Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_18-cv-00323/USCOURTS-azd-4_18-cv-00323-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Estate of Clinton Dewayne Smith, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. 

John T. Shartle, et al.,

Defendants.

No. CV-18-00323-TUC-RCC

ORDER 

Currently before the Court is Defendant United States of America’s 

(“Government”) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. (Doc. 64.) The Government 

argues that this matter should be dismissed because the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) 

employees’ cell assignment and safety decisions are immune from suit under the Federal 

Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”). Id. The Court held oral argument on February 21, 2020. 

Upon consideration of the briefs and argument, the Court will deny the motion.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Convicted sex offender Clinton Dewayne Smith was transferred to the SHU 

between June 28 and July 4, 2016. (Doc. 1 at p. 3, ¶ 6, No. CV-19-00325-RCC.)1Inmate 

Romeo Giovanni, a former gang member, vehemently opposed being housed with Smith.

(Id. at ¶ 8.) Giovanni stated to BOP employees that if placed in the same cell, he would 

kill Smith. (Id.) Nevertheless, BOP employees placed the two together. (Id. at ¶ 9.) By 

July 5, 2016, Giovanni followed through on his threats, murdering Smith. (Id. at p. 4, ¶ 

1 This matter was consolidated with Case No. CV-18-00323-RCC; however, the 

operative Complaint against the Government is located in Case No. CV-19-00325-RCC. 

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10.) The BOP employees were unaware of Smith’s death until Giovanni notified them by

hitting a distress button in the cell. (Id. at p. 35, ¶ 187.)

Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges that BOP employees’ placement of Smith with 

Giovanni was negligent, and this negligence led to Smith’s death. (Id. at p 44-47, pp. 

238-59.)

The Government filed the instant Motion to Dismiss, arguing that (1) Plaintiffs’ 

claims are not viable under the FTCA because negligent cell assignment has no private 

analogue under Arizona law, and (2) BOP’s inmate housing and safety decisions are 

immune from suit under the discretionary function exception to the FTCA. (Doc. 64.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR FTCA CLAIMS

In general, the United States enjoys sovereign immunity and cannot be sued unless 

it has explicitly waived its immunity. F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994). The 

FTCA provides a waiver of immunity for the tortious actions of governmental 

employees. 28 U.S.C. § 2679; Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Craft, 157 F.3d 697, 706 (9th 

Cir. 1998). Under the FTCA, the Government can be sued “under circumstances where 

the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with 

the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b); United 

States. v. Olsen, 546 U.S. 43, 44 (2005). This broad waiver is limited, however, by the 

discretionary function exception. This exception grants the Government immunity from

governmental employees’ actions “based upon the exercise or performance or the failure 

to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or 

an employee of the Government.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). 

“[T]o determine whether the discretionary function exception applies, the court 

must engage in a two-step inquiry.” Nurse v. United States, 226 F.3d 996, 1001 (9th Cir. 

2000). First, the court must decide “whether the challenged conduct involves an element 

of judgment or choice.” Id. “The requirement of judgment or choice is not satisfied if a 

federal statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a course of action for an 

employee to follow, because the employee has no rightful option but to adhere to the 

directive.” United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322 (1991) (internal citations and 

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quotation marks omitted). But an action is discretionary when there are no directives that

“dictate[] the precise manner in which the agency is to complete the challenged task.” 

Green v. United States, 630 F.3d 1245, 1249-50 (9th Cir. 2011). 

If the action is discretionary, the court then considers whether the action “is of the 

kind that the discretionary function exception was designed to shield.” Id. (citing

Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 322-23). “Because the purpose of the exception is to prevent 

judicial second-guessing of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social, 

economic, and political policy through the medium of an action in tort, . . . the exception 

protects only governmental actions and decisions based on public policy.” Gaubert, 499 

U.S. at 323 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). When actions are 

discretionary, there is a presumption that the actions are grounded in policy 

considerations. Id. at 323-24. And so, “[f]or a[n FTCA] complaint to survive a motion to 

dismiss, it must allege facts which would support a finding that the challenged actions are 

not the kind of conduct that can be said to be grounded in the policy of the regulatory 

regime.” Id. at 324-25.

