Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-01855/USCOURTS-ca10-88-01855-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

PETER RAY LAYCOCK, 

FILED 

United Statef Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circi?h 

. JIJt 2 G 1999 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

Petitioner-Appellant,. 

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No. 88-1855 

v. 

STATE OF NEW MEXICO, et al. 

Respondents-Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

For the District of New Mexico 

(D.C. No. CIV 85-1123-SC)) 

Stephen P. Mccue, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Albuquerque, 

New Mexico, for Petitioner-Appellant. 

Gail MacQuesten, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, New Mexico, 

for Respondents-Appellees. 

Before LOGAN, WRIGHT,** and MOORE, Circuit Judges. 

WRIGHT, Circuit Judge. 

Peter ~ay Laycock appeals the district court's denial of 

his petition for habeas corpus relief. He claims that he entered 

an involuntary guilty plea, his counsel rendered ineffective 

assistance, his sentence exceeded the statutory maximum, and he 

received an inadequate sentencing hearing. We affirm the 

** Honorable Eugene A. Wright, Senior Judge of the United States 

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 88-1855 Document: 01019743064 Date Filed: 07/26/1989 Page: 1 
judgment. 

~CKGROUND 

In March 1983, the police arrested Laycock for armed 

robb~ry of a New Mexico convenience store. He admitted robbing it 

and shootin9 at a customer. The appointed public defender 

n.egotiated a plea agreement with the prosecutor. Laycock agreed 

to plead suilty to Count I of the information, armed robbery with 

a firearm enhancement, and the state agreed to dismiss Count II, 

assault with intent to commit a violent felony with a firearm 

enhancement. Laycock and his counsel discussed the possibility of 

his acceptance into the Delancey Street Drug Rehabilitation 

Center. The written plea agreement did not include this or any 

other sentencing provision. 

The court sentenced Laycock to nine years for armed 

robbery, one year for firearm enhancement and two years of parole. 

He filed a petition for post-conviction relief which the court 

denied. After the Supreme Court of New Mexico denied his petition 

for a writ of habeas corpus, he filed a second petition in the 

Federal District Court of New Mexico. The magistrate there found 

that he had exhausted his state court remedies as required by 28 

u.s.c. § 2254(b). See Osborn v. Shillinger, 861 F.2d 612, 613 

(10th Cir. 1988). 

~YSIS 

I. Voluntary Plea 

Laycock alleges that his plea was involuntary. He 

claims that his attorney materially misrepresented the plea 

bargain by promising him a suspended sentence if Delancey Street 

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accepted him into its drug treatment program. 1/ He does not 

contend thqt the prosecutor misrepresented the plea. 

Whether a plea is voluntary is a question of federal law 

subject to de novo review. Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 

431 (1983); Oppel v. Meachum, 851 F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir.), cert. 

denied, 109 s. Ct. 266 (19~8). We accept the magistrate's 

findings qf fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Marshall, 459 

u.s. at 432. 

A plea may not be voluntary when an attorney materially 

misinforms the defendant of the consequences of the plea or the 

court's probable disposition. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 u.s. 

63,75 n.8 (1975); Worthen v. Meachum, 842 F.2d 1179, 1182 (10th 

Cir. 1988); Bonvillain v. Blackburn, 780 F.2d 1248, 1250 (5th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 476 u.s. 1143_(1986). An erroneous sentence 

estimate does not render a plea involuntary, but an attorney's 

unfair representation of probable leniency may be found coercive. 

United States v. Estrada, 849 F.2d 1304,1306 (10th Cir. 1988) 

(citing Wellnitz v. Page, 420 F.2d 935, 936 (10th Cir. 1970)). A 

petitioner's understanding that he will serve less that his full 

sentence is neither a promise nor a plea bargain. Bonvillain, 780 

F.2d at 1252. 

Laycock must prove that his attorney materially 

misrepresented the consequences of the plea. The facts and 

circumstances support the district court's conclusion that counsel 

diq not materially misrepres~nt the plea. Delancey Street was not 

1 He acknowledged that he would first serve a one year mandatory sentence for firearm enhancement, but expected to 

receive a six month credit for time already served. 

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mentioned in the written plea agreement, which Laycock signed 

following an explanation by the stat~ judge. The judge asked 

Laycock specifically if other promises had been made and he 

r~plied "no." Solemn declarations in open court carry a strong 

presumption of verity." Estrada, 849 F.2d at 1306 (citing 

Blackledge, 431 u.~. at 74). None of the participants mentioned ., ." I ' 

Delancey Street at the plea or sentencing nearing. Laycock did 

not inolμde it in his petition for post conviction relief. 

Finally, in his state court habeas petition, Laycock alleged his 

plea was involuntary because the judge failed to inform him of the 

mandatory parole term. He now alleges misrepresentation for the 

first time. Laycock has not established that his attorney 

misrepresented the plea agreement. 

II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

Laycock argues that five of his counsel's tactical 

decisions resulted in ineffective assistance. We review de novo 

the determination of whether an attorney's performance was so 

deficient that it violated a defendant's right to effective 

a$sistance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 u.s. 668, 698 (1984); 

Hopkinson v. Shillinger, 866 F.2d 1185, 1204 (10th Cir. 1989). 

