Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-93-03280/USCOURTS-ca10-93-03280-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

FRED W. PHELPS, SR.; and ) 

EDWARD F. ENGEL I ) 

) 

Plaintiffs-Appellees, ) 

) 

" . ) 

) 

JOAN HAMILTON, in her official ) 

capacity as District Attorney, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

No. 93-3280 

FILEDUnited States Court of Appea& Tenth Circuit 

JUL 11 1995 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 

{D.C. 93-4042-SAC) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Margie J. Phelps, Topeka, Kansas, and Elizabeth M. Phelps of 

Phelps-Chartered, Topeka, Kansas, for Plaintiffs-Appellees. 

Carol R. Bonebrake, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the 

Attorney General, Topeka, Kansas, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Before EBEL, McKAY, and REAVLEY,* Circuit Judges. 

EBEL, Circuit Judge. 

* The Honorable Thomas M. Rea"ley, Senior Circuit Judge, United 

States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sitting by 

designation. 

Appellate Case: 93-3280 Document: 01019277459 Date Filed: 07/11/1995 Page: 1 
Plaintiffs-Appellees, Fred Phelps ("Phelps") and Edward Engel 

("Engel") (collectively "Plaintiffs"), are both Topeka, Kansas 

residents active in a campaign against homosexuality. DefendantAppellant Joan Hamilton ("Hamilton") is the district attorney for 

the Third Judicial District in Topeka. Following her election in 

1992, Hamilton brought several prosecutions against Phelps for 

violating Kansas' criminal defamation statute. Plaintiffs brought 

this lawsuit (1) to invalidate Kansas' criminal defamation statute 

as facially overbroad; as well as (2) to enjoin the pending 

criminal defamation prosecutions against Phelps on the ground that 

the statute was unconstitutionally applied to him and overbroad on 

its face. The district court rejected Hamilton's motion for 

summary judgment based on the abstention doctrine set forth in 

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), ruling that it need not 

abstain from intervening in the pending state court criminal 

prosecutions.1 Phelps v. Hamilton, 828 F. Supp. 831, 845 (D. Kan 

1993). The district court then granted Plaintiffs' motion for 

summary judgment and issued first a preliminary injunction and 

then a permanent injunction invalidating Kansas' criminal 

defamation statute as facially overbroad and enjoining the 

prosecutions brought under that statute. Hamilton appealed, 

arguing that the district court should have abstained from 

intervening in the state court proceedings and that the district 

1 The district court also denied Hamilton's motion for summary 

judgment to dismiss Engel as lacking standing to file suit. 

Hamilton does not challenge that ruling on appeal. 

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court erred in invalidating Kansas' criminal defamation statute. 

We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and reverse and 

remand.2 

As to Phelps, we conclude that the district court erred by 

refusing to abstain from enjoining the state criminal defamation 

prosecutions against him in the absence of proof by Phelps, and a 

finding by the district court, that the prosecutions were 

instituted in bad faith or to harass. Accordingly, we remand so 

that the district court can conduct further proceedings on that 

issue consistent with our opinion. Thus, we do not reach the 

merits of Phelps' "as applied" claim. 

As to Engel, no criminal defamation prosecutions are 

presently pending against him. Rather, he alleges that he has 

previously been prosecuted under the state criminal defamation 

statute and intends to engage in future conduct that may trigger 

further prosecutions under the statute. Engel seeks a declaratory 

judgment that the statute is unconstitutionally overbroad on its 

face because it does not require actual malice before a criminal 

defamation prosecution may be brought for speech on matters of 

public concern. As Younger does not bar us from considering 

Engel's challenge, we reach the merits of his claim and conclude 

that the district court erred in holding Kansas' criminal 

2 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously to honor the parties' request for a 

decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. 

P. 34(f); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

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defamation statute unconstitutional. Thus, we reverse the 

district court's ruling on Engel's overbreadth challenge.3 

I. BACKGROUND 

This case arises out a series of criminal defamation 

prosecutions against Phelps, a Topeka pastor leading a campaign 

against homosexuality, and Engel, a fellow activist against 

homosexual rights. Engel was indicted in 1991 for violating 

Kansas' criminal defamation statute, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-4004 

(1988),4 but the charges were dropped and no subsequent charges 

have been brought against him. Engel insists that he still 

intends to take part in the campaign against homosexuality and to 

3 The district court also ruled on Phelps' identical 

overbreadth challenge. Because we reverse the district court's 

ruling on Engel's overbreadth claim, we also reverse the district 

court's ruling on that claim as to Phelps. 

4 Kansas' criminal defamation law provides that: 

(1) Criminal defamation is maliciously communicating to 

a person orally, in writing, or by any other means, 

false information tending to expose another living 

person to public hatred, contempt or ridicule, or to 

deprive him of the benefits of public confidence and 

social acceptance, or tending to degrade and vilify the 

memory of one who is dead and to scandalize or provoke 

his living relatives and friends. 

(2) In all prosecutions under this section the truth of 

the information communicated shall be admitted as 

evidence. It shall be a defense to a charge of criminal 

defamation if it is found that such matter was true. 

(3) Criminal defamation is a class A misdemeanor. 

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-4004 (1988). 

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continue engaging in political speech similar to that for which he 

had been previously charged with criminal defamation. 

Phelps has engaged in a campaign against homosexuality and 

supporters of homosexual rights through picketing, distributing 

fliers, and transmitting telefacsimiles. During this campaign, 

Phelps allegedly made seven statements which apparently formed the 

basis of the six criminal defamation prosecutions pending against 

him.5 Phelps claims that the criminal defamation prosecutions 

5 While Phelps' exact statements are not found in the record on 

appeal, Hamilton has represented, and Phelps has not denied, that 

the statements at issue are: 

1. Officer Shannon "has been caught by park 

department employees having sex with teenage boys in the 

Burnett Mound Park .... " 

2. "Fag T[opeka] P[olice] D[epartment] Cop Doug 

Shannon Molests Kids." 

3. Counsel [sic] Member Beth Meckler's blood bank 

record of 1988 is "tainted with a social disease (genre 

of Aids or HIV positive)." 

4. Katie Frisbee, "during her life on earth lifted 

up her hand against the Lord's Church and People, doing 

them much evil ... "and further statements [sic] that 

the deceased, Katie Frisbie, was a lier [sic] . 

