Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01475/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01475-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KEVIN DOUGLAS DONAHOE, Civil

No. 13cv1475 JLS (NLS)

Petitioner,

ORDER DISMISSING CASE 

v. WITHOUT PREJUDICE

JEFFREY BEARD, Secretary,

Respondent.

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a Petition for a Writ of

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Petition is subject to dismissal

because Petitioner has failed to allege exhaustion of state court remedies. 

Habeas petitioners who wish to challenge either their state court conviction or the

length of their confinement in state prison, must first exhaust state judicial remedies. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c); Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 133-34 (1987). To exhaust state

judicial remedies, a California state prisoner must present the California Supreme Court

with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of every issue raised in his or her federal

habeas petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c); Granberry, 481 U.S. at 133-34. Moreover, to

properly exhaust state court remedies a petitioner must allege, in state court, how one or

more of his or her federal rights have been violated. The Supreme Court in Duncan v.

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Henry, 513 U.S. 364 (1995) reasoned: “If state courts are to be given the opportunity to

correct alleged violations of prisoners’ federal rights, they must surely be alerted to the

fact that the prisoners are asserting claims under the United States Constitution.” Id. at

365-66 (emphasis added). For example, “[i]f a habeas petitioner wishes to claim that an

evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him [or her] the due process of law

guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he [or she] must say so, not only in federal

court, but in state court.” Id. at 366 (emphasis added).

Petitioner indicates that he has not presented his claims to the California Supreme

Court. (See Pet. at 6-9.) The reason he gives for not exhausting his claims is: “I was told

I had given up my rights at the state level since I plead guilty after coercion was used on

me to force me to plead guilty.” (Id. at 5.) The burden of proving that a claim has been

exhausted lies with the petitioner. Cartwright v. Cupp, 650 F.2d 1103, 1104 (9th Cir.

1981). Petitioner’s waiver of his right to appeal in the state judicial system is not a

sufficient reason to excuse the exhaustion requirement, particularly in light of his

allegations that he was coerced into entering the waiver. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526

U.S. 838, 845 (1999) (holding that the exhaustion doctrine is designed to give state court

the first opportunity to pass upon alleged violations of state prisoner’s federal rights);

Hendricks v. Zenon, 993 F.2d 664, 672 (9th Cir. 1993) (recognizing that the exhaustion

doctrine is essentially a matter of federalism and comity which can be excused only “in

rare cases where exceptional circumstances of peculiar urgency are shown to exist.”)

(quoting Granberry, 481 U.S. at 134); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (“An application for

a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a

State court shall not be granted unless it appears that - (A) the applicant has exhausted

the remedies available in the courts of the State; or (B)(i) there is an absence of available

State corrective process; or (ii) circumstances exist that render such process ineffective

to protect the rights of the applicant.”) 

Petitioner has not alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate that there is an absence

of state corrective process available to him. He has therefore failed to allege exhaustion

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as to any claim presented in the Petition, and it is subject to dismissal. See Rasberry v.

Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Once a district court determines that a

habeas petition contains only unexhausted claims, it need not inquire further into the

petitioner’s intentions. Instead, it may simply dismiss the habeas petition for failure to

exhaust.”) (citing Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 481 (9th Cir. 2001)). 

Further, the Court cautions Petitioner that under the Antiterrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) a one-year period of limitation shall apply to a

petition for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of

a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of:

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the

Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the

applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

28 U.S.C.A. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D) (West 2006).

The statute of limitations does not run while a properly filed state habeas corpus

petition is pending. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006

(9th Cir. 1999). But see Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000) (holding that “an

application is ‘properly filed’ when its delivery and acceptance [by the appropriate court

officer for placement into the record] are in compliance with the applicable laws and rules

governing filings.”). However, absent some other basis for tolling, the statute of

limitations does run while a federal habeas petition is pending. Duncan v. Walker, 533

U.S. 167, 181-82 (2001).

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases provides for summary dismissal

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of a habeas petition “[i]f it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any attached

exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court . . .” Rule 4, 28

U.S.C. foll. § 2254. Here, it appears plain from the Petition that Petitioner is not

presently entitled to federal habeas relief because he has failed to allege exhaustion of

state court remedies.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court DISMISSES this action without prejudice

because Petitioner has failed to allege exhaustion of state judicial remedies. To have this

case reopened, Petitioner must, no later than August 30, 2013, file a First Amended

Petition that cures the pleading deficiencies set forth above.

Petitioner is advised that if he has not submitted a First Amended Petition alleging

exhaustion of his state court remedies by August 30, 2013, he will have to start over by

filing a completely new habeas petition in this Court which will be given a new civil case

number. The Clerk of Court shall send a blank Southern District of California amended

petition form to Petitioner along with a copy of this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 10, 2013

Honorable Janis L. Sammartino

United States District Judge

CC: ALL PARTIES

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