Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-3_06-cv-03002/USCOURTS-arwd-3_06-cv-03002-24/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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To avoid confusion, we will refer to the Johnstons by their first names.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

HARRISON DIVISION

ROBERT D. JOHNSTON; and

MELANIE K. JOHNSTON PLAINTIFFS

v. Civil No. 06-3002

JASON BRISCO, in his official 

capacity as an officer of the Harrison

Arkansas Police Department and in his

individual capacity; et al., DEFENDANTS

MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Before the undersigned for report and recommendation are the motions for summary

judgment filed by separate defendants Danny Hickman, Jason Day, and Boone County (Doc.

170)(the County Defendants), and separate defendants Jason Brisco, Lyle Smith, and Paul

Woodruff (Doc. 184)(the City Defendants). The plaintiffs responded to the County Defendants’

motion (Doc. 195) and the City Defendants’ motion (Doc. 206). 

BACKGROUND

Robert and Melanie Johnston live in Missouri and were returning home on Saturday,

January 3, 2004, traveling northbound on Highway 65 when Officer Jason Brisco of the Harrison

Police Department began traveling behind their vehicle. County Defts’ Exhibit 1 at 8-9 & 65;

City Defts’ Ex. 7 at ¶ 2-3. Robert Johnston was driving a Toyota 4-Runner and Melanie Johnston

and their two children were passengers in the vehicle. County Defts’ Ex. 1 at page 10 & page 1

12; Affidavit of Robert Johnston (Doc. 204) at ¶ 2.

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Melanie testified Robert had the cruise control set and was traveling at a rate of speed

that was four miles under the speed limit. County Defts’ Ex. 1 at 68-69. Robert stated they

previously noted the cruise control was “four miles per hour slower than what the speedometer

read, by checking what the Arkansas Department of Highways and Transportation mobile radar

unit registered.” Robert’s Affidavit (Doc. 204) at ¶ 2. See also Melanie’s Affidavit (Doc. 205)

at ¶ 2.

Robert noted the officer behind him and paid “close attention” to the road and was sure

“to use [his] signals and such.” Robert’s Affidavit at ¶ 3. Melanie testified she did not know

what the posted speed limit was. County Defts’ Ex. 1 at 69. Melanie noticed the patrol car

coming up close behind them and then backing off and then coming close again. County Defts’

Ex. 1 at 69. The Johnstons believed Brisco was probably trying to force them into making a

driving error. Id.

In Melanie’s estimation, Brisco followed the vehicle for approximately ten miles before

he pulled them over. County Defts’ Ex. 1 at page 9. Robert estimated the patrol car followed

them for ten minutes before they neared the Harrison city limits. Robert’s Affidavit at ¶ 3.

Robert felt the officer was “riding [his] tail” and trying to push him to go faster. Id. 

Melanie believes Brisco was well outside the city limits of Harrison when he began

following them. County Defts’ Ex. 1 at 9-10. However, Brisco did not put his lights on and pull

the vehicle over until they were within the city limits. Id.

At approximately 10:00 p.m., the Johnstons pulled off the road into a gas station, Bypass

Exxon. County Defts’ Ex. 1 at page 13 & 71. There were people standing just outside the door

of the station and on the sidewalk. Id. at 72. Robert felt is was a safe place for them to stop.

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Robert’s Affidavit at ¶ 5. See Melanie’s Affidavit at ¶ 9 (Robert “pulled into a gas station so that

we would be in a lighted environment, with other people present.”). 

Brisco approached the vehicle and obtained Robert’s driver’s license and insurance

information and returned to the patrol car. County Defts’ Ex. 1 at 10. When Robert asked why

Brisco had stopped them, Brisco replied they had been going “six over back by Ben Eddings.”

County Defts’ Ex. 1 at 72. Ben Eddings is a local business.

Robert asserts that Brisco had a “rather rude attitude.” Robert’s Affidavit at ¶ 6. Robert

also states he knew Brisco’s claims that he was speeding and driving all over the road were

untrue. Id. Nevertheless, Robert states, although he knew better, he cooperated and gave Brisco

his driver’s license and insurance card. Id. at ¶ 7. 

Brisco noted that the insurance card had expired and asked if they had a different one.

Melanie’s Affidavit at ¶ 14. Melanie replied that the policy was current but that she had not

replaced the card. Id. 

Robert indicates he was then puzzled by Brisco’s action of backing away from the

Johnstons’ vehicle. Robert’s Affidavit at ¶ 7. The children were asleep in the backseat. Id. at

¶ 8.

After what the Johnstons describe as a lengthy period of time, several minutes, they

indicate Brisco again approached the car and demanded that Robert get out. County Defts’ Ex.

1 at 10 & 74; Robert’s Affidavit at ¶ 9; Melanie’s Affidavit at ¶ 19 (Brisco returned pulling on

some gloves and told Robert to get out). Robert asserts Brisco’s attitude was even more

arrogant. Robert’s Affidavit at ¶ 9. 

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Robert asked why but Brisco refused to state a reason for wanting Robert to get out of

the vehicle. County Defts’ Ex. 1 at 10. Robert states he was very concerned about the nature of

Brisco’s business and asked “why, what did I do?” Robert’s Affidavit at ¶ 10. When Brisco

replied that he just wanted to talk to Robert, Robert stated “we are all family, we can talk here.”

Id. at ¶ 11. Robert states he tried calming Brisco down but he was “hell bent on getting [Robert]

out of the vehicle without cause, or reason.” Id. at ¶ 12. When Robert did not get out of the

vehicle, Melanie indicates Brisco became angry, his eyes were bulging, and he told Robert to get

out. Melanie’s Affidavit at ¶ 23. 

After repeated threats made by Brisco of “get out or I’ll pull you out” or “I’ll bust your

window,” Robert states he knew they were in a grave situation. Robert’s Affidavit at ¶ 13. See

also County Defts’ Ex. 1 at 10. Robert did not comply. County Defts’ Ex. 1 at 75. Robert asked

for an attorney. Id. at 78.

When Robert did not get out of the car, Melanie contends Brisco pulled out a telescoping

weapon, some kind of a club, and threatened to bust out the car window. County Defts’ Ex. 1

at 11 & 76. Robert indicates at this point he was stiff from driving for ten to twelve hours

because of chronic back pain and he asked Brisco for help getting out of the car. Robert’s

Affidavit at ¶ 14. Robert maintains Brisco replied: “Get out and I’ll give you help.” Id. at ¶ 15.

At this point, Melanie asserts she had begun to wonder if Brisco was a genuine officer

or someone impersonating an officer. Melanie Affidavit at ¶ 30. She then saw Robert glance

toward the passenger side. Id. at ¶ 31. When Melanie looked, she states she observed another

man on that side of the vehicle reaching for the door handle of the passenger door. Id.

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At about this time, Robert maintains Brisco lunged into his window, which Robert

indicates was halfway up to keep out the rain. Robert’s Affidavit at ¶ 16. As Brisco lunged,

Robert maintains Brisco hit Robert’s face with the baton. Id.

Brisco hit the driver’s side window glass causing it to break and also hit the car where

the Johnstons’ son was sitting. County Defts’ Ex. 1 at 11-12; Robert’s Affidavit at ¶ 18.

Although Brisco indicates that his arm was caught in the window when the Johnstons attempted

to drive away and he was forced to break the window, Melanie testified this was a “contrived

lie.” County Defts’ Ex. 1 at 98. She maintains Brisco’s arm was not in the window. Id. 

Melanie also testified that Brisco reached into the car and grabbed Robert and hit him in

the face. County Defts’ Ex. 1 at 12 & 77. After the window broke, the Johnstons drove away.

Id. at 12; Melanie’s Affidavit at ¶ 32 & ¶ 33. If they hadn’t driven away, Melanie testified she

believed the violence would have only escalated. County Defts’ Ex. 1 at 79.

Robert asserts they left the scene because he believed Brisco must have made a mistaken

identification and confused them with a dangerous person. Robert’s Affidavit at ¶ 19. Robert

maintains he left the scene in hopes of resolving the matter in a less violent way. Id. Melanie

maintains they had concluded there was clearly a case of mistaken identity and they needed to

get to Taney County, Missouri, where they lived and were known, to get the matter resolved.

Melanie Affidavit at ¶ 43.

Brisco’s version of the encounter differs from the Johnstons. Brisco testified he first saw

the Johnston vehicle when he was on Valley Springs on his way to Harrison. Plffs’ Ex. A at 4

(attached to Doc. 210). Brisco testified it was speed that first attracted him to the Johnston

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vehicle. Id. Brisco knew the vehicle was speeding because he looked at his speedometer. Id.

at 6. Brisco was speeding at the time. Id. 

Valley Springs is outside the city limits of Harrison. Plffs’ Ex. A at 4-5 (attached to Doc.

210). Brisco cannot stop a vehicle outside the Harrison city limits. Id. at 5 & 7. He had no

reason to believe that the occupants of the vehicle had committed any crime. Id. at 5.

Brisco followed the Johnston vehicle from Valley Springs to Harrison. Plffs’ Ex. A at

4-5 (attached to Doc. 210). Once in Harrison, Brisco contacted dispatch to request information

about the vehicle. Id. at 5. He was provided with the name and vehicle information. Id. at 7.

Brisco asserts that he witnessed the Johnstons’ vehicle weave onto a curb, travel on the

side of the road above the curb, and then come back down onto the highway. City Defts’ Ex. 7

at ¶ 4. Brisco states the Johnstons were also traveling six miles over the post speed limit. Id.

at ¶ 5.

According to Brisco, he then turned on his in-dash video recorder and continued traveling

behind the Johnstons’ vehicle. City Defts’ Ex. 7 at ¶ 6. The dash camera in his vehicle can be

turned on and off. Plffs’ Ex. A at 7 (attached to Doc. 210). The audio can be turned on and off

separately. Id. at 7-8. The dash camera does not record the radar. Id. at 8.

Brisco saw the Johnstons’ vehicle cross the traffic lines of the highway and weave close

to the curb on at least five occasions. City Defts’ Ex. 7 at ¶ 7. As the Johnston vehicle arrived

at a well lighted area, Brisco indicates he initiated a traffic stop. Id. at ¶ 8; Plffs’ Ex. A at 9

(attached to Doc. 210). By affidavit, Brisco indicated he had probable cause for the stop based

on the vehicle driving left of center, speeding, and because he had reason to believe the operator

was under the influence of a drug or alcohol. City Defts’ Ex. 7 at ¶ 5, ¶ 9 & ¶ 11. In his

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deposition, Brisco testified he was stopping the vehicle for speeding and driving left of center.

Plffs’ Ex. A at 9 (attached to Doc. 210). Brisco testified he initially intended to give Johnston

a written warning for these offenses rather than a citation. Id. at 11-12. 

After the Johnstons pulled into an Exxon station, Brisco got out of his car and

approached. City Defts’ Ex. 7 at ¶ 11. Robert rolled down his window. Id. at ¶ 12. Brisco

indicates that he advised Robert he was concerned about his driving because he was all over the

road and going six over the speed limit. Id. When Brisco asked Robert for his driver’s license

and proof of insurance, Robert acted nervously and was fidgeting. Id. at ¶ 13. Robert’s behavior

at this point was cooperative and polite. Plffs’ Ex. A at 12 (attached to Doc. 210).

