Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-03967/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-03967-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 120
Nature of Suit: Marine Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1333 Admiralty

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

APL CO. PTE. LTD., 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

KEMIRA WATER SOLUTIONS, INC. 

(formally known as "Kemiron 

Companies"), FAIRYLAND ENVITECH 

CO. LTD., 

Defendants. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Case No. 09-3967 SC 

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 

DISMISS

I. INTRODUCTION

 A carrier, APL Co. PTE. LTD. ("APL"), has brought this suit 

against a shipper, Fairyland Envitech Co. LTD. ("Fairyland"), and 

the intended recipient/purchaser of the shipment, Kemira Water 

Solutions, Inc. ("Kemira").1

 See Docket No. 1 ("Compl."). Kemira 

has filed a Motion to Dismiss, on the grounds that venue is 

improper in this district. Docket No. 17 ("Motion"). The Motion 

is fully briefed. Docket Nos. 23 ("Opp'n"), 24 ("Reply"). Having 

considered the papers filed by both parties, the Court concludes 

that this matter is appropriate for determination without oral 

argument. For the reasons stated below, the Court DENIES Kemira's 

Motion to Dismiss. 

 

1

 Fairyland has not participated in this Motion, nor has it 

appeared in these proceedings. 

Case 3:09-cv-03967-SC Document 25 Filed 03/10/10 Page 1 of 14
2 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California 

II. BACKGROUND

 APL is a Singapore corporation with its principal place of 

business in Singapore. Compl. ¶ 4. Kemira is a Delaware 

corporation with its principal place of business in Florida. Id.

¶ 5. Fairyland is alleged to be a company organized under the laws 

of Taiwan, which is also its principal place of business. Id. ¶ 6. 

 APL alleges that Kemira contracted to purchase two cargoes of 

ferrous chloride from Fairyland. Id. ¶¶ 7, 16. According to APL, 

Fairyland tendered these cargoes to APL in late 2006, with the 

ferrous chloride packed into bags which Fairyland had packed or 

caused to be packed in ocean cargo containers. Id. ¶ 7. According 

to Plaintiff, it took the cargoes as Carrier under two Bills of 

Lading, under which Fairyland was the Shipper and Kemira was the 

Consignee. Id. ¶¶ 8-10. These Bills of Lading state that both the 

Shipper and Consignee (which are both grouped, together with 

Receivers and Holders, under the title "Merchants") "shall be 

jointly and severally liable to the Carrier . . . for the 

performance of the obligations of any of them under this Bill of 

Lading." Id. ¶ 13. They also state that Merchants "shall 

indemnify the Carrier against all claims, losses, damages, 

liabilities, or expenses arising in consequences of the Carriage of 

such Goods." Id. ¶ 21. 

 After the first cargo arrived in California, APL discovered 

that the containers holding the cargoes "were leaking and 

hazardous." Id. ¶¶ 18-19. APL spent money "containing, assessing, 

cleaning, and removing the goods." Id. ¶ 20. APL has brought this 

suit against Kemira and Fairyland in the Northern District of 

California, and is apparently seeking to recover under the Bills of 

Case 3:09-cv-03967-SC Document 25 Filed 03/10/10 Page 2 of 14
3 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California 

Lading as contracts, and under the Comprehensive Environmental 

Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. 

§§ 9601 et seq. 

 Kemira seeks to invoke a provision in the Terms and Conditions 

of the Bills of Lading ("Terms") that gives "Merchants" the right 

to "refer any claim or dispute to the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of New York." Huber Decl.2

 Ex. B 

("Terms") § 28(iii). Kemira claims that this provision allows it 

to render the Northern District of California an improper venue. 

The relevant portions of the Terms and Conditions read as follows: 

28. Law and Jurisdiction 

. . . 

ii. Jurisdiction 

All disputes relating to this Bill of Lading 

shall be determined by the Courts of Singapore to 

the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the courts 

of any other country provided always that the 

Carrier may in its absolute and sole discretion 

invoke or voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction 

of the Courts of any other country which, but for 

the terms of this Bill of Lading, could properly 

assume jurisdiction to hear and determine such 

disputes, but shall not constitute a waiver of 

the terms of this provision in any other 

instance. 

iii. Notwithstanding Clause 28 i)3 and ii), if 

Carriage includes Carriage to, from or through a 

port in the United States of America, the 

Merchant may refer any claim or dispute to the 

United States District Court for the Southern 

District of New York in accordance with the laws 

of the United States of America. 

Id. § 28. 