5. Jeffrey Harrington and Mary Ldu Schmidt are 

"homosexuals." 

6. "Kevin Oldham played Russian roulette with 

promiscuous anal sex and lost big time ... "and "[f]ar 

worse, an apostate church will pervert the gospel of 

Jesus Christ on April 10 by holding a memorial service 

for this dead uncircumcised Philistine .... " 

7. "Dike York promotes same sex marriages" and she 

is "seeking to legalize same sex marriages and to force 

their unnatural, God-defying lifestyles down our 

throats." 

Br. of Appellant at 17-18 (citations omitted). 

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based on these alleged statements were commenced in bad faith or 

to harass and that the multiple prosecutions are part of a 

political vendetta that Hamilton is waging against him. Moreover, 

he contends that his use of invective was for political effect and 

is protected by the First Amendment. 

During the course of her 1992 campaign for district attorney, 

Hamilton made hate speech in general, and Phelps' use of epithets 

in particular, central parts of her platform. Hamilton promised 

that, if elected, she would initiate prosecutions under the 

criminal defamation statute and ban "hate," "prejudice," and 

"Fred."6 Phelps argues that Hamilton singled him out for 

prosecution because of animosity between him and Hamilton's 

husband--pointing to a history of discord which culminated in a 

series of letters from Phelps to Hamilton's husband in which 

Phelps assailed the character of Hamilton's husband and accused 

him of womanizing. Hamilton denies that any such animosity 

affected her professional judgment and prosecutorial 

decisionmaking. 

After Hamilton was elected district attorney, she commenced 

six prosecutions against Phelps for violating the criminal 

defamation statute and one prosecution for disorderly conduct.? 

Two of these prosecutions stem from activity before Hamilton took 

6 This statement allegedly referred to Plaintiff-Appellee, Fred 

Phelps. 

7 The record is unclear as to the status of the disorderly 

conduct prosecution. However, this appeal does not implicate that 

prosecution because the district court's injunction only applied 

to present and future prosecutions brought under Kansas' criminal 

defamation statute. See Appellant Appendix at 1. 

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office, and all seven of these prosecutions were filed between 

Hamilton's oath of office on January 11, 1993 and April 20 of that 

year. 

After the first two state criminal defamation cases were 

filed, Phelps and Engel commenced this action in federal court 

seeking declaratory and injunctive relief--i.e. the invalidation 

of Kansas' criminal defamation statute and an injunction enjoining 

the state court criminal defamation proceedings against Phelps. 

After considering both parties' motions for summary judgment, the 

district court granted Plaintiffs' request for declaratory and 

injunctive relief. Hamilton now appeals. 

II. DISCUSSION 

Hamilton raises two arguments on appeal: (1) that the 

district court should have abstained from intervening in the 

pending criminal defamation prosecutions against Phelps in the 

absence of a finding of bad faith or harassment; and (2) that, 

even if intervention was proper, the district court should not 

have invalidated Kansas' criminal defamation statute as facially 

overbroad. As to Hamilton's first argument, we conclude that the 

district court failed to apply the proper standard for considering 

whether the prosecution was commenced in bad faith or to harass so 

as to warrant federal intervention into Phelps' pending state 

criminal defamation prosecutions. That is, in considering 

Hamilton's motion for summary judgment, the district court wrongly 

enjoined the state criminal defamation prosecutions against Phelps 

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without first requiring Phelps to prove that the criminal 

defamation prosecutions had been instituted in bad faith or to 

harass.8 Thus, we must remand the abstention issue for further 

factfinding so that the district court can properly determine if 

Phelps can meet his burden of demonstrating that the criminal 

defamation prosecutions pending against him were commenced in bad 

faith or to harass. If Phelps can meet this burden, then the 

district court should consider the merits of his "as applied" 

constitutional challenge.9 

We next consider Plaintiffs' facial overbreadth challenge to 

the statute in connection with Engel's claim. We conclude that 

the criminal defamation statute, when properly interpreted, passes 

constitutional muster, and accordingly we reverse the district 

court's ruling on that issue as it applies to Engel (and Phelps). 

We review the district court's summary judgment rulings de 

novo. Applied Genetics Int'l, Inc. v. First Affiliated Sec., 

Inc., 912 F.2d 1238, 1241 (lOth Cir. 1990). Even though Younger 

is an equitable doctrine, its application is mandatory, and thus, 

we also review de novo the district court's determination of 

8 The court initially addressed abstention in the context of 

Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. In that context, 

it erroneously concluded that it could grant the preliminary 

injunction upon the mere showing of a genuine issue of material 

fact as to whether the prosecutions were motivated "at least in 

part" by bad faith or a desire to harass. It then issued a 

permanent injunction without taking further evidence or issuing 

further findings. Thus, at no time did the district court require 

Phelps actually to prove that the prosecutions were instituted in 

bad faith or to harass, and at no time did the court actually 

enter a finding of bad faith or harassment. See n.17 infra. 

9 The district court did not consider the merits of Phelps "as 

applied" claim because it invalidated the entire statute as 

facially overbroad. 

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whether to abstain from exercising jurisdiction. Seneca-Cayuga 

Tribe v. Oklahoma ex rel. Thompson, 874 F.2d 709, 711 (lOth Cir. 

1989). In reviewing the record to determine whether any dispute 

of material fact exists, we view all evidence and inferences in 

favor of the party opposing the motion for summary judgment. 

Russillo v. Scarborough, 935 F.2d 1167, 1170 (lOth Cir. 1991). 

A. PHELPS I CLAIMS 

Younger authorizes federal courts to enjoin a pending state 

criminal prosecution provided that it was (1) commenced in bad 

faith or to harass, (2) based on a flagrantly and patently 

unconstitutional statute, or (3) related to any other such 

extraordinary circumstance creating a threat of "irreparable 

injury" both great and immediate. 401 U.S. at 53-54; see also 

Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 611 (1975). As Phelps does 

not allege that this case fits into the catch-all but ill-defined 

category of "extraordinary circumstances," we need only consider 

whether the prosecutions against him are based on a "flagrantly 

and patently" unconstitutional statute or were commenced in bad 

faith or to harass. 

