Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-00835/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-00835-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

BRIAN SASS,

NO. CIV. S 01-0835 MCE KJM P

Petitioner,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CALIFORNIA BOARD OF 

PRISON TERMS, et al.,

Respondents.

----oo0oo----

Brian Sass (hereinafter “Petitioner”), a California prisoner

proceeding pro se, seeks a writ of habeas corpus. This matter

was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). On March 16, 2005, the Magistrate Judge

filed her findings and recommendations, which were served on all

parties and which contained notice that any objections to the

findings and recommendations were to be filed within ten days. 

The California Board of Prison Terms (hereinafter “Respondent” or

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“BPT”) filed timely objections to the Magistrate’s findings and

recommendations. Petitioner subsequently filed a timely reply to

Respondent’s objections. In accordance with the provisions of 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), this Court conducted a de novo review of the

case. Having carefully reviewed the entire file, the Court

rejects the Magistrate’s findings and recommendations. For the

reasons discussed below, Petitioner’s application for a writ of

habeas corpus is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner, currently confined at Folsom State Prison in

Represa, California, has applied for a writ of habeas corpus

under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2254. (Amended Petition at

4(b):(i)(2).) Petitioner was sentenced to life in prison, with

the possibility of parole after fifteen years, as a result of his

1988 convictions for second degree murder, hit and run death,

gross vehicular manslaughter, and felony drunk driving. 

Petitioner’s 1988 convictions were based on the following events:

while operating his truck under the influence of drugs and

alcohol, Petitioner drove into oncoming traffic and caused a

head-on collision, which killed a 27-year-old woman who was five

months pregnant. At the time of the collision, Petitioner had

four DUI convictions on record, with three more DUI charges

pending. (Answer at 2:4-11; Traverse at 2:18-23; F&R Objections

at 7:13-26; Response to F&R Objections at 1:17-24.)

Petitioner does not challenge the validity of his 1988

convictions with the present petition. (Traverse at 3:3-5.) 

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Rather, Petitioner seeks collateral relief from three decisions

of the California Board of Prison Terms (hereinafter “Respondent”

or “BPT”), which denied him parole in 1996, 1999, and 2000,

respectively. (Traverse at 1:17-27.) 

 On September 12, 2002, this Court held that all challenges

to Petitioner’s 1996 parole proceeding were time-barred. 

Consequently, the Court will only address Petitioner’s challenges

to the 1999 and 2000 parole proceedings, both of which were

affirmed by a state trial court, a state appellate court, and the

Supreme Court of California. While Respondent contends that

Petitioner failed to exhaust his state court remedies with regard

to the 1999 proceedings, the Court finds this argument to be

unsupported factually (Amended Petition at 4(a)-4(b); Ex. F; Ex.

G; Ex. H) and without merit on a statutory basis. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(b)(2) (“An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be

denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the

applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the

State.”); see also Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 183 (2001)

(Stevens, J., concurring).

Petitioner contends, through various arguments, that in both

1999 and 2000, Respondent’s decision to deny Petitioner parole

resulted in a violation of Petitioner’s due process rights under

the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution. (Amended Petition at 4(a)-4(c); Traverse at 28:6-

9; 28:16-18; 29:14-19; 39:6-10.)

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STANDARD

At first glance, it appears that a prisoner may challenge

the constitutionality of his or her confinement under both § 2241

and § 2254. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a) (1994). A proper

understanding of the interaction between § 2241 and § 2254,

however, leads to the conclusion that they apply in different

situations. White v. Lambert, 370 F.3d 1002, 1006 (9th Cir.

2004). When a prisoner meets the threshold requirement of being

in custody pursuant to state court judgment, § 2254 is properly

seen as a limitation on the more general grant of habeas

authority in § 2241. Id. at 1008; see also Felker v. Turpin, 518

U.S. 651, 662 (1996) (“authority to grant habeas relief to state

prisoners is limited by § 2254, which specifies the conditions

under which such relief may be granted to ‘a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court.’”).

