Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-5_03-cv-00120/USCOURTS-ared-5_03-cv-00120-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Other Civil Rights

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1

 Walker initially filed a motion for summary judgment on February 11, 2004. This

motion was denied by the Honorable William R. Wilson, United States District Judge, on

March 23, 2004.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

PINE BLUFF DIVISION

JOHN W. WALKER PLAINTIFF

v. No. 5:03CV0120 JLH

THE CITY OF PINE BLUFF, ARKANSAS,

a Public Body Corporate; and 

TERRY WAYNE GRACE, In His Individual

and Official Capacities DEFENDANTS

OPINION AND ORDER

John W. Walker brought claims against the City of Pine Bluff and one of its former police

officers, Terry Wayne Grace, for violation of his civil rights under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth

Amendments and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 and for malicious prosecution. He alleges that Grace

arrested him without probable cause and for racial reasons. Walker has renewed his previous motion

for summary judgment1 on the issue of whether probable cause existed for his arrest. He has also

moved to strike the affirmative defense of qualified immunity. For the following reasons, the

motions are denied.

I.

A court should grant summary judgment when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter

of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).

The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the district

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court of the basis of its motion and identifying the portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers

to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, that demonstrate the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986);

Group Health Plan, Inc. v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 344 F.3d 753, 763 (8th Cir. 2003). When the

moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), the non-moving party must “come forward

with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.

Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1985) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)). The non-moving party

sustains this burden by showing that there are “genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved

only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” Anderson,

477 U.S. at 250. When a non-moving party cannot make an adequate showing on a necessary

element of the case on which that party bears the burden of proof, the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. In deciding a motion for summary judgment,

the court must view the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing

summary judgment. Boerner v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 260 F.3d 837, 841 (8th Cir.

2001) (citing Rabuska v. Crane Co., 122 F.3d 559, 562 (8th Cir. 1997)). If the evidence would allow

a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the non-moving party, summary judgment should be denied.

Derickson v. Fidelity Life Assoc., 77 F.3d 263, 264 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at

248).

II.

In June 1998, Grace stopped a vehicle occupied by four young, black males. Grace says that

he stopped the vehicle because it had no license plates. Another police officer, Stephanie Sheets

Smith, stopped to serve as back-up for Grace. Walker, who was driving in the area, stopped his van

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on the side of the road and got out to observe the traffic stop. The parties agree that Walker stood

at the side of the road near his vehicle but disagree as to his distance from the point where the

officers were talking to some of the young men who had been stopped by Grace. Walker testified

in his deposition that he was about 40 or 50 feet from the officers, but Grace testified that Walker

was about 20 feet away.

Grace was initially unaware of Walker’s presence. Smith approached Walker and asked if

she could help him. He stated, “I’m observing Pine Bluff’s finest in action.” Smith returned to

Grace and called his attention to Walker. Grace then approached Walker and spoke to him. 

Grace and Walker have given different accounts of the events that followed. Walker testified

that Grace asked who he was and why he was there. Walker stated that he told Grace, “I’m watching

Pine Bluff’s finest in action.” Walker said that he then told Grace that Grace had no reason to ask

for identification, but he nevertheless offered Grace his driver’s license. According to Walker, Grace

handcuffed him at this point and placed him in a police car.

According to Grace, Walker said something like, “I’m here to watch you abuse black

people.” Grace testified that Walker was rapidly pacing back and forth and talking so loudly that

persons came out of the houses nearby in response to the commotion that Walker created. Grace

said that he asked Walker to step to one side, pointing where he wanted Walker to go, but that

Walker walked the opposite direction. Grace has conceded that Walker said something like, “I’ll

move wherever you want me to move,” but testified that he did not interpret the statement as

cooperation because Walker was moving in the opposite direction. Grace then frisked Walker,

finding no weapons or contraband, and handcuffed him.

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Grace arrested Walker on the charge of obstructing governmental operations. A person

obstructs governmental operations if he “[k]nowingly obstructs, impairs, or hinders the performance

of any governmental function . . . .” ARK.CODE ANN. § 5-54-102(a)(1). Grace testified that Walker

hindered performance of the traffic stop because he posed a safety concern. Specifically, Grace

testified that Walker stood directly behind Grace so that Grace could not simultaneously watch him

and the men who had been stopped, he stood too close to the area of the traffic stop, he appeared

upset and had a threatening demeanor and attitude, he talked loudly, and he did not move where

Grace asked him to move. The charges against Walker were dismissed on motion of the prosecution.

After the charges against him were dismissed, Walker filed this lawsuit. Grace moved for

summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity. That motion was denied. Grace appealed,

and the Eighth Circuit affirmed. Walker v. City of Pine Bluff, 414 F.3d 989 (8th Cir. 2005).

III.

“[T]he Fourth Amendment permits a law enforcement officer to make a warrantless arrest

if he has probable cause to believe the arrestee has committed an offense.” Lawyer v. City of

Council Bluffs, 361 F.3d 1099, 1105 (8th Cir. 2004). A warrantless arrest without probable cause,

however, violates the individual’s rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Walker, 414

F.3d at 992. An officer has probable cause to arrest a suspect if the facts and circumstances within

the officer’s knowledge are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in

believing that the suspect has committed a crime. Garionis v. Newton, 827 F.2d 306, 309 (8th Cir.

1987). The focus of probable cause for arrest is an objective analysis of the facts known to the police

officers at the time of the arrest. Peterson v. City of Plymouth, 60 F.3d 469, 475-76 & n.10 (8th Cir.

1995). An officer’s subjective intent in arresting a suspect is irrelevant as long as sufficient objective

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evidence establishes probable cause for the arrest. United States v. Davis, 174 F.3d 941, 947 (8th

Cir. 1999); United States v. Clarke, 110 F.3d 612, 613-14 (8th Cir. 1997). “Whether probable cause

exists is a common-sense and practical determination and must be based upon the totality of the

circumstances.” U.S. v. Abadia, 949 F.2d 956, 959 (8th Cir. 1991) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.

213, 230-32, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2328-29, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983)). In an action for unlawful arrest

pursuant to § 1983, the burden of proof is on the defendant police officers to show that the

warrantless arrest was supported by probable cause. See Washington v. Simpson, 806 F.2d 192, 195

(8th Cir. 1986) (in § 1983 action for unlawful arrest, “the trial judge correctly placed the burden of

proof on the defendant officers and found that adequate probable cause existed to support the

arrest.”). Whether probable cause existed is a mixed question of law and fact. See Ornelas v. United

States, 517 U.S. 690, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 134 L. Ed. 2d 911 (1996). In the case of a warrantless stop

and search involving an automobile, the Supreme Court explained:

The principal components of a determination of reasonable suspicion or probable

cause will be the events which occurred leading up to the stop or search, and then the

decision whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively

reasonable police officer, amount to reasonable suspicion or to probable cause. The

first part of the analysis involves only a determination of historical facts, but the

second is a mixed question of law and fact: “[T]he historical facts are admitted or

established, the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy

the [relevant] statutory [or constitutional] standard, or to put it another way, whether

the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated.” PullmanStandard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289, n.19, 102 S. Ct. 1781, 1791, n.19, 72 L. Ed.

2d 66 (1982).

Id. at 696-97, 116 S. Ct. 1662-63, 134 L. Ed. 2d 911.

The testimony of Walker and Grace is in conflict. Walker concedes that Grace’s account

must be accepted for purposes of this motion, but he argues that the Court should find, as a matter

of law, that even accepting Grace’s testimony as true no probable cause to arrest is shown. The

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Court disagrees. On Grace’s account, Walker was standing directly behind him, twenty feet away,

close enough to pose a danger and in a position to do harm; he was behaving in a threatening

manner; and he refused to move when told to do so. A reasonable person could believe that

Walker’s conduct, as described by Grace, hindered the officers in their performance of the traffic

stop.

Referring to the Eighth Circuit’s opinion in Walker, Walker notes that “[t]he Eighth Circuit

stated that it was ‘preposterous’ to believe that [he] would have been creating a distraction to the

officers engaged in the traffic stop by standing as a ‘silent, non-interfering on-looker.’” The issue

then before the Eighth Circuit, however, was not whether probable cause had been shown but

whether Grace was entitled to qualified immunity on the summary judgment record then before the

court. Walker, 414 F.3d at 991. In deciding that issue, the Eighth Circuit viewed the evidence in the

light most favorable to Walker, who, according to his testimony, silently watched the traffic stop

from across the street. Id. at 991-92. Walker argues that even according to Grace’s testimony, he

was a “silent, non-interfering on-looker,” but that is not so. According to Grace’s testimony, Walker

was speaking so loudly that persons came out of nearby houses in response to the commotion that

he created, he was behaving in a threatening manner in a position where he posed a threat to the

officers’ safety, and he refused to move to a position where he could be seen by the officers as they

conducted the traffic stop. Walker’s motion for partial summary judgment is denied.

IV.

Although the Court denied Grace’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified

immunity and the Eighth Circuit affirmed, it does not follow that the Court should strike the defense

of qualified immunity. This Court denied qualified immunity because “there are numerous important

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disputed facts here[.]” The Eighth Circuit held “on this summary judgment record, the district court

properly denied Grace’s motion for qualified immunity protection.” Walker, 414 F.3d at 993. As

noted above, the Eighth Circuit viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to Walker. Id. at

991. In Littrell v. Franklin, 388 F.3d 578, 586 (8th Cir. 2004), the court held, “where questions of

historical fact exist, the jury must resolve those questions so that the court may make the ultimate

legal determination of whether officers’ actions were legal in light of clearly established law.” Here,

questions of historical fact exist. The jury must resolve those questions. The motion to strike is

denied.

CONCLUSION

Whether Grace lacked probable cause to arrest Walker hinges on the facts as to what

happened at the traffic stop and whether, given those facts, a reasonable police officer could have

believed that Walker was committing a crime. These questions must be submitted to a jury.

Walker’s renewed motion for summary judgment is therefore denied. Document #92. Walker’s

motion to strike is denied. Document #98.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 13th day of October, 2006.

 

J. LEON HOLMES

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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