Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_02-cv-00591/USCOURTS-azd-2_02-cv-00591-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

José Parra, et al., )

)

Plaintiffs, ) No. CIV 02-0591-PHX-RCB

)

vs. ) O R D E R

)

Bashas', Inc., )

)

Defendant. ) )

I. Introduction

The original complaint in this action was filed by Plaintiffs

José Parra and Gonzalo Estrada on April 4, 2002. Complt. (doc. 1).

The Court granted Plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint, and

Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint (doc. 116) on March

11, 2004, adding Aurelia Martinez as a named plaintiff. In their

pleadings, Plaintiffs alleged that Defendant Bashas', Inc.

("Bashas'") committed civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. §

1981 for intentional discrimination and under Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000(e) et seq, for both

disparate impact and disparate treatment. In September 2004, 

Case 2:02-cv-00591-DJH Document 234 Filed 03/30/06 Page 1 of 8
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1 Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure lists the

prerequisites to a class action as:

(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all

members is impractical, (2) there are questions of

law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or

defenses of the representative parties are typical

of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the

representative parties will fairly and adequately

protect the interests of the class.

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Plaintiffs filed their motion for appointment of class counsel

(doc. 152) and, under seal, filed their motion for class

certification in this matter (doc. 159). These motions were fully

briefed on November 23, 2004, and the issue of class certification

was argued orally on January 24, 2005. 

On August 31, 2005, the Court issued an order ruling on these

motions. Order (doc. 224). In its order, the Court granted in

part and denied in part Plaintiffs' motion for class certification. 

Id. at 52. Specifically, the Court certified a class defined as

follows:

All Hispanic workers employed by defendant in an

hourly position at any Food City retail store

since April 4, 1998, who have been or may be

subject to the challenged disparate working

conditions.

Id. However, the Court denied Plaintiffs' motion, without

prejudice, as to the issues of the challenged pay policies and

practices. Id. The Court ruled in such a manner because it

concluded that Plaintiffs failed to satisfy the "commonality"

requirement of Rule 23(a)(2)1 in relation to these issues. Id. at

39.

Plaintiffs present evidence that Defendant's

policies governing compensation are similar across

all stores due to the fact that all of Defendant's

stores use company-established pay schedules to

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2 In its motion for reconsideration, Plaintiffs requested oral

argument on this matter. Mot. to Reconsider (doc. 225). Finding

oral argument unnecessary, the Court shall deny this request.

3 Defendant did not file an objection to Plaintiffs' motion for

leave to file a reply. Therefore, the Court shall grant Plaintiffs'

motion for leave to file their reply and has considered the reply in

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determine rates of pay. Mot. (doc. 159) at 4.

Defendant concedes that such pay schedules are

used, and that past pay schedules established for

Food City stores contained lower pay ranges than

those utilized at Bashas' and A.J.'s stores. Resp.

(doc. 190) at 11; Exbt. 7 (doc. 190) at ¶10.

However, both parties concede that over the past

several years the contested pay scales have merged

and, for the most part, are now identical. Mot.

(doc. 159) at 7; Resp. (doc. 190) at 14-15.

Consequently, some class members may now receive

pay that is equal to that of their counterparts in

Defendant's other stores, while other class

members may not. Thus, although Defendant's system

for compensating hourly employees is similar

across all stores, the Court is not satisfied that

the manner in which the system affects the class

raises issues that are common to all class

members.

Id.

In response to the Court's order, Plaintiffs filed a motion

entitled "Plaintiffs' Supplemental Motion to Redefine and Limit

Requested Class and to Reconsider August 31, 2005 Order." Mot. to

Reconsider (doc. 225).2 Believing that the characterization of

this motion as both a "supplemental motion" and a "motion to

reconsider" would cause confusion as to whether Defendant could

respond, the Court issued an order permitting such a response. 

Order (doc. 229). Accordingly, Defendant filed its response on

October 5, 2005. Resp. (doc. 230). Thereafter, Plaintiffs filed a

motion requesting leave to file a reply in this matter, and

attached the proposed reply to the motion. Motion for Leave to

File (doc. 233).3

 

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28 reaching its decision in this order. 

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This Court, having carefully considered the arguments

presented by the parties, now rules on these matters.

II. Motion to Reconsider

The decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration is

left to the sound discretion of the trial court. See School Dist.

No. 1J, Multnomah County v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th

Cir. 1993). Such motions are disfavored and are only appropriate

if a court "(1) is presented with newly discovered evidence; (2)

committed clear error or the initial decision was manifestly

unjust; or (3) if there is an intervening change in controlling

law." Id. A motion for reconsideration is not the place to make new

arguments not raised in the original briefs. All Hawaii Tours v.

Polynesian Cultural Ctr., 116 F.R.D. 645, 650 (D. Haw. 1987), rev’d

on other grounds, 855 F.2d 860 (9th Cir. 1988). Nor is it the time

to ask the court to rethink what it has already thought. Above the

Belt, Inc. v. Mel Bohannan Roofing, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 99, 101 (E.D.

Va. 1983). 

