Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00397/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00397-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Clayton Daniel Willis, 

Petitioner, 

vs. 

Charles L Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV 12-00397-TUC-BPV

ORDER 

On May 23, 2012, Petitioner, Clayton Daniel Willis, an inmate confined in the 

Arizona State Prison in Buckeye, Arizona, filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus by a Person in State Custody, pursuant to Title 28, U.S.C. § 2254, with several 

exhibits attached. (Doc. 1)1

 Respondents have filed an answer to the petition (“Answer”) 

with exhibits A through K attached. (Doc. 9). Petitioner did not file a reply. 

 In accordance with the provisions of Title 28, U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), all parties 

consented to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge to conduct any and all 

further proceedings in this case, including trial and entry of a final judgment, with direct 

review by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals if an appeal is filed. (Doc. 10.) 

 

1

 “Doc.” refers to the documents in this Court’s file. 

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 For the reasons discussed below, the Magistrate Judge denies relief on Grounds 

One and Two of the Petition, and dismisses this action in its entirety. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Plea agreement and sentencing 

On May 15, 2009, a Pima County grand jury charged Petitioner with one count of 

kidnapping, and two counts of aggravated assault. Ex. A.2

 The State filed allegations of 

three prior convictions. Id. At the time set for a settlement conference, Petitioner’s 

counsel advised the court that Petitioner wished to enter a plea to the Indictment. Ex. B. 

At the time set for the change of plea, Petitioner entered a plea to all three counts, an 

allegation of dangerous nature, and admitted to a prior conviction. Ex. C, (Reporter’s 

Transcript (“R.T.”), 10/06/09) at 9-13. 

On November 6, 2009, Petitioner was sentenced to presumptive, concurrent prison 

sentences, the longest being a term of fifteen years. Ex. D. 

B. Petition for post-conviction relief 

 On November 13, 2009, Petitioner initiated a state post-conviction relief (“PCR”) 

proceeding by filing a notice of post-conviction relief. Ex. E. Petitioner’s PCR petition 

alleged three grounds for relief: (1) Petitioner was not aware of several constitutional 

rights he was waiving when he pled guilty; (2) Petitioner was not competent to plead 

guilty; and (3) the trial court erroneously informed Petitioner that he waived his right to 

direct appeal. Ex. F. The trial court summarily dismissed the Rule 32 proceedings stating 

 

2

 The exhibits in this order refer to the exhibits attached to Respondent’s Answer (Doc. 9) unless otherwise indicated. 

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that, having reviewed the file for error the court “cannot find any material issue of fact or 

law that would entitle the Defendant to relief under Rule 32 and finds that no purpose 

would be served by further proceedings.” Ex. G. 

 Petitioner filed a petition for review with the Arizona Court of Appeals, raising the 

same issues he raised in his PCR. Petition (Attachments (Doc. 1-2)) at 47.3

 The appellate 

court granted review but denied relief in a memorandum decision on March 8, 2011. Ex. 

H. The appellate court ruled that although the trial court did not address every possible 

right he was waiving, that the record of the change of plea hearing supports the trial 

court’s finding that his guilty plea was “knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily made” 

and that “taken as a whole, it is clear Willis understood the consequences of pleading 

guilty.” Id. at ¶¶ 7-8. The appellate court further rejected Petitioner’s claim that he was 

not competent to enter a guilty plea, finding the record supported the trial court’s finding 

that nothing at the hearing suggested Petitioner was confused or did not understand the 

rights he was waiving. Id. at ¶ 10. Finally, the appellate court rejected Petitioner’s 

argument that he was entitled to file a delayed appeal, finding, under Arizona law, that a 

pleading defendant can waive the right to appeal, as long as that waiver is knowing and 

intelligent. Id. at ¶¶14-15. 

The Arizona Supreme Court denied a petition for review on September 6, 2011. 

Ex. I. 

. . . 

 

3

 Because the exhibits attached to the Petition are not sequentially numbered, the page numbers provided in this Order in reference to the Petition are the page numbers assigned to the document by the Court’s electronic filing system (CM/ECF). 

