Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-16-01609/USCOURTS-ca7-16-01609-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 16‐1609

JADED MAHELET RUVALCABA MARTINEZ,

Petitioner‐Appellant,

v.

PETER VALDEZ CAHUE,

Respondent‐Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 15 C 11411 — John J. Tharp, Jr., Judge.

____________________

ARGUED JUNE 1, 2016 — DECIDED JUNE 24, 2016

____________________

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and FLAUM, Circuit

Judges.

WOOD, Chief Judge. For the first seven years of A.M.’s life,

he lived in Illinois with his mother, Jaded Mahelet Ruvalcaba

Martinez. A.M.’s father, Peter Valdez Cahue, lived nearby, alt‐

hough he and Martinez never married. They entered into a

private arrangement, never formalized through a court order,

for custody and visitation rights. The events leading to the

lawsuit before us arose when, in 2013, Martinez moved to

Case: 16-1609 Document: 34 Filed: 06/24/2016 Pages: 18
2 No. 16‐1609

Mexico and took A.M. with her. About a yearlater, Cahue per‐

suaded Martinez to send A.M. to Illinois for a visit; he then

refused to return A.M. to Mexico. Martinez petitioned for his

return under the Hague Convention on Civil Aspects of Inter‐

national Child Abduction (“the Convention”), T.I.A.S. No.

11670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89 (Oct. 25, 1980), to which both the

United States and Mexico are parties. The Convention has

been implemented in the United States through the Interna‐

tional Child Abduction Remedies Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 9001 et seq.  

Relying heavily on its finding that Martinez and Cahue

did not share the view that A.M.’s habitual residence (a term

of art under the Convention) would be shifted to Mexico, the

district court found that Illinois remained A.M.’s habitual res‐

idence and dismissed Martinez’s petition. We conclude that

the district court asked the wrong question, and thus came to

the wrong answer. At all relevant times, Martinez had sole

custody of A.M. under Illinois law, while Cahue had no right

of custody either under Illinois law or the Convention. That

means that only Martinez’s intent mattered, and it is plain that

Martinez wanted A.M.’s habitual residence transferred to

Mexico. Cahue’s retention of A.M. in Illinois was therefore

wrongful and he must be returned to Mexico.

I

A.M. was born in 2006 in the Chicago suburb of Oak Lawn,

Illinois. Although Cahue voluntarily acknowledged his pater‐

nity at A.M.’s birth, A.M. lived with Martinez for his entire life

until Cahue retained him in Illinois in 2014. With minor ex‐

ceptions, Martinez and Cahue lived separately for most of

their ten‐year on‐again, off‐again relationship. They appear to

have cooperated relatively well, however, with respect to

A.M. On February 24, 2010, Martinez and Cahue entered into

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No. 16‐1609 3

a private written custody agreement in which Cahue stipu‐

lated that he would “NOT fight custody in court for [A.M.],”

but would be guaranteed “constant access” and overnight vis‐

its “2 nights a week.” Neither parent ever took steps to me‐

morialize this arrangement in a court order.  

In the spring of 2013 Martinez, a Mexican citizen who

worked at the Mexican Consulate in Chicago, began contem‐

plating a move back to Mexico.  She asserts that “everyone,”

including Cahue, knew that she was moving. He denies that

he knew that she was planning to relocate permanently to Mex‐

ico or that she was planning to change A.M.’s domicile. In‐

stead, Cahue says, Martinez told him that she and A.M. were

going to Mexico on vacation. The district court believed Ca‐

hue’s version of events and found that Martinez did not tell

Cahue that she was taking A.M. to live in Mexico. Martinez

has not challenged that factual finding on appeal, and so we

accept it.

On July 26, 2013, Cahue signed a notarized letter author‐

izing A.M. to travel to Mexico. After two weeks, he began call‐

ing Martinez and asking when she planned to return. On Au‐

gust 7, he sent her $300 for gas, because (he says) Martinez

had told him that she might drive back to Chicago. Then Mar‐

tinez stopped communicating with Cahue altogether. Cahue

contacted Martinez’s mother, sister, and father, but learned

nothing; he also spoke with the Oak Lawn police, who told

him that there was nothing they could do.