Brisco testified he did not notice there were children in the back of the vehicle. Plffs’ Ex.

A at 12 (attached to Doc. 210). He did see some clothes and a blanket in the rear of the vehicle.

Id. 

Brisco went to his patrol unit to run a check on the license and registration. City Defts’

Ex. 7 at ¶ 15. Brisco walked backwards to his vehicle for safety reasons. Plffs’ Ex. A at 14-15

(attached to Doc. 210). Brisco did not write the warning ticket while he was in his vehicle. Id.

at 12. When Brisco ran Robert’s license, Brisco received no information to suggest that Robert

had committed any crime. Id. at 15.

Brisco turned the audio off on the dash camera for a period of time because he was

speaking with Officer Toland. Plffs’ Ex. A at 16 (attached to Doc. 210). Toland asked Brisco

if he needed assistance. Id. Brisco responded that he was going to do a field sobriety test. Id.

Brisco did not smell alcohol on Robert and had not asked him if he had been drinking. Id.

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Brisco testified he did not have any evidence to suggest Robert was under the influence of

anything. Id. at 17.

Brisco returned to the vehicle and asked Robert to step out of the vehicle because Brisco

wanted to speak to him. City Defts’ Ex. 7 at ¶ 16. Robert refused. Id. at ¶ 17. Brisco testified

he first asked Robert to get out of the vehicle and then when Robert refused commanded him to

exit the vehicle. Plffs’ Ex. A at 13 (attached to Doc. 210). At this point, Brisco maintains Robert

was no longer being courteous and police because he did not obeyBrisco’s command to exit the

vehicle. Plffs’ Ex. A at 13 (attached to Doc. 210). 

Brisco indicated Robert would have gotten an explanation when he got out of the vehicle.

Plffs’ Ex. A at 14 (attached to Doc. 210). Brisco wanted Robert to get out of the vehicle for a

field sobriety test. Id.

Brisco repeated his request. City Defts’ Ex. 7 at ¶ 17. Robert again refused and stated

the “good Lord told me I cannot get out.” Id. at ¶ 19. As Robert made this statement, he began

rolling up his window. Id. at ¶ 20. 

Brisco placed his left hand on the glass to prevent it from being rolled up all the way.

City Defts’ Ex. 7 at ¶ 21. Brisco maintains he repeatedly told Robert to get out of the car. Id.

at ¶ 22. 

At one point, Brisco indicates Robert stated he needed help. City Defts’ Ex. 7 at ¶ 25.

Brisco did not ask Robert what type of help he needed. City Defts’ Ex. 14 at 23.

Instead, Brisco asserts he responded that he wanted to give Robert help and to roll down

the window. City Defts’ Ex. 7 at ¶ 25; City Defts’ Ex. 14 at 23. At the time, Brisco had his Asp

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baton drawn. City Defts’ Ex. 14 at 23. Brisco drew the baton after the second or third time

Robert refused to exit the vehicle. Plffs’ Ex. A at 18 (attached to Doc. 210).

The baton is used for striking and/or striking people. Plffs’ Ex. A at 17 (attached to Doc.

210). Brisco had the baton out because Robert rolled the window up. Id. Brisco testified he did

not intend to strike Robert. Id. Brisco was wearing gloves because it was cold out and had put

them on before he made the stop. Id. at 18.

Brisco indicates he then told Robert if he did not roll the window down Brisco would

bust it out with his baton. City Defts’ Ex. 7 at ¶ 23. Brisco maintains he told Robert to get out

of the car and roll the window down at least ten times. Id. at ¶ 24.

Brisco also recalled that Robert asked to call an attorney. Plffs’ Ex. A at 20 (attached to

Doc. 210). Brisco responded: “No.” Id. 

When another officer arrived on the scene for backup, the Johnstons turned their heads.

City Defts’ Ex. 7 at ¶ 26. At this point, Brisco indicates he reached his right hand into the vehicle

in an attempt to unlock the driver’s side door. Id. at ¶ 27-28. See also Plffs’ Ex. A at 52

(attached to Doc. 210). Brisco maintains he did not hit Robert. City Defts’ Ex. 14 at 23. See

also Plffs’ Ex. A at 23-24 (attached to Doc. 210)(I reached both arms into the vehicle and had

my baton out. I did not hit, grab, or even touch Robert.). The Johnstons then began screaming

and Robert shifted the car into drive and began to drive away. City Defts’ Ex. 7 at ¶ 29.

Brisco indicates his left hand was still inside the vehicle as the Johnstons started to drive

away. City Defts’ Ex. 7 at ¶ 30. See also Plffs’ Ex. A at 26-27 (attached to Doc. 210)(My left

arm was caught in the window where my watch is. When the vehicle started moving, Imade the

decision to break the window). To free his hand, Brisco states he struck the window with his

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baton to break the glass as the Johnstons were driving away. City Defts’ Ex. 7 at ¶ 32. Brisco

asserts that he used the reasonable amount and degree of force reasonably necessary to prevent

the Johnstons from endangering his life. Id. at ¶ 33. 

Brisco struck the vehicle twice. Plffs’ Ex. A at 28 (attached to Doc. 210). The first strike

was to free his arm. Id. The second strike was just instinct–he kept striking until the threat went

away. Id. 

A copy of the dash camera video tape has been submitted to the court as City Defts’ Ex.

15. When the tape begins, at approximately time stamp 22:23:10, the patrol unit is following

behind the Johnston vehicle. During a portion of the video, the edge of the highway is marked

with a white line or fog line. 

At time stamp 22:25:00, the vehicle appears to veer slightly to the right and near or cross

over the fog line. City Defts’ Ex. 15. At time stamp 22:27:45, the car appears to cross over the

center line of the road on a curve. Id. Shortly thereafter, beginning at time stamp 22:28:07, the

car veers slightly to the left and appears to cross the center line. Id. At time stamp 22:28:42, the

car veers slight to the left and comes close to the center line. Id. At time stamp 22:29:41, the

car crosses the lane divider lines. Id. However, when the car changes lanes it uses it signals.

Id.

At time stamp 22:30:36, Brisco pulls the Johnstons’ car over utilizing his lights and siren.

City Defts’ Ex. 15. The audio recording is difficult to understand. Id. Initially, this difficulty

appears to stem from the fact that music, apparently from the patrol unit’s radio, can be heard

playing. Id. Brisco approaches the Johnston car and begins speaking with Robert indicating he

was concerned about Robert’s driving. Id. Brisco can be head informing Robert that he was

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speeding. Id. Brisco then obtains Robert’s license and registration or insurance. Id. Brisco

backs away from the Johnston car and returns to the patrol unit. Id.

At 22:35:51, Brisco returns to the car. City Defts’ Ex. 15. Brisco can be heard telling

Robert that he needs to talk to him and step out of the vehicle. Id. This is repeated several times.

Id.

Brisco then tells Robert to roll down the window or Brisco will bust it out. City Defts’

Ex. 15. Brisco repeatedly tells Robert to roll down the window. Id. Robert can be heard stating

that “we are all family here, we can talk.” Id. Robert can be heard stating that he can’t get out

because the “good Lord told me I cannot get out.” Id.

Robert indicates that he needs help. City Defts’ Ex. 15. Brisco replies that he wants to

help Robert and for him to roll the window down. Id.

During this exchange, Brisco is standing next to the driver’s window it appears with his

left hand on the window. City Defts’ Ex. 15. When another officer arrives, he stands on the

passenger side of the vehicle towards the rear of the vehicle. Id. 

When the other officer arrives, Brisco reaches his arm into the car and the brake lights

flash on. City Defts’ Ex. 15. Melanie can be heard saying: “Do not.” Id. As the vehicle starts

to drive away, Brisco strikes twice at the vehicle. Id. It appears that he strikes first the driver’s

door window and then the rear driver’s side window. Id. 

At 22:37:57, the Johnston vehicle can be seen quickly leaving the Exxon station. City

Defts’ Ex. 15. The tape then shows Brisco and other vehicles pursuing the Johnstons down a

number of streets in Harrison and onto various highways and roads outside Harrison. Id. During

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the pursuit, the Johnston vehicle can be seen running a number of stop signs, driving across at

least one yard, and taking various actions to avoid the police cars pursuing. Id. 

A narrative report prepared by Brisco indicates the pursuit lasted one hour and twentytwo minutes and covered one hundred and twelve miles. Plffs’ Ex. 2 (attached to Doc. 210).

Speeds reached 105 miles per hour. Id. 

After they left the Exxon, Melanie indicates they were followed by Brisco and other

police cars. County Defts’ Ex. 1 at 13. Melanie characterized the pursuit as a “low speed chase”

and indicated the highest speed their car attained was 75. County Defts’ Ex. 1 at 15. At one

point, Melanie testified the officers attempted to block the Johnstons in but they were

unsuccessful. Id. at 84.

The Johnstons did not pull over again because they had already been assaulted by an

officer. County Defts’ Ex. 1 at page 16. They had a 22 Ruger pistol under one of the seats. Id.

The pistol was not loaded although there were shells for the gun in a bag inside the glove box.

Id. at page 17. 

Hickman first became aware of the pursuant after the Johnstons left the Harrison city

limits. Plffs’ Ex. 1 at 4 (Doc. 197). During the pursuit, the Johnstons crossed into Missouri and

then back into Arkansas. Id. After the Johnstons returned to Arkansas, Hickman met up with

officers who were out but not in pursuit to maintain safety. Id. The only information Hickman

had at the time was that a pursuit was going on. Id. 

After an hour or more, the officers shot at the Johnstons car. County Defts’ Ex. 1 at page

18. Melanie saw an officer in a shooting stance, heard shots fired, heard shots hit the car, and

has a bullet that was extracted from one of the tires. Id. She believes at least two bullets hit the

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tire. Id. at 83. To her knowledge there were no bullet holes in the car except for in the tires. Id.

at 19. One bullet was removed from a tire and she believes one bullet exited the tire. Id. at 19.

The car then left the road, went down a hill, and among some trees before it came to a

stop. County Defts’ Ex. 1 at 20. No police were around the car when it came to a stop. Id. at

21. 

The Johnstons got out of the car and walked away from the car but did not go back

toward the road. County Defts’ Ex. 1 at page 21. In Melanie’s words, they were attempting to

evade injury by the police and running for their lives. Id. at 21 & 31 They did not take anything

from the car with them-- not even their coats. Id. at 31. With respect to the gun, Melanie

testified they did not even recall the gun was in the car until they were told about it by the police.

Id. at 26-27.

After the Johnstons left their vehicle, Hickman called a helicopter to join in the search.

Plffs’ Ex. 1 at 4-5 (Doc. 197). Hickman testified there were signs there might have “been

weapons and stuff” for the safety of people in the county he believed it was necessary to use

other resources. Id. at 5.

