Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01381/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01381-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWW)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Catherine Brumfield, )

)

Plaintiff, ) No. CIV-05-1381 PHX RCB

)

vs. ) O R D E R

)

JoAnne B. Barnhart, )

Commissioner of Social )

Security, )

)

Defendant. ) )

On May 10, 2005, Plaintiff Catherine Brumfield, ("Brumfield")

filed her complaint in this case. Complaint (doc. 1). Brumfield

seeks review in this court of a decision rendered by an

Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") of the Social Security

Administration ("SSA"), who denied her disability and disability

benefits. Id. at 2-3. A motion for summary judgment was filed on

September 13, 2005, which provides the basis for Brumfield's appeal

of the ALJ's findings. Mot. (doc. 5). On November 8, 2005,

Defendant JoAnne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of Social Security ("the

Commissioner"), filed a response and cross-motion for summary 

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judgment, seeking for this court to affirm the ALJ's decision. 

Resp. & Cross-Mot. (doc. 12). These motions were fully briefed on

December 2, 2005. Reply (doc. 19). The court, having carefully

considered the arguments presented by the parties, as well as the

Administrative Record, now rules.

I. Facts

A. Procedural History

On October 16, 2002, Brumfield filed an application for

Disability Insurance Benefits under Title II of the Social Security

Act ("the Act"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433. Administrative Record

("A.R.") (doc. 3) at 20. The application was denied initially and

on reconsideration. Id. Thereafter, a hearing was held on May 10,

2004, before Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Michael J. Cianci,

Jr. Id. at 27. 

On June 9, 2004, the ALJ issued a decision in which he found

Brumfield not disabled within the meaning of the Act. Id.

Specifically, the ALJ found that Brumfield's carpal tunnel

syndrome, fibromyalgia, and depression were "severe." Id. at 26. 

However, the ALJ concluded that despite these impairments,

Brumfield had the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary

and light work activity with certain restrictions. A.R. (doc. 3)

at 26. 

[T]he undersigned finds the claimant retains the

following residual functional capacity: 10 pounds

frequently and 20 pounds occasionally, sit for 6

hours in an 8-hour workday and stand and/or walk 6

hours; with frequent feeling, fine and gross

manipulation and occasional climbing; also

frequent climbing of ramps and stairs, frequent

balancing, crouching, crawling and kneeling; avoid

extreme temperatures and vibrations. The claimant

is also limited to low stress jobs, with low

production quotas.

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Id. at 24-25. The ALJ determined that Brumfield could return to

the occupations she had previously performed and was not under a

disability as defined in the Social Security Act. Id. at 25, 26.

Brumfield requested review by the Appeals Council, however,

the Appeals Council denied this request and adopted the decision as

the Commissioner's final decision. Complaint (doc. 1) at 2. 

Brumfield then commenced this action for judicial review pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Id. at 1. Brumfield seeks for this Court

to "remand this case for award of benefits," or, in the

alternative, "remand this matter to the Commissioner for further

administrative proceedings[.]" Mot. (doc. 5) at 19-20.

B. Background Facts

At the time of the ALJ's decision, Brumfield was a 53-year-old

individual with a high school equivalency education. A.R. (doc. 3)

at 21. Her past work experience includes employment as a file

clerk, proof clerk and sales associate. Id. She alleges that she

became disabled on September 20, 2002. Id. She claimed carpal

tunnel syndrome and fibromyalgia, with fatigue and swelling. Id.

She reported pain in her shoulders, arms, legs and back, numbness,

and problems gripping or grasping with her hands. Id. She also

reported problems sleeping. A.R. (doc. 3) at 21.

II. Standard of Review

Both parties have moved for summary judgment under Rule 56 of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Summary judgment is

appropriate when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact

and...the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 

The Commissioner's denial of benefits is subject to judicial

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review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). The

decision of the Commissioner must be affirmed if it is supported by

substantial evidence and the Commissioner applied the correct legal

standards. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1214 n.1 (9th Cir.

2005); Benton v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Factual determinations by the Commissioner, acting through an ALJ,

must be affirmed if supported by substantial evidence. See Celaya

v. Halter, 332 F.3d 1177, 1180 (9th Cir. 2003); Saelee v. Chater,

94 F.3d 520, 521 (9th Cir. 1996).

Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." 

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). It is more than a

"mere scintilla," but less than a preponderance. Id.; Connett v.

Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 873 (9th Cir. 2003).

 In reviewing the Commissioner's decision, the district court

must "consider the evidence as a whole, weighing both the evidence

that supports and the evidence that detracts from the

Commissioner's conclusion." Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1279

(9th Cir. 1996). If the evidence can reasonably support either

affirming or reversing the Commissioner’s conclusion, the district

court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner

and must affirm. See Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 680-81 (9th

Cir. 2005); McCartey v. Massanari, 298 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir.