In the meantime, Martinez and A.M. settled into their new

life in Mexico. Martinez began work, and A.M. enrolled in a

highly regarded private school in Aguascalientes. After a

brief period of adjustment, A.M. excelled in the new school.

He played soccer (fútbol) on several elite teams, and he

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earned a scholarship. He had friends at school and on his

sports teams, spoke Spanish fluently, attended church regu‐

larly, and spent time with his extended family in Mexico.

But from Cahue’s point of view, matters were not settled.

That fall, he consulted an attorney, who informed him of his

rights under the Convention. The attorney began preparing

documents for a petition Cahue could file under the Conven‐

tion, but he had to withdraw after discovering what he con‐

sidered a conflict of interest. Cahue did not seek alternate rep‐

resentation, nor did he file the petition pro se.

Meanwhile, Martinez pursued legal action in Mexico. On

October 16, 2013, she filed a petition against Cahue for child

support and an order of protection. Martinez testified that she

told Cahue about the petition, but she never served it on him.

Instead, she and Cahue agreed to a visitation plan and she

dropped the petition before the Mexican court ruled on it. Ac‐

cording to the plan, Cahue and A.M. would see each other in

December 2013, April 2014, and July 2014, during A.M.’s

school vacations. The December visit did not take place, but

Martinez and Cahue made plans for A.M. to visit Cahue in

April 2014 as contemplated.

In December 2013, Cahue began communicating with the

U.S. Department of State. A person on the Mexican desk,

Rosemarie Skelly Mendoza, explained his rights under the

Convention and sent him a blank petition for relief. Cahue

never filed it, but he did keep in touch with the State Depart‐

ment by email. As planned, A.M. visited his father during the

April 2014 spring break, from April 26 through May 4, and at

the end of the visit, Cahue sent him back to Mexico. Cahue

testified that he thought about keeping A.M. at that time, but

he did not because Martinez had already agreed to allow

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No. 16‐1609 5

A.M. to visit Cahue that summer, and he did not want to dis‐

rupt A.M.’s school year.  

In July, Martinez again sent A.M. to Chicago as agreed,

thinking that he would stay there for another short visit and

be back in time to start school on August 18, 2014. At first,

Cahue bought only a one‐way air ticket, but Martinez called

his bluff: she refused to allow A.M. to travel without a return

ticket. Cahue appeared to capitulate and bought the round‐

trip ticket. But Martinez’s suspicions were well founded. As

Cahue later admitted, he had no intention of sending A.M.

back to Mexico.

Martinez learned this on August 16, 2014, when she went

to the airport to pick up A.M. and he never arrived. When

Martinez contacted Cahue, he told her that he had forgotten

about the flight, and then he stopped answering her calls. On

August 21, he contacted the State Department and asked it to

put A.M.’s passport “on hold” so that A.M. could not leave

the United States.   

Martinez flew to Illinois on August 25, 2014, meaning to

reclaim her son. She arrived at Cahue’s home that day, sur‐

prising him; with A.M. in tow, she decamped to her parents’

home in Illinois. Two days later, Cahue filed a petition for cus‐

tody in Illinois court, along with an emergency motion for im‐

mediate possession of A.M. and preliminary and permanent

injunctions barring Martinez from removing A.M. from Illi‐

nois. The state court granted his emergency motion, after

which Cahue sent the police to Martinez’s parents’ home, the

police seized A.M., and they returned him to Cahue. Martinez

promptly obtained counsel, filed an answer to Cahue’s peti‐

tion for custody, and attended a hearing in Illinois court on

September 17, 2014. The court continued Cahue’s temporary

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6 No. 16‐1609

possession of the boy and ordered the surrender of A.M.’s U.S.

and Mexican passports.

After those developments, Martinez returned to Mexico,

where she resumed her legal fight. On February 6, 2015, she

filed her petition under the Convention with the Mexican

Central Authority. The U.S. State Department received the pe‐

tition on March 13, 2015. Then on December 15, 2015, after she

discovered that Cahue had obtained a new U.S. passport for

A.M., Martinez commenced emergency proceedings in the

district court and filed her verified petition in the Northern

District of Illinois for A.M.’s return to Mexico.

