Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01488/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-01488-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GARY FRANCIS O’LEARY,

Plaintiff,

v.

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT

OF CORRECTIONS, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:06-cv-01488-LJO-NEW (DLB) PC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL OF ACTION

FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM UNDER

SECTION 1983

(Doc. 15)

I. Findings and Recommendations Following Screening of Amended Complaint

A. Screening Requirement

Plaintiff Gary Francis O’Leary (“plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed this action on October

3, 2006. On March 28, 2007, the court dismissed plaintiff’s complaint, with leave to amend, for

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under section 1983. Plaintiff filed an

amended complaint on April 6, 2007. 

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

Case 1:06-cv-01488-LJO-GSA Document 16 Filed 04/13/07 Page 1 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

“Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited

exceptions,” none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S.

506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).

“Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. A court may dismiss a complaint only

if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with

the allegations. Id. at 514. “‘The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether

the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Indeed it may appear on the face of

the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the test.’” Jackson v. Carey,

353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)); see also

Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004) (“‘Pleadings need suffice only to put the

opposing party on notice of the claim . . . .’” (quoting Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 977 (9th Cir.

2001))). However, “the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff’s factual allegations.”

Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). “[A] liberal interpretation of a civil rights

complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat’l

Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d

266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).

B. Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment Medical Care Claim

Plaintiff is an inmate currently housed at Avenal State Prison. The events at issue in this

action allegedly occurred at Pleasant Valley State Prison (“PVSP”), and relate to the medical care,

or lack thereof, provided to plaintiff by prison officials. 

1. CDCR and PVSP as Defendants

Plaintiff names the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and Pleasant

Valley State Prison as defendants. The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from hearing

suits brought against an unconsenting state. Brooks v. Sulphur Springs Valley Elec. Co., 951 F.2d

Case 1:06-cv-01488-LJO-GSA Document 16 Filed 04/13/07 Page 2 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted); see also Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 116 S.Ct.

1114, 1122 (1996); Puerto Rico Aqueduct Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144

(1993); Austin v. State Indus. Ins. Sys., 939 F.2d 676, 677 (9th Cir. 1991). The Eleventh

Amendment bars suits against state agencies as well as those where the state itself is named as a

defendant. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. California Dep’t of Tranp., 96 F.3d 420, 421

(9th Cir. 1996); Brooks, 951 F.2d at 1053; Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989)

(concluding that Nevada Department of Prisons was a state agency entitled to Eleventh Amendment

immunity); Mitchell v. Los Angeles Community College Dist., 861 F.2d 198, 201 (9th Cir. 1989).

Because CDCR is a state agency and PVSP is part of CDCR, both entities are entitled to Eleventh

Amendment immunity from suit and may not be named as defendants in this action.

2. Private Party Defendants

Plaintiff names the makers of the medication Celebrex and his heart stent as defendants. To

state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must plead (1) that the defendant acted under color of

state law and (2) that the defendant deprived him of rights secured by the Constitution or federal

statutes. Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1986). The makers of Celebrex and

plaintiff’s stent are private parties who were not acting under color ofstate law. See Price v. Hawaii,

939 F.2d 702, 707-08 (9th Cir. 1991). Plaintiff’s section 1983 claim against them fails as a matter

of law. 

3. Claim Against Prison Officials

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation

of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution .

. . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,suit in equity,

or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between

the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

(1976). “‘A person ‘subjects’ anotherto the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning

of [§] 1983, if [that person] does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts or omits

Case 1:06-cv-01488-LJO-GSA Document 16 Filed 04/13/07 Page 3 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

to perform an act which [that person] is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which

complaint is made.’” Hydrick v. Hunter, 466 F.3d 676, 689 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Johnson v.

Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). “[T]he ‘requisite causal connection can be established

not only by some kind of direct, personal participation in the deprivation, but also be setting in

motion a series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause

others to inflict the constitutional injury.’” Id. (quoting Johnson at 743-44). 

To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prison

conditions must involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452

U.S. 337, 347 (1981). A prisoner’s claim of inadequate medical care does not rise to the level of an

Eighth Amendment violation unless (1) “the prison official deprived the prisoner of the ‘minimal

civilized measure of life’s necessities,’” and (2) “the prison official ‘acted with deliberate

indifference in doing so.’” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Hallett

v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted)). A prison official does not act in

a deliberately indifferent manner unless the official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to

inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Deliberate indifference may

be manifested “when prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment,”

or in the manner “in which prison physicians provide medical care.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d

1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133,

1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). Where a prisoner is alleging a delay in receiving medical treatment,

the delay must have led to further harm in order for the prisoner to make a claim of deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060 (citing Shapely v. Nevada Bd.

of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985)). 

“Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.” Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1060. “Under this

standard, the prison official must not only ‘be aware of the facts from which the inference could be

drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,’ but that person ‘must also draw the inference.’”

Id. at 1057 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). “‘If a prison official should have been aware of the

risk, but was not, then the official has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the

risk.’” Id. (quoting Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nevada, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002)).

Case 1:06-cv-01488-LJO-GSA Document 16 Filed 04/13/07 Page 4 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

Plaintiff’s amended complaint is devoid of allegations supporting a claim that any named defendant

“[knew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to [plaintiff’s] health . . . .” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.

Plaintiff therefore fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under section 1983. 

C. Conclusion

Plaintiff’s amended complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under

section 1983. Plaintiff was previously provided with an opportunity to amend to cure the

deficiencies in his claims but was unable to do so. Accordingly, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED

that this action be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted under section 1983.

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within thirty (30)

days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, plaintiff may file written

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s

Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: April 11, 2007 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:06-cv-01488-LJO-GSA Document 16 Filed 04/13/07 Page 5 of 5