Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04149/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04149-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 240
Nature of Suit: Torts to Land
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal Libel,Assault,Slander

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOYCE YAMAGIWA, TRUSTEE OF THE

TRUST CREATED UNDER TRUST

AGREEMENT DATED JANUARY 30, 1980

BY CHARLES J KEENAN, III AND ANNE

MARIE KENNAN, FOR THE BENEFIT OF

CHARLES J KEENAN IV, AS TO AN

UNDIVIDED 50% INTEREST, AND

TRUSTEE OF THE TRUST CREATED

UNDER TRUST AGREEMENT DATED

JANUARY 30, 1980, BY CHARLES J

KEENAN III AND ANNE MARIE KEENAN

FOR THE BENEFIT OF ANN MARIE

KEENAN, AS TO AN UNDIVIDED 50%

INTEREST,

Plaintiff,

 V

CITY OF HALF MOON BAY, COASTSIDE

COUNTY WATER DISTRICT AND DOES 1-

50,

Defendants.

 /

No C 05-4149 VRW

ORDER

Joyce Yamagiwa (“Yamagiwa”), brings this action alleging

that defendant City of Half Moon Bay (“City”) damaged certain real

property that she holds in trust. Doc #1-2. The property, known

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For the Northern District of California

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as the Beachwood Property, is located in the City of Half Moon Bay

at Assessor’s Parcel No 048-280-020 (“Property” or “Beachwood

Property”). Id. 

Yamagiwa brings a federal claim for inverse condemnation

and pendent state claims for inverse condemnation, nuisance,

trespass and recovery of amounts paid to finance public

improvements. Id. Yamagiwa moves for summary judgment on

liability as to the state inverse condemnation claim. Doc #39. 

The City moves for summary judgement on all claims. Doc #47. For

reasons discussed below, plaintiff Yamagiwa’s motion is DENIED. 

Defendant City of Half Moon Bay’s motion is DENIED.

I

The following facts are undisputed:

A

The Beachwood Property is an undeveloped rectangular

24.7-acre parcel on the east side of Highway 1 in the City of Half

Moon Bay. Doc #70, Ex 7 at 1; Doc #46, Ex 125. Plaintiff alleges

that a storm drain project changed the topography of the area in

which the Property is located, preventing water from flowing off

the land and creating a trap that collects water in depressions dug

by the City. Stabilization of this condition, plaintiff contends,

physically damaged the Property and forms the grounds for

plaintiff’s claims.

At least since the mid-1970s, Beachwood has been zoned by

the City for single-family residential use. Doc #45, Ex 121. For

properties located in the coastal zone (like Beachwood),

subdivision requires a Coastal Development Permit (“CDP”) under the

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For the Northern District of California

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Coastal Act. Cal Pub Res Code § 30600(a). Cities that have an

approved Local Coastal Plan (“LCP”) can issue CDPs themselves. But

until a city’s LCP is approved, the CDPs must be issued by the

Coastal Commission. Cal Pub Res Code § 30519(a); City of Half Moon

Bay v Super Ct, 106 Cal App 4th 795 (2003).

Approval of an LCP is typically a two-step process. 

First, the Coastal Commission must certify a Land Use Plan (LUP)

proposed by the local entity. Second, the Coastal Commission must

certify the “implementing ordinances” by which the LUP will be

implemented. Cal Pub Res Code § 30511(b).

Half Moon Bay’s LUP was certified by the Coastal

Commission in 1985. Doc #45, Ex 136. Its implementing ordinances,

and thus its entire LCP, were certified in 1996. Id at 204.

B

William Lyon (Lyon) acquired the Beachwood Property in

the late 1970s. Doc #52, Ex 2 at 148:19-149:25. Lyon also owned

neighboring properties. Doc #52, Ex 20 at HM213044-213061. In

1976, the City approved a tentative map for 97 residential lots on

Beachwood. Doc #1-2 at ¶7. 

While the Beachwood parcel is relatively flat, hills rise

to the east. Doc #46, Ex 425. A 1978 aerial photograph shows two

seasonal creeks on the Property that drained the eastern hills. 

Doc #44, Ex 9. Creek 1 flowed down from the eastern hills and

curved northward onto Beachwood. Creek 2 entered Beachwood at its

southeast corner, flowing westward along its southerly border. Doc

#48, Ex 451 at 26:1-27:13; Doc #45, Ex 70; Doc #48, Ex 453 at 59:3-

60:7; Doc #49 (Weirich Dec) at ¶¶13-18. Creek 1 sometimes

overflowed and flooded Terrace Avenue, south of Beachwood. Doc

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#48, Ex 451 at 28:4-21, 28:25-29:6. And the storm water that

flowed onto and then off of Beachwood sometimes caused flooding to

the Grandview Terrace area to the north of the Property. Doc #48,

Ex 453 at 54:23-55:3; Doc #49 (Weirich Dec) at ¶18. In 1982, Lyon

and other property owners in the area petitioned the City to form

an assessment district to remedy area-wide drainage and flooding

problems. Doc #52, Ex 2 at 167:4-169:1, 169:18-25 & sub-exs 1008,

1009.

The City created the Terrace Avenue Assessment District

(TAAD) in 1982. Doc #44, Ex 21; Doc #71 at 1. As part of the

TAAD, Lyon offered, and the City accepted, a storm drain easement

over the portion of the Property containing TAAD improvements. Doc

#45, Ex 75.

Several details concerning the work done on Beachwood are

noteworthy:

The Northern Drain. Along the entire 1,837-foot

northerly border of the Property, a 30" underground storm drain

pipe was laid in an east-west direction. Doc #49, Ex 21. After

the storm drain was placed in the trench, the trench was backfilled

with compacted soil. Doc #48, Ex 451 at 66:9-68:7, 106:22-107:6,

117:2-14. Seven vertical manhole shafts were built from the

surface down to the pipe, and the compacted trench was filled to

the rim of the manhole covers. Id at 64:24-65:6, 118:21-119:4; Doc

#46, Ex 430. 

The Western Drain. At the northwest corner of Beachwood,

the east/west Northern Drain turned southerly, where it continued

to run in the City’s easement on the west side of Beachwood,

adjacent to Highway 1. The Western Drain was constructed in the

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same trench/backfill manner, though the trench was deeper. Doc

#44, Ex 21, Sheet 6; Doc #49 (Weirich Dec) at ¶28.