 

2

 Marisa G. Huber, Counsel for Kemira, filed a declaration in 

support of the Motion. Docket No. 18. 

3

 Section 28(i) of the Bills of Lading state that the laws of 

Singapore govern the terms, conditions, and interpretation of the 

Bills of Lading. 

Case 3:09-cv-03967-SC Document 25 Filed 03/10/10 Page 3 of 14
4 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California 

III. LEGAL STANDARD

 Rule 12(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a 

defendant to move to dismiss an action for improper venue. This is 

the proper motion by which a defendant may seek to enforce a forum 

selection clause. Argueta v. Banco Mexicano, S.A., 87 F.3d 320, 

324 (9th Cir. 1996). The Court need not accept the pleadings as 

true, and may consider facts outside the pleadings. Murphy v. 

Schneider Nat'l, Inc., 362 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2003). 

However, "the trial court must draw all reasonable inferences in 

favor of the non-moving party and resolve all factual conflicts in 

favor of the non-moving party." Id. at 1138-40. "Federal law 

governs the validity of a forum selection clause." Argueta, 87 

F.3d at 324.4 "A forum selection clause is presumptively valid; 

the party seeking to avoid a forum selection clause bears a 'heavy 

burden' to establish a ground upon which we will conclude the 

clause is unenforceable." Doe 1 v. AOL LLC, 552 F.3d 1077, 1083 

(9th Cir. 2009). 

 If this Court concludes that venue in this district is 

improper, then it "shall dismiss [the case], or if it be in the 

interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division 

in which it could have been filed." 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). 

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Kemira May Invoke Section 28(iii) Even Though It Is 

Contesting Its Status as a "Merchant"

 APL contends that Kemira is attempting to "have its cake and 

 

4

 Neither party has urged the application of Singaporean law to the 

forum-selection provision at issue. 

Case 3:09-cv-03967-SC Document 25 Filed 03/10/10 Page 4 of 14
5 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California 

eat it too," by invoking a right granted to "Merchants" under 

section 28(iii) of the Terms, while maintaining the defense that it 

was not a "Merchant" when it comes to adjudication of the merits of 

the contract. Opp'n at 3-4. Kemira argues that it may waive the 

defense that it is not a Merchant under the contracts for the 

limited purpose of invoking section 28(iii) and invoking the forumselection provision. Reply at 4-5. 

 Because APL is alleging that Kemira is a Merchant, Kemira and 

this Court may rely on this allegation to conclude that Kemira has 

standing to "refer" this dispute to the Southern District of New 

York. In resolving this Motion, this Court should not be required 

to reach the merits of the dispute, and resolve at this preliminary 

stage the question of whether or not Kemira is a Merchant. 

 This Court's conclusion is supported by Marra v. Papandreou, 

in which a panel for the D.C. Circuit considered the question of 

whether the country of Greece was barred from invoking the forumselection provision of a contract that it claimed had been revoked, 

and from which it claimed immunity under the Foreign Sovereign 

Immunities Act ("FSIA"). 216 F.3d 1119 (D.C. Cir. 2000). The 

panel acknowledged that a court considering a forum-selection 

provision "must also address issues that would be conventionally 

understood as going to the 'merits' of a contract dispute." Id. at 

1122. However, it also observed that a forum-selection provision 

"is separate from the obligations the parties owe to each other 

under the remainder of the contract. Thus when a court determines 

that a forum-selection clause is enforceable, it is not making an 

assumption of law-declaring power vis-a-vis other provisions of the 

contract." Id. at 1123 (internal quotation marks and citation 

Case 3:09-cv-03967-SC Document 25 Filed 03/10/10 Page 5 of 14
6 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California 

omitted). Greece therefore argued that its invocation of the 

forum-selection provision was "a waiver of its FSIA defense with 

respect to the clause" only, and the panel agreed. Id. ("If the 

Greek government were sued by Marra for breach of two different 

contracts, it certainly would have the prerogative to waive a 

sovereign immunity defense with respect to one of the contracts and 

invoke that defense for the other."). 

 APL argues that this situation is different from Marra because 

Kemira is arguing (or rather, can be expected to argue) that it was 

not even a party to the Bills of Lading. Opp'n at 3. This is a 

distinction in substantive defenses, and this Court does not find 

the distinction to be significant.5

 It would be impractical to 

attempt to design a test to determine which substantive defenses 

constitute waivers of forum-selection provisions and which 

substantive defenses permit defendants to retain their rights under 

such clauses. Assuming that the allegations in the Complaint are 

correct, and that APL can recover from Kemira at all, Kemira is a 

Merchant and has therefore been granted the right to "refer" 

disputes to the Southern District of New York. Whether or not 

Kemira is a Merchant under the contract is an as-of-yet 

undetermined question that should be adjudicated by a court in 

which venue is proper. 

