Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02350/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02350-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Herve Holemen,

Petitioner

-vsCharles L. Ryan,

Respondent.

CV-12-2350-PHX-SRB (JFM)

Report & Recommendation On Petition 

For Writ Of Habeas Corpus

I. MATTER UNDER CONSIDERATION

Petitioner, incarcerated at the time in the Arizona State Prison Complex at Yuma, 

Arizona, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on 

November 1, 2012 (Doc. 1). On March 18, 2013 Respondents filed their Response 

(“Answer”) (Doc. 10). Petitioner filed a Reply on April 16, 2013 (Doc. 11).

The Petitioner's Petition is now ripe for consideration. Accordingly, the 

undersigned makes the following proposed findings of fact, report, and recommendation 

pursuant to Rule 8(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Rule 72(b), Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72.2(a)(2), Local Rules of Civil 

Procedure. 

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEEDINGS AT TRIAL

Petitioner was arrested in connection with the investigation of two home invasion 

robberies that occurred approximately fifteen minutes apart in the same neighborhood. 

Petitioner was identified as the perpetrator in a show-up identification that night, and a 

photo lineup the next morning. Police recovered property taken in the first robbery, a 

wallet and vitamins, from the inside of Defendant's vehicle which was found parked 

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down the street from the second robbery. (Exhibit AA, Mem. Dec. 8/10/10.) (Exhibits 

to the Answer, Doc. 10, are referenced herein as “Exhibit ___.”) 

Petitioner was indicted in the Maricopa County Superior Court on August 29, 

2008 in a fourteen count Indictment (Exhibit A), including charges of armed robbery, 

kidnapping, burglary, and aggravated assault.

At trial, the prosecution presented testimony of three victim eyewitnesses and the 

investigating officers, as well as various physical evidence, photographs, etc. Counsel 

did not object to the use of the identifications.

Following a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted on three counts of armed robbery, 

four counts of kidnapping, two counts first-degree burglary, and four counts of 

aggravated assault. (Exhibit AA, Mem. Dec. at 2.) On April 24, 2009, he was sentenced 

to two sets of consecutive 15.75 year prison terms, resulting in a combined sentence of 

31.5 years in prison. (Exhibit U, Sentence; Exhibit T M.E. 4/24/9.)

B. PROCEEDINGS ON DIRECT APPEAL

Petitioner filed a direct appeal, arguing error in the admission of the eyewitness 

identifications and insufficient evidence. (Exhibit Y, Opening Brief; Exhibit AA, Mem. 

Dec. at 2.) On August 10, 2010, the Arizona Court of Appeals reviewed the issues for 

fundamental error because the issues had not been raised at trial. They denied the appeal 

and affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. (Exhibit AA, Mem. Dec.) 

Petitioner did not seek further review. (Exhibit AA, Order and Mandate; Petition, 

Doc. 1 at 2.) 

C. FIRST PROCEEDINGS ON POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

On October 5, 2010, Petitioner filed a Notice of Post-Conviction Relief (Exhibit 

BB) with the Maricopa County Superior Court. Counsel was appointed who eventually 

filed a Notice of Completion of Review (Exhibit DD), evidencing an inability to find an 

issue for review. Petitioner then filed a second Notice of Post Conviction Relief (Exhibit 

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EE), and then on July 18, 2011 filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (Exhibit HH).

Petitioner’s PCR petition argued a claim of newly discovered evidence, based on 

an affidavit from a victim (Munoz) disclaiming an ability to affirmatively identify 

Petitioner based upon his memory from the crime, as opposed to the photo lineup or 

press coverage. (Exhibit HH.) In his Reply brief (Exhibit KK), Petitioner “repeatedly 

criticizes his trial counsel.” (Exhibit LL, M.E. 11/9/11 at 6.) On November 9, 2011, the PCR 

court dismissed the petition, finding the newly discovered evidence claim to be without 

merit, and any purported ineffective assistance claim precluded because it was 

improperly raised for the first time in a reply brief. (Exhibit LL, M.E. 11/9/11.) 

Petitioner requested extensions of time for a motion for reconsideration and 

petition for review (Exhibits MM and NN). The PCR court granted Petitioner a 30 day 

extension, until January 19, 2012, to seek review.

Petitioner did not, however, seek further review. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 3.) 

D. SECOND PROCEEDINGS ON POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

On February 7, 2012, Petitioner filed his second PCR notice and petition (Exhibits

PP and QQ).1 Petitioner raised various Fourth Amendment claims and argued 

ineffective assistance of appellate and PCR counsel. On March 1, 2012, the PCR court 

summarily dismissed the petition, finding the claims untimely and either waived, 

precluded, or not cognizable. (Exhibit SS, M.E. 3/1/12.) 

Petitioner did not seek further review. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 3; Exhibit UU Docket 

at 1.)

E. PRESENT FEDERAL HABEAS PROCEEDINGS

Petition - Petitioner commenced the current case by filing through counsel his 

 

1

In his Motion to Strike (Exhibit OO) filed February 1, 2012, Petitioner argued that 

counsel had filed a second PCR petition in January, 2012, and sought to strike it. 

Petitioner’s petition does not identify this proceeding. The trial court’s docket does not 

reflect such a filing. (Exhibit UU, Docket at 1.) 

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Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on November 1, 2012 

(Doc. 1). Petitioner’s Petition asserts two grounds for relief: (1) his Fifth, Sixth, and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated by the denial of the effective assistance of 

counsel at trial; and (2) he was denied the effective assistance of counsel on appeal and 

in state post-conviction proceedings.

Response - On March 18, 2013, Respondents filed their Response (“Answer”) 

(Doc. 10). Respondents argue that the Petition is untimely, and the claims procedurally 

defaulted or procedurally barred.

Reply - On April 16, 2013, Petitioner filed a Reply (Doc. 11). Petitioner argues 

that his petition is timely because he is entitled to statutory tolling for the time in which 

he could have sought further review from the denial of his petitions for post-conviction 

relief, and he is entitled to equitable tolling based upon his pro se untrained status during 

his PCR proceedings, and he has been diligently pursuing his rights. Petitioner seeks to 

excuse his procedural defaults on the same basis, pointing to the recent decision in 

Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012) to excuse his failings to properly challenge the 

effectiveness of trial and appellate counsel.

III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS

A. TIMELINESS

1. One Year Limitations Period

Respondents assert that Petitioner’s Petition is untimely. As part of the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Congress provided a 1-

year statute of limitations for all applications for writs of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging convictions and sentences rendered by state courts. 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d). Petitions filed beyond the one year limitations period are barred and 

must be dismissed. Id.

/ /

/ /

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2. Commencement of Limitations Period

The one-year statute of limitations on habeas petitions generally begins to run on 

"the date on which the judgment became final by conclusion of direct review or the 

expiration of the time for seeking such review." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Here, 

Petitioner’s direct review ended when his time expired for seeking further review of the 

Arizona Court of Appeals decision filed August 10, 2010 (Exhibit AA). Under 

Ariz.R.Crim.Proc. 31.19(a), Petitioner had 30 days thereafter to seek review by the 

Arizona Supreme Court. Thus, Petitioner’s conviction was final on Thursday, 

September 9, 2010. Therefore his one year began running on September 10, 2010, and 

without any tolling would have expired on September 9, 2011, making his November 1, 

2012 Petition delinquent.

3. Statutory Tolling

The AEDPA provides for tolling of the limitations period when a "properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral relief with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 

Tolling for First PCR Proceeding - Under Arizona law, a petition for postconviction relief is "pending" as soon as the notice of post-conviction relief is filed. 

Isley v. Arizona Department of Corrections, 383 F.3d 1054, 1055-56 (9th Cir. 2004) 

("The language and structure of the Arizona postconviction rules demonstrate that the 

proceedings begin with the filing of the Notice.")

Here, Petitioner’s first PCR proceeding was commenced with the filing of his 

PCR notice (Exhibit BB) on October 15, 2010.2 The PCR petition was ultimately denied

 

2

Petitioner’s PCR Notice was dated September 29, 2010, some 16 days prior to its filing. 

(Exhibit BB at 2.) Similarly, Petitioner’s second PCR Notice was dated January 9, 2012, 

but was not filed until February 7, 2012, some 29 days later. (Exhibit PP at 1, 3.) 

Nothing indicates how or when these were forwarded for filing, and Petitioner makes no 

assertion that he is entitled to application of the prison mailbox rule See Stillman v. 

LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199, 1201 (9th Cir. 2003) (“a pro se prisoner's filing of a state 

habeas petition is deemed filed at the moment the prisoner delivers it to prison 

authorities for forwarding to the clerk of the court”).

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by the PCR court on November 9, 2011. (Exhibit LL, M.E. 11/9/11.) Petitioner was 

granted through January 19, 2012 to file his petition for review. (Exhibit NN, M.E. 

12/20/11.) Petitioner did not seek further review.

Respondents argue that because no petition for review was filed, no state 

application was pending after the November 9, 2011 order. Petitioner argues that he is 

entitled to statutory tolling for an additional 71 days, until the time to seek review 

expired. That 71 days makes all the difference.

In the seven circuits known to have addressed the matter, Petitioner’s PCR 

proceeding would have been pending until his time to file for review expired, regardless 

of the fact that he did not again seek review. See Bennett v. Artuz, 199 F.3d 116 (2nd 

Cir.1999) (“a state-court petition is ‘pending’ from the time it is first filed until finally 

disposed of and further appellate review is unavailable under the particular state's 

procedures”); Swartz v. Meyers, 204 F.3d 417, 420–24 (3rd Cir.2000) (“the period of 

limitation tolls during the time a prisoner has to seek review of the Pennsylvania 

Superior Court's decision whether or not review is actually sought”); Taylor v. Lee, 186 

F.3d 557, 561 (4th Cir.1999) (“the entire period of state post-conviction proceedings, 

from initial filing to final disposition by the highest state court (whether decision on the 

merits, denial of certiorari, or expiration of the period of time to seek further appellate 

review), is tolled”); ”); Williams v. Cain, 217 F.3d 303, 309–10 (5th Cir.2000); Williams 

v. Bruton, 299 F.3d 981, 983 (8th Cir.2002) (“the application is ‘pending’ (and thus the 

limitations period is tolled) during the appeal period, even if the petitioner does not 

appeal”); Gibson v. Klinger, 232 F.3d 799, 804 (10th Cir.2000) (“regardless of whether 

a petitioner actually appeals a denial of a post-conviction application, the limitations 

period is tolled during the period in which the petitioner could have sought an appeal 

under state law”); Cramer v. Secretary, Dept. of Corrections, 461 F.3d 1380, 1383 (11th 

Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (“the claim is pending regardless of whether the inmate actually 

files the notice of appeal See also Johnson v. McCaughtry, 265 F.3d 559, 563 n. 3 (7th 

Cir. 2001) (declining to decide the issue); and Yassan v. J.P. Morgan Chase and Co., 

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708 F.3d 963, 969 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Cramer approvingly in the context of a civil 

action). See also Hines v. Bartos, 2007 WL 1381655, * 1 (D.Ariz. 2007) (CV 06-697-

PHX-JAT) (concluding that “an appeal that is never filed cannot be considered timely 

and Petitioner cannot reap the benefit of statutory tolling without actually filing a 

petition for review of the post-conviction relief denial”); Lopez v. Arizona, 2011 WL 

3471084, 6 (D.Ariz. 2011) (CV-10-2159-PHX-JAT(JRI)) (finding no equitable tolling 

after PCR court’s decision, where petition for review was untimely, including for time 

review could have been sought).

In support of his argument that this Court should follow the other circuits, 

Petitioner points to the decision in Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2002), where 

the court found that statutory tolling continued on a California petition for writ of habeas 

corpus until 30 days after the California Supreme Court denied the petition. (Reply, 

Doc. 11 at 4.) However, Lott was based upon Rule 24 of the California Rules of Court 

which explicitly provided that a decision of the California Supreme Court did not 

become final until 30 days after filing. Arizona has no comparable rule. At best, 

Arizona provides for the delay of a mandate until times for a motion for reconsideration 

and petition for review have expired. See Ariz.R.Crim.Proc. 31.23. However, in 

Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069 (2007), the Ninth Circuit concluded that the date of 

issuance of mandates is irrelevant not only to when a conviction becomes final, but also 

when a post-conviction petition is no longer pending for purposes of tolling under 28 

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Thus, Lott does not resolve the matter.

Respondent points to neither any circuits holding contrary to the identified circuit 

decisions, nor to any Ninth Circuit authority on the issue. Instead, Respondent argues

that this Court should buck the trend and rely upon the word “pending” in § 2244(d)(2), 

the absence of a reference to the expiration of the time for further review such as in 

§2244(d)(1)(A), and cases denying tolling for untimely petitions. Finally, Respondent 

argues that it should be irrelevant that Petitioner sought and obtained an extension of the 

time for a petition for review, citing Saunders v. Senkowski, 587 F.3d 543 (2nd Cir. 

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2009). (Answer, Doc. 10 at 17-19.) 

Effect of Extension – Respondents’ latter argument is easily disposed of. The 

Second Circuit in Saunders v. Senkowski, 587 F.3d 543 (2nd Cir. 2009), declined to 

extend its holding in Bennett(that statutory tolling continued until the time for review 

expires) to motions for reconsideration of an intermediate appellate court’s denial of 

leave to further appeal. Here, no such tangential, elongated process is at play. Rather, it 

is the straightforward expiration of the time for further review which Saunders deemed 

to have been resolved in Bennett. “In Bennett, we held that a § 440.10 motion is 

‘pending’ for purposes of AEDPA at least from the time it is filed through the time in 

which the petitioner could file an application for a certificate for leave to appeal the 

Appellate Division's denial of the motion.” 587 F.3d at 548. 

Thus, the undersigned accepts Respondent’s argument that the fact of the 

extension is not controlling as to whether tolling applies, but concludes that if tolling 

does apply, the extension is determinative of the length of the tolling. Here, because of 

the extension, Petitioner could have filed until conclusion of the extended deadline, at 

the end of the 71 days.

