Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00523/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00523-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RUBEN DARIO GARCIA, JR.,

CDCR # J-73373 Civil

No. 

12cv0523 AJB (PCL)

Plaintiff, ORDER DISMISSING FIRST

AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR

FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM

PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(b)

vs.

J. CLUCK; ASBURY; STRICKLAND;

DOREN; J. BURNAUGH; A. PITTMAN;

JOHN/JANE DOES; GARCIA;

HERNANDEZ; C.P. FRANCO; A.

ALLAMBY; ROBLES; C. BUSHIN;

K. BALAKIN; R. COBB; HIRING

AUTHORITY DESIGNEE,

Defendants.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

I.

On March 1, 2012, Plaintiff, a state inmate currently incarcerated at the Richard J.

Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”) located in San Diego, California, and proceeding pro

se, filed a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff also filed a certified

copy of his inmate trust account which the Court construed as a Motion to Proceed In Forma

Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). On May 23, 2012, the Court granted

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Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP and sua sponte dismissed his Complaint for failing to state a

claim upon which relief could be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) & 1915A(b). 

(See May 23, 2012 Order at 9-10.) Plaintiff was granted leave to file an Amended Complaint

in order to correct the deficiencies of pleading identified by the Court. (Id.) On July 6, 2012,

Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). 

II. SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A(b)

As the Court stated in its previous Order, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”)’s

amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 obligates the Court to review complaints filed by all persons

proceeding IFP and by those, like Plaintiff, who are “incarcerated or detained in any facility

[and] accused of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the

terms or conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as

practicable after docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b). Under these

provisions, the Court must sua sponte dismiss any prisoner civil action and all other IFP

complaints, or any portions thereof, which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which

seek damages from defendants who are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A;

Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (§ 1915(e)(2)); Resnick v.

Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 446 n.1 (9th Cir. 2000) (§ 1915A).

To state a claim under § 1983, Plaintiff must allege that: (1) the conduct he complains

of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that conduct violated a

right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. Humphries v. County of Los

Angeles, 554 F.3d 1170, 1184 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)).

1. Count 1 - 42 U.S.C. § 1983 conspiracy

In Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, he alleges a number of Defendants acted “in

concert chain conspiracy” with the intent to retaliate against Plaintiff for filing administrative

grievances. While Plaintiff may have alleged facts sufficient to state a retaliation claim against

some of the Defendants, he has failed to allege facts sufficient to state a conspiracy claim against

any of the named Defendants. 

/ / /

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To the extent that Plaintiff is attempting to plead a conspiracy under section 1983, he

must allege “‘an agreement or meeting of the minds to violate constitutional rights,’” Franklin

v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 441 (9th Cir.2001) (quoting United Steel Workers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge

Corp., 865 F.2d 1539, 1540-41 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted)), and an actual deprivation of

constitutional rights. Hart v. Parks, 450 F.3d 1059, 1071 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Woodrum v.

Woodward County, Oklahoma, 866 F.2d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1989)). “‘To be liable, each

participant in the conspiracy need not know the exact details of the plan, but each participant

must at least share the common objective of the conspiracy.’” Franklin, 312 F.3d at 441

(quoting United Steel Workers, 865 F.2d at 1541). Conclusory allegations of conspiracy as

Plaintiff has alleged, here, however, are insufficient to support a claim under section 1983. See

Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). “Threadbare recitals of the elements

of a cause of action, supported bymere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iabal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Thus, Plaintiff’s conspiracy claims found in “Count 1" are dismissed

for failing to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief may be granted. 

2. Count 2 and 3 - Retaliation claims

As stated above, the Court finds that Plaintiff has adequately stated a retaliation claim

under both counts.

3. Count 4 - Equal Protection

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have violated his right to “equal protection/treatment

under the law.” (FAC at 23.) The “Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

commands that no State shall ‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of

the laws,’ which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated

alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). In order to

state a claim under § 1983 alleging violations of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment, Plaintiff must allege facts which demonstrate that he is a member of a protected

class. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980) (indigents); see also City of Cleburne v.

Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440-41 (1985) (listing suspect classes). In this matter,

Plaintiff has neither sufficiently plead that he is a member of a suspect class nor has he plead

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adequate facts to demonstrate that Defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate

against himbased upon his membership in a protected class. See Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d

1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1154 (1999). 

Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to prove invidious

discriminatoryintent. Village ofArlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,

429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977). Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claims are

dismissed for failing to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief can be granted.

4. Count 5 - Due Process 

Plaintiff alleges his due process rights were violated during his disciplinary hearing. (See

FAC at 24.) “The requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of

interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty and property.” 

Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). State statutes and prison regulations may

grant prisoners liberty interests sufficient to invoke due process protections. Meachum v. Fano,

427 U.S. 215, 223-27 (1976). However, the Supreme Court has significantly limited the

instances in which due process can be invoked. Pursuant to Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472,

483 (1995), a prisoner can show a liberty interest under the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment only if he alleges a change in confinement that imposes an “atypical and

significant hardship . . . in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 484 (citations

omitted); Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 827-28 (9th Cir. 1997). 

