Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00250/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-00250-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 370
Nature of Suit: Other Fraud
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Fraud

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

FIRST HORIZON HOME LOAN

CORPORATION,

Plaintiff, 

v.

MICHAEL EDWARD PHILLIPS, et al.

Defendants.

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No. CV 07-0250-PHX-MHM

ORDER

Currently before the Court are Plaintiff First Horizon Home Loan Corporation’s

(“First Horizon”) motion to strike Defendant Michael Phillips’ affirmative defense, or in

the alternative, motion for a more definite statement pursuant to Rule 12 of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) (Dkt. #8); First Horizon’s motion to strike Defendants

Guaranty Title Agency of Arizona, Inc. (“Guaranty Title”), Christina Lovett, and Claudia

Solis’s affirmative defenses pursuant to FRCP 12 (Dkt. #30); Plaintiff’s motion for

default judgment against Defendant Jason Nowak pursuant to FRCP 55(b)(2) (Dkt. #36);

and Defendant Doron Jampolsky’s motion to quash summons and/or dismiss complaint

due to insufficient service of process (Dkt. #28). After reviewing the pleadings and the

relevant law, the Court issues the following Order.

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I. BACKGROUND

This case involves the sale of the real property located at 7726 North 16th Lane in

Phoenix, Arizona from the seller, Defendant Phillips, to Mercedes Robinson, in which

Plaintiff First Horizon provided loan funding for the transaction (the “Subject

Transaction”) by means of a first mortgage in the amount of $400,000.00, and a second

mortgage in the amount of $100,000.00 (the “Subject Loans”). (Plaintiff’s Amended

Complaint, “Compl.”, Dkt. #5, ¶¶ 14-18). During all relevant times hereto, Defendants

Phillips and Nowak were loan officers for First Horizon, and Defendant Solis was an

escrow officer for Defendant Guaranty Title. (Compl. ¶¶ 4, 7; Defendant Guaranty Title,

Lovett, and Solis’s Answer, ¶ 1). First Horizon contends that Defendant Nyden, during

all relevant times hereto, was the girlfriend of Defendant Phillips and a personal friend of

Robinson, the borrower. (Compl. ¶ 5). First Horizon also contends that, at all relevant

times hereto, Defendant Solis was an escrow officer for Guaranty Title and Defendant

Jampolsky was a Notary Public in the State of Arizona. (Compl. ¶¶ 9, 28). First Horizon

alleges that it incurred losses due to an “elaborate, loan-fraud scheme, perpetrated by

Defendants” in connection with the Subject Transaction and the Subject Loans. (Compl.

¶ 13). Defendants Phillips, Guaranty Title, Lovett, and Solis contest any liability in

connection with the Subject Transaction and the Subject Loans. (Defendant Phillips’s

Answer, Dkt. #7; Defendants Guaranty Title, Lovett, and Solis’s Answer, Dkt. #17). First

Horizon’s complaint includes claims of fraud, conspiracy to commit fraud, and unjust

enrichment against Defendants Phillips, Nowak, and Nyden; constructive fraud against

Defendants Phillips and Nowak; breach of fiduciary duty against Phillips, Nowak,

Guaranty Title, Lovett, and Solis; negligence against Defendants Guaranty Title, Lovett,

Solis, and Jampolsky; and breach of escrow contract against Guaranty Title. (Compl., pp.

10-17).

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II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On December 1, 2006, First Horizon filed a complaint in the Maricopa County

Superior Court of Arizona. (Affidavit of Stephanie Wilson, Dkt. #31, Ex. A). Then, on

February 1, 2007, Defendant Michael Phillips removed this case to the U.S. District Court

for the District of Arizona. (Notice of Removal, Dkt. #1). 