That still leaves this Court to decide if tolling applies.

Carey Does Not Resolve the Issue – Respondents’ statutory language argument 

based on the construction of the word “pending” does not resolve the matter. It is 

tempting to conclude that “pending” means awaiting a decision, and thus where the 

Court of Appeals has decided the application before it and the Arizona Supreme Court 

has no application to review, there is no “application” waiting to be decided, or 

“pending.” 

On the other hand, Petitioner cites Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002) to argue 

that “pending” is a term of art extending beyond a simplistic “is there an unresolved 

application.” (Reply, Doc. 11 at 3-4.) 

The holding of Carey only answered the question whether the time between

successive levels of post-conviction review is tolled, when the subsequent review is 

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actually sought. In this case, however, Petitioner did not seek the subsequent review. 

Thus, the holding of Carey does not resolve the issue.

Carey did, however, impact the meaning of “pending.” Indeed, Justice Kennedy 

(along with the Chief Justice, and Justices Scalia and Thomas) argued in their dissent in 

Carey that the majority opinion adopted an expansive construction of “application” to 

mean the “ordinary state collateral review process,” thereby permitting the word 

“pending” to apply to something other than a particular “application.” 536 U.S. at 228-

229 (Kennedy, J. dissenting). That dissent, of course, is not the law of the land.

Respondent points to the fact that §2244(d)(1)(A) explicitly delays 

commencement of the limitations period until “the expiration of time for 

seeking...review” expires, while the tolling provisions of §2244(d)(2) do not include 

such language. While a true statement, that argument is not dispositive. 

Indeed, in finding that § 2244(d)(2) did not toll the statute of limitations during 

the pendency of a petition for writ of certiorari, the Court in Lawrence v. Florida, 549 

U.S. 327 (2007) observed 

Furthermore, § 2244(d)(1)(A) refers to the “time for seeking” direct 

review, which includes review by this Court under Clay. By parity 

of reasoning, the “time for seeking” review of a state postconviction 

judgment arguably would include the period for filing a certiorari 

petition before this Court. However, § 2244(d)(2) makes no 

reference to the “time for seeking” review of a state postconviction 

court's judgment. Instead, it seeks to know when an application for 

“State ... review” is pending. The linguistic difference is not 

insignificant: When the state courts have issued a final judgment on 

a state application, it is no longer pending even if a prisoner has 

additional time for seeking review of that judgment through a 

petition for certiorari.

Id. at 333-34. However, while employing the absence of the time-for-further-review 

distinction, the Lawrence court primarily relied upon the limitation of § 2244(d)2) to 

“state” petitions, which did not encompass federal certiorari petitions, and the statute’s 

narrow application to collateral review while certiorari petitions were part of the direct 

review process.

Moreover, in Carey, the court did not rely upon the time-for-further-review 

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language to conclude that the statute allowed interregnum tolling. Indeed, neither the 

majority nor the dissent cited that language.

Instead, the Carey court found interregnum tolling based solely upon their 

construction of the word “pending” in §2244(d)(2):

That definition, applied in the present context, means that an 

application is pending as long as the ordinary state collateral review 

process is “in continuance”-i.e., “until the completion of” that 

process. In other words, until the application has achieved final 

resolution through the State's post-conviction procedures, by 

definition it remains “pending.”

536 U.S. at 219-20. Thus, the Court concluded that §2244(d)(2) extends tolling to “the 

time between a lower state court's decision and the filing of a notice of appeal to a higher 

state court.” Id. at 217.

But Carey was based upon the continuance of the process. It did not address what 

happened when the process ultimately did not continue. Nor does the language of Carey

resolve the issue whether the state process is “in continuance” while the clock is running 

out on the time for further review. Until such time, arguably the lower court decision 

has not “achieved final resolution,” at least to the extent that it remains subject to further 

attack.

Moreover, it is troubling to conclude that as the time for further review elapses, 

the “application” is both pending and not. If further review is timely sought, it was 

pending the whole time. If further review is not timely sought, then it turns out that the 

application ceased pending upon the lower court’s determination. Under this approach, 

post-conviction proceedings are not unlike Schrödinger’s potentially-poisoned-cat, 

which is for a time simultaneously alive and dead, until its box is opened to see which.

3

 

This indeterminate state is not a mere theoretical puzzle, but potentially has real 

implications. As noted by the majority in Carey, the principles of exhaustion would 

preclude a habeas petition so long as further review was possible. 536 U.S. at 220. Thus, 

 

3

See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schrödinger's_cat (last accessed 4/22/13) (discussing 

the thought experiment proposed by Austrian physicist Erwin Schrödinger in 1935 to 

explore the quantum entanglement theory of quantum mechanics in which matter is said 

to exist simultaneously in either of two states or both, until measured). 

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until the time for further review elapsed, and the possibility for review terminated, a 

federal habeas petition would be premature. This would be true even if the petitioner 

had no intention of seeking further state review. 

For example, assume that before commencing a PCR proceeding, a petitioner had 

only 15 days of his one year limitations period remaining. But the time for seeking 

further review on the state PCR petition was 30 days. A habeas petition would be due 

within 15 days of a trial court decision on the PCR petition. But, the petition would be 

premature until the 30 days for further review elapsed. But once it elapsed, the clock is 

retroactively deemed to have begun running at the outset of the 30 day time. The

problem becomes even more pronounced in a jurisdiction such as California, with an 

indeterminate, “reasonable” time, deadline for further review. 

Decisions flowing from Pace – Nonetheless, Carey is not the only resource to 

answer the question. Rather, there remains a series of Ninth Circuit cases which, 

although not espousing an explicit response, have repeatedly concluded that tolling was 

not available beyond the lower court’s decision.

Indeed, at least one commentator has concluded that the Ninth Circuit has 

properly concluded that a grant of tolling until the time to appeal expires is “inconsistent 

with the Supreme Court's decisions [indicating] that if a state petition is untimely, none 

of the time before (or during) the court's consideration of the petition is statutorily 

tolled.” See Means, Fed. Hab. Man. § 9A:57 (2010).

The Ninth Circuit decisions are progeny of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Pace 

v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005). As discussed in Pace, for a state petition to toll 

the statute of limitations, it must be “properly filed.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). The Pace 

Court held that when a state post-conviction petition is untimely under state law, then it 

is not “properly filed” within the meaning of § 2244(d)(2) for purposes of statutory 

tolling. 

In Bonner v. Carey, the Ninth Circuit read Pace to mean that “if a state court 

denies a petition as untimely, none of the time before or during the court's consideration 

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of that petition is statutorily tolled.” Bonner v. Carey, 425 F.3d 1145, 1149 (9th 

Cir.2005), amended on other grounds by 439 F.3d 993 (9th Cir.2006) (emphasis added). 

It is true that nothing in Pace explicitly holds that the time between a state 

application and the expiration of the time to appeal therefrom is excluded from statutory 

tolling. Factually, Pace (like Carey) dealt with an interregnum gap between successive 

post-conviction petitions, and focused on whether the second petition was “properly 

filed,” not how long the prior petition was pending. 544 U.S. at 411. Similarly, Bonner

dealt with whether a state habeas petition filed in the California trial court was untimely, 

and thus none of the time during its pendency (including several levels of appeal) was 

tolled. However, neither Pace nor Bonner itself expressly analyzed the tolling effect of 

time available for appeal after a timely but unsuccessful petition. 

The undersigned would be tempted to conclude that the comment in Bonner that 

“none of the time...is tolled” was simply dicta, and proceed with the explicit analysis of 

the other circuits. However, in Thorson v. Palmer, 479 F.3d 643 (9th Cir.2007), the court 

quoted the aforementioned portion of Bonner and specifically held that its petitioner was 

not entitled to any time after the denial of his intermediate appeal, merely because the 

California Supreme Court had deemed his final appeal to be untimely. Thorson held that 

the petitioner’s limitations period “would have begun to run again on the date the 

California Court of Appeal denied Thorson's second petition and would not have stopped 

until he filed his federal habeas petition.” 479 F.3d at 646.

The undersigned is troubled by what arguably is an unexplained expansion of 

Pace emanating from the dicta of Bonner, and continuing in the holding of Thorson. In 

addition, it bears some consideration whether these decisions were driven by the 

indeterminate review deadlines applicable in California. Nonetheless, the language of 

these Ninth Circuit cases admit of no distinction based upon the nature of the state's 

filing deadlines. Instead, this Court is left with the Ninth Circuit’s clear pattern of 

denying any tolling beyond the lower court’s denial when a subsequent petition for 

review is not timely filed.

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Conclusion re First PCR - Accordingly, the undersigned concludes that Petitioner 

is not, under the decisions of the Ninth Circuit in Bonner and Thorson, entitled to 

statutory tolling for the time during which he could have, but did not, seek review from 

the Arizona Supreme Court on his first PCR petition.

As discussed hereinabove, Petitioner’s one year began running on September 10, 

2010. His first PCR was commenced on October 15, 2010 (Exhibit BB), using 36 days 

of his one year, leaving him with 329 days. The first PCR was denied on November 9, 

2011. (Exhibit LL, M.E. 11/9/11.) Thus, Petitioner would have had through Monday, 

October 3, 2012 to file his federal habeas petition.

Second PCR Proceeding - On February 7, 2012, Petitioner filed his second PCR 

notice and petition (Exhibits PP and QQ). At that time, Petitioner still had 239 days of 

his one year remaining. On March 1, 2012, the PCR court summarily dismissed the 

petition. (Exhibit SS, M.E. 3/1/12.) Petitioner did not seek further review. (Petition, 

Doc. 1 at 3; Exhibit UU Docket at 1.) Although some of Petitioner’s claims were 

dismissed as untimely, others were not. Accordingly, Petitioner is entitled to statutory 

tolling for the time from February 7, 2012 through March 1, 2012. For the reasons 

discussed above, he is not for the period during which he could have sought fruthe 

review by the Arizona Court of Appeals. 

Accordingly, Petitioner’s one year would have commenced running again as of 

March 2, 2012, and would have expired 239 days later, on October 26, 2012. 

Petitioner did not commence the current case until the filing, through counsel, of 

his Petition on November 1, 2012 (Doc. 1). Thus, absent equitable tolling, Petitioner’s 

habeas petition was some six days delinquent.

4. Equitable Tolling

Applicable Standard - "Equitable tolling of the one-year limitations period in 28 

U.S.C. § 2244 is available in our circuit, but only when ‘extraordinary circumstances 

beyond a prisoner's control make it impossible to file a petition on time' and ‘the 

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extraordinary circumstances were the cause of his untimeliness.'" Laws v. Lamarque, 

351 F.3d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 2003). 

To receive equitable tolling, [t]he petitioner must establish two 

elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) 

that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way. The 

petitioner must additionally show that the extraordinary 

circumstances were the cause of his untimeliness, and that the 

extraordinary circumstances ma[de] it impossible to file a petition 

on time.

Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal citations and quotations 

omitted). “Indeed, ‘the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under AEDPA] 

is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.’ ” Miranda v. Castro,292 F.3d 1063, 

1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir.).

Petitioner bears the burden of proof on the existence of cause for equitable tolling. Pace 

v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th

Cir. 2006) (“Our precedent permits equitable tolling of the one-year statute of limitations 

on habeas petitions, but the petitioner bears the burden of showing that equitable tolling 

is appropriate.”).

Petitioner argues that in Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. ____, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2564 

(2010), the Court created a rebuttable presumption in favor of equitable tolling. (Reply, 

Doc. 11 at 4.) The presumption applied in Holland was not one that equitable tolling 

should be found in an individual case, but that a presumption that a given statute of

limitations was subject to equitable tolling at all. That presumption was raised in the 

course of deciding “whether AEDPA's statutory limitations period may be tolled for 

equitable reasons,” Holland, 130 S.Ct. at 2550, which the Court decided in the 

affirmative after applying the presumption.

Thus, Petitioner remains subject to the burden of affirmatively proving his own

entitlement to equitable tolling.

Here, Petitioner argues that he is entitled to equitable tolling based upon: (1) his 

pro se status throughout most of the PCR proceedings; (2) the lack of advice by counsel 

on the statute of limitations; (3) his diligence in pursuing his claims; (4) the de minimus

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nature of any delinquency; and (5) his justifiable reliance upon the availability of tolling 

until his time for further review of his PCR proceedings. (Reply, Doc. 11 at 2-3.) 

Pro Se Status / Lack of Advice - The first two circumstances, Petitioner’s pro se 

status and lack of advice on the statute of limitations, do not establish grounds for 

equitable tolling. A prisoner’s pro se status is not an extraordinary circumstance. Felder 

v. Johnson, 204 F.3d 168 (5th Cir. 2000). A prisoner's “proceeding pro se is not a ‘rare 

and exceptional’ circumstance because it is typical of those bringing a § 2254 claim.” 

Felder v. Johnson, 204 F.3d 168, 171 (5th Cir. 2000). Moreover, "ignorance of the law, 

even for an incarcerated pro se petitioner, generally does not excuse prompt filing." 

Fisher v. Johnson, 174 F.3d 710, 714 (5th Cir.1999). ). See also Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 

F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (“a pro se petitioner's lack of legal sophistication is not, 

by itself, an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling”).

Although an attorney's behavior can establish the extraordinary circumstances 

required for equitable tolling, mere negligence or professional malpractice is insufficient. 

Frye v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir.2001). A “garden variety claim of 

excusable neglect,’ such as a simple ‘miscalculation’ that leads a lawyer to miss a filing 

deadline does not warrant equitable tolling.’ ” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. ____, 130 

S.Ct. 2549, 2564 (2010). Rather, the attorney’s misconduct must rise to the level of 

extraordinary circumstances. Id. An unadorned failure to advise about a limitations 

period would, at best, be simple negligence. Cf. Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 801 (9th

Cir. 2003) (allowing equitable tolling where petitioner's counsel was hired almost a year 

in advance, failed to do anything to prepare the petition or to respond to numerous letters 

and phone calls, and withheld petitioner's file for over two months after the limitations 

period expired); Holland, supra (discussing potential for finding of extraordinary 

circumstances where counsel misinformed petitioner about filing deadline, failed to 

communicate conclusion of state appeals, and failed to communicate with petitioner at 

all over a period of years, all despite repeated requests by petitioner). 

