Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-02316/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-02316-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BETSY TAUB,

 Plaintiff,

v.

FLEISHMAN-HILLARD, INC et al,

 Defendants.

________________________________/

No C-04-2316 VRW 

ORDER

Plaintiff Betsy Taub (“Taub”) sued her employer,

defendant Fleishman-Hillard, Inc, (“Fleishman-Hillard”), in

California state court, alleging age discrimination under

California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), wrongful

termination in violation of public policy and intentional

infliction of emotional distress. Not of Rem (Doc #1), Ex A. 

Fleishman-Hillard then removed the case to federal court based on

diversity jurisdiction. Id. Now before the court is FleishmanHillard’s July 11, 2005, motion for summary judgment as to all of

Taub’s claims. Mot SJ (Doc #29). Taub has not opposed dismissal

of the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Opp

SJ (Doc #35) at 25. For the reasons set forth below, FleishmanHillard’s motion is GRANTED.

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I

In 1996, Taub began working as a public relations

associate at the Emeryville, California, office of UpStart

Communications, Inc (“UpStart”) when she was fifty years old. Taub

Decl (Doc #37) at ¶¶ 1, 2. Taub’s duties at UpStart were to

provide public relations services to UpStart’s technology-industry

clients. Taub Depo (Doc#32-3) at 28:2-18, 39:3-16, 48:19-21.

In February 1999, Fleishman-Hillard acquired UpStart, at

which time there were between forty-five and fifty UpStart

employees. Id at 46:18-47:1; Taub Decl at ¶ 2. These employees,

including Taub, appear to have stayed on to work at the Emeryville

office, and Taub continued to perform the same job duties that she

had performed at UpStart. Taub Depo at 43:11-14, 46:18-47:1.

Taub worked at the Emeryville office until December

2002, when Fleishman-Hillard transferred Taub and several other

former UpStart employees to work in the technology group in its San

Francisco office. Id at 42:20-43:2. By that time, Taub was one of

only thirteen former UpStart employees still employed by FleishmanHillard. Id at 48:7-10. UpStart had focused exclusively on

technology-industry clients, and consequently, the 2001 downturn in

the technology industry had forced many former UpStart employees to

leave Fleishman-Hillard. Id at 48:11-49:13. At the time of her

transfer to the San Francisco office, Taub was spending all of her

time working on two technology-industry client accounts: Novadigm

and Wise Solutions. Id at 49:24-50:4.

In February 2003, Taub lost the Wise Solutions account

because Wise Solutions took its public relations work in-house. Id

at 163:4-9. Taub also informed management that she expected
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Novadigm to cut back its budget. Id at 73:10-73:24. Although Taub

worked hard to find other accounts on which to work, her efforts

were unsuccessful. Id at 163:21-164:1; Kundred Depo (Doc ##46-53)

at 125:14-24.

One of the Fleishman-Hillard employees that Taub

contacted in search of work was Nancy Morrison (“Morrison”), a

Senior Vice President in the technology group. Morrison Depo (Doc

##54-56) at 31:1-6. Morrison held between one and two meetings per

week aimed at generating new business, and Taub attended one such

meeting concerning a prospective client. Id at 24:21-26:3. 

Although Morrison claims that she invited Taub to these meetings,

Morrison admits that Taub was not invited to all of them. Id at

24:21-23; 25:19-26:10; Taub Decl at ¶ 5. According to Morrison,

invitations to the meetings were based on whether the employee’s

skill set best matched the prospective client. Morrison Depo at

27:6-10. Taub claims that she was frozen out of the meetings

because of her age. Opp SJ at 5-8.