/// 

/// 

 

5

 Indeed, a defendant who claims that he was not a party to a forum 

selection provision is on no firmer footing than a party who claims 

to have revoked the contract in which a forum selection provision 

is found (as in Marra). In either instance, the plaintiff will 

eventually be required to establish that the contract is valid and 

enforceable to prevail. 

Case 3:09-cv-03967-SC Document 25 Filed 03/10/10 Page 6 of 14
7 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California 

B. Section 28(iii) Permits Merchants to Set the Southern 

 District of New York as the Exclusive Jurisdiction

The outcome of this Motion will depend upon the Court's 

interpretation of section 28(iii) of the Terms. According to 

Kemira, section 28(iii) is a valid and enforceable forum selection 

clause, and by its terms, "APL's complaint should be dismissed 

once Kemira refers the case to New York." Mot. at 5. Its Motion 

therefore rests on the proposition that section 28(iii) is in fact 

an exclusive forum selection clause that conditionally (upon 

"reference" by a Merchant) mandates jurisdiction in the Southern 

District of New York. 

APL contends that the clause is merely permissive, and not 

mandatory. "To be mandatory, a clause must contain language that 

clearly designates a forum as the exclusive one." N. Cal. Dist. 

Council of Laborers v. Pittsburg-Des Moines Steel Co., 69 F.3d 

1034, 1037 (9th Cir. 1995). While an exclusive forum-selection 

clause will give defendants a basis for objecting to venue in any 

other jurisdiction, a permissive forum-selection clause does not 

prevent suits from going forward outside of the selected forum. 

See id. at 1036-37. 

When read in isolation, section 28(iii) is ambiguous. This 

provision purports to give Merchants the right to "refer any claim 

or dispute" to the Southern District of New York. Terms 

§ 28(iii). APL acknowledges that, at the very least, this 

provision would allow a Merchant the right to bring suit against 

APL before a court in the Southern District of New York, and that 

APL would be powerless to contest personal jurisdiction in such 

cases. See N. Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers, 69 F.3d at 1036-37 

Case 3:09-cv-03967-SC Document 25 Filed 03/10/10 Page 7 of 14
8 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California 

(recognizing that by agreeing to forum-selection provision, party 

may consent to jurisdiction in selected forum). In other words, 

this is at least a permissive forum selection provision. APL 

urges that section 28(iii) be read in conjunction with the 

preceding provision, section 28(ii), which explicitly sets 

jurisdiction in the courts of Singapore "to the exclusion of the 

jurisdiction of the courts of any other country," and which 

further allows the Carrier (i.e., APL) to bring suit or submit to 

jurisdiction in any court of any country that it wishes. Terms 

§ 28(ii). APL urges this Court to read section 28(iii) narrowly, 

as an exception to section 28(ii) that merely allows Merchants to 

bring suit in New York, in lieu of Singapore, so long as the Bill 

of Lading involves carriage to, from, or through the United 

States. 

The question is therefore whether the word "refer" permits a 

Merchant to simply "bring," "file," or "submit" "any claim or 

dispute" in New York, or whether Merchants may also "refer" a case 

that has been brought against that Merchant, after it has already 

been filed by APL in an otherwise-competent jurisdiction. The 

Court finds that the narrow reading urged by APL is inconsistent 

with the language that allows Merchants to "refer any claim or 

dispute" to the Southern District of New York. Id. Given the 

broad scope of this language, the Court sees no reason why the 

phrase "any claim or dispute" should not be read to include suits 

that have already been filed. It would have been simple to craft 

language that clearly and explicitly gives the Southern District 

of New York only permissive jurisdiction over APL, or that 

provides Merchants with more limited rights to "file" or "bring 

Case 3:09-cv-03967-SC Document 25 Filed 03/10/10 Page 8 of 14
9 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California 

claims" or "submit disputes" in that district. However, APL chose 

to draft the section using the far more ambiguous term "refer," 

with broad reference to "any claim or dispute," without 

limitation. Terms § 28(iii). 

"[W]here language is ambiguous the court should construe the 

language against the drafter of the contract." Hunt Wesson Foods, 

Inc. v. Supreme Oil Co., 817 F.2d 75, 78 (9th Cir. 1987) 

(discussing forum selection clause). While the Court finds APL's 

narrow reading of the provision to be reasonable, it is not so 

persuasive as to convince the Court that Kemira's broader reading 

is unreasonable. The provision is, at best, ambiguous as to the 

Merchant's right to "refer" an existing lawsuit to the Southern 

District of New York. 

