Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_17-cv-01971/USCOURTS-cand-3_17-cv-01971-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Stockholders Suits

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HENRY MATOZA,

Plaintiff,

v.

THOR INDUSTRIES, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 17-cv-01971-MMC 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS 

APCO HOLDINGS, LLC AND 

ONTARIO TEACHERS’ PENSION 

PLAN BOARD’S MOTIONS TO 

DISMISS; AFFORDING PLAINTIFF 

LEAVE TO AMEND

Re: Dkt. No. 56, 57

Before the Court is defendants APCO Holdings, LLC and Ontario Teachers’ 

Pension Plan Board’s (collectively, “Moving Defendants”) motion, filed August 7, 2017, to 

dismiss plaintiff Henry Matoza’s (“Matoza”) First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), pursuant 

to Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for lack of personal jurisdiction. 

In the alternative, Moving Defendants seek either dismissal, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), for 

failure to state a claim, or an order for a more definite statement, pursuant to Rule 12(e). 

Matoza has filed opposition, to which Moving Defendants have replied. 

Having read and considered the papers filed in support of and in opposition to the 

motion, the Court deems the matter appropriate for determination on the parties’ 

respective written submissions, VACATES the hearing scheduled for September 15, 

2017, and rules as follows.

“In opposing a defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the 

plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that jurisdiction is proper.” See Ranza v. Nike, 

793 F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation and citation omitted). Where “the 

Case 3:17-cv-01971-MMC Document 83 Filed 09/06/17 Page 1 of 3
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United States District Court

Northern District of California

defendant’s motion is based on written materials rather than an evidentiary hearing,”

1

the 

plaintiff must “make a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts.” See id. (internal 

quotation and citation omitted). Here, as set forth below, the Court finds Matoza has 

failed to make the requisite showing.

Matoza’s argument with respect to the Court’s personal jurisdiction over Moving 

Defendants is predicated on the theory that Moving Defendants are alter egoes of their 

subsidiaries, namely, defendants Automobile Corporation (“APCO”) and Warranty 

Support Services, LLC (“WSSL”).2 “The existence of a parent-subsidiary relationship is 

insufficient[] on its own,” however, “to justify imputing one entity’s contacts with a forum 

state to another for the purpose of establishing personal jurisdiction.” See id. at 1070. 

Although “personal jurisdiction may be established where the parent and subsidiary have 

an “alter ego relationship,” the party asserting such relationship must show the parent 

and subsidiary “are not really separate entities.” See id. at 1071 (internal quotation and

citation omitted). “To satisfy the alter ego test, a plaintiff must make out a prima facie 

case (1) that there is such unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities 

of the two entities no longer exist and (2) that failure to disregard their separate identities 

would result in fraud or injustice.” See id. at 1073. As set forth below, the Court agrees 

with Moving Defendants that neither the allegations in the FAC nor the evidence

submitted by Matoza, whether considered separately or in combination, suffices to make 

the requisite showing.

First, the FAC includes no factual allegations in support of Matoza’s conclusory 

allegation that “all defendants . . . are . . . alter-egoes of all other listed defendants” (see

FAC ¶ 11), let alone any factual allegations addressing either prong of the alter ego test, 

see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009) (holding complaint subject to 

 

1 Neither party has requested the Court hold an evidentiary hearing.

2

To date, neither APCO nor WSSL has raised a challenge based on personal 

jurisdiction; rather, both have moved to compel arbitration. 

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

dismissal where it lacks “sufficient factual matter” to support its “legal conclusions”); 

Sandoval v. Ali, 34 F. Supp. 3d 1031, 1040 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (holding “plaintiff must allege 

specifically both of the elements of alter ego liability, as well as facts supporting each”)

(internal quotation and citation omitted). 

Next, Matoza’s efforts to supplement his allegations are unavailing. In particular,

the exhibits on which Matoza relies to show that Moving Defendants are majority owners 

of APCO and share with APCO and WSSL a common address and some management 

personnel, even if accepted as evidence of those additional facts, do not suffice to 

establish an alter ego relationship. See Ranza, 793 F.3d at 1073 (holding “[t]otal 

ownership and shared management personnel are alone insufficient to establish the 

requisite level of control” for alter ego test; dismissing complaint where plaintiff presented 

no evidence constituting “signs of a sham corporate veil”).

Accordingly, the Court finds that, to the extent the FAC alleges claims against 

Moving Defendants, it is subject to dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction.

3

 If Matoza

wishes to proceed against Moving Defendants, he shall file, no later than September 26, 

2017, a Second Amended Complaint, alleging therein facts sufficient to support a finding 

of personal jurisdiction over Moving Defendants. Matoza may not, however, add any new 

parties or claims without first obtaining leave of court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). If 

Matoza does not file a Second Amended Complaint within the time provided, the instant 

action will proceed on the claims in the FAC against the remaining defendants.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 6, 2017

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

 

3

In light thereof, the Court does not consider herein Moving Defendants’ 

arguments under Rule 12(b)(6) and 12(e).

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