Adopting the view of the Ninth Circuit, this Court finds

that § 2254 is the exclusive vehicle for a habeas petition by a

state prisoner in custody pursuant to a state court judgment,

even when the petitioner is not challenging his underlying state

court conviction. White, 370 F.3d at 1007, 1008, 1009-10 (citing

approvingly Cook v. New York State Div. Of Parole, 321 F.3d 274,

278 (2d Cir. 2003) (rejecting petitioner’s contention that § 2241

was applicable because “his custody is ‘pursuant to’ an order of

the parole board rather than a state court”)). Consequently, all

of the statutory requirements of § 2254 apply to the present

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case, no matter what statutory label the prisoner has assigned to

his petition. Id. at 1007 (citing Walker v. O’Brien, 216 F.3d

626, 633 (7th Cir. 2000).

Under § 2254, a district court shall entertain an

application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the

ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution of

the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Further, a petition for

a writ of habeas corpus shall not be granted with respect to any

claim unless the adjudication of the claim resulted in a decision

that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Clearly established federal law is defined by the holdings

of the United States Supreme Court in effect at the time

California adjudicated Petitioner’s claim. Williams v. Taylor,

529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). Notably, circuit law is only

persuasive authority for purposes of determining whether a state

decision is an unreasonable application of Supreme Court

jurisprudence. Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir.

2003); Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600-01 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Finally, where the state summarily denies a petition without

comment, the district court will look to the last reasoned

decision on the issue. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797 (1991). 

If no such decision exists, the district court must independently

review the record to determine whether the state ruling was

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law. Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 981-82

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(9th Cir. 2000).

ANALYSIS

On the basis of the parties’ claims, the Court is presented

with three questions. First, may this Court consider

Petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus? Second,

does Petitioner have a federal liberty interest in parole? 

Finally, if Petitioner does have a liberty interest in parole

(thereby entitling him to due process protections as a matter of

right), what process must California afford Petitioner before it

can deprive him of that interest? 

1. Justiciability

Contrary to Respondent’s claims, the Court finds that

Petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus is not moot. 

First, Petitioner has alleged concrete injuries at the hands of

Respondent, which this Court can remedy. See Spencer v. Kemna,

523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998). Specifically, Petitioner alleges continued

imprisonment and the depravation of federal due process rights as

the result of unfair parole hearings that lacked the appropriate

process (Amended Petition at 4(a)-4(c); Traverse at 28:6-9;

28:16-18; 29:14-19; 39:6-10). See id. As Petitioner contends, a

fair hearing in either 1999 or 2000 could have resulted in his

release from prison. Thus, assuming that Petitioner’s

constitutional rights were violated by the parole boards in

either 1999 or 2000, ordering a new hearing, one conducted in

accordance with both state and federal law, regardless of its

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outcome, would remedy any constitutional violations by offering

Petitioner a fair parole opportunity. Respondent asserts that

ordering a new hearing would be of no consequence since

Petitioner has had three hearings since 2000 (2001, 2002, and

2004) in which he was denied parole. This assertion is without

merit. It necessarily assumes that all of the subsequent

hearings were conducted in accordance with federal law. (Answer

at 6:28-7:8.)

Second, Respondent’s argument that subsequent parole

hearings moot any previous hearings (Opposition to F&R at 3:10-

4:3), if true, places Petitioner’s claim squarely within a narrow

exception to the general mootness doctrine: the injuries alleged

here would then be capable of repetition, yet evading judicial

review. Spencer, 523 U.S. at 17-18. Petitioner would be unable

to complete a full judicial review (state and federal) of a

habeas application before a subsequent hearing mooted that

application. Consequently, a string of unconstitutional hearings

would continually preclude effective judicial review of alleged

constitutional violations. The present case exemplifies such a

situation. Thus, under both the general rule and its exception,

Petitioner’s application is properly before this Court.

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 While Petitioner mentions a substantive due process 1

violation in his Traverse (Traverse at 31:26-33:13), it appears

that Petitioner is simply contesting the procedures accompanying

his parole hearings — a question of procedural due process, not

substantive due process. Nevertheless, even if Petitioner is

asserting a substantive due process violation, the Court does not

recognize such a claim. First, it would be untimely. Second,

Petitioner has failed to identify a fundamental right that has

been abridged in such a way as to implicate substantive due

process protections. 