The Southern Drain. Along Beachwood’s southern boundary,

the City placed a pipe 48" in diameter to drain a large watershed

area from the eastern hills. Doc #44, Ex 21, Sheet 14. The inlet

to the Southern Drain was placed in Creek 1. Doc #48, Ex 451 at

76:23-77:4. A large debris rack was installed atop the inlet to

catch downstream brush. Id at 77:5-16; Doc #48, Ex 453 at 52:12-

23; Doc #49 (Weirich Dec) at ¶30.

Borrowing of Dirt. During construction, the contractor

identified a shortage of fill, and the City approved a change

order. Doc #71, Ex 3. At the request of the owner, fill was taken

from the Property where the streets were being proposed. The

contractor staked out the roads according to the street locations

on the 1976 tentative map. Doc #52, Ex 1 at 161:6-23, Ex 2 at

187:6-188:19, Ex 25 at 4:17-19. Lyon used 8,000 cubic yards of

fill from the Property for his development of a neighboring site. 

Doc #52, Ex 1, sub-ex 43. Another 5,000 cubic yards went to

construct a connection to Highway 1. Id. The grading left

depressions in the areas where the then-planned streets were to go. 

Doc #45, Ex 44; Doc #48, Ex 453 at 110:8-14, 110:24-111:3.

The TAAD project was accepted as complete by the City on

July 2, 1985. Doc #45, Ex 63. It is the TAAD project that

plaintiff alleges is responsible for physical damage to the

Property.

C

In June 1987, Lyon applied for a tentative subdivision

map for a 97-lot single-family subdivision on the Property. Doc

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#52, Ex 10. The City prepared a Negative Declaration for the

proposal, which stated:

The site currently has some drainage problems. Storm

drains have been installed along the north and south

property lines as part of the Terrace Avenue Assessment

District. However, the center portion of the site still

does not drain properly during periods of intense

rainfall. The installation of typical subdivision

improvements including catch basins and a storm drain

system could solve the drainage problems that exist on

the site. Doc #71, Ex 6 at HM306338.

In January 1989, the California Department of Fish & Game (“CDFG”)

commented that the Negative Declaration was inadequate due to “the

presence of riparian wetland habitat on the project site, which was

not identified in the document * * * During a field visit by Dept.

Personnel, approximately 15-20 percent of the project site had

riparian wetland vegetation.” Id, Ex 5 at 24-25.

In response to CDFG’s comment, the Property owner hired

an expert, Harding Lawson Associates (“HLA”), which held on-site

meetings with CDFG. Doc #52, Ex 13. HLA prepared a 1989 report,

which was completed in April 1990, and provided:

During these meetings, CDFG representatives indicated

that CDFG would require mitigation for the loss of all

areas onsite that supported facultative, facultative wet

and/or obligate wetland plant species. Id at 1874.

Wetland vegetation were found to be dominant on

approximately 2.5 acres on the center portion of the

property. Hydric soils and wetland hydrology

characteristics are not present. Id at 1877.

Construction of the proposed Beachwood Subdivision would

result in the loss of approximately 2.5 acres of

wetland/riparian vegetation as defined by the CDFG * * *. 

Id at 1884.

In January 1990, Pilarcitos Valley Associates (PVA)

purchased the Property and entered into an Agreement Regarding

Proposed Stream or Lake Alteration with CDFG, which mitigated the

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loss. Doc #52, Ex 11. In July 1990, the City Council approved the

Beachwood Subdivision vesting tentative map (“VTM”) for 83

residential lots. Doc #93, Ex 1. Lots 1 and 19 of Block 3 were to

be set aside and dedicated to the City for open space or park

purposes. Lot 19 was in the southeast corner where the creek, old

abandoned stock pond and the inlet to the Southern Drain were

located. Doc #45, Exs 141, 147; Doc #48, Ex 462 at 55:9-56:1.

In October 1990, PVA applied to the Coastal Commission

for a CDP. Doc #52, Ex 27 at 2136-43. In March 1991, however, the

City adopted the first of a series of urgency ordinances placing a

moratorium on the issuance of building permits that would require

new sewer service, due to a shortage at the local sewage treatment

plant. Doc #52, Ex 16. Collectively these ordinances resulted in

a sewer moratorium that lasted until 1998. Id. Because of the

lack of sewer capacity, the Coastal Commission would not process

PVA’s application for a CDP. Doc #70, Ex 2 at ¶47.

D

Yamagiwa purchased the Property in 1993. Doc #52, Ex 14,

sub-ex 1246. In April 1996, the Coastal Commission certified the

City’s LCP, thereby transferring to the City the authority to issue

CDPs. Id, Ex 27 at 4026. In February 1998, with the sewage

capacity issue solved, Yamagiwa filed an application for a CDP. 

Doc #48, Ex 1149. In October 1998, the City prepared an initial

study, which stated that CDFG had designated “2.5 acres of the

Property as wetland/riparian habitat, and required on-site

mitigation in the form of a 1.6 acre conservation area and a City

Park.” Doc #71, Ex 8 at HM213843. The record does not establish

the location of this 2.5 acres of wetlands; indeed, there is some

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question whether it exists at all. Doc #87, Ex 8, App C, HLA-1,

Site 1-6 (HLA work papers).

In 1999, the case of Bolsa Chica Land Trust v Super Ct,

71 Cal App 4th 493 (1999) was decided. Prior to that decision, the

Commission had interpreted the Coastal Act to allow residential

development of wetlands, so long as the loss of wetlands was

mitigated. Bolsa Chica held for the first time that the Coastal

Act does not allow residential development of protected wetlands in

the Coastal Zone. Accordingly, in 2000, the City denied Yamagiwa’s

request for a CDP, finding that new wetlands had developed on

Beachwood since the approval of the VTM in 1990. Doc #71, Ex 7;

Doc #45, Ex 179 at ¶¶2,3,9.

E

On May 17, 2000, Yamagiwa filed a complaint in state

court for inverse condemnation, nuisance and trespass, based on

allegations of a physical invasion of the Property (the “Physical

Taking Case”). Doc #70, Ex 1. 

On May 19, 2000, Yamagiwa filed a second lawsuit, also in

state court, challenging the City’s denial of the CDP (the “CDP

Denial/Regulatory Taking Case”). Id, Ex 2. In addition to seeking

a petition to set aside the City’s denial of the CDP, the complaint

contained a cause of action “for damages caused by a taking 42

U.S.C. § 1983, U.S. Const. amend. 5; Cal Const. art. 1, §19).” Id

at 39.