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C. Second petition for post-conviction relief 

 On December 1, 2011, Petitioner filed a second PCR, arguing that the state’s 

failure to allege aggravating factors precluded the trial court from imposing an 

aggravated sentence, and that both trial counsel’s and PCR counsel’s failure to raise this 

issue amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”). Petition, Attachments (Doc. 

1-1) at 75. The trial court summarily dismissed the second PCR on February 1, 2012. Ex. 

J at 3. No petition for review of the trial court’s denial was filed. See Petition, at 5. 

D. Federal Habeas 

Petitioner delivered his federal habeas petition to prison authorities on May 10, 

2012. (Doc. 1.) Petitioner presents two grounds in the Petition in support of his request 

for habeas relief: 

(1) “[Petitioner] was mentally incompetent to plead guilty. Therefore, 

the convictions and sentences violate the U.S. Constitution’s 5th and 

14th Amendments’ due process clauses.” 

(2) “The record does not show that petitioner was aware that he was 

waiving his federal (and state) constitutional rights to (1) testify in 

his own behalf; (2) present evidence in his own defense; (3) compel 

the attendance of witnesses, and (4) to be presumed innocent until 

proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus the convictions 

violated petitioner’s federal constitutional due process rights under 

the U.S. Constitution’s 5th and 14th Amendments’ due process 

clauses.” 

(Doc. 1, at 8-9.) 

II. DISCUSSION 

A. The petition is timely. 

 A one year period of limitation shall apply to an application for writ of habeas 

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. 28 U.S.C. § 

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2244(d)(1). 

 Under the AEDPA, a state prisoner must generally file a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus within one year from “the date on which the judgment became final by the 

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of time for seeking such review[.]” 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). “The time during which a properly filed application for state 

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim 

is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 

2244(d)(2). 

Petitioner had until one year after his conviction and sentence became final to file 

his federal petition. Respondents do not contest the timeliness of the Petition. Upon 

review of the state-court record, the Court finds that, pursuant to the AEDPA, the Petition 

is timely. 

 B. The claims are exhausted. 

A writ of habeas corpus may not be granted unless it appears that a petitioner has 

exhausted all available state court remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); see also Coleman v. 

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). To exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must “fairly 

present” the operative facts and the federal legal theory of his claims to the state's highest 

court in a procedurally appropriate manner. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 848 

(1999); Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277–

78 (1971). If a habeas claim includes new factual allegations not presented to the state 

court, it may be considered unexhausted if the new facts “fundamentally alter” the legal 

claim presented and considered in state court. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 260 

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(1986). 

Here, Willis presented to the Arizona trial and appellate courts the two claims he 

now asserts in his federal habeas petition. See Ex. F; Petition, (Attachments (Doc. 1-2)) at 

47. Thus, the Court can review the merits of his claims.

C. The claims are meritless. 

 1. Standard of review 

Because Willis filed his petition after April 24, 1996, this case is governed by the 

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (“AEDPA”). 

See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326-27 (1997) (holding that AEDPA governs federal 

habeas petitions filed after the date of its enactment, April 24, 1996). 

The AEDPA established a “substantially higher threshold” for habeas relief with 

the “acknowledged purpose of ‘reduc[ing] delays in the execution of state and federal 

criminal sentences.’” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473, 475 (2007) (citations 

omitted). The AEDPA's “‘highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings' ... 

demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Woodford v. 

Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam) (quoting Lindh, 521 U.S. at 333 n. 7). 

Under the AEDPA, a petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on any claim 

“adjudicated on the merits” by the state court unless that adjudication: 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 

Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination 

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 

proceeding. 

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28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The relevant state court decision is the last reasoned state decision 

regarding a claim. Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Ylst v. 

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803–04 (1991)); Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 664 

(9th Cir. 2005). The court of appeals rejected Petitioner’s claims raised in his first PCR on 

the merits in a reasoned opinion, and the state supreme court denied them without 

comment. Exs. H, I. Under the “look through” doctrine, Petitioner’s claims are deemed to 

have been rejected for the same reasons given in the last reasoned decision on the merits. 

In this case the Court looks to the court of appeal’s memorandum decision granting 

review of the trial court’s order denying his PCR and denying relief. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 

802-06. 

