Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03337/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03337-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RONALD KEITH MAUZEY,

Petitioner,

v.

A. P. KANE, warden,

Respondent. /

No. C 05-3337 MHP (pr)

ORDER DENYING HABEAS

PETITION

INTRODUCTION

Ronald Keith Mauzey, a prisoner at the Correctional Training Facility in Soledad,

filed this pro se action seeking a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This matter

is now before the court for consideration of the merits of the pro se habeas petition. For the

reasons discussed below, the petition will be denied. 

BACKGROUND

Ronald Keith Mauzey was convicted in Riverside County Superior Court in 1983 of

several crimes stemming from his efforts to kill his divorcing wife's boyfriend. He shot the

boyfriend and then, while on bail for that offense, tried to hire someone to kill the boyfriend

because he was the only witness who could identify Mauzey as the shooter. He was

convicted at a jury trial of conspiracy to commit first degree murder, attempted first degree

murder, and two counts of soliciting another to commit murder. He was found to have used a

firearm and inflicted great bodily injury in the attempted murder. See Resp. Exh. 1. On

February 8, 1983, Mauzey was sentenced to state prison for 25 years to life on the conspiracy

to commit first degree murder count. See Resp. Exhs. 1 and 2; Cal. Penal Code § 182. The

sentences for the attempted murder count, the related enhancements, and the two solicitation

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to commit murder counts were "stayed and stay to become permanent upon completion of

time served" on the conspiracy count. Resp. Exh. 1, p. 2. Mauzey's habeas petition does not

concern that conviction directly, but instead focuses on a January 9, 2004 decision by a panel

of the Board of Prison Terms (now known as the Board of Parole Hearings ("BPH")) finding

him not suitable for parole.

The BPH identified several factors in support of its determination that Mauzey was

not suitable for parole and would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society or a threat to

public safety if he was released. The factors identified included the circumstances of the

crime, his inadequate performance in prison (i.e., his limited programming, lack of sufficient

beneficial self-help programming, disciplinary record, and a psychological report that was

not totally supportive of release), and his inadequate parole plans. The specifics regarding

the crime and the circumstances supporting the finding of unsuitability are described in the

Discussion section later in this order.

Mauzey sought relief in the California courts. The Riverside County Superior Court

denied his petition for writ of habeas corpus in 2004 in a summary order that would not

qualify as a reasoned decision. Resp. Exh. 28. The California Court of Appeal summarily

denied his petition for writ of habeas corpus and the California Supreme Court summarily

denied his petition for review. Resp. Exhs. 29-32.

Mauzey then filed his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. The court construed

Mauzey's federal petition for writ of habeas corpus to allege due process violations based on

the alleged absence of some evidence to support the BPH's decision and the alleged abuse of

discretion by the BPH in relying on an unchanging factor to deny parole. After an

unsuccessful motion to dismiss, respondent filed an answer. Petitioner filed a traverse. The

matter is now ready for a decision on the merits. 

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

This court has subject matter jurisdiction over this habeas action for relief under 28

U.S.C. § 2254. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This action is in the proper venue because Mauzey was

incarcerated and the challenged action occurred at the Correctional Training Facility in

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Soledad. Soledad is in Monterey County, California, within this judicial district. 28 U.S.C.

§§ 84, 2241(d).

EXHAUSTION

Prisoners in state custody who wish to challenge collaterally in federal habeas

proceedings either the fact or length of their confinement are required first to exhaust state

judicial remedies, either on direct appeal or through collateral proceedings, by presenting the

highest state court available with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of each and every

claim they seek to raise in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c). The parties do not

dispute that state court remedies were exhausted for the claims asserted in the petition.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus "in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

The petition may not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits

in state court unless the state court's adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that

was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that

was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S.

362, 409-13 (2000). Section 2254(d) applies to a habeas petition from a state prisoner

challenging the denial of parole. See Sass v. California Board of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d

1123, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Where, as here, the state court gives no reasoned explanation of its decision on a

petitioner's federal claim, the habeas court does an independent review of the record as it is

the only means of deciding whether the state court's decision was objectively reasonable. 

See Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003).

