Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-05-07096/USCOURTS-caDC-05-07096-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 110
Nature of Suit: Insurance
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 3, 2006 Decided June 19, 2007

No. 05-7096

CAMBRIDGE HOLDINGS GROUP, INC., A DELAWARE

CORPORATION,

APPELLANT

v.

FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY D/B/A CHUBB GROUP OF

INSURANCE COMPANIES,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 01cv02192)

Kenneth T. Ward argued the cause for appellant. With him

on the briefs was Thomas A. Mauro.

Edward G. Gallagher argued the cause and filed the brief

for appellee.

Before: GARLAND and BROWN, Circuit Judges, and

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.

USCA Case #05-7096 Document #1047890 Filed: 06/19/2007 Page 1 of 15
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GARLAND,Circuit Judge: Cambridge Holdings Group, Inc.

sued Federal Insurance Co. in the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia, asserting breach of contract and

related claims. The district court dismissed the suit for failure

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and

Cambridge now appeals. Federal Insurance contends that we

must dismiss the appeal because it is was not filed within the

time permitted by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a). To

resolve that issue, we must consider additional provisions of the

Federal Rules that govern the following subissues: the

appealability of an order that does not dismiss all of the named

parties to a complaint; the validity of an attempt to serve process

by mail; and the starting gun of the filing period when an order

is not set forth in a separate document. After exploring the

intricacies of those provisions, we conclude that the instant

appeal was indeed untimely, and we therefore dismiss it. 

I

This diversity case arose out of a complicated multiparty

transaction, the details of which are neither in the appellate

record nor relevant to our disposition. Cambridge, a Delaware

corporation with its principal place of business in Washington,

D.C., loaned $2.1 million to three entities that are not parties to

this lawsuit. Part of the loan agreement required a Florida law

firm, Altschul, Landy & Collier, P.A., to hold $1.5 million in

escrow for distribution to the borrowers at a later date. The

escrow arrangement was governed by a separate “Guaranty

Deposit Agreement” signed by Cambridge, the three borrowers,

and the escrow agent, Altschul Landy. The Agreement required

that the escrow account be protected by a “fidelity bond”

payable to Cambridge in the event of misfeasance, malfeasance,

or breach of the Agreement by the law firm. To satisfy this

requirement, Altschul Landy obtained an insurance policy from

the Federal Insurance Company through the company’s agent,

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3

Babb, Inc. The policy listed Altschul Landy as the insured party

and Cambridge as the “loss payee.”

Cambridge alleges that, after the $1.5 million was placed in

escrow, Altschul Landy violated the Agreement and

misappropriated the money. Despite repeated demands by

Cambridge, the law firm failed to repay the misappropriated

funds or to submit a claim on the policy to Federal Insurance.

When Cambridge itself sought to make a claim on the policy,

Federal Insurance refused to pay on the ground that only the

insured party could make a claim.

On October 22, 2001, Cambridge sued Federal Insurance,

Babb, and Altschul Landy in the United States District Court for

the District of Columbia. Counts 1 through 4 of the complaint

sought damages from Federal Insurance and Babb on breach of

contract and related theories. Count 5 sought an injunction

requiring Altschul Landy to submit a claim on the insurance

policy.

On July 12, 2004, the district court issued a memorandum

opinion and entered an order in its docket dismissing Counts 1

through 4 for failure to state claims upon which relief can be

granted. See Cambridge Holdings Group, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co.,

357 F. Supp. 2d 89, 91 (D.D.C. 2004) (memorandum opinion);

U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Docket Report

for Case No. 01-cv-02192. The court did not address the

remaining count, Count 5, which sought injunctive relief solely

against Altschul Landy. 

After the court dismissed the claims against Federal

Insurance and Babb, Cambridge’s suit lay dormant. The docket

reflects no activity between the entry of the dismissal on July 12,

2004, and April 28, 2005, when the court sua sponte scheduled

a status hearing for the following month. At that hearing, which

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was attended by representatives of Cambridge, Federal

Insurance, and Babb (but not Altschul Landy), a dispute arose

as to whether the district court’s July 12, 2004 order was final

and appealable, in light of the failure to dismiss Count 5 of the

complaint. Although the district court ordered briefing on the

question, it never expressly resolved the issue. Instead, on June

20, 2005, the court entered an order dismissing Count 5 for

failure to prosecute and dismissing the case in its entirety. This

disposition was repeated in a separate document, entitled “Final

Judgment,” that was also entered on June 20, 2005.

Cambridge filed a notice of appeal on July 19, 2005.