In considering whether a federal plaintiff meets one of the 

exceptions to Younger abstention, federal courts must balance the 

necessity of protecting an individual's exercise of his or her 

constitutional rights with a prosecutor's discretion in selecting 

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certain actions for criminal prosecution.10 Moreover, federalism 

concerns counsel against federal court intervention into state 

prosecutions so that the state judiciary will have the opportunity 

to correct any prosecutorial violations of an individual's 

constitutional rights. These twin rationales of respecting 

prosecutorial discretion and federalism explain why the exceptions 

to Younger only provide for a "very narrow gate for federal 

intervention." Arkebauer v. Kiley, 985 F.2d 1351, 1358 (7th Cir. 

1993) .11 

We first address the exception to Younger abstention for 

flagrantly and patently unconstitutional statutes. The standard 

10 The Supreme Court has explained the importance of allowing 

for prosecutorial discretion: 

"[S]o long as the prosecutor has probable cause to 

believe that the accused committed an offense 

defined by statute, the decision whether or not to 

prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before 

a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his 

discretion." Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 

364 (1978). This broad discretion rests largely on 

the recognition that the decision to prosecute is 

particularly ill-suited to judicial review. Such 

factors as the strength of the case, the 

prosecution's general deterrence value, the 

Government's enforcement priorities, and the case's 

relationship to the Government's overall 

enforcement plan are not readily susceptible to the 

kind of analysis the courts are competent to 

undertake. 

Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985). 

11 Of course, if the Anti-Injunction Act, codified at 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2283, barred the federal courts from considering civil rights 

claims for injunctive relief, the gate allowing for Phelps' claim 

for federal intervention would be shut. However, while Younger 

specifically reserved judgment on this issue, 401 U.S. at 54, the 

Supreme Court subsequently determined that § 2283 does not 

preclude § 1983 actions. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 

242-43 (1972). 

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for enjoining a pending state court proceeding based upon an 

unconstitutional state statute requires that the law be 

"'flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional 

prohibitions in every clause, sentence and paragraph, and in 

whatever manner and against whomever an effort might be made to 

apply it.'" Younger, 401 U.S. at 53-54 (quoting Watson v. Buck, 

313 U.S. 387, 402 (1941)). It is not clear whether this phrase 

was intended to be construed literally to mean that a statute must 

be unconstitutional as applied to every conceivable situation, or 

whether it means only that a statute must be unconstitutional 

under any possible interpretation as applied to the facts of the 

instant case. Compare Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 447 

(1977) with id. at 463 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, 

it is clear that the unconstitutionality of the statute must be 

patent and obvious. Regardless of how we would interpret this 

exception, it is unavailing to Phelps because, as we hold in Part 

IIB, the Kansas statute is not unconstitutional; thus, this 

exception to Younger abstention is inapplicable to the instant 

case. 

We turn, then, to the exception to Younger abstention that 

allows a federal court to enjoin a pending state prosecution that 

is brought in bad faith or to harass.12 Three factors that courts 

12 The terms "bad faith" and "to harass" may have slightly 

different meanings, although they will, to a large degree, 

overlap. Ordinarily, a bad faith prosecution will not be 

predicated upon probable cause. See Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 

117, 126 n.6 (1975). However, if prosecutions are brought for the 

purpose of chilling or preventing a defendant from exercising his 

or her constitutional rights, this may constitute a harassing and/ 

or bad faith prosecution, even though the charges are predicated 

(continued on next page) 

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have considered in determining whether a prosecution is commenced 

in bad faith or to harass are: (1) whether it was frivolous or 

undertaken with no reasonably objective hope of success, see 

Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 126 n.6 (1975) (explaining that a 

bad faith prosecution "generally means that a prosecution has been 

brought without a reasonable expectation of obtaining a valid 

conviction");13 (2) whether it was motivated by the defendant's 

suspect class or in retaliation for the defendant's exercise of 

constitutional rights, see Younger, 401 U.S. at 48 (quoting 

Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 482 (1965));14 and (3) 

(continued from prior page) 

on probable cause. See. e.g., Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 118 

n.ll (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 

part) ("Bad-faith harassment can, of course, take many forms, 

including arrests and prosecutions under valid statutes where 

there is no reasonable hope of obtaining a conviction, and a 

pattern of discriminatory enforcement designed to inhibit the 

exercise of federal rights.") (citations omitted); Cullen v. 

Fliegner, 18 F.3d 96, 103-04 (2d Cir.) ("a refusal to abstain is 

also justified [even when there is a reasonable expectation of a 

successful prosecution] where a prosecution . . . has been brought 

to retaliate for or to deter constitutionally protected conduct"), 

cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 480 (1994); United States v. P.H.E .. 

Inc., 965 F.2d 848, 853 (lOth Cir. 1992) ("[A] prosecution 

motivated by a desire to discourage expression protected by the 

First Amendment is barred and must be enjoined or dismissed, 

irrespective of whether the challenged action could possibly be 

found to be lawful.") (emphasis added); Fitzgerald v. Peek, 636 

F.2d 943, 945 (5th Cir.) (per curiam) ("A [showing of retaliation] 

will justify an injunction regardless of whether valid convictions 

could conceivably be obtained.") (emphasis added), cert. denied, 

452 u.s. 916 (1981). 

13 See. e.g., Central Ave. News. Inc. v. City of Minot. N.D., 

651 F.2d 565, 570 (8th Cir. 1981). 

14 See. e.g., P.H.E., 965 F.2d at 860 (holding that the strategy 

of bringing a series of multiple prosecutions against a defendant 

to curtail the defendant's exercise of constitutional rights 

constituted bad faith and harassment); Fitzgerald, 636 F.2d at 945 

(explaining that a showing that a prosecution was brought in 

(continued on next page) 

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whether it was conducted in such a way as to constitute harassment 

and an abuse of prosecutorial discretion, typically through the 

unjustified and oppressive use of multiple prosecutions, cf. 

Younger, 401 U.S. at 49.15 These factors are important because 

the cost, anxiety, and inconvenience of defending against a single 

prosecution brought in good faith is not enough to establish the 

"great and immediate" threat of irreparable injury necessary to 

justify enjoining pending state proceedings. 

