Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02633/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-02633-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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28 1 Plaintiff’s request for oral argument is denied because the parties have had an

adequate opportunity to present their written arguments, and oral argument will not aid

the Court’s decision. See Lake at Las Vegas Investors Grp., Inc. v. Pac. Malibu Dev., 933

F.2d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 1991).

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Megan Griego, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

City of Surprise, Arizona, a municipal

corporation, et al.,

Defendants. 

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No. CV-10-2633-PHX-SMM

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND

ORDER

Pending before the Court is the Summary Judgment Motion by City of Surprise,

Arizona, and Jeffrey Mihelich (collectively “Defendants”). (Doc. 52.) Plaintiff has

responded, Defendants have replied, and the matter is fully briefed. (Doc. 53; Docs. 56-58.)

After reviewing the briefs, and having determined that oral argument is unnecessary,1

 the

Court will grant Defendant’s motion.

BACKGROUND

I. Factual Background

Plaintiff was employed by the City of Suprise, Arizona (“the City”) as an Economic

Development Coordinator (EDC) from May 2007 through April 30, 2010. (Doc. 53 ¶ 1.) In

2008, Jeffrey Mihelich (“Mihelich”) was hired by the City; later, in April 2010, his title

became Community and Economic Development Director, a position wherein he was

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responsible for the Economic Development Department, and was Plaintiff’s direct

supervisor. (Id. ¶¶ 3-5.)

On or around April 14, 2010, Mihelich held a staff meeting with employees of the

Economic Development Department, including Plaintiff, at which he informed the employees

that there was a proposal to reorganize the department. (Id. ¶ 7.) Shortly after the meeting,

Plaintiff learned that the proposed reorganization would include the elimination of two EDC

positions, including the position she held. (Id. ¶ 8.) If approved by the City Council, the

proposed reorganization would take effect July 1, 2010, and the EDC positions would thus

be eliminated effective June 30, 2010. (Id. ¶ 10.)

The City Council was to hold a budget retreat on April 23 and 24, 2010, to consider

the budget for the upcoming fiscal year. (Id. ¶ 11.) Prior to the retreat, the City’s Information

Security Officer, Gina Busby, was instructed by her supervisor to be alert for suspicious

activity. (Id. ¶ 12.) Approximately one day before the retreat, Busby became aware that

Plaintiff had emailed City documents to her personal email address; believing that Plaintiff’s

conduct may have been harmful to the City, Busby reported the matter to her supervisor. (Id.

¶ 13.)

On April 24, 2010, Plaintiff attended the budget retreat to speak before the City

Council about the proposed reorganization of her department. (Id. ¶ 15.) Mihelich gave

Plaintiff some amount of coaching in what to say to the City Council. (Id. ¶ 16.) Mihelich

also spoke before the City Council about the proposed reorganization, including the

elimination of several positions in the Economic Development Department. (Id. ¶ 22.) Busby

also attended the retreat and heard about the proposal to eliminate several positions in the

Economic Development Department. (Id. ¶ 23.) Busby became concerned about protecting

the City’s information, because he was aware of previous incidents when City employees

deleted or misappropriated City information after learning they may be terminated. (Id. ¶¶

24-25.) Busby was concerned also in light of her knowledge that Plaintiff had previously

emailed City documents to a personal email account. (Id. ¶ 25.)

As a result, Busby recommended that the City disable computer access for all

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employees of the Economic Development Department for the remainder of the weekend, a

recommendation which was approved by Mihelich and April Reynolds, the director of

Human Resources. (Id. ¶ 26.) Busby went to the department to disable computer access, and

noticed a large trash bin filled with binders and documents in the office of another Economic

Development Department employee, Jeanine Jerkovic. (Id. ¶ 27.) Busby took photographs

of the trash bin and showed them to Mihelich, Reynolds, and her supervisor. (Id. ¶ 28.)

Busby’s supervisor then instructed her to disable building access for all employees of the

department for the rest of the weekend. (Id. ¶ 29.)