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2. Petitioner’s Federal Due Process Claim

Petitioner contends that in both 1999 and 2000, Respondent’s

decision to deny him parole resulted in a violation of his

procedural due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution (Amended Petition at

4(a)-4(c)). Because Petitioner challenges a state action, the 1

Court will proceed under the Fourteenth Amendment.

The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall

deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due

process of law. U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1. Federal courts

examine questions of procedural due process in two steps. First,

they must ascertain if there is a liberty or property interest

that was interfered with by the state. Second, if there is such

an interest, the courts must determine if the procedures

attendant upon a depravation of that interest were

constitutionally sufficient. Board of Regents of State Colleges

v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460,

472 (1983) (receded from and rejected on separate grounds).

Addressing the first question (the existence of a liberty

interest), the Court finds that a liberty interest protected by

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the Due Process Clause “must rise to more than an abstract need

or desire and must be based on more than a unilateral hope.

[Indeed], an individual claiming a protected interest must have a

legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” Kentucky Dept. of

Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989) (internal

citations and quotations omitted). 

The United States Supreme Court has expressly denied any

entitlement to a protected liberty interest in parole. 

Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex,

442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). Specifically, the Supreme Court found that

a convicted persons has no constitutional or inherent right to be

released prior to the expiration of a valid sentence. A valid

conviction, with all of its procedural safeguards, extinguishes

that liberty interest. Indeed, once sentenced, the criminal

defendant has been constitutionally deprived of his liberty and

all interests therein. Id. 

However, as an exception to this general rule, a state can

create an enforceable liberty interest in parole through the

“unique structure and language” of its parole statutes. Id. at

12. The Supreme Court has found that “mandatory language” in a

parole statute creates an expectancy of release and gives rise to

a protected liberty interest. Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482

U.S. 369, 371, 377-78 (1987); Greenholtz, 422 U.S. at 12; see

also I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 345-46 (2001) (recognizing

the mandatory language standard).

Before discussing the Supreme Court’s mandatory language

standard in greater depth, this Court will briefly address

Respondent’s assertion that an expanded standard, announced in

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Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), applies to the present

case. (Answer at 7:19-8:8.) This Court acknowledges the Supreme

Court’s holding in Sandin and its interest in moving away from

the mandatory language standard. However, this Court finds that

when considering a liberty interest in parole, the mandatory

language standard announced in Greenholtz and Allen is the only

clearly established federal law squarely on point. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d). 

Sandin is by no means clearly established in the context of

parole rights. To begin with, Sandin dealt with a prisoner’s

conditions of confinement, not the possibility of release from

confinement. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 480-81, 483 n.5, 483-84 (citing

Allen approvingly in the context of “freedom from restraint”);

see also McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 903 (9th Cir. 2002)

(Sandin “was limited to internal prison disciplinary

regulations”). Further, Sandin did not overrule Greenholtz or

Allen. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483 n.5; see also Ellis v. District

of Colombia, 84 F.3d 1414, 1417-18 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Orellana v.

Kyle, 65 F.3d 29, 32 (5th Cir. 1995). As such, these cases are

still the controlling law when considering liberty interests in

parole. Notably, the Supreme Court later cited Greenholtz and

Allen approvingly as examples of cases in which state statutes

created liberty interests through the use of mandatory language. 

St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 345-46. Finally, even some members of the

Supreme Court itself acknowledged the lack of clarity

accompanying the new standard announced in Sandin: “What design

lies beneath these key words? The Court ventures no examples,

leaving consumers of the Court’s work at sea, unable to fathom

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what would constitute an ‘atypical, significant deprivation.’” 

Sandin, 515 U.S. at 490 n.2 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 

As such, this Court is left to follow Greenholtz and Allen

as the clearly established federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). As

discussed above, there is no constitutional right to parole. 

Greenholtz, 422 U.S. at 7. Consequently, in order to establish a

protected liberty interest in parole, Petitioner must look to the

unique structure and language of California’s parole statutes. 