After they saw what was in the car, Hickman testified they realized there were children

in the vehicle. Plffs’ Ex. 1 at 6 (Doc. 197). Hickman testified none of his officers were involved

in shooting at the Johnston vehicle and he was not aware that there might have been a shot fired

until later on that evening. Id.

According to Melanie, the Johnstons were lost in the woods until daybreak. County

Defts’ Ex. 1 at 22. They could hear all terrain vehicles, dogs,see spotlightsshining in the woods,

and heard a helicopter. Melanie’s Affidavit at ¶¶ 48-49. They were all dressed in jeans and teeCase 3:06-cv-03002-RTD Document 213 Filed 05/08/07 Page 13 of 53 PageID #:

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shirts. County Defts’ Ex. 1 at 22. Her son got sick during the night. Id. at 85. At daybreak, the

Johnstons found a farm and some outbuildings. Id. at 23. They spent an hour or more in an

outbuilding attempting to get warm. Id. When they could not get warm, they entered the home

through the kitchen window. Id. There was no phone in the house. Id. at 24.

They got some blankets and dry clothes and then slept. County Defts’ Ex. 1 at 24. When

they woke up, they got some food for their children. Id. They then packed some supplies and

were going to try to walk to their home in Missouri which was about sixty or seventy miles. Id.

at 24-25. They aborted their plan and came back to the farm house immediately. Id.

The Johnstons remained at the farm house until sometime in the evening on Monday,

January 5, 2004, when SWAT arrived. County Defts’ Ex. 1 at 26. According to Hickman, on

January 5th, county and state officers went to the farmhouse to apprehend the Johnstons. Plffs’

Ex. 1 at 7 (Doc. 197). Hickman was not at the scene. Id. at 8. He did not believe the children

were ever considered a threat. Id. He did not know why the children were forced to lie spread

eagle on the ground. Id.

According to Melanie, when SWAT using a megaphone told Robert to come out with his

hands up, he went to the window and asked officers for an opportunity for them to put their own

clothes on. County Defts’ Ex. 1 at 26. The Johnstons then left the house. Id. All four of them

were required to lie face down spread eagle on the porch. Id. at 27. Guns were pointed at them

and the police had dogs there. Id.

Robert was handcuffed and taken to a squad car while Melanie was handcuffed and taken

back in the house with her children. County Defts’ Ex. 1 at 27. The Johnstons’ belongings were

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gathered and then Melanie and her children were put in a squad car and transported to Harrison.

Id. 

After they got to jail, Melanie was told to shower and change into a jail uniform. County

Defts’ Ex. 29. She was then informed by a Department of Human Services (DHS) employee that

her children were going to be taken away from her. County Defts’ Ex. at 29. Melanie asked that

the children go to their grandparents, Roberts’ parents. Id. at 30.

Following her discussion with the DHS employee, Melanie was interviewed by Bob King

and Paul Woodruff. County Defts’ Ex. 1 at 32. She was asked about the events of the night of

January 3rd. Id. According to Melanie, Woodruff also lied to her and told her that the children

had lice. Id.

Melanie was then taken to a cell and she maintains she was left there for two days

without being allowed to make a phone call. County Defts’ Ex. 1 at 33. She was charged with

aggravated assault on a police officer, felony fleeing, endangering the welfare of a minor,

carrying a weapon, burglary, and theft. Id. at 33-34. 

Melanie contends the bail set on them was excessive because they had “actually”

committed no crimes. County Defts’ Ex. 1 at 53. She contends they were not a flight risk. Id.

at 53-54.

The Johnstons retained Johnny Nichols to represent them in January of 2004. County

Defts’ Ex. 1 at 147. On January 9, 2004, the plaintiffs appeared in court before Judge John

Putman. Complaint at ¶ 73. They were represented by Johnny Nichols. Id. Plaintiffs indicate

they were both charged with aggravated assault on Brisco as a result of a lie he told. Id. at ¶ 74.

Specifically, plaintiffs maintain Brisco lied about his arm being caught in the window. Id.

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On January 13, 2004, plaintiffs appeared before Judge Gary Isbell and were given an

immediate unsupervised extended home visit with their children. County Defts’ Ex. 1 at 148-

149; Complaint at ¶ 77. Melanie points out there were documents filed in the juvenile court case

that state the children should remain in the custody of DHS because of the continued

incarceration of the Johnstons. County Defts’ Ex. 1 at 148-149. This was true despite the fact

that it was well known to everyone in the courtroom that they were not incarcerated at the time.

Id. In fact, Melanie states they appeared in their own clothing and were given permission to

travel from the hearing to Yellville to get the children for an extended home visit. Id. at 149. 

It was four more weeks, on February 13, 2004, before the Johnstons got custody of their

children back following a second hearing. County Defts’ Ex. 1 at 157 & 160. During this time,

the children were in the custody of DHS. Id.

In the interim, on February 4, 2004, Johnny Nichols withdrew in the criminal case.

County Defts’ Ex. 1 at 125 & 147. The Johnstons hired Erwin Davis to represent them on

February 4, 2004. County Defts’ Ex. 1 at 112-113 & 124. During the period of time Davis

represented them, the Johnstons were not in jail. Id. at 113. Davis arranged for Nichols to

continue to represent the Johnstons in connection with the case pending in juvenile court

regarding their children. Id. at 125 & 147. 

The Johnstons believed Davis should have moved for dismissal of the charges against

them. County Defts’ Ex. 1 at 114. Furthermore, Davis requested a continuance of the trial that

was scheduled for June 21 or June 22, 2004, despite the Johnstons’ stating that they did not want

a continuance. Id. at 114. Davis was allowed to withdraw in October of 2004. Id. at 112 & 125.

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Approximately ten months after the traffic stop, based on what Melanie testified was a

“falsified” lab analysis, the Johnstons were charged with the simultaneous possession of drugs

and a firearm. County Defts’ Ex. 1 at 90-91. The charges were later dropped. Id. at 91.

The Johnstons retained Michael Dodson and Joseph Paul Smith in early April of 2005.

County Defts’ Ex. 1 at 35, 112 & 180. The Johnstons, who had been representing themselves,

had a court appearance scheduled for April 8, 2005, and had been given until that day to retain

new counsel. Id. at 180-181. Melanie testified she requested that Dodson enter an appearance

on their behalf and that he file a motion for change of venue or a motion asking the judge to

recuse. Id. at 181. The Johnstons did not plan to attend the hearing. Id. at 183-184.

On the morning of April 8, 2005, Dodson phoned the Johnstons and told them he had

been instructed by the Judge that the Johnstons had to appear at the Boone County Courthouse

in Harrison that day. County Defts’ Ex. 1 at 35 & 186. Depending on traffic, it takes the

Johnstons between an hour and an hour and a half to travel from their home to the courthouse

in Harrison. Id. at 187. 

When theywere a couple of blocks from the courthouse, Melanie testified Dodson called

one of their cell phones to advise them that police were waiting on the courthouse lawn for them

and they should exit their car with their hands in the air. County Defts’ Ex. 1. at 35-36, 188 &

192. At some point, Dodson indicated it was a “show of force.” Id. at 188. The Johnstons had

their children with them. Id. After discussing it, the Johnstons decided they did not want the

children to witness a show of force against their parents and didn’t want the children to be taken

from their custody again. Id. at 188-189. The Johnstons decided to turn around and not go to

the courthouse. Id. at 189. Melanie testified she informed Dodson this was what they intended

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to do and he should go ahead and make a motion for change of venue and fight for their rights.

Id.

According to the deposition of Danny Hickman, the Boone County Prosecuting

Attorney’s Office had received evidence from the Taney County, Missouri, authorities that

threats had been made. City Defts’ Ex.11 at page 9. Specifically, Robert allegedly told friends

that April 8th would be a day of reckoning in Boone County. Id. See also Plffs’ Ex. 1 at 10

(Doc. 197).

Hickman received the information either late in the evening on April 7th or early morning

on April 8th. Plffs’ Ex. 1 at 11 (Doc. 197). The threat was taken seriously since it involved a

judge and the courthouse. Id. Hickman did not have time to investigate the threat. Id.

Hickman also testified he was told “they were possibly gathering guns up and they was

going to be coming to Boone County for a day of reckoning” on the Johnstons’ court date. City

Defts’ Ex. 11 at 10. In response, the courthouse was made secure. Id. At the request of the

Boone County Sheriff’s Office, the Harrison Police Department sent five of its officers to the

courthouse on April 8, 2005. City Defts’ Ex. 12 at 11. The Boone County Sheriff’s Office had

five or six officers there including Hickman. Plffs’ Ex. 1 at 14 (Doc. 197). 

Hickman told the Johnstons’ attorney to have the Johnstons come directly to Hickman

and he would make sure they got into the courthouse safely. Plffs’ Ex. 1 at 12 (Doc. 197).

Hickman indicated they had no intention of apprehending the Johnstons. Id. at 13. Instead, they

only intended to protect everyone at the courthouse. Id. Three doors of the courthouse were

locked and all people entering had to go through a metal detector. Id. at 14. The Johnstons

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would have gone through metal detectors. Id. If they had guns, it would have been dealt with

at that time. Id. 

Melanie testified theybelieved since theyhad counsel to represent them they did not have

to be at court. County Defts’ Ex. 1 at 36. However, Melanie indicated Dodson made it clear to

them that their leaving was against his recommendations. Id. at 189.

Melanie indicated they had filed a complaint with the Arkansas Judiciary Discipline

Committee against Judge Webb. County Defts’ Ex. 1 at 36. One of the things Dodson was going

to address that day was their request that Webb recuse himself and also ask for a change of

venue. Id. at 36. However, Melanie indicates their requests were denied and warrants issued for

their arrest for felony failure to appear. Id. at 36.

When the Johnstons left Harrison, they went home. County Defts’ Ex. 1 at 192. They

then left for Colorado that day. Id. at 140 & 194. The Johnstons were arrested at a friend’s

house in Weld County, Colorado, on April 27, 2005. County Defts’ Ex. 1 at 39, 111 & 196. 

The Johnstons were in jail in Colorado approximately eleven days. County Defts’ Ex. 1.

at 40. They were then transported back Arkansas and arrived on May 8th and were placed in

Boone County Jail. Id. at 41 & 199. On May 20th, a bond hearing was held on the failure to

appear charges. Id. at 199-200. 

Melanie remained in jail until she signed a plea agreement on July 22, 2005. County

Defts’ Ex. 1 at 42. She contends she was incarcerated under unconstitutional conditions

including the following: she was not allowed to make phone calls; she was denied access to law

books; male jailers were constantly at the side of women inmates while women jailers rarely

made an appearance; she was housed with convicted felons; the meals she was served were not

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nutritious; the bed linens were not changed; she was forced to shower in front of a window; and

she was not allowed outside exercise for weeks at a time. County Defts’ Ex. 1 at 46, 48-49.

On July 22, 2005, Dodson and Joseph Paul Smith informed plaintiffs a plea agreement

had been worked out for them that involved probation for both the plaintiffs. County Defts’ Ex.

1 at 208-209. The Johnstons indicated they would accept the agreement, even though they were

not guilty, in the interest of being with their children again. Id. at 210.

