Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-02291/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-02291-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:145 Patent Infringement

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SEED LIGHTING DESIGN CO., LTD.,

Plaintiff,

 v.

HOME DEPOT, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 04-2291 SBA

ORDER

[Docket Nos. 57, 76]

This matter comes before the Court onDefendants Home Depot, Trend Lighting, Corp., and Hampton

Bay Fan & Lighting Company's Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 57] and Plaintiff Seed Lighting

Design Co., Ltd.'s Ex Parte Application for Leave to File a Supplemental Opposition [Docket No. 76].

Having read and considered the arguments presented by the parties in the papers submitted to the Court, the

Court findsthis matter appropriate for resolution without a hearing. The Court hereby GRANTS Defendants'

Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 57] and DENIES Plaintiff's Ex Parte Application [Docket No.

76]. 

///

///

Case 4:04-cv-02291-SBA Document 83 Filed 08/03/05 Page 1 of 17
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Plaintiff Seed Lighting Design Co., Ltd. ("Seed Lighting"), a company based in Taiwan, is the

owner of a design patent protecting the ornamental features of a dual-head halogen desk lamp, U.S. Design

Patent No. 407,519 (the "'519 Patent"). Compl. at ¶¶ 5, 10; Decl. of Richard Darwin ("Darwin Decl.") at

Ex. 1. 

Home Depot, Inc. ("Home Depot") is a Delaware corporation doing business in numerous districts

throughout the United States. Compl. at ¶ 6. Trend Lighting Corp. ("Trend Lighting") is a California

corporation that sells wholesale lighting to Home Depot. Id. at ¶ 7. Hampton Bay Fan & Lighting

Company ("Hampton Bay") is a Delaware corporation that also sells wholesale lighting to Home Depot. 

Id. at ¶ 8. Home Depot and Trend Lighting design, make, use, offer for sale, and sell a line of products

under the name Hampton Bay. Id. at ¶ 11. 

Seed Lighting manufactures a lamp called the "Oligio" lamp (hereinafter referred to as the "Subject

Lamp"). The Subject Lamp was featured in the November 1997 issue of Taiwan Lighting Magazine. 

Decl. of Lael D. Beloate ("Beloate Decl.") at Ex. J. 

On May 6, 1998, Seed Lighting filed its design patent application for the '519 Patent in the United

States. Darwin. Decl. at Ex. 1. The Subject Lamp is the embodiment of the '519 Patent. Seed Lighting

does not sell the Subject Lamp directly to consumers in the United States, but instead sells through a single

United States distributor, Lite-Source, Inc. ("Lite-Source"). Darwin Decl. at Ex. 2. Lite-Source has an

exclusive purchasing agreement with Seed Design to sell the Subject Lamp in the United States. Beloate

Decl. at Ex. A, ¶ 3. 

The Subject Lamp was depicted in Home Lighting & Accessories on or about July 1999 and

August 1999. Beloate Decl. at Ex. I. In both the Taiwan Lighting Magazine and Home Lighting &

Accessories publications, Lite-Source is listed as the sole source of the Subject Lamp. Id. at Exs. I, J.

In 2000 and 2001, Lite-Source sold the Subject Lamp to the Great Indoors stores. Id. at Ex. A, ¶

9. Lite-Source also sold the Subject Lamp to the Expo Design Center in 2002. Id. at ¶ 8. The Expo

Design Center is a division of Home Depot. Beloate Decl. at Ex. O. 

Case 4:04-cv-02291-SBA Document 83 Filed 08/03/05 Page 2 of 17
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1The parties met with a Court-appointed mediator on February 17, 2005 but were unable to

resolve the case. Defendants propounded numerous written discovery requests on or about March 4,

2005. Defendants also promptly noticed Plaintiff's deposition. Plaintiff did not propound any written

3

On or about April 8, 2002, Lite-Source noticed that a lamp that appeared to be identical to the

Subject Lamp (hereinafter referred to as the "Hampton Bay Lamp") was also being sold by Home Depot. 

Id. at ¶ 2. Lite-Source later discovered that Trend Lighting was responsible for selling the Hampton Bay

Lamp to Home Depot at a substantially lower price. Id. at ¶¶ 5, 7.

On or about September or October 2002, after reviewing a letter that Seed Lighting sent to Home

Depot concerning the Subject Lamp, Trend Lighting attempted to obtain a license from Seed Lighting. 

Beloate Decl. at Ex. H, H-100:14-101:6. When Trend Lighting was not able to negotiate a license, Trend

Lighting stopped selling the Hampton Bay Lamp. Id. 

B. Procedural Background

On June 10, 2004, Seed Lighting filed a complaint against Home Depot, Trend Lighting, and Hampton

Bay setting forth the following causes of action: (1) infringement ofthe '519 Patent; (2) unfair competition; and

(3) trade dress infringement. In the complaint, Seed Lighting alleges that Trend Lighting and Home Depot

infringed the '519 Patent bymaking, using, and selling an infringing desk lamp under the name Hampton Bay.

