Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01539/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01539-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 17:101 Copyright Infringement

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STARBUZZ TOBACCO, INC., a

California corporation,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 13CV1539-MMA (KSC)

ORDER: 

DENYING APPLICATION TO

FILE THE ACTION UNDER

SEAL;

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S EX

PARTE APPLICATION FOR

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING

ORDER;

DENYING APPLICATION FOR

A SEIZURE ORDER;

DENYING APPLICATION FOR

SUBSTITUTE CUSTODIAN

ORDER;

GRANTING APPLICATION

FOR AN ORDER TO SHOW

CAUSE WHY A PRELIMINARY

INJUNCTION SHOULD NOT

ISSUE

vs.

WISAM NAMOU, et al.,

Defendants.

On July 2, 2012, Starbuzz Tobacco, Inc. (“Plaintiff” or “Starbuzz”) brought

the instant copyright and trademark infringement action against Defendants Wisam

Namou and Sukrat Namou (“Defendants”). Currently pending before the Court is

- 1 - 13CV1539

Case 3:13-cv-01539-MMA-KSC Document 6 Filed 07/02/13 Page 1 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiff’s application to file the action under seal, along with a separate ex parte

motion for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”), an order to show cause (“OSC”)

why a preliminary injunction should not issue, a seizure order, an order prohibiting

destruction of evidence, a substitute custodian order, and an expedited discovery

order. For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s application to

file the action under seal; DENIES Plaintiff’s ex parte motion for a TRO and related

requests; and GRANTS Plaintiff’s application for an OSC why a preliminary

injunction should not issue.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Starbuzz is a leading hookah tobacco manufacturer and distributor in

the United States, with over ninety trademarks in the United States and trademark

registrations in over thirty-three countries. Since its formation, Plaintiff has

expanded its product line to include hookah accessories, cigars, charcoal, candles,

air fresheners, energy drinks, and electronic cigarettes. On January 21, 2013,

Plaintiff applied with the Copyright Office to register the design appearing on page 2

of Plaintiff’s complaint (the “Copyrighted Design”). Plaintiff also uses the

following trademarks that are registered for tobacco and related products and

services: STARBUZZ (Reg. No. 3,113,110), STARBUZZ TOBACCO SINCE 2005

(Reg. No. 3,783,438), BLUE MIST (Reg. No. 3,619,407), CITRUS MIST (Reg. No.

3,695,500), CODE 69 (Reg. No. 3,695,438), DOUBLE APPLE (Reg. No.

4,020,760), PINK (Reg. No. 3,672,967), SAFARI MELON DEW (Reg. No.

3,619,357), and SEX ON THE BEACH (Reg. No. 3,838,818). Plaintiff has also

applied to register various trademarks for electronic cigarettes including the marks

STARBUZZ (Ser. No. 85/909,961) and BLUE MIST (Ser. No. 85/812,403)

(collectively, the Registered Marks and Applications for Marks are referred to as the

“Starbuzz Marks”).

In June 2013, Plaintiff was informed by one of its distributors that Defendants

were selling e-liquid products bearing labels with a design substantially similar to

- 2 - 13CV1539

Case 3:13-cv-01539-MMA-KSC Document 6 Filed 07/02/13 Page 2 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the Copyrighted Design and some of the Starbuzz Marks. Plaintiff, however, does

not produce e-liquid products. Upon receiving this information, the distributor

proceeded to purchase three bottles of e-liquid products from Defendants’ store,

Pure Smoke Shop, located in Lakeside, California. Plaintiff later authorized an

investigator to assess Defendants’ activities and acquire additional evidence. The

investigator purchased additional e-liquid products from Pure Smoke Shop and from

Defendants’ second store, Aztec Smoke Shop. 

According to Plaintiff, the outside of the e-liquid products purchased from

Defendants mimics the appearance of Starbuzz products. The products use

Plaintiff’s house mark “STARBUZZ,” and prominently display a design

substantially similar to the Copyrighted Design. Further, the e-liquid flavors are

nearly identical to Starbuzz’s trademarks for its popular flavored hookah tobacco.

Additionally, Defendants’ products contain the following warning label:

WARNINGS: Potentially fatal if ingested. Seek medical attention if ingestion or contact with skin/eyes occurs. Wash skin and/or

flush eyes immediately if contact occurs.” 

This product should not be used by persons under the age of 18

years of age. Store away from children, light, pets & heat with a container closed tightly. Consult a physician before use.

[Elhalwani Decl. ¶ 15.]

