

among the highest (if not the highest) ratio approved since

Gore changed the landscape and the highest ratio we could

locate in a survey of discrimination cases.5 The highest ratio

4 We evaluate the ratio with regard to $300,000, rather than with regard

to the $868,750 that the jury awarded. Other courts have done the same. 

See, e.g., AutoZone, Inc., 707 F.3d at 839–40 (utilizing reduced $200,000

figure for ratio rather than $500,000 awarded by jury); MacGregor v.

Mallinckrodt, Inc., 373 F.3d 923, 933 (8th Cir. 2004) (utilizing reduced

$300,000 figure for ratio rather than $829,197 awarded by jury); Romano,

233 F.3d at 673 (utilizing reduced $285,000 figure for ratio rather than

$650,000 awarded by jury).

5

See AutoZone, Inc., 707 F.3d at 839–40 (upholding a $200,000

punitive damages award and a $100,000 compensatory damages award);

Trickey v. Kaman Indus. Techs. Corp., 705 F.3d 788, 804 (8th Cir. 2013)

(upholding a $500,000 punitive damages award and a $100,000

compensatory damages award); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n

v. Fed. Express Corp., 513 F.3d 360, 377–78 (4th Cir. 2008) (upholding

a $100,000 punitive damages award and an $8,000 compensatorydamages

award); Goldsmith, 513 F.3d at 1283 (upholding a $500,000 punitive

damages award and a $54,321 compensatory damages award); Tisdale v.

Fed. Express Corp., 415 F.3d 516 (6th Cir. 2005) (upholding a $100,000

punitive damages award and a $15,000 compensatory damages award);

MacGregor, 373 F.3d at 933 (upholding a $300,000 punitive damages

award and a $170,803 compensatory damages award); Zhang, 339 F.3d at

1044 (upholding a $2,600,000 punitive damages award and a $360,000

compensatory damages award); Bogle v. McClure, 332 F.3d 1347, 1362

(11th Cir. 2003) (upholding a $13,300,000 punitive damages award and

 Case: 11-17484, 10/24/2013, ID: 8834319, DktEntry: 45-1, Page 14 of 24
STATE OF ARIZONA V. ASARCO 15

among these cases is the 125,000 to one ratio approved by the

Fifth Circuit in Abner v. Kansas City Southern Railroad Co.6

That is less than half of the ratio at issue here.

It seems clear, based on the analysis of the State Farm

subfactors, that this is a “particularly egregious act.” State

Farm, 538 U.S. at 425. But even “particularly egregious

acts” are subject to the requirement of reasonableness. The

Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the importance of

the ratio inquiry and we cannot cast it aside. Gore, 517 U.S.

at 583 (calling a 500 to 1 ratio “breathtaking” and stating that

it rightly “raise[d] a suspicious judicial eyebrow”); State

a $3,500,000 compensatory damages award); Swinton, 270 F.3d at 819

(upholding a $1,000,000 punitive damages award and a $35,600

compensatory damages award); Zimmerman v. Direct Fed. Credit Union,

262 F.3d 70, 82 (1st Cir. 2001) (upholding a $400,000 punitive damages

award and a $200,000 compensatory damages award); Hampton v. Dillard

Dep’t Stores, 247 F.3d 1091, 1117 (10th Cir. 2001) (upholding a

$1,100,000 punitive damages award and a $56,000 compensatorydamages

award); Romano, 233 F.3d at 673 (upholding a $285,000 punitive

damages award and a $15,000 compensatory damages award); Equal

Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. W&O, Inc., 213 F.3d 600, 617 (11th

Cir. 2000) (upholding a $300,000 punitive damages award and a

$36,257.13 compensatory damages award); Deters v. Equifax Credit Info.

Servs., Inc., 202 F.3d 1262, 1273 (10th Cir. 2000) (upholding a $295,000

punitive damages award and a $5,000 compensatory damages award);

Shea v. Galaxie Lumber &Constr. Co., 152 F.3d 729, 736 (7th Cir. 1998)

(upholding a $2,500 punitive damages award and a $1 compensatory

damages award).