“If the challenged action satisfies both []prongs, that action is immune from suit—

and federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction—even if the court thinks the 

government abused its discretion or made the wrong choice.” Green, 630 F.3d at 1249-

50. 

III. PRIVATE PERSON ANALOGUE

To state a claim under the FTCA, Plaintiffs’ allegations must first demonstrate that 

“a private individual under like circumstances would be liable under state law.” United 

States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 153 (1963); 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). This means that “the 

FTCA applies only if there is a persuasive analogy with private conduct.” See Westbay 

Steel, Inc. v. United States, 970 F.2d 648, 650 (9th Cir. 1992). Since an FTCA claim must 

raise liability under state law, “[t]he breach of a duty created by federal law is not, by 

itself, actionable under the FTCA.” Francois v. United States, CV-16-02936-PHX-BSB, 

2017 WL 467976, at *3 (D. Ariz. Feb. 3, 2017) (quoting Love v. United States, 60 F.3d 

642, 644 (9th Cir. 1995). Furthermore, “[a]lthough the federal government ‘could never 

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be exactly like a private actor, a court’s job in applying the standard is to find the most 

reasonable analogy.’” Dugard v. United States, 835 F.3d 915, 919 (9th Cir. 2016) 

(quoting LaBarge v. Mariposa Cty., 798 F.2d 364, 367 (9th Cir. 1986).

During oral arguments Plaintiffs suggested that the liability imposed upon Arizona 

nursing home employees presented like circumstances to those raised here. They claimed

that a private nursing home employee who cares for a vulnerable elderly person would be 

liable if that employee (1) negligently placed an elderly patient in a room with another

person, (2) knowing that the person had made threats of harm, and (3) as a result of being 

placed together the elderly patient was in fact harmed. Defendant countered that Plaintiffs 

have not pointed to any state statute or case law that demonstrates that there is a state law 

equivalent supporting their example. 

But, Arizona Revised Statutes section 46-455 does impose civil liability on private 

nursing home employees under circumstances like those presented here. The statute 

articulates that “[a] person who has been employed to provide care . . . to a vulnerable 

adult who causes or permits the life of the adult to be endangered . . . by neglect” may be 

subject to civil liability. Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 46-455(A); 46-455(K). 

Like a nursing facility employee, a BOP employee is tasked with the care of 

persons who are dependent upon them to make daily housing and safety determinations.

And, like nursing care employees, BOP has a duty to ensure the safety of the persons who 

reside at the facility. See 28 U.S.C. § 4042(2). So, just as a private nursing home 

employee in Arizona could be held accountable when the employee ignored physical 

threats to a patient, placed the patient with the person making the threats, and injury 

resulted; so too could the Government.

Plaintiffs have presented a persuasive private person analogy that provides liability 

under Arizona law.

IV. DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION EXCEPTION 

By statute, the BOP must “provide suitable quarters and provide for the 

safekeeping, care, and subsistence of all [prisoners].” 28 U.S.C. § 4042(2). Many courts

have determined that BOP decisions about inmate housing and safety are discretionary 

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and therefore precluded from suit under the FTCA. See e.g., Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 

U.S. 337, 349 n.14 (1981) (“[A] prison’s internal security is peculiarly a matter normally 

left to the discretion of prison administrators.”); Merz v. United States, 532 F. App’x 677, 

678 (9th Cir. 2013) (decision to place inmate in cell with another inmate who attacked 

him was not subject to the liability under the FTCA); Mitchell v. United States, 149 F. 

Supp. 2d 1111, 1114 (D. Ariz. 1999) (movement of inmates discretionary and protected 

from suit); Whitefeather v. United States, CV 12-00270-TUC-JGZ, Doc. 32 at 6 (D. Ariz. 

Sept. 11, 2013) (granting summary judgment because “BOP’s housing decisions at USP 

Tucson were discretionary in nature because no federal statute, regulation or policy 

specifically prescribes the housing designation of inmates”); Rinaldi v. United States, 904 

F.3d 257, 273 (3d Cir. 2018) (housing choices discretionary); Montez ex rel. Estate of 

Hearlson v. United States, 359 F.3d 392, 396 (6th Cir. 2004) (BOP officers have 

discretion regarding how to protect inmates); Santana-Rosa v. United States, 335 F.3d 39, 

43-44 (1st Cir. 2003) (same); Cohen v. United States, 151 F.3d 1338, 1143 (11th Cir. 

