Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01366/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01366-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Personal Injury

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALEXANDER E. TAYLOR,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 13-CV-1366 JLS (WVG)

ORDER: (1) GRANTING MOTION

FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN

FORMA PAUPERIS; AND (2) SUA

SPONTE DISMISSING

COMPLAINT FOR FAILING TO

STATE A CLAIM

(ECF No. 2)

vs.

MR. T, aka LAWRENCE TUREAUD,

fka LAWRENCE TERO

Defendant.

Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Alexander E. Taylor’s (“Plaintiff”) motion

for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). (ECF No. 2.) Plaintiff, proceeding pro

se, has submitted a complaint alleging various claims against Defendant Mr. T, his

alleged father, for failing to fulfill his obligations and responsibilities as a parent. (ECF

No. 1.) Plaintiff has not prepaid the $400 in filing and administrative fees mandated by

28 U.S.C. § 1914(a), but instead filed this motion to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a).

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I. MOTION TO PROCEED IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of the

United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of

$400. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a).1

 An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to

prepay the entire fee only if she is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). A federal

court may authorize the commencement of an action without the prepayment of fees if

the party submits an affidavit, including a statement of assets, showing that she is

unable to pay the required filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 

Upon review of the Plaintiff’s motion, the Court finds that Plaintiff has made a

sufficient showing of inability to pay the required filing fees. Accordingly, good cause

appearing, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis.

II. INITIAL SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)

Notwithstanding IFP status, the Court must subject each civil action commenced

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) to mandatory screening and order the sua sponte

dismissal of any case it finds “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which

relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune

from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845,

845 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to

prisoners.”); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (noting

that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “not only permits but requires” the court to sua sponte dismiss

an IFP complaint that fails to state a claim).

Before its amendment by the PLRA, former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) permitted sua

sponte dismissal of only frivolous and malicious claims. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130. 

However, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) mandates that the court reviewing an

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 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, all parties filing civil actions on or after May 1, 2013, must pay an additional administrative fee of $50. See 28 U.S.C. §

1914(a), (b); Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule,

eff. May 1, 2013. However, the additional $50 administrative fee is waived if the

plaintiff is granted leave to proceed IFP. Id. 

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action filed pursuant to the IFP provisions of § 1915 make and rule on its own motion

to dismiss before directing the U.S. Marshal to effect service pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 4(c)(3). See id. at 1127; Calhoun, 254 F.3d at 845; McGore v.

Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604–05 (6th Cir. 1997) (stating that sua sponte screening

pursuant to § 1915 should occur “before service of process is made on the opposing

parties”).

“[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as

true all allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff.” Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000); see

also Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2005); Barren v. Harrington, 152

F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that § 1915(e)(2) “parallels the language of

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)”). 

As currently pleaded, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a

cognizable negligence claim against Defendant. In California, a claim for negligence

must be brought within three years of the alleged incident. Cal. Civ. P. Code § 338. 

Where the running of the statute of limitations is apparent on the face of the complaint,

dismissal for failure to state a claim is proper. See Cervantes v. City of San Diego, 5

F.3d 1273, 1276 (9th Cir. 1993). Plaintiff appears to be contending that Defendant has

breached his parental duty to support Plaintiff, his child, as a minor.2

 (ECF No. 1 at 4-

8.) Pursuant to California Family Code § 3901(a), the duty of support “continues as to

an unmarried child who has attained the age of 18 years, is a full time high school

student, and who is not self-supporting, until the time the child completes the 12th

grade or attains the age of 19 years, whichever comes first.” As Plaintiff was born on

May 25, 1988, Plaintiff would have attained the age of 19 years on May 25, 2007. (Id.

at 2.) As Plaintiff appears to be basing his negligence claim upon actions that took

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The Court further notes that it is unclear from Plaintiff’s vague complaint whether Defendant’s paternity was ever established, or if child support was ever mandated.

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place while Plaintiff was a minor,3 any such negligence action should have been filed

by May 25, 2010. Accordingly, because the running of the applicable statutes is

apparent on the face of the complaint, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s negligence

claim WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Plaintiff’s second cause of action for physical abuse, emotional abuse, and

abandonment is similarly deficient. Plaintiff’s vague allegations fail to identify which,

if any, of Defendant’s actions purportedly caused Plaintiff any harm. Plaintiff further

fails to identify what, if any, damages he may have suffered. Accordingly, the Court

DISMISSES Plaintiff’s second cause of action WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed IFP is

GRANTED. Plaintiff’s complaint is further DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(b) and 1915A(b). Plaintiff is GRANTED thirty

(30) days leave from the date this Order is filed in which to file a First Amended

Complaint which cures all the deficiencies of pleading noted above. Plaintiff’s

Amended Complaint must be complete in itself without reference to the superseded

pleading. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 15.1. Defendants not named and all claims not

re-alleged in the Amended Complaint will be considered waived. See King v. Atiyeh,

814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 28, 2013

Honorable Janis L. Sammartino

United States District Judge

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Plaintiff provides no dates for any specific actions taken by Defendant. Indeed, Plaintiff’s complaint is primarily composed of conclusory allegations that Defendant

failed to perform general tasks when Plaintiff was a minor, speculation as to how Plaintiff’s life would have been different if he had spent time with Defendant, anecdotal

stories such as how a stranger helped Plaintiff tie his tie, and numerous lists of parental guides that Defendant allegedly failed to follow, such as “8 Essential Parental

Responsibilities,” “28 Rules for Fathers of Sons,” “A Guide to Biblical Manhood,” and

“25 Things I Think Every Dad Should Teach His Kids.” (See generally ECF No. 1.)

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