In the instant case, Phelps does not attempt to demonstrate 

that the criminal defamation prosecutions had no prospect of 

success; in fact, the issuance of the arrest warrants against 

Phelps on the criminal defamation charges,16 and a review of the 

(continued from prior page) 

retaliation for, or to discourage, the exercise of constitutional 

rights "will justify an injunction regardless of whether valid 

convictions conceivably could be obtained"); Heimbach v. Village 

of Lyons, 597 F.2d 344, 346-47 (2d Cir. 1979) (per curiam) 

(allegation that prosecutions were initiated for the purposes of 

chilling First Amendment rights and without hope of conviction was 

sufficient to overcome Younger bar against federal court 

intervention); Timmerman v. Brown, 528 F.2d 811, 815 (4th Cir. 

1975) (enjoining prosecution of prisoners as retaliation or to 

deter filing civil charges against prison guards who attacked 

them); Wichert v. Walker, 606 F. Supp. 1516, 1521-22 (D.N.J. 1985) 

(enjoining the disciplinary hearing of a teacher brought as a 

retaliatory measure for political conduct) . 

15 See. e.g., P.H.E., 965 F.2d at 851 (lOth Cir. 1992) 

(emphasizing that the government brought a series of multiple 

prosecutions against a single defendant as part of its analysis of 

bad faith and harassment); Krahm v. Graham, 461 F.2d 703, 705-07 

(9th Cir. 1972) (finding the existence of bad faith in a case 

where the prosecutor filed 14 cases charging the sale of obscenity 

after 6 such cases were found not guilty over the previous two 

weeks and the prosecutor had as many as 21 cases pending against 

certain defendants) . 

16 While Hamilton represents in her brief that she obtained 

arrest warrants for the prosecutions against Phelps, she failed to 

include the underlying documents in her appendix. However, as 

(continued on next page) 

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content of the statements themselves, suggest that the statements 

made by Phelps could arguably be the basis of a conviction for 

criminal defamation. Hence, Phelps' argument for federal court 

intervention must rest on his allegations that the prosecutions 

were commenced in retaliation for the exercise of his 

constitutional rights and that so many prosecutions were brought 

as to rise to the level of prosecutorial harassment. 

As a starting matter, we cannot ignore the "repeated judicial 

authorization[s] for [Hamilton's] conduct," and it thus becomes 

incumbent upon Phelps to advance either some impeachment of such 

authorizations or some extrinsic evidence why Hamilton could not, 

and did not, in good faith rely on those judicial determinations. 

Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 351 (1975). Moreover, Phelps has 

a heavy burden of proof in order to overcome the bar of Younger 

abstention. Under Younger, intervention cannot be predicated on 

mere allegations; rather, the federal plaintiff must prove bad 

faith or harassment before intervention is warranted. Thus, in 

Perez v. Ledesma, a companion case to Younger, the Supreme Court 

explained that federal courts should limit intervention to "cases 

of proven harassment or prosecutions undertaken by state officials 

without hope of obtaining a valid conviction." 401 U.S. 82, 85 

(1971) (emphasis added); see also Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 

(continued from prior page) 

Phelps does not challenge this representation, we accept it as 

true. Specifically, Hamilton stated that three separate judges 

determined that "'there [we]re reasonable grounds for believing 

that ... one Fred W. Phelps, Sr. did then and there, unlawfully, 

intentionally and willfully' commit the crime of criminal 

defamation." Br. of Appellant at 13 (internal quotations 

omitted) . 

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338 (1977) (without proof of bad faith or harassment, federal 

courts must abstain from intervention); Suggs v. Brannon, 804 F.2d 

274, 278 (4th Cir. 1986) (same). With these principles in mind, 

we turn to Phelps' arguments that the prosecutions pending against 

him were (1) in bad faith because they were motivated by a desire 

to retaliate against him for exercising his constitutional rights; 

and (2) constituted harassment. 

In order to prevail on his retaliation claim, Phelps must 

prove that "retaliation was a major motivating factor and played a 

dominant role in the decision to prosecute." Smith v. Hightower, 

693 F.2d 359, 367 (5th Cir. 1982). If Phelps can make an initial 

showing of retaliatory animus, the burden then shifts to Hamilton 

to rebut the presumption of bad faith by offering "'legitimate, 

articulable, objective reasons'" to "'justify [her] decision'" to 

initiate these prosecutions against Phelps. United States v. 

P.H.E .. Inc., 965 F.2d 848, 860 (lOth Cir. 1992) (quoting United 

States v. Raymer, 941 F.2d 1031, 1040 (lOth Cir. 1991)); United 

States v. Adams, 870 F.2d 1140, 1146 (6th Cir. 1989) (alleging 

sufficient circumstances to support the inference of a vindictive 

prosecution establishes a prima facie case of vindictiveness); cf. 

Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist .. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 

287 (1977) (after public employee establishes constitutional 

violation was a substantial motivating factor, the burden shifts 

to the public employer to demonstrate that he or she would have 

acted in the same manner absent the employee's exercise of 

constitutional rights). Ultimately, however, Phelps bears the 

burden of proving that the unconstitutional retaliation was the 

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substantial motivating factor behind Hamilton's decision to 

commence the criminal defamation prosecutions. 

With regard to Phelps' claim of harassment based upon an 

excessive number of prosecutions, Phelps must demonstrate both the 

existence of a substantial number of prosecutions and that a 

reasonable prosecutor would not have brought such multiple charges 

under similar circumstances. While the threshold test does not 

require a specific number of prosecutions, it is clear that the 

number of prosecutions must reach an oppressive level. See 

Timmerman v. Brown, 528 F.2d 811, 815 (4th Cir. 1975) (the 

touchstone of harassment is "a legal exercise of authority in such 

a manner as to be unnecessarily oppressive"). Moreover, mere 

numbers alone do not tell the full story. For example, even 

multiple prosecutions may not be overly burdensome if the 

prosecutions are, or are likely to be, consolidated into a single 

trial. Furthermore, the reasons why the prosecutor brought 

multiple prosecutions are also important--e.g. was it to wear the 

defendant down with the financial and emotional expense of 

multiple trials, or was it because the events themselves were 

separated by time or jurisdiction or otherwise by factors that 

explained the use of multiple prosecutions. 

