Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00718/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-00718-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BLANCA REYNOSO,

Plaintiff,

v.

A. PRATER, an individual, UNITED

STATES OF AMERICA, and DOES 1-

25, inclusive,

Defendants.

 

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Case No.13CV0718 AJB (RBB)

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS

(Doc. No. 8)

Before theCourt is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint, filed on June

13, 2013. (Doc. No. 8). Plaintiff has filed an Opposition and Defendants replied. (Doc. Nos.

10 and 11.) The Court has reviewed the papers filed in support and opposition and finds it

appropriate to rule on the briefs without oral arguments pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1.d.1. 

For the following reasons the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion. 

I. BACKGROUND

The following facts and allegations are taken from Plaintiff’s Complaint. (Doc. No.

1.) Plaintiff, Blanca Reynoso, is a 58-year old United States citizen. On March 2, 2012,

Plaintiff traveled by mini-bus from Tijuana, Mexico, where she was vacationing, to San

Diego, California. Plaintiff had a connecting bus in San Diego that would then take her to

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San Fernando Valley where she resides. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff’s bus came to a stop at the United

States border at the San Ysidro Port of Entry along with a dozen similar buses. According

to Plaintiff, the bus waited for over an hour to cross the border. (Id.) Plaintiff feared that she

would miss her connection in San Diego, when she could not find the bus driver, she left the

bus to inquire about the delay. (Id.) 

Plaintiff approached a booth at the border, finding no one, she walked to a second

booth where she saw an officer. Plaintiff approached the officer, whom she believes to be

Defendant A. Prater, to ask him when the buses would be allowed to cross. According to

Plaintiff, Officer Prater appeared angry and told her she was not allowed to be there. (Id. at

5.) Plaintiff alleges that Officer Prater grabbed her while screaming she would be arrested

and pushed her back towards the bus. Plaintiff further alleges that Officer Prater bent her

arm backwards, threw her on the ground, and shoved his knee into her back. (Id.) Officer

Prater handcuffed her in a way that caused Plaintiff “blinding pain,” he then led her towards

the Customs and Border Protection (“CPB”) office. (Id. at 5-6.) Plaintiff requested to see a

doctorseveral times during her hour long detention. (Id. at 6.) An ambulance was called and

Plaintiff wastransported to Sharp Hospital in Chula Vista where she wastreated for multiple

contusions, back and chest pain. Plaintiff also alleges she suffered from swelling and pain

in her wrists, bruises on her face, tenderness on her ribs and left side, as well as two broken

ribs. (Id. at 6-7.) 

Plaintiff filed the instant action on March 25, 2013, against the individual officers and

the Department of Homeland Security, a federal agency of the United States of America. 

Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges nine (9) causes of action under Bivens and the Federal Tort

Claims Act (“FTCA”): (1) Bivens - Excessive Force; (2) Bivens - Unlawful Detention; (3)

Bivens- Extortion in violation of Fourth and Fifth Amendments; (4) FTCA - Excessive Force

(Civil Code § 52.1); (5) FTCA - Unlawful Detention; (6) FTCA - False Imprisonment; (7)

FTCA - Battery; (8) FTCA - Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; and (9) FTCA -

Negligence. (Id. at 1.) 

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Defendants move to dismiss some of Plaintiff’s claims. (Doc. No. 8.) Defendants

argue that (1) the state law claims against officer Prater should be dismissed based on the

government’s certification that he was acting within the scope of his federal employment

(causes of action four through nine) and (2) the Fourth and Fifth causes of action for

excessive force and unlawful detention should be dismissed for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction asthe United States has not waived sovereign immunity with respect to “Bivens

type” constitutional tort claims. (Id. at 2.) 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the pleadings

and allows a court to dismiss a complaint upon a finding that the plaintiff has failed to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir.

2001). The court only reviews the contents of the complaint, accepting all factual allegations

as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. al-Kidd v.

Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 956 (9th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 8(a)(2) requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader

is entitled to relief.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (U.S. 2007) (citations

omitted). To avoid a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a complaint need not contain detailed factual

allegations, rather, it must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on

its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim has “facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 

B. Bivens Claims (Causes of Action One Through Three)

The Supreme Court has created private damages action against federal officials for

constitutional torts not covered by the FTCA. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of

Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment gives rise to a right of

action against federal law enforcement officials for damages from an unlawful search and

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seizure. 403 U.S. 388 (1970). Bivens, thus establishes an implied private right of action for

tortious deprivation of constitutionalrights against federal officials in their personal capacity.

Id. 

Defendants do not dispute the propriety of Plaintiff’s Bivens claims brought against

Officer Prater in his individual capacity and the unnamed Doe Defendants. As alleged,

Plaintiff’s Bivens claims stand. 

C. State Law Claims Against Officer Prater (Causes of Action Four Through Nine)

Plaintiff’s FTCA claims are brought against all defendants. Defendants argue that

because the United States certified Officer Prater as acting within the scope of his federal

employment with respect to the allegations contained in the Complaint, the United States has

effectively substituted Officer Prater asthe proper defendant on the state law claims alleged. 

(Doc. No. 8 at 2.) Upon substitution, the claims were then deemed to be brought under the

FTCA against the United States. (Id.) 

The United States is the only proper party defendant in an FTCA action. Kennedy v.

