Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_99-cv-04941/USCOURTS-cand-3_99-cv-04941-20/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Personal Injury

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 Following the completion of briefing, plaintiffs filed a motion requesting the Court

delay ruling on OFM’s motion to dismiss, for the purpose of allowing the remaining parties

to exchange initial disclosures. (See Motion for Leave to File Motion for Stay of OFM’s

Motion to Dismiss to Allow Remaining Parties to Comply with FRCP 26(a)(1), filed

December 31, 2007.) Plaintiffs have failed to show good cause for such delay, however,

for the reason that OFM’s motion is directed at the adequacy of the pleadings, and,

accordingly, plaintiffs’ request is hereby denied.

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EMIL ALPERIN, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

VATICAN BANK, et al.,

Defendants. /

No. C-99-04941 MMC

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT OFM’S

MOTION TO DISMISS FOURTH

AMENDED COMPLAINT

(Docket No. 270)

Before the Court is the motion, filed March 20, 2006 by defendant Order of Friars

Minor (“OFM”), to dismiss plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaint on the ground of lack of

standing. Plaintiffs have filed opposition to the motion; OFM has filed a reply.1

 Having

considered the papers filed in support of and in opposition to the motion, the Court rules as

follows.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs consist of both individual and organizational plaintiffs who bring the abovetitled action on behalf of themselves and a purported class of all Serbs, Jews, Roma, and

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former Soviet Union citizens and their heirs and beneficiaries, all of whom are alleged to

have suffered monetary and/or property losses assertedly caused by the Independent

State of Croatia (“NDH”) during the period April 1941 through May 1945. (See Fourth

Amended Complaint (“4AC”) ¶¶ 1, 45-73.) Plaintiff alleges that during such time period, the

NDH was led by Ante Pavelic and his Ustasha Party (collectively, “Ustasha Regime”), who

also controlled parts of Bosnia-Hercegovina, Serbia, and militarily-occupied sectors of the

former Soviet Union. (See id. ¶ 3.) 

The defendants are the Istituto Per Le Opere Di Religione (“IOR”) and OFM. (See

id. ¶¶ 74-85.) Plaintiffs allege that OFM’s administrative structure is divided into

geographically-based provinces, including “several Croatian Franciscan provinces.” (See

id. ¶¶ 79, 81.) The Croatian branch of OFM, plaintiffs allege, maintains facilities in Chicago

“known as the Croatian Franciscan Custody of the Holy Family.” (See id. ¶ 83.) Plaintiffs

further allege that OFM “coordinated, operated and managed the affairs of the Croatian

Confraternity of the College of San Girolamo Degli Illirici” (“Croatian Confraternity”) from

1946 through 1952. (See id. ¶ 85.) 

According to plaintiffs, defendants “accepted, concealed, hypothecated, laundered,

retained, converted and profited from assets looted by the Ustasha Regime during April

1941 through May 1945 and deposited in, or converted, concealed, hypothecated,

trafficked, credited, pledged, exchanged, laundered or liquidated through, the IOR, and

OFM after the demise of the NDH in May 1945.” (See id. ¶ 8.) In that regard, plaintiffs

allege, property was taken by the Ustasha Regime and added to the Ustasha Treasury, 

(see id. ¶¶ 41-44), after which Croatian Franciscans and the Croatian Confraternity

assisted the Ustasha Regime in smuggling and laundering the Ustasha Treasury outside

Croatia, (see id. ¶¶ 142, 144). Thereafter, according to plaintiffs, a portion of the Ustasha

Treasury was “transferred to Vatican City and the College of San Girolamo Degli Illirici and

then to the IOR for conversion.” (See id. ¶ 154.) Plaintiffs further allege that IOR and OFM

converted jewels, gold coins, and gold jewelry from the Ustasha Treasury after the end of

World War II and thereafter transferred such assets to Swiss accounts. (See id. ¶ 159.) 

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Additionally, plaintiffs allege, “the [Croatian] Confraternity received and retained a portion of

the Ustasha Treasury post war for its work with the Ustasha exiles.” (See id. ¶ 145.) 

