Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00372/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00372-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Donald J. Gregory, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Arizona Division of Child Support 

Enforcement, et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV11-0372-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

Pro se Plaintiff Donald J. Gregory filed an amended complaint on May 10, 2011 

against Arizona Assistant Attorney General Kathryn Harris and Arizona Division of 

Child Support Enforcement Assistant Director Veronica Ragland, in their official and 

individual capacities, and against Melanie Gregory in her individual capacity. Doc. 11. 

Defendant Gregory filed a motion to dismiss (Doc. 15) which the Court granted without 

prejudice on July 27, 2011. Doc. 16. Defendants Ragland and Harris (“State 

Defendants”) filed a motion to dismiss on January 1, 2012. Doc. 27. The motion has 

been fully briefed, and neither party has requested oral argument. Docs. 29, 30. State 

Defendants also filed a motion for an order directing Plaintiff to cease attempts to contact 

or communicate directly with Defendants (Doc. 28), and Plaintiff has failed to file a 

timely response. For the reasons stated below, the Court will grant in part Defendants’ 

motion to dismiss without prejudice and grant Defendants motion regarding direct 

communications as set forth in this order. 

 

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I. Background. 

 This action arises from a series of State Court orders and related child support 

enforcement actions. On July 13, 2001, the Arizona Superior Court ordered Plaintiff to 

make monthly payments to Melanie Gregory for the support of their children Victoria, 

Erika, and Jennifer. Doc. 11, ¶¶ 1-2. The 2001 order stated that it would expire if not 

reduced to a judgment three years from the time the youngest child emancipated. Id., ¶ 2. 

The youngest child, Jennifer, left home in 2001, and had a child of her own on 

September 17, 2003. Id. The State Court issued an order on July 23, 2003, finding that 

Jennifer had emancipated when she became pregnant at 16 and eliminating Plaintiff’s 

obligation to pay further child support. Id.; Doc. 27 at 2. Melanie Gregory continued to 

seek and receive enforcement of Plaintiff’s child support obligations from the Arizona 

Division of Child Support Enforcement (“ADCSE”), and Plaintiff requested a review and 

a stop to his wage assignments. Doc. 11, ¶ 1. ADCSE made a determination in 2007 that 

no current child support obligation existed, but made another determination in 2008 that 

Plaintiff still owed child support. Id., ¶¶ 1-2. 

 Plaintiff filed an action in State Court in 2008 requesting that the court stop 

ADCSE’s enforcement actions pursuant to the 2003 order and the fact that the 2001 order 

had not been reduced to a judgment in the three years following the 2003 emancipation 

order and had therefore expired. Doc. 11, ¶ 3. The State Court set aside the 2003 

emancipation order because, under A.R.S. § 25-503, pregnancy is not a basis for 

emancipation. Doc. 27 at 2; see also Doc. 11, ¶ 3. 

 Prior to this ruling, the Arizona legislature eliminated the requirement that a child 

support order be reduced to a court judgment to be enforced and provided that each 

payment is enforceable as a final judgment when it becomes due as a matter of law. 

Doc. 11, ¶ 6; Doc. 27 at 5; see Ariz. Rev. S. § 25-503(I). Plaintiff’s youngest child, 

Jennifer, reached the legal age of emancipation on December 6, 2004. Doc. 11, ¶ 2. 

Defendant Ragland interpreted the new law to mean that child support arrears are 

unenforceable only if three years had passed from the time of emancipation until 

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September 21, 2006, when the new law went into effect. Id., ¶ 6. 

 Plaintiff’s amended complaint alleges that Defendants Harris and Ragland violated 

unspecified state and federal laws by not granting a timely administrative review of the 

ADCSE enforcement actions, thus depriving him of due process. Doc. 11, ¶ 1. Plaintiff 

also alleges that ADCSE’s 2008 review and final determination relied on erroneous facts 

and an expired court order, and that State Defendants fraudulently relied on the expired 

order in enforcement actions. Id., ¶¶ 2-7. The complaint asserts six causes of action: (1) 

violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985; (3) common law 

conspiracy; (4) fraud; (5) negligent infliction of emotional distress; and (6) intentional 

infliction of emotional distress. Doc. 11 at 2. 

II. Discussion. 

 State Defendants move to dismiss the complaint because neither the state nor its 

officials are “persons” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; the complaint fails to state 

a claim against State Defendants; Plaintiff’s state law claims are barred by Arizona’s one 

year statute of limitations under A.R.S. § 12-821 and Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims are barred 

by Arizona’s two year personal injury statute of limitations; and Plaintiff failed to comply 

with state notice of claim provisions under A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A). Doc. 27 at 3-6. 