A short time later, Dodson and Smith came back and said the agreement included a short

prison sentence for Robert but he wouldn’t ever actually see the inside of the prison. County

Defts’ Ex. 1 at 211. Just prior to going into court that day, the Johnstons were presented with a

plea agreement which indicated Roberts was going to receive a three year prison sentence. Id.

at 212. Dodson and Smith indicated Robert would probably do all the time in Boone County or

perhaps go to diagnostics to be evaluated for health reasons. Id. at 212-213. 

Melanie entered into three separate plea agreements on July 22, 2005. City Defts’ Ex.

1-3. The first plea agreement covers Boone County Circuit Court case no. 2004-03-4 and

indicates Melanie was charged with the following offenses: simultaneous possession of drugs

and firearms; aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer, three counts; fleeing in a vehicle;

possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine; endangering the welfare of a minor,

second degree, two counts; and carrying a weapon, two counts. City Defts’ Ex. 1. The

agreement provided that the State would dismiss the charges of simultaneous possession of drugs

and firearms, possession of a controlled substance, endangering the welfare of a minor, and

carrying a weapon in return for Melanie pleading guilty to one count of aggravated assault

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(Officer Brisco) and fleeing in a vehicle. Id. The agreement indicated Melanie would receive

a sentence of five years probation to run concurrently on each felony count. Id.

The second plea agreement covers Boone County Circuit Court case no. 2004-11-3 and

indicates Melanie was charged with residential burglary and theft of property. City Defts’ Ex.

2. Melanie agreed to plead guilty in return for a sentence of five years probation on the burglary

charge and one year probation on the theft of property charge with the terms of probation to run

concurrently. Id. 

The third plea agreement covers Boone County Circuit Court case no. 2005-104-4 and

indicates Melanie was charged with failure to appear. City Defts’ Ex. 3. Melanie agreed to plead

guilty in return for a sentence of five years probation. Id. 

Robert also entered into three separate plea agreements on July 22, 2005. City Defts’ Ex.

4-6. The first plea agreement covers Boone County Circuit Court case no. 2004-04-4 and

indicates Robert was charged with the following: simultaneous possession of drugs and

firearms; aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer, three counts; fleeing in a vehicle;

possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine; endangering the welfare of a minor,

second degree, two counts; carrying a weapon, two counts; reckless driving; and speeding in

excess of fifteen miles per hour over the posted limit. City Defts’ Ex. 4. The agreement provided

the state would dismiss the charges of simultaneous possession of drugs and firearms, possession

of a controlled substance, endangering the welfare of a minor, carrying a weapon, reckless

driving, and speeding in return for Robert pleading guilty to one count of aggravated assault

(Officer Brisco) and felony fleeing. Id. Robert was to receive a sentence of three years in the

Arkansas Department of Correction to run concurrently on each count. Id. 

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The second plea agreement covered Boone County Circuit Court case no. 2004-10-4.

City Defts’ Ex. 5. This agreement indicates Robert was charged with residential burglary and

theft of property. Id. The agreement was that Robert would plead guilty in return for a sentence

of five years probation on the burglary count and one year probation on the theft of property

count with the terms of probation to run concurrently. Id. 

The third plea agreement covers Boone County Circuit Court case no. 2005-105-3. City

Defts’ Ex. 6. This agreement indicates Robert was charged with failure to appear. Id. Robert

agreed to plead guilty in return for a sentence of five years probation. Id. 

By affidavit, Paul Woodruffstates he is an officer with the Harrison Police Department.

City Defts’ Ex. 8 at ¶ 2. Prior to doing an interview with Melanie at the Boone County Sheriff’s

Department, Woodruff states he had been told by a DHS employee that the Johnston children

had lice. Id. at ¶ 8. 

With respect to any statements he made to the local newspaper regarding the Johnston

case, Woodruff asserts the statements were true to the best of his knowledge at the time he made

the statements. City Defts’ Ex. 8 at ¶ 9. During his deposition, Woodruff indicated in response

to a question from the newspaper he had stated that no drugs or alcohol had been found. City

Defts’ Ex. 13 at 8. 

With respect to the box of evidence, Woodruff states he transported a box of evidence

related to the Johnstons’ criminal case to the Arkansas State Crime Lab in Little Rock. City

Defts’ Ex. 8 at ¶ 4. See also City Defts’ Ex. 13 at 9. Woodruff indicates he did not know what

was in the box, did not open the box, did not remove anything from the box, and did not add

anything to the box. City Defts’ Ex. 8 at ¶ 5-6. Woodruff did not do the chemical analysis on

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anything that might have been submitted as evidence related to the prosecution of the Johnstons.

Id. at ¶ 7. 

Woodruff indicated he went to the courthouse on April 8, 2005, in response to

information received regarding the Johnstons. City Defts’ Ex. 13 at 12. Woodruff had been

informed by the sheriff’s office that a threat had been made to court personnel by the Johnstons.

Id. at 13. Woodruff believed it was a threat of violence. Id. 

The court has also been provided with the affidavit of Lyle Smith, the Chief of Police of

the Harrison Police Department. City Defts’ Ex. 9 at ¶ 2. Smith asserts he was not present at the

initial stop of the Johnstons, the pursuit, or any of the events giving rise to the lawsuit. Id. at ¶

5-7.

Smith asserts he has never had to discipline Brisco for the use of excessive force, there

has never been an excessive force lawsuit filed against Brisco, and there have been no citizen

complaints about Brisco using excessive force. City Defts’ Ex. 9 at ¶ 9-11. 

The complaint asserts sixteen separate counts. In count one, plaintiffs allege a violation

of their First Amendment rights. Specifically, they allege they were denied the right to have the

facts of their case heard. Complaint (Doc. 86) at ¶ 128. They maintain Judge Webb refused to

rule on motions filed in his court or even acknowledge their multiple requests that he review the

facts of the case, the evidence of their innocence, and the violations of their civil rights. 

In count two, plaintiffs allege a violation of their Second Amendment right to keep arms.

They point out a pistol that was in their vehicle was seized by the Harrison Police Department.

Complaint at ¶ 132. They allege the pistol remains in the possession of the police department

and all motions to return the seized property have been ignored by the State of Arkansas and

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Judge Webb. Id. Further, they allege their right to keep arms has forever been infringed by their

forced acceptance of the false felony charges. Id. at ¶ 133.

In count three, plaintiffs allege violations of their Fourth Amendment right to be free from

unreasonable searches and seizures. Plaintiff allege Brisco had no reason to demand that Robert

exit his vehicle. Complaint at ¶ 138. Further, they allege the property that was seized was not

illegal to possess and was not used in any crime. Id. at ¶ 139. Plaintiffs allege “defendants”

failed to provide acceptable standards of management, training, supervision, and discipline of

the officers and agencies. Id. at ¶ 140. It is alleged “defendants” knew of this unconstitutional

conduct being endured by the plaintiffs and failed to take corrective action. Id.

In count four, plaintiffs allege violations of the Fifth Amendment right to due process.

Specifically, they allege they were deprived of their freedom and property although they had

committed no crime. Complaint at ¶ 144. They indicate an indictment was issued by Fred

Kirkpatrick based on a false affidavit prepared by Brisco. Id. They assert a probable cause order

was signed by Judge Putman although he had spoken to neither of the plaintiffs. Id. at ¶ 145.

Further, plaintiffs allege they were denied the right to contact anyone, denied the right to a

prompt first appearance, and denied the right to a formal arraignment. Id. at ¶ 146. 

In count five, entitled violation of Sixth Amendment right to trial by an impartial jury,

plaintiffs allege that they hired counsel to assist in their defense, Nichols, Davis, Dodson, and

Smith, and no counsel assisted or defended them. Complaint at ¶ 153. Plaintiffs allege Nichols,

Davis, Dodson, and Smith acted contrary to plaintiffs’ bests interests and direct instructions. Id.

Plaintiffs allege the defendants acted under the color and pretense of state law, statutes,

ordinances, regulations, or customs. Id. at ¶ 155. It is further alleged defendants adopted a

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policy of the wrongful execution of judgments and deprivation of due process rights and other

civil rights of citizens including the plaintiffs. Id. 

In count six, plaintiffs allege a violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition against

excessive bail and cruel and unusual punishment. Plaintiffs allege excessive bail was set in

January of 2004 and again in May of 2005. Complaint at ¶¶ 160-161. Further, they contend the

amount of the fines were excessive. Id. at ¶ 162. 

Plaintiffs allege the “show of force” orchestrated against the Johnstons was cruel and

unusual and an attempt was made to vilify them through a slanderous report in the newspaper.

Complaint at ¶ 163. They maintain the custodial interference and disruption of their serene

family life amounted to cruel and inhumane punishment inflicted on the entire family. Id. at ¶

164.

In count seven, plaintiffs assert violations of their Fourteenth Amendment Due Process

Right to a Fair and Impartial Trial. Plaintiffs maintain Judge Webb should have recused himself

after they filed a complaint against him. Complaint at ¶ 169. Plaintiffs allege Nichols, Davis,

Dodson, and Smith were employed to assist the plaintiffs and ensure their rights were exercised

for their benefit. Id. at ¶ 170. Instead, it is alleged plaintiffs were denied such assistance and

plaintiffs’ rights were waived without their knowledge or consent. Id. 

Plaintiffs allege they were charged with, and arrested for, failure to appear when there was

an armed force waiting for them at the courthouse. Complaint at ¶ 171. Plaintiffs maintain

Dodson made an appearance for them but his appearance was not entered so that they could be

falsely charged and forced into a plea agreement. Id.

In count eight, plaintiffs assert violations of their Fourteenth Amendment Procedural Due

Process rights. Plaintiffs allege they were not provided with paperwork involving the case,

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hearings on the custody issues were held ex parte, and they were informed of a court appearance

with less than twenty-four hours notice. Complaint at ¶ 177. Plaintiffs allege their rights to

procedural due process were violated. Id. at ¶ 178. 

In count nine, plaintiffs asserts violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Equal Rights Under the

Law. Plaintiffs maintain their rights to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for

the security of persons have been, and are being, violated by the defendants. Complaint at ¶ 183.

Plaintiffs allege they were criminally charged based on the word of one lying individual Id. at

¶ 184. Plaintiffs assert they were denied proper proceedings in order to testify openly regarding

the facts of the case. Id. at ¶ 185. 

In count ten, plaintiffs assert general violations of their civil rights under 42 U.S.C. §

1983. They allege:

Defendants, under color of statute, ordinance, or custom subjected the Plaintiffs

to the deprivation of rights, privileges and immunities secured by the United

States Constitution and laws including but not limited to: (a) Deprivation of the

right to be secure in his person; (b) Deprivation of the protection against

excessive bail, fines, and cruel and unusual punishment; (c) Deprivation of the

right to due process at law; (d) Deprivation of the right of equal protection under

the law; (e) Deprivation of the right to redress; (f) Deprived of rights to privileges

[and] immunities of the law; (g) deprived of the rights of free speech; and (h)

Deprived of the right to counsel and access to the courts.

Complaint at ¶ 193. They assert the defendants had the authority for, and were directly

responsible for, the operation, training, and supervision of the Boone County Sheriff’s Office

and the Harrison Police Department. Id. at ¶ 194.