To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, the 

defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient and 

tnat this deficient performance prej~diced his defense. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Hopkinson, 866 F.2d at 1204. 

Although proposed in the capital sentence context, the Supreme 

Court has extended this test to guilty plea challenges based on 

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ineffective assistance of counsel. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 u.s. 52, 

sa c19as). 

In this context, the first prong of this test would be 

satisfied if Laycock proves that counsel's "advice was not within 

the wide range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal 

cases." See Hill, 474 U.S. at 56 (citing McMann v. Richardson, 

397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)). The proper standard for measuring 

attorney performance is reasonably effective assistance. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. The second prong is met if Laycock 

shows that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have 

insisted on going to trial. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. The 

defendant must overcome the "strong presumption that counsel's 

conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional 

assistance." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 

First, Laycock contends that his attorney's advice to 

accept the plea bargain constituted ineffective assistance. The 

advice was well within the range of competence demanded of counsel 

in criminal cases. The client admitted both the robbery and the 

shooting, was identified by witnesses, and had a prior history of 

criminal activity. The claim fails the first element of the 

Strickland test• 

Second, Laycock 9laims that although he told counsel 

that he was intoxicated at the time of the offense, his attorney 

did not consider the possibility of the intoxication defense. He 

has not shown that he supplied counsel with facts necessary to 

raise such a defense or that counsel was unreasonable in deciding 

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Appellate Case: 88-1855 Document: 01019743064 Date Filed: 07/26/1989 Page: 5 
to recommend a plea agreement instead. This claim also fails the 

first prong of the Strickland test. 

Third, Laycock complains that counsel failed to inform 

pim of the ~ossibility that his offenses might merge for 

sentencing purposes. He says that this could shorten his sentence 

and reduce the benefit of the plea bargain to one year. He has 

not shown that counsel had a duty to inform him of this 

possibility, nor that knowledge of it would have caused him to 

reject the plea agreement. This claim fails both prongs of the 

Strickland test. 

Fourth, Laycock claims that counsel's assistance was 

ineffective because he filed no motions. But he suggests nothing 

to demonstrate that motions were necessary or appropriate. This 

claim fails, 

Finally, Laycock contends that failure to advise him of 

his right to appeal after his guilty plea resulted in ineffective 

assistance. An attorney has no absolute duty in every case to 

advise a defendant of his limited right to appeal after a guilty 

plea. Marrow v. United States, 772 F.2d 525, 527 (9th Cir. 1985); 

Carey v. Leverette, 605 F.2d 745, 746 (4th Cir.) (per curiam), 

cert. denied, 444 U.S. 983 (1979): cf. Barber v. United States, 

427 F.2q 70, 71 (10th Cir. 1970); Crow v. United States, 397 F.2d 

284, 285 (10th Cir. 1968) (sentencing court has no duty to advise 

of right to appeal on guilty plea). Failure to notify the 

defendant of this limited right is not in itself ineffective 

assistance. Marrow, 772 F.2d at 527: Carey, 605 F.2d at 746. 

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Normally, when a defendant pleads guilty, he has 

for~closed his right to appeal. Marrow, 772 F.2d at 529. If a 

claim of error is made on constitutional grounds, which could 

result in setting aside the plea, or if the defendant inquires 

abou~ an appeal right, counsel has a duty to inform him. Id. at 

528. Laycock signed this plea agreement indicating that he 

understood that it constituted a waiver of his right to appeal. 

Th~re is no indication that counsel should have known of other 

grounds for appeal. The claim fails. 

III. Sentence Exceeds Statutory Maximum 

Laycock contends erroneously that his sentence exceeded 

the statutory maximum. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 240 

(1970). This claim is reviewed de novo. United States v. Marco, 

868 F!2d ll2l, 1123 (9th Cir. 1989). Sections 30-16-2 N.M.S.A. 

(1978) and 31-l8-15(a)(2) authorize a nine year sentence for armed 

robbery classified as a second degree felony. Laycock received 

nine years. Section 31-18-16 requires a one year enhancement for 

use of a firearm. He received one year. Sections 31-18-lS(c) and 

31-21-lO(c) mandate a two year parole term. He received two 

years. 

Laycock has not specified how his sentence violated the 

statutory m4ximum. He appears to argue that, because the parole 

term was imposed after the rest of the sentence, the sentence is 

unconstitutional. Amending a sentence to conform to the statutory 

requirement is proper under New Mexico law. State v. Acuna,.705 

P.2d 685, 686 (N.M. App. 1985). The sentence does not violate the 

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statutory maximum. 

IV. ~nadequate Sentencing Bearing 

Laycock contends erroneously that his sentencing hearing 

was unconstitμtional because the judge gave him only cursory 

copsideration. The judge obtained and reviewed the prepisposition summary before the hearing, and indicated at the 

hearing that he had discussed th~ report with counsel. The judge 

discusseq its factual accuracy with Laycock, and made a correction 

in the time to be served. The judge asked Laycock if he had any 

additional information to present and listened to his comments. 

This claim has no merit. 

-'U'FIRMED. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Eugene A. Wright United States Circuit Judge 

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