1998) (how to provide safe housing for inmates is not specifically mandated); Calderon 

v. United States, 123 F.3d at 950 (decisions about how to protect inmates are not 

specifically defined); see also Dykstra v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 140 F.3d 791, 795-96

(8th Cir. 1998) (C.F.R. regulations about inmate placement are discretionary). For when 

it comes to the safety and security of inmates, “[p]rison administrators . . . should be 

accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices 

that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain 

institutional security.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321-22 (1986).

However, when a plaintiff can point to a specific measure that an official needed 

to follow, courts have determined that the issue of whether the regulation was indeed 

mandatory precludes dismissal based on the FTCA discretionary function exception. See 

Alfrey v. United States, 276 F.3d 557, 564 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding response to inmate 

threat was discretionary, but factual issue remained as to whether a Central Inmate 

Monitoring evaluation prior to placement was mandatory); Doe v. United States, 510 F. 

App’x 614, 616 (9th Cir. 2013) (granting of summary judgment reversed and remanded

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because officer suggested that there was a mandatory policy in place that would have 

prevented plaintiff’s abuse); Ashford v. United States, 511 F.3d 501, 505 (5th Cir. 2007) 

(usually the exception applies to cell assignment, but in this case it did not apply because 

“there [was] a specific policy in place that constrained the decision-making ability of the 

prison officials.”).

a. Discretionary Action

Plaintiffs argue there may be some non-mandatory decisions in BOP policy that 

have yet to be disclosed. They also think some officials at BOP may not have had 

discretion for certain actions. Therefore, these actions would not be covered by the 

discretionary function exception. Plaintiffs would like further discovery to find out if 

these mandatory policies exist. 

Defendant claims Plaintiffs cannot point to any mandatory measures despite 

disclosure of all the pertinent statutes, regulations, and policies because there are none. In 

addition, Defendant claims, there is an abundance of case law demonstrating that safety 

and cell assignment determinations are discretionary measures not subject to liability 

under the FTCA. 

i. Statutes, Regulations, and Policies

The Court recognizes that many of the statutes, regulations, and policies at issue 

here are readily available and give BOP considerable latitude when making housing and 

safety decisions. This suggests discretion. Furthermore, Defendant has averred that they 

have identified all the applicable statutes, regulations, and policies. However, Plaintiffs 

are not challenging the disclosed policies. Instead, they argue that what BOP has omitted 

suggests undisclosed, mandatory policies exist. The Court, therefore, will address 

Plaintiffs’ allegations.

ii. Mandatory Review of Information

First, some of the BOP’s Program Statements have been redacted and Plaintiffs 

cite to the surrounding unredacted portions to show that the redactions may contain other 

mandatory measures. For instance, they point to the Program Statement that requires 

Lieutenants utilize “all available resources and information” in cell assignment decisions. 

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(Doc. 68 at 13.) They claim that “all” means that there are mandatory things BOP must 

review before determining cell assignments, which demonstrates there is a proper way to 

conduct cell placement. (Id.) Based on the record before the Court, it is impossible to 

conclude that the redacted portions do not mandate the review of specific documents in a 

way that eliminates discretion. 

This is similar to Alfrey v. United States, 276 F.3d 557 (9th Cir. 2002). In Alfrey, 

the court found that it was unclear based on the available evidence whether a Central 

Inmate Monitoring evaluation must be performed prior to inmate placement. Id. 

Likewise, in this case because there is plausible mandatory language and unredacted 

portions of the Program Statement, the Court cannot determine whether there were 

certain documents that had to be reviewed before placement, and further discovery is

warranted before making this determination.

iii. Separation Requirements

Next, Plaintiffs note that the Special Post Order mandating “all available 

resources” does so because there are “many separation requirements . . . in [the SHU.]” 

