Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_17-cv-05499/USCOURTS-cand-3_17-cv-05499-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 17:501 Copyright Infringement

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

PETER MENZEL, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

SCHOLASTIC, INC., 

Defendant. 

Case No. 17-cv-05499-EMC 

PUBLIC/REDACTED VERSION

ORDER GRANTING IN PART 

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT; AND 

GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING 

IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR 

PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

Docket Nos. 105, 107 

Plaintiff Peter Menzel has sued Defendant Scholastic, Inc. for copyright infringement. 

Currently pending before the Court are motions for summary judgment or partial summary 

judgment filed by both parties. Having considered the parties’ briefs and accompanying 

submissions, as well as the oral argument of counsel, the Court hereby GRANTS in part and 

DENIES in part each party’s motion. The Court also GRANTS the various motions to file under 

seal that have been filed in conjunction with the summary judgment briefing. 

I. DISCUSSION 

A. Sealing Motions 

As an initial matter, the Court address the parties’ motions to file under seal. See Docket 

Nos. 104, 106, 115, 119, 125 (motions). The motions have been filed because Scholastic has 

designated certain information as confidential – more specifically, information about its print runs. 

Because dispositive motions are at issue, Scholastic has the burden of showing that there are 

compelling reasons to prevent public disclosure. See Kamakana v. City & County of Honolulu, 

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447 F.3d 1172, 1178-79 (9th Cir. 2006) (stating that a “party must articulate[] compelling reasons 

supported by specific factual findings that outweigh the general history of access and the public 

policies favoring disclosure, such as the public interest in understanding the judicial process”) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). Mr. Menzel opposes sealing. 

The Court has reviewed the substantive submitted by Scholastic. Based on the declaration, 

there are compelling reasons to seal. See Docket No. 104-1 (Lick Decl. ¶ 4) (testifying that 

Scholastic keeps “its print run totals confidential because exposing this information could give 

competitors an advantage in planning their own publications or book lines, including in 

determining how many books to print or setting prices for the publications, as well as knowing the 

value of various publications to Scholastic”). Mr. Menzel’s arguments to the contrary are not 

persuasive. For example, the print run information does not have to be a trade secret in order to 

qualify for sealing. Also, that Scholastic has stipulated to public disclosure of certain print runs in 

a different case does not mean that it should thereby be compelled to file all of its print run 

information publicly. In addition, while some of the print run information is old (e.g., from 2003), 

that is not true for all of the print run information and, in any event, even historical information 

can still be information not shared with competitors. Finally, the Court notes that knowing precise 

numbers for print runs is not of especial public significance. If Mr. Menzel prevails in this case – 

even just in part – that will be public information available to other photographers. 

Accordingly, the motions to file under seal are granted. The Court now turns to the 

parties’ motions for summary judgment. 

B. Legal Standard 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that a “court shall grant summary judgment 

[to a moving party] if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and 

the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). An issue of fact is 

genuine only if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find for the nonmoving party. 

See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). “The mere existence of a 

scintilla of evidence . . . will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could 

reasonably find for the [nonmoving party].” Id. at 252. At the summary judgment stage, evidence 

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must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and all justifiable inferences 

are to be drawn in the nonmovant’s favor. See id. at 255. 

Where a defendant moves for summary judgment based on a claim for which the plaintiff 

bears the burden of proof, the defendant need only by pointing to the plaintiff’s failure “to make a 

showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to [the plaintiff’s] case.” 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); see also Fontenot v. Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 

1190, 1194 (5th Cir. 1986) (stating that, “if the movant bears the burden of proof on an issue, 

either because he is the plaintiff or as a defendant he is asserting an affirmative defense, he must 

establish beyond peradventure all of the essential elements of the claim or defense to warrant 

judgment in his favor”) (emphasis omitted). 

Where a plaintiff moves for summary judgment on claims that it has brought (i.e., for 

which it has the burden of proof), it “must prove each element essential of the claims . . . by 

undisputed facts.” Cabo Distrib. Co. v. Brady, 821 F. Supp. 601, 607 (N.D. Cal. 1992). 

Where a defendant moves for summary judgment based on an affirmative defense (i.e., an 

issue on which it bears the burden of proof), the defendant must establish “all of the essential 

elements of the . . . defense to warrant judgment in [its] favor.” Martin v. Alamo Cmty. College 

Dist., 353 F.3d 409, 412 (5th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis omitted); see 

also Clark v. Capital Credit & Collection Servs., 460 F.3d 1162, 1177 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that 

a defendant bears the burden of proof at summary judgment with respect to an affirmative 

defense). 

C. Burden of Proof 

As an initial matter, the Court addresses the parties’ dispute related to the burden of proof 

on Mr. Menzel’s copyright claim. 

According to Mr. Menzel, to prevail on his copyright claim, he need only prove (1) 

ownership of a valid copyright and (2) copying – nothing more. See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. 

Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991) (stating that, “[t]o establish infringement, two 

elements must be proven: (1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent 

elements of the work that are original”); Rentmeester v. Nike, Inc., 883 F.3d 1111, 1116-17 (9th 

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Cir. 2018) (stating that “[t]o state a claim for copyright infringement, Rentmeester must plausibly 

allege two things: (1) that he owns a valid copyright in his photograph of Jordan, and (2) that Nike 

copied protected aspects of the photo's expression”). Mr. Menzel maintains that he has no 

obligation to prove that the copying was unauthorized – e.g., beyond the scope of a license. See, 

e.g., Muhammad-Ali v. Final Call, Inc., 832 F.3d 755, 760-61 (7th Cir. 2016) (stating that “a 

plaintiff is not required to prove that the defendant’s copying was unauthorized in order to state a 

prima facie case of copyright infringement[;] [r]ather, the burden of proving that the copying was 

authorized lies with the defendant”) (emphasis in original). 

Scholastic takes a contrary position. According to Scholastic, Mr. Menzel admitted in his 

SAC that Scholastic did have licenses to use his photographs, see Hakopian v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 

843, 846 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating that “[a]llegations in a complaint are considered judicial 

admissions”); Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Lacelaw Corp., 861 F.2d 224, 227 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that 

“[j]udicial admissions are formal admissions in the pleadings which have the effect of 

withdrawing a fact from issue and dispensing wholly with the need for proof of the fact[;] [f]actual 

assertions in pleadings and pretrial orders, unless amended, are considered judicial admissions 

conclusively binding on the party who made them”), and, therefore, Mr. Menzel has the burden of 

proving that any use of his photographs by Scholastic was beyond the scope of the licenses. In 

support, Scholastic cites MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993). 

There, the Ninth Circuit stated that, “[t]o prevail on a claim of copyright infringement, a plaintiff 

must prove ownership of a copyright and a copying of protectable expression beyond the scope of 

a license.” Id. at 517 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 

F.2d 1081, 1085 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting the same); Netbula, LLC v. BindView Dev. Corp., 516 F. 

Supp. 2d 1137, 1151 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (stating that “‘[a] copyright owner who grants a 

nonexclusive license to use his copyrighted material waives his right to sue the licensee for 

copyright infringement’” and, “[w]here the existence of a license is not in dispute, and only the 

scope of the license is at issue, the copyright owner bears the burden of proving that the 

defendant’s copying was unauthorized”). Scholastic also points out that the Second Circuit has 

provided a rationale as to why this burden is placed on the copyright owner. Although “the 

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possession of a license by an accused infringer traditionally has been characterized as an 

affirmative defense,” that is because, “in most of the cases addressing the defense of license, the 

issue has been whether a license is held by the accused infringer.” Bourne v. Walt Disney Co., 68 

F.3d 621, 631 (2d Cir. 1995). “[I]n such cases, evidence of a license is readily available to the 

alleged licensee, [and so] it is sensible to place upon that party the burden of coming forward with 

evidence of a license.” Id. But “in cases where only the scope of the license is at issue, the 

copyright owner bears the burden of proving that the defendant’s copying was unauthorized” 

because the court essentially has before it a contract dispute and, “in an ordinary contract action, 

the party claiming a breach carries the burden of persuasion.” Id.; cf. In re McGraw-Hill Global 

Educ. Holdings, LLC, 909 F.3d 48, 66 (3d Cir. 2018) (recognizing that, under Second Circuit law, 

when the “the scope of the license is at issue,” then “unauthorized use is part of the plaintiff’s 

prima facie case” – i.e., “where the plaintiff concedes the existence of a license, the burden may 

fall on the plaintiff, in the first instance, to demonstrate that the scope was exceeded”; but “[w]e 

have yet to consider that doctrine and have no cause to consider it today” because, in the case at 

hand, “[t]he licenses obtained by McGraw-Hill were not granted by the photographers directly but 

by Corbis as a sub-licensor” and, as the photographers “were not themselves directly privy to 

those licenses,” they could not be “expect[ed] . . . to plead unauthorized use as part of a prima 

facie case”) (emphasis in original and added). 