In his attempt to demonstrate that the prosecutions were in 

bad faith or to harass, Phelps argued to the district court that: 

(1) there was a history of ill will between Phelps and Hamilton's 

family; (2) Hamilton initiated seven prosecutions in a period of 

three months; (3) the criminal defamation statute was 

constitutionally suspect; (4) Hamilton made statements in her 

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campaign for district attorney that she would prosecute Phelps; 

and (5) Hamilton initiated prosecutions against him despite the 

fact that his campaign against homosexual rights was 

constitutionally protected activity. 

The district court initially considered these arguments in 

the context of Plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction. 

In that context, the court apparently concluded that it did not 

need actually to determine whether the prosecutions were commenced 

in bad faith or to harass provided that it concluded that Phelps 

had raised a genuine issue of material fact on the issue. When 

the district court entered its permanent injunction, it did so on 

the basis of its findings made to justify the issuance of a 

preliminary injunction. Thus, the district court never made a 

finding of bad faith or harassment. This failure to make any 

definitive finding on the issue of bad faith or harassment in 

conjunction with the issuance of the permanent injunction requires 

us to remand this case for further findings.17 Nevertheless, to 

17 We also note that the district court evaluated whether to 

issue a preliminary injunction (and later a permanent injunction) 

based on the legal standard of whether the prosecutions were 

motivated "at least in part" by bad faith or harassment. We 

recognize that some courts have adopted the less exacting "at 

least in part" test for preliminary injunctions, while maintaining 

a higher standard for permanent injunctions. See. e.g., Smith v. 

Hightower, 693 F.2d 359, 367 n.19 (5th Cir. 1982); Lewellen v. 

Raff, 851 F.2d 1108, 1110 (8th Cir. 1988) (per curiam), cert. 

denied, 489 U.S. 1033 (1989). We are disinclined to adopt this 

approach because we view Younger as a quasi-jurisdictional bar 

based on federalism concerns which are equally valid whether 

considered in the context of an application for a preliminary or 

permanent injunction. See Doran v. Salem Inn. Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 

931 (1975) (underscoring that even preliminary injunctive relief 

"seriously impairs the State's interest in enforcing its criminal 

laws, and implicates the concerns for federalism which lie at the 

heart of Younger"). Even if we were to relax the burden of proof 

(continued on next page) 

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assist the district court in its consideration of bad faith or 

harassment on remand, we briefly address the legal significance of 

Phelps' arguments as to why the prosecutions brought against him 

were commenced in bad faith. 

With regard to Phelps' first argument, we note that animus or 

ill-will between the parties does not, by itself, constitute 

retaliation. Indeed, no prosecutor looks favorably upon 

lawbreakers--whether they be purveyors of obscenity, drug dealers 

or those committing hate crimes. Thus, demonstrating a history of 

personal animosity between the prosecutor and the defendant is 

not, by itself, sufficient to show that a prosecution was 

commenced in bad faith. See Davila v. Texas, 489 F. Supp. 803, 

809 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (explaining that even a long and bitter 

personal history between the prosecutor and the defendant as well 

as the prosecutor's zealousness in prosecuting the case did not 

bring the case within the bad faith exception to Younger) . That 

is not to say that personal animosity--if shown to exist--may not 

be probative of an improper motive, but in and of itself, such 

evidence cannot meet the burden of demonstrating that the 

prosecution was commenced in bad faith or to harass. 

In considering Phelps' second argument, we note that the 

number of separate prosecutions is relevant, but the mere fact 

that Hamilton filed several prosecutions against Phelps is not 

(continued from prior page) 

in the context of a preliminary injunction (i.e. reduce it to a 

likelihood of establishing bad faith or harassment), we still 

would see no basis at the preliminary injunction stage to reduce 

the substantive element of motivation from a "major motivating 

factor" to "at least in part motivated by." 

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dispositive because the parties' briefs suggest that the criminal 

defamation prosecutions were based on probable cause.18 See. 

~' Collins v. County of Kendall. Ill., 807 F.2d 95, 99 (7th 

Cir. 1986) ("Instituting approximately thirty criminal 

prosecutions [against bookstore for obscene material] over a twoyear period does not constitute bad faith or harassment in and of 

itself."), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987); Grandee Corp. v. 

Rochford, 536 F.2d 197, 203 (7th Cir. 1976) (court "not persuaded 

that evidence of multiple prosecutions is sufficient by itself to 

support [the] necessary inference" of bad faith or harassment). 

That is, when an individual repeatedly engages in criminal 

behavior, there is always the risk of multiple criminal 

prosecutions. Cf. Sandquist v. Pitchess, 332 F. Supp. 171, 179 

(C.D. Cal. 1971) ("Where one distributes or exhibits a great 

number of different publications or films, each of which is 

colorably obscene, he assumes a risk of multiple prosecutions and 

the number of arrests and prosecutions he encounters cannot be 

determinative of whether bad-faith harassment has occurred."). 

Phelps' third argument that the criminal defamation statute 

is constitutionally suspect is not a factor in considering 

Hamilton's motivation because, as we conclude below, the statute 

can reasonably be interpreted to conform with the Constitution. 

See discussion of Engel's claim, infra. 

18 Federal courts underscore that the weight of the evidence 

presented in a case is an important consideration in the bad faith 

inquiry because "[s]trong evidence of criminal violations supports 

the inference that the prosecutor is fulfilling his duty to bring 

evidence of criminal activity to the grand jury and not 

retaliating." Hightower, 693 F.2d at 369. 

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As to Hamilton's campaign statements, the district court 

improperly viewed them as probative of an improper motive because 

Hamilton's statements attacking hate crime in general, and 

attacking Phelps in particular, related to the political debate 

over law enforcement policy. To view these statements as 

indicative of bad faith or harassment in subsequent prosecutions 

would intervene into prosecutorial discretion in case selection 

and chill political debate during campaigns for prosecutor--a 

result in contravention of First Amendment values. We must allow 

for and encourage debate about law enforcement strategy because 

prosecutorial decisionmaking and the political process for 

selecting prosecutors should reflect the public's judgment as to 

the proper enforcement of the criminal laws. While these 

judgments must be consistent with the Constitution, courts must 

not be too quick to second-guess state enforcement of its criminal 

laws. This "breathing space" for prosecutorial decisionmaking and 

debate is not without limits, of course. See Shaw v. Garrison, 

467 F.2d 113, 118, 122 (5th Cir.) (enjoining district attorney's 

prosecution of defendant for perjury, after a previously failed 

prosecution for conspiracy to murder President Kennedy, because 

the district attorney pursued the prosecution to publicize his 

book), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1024 (1972). However, we must 

recognize the reality that decisions as to prosecutorial 

priorities understandably will be, and should be, the subject of 

political debate. 

