Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-14-02266/USCOURTS-ca8-14-02266-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 14-2266

___________________________

Quintero Community Association Inc., et al.

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiffs - Appellants

v.

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation as Receiver for Hillcrest Bank, et al.

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellees

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Missouri - Kansas City

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 Submitted: February 10, 2015

 Filed: July 8, 2015

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Before LOKEN, SMITH, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

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LOKEN, Circuit Judge.

Appellants are investors who suffered losses when an Arizona golf course and

residential development failed, allegedly due to the fraud and mismanagement of the

developer, Gary McClung. Unable to recover from the insolvent McClung,

appellants filed this action in state court against the development’s principal lender,

Hillcrest Bank, and its directors, officers, and sole shareholder, asserting numerous

claims. The Kansas Banking Commissioner closed Hillcrest Bank and appointed the

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Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) as receiver. Some months later, the

FDIC removed the case to federal court under 12 U.S.C. § 1819(b)(2)(B). The district

court denied appellants’ timelymotion to remand. Subsequently, the court dismissed

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fourteen of the sixteen countsfor failure to state a claim, dismissed the FDIC because

Hillcrest Bank’s bankruptcy rendered appellants’ claims againsttheBank prudentially

moot, and granted summary judgment to the remaining defendants on appellants’

remaining count. Appellants appeal the denial of their motion to remand, the

dismissal of fourteen counts for failure to state a claim, the grant of summary

judgment on the final count, and the district court’s refusal to permit an amendment

to add an additional tort claim for spoliation. We affirm.

I. Background

McClung’s failed development was a golf course and residential subdivision

in Peoria, Arizona, named Quintero Golf and Country Club (Quintero). Appellant

Quintero Community Association (QCA) was the homeowners association for the

subdivision and a property owner in Quintero. The remaining appellants are

individuals who between 1999 and 2008 invested in Quintero by purchasing

“Revenue Producing Membership Collateral Certificates” or by loaning money to

McClung. In March 2005, Hillcrest Bank loaned McClung $31 million to finance

Quintero’s construction and issued a number of irrevocable standby letters of credit

naming QCA as beneficiary. As beneficiary, QCA had the right to demand payment

of a letter of credit in the event Quintero failed to complete the particular

improvement specified in the letter of credit by a certain date.

Appellants’ Omnibus Petition alleged that, by late 2006, McClung was unable

to pay development contractors on time, and many had ceased working. Appellants

The Honorable Greg Kays, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the

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Western District of Missouri.

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alleged that defendants knew of McClung’s financial distress but loaned him money

anyway, contrary to sound banking practices, thereby “prolong[ing his] financial life”

to appellants’ detriment. They further alleged that defendants “concocted a scheme

with McClung” to conceal his insolvency from appellants, banking regulators, and

the Arizona Department of Real Estate (ADRE). The alleged scheme included

“jimm[ying]” the Bank’s books to make the Quintero project look to be in better

financial health than it was, thereby assisting McClung’s fraudulent communications

to appellants, and allowing McClung to “sen[d] back” letters of credit in March 2007

contrary to their terms and ADRE requirements. On March 31, 2010, the ADRE

suspended Quintero’s public report due to McClung’s failure to complete required

infrastructure. See Ariz. Admin. Code § R4-28-B1203(E). As a result, appellants

lost some or all of their investments. 

In May 2010, appellants filed suit against Hillcrest Bank in Missouri state

court. On October 22, 2010, the Kansas BankingCommissioner determined the Bank

was “critically undercapitalized” and appointed the FDIC as receiver. In preparation

for litigation, some Hillcrest Bank directors had caused Bank records to be copied

onto digital storage media and sent to lawyers at the Bryan Cave law firm for review. 

The FDIC accepted appointment as receiver and demanded return of the copied files. 

Bryan Cave complied.

In January 2011, appellants filed a separate action in state court against

Hillcrest Bank officers and directors and its holding company, Hillcrest Bancshares

(the “Director Defendants”). The state court consolidated the two cases. On

February 28, Hillcrest Bank filed a motion to substitute the FDIC as defendant. The

state court granted the motion on March 1, but on May 7, appellants moved to vacate

the substitution order because the Bank’s motion was not properly served on the

FDIC. The state court granted the motion and vacated its order of substitution on

May 12. 

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Counsel for the FDIC entered an appearance in state court on May 24, filed a

motion to substitute as a party for Hillcrest Bank on May 27, and filed a pleading

opposing appellants’ motion for default judgment against Hillcrest Bank on June 6. 

