Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-05188/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-05188-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD W. BROWN,

Petitioner,

 v.

A. P. KANE, Warden, et al.,

Respondents. /

No. C 05-5188 CRB (PR)

ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR A

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner Richard Brown, a state prisoner incarcerated at the Correctional Training

Facility in Soledad, California, seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254

challenging Governor Schwarzenegger's February 15, 2005 revocation of his grant of parole

by the Board of Prison Terms ("BPT"). Brown claims that the Governor's decision is not

supported by the evidence. For the reasons set forth below, the petition will be granted.

BACKGROUND

On November 11, 1979, at the age of 22, Brown shot and killed Lester McLucas. The

previous day, Brown lost $500 to McLucas in a card game. Although he gave McLucas

some money, Brown still owed McLucas approximately $370. On the day of the murder,

McLucas went to Brown's apartment to collect the debt. Brown and another man left with

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McLucas to visit a mutual friend. After the visit, they continued on toward the home of

Brown's mother. Brown gave directions from the back seat and told McLucas to pull into a

carport. Once inside the carport, Brown held a gun behind McLucas's head and demanded

"the money." McLucas was directed to give the money in his wallet to the other passenger,

who then handed the money to Brown. The passenger ran from the scene. McLucas died

from multiple gunshot wounds to the head.

Brown turned himself into authorities two days later. He was convicted by a jury in

the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of Ventura of second

degree murder and, on August 1, 1980, was sentenced to 15 years to life in state prison with

the possibility of parole. 

Brown was found not suitable for parole the first nine times he appeared before the

BPT. At his tenth hearing on September 28, 2004, the BPT found Brown suitable for parole

and set a parole date; however, the Governor reversed the BPT's parole suitability

determination and revoked the parole date on the ground that Brown would pose an

unreasonable risk to public safety based on the circumstances of the commitment offense.

After unsuccessfully challenging the Governor's decision in the state courts, Brown

sought federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in this court. Per order on March 24,

2006, the court found that the petition appeared to state cognizable claims under § 2254,

when liberally construed, and ordered respondents to show cause why a writ of habeas

corpus should not be granted. Respondents have filed an answer to the order to show cause

and Brown has filed a traverse.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus "in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

The writ may not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the

merits in state court unless the state court's adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a

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decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a

decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding." Id. § 2254(d). 

"Under the 'contrary to' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state

court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of

law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). "Under the

'unreasonable application' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court

identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court's decisions but unreasonably

applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. at 413.

"[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes

in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established

federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable." 

Id. at 411. A federal habeas court making the "unreasonable application" inquiry should ask

whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was "objectively

unreasonable." Id. at 409. 

The only definitive source of clearly established federal law under 28 U.S.C. §

2254(d) is in the holdings (as opposed to the dicta) of the Supreme Court as of the time of the

state court decision. Id. at 412; Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003). 

While circuit law may be "persuasive authority" for purposes of determining whether a state

court decision is an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent, only the Supreme

Court’s holdings are binding on the state courts and only those holdings need be

"reasonably" applied. Id.

DISCUSSION

Brown claims that the Governor violated his right to due process because his reversal

of the BPT's grant of parole is not supported by the evidence. Specifically, Brown contends

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that the Governor's sole reliance on his commitment offense to deny him parole long after he 

served his minimum sentence does not constitute "some evidence" as required by due

process. 

Respondents argue that Brown does not have a constitutionally protected liberty

interest in being released on parole, that due process and the "some evidence" standard do not

apply in the parole context, and that the Governor adequately predicated his reversal of the

BPT on "some evidence" even if due process applies.

A. Due Process in the Parole Context

The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the government from depriving an

inmate of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV. 

Contrary to respondent's position, it is now settled that California's parole scheme, codified in 

California Penal Code section 3041, vests all "prisoners whose sentences provide for the

possibility of parole with a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the receipt of a parole

release date, a liberty interest that is protected by the procedural safeguards of the Due

Process Clause." Irons v. Carey, 479 F.3d 658, 662 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Sass v. Calif. Bd.

of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 2006); Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 914

(9th Cir. 2003); McQuillon v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 903 (9th Cir. 2002)). Due process

accordingly requires that a parole board premise its decision on "some evidence in the

record" such that it is not arbitrary. Sass, 461 F.3d at 1128-29 (quoting Superintendent v.

Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 457 (1985)). The "some evidence" standard is clearly established federal

law in the parole context for purposes of § 2254(d). Id. at 1129.

