Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_01-cv-04974/USCOURTS-cand-3_01-cv-04974-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL DIXON,

Petitioner,

 v.

A.A. LAMARQUE, Warden,

Respondent.

_______________________________

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No. C 01-4974 MMC (PR)

AMENDED

ORDER GRANTING PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner is a California prisoner who filed pro se a petition for a writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on January 22, 2002. The petition was dismissed with

leave to amend and, on March 20, 2002, Petitioner filed a First Amended Petition. The Court

ordered Respondent to show cause why the petition should not be granted, and Respondent

filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that six of the seven claims in the First Amended

Petition were not exhausted. On July 9, 2002, the Court found five of the seven claims had

not been exhausted and, on that basis, dismissed the First Amended Petition with leave to file

a Second Amended Petition containing only the two exhausted claims. On August 20, 2002,

Petitioner filed a Second Amended Petition containing only his two exhausted claims and

Respondent was ordered to show cause why the Second Amended Petition should not be

granted. Respondent filed an answer and memorandum, denying the petition. Petitioner

filed a traverse. 

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This background is derived from the factual background set forth in the opinion of the

California Court of Appeal, lodged herewith as Respondent’s Exhibit A, which is not disputed by the

parties. See also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (requiring district court to presume correct state court’s

factual findings unless the petitioner rebuts the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing

evidence).

2

On April 7, 2004, because Petitioner indicated that he wished to present new claims

herein, the Court ordered him to do so by filing a Third Amended Petition. Petitioner filed a

Third Amended Petition on May 20, 2004, which the Court found deficient but allowed

Petitioner one further opportunity to present his new claims in an amended petition. On

September 9, 2004, Petitioner filed a document titled “Third Amended Petition,” in which he

indicated he did not wish to present any new claims, but rather to proceed on the basis of the

claims in his Second Amended Petition. Consequently, the operative petition is the Second

Amended petition, containing two exhausted claims.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1

In September 1998, in the San Francisco County Superior Court, a jury convicted

Petitioner of forcible rape, forcible sodomy, forcible digital penetration, aggravated assault,

and false imprisonment. The jury failed to reach a verdict on two counts of forcible oral

copulation and an additional count of digital penetration, and the trial court dismissed those

three counts.

At the trial, Loretta B. (“Loretta”) testified that she was assaulted by Petitioner, her

friend and neighbor, in May 1997. In April, 1997, Petitioner had moved into the same

residential hotel in which Loretta resided and began living down the hall from Loretta. 

Loretta recognized Petitioner as a co-worker from years earlier. Loretta and Petitioner

became close friends. They were not lovers. 

Loretta testified that, on May 1, 1997, Loretta, Petitioner, and Loretta’s friend,

Deborah, were sitting around the table in Deborah’s house, talking and drinking. Loretta had

a couple of sips of wine and Petitioner drank a lot of gin. Later, Deborah dropped Loretta

and Petitioner home. The two went to their separate rooms after agreeing to get together

later to eat dinner and watch movies. Loretta cleaned, prepared for dinner, drank half a can

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of beer, and was getting ready to change her clothes when Petitioner knocked on Loretta’s

door and said: “Come here. Come with me right now.” Loretta thought Petitioner was having

trouble with his VCR, as he often did. Loretta went with Petitioner to his room.

Loretta further testified that, once in his room, Petitioner asked her, “Do you love

me?” and “Do you want me?” Loretta responded: “Are you crazy?” Petitioner asked: “Why

did you lie to me?” Bewildered, Loretta said, “Michael, you have been drinking. You’re

intoxicated. Go to sleep. I’ll be back after a while.” Petitioner responded by slapping

Loretta on the face. Loretta went for the door but Petitioner dragged her away saying,

“You’re not going nowhere.” Petitioner pinned Loretta on the floor as she screamed, “Stop”

and “Let me go.” Petitioner then pulled Loretta off the floor and threw her on the bed.

Petitioner pressed a large empty beer bottle against Loretta’s forehead. Loretta thought the

bottle would break since he was pressing it so hard that he was dripping sweat. Loretta

managed to push the bottle away, but then Petitioner pressed her temples with his hands,

while saying, “Don’t look at me.” Loretta screamed: “Michael, it hurts” and “Please stop.” 

Petitioner responded: “Oh, you want pain? I’ll show you pain.” 

Loretta testified that she pleaded with Petitioner to permit her to use the bathroom.

When Loretta was using the commode, Petitioner stood in front of her, dropped his pants,

and asked Loretta to lick his buttocks and massage his testicles. When Loretta said, “You

must be crazy. You’re sick,” Petitioner slapped her face and put her hands on his testicles. 

