Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-03277/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-03277-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 380
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Property Damage
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Property Damage

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES BIRD,

Plaintiff,

v.

KEEFE KAPLAN MARITIME, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 14-cv-03277-MEJ 

ORDER RE: MOTION TO COMPEL 

JOINDER

Re: Dkt. No. 20

INTRODUCTION

In this case for breach of contract, negligence, and breach of warranty, Plaintiff James Bird 

alleges that his marine vessel, Water Song, sustained damage as a result of improper services 

performed by Defendants Keefe Kaplan Maritime, Inc. (“KKMI”) and Eric Koster dba J&H 

Marine.1 Pending before the Court is KKMI’s Motion to Compel Joinder. Mot., Dkt. No. 20. In 

its Motion, KKMI seeks to compel the joinder of Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London Subscribing 

through Premier Marine Insurance Managers Group (USA) Inc. (“Underwriters”) as required 

parties, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 19 and 21. Bird has filed an Opposition 

(Dkt. No. 21) and KKMI filed a Reply (Dkt. No. 23). The Court previously vacated the March 5, 

2015 hearing and took the matter under submission. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); Civil L.R. 7-1(b). 

Having considered the parties’ positions, relevant legal authority, and the record in this case, the 

Court DENIES KKMI’s Motion for the reasons set forth below.

BACKGROUND

The following factual background is taken from Bird’s First Amended Complaint 

(“FAC”). Dkt. No. 7. Bird owns a marine vessel known as the Water Song. FAC ¶ 9. KKMI and 

 

1 An Entry of Default was entered as to Eric Koster on February 18, 2015. Dkt. No. 35. 

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J&H Marine performed services on the Water Song pursuant to an agreement with Bird. Id. ¶¶ 10-

11. Bird alleges that on or about July 24, 2013, the Water Song sustained severe damage due to 

KKMI’s and J&H Marine’s improper services, which resulted in a loss of the vessel’s use and 

value and caused Bird to incur significant repair costs. FAC ¶¶ 12-13. 

Based on these allegations, Bird filed his initial Complaint on July 21, 2014, alleging three 

causes of action: (1) breach of contract, (2) negligence, and (3) breach of warranty. Dkt. No. 1. 

He subsequently filed his FAC on August 11, 2014, alleging the same causes of action. FAC ¶¶ 

14-16.

On December 29, 2014, KKMI filed the present Motion to Compel Joinder of 

Underwriters, arguing that Underwriters should be compelled to join this lawsuit as plaintiffs

pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 19. Mot. at 3. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 provides for the mandatory joinder of parties, 

commonly referred to as “necessary” parties. Rule 19(a)(1) provides that a party must be joined if 

that party’s absence (1) would preclude the grant of complete relief, (2) would impede that party’s 

ability to protect its interests, or (3) would subject any party to the danger of inconsistent 

obligations. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1). 

A Rule 19 motion requires a three-step analysis. E.E.O.C. v. Peabody Western Coal Co., 

610 F.3d 1070, 1078 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Peabody I”). First, the court must determine if the 

nonparty is a “person required to be joined if feasible” under Rule 19(a) and thus necessary to the 

action. Id. at 1078; Dawavendewa v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 276 

F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 2002). Second, if the nonparty “meets the requirements under Rule 

19(a), ‘the court ... [must] determine[s] whether it is feasible to order that the absentee be 

joined.’” Peabody I, 610 F.3d at 1078 (quoting E.E.O.C. v. Peabody Western Coal Co., 400 F.3d 

774, 778 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Peabody II”)). “‘Finally, if joinder is not feasible, the court must 

determine at the third stage whether the case can proceed without the absentee’ or whether the 

action must be dismissed.” Id. (quoting Peabody II, 400 F.3d at 778). The case must be dismissed 

if the nonparty’s interest in the action is “of such a nature that a final decree cannot be made 

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without either affecting that interest, or leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final 

termination may be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience.” Id. (internal quotation 

omitted). 

Rule 19 is designed to protect absent parties as well as those before the Court from 

multiple litigation, inconsistent judicial determinations, or the impairment of interests or rights. 

CP Nat’l Corp. v. Bonneville Power Admin., 928 F.2d 905, 911 (9th Cir. 1991). Rule 19 also is 

designed to further the public’s interest “in avoiding repeated lawsuits on the same essential 

subject matter.” Id. at 912. The determination of whether an absent party should be joined under 

Rule 19 is fact and circumstance specific. N. Alaska Envtl. Ctr. v. Hodel, 803 F.2d 466, 468 (9th 

Cir. 1986). Finally, subject matter jurisdiction cannot be destroyed by joining the otherwise 

necessary party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(2).

