Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-15976/USCOURTS-ca9-14-15976-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 441
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Voting
Cause of Action: 

---

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Neil V. Wake, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted May 11, 2016

San Francisco, California

Filed September 23, 2016

Before: M. Margaret McKeown and Michelle T. Friedland, 

Circuit Judges, and Joan Lefkow,* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge McKeown

 * The Honorable Joan H. Lefkow, Senior District Judge for the U.S. 

District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.

ARIZONA GREEN PARTY;

CLAUDIA ELLQUIST,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

MICHELE REAGAN, in her

official capacity as Secretary 

of the State of Arizona,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 14-15976

D.C. No.

2:14-cv-00375-NVW

OPINION

 Case: 14-15976, 09/23/2016, ID: 10134065, DktEntry: 48-1, Page 1 of 18
2 ARIZONA GREEN PARTY V. REAGAN

SUMMARY**

Civil Rights

The panel affirmed the district court’s summary 

judgment in favor of the Arizona Secretary of State in an 

action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by the Arizona Green 

Party and a supporter challenging the constitutionality of 

Arizona’s filing deadline for new party petitions.

The Green Party asserted that by requiring new parties to 

file recognition petitions 180 days before the primary, 

Arizona unconstitutionally burdened those parties’ First and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights.

Noting that the Green Party did not submit any 

supporting evidence with its motion for summary judgment, 

the panel held that the Green Party did not meet its burden 

of showing that Arizona’s 180-day petition-filing deadline 

significantly burdened its constitutional rights. The panel 

further held that the Secretary demonstrated that the 

restriction served Arizona’s important interest in 

administering orderly elections.

 ** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

 Case: 14-15976, 09/23/2016, ID: 10134065, DktEntry: 48-1, Page 2 of 18
ARIZONA GREEN PARTY V. REAGAN 3

COUNSEL

Julia Damron (argued) and Robert E. Barnes, Los Angeles, 

California, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

James Driscoss-MacEachron (argued), Deputy State 

Attorney General; Office of the Arizona Attorney General, 

Phoenix, Arizona; for Defendant-Appellee.

OPINION

McKEOWN, Circuit Judge:

The Arizona Green Party (the “Green Party” or the 

“Party”), having failed to meet the deadline for recognition 

as an official political party on the 2014 Arizona ballot, 

challenges the constitutionality of Arizona’s filing deadline 

for new party petitions.1 The Green Party seeks declaratory 

and injunctive relief against the Arizona Secretary of State 

(the “Secretary”), claiming that by requiring “new”2 parties 

to file recognition petitions 180 days before the primary, 

 1 Although much of the Green Party’s brief is dedicated to a 

historical discussion of third parties in presidential elections, the Arizona 

rules governing the presidential election cycle are not at issue here. See

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-341(G) (“A nomination petition for the office of 

presidential elector shall be filed not less than sixty nor more than ninety 

days before the general election.”).

2 The term “new” party is something of a misnomer because parties 

that use this mechanism for ballot recognition need not be newly formed. 

For example, the Arizona Green Party has existed for many years but is 

still treated as a “new” party. Although a more accurate term would be 

“small,” “minor” or “third” party, we follow the terminology in 

Arizona’s statute.

 Case: 14-15976, 09/23/2016, ID: 10134065, DktEntry: 48-1, Page 3 of 18
4 ARIZONA GREEN PARTY V. REAGAN

Arizona unconstitutionally burdens those parties’ First and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights.

Ballot access litigation follows a common pattern. The 

scrutiny courts employ in assessing the constitutionality of a 

state’s election law turns on the severity the law imposes on 

the party or candidate’s First and Fourteenth Amendment

rights. The plaintiff bears the burden of showing the severity 

of the burden on those constitutional rights; evidence that the 

burden is severe, de minimis, or something in between, sets 

the stage for the analysis by determining how compelling the 

state’s interest must be to justify the law in question. In this 

case, the Green Party chose not to present any evidence. 

Instead, it relied on analogies to earlier cases to argue that 

Arizona’s 180-day deadline for filing new party recognition 

petitions is unconstitutional as a matter of law.

Without evidence of the specific obstacles to ballot 

access that the deadline imposes, the Green Party did not 

establish that its rights are severely burdened. At best—on 

this record—any burden is de minimis. By contrast, 

Arizona’s evidence supports the interrelated deadlines that 

make up its election cycle. Balancing the impact of the 180-

day filing deadline on the Green Party’s rights against 

Arizona’s interests in maintaining that deadline, we 

conclude that the Green Party has not demonstrated an 

unconstitutional interference with ballot access.