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DISCUSSION

A. Due Process Requires That Some Evidence Support A Parole Denial

A California prisoner with a sentence of a term of years to life with the possibility of

parole has a protected liberty interest in release on parole and therefore a right to due process

in the parole suitability proceedings. See Sass, 461 F.3d at 1127-28; Board of Pardons v.

Allen, 482 U.S. 369 (1987); Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Corr. Complex, 442

U.S. 1 (1979); Cal. Penal Code § 3041(b). 

A parole board's decision satisfies the requirements of due process if “some evidence”

supports the decision. Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128-29 (adopting some evidence standard for

disciplinary hearings outlined in Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454-55 (1985)). "To

determine whether the some evidence standard is met 'does not require examination of the

entire record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the

evidence. Instead, the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that

could support the conclusion reached'" by the parole board. Id. at 1128 (quoting

Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56). The "some evidence standard is minimal, and

assures that 'the record is not so devoid of evidence that the findings of the . . . board were

without support or otherwise arbitrary.'" Id. at 1129 (quoting Superintendent v. Hill, 472

U.S. at 457). The some evidence standard of Superintendent v. Hill is clearly established law

in the parole context for purposes of § 2254(d). Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129. 

A critical issue in parole denial cases concerns the BPH's use of evidence about the

crime that led to the conviction. Three Ninth Circuit cases provide the guideposts for

applying the Superintendent v. Hill some evidence standard on this point: Biggs v. Terhune,

334 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2003), Sass, 461 F.3d 1123, and Irons v. Carey, 479 F.3d 658 (9th Cir.

2007). Biggs explained that the value of the criminal offense fades over time as a predictor

of parole suitability: “The Parole Board’s decision is one of ‘equity’ and requires a careful

balancing and assessment of the factors considered. . . . A continued reliance in the future on

an unchanging factor, the circumstance of the offense and conduct prior to imprisonment,

runs contrary to the rehabilitative goals espoused by the prison system and could result in a

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due process violation.” Biggs, 334 F.3d at 916-17. Biggs upheld the initial denial of a parole

release date based solely on the nature of the crime and the prisoner’s conduct before

incarceration, but cautioned that “[o]ver time . . . , should Biggs continue to demonstrate

exemplary behavior and evidence of rehabilitation, denying him a parole date simply because

of the nature of Biggs’ offense and prior conduct would raise serious questions involving his

liberty interest in parole.” Id. at 916. Next came Sass, which criticized the Biggs statements

as improper and beyond the scope of the dispute before the court: "Under AEDPA it is not

our function to speculate about how future parole hearings could proceed." Sass, 461 F.3d at

1129. Sass determined that the parole board is not precluded from relying on unchanging

factors such as the circumstances of the commitment offense or the parole applicant's preoffense behavior in determining parole suitability. See id. at 1129 (commitment offenses in

combination with prior offenses provided some evidence to support denial of parole at

subsequent parole consideration hearing). Recently, Irons determined that due process was

not violated by the use of the commitment offense and pre-offense criminality to deny parole

for a prisoner 16 years into his 17-to-life sentence. Irons emphasized that all three cases

(Irons, Sass and Biggs) in which the court had "held that a parole board's decision to deem a

prisoner unsuitable for parole solely on the basis of his commitment offense comports with

due process, the decision was made before the inmate had served the minimum number of

years required by his sentence." Irons, 479 F.3d at 665; see e.g., id. at 660 (inmate in 16th

actual year of his 17-to-life sentence). 

The message of these three cases is that the BPH can look at immutable events, such

as the nature of the conviction offense and pre-conviction criminality, to predict that the

prisoner is not currently suitable for parole even after the initial denial (Sass), but the weight

to be attributed to those immutable events should decrease over time as a predictor of future

dangerousness as the years pass and the prisoner demonstrates favorable behavior (Biggs and

Irons). Sass did not dispute the principle that, other things being equal, a criminal act

committed 50 years ago is less probative of a prisoner's current dangerousness than one

committed 10 years ago. Not only does the passage of time in prison count for something,

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exemplary behavior and rehabilitation in prison count for something according to Biggs and

Irons. Superintendent v. Hill's standard might be quite low, but it does require that the

decision not be arbitrary, and reliance on only the facts of the crime might eventually make

for an arbitrary decision.