Lastly, plaintiffs allege, OFM, along with the Croatian Franciscan Custody of Chicago and

the Croatian Confraternity, all profited from their access to Ustasha Treasury funds. (See

id. ¶ 148.) 

Plaintiffs assert causes of action for an accounting, conversion, unjust enrichment,

and restitution, as well as unspecified violations of international law. (See id. ¶¶ 182-201.)

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss for lack of standing is brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000)

(“Because standing and mootness both pertain to a federal court’s subject-matter

jurisdiction under Article III, they are properly raised in a motion to dismiss under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) . . . .”). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) can be

brought as either a “facial” or a “factual” attack. See id. Where, as here, the Court

considers a facial attack on standing, (see Motion at 3:21-22), the Court “must accept as

true all material allegations of the complaint, and must construe the complaint in favor of

the complaining party.” See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975) (citation omitted). 

The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing the elements of

standing. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). 

DISCUSSION

To establish standing, certain constitutional and prudential considerations must be

met. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. The minimum constitutional requirements include (1) an

injury in fact suffered by the plaintiff, (2) a causal connection between the injury and the

conduct of the defendant, and (3) redressability. See id. at 560-61. “[P]rudential standing

encompasses ‘the general prohibition on a litigant’s raising another person’s legal rights,

the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in the

representative branches, and the requirement that a plaintiff’s complaint fall within the zone

of interests protected by the law invoked.’” Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542

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 OFM concedes that five of the twenty-four plaintiffs, who allege that their own

personal property was looted, have adequately alleged an injury in fact. (See Motion at

4:27-28.) The five plaintiffs are Emil Alperin, Jewgenija Romanova, Maria Dankewitsch,

Vladimir Morgunov, and Fred Zlatko Harris. (See 4AC ¶¶ 45-48, 59.)

3

 Although the Fourth Amended Complaint states that “[a]ll individual plaintiffs allege

that their property was taken by the Ustasha Regime,” (see 4AC ¶ 41), the complaint’s

allegations with respect to each individual plaintiff make it clear that not all plaintiffs allege

they personally suffered property loss. 

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U.S. 1, 12 (2004) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)). 

A. Constitutional Requirements for Individual Plaintiffs’ Standing

1. Injury in Fact

OFM first argues that nineteen of the twenty-four individual plaintiffs fail to allege

they personally suffered property loss and, consequently, have failed to allege the requisite

“injury in fact.”2 An “injury in fact” is one that is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or

imminent.” See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. An injury is particularized if it “affect[s] the plaintiff

in a personal and individual way.” See id. at 561 n.1. 

At the outset, OFM argues that plaintiffs Nevenka Vukasovic Malinowski, Eli Rotem,

and Milorad Skoric have failed to allege any property loss. OFM is correct that two of these

three plaintiffs have failed to allege any property loss, and accordingly have not adequately

alleged an injury in fact. In particular, although plaintiff Malinowski alleges that “[a]ll Serb

property in the village was looted,” she fails to allege that any of her own or her family’s

personal property was among the property looted, (see 4AC ¶ 55); similarly, plaintiff Skoric

merely alleges that “the whole village had been pillaged,” without alleging any personal

loss, (see id. ¶ 57). Plaintiff Rotem, however, does allege that “[a]ll the family property in

Zagreb was forfeited and taken by the Ustasha.” (See id. ¶ 56.) Thus only two plaintiffs —

Malinowski and Skoric — have failed to allege any property loss; Rotem will be included

with the seventeen plaintiffs discussed below.

Each of these seventeen plaintiffs alleges that the property of certain family

members or relatives was looted. (See 4AC ¶¶ 49-54, 56, 58, 60-68.)3

 To adequately

plead standing, such plaintiffs must allege they are heirs or legatees of the decedents. 