6 The Fifth Circuit has specifically rejected the applicability of the

“ratio” prong of Gore in any case involving nominal damages. See

Williams v. Kaufman Cnty., 352 F.3d 994, 1016 (5th Cir. 2003) (“[A]ny

punitive damages-to-compensatory damages ‘ratio analysis’ cannot be

applied effectively in cases where only nominal damages have been

awarded.”). This is not the rule in the Ninth Circuit, see Mendez v. County

of San Bernardino, 540 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2008).

 Case: 11-17484, 10/24/2013, ID: 8834319, DktEntry: 45-1, Page 15 of 24
16 STATE OF ARIZONA V. ASARCO

Farm, 538 U.S. at 426 (“courts must ensure that the measure

of punishment is both reasonable and proportionate . . .”). 

But knowing that the ratio guidepost must inform our analysis

does not tell us what ratio would be appropriate in a given

case.

So although we conclude that the requirement of a

reasonable relationship between compensatory and punitive

damages suggests that these damages should be reduced, a

third Gore factor must be considered before we can make a

final determination.

C

The third Gore factor asks us to compare the punitive

damages award to “civil or criminal penalties that could be

imposed for comparable misconduct.” Gore, 517 U.S. at 583. 

The district court below relied on Zhang v. American Gem

Seafoods, Inc., 339 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2003), and Swinton v.

Potomac Corp., 270 F.3d 794 (9th Cir. 2001), and held that

it was appropriate to treat Title VII’s damages cap as “a

legislative judgment similar to the imposition of a civil fine.” 

Zhang, 339 F.3d at 1044. Although both Zhang and Swinton

were § 1981 cases rather than Title VII cases, the district

court saw them as standing for the idea that punitive awards

below the statutory cap are generally constitutionally

reasonable.7

7 Along similar lines, the Fifth Circuit upheld a $125,000 punitive award

in a case involving race-based hostile work environment claims where the

plaintiffs were only awarded $1 in nominal damages, primarily on the

basis of the existence of Title VII’s statutory cap. Abner v. Kansas City

S. R.R. Co., 513 F.3d 154, 164 (5th Cir. 2008). According to the court in

that case, “the combination of the statutory cap and [the] high threshold

of culpability” confined any award to a level tolerated by due process. Id. 

 Case: 11-17484, 10/24/2013, ID: 8834319, DktEntry: 45-1, Page 16 of 24
STATE OF ARIZONA V. ASARCO 17

ASARCO argues that the statutory cap is not a relevant

“civil penalty” by which to benchmark the punitive award in

this case and that “constitutional questions [cannot] turn on

congressional judgments.” Williams v. ConAgra, 378 F.3d

790, 798 (8th Cir. 2004). These arguments miss the mark. 

First, this is clearly a relevant “civil penalty”: the existence of

a statutory cap gives defendants “fair notice . . . of the

severity of the penalty that a State may impose.” Gore,

517 U.S. at 574. Second, Gore’s guidepost specifically

directs courts to look at comparable civil and criminal

penalties. This rule necessarily ensures that constitutional

questions turn in part on congressional judgments.

Williams, which struck down a $6,063,750 punitive

damages award as unconstitutionally excessive, is not to the

contrary. With respect to the third Gore guidepost, Williams

only suggested that the Title VII cap might not represent an

appropriate benchmark with respect to an award in a § 1981

case. However, this is a genuine Title VII case. The

$300,000 damages cap surely represents an example of a

“legislative judgment[] concerning appropriate sanctions for

the conduct at issue.” Gore, 517 U.S. at 583 (quoting

Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc.,

492 U.S. 257, 301 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part

and dissenting in part)). We agree with the district court that

this factor weighs in favor of damages at least on the order of

the statutory cap.

According to the court, the only way a Title VII award could offend due

process would be if the statutory cap itself offended due process. Id. 

