Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_99-cv-02016/USCOURTS-azd-2_99-cv-02016-22/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Ernest Valencia Gonzales, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora B. Schriro, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV-99-2016-PHX-SMM

DEATH PENALTY CASE

ORDER

On June 19, 2008, these proceedings were stayed by order of the Court of Appeals for

the Ninth Circuit pending a ruling on Petitioner’s emergency petition for writ of mandamus.

(Doc. 199.) The Ninth Circuit subsequently granted the mandamus petition, remanding the

matter to this Court to determine Petitioner’s competency to assist counsel. In re Gonzales,

623 F.3d 1242 (9th Cir. 2010). However, on January 8, 2013, the United States Supreme

Court unanimously reversed the Ninth Circuit’s order. Ryan v. Gonzales, 133 S. Ct. 696

(2013). On June 6, 2013, the Ninth Circuit ordered this matter “remanded to the district court

for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision” in Gonzales. (Doc.

206.) It appearing that the Ninth Circuit’s stay of proceedings has been lifted, the Court

herein orders briefing on the merits of Petitioner’s remaining claims.

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1 On this same day the court of appeals summarily denied on the merits a nearly

identical mandamus petition filed by the Federal Public Defender in another Arizona capital

habeas case. See Walden v. United States District Court, No. 00-71244 (9th Cir. filed Oct.

16, 2000).

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BACKGROUND

On November 15, 1999, Petitioner, an Arizona inmate sentenced to death, commenced

these proceedings by filing a pro forma petition for a writ of habeas corpus. (Doc. 1.) The

Court appointed the Federal Public Defender’s Office as counsel. (Doc. 8.) On December

27, 1999, the Court issued a case management order setting a deadline for the filing of an

amended petition. (Doc. 17.) Citing Rule 2 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, the order

required the amended petition to “include every known constitutional error or deprivation

entitling Petitioner to habeas relief.” (Id. at 2.) The order further provided that the amended

petition shall include a “‘Statement of Exhaustion,’ specifically asserting when and where

each ground for relief was raised in the state courts. See Boyd v. Thompson, 147 F.3d 1124,

1127 (9th Cir. 1998).” (Id.)

On July 17, 2000, Petitioner filed a 237-page amended petition raising 60 claims for

relief. (Doc. 28.) He failed, however, to file the required statement of exhaustion. The

Court, granting Respondents’ motion to compel, directed Petitioner to comply with the

December 1999 scheduling order. On September 14, 2000, Petitioner notified the Court that

he had filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the court of appeals. Thereafter, the Court

denied his request for a stay of proceedings and for additional time to file the statement of

exhaustion. (Doc. 40.) On October 6, 2000, Petitioner filed the statement of exhaustion.

(Doc. 42.) Petitioner simultaneously filed a notice of withdrawal of claims, voluntarily

withdrawing 13 unexhausted habeas claims from consideration by the Court. (Doc. 43.) The

notice indicated that Petitioner had initiated a post-conviction-relief (PCR) proceeding in

state court to exhaust the withdrawn claims, but did not request a stay of federal proceedings

on this basis. (Id. at 2.) On October 16, 2000, the court of appeals denied the mandamus

petition as moot.1

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In February 2001, Petitioner, acting pro se, requested that his state-court-appointed

PCR counsel be removed and that he be permitted to represent himself in his successive PCR

proceeding. (Doc. 102-1 at 3-5.) The state court ordered a mental health examination to

determine whether Petitioner was competent to waive counsel. (Id. at 6-7.) The courtappointed expert, Dr. Jack Potts, examined Petitioner and concluded that he was paranoid

and delusional. (Id. at 10.) In August 2001, based on Dr. Potts’s conclusions, the court

found Petitioner incompetent to waive counsel and represent himself. (Id. at 26.)

In December 2001, on the day Petitioner’s successive PCR petition was due, counsel

filed a motion to hold the case in abeyance pending restoration of Petitioner’s competency.

The motion asserted that Petitioner’s inability to rationally communicate with counsel

precluded her from developing a claim of incompetency at the time of trial and sentencing.

(Doc. 102 at 30-36.) The state court denied the motion, finding that: (1) there was no right

in this particular case to a competency determination regarding Petitioner’s ability to assist

counsel prior to the filing of a successive petition; (2) any claim of legal incompetency at

trial and sentencing in Petitioner’s case was not “cognizable” in a successive PCR

proceeding because it would rely on neither newly-discovered evidence nor actual innocence,

the only potentially applicable exceptions to preclusion under Rule 32.2(b) of the Arizona

Rules of Criminal Procedure; and (3) even if the claim was cognizable, counsel had not set

forth “sufficient reasons for not raising the claim in a previous petition or in a timely manner

or demonstrated why defendant’s competency is essential to filing the prospective second

Rule 32 proceeding.” (Id. at 45.)