The Court therefore finds that section 28(iii) gives any 

Merchant the right to object to venue in any suit not brought in 

the Southern District of New York, by "referring" the dispute to 

that district. This is functionally equivalent to an exclusive 

forum-selection provision. The fact that the Merchant must 

actively "refer" a case to the Southern District of New York is of 

no import. Any exclusive forum-selection provision -- no matter 

how unconditionally worded -- is waivable, and therefore requires 

an affirmative act before venue outside of the selected forum is 

rendered improper. Put otherwise, an exclusive forum-selection 

provision will be of no effect until it is invoked, but once 

invoked, it renders all venues except the selected venue 

improper.6 The same is true with section 28(iii): Once a Merchant 

 

6

 There is one respect in which section 28(iii) may differ from a 

more traditional exclusive forum-selection provision (e.g., "any 

Case 3:09-cv-03967-SC Document 25 Filed 03/10/10 Page 9 of 14
10 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California 

exercises its right to "refer" a dispute to the Southern District 

of New York, that district becomes the exclusive forum in which 

that dispute can be heard. 

C. Whether Section 28(iii) Should Be Enforced

Once this Court has established the existence of a valid 

forum-selection clause, "the party challenging the clause bears a 

'heavy burden of proof' and must 'clearly show that enforcement 

would be unreasonable and unjust, or that the clause was invalid 

for such reasons as fraud or over-reaching.'" Murphy, 362 F.3d at 

1140 (quoting Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 

(1972)). APL argues that the interests of justice would be better 

served by maintaining this suit in the Northern District of 

California. Opp'n at 10-12. APL also argues that this Court 

should not dismiss or transfer this suit because there is no 

evidence that APL could assert its claims against either Kemira or 

APL in the Southern District of New York, and therefore that 

district is an "improper venue." Opp'n at 9-10. 

With regard to Kemira, the argument that the Southern District 

of New York may lack personal jurisdiction is specious. Any 

defendant may waive any defense based on personal jurisdiction. 

Ainbinder v. Potter, 282 F. Supp. 2d 180, 185 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 

There is no question that Kemira, having "referred" this suit to 

the Southern District of New York, has waived any objection that 

 

dispute shall be determined by the courts of Singapore"): It is 

not clear that section 28(iii) should be construed as consent by a 

Merchant to venue in, or the jurisdiction of, the Southern District 

of New York, absent a referral by that Merchant. This raises an 

issue as to whether the Southern District of New York would be a 

proper forum for the claims against Fairyland, which has not 

exercised its right to "refer" this dispute to New York. This 

concern is addressed in the next section. 

Case 3:09-cv-03967-SC Document 25 Filed 03/10/10 Page 10 of 14
11 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California 

it might have to jurisdiction in that forum. 

Whether a district court in the Southern District of New York 

would be willing to exercise jurisdiction over Fairyland is a much 

closer question. Arguably, Fairyland has consented to 

jurisdiction in the Southern District of New York, by agreeing to 

the Terms of the Bills of Lading, which give any Merchant the 

right to "refer" cases to that jurisdiction. However, Fairyland 

has not asserted its right to "refer" this suit to the Southern 

District of New York. Given the ambiguous nature of the 

provision, this Court cannot presume that a court in the Southern 

District of New York would assert jurisdiction over Fairyland, by 

construing its acceptance of the ambiguous provision as consent to 

be sued in that forum. In particular, this Court is concerned 

that Fairyland has not purposefully directed any action towards 

the Southern District of New York, or availed itself of the 

benefits of doing business there, merely by accepting a limited 

option to "refer" disputes to New York. See Doe v. Unocal Corp., 

248 F.3d 915, 923 (9th Cir. 2001). Nor can the Court conclude, on 

the basis of the ambiguous provision, that Fairyland could have 

reasonably anticipated being hailed into court there when another 

"Merchant" chose to "refer" a dispute in which Fairyland was a 

codefendant. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 

474 (1985). Fairyland did not draft the provision, and it should 

not be held hostage to its ambiguities. Consequently, it is not 

clear that jurisdiction over Fairyland based on the Bills of 

Lading alone would pass constitutional muster. 