 “The threshold question under AEDPA is whether [the petitioner] seeks to apply a 

rule of law that was clearly established at the time his state-court conviction became 

final.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390 (2000). Therefore, to assess a claim under 

subsection (d)(1), the Court must first identify the “clearly established Federal law,” if 

any, that governs the sufficiency of the claims on habeas review. “Clearly established” 

federal law consists of the holdings of the Supreme Court at the time the petitioner's 

state-court conviction became final. Williams, 529 U.S. at 365; see Carey v. Musladin, 

549 U.S. 70, 74 (2006); Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003), overruled 

on other grounds Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003). Habeas relief cannot be 

granted if the Supreme Court has not “broken sufficient legal ground” on a constitutional 

principle advanced by a petitioner, even if lower federal courts have decided the issue. 

Williams, 529 U.S. at 381; see Musladin, 549 U.S. at 76-77; Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 

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896, 907 (9th Cir. 2004). Nevertheless, while only Supreme Court authority is binding, 

circuit court precedent may be “persuasive” in determining what law is clearly 

established and whether a state court applied that law unreasonably. Clark, 331 F.3d at 

1069. 

 The Supreme Court has provided guidance in applying each prong of § 

2254(d)(1). The Court has explained that a state-court decision is “contrary to” the 

Supreme Court's clearly established precedents if the decision applies a rule that 

contradicts the governing law set forth in those precedents, thereby reaching a conclusion 

opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a matter of law, or if it confronts a set 

of facts that is materially indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court but 

reaches a different result. Williams, 529 U.S. at 405–06; see Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 

8 (2002) (per curiam). In characterizing the claims subject to analysis under the “contrary 

to” prong, the Court has observed that “a run-of-the-mill state-court decision applying the 

correct legal rule to the facts of a prisoner's case would not fit comfortably within § 

2254(d)(1)'s ‘contrary to’ clause.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 406; see Lambert v. Blodgett,

393 F.3d 943, 974 (9th Cir. 2004). 

 Under the “unreasonable application” prong of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas 

court may grant relief where a state court “identifies the correct governing legal rule from 

[the Supreme] Court's cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular ... 

case” or “unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a 

new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to 

a new context where it should apply.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 407. For a federal court to 

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find a state court's application of Supreme Court precedent “unreasonable,” the petitioner 

must show that the state-court decision was not merely incorrect or erroneous, but 

“objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409; Landrigan, 550 U.S. at 473; Visciotti, 537 U.S. at 

25. 

Under the standard set forth in § 2254(d)(2), habeas relief is available only if the 

state-court decision was based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts. Miller–El 

v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240 (2005) (Miller–El II ). A state-court decision “based on a 

factual determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively 

unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.” Miller–El,

537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003) ( Miller–El I ); see Taylor, 366 F.3d at 999. In considering a 

challenge under § 2254(d)(2), state-court factual determinations are presumed to be 

correct, and a petitioner bears the “burden of rebutting this presumption by clear and 

convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Landrigan, 550 U.S. at 473–74; Miller–El 

II, 545 U.S. at 240. 

 2. Ground One of the Petition is meritless. 

Petitioner alleges in Ground One of his Petition that he was mentally incompetent 

to plead guilty. Petition, at 6. Respondents assert that the state courts correctly 

determined that Petitioner was not entitled to relief on this claim. 

 A defendant has a due process right not to be tried while incompetent. See Drope 

v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966). 

Competence to stand trial requires that a defendant have (1) “a rational as well as factual 

understanding of the proceedings against him,” and (2) “sufficient present ability to 

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consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding.” Dusky v. 

United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam). 

 A petitioner in a habeas proceeding who claims that he was incompetent at the 

time of trial must first come forward with “meaningful evidence” of mental 

incompetency. See Demosthenes v. Baal, 495 U.S. 731, 735-36 (1990). “[E]vidence of a 

defendant's irrational behavior, his demeanor at trial, and any prior medical opinion on 

competence” are relevant considerations. Drope, 420 U.S. at 180. A conclusory 

allegation of mental illness without more is not substantial evidence sufficient to raise a 

reasonable doubt concerning competency to stand trial. Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes, 37 

F.3d 504, 510 (9th Cir. 1994). 

