Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-01689/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-01689-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 370
Nature of Suit: Other Fraud
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Petition for Removal

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PATTI ANN COPPES,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

WACHOVIA MORTGAGE CORPORATION

and WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., and

DOES 1 through 40,

 Defendants.

________________________________

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

2:10-cv-01689-GEB-DAD

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

APPLICATION FOR A TEMPORARY

RESTRAINING ORDER

Plaintiff filed an application for a temporary restraining

order (“TRO”) on Friday, July 16, 2010 at 5:07 p.m., in which she

seeks to enjoin Defendants “from conducting the trustee’s sale

scheduled to occur on July 20, 2010, or any other such trustee’s sale

under that certain Deed of Trust against [the] real property [located

at] 8748 Robben Rd., Dixon CA 95620, County of Solano.” (Ex Parte

Application 2:5-8.) Plaintiff stated in her application that her TRO

would be heard at 8:15 a.m. on Monday, July 19, 2010. A Minute Order

issued on July 16 vacating the hearing time since Plaintiff failed to

provide sufficient opportunity for the Court to consider her

application. Defendant Wachovia Mortgage (“Wachovia”) filed an

opposition to Plaintiff’s application Sunday evening on July 18, 2010. 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 governs the issuance of a

TRO. “A plaintiff seeking a [TRO] must establish that [she] is likely

to succeed on the merits, that [she] is likely to suffer irreparable

Case 2:10-cv-01689-GEB-DAD Document 12 Filed 07/19/10 Page 1 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of

equities tips in [her] favor, and that an injunction is in the public

interest.” Am. Trucking Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 559 F.3d

1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Winter v. Natural Res. Def.

Council, Inc., --- U.S. ----, 129 S. Ct. 365, 374, (2008)); see also

Stuhlbarg Intern. Sales Co., Inc. v. John D. Brushy and Co., Inc., 240

F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating the standards for issuing a

TRO are “substantially identical” to those for issuing a preliminary

injunction); Pimentel v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co., 2009 WL

3398789,*1 (S.D. Cal. 2009) (stating that “[t]emporary restraining

orders are governed by the same standard applicable to preliminary

injunctions”) (citation omitted). Further, “[i]n considering a motion

for a temporary restraining order, the Court will consider whether the

applicant could have sought relief by motion for preliminary

injunction at an earlier date without the necessity for seeking lastminute relief by motion for temporary restraining order. Should the

Court find that the applicant unduly delayed in seeking injunctive

relief, the Court may conclude that the delay . . . contradicts the

applicant’s allegations of irreparable injury and may deny the motion

solely on [that] ground.” E.D. Cal. R. 231(b). 

Plaintiff argues she will suffer irreparable injury since

“[i]f the Plaintiff and [her] family are forced to move . . . [they]

will lose their home and be required to uproot . . . to another

place.” (P. & A. in Supp. of Application 8:4-7.) However, Plaintiff

has not shown why she “could [not] have sought relief by motion for

preliminary injunction at an earlier date without the necessity for

seeking last-minute relief by motion for [a TRO].” E.D. Cal. R.

231(b). Plaintiff’s application indicates she has been aware of

Case 2:10-cv-01689-GEB-DAD Document 12 Filed 07/19/10 Page 2 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

Defendants’ desire to initiate foreclosure proceedings on Plaintiff’s

property, at a minimum, since March 12, 2010, when Plaintiff alleges

she received a Notice of Default. (Compl. ¶ 21; Coppes Decl. ¶ 12.) 

Plaintiff also states in her Application “Defendants issued a Notice

of Sale on June 13, 2010.” (P. & A. in Supp. of Application 7:22-24;

see also Compl ¶ 35 (alleging Defendants sent Plaintiff the Notice of

Sale on June 16, 2010).) Further, Plaintiff’s counsel declares he

notified Defendants of Plaintiff’s intention to seek a TRO on July 13,

2010, a week before the trustee’s sale. (Abdallah Decl. ¶ 2.) 

Nonetheless, Plaintiff did not seek injunctive relief until 5:07 p.m.

on Friday, July 16, 2010, one Court day before the scheduled sale of

her property. Plaintiff has not explained why she waited nearly one

month after filing her complaint on June 17, 2010 to file her TRO

application.

Wachovia includes with its opposition a declaration from

Michael Barnas, the Vice President of Loan Documentation for Wachovia

Mortgage, who is responsible for overseeing foreclosure proceedings

for borrowers like Plaintiff. Barnas declares that in a letter dated

January 29, 2010, from Wachovia to Plaintiff, Plaintiff was informed

“that Wachovia had not received the last five mortgage payments

totaling $15,665.75.” Barnas also declares that in a letter dated

April 27, 2010, Plaintiff was informed she is not eligible for

assistance under the Temporary Payment Reduction Program due to

her current financial condition; and that Plaintiff was informed in a 

letter dated June 25, 2010, “that plaintiff had not been approved for

loan modification and that the loan is currently moving towards

foreclosure.”

Case 2:10-cv-01689-GEB-DAD Document 12 Filed 07/19/10 Page 3 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

Since the record shows that Plaintiff has known the 

foreclosure has been looming since and before she received the June 25

letter, and Plaintiff fails to explain why she failed to seek an

injunction earlier, this “delay contradicts [P]laintiff’s allegations

of irreparable injury, and [P]laintiff’s motion is denied.” Mammoth

Specialty Lodging, LLC v. We-Ka Jassa Inv. Fund, LLC, 2010 WL 1539811,

at *2 (E.D. Cal. 2010).

For the stated reasons, Plaintiff’s application for a TRO is

DENIED.

Dated: July 19, 2010

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

Case 2:10-cv-01689-GEB-DAD Document 12 Filed 07/19/10 Page 4 of 4