Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-18-05298/USCOURTS-caDC-18-05298-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 20, 2019 Decided January 24, 2020

No. 18-5298

WOODHULL FREEDOM FOUNDATION, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND WILLIAM P. BARR, IN HIS 

OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED 

STATES,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:18-cv-01552)

Robert L. Corn-Revere argued the cause for appellants. 

With him on the briefs were Ronald G. London, Lawrence G. 

Walters, Daphne Keller, David Greene, Aaron Mackey, and 

Corynne McSherry.

Catherine R. Gellis was on the brief for amici curiae 

Floor64, Inc. d/b/a The Copia Institute, et al. in support of 

plaintiffs-appellants.

USCA Case #18-5298 Document #1825427 Filed: 01/24/2020 Page 1 of 21
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Allen Dickerson and Zac Morgan were on the brief for 

amicus curiae Institute for Free Speech in support of 

appellants.

Brian M. Willen and Lauren G. White were on the brief for 

amicus curiae Center for Democracy & Technology in support 

of plaintiffs-appellants.

James Turner was on the brief for amici curiae Freedom 

Network USA, et al. in support of appellants.

Courtney Dixon, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, 

argued the cause for appellees. With her on the brief were 

Jessie K. Liu, U.S. Attorney, and Scott R. McIntosh, Attorney. 

R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered an 

appearance. Ken Paxton, Attorney General, Office of the 

Attorney General for the State of Texas, Kyle D. Hawkins, 

Solicitor General, Karen L. Watkins, Assistant Attorney 

General, Steven Marshall, Attorney General, Office of the 

Attorney General for the State of Alabama, Leslie Rutledge, 

Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State 

of Arkansas, Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Office of the 

Attorney General for the State of Florida, Chris Carr, Attorney 

General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of 

Georgia, Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Office of the 

Attorney General for the State of Idaho, Curtis T. Hill, Jr., 

Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State 

of Indiana, Derek Schmidt, Attorney General, Office of the 

Attorney General for the State of Kansas, Andy Beshear, 

Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the 

Commonwealth of Kentucky, Jeff Landry, Attorney General, 

Office of the Attorney General for the State of Louisiana, 

Maura Healey, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney 

General for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Keith 

Ellison, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for 

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the State of Minnesota, Jim Hood, Attorney General, Office of 

the Attorney General for the State of Mississippi, Timothy C. 

Fox, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the 

State of Montana, Dave Yost, Attorney General, Office of the 

Attorney General for the State of Ohio, Mike Hunter, Attorney 

General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of 

Oklahoma, Alan Wilson, Attorney General, Office of the 

Attorney General for the State of South Carolina, Jason 

Ravnsborg, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General 

for the State of South Dakota, Sean D. Reyes, Attorney 

General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Utah, 

Mark R. Herring, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney 

General for the Commonwealth of Virginia, and Patrick 

Morrisey, Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for 

the State of West Virginia, were on the brief for the amici 

curiae States in support of appellees.

Christopher J. Schmidt, Jonathan B. Potts, and Adam L. 

Shaw were on the brief for amicus curiae National Center for 

Missing and Exploited Children in support of appellees and 

affirmance.

David Boies and Karen A. Chesley were on the brief for 

amici curiae Legal Momentum, et al. in support of defendantsappellees.

Before: ROGERS, GRIFFITH and KATSAS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

Opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment 

by Circuit Judge KATSAS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: The district court dismissed a preenforcement challenge to a federal statute reflecting 

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Congress’s continual goal of protecting minors online while 

promoting a free and open internet upon concluding that no 

plaintiff had demonstrated standing under Article III of the 

Constitution. Upon review, we hold for the following reasons 

that at least two of the plaintiffs, among the appellants before 

this court, have demonstrated their standing. 

I.

This case relates to Congress’s ongoing effort to protect 

minors online while promoting a free and open internet. To 

this end, Congress passed the Communications Decency Act in 

1996. The Act prohibited the transmission of obscene and 

indecent speech online in order to protect minors from being 

exposed to sexually explicit materials. 47 U.S.C. §§ 223(a), 

(d); see generally Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 

844 (1997). The Act also sought to protect the entities that

publish the online speech of others in order “to promote the 

continued development of the Internet” and “to preserve the 

vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists.” 47 

U.S.C. § 230(b)(1)–(2). Section 230 shields interactive 

computer service providers from being treated “asthe publisher 

or speaker” of any content that is posted by users of the site, id.