The district court held an evidentiary hearing, after which

it determined that there was sufficient evidence that A.M. had

acclimatized to Mexico during the year he lived there with his

mother. It also found, however, that Cahue and Martinez did

not jointly intend that A.M. should move to Mexico in the first

place. To the contrary, it said, Martinez took A.M. to Mexico

without Cahue’s permission or knowledge (presumably

about the permanence of the move—Cahue admitted that he

knew about the trip). Emphasizing the absence of shared pa‐

rental intent, the district court held that Illinois had remained

A.M.’s habitual residence during the year he spent in Mexico,

and thus Martinez’s petition had to be dismissed. Martinez

appeals from that judgment.

II

The Convention represents an international effort to deal

with the vexing problem of child custody when more than one

country is involved. It is fundamentally “an anti‐abduction

treaty.” Garcia v. Pinelo, 808 F.3d 1158, 1162 (7th Cir. 2015)

(quoting Redmond v. Redmond, 724 F.3d 729, 742 (7th Cir.

Case: 16-1609 Document: 34 Filed: 06/24/2016 Pages: 18
No. 16‐1609 7

2013)). Its dual purposes are “to secure the prompt return of

children wrongfully removed to or retained in any Contract‐

ing State,” and “to ensure that rights of custody and of access

under the law of one Contracting State are effectively re‐

spected in the other Contracting States.” Id. (quoting Conven‐

tion art. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 11670). To fulfill the latter purpose, it

seeks “to deter parents from absconding with their children

and crossing international borders in the hopes of obtaining a

favorable custody determination in a friendlier jurisdiction.”

Id. (quoting Walker v. Walker, 701 F.3d 1110, 1116 (7th Cir.

2012)). The Convention is based on the principle “that a child’s

country of habitual residence is ‘best placed to decide upon

questions of custody and access.’” Id. (quoting Whallon v.

Lynn, 230 F.3d 450, 456 (1st Cir. 2000)).  

Key among the Convention’s provisions is its “remedy of

return,” which “entitles a person whose child has wrongfully

been retained in the United States in violation of the Conven‐

tion to petition for return of the child to the child’s country of

‘habitual residence.’” Id. (citations and quotation marks omit‐

ted). A removal or retention is wrongful under the Conven‐

tion where it is “in breach of rights of custody ... under the

law of the state in which the child was habitually resident im‐

mediately before the removal or retention,” and “at the time

of removal or retention those rights were exercised ... or

would have been so exercised but for the removal or reten‐

tion. Convention art. 3, T.I.A.S. No. 11670.  

The pivotal question under the Convention is generally

that of habitual residence. Redmond, 724 F.3d at 742. “In prac‐

tical terms, the Convention may be invoked only where the

child was habitually resident in a Contracting State and taken

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to or retained in another Contracting State.” Id. at 737 (quot‐

ing U.S. Dep’t of State, Hague International Child Abduction

Convention; Text and Legal Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,494,

10,504 (Mar. 26, 1986)).  

The district court recognized this. We review its findings

of fact for clear error, and its conclusions of law (including the

legal framework it adopts) de novo. The determination of ha‐

bitualresidence is a “mixed” question of law and fact, see Red‐

mond, 724 F.3d at 743 (quoting Koch v. Koch, 450 F.3d 703, 710

(7th Cir. 2006)), to which we have given de novo review. See id.

at 742. We have done so because this question is antecedent to

many other issues under the Convention, and it is often de‐

terminative: if a child is currently located in her habitual resi‐

dence, her presence in the country (whether by removal or re‐

tention) is not wrongful. Id. at 737. In order to assure both the

national and the international uniformity that the Convention

was designed to achieve, de novo review is essential. Cf. Or‐

nelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697 (1996) (requiring inde‐

pendent appellate review of determinations of reasonable

suspicion or probable cause, because they “acquire content

only through application” and “[i]ndependent review is ...

necessary if appellate courts are to maintain control of, and to

clarify, the legal principles”). To the extent that “habitual res‐

idence” turns on findings of historical fact, such as the inten‐

tions of the parties or the child’s adjustment to a new environ‐

ment, our review is deferential.

