Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_15-cv-00631/USCOURTS-almd-2_15-cv-00631-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:12201 Americans with Disabilities Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

JOSEPH BOYKIN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CASE NO.: 2:15-cv-631-MHT-GMB

) (WO – Do Not Publish)

GULF COAST ENTERPRISES, )

)

Defendant. )

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff Joseph Boykin (“Boykin”) filed this pro se action on August 31, 2015, 

alleging that he was terminated from his employment because of his disability and age. 

Doc. 1. Now before the court is a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, motion for 

summary judgment filed by Defendant Gulf Coast Enterprises (“Gulf Coast”). Doc. 15. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, this matter was referred to the undersigned United States 

Magistrate Judge for review and submission of a report with recommended findings of 

facts and conclusions of law. For the reasons set forth herein, it is the recommendation of 

the Magistrate Judge that Gulf Coast’s motion (Doc. 15) be DENIED. 

I. JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction over this matter is asserted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The parties 

do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue, and the court finds adequate allegations to 

support jurisdiction and venue within the Middle District of Alabama. 

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II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

At the time Boykin filed his complaint, he was a 75-year-old African American 

male. Doc. 1. From approximately 2007 to 2014, he was employed as a trash collector at 

the Montgomery Veteran’s Administration Annex (“Montgomery VA”) in Montgomery, 

Alabama. Doc. 1. Boykin’s employer was Gulf Coast, an entity that employs persons with 

disabilities and that arranged for Boykin to work at the Montgomery VA. Doc. 1. 

Boykin suffers from persistent bowel and bladder problems and has had his prostate 

removed. Doc. 1. Because of this, Boykin has difficulty controlling his urination. Doc. 1. 

More specifically, if Boykin cannot obtain access to a restroom quickly, he will urinate on 

himself. Doc. 1. As a result, during his employment at the Montgomery VA, Boykin would 

often urinate behind a dumpster if he believed he could not make it to a restroom “to save 

himself from the embarrassment of wetting his pants.” Doc. 1. Boykin did this several 

times without any supervisor telling him not to engage in such behavior. Doc. 1. During 

the relevant time period, Boykin was also the oldest person working for Gulf Coast at the 

Montgomery VA. Doc. 1. Many times his co-workers asked him when he was going to 

retire. Doc. 1.

On September 11, 2014, Boykin was terminated from his position with Gulf Coast 

after he was observed urinating behind an outside dumpster. Doc. 1. Boykin contends that 

he urinated behind the dumpster because the downstairs restroom was being cleaned and 

he could not make it to the upstairs restroom before he urinated on himself. Doc. 1. He 

claims that the reason given by Gulf Coast for his termination—his urinating behind a

dumpster while on duty—was pretextual and that the real reason for his termination was 

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his age and disability. Doc. 1. 

Boykin filed a charge of age and disability discrimination against Gulf Coast on 

September 22, 2014. Doc. 1. On May 27, 2015, the Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission (“EEOC”) mailed Boykin a right-to-sue letter from its Birmingham, Alabama 

office to Boykin in Montgomery, Alabama.

1 Doc. 1-1. 

Boykin filed his complaint on August 31, 2015, alleging claims for age and 

disability discrimination based on his termination by Gulf Coast. Doc. 1. Attached as an 

exhibit to Boykin’s complaint is the right-to-sue letter issued to him by the EEOC. Doc. 

1-1. While this letter indicates that it was mailed from Birmingham to Boykin in 

Montgomery on May 27, 2015, it also contains a handwritten notation indicating that the 

letter was “received” by an unknown individual on June 1, 2015. Doc. 1-1. Other parts of 

the handwritten notation are illegible, and there is no evidence before the court establishing 

what these illegible portions actually state. There is also no evidence before the court 

establishing the handwriting’s author or authors.

On February 3, 2016, Gulf Coast filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, 

motion for summary judgment. Doc. 15. Attached as an exhibit to Gulf Coast’s motion is 

a letter from Boykin’s former attorney in which the attorney states that Boykin “received” 

his right-to-sue letter from the EEOC on May 27, 2015, the same date it was mailed from 

Birmingham to Boykin in Montgomery. Doc. 15. 

On February 4, 2016, the court issued a briefing order informing the parties that it 

 1 The EEOC right-to-sue letter also indicates that it was mailed to Gulf Coast’s counsel in Birmingham as 

well as Boykin’s former lawyer in Montgomery.

