Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01252/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-01252-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERIC ANGEL THOMAS,

CDC# T-68246, Civil No. 07-1252 LAB (BLM)

Plaintiff, ORDER: 

(1) DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED

COMPLAINT WITHOUT

PREJUDICE FOR FAILING TO

STATE A CLAIM AND FOR

SEEKING MONETARY DAMAGES

AGAINST DEFENDANTS WHO ARE

IMMUNE PURSUANT TO

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b) & 1915A(b);

AND

(2) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

RENEWED MOTION FOR STAY

AND ABEYANCE [Doc. No. 7]

vs.

GEORGE W. CLARKE, BERNARD E.

REVAK, LEO VALENTINE, GARY

EDWARDS, 

Defendants.

I. Procedural History

On July 7, 2007, Plaintiff, a state inmate currently incarcerated at Folsom State Prison in

Represa, California, proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. In his Complaint, Plaintiff claimed that San Diego Superior Court Judges violated his

constitutional rights when they refused to remove Plaintiff’s Court appointed counsel, Gary

Edwards, from representing Plaintiff at the preliminary hearing of his criminal proceedings.

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In addition to filing a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”), Plaintiff also filed

a “Motion for Stay and Abeyance of Federal Civil Rights Complaint.” This Court granted

Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP but simultaneously dismissed his Complaint for failing to state

a claim upon which § 1983 relief could be granted and denied Plaintiff’s Motion for Stay and

Abeyance. See Aug. 13, 2007 Order at 6-7. The Court identified the many deficiencies of

pleading in Plaintiff’s Complaint. Id. at 3-6. Nonetheless, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to

file an Amended Complaint in order to correct those deficiencies of pleading. Id. at 7. On

September 12, 2007, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), in addition he filed

a renewed “Motion for Stay and Abeyance of Civil Action pending Exhaustion of State

Proceedings.” 

II. Sua Sponte Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b)

As the Court stated in its previous Order, notwithstanding payment of any filing fee or

portion thereof, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires courts to review complaints

filed by prisoners against officers or employees of governmental entities and dismiss those or

any portion of those found frivolous, malicious, failing to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, or seeking monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A; Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)

(§ 1915(e)(2)); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 446 (9th Cir. 2000) (§ 1915A).

Prior to the PLRA, the former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) permitted sua sponte dismissal of only

frivolous and malicious claims. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126, 1130. However 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A now mandate that the court reviewing a prisoner’s suit make and rule

on its own motion to dismiss before directing that the complaint be served by the U.S. Marshal

pursuant to FED.R.CIV. P. 4(c)(2). Id. at 1127 (“[S]ection 1915(e) not only permits, but requires

a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a claim.”); Barren v.

Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). The district court should grant leave to

amend, however, unless it determines that “the pleading could not possibly be cured by the

allegation of other facts” and if it appears “at all possible that the plaintiff can correct the

defect.” Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130-31 (citing Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir.

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1995); Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1990)). 

“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all

allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff.” Resnick, 213 F.3d at 447; Barren, 152 F.3d at 1194 (noting that § 1915(e)(2)

“parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). However, while liberal

construction is “particularly important in civil rights cases,” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258,

1261 (9th Cir. 1992), the court may nevertheless not “supply essential elements of the claim that

were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Board of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268

(9th Cir. 1982). 

As currently pleaded, it is clear that Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint fails to state a

cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 imposes two essential proof

requirements upon a claimant: (1) that a person acting under color of state law committed the

conduct at issue, and (2) that the conduct deprived the claimant of some right, privilege, or

immunity protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983;

Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams,

474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986); Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc).

The allegations in Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint are no different than those he

presented in his original Complaint. Specifically, Plaintiff continues to allege that his due

process rights were violated by San Diego Superior Court Judges during his criminal trial

proceedings. He vehemently disagrees with the rulings that were made by these Judges and

claims that his “conviction should not stand. . . meaning the [criminal conviction] is

illegitimate.” See FAC at 5. 