In April 2003, Curt Kundred (“Kundred”), the General

Manager in charge of San Francisco operations, proposed to his

boss, Bill Anderson, that Taub and two other former UpStart

employees should be fired. Doc #32-5 at 4:7-17; 131:7-16. On

April 28, Barbara Axmacher (“Axmacher,” at that time Barbara

Ruberg), a member of the Talent Development Department in

Fleishman-Hillard’s St Louis office, emailed Anderson stating that

she had spoken to Kundred and that Taub and two others were to be

let go on April 30. Ackerman Decl (Doc #41), Ex G. The email

stated, “All three [employees] are over the age of 40 but we feel

confident these are the people we need to let go at this time.” 
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Id. Management ultimately decided against terminating Taub,

however, because of concerns that too many UpStart employees were

being let go. Doc #32-5 at 129:1-4.

In July and August of 2003, Novadigm cut back its public

relations budget. Taub Depo at 163:4-20; 164:12-18. Taub

continued to contact others in the office about her need for work

but was unable to obtain any other significant assignments. Id at

164:19-165:3. Because Wise Solutions was no longer a client and

Novadigm had cutback its budget, Taub did not meet her billable

hours goals in July and August of 2003. Id at 164:7-18. After

discussions with Taub’s supervisors, Kundred decided to terminate

Taub. Kundred Decl (Doc #32-1) at ¶ 5. Noting in an August 22,

2003, email that Taub was not “deployable to life sciences or other

groups,” Axmacher relayed Kundred’s desire to terminate Taub and

one other employee in the technology group to Agnes Giaconda, head

of the Talent Development Department. The email stated: “Betsy

[Taub], who is over 60, has been cut back from accounts she was

working and was removed from previous layoff lists because we felt

there was too much focus on letting former UpStart people go. 

Neither [employee] is working on much else and based on their skill

sets, there is no other work for them.” Kundred Depo.

On August 27, 2003, Fleishman-Hillard posted on

hotjobs.com an advertisement for an Account Supervisor, a position

that was one level below Taub’s position. Taub Decl, Ex B. On

September 3, 2003, Taub, who was fifty-seven years old, and the

other employee, who was twenty-eight years old, were terminated. 

Taub Decl at ¶ 1; Kundred Decl at ¶¶ 5-6.

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II

In reviewing a summary judgment motion, the court must

determine whether genuine issues of material fact exist, resolving

any doubt in favor of the party opposing the motion. “[S]ummary

judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is 

‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v

Liberty Lobby, 477 US 242, 248 (1986). “Only disputes over facts

that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law

will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Id. And

the burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact lies with the moving party. Celotex Corp v Catrett,

477 US 317, 322-23 (1986). Summary judgment is granted only if the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FRCP

56(c).

The nonmoving party may not simply rely on the

pleadings, however, but must produce significant probative

evidence, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in FRCP 56,

supporting its claim that a genuine issue of material fact exists. 

TW Elec Serv v Pacific Elec Contractors Ass’n, 809 F2d 626, 630

(9th Cir 1987). The evidence presented by the nonmoving party “is

to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in

his favor.” Anderson, 477 US at 255. “[T]he judge’s function is

not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the

matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for

trial.” Id at 249.

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III

FEHA prohibits the discharge of an employee because of

the employee’s age. Cal Gov Code § 12940(a). Because of the

similarity between FEHA and federal employment discrimination

statutes, California courts look to pertinent federal precedent in

applying FEHA. Guz v Bechtel National, Inc, 24 Cal 4th 317, 354

(2000). In particular, in employment discrimination cases that

rely entirely on circumstantial evidence, California courts apply

the three-stage burden shifting test the United States Supreme

Court established in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v Green, 411 US

792 (1973), and subsequent cases. Guz, 24 Cal 4th at 354.

Under the test, a plaintiff must first establish a prima

facie case by presenting evidence sufficient to give rise to an

inference of age discrimination. Id at 354-56. This creates a

presumption of age discrimination and shifts the burden to the

employer to produce evidence of a non-discriminatory reason for its

employment decision. Id. If the employer meets this burden, the

presumption created by the prima facie case disappears and the

employee must then show that the employer’s proffered reason is a

pretext for age discrimination. Id.

