Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00850/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00850-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 Petitioner’s original petition, filed on April 20, 2006, was dismissed with leave to 1

amend. See Order, filed on June 28, 2006. 

 California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. 2

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WALTER LEE COLE,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-06-0850 MCE GGH P

vs.

ROBERT A. HOREL, Warden, et al.,

Respondents. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner, proceeding pro se, has filed an application pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§2254. Pending before the court is respondent’s motion to dismiss, filed on December 7, 2006,

to which petitioner filed his opposition on January 4, 2007. 

 This action is proceeding on an amended petition, filed on July 11, 2006.1

Petitioner was convicted of one count of second degree murder in October 6, 1983 (Cal. Penal

Code § 187), and sentenced to fifteen years to life plus two years as an enhancement for use of a

gun. Amended Petition, pp. 1., 4. Petitioner claims that CDCR has “restated” his sentence to be 2

a life term, using the “invidious classification of lifer,” refusing to apply his earned good

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 According to respondent, before the earned credits were applied, the earliest date 3

petitioner could have started his life term was June 16, 1984. MTD, p. 3.

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behavior and work-participation credits to reduce his state prison term imposed under Cal. Penal

Code § 190, the applicable statute for a second degree murder conviction in 1983. AP, pp. 4-5. 

He contends that none of the state courts have accorded him his federal or state constitutional due

process or equal protection rights by failing to afford petitioner an evidentiary hearing. Id. 

Petitioner asserts that he has already served his sentence and seeks his release in accordance with

the 1983 Cal. Penal Code § § 2930-2935 and § 190. AP, p. 9. He includes the staff response to

his inmate grievance, wherein he was informed, inter alia, that he had already received the 1/3

credits under Cal. Penal Code § 2931, that his Minimum Eligible Parole Date (MEPD) was June

24, 1994, and that the Board of Prison Terms (now Board of Parole Hearings) will determine

when petitioner will be released. AP, pp. 9. 13. Petitioner claims that the 1/3 credits should have

been applied to reduce his 15-year prison term. AP, p. 10.

Motion to Dismiss 

Respondent moves for dismissal on the ground that this court lacks subject matter 

jurisdiction because the petition does not raise a cognizable federal claim. Motion to Dismiss

(MTD), pp. 1, 6-8. Alternatively, respondent maintains that even if the court considers

petitioner’s claims, petitioner is not entitled to relief because respondent has correctly calculated 

petitioner’s conduct credits and the Board has the sole authority in granting petitioner parole. 

MTD, p. 6.

Respondent sets forth the specific application of conduct credits to which

petitioner was entitled under Cal. Penal Code § 2931. MTD, p. 3. On January 3, 2005, CDCR

performed a credit calculation to determine petitioner’s MEPD, noting October 14, 1983, as the

beginning date for the determinate portion of petitioner’s 15-year-to-life sentence, plus two years

for the firearm enhancement, crediting petitioner with 485 days of pre- and post-sentence credits. 

Id. Under Cal. Penal Code § 2931, respondent avers, petitioner was entitled to conduct credits

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in the amount of eighty-two days, one-third of the 246 days that he served between October 14,

1983, and June 16, 1984. Id. With the application of the eighty-two days, it was calculated that

petitioner would begin his life term on March 26, 1984, at the earliest possible date. MTD, p. 3. 

Sixty days were added to the determinate term due to lost conduct credits arising from prison

misconduct by petitioner. Id. Thus, petitioner’s life term was calculated to have started on May

25, 1984. Id. 

Before calculating his MEPD, according to respondent, CDCR staff noted that

May 25, 1999, was the earliest date on which petitioner could have been released on parole. 

MTD, p. 4. Petitioner did not credit petitioner with pre- or post-sentence credits because those

had already been applied toward his determinate term, respondent contends, but did calculate the

conduct credits to which he was entitled under Cal. Penal Code § 2931, 1826 days, which is onethird of the 5478 days petitioner served between May 25, 1984, and May 25, 1999. Id. Adding

30 days due to lost conduct credit because of misconduct in prison, petitioner’s MEPD was

calculated as having been June 24, 1994. 

