Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01758/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01758-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LEE EDWARD PEYTON,

Plaintiff,

v.

PAT L. VASQUEZ, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:06-cv-01758-OWW-NEW (DLB) PC

ORDER REQUIRING PLAINTIFF TO EITHER

FILE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT OR

NOTIFY COURT OF WILLINGNESS TO

PROCEED ONLY ON COGNIZABLE

EXCESSIVE FORCE CLAIMS

(Doc. 5)

I. Screening Order

A. Screening Requirement

Plaintiff Lee Edward Peyton (“plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed this action on

December 6, 2006. On January 3, 2007, plaintiff filed an amended complaint. 

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

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28 Claims two and three. (Amend. Comp., pgs. 52 & 53.) 1

2

A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467

U.S. 69, 73 (1984), citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957);see also Palmer v. Roosevelt

Lake Log Owners Ass'n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing a complaint under this

standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg.

Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395

U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

B. Plaintiff’s Claims

Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at High Desert State Prison. The events at issue in the

instant action allegedly occurred at Wasco State Prison and the California Substance Abuse

Treatment Facility and State Prison-Corcoran. 

Plaintiff’s lengthy amended complaint sets forth allegations which plaintiff contends give rise

to claims for relief for violation of the Eighth Amendment under various theories, and for denial of

access to the courts. In addition to describing actions taken against him, plaintiff describes actions

taken against other prisoners by staff. The alleged violation of other prisoners’ rights provides no

basis upon which to impose liability in this action and those allegations are should not be included

in any future complaints.

1. Excessive Force Claim1

Plaintiff alleges that on April 4, 2004, defendant Kuykendall ordered him to get down and

as he was complying, Kuykendall and defendant Wilson ran into his cell, grabbed him, and forced

him to the ground. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Kuykendall used his baton to pull up and back

on plaintiff’s left bicep, causing pain and injury. Defendant Wilson placed handcuffs on plaintiff’s

wrists so tightly that the feeling to plaintiff’s wrists was cut off, and defendant Wilson thereafter

slammed plaintiff to the ground on his chest.

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3

Plaintiff alleges that later that morning, he was escorted to administrative segregation and

directed to enter a dark office. Once in the office, defendants Garcia, Kirby, Elias, and Holbuin all

began punching plaintiff until he fell to the ground, and then began kicking and punching him in his

head, face, and body. 

“What is necessary to show sufficient harm for purposes of the Cruel and Unusual

Punishments Clause [of the Eighth Amendment] depends upon the claim at issue . . . .” Hudson v.

McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992). “The objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim is . .

. contextual and responsive to contemporary standards of decency.” Id. (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted). The malicious and sadistic use of force to cause harm always violates

contemporary standards of decency, regardless of whether or not significant injury is evident. Id.

at 9; see also Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 628 (9th Cir. 2002) (Eighth Amendment excessive force

standard examines de minimis uses of force, not de minimis injuries)). However, not “every

malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action.” Id. at 9. “The Eighth

Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments necessarily excludes from constitutional

recognition de minimis uses of physical force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort

repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” Id. at 9-10 (internal quotations marks and citations

omitted). 

“[W]henever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force in violation of

the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the core judicial inquiry is . . . whether force was applied

in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.”

Id. at 7. “In determining whether the use of force was wanton and unnecessary, it may also be proper

to evaluate the need for application of force, the relationship between that need and the amount of

force used, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials, and any efforts made to

temper the severity of a forceful response.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

“The absence of serious injury is . . . relevant to the Eighth Amendment inquiry, but does not end

it.” Id. 

Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to give rise to cognizable excessive force claims against

defendants Kuykendall, Wilson, Garcia, Kirby, Elias, and Holbuin. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). 

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28 Claim five. (Amend. Comp., pg. 57.) 2

4

2. Other Eighth Amendment Claims

a. Denial of Medical Care2

Although plaintiff alleges a claim for relief under section 1983 for denial of medical care,

in violation of the Eighth Amendment, plaintiff’s amended complaint does not contain facts giving

rise to such a claim.

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation

of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution .

. . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,

or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Section 1983 . . . creates a cause of action for violations of the federal

Constitution and laws.” Sweaney v. Ada County, Idaho, 119 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1997)

(internal quotations omitted.) “To the extent that the violation of a state law amounts to the

deprivation of a state-created interest that reaches beyond that guaranteed by the federal Constitution,

Section 1983 offers no redress.” Id. 

Section 1983 plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between the actions

of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See Monell v.

Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “‘A

person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of [§] 1983,

if [that person] does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform

an act which [that person] is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint

is made.’” Hydrick v. Hunter, 466 F.3d 676, 689 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588

F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). “[T]he ‘requisite causal connection can be established not only by

some kind of direct, personal participation in the deprivation, but also be setting in motion a series

of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict the

constitutional injury.’” Id. (quoting Johnson at 743-44). 

///

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28 Claims one, four, six, and eight. (Amend. Comp., pgs. 50, 54, 58, 61.) 3

5

To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prison

conditions must involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452

U.S. 337, 347 (1981). A prisoner’s claim of inadequate medical care does not rise to the level of an

Eighth Amendment violation unless (1) “the prison official deprived the prisoner of the ‘minimal

civilized measure of life’s necessities,’” and (2) “the prison official ‘acted with deliberate

indifference in doing so.’” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Hallett

v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted)). A prison official does not act in

a deliberately indifferent manner unless the official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to

inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Deliberate indifference may

be manifested “when prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment,”

or in the manner “in which prison physicians provide medical care.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d

1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133,

1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). Where a prisoner is alleging a delay in receiving medical treatment,

the delay must have led to further harm in order for the prisoner to make a claim of deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060 (citing Shapely v. Nevada Bd.

of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985)). 

Plaintiff’s amended complaint does not contain any allegations which support a claim that

any of the named defendants “[knew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to [plaintiff’s] health

. . . .” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Accordingly, this claim is not cognizable.

b. Failure to Protect3

Plaintiff alleges that the decision to classify him as a gang member, after which plaintiff was

assaulted by Fresno Bulldogs gang members, violated his right to personal safety. Plaintiff also

alleges that for eight months, he and other prisoners were beaten, starved, kicked, punched, and

denied bedding, clothing, toiletries, mattresses, sanitation, and hygiene. Plaintiff alleges that he was

housed in protective custody even though he is not a protective custody inmate, in violation of his

right to personal safety. Finally, plaintiff alleges that defendant Clark violated his rights by allowing

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hissubordinates to keep inmate Tisdale, a known predator, housed in general population, especially

when plaintiff was a target due to being labeled a snitch. Plaintiff alleges that he was attacked by

inmate Tisdale. 

Although prison conditions may be restrictive and harsh, prison officials must provide

prisoners with food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety. Id.; Toussaint

v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir.

1982). Where a prisoner alleges injuries stemming from unsafe conditions of confinement, prison

officials may be held liable only if they acted with “deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of

serious harm.” Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998). 

The deliberate indifference standard involves an objective and a subjective prong. First, the

alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms, “sufficiently serious . . . .” Farmer v. Brennan, 511

U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second, the prison official

must “know[] of and disregard[] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety . . . .” Farmer, 511 U.S.

at 837. Thus, a prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying humane

conditions of confinement only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of harm and

disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it. Id. at 837-45. 

“What is necessary to show sufficient harm for purposes of the Cruel and Unusual

Punishment Clause depends upon the claim at issue . . . .” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8

(1992). “The objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim is . . . contextual and responsive

to contemporary standards of decency.” Id. at 8 (quotations and citations omitted). “[E]xtreme

deprivations are required to make out a[n] [Eighth Amendment] conditions-of-confinement claim.”

Id. at 9 (citation omitted). With respect to this type of claim, “[b]ecause routine discomfort is part

of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society, only those deprivations

denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are sufficiently grave to form the basis

of an Eighth Amendment violation.” Id. (quotations and citations omitted). 