Compl. at ¶ 11. Seed Lighting also alleges that the design and packaging of the Subject Lamp constitute

protectable trade dress, and that the Hampton Bay Lamp sold by the Defendants infringes those trade dress

rights. Id. at ¶¶ 23, 24. Seed Lighting further alleges that Defendants' alleged actions constitute unfair

competition. Id. at ¶¶ 18-20. On August 13, 2004, Defendants filed an answer to the complaint. 

On October 18, 2004, Judge Chesney issued a PretrialPreparation Order, setting an April 15, 2005

fact discovery deadline. On March 21, 2005, Judge Chesney recused herself fromthis case. Per the March

21, 2005 Order ofRecusal, all pending dates ofmotions, pretrialconferences, and trialwere vacated. All other

dates, including dates relating to discovery deadlines, remained in effect. 

On March 30, 2005, Plaintifffiled an ex parte application, pursuant to FederalRule ofCivil Procedure

16(b), requesting a continuance of the discovery deadline to May 16, 2005. Plaintiff based its request on the

fact thatthe parties had agreed to delay the initiation of discovery until settlement negotiations were exhausted

in an effort to keep the costs of litigation down.1

Case 4:04-cv-02291-SBA Document 83 Filed 08/03/05 Page 3 of 17
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 discovery requests until March 11, 2005.

4

On March 31, 2005, Defendants filed a limited opposition to Plaintiff's ex parte motion to extend the

discovery deadline. In the opposition, Defendants stated that they did not oppose an extension of the fact

discovery deadline to May 13, 2005. However, Defendants requested that the Court impose certain

restrictions on further written discovery. Defendants also requested that neither party be permitted to notice

any additionaldepositions to occur after April 15, 2005, with the exception of Plaintiff's deposition, which had

already been noticed. Additionally, Defendants requested that the deadline for the disclosure of expert witness

reports be continued to May 13, 2005. 

On April 11, 2005, the Court granted in part and denied in part Plaintiff's ex parte application. The

Court found that Plaintiff had shown good cause warranting a limited extension of the fact discovery deadline

to permit the Defendants to conduct a deposition that could notbe scheduled priorto the April 15, 2005 cut-off

date. However, the Court also found that Plaintiff had not demonstrated good cause warranting an extension

of time to propound an unlimited amount of additional written discovery or to conduct additional depositions

after the April 15, 2005 deadline. Accordingly, on April 11, 2005, the Court ordered a continuance of the fact

discovery cut-off deadline to May 16, 2005. The Court further ordered that each party was permitted to serve

the following additional written discovery: (1) no more than ten additional requests for admission; and (2) no

more than ten additional requests for documents. Neither party was permitted to serve additional

interrogatories. The Court also granted Defendants leave to depose Plaintiff so long as the deposition

concluded on or before May 16, 2005. Finally, the Court continued the deadline relating to the exchange of

expert witness reports to May 16, 2005. 

On May 16, 2005, the parties jointly submitted a stipulationrequesting a limited continuance ofthe fact

discovery deadline so that the parties could complete two depositions that had been noticed priorto the original

April 15, 2005 discovery deadline. On May 18, 2005, the Court granted the parties' request. Also on May

18, 2005, the Court held a Case Management Conference. On May 20, 2005, the Court issued an Order for

Pretrial Preparation (the "Pretrial Order"), setting the matter for a jury trialon September 26, 2005. Pursuant

to the Pretrial Order, the fact discovery cut-off was continued to June 17, 2005 and the motion cut-off was

set for August 2, 2005. 

Case 4:04-cv-02291-SBA Document 83 Filed 08/03/05 Page 4 of 17
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

On June 10, 2005, Plaintiff submitted an ex parte application requesting an extension of the fact

discovery deadline to July 17, 2005. Plaintiff also requested that the Court extend the expert discovery

deadline to an unspecified date "beyond May 31, 2005." In support of its request, Plaintiff stated that: (1) it

had been unable to take the deposition of Home Depot despite two previous attempts to notice the deposition

because the parties were not able to agree upon a mutually available date;(2) Defendants had failed to produce

documents that Plaintiff believed were responsive to Plaintiff's discovery requests; and (3) the parties had been

unable to agree on available dates for the depositions ofDefendants' designated experts. Defendants opposed

Plaintiff'srequest on the grounds that no further extensions of time were warranted, since Plaintiff had failed to

timely serve its written discovery despite two previous extensions granted by this Court. Notwithstanding its

objections to Plaintiff's request, however, Defendants agreed to produce Home Depot and its two designated

experts for deposition, even after the June 17, 2005 discovery deadline. 