2002); Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 1995).

As discussed above, the critical issue at the heart of this

proceeding is whether Brumfield is, in fact, disabled under the

Act. The ALJ answered this question in the negative. In order to

qualify for the benefits sought, Brumfield had to show the ALJ

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that her impairments were so functionally limiting as to prevent

her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity for at least

twelve consecutive months. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)(definition of

"Disability"). Brumfield shoulders the burden of proving her

disability. Taylor v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 1985);

Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1432 (9th Cir. 1995)("In

determining the ultimate issue of disability, claimant bears the

burden of proving she is disabled.").

III. Discussion

Brumfield asserts that she is entitled to summary judgment

for six separate reasons. Mot. (doc. 5) at 2-18. She claims that

the ALJ erred by (1) "rejecting" the opinions of treating

physicians; (2) basing the determination of residual function

capacity on the assessment of a nonexamining state agency

physician who did not testify at trial or review all of the

evidence of record; (3) requiring "objective evidence of

significant fatigue;" (4) basing a hypothetical question to the

vocational expert on a person limited to "lower-stress type work

with no high production quotas" instead of determining a functionby-function mental residual functional capacity assessment at

steps four and five of the sequential evaluation process; (5)

mischaracterizing the opinion of Dr. Steven C. Hirdes, Ed.D., an

examining psychologist; and (6) failing to provide clear and

convincing reasons for discounting Brumfield's testimony. Id. at

2-3. Defendant contests all of these assertions. Resp. & CrossMot. (doc. 12). The Court will address each issue in turn.

A. Opinions of Nonexamining and Examining Physicians

At the outset, Brumfield argues that the ALJ erred by

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"rejecting" the opinions of her treating and examining physicians,

and basing the determination of residual function capacity on an 

assessment of a nonexamining physician who did not testify at

trial. Mot. (doc. 5) at 3-9. Dr. Michael J. Fairfax and Dr.

Daniel Freberg are both physicians who examined Brumfield and

provided opinions regarding her condition. A.R. (doc. 3) at 23. 

On the other hand, Dr. Paul S. Drinkwater is a physician who

provided a consultative examination of Brumfield. Id. at 22. 

Finally, Dr. Alan Lockwood is a state agency physician who

provided an opinion regarding Brumfield's condition. Id. at 177-

184.

First, Brumfield argues that the ALJ committed an error of

law when he "rejected" the opinions of examining physicians, Dr.

Fairfax and Dr. Freberg, based on the ALJ's own belief that such

opinions were not supported by the record. Mot. (doc. 6) at 5-7. 

Brumfield asserts that the ALJ, in his decision, failed to state

what was lacking from the records or what part of the medical

record contradicted the physicians' opinions, constituting their

rejection. Id. at 6. Thus, she contends that the ALJ's decision

to reject the treating physicians' opinions may have been "based

on his own assessment," which, Brumfield asserts, goes beyond the

abilities of an administrative law judge. Id. at 6. 

A treating physician's opinion is afforded greater weight

than that of a non-treating physician. Magallanes v. Bowen, 881

F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989). However, a treating physician's

opinion is not necessarily conclusive as to either a physical

condition or the ultimate issue of disability. Id. "[T]he ALJ

need not accept a treating physician's opinion which is “brief and

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conclusionary in form with little in the way of clinical findings

to support [its] conclusion.” Id. 

Furthermore, the Commissioner must provide “clear and

convincing” reasons for rejecting the uncontradicted opinion of an

examining physician. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th

Cir. 1996). Even if the opinion is contradicted by another

doctor, it can only be rejected for specific and legitimate

reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in the record. 

Id. at 830-31. "The opinion of a nonexamining physician cannot by

itself constitute substantial evidence that justifies the

rejection of the opinion of either an examining physician or a

treating physician." Id. at 831. 

In the case at bar, only Dr. Fairfax opined that Brumfield

should be "considered disabled." A.R. (doc. 3) at 135. However,

Dr. Freberg, Brumfield's treating physician, noted in a checklist

form that he believed Brumfield suffered from moderate to

moderately severe pain and fatigue, and that, in his opinion, she

could not sustain work on a regular and continuing basis. Id. at

219-22. The ALJ rejected these opinions, stating that they were

not supported by the record. 

Dr. Fairfax examined Brumfield on September 30, 2003 on a

referral from Dr. Freberg. A.R. (doc. 3) at 23. In regard to Dr.