Here, the most Petitioner asserts is that PCR counsel failed to find issues for 

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review, and thus sought permission for Petitioner to file his own petition. Petitioner 

asserts none of the kinds of extraordinary conduct by counsel which would justify 

equitable tolling.

Reliance on Other Circuits - Petitioner’s also asserts extraordinary 

circumstances based upon his justifiable reliance upon the decisions of other circuits 

finding the availability of tolling until his time for further review of his PCR 

proceedings. Petitioner argues that he “could have incorrectly relied on this premise in 

his calculations.” (Reply, Doc. 11 at 5.) 

The Ninth Circuit has found that a “habeas petitioner who decides when to file his 

federal habeas petition by relying on Ninth Circuit precedent that is later overturned by 

the Supreme Court is entitled to equitable tolling.” Nedds v. Calderon, 678 F.3d 777, 

781 (9th Cir. 2012). Moreover, the petitioner is not required to affirmatively show that 

he actually relied on the precedent in deciding when to file, but may rely upon 

circumstances creating a presumption of reliance. Id. at 782-783.

Here, Petitioner points to no Ninth Circuit precedent on which he could have 

relied to delay his filing. No provision is made for reliance on other circuits, and there 

simply was no binding Ninth Circuit precedent in Petitioner’s favor on which he could 

have relied. Rather, had Petitioner sought for Ninth Circuit authority on which to rely, 

he would have been faced with the Bonner and Thorson cases upon which the 

undersigned relies to conclude that tolling is not available during the time for unsought 

further review. 

Thus, Petitioner is, at best, in the same position as a party who has simply 

miscalculated the deadline, a circumstance which does not justify equitable tolling. See

e.g. Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1068 (9th Cir. 2002); Frye v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 

1144 (9th Cir. 2001). 

De Minimus Delay and Diligence - Plaintiff’s remaining arguments are based 

upon the de minimus nature of his delinquency, and his diligence at pursuing his claims.

The law is clear that even if extraordinary circumstances prevent a petitioner from 

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filing for a time, equitable tolling will not apply if he does not continue to diligently 

pursue filing afterwards. “If the person seeking equitable tolling has not exercised 

reasonable diligence in attempting to file after the extraordinary circumstances began, 

the link of causation between the extraordinary circumstances and the failure to file is 

broken, and the extraordinary circumstances therefore did not prevent timely filing.” 

Valverde v. Stinson, 224 F.3d 129, 134 (2nd Cir. 2000). But see Lott v. Mueller, 304 

F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2002), McKeown, J. dissenting (arguing that equitable tolling should 

work a stoppage of the clock, with a resulting extension of the deadline). Ordinarily, 

thirty days after elimination of a roadblock should be sufficient. See Guillory v. Roe, 

329 F.3d 1015, 1018, n.1 (9th Cir. 2003). 

In this case, it is true that Plaintiff was diligent in pursuing his claims in the state 

courts. He allowed little more than one month to elapse between direct review and his 

first PCR, and only about three months between his first and second PCR proceedings. 

However, eight months passed thereafter, before he filed his federal petition. 

A short delay after the expiration of the limitations period might be relevant if 

Petitioner proffered some extraordinary circumstance which would justify equitable 

tolling prior to that point. The shortness of the delay could establish diligence. The 

shortness of the delay, by itself, however, does not relieve Petitioner of the effect of his 

having filed after the limitations period expired See, e.g., United States v. Marcello, 212 

F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir.2000) (federal habeas petition submitted one day late was 

properly dismissed as untimely under AEDPA); Lattimore v. Dubois, 311 F.3d 46, 53–54 

(1st Cir.2002) (reversing district court's decision to give the petitioner a “grace period” 

and dismissing a habeas petition as untimely when it was submitted one day late); 

Lookingbill v. Cockrell, 293 F.3d 256, 265 (5th Cir.2002) (stating “[w]e have 

consistently denied tolling even where the petition was only a few days late”). Cf. 

United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 100–01 (1985) (“If 1–day late filings are acceptable, 

10–day late filings might be equally acceptable, and so on in a cascade of exceptions that 

would engulf the rule erected by the filing deadline...A filing deadline cannot be 

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complied with, substantially or otherwise, by filing late—even by one day.”).

Accordingly, neither the nearness of Petitioner to the mark, nor his diligence 

before the state courts, established grounds for equitable tolling in the face of his 

substantial delay thereafter in filing his federal petition.

Conclusion – Petitioner has failed to show circumstances which would justify 

equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. Thus, Petitioner’s Petition was untimely.

5. Actual Innocence

The Ninth Circuit has concluded that the habeas statute of limitations is subject to 

an exception for claims of actual innocence. Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 

2011). Petitioner makes no such claim in this proceeding.

6. Summary

Petitioner’s time for seeking “direct review” ended on September 9, 2010, on the 

expiration of his time to seek review by the Arizona Supreme Court on direct appeal. 

Accordingly, Petitioner’s one year limitations period began running on September 10, 

2010. The running of the limitations period was tolled during the pendency of his first 

PCR proceeding, from October 15, 2010 through November 9, 2011, and during the 

pendency of his second PCR proceeding, from February 7, 2012 through March 1, 2012. 

Thus his limitations period expired on October 26, 2012. His Petition was not filed until 

November 1, 2012, and was delinquent. Petitioner has failed to show exceptional 

circumstances and diligence in bringing his federal petition to justify equitable tolling, 

and has not asserted actual innocence to avoid the limitations period. Therefore, his 

federal habeas petition is untimely, and must be dismissed with prejudice. 

B. EXHAUSTION & PROCEDURAL DEFAULT

Respondents also argue that Petitioner has failed to properly exhaust, and now has 

procedurally defaulted, his state remedies, and thus is barred from federal habeas review. 

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(Answer, Doc. 10 at 25, et seq.) Petitioner argues that any procedural default should be 

excused because Petitioner was largely unrepresented throughout his post-conviction 

proceedings, and post-conviction counsel was ineffective. (Reply, Doc. 11 at 5-7.)

Because the recommended dismissal on the statute of limitations involves issues 

subject to debate, the undersigned will address Respondents’ alternative procedural 

defenses.

1. Exhaustion Requirement

Generally, a federal court has authority to review a state prisoner’s claims only if 

available state remedies have been exhausted. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 

(1981) (per curiam). The exhaustion doctrine, first developed in case law, has been 

codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c). When seeking habeas relief, the burden is on 

the petitioner to show that he has properly exhausted each claim. Cartwright v. Cupp, 

650 F.2d 1103, 1104 (9th Cir. 1981)(per curiam), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1023 (1982).

Ordinarily, “to exhaust one's state court remedies in Arizona, a petitioner must 

first raise the claim in a direct appeal or collaterally attack his conviction in a petition for 

post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 32.” Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36, 38 (9th 

Cir. 1994). Only one of these avenues of relief must be exhausted before bringing a 

habeas petition in federal court. This is true even where alternative avenues of reviewing 

constitutional issues are still available in state court. Brown v. Easter, 68 F.3d 1209, 

1211 (9th Cir. 1995); Turner v. Compoy, 827 F.2d 526, 528 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 

489 U.S. 1059 (1989). “In cases not carrying a life sentence or the death penalty, ‘claims 

of Arizona state prisoners are exhausted for purposes of federal habeas once the Arizona 

Court of Appeals has ruled on them.’” Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 

2005)(quoting Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999)).

2. Procedural Default

Ordinarily, unexhausted claims are dismissed without prejudice. Johnson v. 

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Lewis, 929 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1991). However, where a petitioner has failed to 

properly exhaust his available administrative or judicial remedies, and those remedies are 

now no longer available because of some procedural bar, the petitioner has "procedurally 

defaulted" and is generally barred from seeking habeas relief. Dismissal with prejudice 

of a procedurally barred or procedurally defaulted habeas claim is generally proper 

absent a “miscarriage of justice” which would excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 

1, 11 (1984).

Respondents argue that Petitioner may no longer present his unexhausted claims 

to the state courts. Respondents rely upon Arizona’s preclusion bar, set out in Ariz. R. 

Crim. Proc. 32.2(a) and time limit bar, set out in Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4. (Answer, Doc. 

10 at 20, 21, n. 18.)4 

Remedies by Direct Appeal - Under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 31.3, the time for filing a 

direct appeal expires twenty days after entry of the judgment and sentence. Accordingly, 

direct appeal is no longer available for review of Petitioner’s unexhausted claims. 

Remedies by Post-Conviction Relief – Under Arizona’s waiver and timeliness 

bars, Petitioner can no longer seek review by a subsequent PCR Petition. 

Waiver Bar - Under the rules applicable to Arizona's post-conviction process, a 

claim may not ordinarily be brought in a petition for post-conviction relief that "has been 

waived at trial, on appeal, or in any previous collateral proceeding." Ariz.R.Crim.P. 

32.2(a)(3). Under this rule, some claims may be deemed waived if the State simply 

shows "that the defendant did not raise the error at trial, on appeal, or in a previous 

collateral proceeding." Stewart v. Smith, 202 Ariz. 446, 449, 46 P.3d 1067, 1070 (2002) 

(quoting Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2, Comments). For others of "sufficient constitutional 

magnitude," the State "must show that the defendant personally, ''knowingly, voluntarily 

and intelligently' [did] not raise' the ground or denial of a right." Id. That requirement is 

 

4

The Court’s scheduling Order directed that “that any allegations of procedural default 

or application of an independent and adequate state ground shall include an indication of 

the specific state rule(s) and/or authorities alleged to bar the affected claim(s).” (Order 

12/21/12, Doc. 4 at 2.) Respondents’ footnote reference to Rules 32.2(a) and 32.4(a) 

meets the letter of that direction, but not its spirit.

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limited to those constitutional rights “that can only be waived by a defendant 

personally.” State v. Swoopes 216 Ariz. 390, 399, 166 P.3d 945, 954 (App.Div. 2, 2007). 

Indeed, in coming to its prescription in Stewart v. Smith, the Arizona Supreme Court 

identified: (1) waiver of the right to counsel, (2) waiver of the right to a jury trial, and (3) 

waiver of the right to a twelve-person jury under the Arizona Constitution, as among 

those rights which require a personal waiver. 202 Ariz. at 450, 46 P.3d at 1071.5 Claims 

based upon ineffective assistance of counsel are determined by looking at “the nature of 

the right allegedly affected by counsel’s ineffective performance. Id.

Here, Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance have at their core the kinds of 

claims not within the types identified as requiring a personal waiver, e.g. the fairness of 

identification procedures and permissibility of searches.

Timeliness Bar - Even if not barred by preclusion, Petitioner would now be barred 

from raising his claims by Arizona’s time bars. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.4 requires that 

petitions for post-conviction relief (other than those which are “of-right”) be filed 

“within ninety days after the entry of judgment and sentence or within thirty days after 

the issuance of the order and mandate in the direct appeal, whichever is the later.” See 

State v. Pruett, 185 Ariz. 128, 912 P.2d 1357 (App. 1995) (applying 32.4 to successive 

petition, and noting that first petition of pleading defendant deemed direct appeal for 

purposes of the rule). That time has long since passed.

Exceptions - Rules 32.2 and 32.4(a) do not bar dilatory claims if they fall within 

the category of claims specified in Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d) through (h). See Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 32.2(b) (exceptions to preclusion bar); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a) (exceptions to 

timeliness bar). Petitioner has not asserted that any of these exceptions are applicable to 

 

5

Some other types of claims addressed by the Arizona Courts in resolving the type of 

waiver required include: right to be present at non-critical stages (waived by omission), 

Swoopes, 216Ariz. at 403, 166 P.3d at 958; improper withdrawal of plea offer (waived 

by omission), State v. Spinosa, 200 Ariz. 503, 29 P.3d 278 (App. 2001); double jeopardy 

(waived by omission), State v. Stokes, 2007 WL 5596552 (App. 10/16/07); illegal 

sentence (waived by omission), State v. Brashier, 2009 WL 794501 (App. 2009); judge 

conflict of interest (waived by omission), State v. Westmiller, 2008 WL 2651659 (App. 

2008).

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his claims. Nor does it appears that such exceptions would apply. The rule defines the 

excepted claims as follows:

d. The person is being held in custody after the sentence 

imposed has expired;

e. Newly discovered material facts probably exist and such 

facts probably would have changed the verdict or sentence. Newly 

discovered material facts exist if:

(1) The newly discovered material facts were 

discovered after the trial.

(2) The defendant exercised due diligence in securing 

the newly discovered material facts.

(3) The newly discovered material facts are not 

merely cumulative or used solely for impeachment, unless the 

impeachment evidence substantially undermines testimony which 

was of critical significance at trial such that the evidence probably 

would have changed the verdict or sentence.

f. The defendant's failure to file a notice of post-conviction 

relief of-right or notice of appeal within the prescribed time was 

without fault on the defendant's part; or

g. There has been a significant change in the law that if 

determined to apply to defendant's case would probably overturn the 

defendant's conviction or sentence; or

h. The defendant demonstrates by clear and convincing 

evidence that the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to 

establish that no reasonable fact-finder would have found defendant 

guilty of the underlying offense beyond a reasonable doubt, or that 

the court would not have imposed the death penalty.

Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1.

Paragraph 32.1 (d) (expired sentence) generally has no application to an Arizona 

prisoner who is simply attacking the validity of his conviction or sentence. Where a 

claim is based on "newly discovered evidence" that has previously been presented to the 

state courts, the evidence is no longer "newly discovered" and paragraph (e) has no 

application. Here, Petitioner has long ago asserted the facts underlying his claims. 

Paragraph (f) has no application where the petitioner filed a timely notice of postconviction relief. Paragraph (g) has no application because Petitioner has not asserted a 

change in the law since his last PCR proceeding. Finally, paragraph (h), concerning 

claims of actual innocence, has no application to Petitioner’s procedural claims.

