Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01491/USCOURTS-casd-3_11-cv-01491-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IVAN URIAS,

Defendant-Petitioner,

CASE NOS. 11-cv-1491-BEN

 10-cr-927-BEN

ORDER 

(1) DENYING MOTION TO

VACATE, SET ASIDE, OR

CORRECT SENTENCE

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2255

(2) DENYING CERTIFICATE OF

APPEALABILITY

vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Respondent.

Before this Court is a Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence Pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 filed by Petitioner Ivan Urias. (Docket No. 30). Petitioner alleges

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that he received ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) because his attorney failed to

research whether Petitioner’s prior conviction disqualified himfor “safetyvalve” relief,

and incorrectly advised him that he would qualify for it. (Mot. at 6). Petitioner claims

that he would not have signed the plea agreement if he had known that he would not

qualify. (Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion (Memo) at 8). Petitioner claims

that this violated his Sixth Amendment rights, and rendered his plea invalid. (Id. at 1).

For the reasons stated below, Petitioner’s Motion is DENIED. 

///

All docket numbers refer to the docket in the criminal case, 10-cr-927-BEN. 1

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I. Background

On February 18, 2010, a Complaint wasfiled alleging that Petitioner violated 21

U.S.C. §§ 952 and 960 by importing approximately 11.75 kilograms of cocaine into the

United States. (Docket No. 1). Petitioner retained John Francis Kelly shortly

thereafter, and claims he informed Kelly that he had been arrested for a “DUI” on May 2

1, 2006. (Memo at 3). Petitioner claims that Kelly told him not to worry, as the

conviction was already three years old. (Id.)

On March 3, 2010, the United States of America (Government) offered Petitioner

a plea agreement. (Mot., Exh. A). Petitioner states that Kelly gave him a copy and

went over the agreement carefully. (Memo at 4). The “Sentencing Guideline

Calculations” section included an entry for “Safety Valve (if applicable).” (Plea Ag.

at 7). The agreement stated that if the defendant truthfully disclosed all information

and evidence concerning the offense and relevant conduct, and if defendant “otherwise

qualifies” for the safety valve in § 5C1.2, that the government would recommend a

two-level reduction and relief from any statutory mandatory minimum. (Id. at 8). The

agreement also stated “Defendant understands that if he does not qualify for § 5C1.2,

defendant may be subject to a statutory mandatory minimum sentence.” (Id.) The

agreement contained a waiver of Petitioner’s right to appeal and collaterally attack the

conviction or the sentence. (Id. at 10). Petitioner claims that Kelly told him that the

agreement “basically only provided for a 37 month term of imprisonment because he

qualified for all of the agreement’s departures and because the Government had agreed

to recommend the bottom of the recommended sentencing guideline range.” (Memo

at 4). Petitioner statesthat Kelly told him that he should accept the agreement, because

it was the best he was going to get. (Id.) Petitioner signed the agreement on March 30,

2010. (Plea Ag.)

Petitioner states that another inmate told him that his prior conviction might

Petitioner states that his prior conviction was actually for “Driving While 2

Having a Measurable Blood Alcohol.” (Mot. at 3).

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disqualify him for the safety valve. (Id. at 4-5). Petitioner claims he contacted Kelly

and reminded him of the conviction. (Id. at 5). He claims that Kelly said not to worry,

and that Kelly would contact the attorney who handled his 2006 case. (Id.) Petitioner

entered a plea of guilty to the sole count of the Information before Magistrate Judge

Anthony J. Battaglia on April 1, 2010. (Docket Nos. 16, 17). After entering his plea,

Petitioner states that he “kept asking” Kelly about the 2006 conviction. (Memo at 5). 

Petitioner claims that Kelly said that the prior attorney had retired, that Petitioner

should not worry, and that Kelly would handle everything. (Id. at 5-6).

Petitioner claims he spoke to another attorney, Phillip DeMassa, because Kelly

had not addressed his concerns. (Id. at 6). Petitioner states that DeMassa initially told

him he had a good agreement and should not change lawyers. (Id.) Petitioner reports

that DeMassa returned “one to two hours later” and told him that he was in trouble. 

(Id.) He told Petitioner that he did not qualify for the safety valve, and therefore would

not receive all the benefits of the plea agreement, because he had committed the federal

offense while on probation. (Id.) DeMassa informed Petitioner that he could help him. 

(Id. at 7). Petitioner received confirmation of his statusin late May or early June, when

Petitioner saw the pre-sentence report (PSR), and Kelly told him that he would not

qualify for the safety valve. (Id.) Kelly told Petitioner that he would explain the

situation to the court and something would work out. (Id.)