Fairfax's opinion, the ALJ noted that Dr. Fairfax provided no

explanation for his summary conclusion that Brumfield was

disabled, and that, in any event, such an opinion was inconsistent

with Dr. Fairfax's own findings. Id.

Dr. Fairfax's conclusion was inconsistent with his

own findings which showed little findings as to

fibromyalgia and her hand impairments did not

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1 Defendants, in their response, note that "[e]levated blood

levels of rheumatoid factor, ANA and erythrocyte sedimentation rate

(ESR) are indications of rheumatoid arthritis." Resp. & Cross-Mot.

(doc. 12) at 5 n.2, citing The Merck Manual of Diagnosis and Therapy,

417-418 (17th ed. 1999).

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support significant functional limitations. The

claimant's medications helped her condition. The

claimant was being seen on an as needed basis.

Id. The ALJ noted that Dr. Fairfax provided no explanation for

his opinion that Brumfield was disabled, with diagnoses of

fibromyalgia and carpal tunnel syndrome. Id. In addition, the

ALJ noted that Dr. Fairfax's examination "disclosed no gross motor

or sensory deficits [and]...[d]eep tendon reflexes were intact and

symmetric of the upper and lower extremities." Id. 

Records were reviewed, with a previous MRI of the

cervical spine showing no significant abnormality.

Recent laboratory studies indicated a normal CBC,

and chemistry profile. Her rheumatoid factor was

negative on two occasions. The sedimentation rate

was normal and ANA was negative.1

A.R. (doc. 3) at 23. For these reasons, the ALJ rejected Dr.

Fairfax's conclusion that Brumfield was disabled.

Dr. Freberg was Brumfield's treating physician. A.R. (doc.

3) at 23. In regard to Dr. Freberg's opinion, the ALJ explained

that there were no records from Dr. Freberg that supported his

opinion. A.R. (doc. 3) at 23. On April 29, 2004, Freberg signed

a pain questionnaire where he indicated that Brumfield had

moderate to moderately severe pain. Id. at 219-20. Additionally,

Dr. Freberg noted that Brumfield's pain ranged from "often" to

"frequently" interfering with attention and concentration,

persistence, or pace. Id. Finally, Dr. Freberg indicated in a

fatigue residual functional capacity questionnaire, reported on

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the same day, that Brumfield had moderately severe to severe

fatigue, causing interference with attention and concentration,

causing an inability to sustain work on a regular and continuing

basis. Id. at 221-22. All of these opinions were expressed in

checklist forms with no explanations. Id. at 219-22.

The ALJ, in his decision, notes that Dr. Freberg provided no

specific functional findings to support his pain analysis. A.R.

(doc. 3) at 23. In relation to Dr. Freberg's conclusions

regarding Brumfield's mental limitations, the ALJ found that such

conclusions were not consistent with the record. Id. at 24. The

ALJ notes that Dr. Steven Hirdes, an examining psychologist,

concluded that Brumfield suffered from a "major depressive

disorder, single episode, moderate." Id. He points out that Dr.

Hirdes expressed mainly mild limitations, none of which precluded

the ability to function in a work or social setting. Id.

Furthermore, the ALJ notes that this analysis was "confirmed by

other functional mental assessments by state agency physicians." 

Id. Thus, the ALJ determined that, "[t]he mental limitations

stated...by Dr. Freberg are rejected, as they are not consistent

with the record and there was very little mention in his notes of

a mental problem and no functional assessment at all." A.R. (doc.

3) at 24. "[T]he ALJ need not accept a treating physician's

opinion which is “brief and conclusionary in form with little in

the way of clinical findings to support [its] conclusion.” 

Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751. As a result, the ALJ rejected Dr.

Freberg's conclusions as a whole, "as there were no records

submitted by him to support any severe impairments at all." Id.

at 23. 

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2 A claimant's residual functional capacity is what he can still

do despite his physical, mental, nonexertional, and other

limitations. See Cooper v. Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1152, 1155 n.5 (9th

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 In her motion, Brumfield does not directly dispute the ALJ's

statement that Dr. Freberg provided no specific functional

findings to support his pain analysis. Instead, Brumfield seems

to assert that the ALJ's decision was inappropriately based on the

fact that Dr. Freberg did not provide a functional assessment. 

Mot. (doc. 5) at 7. The Court disagrees. As described above, the

ALJ, in his decision, explains his rejection of Dr. Freberg's

opinion with specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by

substantial evidence in the record. Such decision was not based

merely on Dr. Freberg's lack of a functional assessment. 

When presented with conflicting medical opinions, the ALJ

must determine credibility and resolve the conflict. Batson v.

Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, 359 F.3d 1190,

1195 (9th Cir. 2004). Greater weight must be given to the

opinions of examining physicians, and in the case of a conflict

the ALJ must give specific, legitimate reasons for disregarding

the opinion of such a physician. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31. 

