Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-00664/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-00664-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIAM JAMES, 

Plaintiff, No. 2:10-cv-0664 MCE DAD P

vs.

COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO et al.,

Defendants. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Plaintiff is a former pretrial detainee proceeding pro se with a civil rights action

seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter is before the court on a motion to dismiss

brought on behalf of defendants County of Sacramento, John McGinness, Eric Maness, Mark

Filer, Ernesto Necoechea, and Michael Sotak. Plaintiff has filed an opposition to the motion, and

defendants have filed a reply.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is proceeding on his original complaint against defendants County of

Sacramento, John McGinness, Eric Maness, Mark Filer, Nurse Ernesto Necoechea, and Dr.

Michael Sotak. Therein, he alleges that on or about March 3, 2008, he was a pretrial detainee at

the Sacramento County Mail Jail. According to plaintiff, county jail officials were aware that he

suffered from a seizure disorder. Plaintiff alleges that he submitted a Miscellaneous Medical

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Needs form to jail staff and indicated that he needed to be housed on a lower tier and assigned to

a lower bunk to avoid the risk of falling down stairs or from an upper bunk. However, on March

7, 2008, county jail officials assigned plaintiff to a cell on the second tier of the fourth floor of

the jail. Plaintiff informed the officers escorting him to his assigned cell about his seizure

disorder and showed them the Miscellaneous Medical Needs form, but they nevertheless

instructed him to go to his cell. Plaintiff then showed the Miscellaneous Medical Needs form to

the officers in the control tower, and they too instructed him to return to his cell. (Compl. at 3.)

On or about March 19, 2008, while transferring from his cell to another location,

plaintiff had a seizure while at the top of the stairs that led from the second tier to the first tier of

the floor. Plaintiff fell down the stairs and suffered serious injuries and pain as a result of the

fall. Plaintiff was transported to Sutter Medical Center by ambulance in a semi-conscious state

and remained in the intensive care unit for three days. While at Sutter, plaintiff was diagnosed

with an intercerebral hemorrhage and severe sciatic-like pain. On March 21, 2008, plaintiff was

released from Sutter Medical Center and transported back to the main jail. He was then

transported to a medical cell in a wheelchair. Defendant Filer told plaintiff to get out of the

wheelchair and lie on the mattress on the floor of his cell. Plaintiff told the defendant that he

needed the wheelchair and that he was in too much pain to get out of the wheelchair. Defendant

Filer consulted with defendants Nurse Necoechea and Dr. Sotak who, without examining

plaintiff, opined that he did not need a wheelchair. Defendant Filer then asked defendant

Kendrick to assist him in distracting plaintiff while defendant Filer tipped the wheelchair and

dumped plaintiff onto the floor. Neither defendant Filer nor defendant Kendrick attempted to

assist or lift plaintiff out of the wheelchair. Defendants Filer, Kendrick, Nurse Necoechea, and

Dr. Sotak then left plaintiff on the floor and laughed at his complaints of pain. Plaintiff alleges

that he suffered severe pain in his legs and back after this incident. Finally, on April 17, 2009,

after conducting a medical evaluation, a jail physician signed a Miscellaneous Medical Needs

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form for plaintiff reiterating that plaintiff needed a lower bunk on a lower tier and also needed a

wheelchair. (Compl. at 3-4.)

Plaintiff asserts the following claims in his complaint: (1) the defendants, not

including the County of Sacramento, violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights when they were

deliberately indifferent to his medical needs; (2) defendants Filer, Kendrick, Nurse Necoechea,

and Dr. Sotak violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights when they used excessive force against

him; (3) the defendants violated his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”)

and the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”) when they failed to accommodate his seizure disorder by

housing him in an inappropriate cell and by depriving him of a wheelchair; (4) - (5) defendants

County of Sacramento, McGinness, and Maness violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights when

they failed to supervise and adequately train jail staff and maintained policies that were the

moving force behind the violation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights; (6) defendants Nurse

Necoechea, Dr. Sotak, Filer, and Kendrick violated California Government Code § 845.6; (7)

defendants, not including the County of Sacramento, violated California Government Code §

820; (8) defendants violated California Government Code §§ 11135-11139; and (9) defendants

McGinness and Maness were negligent in their supervision, training, hiring and retention. In

terms of relief, plaintiff requests monetary damages. (Compl. at 5-13.)

