Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00826/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-00826-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Samora McIntosh, )

)

Petitioner, ) CIV 11-00826 PHX DGC (MEA)

)

v. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

Shelton Richardson, et al., ) 

) 

 Respondents. )

) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE DAVID G. CAMPBELL:

Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed a petition for

writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on April 8,

2011. Respondents filed a Limited Answer to Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Doc. 8) on June 17, 2011. As of

October 13, 2011, Petitioner had not filed any reply to the

answer to his petition.

I Procedural History

On May 11, 2007, a Maricopa County grand jury indicted

Petitioner on one count of possession of marijuana for sale

having a weight of more than four pounds and one count of

possession of drug paraphernalia; four co-defendants were named

in the indictment. See Answer, Exh. A. On October 17, 2007,

Petitioner and his four co-defendants proceeded to trial before

a pro tem Superior Court judge; all of the defendants

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represented themselves, each with respective advisory counsel.

Id., Exh. B. Petitioner was found guilty of both offenses as

alleged in the indictment.

On December 4, 2007, the trial court sentenced

Petitioner to the presumptive term of imprisonment of five years

pursuant to his conviction for possession of marijuana for sale

offense, and awarded Petitioner 216 days of presentence

incarceration credit. Id., Exh. E & Exh. F. The docket entry

indicates that Petitioner “refused to sign terms and conditions

of probation.” Id., Exh. E. The trial court found, therefore,

that Petitioner “rejected probation as to Count 2”. Id., Exh.

E. Accordingly, having found that Petitioner rejected probation

for the possession of drug paraphernalia offense, the state

court sentenced Petitioner to the presumptive term of

imprisonment of 1 year, to be served concurrently with the

sentence on the possession of marijuana offense. Id., Exh. F.

Petitioner took a timely direct appeal of his

convictions and sentences. Petitioner asserted that: (1) he did

not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel; (2)

the trial court erred by sentencing Petitioner to a term of

imprisonment pursuant to his conviction for possession of drug

paraphernalia, when Arizona statutes mandated a sentence of

probation; (3) the trial court erred by not establishing it had

jurisdiction to preside over Petitioner’s case, because the

court commissioners did not have authority to issue search

warrants or preside over criminal trials, and also failed to

have loyalty oaths on file with the Arizona Secretary of State.

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See id., Exh. G.

On June 4, 2009, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed

Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. Id., Exh. H & Exh. I.

Petitioner sought review of this decision by the Arizona Supreme

Court, which denied review on October 27, 2009. Id., Exh. K.

In his petition for federal habeas relief Petitioner

asserts: (1) he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his

Sixth Amendment right to counsel; (2) the trial court erred in

sentencing Petitioner to imprisonment for possession of drug

paraphernalia because Arizona law mandates a sentence of

probation; (3) the trial court did not have jurisdiction over

Petitioner’s criminal proceedings because the court commissioner

did not have authority to issue search warrants or preside over

criminal trials and the court commissioner did not have a

loyalty oath on file; (4) there was insufficient evidence to

support Petitioner’s conviction for possession of marijuana for

sale, as he was merely present in the house where the marijuana

was found; and (5) Petitioner’s due process rights were violated

when the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that it

could convict Petitioner on coconspirator liability. See Doc.

1. 

Respondents argue that Petitioner’s habeas action was

not filed within the one-year statute of limitations and that

Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling of the statute

of limitations. 

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II Analysis

A. Statute of limitations

The petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus is barred

by the applicable statute of limitations found in the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). The

AEDPA imposed a one-year statute of limitations on state

prisoners seeking federal habeas relief from their state

convictions. See, e.g., Espinoza Matthews v. California, 432

F.3d 1021, 1025 (9th Cir. 2005); Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918,

920 (9th Cir. 2002).

The Arizona Supreme Court denied review in Petitioner’s

direct appeal on October 27, 2009. Petitioner’s conviction

became final 90 days later, on or about January 26, 2010, when

the time for seeking certiorari by the United States Supreme

Court expired. See Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 267,

128 S. Ct. 1029, 1033 (2008); Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051,

1053 n.1 (9th Cir. 2008). Petitioner, therefore, had until

January 25, 2011, to file a federal habeas petition. See 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). The habeas petition was not filed until

April 8, 2011, more than two months after the statute of

limitations expired.