As the Court informed Plaintiff in its previous Order, he cannot seek monetary damages

against San Diego Superior Court Judges Clarke, Revak and Valentine because they are entitled

to absolute judicial immunity. See Aug. 13, 2007 Order at 6 (citing Stump v. Sparkman, 435

U.S. 349, 359 (1978) (noting the longstanding rule that “[a] judge is absolutely immune from

liability for his judicial acts even if his exercise of authority is flawed by the commission of

grave procedural errors.”); Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Judges and

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those performing judge-like functions are absolutely from damage liability for acts performed

in their official capacities.”)). The allegations made by Plaintiff all relate directly to the rulings

these Judges made during his criminal proceedings. Thus, the claims against Defendants Clarke,

Revak and Valentine are dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for seeking

monetary relief against defendants who are immune from such relief.

In addition, the entire basis for Plaitniff’s First Amended Complaint, is the allegation that

he was convicted of a crime due to the actions, or inactions, of all the named Defendants. Such

allegations amount to an attack on the validity of his underlying criminal proceedings, and as

such, are not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless and until he can show that conviction

has already been invalidated. See Aug. 13, 2007 Order (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,

486-87 (1994)). He has failed to show that his conviction has been invalidated. Instead, he

claims that his criminal action was “obtained by ‘illegal’ and ‘unconstitutional means.” FAC

at 5. Heck holds that “in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or

imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a

conviction or sentence invalid, a section 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or

sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by

a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal

court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. A claim challenging the

legality of a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under §

1983. Id. at 487; Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 643 (1997).

In Heck, the Supreme Court held that: 

when a state prisoner seeks damages in a section 1983 suit, the

district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the

plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or

sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the

plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already

been invalidated. But if the district court determines that the

plaintiff’s action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the

invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the

plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed.

Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 (emphasis added). An action that is barred by Heck should be dismissed

for failure to state a claim without prejudice to Plaintiff’s right to file a new action if he succeeds

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in invalidating his conviction. Edwards, 520 U.S. at 649.

In addition, this Court will not convert Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint into a

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973)

(holding that “when a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical

imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release

. . . his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.”). 

Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint must be dismissed for

failing to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief may be granted and for seeking monetary

damages against immune Defendants. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27.

Because the Court has previously notified Plaintiff of his pleading deficiencies and has already

granted him an opportunity to amend, and it does not now appear “at all possible that ... plaintiff

can correct the defect(s)” of his pleading, further leave to amend is denied as futile. See Lopez,

203 F.3d at 1130-31.

III. Plaintiff’s Motion for Stay and Abeyance of Federal Civil Rights Complaint

Once again, Plaintiff also seeks an Order from this Court staying this action while he

proceeds with his state habeas petition [Doc. No. 7]. For this proposition Plaintiff relies on the

recent Supreme Court decision found in Wallace v. Kato, __ U.S. __, 127 S.Ct. 1091 (2007).

However, in Wallace, the Supreme Court held the limitation period for a § 1983 claim for false

arrest “begins to run at the time the claimant becomes detained pursuant to legal process,” even

where the arrest later leads to a criminal conviction. Id. at 1100. Here, Plaintiff has no false

arrest claims and his First Amended Complaint suffers from deficiencies other than the Heck bar.

Thus, Plaintiff’s Motion for a Stay and Abeyance is DENIED [Doc. No. 7]. 

IV. Conclusion and Order

Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s renewed “Motion for Stay and Abeyance of Federal Civil Rights

Complaint Proceeding Pending Exhaustion of State Habeas Petition” [Doc. No. 7] is DENIED.

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1

 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) provides that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal

... under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any

facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds

that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the

prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

K:\COMMON\BURNS\_CASES DJ\CIVIL\_ATTENTION - SIGNED ORDERS\07cv1252 Dismiss FAC -6- 07cv1252

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that:

2. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint [Doc. No. 5] is DISMISSED for failing to state

a claim upon which section 1983 relief can be granted and for seeking monetary damages against

immune Defendants without further leave to amend pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and

1915A. Plaintiff is further notified that this dismissal may later be counted as a “strike” against

him pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).1

The Clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 9, 2007

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

United States District Judge

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