Plaintiff alleges that since it does not know the exact ingredients of the eliquid products, it can only assume, based on the warnings, that the e-liquid products

are indeed potentially fatal and harmful to consumers. Accordingly, Plaintiff insists

that sales of the e-liquid products must be stopped immediately to avoid further

potential death or injury. Moreover, Plaintiff alleges, any harm arising from the use

of the e-liquid products will be unfairly and mistakenly attributed to Plaintiff,

negatively impacting Plaintiff’s reputation. 

DISCUSSION

A. Ex Parte TRO

The standard for a TRO is the same as for a preliminary injunction. See

- 3 - 13CV1539

Case 3:13-cv-01539-MMA-KSC Document 6 Filed 07/02/13 Page 3 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir.

2001). To obtain preliminary injunctive relief, the moving party must show: (1) a

likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a likelihood of irreparable harm to the

moving party in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips

in the moving party’s favor; and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest. 

Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). The court may

apply a sliding scale test, under which “the elements of the preliminary injunction

test are balanced, so that a stronger showing of one element may offset a weaker

showing of another.” Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131

(9th Cir. 2011). A restraining order is an “extraordinary remedy that may only be

awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter,

555 U.S. at 22.

With respect to issuing an ex parte TRO, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

65(b)(1) provides that a “court may issue a temporary restraining order without

written or oral notice to the adverse party or its attorney only if: (A) specific facts in

an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that immediate and irreparable

injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be

heard in opposition; and (B) the movant’s attorney certifies in writing any efforts

made to give notice and the reasons why it should not be required.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

65 (emphasis added). 

The United States Supreme Court has explained that the circumstances

justifying the issuance of an ex parte TRO are extremely limited:

The stringent restrictions imposed . . . by Rule 65 on the availability of ex parte temporary restraining orders reflect the fact that our entire

jurisprudence runs counter to the notion of court action taken before

reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard has been granted both sides of a dispute. Ex parte temporary restraining orders are no doubt necessary in certain circumstances, but under federal law they should be restricted to serving their underlying purpose of preserving the status quo and preventing irreparable harm just so long as is

necessary to hold a hearing, and no longer.

Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 438-39 (1974) (internal

- 4 - 13CV1539

Case 3:13-cv-01539-MMA-KSC Document 6 Filed 07/02/13 Page 4 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

citation omitted). 

Consistent with the overriding concern articulated by the Supreme Court, the

Ninth Circuit has stated that there are “very few” circumstances justifying the

issuance of an ex parte TRO. Reno Air Racing Ass’n, Inc. v. McCord, 452 F.3d

1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2006). For instance, notice may be excused where it “is

impossible either because the identity of the adverse party is unknown or because a

known party cannot be located in time for a hearing.” Id. Or, notice may not be

required where providing “notice to the defendant would render fruitless the further

prosecution of the action” because the adverse party is likely to destroy evidence. 

Id.

In the context of trademark infringement, such cases include situations where

an alleged infringer is likely to dispose of the infringing goods before the hearing.

Reno Air, 452 F.3d at 1131. To justify an ex parte proceeding on this ground, “the

applicant must do more than assert that the adverse party would dispose of evidence

if given notice.” Id. “[P]laintiffs must show that defendants would have disregarded

a direct court order and disposed of the goods within the time it would take for a

hearing . . . [and] must support such assertions by showing that the adverse party has

a history of disposing of evidence or violating court orders or that persons similar to

the adverse party have such a history.” Id. (citation omitted).

Plaintiff first contends that an ex parte TRO is appropriate because there is a

“clear and present danger that consumers will be physically harmed if Defendants

are not immediately enjoined from distributing and selling their infringing

products.” [Mot. at 8.] Proceeding with normal notice and hearing procedures

increases the risk that Defendants’ dangerous products will reach the public or that

Defendants will improperly dispose of the products without taking into account their

hazardous nature. [Id.] Furthermore, Plaintiff argues that if anyone is harmed by the

product, it will be erroneously blamed. 

Plaintiff’s argument fails to establish either the presence or immediacy of

- 5 - 13CV1539

Case 3:13-cv-01539-MMA-KSC Document 6 Filed 07/02/13 Page 5 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

harm necessary to issue an ex parte TRO. Plaintiff provides no evidence of the

potential danger of the product other than the warning label. Yet, the presence of a

warning label does not establish that the e-liquid creates a “clear and present danger”

to consumers. Warning labels are ubiquitous, and serve to decrease, not increase,

harm. Thus, the Court finds this argument to be purely speculative. So, to, is the

corresponding argument that Plaintiff will be erroneously blamed should a consumer

be injured by the product. But more relevant to the present discussion, Plaintiff fails

to demonstrate why giving notice to Defendant of the pending TRO would increase

these harms. 