Scholastic is correct. As a preliminary matter, the Court notes it has already held in the 

case at bar that, “because Mr. Menzel admitted in his complaint that license agreements do exist, 

he must include in his complaint allegations that, e.g., the licenses have been exceeded.” Menzel 

v. Scholastic, Inc., No. 17-cv-05499-EMC, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44833, at *8 n.1 (N.D. Cal. 

Mar. 19, 2018) (noting that, where allegations pled in a complaint establish the existence of an 

affirmative defense, a court may dismiss). 

In addition, the Ninth Circuit has held that where, as here, it is undisputed that there was a 

license agreement, “[t]o prevail on a claim of copyright infringement, a plaintiff must prove 

ownership of a copyright and a copying of protectable expression beyond the scope of [the] 

license.” MAI, 991 F.2d at 517 (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis added); see also 

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S.O.S., 886 F.2d at 1085 (noting the same). This Court is bound by the Ninth Circuit precedent. 

At the hearing, Mr. Menzel took the position that MAI and S.O.S. are distinguishable. 

According to Mr. Menzel, in each case, the parties had a dispute about the scope of the license; 

given this circumstance, it was not unfair for the plaintiff to first bear the burden of proving what 

the actual scope of the license was. But contrary to what Mr. Menzel asserts, MAI did not involve 

a dispute about the scope of the license. Rather, the issue was whether the defendant had engaged 

in any “copying” under the Copyright Act. And in neither MAI nor S.O.S. did the Ninth Circuit 

suggest that its holding uniquely applies to a dispute about the scope of the license. 

Finally, the Second Circuit case Bourne provides persuasive rationale as to why the 

plaintiff should have the burden of proving copying beyond the scope of a license where there is 

no dispute that a license exists and the only question is whether the defendant’s use of copyrighted 

material falls within the scope of the existing license. “[W]here only the scope of the license is at 

issue, the copyright owner bears the burden of proving that the defendant’s copying was 

unauthorized” as the court has essentially before it a contract dispute and, “in an ordinary contract 

action, the party claiming a breach carries the burden of persuasion.” Bourne, 68 F.3d at 631. 

The Court acknowledges the Seventh Circuit’s Muhammad-Ali decision on which Mr. 

Menzel relies. See Muhammad-Ali, 832 F.3d at 760-61 (stating that “a plaintiff is not required to 

prove that the defendant’s copying was unauthorized in order to state a prima facie case of 

copyright infringement[;] [r]ather, the burden of proving that the copying was authorized lies with 

the defendant”) (emphasis in original). However, as Scholastic points out, the case provides 

limited support as, there, “the plaintiff had not [pled] that a license had been issued and 

[exceeded]. Rather, the defendant contended that its distribution of lithographs depicting Louis 

Farrakhan had been permitted under an implied license.” Def.’s Opp’n at 4 n.1. Moreover, the 

Seventh Circuit Muhammad-Ali decision makes the same point that the Second Circuit Bourne 

decision did – i.e., that usually a defendant has the burden of proving that a use was authorized 

(e.g., by a license) because it is difficult for a plaintiff to prove a negative (i.e., that the use was not 

authorized) and, “if there is evidence of a license, it is most likely to be in the possession of the 

purported licensee.” Muhammad-Ali, 832 F.3d at 761 (citing Bourne). In this case, it is largely 

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undisputed that there were licenses between Mr. Menzel and Scholastic. 

Left with this predicament, Mr. Menzel argues that the instant case is distinguishable from 

the cases on which Scholastic relies because, here, there is no “disagreement about the scope of a 

license”; rather, the “licenses are clear on their face” and “Scholastic doesn’t argue that there is 

any disagreement as to what the licenses permit, and what they do not.” Pl.’s Reply at 2-3. But 

Mr. Menzel misses the point. Bourne distinguished two situations: (1) where the existence of a 

license was in dispute and (2) where the existence of a license was not in dispute but there was a 

question as to whether the defendant’s use had gone beyond the scope of the license. Bourne was 

not concerned about how clear the scope of the license was– i.e., that license terms might need to 

be interpreted – although admittedly some license terms did need interpretation in Bourne. Where 

the fact of the license is clear, the plaintiff must prove the defendant exceeded that license. Cf., 

e.g., S.O.S., 886 F.2d at 1088-89 (“conclud[ing] that Payday exceeded the scope of its license” 

based on the “unambiguous” and “literal” language of the contract; remanding to the district court 

to determine “[w]hether [Payday’s] acts, unshielded by any license, infringed S.O.S.’s 

copyright”). 

Accordingly, the Court holds that, to the extent that the existence of a license is not 

disputed, Mr. Menzel has the burden of proving of proving that Scholastic exceeded the scope of 

the license issued. 

D. Main Affirmative Defenses 

The Court addresses next the main affirmative defenses asserted by Scholastic.1 

 

1

 There are several affirmative defenses (for which Mr. Menzel seeks summary judgment) that are 

not that significant or that are duplicative. For example: 

 First affirmative defense: failure to state a claim for relief. Even if this defense is not 

properly denominated an affirmative defense (i.e., one for which Scholastic bears the 

burden of proof), that does not mean that Scholastic cannot defend on ground that Mr. 

Menzel has not proven the elements of his copyright claim.  Third affirmative defense: license. This defense relates to the burden-of-proof issue 

discussed above. Given the Court’s ruling above, this defense is not actually an 

affirmative defense (i.e., one for which Scholastic bears the burden of proof), but 

Scholastic may still defend on the basis that Mr. Menzel has failed to prove the elements of 

his copyright claim. 

 Seventh, ninth, and tenth affirmative defenses: lack of standing, lack of injury, and 

statutory damages. These defenses are essentially duplicative of another defense – i.e., that 

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1. Time Bar/Damages Bar 

In its second affirmative defense, Scholastic asserts that Mr. Menzel’s copyright claim “is 

barred, in whole or in part, by the applicable three[-]year statute of limitations for a claim of 

copyright infringement (17 U.S.C. § 507(b)) and/or the three[-]year limitation on damages 

pursuant to Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962, 1969 (2014).” Ans., 2d 

Affirm. Def. (emphasis added). Because this case was filed back in September 2017, Scholastic is 

arguing that Mr. Menzel can sue only for infringements that took place from September 2014 and 

after, and, in any event, is limited to damages that were incurred for that period. 

There is no dispute that the above defense is in fact an affirmative defense for which 

Scholastic bears the burden of proof. Both parties have moved for summary judgment on the 

affirmative defense. 

a. Time Bar 

i. Discovery Rule v. Injury Rule 

Title 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) provides that “[n]o civil action shall be maintained under the 

provisions of this title [governing copyrights] unless it is commenced within three years after the 

claim accrued.” 15 U.S.C. § 507(b). 