Count eleven, conspiracy to interfere with rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, alleges all

defendants conspired to, and did deter, by force, intimidation, and threat the due course of justice

with the intent to deny the plaintiffs the equal protection of the laws. Complaint at ¶¶ 200-201.

Similarly, count twelve, action for neglect to prevent under 42 U.S.C. § 1986, alleges each and

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every defendant had the opportunity and obligation to assist the plaintiffs in their pursuit of

justice and instead chose to further the wrongs against the plaintiffs. Id. at ¶ 208.

Count thirteen purports to allege violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Count fourteen is

entitled “false imprisonment/wrongful execution of judgment.” This count alleges that as the

result of the wilful actions of each and every defendant the plaintiffs were imprisoned against

their will and against the laws of the United States and their children illegally removed from their

custody. Complaint at ¶ 218. 

Count fifteen alleges a First Amendment retaliation claim. Plaintiffs assert that all of the

defendants knowingly, with sadistic and malicious intent, acting in concert, attempted to

circumvent justice by implementing and advocating a tidal wave of fear, intimidation, and

violence against the plaintiffs. Complaint at ¶ 226. 

Finally, in count sixteen, plaintiffs maintain that each and every defendant has violated

RICO and caused the plaintiffs to be imprisoned against their will. Id. at ¶ 236. Defendants

pattern of racketeering activity is alleged to include causing citizens to expend time for court

appearances and expend money to pay court costs, fines, and fees as a result of defendants’

unlawful acts, false reports, and false arrests. Id. at ¶ 233. Defendants are further alleged to

discourage thorough investigations of underlying allegations of unlawful detainment, false

reports, police brutality, and denial of due process. Id.

DISCUSSION

As noted above, there are two separate motions for summary judgment pending. After

setting forth the applicable standard, we will address each summary judgment motion in turn.

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Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate if, after viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences

in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986), the record "show[s] that

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). "Once a party moving for summary judgment has

made a sufficient showing, the burden rests with the non-moving party to set forth specific facts,

by affidavit or other evidence, showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists." Nat’l Bank

of Commerce v. Dow Chem. Co., 165 F.3d 602, 607 (8th Cir.1999). 

The non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical

doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. "They must show there is sufficient

evidence to support a jury verdict in their favor." Nat’l Bank, 165 F.3d 607 (citing Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986)). "A case

founded on speculation or suspicion is insufficient to survive a motion forsummary judgment."

Id. (citing Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 625 (8th Cir. 1985)). 

Motion for Summary Judgment by Danny Hickman, Jason Day and Boone County

Danny Hickman, the Sheriff of Boone County, Arkansas, and Jason Day, Deputy

Sheriff/Jail Administrator, move for judgment as a matter of law on the remaining claims against

them. They point out that on January 17, 2007 (Doc. 164), all claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981,

1985, 1986, 1987, 1988 and RICO were dismissed with prejudice. Moreover, the same order

dismissed the claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for false arrest/false imprisonment as

barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 129 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1994). This

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The County Defendants argue they have been sued in their official capacities only. See County Defts’ Brief (Doc. 2

171) at page 2. However, a review of the complaint clearly shows that plaintiffs have sued Danny Hickman and Jason Day

in both their official and individual capacities. See Amended Complaint (Doc. 86) at 1.

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leaves plaintiffs claims that Hickman is liable for the actions taken by the officers during the

pursuit, including the firing of shots at the plaintiffs, the apprehension of the plaintiffs, the fact

that charges were filed against them, the amount of bail that was set, and a show of force against

them on April 8, 2005. Additionally, plaintiffs contend their rights were violated in a number

of ways by the conditions under which they were held at the Boone County Jail.

2

(A). Use of Force

With respect to the alleged use of force by Brisco, the plaintiffs have admitted that

Hickman has no responsibility for officers employed by the Harrison Police Department. See

e.g., County Defts’ Ex. 1 at 42. Plaintiffs are unable to identify the officer who allegedly fired

shots at the tires of the plaintiffs’ vehicle on January 3, 2004. Id. at 18-19. The only testimony

offered suggesting the identity of the shooter indicates he is believed to have been Jerry Watts

of the Arkansas State Police. See e.g., Plffs’ Ex. J at 7 (attached to Doc. 204). Hickman

obviously had no responsibility for officers employed by the Arkansas State Police. Id. 

Plaintiffs cannot identify the officers who were at the farmhouse, forced them to spread

eagle, held guns on them, handcuffed them, and took them into custody. County Defts’ Ex. 1 at

28. Hickman testified he was not present at the traffic stop, was not personally involved in the

pursuit although he did go to the area the pursuit was being conducted in, and was not present

at the farmhouse. Plffs’ Ex. 1 at 4-8 (attached to Doc. 197). 

“Liability under section 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the

deprivation of rights. To establish personal liability of the supervisory defendants, [the

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plaintiffs] must allege specific facts of personal involvement in, or direct responsibility for, a

deprivation of [their] constitutional rights.” Clemmons v. Armontrout, 477 F.3d 962, 967 (8th

Cir. 2007)(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). General responsibility for supervising

the operations of a Sheriff’s Department is insufficient to establish personal involvement. Id.

To the extent plaintiffs seeks to hold Hickman liable merely because he has supervisory

authority over all county officers, this general supervisory authority is an insufficient basis to

hold him liable. See e.g., Kahle v. Leonard, 477 F.3d 544, 550 (8th Cir. 2007)(A failure-tosupervise claim may be maintained only if the official demonstrated deliberate indifference or

tacit authorization of the offensive acts).

Finally, with respect to the alleged show of force at the Boone County Courthouse, the

County Defendants maintain the mere threat of force, without more, does not violate the

constitution. The Eighth Circuit has held that a “threat constitutes an actionable constitutional

violation only when the threat is so brutal or wantonly cruel as to shock the conscience, or if the

threat exerts coercive pressure on the plaintiff and the plaintiff suffers the deprivation of a

constitutional right.” King v. Olmstead, 117 F.3d 1065, 1067 (8th Cir. 1997). Certainly the

threat of the use of force, particularly deadly force, for no legitimate law enforcement purpose,

could state a constitutional violation. See e.g., Black v. Stephens, 662 F.2d 181 (3d Cir.

1981)(plain-clothes officer’s conduct in pointing his weapon at the head of a motorist, without

any legitimate law enforcement purpose, was sufficient to satisfy the shocks-the-conscience

standard). See also Hawkins v. Holloway, 316 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2003)(sheriff pulling gun

on employees and threatening to shoot them–genuine issue of material fact as to whether his

conduct amounted to a sincere threat of violence rather than a joke–agreeing with Black’s

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holding that an official’s threat to employ deadly force for no legitimate reason rises to a

substantive due process violation). 

In this case, however, Hickman testified at his deposition that law enforcement personnel

were dispatched to the courthouse on April 8th in response to a report received from Taney

County Missouri officials that a threat had been made by the plaintiffs. Although the plaintiffs

may contend they were not a threat, nothing has been submitted to the court to dispute

Hickman’s assertion that such a report was received. The fact that this information was received

by Hickman provides a legitimate reason for law enforcement personnel to be dispatched to the

courthouse. 

The Johnstons were represented by counsel and their counsel was present at the

courthouse and speaking to them on their cell phone when they made the decision to not appear

for court. The Johnstons had not witnessed the alleged use of force, spoken to Hickman or any

other law enforcement personnel, and were not told by their attorney that they were going to be

harmed, assaulted, or arrested when they arrived at the courthouse. Instead, they were merely

told to get out of their car with their hands in the air. See e.g., County Defts’ Ex. 1 at 36. 

 (B). Criminal Charges and Setting of Bail

The Arkansas Constitution provides that only a prosecutor can file a criminal information

or indictment. Ark. Const. amend. 21, § 1. The filing of criminal charges and the choice of what

charges to file is entirely within the prosecutor’s discretion. See e.g., State v. Murphy, 315 Ark.

68, 864 S. W. 2d 842 (1992). A circuit judge has no authority to amend a charge brought by a

prosecuting attorney. See e.g., State v. Brooks, 360 Ark. 499, 202 S.W. 3d 508 (2005).

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A prosecuting attorney is an elected official. “The office of Prosecuting Attorney is a

constitutional office which operates in a quasi-judicial capacity.” Venhaus v. Brown, 286 Ark.

229, 232, 691 S. W. 2d 141 (1985). The prosecuting attorney performs his functions in a

subdivision of the state, a district. See e.g., Simes v. Crumbly, 368 Ark. 1, ___ S. W. 3d ___

(2006); Morrow v. Strait, 186 Ark. 384, 53 S. W. 2d 857 (1932). In this case, the prosecuting

attorney for the Fourteenth Judicial District.

“Incumbent prosecuting attorneys, like all Constitutional officers, have the right and the

duty to perform the functions of their office until they are legally removed from office or legally

disqualified to act.” Venhaus, 286 Ark. at 232. The Circuit Courts have the authority to appoint

a special prosecutor to assist in the investigation, indictment, and prosecution of a prosecuting

attorney alleged to have committed a crime in his own district. See e.g., Weems v. Anderson, 257

Ark. 376, 516 S. W. 2d 895 (1974). 

Similarly circuit and district judges are Constitutional officers who are elected to serve

within a judicial district. Ark. Const. amend. 80, § 17. Judges, prosecuting attorneys and other

State officers may be removed from office through impeachment. Ark. Const. Art. 15, § 1.

Bail is set by the judge. See e.g., Ark. R. Crim. P. 8.3, 8.5 & 9.2. The amount of the bail

rests in the reasonable discretion of the court. See e.g., Foreman v. State, 317 Ark. 146, 875 S.

W. 2d 853 (1994). 

To the extent plaintiffs’ claims are based on the refusal of Hickman to bring criminal

charges against various individuals including the prosecutor, the circuit judge, and the individual

who threw a rock at their car, among others, the claims fail. A private citizen has no right to

institute criminal prosecution. See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 64-65, 106 S. Ct. 1697,

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90 L. Ed. 2d 48 (1986); In re Kaminski, 960 F.2d 1062, 1064 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (private party

lacks judicially cognizable interest in prosecution of another person); Lopez v. Robinson, 914

F.2d 486, 494 (4th Cir. 1990); Cok v. Cosentino, 876 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1989). Furthermore,

failing to investigate and prosecute an offense does not give rise to liability under § 1983. See

e.g., Scher v. Chief Postal Inspector, 973 F.2d 682, 683 (8th Cir. 1992)(postal inspection

service); Fraire v. City of Arlington, 957 F.2d 1268, 1278 (5th Cir. 1992)(police). Finally,

Hickman had no supervisory authority over either the prosecuting attorneys’ office or the court.

(C). Conditions of Confinement

With respect to the plaintiffs’ unconstitutional conditions of confinement claims, the

County defendants present three arguments. First, they contend they are entitled to judgment as

a matter of law because the plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative grievance by utilizing

the grievance procedure at the jail. Second, defendants contend the claims are barred by the

physical injury requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Third, defendants maintain the

plaintiffs allegations do not rise to the level of constitutional violations.