Petitioner substituted DeMassa as his counsel on June 12, 2010, and DeMassa

represented him during his sentencing. (Id.) Although Petitioner does not allege that

DeMassa was ineffective, he states that DeMassa apparently thought Petitioner would

be willing to cooperate with the government. (Id. at n.4). Petitioner states that when

this did not occur, DeMassa “refused to do anything” for Petitioner. (Id.)

On September 7, 2010, Petitioner was sentenced by this Court to 120 months of

imprisonment, the mandatory minimum for his offense. (Docket Nos. 26, 27). 

Petitioner filed his Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence on July 6, 2011.

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II. Legal Standard

A district court may “vacate, set aside or correct” the sentence of a federal

prisoner that wasimposed in violation of the Constitution or a law of the United States. 

28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). A district court must hold an evidentiary hearing before denying

a § 2255 motion, unless it is conclusively shown that the prisoner is entitled to no

relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b). However, if it is clear the petitioner has failed to state a

claim, or has “no more than conclusory allegations, unsupported by facts and refuted

by the record,” a district court may deny a § 2255 motion without an evidentiary

hearing. United States v. Quan, 789 F.2d 711, 715 (9th Cir. 1986).

III. Discussion

A. Waiver of Right to Collateral Attack

The Government claims that Petitioner cannot assert his claim in a § 2255

motion because he waived his right to collaterally attack his sentence in his plea

agreement. (Opp. at 4; Plea Ag. at 10). The Ninth Circuit has upheld the validity of

waivers of the right to collateral attack. United States v. Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1014

(9th Cir. 1993). The right to collateral attack in a criminal case is purely statutory. Id.

A waiver of the right to collateral attack will be enforced where it was “knowing

and voluntary,” and encompasses the right to appeal on the grounds raised. Id.;

Patterson-Romo v. United States, No. 10-cr-3319, No. 12-cv-1343, 2012 WL2060872,

at *1 (S.D. Cal. June 7, 2012). A waiver of appeal is unenforceable where the

agreement as a whole is involuntary or otherwise unenforceable. See United States v.

Portillo-Cano, 192 F.3d 1246, 1250 (9th Cir. 1999). Where a defendant has counsel

during the plea process and enters a plea upon the advice of counsel, the voluntariness

ofthe plea depends upon whether counsel’s advice was within the range of competence

demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985).

Review of Ninth Circuit precedent indicates that a waiver of collateral attack

rights will not preclude a petitioner from raising a § 2255 claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel in connection with the plea agreement containing the waiver. The

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Ninth Circuit held that “a plea agreement that waives the right to file a federal habeas

petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is unenforceable with respect to an IAC claim

that challenges the voluntariness of the waiver.” Washington v. Lampert, 422 F.3d

864, 871 (9th Cir. 2005). The Ninth Circuit reiterated that “claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel . . . challenge the voluntary and intelligent nature of the plea

agreement.” Id. at 869 (quoting United States v. Ruiz, 241 F.3d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir.

2001)). In reaching its conclusion, the Ninth Circuit in Lampert relied on its own

precedent expressing doubts that a waiver of § 2255 rights would be enforceable with

respect to an IAC claim based on “counsel’s erroneously unprofessional inducement

of the defendant to plead guilty or accept a particular plea bargain.” Id. at 870

(discussing United States v. Pruitt, 32 F.3d 431 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v.

Jeronimo, 398 F.3d 1149 (9th Cir. 2005)). The Lampert Court noted that other circuits

had held that waivers cannot bar such IAC claims in the context of § 2255 motions. 

Id. at 870-71. The Ninth Circuit has recently assumed in dicta that a petitioner could

raise an IAC claim connected to her plea in a § 2255 collateral attack. United States

v. Brizan, 709 F.3d 864, 867 (9th Cir. 2013).

Petitioner argues that IAC caused him to accept an agreement that he would not

otherwise have accepted, and to enter a plea he would not otherwise have entered. 

(Reply at 1). Petitioner claims that both his plea and his plea agreement are invalid. 

(Id.) Accordingly, this Court finds that Petitioner’s waiver does not prevent him from

raising the instant challenge.

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim

1. Legal Standard

An IAC claim must demonstrate that (1) defense counsel’s performance was

deficient; and (2) this deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690-92 (1994). The Strickland test “applies to challenges

to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 58. Where

a court concludes that a petitioner was not prejudiced by any deficient performance, it

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may proceed directly to the second prong. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. As this Court

finds that Petitioner was not prejudiced, it will not resolve the first prong.

2. Prejudice

In the context of a plea bargain, the prejudice requirement is met by showing that

“there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, he would not

have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 57-59;

see also Womack v. McDaniel, 497 F.3d 998, 1002 (9th Cir. 2007). The record

demonstrates that Petitioner cannot make this showing.