On March 2, 2007, First Horizon filed an amended complaint. (Dkt. #s 5, 6). And

on March 7, 2007, the District Court issued summons as to the named Defendants in First

Horizon’s amended complaint. (Dkt. #7). Defendant Phillips answered the complaint on

March 23, 2007 (Dkt. #7); and on April 12, 2007, First Horizon filed the instant motion to

strike Phillips’s affirmative defense pursuant to FRCP 12(f), or in the alternative for a

more definite statement pursuant to FRCP 12(e). (Dkt. #8). Defendants Guaranty Title,

Lovett, and Solis waived their summons and then answered the complaint on June 16,

2007 (Dkt. #s 9, 17). And on July 9, 2007, First Horizon filed the instant motion to strike

Guaranty Title, Lovett, and Solis’s affirmative defense. (Dkt. #30).

On May 16, 2007, First Horizon applied for entry of default against Defendant

Nowak pursuant to FRCP 55(a). (Dkt. #11). First Horizon served Nowak on April 22,

2007, by leaving copies of the summons, complaint, exhibits, and notice of errata with

“Richard Tracey, co-occupant” at Nowak’s residence. (Affidavit of Service, Dkt. # 12). 

Nowak did not respond within the 20 days allotted under FRCP 12(a); and on June 29,

2007, the Clerk of the Court entered default against Nowak. (Dkt. #27). Then, on August

17, 2007, First Horizon filed the instant motion for default judgment against Nowak

pursuant to FRCP 55(b)(2) and FRCP 54(b). (Dkt. #36).

On June 28, 2007, First Horizon applied for entry of default against Defendant

Jampolsky pursuant to FRCP 55(a). (Dkt. #24). But on June 29, 2007, Defendant

Jampolsky filed the instant motion to quash summons and/or dismiss the complaint

against him due to insufficient service of process. (Dkt. #28).

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III. DISCUSSION

A. Defendant Jampolsky’s Motion To Quash

1. FRCP 4(m)

“District courts have broad discretion to extend time for service under Rule 4(m).” 

Efaw v. Williams, 473 F.3d 1038, 1041 (9th Cir. 2007). FRCP 4(m) provides, in

pertinent part:

If service of the summons and complaint is not made upon a defendant

within 120 days after the filing of the complaint, the court, upon motion or

on its own initiative after notice to the plaintiff, shall dismiss the action

without prejudice as to that defendant or direct that service be effected

within a specified time; provided that if the plaintiff shows good cause for

the failure, the court shall extend the time for service for an appropriate

period.

Rule 4(m) states that a district court must grant an extension of time when the plaintiff

shows good cause for the delay. Efaw, 473 F.3d at 1040 (citation omitted). In addition,

“the rule permits the district court to grant an extension even in the absence of good

cause.” Id. (emphasis in original). However, in making extension decisions under Rule

4(m), a district court should consider the statute of limitations, prejudice to the defendant,

actual notice of a lawsuit, and eventual service. Id. at 1041 (citation omitted).

First Horizon’s complaint was removed to the U.S. District Court for the District

of Arizona on February 1, 2007. (Dkt. #1). First Horizon had 120 days from that date to

serve Defendant Jampolsky. Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m). Thus, service should have been

completed by June 1, 2007; but it was not allegedly completed until June 3, 2007. 

However, as an initial matter, First Horizon contends that the 120-day clock began on

March 2, 2007, because First Horizon filed an amended complaint on that date. (Dkt. #5). 

However, although a plaintiff may be given 120 days from the date of amendment to

serve any new defendants named in the amended complaint, amendments will ordinarily

not extend the time for serving parties who were named earlier. See City of Merced v.

Fields, 997 F.Supp. 1326, 1338 (E.D.Cal. 1998); see also Bolden v. City of Topeka, 441

F.3d 1129, 1148-49 (10th Cir. 2006). First Horizon’s amended complaint did not add

Jampolsky as a new defendant; Jampolsky was a named defendant in First Horizon’s

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original complaint. (Dkt. #1). Thus, the Court finds that First Horizon’s 120-day clock

started ticking when the case was removed to this Court on February 1, 2007. 