In Polar Bear Products v. Timex Corp., 384 F.3d 700 (9th Cir. 2004), the Ninth Circuit 

explained that a copyright claim accrues “when the copyright holder ‘has knowledge of a violation 

or is chargeable with such knowledge.’” Id. at 706. In other words, “the three-year clock begins 

upon discovery of the infringement.” Id. Accordingly, “the statute of limitations does not prohibit 

recovery of damages incurred more than three years prior to the filing of suit if the copyright 

plaintiff was unaware of the infringement, and that lack of knowledge was reasonable under the 

circumstances.” Id. The Ninth Circuit added that “[i]t makes little sense . . . to bar damages 

recovery by copyright holders who have no knowledge of the infringement, particularly in a case 

 

the copyright registrations are invalid or unenforceable.  Eighth affirmative defense: “good faith.” This defense relates to the willful infringement 

issue discussed below. Even if the defense is not properly categorized as an affirmative 

defense (i.e., one for which Scholastic bears the burden of proof), Scholastic may still 

defend on the ground that Mr. Menzel has failed to prove the elements of willful 

infringement. 

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 . . . in which much of the infringing material is in the control of the defendant.” Id. at 706-07. 

In the instant case, Mr. Menzel relies on Polar Bear’s “discovery rule” to argue that his 

copyright claim is not time barred. More specifically, he argues that, even though many 

infringements took place before September 2014, he did not sue at that time because “he had no 

reason to believe Scholastic was infringing. It was only after he spoke with a colleague at a 

National Geographic convention – between 2 and 3 years ago – and retained counsel that he 

suspected Scholastic had been infringing his work.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 14. 

Scholastic recognizes Polar Bear’s discovery rule but contends that it was effectively 

overruled by the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Petrella. 

In Petrella, the Supreme Court addressed “whether the equitable defense of laches . . . may 

bar relief on a copyright infringement claim brought within § 507(b)’s three-year limitations 

period.” Petrella, 572 U.S. at 667 (emphasis added); see also id. at 674-75 (noting that plaintiff 

“sought relief only for acts of infringement occurring” three years before she filed suit). The 

Court ultimately held that the defense may not bar relief because “courts are not at liberty to 

jettison Congress’ judgment on the timeliness of suit.” Id.

Given the specific question being addressed by Supreme Court – laches – Petrella is not on 

point. Scholastic argues nevertheless that there is language in Petrella indicating that the 

discovery rule has been supplanted by an injury rule (i.e., that a claim accrues at time of injury 

regardless of discovery). In particular: 

 “A claim ordinarily accrues ‘when [a] plaintiff has a complete and present cause 

of action.’ In other words, the limitations period generally begins to run at the 

point when ‘the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief.’ A copyright claim thus 

arises or ‘accrue[s]’ when an infringing act occurs.” Id. at 670. 

 “Although we have not passed on the question, nine Courts of Appeals have 

adopted, as an alternative to the incident of injury rule, a ‘discovery rule,’ which 

starts the limitations period when ‘the plaintiff discovers, or with due diligence 

should have discovered, the injury that forms the basis for the claim.’” Id. at 670 

n.4. 

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But the language from Petrella does not do away with the discovery rule. Instead, the 

Supreme Court recognized that it had not passed on the question of whether the discovery rule 

could serve as an alternative to the injury rule.2 Absent a clear overruling by the Supreme Court, 

this Court remains bound by the discovery rule as established in Polar Bear. Cf. Day v. Apoliona, 

496 F.3d 1027, 1031 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that, “‘[w]here intervening Supreme Court authority 

is clearly irreconcilable with our prior circuit authority[,] . . . a three judge panel of this court and 

district courts should consider themselves bound by the intervening higher authority and reject the 

prior opinion of this court as having been effectively overruled’”). Even the case cited by 

Scholastic, which states that “[s]ome language in Petrella does appear to embrace an injury-rule 

analysis,” ultimately still applied the discovery rule. Yue v. MSC Software Corp., No. 15-cv05526-PJH, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94884, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2016) (stating that, because 

the Supreme Court “did not directly ‘pass on’ the issue of whether the discovery rule was available 

to a plaintiff who was not aware of an earlier infringement, . . . the Ninth Circuit’s decision in 

Polar Bear Products remains binding precedent in this circuit”). 

ii. Application of Discovery Rule 

Scholastic contends that, even if the Court does apply the discovery rule, Mr. Menzel’s 

claims are still time barred. More specifically, Scholastic contends that, if all that Mr. Menzel has 

to prove for copyright infringement is (1) ownership and (2) copying (as he claims), then he 

“‘discovered’ ownership and use shortly after the invoices [i.e., licenses] were issued.” Def.’s 

 

2

 In a post-Petrella case, SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, 137 

S. Ct. 954 (2017), the Supreme Court addressed an issue similar to that in Petrella – whether 

laches could preclude a claim for damages incurred within the Patent Act’s six-year limitations 

period. See 35 U.S.C. § 286. Contrary to what Scholastic suggests, nothing in SCA indicated that 

the Supreme Court was foreclosing the discovery rule. The Court simply stated as follows: 

As we wrote in Petrella, “[a] claim ordinarily accrues ‘when [a] 

plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action.’” While some 

claims are subject to a “discovery rule” under which the limitations 

period begins when the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered 

the injury giving rise to the claim, that is not a universal feature of 

statutes of limitations. And in Petrella, we specifically noted that 

“we have not passed on the question” whether the Copyright Act’s 

statute of limitations is governed by such a rule. 

SCA, 137 S. Ct. at 962. 

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Mot. at 9. 

This argument makes little sense. The question is not when Mr. Menzel knew or should 

have known that Scholastic was copying his photographs but rather when it was (allegedly) 

illegally copying them. 

Scholastic does try to clarify the issue somewhat in its reply brief: 

Plaintiff claims that he can both file suit and be granted summary 

judgment solely on the basis of a showing of ownership and use of 

his photographs (i.e., that he does not have any burden to show that 

the use was infringing). There is nothing confusing or wrong about 

holding him to this same position when it comes to determining the 

time of accrual of his claims for statute of limitations purposes. 

Def.’s Reply at 6. But Scholastic’s position is problematic given that, as discussed above, for 

purposes of the instant case, Mr. Menzel has to show that the copying exceeded the scope of the 

license. 

The Court thus denies Scholastic’s motion for summary judgment on the statute of 

limitations. Scholastic has not established the essential elements of its affirmative defense – i.e., 

did Mr. Menzel know or should he have known about the alleged infringements prior to 

September 2014? 

As for Mr. Menzel’s motion for summary judgment on the statute of limitations, it is 

granted. Mr. Menzel argued that there is no evidence to support Scholastic’s argument that his 

copyright claims are time barred. Scholastic did not provide any such evidence of Mr. Menzel’s 

earlier actual or constructive knowledge of the alleged infringements prior to 2014 (e.g., that 

information on print runs are public and that therefore Mr. Menzel should have known that a print 

run was exceeded on a license prior to September 2014). 

b. Damages Bar 

According to Scholastic, even if the Court does not construe Petrella in its favor on the 

statute of limitations, Petrella holds that, even if a claim is not time barred, a plaintiff is still 

limited to damages that were incurred within the three years prior to the plaintiff’s filing suit. 

There are several problems with Scholastic’s position. First, Petrella is not on point 

because, in the case, the plaintiff never sought damages outside of the three-year period before the 

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filing of the complaint. See Petrella, 572 U.S. at 674-75 (noting that the plaintiff filed suit on 

January 6, 2009, and “sought relief only for acts of infringement occurring on or after January 6, 

2006”). 

Second, Scholastic isolates language used in Petrella from the broader context of the case. 

Scholastic focuses on the following language from Petrella: “As earlier observed, see supra, at 

671-672 . . . , a successful plaintiff can gain retrospective relief only three years back from the 

time of filing suit. No recovery may be had for infringement in earlier years.” Id. at 677 

(emphasis added). But in pages 671-72, the Supreme Court was simply making its point that, for 

statute-of-limitations purposes, there is an injury rule for accrual: “[A] copyright claim . . . arises 

or ‘accrue[s]’ when an infringing act occurs.” Id. at 671. Thus, the statement above from Petrella 

did not clearly create a damages bar independent of a time bar. The discovery rule and the ability 

to recover damages consistent with that rule was not at issue. 

