Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-07658/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-07658-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LEWIS HAGGARD,

Petitioner,

 v.

BEN CURRY,

Respondent. /

No. C 06-07658 SI

ORDER DENYING RESPONDENT’S

MOTION TO STAY ORDER GRANTING

HABEAS PETITION PENDING APPEAL

AND GRANTING RESPONDENT’S

REQUEST FOR TEMPORARY STAY 

Respondent has filed a motion to stay the Court’s August 11, 2010 order granting petitioner’s

habeas petition pending respondent’s appeal to the Ninth Circuit. For the reasons set forth below, the

motion is DENIED. Respondent’s alternative request for a temporary stay is GRANTED.

DISCUSSION

Petitioner Lewis Haggard was convicted in 1979 of kidnaping for the purpose of committing

robbery, and was sentenced to a term of 7 years to life. In a federal habeas petition filed with this Court

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, petitioner challenged the February 4, 2004 decision of the Board of Parole

Hearings (“BPH”) finding him unsuitable for parole. The Court granted the habeas petition on August

11, 2010 and ordered BPH to set a date for petitioner’s release within thirty days of the order.

Ordinarily, “[t]here is a presumption of release pending appeal where a petitioner has been

granted habeas relief.” O’Brien v. O’Laughlin, 130 S. Ct. 5, 6 (2009). Respondent argues that the Court

“should not” apply the presumption in petitioner’s favor because this case involved only a challenge to

the denial of parole, rather than a challenge to the underlying conviction. The Court was unable to

locate any Supreme Court or Ninth Circuit authority indicating that the presumption of release does not

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apply in the present circumstances. Even if the presumption does not apply, however, the Court finds

that a stay is unwarranted under the traditional factors governing the issuance of a stay. These factors

are: “(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits;

(2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will

substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.”

Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987). The factors should be applied flexibly to the facts of

a particular case, and a court may also take into account other considerations such as “the possibility

of flight,” the “risk that the prisoner will pose a danger to the public if released,” and “[t]he State’s

interest in continuing custody and rehabilitation pending a final determination of the case on appeal.”

Id. at 777.

I. Strong Showing of Likelihood of Success on the Merits

Respondent contends that it is likely to succeed on the merits of its appeal because this Court

“improperly applied as clearly established federal law the . . . state law some-evidence test that did not

exist when the Board denied Haggard parole in 2004.” Mot. at 5. Respondent argues that “AEDPA’s

purpose is to enforce minimum federal Constitutional protections, not higher state law standards.” Id.

In applying the California “some evidence” test, however, the Court was following the Ninth Circuit’s

binding en banc decision in Hayward v. Marshall, 603 F.3d 546 (9th Cir. 2010), as well as its

subsequent panel decisions in Pearson v. Muntz, 606 F.3d 606 (9th Cir. 2010) and Pirtle v. California

Board of Prison Terms, --- F.3d ----, 2010 WL 2732888, at *5 (9th Cir. July 12, 2010). Respondent is

essentially arguing that Hayward and its progeny were wrongly decided, but these decisions are binding

in this Circuit. This factor does not weigh in favor of granting a stay.

II. Irreparable Injury to the State 

The second Hilton factor directs the Court to examine whether the stay applicant will be

irreparably injured absent a stay. Respondent contends that it will be irreparably injured if a stay is not

granted because this Court’s order directing release rather than a new parole hearing “usurps the

legislative mandate with which the Board is charged” as well as “the Governor’s ability to exercise his

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discretion in reviewing parole matters.” Mot. at 7. Even assuming that the state is injured by the order

directing petitioner’s release rather than a new parole hearing, respondent has not explained how this

injury is “irreparable” – in other words, why its interest in conducting parole proceedings cannot be

vindicated if this Court’s order is ultimately reversed on appeal. In granting the petition, the Court

found that petitioner had community ties and specific plans for his release, including a stable and

longstanding relationship with his wife, who has cancer and for whom petitioner will act as caretaker

upon his release; a waiting offer of employment; and an NA sponsor. There is no indication that

petitioner poses a risk of flight and that the state’s interest in making parole decisions will therefore be

irreparably harmed if petitioner is released pending appeal.

Respondent also argues that denial of a stay will irreparably injure the state’s interest in ensuring

public safety. The Court’s granting of petitioner’s habeas petition, however, centered on its finding that

there was no evidence to support the determination that petitioner posed a current risk of danger to the

public when he was denied parole in 2004. Thus, this factor cannot weigh in favor of granting a stay.

III. Substantial Injury to Petitioner

The third Hilton factor asks whether the granting of a stay will substantially injure any other

party to the proceeding. Respondent suggests that petitioner will not be harmed if a stay is issued

because the postponement of his “desire” to gain “early release” on parole does not amount to a

significant hardship. Mot. at 7. The Court has concluded, however, that petitioner’s release on parole

is overdue by at least six years (measured from the date of the challenged parole hearing), and likely

even longer. The substantial injury petitioner will continue to suffer if his release is stayed weighs

strongly against granting a stay.

IV. Public Interest

The fourth and final factor to consider in ruling on a stay motion is where the public interest lies.

Respondent argues that “deference should be afforded to the State’s established parole procedures” and

that “the public maintains an interest in preserving the Board’s decision while the appeal of this Court’s

decision is pending.” Mot. at 8. The Court does not disagree that the public has an interest in the

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operation of state parole procedures without federal interference. The public also has an interest,

however, in ensuring that state procedures are not applied in contravention of prisoners’ due process

rights. Thus, the public interest does not weigh for or against granting a stay.

In sum, the Court finds that the Hilton factors compel denial of a stay of petitioner’s release

pending appeal. See Hilton, 481 U.S. at 777-78 (“The interest of the habeas petitioner in release

pending appeal . . . will be strongest where the factors mentioned in the preceding paragraph are

weakest,” particularly where the state does not make a strong showing on the merits). 

V. Temporary Stay

In the alternative, respondent requests a temporary stay to enable it to seek a stay from the Ninth

Circuit. This alternative request is GRANTED. The Court’s August 11, 2010 order granting

petitioner’s habeas petition and ordering respondent to set a date for his release is hereby STAYED until

September 30, 2010.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, respondent’s motion for a stay pending appeal is hereby DENIED.

The alternative request for a temporary stay is GRANTED, and the Court’s order granting the habeas

petition is stayed until September 30, 2010. (Docket No. 28).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 25, 2010 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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