The district court also appeared to weigh the fact that 

Phelps engaged in some protected conduct in evaluating whether the 

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prosecutions were commenced in bad faith or to harass. However, 

the critical inquiry is not whether Phelps engaged in some 

protected activity; rather, it is whether the prosecutor sought to 

limit Phelps' ability to conduct constitutionally protected speech 

by these criminal prosecutions. In the instant case, the basis of 

the criminal charges does not appear to be Phelps' picketing or 

the political views on homosexuality that he expressed; rather, 

the charges focus on allegations that he allegedly criminally 

defamed certain individuals in the course of his campaign. There 

is no apparent inconsistency between Phelps' ability to espouse 

his political views and holding him accountable if he criminally 

defames certain individuals in the process. 

In sum, in order to warrant federal court intervention, 

Phelps must offer sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the 

prosecutions were substantially motivated by a bad faith motive or 

were brought to harass. Although we are skeptical that Phelps can 

meet this burden of proof, because the district court did not make 

any factual findings justifying an exception to Younger 

abstention, we remand for further consideration of this issue in 

accordance with the principles set forth in this opinion. 

B. ENGEL'S CLAIMS 

It is uncontested that Engel's previous conduct and 

association with Phelps give him a sufficient personal stake in 

the outcome of the suit to have standing to challenge the criminal 

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defamation law.19 See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 

(1975); see also Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 711-12 (1977) 

(holding that past criminal proceedings may indicate the 

likelihood of future prosecution and support a claim for 

declaratory and injunctive relief). However, because Engel's 

interests in this case are so closely related with Phelps' 

interests, we must consider the possibility contemplated in Doran, 

that "there plainly may be some circumstances in which legally 

distinct parties are so closely related that they should all be 

subject to the Younger considerations which govern any one of 

them." 422 U.S. at 928. 

In Doran, the Court held that three owners of topless bars 

were legally distinct parties and abstention as to one did not 

require abstention as to the other two, even though they were 

"represented by common counsel, and have similar business 

activities and problems, [because] they [we]re apparently 

unrelated in terms of ownership, control, and management." Id. at 

928-29. Doran, along with Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975), 

and Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974), form a trilogy of 

cases which govern the issue of whether a related party is barred 

by Younger from seeking federal court relief despite the absence 

of a pending prosecution as to that party. Steffel held that 

Younger did not bar an individual who heeded the warning of the 

police to avoid a prosecution for trespassing, while his companion 

was arrested in the process of distributing handbills, from 

19 Hamilton contested this issue before the district court, but 

has conceded on appeal that Engel has standing to challenge the 

criminal defamation statute. 

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seeking declaratory relief in federal court, even though there was 

an extant criminal proceeding against his companion for trespass. 

Id. at 475. On the other hand, Hicks held that Younger abstention 

applied to an action for declaratory relief brought by the owners 

of a movie theatre shortly after two of its employees had been 

charged with distribution of obscenity, concluding that the two 

legally distinct parties were so "intertwined" as to require 

abstention. See 422 u.s. at 349.20 

In the instant case, although Phelps and Engel are coplaintiffs and share the same political agenda, those facts alone 

are not enough to invoke the doctrine of derivative abstention, 

see Doran, 422 U.S. at 928-29, and there is no evidence in the 

record that Engel has brought his case merely "'to annul the 

results of a state trial.'" Wooley, 430 U.S. at 711 (quoting 

Huffman, 420 U.S. at 609). Moreover, as Engel represents that he 

is motivated by his concern of facing future prosecutions which 

would impinge on the exercise of his constitutional rights, it 

would be unfair to hold his constitutional rights hostage to the 

outcome and timing of Phelps' criminal court proceedings. Hence, 

as Engel meets both the requirements of (1) facing a threatened 

prosecution and/or being potentially deprived of his 

constitutional rights, and (2) being unable to intervene in a 

20 The Supreme Court in Hicks also observed that the day after 

the federal plaintiffs filed their federal suit, they were named 

in a state criminal proceeding and that, "where state criminal 

proceedings are begun against the federal plaintiff after the 

federal complaint is filed but before any proceeding of substance 

on the merits have taken place in the federal courts, the 

principles of Younger v. Harris should apply in full force." 422 

u.s. at 349. 

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state proceeding so as to have a meaningful opportunity to present 

his claim, see Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar 

Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432, 435-37 (1982), derivative abstention is 

inappropriate. Thus, the district court correctly declined to 

abstain from considering the merits of Engel's overbreadth 

challenge pursuant to Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965). 

Engel's facial challenge of Kansas' criminal defamation 

statute begins with New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 

(1964), which sought to prevent a "chilling effect" on political 

speech by precluding public figures from asserting claims under 

civil defamation laws for a defamatory falsehood unless the 

alleged defamation was "made with 'actual malice'--that is, with 

knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether 

it was false or not." Id. at 279-80.21 Eight months after New 

York Times, the Court extended the actual malice standard to 

criminal defamation statutes and struck down Louisiana's criminal 

defamation law because it failed to provide for an actual malice 

standard in cases involving matters of public concern. Garrison 

v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 78 (1964). 

Engel argues that the Kansas law is facially invalid because 

it suffers from the same constitutional deficiency. Kansas' 

criminal defamation law provides that: 

(1) Criminal defamation is maliciously communicating to 

a person orally, in writing, or by any other means, 

false information tending to expose another living 

person to public hatred, contempt or ridicule, or to 

21 No one here contends that Engel and Phelps are not public 

figures or that the issue of homosexual rights is not a matter of 

public concern. 

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deprive him of the benefits of public confidence and 

social acceptance, or tending to degrade and vilify the 

memory of one who is dead and to scandalize or provoke 

his living relatives and friends. 

