Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02626/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02626-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRIAN K. CRAWFORD,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-03-2626 MCE JFM P

vs.

DIANA K. BUTLER, Warden, et.al,

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding in propria persona with an application for

a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges his April 14, 2000,

conviction on charges of first degree burglary, CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 459, 460, and receiving

stolen property, CAL. PENAL CODE § 496(a), the finding that he had four serious prior felony

convictions within the meaning of the “three strikes law,” CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667(b)-(i),

1170.12, and that he had served two prior, separate prison terms, CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667.5(b),

and his sentence of 36 years to life in prison imposed thereon on August 11, 2000. Petitioner

raises three claims in his petition, filed December 4, 2003, that his prison sentence violates the

Constitution. Petitioner alleges that the giving of California Jury Instruction (hereinafter

“CALJIC”) No. 2.15 by the trial court violated his due process rights by allowing the jury to

draw an impermissible inference of guilt as to the charge of first-degree burglary from the

petitioner’s possession of stolen property. Second, petitioner claims that his right to effective

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 The facts are taken from the opinion of the California Court of Appeal for the Third 1

Appellate District in People v. Crawford, No.# C036567 (January 30, 2002) (hereinafter

Opinion), a copy of which is attached as Exhibit C to Respondent’s Answer, filed January 28,

2004.

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assistance of counsel was violated when the trial court denied his motion to substitute counsel. 

Finally, petitioner argues that the trial transcripts were impermissibly altered, implicating him in

the charged offenses and denying him a fair trial.

FACTS1

As Mary R. was returning home for lunch on June 14, 1999, she

observed defendant, whom she had never seen before, walking

along the street looking into the windows of two nearby houses. A

moped was parked in front of one of the houses. She lost sight of

defendant when he walked behind a garage.

While eating lunch, Mary R. became suspicious of defendant’s

conduct. Thus she drove back toward the houses where she had

seen him. When she saw that the gate between the houses was

open, she returned home and dialed 911. While waiting for the

officers to come, she saw defendant walk out from the area of the

houses. He was wearing or carrying gloves and went to the moped. 

Defendant then obtained a bag and walked back to the front of one

of the houses, where Mary R. lost sight of him.

As Mary R. was leaving her home to get the license plate number

of the moped, Deputy Sheriff Jerry Bufford drove up. While Mary

R. was telling Bufford about her observations, defendant drove off

on the moped with “stuff in his possession.” Bufford and other

officers gave chase and stopped defendant. In his pockets were 14

gold chains and 18 gold rings. A duffel bag that he was carrying

contained a video cassette recorder, a small stereo system,

headphones, and camera equipment. He also possessed a pair of

gloves.

James C., the owner of one of the residences where Mary R. had

seen defendant, identified all of the items, except the gloves and

duffel bag, as having been stolen from his residence, which had

been entered by a person who damaged the screen to a bedroom

window that had been partly left open.

Approximately one week after the burglary, James C. received a

letter that defendant mailed from county jail. It stated: “Well I was

laying in bed last night reading ‘Revelation’ in my Bible, and

something came over me, and told me to write you and tell you that

I’m sorry for what you’ve went through on the 14 of June and I th

pray that you would please forgive me.”

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(People v. Crawford, slip op. at 2-3). 

ANALYSIS

I. Standards for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

Federal habeas corpus relief is not available for any claim decided on the merits in

state court proceedings unless the state court's adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Under section 2254(d)(1), a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly

established United States Supreme Court precedents if it applies a rule that contradicts the

governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or if it confronts a set of facts that are materially

indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at different

result. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 7 (2002) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-406

(2000)). 

Under the “unreasonable application” clause of section 2254(d)(1), a federal

habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle

from the Supreme Court’s decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the

prisoner’s case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. A federal habeas court “may not issue the writ

simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court

decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that

application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 412; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63,

123 S.Ct. 1166, 1175 (2003) (it is “not enough that a federal habeas court, in its independent

review of the legal question, is left with a ‘firm conviction’ that the state court was ‘erroneous.’”)

