Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-87-01967/USCOURTS-ca10-87-01967-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 350
Nature of Suit: Motor Vehicle Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

---

. ' ... 

MARK D. 

v. 

EARL L. 

and 

FARMERS 

.FILED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

Unit.eel S~t.es Co!Jrt of Appeals J.enth Circuit 

MAR 1 111989 

KITSON, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

) 

) 

EDSALL, ) 

) 

Defendant, ) 

) 

) 

) 

INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellee. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 87-1967 

(D.C. No. 85-1762-R) 

( W. D. Ok la. ) 

Before MCKAY and BARRETT, Circuit Judges, and JENKINS, Chief 

Judge.** 

**Honorable Bruce s. Jenkins, Chief Judge, United States District 

Court for the District of Utah, sitting by designation. 

The plaintiff-appellant appeals the district court's order, 

entered July 7, 1987, rendering judgment in favor of the 

defendant-appellee, Farmers Insurance Company, Inc. (Farmers) and 

denying coverage for the plaintiff under any automobile insurance 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 87-1967 Document: 010110024602 Date Filed: 03/14/1989 Page: 1 
... 

policy issued by Farmers to the plaintiff's mother and stepfather. 

The underlying diversity action arose out of an automobile 

accident near Watonga, Oklahoma, on July 21, 1984, in which the 

plaintiff suffered severe injuries. The plaintiff originally sued 

only Mr. Edsall, whom he claimed was driving the pickup truck in 

which he was a passenger, but subsequently amended his complaint 

to add Farmers as a party defendant. 

Farmers had issued a liability policy to the plaintiff's 

father, as well as one to the plaintiff's mother and stepfather. 

The plaintiff sought to recover the uninsured motorist benefits 

provided under the two Farmers policies. The plaintiff and 

defendants settled all issues except the issue of whether the 

plaintiff was an insured under the terms of his mother's and 

stepfather's policy. The plaintiff and Farmers submitted 

stipulated facts to the district court, and Farmers moved for 

judgment on those facts. 

In order to 

under the subject 

determine whether the plaintiff was an insured 

policy, the district court first had to 

determine whether the plaintiff owned a certain 1981 Corvette at 

the time of the ace iden t. The pol icy defined an "insured II as II the 

named insured or a re l ative.'' A "relative," in turn, was defined 

as "a relative of the named insured who is a resident of the same 

household, provided neither such relative nor his spouse owns an 

automobile." Therefore, if the plaintiff owned the Corvette in 

question, he would not be covered as an insured under· the policy. 

Both parties contended that the question of ownership was a 

matter of fact under Ok l ah oma law, and the district court agreed. 

2 

Appellate Case: 87-1967 Document: 010110024602 Date Filed: 03/14/1989 Page: 2 
Our review of Oklahoma law leads us to the same conclusion. See 

Starr v. Welch, 323 P.2d 349 (Okla. 1958). Therefore, the 

district court's determination that the plaintiff, not his father, 

owned the Corvette is a finding of fact, which will not be 

disturbed on appeal unless clearly erroneous. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

52(a). We review findings of fact under the "clearly erroneous" 

standard even when the same are based solely on documentary 

evidence or stipulated facts. See Sawyer v. Swift & Co., 836 F.2d 

1257, 1259 (10th Cir. 1988). Furthermore, the "clearly erroneous" 

standard applies to both "subsidiary" and "ultimate" findings of 

fact, without distinction. See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 

U.S. 273, 287 (1982). 

We have held that "a finding of fact is 'clearly erroneous' 

if it is without factual support in the record, or if the 

appellate court, after r e v iewing all the evidence, is left with 

the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." 

LeMaire v. United States, 826 F.2d 949, 953 (10th Cir. 1987); see 

also Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985); 

United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 

(1948). 