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See, e.g., Bodner v. Paribas, 114 F. Supp. 2d 117, 121, 126 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding

plaintiffs, who were family members of Holocaust victims, had standing to challenge theft of

said victims’ assets because plaintiffs were “statutory distributees of the decedents’

estates” under French and New York law); see also Webb v. City of Dallas, 314 F.3d 787,

791 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded injury in fact by alleging they were

heirs under deed in dispute). Two of the seventeen plaintiffs, Vladamir Brodich and Vladan

Celebonovic, allege they are the sole heirs of the decedents whose property was looted,

(see 4AC ¶¶ 49, 65); the remaining fifteen plaintiffs, however, do not allege they are heirs

or legatees, or otherwise legally entitled, to the assertedly stolen property.

In sum, seven plaintiffs — Emil Alperin, Jewgenija Romanova, Maria Dankewitsch,

Vladimir Morgunov, Fred Zlatko Harris, Vladimir Brodich, and Vladan Celebonovic — have

adequately alleged an injury in fact, (see id. ¶¶ 45-49, 59, 65), while seventeen plaintiffs —

William Dorich, Igor Najfeld, Lizabeth Lalich, Mladen Djuricich, Robert Predrag Gakovich,

Nevenka Vukasovic Malinowski, Eli Rotem, Milorad Skoric, Veljko Miljus, Milja Conger,

Allen Dolfi Herskovich, Bogdan Kljaic, David Levy, Zdenka Baum Ruchwarger-Levy, Desa

Tomasevic Wakeman, Daniel Pyevich, and Koviljka Popovic — have failed to allege an

injury in fact, (see id. ¶¶ 50-58, 60-64, 66-68). 

2. Causal Connection

OFM next argues that all of the plaintiffs have failed to adequately allege the

requisite causal connection because the alleged property loss is alleged to have resulted

solely from the independent action of third parties, and plaintiffs have failed to allege any

connection between those third parties and OFM. For purposes of standing, a causal

connection must exist “between the injury and the conduct complained of,” and the

asserted injury must be “‘fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant,

and not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court.’” 

See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61 (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26,

41-42 (1976) (alteration in original)). 

Here, OFM argues, plaintiffs have failed to allege “OFM created the [Ustasha]

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 The Fourth Amended Complaint also includes the allegation, “All individual

plaintiffs allege that their property was taken by the Ustasha Regime which maintained a

systematic procedure of looting and plunder from its victims in which confiscated property

was deposited in central accounts in Zagreb or was auctioned or sold first and the

proceeds sent to the Ustasha Treasury.” (See 4AC ¶ 41.) This general allegation,

however, is based on more specific allegations, which describe the property each plaintiff

alleges to have been looted and the circumstances under which it was taken. (See 4AC ¶¶

45-68.) 

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Treasury in the first instance or looted the private property that became part of the

Treasury.” (See Motion at 6:23-24.) The causes of action against OFM rely, however, on

OFM’s alleged receipt of looted assets from the Ustasha Treasury, (see 4AC ¶¶ 12-13),

and plaintiffs expressly state in their opposition that they are not alleging that OFM took the

property directly from plaintiffs, (see Opp. at 5:27-6:3).

OFM next argues that four plaintiffs have failed to allege their property was looted by

the Ustasha Regime and added to the Ustasha Treasury. In particular, OFM argues,

plaintiffs Emil Alperin, Jewgenija Romanova, Maria Dankewitsch, and Vladimir Morgunov

allege that “Croatian troops” in the Ukraine or “Croatian Naval personnel” looted their

property, not the Ustasha Regime. (See 4AC ¶¶ 45-48.)4 Although the complaint also

contains general allegations that the Ustasha Regime contributed armed forces to fight in

the Soviet Union alongside those of Germany, that “Croatian troops assisted the German

occupiers of Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia and participated in their systematic plunder and

looting,” and that “[t]he Ustasha Treasury contained loot from the former Soviet Union,”

(see id. ¶¶ 108-117), the inclusion of such general allegations is insufficient to allege that

the property of any of the above four plaintiffs was taken by the Ustasha Regime, given to

the Ustasha Regime, or otherwise became part of the Ustasha Treasury.