A

The Convention does not define “habitual residence,” but

we have understood the inquiry to be a “practical, flexible,

factual” one that “accounts for all available relevant evidence

and considers the individual circumstances of each case.”

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No. 16‐1609 9

Redmond, 724 F.3d at 732 (quoting Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d

1067, 1071 (9th Cir. 2001). As the term suggests, the search is

for the place where the child has made his or her home; it

identifies the country whose courts should be entrusted with

determinations such as custody and support. Generally “[a]

court should infer a change in habitual residence only where

[it] ‘can say with confidence that the child’s relative attach‐

ments to the two countries have changed to the point where

requiring return to the original forum would now be tanta‐

mount to taking the child out of the family and social envi‐

ronment in which its life has developed.’” Id. at 745 (quoting

Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1081).  

The two most important factors in the analysis are paren‐

tal intent and the child’s acclimatization to the proposed home

jurisdiction. Id. at 744–45. Courts have differed on the weight

each factor should receive. We have tended to privilege the

parents’ perspective, id., but even so, we have stressed that

this emphasis is dependent on the circumstances. Id. at 746.

We also have noted that “[t]he intention or purpose which has

to be taken into account is that of the person or persons entitled

to fix the place of the child’s residence.” Id. at 747 (quoting

Mozes, 239 F.3d at 1076). Importantly, shared intent “has less

salience when only one parent has the legal right” to deter‐

mine residence. Id.

1

We consider first the question whether Martinez’s initial

removal of A.M. to Mexico in July 2013 was subject to any le‐

gal restrictions that might allow Cahue’s intent to affect the

analysis. Martinez argues that, as the parent with sole custody

of A.M., she had the exclusive right to establish his habitual

residence. This is not quite accurate. In Illinois, a custodial

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parent’s discretion to remove a child from the state is not com‐

pletely unrestrained. In the absence of a custody order, she is

not required to seek the court’s permission to relocate outside

of Illinois. See In re Parentage of R.B.P., 915 N.E. 2d 434, 439 (Ill.

App. Ct. 2009) (holding that where there is no custody order,

a mother need not seek permission under 750 ILCS 5/609

(2013) to leave the state). Nevertheless, a custodial parent may

be enjoined “upon application by any party” from relocating

with a child outside of Illinois “pending the adjudication of

the issues of custody and visitation.” 750 ILCS 45/13.5(a)

(2013). The latter section applies only in an “action brought

under [the Illinois Parentage Act of 1984] for the initial deter‐

mination of custody or visitation of a child or for modification

of a prior custody or visitation order.” A party may obtain an

injunction under section 13.5 even if the parentage action

commences after the custodial parent has left the state.

Hedrich v. Mack, 27 N.E.3d 666, 670 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015). At the

conclusion of the proceeding, even if the resulting court order

grants her sole custody, the custodial parent must show that

moving “is in the best interests of [the] child.” 750 ILCS

5/609(a) (2013); see also Fisher v. Waldrop, 849 N.E.2d 334 (Ill.

2006) (section 609(a) applies where there is a custody order in

place).  

But Cahue never obtained rights of custody for Conven‐

tion purposes under these statutes, nor was Martinez’s right

to relocate A.M. constrained by them. In the absence of a court

order, Illinois law presumes that the mother of a child born

out of wedlock has sole custody. See 720 ILCS 5/10–5(a)(3)

(2013) (for purposes of statute on child abduction it is “pre‐

sumed that, when the parties have never been married to each

other, the mother had legal custody of the child unless a valid

court order states otherwise”); 750 ILCS 45/14(a)(2) (2013)

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No. 16‐1609 11

(presuming mother had legal custody even where there has

been a judgment of paternity if no order grants custody to the

father, unless he has had physical custody for at least six

months prior to the date when the mother seeks to enforce her

custodial rights); see also In re Arthur H., 819 N.E.2d 734, 756‐

57 (Ill. 2004) (Garman, J., dissenting). Joint custody does not

arise automatically; a court must award it. See 750 ILCS

5/602.1(b) (2013). Moreover, joint custody is not the default

option: a court may confer joint custody only “if it determines

that joint custody would be in the best interests of the child.”