In this case, Plaintiff has failed to establish a liberty interest protected by the Constitution

because he has not alleged, as he must under Sandin, facts related to the conditions or

consequences of disciplinary hearing which show “the type of atypical, significant deprivation

[that] might conceivably create a liberty interest.” Id. at 486. For example, in Sandin, the

Supreme Court considered three factors in determining whether the plaintiff possessed a liberty

interest in avoiding disciplinary segregation: (1) the disciplinary versus discretionary nature of

the segregation; (2) the restricted conditions of the prisoner’s confinement and whether they

amounted to a “major disruption in his environment” when compared to those shared by

prisoners in the general population; and (3) the possibilityof whether the prisoner’s sentence was

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lengthened by his restricted custody. Id. at 486-87. 

Therefore, to establish a due process violation, Plaintiff must first show the deprivation

imposed an atypical and significant hardship on him in relation to the ordinary incidents of

prison life. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483-84. Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts from which the

Court could find there were atypical and significant hardships imposed upon him as a result of

the Defendants’ actions. Plaintiff must allege “a dramatic departure from the basic conditions”

of his confinement that would give rise to a liberty interest before he can claim a violation of due

process. Id. at 485; see also Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1088-89 (9th Cir. 1996), amended

by 135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998). He has not; therefore the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed

to allege a liberty interest, and thus, has failed to state a due process claim. See May, 109 F.3d

at 565; Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 466; Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486.

Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claims

for failing to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief may be granted.

5. Count 6 - 8th Amendment claims

Plaintiff alleges that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated when Defendants

allegedly retaliated against him. In order for a prisoner to assert an Eighth Amendment claim,

a prisoner must satisfy two requirements: one objective and one subjective. Farmer v. Brennan,

511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Allen v. Sakai, 48 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 1994). Under the

objective requirement, the plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to show that “a prison official’s

acts or omissions . . . result[ed] in the denial of the ‘minimal civilized measure of life’s

necessities.’” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347). This objective

component is satisfied so long as the institution “furnishes sentenced prisoners with adequate

food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d

1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982). Here, Plaintiff alleges no sufficient facts from which the Court

could find that he has alleged any allegations that he has been denied inadequate food, clothing,

shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to allege a

violation under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment.

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6. Count 7 - Access to Courts

Plaintiff alleges that his right to access to the courts was denied by Defendants. Prisoners

do “have a constitutional right to petition the government for redress of their grievances, which

includes a reasonable right of access to the courts.” O’Keefe v. Van Boening, 82 F.3d 322, 325

(9th Cir. 1996); accord Bradley v. Hall, 64 F.3d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir. 1995). In Bounds, 430

U.S. at 817, the Supreme Court held that “the fundamental constitutional right of access to the

courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful

legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from

persons who are trained in the law.” Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977). To establish

a violation of the right to access to the courts, however, a prisoner must allege facts sufficient

to show that: (1) a nonfrivolous legal attack on his conviction, sentence, or conditions of

confinement has been frustrated or impeded, and (2) he has suffered an actual injury as a result. 

Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 353-55 (1996). An “actual injury” is defined as “actual prejudice

with respect to contemplated or existing litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing deadline

or to present a claim.” Id. at 348; see also Vandelft v. Moses, 31 F.3d 794, 796 (9th Cir. 1994);

Sands v. Lewis, 886 F.2d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 1989); Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1093 (9th

Cir. 1996).

Here, Plaintiff has failed to allege any actions with any particularity that have precluded

his pursuit of a non-frivolous direct or collateral attack upon either his criminal conviction or

sentence or the conditions of his current confinement. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 355 (right to

access to the courts protects only an inmate’s need and ability to “attack [his] sentence[], directly

or collaterally, and ... to challenge the conditions of [his] confinement.”); see also Christopher

v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002) (the non-frivolous nature of the “underlying cause of

action, whether anticipated or lost, is an element that must be described in the complaint, just

as much as allegations must describe the official acts frustrating the litigation.”). Moreover,

Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to show that he has been actually injured by any specific

defendant’s actions. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351. Plaintiff refers to a denial of leave to amend in

another civil rights action but there is absolutelyno supporting factual allegations that would link

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the denial of leave to amend to any specific action on the part of any named Defendant. 

In short, Plaintiff has not alleged that “a complaint he prepared was dismissed,” or that

he was “so stymied” by any individual defendant’s actions that “he was unable to even file a

complaint,” direct appeal or petition for writ of habeas corpus that was not “frivolous.” Lewis,

518 U.S. at 351; Christopher, 536 U.S. at 416 (“like any other element of an access claim[,] ... 

the predicate claim[must] be described well enough to apply the ‘nonfrivolous’ test and to show

that the ‘arguable’ nature of the underlying claim is more than hope.”). Therefore, Plaintiff’s

access to courts claims must be dismissed for failing to state a claim upon which section 1983

relief can be granted.

Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint must be

DISMISSED without prejudice for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b)(1). Plaintiff will be given leave to file an Amended

Complaint in which he proceeds with only those claims that the Court has found survive the

screening process or he may attempt to correct the deficiencies of pleading identified in this

Order and the Court’s previous May 23, 2012 Order.

III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b) and § 1915A(b). However, Plaintiff is GRANTED forty five (45)

days leave from the date this Order is “Filed” in which to file a Second Amended Complaint

which cures all the deficiencies of pleading noted above. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must

be complete in itself without reference to the superseded pleading. See S.D. Cal. Civ. L. R. 15.1. 

Defendants not named and all claims not re-alleged in the Amended Complaint will be deemed

to have been waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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2. The Clerk of Court is directed to mail Plaintiff a copy of a Court approved civil

rights complaint form.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 30, 2012

Hon. Anthony J. Battaglia

U.S. District Judge

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