OFM further argues that, to the extent plaintiffs have alleged any conduct on the part

of the Ustasha, any wrongful assistance to the Ustasha is alleged to have been provided by

the Croatian Franciscans and the Croatian Confraternity, and that plaintiffs fail to

adequately allege facts suggesting OFM can be held liable for the acts of such entities. 

Although plaintiffs allege that “OFM assisted Ustasha war criminals to evade justice by

smuggling and laundering [the] loot,” (see id. ¶ 141), plaintiffs define “OFM” as

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 The complaint alleges, “Upon the demise of the Ustasha Regime in May 1945, a

substantial portion of the Ustasha Treasury was transferred to [the Ustasha’s Regime’s]

Croatian Franciscan allies for transport to Rome and elsewhere where Croatian

Franciscans sympathetic to the Ustasha were based.” (See 4AC ¶ 142.) The complaint

further alleges the Croatian Confraternity, among others, “use[d] funds from the Ustasha

Treasury,” (see id. ¶ 144), and “received and retained a portion of the Ustasha Treasury

post war,” (see id. ¶ 145). 

6

 Plaintiffs argue that “OFM provided the direct means of laundering the Ustasha

Treasury through the Croatian Confraternity at San Girolamo and was the lynchpin in the

entire scheme [4AC ¶ 141-148].” (See Opp. at 11:4-6) (emphasis added.)

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encompassing OFM, the Croatian Franciscans, and the Croatian Confraternity, (see id. ¶

4). Such allegation, standing alone, leaves unspecified the entity or entities alleged to have

committed the above-described acts. Further, from other allegations in the complaint,5

 as

well as from plaintiffs’ opposition to the instant motion,6

 it is clear that the Croatian

Franciscans and Croatian Confraternity are the alleged actors.

To connect OFM to the Croatian Confraternity, plaintiffs allege OFM “coordinated,

operated, and managed the affairs of the Croatian Confraternity of the College of San

Girolamo Degli Illirici 1946-1952 through its Chief Economist and General Definitor Dominic

Mandic who was also the former Franciscan Provincial of Hercegovina.” (See 4AC ¶ 85.) 

If plaintiffs are relying on an agency, alter ego, or other relationship between OFM and the

Croatian Confraternity, plaintiffs have not alleged such, nor have they, in their opposition,

identified any theory on which OFM’s asserted liability for such acts rests.

To connect OFM to the Croatian Franciscans, plaintiffs allege that “OFM’s

administrative structure is divided in geographically based Provinces,” with the Croatian

branch consisting of five provinces. (See id. ¶ 81-82.) Relying on Watson v. Jones, 80

U.S. 679, 722-23 (1871), plaintiffs contend that in such a religious “hierarchy” there exist

“superior ecclesiastical tribunals with a general and ultimate power of control more or less

complete, in some supreme judicatory over the whole membership of that general

organization.” (See Opp. at 9:2-8). Plaintiff’s argument is unpersuasive. First, although

plaintiffs allege that OFM is now administratively divided into provinces, (see 4AC ¶¶ 81-

82), plaintiffs have failed to allege the nature of OFM’s structure during the relevant time

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 In so ruling, the Court does not reach OFM’s additional argument, essentially a

factual attack on standing, that OFM is a separate legal entity from its provinces,

specifically, a separate “juridic person” under Italian as well as Canon law, and, as such,

may not be held liable for the acts of its provinces. (See Decl. of Settimio Carmignani

Caridi ¶¶ 58-61.) Assuming such law is relevant, the evidence submitted by OFM in

support thereof is not of a nature clearly subject to judicial notice. See, e.g., White, 227

F.3d at 1242 (“With a factual Rule 12(b)(1) attack . . . a court may look beyond the

complaint to matters of public record without having to convert the motion into one for

summary judgment.”). 

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period. Moreover, plaintiffs’ allegation that OFM is a hierarchical religious organization

does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that it is a single entity liable for all actions of its

provinces. As the Supreme Court recognized in Watson, there are multiple ways in which a

religious organization may be structured, including one in which a “religious congregation is

strictly independent of other ecclesiastical associations, and so far as church government is

concerned, owes no fealty or obligation to any higher authority.” See Watson, 80 U.S. at

722-23. Consequently, plaintiffs’ allegations as to OFM’s structure are insufficient to plead

OFM’s liability based on acts taken by the Croatian Franciscans.

