Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-01605/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-01605-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

KARTHIK SUBRAMANI,

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

WELLS FAGO BANK, N.A.; and 

FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE COMPANY,

 Defendants. 

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Case No. 13-cv-01605-SC

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

I. INTRODUCTION 

Now before the Court is Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.'s 

("Wells Fargo") motion for summary judgment. The motion is fully 

briefed,1

 and the Court deems it suitable for disposition without 

oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b). For the reasons 

set forth below, Defendant Wells Fargo's motion for summary 

judgment is GRANTED. 

/// 

 

1

 ECF Nos. 68 ("Mot."), 76 ("Opp'n"), 80 ("Reply"). 

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II. BACKGROUND 

A. Factual Background 

This is a mortgage foreclosure case. Plaintiff Karthik 

Subramani obtained a $479,600 mortgage loan (the "Loan") from 

Defendant Wells Fargo on October 18, 2006, recorded by an 

adjustable-rate promissory note and secured by a deed of trust 

("DOT") against residential real property in Livermore, California. 

The DOT states that Plaintiff agreed to repay the borrowed $479,600 

or risk foreclosure, and that "[t]he Note or a partial interest in 

the note (together with this Security Instrument) can be sold one 

or more times without prior notice to [Plaintiff]." Wells Fargo 

was the original lender under the DOT, and Fidelity National Title 

Insurance Company ("FNTIC") was the original trustee. 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant first sold the Loan to Wells 

Fargo Asset Securities Corporation ("WFASC") sometime around 

October 24, 2006. Soon after that, WFASC allegedly bundled 

Plaintiff's Loan (consisting of the note and DOT) with other 

mortgages into a mortgage-backed securities pool, the Wells Fargo 

Mortgaged Backed Securities 2006-AR18 Trust, Mortgage Pass-Through 

Certificates, Series 2006-AR18 (the "WFMBS 2006-AR18 Trust"). The 

WFMBS 2006-ARIB Trust had been established on October 1, 2006 with 

the execution of a pooling and servicing agreement ("PSA"). 

On July 23, 2009, Plaintiff received a notice of default 

("NOD") from First American Title Insurance Company acting as an 

agent for First American Loanstar Trustee Services ("First American 

Loanstar") as purported "Agent for the Current Beneficiary." 

Compl. Ex. B ("NOD 1"). 

On August 25, 2009, First American Loanstar, acting as 

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"attorney in fact for [Defendant]," issued a Substitution of 

Trustee ("SOT 1"), substituting itself as trustee. 

Plaintiff's first NOD was rescinded on September 10, 2010, but 

Plaintiff defaulted again, and a second NOD was recorded on May 10, 

2011. The second NOD was issued on May 4, 2011, by LSI Title 

Company acting as agent for Federal National Title Company 

("FNTC"). On May 6, 2011, between the issuance and recordation of 

the second NOD, Defendant issued a second Substitution of Trustee 

("SOT 2") appointing FNTC as substitute trustee under the DOT. 

Three months later, on August 11, 2011, the second SOT was 

recorded. 

Plaintiff did not cure his second default, and on August 11, 

2011 -- the same day the second SOT was recorded -- FNTC, acting as 

trustee under the DOT, issued and caused recording of the Notice of 

Trustee Sale. A year later, on August 9, 2012, FNTC sold 

Plaintiff's Property in a foreclosure sale to non-party California 

Equity Management Group, Inc., and issued the Trustee's Deed Upon 

Sale ("TDUS") on August 15, 2012. Plaintiff contends that all of 

the legal documents described above were void because Defendant was 

no longer the valid lender in the DOT, or even an agent of a 

successor beneficiary, after it sold the Loan in 2006. According 

to Plaintiff, Defendant did not assign the DOT or endorse the note 

pursuant to the PSA. Nor did Defendant abide by California law 

regarding the endorsement, assignment, and recordation of notes and 

DOTs. Plaintiff therefore states that after Defendant sold the 

Loan, neither Defendant nor anyone else had any right to or 

interest in the Loan, so all legal notices associated with the note 

and DOT -- including the SOTs, NODs, and the foreclosure sale 

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itself -- are illegal and void. 