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Defendants first argue they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law because plaintiffs

failed to fully exhaust the administrative remedies as to their claims of unconstitutional

conditions of confinement. Defendants maintain the same is true regarding the vague allegations

plaintiff make concerning access to legal books and the ability to make phone calls. 

During her deposition, Melanie was asked if she submitted grievances about all her

problems at the jail. County Defts’ Ex. 1 at 52. She responded: “Not official grievances.” Id.

When asked why not, she stated: “What would it have changed.” Id.

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Plaintiffs also maintain Melanie wrote letters to various entities, including the Department of Health, the Joint 3

Commission on Accredidation, the American Civil Liberties Union, the Department of Justice, etc., in an effort to bring

attention to the horrible conditions at jail. See Plff’s Ex. 4 (attached to Doc. 197). These letters, of course, do nothing to

establish that Melanie submitted grievances to officials at the Boone County Jail.

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In opposition, plaintiffs assert that Melanie did submit written complaints or grievances

about some of her concerns and needs while in jail but not all of them. (Doc. 196 at 16). 3

Moreover, they assert the jail staff did not provide grievance forms to inmates. Id. Based on

these facts, plaintiffs state Melanie responded as she did to the questions posed to her during her

deposition. Id. With respect to Robert, plaintiffs states he made regular requests for grievance

forms, rarely received them, but made many written and verbal requests to jail employees. Id.

at 16-17. 

According to plaintiffs, the grievance procedure at the Boone County Jail consists of an

inmate requesting a grievance form from a jailer when the jailer appears at meal time. (Doc. 196

at 17). Sometimes after days of requesting a form, plaintiffs state that you might get a form or

a piece of paper. Id. An inmate then writes down his complaint and returns it to a jailer at meal

time. Id. According to plaintiffs, at no time did either of them receive any written response to

any grievance. Id.

As amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)

mandates exhaustion of available administrative remedies before an inmate files suit. Section

1997e(a) provides: “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section

1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other

correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 

The Supreme Court in Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 738-39, 121 S. Ct. 1819, 149 L.

Ed. 2d 958 (2001) held that “exhaustion is required where administrative remedies are available

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even if the available administrative remedies do not provide the precise, or full, relief sought.”

Walker v. Maschner, 270 F.3d 573, 577 (8th Cir. 2001). It rejected the idea that the PLRA

allowed for a futility exception. Booth, 532 U.S. at 740-41. 

Further, the term “administrative remedies” has been held to encompass remedies not

promulgated by an administrative agency. Concepcion v. Morton, 306 F.3d 1347, 1352 (3d Cir.

2002). Specifically, it has been held that a grievance procedure contained in a handbook

constitutes an available administrative remedy within the meaning of § 1997e(a). Conception,

306 F.3d at 1352. When all claims have not been exhausted, the case is subject to dismissal.

Kozohorsky v. Harmon, 332 F.3d 1141 (8th Cir. 2003)(total exhaustion required); Jones v.

Norris, 310 F.3d 610, 612 (8th Cir. 2002); Graves v. Norris, 218 F.3d 884, 885 (8th Cir. 2000).

We do not believe on the record before the court that the County defendants are entitled

to dismissal of the conditions of confinement claims based on the plaintiffs’ failure to exhaust

administrative remedies. Melanie did admit during her deposition that she did not submit

grievances regarding “all” of her complaints. However, her testimony does not establish that she

did not submit “any” grievances. 

Further, as plaintiffs point out, the County defendants submitted only Melanie’s

deposition in support of their argument that the plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative

remedies–nothing is provided to the court regarding Robert or the grievances he submitted. In

fact, other than the description contained in the plaintiffs’ brief of the grievance procedure at the

Boone County Jail, the summary judgment record contains no copies of grievances submitted

by the plaintiffs and no affidavits by the County defendants or anyone working at the Boone

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County Jail regarding the grievance procedure or establishing that no grievances were submitted

by the plaintiffs regarding their conditions of confinement, etc. 

Physical Injury Requirement of the PLRA

The County defendants also contend the conditions of confinement claims are barred by

the physical injury requirement of the PLRA. Defendants assert plaintiffs have not alleged and

cannot prove that they suffered any physical injury as a result of the deplorable conditions in the

Boone County Jail. 

Codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), section 803(d) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of

1996 (PLRA) provides as follows: "No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner

confined in jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered

while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury." This provision limits the ability

of a prisoner to assert a lawsuit for non-physical injury. See e.g., Harris v. Garner, 216 F.3d

970, 974 (11th Cir. 2000). The application of the provision depends on the status of the plaintiff

at the time the lawsuit is commenced. Id. See also Kerr v. Puckett, 138 F.3d 321 (7th Cir.

1998)(§ 1997e(e) applies only to prisoners).

In this case, as plaintiffs correctly point out, they were not “prisoners” when this lawsuit

was commenced. The physical injury requirement of the PLRA, § 1997e(e), therefore has no

application.

Failure to State a Claim

Defendants next argue that plaintiffs’ unconstitutional conditions of confinement claims

fail as a matter of law because the plaintiffs cannot demonstrate they suffered any injury or

adverse health consequences as a result or their confinement or that the defendants knew of and

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Plaintiffs argue the defendants are seeking a reversal of the court’s earlier ruling on the motion to dismiss (Doc. 4

164). Different legal standards apply to the two motions. See Samuels v. Kansas City Mo. School District, 437 F.3d 797,

801 (8th Cir. 2006)(If the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs and giving them the benefit of all

reasonable inferences shows there are no genuine issues of material fact, then summary judgment is appropriate); Casazza v.

Kiser, 313 F.3d 414, 417-418 (8th Cir. 2002)(In ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion, the court accepts the allegations of the

complaint as true and may dismiss the case only when it appears beyond doubt the plaintiffs can prove no set of facts in

support of their claim that would entitle them to relief). Furthermore, in connection with the summary judgment motion, the

court is free to consider exhibits submitted by the parties. See BJC Health System v. Columbia Cas. Co., 348 F.3d 685,

687-688 (8th Cir. 2003)(In ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court may not consider matters outside

the pleadings such as written or oral evidence in support of, or opposition to, a pleading or the claims of the parties).

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disregarded an excessive risk to plaintiffs health or safety. They point out plaintiffs’

4

confinement was temporary. Defendants maintain the plaintiffs allegations simply do not rise

to the level of a constitutional violation.

“[W]hen the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his will, the

Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety

and general well-being.” County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 118 S. Ct. 1708, 1719,

140 L. Ed. 2d 1043 (1998)(citation omitted). The Constitution does not mandate comfortable

prisons, but neither does it permit inhumane ones. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832, 114

S. Ct. 1970, 128 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1994). 

In Butler v. Fletcher, 465 F.3d 340, 344 (8th Cir. 2006), the Eighth Circuit held that

deliberate indifference is the “appropriate standard of culpability for all claims that prison

officials failed to provide pretrial detainees with adequate food, clothing, shelter, medical care

and reasonable safety.” “A prisoner alleging an Eighth Amendment violation must prove both

an objective and subjective element. Revels v. Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 875 (8th Cir. 2004)(citing

Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 115 L. Ed. 2d 271 (1991)). “The

defendant’s conduct must objectively rise to the level of a constitutional violation by depriving

the plaintiff of the minimal civilized measure oflife’s necessities. The defendants’ conduct must

also reflect a subjective state of mind evincing deliberate indifference to the health or safety of

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the prisoner” Revels, 382 F.3d at 875 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Deliberate indifference is established when the plaintiff shows “the defendant was substantially

aware of but disregarded an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Revels, 382 F.3d at 875.

The Supreme Court has stated that “[n]othing so amorphous as ‘overall conditions’ can

rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment when no specific deprivation of a single human

need exists.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 305, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 115 L. Ed. 2d 271 (1991).

However, “[c]onditions of confinement may establish an Eighth Amendment violation ‘in

combination’ when each would not do so alone, but only when they have a mutually enforcing

effect that produces the deprivation of a single, identifiable human need such as food, warmth,

or exercise–for example, a low cell temperature at night combined with a failure to issue

blankets.” Gates v. Cook, 376 F.3d 323, 333 (5th Cir. 2004)(citing Wilson, 501 U.S. at 304).

The standards against which a court measures prison conditions are “the evolving standards of

decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102, 97

S. Ct. 285, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1976). 

Plaintiffs contend the food at the Boone County Jail was not nutritious and was not

prepared under clean conditions. Theyassert that the containers in which the powdered milk was

prepared went unwashed and the old milk residue soured. 

Plaintiffs have submitted a record of the meals served on various days. Plff’s Ex. 3

(attached to Doc. 196). This exhibit indicates meals were served at 7:00 a.m., 12 noon, and 5:00

p.m. Id. Breakfast typically consisted of an egg sandwich, a honey bun, coffee, milk and orange

juice. Id. Lunch typically consisted of a peanut butter and jelly sandwich, a bologna sandwich,

and milk. Id. Supper typically consisted of an unspecified TV Dinner, a fruit cup, bread, and

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milk. Id. No portion size or nutritional information is contained on this exhibit. Defendants

have submitted nothing to the court regarding the meals served at the Boone County Jail, whether

those meals have been approved by a dietician, or whether the meals meet the caloric and

nutritional needs of the inmates. 

During the three months they were confined at the Boone County Jail, plaintiffs contend

they did not receive an opportunity for outdoor exercise on a regular basis. Plaintiffs have

submitted as an exhibit what appears to be the jail log which plaintiffs maintain establishes that

during their incarceration at the Boone County Jail the male detainees were allowed outdoor

exercise on only two occasions and the female detainees were allowed outdoor exercise on five

occasions. Plffs’ Ex. 4 (attached to Doc. 196)(5/12/05–females and males; 5/18/05–females and

then listed separately cell 3 & 7 to yard call; 6/9/05–females; 7/13/05–females; 7/22/05–females

and males). Plaintiffs assert that as many as five weeks passed without any outdoor exercise. 

Although Melanie testified there was adequate space in her cell to exercises, defendants

have provided the court with no information on whether Robert had adequate space to exercise

in his cell. Moreover, defendants have provided the court with no information regarding the

opportunity for exercise afforded to detainees in general, whether inside or outside, when outside

exercise was offered and if outside exercise was always noted on the jail log.

Plaintiffs assert the air quality was unacceptable. They indicate the dirt within the

ductwork was “abundant” and the vents coated in grime. Plaintiffs maintain Melanie developed

wheezing in her chest. In the months of June and July, plaintiffs maintain the air conditioning

was so frigid that they were forced to wear two pairs of socks and huddle under blankets

constantly. 

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Plaintiffs point to the following deficiencies in the are of sanitation and personal hygiene:

(1) they were not provided with, or allowed to possess, a towel in their cells; (2) cleaning

supplies were only provided occasionally and the same cleaning rags were used for cleaning

toilets and the tables; (3) trash was allowed to accumulate for days; (4) the male inmates often

did not have toilet paper; and (5) the bed linens were not washed during their entire

incarceration. 

