Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-13-05093/USCOURTS-caDC-13-05093-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

---

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 11, 2014 Decided May 13, 2014 

No. 13-5093 

RONNIE FOOTE, 

APPELLANT

v. 

ERNEST MONIZ, SECRETARY OF ENERGY, 

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:11-cv-01351) 

Ronnie Foote, appearing pro se, argued the cause and 

filed the briefs for appellant. 

Charles W. Scarborough, Attorney, U.S. Department of 

Justice, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief 

were Stuart F. Delery, Acting Assistant Attorney General, 

Ronald C. Machen Jr., U.S. Attorney, and Marleigh D. 

Dover, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice. 

Before: KAVANAUGH and PILLARD, Circuit Judges, and 

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge. 

USCA Case #13-5093 Document #1492703 Filed: 05/13/2014 Page 1 of 6
2 

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge

KAVANAUGH. 

KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge: In order to protect national 

security, the Department of Energy’s Human Reliability 

Program carefully evaluates employment applicants for 

certain positions, such as those where the employees would 

have access to nuclear devices, materials, or facilities. A 

limited number of positions fall into that category and require 

certification under this Program. See 10 C.F.R. § 712.10. To 

obtain certification, applicants must meet a range of 

requirements, including passing a psychological evaluation, 

passing random drug tests, annually submitting an SF-86 

Questionnaire for National Security Positions, and 

successfully completing a counterintelligence evaluation that 

includes a polygraph examination. See id. § 712.11. 

In this case, the Department refused to certify Ronnie 

Foote under the Human Reliability Program. Foote claims 

that, in denying him certification, the Department relied on 

the psychological evaluation of a Department psychologist, 

Dr. Daniel Seagrave, who allegedly recommended against 

certification because of Foote’s race. Because Foote could 

not obtain the certification, he could not obtain the job he 

wanted at the Department. 

Foote sued under Title VII. The Government says that 

Foote’s Title VII claim is barred by Department of the Navy v. 

Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988). The District Court agreed. 

To resolve the Egan issue here, we must address two 

questions. First, under Egan, is the Department of Energy’s 

denial of Human Reliability Program certification the kind of 

agency judgment that is insulated from judicial review, absent 

a statute that specifically makes the judgment reviewable? 

USCA Case #13-5093 Document #1492703 Filed: 05/13/2014 Page 2 of 6
3 

Second, was Dr. Seagrave in the category of Department of 

Energy personnel trained and authorized to make a judgment 

about Foote’s suitability for certification? 

First, we conclude that the Department of Energy’s 

decision not to certify an applicant under the Human 

Reliability Program is the kind of judgment covered by Egan. 

Egan stated that the presumption in favor of judicial 

review of administrative action “runs aground when it 

encounters concerns of national security.” 484 U.S. at 527. 

The Court identified the President’s Article II Commander in 

Chief authority – a “constitutional investment of power in the 

President” that “exists quite apart from any explicit 

congressional grant” – as a source of the Executive Branch’s 

authority to control access to classified information. Id. And 

the Court recognized that “unless Congress specifically has 

provided otherwise, courts traditionally have been reluctant to 

intrude upon the authority of the Executive in military and 

national security affairs.” Id. at 530. In Egan, the Court 

therefore held that the agency’s decision to deny or revoke a 

security clearance was not subject to review because Congress 

had not specifically provided otherwise. 

On several occasions, we have read Egan to bar review, 

absent a statute specifically providing otherwise, of an agency 

employment action that is based on a similar kind of 

predictive national security judgment as that which underlies 

the denial or revocation of a security clearance. 

For example, in United States Information Agency v. Krc, 

the United States Information Agency had refused to clear a 

Foreign Service officer for overseas postings. 905 F.2d 389 

(D.C. Cir. 1990). Citing Egan, we concluded that the 

agency’s decision was not reviewable. See id. at 394-96. We 

USCA Case #13-5093 Document #1492703 Filed: 05/13/2014 Page 3 of 6
4 

reasoned that the “nature” of the agency’s decision was 

“analogous to the Navy’s decision in Egan” because it 

involved an assessment of whether the officer might 

compromise sensitive information. Id. at 395. 