Therefore, none of the exceptions apply, and Arizona’s time and waiver bars 

would prevent Petitioner from returning to state court. Thus, Petitioner’s claims that 

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were not fairly presented are all now procedurally defaulted.

3. Procedural Bar on Independent and Adequate State Grounds

Related to the concept of procedural default is the principle of barring claims 

actually disposed of by the state courts on state grounds. “[A]bsent showings of ‘cause’ 

and ‘prejudice,’ federal habeas relief will be unavailable when (1) ‘a state court [has] 

declined to address a prisoner's federal claims because the prisoner had failed to meet a 

state procedural requirement,’ and (2) ‘the state judgment rests on independent and 

adequate state procedural grounds.’ ” Walker v. Martin, - - - U.S. - - -, 131 S.Ct. 1120, 

1127 (2011). 

In Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573 (9th Cir.2003), the Ninth Circuit addressed 

the burden of proving the independence and adequacy of a state procedural bar.

Once the state has adequately pled the existence of an independent 

and adequate state procedural ground as an affirmative defense, the 

burden to place that defense in issue shifts to the petitioner. The 

petitioner may satisfy this burden by asserting specific factual 

allegations that demonstrate the inadequacy of the state procedure, 

including citation to authority demonstrating inconsistent 

application of the rule. Once having done so, however, the ultimate 

burden is the state's. 

Id. at 584-585. 

4. Application to Petitioner’s Claims

No Fair Presentation - For his Ground 1, Petitioner argues that his Fifth, Sixth, 

and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated by the denial of the effective assistance 

of counsel at trial, based upon counsel’s failure to challenge: (1) an unduly suggestive 

pre-trial identification; (2) the reliability of an in-court eye-witness identification; and (3) 

the admissibility of an improperly seized wallet. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 4-12.) For his 

Ground 2, Petitioner argues that his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights were 

violated by the denial of counsel during his PCR proceedings.

Both of Petitioner’s claims are founded upon the ineffective assistance of or lack 

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of counsel. Petitioner’s only foray into the Arizona Court of Appeals was on direct 

appeal. He asserted no claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in that proceeding. 

Nor could he have raised in that proceeding the lack of counsel in the subsequent postconviction proceedings.

It is true that Petitioner’s direct appeal addressed at least some of the facts 

underlying his ineffectiveness of trial counsel claim, e.g. the errors in admission of the 

eyewitness identifications. However, that is not sufficient to fairly present the 

ineffective assistance claims Petitioner now asserts. “While [the ineffective assistance 

and underlying constitutional claim are] admittedly related, they are distinct claims with 

separate elements of proof, and each claim should have been separately and specifically 

presented to the state courts.” Rose v. Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2005).

Accordingly, Petitioner did not properly exhaust his state remedies on any of the 

claims he raises in this proceeding.

Procedural Bar - Nonetheless, Petitioner did arguably raise some of his claims to 

the PCR court. 

Claims Concerning Trial Counsel - In the first PCR proceeding, although the 

petition was founded solely upon a claim of newly discovered evidence, the PCR court 

noted that “[i]n his reply brief, petitioner repeatedly criticizes his trial counsel.” (Exhibit 

LL, M.E. 11/9/11 at 6.) Indeed, Petitioner complained that trial counsel failed to object 

to the various eyewitness identifications and the seized wallet. (Exhibit KK at 1-3.) 

However, the PCR court found that any such claim was waived based upon 

Petitioner having raised it for the first time in his reply brief, and without seeking leave 

to amend his PCR petition. Thus, this claim was disposed of by the state court on state 

grounds. 

Petitioner proffers nothing to suggest that this was not an independent and 

adequate state ground. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that Petitioner’s claims 

concerning trial counsel were procedurally barred.

Claims Concerning PCR Counsel - In his second PCR proceeding, Petitioner 

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argued that appellate and PCR counsel were ineffective in failing to challenge the 

identifications and seizure of evidence. Petitioner cited a variety of federal authorities in 

support of his assertion of ineffective assistance, including Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 

335 (1980). (Exhibit QQ, 2nd PCR Pet. at 14-15.) The PCR court held:

In regards to appellate counsel, the defendant cannot raise a claim of 

this nature in an untimely or successive petition for post-conviction 

relief See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a). Additionally, the defendant 

raised this claim in his previous Rule 32 proceeding that was

dismissed on November 9, 2011. Therefore, he is precluded from 

raising the issue in subsequent Rule 32 proceeding. See Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 32.2(a)(2). In regards to previous post-conviction relief 

counsel, defendants who were entitled to a direct appeal have no 

constitutional right to . effective assistance of counsel in postconviction relief proceedings. See State v. Pruett, 185 Ariz. 128, 

912 P.2d 1023 (App. 1996). Therefore, the claim raised by the 

defendant is not cognizable under Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1.

(Exhibit SS, M.E. 3/1/12 at 2.)

Thus, the PCR Court disposed of Petitioner’s attack on PCR counsel by 

concluding that he failed to allege a constitutional violation, and thus had not asserted a 

claim cognizable under Ariz.R.Crim.Proc. 32.1. In so doing, the PCR court was required 

to determine that Petitioner had no federal constitutional right to effective assistance of 

counsel in his PCR proceeding. 

Federal habeas review of a defaulted federal claim is precluded only when the 

state court has disposed of the claim on a procedural ground "that is both 'independent' of 

the merits of the federal claim and an 'adequate' basis for the court's decision." Harris v. 

Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 260 (1989). A state procedural default ruling is not independent if 

application of the bar depends on an antecedent ruling on the merits of the federal claim. 

See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74-75 (1985)). A state court applying a state 

procedural bar that is “interwoven” with consideration of federal claims does not bar 

habeas review. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 (1991). 

Accordingly, the state court’s rejection of this claim was interwoven with its 

determination that there was no federal constitutional right to counsel in a PCR 

proceeding. Therefore, this would not be the application of an independent and adequate 

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state ground, leaving this claim merely not properly exhausted by virtue of Petitioner’s 

failure to seek review by the Arizona Court of Appeals.

4. Summary Regarding Procedurally Defaulted Claims 

Petitioner’s claims are all either not properly exhausted by his failure to seek 

review by the Arizona Court of Appeals, and thus now procedurally defaulted, or 

procedurally barred on an independent and adequate state ground. Thus, his claims are 

precluded from habeas review absent cause and prejudice or actual innocence.

D. CAUSE AND PREJUDICE

1. Standard

If the habeas petitioner has procedurally defaulted on a claim, or it has been 

procedurally barred on independent and adequate state grounds, he may not obtain 

federal habeas review of that claim absent a showing of “cause and prejudice” sufficient 

to excuse the default. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 11 (1984). 

"Cause" is the legitimate excuse for the default. Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 

1123 (1991). "Because of the wide variety of contexts in which a procedural default can 

occur, the Supreme Court 'has not given the term "cause" precise content.'" Harmon v. 

Barton, 894 F.2d 1268, 1274 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Reed, 468 U.S. at 13), cert. 

denied, 498 U.S. 832 (1990). The Supreme Court has suggested, however, that cause 

should ordinarily turn on some objective factor external to petitioner, for instance:

... a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not 

reasonably available to counsel, or that "some interference by 

officials", made compliance impracticable, would constitute cause 

under this standard. 

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (citations omitted). 

Here, Petitioner asserts his untrained, pro se status and the lack of adequate 

assistance of PCR counsel in his first PCR proceeding (coupled with the denial of 

additional time for research) as good cause to excuse his failures to exhaust and 

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procedural bars. 

2. Pro Se Status

The “cause and prejudice” standard is equally applicable to pro se litigants, 

Harmon v. Barton, 894 F.2d 1268, 1274 (11th Cir. 1990); Hughes v. Idaho State Board 

of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 908 (9th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, the mere fact that 

Petition was unrepresented at various times does not establish cause.

3. Ineffective Assistance

a. Ineffectiveness as Cause

Ineffective assistance of counsel may constitute cause for failing to properly 

exhaust claims in state courts and excuse procedural default. Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 

923, 932, (9th Cir. 1998). However, ordinarily, to meet the “cause” requirement, the 

ineffective assistance of counsel must amount to an independent constitutional violation. 

Id. Accordingly, where no constitutional right to an attorney exists (e.g. in a PCR 

proceeding), ineffective assistance will not amount to cause excusing the state procedural 

default. Id. However, the Supreme Court has recently recognized two exceptions to this 

requirement, in Maples and Martniez.. 

In Maples v. Thomas, 132 S.Ct. 912 (2012), the Supreme Court held that cause 

could be shown when post-conviction counsel was not merely negligent (and under the 

law of agency, that negligence being chargeable to the petitioner) but had abandoned the 

representation without notice to the petitioner, resulting in the loss of his state remedies. 

In Martinez v. Schriro, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012), the Court held that “where, under 

state law, claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel must be raised in an initialreview collateral proceeding, a procedural default will not bar a federal habeas court 

from hearing a substantial claim of ineffective assistance at trial if, in the initial-review 

collateral proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in that proceeding was 

ineffective.” Id. at 1320. 

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Maples has no application here. PCR counsel in Petitioner’s first proceeding did 

file a notice (Exhibit DD) indicating his inability to find an issue for review and seeking 

leave for Petition to file a petition on his own. However, Petitioner was given notice of 

that filing, and not only was given, but exercised a right to file his own petition. (See

Exhibit DD, Notice at 2 (reflecting service on Petitioner); Exhibit FF, M.E. 6/10/11; and 

Exhibit HH, 1st PCR Pet.) Thus, unlike the Petitioner in Maples, Petitioner was not 

abandoned, nor even left without notice to pursue his claims on his own.

Martinez, on the other hand, does apply. Petitioner asserts (in his Ground One) 

that trial counsel was ineffective. He asserts in his Ground Two and his Reply that PCR 

counsel was ineffective in failing to raise those claims. If, indeed, PCR counsel was 

ineffective, then Petitioner will have established cause to excuse his procedural default.

For Petitioner to rely upon Martinez, Petitioner must “demonstrate[e] two things: 

(1) ‘counsel in the initial-review collateral proceeding, where the claim should have been 

raised, was ineffective under the standards of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 

104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984),’ and (2) ‘the underlying ineffective-assistanceof-trial-counsel claim is a substantial one, which is to say that the prisoner must 

demonstrate that the claim has some merit.’” Cook v. Ryan, 688 F.3d 598, 607 (9

th Cir. 

2012) (quoting Martinez, 132 S.Ct. at 1318).

Respondents argue that Petitioner cannot rely upon Martinez because Petitioner 

has not exhausted his state remedies on his claim of ineffective assistance of PCR 

counsel. (Answer, Doc. 10 at 28-29.) However, the Ninth Circuit has held that “an 

ineffective assistance of PCR counsel claim used to establish cause for a procedural 

default of a claim for ineffective assistance of sentencing counsel need not be exhausted 

itself.” Dickens v. Ryan, 688 F.3d 1054, 1072 (9th Cir. 2012).

Thus, this Court must resolve whether, under Martinez, Petitioner’s PCR counsel 

was ineffective so as to provide cause for Petitioner’s failure to properly exhaust his 

claims concerning the ineffectiveness of trial counsel.

/ / 

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b. Standard for Ineffectiveness

Generally, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are analyzed pursuant to 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In order to prevail on such a claim, 

Petitioner must show: (1) deficient performance - counsel’s representation fell below the 

objective standard for reasonableness; and (2) prejudice - there is a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different. Id. at 687-88. Although the petitioner must prove both 

elements, a court may reject his claim upon finding either that counsel's performance 

was reasonable or that the claimed error was not prejudicial. Id. at 697.

There is a strong presumption counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of 

reasonable professional assistance and that, under the circumstances, the challenged 

action might be considered sound trial strategy. U.S. v. Quinterro-Barraza, 78 F.3d 

1344, 1348 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 848 (1996); U.S. v. Molina, 934 F.2d 

1440, 1447 (9th Cir. 1991). The court should “presume that the attorneys made 

reasonable judgments and decline to second guess strategic choices.” U.S. v. Pregler, 

233 F.3d 1005, 1009 (7th Cir. 2000).

An objective standard applies to proving such deficient performance, and requires 

a petitioner to demonstrate that counsel’s actions were “outside the wide range of 

professionally competent assistance, and that the deficient performance prejudiced the 

defense.” United States v. Houtcens, 926 F.2d 824, 828 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-90). The reasonableness of counsel’s actions is judged 

from counsel’s perspective at the time of the alleged error in light of all the 

circumstances. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986); Strickland, 466 U.S. 

at 689. 

“The law does not require counsel to raise every available nonfrivolous defense. 

Counsel also is not required to have a tactical reason—above and beyond a reasonable 

appraisal of a claim's dismal prospects for success—for recommending that a weak claim 

be dropped altogether.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 127 (2009) (citations 

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omitted). 

Moreover, it is clear that the failure to take futile action can never be deficient 

performance. See Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1445 (9th Cir.1996); Sexton v. Cozner, 

679 F.3d 1150, 1157 (9th Cir. 2012). “The failure to raise a meritless legal argument 

does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.” Baumann v. United States, 692 

F.2d 565, 572 (9th Cir. 1982). 

In evaluating the ineffectiveness of PCR counsel (and as part thereof, the 

ineffectiveness of trial counsel), this habeas Court is not constrained by the limits on 

grants of habeas relief in 28 U.S.C. § 2254, i.e. state court decisions contrary to or 

unreasonable application of Supreme Court law, etc.. Cf. Martinez, 132 S.Ct. at 1320 

(finding limits on habeas relief for ineffectiveness of PCR counsel not applicable to 

cause and prejudice determination).

c. Alleged Ineffectiveness of PCR (and Trial) Counsel

Petitioner argues three instances of deficient performance by trial counsel which 

should have been challenged by PCR counsel:

A competent attorney, representing Petitioner on a petition for postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Arizona Rules of Criminal 

Procedure, [(1)] would have argued ineffective assistance of 

counsel, by virtue of trial counsel’s failure to challenge two

suggestive out-of-court identifications prior to trial, [(2)] his failure 

to challenge eyewitness in-court identification, and [(3)] his failure 

to challenge an illegal search and seizure of Petitioner’s vehicle.