Loretta refused to comply again, and Petitioner slapped her again. Loretta then put her

tongue in Petitioner’s rectum and held his testicles. Petitioner was dissatisfied. He slapped

Loretta and asked her to orally copulate him. He held her head and shoved his penis in her

mouth. When Loretta gagged and fell on the bathroom floor, Petitioner grabbed her arm and

dragged her away. Petitioner kicked her back and buttocks. Loretta ran screaming to the

bathroom where she tried to close the door against Petitioner, but he kicked it open. 

A neighbor testified that he heard Loretta screaming for help and heard a fist

repeatedly hitting flesh. He could hear the noise through the air shaft onto which Petitioner’s

bathroom window opened. The neighbor rushed to his own window on the air shaft. Since

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he could not get to Loretta, he threw a teacup out his window and into Petitioner’s bathroom

window where it broke a hole in the glass.

Loretta testified that she saw the teacup come through the window. Petitioner pulled

her into his living room and raped her, forcing his penis into her vagina. Petitioner also put

his finger into her vagina and rectum, and put his penis into her rectum. Petitioner hit Loretta

and kept saying: “I’m going to kill you, bitch.”

The hotel clerk testified that, after receiving a telephone call from the neighbor across

the air shaft, he came to Petitioner’s room and knocked on the door. Both the clerk and the

neighbor testified that they heard Loretta saying she wanted to get out. The clerk left to call

the police. 

Officer Garrity, the police officer who responded to the clerk’s call, testified that he

heard a woman crying inside Petitioner’s room. The officer knocked on the door and

identified himself. Petitioner opened the door and Loretta said to the officer: “Help me, let

me out.” Loretta ran out of the room and the officer saw that her face was swollen and

bloody. Loretta told the officer that she and Petitioner had been friends but, on that night, he

had held her in his room against her will and raped her. Officer Garrity called for assistance

and he and other officers went to Petitioner’s room to arrest him. When Officer Garrity

knocked on the door, Petitioner told the officers, “Come get me, fuckers.” Petitioner then

quickly closed the door as the officers came forward. Petitioner opened and closed the door

in the officers’ faces four times. He finally was grabbed and taken into custody.

Officer Bulsalacchi, who interviewed Loretta at the hospital, testified that Loretta was

shaking and crying. When asked whether she had been having sexual relations with

Petitioner, Loretta answered in the affirmative and said they had had relations for about three

months. At trial, Loretta testified that she was in a state of shock when she spoke with the

officer and denied any sexual relationship with Petitioner.

The nurse who performed a sexual assault examination on Loretta testified that

Loretta had bruises on her face, torso, arms, back and buttocks. Loretta also had fresh

abrasions on her vagina, suggestive of forced intercourse. An examination of Petitioner

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found that the surface of his penis had cells matching orifice cells from Loretta, either her

mouth, anus, or vagina.

Also at the trial, Jewell R. (“Jewell”) testified that, in 1992, she was “partying” with

her friend Barbara and Petitioner, who at that time was Barbara’s boyfriend. Jewell fell

asleep in the living room and was awakened by screaming. Barbara and Petitioner were

arguing over money. Jewell went into the bedroom when she heard Barbara calling her and

found that Barbara’s forehead was bleeding and Petitioner was holding a broken brandy

bottle. Petitioner repeatedly slapped Barbara and then threw Jewell on the bed. Petitioner

told Barbara, “I’m going to show you what it’s like to make love to a real woman,” and

forced his penis into Jewell’s vagina. He also unsuccessfully tried to force Barbara to have

oral sex with Jewell. Jewell phoned the police. Jewell’s sexual assault examination revealed

abrasions suggestive of forced intercourse.

Petitioner denied raping Loretta and testified that he and Loretta had begun a sexual

relationship soon after he moved into the residential hotel. On the day in question, Loretta

came to his room drunk and initiated oral copulation of him. Petitioner fell asleep and then

awoke to go to the bathroom. Loretta followed him to the bathroom and began talking loudly

about her fear that Petitioner would desert her. At that point, someone threw a cup through

Petitioner’s bathroom window, which struck Loretta in the head. The hotel clerk came and

later the police. Petitioner further testified that he refused to come out of his room because he

did not want to go to jail for “some bullshit.” Petitioner was on parole for the 1992 assault

upon his girlfriend, Barbara.

Petitioner denied raping Jewell in 1992; he testified that Jewell had propositioned him

when Barbara was out of the house and that he and Jewell had consensual sex. When

Barbara returned, the three partied together. Later, he and Barbara fought and he “slapped

her upside the head.” The fight blew over, however, and Petitioner spent the night without

incident.