DISCUSSION

In its Motion, KKMI argues that Underwriters are a required party because they are a 

subrogee to the same claims asserted by Bird and because they have expressed an intention to 

recover damages from KKMI arising from those rights. Mot. at 2-3, 5. KKMI and Bird agree that 

Underwriters insured the Water Song at the time the vessel was damaged. Id. at 3; Opp’n at 2. 

However, Bird argues that Underwriters are not a required party because he has a right to recover 

damages from KKMI, regardless of Underwriters’ right to reimbursement. Opp’n at 4-5. 

The first step in a Rule 19 analysis is to determine whether Underwriters are a required 

party to the action. Alto v. Black, 738 F.3d 1111, 1125-26 (9th Cir. 2013). In doing so, the Court 

first asks whether complete relief can be afforded to Bird in Underwriters’ absence. Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 19(a)(1)(A); N.D. ex rel. parents acting as guardians ad litem v. Hawaii Dep’t of Educ., 600 

F.3d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 2010). In the alternative, the Court considers whether Underwriters 

have a legally protected interest in the subject of the suit such that their absence would (1) impede 

their ability to protect that interest or (2) subject Bird or KKMI to the danger of inconsistent 

obligations. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(B); Hawaii Dep’t of Educ., 600 F.3d at 1109. Underwriters 

are a necessary party if they satisfy either test. Dawavendewa, 276 F.3d at 1155. 

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A. Complete Relief as to the Existing Parties

KKMI argues that the existing parties cannot be afforded complete relief in Underwriters’ 

absence. Mot. at 5. However, KKMI fails to articulate a reason why the Court is unable to afford 

complete relief without Underwriters’ presence. 

In his Opposition, Bird argues that Underwriters may not enforce their subrogation right 

until he has been fully compensated. Opp’n at 4. It is Bird’s position that he has the right to bring 

this action against KKMI regardless of Underwriters’ right to reimbursement from the recovery. 

Id. at 5. 

The “complete relief” element is “concerned with consummate rather than partial or 

hollow relief as to those already parties, and with precluding multiple lawsuits on the same cause 

of action.” Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 705 F.2d 1030, 1043 (9th Cir. 1983). 

“This portion of the rule is concerned only with relief as between the persons already parties, not 

as between a party and the absent person whose joinder is sought.” Eldredge v. Carpenters 46 N. 

Cal. Joint Apprenticeship & Training Comm., 662 F.2d 534, 537 (9th Cir. 1981) (internal 

quotation omitted). As such, courts ask whether the nonparty’s absence “would preclude the 

district court from fashioning meaningful relief as between the parties.” Disabled Rights Action 

Comm. v. Las Vegas Events, Inc., 375 F.3d 861, 879 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Here, KKMI fails to explain why complete relief as between the current parties is not 

possible without Underwriters’ participation. It is clear that Bird could obtain complete relief 

without joining Underwriters. Bird alleges breach of contract, negligence, and breach of warranty 

against KKMI and seeks monetary damages. FAC ¶¶ 14-17. Should Bird prove his case, he can 

recover complete relief from KKMI, and Underwriters are not needed to grant Bird this relief. As 

such, Underwriters are not a necessary party under Rule 19(a)(1)(A). 

B. Underwriters’ Interest Relating to Action 

The Court next considers whether Underwriters may be a necessary party because 

Underwriters claim a legally protected interest in the subject of the suit such that a decision in 

their absence will (1) impair or impede its ability to protect that interest or (2) expose Bird or 

KKMI to a substantial risk of multiple or inconsistent obligations. See Rule 19(a)(1)(B); 

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Dawavendewa, 276 F.3d at 1155.

1. Underwriters’ Ability to Protect Interest

KKMI argues that Underwriters’ absence will impair its ability to protect its subrogated 

interest. Mot. at 5. KKMI does not specify how its ability to protect its interest would be 

impaired, and Bird does not respond to this argument in his Opposition. 

Under Rule 19, an absent party is necessary if its “participation is necessary to protect its 

legally cognizable interests.” Disabled Rights Action Comm., 375 F.3d at 880. This requires the 

court to ask whether the absent party’s “interest will be impaired or impeded by the suit.” Makah 

Indian Tribe v. Verity, 910 F.2d 555, 558 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Underwriters may have an interest in the present action. See United States v. Aetna Cas. & 

Surety Co., 338 U.S. 366, 380-81 (1949) (“If [an insurer] has paid only part of the loss, both the 

insured and insurer ... have substantive rights against the tortfeasor which qualify them as real 

parties in interest.” (internal citation omitted)). Underwriters demanded reimbursement for the 

costs of repairs to the Water Song in a letter sent to KKMI on September 19, 2014. Griffin Decl., 

Ex. A at 2, Dkt. No. 20-2. Underwriters asserted that the total paid under Bird’s policy to repair 

the damage was $507,525.86, in addition to Bird’s deductible of $5,700, for a total of 

$513,225.86. Id. The letter further indicated that “a claim is expected.” Id. 