The following Monday, April 26, 2010, building access was restored to the employees

of the department, and the employees, including Plaintiff, returned to work. (Id. ¶¶ 31-34.)

Some time on that day, City Attorney Michael Bailey was in the department and observed

Plaintiff shredding documents in the break room. (Id. ¶ 40.) Bailey contacted Mihelich and

reported that Plaintiff was shredding documents, expressed concern that Plaintiff may be

shredding public records, and instructed Mihelich to follow up on the matter. (Id. ¶ 41.)

Mihelich and Reynolds went to the break room, where Plaintiff was still shredding

documents, and asked her to stop. (Id. ¶ 43.)

Mihelich and Reynolds then met with Plaintiff, and Mihelich mentioned that there was

evidence that Plaintiff had emailed City files to her personal email; Plaintiff admitted that she

had done so. (Id. ¶ 45.) At the conclusion of the meeting, the City placed Plaintiff on

administrative leave. (Id. ¶ 46.) Mihelich and Reynolds contacted the Interim City Manager

Mark Coronado later that day, and informed him of their concerns relating to Plaintiff’s

shredding of documents and transferring files to her personal email. (Id. ¶ 55.) Mihelich

recommended that Plaintiff be terminated, and Coronado supported the recommendation. (Id.

¶¶ 55, 58.) Mihelich notified Plaintiff on April 27, 2010 that her employment was being

terminated. (Id. ¶ 64.)

On April 26, 2010, Mihelich had also informed Coronado about the trash bin of

documents that was discovered in Jerkovic’s office, and recommended that Jerkovic be

terminated as well. (Id. ¶ 61.) Coronado concurred, and Mihelich notified Jerkovic of her

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termination the same day as Plaintiff, April 27, 2010. (Id. ¶ 65.) Jerkovic attended the budget

retreat, but did not speak before the City Council. (Id. ¶ 19.) Jerkovic did speak with three

members of the City Council during a break at the retreat, but testified at deposition that she

has no reason to believe that Mihelich knew of the content of her communication with those

council members. (Id. ¶ 20.)

In June of 2010, the City Council voted to approve the budget, including the changes

to the Economic Development Department. (Id. ¶ 67.) As part of this reorganization, the city

eliminated two EDC positions, including the position previously held by Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 68.)

II. Procedural Background

Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants, alleging a single claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

(Doc. 1.) Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that her termination by Defendants was in retaliation

for her speech before the City Council, and thus that Defendants violated her constitutional

right to freedom of speech. (Id.) 

This Court has jurisdiction over the suit under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and venue is proper

under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Defendants now bring this motion for summary judgment against

Plaintiff. (Doc. 52.)

LEGAL STANDARD

A court must grant summary judgment if the pleadings and supporting documents,

viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, “show[] that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Jesinger v.

Nev. Fed. Credit Union, 24 F.3d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 1994). Substantive law determines

which facts are material. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); see also

Jesinger, 24 F.3d at 1130. “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit

under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson,

477 U.S. at 248. The dispute must also be genuine, that is, the evidence must be “such that

a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.; see Jesinger, 24 F.3d

at 1130.

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A principal purpose of summary judgment is “to isolate and dispose of factually

unsupported claims.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24. Summary judgment is appropriate against

a party who “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element

essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”

Id. at 322; see also Citadel Holding Corp. v. Roven, 26 F.3d 960, 964 (9th Cir. 1994). The

moving party need not disprove matters on which the opponent has the burden of proof at

trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24. The party opposing summary judgment need not

produce evidence “in a form that would be admissible at trial in order to avoid summary

judgment.” Id. at 324. However, the nonmovant must set out specific facts showing a genuine

dispute for trial. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

585-88 (1986); Brinson v. Linda Rose Joint Venture, 53 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 1995).

