Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02853/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-02853-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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The ADC defines a Security Threat Group as:

Any organization, club, association or group of individuals, either formal or informal

(including traditional prison gangs), that may have a common name or identifying

sign or symbol, and whose members engage in activities that include, but are not

limited to: planning, organizing, threatening, financing, soliciting, committing or

LMH

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Edward Hernandez, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Dora Schriro, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 05-2853-PHX-DGC (JJM)

ORDER

This is a civil rights action filed by a state prisoner. Plaintiff has requested a

preliminary injunction (dkt. #5), and Defendants have moved (dkt. #16) to dismiss Counts

I and III for lack of exhaustion. After careful review of the motions and the record, the Court

will deny injunctive relief and dismiss Counts I and III without prejudice.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, a Native American Indian, is housed at the highest custody level of the

Arizona Department of Corrections known as Special Management Unit II. He was placed

in SMU II after he was validated as a member of a Security Threat Group known as the

Warrior Society.1

 

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attempting to commit unlawful acts or acts that violate the Department’s written

instructions, which detract from the safe and orderly operation of prisons.

Dep’t Ord. 806 (Definitions).

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The defendants are ADC Director Dora Schriro, Deputy Warden Carson McWilliams,

and Correctional Classification Specialist Dorinda Cordova. Plaintiff brought four counts

for relief in his Complaint: (1) the conditions of SMU II trigger a liberty interest requiring

periodic review that is meaningful; (2) the conditions of SMU II violate the Eighth

Amendment; (3) his continued placement in SMU II is retaliatory for refusing to inform on

other prisoners; and (4) his rights under the First Amendment and Religious Land Use of

Institutionalized Persons Act were violated by restrictions on his Native American traditions.

Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief related to his classification and religious practice, and

Defendants seek to dismiss Counts I and III for lack of exhaustion.

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

A. Request for Default and Motion to Request Acceptance

of Response as Timely.

When Defendants failed to file a response to Plaintiff’s injunction motion, Plaintiff

requested a default judgment. See dkt. #11 at 5. Entry of default is not required when a

party fails to respond to a motion, and the Clerk of Court properly declined to enter a default

because Defendants had answered the Complaint. See FED.R.CIV. P. 55(a). After Plaintiff

requested default, Defendants recognized their error and promptly filed a response along with

a motion asking the Court to accept their response as timely. They explain that they

inadvertently overlooked the part of the Court’s order that required them to respond to the

motion for a preliminary injunction. 

Plaintiff has not responded to Defendants’ motion to accept their untimely response.

The failure to respond may be deemed a consent to the granting of the motion. See LRCIV

7.2(i). The length of the delay caused by Defendants was not significant, and there is no

indication that Plaintiff has suffered any prejudice. The Court will therefore grant

Defendants’ motion to accept the untimely response.

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B. Parties’ Contentions.

In his motion for a preliminary injunction, Plaintiff asserts that (1) the conditions of

his placement violate the Eighth Amendment and trigger a liberty interest requiring a

“meaningful” reclassification review, and (2) his right of religious exercise in certain Native

American traditions has been infringed. For relief, Plaintiff requests a “meaningful

reclassification” review to lower his scores so that he is returned to the general population,

and an order permitting him to participate in certain Native American traditions. He has

submitted a declaration (dkt. #6) in support of his motion.

Defendants have not responded to Plaintiff’s claims regarding the conditions of his

placement and right to a meaningful reclassification review. They do assert, however, that

Plaintiff is able to participate in most of forms of religious exercise except when security

interests justify certain limitations. In support, Defendants submitted the affidavit of Michael

Linderman, the Administrator of Pastoral Activities for the ADC. (Linderman Aff., dkt. #34,

Attach. A.)

C. Legal Standard.

 A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy and will not be granted absent

a clear showing of likely success in the underlying claim and possible irreparable injury. See

Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam); Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418

F.3d 989, 993-94 (9th Cir. 2005); Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 805 (9th Cir. 1995).

Alternately, a party may show that serious questions going to the merits were raised and the

balance of hardships tips sharply in his favor. Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 994.

D. Analysis.

1. Conditions of SMU II.

Plaintiff claims that the conditions in SMU II impose an “atypical and significant

hardship” in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life, and he seeks an order returning

him to the general population. Defendants have not responded to these allegations. Though

unrebutted, Plaintiff’s allegations do not merit the extraordinary remedy of injunctive relief.