Here, these rules were satisfied, as the ALJ gave specific and

legitimate reasons to question Dr. Fairfax's and Dr. Freberg's

opinions on the degree of Brumfield's impairment. The fact that

the ALJ did not give Dr. Fairfax's and Dr. Freberg's opinions the

weight Brumfield desires does not create an error of law.

Second, Brumfield asserts that the ALJ committed an error of

law when he based his determination of residual function capacity

("RFC")2 on the assessment of a nonexamining physician who did not

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28 Cir. 1989); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545 (2005).

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testify at trial or review the entire record. Mot. (doc. 5) at 8-

9. Specifically, Brumfield asserts that the ALJ improperly

adopted the "limitation to 'low stress' work" and "paragraph B

ratings" of a state agency physician's report. Id. at 8. She

argues that the Ninth Circuit only allows the Commissioner to rely

on the opinions of nonexamining physicians in order to deny

benefits when such physicians testify at trial. Id., citing

Roberts v. Shalala, 66 F.3d 179, 184 (9th Cir. 1995); Andrews v.

Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1038-39 (9th Cir. 1995); Magallanes, 881

F.2d at 752. In addition, Brumfield contends that the state

agency physicians' opinions are not reliable as he did not

consider evidence that was submitted after his assessments. Mot.

(doc. 5) at 9. Thus, Brumfield argues that "[t]he ALJ decision,

founded on vocation expert testimony that in turn was based on

assumptions not supported by substantial evidence–namely, on the

opinions of nonexamining state agency physicians–is itself not

supported by substantial evidence." Id.

The opinions of treating and examining physicians are

entitled to greater weight than the opinions of nonexamining

physicians. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. Although Brumfield correctly

states the law that an ALJ may not solely base his decision to

deny benefits on the opinion of a nonexamining physician, such a

situation is not the case here.

In the case at bar, the disputed state agency opinion appears

to be Dr. Alan Lockwood's report, dated June 19, 2003. A.R. (doc.

3) at 177-184. Dr. Lockwood recommended "light level limitations"

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as opposed to a prior assessment that recommended "medium level

limitations." Id. at 183. Dr. Lockwood explained that he

recommended "light level limitations" because the updated medical

evidence in the record supported such a result. Id. In any

event, the ALJ did not solely rely on Dr. Lockwood's opinion in

determining Brumfield's RFC. 

In his decision, the ALJ cites numerous reports and records

from different doctors as evidence indicating that Brumfield can

perform light work with some limitations. A.R. (doc. 3) at 22-24

(citing evidence from the reports of Dr. Alan Lockwood, Family

Health Care, Dr. Paul Drinkwater, M.D., Dr. Michael Fairfax, D.O.,

Dr. William Mora, M.D., Dr. Kenneth Root, M.D., and Dr. Steven

Hirdes, Ed.D.). In addition, the ALJ cites Brumfield's own

testimony to support his decision. He notes that Brumfield

testified that she volunteers for her church, does her own

cleaning, laundry, cooking, transports her disabled friend and

does not use any ambulatory devices. Id. at 25. The ALJ also

points out that Brumfield testified that she manages her own

finances, can walk and goes door to door, exercises at the gym and

on an exercise bike, socializes with friends, goes out for dinner

and can travel, as she went to San Diego for one week after her

alleged onset date of disability. Id. The decision shows that

the ALJ considered the entire record in determining Brumfield's

RFC. Thus, the Court does not find that the ALJ's consideration

of the nonexamining state agency physician's opinion was improper.

B. Alleged Requirement of "Objective Evidence of Significant

Fatigue"

In her motion, Brumfield challenges the ALJ's comment that

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"[t]here was no objective evidence of significant fatigue." Mot.

(doc. 5) at 10. It is not clear to the Court exactly what

Brumfield alleges was improper about the ALJ's statement. 

However, it seems that Brumfield believes that the ALJ improperly

discounted the severity of her symptom of fatigue by exclusively

requiring "objective evidence" to support the severity of her

claim. The Court is not convinced that this is the case. 

At the outset, the Court notes that Brumfield has not

complained that she suffers from Chronic Fatigue Syndrome, however

she asserts that her carpal tunnel syndrome, fibromyalgia, and

depression result in fatigue. A.R. (doc. 3) at 21. In his

decision, the ALJ notes the lack of objective evidence of

significant fatigue in connection with his discussion of Dr.