Id. § 602.1(c).

Cahue did not obtain a custody order during the time that

mattered. His agreement with Martinez provided him only

with agreed visitation rights—that is, a right of access that

does not trigger the remedy of return under the Convention.

See Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 13 (2010). And even if that

agreement had spoken to custody, it would not have legal ef‐

fect: Illinois courts generally do not respect private agree‐

ments affecting custody. See In re Marriage of Linta, 18 N.E.3d

566, 570 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014) (noting that “the law severely lim‐

its on public‐policy grounds the enforceability of contracts af‐

fecting the custody ... of children” and “per se rejects premar‐

ital agreements that ... specify custody”). In July 2013, there‐

fore, Cahue had no custody rights under Illinois law.

Neither did Illinois accord him the lesser right of ne exeat,

which is a joint right to determine a child’s country of resi‐

dence. See Abbott, 560 U.S. at 10 (holding ne exeat to be right

of custody under the Convention). While section 13.5(a) pro‐

vides a mechanism to enjoin temporarily the removal from, or

compel the return of a child to, the state of Illinois, it is not a

right to veto the relocation. It merely requires that the removal

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12 No. 16‐1609

be subjected to the scrutiny of a court. The court then deter‐

mines whether relocation should be enjoined pending the ad‐

judication of the custody question, considering the peti‐

tioner’s previous involvement with the child, the likelihood of

parentage, and the impact on the person being enjoined. 750

ILCS 45/13.5(a) (2013). The injunction lasts only until the ad‐

judication of custody or visitation is completed. After that, the

custodial parent may remove the child if a court finds that it

“is in the best interests of [the] child.” 750 ILCS 5/609(a)

(2013). The noncustodial parent has no right to determine the

child’s location; he or she has only the right to ask a court to

supervise. These laws show that Cahue never took the proper

steps to secure the rights on which he is trying to rely. There

was no existing custody order or even a pending custody pro‐

ceeding relating to A.M. in July 2013. As a result, neither sec‐

tion 13.5(a) nor section 609(a) could have restrained Martinez

from moving to Mexico with A.M.

Cahue asserts that because he and Martinez executed a

Voluntary Acknowledgement of Paternity at A.M.’s birth, and

because 750 ILCS 46/305(a) (2016) “confers upon the acknowl‐

edged father all of the rights and duties of a parent,” he has

rights of custody as a matter of law. There are two problems

with this theory. First, section 305(a) was not enacted until

2016. Second, even a judgment of paternity does not in itself

confer any rights of custody or visitation. See In re Parentage

of J.W., 990 N.E.2d 698, 706 (Ill. 2013) (“[A] judgment of pater‐

nity does not automatically entitle a biological father to visit‐

ation.”); J.S.A. v. M.H., 863 N.E.2d 236, 253 (Ill. 2007) (noting

that “the right of a biological father to establish paternity to a

child born to a marriage does not also mean that the legal

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No. 16‐1609 13

rights flowing from the parent and child relationship,” in‐

cluding custody, “are automatically conferred”).  

Cahue’s argument to the contrary finds no support in Illi‐

nois law. Nor are we persuaded by his criticism of ourreliance

on Redmond. It is true, as he points out, that unlike the father

in Redmond, whom Irish law did not recognize as a parent,

Cahue is A.M.’s acknowledged father. We accept that for some

purposes this has legal consequences. But the Convention in‐

sists on a particular right—the right of custody—and Cahue

lacked that both when Martinez moved to Mexico in July 2013

and when Cahue refused to return A.M. to his mother in Au‐

gust 2014. Neither did Illinois law restrict Martinez’s move‐

ment of A.M. at either time. At both times that mattered, Ca‐

hue had no legal right to decide A.M.’s residence, and Mar‐

tinez had an unrestricted right to do so.  

