Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-01247/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-01247-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARK J. VANDENBURGH,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-08-1247DOC (CMK)

vs. O R D E R GRANTING

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

GARY STANTON, Head Sheriff

Defendant.

 /

ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant Sheriff Gary Stanton’s (“Sheriff Stanton” or “Defendant”)

Motion for Summary Judgment. After considering the moving, opposing and replying papers,

and for the reasons that follow, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendant’s Motion.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Mark J. Vandenburgh (“Vandenburgh” or “Plaintiff”), a state prisoner at Solano

County Jail ( “Solano County” or the “Jail”) proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

On May 28, 2008, Plaintiff filed a grievance with the Solano County Sheriff’s Office (the

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 Plaintiff has failed to comply with Local Rule 56-260(b) which mandates that any party 1

opposing a motion for summary judgment “reproduce the itemized facts in the Statement of

Undisputed Facts and admit those facts that are undisputed and deny those that are disputed,

including with each denial a citation to the particular portions of any pleading, affidavit,

deposition, interrogatory answer, admission or other document relied upon in support of that

denial.” Despite Plaintiff’s failure to comply, this Court will consider the attachments to his

Opposition because he is proceeding pro se.

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“Sheriff’s Office”) claiming that the Jail’s regulations with respect to legal mail procedures were

invalid because they permit institutional authorities to “read letters to and from an attorney to

search for ‘verbal contraband,’ or to read all ‘enclosures’ such as letters.” Pl.’s Opp. Attach. 5.1

The Sheriff’s Office determined Plaintiff’s grievance to be unfounded and stated that the county

employees do not read inmates’ legal mail. Pl.’s Opp. Attach. 6. Plaintiff appealed this

response, but the Sheriff’s Office denied the appeal because Plaintiff did not provide his original

grievance with the appeal. Pl.’s Opp. Attachs. 7-8. The Sheriff’s Office also informed Plaintiff

he had exhausted all administrative remedies as they applied to this issue. Pl.’s Opp. Attach. 8.

On June 18, 2008, Plaintiff filed another grievance with the Sheriff’s Office in which he

claimed that “outgoing legal mail is taken and at the discretion of the officer it is read or not. 

This Facility[,] Solano County Justice Center gives the officers the right to read privileged legal

mail without prior warning.” Pl.’s Opp. Attach. 2. On June 19, 2008, the Sheriff’s Office

responded and informed Plaintiff that “Department policy states that inmate legal mail is to be

scanned for contraband in the presence of the inmate.” Pl.’s Opp. Attach. 3. Plaintiff’s

grievance was not sustained because it was a “random statement” that was not supported by

allegations of wrongdoing by particular officers. Id. Plaintiff attempted to appeal this decision. 

Id.

Sheriff Stanton was elected the Sheriff/Coroner of Solano County on July 9, 2001, and

continues to hold these positions today. Def.’s Statement of Undisputed Facts (“Def.’s

Statement”) 1:19-20; Compl. 5. The Solano County Sheriff’s Department (the “Sheriff’s

Department”) has adopted policies governing inmate correspondence and the inspection of mail. 

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Def.’s Statement 1:24-25; Pl.’s Statement of Facts (“Pl.’s Statement”) 1:19-21. Once in Jail

Administration, the exterior of each piece of legal mail is marked with the location of the inmate

who is the intended recipient and staff makes an entry in the inmate legal mail log stating that the

inmate received a piece of legal mail. Def.’s Statement 2:3-4; Pl.’s Statement 1:19-21. After

being logged in, legal mail is placed unopened in a box before being delivered to the housing

units where the module officer in each housing unit opens all incoming legal mail in the presence

of the inmate and inspects it for contraband. Def.’s Statement 2:9-11; Pl.’s Statement 1:19-21.

Defendant also claims that the following policies are in place with respect to legal mail:

(1) outgoing legal mail is inspected by the module officer prior to the mail being sealed by the

inmate; and (2) legal mail will not be read or censored by any staff member except where there is

specific documentation to support such action or there is reasonable suspicion that plans are

being formulated by the inmate to send or receive contraband, plot an escape, or engage in any

other activity that could jeopardize the security of the facility. Def.’s Statement 2-3; Pl.’s

Statement 1:19-21. In Plaintiff’s statement of facts, he states that he disputes these two policies,

apparently because he believes that the policy states that it “forbid[s] module officers from

reading outgoing legal mail.” Pl.’s Statement 1:22-27.

