Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00708/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-00708-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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 “Doc.#” refers to the docket number of filings in this case.

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SC

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Robin Lorenzo Thomas, Jr., 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

MCSO, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 09-0708-PHX-DGC (JRI)

ORDER

Plaintiff Robin Lorenzo Thomas, Jr., who is confined in the Lower Buckeye Jail in

Phoenix, Arizona, has filed a pro se civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and

an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis. (Doc.# 1, 3.)1

 The Court will order

Defendant Hatton to answer Count I of the Complaint and will dismiss the remaining claims

and Defendant without prejudice. 

I. Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Filing Fee

Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis will be granted. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a). Plaintiff must pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

The Court will assess an initial partial filing fee of $21.34. The remainder of the fee will be

collected monthly in payments of 20% of the previous month’s income each time the amount

in the account exceeds $10.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The Court will enter a separate

Order requiring the appropriate government agency to collect and forward the fees according

to the statutory formula. 

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II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against

a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised

claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

III. Complaint

Plaintiff alleges three counts for excessive force, disciplinary proceedings, and

retaliation. He sues the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office (MCSO) and Officer Hatton.

Plaintiff seeks injunctive and compensatory relief. 

Plaintiff alleges the following facts: Plaintiff has an anxiety disorder. On March 28,

2009, Plaintiff was placed in an overcrowded cell. Plaintiff suffered an anxiety attack and

yelled in a panic. Officer Hatton ordered Plaintiff to step out of the cell. When Plaintiff did,

apparently calling Hatton a “Fat Boy,” Hatton grabbed Plaintiff. Plaintiff stepped back and

asked Hatton why he was grabbing him. Hatton began pushing Plaintiff and Hatton and his

partner grabbed Plaintiff by the neck and slammed him to the ground. They cuffed Plaintiff

and stood him up. Hatton then began pushing Plaintiff in the chest causing Plaintiff to suffer

chest, back, neck, wrist, and finger problems.

IV. Failure to State a Claim

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts supporting that (1) the

conduct about which he complains was committed by a person acting under the color of state

law and (2) the conduct deprived him of a federal constitutional or statutory right. Wood v.

Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1989). In addition, a plaintiff must allege that he

suffered a specific injury as a result of the conduct of a particular defendant and he must

allege an affirmative link between the injury and the conduct of that defendant. Rizzo v.

Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976). 

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 See http://www.courtminutes.maricopa.gov/docs/Criminal/042009/m3670020.pdf.

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A. MCSO

MCSO is not a proper defendant. In Arizona, the responsibility for operating jails and

caring for prisoners is placed by law upon the sheriff, see A.R.S. §§ 11-441(A)(5), 31-101,

while the responsibility for providing medical care for prisoners is placed by law on the

county, see A.R.S. §§ 11-251(8), 11-291(A). MCSO is simply an administrative creation of

the sheriff to allow him to carry out his statutory duties and is not a “person” amenable to suit

pursuant to § 1983. Accordingly, MCSO will be dismissed as a defendant. 

B. Disciplinary Proceedings

Plaintiff alleges that his due process rights have been violated in connection with

disciplinary proceedings. According to records available on-line, Plaintiff is awaiting trial

on one count following a mistrial.2

 Thus, Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at relevant times.

A pretrial detainee is entitled to due process before being subjected to punishment,

whether for the crime with which he is charged or for violation of jail disciplinary rules. See

Mitchell v. Dupnik, 75 F.3d 517, 525 (9th Cir. 1996). Further, a pretrial detainee has a

substantive due process right against restrictions that amount to punishment for criminal

offenses. Valdez v. Rosenbaum, 302 F.3d 1039, 1045 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing United States

v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979); Redman

v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1440-41 (9th Cir.1991) (en banc)). This right is

violated if restrictions are “imposed for the purpose of punishment.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 535.