The one-year statute of limitations for filing a habeas

petition may be equitably tolled if extraordinary circumstances

beyond a prisoner’s control prevent the prisoner from filing on

time. See Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2554, 2562

(2010); Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092, 1096-97 (9th Cir. 2010).

A petitioner seeking equitable tolling must establish two

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elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently,

and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.”

Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418, 125 S. Ct. 1807, 1814-15

(2005). See also Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008,

1011-14 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 244 (2009). In

Holland the Supreme Court eschewed a “mechanical rule” for

determining extraordinary circumstances, while endorsing a

flexible, “case-by-case” approach, drawing “upon decisions made

in other similar cases for guidance.” Bills, 628 F.3d at

1096-97.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has determined

equitable tolling of the filing deadline for a federal habeas

petition is available only if extraordinary circumstances beyond

the petitioner’s control make it impossible to file a petition

on time. See Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 1048-49 (9th

Cir. 2010); Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011-14 & n.4; Harris v.

Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 1054-55 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2008); Gaston v.

Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034 (9th Cir. 2003), modified on other

grounds by 447 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2006). Equitable tolling is

only appropriate when external forces, rather than a

petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file

a timely habeas action. See Chaffer, 592 F.3d at 1048-49;

Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011; Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d

1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). Equitable tolling is also available

if the petitioner establishes their actual innocence of the

crimes of conviction. See Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 2011 WL

3275947, at *2-*3 (9th Cir.).

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Equitable tolling is to be rarely granted. See, e.g.,

Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011; Jones v. Hulick, 449 F.3d 784,

789 (7th Cir. 2006); Stead v. Head, 219 F.2d 1298, 1300 (11th

Cir. 2000). Equitable tolling is inappropriate in most cases

and “the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under

AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.”

Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002).

Petitioner must show that “the extraordinary circumstances were

the cause of his untimeliness and that the extraordinary

circumstances made it impossible to file a petition on time.”

Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 959 (9th Cir. 2010). It is

Petitioner’s burden to establish that equitable tolling is

warranted in his case. See, e.g., Espinoza Matthews v.

California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2004); Gaston, 417

F.3d at 1034.

A petitioner’s pro se status, ignorance of the law, and

lack of legal representation during the applicable filing period

do not constitute circumstances justifying equitable tolling

because such circumstances are not “extraordinary.” See, e.g.,

Chaffer, 592 F.3d at 1048-49; Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011-

14; Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006);

Shoemate v. Norris, 390 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 2004).

Petitioner has not filed any pleading in reply to the

answer to his petition asserting the petition is not timely. 

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B. Alternative bases for denying Petitioner’s claims

for relief

1. Petitioner asserts he did not knowingly and

intelligently waive his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 

This claim was denied on the merits by the state court

after a thorough and well-reasoned review of Petitioner’s claim,

the facts of Petitioner’s case, and the relevant law on point.

The state court reviewed the record on appeal, including

Petitioner’s pleadings and the colloquy during which the trial

court advised him of the risks of waiving his right to counsel.

The trial court delineated all of the responsibilities and

requirements Petitioner was undertaking by choosing to represent

himself. The Court of Appeals concluded that Petitioner’s

waiver of his constitutional right to counsel was knowing and

voluntary. 

The Court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus to a

state prisoner on a claim adjudicated on the merits in state

court proceedings unless the state court reached a decision

contrary to clearly established federal law, or the state court

decision was an unreasonable application of clearly established

federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1994 & Supp. 2010); Carey

v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 75, 127 S. Ct. 649, 653 (2006);

Musladin v. Lamarque, 555 F.3d 834, 838 (9th Cir. 2009).

Factual findings of a state court are presumed to be correct and

can be reversed by a federal habeas court only when the federal

court is presented with clear and convincing evidence. See 28

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240-41,

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125 S. Ct. 2317, 2325 (2005); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S.

322, 340, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 1041 (2003); Crittenden v. Ayers, 624

F.3d 943, 950 (9th Cir. 2010); Stenson v. Lambert, 504 F.3d 873,

881 (9th Cir. 2007).

A state court decision is contrary to federal law if it

applied a rule contradicting the governing law of Supreme Court

opinions, or if it confronts a set of facts that is materially

indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court but

reaches a different result. See, e.g., McNeal v. Adams, 623

F.3d 1283, 1287-88 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 79 U.S.W.L.