Under Rule 19, “the finding that a party is necessary to the action is predicated only on that 

party having a claim to an interest.” Shermeon v. United States, 982 F.2d 1312, 1317 (9th Cir. 

1982) (emphasis in the original). In other words, “[j]oinder is ‘contingent ... upon an initial 

requirement that the absent party claim a legally protected interest relating to the subject matter of 

the action.’” Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 317 F.3d 954, 971 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Northrop 

Corp., 705 F.2d at 1043). “Where a party is aware of an action and chooses not to claim an 

interest, the district court does not err by holding that joinder was ‘unnecessary.’” Id. at 971

(quoting United States v. Bowen, 172 F.3d 682, 689 (9th Cir. 1999)). 

Here, KKMI informed Underwriters about the present action in a letter written on 

September 29, 2014. Griffin Decl., Ex. B, Dkt. No. 20-3. Underwriters have also submitted a 

declaration relating to this litigation. Dkt. No. 31. Despite their knowledge of Bird’s lawsuit, 

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Underwriters have not asserted a formal interest in this action. Given this background, the Court 

finds it unnecessary to join them as a party. See Northrop Corp., 705 F.2d at 1043-44 

(Government was unnecessary party where it “never asserted a formal interest in either the subject 

matter of this action or the action itself” and “meticulously observed a neutral and disinterested 

posture”); Bowen, 172 F.3d at 689 (joinder unnecessary where absent party was aware of litigation 

but chose not to claim interest); Acer, Inc. v. Tech. Properties Ltd., 2011 WL 1327333 at *2 (N.D. 

Cal. Apr. 11, 2011) (refusing to join party who declined to intervene despite having interest in 

subject matter and knowledge of instant litigation); Blumberg v. Gates, 204 F.R.D. 453, 455 (C.D. 

Cal. Nov. 6, 2001) (“The Court believes that it should, consistent with Rule 19, respect the 

decision of the absent parties [aware of litigation], who have never claimed an interest in the 

present litigation, to remain on the sidelines”). 

2. KKMI’s Risk of Multiple or Inconsistent Obligations

KKMI further argues that Underwriters’ absence leaves it subject to a substantial risk of 

incurring double or inconsistent obligations from different courts. Mot. at 2, 5, 7. KKMI does not 

explain how future judgments would be inconsistent, nor does Bird address the matter in his 

Opposition. 

Rule 19 necessitates joinder of Underwriters if their absence will leave an existing party 

subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(B)(ii). However, although Underwriters may pursue their own lawsuit 

against KKMI, subsequent litigation that results in different liabilities does not necessitate 

compulsory joinder. United Kingdom Mut. Steamship Assurance Ass’n (Bermuda), Ltd. v. Cont’l 

Maritime of San Francisco, Inc., 1991 WL 354881 at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 1991) (“A possibility 

of multiple litigation with inconsistent results does not require joinder of an absent person.”); 

Blumberg, 203 F.R.D. at 447 (“[T]he fact that [the defendant] might obtain different results in 

different cases does not establish a basis for Rule 19 joinder.”). 

Nor would KKMI be subject to inconsistent obligations if Underwriters were not joined in 

this action. “Inconsistent obligations occur when a party is unable to comply with one court’s 

order without breaching another court’s order concerning the same incident. Inconsistent 

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adjudications or results, by contrast, occur when a defendant successfully defends a claim in one 

forum, yet loses on another claim arising from the same incident in another forum.” Cachil Dehe 

Band of Wintun Indians of the Colusa Indian Cmty. v. California, 547 F.3d 962, 976 (9th Cir. 

2008) (quoting Delgado v. Plaza Las Americas, Inc., 139 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1998)). In this case, 

Bird only seeks a monetary judgment. FAC ¶ 17. Should Bird prevail, KKMI could conceivably 

comply with that judgment without being forced to breach another court’s order regarding any 

claims brought by Underwriters. See Donne v. Hart, 2011 WL 3925129, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 

2011) (“Even if both Plaintiffs and [absent party] were to prevail against Defendants in separate 

suits, Defendants’ total liability is limited to the ... loss; a recovery in one suit will be considered 

by the later suit in determining damage.”). 

Accordingly, Underwriters are not a necessary party under Rule 19(a)(1)(B) and joinder is 

not required. Because Underwriters are not a party “required to be joined,” the Court need not 

consider whether joinder is feasible. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, the Court DENIES KKMI’s Motion to Compel Joinder. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 5, 2015

______________________________________

MARIA-ELENA JAMES

United States Magistrate Judge

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