Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_20-cv-01974/USCOURTS-azd-2_20-cv-01974-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Nicole M Roegner,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Commissioner of Social Security 

Administration,

Defendant.

No. CV-20-01974-PHX-DLR

ORDER 

On April 11, 2022, the Court reversed the Social Security Administration’s nondisability decision and remanded this matter for further proceedings. (Docs. 18, 19.) On 

remand, the Administration ruled in Plaintiff’s favor. (Doc. 22-2.) The Administration 

withheld 25% of Plaintiff’s past-due benefits to pay any potential attorney fee award. (Id.

at 4.) Plaintiff entered into a contingent-fee agreement under which she agreed to pay her 

attorney 25% of any past-due benefits awarded. (Doc. 22-4.) Plaintiff’s counsel now 

moves, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), for an award of $21,992.00 in fees, representing 

less than 25% of Plaintiff’s past-due benefits. (Doc. 22 at 3.)

Whenever the Court enters a judgment favorable to a disability benefits claimant, 

the Court can award reasonable attorney fees in an amount not to exceed 25% of the total 

past-due benefits awarded to the claimant. 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). Section 406(b) “does 

not displace contingent-fee agreements as the primary means by which fees are set for 

successfully representing Social Security benefits claimants in court. Rather, § 406(b) calls 

for court review of such arrangements as an independent check, to assure that they yield 

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reasonable results in particular cases.” Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 807 (2002). 

Thus, when determining whether a contingency fee request is reasonable, the Court must 

first “respect the primacy of lawful attorney-client fee agreements.” Crawford v. Astrue, 

586 F.3d 1142, 1150 (9th Cir.2009) (en banc) (internal quotations omitted). The Court 

starts with the contingent-fee agreement and then tests the resulting award for 

reasonableness, adjusting downward “if the attorney provided substandard representation 

or delayed the case, or if the requested fee would result in a windfall.” Id. at 1149-51. When 

assessing whether the requested fee would result in a windfall, the Court considers whether 

the benefits were proportionate to the time spent on the case and may, if necessary, use the 

lodestar calculation as a non-dispositive aid. Id. at 1151.

Counsel’s contingent-fee request is less than 25% of past-due benefits, there is no 

evidence of substandard performance or delay, and neither the Government nor Plaintiff 

have raised any objections to the reasonableness of the request. (See Doc. 23.) Although 

the fee award reflects a relatively high effective hourly rate of $1,912.35, this rate is not 

outside the bounds of effective hourly rates approved by other courts when ruling on 

applications under § 406(b) (see Doc. 24 at 2-3 (collecting cases approving comparable 

effective hourly rates)), and the Court does not find that the fee award would result in a 

windfall in this case. Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s counsel’s motion for attorney fees under 42 

U.S.C. § 406(b) (Doc. 22) is GRANTED. Counsel’s fees are approved in the amount of 

$21,992.00, payable from Plaintiff’s past-due benefits in accordance with Administration 

policy. Plaintiff shall be refunded the $2,511.14 in attorney fees previously awarded to

counsel under the Equal Access to Justice Act. (See Doc. 21.)

Dated this 13th day of December, 2024.

Douglas L. Rayes

Senior United States District Judge

Case 2:20-cv-01974-DLR Document 25 Filed 12/13/24 Page 2 of 2