Having determined that there is a due process right, and that some evidence is the

evidentiary standard for judicial review, the next step is to look to state law because that sets

the criteria to which the some evidence standard applies. One must look to state law to

answer the question, "'some evidence' of what?"

B. State Law Standards For Parole For Life Prisoners In California

California uses indeterminate life sentences for persons convicted of murders and

certain other crimes, including conspiracy to commit murder. See Cal. Penal Code §§ 182,

187. Conspiracy to commit first degree murder results in the same sentence as first degree

murder. See Cal. Penal Code § 182 ("When they conspire to commit any other felony, they

shall be punishable in the same manner and to the same extent as is provided for the

punishment of that felony."). California's parole scheme described below provides that a

release date normally must be set unless various factors exist, but the "unless" qualifier is

substantial. 

A BPH panel meets with an inmate one year before the prisoner's minimum eligible

release date "and shall normally set a parole release date. . . . The release date shall be set in a

manner that will provide uniform terms for offenses of similar gravity and magnitude in

respect to their threat to the public, and that will comply with the sentencing rules that the

Judicial Council may issue and any sentencing information relevant to the setting of parole

release dates." Cal. Penal Code § 3041(a). Significantly, that statute also provides that the

panel "shall set a release date unless it determines that the gravity of the current convicted

offense or offenses, or the timing and gravity of current or past convicted offense or offenses,

is such that consideration of the public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration

for this individual, and that a parole date, therefore, cannot be fixed at this meeting." Cal.

Penal Code § 3041(b). 

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Both Mauzey and respondent base their arguments on the regulations for parole

consideration of murderers, 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2400 et seq.1

 Mauzey was not, however,

convicted of murder and those regulations may not be the appropriate regulations. Instead,

his case appears to be covered by the regulations at 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2280 et seq. which

apply to non-murdering life prisoners. The differences between the two sets of regulations is

insubstantial. See 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2400 (last paragraph).

One of the implementing regulations, 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2281, allows for

consideration of a wide range of information in determining suitability, see § 2281(b), and

lists circumstances tending to show suitability and circumstances tending to show

unsuitability, § 2281(c) and (d).2

 The regulation also provides that "[t]he panel shall first

determine whether a prisoner is suitable for release on parole. Regardless of the length of

time served, a life prisoner shall be found unsuitable for and denied parole if in the judgment

of the panel the prisoner will pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from

prison." 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2281(a). The regulations contain a matrix of suggested base

terms for several categories of crimes. See 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2282. For example, for

kidnapping for robbery or ransom, the matrix of base terms ranges from the low of 8, 10, or

12 years to a high of 13, 15, or 17 years, depending on some of the facts of the crime. Some

prisoners estimate their time to serve based only on the matrix. However, going straight to

the matrix to calculate the sentence puts the cart before the horse because it ignores critical

language in the relevant statute and regulations that requires him first to be found suitable for

parole.

The statutory scheme places individual suitability for parole above a prisoner's

expectancy in early setting of a fixed date designed to ensure term uniformity. In re

Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061, 1070-71 (Cal.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 92 (2005). Under

state law, the matrix is not reached unless and until the prisoner is found suitable for parole. 

See id. at 1070-71 (discussing use of matrix in murder cases); 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2282(a)

("[t]he panel shall set a base term for each life prisoner who is found suitable for parole"). 

The California Supreme Court's determination of state law in Dannenberg is binding in this

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federal habeas action. See Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 629-30 (1988). 

The California Supreme Court also has determined that the facts of the crime alone

can support a sentence longer than the statutory minimum even if everything else about the 

prisoner is laudable. "While the Board must point to factors beyond the minimum elements

of the crime for which the inmate was committed, it need engage in no further comparative

analysis before concluding that the particular facts of the offense make it unsafe, at that time,

to fix a date for the prisoner's release." Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1071; see also In re

Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th 616, 682-83 (Cal. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 980 (2003) ("[t]he

nature of the prisoner's offense, alone, can constitute a sufficient basis for denying parole"

but might violate due process "where no circumstances of the offense reasonably could be

considered more aggravated or violent than the minimum necessary to sustain a conviction

for that offense"). 