§ 230(c)(1), except where the published user content violates 

federal law, id. § 230(e)(1), including 47 U.S.C. § 223, relating 

to obscenity, and 18 U.S.C. § 110, relating to the sexual 

exploitation of children. It defines “interactive computer 

service” as “any information service, system, or access 

software provider that provides or enables computer access by 

multiple users to a computer server . . . .” 47 U.S.C. 

§ 230(f)(2). 

In 2000, Congress enacted the Trafficking Victims 

Protection Act, codified as relevant at 18 U.S.C. § 1591, to

prohibit the sex trafficking of children by force, fraud, or 

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coercion. In 2003, Congress authorized victims of sex 

trafficking to file civil actions. 18 U.S.C. § 1595.

When minor victims of sex trafficking sued publishers of 

online classified advertising related to sex trafficking, however 

the courts have held that Section 230(c)(1) precluded liability. 

For instance, when three victims of sex trafficking filed suit 

under Section 1595, alleging that Backpage.com, a publisher 

of online classified advertising, had structured its website to 

camouflage advertisements for sex traffickers, the district court

ruled that Section 230 provided Backpage.com civil immunity 

from suit and dismissed the suit in its entirety. Doe ex rel. Roe 

v. Backpage.com, LLC, 104 F. Supp. 3d 149, 154, 159–61, 165 

(D. Mass. 2015). The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, 

observing the courts had interpreted Section 230(c)(1) broadly 

so that “lawsuits seeking to hold a service provider liable for 

its exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial functions —

such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or 

alter content — are barred.” Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 

817 F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting Zeran v. Am. Online, 

Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997)) (collecting cases). To 

the extent victims of sex trafficking wished to bring civil suits

against internet publishers such as Backpage.com that “tailor[] 

[their] website[s] to make sex trafficking easier,” the First 

Circuit advised that “the remedy is through legislation” —

amending Section 230 — “not through litigation.” Doe No. 1 

v. Backpage.com, 817 F.3d at 29.

In 2017, Congress passed the Allow States and Victims to 

Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act (“FOSTA”), Pub. L. No. 115-

164, 132 Stat. 1253 (2018), to narrow Section 230’s scope and

provide prosecutors with new tools to combat the sex 

trafficking of both minors and adults. FOSTA set forth the 

“sense of Congress” that Section 230 was “never intended to 

provide legal protection to websites that unlawfully promote 

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and facilitate prostitution and websites that facilitate traffickers 

in advertising the sale of unlawful sex acts with sex trafficking 

victims,” id. § 2(1), 132 Stat. at 1253, and declared that 

“clarification” of Section 230 was needed to ensure that it 

would “not provide such protection to such websites,” id.

§ 2(3). FOSTA narrowed the scope of immunity for interactive 

computer service providers, by providing that Section 230 has 

“[n]o effect on sex trafficking law,” and shall not “be construed 

to impair or limit” civil claims brought under Section 1595 or 

criminal charges brought under state law if the underlying 

conduct would constitute a violation of Sections 1591 or 

2421A. Id. § 4(a), 125 Stat. at 1254 (codified at 47 U.S.C. 

§ 230(e)(5)). These amendments are retroactive, applying 

“regardless of whether the conduct alleged occurred, or is 

alleged to have occurred, before, on, or after . . . enactment.” 

Id. § 4(b), 132 Stat. at 1254–55.

In a new provision, FOSTA proscribed “own[ing], 

manag[ing], or operat[ing] an interactive computer service . . . 

with the intent to promote or facilitate the prostitution of 

another person,” punishable by a fine and imprisonment for not 

more than ten years. Id. § 3(a), 132 Stat. at 1253–54 (codified 

at 18 U.S.C. § 2421A(a)). This provision adopts the definition 

of “interactive computer service” in Section 230(f) of the 

Communications Decency Act. 18 U.S.C. § 2421A(a). When 

the underlying conduct “promotes or facilitates the prostitution 

of 5 or more persons” or when the person “acts in reckless 

disregard of the fact that such conduct contributed to sex 

trafficking,” there is an enhanced penalty of imprisonment for 

not more than twenty-five years. Id. § 2421A(b). An 

individual injured by such an aggravated violation may sue for 

money damages. Id. § 2421A(c). It is an affirmative defense 

if “the promotion or facilitation of prostitution is legal in the 

jurisdiction where the promotion or facilitation was targeted.” 