Although certainly the statutory cap and the high threshold of culpability

impact our Gore analysis, no authority supports the Fifth Circuit’s

conclusion that Gore is rendered extraneous by the existence of these

factors in Title VII.

 Case: 11-17484, 10/24/2013, ID: 8834319, DktEntry: 45-1, Page 17 of 24
18 STATE OF ARIZONA V. ASARCO

D

Given ASARCO’s highly reprehensible conduct and the

presence of a comparable civil penalty in the form of the Title

VII damages cap, we conclude that the Constitution does not

bar the imposition of a substantial punitive award in this case. 

But this does not change the fact that a 300,000 to 1 ratio

raises our “judicial eyebrow[s].” Gore, 517 U.S. at 583.

In Mendez v. County of San Bernardino, the only other

Ninth Circuit case to address the Gore guideposts where only

nominal damages were awarded, the court held a $250,000

award excessive. Mendez, 540 F.3d at 1122–23. The

defendant in that case, an officer, was found to have

recklessly disregarded the constitutional rights of a Spanishspeaking woman when he took advantage of her poor grasp

of English and railroaded her into consenting to a search of

her home. Id. at 1116. Mendez was awarded only $1 on each

of her false arrest and illegal search claims but $250,000 in

punitive damages against the officer. The court relied heavily

upon the second Gore guidepost in striking down the award,

noting that the $250,000 figure was “staggering” in light of

the lack of actual damages. Id. at 1122.

Importantly, the court in Mendez approved the district

court’s remittitur of Mendez’s award to $5,000—a 2,500 to

one ratio, because Mendez involved well in excess of the

traditional ten to one that the Supreme Court has approved. 

Id. This provides us with at least some guidance as to how to

reduce this award, and ASARCO argues that we should

follow Mendez’s ratio and remit punitive damages in this case

to $2,500.

 Case: 11-17484, 10/24/2013, ID: 8834319, DktEntry: 45-1, Page 18 of 24
STATE OF ARIZONA V. ASARCO 19

We disagree. The court in Mendez noted substantially

less reprehensibility than there was in this case: the court

concluded that the officer’s conduct was closer to mere

accident than to malice, the conduct was an isolated incident,

and the conduct posed no risk to Mendez’s health or safety. 

Id. at 1121. Here, all of those factors are reversed, so it

stands to reason that ASARCO’s conduct supports a higher

ratio of damages. Furthermore, the third Gore guidepost was

of no help in Mendez, while here it weighs in favor of a larger

award. Finally, Mendez noted the importance of an award

“sufficient to deter [defendants] from engaging in similar

conduct in the future.” Id. at 1122. A $2,500 award would

clearly be insufficient to deter ASARCO in this case, even

considering the award of $350,903 in attorneys’ fees.

Although we think a ratio higher than 2,500 to one is

called for byASARCO’s conduct, the $300,000 awarded was

nonetheless excessive. As we indicated above, no court in a

discrimination case has ever upheld a ratio of punitive

damages to compensatory damages greater than 125,000 to 1. 

Many discrimination cases have struck down awards as

constitutionally excessive with substantially smaller ratios. 

See Thomas v. iStar Fin., Inc., 652 F.3d 141, 149–50 (2d Cir.

2011) (holding that a $1.6 million punitive damages award,

in comparison to a $280,000 compensatory damages award,

violates due process); Mendez-Matos v. Mun. of Guaynabo,

557 F.3d 36, 55 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding that a $350,000

punitive damages award, in comparison to a $35,000

compensatory damages award, violates due process); Bains,

405 F.3d at 776–77 (holding that a $5 million punitive

damages award, in comparison to a $50,000 compensatory

damages award, violates due process); Williams, 378 F.3d at

798 (holding that a $6,063,750 punitive damages award, in

comparison to a $600,000 compensatory damages award,

 Case: 11-17484, 10/24/2013, ID: 8834319, DktEntry: 45-1, Page 19 of 24
20 STATE OF ARIZONA V. ASARCO

violates due process); Lincoln v. Case, 340 F.3d 283, 294 (5th

Cir. 2003) (holding that a $100,000 punitive damages award,

in comparison to a $500 compensatory damages award,

violates due process); Ross v. Kan. City Power & Light Co.,

293 F.3d 1041, 1049 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that a $120,000

punitive damages award, in comparison to a $6,000

compensatory damages award, violates due process);

