Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00849/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00849-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Bivens Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHRISTOPHER J. WARREN,

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

MANAGEMENT AND TRAINING 

CORPORATION, CHRIS APKER, 

GEORGIANA PUENTES, AND JESSE 

BERNAL,

 Defendants.

1:16-cv-849-LJO-DLB (PC)

SCREENING ORDER DISMISSING 

COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO 

AMEND AND DENYING MOTION 

FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 

(Doc. 5)

I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT TO PARTIES AND COUNSEL

Judges in the Eastern District of California carry the heaviest caseloads in the nation, and this 

Court is unable to devote inordinate time and resources to individual cases and matters. Given the 

shortage of district judges and staff, this Court addresses only the arguments, evidence, and matters 

necessary to reach the decision in this order. The parties and counsel are encouraged to contact the 

offices of United States Senators Feinstein and Boxer to address this Court’s inability to accommodate 

the parties and this action. The parties are required to reconsider consent to conduct all further 

proceedings before a Magistrate Judge, whose schedules are far more realistic and accommodating to 

parties than that of U.S. District Judge Lawrence J. O'Neill, who must prioritize criminal and older civil 

cases.

Civil trials set before Judge O'Neill trail until he becomes available and are subject to suspension 

mid-trial to accommodate criminal matters. Civil trials are no longer reset to a later date if Judge O'Neill 

is unavailable on the original date set for trial. Moreover, this Court's Fresno Division randomly and 

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without advance notice reassigns civil actions to U.S. District Judges throughout the nation to serve as 

visiting judges. In the absence of Magistrate Judge consent, this action is subject to reassignment to a 

U.S. District Judge from inside or outside the Eastern District of California.

II. SCREENING REQUIREMENT AND STANDARD.

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court

must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally frivolous, 

malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a 

defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-

(iii). Similarly, when a plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis but § 1915A does not apply, the court 

“shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines” that the action “is frivolous or malicious,” 

“fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant 

who is immune from such relief.” Pierce v. San Francisco Exam'r, No. 15-CV-06051-EMC, 2016 WL 

2851649, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 16, 2016) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)). If an action is dismissed 

on one of these three basis, a strike is imposed per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). An inmate who has had three or 

more prior actions or appeals dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted, and has not alleged imminent danger of serious physical injury does not 

qualify to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Richey v. Dahne, 807 F.3d 1201, 1208 

(9th Cir. 2015). 

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 

entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare 

recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mereconclusory statements, do not suffice.” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 

(2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted 

inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted).

Prisoners proceeding pro se in civil rights actions are entitled to have their pleadings liberally 

construed and to have any doubt resolved in their favor. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 

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2010) (citations omitted). To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which 

requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is 

liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted). The sheer possibility 

that a defendant acted unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of 

satisfying the plausibility standard. Id.

III. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE

1. Procedural Posture

Plaintiff Christopher J. Warren is a federal prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in 

this civil rights action. Plaintiff filed his complaint on June 20, 2016. Doc. 1. On July 1, 2016, he filed 

an amended complaint. Doc. 6, First Amended Complaint (“FAC”).

1

Plaintiff alleges that Management 

and Training Corporation (“MTC”) and three of its individual employees (Craig Apker, Geogiana 

Puentes, and Jesse Bernal) are liable under California’s Bane Act (Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1) because they 

forced him to make copies of copyrighted materials, in violation of 17 U.S.C. § 506 and his First, Fifth, 

and Eighth Amendment rights. Plaintiff raises no federal causes of action.2

2. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff is incarcerated at federal prison in Taft, California, which is operated by Defendant 

Management and Training Corporation (“MTC”). FAC at Ct. R. 9. Defendant Apker is warden of the 

prison. Id. His allegations are based on the period of time where he was “hired” by MTC staff to act as 

“the inmate copy clerk” on February 1, 2014. Id. at Ct. R. 11. He states that his job duties included 

making copies for various employees at the facility, including Defendants Bernal (his unit manager) and 

Puentes (the associate warden). Id. Part of his job included copying entire books for staff members. Id. 