When Martinez moved to Mexico with A.M., she may

have violated the terms of the couple’s private custody agree‐

ment. But the move did not violate a right of custody for Con‐

vention purposes. Martinez’s removal of A.M. to Mexico was

therefore not wrongful. See Redmond, 724 F.3d at 738–39; White

v. White, 718 F.3d 300, 304‐06 (4th Cir. 2013). Nor did it violate

Illinois law. Because only Martinez has rights of custody un‐

der the Convention, and Illinois law did not in any way re‐

strict her right to move away from the country with her son,

only her intent was of legal significance.

2

The second key consideration in determining habitual res‐

idence is the extent to which the child has acclimatized to one

or the other place. The district court found that by August

2014, A.M. had acclimatized to Mexico. While A.M. had spent

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14 No. 16‐1609

most of his life in Illinois, that fact is not dispositive. (That

would create the kind of formulaic, ratio‐based test that ap‐

pears nowhere in the Convention.) By the end of his first year

in Mexico, he displayed all of the indicia of habitualresidence,

including friends, extended family, success in school, and par‐

ticipating in community and religious activities. The district

court found that A.M. had adapted successfully to Mexico,

and that finding is not clearly erroneous. Based on Martinez’s

intent that he change habitual residence, the lack of any right

on Cahue’s part to veto her preference, and A.M.’s own suc‐

cessful acclimatization, we conclude that Mexico was A.M’s

habitual residence at the time Cahue acted to retain him in the

United States.  

B

Because the district court found that A.M.’s habitual resi‐

dence was Illinois, it had no reason to evaluate the wrongful‐

ness of Cahue’s 2014 retention of A.M., or any possible de‐

fenses that Cahue might have raised. Although it will some‐

times be desirable to remand to the district court for it to con‐

sider wrongfulness and possible defenses in the first instance,

that will depend on how well the record is developed,

whether the parties have had an opportunity to brief the is‐

sues, and how time‐sensitive the case is. In this instance, those

considerations persuade us to take up these issues now, with‐

out a remand.

1

As we noted earlier, a removal orretention is wrongful un‐

der the Convention if it is “in breach of rights of custody ...

under the law of the state in which the child was habitually

resident immediately before the removal or retention”; and

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No. 16‐1609 15

“at the time of removal or retention those rights were exer‐

cised ... or would have been so exercised but for the removal

or retention.” Convention art. 3, T.I.A.S. No. 11670.

Cahue admits that he retained A.M. in Illinois without

Martinez’s consent. In doing so, he violated her rights of cus‐

tody under Mexican law. See Civil Code for the State of

Aguascalientes, arts. 434, 437, 440–41; Garcia, 808 F.3d at 1164

(noting that the right called patria potestas is “a ‘right of cus‐

tody’under the Convention” that is conferred to both parents,

and whose “central values” are “fairness and reciprocity”).

Martinez regularly sought contact with A.M. from the time

Cahue retained him forward. See Walker, 701 F.3d at 1121 (not‐

ing that “any sort of regular contact” with the child qualifies

as “exercising ... custody rights” under the Convention). Ca‐

hue’s retention of A.M. was wrongful under the Convention.

2

Because Cahue’s retention of A.M. in July 2014 was wrong‐

ful, A.M. must be returned to Martinez unless Cahue can

show that either of the two defenses he presented applies: that

A.M. is now so “settled in [his] new environment” that he

should not be returned, see Convention art. 12, T.I.A.S. No.

11670, or that Martinez “subsequently acquiesced in the ... re‐

tention,” see id. art. 13(a). It is important, in evaluating these

defenses, to bear in mind that even if the facts provide some

support for a defense, “a court still has discretion to order the

return of a child if it would further the aim of the Conven‐

tion[,] which is to provide for the return of a wrongfully re‐

moved child.” Garcia, 808 F.3d at 1167 (quoting de Silva v. Pitts,

481 F.3d 1279, 1285 (10th Cir. 2007)). The Convention achieves

its aims both by returning children in individual cases and by

deterring future abductions or wrongful retentions. Id. at

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16 No. 16‐1609

1168–69. “The Convention’s ‘defenses ... are narrowly con‐

strued’ at least in part to preserve that deterrence.” Id. at 1169

(quoting de Silva, 481 F.3d at 1285). Where applying a defense

would undermine the deterrent effect of the Convention’s sys‐

tem, a court should hesitate to take that step.

