Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-93-04127/USCOURTS-ca10-93-04127-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH FILED 

Ualted States Court of Appegls 

Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 3 0 1995 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, 

an Illinois corporation, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

RICHARD WORTHINGTON, individually ) 

and as guardian ad litem of Kaycee ) 

Lynn Kimmel, Kristopher Dean Kimmel) 

and Charlee Karena Kimmel; KAREN ) 

WORTHINGTON, individually and as ) 

guardian ad litem of Kaycee Lynn ) 

Kimmel, Kristopher Dean Kimmel and ) 

Charlee Karena Kimmel; DAVID ALAN ) 

ROTH, individually and as guardian ) 

ad litem of Kaycee Lynn Kimmel, ) 

Kristopher Dean Kimmel and Charles ) 

Karena Kimmel; KELSEY KYLE KIMMEL, ) 

NANCY RAVERA and JAE LOWDER, ) 

Defendants-Appellees. 

) 

) 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

No. 93-4127 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Utah 

(D.C. No. 92-C-377G) 

Robert G. Wright (Gary L. Johnson, also of Richards, Brandt, 

Miller & Nelson, with him on the briefs), Salt Lake City, Utah, 

for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Colin King (Edward B. Havas and Alan W. Mortensen, also of Wilcox, 

Dewsnup & King, with him on the brief), Salt Lake City, Utah, for 

Defendants-Appellees. 

Appellate Case: 93-4127 Document: 01019290330 Date Filed: 01/30/1995 Page: 1 
Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, LOGAN, Circuit Judge, and DAUGHERTY, 

District Judge.* 

LOGAN, Circuit Judge. 

Allstate Insurance Company filed this federal diversity action for a declaratory judgment, naming as defendants its insureds 

in a homeowner's policy and the parties suing those insureds in a 

Utah state court, seeking a determination that it had no duty 

under a homeowner's insurance policy to defend and indemnify Karen 

Worthington Brown (Brown) and her ex-husband, Richard Worthington 

(husband). The suit arose out of Richard Worthington's kidnapping 

of hostages and fatal shooting of a nurse. Brown had been sued in 

state court by victims and their survivors on claims that she had 

negligently entrusted weapons to her husband and failed to warn 

the potential victims. On appeal, Allstate asserts that summary 

judgment for defendants was improper because (1) the insurance 

policy unambiguously provided that because the husband's intentional acts were not covered under the policy Brown's negligent 

acts also were not covered; and (2) Brown's actions or omissions 

did not constitute an "accident" under terms of the policy.1 

* The Honorable Frederick A. Daugherty, Senior United States District Judge, United States District Court for the Western District 

of Oklahoma, sitting by designation. 

1 Allstate also argues that the "innocent coinsured" case law 

does not afford coverage. See Error v. Western Home Ins. Co., 

762 P.2d 1077 (Utah 1988). Because of our decision on the other 

points we need not, and do not, address this contention challenging the district court's alternative finding. 

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Appellate Case: 93-4127 Document: 01019290330 Date Filed: 01/30/1995 Page: 2 
I 

Brown underwent a tubal ligation at Alta View Hospital in 

Sandy, Utah, in July 1989. Her husband did not approve of the 

procedure, and over the following two years exhibited growing resentment and hostility toward the doctor and the staff at Alta 

. View Hospital. The allegations in the state court complaints were 

that, as a precaution, Brown removed all of her husband's firearms 

from their residence; but, on the eventful day, when her husband 

demanded that she give him the guns, she did so. Brown allegedly 

knew her husband planned to go to the hospital and kill the doctor 

who had performed the tubal ligation, but she did not try to warn 

her doctor or the Alta View Hospital. Her husband did take firearms and a bomb he had constructed to the Alta View Hospital, 

where he took hostages and shot and killed a nurse, Karla Roth. 

