Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_09-cv-08163/USCOURTS-azd-3_09-cv-08163-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 05:702 Administrative Procedure Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

The Save the Peaks Coalition, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

United States Forest Service, et al., 

Defendants. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV 09-8163-PCT-MHM

ORDER

This lawsuit concerns challenges under the National Environmental Policy Act

(“NEPA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 - 4370(d) to the United States Forest Service’s 2005 decision

to allow Intervenor-Defendant Arizona Snowbowl Resort Limited Partnership (“the

Snowbowl”) to upgrade its operations by allowing the production of man-made snow using

non-potable Class A+ reclaimed wastewater. See Ariz. Admin. Code § R18-11-303.

Plaintiffs are specifically challenging whether the 2005 Environmental Impact Statement

prepared and issued by the Forest Service in connection with this upgrade violated the

National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 - 4370d (“NEPA”) by failing to

properly and sufficiently consider and address the possibility or likelihood that people would

ingest snow made from Class A+ reclaimed wastewater and the health impact of such

potential ingestion.

Currently pending before the Court are Plaintiffs’ The Save the Peaks Coalition,

Case 3:09-cv-08163-MHM Document 142 Filed 12/01/10 Page 1 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

Kristin Huisinga, Clayson Benally, Sylvan Grey, Don Fanning, Jeneda Benally, Frederica

Hall, Berta Benally, Rachel Tso, and Lisa Tso's Motion for Summary Judgment, (Doc. 74),

and Motion to Strike, (Doc. 101). Also pending are Intervenor-Defendant Arizona

Snowbowl Resort Limited Partnership’s (“the Snowbowl's”) Motion to Strike Plaintiffs'

Citation to the Vacated Ninth Circuit Panel Opinion, (Doc. 85), and Motion for Summary

Judgment, (Doc. 88), as well as Defendant United States Forest Service and Earl Stewart, in

his official capacity as Forest Supervisor for the Coconino National Forest’s (“the Federal

Defendants”) Motion for Summary Judgment, (Doc. 92). After reviewing the pleadings and

conducting oral argument on July 20, 2010, the Court issues the following order.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Most of the core facts in this case are not disputed. The San Francisco Peaks are part

of 1.8 million acres of public federal land located within the Coconino National Forest.

Since at least 1938, people have been attracted to the snow-covered slopes of the San

Francisco Peaks for skiing and winter recreation activities. As winter sports activity

increased over time, a ski area was developed and expanded on the western flank of the San

Francisco Peaks—with a Poma lift installed in 1958, and a chair lift installed in 1962. The

ski area, currently known as the Arizona Snowbowl, is located entirely on 777 acres of land

within the Coconino National Forest. The Snowbowl operates under a Forest Service-issued

Special Use Permit (“SUP”) pursuant to the Forest Ski Area Permit Act of 1986, 16 U.S.C.

§ 497(b). The SUP is renewable on a 40-year basis. In 1979, the Snowbowl introduced a

master plan for upgrading the ski area. The master plan included proposals for the installation

of new lifts, trails, and facilities. Shortly after the Forest Service approved the Snowbowl’s

proposed upgrades in 1979, several Native American Tribes challenged the decision in

federal court. The Forest Service’s decision approving the master plan was ultimately upheld

by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. See Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir.

1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956 (1983). 

In 2002, Intervenor-Defendant Snowbowl submitted to the Forest Supervisor for the

Coconino National Forest a formal proposal entitled the “Arizona Snowbowl Facilities

Case 3:09-cv-08163-MHM Document 142 Filed 12/01/10 Page 2 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

Improvements Proposal.” The goals of the Proposed Action were twofold: (1) to provide a

consistent and reliable operating season and (2) to improve safety, skiing conditions, and

recreational opportunities by bringing terrain and infrastructure into balance with existing

demand. The proposed action included a request for snowmaking from non-potable Class A+

reclaimed wastewater supplied by the City of Flagstaff through a previously authorized

agreement with the Snowbowl. The en banc Ninth Circuit characterized the non-potable

Class A+ reclaimed wastewater that is to be utilized on the Snowbowl as follows:

The recycled wastewater to be used for snowmaking is classified as

“A+” by the Arizona Department of Environmental Quality (“ADEQ”).

[] A+ recycled wastewater is the highest quality of recycled wastewater

recognized by Arizona law and may be safely and beneficially used for

many purposes, including irrigating school ground landscapes and food

crops. [] Further, the ADEQ has specifically approved the use of

recycled wastewater for snowmaking. 

***

The recycled wastewater that will be used at the Snowbowl “will

undergo specific advanced treatment requirements, including tertiary

treatment with disinfection. In addition, the reclaimed water will

comply with specific monitoring requirements, including frequent

microbiological testing to assure pathogens are removed, and reporting

requirements.”[] Further, the recycled wastewater will “comply with

extensive treatment and monitoring requirements under three separate

permit programs: the Arizona Pollutant Discharge Elimination System

(“AZPDES”) Permit, the Arizona Aquifer Protection Permit Program,

and the Water Reuse Program.” []

Navajo Nation v. United States Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1065 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc),

cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 2763 (2009) (internal citations and internal footnote omitted).

In September 2002, the Forest Supervisor for the Coconino National Forest issued a

scoping notice on the Forest Service’s Proposed Action for improvements at the Snowbowl

to interested individuals, public agencies, and other organizations. The notice included a

summary of the proposed action, including the proposal to create snow from Class A+

reclaimed wastewater. 

On October 7, 2002, the Forest Service published a notice of intent to prepare an

Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) in the Federal Register. The notice stated that the

chief feature of the Proposed Action was to produce artificial snow from Class A+ reclaimed

Case 3:09-cv-08163-MHM Document 142 Filed 12/01/10 Page 3 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

wastewater on 203.5 acres of skiing terrain within the SUP area. See 67 Fed. Reg. 62435

(Oct. 7, 2002). On February 2, 2004, the Forest Service issued a Draft Environmental Impact

Statement (“DEIS”). On February 18, 2005, the Forest Supervisor for the Coconino National

Forest issued the Final Environmental Impact Statement (“FEIS”) for the Arizona Snowbowl

Facilities Improvements proposal. The Record of Decision (“ROD”) was then issued on

February 18, 2005. The ROD selected Alternative Two, which includes authority to make

snow from Class A+ reclaimed wastewater. The Forest Service thereafter received

twenty-eight appeals from fifty-nine individuals and organizations. (See AR Index, p. 15 -

17) (listing individuals and organizations who submitted materials to the Appeal Deciding

Officer).

In June 2005, four groups of plaintiffs, composed of several Native American Tribes

and Nations, along with various individuals, and environmental organizations, filed suit in

the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, challenging the Forest Service’s

actions in the Arizona Snowbowl Facilities Improvements Project. The cases were

consolidated into a single action before the Honorable Paul G. Rosenblatt. See Navajo

Nation v. United States Forest Serv., 408 F. Supp. 2d 866 (D. Ariz. 2006) (consolidating

Nos. CV 05-1824-PCT-PGR, CV-05-1914-PCT-EHC, CV-05-1949-PCT-NVW, CV05-1966-PCT-JAT). The plaintiffs in the consolidated Navajo Nation litigation consisted of

the Hopi Tribe, the Navajo Nation, the White Mountain Apache Nation, the Yavapai-Apache

Nation, the Hualapai Tribe, the Havasupai Tribe, Norris Nez, Bill Bucky Preston, Rex

Tilousi, Dianna Uqualla, the Sierra Club, the Center for Biological Diversity, and the

Flagstaff Activist Network. The Navajo Nation plaintiffs brought claims for alleged

violations of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (“RFRA”), 42 U.S.C. §§

2000bb et seq., the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (“NEPA”), 42 U.S.C. §§

4321 et seq., and the National Historic Preservation Act (“NHPA”), 16 U.S.C. §§ 470 et seq.,

the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq. (“ESA”), the Grand Canyon National

Park Enlargement Act, 16 U.S.C. § 228i (“GCEA”), the National Forest Management Act,

16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1687 (“NFMA”), and a count alleging the United States had failed to

Case 3:09-cv-08163-MHM Document 142 Filed 12/01/10 Page 4 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

comply with its trust responsibilities to the various Native American Tribes and Nations. See

Navajo Nation, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 871. 

With respect to NEPA, the Navajo Nation plaintiffs’ complaint specifically alleged

that “(1) the [FEIS] failed to consider a reasonable range of alternatives to the use of recycled

wastewater; (2) the FEIS failed to discuss and consider the scientific viewpoint of Dr. Paul

Torrence; (3) the FEIS failed adequately to consider the environmental impact of diverting

the recycled wastewater from Flagstaff's regional aquifer; and (4) the FEIS failed adequately

to consider the social and cultural impacts of the Snowbowl upgrades on the Hopi people.”

Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1079. At summary judgment, the plaintiffs for the first time

raised a claim that “the FEIS failed adequately to consider the risks posed by human

ingestion of artificial snow.” Id. As the en banc Ninth Circuit noted, “[the relevant]

complaint did not include this NEPA claim or the factual allegations upon which the claim

rests.” Id. The defendants in the Navajo Nation lawsuit responded to this new argument in

their appeal brief contending that the plaintiffs had failed to properly plead this new NEPA

claim in the complaint. The plaintiffs countered by moving the district court for leave to

amend their complaint to add the NEPA claim relating to the risks posed by human ingestion

of snow made with Class A+ reclaimed wastewater. The district court denied the motion

for leave without comment. Navajo Nation, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 908 (“IT IS FURTHER

ORDERED that the Navajo Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend/ Correct Amended Complaint (Doc.

75) is DENIED”). 

The district court ultimately granted summary judgment for the defendants on all

claims, except the RFRA claim, which was similarly denied after a lengthy trial to the bench.

See id. The case was then appealed. On appeal, a three-judge Ninth Circuit panel affirmed

in part, and reversed in part, the district court’s ruling. See Navajo Nation v. United States

Forest Serv., 479 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2007), vacated, 506 F.3d 717. The panel opinion

reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the RFRA issue, as well as the

single NEPA claim regarding risks posed to human health from the ingestion of snow made

from reclaimed wastewater. 