B. Procedural History 

Plaintiff has twice amended his complaint, and Defendants have 

twice moved to dismiss. See ECF Nos. 24 ("FAC"), 25 ("MTD FAC"), 

35 ("SAC"), 36 ("MTD SAC"). At this point, the Court has dismissed 

with prejudice Plaintiff's claims for constructive fraud, violation 

of the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"), declaratory relief, and under 

California Civil Code section 2934(a)(1)(A). The Court also 

dismissed with prejudice Plaintiff's claims under the unfair and 

unlawful prongs of California's Unfair Competition Law ("UCL"). 

See ECF Nos. 33 ("MTD FAC Order"), 44 ("MTD SAC Order"). 

Four causes of action remain: Plaintiff's wrongful 

foreclosure, cancellation of instruments, unjust enrichment, and 

UCL fraud claims. See MTD FAC Order at 18, MTD SAC Order at 8-9. 

The wrongful foreclosure, cancellation of instruments, and unjust 

enrichment claims are all premised on the argument that Wells Fargo 

sold the Loan and has no interest through which it may foreclose on 

Plaintiff's home. See SAC ¶¶ 77-81, 95-97, 98-100. 

III. LEGAL STANDARD 

Entry of summary judgment is proper "if the movant shows that 

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant 

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(a). Summary judgment should be granted if the evidence would 

require a directed verdict for the moving party. Anderson v. 

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251 (1986). "A moving party 

without the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial -- usually, but 

not always, a defendant -- has both the initial burden of 

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production and the ultimate burden of persuasion on a motion for 

summary judgment." Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz 

Cos., Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). 

"In order to carry its burden of production, the moving party 

must either produce evidence negating an essential element of the 

nonmoving party's claim or defense or show that the nonmoving party 

does not have enough evidence of an essential element to carry its 

ultimate burden of persuasion at trial." Id. "In order to carry 

its ultimate burden of persuasion on the motion, the moving party 

must persuade the court that there is no genuine issue of material 

fact." Id. "The evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and 

all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. However, "[t]he mere existence of a 

scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will 

be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could 

reasonably find for the plaintiff." Id. at 252. 

IV. DISCUSSION 

Plaintiff's claims all revolve around his assertion that Wells 

Fargo sold its interest in the Loan and therefore does not have 

standing to foreclose on the loan. Plaintiff makes a brief, 

secondary argument that the foreclosure was invalid because the 

second NOD named FNTC as trustee, but FNTC was not substituted as 

trustee until months later. The Court begins by discussing the 

substance of those allegations, determining that Plaintiff lacks 

evidence to support the first and that the second is insufficient 

to support any of his causes of action. Then the Court assesses 

the effect of those holdings on each of Plaintiff's claims. 

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A. Wells Fargo's Interest in the Loan 

It is undisputed that Plaintiff initially obtained the Loan 

from Wells Fargo in October 2006. See SAC ¶ 10; ECF No. 69 ("RJN") 

Ex. A. Plaintiff alleges that "shortly after loan closing . . . 

[Wells Fargo] irrevocably sold the Plaintiff's mortgage loan . . . 

to 'Depositor' WELLS FARGO ASSET SECURITIES CORPORATION." SAC ¶ 

14. 

1. Evidence That Wells Fargo Retained its Interest in 

the Loan 

There are, however, a number of reasons to believe that Wells 

Fargo did not sell its interest in the Loan at that time. In 

August of 2010, Plaintiff entered into a loan modification 

agreement with Wells Fargo. ECF No. 70 ("Grewal Decl.") Ex. C 

("Subramani Depo.") at 46:8-47:18. Plaintiff claims that he 

entered into the modification agreement despite his belief that 

Wells Fargo was no longer the beneficiary of the DOT. See 

Subramani Depo. at 47:6-48:19. However, when Plaintiff filed a 

bankruptcy petition in December 2010, he listed Wells Fargo as the 

mortgagee on his home loan and certified that the information he 

provided was correct under penalty of perjury. RJN Ex. D at 14, 

24. 