Id. § 2421A(e).

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FOSTA also amended 18 U.S.C. § 1591, which prohibits 

the sex trafficking of children, to define “participation in a 

venture” to mean “knowingly assisting, supporting, or 

facilitating a violation” of the section. FOSTA § 5(2), 132 Stat. 

at 1255 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1591(e)(4)). Further, it 

amended 18 U.S.C. § 1595, which provides a federal cause of 

action for victims of sex trafficking, to authorize state attorneys 

general to file civil parens patriae suits when they have “reason 

to believe that an interest of the residents of that State has been 

or is threatened or adversely affected by a person who violates 

section 1591.” FOSTA § 6(a), 132 Stat. at 1255 (codified at 18 

U.S.C. § 1595(d)). 

Upon enactment of FOSTA, a number of online service 

providers that enable interpersonal contact between users, like 

Craigslist and Reddit, immediately removed content and 

eliminated entire sections of their websites. Compl. ¶¶ 53–60. 

For example, Craigslist eliminated its Personals and 

Therapeutic Services sections and blocked the reposting of 

advertisements previously listed in the Therapeutic Services 

section to other sections. Compl. ¶¶ 55–56. In a public 

statement, Craigslist explained that it had taken these services 

offline because Congress had passed FOSTA and it did not 

want to risk liability and jeopardize its other services. Compl. 

¶ 55. Craigslist added that it hoped to bring these services back 

some day. Id. 

II.

On June 28, 2018, appellants, who are various individuals 

and organizations purporting to engage in constitutionally

protected speech on the internet, filed a pre-enforcement 

challenge to FOSTA, alleging harm to their online activities. 

Their complaint presented facial and as applied challenges to 

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FOSTA under the First and Fifth Amendments. The plaintiffs 

argued that (1) FOSTA’s content-based restrictions are 

overbroad and fail to satisfy strict scrutiny; and (2) FOSTA’s 

restrictions on speech are impermissibly vague. They also 

argued that FOSTA contains an unconstitutional ex post facto

provision. They sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin the 

enforcement of FOSTA. 

Four plaintiffs alleged concerns that their advocacy for,

dissemination of information and resources to, or hosting of 

others’ online speech about sex workers could be characterized 

a “promoting” or “facilitating” prostitution. These plaintiffs

include a national human rights organization dedicated to 

sexual freedom, an international human rights organization, an

advocate for sex workers, and a digital library of websites. 

Compl. ¶ 2. Specifically, Woodhull Freedom Foundation

(“Woodhull”) is an advocacy organization dedicated to 

protecting the right to sexual freedom. The organization works 

to support the health and safety of sex workers, a group that

includes adult film performers, live webcam models, sexual 

wellness instructors, escorts, and prostitutes. Woodhull 

operates a website and uses a variety of online technologies to 

plan and host its annual multi-day Sexual Freedom Summit. 

Compl. ¶ 74. The Summit includes a sex worker track with 

workshops devoted to issues affecting sex workers. Compl. ¶¶ 

67–73. Human Rights Watch is an international human rights 

monitoring organization that publishes reports, press releases, 

podcasts, videos and other online documents to advocate for

the decriminalization of sex work and document abuses against 

sex workers. Compl. ¶¶ 86–89. Alex Andrews is an advocate 

for sex worker rights and a co-founder of several groups that 

advocate for the health, safety, and human rights of sex 

workers. In 2015, Andrews collaborated with advocates and 

sex workers to create Rate That Rescue, which is a sex workerled, ratings and review website that provides a resource for sex 

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workers to learn more about the various organizations that 

provide services for them. Compl. ¶¶ 105–06. Notably, 

although Rate That Rescue was originally designed to provide 

information about support and rescue organizations, it has 

expanded to share information about all types of products and 

services that sex workers use — ranging from social media 

networks like Twitter, to website builders like Wix, to online 

payment processors like PayPal. Compl. ¶ 109. The Internet 

Archive, as its name suggests, stores and displays a vast 

amount of historical website data; it regularly archives web 

pages and maintains over 330 billion web pages spanning from 

1996 to present. Compl. ¶¶ 121–23.

The remaining plaintiff, Eric Koszyk, is a licensed 

massage therapist and the owner of Soothing Spirit Massage. 