U.S. Postal Service, 145 F.3d 1077, 1077 (9th Cir. 1998). Moreover, the “FTCA is the

exclusive remedy for tort actions against a federal agency, and thisis so despite the statutory

authority of any agency to sue or to be sued in its own name.” Id. (Affirming the district

court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s FTCA claimasimproperly brought against a person and entity

not subject to the FTCA) (emphasis added); see also Lance v. U.S., 70 F.3d 1093, 1095 (9th

Cir. 1995) (“The district court also properly dismissed Lance’s action to the extent his

complaint named Does 1 through 20 as additional defendants: the United States is the only

proper defendant in an FTCA action.”).

Accordingly, the FTCA claims as brought against Officer Prater and individual Doe

defendants are DISMISSED with prejudice. 

D. FTCA Claims Pursuant to California Civil Code § 52.1 Against the United States

Plaintiff’s fourth and fifth causes of action are FTCA claims made pursuant to

California Civil Code § 52.1. Defendants argue that these claims must be dismissed as the

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United States has not waived its sovereign immunity with respect to Bivens claims.1

Specifically, Plaintiff’s constitutional tort theories alleged under the United States

Constitution are improper and that in essence, Plaintiff seeks to bring Bivens type actions

against the United States itself. (Doc. No. 8 at 3-4.) Plaintiff argues that these causes of

action are made pursuant to the FTCA, not Bivens. (Doc. No. 10 at 3.) 

Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies

from suit. F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475, 114 S.Ct. 996 (1994) (internal citations

omitted). The FTCA waived the Federal Government’s sovereign immunity for certain torts

committed by federal employees. 28 U.S.C. § 1346. However, constitutional tort claims are

not cognizable under § 1346(b) and thus not actionable. Meyer, 510 U.S. at 475. To be

actionable under § 1346, a claim must allege, inter alia, that the United States “would be

liable to the claimant” as “a private person” “in accordance with the law of the place where

the act or omission occurred.” Id. (“The United States simply has not rendered itself liable

under § 1346(b) for constitutional tort claims.”). 

 Section 52.1 provides that if a person interferes, or attempts to interfere, by threats,

intimidation, or coercion with the exercise of enjoyment of the constitutional or statutory

rights of any individual, the individual may sue for damages independently of any other

action that is available. See Xue Lu v. Powell, 621 F.3d 944, 950 (9th Cir. 2010). Plaintiff

claims her rights under the United States and California Constitution were violated by

Defendants’ actions, specifically she cites to: 

1. Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section

13 ofthe CaliforniaConstitution - right to be free fromunreasonable detentions,

searches, and seizures; 

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss only argues about the Fourth cause of action

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(Excessive Force: FTCA claim pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1). (Doc. No. 8 at3.) 

However, Defendant’s Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition makes the same argument for the

Fifth caues of action (Unlawful Detention in violation of the Fourth Amendment: FTCA

Claim pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1). (Doc. No. 12 at 2). Accordingly, the Court

will discuss the motion with respect to both the Fourth and Fifth cause of action. 

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2. Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I,

Section 7 of the California Constitution - right to due process and equal

protection of the laws; and 

3. California Civil Code Section 43 - right of protection from bodily restraint

or harm, from personal insult and from defamation. 

(Doc. No. 1 at 11-12.) 

Plaintiff’s fourth and fifth claim made pursuant to § 52.1, to the extent premised upon

violations of the United States Constitution, are improper. The FTCA only subjects the

United States to liability as a “private person” would. Meyer, 510 U.S. at 475. “A wrongful

search orseizure by a private party does not violate the fourth amendment.” U.S. v. Walther,

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652 F.2d 788, 791 (9th Cir. 1981). “With a few exceptions, such as the provisions of the

Thirteenth Amendment, constitutional guarantees of individual liberty and equal protection

do not apply to the actions of private entities.” Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 500

U.S. 614, 619, 111 S.Ct. 2077 (1991). What Plaintiff seeks basically amounts to a claim

based on federal constitutional violations, that in the first place, cannot be the basis of

liability under the FTCA. See Munyua v. U.S., No.C-03-04538 EDL, 2005 WL 43960, at *12

(N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2005) (granting defendant UnitedStates’summary judgment on plaintiff’s

claims made under California Civil Code § 52.1 and stating “[t]he Court is also wary of

allowing Plaintiff to make what amounts to a claimbased on federal constitutional violations

that cannot be a basis of liability under the FTCA.”). While California Civil Code § 52.1

allow for such claims as a matter ofstate law, this Federal District Court findsthem improper

as the Supreme Court has expressly denied the applicability of the FTCA to constitutional

tort claims. 

Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff’s FTCA claims are premised upon alleged

violations of the United States Constitution, they are DISMISSED with prejudice. 

 The exception being when the private party acts as an “instrument or agent” of 2

the state. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487, 91 S.Ct. 2022 (1971). 

However, this is irrelevant to the Court’s analysis of the FTCA’s requirements. 

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III. CONCLUSION

The Court GRANTS the entirety of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff’s FTCA

claims brought against individual officers and FTCA claims, to the extent premised upon

United States constitutional tort theories, against the United States are DISMISSED with

prejudice. The Court finds that further amendment would be futile as no set of facts can

render the claims valid. Saul v. United States, 928 F.2d 829, 843 (9th Cir. 1991); see also

Millerv. Rykoff-Sexton, Inc., 845 F.2d 209, 214 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Plaintiff’s Bivens and FTCA claims, premised on state law, may proceed. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: November 4, 2013

Hon. Anthony J. Battaglia

U.S. District Judge

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