(Petition, Doc. 1 at 4. See also Reply, Doc. 11 at 5-7.)

(1) Failure to Challenge Out-of-Court Identifications

Petitioner argues that the “evidence of guilt was limited to two eye-witness 

identifications from one home invasion, and one eye-witness identification from the 

second...Under these circumstances, it was incumbent upon trial counsel to make a 

reasonable effort to challenge the admissibility of that evidence before it was presented 

to the jury.” (Reply, Doc. 11 at 6.) Petitioner argues that trial counsel “did not file any 

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pretrial motions with respect to the identification issues.” (Id.)

(a) Show-up Identification

Petitioner complains about the use of a “one-person show-up identification 

procedure” when the victim Belem Vega identified Petitioner. Petitioner argues that Due 

Process precludes the use of unduly suggestive pretrial identification procedures. 

(Petition, Doc. 1 at 7.) 

Petitioner correctly argues that under state law, the prosecution bears a burden of 

establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that the identification procedures were 

not unduly suggestive, and/or that subsequent in-court identifications were not tainted by 

them. (Id., citing State v. Dessureault, 104 Ariz. 380, 384, 452 P.2d 951, 955 (1969).) 

In Dessureault, the Arizona Supreme Court laid out the process for evaluating challenges 

to identification procedures:

First, if at the trial the proposed in-court identification is 

challenged, the trial judge must immediately hold a hearing in the 

absence of the jury to determine from clear and convincing evidence 

whether it contained unduly suggestive circumstances. In this the 

burden is on the prosecution to establish from all the circumstances 

surrounding the pretrial identification that it was not such as to be 

unduly suggestive.

Second, if the trial judge concludes that the circumstances of 

the pretrial identification were unduly suggestive or that the 

prosecution has failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence 

that they were not, then it is the prosecution's burden to satisfy the 

trial judge from clear and convincing evidence that the proposed incourt identification is not tainted by the prior identification.

Dessureault, 104 Ariz. at 384, 453 P.2d 951, 955 (Ariz. 1969). 

In the second phase, the court considers the factors identified in Neil v. Biggers, 

409 U.S. 188 (1972). “[T]he factors to be considered in evaluating the likelihood of 

misidentification include the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time 

of the crime, the witness' degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness' prior 

description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the 

confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and the confrontation.” Id. at

199-200 (1972). See also State v. Tresize, 127 Ariz. 571, 575, 623 P.2d 1, 5 (1980).

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Suggestiveness – To establish that the show-up identification was unduly 

suggestive, Petitioner points to the fact that Petitioner was the only person shown to 

Vega and was in handcuffs and accompanied by at least one officer. However, neither 

circumstance makes a show-up identification unduly suggestive. 

The essence of a show-up identification is the presentation of a single suspect. 

“As an initial matter, we note that in most cases it is unavoidable that a show-up at the 

scene of a crime will be suggestive of guilt to a certain degree. Nevertheless, [the Ninth 

Circuit] has found that show-ups are not objectionable unless the procedure was so 

impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable 

misidentification.” U.S. v. Kessler, 692 F.2d 584, 585 (9th Cir. 1982) (internal citations 

and quotations omitted). Accordingly, the presentation of Petitioenr alone was not 

unduly suggestive.

Neither is the fact that Petitioner was in handcuffs and accompanied by at least 

one officer. The Ninth Circuit has recognized that such a presentation need not be found 

unduly suggestive: “The use of handcuffs or other indicia of custody will not invalidate 

a show-up, at least where necessary for the prompt and orderly presentation of the 

suspect, consistent with protection of the officers and witnesses.” U.S. v. Kessler, 692 

F.2d 584, 586 (9th Cir.1982). See also U.S. v. Bagley, 772 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1985) 

(finding one-man show-up at bank with defendant handcuffed and surrounded by law 

enforcement officers within an hour and a half of the robbery was suggestive, but not 

impermissibly so).

Here, Officer Mills testified that Petitioner was handcuffed to insure officer 

safety, in light of the number of people from Petitioner’s residence at the scene, 

outnumbering the officers. (Exhibit K, R.T. 1/7/09 at 59.) Moreover, the show-up 

identification occurred between 30 minutes and less than three hours after the robbery. 

Vega testified:

Q. At some point, were you asked to look at a suspect to 

determine whether it was someone who was involved in the armed 

robbery?

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A. Yes.

Q. Okay. About how long after the actual armed robbery did 

that occur?

Q. [sic] About an hour, 45 minutes; about an hour.

(Exhbit I, R.T. 1/6/9 at 192.) 

Vega testified that after the robbery, she called 9-1-1 and the police arrived at her 

home ten minutes later. (Exhibit I, R.T. 1/6/9 at 192.) Officer Mills testified that he was 

dispatched to Vega’s home at “around midnight.” (Exhibit K.R.T. 1/7/09 at 29.) Officer 

Mills testified that the identification occurred “shortly after midnight,” (Exhibit K, R.T. 

1/7/09 at 67), but also stated it occurred “at zero - - or 2:36 in the morning (Id. at 51.) 

On cross-examination, Vega agreed with defense counsel’s characterization as a 

half hour:

Q. Okay. Now, later on that evening, actually within about 

half an hour or so, a police officer showed you my client, 

highlighted in the police headlights, in handcuffs and you identified 

him, right?

A. Yes.

(Exhibit K, R.T. 1/7/09 at 9.) 

Petitioner also complains that he was 50 feet away when Vega identified him at 

the show up identification. (See Exhibit K, R.T. 1/7/09 at 66-67.) However, while this 

may or may not have impacted the reliability of the identification, Petitioner fails to 

suggest how it made it unduly suggestive. The undersigned might be tempted to find 

undue suggestiveness had the witness been so far away that it suggested the officers 

intended her to identify Petitioner as the perpetrator regardless of whether she recognized 

him, or, perhaps if she had asked for a closer look and the officer refused. But here, 

Vega was being asked to identify someone she already knew. 

Vega testified that during the robbery she recognized Petitioner as one of the 

people who hang around a neighboring property.

Q. So is that the person that you first saw in the kitchen?

A. Yeah, he was the one at the kitchen, yeah, by the kitchen.

Q. And once that person that got close to you -- you said only 

a couple of feet, right?

A. Uh-huh.

Q. Yes?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you recognize him then?

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A. Yes. Yeah.

Q. How did you recognize him? What did you recognize him 

from?

A. From next door, because I would see them hanging out 

there all of the time.

* * * 

Q. So, okay. So then you noticed this person who came up 

close was saying - - and was saying “Let’s go” from being at the 

house, I guess closest to 83rd Avenue, is that right?

A. Uh-huh. Correct.

(Exhibit I, R.T. 1/6/9 at 189.) 

Conversely, suggestiveness of the procedure was decreased by the facts that the 

officer advised Vega to make no assumptions based on Petitioner’s being handcuffed; 

and he advised Vega to not presume that Petitioner was the suspect. (Exhibit K RT 

1/7/09 at 52-53.) 

Under these circumstances, the undersigned finds no basis to conclude that the 

show-up identification procedures were unduly suggestive. Conversely, the undersigned 

concludes that had trial counsel obtained a Dessureault hearing on the Vega 

identification, the trial court would have found clear and convincing evidence that the 

identification procedure was not unduly suggestive.

“If we find that a challenged procedure is not impermissibly suggestive, our 

inquiry into the due process claim ends.” U.S. v. Bagley, 772 F.2d 482, 492 (9th Cir. 

1985). It is only after finding it unduly suggestive, that the court is required to consider 

the Biggers factors. Id. See also State v. Taylor, 27 Ariz. App. 330, 333, 554 P.2d 926, 

929 (Ariz. App. 1976).

Even if the undersigned could find the lineup unduly suggestive, the undersigned 

would find that the identification was nonetheless reliable in light of the Biggers factors. 

Opportunity to View at Crime – Petitioner argues that Vega had only a limited 

opportunity at the time of the crime to view the perpetrator she identified as Petitioner. 

Vega described three perpetrators. She described the man who woke her in her 

bedroom. (Exhibit I, R.T. 1/6/09 at 179.) When she left her bedroom to get her money 

to give to the intruder, she saw two other men, one by the front door in the living room, 

and one in the kitchen by the broken back door who she identified as Petitioner. (Id. at 

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182.) Vega’s ability to view Petitioner was limited.

Although she described her house as “pretty small,” she described Petitioner as 

initially being “pretty far” from her. (Id. at 182-184.) Then she described him coming 

closer:

Q. And there is a third person?

A. Yes.

Q. Where is that third person?

A. In the kitchen by the door, by the glass door..

Q. And that's the one who is fairly close to

A. No, he was pretty far.

Q. About the same distance from me to you, is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you describe that person?

A. That one, I couldn't really see him that well because it 

was kind of far. And they were also telling me not to look at them 

and like to look down, so he was too far. I couldn't really see him 

that well.

Q. Well, what about him could you see?

A. He was pretty tall, too, and not really skinny; maybe 

around -- he was pretty tall, like six feet.

Q. Did you recognize him?

A. I -- kind of, yeah, I would.

Q. How did you recognize him?

A. Well, at some point when they were taking too long, he 

came closer and that's when I saw him a little bit closer, because he 

came closer to tell them that he was taking too long, that they 

needed to leave.

(Exhibit I, R.T. 1/6/9 at 183-185.) 

On cross-examination, Vega indicated she was able to see only portions of 

Petitioner:

Q. Because the eyes is the only thing you saw, right?

A. Yeah.

Q. Was --

A. Just the eyes and the head, this part (indicating).

Q. They were wearing ball caps over their heads, weren't 

they?

A. No, they weren't.

* * * 

Q. Okay. They were wearing bandanas, though?

A. Yes, they were.

Q. And the bandanas were up to a level just under their eyes?

A. Yes.

(Exhibit K, R.T. 1/7/09 at 10-11.)

Nonetheless, as noted herein above, Vega testified that during the robbery she 

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recognized Petitioner as one of the people who hang around a neighboring property. 

(Exhibit I, R.T. 1/6/9 at 189.) Similarly, in U.S. v. Crozier, the Sixth Circuit found an 

increase in reliability, based on opportunity to view, when a robbery victim had 

previously seen the defendant in the store, taking note of him as not being a regular 

customer.

Degree of Attention – There is no suggestion here that Vega was a “casual or 

passing observer. Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977). She was, after all, 

the one being robbed. To be sure, Petitioner suggests that an expert might have opined 

of the risks of “weapons focus” in such situations, essentially asserting that the witnesses 

would have been too distracted by the weapons to pay enough attention to the 

perpetrators to identify them. However, Petitioner offers nothing to suggest that such 

actually happened in this case.

Accuracy of Prior Description - The absence of a prior description cuts against 

the reliability of the show-up identification. See U.S. v. Crozier, 259 F.3d 503, 511-512 

(6th Cir. 2001). The parties point to nothing in the record to indicate that Vega gave 

anything more than a vague physical description of Petitioner prior to the show up 

identification, i.e. that the culprits were African American males.6 (Exhibit K, R.T. 

1/7/09 at 60.) 

Officer Mills testified that Vega had described the perpetrator at the back door as 

wearing a hat.

Q. So the person -- she told you that SP-3 is or the person 

that you listed person that was listed as SP-3 in your report that 

person was wearing a baseball cap?

A. Yes, sir.

 

6 At trial Vega testified that the perpetrator by the back door was “pretty tall, like six 

feet,” and “not really skinny.” (Exhibit K, R.T. 1/7/09 at 185.) However, there is no 

indication that this description had been provided prior to the show up identification. 

Similarly, Vega testified at trial that the gloves worn by the culprits were not latex or 

rubber gloves, but a thick material, like work gloves, and were not wearing ball caps. 

(Exhibit I, R.T. 1/6/09 at 199.) Cross-examination suggested she had told police officers 

that they were all wearing ball caps. (Exhibit K, R.T. 1/7/09 at 11.) However, there was 

no affirmative evidence that Vega had provided the descriptions of the gloves or hats 

prior to the show-up identification.

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Q. And she told you that that's the person that she identified 

in the one-on-one show-up in front of the police car with the lights 

on, right?

A. Yes, sir.

(Exhibit K, R.T. 1/7/09 at 66.) The parties point to no testimony as to whether Petitioner 

did or did not have a hat on at the time of the show up identification, although there was 

testimony that indicated there was a hat in the car. (See Exhibit K, R.T. 1/7/09 at 141.) 

However, Vega offered the clear description that the culprits hung around the 

neighborhood, particularly at the house on the corner. This description had been made 

available before Petitioner was apprehended coming out of that house. (See Exhibit K, 

R.T. 1/7/09 at 84-85.) 

Petitioner does point to discrepancies in Vega’s description of Petitioner’s actions 

and dress. On cross-examination, defense counsel questioned Vega about whether at the 

show-up identification she had identified Petitioner as being the perpetrator at the front 

door, rather than at the back door. 

Q. So if -- okay. So you did not tell the police officer that the 

person he was showing you was the guy by the front door?

A. No, I didn't tell him that.

* * *

Q. You told the police officer that the guy you saw was the 

guy by the back door?

A. I don't really remember them asking me where he was. I 

don't remember them telling me where exactly he was in the house.

(Exhibit K, R.T. 1/7/09 at 9-10.) The officer, on the other hand, testified that Vega 

identified Petitioner as the perpetrator at the front door:

Q. Okay. And when -- when she identified my client, you 

had my client standing in front of the police car with the lights on in 

handcuffs, and she identified him.

She told you that that’s the guy that was by the front 

door, right?

A. Yes, sir.

(Exhibit K, R.T. 1/7/09 at 63.) The prosecution attempted to impeach the officer’s 

testimony by suggesting that the officer had simply become confused in his 

understanding or recording of Vega’s statements about the various perpetrators. (Id. at 

74-75.) But the officer remained adamant that Vega told him Petitioner was at the front 

door. (Id. at 80-81.) 