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

I. Defendants’ Motion

Defense counsel has filed the pending motion to dismiss based on the following

grounds: (1) plaintiff’s fourth and fifth Monell claims against defendants McGinness, Maness,

Filer, Nurse Necoechea, and Dr. Sotak in their official capacity should be dismissed as redundant

because plaintiff names the County of Sacramento as a defendant in these claims for relief; (2)

plaintiff’s second claim against defendants Nurse Necoechea and Dr. Sotak should be dismissed

because he has not alleged that they used force against him; (3) plaintiff’s third claim against

defendants Filer, McGinness, Maness, Nurse Necoechea, and Dr. Sotak should be dismissed as

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there is no individual liability under the ADA and RA; and (4) plaintiff’s state law claims should

be dismissed as barred by the statute of limitations. (Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 1 & 5-8.)

II. Plaintiff’s Opposition

In a brief opposition to defendants’ motion to dismiss, plaintiff reiterates many of

the allegations of his complaint. In this regard, plaintiff directs the court to review the claims

defendants seek to dismiss. Plaintiff also contends that a claims administrator who works on

behalf of the county agreed that plaintiff could submit a reasonable offer to settle his state law

claims. In plaintiff’s view, this purported agreement voided any previous rejection of his state

law claims and presumably advanced the start date of the statute of limitations on his claims to a

later date. (Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 1-4 & Attachs.)

III. Defendants’ Reply

In reply, defense counsel argues that plaintiff does not oppose defendants’

argument that the court should dismiss his fourth and fifth claims against defendants McGinness,

Maness, Filer, Nurse Necoechea, and Dr. Sotak in their official capacity as redundant. In

addition, defense counsel argues that plaintiff does not oppose defendants’ argument that the

court should dismiss his second claim against defendants Nurse Necoechea and Dr. Sotak

because he does not allege that these defendants used force against him. In fact, plaintiff

reiterates in his opposition that these defendants allegedly violated his constitutional rights

because they failed to “properly medically examine him.” Next, defense counsel notes that

plaintiff’s opposition merely restates his ADA and RA allegations, but since plaintiff cannot state

a claim against the defendants in their individual capacity they should be dismissed. Finally,

defense counsel repeats that plaintiff’s state law claims are untimely and notes that insofar as

plaintiff argues that the defendants should be equitably estopped from asserting a statute of

limitations defense, plaintiff has failed to prove the requirements for estoppel. (Defs.’ Reply at

1-2.) 

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ANALYSIS

I. Motion Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure tests the sufficiency of the complaint. North Star Int’l v. Arizona Corp. Comm’n, 720

F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir. 1983). Dismissal of the complaint, or any claim within it, “can be based

on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a

cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 

See also Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984). In order to

survive dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than “a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations sufficient “to

raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 555 (2007).

In determining whether a pleading states a claim, the court accepts as true all

material allegations in the complaint and construes those allegations, as well as the reasonable

inferences that can be drawn from them, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Hishon v.

King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S.

738, 740 (1976); Love v. United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1989). In the context of a

motion to dismiss, the court also resolves doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen,

395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). However, the court need not accept as true conclusory allegations,

unreasonable inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. W. Mining Council v. Watt, 643

F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981).

In general, pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted

by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The court has an obligation to construe

such pleadings liberally. Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc). 

However, the court’s liberal interpretation of a pro se complaint may not supply essential

elements of the claim that were not pled. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d

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266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir. 1992).

II. Discussion

The court will address each of defendants’ arguments in turn. First, defendants

have moved to dismiss plaintiff’s fourth and fifth Monell claims against defendants McGinness,

Maness, Filer, Nurse Necoechea, and Dr. Sotak in their official capacity as redundant because

plaintiff has also named defendant County of Sacramento in his fourth and fifth claims. As an

initial matter, plaintiff only lists defendants County of Sacramento, McGinness, and Maness in

his fourth and fifth claims. (Compl. at 8-11.) As to defendants McGinness and Maness, as

defense counsel observes, plaintiff does not appear to oppose this aspect of the pending motion. 

Moreover, “[w]hen both a municipal officer and a local government entity are named, and the

officer is named only in an official capacity, the court may dismiss the officer as a redundant

defendant.” Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform v. Los Angeles County Sheriff Dep’t, 533 F.3d 780, 799

(9th Cir. 2008). See also Armstrong v. Siskiyou County Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. 2:07-cv-1046-GEBGGH, 2009 WL 4572879 at *5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2009) (granting summary judgment for officers

because official capacity claims against them were redundant of the claims against the Siskiyou

County Sheriff’s Department), aff’d No. 09-17801, 2011 WL 835183 (9th Cir. Mar. 10, 2011). 

Accordingly, the court will recommend that defendants’ motion to dismiss defendants

McGinness and Maness from plaintiff’s fourth and fifth claims be granted.

