Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00494/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-00494-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MORRIS GILCHRIST,

Booking # 16179894,

Plaintiff,

vs.

ALFRED JOSHUA; BERKMAN; 

MARTINEZ; TONG; SANTOS; 

EVANGELISTA; PREVOST; GORE,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:17-cv-0494-LAB-MDD

ORDER: 

1) GRANTING MOTION TO 

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 

[Doc. No. 2]; AND 

2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR 

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM 

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 

AND § 1915A(b)

Plaintiff, Morris B. Gilchrist, is currently housed at the San Diego Central Jail

(“SDCJ”). He has filed a Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and requests leave to 

proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) (Doc. Nos. 16). Because Plaintiff’s motion to proceed 

IFP complies with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2), the Court grants him leave to proceed without 

full prepayment of the civil filing fees required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a), but dismisses his

Complaint for failing to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b).

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A. Plaintiff’s IFP Motion

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the 

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of 

$400.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to 

prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. 

Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a prisoner who is granted leave to 

proceed IFP remains obligated to pay the entire fee in “increments” or “installments,” 

Bruce v. Samuels, __ S. Ct. __, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (U.S. 2016); Williams v. Paramo, 

775 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), and regardless of whether his action is ultimately 

dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th 

Cir. 2002).

Section 1915(a)(2) requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a 

“certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for . . . the 

6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified 

trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average 

monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly 

balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner 

has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having 

custody of the prisoner then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the 

preceding month’s income, in any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards 

those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2); 

Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629.

 

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 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative fee of $50. See

28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. 

Dec. 1, 2014). The additional $50 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to proceed 

IFP. Id.

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In support of his IFP motion, Plaintiff has submitted a prison certificate which has 

been completed by an administrative lieutenant with the San Diego County Sheriff’s 

Department. See Doc. No. 2 at 5; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); S.D. CAL. CIVLR 3.2; 

Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119. This statement shows that Plaintiff’s current available 

balance in his trust account is $0.13 (Doc. No. 2 at 5), and it appears Plaintiff is unable to 

pay any initial fee at this time. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event 

shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or 

criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to 

pay [a] initial partial filing fee.”); Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 630; Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 

(finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve” preventing dismissal of a 

prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay . . . due to the lack of funds available 

to him when payment is ordered.”). 

Therefore, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to proceed IFP, declines to “exact” any 

initial filing fee because his trust account statement shows he “has no means to pay it,” 

Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629, and directs the Watch Commander at SDCJ to collect the entire 

$350 balance of the filing fees required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914 and forward them to the 

Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment payment provisions set forth in 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(1). See id.

B. Legal Standards for Screening Complaint Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his complaint requires a preanswer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these 

statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of 

it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants 

who are immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) 

(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 

2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that 

the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” 

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Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford 

Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 

F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 

applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 

as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121. 

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the 

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 

relief [is] ... a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its 

judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or 

“unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting 

this plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 

(9th Cir. 2009).

C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of action for the “deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. 

Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must 

allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the 

United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person 

acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Long v. Cty. of 

Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006).

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1. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff is currently housed at the SDCJ. (See Compl. at 1.) Plaintiff claims that 

he suffers from a “torn rotator cuff” and has sought medical treatment from various SDCJ 

medical personnel. (Id. at 4-6.) Plaintiff further claims that he has been refused 

treatment by several individuals in violation of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment 

rights. (Id.) Plaintiff seeks to have his torn rotator cuff “surgically repaired,” along with 

compensatory and punitive damages. (Id. at 8.)

2. Inadequate Medical Care

Prison officials are liable only if they are deliberately indifferent to the prisoner’s 

serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976); see also Clouthier

v. Cnty. of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1241-44 (9th Cir. 2010) (applying Estelle’s 

Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference standard to inadequate medical care claims 

alleged to violate a pretrial detainees’ due process rights). 

Here, Plaintiff alleges that he suffers from a “torn rotator cuff.” (Compl. at 6.) For 

the purposes of this stage of the screening process, the Court will view Plaintiff’s facts in 

the light most favorable to him and find that he has alleged that his medical needs were 

objectively serious. See McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1991) 

(defining a “serious medical need” as one which the “failure to treat ... could result in 

further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.’”), overruled 

on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) 

(citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“[A] complaint must contain 

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 

face.’”) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The “existence of an injury that a 

reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment; 

the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily 

activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain are examples of indications that 

a prisoner has a ‘serious’ need for medical treatment.” McGuckin, 974 F.3d at 1059-60.