Drinkwater's examination and its consistency with the medical

evidence in the record. Id. at 23. The Court is not convinced,

as Brumfield argues, that the ALJ's decision to deny her benefits

was based entirely upon the lack of objective evidence of

significant fatigue. Upon review of the ALJ's decision, it is

evident to the Court that the ALJ considered the entire record in

this case, including Brumfield's own statements about her claimed

symptoms and activities, in finding her not disabled. 

C. Hypothetical Question

In her motion, Brumfield contends that the ALJ committed a

legal error when he posed a specific hypothetical question to the

vocational expert, which included a limitation to "low-stress jobs

with low production quotas." Mot. (doc. 5) at 11-13. Brumfield

asserts that the problem with the ALJ's assessment of "low-stress

jobs with low production quotas" is that the RFC upon which that

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assessment was based "falls short of the function-by-function

assessment required by Social Security Ruling 96-8p." Reply (doc.

19) at 9. In short, Brumfield challenges the process by which the

ALJ reached his mental RFC determination. Id. at 10. Although it

is not clear to the Court exactly what Brumfield alleges was

improper about the ALJ's determination, it seems that she is

asserting that the ALJ erred by not performing a function-byfunction comparison between her RFC and her past relevant work.

Social Security Ruling 96-8p discusses issues regarding the

RFC assessment and its use at steps 4 and 5 of the sequential

evaluation process. Social Security Ruling 96-8p, 1996 SSR LEXIS

5, at *8. 

RFC may be expressed in terms of exertional

category, such as light, if it becomes necessary

to assess whether an individual is able to do

his...or her past relevant work as it is generally

performed in the national economy. However,

without the initial function-by-function

assessment of the individual's physical and mental

capacities, it may not be possible to determine

whether the individual is able to do past relevant

work as it is generally performed in the national

economy because particular occupations may not

require all of the exertional and nonexertional

demands necessary to do the full range of work at

a given exertional level. 

 

Id. at **8-9. Brumfield notes that the Commissioner recognized in

Social Security Ruling 85-15 that the basic mental demands of

competitive, remunerative, unskilled work include:

...the abilities (on a sustained basis) to

understand, carry out, and remember simple job

instructions; to respond appropriately to

supervision, coworkers, and usual work situations;

and to deal with changes in a routine work

setting.

Mot. (doc. 5) at 12 n.28 (citing Social Security Ruling 85-15,

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3 The claimant must be able to perform:

1. The actual functional demands and job duties of

a particular past relevant job; or

2. The functional demands and job duties of the

occupation as generally required by employers

throughout the national economy.

SSR 82-61. 

Pinto, 249 F.3d at 845.

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1985 SSR LEXIS 20, at *11). The Ninth Circuit, however, has

stated that it has "never required explicit findings at step four

regarding a claimant's past relevant work both as generally

performed and as actually performed." Pinto v. Massanari, 249

F.3d 840, 845 (9th Cir. 2001). A vocational expert merely has to

find that a claimant can or cannot continue his or her past

relevant work as defined by the regulations.3 Id. "The claimant

has the burden of proving an inability to return to his former

type of work and not just his former job." Villa v. Heckler, 797

F.2d 794, 798 (1986). Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has found that

"[p]reparing a function-by-function analysis for medical

conditions or impairments that the ALJ found neither credible nor

supported by the record is unnecessary." Bayliss, 427 3d. at

1217. 

Here, the ALJ found no mental limitations supported by

substantial evidence in the record. A.R. (doc. 3) at 24. 

Specifically, the ALJ cites the opinion of Dr. Steven Hirdes and

other functional mental assessments by state agency physicians to

support this finding. Id. In the case at bar, Dr. Hirdes opined

that Brumfield's ability to conduct the following activities was

either "unlimited" or "limited but satisfactory": (1) follow work

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rules; (2) relate to co-workers; (3) deal with the public; (4) use

judgment; (5) interact with supervisors; (6) function

independently; (7) maintain attention/concentration; (8)

understand, remember and carry out complex job instructions; (9)

understand, remember and carry out detailed, but not complex, job

instructions; (10) understand, remember and carry out simple job

instructions; (11) maintain personal appearance; and (12) relate

predictably in social situations. A.R. (doc. 3) at 140-41. 

Moreover, a Psychiatric Review Technique form, dated April 2003,

identified moderate limitations in maintaining concentration,

persistence, or pace, and recommended that Brumfield could

function occupationally. Id. at 155-168. The RFC that followed

found no significant limitations in Brumfield's mental ability to

perform certain sustained work and social activities over a normal

workday and workweek on an ongoing basis. Id. at 169-172. 

Another Psychiatric Review Technique form identified as "mild"

Brumfield's restrictions of activities of daily living, and

difficulties in social functioning and maintaining concentration,

persistence, or pace. Id. at 187-200. Again, the RFC that

followed found no evidence of limitations in Brumfield's mental

ability to perform certain sustained work and social activities

over a normal workday and workweek on an ongoing basis. Id. at

203-05. 