In short, plaintiffs have failed to adequately allege the requisite causal connection

between OFM and the acts alleged to have been committed by either the Croatian

Franciscans or the Croatian Confraternity.7

 Additionally, as noted above, plaintiffs Emil

Alperin, Jewgenija Romanova, Maria Dankewitsch, and Vladimir Morgunov have failed to

adequately allege their property became part of the Ustasha Treasury.

3. Redressability

OFM further argues that the equitable relief plaintiffs seek, specifically, an

accounting and restitution, is “not substantially likely to ameliorate the property losses

plaintiffs allege,” and thus that plaintiffs, for purposes of standing, have failed to meet the

requirement of redressability. (See Motion at 8:16-19.) Redressability requires that it be

“‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable

decision.’” See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (quoting Simon, 426 U.S. at 38, 43, 96). Here,

plaintiffs seek from OFM not only an accounting and restitution but also disgorgement of

profits and damages. (See 4AC, Prayer for Relief ¶¶ 3-7.) There is a likelihood that these

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 OFM argues plaintiffs’ restitution claim is not redressable because the Treaty of

Peace with Italy precludes recovery in this forum. The redressability requirement

addresses whether the relief sought is likely to redress the asserted injury, however, not

whether plaintiffs can prove entitlement to such relief. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina

Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 75 n.20 (holding a plaintiff must show “a ‘substantial

likelihood’ that the relief requested will redress the injury claimed”); see also Lac Du

Flambequ Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Norton, 422 F.3d 490, 501 (7th Cir.

2005) (“Redressability . . . depends upon the relief requested, not the relief [the plaintiff]

could prove it was entitled to on the merits.”).

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 The ATS provides: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil

action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of

the United States.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1350. The federal question statute provides: “The

district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the

Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

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two additional forms of relief, and, in particular, damages, will redress plaintiffs’ asserted

injuries, if liability is shown.8

4. Summary with Respect to Constitutional Standing Requirements

In sum, seventeen plaintiffs have failed to allege an injury in fact, four plaintiffs have

failed to allege their property became part of the Ustasha Treasury, and all plaintiffs have

failed to allege the requisite causal connection between their asserted injuries and the

conduct of OFM. Accordingly, with the exception of redressability, the individual plaintiffs

have failed to adequately allege the minimum constitutional requirements necessary to

establish standing. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. 

B. Prudential Principles Regarding Individual Plaintiffs’ Standing

1. Zone of Interests

With respect to the prudential principles relevant to the question of standing, OFM

first argues that plaintiffs’ complaint does not fall within the “zone of interests” protected by

the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”), 28 U.S.C. § 1350, or by the federal question statute, 28

U.S.C. § 1331.9

 A “plaintiff’s complaint must ‘fall within the zone of interests to be

protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question.’” See

Individuals for Responsible Gov’t, Inc. v. Washoe County, 110 F.3d 699, 703 (9th Cir.

1997) (quoting Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of Church &

State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982)). In determining whether a plaintiff’s complaint meets

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10 In interpreting Sosa, plaintiffs cite to Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 456 F.3d 1069 (9th

Cir. 2006). The Ninth Circuit, however, has withdrawn such opinion and granted rehearing

en banc. See Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 499 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 2007).

11 To the extent OFM argues that the violations alleged by plaintiffs, i.e., “gardenvariety . . . claims for the recovery of property,” (see Motion at 11:6-8 (citing Alperin, 410

F.3d at 548)), are not the types of claims permitted to be brought under the ATS, (see id. at

10:23-11:8), the argument does not go to the question of standing. Such argument may,

however, be raised by separate motion.