3727 (June 27, 2011) (No. 10-10109). 

The state court’s determination of a habeas claim may

be set aside under the unreasonable application prong if, under

clearly established federal law, the state court was

“unreasonable in refusing to extend [a] governing legal

principle to a context in which the principle should have

controlled.” Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 166, 120 S. Ct.

2113, 2120 (2000). See also Cheney v. Washington, 614 F.3d 987,

994 (9th Cir. 2010). However, the state court’s decision is an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law only

if it can be considered objectively unreasonable. See, e.g.,

Renico v. Lett, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1862 (2010). 

And as this Court has explained,

“[E]valuating whether a rule application was

unreasonable requires considering the rule’s

specificity. The more general the rule, the

more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes

in case-by-case determinations.” Ibid. “[I]t

is not an unreasonable application of clearly

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established Federal law for a state court to

decline to apply a specific legal rule that

has not been squarely established by this

Court.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, [] 129 S.Ct.

1411, 1413–14, [] (2009) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011). See also

Howard v. Clark, 608 F.3d 563, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2010).

Additionally, the United States Supreme Court recently

held that, with regard to claims adjudicated on the merits in

the state courts, “review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the

record that was before the state court that adjudicated the

claim on the merits.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388,

1398 (2011).

 The Court of Appeals’ decision that Petitioner

voluntarily and intelligently waived his right to counsel was

not clearly contrary to nor an unreasonable application of

federal law and, accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to

federal habeas relief on this claim. See Cook v. Schriro, 538

F.3d 1000, 1016-17 (9th Cir. 2008).

2. Petitioner contends the trial court erred in

sentencing Petitioner to imprisonment for possession of drug

paraphernalia because Arizona law mandates a sentence of

probation.

This claim was denied on the merits by the Arizona

Court of Appeals. The argument raised by Petitioner in his

direct appeal rested solely on an interpretation of an Arizona

state sentencing statute in effect at the time of Petitioner’s

crime and whether Petitioner had waived, at sentencing, a right

to be sentenced to probation rather than a concurrent term of

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imprisonment pursuant to his conviction for possession of

paraphernalia. 

Violations of state law or state criminal procedure

which do not infringe upon specific federal constitutional

protections are not cognizable under section 2254. See, e.g.,

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 112 S. Ct. 475 (1991).

Violations of state sentencing laws do not state a claim for

federal habeas relief. See Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389

(9th Cir. 1997) (holding that a petitioner may not “transform a

state-law issue into a federal one merely by asserting a

violation of due process.”). Because Petitioner’s second claim

is not cognizable, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief

on the basis of this claim.

3. Petitioner argues the trial court did not have

jurisdiction over Petitioner’s criminal proceedings because the

court commissioner did not have authority to issue search

warrants or preside over criminal proceedings and the court

commissioner and pro tem Superior Court judge did not have a

loyalty oath on file.

Petitioner raised this issue in his direct appeal and

the claim was denied on the merits of the claim. The Arizona

Court of Appeals noted Petitioner had conceded he was incorrect

with regard to whether the named commissioners and judges had

the correct documentation on file to exercise jurisdiction over

Petitioner’s criminal proceedings.

As stated supra, the state court’s findings of fact and

conclusions of state law are binding on this Court. Accordingly,

because the state court has concluded that there is no factual

basis for this claim, the claim must be denied.

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1

 Prior to 1996, the federal courts were required to dismiss

a habeas petition which included unexhausted claims for federal habeas

relief. However, section 2254 now states: “An application for a writ

of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the

failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the

courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (1994 & Supp. 2010). 

-11-

4. Petitioner asserts that there was insufficient

evidence to support his conviction for possession of marijuana

for sale. 

Petitioner did not raise this issue in his direct

appeal. As discussed, infra, Petitioner has procedurally

defaulted this claim and has not shown cause for nor prejudice

arising from his procedural default. Accordingly, the Court may

not grant relief on this claim.

5. Petitioner contends his right to due process was

violated when the trial court erroneously instructed the jury

that it could convict Petitioner on coconspirator liability. 