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may treat Gulf Coast’s motion as one for summary judgment and providing Boykin with 

instructions on how to respond to such a motion. Doc. 17. Boykin initially failed to respond 

to Gulf Coast’s motion. After Gulf Coast filed a reply on February 25, 2016 (Doc. 18),

Boykin sought and was granted an extension of time to respond to Gulf Coast’s motion, 

and he filed a two-page response on March 11, 2016. Docs. 19–21. Gulf Coast filed a reply

to Boykin’s response on March 14, 2016. Doc. 22. With briefing completed, Gulf Coast’s 

motion is now ripe for review and disposition.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because matters outside the pleadings have been submitted in support of Gulf 

Coast’s motion and have been considered by the court in making this recommendation,

2

the court must construe the motion as one for summary judgment rather than for dismissal. 

Accordingly, the court will apply the summary-judgment standard of review. 

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party “always bears the initial responsibility of 

informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the 

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 

 2 The court recognizes that conversion of a motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment is not always 

required when the district court considers an extrinsic document if that document is (1) central to the 

plaintiff’s claims and (2) its authenticity is not disputed. See Speaker v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 

Servs. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, 623 F.3d 1371, 1379 (11th Cir. 2010). In the employment 

context, this exception routinely includes EEOC documents. See Chesnut v. Ethan Allen Retail, Inc., 971 

F. Supp. 2d 1223, 1228 (N.D. Ga. 2013). However, in this case, the court is considering documents other 

than Boykin’s EEOC documents—namely, correspondence from his former lawyer to defense counsel—in 

deciding Gulf Coast’s motion. Thus, the proper course of action is for the court to treat the motion as one 

for summary judgment. 

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affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine [dispute] of 

material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (internal quotations 

omitted) (alteration to original). 

In responding to a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the 

non-moving party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt 

as to the material fact.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 

574, 586 (1986). If the evidence is “merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, 

summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 

249−50 (1986) (internal citations omitted). “However, disagreement between the parties 

is not significant unless the disagreement presents a genuine [dispute] of material fact.” 

Gamble v. Pinnoak Resources, LLC, 511 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1122 (N.D. Ala. 2007) (internal 

quotations omitted) (alteration to original). A factual dispute is genuine when “the 

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

Finally, when a district court considers a motion for summary judgment, all 

evidence and inferences drawn from the evidence must be viewed in the light most 

favorable to the non-moving party. Graham v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 193 F.3d 1274, 

1282 (11th Cir. 1999). “The court must avoid weighing conflicting evidence or making 

credibility determinations. Instead, ‘[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, 

and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.’” Gamble, 511 F. Supp. 2d at 

1122 (quoting Steward v. Booker T. Washington Ins. Co., 232 F.3d 844, 848 (11th Cir. 

2000) (internal quotations and citations omitted)). “Where a reasonable fact finder may 

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draw more than one inference from the facts, then the court should refuse to grant summary 

judgment.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).

IV. DISCUSSION

Gulf Coast’s motion seeks the entry of summary judgment in its favor on Boykin’s 

age and disability claims on essentially three grounds: (1) that Boykin failed to file his 

lawsuit in a timely manner; (2) that Boykin did not comply with Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 4(m) or the orders of this court; and (3) that Boykin is judicially estopped from 

pursuing his claims because he failed to disclose his EEOC charge and this lawsuit in his

Chapter 13 bankruptcy filings. After careful consideration, the court does not find these 

arguments sufficient to warrant the entry of summary judgment in Gulf Coast’s favor at 

this time.3

A. Timeliness of Lawsuit

Under Title VII, once an aggrieved party has received a right-to-sue notice from the 

EEOC, the party has 90 days to bring a civil action against the defendant named in the 

charge. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).4 “Once the defendant contests this issue, the plaintiff 

has the burden of establishing that he met the ninety day filing requirement.” Green v. 

 3 The court notes that Gulf Coast’s motion was alternatively filed as a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rules 

12(b) and 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court finds that the motion would be due to 

be denied, for reasons similar to those set forth herein, even if the court were to treat it as a motion to 

dismiss.

4 “It is settled law that, under the ADA, plaintiffs must comply with the same procedural requirements to 

sue as exist under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.” Zillvette v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 179 F.3d 

1337, 1339 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a)). “Similarly, the ADEA provides that a plaintiff 

asserting a claim under that statute must file her complaint within 90 days of her receipt of a right-to-sue 

letter.” Miller v. Georgia, 223 Fed. App’x 842, 844 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 626(e); Kerr v. 