In Ryan v. Reno, the Department of Justice had decided 

that several job applicants were ineligible for security 

clearances. 168 F.3d 520 (D.C. Cir. 1999). The applicants 

sued under Title VII. We ruled that the Department’s 

decision was not reviewable because it was “based on the 

same sort of ‘predictive judgment’ that Egan tells us ‘must be 

made by those with the necessary expertise in protecting 

classified information,’ without interference from the courts.” 

Id. at 524 (quoting Egan, 484 U.S. at 529). 

In Bennett v. Chertoff, the Transportation Security 

Administration had decided that a job applicant was not 

“suitable” for employment because she could not obtain a 

TSA security clearance. 425 F.3d 999 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The 

applicant sued under Title VII. We again stated that the 

agency’s decision was not reviewable under Egan. See id. at 

1001-04. 

In our view, the Egan principle, as applied by the 

Supreme Court and in our cases, likewise applies to the 

Department of Energy’s decision whether to certify someone 

under its Human Reliability Program. To begin with, the 

Government has a substantial national security interest in 

denying unreliable or unstable individuals access to nuclear 

devices, materials, and facilities, a point that requires no 

extended discussion. Indeed, the Human Reliability Program 

was established in part under the same Executive Order cited 

in Egan – Executive Order 10,450 – in order to “protect the 

national security” by identifying “individuals whose judgment 

USCA Case #13-5093 Document #1492703 Filed: 05/13/2014 Page 4 of 6
5 

may be impaired” by any “condition or circumstance that may 

represent a reliability, safety, or security concern.” Human 

Reliability Program, 69 Fed. Reg. 3213, 3213-14, 3223 (Jan. 

23, 2004). Further aligning this program with Egan, an 

applicant seeking certification under the Human Reliability 

Program must already possess or obtain a “Q” access 

authorization, the Department of Energy’s highest level of 

security clearance. See 10 C.F.R. § 712.11(a)(1). 

In short, the decision whether to certify an applicant 

under the Human Reliability Program, like the decision 

whether to grant a regular security clearance, is “an attempt to 

predict” an applicant’s “future behavior and to assess 

whether, under compulsion of circumstances or for other 

reasons, he might compromise sensitive information.” Egan, 

484 U.S. at 528. Therefore, the decision whether to certify an 

applicant under the Human Reliability Program is the kind of 

agency judgment that Egan insulates from review, absent a 

statute that specifically says otherwise. 

Second, we conclude that Dr. Seagrave, the individual 

who performed the psychological evaluation of Foote, was in 

the category of officials within the Department of Energy 

authorized and trained to make a judgment about Foote’s 

suitability for certification. 

In Rattigan v. Holder, we held that Egan shields from 

review the “security-clearance-related judgments of agency 

personnel specifically trained and authorized to make them.” 

643 F.3d 975, 982 (D.C. Cir. 2011), on rehearing, 689 F.3d 

764, 768 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (adhering to prior panel decision on 

this point). The psychological evaluation component of the 

Human Reliability Program determines whether an applicant 

“(1) Represents a security concern; or (2) Has a condition that 

USCA Case #13-5093 Document #1492703 Filed: 05/13/2014 Page 5 of 6
6 

may prevent the individual from performing . . . duties in a 

reliable and safe manner.” 10 C.F.R. § 712.14(a); see also 69 

Fed. Reg. at 3215 (psychological evaluation aims to assess 

“at-risk behavior or conditions that raise a security concern”). 

The psychological evaluation is administered by what the 

regulations describe as Designated Psychologists who must 

meet specified education and experience requirements. See 

10 C.F.R. § 712.33. Foote was examined by one such 

psychologist, Dr. Seagrave. Dr. Seagrave served as the 

Alternate Lead Psychologist at the National Nuclear Safety 

Administration within the Department of Energy. As a 

psychologist specifically trained and assigned to conduct 

psychological evaluations for this important program, Dr. 

Seagrave was well within the category of individuals 

authorized under Rattigan to make a judgment about Foote’s 

suitability for certification. Therefore, under Egan, the 

Department’s decision not to certify Foote under the Human 

Reliability Program is unreviewable, and Foote’s suit may not 

proceed. 

We affirm the judgment of the District Court. 

So ordered. 

USCA Case #13-5093 Document #1492703 Filed: 05/13/2014 Page 6 of 6