Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-00359/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-00359-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EDGARDO ALONSO, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

)

v. )

)

THE PEOPLE, ) 

 )

Respondent. )

)

 )

1:12-cv—00359-SKO-HC

ORDER DISMISSING PETITIONER’S

STATE LAW CLAIM CONCERNING DENIAL

OF SEVERANCE PURSUANT TO CAL.

PEN. CODE § 954 (DOC. 1)

ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER LEAVE

TO FILE A MOTION TO AMEND THE

PETITION TO NAME A PROPER

RESPONDENT NO LATER THAN THIRTY

(30) DAYS AFTER THE DATE OF

SERVICE OF THIS ORDER (Doc. 1)

ORDER TO PETITIONER TO SHOW CAUSE

IN THIRTY (30) DAYS WHY THE

PETITION SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED

FOR PETITIONER’S FAILURE TO

EXHAUST STATE COURT REMEDIES

(Doc. 1)

DEADLINE: 30 DAYS

Petitioner is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with a

petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), Petitioner has consented to

the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge to conduct

all further proceedings in the case, including the entry of final

judgment, by manifesting consent in a signed writing filed by

Petitioner on May 22, 2012 (doc. 4). Pending before the Court is

the petition, which was filed on March 9, 2012.

1

Case 1:12-cv-00359-SKO Document 5 Filed 04/23/12 Page 1 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

I. Screening the Petition 

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in the United

States District Courts (Habeas Rules) requires the Court to make

a preliminary review of each petition for writ of habeas corpus.

The Court must summarily dismiss a petition "[i]f it plainly

appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the

petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court....” 

Habeas Rule 4; O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir.

1990); see also Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490 (9th Cir.

1990). Habeas Rule 2(c) requires that a petition 1) specify all

grounds of relief available to the Petitioner; 2) state the facts

supporting each ground; and 3) state the relief requested. 

Notice pleading is not sufficient. Instead, the petition must

state facts that point to a real possibility of constitutional

error. Rule 4, Advisory Committee Notes, 1976 Adoption;

O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d at 420 (quoting Blackledge v.

Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 75 n.7 (1977)). Allegations in a petition

that are vague, conclusory, or palpably incredible are subject to

summary dismissal. Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490, 491 (9th

Cir. 1990).

Further, the Court may dismiss a petition for writ of habeas

corpus either on its own motion under Habeas Rule 4, pursuant to

the respondent's motion to dismiss, or after an answer to the

petition has been filed. Advisory Committee Notes to Habeas Rule

8, 1976 Adoption; see, Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039, 1042-43

(9th Cir. 2001). A petition for habeas corpus should not be

dismissed without leave to amend unless it appears that no

tenable claim for relief can be pleaded were such leave granted. 

2

Case 1:12-cv-00359-SKO Document 5 Filed 04/23/12 Page 2 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Jarvis v. Nelson, 440 F.2d 13, 14 (9th Cir. 1971). 

II. Failure to Name a Proper Respondent 

Petitioner has named “The People” as Respondent. Petitioner

is incarcerated at the KVSP located in Delano, California. The

warden at that facility is Martin Biter. 

A petitioner seeking habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254 must name the state officer having custody of him as the

respondent to the petition. Habeas Rule 2(a); Ortiz-Sandoval v.

Gomez, 81 F.3d 891, 894 (9th Cir. 1996); Stanley v. California

Supreme Court, 21 F.3d 359, 360 (9th Cir. 1994). Normally, the

person having custody of an incarcerated petitioner is the warden

of the prison where the petitioner is incarcerated because the

warden has "day-to-day control over" the petitioner and thus can

produce the petitioner. Brittingham v. United States, 982 F.2d

378, 379 (9th Cir. 1992); see also, Stanley v. California Supreme

Court, 21 F.3d 359, 360 (9th Cir. 1994). However, the chief

officer in charge of state penal institutions is also

appropriate. Ortiz, 81 F.3d at 894; Stanley, 21 F.3d at 360. 

Where a petitioner is on probation or parole, the proper

respondent is his probation or parole officer and the official in

charge of the parole or probation agency or state correctional

agency. Id. 