In February 2002, state counsel filed a successive PCR petition asserting only four

claims, including that Petitioner had a right to assist counsel in a second PCR proceeding,

that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine his current competency, and that

he was incompetent at the time of trial and sentencing. (Doc. 108-1 at 3-24.) State PCR

counsel did not raise any of the claims withdrawn from the amended federal habeas petition.

(Id.) The state court denied the petition, again explaining that Petitioner had failed to present

a “colorable claim . . . that newly discovered evidence shows defendant was incompetent to

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stand trial.” (Id. at 40.) Counsel filed a petition for review, which the Arizona Supreme

Court denied on October 28, 2003. (Doc. 108-2 at 6.) 

Following withdrawal of the 13 unexhausted claims in October 2000, the parties

briefed the procedural status of Petitioner’s remaining claims. This concluded in February

2001, with the filing of Petitioner’s sur-reply. (Doc. 59.) The procedural status of

Petitioner’s claims remained under advisement until September 2002 when, following the

United States Supreme Court’s decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (requiring

jury determination of aggravating factors necessary for imposition of the death penalty), the

Court stayed Petitioner’s sentencing-related claims pending exhaustion in state court of a

claim based on Ring. (Doc. 75.) Petitioner initiated another state PCR proceeding, and the

state court consolidated it with the already pending PCR petition. As previously noted, the

Arizona Supreme Court denied review of the petition in October 2003. (Doc. 81.) In July

2004, following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Schriro v. Summerlin, 542

U.S. 348 (2004) (holding that Ring does not apply retroactively to pending cases), the Court

lifted the stay.

Over the next eighteen months, while the matter was under advisement, Petitioner did

not seek amendment to reincorporate the 13 withdrawn claims or to add the claims litigated

in the second PCR petition. Nor did he seek a competency determination by this Court,

despite the June 2003 decision in Rohan ex rel. Gates v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 803 (9th Cir.

2003), abrogated by Gonzales, 133 S. Ct. at 696, which first recognized a statutory right to

competence in federal habeas proceedings. In January 2006, the Court entered its order

regarding the procedural status of Petitioner’s habeas claims. (Doc. 97.) The Court

dismissed some of the claims on procedural grounds or as plainly meritless, and established

a deadline for Petitioner to submit briefing on the merits of the remaining claims. (Id.) 

Shortly thereafter, Petitioner’s counsel moved to stay this action pursuant to Rohan,

contending that Petitioner was incapable of rationally communicating with or assisting

counsel. (Doc. 102.) The motion indicated that since October 2003 Petitioner had refused

some 26 attempted visits from habeas counsel and support staff, who wished to “discuss

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these upcoming proceedings, including merits briefing and requests for evidentiary

development.” (Id. at 5-6.) The motion and subsequent supplemental briefs further indicated

that Petitioner’s assistance was necessary for briefing the merits of numerous exhausted

claims, amending the first amended habeas petition, and identifying new claims not yet

raised. (Doc. 102 at 6; Doc. 108 at 6-8; Doc. 184 at 9-16.) 

After two years of litigation regarding Petitioner’s competency and the issue of

forcible medication, the Court entered an order on April 23, 2008, denying Petitioner’s

motions for a competency hearing and to stay these proceedings. (Doc. 187.) The Court,

applying the Rohan framework, determined that Petitioner’s remaining claims were recordbased or involved purely legal issues, and therefore would not potentially benefit from

Petitioner’s ability to communicate rationally with counsel. Petitioner’s emergency petition

for writ of mandamus followed.

DISCUSSION

In its June 6, 2013 order, the Ninth Circuit neither granted nor denied the mandamus

petition. Rather, the panel “remanded” the matter for further proceedings consistent with the

Supreme Court’s decision in this case. In doing so, the panel noted that its original decision

granting mandamus “discussed only Gonzales’s exhausted claims because his unexhausted

claims were procedurally defaulted for purposes of federal habeas under Coleman v.

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n.1 (1991).” (Doc. 206 at 1-2.) Citing the United States

Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012),

recognizing for the first time an exception to Coleman for substantial trial-level

ineffectiveness claims, the panel further directed that “with respect to Gonzales’s

unexhausted claims that may meet the Martinez exception to procedural default, the district

court shall consider whether to exercise its discretion to grant a stay” based on Petitioner’s

alleged incompetency to assist counsel. The panel further specifically identified Claim 52,

alleging ineffective assistance at sentencing, as one that may benefit from Petitioner’s

assistance.

