Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01482/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01482-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

James Michael West, )

)

Petitioner, ) CIV 12-01482 PHX DGC (MEA)

)

v. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

Charles L. Ryan, et al., ) 

) 

 Respondents. )

) 

_______________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE DAVID G. CAMPBELL:

Petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed a petition for

writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on July 10,

2012. Respondents filed a Limited Answer to Petition for Writ

of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Doc. 8) on October 9, 2012.

Petitioner filed a reply to the answer to his petition on

October 31, 2012. See Doc. 9 & Doc. 10. 

I Procedural History

A grand jury indictment returned November 7, 2006,

charged Petitioner with three counts of sexual conduct with a

minor, one count of molestation of a child, and one count of

sexual conduct with a minor. See Answer, Exh. A. On March 2,

2007, Petitioner, pursuant to a written plea agreement, pled

guilty to one count each of: (1) sexual conduct with a minor, a

class 2 felony and dangerous crime against children (Count 1);

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(2) attempted sexual conduct with a minor, a class 3 felony and

dangerous crime against children (Count 2); and (3) attempted

molestation of a child, a class 3 felony and dangerous crime

against children (Count 4). See id., Exh. B. Pursuant to the

agreement, the state agreed to drop two counts of the indictment

and any potential charges arising from a 2006 police report and

images found on Petitioner’s computer. Id., Exh. B.

On April 5, 2007, the state trial court sentenced

Petitioner to 14.25 years imprisonment pursuant to his

conviction on Count 1 and imposed a term of lifetime probation

pursuant to his convictions on Counts 2 and 4. See id., Exh. C.

On September 3, 2008, one year and five months later, Petitioner

initiated an action for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule

32, Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. See id., Exh. D. On

September 19, 2008, the state trial court dismissed Petitioner’s

notice of post-conviction relief as untimely. Id., Exh. E. 

Petitioner thereafter filed a “motion for sentence

modification for exceeding subject matter jurisdiction,” arguing

that the imposition of lifetime probation both constituted cruel

and unusual punishment in violation of the Fifth, Fourteenth,

and Eighth Amendments and that the imposition of this sentence

also violated his right to equal protection of the laws. Id.,

Exh. F. The state trial court construed the motion as a second,

successive petition for post-conviction relief and dismissed it

pursuant to Rule 32.4(a) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure as untimely. See id., Exh. G. 

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Petitioner sought review of the trial court’s decision

dismissing his Rule 32 action by the Arizona Court of Appeals,

which dismissed the petition for review on February 10, 2012.

See id., Exh. H. 

On July 10, 2012, Petitioner filed the pending petition

for writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner argues he is entitled to

habeas relief because the imposition of lifetime probation

violates his right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment.

Petitioner also asserts the imposition of lifetime probation

violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments.

II Analysis

A. Statute of limitations

The petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus is barred

by the applicable statute of limitations found in the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). The

AEDPA imposed a one-year statute of limitations on state

prisoners seeking federal habeas relief from their state

convictions. See, e.g., Espinoza Matthews v. California, 432

F.3d 1021, 1025 (9th Cir. 2005); Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918,

920 (9th Cir. 2002). The one-year statute of limitations on

habeas petitions generally begins to run on “the date on which

the judgment became final by conclusion of direct review or the

expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1)(A). For an Arizona non-capital pleading defendant,

the conviction becomes “final” at the conclusion of the first

“of-right” post-conviction proceeding under Rule 32, Arizona

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rules of Criminal Procedure. “Arizona’s Rule 32 of-right

proceeding for plea-convicted defendants is a form of direct

review within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).”

Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 717 (9th Cir. 2007). “To

bring an of-right proceeding under Rule 32, a plea-convicted

defendant must provide to the Arizona Superior Court, within 90

days of conviction and sentencing in that court, notice of his

or her intent to file a Petition for Post–Conviction Review.”

Id. at 715 (citing Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a)).

Petitioner’s state court conviction became final on or

about July 5, 2007, ninety days after he was sentenced pursuant

to his guilty plea, when the time expired for Petitioner to file

a timely Rule 32 action. Accordingly, the one-year statute of

limitations on Petitioner’s federal habeas action began to run

on or about July 6, 2007, and expired on or about July 6, 2008,

unless it was tolled by a properly-filed state action for postconviction relief. Petitioner did not file a timely action for

state post-conviction relief in-between the time his conviction

became final and the time the statute of limitations expired.