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The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state

court judgment. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002). 

II. Petitioner’s Claims

A. The Trial Court’s Jury Instruction Did Not Deny Due Process.

Petitioner’s first claim is that a jury instruction by the trial judge that permitted a

presumption as to the charge of burglary to arise from the possession of stolen property violated

due process. Petitioner contends that CALJIC No. 2.15, which permits the jury to infer that a

defendant is guilty of burglary when he is in possession of stolen property and some other

corroborating evidence is present, violates due process because it permitted the jury to convict

with evidence not proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Petitioner’s claim is without merit and

denial is recommended. 

The last reasoned rejection of this claim is the decision on petitioner’s direct

appeal by the Court of Appeal for the State of California, Third Appellate District. The state

appellate court rejected this claim on the ground that:

 The court instructed the jury as follows: “If you find that a

defendant was in conscious possession of recently stolen property,

the fact of that possession is not by itself sufficient to permit an

inference that the defendant is guilty of the crime of burglary. 

Before guilt may be inferred, there must be corroborating evidence

tending to prove defendant’s guilt. However, this corroborating

evidence need only be slight, and need not by itself be sufficient to

warrant an inference of guilt. [¶] As corroboration, you may

consider the attributes of possession – time, place and manner, that

the defendant had an opportunity to commit the crime charged, the

defendant’s conduct, and any other evidence which tends to

connect defendant with the crime charged.” (CALJIC No. 2.15

(6th ed. 1996) p. 57.)

Defendant contends the giving of CALJIC No. 2.15 deprived him

of due process because it “permits a jury to find a defendant guilty

of burglary based on his conscious possession of recently stolen

property and only slight corroboration evidence,” thereby

conflicting with and lessening the burden of proof set forth in the

reasonable doubt instruct, CALJIC No. 2.90. We disagree.

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Instructions are not considered in isolation; their correctness and

adequacy is determined by consideration of the entire charge to the

jury. (People v. Wilson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 926, 943.)

Here the jury was advised that the instructions were to be

considered as a whole, each in light of all the others. In addition to

defining reasonable doubt and informing the jury that defendant

was presumed innocent until the prosecution had proven him guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury was instructed on the required

elements of burglary and receiving stolen property, and was told

that in order to prove those crimes, each of the elements must be

proved.

Given the entire instructional charge, the jury would have

understood CALJIC No. 2.15 to preclude a finding of guilt of the

burglary only on the fact that defendant was knowingly in

possession of property taken in a burglary which had just occurred. 

The jury would also have understood that the inference of guilt

permitted by CALJIC No. 2.15 could be drawn only if defendant’s

recent possession of the victim’s stolen property coupled with the

corroborating evidence was sufficient to prove defendant’s guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt. Consequently, the instruction did not

lessen the prosecution’s burden of proof. (People v. Holt (1997)

15 Cal.4th 619, 677.) 

(People v. Crawford, slip op. at 9-11.)

In general, a challenge to jury instructions does not state a federal constitutional

claim. See Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Engle v. Isaac, 456

U.S. 107, 119 (1982)); Gutierrez v. Griggs, 695 F.2d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir. 1983). In order to

warrant federal habeas relief, a challenged jury instruction “cannot be merely ‘undesirable,

erroneous, or even “universally condemned,”’ but must violate some due process right

guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Prantil v. California, 843 F.2d 314, 317 (9th Cir.

1988) (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146 (1973)). To prevail on such a claim

petitioner must demonstrate that the “ailing instruction . . . so infected the entire trial that the

resulting conviction violates due process.’” Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433 (2004) (quoting

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72, 112 S.Ct. 475, 482 (1991)(quoting Cupp, 414 U.S. at 147)). 