Fleishman-Hillard makes two arguments to support its

motion for summary judgment. First, Fleishman-Hillard contends

that Taub has not established a prima facie case of discrimination

because she has not produced evidence that her discharge occurred

under circumstances giving rise to an inference of age

discrimination. Mot SJ at 10-12. Second, Fleishman-Hillard claims

that even if Taub could establish a prima facie case, Taub has not

presented any evidence that Fleishman-Hillard’s justification for
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terminating her was pretextual. Id at 17-22. The court will

examine each of these claims in turn.

A

The degree of proof necessary to establish a prima facie

case on summary judgment is “minimal,” and “does not even need to

rise to the level of a preponderance of the evidence.” Wallis v JR

Simplot Co, 26 F3d 885, 889 (9th Cir 1994). To establish a prima

facie case, a plaintiff must show that she was: (1) over age

forty; (2) performing her job in a satisfactory manner; (3)

discharged; and (4) replaced by a substantially younger employee

with equal or inferior qualifications. Rose v Wells Fargo &

Company, 902 F2d 1417, 1421 (9th Cir 1990).

Taub has presented evidence that she was over forty

years old and was discharged, thus establishing elements one and

three of a prima facie case. She has also produced some evidence

of the second element, satisfactory performance. For instance,

Morrison testified that Taub’s performance did not warrant a

performance improvement plan. Morrison Depo at 45:8-12. And

Kundred states that Taub “was not terminated because of ‘poor

performance.’” Kundred Supp Decl (Doc #58) at ¶ 7. Nonetheless, a

May 2003 evaluation stated that Taub should “[l]earn to better

manage her time on Novadigm so she can take on additional

accounts.” Doc #32-2. This suggests that Taub’s inability to

secure new work may stem from her inefficient efforts elsewhere.

The review contained a number of other criticisms of

Taub’s performance (e g, Taub “isolates herself in her office”

inadequately “interact[ing] with the rest of the San Francisco

office,” “inappropriately reached out to Claudia Carasso about
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Claudia returning to the agency,” “needs to spend more time with

her supervisor and peers to resolve what she doesn’t understand,”

“needs to learn how to achieve goals from the client during the

normal business day,” needs to “demonstrate[] the same or

comparable capabilities of other managing supervisors in the San

Francisco office”). Id at 11-12. This review covered the period

up to May 2003, two months before Novadigm cut back its public

relations budget and Taub failed to meet her billable hours goals. 

This record fails to establish the satisfactory performance prong

of Taub’s prima facie case.

But even if the court assumes for purposes of this

motion that Taub performed her job in a satisfactory manner, she

has not shown that she was replaced by a younger worker. Although

Fleishman-Hillard posted an advertisement for an Account Supervisor

on hotjobs.com seven days before Taub was terminated, Taub conceded

that the Account Supervisor position was one level below Taub’s

position of Managing Supervisor and that an Account Supervisor

could only handle thirty percent of Taub’s Novadigm work. Taub

Decl, Ex B; Taub Depo at 234:12-23. And although Fleishman-Hillard

hired a Senior Account Executive in the technology group less than

a month after Taub was terminated, that position was two levels

below Taub. Ackerman Decl, Ex D; Kundred Depo at 50:1-16. 

Presumably, an employee in that position could handle only a

fraction of Taub’s duties.

The fourth element of a prima facie case -- replacement

by a younger worker -- is not required in every case. In cases in

which the termination was part of a reduction in workforce, the

employee may satisfy the replacement prong by showing “through
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circumstantial, statistical, or direct evidence that the discharge

occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of age

discrimination.” Rose, 902 F2d at 1421. The employee can

establish this inference by showing either that the employer had a

continuing need for the employee’s services because the employee’s

duties were still being performed, or by showing that others not in

the protected class were treated more favorably. Nidds v

Schindler, 113 F3d 912, 917 (9th Cir 1996).

Failure to show replacement by a younger worker is not

alone fatal to Taub’s case because the evidence shows that her

termination was part of a reduction in workforce. FleishmanHillard has cited losses in its technology practice in the middle

of 2003 and its inability to “sustain the level of existing

employees” as a contributing factor in Taub’s termination. See, e

g, Kundred Decl at ¶ 3. Taub may therefore satisfy the fourth

requirement of a prima facie case by showing either a continuing

need for her services or by showing that younger employees were

treated more favorably than she was treated.