Petitioner’s failure to name a proper respondent requires

dismissal of his habeas petition for lack of jurisdiction.

Stanley, 21 F.3d at 360. However, the Court will give Petitioner

the opportunity to cure this defect by amending the petition to

name a proper respondent, such as the warden of his facility. 

See, In re Morris, 363 F.3d 891, 893-94 (9th Cir. 2004). 

3

Case 1:12-cv-00359-SKO Document 5 Filed 04/23/12 Page 3 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

In the interest of judicial economy, Petitioner need not

file an amended petition. Instead, Petitioner may file a motion

entitled "Motion to Amend the Petition to Name a Proper

Respondent" wherein Petitioner may name the proper respondent in

this action.

III. Exhaustion of State Court Remedies 

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to challenge

collaterally a conviction by a petition for writ of habeas corpus

must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). 

The exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and

gives the state court the initial opportunity to correct the

state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v.

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509,

518 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1162-63 (9th Cir.

1988). 

A petitioner may satisfy the exhaustion requirement by

providing the highest state court with the necessary jurisdiction

a full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before

presenting it to the federal court, and demonstrating that no

state remedy remains available. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270,

275-76 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir.

1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court

was given a full and fair opportunity to hear a claim if the

petitioner has presented the highest state court with the factual

and legal basis for the claim. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364,

365 (1995) (legal basis); Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 9-

10 (1992), superceded by statute as stated in Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362 (2000) (factual basis). 

4

Case 1:12-cv-00359-SKO Document 5 Filed 04/23/12 Page 4 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the

state court that he was raising a federal constitutional claim. 

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669

(9th Cir. 2000), amended, 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001); Hiivala

v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999); Keating v. Hood,

133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir. 1998). In Duncan, the United

States Supreme Court reiterated the rule as follows: 

In Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275...(1971),

we said that exhaustion of state remedies requires that

petitioners "fairly presen[t]" federal claims to the

state courts in order to give the State the

"'opportunity to pass upon and correct’ alleged

violations of the prisoners' federal rights" (some

internal quotation marks omitted). If state courts are

to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations

of prisoners' federal rights, they must surely be

alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting

claims under the United States Constitution. If a

habeas petitioner wishes to claim that an evidentiary

ruling at a state court trial denied him the due

process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment,

he must say so, not only in federal court, but in state

court.

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. The Ninth Circuit examined the rule

further in Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-69 (9th Cir.

2000), as amended by Lyons v. Crawford, 247 F.3d 904, 904-05 (9th

Cir. 2001), stating: 

Our rule is that a state prisoner has not "fairly

presented" (and thus exhausted) his federal claims

in state court unless he specifically indicated to

that court that those claims were based on federal law.

See, Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th Cir.

2000). Since the Supreme Court's decision in Duncan,

this court has held that the petitioner must make the

federal basis of the claim explicit either by citing

federal law or the decisions of federal courts, even

if the federal basis is "self-evident," Gatlin v. Madding,

189 F.3d 882, 889 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Anderson v.

Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7... (1982)), or the underlying

claim would be decided under state law on the same

considerations that would control resolution of the claim

on federal grounds, see, e.g., Hiivala v. Wood, 195 

F.3d 1098, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. Zenon,

5

Case 1:12-cv-00359-SKO Document 5 Filed 04/23/12 Page 5 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

88 F.3d 828, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1996); Crotts, 73 F.3d 

at 865.

...

In Johnson, we explained that the petitioner must alert

the state court to the fact that the relevant claim is a

federal one without regard to how similar the state and

federal standards for reviewing the claim may be or how

obvious the violation of federal law is.

Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-69 (9th Cir. 2000), as

amended by Lyons v. Crawford, 247 F.3d 904, 904-05 (9th Cir.

2001). 

Where none of a petitioner’s claims has been presented to

the highest state court as required by the exhaustion doctrine,

the Court must dismiss the petition. Raspberry v. Garcia, 448

F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006); Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478,

481 (9th Cir. 2001). The authority of a court to hold a mixed

petition in abeyance pending exhaustion of the unexhausted claims

has not been extended to petitions that contain no exhausted

claims. Raspberry, 448 F.3d at 1154.