BACKGROUND

Arizona election law provides three avenues for political 

parties to obtain state recognition, each of which requires a 

threshold level of political support within the state. For 

automatic and continued recognition, a party must have 

received at least five percent of votes cast in the last 

preceding general election or achieved a threshold number 

 Case: 14-15976, 09/23/2016, ID: 10134065, DktEntry: 48-1, Page 4 of 18
ARIZONA GREEN PARTY V. REAGAN 5

of registered electors. A third alternative allows a party to

demonstrate the requisite level of support via petition.

Arizona Revised Statute § 16-804 lays out the 

framework for automatic and continued recognition:

A) A political organization that at the last 

preceding [applicable] general election cast 

. . . not less than five per cent of the total 

votes cast for governor or presidential 

electors, . . . is entitled to representation as a 

political party on the official ballot for state 

officers or for officers of such county or local 

subdivision.

B) [A] political organization is entitled to 

continued representation as a political party 

on the official ballot . . . if, on October 1 of 

the year immediately preceding the year [of 

the applicable] general election . . . [or] one 

hundred fifty-five days immediately 

preceding the primary election in such 

jurisdiction, such party has registered 

electors in the party equal to at least twothirds of one per cent of the total registered 

electors in such jurisdiction.

Id. § 16-804(A), (B). Parties that do not meet these 

requirements may obtain recognition by filing “a petition 

signed by a number of qualified electors equal to not less 

than one and one-third per cent of the total votes cast for 

governor at the last preceding general election at which a 

governor was elected.” Id. § 16-801(A).

Once recognized through any of these mechanisms, 

parties are entitled to state-provided primary ballots as well 

 Case: 14-15976, 09/23/2016, ID: 10134065, DktEntry: 48-1, Page 5 of 18
6 ARIZONA GREEN PARTY V. REAGAN

as a designated column of party candidates on the general 

election ballot. Id. §§ 16-341(B), 16-502(C). New party 

recognition lasts for two regularly scheduled general 

elections for federal office before party status must be 

renewed. Id. § 16-801(B).

Even if a party does not qualify as officially recognized, 

its candidates still have the benefit of party designation, 

subject to some restrictions.3 Candidates who are affiliated 

with unrecognized political organizations can run as 

independent candidates and may designate their own party 

affiliation, which appears next to the candidate’s name on 

the general election ballot. Id. at § 16-341. Write-in 

candidates may also designate a party affiliation next to their 

name, which is posted on the Arizona Secretary of State’s 

official website. See id. § 16-312.

The Green Party sought recognition via petition in 2014 

because it lost its official status in 2013. After the 2010 

gubernatorial election, the Green Party was on notice that it 

had failed to garner five per cent of the vote and, on 

November 20, 2013, the Secretary officially confirmed that 

the Green Party had lost its recognized status. At that point, 

the Party had approximately three months to collect 

signatures in support of new party recognition. Signature 

gathering to obtain recognition under § 16-801 may 

commence as soon as a party learns that it did not qualify for 

automatic recognition based on votes cast or electors 

registered in the previous general election. For the 2014 

 3 At oral argument, counsel for the Secretary explained that the 

restrictions listed in § 16-341 prohibit independent candidates from 

circumventing the rules for county or municipal party recognition or for 

continued recognition under § 16-804, but that there was “no limit that I 

see that would stop” an independent candidate from designating the 

Green Party as its political affiliation on the general election ballot.

 Case: 14-15976, 09/23/2016, ID: 10134065, DktEntry: 48-1, Page 6 of 18
ARIZONA GREEN PARTY V. REAGAN 7

election cycle, parties petitioning under § 16-801 were 

required to file 23,401 signatures with the Secretary by 

February 27, 2014.

The 180-day petition-filing deadline has been an element 

of Arizona election law since 2000. Id. § 16-803(A) (“A 

petition for recognition of a new political party shall be filed 

. . . not less than one hundred eighty days before the primary 

election for which the party seeks recognition.”).4 The 

deadline is calculated by working backward from a number 

of nested deadlines leading up to the primary, which include:

$ Calculating candidate signature requirements, id. 