A woman from Petitioner’s church testified on his behalf. She said Loretta told her

that she was in love with Petitioner and was going to marry him.

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The jury convicted Petitioner of a number of sexual acts, specifically, forcible rape,

forcible sodomy, and forcible digital penetration, as well as aggravated assault and false

imprisonment. On January 28, 1999, the trial court, after finding Petitioner had two prior

convictions, one of which was a “strike,” sentenced him to an aggregate prison term of 30

years in state prison. The California Court of Appeal affirmed. The Supreme Court of

California summarily denied both the petition for direct review and a subsequent petition for

a writ of habeas corpus.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

The instant petition is governed by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty

Act (“AEDPA”) of 1996. Under AEDPA, the district court may grant habeas relief only if

the state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Habeas relief is warranted only if the constitutional error

at issue had a “‘substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s

verdict.’” Penry v. Johnson, 121 S. Ct. 1910, 1920 (2001) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson,

507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993)). In the present case, this Court reviews the decision of the

California Court of Appeal, the last state court to address Petitioner’s claims in a reasoned

decision. See LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n.7 (9th Cir. 2000).

B. Legal Claims

1. Jury Instructions: Standard of Proof

Petitioner argues that the jury instructions regarding the use of evidence of Petitioner’s

alleged prior sexual offense violated his right to due process by lowering the prosecution’s

burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a

reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. 

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 Section 352 provides: “The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative

value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue

consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of

misleading the jury.”

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The following paragraph was added to CALJIC No. 2.50.01 in 1999 : “However, if you find

by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed [a] prior sexual offense[s], that is

not sufficient by itself to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [he] [she] committed the charged

crime[s]. If you determine an inference properly can be drawn from this evidence, this inference is

simply one item for you to consider, along with all other evidence, in determining whether the

defendant has been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the charged crime.”

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See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). 

Under California law, evidence of prior “bad acts” ordinarily is inadmissible to prove

criminal disposition. See Cal. Evid. Code § 1101(a). California Evidence Code §1108

provides one of the exceptions: 

In a criminal action in which the defendant is accused of a sexual offense,

evidence of the defendant’s commission of another sexual offense or offenses

is not made inadmissible by Section 1101, if the evidence is not inadmissible

pursuant to Section 352.[2] 

Cal. Evid. Code § 1108.

Here, as set forth above, the trial court allowed evidence of prior sex crimes. As a

result, the trial court instructed the jury pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.50.01, titled “Evidence of

Other Sexual Offenses (Evidence Code § 1108).” In 1999, CALJIC No. 2.50.01 was

amended to clarify the manner in which jurors are to evaluate guilt of a current charge where

they have found the defendant committed a prior sex crime.3

 The jury in petitioner’s case,

however, received the pre-1999 version of CALJIC No. 2.50.01, which read in relevant part

as follows:

If you find that the defendant committed a prior sexual offense, you may, but are not

required to, infer that the defendant had a disposition to commit such sexual offenses.

If you find that the defendant had this disposition, you may, but are not required to,

infer that he is likely to commit and did commit the crimes with which he is accused n

this case.

Unless you are instructed otherwise, you are not to consider this evidence for

any other purpose.

(Reporter’s Transcript (“RT”) at 1017-18). The above language was read to the jury in

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conjunction with a modified version of another jury instruction, CALJIC No. 2.50.1, which

ascribed a lesser burden of proof to previous sex offenses:

Within the meaning of this instruction, the prosecution has the burden of proving by a

preponderance of the evidence that a defendant committed sexual offenses other than

those for which he is on trial. You must not consider this evidence for any purpose

unless you find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant committed the

sexual offenses described in the prior testimony.

(Reporter’s Transcript (“RT”) at 1017-18). 

Petitioner argues that the above instructions, taken together, allowed the jury to find

him guilty by a preponderance of the evidence rather than beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Petitioner further argues that these instructions, even when considered in the context of all

the jury instructions, failed to clarify for the jurors that each element of the crime must be

proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Petitioner contends he was denied due process, for the

reason that the jury might have used the wrong standard of proof and it is impossible to

determine what standard the jury in fact employed in deciding the case. 

In affirming the convictions, the California Court of Appeal determined that the

instructions, when read as whole, did not mislead the jury. In that regard, the Court of

Appeal reasoned that the original and revised versions of CALJIC No. 2.50.01 are not

significantly different; in particular, the Court of Appeal found that although the instructions

given to the jury lacked a reiteration of the correct standard of proof as provided by the

revised version of CALJIC No. 2.50.01, they nevertheless were constitutionally sufficient.