Neither the decision to classify plaintiff as a gang member nor the decision to house plaintiff

in protective custody constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Although plaintiff alleges that he was

later attacked due to this classification and that he was not a protective custody inmate (child

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molesters, rapists, and other sensitive needs inmates), classification and housing placement decisions

such as these do not support a claim for violation of the Eighth Amendment. With respect to being

beaten, starved, etc., plaintiff’s allegations give rise to an excessive force claim, discussed

previously. However, plaintiff has not alleged any facts which support a claim that any other named

defendants acted with deliberate indifference to a substantial threat to plaintiff’s health or safety.

Vague allegations of unconstitutional conditions, linked to no one in particular, and allegations of

the violation of other prisoners’ rights do not give rise to claims for relief under section 1983. 

Finally, with respect to the attack by inmate Tisdale, plaintiff has not alleged any facts

supporting a claim that defendant Clark “[knew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to

[plaintiff’s] . . . safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Undersection 1983, liability may not be imposed

on supervisory personnel for the actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior.

When the named defendant holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between the defendant and

the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858,

862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S.

941 (1979). To state a claim for relief under section 1983 for supervisory liability, plaintiff must

allege some facts indicating that the defendant either: personally participated in the alleged

deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them; or

promulgated or “implemented a policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of

constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation.’” Hansen v. Black, 885

F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th

Cir. 1989). No such facts are alleged. 

3. Denial of Access to the Courts

Plaintiff alleges that he was repeatedlydenied access to the law library and was denied access

to assistance, which violated his right of access to the courts.

Inmates have a fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts. Lewis v. Casey, 518

U.S. 343, 346 (1996). The right of access is merely the right to bring to court a grievance the inmate

wishes to present, and is limited to direct criminal appeals, habeas petitions, and civil rights actions.

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Id. at 354. The State is not required to enable the inmate to discover grievances or to litigate

effectively once in court. Id. 

Inmates do not have the right to a law library or legal assistance. Id. at 351. Law libraries

and legal assistance programs are only the means of ensuring access to the courts. Id. Because

inmates do not have “an abstract, freestanding right to a law library or legal assistance, an inmate

cannot establish relevant actual injury by establishing that his prison’s law library or legal assistance

program is subpar in some theoretical sense.” Id. Rather, an inmate claiming interference with or

denial of access to the courts must show that he suffered an actual injury. Id. 

Claims for denial of access to the courts may arise from the frustration or hindrance of “a

litigating opportunity yet to be gained” (forward-looking access claim) or from the loss of a

meritorious suit that cannot now be tried (backward-looking claim). Christopher v. Harbury, 536

U.S. 403, 412-15, 122 S.Ct. 2179, 2185-87 (2002). For backward-looking claims such as that at

issue here, plaintiff “must show: 1) the loss of a ‘nonfrivolous’ or ‘arguable’ underlying claim; 2)

the official acts frustrating the litigation; and 3) a remedy that may be awarded as recompense but

that is not otherwise available in a future suit.” Phillips v. Hust, 477 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir.

2007).

The first element requires that plaintiff show he suffered an “actual injury” by being shut out

of court. Harbury 536 U.S. at 415, 121 S.Ct. at 2187; Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351, 116 S.Ct. at 2180;

Phillips, 477 F.3d at 1076. The second element requires that plaintiff show defendant proximately

caused the alleged violation of plaintiff’s rights, “[t]he touchstone . . . [for which] is foreseeability.”

Phillips, 477 at 1077. Finally, the third element requires that plaintiff show he has no other remedy

than the relief available via this suit for denial of access to the courts. Id. at 1078-79.

Plaintiff’s allegations do not support a claim for relief for denial of access to the courts. The

allegation that plaintiff could have and would have litigated his court cases differently and more

effectively with adequate access to the law library and assistance does not support a claim under

section 1983. Plaintiff has not alleged any facts demonstrating that he suffered an actual injury and

plaintiff has not alleged any facts demonstrating that any named defendant acted with the requisite

state of mind.

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4. Retaliation

Plaintiff alleges in several places that he was retaliated against, although plaintiff incorrectly

pleads that retaliation violates the Eighth Amendment. Allegations of retaliation against a prisoner’s

First Amendment rights to speech or to petition the government may support a section 1983 claim.

Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d

1135 (9th Cir. 1989); Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995). “Within the prison

context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic elements: (1) An assertion

that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s

protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment

rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v.

Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005).