Compl. ¶ 93. He alleged that he suffered constitutional and 

monetary injuries when Craigslist, the online platform he used 

to disseminate his speech, shut down certain services in 

response to FOSTA. Compl. ¶ 2. Since 2007, Koszyk had

posted weekly advertisements on Craigslist — in the 

Therapeutic Services section — in order to reach 

approximately 90 percent of his clientele. Compl. ¶¶ 94–95. 

After FOSTA became law, Craigslist removed his 

advertisements, shut down its Therapeutic Services section, 

Compl. ¶ 97, and blocked his attempts to re-post his 

advertisements to other sections of Craigslist’s website.

Compl. ¶ 98. Because he has been unable to post his 

advertisements on Craigslist, he alleged that he has had almost 

no clients and has been unable to provide a supplemental 

income for his family. Compl. ¶ 100.

The district court granted the government’s motion to 

dismiss for lack of Article III standing. The district court ruled

that plaintiffs Woodhull, Human Rights Watch, Andrews, and 

the Internet Archive lacked standing to bring a pre-enforcement 

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challenge to FOSTA, interpreting FOSTA not to apply to their 

described conduct and finding that they lacked a credible threat 

of prosecution. Woodhull Freedom Found. v. United States, 

334 F. Supp. 3d 185, 196-204 (D.D.C. 2018). The district court 

stated that Section 2421A was “plainly calculated to ensnare 

only specific unlawful acts with respect to a particular 

individual, not the broad subject-matter of prostitution.” Id. at 

200. The district court noted FOSTA requires that a person act 

“with the intent to promote or facilitate ‘the prostitution of

another person,’” id. (emphasis in original), and the requisite 

mens rea establishes a “high bar,” which “further narrows that 

provision’s scope,” id. at 201. Additionally, the district court 

ruled that Koszyk failed to establish redressability because his 

injury was the result of Craigslist’s decision to remove his 

advertisements — a discretionary decision by a third party not 

before the court. Id. at 203.

III.

To establish Article III standing, “a plaintiff must show (1) 

an ‘injury in fact,’ (2) a sufficient ‘causal connection between 

the injury and the conduct complained of,’ and (3) a 

‘likel[ihood]’ the injury ‘will be redressed by a favorable 

decision.’” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus (SBA), 573 U.S. 

149, 157–58 (2014) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 

U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)). Pre-enforcement review is 

permitted where the threatened enforcement of a law is 

“sufficiently imminent.” SBA, 573 U.S. at 159. “[A]n actual 

arrest, prosecution, or other enforcement action is not a 

prerequisite to challenging the law.” Id. at 158. Rather, “a 

plaintiff satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement where he

alleges ‘an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably 

affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a 

statute, and there exists a credible threat of prosecution 

thereunder.” Id. at 159 (quoting Babbitt v. United Farm 

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Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979)). In Babbitt, 

the Court quoted its precedent for the proposition that 

individuals whose fear of prosecution is “imaginary or 

speculative[] are not to be accepted as appropriate plaintiffs.” 

442 U.S. at 298 (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 42 

(1971)).

Applying Babbitt, the Court in SBA analyzed whether the 

plaintiffs had established a sufficiently imminent threat in a 

three-part test. First, had the plaintiffs alleged “an intention to 

engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a 

constitutional interest.” 573 U.S. at 161 (quoting Babbitt, 442 

U.S. at 298). Second, was the intended future conduct 

“‘arguably . . . proscribed by [the] statute’ they wish[ed] to 

challenge.” SBA, 573 U.S. at 162 (quoting Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 

298). Third, was “the threat of future enforcement of the 

[challenged] statute . . . substantial.” SBA, 573 U.S. at 164. 

Although lower “courts’ willingness to permit pre-enforcement 

review is ‘at its peak’ when claims are rooted in the First 

Amendment,” N.Y. Republican State Comm. v. SEC, 799 F.3d 

1126, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Unity08 v. FEC, 596 F.3d 

861, 865 (D.C. Cir. 2010)), a plaintiff must still demonstrate 

more than a subjective chill to establish an injury-in-fact, see, 

e.g., Seegars v. Gonzales, 396 F.3d 1248, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 

2005); Am. Library Ass’n v. Barr, 956 F.2d 1178, 1194 (D.C. 