On September 3, 2008, one year and five months after he

was sentenced, Petitioner initiated an action for postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal

Procedure. See Answer, Exh. D. On September 19, 2008, the

state trial court dismissed Petitioner’s notice of

post-conviction relief as untimely. Id., Exh. E. 

Although the relevant federal statute allows that the

statute of limitations may be tolled by the pendency of a

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1 Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418, 125 S. Ct. 1807,

1814-15 (2005).

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properly filed action for state post-conviction relief,

Petitioner’s untimely Rule 32 action for state post-conviction

relief could not and did not re-start the already-expired

statute of limitations. See, e.g., Allen v. Siebert, 552 U.S.

3, 5–7, 128 S. Ct. 2 (2007) (holding that the rule announced in

Pace1 applies even where there are exceptions to the state-court

filing deadlines, and reaffirming that a state court’s rejection

of a petition as untimely is “the end of the matter” for

determining whether a petitioner is entitled to tolling under §

2244(d)(2)); Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001).

Petitioner’s state action for post-conviction relief did not

toll the statute of limitations because it was not “properly

filed”. See White v. Martel, 601 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2010);

Zepeda v. Walker, 581 F.3d 1013, 1018 (9th Cir. 2009) (rejecting

contention that state must prove that rules concerning time bars

are “firmly established and regularly followed before

noncompliance will render a petition improperly filed for AEDPA

tolling”).

The one-year statute of limitations for filing a habeas

petition may be equitably tolled if extraordinary circumstances

beyond a prisoner’s control prevent the prisoner from filing on

time. See Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2554, 2562

(2010); Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092, 1096-97 (9th Cir. 2010).

A petitioner seeking equitable tolling must establish two

elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently,

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and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.”

Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418, 125 S. Ct. 1807, 1814-15

(2005). See also Ford v. Gonzalez, 683 F.3d 1230, 1237 (9th

Cir. 2012); Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 959 (9th Cir.

2010); Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1011-14 (9th

Cir. 2009). In Holland the Supreme Court eschewed a “mechanical

rule” for determining extraordinary circumstances, while

endorsing a flexible, “case-by-case” approach, drawing “upon

decisions made in other similar cases for guidance.” Bills, 628

F.3d at 1096-97.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has determined

equitable tolling of the filing deadline for a federal habeas

petition is available only if extraordinary circumstances beyond

the petitioner’s control make it impossible to file a petition

on time. See Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 1048-49 (9th

Cir. 2010); Porter, 620 F.3d at 959; Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d

at 1011-14 & n.4; Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 1054-55 & n.4

(9th Cir. 2008). Equitable tolling is only appropriate when

external forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence,

account for the failure to file a timely habeas action. See

Chaffer, 592 F.3d at 1048-49; Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011;

Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). Equitable

tolling is also available if the petitioner establishes their

actual innocence of the crimes of conviction. See Lee v.

Lampert, 653 F.3d 929, 933-34 (9th Cir. 2011).

Equitable tolling is to be rarely granted. See, e.g.,

Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011; Jones v. Hulick, 449 F.3d 784,

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789 (7th Cir. 2006); Stead v. Head, 219 F.2d 1298, 1300 (11th

Cir. 2000). Equitable tolling is inappropriate in most cases

and “the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under

AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.”

Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002).

Petitioner must show that “the extraordinary circumstances were

the cause of his untimeliness and that the extraordinary

circumstances made it impossible to file a petition on time.”

Porter, 620 F.3d at 959. It is Petitioner’s burden to establish

that equitable tolling is warranted in his case. See, e.g.,

Porter, 620 F.3d at 959; Espinoza Matthews v. California, 432

F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2004); Gaston, 417 F.3d at 1034.

In reply to the answer to his petition, Petitioner

contends he was improperly sentenced and that he has exhausted

his claims in the state courts. Petitioner seeks an evidentiary

hearings, averring the state courts improperly found the facts

in his case.