Third, because Petrella did not clearly create damages bar independent of the limitations 

bar, Polar Bear continues to be binding precedent on this Court, and, in Polar Bear, the Ninth 

Circuit made clear that a plaintiff can be awarded damages outside of the three-year period before 

the filing of his complaint. 

In copyright litigation, the statute of limitations issue that often 

arises is that the plaintiff filed its copyright claim more than three 

years after it discovered or should have discovered infringement. 

Here, Timex makes a different, novel argument and asks us to rule 

that § 507(b) prohibits copyright plaintiffs from obtaining any 

damages resulting from infringement occurring more than three 

years before filing the copyright action, regardless of the date the 

plaintiff discovered the infringement. In Kling v. Hallmark Cards, 

Inc., 225 F.3d 1030, 1041-42 (9th Cir. 2000), we left for another day 

precisely this argument; that day is now upon us. We conclude that 

§ 507(b) permits damages occurring outside of the three-year 

window, so long as the copyright owner did not discover – and 

reasonably could not have discovered – the infringement before the 

commencement of the three-year limitation period. Because Polar 

Bear did not discover Timex's infringement until within three years 

of filing suit, Polar Bear may recover damages for infringement that 

occurred outside of the three-year window. 

Id. at 705-06 (emphasis added). 

The cases on which Scholastic relies, see, e.g., Papazian v. Sony Music Entm’t, No. 16-cv07911 (RJS), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164217 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2017), are not persuasive in that 

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(1) they do not do much other than quote Petrella and/or (2) they do not provide any real 

explanation as to why a plaintiff who, under the discovery rule, has a timely claim cannot get 

damages outside of the three-year period prior to the filing of his suit. Indeed, it is not even clear 

that the courts were asked to address this specific issue. Furthermore, as Mr. Menzel points out, 

there are post-Petrella cases that expressly reject Scholastic’s position. See, e.g., PK Music 

Performance, Inc. v. Timberlake, No. 16-CV-1215 (VSB), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169652 

(S.D.N.Y. Sep. 30, 2018); Mitchell v. Capitol Records, LLC, 287 F. Supp. 3d 673 (W.D. Ky. 

2017). 

Accordingly, as to the “damages bar” asserted by Scholastic, the Court denies summary 

judgment in favor of Scholastic and grants summary judgment in favor of Mr. Menzel. 

2. Claims Arise Under Contract Law 

In its fourth affirmative defense, Scholastic alleges that, “[t]o the extent [it] has breached 

the terms of any license agreement, Plaintiff’s claims arise under contract law, not copyright law.” 

Ans., 4th Affirm. Def. Only Mr. Menzel has moved for summary judgment on this defense. 

The backdrop for the defense is related to a distinction that courts have made between 

contract “conditions” and contract “covenants” when a plaintiff gives a license to the defendant to 

use its copyright. The Ninth Circuit has explained as follows: 

"A copyright owner who grants a nonexclusive, limited license 

ordinarily waives the right to sue licensees for copyright 

infringement, and it may sue only for breach of contract." However, 

if the licensee acts outside the scope of the license, the licensor may 

sue for copyright infringement. Enforcing a copyright license 

"raises issues that lie at the intersection of copyright and contract 

law." 

We refer to contractual terms that limit a license's scope as 

"conditions," the breach of which constitute copyright infringement. 

We refer to all other license terms as "covenants," the breach of 

which is actionable only under contract law. We distinguish 

between conditions and covenants according to state contract law, to 

the extent consistent with federal copyright law and policy. 

MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm't, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 939 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Graham v. 

James, 144 F.3d 229, 237 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that, “if the nature of the licensee's violation 

consists of a failure to satisfy a condition to the license . . . any use by the licensee is without 

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authority from the licensor and may therefore[] constitute infringement of copyright”) (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

In MDY, the Ninth Circuit gave the following example distinguishing conditions from 

covenants. 

“[C]onsider a license in which the copyright owner grants a person 

the right to make one and only one copy of a book with the caveat 

that the licensee may not read the last ten pages. Obviously, a 

licensee who made a hundred copies of the book would be liable for 

copyright infringement because the copying would violate the 

Copyright Act’s prohibition on reproduction and would exceed the 

scope of the license. Alternatively, if the licensee made a single 

copy of the book, but read the last ten pages, the only cause of 

action would be for breach of contract, because reading a book does 

not violate any right protected by copyright law.” 

Id. at 940 (quoting Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware Eng’g & Consulting, Inc., 421 F.3d 

1307, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). The MDY court confirmed this approach by making the following 

comment with respect to the facts of the case before it: 

For instance, [Term of Use] § 4(D) forbids creation of derivative 

works based on [World of Warcraft] without Blizzard’s [i.e., the 

game creator’s] consent. A player who violates this prohibition 

would exceed the scope of her license and violate one of Blizzard’s 

exclusive rights under the Copyright Act. In contrast, ToU § 

4(C)(ii) prohibits a player’s disruption of another player’s game 

experience. A player might violate this prohibition while playing 

the game by harassing another player with unsolicited instant 

messages. Although this conduct may violate the contractual 

covenants with Blizzard, it would not violate any of Blizzard’s 

exclusive rights of copyright. 

Id. at 940-41.3

 But see Sohm v. Scholastic Inc., No. 16-CV-7098 (JPO), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

53490, at *34-35 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2018) (concluding that a license term limiting print runs was 

a covenant and not a condition because, under New York contract law, a contract term that simply 

delineates acceptable and unacceptable behavior under a license (i.e., no condition created) is a 

 

3 Accord Spinelli v. Nat’l Football League, 903 F.3d 185, 202 (2d Cir. 2018) (“[W]e have held 

that where an agreement permitted the licensee to distribute a computer program on CD-ROMs 

and required the licensee to pay the licensor $1,000 for each new CD-ROM release and $1 dollar 

for each copy sold, the licensee’s failure to pay the applicable royalties on its CD-ROM sales 

constituted a breach of contract, not copyright infringement. By contrast, where an agreement 

licensed CBS's use of a journalist’s videos and photographs in its own programming, but did not 

allow CBS to sublicense the journalist’s materials, CBS’s sublicenses to other companies exposed 

CBS to liability for copyright infringement.”). 

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covenant; license was given to Scholastic by Corbis, a third party to whom the plaintiffphotographer gave authority to issue licenses on his behalf). Thus, “for a licensee’s violation of a 

contract to constitute copyright infringement, there must be a nexus between the condition and the 

licensor’s exclusive rights of copyright.” Id. (emphasis added). 

In the instant case, Mr. Menzel alleges that Scholastic exceeded the terms of the license 

agreements by, e.g., exceeding print runs, going outside geographical restraints, and violating 

restrictions to the printed (as opposed to electronic) form. MDY is thus on point. See also Actuate 

Corp. v. Fid. Nat'l Info. Servs., No. C 14-02274 RS, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117513, at *6 (N.D. 

Cal. Aug. 21, 2014) (stating that “courts in this circuit have recognized claims for copyright 

infringement where the licensee created or distributed copies in excess of explicit numeric 

conditions within the licensing agreement while rejecting such claims where the gravamen of the 

complaint was a failure to remit sufficient royalties”); Actuate, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117513, at 

*8 (indicating that “form and geographic limitations” would be considered conditions). Moreover, 

tellingly, Scholastic has not identified any specific contract term that it believes should be 

construed as a covenant instead of a condition. Because it is Scholastic’s burden to prove its 

affirmative defense, and not Mr. Menzel’s, the Court grants Mr. Menzel’s motion for summary 

judgment on the affirmative defense. 

Scholastic argues still that there will be questions of fact as to whether contract terms are 

conditions or covenants, citing in particular Mr. Menzel’s deposition. Scholastic relies on the 

following to argue it is a question of fact as to whether, e.g., a print run limitation is a condition or 

covenant. 