In support of Ground One, Petitioner cites to an evaluation performed by a 

psychiatrist and prepared 8 months after his conviction and sentence, and concluding: 

As a result of his limited education; guilt and depression and probably 

limited intelligence, Mr. Willis probably did not fully understand his legal 

options at the time he entered into the plea agreement and was not 

competent to enter into the plea. ... Thus, there is a substantial indication 

that Mr. Willis was not competent to make informed legal choices at his 

change of plea hearing and at the time he was sentenced. 

Petition, at 9 (citing Psychiatric Evaluation Report, June 3, 2010), found at Ex. K. 

 The trial court rejected Petitioner’s argument, concluding that “[n]othing at the 

hearing, as supported by the record, suggests that the Defendant was confused or did not 

understand the rights he was waiving. Although competency was never raised by defense 

counsel, the Court was aware of the Defendant’s mental health issues and ensured that 

the plea hearing was not rushed and that the Defendant had the time he needed to make 

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such an important decision.” Ex. G, at 2. The trial court properly relied on its own 

observations and the fact that defense counsel, despite questioning Petitioner’s decision, 

did not raise the issue of competency, in determining that Petitioner was competent to 

enter his guilty plea. See Miles v. Stainer, 108 F.3d 1109, 1112 (9th Cir. 1997)(holding 

that in determining whether a defendant is capable of understanding the proceedings and 

assisting counsel, the trial court may rely upon the defendant’s demeanor in court and any 

irrational behavior or lack thereof); Hernandez v. Ylst, 930 F.2d 714, 718 (9th Cir. 

1991)(deeming significant fact that the trial judge, government counsel, and defendant’s 

attorney did not perceive a reasonable cause to believe defendant was incompetent). 

 In a detailed and accurate summary of the record, the court of appeals also rejected 

Petitioner’s arguments, finding that: 

...the record shows that Willis told the trial court why he wanted to plead 

guilty, demonstrated that he was well-informed about his medications, and 

stated he had been advised by counsel and understood the ramifications of 

pleading guilty. Although the court did not refer to Morenz’s report in its 

ruling denying post-conviction relief, we infer the court considered that 

report along with its own recollection of Willis’s behavior at the change-ofplea hearing, as well as considering the presentence report, which also 

addressed Willis’s mental health issues. 

Additionally, as the court noted in its ruling denying post-conviction relief, 

[Willis’s counsel] did not question Willis’s competency, despite her 

apparent disagreement with his decision to plead guilty. In fact, at the 

sentencing hearing, [counsel] stated that Willis had injured his wife when 

he was not taking his medication, but “[h]e is back on his medication here 

at the jail”; the presentence report also confirmed this statement. 

Furthermore, at sentencing the court told Willis it had considered “all the 

factors that your lawyer has again argued to me, the mental health issues, 

your remorse for what you did, your acceptance of responsibility, pleading 

to the indictment.” Therefore, viewed in the light most favorable to the 

court's ruling, the court did not abuse its discretion by denying Willis’s 

claim that he had not been competent to plead guilty. 

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(Ex. H at 7–8.) 

 The factual findings of the state court are presumed correct. 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(e)(1). This includes a state court's determinations that a defendant is competent to 

stand trial. See Baal, 495 U.S. at 735 (stating that a state court finding that a defendant is 

competent to stand trial is a finding of fact entitled to a presumption of correctness under 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)); Torres v. Prunty, 223 F.3d 1103, 1110 n.6 (9th Cir. 2000)(in 

finding state court’s determination that mental competency hearing was unnecessary was 

unreasonable within the meaning of § 2254(d)(2), court necessarily finds clear and 

convincing evidence was presented to rebut the presumption of correctness of state 

court’s findings). Petitioner bears the burden of rebutting this presumption by clear and 

convincing evidence. 28 U.S .C. § 2254(e)(1). Petitioner has not demonstrated by clear 

and convincing evidence that he was incompetent at the time he entered his guilty plea. 

Although Petitioner’s decision to plead to the indictment is arguably “evidence of a 

defendant's irrational behavior”, see Drope, 420 U.S. at 180, Petitioner clearly and 

rationally explained the reason for this decision to the trial court: 

There’s a few reasons, Your Honor. I don’t want my wife and daughter to 

go through any of that any more than what they already have. And, two, 

I’m ready to go. And, three, there’s no plea in the case. But the main reason 

is my wife and daughter. I have just don’t want them to do that. 