Petitioner has not stated an adequate basis for

equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. Compare

Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2564; Porter, 620 F.3d at 961 (noting the

circumstances of cases determined before and after Holland). A

petitioner’s pro se status, ignorance of the law, and lack of

legal representation during the applicable filing period do not

constitute circumstances justifying equitable tolling because

such circumstances are not “extraordinary.” See, e.g., Chaffer,

592 F.3d at 1048-49; Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1011-14;

Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006);

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Shoemate v. Norris, 390 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 2004). The

vicissitudes of prison life are not “extraordinary”

circumstances that make it impossible to file a timely habeas

petition. See, e.g., Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th

Cir. 2009).

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a

petitioner is entitled to tolling of the statute of limitations

if they can establish that they are actually innocent of the

crimes of conviction. See Lee, 653 F.3d at 934. The petitioner

must show “it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror

would have convicted him in the light of the new evidence.” Id.

at 938. Petitioner does not assert that he is actually

innocent, but instead emphasizes that he was improperly

sentenced. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to tolling

of the statute of limitations based on the theory of actual

innocence.

B. Exhaustion and procedural default

Respondents argue that Petitioner has procedurally

defaulted his federal habeas claims in the state courts.

The District Court may only grant federal habeas relief

on the merits of a claim which has been exhausted in the state

courts. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842, 119 S.

Ct. 1728, 1731 (1999); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-

30, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991). To properly exhaust a

federal habeas claim, the petitioner must afford the state the

opportunity to rule upon the merits of the claim by “fairly

presenting” the claim to the state’s “highest” court in a

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2

 Prior to 1996, the federal courts were required to dismiss

a habeas petition which included unexhausted claims for federal habeas

relief. However, section 2254 now states: “An application for a writ

of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the

failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the

courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (1994 & Supp. 2011).

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procedurally correct manner. See, e.g., Castille v. Peoples,

489 U.S. 346, 351, 109 S. Ct. 1056, 1060 (1989); Rose v.

Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir. 2005).2 The Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that, in non-capital

cases arising in Arizona, the “highest court” test of the

exhaustion requirement is satisfied if the habeas petitioner

presented his claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals, either on

direct appeal or in a petition for post-conviction relief. See

Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999). See

also Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F. Supp. 2d 925, 932 (D. Ariz.

2007). 

To satisfy the “fair presentment” prong of the

exhaustion requirement, the petitioner must present “both the

operative facts and the legal principles that control each claim

to the state judiciary.” Wilson v. Briley, 243 F.3d 325, 327

(7th Cir. 2001). See also Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1066

(9th Cir. 2003). In Baldwin v. Reese, the Supreme Court

reiterated that the purpose of exhaustion is to give the states

the opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged constitutional

errors. See 541 U.S. 27, 29, 124 S. Ct. 1347, 1349 (2004).

Therefore, if the petitioner did not present the federal habeas

claim to the state court as asserting the violation of a

specific federal constitutional right, as opposed to violation

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of a state law or a state procedural rule, the federal habeas

claim was not “fairly presented” to the state court. See, e.g.,

id., 541 U.S. at 33, 124 S. Ct. at 1351. 

A federal habeas petitioner has not exhausted a federal

habeas claim if he still has the right to raise the claim “by

any available procedure” in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(c) (1994 & Supp. 2011). Because the exhaustion requirement

refers only to remedies still available to the petitioner at the

time they file their action for federal habeas relief, it is

satisfied if the petitioner is procedurally barred from pursuing

their claim in the state courts. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S.

81, 92-93, 126 S. Ct. 2378, 2387 (2006). If it is clear the

habeas petitioner’s claim is procedurally barred pursuant to

state law, the claim is exhausted by virtue of the petitioner’s

“procedural default” of the claim. See, e.g., id., 548 U.S. at

92, 126 S. Ct. at 2387. 