The plaintiff bears the burden of establish that “good cause” exists to excuse a

delay in service of process. Efaw, 473 F.3d at 1040. First Horizon contends that good

cause exists in the instant action because First Horizon initially believed that Jampolsky’s

counsel, Jeffrey Matura, would accept service on behalf of his client; and that in May

2007, after learning that Mr. Matura was not going to accept service, First Horizon

initiated service attempts on Jampolsky at both his home and business. (Plaintiff’s

Response, Dkt. #31, p.5). The record indicates that First Horizon diligently attempted

service on Jampolsky during May 2007. However, First Horizon’s initial three-month

period of alleged confusion regarding whether Jampolsky’s counsel would accept service

on behalf of his client does not constitute good cause to excuse a delay in service of

process. Nonetheless, Jampolsky and his attorney had actual notice of this lawsuit. 

(Defendant Doron Jampolsky’s Reply, Dkt. #33, p.6). In addition, nothing in the record

indicates that Jampolsky has suffered prejudice due to the two-day delay in service of

process. Further, as discussed below, the Court finds that service was adequately

completed in this case. Thus, the Court, in exercising its broad discretion under FRCP

4(m), finds that service in this case was not untimely.

2. FRCP 4(e)

FRCP 4(e) provides, in pertinent part:

[S]ervice upon an individual . . . may be effected . . . by delivering a copy

of the summons and of the complaint to the individual personally or by

leaving copies thereof at the individual’s dwelling house or usual place of

abode with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein

or by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an agent

authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process.

Although process need not be handed directly to the served defendant, the recipient of

process must be of “suitable age and discretion” and ordinarily must be “residing” at the

defendant’s home. Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(e). However, service of process is not intended to be a

game of cat and mouse. See, e.g., U.S. v. Tobins, 483 F.Supp.2d 68, 79 (D.Mass. 2007);

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National Labor Relations Bd. v. Clark, 468 F.2d 459, 464 (5th Cir. 1972). As such, when

a defendant has received actual notice of the commencement of an action, “the provisions

of Rule 4(e) should be liberally construed to effectuate service and uphold the jurisdiction

of the court, thus insuring the opportunity for a trial on the merits.” Karlsson v.

Rabinowitz, 318 F.2d 666, 668 (4th Cir. 1963); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 1 (the FRCP should

be construed to secure “the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action”).

Defendant Jampolsky contends that service was improper pursuant to FRCP 4(e)

because his mother was served with process, and although she was at Jampolsky’s

residence at the time, she does not in fact reside with him. (Dkt. #26, p.5; Affidavit of

Doron Jampolsky, Dkt. #26, Ex. 2). In response, First Horizon submits an affidavit of

service, in which the Process Server provides details about his service on an adult female,

who he contends was Jampolsky’s wife. (Affidavit of Service, Dkt. #31, Ex. E).

Regardless of whether service was in fact effected on Jampolsky’s wife or his

mother, the Court finds that service was proper in this case. See, e.g., Derbyshire, 157

F.R.D. at 60 (finding that service on the defendant's mother at an address that defendant

represented to be his current address was adequate given the defendant’s actual notice of

the pending lawsuit and his apparent attempts to avoid service of process.). The record

makes clear that Jampolsky received actual notice of this lawsuit; and thus the Court finds

that service was proper pursuant to FRCP 4(e).

B. Plaintiff’s Motions to Strike

First Horizon moves to strike the affirmative defense(s) of Defendants Phillips and

Defendants Guaranty Title Agency of Arizona, Inc., Christina Lovett, and Claudia Solis

pursuant to FRCP 12(f). In the alternative, First Horizon moves for a more definite

statement pursuant to FRCP 12(e). Rule 12(f) provides, in pertinent part:

Upon motion made by a party . . . the court may order stricken from any

pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent,

or scandalous matter.

Motions to strike pursuant to Rule 12(f) are disfavored. See Taylor v. Quall, 471

F.Supp.2d 1053, 1058-59 (C.D.Cal. 2007). Nonetheless, a Rule 12(f) motion may be

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proper when a defense is insufficient as a matter of law. See Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984

F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th Cir. 1993), rev’d on other grounds, 510 U.S. 517 (1994). “Courts

must view the pleadings under attack in the light more favorable to the pleader.” Lazar v.

Trans Union LLC, 195 F.R.D. 665, 669 (C.D.Cal. 2000).