Rubinstein v. Adm’rs of Tulane Educ. Fund, 218 F.3d 392,

408 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that a $750,000 punitive

damages award, in comparison to a $2,500 compensatory

damages award, violates due process).

Our task in reducing the award is not easy. No bright line

ratio has been set by the Supreme Court for cases which are

“particularly egregious.” State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425. Since

nothing compels a particular dollar figure, we conclude that

the highest punitive award supportable under due process is

$125,000, in accord with the highest ratio we could locate

among discrimination cases. Abner, 513 F.3d at 164. We

think this is the highest award which maintains the required

“reasonable relationship” between compensatoryand punitive

damages. Gore, 517 U.S. at 580. This award is nonetheless

on the order of the damages cap in Title VII and proportional

to the reprehensibility of ASARCO’s conduct.

III

We conclude that the punitive damages award of

$300,000 is outside of constitutional limits, so it must be

 Case: 11-17484, 10/24/2013, ID: 8834319, DktEntry: 45-1, Page 20 of 24
STATE OF ARIZONA V. ASARCO 21

vacated. On remand, the district court may order a new trial

unless the plaintiff accepts a remittitur to $125,000.

Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal.

VACATED AND REMANDED for proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

HURWITZ, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting

in part:

Judge O’Scannlain’s majority opinion ably navigates the

doctrinal shoals created by the Supreme Court’s

constitutionalization of punitive damages. I agree with the

majority that ASARCO’s conduct was reprehensible and

warranted punitive damages. I also agree with the majority

that a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory

damages is not constitutionally mandated in cases involving

nominal damages. I differ from my shipmates only as to the

final port of call. Rather than reduce the punitive damages

award to $125,000, I would affirm the judgment below in its

entirety because the award falls within the statutory cap on

damages in Title VII.

In BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, the Supreme

Court held that a punitive damages award violates due

process if it is “grossly excessive” in relation to the

government’s interests in punishing unlawful conduct and

deterring its repetition. 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996). The Court

explained that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment limits punitive damages awards because

“[e]lementary notions of fairness . . . dictate that a person

 Case: 11-17484, 10/24/2013, ID: 8834319, DktEntry: 45-1, Page 21 of 24
22 STATE OF ARIZONA V. ASARCO

receive fair notice not only of the conduct that will subject

him to punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty that

a State may impose.” Id. at 574.

A properly instructed jury awarded one dollar in nominal

damages and $868,750 in punitive damages against ASARCO

for its reprehensible conduct. The trial judge then reduced

the total award—as required by Title VII—to $300,000,

42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(D), but declined to reduce the award

further. The issue is thus whether the $299,999 punitive

damages award “can fairly be categorized as ‘grossly

excessive’ in relation to the” government’s interests in

punishment and deterrence such that “it enter[s] the zone of

arbitrariness that violates the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment.” Gore, 517 U.S. at 568 (internal

quotations omitted). I cannot so conclude.

The majority, although properly rejecting a single-digit

ratio test in a case with nominal damages, nonetheless

concludes that it must apply some sort of ratio analysis to

comply with Gore. It then finds guidance in a Fifth Circuit

opinion which upheld an award of one dollar in nominal

damages and $125,000 in punitive damages to plaintiffs who

suffered racial discrimination in the workplace. Abner v.

Kan. City S. R.R. Co., 513 F.3d 154, 157 (5th Cir. 2008).