§§ 16-168(G), 16-322(B);

$ Filing deadlines for candidates, id. at §§ 16-311, 16-

341;

$ Mailing notice to voters on the early voting list, id. at 

§ 16-544(D);

$ Resolving nomination petition challenges, id. at 

§ 16-351(A);

$ Finalizing primary ballots for printing;

$ Mailing primary ballots to uniformed and overseas 

voters, id. at § 16-544(F);

 4 Before the new party petition deadline was amended in 2000, the 

deadline was 140 days before the primary. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-803 

(2000). In 2011 and 2012, the Arizona legislature again amended § 16-

803 to shift part of the task of verifying signatures from the counties to 

the Secretary, but the 180-day deadline remained the same. Id. (2011) 

(amended by S.B. 1471); id. (2012) (amended by H.B. 2033).

 Case: 14-15976, 09/23/2016, ID: 10134065, DktEntry: 48-1, Page 7 of 18
8 ARIZONA GREEN PARTY V. REAGAN

$ Testing the electronic ballot machines, id. at § 16-

449; and

$ Early voting deadlines for the primary, id. at § 16-

542(C).

Rather than filing a new party petition, in February 2014 

the Green Party and Green Party supporter Claudia Ellquist 

filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit against the Secretary in federal 

court alleging that the February deadline was 

unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth 

Amendments. In an effort to resolve the matter before the 

2014 general election, the parties stipulated to an expedited 

litigation process resulting in cross-motions for summary 

judgment. The Green Party did not seek a preliminary 

injunction.

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of 

the Secretary. Because the Green Party did not present any 

evidence or controvert the Secretary’s material facts, the 

district court found that the Green Party had failed to 

demonstrate how “the 180-day deadline alone, considered 

outside the context of the election cycle requiring it, 

necessarily imposes a severe burden. And they have not 

offered evidence—or even alleged—that the other 

interrelated provisions governing the election cycle impose 

a severe burden.” Explaining that the deadline was not 

“unnecessary, excessive, or discriminatory,” the district 

court concluded that “the interplay between the February 

deadline and [Arizona’s] election scheme as a whole . . . 

rationally accommodates the state’s administrative needs.”

The Green Party did not seek expedited review on 

appeal, and its first brief was not filed until September 2014, 

long after the petition-filing deadline passed.

 Case: 14-15976, 09/23/2016, ID: 10134065, DktEntry: 48-1, Page 8 of 18
ARIZONA GREEN PARTY V. REAGAN 9

ANALYSIS

I. Mootness

The 2014 election has come and gone, so we cannot 

devise a remedy that will put the Green Party on the ballot 

for that election cycle. All specific demands for relief 

related to the 2014 election are moot. Because the Green 

Party will need to requalify as a new party every two election 

cycles (unless it reaches the § 16-804 threshold), the 180-

day deadline is likely to surface again and is therefore 

“capable of repetition, yet evading review,” Norman v. Reed, 

502 U.S. 279, 288 (1992) (quoting Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 

U.S. 814, 816 (1969)). Accordingly, the challenge to that 

deadline’s constitutionality is not moot. We thus have 

jurisdiction to address the merits of the Green Party’s claim 

on appeal.

II. The Balancing Test for Ballot Access

The foundation of our analysis comes from two Supreme 

Court cases that address the framework in ballot access 

cases: Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983), and 

Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992). In Anderson, the 

Supreme Court articulated a balancing test to determine 

whether rules impacting ballot access pass constitutional 

muster:

[A] court must . . . . first consider the 

character and magnitude of the asserted 

injury to the rights protected by the First and 

Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff 

seeks to vindicate. It then must identify and 

evaluate the precise interests put forward by 

the State as justifications for the burden 

imposed by its rule. In passing judgment, the 

 Case: 14-15976, 09/23/2016, ID: 10134065, DktEntry: 48-1, Page 9 of 18
10 ARIZONA GREEN PARTY V. REAGAN

Court must not only determine the legitimacy 

and strength of each of those interests; it also 

must consider the extent to which those 

interests make it necessary to burden the 

plaintiff’s rights. Only after weighing all 

these factors is the reviewing court in a 

position to decide whether the challenged 

provision is unconstitutional.

460 U.S. at 789. In Burdick, the Court refined its analysis as 

to the degree of rigor required in weighing a restriction’s 

burden on ballot access rights against the state’s interest:

[T]he rigorousness of our inquiry into the 

propriety of a state election law depends upon 

the extent to which a challenged regulation 

burdens First and Fourteenth Amendment 

rights. Thus, as we have recognized when 

those rights are subjected to severe 

restrictions, the regulation must be narrowly 

drawn to advance a state interest of 

compelling importance. But when a state 

election law provision imposes only 

reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions 

upon the First and Fourteenth Amendment 

rights of voters, the State’s important 

regulatory interests are generally sufficient to 

justify the restrictions.