In making its determination, this court must evaluate the challenged jury instructions “‘in the

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context of the overall charge to the jury as a component of the entire trial process.’” Prantil, 843

F. 2d at 317 (quoting Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1239 (9th Cir. 1984)). 

An error in the giving of jury instructions is a “trial error” as distinct from a

“structural defect.” Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309-10 (1991); Drayden v. White, 232

F. 3d 704, 709 (9th Cir. 2000). A federal court may grant habeas relief based on trial error only

when that error "'had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's

verdict.'" Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993)(quoting Kotteakos v. United States,

328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)). If a reviewing court is in “grave doubt” as to whether the error had

such an effect, the petitioner is entitled to the writ. Coleman v. Calderon, 210 F.3d 1047, 1051

(9th Cir. 2000).

Petitioner did not object to the jury instruction. (Reporter’s Transcript on Appeal

[hereinafter “RT”] 503.) Timely objection is a necessary prerequisite in order to permit the trial

court to correct any instructional mistakes before the jury retires. See Leary v. United States, 395

U.S. 6, 32 (1969). Absent an objection, the court is not permitted to review the due process

claim made by petitioner. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 123 (1990).

Even if the court were to find a basis for review, there is no legal error on this

issue warranting relief. The “category of infractions that violate ‘fundamental fairness’” has

been defined “very narrowly.” Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352 (1990). An

instruction that requires the jury to infer a finding, shifting the burden of proof from the

prosecutor to defendant, violates a defendant’s due process rights. See Carella v. California, 491

U.S. 263, 265 (1989). However, where that inference is permissive, the instruction is

constitutionally sound. Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157 (1979).

The inference that a jury can draw from CALJIC No. 2.15 is a permissive one,

neither required by the mere possession of stolen property nor mandated by the existence of other

corroborating factors such as proximity to the crime scene, opportunity to commit the crime, or

subsequent conduct. Schwendeman v. Wallenstein, 971 F.2d 313, 316 (9th Cir. 1992), cert.

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denied, 113 S.Ct. 975 (1993). When the inference is permissive, allowing the jury to infer an

essential fact from proof of another fact is lawful so long as “the inferred fact is more likely than

not to flow from the proved fact on which it is made to depend.” Id., (citations and internal

quotations omitted). It is not unlikely that someone in conscious possession of recently stolen

property acquired it during a burglary.

The Court of Appeal correctly noted that CALJIC No. 2.15 must be considered in

the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record. Cupp, 414 U.S. at 147. The jury in

this case was advised of the presumption of innocence, (RT 561); the prosecution’s burden to

prove all elements beyond a reasonable doubt, (RT 562); that all facts essential to an inference

must also be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, ( RT 555); and that competing reasonable

interpretations of the evidence must be resolved in favor of the defendant, (RT 556). Given this

context, there is not a “reasonable likelihood” that the jury could have understood CALJIC 2.15

to require something less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Boyde v. California, 494 U.S.

370, 380 (1990). 

Furthermore, the trial record provides strong evidence of petitioner’s guilt. 

Petitioner was seen casing the victim’s apartment prior to the theft, was seen fleeing the scene,

was caught with items taken from the victim’s apartment, as well as gloves, and wrote a jailhouse

confession to the victim just days after the burglary. Due to the strength of the evidence against

petitioner, there is little likelihood of any misapplication of the jury instruction by the jury, nor

can it be said that Petitioner’s conviction violated due process. Estelle, 112 S.Ct. at 482; Boyde,

494 U.S. at 380. The finding on this issue was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable

application of Federal law. Petitioner’s first claim for relief should be denied.

B. The Trial Court’s Denial of Petitioner’s Marsden Motion Was Not in Error.

Petitioner’s second claim is that the trial court erred by denying his motion to

dismiss appointed counsel. Petitioner claims that the relationship between he and his appointed

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counsel had inextricably broken down and, as a result, effective representation was no longer

possible. Petitioner’s second claim is without merit and denial is recommended. 

The California Court of Appeal addressed this claim as follows:

Defendant contends the trial court erred when it “forced [him] to

proceed with an attorney he completely mistrusted, resulting in a

breakdown of the attorney/client relationship.” The record does

not support this claim.

When a defendant seeks to have the trial court discharge his

appointed counsel and substitute another attorney, he is “entitled to

relief if the record clearly shows that the first appointed attorney is

not providing adequate representation [citation] or that defendant

and counsel have become embroiled in such irreconcilable conflict

that ineffective representation is likely to result [citations].” 

