Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-06124/USCOURTS-cand-3_18-cv-06124-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 290
Nature of Suit: Other Real Property Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331(a) Fed. Question: Real Property

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HELICOPTERS FOR AGRICULTURE;

JAMES BARRETT; HEIDI BARRETT; 

and BARRETT AND BARRETT

VINEYARDS, LP,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

COUNTY OF NAPA and NAPA COUNTY

BOARD OF SUPERVISORS,

Defendants. /

No. C 18-06124 WHA

ORDER DENYING IN

PART AND GRANTING 

IN PART MOTION TO

DISMISS

INTRODUCTION 

In this action challenging a county ordinance regulating the use of helicopters for

agricultural purposes, defendants’ motion to dismiss is DENIED IN PART and GRANTED IN

PART.

STATEMENT 

In June 2018, the voters of Napa County passed an initiative measure that restricted the

use of helicopters for agricultural operations. The measure was soon adopted as Napa County

Ordinance No. 2018-002 and included the following statement of purpose:

The people find that any proliferation of personal use airports or

heliports would be inconsistent with and detrimental to the rural,

agricultural and peaceful character of Napa County. This

Ordinance is intended to prohibit any new personal use airports or

heliports. Also, the Ordinance makes no changes to existing law

that permits the landing of aircraft and helicopters for emergency

uses. Finally, the Ordinance clarifies the limited circumstances

Case 3:18-cv-06124-WHA Document 49 Filed 04/18/19 Page 1 of 8
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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under which helicopters may take-off and land in the County for

agricultural purposes.

The ordinance specifically modified Section 18.120.010 of the Napa County Code,

which listed exceptions to use limitations. Before the enactment of the ordinance, Section

18.120.010 explicitly allowed “[h]elicopter takeoffs and landings solely in support of direct

agricultural production activities such as aerial spraying and frost protection” without a user

permit in any zoning district. The ordinance modified that section to allow “[h]elicopter

takeoffs and landings at locations other than public airports, in support of direct agricultural

activities, but only if the takeoffs and landings comply with all of the following conditions: (a)

they are solely in support of direct aerial agricultural activities and applications such as aerial

spraying, aerial frost protection, or aerial mapping; (b) they do not transport persons other than

those essential to the conduct of such aerial activities; and (c) they are unavoidable.”

The ordinance further required that within forty-eight hours of any takeoff or landing in

support of direct agricultural activities, the helicopter operator had to submit a written report

stating the date, time, duration, and aerial activity of the operation, along with the people who

participated in the activity, and the reason why the operation was unavoidable. Violation of the

ordinance could result in civil and criminal penalties (First Amd. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 33–38).

Plaintiff Helicopters for Agriculture is an unincorporated nonprofit association

committed to the removal of state and local regulatory barriers to the use of helicopters for

agricultural operations. Plaintiffs James and Heidi Barrett are residents of Napa County and

owners of plaintiff Barrett and Barrett Vineyards, LP, a California limited partnership that owns

and operates a vineyard in northern Napa County. Since 2010, the Barretts have owned and

used a helicopter for agricultural activities on their vineyards and offered similar services to

clients that own vineyards in neighboring counties. Helicopters play a critical role, they say, in

agricultural management and production and are used for distribution of seed for crop cover,

frost protection, aerial spraying, grape drying, and vineyard inspection. The Barretts allege that

continued helicopter use may subject them to civil and criminal liability. Plaintiffs thus bring

this action for declaratory and injunctive relief against defendants, the County of Napa and its

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Board of Supervisors, in order to protect their own interests and those of other owners and

operators of farms and vineyards in Napa County (First Amd. Compl. ¶¶ 1–7, 10–24). 

Plaintiffs assert three lines of attack against the ordinance. First, plaintiffs bring a facial

challenge that the ordinance is insufficiently precise to give fair notice, thus violating due

process. Second, plaintiffs claim that the ordinance is facially preempted by Federal Aviation

Administrations regulations. Third, the Barretts claim that the application of the ordinance

would deprive them of their vested rights in violation of due process. Defendants Napa County

and its Board of Supervisors move to dismiss all claims. 

ANALYSIS

1. VOID FOR VAGUENESS.

The Due Process Clause prohibits the government from “tak[ing] away someone’s life,

liberty, or property under a criminal law so vague that it fails to give ordinary people fair notice

of the conduct it punishes, or so standardless that it invites arbitrary enforcement.” Johnson v.