To satisfy this requirement, Taub argues that younger

workers were treated more favorably than she and points to: (1)

the hotjobs.com advertisement discussed above; (2) evidence that

Nancy Morrison excluded Taub but invited younger workers to

meetings; and (3) an email from Kundred suggesting that Andrew

Miller, in his thirties, be used for a new project instead of Taub. 

Opp SJ at 21. Even though the evidence required at the prima facie

stage is minimal, the court finds that the evidence Taub has

presented fails to demonstrate that Taub’s discharge occurred under

circumstances giving rise to an inference of age discrimination.
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Because the hotjobs.com advertisement was for a position

that differed significantly from Taub’s and because Taub has not

established that a younger account supervisor was actually hired,

the advertisement shows neither a continuing need for her duties

nor that younger workers were treated more favorably.

The evidence that Nancy Morrison excluded Taub but

invited younger workers to meetings does not support a possible

inference that younger workers were treated more favorably. 

According to Morrison’s testimony, she held between one and two

meetings per week aimed at developing new business in the

technology group. Morrison did not invite Taub to some of these

meetings, even though she knew that Taub was looking for work. The

problem (for Taub) is that she has not presented evidence of who

was invited to the meetings, the age of employees who were invited,

how many meetings the employees were invited to in comparison to

Taub, their qualifications in comparison to Taub’s and that Taub

had the qualifications or contacts to contribute to the objectives

of Morrison’s meetings. Furthermore, Taub testified that she knows

of no other facts that would support a contention that Morrison

excluded Taub because of her age. Taub Depo at 349:12-350:2. This

sequence of events and circumstances simply is insufficient to give

rise to an inference of discrimination. See Ritter v Hughes

Aircraft Co, 58 F3d 454, 457 (9th Cir 1995) (holding that an

employee who lacked specific evidence of the identity, age or

inferior qualifications of his replacement failed to establish a

prima facie case of age discrimination).

Taub’s reference to an email from Kundred to Michael

Busselen, General Manager of Fleishman-Hillard’s San Diego office,
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also is unavailing. Busselen had contacted the San Francisco

office to find an employee to work on a new project. Doc #53. In

response, Shawn Dainas, a vice president at that office, suggested

Taub. Id. When Busselen contacted Kundred about Dainas’

suggestion, Kundred said “Do not use Betsy.” Id. Kundred

suggested assigning the project to Andrew Miller, who was in his

thirties. Id. Despite Kundred’s suggestion of a younger employee,

this email does not itself allow the inference of age

discrimination because Busselen specifically stated that he did not

want to use Taub if she might be terminated in the next sixty days. 

Id. He sent this email to Kundred less than two weeks before Taub

was terminated, and Kundred testified that he said not to use Taub

because he had essentially already made the decision to terminate

her. Kundred Depo at 155:1-10.

B

But putting this all aside, even if Taub had established

a prima facie case, Fleishman-Hillard has satisfied its burden of

production by articulating legitimate and nondiscriminatory reasons

for Taub’s termination. Fleishman-Hillard claims that the amount

of work available was insufficient to sustain the number of

employees in the technology group. Mot SJ at 12-17. FleishmanHillard also asserts that it selected Taub for termination because

she did not have enough work, she lacked the skills required to

obtain new work and her performance was deficient. Id.

Indeed, Fleishman-Hillard has produced evidence that

when Taub was terminated, Novadigm, Taub’s only client, had cut

back its hours such that Taub did not reach her billable hours

goals for July and August 2003. Taub herself acknowledged that
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insufficient billable hours would leave an employee vulnerable to

termination. Doc #58-2 at 286:15-287:6. In addition, Kundred

testified that he believed Taub did not have the skills necessary

to work on a broad range of clients, an assertion that Axmacher

referenced in her emails. Doc #58-6 at 137:2-23. That FleishmanHillard terminated a twenty-eight-year-old employee who was also

thought to lack the desired “skill set” supports this assertion. 

