Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-06009/USCOURTS-ca10-90-06009-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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' FILED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APP~ted States Court of Appeals 

'.rENTH CIRCUIT Tenth Circuit 

MARGARET A. WOLFENBARGER and JOHN ) 

Q. WOLFENBARGER, doing business ) 

as Shady Sam's Pawn Shop, ) 

) 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

KENT DUNEGAN; JAMES A. TUCKNESS; ) 

CARL REED; ROBERT L. GILLIAN; ) 

CITY OF LAWTON, OKLAHOMA, a ) 

Municipal corporation, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

APR 171991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 90-6009 

(W.D. Oklahoma) 

(D.C. No. CIV-88-2026-R) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, SEYMOUR, and ANDERSON, Circuit 

Judge. 

Plaintiffs Margaret A. and John Q. Wolfenbarger 

( "Wolfenbargers "- or ___ "plaintiffs"), owners of _. Shady_ Sam's Pawn 

Shop, appeal a district court order granting summary judgment in 

favor of the defendants. We affirm. 

The Wolfenbargers seek damages under 42 U.S.C. S 1983 against 

police officers Kent Dunegan, James A. Tuckness, and Carl Reed, 

police chief Robert L. Gillian and the city of Lawton, Oklahoma 

("defendants"). The facts are as follows: The three police 

officers on five separate occasions between March and September 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-6009 Document: 010110034198 Date Filed: 04/17/1991 Page: 1 
• 

• 1988 submitted affidavits and obtained search warrants in order to 

seize allegedly stolen property located at Shady Sam's Pawn Shop. 

The affidavits indicated that the crime of knowingly concealing 

and withholding stolen property was being committed and that the 

goods may be needed as evidence against the suspected thieves. 

The warrants were served and the property seized. All of the 

seized property was subsequently disposed of by court order after 

hearings. The Wolfenbargers do not dispute that they or their 

attorney attended each of the hearings. In one instance, the 

Wolfenbargers were awarded the goods. 

The Wolfenbargers then brought this action against the 

defendants alleging that their Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights, 

applied to the states by the due process clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment, had been violated. They argued, first, that the warrants were not based on probable cause and that the seizures were 

unreasonable, and second, that they were deprived of their 

property without due process. These arguments were rejected by 

the district court and the plaintiffs now reurge them on appeal. 

In reviewing a summary judgment order, we apply the same 

standard employed by the trial court. Applied Genetics Int'l, 

Inc. v. First Affiliated Secur., Inc., 912 F.2d 1238, 1241 (10th 

Cir. 1990). Thus, we will reverse only if we determine that, 

viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the 

Wolfenbargers, a genuine issue of material fact was in dispute or 

the substantive law was incorrectly applied. Id. On appeal, the 

Wolfenbargers do not challenge any fact considered by the court 

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below. Therefore, we review solely to determine whether the legal 

standard was properly applied. 

Although their arguments are unclear, the Wolfenbargers 

appear to claim that there was no probable cause to issue the warrants because three of the four suspected thieves were not charged 

with the crime "knowingly concealing and withholding stolen 

property." They also seem to argue that the seizure was unreasonable because the stolen property was never used as evidence in 

those cases. We disagree. 

Upon review, we give great deference to a magistrate's decision to issue a search warrant. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 

236 (1983). "[C)ourts should not invalidate warrants by 

interpreting affidavits in a hypertechnical, rather than a 

conunonsense, manner." Id. (quoting United States v. Ventresca, 

380 U.S. 102, 109 (1965)). Instead, "so long as the magistrate 

had a 'substantial basis for ... conclud[ing)' that a search 

would uncover evidence of wrongdoing, the Fourth Amendment 

requires no more." Id. (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 

257, 271 (1960)): see Zurcher v .. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 

554, 556 n.6, 559 (1978). Such a substantial basis exists here. 