Karla Roth's husband and her children brought suit in Utah 

state court against both Brown and her husband. The Roths alleged 

that Brown "negligently and/or recklessly" breached a duty to warn 

the potential victims or the proper authorities and the failure 

contributed to Karla Roth's death.2 I R. 78. Subsequently others 

sued Brown for severe emotional distress and other injuries based 

upon theories of negligence in returning weapons to her husband 

and negligently or recklessly failing to warn the potential victims or the proper authorities. 

2 Brown moved for summary judgment in the state suit, alleging 

that she had no duty to Karla Roth. The district court of Utah 

denied the motion, stating that it could not be concluded as a 

matter of law that she owed no duty to Karla Roth. Brown petitioned the Utah Supreme Court for relief from the denial of her 

motion; the Utah Supreme Court denied the petition. 

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Appellate Case: 93-4127 Document: 01019290330 Date Filed: 01/30/1995 Page: 3 
Brown requested that Allstate defend her in the state negligence suits under a homeowner's policy in effect at the time. 

Allstate then filed this declaratory judgment action in the federal district court, claiming that it had no duty to defend and 

indemnify either Brown or her husband against the state tort 

claims. In considering cross motions for summary judgment, the 

court held that the criminal act exclusion in the policy unambiguously excluded coverage for the husband's acts. The district 

court held, however, that the term 11 an insured11 as used in the 

intentional and criminal exclusion clauses was ambiguous as to 

whether the husband's criminal and intentional acts excluded indemnification for the wife's negligent acts. II Appellant's App. 

439-40. Alternatively, it found that even if the intentional and 

criminal exclusionary clauses were not ambiguous as to coverage 

for the wife's alleged negligence, such preclusion would violate 

Utah substantive law that policies be interpreted based upon principles of individual responsibility. Id. at 440, 453. Thus, it 

granted summary judgment against the insurance company with respect to coverage for Brown, and only that determination is at 

issue in this appeal. 

II 

We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the 

same standards as the district court. Utah Power and Light Co. v. 

Federal Ins. Co., 983 F.2d 1549, 1553 (lOth Cir. 1993). If, as 

here, there are no genuine issues of material fact, we determine 

whether the district court correctly applied the substantive law 

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Appellate Case: 93-4127 Document: 01019290330 Date Filed: 01/30/1995 Page: 4 
of Utah. See APC Operating Partnership v. Mackey, 841 F.2d 1031, 

1033 (lOth Cir. 1988). 

Allstate first argues that the district court erred in finding the insurance contract ambiguous. Allstate asserts that as a 

coinsured of her husband the contract clearly excluded Brown's 

acts or omissions from coverage. As with any question of contract 

interpretation we examine closely the language of the particular 

contract. We apply Utah law, which provides that insurance policies are interpreted under general contract principles. Bergera 

v. Ideal Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 524 P.2d 599, 600 (Utah 1974); see 

also Utah Power and Light Co., 983 F.2d at 1553. Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law to be determined by this 

court. See Alf v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 850 P.2d 

1272, 1274 (Utah 1993); Stegall v. Little Johnson Assocs., 996 

F.2d 1043, 1048 (lOth Cir. 1993). Ambiguities in an insurance 

contract are construed against the insurer. Utah Farm Bureau Mut. 

Ins. Co. v. Orville Andrews & Sons, 665 P.2d 1308, 1309 (Utah 

1983); see also Royal College Shop. Inc. v. Northern Ins. Co., 

895 F.2d 670, 674 (lOth Cir. 1990). "Under Utah law, an insurer 

must use explicit language if it intends to limit coverage by an 

exclusion." United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Sandt, 854 P.2d 

519, 524 (Utah 1993). 

The liability section of the policy provides in part: 

SECTION II 

TION 

Coverage X 

FAMILY LIABILITY AND GUEST MEDICAL PROTECFamily Liability Protection 

Losses We Cover: 

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Appellate Case: 93-4127 Document: 01019290330 Date Filed: 01/30/1995 Page: 5 
Subject to the terms, limitations and conditions of this 

policy, Allstate will pay damages which an insured person becomes legally obligated to pay because of bodily 

injury or property damage arising from an accident and 

covered by this part of the policy. 