C. Some Evidence Supports The BPH's Decision In Mauzey's Case

The BPH found Mauzey unsuitable for parole, basing its decision on the

circumstances of the commitment offense, Mauzey's inadequate performance in prison (i.e.,

his limited programming, lack of sufficient beneficial self-help programming, disciplinary

record, and psychological report that was not totally supportive of release), and his

inadequate parole plans. 

1. Commitment Offense

The facts of the crime were described in the probation officer's report as well as in

prior hearing transcripts:

In April 1981, Mauzey's wife, Elke, began divorce proceedings and moved in with

John Paullin. On or about June 19, 1981, Mauzey tried to persuade Elke to leave Paullin,

telling her he knew Paullin's identity, had driven by Paullin's residence and was going to hire

people to "get him." Exh. 5, p. 5. Elke stated that Mauzey had been violent toward her in

the past and he had a violent temper when drinking. 

On June 30, 1981, Paullin went to answer his front door at his home. Mauzey kicked

open the door, pointed a .22 caliber rifle at Paullin and then shot him. Id. at 4-5. Mauzey

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and Paullin struggled. Paullin suffered serious injuries and had to undergo surgery to repair

his liver, pancreas, colon and stomach. Id. at 5. Paullin also had to undergo additional

surgeries in later days and had long-term complications from the shooting. Id. at 5, 10. 

On July 9, 1981, Mauzey was arrested and booked for attempted murder. He was

released on bail. While he was out on bail, he engaged in the conduct that formed the basis

for the conspiracy and solicitation convictions. 

Mauzey solicited Arthur Carranza to kill Paullin because Paullin was the only person

who could identify Mauzey as the shooter. Police detectives learned in November 1981 that

Carranza had information concerning Mauzey possibly soliciting Carranza to murder Paullin. 

The police already knew that Mauzey had been arrested for the attempted murder of Paullin,

that Paullin had testified against Mauzey and that Mauzey had been held to answer in

Superior Court. 

Subsequently, on November 30, 1981, and December 7, 1981, detectives contacted

Carranza who indicated that sometime after August, 1981, the defendant had taken a

liking to him, invited him to live in his home and did on several occasions solicit him

to kill Mr. Paullin as he was the only person who could identify him regarding the

attempted murder. The defendant offered to buy Carranza a house, give him a job in

his construction company and pay him $4,000.00 a month, not only for killing Mr.

Paullin but also for assisting in illicit sales of cocaine. A slip of paper the defendant

had given Carranza with John Paullin's name, make of car and home and business

addresses was seized as evidence. Carranza advised the detectives the defendant

drove him by Paullin's residence and business, showed him the probable route of

travel between Paullin's home and business and suggested "sniping" Paullin while en

route to his office. Carranza advised detectives he did not want to commit the murder

himself but may find someone who would and that he did on one occasion contact

another subject. It was later determined through the defendant's telephone records that

in October, 1981, Carranza telephoned a Felix Salsedo for the purposes of soliciting

the murder for the defendant. For the purpose of the investigation it was determined

the informant [i.e., Carranza] would make contact with the defendant and should the

defendant still be inclined to solicit Mr. Paullin's murder, Detective Brian McAuley

would be introduced as "Wolf", a paid killer. 

On December 8, 1981, the informant met the defendant at his residence and

during taped conversation the defendant made several comments regarding wanting

Mr. Paullin killed. Appropriate payment for the killing was discussed and reference

was made to "one grand", "a kilo", or "some coke." 

On December 9, 1981, Detective McAuley telephoned the defendant as "Wolf"

concerning the solicitation for murder. In the recorded conversation the defendant

provided the detective with information concerning Mr. Paullin and indicated he still

wanted Paullin killed.

On December 10, 1981, the informant again contacted the defendant regarding

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subject "Wolf" killing Paullin on Friday, December 11, 1981. The defendant

indicated in reference to the killing of Mr. Paullin that it was too soon and that he

wanted to postpone the killing until he was able to pay half down and the other half

upon completion of the job.

On December 11, 1981, an arrest warrant was obtained and the defendant was

arrested without incident at his residence.

Resp. Exh. 5, pp. 6-7.