Defendants have provided the court with no information regarding any of the following:

how often detainees were allowed to shower; whether detainees had access to basic hygiene

supplies between showers; when cell areas and common areas of the jail were cleaned; when

trash was removed from the cells and common areas; and when detainees were provided with

toilet paper. 

Finally, plaintiffs maintain their rights were violated because they were: denied spousal

visitation and were not permitted to correspond in writing; they were only allowed one fifteen

minute visit per week with their children and one such visit was canceled when plaintiffs told

one another that they loved each other; and they were housed with convicted felons. 

Defendants maintain conditions the plaintiffs were subjected to did not violate the

constitution and were only temporary. Furthermore, defendants assert the plaintiffs suffered no

injury or adverse health consequences. 

We believe there are genuine issues of material fact that preclude entry of judgment in

defendants’ favor on this claim. Plaintiffs maintain Melanie developed wheezing and breathing

difficulties because of the air quality problems within the jail. Plaintiffs also maintain they

suffered physical discomfort because of the cold temperatures at the facility and were harmed

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other ways as a result of the conditions under which they were confined. As noted above,

defendants have not provided the court with any information, by affidavit or other means,

regarding meals, the provision of hygiene items, when detainees are allowed to shower, when

detainees are furnished clean clothing and bedding, the cleaning of the jail, the detainees

opportunity to exercise, how the temperature is controlled, etc. 

Motion for Summary Judgment of Jason Brisco, Paul Woodruff, and Lyle Smith

The City Defendants move for summary judgment on all claims asserted against them.

(A). The Traffic Stop, the Use of Force, and the Pursuit

“A traffic stop is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if it is supported by either

probable cause or an articulable and reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation has occurred.”

United States v. Herrera-Gonzalez, 474 F.3d 1105, 1009 (8th Cir. 2007)(internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). Furthermore:

Even if the officer was mistaken in concluding that a traffic violation occurred,

the stop does not violate the Fourth Amendment ifthe mistake was an objectively

reasonable one. United States v. Martin, 411 F.3d 998, 1001 (8th Cir.

2005)(noting that “[t]he determinative question is not whether [the defendant]

actually violated the Motor Vehicle Code . . . but whether an objectively

reasonable police officer could have formed a reasonable suspicion that [the

defendant] was committing a code violation”). While officers have an obligation

to understand the law, this court should not expect them to interpret the traffic

laws with the subtlety and expertise of a criminal defense attorney, and the

determination of objective reasonableness is not to be made with the vision of

hindsight, but instead by looking to what the officer reasonably knew at the time.

Finally, the constitutional reasonableness of a traffic stop does not depend on the

actual motivations of the officer involved, and the subjective intentions of the

officer making the stop are irrelevant in determining the validity of the stop.

Herrera-Gonzalez, 474 F.3d at 1109 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

According to Brisco, he observed the Johnston vehicle drive onto a curb, along the

sidewalk, and back down onto the highway. City Defts’ Ex. 7 at ¶ 4. He also observed the

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vehicle speeding, crossing the centerline, and crossing the fog line when one was present and

veering to the right when no fog line was present. See City Defts’ Ex. 7 at ¶ 5-7 & City Defts’

Ex. 15. Based on his observations, Brisco asserts he had probable cause to believe the driver of

the Johnston vehicle had violated the following provisions of Arkansas law--Ark. Code Ann. §

5-65-103 (driving while intoxicated); Ark. Code Ann. § 27-51-104 (careless driving); Ark. Code

Ann. § 27-51-201 (speeding); Ark. Code Ann. § 27-51-301 (driving left of center). 

After reviewing the applicable law, we conclude Brisco’s traffic stop of the Johnstons

was valid. See United States v. Coney, 456 F.3d 850, 855-56 (8th Cir. 2006)(“An officer has

probable cause to conduct a traffic stop when he observes even a minor traffic violation”). See

also, United States v. Herrera Martinez, 354 F.3d 932, 933-34 (8th Cir. 2004)(concluding that

the officer had probable cause to make a traffic stop where the officer observed no traffic

violations other than a single fog-line crossing); United States v. Pulliam, 265 F.3d 736, 739 (8th

Cir. 2001)(concluding that a traffic violation had occurred where the officer observed the driver

drift over the fog line twice in two miles).

“A law enforcement officer may order the driver out of a vehicle during a lawful traffic

stop.” Janis v. Biescheuvel, 428 F.3d 795, 799 (8th Cir. 2005)(citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms,

434 U.S. 106, 111, 98 S. Ct. 330, 54 L. Ed. 2d 331 (1977)). See also United States v. Coleman,

148 F.3d 897, 904 (8th Cir. 1998)(holding that traffic violations provide probable cause for

stopping a car and ordering the driver and passenger out of the car). The officer may also check

the driver’s identification and vehicle registration and ask routine questions concerning the

driver’s destination and the purpose of his trip. See United States v. Long, 320 F.3d 795, 799

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(8th Cir. 2003). In this case, it is undisputed that Robert did not get out of his vehicle when

ordered to do so by Brisco. 

In Janis the officers suspected Richards was intoxicated. Janis, 428 F.3d at 799. The

officers attempted to stop his vehicle in a thirty minute pursuit during which they employed tiredeflating spikes and a rolling roadblock. Id. When Richards finally stopped, Richards refused

to get out of the car and the officers forcibly removed him. Id. at 798. One of the officers

reached through the open driver’s door, grabbed Richards’ arms, and pried his grip from the

steering wheel. Id. Richards was then pulled out of the vehicle and placed on the road face

down, his arms pulled behind his back, and he was handcuffed. Id. 

Richards complained of pain in his left shoulder and arm. Janis, 428 F.3d at 798. He

was taken to the side of the road and it was determined he was not intoxicated but suffering from

diabetic shock. Id. An ambulance was called. Id. 

The Eighth Circuit rejected the claim that the officers had used excessive force against

Richards. Janis, 428 F.3d at 800. The court concluded the use of force “was measured, brief,

and appropriate to accomplish the purposes of the stop to: 1) secure Richards and his vehicle;

2) ensure that no criminal activity was afoot; and 3) preserve Richards’s, the officers’, and the

public’s safety in light of the circumstances.” Id. 

In Lawyer v. City of Council Bluffs, 361 F.3d 1099, 1105 (8th Cir. 2004), Officer Clark

directed Michael to get out of his vehicle to sign the citation. Id. Michael refused. Id. Clark

attempted to open the door but it was locked. Id. Clark requested that the door be unlocked and

Michael ignored the requests. Id. Clark then reached inside through the open window to unlock

the door and open it. Id. When Clark reached inside, the window began rolling up. Id.

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“Whatever the cause of the window rising,” the court concluded it was “objectively

reasonable for Clark to believe that he was in immediate danger, as he faced the possibility that

he could be dragged down the road with his arm trapped in the window if the vehicle began to

move.” Id. Clark used pepper spray against Michael and the court concluded the use was

objectively reasonable. Id.

When Robert failed to get out of the vehicle, this entitled Brisco to use some force to

remove Robert from the vehicle. See e.g., Janis, 428 F.3d at 799-800. Once the vehicle began

to pull away, it was objectively reasonable for Brisco to believe he was in immediate danger and

for him to use the baton to strike the window. Id. Brisco employed no other force against the

plaintiffs. 

Woodruff and Smith were not present at the initial stop of the Johnstons. They were not

involved in the pursuit of the Johnstons. 

“Liability under section 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the

deprivation of rights. To establish personal liability of the Smith, as Chief of Police, [the

plaintiffs] must allege specific facts of personal involvement in, or direct responsibility for, a

deprivation of [their] constitutional rights.” Clemmons v. Armontrout, 477 F.3d 962, 967 (8th

Cir. 2007)(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). General responsibility for supervising

the operations of a Police Department is insufficient to establish personal involvement. Id.

There is simply no basis on which Smith can be held liable for the initial traffic stop, the alleged

use of force by Brisco, or the actions taken during the pursuit. See e.g., Kahle v. Leonard, 477

F.3d 544, 550 (8th Cir. 2007)(A failure-to-supervise claim may be maintained only if the official

demonstrated deliberate indifference or tacit authorization of the offensive acts).

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To the extent the plaintiffs contend Brisco denied their constitutional rights by refusing

Robert’srequest for an attorney as required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602,

16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966) and its progeny, the claim fails as a matter of law. “‘[T]he remedy for

a Miranda violation is the exclusion from evidence of any compelled self-incrimination, not a

section 1983 action.’” Hannon v. Sanner, 441 F.3d 635, 636 (8th Cir. 2006)(quoting Warren v.

City of Lincoln, 864 F.2d 1436, 1442 (8th Cir. 1989)).

(B). Alleged Planting or Falsification of Evidence 

The plaintiffs maintain the box of evidence transported by Woodruff to the Arkansas

State Crime Lab in Little Rock that lab analysis showed contained methamphetamine was either

planted or the lab analysis was falsified. Woodruff testified that he transported the box of

evidence from Harrison to the State Crime Lab. City Defts’ Ex. 8 at ¶ 4. He did not know what

was in the box, did not open the box, and did not add anything to the box or remove the box. Id.

at ¶ 5-6. He was not involved in analyzing the contents of the box. Id. at ¶ 7.

Plaintiffs merely assert that the box was not theirs and they did not possess

methamphetamine. They have pointed to nothing suggesting Woodruff planted the evidence,

that the evidence was planted, or that he was involved in anyway in analyzing the evidence or

generating the report. See e.g., Janis v. Biesheuvel, 428 F.3d 795, 799 (8th Cir. 2005)(Nonmoving party must produce specific facts that show that there is a genuine issue for trial). No

genuine issue of material fact exists as to this claim.

(C). Alleged False Statements by Woodruff and Smith

Plaintiffs maintain that Woodruff falsely told Melanie during her interview at the Boone

County Jail that her children had lice. Plaintiffs also question the fact that he told a local

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newspaper that no drugs or alcohol were involved in the case yet he was the officer who

transported the box that allegedly contained methamphetamine to the State Crime Lab.

Plaintiffs have presented no evidence to Woodruff was not told by a DHS employee that

the children have lice. Furthermore, plaintiffs have presented nothing to dispute or call into

question Woodruff’s assertion that he believed the statement that no drugs or alcohol were

involved in the incident was a true statement at the time he made it. See e.g., Janis v. Biesheuvel,

428 F.3d 795, 799 (8th Cir. 2005)(Non-moving partymust produce specific facts that show that

there is a genuine issue for trial).

With respect to Smith, plaintiffs maintain he failed to report that shots were fired at the

Johnstons although he heard rumors the shots were fired by Jerry Watts with the Arkansas State

Police. Plffs’ Ex. J at 7 (attached to Doc. 204). Moreover, this fact is not in any reports of the

Harrison Police Department concerning the stop or pursuit of the Johnstons. Id.

Smith spoke to a reporter at the Harrison Daily Times following the initial event. Plffs’

Ex. J at 8 (attached to Doc. 204). In an article that appeared in the paper on Monday, January

5, 2004, Smith indicated that an individual threw a rock at the Johnston vehicle during the police

pursuit. Id. Smith made this statement in response to question by the newspaper. Id. 

