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Nature of Suit Code: 370
Nature of Suit: Other Fraud
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

TRAVIS Z. GONZALES, an

individual,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

CARMAX AUTO

SUPERSTORES, LLC, a

Virginia Limited Liability

Company; SANTANDER

CONSUMER USA, INC., an

Illinois Corporation; SAFECO

INSURANCE COMPANY OF

AMERICA, a New Hampshire

Corporation, 

Defendants-Appellants.

No. 14-56305

D.C. No. 

8:13-cv-01391-CJCRNB

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2 GONZALES V. CARMAX

TRAVIS Z. GONZALES, an

individual,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CARMAX AUTO

SUPERSTORES, LLC, a

Virginia Limited Liability

Company; SANTANDER

CONSUMER USA, INC., an

Illinois Corporation; SAFECO

INSURANCE COMPANY OF

AMERICA, a New Hampshire

Corporation, 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 14-56842

D.C. No. 

8:13-cv-01391-CJCRNB

ORDER

Filed January 6, 2017

Before: Stephen Reinhardt, Alex Kozinski,

and Kim McLane Wardlaw, Circuit Judges.

Order

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GONZALES V. CARMAX 3

SUMMARY*

Attorney’s Fees / California Consumer Legal

Remedies Act

The panel held that plaintiff Travis Gonzales was not

barred from recovering appellate attorney’s fees against

CarMax Auto Superstores, LLC, under Section 1782 of the

California Consumer Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”), and

remanded to the district court to determine in the first

instance whether Gonzales qualified as a prevailing plaintiff

under the CLRA and the reasonableness of the fees he

requested.

Section 1782(b) of the CLRA provides that “no action for

damages may be maintained under Section 1780 if an

appropriate correction . . . is given . . . to the consumer within

30 days after receipt of the notice.” Interpreting Section

1782, the California Court of Appeal held that no attorney’s

fees were recoverable in actions for damages under the

CLRA unless the plaintiff’s notice letter is not appropriate or

timely. 

The panel held that because plaintiff Gonzales sought

only injunctive relief for CarMax’s violation of the CLRA,

CarMax’s correction offer did not bar Gonzales from

recovering attorney’s fees. The panel held that Section

1782(b) applied only to an action for damages.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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4 GONZALES V. CARMAX

The panel held that it was relatively clear that Gonzales

achieved his litigation objectives, where he was awarded

summary judgment on appeal but the district court still had to

enter a final judgment on remand. The panel concluded that

the district court should determine in the first instance

whether Gonzales was a “prevailing party” under section

1780(e) of the CLRA, and the reasonableness of Gonzales’

requested attorney’s fees.

COUNSEL

Hallen D. Rosner (argued), Rosner, Barry & Babbitt, LLP,

San Diego, California, for Plaintiff-Appellant/CrossAppellee.

Kurt A. Schlichter (argued), Steven C. Shonack, Jamie L.

Keeton, Schlichter & Shonack, LLP, El Segundo, California,

for Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants.

ORDER

Travis Z. Gonzales seeks attorney’s fees under

California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”) in

connection with these two appeals, which were consolidated

for purposes of oral argument and decision. In Case No. 14-

56842, we granted summary judgment to Gonzales on his

CLRA and Unfair Competition Law claims. In Case No. 14-

56305, we affirmed the district court’s denial of attorney’s

fees to CarMax under Section 1780(e) of the CLRA. 

Gonzales’s application for appellate attorney’s fees

presents the following issues: (1) whether Gonzales is barred

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GONZALES V. CARMAX 5

from collecting attorney’s fees because CarMax proffered an

appropriate correction pursuant to Section 1782 of the CLRA;

(2) whether Gonzales is a “prevailing plaintiff” under Section

1780(e) of the CLRA; (3) whether Gonzales’s attorney’s fee

requests are reasonable.

We conclude that Gonzales is not barred from recovering

attorney’s fees under Section 1782 of the CLRA.

Consequently, we remand to the district court to determine in

the first instance whether Gonzales qualifies as a prevailing

plaintiff under the CLRA and the reasonableness of the fees

he has requested.

1. CarMax’s correction offer, whether it was

appropriate or not, does not bar Gonzales from

recovering attorney’s fees.