The ALJ found no mental limitations supported by substantial

evidence in the record. A.R. (doc. 3) at 24 ("The claimant's

mental condition was stable and the residual functional capacity

has been adjusted to reflect the limitations caused by her

impairments."). Accordingly, a function-by-function analysis for

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such mental impairments was unnecessary. Bayliss, 427 3d. at

1217. 

In regard to the contested hypothetical question, vocational

expert Sandra K. Richter was present during Brumfield's hearing. 

A.R. (doc. 3) at 263. She identified Brumfield's past relevant

work as a file clerk with light level exertion. Id. at 279-281. 

In addition, she concluded that Brumfield had also worked as a

proof clerk at the sedentary level. Id. In response to the ALJ's

hypothetical questions, Richter opined that an individual with

conditions similar to Brumfield could work, at a minimum, as a

proof clerk. Id. at 282-84. In light of the discussion above,

the Court finds that the hypothetical the ALJ posed to Richter

contained all of the limitations that the ALJ found credible and

supported by substantial evidence in the record. A hypothetical

including mental limitations was unnecessary in light of the ALJ's

finding that there was no substantial evidence that supported the

existence of such limitations. A.R. (doc. 3) at 24. Thus, the

ALJ's reliance on the testimony Richter gave in response to the

contested hypothetical question was proper.

D. Opinion of Steven C. Hirdes, Ed.D.

Brumfield argues that the Court should remand this matter for

payment of benefits due to the ALJ's alleged mischaracterization

of the opinion of Dr. Steven C. Hirdes, Ed.D. Mot. (doc. 5) at

13-15. Specifically, Brumfield challenges the ALJ's statement

that Dr. Hirdes found "mainly mild limitations...none of which

precluded the ability to function in a work or social setting[.]" 

Id. at 14; see also A.R. (doc. 3) at 24. Brumfield asserts that

the ALJ's statement is "only partially true," noting that Dr.

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Hirdes opined that Brumfield was "seriously limited but not

precluded" from dealing with work stresses, behaving in an

emotionally stable manner, and demonstrating reliability. Mot.

(doc. 5) at 14. Additionally, Brumfield argues that, "by

definition a person who is seriously limited does not suffer from

mild limitations." Id. Consequently, Brumfield contends that the

ALJ improperly mischaracterized Dr. Hirdes' opinion. Id.

In his report, Dr. Hirdes opined that Brumfield was

"seriously limited but not precluded" from dealing with work

stresses, behaving in an emotionally stable manner, and

demonstrating reliability. A.R. (doc. 3) at 140-141. However,

Dr. Hirdes also noted in his report that Brumfield's ability to

conduct the following list of activities was either "unlimited" or

"limited but satisfactory": (1) follow work rules; (2) relate to

co-workers; (3) deal with the public; (4) use judgment; (5)

interact with supervisors; (6) function independently; (7)

maintain attention/concentration; (8) understand, remember and

carry out complex job instructions; (9) understand, remember and

carry out detailed, but not complex, job instructions; (10)

understand, remember and carry out simple job instructions; (11)

maintain personal appearance; and (12) relate predictably in

social situations. Id. Brumfield does not seem to challenge the

reasonableness of characterizing the limitations defined as either

"unlimited" or "limited but satisfactory" as "mild." Therefore,

it is appropriate to characterize Dr. Hirdes' report, which

reported only three tasks out of a total of fifteen as being

"seriously limited but not precluded," as expressing "mainly mild

limitations." The Court is not convinced that the ALJ

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mischaracterized Dr. Hirdes' opinion when he stated that "[t]here

were mainly mild limitations expressed, none of which precluded

the ability to function in a work or social setting[.]" A.R.

(doc. 3) at 24.

C. Brumfield's Testimony

Brumfield's final argument is that the ALJ improperly

rejected her testimony. Mot. (doc. 5) at 15-18. First, she

asserts that the ALJ did not specifically identify what testimony

was not credible. Id. at 17. Second, she argues that the ALJ did

not provide clear and convincing reasons for finding such

testimony not credible. Id.

Once a claimant produces medical evidence of an underlying

impairment which is reasonably likely to be the cause of certain

subjective symptoms, the ALJ may not discredit a claimant's

testimony on that issue solely because the degree of limitation

alleged by the claimant is not supported by objective medical

evidence. See Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 346-47 (9th Cir.

1991); Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 602-04 (9th Cir. 1989). The

ALJ cannot reject the claimant's testimony about subjective

complaints without making findings sufficiently specific to permit

the reviewing court to conclude that the ALJ did not arbitrarily

discredit that testimony. See Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 346-47. 

