Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00201/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-00201-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:0405id Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIAM J. NORWOOD,

Plaintiff,

v.

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security1

,

Defendant.

Case No.: 3:18-cv-00201-GPC (RNB)

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION GRANTING 

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff William J. Norwood (“Plaintiff”) filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 

405(g) of the Social Security Act (“Act”) seeking judicial review of the final 

administrative decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration 

(“Defendant” or “Commission”), which denied Plaintiff’s application for supplemental 

security income (“SSI”). (See ECF No. 12 (Compl.).) The parties have filed crossmotions for summary judgment. (See ECF No. 11 (Plaintiff’s motion); ECF No. 17 

(Defendant’s motion).) On October 17, 2018, Magistrate Judge Robert N. Block issued a 

report and recommendation (“Report”) recommending that Plaintiff’s motion for 

summary judgment be denied and that Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment 

 

1 Nancy A. Berryhill is hereby substituted as the defendant in this case per Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). 

2 ECF page numbers are based on CM/ECF pagination.

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be granted. (ECF No. 24.) No objections were filed. After careful consideration of the 

pleadings and supporting documents, the Court ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s Report 

and DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and GRANTS Defendant’s 

cross-motion for summary judgment.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

After cross-referencing the administrative record, the Court recites the facts as 

substantially presented in the Report. (ECF No. 24, at 2.)

Plaintiff alleges his disability began in 2005, when at 27 years old, he suffered 

from a gunshot wound to his back. (Certified Administrative Record [“AR”] 110, 183.) In 

May 2011, a consultative orthopedic examination showed Plaintiff to be 71 inches tall, 

and weigh 340 pounds. (ECF. No. 11, at 3.) During that same examination, the examining 

physician diagnosed Plaintiff as having chronic thoracic and lumbar strain and sprain, 

right ankle fusion, and early degenerative joint disease. (Id.) Between 2013 and 2016, 

Plaintiff was seen by a number of physicians for both physical and mental complaints. 

(Id.) Plaintiff’s physical complaints included morbid obesity, chronic back pain, and 

degenerative changes in Plaintiff’s right knee and right ankle. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff’s mental 

complaints included symptoms of PTSD, depression, anxiety, and difficulty sleeping. 

(Id.)

Plaintiff’s medical records from Family Health Centers of San Diego (“FHC”) and

Plaintiff’s consultative psychiatrist, Dr. Glassman, both indicated that Plaintiff had 

medically-determinable mental impairments of depression, anxiety, and post-traumatic 

stress disorder. (See AR 19.) In particular, the FHC records include the opinions of social 

worker Yo Ishida, and reflect Plaintiff’s complaints recorded during a mental 

examination. (See ECF No. 22, at 9.)

Three other physicians, Dr. Ross, Dr. Schnute, and Dr. Sabourin, alongside 

Plaintiff’s own Medical Examiner, also examined Plaintiff. (See ECF No. 21, at 4-5; AR 

33-76.) Dr. Ross’s report indicated that Plaintiff could lift/carry 20 pounds occasionally, 

carry 10 pounds frequently, and could stand/walk for 4 hours and sit for 6 hours in an 8-

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hour workday. (AR 97.) Similarly, Dr. Schnute found the same lifting, carrying, and 

sitting restriction, but indicated that Plaintiff could stand/walk for 6 hours in an 8-hour 

workday. (AR 109.) Both Dr. Ross and the Medical Examiner shared the same opinion 

that Plaintiff had the capacity for light lifting and carrying, but was limited to standing 

and walking only four hours in a normal workday. (Id.) Both of the orthopedic 

consultative examiners, Dr. Schnute and Dr. Sabourin, shared the opinion that Plaintiff 

had the capacity for light work. (Id.)

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On March 26, 2013, Plaintiff filed an application for SSI under Title XVI of the 

Social Security Act, alleging disability beginning May 17, 2005. (AR 183-88.) After his 

application was initially denied and upon reconsideration (AR 114-17, 122-26), Plaintiff 

requested an administrative hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). (AR 

131.) On May 3, 2017, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not been under a disability, as 

defined in the Social Security Act since March 26, 2013, the date his application was 

filed. (AR 16-24). The ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the Commission on 

December 27, 2017, when the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. (AR 

1-6.) 