Where some claims are exhausted and others are not (i.e., a

“mixed” petition), the Court must dismiss the petition without

prejudice to give Petitioner an opportunity to exhaust the

unexhausted claims if he can do so. Rose, 455 U.S. at 510, 521-

22; Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Gordon), 107 F.3d 756,

760 (9th Cir. 1997), en banc, cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 265 (1997);

Greenawalt v. Stewart, 105 F.3d 1268, 1273 (9th Cir. 1997),

cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 1794 (1997). The Court must, however,

give a petitioner an opportunity to amend a mixed petition to

delete the unexhausted claims and permit review of properly

exhausted claims. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. at 520; Calderon v.

United States Dist. Ct. (Taylor), 134 F.3d 981, 986 (9th Cir.

6

Case 1:12-cv-00359-SKO Document 5 Filed 04/23/12 Page 6 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 920 (1998); James v. Giles, 221

F.3d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 2000).

Here, Petitioner alleges that he is an inmate of the Kern

Valley State Prison (KVSP) serving a sentence of fifty-four years

to life imposed in the Tulare County Superior Court in June 2009

for attempted murder with gang and gun enhancements. (Pet. 2.) 

Petitioner raises the following claims in the petition: 1) the

trial court abused its discretion in denying Petitioner’s motion

to sever counts 1 and 2 from counts 3 through 7 because counts 3

through 7 were not eligible for joinder under Cal. Pen. Code 

§ 954; 2) the failure to sever and the introduction of

inflammatory gang predicate evidence violated Petitioner’s right

to due process and a fair trial; 3) the prosecutor committed

prejudicial misconduct by vouching for two key prosecution

witnesses and impeaching a defense witness with a non-existent

criminal offense, which violated Petitioner’s Fourteenth

Amendment right to due process and a fair trial; 4) trial

counsel’s failure to impeach witness Rodriguez with prior

convictions, request an instruction limiting use of the evidence

of gang activity, object to the court’s directions regarding gang

expert testimony, object on the basis of due process and pursuant

to Cal. Evid. Code § 352 to predicate crime gang evidence,

request an in-custody protective instruction, object and request

admonitions concerning various instances of prosecutorial

misconduct, impeach witness Rodriguez with prior convictions,

request a prophylactic gang evidence instruction, object to

unspecified, related misinstructions, challenge inflammatory gang

evidence, and request an instruction to prevent diminution of the

7

Case 1:12-cv-00359-SKO Document 5 Filed 04/23/12 Page 7 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

presumption of innocence all constituted prejudicial, ineffective

assistance of counsel; 5) incorrect instructions on imperfect

self-defense violated Petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment right to

due process and a fair trial; and 6) cumulative prejudice from

the matters forming the substance of many of the aforementioned

claims violated Petitioner’s right to due process of law. (Pet.

3-12.)

With respect to exhaustion, Petitioner alleges that he

appealed to the Court of Appeal of the state of California in

case number F058239. He further alleges that a petition for

review was denied in March 2011. He also states that he did not

seek review in the California Supreme Court. However, reference

to the official website of the California courts reflects that 1

Petitioner did seek review of his criminal appeal in the

California Supreme Court in case number S189392. Thus, it

appears that Petitioner did seek review by the state’s highest

court of the state appellate court’s ruling affirming the

judgment.

Petitioner thus alleges in effect that he sought review. 

The issues he raises include 1) abuse of discretion by the trial

court; 2) insufficient defense counsel; and 3) prosecutorial

misconduct. (Pet. 13.) It thus appears that he did not raise

the claims concerning instructional error and cumulative error. 

However, after listing the issues raised, Petitioner further

The Court may take judicial notice of facts that are capable of accurate and ready determination by resort

1

to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned, including undisputed information posted on official web

sites. Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); United States v. Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d 331, 333 (9th Cir. 1993); Daniels-Hall v.