We may investigate or settle any claim or suit for covered damages against an insured person. If an insured 

person is sued for these damages, we will provide a defense with counsel of our choice, even if the allegations are groundless, false or fraudulent. We are not 

obligated to pay any claim or judgment after we have 

exhausted our limit of liability. 

Losses We Do Not Cover: 

1. We do not cover bodily injury or property 

damage resulting from: 

a) An act or omission intended or expected 

to cause bodily injury or property damage. This exclusion applies even if the 

bodily injury or property damage is of a 

different kind or degree, or is sustained 

by a different person or property, than 

that intended or expected; or 

b) An act or omission committed by an insured person while insane or while lacking the mental capacity to control his or 

her conduct or while unable to form any 

intent to cause bodily injury or property 

damage. This exclusion applies only if a 

reasonable person would expect some 

bndily injury or property damage to result from the act or omission. 

2. We do not cover bodily injury or property damage resulting from: 

a) A criminal act or omission; or 

b) An act or omission which is criminal in 

nature and committed by an insured person 

who lacked the mental capacity to appreciate the criminal nature or wrongfulness 

of the act or omission or to conform his 

or her conduct to the requirements of the 

law or to form the necessary intent under 

the law. 

This exclusion applies regardless of whether the 

insured person is actually charged with, or convicted 

of, a crime. 

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Appellate Case: 93-4127 Document: 01019290330 Date Filed: 01/30/1995 Page: 6 
I Appellant's App. 227-28 (bold type in original; other emphasis 

added) . 

The first paragraph of the liability section, by its terms, 

provides coverage to "an insured person." The particular exclusionary clauses on which Allstate relies, however, do not include 

any reference to "an insured" or "any insured," see id. ,,,, 1 (a) 

and 2(a), although the clauses excluding coverage of acts or omissions while insane or lacking capacity to control conduct do explicitly refer to "an insured person". See id. ,,,, 1 (b) and 2 (b) . 

Finally, the criminal act clause refers to "the insured person" in 

its final sentence. 

In reading these clauses as a whole, we cannot tell whether 

the intentional act and criminal act exclusions are intended to 

exclude coverage to all insureds based on intentional acts by an 

insured. The exclusions merely state that "we do not cover bodily 

injury or property damage resulting from an act or omission intended or expected to cause bodily injury or property damage 

.... " If we read the "an" in the first paragraph of the 

"Losses We Cover" section as meaning "any insured," it appears 

that an insured or any insured is covered for liability for bodily 

injury or property damage unless that injury or damage resulted 

from an act or omission intended or expected to cause bodily injury or property damage. The exclusionary clauses in question, 

,,,, 1 (a) and 2 (a) , do not explicitly state whether the triggering 

act or omission must be performed by "the insured," by "any insured," or by "an insured." 

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Appellate Case: 93-4127 Document: 01019290330 Date Filed: 01/30/1995 Page: 7 
Limitations on insurance coverage must be effected through an 

exclusion clause with language that clearly identifies the scope 

of the limitation to the reasonable purchaser of insurance. 

Draughon v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc'y., 771 P.2d 1105, 1108 (Utah App. 

1989). Here, the exclusion clause does not clearly identify 

whether the intentional act or omission by one insured would preclude coverage for related negligence by another insured. In 

fact, the clause can be read as excluding coverage to any insured 

for injuries intentionally caused by a noninsured. 

We also note that 1111 1 (b) and 2 (b) refer to acts or omissions 

by "an insured," and the final sentence of 11 2 refers to "the insured." These clauses are different from those in the cases relied upon by Allstate, in which the use of "an insured" rather 

than "the insured" in the exclusionary clause itself was held to 

prevent coverage for injury caused by the intentional acts of one 

insured, when a suit was brought against a coinsured on a theory 

of negligence. See, ~. Allstate Ins. Co. v. McCranie, 716 

F. Supp. 1440, 1447-49 (S.D. Fla. 1989), aff'd sub nom. Allstate 

Ins. Co. v. Manning, 904 F.2d 713 (11th Cir. 1990); Allstate Ins. 