The deed of trust, both notices of default, the rescission of 

declaration of default, the substitution of trustee, and notice of 

trustee's sale all list Wells Fargo as the beneficiary. See RJN 

Ex. A at 1, Ex. B at 2, Ex. C at 1, Ex. F at 2, Ex. G at 1, Ex. H 

at 1.2 Those documents cover a period from the initiation of the 

 

2

 Plaintiff does not object to the Court taking judicial notice of 

these documents, but he does object to the Court's consideration of 

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Loan in October 2006 through the trustee's sale in August of 2011, 

and all suggest that Wells Fargo was the beneficiary of the DOT

throughout that period. Wells Fargo was the only entity that ever 

attempted to foreclose on the loan and Plaintiff never made 

payments on the Loan to any other person. Subramani Depo. at 49:4-

22; Grewal Decl. Ex. A at 2. Finally, Wells Fargo's Vice President 

of Loan Documentation has submitted a declaration stating that she 

has personal knowledge of Wells Fargo's records of Plaintiff's 

loan. See ECF No. 71 ("Mulder Decl.") ¶¶ 1-3. She states that 

Wells Fargo never transferred its beneficial interest in the loan 

nor sold Plaintiff's debt. Id. ¶ 12. 

Plaintiff's contention is that all of the documents Wells 

Fargo provides are fraudulent, and he attacks Ms. Mulder's 

declaration for being insufficiently detailed. See Opp'n at 5-6. 

Neither of those contentions changes the fact that Wells Fargo has 

exceeded its burden (as a moving party that does not bear the 

burden of proof at trial) of production for this motion. Wells 

Fargo has submitted significant evidence that it was the 

beneficiary of the DOT and mortgagee on the Loan throughout the 

relevant time period. Absent some contradictory evidence, the 

Court must find that no genuine dispute of material fact exists as 

to whether Wells Fargo sold its interest in the loan. 

 

the truth of the matters asserted therein. Specifically, Plaintiff 

seems to be concerned that the Court will consider the truth of 

statements in these documents asserting that Wells Fargo was the 

true beneficiary of the DOT. The Court does not consider the truth 

of those statements, but it does note that every publicly recorded 

document regarding the Loan lists Wells Fargo as the true 

beneficiary. While that does not conclusively prove that Wells 

Fargo remained the true beneficiary at all times, it does evince a 

lack of any evidence that Wells Fargo ever sold or transferred its 

interest to someone else. 

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2. Evidence that Wells Fargo Sold its Interest in the 

Loan 

The only evidence Plaintiff offers in support of his claim 

that Wells Fargo transferred its beneficial interest is the expert 

opinion of Lawrence Asuncion. Mr. Asuncion has a degree in 

economics and was a businessman for many years. See Opp'n Ex. A 

("Asuncion Rpt.") at 3-4. He styles himself as a "forensic 

mortgage loan auditor," and he is now the Chief Forensic 

Securitization Audit and Mortgage Fraud Analyst for Certified 

Securitization Analysis. Id. Mr. Asuncion claims "over four 

thousand hours of research and study in the areas of the Truth in 

Lending Act ('TILA'), the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act 

('FDCPA'), the Fair Credit Reporting Act ('FCRA'), Foreclosure 

Litigation, Asset-Backed Securitization and its effects and 

applications in Foreclosure and Loss Mitigation" during the past 

four years. Asuncion Rpt. at 3. Mr. Asuncion does not specify how 

his "research and study" was divided among the topics he lists, nor 

does he provide any indication of where his study occurred or 

whether it was supervised. He has "completed and certified 

hundreds of Securitized Analysis Reports in residential real estate 

mortgage investigation" and claims familiarity with "industry 

standards, customs, practices and legal requirements of debt 

instruments and mortgage loan securitizations." Id. He lists no 

professional certifications or publications. Mr. Asuncion offers 

an expert opinion that Wells Fargo sold the Loan to HSBC USA, 

National Association shortly after it was executed. Asuncion Rpt. 

at 24, 28; ECF No. 79 ("Asuncion Decl.") ¶ 3. According to Mr. 

Asuncion, Wells Fargo sold Plaintiff's loan as part of a 

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securitization process that pooled a large number of mortgages 

together and transferred them to other entities. 

Wells Fargo argues that Mr. Asuncion's opinion is 

inadmissible. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 permits an expert 

qualified by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education 

to testify in the form of an opinion if (1) his scientific, 

technical, or other knowledge will be helpful to the trier of fact; 

(2) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (3) the 

testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and 

(4) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to 

the facts of the case. The Supreme Court has established a twopart test for determining the admissibility of expert testimony: 

(1) the trial court must make a preliminary assessment of whether 

the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is 

scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology 

properly can be applied to the facts in issue; and (2) the court 

must ensure that the proposed expert testimony is relevant and will 

serve to aid the trier of fact. See United States v. Finley, 301 

F.3d 1000, 1008 (9th Cir. 2002) (describing the two-part step 

established in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 

(1993)). 

