Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-03340/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-03340-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CANDACE LEE,

Plaintiff,

 v.

CITY OF REDWOOD CITY, et al.,

Defendants. /

No. C 06-3340 SBA

ORDER

[Docket No. 31]

This matter comes before the Court on individual Defendants Carlos Bolanos, Scott Warner,

James Stoney, Kathryn Anderson, and Jamie Mateo's Motion to Dismiss or, alternatively, for a More

Definite Statement.

BACKGROUND

a. Facts and Allegations

Plaintiff is a resident of San Mateo County, California. Compl. at ¶ 2. She is proceeding in

this action pro se. Defendants are the City of Redwood City, Redwood City police chief Carlos

Bolanos, and Redwood City police officers Scott Warner, James Stoney, Kathryn Anderson, Dan

Smith, Edward Feeney, and Jamie Mateo. 

On May 2, 2005 at approximately 8:00 a.m., Plaintiff was in her home at 162 Roosevelt Ave.

#2 in Redwood City. She alleges that Defendants Smith and Feeney entered her home without a

warrant or probable cause and arrested her. Compl. at ¶ 11. Lee had called 911 to report "an oral

disagreement" between herself and her husband. Id. at ¶ 13. After officers arrived, Plaintiff's boss

called several times. Plaintiff alleges that the officers ordered her not to answer the phone, kicked

her many times on her lower right leg, and ordered her to sit on the floor with her back straight with

an officer's foot on her knee. Id. at ¶ 15. "Thereafter Defendants JAMIE MATEO came to the

premises under the supervision of Defendants JAMES STONEY, KATHRYN J. ANDERSON, and

Case 4:06-cv-03340-SBA Document 44 Filed 11/13/06 Page 1 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 2

SCOTT WARNER (hereinafter "Police Officers") together made a decision to remove Lee from her

premises under the Defendant Police Chief, CARLOS G. BOLANOS (hereinafter "Police Chief")

authority without any legal justification." Id. at ¶ 11. 

Plaintiff alleges that after the officers made a decision to arrest her, they pulled her hair and

handcuffed her while she was sitting on the floor "with the Officers' knees on top of Lee's leg and

her body and further twist Lee's body and her head. Officers used their full strainght [sic] to twist

Lee's head in preventing her from her breathe [sic]." Id. at ¶ 16. She alleges that an officer took her

picture to prove that she had struggled and "go against the Officers while she was lying down on the

floor," and that the officers made a false report against her. Id.

Further, Plaintiff alleges that the officers retaliated against her, apparently for being Chinese

and for previously filing a case against the Police Chief. Id. at ¶ 18. Plaintiff states that officers

issued a Protective Order without probable cause and detained Plaintiff for eight days. Id. at ¶ 19. 

The Complaint contains other, essentially incomprehensible, allegations. It concludes that

"humiliations caused embarrassments within the last 11 years for Lee and she event suffered more

than any words that could describe which was done in the purpose to cover up Police Officers'

misconduct in retaliations against Lee. As a proximate result of the conduct of Defendants and each

of them as described herein, plaintiff suffered injuries and damages as hereinafter set forth." Id. at

¶¶ 31-32. 

Plaintiff asserts three separate violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. First, she alleges that all

Defendants acted under color of state law to deprive Plaintiff of the right to be free from

unreasonable searches and seizures, and the right not to be deprived of life, liberty or property

without due process of law. 

Second, Plaintiff states that the officers were acting within the course and scope of their

employment, and that their actions were "done under the supervision, direction and control of

Defendants CITY OF REDW000 [sic] CITY, Police Chief, Scott Warner, James Stoney, and

Kathryn J. Anderson who acting in his capacity as the CITY OF REDWOOD CITY Government

Case 4:06-cv-03340-SBA Document 44 Filed 11/13/06 Page 2 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 3

Officials. Defendants had notice of the violent tendencies and the predilection for the use of

unreasonable and excessive force possessed by Defendants Police Officers for detaining, punishing,

and depriving life and liberty from individuals with no apparent mental disorder, without reasonable

or probable cause." Id. at ¶ 41.

