Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_24-cv-00897/USCOURTS-caed-1_24-cv-00897-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KARLIS RUBENS HOWARD,

Plaintiff,

v.

PENNER, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:24-cv-00897-HBK (PC)

ORDER DENYING EX PARTE MOTION 

FOR STAY OF CASE

(Doc. No. 11)

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s “Ex Parte Motion for Stay Pending Release From 

Prison,” filed October 31, 2024. (Doc. No. 11). Plaintiff requests a stay of the case for 90 days 

because he anticipates being released from CDCR custody in December and would like to retain 

counsel before proceeding further with this case. (Id. at 1-2).

A federal court enjoys “broad discretion to stay proceedings as an incident to its power to 

control its own docket.” Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 706 (1997). Here, however, the Court 

finds that a stay of Plaintiff’s case is not warranted. The Court recently screened Plaintiff’s 

Complaint and found it failed to state any cognizable claim. (See Doc. No. 10). Thus, this case 

has not proceeded past the preliminary screening stage and there are no proceedings to be stayed. 

Plaintiff remains under a Court-ordered deadline to respond to the Court’s October 31, 2024 

Screening Order.

Here, the events giving rise to Plaintiff’s Complaint took place in late August 2023 and 

Case 1:24-cv-00897-HBK Document 12 Filed 11/05/24 Page 1 of 3
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September 2023. To the extent Plaintiff wishes to retain counsel to assist him in litigating this 

action, Plaintiff has the option of voluntarily dismissing this action without prejudice under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41. Counsel may then refile a new action before the applicable 

limitation period elapses. In this regard, the Court apprises Plaintiff of the potential applicable 

limitations period. 

Because §1983 contains no specific statute of limitation, federal courts apply the forum 

state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927 (9th 

Cir. 2004); Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 954 (9th Cir. 2004); Fink v. Shedler, 192 F.3d 

911, 914 (9th Cir. 1999). California’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions is two 

years. Jones, 393 F.3d at 927 (citing Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 335.1). The law of the forum state 

also governs tolling. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 394 (2007) (citing Hardin v. Straub, 490 

U.S. 536, 538–39 (1989)); Jones, 393 F.3d at 927 (noting that in actions where the federal court 

borrows the state statute of limitation, the federal court also borrows all applicable provisions for 

tolling the limitations period found in state law). Under California law, the statute of limitations 

for prisoners serving less than a life sentence is tolled for two years. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §

352.1(a); Johnson v. California, 207 F.3d 650, 654 (9th Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds, 

543 U.S. 499 (2005). The two years of tolling applies so long as a plaintiff was incarcerated at 

the time the cause of action accrued. See, e.g., Fink v. Shedler, 192 F.3d 911, 915 (9th Cir. 1999) 

(applying Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §352.1 to former prisoner’s Eighth Amendment claim), as

amended on denial of reh'g and reh'g en banc (Dec. 13, 1999). Thus, as long as a plaintiff was in 

prison when the claim accrued, he is entitled to tolling during the time he was incarcerated from 

the accrual date (not to exceed two years), plus the two years of the statute of limitations. 

Unlike the length of the limitations period, however, “the accrual date of a § 1983 cause 

of action is a question of federal law that is not resolved by reference to state law.” Wallace, 549 

U.S. at 388; Hardin, 490 U.S. at 543–44 (federal law governs when a § 1983 cause of action 

accrues). “Under the traditional rule of accrual . . . the tort cause of action accrues, and the statute 

of limitation begins to run, when the wrongful act or omission results in damages.” Wallace, 549 

U.S. at 391. Put another way, “[u]nder federal law, a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or 

Case 1:24-cv-00897-HBK Document 12 Filed 11/05/24 Page 2 of 3
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has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.” Maldonado, 370 F.3d at 955; 

TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 1999). At the earliest, Plaintiff had knowledge 

of the events in August 2023.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s Ex Parte Motion to Stay Proceedings (Doc. No. 11) is DENIED for reasons 

set forth herein.

2. Plaintiff remains required to submit to correctional officials for mailing a response to 

the Court’s October 31, 2024 Screening Order (Doc. No. 10) no later than November 

26, 2024.

3. Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the October 31, 2024 Screening Order will result in 

the undersigned recommending Plaintiff’s case be dismissed for failure to prosecute 

and comply with the Court’s Order.

4. In the alternative, Plaintiff may file a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal Under Rule 41, if 

he wishes to retain counsel after his release from prison to litigate this action by filing 

a complaint in a new action before the expiration of the applicable statute of 

limitations. 

Dated: November 4, 2024 

HELENA M. BARCH-KUCHTA

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:24-cv-00897-HBK Document 12 Filed 11/05/24 Page 3 of 3