Petitioner contends that he would not have pleaded guilty if he had known that

he would not qualify for the safety valve. (Memo at 8, 12). He states that if he had

been convicted at trial, he faced a 135-168 month sentence. (Id. at 12). He points out

that thisis “only” 25 months more than the sentence he received. (Id.) That sentencing

range indicates that Petitioner would have received 15-48 months of additional prison

time had he gone to trial and been convicted, unless this Court deviated from the

guidelines. Petitioner speculates that, had he been convicted at trial, he “probably”

would have received a “Mitigating Role reduction” at sentencing, reducing his

guideline range to 87-108 months. (Id. at 12-13). Petitioner concedes that this Court

would still have been required to impose at least the mandatory minimum sentence of

120 months, but that this means that the Court would “probably” not have imposed a

sentence above the mandatory minimum. (Id.) Petitioner states that this Court

“expressed concern” about sentencing him to 120 months, raising the “reasonable

probability” that it would have imposed the bottom of any guideline range or the

mandatory minimum sentence. (Id.) Petitioner concludes that “he would not have

fared much worse if he proceeded to trial.” (Id.)

Petitioner’s arguments demonstrate that he cannot show that there was a

“reasonable probability” that he would not have pleaded guilty. Petitioner could not

have received a lower sentence if convicted, and risked the imposition of a higher

sentence. The guidelines range suggests that he might have faced an additional one to

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four years in custody, a substantial addition to the ten-year sentence he received. 

Although this Court expressed concern about the severity of the sentence, Petitioner

was unaware of this prior to the sentencing hearing. 

Petitioner would only have had a better outcome if he had persuaded a jury to

find him not guilty. Petitioner nowhere contends that he would have been able to do

so. Even as he seeks to invalidate his plea, Petitioner nowhere asserts that the facts of

the case have been misstated. The record shows that Petitioner was caught attempting

to enter the United States with 11.75 kilograms of cocaine in his vehicle. 

Review of the sentencing hearing transcript reveals that Petitioner was

represented by new counsel. (Tr. of Sentencing, Docket No. 29). This Court spoke to

counsel at side bar regarding the fact that it was a mandatory minimum, 120-month

sentence. (Id. at 2:16-22). DeMassa conceded it was a mandatory minimum sentence,

that he had nothing to add, and that “there is no reason for the court not to impose

that.” (Id. at 2:20-22). The Court addressed Petitioner, and told him that: “If there is

anything you wish to say, now is the time to say it.” (Id. at 3:7-9). Petitioner stated

that his family did not get the funds to get him the “best help,” and he “thought he

would get an extension to see if there was anything else that could be done with my

case.” (Id. at 3:14-19). Petitioner then stated that he regretted what he had done. (Id.

at 3:19-20). The Court noted that it had no discretion in imposing the mandatory

minimum, but that it felt that a lesser sentence might be appropriate, given that

Petitioner was only 28 years old and had no other criminal history. (Id. at 4:14-5:2). 

This Court also invited a Rule 35 motion. (Id. at 5:3-6). 

Although Petitioner might have wished for a delay or the “best” counsel, he did

not indicate that there were any problems he wanted to raise, or which he felt needed

time and attention from new counsel. He did not mention unhappiness with counsel

or his plea agreement, raise ineffective assistance of counsel, or make any reference to

a desire to withdraw his plea. 

Petitioner had ample opportunity to attempt to withdraw his plea. Under Federal

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Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(d)(2)(B), a defendantseeking to withdraw a guilty plea

after the court has accepted it, but before a sentence has been imposed, must

demonstrate a “fair and just” reason for withdrawal. The Ninth Circuit has stated that

the “fair and just” standard is “generous and must be applied liberally.” United States

v. Mayweather, 634 F.3d 498, 504 (9th Cir. 2010). The defendant is not required to

prove that his plea is invalid. Id. When a defendant seeks to withdraw his plea based

on erroneous orinadequate legal advice, the defendant’s burden is “simply to show that

proper advice ‘could have at least plausibly motivated a reasonable person in [the

defendant’s] position not to have pled guilty had he known about the [grounds for

withdrawal] prior to pleading.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Garcia, 401 F.3d 1008,

1012 (9th Cir. 2005) (alterations in Mayweather)).

As Petitioner states the facts, he had months to consider his options and consult

with new counsel before he was sentenced. Petitioner knew that Kelly had misadvised

him and that he would not qualify for the safety valve since his meeting with DeMassa. 