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However, this discrepancy relates to Vega’s overall credibility. It does not create 

an inference that Vega identified Petitioner as the culprit merely because of his presence 

at the show up identification. In applying Biggers, the courts are not tasked to evaluate 

the reliability of the witness, but the reliability of the identification procedure.

It is true the defense attempted to clarify with Vega at trial that there was a 

difference in her description of the two: the culprit at the front door had “really short 

hair,” while the culprit at the back door (who she identified as Petitioner) had puffy hair, 

pulled back. (Exhibit K, R.T. 1/7/09 at 8-9. See also R.T. 1/6/09 at 183.) However, as 

with the location itself, there is no indication that Vega had proffered those descriptions 

prior to the show-up identification.

Level of Certainty – Although perhaps fuzzy on some details of the crime and 

investigation, Vega expressed no hesitancy in any of her identifications of Petitioner.

Elapsed Time – As discussed hereinabove, the show-up identification occurred 

between 30 minutes and less than three hours after the robbery. That was soon enough 

to point to the reliability of Vega’s identification.

Analysis of Evidentiary Challenge – For the reasons discussed hereinabove, the 

undersigned concludes that the Vega identification procedure was not unduly suggestive. 

Even if deemed unduly suggestive, the undersigned would find that the identification 

was none the less reliable.

The witness’s limited opportunity to view the perpetrator, and (to a limited extent) 

the absence of a matching prior physical description, contribute to the possibility of a 

misidentification. The minimal elapsed time, certainty of the witness, and instructions 

given to the witness at the show-up identification all reduce the possibility. 

The most critical factor, however, was the witness’s pre-existing familiarity with 

Petitioner as a regular in the neighborhood. That familiarity provides reliability that 

would overcome the limited opportunity for observation, lack of prior physical 

description, and confusion over other details. The most brief and limited of viewings can 

allow an observer to identify a familiar person. Further, it would reduce the 

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suggestiveness of the show-up identification; the witness was not, in her mind, 

identifying the visage she saw in her home so much as identifying that Petitioner was the 

person she already knew the perpetrator to be.

In sum, the undersigned concludes that the trial court would have found clear and 

convincing evidence that “under the ‘totality of the circumstances' the identification was 

reliable even though the confrontation procedure was suggestive.” Biggers, 409 U.S. at 

199.

Analysis of Trial Counsel - Under these circumstances, the undersigned cannot 

find that the probability of success in an attempt to exclude the identification evidence 

from Vega was great enough that trial counsel was “outside the wide range of 

professionally competent assistance,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-90, in not raising the 

argument. 

Even if counsel was deficient in challenging Vega’s identification, and could have 

successfully excluded it, the undersigned cannot find a reasonable probability that the 

outcome of the proceeding would have been different. There remained other substantial 

evidence against Petitioner, including the wallet and vitamins from the first robbery in 

Petitioner’s vehicle, the (albeit unused) latex gloves in his vehicle, the holster and bullets 

in the car, Petitioner’s discovery near the second robbery, and the other identifications. 

Even if all the identifications were excluded, the undersigned cannot find a 

reasonable probability that the jury would have been swayed from convicting, given the 

remaining evidence.

Nonetheless, Martinez does not mandate that Petitioner show that his underlying 

claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel would have been a winner, merely that it 

was “substantial,” i.e. that it “has some merit.” Martinez, 132 S.Ct. at 1318. Here, the 

undersigned may not ultimately be swayed, but that is not to say that the claim is 

insubstantial or has no merit. 

Thus, this Court must proceed to analyze PCR counsel’s performance.

Analysis of PCR Counsel – The other prong of the Martinez analysis asks 

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whether, in light of the purported ineffectiveness of trial counsel, PCR counsel was 

ineffective. Only if PCR counsel was operating “outside the wide range of 

professionally competent assistance,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-90, in failing to raise 

trial counsel’s ineffectiveness, can Petitioner’s procedural default be excused.

At this stage, the analysis comes full circle to the ultimate evaluation of the 

underlying claim.7 Here, given the undersigned’s conclusion that the evidentiary attack 

would have ultimately been unsuccessful (both at the “unduly suggestive” stage and the 

reliability stage) and that there was no prejudice, and thus the attack on trial counsel 

would have been unsuccessful, it follows that the undersigned cannot find that PCR 

counsel performed deficiently in failing to raise the claim. Similarly, the undersigned 

cannot find a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different had 

PCR counsel mounted the claim.

Therefore, the undersigned finds no cause to excuse the procedural default arising 

from the Vega identifications.

(b) Munoz Photo Lineup

Next, Petitioner argues that the photo identifications by Miguel Munoz, a victim 

at the first robbery, should have been challenged. Petitioner argues the photo lineup was 

unduly suggestive, pointing to: (1) Munoz’ initial uncertainty; and (2) his subsequent 

retraction of the identification. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 5, 7, 10.) The propriety of photo

identifications are determined under the standards adopted in Biggers. Manson v. 

 

7

The undersigned recognizes that in many instances the two Martinez prongs are so 

intertwined that they will be subsumed into one analysis focused on one or the other 

prongs, i.e. trial counsel’s performance or PCR counsel’s performance. There remains, 

however, a clear distinction between the prongs. For example, there are gradations of 

the potential for success, and ultimate effect, of the foregone tactic. Some underlying 

claims will be so attractive that trial counsel was clearly ineffective, and thus (barring 

inability to discover, or other impediments), PCR counsel was clearly ineffective in not 

raising it. Others may be so clearly meritless that both trial and PCR counsel were 

obviously not ineffective in avoiding the claim. And there may be still others, in the 

middle ground, that are substantial enough that (while perhaps not guaranteed of 

success) they require a determination whether PCR counsel had other tactical reasons to 

raise or not raise the claim, i.e. the availability or absence of other, more attractive, 

claims, or was otherwise acting reasonably in foregoing the claim.

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Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977); State v. Martinez, 121 Ariz. 62, 588 P.2d 355 (App. 

1978). 

Suggestiveness – Petitioner has pointed to no particular suggestiveness in the

photo lineup procedure. 

Officer Cordova indicated that another detective had selected 12 similar photos, 

and had a computer place them in random order and print out the photo lineup. (Exhibit 

K, R.T. 1/7/09 at 98-99.) Cordova separated Munoz from Tonya Hards, and showed 

Munoz the lineup. (Id. at 100-101. See also, Exhibit I, R.T. 1/6/9 at 129.) Munoz was 

advised about the limitations of the photos and that no identification need be made. 

(Exhibit K, R.T. 1/7/09 at 102-104.) 

Munoz stated that he did not recognize anyone from the photo lineups. (Id. at 101, 

111; Exhibit I, R.T. 1/6/09 at 54.) Although, Munoz testified that he had told the officer 

that he thought that Petitioner’s photo looked like the perpetrator, he was not sure.

Subsequently, the lineups were shown to Hards, who eventually identified 

Petitioner’s photo as the perpetrator who had been at the front door. (Id. at 104-105.) 

Munoz then asked to look at the photo lineups again. (Id. at 102.) There is no indication 

whether Munoz was permitted to again view the lineups.

At trial, Munoz testified that Petitioner looked “very, very much like I 

remember.” (Exhibit I, R.T. 1/6/09 at 58.) 

Subsequently, Munoz executed an Affidavit indicating that he was not sure 

whether his in court identification was based upon his memory from the time of the 

crime, or developed from the lineup pictures and TV news reports. (Exhibit HH, PCR 

Petition at Exhibit A, Affidavit.) 

On these facts, the undersigned finds no reason to conclude that the photo lineup 

procedure was unduly suggestive. See e.g. State v. Taylor, 27 Ariz. App. 330, 332-333, 

554 P.2d 926, 928-929 (Ariz. App. 1976) (photo lineup not unduly suggestive where no 

challenge to photos used or manner of presentation); U.S. v. Monks, 774 F.2d 945 (9th

Cir. 1985) (photo lineup not unduly suggestive where no direction toward defendant was 

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given, no other witnesses present, and nothing to indicate defendant should be chosen).

Even if deemed unduly suggestive, the undersigned would find that the

identification was not unreliable.

Opportunity to View – Petitioner points to no limitation in Munoz’s opportunity 

to view the perpetrator. At trial, Munoz described Petitioner as the perpetrator who 

stayed at the door during the invasion, during the several minutes the other two searched 

the home. (Exhibit I, R.T. 1/6/09 at 50-51, 61-62.) He described his interaction with 

Petitioner at the time of the crime: 

Q. BY MR. TREON: What is it about the defendant that you 

recognize?

A. Well, like I said, I remember he spent two minutes right in 

front of me and thinking -- going back to that and I look at him, and 

he's been looking at me, like I went back to when he was looking at 

me and it reminds me a lot. It reminds me a lot. It's like lived it 

again; he was looking at me.

(Exhibit I, R.T. 1/6/09 at 59.) 

Munoz also described all of the perpetrators as wearing baseball caps pulled down 

and bandanas covering the lower half of their faces so that all he could see was their 

eyes. (Exhibit I, R.T. 1/6/09 at 68; Exhibit K, R.T. 1/7/09 at 111-112.) 

Degree of Attention –Munoz was, like Vega, no casual observer, but a victim of 

the crime. 

Accuracy of Prior Description – As with Vega, the record does not reflect 

anything other than a vague prior description, i.e. that the perpetrators were African 

American males, and that Petitioner (the man at the front door) was about five feet ten 

inches tall. However, Munoz also described the culprits as wearing latex gloves and dark 

baseball caps. (Exhibit I, R.T. 1/6/09 at 70-71.) A cap and latex gloves were found in 

Petitioner’s car. (Exhibit K, R.T. 1/7/09 at 138-139 (gloves), 142-144 (hat).)

Munoz offered conflicting testimony at trial over whether the culprits were using 

shirts or bandanas to cover their faces. (Exhibit I, R.T. 1/6/09 at 68 (bandanas), 102 -103 

(shirts).) He testified, however, that he did not know at the time what a bandana was and 

what he told police was that their faces were covered with their shirts. (Id. at 103-104, 

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140.) 

Level of Certainty – When interviewed by police officers at the scene, Munoz 

denied being able to identify the perpetrators:

Q. Okay. Did you ask him if he thought he could identify 

these folks?

A. Yes.

Q. And what did he tell you?

A. He said no.

(Exhibit I, R.T. 1/6/09 at 169.) It is unclear, particularly given Munoz’s broken English, 

whether this was intended to relate an inability to recognize them in the future, or an 

inability to provide their names, etc.

At trial, Munoz testified that he was unable to identify anyone from the photo 

lineup. (Exhibit I, R.T. 1/6/09 at 53-54.) He clarified that he told the officer he might 

recognize Petitioner’s picture as familiar, but he was not sure. (Id. at 63.) Detective 

Cordova agreed that Munoz “didn’t give any indication at all that he recognized 

anybody.” (Exhibit K, R.T. 1/7/09 at 110-111.) 

In any event, Munoz was unable to positively identify Petitioner in the photo 

lineup, offered only a half-hearted identification at trial, and subsequently further 

qualified the identification in his affidavit.

Petitioner points to that affidavit as further evidence that the photo lineup was 

suggestive. Assuming that such post-trial evidence is properly considered in a Biggers

analysis, the undersigned does not find it significant. At best, the affidavit edges further 

away from Munoz’s testimony about the lineup and trial identifications that Petitioner 

looked like he remembered, and clarifies that the memory could have come from the 

crime, from the lineup, or from TV coverage. Given the weakness of the identifications 

previously offered, the witness’s further confusion, some two years after trial, does not 

significantly alter the landscape of circumstances of the identifications. It is not 

Munoz’s credibility (his memory, etc.) which is at issue, but rather the suggestive effect 

of the photo lineup and is effect on the reliability of his identifications.

Elapsed Time - Officer Cordova testified that he showed the photo lineup to

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Munoz the morning after the incident at about 10:00 or 10:15. (Exhibit K, R.T. 1/7/09 at 

97-98.) Munoz described the events as occurring after 10:00 pm (Exhibit I, R.T. 1/6/09 

at 38). Thus barely 12 hours, or less, had transpired.

Analysis of Evidentiary Challenge – The factors indicating the likelihood that a 

misidentification occurred from the photo lineup include Munoz’s limited ability to view 

the perpetrators as a result of the baseball caps and bandanas or shirts covering their 

faces. The factors to the contrary include his degree of attention and the elapsed time. 

The accuracy of his prior description is limited by the extent of that description, but his 

description did match with respect to Petitioner’s race, gender, and his possession (albeit 

in his car, rather than on his person) of latex gloves and a cap. 

Munoz’s lack of certainty in his identifications is a dual edged sword. On the one 

hand, the fact that despite finding Petitioner’s photo familiar he refused to identify him 

suggests that the lineup procedure was not suggestive. This is not a situation where 

Petitioner has claimed that the lineup was rigged to direct Munoz to his picture, e.g. by 

presenting pictures similar to each other but not to Petitioner’s photo, etc. In the latter 

type of scenario, a half-hearted identification indicates that the suggestiveness worked. 

In this situation, the half-hearted identification indicates that the lineup was not 

suggestive, and left the witness to rely solely upon his own memory.

On the other hand, by the time of trial, Munoz had become more comfortable with 

identifying Petitioner. There is some inference, particularly in light of his post-trial 

affidavit, that this may have come from seeing Petitioner’s photo. However, the affidavit 

indicates that ambivalence whether Munoz had been tainted by the photo lineup, press 

coverage, or simply seeing Petitioner at the defense table in court.

Ultimately, the fact that Munoz was unwilling to affirmatively identify Petitioner 

in the photo lineup, and the limited nature of his identification at trial, lead the 

undersigned to conclude that “under the ‘totality of the circumstances' the identification 

was reliable even though the confrontation procedure was suggestive.” Biggers, 409 

U.S. at 199.