Mauzey spoke with the probation officer after his conviction and "essentially

maintained his innocence in the instant matter feeling that the most he should have been

convicted of was 'simple assault or assault with a deadly weapon'" because he had only gone

to the house to scare the victim. Resp. Exh. 5, p. 7. With regard to the conspiracy and

solicitation charges, Mauzey claimed that it was Carranza who had suggested getting rid of

the witness and offered to kill Paullin to show his appreciation for what Mauzey was doing

for him. Mauzey said he did not take the informant seriously. Id. at 8.

 The BPH considered a circumstance and factors proper under California law. A

circumstance tending to indicate unsuitability for parole is that the prisoner "committed the

offense in an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner." 15 Cal. Code Regs. §

2281(c)(1). The factors to be considered in determining whether that circumstance exists are

that there were multiple victims, "[t]he offense was carried out in a dispassionate and

calculated manner, such as an execution-style murder," "[t]he victim was abused, defiled or

mutilated during or after the offense," "[t]he offense was carried out in a manner which

demonstrates an exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering," and "[t]he motive for

the crime is inexplicable or very trivial in relation to the offense." 15 Cal. Code Regs. §

2281(c)(1).

The facts to be considered in looking at whether the commitment crime had the listed

factors in § 2281(c)(1) are the facts from the whole episode, beginning with the shooting of

Paullin through the last telephone call between Mauzey and Carranza. Although the

sentences on the attempted murder and the two solicitation to commit murder convictions

were stayed, they are not irrelevant, as Mauzey seems to assume in his arguments. Nothing

in the record explains why the sentencing court stayed the sentences, but it most likely was

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pursuant to California Penal Code § 654, which provides that "[a]n act or omission that is

punishable in different ways by different provisions of law shall be punished under the

provision that provides for the longest potential term of imprisonment, but in no case shall

the act or omission be punished under more than one provision." Section 654 applies "not

only to individual criminal acts, but also to courses of conduct that are motivated by a single

intent or objective. [Citations.] Therefore, when multiple convictions are based on a single

act, . . . or an indivisible course of conduct, the use of such convictions must not result in the

defendant being 'punished under more than one' Penal Code provision." People v. Pearson,

42 Cal.3d 351, 359 (Cal. 1986). Due to the multitude of acts here, especially since the

attempted murder appears to have predated the formation of any conspiracy, section 654

apparently was applied to cause a single punishment for an indivisible course of conduct

intended to cause the death of John Paullin. Mauzey's motive may have changed (from the

initial jealousy and anger to the later desire to silence a witness), but the objective of killing

Paullin remained the same. Even though the sentences were stayed, section 654 does not

preclude the consideration of the facts that underlie those convictions to be considered in

determining whether the § 2281(c)(1) factors are present. Otherwise, an accurate picture of

the extent of the conspiracy would not be possible: there is a significant difference between a

conspiracy to commit murder that had four overt acts (that neither party has identified in this

action) and a conspiracy to commit murder that included shooting the target of the conspiracy

with the intent to kill him as well as repeated efforts to hire a hit man to finish the job of

killing the target. Consideration of the entire episode also is consistent with the regulation

that allows a criminal conviction resulting in a stayed or suspended sentence to "be

considered as part of the individual's criminal history . . . or as an integral part of the

circumstances of an offense for which the prisoner is currently committed to prison." 15 Cal.

Code Regs. § 2326(b).

The BPH denied parole and relied on the circumstances of the commitment offense in

doing so. The BPH stated: "The offense was carried out in an especially violent and brutal

manner. The offense was carried out in a manner which demonstrates an exceptionally

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callous disregard for human suffering and life." RT 65.

There was some evidence to support the BPH's reliance on the circumstances of the

offense as tending to show Mauzey was not suitable for parole. This criminal episode

involved a long term commitment by Mauzey to the goal of killing Paullin. Mauzey was not

satisfied to merely shoot and gravely injure Paullin, and took further steps to have him killed. 

Mauzey's murderous mind-set lasted for months, and continued even after he saw the

devastation he had caused with the initial shooting. The facts truly do reflect an

exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering and life. The BPH identified far more

than the minimum elements of a conspiracy when it pointed out that the criminal conduct

included Mauzey shooting the victim and soliciting his murder. See Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th

at 1071. That the victim was not killed does not make Mauzey's crime any less

reprehensible, especially because the evidence suggests that it was a lack of readily available

cash rather than a lack of interest that eventually led Mauzey to postpone the murder he had

solicited. 

