Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00077/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00077-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Ignacio Saenz, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Jeffrey Van Winkle; et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV 13-77-PHX-JAT

ORDER

Pending before this Court is Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

(“Petition”). The Magistrate Judge to whom this case was assigned issued a Report and

Recommendation (R&R) recommending that this Court deny the Petition. This Court “may

accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the

magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

Petitioner has filed objections to the R&R. Consistent with United States v. ReynaTapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc), this Court will review the portion of

the R&R to which there is an objection de novo.

I. Factual Background

The R&R quotes the Arizona Court of Appeals’ recounting of the facts of this case,

which are as follows:

On June 23, 2006, at 8:55 p.m., Arizona Department of Public Safety

Officer Manjarres was patrolling Interstate 8 in Pinal County. He observed a

pick-up truck, driven by Saenz, “cross[] over the solid white line . . . that

Case 2:13-cv-00077-JAT Document 19 Filed 07/02/14 Page 1 of 9
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separates the slow lane from the emergency lane” for approximately three feet

and then return to the driving lane. He followed the truck, determined it was

going sixty miles per hour in a seventy-five-mile-per-hour zone, and observed

it travel into the emergency lane again. He then initiated a traffic stop.

When Saenz rolled down the window, Manjarres smelled a “moderate

odor of alcohol emitting from the vehicle.” He noticed Saenz’s face was

flushed and his speech slurred. Saenz agreed to perform two field sobriety tests

but refused to perform a third. Based on his performance on the tests,

Manjarres decided to arrest Saenz for driving under the influence of

intoxicating liquor (DUI) while impaired to the slightest degree. Saenz

physically resisted as Manjarres attempted to place handcuffs on him, so

Manjarres released him to create distance and drew his taser. As Saenz ran

toward his truck, Manjarres fired his taser, hitting Saenz in the back. Saenz

removed the taser “probes” and fled in his truck. A twenty-six mile chase

ensued, ending when Saenz drove his truck into the desert, turned off his

lights, and fled on foot. Saenz was arrested at his place of work a few days

later.

Doc. 15 at 1-2 (quoting Doc. 13-2 at 93-94).

Petitioner does not object or argue that the above quoted language accurately

represents the Arizona Court of Appeals’ decision. Accordingly, the Court adopts this

summary as the finding of the state court. However, Petitioner does object and argue some

of the facts are incorrect. The Court will address those objections as necessary below.

II. Preliminary Requests

Petitioner asks this Court to release him from the Arizona Department of Corrections

so that he can do discovery on this case. That request is denied.

Petitioner also complains about his lack of counsel. Specifically, Petitioner states,

“...Petitioner was also denied a Federal Public Defender by a Federal Judge to promptly

represent him for what the state court Judges refused to do.” Doc. 18 at 40.

The rules governing habeas proceedings mandate the appointment of

counsel if necessary for the effective utilization of discovery procedures (Rule

6(a), 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254), or if an evidentiary hearing is required (Rule

8(c)), but “[t]hese rules do not limit the appointment of counsel under 18

U.S.C. § 3006A at any stage of the case if the interest of justice so requires.”

Rule 8(c)....

...In deciding whether to appoint counsel in a habeas proceeding, the

district court must evaluate the likelihood of success on the merits as well as

the ability of the petitioner to articulate his claims pro se in light of the

complexity of the legal issues involved. See, e.g., Maclin v. Freake, 650 F.2d

885, 887-88 (7th Cir.1981); Dillon v. United States, 307 F.2d 445, 447 (9th

Cir.1962). 

Weygandt v. Look, 718 F.2d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 1983).

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1

 “Cause” to excuse procedural default requires a showing that:

(1) the claim of “ineffective assistance of trial counsel” was a “substantial”

claim; (2) the “cause” consisted of there being “no counsel” or only

“ineffective” counsel during the state collateral review proceeding; (3) the

state collateral review proceeding was the “initial” review proceeding in

respect to the “ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim”; and (4) state law

requires that an “ineffective assistance of trial counsel [claim] ... be raised in

an initial-review collateral review proceeding.”

Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S.Ct. 1911, 1918 (2013) (alterations in original) (quoting Martinez,

132 S.Ct. at 1318-19; 1320-21).

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In this case, the Court has reviewed the Petition, Answer, R&R, and Objections. The

Court does not find discovery is necessary. Further, the Court finds that Petitioner is capable

of articulating his claims pro se and that Petitioner is unlikely to succeed on the merits.

Therefore, to the extent Petitioner is requesting counsel, that request is denied.

III. Default of Claims

The R&R concludes that this Court should not reach the merits of any of the claims

made in the Petition because Petitioner failed to exhaust those claims in state court. Doc. 15

at 11. Petitioner does not dispute that he did not exhaust his claims in state court. Instead,

Petitioner argues that his lack of exhaustion should be excused because it is the fault of his

appellate counsel. More specifically, Petitioner alleges that he asked his appellate counsel

to raise additional issues, and counsel did not. Doc. 18 at 25-26. Petitioner further alleges

that counsel “...should have known better....” Id. at 26.

In Martinez v. Schriro, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012), the United States Supreme Court held

that ineffectiveness of post-conviction relief counsel could excuse procedural default of

claims of ineffectiveness of trial counsel. In Nguyen v. Curry, 736 F.3d 1287, 1296 (9th Cir.

2013), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the exception Martinez created also

applied to claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.1

Notably, both Martinez and Nguyen created an exception for failing to exhaust claims

of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. In this case, Petitioner elected to waive counsel and

proceed pro se at trial. Doc. 13 at 4. Therefore, he does not have any valid ineffective

Case 2:13-cv-00077-JAT Document 19 Filed 07/02/14 Page 3 of 9
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2

 As discussed above, Petitioner proceeded pro se at trial. In his objections, Petitioner

states that his advisory counsel did not do enough to assist Petitioner. Doc. 18 at 28. If a

defendant elects to waive counsel, but the court nonetheless appoints stand-by counsel or

advisory counsel, there is no constitutional right to effective assistance from “waived”

counsel. Cf. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834, n. 46 (1975) (“a defendant who elects

to represent himself cannot thereafter complain that the quality of his own defense amounted

to a denial of ‘effective assistance of counsel.’”). Therefore, to the extent Petitioner is

attempting to make an ineffective assistance of counsel argument regarding advisory counsel,

the claim fails. 

3

 Petitioner also argues that his failure to exhaust should be excused because the

inmate who wrote his Rule 32 petition in state court was ineffective for not raising these

claims. Doc. 18 at 35. The Court finds that Martinez and its progeny do not extend to

inmate assistance.

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assistance of trial counsel claims.2

 Thus, the issue presented is whether Martinez (and

Nguyen) are properly applied to claims of error at trial other than ineffective assistance of

trial counsel.

In Hurles v. Ryan, 2014 WL 1979307, *9-10 (9th Cir. 2014), the Court of Appeals

answered this question in Petitioner’s favor. Specifically, the Court of Appeals considered

the merits of a claim that trial counsel raised, thoroughly argued, but lost (accordingly, trial

counsel was not ineffective); yet appellate counsel failed to raise this claim on appeal (and

accordingly, appellate counsel was ineffective). Id.

Thus, this Court must consider the substance of each of Petitioner’s unexhausted

theories to determine whether any of them show a “substantial” claim of ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel for failing to raise them on appeal, such that Petitioner’s

failure to exhaust would be excused.3

 Under this formulation, exhaustion within the state

courts is no longer required for any substantial claim, because it would always be excused

by counsel’s failure to raise it. Thus, the end result is that this Court must always consider

the “merits” of every claimed raised by every petitioner if the petitioner also raises

ineffectiveness of appellate counsel or post-conviction-relief counsel. It is not clear to this

Court that the end of the exhaustion requirement was the intent of the Supreme Court in

Martinez, but it is nonetheless the practical result.

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4

 As the R&R details, theories 1-4 are found in Petitioner’s Petition. Doc. 15 at 4-5.

5

 Theories 5-9 are found in Petitioner’s objections. Doc. 18.