National Education Association, 629 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir. 2010). It is appropriate to take judicial notice of the

docket sheet of a California court. White v Martel, 601 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 332

(2010). The address of the official website of the California state courts is www.courts.ca.gov.

8

Case 1:12-cv-00359-SKO Document 5 Filed 04/23/12 Page 8 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

states, “INTER ALIA.” (Id.) Thus, it is unclear whether

Petitioner exhausted his state court remedies as to all the

claims and sub-claims raised in the petition that he has filed in

this Court.

Petitioner has neither alleged that all his claims were

presented to the California Supreme Court nor provided this Court

with documentation showing that all the claims have been

presented to the California Supreme Court.

Accordingly, upon review of the instant petition for writ of

habeas corpus, it appears that Petitioner has not presented at

least one of his claims to the California Supreme Court. If

Petitioner has not presented all of his claims to the California

Supreme Court, the Court cannot proceed to the merits of those

claims. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). It is possible, however, that

Petitioner has presented all his claims to the California Supreme

Court and simply neglected to inform this Court. 

Thus, Petitioner must inform the Court if his claim

concerning ineffective assistance of counsel has been presented

to the California Supreme Court, and if possible, provide the

Court with a copy of the petition filed in the California Supreme

Court, along with a copy of any ruling made by the California

Supreme Court. Without knowing what claims have been presented

to the California Supreme Court, the Court is unable to proceed

to the merits of the petition. Petitioner will be granted thirty

(30) days in which to respond to the Court’s order.

IV. State Law Claim 

Federal habeas relief is available to state prisoners only

to correct violations of the United States Constitution, federal

9

Case 1:12-cv-00359-SKO Document 5 Filed 04/23/12 Page 9 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

Federal habeas relief is not available to retry a state issue

that does not rise to the level of a federal constitutional

violation. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). 

Alleged errors in the application of state law are not cognizable

in federal habeas corpus. Souch v. Schiavo, 289 F.3d 616 (9th

Cir. 2002) (a claim challenging state court’s discretionary

decision concerning application of state sentencing law presented

only state law issues and was not cognizable in a proceeding

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254); Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380,

1389 (9th Cir. 1996). The Court accepts a state court's

interpretation of state law. Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380,

1389 (9th Cir. 1996). In a habeas corpus proceeding, this Court

is bound by the California Supreme Court’s interpretation of

California law unless it is determined that the interpretation is

untenable or a veiled attempt to avoid review of federal

questions. Murtishaw v. Woodford, 255 F.3d 926, 964 (9 Cir. th

2001).

Here, Petitioner’s first claim is that the trial court

abused its discretion in not granting Petitioner’s motion for a

severance of counts 1 and 2, on the one hand, and counts 3

through 7, on the other because the offenses were not subject to

joinder under Cal. Pen. Code § 954. (Pet. 3.) Petitioner’s

claim is based solely on state law. Thus, it is not a claim

cognizable in a proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Because the defect in Petitioner’s claim is due to the

nature of the claim and not any defect in facts, granting leave

to amend would be futile. 

10

Case 1:12-cv-00359-SKO Document 5 Filed 04/23/12 Page 10 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Accordingly, Petitioner’s state law claim will be dismissed

without leave to amend.

V. Disposition 

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that:

1) Petitioner’s state law claim concerning denial of a

motion for a severance of counts is DISMISSED without lave to

amend; and

2) Petitioner is GRANTED thirty (30) days from the date of

service of this order in which to file a motion to amend the

instant petition to name a proper respondent. Failure to move to

amend the petition and state a proper respondent will result in a

recommendation that the petition be dismissed for lack of

jurisdiction; and

3) Petitioner is ORDERED to show cause why the petition

should not be dismissed for Petitioner’s failure to exhaust state

remedies as to all his claims. Petitioner is ORDERED to inform

the Court within thirty (30) days of the date of service of this

order whether or not all his claim have been presented to the

California Supreme Court. 

Petitioner is forewarned that failure to follow this order

will result in dismissal of the petition pursuant to Local Rule

110.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 20, 2012 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto 

ie14hj UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

11

Case 1:12-cv-00359-SKO Document 5 Filed 04/23/12 Page 11 of 11