504 U.S. at 434 (internal quotations and citation omitted).

We have summarized the Supreme Court’s approach as 

a “balancing and means-end fit framework.” Pub. Integrity 

All., Inc. v. City of Tucson, — F.3d —, 2016 WL 4578366, 

at *3 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). This is a sliding scale test, 

where the more severe the burden, the more compelling the 

 Case: 14-15976, 09/23/2016, ID: 10134065, DktEntry: 48-1, Page 10 of 18
ARIZONA GREEN PARTY V. REAGAN 11

state’s interest must be, such that “a state may justify 

election regulations imposing a lesser burden by 

demonstrating the state has important regulatory interests.” 

Ariz. Libertarian Party v. Reagan, 798 F.3d 723, 729–30

(9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 823 (2016) (internal 

citations, alterations, and quotation marks omitted).

III. Burdens on Ballot Access 

We begin by acknowledging the importance of third 

parties and the constitutional interests implicated by limiting 

their access to the ballot. As the Supreme Court emphasized 

in Norman:

[T]he constitutional right of citizens to create 

and develop new political parties . . . . derives 

from the First and Fourteenth Amendments 

and advances the constitutional interest of 

like-minded voters to gather in pursuit of 

common political ends, thus enlarging the 

opportunities of all voters to express their 

own political preferences. To the degree that 

a State would thwart this interest by limiting 

the access of new parties to the ballot, we 

have called for the demonstration of a 

corresponding interest sufficiently weighty to 

justify the limitation.

502 U.S. at 288–89 (internal citations omitted).

These principles led the Court to strike down a series of 

Ohio laws that made it virtually impossible for any party 

other than the Democratic and Republican parties to appear 

on the ballot. As the Court observed, “[t]he right to form a 

party for the advancement of political goals means little if a 

party can be kept off the election ballot and thus denied an 

 Case: 14-15976, 09/23/2016, ID: 10134065, DktEntry: 48-1, Page 11 of 18
12 ARIZONA GREEN PARTY V. REAGAN

equal opportunity to win votes.” Williams v. Rhodes, 

393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968).

More specifically, the Supreme Court, and many lower 

courts, have recognized that—in general—timing obstacles 

can pose unconstitutional barriers to ballot access:

When the primary campaigns are far in the 

future and the election itself is even more 

remote, the obstacles facing an independent 

candidate’s organizing efforts are 

compounded. Volunteers are more difficult 

to recruit and retain, media publicity and 

campaign contributions are more difficult to 

secure, and voters are less interested in the 

campaign.

Anderson, 460 U.S. at 792; see also Libertarian Party of 

Ohio v. Blackwell, 462 F.3d 579, 586–87 (6th Cir. 2006) 

(“Deadlines early in the election cycle require minor 

political parties to recruit supporters at a time when the 

major party candidates are not known and when the populace 

is not politically energized. . . . Early deadlines also have the 

effect of ensuring that any contentious issue raised in the 

same year as an election cannot be responded to by the 

formation of a new political party. The combination of these 

burdens impacts the party’s ability to appear on the general 

election ballot, and thus, its opportunity to garner votes and 

win the right to govern.” (internal citations omitted)). For 

all of these reasons, we can imagine how an early filing 

deadline could impact the Green Party’s rights, but that does 

not mean that Arizona’s deadline necessarily poses an 

unconstitutional burden.

The relevant inquiry is whether “[the state]’s ballot 

access requirements seriously restrict the availability of 

 Case: 14-15976, 09/23/2016, ID: 10134065, DktEntry: 48-1, Page 12 of 18
ARIZONA GREEN PARTY V. REAGAN 13

political opportunity.” Libertarian Party of Wash. v. Munro, 

31 F.3d 759, 762 (9th Cir. 1994). The Green Party bears the 

initial burden of showing such restrictions. See id. In 

Munro, we made clear that parties alleging a severe burden 

must provide evidence of the specific burdens imposed by 

the law at issue. See id. “[T]he extent of the burden that a 

primary system imposes . . . is a factual question on which 

the plaintiff bears the burden of proof.” Democratic Party of 

Haw. v. Nago, — F.3d —, 2016 WL 4269872, at *2 (9th Cir. 