(People v. Crandell (1988) 46 Cal. 3d 833, 854) However, “a

defendant may not force the substitution of counsel by his own

conduct that manufactures a conflict.” (People v. Smith (1993) 6

Cal. 4th 684, 696.)

At a Marsden hearing (People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118)

conducted prior to the commencement of trial defendant asked the

court to appoint another attorney to represent him.

Defendant first complained that the prosecutor had agreed to strike

one of defendant’s prior serious felony convictions, but then “put

the strike back on [him] again.” Appointed counsel explained that

a settlement judge had offered to strike one of the prior conviction

allegations if defendant entered a negotiated plea in exchange for a

determinate term of 23 years, but that defendant refused the offer. 

Counsel then sought a better offer, a term of 18 years, and

explained to defendant that it was better than an indeterminate term

of 25 years. Once again, defendant rejected the proposal and told

counsel “don’t come back with any [more] offers” because “he

wanted to go to trial.” Defendant accused counsel of lying. 

According to him, she did not explain what sentence he would

receive if a prior conviction allegation was stricken and, in

defendant’s words, “didn’t give me a chance to – you know, do I

want it or not.” Counsel then reiterated that, contrary to

defendant’s claim, she informed him of the offer and its

consequences.

Defendant also faulted his counsel for “not doing what [he was]

asking her to do,” by filing a Pitchess motion (Pitchess v. Superior

Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531) on the ground the officers lied under

oath at the preliminary hearing. In response, counsel stated that

she told defendant why a Pitchess motion was not appropriate, that

she complied with all of his reasonable requests, and that she was

“willing to work with [defendant]” and was prepared to go to trial.

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In denying the Marsden motion, the court concluded that any lack

of communication was due to defendant’s failure to “listen

sometimes” and that a Pitchess motion would be unmeritorious

and a “dismal waste of time.”

During jury selection, a mistrial was declared at defendant’s

request when a prospective juror reported having observed that the

prosecutor’s file was stamped with the notation, “3 STRIKE

CASE.”

Before a new jury panel was summoned, defendant accused

appointed counsel of “railroad[ing]” him. According to him,

counsel had said she did not care about his case and had “let [him]

know she’s against [him].” During the Marsden hearing,

defendant claimed that his counsel no longer was trying to help

him and that talking with her was “like talking to the DA.” Saying

he would refuse to communicate with counsel, defendant asserted:

“She revealed to me she’s against me. She don’t care. That’s her

job is to get rid of third strikers. That’s what she saying. I don’t

care, you’re a third striker. You shouldn’t have done crime. All

this. . . That ain’t no lawyer to me.” Defendant also claimed that

counsel had not talked to him about the evidence and had not

responded to his satisfaction when he asked what would occur if

the victim did not show up at trial. Counsel disputed defendant’s

claims in great detail. She had spoken to him about the evidence

and had attempted to explain the law to him; however, he thought

he knew more about it than she and, “as usual,” he argued with her. 

She had told defendant, “I’ve come to the point where I truly

believe you do understand what is going on. You just don’t like it.

. . .” Counsel asserted that her “communication [with defendant]

hasn’t broken down,” and she was “working very hard for [him],”

and that she could assist him if he would simply listen to her. 

Noting that she had already been successful on a motion that was

“very helpful to the defense,” counsel ended by stating: “I don’t

have any bad feelings toward [defendant]. I don’t want him to

keep hurting himself in front of anybody else. I’m trying to keep

him from hurting himself by not doing these motions again and

having outbursts in court and trying to exit himself from the

courtroom.”

The court denied defendant’s Marsden motion, concluding that he

was receiving, “[a]dequate as well as intelligent and knowing

representation,” and that, while there was a “conflict” between

defendant and counsel, it was “one-sided” and not “irreconcilable”

or likely to result in ineffective representation.[sic]”

Defendant requested to represent himself, and the court granted the

request but asked counsel to do her best to remain available in case

if necessary.

