Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-02001/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-02001-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal - Employment Discrimination

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES CORNN, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC.

Defendant.

NO. C03-2001 TEH 

ORDER DENYING UNITED PARCEL

SERVICE, INC.’S OBJECTION TO

SPECIAL MASTER’S DECISION

DENYING UPS’S SECOND REQUEST

TO DEPOSE ABSENT CLASS

MEMBERS

This matter came before the Court on Monday, September 11, 2006, on Defendant

United Parcel Service, Inc.’s (“UPS’s”) objection to the decision of the Court-appointed

discovery master, Edward Swanson (“Special Master”), denying UPS’s second request to

depose absent class members. After careful consideration of the parties’ written and oral

arguments, this Court DENIES Defendant’s objection for the reasons explained below.

BACKGROUND

This is a class action complaint brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 23 by all non-exempt, hourly California employees of UPS who held the positions

of parcel package delivery drivers, feeder drivers, combination drivers and utility drivers

during the period February 6, 1999 to the present. This action arises out of Plaintiffs’

allegations that UPS has employed electronic timekeeping systems and other class-wide

policies and procedures to keep from paying class members the wages to which they are

lawfully entitled. The class consists of approximately 20,000 employees. 

On January 20, 2006, UPS requested to depose 1,000 absent class members in this

matter. The Special Master denied UPS’s request without prejudice, finding, inter alia, that

UPS had not shown why depositions were necessary where interrogatories appeared

sufficient to discover the limited scope of the information sought. 

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On June 7, 2006, UPS submitted a second proposal in which it requested to depose 80

absent class members. UPS proposed 60 depositions of individuals randomly selected “in

proportion to the ratio each group bears to the total number of drivers from all participating

categories statewide,” Mot. at 7, and 20 depositions of individuals hand-selected by UPS. 

The Special Master denied UPS’s second request and ordered that if the company

wishes to seek discovery of absent class members, it shall do so by way of interrogatories or

a questionnaire. The Special Master concluded that UPS had not met its burden of

establishing why depositions were necessary, as opposed to well-crafted and detailed

interrogatories, and, further, that UPS had advanced no compelling rationale supporting the

company’s request for 80 depositions. 

On July 10, 2006, UPS filed its timely objection to the Special Master’s decision

denying UPS’s second request to depose absent class members. UPS argued that the Special

Master’s determination that interrogatories are a suitable alternative for depositions in this

matter is erroneous because more extensive and detailed information can be elicited in a

deposition than in response to interrogatories. Further, UPS asserted that its request is

supported by precedent.

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53 governs the use of court-appointed special

masters. Pursuant to Rule 53(g)(3) the court “must decide de novo all objections to findings

of fact made or recommended by a master,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(g)(3), “unless the parties

stipulate, with the court’s consent, that the findings will be reviewed for clear error or – with

respect to a master appointed on the parties’ consent or appointed to address pretrial or

post-trial matters – that the findings will be final.” Adv. Comm. Notes to 2003 Amendments

to Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(g). “The district court also reviews de novo all ‘objections to

conclusions of law made or recommended by a master.’” Plumbers & Pipefitters Local 572

Pension Fund v. Cisco Sys., Inc., No. C01-20418JW, 2005 WL 149555, at *2 (N.D. Cal.

June 21, 2005) (emphasis omitted) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(g)(4)). Thus, as the exceptions

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to Rule 53(g) do not apply in this case, the Court applies a de novo standard of review in

analyzing the instant motion. 

DISCUSSION

As an initial matter, the Court notes that both parties have devoted substantial written

argument to whether UPS has demonstrated the need for discovery of absent class members. 

However, the Special Master previously ordered that UPS should be allowed “to seek

discovery of absent class members,” Special Master’s Decision Regarding UPS’s Request to

Depose Absent Class Members at 3, and Plaintiffs have not objected to that decision. 

Accordingly, the Court accepts the Special Master’s determination on this issue and does not

intend to revisit it. Therefore, the Court need not consider arguments that refer to whether

discovery of absent class members should be allowed, e.g., UPS’s due process argument,

Mot. at 10, Reply at 8-9. 

UPS argues that it should be allowed to take 80 depositions of absent class members

(60 randomly selected and 20 hand-selected by UPS) because other discovery devices, such

as interrogatories or a questionnaire, are not suitable alternatives in this case. Although an

absent class-action plaintiff is generally not required to do anything, Phillips Petroleum Co.

v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 810 (1985), under certain circumstances, absent class members may

be required to submit to discovery, Long v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 761 F. Supp. 1320,

1326 n.5 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (citation omitted). To determine whether depositions of absent

class members will be allowed, this Court adopts the legal standard drafted by the Special

Master, with one exception, as discussed below:

Where such discovery has been allowed, courts have required the

proponent to demonstrate that (1) the discovery is not sought to

take undue advantage of class members or with the purpose or

effect of harassment or altering membership in the class; (2) the

discovery is necessary at trial of issues common to the class; 

(3) responding to the discovery requests would not require the

assistance of counsel; and (4) the discovery seeks information not

already known by the proponent. See On the House Syndication,

Inc. v. Federal Express Corp., 203 F.R.D. 452, 455 (S.D. Cal.