Co. v. Gilbert, 852 F.2d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 1988); Allstate Ins. 

Co. v. Foster, 693 F. Supp. 886, 889 (D. Nev. 1988); Allstate Ins. 

Co. v. Roelfs, 698 F. Supp. 815, 822 (D. Alaska 1987) ; State Farm 

Fire and Cas. Co. v. Davis, 612 So. 2d 458, 466 (Ala. 1993) . All 

of these cases dealt with language that excluded coverage to "an 

insured," which the court read as "any insured." We do not know 

why the Allstate policies differ. But we must deal with the particular policy and the specific language at issue before us. In 

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Appellate Case: 93-4127 Document: 01019290330 Date Filed: 01/30/1995 Page: 8 
the instant case the applicable exclusion clauses do not use the 

term "an insured", "any insured," or even "insured."3 

Allstate points out its "joint obligations clause," which 

reads "[t]he terms of this policy impose joint obligations on persons defined as an insured person. This means that the responsibilities, acts and failures to act of a person defined as an insured person will be binding upon another person defined as an 

insured person," I Appellant's App. 26 (bold in original). But 

Allstate does not urge that this clause renders unambiguous the 

pertinent liability exclusion clauses. Nevertheless, we considered this argument because another case relied on it. See 

Allstate Ins. Co. v. McCranie, 716 F. Supp. at 1448 (citing 

Allstate Ins. Co. v. Childs, No. 87-1055-Civ-ORL 18 (M.D. Fla. 

July 7, 1988)). We believe, based on the placement of the joint 

obligations clause in the policy, that the provision refers to 

obligations to pay premiums, to make timely claims, etc., and that 

in any event a reasonable insured would not understand a "joint 

obligations" clause to exclude liability coverage for all insureds 

when coverage was excluded for one insured. 

Although we reason differently, we agree with the district 

court's determination that the policy was ambiguous as to whether 

Allstate had a duty to defend and indemnify Brown when her coinsured husband was not covered because he engaged in an intentional 

or criminal act excluded by the policy. Based on Utah law that 

3 Many cases defendants rely on found policies ambiguous because 

of severability clauses, and we note that the policy in question 

does not contain a severability clause. Because we have ruled the 

pertinent clauses to be ambiguous for other reasons, however, we 

need not address the severability clauses. 

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Appellate Case: 93-4127 Document: 01019290330 Date Filed: 01/30/1995 Page: 9 
contracts of insurance are to be construed in favor of the insured, particularly exclusionary clauses, we hold that Allstate 

has a duty to defend suits alleging Brown's negligence and, if 

liability is imposed, to indemnify Brown even though her coinsured 

is denied coverage because of his intentional or criminal acts. 

In so holding, we also reject Allstate's argument that we 

should look to the "underlying cause of the injury" to determine 

whether Brown is covered. Allstate cites Gilbert, 852 F.2d 449, 

and Allstate Ins. Co. v. Freeman, 443 N.W.2d 734 (Mich. 1989), for 

the proposition that if injuries and damages arise from one 

insured's intentional or criminal conduct, the insurance company 

has no obligation to indemnify or defend any coinsured who is sued 

on a negligence theory. Gilbert and Freeman are distinguishable 

in that their results were based in part on the "an insured" language in the exclusion portion of the policy. Freeman also relied 

in part upon cases involving vehicle accidents in which insureds 

sought to have the insurer defend under a homeowner's policy. 

Such cases, we believe, involve a different concept than the instant case. It seems logical that if a homeowner's policy excludes coverage for the use of automobiles, the negligent entrustment of automobiles is derivative, and there should be no coverage. Negligent entrustment of weapons and failure to warn are not 

derivative in the same way. 