On February 22, 2001, the trial court granted the writ

petition and ordered the City to issue a CDP. Id, Ex 4. In March

2003, because she prevailed in the CDP Denial/Regulatory Taking

Case, Yamagiwa dismissed her Physical Taking Case without

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prejudice, with an agreement that all applicable statutes of

limitations would be tolled from May 17, 2000. Id, Ex 3.

In January 2004, the parties reached a non-cash

stipulated settlement in the CDP Denial/Regulatory Taking Case. 

Id, Exs 4 & 6. A final subdivision map was conditionally approved

by the City, to be recorded only if Yamagiwa successfully defended

the court-ordered CDP on appeal. Id. Yamagiwa dismissed with

prejudice the remaining causes of action in the CDP

Denial/Regulatory Taking Case, “including all of Yamagiwa’s damage

claims for alleged takings and violations of various civil rights,

* * * Yamagiwa shall take nothing by way of these claims.” Id.

The City appealed the trial court decision ordering the

City to approve the CDP and, on July 27, 2005, the state court of

appeal reversed and upheld the City’s determination of wetlands and

the City’s denial of the CDP. Yamagiwa v City of Half Moon Bay,

2005 WL 1774402.

F

On September 8, 2005, Yamagiwa filed this action,

reviving the claims in the Physical Taking Case that were

previously dismissed without prejudice. The City removed the

action to this court on October 13, 2005. Doc #1-1.

The state court of appeal 2005 decision arguably settled

the dispute whether there were new wetlands on the Property. Based

on the assumption of new wetlands, the issue in this case is what

caused those wetlands to develop. Yamagiwa alleges that a

substantial cause of the creation of the newly formed wetlands was

the City’s TAAD public works construction. Doc #1-2 at ¶9.

\\

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Yamagiwa alleges that several features of the

construction have caused water to invade, come onto and remain on

the Property, including construction of a berm that directs water

to the Property, street improvements in the Highland Park

Subdivision that channel surface water to the Property and problems

with the City’s storm drain system that cause water to be deposited

on the Property. Id at ¶11.

Yamagiwa also alleges that the removal of fill left

depressions on the surface of the Property and that water collects

or “ponds” in those depressions. Id at ¶12. Yamagiwa further

alleges that the ponding continued during the seven year sewer

moratorium. Id. 

II

When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the court

must determine whether genuine issues of material fact exist,

resolving any doubt in favor of the party opposing the motion. 

“[S]ummary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material

fact is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” 

Anderson v Liberty Lobby, 477 US 242, 248 (1986). “Only disputes

over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the

governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary

judgment.” Id. And the burden of establishing the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact lies with the moving party. Celotex

Corp v Catrett, 477 US 317, 322S23 (1986). Summary judgment is

granted only if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law. FRCP 56(c).

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In response to the motion, the non-moving party may not

simply rely on the pleadings, but must produce significant

probative evidence supporting its claim that a genuine issue of

material fact exists. TW Elec Serv v Pacific Elec Contractors

Assn, 809 F2d 626, 630 (9th Cir 1987). “[T]he judge’s function is

not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the

matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for

trial.” Id at 249. Furthermore, the evidence presented by both

parties must be admissible. FRCP 56(e). Conclusory, speculative

testimony in affidavits and moving papers is insufficient to raise

genuine issues of fact and defeat summary judgment. Thornhill

Publishing Co, Inc v GTE Corp, 594 F2d 730, 738 (9th Cir 1979).

III

Inverse Condemnation Claims

Both parties have moved for summary judgment on

Yamagiwa’s inverse condemnation claims. For reasons discussed

below, the court DENIES both sides’s motions.

A

The court first addresses Yamagiwa’s motion. Yamagiwa

moves for summary judgment only as to her state inverse

condemnation claim, brought under Article 1, Section 19 of the

California Constitution. Section 19 provides in relevant part:

“Private property may be taken or damaged for public use only when

just compensation, ascertained by a jury unless waived, has first

been paid to, or into court for, the owner.” Four elements are

required to establish liability for inverse condemnation: First,

Yamagiwa has an interest in the Property; Second, the City

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substantially participated in the planning, approval, construction

or operation of a public project or public improvement; Third,

Yamagiwa’s property suffered damage; and Fourth, the City’s

project, act or omission was a substantial cause of the damage. 

Imperial Cattle Co v Imperial Irrigiation Dist, 167 Cal App 3d 263,

269 (1985), disapproved on other grounds in Bunch v Coachella

Valley Water Dist, 15 Cal 4th 432 (1997).

Here, there is no dispute as to the first and third

elements: Yamagiwa owns the Property, and the Property suffered

damage. The issues in this case go to the extent of the City’s

participation in the public projects and, relatedly, whether the

City was a substantial cause of the alleged damage. Specifically,

the City argues that the motion can be denied on any one of five

separate grounds: First, the substantial cause of the wetland

development was the conduct of the prior Property owners in

requesting storm drain improvements that were intended to service a

finished subdivision and not drain the raw land. Second, there is

considerable disputed evidence on whether the TAAD improvements

were a substantial cause of the wetland development. Third,

Yamagiwa cannot show unreasonable conduct by the City, a

requirement for flood control cases. Fourth, Yamagiwa cannot show

that she took reasonable measures to protect the Property. And

fifth, there are intervening causes for the wetlands. Doc #83 at

10-11. As discussed below, the court need only address the City’s

second argument.

Yamagiwa argues that the following evidence establishes

beyond dispute that the TAAD measures were a substantial cause of

the wetlands: First, Gary Whelen, the City’s Building Inspector and

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the only person who observed construction of the TAAD improvements

every day from September 1983 through July 1985 gave testimony that

he “felt that the City’s construction contributed to [the

wetlands].” Doc #48, Ex 452 at 272:12-19. Second, Yamagiwa’s

experts, Dr Josselyn and Dr Weirich, testify to how the TAAD

construction created conditions conducive to the formation of

wetlands, including how the TAAD measures created low-lying areas

where stormwater was able to collect. Doc #49. Dr Weirich, a

hydrology expert, opines that the Northern Drain dammed the

historic northwesterly path of flow of surface water off of

Beachwood. Id, (Weirich Dec) at ¶¶21, 24, 26, 35-37. Dr Weirich

also opines that the City’s grading activities, when the City

removed fill, created gaping “borrow pits” in which storm water was

trapped and that the City’s efforts to drain them into storm stubs

created depressions south of the storm stubs in which water sat. 