Third, Plaintiff alleges that the acts complained of "are indicative and representative of a

repeated course of conduct by personnel and officers from the Redwood City Police Department

which is tantamount to an informal custom or policy that condones and encourages the use of

excessive force and . . . unlawfully detaining and punishing individuals without due process." Id. at

¶ 43. Plaintiff claims that the City was deliberately indifferent to monitoring or controlling repeated

violations of constitutional rights by members of the police department, and that the City failed to

properly supervise, train, or discipline law enforcement officers. Id. 

Finally, Plaintiff makes claims for assault and battery, false arrest and imprisonment,

intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Id. at ¶¶

44-53. She seeks an Order requiring Defendants to adopt an affirmative program of compliance

with the Civil Rights Act, as well as compensatory and punitive damages, attorneys' fees and costs. 

a. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed a previous Complaint in this matter on May 19, 2006. The named Defendants

were the City of Redwood City; Barbara Pierce, mayor of Redwood City; Carlos Bolanos, police

chief of Redwood City; Edward Everett, city manager for Redwood City; Stan Yamamoto, city

attorney for Redwood City; and Redwood City police officers Smith and Feeney. Defendants

Pierce, Bolanos, Everett, and Yamamoto moved to dismiss. Plaintiff alleged that the Moving

Defendants were acting as supervisors during the May 2, 2005 arrest. The Court held that Plaintiff

failed to allege facts sufficient to hold the Moving Defendants liable as supervisors, and granted the

motion. Plaintiff's claims against the Moving Defendants related to the May 2, 2005 arrest were

dismissed with leave to amend. 

Plaintiff filed an amended Complaint on August 24, 2006. Again, the named Defendants in

Case 4:06-cv-03340-SBA Document 44 Filed 11/13/06 Page 3 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 4

the instant complaint are the City of Redwood City, police chief Carlos Bolanos, and Redwood City

police officers Scott Warner, James Stoney, Kathryn Anderson, Dan Smith, Edward Feeney, and

Jamie Mateo. Defendants Bolanos, Warner, Stoney, Anderson, and Mateo filed the instant Motion

to Dismiss on September 12, 2006.

LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Rule 12(b)(6)

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a motion to dismiss should be granted if it

appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff "can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which

would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). For purposes of such a

motion, the complaint is construed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff and all properly pleaded

factual allegations are taken as true. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969); Everest &

Jennings, Inc. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 226, 228 (9th Cir. 1994). All reasonable

inferences are to be drawn in favor of the plaintiff. Jacobson v. Hughes Aircraft, 105 F.3d 1288,

1296 (9th Cir. 1997). When a plaintiff attaches exhibits to the complaint, those exhibits may be

considered as part of the pleadings. Cooper v. Bell, 628 F.2d 1208, 1210 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1980). 

The court does not accept as true unreasonable inferences or conclusory legal allegations cast

in the form of factual allegations. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir.

1981); see Miranda v. Clark County, Nev., 279 F.3d 1102, 1106 (9th Cir. 2002) ("[C]onclusory

allegations of law and unwarranted inferences will not defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to state

a claim."); Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 987 ("Nor is the court required to

accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or

unreasonable inferences."), as amended by, 275 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001).

B. Rule 12(e)

Rule 12(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[i]f a pleading is so vague

or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, the party

may move for a more definite statement before interposing a responsive pleading." Motions for a

Case 4:06-cv-03340-SBA Document 44 Filed 11/13/06 Page 4 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 5

more definite statement are "proper only where the complaint is so indefinite that the defendant

cannot ascertain the nature of the claim being asserted." Sagan v. Apple Computer, Inc., 874 F.

Supp. 1072, 1077 (C.D. Cal. 1994). A plaintiff need only "set forth enough details so as to provide

the defendant and the court with a fair idea of the basis of the complaint and the legal grounds

claimed for recovery." Self Directed Placement Corp.v. Control Data Corp., 908 F.2d 462, 466 (9th

Cir. 1990). Rule 12(e) motions are viewed with disfavor and are rarely granted. Id.