The state court granted the FDIC’s motion for substitution on June 9. The FDIC

removed the case to federal court under 12 U.S.C. § 1819(b)(2)(B) on September 6. 

Appellants moved to remand, arguing the FDIC failed to remove the action “before

the end of the 90-day period beginning on the date . . . the Corporation is substituted

as a party” in state court. 12 U.S.C. § 1819(b)(2)(B). The district court denied the

motion to remand on December 6, 2011. Its subsequent rulings on the merits of

appellants’ claims were entered in January 2013 and in April and May of 2014.

II. Denial of the Motion To Remand

Plaintiffs first argue the district court erred in denying their motion to remand

because the FDIC’s removal was untimely, and therefore the court lacked subject

matter jurisdiction over the removed action. The state court granted the FDIC’s

motion to substitute as a party on June 9, 2011, and the FDIC removed the case to

federal district court on September 6, ninety days later. The FDIC contends that the

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removal is timely applying the plain meaning of § 1819(b)(2)(B). Plaintiffs argue,

however, that the FDIC was “substituted as a party” for purposes of § 1819(b)(2)(B)

prior to June 9 and thus the ninety-day removal window closed before September 6. 

Relying on FDIC v. North Savannah Properties, LLC, 686 F.3d 1254, 1259 (11th Cir.

2012), appellants argue that the FDIC issubstituted as a party, and the removal period

beginsto run, when the FDIC takes “some affirmative action beyond its appointment

as receiver.” Here, they contend, the FDIC took the requisite “affirmative action”

when it filed an entry of appearance on May 24, 2011, a motion for substitution on

May 27, and an opposition to default judgment on June 6.

Inclusive of June 9 and September 6. See 12 U.S.C. § 1819(b)(2)(B).

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We need not decide whether removal was untimely, because even if the district

court erred in failing to remand, that error would not be grounds to reverse at this

stage of the litigation. In Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61 (1996), the Supreme

Court considered whether the absence of complete diversity at the time of removal,

required by 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b), necessitated vacating the district court’s subsequent

judgment, when complete diversity existed when final judgment was entered. 

Though grant of plaintiff’s timely motion to remand “would have kept the case in

state court,” the Court concluded that, once “a diversity case has been tried in federal

court . . . considerations of finality, efficiency, and economy become overwhelming.”

Caterpillar, 519 U.S. at 75. Accordingly, the Court held, “a district court’s error in

failing to remand a case improperly removed is not fatal to the ensuing adjudication

if federal jurisdictional requirements are met at the time judgment is entered.” Id. at

64; see Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 573-75 (2004). 

The “timeliness of removal is a procedural defect -- not a jurisdictional one.” 

Moore v. N. Am. Sports, Inc., 623 F.3d 1325, 1329 (11th Cir. 2010). Here, when the

FDIC became a substituted party, 12 U.S.C. § 1819(b)(2)(A) gave the district court

subject matter jurisdiction, both at the time of removal and when final judgment was

ultimately entered. Although federal jurisdiction inCaterpillar was based on diversity

of citizenship, its rule has been applied to cases in which removal based on federal

question jurisdiction was untimely, a motion to remand was denied, and the case

proceeded to final judgment in federal court. See Wagner v. Campbell, 779 F.3d 761,

765 (8th Cir. 2015) (“we take careful note that jurisdiction would have existed in the

district court from the inception of this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit”); Paluch v. Rambo,

453 F. App’x 129, 132 (3d Cir. 2011). We construe Caterpillar as a “categorical rule”

that applies whether the case proceeded to final judgment after trial, or by summary

judgment. Buffets, Inc. v. Leischow, 732 F.3d 889, 897-98 (8th Cir. 2013).

In this case, multiple claims and a complex factual background resulted in

nearly four years of litigation after the district court denied appellants’ motion to

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remand based on a procedural defect. “To wipe out the adjudication postjudgment,

and return to state court a case . . . satisfying all federal jurisdictional requirements,

would impose an exorbitant cost on our dual court system, a cost incompatible with

the fair and unprotracted administration of justice.” Caterpillar, 519 U.S. at 77. To

do so here would be particularly unwarranted, as Congress intended § 1819(b)(2) “to

afford the FDIC every possibility of having a federal forum within the limits of

Article III.” Adair v. Lease Partners, Inc., 587 F.3d 238, 242 (5th Cir. 2009). 