A. . . . I remember in grade school seeing all these little 

pamphlets and magazines that they would send around, and 

you know, I really trusted Scholastic. 

Q. And you don’t anymore? 

A. I trust them less. 

Q. And why is that? 

A. Because if they fall into the category of textbook publishing 

in general, print runs are overrun and they don’t come back 

and ask for, you know, a renewed license. 

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People tend to ask when they get caught and they are not 

proactive in knowing that their print run doubled and that 

they should go back to all the people that they licensed from 

and tell them that fact so that they could increase their fee a 

little bit. 

Docket No. 113-2 (Rosenthal Decl., Ex. A) (Menzel Depo. at 100-01). But the deposition 

testimony weighs more in favor of Mr. Menzel rather than Scholastic – i.e., a “renewed license” 

with more money would be required because the original license was conditioned on compliance 

with the specific print run limitations. 

3. Invalid and/or Unenforceable Copyright Registration 

In the sixth affirmative defense, Scholastic asserts that “some or all . . . copyright 

registrations may be invalid and/or unenforceable.” Ans., 6th Affirm. Def.; see also 7 U.S.C. § 

411(a) (providing that “no civil action for infringement of the copyright in any United States work 

shall be instituted until preregistration or registration of the copyright claim has been made in 

accordance with this title”). 

Only Mr. Menzel has moved for summary judgment on this defense. 

Based on its opposition, Scholastic seems to make two arguments as to why certain 

copyright registrations are problematic. Each argument is addressed below. 

a. Copyright Registration VA 1-719-226 

According to Scholastic, one problematic copyright registration is VA 1-719-226 

(registered in October 2007). That registration apparently covers hundreds of images, including 

eight images at issue in this case. See Def.’s Opp’n at 11 (identifying rows from SAC that are 

covered by the registration VA 1-719-226; also stating that the “backup” for the copyright 

registration consists of “approximately fifty pages, each identifying over one hundred images that 

are purportedly registered”). 

Under the Copyright Act regulations, an applicant may ask for one registration – a “group 

registration” – to cover more than one photograph. The Copyright Office has a circular on 

“Multiple Works” (Circular No. 34) that addresses, inter alia, group registrations. It provides, 

inter alia, as follows: 

When the Copyright Office issues a group registration, it prepares 

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one certificate of registration for the entire group and assigns one 

registration number to that certificate. A registration for a group of 

unpublished works, a group of unpublished photographs, a group of 

published photographs, a group of contributions to periodicals, or a 

group of secure test items covers the copyrightable authorship in 

each work that has been included in the group, and each work is 

considered to be registered as a separate work. Similarly, a 

registration for a group of serials, newspapers, or newsletters covers 

each issue in the group, and each issue is considered to be registered 

as a separate work. 

https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ34.pdf (last visited December 4, 2019). 

In October 2007, the federal regulations specified as follows with respect to group 

registration of photographs: 

Pursuant to the authority granted by 17 U.S.C. 408(c)(1), the 

Register of Copyrights will accept a single application (on Form 

VA), deposit and filing fee for registration of a group of 

photographs if the following conditions are met: [inter alia] (iii) The 

photographs in the group must have been published within the same 

calendar year. 

37 C.F.R. § 202.3(b)(10)(iii) (version effective July 25, 2007, to July 1, 2008) (emphasis added).4 

According to Scholastic, Mr. Menzel is not entitled to summary judgment on the 

affirmative defense of invalidity/unenforceability because there is a question of fact as to whether 

the photographs in the group covered by the registration were all published within the same 

calendar year. The registration on its face indicates that the date of publication is October 2007. 

See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “publication” as “the distribution of copies or phonorecords of a 

work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending”). But, 

Scholastic notes, per Row 3 in the SAC, it got a license to use one photograph covered by the 

registration in 1998 – i.e., before the alleged date of publication. Similarly, per Rows 47-51, 

Scholastic got a license to use a photograph covered by the registration in 2001 – i.e., before the 

alleged date of publication.5

 

4

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identified in space 3b of the application”; if not, “the range of dates of publication . . . must be 

specified in space 3b of the application, and the date of publication of each photograph within the 

group must be identified [e.g.] [o]n each deposited image.” 37 C.F.R. § 202.3(b)(10)(iv). 5

 Scholastic also got a license to use a photograph after 2007 (see Rows 69, 71, 79, 87, and 89) but 

that would seem to be inconsequential because that would be consistent with a first publication 

date of 2007. 

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The Court is not persuaded by Scholastic’s argument. Although Scholastic has pointed to 

some inaccuracies in the copyright registration at issue – with respect to six different images – an 

inaccuracy in and of itself is not a basis to invalidate a copyright. The Ninth Circuit has held that 

“[a] certificate of registration satisfies the [registration requirement], 

regardless of whether the certificate contains any inaccurate 

information,” unless (1) “the inaccurate information was included on 

the application for copyright registration with knowledge that it was 

inaccurate,” and (2) “the inaccuracy of the information, if known, 

would have caused the Register of Copyrights to refuse 

registration.” 17 U.S.C. § 411(b)(1). Thus we have held that 

“inadvertent mistakes on registration certificates do not invalidate a 

copyright and thus do not bar infringement actions, unless the 

alleged infringer has relied to its detriment on the mistake, or the 

claimant intended to defraud the Copyright Office by making the 

misstatement.” 

L.A. Printex Indus. v. Aeropostale, Inc., 676 F.3d 841, 852-53 (9th Cir. 2012). 

Here, Scholastic has not made any claim that it relied on Mr. Menzel’s mistake. And to 

the extent that Scholastic suggests Mr. Menzel intended to defraud the Copyright Office instead of 

simply committing an inadvertent error, no reasonable jury could so find based on the undisputed 

facts in the record. Scholastic admits that the group registration at issue covers thousands of 

photographs. See Def.’s Opp’n at 11 (stating that the “backup” for the copyright registration 

consists of “approximately fifty pages, each identifying over one hundred images that are 

purportedly registered”). But it has pointed to inaccuracies with respect to only six of the 

thousands of images. This limited number suggests at most negligence or a mistake rather than a 

deliberate intent to defraud the Copyright Office. Nor is there any other indicia of a pattern or 

practice by Mr. Menzel to include inaccurate information in his registration application. 

Scholastic has not made a plausible claim of fraud which can reasonably be inferred on these facts. 

Accordingly, the Court grants Mr. Menzel’s motion for summary judgment on the 

affirmative defense to the extent copyright registration VA 1-719-226 is at issue. 

b. Infringement Before Registration 

In addition to the copyright registration above, Scholastic challenges a few other copyright 

registrations. More specifically, Scholastic argues that, in certain instances, Mr. Menzel is 

claiming infringement before Mr. Menzel registered the photograph. 

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Scholastic has a fair point in two instances. More specifically, for Rows 50 and 51 of the 

SAC, the copyright registration for the photograph is October 2007, and Mr. Menzel seems to be 

claiming infringement based on a book published in 2002. 

Other than these two examples, however, Scholastic has not shown alleged infringements 

prior to the copyright registration date. Although Scholastic identifies several more examples that 

it claims support its position, those examples do not actually lend any support because they are 

mistakenly predicated on the information in the SAC which shows only the publications where 

Scholastic was permitted to use the photographs – not publications where Scholastic infringed. 

See Def.’s Opp’n at 10 (discussing Rows 3, 13-21, 28-39, 44-46, and 47-51 of the SAC). 

Accordingly, the Court denies Mr. Menzel’s motion for summary judgment on Rows 50 

and 51 of the SAC; but otherwise, Mr. Menzel’s motion is granted because Scholastic has not 

identified other examples where (alleged) infringement occurred prior to the registration date. 

E. Chart on Alleged Infringements 

Having addressed the burden of proof and the main affirmative defenses asserted by 

Scholastic, the Court now turns to Mr. Menzel’s specific claims of infringement. The parties have 

provided a chart to the Court that covers each claim of alleged infringement. Each row in the 

chart is addressed below.6 See Docket No. 126-1 (chart). 