First Horizon contends that Defendants may not legally assert an affirmative

defense of negligent underwriting. However, it is unclear from the record whether

Defendants in fact assert an affirmative defense of negligent underwriting. Accordingly,

the Court will not address the substantive merits of such a defense at this time. 

However, First Horizon has also moved, in the alternative, for a more definite

statement of Defendants’ affirmative defenses pursuant to FRCP 12(e). Rule 12 (e)

provides, in pertinent part:

If a pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted is so vague or

ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive

pleading, the party may move for a more definite statement . . . .”

The decision to grant or deny a motion for a more definite statement pursuant to FRCP

12(e) is committed to the Court’s sound discretion. See Sheffield v. Orius Corp., 211

F.R.D. 411, 414 (D.Or. 2002). The pleading requirements under the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure are quite liberal and thus motions for a more definite statement are

generally disfavored. See McQueen v. Woodstream Corp., 2007 WL 2284747, at *7

(D.D.C. 2007). Indeed, FRCP 8(a)(2) only requires that a pleading contain “a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” The main

purpose of a pleading is to put the opposing party on notice of the nature of the parties’

claims and defenses and afford the opposing party a chance to argue why the defense is

unfounded. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Illinois Found., 402 U.S. 313,

350 (1971). As such, each party must set forth enough details so as to provide the

opposing party and the Court with a fair idea of the basis of the claims and the asserted

defenses, and the legal grounds for recovery. See Self Directed Placement Corp. v.

Control Data Corp., 908 F.2d 462 (9th Cir. 1990).

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In this case, Defendants’ statements regarding their affirmative defenses are vague

and mostly unsupported, providing little notice to either First Horizon or this Court as to

what affirmative defenses Defendants assert in response to First Horizon’s complaint. 

Defendant Phillips’ answer mentions no specific affirmative defense, and Defendants

Guaranty Title, Lovett, and Solis’s answer, although it appears to reference comparative

fault under A.R.S. §§ 12-2505 and 2506, mentions no other specific affirmative defense,

such as the defense of negligent underwriting. Defendants’ statements regarding their

affirmative defenses are clearly vague, blanket statements that only generally contest their

liability in this case. Defendants’ pleadings are not simple, concise, and direct, as

required under FRCP 8(e), and Plaintiff and the Court are left to guess as to what

affirmative defenses Defendants assert in their pleadings, and against whom they are

asserted. As such, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion for a more definite statement

pursuant to FRCP 12(e), and directs Defendant Phillips and Defendants Guaranty Title

Agency of Arizona, Inc., Christina Lovett, and Claudia Solis to amend their answers to

include a more definite statement of their affirmative defense(s) by pleading their

affirmative defenses in separate paragraphs and labeling each as an affirmative defense.

C. Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment

“Entry of default judgment is governed by FRCP 55 and is left to the trial court’s

sound discretion.” Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). After entry of

default by the Clerk of the Court pursuant to FRCP 55(a), the Court may grant default

judgment pursuant to FRCP 55(b)(2). See Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471 (9th Cir.

1986) (discussing the sequential two-step process under FRCP 55). Factors that a district

court may consider in exercising its discretion include: 

(1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of plaintiff's

substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the sum of

money at stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning

material facts; (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect, and (7)

the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring

decisions on the merits. 

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Id., 782 F.2d at 1471-72. After default has been entered by the Clerk of the Court, the

factual allegations of the complaint are taken as true, except for those allegations relating

to damages. See TeleVideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 1987). 

“A party seeking default judgment must state a claim upon which it may recover.” Philip

Morris USA, 219 F.R.D. 494, 501 (C.D.Cal. 2003). Furthermore, a plaintiff must prove

all damages sought in the complaint. See Philip Morris USA, 219 F.R.D. at 498; see also

Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(b)(2) (“In determining damages, a court can rely on the declarations

submitted by the plaintiff.”).