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2 This Court reached the same conclusion in its order denying Petitioner’s

request for a competency determination, observing that the remaining, properly exhausted

claims could not benefit from Petitioner’s personal input because each was resolvable

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The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly emphasized that mandamus is an “extraordinary”

remedy and is appropriate only if the factors set forth in Bauman v. United States Dist. Court,

557 F.2d 650, 654-55 (9th Cir. 1977), weigh in favor of relief. See, e.g., Calderon v. United

States Dist. Court (Kelly V). In its original decision in this case, the Ninth Circuit determined

that the Bauman factors justified mandamus relief. However, that order was unanimously

reversed by the Supreme Court. Thus, the jurisdictional basis of the Ninth Circuit’s June 6,

2013 order is unclear, and it appears to be merely advisory. See generally United States v.

Guerrero, 693 F.3d 990, 995 (9th Cir. 2012) (observing that appellate court lacks jurisdiction

to review non-final rulings absent satisfaction of the requirements for collateral order review

or writ of mandamus).

In any event, the Court concludes that further consideration of Petitioner’s

unexhausted claims is unwarranted because each was voluntarily withdrawn. The Ninth

Circuit’s order suggests that the claims were found procedurally defaulted for failure to

exhaust. However, as set forth in the background section above, Petitioner sua sponte

withdrew the claims (including Claim 52) prior to the Court determining the procedural

status of his claims, and Petitioner never sought amendment to reincorporate them back into

the petition. Moreover, in the Court’s 2008 order denying the motion for a competency

hearing, which was challenged by Petitioner in his petition for mandamus, the Court

expressly addressed the 13 withdrawn claims, noting that Petitioner had not moved for

amendment and that the claims were no longer before the Court. (Doc. 187 at 18.) For this

reason, the Court found then, as it does again now, that Petitioner’s alleged incompetency

to assist counsel with regard to these claims is a moot question.

The Supreme Court determined in this case that Petitioner’s alleged incompetency

provides no barrier to consideration of his properly exhausted claims because each is record

based or resolvable as a matter of law.2

 Gonzales, 133 S. Ct. at 708. Therefore, this Court

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irrespective of Petitioner’s capacity for rational communication with counsel. The Court did

not find that Petitioner’s competency to assist counsel is irrelevant for all purposes, only that

it provides no basis for forestalling resolution of claims for which Petitioner’s assistance is

plainly unnecessary.

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sets forth below a merits briefing schedule to move these claims toward final resolution.

Because Petitioner’s counsel have had ample time to research and brief the merits of the

claims, any motion for a continuance is disfavored. Furthermore, the Court intends for the

parties to adhere to this briefing schedule regardless of any litigation that may be

contemplated concerning claims not currently before the Court. 

For the benefit of the parties, the Court re-lists the claims it found properly exhausted

and appropriate for review on the merits:

Claim 1: Trial Court Did Not Allow Redetermination of Probable Cause on

Counts 1-4 of the Indictment in Violation of the 14th Amendment.

Claim 4: Improperly Suggestive Photo Line-up Procedures and Improper

Admission of Testimony Based on Faulty Identification Procedures in

Violation of the 6th and 14th Amendments.

Claim 5: Trial Court Improperly Denied Petitioner’s Motion for Experts in

Violation of the 6th and 14th Amendments.

Claim 7: Trial Court Improperly Ruled Allowing Petitioner’s Involuntary

Statements to be Used to Impeach Him if He Chose to Testify at Trial

in Violation of the 6th and 14th Amendments.

Claim 9: Trial Judge’s Open Hostility toward Petitioner and Refusal to Recuse

Himself Violated the 6th and 14th Amendments.

Claim 13: Trial Court Allowed Witness, Deborah Wagner, to Remain in

Courtroom During Jury Selection and After She Testified at Trial in

Violation of the 6th and 14th Amendments.

Claim 14: Trial Court Allowed Martha Trinidad’s Testimony to be Read into the

Record in Violation of the 6th and 14th Amendments.

Claim 15: Trial Court Did Not Examine Whether State Had Made Good Faith

Effort to Assure Martha Trinidad’s Availability for Trial Prior to

Admitting Her Testimony in Violation of the 6th and 14th

Amendments.

Claim 16: Trial Court Improperly Admitted Prior Testimony of Martha Trinidad

Despite Lack of Reliability in Former Testimony in Violation of the 6th

and 14th Amendments.

Claim 17: Trial Court’s Admission of Wagner’s Courtroom Identification of

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Petitioner was Tainted by Exposure to Petitioner at First Trial in

Violation of the 6th and 14th Amendments.

Claim 19 Trial Court Improperly Failed to Declare Mistrial When Two State

Witnesses Failed to Obey Exclusion Order and Stayed in the

Courtroom in Violation of the 14th Amendment.

Claim 20 Trial Court Erred by Not Summoning Counsel When Jury Submitted

Note to Judge and Judge Discussed Note with Jurors in Violation of the

6th and 14th Amendments.

Claim 26: Trial Court Committed Fundamental Error by Not Properly Defining

Reasonable Doubt for the Jury in Jury Instructions in Violation of the

6th and 14th Amendments.