United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2556 (2015). “The Fifth Amendment prohibits the enforcement

of vague criminal laws, but the threshold for declaring a law void for vagueness is high.” Id. at

2576. Facial challenges to a law, as here, are especially “disfavored” because they “often rest

on speculation” and “run contrary to the fundamental principle of judicial restraint that courts

should neither anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of necessarily deciding it

nor formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which

it is applied.” Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442,

450 (2008) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 

Our court of appeals recently addressed the legal standard for facial void for vagueness

challenges in Gurrero v. Whitaker, 908 F.3d 541 (9th Cir. 2018). Before Gurrero, plaintiffs

mounting a facial challenge for vagueness had to “establish that no set of circumstances exists

under which the statute would be valid,” a high bar outlined in United States v. Salerno, 481

U.S. 739, 745 (1987). Our court of appeals found that two Supreme Court decisions, Johnson,

135 S.Ct. at 2556, and Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018), expressly rejected the “no

set of circumstances” test in the void for vagueness context. Gurrero, 908 F.3d. at 544. Our

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 A court may judicially notice a fact that is “not subject to reasonable dispute” because it “can be

accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Federal

Rules of Evidence 201(b). Courts may take judicial notice of matters of public record, including municipal

ordinances. Santa Monica Food Not Bombs v. City of Santa Monica, 450 F.3d 1022, 1025 n.2 (9th Cir 2006). 

Therefore, plaintiffs’ request for judicial notice of Exhibit A, Ordinance No. 2018-02, is GRANTED. Exhibit B,

an FAA Advisory Circular on rotocraft external-load operations, is not necessary for resolving the motion to

dismiss, so the request for judicial notice as to Exhibit B is DENIED AS MOOT. 

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court of appeals lowered the burden for parties, like plaintiffs, that bring facial void for

vagueness challenges as the government cannot defeat challenges by simply offering a single

example where a law could be clearly applied.

Here, plaintiffs challenge the use of the words “essential” and “unavoidable” in the

ordinance as impermissibly vague. The ordinance specified that only personnel “essential” to

the conduct of aerial activities were allowed on the helicopters, and the helicopter takeoffs and

landings had to be “unavoidable.”1

 The ordinance, however, failed to define these words or

provide other context (First Amd. Compl. ¶¶ 39–48). 

This order holds that the word “unavoidable” is unduly vague, at least at the pleading

stage. Does it mean that the crop will fail without that particular aerial spraying? Does it mean

that ground-based spraying—as in hand spraying—would not suffice? Does it mean that the

flight is barred if it is physically possible to take off and land from a municipal airport? Or does

it simply mean that if aerial spraying is used, the task must be accomplished in the fewest

number of flights possible? Yes, the word “unavoidable” has been upheld in other contexts but

here the context lends itself to too many possibilities. 

On the other hand, the word “essential” is not vague. It means the pilot and all other

personnel on board are needed to safely complete the flight and to complete the agricultural

operation. This includes spray operators, co-pilots, and even the field manager of the vineyard

if needed to direct the spraying operations. Thus, as to “essential,” defendants’ motion to

dismiss the void for vagueness claim is GRANTED. As to “unavoidable,” the motion is DENIED.

2. FEDERAL PREEMPTION.

Plaintiffs also claim that the ordinance is preempted by the Federal Aviation Act of

1958, 49 U.S.C. §§ 40101–50105. “There are three circumstances in which state law is

preempted under the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2, by federal law: (1) express

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preemption, where Congress explicitly defines the extent to which its enactments preempt state

law; (2) field preemption, where state law attempts to regulate conduct in a field that Congress

intended the federal law exclusively to occupy; and (3) conflict preemption, where it is

impossible to comply with both state and federal requirements, or where state law stands as an

obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purpose and objectives of Congress.” 

Indus. Truck Ass’n, Inc. v. Henry, 125 F.3d 1305, 1309 (9th Cir. 1997). 

As the “Federal Aviation Act has no express preemption clause,” plaintiffs preemption

theories must allege either implied field preemption or conflict preemption. See Martin ex rel.

Heckman v. Midwest Exp. Holdings, Inc., 555 F.3d 806, 808 (9th Cir. 2009). To bring a facial

preemption challenge, plaintiffs must still overcome the high bar set in Salerno: that “no set of

circumstances exists under which the Act could be valid.” See Puente Arizona v. Arpaio, 821

F.3d 1098, 1104 (9th Cir. 2016). 

A. Field Preemption.

The “essential field preemption inquiry is whether the density and detail of federal

regulation merits the inference that any state regulation within the same field will necessarily

interfere with the federal regulatory scheme.” Nat’l Fed. of the Blind v. United Airlines, Inc.,

813 F.3d 718, 734 (9th Cir. 2016). A two-step framework has been established for evaluating

field preemption: “The first step in determining whether [field preemption] exists is to delineate

the pertinent regulatory field; the second is to survey the scope of the federal regulation within

that field.” Ibid.

Here, there is an initial dispute over the pertinent regulatory field. Plaintiffs assert that

the ordinance encroaches on federal regulation of aircraft navigation, aircraft noise, and air

safety, fields that have found to be preempted by the FAA. Defendants counter that the

pertinent regulatory field is helicopter takeoffs and landings for agricultural purposes on private

property, a field that lacks pervasive regulations. Courts tasked with delineating the pertinent

regulatory field have tailored it narrowly. See, e.g., Martin, 555 F.3d at 811 (“[I]t means that

when the agency issues ‘pervasive regulations’ in an area, like passenger warnings, the FAA

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preempts all state law claims in that area”). Thus, defendants’ narrower characterization of the

pertinent field is more appropriate (Opp. 5–7; Reply Br. 2 –5). 

