Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-01941/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-01941-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RONALD G FUCCI,

 Petitioner,

 v

AP KANE, Acting Warden,

 Respondent.

 

No C 06-1941 VRW

 ORDER

Petitioner Ronald Fucci, a California state prisoner,

seeks a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 USC § 2254(a),

challenging the denial of parole by the Board of Prison Terms

(Board) on December 18, 2003. Doc #1. In its July 27, 2006 Order

to Show Cause, this court found that petitioner raised two

cognizable due process claims: (1) the Board’s denial of parole was

not supported by the evidence; and (2) the Board’s denial of parole

violated his plea agreement. Doc #2 at 3. Respondent Anthony Kane

moved to dismiss the petition on statute of limitations grounds and

this court denied the motion. Doc #7; Doc #12. Respondent

thereafter filed an answer to the petition and petitioner filed a

traverse. Doc #13; Doc #14. After reviewing the papers and the

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relevant portions of the record, the court concludes that

petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief based on the

claims presented and therefore the petition is DENIED.

I

On August 12, 1988, petitioner pled guilty to first

degree murder and was sentenced to twenty-five years to life. Doc

#13, Ex 1. He has been serving his sentence since September 28,

1988 and his minimum eligible parole date was on November 15, 2004. 

Doc #13, Ex 4 at 1. Petitioner disputes some of the facts

underlying his conviction, but acknowledges his involvement in the

crime and accepts responsibility for his actions. Doc #13, Ex 4 at

64-66.

On December 3, 1987, petitioner and two co-defendants,

Prickett and Kangas, were admitted into the victim’s home under the

guise of selling him drugs, but with the intention to steal from

him to satisfy an outstanding debt. Doc #13, Ex 5 at 1, Ex 4 at

20. Petitioner had a special relationship of confidence and trust

with the victim, making the victim especially vulnerable. Doc #13,

Ex 5 at 2. An argument ensued between petitioner and the victim

and petitioner physically forced him to the ground. Id. 

Petitioner bound the victim’s hands and feet with duct tape, while

Kangus and Pricket started rummaging through his home looking for

property to steal. Doc #13, Ex 5 at 1. Petitioner maintains that

when the victim began yelling and screaming, Kangas kicked him in

the head and wrapped duct tape around his mouth and nose to quiet

him down. Doc #13, Ex 5 at 2. As Kangus and Prickett burglarized

the victim’s house, petitioner glanced at the victim and noticed

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that he was motionless and unresponsive. Id. Petitioner contends

that soon thereafter he observed that the victim was not breathing

and attempted to cut holes in the duct tape around his nose but the

victim had already died. Id at 1-2. Kangus and Picket left, while

petitioner stole some of the victim’s property to sell in order to

have money to leave town. Id at 2. Petitioner fled to Idaho and

was arrested when he returned to California. Id. 

When Kangus was arrested, he stated that petitioner

killed the victim by hitting him in the head with a frying pan. Id

at 1. A doctor concluded that the victim had died of suffocation

because his mouth and nostrils were completely sealed by at least

twelve wraps of duct tape. Id. He also observed evidence of

trauma to the victim’s eyes, face, head and back. Id. 

Petitioner appeared before the Board for his initial

parole consideration hearing on December 18, 2003. Doc #13, Ex 4

at 1. The Board found him unsuitable for parole and deferred

reconsideration for three years. Doc #13, Ex 4 at 71, 73. 

Specifically, the Board found that: (1) petitioner’s commitment

offense was carried out in an especially cruel, callous and

dispassionate manner; (2) petitioner had failed previous grants of

probation; (3) petitioner had an unstable social history and prior

criminality, which included drugs and alcohol abuse beginning at

age thirteen, dropping out of high school and having numerous

contacts with the police; (4) petitioner received three 115s

(disciplinaries); and (5) a 2003 psychological report was not

wholly supportive of his release, stating that unless various

support and monitoring programs were in place for petitioner and he

faithfully followed them, he would remain a danger to society. Doc

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#13, Ex 4 at 71-73. The Board further found that petitioner needed

to “participate in self-help in order to face, discuss, understand

and cope with stress in a nondestructive manner,” and until

progress was made, petitioner continued to be unpredictable and a

threat to others. Doc #73, Ex 4 at 73. Although the Board

commended petitioner for positive programming, including obtaining

his GED, learning sewing machine repair and bookbindery and

attending AA meetings, it found that the “positive aspects of his

behavior [did] not outweigh the factors of unsuitability.” Id. 