(2) In all prosecutions under this section the truth of 

the information communicated shall be admitted as 

evidence. It shall be a defense to a charge of criminal 

defamation if it is found that such matter was true. 

(3) Criminal defamation is a class A misdemeanor. 

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-4004 (1988). 

In considering whether Kansas' criminal defamation statute is 

facially overbroad, we must "proceed with caution and 

restraint.n22 Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 

216 (1975). Hence, the statute "should not be deemed facially 

invalid unless it is not readily subject to a narrowing 

construction by the state courts and its deterrent effect on 

legitimate expression is both real and substantial." Id. 

(citations omitted) . 

The federal courts do not have the power to narrow a state 

law by disregarding plain language in the statute just to preserve 

it from constitutional attack. Wilson v. Stocker, 819 F.2d 943, 

948 (lOth Cir. 1987). However, we are permitted to construe 

ambiguous state statutes and to extrapolate the true meaning of 

such statutes according to traditional rules of statutory 

construction, and then to judge the constitutionality of such 

statutes as so construed. Among the statutory construction tools 

available to us are "the interpretations . . . given to analogous 

22 In exam1n1ng Kansas' criminal defamation statute, we must 

consider the district court's interpretation of Kansas state law 

de novo. Schmidt v. Farm Credit Serv., 977 F.2d 511, 514 (lOth 

Cir. 1992). 

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statutes, and, perhaps to some degree, to the interpretation of 

the statute given by those charged with enforcing it." Grayned v. 

City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972). We are also permitted 

to utilize "the well-established principle that statutes will be 

interpreted to avoid constitutional difficulties," Frisby v. 

Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 483 (1988), and ultimately, we evaluate 

whether a statute is "fairly subject to an interpretation which 

will render unnecessary or substantially modify the federal 

constitutional question," Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 468 

(1987). 

The parties agree that no Kansas appellate court has 

considered whether the actual malice standard of New York Times 

and Garrison applies to Kansas' criminal defamation statute. 

Hamilton claims that the statute should be so construed, arguing 

that: (1) we should presume that the Kansas legislature acted with 

full knowledge of, and intent to comply with, the New York Times 

and Garrison decisions when it subsequently enacted this criminal 

defamation statute; (2) the Kansas courts have a strong rule of 

construction to interpret statutes so as to preserve their 

constitutional validity; (3) the "actual malice" standard of New 

York Times has long been applied in Kansas civil defamation cases; 

(4) this standard was also applied to the predecessor criminal 

defamation statute, and (5) the Kansas Criminal Code, Kan. Stat. 

Ann. § 21-3201 (1988), inserts criminal intent into all statutory 

offenses unless specifically excluded. Despite these arguments, 

the district court's examination of the Kansas Pattern Jury 

Instructions and the Kansas common law definition of malice led it 

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to strike down the law as facially overbroad. See Phelps, 828 

F. Supp. at 848, 850. For the reasons set forth below, we 

disagree. 

First, we must presume that the Kansas legislature acted with 

knowledge of existing constitutional law as to the permissible 

parameters of criminal defamation when it enacted Kan. Stat. Ann. 

§ 21-4004 (1988). In interpreting this Kansas statute, we afford 

weight to Kansas' rules of statutory construction not only because 

they assist in ascertaining the intended meaning and application 

of the statute, but because they also embody substantive state 

policies under Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) and 

its progeny.23 Kansas' principles of statutory construction 

explain that we must assume that the legislature was aware of and 

understood the relevant Supreme Court case law on defamation 

because: "It is presumed that the legislature, in amending a 

statute, acted with full knowledge and information as to the 

subject matter of the statute, as to prior and existing 

legislation on the subject of the statute, and as to judicial 

decisions with respect to prior and existing law." State v. 

Coley, 694 P.2d 479, 482 (Kan. 1985) (citing Szoboszlay v. 

Glessner, 664 P.2d 1327 (Kan. 1983)). 

At the time the statute was enacted in its present form, the 

Supreme Court had decided both New York Times and Garrison, which 

23 State rules of statutory construction should be applied by 

the federal courts in interpreting a state statute. See Moodie v. 

School Book Fairs. Inc., 889 F.2d 739, 743-44 (7th Cir. 1989) 

(construing a Wisconsin trade regulation statute pursuant to 

Wisconsin's rules of statutory construction so as to determine the 

meaning of the statute in the same manner as would the Wisconsin 

courts) . 

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clearly established that it would be unconstitutional to impose 

defamation liability upon a person for uttering false and 

defamatory statements about a public figure or related to a public 

issue unless the person publishing the defamation did so with 

actual malice--i.e. with knowledge of the falsity of the 

statements or with reckless disregard of their truth or falsity. 

Second, we must honor the practice of the Kansas courts to 

interpret Kansas legislation so as to uphold its constitutionality 

whenever possible. In State v. Thompson, the Kansas Supreme Court 

stressed that: 

it is the court's duty to uphold the statute under 

attack, if possible, rather than to defeat it, and if 

there is any reasonable way to construe the statute as 

constitutionally valid, that should be done. City of 

Baxter Springs v. Bryant, 598 P.2d 1051 (1979). We have 

stated that the fundamental rule of statutory 

construction, to which all others are subordinate, is 

that the purpose and intent of the legislature governs 

when that intent can be ascertained from the statute. 

In determining legislative intent, courts are not 

limited to a mere consideration of the language employed 

but may properly look to the historical background of 

the enactment, the circumstances attending its passage, 

the purposes to be accomplished and the effect the 

statute may have under the various constructions 

suggested. 

701 P.2d 694, 696 (Kan. 1985). The Kansas Supreme Court endeavors 

to avoid invalidating statutes because "[a] statute which is 

facially overbroad may be authoritatively construed and restricted 

to cover only conduct which is not constitutionally protected and, 

as construed, the statute will thereafter be immune from attack on 

grounds of overbreadth." State v. Robinson, 718 P.2d 1313, 1318 

(Kan. 1986) (citing State v. Thompson, 701 P.2d 694 (Kan. 1985)); 

see also State v. Motion Picture Entitled "The Bet", 547 P.2d 760, 

766-67 (Kan. 1976) (interpreting Kansas' obscenity statute in a 

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manner consistent with the Constitution). Thus, Kansas courts 

strive to avoid striking down statutes based on the unintended 

criminalization of protected conduct. 