Even if the contested portions of the affidavit were excised, 

Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171-72 (1978), the affidavits 

for each of the warrants still clearly established that certain 

items had been reported as stolen and that the property to be . 

seized at the pawn shop had been reasonably identified as those 

items. That information is sufficient to justify the warrants 

since "valid warrants may be issued to search any property .•. 

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' 

at which there is probable cause to believe that fruits ... of a 

crime will be found." Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. at 554 

(emphasis omitted);~ 22 Okla. Stat.§ 1222. 

The Wolfenbargers also seem to argue that at the time the 

search warrants were issued, the property was no longer being 

concealed from anyone and that the Wolfenbargers had no knowledge 

that the property was stolen. It is not necessary that the 

Wolfenbargers be culpable themselves. 22 Okla. Stat. S 1222; 

Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. at 559. Despite the 

Wolfenbargers• apparent innocence and the legal owners' knowledge 

of their property's location, "it is likely that the real culprits 

will [also] have access to the property," and failure to seize t~e 

property pursuant to the search warrant "could easily result in 

the disappearance of the evidence," Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 

U.S. at 561, and prevent the recovery of the stolen goods. 

The Wolfenbargers next argue that, even if the warrants were 

valid, their right to procedural due process was violated by the 

officers' retention of the goods without a hearing. To support 

this argument, they cite Coleman v. Turpen, 697 F.2d 1341 (10th 

Cir. 1982), and Lavicky v. Burnett, 758 F.2d 468 (10th Cir. 1985), 

cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1101 (1986). In those cases, like 

Wolfenbarger v. Williams, 774 F.2d 358 (1985), cert. denied, 475 

U.S. 1065 (1986), the plaintiffs requested the return of seized 

property but were permanently divested of possession without a 

hearing. In contrast, hearings were held in this case and 

attended by the plaintiffs before permanent disposition of the 

property. 

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Plaintiffs seem to further argue that they were deprived of 

their constitutional rights because the judicial system did not 

automatically provide them with a speedy hearing on the disposition of the property. While the hearings were held up to sixteen 

months after the seizures, the record does not indicate that the 

Wolfenbargers sought a hearing any earlier. While "a hearing must 

be had before one is finally deprived of his property . [,] 

mere postponement of the judicial enquiry is not a denial of due 

process, if the opportunity given for ultimate judicial determination of liability is adequate." Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 

540 (1980) (quoting Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 

(1974)). Since the plaintiffs were given a full and adequate 

hearing before being permanently deprived of the goods, we do not 

find a violation of due process. 

The Wolfenbargers also argue that, had the hearings mentioned 

in 22 Okla. Stat. SS 1235, 1236, and 1237 been provided, they 

would have been afforded due process. Appellants' Brief at 10. 

However, the statutes do not automatically entitle them to such 

hearings and the record does not establish that the plaintiffs 

requested such hearings or challenged the affidavits supporting 

the warrants. 

Finally, the Wolfenbargers suggest that the city of Lawton 

and police chief Gillian are liable for making and maintaining a 

policy that permitted the alleged deprivations. They argue that 

the prior judgments entered for the Wolfenbargers in Wolfenbarger 

v. Williams, 774 F.2d 358 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 

1065 (1986), and Wolfenbarger v. Williams, 826 F.2d 930 (10th Cir. 

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• 

.,. 1987), should have put Gillian and the city on notice that their 

police officers might continue to infringe on the constitutional 

rights of the Wolfenbargers and, presumably, that they should have 

adjusted police policy to prevent such deprivations. The 

plaintiffs have claimed no other basis than the defendants' 

"deliberate indifference" to the prior constitutional violations. 

The violations in the prior Wolfenbarger cases, however, have not 

been repeated here. Since the police did not once again deprive 

the Wolfenbargers of property without a warrant or a hearing, we 

cannot find that they acted with deliberate indifference to the 

requirements set forth in the two Wolfenbarger v. Williams cases. 

Upon thorough review of all of the Wolfenbargers' claims, we 

find that the district court properly applied the law. 

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court order granting summary 

judgment to the defendants. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Stephen H. Anderson 

Circuit Judge 

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