Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00225/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00225-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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1 Respondent did not address the merits of Petitioner’s claims, rather he noted he would

file a response if the motion to dismiss was denied. (Doc. 29 at 1 n.1.) By May 9, 2012 Order of the

Court, Respondent was directed to answer the Petition and prohibited from filing a dispositive motion

absent permission of the Court. (Doc. 5 at 4.) The Court determines that additional briefing is

unwarranted in the circumstances and rules on the documents it has before it.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

David Evan Starr, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Louis W. Winn, Jr., Warden,

Respondent.

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No. CV-12-225-TUC-RCC-DTF

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the Court is a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus brought pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2241. Petitioner, David Evan Starr, while confined in the United States Penitentiary

in Tucson, Arizona, alleges that due to a deficiency in his restitution order, the Bureau of

Prisons (“BOP”) lacks authority to enforce his restitution order through the Inmate Financial

Responsibility Program (“IFRP”). Petitioner requests that he be placed on permanent “IFRP

Exempt” status, that he be free from an obligation to make restitution payments until his release,

and that his restitution obligation be recalculated upon his release from custody. Pursuant to the

Rules of Practice of the Court, this matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Ferraro for a Report

and Recommendation. Before the Court are the Petition (Doc. 1), Respondent’s Motion to

Dismiss1

 and Reply (Docs. 29, 35), Petitioner’s Response and Sur-Response (Docs. 34, 36),

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Petitioner’s Request for Summary Judgment (Doc. 42) and Respondent’s Opposition thereto

(Doc. 44). The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after its independent

review, grant the Petition in part and deny the Petition in part.

BACKGROUND

In 1998, prior to and separate from Petitioner’s current period of incarceration, Petitioner

pled guilty in the U.S. District Court, Northern District of Iowa to a violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 1343(f), fraud by wire, radio or television. (Doc. 1, Ex. A at 1.) He was sentenced to 36

months incarceration and ordered to pay $259,000 in restitution “immediately.” (Id. at 2.) The

sentencing court waived the interest requirement, stating that Petitioner “does not have the

ability to pay interest.” (Id.) Petitioner’s restitution order further stated that restitution shall be

due during Petitioner’s period of imprisonment, and that “[a]ll criminal monetary payments,

except those payments made through the Bureau of Prisons’ Inmate Financial Responsibility

Program, are to be made as directed by the Court, the probation officer, or the United States

Attorney.” (Id. at 3.) In January 2004, Petitioner’s restitution order was amended to reduce the

amount owed to $94,520.75. (Id., Ex. C at 1.) The amended order did not contain a schedule of

payments. (Id. at 1-2.)

Following his release, Petitioner again faced criminal charges in the same district and,

in 2007, Petitioner was sentenced to 720 months of incarceration. (Doc. 29 at 3; Doc. 34 at 1,

4.) Petitioner is currently serving out this sentence in the United States Penitentiary, Tucson.

(Doc. 1 at 1.)

Petitioner alleges in his Petition, and Respondent does not dispute, that because

Petitioner is subject to an order of restitution related to his previous conviction, he cannot

receive certain benefits unless he is enrolled in the IFRP. (Id. at 6.) While participating in the

IFRP, Petitioner alleges he was required to make payments towards his restitution obligation

according to a payment schedule established by the BOP. (Id. at 4.) In his Motion for Summary

Judgment, Petitioner informed the Court that he has been placed on “Temporary IFRP Exempt”

status. (Doc. 42 at 2.) Petitioner continues to seek a change in status to “Permanent IFRP

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Exempt.” (Doc. 1 at 9; Doc. 42.) Respondent provided no response to Petitioner’s current status

with respect to the IFRP, rather, he argued only that a motion for summary judgment did not

comply with the rules and should be denied. (Doc. 44.)

ANALYSIS

Exhaustion

Typically, the Court requires an inmate to exhaust all available administrative remedies

before it agrees to reach the merits of a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 claim. Martinez v. Roberts, 804 F.2d

570, 571 (9th Cir. 1986). However, exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a jurisdictional

requirement of a § 2241 claim. Ward v. Chavez, 678 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2012). Petitioner

argues that, although he did not exhaust the appeals available to him through the BOP’s

Administrative Remedy Program before filing the instant Petition, his claim should nevertheless

be heard because exhaustion would be futile. (Doc. 1 at 13.) Respondent does not dispute

exhaustion. 

When the court deems exhaustion futile, the claim may properly be addressed prior to

exhaustion. Ward, 678 F.3d at 1045. Grievances based on official BOP policy, such as that

controlling the IFRP, are particularly ripe for consideration based on futility. Id. at 1046

(“Because of the existence of official BOP policy–the IFRP–exhaustion would be futile here.”);

see also Sours v. Chavez, No. CV08-1903-PHX-SRB, 2009 WL 2714028, *3 (D. Ariz. Aug. 27,

2009) (deeming exhaustion futile where BOP relied upon IFRP policy to reject the petitioner’s

appeals in the Administrative Remedy Program). Accordingly, the Court should exercise its

discretion and overlook Petitioner’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies, particularly

as Respondent did not raise this issue.

Merits

As an initial matter, Respondent argues that the Court should not address the merits of

Petitioner’s claims because he waived them when he failed to file a direct appeal challenging

his restitution order, and did not appeal the denials of his motions to modify restitution. (Doc.