2016). In challenging ballot access regulations, parties must 

articulate the nature of the burden, which “should be

measured by whether, in light of the entire statutory scheme 

regulating ballot access, ‘reasonably diligent’ [parties] can 

normally gain a place on the ballot, or whether they will 

rarely succeed in doing so.” Nader v. Brewer, 531 F.3d 

1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted).

In its complaint, the Green Party alleges that the 

February deadline greatly increases costs faced by third 

parties, was not designed to allow a reasonably diligent 

minor party to qualify for ballot access, and requires minor 

parties to gather signatures when the “mind of the general 

public and the attention of the media is not focused on the 

general elections.” These may well be legitimate 

complaints, but the Green Party did not submit any 

supporting evidence with its motion for summary judgment.

Instead, the Party chose to argue that the deadline was 

unconstitutional as a matter of law. As a result, “[a]ny effort 

to apply the balancing standard to this case is hamstrung by 

a lack of evidence. . . . Without any evidence regarding the 

practical consequences of the [deadline], we find ourselves 

in the position of Lady Justice: blindfolded and stuck 

holding empty scales.” Ariz. Libertarian Party, 798 F.3d at 

736 (McKeown J., concurring) (internal citations omitted). 

 Case: 14-15976, 09/23/2016, ID: 10134065, DktEntry: 48-1, Page 13 of 18
14 ARIZONA GREEN PARTY V. REAGAN

For example, we do not know how difficult it was for the 

Green Party to collect the required signatures, how much the 

signature-gathering effort cost, whether petition efforts 

diverted the Party’s resources from other endeavors, whether 

the “mind of the general public” was diverted from the 

election at the time the Party sought to collect signatures, 

how difficult it has been for new parties to comply with the 

deadline historically, or even if the Party attempted to 

comply with the deadline at all. Without evidence, the 

burdens identified in the Green Party’s complaint are purely 

speculative.

In the absence of specifics, the Green Party relies heavily 

on a district court decision holding an Arkansas filing 

deadline unconstitutional. See Citizens to Establish a Reform 

Party in Ark. v. Priest, 970 F. Supp 690 (E.D. Ark. 1996). 

Unlike the Green Party, the Arkansas Reform Party 

presented considerable testimony about the burdens of the 

deadline, including the analysis of two experts in minor 

political parties and ballot access. Id. at 694. For example, 

the plaintiffs presented testimony that “[t]hey experienced 

difficulty collecting petition signatures in the winter time 

due to cold temperatures and inclement weather,” id. at 692, 

circumstances that would likely not impair signature 

gathering in early winter in most parts of Arizona. The 

extensive evidence provided in Priest stands in stark contrast 

to the bare record here.

Analogy and rhetoric are no substitute for evidence, 

particularly where there are significant differences between 

the cases the Green Party relies on and the Arizona election 

system it challenges. The Supreme Court and our sister 

circuits have emphasized the need for context-specific 

analysis in ballot access cases. See Cal. Democratic Party 

v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 578 (2000) (“The evidence in this 

 Case: 14-15976, 09/23/2016, ID: 10134065, DktEntry: 48-1, Page 14 of 18
ARIZONA GREEN PARTY V. REAGAN 15

case demonstrates that under California’s blanket primary 

system, the prospect of [harm] is far from remote—indeed, 

it is a clear and present danger.” (emphasis added));

Blackwell, 462 F.3d at 587 (“In determining the magnitude 

of the burden imposed by a state’s election laws, the 

Supreme Court has looked to the associational rights at issue, 

including whether alternative means are available to exercise 

those rights; the effect of the regulations on the voters, the 

parties and the candidates; evidence of the real impact the 

restriction has on the process; and the interests of the state 

relative to the scope of the election.” (emphasis added)); 

Nago, 2016 WL 4269872, at *2 (“Because the . . . Party has 

not presented any evidence to meet its burden, its facial 

challenge fails.”).

The balancing test rests on the specific facts of a 

particular election system, not on “strained analog[ies]” to 

past cases. Munro, 31 F.3d at 762. That filing deadlines of 

similar lengths may prove unconstitutionally burdensome in 

the context of some election schemes does not eliminate the 

need for evidence that a severe burden was imposed by the 

filing deadline in this case. See id. (“The problem . . . is that, 

while the [Party] claim[s] to suffer exactly the same 

disabilities that the Court found unconstitutional in 

Anderson, [its] situation is vastly different.”). This is not to 

say that in a most unusual circumstance a ballot regulation 

could not be deemed unconstitutional on its face without 

further evidence. But such is not the case here.