Even if the attempted murder and solicitations to commit murder could not be

considered as part of the commitment offense, evidence regarding those additional crimes

could be considered under 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2281(c)(2), which allows the BPH to

consider the prisoner's previous record of violence and under § 2281(b) which allows the

BPH to consider all relevant and reliable information, including the prisoner's involvement in

other criminal misconduct. 

2. Institutional Performance

Section 2281(b) specifically allows the BPH to consider a great range of relevant and

reliable information, such as the prisoner's social history, "past and present mental state," and

"past and present attitude toward the crime." The BPH also may consider evidence that the

"prisoner has engaged in serious misconduct in prison or jail" as tending to indicate

unsuitability for parole. 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2281(c)(6). The BPH also may consider, as

tending to show suitability, that "[i]nstitutional activities indicate an enhanced ability to

function within the law upon release." 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2281(d)(9). 

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The BPH found that Mauzey's performance in prison tended to show he was not

suitable for parole. The BPH noted that he had programmed in a limited manner while

incarcerated. He had not sufficiently participated in beneficial self-help as previously

recommended by the BPH, by counselors and by his psychiatrists. The BPH stated that

Mauzey "needs to participate in self-help, in order to face, discuss, understand and cope with

stress in a non-destructive manner. Until progress is made, the prisoner continues to be

unpredictable and a threat to others." RT 67.

There was sufficient evidence to support the determination that Mauzey had not

sufficiently participated in beneficial self-help programming. The record had extensive

evidence that Mauzey had a substance abuse problem before he arrived at prison. He told

the probation officer that the shooting was the result of personal problems and done after he

"had been on a 3 day binge and had used cocaine." Resp. Exh. 5, p. 7, 11. At trial, he had

asserted a diminished capacity defense due to heavy use of alcohol and cocaine with regard

to the attempted murder charge. See Resp. Exh. 6 (2/25/98 hearing) RT 21-22. Mauzey

contended that his alcohol and cocaine abuse was limited to a 3-month period of time in

1981, see RT 39, but the evidence indicated that the problem lasted longer than that. See RT

39; Resp. Exh. 24, p. 2 (psychologist wrote that Mauzey "denies any history of substance

abuse whatsoever until a three month window in which the commitment offense occurred"). 

For example, Mauzey had a DUI conviction in 1980 that was eight months before the

attempted murder and a reckless driving conviction involving his alcohol consumption in

1981 that occurred outside the window of time he identifies as his sole time of abuse. See

Resp. Exh. 5, p. 3; RT 39-40. And the probation officer's report showed that his ex-wife had

complained of his violent temper when he drank. 

Mauzey takes issue with any requirement that he participate in an AA or NA program. 

He contends that such programs violate his First Amendment religious freedom rights by

violating the Establishment Clause in that they are religion-based programs. The BPH

doubted the sincerity of this protest because Mauzey had long refused to participate solely on

the ground that he had no substance abuse problem and currently was willing to participate in

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such a program if it was required on parole. See RT 39-41, 46-47, 50-51, 69-70; see also

Resp. Exh. 6 (2/25/98 hearing transcript) at 23-25, 32-33; Resp. Exh. 4 (2/20/96 hearing

transcript) at 30-34. However, even assuming it to be a sincere protest, the BPH determined

it was not well-founded because numerous other self-help programs that had no religious

affiliation had been identified for Mauzey and he failed to participate in those also. RT 48-

49. At earlier parole consideration hearings, the BPH panel had told Mauzey to consider any

self-help and therapy programming that may become available, including self-study materials

or motivational books. See Resp. Exh. 8 (9/24/02 hearing) RT 50; see also Resp. Exh. 7

(10/31/00 hearing) RT 15-16, 63; Resp. Exh. 4 (2/20/96 hearing) RT 41-45. Despite the fact

that panel members had on earlier occasions identified other self-help programs besides AA

and NA, Mauzey nonetheless continued to maintain at the 2004 hearing that the BPH was

trying to force him to become a Christian or participate in NA or AA to obtain parole. 