While he was “slightly concerned” about this practice, he was told that it was acceptable because the 

 

1 The Court will construe Plaintiff’s memorandum of points and authorities attached to the FAC to constitute part of the FAC.

2

Plaintiff originally sought to recover pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Bivens doctrine, but amended his complaint to 

drop this allegation upon realizing that such claims against private contractors operating federal facilities were foreclosed by 

the Supreme Court in Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617, 626 (2012). FAC at Ct. R. 2. 

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copies “fell under the exceptions to copyright protection statutes because it was ‘educational’ and for the 

‘social cause of rehabilitation.’” Id. at Ct. R. 12. He alleges that Puentes ordered him to make “hundreds

upon hundreds of copies of entire textbooks,” that these orders were documented, and that this was done 

with “the knowledge, permission and oversight” of Bernal. Id. 

Between June and November of 2014, Plaintiff enrolled in a class on intellectual property. Id. at 

Ct. R. 13. In this class, “it became clear to him that MTC was violating title 17 as part of the MTC

COMMON PRACTICE.” Id. Plaintiff reports that he raised the issue “no less than three times” with 

three different staff members. Id. at 14. The first “stopped the practice for herself” but told him to “do as 

your [sic] told, your [sic] an inmate, it’s not on you.” Id. The second told him that he had “warned” 

MTC about the fact that “someone could get in trouble,” but advised Plaintiff to “keep doing what you 

are doing—you don’t have a choice.” Id. The third responded by threatening “to get the Major-the 

highest ranking member of a security apparatus in the prison to come and ‘enforce’ so that inmates do 

‘what they are told by staff per policy.’” Id.

Plaintiff subsequently quit his position as copy clerk and attempted to transfer to another facility 

several times “to get separation from him at his MTC keepers for fear of retaliation, fear that the would 

get caught and attempt to blame the inmates – the Plaintiff for their own misconduct.” Id. at Ct. R. 14-

15. These attempts were denied, apparently based on internal policy considerations. Id.at Ct. R.15. 

In March of 2016, less that year after he quit his position as copy clerk, Plaintiff filed an 

“administrative remedy request”3 with the Bureau of Prison’s general counsel, and notified him of the 

alleged copyright law violations, and requested a transfer from MTC care. Id. at Ct. R. 16. Bernal was 

subsequently observed “raiding the Satellite Camp copy room.” Id. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff was 

informed that all of the order forms documenting the copying practices were missing and the copy room 

 

3 The BOP maintains the “Administrative Remedy Program” to “allow an inmate to seek formal review of an issue relating 

to any aspect of his/her own confinement.” 28 C.F.R. § 542.10 (a). Once a request for remedy is filed, a “response shall be 

made by the Warden or CCM within 20 calendar days; by the Regional Director within 30 calendar days; and by the General 

Counsel within 40 calendar days. 28 C.F.R. § 542.18. 

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was being closed “indefinitely.” Id. Plaintiff alleges that these forms “are the one document that that 

shows the liability of their staff members and company.” Id. at Ct. R. 17. He also claims that MTC “has 

shredded pallets and pallets of evidence, keeping only 3 boxes of copied books as the ‘evidence of their 

internal investigation.’” Id. His request for transfer was denied on April 4, 2016. Id. at Ct. R. 16. 

Plaintiff filed a second request on April 10, 2016, in which he alleged that MTC was conducting a 

“cover-up. On April 19, 2016 he filed a third request, wherein he stated claims for retaliation. Id. These 

requests were denied on April 29, 2016. Id. A fourth request, filed April 30, 2016, was also denied. Id. at 

Ct. R. 17. On June 6, 2016 he filed a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act with the BOP. Id.

Plaintiff reports that MTC has since changed their photocopying practices “to include copyright 

notices and higher-authority sign offs before copying can be done.” Id. He also reports that MTC has 

begun working with publishers to obtain licenses to use materials. Id. However, he claims that since this 

time he has “now suffered intolerable work and living environments, retaliation, deprivation of civil 

rights and emotional distress.” Id. at Ct. R. 24. 

