Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00214/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-00214-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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08cv00214H(JMA)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ENRIQUE BAHENA,

Petitioner,

v.

VICTOR M. AMALGER, Warden, et

al.,

Respondent. 

 

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Case No. 08-CV-00214-H (JMA)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING PETITIONER’S MOTION

TO STAY FEDERAL PROCEEDINGS

On March 11, 2005, Petitioner was convicted in San Diego

Superior Court of residential burglary (Cal. Penal Code § 459)

and vandalism greater than $400 (Cal. Penal Code § 594). 

(Petition [Doc. No. 1] at 1-2.) Petitioner was sentenced to 14

years in state prison based on his conviction and sentence

enhancements for a prison prior (Cal. Penal Code § 667.5) and a

strike prior (Cal. Penal Code § 667, 1170.12). (Id.) 

Petitioner appealed his conviction, contending that the

evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support the

conviction and that trial counsel was constitutionally

ineffective. (Petition at 2.) The California Court of Appeal

Case 3:08-cv-00214-H-JMA Document 23 Filed 11/25/08 Page 1 of 6
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affirmed the conviction. (Id.) Petitioner sought review by the

California Supreme Court, raising the same two claims, and the

California Supreme Court denied the Petition for Review. (Id.) 

Thereafter, Petitioner sought collateral review in California

Superior Court, contending that his sentence violated his right

to be tried by a jury. (Id. at 3.) That court denied the

petition on July 26, 2007. (Id.)

On February 4, 2008, Petitioner filed the instant petition

for writ of habeas corpus, contending that: (1) there was

insufficient evidence to support Petitioner’s residential

burglary conviction; and (2) Petitioner received ineffective

assistance of trial counsel. (Petition at 6-12.) On March 14,

2008, the Court issued an order setting a briefing schedule on

the Petition. (Doc. No. 7.) On May 20, 2008, Petitioner filed a

Motion to Stay the Proceedings (the “Motion”), requesting that

the Court stay the Petition until the California Supreme Court

has ruled on four additional claims raised by Petitioner in that

court. (Doc. No. 15.) On July 2, 2008, Respondent filed an

Opposition to the Motion. (Doc. No. 17.) On August 28, 2008,

Petitioner filed his Reply to the Opposition (styled as “Motion

for Stay and Abeyance”). (Doc. No. 22.) 

Petitioner requests a stay of the proceedings in this Court

while he exhausts state remedies as to four unexhausted claims:

(1) Petitioner was improperly charged; (2) Petitioner is

factually innocent; (3) Petitioner was maliciously prosecuted;

and (4) Petitioner’s counsel was ineffective because he failed to

file motions or investigate the case. (Motion at 1.) Once he

exhausts available state remedies as to the new claims,

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Petitioner seeks leave to amend the Petition here to add those

claims. (Id.) For the reasons outlined below, the Court

recommends that the Motion be DENIED.

Pursuant to Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005), a district

court has discretion to grant a stay if: (1) the petitioner had

good cause for his failure to exhaust; (2) his unexhausted claims

are potentially meritorious; and (3) there is no indication that

the petitioner engaged in intentionally dilatory litigation

tactics. Rhines, supra, 544 U.S. at 278. The Supreme Court made

clear in Rhines that “stay and abeyance should be available only

in limited circumstances.” Rhines, supra, 544 U.S. at 277. 

Staying a federal habeas petition frustrates the AEDPA’s

objective of encouraging finality by allowing a petitioner to

delay the resolution of federal proceedings. Id. Additionally,

stays undermine the AEDPA’s goal of streamlining federal habeas

corpus proceedings by decreasing a petitioner’s incentive to

first exhaust all his claims in state court. Id. As a threshold

matter, “[b]ecause granting a stay effectively excuses a

petitioner’s failure to present his claims first to the state

courts, stay and abeyance is only appropriate when the District

Court determines there was good cause for the petitioner’s

failure to exhaust his claims first in state court.” Id.

Petitioner contends that he had good cause for filing his

federal Petition before he exhausted his claims in state court

because he was confused regarding state filing requirements. 

(Reply at 3.) Petitioner asserts that he was unsure whether his

most recent state petition would be accepted as timely filed, and

he did not want to lose the chance to file a federal petition on

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the two claims already exhausted on direct appeal. (Reply at 3.) 

Petitioner cites Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005), to

further this argument. The opinion states that “[a] petitioner’s

reasonable confusion about whether a state filing would be timely

will ordinarily constitute ‘good cause’ for him to file in

federal court.” Pace, supra, 544 U.S. at 416. On its face, this

dicta seems to help Petitioner. However, Petitioner’s use of

this argument is flawed in two respects: (1) the opinion’s

language applies to a distinct factual situation involving the

tolling of a statute of limitations, and (2) Petitioner fails to

show how his situation is analogous to the one in Pace. 

In Pace, during the time between Pace’s conviction and the

filing of his federal habeas corpus petition, habeas corpus laws

were amended, which resulted in significant changes when applied

to Pace so as to justify reasonable confusion over the timeliness

of filings. See Pace, supra, 544 U.S. at 410-13. The Supreme

Court affirmed the decision of the Third Circuit and held that an

untimely state petition is not considered “properly filed” for

purposes of tolling the AEDPA’s statute of limitations. Id. at

412-13. Although the court suggested that Petitioner’s

“reasonable confusion” about the timeliness of his state filing

could constitute “good cause” for his failure to exhaust

available state remedies prior to filing a “protective” federal

petition under the Rhines test (see id.), the facts giving rise

to any asserted confusion about timeliness in Pace, i.e., the

almost simultaneous amendment of state and federal statutes, do

not exist here. Unlike the factual situation in Pace, there have

been no major changes to California or federal habeas corpus law

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since the time of Petitioner’s conviction. Any confusion

Petitioner may have had about timeliness of his state filings is

nothing more than ignorance of the law. Under Rhines, ignorance

of the law does not constitute “good cause” for failing to

properly exhaust available state remedies prior to filing a

federal petition. See Kibler v. Walters, 220 F. 3d 1151, 1154

(9th Cir. 2000) (finding that a petitioner’s lack of knowledge

regarding the requirements of state habeas corpus law was

insufficient to establish good cause for petitioner’s failure to

exhaust state claims). 

In addition to his failure to show good cause for a stay of

federal proceedings, Petitioner fails to address in any way the

other two required elements of the Rhines test. Nowhere in his

Motion or Reply does he set forth any reason why his pending

state claims are potentially meritorious, nor does he assert that

he has not engaged in intentionally dilatory tactics in bringing

his claims in state and federal court.

A decision allowing Petitioner to stay his federal habeas

corpus petition based on his confusion regarding state procedural

matters would seriously weaken the holding of Rhines. Such a

determination would open the door of “good cause” to virtually

any petitioner who asserts that he was unclear about state habeas

corpus law and its procedural requirements. Such a result would

contradict the AEDPA’s policy goals of streamlining and

simplifying the federal habeas corpus system and would result in

serious delays and court congestion. 

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For all the foregoing reasons, the undersigned magistrate

judge recommends that Petitioner’s Motion to Stay the Proceedings

be DENIED.

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable

Marilyn L. Huff, United States District Judge assigned to this

case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

IT IS ORDERED that no later than December 24, 2008 any party

may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on

all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections to

Report and Recommendation.” 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall

be served and filed no later than January 7, 2008. The parties

are advised that failure to file objections within the specified

time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of

the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th

Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: November 25, 2008

Jan M. Adler

U.S. Magistrate Judge

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