Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02767/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02767-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 Petitioner has two petitions for writ of habeas corpus pending before the court challenging 1

two separate convictions. In this case, petitioner challenges a San Joaquin County conviction. In

the other case, petitioner challenges a Placer County conviction. See Haynes v. Carey, No. CIV S07-0484 LKK DAD P. 

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL DEWAYNE HAYNES,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-06-2767 LKK DAD P

vs.

THOMAS L. CAREY, Warden, ORDER AND

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed an amended petition for

writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On March 15, 2007, the undersigned

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ordered respondent to serve a response to the petition. On May 11, 2007, respondent filed a

motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioner filed his petition beyond the one-year statute of

limitations contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). On June 4, 2007, petitioner filed a timely

opposition to respondent’s motion to dismiss. 

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BACKGROUND

Petitioner challenges a judgment of conviction entered in the San Joaquin County

Superior Court on April 3, 2001. (Docs. Lodged by Resp’t May 16, 2007, Doc. 1.) Following a

jury trial, petitioner was convicted of 11 counts of second degree robbery and one count of

attempted second degree robbery and sentenced to 45 years and eight months in state prison. 

(Id., Doc. 1 & 2.) On October 10, 2002, the California Court of Appeal affirmed petitioner’s

conviction. (Id., Doc. 2.) On March 26, 2003, the California Supreme Court denied his petition

for review. (Id., Doc. 4.)

Petitioner filed three state habeas petitions, challenging his judgment of

conviction. On April 7, 2004, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the San

Joaquin County Superior Court. On April 28, 2004, the Superior Court denied the petition on the

merits. (Docs. Lodged by Resp’t May 16, 2007, Doc. 5 & 6.) On October 14, 2005, petitioner

filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Court of Appeal for the Third

Appellate District. (Id., Doc. 7.) On January 12, 2006, the Court of Appeal summarily denied

the petition. (Id., Doc. 8.) Finally, on March 24, 2006, petitioner filed a petition for writ of

habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court. (Id., Doc. 9.) On November 29, 2006, the

California Supreme Court summarily denied that petition. (Id., Doc. 10.) Petitioner filed this

action on December 7, 2006. 

RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

Respondent has filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that petitioner’s habeas

petition is time-barred under AEDPA. Respondent argues that the AEDPA applies to the instant

petition. (Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss at 3.) Respondent further argues that petitioner filed the

instant petition beyond the one-year statute of limitations set out in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) & (2). 

(Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss at 1.) Accordingly, respondent contends that the court should dismiss

this action with prejudice. (Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss at 5.)

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 Respondent calculates that 266 days of the statute of limitations elapsed as follows: June 2

25-30 (6 days); July (31 days); August (31 days); September (30 days); October (31 days);

November (30 days); December (31 days); January (31 days); February (29 days); March 1-16 (16

days). (Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss at 3 n.3.) 

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Respondent argues that, on March 26, 2003, the California Supreme Court denied

petitioner’s petition for review. (Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss at 3; Lodged Doc. 4.) Accordingly, 

respondent contends, petitioner’s judgment of conviction became “final” within the meaning of

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) when the time for filing a petition for writ of certiorari expired 90

days later, on June 24, 2003. The one-year statute of limitations period began running the

following day, on June 25, 2003. Respondent contends that the last day for petitioner to file a

federal habeas petition was on June 24, 2004, plus any time for tolling. (Resp’t’s Mot. to

Dismiss at 3.)

Respondent acknowledges that proper filing of a state post-conviction application

with respect to the challenged judgment of conviction tolls the one-year statute of limitations

period. (Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss at 3.) Respondent argues that, under the mail box rule,

petitioner filed his first state habeas petition with the San Joaquin County Superior Court on

March 16, 2004. According to respondent, 266 days had elapsed since his judgment of

conviction became final. (Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss at 3.) Respondent concedes that petitioner 2

is entitled to tolling from the period of March 16, 2004, the date the petitioner filed his first state

petition under the mailbox rule, through April 28, 2004, the date the Superior Court denied the

petition. (Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss at 4; Lodged Docs. 5 & 6.) 

However, respondent argues that petitioner is not entitled to tolling for the 535-

day period between April 28, 2004, the date the San Joaquin County Superior Court denied his

petition and October 14, 2005, the date the petitioner filed his second petition with the California

Court of Appeal. (Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss at 4; Lodged Docs. 6 & 7.) In this regard,

respondent contends that the 535-day delay is unreasonable and unjustified, and therefore,

petitioner is not entitled to the benefit of statutory tolling. (Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss at 4.)

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 Petitioner has filed an identical opposition to a pending motion to dismiss in his other 3

habeas action before the court. See Haynes v. Carey, No. CIV S-07-0484 LKK DAD P.

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PETITIONER’S OPPOSITION3

Petitioner argues that respondent erroneously relies on a timeliness procedure that

is inadequate, insufficiently clear, not firmly established, and not consistently applied, and

therefore, it cannot be used to justify barring federal review. (Pet’r’s Opp’n to Resp’t’s Mot. to

Dismiss at 2.) Petitioner further argues that the state courts did not deny petitioner’s habeas

petitions as untimely. (Id. at 3, 8.) In addition, petitioner contends that the state never provided

petitioner “notice” on how to avoid violating the state’s timeliness rules. (Id.) 