Plaintiff also disputes the application and enforcement of these policies. Plaintiff alleges

that certain unnamed correctional or module officers (“module officers”) unlawfully read and

inspected Plaintiff’s outgoing legal mail for “verbal contraband” directly after he handed the mail

to the module officers. Opp. 2:24-28. In addition, Plaintiff claims that the module officers

denied him the ability to get copies of “authenticated documents.” Id. at 2:13-16.

Plaintiff claims that Sheriff Stanton, as Head Sheriff, was responsible for ensuring that

module officers did not read his outgoing legal mail. Id. at 6:1-7. Plaintiff claims he has

suffered emotional and mental suffering which has directly caused a physical injury that is “not

visibly apparent.” Id. at 1:24-27.

On June 4, 2008, Plaintiff filed his original Complaint with the United States District

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Court, Eastern District of California against Solano County and Sheriff Stanton. On June 27,

2008, Plaintiff was ordered to amend his Complaint by Magistrate Judge Craig M. Kellison

because he failed to indicate how either named defendant was involved in any alleged

constitutional violation. On July 17, 2008, Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint solely against

Sheriff Stanton. On November 25, 2008, Plaintiff’s case was reassigned to this Court and

Defendant Sheriff Stanton now moves for summary judgment.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is proper if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,

and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as

to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c).

The Court must view the facts and draw inferences in the manner most favorable to the

non-moving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S. Ct. 993 (1962);

Chevron Corp. v. Pennzoil Co., 974 F.2d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 1992). The moving party bears

the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial, but it

need not disprove the other party’s case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256,

106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986). 

When the non-moving party bears the burden of proving the claim or defense, the moving party

can meet its burden by pointing out that the non-moving party has failed to present any genuine

issue of material fact. Musick v. Burke, 913 F.2d 1390, 1394 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Once the moving party meets its burden, the “adverse party may not rest upon the mere

allegations or denials of the adverse party’s pleading, but the adverse party’s response, by

affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is

a genuine issue for trial. If the adverse party does not so respond, summary judgment, if

appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); see also Anderson,

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477 U.S. at 248-49. Furthermore, a party cannot create a genuine issue of material fact simply by

making assertions in its legal papers. There must be specific, admissible evidence identifying the

basis for the dispute. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense v. Walter Kidde & Co., Inc.,

690 F.2d 1235, 1238 (9th Cir. 1980). The Supreme Court has held that “[t]he mere existence of

a scintilla of evidence . . . will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could

reasonably find for [the opposing party].” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.

B. Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

 In order to obtain relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must articulate: “(1) a

violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute, (2) proximately

caused (3) by conduct of a ‘person’ (4) acting under color of state law.” Crumpton v. Gates, 947

F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). A person causes the violation of rights protected by the

Constitution, within the meaning of § 1983, when that person “does an affirmative act,

participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which [that person] is legally

required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588

F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978); see also Sanders v. City and County of San Francisco, 226 Fed.

App. 687, 691 (9th Cir. 2007).

Prison officials, when acting in their official capacity, are acting under color of state law.

See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988). “Liability under [§] 1983 arises only

upon a showing of personal participation by the defendant. A supervisor is only liable for the

constitutional violations of . . . subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the

violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them. There is not respondeat

superior liability under [§] 1983.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (citations

omitted); see also Preschooler II v. Clark County Sch. Bd. Of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1182 (9th Cir.

2007).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff raises a number of claims arising from his interactions with the module officers

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with respect to his legal mail. These claims constitute alleged deprivations of Plaintiff’s civil

rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. While Plaintiff’s claims are unfocused, he appears to present two

arguments: (1) Solano County’s current policy regarding legal mail is unconstitutional, thus he is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law against Sheriff Stanton as the officer responsible for that

policy and; (2) Sheriff Stanton has acted unconstitutionally for failing to enforce or investigate

violations of Solano County’s policy.

A. The Constitutionality of Solano County’s Policy

 Plaintiff contends that Solano County’s policy regarding inmates’ legal mail is

unconstitutional. Plaintiff explains that “the policy” to which he refers “instructs module officers

to inspect outgoing mail for contraband prior to being sealed by inmate.” Opp. 4:17-22. Solano

County’s policy is undisputed and Defendant has provided the Court with the policy entitled

“Solano County Sheriff’s Department Custody Division Procedure.” Def.’s Statement 3:20-23;

Pl.’s Statement 1:16-20; Def. Ex. A. 

Plaintiff fails to put forth any evidence demonstrating that Solano County’s policy

regarding the inspection of legal mail for contraband is unconstitutional. Plaintiff argues that

“[t]he United States Supreme Court and the Supreme Court in California have already deemed

this facilities [sic] policy invalid.” Opp. 3:17-23. However, Plaintiff does not cite to any specific

case in support of his contention.

Plaintiff also claims that he “was informed that facility policy permits and gives the

module officers the right to read for verbal contraband.” Opp. 4:24-5:7 (emphasis added).

Plaintiff appears to have misinterpreted the practice of “inspecting” inmate mail with “reading”

inmate mail. The policy states that all mail will not be read or censored by any staff member

except where there is specific documentation to support such action or there is reasonable

suspicion that plans are being formulated by the inmate to send or receive contraband, plot an

escape, or engage in any other activity that could jeopardize the security of the facility. Def.’s

Statement 3:1-6. Although the policy allows for “inspection” of legal mail in front of the inmate,

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this practice “in no way constitutes censorship, since the mail will not be read.” Def.’s Statement

3:20-23; Pl.’s Statement 1:15-20. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 577 (1974). Moreover, “by

acceding to a rule whereby the inmate is present when mail from attorneys is inspected, [prison

officials] have done all, and perhaps even more, than the Constitution requires.” Wolff at 577.

Therefore, contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, case law directs that Solano County’s undisputed

policy regarding legal mail is constitutional. Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law

as to his responsibility for the Jail’s current policy.

B. Failure to Follow Solano County Policy

 Plaintiff claims that even if Solano County’s current policy is constitutional, Sheriff

Stanton has failed to follow the policy. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that his legal mail is not

being “inspected” but rather read by module officers. Opp. 4:24-28. Plaintiff contends that

Sheriff Stanton is responsible for investigating the behavior of the module officers because they

are his subordinates. Id. at 3:11-17. In addition, Plaintiff claims that Sheriff Stanton is generally

responsible for all of the conduct of his subordinates. Id.

Plaintiff states that Sheriff Stanton failed to “supervise and enforce the policy he alone

has the authority to do.” Opp. 6:1-6. In order to avoid summary judgment, Plaintiff can longer

rely on his pleadings to show that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Plaintiff does

not claim that Sheriff Stanton was personally involved in the reading of Plaintiff’s mail. Instead,

Plaintiff’s claim against Sheriff Stanton relies on his supervisory position over the officers

actually reading the mail. Plaintiff has not named any of the module officers he accuses of

reading his mail. Moreover, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts whatsoever suggesting that Sheriff

Stanton had knowledge of the conduct of his subordinates or any facts that demonstrate that

Sheriff Stanton could not or would not enforce Solano County’s policy. Plaintiff even states that

“until he becomes no longer incarcerated . . . plaintiff cannot under these specific set of

circumstances expose the intentional abuse of the continuing act of reading plaintiffs [sic]

‘outgoing’ legal mail.” Opp. 2:7-17.

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Plaintiff further argues that Sheriff Stanton is generally responsible for the conduct of his

subordinates. Although Sheriff Stanton is the Sheriff of the Jail, he is not liable because there is

no respondeat superior liability under § 1983. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.

1989). Sheriff Stanton would only be liable if he “participated in or directed the violations, or

knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Id. Again, Plaintiff has not provided

any facts that demonstrate that Sheriff Stanton knew of violations taking place. Even looking at

the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, and recognizing that he is proceeding pro se, the

Court cannot see how a reasonable jury could find that Sheriff acted unconstitutionally in his

implementation of Solano County Policy.

Although the Court acknowledges that Plaintiff is reluctant to identify the actual prison

officers who were the alleged abusers of his rights, he leaves the Court with no basis on which to

find in his favor. Thus, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that there is genuine issue of material fact

for trial and Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Sheriff Gary Stanton’s Motion for Summary

Judgment is hereby GRANTED.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Sitting by Designation

DATED: February 5, 2010

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