Ex. C (R.T. October 6, 2009), at 4-5. 

 Further, Petitioner explained to the court that while he had not been taking his 

medications at the time of the offense, he was taking his medications at the time he 

entered the change of plea, was “clear headed,” and had discussed the plea fully with his 

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attorney. Id. at 5. The mere fact that a defendant takes medications prescribed for mental 

health purposes does not mandate an additional evaluation. Amaya-Ruiz v. Stewart, 121 

F.3d 486, 493 (9th Cir. 1997); see also Sturgis v. Goldsmith, 796 F.2d 1103, 1109-10 (9th

Cir. 1986) (stating that failure to present evidence of medication petitioner was taking or 

“how [the medication] might have affected his competence at trial” failed to raise a bona 

fide doubt as to petitioner’s competency to stand trial). There is no evidence that the 

medication Petitioner was taking rendered him unable to understand the proceedings or 

assist counsel. Petitioner has not offered any additional evidence, aside from the noncontemporaneous psychiatric report, which was before both the trial and appellate court, 

to overcome the presumption of correctness. 

 Upon review of the record, the state court's rejection of Petitioner's competency 

claim is neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of clearly established 

Federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge denies the Petition 

with respect to Ground One. 

 3. Ground Two of the Petition is meritless 

Petitioner alleges in Ground Two of the Petition that the record does not 

demonstrate that he was aware that by entering his guilty plea he was waiving his right to 

testify, to present evidence and witnesses in his defense, and to his presumption of 

innocence. Petition, at 7. Respondents assert this claim was properly rejected on the 

merits by the state courts. Answer, at 3. 

 In order to be valid, a guilty plea must be “voluntary and intelligent.” See Brady v. 

United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 766 

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(1970); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969). A habeas petitioner bears the 

burden of establishing that his guilty plea was not voluntary and knowing. See Parke v. 

Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 31-34 (1992). Petitioner has failed to meet that burden. 

 In Boykin v. Alabama, the Supreme Court held that a knowing and voluntary 

guilty plea must include an explicit waiver by the criminal defendant of his constitutional 

rights against self-incrimination, right to trial by jury, and right of confrontation. 395 U.S. 

238, 242-43 (1969). The Boykin Court went on to say that “[w]e cannot presume a waiver 

of these three important federal rights from a silent record.” Id. 395 U.S. at 243. The 

Brady Court clarified Boykin by stating, ‘the new element added in Boykin was the 

requirement that the record must affirmatively disclose that a defendant who pleaded 

guilty entered his plea understandingly and voluntarily.’ 397 U.S. at 747-748 fn. 4. In 

North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970), the Court explained that in determining 

the validity of guilty pleas the ‘standard was and remains whether the plea represents a 

voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the 

defendant.’ Thus, specific articulation of the Boykin rights waived by a defendant is not 

required if the waiver can otherwise be gleaned from the record. Wilkins v. Erickson, 505 

F.2d 761, 763 (9th Cir. 1974). 

 As a threshold matter, Petitioner has not identified the clearly established federal 

law that was allegedly misapplied by the state courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams 

v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (2000). Accordingly, this Court cannot find that the state 

court’s treatment of this claim was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of clearly 

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established Supreme Court law. To the extent Petitioner is arguing, as he did in the state 

courts below, that his plea was in violation of Boykin, the record shows that Petitioner 

was advised of the specific rights at issue in Boykin, but more importantly, the record 

demonstrates he entered his plea knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. See Ex. C (R.T. 

October 6, 2009), at 7-8. 

 To the extent Petitioner’s guilty plea waived other specific rights not discussed in 

Boykin, the state court correctly determined that the plea was entered “knowingly, 

intelligently and voluntarily” considering the record before the state court. To determine 

whether a defendant was properly advised, the court must consider the totality of the 

circumstances. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 749 (1970). The Ninth Circuit 

has held that specific articulation of the defendant’s rights, even those at issue in Boykin, 

is not required as long as the record affirmatively shows that the defendant entered its 

guilty plea voluntarily and intelligently. See Wilkins v. Erickson, 505 F.2d 761, 763 (9th

Cir. 1974) (“Boykin does not require specific articulation of the above mentioned three 

rights in a state proceeding.”). Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has explained that “Boykin does 

not require the state court to enumerate all of the rights a defendant waives as long as the 

record indicates that the plea was entered voluntarily and understandingly.” Rodriguez v. 

