Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-07566/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-07566-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

LAWRENCE EUGENE PATTERSON, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

FERNAND ALVAREZ, 

Defendant. 

Case No. 18-cv-07566-PJH 

ORDER OF DISMISSAL 

Plaintiff, a state prisoner, proceeds with a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. The original complaint was dismissed with leave to amend and plaintiff 

has filed an amended complaint. 

DISCUSSION 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners 

seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and 

dismiss any claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief 

may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 

relief. Id. at 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. 

Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and plain statement 

of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." "Specific facts are not 

necessary; the statement need only '"give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . . claim 

is and the grounds upon which it rests."'" Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) 

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(citations omitted). Although in order to state a claim a complaint “does not need detailed 

factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds’ of his 'entitle[ment] 

to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the 

elements of a cause of action will not do. . . . Factual allegations must be enough to 

raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 

U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). A complaint must proffer "enough facts to state 

a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570. The United States Supreme 

Court has recently explained the “plausible on its face” standard of Twombly: “While legal 

conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual 

allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their 

veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential 

elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was 

violated, and (2) that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the 

color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 

LEGAL CLAIMS 

Plaintiff states that he received inadequate eye care and lost sight in his left eye. 

Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment’s 

proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 

(1976); McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other 

grounds, WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en 

banc). A determination of “deliberate indifference” involves an examination of two 

elements: the seriousness of the prisoner's medical need and the nature of the 

defendant's response to that need. Id. at 1059. 

A “serious” medical need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could 

result in further significant injury or the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Id. 

The existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and 

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worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly 

affects an individual's daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain are 

examples of indications that a prisoner has a “serious” need for medical treatment. Id. at 

1059-60. 

A prison official is deliberately indifferent if he or she knows that a prisoner faces a 

substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable 

steps to abate it. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). The prison official must 

not only “be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial 

risk of serious harm exists,” but he “must also draw the inference.” Id. If a prison official 

should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the official has not violated the 

Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk. Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 

F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002). “A difference of opinion between a prisoner-patient and 

prison medical authorities regarding treatment does not give rise to a § 1983 claim.” 

Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981). 

Section 1983 does not contain its own limitations period. The appropriate period is 

that of the forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury torts. See Wilson v. 

Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985); TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 1999). 

In California, the general residual statute of limitations for personal injury actions is the 

two-year period set forth at California Civil Procedure Code section 335.1 and is the 

applicable statute in § 1983 actions. See Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 954 (9th 

Cir. 2004); see also Silva v. Crain, 169 F.3d 608, 610 (9th Cir. 1999) (limitations period 

for filing § 1983 action in California governed by residual limitations period for personal 

injury actions in California, which was then one year and codified in Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 

§ 340(3)); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1 (enacted in 2002) (current codification of residual 

limitations period, which is now two years). 

California Civil Procedure Code section 352.1 recognizes imprisonment as a 

disability that tolls the statute of limitations for up to two years when a person is 

“imprisoned on a criminal charge, or in execution under the sentence of a criminal court 

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for a term less than for life.” See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 352.1(a). 

On October 9, 2013, plaintiff complained to medical officials about blurry vision in 

his left eye. He was examined by medical staff and provided eye drops. On October 10, 

2013, plaintiff was seen by defendant Dr. Alvarez, after plaintiff suffered a sudden loss of 

vision. Defendant ordered an urgent referral to Ophthalmology, though plaintiff states 

that defendant did not detect any damage to plaintiff’s left eye. 

Plaintiff was seen on October 16, 2013, by an eye doctor who diagnosed a retinal 

detachment and recommended plaintiff be seen by an outside retina specialist. The next 

day, October 17, 2013, plaintiff was seen by an outside retina specialist and surgery was 

performed on October 18, 2013, to reattach the retina. At a follow up appointment with 

the retina specialist on April 4, 2014, it was noted that plaintiff’s retina was reattached, 

but he had developed a cataract and a macular pucker. Another surgery was conducted 

on August 25, 2014, to correct these new problems. An additional surgery occurred on 

December 9, 2014. On June 1, 2016, the outside specialist concluded that the vision 

would not improve further. Beginning in October 2016, plaintiff was seen several times 

by ophthalmology and retina specialists at the University of California San Francisco. 

Plaintiff alleges that he was not timely notified of the damage to his eye and that 

his vision would not improve, and that defendant Dr. Alvarez failed to detect damage to 

his eye. He also argues that his medical issues were not timely treated. The original 

complaint was dismissed with leave to amend to address the statute of limitations and 

provide more details how defendant violated his constitutional rights. Plaintiff has failed 

to cure the deficiencies of the original complaint. Even assuming this action is timely, 

plaintiff has not shown an Eighth Amendment violation. Plaintiff was promptly seen by 

medical staff and referred to specialists and received various surgeries. Defendant 

examined plaintiff and even if he did not discover the specific extent of the damage to the 

eye he urgently referred plaintiff to Ophthalmology. Within eight days plaintiff was 

diagnosed with a detached retina and received surgery. This does not demonstrate 

deliberate indifference, and this was defendant’s only involvement. To the extent that 

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defendant did not inform plaintiff of the damage to his eye, defendant only treated plaintiff 

once and was not an eye doctor. Plaintiff was subsequently seen by several eye 

specialists. If none of the eye specialists at the various appointments and surgeries over 

the years discussed plaintiff’s condition with him, defendant is not liable. Plaintiff has 

failed to state a claim and because further amendment would be futile, this action is 

dismissed without leave to amend. 

CONCLUSION 

1. This action is DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to state a claim. 

2. The clerk shall close this case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: June 28, 2019 

 

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON 

United States District Judge 

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