The Supreme Court set forth the "some evidence" standard in Superintendent v. Hill,

which concerned the revocation of "good time" credits towards parole based on inmate

misconduct. 472 U.S. at 455. The Court rested its holding upon the foundation laid in Wolff

v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-67 (1974). As the Court noted, Wolff required, among

other things, that an inmate receive "a written statement by the fact finder of the evidence

relied on and the reasons" for the deprivation of his good time credits. Hill, 472 U.S. at 454

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(citing Wolff, 418 U.S. at 565). The Court then added to Wolff: "[R]evocation of good time

does not comport with 'the minimum requirements of procedural due process,' unless the

findings of the prison disciplinary board are supported by some evidence in the record." Hill,

472 U.S. at 455 (quoting Wolff, 418 U.S. at 558). 

The "some evidence" standard does not permit the court to "reweigh the evidence." 

Powell v. Gomez, 33 F.3d 39, 42 (9th Cir. 1994). Instead, the inquiry is "whether there is

any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary

board." Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56. While this test is minimally stringent, it must at minimum

protect an inmate's "strong interest in assuring that the loss of [parole] is not imposed

arbitrarily." Id. at 454. 

Due process also requires that the evidence underlying the parole board's decision

have some indicia of reliability. Biggs, 334 F.3d at 915; McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 904. 

Relevant in this inquiry is whether the prisoner was afforded an opportunity to appear before,

and present evidence to, the board. See Pedro v. Oregon Parole Bd., 825 F.2d 1396, 1399

(9th Cir. 1987).

B. State Parole Standards

California prescribes indeterminate sentences for non-capital murders: 25 years to life

for first degree murder and 15 years to life for second degree murder. Cal. Penal Code § 190. 

One year prior to the expiration of a prisoner’s minimum sentence, a BPT panel meets with

the inmate and "set[s] a release date unless it determines that the gravity of current convicted

offense or offenses, or the timing and gravity of current or past convicted offense or offenses,

is such that consideration of the public safety requires a more lengthy incarceration." Cal.

Penal Code § 3401(a). Regardless of the length of time served, "a life prisoner shall be

found unsuitable for and denied parole if in the judgment of the panel the prisoner will pose

an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from prison." 15 Cal. Code Regs. §

2402(a). 

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California's parole scheme requires that both the Governor and the BPT have "some

evidence" that the inmate will be a continuing threat to society in order to deny parole. See

In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061, 1095 (2005)

C. State Proceedings

The record shows that when the BPT convened on September 28, 2004 to review 

Brown's case, it took a holistic view of the record. Although it had denied Brown parole nine

times previously, the BPT found Brown to be suitable for parole in 2004 because he showed

ample signs of rehabilitative progress over the course of his incarceration, which had almost

reached 25 years at that point. Resp't Answer Ex. 2 at 57-60. In addition to pointing out that

Brown had no significant prior history of violent crime and had been disciplinary-free for the

last 15 years, the BPT noted that Brown had obtained his G.E.D., participated in numerous

self-help programs, showed signs of remorse, and had been evaluated by a psychiatrist as

having a violence potential no greater than the average citizen's. Id. at 58-59. The BPT

weighed these factors against the aggravating nature of Brown's offense, particularly that he

had an opportunity to abort the murder, that he used a firearm, and that the crime was

connected with other criminal activity. Id. at 60. The BPT concluded that the good

outweighed the bad. Id. at 57.

Unlike the BPT, the Governor premised his decision solely on Brown's commitment

offense. While the Governor discussed in narrative form some presumably negative aspects

of Brown's past criminal history and prison record, he did not in any way tie this discussion

to his analysis; he did not identify these factors as negative or as weighing against Brown's

release. Resp't Answer Ex. 5 at 2. The Governor noted, as did the BPT, that Brown's

significant work "to enhance his ability to function within the law" during his time in prison,

which at that point surpassed 25 years, weighed in favor of his release. Id. at 2, 3. He

nonetheless found that Brown’s commitment offense was "an especially heinous seconddegree murder" and that "Brown’s actions exceeded the minimum necessary for a seconddegree murder conviction." Id. The Governor determined that, although Brown was

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acquitted of robbery and first-degree felony murder, "the facts in the record indicate that Mr.

McLucas was murdered in connection with a robbery[.]" Id. The Governor concluded that

based on "[t]he gravity of this atrocious murder alone . . . Brown would presently pose an

unreasonable risk to public safety[.]" Id. at 3. Consequently, he reversed the BPT’s grant of

parole. Id.