Case 3:09-cv-08163-MHM Document 142 Filed 12/01/10 Page 5 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

The case proceeded to en banc review, where the en banc Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment and entry of judgment in

favor of the defendants in all respects. Navajo Nation, 535 F.3d at 1080 (“We affirm the

district court’s entry of judgment in favor of the Defendants on the RFRA claim, and the

district court’s grant of summary judgment to the Defendants on the NEPA and the NHPA

claims.”). As to the single NEPA claim concerning the risks posed to human health from the

ingestion of snow made from reclaimed wastewater—the claim for which the district court

was reversed by the initial panel—the en banc Ninth Circuit noted that “Plaintiffs raised this

claim for the first time in their motion for summary judgment” and held that “[b]ecause the

[plaintiffs] failed sufficiently to present this NEPA claim to the district court and also failed

to appeal the district court’s denial of their motion to amend the complaint to add this NEPA

claim, the claim is waived on appeal.” Id. Following the Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision,

the Navajo Nation plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States

Supreme Court, which was denied on June 8, 2009. See Navajo Nation v. United States

Forest Serv., 129 S. Ct. 2763 (2009).

On September 9, 2009, Plaintiffs filed the instant litigation. In this case, Plaintiffs The

Save the Peaks Coalition, Kristin Huisinga, Clayson Benally, Sylvan Grey, Don Fanning,

Jeneda Benally, Frederica Hall, Berta Benally, Rachel Tso, and Lisa Tso have filed a

Complaint against Defendants the United States Forest Service and Earl Stewart, in his

official capacity as Forest Supervisor for the Coconino National Forest pursuant to NEPA.

(See Doc. 1). On December 3, 2009, this Court granted the Snowbowl’s Motion to Intervene

as a Defendant. (Doc. 19). 

Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges several NEPA violations. Count One alleges that “the

FEIS does not contain a reasonably thorough discussion of the significant aspects of the

probable environmental consequences of the project—the FEIS ignores the possibility of

children (and others) eating snow made from reclaimed wastewater.” (Doc. 1, p. 12). Count

Two alleges that “by failing to analyze impacts of eating snow made from reclaimed sewer

water, the [Forest Service] failed to ensure the scientific integrity of its analysis.” (Id., p. 14).

Case 3:09-cv-08163-MHM Document 142 Filed 12/01/10 Page 6 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

Count Three alleges a “failure to disseminate quality information” on the part of the Forest

Service. (Id., p. 15). The current Plaintiffs ask that the Court find that the Defendant's

actions were “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance

with law; and/or [] without observance of procedure required by law, as mandated by the

APA.” (Id., p. 16). Plaintiffs also request injunctive relief in the form of (1) a finding by this

Court that the FEIS was inadequate as a matter of law; (2) a finding that the Forest Service

violated NEPA in approving the Snowbowl improvement project; (3) the issuance of a

mandatory injunction that would stay all action in furtherance of the Snowbowl improvement

project until the Forest Service can comply with all applicable laws and regulations; and (4)

hold that the Forest Service action was unlawful and set it aside. (Id.)

On February 24, 2010, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint, (Doc.

39), in order to add an additional Count alleging that the Forest Service “failed to consider

significant new information” since the ROD was issued in February 2005, in violation of

NEPA. On September 22, 2010, that Motion was denied as untimely and lacking good cause.

(Doc.135).

On March 12, 2010, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on all Counts.

(Doc. 74). On April 2, 2010, Intervenor-Defendant Snowbowl filed a Motion to Strike

Plaintiff's Citation to the Vacated Ninth Circuit Panel Opinion. (Doc. 85). On April 9, 2010,

the Snowbowl filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, in which it argued that Plaintiffs

lacked standing under Article III of the U.S. Constitution, that Plaintiffs failed to exhaust

their administrative remedies, that Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the doctrine of claim

preclusion, or res judicata, and that the NEPA claims fail on the merits. (Doc. 88). On April

9, 2010, the Federal Defendants also moved for summary judgment. (Doc. 92). The Federal

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs lack standing, have failed to exhaust their administrative

remedies, that Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the equitable doctrine of laches, and that the

Federal Defendants complied with NEPA. (Id.) On May 18, 2010, Plaintiffs filed a Motion

to Strike the reply briefs filed by the Federal Defendants and Intervenor-Defendant

Snowbowl on the grounds that Defendants have improperly introduced new evidence in their

Case 3:09-cv-08163-MHM Document 142 Filed 12/01/10 Page 7 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 -

reply and that such evidence is outside the administrative record and that Defendants’ reply

briefs are unrelated to their Motions for Summary Judgment and are instead focused on

Plaintiffs’ Summary Judgment Motion—therefore constituting impermissible sur-replies.

(Doc. 101). On May 25, 2010, this Court issued an Order directing the Parties to submit

supplemental briefing on the issue of whether this “lawsuit is barred by the doctrine of claim

preclusion or res judicata.” (Doc. 102). The Court further Ordered that “as part of the

supplemental briefing, the Parties are directed to discuss whether privity exists between

Plaintiffs in this lawsuit and the plaintiffs in the case of Navajo Nation v. United States

Forest Serv., 408 F. Supp. 2d 866 (D. Ariz. 2006), affd, 535 F. 3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2008)(en

banc), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2763 (2009). Specifically, the Parties should address the fourth

and fifth exceptions to the rule against nonparty preclusion as set forth by the United States

Supreme Court in Taylor v. Sturgell, 128 S.Ct. 2161, 2172-73(2008) (“a nonparty is bound

by a judgment if she assume[d] control over the litigation in which that judgment was

rendered... [and] a party bound by a judgment may not avoid its preclusive force by

relitigating through a proxy”).” (Id.) On June 21, 2010, the Parties’ supplemental briefs

were filed with the Court. (Docs. 107, 108, 109).

In September 2010, the Flagstaff City Council held a series of meetings in which it

considered the possibility of amending Snowbowl’s contract to allow it to purchase

“recovered reclaimed” water for snowmaking. Recovered reclaimed water is approved for

use as drinking water and if Snowbowl were to make snow using recovered reclaimed water,

the Plaintiffs' claims would likely be moot. On September 16, 2010, Intervenor Defendant

Snowbowl filed a Supplement to its Reply in Support of its Cross-Motion for Summary

Judgment concerning presentations made by Plaintiffs before the Flagstaff City Council.

(Doc. 133). In the supplement, Snowbowl argued that statements by the Plaintiffs at the

Flagstaff City Council urging the Council not to allow Snowbowl to purchase recovered

reclaimed water for snowmaking warranted dismissal of the lawsuit under the doctrine of

unclean hands. Plaintiffs filed a response countering that their statements did not warrant

dismissal.

Case 3:09-cv-08163-MHM Document 142 Filed 12/01/10 Page 8 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 -

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The Ninth Circuit has endorsed the use of summary judgment motions under Rule 56

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for review of agency actions under the

Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). Nw. Motorcycle Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 18

F.3d 1468, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1994). The court’s role is not to resolve facts, but to “determine

whether or not as a matter of law the evidence in the administrative record permitted the

agency to make the decision it did.” Occidental Eng’g Co. v. Immigration & Naturalization

Serv., 753 F.2d 766, 769 (9th Cir. 1985). The administrative agency itself is the fact-finder;

summary judgment is appropriate for determining “the legal question of whether the agency

could reasonably have found the facts as it did.” Id. at 770. Under the APA, questions of

law are reviewed de novo by the Court. See 5 U.S.C. § 706; Memorial, Inc. v. Harris, 655

F.2d 905, 911 (9th Cir. 1980) (“under the APA review provisions it is the Court which

decides all relevant questions of law”). “Judicial review of agency decisions under NEPA

. . . is governed by the [APA], which specifies that an agency action may be overturned only

where it is found to be ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in

accordance with law.’” Native Ecosystems Council v. Dombeck, 304 F.3d 886, 891 (9th Cir.

2002) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)).

III. Defendants’ Jurisdictional Claims

As an initial matter, Defendants argue that the Court should dismiss this case for lack

of jurisdiction. Defendants raise a number of jurisdictional arguments any one of which

could dispose of this case without reaching the merits of the underlying NEPA claims. These

are addressed below.

A. Standing

The Defendants in this case argue that the Plaintiffs lack standing to bring this lawsuit.

To establish standing a plaintiff must show that: (1) he has suffered an injury in fact; (2) the

injury is fairly traceable to the conduct of the defendant; and (3) a favorable federal court

decision would be likely to redress the injury. Pit River Tribe v. U.S. Forest Service, 469

F.3d 768, 778 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Case 3:09-cv-08163-MHM Document 142 Filed 12/01/10 Page 9 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 10 -

Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs have not satisfied the “injury in fact” element

because Plaintiffs either do not recreate in the Snowbowl SUP area in which snowmaking

will take place or do not recreate it in ways that make it likely that they will ingest snow

made with reclaimed water. Plaintiffs respond that the “injury in fact” element of Article III

standing in a NEPA case is satisfied if the plaintiff has an aesthetic or recreational interest

in the particular place and that interest will be impaired by the defendant’s conduct. See, e.g.,

White Tanks Concerned Citizens v. Strock, 563 F.3d 1033, 1038 (9th Cir. 2009); Friends of

the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S.167, 183, 120 S.Ct. 693 (2000). All of the

Plaintiffs use and enjoy the Snowbowl area for recreational and aesthetic purposes; they

claim that their recreational and aesthetic enjoyment of the area will be diminished if the

project goes forward and trees are cleared, a pipeline is run up the mountain and a massive

catch basin for reclaimed water is installed and if potentially unsafe snow made from

reclaimed water is used at Snowbowl. Plaintiffs argue that these interests are sufficient to

satisfy the “injury in fact” requirement. 