Cir. 1992). 

Upon de novo review of the dismissal of plaintiffs’ 

complaint for lack of Article III standing, see Renal Physicians 

Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 489 F.3d 1267, 

1273 (D.C. Cir. 2007), and upon accepting as true, as we must, 

all material allegations of the complaint and construing the 

complaint in favor of the complaining party, Warth v. Seldin, 

422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975), we hold that Andrews and Koszyk

have demonstrated their Article III standing. Given identical 

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claims by the other plaintiffs, the court need not decide whether

additional plaintiffs have standing. See Rumsfeld v. Forum for 

Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 53 n.2 (2006);

Watt v. Energy Action Educ. Found., 454 U.S. 151, 160 (1981); 

UAW-Labor Emp’t & Training Corp. v. Chao, 325 F.3d 360, 

362 (D.C. Cir. 2003).

As an initial matter, the parties possibly disagree about 

whether at the motion to dismiss stage, a “plaintiff’s nonfrivolous contention regarding the meaning of a statute must be 

taken as correct for purposes of standing.” Appellants’ Br. 23

(quoting Sandvig v. Sessions, 315 F. Supp. 3d 1, 18 (D.D.C. 

2018)). Appellants rely on Information Handling Services, Inc. 

v. Defense Automated Printing Services, 338 F.3d 1024 (D.C. 

Cir. 2003), where the plaintiff alleged that the government had

violated statutory requirements, id. at 1026, and the court held 

that, at the motion to dismiss stage, the court “assume[s]” that 

the plaintiff “has read the statute correctly,” id. at 1030. The 

government acknowledges that this is the correct standard 

“[w]hen a plaintiff’s theory of injury is that the defendant has 

violated a statute and caused the plaintiff harm.” Appellees’

Br. 28 (emphasis in original). Under such circumstances, the 

court assumes that the plaintiff’s legal theory is correct 

because, “[w]ere that not the case, [the court] would effectively 

be deciding the merits under the guise of determining the 

plaintiff’s standing.” Information Handling Servs., 338 F.3d at 

1030. But in a pre-enforcement challenge, which Information 

Handling was not, the government correctly points out that the 

court should look to SBA to determine whether the plaintiff has

asserted an “imminent threat” that a statute will be enforced 

against the plaintiff because the plaintiff’s conduct is “arguably 

. . . proscribed by a statute, and there exists a credible threat of 

prosecution thereunder,” SBA, 573 U.S. at 159 (quoting 

Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 298). Upon applying the test in SBA, we 

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conclude that plaintiffs Andrews and Koszyk have Article III 

standing.

A.

Andrews has established an Article III injury-in-fact

because she has alleged “an intention to engage in a course of 

conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but 

proscribed by a statute, and there exists a credible threat of 

prosecution thereunder.” SBA, 573 U.S. at 159 (quoting 

Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 298). Her alleged conduct is “arguably 

affected with a constitutional interest,” SBA, 573 U.S. at 161

(quoting Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 298), because Andrews’ intended 

future conduct involves speech. Andrews operates a website 

that allows sex workers to share information. Compl. ¶¶ 106, 

109. Her conduct is “arguably proscribed” by FOSTA because 

it is a crime to own, manage, or operate an “interactive 

computer service[]” with the intent to “promote or facilitate the

prostitution of another person,” 18 U.S.C. § 2421A(a). FOSTA

does not define “promote” or “facilitate,” nor does it specify 

what constitutes “prostitution,” a term undefined by federal 

law. Nor are these terms limited by a string of adjacent verbs

(such as advertises, distributes, or solicits) that would convey

“a transactional connotation” that might narrow the statute’s 

reach. Cf. United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 294 (2008). 

The terms “promote” and “facilitate,” when considered in 

isolation, “are susceptible of multiple and wide-ranging 

meanings.” Cf. id. Because the verbs “promote” and 

“facilitate” are disjunctive, FOSTA arguably proscribes 

conduct that facilitates prostitution. The common meaning of 

facilitate is “‘to make easier’ or less difficult, or to assist or 

aid.” United States v. Rivera, 775 F.2d 1559, 1562 (11th Cir. 

1985) (quoting United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1032 

(5th Cir. 1981)); see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 

2019) (“To make the occurrence of (something) easier; to 

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render less difficult.”); cf. United States v. Bennett, 1996 WL 

477048, at *5 (9th Cir. Aug. 21, 1996). 