Under California Civil Code § 1782(b), “no action for

damages may be maintained under Section 1780 [of the

CLRA] if an appropriate correction, repair, replacement, or

other remedy is given, or agreed to be given within a

reasonable time, to the consumer within 30 days after receipt

of the notice.” CarMax argues that it made a timely and

appropriate CLRA correction offer, which Gonzales rejected.

Therefore, according to CarMax, Gonzales is barred from

recovering any fees for continuing to pursue his claims. We

reject CarMax’s argument.

The California Court of Appeal has “interpreted section

1782 to create a requirement analogous to exhaustion of

administrative remedies” and therefore has concluded that

“[a]ttorney fees are not recoverable in actions for damages

under the CLRA unless the response to the notice letter is not

an appropriate one or no response is forthcoming within the

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6 GONZALES V. CARMAX

statutory time period.” Benson v. S. Cal. Auto Sales Inc.,

192 Cal. Rptr. 3d 67, 77 (Cal. Ct. App.), review denied (2015)

(emphasis added). The Benson court, however, explicitly

declined to “address the requirements for an attorney fee

award based on a request for injunctive relief.” Id. at 77–78.

In addition to actual and punitive damages, the CLRA

explicitly authorizes injunctive relief, restitution, and “[a]ny

other relief that the court deems proper.” Cal. Civ. Code

§ 1780(a). In the present case, Gonzales’ Second Amended

Complaint did “not seek damages of any kind” on his CLRA

claim, but rather sought only an “injunction prohibiting acts

or practices which violate the CLRA.” As the California

Supreme Court noted, “section 1782, subdivision (d)

contemplates the filing of a CLRA action for injunctive relief

alone, and such actions are not subject to the requirements of

subdivisions (a) and (b) of notice and allowance for voluntary

correction,” which apply only to an action for damages.

Meyer v. Sprint Spectrum L.P., 200 P.3d 295, 301 (Cal.

2009). Because Gonzales sought only injunctive relief for

violation of the CLRA,1 CarMax’s correction offer does not

bar Gonzales from recovering attorney’s fees.2

1 As explained in our original opinion, CarMax violated Section

11713.18(a)(6) of the California Vehicle Code, and violations of that

provision are “actionable under the Consumer Legal Remedies Act.” Cal.

Veh. Code § 11713.18(b); see also Gonzales v. CarMax Auto Superstores,

LLC, 840 F.3d 644, 649 (9th Cir. 2016).

2 We are not presented here with the question of a plaintiff who seeks

both injunctive relief and damages under the CLRA, and accordingly

express no view on that issue. 

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GONZALES V. CARMAX 7

2. The district court should address whether

Gonzales is a prevailing plaintiff in the first

instance

Under the CLRA, “[t]he court shall award court costs and

attorney’s fees to a prevailing plaintiff in litigation.” Cal. Civ.

Code § 1780(e). Because the CLRA does not define the term

“prevailing plaintiff,” California courts have “adopt[ed] a

pragmatic approach, determining prevailing party status

based on which party succeeded on a practical level.”

Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 273,

281–82 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). “Under that approach, the court

exercises its discretion to determine the prevailing party by

analyzing which party realized its litigation objectives.” Id. at

282(citation and quotation marks omitted); Parkinson v.

Hyundai Motor Am., 796 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1169 (C.D. Cal.

2010) (“A plaintiff is the prevailing party if he or she

obtained a ‘net monetary recovery’ or ‘realized its litigation

objectives,’ including pursuant to a settlement agreement.”)

(quoting Kim v. Euromotors W./The Auto Gallery, 56 Cal.

Rptr. 3d 780, 786 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007)).

The California Court of Appeal has also instructed,

however, that “[d]eterminations of whether [a plaintiff] is a

‘prevailing plaintiff’ and the amount to be awarded, if any,

are to be made, in the first instance, by the trial court in the

sound exercise of its discretion.”Kim, 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 788.

Here, as CarMax argues, although Gonzales was awarded

summary judgment on appeal, our opinion did not order a

particular remedy—the district court must still enter a final

judgment on remand. Consequently, although it is relatively

clear that Gonzales “achieved his litigation objectives” on

appeal, the district court should, after fashioning a remedy in

conformity with our opinion, determine in the first instance

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8 GONZALES V. CARMAX

whether Gonzales qualifies as a prevailing plaintiff under

Section 1780(e) of the CLRA and the reasonableness of

Gonzales’ requested attorney’s fees in both case No. 14-

56842 and 14-56305.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

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