2001); Collins v. Int’l Dairy Queen, 190 F.R.D. 629, 630-31

(M.D. Ga. 1999); McCarthy v. Paine Webber Group, Inc., 164

F.R.D. 309, 313 (D. Conn. 1995). In addition, courts consider

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the need for efficiency and economy before ordering discovery. 

See Klein v. King, 132 F.R.D. 525 (N.D. Cal. 1990). Applying

these principles, courts have found the burden on the defendant to

justify discovery of absent class members by means of deposition

is particularly heavy. See Baldwin & Flynn v. National Safety

Associates, 149 F.R.D. 598, 600 (N.D. Cal. 1993).

Special Master’s Decision Regarding UPS’s Request to Depose Absent Class Members at 2.

UPS urges the Court to eliminate the third factor from the legal standard drafted by

the Special Master, “responding to the discovery requests would not require the assistance of

counsel,” id., because “if all [absent class member] discovery requests that involve the

assistance of class counsel are improper, this factor would effectively result in a ban of

[absent class member] discovery.” Reply at 2. The Court disagrees with UPS’s conclusion,

especially as discovery sought in the present case would not necessarily require the

assistance of counsel and could be captured by interrogatories or a questionnaire

administered by a third party given the limited scope of the information sought concerning

individual employees’ actions and understanding of company policy. However, the

requirement appears unnecessarily restrictive and may be subsumed by general

considerations of efficiency and economy regarding the use of discovery. Accordingly, the

Court will not consider whether respondents would require the assistance of counsel in its

analysis.

UPS argues that “[t]he terse, uninformative answers typically served in response to

interrogatories are simply no substitute for the extensive, detailed information that can be

elicited in even a short deposition.” Mot. at 8. UPS contends that it cannot anticipate what

information will be disclosed if it is provided “the opportunity to sit down with a class

member for a couple of hours, and probe.” Id. at 9. However, given that absent class

members are generally not required to do anything, Phillips Petroleum Co., 472 U.S. at 810,

and the burden on defendants seeking deposition testimony rather than interrogatory

responses is more severe, see Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 501 F. 2d 324, 341 (7th Cir.

1974), Baldwin, 149 F.R.D. at 600, UPS’s proffered rationale appears only to state the

company’s preference rather than provide sufficient justification for ordering depositions of

absent class members. Moreover, UPS’s contention that interrogatories would be an

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“absurd” substitute for deposition testimony because respondents could answer in “vague

generalities” that would not provide “any concrete, helpful information” is not persuasive. 

Mot. at 9. Deposition questions would likely elicit similar responses if asked in an

open-ended manner. For example, UPS argues that had Plaintiff Eric Duvoe responded to an

interrogatory that asked “whether UPS provided him with second meals on days he worked

more than 10 hours, he probably would have answered ‘no.’” Id. UPS contends that it “could

not have guessed to ask an interrogatory about taking DIADs home before clocking out,” as

was Mr. Duvoe’s practice. Id. However, as the Special Master concluded after reviewing

Mr. Duvoe’s transcript, “[m]ost of the information obtained on the relevant topics was

obtained by straight-forward questions about whether Devoe [sic] took breaks, when he took

them, how he recorded them, and what he was instructed about taking breaks.” Special

Master’s Decision Regarding UPS’s Second Request to Depose Absent Class Members at 2. 

Given the limited scope of the information sought, e.g., whether UPS “provided drivers with

opportunities to take meals but drivers voluntarily chose not to take them,” Reply at 5, or

whether “drivers did not record their lunch periods because they took the same amount of

time that the standard lunch program accounted for,” id. at 6, it appears that questions could

be drafted to account for various permutations of responses, and thus interrogatories or a

questionnaire would be sufficient. The Court does not accept UPS’s reluctance to draft wellcrafted questions as proof of the impossibility of the undertaking in this matter.

Moreover, the Court is not persuaded by the cases cited by UPS. First, these cases are

factually dissimilar as they involve relatively small class actions in which the court ordered

deposition testimony. See Kaas v. Pratt & Whitney, No. 89-8343-CIV-PAINE, 1991 WL

158943, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 18, 1991) (approximately 100 class members, court ordered

entire class could be deposed); Rosen v. Reckitt & Colman, Inc., No. 91 CIV. 1675 (LMM),

1994 WL 652534, at *3, *12 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 1994) (50 class members, court ordered

entire class could be deposed); Brooks v. Farm Fresh, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 1185, 1188 (E.D.

Va. 1991) (127 class members, court ordered entire class could be deposed); Krueger v. New

York Tel. Co., 163 F.R.D. 446, 449-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (162 class members, court ordered

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In Brooks, the plaintiffs brought a class action under the FLSA, which, as explained

above, also relies upon the enforcement provisions of 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). 759 F. Supp. at

1187.