The was some evidence to support the BPH's determination that Mauzey's disciplinary

record tended to show he was unsuitable for parole. He had received eight CDC-115s for

rule violations, some of which were quite recent. Mauzey had received one CDC-115 since

his last parole consideration hearing in 2002, for refusing to move from his cell to a dorm. 

See Resp. Exh. 10. He also had received one CDC-115 just before his last hearing in 2002

for refusing to provide required DNA samples. See Resp. Exh. 9. In past years he had

received other CDC-115s for failing to comply with grooming standards (by maintaining too

long of a mustache after having received two CDC-128s for this rule violation) in 1998, for

refusing to comply with an order and being contentious with a sergeant in 1998, for

introducing contraband (i.e., a note giving directions on how to manufacture

methamphetamine) into a facility in 1997, for refusing to show skin for a prisoner count in

1997, for fighting in 1995, and for disclosing confidential information (that he had acquired

as a clerk) in 1990. See Resp. Exhs. 11-17. (He also received several more CDC-115s after

the 2004 hearing, but those are irrelevant to the question of whether some evidence supports

the BPH's decision in 2004.) Mauzey also had received five CDC-128 counseling

memoranda for lesser rule infractions. Resp. Exh. 22 (disciplinary sheet). 

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There also was evidence to support the BPH's reliance on the psychological report

dated September 29, 2003, which was "not totally supportive of release." RT 66. The

psychologist opined that, "[i]f released to the community, his violence potential is somewhat

higher than that of the average citizen in the community due to his history of violence and

history of involvement with alcohol and drugs." Resp. Exh. 23, p. 3. The BPH also noted

that the psychologist had noted that, although Mauzey denied having an alcohol or drug

problem and was resistant to attending Alcoholics Anonymous, "it would be reasonable to

monitor his drug and alcohol consumption through urine testing on a random basis if he were

granted parole." RT 66-67; Resp. Exh. 23, p. 3. The current diagnostic impression in 2003

had not changed from the diagnostic impression in the 1999 psychological report: Mauzey

had an "Antisocial Personality Disorder, much improved." Resp. Exh. 23, p. 2, and Exh. 24,

p. 3.

The BPH's consideration of and reliance on Mauzey's insufficient participation in

beneficial self-help programming, his continued disciplinary problems, and the psychological

report was proper and was supported by sufficient evidence.

3. Inadequate Parole Plans

The prisoner's parole plans can be considered by the BPH. Among the circumstances 

listed as tending to show suitability are the existence of realistic plans for the release or the

development of marketable skills that can be put to use upon release. See 15 Cal. Code

Regs. § 2281(d)(8). Section 2281(b) allows the BPH to consider “any other information

which bears on the prisoner’s suitability for release.”

The BPH relied on Mauzey's inadequate parole plans in determining that he was

unsuitable for parole. RT 67. Specifically, the BPH noted that Mauzey "has no written

confirmation of a residence or a job offer." RT 67.

Mauzey had been a construction contractor and business owner before his

imprisonment at age 37. He also apparently had taken classes in and/or done accounting

work before his incarceration. He had graduated from high school and had some college

work done before he was incarcerated. Mauzey thus had ample skills to accomplish his

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intended plan to work in the construction industry and then pursue a contractor's license if he

was paroled. See RT 37-38. Any requirement that Mauzey become trained in another trade

– such as in typewriter repair or dry cleaning – would not be a sufficient reason to deny

parole. The parole authority rightly may be concerned with a prisoner's employment

prospects if he is paroled, but Mauzey had enough training and experience in a field with

employment potential that he did not need to be further trained in another field that had less

potential. Tying up a slot in one of the vocational trade training programs just to fulfill the

requirement that a parolee have two or more trades elevates form over substance in the parole

planning department. 