There is also evidence that Taub’s performance was

deficient in certain areas. Fleishman-Hillard has argued that

Taub’s performance was one of the reasons that she was unable to

obtain work. Mot SJ at 13-17. As previously, the May 2003

evaluation Taub received suggested a need for improvement in

several areas, including a need to improve her “strategic

execution,” a need to become less isolated in the office and a need

to improve communication with her clients. Doc #32-2. Kundred

states that he did not take this evaluation into account when

terminating Taub, but that he did consider her “visibility, her

insularity, [and] her need to think more strategically, all of

which Ms. Taub conceded were true in our meetings in June 2003 and

that happened to appear in that evaluation.” Kundred Supp Decl at

¶ 7. Moreover, as noted, this (at best) mixed performance review

preceded Taub’s failure to meet her billable hours goals in July

and August 2003 after the Novadigm cutbacks.

C

Because Fleishman-Hillard has articulated

nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating Taub, she must produce

evidence sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to conclude either

that Fleishman-Hillard’s reasons for terminating her are false or
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that age discrimination was the true reason for her discharge. 

Nidds, 113 F3d at 918. This evidence must be “specific” and

“substantial.” Wallis, 26 F3d at 890. 

Taub contends both that Fleishman-Hillard’s reasons for

terminating her are false and that the true reason for her

termination was age discrimination. Taub argues that FleishmanHillard did not terminate her for economic reasons because the

evidence shows that the San Francisco office was profitable in 2002

and 2003. Opp SJ at 11-12. She also argues that her work

experience shows that she had the skill set required to service a

broad range of clients. Id at 3-4. Taub further contends that

emails mentioning her age in connection with her termination

demonstrate that age discrimination was the true reason for her

termination. Id at 23. Finally, Taub has presented statistical

evidence that, in her view, shows that Fleishman-Hillard

discriminated against older employees. Ackerman Decl, Ex E; Opp SJ

at 4. After reviewing the evidence on these issues, the court

finds that Taub has failed to produce specific and substantial

evidence of pretext.

Taub argues that Fleishman-Hillard did not terminate her

for economic reasons because the San Francisco office was

profitable in 2002 and 2003. But Taub’s evidence on this point

does not address Fleishman-Hillard’s stated reason for terminating

her. Kundred stated that profitability concerns in the technology

practice meant that the technology group could not sustain the

number of existing employees. Although the technology practice did

make a profit in 2003, financial records show that the practice

experienced losses in five of the last six months of calendar year
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2003, thus supporting Kundred’s statement. Ackerman Decl, Ex F. 

And Taub has not pointed to any evidence suggesting that the

technology practice did not have “profitability concerns” in 2003. 

Rather, Taub argues that Fleishman-Hillard did not terminate her

for economic reasons because the San Francisco office as a whole

was profitable, an assertion that Fleishman-Hillard does not

contest. Because this evidence is not inconsistent with Kundred’s

stated reason, it does not show pretext.

Taub also argues that Fleishman-Hillard’s statement that

she lacks the skills to work with a broad range of clients is

false. Taub points to her employment history, which shows that she

has experience working for eleven different clients. Opp SJ at 2-

4. Taub also points to the email from Shawn Dainas to the general

manager of the San Diego office in which Dainas suggested Taub as a

candidate for a new assignment and detailed her experience working

with various clients and reporters. Doc #53. Finally, Taub argues

that Fleishman-Hillard has not specified what skills Taub was

lacking. Opp SJ at 23.

The evidence on this point does not create a genuine

issue of material fact as to pretext. Although Kundred did not

specify what skills Taub lacked, he stated that he had learned from

managers who had worked with Taub that she was not readily

deployable to a broad range of work. Doc #32-5 at 137:2-138:14. 