Accordingly, as in Wagner, 779 F.3d at 765, “[w]e decline to review the district

court’s decision on the motion to remand.”3

III. The Merits Rulings

After denying appellants’ motion to remand, the district court dismissed

fourteen counts for failure to state a claim in January 2013, leaving only a breach of

contract claim against Hillcrest Bank and a conversion claim against the Director

Defendants for copying Hillcrest Bank’s records and transmitting them to attorneys

at Bryan Cave. In September 2013, the FDIC determined that Hillcrest Bank in

receivership lacked sufficient assetsto make distributionsto unsecured creditors. See

78 Fed. Reg. 56,228 (Sept. 12, 2013); 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(11)(A). In April 2014, the

district court dismissed the FDIC as a party, concluding appellants’ claims against the

FDIC as the Bank’s receiver were prudentially moot. See Adams v. RTC, 927 F.2d

348, 354 (8th Cir. 1991). Appellants do not appeal that ruling. Consequently, we

need not review the court’s earlier dismissal of appellants’ claims against Hillcrest

Bank. The following month, the district court granted summary judgment to the

Director Defendants on the conversion claim, denied appellants’ motion to amend the

At least two circuits have concluded that a case should be remanded to state 3

court if a motion to remand was improperly denied, and the district court’s final

judgment is reversed on the merits. See Huffman v. Saul Holdings Ltd. P’ship, 194

F.3d 1072, 1080 (10th Cir. 1999). As we affirm the district court’s rulings on the

merits, we need not consider this question. 

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Omnibus Petition to add a claimfor spoliation, and entered final judgment dismissing

all claims. 

A. The Rule 12(b)(6) Dismissals. Appellants argue the district court erred in

dismissing fourteen counts for failure to state a claim. “We review de novo the

district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss.” Gorog v. Best Buy Co., 760 F.3d 787,

792 (8th Cir. 2014). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on

its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotation omitted). “A

pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements

of a cause of action will not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked

assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. (quotations omitted). 

Like the district court, we find it “incredibly difficult to sift through

[appellants’] 72 single-spaced pages and 340 numbered paragraphs to ascertain any

coherent argument as to why [defendants] are liable.” The bulk of appellants’ highly

confusing Omnibus Petition consists ofsheer speculation and conclusory allegations

of defendants’ wrongdoing. At oral argument, counsel declined to prioritize

appellants’ fifteen claims of reversible error. The district court discussed in detail

why each count failed to state a claim. We have little to add. 

Appellants’ brief on appeal argues at great length that the fourteen dismissed

counts adequately pleaded claims that Hillcrest Bank breached fiduciary duties to

appellants; aided and abetted McClung’s fraudulent financial misrepresentations and

his fraudulent and improper cancellation of letters of credit, which intentionally

interfered with appellants’ contract or business relations; negligently cancelled the

letters of credit and negligently failed “to learn of and prevent” McClung’s fraudulent

activities; and conspired with McClung to engage in various vaguely pleaded torts. 

These are claims against Hillcrest Bank we need not review.

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The claims we need to review because they survived dismissal of the FDIC and

Hillcrest Bank are appellants’ claims against the Director Defendants, including

Hillcrest Bancshares. As to these claims, appellants’ brief says little beyond

conclusory assertions such as, “The petition repeatedly avers that each defendant

knew about McClung’s bad financial condition, his scam attempts to get more

financing, knew that the development had not been completed, and knew that the

Bank had engaged in improper banking practices . . . to conceal its own bad financial

condition and avoid being shut down by the FDIC.”

The district court concluded that the allegations in appellants’ Omnibus

Petition were similarly deficient, failing to plead facts establishing plausible claims

that each officer and director could be personally liable to appellants. Appellants fail

to provide specific cites to the Omnibus Petition refuting this conclusion. “Without

some guidance, we will not mine a summary judgment record searching for nuggets

of factual disputes to gild a party’s arguments.” Rodgers v. City of Des Moines, 435

F.3d 904, 908 (8th Cir. 2006). Likewise, without guidance, we will not mine a

seventy-two-page complaintsearching for nuggets thatmightrefute obvious pleading

deficiencies.

1. As to the claims that the Director Defendants breached fiduciary duties to

appellants, they alleged no facts plausibly suggesting that each Hillcrest Bank officer,

director, or shareholder consciously assumed to act as their fiduciaries in these

business transactions. See Urias v. PCS Health Sys., Inc., 118 P.3d 29, 35 (Ariz.

App. 2005); Denison State Bank v. Madeira, 640 P.2d 1235, 1243-44 (Kan. 1982).4

Applying Missouri choice-of-law principles, the district court concluded

4

Kansas law applied to breach of fiduciary duty and conversion claims, Arizona law

applied to Arizona statutory claims, and there is no apparent conflict between Kansas

and Arizona law regarding any other claim. This ruling is not contested on appeal.