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the “zone of interests” requirement, the court must consider the “substantive statute whose

duties the plaintiff [is] seeking to enforce.” See Cetacean Community v. Bush, 386 F.3d

1169, 1177 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 175 (1997) (“In

determining whether the petitioners have standing under the zone-of-interests test to bring

their [Administration Procedure Act] claims, we look not to the terms of the [Endangered

Species Act’s] citizen-suit provision, but to the substantive provisions of the [Endangered

Species Act], the alleged violations of which serve as the gravamen of the complaint.”).

The ATS and federal question statute do not, however, confer any substantive

rights; they merely provide the court with jurisdiction to hear certain matters. See Sosa v.

Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004) (holding “the ATS is a jurisdictional statute

creating no new causes of action”)10; see also Montana-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Northwestern

Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246, 249 (1951) (“The Judicial Code [§ 1331], in vesting

jurisdiction in the District Courts, does not create causes of action, but only confers

jurisdiction to adjudicate those arising from other sources which satisfy its limiting

provisions.”). OFM makes no argument with respect to the “zone of interests” test as

applied to plaintiffs’ substantive claims, specifically “common law property claims.” See

Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 539 (9th Cir. 2005). Consequently, OFM has failed

to show plaintiffs’ claims fall outside the relevant “zone of interests.”11

2. Generalized Grievances

OFM next asserts that plaintiffs fail to meet the prudential standing requirements

because claims based on OFM’s alleged assistance to the Ustasha Regime constitute

“generalized grievances.” (See Mot. at 11.) Courts ordinarily will refrain “from adjudicating

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‘abstract questions of wide public significance’ which amount to ‘generalized grievances,’

pervasively shared and most appropriately addressed in the representative branches.” See

Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at 475 (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 499-500). Here,

as OFM concedes, however, plaintiffs allege “a variety of individualized property losses.” 

(See Motion at 11:13-14.) Consequently, to the extent plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged

personalized injuries, they are not seeking adjudication of generalized grievances.

3. Third Party Rights

Finally, OFM argues that a majority of the individual plaintiffs are not asserting their

own legal rights, but rather “those of relatives who were allegedly the victims of looting by

Ustasha and other actors.” (See Motion at 11:21-22.) Generally, a party must “assert his

own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or

interests of third parties.” See Warth, 422 U.S. at 499. As previously discussed, five of the

individual plaintiffs allege the loss of their own personal property, (see 4AC ¶¶ 45-48, 59),

and two of the individual plaintiffs allege they are the sole heirs of decedents whose

property was looted, (see id. ¶¶ 49, 65); the remaining seventeen individual plaintiffs assert

property rights of family members or relatives. Consequently, only seven individual plaintiffs

are asserting their own legal rights and interests and the remaining seventeen individual

plaintiffs are asserting the rights of third parties. 

4. Summary

Although the individual plaintiffs have, to some degree, satisfied the prudential

principles regarding standing, such plaintiffs nonetheless have failed to satisfy the minimum

constitutional standing requirements, as set forth above. Accordingly, OFM’s motion to

dismiss the individual plaintiffs’ claims against OFM, for lack of standing, will be GRANTED.

C. Associational Plaintiffs’ Standing

OFM’s next argument is that the associational plaintiffs lack standing. “[A]n

association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when: (a) its members

would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect

are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief

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requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.” Hunt v.

Washington State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977). 

The complaint sufficiently alleges that each associational plaintiff has members who

have suffered an injury in fact: “All organizational plaintiffs have, and represent, members

whose property was looted by the Ustasha, deposited in the Ustasha Treasury and

converted or retained by defendants.” (See 4AC ¶ 44.) As previously discussed, however,

the complaint fails to allege the requisite causal connection between the actions of OFM

and the injury suffered. Accordingly, the associational plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently

plead that any of their “members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right.” 

See Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343.

OFM also argues that plaintiffs have “fail[ed] to allege that the interests this suit

seeks to vindicate are germane to the purpose of any of these organizations.” (See Motion

at 13:8-9.) Specifically, OFM argues that plaintiffs have failed to “indicate what the specific

purpose of these organizations in fact might be.” (See id. at 13:9-10.) “[C]ourts have

generally found the germaneness test to be undemanding.” Presidio Golf Club v. Nat’l Park

Serv., 155 F.3d 1153, 1159 (9th Cir. 1998); see also Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d

1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1993) (“[I]t is clear that the employees’ interest in the conditions of the

workplace is germane to Local 115's purpose as the collective bargaining agent of the

employees”). 