Plaintiff now brings two claims against Defendants for violation of the Bane Act, which are 

premised on violations of his constitutional rights, and one California state law negligence claim. 

IV. ANALYSIS

1. Subject matter jurisdiction

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokonnen v. Guardian Life Insurance Co., 

511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). “It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction and the 

burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” Id. (internal citations 

omitted). The Court may raise the absence of subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte, and must dismiss an 

action if it determines at any time that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (if 

court determines at any time that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it must dismiss action); Steel v. 

Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998) (court “bound to ask and answer for 

itself,” whether it has jurisdiction, “even when not otherwise suggested”); Fiedler v. Clark, 714 F.2d 77, 

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78 (9th Cir. 1983) (federal court may dismiss sua sponte if jurisdiction lacking). 

a. Federal Question

It is “settled doctrine that where a suit is brought in the federal courts upon the sole ground that 

the determination of the suit depends upon some question of a federal nature, it must appear, at the 

outset, from the declaration or the bill of the party suing, that the suit is of that character.” Skelly Oil Co. 

v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 672, 70 S. Ct. 876, 879, 94 L. Ed. 1194 (1950) (internal 

quotations omitted). “The federal questions must be disclosed upon the face of the complaint, unaided 

by the answer.” Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 415 U.S. 125, 127–28 (1974) (internal 

quotations omitted). Moreover, “the complaint itself will not avail as a basis of jurisdiction in so far as it 

goes beyond a statement of the plaintiff's cause of action and anticipates or replies to a probable 

defense.” Id. 

Here, Plaintiff asserts that this court has jurisdiction because his claim involves allegations of

constitutional and copyright law violations. Federal courts have jurisdiction over cases arising under any 

“the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States,” and, more specifically, any “[a]ct of Congress 

relating to patents, plant variety protection, copyrights and trademarks.” 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1338. “A 

case may arise under federal law ‘where the vindication of a right under state law necessarily turned on 

some construction of federal law.’” Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808–09, 106 

S. Ct. 3229, 3232, 92 L. Ed. 2d 650 (1986) (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. of State of Cal. v. Constr. 

Laborers Vacation Trust for S. California, 463 U.S. 1, 9, (1983). 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants are liable to him under California Civil Code § 52.1, known as 

“the Bane Act,” because they coerced him to violate federal copyright law and that conduct, in turn, 

violated his First, Eighth, and Fifth Amendment rights. Whether such violations occurred are federal 

questions and pivotal issues in the case. Thus, the Court finds that it has subject matter jurisdiction over 

Plaintiff’s Bane Act claims at this stage. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1338. Because Plaintiff’s state law 

negligence claim arises out of the same controversy as his Bane Act claim, the Court has supplement 

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jurisdiction of this claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

4

2. Sufficiency of Plaintiff’s Bane Act Claim

Plaintiff brings this action under California’s Bane Act, California Civil Code § 52.1, which

creates a cause of action for “violations of constitutional and statutory rights.” Rivera v. Cty. of Los 

Angeles, 745 F.3d 384, 393 (9th Cir. 2014). California courts have recognized that there are two distinct 

elements for a section 52.1 cause of action: “(1) intentional interference or attempted interference with a 

state or federal constitutional or legal right, and (2) the interference or attempted interference was by 

threats, intimidation or coercion.” Allen v. City of Sacramento, 234 Cal. App. 4th 41, 67, (2015). Section 

52.1 was not intended to redress harms “brought about by human error rather than intentional conduct,” 

but rather that “where coercion is inherent in the constitutional violation alleged, i.e., an over detention 

in County jail, the statutory requirement of ‘threats, intimidation, or coercion’ is not met.” Shoyoye v. 

Cty. of Los Angeles, 203 Cal. App. 4th 947, 959 (2012).

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants are liable under the Bane Act for violating his Eighth 

Amendment right. Thus, whether his Bane Act claim is sufficient turns on whether he has alleged 

violations of his First, Eighth, and Fifth Amendment rights.

a. Eighth Amendment Claims

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim is based on the fact that as a copy clerk, he was “ordered

. . .to make hundreds upon hundreds of copies of entire textbooks, in violation of title 17, without 

having the appropriate permissions or licenses at the time.” FAC at 12. 