Plaintiff’s amended complaint does notset forth any facts supporting a claim that any named

defendant retaliated against him because of his exercise of a protected right, in violation of the First

Amendment.

5. Claim for Injunctive Relief

In addition to money damages, plaintiff seeks injunctive relief. “[T]hose who seek to invoke

the jurisdiction of the federal courts must satisfy the threshold requirement imposed by Article III

of the Constitution by alleging an actual case or controversy.” City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461

U.S. 95, 101, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 1665 (1983) (citations omitted); Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444

F.3d 1118, 1126 (9th Cir. 2006). “Abstract injury is not enough.” Lyons, 461 U.S. at 101, 103 S.Ct.

at 1665. “[P]laintiff must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some

direct injury as the result of the challenged official conduct and the injury or threat of injury must

be both real and immediate, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Id. (internal quotations and citations

omitted). “The key issue is whether the plaintiff is ‘likely to suffer future injury.’” Jones, 444 F.3d

at 1126 (quoting Lyons at 105, 1667). When a government agency is involved, it must “be granted

‘the widest latitude in the dispatch of its own internal affairs,’” Gomez v. Vernon, 255 F.3d 1118,

1128 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378-79, 96 S.Ct. 598, 608 (1976)), and

“[w]hen a state agency is involved, these considerations are, in anything, strengthened because of

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federalism concerns,” Gomez, 255 F.3d at 1128. “[A]ny injunctive relief awarded must avoid

unnecessary disruption to the state agency’s ‘normal course of proceeding.’” Id. at 1128 (quoting

O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 501, 94 S.Ct. 669, 679 (1974)). 

In addition, any award of equitable relief is governed by the Prison Litigation Reform Act,

which provides in relevant part, “Prospective relief in any civil action with respect to prison

conditions shall extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of a

particular plaintiff or plaintiffs. The court shall not grant or approve any prospective relief unless

the court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the

violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of

the Federal right.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A).

Equitable remedies are “unavailable absent a showing of irreparable injury, a requirement

that cannot be met where there is no showing of any real or immediate threat that the plaintiff will

be wronged again - a ‘likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable injury.’” Lyons at 111,

1670 (quoting O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 502, 94 S.Ct. at 679). In this instance, it is the past conduct of

defendants which gives rise to plaintiff’s claims for relief, and should plaintiff prevail, plaintiff’s

injury will not go unrecompensed because plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law. Id. Plaintiff is

not entitled to equitable relief in this action for defendants’ past conduct. Therefore, plaintiff’s claim

for injunctive relief is not cognizable.

 C. Conclusion

Plaintiff’s amended complaint states cognizable claims for relief against defendants

Kuykendall, Wilson, Garcia, Kirby, Elias, and Holbuin for use of excessive physical force, in

violation of the Eighth Amendment. However, plaintiff’s amended complaint does not state any

other claims upon which relief may be granted under section 1983. The court will provide plaintiff

with the opportunity to file a second amended complaint, if plaintiff wishes to do so.

If plaintiff does not wish to file a second amended complaint and is agreeable to proceeding

only against defendants Kuykendall, Wilson, Garcia, Kirby, Elias, and Holbuin for use of excessive

force, plaintiff may so notify the court in writing. The court will then issue Findings and

Recommendations recommending that the remaining claims and defendants be dismissed from this

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action, and will forward plaintiff six summonses and six USM-285 forms to fill out and return to the

court. Upon receipt of these documents, the court will direct the United States Marshal to initiate

service of process on defendants.

In the event that plaintiff does wish to amend his complaint, plaintiff is advised Local Rule

15-220 requires that an amended complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior

pleading. As a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux

v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original

pleading no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an

original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.

If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions

complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy,

625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how each named

defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some

affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v.

Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy,

588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk’s Office shall send plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

2. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, plaintiff must either:

a. File a second amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the

court in this order, or

b. Notify the court in writing that he does not wish to file a second amended

complaint and wishes to proceed only against defendants Kuykendall,

Wilson, Garcia, Kirby, Elias, and Holbuin on his cognizable excessive force

claims; and

///

///

///

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3. If plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed for failure to

obey a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: May 15, 2007 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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