Plaintiffs’ complaint, however, is specifically that the Forest Service failed to properly

consider and assess the possible health effects of people ingesting snow made from reclaimed

water. So while Plaintiffs may have a general aesthetic and environmental interest in the

Snowbowl environment that will be affected by cleared trees, running pipelines and catch

basins, those broader aesthetic and environmental interests would not give them standing to

assert the specific claim brought in this case. Plaintiffs’ recreational interests in the

Snowbowl, however, could give them standing to assert their NEPA claim, if those

recreational interests are imperiled by the alleged insufficiency of the EIS. See, e.g.,

National Park and Conservation Ass’n v. Stanton, 54 F. Supp.2d 7, 15 (D.D.C. 1999). All

of the Plaintiffs in this case live in Flagstaff or near the Snowbowl and all of them recreate

at Snowbowl – that they either ski, hike, snowshoe, gather snow, or play in the snow – at

Case 3:09-cv-08163-MHM Document 142 Filed 12/01/10 Page 10 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

The fact that some of the Plaintiffs allege only that they have recreated in the

"Snowbowl" area, rather the specific SUP area in which snow made from reclaimed water

will be used does not deprive them of standing. Plaintiffs have clearly stated that they

recreate in the Snowbowl. The Snowbowl is a 777 acre area, 205 acres of which will have

snow made from reclaimed water. Plaintiffs' claims thus are not like those of the Plaintiffs

in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), who objected to 4500 acres of

mining on a 5.5 million acres who only vaguely alleged that their enjoyment of federal lands

in the vicinity of these million of acres had been adversely affected.

- 11 -

Snowbowl.1

 One of the Plaintiffs, Kristin Huisinga has even stated that she eats snow at

Snowbowl and Plaintiff Clayson Benally, has asserted that he bathes in the snow and uses

the snow there to make essential water/oil preparations used in healing ceremonies. Plaintiff

Don Fanning says that he hikes and throws snow at Snowbowl. 

Certainly, Plaintiffs who eat snow or bathe in the snow at Snowbowl have a suffered

a concrete injury in fact if the Forest Service failed to properly consider the health effects of

ingesting snow made from reclaimed water on Snowbowl. Defendants stress that even if a

few of the Plaintiffs may satisfy the standing requirement, not all of them do because they

have not demonstrated that they are likely to ingest snow at the site where the snow made

from reclaimed water will be used. As an initial matter, once one of multiple plaintiffs is

found to have standing, other plaintiffs’ lack of standing is irrelevant for purposes of

determining whether to dismiss the suit on that basis. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan

Housing Development Corp, 429 U.S. 252, 264, 97 S.Ct. 555 (1977) (“we have at least one

individual plaintiff who has demonstrated standing. . .”); Id. at n.9 (“ Because of the presence

of this plaintiff, we need not consider whether the other individual and corporate plaintiffs

have standing to maintain the suit.”). Moreover, Defendants are incorrect that Plaintiffs have

to essentially demonstrate that they have concrete plans to go eat snow at the SUP area next

year in order to have standing in this case. The Plaintiffs' recreational interests in skiing,

snowboarding, snowshoeing, hiking and other activities on Snowbowl provide a sufficient

basis for standing since such recreational interests would be imperiled if the Forest Service

failed to properly consider the health effects of ingesting reclaimed water. See, e.g., Florida

Case 3:09-cv-08163-MHM Document 142 Filed 12/01/10 Page 11 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 12 -

Public Interest Research Group Citizen Lobby, Inc. v. EPA, 386 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir. 2004)

(Plaintiffs for whom the aesthetic and recreational values of the area will be lessened by the

degradation of water quality have standing to challenge EPA review of water standards,

including people who canoe and fish in waterbodies delisted from impaired waters list);

Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter v. Cedar Point Oil Co. Inc., 73 F.3d 546 (5th Cir. 1996)

(plaintiffs who lived near bay where "produced water" would be discharged, and used the bay

for recreation and expressed concern that "produced water" would impair their enjoyment

of activities because these depended on good water quality had alleged an injury in fact). 

Defendants also argue that the injury is not actual or imminent, but rather conjectural

or hypothetical. Of course, in this case none of the Plaintiffs has yet been injured by

ingesting snow made from reclaimed water and it is unclear when or if such an injury will

occur. The Supreme Court has held, however, that "threatened injury" will satisfy the injury

in fact requirement for standing. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for

Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 472, 464 (1982). All of the Plaintiffs in this

case have indicated that they recreate on Snowbowl. Ms. Huisinga, for example, has stated

that she goes to the Snowbowl around thirty times per year and that she has a specific plan

to recreate in the Snowbowl area in April 2010. Mr. Benally says he goes to the Snowbowl

approximately ten times a year Mr. Fanning testified that in the previous year he had gone

to the Snowbowl more than ten times during the off-ski season and a couple of times during

the ski season. Plaintiffs' injury is thus neither conjectural nor hypothetical.

The Defendants do not directly question that Plaintiffs' alleged injury is traceable to

the conduct of the Defendant, other than to state that there is no concrete injury. The injury

the Plaintiffs have alleged is in any event traceable to the U.S. Forest Service's alleged failure

to consider the health effects of ingesting reclaimed water. And a decision by this Court that

the Forest Service needs to give further consideration of the health effects of ingesting

reclaimed snow would require additional review by the agency that could influence its

decision. This satisfies the requirement that a favorable decision would redress the injury.

Citizens for Better Forestry v. U.S. Dep't of Ag., 341 F.3d 961, 975-76 (9th Cir. 2003)

Case 3:09-cv-08163-MHM Document 142 Filed 12/01/10 Page 12 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

 The Court also finds that the Save the Peaks Coalition has organizational standing.

An association has standing when 1) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in

their own right; 2) the interests at stake are germane to the organization's purpose; and 3)

neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual

members in the lawsuit. Citizens for Better Forestry, 341 F.3d at 976. As discussed above,

the Coalition members do have standing. Part of organization's purpose is to preserve the

environmental integrity of the land on which the Forest Service is proposing to use

reclaimed water. The relief requested does not require the participation of individual

members in the lawsuit. 

- 13 -

(quoting Public Citizen v. Dept.of Transp., 316 F.3d 1002,1019 (9th Cir. 2003) and citing

Hall v. Norton, 266 F.3d 977 (9th Cir. 2001)).

In addition, Plaintiffs have established a procedural injury. To establish a procedural

injury a plaintiff must allege that an agency violated procedural rules; 2) that these rules

protect a plaintiff's concrete interests; and 3) that it is reasonably probable that the challenged

action will threaten their concrete interests. City of Sausalito v. O'Neill, 386 F.3d 1186 (9th

Cir. 2004) (citing Citizens for Better Forestry, 341 F.3d at 969-70). Again, Plaintiffs'

recreational interests are "concrete" and sufficiently threatened by the Forest Service's

alleged failure to properly consider the health effects of ingesting snow in preparing its

environmental impact statement.2

B. Exhaustion of Remedies

Defendants also argue that the Plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative

remedies because they did not specifically comment on the snow ingestion issue in response

to the Draft Environmental Impact Statement and did not raise that issue in their appeals of

the Record of Decision to the Forest Service. Defendants argue that while the Plaintiffs have

made comments and filed appeals about the Snowbowl upgrade, their comments and appeals

were not specific enough to the issue of human ingestion of snow made with reclaimed water

to put the Forest Service on notice and thus exhaust this claim. 

Under the Forest Service regulations, a person must exhaust all administrative appeal

procedures, including submitting substantive comments and an appeal of the agency action.

This procedure allows the Forest Service to give the issue meaningful consideration and to

Case 3:09-cv-08163-MHM Document 142 Filed 12/01/10 Page 13 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 14 -

have the first opportunity to resolve concerns. Dep't. of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S.

752, 764 (2004); Idaho Sporting Congress v. Rittenhouse, 305 F.3d 957, 965 (9th Cir. 2002).

Administrative remedies are exhausted "if the appeal, taken as a whole, provided sufficient

notice to the Forest Service to afford it the opportunity to rectify the violations that the

plaintiffs alleged. Great Basin Mine Watch v. Hankin, 456 F.3d 955, 968 (9th Cir. 2006).

The claims raised at the administrative appeal and in the federal complaint must be "so

similar" that the district court can ascertain that the agency was on notice of, and had an

opportunity to consider and decide, the same claims now raised in federal court. Native

Ecosystems Council, 304 F.3d at 889. 

In this case, the Plaintiffs highlight a number of statements in their comments to the

Forest Service communicating their concerns regarding the health effects of ingesting

reclaimed water. Plaintiff Kristin Huisinga, for example, stated in her comments that

“[s]ignificant levels of human birth control and pharmaceutical products are not removed in

the process of water treatment. These compounds are likely to cause severe defects in . . .

humans. . .”. Plaintiff Clayson Benally in his comments stated “I’m also concerned about

chemicals and pharmaceuticals that aren’t currently tested for, in this grade of wastewater.”

He added that reclaimed water "has only now been looked at for endocrine disruptors. It is

my understanding that the full impact is still unknown. I urge you to have the foresight and

allow these findings to be included into the EIS. What affect [sic] will this have on people

that may ingest this artificial snow.” Plaintiff Jeneda Benally states in her comments that

“with known endocrine disrupters in the water, who will be responsible for any sickness that

a child may develop from ingestion of effluent snow?” Plaintiff Don Fanning states in his

comments that “we’ll be dealing with treated sewage that is undiluted with fresh water and

people who will be falling in great frozen piles of the stuff and probably accidentally

swallowing some. Not to speak of children and even adults who indulge in the winter

tradition of eating snow . . .” .

Defendants claim that the Plaintiffs' comments are not sufficiently specific on the

issue of health effects of ingesting snow made from reclaimed water. Some of these

Case 3:09-cv-08163-MHM Document 142 Filed 12/01/10 Page 14 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 15 -

comments, however, particularly those of Plaintiffs Clayson and Jeneda Benally and Don

Fanning are specific on this issue. Moreover, in order to provide sufficient notice a claimant

need only alert the agency in "general terms, rather than with precise legal formulations."

Rittenhouse, 305 F.3d at 965. As one Court has put it, “there is no requirement that an

intervenor must make every specific legal claim in the comment period or forfeit the right

to bring a case in federal court. Rather a party need only alert agency to its contention."

Earth Island Institute v. Morse, 2009 WL 2423478 at *4 (E.D. Cal. 2009). The comments

highlighted by the Plaintiffs plainly alert the Forest Service to their concern regarding the

health effects of exposure to snow from reclaimed water, including concerns about the effects

of ingestion.