Factors the ALJ may legitimately consider to make a credibility

determination include the claimant's daily activities, treatment

for relief of pain, inconsistencies in testimony, effectiveness or

adverse side effects of any pain medication, and relevant

character evidence. Id.; Light v. Social Security

Administration, 119 F.3d 789, 792-93 (9th Cir. 1997). However,

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the ALJ is the trier of fact. Fair, 885 F.2d at 604. As long as

the ALJ's determination was reached based on an explicit

consideration of the appropriate factors, it is not the reviewing

court's place to second-guess that determination. Id.

At the hearing on May 10, 2004, Brumfield testified that she

is unable to work because when she tries "to do anything on a

regular basis, it flares up her arms...and [she] become[s] so

fatigued that [she] just cannot function." A.R. (doc. 3) at 270. 

She later clarified that she was speaking about her carpal tunnel

syndrome and fibromyalgia. Id. Additionally, Brumfield testified

that in using her arms and hands, she experiences "[a] lot of

pain." Id. "If I try to do things on a continuous basis, the

pain is more than I can handle." Id. She stated that she has

trouble gripping items, light or heavy, and has numbness in her

hands. Id. at 271. With respect to her fibromyalgia, Brumfield

testified that she experiences pain in her shoulders, neck, arms,

and back. A.R. (doc. 3) at 271. She stated that she left her

last job due to her pain and exhaustion. Id. at 277. 

In contrast, Brumfield also testified that she does her

laundry, the basic cleaning around her home, and most of the

cooking. Id. at 272. However, she maintained that "mopping" and

"scrubbing the venetian blinds [and] windows" are beyond her

abilities. Id. at 272-273. Brumfield stated that she drives and

has trouble driving only on "some days." Id. In addition, she

testified that she volunteers for her church around 30 to 40 hours

a month, by helping others in the congregation and going out "door

to door teaching others about the Bible." A.R. (doc. 3) at 275. 

She further testified that since the date of onset, she took a

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week-long trip to San Diego and that she is doing low intensity

exercises to increase her strength. Id. at 276. "I have an

exercise bike at home, and I go and do workouts at a gym trying to

gain strength." Id. She stated that she has had no surgery for

her carpal tunnel syndrome and uses no ambulatory devices. Id. at

270, 276, 277-78. 

In his decision, the ALJ found that Brumfield's "subjective

complaints that she is unable to work are not accepted to the

extent alleged." A.R. (doc. 3) at 25. The Court believes this

statement clearly identifies what testimony of Brumfield's the ALJ

found to be not credible. Moreover, the ALJ offered specific

reasons for discounting Brumfield's testimony regarding her

inability to work.

[Brumfield's] complaints and alleged limitations

are out of proportion to the evidence. This does

not mean that the claimant has no limitations. To

the contrary, the undersigned does find work

limitations. However, her limitations do not

preclude all work activity. The claimant has

undergone conservative treatment since her alleged

onset date of disability, with no

hospitalizations. The claimant stated that she

volunteer [sic] for her church, does her own

cleaning, laundry, cooking, transports her

disabled friend and does not use any ambulatory

devices. She also managed her own finances, can

walk and goes door to door, exercised at the gym

and on an exercise bicycle, socializes with

friends, goes out for dinner. She also can travel

and went to San Diego for one week, after her

alleged onset date of disability. There is no

objective evidence to support significant sideeffects from medication.

Id.

Brumfield argues that the ALJ failed to express sufficient

reasons to discredit her testimony, because (1) her ability to

perform limited activities of daily living fails to show the

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ability to sustain work activities on a regular basis, and (2) the

ALJ failed to provide a nexus between her limited activities and

the ability to sustain regular work. Mot. (doc. 5) at 17-18. In

support of her arguments, Brumfield cites the opinions in Benecke

v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587 (9th Cir. 2004) and Gonzalez v.

Sullivan, 914 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1990), respectively. The Court

does not find these cases to directly discredit the ALJ's decision

in the case at bar. 

In Benecke, the court affirmed the district court's finding

that the ALJ erred in discounting the claimant's testimony about

the severity of her symptoms. 379 F.3d at 593-94. The court

noted that the ALJ, in making the credibility determination,

relied largely on Benecke's ability to carry out certain routine

tasks. Id. at 594. The court found these reasons to be

insufficient because, "[a]s described...Benecke's daily activities

are quite limited and carried out with difficulty." Id. 

