Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_16-cv-01768/USCOURTS-cand-5_16-cv-01768-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

RYAN WILLIAM CAMPBELL,

Plaintiff,

v.

SERGEANT M. BURNS, DEPUTY J. 

PEREZ, DEPUTY J. SULLIVAN, DEPUTY 

M. TSUCHIRA, THE COUNTY OF 

MONTEREY and DOE 1 through and 

including DOE 5,,

Defendants.

Case No. 5:16-cv-01768-HRL

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 8

This civil rights suit arises from plaintiff Ryan Campbell’s arrest on Valentine’s Day 2015. 

He sues Monterey County (County) and several of its peace officers, claiming that County 

Sheriff’s deputies used excessive force during the arrest. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), 

defendants now move to dismiss two of Campbell’s claims. Plaintiff opposes the motion. The 

matter is deemed suitable for determination without oral argument, and the July 26, 2016 hearing 

is vacated.1 Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). Upon consideration of the moving and responding papers,2this 

 

1

Plaintiff’s counsel’s request for telephonic appearance (Dkt. 19) is denied as moot.

2 Defendants request that this court take judicial notice of various state court records, apparently

for the purpose of having this court draw conclusions on ultimate issues in dispute---namely, 

whether the defendants’ use of force was justified. That is not an appropriate determination to be 

made on the instant motion, and this court finds it unnecessary to consider those materials to 

Case 5:16-cv-01768-HRL Document 20 Filed 07/22/16 Page 1 of 7
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

court denies the motion.3

The following background facts are drawn from the complaint’s allegations, which are 

deemed true for the present purpose of resolving the instant motion:

On February 14, 2015, Campbell and his girlfriend, Tiffany Harward, were at the AT&T 

golf tournament in Pebble Beach, California. They went to the Tap Room, a restaurant located 

inside The Lodge at Pebble Beach. Harward later stepped outside for some fresh air, at which 

time defendant Deputies Perez and Sullivan told her that she must immediately leave the premises. 

Because the deputies would not permit her to return to the restaurant, Harward texted plaintiff, 

who then joined her outside. Deputy Sullivan allegedly told Campbell that Harward was sick and 

needed to leave. Campbell and Harward left in a taxi.

Less than thirty seconds into the cab ride, plaintiff realized he left his wallet at the 

restaurant. At his request, the cab driver turned around and returned to the premises so he could 

retrieve his wallet.

Upon their return, Campbell and Harward stepped out of the taxi and were spotted by 

Deputies Sullivan and Tsuchira and by Sergeant Burns, who made a beeline for the couple. 

According to plaintiff, these defendants “immediately displayed an aggressive demeanor” and 

began to shout at them, demanding to know why they had come back. (Dkt. 1, Complaint ¶ 17). 

Nevertheless, defendants allegedly “closed their ears to any explanation and shouted orders to 

[Campbell and Harward] to ‘shut up.’” (Id.).

Campbell says that, based on their behavior, he believed that Sullivan, Tsuchira, and Burns 

were angry that he apparently had defied their orders to leave. Sensing that they were about to use 

physical force against him, plaintiff says that he put his hands up, with his palms facing forward, 

to signal his submission to their authority---all the while, trying to explain that he had returned for 

his wallet.

At that point, Campbell says that, even though his hands were still up, and without any 

 

resolve the motion in any event. Defendants’ request for judicial notice is denied.

3 All parties have expressly consented that all proceedings in this matter may be heard and finally 

adjudicated by the undersigned. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c); Fed. R. Civ. P. 73.

Case 5:16-cv-01768-HRL Document 20 Filed 07/22/16 Page 2 of 7
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

warning or provocation, Sullivan and Tsuchira “each grabbed one of [his] arms, spun him around, 

and then slammed him face down onto the tarmac.” (Complaint ¶ 19). Deputy Perez allegedly 

then “joined his partners in battering [plaintiff].” (Id.). The complaint goes on to allege that 

before handcuffing Campbell, “the Deputies repeatedly hit him on the back of his head, knowingly 

forcing his face into the rough and highly abrasive tarmac,” and ignored his cries of pain and pleas 

to stop. (Id. ¶ 20). The deputies eventually handcuffed plaintiff and sat him up. Campbell says 

that his entire face was covered with blood; and, until emergency medical technicians arrived, he 

sat on the ground crying, still trying to explain that he only wanted to get his wallet.

Campbell’s complaint asserts three claims for relief. The first is asserted against the 

individual defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his civil rights under the First, 

Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments (the right to free speech, the right not to be deprived of 

property without due process, and the right to be free from excessive force). This claim is not 

challenged by defendants on the present motion.

It is the second and third claims that defendants seek to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 

12(b)(6). Those claims are for violation of the Bane Act (Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(b)) as to the

individual defendants; and for vicarious liability/respondeat superior (Cal. Gov’t Code § 815.2) as 

to the County. For the reasons discussed below, the court denies defendants’ motion to dismiss 

these claims.

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) tests 

the legal sufficiency of the claims in the complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 

2001). Dismissal is appropriate where there is no cognizable legal theory or an absence of 

sufficient facts alleged to support a cognizable legal theory. Id. (citing Balistreri v. Pacifica Police 

Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990)). In such a motion, all material allegations in the 

complaint must be taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the claimant. Id. 

However, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). Moreover, “the court 

is not required to accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those 

Case 5:16-cv-01768-HRL Document 20 Filed 07/22/16 Page 3 of 7
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged.” Clegg v. Cult Awareness 

Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1994).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the 

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” This means that the “[f]actual allegations 

must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (citations omitted) 

However, only plausible claims for relief will survive a motion to dismiss. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 

1950. A claim is plausible if its factual content permits the court to draw a reasonable inference 

that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Id. A plaintiff does not have to provide 

detailed facts, but the pleading must include “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfullyharmed-me accusation.” Id. at 1949.

Documents appended to the complaint or which properly are the subject of judicial notice 

may be considered along with the complaint when deciding a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion. See

Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1990); 

MGIC Indem. Corp. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500, 504 (9th Cir. 1986).

While leave to amend generally is granted liberally, the court has discretion to dismiss a 

claim without leave to amend if amendment would be futile. Rivera v. BAC Home Loans 

Servicing, L.P., 756 F. Supp.2d 1193, 1997 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (citing Dumas v. Kipp, 90 F.3d 386, 

393 (9th Cir. 1996)).

DISCUSSION

A. Claim 2: Violation of the Bane Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(b)

Campbell asserts this Bane Act claim against the individual defendants. They contend that 

dismissal is warranted because this claim is encompassed by plaintiff’s first claim for relief under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. In essence, section 52.1 of California’s Bane Act provides that any individual 

whose exercise or enjoyment of federal or state constitutional rights have “been interfered with” 

“by threat, intimidation, or coercion” may bring a civil suit for damages, injunctive relief, and 

appropriate equitable and declaratory relief. See Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(a), (b).

Defendants posit that Campbell cannot state a claim for relief under the Bane Act if the 

Case 5:16-cv-01768-HRL Document 20 Filed 07/22/16 Page 4 of 7
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

basis for that claim is the same as the one underlying his § 1983 claim. The cases defendants cite, 

however, say nothing of the kind. In those decision, the § 1983 claim failed because there was no 

evidence that any constitutional violation occurred. And, because the plaintiffs based their Bane 

Act claim on the same alleged constitutional violation, their Bane Act claim necessarily also 

failed. See Reynolds v. Cnty. of San Diego, 84 F.3d 1162, 1170-71 (9th Cir. 1996), overruled on 

other grounds by Acri v. Varian Associates, Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1997); Mendez v. 

Cnty. of Alameda, No. C03-4485 PJH, 2005 WL 3157516, at *9 (N.D. Cal., Nov. 22, 2005).

Defendants’ motion to dismiss Claim 2 is denied.

B. Claim 3: Vicarious Liability/Respondeat Superior, Cal. Gov’t Code § 815.2

Campbell asserts this claim against the County. Section 815.2 of the California 

Government Code provides, in relevant part:

A public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission 

of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment if 

the act or omission would, apart from this section, have given rise to a cause 

of action against that employee or his personal representative.

Cal. Gov’t Code § 815.2(a).

The County argues that because plaintiff has not alleged a separate and distinct state 

constitutional violation, Claim 3 is really just a § 1983 claim. As such, the County contends that 

this claim must be dismissed because plaintiff has not alleged a County policy, practice, or custom 

under Monell.

4

 However, the County cites no authority that Campbell is precluded from seeking 

to hold the County liable under California Gov’t Code § 815.2, rather than § 1983. And, while 

there is no dispute that there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, as explained by the 

Ninth Circuit:

The result is different with regards to [plaintiff]’s state law claim for 

excessive force under California Civil Code § 52.1. Because California has 

rejected the Monell rule, see Cal. Gov’t Code § 815.2, state law “imposes 

liability on counties under the doctrine of respondeat superior for acts of 

county employees; it grants immunity to counties only where the public 

employee would also be immune.” Robinson, 278 F.3d at 1016. The 

defendants do not raise any state statutory immunities. Thus, should 

[plaintiff] prevail on her excessive force claim, liability could extend to the 

County.

 

4 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).

Case 5:16-cv-01768-HRL Document 20 Filed 07/22/16 Page 5 of 7
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Cameron v. Craig, 713 F.3d 1012, 1023-24 (9th Cir. 2013).

The County’s motion to dismiss Claim 3 is denied.

C. Whether the complaint states sufficient facts

Finally, defendants contend that the complaint merely contains formulaic recitations and 

does not allege sufficient facts that would entitle plaintiff to relief. This court disagrees. As 

discussed above, the complaint asserts detailed facts as to the incident in question and the alleged 

excessive force used by the defendant deputies. Defendants dispute Campbell’s alleged version of 

events (they claim that he was unruly and that the amount of force used was necessary to bring 

him under control). Under the standard governing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motions, however, this 

court must accept the complaint’s allegations as true in evaluating the sufficiency of plaintiff’s 

pleading. Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficiently pled.

ORDER

Based on the foregoing, defendants’ motion to dismiss Claims 2 and 3 of the complaint is 

denied.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 22, 2016

HOWARD R. LLOYD

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 5:16-cv-01768-HRL Document 20 Filed 07/22/16 Page 6 of 7
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

5:16-cv-01768-HRL Notice has been electronically mailed to:

Charles Anthony Piccuta charles@piccutalaw.com

Irven L. Grant granti@co.monterey.ca.us, mcmillincb@co.monterey.ca.us, 

zinmank@co.monterey.ca.us

Case 5:16-cv-01768-HRL Document 20 Filed 07/22/16 Page 7 of 7