On May 24, 2005, the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County

of Ventura considered Brown's petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the

Governor's decision. The court denied the petition on the ground that "some evidence" in the

record supported the Governor's decision. Resp't Answer Ex. 9 at 2. The court characterized

the Governor's decision as based unequivocally and exclusively on Brown's commitment

offense. Id. It affirmed the Governor's right to reach conclusions contrary to the jury's

verdict – specifically regarding whether Brown committed a robbery – in evaluating the

commitment offense so long as some evidence in the record supported those conclusions, and

determined that the Governor's reliance on the commitment offense satisfied the some

evidence standard. Id. The California Court of Appeal and Supreme Court of California

summarily denied Brown's subsequent petitions for state habeas relief. See Resp't Answer

Exs. 11 & 13.

D. Analysis

The critical issue in this case is whether Brown's commitment offense alone can

satisfy the "some evidence" standard more than 25 years after he committed the offense. 

Under the circumstances of this case, the court is satisfied that it cannot.

The Ninth Circuit's recent opinion in Irons shed some light on whether reliance on an

immutable factor such as the commitment offense violates due process. Although the court

affirmed the BPT's denial of parole for Irons, it made clear that "indefinite detention based

solely on an inmate's commitment offense, regardless of the extent of his rehabilitation, will

at some point violate due process, given the liberty interest in parole that flows from the

relevant California statutes." Irons, 479 F.3d at 665 (citation and footnote omitted). In two

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earlier cases, Biggs and Sass, the court had also affirmed the BPT's denial of parole, but

made contradictory observations on the effect of continued denial of parole based solely on

unchanging factors such as the inmate's commitment offense and/or prior criminal history. 

Compare Biggs, 334 F.3d at 917 ("continued reliance in the future on an unchanging factor,

the circumstance of the offense and conduct prior to imprisonment, runs contrary to the

rehabilitative goals espoused by the prison system and could result in a due process

violation") with Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129 ("it is not our function to speculate about how future

parole hearings could proceed"). Irons limited the holdings of Biggs, Sass and itself to

inmates deemed unsuitable prior to the expiration of their minimum sentences and held the

door open for inmates deemed unsuitable after the expiration of their minimum sentences:

"All we held in [Biggs and Sass,] and all we hold today, . . . is that, given the particular

circumstances of the offenses in these cases, due process was not violated when these

prisoners were deemed unsuitable for parole prior to the expiration of their minimum terms." 

Id. Brown was deemed unsuitable by the Governor more than ten years after the expiration

of his 15-year minimum sentence. 

Biggs, Sass and Irons resemble one another factually. All three involved inmates who

had not yet served their minimum prison sentences, and all three involved convicted

murderers, although the severity of each offense differed. In all three cases, the BPT relied

solely on the inmate’s immutable commitment offense and/or prior criminal history in

denying parole.

Biggs presented the most serious offense of the three. Biggs was convicted of firstdegree felony murder for participating in a 1981 plot to kill a witness in a criminal

proceeding against his employer. Biggs, 334 F.3d at 912. While Biggs refused to actually

kill the victim, he lured the victim into a trap, "was present at the location during the murder,

paid money to the co-conspirators, and returned with the killers in an attempt to better

conceal the body." Id. at 912, 916. Biggs was convicted for first-degree murder and

sentenced to 25 years to life in prison with the possibility of parole. Id. at 912.

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Sass' offense was less grave, despite the numerosity of his convictions. In 1988, after

causing a fatal automobile accident while driving under the influence of alcohol, Sass was

convicted of second-degree murder, gross vehicular manslaughter, hit-and-run death, causing

injury while driving under the influence, and felony drunk driving. Sass, 461 F.3d at 1125,

1130. Leading up to the commitment offense, Sass had seven DUI's. Id. at 1130, n.1. Sass

was sentenced to 15 years to life in prison with the possibility of parole. Id. at 1130.

Irons' offense falls somewhere between those in Biggs and Sass. In 1985,

Irons was living in the home of a couple, with another tenant, John Nicholson. 

The couple suspected that Nicholson was dealing drugs and was stealing from

them. Irons shared their suspicions. He confronted Nicholson and an angry

argument ensued in which Nicholson denied responsibility for the thefts. Irons

went to his room, retrieved his gun, and then went to Nicholson’s room where

he fired 12 rounds into Nicholson and, after Nicholson complained that he was

in pain, stabbed him twice in the back. He then wrapped Nicholson’s body in a

sleeping bag and left it in the room for the ten days it took him to procure a car. 

Irons then took the body to the coast, weighed it down, and disposed of it in the

ocean. 

When the police found the body their investigation led them to . . . arrest the

owner of the house. Irons intervened, explained to the police that they had the

wrong person, and confessed to the killing. 

Irons, 479 F.3d at 660. Irons was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to 17

years to life in prison with the possibility of parole. Id. Prior to his conviction, he had no

criminal record. Id.