McDonald’s Corp., 427 F.3d 947, 951 (11th Cir. 2005)).

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Union Foundry Co., 281 F.3d 1229, 1234 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing Jackson v. Seaboard 

Coast Line R.R. Co., 678 F.2d 992, 1010 (11th Cir. 1982)). Thus, if there is no genuine 

dispute that Boykin failed to file his age and disability claims within 90 days of his receipt 

of the EEOC’s right-to-sue letter, then his claims must be dismissed as time-barred. Id. at

1233.

Boykin’s complaint alleges that the EEOC “issued” him a right-to-sue letter, with 

no determination, on May 27, 2015. Doc. 1, ¶ 2. The right-to-sue letter attached as an 

exhibit to Boykin’s complaint also states that it was mailed on May 27, 2015. Doc. 1-1. 

Indeed, this date—May 27, 2015—is the basis for Gulf Coast’s timeliness argument. That 

is, Gulf Coast claims that Boykin’s complaint must have been filed within 90 days of May 

27, 2015, which was August 25, 2015, and thus his claims are time-barred since he did not 

file his complaint until August 31, 2015.

However, the record before the court reveals conflicting evidence as to the date of 

Boykin’s receipt of the letter. While Gulf Coast submitted a letter from Boykin’s former 

attorney stating that Boykin received his right-to-sue letter on May 27, 2015,5 the right-tosue letter submitted with Boykin’s complaint also contains a handwritten notation 

indicating that the letter was “received” by an unidentified individual on June 1, 2015. 

Docs. 1, 1-1, 15. If Boykin did actually receive the right-to-sue letter on June 1, 2015, then 

 5 To the extent the EEOC right-to-sue letter or the letter from Boykin’s former attorney may be characterized 

as hearsay, this evidence may be considered at summary judgment if it can be reduced to admissible form 

at trial. See Macuba v. Deboer, 193 F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing several cases). The court finds 

that, assuming this evidence constitutes hearsay, it could be admissible at trial through the presentation of 

live testimony or through an exception to the hearsay rule, and therefore it may be considered at the 

summary-judgment stage.

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the 90-day deadline to file his complaint would not have expired until August 31, 20156—

the day he filed his complaint. Thus, Boykin’s claims would be timely.

There is no evidence before the court demonstrating who wrote the handwritten 

notation on Boykin’s right-to-sue letter, what the other parts of the notation say, or who

received the letter on June 1, 2015. Moreover, from a logistical standpoint the court finds 

it unlikely—though certainly not impossible—that Boykin received the right-to-sue letter 

in Montgomery on the same day it was mailed from the EEOC’s Birmingham office. As 

a result, the evidence currently before the court is sufficient, when taken in a light most 

favorable to Boykin, as the non-movant, to create a genuine factual dispute as to the date 

Boykin received his right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. This disputed fact prevents the 

court from recommending the entry of summary judgment in Gulf Coast’s favor on 

timeliness grounds at this time.

7

B. Compliance with Rule 4(m) and Orders of the Court

Gulf Coast also seeks summary judgment on Boykin’s claims on the basis that the 

complaint was not served within the timeframe required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

4(m) and Boykin has otherwise failed to comply with orders of the court. The court 

declines to recommend the entry of summary judgment in Gulf Coast’s favor on these 

grounds. While pro se parties are obligated to follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

 6 Strictly speaking, Boykin’s 90-day deadline fell on Sunday, August 30, 2015, so the filing period 

continued to run until the end of the next day that was not a Sunday, which was Monday, August 31, 2015. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1)(C).

7 While summary judgment is not appropriate at this time, the court may entertain a subsequent motion for 

summary judgment on timeliness grounds once the parties have had an opportunity to conduct discovery—

even limited discovery—on when Boykin received his right-to-sue letter. 

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and the court’s local rules, they are also granted some leniency, as they generally are not 

lawyers and are not familiar with the mechanics of a federal lawsuit. In light of his pro se 

status, the court finds that Boykin’s compliance with court rules and orders has not be so 

deficient as to mandate the entry of summary judgment at this early stage in the litigation. 