The BPH correctly noted, however, that Mauzey had no job offers. While he had a

marketable trade of construction skills, he had no evidence that someone actually wanted to

hire him. The BPH also noted that Mauzey had no current written confirmation that he could

live in one of his mother's homes. The BPH's determination that the parole residence plans

had to be evidenced in a current writing was not unreasonable but alone would not have

provided some evidence of unsuitability. The BPH's reliance on the inadequate parole plans

alone would not alone support a finding that an inmate was unsuitable for parole, but could

be considered as a small part of the overall picture of Mauzey. “Circumstances which taken

alone may not firmly establish unsuitability for parole may contribute to a pattern which

results in a finding of unsuitability.” 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2281(b). 

4. There Was Enough Evidence To Support The Decision 

As with many parole denial habeas petitions, there is not much dispute about the facts,

but instead about what they mean. The weight to be attributed to the commitment offense

may fade over time as a predictor of current dangerousness, but the rate at which the criminal

conduct fades as a predictor slows down when the prisoner engages in further misconduct

and does not demonstrate rehabilitation. Here, Mauzey had accumulated eight CDC-115s for

rule violations in prison and five CDC-128s for lesser infractions. One of the rule violations

was for fighting, indicated a continued tendency toward violence. He also had a substance

abuse problem that he refused to address. This refusal to address the substance abuse

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problem, plus his repeated violation of prison rules plus his commitment offense raise grave

concerns about his ability to comply with the law and refrain from violence if released. They

indicate that his rehabilitation is still a work in progress. While Mauzey and other prisoners

decry the use of the unchanging evidence of pre-incarceration events, in-prison behavior is

something the prisoner has control over, and the fact that a prisoner continues to violate

prison rules indicates that he does not have a very high level of self-control, especially when

the misconduct occurs years into the sentence and at a time when he should realize how such

conduct will reflect on his parole suitability. Biggs and Irons did not stand for the

proposition that in-prison behavior doesn't matter -- to the contrary, they stand for the

proposition that old bad facts can at a certain point be overcome by more recent good facts

regarding a prisoner's ability to conform to societal norms. Mauzey's continued misconduct

in prison plus his refusal to address a substance abuse problem support the BPH's view that

he is not suitable for parole and would present a danger to society if released on parole even

though he had already been in prison 21 actual years since his 25-to-life sentence was

imposed.

The state court's rejection of Mauzey's insufficient evidence claim was not an

unreasonable application of or contrary to the Superintendent v. Hill standard. There was

some evidence to support the BPH's determination that Mauzey was unsuitable for parole

based on the circumstances of the commitment offense, his unimpressive in-prison behavior

and his inadequate parole plans. He is not entitled to the writ. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition is denied on the merits. The clerk shall close

the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: April 25, 2007 

Marilyn Hall Patel

United States District Judge

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1. The regulations for parole consideration for prisoners convicted of murder also apply to

 prisoners convicted of certain attempted murders. See 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2400 ("The

criteria and guidelines in this article apply to prisoners sentenced to prison for first and

second degree murders committed on or after November 8, 1978 and attempted murders

where the perpetrator is sentenced to life pursuant to the provisions of Penal Code § 664.")

Although Mauzey was convicted of attempted murder as well as of conspiracy to commit

murder, his primary sentence is for conspiracy to commit murder. His attempted murder

sentence was stayed and he is not now serving a sentence on an attempted murder, so his

case is not considered under the regulations at § 2400 et seq.

2. The listed circumstances tending to show unsuitability for parole are the nature of the

commitment offense, i.e., whether the prisoner committed the offense in "an especially

heinous, atrocious or cruel manner;" the prisoner has a previous record of violence; the

prisoner has an unstable social history, the prisoner previously engaged in a sadistic sexual

offense, the prisoner has a lengthy history of severe mental problems related to the offense;

and serious misconduct while in prison. 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2281(c). The listed

circumstances tending to show suitability for parole are the absence of a juvenile record,

stable social history, signs of remorse, a stressful motivation for the crime, whether the

prisoner suffered from battered woman's syndrome, lack of criminal history, the present age

reduces the probability of recidivism, the prisoner has made realistic plans for release or

developed marketable skills, and positive institutional behavior. 15 Cal. Code Regs. §

2281(d). The circumstances listed as tending to show unsuitability and suitability "are set

forth as general guidelines; the importance attached to any circumstance or combination of

circumstances in a particular case is left to the judgment of the panel." 15 Cal. Code Regs. §

2281(c) and (d). 

NOTES

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