1. Row 13a 

Scholastic’s motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations is denied.7

 

6

 The Court notes that, in several instances, the chart shows several rows of alleged infringements 

based on a single publication source by Scholastic (e.g., Rows 13a-b; Rows 15a-c; Rows 17a-f; 

Rows 2-3; Rows 5-11; Rows 13-17; Rows 18-21; Rows 22-25; Rows 26-27; Rows 28-39; Rows 

40-43; Rows 44-46; Rows 47-49; Rows 50-51; Rows 53-54; Rows 58-59; Rows 62-68; Rows 72-

78; Rows 79-81; Rows 82-83; Rows 87-88; Rows 89-91). This usually seems to happen where 

there are a series of related photos by Mr. Menzel (e.g., photos of various meals made out of 

bugs). Scholastic would use all of the related photos in one magazine or book article. Although 

this fact does not have any impact on the prima facie case for infringement, the context is still 

important to keep in mind as it arguably has some bearing on how “willful” an infringer Scholastic 

allegedly is. In other words, even though there may be multiple violations, the number of 

violations may be tempered somewhat by the fact that Scholastic published the multiple photos in 

one publication source. 

7

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damages bar defense. 

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Mr. Menzel’s motion for summary judgment is also denied because there is a question of 

fact. Mr. Menzel claims that the photo appears in a book (published in 2005) and that Scholastic 

has not produced a license/invoice for use in that book. Scholastic does not dispute use of the 

photo in the book but argues there is a question of fact as to whether the use was licensed. In 

particular, Scholastic argues that, even though it does not have the actual license/invoice anymore, 

it was able to find a document (Ex. PP) that suggests there was a license/invoice. The Court has 

looked at Ex. PP. Row 5 in Ex. PP does give rise to a question of fact; it seems to refer to the 

photo at issue (a Cambodian woman selling bugs) and the publication at issue (Read 180, rBook). 

Row 13a shall proceed to trial. 

2. Row 13b 

Scholastic’s motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations is denied. 

Mr. Menzel’s motion for summary judgment is also denied because there is a question of 

fact. The same basic analysis above for Row 13a applies here. However, Row 4 in Ex. PP is the 

applicable row instead of Row 5. 

Row 13b shall proceed to trial. 

3. Row 14 

Scholastic’s motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations is denied. 

Mr. Menzel’s motion for summary judgment is granted. Mr. Menzel has pointed to a 

photo used in a book (2007) for which Scholastic has not produced a license/invoice. Scholastic 

has not pointed to a license/invoice or any other document suggesting that the use might have been 

licensed. 

Although Mr. Menzel is entitled to summary judgment on Row 14, the issue of damages is 

still in need of resolution. 

4. Row 15a 

Scholastic’s motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations is denied. 

Mr. Menzel’s motion for summary judgment is granted. Scholastic had a license for the 

photo (see Row 79), but the license did not cover online/electric publication and Scholastic posted 

a copy of the publication at issue (SuperScience) online. Scholastic has not shown that the 

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affirmative defense of copyright invalidity/unenforceability is applicable. 

Although Mr. Menzel is entitled to summary judgment on Row 15a, the issue of damages 

is still in need of resolution. 

5. Row 15b 

Scholastic’s motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations is denied. 

Mr. Menzel’s motion for summary judgment is granted. Scholastic had a license for the 

photo (see Row 80), but the license did not cover online/electric publication and Scholastic posted 

a copy of the publication at issue (SuperScience) online. 

Although Mr. Menzel is entitled to summary judgment on Row 15b, the issue of damages 

is still in need of resolution. 

6. Row 15c 

Scholastic’s motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations is denied. 

Mr. Menzel’s motion for summary judgment is granted. Scholastic had a license for the 

photo (see Row 81), but the license did not cover online/electric publication and Scholastic posted 

a copy of the publication at issue (SuperScience) online. 

Although Mr. Menzel is entitled to summary judgment on Row 15c, the issue of damages 

is still in need of resolution. 

7. Row 17a 

Scholastic’s motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations is denied. 

Row 17a shall proceed to trial. 

8. Row 17b 

Scholastic’s motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations is denied. 

Mr. Menzel’s motion for summary judgment is granted. Scholastic had a license for the 

photo (see Row 73), and the license allowed for online/electronic use through May 2016, but 

Scholastic posted a copy of the publication (Junior Scholastic) online after May 2016. 

Although Mr. Menzel is entitled to summary judgment on Row 17b, the issue of damages 

is still in need of resolution. 

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9. Row 17c 

Scholastic’s motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations is denied. 

Mr. Menzel’s motion for summary judgment is granted. Scholastic had a license for the 

photo (see Row 74), and the license allowed for online/electronic use through May 2016, but 

Scholastic posted a copy of the publication (Junior Scholastic) online after May 2016. 

Although Mr. Menzel is entitled to summary judgment on Row 17c, the issue of damages 

is still in need of resolution. 

10. Row 17d 

Scholastic’s motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations is denied. 

Mr. Menzel’s motion for summary judgment is granted. Scholastic had a license for the 

photo (see Row 75), and the license allowed for online/electronic use through May 2016, but 

Scholastic posted a copy of the publication (Junior Scholastic) online after May 2016. 

Although Mr. Menzel is entitled to summary judgment on Row 17d, the issue of damages 

is still in need of resolution. 

11. Row 17e 

Scholastic’s motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations is denied. 

Mr. Menzel’s motion for summary judgment is granted. Scholastic had a license for the 

photo (see Row 76), and the license allowed for online/electronic use through May 2016, but 

Scholastic posted a copy of the publication (Junior Scholastic) online after May 2016. 

Although Mr. Menzel is entitled to summary judgment on Row 17e, the issue of damages 

is still in need of resolution. 

12. Row 17f 

Scholastic’s motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations is denied. 

Mr. Menzel’s motion for summary judgment is granted. Scholastic had a license for the 

photo (see Row 77), and the license allowed for online/electronic use through May 2016, but 

Scholastic posted a copy of the publication (Junior Scholastic) online after May 2016. 

Although Mr. Menzel is entitled to summary judgment on Row 17f, the issue of damages 

is still in need of resolution. 

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13. Row 1 

Scholastic’s motion for summary judgment is denied. The statute-of-limitations defense is 

not applicable. In addition, there is a question of fact as to whether the license/invoice was 

exceeded. Although there is no usage data for this photo, a reasonable jury could still infer that 

Scholastic exceeded the license/invoice based on other evidence – e.g., if Scholastic exceeded 

licenses/invoices in many other situations. 

Row 1 shall proceed to trial. 

14. Rows 2-11 

Scholastic’s motion for summary judgment is denied. The same basic analysis above for 

Row 1 applies here. (For Row 3, the affirmative defense of copyright invalidity/unenforceability 

is not applicable.) 

Rows 2-11 shall proceed to trial. 

15. Row 12 

Scholastic’s motion for summary judgment is denied. The statute-of-limitations defense is 

not applicable. Also, there is a question of fact; depending on the circumstances, a reasonable jury 

could make inferences about circulation numbers for the magazine based on circulation numbers 

for subsequent years. 

Row 3 shall proceed to trial. 

16. Rows 13-21 

Scholastic’s motion for summary judgment is denied. The same basic analysis above for 

Row 1 applies here. 

Rows 13-21 shall proceed to trial. 

17. Row 22 

Scholastic’s motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations is denied. 

Mr. Menzel’s motion for summary judgment is granted. The license/invoice allowed for 

120,000 uses and Scholastic does not dispute that it exceeded this use. 

Although Mr. Menzel is entitled to summary judgment on Row 22, the issue of damages is 

still in need of resolution. 

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18. Rows 23-27 

Scholastic’s motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations is denied. 