On October 17, 2018, Magistrate Judge Robert N. Block issued a Report 

recommending Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment be denied and Defendant’s 

cross-motion for summary judgment be granted. (ECF No. 24.) No objections to the 

Report have been filed by either party by the October 31, 2018 deadline. In reviewing 

these motions, the Magistrate Judge followed both the ALJ and the Commissioner’s fivestep sequential evaluation process. (See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920.) This five-step sequential 

process is used to determine whether a plaintiff is disabled. (See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 

416.920.) In steps one through four, the burden is on the claimant to demonstrate a severe 

impairment and an inability to perform past work. At step five, if there has not yet been a 

determination, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to demonstrate the claimant is not 

disabled. (See also Valentine v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 689 (9th Cir. 

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2009).)

Both of the issues brought by Plaintiff on appeal are geared toward the second step 

of the five-step sequential process. The second step, “the severity step,” weeds out 

claimants with minor problems, making them ineligible for disability benefits. (See Buck 

v. Berryhill, 869 F.3d 1040, 1048 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Step two is merely a threshold 

determination meant to screen out weak claims.”).) Claimants must have a severe 

impairment, or combination of impairments, which significantly limits their physical or 

mental ability to do basic work activities or else they will be found not disabled. (See 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c).) If the impairment is severe, the ALJ then proceeds to 

step three. However, a claimant’s impairment, or combination of impairments, is not 

severe if it does not significantly limit his or her physical or mental ability to do basic 

work activities. Basic work activities are defined as the abilities and aptitudes necessary 

to do most jobs, such as walking, standing, sitting, and lifting. (See 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1522.) To satisfy step two’s requirement of a severe impairment, the claimant must 

prove the physical or mental impairment by providing medical evidence consisting of 

signs, symptoms, and laboratory findings; the claimant’s own statement of symptoms 

alone will not suffice. (See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1508, 416.908.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The district court’s duties in connection with a Report of a magistrate judge are set 

forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). The district judge 

must “make a de novo determination of those portions of the report . . . to which 

objection is made,” and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings 

or recommendations made by the magistrate.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). The district court need 

not review de novo those portions of a Report to which neither party objects. See Wang v. 

Masaitis, 416 F.3d 992, 1000 n. 13 (9th Cir. 2005); U.S. v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 114, 

1121-22 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). When no objections are filed, the Court may assume 

the correctness of the magistrate judge’s findings of fact and decide the motion on the 

applicable law. Campbell v. United States Dist. Court, 501, F.2d 196, 206 (9th Cir. 

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1974); Johnson v. Nelson, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (S.D. Cal. 2001). 

Because no objections have been filed, the Court assumes the correctness of the 

magistrate judge’s factual findings and adopts them in full. See Campbell, 501 F.2d at 

206. 

A court “will disturb the denial of benefits only if the decision contains legal error 

or is not supported by substantial evidence.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 

(9th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as reasonable to support a conclusion.” Id. The “evidence 

must be more than a mere scintilla but not necessarily a preponderance.” Connett v. 

Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 873 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). The court will uphold the 

ALJ’s conclusion when the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 

interpretation. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). Finally, the court 

will not reverse an ALJ’s decision for harmless error, which exists when it is clear from 

the record that “the ALJ’s error was ‘inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability 

determination.’” Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 2006) 

(quoting Stout v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1055-56 (9th Cir. 2006)). 

DISCUSSION

A. Whether the ALJ Erred in its Consideration of Plaintiff’s Mental 

Impairments

Plaintiff argues the ALJ failed to properly consider the severity of Plaintiff’s 

mental impairments at step two of the five-step sequential evaluation process. (See ECF 

No. 11, at 8-10.) 

A step two analysis of the five-step sequential process requires the ALJ to 

determine whether an impairment is severe or not severe. (See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a).) 

An impairment is not severe if it does not significantly limit the claimant’s physical or 

mental ability to do basic work activities. (See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c).) Basic work 

activities are defined as the abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs, such as 

walking, standing, sitting, and lifting. (See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1521, 416.921.) To satisfy 

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step two’s requirement of a severe impairment, the claimant must prove the physical or 

mental impairment by providing medical evidence consisting of signs, symptoms, and 

laboratory findings; the claimant’s own statement of symptoms alone will not suffice. 

(See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1508, 416.908.)

