Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-02800/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-02800-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARK A. SMITH,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-09-2800 FCD GGH P

vs.

DORA M. RIOS,

Defendants. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Plaintiff is civilly committed to a state hospital and purports to have filed an

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. By Order, filed on February 25, 2010, plaintiff’s claim was

dismissed with leave to amend either under § 1983 or under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by way of a

petition for writ of habeas corpus. 

As plaintiff was previously informed, a complaint must contain more than a

“formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations

sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007). “The pleading must contain something

more...than...a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of

action.” Id., quoting 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 1216, pp. 235-235

(3d ed. 2004). “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a

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claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___ U.S.___, 129 S.Ct. 1937,

1949 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955). “A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

Pro se pleadings are liberally construed. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,

520-21, 92 S. Ct. 594, 595-96 (1972); Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th

Cir. 1988). Unless it is clear that no amendment can cure the defects of a complaint, a pro se

plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis is entitled to notice and an opportunity to amend before

dismissal. See Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1230.

On the form for a civil rights complaint, plaintiff once again seeks to fault his

“public defender conflict attorney,” Dora M. Rios, for ineffective assistance of counsel for, inter

alia, failing to adequately communicate with him (apparently before an SVP commitment

hearing/trial). Docket # 10, Amended Complaint, p. 3. He also faults her for failing to subpoena

witnesses on his behalf and for not contacting a John Podboy, Ph.D, presumably a potential

expert witness on plaintiff’s behalf. Id. Plaintiff also claims to be a victim of double jeopardy,

averring that he served 22 years time for the underlying crime and only came under this current

commitment due to having violated parole on a “phony” conviction for failing to register by

having a can of beer. Id. Plaintiff asks for his sentence to be overturned and for a new trial. Id.,

at 7.

Plaintiff was previously informed that his § 1983 filing was inapposite for a

number of reasons:

In the first place, plaintiff makes clear that he is a civil detainee

pursuant to California’s Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA)

(Cal. Welf & Inst. Code § 6600, et seq.), although he claims to be

under a sentence of “indefinite life.” Id., at 3, 10. If plaintiff is

civilly detained, he is not serving a life sentence, or, in fact, any

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 At most, plaintiff may be civilly committed (pursuant to a single commitment) for a 1

period of two years “for appropriate treatment and confinement in a secure facility.” Jones v.

Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 923 (9 Cir. 2004), citing Cal. Welf & Inst. Code § 6604. th

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prison sentence.1

In the second place, the Civil Rights Act under which this action

was filed provides as follows:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . .

subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of

the United States . . . to the deprivation of any

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured

in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper

proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. A public defender is not a state actor within the

meaning of § 1983 in representing a client in the traditional

adversarial role of a lawyer. Miranda v. Clark County, Nevada,

319 F.3d 465, 468 (9 Cir. 2003), citing Polk County v. Dodson, th

454 U.S. 312, 325, 102 S. Ct. 445 (1981).

Third, if plaintiff is seeking to challenge the constitutionality of his

current commitment and wishes to raise a claim for ineffective

assistance of counsel, he must proceed as a petitioner by way of a

petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

Order, filed on February 25, 2010, p. 3.

Notwithstanding, plaintiff filed a purported amended § 1983 complaint, which

should now be dismissed with prejudice for the reasons stated above. “A pro se litigant must be

given leave to amend his or her complaint unless it is ‘absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the

complaint could not be cured by amendment.’” Noll, 809 F.2d at 1448 (quoting Broughton v.

Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir.1980) (per curiam)); accord Eldridge v. Block,

832 F.2d 1132, 1135-36 (9th Cir.1987). Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d

621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). 

However, leaving no stone unturned, plaintiff, also mixed within his amended

filing, the form for proceeding as a petitioner on an application for a writ of habeas corpus,

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Docket # 10, Petition, p. 4. Petitioner asserts that he is

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 A petition may be denied on the merits without exhaustion of state court remedies. 28 2

U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). 

 Petitioner is cautioned that the habeas corpus statute imposes a one year statute of 3

limitations for filing non-capital habeas corpus petitions in federal court. In most cases, the one

year period will start to run on the date on which the state court judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of time for seeking direct review, although the

statute of limitations is tolled while a properly filed application for state post-conviction or other

collateral review is pending. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 

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challenging an indefinite sentence imposed by a “conviction” on September 25, 2009, but also

conflictingly states that he is currently under an SVP civil commitment (i.e., not a criminal

conviction). Id. Petitioner asserts, nevertheless, that his petition challenging the commitment on

grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel is currently pending in the state court’s first appellate

district. Id., at 5.

The exhaustion of state court remedies is a prerequisite to the granting of a

petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). If exhaustion is to be waived, it must

be waived explicitly by respondent’s counsel. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(3). A waiver of exhaustion, 2

thus, may not be implied or inferred. A petitioner satisfies the exhaustion requirement by

providing the highest state court with a full and fair opportunity to consider all claims before

presenting them to the federal court. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971); Middleton v.

Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1021 (1986). 

It is apparent that petitioner himself has in essence conceded that he has failed to

exhaust state court remedies. The claims have not been presented to the California Supreme

Court. Further, there is no allegation that state court remedies are no longer available to

petitioner. Accordingly, the petition should be dismissed without prejudice.

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IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that, to the extent that plaintiff intends to

proceed by way of a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, this action be dismissed with

prejudice; in the alternative, to the extent that plaintiff, as petitioner, seeks to proceed by way of

28 U.S.C. § 2254, this action be dismissed without prejudice for a failure to exhaust state court

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remedies. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, plaintiff/petitioner may file

written objections with the court. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff/petitioner is advised that failure to

file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court's order. 

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: April 2, 2010 /s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 

GREGORY G. HOLLOWS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

GGH:009

smit2800.fte

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