 Plaintiffs Save the Peaks Coalition, Clayson Benally, Jeneda Bennally and Berta

Benally also referenced their concerns regarding the health effects from exposure to

reclaimed water in their administrative appeals. Their appeal stated:

The Forest Service never asked for interagency consultation on this matter

from any substantial government authority including the National Institute of

Child Health...the Forest Service cannot even pretend to speak with any

authority on these human health matters and their response to comments raised

concerning human health have been largely ignored in the FEIS. . . .The FEIS

has failed to consider genetics and even pharmacogenomics in its insistence

on pollutants.

Plaintiff Kristin Huisinga stated in her appeal that Dr. Catherine Popper’s study generated

data using water from Flagstaff showing that some compounds within an understudied group

called "endocrine disrupters” have detrimental effects of the thyroid and male reproductive

systems in salamanders and other amphibians and that these results have implications for

human health. Plaintiff Don Fanning stated that his appeal incorporated his comments,

which he attached. As previously noted Mr. Fanning's comments specifically expressed

concern regarding the health effects of ingesting snow.

Plaintiffs' comments and appeals clearly reference a general concern with the health

effects of exposure to reclaimed water and many explicitly express a concern regarding the

safety of ingesting reclaimed water. The fact that not all of the Plaintiffs explicitly state at

either the comment or appeal stage that they are concerned about the health effects of

Case 3:09-cv-08163-MHM Document 142 Filed 12/01/10 Page 15 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 16 -

ingesting reclaimed snow does not mean that they failed to exhaust their remedies. Their

statements regarding the presence of chemicals and compounds in reclaimed water that could

have implications for human health are sufficiently similar to their claim regarding the health

effects of ingesting snow made from reclaimed water to give the Forest Service notice of

their current claims. See, e.g., Rittenhouse, 305 F.3d at 965-66 (group's comments

concerning effects of alternatives on "old growth habitat" and "old growth dependent

species" were sufficient to exhaust claims regarding regulations requiring the monitoring of

species population trends because, "it would be unreasonable to require that the Conservation

Groups incant the magic words 'monitor' and 'population trends' in order to leave the

courtroom door open"); see also Morse, 2009 WL 2423478 at *4 (plaintiff's concerns

regarding stand densities and overthining alerted Forest Service of allegations that the agency

had applied wrong methodology and figures to assess stand density). Moreover, a number

of courts assessing exhaustion of remedies in this context have stressed that compliance with

NEPA is a primary duty of the federal agency and that the onus should not fall on

commentators to point out flaws to preserve the ability to challenge actions. Native

Ecosystems Council, 222 F.3d at 559; Dep't of Transp. v. Public Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 765

(2004). Considering the comments and appeal taken as a whole, the Court finds that the

Forest Service was on notice of Plaintiffs' concerns regarding the health effects of exposure

to snow made from reclaimed water and that Plaintiffs exhausted their administrative

remedies.

C. Res Judicata

Defendants also argue that the claims of some or all of the Plaintiffs are barred by the

doctrine of res judicata because they were or could have been brought in the 2005 Navajo

Nation litigation. To establish res judicata, the following elements are necessary 1) identity

of claims; 2) a final judgment on the merits; and 3) privity between the parties. Hells Canyon

Preservation Council v. U.S Forest Service, 402 F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 2005).

To determine whether two lawsuits involve the same claim, the court looks at four

criteria: 1) whether the two claims arise out of the same transactional nucleus of operative

Case 3:09-cv-08163-MHM Document 142 Filed 12/01/10 Page 16 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 17 -

facts; 2) whether the rights or interests established in the prior judgment would be destroyed

or impaired by prosecution of the second action; 3) whether the two suits involve

infringement of the same right and 4) whether substantially the same evidence is presented

in the two actions. Mpoyo v. Litton Electro-Optical Systems, 430 F.3d 985, 987 (9th Cir.

2005). The first factor, however, is considered controlling. Id. at 430 F.3d at 988.

The Plaintiffs' claims in this case are essentially that the Forest Service failed to

consider and address the health effects of ingesting snow made from reclaimed water when

preparing the FEIS and approving the Snowbowl upgrade project. The Plaintiffs in the 2005

Navajo Nation lawsuit attempted to amend their complaint to add this same claim. The

District Court denied the motion to amend, and its holding was ultimately upheld by the en

banc Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Plaintiffs deny that their current claims and the claims

of the Plaintiffs in the Navajo Nation litigation arise out of the same nucleus of operative

facts. They base their argument in part on the en banc panel opinion which found that the

Navajo Nation plaintiffs' complaint "did not include this NEPA claim or the factual

allegations upon which the claim rests . . ." 535 F.3d at 1079. Whether two events are part

of the same nucleus of operative facts, however "depends on whether they are related to the

same set of facts and whether they could be conveniently tried together." Mypoyo, 430 F.3d

at 987. The fact that the Navajo Nation plaintiffs failed to state facts sufficient to raise the

claim asserted by the current plaintiffs does not mean that the claim did not arise from the

same nucleus of operative facts. The Navajo Nation plaintiffs, like the Plaintiffs in this case,

challenged the Forest Service's action in preparing the FEIS and approving the project under

NEPA. The Navajo Nation decision addressed the environmental impact of using reclaimed

water to make snow. 408 F. Supp.2d at 876. The plaintiffs in the Navajo Nation case even

attempted to amend their complaint to add claims of the Plaintiffs in this case indicating that

these were related to their other claims and could conveniently be tried together. Therefore,

the two claims do arise from the same nucleus of operative fact and the "identity of claims"

element is satisfied.

Plaintiffs also deny that the Navajo Nation litigation reached a final judgment on the

Case 3:09-cv-08163-MHM Document 142 Filed 12/01/10 Page 17 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 18 -

merits of the claim because the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals only affirmed the district

court ruling denying the Plaintiff's motion to amend the claim. They argue that court's ruling

means that the claim was never properly before the court and so not decided on the merits

for purposes of res judicata. Plaintiffs cite Hells Canyon Preservation Council v. U.S. Forest

Service in support of their claim. 402 F.3d 683. In Hells Canyon, a Plaintiff voluntarily

withdrew a claim before the court ruled on summary judgment. The Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals ruled that because the action did not contain the claim there was no final judgment

on its merits for purposes of res judicata. 403 F.3d at 687. The claim in this case, however,

was not voluntarily withdrawn by the plaintiffs in the Navajo Nation case. Rather the

plaintiffs attempted to amend their complaint to add the claim and the court denied their

motion to amend. The Ninth Circuit has ruled that "[d]enial of leave to amend in a prior

action based on dilatoriness does not prevent application of res judicata in a subsequent

action." Mpoyo, 430 F.3d at 988-89 (holding that denial of a motion for leave to amend a

complaint to add claims constituted a final judgment on the merits of the claim for res

judicata purposes). Moreover, "[t]he overwhelming weight of Ninth Circuit precedent stands

for the proposition that res judicata bars not only all claims that were actually litigated, but

also claims that could have been asserted in the prior action, as long as the prior action

resulted in a final judgment on the merits." Baker v. Voith Fabrics US Sales, Inc., 2007 WL

1549919 at * 5 (E.D. Wash. 2007), citing Tahoe Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Taho

Reg'l Planning Agency, 322 F.3d 1064, 1078 (9th Cir. 2003); Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297

F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 2002); Federated Dept. Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 396

(1981). Thus, the Court finds that there was a final ruling on the merits for purposes of res

judicata.

The final inquiry is whether the Plaintiffs in this lawsuit are in privity with the

plaintiffs from the earlier Navajo Nation litigation. Generally a non-party is not precluded

by res judicata from bringing claims that were or could have been brought in a previous suit

unless one of the following exceptions applies: 1) one person has agreed to be bound by the

determination of issues in an action between others; 2) a preexisting substantive legal

Case 3:09-cv-08163-MHM Document 142 Filed 12/01/10 Page 18 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 19 -

relationship exists between the person to be bound and a party to the judgment; 3) a nonparty

was adequately represented by someone with the same interests who was a party to the suit;

4) a nonparty assumed control over the litigation in which that judgment was rendered; 5)

a party bound by a judgment relitigates through a proxy and 6) certain circumstances under

a special statutory scheme such as bankruptcy and probate. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880

(2008). 

Only the third, fourth, or fifth exceptions could potentially apply in this case. The

Defendants point to a number of connections between the Plaintiffs in this case and the prior

litigation to establish that the current Plaintiffs were either adequately represented by parties

in the Navajo Nation lawsuit, assumed control of the prior litigation or are really now serving

as proxies for the plaintiffs in the first lawsuit. Defendants stress that the plaintiffs in this

and the prior suit are represented by the same counsel, Mr. Howard Shanker, and that Mr.

Shanker prepared the administrative appeal for some of the plaintiffs in both cases.

Defendants also stress that some of the Plaintiffs in this litigation were either members of or

associated with organizations who were plaintiffs in the prior lawsuit such as the Sierra Club

and the Navajo Nation. Defendants also point to the fact that some of the Plaintiffs have

solicited money to pay for the prior litigation and organized and attended protests and events

in support of the previous litigation. Defendants also point to statements by attorneys for the

plaintiffs in the Navajo Nation litigation stating after termination of that earlier lawsuit that

they were considering other possible legal avenues, including one claim that the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals had not addressed. Defendants also highlight a statement on the

Save the Peaks Website calling the earlier lawsuit "our prior court case".

The Court is not convinced, however, that there is privity between all of the Plaintiffs

in this and the Navajo Nation lawsuit. As an initial matter, other than to point out that the

Plaintiffs in this case are represented by the same lawyer who represented the plaintiffs in

Navajo Nation, the Defendants have not alleged any connection between the plaintiffs in the

first lawsuit and two of the Plaintiffs in this case, Lisa Tso and Frederica Hall. See Earth

First v. Block, 569 F. Supp. 415, 421 (D. Oreg. 1983) ("Even if this were the case, there are

Case 3:09-cv-08163-MHM Document 142 Filed 12/01/10 Page 19 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 20 -

parties to this action which were not parties to [the prior litigation] and were not in privity

with any party in that action. Since those non-parties cannot be bound by the prior decision,

the court would proceed in any event to order compliance with NEPA.") Having the same

counsel, without more, is not sufficient to establish privity. Southwest Voter Registration

Education Project v. Shelley, 344 F.3d 882, 904 (9th Cir. 2003).