Respondent contends that under Cal. Penal Code § 190, under which petitioner

concedes that he was sentenced, the Board is not required to fix a convicted murderer’s term until

he has been found suitable for parole. MTD, p. 7. Cal. Penal Code § 3041(b) sets forth that a

release date will not be set if the release implicates public safety; under CAL. CODE REGS. tit.xv,

§2403, “ [t]he panel shall set a base term for each life prisoner who is found suitable for parole”;

under CAL. CODE REGS. tit.xv, § 2402 (“[r]egardless of the length of time served, a life prisoner

shall be found unsuitable for parole if in the judgment of the panel the prisoner will pose an

unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from prison.”) MTD, p. 7.

Opposition

Petitioner believes he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing and the respondent has

failed to support any ground for not having one. Opposition (Opp.), pp. 4, 30-33. He seeks

immediate release. Opp., p. 4. Petitioner also contends that he has a state-created liberty interest

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in having his conduct credits calculated on a worksheet for determinate-sentenced, as opposed to

indeterminate-sentenced, prisoners. Id., at 5-6. He argues that his one-third credits should have

operated to reduce his 15-year prison term to 10 years in prison and three years on parole and that

staff has misinterpreted or misapplied the relevant state statutes, stating in part that he was not

sentenced, pursuant to Cal. Penal Code § 1168(b) as respondent maintains, but pursuant to Cal.

Penal Code § 1170. Id., at 6-22. He also contends that CDCR’s administrative designation of

him as a “life prisoner” is an “invidious classification” and an erroneous interpretation of the

applicable state penal statutes, wrongly subjecting him to the jurisdiction of the parole hearing

board. Id., at 23-32. 

Discussion

Petitioner, sentenced in 1983 to a term of 15 years to life for second degree

murder (with a two-year enhancement), is simply wrong that his conduct credits should be

calculated on a worksheet for determinate, as opposed to indeterminate, sentenced prisoners. As

petitioner has noted (Opp., p. 13), on November 7, 1978, a general election ballot initiative was

adopted into state law wherein, “the punishment for second degree murder was increased from a

determinate term of five, six, or seven years to an indeterminate term of fifteen years to life.” In

re Dayan, 231 Cal. App. 3d 184, 187, 282 Cal. Rptr. 269 (1991). Finding that “[a] sentence of 15

years to life is by its nature an indeterminate term,” the California Appellate Court has

specifically ruled that:

The punishment for indeterminate crimes cannot be determined as

set forth in the determinate sentencing scheme in section 1170 et

seq., and thus section 1168, subdivision (b), provides that for

persons not sentenced under those provisions the court shall not fix

the term or duration of the period of imprisonment.” ( Id., at p. 490,

188 Cal. Rptr. 698.)

Id. 

Moreover, the classification of petitioner as a “life prisoner” is also in compliance

with state law:

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 Like petitioner herein, Monigold was sentenced to a 15-year to life term for second 4

degree murder and also sentenced to a two-year enhancement for use of a firearm; the court

therein noted that the enhancement term “must be served prior to commencement of the

indeterminate life sentence.” Monigold, supra, 139 Cal. App.3d at 487-88, 188 Cal. Rptr. 698. 

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A life prisoner is administratively defined as a “prisoner serving a

sentence of life with the possibility of parole” and consequently

includes a prisoner sentenced to 15 years to life for a second degree

murder committed on or after November 8, 1978.

In re Monigold, 139 Cal. App. 2d 485, 488 n.1, 188 Cal. Rptr. 698 (1983).4

Since 1978, the amended Cal. Penal Code § 190, in relevant part, has provided 

that inmates sentenced to 15 years to life for second degree murder are eligible to earn conduct 

credits toward their sentences. In re Oluwa, 207 Cal. App. 3d 439, 442, 255 Cal. Rptr. 35

(1989).

“A writ of habeas corpus is available under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) only on the basis

of some transgression of federal law binding on the state courts. Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d

1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985); Gutierrez v. Griggs, 695 F.2d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir. 1983). It is

unavailable for alleged error in the interpretation or application of state law. Middleton v. Cupp,

768 F.2d at 1085; see also Lincoln v. Sunn, 807 F.2d 805, 814 (9th Cir. 1987); Givens v.

Housewright, 786 F.2d 1378, 1381 (9th Cir. 1986). The court finds that petitioner’s claim of a

violation of Cal. Penal Code § 190 alleges a violation of state law only, because petitioner is

challenging the interpretation and application of state law as it applies to his sentence. No party

disputes that the state courts have ruled on petitioner’s claims concerning the interpretation and

application of state sentencing law, thus, the alleged improper application of state law is not

subject to review by federal court. Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 110 S. Ct. 3092, 3102 (1990). 