II

On appeal, Cambridge challenges only the dismissal of its

breach of contract claim against Federal Insurance. In addition

to defending on the merits, Federal Insurance contends that we

must dismiss the appeal because it is untimely. 

The time for filing a notice of appeal is governed by Federal

Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), which provides that an appeal

from a decision of a district court in a civil case may only be

taken by filing a notice of appeal “within 30 days after the

judgment or order appealed from is entered.” FED. R. APP. P.

4(a)(1)(A); see FED. R. APP. P. 3(a)(1); see also 28 U.S.C. §

2107(a). In this case, the district court’s order dismissing

Cambridge’s breach of contract claim was entered in the docket

on July 12, 2004. Cambridge, however, did not file a notice of

appeal until July 19, 2005 -- 372 days later.

Despite this delay, Cambridge asserts that its notice of

appeal was timely because it was filed within thirty days of the

entry of the district court’s June 20, 2005 judgment, which

dismissed Count 5 and the complaint in its entirety. Cambridge

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maintains that Rule 4(a)’s clock did not begin to run until the

entry of that later judgment, for two reasons. First, it argues that

the July 12, 2004 order was not an appealable final order

because it did not resolve the litigation as to all parties as

required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). Second,

Cambridge asserts that, even if the July 12, 2004 order was

otherwise appealable, it still did not start the Rule 4(a) clock

because it was not set forth in a “separate document,” as

required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58(a) and Federal

Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(7).

We address these two arguments in Parts III and IV,

respectively.

III

Cambridge’s first contention is that the district court’s July

12, 2004 order was not appealable because it did not dispose of

Count 5 of the complaint, which sought injunctive relief against

Altschul Landy. Generally, the jurisdiction of courts of appeals

is limited to appeals from “final decisions of the district courts.”

28 U.S.C. § 1291; see Outlaw v. Airtech Air Conditioning &

Heating, Inc., 412 F.3d 156, 159 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The finality

of a decision in a case involving multiple claims or multiple

parties is governed in part by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

54(b), which specifies that a district court

may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or

more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only

upon an express determination that there is no just

reason for delay and upon an express direction for the

entry of judgment. In the absence of such

determination and direction, any order or other form of

decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer

than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer

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than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to

any of the claims or parties . . . .

FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b). The district court’s July 12, 2004 order

indisputably failed to adjudicate Count 5 of the complaint, and

did not make the required “determination and direction.”

Therefore, Cambridge argues, that order was not final, and

hence not appealable, because it adjudicated “fewer than all the

claims [and] the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the

parties.” Id. And if the July 12, 2004 order was unappealable,

it could not have started Rule 4(a)’s limitation on Cambridge’s

time to file a notice of appeal. As a consequence, Cambridge

asserts, the clock did not start until June 20, 2005, when the

district court entered a final, appealable order under Rule 54(b).

Under most circumstances, Cambridge’s analysis would

undoubtedly be correct. In this case, however, Altschul Landy

did not file an answer, enter an appearance, or otherwise

participate in the litigation. Federal Insurance contends that

Altschul Landy was never even served with a summons and

complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4. In

these circumstances, Federal Insurance argues, Altschul Landy

was not one of the “parties” to the litigation within the meaning

of Rule 54(b). If this argument is correct, the district court’s

July 12, 2004 order was final and appealable because it did

decide all of the claims against Federal Insurance and Babb, and

thus fully resolved the rights and liabilities of all the properly

served parties to the lawsuit. 

In order to resolve this dispute, we must address two issues.

First, we must determine whether a defendant that has never

been served is a “party” for purposes of Rule 54(b), a question

of first impression in this circuit. Second, because we conclude

that an unserved defendant is not a party, we must determine

whether Altschul Landy was ever served.

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1

See Leonhard v. United States, 633 F.2d 599, 608 (2d Cir. 1980);

Gomez v. Gov’t of the Virgin Islands, 882 F.2d 733, 736 (3d Cir.

1989); Swanson v. Whitmare, No. 88-7506, 1988 WL 60932, at *1

(4th Cir. June 3, 1988); Kane Enters. v. MacGregor (USA) Inc., 322

F.3d 371, 374 n.1 (5th Cir. 2003); Smith v. Bd. of County Comm’rs,

No. 97-3107, 1998 WL 321045, at *1 (6th Cir. June 2, 1998); Young

v. Mount Hawley Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 81, 83 (8th Cir. 1988); Raiser v.

Utah County, 409 F.3d 1243, 1245 n.2 (10th Cir. 2005); Insinga v.