First Horizon has satisfied the procedural requirements for default judgment

against Defendant Nowak. First Horizon (1) served Nowak with the summons and

complaint on April 22, 2007 (Dkt. #12); (2) caused the Clerk of the Court to enter the

default against Nowak on June 29, 2007 for failure to answer (Dkt. #27); (3) stated that

Nowak is not a minor or incompetent, was not served by publication, and is not in the

military (Plaintiff’s Motion For Judgment, Dkt. #36, p.3); and (4) filed declarations

regarding the amount of costs sought and calculations regarding the amount of loss (Bill

of Costs, Dkt. #35; Affidavit of Stephanie Wilson, Ex. C, Dkt. # 36; Affidavit of Dean

McGee, Ex. D, Dkt. #36). Finally, because Plaintiff does not request relief that differs

from or exceeds that prayed for in the complaint, the application for default judgment

complies with FRCP 54(c). Accordingly, the Court need only analyze the Eitel factors to

determine whether default judgment is appropriate in the instant action.

In considering the Eitel factors, the Court takes all factual allegations in First

Horizon’s complaint as true, except for those relating to damages. See Heidenthal, 826

F.2d at 917-18. After reviewing the complaint and the affidavits submitted in support of

First Horizon’s motion for default judgment against Defendant Nowak, the Court finds

that the Eitel factors favor granting default judgment against Nowak. First, Plaintiff

would clearly suffer prejudice if default judgment was not granted because it would be

without other recourse for recovery with respect to its unjust enrichment claim against

Nowak. Second, First Horizon has adequately pled all five claims against Defendant

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Nowak: (1) conspiracy to commit fraud; (2) fraud; (3) constructive fraud; (4) breach of

fiduciary duty; and (5) unjust enrichment. Third, as Nowak’s failure to answer

constitutes an admission to the averments contained in the complaint under FRCP 8(d),

the Court must accept these allegations as true. Accordingly, the first three Eitel factor

favor entry of default judgment against Defendant Nowak.

Pursuant to the fourth Eitel factor, the Court considers the amount of money at

stake in relation to the seriousness of Defendant's conduct. See Eitel, 782 F.2d at

1471-72. In support of its claims, First Horizon submits affidavits relating the expenses

incurred by First Horizon in relation to the Subject Transaction and Subject Loans in the

amount of $149,954.42, plus the unjust enrichment received by Nowak in the amount of

$50,000.00. (Dkt. #35, Ex. C, D). First Horizon contends that Defendant Nowak was

intimately involved in the Subject Transaction and in fraudulently securing the Subject

Loans from First Horizon. (Dkt. #5). First Horizon also submits a statement of costs that

includes a process fee of $81.00 and a filing fee of $245.00. (Dkt. #36, p.1). As such, the

Court finds that this factor favors granting default judgment against Defendant Nowak.

The fifth Eitel factor considers the possibility of dispute as to any material facts in

the case. However, on entry of default, as previously stated, all well-pleaded facts in the

complaint are taken as true, except those relating to damages. See TeleVideo Sys., Inc.,

826 F.2d at 917-18. Here, Plaintiff filed a well-pleaded complaint alleging the facts

necessary to establish its claims, Defendant Nowak failed to appear, and the Clerk of the

Court entered default against Defendant Nowak. Thus, no dispute has been raised

regarding the material averments of the complaint, and the likelihood that any genuine

issue may exist is, at best, remote given Nowak’s failure to respond to his summons. 

Thus, this factor also favors the entry of default against Defendant Nowak.

The sixth Eitel factor considers the possibility that default resulted from excusable

neglect. “Due process requires that all interested parties be given notice reasonably

calculated to apprise them of the pendency of the action and be afforded opportunity to

present their objections before a final judgment is rendered.” Philip Morris USA, 219

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F.R.D. at 500-01 (citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306,

314 (1950)). In this case, Defendant received notice of both Plaintiff First Horizon’s

complaint and First Horizon’s application for entry of default. (Affidavit of Service, Dkt.

#12; Application for Entry of Default, Dkt. #24). Defendant Nowak failed to answer the

complaint and has not opposed this motion, and in light of the summons and application

for entry of default delivered to Nowak regarding the pending lawsuit, and the extended

period of time that has elapsed, the possibility of excusable neglect appears to be remote.

Accordingly, this factor favors granting default judgment against Defendant Nowak.