Mr. Menzel’s motion for summary judgment is granted. The same basic analysis above for 

Row 22 applies here. 

Although Mr. Menzel is entitled to summary judgment on Rows 23-27, the issue of 

damages is still in need of resolution. 

19. Rows 28-49 

Scholastic’s motion for summary judgment is denied. The same basic analysis above for 

Row 1 applies here. (For Rows 47-49, the affirmative defense of copyright 

invalidity/unenforceability is not applicable.) 

Rows 28-49 shall proceed to trial. 

20. Row 50 

Scholastic’s motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations is denied. 

Mr. Menzel’s motion for summary judgment is denied. Scholastic is not precluded from 

asserting the affirmative defense of copyright invalidity/unenforceability (i.e., based on 

infringement before registration). There is also a question of fact as to whether Mr. Menzel 

“regularly issued licenses despite being aware that the publication had already been printed, or 

printed in part.” 

Row 50 shall proceed to trial. 

21. Row 51 

Scholastic’s motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations is denied. 

Mr. Menzel’s motion for summary judgment is denied. The same basic analysis above for 

Row 50 applies here. 

Row 51 shall proceed to trial. 

22. Row 52 

Scholastic’s motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations is denied. 

Row 52 shall proceed to trial. 

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23. Rows 53-54 

Scholastic’s motion for summary judgment is denied. The same basis analysis above for 

Row 1 applies here. 

Rows 53-54 shall proceed to trial. 

24. Row 55 

Both parties’ motions for summary judgment are denied. There is a question of fact. The 

license/invoice allows for publication in North America. Scholastic ended up using the photo in a 

publication titled Weird Science Jobs. Scholastic produced a document (Ex. E) that indicates that 

Weird Science Jobs had a “Distribution” of “UNRESTRICTED” and a “Territory” of “WORLD.” 

Mr. Menzel thus argues that there is evidence showing that Weird Science Jobs was published 

outside of North America. Scholastic argues that Ex. E “does not show any actual distribution of 

this photograph outside of North America” (emphasis added), which is true, but such could 

reasonably be inferred. On the other hand, Ex. E is not necessarily dispositive as it is not clear 

what kind of document Ex. E is in the first place, whether it is accurate, and whether 

“UNRESTRICTED” and “WORLD” means that, in fact, global distribution was not just 

contemplated but in fact accomplished or likely. 

However, to the extent Mr. Menzel claims infringement because Scholastic “began 

printing this publication . . . before it sought a license,” the Court rejects that infringement theory. 

Scholastic asserts that “Menzel was aware that the book had already been published when he 

granted the rights to this image.” The evidence supports this assertion. See Ex. Z (invoice request 

to Mr. Menzel dated September 2, 2003, and asking for permission to use photo in Weird Science 

Jobs “scheduled for publication in August 2003”) (emphasis added). Mr. Menzel’s response is 

that the actual invoice provides: “Rights are granted to ‘Scholastic Inc.’ only upon full payment of 

this invoice.” Docket No. 107-4, at 19 (Menzel Decl., Ex. B) (emphasis added). Mr. Menzel 

suggests that he could not have authorized prior use because Scholastic did not have any right to 

reproduce until it paid the invoice. This argument is not persuasive; there is no dispute that 

Scholastic did pay and, once Scholastic paid, the only reasonable inference to be drawn is that 

Scholastic was thereby given the retroactive right to reproduce. 

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Row 55 shall proceed to trial. 

25. Row 56 

Scholastic’s motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations is denied. 

Row 56 shall proceed to trial. 

26. Row 57 

Scholastic’s motion for summary judgment is granted. The license/invoice allowed for 

40,000 uses. It appears that Scholastic ended up using the photo in New Book of Knowledge 2003 

(which has the ISBN 0717205355). See Docket No. 126-1 (joint chart). Ex. E reflects that there 

were copies made of New Book of Knowledge 2003 (ISBN 0717205355). See Ex. E (third 

table on page 4). Thus, the use here – – was within the scope of the license. 

Mr. Menzel suggests that there is a question of fact because a different publication NBKA 

Blue English (ISBN 0717206424) was printed times (i.e., in excess of the 40,000 licensed 

uses). See Ex. U (second entry); see also Ex. U (showing ISBN for NBKA Blue). But there is no 

evidence that the photo at issue was contained in this different publication. 

The copyright infringement claim based on Row 57 is dismissed. 

27. Rows 58-59 

Scholastic’s motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations is denied. 

Mr. Menzel’s motion for summary judgment is granted. The license/invoice allowed for 

distribution in North America only and there was distribution outside of North America. 

Although Mr. Menzel is entitled to summary judgment on Rows 58-59, the issue of 

damages is still in need of resolution. 

28. Row 60 

Scholastic’s motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations is denied. 

Mr. Menzel’s motion for summary judgment is granted. The license/invoice allowed for 

350,000 uses and Scholastic printed copies. 

Although Mr. Menzel is entitled to summary judgment on Row 60, the issue of damages is 

still in need of resolution. 

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29. Row 61 

Scholastic’s motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations is denied. 

Mr. Menzel’s motion for summary judgment is granted. The license/invoice allowed for 

609,000 uses and Scholastic printed copies. 

Although Mr. Menzel is entitled to summary judgment on Row 61, the issue of damages is 

still in need of resolution. 

30. Rows 62-68 

Scholastic’s motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations is denied. 

Mr. Menzel’s motion for summary judgment is granted. The license/invoice allowed for 

300,000 uses and Scholastic printed copies. 

Although Mr. Menzel is entitled to summary judgment on Rows 62-68, the issue of 

damages is still in need of resolution. 

31. Row 69 

Scholastic’s motion for summary judgment is denied. The same basis analysis above for 

Row 1 applies here. 

Row 69 shall proceed to trial. 

32. Row 70 

Scholastic’s motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations is denied. 

Mr. Menzel’s motion for summary judgment is granted. The license/invoice allowed for 

260,000 uses and Scholastic made copies. 

Although Mr. Menzel is entitled to summary judgment on Row 70, the issue of damages is 

still in need of resolution. 

33. Row 71 

Scholastic’s motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations is denied. 

Mr. Menzel’s motion for summary judgment is granted. The license/invoice allowed for 

100,000 uses and Scholastic made copies. The affirmative defense of copyright 

invalidity/unenforceability is not applicable. 

Although Mr. Menzel is entitled to summary judgment on Row 71, the issue of damages is 

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still in need of resolution. 

34. Rows 72-78 

Scholastic’s motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations is denied. 

Mr. Menzel’s motion for summary judgment is granted. The license/invoice allowed for 

375,000 uses in North America and Scholastic made copies and distributed outside of 

North America. 

Although Mr. Menzel is entitled to summary judgment on Rows 72-78, the issue of 

damages is still in need of resolution. 

35. Row 79 

Scholastic’s motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations is denied. 

Mr. Menzel’s motion for summary judgment is granted. The license/invoice allowed for 

133,000 uses and Scholastic made copies. The affirmative defense of copyright 

invalidity/unenforceability is not applicable. 

Although Mr. Menzel is entitled to summary judgment on Row 79, the issue of damages is 

still in need of resolution. 

36. Rows 80-81 

Scholastic’s motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations is denied. 

Mr. Menzel’s motion for summary judgment is granted. The license/invoice allowed for 

133,000 uses and Scholastic made copies. 

Although Mr. Menzel is entitled to summary judgment on Rows 80-81, the issue of 

damages is still in need of resolution. 

37. Rows 82-83 

Scholastic’s motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations is denied. 