 Petitioner properly exhausted his administrative

remedies. Doc #13, Exs, 10, 11. On September 20, 2004, petitioner

filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Fresno County

superior court. Doc #13, Ex 12. On September 30, 2004, the

superior court denied petitioner relief, stating that “the existing

evidence does not justify the requested relief at this time.” Doc

#13, Ex 13. On January 5, 2005, petitioner filed for habeas relief

in the Fifth District Court of Appeal, which summarily denied him

relief on January 13, 2005, then on June 22 petitioner exhausted

his state court remedies by filing for habeas relief in the

California Supreme Court, which also denied him relief on February

22, 2006. Doc #13, Exs 14, 15, 16, 17. 

II

The court may grant federal habeas relief to a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court only if it

determines that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution,

laws or treaties of the United States. 28 USC § 2254(a); Rose v

Hodges, 423 US 19, 21 (1975). The petition cannot be granted

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unless the state court decision “was contrary to, or involved in an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or “based on

an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 USC § 2254(d). 

Section 2254 “is the exclusive vehicle for habeas

petition by a state prisoner * * * even when the petitioner is not

challenging his underlying state court conviction.” Sass v

California Bd of Prison Terms, 461 F3d 1123, 1126 (9th Cir 2006). 

When a state court does not explain its reasoning, the court must

conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether

the state court’s decision was objectively unreasonable. See id at

1127.

III

A

California Penal Code section 3041 vests California

prisoners whose sentences provide for possibility of parole with a

constitutionally protected liberty interest in the receipt of a

parole release date, protected by the procedural safeguards of the

Due Process Clause. Irons, II v Carey, 2007 WL 2027359, *3 (9th

Cir). Because in California there is a liberty interest in

obtaining parole, prisoners may not be deprived of this expectancy

without due process of law. See McQuillion v Duncan, 306 F3d 895,

903 (9th Cir 2002).

 The Ninth Circuit has held that the process due in a

proceeding to set a parole date is the same as the Supreme Court

outlined in Superintendent, Mass Correctional Inst at Walpole v

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Hill, 472 US 445 (1985), for prison disciplinary hearings. Jancsek

v Oregon Board of Parole, 833 F2d 1389, 1390 (9th Cir 1987). The

Court in Hill, 472 US at 456, held that the requirements of due

process are satisfied if “some evidence” supports the decision. To

determine whether the some evidence standard is met, the relevant

question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could

support the conclusion reached by the parole board. Sass, 461 F3d

at 1128. The some evidence standard is minimal and its purpose is

to ensure that “the record is not so devoid of evidence that the

findings of [the parole] board were without support or arbitrary. 

Id at 1129 (quoting Hill, 472 US at 457). 

When assessing whether the parole board’s decision was

supported by some evidence, the court must look to the underlying

California law that sets out the factors that parole boards must

use in determining a prisoner’s suitability for parole. See Irons,

II, 2007 WL 2027359 at *5. Under California law, parole may be

denied if the Board “determines that the gravity of the current

convicted offense or offenses, or the timing and gravity of current

or past convicted offense or offenses, is such that consideration

of the public safety requires a more lengthy period of

incarceration * * *.” Cal Penal Code § 3041(b).

B

Petitioner argues that the Board’s decision was not

supported by some evidence because its finding that petitioner’s

commitment offense was carried out in an especially cruel, callous

and dispassionate manner did not comport with the evidence in the

record and the reliance on his commitment offense violates due

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process. Doc #14 at 5, 8. Moreover, petitioner contends that the

Board’s finding that he lacked marketable skills was arbitrary and

his denial of parole violated the terms of his plea agreement. Doc

#14 at 10; Doc #1 at 8, 13, 18-19. The court addresses each of

these contentions in turn. 

1 

Petitioner first challenges the Board’s finding that his

commitment offense was carried out in an exceptionally cruel and

callous manner. Doc #14 at 5. He argues that there are no facts

in the record that indicate the crime involved multiple victims;

abuse, defilement or mutilation; exceptionally callous disregard

for human suffering; or an inexplicable motive as required by Cal

Code Regs, tit 15 § 2402(c)(1)(A)-(E).

