Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-86-01619/USCOURTS-ca10-86-01619-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 

---

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF·· APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

PATS! AYALA, et al, and 

MYRA LYNN GUTHRIE, et al, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

FILED 

Unit.ed Stat.es Court of Appeals 'fenth Circuit 

JUN 161989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

No. 86-1619 

JOY MANUFACTURING COMPANY, 

et al, 

Defendants, 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, MINE SAFETY ) 

AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, ) 

Defendant-Appellee. 

) 

) 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. Nos. 82-JM-1907 and 83-JM-580) 

David W. Griffith of Williams, Trine, Greenstein & Griffith, P.C., 

Boulder, Colorado, for Plaintiffs-Appellants. 

Brenda Moss Green, Trial Attorney, Torts Branch, Civil Division, 

U.S. Department of Justice (Richard K. Willard, Assistant Attorney 

General, and Phyllis Jackson Pyles, Senior Trial Attorney, U.S. 

Department of Justice, with her on the brief), Washington, D.C., 

for Defendant-Appellee. 

Before MCKAY, TACHA, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

MCKAY, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 86-1619 Document: 01019565569 Date Filed: 06/16/1989 Page: 1 
On April 15, 1981, fifteen miners were killed in a methane 

and coal dust explosion in a Colorado coal mine. The plaintiffs 

alleged that the explosion was caused by the improperly wired 

lighting system on a continuous mining machine. They further 

alleged that the Mine Safety Health Administration (MSHA) inspector negligently provided technical assistance on specific wiring 

connections and that he inspected and failed to detect that the 

lighting system was improperly and dangerously installed in violation of mandatory federal safety standards, see 30 C.F.R. § 75.313 

(1988), and basic, readily ascertainable engineering principles. 

Plaintiffs sued the United States and the machine manufacturer 

under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b) and 

2671 (1982). The trial court dismissed the complaint against the 

United States for failure.to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. ~. 

12(b)(6) on the ground that MSHA's negligent inspection was within 

the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims 

Act. See 28 u.s.c. 2680(a) (1982). 1 Plaintiffs appeal the district court's order granting the United States' motion to dismiss. 

1 28 u.s.c. § 2680(a) states: 

The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) 

of this title shall not apply to--

(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an 

employee of the Government, exercising due care, in the 

execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not 

such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the 

exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or 

perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of 

a federal agency or an employee of the Government, 

whether or not the discretion involved be abused. 

-2-

Appellate Case: 86-1619 Document: 01019565569 Date Filed: 06/16/1989 Page: 2 
"[T]he sufficiency of a complaint is a question of law which 

we review de novo. Accordingly, we apply the same scrutiny to the 

complaint as did the trial court." Morgan v. City of Rawlins, 792 

F.2d 975, 978 (10th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted). We noted in 

Morgan that: 

Dismissal of a case pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) 

requires the legal determination that the plaintiff can 

prove no set of facts in support of his claim to entitle 

him to relief. To reach this conclusion, we clothe 

plaintiff's claim in such fashion to presume all allegations true. "The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure erect 

a powerful presumption against rejecting pleadings for 

failure to state a claim." 

Id. (citations omitted). 

The district court in granting defendant's 12(b}(6) motion 

relied on United States v. s. A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio 

Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467.U.S. 797, ·813-14 ·(1984), 2 which 

held that "whatever else the discretionary function exception may 

include it plainly was intended to encompass the discretionary 

acts of Government acting in its role as a regulator of the conduct of private individuals." Since Varig Airlines, ·however, th~ 

Supreme Court has given further guidance on the scope of the discretionary function exception to FTCA liability. In light of 

Berkovitz v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 1954 (1988), we reverse the 

district court's grant of defendant's 12(b)(6) motion. 

2 In Varig 124 passengers were killed as a result of a fire on 

a Boeing 707. The Civil Aeronautics Agency, a predecessor of the 

FAA, certified that the jet's designs, plans, specifications, and 

performance data had been shown to be in conformance with minimum 

safety standards. Varig Airlines sued the government under the 

FTCA seeking damages for the destroyed aircraft. 

-3-

Appellate Case: 86-1619 Document: 01019565569 Date Filed: 06/16/1989 Page: 3 
The plaintiffs in Berkovitz sued the National Institutes of 

Health's Division of Biologic Standards (DBS), which licensed 

Lederle Laboratories to produce Orimune, an oral polio vaccine. 