This court must defer to a state court’s interpretation of its own laws unless that

“interpretation is untenable or amounts to a subterfuge to avoid federal review of a constitutional

violation.” Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9 Cir. 1989). While petitioner urges th

his own interpretation of state law, this court finds that the interpretation of the at-issue state law

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by the California courts, to the extent petitioner has provided it, is neither untenable nor a

subterfuge to avoid federal review. Accordingly, this claim should be dismissed on this ground.

The court makes the following observations about petitioner’s claim. First,

petitioner was sentenced to fifteen years to life. His maximum term is life in prison and he has

not been kept in beyond the end of that term. Petitioner has apparently confused the minimum

term necessary to be served before parole could be implemented at its earliest, the minimum

eligible parole date (MEPD), with a determinate sentence of fifteen years. Indeed, the Board was

not required to find petitioner even eligible for a parole setting within fifteen years. Petitioner

could spend the rest of his life in prison without ever becoming eligible for parole.

Second, the court notes that under California law, petitioner is no longer entitled

to earn credits toward his release date. In In re Dayan, 231 Cal. App. 3d 184, 282 Cal. Rptr. 269

(1991), the petitioner, serving a sentence of fifteen years to life for second degree murder, alleged

that he was entitled to application of good behavior credits toward his statutory minimum term of

fifteen years and toward his actual term set by the Board of Prison Terms (now Board of Parole

Hearings). As petitioner’s own exhibit (page 30) states in the state superior court denial of his

habeas application: “Release from prison is determined only by the Board. And, no matter how

long a prisoner has been confined, he will not be released until he has been found suitable for

parole. Cal. Penal Code § 3041(b); CAL. CODE REGS. tit.15, § 2281(a).” Petitioner herein does not

challenge a parole denial.

Cal. Penal Code § 190(a) mandates application of good behavior credits by the

CDC (now CDCR) against the minimum term for second degree murder (fifteen years) imposed

by statute for purposes of establishing the MEPD. Dayan, supra, at 188, 282 Cal. Rptr. at 271. 

However, nothing in the statute requires the Board (or CDCR) to reapply the same credits to the

actual term it sets. Id., 282 Cal. Rptr. at 271. Thus, theoretically, if a prisoner were determined

to be parole eligible at the earliest possible time, credits might be of some use in actually

reducing the absolute minimum time to be served before release on parole. See People v.

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Rowland, 134 Cal. App.3d 1, 13-14, 184 Cal. Rptr. 346, 352 (1982). However, if a prisoner’s

incarceration time passes his MEPD, and he has yet to be found eligible for parole, computation

of time credits is meaningless – he will be released if and when found eligible, and then only

after a computation of a release date under Board matrices.

As to petitioner’s insistence that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing:

[a] habeas petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing if: (1) the

allegations in his petition would, if proved, entitle him to relief;

and (2) the state court trier of fact has not, after a full and fair

hearing, reliably found the relevant facts. See, e.g., Townsend v.

Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963); Jones, 114

F.3d at 1010; Smith v. McCormick, 914 F.2d 1153, 1170 (9th

Cir.1990). 

Phillips v. Woodford, 267 F.3d 966, 973 (9th Cir. 2001). 

In the instant case, petitioner has long passed his MEPD without any finding of

parole eligibility. Nor does any party deny that petitioner has had a parole suitability hearing and

has been denied parole. Petitioner’s misunderstanding of the applicable law does not provide a

basis for the court to order an evidentiary hearing. Pursuant to Dayan, petitioner is no longer

entitled to any credit reduction. To the extent petitioner is claiming that the CDCR (or the

Board) has failed to award him credits, this claim is without merit and respondent’s motion to

dismiss should be granted.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that respondent’s motion to

dismiss, filed on December 7, 2007, be granted.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised 

\\\\\

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that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: 7/31/07

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 

 GREGORY G. HOLLOWS

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

GGH:009

cole0850.mtd

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