Implementing regulations set detailed factors to consider

whether an inmate convicted of murder with an indeterminate life

sentence is suitable for parole. See Cal Code Regs tit 15, §§

2402(c)-(d). Among these factors indicating unsuitability for

release are, inter alia: (1) the prisoner’s commitment offense was

committed in an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner; (2)

the prisoner has a previous record of violence; (3) the prisoner

has an unstable social history; (4) the prisoner has a lengthy

history of severe mental problems related to the offense; and (5)

the prisoner has engaged in serious misconduct while in prison. 

See Cal Code Regs, tit 15 § 2402(c).

When a finding of unsuitability is predicated on the

prisoner’s commitment offense, “the Board must point to factors

beyond the minimum elements of the crime for which the inmate was

committed * * *.” See In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal App 4th 1061, 1071

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(2005). Such factors include, that “the offense was carried out in

a dispassionate and calculated manner,” that “the victim was abused

* * * during or after the offense” and that “the offense was

carried out in a manner which demonstrates an exceptionally callous

disregard for human suffering.” See Cal Code Regs, tit 15 §

2402(c)(1)(B)-(D). 

The Board stated that the crime was carried out in an

especially cruel and callous manner because of the dispassionate

manner the victim was killed, satisfying Cal Code Regs, tit 15 §

2402(c)(1)(B). Doc #13, Ex 4 at 71. This conclusion was drawn

from the fact that petitioner and his two crime partners, during a

home invasion, physically forced the victim to the ground, bound

him and wrapped at least twelve layers of duct tape around his

mouth and nose which led to his suffocation. Id. Even after the

victim was dead, petitioner continued burglarizing the victim’s

home, which suggested an indifference towards the victim’s death. 

Id. 

In addition to the facts specifically recited in the

Board’s decision, the record contains other facts that could

buttress the Board’s decision. A doctor observed evidence of

trauma to the victim’s eyes, face, head and back, which indicates

that “the victim was abused * * * during or after the offense.” 

Doc #13, Ex 5 at 1; Cal Code Regs, tit 15 § 2402(c)(1)(C). 

Petitioner knew the victim and had a special relationship of trust

with him. Doc #13, Ex 5 at 2. During the commission of the crime

petitioner had clear opportunities to cease the fatal attack but

instead continued. Id. Moreover, petitioner and his confederates

went to burglarize the victim’s home to satisfy a mere thirty

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dollar debt, demonstrating a motive for the crime that is “very

trivial in relation to the offense.” Doc #13, Ex 3 at 2; Cal Code

Regs, tit 15 § 2402(c)(1)(E). 

Accordingly, “some evidence” supported the Board’s use of

the “dispassionate and calculated” factor. Additionally, the court

finds evidence in the record that the victim was “abused” and the

motive was “trivial” in finding the murder was carried out in “an

especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner.” Cal Code Regs, tit

15 § 2402(c)(1). 

The court notes that only when the Board, unlike this

case, relies solely on the commitment offense in denying parole do

the circumstances of the offense have to be considered more

aggravated or violent than the minimum necessary to sustain a

conviction for that offense. See Dannenberg, 34 Cal App 4th at

1094. Even so, the circumstances of the crime in this case go

beyond the minimum necessary to sustain the conviction. Id.

Special circumstances, such as felony murder, justifying punishment

by death or life without the possibility of parole are acts beyond

the minimum necessary to sustain the conviction. See In re Van

Houten, 116 Cal Ap 4th 339, 353 (2004). Petitioner pled guilty to

first degree murder punished currently by a sentence of twenty-five

years to life with the possibility of parole; this offense is

characterized by a lack of special circumstances justifying the

death sentence or life without the possibility of parole. Cal Pen

Code §§ 190(a), 190.2(a); Van Houten, 116 Cal App 4th at 353. 

Petitioner’s offense, however, involved the special circumstance of

felony murder because the victim was killed during the course of a

home invasion robbery. Doc #13, Ex 4 at 71; Cal Pen Code §

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190.2(a)(17(A), (G). Therefore, notwithstanding other facts in the

record supporting a denial of parole, petitioner’s commitment

offense alone could have sustained the Board’s decision. 

2

Next, petitioner argues that the Board’s reliance on an

immutable factor to deny him parole, namely his commitment offense,

violated his due process. Doc #14 at 8. This argument is without

merit. 