On June 16, 2005, the Court granted in part and denied in part Plaintiff's ex parte application. The

Court found that Plaintiff had notshown good cause warranting an extension of the fact discovery deadline to

July 17, 2005 or an extension of the expert discovery deadline to an unspecified date after July 17, 2005. The

Court noted that it had already granted Plaintiff a two-month extension of time within which to complete its

discovery. The Court also noted that Plaintiff's failure to complete discovery consistent with the original

scheduling order, or during the additionalperiod provided bythe priorextension, or to compelfurther discovery

responses pursuant to FederalRule of Civil Procedure Rule 37, was its own fault. However, since Defendants

agreed to make Home Depot and Defendants' two experts available for deposition, the Court granted Plaintiff

leave to take these three depositions after the June 17, 2005 deadline.

On June 21, 2005, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendants' Motion for

Summary Judgment was noticed for a July 26, 2005 hearing date. On June 23, 2005, after being informed by

the Court that the July 26, 2005 hearing date was not available, Defendants filed an ex parte application

requesting that the Court allow Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment to be heard on July 26, 2005. On

June 28, 2005, the Court granted Defendants' ex parte application.

Pursuant to the Court's standing orders, Plaintiff's opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary

Judgment was due on July 5, 2005. However, on July 5, 2005, instead of filing an opposition, Plaintiff

Case 4:04-cv-02291-SBA Document 83 Filed 08/03/05 Page 5 of 17
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 2Plaintiff's proposed supplemental opposition was filed concurrently with the ex parte application. 

6

submitted an ex parte application requesting a one-week extension of time to file the opposition brief. In the

ex parte application, Plaintiff stated thatit was not able to comply with the July 5, 2005 deadline because it did

not begin preparing its opposition brief until June 28, 2005.

On July 5, 2005, the Court issued anorder denying Plaintiff's ex parte application. However, the Court

granted Plaintiff a brief extension oftime to file its opposition brief, such that the briefwas due on or before July

7, 2005. In denying the ex parte application, the Court noted that Plaintiff had a history of failing to act

diligently and had repeatedly failed to meet the Court's deadlines. The Court also reminded Plaintiffthat, given

the August 2, 2005 motion cut-off deadline and the September 2005 trial date, Plaintiff was expected to be

in the position to readily respond to any dispositive motions filed by the Defendants. 

On July 21, 2005, Plaintiff filed an ex parte application requesting leave to file a supplemental

opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.2 On that same date, Defendants filed their

opposition to Plaintiff's ex parte application. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Under FederalRule ofCivil Procedure 56, a court may properly grant a motion forsummary judgment

if the pleadings and materials demonstrate that there is "no genuine issue as to any materialfact and the moving

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A

dispute about a material fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdictfor

the nonmovingparty." Andersonv. LibertyLobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Summary judgment may

be granted in favor of a defendant on an ultimate issue of fact where the defendant carries its burden of

“pointing out to the district court that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.”

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325; see Johnston v. IVAC Corp., 885 F.2d 1574, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1989).

To withstand a motion forsummary judgment, the non-movantmustshow that there are genuine factual

issues which can only be resolved by the trier offact. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. The nonmoving party may

not rely on the pleadings but must present specific facts creating a genuine issue of material fact. T.W. Elec.

Serv.v.PacificElec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). The court's function, however,

is not to make credibility determinations. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. The inferences to be drawn from the

Case 4:04-cv-02291-SBA Document 83 Filed 08/03/05 Page 6 of 17
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

“Trade dress refers generally to the total image, design, and appearance of a product and may

include features such as size, shape, color, color combinations, texture, or graphics.” Clicks Billiards, Inc.

v. Sixshooters, Inc., 251 F.3d 1252, 1257 (9th Cir. 2001). 

4Mr. Berger has been a faculty member of Northwestern University since 1986. Berger Decl. at ¶

2. He received his Master's Degree in Business Administration from the University of Chicago Graduate

School of Business in 1978, with concentrations in marketing and finance. Id. In addition to the numerous

graduate and undergraduate classes Mr. Berger has taught at Northwestern University, Roosevelt

University's Walter E. Heller College of Business Administration, DePaul University's College of

Commerce, the Lake Forest Graduate School of Management, and the University of Illinois at Chicago,

Mr. Berger is also a Principal of James T. Berger/Marketing Strategis, a strategic marketing

communications and consulting firm. Id. 

7

facts must be viewed in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d

at 631.

ANALYSIS

I. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment

A. Trade Dress Infringement

In order for a plaintiffto prove a claim fortrade dress3infringement, the trade dress holder must be able

to prove: (1) that its claimed dress is non-functional; (2) that its claimed dress serves a source-identifying role

either because it is inherently distinctive or has acquired secondary meaning; and (3) that the defendants'

product creates a likelihood ofconfusion. ClicksBilliards, Inc. v. Sixshooters, Inc., 251 F.3d 1252, 1258

(9th Cir. 2001). Here, in the instant Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants state that they are entitled to

summary judgment on Plaintiff's trade dress claim because the undisputed facts show that Plaintiff cannot

establish the second factor of trade dress infringement: secondary meaning. 