ANALYSIS

The instant Motion to Dismiss is brought only by Defendants Bolanos, Warner, Stoney,

Anderson, and Mateo. There is no Motion to Dismiss as to Defendant City of Redwood City or

Defendants Smith and Feeney. 

A. First Claim for Relief under § 1983

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right

secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and (2) that the alleged

violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487

U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Plaintiff must allege that Defendants personally participated in or directed the

arrest and/or use of excessive force, or knew of these violations and failed to prevent them. There is

no respondeat superior liability under § 1983. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989).

 Moving Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to support a §

1983 claim against them, because she does not allege that they were directly involved in her arrest or

in the use force to secure her arrest. Motion at 5.

The Court disagrees. The Amended Complaint states that Feeney and Smith entered the

premises and arrested Plaintiff. "Thereafter," Mateo came to the premises under the supervision of

Stoney, Anderson, and Warner, who "together made a decision to remove Lee from her premises"

under the authority of Bolanos. Compl. at ¶ 11 (emphasis added). The Amended Complaint states

that "Police Officers" kicked Plaintiff, pulled her hair, stood on her, and twisted her head. Id. at ¶¶

15, 16. Which officers were involved in these physical acts is unclear. Although confusing, these

Case 4:06-cv-03340-SBA Document 44 Filed 11/13/06 Page 5 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 6

could be construed as allegations that all Moving Defendants were involved in Plaintiff's arrest and

in the use of force against her. Plaintiff does not state outright that all Defendants were present, and

it seems unlikely that the Chief of Police was involved in responding to a routine domestic violence

call. However, the "Supreme Court has instructed the federal courts to liberally construe the 'inartful

pleading' of pro se litigants." Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Accordingly, drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff's favor and taking the facts as

alleged by her to be true, Plaintiff has stated a claim for Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment

violations by the Moving Defendants. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is DENIED as to Plaintiff's

First Claim for Relief. 

B. Second Claim for Relief under § 1983

Plaintiff fails to provide any facts in support of her allegation that Defendants "had notice of

the violent tendencies and the predilection for the use of unreasonable and excessive force possessed

by Defendants Police Officers for detaining, punishing, and depriving life and liberty from

individuals with no apparent mental disorder, without reasonable or probable cause." Plaintiff's

statement that the officers' acts were done "under the supervision, direction and control of

Defendants" is likewise completely unsupported. There is no evidence that the officers named as

Defendants had any role in supervising or directing other officers. 

The Court will not accept Plaintiff's conclusory allegations of law or draw unwarranted

factual inferences. Miranda, 279 F.3d at 1106. Thus, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED

as to Plaintiff's Second Claim for Relief. 

The Court will not grant further leave to amend. Plaintiff has had one opportunity to amend

the complaint with regard to this specific claim; the previous Order made it clear that Plaintiff

needed to sufficiently allege facts that would give rise to supervisory liability. She has failed to do

so. Thus, the Court finds that further amendment would be futile. DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys.,

957 F.2d 655, 685 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that leave to amend is properly denied where amendment

would be futile). 

Case 4:06-cv-03340-SBA Document 44 Filed 11/13/06 Page 6 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 7

C. Third Claim for Relief under § 1983

Under Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), a municipality may be held

liable under § 1983 "only for constitutional violations occurring pursuant to an official government

policy or custom." Hart v. Parks, 450 F.3d 1059, 1071 (9th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff asserts that the acts

she complains of are indicative of an "informal custom or policy" and the failure of the City to

properly supervise, train, and discipline police officers. A failure to train or supervise can amount to

a "policy or custom" sufficient to impose § 1983 liability on a municipality. Anderson v. Warner,

451 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2006). 