Plaintiff Ukraine Organization of Ukrainian Antifascist Resistance Fighters is alleged

to be “an official representative of 8,500 former partisans and resistors of the Nazi

occupation of Ukraine and concentration camp victims”; its membership, according to the

complaint, “includes some victims of the Croatian occupying forces in Ukraine.” (See 4AC

¶ 69.) Plaintiff Ukrainian Union of Nazi Victims and Prisoners is alleged to “represent over

300,000 former slave and forced laborers, prisoners, concentration camp, and ghetto

survivors,” including “some victims of the Croatian occupying forces in Ukraine.” (See id. ¶

70.) Plaintiff Jasenovac Research Institute alleges it is “a human rights organization and

research institute . . . committed to establishing the truth about the Holocaust in

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12 Plaintiffs allege that “[t]he Ustasha previously committed atrocities against Serbs,

Jews, and Roma” in Krajina and Slavonia from 1941 until 1945 when such regions were

part of the NDH. (See 4AC ¶ 73.)

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Yugoslavia, dedicated to the search for justice for . . . Ustasha persecution against Serbs,

Jews, and Romas” and whose “membership includes Serbs, Jewish, and Roma Holocaust

survivors of the Ustasha terror.” (See id. ¶ 71.) Plaintiff International Union of Former

Juvenile Prisoners of Fascism alleges it “represents Nazi victims in the former Soviet

Union,” including “some victims of the Croatian occupying forces in the former Soviet

Union,” (see id. ¶ 71), and plaintiff The Republic of Serbian Krajina in Exile alleges it

“represents the interests of all Serb, Jewish, and Roma Holocaust Survivors from Krajina,

Western Srem, Baranja and Slavonia,”12 (see id. ¶ 73). 

Each organization, as alleged, has an interest in abuses committed by the Ustasha

during the Holocaust. The associational plaintiffs need not allege that their interests in this

action are germane to an express purpose of such organizations. See, e.g., Presidio Golf

Club, 155 F.3d at 1159 (holding club’s interests need not be included in club’s stated

purpose for said interests to meet requirement that interests be germane to club’s

purpose). Accordingly, plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that the interests they seek to

protect in this action are germane to each associational plaintiff’s purpose. 

Lastly, OFM argues that participation of individual members is necessary because

plaintiffs have requested monetary damages. An associational plaintiff’s request for

equitable relief, such as declaratory or injunctive relief, does not require individualized

proof, and, consequently, is not a bar to standing. See, e.g., Associated General

Contractors v. Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, 159 F.3d 1178, 1181 (9th

Cir. 1998). An associational plaintiff lacks standing to seek monetary relief, however, 

because such claims would require individual members to participate in the lawsuit. See,

e.g., United Union of Roofers, Waterproofers, & Allied Trades No. 40 v. Ins. Corp. of Am.,

919 F.2d 1398, 1399-1400 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding association’s suit for damages for its

members’ lost wages required individualized proof by association’s members). To the

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extent the associational plaintiffs assert claims for which they are seeking monetary

damages, specifically, conversion, unjust enrichment, and restitution, the associational

plaintiffs lack standing with respect to such claims.

In sum, although each of the associational plaintiffs is seeking to protect interests

germane to its purpose, and, to the extent each such plaintiff seeks equitable relief, the

participation of its individual members is not required, plaintiffs, as discussed above, have

not adequately alleged the individual members would have standing to sue in their own

right. 

Accordingly, OFM’s motion to dismiss the associational plaintiffs’ claims against

OFM, for lack of standing, will be GRANTED.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, OFM’s motion to dismiss the claims asserted

against OFM for lack of standing is hereby GRANTED, and all claims against OFM are

hereby DISMISSED, with leave to amend. Any amended complaint shall be filed no later

than 30 days from the date of this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 21, 2008 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

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