“The trade dress of a product . . . attains secondary meaning when the purchasing public associates

the dress with a particular product.” Id. at 1262. The elements making up the trade dress “must have been

used in such a manner as to denote product source.” Id. Thus, a product feature whose impact is only

“decorative and aesthetic, with no source-identifying role, cannot be given exclusive rights under trade dress

law.” Id. "[P]roof of secondary meaning entails vigorous evidentiary requirements." Yankee Candle Co.,Inc.

v. Bridgewater Candle Co., LLC, 259 F.3d 25, 43 (1st Cir. 2001). "The only direct evidence probative of

secondary meaning is consumer surveys and testimony by individual consumers." Id.

In support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants have submitted a survey conducted by

their expert, James Berger,4 which is intended to demonstrate that the Subject Lamp has not acquired any

Case 4:04-cv-02291-SBA Document 83 Filed 08/03/05 Page 7 of 17
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

secondary meaning. See Decl. ofJames Berger ("Berger Decl."). As described in the survey, at Mr. Berger's

direction, 150 consumers were interviewed in three separate shopping malls around the country. Berger Decl.

at Ex. 1. Each person who participated in the survey was prequalified as someone who had actually purchased

a desk or table lamp in the last five years. Id. The participants were shown six desk and table lamps, including

the Subject Lamp, and were asked to identify the source of the lamps, to the extent that they were able to do

so. Id. None of the consumers surveyed identified Seed Lighting as the source of the Subject Lamp. Id.

In its opposition, Seed Lighting argues that the Berger survey is inadmissible and thatitshould be given

no weight because (1) Mr. Berger conducted the survey without a "screening questionnaire"; (2) Mr. Berger

let the interviewers "wing it"; (3) Mr. Berger's survey questions were biased, ambiguous, and compound. 

In evaluating a survey, a Court must first determine whether the survey is admissible. Clicks, 251 F.3d

at 1263. This involves an analysis of whether the survey is relevant, supported by proper foundation, and

conducted according to accepted principles. Id. Once the survey is admitted, issues of methodology, survey

design, reliability, the experience and reputation of the expert, and critique of conclusions go to the weight of

the survey. Id. Here, Seed Lighting fails to articulate in any way how the survey is inadmissible. Having

reviewed the expert report and the methodology setforth therein, the Court concludes that the survey is, in fact,

relevant and admissible. Indeed, although consumer surveys are often subject to criticism and varying

interpretations, they are a routine and well-established method for presenting evidence as to secondary

meaning. See Excelligence Learning Corp. v. Oriental Trading Company, Inc., 2004 WL2944048 (N.D.

Cal. 2004) (citing Clicks, 251 F.3d at 1262). Accordingly, courts have consistently found that "[a]n expert

survey ofpurchasers can provide the most persuasive evidence on secondary meaning." Levi Strauss & Co.

v. Blue Bell, Inc., 778 F.2d 1352, 1358 (9th Cir. 1985). 

With respect to Seed Lighting's attack on the weight of the survey, these criticisms are equally without

merit. First, the undisputed evidence shows that the participants in the survey were pre-screened and that the

survey was carefully designed to target only those individuals who had purchased either a table or desk lamp

within the past five years. Berger Decl. at Ex. B. Seed Lighting's contention that the interviewers were

expected to "wing it" is also false, and blatantly ignores the fact that the interviewers were provided with a

written questionnaire. Id. Seed Lighting also fails to explain how the survey questions were "biased" or how

the questions were so ambiguous that they rendered the survey unreliable. To the contrary, the questions are

Case 4:04-cv-02291-SBA Document 83 Filed 08/03/05 Page 8 of 17
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

undisputedly straightforward and are precisely the type of questions that should have been asked. See, e.g.,

Excelligence, 2004 WL 2944048 at * 10 ("The survey tested whether the participants could identify the

source of each [product] fromits appearance. This is exactly the appropriate equation to ask when attempting

to determine whether a particular [product's] trade dress has secondary meaning."). 

Seed Lighting's alternative argument that the survey was fundamentally flawed because it targeted

consumers, rather than "private label wholesalers," has been consistently rejected by the Ninth Circuit. See

Self-Realization Fellowship Church v. Ananda Church of Self-Realization, 59 F.3d 902, 910 (9th Cir.

1995) (stating that declarations submitted by an entity's wholesalers are not probative); see also International

Jensen, Inc. v. Metrosound U.S.A., Inc., 4 F.3d 819, 824 (9th Cir. 1993) ("a product's trademark or trade

dress acquires a secondary meaning when the purchasing public associates the mark or dress with a single

producer or source") (emphasis added). Indeed, as stated by the Ninth Circuit in Self-Realization,

"[a]ttestations from persons in close association and intimate contact with the trademark claimant's business

does not reflect the views of the purchasing public." Id. (internal quotations omitted). 

Since the Berger survey is the only direct evidence in the record regarding secondary meaning, and

purportedly establishes that the purchasing public does not associate the Subject Lamp with Seed Lighting,

Seed Lighting has the burden of presenting sufficient circumstantial evidence of secondary meaning to create

a triable issue of material fact on this issue. See, e.g., Excelligence, 2004 WL 2944048 at * 10. In this

regard, however, Seed Lighting's opposition brief is utterly deficient. 