Id at ¶¶31-33, 46-52. Finally, Dr Weirich opines that the City’s

failure to maintain the 48" debris rack/inlet in the southeast

corner of the Property created conditions conducive to wetland

formation. Id at ¶¶39-45. Yamagiwa also refers to 19 site

photographs from 2003 to 2005 that show where standing water has

produced wetlands. Doc #46, Ex 432. According to Dr Josselyn,

most of these wetlands track the locations of the City’s grading,

trenches to the storm drain dug by the City or the dammed path on

the northside of the Property. Doc #49, (Josselyn Dec) at ¶¶ 16-

22, 24. 

The City places these asserted “facts” in dispute or

weakens their probative value. The City first correctly points out

that Whelen is not a wetlands expert, and his lay opinion is not

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definitive evidence of causation. Doc #87, Ex 11 at 16:13-22.

Regarding Dr Weirich’s opinions: The City also points out that

photographs taken from 2003 to 2005 have little, if any, relevance

to how the TAAD inlets functioned from 1985-2000. Doc #46, Ex 432. 

Further, Whelen testified that as late as February 1999, “the 48-

inch and the 30-inch storm systems appear[ed] to be clear and

working as designed.” Doc #87, Ex 1 at 292:3-293:4, 293:13-21. 

Finally, the City’s expert, Dr Coats, concludes that the TAAD

improvements reduced the average external contribution of water to

the Property by 97-98 percent when compared with pre-TAAD levels

and that “[i]f not for the TAAD improvements, the duration and

frequency of ponding on the site would be greater than it is

today.” Doc #87, Ex 7 at 3-5. Dr Coats could find no physical

evidence that water had overtopped the drainage basin surrounding

the 48-inch inlet or that the debris in the drainage channel was

causing water to bypass it. Id at 8. Regarding Dr Weirich’s

opinion that the 30-inch storm drain created a dam, the City’s

expert, Dr Huffman, disagrees that the northern drain is preventing

all water from leaving the Property and opines that the drain did

not substantially alter subsurface flow of water. Doc #87, Ex 12

at 2-4. The City also points out that Dr Weirich’s dam theory is

refuted by evidence of a pre-TAAD central depression where water

ponded on the Property. Doc #87, Ex 8 at 24, Ex 3 at 00617 &

00636. Finally, regarding Dr Weirich’s opinion that the borrow

“pits” created wetlands, Dr Coats and Dr Huffman theorize that the

actual amount of water on the site is not more than before TAAD,

and that the ponding is simply easier to see on aerial photographs

due to removal of topsoil. Doc #87, Ex 9 at 6, Ex 7.

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Further, the City submits evidence to refute the

inference that TAAD measures substantially caused the wetlands. Dr

Huffman concludes that, based on his examination of historical

evidence, wetlands pre-dated the TAAD and that normal rainfall, in

and of itself, is enough to support wetlands on the Property. Doc

#87, Ex 8 at 2, 23-27, 36-37. Dr Huffman also discovered wetlands

on the Glenacre Property directly to the North. Id. Finally, the

City points out that Yamagiwa and prior owners have engaged in

continuous development activities on the Property since the late

1970s that could have impacted topography, hydrology and plant

growth. Doc #52, Ex 4, Ex 9 at 12:5-16, 13:3-14:16, Ex 11, Ex 25

at 5:2-8; Doc #87, Ex 2 at 82:17-22, 97:8-20, 99:4-102:15, 122:17-

126:5, 132:20-133:18. This included grading, compacting of lots,

disking for fire protection, construction of improvements to

connect to Highway 1 and removal of piles of debris, some as large

as “whole houses.” Id.

Yamagiwa does not refute these points in her reply brief. 

Doc #88-1. In sum, the City correctly points out that proof of

“substantial causation” will involve a battle of the experts over

material facts, preventing the court from granting summary

judgment. Accordingly, Yamagiwa’s motion is DENIED.

B

The court next addresses the City’s motion for summary

judgment on both the state and the federal inverse condemnation

claims. The City first argues that Yamagiwa’s claims are time

barred. In California, the statute of limitation is three years

for a physical taking claim arising out of physical damage to real

property and five years for a complete physical taking of title to

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property. Cal CCP §§ 318, 319, 338. There is no federal statute

of limitations for physical taking claims, and, therefore, federal

courts apply relevant state statutes. See Johnson v Railway

Express Agency, Inc, 421 US 454, 462 (1975); Sierra Club v Chevron

USA, Inc, 834 F2d 1517, 1521 (9th Cir 1987). Here, Yamagiwa

alleges physical damage caused by the presence of City-created

wetlands on the Property and her claim is, therefore, controlled by

either the three- or five-year statute of limitations.

It is undisputed that the alleged physical taking – the

drainage measures and removal of fill – occurred in 1984 and 1985. 

The source of the claim – wetland formation resulting from these

measures – is not a single event; it is continuous. Where alleged

damage to private property results from a “continuous process of

physical events” rather than a single event, federal law provides

that a claim accrues when the taking has “stabilized.” United

States v Dickinson, 331 US 745, 749 (1947). 

[S]tabilization occurs when it becomes clear that the

gradual process set into motion by the government has

effected a permanent taking, not when the process has

ceased or when the entire extent of the damage is

determined. Thus, during the time when it is uncertain

whether the gradual process will result in a permanent

taking, the plaintiff need not sue, but once it is clear

that the process has resulted in a permanent taking and

the extent of the damage is reasonably foreseeable, the

claim accrues and the statute of limitations begins to

run.

Boling v US, 220 F3d 1365, 1370-71 (Fed Cir 2000). The flexible

approach of Dickinson has been followed by the California courts. 

See Pierpont Inn, Inc v State of California, 70 Cal 2d 282, 291-93

(1969), disapproved on other grounds in Los Angeles MTA v

Continental Development Corp, 161 Cal 4th 694 (1997).

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It is undisputed that Yamagiwa first filed a claim for

physical taking on May 17, 2000 and that the statute was tolled from

that date. Yamagiwa argues that her claim is timely because it did

not accrue until the City denied her CDP application on May 2, 2000. 