 As the Court previously stated, officials of state agencies cannot be sued in their 

official capacities under § 1983. See Doc. 16 at 4, citing Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State 

Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Plaintiff argues that the doctrine of Ex Parte Young

makes an exception to this rule where individual officers have acted to enforce an 

unconstitutional state statute or proceeding. Doc. 29 at 2-3. 

Ex Parte Young permits suits against state officials acting in their official capacity 

where a claimant seeks only prospective relief. See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 

(1908); Doe v. Lawrence Livermore Nat’l Lab., 131 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1997). Here, 

Plaintiff seeks prospective relief ordering Defendants to close the case against him, lift all 

levies, liens, and tax off-sets, and cure his credit profile. Doc. 11 at 8. The Court 

previously found that Plaintiff had not alleged facts showing that the officials named in 

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this suit have the power under state law to perform or not perform the acts requested. 

Doc. 16 at 3-4. 

 The amended complaint states that Kathryn Harris represents ADCSE through the 

Attorney General’s Office and that she has a duty to ensure that it complies with state and 

federal laws, including that ADCSE review its files every three years or sooner. Doc. 11 

at 3. It also states that Veronica Ragland is responsible for maintaining and updating the 

records, files, and reviews of ADCSE. Id. The amended complaint further alleges that 

State Defendants violated these duties by failing to ensure Plaintiff a timely 

administrative review, thus depriving him of his due process rights, including the right to 

be heard and to bring a defense at an orderly hearing. Doc. 11 at 3. 

 Defendants argue that Plaintiff does not plead a single fact about Ms. Ragland 

other than to identify her by her official position in the caption of the complaint. But 

Plaintiff has alleged specific, review-related duties and a failure to perform these duties 

on the parts of both State Defendants leading to a violation of his due process rights. 

These allegations, taken as true, are sufficient to state a § 1983 claim for prospective 

relief. Under Ex Parte Young, “[t]he fact that a state officer, by virtue of his office, has 

some connection with the enforcement of the act, is the important and material fact.” 209 

U.S. 123 at 157. 

 Defendants also argue on the basis of Preschooler II v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Bd. of 

Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1182 (9th Cir. 2007), that there is no “respondeat superior” liability 

under Ex Parte Young and that even if the amended complaint alleges facts showing that 

someone at ADCSE violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, it does not show that 

Defendant Ragland directed or knew of the alleged violations and failed to prevent them. 

Doc. 27 at 4. Unlike Preschooler II, however, Plaintiff has not alleged a failure to stop 

known acts of abuse by a subordinate; rather Plaintiff has alleged that state Defendants 

have failed to perform their own affirmative duties of ensuring ADCSE’s compliance 

with required administrative review procedures. Defendants do not argue that State 

Defendants did not have these affirmative duties; nor do they dispute whether State 

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Defendants have authority by virtue of these duties to prospectively cancel liens and 

restore Plaintiff’s credit record in the event that due process violations took place. The 

Court will deny Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims with respect to 

Plaintiff’s right to a timely administrative review.1

 

 The complaint also alleges that Defendant Ragland placed a child support lien on 

his KIA “using a fraudulent court order.” Doc. 11, ¶ 5. Accepting that Defendant 

Ragland may be liable under § 1983 with regard to this lien, Plaintiff must allege 

sufficient facts upon which the Court could infer that the court order Defendant Raglan 

relied on was invalid and that her attachment of the lien therefore violated due process. 

 As with the initial complaint, Plaintiff does not specify whether the court order 

was wrongly decided – in which case Plaintiff’s challenge to the state court order in 

federal court would likely be barred by Rooker-Feldman – or whether Defendant Ragland 

falsified a properly-decided court order (see Doc. 16 at 2), and Plaintiff alleges 

insufficient facts to support either claim. It appears that Plaintiff refers to the 2001 order 

that Plaintiff claims was superseded in 2003 and nonetheless expired when not reduced to 

a judgment. But the 2003 order was set aside in 2008, and the requirement that a child 

support order be reduced to a judgment was eliminated in 2006. 