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As a prerequisite to preliminary injunctive relief, a plaintiff must do more than allege

imminent harm sufficient to establish standing; he must also demonstrate immediate

threatened injury. Carribbean Marine Serv. v. Baldridge, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988).

In other words, a plaintiff must show a real or immediate threat – a likelihood of substantial

and immediate irreparable injury. Gomez v. Vernon, 255 F.3d 1118, 1129 (9th Cir. 2001)

(quotation and citation omitted). Speculative injury is not sufficient. Carribean Marine

Serv., 844 F.3d at 674. 

Plaintiff asserts that if he is in SMU indefinitely, the long term confinement would

cause psychological decomposition. (Mot. at 2; see also Mot. at 4, 10.) He claims that he

suffers “potential psychological and physical harm” every day he is there. (Mot. at 2.)

Whether Plaintiff will be in SMU indefinitely is speculative, and a claim of potential harm

does not demonstrate a likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable injury. Although

Plaintiff’s allegation of harm might be enough to state a claim, it is not sufficient to warrant

injunctive relief.

2. Periodic review.

Plaintiff contends that he has been denied adequate process because his placement is

reviewed only every 180 days. He claims that the only reason to continue his placement

would be misconduct on his part, and he has not committed any misconduct. (Mot. at 3.)

Defendants have not responded to this contention. Regardless, Plaintiff has not demonstrated

that he will be successful in this claim. 

Assuming that the conditions of Plaintiff’s placement require periodic review as a

matter of procedural due process, see Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 477 n.9 (1983),

Plaintiff has not asserted what is unconstitutional about the review he receives every 180

days. Periodic review must not be pretextual, see id. at 477 n.9, but Plaintiff has not

explained why his review is pretexual. Although he believes he must commit misconduct

to be retained in SMU II, his STG membership is a justifiable reason for his continued

placement. Because Plaintiff has not shown a likelihood of success on the merits, the Court

will not grant “meaningful reclassification review” by way of injunctive relief.

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3. Religious exercise.

Plaintiff contends that his rights under the First Amendment and the Religious Land

Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 have been violated regarding the practice of

his Native American traditions.

a. First Amendment.

Prisoners retain the First Amendment right to free exercise of religion. O’Lone v.

Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987); Henderson v. Terhune, 379 F.3d 709, 712 (9th

Cir. 2004). To state a claim, Plaintiff must allege that Defendants burdened the practice of

his religion without any justification reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.

Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 736 (9th Cir. 1997). Whether a regulation is reasonably

related to legitimate penological interests requires a four-part analysis: (1) whether there is

a valid, rational connection between the regulation and the legitimate governmental interest;

(2) whether there are alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to inmates;

(3) the impact accommodation of the right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the

allocation of prison resources; and (4) the absence of ready regulatory alternatives. Turner

v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90 (1987); accord Henderson, 379 F.3d at 713.

 b. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”).

Under RLUIPA, a government may not impose a substantial burden on the religious

exercise of a confined person unless the government establishes that the burden furthers a

“compelling governmental interest” and does so by “the least restrictive means.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000cc-1(a)(1)-(2). This “compelling government interest” and “least restrictive means”

test replaced Turner’s “legitimate penological interest” test. Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 994

(citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)). Under its own terms, RLUIPA must be “construed broadly

in favor of protecting an inmate’s right to exercise his religious beliefs.” Id. at 995 (citing

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g)). Last year, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of

RLUIPA against an Establishment Clause challenge. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 125 S. Ct. 2113

(2005). 

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The inmate bears both the burden of establishing a prima facie case and the burden

of persuasion on whether there is a “substantial burden” on the inmate’s exercise of religious

beliefs. Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 994 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b)). A burden is

substantial when it imposes a significantly great restriction or onus upon religious exercise.

Id. at 995 (quotations omitted). If the inmate meets his burden of proof, the government

bears the burden of persuasion to prove that the substantial burden on the exercise of

religious beliefs is both in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and the least

restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. Warsoldier, 418 F.3d

at 995 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a); § 2000cc-2(b)).

c. Analysis.

Because the standards under RLUIPA are more favorable to Plaintiff, the Court will

begin with the statute. Plaintiff’s factual allegations and requests for relief regarding this

claim are scattered throughout his Complaint, Motion, and Declaration in Support. The

Court reads his pleadings with the required liberality for pro se litigants, see Hearns v.

Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2005). 

In Count IV of his Complaint, Plaintiff asserts that (1) despite his requests and

contrary to ADC policy, Defendants Schriro and McWilliams prevented him from engaging

in sweat lodge and pipe ceremonies with a Native American Spiritual Advisor; (2) contrary

to ADC policy, Defendant McWilliams confiscated his red and blue headband, and

Defendant McWilliams and Schriro continue to refuse to allow Plaintiff to purchase a

headband; (3) contrary to ADC policy, Defendants McWilliams and Schriro continue to

refuse to allow Plaintiff to wear his medicine bag or obtain an alternative; and (4) Defendant

Schriro refuses to pursue the hiring of a Native American Spiritual Advisor/Medicine Man

or Woman so Plaintiff may seek counsel for a sacred pipe or sweat lodge ceremony. (Compl.

at 7 - 7C, dkt. #1.)

In his Declaration in Support, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants do not comply with

their own policies because he is not allowed to possess and wear religious articles nor have

access to a Native American spiritual advisor or volunteer, despite his repeated requests.

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(Pl.’s Aff., ¶¶ 16-17, dkt. #6.) In his Motion, Plaintiff asserts that he has not been permitted

to wear a headband or a sacred medicine bag in and out of his cell. (Mot. at 8.) He contends

that general population inmates are allowed to participate in weekly sweat lodge ceremonies,

talking circles, annual Pow-Wows, smudging, and the possession of religious articles. (Pl.’s

Aff., ¶ 20, dkt. #6.) 

 For relief, Plaintiff requests an order permitting him (1) to participate in a sacred pipe

and sweat lodge ceremony two or three times per year when an advisor or volunteer is

available (which he states is significantly fewer times than the weekly ceremonies for general

population inmates) (Mot. at 4, 7, dkt. #5); (2) to have a sweat lodge built as required under

policy (Mot. at 6, 7); (3) to possess and wear a medicine bag (Mot. at 6, 8; Pl.’s Aff., ¶ 23,

dkt. #6); and (4) to participate in talking circles, Pow-Wow ceremonies and smudging as

would a general population inmate (Pl.’s Aff., ¶¶ 1, 20).

i. Sweat Lodge.

Plaintiff requests that a sweat lodge be built for SMU II inmates. Sweat lodge

ceremonies are not permitted for inmates in SMU II because the recreational areas, which are

“designed to provide the highest possible security for the most dangerous inmate,” are not

capable of accommodating a sweat lodge. Linderman Aff., ¶ 21. Inmates who participate

in sweat lodge ceremonies disappear from view, which is permitted in lower level custody

arrangements but not in SMU II. Id., ¶ 22.

The Supreme Court noted that lawmakers supporting RLUIPA anticipated that it

would be applied with “due deference to the experience and expertise of prison and jail

administrators in establishing necessary regulations and procedures to maintain good order,

security and discipline, consistent with consideration of costs and limited resources.” See

Cutter, 125 S. Ct. at 2123 (citing Joint Statement S7775, quoting S. Rep. No. 103-11, p. 10

(1993), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1993, pp. 1892, 1899, 1900). The Ninth Circuit

has recognized that security is a compelling state interest. Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 998.

Given this law, Plaintiff has not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of his

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claim that refusing to build a sweat lodge for SMU II inmate fails to further a compelling

governmental interest.

Plaintiff also seeks to attend sweat lodge ceremonies with a spiritual advisor.

Presumably, he would periodically like to join the general population in their sweat lodge

ceremonies. Group activities are not permitted for inmates in SMU II for security reasons.

(Linderman Aff., ¶ 24.) Allowing Plaintiff to attend sweat lodge ceremonies with the general

population, regardless of whether a spiritual advisor also attends, would place security

interests in jeopardy. Plaintiff has not shown that he is likely to prevail on the merits of his

claim that denying him access to such ceremonies does not further a compelling government

interest in security. Nor has he shown that he is likely to succeed in a claim that there are

other means of ensuring security that would be less restrictive.

ii. Pipe ceremony.

Plaintiff seeks to participate in a pipe ceremony with an advisor or volunteer.