In addition, none of the connections that the Defendants identify are sufficient to

establish that the Plaintiffs in this litigation were represented by the plaintiffs in Navajo

Nation. Some of the Plaintiffs in this litigation were members of or affiliated with the

Navajo Nation, the Sierra Club and the Center for Biological Diversity, organizations that

served as plaintiffs in the Navajo Nation case. Those organizations, however, were not suing

on behalf of a class or in representation of other members so that they are not in privity with

their members. See Taylor, 553 U.S. at 894; Cf. Yankton Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Dept. of

Health and Human Services, 533 F.3d 634, 641 (8th Cir. 2008). A statement on the Save the

Peaks website calling the earlier litigation "our prior court case", although suspicious, does

not without more establish that all of the Plaintiffs in this litigation were adequately

represented by the plaintiffs in the prior litigation. 

The fact that Plaintiffs in this case either helped raised money for or organized and

participated in rallies and events in support of the plaintiffs in the Navajo Nation lawsuit does

not come close to establishing that the plaintiffs in this case "assumed control"over the 2005

litigation. Rather, "to have control of litigation requires that a person have effective choice

as to the legal theories and proofs to be advanced in behalf of the party to the action . . . .It

is not sufficient, however, that the person merely contributed funds or advice in support of

the party, supplied counsel to the party, or appeared as amicus curiae." Virginia Hosp. Ass'n

v. Baliles, 830 F.2d 1308, 1332 (4th Cir. 1987). Defendants cite cases in which the payment

of legal fees was mentioned by the court as evidence of control. In those cases, however,

there was significant additional involvement by the party determined to be bound by the

judgment. See Montana v. U.S., 440 U.S. 147 (1979) (government had active role in

reviewing and approving filings); Jones v. Craig, 212 F.2d 187 (6th Cir. 1954) (composer

Case 3:09-cv-08163-MHM Document 142 Filed 12/01/10 Page 20 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 21 -

assisted in preparation of defense and testified as witness in copyright infringement action).

As for the claim that the current Plaintiffs are serving as proxies for the plaintiffs in

the prior suit, Defendants offer no evidence other than inferences based on statements by

counsel for the Navajo Nation plaintiffs about pursuing other legal avenues including a claim

that the Ninth Circuit did not rule on, as well as the current Plaintiffs' awareness and support

for the prior litigation. Although Defendants raise a number of questions about how

intertwined the plaintiffs from the Navajo Nation litigation are with the current Plaintiffs,

Defendants have not established that the former are using the latter as a proxy.

The Court thus finds that insufficient evidence of privity has been provided so that the

Plaintiff's claims are not barred by the doctrine of res judiciata.

IV. Laches

Defendants also claim that Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the doctrine of laches. As

an initial matter, the Court notes that the doctrine of laches is only sparingly invoked in

environmental cases. See Preservation Coaltion v. Pierce, 667 F.2d 851, 854 (9th Cir. 1982).

To establish laches as an affirmative defense, the party invoking the doctrine must show: 1)

that the opposing party lacked diligence in pursuing claims; and 2) that the party invoking

the doctrine suffered prejudice from that lack of diligence. Apache Survival Coal. v. United

States, 21 F.3d 895, 905 (9th Cir. 1994). Whether laches bars a claim depends on the

particular facts and circumstances of the individual case. Ocean Advocates v. U.S. Army

Corps of Engineers, 402 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Defendants' argument pertaining to laches is that all of the Plaintiffs in this case were

aware of but failed to join the Navajo Nation lawsuit brought in 2005 and waited to bring this

lawsuit until that first suit was resolved. Defendants argue that they are prejudiced, because

they have been forced to litigate similar challenges to the same project challenged in a prior

suit. Defendant Snowbowl also says that it has expended a great deal of resources on both

the prior litigation and on the Snowbowl project before this action was filed. 

The Plaintiffs do not deny that they were aware of and declined to join the 2005

lawsuit, waiting to file their current claims until the Navajo Nation litigation ended. Instead,

Case 3:09-cv-08163-MHM Document 142 Filed 12/01/10 Page 21 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 22 -

they argue that there has been no lack of diligence on their part since there has been no final

agency authorization in this case. Plaintiffs cite Ocean Advocates v. U.S. Army Corp of

Engineers, 402 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2005) in support of their argument that they did not lack

diligence. In Ocean Advocates, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a district court

ruling that Plaintiffs were barred by the doctrine of laches from challenging a permit issued

by the Army Corps of Engineers to extend a pier. The Army Corps of Engineers had issued

the permit in 1996 and Plaintiffs waited until 2000 to initiate their lawsuit. Plaintiffs cite

language from Ocean Advocates where the court notes that it had “held that delays of eight

to ten years did not demonstrate lack of diligence." 402 F.3d at 863

A closer look at Ocean Advocates, however, indicates that the circumstances

discussed in that case differ significantly from those in this case. The court in Ocean

Advocates outlined the test for assessing a party's diligence, stating it should consider: 1)

whether the plaintiff attempted to make its position known to the defendant before filing suit;

2) the defendant's response to the plaintiff and; 3) whether developments, such as

construction or other visible changes can "motivate [a party] to investigate whether any legal

basis exist[s] for challenging the project." 402 F.3d at 862. As other courts have noted these

factors cannot always be neatly applied to the facts of an individual case. See Preservation

Coaltion, Inc., 667 F.2d at 854. 

In assessing the plaintiff's diligence, the court in Ocean Advocates stressed that

plaintiffs had initiated contact with the Corps within one year of the permit being granted and

that it "maintained continued and consistent dialogue with the Corps until the Corps granted

the permit extension in 2000." 402 F.3d at 862. In addition, the project was effectively

halted by additions made to the threatened species list that required further environmental

review on the part of the Corps as well as permit extensions before the project could proceed

and that the Plaintiffs were communicating with the defendants about this. Id. Cases cited

by the Ocean Advocates court in support of the statement that an eight to ten year delay

would not necessitate a finding of laches involved circumstances in which either the nature

of the project or the status of the environment changed significantly after its initial approval

Case 3:09-cv-08163-MHM Document 142 Filed 12/01/10 Page 22 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 23 -

so that Plaintiffs could not be faulted for failing to challenge the project earlier. Coalition

for Canyon Pres. v. Bowers, 632 F.2d At 780 (9th Cir. 1980) (seven-year delay in bringing

suit opposing four-lane road was not lack of diligence because initial proposal was a two-way

road and final approval for a continuous four lane road was not granted until four years after

initial approval and Plaintiffs began letter writing and petition circulation campaign for twolane road); Preservation Coalition, Inc., 667 F.2d at 854-55 (ten-year delay in bringing NEPA

action against HUD for impact of urban renewal on historical landmarks was not due to lack

of diligence, because buildings at issue were not placed on national register until several

years after project was approved and plaintiffs did not know that any historic buildings would

be demolished until shortly before they filed suit). 

This case differs in a number of important ways from the circumstances described in

Ocean Advocates. First, the Plaintiffs in this case have not been engaged in an alternative

continued dialogue with the Forest Service since 2005 in an attempt to resolve their claims.

Rather, after participating in the comments and administrative appeal process, Plaintiffs

completely dropped communications with the Forest Service after 2005 until initiating this

lawsuit in 2009. Inexcusable delay has been found for shorter periods than the four year

delay in this case. See Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Andrus, 687 F.2d 1324, 1338-39 (10th Cir.

1982) (three-year delay resulted in laches); National Parks and Conservation Ass'n v. Hodel,

679 F. Supp. 49, 53 (D.D.C. 1987) (same); City of Rochester v. U.S. Postal Service, 541 F.2d

967, 977 (2d Cir. 1976) (finding inexcusable delay when suit was filed less than two years

after the relevant agreement); Friends of Yosemite v. Frizzell, 420 F. Supp. 390, 397 (D. C.

Cal. 1976) (sufficient delay when suit was filed over three years after the project was

publicized and over two years after the relevant agency action), all cited in Apache Survival

Coalition v. U.S., 21 F.3d 895, 910 (9th Cir. 1994). 

Second, neither the nature of the Snowbowl upgrade project nor the environment at

issue has changed fundamentally such that Plaintiffs only recently became aware of their

objections to the project. Rather, the Forest Service approved the use of reclaimed water for

snowmaking in 2005 and Plaintiffs have been aware of and opposed to this since that time.

Case 3:09-cv-08163-MHM Document 142 Filed 12/01/10 Page 23 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 24 -

The final agency action for purposes of the APA occurred in February 2005 with the issuance

of the Record of Decision. Without this final decision, the 2005 Navajo Nation lawsuit

challenging the same FEIS that Plaintiffs now challenge could not have gone forward.

Plaintiffs are thus claiming that although the Forest Service issued a final decision in 2005

that could be and has in fact been reviewed by the district court and the Ninth Circuit, until

every last permit necessary for the project is issued, successive plaintiffs can continue to

initiate serial lawsuits against the Forest Service in connection with its decision approving

the Snowbowl improvement project. This makes little sense. As indicated above, although

there are limited circumstances in which a final agency action would not start the clock for

purposes of laches, those circumstances are not found in this case.

Perhaps the most significant difference, however, is the fact Plaintiffs sat by for years

while the lawsuit challenging the Forest Service decision on similar bases was initiated and

litigated by the Navajo Nation and other plaintiffs. Plaintiffs were admittedly aware of the

lawsuit and could have joined it, yet they elected instead to wait to bring their claims until

the initial lawsuit was resolved. In this respect, the Plaintiffs in this case are rather like the

plaintiffs in Apache Survival Coalition v. U.S, 118 F.3d 663 (9th Cir.1997) ("Apache

Survival II"), in which the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a district court ruling that

plaintiffs were barred by the doctrine of laches. In Apache Survival II, a coalition made up

of members of the Apache Tribe sought an injunction to cease construction of a system of

telescopes on Mount Graham in Arizona. The plaintiffs claimed that in approving a new site

for the project the Forest Service failed to comply with the National Historic Preservation

Act (“NHPA”). Only two years prior, a coalition made up of several environmental groups

had filed a lawsuit and successfully claimed that the new site was not authorized by

Congress. Congress eventually intervened and approved the new site for the telescope. 