For example, Seed Lighting first argues that it can establish secondary meaning because it has enjoyed

the exclusive use of the Subject Lamp since 1997. However, this alone, is not sufficient to prevent summary

judgment of its trade dress claim. See Excelligence, 2004 WL 2944048 at * 10. “Proof of secondary

meaning requires at least some evidence that consumers associate the trade dress with the source. Although

evidence of pervasiveness of the trade dress may support the conclusion that a mark has acquired secondary

meaning, it cannot stand alone.” Yankee Candle Co., 259 F.3d at 43 (affirming summary judgment for the

defendant on issue of secondary meaning despite the plaintiff’s extensive evidence regarding advertising,

exclusive use, and high volume of sales). Although Seed Lighting's alleged period of exclusive use could have

provided ample time for its design to obtain secondary meaning, "secondary meaning cannot emerge in a

vacuum." See, e.g.,ContinentalLaboratoryProducts,Inc. v. Medax Int'l, Inc., 114 F.Supp.2d 992, 1005-

Case 4:04-cv-02291-SBA Document 83 Filed 08/03/05 Page 9 of 17
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

1006 (S.D. Cal. 2000). 

Here, the undisputed evidence confirms that Seed Lighting made no effort to create secondarymeaning

during its alleged period of exclusive use of the Subject Lamp. For example, as Defendants note:

• Seed Lighting never stamped or otherwise affixed its name or logo to the Subject Lamp. See

Darwin Decl. at Ex. 3 (Resp. to Request for Admission ("RFA") No. 2); see also Darwin

Decl. at Ex. 4 (Depo. of Meiric Chen ("Chen Depo.") at 179:23-180:11). 

• Seed Lighting never advertised the Subject Lamp in the United States. See Darwin Decl. at

Ex. 4 (Chen Depo. at 165:11-25).

• Seed Lighting never advertised at all in the United States. See id. (Chen Depo. at 179:15-18).

• Seed Lighting never attended trade shows in the United States. See id. (Chen Depo. at

179:119-21).

• Seed Lighting never sold the Subject Lamp directly to consumers in the United States. See

id. (Chen Depo. at 150:20-25).

• The Subject Lamp is only advertised in the United States as a Lite-Source product, not as a

product made by Seed Lighting. Id. (Chen Depo. at 164:5-8, 165:11-25).

• The founder of Seed Lighting does not believe that consumers in the United States are even

aware of Seed Lighting. Id. (Chen Depo. at 179:23-180:11). 

Accordingly, there is no evidence that any ofSeed Lighting'ssales, advertising, or promotionalactivities

created an association between the Subject Lamp and Seed Lighting in the mind of the consumer. In light of

this overwhelming evidence, Seed Lighting cannot establish secondary meaning merely by alleging that

Defendants intentionally copied the Subject Lamp. See Excelligence, 2004 WL 2944048 at * 11. While it

is true that, "in appropriate circumstances, deliberate copying may suffice to support an inference of secondary

meaning,"Fuddruckers, Inc. v.Doc'sB.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837, 844 (9th Cir. 1987), in order to make

this finding, the deliberate copying must be an intentional attempt to capitalize on a company's reputation or

goodwill. See id. (requiring a finding that the plaintiff's name was "adopted deliberately with a view to obtain

some advantage from the good will, good name, and good trade which another has built up . . . [and an

indication] that he expects confusion and resultant profit."). Indeed, as the First Circuit noted in Yankee

Candle Company, mere attempts to copy a product are not necessarily probative, since the copier may very

well be exploiting a particularly desirable feature, rather than seeking to confuse consumers as to the source

of the product. Yankee Candle Company, 259 F.3d at 45. Thus, the relevant intent is not just the intent to

copy, but, rather, the intent to "pass off" one's goods as those of another. Id. Seed Lighting has made no such

Case 4:04-cv-02291-SBA Document 83 Filed 08/03/05 Page 10 of 17
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

showing here. 

Last, the Court notes thatDefendants have also argued that Seed Lighting cannot establish protectable

trade dress rights in the packaging of the SubjectLamp because:(1) the packaging does not appear to belong

to Seed Lighting; and (2) the box in which the Subject Lamp is sold explicitly identifies Lite-Source as the

source of the lamp. See Darwin Decl. at Ex. 8. These facts appear to be beyond dispute, as Seed Lighting's

name is clearly notmentioned anywhere on the Subject Lamp or the Subject Lamp's packaging. Additionally,

Seed Lighting utterly fails to address this issue in its opposition. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Seed

Lighting has conceded this point. 

Because the Court finds that Seed Lighting has not established that the Subject Lamp has acquired

secondary meaning, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the trade dress infringement claim. See,

e.g., Excelligence, 2004 WL 2944048 at * 11. 