29 at 4.) It is true that if Petitioner wishes to object to his restitution order, he must do so in the

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2 To the extent there is a question as to whether the law of the circuit in which Petitioner

was sentenced applies, the Eighth Circuit (which encompasses the Northern District of Iowa) also

interprets the MVRA as “requir[ing] the district court to set a detailed payment schedule at sentencing.”

United States v. McGlothlin, 249 F.3d 783, 785 (8th Cir. 2001).

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Northern District of Iowa, where he was sentenced. However, it is well established that the

manner in which an inmate’s sentence is executed is properly disputed via a § 2241 petition. See

Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 864 (9th Cir. 2000). To the extent Petitioner challenges

the enforcement of his sentence by BOP, specifically, whether BOP may implement a schedule

of restitution payments in lieu of the court, a § 2241 petition has been recognized as the

appropriate mechanism. See LeBlanc v. Norwood, CV 09-1551-CJC, 2010 WL 2891539, *5

(May 6, 2010) report and recommendation adopted (C.D. Cal. July 16, 2010) (“Petitioner’s

§ 2241 claim asserts and proves a deficiency in the execution of his sentence . . . Petitioner

should be placed on “IFRP Exempt” status in light of the BOP’s lack of authority to implement

a payment schedule through that program.”). The Court finds that Petitioner did not waive his

objection to BOP enforcement of his restitution order by failing to object to the order itself.

In Claims 1 and 2, Petitioner argues that the BOP cannot impose a restitution payment

schedule on him because the Court did not do so. Under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act

(“MVRA”), the economic circumstances of the defendant have no bearing on the amount of

restitution ordered by the sentencing court, for it is required to set a restitution amount that will

fully compensate the victim. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(1)(A). However, “the court shall, pursuant to

section 3572, specify in the restitution order the manner in which, and the schedule according

to which, the restitution is to be paid, in consideration of” the defendant’s financial situation.

18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(2). The Ninth Circuit holds that the statutory duty to set a payment schedule

“in consideration of” defendant’s finances belongs to the court alone and cannot be delegated

to the BOP or any other authority.2 See United States v. Gunning, 401 F.3d 1145, 1150 (9th Cir.

2005).

The circuit’s position on the issue was further clarified in Ward v. Chavez. There, the

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Court held that “if the defendant is unable to pay restitution immediately, the court cannot

simply order ‘immediate’ repayment and leave the details of the actual payment schedule to the

BOP.” Ward, 678 F.3d at 1052. Absent a proper payment schedule, the BOP “lacks the

authority to collect restitution payments” through the IFRP. Id. at 1051; see also Ybarra v.

Smith, No. CV-09-1447-PHX-DGC, 2010 WL 5361833, *2 (D. Ariz. Dec. 21, 2010) (“Without

a proper order, the BOP does not have the authority to require a schedule of restitution

payments collected while Petitioner is participating in the IFRP.” (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted)); see also Smiley v. Smith, CV 11-1153-PHX-GMS, 2013 WL 57822, *4 (D.

Ariz. Jan. 4, 2013) (applying Ward to hold that the petitioner is exempted “from the IFRP until

a proper restitution schedule has been set by the sentencing court”). 

In this case, the sentencing court set restitution at $259,000, noted that Petitioner was

unable to afford interest, but failed to set a schedule for repayment “in consideration of”

Petitioner’s financial circumstances as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(2). Petitioner’s amended

order of restitution likewise contains no schedule of payments. Instead, the BOP, through the

IFRP, created its own repayment schedule. It did not have the authority to do so. Unless and

until the sentencing court’s restitution order is changed to include a payment schedule, the BOP

should be instructed to stop collecting payments under Petitioner’s IFRP plan and place

Petitioner on “IFRP Exempt” status. 

Petitioner argues, in Claim 3, that he “should not be required to pay any restitution while

he is in prison and has no income,” (Doc. 1 at 6), thereby disputing the provision in his original

restitution order requiring that payment “shall be due during the period of imprisonment.” (Id.,

Ex. A at 3). He further argues in Claim 4 that his “restitution obligation should be recalculated

just before he is released from custody.” (Doc. 1 at 7.) Generally, a habeas petition filed under

§ 2241 is only appropriate to challenge the “manner, location, or conditions of a sentence’s

execution.” Hernandez, 204 F.3d at 864. This Court lacks jurisdiction in a § 2241 petition to

consider Petitioner’s claims requesting modifications as to the amount or the terms of his order

of restitution.

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Because the Court concludes Petitioner is entitled to relief on the merits of his Petition,

it does not reach his motion for summary judgment.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court GRANT

IN PART the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1), to the extent that Petitioner be put on

“IFRP Exempt” status until a proper restitution schedule has been set by the sentencing courts,

and DENY IN PART the Petition, to the extent Petitioner requests changes to the terms of his

order of restitution. The Magistrate further recommends the District Court DENY Respondent’s

Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 29) and DENY AS MOOT Petitioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment

(Doc. 42).

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2), any party may serve and file

written objections within fourteen days of being served with a copy of the Report and

Recommendation. A party may respond to the other party’s objections within fourteen days. No

reply brief shall be filed on objections unless leave is granted by the district court. If objections

are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. Any objections filed should be captioned with

the following case number: CV-12-225-TUC-RCC.

DATED this 12th day of August, 2013.

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