Id. at 12. If the structure and language of those statutes

creates an entitlement to parole release or a presumption or

expectation of parole release, then California has established a

protected liberty interest. In both Greenholtz and Allen, the

Supreme Court found that the existence of mandatory language

created the necessary presumption and expectation of parole. 

Allen, 482 U.S. at 371 (holding that mandatory language created a

presumption of parole release); Greenholtz, 422 U.S. at 11-12

(holding that mandatory language created a protectible

entitlement to parole release). Thus, under clearly established

federal law, the existence of mandatory language in a state

parole statute will give rise to a federal liberty interest

protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

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 All further references to § 3041 are to the California 2

Penal Code.

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Turning to the question of whether California’s parole

statutes use mandatory language, § 3041 of the California Penal

Code states in relevant part: 2

(a) One year prior to the inmate’s minimum

eligible parole release date a panel . . .

shall again meet with the inmate and shall

normally set a release date as provided . . .

(b) The panel . . . shall set a release date

unless it determines that . . . consideration

of the public safety requires a more lengthy

period of incarceration . . . 

California Penal Code §§ 3041(a), 3041(b) (West 2000) (emphasis

added). Significantly, it does not appear that § 3041 uses the

word “shall” in an absolute or mandatory sense. The syntax of

subdivision (a) implies that “shall” modifies the adverb

“normally”, and “normally” directly modifies the verb “set”.

Further, in subdivision (b), “shall” is qualified by the phrase

“unless it determines”.

Nonetheless, in 2002, without the assistance of a definitive

California Supreme Court interpretation, the Ninth Circuit found

the language of § 3041 to be mandatory in nature, thereby

creating a presumption of parole release and an associated

liberty interest. McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 902; see also Biggs v.

Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 914 (2003) (“a state’s statutory scheme,

if it uses mandatory language, creates a presumption that parole

release will be granted . . . and thereby gives rise to a

constitutional liberty interest.”). This Court would normally

defer to the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of a state statute;

however, under habeas corpus jurisprudence, circuit opinions are

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only persuasive authority, Taylor, 529 U.S. at 412; Clark, 331

F.3d at 1069; Duhaime, 200 F.3d at 600-01.

In 2005, the Supreme Court of California provided a

definitive interpretation of § 3041’s structure and language with

its decision in In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061, 1087 (2005). 

In Dannenberg, the California Supreme Court concluded that 1) the

language of § 3041 is not mandatory, 2) there is no right to

parole in California, 3) the Board of Prison Terms has extremely

broad discretion and is not required to fix a parole date, and 4)

the statutory scheme of § 3041 indicates that § 3041(b)

extinguishes any expectancy an inmate may have in parole found in

§ 3041(a). Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1084, 1087-88, 1097-98. 

Thus, this Court is faced with a choice between two

conflicting interpretations to inform its decision regarding the

nature of the language in § 3041. As a matter of clearly

established federal law, the Supreme Court has regularly deferred

to state court interpretations of state statutes. Indeed, “a

State’s highest court is the final judicial arbiter of the

meaning of state statutes.” Gurley v. Rhoden, 421 U.S. 200, 208

(1975) (internal quotations and citations omitted). When a state

court has made its own definitive determination as to the meaning

of a state statute, federal courts give this finding great weight

in determining the natural effect of a statute, and if it is

consistent with the statute’s reasonable interpretation, it will

be deemed conclusive. Id.

This general principle of deference to state court

interpretations is also a part of the Supreme Court’s clearly

established habeas corpus jurisprudence. For example, in

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Greenholtz, the Court noted that it was denied the benefit of the

Nebraska courts’ interpretation of the scope of the liberty

interest, if any, that the State’s parole statute was intended to

afford. Greenholtz, 422 U.S. at 12. (citing approvingly Bishop

v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 345, 346 n.10 (1976) (demonstrating

deference to, and the need for, the holdings and interpretations

of state supreme courts when establishing interests protected by

due process); see Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 377 n.8 (1987) (implying

that a Montana Supreme Court decision would have been instructive

if there had been one on point); see also White, 370 F.3d at

1013, 1013 n.10 (using a Washington Supreme Court decision to

establish the non-existence of a liberty interest). Thus,

federal courts have established a long standing practice of

paying great deference to the views of those courts who are

familiar with the intricacies and trends of local law. Bishop,

426 U.S. at 346 n.10. 

Acknowledging both the Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit

precedent regarding federal deference to state court

interpretations of state statutes, this Court will follow the

California Supreme Court’s 2005 interpretation of § 3041,

explicitly recognizing that court’s familiarity with, and

knowledge of, the laws governing California’s penal system. 