This step two analysis entails: “determining whether the claimant has any 

medically determinable mental impairments; rating the degree of functional limitation 

resulting from the mental impairment(s) in four broad functional areas; determining the 

severity of the mental impairment(s); and then if any of the mental impairments is severe, 

proceeding to step three of the sequential evaluation process.” (See 20 C.F.R. §

416.920a(b)-(d); see also Keyser v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 648 F.3d 721, 725 (9th 

Cir. 2011).) In rating the degree of limitation, the following five-point scale is utilized: 

None, mild, moderate, marked, and extreme. (See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920a(c)(4).) As 

indicated by the ALJ, under the Commissioner’s regulations, if the degrees of limitation 

are rated as “non” or “mild”, the impairment generally is considered not severe, “unless 

the evidence otherwise indicates that there is more than a minimal limitation in your 

ability to do basic work activities.” (See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920a(d)(1).)

Plaintiff contends that because Dr. Glassman, a consultative examiner, found some 

evidence of Plaintiff having depression and anxiety that Plaintiff would necessarily have 

some limitations in his ability to respond appropriately to usual work situations. (See

ECF No.11, at 8-9; AR 757.) Such limitations, Plaintiff alleges, causes more than a 

“minimal of effect” on his ability to work, and should have been determined to be a 

“severe” impairment. (See ECF No. 11, at 10.) A finding of a “severe” impairment would 

enable the ALJ to move to the next step in the Social Security Administration’s five-step 

process. See Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F. 3d 1152, 1160 (9th Cir. 2001).

Defendant argues that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding at step two 

that Plaintiff’s mental limitations were no more than mild, and therefore non-severe. (See

ECF No. 17, at 12.) Specifically, Defendant contends the purported severity of Plaintiff’s 

mental impairments relies solely on the existence of a diagnosis and recitation of alleged 

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symptoms. (See ECF No. 8-10.) Such a diagnosis of impairments alone, however, is not 

sufficient to establish severity. Verduzco v. Apfel, 188 F.3d 1087, 1089 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Rather, an impairment must “significantly limit[] [Plaintiff’s] physical or mental ability to 

do basic work activities” in order to qualify as severe. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c) (emphasis 

added). Ultimately, Dr. Glassman’s assessment form concluded that Plaintiff “had no 

major mental status abnormalities” and that Plaintiff’s degree of limitation in all the 

functional areas considered was either “none” or “mild.” (See AR 756-58).

Consistent with the diagnosis reflected in Plaintiff’s treatment records from FHC 

and in the psychiatric examination report of Dr. Glassman, the ALJ accepted that Plaintiff 

had medically-determinable mental impairments of depression, anxiety, and posttraumatic stress disorder. (See AR 19.) However, noting that there was little evidence in 

the file showing more significant limitations than what Dr. Glassman had noted in her 

examination, the ALJ correctly found that Plaintiff had shown no more than mild 

limitation in each of the four broad functional areas considered at step two of the fivestep sequential evaluation process. (Id.) Specifically, Dr. Glassman indicated that 

Plaintiff “showed no major mental status abnormalities” and that Plaintiff’s degree of 

limitation in all the functional areas considered was either “none” or “mild.” (See AR 

756-58.) Additionally, the FHC records merely indicate that Plaintiff sought treatment 

from a licensed social worker on four occasions, but these records are devoid of any 

evidence of specific functional limitations attributable to Plaintiff’s mental impairments. 

(See AR 675-76, 677-81, 746-47, 748-52.) Finally, as indicated by the Magistrate Judge, 

in Plaintiff’s hearing testimony regarding his work, Plaintiff never attributed his inability 

to hold a job to his mental impairment(s), only citing the pain and physical limitations 

caused by physical impairments. (See AR 39-46, 60). In accordance with the 

Commissioner’s regulations, the ALJ properly concluded that Plaintiff’s medicallydeterminable mental impairments were non-severe. (Id.)

The Court therefore finds that reversal is not warranted based on the ALJ’s alleged 

failure to properly consider the severity of plaintiff’s mental impairments at step two.

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B. Whether the ALJ Erred in its Consideration of the Opinions of Plaintiff’s 

Treating Physicians and the State Agency Physicians

Plaintiff also argues the ALJ failed to properly consider the opinions of Plaintiff’s 

treating physician and the State agency physicians. (See ECF No. 11, at 10.) Specifically, 

Plaintiff first contends that the ALJ failed to properly consider the opinions of Plaintiff’s 

treating physician at FHC. (See ECF No. 11, at 13-15 (citing AR 748-52).) The Ninth 

Circuit standard cited by Plaintiff indicates that failure to provide specific and legitimate 

reasons for rejecting the opinion of an examining doctor is reversible error. Crain v. 

