Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-00531/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-00531-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Breach of Contract

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Gwendolyn Smith, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Robert N. Hoskyns, D.M.D., d/b/a Bella

Dontia Dental Renewal, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-10-531-PHX-GMS

ORDER

Pending before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 11) for lack of timely process

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) filed by Defendant Robert N. Hoskyns

(“Hoskyns”). For the following reasons, the Court denies Defendant’s Motion. 

BACKGROUND

Rule 4(m) provides the following:

If a defendant is not served within 120 days after the complaint is filed, the

court . . . must dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant or

order that service be made within a specified time. But if the plaintiff shows

good cause for the failure, the court must extend the time for service for an

appropriate period.

Plaintiff filed her Complaint on March 8, 2010. To comply with Rule 4(m), service had to

be made by July 6, 2010. It is unclear, however, whether Defendant was served on July 6,

2010 or July 7, 2010. The proof of service on record is internally inconsistent because it

indicates “07/06/2010” as the date of service at the top of the document, but then states

Case 2:10-cv-00531-GMS Document 16 Filed 01/06/11 Page 1 of 3
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 The Court disregards Plaintiff’s reliance on a handwritten proof of service

referencing “6/6/2010” and “6/7/2010” as the service dates because this document was never

filed with the Court. (Doc. 13).

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“07/07/2010” in the two other date slots. (Doc. 10).1

 In addition, Defendant supplies the

sworn declaration of Lee Christensen, who attests to accepting service of the Complaint on

July 7, 2010, as well as a sworn declaration from Chelsea Johnson, who declares being

present when Lee Christensen accepted service of the Complaint on that day. (Doc. 14, Ex.

1). In any event, the Court need not determine on which of the two days Defendant was

served. 

DISCUSSION 

Rule 4(m) provides that “the court must extend the time for service” upon a showing

of “good cause” for the delay. “At a minimum, good cause means excusable neglect.”

Boudette v. Barnette, 923 F.2d 754, 756 (9th Cir. 1991). While maintaining that Defendant

was timely served on July 6, 2010, Plaintiff asserts that there is good cause for any delay

because Plaintiff, in good faith, “relied on a process server who attended law school with

Plaintiff but is not a licensed attorney, who conducted service at her own expense entirely

as a favor to Plaintiff, and whom Plaintiff would have believed not to have been capable of

being careless about recording dates attesting to such service.” (Doc. 13). These facts do not

constitute good cause. See Hart v. United States, 817 F.2d 78 (9th Cir. 1987) (secretarial

misdeeds allegedly causing improper service were at best inadvertent error, and, therefore,

were not good cause).

The Ninth Circuit has held, however, that district courts have broad discretion under

Rule 4(m) to extend the time for service even without a showing of good cause. See United

States v. 2,164 Watches, 366 F.3d 767, 772 (9th Cir. 2004); In re Sheehan, 253 F.3d 507, 513

(9th Cir. 2001). This holding is consistent with the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 4(m),

which state that the rule “explicitly provides that the court shall allow additional time if there

is good cause for the plaintiff’s failure to effect service in the prescribed 120 days, and

authorizes the court to relieve a plaintiff of the consequences of an application of [Rule 4(m)]

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even if there is no good cause shown.” When deciding whether to exercise its discretion

under Rule 4(m), the Court may consider factors such as “a statute of limitations bar,

prejudice to the defendant, actual notice of a lawsuit, and eventual service.” Efaw v.

Williams, 473 F.3d 1038, 1041 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Troxell v. Fedders of N. Am., Inc., 160

F.3d 381, 383 (7th Cir. 1998)). Although the Court finds that there is no good cause for

Plaintiff’s failure to effect service within 120 days, the Court will exercise its discretion to

retroactively extend the period for service of process through July 7, 2010, one day beyond

the prescribed 120-day period. See Mann v. Am. Airlines, 324 F.3d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir.

2003) (“Rule 4(m) explicitly permits a district court to grant an extension of time to serve the

complaint after that 120-day period.”); cf. Henderson v. United States, 517 U.S. 654, 661

(1996) (concluding that “the 120-day provision operates not as an outer limit subject to

reduction, but as an irreducible allowance”). Accordingly, the Court exercises its discretion

to extend the time to serve because of the ambiguity surrounding the service dates included

within the proof of service, the fact that there was eventual service one day later, and that

Defendant has identified no prejudice resulting from the one-day delay.

The Court need not consider Defendant’s statute of limitations argument with respect

to medical malpractice actions because it was raised for the first time in the Reply. See

Delgadillo v. Woodford, 527 F.3d 919, 930 n.4 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Arguments raised for the

first time in [the] reply brief are deemed waived.”); Marlyn Nutracueticals, Inc. v. Improvita

Health Prods., 663 F.Supp.2d 841, 848 (D.Ariz. 2009) (“The Court need not consider

Defendants’ position, however, since it was first raised in their reply brief . . . Thus, even if

the argument has merit, this Court cannot appropriately consider it, since Plaintiffs did not

have the opportunity to respond.”). 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 11) is

DENIED without prejudice. 

DATED this 6th day of January, 2011.

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