Doc #80 at 15. Because she filed her physical taking claim in 2000

and because that claim was tolled for purposes of this action,

Yamagiwa argues that the present claim is timely. The City argues

that the 2000 denial was a regulatory act and cannot form the basis

for a physical taking claim. Further, the City argues that

Yamagiwa’s inverse claim accrued, at the latest, in 1989.

1

The City’s argument that if the denial of the CDP

constituted any taking, it had to be a regulatory taking is

predicated on the following: 

Where the government authorizes a physical occupation of

property (or actually takes title), the Takings Clause

generally requires compensation. But where the government

merely regulates the use of property, compensation is

required only if considerations such as the purpose of the

regulation or the extent to which it deprives the owner of

the economic use of the property suggest that the

regulation has unfairly singled out the property owner to

bear a burden that should be borne by the public as a

whole. The first category of cases requires courts to

apply a clear rule; the second necessarily entails complex

factual assessments of the purposes and economic effects

of government actions.

 

Yee v City of Escondido, 503 US 519, 522-23 (1992) (citations

omitted). Yamagiwa dismissed her regulatory taking claim with

prejudice in 2004. The City argues that Yamagiwa cannot merge the

accrual of her dismissed regulatory taking claim with her physical

taking claim to avoid the statute of limitations. Doc #92 at 2.

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While Yamagiwa admits this is not a regulatory taking

case, Doc #80 at 1, she contends that “the world is not so neatly

divided into physical and regulatory takings.” Id at 12. Here,

according to Yamagiwa, denial of the CDP was the “manifestation” of

constitutional damages, and an earlier complaint would have been

dismissed as premature for lack of damages. Id at 13-14.

The court agrees. Damages are a required element of a

physical taking claim. Frustruck v City of Fairfax, 212 Cal App 2d

345, 368 (1963) (“Actions for the taking and damaging of private

property are subject to the rule that proof of damage is an

essential part of the plaintiff’s case”); Northwest LA Fish & Game

Preserve Com’n v US, 446 F3d 1285, 1291 (Fed Cir 2006) (“a claim

does not accrue until the claimant suffers damage.”) Indeed the

“stabilization” rule governing the statute of limitations can be

read as an iteration of this basic doctrine. “Dickinson established

the principle that, when the government allows a taking of land to

occur by a continuing process of physical events, plaintiffs may

postpone filing suit until the nature and extent of the taking is

clear.” Northwest at 1291 (citation omitted). 

Indeed, the Federal Circuit’s opinion in Northwest is

instructive. In Northwest, a Louisiana state agency brought suit

against the United States alleging that actions of the Army Corps

of Engineers damaged a lake, called Black Lake, that the state

agency maintained for recreation. The agency was required 

periodically to drain the lake by directing water into the adjacent

Red River in order to remove aquatic weeds. Northwest at 1286-87. 

The Army Corps constructed a project that created a series of

pools, locks and dams on the river. In 1984, the Corps approved a

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design to impound water in one of the pools. Id. This reduced the

state agency’s ability to drain the lake. In 1996, hydrilla, a

submerged weed, became a problem in the lake. Id at 1287-88. 

Hydrilla had first been discovered in 1993 and was also found in

1995; but the extent of the weed in 1996 led the state to request

permission to draw down the lake. Id. In January of 1997, the

Corps refused to allow the drawdown. Id. The state agency filed

suit in 2001, alleging in part appropriation of lands, waters and

properties without compensation. Id at 1288-89. The Court of

Federal Claims dismissed the action on statute of limitations

grounds, finding the 6-year statute under the Tucker Act, 28 USC §

1491, was triggered in 1994. Id at 1289. 

The Federal Circuit reversed, finding that the Corp’s

refusal to drawdown the lake in 1997 triggered the statute. It

wrote:

A taking occurs when governmental action deprives the

owner of all or most of its property interest. (The word

“property” “denote[s] the group of rights inhering in the

citizen's relation to the physical thing, as the right to

possess, use and dispose of it.”). For example, “[w]here

the government by the construction of a dam or other

public works so floods lands belonging to an individual

as to substantially destroy their value there is a taking

within the scope of the Fifth Amendment.”

Northwest at 1289 (citations omitted).

The court continued:

[A] claim does not accrue until the claimant suffers

damage. Because some growth of hydrilla is normal, the

damage in this case, which was uncontrolled overgrowth

and the Corps [sic] refusal to reduce the water level,

did not occur until January 1997. In 1994, when the Corps

had not yet issued a final refusal, there was only the

possibility or threat of damage or a taking. A possible

future taking of property cannot give rise to a present

action for damages. Thus, in this case, until the

hydrilla had grown, and had grown to harmful levels, and

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the Corps refused to drain the lake to alleviate the harm

caused by the overgrowth of hydrilla, damages were not

“present,” i.e. they were still unquantifiable and

speculative. 

Northwest at 1291 (citations omitted).

Accordingly, while the Federal Circuit found that

significant hydrilla growth appeared by 1997, it chose that date at

least in part because that is when the Corp took governmental

action – by refusing the drawdown. Similarly here, the City denied

Yamagiwa’s application for a CDP in 2000, thereby fixing the date

Yamagiwa sustained damage.

Finally, the court notes that Yamagiwa, through agreement

with the City, dismissed her physical taking claim without

prejudice in 2003. The City argues that damage stabilized by 1989,

requiring Yamagiwa to bring the claim by 1994 at the latest. The

agreement between the City and Yamagiwa in 2003, however,

specifically reserved Yamagiwa’s right later to re-assert her

physical taking claim. 

For the reasons above, the court finds that Yamagiwa’s

claim did not stabilize, i e, she did not suffer damage caused by

City-created wetlands, until the 2000 denial of the CDP deprived

her of any right to develop the Property.

The City implies that Yamagiwa could not be damaged by

the 2000 denial because the right to develop in the Coastal Zone

was always contingent on obtaining a CDP. Doc #92 at 9. This, of

course, is sophistry. While the extent and prospects of Yamagiwa’s

ability to develop may be relevant to the measure of damages, it

does not change the fact that the extent of the damages, large or

small, first materialized with the 2000 denial. Indeed it is

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undisputed that Yamagiwa purchased the Property with a vesting

tentative map, and the City admits that “Yamagiwa may have suffered

additional wetlands damage when the City denied the CDP in 2000.” 

Doc #92 at 2 (emphasis in original).