(Doc. 64-2 at 62). Plaintiffs claim the undisclosed separation requirements may also be 

mandatory and may have specifically prohibited Giovanni from being placed with Smith 

because of his separation classification, likely due to prior acts of violence. (Doc. 1 at 38-

39, ¶¶ 207-08, 210.) Like the mandatory review of information, at this juncture there is 

factual issue as to whether Giovanni’s history mandated separation. This issue warrants 

further discovery. 

iv. Other Procedures

Finally, Plaintiffs claim that there seem to be other mandatory initiatives that 

guide housing inmates in the SHU. (Doc. 68 at 13-14.) They note that the Special Post 

Order on Sexual Offender/Protective Custody indicates placement will be “methodical,” 

and Plaintiff claims that BOP has a policy to check if single beds are available before 

placement. (Id.) Further, Plaintiffs claim that it appears that inmates are asked whether 

they would accept the cell mate, and when an inmate refuses, BOP will find another 

cellmate. (Id. at 14.) In this case, Giovanni was asked earlier in the day whether he would 

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accept another inmate who was a sex offender. (Doc. 1 at p. 26, ¶ 128; p. 29, ¶¶146-49.) 

When he refused BOP placed the inmate elsewhere. (Id. at p. 33, ¶ 167.) Smith was not 

so lucky. If these alleged policies exist, Plaintiffs have a good argument that Smith 

should not have been placed with Giovanni. Again, the omissions preclude the Court 

from determining conclusively whether the term “methodical” shows the evaluations 

were mandatory or discretionary. 

v. Monitoring Inmates

Moreover, Plaintiffs’ Complaint claims that BOP officers did not follow the 

measures defined in BOP Program Statement P5270.10. (Doc. 1 at p. 40, ¶ 218.) This 

directive, they claim, mandates a daily check on inmates by the BOP Lieutenant and BOP 

personnel. (Id.) Plaintiffs believe no one from BOP performed a daily check during the 

time that Smith was murdered. (Id. at p. 41, ¶ 222.)

This situation is like Middleton v. U.S. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 658 F. App’x 167, 

171-72 (3d Cir. Aug. 15, 2016), where the Third Circuit vacated the district court’s 

granting of a motion to dismiss because the complaint alleged that BOP had Post Orders 

regarding pat downs that may have been mandatory. Similarly, in Rich v. United States, 

811 F.3d 140, 147 (4th Cir. 2015), the Fourth Circuit remanded for further discovery 

where Post Orders suggested specific requirements that officers may have had to follow 

when performing searches. Like these circuits, the Ninth Circuit has also remanded 

FTCA claims for further discovery because the suggestion of a mandatory policy 

prevented the court from determining whether the action was covered by the 

discretionary function exception. Doe, 510 F. App’x at 616. 

In defense, the Government merely reiterates its assertion that the discretionary 

function exception applies to BOP’s housing decisions. (Doc. 75 at p. 11-14.) This does 

not, however, address monitoring measures that should have been taken after officers 

have placed an inmate in housing. And Defendant has offered no affidavits stating this 

Program Statement was not mandatory, nor provided any regulations that suggest 

monitoring inmates was within BOP officials’ discretion. See e.g., Keller v. United 

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States, 771 F.3d 1021, 1024 (7th Cir. 2014) (remanding for further discovery where 

Program statements were redacted). 

Plaintiffs’ allegation that BOP failed to perform a mandatory monitoring of Smith 

presents a plausible non-discretionary action. The Court finds that further discovery as to 

BOP monitoring measures may take this claim outside the purview of the discretionary 

function exception if it is, in fact, mandatory. This prevents dismissal.

b. Public Policy

Plaintiffs make no argument that inmate housing decisions are not founded in 

policy concerns. In fact, cell assignment and security measures in prisons implicate 

multiple policy concerns. See Mitchell v. United States, 149 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1114 (D. 

Ariz. 1999) (“Decisions . . . including the number of guards, . . . and tactical choices 

made surrounding the movement of inmates are judgment calls and choices based on 

policy determinations that seek to accommodate safety goals and the reality of finite 

agency resources.”). 

In sum, based on the record before the Court it is impossible to conclude whether 

the discretionary function exception applies. Therefore, dismissal at this stage is 

inappropriate.

V. NEGLIGENT GUARD THEORY

Alternatively, Plaintiffs argue that they have raised a viable FTCA claim because 

BOP employees’ cell assignment and failure to check on Smith was due to laziness. (Doc. 

68 at p. 17.)