Ricketts, 798 F.2d 1250, 1254 (9th Cir. 1986). 

 The appellate court acknowledged that the trial court did not specifically inform 

Willis of certain rights at the change-of-plea hearing. Nonetheless, the record in this case 

demonstrates that Petitioner was aware of his rights, and aware of the consequences of 

waiving them, and that his waiver was knowing and voluntary. As the trial court noted: 

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 On October 6, 2009 the Defendant plead guilty to the indictment and 

admitted one historical prior felony conviction. He was first advised of the 

charges, the sentencing range for each count and the constitutional rights he 

would waive by pleading guilty. In a colloquy between the Court and the 

Defendant, he stated that he understood what he was giving up by pleading 

guilty. The Court then questioned the Defendant regarding the 

voluntariness of his decision. The Defendant stated that after discussing it 

at length with his attorney, he still wished to plead to the indictment and to 

one prior felony conviction. The Defendant was then asked about his 

decision to admit his prior conviction. He was reminded that he had a right 

to a court trial and by admitting the prior he was giving up additional rights, 

including the right to make the State prove the prior with actual documents, 

evidence and witnesses. The Defendant stated that he understood he was 

giving up those rights as well. The Court then accepted his pleas of guilty, 

allowed him to make the factual basis, and questioned him about his prior 

conviction. At the conclusion, the Court found that his pleas and admission 

were knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily made. 

Ex. F, at 1-2. 

 Judging by the totality of the circumstances, the record supports the state court’s 

finding that the plea was voluntary. Petitioner was advised by the trial court of the 

consequences of a request to enter a plea to the Indictment at an earlier settlement 

conference (Ex. B). At the change of plea hearing he was represented by counsel who had 

spoken with him “extensively” about going to trial and advised him he “had nothing to 

lose” doing so (R.T. October 6, 2009, at 4); he was advised of the right to a jury trial, to 

representation by counsel, to have a jury decide aggravating factors, to question and 

cross-examine all the State’s witness, and to remain silent (Id. at 7-8); he was advised of 

the sentencing range he was exposed to by taking the plea (Id. at 9); he was advised of his 

right to a trial to prove the prior conviction used to aggravate his sentence (Id. at 12). 

Additionally, he was represented by counsel and was experienced with court proceedings 

and the criminal justice system. The state court’s decision was not contrary to or an 

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unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge 

denies the Petition with respect to Ground Two. 

III. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 

 In the event Petitioner appeals from this Court's judgment, and in the interests of 

conserving scarce resources that otherwise might be consumed drafting an application for 

a certificate of appealability to this Court, the Court on its own initiative has evaluated 

the claims within the Petition for suitability for the issuance of a certificate of 

appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); Turner v. Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 864-65 (9th 

Cir. 2002). 

 Rule 22(b) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that when an 

appeal is taken by a petitioner, the district judge who rendered the judgment “shall” either 

issue a certificate of appealability (“COA”) or state the reasons why such a certificate 

should not issue. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), a COA may issue only when the 

petitioner “has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” With 

respect to claims rejected on the merits, a petitioner “must demonstrate that reasonable 

jurists would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or 

wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (citing Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 

U.S. 880, 893 & n. 4, (1983)). For procedural rulings, a COA will issue only if 

reasonable jurists could debate (1) whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial 

of a constitutional right and (2) whether the court's procedural ruling was correct. Id. 

 Upon review of the record in light of the standards for granting a certificate of 

appealability, the Court concludes that a certificate shall not issue as the resolution of the 

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petition is not debatable among reasonable jurists and does not deserve further 

proceedings. 

 Accordingly, 

 IT IS ORDERED as follows: 

 (1) Petitioner’s § 2254 habeas petition (Doc. 1) is DENIED and this case is 

dismissed with prejudice. 

 (2) A Certificate of Appealability is DENIED and shall not issue 

 (3) The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment accordingly and close the file 

in this matter. 

 Dated this 12th day of May, 2014. 

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