Wells Fargo argues at the outset that Mr. Asuncion cannot be 

qualified as an expert under Rule 702. According to Wells Fargo, 

Mr. Asuncion's 4,000 hours of research and study over the past four 

years are insufficient to qualify him as an expert. The Court is 

inclined to agree; Mr. Asuncion's background does not demonstrate 

expertise on any matter relevant to this case. Indeed, the 

undersigned has previously excluded Mr. Asuncion's opinion that a 

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certain loan was securitized based on similar objections. See ECF 

Nos. 14-1, 27, Santos v. Bank of America, N.A., No. 3:12-cv-01538-

SC (N.D. Cal. 2012). In this case, however, the clearest basis for 

excluding Mr. Asuncion's opinion is that it is neither based on 

sufficient facts and data nor was it reached using reliable 

methodology. 

Mr. Asuncion's methodology, to the extent it is discernible 

from his report (which is rather opaque), was apparently to search 

through Wells Fargo's SEC filings related to a mortgage loan 

purchase agreement from around the time the Loan was executed. See 

Asuncion Rpt. at 10-11, Ex. 1 at 80-94; Asuncion Decl. at 2. Mr. 

Asuncion claims to have "established a match within the range and 

parameters of the 1,130 mortgage loans pooled under Loan Group I of 

the securitization trust . . . ." Asuncion Rpt. at 12. Mr. 

Asuncion never explains exactly what that means. From his report 

and attached exhibits, it appears that Mr. Asuncion examined the 

SEC filings, which specify certain characteristics of the loans 

bundled in the securitization. For each characteristic, such as 

the origination date of the loan, the purpose of the loan, the 

interest rate, the maximum interest rate, the date to the first 

adjustment, and the size of the loan, Mr. Asuncion found some 

number of loans with the same characteristics as the Loan at issue 

in this case. In other words, Mr. Asuncion has found that, in 

2006, Wells Fargo securitized some number of loans with similar 

characteristics to the Loan at issue here. 

There a number of rather obvious problems with this approach. 

The first is that it does not necessarily tell us anything about 

Plaintiff's loan at all. The fact that Wells Fargo securitized a 

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number of loans, some of which shared certain characteristics with 

Plaintiff's, around the time that Plaintiff's loan was executed 

does not mean that Plaintiff's loan was securitized. Second, it is 

unclear how Mr. Asuncion selected the certain loan pooling 

agreement he examined. Third, Plaintiff provides no support 

whatsoever for his inference that Plaintiff's loan must have been 

one of the loans with similar characteristics that was included in 

the securitization agreement. Plaintiff's search results 

themselves demonstrate that multiple loans match each of his search 

criteria. Fourth, it is unclear from the report that Plaintiff's 

data permits him to determine whether multiple parameters apply to 

the same loan or loans. For example, Mr. Asuncion's data appear to 

reveal that Group I included 45 loans with 360 months remaining to 

maturity, and 193 loans with original principal balances in the 

range of $450,001 to $500,000 (both of which "matched" Plaintiff's 

loan). But Mr. Asuncion's report does not demonstrate whether or 

how he determined how many loans both had 360 months to maturity 

and an original principal balance in that range. There is simply 

no explanation for his conclusion that Plaintiff's loans must have 

been one of the similar loans securitized in 2006. In fact, from 

the data in the report alone, there does not appear to be any 

conclusive evidence that any of the loans included in the 

securitization agreement matched Plaintiff's loan for all 

parameters. Even if Mr. Asuncion had such information, he never 

provides support for his assumption that one of the loans with 

matching parameters was Plaintiff's loan. 

The best way to phrase Mr. Asuncion's findings is this: he 

discovered that Wells Fargo securitized a large number of loans in 

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2006, many of which shared certain characteristics with Plaintiff's 

loan. That fact simply does not support a conclusion that Wells 

Fargo securitized Plaintiff's loan, much less a conclusion that 

Wells Fargo sacrificed any beneficial interest in the Loan. 

Accordingly, the Court SUSTAINS Wells Fargo's objection to Mr. 