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With defendant now representing himself, a jury was impaneled

and the matter continued for several days. When the court

convened again for the evidentiary stage of the trial, defendant

requested a continuance, saying he was not prepared to go forward. 

The court denied the request. Defendant then stated that he would

not “have anything to do with this trial” and that “Y’all can take

me back to my cell.” Later, defendant said that whenever the court

asked him a question he would tell the jury, “I’m not ready.” The

court admonished him not to do so before the jury. Four witnesses

then testified. At the end of direct testimony of each witness, the

court asked defendant whether he wished to cross-examine. Each

time, he responded that he was not prepared to defend himself,

adding on one occasion that the court had not given him adequate

time to prepare.

On September 30, 1999, the court granted a “joint” motion for a

mistrial when the prosecutor informed the court there had been

“late discovery of. . . potentially exculpatory evidence. . . .”

The trial resumed again on March 20, 2000, and defendant said he

was not prepared to proceed. Following a recess, defendant

informed the court that he had “decided to give up [his] pro per for

a lawyer.” When the court told him it was too late to do so,

defendant said he was not going to go to trial because the

prosecutor and court reporter were “crooked” and the court reporter

falsified the transcripts. Defendant threatened that, if forced to

trial, he was “going to tell every jury. . . everything. . . .”

Defendant then refused to participate in jury selection.

The following day, defendant refused to participate in further

pretrial discussions, so appointed counsel who had been relieved

was contacted and returned to court. The court found defendant

had abused his pro per status by not cooperating, by plugging his

ears with his hands when spoken to by the court, and by refusing to

participate in jury selection. The court revoked defendant’s status,

appointed counsel to represent defendant again, and declared

another mistrial at counsel’s request because counsel needed time

to prepare for trial.

On April 11, 2000, defendant’s fourth trial commenced, and he

made another Marsden motion. During the hearing, he recounted

his prior reasons for wanting counsel relieved but added that he

had now filed a complaint against her with the State Bar of

California. Counsel acknowledged that defendant did not like her,

but assured the court that she held no animosity toward him and

was prepared for trial. She also disputed defendant’s complaints. 

She advised the court, however, that the three times she had

attempted to have contact with him since her reappointment,

defendant had refused to see her.

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The trial court denied the motion, finding “there is not a conflict

between the defendant and his attorney such that she could not

continue to adequately represent him.”

During the afternoon session, defendant became disruptive and

continued such behavior despite a multitude of warnings from the

court that disruption would not be tolerated. Ultimately, defendant

was removed from the courtroom for violating the court’s order to

refrain from outbursts and from talking to the jury. The following

day, defendant was afforded the opportunity to reconsider

participating in his trial, but he declined to do so stating he would

continue to be disruptive. He also turned down the opportunity to

view the trial from another location through cameras set up in

court. The trial proceeded in defendant’s absence, and he was

convicted as charged.

Relying solely on his own testimony during Marsden hearings,

defendant argues “it is indisputable that there was a complete

breakdown in communication between [defendant] and his trial

counsel. . . . As a result, [defendant] had no confidence in

counsel’s representation. He was convinced that counsel was

working against his interests in cooperation with the prosecutor.”

It follows, he argues, that the court erred in forcing him to go to

trial represented by that attorney.

As we have noted, counsel disputed defendant’s claims of deficient

representation and stated there was no irreconcilable conflict if he

simply would cooperate with counsel. In denying defendant’s

Marsden motions, the trial court necessarily believed counsel’s

version of events and disbelieved defendant.

Without question, the record as recounted above amply supports

the conclusion that the conflict between defendant and his counsel

was of defendant’s own making, and that defendant’s accusations

were obviously manufactured in an effort to avoid going to trial.

“[A] defendant may not force the substitution of counsel by his

own conduct that manufactures a conflict.” (People v. Smith,

supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 696.) Hence, the court correctly denied all of

defendant’s Marsden motions and properly required him to

proceed to trial with appointed counsel. 

(People v. Crawford, slip op. at 3-9.)