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Nor did they allege how each Director Defendant substantially assisted primary

tortfeasor McClung in a breach of fiduciary duty that proximately caused appellants’

injuries. See Cal X-Tra v. W.V.S.V. Holdings, LLC, 276 P.3d 11, 40 (Ariz. App.

2012) (elements of aiding and abetting); State ex rel. Mays v. Ridenhour, 811 P.2d

1220, 1231-32 (Kan. 1991) (same). “[D]irector and officer liability in breach of

fiduciary duty actions is determined on an individual -- rather than a collective --

basis.” In re Farmland Indus., Inc., 335 B.R. 398, 410 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2005).

Appellants also failed to plausibly allege how each Director Defendant aided

and abetted breaches of fiduciary duty when undescribed letters of credit were

allegedly canceled by either McClung or Hillcrest Bank. Under Arizona and Kansas

law, “a director cannot be liable without some kind of personal participation in the

tort or at least acquiescence by knowledge of the tort combined with a failure to act.” 

Dawson v. Withycombe, 163 P.3d 1034, 1051 (Ariz. App. 2007); accord Kerns ex rel.

Kerns v. G.A.C., Inc., 875 P.2d 949, 957-58 (Kan. 1994). Defendant Robert Sperry

is alleged to have issued letters of credit to McClung and then agreed to “free up”

funds when McClung asked that letters of credit be “sent back” to Hillcrest in March

2007. That does not plausibly allege that Sperry participated in canceling any letters

of credit. The only letter of credit in the record on appeal expired of its own terms in

March 2006. Once issued, an irrevocable letter may not be cancelled except

according to its terms or with the consent of the beneficiary. See U.C.C. § 5-106(b). 

The allegedly cancelled letters of credit were not attached to the Omnibus Petition,

and no facts were pleaded to support the conclusory assertion that all Director

Defendants personally participated in canceling the letters of credit. Such “naked

assertions, devoid of further factual enhancement,” did not nudge appellants’ claims

“across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 680

(quotations omitted). Nor did appellants plausibly allege how cancellation of the

letters of credit proximately caused their losses. 

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2. Appellants failed to plead fraud with the specificity required by Rule 9(b)

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. “Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement for

fraud applies equally to a claim for aiding and abetting.” E-Shops Corp. v. U.S. Bank

Nat’l Ass’n, 678 F.3d 659, 663 (8th Cir. 2012). Thus, “the complaint must set forth

the who, what, when, where, and how surrounding the alleged fraud,” id. (quotation

omitted), and specify “what was obtained as a result.” United States ex rel. Joshi v.

St. Luke’s Hosp., Inc., 441 F.3d 552, 556 (8th Cir. 2006). Appellants’ shotgun-style

allegations of wrongdoing by all the Director Defendants “generally, in a group

pleading fashion . . . do[es] not satisfy Rule 9(b).” Streambend Props. II, LLC v. Ivy

Tower Mpls., LLC, 781 F.3d 1003, 1013 (8th Cir. 2015). 

The allegations in Count 4 did not come close to meeting this standard. 

Appellants entirely failed to plead facts plausibly showing that any Director

Defendant knew of any of McClung’s alleged fraudulent misrepresentations to

appellantsregarding Quintero’s financial health,some ofwhich occurred years before

Hillcrest Bank began dealing with McClung. See E-Shops, 678 F.3d at 664; Mays,

811 P.2d at 1232 (aiding and abetting liability requires knowledge of principal’s

tortious activity) Cal X-Tra, 276 P.3d at 40 (same). Allegations that the Director

Defendants assisted McClung’s fraud byjimmying the Bank’s books and “execut[ing]

transactions that gave the false appearance of financial viability” were far too vague

to satisfy Rule 9(b). Nor did appellants show how they relied on McClung’s alleged

misrepresentations and how that reliance caused them injury. See Nordstrom v.

Miller, 605 P.2d 545, 551-52 (Kan. 1980) (elements of fraud); Dillon v. Zeneca

Corp., 42 P.3d 598, 603 (Ariz. App. 2002) (same). 