LaBella, 817 F.2d 1469, 1470 (11th Cir. 1987).

2

The First Circuit has noted the issue but thus far has not taken a

position. See Barrett ex rel. Estate of Barrett v. United States, 462

F.3d 28, 33 (1st Cir. 2006). The Seventh and Ninth Circuits have

generally adopted the approach of the other circuits, but with different

qualifications. Whatever their wisdom, those qualifications would not

affect the outcome of this case, and we therefore take no position on

them. The Seventh Circuit has thus far applied the other circuits’

approach only when two conditions have been met: First, “an attempt

by the plaintiff to serve the complaint on the unserved defendant

would be untimely under FED.R.CIV.P. 4(m),” and second, “any new

complaint against the unserved defendant would be barred by the

statute of limitations.” Manley v. City of Chicago, 236 F.3d 392, 395

(7th Cir. 2001). Both conditions are met here. See FED. R. CIV. P.

4(m) (requiring service within 120 days after the filing of the

A

Although the interpretation of the term “parties” in Rule

54(b) is a question of first impression in this circuit, that is

hardly the case elsewhere. To the contrary, our sister circuits

“treat an improperly served defendant as never [having been]

before the district court” for purposes of Rule 54(b). Kane

Enters. v. MacGregor (USA) Inc., 322 F.3d 371, 374 n.1 (5th

Cir. 2003); see 15A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.

MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3914.7 (2d ed.

1992). Eight circuits have expressly adopted this view.1 None

has adopted a contrary interpretation.2

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complaint); D.C. CODE § 12-301(7) (three-year statute of limitations

for contract actions). The Ninth Circuit has qualified the other

circuits’ approach by holding that an order disposing of all claims only

against served parties is not final if “it is clear from the course of

proceedings that further adjudication is contemplated” by the district

court. Disabled Rights Action Comm. v. Las Vegas Events, Inc., 375

F.3d 861, 871-72 (9th Cir. 2003). In the instant case, there is no such

indication in the district court record.

At oral argument, Cambridge conceded that the position

adopted by the other circuits is correct, see Oral Arg. Recording

at 1:50, and we now join them in holding that defendants that

have not been subject to effective service are not “parties”

within the meaning of Rule 54(b). As a consequence, we also

hold that a district court order disposing of all claims against all

properly served defendants satisfies the requirements of Rule

54(b), even if claims against those not properly served remain

unresolved. 

This position not only has the virtue of consistency with our

sister circuits, but also reflects the soundest interpretation of

Rule 54(b). The rule was enacted to codify “[t]he historic rule

in the federal courts” prohibiting “piecemeal disposition of

litigation” by preventing an appeal in a case where litigation

before the district court is ongoing. See FED. R. CIV. P. 54

advisory committee’s notes to 1946 amendment. The failure to

dispose of a claim against a served party renders an order

unappealable because such a claim will necessarily involve

further action by the parties or the district court. By contrast,

when a district court dismisses a suit as to all served defendants

and only an unserved defendant remains, there is generally no

reason to anticipate additional proceedings before the district

court. Indeed, unless the procedural requirements of effective

service of process have been satisfied, the court lacks personal

jurisdiction to act with respect to that defendant at all. See Omni

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Capital Int’l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., Ltd., 484 U.S. 97, 104

(1987); Gorman v. Ameritrade Holding Corp., 293 F.3d 506,

514 (D.C. Cir. 2002).

B

The application of Rule 54(b) to this appeal therefore

depends on whether Altschul Landy was made a party to the suit

through valid service of process. The relevant rule for this case

is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(h), which provides two

methods for effecting service: “by delivering a copy of the

summons and of the complaint to an officer, a managing or

general agent, or to any other agent authorized by appointment

or by law to receive service of process,” FED.R.CIV. P. 4(h)(1);

or by complying with “the law of the state in which the district

court is located, or in which service is effected, for the service

of a summons upon the defendant in an action brought in the

courts of general jurisdiction of the State,” FED. R. CIV. P.

4(e)(1) (cross-referenced by Rule 4(h)(1)). 

Cambridge does not contend that it effected service on

Altschul Landy by either of these methods. Instead, it relies

solely on another provision of Rule 4, asserting that “[t]he Law

Firm was served by mail as authorized by the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure 4(c)(2)(C)(ii).” Appellant’s Reply Br. 1

(emphasis omitted). In support, Cambridge cites a letter to its

counsel from Joseph Altschul, who was at one time a member

of Altschul Landy. The letter, dated November 19, 2001, states

in relevant part:

On Friday, November 16, 2001, I received by

Fedex your November 15, 2001 and October 22, 2001

letters, together with a notice and complaint against

[Federal Insurance], Babb, Inc., and Altschul, Landy &

Collier, P.A.