 It is possible that the lien was placed after the 2003 order and before the 2008 

order and that it was for ongoing rather than past due amounts, making the order invalid 

under the operative 2003 ruling at that time; the amended complaint, however, has not 

stated when the lien was placed, what order it relied upon, or whether the collection was 

 

1

 With respect to Plaintiff’s claim that ADCSE’s September 2008 final determination was factually flawed, the Court agrees that Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts connecting State Defendants to that determination’s allegedly erroneous findings. The amended complaint alleges that the 2008 determination lists additional children in 

the support obligation from the 2001 court order, thus showing that State Defendants “used a False court order.” Doc. 11, ¶ 2. But Plaintiff has alleged no facts showing that State Defendants had an affirmative duty to verify the substance of the 2008 

determination. Nor has Plaintiff alleged facts showing that either Defendant participated in this determination or knew of and failed to remedy its alleged errors. 

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for ongoing or past due amounts. Absent such factual allegations, the mere possibility of 

misconduct is insufficient to state a claim. The complaint must plead “enough facts to 

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

544, 570 (2007). This plausibility standard “is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ 

but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the 

well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of 

misconduct, the complaint has alleged B but it has not ‘show[n]’ B ‘that the pleader is 

entitled to relief.’” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 

(2009). 

 The complaint also alleges that Defendant Harris acted fraudulently when she 

represented Defendants in the 2008 hearing because she knew that the 2001 order had 

expired. Doc. 11, ¶ 3. Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant Harris made false 

statements of fact or otherwise improperly influenced the court commissioner. Rather, 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Harris had reason to know that the 2001 order had 

expired because she argued a case in 2005 in which the Arizona Supreme Court found 

that if a judgment was not obtained on a child support order within three years of 

emancipation, the court order expired by operation of law. Id., Doc. 29 at 4. But the case 

to which Plaintiff refers (State ex rel. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Hayden, 115 P.3d 116 (Ariz. 

2005)) predates the 2006 changes in Arizona law that eliminated the need to obtain a 

judgment on a child support order and therefore does not show that Defendant Harris had 

reason to believe that the 2001 order had expired and that enforcement actions based on 

that order were improper. See Ariz. Rev. S. § 25-503(I). To the extent Plaintiff claims 

that the 2008 State Court decision relied on a faulty legal interpretation or was 

procedurally inadequate (see Doc. 11, ¶ 3), these allegations do not show that Defendant 

Harris acted unconstitutionally, and Plaintiff could have challenged the appropriateness 

of the State Court actions and ruling on appeal. 

 Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Harris “is guilty of fraud by intentional 

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deception” because she changed the wording used by the Federal Office of Child Support 

Enforcement (“OCSE”) when, in response to OCSE’s request, she clarified the 

applicability of the new law to orders that had not terminated prior to that law going into 

effect. Doc. 11, ¶ 6. This allegation, however, is not plausible on the facts pled. Plaintiff 

alleges that OSCE made a statement that “[in] cases prior to September 21, 2006 where 

the youngest child had emancipated and three years have passed: If a final judgment on 

arrears was not obtained, then the arrears cannot be collected[.]” Id. Defendant Harris’ 

alleged explanation was that “[i]n cases where the youngest child did emancipate and 

three years had passed prior to September 21, 2006 and no judgment was obtained, the 

arrears are then considered unenforceable[.]” Id. Plaintiff alleges that changing the word 

“have” to “had” constitutes intentional deception, but Plaintiff does not show how 

Defendant Harris’ rewording misconstrues the meaning of OCSE’s statement or how 

OCSE’s statement precludes Defendant Harris’ explanation. Moreover, this statement 

was made in response to a query from Plaintiff to OCSE in October 2010, long after the 

relevant court orders had been entered in this case, and Plaintiff does not show any 

connection between this statement and the alleged unconstitutional enforcement actions. 

 The Court concludes that Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to support a § 1983 

claim against State Defendants with respect to his right to a timely administrative review. 

The amended complaint fails to allege sufficient facts, however, to support Plaintiff’s 

additional § 1983 claims. Additionally, the complaint alleges no facts showing that the 

State Defendants acted in concert or conspired together, and thus provides no basis to 

support Plaintiff’s § 1985 or common law conspiracy claims. 

 Plaintiff’s fraud claims fail for lack of particularity. Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 9(b) requires that a plaintiff “state with particularity the circumstances 

constituting fraud or mistake.” As discussed above, Plaintiff has alleged generally that 

the State Defendants were responsible for ADCSE’s enforcement actions and that 

Defendant Ragland placed a lien on Plaintiff’s vehicle, but Plaintiff has failed to allege 

the specific actions or circumstances in which State Defendants made false or fraudulent 

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statements, falsified court orders, or otherwise acted to perpetrate a fraud or mistake. 