For particular governmental action to constitute punishment, the action must cause the

detainee to suffer some harm or disability, and the purpose of the action must be to punish

the detainee. Demery v. Arpaio, 378 F.3d 1020,1029 (9th Cir. 2004). But jail officials are

entitled to impose restrictions to effect confinement, and detention will necessarily affect a

detainee’s ability to live as comfortably as he might like; a de minimis level of imposition is

permissible. Bell, 441 U.S. at 539 n.21. There is no constitutional infringement, if

restrictions are “but an incident of some other legitimate government purpose.” Id. In such

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 Thus:

Not every disability imposed during pretrial detention amounts to

“punishment” in the constitutional sense, however. Once the Government has

exercised its conceded authority to detain a person pending trial, it obviously

is entitled to employ devices that are calculated to effectuate this detention.

Traditionally, this has meant confinement in a facility which, no matter how

modern or how antiquated, results in restricting the movement of a detainee in

a manner in which he would not be restricted if he simply were free to walk

the streets pending trial. Whether it be called a jail, a prison, or a custodial

center, the purpose of the facility is to detain. Loss of freedom of choice and

privacy are inherent incidents of confinement in such a facility. And the fact

that such detention interferes with the detainee’s understandable desire to live

as comfortably as possible and with as little restraint as possible during

confinement does not convert the conditions or restrictions of detention into

“punishment.”

Bell, 441 U.S. at 537.

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a circumstance, governmental restrictions are permissible. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747.3

Although Plaintiff may be able to allege additional facts sufficient to state a claim for

violation of his due process rights, he has not done so in his Complaint. Plaintiff alleges that

he received a write-up for assaulting Officer Hatton, who according to Plaintiff lied to coverup his own wrong-doing, and Plaintiff was placed in the “hole” for a week before seeing a

hearing officer. Plaintiff alleges that he was subsequently sentenced to serve 30 days in the

hole and reclassified to maximum security. 

Plaintiff’s initial placement in “the hole” before a hearing appears to refer to

placement in administrative segregation. Placement in administrative segregation does not

implicate due process. Valdez, 302 F.3d at 1045. Plaintiff otherwise alleges that he was

sanctioned after being found guilty of a disciplinary violation that resulted in his placement

in the hole, i.e., disciplinary segregation for 30 days, and reclassification to maximum

security. Plaintiff fails to allege facts to support that he was denied due process safeguards

before being sanctioned for disciplinary violations. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a due

process claim. 

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C. Retaliation

In Count III, Plaintiff alleges that Hatton retaliated against him by pushing him and

roughing him up “a little bit” after Plaintiff called him “Fat Boy.” To state a constitutional

claim for retaliation, a plaintiff must allege that a defendant acting under color of state law

took adverse action against him because he engaged in protected conduct, that the adverse

action was not narrowly tailored to advance legitimate correctional goals, and that the

adverse action chilled the plaintiff’s exercise of his First Amendment rights or caused the

prisoner to suffer more than minimal harm. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-58 (9th

Cir. 2005); see also Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 267 (9th Cir. 1997) (retaliation claims

requires an inmate must show (1) that the prison official acted in retaliation for the exercise

of a constitutionally-protected right, and (2) that the action “advanced no legitimate

penological interest”).

Plaintiff appears to assert that Hatton retaliated against Plaintiff after Plaintiff called

Hatton “Fat Boy.” Plaintiff’s allegations do not support that he was engaged in conduct

protected by the First Amendment in a prison setting. See Ruiz v. California Dep’t of Corr.,

No. , 2007 WL 1827637 at *2 (C.D. Cal. April 22, 2008) (prisoner’s comments expressing

dissatisfaction about matters of personal concern to inmate was not a matter of public

concern protected by the Free Speech Clause); Whitfield v. Snyder, No. 06-1634, 2008 WL

397457 at *3 (7th Cir. Feb. 14, 2008) (prisoner’s complaint about prison job involved matters

of personal, rather than public, concern and did not qualify as protected speech); Hurd v.

Scribner, No. 06CV0412 JAH (LSP), 2007 WL 1989688 at * 11 (S.D. Cal. May 2, 2007) (“a

prison regulation prohibiting the use of disrespectful language does not violate FirstAmendment rights and prisoners can be disciplined for violation such a prohibition,” citing

Bradley v. Hall, 64 F.3d 1276, 1280 (9th Cir. 1995)). Calling a detention officer “Fat Boy”

is not a matter of public concern that is protected by the First Amendment. Because Plaintiff

fails to allege facts to support that Hatton retaliated against him for exercising a

constitutionally protected right, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for retaliation.