The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees the right to effective and

competent assistance of counsel in a criminal prosecution. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668 (1984). Where a defendant is proceeding with the assistance of counsel, he may move to

dismiss or substitute counsel, whether appointed or retained. The grant or denial of such a

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motion may depend on its timeliness and the nature of the conflict between the defendant and

current counsel. United States v. McClendon, 782 F.2d 785, 789 (9th Cir. 1986). In assessing on

direct appeal a federal trial court’s decision to deny a motion to substitute counsel, the court

looks at three factors: "'(1) timeliness of the motion to dismiss counsel; (2) the adequacy of the

court's inquiry into the defendant's complaint; and (3) whether the conflict between the defendant

and his attorney was so great that it resulted in a total lack of communication preventing an

adequate defense.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Mills, 597 F.2d 693, 700 (9th Cir. 1979)). See

also, United States v. Musa, 220 F.3d 1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). A denial of a motion for

substitution of counsel on the first day of trial will be upheld where there is insufficient showing

of conflict with current counsel. McClendon, 782 F.2d at 789. Additionally, it is within a trial

judge's discretion to deny a motion to substitute made on the eve of trial if the substitution would

require a continuance. Id.

In assessing such a claim in the context of a habeas corpus proceeding, the focus

is different than that on direct review. In Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 2000) (en

banc) the court stated: 

Our primary reason for accepting this case for en banc review was

to correct the standard of review we have been using to examine

the constitutionality of a state court’s handling of a motion to

substitute appointed counsel based on allegations of an

irreconcilable conflict. In Bland, we said that the test is whether a

state court’s denial of such a motion was for an “abuse of

discretion.” Bland, 20 F.3d at 1475.

 

* * *

[O]ur only concern when reviewing the constitutionality of a statecourt conviction is whether the petitioner is “in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). See also Coleman v. Thompson,

501 U.S. 722, 730, 111 S.Ct. 2546. 115 L.Ed. 640 (1991) (“The

[habeas] court does not review a judgment but the lawfulness of

the petitioner’s custody simpliciter.”) (emphasis in original). A

particular abuse of discretion by a state court may amount also to a

violation of the Constitution, but not every state court abuse of

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discretion has the same effect. Accordingly, to the extent that they 

conflict with this opinion, we overrule Bland and Crandell v.

Bunnell, 144 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 1998).

Id. at 1024-25 (footnotes omitted). In Schell the court determined that it was “well established

and clear that the Sixth Amendment requires on the record an appropriate inquiry into the

grounds of such a motion, and that the matter be resolved on the merits before the case goes

forward.” 218 F.3d at 1025; see also Hudson v. Rushen, 686 F.2d 826, 829 (9th Cir. 1982)

(“Thus, the state trial court’s summary denial of a defendant’s motion for new counsel without

further inquiry violated the Sixth Amendment.”)

 Under such an inquiry the state trial court’s handling of the motion to substitute

appointed counsel in this case certainly passes constitutional muster. The trial court allowed

petitioner the opportunity to fully explain on the record his problems with his attorney. The court

focused on and fully explored the nature of the conflicts expressed by petitioner. The

undersigned finds that the trial court made an adequate inquiry into petitioner's complaints and

resolved the matter on the merits before proceeding with the case.

This does not end the inquiry. According to the court in Schell:

Thus, the ultimate question the federal courts must answer here is

not whether the state trial court “abused its discretion” in not

deciding [defendant’s] motion, but whether this error actually

violated [defendant’s] constitutional rights in that the conflict

between [defendant] and his attorney had become so great that it

resulted in a total lack of communication or other significant

impediment that resulted in turn in an attorney-client relationship

that fell short of that required by the Sixth Amendment.

Id. at 1026. Trial counsel met this standard, providing effective assistant to petitioner. Trial

counsel affirmed before the court that she was able to represent petitioner. (RT 351.) There was

no indication that counsel’s performance was fatally impacted by petitioner’s actions.