The article also quotes Smith as saying that reports of two children being in the vehicle

were unconfirmed. Plffs’ Ex. J at 9 (attached to Doc. 204). Finally, Smith is quoted as saying

Robert had a knife. Id. This statement was based on a call-in “that said they saw the subject

with a knife.” Id. at 10. 

Plaintiffs’ claim is based on the fact that Smith reported certain “facts” to the newspaper

(Robert having a knife) while not reporting others (the shots) and referring to the presence as the

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children as “unconfirmed.” The Supreme Court has made clear that injury to reputation alone

cannot support a claim under § 1983. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 708-09, 96 S. Ct. 1155,

47 L. Ed. 2d 405 (1976). We need not consider whether Smith’s statements to the newspaper

were in defamatory because even assuming this issue was resolved in plaintiffs’ favor their claim

would nevertheless fail as a matter of law. See e.g., Everett v. City of Chester, 391 F. Supp. 26,

28 (D.C. Pa. 1975)(“With respect to the statements concerning plaintiffs’ arrest and incarceration

made by members of the Chester Police Department to the local media, the law is clear that the

Civil Rights Act does not give rise to a cause of action for defamation”).

(D). Confiscated or Seized Items

Plaintiffs maintain they have requested return of a pistol, ball bat, a map, and a

checkbook, all of which were seized during the search of their vehicle. As all these items may

legally be possessed, plaintiffs maintain they are not evidence of criminal activity. 

The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const.

amend. IV. “Generally, searches or seizures conducted without prior approval by a judge or

magistrate are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Kimhong Thi Le,

474 F.3d 511, 514 (8th Cir. 2007)(citation omitted). As with nearly every general rule,

exceptions are recognized. Id. One exception to the warrant requirement is recognized “for

searching a vehicle lawfully impounded by law enforcement officers.” Id. (citation omitted).

“Impoundment of a vehicle for the safety of property and the public is a valid community

caretaking function of the police, which does not requirement a warrant.” Id. (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). When a vehicle is lawfully impounded, “[l]aw enforcement may

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search [the] . . . vehicle to inventory its contents without obtaining a warrant.” Kimhong Thi Le,

474 F.3d at 515.

Another recognized exception to the warrant requirement is referred to as the

“automobile exception.” See e.g., United States v. Wells, 347 F.3d 280, 287 (8th Cir. 2003).

Under the automobile exception, “if law enforcement had probable cause to believe the vehicle

contained contraband or other evidence of crime” the vehicle may be searched without a warrant.

Id. (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158-59, 45 S. Ct. 280, 69 L. Ed. 2d 543

(1925)).

Thus, to the extent plaintiffs challenge the search of the vehicle, their claims fail. With

respect to the alleged deprivations of their property, these claims also fail. The Supreme Court

has held that the negligent or intentional deprivation of property does not violate due process so

long as adequate post-deprivation remedies exist. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533,

104 S. Ct. 3194, 82 L. Ed. 2d 393 (1984)(intentional deprivation of property does not violate due

process when meaningful post-deprivation remedy is available). See also Barnett v. Centoni, 31

F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 1994)(negligent or intentional deprivation of prisoner's property fails to state

claim under § 1983 if state has adequate post-deprivation remedy). Plaintiffs can file a motion

a replevin action for return of the property, Drug Task Force for the Thirteenth Judicial District

v. Hoffman, 353 Ark. 182, 114 S. W. 3d 213 (2003)(utilizing Ark. Code Ann. § 18-60-804 which

provides a remedy for recovery of property in the possession of another), a motion for return of

the seized property, Ark. R. Crim. P. 15.2, or a conversion action, Elliot v. Hurst, 307 Ark. 134,

817 S.W.2d 877, 880 (1991)(cause of action for conversion lies where distinct act of dominion

is exerted over property in denial of owner's right). 

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With respect to the pistol, plaintiffs also maintain their Second Amendment rights have

been violated by the defendants’ failure to return the pistol and by the suspension of their right

to bear arms. Plaintiffs state they have been told by Woodruff that the pistol could be returned

to a family member. 

The Second Amendment protects the right of individuals to privately possess and bear

firearms. U.S. Const. amend. 2. However, statutes prohibiting the possession of firearms by

those convicted of felony criminal offenses have repeatedly been upheld. See e.g., United States

v. Wilson, 315 F.3d 972 (8th Cir. 2003)(upholding as constitutional 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)).

Under Ark. Code Ann. § 5-73-103, any person, unless authorized by the Governor, his designee,

or the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives of the United States Department

of Justice, or other bureau or office designated by the Department of Justice, who has been

convicted of a felony is prohibited from possessing or owning a firearm. 

Although plaintiffs maintain their felony convictions were wrongful, they cannot overturn

those convictions through the use of a civil rights action brought in this court. Heck v.

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 129 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1994). No Second Amendment

violation has occurred. Under the applicable statute, plaintiffs may not possess or own the pistol.

Moreover, plaintiffs state they have been informed by the Harrison Police Department that the

pistol can be returned to a member of plaintiffs’ family. 

(E). Alleged Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 by failing to Apprehend and Prosecute the

Individual Throwing the Rock

Plaintiffs maintain the City defendants deprived them of the full and equal benefit of the

laws when they failed to establish that they arrested, charged, and prosecuted the Harrison

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resident who threw the rock at the Johnstons’ vehicle. Plaintiffs note Harrison police officers

witnessed the rock throwing incident and an unidentified Harrison officer instructed that the

individual be arrested.

Section 1981 “provides that all persons shall have the same right to ‘make and enforce

contracts’ and the right to ‘the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the

contractual relationship.’” Bediako v. Stein Mart, Inc., 354 F.3d 835, 839 (8th Cir. 2004)(quoting

42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)-(b)).

To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the Full-and-Equal Benefit clause

of § 1981, plaintiffs must show that: (1) they are members of a protected class; (2) the defendants

intended to discriminate on a constitutionally prohibited basis; and (3) that the discrimination

interfered with a protected activity as defined in § 1981. Bediako v. Stein Mart, Inc., 354 F.3d

at 839. Further, a showing of state action is required. Adams v. Boy Scouts of AmericaChickasaw Council, 271 F.3d 769, 777 (8th Cir. 2001)(citing Youngblood v. Hy-Vee Food

Stores, Inc., 266 F.3d 851, 855 (8th Cir. 2001)).

The plaintiffs claims fail because there is no allegation that they belong to a protected

class. Nor is there any allegation that the defendants intended to discriminate against the

plaintiffs based on their membership in a protected class or that the plaintiffs were treated

differently than similar situated nonmembers of the protected class. Turner v. Gonzales, 421

F.3d 688, 694 (8th Cir. 2005). 

(F). Claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986

Plaintiffs allege the defendants conspired to deter them from attending court on April 8,

2005, by intimidation, and threat of force. Plaintiffs assert claims under both 42 U.S.C. § § 1985

& 1986. 

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A claim under § 1985 is premised upon the existence of an alleged conspiracy which must

be motivated by a class-based animus. Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263,

268-69 (1993). Plaintiffs have not alleged they are members of a protected class nor have they

alleged that the alleged conspiracy was based upon a class-based animus. Finally, no claim exists

under § 1986 as in order to be liable under § 1986 a defendant must have neglected or refused

to prevent a § 1985 conspiracy. See Steele v. City of Bemidji, 257 F.3d 902, 906 (8th Cir.

2001)(citing Brandon v. Lotter, 157 F. 3d 537, 539 (8th Cir. 1998)); see also Gatlin v. Green,

362 F.3d 1089, 1095 (8th Cir. 2004)(a § 1986 claim must be predicated upon a valid § 1985

claim).

(G). Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1987 and 42 U.S.C. § 1988

Plaintiffs purport to assert a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1987. Section 1987 authorizes the

United States attorneys, marshals, deputymarshals, the United States magistrate judges, with the

power to arrest, imprison, or bail offenders, and any other officer specifically empowered by the

President to institute prosecution of the violations of certain civil rights statutes. Obviously,

plaintiffs have no authority to prosecute the defendants under this statute.

Plaintiffs also purport to assert a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Section 1988 does not

provide for a separate cause of action. See e.g., Rose v. Kenyon College, 211 F. Supp. 2d 931,

939 (S.D. Ohio 2002). Section 1988 merely provides for the application of common law in civil

rights proceedings brought under other statutes and for attorneys’ fees and experts’ fees in civil

rights cases. Id.

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(H). Claims under RICO

Finally, we believe plaintiffs have failed to state a cause of action under the Racketeer

Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) against the City Defendants. Section 1962(c)

of RICO makes it “unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise

engaged in . . . interstate . . . commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the

conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.” 18 U.S.C. §

1962(c). “Section 1964(c) allows a private party, who has been injured in his property from a

RICO violation, to sue for damages.” Wisdom v. Fist Midwest Bank of Poplar Bluff, 167 F.3d

402, 406 (8th Cir. 1999). “To state a RICO claim, the [plaintiffs] must show ‘(1) conduct (2) of

an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity.’” Id. (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L.

V. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 496, 105 S. Ct. 3275, 87 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1985)). 

For a pattern to exist there must be at least two acts of racketeering activity. 18 U.S.C.

§ 1961(5). These acts must be related and must “amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal

activity.” United Healthcare Corp. v. American Trade Ins. Co., Ltd., 88 F.3d 563, 571 (8th Cir.

1996)(citation omitted). In defining racketeering activity § 1961(1) lists the various predicate

acts that will support a RICO claim. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). 

Here, plaintiffs allege that the defendants’ racketeering activity consists of violating the

constitutional rights of citizens, including the denial of due process, causing families and citizens

to expend time for court appearances and court costs, fines, or fees as a result of unlawful arrests,

discouraging through investigations of underlying allegations of unlawful detainment, false

police reports, police brutality, use of excessive force, and denial of due process. Complaint at

¶ 233. 

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The term racketeering activity is defined to include a variety of criminal offenses under

state and federal law including murder, kidnaping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion,

and obstruction of justice. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). Unlawful arrests, violations of due process, and

other general violations of constitutional rights such as those alleged by the plaintiffs are not

among the offenses included in the definition of racketeering activity. Plaintiffs’ RICO claims

therefore fail. Moreover, there is no suggestion that the predicate acts amount to, or pose a threat

of, continued criminal activity. 

CONCLUSION

I therefore recommend as follows: (1) the motion for summary judgment filed by Danny

Hickman, Jason Day, and Boone County (the County Defendants) (Doc. 170) be granted with

respect to all claims except plaintiffs’ claim that they were subjected to unconstitutional

conditions of confinement while in the Boone County Jail; and (2) the motion for summary

judgment filed by Jason Brisco, Lyle Smith, and Paul Woodruff (the City Defendants) (Doc. 184)

be granted and all claims against these defendants be dismissed.

The parties have ten days from receipt of this report and recommendations to file

objections to the same pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely

objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties are

reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the

district court.

DATED this 8th day of May 2007.

/s/ J. Marschewski 

HON. JAMES R. MARSCHEWSKI 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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