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V. Claims for Which an Answer Will be Required

In Count I, Plaintiff alleges that Hatton used excessive force against him. Hatton will

be required to respond to that Count.

VI. Warnings

A. Release

Plaintiff must pay the unpaid balance of the filing fee within 120 days of his release.

Also, within 30 days of his release, he must either (1) notify the Court that he intends to pay

the balance or (2) show good cause, in writing, why he cannot. Failure to comply may result

in dismissal of this action.

B. Address Changes

Plaintiff must file and serve a notice of a change of address in accordance with Rule

83.3(d) of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff must not include a motion for other

relief with a notice of change of address. Failure to comply may result in dismissal of this

action.

C. Copies

Plaintiff must serve Defendants, or counsel if an appearance has been entered, a copy

of every document that he files. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a). Each filing must include a certificate

stating that a copy of the filing was served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(d). Also, Plaintiff must submit

an additional copy of every filing for use by the Court. See LRCiv 5.4. Failure to comply

may result in the filing being stricken without further notice to Plaintiff.

D. Possible Dismissal

If Plaintiff fails to timely comply with every provision of this Order, including these

warnings, the Court may dismiss this action without further notice. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet,

963 F.2d 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (a district court may dismiss an action for failure to

comply with any order of the Court).

IT IS ORDERED: 

(1) Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis,filed with the Complaint,

is granted. (Doc.# 3.)

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(2) As required by the accompanying Order to the appropriate government agency,

Plaintiff must pay the $350.00 filing fee and is assessed an initial partial filing fee of $21.34.

(3) Counts II and III and Defendant MCSO are dismissed without prejudice.

(4) Defendant Hatton must answer Count I. 

(5) The Clerk of Court must send Plaintiff a service packet including the

Complaint (doc.# 1), this Order, and both summons and request for waiver forms for

Defendant Hatton.

(6) Plaintiff must complete and return the service packet to the Clerk of Court

within 20 days of the date of filing of this Order. The United States Marshal will not provide

service of process if Plaintiff fails to comply with this Order.

(7) If Plaintiff does not either obtain a waiver of service of the summons or

complete service of the Summons and Complaint on a Defendant within 120 days of the

filing of the Complaint or within 60 days of the filing of this Order, whichever is later, the

action may be dismissed as to each Defendant not served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m); LRCiv

16.2(b)(2)(B)(I).

(8) The United States Marshal must retain the Summons, a copy of the Complaint,

and a copy of this Order for future use.

(9) The United States Marshal must notify Defendants of the commencement of

this action and request waiver of service of the summons pursuant to Rule 4(d) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. The notice to Defendants must include a copy of this Order. The

Marshal must immediately file requests for waivers that were returned as undeliverable and

waivers of service of the summons. If a waiver of service of summons is not returned by a

Defendant within 30 days from the date the request for waiver was sent by the Marshal, the

Marshal must:

(a) personally serve copies of the Summons, Complaint, and this Order upon

Defendant pursuant to Rule 4(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and

(b) within 10 days after personal service is effected, file the return of service

for Defendant, along with evidence of the attempt to secure a waiver of service of the

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summons and of the costs subsequently incurred in effecting service upon Defendant.

The costs of service must be enumerated on the return of service form (USM-285) and

must include the costs incurred by the Marshal for photocopying additional copies of

the Summons, Complaint, or this Order and for preparing new process receipt and

return forms (USM-285), if required. Costs of service will be taxed against the

personally served Defendant pursuant to Rule 4(d)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, unless otherwise ordered by the Court.

(10) A Defendant who agrees to waive service of the Summons and Complaint

must return the signed waiver forms to the United States Marshal, not the Plaintiff.

(11) Defendant must answer the Complaint or otherwise respond by appropriate

motion within the time provided by the applicable provisions of Rule 12(a) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure.

(12) Any answer or response must state the specific Defendant by name on whose

behalf it is filed. The Court may strike any answer, response, or other motion or paper that

does not identify the specific Defendant by name on whose behalf it is filed.

(13) This matter is referred to Magistrate Judge Jay R. Irwin pursuant to Rules 72.1

and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure for all pretrial proceedings as authorized

under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

DATED this 11th day of May, 2009.

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