This meeting was held before he saw the PSR during his meeting with Kelly in late

May or early June 2010. From June 12, 2010, Petitioner was represented by new

counsel who was aware of the problem and did not raise it. Petitioner claims that

DeMassa essentially abandoned himafter he refused to cooperate with the government,

and that Petitioner could not have filed a motion to withdraw. However, Petitioner did

not raise any IAC claims as to DeMassa, and did not mention any concerns to this

Court. Petitioner never alleges that he asked DeMassa about withdrawing the plea, or 3

that he told DeMassa to attempt to do so. Despite time and assistance, Petitioner made

no efforts to withdraw his plea and proceed to trial.

In his Reply, Petitioner points to the fact that neither Kelly nor DeMassa sought

to use state procedures to mitigate the impact of his past conviction. (Reply at 6). 

Although this Court will not unnecessarily consider an issue not raised in the

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Motion, it would be difficult for Petitioner to prevail on an ineffective assistance of

counsel claim as to the failure to file a motion to withdraw, particularly given the fact

that he was facing a mandatory minimum. See United States v. Sanchez-Ross, Nos.

CR-04-139, CV-06-253, 2006 WL 3457211, at *4-5 (E.D. Wash. Nov. 30, 2006).

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Petitioner pointsto the opinion in United States v. Yepez, 652 F.3d 1182, 1199 (9th Cir.

2011), in which a three-judge panel held that where a defendant had persuaded a state

court to have his probation terminated nunc pro tunc to the day before his offense, he

should be sentenced asif he had not been on probation the day of the offense, allowing

the defendant to qualify for the safety valve. However, an en banc panel of the Ninth

Circuit reversed the decision and held that the defendant was to be sentenced based on

the historical fact that he had been on probation during the offense. United States v.

Yepez, 704 F.3d 1087, 1091 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). The Court notes that the first

Yepez decision was issued months after Petitioner was sentenced. Additionally,

Petitioner did not raise this claim in his initial Petition or assert any IAC claims against

DeMassa. Petitioner acknowledged that he could have alleged that Kelly and DeMassa

rendered IAC when they failed to follow the Yepez procedure, but “only raised a valid

claim of IAC against Attorney Kelly for bad legal advice.” (Reply at 6, n.2). Petitioner

cannot rely on the failure of his attorneys to attempt to terminate his probation.

Petitioner also cites to Canas v. United States, Nos. 07-cv-637, 02-cr-5366, 2010

WL 121308 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2010). In Canas, the district court found that counsel

was ineffective for failing to investigate conflicting reports regarding whether the

defendant had a prior conviction. Id. at *4. Canas’ prior conviction rendered him

ineligible for the safety valve, and subjected him to a mandatory minimum sentence. 

Id. at *1, 5. The district court concluded that Canas had been prejudiced by counsel’s

deficient performance. Id. at *4-5. Although Canas faced a 120-month mandatory

minimumsentence because of his prior conviction, the Canas court found itsignificant

that the guideline range for his offenses was no more than 123 months, “a relatively

minor three-month differential.” Id. at *5. By contrast, Petitioner concedes that he

could have faced 15-48 months of imprisonment had he proceeded to trial. Such time

can hardly be characterized as a minor differential. Additionally, the defendant in

Canas filed a “motion to strike prior, or in the alternative to withdraw plea” which

included a declaration from his counsel. Id. at *2. Petitioner made no such efforts.

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Given that Petitioner was facing a mandatory minimum, would have risked a

longer sentence if he went to trial, nowhere suggests he might have been found not

guilty, knew for months that he did not qualify for the safety valve, wasrepresented by

new counsel for months, and failed to take opportunities to raise the issue before this

Court, this Court concludes that Petitioner was not prejudiced by his first counsel’s

allegedly deficient performance. He cannot show that there is a “reasonable

probability” that he would have insisted upon proceeding to trial.

C. Evidentiary Hearing

Unless the motion and the records of a case conclusively show that the prisoner

is entitled to no relief, a court is required to grant a hearing. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b). 

However, where the record demonstrates that a petitioner has failed to state a claim, a

district court may deny a § 2255 motion without an evidentiary hearing. Quan, 789

F.2d at 715. Given the foregoing discussion, this Court finds that Petitioner cannot

succeed upon his IAC claim. Based upon Petitioner’s own allegations and the record

before this Court, an evidentiary hearing would not allow Petitioner show prejudice.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct

Sentence is DENIED. 

A court may issue a certificate of appealability where the petitioner has made a

“substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” and reasonable jurists

could debate whether the petition should have been resolved differently, or that the

issues presented deserve encouragement to proceed further. See Miller-El v. Cockrell,

537 U.S. 322, 335 (2003). This Court finds that Petitioner has not made the necessary

showing. A certificate of appealability is therefore DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 19, 2014

Hon. Roger T. Benitez

United States District Judge

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