Even under the Governor’s version of the facts, much distinguishes this case from

Biggs, Sass and Irons, and pushes it beyond the point at which sole reliance on the

commitment offense may be said to comport with due process. For one, Brown's offense in

of itself is objectively less probative of future recidivism and continuing danger to society

than the offenses in Biggs, Sass and Irons. 

In Biggs, the petitioner engaged in a murderous plot to save his employer from

prosecution and perpetuate his criminal activity; Biggs demonstrated an anti-social

willingness to not only participate in and conceal a murder, but also to disrupt the criminal

justice system that protects society against such crimes. Because the murder resulted from

callous forethought and conspiracy, Biggs demonstrated a lack of a moral compass that

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would endanger society were he released. In Sass, the petitioner killed someone as a result

of his alcoholism and despite his having received seven prior DUI’s; only a total recovery

from his substance abuse could ensure society’s safety upon his release. In Irons, while the

petitioner eventually turned himself in, he callously stabbed his victim after complaining of

his twelve gunshot wounds and then carried out a plan over the course of ten days to dispose

of the body. Though arguably less severe than Biggs's crime, Irons’ crime suggests a similar

lack of a moral compass.

In the instant case, while a modicum of forethought was involved, there is no evidence

in the record, nor does the Governor suggest, that Brown intended to kill his victim as in

Biggs. And while Biggs's motive was to sabotage a criminal prosecution, which is among

the most dubious motives possible, Brown sought only to recoup his gambling losses. 

Unlike in Sass, Brown has no, let alone seven, similar offenses on his record. And unlike in

Irons, Brown did nothing so callous as firing twelve rounds into his victim and then stabbing

him to quiet his complaining. Brown made no effort to conceal his crime; he almost

immediately turned himself in. In sum, Brown’s offense was not the ultimate and most

serious of a long string of similar crimes as was the case in Sass, nor does Brown's offense

suggest the lack of a moral compass exhibited in Biggs and Irons. 

Another critical difference between this case and Biggs, Saas and Irons is that Brown

has served a substantial amount of time beyond his minimum sentence. This court must

consider that at some point after an inmate has served his minimum sentence the probative

value of his commitment offense as an indicator of "unreasonable risk of danger to society"

recedes below the "some evidence" required by due process to support a denial of parole. 

See Irons, 479 F.3d at 665. A decision to revoke parole based solely on an inmate's

commitment offense that can no longer be considered probative of dangerousness to society

would be arbitrary and not comport with the "some evidence" standard. See Hill, 472 U.S. at

545-55, 457. This is one of those cases. When the Governor reversed the BPT's grant of

parole (and the state courts affirmed his decision) in 2005, Brown had served more than 25

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Brown has now served more than 27 years in prison.

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years in prison and exceeded his 15-year minimum sentence by more than ten years.1

Needless to say, Brown's lengthy detention has diminished the probative value of his

commitment offense. In fact, not only has Brown's incarceration eclipsed his 15-year

minimum term for second-degree murder, but it also has eclipsed the 25-year minimum term

he would have received had he been convicted of felony first-degree murder, as the Governor

suggested he should have been.

Petitioner's commitment offense would be a sufficient basis to deny his parole if it

indicated a risk of re-offending and of a danger to society. It does not. What underlies

petitioner's commitment offense is a series of exercises in poor judgment: He bet $500 in a

card game, lost that card game, used the threat of force to recoup his losses, and wound up

shooting McLucas to death. Whether petitioner is currently dangerous enough to society to

preclude his parole depends on whether his judgment is likely to fail him as gravely as it did

when he embarked on the series of events that led him to kill McLucas in 1979. By itself,

however, Brown's exercise of poor judgment at age 22 is not probative, absent any more

recent indicators, of his exercise of poor judgment again at his nearing the age of 50. Not

only did the Governor and state courts fail to point to any such indicators, but Brown's

ultimately positive prison record over the past two and a half decades indicates, as the BPT

concluded, that he is suitable for parole.

CONCLUSION

After careful review of the record and pertinent law, the court is satisfied that the

Governor's decision to revoke the BPT's grant of parole was arbitrary and did not comport

with the some evidence standard. The state court's determination that the Governor's sole

reliance on Brown's commitment offense satisfied the "some evidence" standard was an

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Because Brown is entitled to relief on his due process claim, the court need not consider the

ex post facto claim he raised in the alternative.

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objectively unreasonable application of Hill. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Brown is entitled to

federal habeas relief on his due process claim.2

Brown's petition for a writ of habeas corpus is GRANTED. Respondent must release 

Brown on parole within 10 days of the date of this order. Within 20 days of the date of this

order, respondent must also file a notice with the court confirming the date on which Brown

was released.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 2, 2007 

CHARLES R. BREYER

United States District Judge

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