The District Court may only grant federal habeas relief

on the merits of a claim which has been exhausted in the state

courts. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842, 119 S.

Ct. 1728, 1731 (1999); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-

30, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991). To properly exhaust a

federal habeas claim, the petitioner must afford the state the

opportunity to rule upon the merits of the claim by “fairly

presenting” the claim to the state’s “highest” court in a

procedurally correct manner. See, e.g., Castille v. Peoples,

489 U.S. 346, 351, 109 S. Ct. 1056, 1060 (1989); Rose

v.Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005).1 either on

direct appeal or in a petition for post-conviction relief. See

Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999). See

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2 A petitioner must present to the state courts the

“substantial equivalent” of the claim presented in federal court.

Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 278, 92 S. Ct. 509, 513-14 (1971);

Libberton v. Ryan, 583 F.3d 1147, 1164 (9th Cir. 2009). Full and fair

presentation requires a petitioner to present the substance of his

claim to the state courts, including a reference to a federal

constitutional guarantee and a statement of facts that entitle the

petitioner to relief. See Scott v. Schriro, 567 F.3d 573, 582 (9th

Cir. 2009); Lopez v. Schriro, 491 F.3d 1029, 1040 (9th Cir. 2007).

Although a habeas petitioner need not recite “book and verse on the

federal constitution” to fairly present a claim to the state courts,

Picard, 404 U.S. at 277-78, 92 S. Ct. at 512-13, they must do more

than present the facts necessary to support the federal claim. See

Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6, 103 S. Ct. 276, 277 (1982).

-12-

also Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F. Supp. 2d 925, 932 (D. Ariz.

2007). 

To satisfy the “fair presentment” prong of the

exhaustion requirement, the petitioner must present “both the

operative facts and the legal principles that control each claim

to the state judiciary.” Wilson v. Briley, 243 F.3d 325, 327

(7th Cir. 2001). See also Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1066

(9th Cir. 2003). In Baldwin v. Reese, the Supreme Court

reiterated that the purpose of exhaustion is to give the states

the opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged constitutional

errors. See 541 U.S. 27, 29, 124 S. Ct. 1347, 1349 (2004).

Therefore, if the petitioner did not present the federal habeas

claim to the state court as asserting the violation of a

specific federal constitutional right, as opposed to violation

of a state law or a state procedural rule, the federal habeas

claim was not “fairly presented” to the state court. See, e.g.,

id., 541 U.S. at 33, 124 S. Ct. at 1351.2 

A federal habeas petitioner has not exhausted a federal

habeas claim if he still has the right to raise the claim “by

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any available procedure” in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(c) (1994 & Supp. 2010). Because the exhaustion requirement

refers only to remedies still available to the petitioner at the

time they file their action for federal habeas relief, it is

satisfied if the petitioner is procedurally barred from pursuing

their claim in the state courts. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S.

81, 92-93, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2387 (2006). If it is clear the

habeas petitioner’s claim is procedurally barred pursuant to

state law, the claim is exhausted by virtue of the petitioner’s

“procedural default” of the claim. See, e.g., id., 548 U.S. at

92, 126 S. Ct. at 2387. 

Procedural default occurs when a petitioner has never

presented a federal habeas claim in state court and is now

barred from doing so by the state’s procedural rules, including

rules regarding waiver and the preclusion of claims. See

Castille, 489 U.S. at 351-52, 109 S. Ct. at 1060. Procedural

default also occurs when a petitioner did present a claim to the

state courts, but the state courts did not address the merits of

the claim because the petitioner failed to follow a state

procedural rule. See, e.g., Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797,

802, 111 S. Ct. 2590, 2594-95 (1991); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 727-

28, 111 S. Ct. at 2553-57; Szabo v. Walls, 313 F.3d 392, 395

(7th Cir. 2002). “If a prisoner has defaulted a state claim by

‘violating a state procedural rule which would constitute

adequate and independent grounds to bar direct review ... he may

not raise the claim in federal habeas, absent a showing of cause

and prejudice or actual innocence.’” Ellis v. Armenakis, 222

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F.3d 627, 632 (9th Cir. 2000), quoting Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d

1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 1994).

The Court may consider the merits of a procedurally

defaulted claim if the petitioner establishes cause for their

procedural default and prejudice arising from that default.