When the Apache Coalition later sought the injunction on the basis of a NHPA claim, the

district court interpreted the Apache Coalition’s failure to join the lawsuit by the

environmental coalition as lack of diligence and ruled that their claims were barred by the

doctrine of laches and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.

Case 3:09-cv-08163-MHM Document 142 Filed 12/01/10 Page 24 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 25 -

The Plaintiffs in this case, like the plaintiffs in Apache Survival II, failed to join a

prior lawsuit in which other plaintiffs raised similar claims. All of the Plaintiffs in this case

were aware of the other litigation and, as previously discussed, some of them were actively

supporting it through fundraising or generating awareness. The only answer offered by the

Plaintiffs for their failure to bring the lawsuit earlier is that they were not needed. It thus

appears that the Plaintiffs in this case like the Apache Survival II plaintiffs were "waiting to

bring suit until the challenges launched by other parties have failed," which the Ninth Circuit

found shows a lack of diligence warranting application of the doctrine of laches. See Apache

Survival II,118 F.3d at 666; see also Apache Survival I, 21 F.3d 895 at 909. 

 Plaintiffs further argue that their claims cannot be barred by laches because there has

been no prejudice in this case. Plaintiffs argue that prejudice in the environmental context

is generally measured by what Congress defines as prejudice. Coalition for Canyon Pres.,

632 F.2d at 780. They thus argue that because the relief they seek is still practicable –

snowmaking from reclaimed water has not yet begun – there is no prejudice in this case. Of

course, the prejudice suffered by the Defendant is also relevant. As Plaintiffs acknowledged,

"[d]elay may be prejudicial if substantial work has been completed before the suit was

brought." Pres. Coalition, Inc., 667 F.2d at 855; see also Daingerfield Island Protective Soc'y

v. Lujan, 920 F.2d 32, 40 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Stow v. U.S., 696 F. Supp. 857, 863 (W.D.N.Y.

1988); Friends of Yosemite, 420 F. Supp. at 398. Defendant Snowbowl had expended a great

deal of resources on the Snowbowl upgrade project before this action was filed. As Plaintiffs

admitted at oral argument, the fact that the Snowbowl improvement project is almost

complete is problematic for purposes of prejudice in the laches context. Moreover, Plaintiffs

entirely ignore the burden on the Defendants of repeatedly litigating serial and similar claims.

Although litigation by itself is not considered prejudicial for purposes of laches, "successive

challenges, where one plaintiff awaits the outcome of another plaintiff's [lawsuit] before

bringing its own claim," Apache Survival II, 118 F.3d at 666 n.5, generates a burden of a

different kind that is unduly prejudicial for Defendants. The Court finds that the near

completion of the project coupled with the burden of serial and similar litigation is sufficient

Case 3:09-cv-08163-MHM Document 142 Filed 12/01/10 Page 25 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

At oral argument Plaintiffs argued that the fact that in 2008 the Ninth Circuit Court

of Appeals found for the Navajo Nation plaintiffs on the same claims that they bring here

excused their delay in bringing this litigation. The Ninth Circuit's ruling in 2008, however,

does not excuse Plaintiff's failure to join the litigation in 2005.

4

 Because the Court finds that Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the doctrine of laches

and in the alternative finds against Plaintiffs on the merits of the NEPA claims, the Court

only briefly addresses Defendants' other affirmative defense. In a supplement to its Reply

in support of its cross motion for summary judgment, Defendants asserted that Plaintiffs'

claims are also barred by the doctrine of unclean hands. Defendant Snowbowl pointed to

statements by Plaintiffs to the Flagstaff City Council, which was considering amending the

contract with Snowbowl to allow for the use of "recovered reclaimed" water for

Snowmaking. Because none of the health concerns associated with plain "reclaimed water"

apply to "recovered reclaimed" water, this change in the contract had the potential to moot

this litigation. Some of the Plaintiffs, including Berta Benally, Clayson Benally, Jeneda

Benally and Frederica Hall made statements before the City Council opposing amending the

contract to allow for the use of "recovered reclaimed" water, citing a number of reasons,

some even specifically stating that they did not want the use of potable water approved for

snowmaking because they wanted the lawsuit to go forward. Defendant Snowbowl argues

that this is evidence of unclean hands because it reveals that Plaintiffs are not really

concerned about the health effects of snow made from reclaimed water, but are instead

opposed to snowmaking from any source on Snowbowl so that this lawsuit is simply a

pretext to delay project implementation. While the Court notes that the history of this case

together with some of the Plaintiffs' comments against the use of potable water for

snowmaking create an inference that the claims made in this case are a pretext for different

aims, which if established might bar the claims on the basis of unclean hands (see Jicarilla

Apache Tribe v. Andrus, 687 F.2d 1324, 1340 (10th Cir. 1982)), the evidence offered by

Snowbowl is insufficient to establish this affirmative defense and bar the lawsuit. The

Plaintiffs' comments included other credible reasons for opposing the use of recovered

reclaimed water for snowmaking, including that this would be a poor use of a scarce

resource. Contrary to Defendants' assertion, Plaintiffs' position in this suit regarding the

health effects of reclaimed water does not per se preclude them from opposing the use of

recovered reclaimed water for snowmaking.

- 26 -

to establish prejudice for a laches defense here.

Plaintiffs fail to explain how their failure to join the prior case is materially

distinguishable from that of the plaintiffs in Apache Survival II, 3

 and the Court finds that

Defendants will be sufficiently prejudiced to satisfy laches. Therefore, based on the particular

circumstances of this case, the Court finds that Defendants have established this affirmative

defense.4

Case 3:09-cv-08163-MHM Document 142 Filed 12/01/10 Page 26 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 27 -

V. NEPA Claims

Although the Court finds that the claims in this case are barred by laches, the Court

also provides an alternative ruling on the merits of Plaintiffs' NEPA claims. When reviewing

an agency's FEIS, the Court applies the arbitrary and capricious standard. Native Ecosystems

Council, 304 F.3d at 891. A reviewing court must "consider whether the decision was based

on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of

judgment. . . . Although this inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful, the ultimate

standard of review is a narrow one. The court is not empowered to substitute its judgment

for that of the agency." Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).

The Court must determine whether the document contained a "reasonably thorough

discussion of the significant aspects of the probable environmental consequences." Idaho

Conservation League v. Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508, 1519 (9th Cir. 1992). Courts apply a "rule

of reason" standard when making this finding. Center for Biological Diversity v. United

States Forest Service, 349 F.3d 1157, 1166 (9th Cir. 2003). The agency must articulate a

"rational connection between the facts found and the choice made." Burlington Truck Lines

v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168, 83 S. Ct. 239, 246 (1962). Under the rule of reason

standard the Court reviews the agency to ensure it has taken a hard look at the environmental

effects of the proposed action. "Once satisfied that a proposing agency has taken a 'hard look'

at a decision's environmental consequences, the review is at an end." State of Cal. v. Block,

690 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1981). "[W]hile formal findings are not required, the record must be

sufficient to support the agency action, show that the agency has considered the relevant

factors and enable the court to review the agency's decision." Beno v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057,

1073 (9th Cir. 1994) "While [the Court] may not supply a reasoned basis for the agency's

action that the agency itself has not given, [the Court] will uphold a decision of less than

ideal clarity if the agency's path may reasonably be discerned." Bowman Transp., Inc. v.

Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285 (1974), cited in River Runners for

Wilderness v. Martin, 2007 WL 4200677 at *13 (D. Ariz. 2007).

The Plaintiffs in this case allege that the FEIS does not contain a reasonably thorough

Case 3:09-cv-08163-MHM Document 142 Filed 12/01/10 Page 27 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 28 -

discussion of the significant aspects of the probable environmental consequences of the

project because it ignores the possibility of children and others eating snow made from

reclaimed wastewater. As an initial matter, the Court notes that the Arizona District Court

as well as the Ninth Circuit in the Navajo Nation litigation previously determined that the

Forest Service complied with NEPA when considering the environmental impact of making

snow from reclaimed water. The District Court found that:

[T]he record shows that the Forest Service conducted a reasonable

scientific analysis of the environmental impacts of the proposed snowmaking

based on the best available scientific evidence. 

First and foremost, it is important for the Court to note that the Arizona

Department of Environmental Equality (ADEQ") has adopted water quality

standards for the direct reuse of reclaimed water aimed at protecting health and

the environment. Furthermore, the ADEQ specifically allows Class A+

reclaimed water – the class of water to be used at the Snowbowl – for direct

reuse in snowmaking. As such, the Forest Service properly relied, in part upon

the ADEQ's determination that snowmaking is an acceptable and safe use of

reclaimed water. In addition, the Forest Service evaluated extensive data

monitoring Class A+ reclaimed water from the Rio de Flag WRF for

wastewater constituent as well as monitoring for metals, organic chemicals and

other parameters.

408 F. Supp.2d at 876. This opinion was affirmed by the en banc Ninth Circuit. 535 F.3d at

1080. Here, the Court takes note that Defendants filed a motion to strike Plaintiffs'

references to the initial Ninth Circuit opinion which reviewed the district court's ruling and

was ultimately overturned by the en banc Ninth Circuit decision. The en banc Ninth Circuit

Court ordered that the panel decision not be cited as precedent. To the extent Plaintiffs are

citing to the opinion to provide background on the case, they are permitted to do so. The

decision, however, is not binding upon this Court, which must conduct its own analysis of

Plaintiffs' NEPA claims.

 Although the District Court has already found and the Ninth Circuit has confirmed

that the FEIS at issue in this case included a reasonable analysis of the environmental impact

of using reclaimed water for snowmaking, Plaintiffs now claim that the agency failed to take

the requisite hard look at the potential effects of ingesting snow made from reclaimed water.