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By this Court’s count, Petitioner has nine unexhausted claims: 1) double jeopardy; 2)

ineffective assistance of trial counsel in failing to offer mental health evidence to the jury;

3) trial judge’s error in failing to allow mental health evidence to be submitted to the jury;

4) trial judge’s consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors at sentencing;4

 5) certain

disputes of fact; 6) request for video; 7) alleged “with prejudice” dismissal and/or the state

trial judge received bribes; 8) facts do not support escape charge; and 9) arraignment was

defective.5

 With respect to the claims that are raised before this Court for the first time by

way of Petitioner’s objections, for purposes of this Order, the Court will give Petitioner the

benefit of liberal construction and determine whether they are substantial. However,

procedurally, these claims are likely not properly before this Court for any purpose because

they were not raised in Petitioner’s Petition.

A. Substantiality

Claims 1, 3, 4, and 9

These claims are all alleged errors of state law. The Supreme Court has “stated many

times that federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.” Estelle v.

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly,

Petitioner cannot state a claim that is substantial based on any of these alleged errors.

To the extent Petitioner has tried to characterize Claim 1 as a constitutional double

jeopardy argument, Petitioner is incorrect that he was placed in double jeopardy.

Specifically, Petitioner claims that the sentencing aggravating factor of covering up his

offense was inherent in the crime of escape; therefore the trial judge using that aggravating

factor was inappropriate. Doc. 15 at 4 (summarizing Petitioner’s claims). However, the

Arizona Court of Appeals, after finding that Petitioner had waived this argument, held in the

alternative that Petitioner was wrong as a matter of state law. Specifically, the Arizona Court

of Appeals stated:

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In any event, we would not conclude that “covering up” a crime is

inherent in the crime of escape. Third-degree escape requires only that the

person “knowingly escape[] or attempt[] to escape from custody” after having

been arrested for, charged with, or convicted of a misdemeanor or petty

offense. A.R.S. § 13-2502. There is no requirement that the purpose of the

escape be to conceal evidence of a crime.

Doc. 13-2 at 96; Exhibit G at 5, n.2. 

Accordingly, Claim 1, under state law, fails to raise a substantial double jeopardy

issue. As a result of the foregoing, none of Claims 1, 3, 4, or 9 raise a claim that is

substantial.

Claim 2

In Claim 2, Petitioner alleges ineffective assistance of trial counsel. As discussed

above Petitioner elected to proceed pro se at trial; therefore, Petitioner cannot bring a

substantial claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S.

806, 834, n. 46 (1975) (“a defendant who elects to represent himself cannot thereafter

complain that the quality of his own defense amounted to a denial of ‘effective assistance of

counsel.’”).

Claims 5 and 8

All of these Claims can be fairly characterized as Petitioner challenging the

sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction.

Under Jackson [v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979)], a petitioner “is entitled to

habeas corpus relief if it is found that upon the record evidence adduced at the

trial no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt.” 443 U.S. at 324, 99 S.Ct. 2781. “The Jackson standard

‘must be applied with explicit reference to the substantive elements of the

criminal offense as defined by state law.’ ” Chein v. Shumsky, 373 F.3d 978,

983 (9th Cir.2004) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n. 16, 99 S.Ct. 2781).

Boyer v. Belleque, 659 F.3d 957, 964 (9th Cir. 2011).

Here, the majority of Petitioner’s “objections” encompass his alternative version of

events. By way of example, Petitioner argues that an officer testified that Petitioner was

tasered in the shoulder, when Petitioner contends he was really tasered in the back. Doc. 18

at 10. As a further example, Petitioner argues that he did not escape, but instead, “left the

scene for his safety do [sic] to a trigger happy D.P.S. employee who will tase someone when

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he is not threaten [sic], ....” Doc. 18 at 8.

Here, the jury heard the evidence against Petitioner and the Court has reviewed the

transcripts in the record. The Court cannot conclude that no rational trier of fact could have

found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, Claims 5 and 8 are not

substantial.

Claim 6

In Claim 6, Petitioner claims that there was a “hindered” video of his stop and that it

was not produced to him in discovery. For example, Petitioner states “And the only evidence

(the video tape) that proves Petitioner’s innocence was withheld.” Doc. 18 at 48. Petitioner

also states, “The Arizona [sic] of Appeals without investigating facts allowed altered incident

reports to this fraudulent case for an unlawful conviction and sentence, which an

“Honorable” investigation for the Hindered D.P.S. video Surveillance tape that was not

conducted by any agency involved in this fraudulent [sic] would have made a clear decision

to close this case.” Id. at 2.