Given Kansas' principles of statutory construction--searching 

for the intent of the legislature, seeking to uphold the statute 

against an overbreadth challenge, and avoiding an unintended 

criminalization of protected conduct--we do not view the 

challenged statute as criminalizing speech which the legislature 

knew was constitutionally protected, but rather as only intending 

to criminalize unprotected speech. 

Moreover, there is support for the proposition that the 

Kansas courts have long required actual malice before an 

individual may maintain a defamation action on a matter of public 

concern. The Kansas legislature presumably was aware of that case 

law when it enacted the criminal defamation statute. For example, 

in Coleman v. MacLennan, the Kansas Supreme Court, after 

considering the granting of a jury instruction to employ the 

actual malice standard in a civil case, explained that "the rule 

of privilege is the same in both civil and criminal actions." 98 

P. 281 (Kan. 1908). Following this explanation, the court 

articulated that the privilege of commenting on matters of public 

concern requires the standard of actual malice in punishing 

defamation: 

Generally we think a person may in good faith publish 

whatever he may honestly believe to be true, and 

essential to the protection of his own interests or the 

interest of the person or persons to whom he makes the 

publication, without committing any public offense, 

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although what he publishes may in fact not be true, and 

may be injurious to the character of others. 

Id. at 287. 

While Engel concedes that the Kansas courts have applied the 

actual malice standard in civil defamation cases, he views this as 

irrelevant to the interpretation of its criminal counterpart. He 

distinguishes criminal cases from the law of civil defamation 

because the law of civil defamation is judge-made. In this 

regard, Engel cites to State v. Wait, 24 P. 354 (Kan. 1890). It 

is true that Wait seems to hold that a criminal prosecution may be 

maintained against a newspaper for publishing false and defamatory 

statements about a lawyer in connection with a highly-publicized 

trial without regard for the good faith of the publisher. 

However, at another place in that opinion, the court suggests that 

there might be a privilege for good faith publications if the 

defamation involved a public official. Id. at 356. In any event, 

the later case of Coleman v. MacLennan clearly equates the 

doctrine of privileged communications in criminal and civil 

defamation actions. That is, in both criminal and civil 

defamation actions, a publisher enjoys a good faith privilege if 

he or she reasonably believed the published material was truthful. 

We presume that the Kansas legislature would have looked to and 

relied on the subsequent opinion--i.e. Coleman--in enacting the 

criminal defamation statute. Furthermore, while the law of civil 

defamation is judge-made, the interpretation of the ambiguous and 

undefined "malice" requirement of the criminal statute also must 

be interpreted by the judiciary, and it stands to reason that if 

the judiciary had been committed to the actual malice standard in 

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civil cases involving matters of public concern, it certainly 

would apply that standard to criminal cases--i.e. where rule of 

lenity concerns apply. 

Finally, the Kansas Criminal Code provides that criminal 

intent shall be an element in all statutory offenses. See Kan. 

Stat. Ann. § 21-3201 (1988). The district court dismissed this 

argument because it concluded that the conduct being punished was 

the act of publication. Thus, according to the district court, 

the added element of intent only meant that publication had to be 

knowing and intentional, and did not require the publisher to know 

the statements were false. While that is certainly one 

permissible reading of the statute, there is another reading that 

the statute does not punish the mere publication of defamatory 

statements; rather, it punishes only the publication of false 

defamatory statements. Thus, it is the conduct of publishing 

false statements that the defendant must do intentionally. That 

interpretation would require proof that the defendant knew the 

statement was false, and such an interpretation would fully 

comport with New York Times and Garrison. When two 

interpretations are possible, the rule of lenity in a criminal 

case requires the courts to choose the interpretation more 

favorable to the defendant.24 

24 The district court also referred to Fitts v. Kolb, which 

noted that all state courts which have considered constitutional 

challenges to similar criminal defamation laws have invalidated 

them and "left the revisions to the state legislators." 779 

F. Supp. 1502, 1511 & n.42 (D.S.C. 1991). Moreover, the district 

court highlighted that Fitts refused to interpret the criminal 

defamation statute along the lines of South Carolina's civil 

defamation law because that law has been judicially developed 

(continued on next page) 

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Should we refuse to interpret the statute in the same manner 

as would the Kansas courts--i.e. narrowly--we would reach the 

unseemly result that the constitutionality of the statute would be 

determined by whether the challenge was brought in federal or 

state court. As Kansas' criminal defamation statute is 

sufficiently ambiguous, we must follow the approach of the Kansas 

courts and interpret that statute as requiring actual malice in 

criminal defamation cases involving matters of public concern.25 

Therefore, we uphold the statute as facially valid.26 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the district court's 

grant of Engel's motion for summary judgment and hold that Kansas' 

(continued from prior page) 

while its criminal counterpart has been the province of the 

legislature. Id. at 1511-12. However, the district court failed 

to note two essential differences between Fitts and the instant 

case: (1) that, unlike Kansas courts, South Carolina courts have 

been hesitant to interpret statutes liberally to uphold them 

against challenge, see id. at 1511, and (2) that, unlike Kansas, 

South Carolina lacked an interpretation of a prior statute that 

included the actual malice standard for matters of public concern. 

25 Because Phelps and Engel are both public figures engaged in 

debate over a matter of public concern, we need not address 

whether our interpretation of the Kansas statute would apply 

equally to an act of defamation pertaining to non-public issues 

and non-public figures. Although several of the construction 

tools we have applied suggest that this statute would require 

actual malice for all defamations (both public and private) , we 

note that there is no constitutional requirement of actual malice 

for purely private defamations. 

26 We note that this actual malice requirement could be 

satisfied by giving a jury instruction on privilege--that is, 

requiring the jury to find the presence of actual malice--in cases 

involving matters of public concern. 

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criminal defamation statute is facially valid. We REMAND for 

further proceedings as to Phelps to determine whether the district 

court should abstain from considering Phelps' "as-applied" 

challenge to the Kansas criminal defamation statute. That is, 

further proceedings must consider, based on the standards outlined 

herein, whether Phelps can demonstrate that Hamilton commenced the 

prosecutions against him in bad faith or to harass so as to 

warrant an exception to Younger abstention. 

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