They argue that nowhere in the FEIS does the Forest Service even acknowledge the

Case 3:09-cv-08163-MHM Document 142 Filed 12/01/10 Page 28 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 29 -

possibility that people, specifically children, who recreate in the snow made from reclaimed

water may ingest snow. For Plaintiffs to so narrow the critique of the FEIS after the courts

have already approved the agency's review of the environmental impact of snowmaking from

reclaimed water is a questionable approach to NEPA litigation. Swanson v. U.S. Forest

Service, 87 F.3d 339, 343-44 (9th Cir. 1996) (plaintiffs may not "fly speck" the FEIS and

hold it insufficient on the basis of technical deficiencies). Reviewing the FEIS, in any event,

it is clear that the agency's consideration of the impact of snow made from reclaimed water

on human health, including the possibility of ingestion was “reasonably thorough,” Idaho

Conservation League, 956 F.2d at 1519, such that the decision of the Forest Service to

approve of the use of reclaimed water for snowmaking was not arbitrary and capricious.

 As noted, the Forest Service relied in part on the ADEQ's authorization of the use of

A+ grade reclaimed water for snowmaking. The FEIS notes that Class A+ reclaimed water

is deemed safe for unrestricted recreational uses, such as skiing. The FEIS includes the

following statement:

The State of Arizona allows Class A and A+ reclaimed water for direct reuse

in snowmaking. Due to the relatively high risk of human exposure to potential

contaminants in reclaimed water, ADEQ has developed strict and specific

treatment requirements for reuse applications having higher degrees of public

contact, such as skiing, that include secondary treatment, filtration, and

disinfection. In meeting these requirements, the reclaimed water is considered

acceptable for unrestricted recreational use. 

The District Court explicitly approved of the Forest Service's reliance on ADEQ when

determining that the agency complied with NEPA in considering the environmental impact

of making snow from reclaimed water. Navajo Nation, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 876. The

Plaintiffs, however, fault the Forest Service for relying on Arizona's standards for the use of

reclaimed water rather than engaging in its own consideration of the possible risks of

ingestion. The Plaintiffs make a related claim that in relying on ADEQ's standards, the

Forest Service failed to ensure the scientific integrity of its environmental analysis as is

required by 40 C.F.R. §1502.24, and failed to provide accurate scientific analysis, expert

agency comments and public scrutiny. The Plaintiffs also claim that the Forest Service's

reliance on the ADEQ means that it failed to disseminate quality information on the potential

Case 3:09-cv-08163-MHM Document 142 Filed 12/01/10 Page 29 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 30 -

impact of ingesting snow made from Class A+ reclaimed water. The Plaintiffs claim that the

failure to take a hard look, to ensure the scientific integrity of the analysis and to disseminate

quality information was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion or not otherwise in

accordance with law or without the procedure required by law. 5 U.S.C. §706(2)(D).

As an initial matter, NEPA and its implementing regulations assume state and federal

agency cooperation. 42 U.S.C.S. §4331(a)(2007). NEPA directs federal agencies to

incorporate "views of the appropriate Federal, State, and local agencies, which are authorized

to develop and enforce environmental standards." 42 U.S.C.S. §4332(C) (2007) (emphasis

added). ADEQ is the agency designated by the Arizona Legislature to enforce the Clean

Water Act. It is in connection with this function that ADEQ has developed the standards for

reclaimed water and established a permit program for processing and using different grades

of reclaimed water. The Forest Service's reliance on ADEQ's approval of snowmaking as

a use for A+ reclaimed water is in keeping with the "cooperative federalism" which

permeates water regulation under NEPA. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167

(1992). Therefore, it is appropriate for the Forest Service to rely on ADEQ standards. See,

e.g., Friends of the Payette v. Horsehsoe Bend Hydroelectric Co., 988 F.2d 989, 993 (9th Cir.

1993) (Corps of Engineers properly relied on certification of compliance with state water

quality standards granted by Idaho DEQ in issuing environmental assessment and finding no

significant impact under NEPA); Border Power Plant Working Group v. Dep't of Energy,

260 F. Supp.2d 997, 1020-21 (S.D. Cal. 2003) (reliance on standards of another agency

designed to protect human health is appropriate in the NEPA process). 

The Plaintiffs stress that although the ADEQ approved of the use of Class A+

reclaimed water for snowmaking, this does not specifically mean that the state agency

approves of the ingestion of Class A+ reclaimed water. Rather the ADEQ prohibits the use

of reclaimed water for full immersion recreational activities, such as swimming or water

skiing, with a potential for ingestion. The ADEQ also prohibits the use of reclaimed water

for evaporative cooling or misting. Irrigation users of reclaimed water must also employ

application methods that reasonably preclude contact with drinking fountains, water coolers

Case 3:09-cv-08163-MHM Document 142 Filed 12/01/10 Page 30 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 31 -

or eating areas. State regulations also require that wherever reclaimed water is used, signage

be posted, indicating that the water should not be ingested. Thus, the Plaintiffs argue that

it was not appropriate for the Forest Service to rely on the ADEQ's approval of the use of

Class A and A+ reclaimed water for "snowmaking" in assessing whether the snow could

safely be ingested. 

The Forest Service, however, considered and discussed ADEQ's reclaimed water

grading system as well as state standards for issuing permits for the use of reclaimed water.

The agency noted that ADEQ's determination that a particular grade of reclaimed water was

appropriate for a particular use was made in a risk-based framework to protect public health

and minimize hazards associated with potential exposures. Recreational activities related to

snowmaking do not carry the same risk of exposure or ingestion as full immersion activities

such as swimming or waterskiing, or drinking reclaimed water from a drinking fountain.

Therefore, the fact that ADEQ does not approve of the use of reclaimed water for full

immersion activities such as swimming, does not approve of ingestion of reclaimed water

through a drinking fountain or does not approve of inhalation through misting and that it

requires signs warning people not to ingest the water, does not mean any and all ingestion

is considered unsafe. Rather, it is inconceivable that the state would approve of the use of

Class A and A+ reclaimed water for snowmaking without considering the likelihood of

exposure, including some ingestion, that comes with recreation associated with snowmaking.

Indeed, the FEIS notes that reclaimed water is deemed safe by the state for irrigation of crops

as well as for schoolground, residential and open landscape irrigation, all of which also

involve some risk of ingestion. It was not arbitrary and capricious for the Forest Service to

assume that the ADEQ, an organization tasked with developing and implementing standards

for water use, considered and accepted the relative risk of ingestion associated with

recreating in snow when it approved the use of Class A+ reclaimed water for snowmaking.

See Border Power Plant Working Group, 260 F. Supp.2d at1020-21. 

 Morever, although the Forest Service appropriately relied in part on state regulatory

standards regarding the use of Class A+ reclaimed water, this was not the extent of the

Case 3:09-cv-08163-MHM Document 142 Filed 12/01/10 Page 31 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 32 -

agency's investigation and discussion regarding the safety of ingesting snow made from

reclaimed water. Rather, the Forest Service engaged in extensive discussion regarding the

safety of exposure to reclaimed water, including through ingestion. The Forest Service

considered, for example, federal regulatory standards for drinking water and found that the

reclaimed water satisfied EPA standards for all substances tested. The Forest Service also

considered that the EPA has explicitly mentioned snowmaking as a possible recreational use

for reclaimed water. The Forest Service also considered a number of studies and reports on

reclaimed water use, including a report that found that Class A+ reclaimed water was suitable

for crop irrigation even where the crops would be consumed raw, as well as a study regarding

the use of reclaimed water as drinking water in Namibia. The FEIS also cited reports from

Colorado and California, in which the use of reclaimed water as drinking water has been

considered, though not approved only because of the stigma of drinking reclaimed water. The

FEIS also contains information about studies concerning ingestion of wastewater comingled

with groundwater.

In addition to discussing the ADEQ's standards, federal drinking water standards, as

well as studies and reports regarding the use of reclaimed water, the Forest Service also

discussed at length the process for treating the water at the Flagstaff Rio de Flag treatment

plant, which will provide the water for snowmaking. The FEIS also discusses the various

monitoring and permit requirements for providing reclaimed water to be used for

snowmaking, including testing, treatment and reporting. This included discussions of the

various means of removing most bacteria and pollutants from the water. The FEIS also

discusses the quality of the Class A+ water used based on studies of the water from Rio de

Flag testing the water for levels of various particles. 

In addition, the Forest Service also considered a number of studies that examined the

potential health impacts of exposure to a class of pollutants called endocrine disruptors,

which are contained in small amounts in reclaimed water. One of the studies examined the

effects of Rio de Flag treated water on amphibians immersed in the water. The FEIS noted

that while this study suggested that endocrine disruptors in the water may have some

Case 3:09-cv-08163-MHM Document 142 Filed 12/01/10 Page 32 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 33 -

potential health impact for humans, it also stressed that full immersion of amphibians in

100% reclaimed water represented a much greater level of exposure than humans recreating

in snow made from reclaimed water, some of which would likely be mixed with natural

snow. The FEIS also cited other studies suggesting that there were no adverse human effects

from endocrine disruptors. As the Forest Service makes clear, the scientific data regarding

the health effects of human exposure to reclaimed water is uncertain, with some studies

suggesting that certain compounds in the water do have potential for some health impact and

others indicating there is no impact on human health. 

The FEIS thus includes extensive discussions of various factors relevant for assessing

the safety of ingesting reclaimed water, including discussions of the ADEQ standards and

permit requirements, studies on the impact of full immersion of animals in the water to be

used for snowmaking, studies and reports regarding the use of reclaimed water, including use

as drinking water, analysis of the composition of the water to be used for snowmaking, and

comparison with federal drinking standards, and discussion of the treatment the water will

incur before it is used to make snow. In considering certain studies regarding the effects of

exposure to Class A+ reclaimed water, the FEIS properly notes an absence of certainty or

consensus surrounding this issue with some of the data suggesting a possible harmful effect

of endocrine disruptors and other studies suggesting no effect. This is entirely appropriate

and in compliance with NEPA. See Salmon River Concerned Citizens v. Robertson, 32 F.3d

1359 (9th Cir. 1994) (NEPA does not require courts to resolve disagreements among various

scientists as to methodology); Robertson v. Metho Valley Citizen’s Council, 490 U.S. at 350

(1989) (“NEPA merely prohibits uninformed agency action”). The Forest Service thus

provides a "reasonably thorough discussion of the significant aspects of the probable

environmental consequences" Idaho Conservation League, 956 F.2d at 1519, such that its

decision to approve the use of Class A+ reclaimed water for snowmaking was not arbitrary

and capricious and the Court finds that as a matter of law, the evidence in the administrative

record permitted the agency to make the decision it id. Occidental Eng'g Co. v. Immigration

& Naturalization Serv., 753 F.2d at 769.