A government employee alleging that he has been subject to retaliation for exercising

his rights under the First Amendment must prove: (1) that the employee’s conduct was

constitutionally protected; and (2) that the conduct was “a substantial or motivating factor”

for the alleged retaliation. Keyser v. Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist., 265 F.3d 741, 750

(9th Cir. 2001) (citing Board of County Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 688, 675 (1996)).

Even if the employee can show these two elements, however, “the government can escape

liability by showing that it would have taken the same action even in the absence of the

protected conduct.” Board of County Comm’rs, 518 U.S. at 675.

DISCUSSION

Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim that she was terminated

in retaliation for exercise of her constitutionally protected right to free speech. (Doc. 52.)

Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s claim must fail, because: (1) the reorganization which

would have resulted in Plaintiff’s termination was proposed before Plaintiff spoke to the City

Council; (2) Plaintiff fails to assert facts sufficient to create a genuine dispute as to whether

Plaintiff’s speech was a substantial or motivating factor in her termination; and (3) because

both the City and Mihelich are subject to immunity. (Id.)

Plaintiff responds by arguing that she has asserted sufficient facts from which a

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reasonable jury could infer that her speech was a substantial or motivating factor for her

termination. (Doc. 56.) According to Plaintiff, the proximity in time between her speech to

the City Council on April 24 and her termination the following Monday, April 26, is

sufficient circumstantial evidence from which a jury could find retaliation. (Id.) Similarly,

Plaintiff argues that she has asserted sufficient facts from which a jury could infer that

Defendants’ proffered explanations for Plaintiff’s termination were mere pretext. (Id.)

After consideration of the parties’ positions, and upon review of all disputed and

undisputed facts, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to allege specific evidence sufficient to

support a genuine dispute of material fact. Even making all reasonable inferences from the

facts in favor of Plaintiff, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to contradict Defendants’ claim

that Plaintiff’s position was proposed to be eliminated prior to Plaintiff’s speech before the

City Council. 

It is undisputed that Mihelich informed Plaintiff and others in her department of the

proposed reorganization on or around April 14, and that Plaintiff soon after became aware

that her position specifically was up for elimination. It is also undisputed that the

reorganization was proposed as part of the new budget for the upcoming fiscal year, and that

the proposal was not retaliatory toward Plaintiff or anyone in the department. Thus,

Plaintiff’s position as an EDC was already being contemplated for termination well before

Plaintiff’s speech, and Plaintiff does not contend that the reorganization itself was retaliatory.

Rather, Plaintiff contends that it was her accelerated termination which shows a

retaliatory motive on the part of Defendants. The Court finds that Plaintiff fails to establish

a genuine issue of material fact on this point as well. It is undisputed that the City’s

information Security Officer, Busby, was concerned with Plaintiff’s emailing of city

documents to her personal email prior to the City Council retreat. It is also undisputed that

Mihelich gave Plaintiff coaching and support in speaking before the City Council. Plaintiff

was then seen shredding documents by Mihelich, City Attorney Bailey, and HR Director

Reynolds, and that Mihelich and Reynolds then met with Plaintiff to discuss her emailing of

City documents to her personal email. Finally, it is undisputed that Jerkovic, who did not

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speak before the City Council, was terminated on the same day as Plaintiff, after it was

discovered that Jerkovic too had discarded City documents.

Plaintiff’s evidence that her termination was motivated by her speech before the City

Council, on the other hand, rests on speculation; Plaintiff merely second-guesses the

legitimate reasons proffered by Defendants, and bases her speculation solely on her own

avowals that the proximity in time between her speech and her termination alone is enough

to infer improper motive. (Doc. 56.) 

The Court disagrees, and finds that Plaintiff has failed to allege specific facts

sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine dispute for trial. In light of the fact that the

proposed termination of Plaintiff’s position pre-dated her speech to the City Council, and that

another department employee was terminated at the same time for the same reason, Plaintiff’s

claims of improper retaliation do not raise a genuine issue of fact. Thus, the Court finds that

summary judgment in favor of Defendants is appropriate.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is

GRANTED. (Doc. 52.)

DATED this 30th day of September, 2012.

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