The Ninth Circuit has held that a parole board’s sole

reliance on the gravity of the offense and conduct prior to

imprisonment in denying parole can be initially justified. Irons,

II, 2007 WL 2027359 at *5. Over time, however, continued reliance

on the nature of the offense when the prisoner demonstrates

exemplary behavior and evidence of rehabilitation, could result in

a due process violation. Id. 

In the instant case, petitioner was denied parole after

his initial parole hearing. Moreover, the Board based its decision

on other factors besides his commitment offense. Doc #13, Ex 4 at

1, 71-73. The Board considered petitioner’s history of drug and

alcohol abuse and his escalating pattern of criminal conduct prior

to his imprisonment, including probation violations, public

intoxication, driving under the influence and battery. Doc #13, Ex

3 at 5-8, Ex 4 at 71-72. The Board also took into account

petitioner’s three conduct violations (out of bounds, battery and

smoking in a cell) while in prison. Additionally, a psychiatric

report stated that petitioner needed a longer period of observation

and evaluation and that if released without a support system and

//

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continued monitoring, he remained a danger to the community. See

Doc #13, Ex 4 at 72, 74. 

Accordingly, because this was petitioner’s initial parole

hearing and the Board used other factors besides his commitment

offense to deny him parole, petitioner cannot maintain that his

right to due process was violated by a “continued reliance” on his

commitment offense. Therefore, the Board in basing its decision on

pre-conviction recidivism, social instability with substance abuse,

prison misconduct and the nature of the offense easily satisfied

the “some evidence” standard. See Sass, 461 F3d 1129. 

3

Petitioner also argues that the Board arbitrarily ruled

that petitioner needed to “upgrade vocationally.” Doc #14 at 10. 

One factor that lends support to a prisoner being suitable for

parole is a showing by the prisoner that he or she “has made

realistic plans for release or has developed marketable skills that

can be put to use upon release.” See Cal Code Regs, tit 15 §

2402(d)(8). Petitioner points to the fact that he is skilled in

sewing machine repair and bookbinding and that he is a certified

fitness trainer and has experience as a heavy equipment operator. 

Doc #13, Ex 4 at 37-38, 40, 49. Petitioner contends that based on

these skills he secured a firm job offer, thus proving he possessed

marketable skills within the meaning of § 2402(d)(8). Doc #14 at

10. 

As the court reads the decision, the Board’s view of

petitioner’s job skills was generally positive and it intended to

encourage petitioner to continue “going down the right path.” See

Doc #13, Ex 4 at 75. There is no indication in its decision that

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the Board based its denial of parole on a finding that petitioner

lacked marketable skills. In any event, the court’s role is

limited to determining whether the Board’s decision was supported

by some evidence, which it was. See Biggs v Terhune, 334 F3d 910,

916 (9th Cir 2003)(holding that “the district court was correct in

finding that in spite of the fact that several of the Board’s

findings were unsupported, there was some evidence supporting the

Board’s decision * * *.”). Because the record is not so devoid of

evidence that the findings of [the parole] board were without

support, the court need not examine further. See Sass, 461 F3d at

1128. 

4

Finally, petitioner asserts he is entitled to parole

pursuant to his plea agreement. Doc #1 at 8. He contends that “he

entered into a plea based on the expectation his crime would be

treated as less serious.” Id at 13. Petitioner contends that the

reciprocal benefit of the plea agreement is the earliest possible

release as long as his behavior in prison does not suggest that he

is currently a threat to society. Id at 18-19. 

Under California law, plea agreements are governed by

ordinary rules of contract interpretation. See Buckley v Turnhune,

441 F3d 688, 694-95 (9th Cir 2006). Thus, “California courts are

required to construe and interpret plea agreements in accordance

with state law.” Id at 695. 

Petitioner’s plea agreement indicates that his crime was

treated as “less serious” than if he had been sentenced following a

conviction at trial; his offense involved the special circumstance

of felony murder, which is punishable by death, but he instead

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received a sentence of twenty-five years to life with the

possibility of parole. More importantly, though, petitioner has

produced no evidence showing that his plea agreement included the

promise of release from prison once eligible for parole.

Accordingly, the court finds that the Board did not violate the

terms of petitioner’s plea agreement in denying him parole.

IV

For the reasons stated herein, the petition for a writ of

habeas corpus is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Judge

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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