The plaintiff, while acknowledging that no one factor is 

determinative of ownership under Oklahoma law, contends on appeal 

that the district court's finding that the plaintiff owned the 

Corvette, within the contemplation of the poli~y, is clearly 

. erroneous. He asserts that the facts conclusively established 

that the plaintiff's father was an "accommodation purchaser," and 

he contends that, pursuant to American Motorists Insurance Co. v. 

3 

Appellate Case: 87-1967 Document: 010110024602 Date Filed: 03/14/1989 Page: 3 
Biggs, 380 P.2d 950 (Okla. 1963), and Hardware Mutual Casualty Co. 

v. Chapman, 272 F.2d 614 (7th Cir. 1959), an accommodation 

purchaser, as a matter of law, is the ''owner" of the vehicle 

purchased. We do not believe that the cases cited by plaintiff 

support his position. 

In Biggs, the Oklahoma Supreme Court reviewed the trial 

court's finding that the named insured, rather than his son, owned 

the vehicle in question. Noting that the standard of review on 

appeal did not permit reversal of the trial court's judgment 

unless no evidence reasonably supported the same, the court 

concluded that "there was evidence reasonably supporting the 

determination that the Ford was owned by Mr. Hoffman, Sr." 380 

P.2d at 952. The court discussed the conflicting evidence and 

determined that the trial court's finding on the disputed question 

of fact would not be distu rbed. Id. at 951-52. 

Assuming, as the plaintiff contends, that the father in Biggs 

was an accommodation purchaser, the Oklahoma Supreme Court's 

refusal to reverse the trial court's finding of fact in no way 

establishes, as a matter of law, that an accommodation purchaser 

is the owner of the vehicle purchased. 

The plaintiff's reliance on Chapman is even more misplaced, 

because the jury determined that the father did not purchase the 

vehicle as an accommodation to his son, as some of the evidence 

suggested, but that he owned the vehicle and used it principally 

in his business. 272 F.2d at 616. The issue before· the court of 

appeals was whether the district court erred in denying the 

insurer's motion for directed verdict and its motion for judgment 

4 

Appellate Case: 87-1967 Document: 010110024602 Date Filed: 03/14/1989 Page: 4 
notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, motion for new 

trial. Id. The court determined that the evidence, though 

conflicting, suppo r ted a s ubmission of the issue of ownership to 

the jury, so the distri ct court did not err in denying either the 

motion for directed verdict or for judgment notwithstanding the 

verdict. Id. The court further concluded that the district court 

did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant the insurer a 

new trial. Id. at 617. 

Therefore, eve n i f the facts, here, established that the 

plaintiff's father boug ht the car as an accommodation to the 

plaintiff, the issue of whether the plaintiff or his father owned 

the car remained a question of fact for the district court to 

resolve from the stipulated facts. 

The plaintiff also argues on appeal that the term "owns," 

within the context of the policy, is ambiguous because it could 

mean either legal ownership or equitable ownership. Therefore, 

the plaintiff contends, the policy should be construed against the 

insurer and in favor of the plaintiff so as to make him an insured 

thereunder. 

Oklahoma law makes ownership a finding of fact and thereby 

eliminates any ambiguity from the policy terms at issue. Once the 

district court found that the plaintiff "owned" the Corvette, 

which finding is supported amply by the record, the plaintiff 

clearly fell within the scope of the exclusion for relatives who 

own automobiles. We, therefore, see no ambiguity in the policy 

terms at issue. 

5 

Appellate Case: 87-1967 Document: 010110024602 Date Filed: 03/14/1989 Page: 5 
' -

We conclude from our review of the record that the district 

court's finding of ownership was not clearly erroneous, and that 

the court properly concluded, based on such finding, that the 

plaintiff was not ent i t l ed to any benefits under the Farmers 

po l icy issued to his mother and stepfather. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

Western District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED. 

The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

PER CURIAM 

6 

Appellate Case: 87-1967 Document: 010110024602 Date Filed: 03/14/1989 Page: 6