In any event, our review indicates that the Utah courts have 

not specifically adopted nor rejected the view that negligent acts 

or omissions connected to intentional acts of other insureds are 

never covered by homeowner's liability policies. Therefore, based 

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on the Utah policies of construing exemptions against the insurance company and of focusing on individual responsibility, see 

Error v. Western Home Ins. Co., 762 P.2d 1077 (Utah 1988), we believe the district court correctly focused on the cause of action 

against the insured for whom the company is attempting to deny 

coverage--here, Brown's negligence. See Catholic Diocese v. 

Raymer, 840 P.2d 456, 461 (Kan. 1992) (looking to specific theory 

of liability alleged rather than underlying cause of injury to 

determine insurance coverage). If Allstate wants its homeowner's 

insurance policies to exclude coverage for all insured persons for 

an excluded act by any insured person, it can do so by careful 

drafting. 

III 

Finally, Allstate asserts that Brown's actions or omissions 

did not constitute an "accident." The policy provides "[s]ubject 

to the terms, limitations and conditions of this policy, Allstate 

will pay damages which an insured person becomes legally obligated 

to pay because of bodily injury or property damage arising from an 

accident and covered by this part of the policy." I Appellant's 

App. 44 (bold in original). Allstate contends that the allegations against Brown do not constitute an "accident" under the 

policy because her alleged negligence is not the action that actually caused Karla Roth's death or the other injuries, citing Mutual of Enumclaw v. Wilcox, 843 P.2d 154 (Idaho 1992). In that 

case a woman was sued for her negligence in failing to warn potential victims of her ex-husband's propensity to sexually molest 

children. The Idaho Supreme Court held the wife was not entitled 

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Appellate Case: 93-4127 Document: 01019290330 Date Filed: 01/30/1995 Page: 11 
to coverage because her conduct was not the conduct that caused 

the injuries. Allstate's "no accident" argument goes too far we 

believe; it would seem to relieve the insurer from providing a defense to any suit brought against a nonacting insured--e.g., when 

husband inadvertently dropped a substance on a walkway that caused 

injury and the injured party sues both insured spouses. As stated 

above, we believe Utah would more likely follow the courts that 

look to the actual allegations of negligence and not the "underlying actions." 

Further, Utah has adopted a broad definition of accident in 

accidental death policies. Winchester v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. 

of America, 975 F.2d 1479, 1487 (lOth Cir. 1992) (Utah courts apply the "less strict standard of defining 'accidental' as a result 

that was not reasonably foreseeable even if the means causing the 

result was foreseeable or even intentional." (citation omitted)). 

The Utah court also has noted that in a liability policy, "courts 

have generally held that 'accident' includes results negligently 

caused by the insured." Hoffman v. Life Ins. Co. of N. America, 

669 P.2d 410, 416 n.2 (Utah 1983). 

We AFFIRM the district court's holding that Allstate has a 

duty to defend and, if necessary, indemnify its insured, Karen 

Worthington Brown, in the suits that claim she negligently entrusted weapons and negligently failed to warn others of her 

husband's potential dangerousness. 

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Appellate Case: 93-4127 Document: 01019290330 Date Filed: 01/30/1995 Page: 12 
No. 93-4127 

Allstate Insurance Company v. 

worthington, et al. 

DAUGHERTY, District Judge, dissenting. 

I must respectfully dissent. As indicated in the majority 

opinion, the applicable section in the policy at issue in the case 

at bar covers "damages which an insured person becomes legally 

obligated to pay because of bodily injury or property damage 

arising from an accident . II (emphasis added). The section 

specifically excludes coverage for injuries resulting from "[a)n 

act or omission intended or expected to cause bodily injury or 

property damage. This exclusion applies even if the bodily injury 

or property damage is of a different kind or degree, or is 

sustained by a different person or property, than that intended or 

expected II (emphasis added). It is my opinion that the 

injuries at issue in the lawsuit against Karen Worthington could 

not be considered to have arisen from an "accident" in any logical 

or reasonable sense of the word, whether one looks to the conduct 

that caused the injury, as did the Idaho Supreme Court in Mutual of 

Enumclaw v. Wilcox, 843 P.2d 154 (Idaho 1992), or the allegations 

asserted against Karen Worthington herself. 