Second, defendants have moved to dismiss plaintiff’s second claim against

defendants Nurse Necoechea and Dr. Sotak because plaintiff has not alleged that these

defendants used any force against him. In plaintiff’s opposition to defendants’ motion, plaintiff

directs the court to the second claim of his complaint and reiterates that defendants Nurse

Necoechea and Dr. Sotak “fail[ed] to properly medically examine him” before defendant Filer

dumped him out of his wheelchair. Plaintiff is advised that there can be no liability under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions

and the claimed deprivation. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633

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F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Here, in his

complaint plaintiff alleges that defendant Filer, not Nurse Necoechea and Dr. Sotak, used force

against him. Accordingly, the court will recommend that defendants’ motion to dismiss

defendants Nurse Necoechea and Dr. Sotak from plaintiff’s second (excessive use of force) claim

be granted.

Next, defendants have moved to dismiss plaintiff’s third claim against defendants

McGinness, Maness, Nurse Necoechea, Dr. Sotak, and Filer because there is no individual

liability under the ADA and RA. In plaintiff’s opposition to defendants’ motion, plaintiff directs

the court to the third claim of his complaint and reiterates that the defendants discriminated

against him by failing to accommodate his seizure disorder by housing him in an inappropriate

cell and by refusing to allow him to keep his wheelchair. However, it is well established that

“plaintiff cannot bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a State official in her individual

capacity to vindicate rights created by Title II of the ADA or section 504 of the Rehabilitation

Act.” Vinson v. Thomas, 288 F.3d 1145, 1156 (9th Cir. 2002). Accordingly, the court will

recommend that defendants’ motion to dismiss defendants McGinness, Maness, Nurse

Necoechea, Dr. Sotak and Filer from plaintiff’s third (ADA/RA) claim be granted.

Finally, defendants have moved to dismiss plaintiff’s state law claims as barred by

the applicable statute of limitations. Under the California Tort Claims Act, plaintiff is required

to bring any government tort claim against a public entity or its employees within six months

after the cause of action accrues. See Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 811.2, 905 & 911.2. Here, plaintiff

complains about events that allegedly took place in March and/or April 2008. On April 8, 2008,

plaintiff brought two separate claims to the County of Sacramento, both of which the county

rejected on April 21, 2008. (Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at Exs. A-D.) Plaintiff had six months

thereafter to file a court action regarding the claims. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 945.6. However,

plaintiff did not file this action until March 19, 2010, well after the six-month period had

expired. Moreover, insofar as plaintiff is asserting a claim for equitable estoppel based on a

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letter he received from a county claims administrator, he in error. In the letter, the claims

administrator informed plaintiff that he declined plaintiff’s settlement offer because he did not

have the authority to facilitate plaintiff’s “early release from jail.” The claims administrator

noted that if plaintiff wished to settle his claim he could submit a reasonable settlement demand

for consideration. (Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss Attachs.) The letter did not explicitly

or implicitly mention the county’s prior decisions to reject plaintiff’s claims during the

administrative review process. Nor does plaintiff allege that the letter contains false or

misleading information that either prevented him from filing a complaint containing his state law

cause of action on time or led plaintiff to conduct himself in a way he otherwise would not have

as is required to assert a claim of estoppel. See Steinhart v. County of Los Angeles, 47 Cal. 4th

1298, 1315 (2010); State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 40 Cal.3d 5,

16 (1985); Harris v. Harris, 2:11-cv-2186 GEB KJN, 2012 WL 1435680 at *25 (E.D. Cal. Apr.

25, 2012) (“Estoppel commonly results from misleading statements about the need for or the

advisability of a claim.”). 

Finally, plaintiff was a pretrial detainee when he filed this action. Accordingly,

the tolling provisions of state law - which toll the statute of limitations for a period of up to two

years based on the disability of imprisonment - do not apply. See Cal. Code of Civ. P. § 352.1;

Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 927-28 (9th Cir. 2004) (civil detainee not entitled to tolling of

statute of limitations for two years because he was not “imprisoned on a criminal charge, or in

execution under the sentence of a criminal court for a term less than for life.”). Accordingly, the

court will recommend that defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s state law claims as barred by

the applicable statute of limitations be granted. 

CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 31) be granted as follows:

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a. Defendants’ motion to dismiss defendants McGinness and Maness in

their official capacity from plaintiff’s fourth and fifth claims be granted;

b. Defendants’ motion to dismiss defendants Nurse Necoechea and Dr.

Sotak from plaintiff’s second claim be granted;

c. Defendants’ motion to dismiss defendants McGinness, Maness, Nurse

Necoechea, Dr. Sotak and Filer from plaintiff’s third claim be granted;

d. Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s sixth, seventh, eighth, and

ninth claims based on state law as barred by the statute of limitations be

granted; and

2. Defendants be directed to file an answer to plaintiff’s remaining claims within

thirty days of any order adopting these findings and recommendations.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within seven days after service of the objections. The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the

District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: June 11, 2012.

DAD:9

jame0664.57

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