Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00864/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00864-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:0427 Social Security Benefits

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 Plaintiff’s original petition sought fees based on 6.6 hours of attorney time in 2007. It 1

was supplemented by an additional request for fees based on 3 hours of attorney time spent

researching and preparing the reply to defendant’s opposition to the petition. Although this

attorney time was spent in 2008, plaintiff requested reimbursement at the 2007 rate of $167.27

and it is this request the court considers. As a separate matter, plaintiff miscalculated her

supplemental request by $219.47, a miscalculation the court has corrected as reflected above. 

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SUSAN BRIENZO, 

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-06-0864 KJM

vs.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, ORDER

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant. 

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Pending before the court is plaintiff’s motion for an award of attorneys’ fees under

the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1). Plaintiff seeks fees based on

19.4 hours of attorney time in 2006 at the rate of $161.85 per hour, and 9.6 hours of attorney time

in 2007 at the rate of $167.27 per hour. Plaintiff also seeks fees based on 5.2 hours of paralegal 1

time at the rate of $75.00, for a total of $5,135.67. Defendant contends fees under the EAJA

should not be awarded because the government’s position was substantially justified. In the

event fees are awarded, defendant contends that the amount of hours claimed is unreasonable. 

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A. Substantial Justification

The EAJA provides that the prevailing party in a civil action against the United

States may apply for an order for attorneys’ fees and expenses within thirty days of final

judgment in the action. An applicant for Social Security benefits receiving a remand under

sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) is a prevailing party, regardless of whether the applicant later

succeeds in obtaining the requested benefits. Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292 (1993). In this

case, the matter was remanded under sentence four based on the order of the court on crossmotions for summary judgment. See Order filed March 30, 2007. Plaintiff thus is entitled to an

award of fees under the EAJA. The court must allow the fee award unless it finds the position of

the United States was substantially justified. Flores v. Shalala, 49 F.3d 562, 568-69 (9th Cir.

1995).

The burden of establishing substantial justification is on the government. Gutierrez

v. Barnhart, 274 F.3d 1255, 1258 (9th Cir. 2001). In Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988), the

Supreme Court defined “substantial justification” as

‘justified in substance or in the main’))that is, justified to a degree

that could satisfy a reasonable person. That is no different from the

‘reasonable basis in both law and fact’ formulation adopted by the

Ninth Circuit and the vast majority of other Courts of Appeals that

have addressed this issue.

Id. at 565. A position does not have to be correct to be substantially justified. Id. at 566 n.2; see

also Russell v. Sullivan, 930 F.2d 1443, 1445 (9th Cir. 1991), receded from on other grounds,

Sorenson v. Mink, 239 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 2001); Lewis v. Barnhart, 281 F.3d 1081, 1083 (9th

Cir. 2002).

In determining substantial justification, the court reviews both the underlying

governmental action being defended in the litigation and the positions taken by the government

in the litigation itself. Barry v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 1324, 1331 (9th Cir. 1987), disapproved on

other grounds, In re Slimick, 928 F.2d 304 (9th Cir. 1990). Where the underlying government

action was not substantially justified, it is unnecessary to determine whether the government’s

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litigation position was substantially justified. Andrew v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 875, 880 (9th Cir.

1988).

Defendant contends the government’s position was substantially justified. In

support of this contention, defendant cites a Ninth Circuit decision issued after all briefing on

this case was submitted: Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2007). In that case, the court

affirmed the ALJ’s finding that plaintiff’s depression did not constitute a sufficiently severe

non-exertional limitation to require vocational testimony at step five of the sequential evaluation.

Id. at 1076. The ALJ’s reliance on the Medical Vocational guidelines (“grids”) was therefore

found not to be in error. Id. 

Although there are factual similarities between Hoopai and the present case, this

court did not remand for improper reliance on the grids. Rather, here, the court noted

unexplained inconsistencies in the ALJ’s evaluation of the medical evidence with regard to

plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”). In particular, while the ALJ expressly credited

and relied on the opinion of non-examining physician, Dr. Lon Gottschalk – the only psychiatric

opinion credited by the ALJ – his RFC assessment did not reflect Dr. Gottschalk’s opined

limitations. See Order filed September 28, 2007 at 4:19-5:26. The ALJ failed to explain this

inconsistency, which the court found undermined the legitimacy of the RFC assessment, as well

as the hypothetical posed to the expert. Furthermore, the ALJ fully credited the non-examining

physician’s opinion, but did not give specific and legitimate reasons for according significantly

less weight to the medical opinion of examining physician Dr. Kalman See id. at 9:14-11:5. The

ALJ’s treatment of these medical opinions was in error and undermined the legitimacy of the

hypothetical posed to the vocation expert. 

These issues were distinct from those raised in Hoopai. Here, the ALJ’s failure to

provide an accurate characterization of the record and properly evaluate the medical opinions was

not substantially justified. See, e.g., Sampson v. Chater, 103 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 1996) (position

not justified where ALJ mischaracterized medical evidence and failed to take adequate account

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of testimony); see Andrew, 837 F.2d at 880 (where the underlying government action was not

substantially justified, it is unnecessary to determine whether the government’s litigation position

was substantially justified). Having reviewed the transcript, briefing on the cross-motions for

summary judgment and the order granting remand in this case, the court has determined

defendant’s position was not reasonably based in either law or fact. Fees under the EAJA will

therefore be awarded. 

B. Reasonable Fee

The EAJA directs the court to award a reasonable fee. In determining whether a

fee is reasonable, the court considers the hours expended, the reasonable hourly rate, and the

results obtained. See Commissioner, INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154 (1990); Hensley v. Eckerhart,

461 U.S. 424 (1983); Atkins v. Apfel, 154 F.3d 986 (9th Cir. 1998). Defendant contends that the

hours expended by plaintiff’s counsel are unreasonable. Specifically, defendant argues that any

additional costs incurred by having three attorneys, instead of one, work on this case should be

excluded. For example, defendant objects to the time spent by attorney Ann M. Cerney in

reviewing the brief written by another attorney. This argument is not well-taken. There is

nothing objectionable to lawyers collaborating on a case and, within reason, each billing for their

time. Moreover, the court notes that Ms. Cerney signed the briefs in this case and therefore, at a

minimum, was required to review the document she was signing. 

Defendant also objects to specific entries for instructing support staff on filing

documents or obtaining extensions, and to paralegal time that was primarily “secretarial” in

nature. The Commissioner asserts that these tasks are not ones traditionally performed by an

attorney. See Jean v. Nelson, 863 F.2d 759, 778 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that a prevailing party

may recover fees only for work an attorney traditionally performs); Granville House v. Dep’t of

Health, Educ. and Welfare, 796 F.2d 1046, 1050 (8th Cir. 1986), vacated on other grounds, 813

F.2d 881 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding that an attorney could not recover fees for work which could

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have been done by support staff). Having carefully reviewed the pending petition, the court is of

the opinion that these tasks are normally carried out in litigation and are compensable. 

In conclusion, in reviewing the transcript, briefing on the cross-motions for

summary judgment and order granting remand in this case, as well as scrutinizing the time

expended on tasks as set forth in plaintiff’s attorney’s schedule of hours, the court has

determined the hours claimed are reasonable. The court has examined closely the hours claimed

by counsel and finds no reason to believe they are inflated. Counsel therefore will be paid for the

claimed hours of attorney and paralegal time spent in the prosecution of this action. 

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff’s December 12, 2007,

motion for EAJA fees is granted. Plaintiff is awarded attorneys’ fees pursuant to the EAJA in the

amount of $5,135.67. 

DATED: April 10, 2008.

brienzo.eaja

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