Asuncion's opinion. The Court finds that Mr. Asuncion's opinion is 

neither reached through reliable methodology nor based on 

sufficient facts and data. Searching the records of a 

securitization agreement for loans with similar characteristics is 

not a reliable method of determining whether any particular given 

loan was sold as part of that agreement.3

3. Conclusion 

The Court finds that Wells Fargo has met both its burden of 

production and burden of persuasion on this issue. It is 

undisputed that Wells Fargo was the initial mortgagee, and Wells 

Fargo has provided sufficient evidence suggesting that it never 

transferred its beneficiary interest in the Loan. Plaintiff, who 

would bear the burden of proof at trial, has no evidence at all 

that Wells Fargo ever transferred the Loan. As a result, the Court 

finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact: Wells Fargo 

retained its beneficial interest in the Loan and DOT through the 

foreclosure sale. 

B. Substitution of Trustee 

Wells Fargo substituted Fidelity National Title Company 

 

3

 That is not to say that such data combined with other information 

might support a conclusion like the one Mr. Asuncion offers. But 

standing alone, Mr. Asuncion's data is insufficient to support his 

conclusion. And "matching parameters," standing alone, is an 

unreliable methodology. 

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("FNTC") as the trustee under the deed of trust (for First American 

LoanStar Trustee Services, LLC) on August 11, 2011. See RJN Ex. G. 

However, the second notice of default was executed on May 4, 2011 

(and recorded on May 10) and specified FNTC as the trustee. 

Plaintiff argues that, the second notice of default "is fraudulent, 

null and void" because it preceded the substitution of trustee. 

Opp'n at 13-14. Plaintiff argues that the second notice of default 

was executed by, and the ensuing foreclosure sale was conducted by, 

a trustee that was not duly substituted. See Opp'n at 9-10. 

The California Court of Appeal has already addressed this 

issue. In Ram v. OneWest Bank, FSB, the court faced a scenario in 

which a notice of default identified Aztec Foreclosure Corporation 

("Aztec") as the trustee. 183 Cal. Rptr. 3d 638, 641 (Cal. Ct. 

App. 2015). However, the beneficiary did not execute a 

substitution of trustee to name Aztec as the trustee until several 

weeks later. Id. The court held that the beneficiary had 

"complied with the procedure authorized by the Legislature" and 

that the "supposed defect" could not "form the basis for rendering 

the ensuing trustee's sale not just voidable, but absolutely void." 

Id. at 646.4

 

4

 Both Wells Fargo and the California Court of Appeal cite 

California Civil Code Section 2934a(c) as the basis for this 

conclusion. See Ram, 183 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 645; Reply at 5. All 

that section says, however, is that it is permissible for a 

beneficiary to effect substitution of a trustee after a notice of 

default is recorded but before a notice of sale is recorded, so 

long as the beneficiary provides proper notice of the substitution. 

The statute does not explicitly permit a beneficiary to name as 

trustee on a notice of default an entity that is not the trustee of 

record but will be substituted in the future. That is, the statute 

never says that it is okay for a beneficiary to name the wrong 

trustee on a notice of default. And it seems unlikely that 

California legislature intended to permit that when it passed the 

law. Rather, the statute was probably passed to address 

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Moreover, the Ram court made clear that even if prematurely 

naming an incorrect trustee did constitute a procedural 

irregularity, it would be unlikely to cause prejudice. "The 

primary purpose of a notice of default is to provide notice of the 

amount in arrears and an opportunity to cure the default. In order 

for a defect in the notice of default to be material, it must cause 

prejudice." Id. at 649 (internal citations omitted). Plaintiff 

has not identified any reason that naming FNTC as the trustee 

before FNTC was duly substituted as the trustee caused him any 

prejudice at all. Ram is directly on point: the fact that FNTC was 

not substituted as trustee until after the notice of default was 

recorded cannot serve as basis for Mr. Subramani's challenge to the 

foreclosure. "[T]he recorded substitution of trustee constituted 

conclusive evidence that [FNTC] had the authority to conduct the 

trustee's sale and to convey title to [Mr. Subramani's] home to the 

highest bidder, even if the notice of default was improperly signed 

and recorded by [FNTC] before it became trustee." See id. at 647. 

C. Mr. Subramani's Claims 

1. Wrongful Foreclosure 

The elements or a wrongful foreclosure claim are: "(1) the 

trustee or mortgagee caused an illegal, fraudulent, or willfully 

oppressive sale of real property pursuant to a power of sale in a 

mortgage or deed of trust; (2) the party attacking the sale . . . 

 

specifically the situation it describes: substitution of a trustee 

after a notice of default issues (presumably specifying the correct 

trustee of record at the time) but before recording a notice of 

sale. This difference of opinion regarding the interpretation of 

Section 2934a, however, does not affect the outcome in this case 

because Mr. Subramani cannot show that he was prejudiced by Wells 

Fargo's failure to name the correct trustee of record. 