The word "accident" is defined by Webster's Unabridged 

Dictionary as "an event or condition occurring by chance or arising 

from unknown or remote causes; lack of intention or necessity; an 

unforeseen, unplanned event or condition II Webster's Third 

New International Dictionary 11 (1981). Black's Law Dictionary 

states that the word "accident" denotes "any unexpected personal 

injury resulting from any unlocked for mishap or occurrence ... 

Appellate Case: 93-4127 Document: 01019290330 Date Filed: 01/30/1995 Page: 13 
An event that takes place without one's foresight or expectation; 

an undesigned, sudden and unexpected event. A more 

comprehensive term than 'negligence,' and in its common 

signification the word means an unexpected happening without 

intention or design." Black's Law Dictionary 15 (6th ed. 1990). 

An insurance law treatise defines the concept of "accidental" as 

"happening by chance or unexpectedly taking place, not according to 

the usual course of things; fortuitous; befalling by chance out of 

the regular course of things; ... " Couch on Insurance 2d (Rev. 

ed.) §41:19. The Utah Supreme court has stated that "a person is 

a victim of an accident when, from the victim's point of view, the 

occurrence causing the injury or death is not a natural and 

probable result of the victim's own acts." Hoffman v. Life 

Insurance Co. of North America, 669 P.2d 410, 416 (Utah 1983). 

The above definitions consistently define accident in the same 

general terms. It is apparent that when such definitions are 

applied to the facts of the case at bar, neither the results 

flowing from the conduct of Richard Worthington, the perpetrator of 

the crime, or the conduct of his then wife Karen Worthington should 

be properly considered accidental. 

Applying the rationale used in the Enumclaw case cited above, 

the focus is placed on the actions which actually cause the 

underlying injury, in this case the deliberate and intentional 

criminal conduct of Richard Worthington. It is undisputed that 

Richard Worthington's intentional conduct is not covered by the 

homeowner's policy and, under the theory of Enumclaw, though Karen 

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Worthington did not commit the acts which caused the injuries, the 

homeowner's policy should provide no coverage to her as well. I 

find such an approach to be well-reasoned and sound, and disagree 

with the majorit'y that such approach would necessarily relieve an 

insurer from providing a defense to any nonacting insured. 

In any event, I am also of the opinion that the allegations 

made against Karen Worthington individually do not constitute the 

occurrence of an accident pursuant to the terms of the Allstate 

homeowner's policy. Karen Worthington is claimed to have acted 

negligently in giving Richard Worthington access to his firearms 

when he was obviously agitated and unstable and when she knew of 

his threats of bodily harm to her doctor and personnel at the 

hospital, and having such knowledge, in failing to warn the 

hospital and the authorities of his intent to do violence at the 

hospital. Applying Utah's definition of an accident as "an 

unlocked-for mishap which is not expected or designed," Hoffman, 

669 P.2d at 416 (Utah 1983), citing Schmidt v. Industrial Commision 

of Utah, 617 P.2d 693 (Utah 1980), I fail to see how such 

definition could encompass the allegations made against Karen 

Worthington in the Utah state cases. Given Karen Worthington's 

awareness of her husband's mental state, the threats he had made 

and her knowledge that he was bound for the hospital with an 

arsenal of firearms, the death of Karla Roth and the injuries 

sustained by the other Defendants should be deemed "naturally and 

probably expected or anticipated," Hoffman, 669 P. 2d at 416, as she 

furnished the weapons to her husband and then failed to warn. 

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Moreover, I do not agree with the majority that the reference 

in the pertinent section of the Allstate policy to "an insured 

person" is ambiguous. It should be noted that the pertinent family 

liability section of the policy uses the phrase "an insured person" 

five times during the explanation of included and excluded losses. 