Finally, “the mere existence of Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(b) indicates that the seventh Eitel

factor is not alone dispositive.” Philip Morris USA, 219 F.R.D. at 501 (citing Cal. Sec.

Cans., 238 F.Supp.2d at 1177). “Moreover, Defendant's failure to answer [Plaintiff's]

Complaint makes a decision on the merits impractical, if not impossible. Under FRCP

55(a), termination of a case before hearing the merits is allowed whenever a defendant

fails to defend an action.” Cal. Sec. Cans., 238 F.Supp.2d at 1177. This is exactly what

occurred here, and thus the seventh Eitel factor does not preclude the Court from entering

default judgment against Defendant Nowak. Accordingly, in light of the Eitel factors as a

whole, the Court finds that default judgment against Defendant Nowak is appropriate.

Nonetheless, “[i]n granting default judgment, a court can award only up to the

amount prayed for by a plaintiff in its complaint.” Truong Giang Corp. v. Twinstar Tea

Corp., 2007 WL 1545173, at *13 (N.D.Cal. 2007). Although a demand for relief must be

specific under FRCP 8(a)(3), a “[p]laintiff’s burden in ‘proving up’ damages on a motion

for default judgment is relatively lenient. If proximate cause is properly alleged in the

complaint, it is admitted upon default. Injury is established and plaintiff need prove only

that the compensation sought relates to the damages that naturally flow from the injuries

pled.” Philip Morris USA, 219 F.R.D. at 498 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(c)) (citing Cripps

v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 980 F.2d 1261, 1267 (9th Cir. 1992)).

In the instant case, First Horizon seeks from Defendant Nowak: (1) individual

damages for its unjust enrichment claim in the amount of $50,000; (2) related service of

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process fee of $81.00; (3) damages for its conspiracy to commit fraud, fraud, constructive

fraud, and breach of fiduciary duty claims in the amount of $149,954.42, jointly and

severally with the other defendants; and 4) filing fee of $245.00, also jointly and severally

with the other defendants. (Motion For Default Judgment, Dkt. #36, p.1). First Horizon

demands each of these forms of relief in its complaint; as such, First Horizon’s requested

remedies do not differ from the relief prayed for in the complaint. (Compl., pp. 10-17). 

First Horizon has submitted, along with a number of supporting exhibits, a statement of

costs (Dkt. #35); an affidavit from Dean McGee, Senior Vice-President of First Horizon,

detailing the calculations in determining the loss incurred on the Subject Property due to

the Subject Loans, in the amount of $149,954.42 (Dkt. #36, Ex. D); and an affidavit from

Stephanie Wilson, attorney for First Horizon, discussing the amount loss and related costs

($245.00) due to the Subject Loans, as well as Defendant Nowak’s alleged unjust

enrichment and related costs, in the amount of $50,000.00 and $81.00, respectively (Dkt.

#36, Ex. C). After reviewing the affidavits and related exhibits, the Court finds that

Plaintiff First Horizon’s requested damages against Defendant Nowak are reasonably

calculated and naturally derive from the injuries pled in First Horizon’s complaint. 

Therefore, the Court grants Plaintiff First Horizon’s motion for default judgment against

Defendant Nowak for individual damages and costs in the amount of $50,081.00, and

damages in the amount of $149,954.42, plus costs of $245.00, to be shared jointly and

severally with the remaining defendants.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Jampolsky’s motion to quash

summons (Dkt. #28) is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motions to strike (Dkt. #s 8, 30) are

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Phillips must amend his answer to

include a more definite statement of his affirmative defense(s) pursuant to Rule 12(e);

Defendant Phillips must file his amended answer within 10 days of this Order;

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants Guaranty Title Agency of

Arizona, Inc., Christina M. Lovett, and Claudia Solis must amend their answer to include

a more definite statement of their affirmative defense(s) pursuant to Rule 12(e);

Defendants Guaranty Title, Lovett, and Solis must file their amended answer within 10

days of this Order;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment against

Defendant Jason Nowak (Dkt. #36) is GRANTED.

 DATED this 31st day of March, 2008.

Case 2:07-cv-00250-GMS Document 37 Filed 03/31/08 Page 13 of 13