The Green Party cannot prevail by “simply parrot[ing] 

the language of [earlier cases] without demonstrating how it 

actually applies to [the challenged] scheme.” Id. at 763. 

Significantly, we explained in Nader that “[t]o determine the 

severity of the burden, . . . past candidates’ ability to secure 

a place on the ballot can inform the court’s analysis” of 

 Case: 14-15976, 09/23/2016, ID: 10134065, DktEntry: 48-1, Page 15 of 18
16 ARIZONA GREEN PARTY V. REAGAN

whether a state election law passes constitutional muster. 

531 F.3d at 1035; id. at 1038 (finding a severe burden where 

historical evidence showed that after changing the filing 

deadline, no independent candidate had appeared on the 

ballot). Here, recent historical evidence shows that nonmajor parties, including the Green Party, have been able to 

gain official party recognition in Arizona despite the 180-

day filing deadline. What little evidence we do have 

therefore suggests that Arizona’s deadline does not severely 

burden constitutional rights.

Absent evidence of the particular burdens imposed in 

this case, we conclude that, at best, the 180-day petitionfiling deadline imposes a de minimis burden on 

constitutional rights.

IV. Arizona’s Legitimate Interest

Because the record demonstrates that the filing deadlines 

imposes no more than a de minimis burden on the Green 

Party’s constitutional rights, Arizona need only demonstrate 

that the filing deadline serves “important regulatory 

interests.” Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (internal quotations 

omitted). The evidence Arizona presented more than 

satisfied this burden.

Unlike the Green Party, the Secretary presented 

substantial evidence that details the processes for ballot 

access and the rationale behind each step in the timeline at 

each stage of the election process. The nested deadlines 

leading up to the Arizona primary, as well as the tasks that 

must be accomplished between the primary and general 

election, reflect an effort by the state to achieve the 

important goal of orderly elections. For example, the 

number of required signatures for independent candidate 

petitions depends on the number of registered voters who are 

 Case: 14-15976, 09/23/2016, ID: 10134065, DktEntry: 48-1, Page 16 of 18
ARIZONA GREEN PARTY V. REAGAN 17

not affiliated with a recognized party. For this reason, the 

state must know how many recognized parties will appear 

on the ballot before setting the candidate signature 

requirements, at which point candidates have two months to 

collect signatures. As Arizona’s Assistant State Election 

Director explained, “[i]f the petition deadline to obtain 

recognized party status were moved to a later date, new party 

candidates would have little or no meaningful opportunity to 

obtain the requisite number of signatures to qualify for the 

party’s primary ballot.” She also noted that in late May, 

Arizona counties mail a list of recognized political parties 

holding primaries in a particular election to the more than 

1.9 million early registered voters, and that adding additional 

parties after the mailing deadline could therefore impose 

considerable burdens on the counties and lead to voter 

confusion. Also, in preparation for the primary, ballots must 

be translated into Spanish and several Native American 

languages, a process that takes time. (See above for the 

statutory scheme regulating the pre-election deadlines).5

Even if Arizona could “streamline its system” and 

prepare for the primary in a shorter period of time, it is not 

required to “adopt a system that is the most efficient 

possible.” Munro, 31 F.3d at 764. On this record, we 

conclude that Arizona’s filing deadline serves “important 

regulatory interests,” Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434, that 

outweigh any de minimis burden the deadline may impose 

on the Green Party’s rights.

 5 The Green Party does not challenge the time allotted for candidates 

to collect signatures, the time needed to print and distribute ballots, or 

any of the other interconnected deadlines leading up to the primary.

 Case: 14-15976, 09/23/2016, ID: 10134065, DktEntry: 48-1, Page 17 of 18
18 ARIZONA GREEN PARTY V. REAGAN

CONCLUSION

The Green Party has not met its burden of showing that 

Arizona’s 180-day petition-filing deadline significantly 

burdens constitutional rights, while the Secretary has 

demonstrated that the restriction serves Arizona’s important 

interest in administering orderly elections. The district court 

therefore correctly granted summary judgment in favor of 

the Secretary.

AFFIRMED.

 Case: 14-15976, 09/23/2016, ID: 10134065, DktEntry: 48-1, Page 18 of 18