Abner does provide important guidance, but quite

different than that discerned by the majority. The Fifth

Circuit concluded in that case that ratio analysis should not

apply because, in Title VII cases, Congress has cabined

“discretion in the amount of the award in the most direct

manner possible”: It placed a cap on the permissible

aggregate of compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at 163. 

As that court recognized, the issue in a Title VII case is

 Case: 11-17484, 10/24/2013, ID: 8834319, DktEntry: 45-1, Page 22 of 24
STATE OF ARIZONA V. ASARCO 23

therefore not the ratio between punitive and compensatory

damages, but instead “if the statutory cap itself offends due

process.” Id. at 164.

Two of our sister circuits have held that the $300,000

statutory cap in Title VII obviates any due process concerns

when the plaintiff has proven egregious conduct. Id. (“[T]he

combination of the statutory cap and high threshold of

culpability for any award confines the amount of the award to

a level tolerated bydue process.”);Cush-Crawford v. Adchem

Corp., 271 F.3d 352, 359 (2d Cir. 2001) (“We hold that in

Title VII cases . . . punitive damages may be awarded within

the limits of the statutory caps if the defendant has been

shown to have acted with a state of mind that makes punitive

damages appropriate . . . .”). I agree.

Mendez v. County of San Bernardino, 540 F.3d 1109 (9th

Cir. 2008), upon which the majority relies, is not to the

contrary. In Mendez, the district court found a $250,000

punitive damages award grossly excessive when only one

dollar in nominal damages was awarded on the plaintiff’s

§ 1983 false arrest and illegal search claims. Id. at 1122. 

This court approved the district court’s remittitur of

Mendez’s award to $5,000. Like Abner, Mendez stands for

the proposition that single-digit ratio analysis is not a

talisman in civil rights cases involving nominal damages. 

But, unlike this case and Abner, the statute at issue in

Mendez, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, has no cap on punitive damages. 

Mendez therefore does not instruct us that ratio analysis is

required in Title VII cases.

Gore explained that “a reviewing court engaged in

determining whether an award of punitive damages is

excessive should accord substantial deference to legislative

 Case: 11-17484, 10/24/2013, ID: 8834319, DktEntry: 45-1, Page 23 of 24
24 STATE OF ARIZONA V. ASARCO

judgments concerning appropriate sanctions for the conduct

at issue.” 517 U.S. at 583 (internal quotations omitted). 

Thus, a relevant civil penalty provides the notice necessary to

allow a punitive damages award. Id. at 574. The majority

correctly concludes that the Title VII damages cap is “clearly

a relevant ‘civil penalty.’” Majority Op. at 17 (internal

quotations omitted); see Zhang v. Am. Gem Seafoods, Inc.,

339 F.3d 1020, 1045 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that Title VII’s

damages cap is “a legislative judgment similar to the

imposition of a civil fine”). This case is therefore analytically

no different than if Title VII gave the trial court the power to

impose a fine not to exceed $300,000 upon finding egregious

conduct. A defendant receiving a fine within the statutory

limits could hardly complain of a due process violation

because of the absence of notice.

And, although I agree with the analysis in Abner, I find it

problematic that the majority believes that the ceiling of

constitutionally acceptable punitive damages in Title VII

cases has somehow forever been fixed by that opinion. 

Would a different result be mandated if the Fifth Circuit in

Abner had upheld a jury award of the full $300,000 allowed

by Title VII? Abner simply affirmed a jury award of

$125,000 in exemplary damages. It did not hold that this

award was the maximum permissible under the Constitution,

let alone that it was forever fixing the constitutional ratio for

punitive damage awards.

Of course, even absent due process concerns, a district

court should reduce a punitive damages award if unsupported

by the evidence. But the district judge declined to do that

here, and the majority does not suggest he erred on that score. 

I would therefore leave the trial court’s considered judgment

undisturbed, and affirm the judgment below.

 Case: 11-17484, 10/24/2013, ID: 8834319, DktEntry: 45-1, Page 24 of 24