Petitioner’s attempts to characterize his actions as non-dilatory are not supported

by the record. While two of the three mistrials in this case were not the result of actions by

petitioner, the record indicates that petitioner clearly sought to obstruct the orderly progress of his

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trial. The source of disagreement over petitioner’s representation came solely from petitioner’s

refusal to cooperate in his own defense, including refusing to respond to his attorney’s requests

for information or to attend the trial. There was no credible basis for petitioner’s conflict with

his attorney and when asked to cite a basis for his complaints, petitioner was unable to clearly

articulate any fundamental disagreement. Rather, petitioner’s complaints focused upon his

perception that trial counsel was not “representing [him] right,” (RT 344), was failing to filing

otherwise frivolous motions, (RT 345), and was cooperating too readily with the prosecutor, (RT

354). As a result of the lack of justification, the trial court found petitioner to be not credible

when compared to his attorney. That finding is not clearly erroneous and this court must defer to

it. 22 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Petitioner is not entitled to a “meaningful relationship with his attorney,” Morris

v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1983), but rather, effective representation. Counsel’s performance

at trial was competent and there is no evidence that any doubts about the advisability of going to

trial negatively influenced her performance. Furthermore, disagreement does not warrant relief

as Petitioner only has a right to effective representation, not to an attorney who shares his opinion

on trial tactics. See United States v. Mejia-Mesa, 153 F.3d 925, 931 (9th Cir. 1998); see

also Schell, 218 F.3d at 1026 n.8 (quoting Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 8 (1966)(Harlan, J.,

dissenting in part))(“‘[A] lawyer may properly make a tactical determination of how to run a trial

even in the face of his client’s incomprehension or even explicit disapproval.’”). Although

petitioner faults counsel for failing to pursue numerous motions, there is no indication such

motions would have been fruitful. Finally, while it appears from the record that petitioner’s

attorney believed the best resolution of this case was a plea agreement, she prepared for a

possible trial and was able to skillfully represent petitioner when required.

A conflict which causes problems in some area of the attorney-client relationship

but which ultimately has no significant impact on counsel's representation before the court does

not rise to ineffective assistance. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348-350 (1980); see also

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United States v. Mett, 65 F.3d 1531, 1535 (9th Cir.1995). Under the circumstances presented

here, the trial court did not err in denying petitioner’s request for new counsel. See United States

v. Robinson, 913 F. 2d 712, 716 (9th Cir. 1990) (no error in failing to offer defendant substitute

counsel where the crux of the problem was defendant’s anger at his attorney’s refusal to raise

defenses to the charges which the attorney considered frivolous); see also United States v.

Padilla, 819 F.2d 952, 956 (10th Cir. 1987) (finding that defendant's complaints that his

appointed counsel refused to structure a defense as he directed did not constitute good cause for

substitution of counsel and stating, "there is no absolute right to counsel of one's choice”). 

Accordingly, the state court’s ruling was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of

Federal law. Petitioner’s Marsden claim should be denied. 

C. There Was No Error with Petitioner’s Pretrial Transcripts that Warrants Relief. 

Petitioner’s third claim is that his pretrial transcripts were altered so that they no

longer reflect the true nature of the preliminary hearing. Petitioner argues that key testimony

from his pretrial hearing was removed from the final transcripts, and other testimony contained

therein did not occur at the hearing. Petitioner claims this alteration prevented him from

receiving a fair trial. Petitioner’s claim should be denied. 

The last reasoned rejection of this claim is the decision on petitioner’s direct

appeal by the Superior Court of California, County of Sacramento. The state court rejected this

claim on the ground that:

Petitioner claims that the transcript of his preliminary hearing held

on July 20, 1999, was tampered with to wrongfully convict him of

burglary. He claims that certain testimony of witnesses and

statements of counsel were omitted and that the actual testimony at

the preliminary hearing was changed in the transcript.

Petitioner’s claim is not reviewable now that he has received a

trial. Errors at the preliminary hearing are not reviewable on

appeal or by writ of habeas corpus unless they deprived the

defendant of a fair trial or otherwise caused prejudice. (See People

v. Millwee (1988) 18 Cal.4th 96, 122; People v. Talhelm (2000) 85

Cal.App.4th 400, 404-405.) Petitioner has not shown how errors in 

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the preliminary hearing transcript denied him of a fair trial or

otherwise caused prejudice.