Under Ninth Circuit case law, a prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when they 

cause a deprivation that is “objectively, ‘sufficiently serious. ’”5Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834

 

4 As discussed below, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state claims with regards to these allegations. Because it is 

not clear that amendment would be futile, the Court is not dismissing these claims with prejudice. If Plaintiff cannot cure 

these issues on amendment and these claims are dismissed, the Court may decline to continue to exercise supplement 

jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). 

5 While Plaintiff alleges violation of state law, because the underlying cause is a federal question, federal law controls. While 

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(1994) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991). Such a claim may be based on conditions of 

confinement if a petitioner can show that an act or omission resulted in “the denial of ‘the minimal 

civilized measure of life's necessities.” Id. (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)). 

Additionally, a plaintiff must show that a prison official acted with “a sufficiently culpable state of 

mind.” Id. (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297). “In prison-conditions cases that state of mind is one of 

‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate health or safety.” Id.

Where courts have found that conditions of confinement have violated the Eighth Amendment, 

there has always been an element of harm, or “an unreasonable risk of serious damage” to an inmate’s 

current or future health. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993). For example, denial of medical 

attention to prisoners constitutes an eighth amendment violation “if the denial amounts to deliberate 

indifference to serious medical needs of the prisoners.” Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1111 

(9th Cir. 1986). Similarly, the Ninth Circuit found double-celling practices at one facility 

unconstitutional where it was “undisputed” that the practice posed “serious risks of violence and sexual 

attack to its inhabitants.” Balla v. Idaho State Bd. of Corr., 869 F.2d 461, 472 (9th Cir. 1989). In the 

context of prison work, the Ninth Circuit has found that “the Eighth Amendment does not apply unless 

prisoners are compelled to perform physical labor which is beyond their strength, endangers their lives 

or health, or causes undue pain.” Berry v. Bunnell, 39 F.3d 1056, 1057 (9th Cir. 1994) (no constitutional 

violation where inmate was forced to work an extra eight-hour shift as a clerk, but he suffered no 

physical harm). 

The Court cannot locate any authority that remotely supports Plaintiff’s assertion that 

Defendants’ conduct violated his Eighth Amendment rights. Plaintiff does not allege that his work in the 

 

the cases in this discussion Eighth Amendment claims in the context of claims brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983, this 

Court finds their analyses persuasive as to the disposition of Plaintiff’s state law claims. As many sister courts have found, 

“the elements of a § 52.1 claim are essentially identical to those of a § 1983 claim.” Love v. Salinas, No. 2:11-CV-00361-

MCE, 2011 WL 2620453, at *7 (E.D. Cal. July 1, 2011) (citing Corser v. Cty. of Merced, No. 1:05CV00985OWWDLB, 

2009 WL 174144, at *25 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2009); see also Harper ex rel. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 345 F. Supp. 

2d 1096, 1115 (S.D. Cal. 2004) (overturned on other grounds by Harper ex rel. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 549 U.S. 

1262 (2007)). Additionally, the Court could find no parallel cases in California’s appellate case law. 

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clerk’s office compelled him to suffer any harms. Nor does he claim that his work endangered his life or 

health. While he believes that he was forced to violate copyright laws, there is no indication in his 

pleadings that he was at risk for being held liable. All that this Court may conclude from his pleadings is 

that he made a lot of copies and that at some point he came to believe that his activities were unlawful. 

Thus, there is no basis from which this Court can find that he suffered or was exposed to risk in a 

manner that has been recognized as unconstitutional. Because Plaintiff was not suffering or at risk, there 

is no basis from which the Court can conclude that any of the Defendants acted with deliberate 

indifference. 

b. Due Process Claims

Plaintiff alleges that his due process rights were violated because Defendants did not give him 

proper notice that “that his job would involve violating federal law.” FAC at Ct. R. 21.

“The requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interests 

encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty and property.” Bd. of Regents of 

State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). “When protected interests are implicated, the right to 

some kind of prior hearing is paramount.” Id. at 569-70. “Property interests protected by procedural due 

process extend well beyond actual ownership of real estate, chattels, or money.” Id. at 571–72. 