2

Even assuming arguendo that the 2000 denial did not

trigger the accrual of the inverse condemnation claim, the City has

not met its burden to show that the claim accrued earlier than five

years before the complaint was filed, i e, prior to May 17, 1995.

The City points to the fact that HLA, in consultation

with CDFG, charted wetlands on the Property in 1989, a finding

verified by Yamagiwa’s expert, Dr Michael Josselyn. Doc #52, Ex 19

at 52:8-58:8, 60:7-11, 133-137, 164:11-16, 163:5-16. As described

above, the presence of wetlands in 1989-1990 resulted in conditions

imposed on development through the Streambed Alteration Agreement

and the conditions placed on the 1990 VTM. Doc #52, Ex 11, Ex 27

at 1938-39.

Yamagiwa argues, however, that evidence as to the

location and extent of any wetlands in 1989/1990 is unclear and

disputed. Doc #80 at 6. The court agrees. Specifically, the City

fails to establish that any wetlands existing in 1989 were the

alleged City-created wetlands. 

The CDFG’s 1989 memo stated: “During a field visit by

Department personnel, approximately 15-20 percent of the project

site had riparian wetland vegetation with three small retention

ponds.” Doc #71, Ex 5 at 24-25. No map accompanied CDFG’s memo,

and no further detail was provided as to what “15-20 percent” of

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the site CDFG meant, such as whether it referred to the creek

channel and abandoned stock pond in the southeast corner. Doc #49

at 24. There has never been any dispute that the creek channel and

the pond in the southeast corner constituted wetlands and so would

not be developed. Id. The City argues that, while no map

accompanied the CDFG memo, the wetlands report prepared by HLA was

created after extensive consultation with CDFG, and the HLA report

did include a map. The City submits a copy of this map. Doc #94,

Ex 2. The City fails to establish, however, what exactly the map

is supposed to show and nowhere suggests that the map shows wetland

areas corresponding to TAAD areas. If it wanted to show that the

map represented vegetation caused – or even potentially caused – by

the TAAD, the City could have easily done so in its brief or any of

its several expert reports. Quite to the contrary, the City admits

in its opposition to Yamagiwa’s motion that “as shown by the

wetlands maps produced by Harding Lawson Associates in 1989 and

again by various wetlands experts in 1999, most of the wetlands lie

outside of areas allegedly graded by the City.” Doc #83 at 14. 

The City continues, “Moreover, even if some of the graded areas and

some of the wetland areas are located in similar parts of the

Property, such simple correlation is insufficient to show the

causation necessary to find liability as a matter of law.” Id.

The City also points to a portion of the 1989 HLA report

identifying wetland vegetation on approximately 2.5 acres on the

center portion of the property. Doc #52, Ex 13 at 1877. While it

is unclear what “center” means, the City, again in its opposition

to plaintiff’s motion, cites to “evidence of ponding in the preTAAD central depression.” Doc #83 at 2 (emphasis added). As noted

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previously, supra at 7-8, this “evidence” is at best disputed, if

not in doubt.

The City further admits that “evidence establishes that

the Property contains a large topographic depression where flooding

and ponding occurred that predates the construction of the TAAD

improvements.” Doc #83 at 1, 17. And “according to the City’s

experts, there were wetlands on the Property before the TAAD

improvements were even constructed” and “normal rainfall, in and of

itself, is enough to support wetlands on the Property.” Id at 2-3,

18, 25.

Finally, Yamagiwa submits compelling affirmative evidence

refuting any inference that City-created wetlands had substantially

developed by 1989/1990. Specifically, Yamagiwa points to the

language of the City’s May 2, 2000 Resolution, denying Yamagiwa’s

CDP. Doc #45, Ex 179. The City Council made the following

finding:

The owners of a 24.7 acre parcel of land generally known

as the Beachwood subdivision sought and obtained approval

of a vesting tentative map (‘VTM’ herein) from the City

of Half Moon Bay in 1990. That tentative map approved

certain conditions which if satisfied would allow for the

subdivision of the parcel into 83 buildable lots. At the

time that the VTM was approved, it was determined that

wetlands covered a portion of the site, and the map was

approved so as to prevent the development of that area.

Id at 9274 (emphasis added).

The City Council went on to describe the issue in 2000 as

“whether the site has seen an increase in the presence of wetlands

since the 1990 approval of the VTM.” Id at 9276. It found that

there were “additional and previously unstudied wetlands on the

property” (id at 9275); that “the extent of the wetlands on the

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site is greater than was determined at the time the VTM was

approved” (id at 9282); that there were “nine new wetland areas” on

Beachwood (id at 9282); and that an EIR would be required even

though the City approved a negative declaration in 1990 due to “new

information of substantial importance, which was not known and

could not have been known with the exercise of reasonable diligence

at the time the negative declaration was adopted.” Id at 9283.

The City does not dispute this language but argues that

it does not necessarily show that there were “new” wetlands on the

Property in 2000 that did not exist in 1989. Doc #83 at 14. The

City argues that “[s]ince the City was not responsible for the CDP,

it had no reason to study, and did not study the presence of

Coastal Act wetlands on the property at that time [1990].” Id at

9. The court is unpersuaded. The language of the City’s 2000

denial and the evidence of non-City-created wetlands raise a

factual dispute as to when the alleged City-created wetlands

developed to the point of stabilization.

A reasonable jury could find that, if wetlands existed in

1989, they were not as extensive as (or co-extensive with) the

wetlands found in 2000. Accordingly, the court finds that the time

at which the alleged City-created wetlands developed is a disputed

fact, providing a separate and independent reason to deny the

City’s request for summary judgment on statute of limitations

grounds.

3

The preceding discussion uncovers a tension in this

litigation for both parties and especially for the City. Yamagiwa

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alleges that the City’s 1984 actions created the wetlands. For

purposes of opposing the City’s motion, however, Yamagiwa must

maintain that evidence of City-created wetlands was insubstantial

prior to May 1995. Conversely, while the City in defending this

case disclaims that its actions were a substantial cause of the

wetlands, its statute of limitations argument requires the City to

argue that City-created wetlands were developed and established by

1995. Yamagiwa’s position, while the more straightforward, depends

on evidence in dispute. The City’s position, also hinged on

disputed evidence, suffers also from an inherent inconsistency that

makes its presentation problematic. The court cannot, through the

vehicle of summary judgment, choose a position for the parties. 