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“[A] defendant who subjects [Rule 23] class members to [discovery requests]

requires those members to take some affirmative action to remain in the class, effectively

creating an ‘opt in’ requirement which is inconsistent with the ‘opt out’ provisions of Rule

23.” On the House Syndication, Inc., 203 F.R.D. at 456 (citation omitted). Of course, as

noted above, although it is disfavored, under certain circumstances courts have allowed

discovery of absent class members in Rule 23 class actions. Long, 761 F. Supp. at 1326 n.5

(citation omitted). 

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14 members of class could be deposed). Further, with the exception of Brooks, these cases

all involved class actions brought under the Age Discrimination and Employment Act

(“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621, et. seq., that incorporates the enforcement provisions of 29

U.S.C. § 216(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FSLA”).1

 Kaas, 1991 WL 158943, at *2. 

There is a fundamental difference between a class action, such as this one, brought under

Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and a class action pursued under § 216(b). 

Id. (citation omitted). Under Rule 23, each person is considered to be a class member unless

he has opted out of the lawsuit. Id. (citation omitted). Further, “[n]othing in Rule 23

suggests that class members are deemed ‘parties.’” Wainwright v. Kraftco Corp., 54 F.R.D.

532, 534 (N.D. Ga. 1972). By contrast, under § 216(b) “no person can become a party

plaintiff . . . unless he has affirmatively ‘opted into’ the class.” Kaas, 1991 WL 158934, at

*2 (citation omitted). Pursuant to § 216(b), “[n]o employee shall be a party plaintiff to any

such [class] action unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a party and such

consent is filed in the court in which such action is brought.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (held

unconstitutional in part on other grounds by Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 704, 759 (1999)). The

affirmative opt-in requirement for class actions brought under § 216(b), compared to

Rule 23’s opt-out requirement, represents a significant procedural difference.2

 By

affirmatively electing to opt in, class members under § 216(b) have agreed to participate in

the litigation to an extent that class members under Rule 23 have not. This may, in part,

explain the courts’ willingness to permit the depositions of absent class members in these

class actions brought under the enforcement provisions of § 216(b). Because the cases cited

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This ruling does not preclude UPS from asserting that it is entitled to depose absent

class members recently identified by Plaintiffs as potential witnesses. Neither the Special

Master’s decision nor the parties’ arguments regarding UPS’s objection to the decision

considered whether UPS may depose absent class members who have been named as

potential trial witnesses. 

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by UPS differ both factually and procedurally from the instant case, they will not be followed

by this Court.

Finally, this Court does not adopt any requirement that the parties’ discovery requests

in this matter be supported by a statistical rationale, Special Master’s Decision Regarding

UPS’s Second Request to Depose Absent Class Members at 3, as it appears that anecdotal

evidence bearing upon the issues common to the class may be relevant at trial. However, the

Court’s recognition that anecdotal evidence may be relevant in this matter does not obviate

the need for UPS to justify requesting discovery from a particular number of absent class

members. Further, the discovery of anecdotal evidence bearing upon issues common to the

class is not in itself an adequate justification for ordering depositions of absent class

members as this Court has found that the limited scope of permissible inquiry in this matter

may be captured by interrogatories or a questionnaire.3

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the above reasons, Defendant’s Objection to Special Master’s

Decision Denying UPS’s Second Request to Depose Absent Class Members is DENIED. 

Although UPS has demonstrated a need for discovery from absent class members, it has not

satisfied the more severe burden required for ordering depositions as opposed to

interrogatories. Clark, 501 F. 2d at 341. It appears that given the limited scope of the

information sought, well-crafted questions could be drafted to account for various

permutations of responses, and thus interrogatories or a questionnaire would be sufficient in

this matter. 

Moreover, pursuant to the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, which was passed by

Congress to address “the dual problems of cost and delay in Federal civil litigation,” S. Rep.

No. 101-416, at 6 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802, 6808, district courts must

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consider the need for economy and efficiency before ordering discovery. A principal cause

of high litigation costs is discovery abuse. Id. at 6823. In fact, “[t]he most frequently cited

types of lawyer abuse leading to high transaction costs are lawyers who ‘over-discover’ cases

rather than focus on controlling issues and lawyers and litigants who use discovery as an

adversarial tool to raise the stakes for their opponents.” Id. at 6824 (citation omitted). Thus,

it is the duty of the judge, as the sole representative of the public interest, to intervene in the

discovery process where it is necessary to avoid high costs and excessive delay, id. at 6820,

and thereby ensure “the deliberate and prompt adjudication of disputes,” id. at 6811 (citing

136 Cong. Rec., Jan. 25, 1990). In accordance with the duties prescribed by the Civil Justice

Reform Act, this Court will not order the more costly and burdensome method of discovery

in this matter, depositions, where it appears that interrogatories or a questionnaire would be

suitable alternatives. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 09/14/06 

THELTON E. HENDERSON, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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