The phrase "the insured person" is used only once, and that use 

occurs at the end of the liability section and understandably 

applies only to the insured who is actually charged with a crime. 

As a result, when the liability section is construed as a whole, I 

am of the opinion that the language used by Allstate in this 

section of its policy is not ambiguous but "is sufficient to 

demonstrate that the intentional act of any insured negates 

coverage for claims brought against another insured." Allstate 

Insurance Co. v. McCranie, 716 F.Supp. 1440, 1448 (S.D. Fla. 1989), 

aff'd, 904 F.2d 713 (11th Cir. 1990). See also, Allstate Ins. Co. 

v. Gilbert, 852 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1988); Allstate Ins. Co. v. 

Roelfs, 698 F.Supp. 815 (D. Alaska 1987); Allstate Ins. co. v. 

Foster, 693 F.Supp. H86 (D. Nev. 1988); State Farm Fire and 

Casualty Co. v. Davis, 612 So.2d 458 (Ala. 1993); Allstate Ins. Co. 

v. Freeman, 443 N.W.2d 734 (Mich. 1989); Allstate Ins. Co. v. 

Mugavero, 589 N.E.2d 365 (N.Y. 1992). 

The alternative determination of the district court to allow 

insurance coverage for Karen Worthington was on the basis that she 

was an innocent co-insured under the rule enunciated in Error v. 

Western Home Ins. Co., 762 P.2d 1077 (Utah 1988). Such 

determination is clearly erroneous considering the allegations made 

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against her in the Utah state cases and the requirement of the 

courts who have embraced this rule that such a co-insured must have 

no involvement in the events which caused the damage. Hedtcke v. 

Sentry Ins. Co., 326 N.W.2d 727 (Wis. 1982); Auto-Owners Ins. Co. 

v. Eddinger, 366 So.2d 123 (Fla. 1979); Economy Fire and Casualty 

Co. v. Warren, 390 N.E.2d 361 (Ill. App. 625). Karen Worthington 

admittedly gave her husband the firearms and failed to warn the 

hospital of his intentions. Thus, she was not an innocent coinsured but was a co-insured involved in the events bringing about 

the damage complained of by the Defendants. The majority did not 

treat with this alternative finding, but in dissent I should. I 

would find the fire insurance case of Error, in which the coinsured wife was completely innocent in that she was not in any way 

involved in the act of arson committed by her co-insured husband, 

to be not applicable to the facts of this case and the alternative 

finding to be erroneous. Karen Worthington was not innocent but 

was involved. 

In summary, it seems clear to me that the allegations made 

against Karen Worthington in the Utah state cases concerning her 

furnishing her husband his weapons and with knowledge of his 

threats of violence failing to warn the hospital or authorities of 

his intent in going to the hospital describe deliberate conduct on 

her part with expected consequences of violence. Such conduct does 

not constitute an accident as required by the applicable section of 

the insurance policy for it to afford coverage to her. As stated 

above, the relevant section specifically excludes coverage for 

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injuries resulting from an act (furnishing firearms) or omission 

(failing to warn) expected to cause bodily injury, even though not 

of a precise kind or degree or sustained by a different person than 

that intended. Such conduct also does not sustain an accident 

under Utah law, which requires a result not expected or 

anticipated. It also seems clear to me that the use of the words 

"an insured person" in the relevant liability section means any 

insured person, thus excluding Karen Worthington from coverage on 

this basis as well. The briefs cite four federal and at least six 

state cases to this effect and they also find no ambiguity in this 

meaning and intent. As a question of law for the Court, I would 

find no ambiguity in the liability section. The innocent coinsured rule used in Error is inapplicable to the admitted facts of 

this case. I would therefore reverse the district court's holding 

that Allstate has the duty to defend and indemnify its insured, 

Karen Worthington Brown, as to the suits brought against her by the 

Defendants. 

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