When the court issued a show-cause order indicating that there was no evidence before it 

demonstrating that Gulf Coast had been properly served and requiring Boykin to provide 

an explanation as to why his complaint should not be dismissed for want of prosecution 

(Doc. 10), Boykin timely responded and perfected service on Gulf Coast on January 13, 

2016. Thus, the court elected to exercise its discretion to extend the time for service upon 

a showing of good cause. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) (“But if the plaintiff shows good cause 

for the failure, the court must extend the time for service for an appropriate period.”).

The court similarly does not find merit in Gulf Coast’s argument that Boykin’s 

claims should be dismissed because he did not respond to the court’s February 4, 2016 

briefing order (Doc. 17) or its February 29, 2016 order (Doc. 20). While Boykin was late 

in responding to the court’s February 4, 2016 briefing order, he did file a motion for 

extension of time to respond on February 26, 2016 (Doc. 19), which the court, in its 

discretion, granted. And even though Boykin’s response to Gulf Coast’s summary 

judgment motion (Doc. 21) is not as specific or as thorough as a response from a lawyer 

might have been, the court finds that it sufficiently complies with the directives of the 

court’s February 29, 2016 order. Thus, Gulf Coast’s motion for summary judgment is due 

to be denied to the extent it seeks summary judgment on Boykin’s claims based on his 

failure to comply with Rule 4(m) or certain orders of the court. 

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C. Judicial Estoppel

Gulf Coast’s final argument is that Boykin should be judicially estopped from 

pursuing his claims in this case because he did not list his charge of discrimination or this 

lawsuit as an asset in his Chapter 13 bankruptcy filings. Boykin filed his Chapter 13 

petition on July 31, 2015, almost a year after he filed his charge of discrimination against 

Gulf Coast and a month before he filed this lawsuit. 

Gulf Coast did not raise this argument until its second reply brief, and Boykin has 

not had an opportunity to respond. As a result, the court will not consider Gulf Coast’s 

judicial estoppel argument at this time, particularly when Gulf Coast could have discovered

the existence of Boykin’s bankruptcy petition before it filed its motion for summary 

judgment through reasonable investigation. See Wetherbee v. S. Co., 423 Fed. App’x 933, 

934 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Lovett v Ray, 327 F.3d 1181, 1183 (11th Cir. 2003) (“[W]e do 

not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief.”)).

Even if the court were to entertain Gulf Coast’s judicial estoppel argument, there is 

insufficient evidence before the court to warrant the entry of summary judgment on this 

basis. As noted by Gulf Coast in its second reply brief, the Eleventh Circuit has recognized 

“that when a debtor fails to disclose a pending lawsuit to the bankruptcy court, while having 

knowledge of the lawsuit and a motive to conceal it, the doctrine of judicial estoppel bars 

the undisclosed action from proceeding.” Dunn v. Advanced Med. Specialties, Inc., 556 

Fed. App’x 785, 788 (11th Cir. 2014); see Doc. 22. The Eleventh Circuit applies judicial 

estoppel “in situations involving intentional contradictions, not simple error or 

inadvertence.” Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 291 F.3d 1282, 1286 (11th Cir. 2002). Gulf 

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Coast has presented no evidence demonstrating Boykin’s motive or intent in failing to 

disclose his EEOC charge or this lawsuit in his Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceedings, and 

without such evidence the court cannot conclude as a matter of law that the doctrine of 

judicial estoppel bars Boykin’s claims. Thus, Gulf Coast’s motion for summary judgment 

on the basis of judicial estoppel is due to be denied. 

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate 

Judge that Gulf Coast’s motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, motion for summary 

judgment (Doc. 15) be DENIED.

It is further ORDERED that the parties shall file any objections to this 

recommendation on or before March 31, 2016. Any objections filed must specifically 

identify the findings in the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation to which an objection is 

being asserted. Frivolous, conclusive, or general objections will not be considered by the 

district court. The parties are advised that this report and recommendation is not a final 

order of the court, and, therefore, it is not appealable. 

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in 

the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation shall bar the party from a de novo

determination by the district court of issues addressed in the report and recommendation, 

and shall bar the party from attacking on appeal factual findings in the report and 

recommendation that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of 

plain error or manifest injustice. See Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982); 

Stein v. Reynolds Sec., Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982); Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 

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F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (adopting as binding precedent all decisions of the 

former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981).

DONE this 17th day of March, 2016.

/s/ Gray M. Borden

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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