Our inquiry, however, does not end there. Even if pervasive regulations do not occupy

the field of helicopter takeoffs and landings for agricultural purposes on private property, the

ordinance could still impermissibly encroach upon helicopter operations for agricultural

purposes, a field which does have extensive regulations. See 14 C.F.R. pt. 137. This underlies

a central question in this dispute: whether the ordinance is primarily a land use or zoning

regulation that is traditionally within the province of local government or if the ordinance

affects how, where, and when pilots can operate a helicopter, an area exclusively occupied by

federal law.

This order finds that the ordinance specifically targets helicopter takeoffs and landings

at locations other than public airports, making it primarily a land use regulation. Although the

ordinance dictates that only essential personnel are allowed on board and allows only

unavoidable landings and takeoffs, it still primarily regulates where these helicopter operations

can begin and end. Defendants are persuasive that the ordinance is an instance of “using the

zoning power to assure harmonious development” that does not impinge on helicopter

operations. San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Gianturco, 651 F.2d 1306, 1313–1314 (9th Cir.

1981). Furthermore, for a facial preemption challenge, plaintiffs must establish that there are

“no sets of circumstances” where the ordinance could be valid. Plaintiffs have failed to meet

this high burden as the ordinance could easily be construed as a traditional land use regulation. 

Therefore, defendants’ motion to dismiss the field preemption claim is GRANTED. 

B. Conflict Preemption.

Conflict preemption applies “where compliance with both federal and state regulations

is a physical impossibility” and in “those instances where the challenged state law stands as an

obstacle to the objectives of Congress.” Ventress v. Japan Airlines, 747 F.3d 716, 720–21 (9th

Cir. 2014), cert denied, 135 S.Ct. 164 (2014). As in the case of field preemption, plaintiffs have

failed in its facial challenge to establish that the ordinance conflicts with federal regulations

governing helicopter operations in every circumstance. 

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Plaintiffs contend that the requirement to only carry essential personnel conflicts with

FAA regulations on who may be carried on board agricultural helicopter operations. Plaintiffs

point to 14 C.F.R. § 133.35, which states “No certificate holder may allow a person to be

carried during rotocraft external-load operations unless that person (1) Is a flight crewmember;

(2) Is a flight crewmember trainee; (3) Performs an essential function in connection with the

external-load operation; or (4) Is necessary to accomplish the work activity directly associated

with that operation.” This FAA rule is a prohibition, not a conferral of rights. It does not

confer a right to carry trainees. It bars pilots from carrying anyone other than the listed

individuals. The ordinance does not bar all training flights. It limits spraying flights and bars

trainees on spraying flights, given that they are not essential to spraying. There is no direct

conflict since the federal regulations and county ordinance can accommodate each other (Opp.

10–12).

Plaintiffs also point to another regulation that prohibits private agricultural aircraft

operators from operating over a congested area. 14 C.F.R. § 137.35. Plaintiffs, however, have

failed to establish that following the ordinance would require more helicopter operations to

occur over congested areas in every circumstance. There is a possibility that helicopters could

be routed from public airports to their agricultural operations with more circuitous routes that

have little or no intersection with congested areas. As plaintiffs fall short of establishing a

conflict in every circumstance, the defendants’ motion to dismiss the conflict preemption claim

is GRANTED. 

3. VESTED RIGHTS.

Finally, the Barretts assert that the ordinance deprives them of a vested property right:

the right to continue their longstanding use of a helicopter for agricultural management

activities. Although the complaint initially alleged constitutional due process violations,

subsequent briefing has clarified that plaintiffs’ claim involves the “vested right to continue a

use which existed at the time zoning regulations changed and the use thereafter became a

nonconforming use.” Stokes v. Bd. of Permit Appeals, 52 Cal. App. 4th 1348, 1353 (1997). 

This vested rights claim is a “species of governmental estoppel” and a “claim of estoppel

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against the government rests not on Constitutional norms of fairness but on broader norms of

equity.” Lakeview Development Corp. v. City of South Lake Tahoe, 915 F.2d 1290, 1295 (9th

Cir. 1990). Thus, state law governs this claim. 

The Barretts’ challenge, however, is not ripe for judicial review because they have not

yet been denied permission to continue their helicopter operations. See League to Save Lake

Tahoe v. Crystal Enters., 685 F.2d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 1982) (noting that the vested rights

claim was not ripe as the landowner had not been denied permission to continue the project). 

The Barretts assert that it would be futile to seek permission to continue their nonconforming

use as defendants deny their vested rights as a matter of law in this action. This order disagrees

and holds that the Barretts must apply for a permit. Then we can litigate the specific conditions

imposed and whether those conditions violate any “vested right” granted. Thus, defendants’

motion to dismiss the claim for vested rights is GRANTED. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion to dismiss the facial void for vagueness

claim is DENIED (to the extent stated above), the facial federal preemption claim is GRANTED,

and the vested rights claim is GRANTED. The answer is due within TEN DAYS from the date of

this order. Discovery may commence. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 18, 2019. WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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