The Ninth Circuit has held the use of the pre-1999 version of CALJIC 2.50.01 in

tandem with CALJIC 2.50.1 unconstitutionally lowers the prosecution’s burden of proof and

is sufficient ground for habeas relief under the AEDPA standard. See Gibson v. Ortiz, 387

F.3d 812 (9th Cir. 2004). In Gibson, the Ninth Circuit, after first noting that Gibson was

tried in October 1998, further observed that the Due Process principle established by the

Supreme Court in Winship, specifically, that the prosecution must prove every element

charged in a criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt, is “a proposition of which there

could be no doubt when Gibson was tried.” See Gibson, 387 F.3d at 817, 820; see also In re

Winship, 397 U.S. at 364. The Ninth Circuit then concluded that the jury instructions given

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at Gibson’s trial ran “directly contrary to Winship’s maxim.” Id. at 822. The Ninth Circuit

thus held the state court’s adjudication upholding the instructions was contrary to clearly

established Federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States in Winship,

and affirmed the District Court’s decision to grant habeas relief under § 2254. See id. at 823.

The instructions at issue in Gibson read, in pertinent part:

If you find that the defendant committed a prior sexual offense, you may, but

are not required to, infer that the defendant had a disposition to commit the

same or similar type sexual offenses. If you find that the defendant had this

disposition, you may, but are not required to infer that he was likely to commit

and did commit the crime or crimes of which he is accused. 

Within the meaning of the preceding instructions the prosecution has the

burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant committed

sexual offenses and/or domestic violence other than those for which he is on trial. 

Id. at 817-18. The Ninth Circuit found said instructions impermissibly lowered the

prosecution’s burden of proof. See id. at 822. In particular, the Ninth Circuit found that

because the jurors were informed they could find the defendant committed the charged

offenses if they found he committed the prior offenses, and because they were further

instructed that the prior offenses could be proved by a simple preponderance of the evidence,

the jury effectively had been instructed that the defendant could be found guilty based on a

preponderance of the evidence. See id. In so holding, the Ninth Circuit noted it was the

“interplay” of the instructions there at issue that allowed the jury to convict based on a

preponderance of the evidence, see id., and found it significant that the jury was not told how

the instructions they received as to the standard of proof for the prior offenses could be

“harmonized” with the instructions they received as to the standard of proof for the charged

offenses, see id. at 823. Although the jury in Gibson had received the standard instruction on

reasonable doubt (CALJIC No. 2.01) as well as on the presumption of innocence (CALJIC

No. 2.90), the Ninth Circuit found CALJIC No. 2.50.01 gave the jury “an alternate means of

conviction with a lesser standard of proof than is required by the Constitution.” See id. at

825. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit found, while the constitutionally correct instructions

provided general guidelines, CALJIC No. 2.50.01 carved out a specific exception; the Ninth

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Circuit further reasoned that the well-settled rule of construction, “that the specific controls

the general,” applies to jury instructions as well, rendering the instructions in Gibson’s trial

unconstitutional overall. See id. at 823.

The instant case is indistinguishable from Gibson. The jury instructions at issue here

are virtually identical to the instructions at issue in Gibson. As in Gibson, the preponderance

standard combined with CALJIC 2.50.01 to provide an alternative to the general reasonable

doubt standard, thus affording the jury “two routes of conviction, one by a constitutionally

sufficient standard and one by a constitutionally deficient one.” See id. at 823. Here, as in

Gibson, the trial court provided the jury with appropriate general instructions on the

presumption of innocence, on the prosecutor’s burden of proof, and on considering the jury

instructions as a whole. As Gibson held, however, such additional instructions do not suffice

to cure the defect in the challenged instructions. 

Respondent attempts to distinguish the present case from Gibson by contending that

the Gibson court was heavily swayed by the prosecution’s closing argument, wherein the

prosecutor emphasized the preponderance standard for purposes of showing “a disposition,”

from which the jury then was encouraged to “make these inferences that [the defendant] did

in fact commit these crimes.” See Gibson, 387 F.3d at 824. Gibson did quote portions of the

prosecutor’s summation, and acknowledged that a prosecutor’s arguments are to be

considered “as a part of the context for evaluating the challenged instructions.” See id.