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However, even assuming Plaintiff’s medical condition is “objectively serious,” 

nothing in his Complaint supports a “reasonable inference that [any individual] 

defendant” acted with deliberate indifference to his plight. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “In 

order to show deliberate indifference, an inmate must allege sufficient facts to indicate 

that prison officials acted with a culpable state of mind.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 

302 (1991). The indifference to medical needs also must be substantial; inadequate 

treatment due to malpractice, or even gross negligence, does not amount to a 

constitutional violation. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 

(9th Cir. 2004) (“Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard.”) (citing Hallett v. 

Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 1204 (9th Cir. 2002); Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 

(9th Cir. 1990)). 

Here, Plaintiff has named as Defendants Tong, Santos, Evangelista, Provost and 

Gore as Defendants but he fails to identify in any way what these Defendants are alleged 

to have done, or not done, with respect to his medical care. He must provide specific 

factual allegations as to how these individuals were “deliberately indifferent” to his 

serious medical needs.

In addition, Plaintiff is seeking surgery for his medical needs. However, a

difference of opinion between a pretrial detainee and the doctors at the Jail as to the 

appropriate course or type of medical attention he requires does not amount to deliberate 

indifference, see Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 987 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Sanchez v. 

Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989)), and any delay in providing an appropriate 

course of treatment does not by itself show deliberate indifference, unless the delay is 

alleged have caused harm. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060; Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of 

State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). Without more, Plaintiff’s 

Complaint currently amounts only to “unadorned, the defendant[s]-unlawfully-harmedme accusation[s],” which “stop[] short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 

‘entitlement to relief’” as to any constitutionally inadequate medical care claim. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).

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3. Vicarious Liability

Finally, as to Defendant Bill Gore, Plaintiff’s complaint also fails to state a claim 

upon which § 1983 relief can be granted, because it contains no individualized factual

allegations of wrongdoing by this Defendant.

“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits,” Plaintiff “must 

plead that each Government-official defendant, though the official’s own individual 

actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676. Plaintiff’s Complaint, 

however, contains no further “factual enhancement” to describe what these defendants 

did, or failed to do in connection with the claims in his complaint. Estate of Brooks v. 

United States, 197 F.3d 1245, 1248 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Causation is, of course, a required 

element of a § 1983 claim.”). “The inquiry into causation must be individualized and 

focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or 

omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 

F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976)).

Thus, without some specific “factual content” that might allow the Court to “draw 

the reasonable inference” that Defendant Gore may be held personally liable for any 

unconstitutional conduct directed at Plaintiff, the Court finds his Complaint fails to “state 

a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

4. Leave to Amend

A pro se litigant must be given leave to amend his or her complaint to state a claim 

unless it is absolutely clear the deficiencies of the complaint cannot be cured by 

amendment. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130 (noting leave to amend should be granted when 

a complaint is dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “if it appears at all possible that the 

plaintiff can correct the defect”). While the Court finds Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state 

any claim upon which relief can be granted, it will provide him a chance to fix the 

pleading deficiencies discussed in this Order. 

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D. Conclusion and Orders

Based on the forgoing, the Court: 

1. GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) 

(Doc. No. 2).

2. DIRECTS the Watch Commander at the SDCJ, or his or her designee, to 

collect from Plaintiff’s prison trust account the $350 filing fee owed in this case by 

garnishing monthly payments from his account in an amount equal to twenty percent 

(20%) of the preceding month’s income and forwarding those payments to the Clerk of 

the Court each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(2). 

3. DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on the Watch 

Commander, San Diego Central Jail, 1173 Front Street, San Diego, California 92101.

4. DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint for failing to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b), and GRANTS

him forty-five (45) days leave from the date of this Order in which to file an Amended 

Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading noted. Plaintiff’s Amended 

Complaint must be complete in itself without reference to his original pleading. 

Defendants not named and any claims not re-alleged in the Amended Complaint will be 

considered waived. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner 

& Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[A]n amended pleading supersedes 

the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012).

5. DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to mail to Plaintiff, together with this Order, a 

blank copy of the Court’s form “Complaint under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983” for his use in amending.

Dated: April 20, 2017

Hon. Larry Alan Burns

United States District Judge

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