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Analysis of Trial Counsel – Even if the undersigned could conclude that the 

evidentiary claim had merit, two tactical considerations lead the undersigned to conclude 

that trial counsel was not deficient for failing to challenge Munoz’ in-court identification 

based upon his exposure to the photo lineup. 

First is the weakness of the claim. Effective counsel chooses his battles wisely, 

and doesn’t mount every possible challenge. See Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1434 

(9th Cir. 1989). Here, trial counsel could have easily concluded that pursuing this claim 

was unwise because of the oddness of challenging an out-of-court identification 

procedure where no identification had been made, and where there was nothing 

demonstrably suggestive about the photo lineup procedure.

Second, counsel could have made the reasonable tactical decision that allowing 

the testimony by Munoz cast doubts upon the photo lineup identification by Hards, who 

spent most of the time during the robbery hiding under the covers, and had even less of 

an opportunity to view the perpetrators than did Munoz. 

Finally, given the hesitations in Munoz’s identification at trial (and thus its 

limited effect on the jury), and the other evidence of Petitioner’s guilt, the undersigned 

cannot find a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been 

different had trial counsel successfully excluded evidence of the photo lineup and/or the 

in court identification. Thus, the undersigned cannot find prejudice from the failure of 

trial counsel to pursue the claim.

Analysis of PCR Counsel – Here, the question whether the claim of 

ineffectiveness of trial counsel was “substantial” under the first Martinez prong is far 

closer than with the Vega identification. Given the tactical considerations and lack of 

prejudice described above, the undersigned finds that the claim was not “substantial.,”

i.e. that it does not have “some merit.” Martinez, 132 S.Ct. at 1318

Even if the undersigned presumes that the claim was substantial, the undersigned 

cannot say that PCR counsel performed deficiently by failing to raise the ineffectiveness 

claim. PCR counsel could have reasonably concluded that the claim was so without 

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merit that it was not worth raising.

Accordingly, the undersigned concludes that Petitioner has failed to meet the 

requirements of Martinez as to this claim, and thus has failed to show cause to excuse his 

procedural default.

(c) Hards Photo Lineup – Next Petitioner complains about the identification by 

Tonya Hards, a victim at the first home invasion. 

Suggestiveness – The only particular element of the photo lineup complained of 

by Petitioner is the fact that Hards was encouraged or permitted to utilize business cards 

to shield the tops and bottoms of the photos, and that this was suggested or permitted 

while she was viewing the lineup in which Petitioner’s photo was contained.

The testimony at trial indicated that the morning after the crimes, Hards was 

presented two or three photo lineups, one of which included Petitioner’s photo. 

Although Munoz had been previously shown the lineups, she was not present in the 

room, and Munoz had not communicated the results of his viewing and was Munoz was 

not present with Hards while she looked at the lineups. Hards was instructed that she 

need not identify anyone from the lineups, and that the perpetrators pictures may or may 

not be in the lineups. She did not know whether anyone else had made an identification 

or any evidence found. 

At trial Hards testified:

Q. Well, when you looked at those photographs and -- you're 

looking at photographs of a person's full face, is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. When you looked at them that way that first time, did you 

recognize anyone immediately?

A. No.

Q. Okay. And to be fair, the night that this happened, the 

night before, were you able to see their full faces?

A. No, I did not see their full face.

Q. And do you remember that because you had not seen their 

full faces -- well, did you tell the detective that you couldn't pick 

someone?

A. Yeah, I told him that it's going to be hard for me to pick 

someone out and people have distinguishing features, and the only 

part I got to see of them was their eyes.

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So he asked me that if he were to hand me a card and 

if I were to cover it, would I be able to identify somebody, if I feel I 

would be able to identify somebody. And I thought that was a good 

idea, so I asked him for two cards to cover the top and the mouth 

and the

Q. And did you do that?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. And once you did that and you covered up the mouth and 

nose -- and did you cover up kind of like the hair or forehead?

A. Yes.

Q. I guess when you did that, I guess the only thing left was 

the people's eyes, is that right?

A. That's right.

Q. And when you looked at just the eyes, did any of the 

pictures stand out to you?

A. Yes.

Q. And did you do anything to indicate that it stood out to 

you?

A. Just the feeling that they gave me.

Q. Did you say anything to the detective?

A. Yeah, I said that those look like the eyes that I that I seen.

Q. The eyes that you saw that night, the night of August 19th, 

when you saw the person come into the house or when you saw the 

person with the gun, do you see a person with those eyes in the 

courtroom today?

A. Yes, sir.

(Exhibit I, R.T. 1/6/09 at 131-132.) Hards then identified Petitioner. (Id. at 133.)

On cross-examination, Hards indicated that using the business cards “was the 

detective’s idea.” (Exhibit I, R.T. 1/6/09 at 148.) 

Q. Okay. And up to that point, you had not said to the 

detective -- you had not told him, well, you know, his eyes were 

really noticeable; if you cover up everything but the eyes, I bet I can 

-- I could pick the eyes out?

You didn't say anything like that, did you? .

A. I said I had that I'd have to see a lineup, I had -- I'd have 

to see a lineup without having a hat on and something covering their 

mouth so I could identify that way, because a mouth and nose are 

very distinctive features on a person. So when that's added on to a 

pair of eyes t it changes everything.

So when I had told him I would need to see a lineup 

like that t he said: Well, if I give you a business card to cover it up 

would that help you?

And I told him: Yes.

(Exhibit I, R.T. 1/6/09 at 148-149.)

The undersigned finds the “suggestiveness” arising from the offer of the business 

cards to be very limited. The officer was not pressuring the witness to make an 

identification by offering the cards. Rather, he was responding to the witness’s own 

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suggestion that the viewing the entire mugshot was distracting.

Further, a finding of suggestiveness depends upon the assumption that Hards 

would infer from the offer of the cards that the suspect was to be found among the 

photos. That inference is already implicit in any photo lineup, despite any admonition to 

the contrary. What rationale policeman with no suspect would bring random photos a 

few dozen at a time? Cf. Dickerson v. Fogg, 692 F.2d 238, 245 (2

nd Cir. 1982) (officer 

“illegitimately pressured [witness] into taking a second and third look at [suspect] after 

his first tentative identification”). Nothing in this situation served to go beyond that 

inherent suggestiveness of the photo lineup.

Petitioner complains that the officer did this while Hards was viewing the lineup 

containing Petitioner’s picture. That, without more, does not significantly increase the 

suggestiveness. It might be more suggestive if, for example, the officer had placed the 

business cards over Petitioner’s face and asked the witness to take another look at 

Petitioner. But here, the witness was looking at a group of 6 photos in the one grouping, 

and there is nothing to indicate she was discouraged from going back to the other 

group(s). See e.g. U.S. v. Collins, 559 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1977) (six photo lineup not 

unduly suggestive).

The goal of the Biggers analysis is to avoid unreliable identifications that result 

from identification procedures that, in essence, point the witness to the suspect. See 

Simmons v. U.S., 390 U.S. 377, 383 (1968) (unduly suggestive “if the police display to 

the witness only the picture of a single individual who generally resembles the person he 

saw, or if they show him the pictures of several persons among which the photograph of 

a single such individual recurs or is in some way emphasized”). The process is unduly 

suggestive if it “made it all but inevitable that [the witness] would identify [defendant] 

whether or not he was in fact ‘the man,’” where “[i]n effect, the police repeatedly said to 

the witness, ‘This is the man.’” Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 443 (1969).

The offer of business cards to restrict the view of the photographs did not point 

the witness to any photograph in particular. The officer was simply responding to the 

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concerns of the witness viewing the photos, much in the same way that one might offer 

to turn on better lighting or block the glare of the sun. Moreover, restricting the photos 

to the portion of perpetrators visible to the witness could serve to increase the reliability 

of the identification by limiting the witness to relying on what they actually observed.

In sum, the undersigned cannot find that the Hards photo lineup was unduly 

suggestive.

Even if deemed unduly suggestive, the undersigned would find the identification 

nonetheless reliable under the Biggers factors.

Opportunity to View – Hards opportunity to view the perpetrator was limited by 

by their baseball caps and coverings over their faces (Exhibit I, R.T. 1/6/09 at 121).

Q. Okay. Were you able to see the person with the gun who 

you said was kind of partly by the bar and partly by the couch, could 

you see his face?

A. Yes, I seen his face.

Q. What part of his face could you see?

A. Only his eyes.

Q. Could you see around his eyes at all?

A. Just seen from right about here (indicating).

Q. And when you're saying "right about here", you're putting 

your hand above and below your eyes?

A. Yes.

(Exhibit I, R.T. 1/6/09 at 124-125.) On cross examination, Hards clarified that the hats 

were on normally, just above the eyebrows. (Id. at 141-142.)

Hards opportunity to view was limited in time by her decision to hide under the 

covers on the couch where she was sleeping. 

Q. And so once you were woken up and you heard the people 

talking about the robbery, other than actually being awake, did you 

do anything?

A. I removed the blankets from on top of me and I had 

popped my head up. And I had seen the person standing there with 

the gun over my head, over the couch, and I just layed back down 

and covered myself back up with the blanket.

(Exhibit I, R.T. 1/6/09 at 119.) 

Degree of Attention – Hards, like Vega and Munoz, was not a casual bystander, 

but a victim fearing for her life. Thus, she would be expected to have been paying acute 

attention to the perpetrators and events occurring around her.

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Accuracy of Prior Description – There is no indication that Hards provided 

anything beyond a general physical description of the perpetrators that could be verified 

against Petitioner’s appearance. 

Level of Certainty – Although Hards hesitated while viewing the full photos, 

once she used the cards to focus her view on the parts of the perpetrators’ faces she 

observed, she was certain in her identification, identifying Petitioner by saying “those 

look like the eyes that I - - that I seen.” (Exhibit I, R.T. 1/6/09 at 132; Exhibit K, R.T. 

1/7/09 at 113-114.) She told Detective Cordova that she was “really sure, pretty sure” 

that Petitioner’s photo was the perpetrator (Exhibit K, R.T. 1/7/09 at 105-106), and that 

she was comfortable saying that it was the person hold the gun in her house (id. at 115). 

Hards likewise was confident in her identification of Petitioner in the courtroom. 

(Exhibit I, R.T. 1/6/09 at 132-133.)

Elapsed Time – Less than 12 hours elapsed between the crime and the photo 

lineup. (See Exhibit K, R.T. 1/7/09 at 108-109.)

Analysis of Evidentiary Challenge – As discussed above, there is nothing about 

the photo lineup which was unduly suggestive. The reliability of the identification is 

enhanced by the degree of attention, level of certainty and limited elapsed time. The 

reliability is reduced by Hards’ limited opportunity to view the perpetrator and the lack 

of a matching prior description. The detraction resulting from the limited opportunity to 

view is minimized by the fact that Hards based her identification on the limited portion 

of the perpetrator that she was able to view. 

In sum, the undersigned does not find that under the circumstances the photo 

lineup was so suggestive as to “give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable 

misidentification.” Kessler, 692 F.2d at 585.

Analysis of Trial Counsel – Short of the physical evidence found in the car, and 

the observed behavior of Petitioner and his girlfriend following the crimes, Hards offered 

what was arguably the most damning testimony. Munoz provided only hesitant 

identifications. Vega was certain in her identifications, but that identification was 

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subjected to significant attack based upon the suggestiveness of the show-up 

identification. Hards, on the other hand, with no prior connection to Petitioner, picked 

him out of an array of photos. Thus, the exclusion of Hards testimony could have 

created a reasonable probability of a different outcome, indicating prejudice from 

counsel’s failure to pursue the claim.

That presumes, of course, that counsel would have been successful in excluding 

Hards’ identification. While the undersigned would have found sufficient reliability to 

admit the evidence, reasonable jurists might have reached a different conclusion. Hards’ 

lack of a prior description and limited opportunity to view the perpetrator are significant 

indicators of a lack of reliability. However, the failure to establish that the procedure 

was unduly suggestive precludes a finding that the claim of ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel was substantial. 

Analysis of PCR Counsel – Given the undersigned’s view of the lack of merit in 

the underlying claim, even if the claim concerning trial counsel had some merit, the 

undersigned cannot say that PCR counsel was not acting within the wide range of 

reasonable counsel in failing to pursue the claim. 

Consequently, the undersigned cannot find that Petitioner received ineffective 

assistance of PCR counsel, and thus Petitioner has not shown cause for his failure to 

exhaust this claim.

(2) Failure to Challenge In-Court Identification

Next, Petitioner argues that PCR counsel was ineffective for failing to raise a 

claim that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge the in-court identifications. 

Apart from the derivative challenges based on the suggestiveness of the pretrial 

identifications (discussed hereinabove), Petitioner points only to trial counsel’s failure to 

retain an expert to testify about the lack of reliability in eyewitness identifications. 

Petitioner raises concerns about the witnesses’ lack of opportunity to view the 

victims, the suggestiveness of the identification procedures, the stressfulness of the 

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situation, “weapons focus,” etc. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 9-11.) Petitioner points to the 

research available on the effects of such matters on the reliability of eyewitness 

identifications, and argues that trial counsel’s failure to call an expert left such research 

unused.

At the outset, the undersigned notes that Petitioner fails to proffer any particular 

expert’s testimony. A petitioner may not simply speculate about what a witness’ 

testimony might be, but must adduce evidence to show what it would have been. Grisby 

v. Blodgett, 130 F.3d 365, 373 (9th Cir. 1997). “[E]vidence about the testimony of a 

putative witness must generally be presented in the form of actual testimony by the 

witness or on affidavit. A defendant cannot simply state that the testimony would have 

been favorable; self-serving speculation will not sustain an ineffective assistance claim.” 

U.S. v. Ashimi, 932 F.2d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 1991).

Petitioner does, at least, provide generalities of the kinds of expert testimony 

which he contends could have been obtained. The undersigned presumes, for purposes 

of this Report and Recommendation, that such testimony would have indeed been 

available.

Analysis of Trial Counsel- Plaintiff must show both deficient performance and 

prejudice on the part of trial counsel in failing to call such an expert.