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Please be advised that I resigned from Altschul,

Landy & Collier, P.A. earlier this year and do not have

the authority to speak on behalf of the firm, which is

being wound-up by Nancy S. Landy.

Joint Appendix tab 4, exhibit B. Cambridge argues that this

letter is sufficient to establish service because it “clearly

acknowledges receipt of the complaint, and through the

reference to the ‘notice’ of October 22, 2001, of the summons.”

Appellant’s Reply Br. 1. According to Cambridge, “[s]ervice

under Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) is complete when the recipient receives

the complaint and summons and has actual notice of the pending

lawsuit,” and “[s]uch service need not be officially

acknowledged in any particular form.” Id. (emphasis added).

This argument has a number of shortcomings, not the least

of which is that the letter upon which it relies establishes only

that Joseph Altschul had notice of the pending lawsuit. It does

not establish that the law firm had notice, since the letter stated

that Altschul was no longer a member of the firm and was

without authority to speak on its behalf. 

But the more significant defect in Cambridge’s argument is

that there is no “Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii)” in the relevant version of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. That provision was

deleted in the 1993 amendments to the rule, and was replaced

with a new provision, subsection 4(d). See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d)

advisory committee’s notes to the 1993 amendments. As

amended, Rule 4(d) forecloses Cambridge’s contention that

federal “service by mail” is complete whenever a defendant

acknowledges actual receipt of the summons and complaint. In

fact, Rule 4(d) is not a rule about “service by mail” at all, but

rather a rule about “waiver of service.” The rule permits a

plaintiff to use the mail to “notify . . . a defendant of the

commencement of the action and request that the defendant

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waive service of a summons.” FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(2). If the

defendant returns a waiver, the rule provides that “the action

shall proceed . . . as if a summons and complaint had been

served at the time of filing the waiver.” FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(4).

But if the defendant does not waive, the rule does not suggest

that service is nonetheless effective. To the contrary, the rule

provides that, “[i]f a defendant . . . fails to comply with a request

for waiver . . . , the court shall impose the costs subsequently

incurred in effecting service on the defendant.” FED. R. CIV. P.

4(d)(2) (emphasis added). And Rule 4(h), referenced above,

lists the two ways in which such service may be effected where

“a waiver of service has not been obtained.” FED. R. CIV. P.

4(h); see also FED.R.CIV. P. app. Form 1A (form for requesting

a waiver of service, advising the recipient that “[i]f you do not

return the signed waiver . . . , [the plaintiff] will take appropriate

steps to effect formal service in a manner authorized by the

Federal Rules” (emphasis added)). Indeed, the Advisory

Committee notes make clear that one of the purposes of the

1993 amendment was to prevent precisely the mistake that

Cambridge made here:

The former text described this process as service-bymail. This language misled some plaintiffs into

thinking that service could be effected by mail without

the affirmative cooperation of the defendant. It is more

accurate to describe the communication sent to the

defendant as a request for a waiver of formal service.

FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d) advisory committee’s notes to 1993

amendments (citation omitted). 

Relying on the Second Circuit’s decision in Morse v. Elmira

Country Club, 752 F.2d 35, 41 (2d Cir. 1984), Cambridge insists

that service by mail is effective under Rule 4, regardless of

whether the defendant returns a waiver, as long as the defendant

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3

When the inevitability of this outcome became clear during oral

argument, Cambridge responded in its rebuttal -- creatively, but

belatedly -- that in sending the complaint to Joseph Altschul in

November, 2001, it was not actually seeking a waiver of service under

Rule 4(d). Instead, Cambridge said, it was accomplishing personal

service by a private process server: to wit, the Federal Express

delivery person. See Oral Arg. Recording at 30:50. We decline to

consider this novel and unlikely theory, both because it came too late,

see Ark Las Vegas Rest. Corp. v. NLRB, 334 F.3d 99, 108 n.4 (D.C.

Cir. 2003) (holding that contentions first raised in oral argument are

waived), and because it is inconsistent with the theory of federal mail

service advanced in Cambridge’s briefs.

receives actual notice of the lawsuit. Appellant’s Reply Br. 1.