Similarly, protected liberty interests go beyond the “freedom from bodily restraint” and include

the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of 

life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up 

children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, 

and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized . . . as essential to 

the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.

Id. at 572. Protected interests may also “arise from an expectation or interest created by state laws or 

policies.” Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005). 

Here, it is unclear which of Plaintiff’s protected interests were implicated. Plaintiff does not, 

however, claim that he suffered any effects that affected his liberty or his property. To the extent that 

Plaintiff may be alleging that his ability to transfer out of prisons was affected, this avenue has been 

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foreclosed by the Supreme Court. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976) (no liberty interest in 

staying in a particular facility). 

c. Retaliation Claims

While Plaintiff does not delineate a First Amendment claim, he does allege that he “[w]hen he 

blew the whistle, [he] was met with retaliation that is still going on to this day.” FAC at Ct. R. 22, 24. A 

viable claim of retaliation in violation of the First Amendment consists of five elements: “(1) An 

assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner's 

protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, 

and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 

F.3d 559, 567 (9th Cir. 2005). To the extent that Plaintiff intended to raise a claim that his First 

Amendment rights were violated by retaliatory conduct, he fails to state a claim because he does not 

explain how he “blew the whistle,” “informally objected,” or how he was “met with threats.” 

3. Negligence

Plaintiff’s final claim is for negligence under California state law. FAC at Ct. R. 23. In 

California, “[a]ctionable negligence involves a legal duty to use due care, a breach of such legal duty, 

and the breach as the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury.” Beacon Residential Cmty. Assn. 

v. Skidmore, Owings & Merrill LLP, 59 Cal. 4th 568, 573 (2014). Plaintiff’s claim fails because he has 

not alleged a cognizable injury. Plaintiff does not allege facts that suggest that he suffered a harm that 

might have been reasonably foreseeable by any of the Defendants. While he claims that he was 

subjected to “intolerable work and living environments,” Plaintiff has alleged no facts that explain how 

or why his conditions were intolerable. He describes that MTC staff falsely told other inmates that they

were “going away” because of his conduct, but he does not state that the other inmates did anything in 

response. Plaintiff’s claim that the suffered from “emotional distress” fails because he does not link this 

consequence to the conduct of any particular Defendant. Thus, there is no basis from which this Court 

might conclude that his distress was foreseeable, much less that a Defendant had a duty to prevent it. See 

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Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 6 Cal. 4th 965, 985 (1993) (“[U]nless the defendant has assumed 

a duty to plaintiff in which the emotional condition of the plaintiff is an object, recovery is available 

only if the emotional distress arises out of the defendant's breach of some other legal duty and the 

emotional distress is proximately caused by that breach of duty.”) 

V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons stated, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. 

Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s complaint and DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for a 

preliminary injunction (Doc. 5). Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint within 30 days of 

service of this Order.

Plaintiff’s amended complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but must state what each 

named defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional or other federal rights. Iqbal, 

129 S.Ct. at 1948-49. “The inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the duties and 

responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a 

constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988). Although accepted as 

true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted).

Finally, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint, Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 

F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997), and must be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or 

superceded pleading.” Local Rule 220. “All causes of action alleged in an original complaint which are 

not alleged in an amended complaint are waived.” King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987) 

(citation omitted). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original complaint no longer serves 

any function in the case. Thus, any amended complaint must be written or typed so that it so that it is 

complete in itself without reference to any earlier filed complaint. Local Rule 220. 

Accordingly, the Court ORDERS that:

1. The Clerk’s Office shall send to Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

2. Plaintiff’s FAC, filed on July 1, 2016, is DISMISSED for failure to state a claim;

3. Within thirty days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file a second amended 

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complaint or a notice of voluntary dismissal; and

4. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, the Court will 

dismiss this action with prejudice for failure to state a claim and to obey a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 5, 2016 /s/ Lawrence J. O’Neill _____ 

UNITED STATES CHIEF DISTRICT JUDGE

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