B. Patent Infringement

Defendants have also moved for summary judgment on Seed Lighting's patent infringement claim on

the grounds that Seed Lighting's design patent is invalid for non-enablement. 

A design patent protects the nonfunctional aspects of an ornamental design as shown in the patent.

Elmer v. ICC Fabricating, Inc., 67 F.3d 1571, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1995); see 35 U.S.C. § 171 (providing that

a patent may be obtained for the ornamental design of an article of manufacture). "A patented design is

ordinarily claimed 'as shown,' that is, by its drawing." 35 U.S.C. § 171; Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v.

Hercules Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 162 F.3d 1113, 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 

To be valid, design patents must comply with the requirements of section 112 of the United States

Patent Code. The second paragraph of § 112 provides that "[t]he specification shall conclude with one or

more claims particularly pointing out and distinctively claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards

as his invention." 35 U.S.C. § 112(2). "Determining whether a claim is definite requires an analysis of whether

one skilled in the art would understand the bounds of the claim when read in light of the specification."

Personalized Media Communications v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 161 F.3d 696, 706 (Fed. Cir. 1998).

Because, in a design patent, "the drawings or photograph constitute[]the entire visualdisclosure ofthe claims[,]

it is of utmost importance that the drawing or photo be clear and complete, and that nothing regarding the

design sought to be patented is left to conjecture." See Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 1503.2.

Case 4:04-cv-02291-SBA Document 83 Filed 08/03/05 Page 11 of 17
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5Mr. Woodring is an industrial designer engineer with 43 years experience in the industry. Decl. of

Cooper Woodring ("Woodring Decl.") at ¶ 2. Mr. Woodring has a Bachelor's Degree and a Master's

Degree in Industrial Design and has received over 25 design and utility patents. Id.

6Defendants also point out that Mr. Woodring's report has not been rebutted – and more

importantly – cannot be rebutted by Seed Lighting at trial because Seed Lighting has failed to retain or

disclose a rebuttal expert on this issue.

12

Here, since the '591 Patent survived the full patent examination process, it is presumed valid pursuant to 35

U.S.C. § 282. Defendants must therefore prove their invalidity defense by clear and convincing evidence.

Abbott Lab. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 182 F.3d 1315, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 

To meet their burden of proof, Defendants have cited to a report prepared by their expert, Cooper

Woodring,5as well as certain admissions made by the inventor of the lamp, Meiric Chen. For example,

Defendants contend, and Seed Lighting does not dispute, thatMr. Woodring and Mr. Chen are experts skilled

in the art of industrial design. Defendants further contend, and Seed Lighting does not dispute, that Mr.

Woodring has identified certain mistakes and ambiguitiesin the drawings ofthe '591 Patent.6 Defendants also

contend, and Seed Lighting does not dispute, that Mr. Chen has conceded that, due to certain ambiguities in

the '519 Patent's drawings, even he cannot clearly articulate the precise scope of the patent. 

As Mr. Woodring explains in his report, the '519 Patent consists of one claim, which itself consists of

ten separate figures on six drawing sheets. See Cooper Decl. at Ex. 1. The mistakes and ambiguities in the

Patent's drawings fall within three of the six major components of the Subject Lamp: (1) the base, (2) the

shades, and (3) the disk at the top of the vertical rods. Id. These components contain the following

inconsistencies and flaws:

• The base of the Subject Lamp is depicted as a thin, flat, disk-like plate in Figure 1 and as a

raised, domed shape in Figures 2 and 3.

• The underside of the Subject Lamp is depicted in Figure 8 as having a specific edge and wall

thickness around the perimeter ofthe shade and in Figure 5 as consisting of a solid surface with

no edge or wall thickness. 

• The disk at the top of the vertical rods of the Subject Lamp is shown in Figure 1 as having the

same outer dimensionas the square formed by the "sliders" thatmove the shades up and down

and in Figure 4 as being small enough to fit within the square formed by those sliders. 

Id. 

Due to these inconsistencies, after reviewing the '591 Patent during his deposition, Mr. Chen – the

inventor of the patent – agreed that he could not determine whether the base ofthe claimed lamp was a flat

Case 4:04-cv-02291-SBA Document 83 Filed 08/03/05 Page 12 of 17
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7Seed Lighting fails to address this point in its opposition.

8For example, in paragraph 18 of the complaint, Seed Lighting alleges that "[t]hrough their

infringement of the patent-in-suit, defendants HOME DEPOT, HAMPTON BAY and TREND have

wrongfully diverted and secured sales, monies, and profits which rightfully should have been made by

plaintiff." Compl. at ¶ 18. 

13

disk or a rounded dome. See Darwin Decl. at Ex. 4 (Chen Depo. at 142:10-14; 143:5-14). Mr. Chen also

stated in his deposition that Figure 5 of the '591 Patent - which appears to show a solid surface with no edge

– is notsupposed to depict a solid surface, but, rather, the underside ofthe shade. Id. (Chen Depo. at 144:1-

10). 