C

The City alternatively argues that the court should grant

summary judgement on the inverse condemnation claims because

Yamagiwa’s predecessors consented to the alterations to the

Property. Doc #47 at 26. The City argues that the prior owner,

William Lyon, not only consented to the TAAD improvements, but

filed the petition requesting that the City undertake the project. 

Id. Likewise, when the TAAD construction ran short of fill,

William Lyon not only consented, but paid for and used more than

half of the dirt removed from the Property. Id at 26. 

Yamagiwa correctly points out that the applicability of

the consent defense turns on the consent. Doc #80 at 26-27. In

Albers v Los Angeles County, 62 Cal 2d 250 (1965), a group of

developers voluntarily granted an 80-foot right of way to Los

Angeles County for construction of Crenshaw Boulevard. The

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developers also consented to cuts and fills within and outside the

dedicated right of way to construct the road. Id at 264. The

county built the road, cutting and filling as the landowners had

authorized. Id. A large landslide ensued, damaging the owners’

property. Id. As the City argues here, the county in Albers

contended that the developers could not recover because they had

consented to the project and had donated the property necessary

for the road. Id. The California Supreme Court disagreed,

holding that the developers could be estopped from claiming

damages “reasonably to be anticipated by such fills,” but not

damages arising from the ensuing landslide. Id at 265.

[W]e cannot say that the companies in accepting such

benefit as accrued to them through the construction of

Crenshaw Boulevard and the making of the fills consented

to the damage of their land which was not a natural,

necessary and reasonable incident to the construction of

the road and the making of the fills.

Albers v Los Angeles County, 62 Cal 2d 250, 266 (1965) (internal

quotes omitted). Here, Yamagiwa argues, while the prior owners

donated the easement and favored development of the storm drain

system, there is no evidence that Yamagiwa or her predecessors

consented to the development of wetlands on the Property. Doc #80

at 27.

The City does not dispute that consent is no defense

where a defendant’s conduct exceeds the scope of the consent. 

Rather, the City argues:

While [the storm drain dedications] constitute part of

the consent, they are not the entirety of the consent. 

The undisputed facts also show that Property owners

consented to, and indeed paid for the bulk of the removal

of the 13,000 cubic yards of fill from the Property. It

is these areas which Yamagiwa claims have filled up with

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water and formed wetlands. * * * [T]he formation of

wetlands here was, according to Yamagiwa, the direct and

natural result of removal of the fill. Doc #92 at 17. 

This is disingenuous. As discussed above, Yamagiwa alleges that

both the removal of fill and the storm drain easements caused

wetland formation. The City does not argue that wetland formation

was a direct and natural result of the latter project. Further,

Yamagiwa points out that the City’s report on environmental impacts

of the TAAD project, prepared before the TAAD was built, did not

identify wetlands as a likely impact. Doc #45, Ex 77.

Accordingly, a reasonable jury could very well find that

Yamagiwa and her predecessors did not consent to the alleged

wetland formation. For all the above reasons, the City’s motion

for summary judgment on the inverse condemnation claims is DENIED.

IV

Nuisance & Trespass Claims

The City argues that Yamagiwa’s nuisance and trespass

claims are also barred by both the statute of limitations and the

consent doctrine. Doc #47 at 25.

First, the City argues that the claims are time-barred

under the California Tort Claims Act, which provides that no suit

for “money or damages” may be brought against a public entity

unless a written claim was presented to the entity within one year

of the accrual of the cause of action. Cal Gov Code §§ 905, 911.2,

945.4. A suit for “money or damages includes all actions where the

plaintiff is seeking monetary relief, regardless of whether the

action is founded in tort, contract or some other theory.” Hart v

Alameda County, 76 Cal App 4th 766, 778 (1999). The City contends

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that “[a]s with the inverse [condemnation] claim * * * there is

undisputed evidence that the nuisance and trespass claims also

accrued in 1989, at the latest.” Doc #47 at 25. As discussed

above, the court rejects this argument.

The City also points out, however, that Yamagiwa’s

attorney wrote a letter to the City in March 1999, “alleging the

same theory of damage that Yamagiwa puts forth in this case.” Id. 

Accordingly, under the California Tort Claims Act, the City argues,

Yamagiwa’s tort claim, filed on May 17, 2000 was still outside of

the one-year limitations period. Id at 25-26. Yamagiwa fails to

address this argument in her opposition. 

The court has reviewed the March 1999 letter, however,

and disagrees with the City’s characterization. Yamagiwa’s

attorney wrote a letter to the City’s Planning Commission on March

10, 1999 responding to a staff report that concerned the Beachwood

CDP. Doc #52, Ex 5. The staff report had concluded that, based on

the discovery of potential new wetlands on the site, the City could

not act on the pending CDP application. Id at 1. The letter first

informed the Commission that in 1989, the Army Corps of Engineers

had determined that no wetlands would be affected by the project

and that in 1998, the City had circulated a negative declaration

reaching the same conclusion. Id. The letter also informed the

Commission that news of potential wetlands had focused the owner’s

attention “on the issue of ponding water on the site.” Id at 2. 

The owner had learned that “the existing publicly-owned and

operated drainage system on the site [had] ceased to function

properly and [was] spilling water onto the property.” Id. The

letter nowhere, however, conceded that wetlands existed on the

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Property or that the CDP should be denied, and states in pertinent

part:

If the City denies a CDP on the grounds that wetlands

that did not previously exist now prevent the property

from being developed, the City will be liable to the

owner for a physical as well as a regulatory taking of

property. It will also, of course, have to return to

Beachwood all of the assessments Beachwood has paid for

public improvements designed to serve the development of

the site. Id at 3 (emphasis added).

While the City is correct that Yamagiwa alleges in this case that

the drainage system has failed, the crux of the current action is

that the City-created wetlands have damaged Yamagiwa’s property – a

position that she rejects in the March 1999 letter.

Finally, as discussed at length above, Yamagiwa could not

know the extent of her damages for the alleged taking until the

City denied her CDP in 2000. While measure of damages may differ

depending on the cause of action, the basis for her takings damage

claim – loss of value in property caused by wetlands and manifested

by the 2000 denial – provides the same basis for damages alleged

under the nuisance and trespass claims. Accordingly, Yamagiwa’s

nuisance and trespass claims are not time-barred.