“Cause” is a legitimate excuse for the petitioner’s procedural

default of the claim and “prejudice” is actual harm resulting

from the alleged constitutional violation. See Thomas v. Lewis,

945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991). Under the “cause” prong

of this test, Petitioner bears the burden of establishing that

some objective factor external to the defense impeded his

compliance with Arizona’s procedural rules. See Moorman v.

Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1058 (9th Cir. 2005); Vickers v.

Stewart, 144 F.3d 613, 617 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez-Villareal

v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996). To establish

prejudice, the petitioner must show that the alleged error

“worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting

his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.”

United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 1595

(1982). See also Correll v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 1404, 1415-16

(9th Cir. 1998).

Generally, a petitioner’s lack of legal expertise is

not cause to excuse procedural default. See Hughes v. Idaho

State Bd. of Corr., 800 F.2d 905, 908 (9th Cir. 1986).

Additionally, allegedly ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel does not establish cause for the failure to properly

exhaust a habeas claim in the state courts unless the specific

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Sixth Amendment claim providing the basis for cause was itself

properly exhausted. See Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446,

451, 120 S. Ct. 1587, 1591 (2000); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 755, 111

S. Ct. at 2567; Deitz v. Money, 391 F.3d 804, 809 (6th Cir.

2004). 

To establish prejudice, the petitioner must show that

the alleged constitutional error worked to his actual and

substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with

constitutional violations. See Vickers, 144 F.3d at 617;

Correll, 137 F.3d at 1415-16. Establishing prejudice requires

a petitioner to prove that, “but for” the alleged constitutional

violations, there is a reasonable probability he would not have

been convicted of the same crimes. See Manning v. Foster, 224

F.3d 1129, 1135-36 (9th Cir. 2000); Ivy v. Caspari, 173 F.3d

1136, 1141 (8th Cir. 1999). Although both cause and prejudice

must be shown to excuse a procedural default, the Court need not

examine the existence of prejudice if the petitioner fails to

establish cause. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n.43,

102 S. Ct. 1558, 1575 n.43 (1982); Thomas, 945 F.2d at 1123

n.10.

Review of the merits of a procedurally defaulted habeas

claim is required if the petitioner demonstrates review of the

merits of the claim is necessary to prevent a fundamental

miscarriage of justice. See Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393,

124 S. Ct. 1847, 1852 (2004); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316,

115 S. Ct. 851, 861 (1995); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,

485-86, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2649 (1986). A fundamental miscarriage

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of justice occurs only when a constitutional violation has

probably resulted in the conviction of one who is factually

innocent. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 485-86, 106 S. Ct. at 2649;

Thomas v. Goldsmith, 979 F.2d 746, 749 (9th Cir. 1992) (showing

of factual innocence is necessary to trigger manifest injustice

relief). 

Petitioner did not exhaust either his fourth or his

fifth claim for federal habeas relief in the state courts.

Because the claims are now procedurally foreclosed, Petitioner

has exhausted but procedurally defaulted these two claims.

Petitioner has not shown cause for, nor prejudice arising from

his procedural default of the claims. Petitioner has not

established that a fundamental miscarriage of justice will occur

absent consideration of the claims. Accordingly, Petitioner is

not entitled to federal habeas relief on either his fourth or

his fifth claims for relief.

III Conclusion

The federal habeas petition was not filed within the

one-year statute of limitations and Petitioner has not provided

a basis for equitable tolling of the statute of limitations.

Additionally, all of Petitioner’s claims for relief may be

denied because Petitioner has failed to state a cognizable claim

for relief and because the state courts did not err in denying

the claims for relief presented in Petitioner’s direct appeal.

Furthermore, Petitioner’s fourth and fifth claims for relief may

be dismissed because Petitioner procedurally defaulted these

claims in the state courts and he has not established cause for,

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nor prejudice arising from these claims.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. McIntosh’s

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter,

the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a

response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules

of Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the

District of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation

may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. 

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

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appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, R. 11, the District

Court must “issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it

enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” The undersigned

recommends that, should the Report and Recommendation be adopted

and, should Petitioner seek a certificate of appealability, a

certificate of appealability should be denied because Petitioner

has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right as required by 28 U.S.C.A § 2253(c)(2).

DATED this 13th day of October, 2011.

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