Defendants assert that a pipe ceremony may be conducted alone in the recreation yard, with

or without an advisor. (Linderman Aff., ¶ 18.) Defendants claim that it is Plaintiff’s

responsibility to find an advisor willing to visit him, as none are on staff. Id.,¶ 19. Plaintiff

has not replied. 

Parties may rely on developments postdating the pleadings to show whether injunctive

relief remains appropriate. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 846-47 (1994).

Defendants’ concession that Plaintiff may conduct a pipe ceremony during recreation, with

or without an advisor, presumably has resolved this issue. Plaintiff therefore has not shown

that he is entitled to injunctive relief.

iii. Headband and medicine bag.

Plaintiff alleges that his red and blue headband were confiscated by Defendant

McWilliams, that he is not permitted to purchase a headband, and that Defendants

McWilliams and Schriro refuse to allow him to wear his medicine bag or obtain an

alternative. In response, Defendants concede that inmates in SMU II are permitted to wear

a headband or a medicine bag when in the recreational area for two hours per session, three

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days per week, or while in their cells involved in religious practice. (Linderman Aff., ¶ 11.)

For security reasons, the headband and medicine bag may not be worn while in transit

between his cell and the recreational area; instead, inmates may have duplicate items at each

location. Id., ¶ 12. 

Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s practice has not been substantially burdened

because Plaintiff has failed to recognize that he may wear his religious articles. As stated,

parties may rely on developments postdating the pleadings to show whether injunctive relief

remains appropriate. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 846-47. Plaintiff has not replied to

Defendants’ concession that he may have duplicate sets of a headband and medicine bag for

use either in his cell or during recreation. On this record, Plaintiff has failed to establish his

right to injunctive relief.

iv. Smudging, talking circles and Pow-Wows.

Plaintiff would like to participate in group activities involving smudging, talking

circles, and Pow-Wows. Defendants contend that group gatherings such as talking circles

and Pow-Wows are not permitted in SMU II because of security concerns. (Linderman Aff.,

¶ 24.) They concede that inmates in SMU II may participate in smudging during recreation

time. Id.,¶ 14. Defendants contend that the compelling governmental interest in security

justifies restricting inmates in SMU II from participating in group activities and that they

have offered a less restrictive means such as a solitary smudging during recreation time.

Plaintiff has not replied. Presumably, he is satisfied with the concession. In any case,

Plaintiff has not shown that he is likely to succeed on the merits and therefore entitled to

injunctive relief.

In light of Plaintiff’s inability to show a likelihood of success on his claims under

RLUIPA, he also cannot satisfy the First Amendment standards. In other words, if Plaintiff

has failed to establish his right to injunctive relief under the more favorable requirements of

RLUIPA, he cannot show an entitlement to such relief under the less demanding standards

of the First Amendment. Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief will therefore be denied

without prejudice.

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MOTION TO DISMISS AND OTHER MOTIONS

A. Parties’ Contentions.

Defendants contend that Plaintiff failed to grieve Count I (continued placement in

SMU II) and Count III (retaliation) up to the Director’s level. Defendants submit the

affidavit of Aurora Aguilar, a Hearing Officer, in support of their contentions. (Aguilar Aff.,

Mot., Ex. 1, Dkt. #16.) In response, Plaintiff submits several reasons why he believes the

exhaustion requirement is satisfied. In support, he submits an affidavit of Inmate Jay Jonas.

(Jonas Aff., Mot. to Strike, Ex. 5.) Defendants have replied that the process is not excused

by a claim of futility.

B. Motion to strike.

Plaintiff also seeks, pursuant to Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

to strike Aguilar’s affidavit as made in bad faith on the basis that her averments are

misleading. Rule 12(f) permits the court to strike “from any pleading any insufficient

defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Its purpose is “to

avoid the expenditure of time and money that must arise from litigating spurious issues by

dispensing with those issues prior to trial.” Sidney-Vinstein v. A.H. Robins Co., 697 F.2d

880, 885 (9th Cir. 1983). 

By its own terms, Rule 12(f) applies to a “pleading” and not an affidavit. See

Wimberly v. Clark Controller Co., 364 F.2d 225, 227 (6th Cir. 1966); Wright & Miller, 5C

FED. PRAC.&PROC.CIV.3d § 1380 (2005) (Rule 12(f) is “neither an authorized nor a proper

way . . . to strike an opponent’s affidavits”). Moreover, Plaintiff does not challenge the legal

sufficiency of Augilar’s affidavit; he simply disagrees with her position. This disagreement

is not a basis to strike. Plaintiff was free to (and did) submit countervailing evidence.