Petitioner contends that California’s timeliness rule bars habeas petitions that are

filed after a “substantial delay.” (Pet’r’s Opp’n to Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss at 3.) However,

petitioner emphasizes that there are no standards for determining what period of time or factors

constitute “substantial delay” in noncapital cases. There are also no standards for determining

what factors justify any particular length of delay. According to petitioner, the California

Supreme Court’s application of the timeliness rule has not provided clarity because that court

often rejects cases without explanation, as it did in this case. (Id. at 3.) 

Finally, in his hand-written opposition to the motion petitioner notes that the

library at his prison was often closed, and inmates had limited access to it due to prison lock

downs, prison staff meetings, training and scheduling irregularities. (Pet’r’s Opp’n to Resp’t’s

Mot. to Dismiss at 7-8.) Petitioner contends that the repeated closings of the prison law library

delayed him in the filing of his state habeas petitions. For the foregoing reasons, petitioner

concludes that respondent’s motion to dismiss should be denied. (Id. at 8.)

ANALYSIS

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), a

one-year period of limitation applies to a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in federal court

by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). This

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statute of limitations applies to all federal habeas petitions filed after the AEDPA was enacted. 

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 322-23 (1997). The pending petition falls in this category.

The judgment of conviction was entered in petitioner’s underlying case on April

3, 2001. (Docs. Lodged by Resp’t May 16, 2007, Doc. 1.) On appeal, the California Supreme

Court denied review on March 26, 2003, and petitioner’s judgment of conviction became final on

June 24, 2003, upon expiration of the time for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the United

States Supreme Court. See Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1158-1159 (9th Cir. 1999). The

AEDPA statute of limitations began to run the following day, on June 25, 2003. Patterson v.

Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001). It expired one year later, on June 24, 2004, unless

petitioner is entitled to the benefit of tolling. 

“The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be

counted” toward the AEDPA statute of limitations. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). The statute of

limitations is not tolled during the interval between the date on which a judgment becomes final

and the date on which the petitioner files his first state collateral challenge because there is no

case “pending.” Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999). Once a petitioner

commences state collateral proceedings, a state habeas petition is “pending” during a full round

of review in the state courts, including the time between a lower court decision and the filing of a

new petition in a higher court, as long as the intervals between petitions are “reasonable.” Carey

v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 222-24 (2002).

The court finds that petitioner is not entitled to tolling for the entire period

between April 28, 2004, the date the San Joaquin County Superior Court denied his first petition,

and October 14, 2005, the date petitioner filed his second petition in the California Court of

Appeal. (Docs. Lodged by Resp’t May 16, 2007, Doc. 6 & 7.) Nearly 18 months passed

between the Superior Court’s denial of his petition and the filing of his petition with the

California Court of Appeal. Although he has offered reasons, he has offered no persuasive

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 To the extent that petitioner’s explanation regarding his lack of library access may be 4

construed as an argument for equitable tolling, the court rejects it. The Supreme Court has held

that,“a litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two elements: (1) that he

has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his

way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); see also Lawrence v. Florida, ___ U.S. ___,

127 S. Ct. 1079 (2007) (assuming without deciding that equitable tolling applies to § 2244(d)).

Equitable tolling will be unavailable in most cases. See Corjasso v. Ayers, 278 F.3d 874, 877 (9th

Cir. 2002); Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). In the present case, the court finds

that petitioner has failed to demonstrate that he pursued his habeas claims diligently in state court

and is entitled to equitable tolling. Petitioner waited almost 18 months following the San Joaquin

County Superior Court’s decision to advance his claims in the Court of Appeal. 

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explanation for this length of delay in pursuing habeas relief through the state courts. It must be 4

noted that in his other case pending before this court petitioner was able to file his habeas

petition with the state appellate court within 170 days of the denial of his Superior Court petition

despite the same apparent impediments caused by his lack of law library access. (See Haynes v.

Carey, No. CIV S-07-0484 LKK DAD P). Even if the court were to find that petitioner had

adequately explained a six month delay in filing his habeas petition with the California Court of

Appeal, that would still leave approximately one year of essentially unexplained delay. Such a

period of unexplained delay is unreasonable. See Evans, 126 S. Ct. at 853-83 (concluding that an

unexplained and unjustified filing delay of six-months is unreasonable); Gaston v. Palmer, 447

F.3d 1165, 1167 (9th Cir. 2006) (concluding that unexplained delays of 18, 15, and 10 months

between habeas filings are unreasonable and could not be subject to interval tolling). 

Accordingly, the court concludes that petitioner’s February 16, 2007 amended

petition for a writ of habeas corpus is time-barred, and this action should be dismissed with

prejudice. 

OTHER MATTERS

Respondent has informed the court that D.K. Sisto is the current Warden of

California State Prison Solano, not Thomas L. Carey. Respondent requests that the court

substitute D.K. Sisto as respondent in this action. Good cause appearing, the court will grant

respondent’s request. 

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Respondent’s request to substitute D.K. Sisto, Warden of California State

Prison Solano, for Thomas L. Carey, is granted; and 

2. The Clerk is directed to amend the court’s docket accordingly.

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that respondent’s May 11, 2007 motion to

dismiss the petition as barred by the statute of limitations be granted. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. A document containing objections

should be titled “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply

to objections shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties

are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may, under certain

circumstances, waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See Martinez v. Ylst, 951

F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: October 16, 2007.

DAD:9

hayn2767.157 

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