Kundred also stated that Taub had limited experience working with a

broad range of clients as compared to other members of the

technology practice. Kundred Decl at ¶ 5. Because Taub has not

pointed to any evidence that she was equally or better qualified to

work with a broad range of clients than those employees who were
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retained, Taub has not pointed to any evidence that FleishmanHillard’s statements regarding her skills are false.

Next, Taub argues that two emails connected to her

termination that mention her age show that discrimination was the

true reason for firing her. The August 22 email from Barbara

Axmacher described Taub as “over sixty.” Kundred Depo. A

reference to age, however, without any indication of favoritism for

younger workers or animus against older workers cannot support an

inference of discrimination. See Nelson v J C Penney, 75 F3d 343,

346 (8th Cir 1996) (“A fact finder may not simply convert a

condition that is necessary for a finding of liability (here,

knowledge of a plaintiff’s age) into one that is sufficient for

such a finding.”). Furthermore, Axmacher explains that she only

brought up Taub’s age because of risk management and severance

concerns. Doc #32 at ¶ 5. The April 28 email confirms this

assertion: In referring to Taub and two other employees who had

been proposed for termination, the email states, “All three are

over the age of 40 but we feel confident these are the people we

need to let go at this time.” Id, Ex G. But Taub was not let go

at this time suggesting, if anything, that mention of age may have

led to Taub’s retention. Axmacher’s use of the word “but”

indicates a reluctance to lay off employees who are in the

protected age group. The mere mention of age is simply too

attenuated to support a triable issue of pretext.

Finally, statistical evidence that Taub has presented is

not probative in showing age discrimination. According to Taub,

employment records show that at the time of Taub’s termination

there were “significantly higher number of UpStart employees over
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age 40, in comparison to the employees of Fleishman-Hillard,” that

Taub was the oldest employee in the San Francisco office at the

time she was terminated and that there was not an employee in a

similar position to Taub over age 40. Id, Ex E; Opp SJ at 4. 

Because these statistics fail to take into account any variables

besides age, job title, and office, however, they are not

probative. For instance, Taub began working as a public relations

associate at age fifty. If the average age of applicants for that

position is much lower, then that factor, rather than age

discrimination, would account for the difference in ages between

Taub and her co-workers. See Pottenger v Potlatch, 329 F3d 740,

748 (9th Cir 2003) (where statistics used to prove age

discrimination failed to take into account job performance, they

failed to raise a triable issue of fact regarding pretext).

Hence, Taub has not produced specific and substantial

evidence that creates an issue of material fact as to the truth of

Fleishman-Hillard’s legitimate explanation for firing Taub. 

Fleishman-Hillard is therefore entitled to summary judgment as to

Taub’s FEHA age discrimination claim.

D

Taub has also brought a claim for wrongful discharge in

violation of public policy. Taub bases this claim on FEHA’s

expression of the public policy against age discrimination. Not of

Rem, Ex A at ¶¶ 25-26.

According to the California supreme court, “the public

policy against age discrimination articulated in the FEHA is

subject to the FEHA’s limitations on the nature and scope of the

statutory prohibition against age discrimination.” Esberg v Union
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Oil Co, 28 Cal 4th 262, 272 (2002). If an employer has not

violated FEHA, the employee’s claim for wrongful discharge in

violation of public policy based on FEHA fails. Id at 272-73. 

Because Taub has not established a violation of FEHA, FleishmanHillard is also entitled to summary judgment as to Taub’s claim for

wrongful termination in violation of public policy.

IV

In sum, the court GRANTS Fleishman-Hillard’s motion for

summary judgment on the grounds that Taub has failed to present

evidence establishing a prima facie case of age discrimination and

that Taub has failed to present specific and substantial evidence

that Fleishman-Hillard’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for

her termination are pretextual. Because Taub has not established a

genuine issue of material fact whether defendant violated FEHA,

Fleishman-Hillard is also entitled to summary judgment as to

plaintiff’s claim of wrongful termination in violation of public

policy. Taub’s claims of age discrimination under FEHA, wrongful

termination in violation of public policy and intentional

infliction of emotional distress are DISMISSED. The clerk is

directed to close the file and terminate all pending motions.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge