Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02853/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02853-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1 Petitioner has another case pending before this Court, Hawks v. Kane, 04-

1822, challenging the denial of parole following a hearing in 2002.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HAROLD HARVEY HAWKS,

Petitioner,

 v.

ANTHONY P. KANE, Warden,

Respondent.

ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER, Governor,

BOARD OF PRISON TERMS, Real Parties In

Interest

 /

No. C 05-02853 JSW

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO

DISMISS AND DIRECTING

PETITIONER TO FILE

MEMORANDUM OF LAW AND

EXHIBITS IN SUPPORT OF

PETITION

This matter comes before the Court on consideration of Respondent Anthony Kane’s

(“Respondent”) motion to dismiss the petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by Petitioner

Harold Harvey Hawks (“Petitioner”). Having considered the motion, the opposition thereto, and

relevant legal authority, the motion is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

On July 13, 2005, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the

decision of the Board of Prison Term (“BPT”) to deny Petitioner parole in November 2003.1

Respondent moves to dismiss the petition on the following grounds: (1) that recent California

Supreme Court authority interpreting California’s parole scheme establishes that Petitioner has

no federally protected liberty interest in parole and, therefore, the Court lacks jurisdiction over

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the matter; (2) Petitioner has failed to show he was denied equal protection of the laws; and (3)

the Petition is an improper pleading because it fails to include all grounds for relief.

ANALYSIS

A. Petitioner Has a Federally Protected Liberty Interest in Parole.

In general, “[t]here is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be

conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence.” Greenholtz v. Inmates of 

Nebraska Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). However, “a state’s statutory

scheme, if it uses mandatory language, ‘creates a presumption that parole release will be

granted’ when or unless certain designated findings are made, and thereby gives rise to a

constitutional liberty interest.” McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 901 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing

Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 377-78 (1987); Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 12).

The California statutory provision at issue provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]he panel or

the board, sitting en banc, shall set a release date unless it determines that the gravity of the

current convicted offense or offenses ... is such that consideration of the public safety requires a

more lengthy period of incarceration for this individual and that a parole date, therefore, cannot

be fixed ... .” Cal. Penal Code § 3041(b) (emphasis added). This “shall-unless” language is

similar to the statutes that were at issue in Allen and Greenholtz. See Allen, 482 U.S. at 376

(“Subject to the following restrictions, the board shall release on parole ... any person confined

in the Montana state prison or the women’s correction center ... when in its opinion there is

reasonable probability that the prisoner can be released without detriment to the prisoner or the

community.”) (quoting Mont. Code Ann. § 46-230201 (1985) (emphasis added and in original);

Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11 (“[w]henever the Board of Parole considers the release of a

committed offender who is eligible for release on parole, it shall order his release unless it is of

the opinion that his release should be deferred because ... ”) (quoting Neb. Rev. Stats. § 83-

1,114(1) (1976)) (emphasis added).

Recognizing the similarity between California’s statutory scheme and the statutory

scheme at issue in Allen and Greenholtz, the Ninth Circuit has held that “California’s parole

scheme gives rise to a cognizable liberty interest in release on parole. The scheme creates a

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presumption that parole release will be granted unless the statutorily defined determinations are

made.” McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 902 (internal quotations and citations omitted). That court

reiterated this holding in Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 914 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[I]t is clear that

“California’s parole scheme gives rise to a cognizable liberty interest in release on parole.”)

(quoting McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 902). 

Respondent contends that the California Supreme Court’s decision in In re Dannenberg,

34 Cal. 4th 1061 (2005) undermines the Ninth Circuit’s holdings in Biggs and McQuillion, and

Respondent relies in part on Sass v. California Board of Prison Terms, 376 F. Supp. 2d 975

(E.D. Cal. 2005) in support of this argument. This Court disagrees with the Sass court’s

conclusion that the holding in Dannenberg clearly demonstrates California’s parole scheme is

not mandatory. The issue presented in Dannenberg was whether the BPT was required to set

uniform parole dates under Section 3041(a) before it determined whether a particular inmate

was suitable for parole under 3041(b). See Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th

 at 1069, 1077. It

concluded the answer to that question was no. Id. at 1096. However, the Dannenberg court

used language throughout the opinion which suggests that it presumed an inmate retained a

protected liberty interest in the possibility of parole. See, e.g., id. at 1094 (noting continued

reliance on commitment offense “might thus also contravene the inmate’s constitutionally

protected expectation of parole”), 1095 n.16 (“well established principles” regarding parole

discretion with deferential judicial oversight “define and limit the expectancy in parole from a

life sentence to which due process interests attach”). Furthermore, California courts addressing

the issue post Dannenberg continue to assume a protected liberty interest exists. See In re Scott,

133 Cal. App. 4th 573 (2005); In re DeLuna, 126 Cal. App. 4th 585 (2005).

Accordingly, this Court finds itself in agreement with a majority of courts that have

considered the impact of Dannenberg on the issue presented by Respondent’s motion and

cannot find that the Dannenberg opinion represents a clear holding that California’s parole

scheme is not mandatory. See, e.g., Blankenship v. Kane, 2006 WL 515627 at *3 (N.D. Cal.

Feb. 28, 2006) (citing cases). Accordingly, under the holdings of McQuillion and Biggs,

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Petitioner has a federally protected liberty interest in parole, the Court has jurisdiction over this

matter. Accordingly, Respondent’s motion is DENIED on this basis.

B. The Motion to Dismiss is Denied as Moot on the Equal Protection Argument.

Respondent also moves to dismiss the petition arguing that Petitioner has failed to allege

sufficient facts to demonstrate a denial of equal protection. Petitioner asserts in response that he

is not pursuing an Equal Protection claim. Accordingly, Respondent’s motion is DENIED AS

MOOT on this basis. Taking Petitioner at his word, however, in answering the Petition,

Respondent need not respond to any allegations with respect to violations of equal protection

rights. (See, e.g., Petition at 15:7-9.)

C. Respondent’s Motion Is Denied With Respect to the Form of the Petition.

Respondent’s final argument with respect to its motion to dismiss is that Petitioner

improperly incorporates argument and factual evidence from his related case and, therefore, the

current Petition fails to set forth all grounds for relief. In response, Petitioner asserts that all

facts supporting his claims with respect to the denial of parole in November 2003 are set forth in

his motion. The Court’s own review of the Petition demonstrates that Petitioner sets forth the

factual bases underlying his claim. Accordingly, Respondent’s motion is DENIED on this basis.

 However, because this case involves a separate and distinct hearing from the hearing

presented in case 04-1822, the Court HEREBY ORDERS Petitioner to file a memorandum of

law in support of his arguments with respect to the 2003 hearing and to file any exhibits relied

on in this proceeding that have not yet been filed in this case but that were filed in case 04-1822.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner shall file his memorandum of

law and any additional exhibits by no later than April 21, 2006. There shall be no extensions of

this deadline. As Petitioner acknowledges, the legal arguments in support of his Petition

parallel those presented in support of case 04-1822, thus the Court expects this deadline shall

not pose an undue burden on Petitioner. 

It is FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent must file and serve on Petitioner on or

before May 19, 2006, an answer conforming in all respects to Rule 5 of the Rules Governing

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Section 2254 Cases, showing cause why a writ of habeas corpus should not be issued. 

Respondent must file with the answer a copy of all portions of the administrative record that are

relevant to a determination of the issues presented by the petition.

If Petitioner wishes to respond to the answer, he must do so by filing a traverse with the

Court and serving it on Respondent on or before June 16, 2006.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 29, 2006 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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