“While statements of the time, place and nature of the alleged fraudulent activities are 

sufficient, mere conclusory allegations of fraud are insufficient.” Moore v. Kayport 

Package Exp., Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 540 (9th Cir. 1989). Plaintiff has also failed to make a 

plausible claim that Defendant Harris acted fraudulently when she relied on a change in 

Arizona law to assert that the relevant child support order had not expired in this case. 

 The complaint also fails to state a claim for intentional or negligent infliction of 

emotional distress. Intentional infliction of emotional distress requires a showing of 

extreme and outrageous conduct. See Ford v. Revlon Inc., 153 Ariz. 38, 42 (Ariz. 1987). 

The facts alleged in the complaint are insufficient to meet this burden. Negligent 

infliction of emotional distress requires a showing of physical injury or “substantial, 

long-term emotional disturbances.” See Pierce v. Casas Adobes Baptist Church, 162 

Ariz. 269, 272 (Ariz. 1989); Monaco v. HealthPartners of S. Arizona, 196 Ariz. 299, 303 

(Ariz. Ct. App. 1999). Plaintiff makes only the conclusory statement that Defendants 

have caused him emotional distress. Doc. 11, ¶ 7. Absent sufficient factual allegations to 

back up Defendants’ misconduct and Plaintiff’s injury, merely alleging the elements of 

the claim does not satisfy Plaintiff’s minimum pleading requirements. See Twombly, 127 

S.Ct. at 1965 (“a formulistic recitation of the elements of a claim will not do” to state a 

claim). 

 Because Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to support a § 1983 claim, the Court 

will address Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff’s claims are nonetheless barred by 

Arizona’s statutes of limitations and notice of claims requirements. Defendants assert, 

and Plaintiff does not disagree, that Plaintiff’s state law claims are subject to a one year 

statute of limitations under A.R.S. § 12-821 and his § 1983 claims are subject to 

Arizona’s two year personal injury statute of limitations. Doc. 27 at 5-6. Plaintiff 

responds that the “continuing violation doctrine” applies, making his claims timely 

because he has alleged at least one unlawful act in 2010. Doc. 29 at 3-4. Plaintiff refers 

to Defendant Ragland’s alleged fraudulent misrepresentations in October 2010 and a lien 

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placed on his vehicle in June 2010. Id.2 

 Defendants argue on the basis of Ward v. Caulk, 650 F.2d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 

1981), that these alleged unlawful acts are merely the “ill effects of the original 

violation,” namely, the 2008 State Court ruling, and do not constitute continuing acts. 

Doc. 30 at 2 (internal quotation marks omitted). But Ward dealt with a plaintiff’s attempt 

to toll the statute of limitations on an employment discrimination claim throughout the 

sixteen-month period of his unemployment absent further discriminatory acts by his 

previous employer and found that no continuing violation applied. 650 F.2d at 1147. It 

is not clear from Arizona law that the continuing violation doctrine would not apply here 

where Plaintiff has attempted to state a claim for continued unlawful enforcement actions 

on the part of State Defendants. Furthermore, Arizona’s notice of claim requirement 

applies only to a request for damages. See Home Builders Ass’n of Cent. Arizona v. 

Kard, 219 Ariz. 374, 381 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008). It does not bar claims where, as here, 

Plaintiff has requested injunctive and declaratory relief. 

III. Defendants’ Motion for an Order Directing Plaintiff to Cease Contact. 

The Court will grant Defendants’ motion for an order directing Plaintiff to cease 

all efforts to contact State Defendants’ regarding this litigation and address all future 

communications to their legal counsel. This order does not preclude Plaintiff from 

contacting State Defendants in their official capacities to the extent that such contact is 

necessary to resolve current or ongoing issues related to child support enforcement 

unrelated to this litigation. 

IT IS ORDERED: 

 1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss the compliant (Doc. 27) is granted in part 

and denied in part as set forth in this order. 

 2. Defendants’ motion for an order directing Plaintiff to cease any attempts to 

 

2

 The complaint only alleges that Plaintiff discovered a lien on his KIA in 2010. 

As noted above, it does not allege facts showing when and upon what basis the lien was 

attached. 

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contact or communicate directly with State Defendants (Doc. 28) is granted as set forth 

in this order. 

 Dated this 2nd day of May, 2012. 

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