Case 3:09-cv-08163-MHM Document 142 Filed 12/01/10 Page 33 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

Plaintiffs offer no support for their claim that the Forest Service failed to disseminate

quality information other than to state in their motion for summary judgment that the Forest

Service improperly assumed that the ADEQ determined reclaimed water to be safe and failed

to provide the requisite decisional documents to the public, and to make the conclusory

allegation that "[r]egardless of whether or not the agency relied on ADEQ the Forest Service

completely failed to disseminate 'high quality' information concerning the ingestion of snow."

Plaintiffs failed to respond to Defendants' motion for summary judgment on this claim. Thus,

even though the Court finds that the Forest Service did disseminate quality information on

the potential impact of ingesting snow made from reclaimed water because it was appropriate

for it to rely on the ADEQ and because the additional information it provided related to the

additional inquiry it made regarding the safety of exposure to reclaimed water was quality

information, the Court also concludes that because the Plaintiffs failed to respond to

Defendants' motion for summary judgment on this point, they have abandoned this claim.

Jenkins v. County of Riverside, 398 F.3d 1093, 1095 n.4 (9th Cir. 2005). 

- 34 -

The Court also concludes that in relying on the ADEQ and the EPA standards and in

conducting its own extensive analysis of the available scientific information, the Forest

Service did not fail to ensure the scientific integrity of its environmental analysis. For the

same reasons, the Court also finds that the Forest Service did not fail to disseminate quality

information related to the potential impact of ingesting snow made from reclaimed water.

The extensive information the agency provided in connection with its analysis constituted

quality information.5

Although the Forest Service engaged in a thorough discussion regarding the safety of

exposure to reclaimed water for humans sufficient to assess the safety of ingestion, Plaintiffs

cite the fact that the FEIS does not explicitly mention the risk that individuals may ingest

snow during recreation as evidence that the agency failed to properly consider this issue. The

Forest Service's responses to comments from the public, however, more directly and

specifically address the risk that snow made from reclaimed water may be ingested by those

recreating in it and what steps will be taken to minimize those risks. The responses include

the following statements: 

[the proposal] has the potential to directly expose winter recreational

users and Snowbowl employees to reclaimed water in the form of artificial

snow. Potential exposure pathways include inhalation, ingestion, and

dermal contact. The potential for incidental ingestion and dermal contact

with snow are the primary routes of exposure given the water reuse is for

Case 3:09-cv-08163-MHM Document 142 Filed 12/01/10 Page 34 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 35 -

snowmaking...[A]lthough direct and full body contact with artificial snow is

expected to occur, the general need for winter garments to protect against wet

and cold will limit the potential for and amount of dermal contact.

Consequently, the use of reclaimed water use in artificial snowmaking is not

considered to have a major negative impact to the public during recreation

uses. 

Conditions specified for the permitted reuse of reclaimed water under the City

of Flagstaff Reclaimed Water Individual Permit are intended to minimize the

risk of exposure and protect public health. To minimize risks of ingestion at

reuse sites there are requirements for signage advising the public of the

use of reclaimed water. At the Snowbowl, as at other open areas such as city

parks and schools in Flagstaff where the reclaimed water is used, signs will be

posted to alert staff and recreational users that reclaimed water is used

for artificial snowmaking and to avoid intentional ingestion of snow.

(Response to comment 6.4 (5)) (emphasis added). Another response states:

If the snowmaking alternative is approved, signs will be posted at the

Arizona Snowbowl to inform the public that reclaimed water is used to

make artificial snow and not to ingest the snow. To prevent illness from

ingestion of reclaimed water in use at the Arizona Snowbowl as well as at

City of Flagstaff parks and school grounds, the wastewater is disinfected

by ultraviolet radiation followed by hypochlorite at the Rio de Flag WRF

prior to reuse. Monitoring of bacterial levels is done daily to assure the

reclaimed water is adequately disinfected.

[t]he use of reclaimed water in the proposed snowmaking is not

considered to have a major adverse impact to the public during

recreational skiing and snow play. It should also be noted that reclaimed

water used for public recreation, or any reuse application that has the

potential for direct public contact is very strictly controlled. The Arizona

Department of Environmental Quality (ADEQ) has developed regulations

compelling specific advanced treatment requirements for reuse

applications having higher degrees of public contact, such as skiing, that

include tertiary treatment with disinfection. In addition ADEQ requires

permits for all reclaimed water reuse that specify monitoring requirements,

including frequent microbiological testing to assure pathogens are removed

from wastewater, and reporting requirements. In meeting these requirements,

the reclaimed water is acceptable for unrestricted body contact and authorized

for artificial snowmaking for skiing by ADEQ. 

(Response to comment 6.5) (emphasis added). Still another response answering a comment

about the possibility of children ingesting the snow states:

There will be signs posted at Snowbowl informing visitors of the use of

reclaimed water at a snowmaking water source. Much like the areas of

Flagstaff where reclaimed water is used, it is the responsibility of the visitor

or the minor's guardian to avoid consuming snow made with reclaimed

water. It is important to note that machine-produced snow would be mixed

and therefore diluted with natural snow decreasing the percentage of machine

produced snow within the snowpack. Because ADEQ approved the use of

reclaimed water, it is assumed different types of incidental contact that

Case 3:09-cv-08163-MHM Document 142 Filed 12/01/10 Page 35 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 36 -

could potentially occur from use of class A reclaimed water for

snowmaking were fully considered.

(Response to comment 6.42) (emphasis added). These responses confirm that in examining

the safety of using reclaimed water for snowmaking, the Forest Service was aware of and

considered the fact that individuals, including children, recreating in the snow made from

reclaimed water might ingest the snow. The Plaintiffs argue that the response to the

comments are not part of the FEIS and therefore cannot be considered when assessing the

agency's response. Courts can, however, look to the responses to comments for confirmation

that an agency has taken the requisite hard look of an issue under NEPA. See, e.g., Envtl.

Prot. Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Forest Service, 451 F.3d 1005, 1014-15 (9th Cir. 2006) (even if Forest

Service erred by failing to include a proposed timber sale in the EIS, it remedied the error

by including a reasonably complete discussion of the issue in the comment response); Native

Ecosystems Council v. U.S. Forest Service, 428 F.3d 1233, 1241 (9th Cir. 2005) (Forest

Service's point by point response to comments "underscores our conclusion that the Forest

Service took a hard look and fairly considered the Reynolds Report habitat

recommendations"). 

The Court thus finds that the Forest Service took the requisite hard look at the

possibility that individuals, including children, would ingest snow made from reclaimed

water and that its decision to approve the use of Class A + reclaimed water for snowmaking

was not arbitrary and capricious. The Forest Service does not explicitly conclude that based

on its review of the relevant information and studies, the incidental or even intentional

ingestion of snow made from reclaimed water by children and adults that may occur during

recreation will be safe. Such a conclusion, however, is not necessary. Beno v. Shalala, 30

F.3d at 1073 ("[W]hile formal findings are not required, the record must be sufficient to

support the agency action, show that the agency has considered the relevant factors and

enable the court to review the agency's decision."); see also C.K. v. New Jersey Dep't of

Health & Human Servs., 92 F.3d 171, 183 (3d Cir. 1996) ("[T]he mere absence of formal

findings is not a sufficient basis for reversal because the Secretary was not required under

Case 3:09-cv-08163-MHM Document 142 Filed 12/01/10 Page 36 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 37 -

the APA or [42 U.S.C. §] 1315(a) to make findings . . .") While this may mean that the FEIS

has “less than ideal clarity” on this particular issue, the Court finds that the Forest Service

engaged in a reasonably thorough discussion regarding the human health effects of exposure

to reclaimed water, including ingestion, from which “the agency's path may reasonably be

discerned." Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. at 285.

Although the Plaintiffs have consistently conveyed to this Court their desire that the agency

had reached a different conclusion and determined that the potential risk to human health

posed by the ingestion of snow made from reclaimed water during recreation is too great to

approve the proposal, that is not the Court’s decision to make. Robertson, 490 U.S. at 349.

"[T]he Court is obligated to defer to the responsible federal agency's informed assessment

of the scientific evidence." Navajo Nation, 408 F. Supp.2d at 878. Based on the record

before it, the Court concludes that the Forest Service made such an informed assessment.

VI. Summary

The Court finds that the Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the doctrine of laches.

Plaintiffs lacked diligence in pursuing their claims by knowingly failing to join the Navajo

Nation litigation initiated in 2005 and waiting to bring their lawsuit until that lawsuit was

complete. This has prejudiced the Defendants because much of the improvement project is

now complete and both Snowbowl and the Forest Service have been forced to litigate and

may continue to be forced to litigate serial lawsuits filed by plaintiffs who without

justification delay bringing claims until resolution of other lawsuits. In the alternative, the

Court finds that the Forest Service has taken the requisite hard look at the environmental

effects of the proposed challenged action. Based on all of the information presented, the

Court finds that the Forest Service considered the relevant factors and that the evidence in

the record reasonably permitted the agency to make the decision it did. There is an 

/ / /

/ / / 

/ / /

/ / / 

Case 3:09-cv-08163-MHM Document 142 Filed 12/01/10 Page 37 of 38
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 38 -

insufficient basis for the Court to grant Plaintiffs' request and find the agency's decision was

arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with the law. 

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment

(Doc. 74)

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting Defendants' Motion for Summary

Judgement. (Docs. 88 and 92)

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Defendant Arizona Snowbowl Resort

Limited Partnership's Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Citations to the Vacated Ninth Circuit Panel

Opinion. (Doc. 85)

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike. (Doc. 101).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk to enter judgment for Defendants.

DATED this 30th day of November, 2010.

Case 3:09-cv-08163-MHM Document 142 Filed 12/01/10 Page 38 of 38