As Petitioner recounts, at trial, the Officer who arrested him testified that a dash-cam

did not exist in the patrol vehicle on June 23, 2006. Id. at 7. Petitioner claims this testimony

was false. Id. On this record, Petitioner has presented no evidence, other than his selfserving allegations, that a video of the stop exists. The Court finds that Petitioner’s

unsubstantiated allegations cannot overcome the under-oath testimony of the Officer who

stated that no camera was in the car. Further, even if Petitioner is correct that a video existed,

Petitioner’s own version of the events of that night show that the video likely would not have

aided his defense. Accordingly, the Court finds that this claim is not substantial and his

appellate counsel’s failure to raise it does not excuse Petitioner’s default of his claims.

Claim 7

Petitioner finally argues that at some point he was charged and then released because

those charges were dismissed; then he was re-charged. Petitioner claims the charges and

conviction that are the subject of this habeas petition are from the re-charging. Petitioner has

a theory that the original charges were dismissed with prejudice, but the records were altered

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to say without prejudice. 

Petitioner’s various allegations include, “On June 30th 2006, [Petitioner] was released

from custody with no further Court dates since all charges were dismissed ‘with

prejudice.’...[The indictment, trial and sentencing] is misleading to make believe a lawful

indictment is valid to charges that were for [sic] fact dismissed ‘with prejudice.’” Doc. 18 at

16. Petitioner further alleges, “Here [P]inal county officials cover-ups were to hinder facts

for a [sic] unlawful convictions. Altered court records, Bribing Judge to date fraudulent

complaints and warrant after the unlawful arrest on July 6, 2006.” Id. at 27. Petitioner also

states, “As the trial court order states, Petitioner claimed his release order was altered to

remove the words ‘with-prejudice.’” Id. at 33. Petitioner also claimed, “[the] Detective ...

and [the] Deputy County Attorney ... refused to tell the Grand Jury that all charges from June

23 and 28, 2006, were dismissed ‘with prejudice.’” Id. at 50.

Attached to his objections at page 76, Petitioner has an order from a Pinal County

Court setting his release conditions following a preliminary hearing. Doc. 18 at 76.

Petitioner was released on his own recognizance (“OR”). Id. Petitioner has hand written

under the section stating that he was released OR that it used to say “with prejudice” but

someone reacted or deleted that information.

Petitioner has no evidence other than his own self-serving statements that this

document ever said “with prejudice.” Moreover, Petitioner’s statements lack credibility

because the document itself merely sets release conditions. It does not “dismiss” the charges

against Petitioner such that the words with prejudice or without prejudice would logically

have been present. Further, it is a preprinted form, and there is no space on it for any

additional information. Thus, Petitioner’s theory that the charges against him were ever

dismissed with prejudice, but that someone altered the record to reflect otherwise, is not

substantial and his appellate counsel was not ineffective for not raising it.

B. Conclusion on substantiality

As recounted above, the Court finds that none of Petitioner’s claims are substantial.

Therefore, Petitioner’s allegation that his appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising

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these claims does not overcome Petitioner’s default of these claims. Accordingly,

Petitioner’s objection to the R&R’s conclusion that his claims are procedural defaulted is

overruled.

C. Result of Default

The Court agrees with the recommendation of the R&R that this Court find that all

of Petitioner’s claims in his Petition were not exhausted, were procedurally defaulted and that

Petitioner has not shown cause to excuse the default nor has he shown a miscarriage of

justice. See Doc. 15 at 11. Further, as indicated above, Petitioner did not object to the

conclusion that his claims were defaulted, but instead suggested that such default should be

excused by ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court, having overruled that objection,

will accept the recommendation of the R&R and deny the Petition. 

IV. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing,

IT IS ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation (Doc. 15) is accepted as

modified to address Petitioner’s objections. The objections (Doc. 18) are overruled. The

Petition is denied, with prejudice, and the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment

accordingly.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to Rule 11 of the Rules Governing

Section 2254 Cases, in the event Petitioner files an appeal, the Court denies issuance of a

certificate of appealability because denial of the Petition is based on a plain procedural bar

and jurists of reason would not find this Court’s procedural ruling debatable. See Slack v.

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).

DATED this 2nd day of July, 2014.

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