Claim 27: Trial Court Improperly Denied Petitioner Counsel Before and During

His Motion for a New Trial in Violation of the 6th and 14th

Amendments.

Claim 29: State Court Improperly Concluded That There Was Sufficient Evidence

of Creation of Grave Risk of Harm to Another to Support the

Aggravating Circumstance in Violation of the 8th and 14th

Amendments.

Claim 30: State Court Improperly Concluded That There Was Sufficient Evidence

of Pecuniary Gain to Support the Aggravating Circumstance in

Violation of the 8th and 14th Amendments.

Claim 32: Trial Court Failed to Consider and Weigh as Mitigation That Petitioner

Was Convicted of Felony-murder, Not Premeditated Murder, in

Violation of the 6th, 8th and 14th Amendments.

Claim 33: Trial Court Improperly Allowed at Sentencing Victim’s Family and

Witnesses to Offer Opinion on Appropriate Punishment in Violation of

the 6th, 8th and 14th Amendments.

Claim 34: Arizona’s Death Penalty Statute Precludes Sentencer from Considering

All Relevant Mitigation in Violation of the 6th, 8th and 14th

Amendments.

Claim 36: Arizona’s Death Penalty Statute Presumes the Death Penalty to be

Appropriate Sentence in Violation of the 6th, 8th and 14th

Amendments.

Claim 38 Arizona’s Death Penalty Statute Is Unconstitutional Because Under the

14th Amendment Equal Protection Clause, Petitioner Is Entitled to Jury

Trial at Sentencing.

Claim 39 Arizona’s Death Penalty Statute Is Unconstitutional on its Face

Because it Improperly Places on the Petitioner the Obligation to Prove

the Existence of Mitigating Factors in Violation of the 6th, 8th and 14th

Amendments.

Claim 40 Arizona’s Death Penalty Statute Is Unconstitutional Because During

the Sentencing Process it Lacks Ascertainable Guidelines for the

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Sentencer to Follow in Weighing Aggravating Circumstances Versus

Mitigating Factors in Violation of the 6th, 8th and 14th Amendments.

Claim 41: Arizona’s Death Penalty Statute Is Unconstitutional Because it Denies

the Right to Voir Dire the Sentencing Judge Regarding Possible Bias

Towards the Petitioner in Violation of the 6th, 8th and 14th

Amendments.

Claim 42 Arizona’s Death Penalty Statute Is Unconstitutional Because it Leaves

to the Prosecutor’s Discretion Whether or Not Death Penalty Will Be

Sought in Each Case in Violation of the 6th, 8th and 14th Amendments.

Claim 45 Trial Counsel Failed to Object or Move for Mistrial Following

Conversation Between Two Witnesses after Rule Excluding Witnesses

Had Been Invoked in Violation of the 6th and 14th Amendments.

Claim 46 Trial Counsel Failed to Object or Move for Mistrial Following

Testimony from Police Officer that Petitioner was Identified from

Photo Lineup only Consisting of Pictures of Individuals Previously

Arrested in Violation of the 6th and 14th Amendments.

Claim 47 Trial Counsel Failed to Make a Proper Hearsay Objection or Move for

Mistrial after Police Officer Testified to Statements Made by Witness

Cathy Trinidad where Officer’s Recollection and Witness Testimony

Were Consistent in Violation of the 6th and 14th Amendments.

Claim 48 Trial Counsel Failed to Object to Hearsay Offered by Police Officer

Regarding Statements Made by Witness Gloria Alvarez on

Identification Issues in Violation of the 6th and 14th Amendments.

Claim 49 Trial Counsel Failed to Offer Proof in Support of His Request for an

Expert Witness on the Issue of Identification in Violation of the 6th and

14th Amendments.

Claim 50 Trial Counsel Failed to Request Second Lawyer to Assist on this

Capital Case as Recommended by ABA Standards in Violation of the

6th and 14th Amendments.

(Doc. 97 at 33-36.)

Based on the foregoing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that no later than September 20, 2013, Petitioner shall

file a merits brief regarding the above-listed claims. The brief shall specifically identify and

apply appropriate AEDPA standards of review to each claim for relief and shall not simply

restate facts and argument contained in the amended petition. Petitioner shall also identify

in the merits brief: (1) each claim for which further evidentiary development is sought; (2)

the facts or evidence sought to be discovered, expanded, or presented at an evidentiary

hearing; (3) why such evidence was not developed in state court; and (4) why the failure to

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develop the claim in state court was not the result of lack of diligence, in accordance with the

Supreme Court’s decision in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420 (2000).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondents shall file a response to the merits

brief no later than October 18, 2013. If Petitioner files a reply, he shall do so no later than

November 8, 2013. 

DATED this 1st day of July, 2013.

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