But Cambridge’s reliance on Morse has two fatal flaws. First,

the Second Circuit decided Morse prior to the 1993 amendment

to Rule 4, and based its decision on since-deleted language from

the former subsection (c)(2)(C)(ii). See Morse, 752 F.2d at 36

& n.1. Second, even before the 1993 amendment, this court had

expressly declined to follow Morse. See Combs v. Nick Garin

Trucking, 825 F.2d 437, 446-47 (D.C. Cir. 1987). We therefore

reiterate that, under Rule 4(d), waiver of service is not effective

unless the defendant returns a waiver.

Cambridge does not contend that Altschul Landy ever

returned a waiver of service, and concedes that there is no

indication in the record that it did. See Oral Arg. Recording at

5:50. We therefore find that Cambridge did not obtain a valid

waiver of service under Rule 4(d). And because Cambridge

does not claim that it served Altschul Landy by any other means

authorized by Rule 4, we conclude that the law firm was never

properly served and therefore was not a “party” within the

meaning of Rule 54(b).3

 Accordingly, the district court’s July

12, 2004 order was a final judgment within the meaning of that

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4

Some courts have held that a judgment that does not resolve a

claim against one of several defendants is not appealable under Rule

54(b) if the effectiveness of service on that defendant is uncertain. See

Swanson, 1988 WL 60932, at *1; Patchick v. Kensington, 743 F.2d

675, 677 (9th Cir. 1984). Although Cambridge insists that its service

was effective, we have concluded that its only method of service was

ineffective as a matter of law. We therefore need not decide how we

would address a case in which there is factual uncertainty as to

whether a party was properly served.

rule, because it fully resolved the litigation as to all parties to the

lawsuit.4

IV

Cambridge’s remaining argument is that, even if the district

court’s July 12, 2004 order was a final and appealable judgment,

it did not start the limitations period fixed by Rule 4(a) of the

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure because it was not set

forth in a separate document, as required by Rule 58 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This argument is also without

merit.

Rule 58(a)(1) states: “Every judgment and amended

judgment must be set forth on a separate document.” FED. R.

CIV. P. 58(a)(1). Cambridge notes that the district court’s July

12, 2004 order dismissing its claims against Federal Insurance

was not set forth in a separate document. It then cites this

court’s opinion in Pack v. Burns International Security Service,

130 F.3d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1997), which held that, when a district

court fails to comply with Rule 58’s separate document

requirement, “‘[a]n appellant may . . . safely wait until a

conforming judgment has been entered and file an appeal at that

time.’” Appellant’s Br. 18 (quoting Pack, 130 F.3d at 1072).

Because the district court did not issue a “conforming judgment”

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in a separate document until June 20, 2005, and because

Cambridge filed its notice of appeal within thirty days of the

entry of that document, Cambridge contends that its appeal was

timely.

Once again, Cambridge has apparently been consulting an

outdated copy of the Federal Rules. In 2002, Rule 4 of the

appellate rules and Rule 58 of the civil rules were amended to

“ensure that parties will not be given forever to appeal . . . when

a court fails to set forth a judgment or order on a separate

document in violation of FED.R.CIV.P. 58(a)(1).” FED.R.APP.

P. 4(a)(7) advisory committee’s notes to 2002 amendments.

Rule 4(a)(7) now states:

A judgment or order is entered for purposes of this

Rule 4(a) . . . when the judgment or order is entered in

the civil docket . . . and when the earlier of these

events occurs: the judgment or order is set forth on a

separate document, or 150 days have run from entry of

the judgment or order in the civil docket . . . . 

FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(7)(A) (emphasis added); see also FED. R.

CIV. P. 58(b) (reflecting a corresponding amendment). Thus,

when a district court enters an order that would otherwise

constitute a final judgment, but fails to set it forth in a separate

document as required by Rule 58, the Rule 4(a) clock begins to

run 150 days after the order is entered in the docket. See

Outlaw, 412 F.3d at 162-63.

In this case, there is no dispute that the district court’s order

dismissing Cambridge’s claims against Federal Insurance was

entered in the civil docket on July 12, 2004. See U.S. District

Court for the District of Columbia, Docket Report for Case No.

01-cv-02192. Pursuant to amended Rule 4(a)(7)(A), it was

therefore entered for purposes of Rule 4(a) 150 days later -- on

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December 9, 2004 -- notwithstanding the lack of a separate

document. When confronted with the amended rule at oral

argument, counsel for Cambridge conceded as much. See Oral

Arg. Recording at 1:35. Accordingly, Rule 4(a)’s thirty-day

period ran out in January 2005 -- six months before Cambridge

filed its notice of appeal on July 19, 2005. 

V

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Cambridge’s

appeal was untimely, and it is therefore

Dismissed.

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