Mr. Menzel’s motion for summary judgment is granted. Mr. Menzel claims that Scholastic 

printed the photo in the publication at issue (Food: The Good, the Bad, and the Gross, Read 180 

Stage A, ISBN 0545340799) “before obtaining a license to do so.” The invoice date is August 4, 

2011. See Docket No. 126-1 (joint chart); Docket No. 107-4, at 48 (Menzel Decl., Ex. B) (Invoice 

No. 2419). Ex. P indicates that the “Food” publication with the specific ISBN was published in 

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some instances after August 4, 2011, but in other instances before August 4, 2011. See Ex. P (top 

of page 4). Scholastic has not specifically claimed here that Mr. Menzel knew about the use prior 

to August 4, 2011, before he entered into the license/invoice, and thus there is no basis to infer the 

license covered prior publication. 

Although Mr. Menzel is entitled to summary judgment on Rows 82-83, the issue of 

damages is still in need of resolution. 

38. Row 84 

Scholastic’s motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations is denied. 

Mr. Menzel’s motion for summary judgment is also denied. Mr. Menzel claims the 

license/invoice was exceeded because Scholastic used the photo at issue two times in the 

publication and “Scholastic has not produced any license authorizing a second use of this image.” 

However, the license/invoice at issue – Invoice No. 2419 – seems to provide for a “2nd use.” 

Docket No. 107-4, at 48 (Menzel Decl., Ex. B) (describing image of “Grasshopper Taco,” a spot 

size for which Scholastic was charged $250 and a “2nd use: 1/6 page” for which Scholastic was 

charged another $250). Thus, there is a question of fact. 

Row 84 shall proceed to trial. 

39. Row 85 

Scholastic’s motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations is denied. 

Mr. Menzel’s motion for summary judgment is also denied. Similar to above, Mr. Menzel 

claims that the license/invoice did not authorize use of the photo at issue two times. But Invoice 

No. 2419 refers to “Image: Cambodia, women selling cooked cicadas: 1/2 page” and then “Image: 

Cambodia, women selling cooked cicadas: 1/12 page teachers edition (50,000).” Docket No. 107-

4, at 48 (Menzel Decl., Ex. B). In short, there is a question of fact. 

Row 85 shall proceed to trial. 

40. Row 86 

Scholastic’s motion for summary judgment is granted. Mr. Menzel does not oppose 

Scholastic’s request for a finding of noninfringement. 

The copyright infringement claim based on Row 86 is dismissed. 

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41. Row 87 

Scholastic’s motion for summary judgment is granted. According to Mr. Menzel, the 

license/invoice is dated February 4, 2014, but Scholastic began to use the photo at issue before 

then. However, as Scholastic points out, Mr. Menzel “was aware in granting the license that the 

publication has already been published.” See Ex. JJ (license/invoice showing date of February 4, 

2014, and referring to use in a Scholastic publication dated October 2013). 

The copyright infringement claim based on Row 87 is dismissed. 

42. Row 88 

Scholastic’s motion for summary judgment is granted. The same basic analysis above for 

Row 87 applies here. 

The copyright infringement claim based on Row 88 is dismissed. 

43. Row 89 

Scholastic’s motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations is denied. 

Mr. Menzel’s motion for summary judgment is granted. The license/invoice allowed for 

542,656 uses and Scholastic made copies. The affirmative defense of copyright 

invalidity/unenforceability is not applicable. 

Although Mr. Menzel is entitled to summary judgment on Row 89, the issue of damages is 

still in need of resolution. 

44. Rows 90-91 

Scholastic’s motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations is denied. 

Mr. Menzel’s motion for summary judgment is granted. The same basic analysis above for 

Row 89 applies here (except here Scholastic does not assert the affirmative defense of copyright 

invalidity/unenforceability). 

Although Mr. Menzel is entitled to summary judgment on Rows 90-91, the issue of 

damages is still in need of resolution. 

45. Row 92 

Both parties’ motions for summary judgment are denied. There is a question of fact. Mr. 

Menzel claims that the license/invoice only allowed for 1,200,000 uses, see Ex. MM (providing 

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for print run of 1.2 million), which Scholastic exceeded by making copies for 

distribution to students and another copies for distribution to teachers. Mr. Menzel relies 

on Ex. O (page 2 of 7) to support these distribution numbers. But elsewhere in Ex. O (page 1) it is 

suggested that the distribution number was smaller – i.e., copies for distribution to 

students and copies for distribution to teachers (for a total of ). 

Row 92 shall proceed to trial. 

46. Row 93 

Both parties’ motions for summary judgment are denied. There is a question of fact. The 

situation on this alleged infringement is somewhat confusing. The license/invoice can be found at 

Ex. NN. It reflects a print run of 939,000 for use in Scholastic News 4, “issue dated 10/26/2015.” 

Ex. NN. Ex. M is a document that relates to actual print runs of Scholastic News 4. Based on 

page 1, it appears that there were copies for distribution to students and copies for 

distribution to teachers. 

Although the above suggests that the license/invoice scope was exceeded, Scholastic 

suggests that the Teacher’s Edition of Scholastic News 4 did not actually contain the photo at 

issue. See Ex. TT. This appears to be true. In response, Mr. Menzel argues that the Teacher’s 

Edition is dated October 26, 2015, and he is claiming infringement based on a publication dated 

October 16, 2015. But how Mr. Menzel is claiming a publication date of October 16, 2015, is not 

clear given that the invoice at issue implicates Scholastic News 4, dated October 26, 2015. 

Assuming that Scholastic has the better argument on the above, one would think that 

Scholastic’s position would be that only the copies for distribution to students (as 

reflected in Ex. M) should count. However, in the chart, Scholastic states that the print run on the 

Student Edition “is [which is] within the license limit.” But this position does not make 

sense because the license/invoice clearly allows for only 939,000 copies. 

Row 93 shall proceed to trial. 

47. Row 94 

Scholastic’s motion for summary judgment is granted. The issue on this alleged 

infringement relates to use of the photo at issue before the license/invoice date. The 

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license/invoice date is February 3, 2016. See Ex. UU. The license/invoice refers to publication in 

Scholastic News 5/6, “issue dated 10/26/2015” – i.e., several months before the license/invoice 

date. Scholastic thus argues that necessarily means Mr. Menzel approved of the prior use with the 

license. In response, Mr. Menzel argues that there is a question of fact because the license/invoice 

also states: “Rights are granted to ‘Scholastic, Inc.’ only upon full payment of this invoice.” Ex. 

UU (emphasis added). As indicated above in the analysis for Row 55, Mr. Menzel’s argument is 

not persuasive. There is no dispute that Scholastic did pay and, once Scholastic paid, the only 

reasonable inference that could be made is that Scholastic was thereby given the retroactive right 

to reproduce. 

The copyright infringement claim based on Row 94 is dismissed. 

F. Willful Infringement 

Finally, Mr. Menzel has moved for summary judgment on the issue of willful 

infringement. Presumably, Mr. Menzel is only asking for a finding of willful infringement to the 

extent the Court has found in his favor above. 

The Court denies the motion for summary judgment. The evidence of record is not enough 

to show willful infringement as a matter of law – i.e., where the only conclusion a reasonable jury 

could reach is willful infringement. Whether Scholastic willfully infringed will turn on more than 

just the number of times Mr. Menzel’s rights were infringed.8 Other factors that may inform the 

analysis include: the number of times Scholastic did not infringe Mr. Menzel’s rights; the number 

of times Scholastic infringed, or did not infringe, other licensors’ rights; whether Scholastic knew 

or should have known of infringement of its licensors’ rights (whether the rights of Mr. Menzel or 

the rights of other licensors); how many licenses Scholastic has taken over the years; and so forth. 

Accordingly, Mr. Menzel’s motion for summary judgment on willful infringement is 

denied. 

/// 

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8

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dispositive on the issue of willfulness, the Court does not agree. 

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II. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, both parties’ motions are granted in part and denied in part. The 

issues remaining for trial include: (1) claims for infringement where there are questions of fact to 

be decided; (2) damages for those claims where Mr. Menzel was granted summary judgment; and 

(3) willful infringement. 

This order disposes of Docket Nos. 105 and 107. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: December 18, 2019 

______________________________________ 

EDWARD M. CHEN 

United States District Judge 

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