The record here is equivocal at best on the applicability of

the “settled‐child” defense, and as our account of the facts

demonstrates, it does not support a finding that Martinez ever

acquiesced in Cahue’s actions. Moreover, it was Cahue who

willfully circumvented the Convention’s procedures, time

and again. Based on his conversations with an attorney and

State Department personnel, Cahue was aware of his legal

remedies. He nevertheless declined to exercise them because

he “knew [he] wouldn’t have won” (as he put it) on the peti‐

tion. Instead, he took advantage of Martinez’s good faith and

made her think that it was safe to send A.M. to Illinois for a

visit. He lulled Martinez into a false sense of security when he

returned A.M. to Mexico at the conclusion of A.M.’s spring‐

break stay.

Cahue may have tipped his hand when he bought the one‐

way ticket for the summer visit, but when Martinez raised the

point, he changed it to a round‐trip ticket. Yet all the while, he

planned to keep A.M. with him. In the past, we have sharply

criticized such “self‐help” measures, even suggesting that

there should be an anti‐self‐help poison pill: where a parent

exercises self‐help instead of using the Convention’s legal

remedies, he or she would transform the other parent’s juris‐

diction into the child’s habitual residence. See Kijowska v.

Haines, 463 F.3d 583, 588–89 (7th Cir. 2006). We need not go

that far now, however, and we note that any such step should

never lose sight of the best interests of the child. It is enough

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No. 16‐1609 17

to say that in this case, rewarding Cahue’s strategy would be

quite damaging to the deterrent effect of the Convention.  

Cahue has also taken advantage of Martinez’s pursuit of

her legal remedies through the Convention: during the pen‐

dency of her petition, he has worked actively to cement his

advantage in the courts of Illinois, his preferred jurisdiction.

When Martinez flew to Illinois, Cahue obtained an emergency

orderfrom an Illinois court to keep A.M. there. After Martinez

returned to Mexico, despite her pending petition under the

Convention, he sought and obtained a default judgment in

state court granting him sole custody. Martinez instituted the

present emergency proceeding after she discovered that Ca‐

hue had obtained a new passport for A.M. and taken him to

Mexico without her knowledge or consent.

It is unclear whether the Illinois default judgment can or

will be reopened, and the Convention does not in principle

concern itself with custody decisions. Nevertheless, allowing

Cahue to gain an advantage from circumventing and exploit‐

ing the Convention in this way would pervert its goals. After

all, the Convention “seeks ... to prevent a later decision on”

custody from “being influenced by a change of circumstances

brought about through unilateral action by one of the par‐

ties.” Garcia, 808 F.3d at 1162 (quoting Elisa Pérez–Vera, Ex‐

planatory Report: Hague Conference on Private International Law

¶ 71, in 3 Acts and Documents of the Fourteenth Session 426, 447–

48 (1980)). Here, declining to apply the Convention’s remedy

of return would do just that.

III

Martinez’s initial decision to move A.M. to Mexico was

lawful: she had sole custody over A.M. under Illinois law, and

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18 No. 16‐1609

neither Illinois law nor the Convention precluded her from

moving with her son to Mexico with or without Cahue’s per‐

mission. Cahue had no rights of custody over A.M. that qual‐

ified Martinez’s position. Once in Mexico, A.M. adapted read‐

ily to his new home, such that by August 2014, when his fa‐

ther refused to return him, he was being kept from his habit‐

ual residence. Cahue retained A.M. in violation of Martinez’s

rights of custody under Mexican law—rights that she exer‐

cised continuously. Cahue’s retention of A.M. was therefore

wrongful under the Convention. Finally, applying a defense

here would not serve the aims of the convention.

We REVERSE the judgment of the district court and order

that A.M. be returned to Martinez’s custody in Mexico at the

earliest possible time.

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