Some courts have found that a guard’s actions are not immune from suit under the

discretionary function exception when the “negligent guard theory” applies. See e.g., 

Padilla v. United States, No. LACV 09-05651, 2012 WL 12882367, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 

9, 2012); Middleton, 658 F. App’x at 171-72; Palay, 349 F.3d 418, 430-32 (7th Cir. 

2003); Coulthurst v. United States, 214 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 2000). The Supreme Court has 

explained that under the negligent guard theory, a governmental agent’s actions may 

seem to be discretionary, but fail the policy prong of the exception’s analysis because the 

specific actions “simply cannot be said to be based on the purposes that the regulatory 

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regime seeks to accomplish.” Padilla, 2012 WL 12882367, at *6 (quoting Gaubert, 499 

U.S. at 325). This may occur when officials perform discretionary duties in a lazy, 

careless, or inattentive matter. Id. (citing Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 

471, 476 (2d Cir. 2006).

For instance, in Padilla v. United States, 2012 WL 12882367, at *7, prison guards 

placed Padilla with a cellmate after Padilla repeatedly requested to be separated and 

guards saw that the inmate had caused previous injury to Padilla. Id. at *2. Padilla was 

later killed by his cellmate. Id. The court distinguished this case from other similar cell 

assignment FTCA claims. Id. (comparing to Alfrey, 276 F.3d at 557 (BOP informed of 

verbal threat); Calderon, 123 F.3d at 947 (same)). Unlike mere threats, which are 

prospective rather than reflective, the known prior physical injury removed the guard’s 

discretion, and “would have required staff to separate (them).” Id. at *8. The inaction of 

the guards after finding out about Padilla’s injuries, combined with Padilla’s repeated 

requests to be removed, could have no basis in furthering any governmental policies, 

such as inmate safety. Id. at 9. 

Like Padilla, the Court finds that the negligent guard theory may also undermine

Defendant’s discretion here. While the guards here were not on notice of prior physical 

altercations between Smith and Giovanni, Plaintiffs assert that Giovanni had a history of 

violent behavior which would have required his separation. In addition, he made an 

unambiguous death threat against Smith. “[S]pecific and immediate threats against 

inmates are less likely to be the type of decision to be grounded [in policy concerns].” 

Montez ex rel. Estate of Hearlson, 359 F.3d at 398. To place Giovanni with Smith under 

these circumstances could be perceived as careless under the negligent guard theory. 

Furthermore, the failure to monitor Smith after his transfer to the SHU may be 

subject to the negligent guard theory. The Court believes the Complaint adequately 

asserts (1) there was a policy mandating a BOP check on inmates, (2) BOP failed to do 

so, and (3) there is no explanation for BOP’s failure. (Doc. 1 at p. 33, ¶ 168.)

Furthermore, Plaintiffs allege that the SHU was short staffed over the Fourth of July 

weekend. (Id. at p. 33, ¶ 168.) These facts suggest that the guards may have been 

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inattentive, and perhaps lazy. 

VI. CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS

Plaintiffs allege that their claims are not precluded because they raise 

constitutional violations; specifically, violations of the Fifth and Eighth Amendments. 

(Doc. 68 at 7-8.) A constitutional tort, however, is not actionable under 28 U.S.C. 

§1346(b) because it does not raise a claim that could be considered a violation of state 

law. See F.D.I.C., 510 U.S. at 477-78 (“By definition, federal law, not state law, provides 

the source of liability for a claim alleging the deprivation of a federal constitutional 

right.”). Therefore, Plaintiffs’ FTCA claims cannot succeed on this basis. 

VII. DEFENDANT’S UNREDACTED EXHIBITS

The Court has reviewed the exhibits submitted for en camera review and finds that 

they do not change its analysis. The exhibits do not describe the various separation 

requirements eluded to in the Special Post Orders, nor define what sources should be 

utilized during housing determinations. Moreover, the redacted documents include 

information on defined monitoring schedules related to Plaintiff’s claim. The disclosure 

only reinforces the Court’s decision that it is too soon to dismiss this matter. 

VIII. CONCLUSION

The Court cannot grant a motion to dismiss based on the information currently 

available. The Court will allow discovery to proceed but may reevaluate Defendant’s 

discretionary function exception argument should Defendant choose to file a dispositive 

motion.

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED:

1. United States of America’s Motion to Dismiss is DENIED. (Doc. 64.) 

Dated this 9th day of March, 2020.

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