Procedural default occurs when a petitioner has never

presented a federal habeas claim in state court and is now

barred from doing so by the state’s procedural rules, including

rules regarding waiver and the preclusion of claims. See

Castille, 489 U.S. at 351-52, 109 S. Ct. at 1060. Procedural

default also occurs when a petitioner did present a claim to the

state courts, but the state courts did not address the merits of

the claim because the petitioner failed to follow a state

procedural rule. See, e.g., Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797,

802, 111 S. Ct. 2590, 2594-95 (1991); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 727-

28, 111 S. Ct. at 2553-57; Szabo v. Walls, 313 F.3d 392, 395

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(7th Cir. 2002). “If a prisoner has defaulted a state claim by

‘violating a state procedural rule which would constitute

adequate and independent grounds to bar direct review ... he may

not raise the claim in federal habeas, absent a showing of cause

and prejudice or actual innocence.’” Ellis v. Armenakis, 222

F.3d 627, 632 (9th Cir. 2000), quoting Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d

1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 1994).

The doctrine of procedural default provides

that a federal habeas court may not review

constitutional claims when a state court has

declined to consider their merits on the

basis of an adequate and independent state

procedural rule. A state procedural rule is

adequate if it is regularly or consistently

applied by the state courts and it is

independent if it does not depend on a

federal constitutional ruling. Where a state

procedural rule is both adequate and

independent, it will bar consideration of the

merits of claims on habeas review unless the

petitioner demonstrates cause for the default

and prejudice resulting therefrom or that a

failure to consider the claims will result in

a fundamental miscarriage of justice.

McNeill v. Polk, 476 F.3d 206, 211 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal

citations and quotations omitted).

We recognize two types of procedural bars:

express and implied. An express procedural

bar occurs when the petitioner has presented

his claim to the state courts and the state

courts have relied on a state procedural rule

to deny or dismiss the claim. An implied

procedural bar, on the other hand, occurs

when the petitioner has failed to fairly

present his claims to the highest state court

and would now be barred by a state procedural

rule from doing so.

Robinson v. Schriro, 595 F.3d 1086, 1100 (9th Cir.), cert.

denied, 131 S. Ct. 566 (2010).

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Because the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure

regarding timeliness, waiver, and the preclusion of claims bar

Petitioner from now returning to the state courts to exhaust any

unexhausted federal habeas claims, Petitioner has exhausted, but

procedurally defaulted, any claim not previously fairly

presented to the Arizona Court of Appeals in his direct appeal.

See Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 2005);

Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2002). See also

Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860, 122 S. Ct. 2578, 2581

(2002) (holding Arizona’s state rules regarding the waiver and

procedural default of claims raised in attacks on criminal

convictions are adequate and independent state grounds for

affirming a conviction and denying federal habeas relief on the

grounds of a procedural bar); Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923,

931-32 (9th Cir. 1998).

Respondents contend:

Petitioner raised the claims he is now his

petitions for post-conviction relief. The

state court, however, concluded that the

petitions were untimely filed, and were thus

precluded under applicable state law. As a

result of the state court’s express

application of a state procedural bar,

Petitioner’s pending claims were not properly

exhausted and are thus procedurally

defaulted.

Petitioner did not present his claims to the state

trial court in a timely Rule 32 action. As stated supra,

Arizona’s Rules of Criminal Procedure regarding waiver and the

timeliness of claims have been found to be an adequate and

independent basis for affirming a petitioner’s convictions and

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sentences and denying federal habeas relief. Accordingly,

unless Petitioner can establish cause for and prejudice from his

procedural default of his claims in the state courts, the Court

should not consider the merits of his claims.

C. Cause and prejudice

The Court may consider the merits of a procedurally

defaulted claim if the petitioner establishes cause for their

procedural default and prejudice arising from that default.

“Cause” is a legitimate excuse for the petitioner’s procedural

default of the claim and “prejudice” is actual harm resulting

from the alleged constitutional violation. See Thomas v. Lewis,

945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991). Under the “cause” prong

of this test, Petitioner bears the burden of establishing that

some objective factor external to the defense impeded his

compliance with Arizona’s procedural rules. See Moorman v.

Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1058 (9th Cir. 2005); Vickers v.

Stewart, 144 F.3d 613, 617 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez-Villareal

v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996).

Generally, a petitioner’s lack of legal expertise is

not cause to excuse procedural default. See Hughes v. Idaho

State Bd. of Corr., 800 F.2d 905, 908 (9th Cir. 1986).