Arguments of counsel, however, generally carry less weight with a jury than do instructions

from the court. See Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 384-85 (1990). As the court in

Gibson itself clarified: “[T]he prosecutor’s arguments are weighted much less heavily in our

analysis than the instructions of the trial judge.” Gibson, 387 F.3d at 824. Indeed, the

determination by the Gibson court was reached prior to its discussion of the prosecutor’s

closing argument. See id. at 822. (“When viewed as a whole, there is nothing ambiguous or

confusing about the challenged instructions. . . . However, the burden of proof the 

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It would appear that the Gibson Court’s purpose in discussing the prosecutor’s closing

remarks was to demonstrate that the prosecution itself had understood the challenged instruction as

unambiguously permitting a finding of guilt based on essential facts proved by less than beyond a

reasonable doubt. See id. at 824. (“[I]t is ironic that the State now urges us to reject the very

interpretation of CALJIC No. 2.50.01 that the prosecution advanced to the jury.”)

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instructions supplied for the permissive inference was unconstitutional.”)4

Consequently, although the prosecutor in the instant case did not make the same argument as

the prosecutor in Gibson, the core of the Gibson decision – that without clarifying language

the interplay between CALJIC No. 2.50.01 and CALJIC No. 2.50.1 renders the jury

instructions unconstitutional – is equally applicable.

In sum, Gibson is dispositive. The instructions in this case are effectively the same as

those found unconstitutional in Gibson. Accordingly, as the Ninth Circuit held in Gibson,

the California Court of Appeal’s opinion rejecting Petitioner’s due process claim was an

unreasonable application of “clearly established” Supreme Court law that existed at the time

of Petitioner’s trial. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

2. Jury Instructions: Propensity Evidence

Petitioner’s second claim is that CALJIC No. 2.50.01 violated his constitutionally

protected right to due process because it allowed him to be convicted of the current offense

based solely upon the jury’s determination that he committed the prior offense. Petitioner’s

claim is unavailing. In Gibson, the Ninth Circuit found no constitutional error in CALJIC

No. 2.50.01, stating: “Had the jury instructions ended with CALJIC 2.50.01, our inquiry

would have ended with a denial of Gibson’s petition.” See Gibson, 387 F.3d at 822. As

discussed above, the Ninth Circuit granted the habeas petition in Gibson not because the jury

was given CALJIC No. 2.50.01, but rather because CALJIC No. 2.50.01 was followed

immediately by CALJIC No. 2.50.1, which lowered the prosecution’s burden of proof, thus

rendering the jury instructions “constitutionally infirm.” See id.

To the extent Petitioner argues the use of propensity evidence violated his due process

rights, that argument likewise fails. In rejecting this claim, the Court of Appeal noted that

the California Supreme Court has affirmed the constitutionality of Evidence Code § 1108. 

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Specifically, the Court of Appeal cited the California Supreme Court’s decision in People v.

Falsetta as holding that § 1108 properly “expands ‘the admissibility of disposition or

propensity evidence in sex offense cases.’” (See Resp.’s Ex. A at 6 (quoting People v.

Falsetta, 21 Cal.4th 903, 911 (1999)).) 

To date, the United States Supreme Court has not ruled on whether the use of

propensity evidence violates due process; rather, the Supreme Court has expressly declined

to rule on the constitutionality of the use of propensity evidence. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502

U.S. 62 (1991). As discussed above, law clearly established by the United States Supreme

Court is a prerequisite to habeas relief pursuant to § 2254(d)(1). See Williams v. Taylor, 529

U.S. 362, 412 (“Section 2254(d)(1) restricts the source of clearly established law to [the

Supreme] Court’s jurisprudence.”). 

Moreover, although federal courts have not addressed the specific question of whether

California Evidence Code § 1108 violates due process, federal courts addressing the

admission of prior sexual offenses under parallel federal evidentiary rules have found the

admission of such evidence comports with due process provided its prejudicial effect does

not outweigh its probative value. See Fed. R. Evid. 403, 413, 414; United States v. LeMay,

260 F.3d 1018, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Mound, 149 F.3d 799, 801 (8th Cir.

1998); United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1433 (10th Cir. 1998).

Accordingly, it was neither an unreasonable application of nor contrary to federal law

for the state court to find Petitioner’s due process rights had not been violated by the

admission of propensity evidence under California Evidence Code § 1108. As set forth

above, however, Petitioner’s first claim provides a clear basis for relief. Petitioner thus is

entitled to habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

//

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Case 3:01-cv-04974-MMC Document 44 Filed 08/09/07 Page 12 of 13
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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CONCLUSION 

In light of the foregoing, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is GRANTED.

Respondent shall release Petitioner from custody, unless, within ninety (90) days of

the filing of this order and entry of judgment thereon, the state (1) commences retrial

proceedings on the sex offense charges, or (2) commences re-sentencing proceedings on the

two charges that are not affected by this Court’s order. 

All pending motions are terminated.

The Clerk shall close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 9, 2007

____________________________

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

Case 3:01-cv-04974-MMC Document 44 Filed 08/09/07 Page 13 of 13