Second, Plaintiff contends that an ex parte TRO is appropriate because

“[o]nce Defendants become aware of the weight of evidence against them, through a

noticed application for temporary restraining order, they are likely to attempt to

destroy or hide evidence of their wrongdoing.” [Mot. at 9.] According to Plaintiff, 

“[t]he fact that [Defendants] operate two retail stores with a limited amount of

inventory at each store will allow them to quickly and easily destroy or hide the

infringing products and/or the means of making or obtaining such goods, as well as

hide or destroy related business records, to avoid being caught with the illicit items

and to further hide the extent of their infringing activities.” [Id.]

1

However, Plaintiff has not submitted evidence demonstrating that “notice to

the defendant[s] would render fruitless the further prosecution of the action.” Reno

Air, 452 F.3d at 1131. Plaintiff does not cite evidence showing that Defendants

would disregard a Court order and dispose of or hide the allegedly infringing goods

within the time it would take for a hearing. For instance, Plaintiff offers no evidence

that Defendants have failed to appear in court when required or evidence suggesting

1

 The Court finds Plaintiff’s reasons for proceeding ex parte to be contradictory: on the one

hand, Defendants should not be given notice because “proceeding with normal notice and hearing

procedures increases the risk that Defendants’ dangerous products will reach the public . . . .” [Mot.

at 8.] But on the other hand, if notice is given, Defendants will “destroy or hide the infringing

products.” [Mot. at 9.] If the products were destroyed or hidden, it is difficult to imagine how they

would reach the public. 

- 6 - 13CV1539

Case 3:13-cv-01539-MMA-KSC Document 6 Filed 07/02/13 Page 6 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

that Defendants have a history of disposing of evidence or that other individuals or

entities similar (i.e., reasonably comparable) to Defendants have a history of

destroying evidence. Instead, Plaintiff generally argues that “most infringers who

are faced with such clear allegations of infringement and the imminent seizure of

property and records are highly likely to destroy evidence in an effort to hide their

wrongdoing. [Mot. at 9.] A declaration by Plaintiff’s counsel, Natu Patel, was filed

to support this assertion. [See Patel Decl. ¶ 4 (“In my experience, accused infringers

served with notice of an application for a temporary restraining order and/or

preliminary injunction will attempt to destroy evidence in their possession in an

effort to hide their wrongdoing.”).]

Furthermore, it appears that notice to the Defendants would not render

fruitless the further prosecution of the action because Plaintiff already has in its

possession several allegedly infringing products. Without voicing an opinion as to

the veracity of this evidence, the Court simply points out that such evidence may

already form the basis of a claim.

In sum, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s conclusory argument and the

statements made by its counsel are insufficient to justify the issuance of a TRO

without notice to Defendants. While Plaintiff has filed affidavits and evidence in

support of its motion, Plaintiff has failed to “clearly show that immediate and

irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party

can be heard in opposition,” as required for the issuance of an ex parte TRO. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b) (emphasis added). Accordingly, because Plaintiff has not

shown immediacy of harm, Plaintiff has not shown good cause to be excused from

the notice requirement set forth in Rule 65(b)(1). 

B. Ex Parte Seizure Orders under 15 U.S.C. § 1116

Predicated on its claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1114(a), Plaintiff has requested an

ex parte seizure order under 15 U.S.C. § 1116. Section 1116(d)(1)(A) provides that

in counterfeit trademark cases arising under 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a), a court may

- 7 - 13CV1539

Case 3:13-cv-01539-MMA-KSC Document 6 Filed 07/02/13 Page 7 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

issue an ex parte injunction “providing for the seizure of goods and counterfeit

marks involved in such violation and the means of making such marks, and records

documenting the manufacture, sale, or receipt of things involved in such violation.”

15 U.S.C. § 1116(d) (1)(A); Vuitton v. White, 945 F.2d 569, 572 (3d Cir. 1991).

“The purpose of the ex parte seizure provision is to provide victims of trademark

counterfeiting with a means of ensuring that the courts are able to exercise their

jurisdiction effectively in counterfeiting cases.” Vuitton, 945 F.2d at 575 (quoting

Joint Statement on Trademark Counterfeiting Legislation, 130 Cong. Rec. H12076,

H12080 (1984) ( “Joint Statement”)). The courts are only to issue such orders where

there is no other means by which to prevent those who deal in counterfeits from

destroying or transferring evidence. Id.

Plaintiff states that the standard to be applied in determining whether to grant

a seizure order ex parte is the same as that applied to an application for a preliminary

injunction. [Mot. at 22.] While it is true that these requirements must be

established, there are a number of other requirements under § 1116(d) that Plaintiff

fails to address. For instance, under § 1116(d)(2), the movant must address whether

the local United States attorney should received notice.