Additionally, allegedly ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel does not establish cause for the failure to properly

exhaust a habeas claim in the state courts unless the specific

Sixth Amendment claim providing the basis for cause was itself

properly exhausted. See Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446,

451, 120 S. Ct. 1587, 1591 (2000); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 755, 111

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S. Ct. at 2567; Deitz v. Money, 391 F.3d 804, 809 (6th Cir.

2004). 

To establish prejudice, the petitioner must show that

the alleged constitutional error worked to his actual and

substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire criminal

proceedings with constitutional violations. See Vickers, 144

F.3d at 617; Correll v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 1404, 1415-16 (9th

Cir. 1998). Establishing prejudice requires a petitioner to

prove that, “but for” the alleged constitutional violations,

there is a reasonable probability he would not have been

convicted of the same crimes. See Manning v. Foster, 224 F.3d

1129, 1135-36 (9th Cir. 2000); Ivy v. Caspari, 173 F.3d 1136,

1141 (8th Cir. 1999). Although both cause and prejudice must be

shown to excuse a procedural default, the Court need not examine

the existence of prejudice if the petitioner fails to establish

cause. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n.43, 102 S. Ct.

1558, 1575 n.43 (1982); Thomas, 945 F.2d at 1123 n.10.

Petitioner contends that he properly exhausted his

claims in the state courts and that he complied with all state

and federal rules of procedure. Petitioner also asserts that

his sentence was void “ab initio” and that the state failed to

timely respond to his Rule 32 petition. Petitioner contends

that the AEDPA standard of review does not apply to his claims

for habeas relief because the state courts dismissed his claims

without addressing the merits of the claims. 

Petitioner has not established cause for his failure to

fairly present his claims to the Arizona state courts.

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Additionally, Petitioner has not established prejudice arising

from the procedural default of his claims. Therefore, the Court

need not consider the merits of the claims absent a showing that

a fundamental miscarriage of justice will otherwise occur.

D. Fundamental miscarriage of justice

Review of the merits of a procedurally defaulted habeas

claim is required if the petitioner demonstrates review of the

merits of the claim is necessary to prevent a fundamental

miscarriage of justice. See Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 393,

124 S. Ct. 1847, 1852 (2004); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 316,

115 S. Ct. 851, 861 (1995); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,

485-86, 106 S. Ct. 2639, 2649 (1986). A fundamental miscarriage

of justice occurs only when a constitutional violation has

probably resulted in the conviction of one who is factually

innocent. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 485-86, 106 S. Ct. at 2649;

Thomas v. Goldsmith, 979 F.2d 746, 749 (9th Cir. 1992) (showing

of factual innocence is necessary to trigger manifest injustice

relief). To satisfy the “fundamental miscarriage of justice”

standard, a petitioner must establish by clear and convincing

evidence that no reasonable fact-finder could have found him

guilty of the offenses charged. See Dretke, 541 U.S. at 393,

124 S. Ct. at 1852; Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 842-43

(9th Cir. 2001).

Petitioner does not assert that he is innocent of the

crimes of conviction, but instead emphasizes that he was

improperly sentenced. Accordingly, Petitioner has not

established that a fundamental miscarriage of justice will occur

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absent consideration of the merits of his habeas claims.

III Conclusion

Petitioner did not file his habeas petition within one

year of the date his state conviction became final.

Petitioner’s untimely Rule 32 action did not statutorily toll

the expired statute of limitations. Petitioner has not

established that he is entitled to equitable tolling of the

statute of limitations. Additionally, Petitioner procedurally

defaulted his claims in the state courts by not fairly

presenting them to the state courts in a procedurally correct

manner. Petitioner has not shown cause for, nor prejudice

arising from his procedural default of his claims. Petitioner

has not established that a fundamental miscarriage of justice

will occur absent consideration of the merits of his federal

habeas claims. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. West’s Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and dismissed with

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District

Court’s judgment.

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the

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parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a response

to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of Civil

Procedure for the United States District Court for the District

of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not

exceed seventeen (17) pages in length.

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

of the issues. See United States v. Reyna–Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, R. 11, the District

Court must “issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it

enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” The undersigned

recommends that, should the Report and Recommendation be adopted

and, should Petitioner seek a certificate of appealability, a

certificate of appealability should be denied because Petitioner

has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right as required by 28 U.S.C.A § 2253(c)(2).

DATED this 8th day of November, 2012.

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