Having carefully considered all of the aforementioned

issues, this Court finds as follows: First, the language of §

3041 is not mandatory. Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1087-88. In §

3041, “shall” is not used in an absolute sense. The syntax of

the key subdivision in § 3041 (see infra note 4) eviscerates the

mandatory strength and force of the word “shall”. Thus, the

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 Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1097-98 (“one who is legally 3

convicted has no vested right to the determination of his

sentence at less than maximum . . . [i]t is fundamental to [an]

indeterminate sentence law that every such sentence is for the

[statutory] maximum unless the [parole] [a]uthority acts to fix a

shorter term.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted); see

also In re Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th 616, 655 (2002); In re Minnis

7 Cal. 3d 639, 646 (1972)

 “The most natural and reasonable way to read [§ 3041] is 4

that subdivision (a) applies only if subdivision (b) does not

apply . . . .” Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1087. In other words,

subdivision (b) is not the gateway to parole. It is simply a

precondition to the possibility of parole under subdivision (a),

which uses the non-mandatory language, “shall normally set”. 

Subdivision (b) applies to situations in which parole should be

denied in the interest of public safety. Under Dannenberg, only

when subdivision (b) does not apply, i.e., there is no threat to

public safety, does the non-mandatory language of subdivision (a)

apply. Id. Thus, “the statutory language belies the notion of a

mandatory duty to set release date for all indeterminate life

inmates.” Id. 

 Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1087-88 (“the statutory 5

language belies the notion of a mandatory duty to set release

date for all indeterminate life inmates . . . [w]ithin this broad

range, the parole authority was given virtually unbridled

statutory power.”); Id. at 1078 (“certain serious offenders,

including ‘noncapital’ murderers . . . remain subject to

indeterminate sentences . . . [a]s under prior law, life inmates

actual confinement periods within the statutory range are decided

by an executive parole authority. This agency, an arm of the

Department of Corrections, is now known as the BPT.”) 

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statutory language belies the notion of a mandatory duty to set a

release date. Id. Second, the lack of mandatory language in §

3041, especially when considered in light of 1) California’s long

standing jurisprudence denying the existence of a parole right,3

2) the statutory scheme of § 3041, and 3) the broad discretion 4

given to the BPT under the “noncapital murderers” exception to

California’s determinant sentencing law, precludes a legitimate 5

expectation of parole release and, thus, does not give rise to an

associated liberty interest under clearly established federal

law. Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1084, 1087-88, 1097-98; 28

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U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Allen, 482 U.S. at 371; Greenholtz,

422 U.S. at 11-12 (standing for the proposition that the nonexistence of mandatory language precludes the finding of a

liberty interest in parole). 

Under the Supreme Court’s mandatory language standard, as

expressed in Greenholtz and Allen, this Court holds that the

unique structure and language of § 3041 precludes the finding of

a federal liberty interest in parole. Greenholtz, 422 U.S. at

12; Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1087-88. Thus, with regard to

parole, California prisoners are not entitled to federal due

process protections as a matter of right. Consequently,

California’s determination that Petitioner’s federal due process

rights were not violated during his 1999 and 2000 parole hearings

was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Indeed, this

Court may only entertain an application for a writ of habeas

corpus on the grounds that Petitioner is held in violation of the

Constitution of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The

non-existence of a federal liberty interest in parole precludes

such a finding as well as this Court’s jurisdiction over

Petitioner’s present claims. The Court’s decision today does

not, of course, preclude the existence of state due process

protections, found under state standards. See e.g. In re

Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th 616, 655 (2002); In re Minnis 7 Cal. 3d

639, 646 (1972).

//

//

//

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CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, Petitioner’s application for

a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 15, 2005

___________________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:01-cv-00835-MCE -KJM Document 46 Filed 06/15/05 Page 17 of 17