However, Plaintiff simply does not offer any facts in support of her claim that the City of

Redwood City fails to properly train or supervise its police officers. That she was allegedly arrested

without probable cause and subjected to excessive force is insufficient – those may have been the

acts of bad officers who ignored their training and evaded supervision. Once again, the Court does

not accept Plaintiff's conclusory allegations of law or unwarranted factual inferences. Miranda, 279

F.3d at 1106. Thus, this claim should be dismissed. However, it is unclear whether this claim is

asserted only against the City of Redwood City – which is not involved in the instant Motion to

Dismiss – or also against the individual Defendants. Plaintiff does state that the alleged informal

custom or policy is "the direct and proximate result of the deliberate indifference of the City of

Redwood City, Police Chief, Scott Warner, James Stoney, and Kathryn J. Anderson to prevent,

control, or monitor repeated violations of the constitutional rights of individuals by members of the

law enforcement agencies of said Defendants." Compl. at ¶ 43.

Accordingly, to the extent that Plaintiff's Third Claim for Relief attempts to impose

supervisory liability on the individual Defendants, Moving Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is

GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND for the reasons discussed above. 

D. State Law Claims

Defendants argue that if Plaintiff's federal claims are dismissed, the state law claims should

be dismissed as well. Because the Motion to Dismiss with respect to Plaintiff's first claim under §

Case 4:06-cv-03340-SBA Document 44 Filed 11/13/06 Page 7 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 8

1983 has been denied, the state law claims will not be dismissed. The Court retains supplemental

jurisdiction over them, as they arise from a common nucleus of operative facts.

E. Defendants' Motion for a More Definite Statement

With respect to the claims that have been dismissed, Defendants' request for a more definite

statement is DENIED AS MOOT. Further, the request is DENIED with respect to Plaintiff's first

claim for relief; although it lacks clarity, Defendants have been put on notice of Plaintiff's claim

such that they can be reasonably expected to frame a responsive pleading.

The inability to ascertain all of the facts from a complaint is not an adequate ground for a

more definite statement, as these concerns can be addressed through discovery. See White v.

Hansen, 2005 WL 1806367 at *16 (N.D. Cal. 2005) ("[r]ule 12(e) provides a remedy for

unintelligible pleadings; it is not intended to correct a claimed lack of detail") (quoting Resolution

Trust Corp. v. Gershman, 829 F. Supp. 1095, 1103 (E.D. Mo. 1993)).

F. Defendants' Request for Sanctions

Defendants point out that they did not receive a copy of Plaintiff's opposition papers until

October 26, 2006, two days after they were due. Under Local Rule 5-5(a), papers in cases not

designated for e-filing must be actually delivered to the receiving attorney or party on or before the

due date. Defendants argue that the Court should sanction Plaintiff for failure to abide by the local

rules, and that the appropriate sanction is dismissal of the suit. Reply at 4. Plaintiff's opposition to

the first Motion to Dismiss was two days late, and the Court commented that it "has excused

Plaintiff's delay on this occasion, but it is not inclined to do so in the future. The Court reminds

Plaintiff that failure to comply with its orders or the rules may result in dismissal with prejudice

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b)." Order at 6.

Although Plaintiff was warned that the suit might be dismissed if she failed to timely deliver

her papers, the Court is not inclined to impose such a harsh sanction at this time. Plaintiff is once

again admonished that papers must not only be mailed, but actually received by the opposing party

on or before the due date. Plaintiff should be aware that, although she is proceeding pro se, she is

Case 4:06-cv-03340-SBA Document 44 Filed 11/13/06 Page 8 of 9
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 9

nevertheless obligated to follow the same rules as represented parties. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d

565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). 

CONCLUSION

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Moving Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED

IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Plaintiff's Second and Third Claims for Relief are

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as to Defendants Bolanos, Warner, Stoney, Anderson and Mateo. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Case Management Conference currently set for

November 14, 2006 at 1:00 p.m. is hereby continued to December 13, 2006, at 3:30 p.m. The Case

Management Conference will be held telephonically. The parties shall meet and confer prior to the

conference and shall prepare a joint Case Management Conference Statement, which shall be filed

no later than December 4, 2006. Plaintiff shall be responsible for filing the Case Management

Conference Statement, as well as for arranging the Case Management Conference call. All parties

shall be on the line and shall call (510) 637-3559 at the above indicated date and time. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 11/13/06 

 SAUNDRA BROWN ARMSTRONG

United States District Judge

Case 4:06-cv-03340-SBA Document 44 Filed 11/13/06 Page 9 of 9