The value of such expert testimony has been recognized by the Sixth Circuit. “We 

agree with the district court that ‘other means’ of attacking eyewitness identifications 

[e.g. cross-examination] do not effectively substitute for expert testimony on their 

inherent unreliability.” Ferensic v. Birkett, 501 F.3d 469, 481 (6

th

 Cir. 2007). Arizona 

has similarly, long recognized the value and admissibility of such expert testimony. See 

State v. Chapple, 137 Ariz. 281, 770 P.2d 1208 (1983). However, Arizona has also 

limited the requirement that trial courts admit such testimony to cases decided “solely on 

unusual, delayed, ambiguous eyewitness identification,” and have authorized trial courts 

to refuse it in cases, not unlike the instant one, where “there was prompt, positive, 

unambiguous eyewitness identification supported by considerable other physical 

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evidence tying defendant to the crime.” State v. McCutcheon, 162 Ariz. 54, 58, 781 P.2d 

31, 35 (1989).

Even assuming that the evidence would have been found admissible in this case, 

that does not mean that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to offer it.

In addressing the deficient performance prong of the Strickland standard, the Fifth 

Circuit has found “specious” an argument that counsel is required to use such testimony 

in order to provide effective assistance. Cantu v. Collins, 967 F.2d 1006, 1016 (5

th Cir. 

1992). The court observed:

While petitioner is correct that the admission of expert testimony 

regarding eyewitness identifications is proper, he cites no authority 

to support the theory that his trial counsel was required to call an 

expert witness to challenge Moreno's testimony. Indeed, Cantu's 

trial counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that he considered 

seeking the services of an expert witness on the issue of eye-witness 

identification but decided against it based on his belief that his 

cross-examination of Moreno would be sufficient to refute the 

accuracy of the identification.

967 F.2d at 1016. While here there is no evidence that Petitioner’s trial counsel actually 

made a strategic decision to not call an eyewitness expert, this Court need not determine 

the actual reason for an attorney's actions, as long as the act falls within the range of 

reasonable representation. Morris v. California, 966 F.2d 448, 456-457 (9th Cir. 1991), 

cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 96 (1992). Here counsel engaged in extensive cross-examination 

of the eyewitnesses, which if not successful, was at least effective in high-lighting the 

kinds of concerns that an expert would have relied upon in attacking the credibility of the 

eyewitnesses, e.g. their limited opportunity to view the perpetrators both as to the time 

viewed and the constraints of their disguises, the hesitations of the witnesses, etc.

Even if this Court were to conclude, in hindsight, that in cases such as this, with 

disputed eyewitness identifications, counsel ought to be required to retain an expert to 

testify on eyewitness identifications, this Court cannot say that this was the practice in 

place among reasonable attorneys at the time of Petitioner’s trial. Accordingly, this 

Court cannot find that counsel’s failure to retain such an expert was outside the wide 

range of professionally competent assistance, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-90, as judged 

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from counsel’s perspective at the time of the alleged error. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 

U.S. 365, 381 (1986). 

“Moreover, the purpose of the effective assistance guarantee of the Sixth 

Amendment is not to improve the quality of legal representation, although that is a goal 

of considerable importance to the legal system. The purpose is simply to ensure that 

criminal defendants receive a fair trial.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.

The Ninth Circuit has similarly declined to create a requirement for eyewitness 

identification experts, but has done so from the prejudice prong. In Howard v. Clark, 

608 F.3d 563 (9th Cir. 2010), the Court observed that it has repeatedly rejected efforts to 

insert such experts into federal criminal trials:

We have repeatedly affirmed district court decisions to exclude the 

testimony of eyewitness-identification experts from federal criminal 

trials. In reaching these decisions, we have made it clear that we 

“adhere to the position that skillful cross examination of 

eyewitnesses, coupled with appeals to the experience and common 

sense of jurors, will sufficiently alert jurors to specific conditions 

that render a particular eyewitness identification unreliable.”

608 F.3d at 573-74 (citations omitted). The court concluded: “If federal defendants are 

not prejudiced by the exclusion of testimony from eyewitness-identification experts, [the 

state prisoner] was not prejudiced by his trial attorney's failure to call such an expert, 

especially on this record.” The record in Howard was even less substantial than the

present case. It reflected a conviction for a shooting, based solely upon eyewitness 

identifications by one witness who was certain of his identifications both in a photolineup and at trial, and another witness who disputed whether she made a positive 

identification in the photo-lineup and asserted at trial that the defendant was not the 

shooter.

Despite the strong federal case law against a mandate that counsel use eyewitness 

identification expert testimony, and despite the limits of Arizona’s embrace of such 

evidence, the undersigned cannot say that a claim of ineffective assistance based on 

counsel’s failure to offers such testimony was wholly without merit.

Analysis of PCR Counsel – The undersigned is convinced, however, that PCR 

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counsel was not ineffective in failing to raise the claim. The admissibility of the 

evidence in a case such as this is less than clear. The requirement that trial counsel offer 

it even less so. And, given the cross-examination of the eyewitnesses provided to the 

jury, and the physical evidence tying Petitioner to the crime, the undersigned cannot find 

a likelihood that the outcome of the trial would have been different.

Therefore, the undersigned must conclude that Petitioner has failed to show 

ineffective assistance of PCR counsel, and thus has failed to excuse his procedural 

default of his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

(3) Failure to Challenge Seizure of Wallet

Finally, Petitioner asserts that PCR counsel was ineffective for failing to argue 

that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to seek to exclude evidence arising from the 

seizure of the victim’s wallet from Petitioner’s car. Petitioner argues that there were no 

exigent circumstances which justified the seizure of the wallet without a search warrant. 

(Petition, Doc. 1 at 11-12.) 

Respondents argue that Petitioner fails to provide authority for his argument that 

Petitioner’s girlfriend could not be prevented from taken stolen property that was in the 

officer’s plain sight. Respondents further argue that the seizure of the wallet was 

permissible under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, which permits a 

search of a vehicle if there is probable cause to belief it contains evidence of a crime.

The Supreme Court has long held that a warrantless search of an automobile is not 

unreasonable, so long as it is supported by probable cause to believe the vehicle contains 

contraband or evidence of a crime. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991). 

“Probable cause to search exists when the known facts and circumstances are sufficient 

to warrant a reasonable person to conclude that contraband or evidence of a crime will be 

found.” U.S. v. Ibarra, 345 F.3d 711, 716 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Here, the wallet was seized by Sergeant Montoya. Prior to seizing the wallet, 

Montoya had been informed that a victim at the second robbery had reported a belief that 

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one of the perpetrators hung around the house where Petitioner’s car was parked. 

(Exhibit K, R.T. 1/7/09 at 84-85.) Moreover, the car matched the description provided to 

Montoya of the perpetrator’s vehicle from the first robbery, and appeared unusual 

because its windows were left down, something unusual in the neighborhood at that time 

of night. (Id. at 86-87.) Finally, Montoya observed a brown wallet lying on the center 

console which matched the description of the wallet taken from the first robbery.” (Id. at 

87.) Montoya testified that he “he thought it was a possibility that that wallet could be 

the wallet that was taken in the earlier home invasion.” (Id. at 89.) 

Here, the tripartite knowledge of the location of the vehicle in relation to the 

perpetrator’s common location, the use of a similarly described vehicle in the crime, and 

the visible wallet matching the stolen goods in an unsecured vehicle, would warrant a 

reasonable person to conclude that the wallet was evidence of a crime, and thus that the 

vehicle contained such evidence.

Petitioner argues that under the circumstances there were, nonetheless, no exigent 

circumstances to search the vehicle or seize the wallet. Petitioner indicates he was, at the 

time, “not at liberty to retrieve the wallet” and neither he nor anyone else was able to 

transport the vehicle away. (Petition, Doc. 1 at 12.) However, in Arizona v. Grant, the 

Supreme Court clarified that access to the vehicle is a requirement only when the search 

is “incident to a recent occupant’s arrest.” 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009). The Court 

recognized the separate situation where “it is ‘reasonable to believe evidence relevant to 

the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.’” Id. at 343 (citations omitted). The 

Court found the search in Grant unreasonable only because “[n]either the possibility of 

access nor the likelihood of discovering offense-related evidence authorized the search.” 

Id. at 344. Further, the Court further acknowledged the separate exception authorizing a 

warrantless search “if there is probable cause to believe a vehicle contains evidence of 

criminal activity.” Id.at 347. 

Because here there was probable cause for Sergeant Montoya to believe that the 

car contained evidence of criminal activity, no exigent circumstances needed to be 

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shown.

Analysis of Counsel – Because the undersigned concludes that the underlying 

evidentiary claim is wholly without merit, the undersigned cannot find any merit to the 

suggestion that trial counsel was ineffective.

Even if the undersigned could find some glimmer of hope in the evidentiary 

argument, the authorities cited above would make entirely reasonable a tactical decision 

by PCR counsel not to assert the claim. Therefore, the undersigned finds no merit to the 

contention that PCR counsel was ineffective in failing to raise a claim based on trial 

counsel’s failure to assert this claim.

Therefore, Petitioner has failed to excuse his procedural default on this claim.

4. Prejudice

Although both "cause" and "prejudice" must be shown to excuse a procedural 

default, a court need not examine the existence of prejudice if the petitioner fails to 

establish cause. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n. 43 (1982); Thomas v. Lewis, 945 

F.2d 1119, 1123 n. 10 (9th Cir.1991). Petitioner has filed to establish cause for his 

procedural default. 

Nonetheless, for the reasons stated herein above, even if Petitioner could show 

cause to excuse his procedural defaults, the undersigned could not find prejudice from 

the claimed ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

5. Actual Innocence

The standard for “cause and prejudice” is one of discretion intended to be flexible 

and yielding to exceptional circumstances, to avoid a “miscarriage of justice.” Hughes v. 

Idaho State Board of Corrections, 800 F.2d 905, 909 (9th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, 

failure to establish cause may be excused “in an extraordinary case, where a 

constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually 

innocent.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986) (emphasis added). Although 

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not explicitly limited to actual innocence claims, the Supreme Court has not yet 

recognized a "miscarriage of justice" exception to exhaustion outside of actual 

innocence. See Hertz & Lieberman, Federal Habeas Corpus Pract. & Proc., §26.4 at 

1229, n. 6 (4th ed. 2002 Cumm. Supp.). The Ninth Circuit has expressly limited it to 

claims of actual innocence. Johnson v. Knowles, 541 F.3d 933, 937 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Petitioner makes no claim of his actual innocence, and the undersigned finds no 

basis to conclude that Petitioner was actually innocent.

6. Summary re Exhaustion

Petitioner has procedurally defaulted on his claims or they have been procedurally 

barred on independent and adequate state grounds. He has failed to show cause, whether 

because of his pro se status or the ineffectiveness of PCR counsel to excuse his 

procedural failures, and has failed to show prejudice from any alleged constitutional 

violations. Petitioner has not asserted nor shown his actual innocence. 

Therefore, even if deemed timely, Petitioner’s claims must be dismissed with 

prejudice as procedurally defaulted and/or procedurally barred.

C. SUMMARY

Petitioner has failed to show adequate statutory tolling, and therefore his Petition 

is delinquent. He has failed to show exceptional circumstances to entitle him to 

equitable tolling, and has not shown actual innocence to avoid the effect of his 

delinquency. Accordingly, his petition must be dismissed with prejudice as barred by 

the habeas statute of limitations.

Alternatively, Petitioner has either procedurally defaulted his state remedies on 

the claims he raises, or they are were procedurally barred on an independent and 

adequate state ground. Petitioner has failed to show cause, prejudice, or actual 

innocence to avoid the effect of his default. For this reason also his petition must be 

dismissed with prejudice.

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IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Ruling Required - Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, requires 

that in habeas cases the “district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability 

when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” Such certificates are required in 

cases concerning detention arising “out of process issued by a State court”, or in a 

proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 attacking a federal criminal judgment or sentence. 28 

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). 

Here, the Petition is brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and challenges 

detention pursuant to a State court judgment. The recommendations if accepted will 

result in Petitioner’s Petition being resolved adversely to Petitioner. Accordingly, a 

decision on a certificate of appealability is required. 

Applicable Standards - The standard for issuing a certificate of appealability 

(“COA”) is whether the applicant has “made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has rejected the 

constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is 

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “When the district court denies a habeas petition 

on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a 

COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right 

and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in 

its procedural ruling.” Id.

Standard Not Met - Assuming the recommendations herein are followed in the 

district court’s judgment, that decision will be on procedural grounds. The undersigned 

finds that reasonable jurists could find debatable or wrong those portions of the ruling 

relating to statutory tolling of the habeas statute of limitations during the expiration of 

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the time for un-sought, subsequent state review of post-conviction proceedings.

However, a debate over the procedural ruling is insufficient to justify a certificate 

of appealability. Rather, a substantial showing of a valid claim of the denial of a 

constitutional right must also be shown, that is that “reasonable jurists could debate 

whether (or for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a 

different manner.” Slack, 529 U.S. at 484.

Here, under the reasoning set forth herein, the undersigned has concluded that the 

underlying constitutional claims are without merit. The undersigned further finds that 

jurists of reason could not find differently on the merits of the claims.

Accordingly, the undersigned finds that a certificate of appealability should not

issue.

V. RECOMMENDATION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's Petition for Writ 

of Habeas Corpus, filed November 1, 2012 (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that, to the extent the reasoning of this 

Report and Recommendation is accepted, a Certificate of Appealability be DENIED.

VI. EFFECT OF RECOMMENDATION

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court's judgment. 

However, pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties 

shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See also Rule 8(b), Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Proceedings. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) days 

within which to file a response to the objections. Failure to timely file objections to any 

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findings or recommendations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a 

party's right to de novo consideration of the issues, see United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 

328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)(en banc), and will constitute a waiver of a party's 

right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant 

to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143, 1146-

47 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Dated: June 19, 2013

12-2350r RR 13 04 19 on HC Final.docx

James F. Metcalf

United States Magistrate Judge

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