Because Fairyland has not yet participated in these 

Case 3:09-cv-03967-SC Document 25 Filed 03/10/10 Page 11 of 14
12 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California 

proceedings,7 the Court is aware of no facts that would, 

independently of the Terms of the Bills of Lading, provide that 

district with jurisdiction over Fairyland. Although APL raises 

this concern in its Opposition, Opp'n at 10, Kemira's Reply is 

completely silent as to whether personal jurisdiction over 

Fairyland would exist in New York. The Court finds no basis for 

concluding that the Southern District of New York would be able to 

assert personal jurisdiction over Fairyland.8

The Northern District of California remains a possible venue 

for APL's claims against Fairyland. In this circumstance, where 

venue may be improper as to only one defendant, "the interests of 

justice require the trial court to consider the possibility of 

transfer or dismissal of improper parties under F.R.Civ.P. 21 and 

28 U.S.C. § 1406(a)." Anrig v. Ringsby United, 603 F.2d 1319, 

1325 (9th Cir. 1978) (considering case in which venue under 28 

U.S.C. § 1391 was improper as to only certain defendants). 

However, the claims against both Kemira and Fairyland are deeply 

intertwined, and relate to exactly the same facts. The suit 

 

7

 Kemira claims that Fairyland has not been properly served. Reply 

at 9 n.3. However, APL has averred that Fairyland was properly 

served when APL caused the Complaint, Summons, and related 

documents to be mailed to Fairyland "through the Clerk of the 

Northern District California on November 4, 2009" in accordance 

with Rule 4(f)(2)(C)(ii) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

See Docket No. 9 ("APL Case Management Statement") at 2. No proof 

of service has been filed with this Court. 

8

 Although APL bears the burden of showing why enforcement of the 

forum-selection provision would be improper, under these 

circumstances, it is sufficient that APL has raised legitimate 

concerns related to obtaining personal jurisdiction over Fairyland 

in New York, which Kemira has completely ignored in its Reply. 

This Court will not place on APL the onerous burden of proving that 

the courts of the Southern District of New York would actually lack 

jurisdiction over Fairyland, which may well rest upon facts outside 

of its possession. 

Case 3:09-cv-03967-SC Document 25 Filed 03/10/10 Page 12 of 14
13 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California 

against Fairyland and Kemira is one in the same, and to allow the 

action against Kemira to go forward in New York while the same 

suit involving the same facts continues against Fairyland in this 

district would be inefficient, and would run the risk of 

duplicative litigation and potentially inconsistent judgments. 

This Court concludes that severance of this action would not be 

fair or reasonable.9 

This Court therefore declines to enforce section 28(iii) at 

this time. Transfer to the Southern District of New York would be 

unreasonable where it is not clear that that district would have 

jurisdiction over an important party to this dispute, and where 

separate proceedings against each defendant would be inefficient 

or unduly burdensome. Moreover, because of the jurisdictional 

concerns outlined above, this Court lacks the authority to 

transfer this suit to the Southern District of New York under 28 

U.S.C. § 1406, because it is not clear that the Southern District 

of New York is a "district or division in which [this suit] could 

have been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). Dismissal of this suit, 

with leave to refile against Defendants in the Southern District 

of New York, would be similarly unreasonable. This Court must 

therefore DENY Kemira's Motion. 

/// 

/// 

 

9

 APL also argues that, because of the lack of jurisdiction in New 

York, Kemira's referral of this suit to New York is not "in 

accordance with the laws of the United States," as required by 

section 28(iii). This clause appears to broadly prevent "referral" 

of a dispute to New York when the courts of that forum could not 

lawfully consider the dispute. This Court agrees that this clause 

serves as an independent basis for maintaining the dispute in 

California at present. 

Case 3:09-cv-03967-SC Document 25 Filed 03/10/10 Page 13 of 14
14 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California 

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Kemira's Motion to Dismiss is 

DENIED. 

In addition, the Court notes that APL has not filed with this 

Court a proof of service as to Defendant Fairyland within the 120-

day limit set out by Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

procedure. APL is therefore ORDERED to fully explain the status 

of its attempt to serve Fairyland, and to show good cause for its 

failure to complete service within the contemplated time period. 

It may do so in its Case Management Statement for the upcoming 

March 19, 2010 Case Management Conference, which is due no later 

than March 12, 2010. The March 19, 2010 Case Management 

Conference, set for 10:00 a.m. in Courtroom 1, on the 17th floor, 

U.S. Courthouse, 450 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, CA 94102, 

remains on calendar. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: March 10, 2010 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

 

Case 3:09-cv-03967-SC Document 25 Filed 03/10/10 Page 14 of 14