Here, Plaintiffs do not raise any newly discovered evidence in

their motion. In their request for reconsideration, Plaintiffs ask

the Court to "certify a more limited class, covering only those

employees who were actually paid a rate on the disputed pay scales,

which was lower than that for comparable Bashas'/A.J.'s Fine Foods

workers[.]" Mot. to Reconsider (doc. 225) at 2. Specifically,

Plaintiffs ask that the Court certify a class defined as:

All Hispanic workers employed by defendant in an

hourly position at any Food City retail store

since April 4, 1998, who were subject to

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defendant's policy of using lower pay schedules

for Food City workers than for workers in

comparable positions in Bashas' and A.J.'s Fine

Food stores. The class excludes any Hispanic Food

City employee who was, at all times during his or

her employment, paid a rate that was the same as

the rate for the equivalent position in Bashas'

and A.J.'s Fine Food stores.

Id. Plaintiffs do not raise any new evidence in relation to this

proposed change but merely argue that it is a clarification that

will resolve the Court's prior concerns about the proposed class

meeting the Rule 23(a)(2) requirement of "commonality." Reply

(doc. 233) at 1. However, in support of this change, Plaintiffs

put forth the same assertions that they posed in their initial

motion for class certification. Mot. for Reconsideration (doc.

225) at 4-16. A motion for reconsideration that merely repeats

arguments previously raised is appropriately denied. Taylor v.

Knapp, 871 F.2d 803, 805 (9th Cir. 1988).

Second, this Court did not commit clear error when it refused

to grant Plaintiffs' motion for class certification on the issues

of the challenged pay policies and practices. To prove that the

Court committed clear error, the movant must demonstrate that the

Court’s action falls clearly outside the bounds of its authority. 

McDowell v. Calderdon, 197 F.3d 1253, 1256 (9th Cir. 1999). If the

propriety of the Court’s judgment is a debatable question, there is

no clear error and the motion to reconsider is properly denied. 

Id. Here, Plaintiffs have made no arguments demonstrating that the

Court’s order falls outside the bounds of its authority. 

Finally, Plaintiffs have not indicated that there has been an

intervening change in controlling law. Therefore, the third basis

for a motion for reconsideration is not met. Consequently,

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Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration shall be denied.

III. Motion to Redefine

Plaintiffs also base their motion on Rule 23(c)(1)(C) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 23(c)(1)(C) provides that

"[a]n order under Rule 23(c)(1) may be altered or amended before

final judgment." This rule "provides district courts with broad

discretion to determine whether a class should be certified, and to

revisit that certification throughout the legal proceedings before

the court." Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 871 n.28 (9th Cir.

2001). 

Pursuant to this discretion, Plaintiffs ask the Court to

certify the more limited class, covering only those employees who

were actually paid a rate on the disputed pay scales. Mot. to

Reconsider (doc. 225) at 2. 

As plaintiffs understand the [Court's prior]

ruling, the Court concluded that the class, as

proposed, was too broad in that it encompassed

Hispanic employees who had been subject to lower

pay scales as well as some who, in later years,

were paid at the same rate as their counterparts

at Bashas' and A.J.'s Fine Foods when rates for

particular jobs were equalized...This narrower

class definition is expressly tailored to address

the concerns raised by this Court and satisfies

the requirements of Rule 23(a) and 23(b).

Id. at 1. Plaintiffs assert that the fact that Defendant

eventually merged the contested pay scales "does not deprive

victims of their right to seek redress for earlier violations nor

moot the issues." Id., citing Gonzales v. Police Dept., City of

San Jose, Cal., 901 F.2d 758, 762 (9th Cir. 1990) ("That minority

employees were 'promoted just before trial...does not constitute a

defense to plaintiffs' charges, nor does it moot the issues...'"). 

Plaintiffs argue that evidence demonstrates that substantial

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4 Plaintiffs note that because discovery was cut off in April

2004, they do not have the pay scales for 2004 and 2005 and are thus

unable to determine whether the pay scales are now identical. Mot. to

Reconsider (doc. 225) at 5 n.5.

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differences remained in the 2001 pay scale, indicating that 2,200

Hispanic Food City employees held jobs paid based upon the lower

pay scale. Id. at 5. In addition, Plaintiffs note that, while a

number of pay steps were equalized in 2002 and 2003, more than 700

Hispanic workers were still paid based upon lower rates than their

Bashas' counterparts in 2003.4 Id.

In contrast, Defendant asserts that these same arguments were

previously raised by Plaintiffs in their original motion for class

certification. Resp. (doc. 230) 11-13. 

The evidence in this case has not changed since

the Court's August 31, 2005 Order. The factual

information offered by Plaintiffs is not new, it

is simply repackaged.

Id. at 13. Moreover, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs'

"redefinition" of the class is no different from the original

definition proposed. Id. at 8. Defendant notes that, although the

newly proposed definition explicitly limits itself to those that

have suffered a loss, parties who have not suffered an economic

loss would not have been entitled to relief under the original

definition either. Id. at 8-9. Thus, Defendant maintains that

Plaintiffs' motion is merely an effort to rehash law and facts that

have already been considered by the Court, and asserts that the

motion should be denied. Id. at 14. The Court agrees.

The Court sees no real difference between Plaintiffs' newly

proposed class definition and that proposed in Plaintiffs' original

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motion for class certification. Consequently, the motion currently

before the Court is a motion to reconsider matters that the Court

has already reviewed and ruled upon. For the reasons explained

above, such a motion must be denied.

Therefore, 

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs' motion for leave to file reply

brief (doc. 233) is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Supplemental Motion to

Redefine and Limit Requested Class and to Reconsider August 31,

2005 Order (doc. 225) is DENIED.

DATED this 29th day of March, 2006.

Copies to counsel of record

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