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was prejudiced or harmed; and (3) in cases where the trustor or 

mortgagor challenges the sale, the trustor or mortgagor tendered 

the amount of the secured indebtedness or was excused from 

tendering." Lona v. Citibank, N.A., 134 Cal. Rptr. 3d 622, 633 

(Cal. Ct. App. 2011). Plaintiff alleges that the foreclosure sale 

in this case was illegal and fraudulent because Wells Fargo lacked 

the authority to foreclose on the property. According to 

Plaintiff, Wells Fargo's lack of authority stems from the alleged 

transfer of its beneficial interest in the Loan to a "true unknown 

beneficiary." See SAC ¶¶ 77-81. Because the Court finds that 

there is no evidence that Wells Fargo ever transferred its 

beneficial interest in the Loan, Plaintiff has no evidence of the 

first element of this claim. Thus, there is no genuine dispute of 

material fact as to whether the foreclosure was illegal, 

fraudulent, or willfully oppressive. Wells Fargo's motion is 

GRANTED as to the wrongful foreclosure claim. 

2. Cancellation of Instruments 

California Civil Code Section 3412 permits cancellation of 

"[a] written instrument, in respect to which there is a reasonable 

apprehension that if left outstanding it may cause serious injury 

to a person against whom it is void or voidable." Once again, this 

claim is premised on Plaintiff's assumption that Wells Fargo 

transferred its beneficial interest in the Loan. See SAC ¶¶ 95-96. 

Plaintiff's legal theory is that the deed of trust and foreclosure 

documents are void "as a result of the bungled securitization and 

the Defendants acting without any legal standing and authority from 

the unknown beneficiary . . . ." Id. ¶ 95. Because Plaintiff has 

no evidence that the "bungled securitization" ever occurred, he 

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cannot show that a genuine dispute as to a material fact exists. 

This claim, too, must fail. Wells Fargo's motion for summary 

judgment is GRANTED as to the cancellation of instruments cause of 

action. 

3. Unjust Enrichment 

"The elements of an unjust enrichment claim are the 'receipt 

of a benefit and [the] unjust retention of the benefit at the 

expense of another.'" Peterson v. Cellco P'ship, 164 Cal. App. 4th 

1583, 1593 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008). Plaintiff alleges that Wells 

Fargo unjustly retained his mortgage payments. The basis for that 

claim is, again, that Wells Fargo "collected mortgage payments from 

the Plaintiff for years after it sold the loan." Opp'n at 14. 

Because there is no evidence that Wells Fargo ever sold the Loan, 

Wells Fargo's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to this 

claim as well. 

4. UCL Fraud 

Plaintiff's UCL fraud claim includes a litany of Defendants' 

allegedly fraudulent practices. See id. ¶ 109. Strangely, the 

operative complaint alleges that Wells Fargo perpetrated these 

fraudulent practices, causing "substantial harm to California 

consumers." Id. ¶ 112. It is, therefore, unclear whether 

Plaintiff alleges that Wells Fargo perpetrated all of these 

practices against him. Many of the claims are not adequately 

supported by factual allegations in the complaint. It is clear 

that, at least to some extent, Plaintiff's UCL claim is based on 

the same alleged sale of the Loan as his other claims. Some of the 

behavior he cites includes "[e]xecuting and recording false and 

misleading documents; and . . . [a]cting as beneficiaries and 

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trustees without the legal authority to do so." Id. ¶ 109. In his 

opposition brief, Plaintiff clarifies that "[t]he basis of 

Plaintiff's claim is that Wells Fargo fraudulently continues to 

assert rights under Plaintiff's note and deed of trust 

notwithstanding the fact that it sold the mortgage loan in 2006." 

Opp'n at 14-15. Because that is the basis of Plaintiff's UCL 

claim, and because the Court has determined that Plaintiff has no 

evidence that the Loan was sold in 2006, the Court finds that 

summary judgment is warranted on this claim as well. Wells Fargo's 

motion is GRANTED as to Plaintiff's UCL claim. 

V. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons set forth above, Defendant Wells Fargo's 

motion for summary judgment is GRANTED with respect to all of 

Plaintiff Karthik Subramani's remaining causes of action. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 Dated: March 13, 2015 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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