At the hearing, Benecke testified to the

following: She experiences constant pain

throughout her entire body. Although prescription

pain medication reduces her pain somewhat, it

interferes with her ability to concentrate. Due to

severe fatigue, she naps for one to two hours

daily. When awake, she spends most of her time

sitting in a recliner because her pain increases

whenever she does anything else. She has been able

to take one class at a time at Arizona State

University, but only with special accommodations

from the school's disability office. She remains

able to drive, but driving further than five miles

causes severe pain in her arms.

Id. at 592. In contrast to the routine activities involved in

Benecke, Brumfield described activities that both required

exertion (walking door to door, teaching others about the Bible,

travel, cleaning) and are not necessary to daily life

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(volunteering for her church). A.R. (doc. 3) at 272-76. 

In Gonzalez, the court concluded that the ALJ had failed to

properly articulate reasons for discrediting the claimant's pain

testimony. 914 F.2d at 1201-02. The court noted that a possible

explanation for the ALJ's determination was that the claimant had

indicated that twice a day he walked one to one and a half miles,

and that he sometimes watched ball games, alternating sitting and

standing. Id. at 1201. However, the court pointed out that the

ALJ did not specifically link these activities to explaining why

he concluded that the claimant's pain testimony lack credibility,

or how the ability to perform such tasks translated into the

ability to perform appropriate work. Id. The court also noted

that "[t]he ALJ's opinion indicated that he probably disbelieved

the excess pain testimony because it was 'out of proportion to the

medical evidence'-an inadequate reason, since it is the very

nature of excess pain to be out of proportion to the medical

evidence." Id.

While the ALJ's failure to link his discounting of

the appellant's pain testimony to the appellant's

testimony about his daily activities may seem to

be a minor error, we are wary of speculating about

the basis of the ALJ's conclusion-especially when

his opinion indicates that the conclusion may have

been based exclusively upon an improper reason.

 Id. Thus, the court seems to have made much of its decision to

remand the matter on the fact that the ALJ's decision indicated

that his conclusion may have been based exclusively upon his

opinion that the testimony was out of proportion to the medical

evidence--an improper reason. Gonzalez, 914 F.2d at 1201. 

Such circumstances are not the case here. In the case at

bar, the ALJ did not completely reject all of Brumfield's

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testimony. The ALJ specifically notes that he did not accept

Brumfield's subjective complaints that she is unable to work to

the extent alleged. A.R. (doc. 3) at 25. In his decision, the

ALJ recognizes that Brumfield has some work limitations, however,

he discredits Brumfield's testimony that she is completely unable

to work due to her pain and fatigue. Id. ("...her limitations do

not preclude all work activity"). Unlike Benecke, Brumfield

testified that she conducts activities that both require exertion

and are not necessary to daily life. In addition, the Court does

not find the ALJ's decision in this case to be similar to that

described in Gonzales. Here, the Court need not speculate as to

the reasons the ALJ discredited Brumfield's testimony regarding

her ability to work. Although the ALJ does not specifically

describe how the performance of Brumfield's activities translate

into the ability to perform appropriate work, the ALJ's opinion

also does not indicate that he disbelieved her testimony regarding

her ability to work because it was “out of proportion to the

medical evidence." Thus, the Court need not be as cautious as the

court in Gonzales. 

The Ninth Circuit has recognized that disability claimants

should not be penalized for attempting to lead normal lives in the

face of their limitations. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722

(9th Cir. 1998). "Only if the level of activity were inconsistent

with Claimant's claimed limitations would these activities have

any bearing on Claimant's credibility." Such circumstances are

evident in this case. Id. Contrary to Brumfield's assertion,

there are sufficient reasons addressed to Brumfield's testimony

that support the ALJ's credibility determination. An ALJ is

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permitted to reject testimony regarding subjective symptoms as

long as he makes specific findings justifying that decision. 

Fair, 885 F.2d at 604. Here, the Court concludes that the ALJ

made the requisite specific findings, and there is substantial

evidence to support his decision.

IV. Conclusion

Upon review of each of Brumfield's challenges to the ALJ's

decision, the Court finds that the ALJ fulfilled his

responsibility to consider the medical evidence, and the record as

a whole, in making specific findings concerning Brumfield's

alleged disability. The evidence cited by the ALJ in his decision

is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as

adequate to support his conclusion that Brumfield in not disabled. 

Although some of the evidence highlighted by Brumfield is possibly

susceptible to more than one interpretation, the district court

must uphold the ALJ's decision. Id. Therefore, the Court finds

that the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence.

Therefore, 

IT IS ORDERED that Brumfield's motion for summary judgment

(doc. 5) is DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's cross-motion for

summary judgment (doc. 12) is GRANTED. The court clerk is

directed to enter JUDGMENT for Defendant and terminate this case.

DATED this 19th day of June, 2006.

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Copies to counsel of record

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