Finally, even if the affidavit could be stricken, it does not contain any of the types of material

listed in Rule 12(f). Thus, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s motion.

C. Legal Standards for Exhaustion.

A prisoner may not challenge prison conditions without first exhausting available

administrative remedies. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); see Roles v. Maddox, 439 F.3d 1016, 1017

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(9th Cir. 2006). Exhaustion is mandated regardless of the type of relief sought, Booth v.

Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001), and for all inmate suits regarding prison life, Porter v.

Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 523 (2002). Defendants bear the burden of raising and proving the

absence of exhaustion. Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Ngo

v. Woodford, 403 F.3d 620, 626 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 647 (2005). The lack of

exhaustion is properly raised as a matter of abatement in an unenumerated Rule 12(b)

motion. Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119-20. Under this standard, the court may look beyond the

pleadings and decide disputed issues of fact. Id. at 1120. The Court has broad discretion

as to the method to be used in resolving the factual dispute. Ritza v. Int’l Longshoremen’s

& Warehousemen’s Union, 837 F.2d 365, 369 (9th Cir. 1988) (quotation omitted). Lack of

exhaustion warrants dismissal of the claim without prejudice. Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1120; see

also Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1170 (9th Cir. 2005).

D. Exhaustion Analysis.

1. Grievance policy.

Issues that may generally be grieved are set forth in ADC’s Department Order 802,

which provides in pertinent part:

Inmates may use the grievance process for the following issues:

Property, staff, visitation, mail, food service, institutional procedures,

Department Written Instructions, program access, medical care, religion and

conditions of confinement.

 * * * *

Inmates may not use the inmate grievance system for classification, discipline

issues, or any other system which has its own unique appeal process.

DO 802.01 (1.1.1, 1.2.3) (emphasis in original) (Attach. A to Aguilar Aff., Defs.’ Mot. to

Dismiss, dkt. #16; Ex. 1 to Pl.’s Resp., dkt. #27). 

Classification has its own appeal system as set forth in DO 801. (Ex. 2 to Pl.’s Mot.

to Strike, dkt. #27). The policy provides for only “one appeal opportunity” of the “final

decision by the Central Classification Office.” Id. On October 25, 2005 – after Plaintiff filed

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2

Although Plaintiff asserts that he attached this revised new policy as Exhibit 2 (Resp. at 3,

dkt. #28; Exhibit 2, dkt. #27), he has actually submitted a copy of the former policy. The current

policy is available at http://www.azcorrections.gov/Policies/DI232.html.

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this action – DO 801 was modified by Director’s Instruction #232.2 Revised DI #232, part

801.06, contains a section that applies to Procedures for Maximum Security Placement.

Under Part 1.2, there is an appeal provision for the decision to place an inmate in maximum

custody. There are provisions for periodic review (60 days, 180 days, and annually

thereafter), but no indication how these may be appealed. DI #232, part 801.06 (1.3). 

2. Count I - Meaningful review of Placement in SMU II.

Defendants bear the burden of demonstrating that the pertinent relief is available.

Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 937 (9th Cir. 2005). They contend that Plaintiff’s challenge

in Count I to the lack of meaningful review of his continued placement in SMU II may be

grieved under DO 802 as a challenge to the lack of institutional procedures regarding

confinement in SMU II and as a claim regarding conditions of confinement. There is no

record that Plaintiff filed a grievance regarding this claim.

Plaintiff contends that Count I was not grievable under DO 802 because classification

has its own process under DO 801. The Court is not persuaded by this contention. The

appeal process under DO 801 applies to the decision to place an inmate under a certain

classification, not to the adequacy of later review of that decision. 

Plaintiff next contends that the revised DI #232 allows appeals of classification

procedures. The Court is not persuaded by this contention. Even after revision, DI #232

only definitively allows appeal of the initial placement decision. There are no specific appeal

procedures in DI #232 for appeal of the “procedures” after placement, except to provide that

periodic review occurs at regular intervals (60 days, 80 days, and annually thereafter).

Moreover, this revision took place after the event in suit. If Plaintiff is trying to say that

revised DI #232 defines the parameters of the superseded DO 802, he then would have been

obligated to raise Count I in the classification appeal process under DO 802. He did not do

that. Although he submits an example of an appeal of a classification review, (ex. #3, Mot.