The City’s argument that the nuisance and trespass claims

are barred by the consent doctrine is easily disposed. As with the

inverse condemnation claim, consent may be a defense to trespass

and nuisance, but the applicability of the defense turns on the 

consent. See Mangini v Aerojet-General Corp, 230 Cal App 3d 1125,

1140-41 (1991). As discussed above, what Yamagiwa and her

predecessors consented to, i e, whether they could have reasonably

anticipated the wetlands when accepting the TAAD improvements, is a

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disputed issue of fact. Accordingly, the City’s motion for summary

judgment on nuisance and trespass is DENIED.

V

Claim for Recovery of Amounts Paid

Last, the City seeks summary judgment on Yamagiwa’s claim

for recovery of amounts paid. Yamagiwa seeks refunds of the

following amounts: (1) over $300,000 paid to TAAD for the drainage

improvements; (2) over $300,000 paid to install improvements to

Highway 1 to satisfy conditions imposed on its 1990 tentative

subdivision map; and (3) over $790,000 paid to a sewer assessment

district to provide sewage capacity to serve development of the

Property and other properties in the City. Doc #1-2 at ¶¶34-36. 

A

The City first argues that Yamagiwa is not entitled to

reimbursement for payments to TAAD because TAAD was created at the

behest of a prior owner. Doc #47 at 29. Under the Ninth Circuit’s

decision in Furey v City of Sacramento, 780 F2d 1448 (9th Cir

1986), the City argues, the creation of the TAAD thus constitutes

“private investment,” which was voluntarily taken. Id. In Furey,

the City of Sacramento assessed the owners of agricultural land for

sewer improvements that would service urban development of the

land. After the sewer improvements were built and the owners had

paid much of their assigned assessment, the City amended its

general plan and re-zoned the land as open space, preventing the

owners, including plaintiff Furey from developing and making use of

the sewer improvements. Id at 1452. Furey alleged that the

assessment constituted a taking of his property. The Ninth Circuit

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held that “when a private landowner * * * undertakes to construct

improvements at his own expense, no government taking has occurred

when a subsequent exercise of the government’s police power

restricts the landowner’s ability to make use of the improvement.” 

Id at 1454. Applying the Furey factors here, the City concludes

that the TAAD payments fall “on the private investment side of the

line.” Doc #47 at 31. 

Yamagiwa clarifies in her opposition brief, however, that

she does not bring her claim for return of amounts paid under the

Fifth Amendment takings clause or the Ninth Circuit’s Furey opinion. 

Doc #80 at 28. Rather, Yamagiwa’s fourth cause of action is a

pendent state claim brought under the California Supreme Court’s

decision in Furey v City of Sacramento, 24 Cal 3d 862 (1979). Both

the federal and state Furey cases arose from the same dispute

described above. Two landowners brought suit in state court, Furey

and Webster. Furey’s federal action was stayed pending resolution

of the state case. Furey, 24 Cal 3d at 870. At the time Furey was

decided, damages were not available for inverse condemnation owing

to diminution in the value of land, resulting from city-imposed

regulations. (This rule, first established in Agins v City of

Tiburon, 24 Cal 3d 266 (1979) was later repudiated by First

Evangelical Lutheran Church v County of Los Angeles, 482 US 304,

(1987)). Despite the then-existing limitation on damages, the

California Supreme Court in Furey created an equitable remedy for

situations in which “actions have operated to bring about

substantial financial commitment on the part of taxpayers included

in a special assessment district who are precluded by a later

governmental action from realizing substantially all benefits

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generated by the district.” Furey, 24 Cal 3d at 873. Specifically,

the court held:

[I]f the allegations made in the complaints before us are

demonstrated at trial, relief would lie by way of

declaratory relief or mandate precluding the application

of the subject land-use regulations to plaintiffs. We

also believe, however, that prior to the issuance of any

judgment the trial court should afford defendants a

reasonable opportunity to make use of * * * reassessment

procedures * * * or to take other appropriate action

directed toward ameliorating in equitable fashion the

gross inequities which here appear. Furey, 24 Cal 3d at

877-78.

Yamagiwa argues that her claim is one for “equitable” relief and

that, “[h]aving vigorously litigated and defended its CDP denial,

the only alternative left for the City is to refund the assessments

paid.” Doc #80 at 30. 

The City correctly points out, however, that the Furey

court expressly held that plaintiffs could not compel the city to

refund assessments. Furey, 24 Cal 3d at 871-72, 874, 877-78. 

Rather, it recognized that the relevant California statutes left it

to the discretion of the public agency whether to re-assess

plaintiff’s property to provide relief, and that “it has been held

that a writ of mandate to compel reassessment will not lie in such

circumstances.” Id at 874. Further, the Furey court held that,

where a city assesses property for public improvements and then

later re-zones such property, preventing it from realizing the

benefits of the improvements, the sole relief the property owner can

obtain is “declaratory relief or mandate precluding the application

of the subject land-use regulations to plaintiffs.” Id at 877-78. 

Furey held that a city could elect to provide a refund in lieu of

being estopped from applying its regulations, but it did not hold

that the city could be forced to pay in the first instance. Id. 

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Accordingly, Yamagiwa cannot recover amounts paid for the drainage

improvements.

This does not, however, preclude Yamagiwa from seeking

equitable relief from the City’s assessments. See Furey, 24 Cal 3d

at 878; Yamagiwa v City of Half Moon Bay, 2005 WL 1774402 (Cal App 1

Dist 2005) at 10 fn 13. Accordingly, the City’s motion for summary

judgment on Yamagiwa’s claim directed to the assessments must be

DENIED.

B

The above analysis also prevents Yamagiwa from recovering

amounts paid for the Highway 1 improvements and for the sewer

assessment district. While both involved substantial financial

commitments by Yamagiwa and her predecessors, and while Yamagiwa was

prevented from realizing the benefits of these payments, the court

cannot, under equitable theories, compel the City to refund these

assessments. Again, while Yamagiwa cannot recover damages unless

the City determines that is a suitable alternative to declaratory or

equitable relief, Yamagiwa may still pursue equitable relief.

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VI

For reasons discussed above, plaintiff Yamagiwa’s motion

for summary judgment is DENIED. Defendant City of Half Moon Bay’s

motion for summary judgment is DENIED. The parties are to appear

for a pre-trial conference on May 1, 2007 at 9:00 am and for trial

on June 4, 2007 at 8:30 am.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

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