Alternatively, the term “facilitate” could be interpreted “as 

a synonym for ‘terms like ‘aid,’ ‘abet,’ and ‘assist,’” in which 

case the term’s meaning would be limited by the background 

law of aiding and abetting. See Concurring Op. 2 (quoting 

Abuelhawa v. United States, 556 U.S. 816, 821 (2009)). Even 

reading the term “facilitate” narrowly, Andrews has adequately 

alleged her intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably 

proscribed by FOSTA. 

Andrews founded a sex worker-led, community forum

called Rate That Rescue. Compl. ¶¶ 105–06. Rate That Rescue 

operates as a ratings and review website, hosting content 

created by both organizations that provide services to sex 

workers and the sex worker community. Compl. ¶ 106. Rate 

That Rescue allows sex workers to share information about

products or services that they commonly use, such as payment 

processors, like PayPal. Compl. ¶ 109. Such discussions may, 

for example, facilitate prostitution by providing sex workers

and others with tools to ensure the receipt of payment for sexual 

services. Because Andrews has alleged that she intends to host 

such discussions on her website, her intended conduct is

arguably proscribed by FOSTA. And because Rate That 

Rescue has thousands of users, Compl. ¶ 116, Andrews’

intended conduct is also arguably proscribed by the aggravated 

offense provision. See 18 U.S.C. § 2421A(b)(1) (“promotes or 

facilitates the prostitution of 5 or more persons”).

The government maintains that even if the terms 

“promote” or “facilitate” can be read broadly in isolation, 

FOSTA cannot be read to encompass plaintiffs’ intended 

conduct because advocacy and educational activities do not 

promote or facilitate any specific, unlawful instance of 

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prostitution. Appellees’ Br. 21–22. It endorses the district 

court’s interpretation that the text of Section 2421A is “plainly 

calculated to ensnare only specific unlawful acts with respect 

to a particular individual.” Woodhull, 334 F. Supp. 3d at 200; 

Appellees’ Br. 16–17. Further, the government suggests that 

individuals and organizations who advocate for the safety or 

well-being of sex workers do not act “with the intent” to 

facilitate a specific act of illegal prostitution, as required under 

Section 2421A. Appellees’ Br. 19; Woodhull, 334 F. Supp. 3d 

at 201. 

In short, the court need not read FOSTA to encompass 

advocacy or educational activities to hold that Andrews has 

standing. Because Andrews’ website allows sex workers to 

share information about online payment processors like 

PayPal, Compl. ¶ 109, Andrews has alleged “some desired 

conduct . . . that might trigger an enforcement action,” see 

Matthew A. Goldstein, PLLC v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 851 F.3d 

1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Compl. ¶ 109. That Andrews’ intended 

conduct is unlike the intentional measures taken by 

Backpage.com to help online sex traffickers avoid detection by 

law enforcement, even assuming Backpage.com was a 

motivating consideration behind FOSTA’s enactment, 

Appellees’ Br. 17–19; see H.R. Rep. No. 115-572, pt. 1, at 3–

6 (2018), does not mean that Andrews’ conduct falls outside 

FOSTA’s scope. FOSTA’s text does not limit its scope to 

“bad-actor websites,” id. at 3, or even to classified advertising 

websites. 

On this record, there is also ample reason to conclude that

the threat of future enforcement against Andrews is substantial. 

SBA, 573 U.S. at 164. The Department of Justice “has not 

disavowed any intention of invoking the criminal penalty 

provision,” Babbitt, 442 U.S. at 302, against individuals who 

operate websites like Rate That Rescue. For instance, the 

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Department noted in a March 23, 2018, letter to the Office of 

Management and Budget that prosecutors can avoid any 

unconstitutional ex post facto problems by pursuing only 

prosecutable criminal conduct that takes place after FOSTA 

was enacted, yet never suggested that the terms “promote” and 

“facilitate” are to be narrowly understood to focus on classified 

advertising websites, like Backpage.com, and to exclude

information sharing websites like Rate That Rescue. Further, 

the Department has repeatedly characterized Rate That Rescue 

as a website that “collects reviews of rescue resources for sex 

workers, such as housing, rehabilitation, and domesticviolence facilities,” Appellees’ Br. 18–19, and maintained that 

providing harm reduction information to persons engaged in 

sex work is different in kind from promoting or facilitating 

prostitution, Oral Arg. Recording at 21:10–21:58; 29:25–30:10 

(Sept. 20, 2019). But the Department has yet to disavow any 

intention to prosecute an individual or organization that 

operates a sex worker-led forum about topics like PayPal. And 

although the Department has maintained in the instant litigation 

that plaintiffs’ intended conduct is not proscribed by Section 

2421A, “there is nothing that prevents the [Department] from 

changing its mind,” Vt. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, 221 

F.3d 376, 383 (2d Cir. 2000).