The court shall not receive an application under this subsection unless the applicant has given such notice of the application as is reasonable under the circumstances to the United States attorney for the judicial district in which such order is sought. Such attorney may participate in the proceedings arising under such application if such proceedings may affect evidence of an offense against the United States. The court may deny such application if the court determines that the public interest in a potential prosecution so requires.

15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(2) (emphasis added). In addition, the application “shall–(A) be

based on an affidavit or the verified complaint establishing facts sufficient to support

the findings of fact and conclusions of law required for such order; and (B) contain

the” following information for use in the court’s order: (1) findings of fact and

conclusions of law; (2) a description of the matter to be seized and its location; (3)

the seizure date; (4) the security required; and (5) the post-seizure hearing date. Id. §

- 8 - 13CV1539

Case 3:13-cv-01539-MMA-KSC Document 6 Filed 07/02/13 Page 8 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1116(d)(3), (d)(5).

Further, “[t]he court shall not grant such an application unless–” the applicant

posts adequate security as a court determines; and “the court finds that it clearly

appears from specific facts that”: (1) only an ex parte seizure order will achieve the

purposes of § 1114; (2) the applicant has not publicized the requested seizure; (3)

the applicant is likely to succeed in showing the person against whom seizure would

be ordered used a counterfeit mark in violation of § 1114; (4) an immediate and

irreparable injury will occur if such seizure is not ordered; (5) the matter to be seized

will be located at the place identified in the application; (6) the harm to the applicant

of denying the application outweighs the harm to the legitimate interests of the

person against whom seizure would be ordered of granting the application; and (7)

the person against whom seizure would be ordered, or persons acting in concert with

such person, would destroy, move, hide, or otherwise make such matter inaccessible

to the court, if the applicant were to proceed on notice to such person. Id. §

1116(d)(4); Vuitton, 945 F.2d at 574 n.5.

In light of these requirements, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to meet

its burden to demonstrate that a seizure order is appropriate. Indeed, Plaintiff’s

motion papers nearly entirely fail to address any of the requirements listed above. 

Thus, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s ex parte seizure request.

C. Substitute Custodian Order

Plaintiff requests that the Court appoint The Patel Firm, P.C., as custodian

over any goods seized. [Mot. at 23.] However, because the Court denies Plaintiff’s

request for an ex parte seizure order, Plaintiff’s request for a substitute custodian

order is DENIED.

D. Request For An OSC Why A Preliminary Injunction Should Not Issue 

Although Plaintiff is not entitled to an ex parte TRO, given the declarations

submitted by Plaintiff and the evidence attached thereto, which raise serious

allegations of trademark and copyright infringement, the Court will issue an

- 9 - 13CV1539

Case 3:13-cv-01539-MMA-KSC Document 6 Filed 07/02/13 Page 9 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

evidence preservation order and set an expedited briefing schedule for a hearing

regarding Plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s

request for an OSC why a preliminary injunction should not issue is GRANTED.

E. Request To File The Action Under Seal

In light of the Court’s findings, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s request to file

the action under seal.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1. Plaintiff’s application to file the action under seal is DENIED.

2. Plaintiff’s request for an ex parte TRO is DENIED.

3. Plaintiff’s request for an ex parte seizure order is DENIED. 

4. Plaintiff’s request for a substitute custodian order is DENIED.

5. Plaintiff’s request for an OSC why a preliminary injunction should not

issue is GRANTED. Plaintiff shall serve Defendants with all documents filed in

this matter, including the complaint, the instant applications, and this Order by July

8, 2013, and provide proofs of service to the Court by July 11, 2013. Once these

documents are timely served on Defendants, Plaintiff may contact the Court to

schedule an OSC hearing on the request for a preliminary injunction. 

6. The Court ORDERS Defendants to take reasonable steps to preserve

any and all records or documents, as defined in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

34(a)(1)(A), of the following products, in their possession, custody, or control now

or that come into their possession custody, or control hereafter, whether apparently

legitimate or counterfeit: products that bear Plaintiff’s Starbuzz Marks, as set forth

in Plaintiff’s complaint and exhibits attached thereto.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

- 10 - 13CV1539

Case 3:13-cv-01539-MMA-KSC Document 6 Filed 07/02/13 Page 10 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7. The Court will reconsider Plaintiff’s request for an expedited discovery

after Defendants have had the opportunity to brief this issue and the Court has ruled

on Plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: July 2, 2013

Hon. Michael M. Anello

United States District Judge

- 11 - 13CV1539

Case 3:13-cv-01539-MMA-KSC Document 6 Filed 07/02/13 Page 11 of 11