In its opposition, Seed Lighting does not identify a single piece of evidence or testimony that would

demonstrate to the Court that a person skilled in the art would understand the bounds of the '519 Patent's

claim. To the contrary, even Seed Lighting's own witness appears to agree that the patent drawings are flawed

and unclear. Further, Seed Lighting's sole response to Defendants' evidence is that "the slight differences or

vagaries contained within the nine figures which make up the '519 Patent are so insubstantial and

inconsequential as to render Home Depot's indefiniteness argument meaningless." Opp. at 8. The bare,

unsupported belief of Seed Lighting's counsel that the vagaries are "insubstantial,"however, is notsufficient to

overcome summary judgment. T.W.Elec.Serv., 809 F.2d at 630 (nonmoving party must present specific facts

creating a genuine issue ofmaterialfact). Without any evidence, facts, or expert testimony, the Court findsthat

Seed Lighting has utterly failed to demonstrate the existence of genuine factual issues sufficient to preclude

summary judgment on its patent claim. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. 

C. Unfair Competition

Defendants have also moved forsummary judgment on Seed Lighting's unfair competition claim. After

correctly observing that Seed Lighting's complaint does not reference either the common law or a specific

statute as the basis for Plaintiff's "unfair competition" claim, Defendants state that they have construed the claim

as arising under § 1125(a) of the Lanham Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125.7 While it appears that Seed Lighting's

unfair competition claim is actually premised on its patent infringement theory,8it is fair to say that to prevail on

its unfair competition claim, Seed Lighting must be able to show either trade dress infringement or patent

infringement. Since the Court has concluded that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on both the

trade dress infringement and the patent infringement claims, the Court finds that Defendants are entitled to

Case 4:04-cv-02291-SBA Document 83 Filed 08/03/05 Page 13 of 17
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

summary judgment on the unfair competition claim as well. 

II. Plaintiff's Ex Parte Application

On July 21, 2005, Seed Lighting filed an ex parte application requesting leave to file a supplemental

opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. In the ex parte application, Seed Lighting argues

there is "good cause" for leave to file a supplemental brief because it was "not adequately able to argue its

oppositionwithout the testimony ofthe trade dress expert, whose survey the defendants' motion for summary

judgment as to trade dress primarily relies." Seed Lighting states that it did not take the deposition of

Defendants' patent expert until July 6, 2005 and did not take the deposition of Defendants' trademark expert

until July 14, 2005. Seed Lighting further states that its supplemental opposition "would be limited to the

deposition testimony of defendants' expert who conducted the secondary meaning survey." 

Also on July 21, 2005, Defendants filed an opposition to Seed Lighting's ex parte application. In their

opposition, Defendants state that: (1) as a matter of professional courtesy, Defendants agreed to make their

experts available for deposition prior to date Seed Lighting's opposition brief was due, even though Seed

Lighting had failed to properly notice these depositions prior to the discovery cut-off; and (2) despite being

givenmultiple opportunities to do so, Seed Lighting failed to take the depositions of Defendants' experts until

mid-July. In support oftheir opposition, Defendants provide the Court with correspondence between counsel

for Seed Lighting and Defendants, which shows that Defendants did, in fact, make their experts available for

deposition on several occasions in June 2005. Defendants further argue that they will be severely prejudiced

if Seed Lighting is allowed to provide supplemental briefing on the Motion for Summary Judgment, especially

in light of the fact that Seed Lighting filed its ex parte application only three Court days prior to the scheduled

hearing date. 

Having considered the ex parte application and Defendants' opposition to the ex parte application, the

Court finds that Seed Lighting's ex parte application is untimely and lacks merit. Specifically, the Court finds

that:(1) Seed Lighting has not shown good cause as to why it should be permitted to file a supplementalbrief;

and (2) Seed Lighting has failed to demonstrate why it was not able to obtain the relevant discovery at an earlier

date through the exercise of diligence. Further, the fact that Seed Lighting did not move for a continuance of

the Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to FederalRule ofCivil Procedure 56(f) at the time it filed itsinitial

opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is fatal to its claim that such discovery should now

Case 4:04-cv-02291-SBA Document 83 Filed 08/03/05 Page 14 of 17
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

Indeed, although Plaintiff did state in its opposition brief that it was still in the process of conducting

depositions, see Opp. at 4:14-17, Plaintiff failed to move for a continuance of the hearing on this basis or to

otherwise argue to the Court that the on-going depositions were likely to produce facts relevant to its

opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment. See Brae Transp., Inc., 790 F.2d at 1443 ("References

in memoranda and declarations to a need for discovery do not qualify as motions under Rule 56(f).")

15

be considered by this Court. See Brae Transp., Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 790 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9th Cir.