After plaintiff ingested a dose of Orimune, he contracted a severe 

case of polio. In Berkovitz, a unanimous Court noted: "In 

restating and clarifying the scope of the discretionary function 

exception, we intend specif~cally to reject the Government's argument that the exception precludes liability for any and all 

acts arising out of the regulatory programs of federal agencies." 

Id. at 1959-60. The Court held that "if the [government's] policy 

leaves no room for an official to exercise policy judgment in performing a given act, or if the act simply does not involve the 

exercise of such judgment, the discretionary function exception 

does not bar a claim that the act was negligent or wrongful.'' Id. 

at 1964. 3 

3 Two circuits have made similar decisions citing Berkovitz. 

See McMichael v. United States, 856 F.2d 1026 (8th Cir. 1988) (In 

consolidated actions filed against the United States under the 

FTCA, plaintiffs sought damages for injuries and death resulting 

from a munitions plant explosion. In a prior appeal the Eighth 

Circuit had affirmed the district court's ruling that the 

discretionary function exception did not bar the plaintiff's claim 

against the United States. On this appeal, the court again 

affirmed its conclusion, relying on Berkovitz.); Patterson v. 

United States, 856 F.2d 670 (4th Cir. 1988), reh'g granted, 866 

F.2d 1538 (1989) (Injured resident and estate of deceased resident 

sued the United States under the FTCA, challenging the Office of 

Surface Mining's inspection of a fire at a coal refuse pile. The 

Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal and held 

that the allegedly negligent inspection of fire site was not 

within discretionary function exception, citing Berkovitz.) 

-4-

Appellate Case: 86-1619 Document: 01019565569 Date Filed: 06/16/1989 Page: 4 
In this case, the government denies that its inspector violated a mandatory safety standard which allegedly caused the mine 

disaster. However, it argues that even if the standard were violated, the inspector was acting in his regulatory capacity and his 

acts were well within the broad discretion given to MSHA inspectors in the performance of their regulatory and enforcement 

duties. Plaintiffs reply that the initial "broad discretion" 

given the MSHA inspectors to regulate mines is not being challenged here. Rather, the specific technical assistance (i.e. to 

connect the wires to the wrong terminal in violation of mandatory 

federal safety standards) is what is at issue. This is similar to 

the situation in McMichael where the Eighth Circuit stated: "In 

the case before us, as in Berkovitz, the initial discretion 

granted by the regulations to the Defense Department was broad; 

the inspectors, however, violated the Department's own policy 

directives by failing to comply with specific procedures mandated 

by the Defense Department." McMichael, 856 F.2d at 1033. 

The plaintiffs assert that the ''technical assistance" provided by the MSHA inspector did not involve the balancing of 

policy interests or the regulation of the conduct of others. The 

MSHA inspector directed a mine operator to connect the power supply to the continuous mining machine. Those directions ultimately 

resulted in a written wiring diagram given to mine electricians 

which plaintiffs allege caused the lights to be connected incorrectly, in an unsafe and hazardous way and in violation of mandatory federal safety regulations. The plaintiffs contend that the 

-5-

Appellate Case: 86-1619 Document: 01019565569 Date Filed: 06/16/1989 Page: 5 
MSHA inspector directed the specific terminals to which the wires 

should be connected, and that such activity did not involve the 

exercise of discretion, but rather, simply involved engineering 

and safety considerations. 

Because the conduct of th~ MSHA inspector involved no discretion or policymaking choices, plaintiffs assert that the court 

erred in granting defendant's 12(b}(6} motion to dismiss on the 

basis of the discretionary function exception. "Because petitioners may yet show • • • that the conduct challenged here did not 

involve the permissible exercise of policy discretion, the invocation of the discretionary function exception to dismiss petitioners' ... claim was improper." Berkovitz, 108 S. Ct. at 1964. 

We conclude that plaintiffs have pled sufficient facts to withstand a motion to dismiss in light of Berkovitz. We therefore 

reverse the district court's grant of defendant's motion to dismiss and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

REVERSED and REMANDED. 

-6-

Appellate Case: 86-1619 Document: 01019565569 Date Filed: 06/16/1989 Page: 6