Even if the court were to consider his claim, the evidence he

provides does not support his claim that the transcript was

tampered with. In fact, the evidence shows that his claims are just

plain frivolous.

He claims that two transcripts filed by “F. Kilgore” and “N.

Hashimoto” were filed by persons who work in the District

Attorney’s office. He concludes from this that his attorney

received the transcripts from the prosecution and suggests there

was a conspiracy involving his own attorney to falsify the

transcripts. “F. Kilgore” and “N. Hashimoto” are deputy clerks

with the court and do not work for the District Attorney’s office.

He also notes that the two transcripts he received from his attorney

were both file-stamped July 27, 1999, and certified as complete

and accurate by the court reporter on July 21, 1999, but they have

different words and different type. Although both of these

transcripts are file endorsed on July 27, 1999, the second one bears

the notation “nunc pro tunc,” which means that it was received

after July 27, 1999, and is the corrected copy. The second

transcript corrected two obvious typographical errors: “2. . . the

front” was changed to “to. . . the front” and “double bag” was

changed to “duffel bag.”

Petitioner claims that the third transcript, which was purchased by

a friend, shows that the transcript was falsified because it has

different type than the other two. Contrary to petitioner’s

assumption, court reporters do not make Xeroxed copies of

transcripts, but instead print them from a computer, which can

result in different font or print.

Petitioner’s attorney explained to petitioner at a Marsden hearing

that his transcripts were not falsified. And the Court explained to

him again at the sentencing hearing. Petitioner now claims that the

transcripts of the Marsden and sentencing proceedings were

falsified to include these statements. He provides absolutely

nothing to support this claim.

(People v. Crawford, attached as Exhibit G to Respondent’s Answer, filed January 28, 2004.)

Petitioner has not presented a colorable claim of any constitutional violation. In

order to be colorable, a claim must have both legal and factual support. Beaudry Motor Co. v.

Abko Properties, Inc., 780 F.2d 751, 756 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 825 (1986). A claim is

not colorable if it is factually unsupported, legally unsupported, or both.

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As noted by the Superior Court, Petitioner presents no factual support for his

claim. The state court’s factual findings on this issue are entitled to a presumption of

correctness, and there is nothing clearly erroneous about the court’s evaluation of the editing and

printing services that accompanied petitioner’s transcripts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Petitioner

presents a cornucopia of previously filed exhibits to support his claim, including letters to trial

judges requesting investigation of this issue, motions for court records, motions seeking to

amend the state habeas corpus petition, and a motion for a continuance; however, none of those

exhibits upset the presumption that accompanies the state court findings. There is nothing in

petitioner’s materials or the record to suggest any tampering which warrants relief.

Without some affirmative evidence, petitioner’s own memory of events that are

alleged to have occurred during the preliminary hearing, when compared to the official transcript

and the memories of petitioner’s trial counsel and the judge, do not create a due process

violation. “Conclusory allegations which are not supported by a statement of specific facts do

not warrant federal habeas relief.” James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994). Implicit in this

legal maxim is a requirement that the facts alleged contain some element of truth. As shown by

the state court, the other proof alleged by petitioner, corrections in two misspelled words, filings

by different employees of the clerk’s office, and differing type fonts, do not carry any of the

weight petitioner ascribes to them. Nothing in petitioner’s claim demonstrates any improper

alteration entitling him to relief.

Furthermore, even if the court were to construe petitioner’s allegations as

improper tampering with the official transcript, petitioner has failed to demonstrate how those

changes resulted in prejudice. Without such a showing, there can be no violation of due process. 

See Tedford v. Hepting, 990 F.2d 745, 746 (3rd Cir. 1993). Consequently, the Superior Court’s

finding on this issue was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of Federal law. 

Petitioner’s third claim for relief should be denied.

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For the foregoing reason, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner's

application for a writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within ten days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: January 25, 2007.

13

Craw2626.157.wpd

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