3. Regarding the claim in Count 8 that the Director Defendants assisted and

participated in Hillcrest Bank’s alleged negligent mismanagement, we agree with the

district court that Count 8 failed to state a claim even if it plausibly alleged the

Defendant Directors owed appellants a duty of care. In general, banks owe no duty

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of care to non-customers. See Eisenberg v. Wachovia Bank, 301 F.3d 220, 225 (4th

Cir. 2002); Gilbert Tuscany Lender, LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, 307 P.3d 1025, 1028

(Ariz. App. 2013); N. Cent. Kan. Prod. Credit Ass’n v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 726, 730-31

(Kan. 1987). Arguably, Hillcrest Bank and therefore the Director Defendants had

some duty of care by reason ofthe Bank’s complex relationships with appellants. But

the Omnibus Petition did not plausibly allege breaches of a specific duty, for

example, by showing how each Director knew of alleged problems with the Quintero

loans, why each Director’s knowledge created a duty to act, and how the Directors’

failure to act was both the actual and proximate cause of appellants’ injuries. See

Shirley v. Glass, 308 P.3d 1, 6 (Kan. 2013); Dawson, 163 P.3d at 1051; Kerns, 875

P.2d at 957-58; Wisener v. State, 598 P.2d 511, 512 (Ariz. 1979).

4. The remaining counts do not require extended discussion. Count 2 failed

to allege facts showing that any defendant canceled letters of credit with the intent to

interfere with appellants’ contractual or business relationships or caused appellants’

losses. See generally Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766.

Count 5 contained only conclusory and speculative assertions that an

agreement existed between the Director Defendants and McClung to accomplish

vaguely pleaded torts. This was insufficient to support a claim of civil conspiracy. 

See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Wells Fargo Bank v. Ariz. Laborers, Teamsters and

Cement Masons Local No. 395 Pension Trust Fund, 38 P.3d 12, 36 (Ariz. 2002)

(elements of civil conspiracy); Mays, 811 P.2d at 1226 (same). 

Count 7, which charged the Director Defendants with aiding and abetting

Hillcrest Bank in converting funds owed to two appellants, failed to allege facts

showing the personal participation of any Director. Count 9 alleged “Violations of

Consumer Protection Law,” and referenced “Arizona Consumer Protection Statutes,”

but did not explain which law was violated. In substance, Count 9 simply re-alleged

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the aiding-and-abetting-fraud claim in Count 4 with nothing approaching the

particularity required by Rule 9(b). Count 16 asserted claims of tortious interference

and aiding and abetting against Hillcrest Bank’s sole shareholder, Hillcrest

Bancshares, but failed to plausibly allege how Hillcrest Bancshares was involved. 

The district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals are affirmed.

B. Summary Judgment on the Conversion Claim. Count 1 alleged that the

Director Defendants converted property in which appellants had an interest when

defendants copied Hillcrest Bank’s records and transferred the copiesto Bryan Cave. 

The district court granted summary judgment dismissing this claim. Reviewing de

novo, we agree. See Alexander v. Avera St. Luke’s Hosp., 768 F.3d 756, 759 (8th

Cir. 2014) (standard of review). Under Kansas law, conversion is “the unauthorized

assumption or exercise of the right of ownership over goods or personal chattels

belonging to another to the exclusion of the other’s rights.” Bomhoff. v. Nelnet Loan

Servs., Inc., 109 P.3d 1241, 1246 (Kan. 2005) (emphasis added). Assuming without

deciding that QCA as well as Hillcrest Bank possessed a property interest in the

Bank’s records, the Director Defendants’ mere copying of those records did not

interfere with QCA’s property interest. See Moeller v. Kain, No. 98,531, 2008 WL

4416042, at *6 (Kan. App. Sept. 26, 2008) (copying files and removing the copies is

not conversion); accord Monarch Fire Prot. Dist. v. Freedom Consulting & Auditing

Servs., Inc., 644 F.3d 633, 637 (8th Cir. 2011) (“Under Missouri law, a copy of a

document cannot be converted where the owner has not been deprived of possession

or prevented from utilizing the property.”).

C. Denial of Leave to Amend. Finally, appellants argue that the district court

abused its discretion in denying QCA leave to amend its petition to include a new tort

claim for spoliation of evidence during litigation. See O’Neil v. Simplicity, Inc., 574

F.3d 501, 505 (8th Cir. 2009) (standard of review). The district court concluded that

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QCA unduly delayed seeking leave to amend, defendants were prejudiced by the

delay, and the amendment would likely be futile. We agree. The Supreme Court of

Kansas has not yetrecognized an independent tort ofspoliation when a party destroys

evidence that would have been useful to an adverse or potentially adverse litigant. 

See Superior Boiler Works, Inc. v. Kimball, 259 P.3d 676, 685-90 (Kan. 2011). 

There was no abuse of the district court’s substantial discretion. 

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

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