1986) ("Failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 56(f) is a proper ground for denying discovery and

proceeding to summary judgment.")9 

Moreover, even ifthis Court were to construe the ex parte application as an untimely Rule 56(f) motion,

Seed Lighting has failed to show that a continuance is warranted. Although Rule 56(f) allows the Court to grant

a continuance when a party opposing summary judgment wishes to conduct further discovery, the Court may

properly deny the request ifthe movant has failed diligently to pursue discovery in the past, Mackey v. Pioneer

National Bank, 867 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1989), or ifthe movant fails to show how the informationsoughtwould

preclude summaryjudgment.California Union Ins. Co. v. AmericanDiversifiedSav.Bank, 914 F.2d 1271,

1278 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Hall v. State of Hawaii, 791 F.2d 759, 761 (9th Cir. 1986)).

Here, Seed Lighting has a well-documented history of failing to diligently pursue its discovery

opportunities. In fact, Seed Lighting has offered no reason why it was not able to take the deposition of Mr.

Berger priorto the initial expert discovery cut-off deadline or during the numerous extensions of time givento

it to complete its discovery. In fact, it appears that Defendants and Seed Lighting discussed the scheduling of

Mr. Berger's deposition as early as May 25, 2005, but that Seed Lighting nevertheless declined to notice Mr.

Berger's deposition prior to the discovery deadline. It further appears fromthe papers submitted to the Court

that Defendants granted Seed Lighting several opportunities to take the deposition of Mr. Berger in June,

notwithstanding Seed Lighting'sfailure to comply with the relevant deadlines, but that Seed Lighting continued

to postpone its decision to take the deposition of Mr. Berger in an effort to avoid the costs of litigation. 

Further, and most significantly, even ifthe Court were to consider the supplemental opposition, it fails

to show that Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment. Summary judgment may be granted in favor

of a defendant on an ultimate issue of fact where the defendant carries its burden of “pointing out to the district

court that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325;

see Johnston v. IVAC Corp., 885 F.2d 1574, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1989). Here, the supplemental opposition

Case 4:04-cv-02291-SBA Document 83 Filed 08/03/05 Page 15 of 17
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 10Significantly, a consumer survey is a piece of evidence that Plaintiff should have produced. 

16

makes clear that Plaintiff has no evidence sufficient to carry its burden of proof on the trade dress infringement

claim. 

As set forth herein, supra, in a trade dress infringement claim, the plaintiff bears the burden of proof

and must be able to establish that:(1) that its claimed dress is non-functional; (2) that its claimed dress serves

a source-identifying role either because it is inherently distinctive or has acquired secondary meaning; and (3)

that the defendants' product creates a likelihood of confusion. ClicksBilliards, Inc. v. Sixshooters, Inc., 251

F.3d 1252, 1258 (9th Cir. 2001). Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is premised on the fact that

Plaintiff cannot establish an essential element of its trade dress claim, i.e. that the Subject Lamp has acquired

a secondary meaning. In support of this argument, Defendants have conducted their own consumer survey,

and have also shown that:(1) Seed Lighting never stamped or otherwise affixed its name or logo to the Subject

Lamp; (2) Seed Lighting never advertised the Subject Lamp in the United States; (3) Seed Lighting never

advertised at all in the United States; (4) Seed Lighting never attended trade shows in the United States; (5)

Seed Lighting never sold the Subject Lamp directly to consumers in the United States; (6) the Subject Lamp

is only advertised in the United States as a Lite-Source product, not as a productmade by Seed Lighting; and

(7) the founder of Seed Lighting does not believe that consumers in the United States are even aware of Seed

Lighting. 

Plaintiff's proposed supplemental opposition focuses solely on one piece of evidence proffered by

Defendants, the consumer survey.10 Specifically, Seed Lighting argues that: (1) the Berger survey violated the

"anonymous source rule"; (2) the Berger survey failed to controlfor certain variables; (3) the Berger surveyhad

a built-in bias toward Home Depot;(4)Mr. Berger failed to prevent Home Depot employees fromparticipating

in the survey; and (5) the Berger survey had a response rate below 50%. Seed Lighting then concludes that

Defendants' survey should be afforded little weight. This conclusion only demonstrates that there is no direct

evidence that the Subject Lamp has not acquired secondary meaning. To overcome the instant Motion for

Summary Judgment, however, Plaintiff must establish that there is some evidence that the Subject Lamp has

acquired secondary meaning. The proposed supplemental opposition brief does not establish this. As such,

the proposed supplemental opposition brief is insufficient to overcome summary judgment. 

Case 4:04-cv-02291-SBA Document 83 Filed 08/03/05 Page 16 of 17
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

17

Insum, Seed Lighting has not demonstrated that good causewarrants considerationofthe supplemental

opposition. More importantly, however, the supplemental opposition does not alter this Court's ultimate

conclusion that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's Ex

Parte Application for Leave to File a Supplemental Opposition. 

CONCLUSION

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 57] is

GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Plaintiff's Ex Parte Application forLeave to File a Supplemental

Opposition [Docket No. 76] is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

Dated: 8-3-05 SAUNDRA BROWN ARMSTRONG

United States District Judge

Case 4:04-cv-02291-SBA Document 83 Filed 08/03/05 Page 17 of 17