Furthermore, Section 2421A provides a private right of 

action for any person injured by an aggravated violation. 18 

U.S.C. § 2421A(c). The Supreme Court has acknowledged that 

“[t]he credibility of [a] threat is bolstered” where “the universe 

of potential complainants is not restricted to state officials who 

are constrained by explicit guidelines or ethical obligations.” 

SBA, 573 U.S. at 164. And Congress amended Section 230 to 

allow prosecutions under state law if the conduct underlying 

the charge would constitute a violation of Section 2421A. 

Twenty-one states emphasize that “the State need not wait for 

the Department of Justice to prosecute traffickers operating in 

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17

the State.” Amicus Br. for the State of Texas, et al., 9. This 

amicus brief also cites pending legislation in Texas that would 

enact a local FOSTA. Id. at 9 n.3. These states have not 

disavowed any intention to prosecute individuals like 

Andrews. 

B.

Koszyk has also established Article III standing. Where

“a plaintiff’s asserted injury arises from the government’s 

allegedly unlawful regulation . . . of someone else, . . . causation 

and redressability ordinarily hinge on the response of the 

regulated (or regulable) third party.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562

(emphasis in original). Koszyk’s alleged injury-in-fact is, 

however, fairly traceable to the passage of FOSTA and 

“not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third 

party not before the court.” Id. at 560 (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. 

Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41–42 (1976)). Craigslist 

removed Koszyk’s advertisements and “shut down its 

Therapeutic Services section in response to FOSTA’s 

passage,” and Koszyk alleges that he has not been able to post 

on Craigslist since, thereby drying up his client base. Compl. 

¶¶ 97–100.

Additionally, Koszyk has met his burden to establish 

redressability. Where the requested “relief for the [plaintiff] 

depends on actions by a third party not before the court,” the 

plaintiff “must demonstrate that a favorable decision would 

create ‘a significant increase in the likelihood that the plaintiff 

would obtain relief that directly redresses the injury suffered.’” 

Klamath Water Users Ass’n v. FERC, 534 F.3d 735, 739 (D.C. 

Cir. 2008) (quoting Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452, 464 (2002)). 

Koszyk alleges that Craigslist shut down the Therapeutic 

Services section on its website and began to remove his posts 

shortly after the passage of FOSTA. Compl. ¶¶ 97–98. 

Craigslist publicly announced that it attributed the closure of 

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18

this section to concerns about FOSTA, stating, “US Congress 

just passed HR 1865, ‘FOSTA’, seeking to subject websites to

criminal and civil liability when third parties (users) misuse 

online personals unlawfully.” Compl. ¶ 55 (quoting About 

FOSTA, CRAIGSLIST, 

https://www.craigslist.org/about/FOSTA (last visited Nov. 15, 

2019)). Further, Craigslist stated that it was taking “craigslist 

personals offline” so as not to risk liability and jeopardize its 

other services. Id. Craigslist added: “Hopefully we can bring 

them back some day.” Id. Given Craigslist’s statements about

the reason for the removal of those sections and its desire to 

bring them back, there is a “significant increase in likelihood” 

that Koszyk would obtain relief in the event that FOSTA is 

invalidated. 

Accordingly, because Andrews and Koszyk have 

established their Article III standing to bring a pre-enforcement 

challenge to FOSTA — Andrews has alleged intended conduct 

that is arguably proscribed by FOSTA and the threat of future 

enforcement is substantial, while Koszyk has demonstrated 

that a favorable decision would create a significant increase in 

likelihood that he would obtain relief — we reverse the order 

dismissing the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction 

and remand the case to the district court for further 

proceedings.

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KATSAS, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and concurring 

in the judgment: I agree with my colleagues on the bottom line. 