Callahan, 996 F. Supp. 1003, 1014 (D. Or. 1997), citing Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 

831-832, 834 (9th Cir. 1995). However, as the Commissioner points out in her crossmotion, the FHC records identified by Plaintiff are those of social worker Yo Ishida, who 

was not a physician and whose opinions were not subject to the Ninth Circuit standard

cited by Plaintiff. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.902, 416.913(a) & (d). As the Commissioner also 

points out, the FHC records identified by Plaintiff merely reflect Plaintiff’s complaints to 

the FHC social worker Ishida, a mental examination of unremarkable results, and a 

diagnosis. (See ECF No. 22, at 9.) Not only do these records fail to reflect judgments 

about the nature or severity of Plaintiff’s impairments, they do not contain any medical 

opinions. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(a)(1). 

Plaintiff also argues the ALJ failed to properly consider the opinions of the State 

agency physicians that Plaintiff was limited to “sedentary” work. (See ECF No. 11, at 14; 

see also ECF No. 21, at 4-5.) As correctly explained by the Commissioner, the physicians 

did not render this opinion. Instead, Plaintiff has misattributed statements by the State 

agency disability examiners to the two State agency physicians. (See ECF No. 22, at 3-5.)

The record shows that the first of two physicians, Dr. Ross, opined that Plaintiff could 

lift/carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently, and could stand/walk for 4 

hours and sit for 6 hours in an 8-hour workday. (AR 97.) The second physician, Dr. 

Schnute, similarly found the same lifting/carrying and sitting restrictions, but opined that 

Plaintiff could stand/walk for 6 hours in an 8-hour workday. (AR 109.) Such limitations 

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are in fact consistent with light work, and greater than sedentary work. See 20 C.F.R. §§

416.967(a), (b); SSR 83-10, 1983 WL 31251, at *5 (Jan. 1, 1983) (a sedentary level of

work should generally total no more than about 2 hours standing or walking of an 8-hour 

workday).

Plaintiff also argues the ALJ has not provided adequate reasons for rejecting or 

limiting the opinions of some of plaintiff’s treating and examining physicians. However, 

this argument is contradicted by the record. (See ECF No.11, at 11.) In his decision, the 

ALJ explained the extent to which he relied on and/or discounted the opinions of Dr. 

Ross and Dr. Schnute and his reasons for doing so. (See AR 21-22). First, the ALJ noted 

that Dr. Ross and the Medical Examiner shared the same opinions that Plaintiff had the 

capacity for light lifting and carrying, but was also limited to standing and walking only 4 

hours in a normal workday. (Id. at 22.) Additionally, Dr. Schnute and Dr. Sabourin, both

orthopedic consultative examiners, shared the opinion that Plaintiff had the capacity for 

light work. (Id. at 22.) While the opinions from Dr. Schnute and Dr. Sabourin were also 

“generally supportive of the capacity for a range of light work,” the ALJ was only giving 

“partial weight” to their opinions. (Id.) Where the ALJ gave “more weight” to the 

opinions of Dr. Ross and the Medical Examiner, it was in recognition of Plaintiff’s “need 

for additional standing and walking restrictions.” (Id.)

Moreover, in considering whether the ALJ erred in its consideration of the 

opinions of Plaintiff’s treating physicians, the Magistrate Judge determined the ALJ did 

not err. As pointed out by the Magistrate Judge, it was not an error for the ALJ to 

disregard the FHC records because the records did not indicate any medical opinions, 

reflect judgments about the nature or severity of Plaintiff’s impairments, or indicate what 

Plaintiff can still do despite his impairments. (See 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(a)(1).) Further, 

the Magistrate Judge correctly indicated that the ALJ properly considered the assessment 

of the State agency physicians, who determined that Plaintiff had sitting/lifting/carrying 

restrictions, but that such restrictions would not limit Plaintiff to sedentary work. Finally, 

the Magistrate Judge determined the ALJ properly explained the extent to which he relied 

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on and/or discounted the opinions of Plaintiff’s examining physicians, which ultimately 

gave more weight to the physician recognizing additional work restrictions in favor of 

Plaintiff.

The Court therefore finds that reversal is not warranted based on the ALJ’s alleged 

failure to properly consider the opinions of the State agency physicians. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the above, the Court ADOPTS the Report in full and GRANTS

Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment and DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for 

summary judgment and AFFIRMS the decision of the Commissioner and dismissing this 

action with prejudice. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in accordance with this 

Order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 28, 2019

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