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to Strike), he raised only a claim that his classification score should have been lowered

because he had no disciplinary violations. He did not raise a claim that post-classification

review procedure was not meaningful. Thus, assuming that DO 802 was an available method

to exhaust administrative remedies, Plaintiff did not do so.

Alternately, Plaintiff contends that the issue was exhausted when he appealed his

validation as a member of a STG. (Mot. to Strike, Ex. 6.) This appeal, however, does not

contain a claim that the periodic review of his placement is not meaningful. Thus, the issue

was not presented to prison officials.

Inmates must exhaust remedies that are “available,” which means they must “navigate

all of a prison’s administrative review process” regardless of the type of relief sought.

Brown, 422 F.3d at 934 (citing Booth, 532 U.S. at 739). The underlying goal is to allow

corrections official the opportunity to address complaints internally before coming to federal

court. Porter, 534 U.S. at 525. Plaintiff did nothing to satisfy this goal. He could have filed

a grievance under DO 802 or he could have included the claim in an appeal from a decision

denying reclassification under DO 801. He did not attempt either. The Supreme Court has

declined to read a futility exception into § 1997e(a), see Booth, 532 U.S. at 741 & n.6, and

the Court will not permit Plaintiff to create one. On this record, the Court is satisfied that

administrative relief was available for Plaintiff’s claim. The Court will grant Defendants’

motion to dismiss Count I.

3. Count III - Retaliation.

In Count III, Plaintiff asserts that his continued placement in SMU II is retaliatory for

refusing to inform on other prisoners. Defendants contend that this claim was grievable

under DO 802 as a grievance against “staff.” 

Plaintiff contends that his retaliation claim is not grievable because it is not listed

under DO 802. The Court is not persuaded that DO 802 is so narrow. Plaintiff also asserts

that his retaliation claim is intertwined with his exhausted claims regarding conditions of

confinement. There is no indication, however, that a retaliation claim was raised in these

grievances. (See Attach. B. to Aguilar Aff., Mot. to Dismiss, dkt. #16.) 

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Finally, Plaintiff submits an affidavit of inmate Jay Jonas to show that Jonas had a

similar retaliation claim that was returned unprocessed. (Jonas Aff., Mot. to Strike, Ex. 5,

dkt. #27.) For his retaliation claim, Jonas (1) filed an informal resolution that was denied,

(2) appealed the response to the grievance coordinator, (3) appealed the coordinator’s

response to the deputy warden, and (4) finally appealed to the director. Id., ¶ 8. The Director

refused his claim and returned it as unprocessed because it had been addressed in another

grievance. Id., ¶¶ 8-9. This evidence proves that retaliation claims are grievable. Jonas’

retaliation claim was returned only when it was discovered to be a duplicate. In addition,

Jonas admits that he raised the same claims as Plaintiff’s Count I and III in another lawsuit,

and both counts were dismissed as unexhausted. (Jonas Aff., ¶ 5); see also Jonas v. Schriro,

CV 04-2719-PHX-SMM (MEA) (D. Ariz.) (dkt. #19). Plaintiff could have grieved his

retaliation claim. The Court will grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count III.

E. Miscellaneous Motions

Plaintiff has also filed a “Motion to Amend/Correct” (dkt. #8) that re-submits a copy

of his complaint and other motions after an extra set was returned to him by the Clerk with

a filemark stamp. The Court has adequate copies of those pleadings. Plaintiff’s motion will

be denied as moot.

Plaintiff has also moved for extension of time (dkt. #17) to respond to Defendants’

motion to dismiss. This motion is moot, as Plaintiff has already filed a response which the

Court has considered. See Dkt. #28. The motion will therefore be denied.

IT IS ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction (dkt. #5) is denied without

prejudice. 2. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (dkt. #16) is granted. Counts

I and III are dismissed without prejudice.

2. Defendant’s Motion to Accept Untimely Response (dkt. #35) is granted.

Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend/Correct (dkt. #8), for Extension of Time (dkt.

#17) and to Strike (#27) are denied.

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3. This matter is referred back to Magistrate Judge Jacqueline J. Marshall for

further proceedings on Counts II and IV of Plaintiff’s Complaint.

DATED this 18th day of May, 2006.

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