At the motion-to-dismiss stage of this case, plaintiffs Alex 

Andrews and Eric Koszyk plausibly alleged Article III standing 

to bring a pre-enforcement challenge to the Allow States and 

Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017 (FOSTA), 

Pub. L. No. 115-164, 132 Stat. 1253 (2018). I also agree with 

most, but not all of my colleagues’ reasoning. 

FOSTA’s central provision makes it a crime to own, 

manage, or operate a website “with the intent to promote or 

facilitate the prostitution of another person.” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2421A(a). To secure standing, and to make FOSTA seem 

obviously unconstitutional, the plaintiffs advocate a sweeping 

construction of this provision. Here is their position in a 

nutshell: the phrase “promote or facilitate” is disjunctive, 

“facilitate” can mean “make easier,” and FOSTA thus prohibits 

any online speech that makes prostitution easier. According to 

the plaintiffs, this includes several categories of speech in 

which they seek to engage—advocating for decriminalization; 

educating prostitutes about rights and risks; helping prostitutes 

obtain housing, medical attention, child care, or other essential 

services; and even internet archiving that incidentally sweeps 

up content related to prostitution. My colleagues neither adopt 

this construction of FOSTA nor follow it to its logical 

conclusion that all five plaintiffs have standing. But they do 

identify this construction as at least one possible reading of 

FOSTA. Ante at 13–14. 

I would reject the plaintiffs’ proposed construction, which 

ignores or overreads all the key statutory terms. To begin, 

FOSTA focuses not on prostitution as an abstract legal or 

policy matter, but on “the prostitution of another person”—a 

widely criminalized act involving the exchange of sex for 

money, see, e.g., Prostitution, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY

(10th ed. 2014). Moreover, in the criminal law, to “promote” 

prostitution means to pander or pimp—another common 

USCA Case #18-5298 Document #1825427 Filed: 01/24/2020 Page 19 of 21
2 

offense that involves recruiting a prostitute or soliciting 

prospective customers. See, e.g., Pandering, BLACK’S LAW 

DICTIONARY, supra (“The act or offense of recruiting a 

prostitute, finding a place of business for a prostitute, or 

soliciting customers for a prostitute.—Also termed promoting 

prostitution.”). Likewise, in criminal statutes, “facilitate” need 

not mean “make easier.” Abuelhawa v. United States, 556 U.S. 

816, 819 (2009). To the contrary, as a synonym for “terms like 

‘aid,’ ‘abet,’ and ‘assist,’” it presumptively follows, and is 

limited by, the background law of aiding and abetting. Id. at 

821. FOSTA’s requirement of action with an “intent to 

promote or facilitate” prostitution confirms this presumption, 

by tracking almost verbatim the canonical formulation for the 

offense of aiding and abetting. See, e.g., Rosemond v. United 

States, 572 U.S. 65, 74 (2014) (to give assistance “with the 

intent thereby to promote or facilitate commission of the 

crime” (quotation marks omitted)); 2 W. LAFAVE,

SUBSTANTIVE CRIM. L. § 13.2 (3d ed. 2018) (same). This is not 

to suggest that FOSTA requires proof of a specific, completed 

act of prostitution, as would the offense of aiding and abetting 

prostitution. But FOSTA does require that the defendant own, 

manage, or operate a website with the specific intent to pander 

or otherwise abet the exchange of sex for money—not simply 

to advocate for, educate, or provide general assistance to 

persons who prostitute. 

Properly construed, FOSTA does not arguably cover the 

advocacy, education, assistance, or archiving done by plaintiffs 

Woodhull Freedom Foundation, Human Rights Watch, and 

Internet Archive. Nor does it arguably cover Andrews’s 

website insofar as it provides information about “support and 

rescue” organizations that either discourage prostitution 

altogether or seek to mitigate its harmfulness. Ante at 9. But 

as my colleagues explain, the website also provides prostitutes 

with information about “online payment processors like 

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3 

PayPal,” id., which directly assists the exchange of sex for 

money, id. at 14. In context, such postings might support an 

inference that Andrews has the requisite intent to “promote or 

facilitate the prostitution” of someone besides herself. Because 

Andrews thus arguably engages in activities proscribed by 

FOSTA, I agree with my colleagues that she has standing to 

challenge it. 

Finally, I agree with my colleagues’ analysis of why 

Koszyk has standing, so I join Parts I, II, and III.B of the 

majority opinion, and I respectfully concur in the judgment. 

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