Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00763/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00763-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

DAVID TOWNSEL, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

MADERA COUNTY DEPT PROBATION, et 

al., 

Defendants. 

Case No. 1:15-cv-00763-LJO-SAB 

ORDER DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED 

COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND 

FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM 

(ECF No. 14) 

THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE 

 Plaintiff, David Townsel, a former state prisoner, proceeding pro se and in forma 

pauperis, filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on May 19, 2015. (ECF No. 

1.) Currently before the Court is Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, filed September 2, 2015. 

(ECF No. 14.) 

I. 

SCREENING REQUIREMENT 

 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court must dismiss a case if at any time the Court 

determines that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In 

determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim, the Court uses the same pleading standard 

used under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). A complaint must contain “a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause 

of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

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662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 

 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim 

to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

570). “[A] complaint [that] pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability . 

. . ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’” Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Further, although a court must accept as 

true all factual allegations contained in a complaint, a court need not accept a plaintiff’s legal 

conclusions as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 

II. 

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS

 Plaintiff brings this action against Defendants Mark L. Duarte and Jennifer Swaine 

alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment. (First Am. Compl. 1, ECF No. 14.) Plaintiff 

alleges that Defendant Duarte made false reports to Madera County Department of Probation 

Officer, Defendant Swaine. (Id.) Without having ever evaluated Plaintiff, Defendant Duarte 

reported that Plaintiff had signs of unstable psychiatric markers for the months of June, July, and 

August of 2013. (Id. at 1-2.) Plaintiff was later confined on a probation violation and, due to the 

report of unstable psychiatric markers. was required to attend mental health counseling. (Id. at 

2.) Plaintiff was evaluated on November 18, 2013 by a nurse at the facility who determined that 

Plaintiff was not suicidal, showed no signs of any psychotic markers for his schizophrenia, and 

was not a danger to himself or others. (Id. at 3.) Defendant contends he was also held beyond 

the time that he was ordered to serve. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff is seeking one million dollars in 

damages. (Id.) 

III. 

DISCUSSION 

 A. Cruel and Unusual Punishment 

 Plaintiff asserts that the conduct of Defendants Duarte and Swaine violated the Eighth 

Amendment. The Eighth Amendment prohibits inhumane methods of punishment and inhumane 

conditions of confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing 

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Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994) and Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 

(1981)) (quotation marks omitted). Conditions must not involve the wanton and unnecessary 

infliction of pain, Morgan, 465 F.3d at 1045 (citing Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347) (quotation marks 

omitted), thus, conditions which are devoid of legitimate penological purpose or contrary to 

evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society violate the Eighth 

Amendment, Morgan, 465 F.3d at 1045 (quotation marks and citations omitted); Hope v. Pelzer, 

536 U.S. 730, 737 (2002); Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346. 

 To prove a violation of the Eighth Amendment the plaintiff must “objectively show that 

he was deprived of something ‘sufficiently serious,’ and make a subjective showing that the 

deprivation occurred with deliberate indifference to [his] health or safety.” Thomas v. Ponder, 

611 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). Deliberate indifference requires a 

showing that “officials were aware of a “substantial risk of serious harm” to an [the plaintiff’s] 

health or safety and that there was no “reasonable justification for the deprivation, in spite of that 

risk.” Id. (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 844 (1994)). Officials may be aware 

of the risk because it is obvious. Thomas, 611 F.3d at 1152. In order to state a claim for 

violation of the Eighth Amendment, the plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to support a claim 

that officials knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to the plaintiff. E.g., 

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847; Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998). 

 The terms imposed as part of a defendant’s sentence can violate the Eighth Amendment. 

See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20 (2003) (The Eighth Amendment contains a “narrow 

proportionality principle” which “applies to noncapital sentences.”); United States v. Williams, 

636 F.3d 1229, 1232 (9th Cir. 2011) (a sentence cannot be grossly disproportionate to the crime 

committed). 

 Plaintiff has not alleged any facts to state a claim that his conditions of probation were 

disproportionate to his sentence. Plaintiff alleges that he was required to obtain mental health 

treatment while incarcerated due to a probation violation, but has alleged no facts to show that he 

was at a significant risk of harm due to being required to participate in mental health treatment. 

Plaintiff’s first amended complaint is devoid of any allegations that a named defendant was 

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aware that he was at a significant risk of harm and failed to appropriately respond. 

 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s first amended complaint does not state a cognizable claim for a 

violation of the Eighth Amendment. 

B. Due Process 

 Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant Duarte submitted a false statement to his probation 

which resulted in the revocation of his probation would implicate the Due Process Clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment. The Due Process Clause protects against the deprivation of liberty 

without due process of law. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005). In order to state a 

cause of action for a deprivation of due process, a plaintiff must first identify a liberty interest for 

which the protection is sought. Id. 

 The Due Process Clause itself does not contain any language that grants a broad right to 

be free from false accusations, but guarantees certain procedural protections to defend against 

false accusations. Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 951 (2nd Cir. 1986). The revocation of 

probation is a loss of liberty that requires the probationer to be accorded due process. Gagnon v. 

Scapelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973). Due process requires two components for the decision to 

revoke probation: “(1) a retrospective factual question whether the probationer has violated a 

condition of probation; and (2) a discretionary determination by the sentencing authority whether 

violation of a condition warrants revocation of probation.” Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 611 

(1985). 

 As relevant here, Plaintiff would be “entitled to an opportunity to show not only that he 

did not violate the conditions [of his probation], but also that there was a justifiable excuse for 

any violation or that revocation is not the appropriate disposition.” Black, 471 U.S. at 612. 

Plaintiff has not alleged any facts to state a claim that his probation was revoked without due 

process of law. 

IV. 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER 

 For the reasons stated, Plaintiff’s first amended complaint does not state a cognizable 

claim for relief for a violation of his constitutional rights. Plaintiff shall be granted one final 

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