Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-01876/USCOURTS-ca8-03-01876-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

---

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-1876

___________

Lois J. Royer, as personal *

representative of the estate of *

Kenneth Royer, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellant, *

*

v. * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the

City of Oak Grove; David Frasher; * Western District of Missouri.

Shirley Helen Johnson; James Bradley *

Alexander; Roger Michael Johnston, *

*

Defendants - Appellees. *

*

Frank B.W. McCollum, *

*

Defendant. *

___________

Submitted: February 9, 2004

 Filed: July 9, 2004

___________

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, BOWMAN and WOLLMAN, Circuit Judges.

___________

BOWMAN, Circuit Judge.

Appellate Case: 03-1876 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/09/2004 Entry ID: 1786235 
1

Kenneth Royer died after this suit was filed and his wife, Lois J. Royer, as the

representative of his estate, has been substituted as the plaintiff.

2

The Honorable Fernando J. Gaitan, Jr., United States District Judge for the

Western District of Missouri.

-2-

This case concerns a lawsuit filed by Kenneth Royer1

 against the City of Oak

Grove, Missouri (City), three current or former aldermen, the former City

Administrator, the former mayor, and a private attorney retained by the City. Royer's

suit follows in the wake of several suits filed against Royer (by the City and/or nonprofit foundations he formerly headed) and a separate suit filed against Royer by the

City after Adrianna Hall, a City employee, accused him of sexual harassment. Royer

brought this suit alleging that the City's suit against him, its conduct following the

allegations of sexual harassment, and its limited ban on his presence in a city building

violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) by interfering with his First Amendment freedom

of association rights, his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, and his free

access to the courts. Royer also alleged various state-law violations. Originally filed

in state court, the defendants removed the action to federal court and eventually

moved for summary judgment. The District Court2

 granted summary judgment to all

the defendants on the § 1983 claims and remanded Royer's state-law claims to the

state court from which they had been removed. We affirm. 

Kenneth Royer was the president of three related not-for-profit organizations

located in Oak Grove, Missouri. The first of these organizations, the Oak Grove

Development Foundation, Inc. (OGDF), is a non-profit corporation established for

the City's benefit in the early 1980's to serve as a vehicle for financing new public

buildings, including the Davis Memorial Center. Oak Grove Senior Citizens, Inc.

(OGSC), is a non-profit corporation that provides services for senior citizens in Oak

Grove, including a daily lunch service at the Davis Memorial Center. Finally, Davis

Memorial Center, Inc. (DMCI), operated the Davis Memorial Center where Adrianna

Hall worked in the meals program run by OGSC. The relationship between these

Appellate Case: 03-1876 Page: 2 Date Filed: 07/09/2004 Entry ID: 1786235 
-3-

foundations and the City deteriorated and eventually gave rise to several of the suits

already mentioned. In response to a petition and pursuant to state law, the State

Auditor of Missouri, Claire McCaskill, performed an audit of the City and at least one

of the not-for-profit organizations, OGDF. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 29.230 (2000); State

Auditor of Missouri, Audit Report of City of Oak Grove, Missouri (Feb. 28, 2002).

The Auditor's report reveals several things germane to this suit. As with other

buildings that OGDF financed, the foundation retained ownership of the Davis

Memorial Center, and it entered into a lease agreement with the City that gave the

City exclusive control over the building. The report also noted that OGDF entered

into a second lease agreement that also gave DMCI exclusive control over the newlybuilt Center. Audit Report at 9. In addition, the report explains that DMCI has

existing long-term leases with at least one other entity that permit that entity to use

a portion of the building. Id. During the summer of 1999, the City took preliminary

steps to investigate the conduct of these three non-profit entities and to (re)assert

control over them and to ensure their proper functioning. Shortly thereafter, Adrianna

Hall, who worked at the Davis Memorial Center in the lunch program run by OGSC,

accused Royer of sexually harassing her. Hall draws her salary and benefits from the

City, but her salary is at least partly reimbursed by the foundations, which may have

some authority over her working conditions.

In reponse to Hall's charges, the City ordered Royer to stay away from Hall,

and later banned him from the Davis Memorial Center during her working hours. The

City also asked Frank McCollum, an attorney who was also handling the City's

investigation of the foundations, to advise them on Hall's claim. Over the course of

the next month, the City investigated Hall's claim and determined that it had merit.

Thereafter, the City felt compelled to sue Royer and sought an injunction that would

prevent him from entering the building on a permanent basis. This state-court suit

was dismissed because it had not been properly authorized by the City's board of

aldermen. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 79.130. The present federal lawsuit, brought by

Royer, followed.

Appellate Case: 03-1876 Page: 3 Date Filed: 07/09/2004 Entry ID: 1786235 
3

With unnecessary hyperbole, Royer urges that the District Court erred when

it granted summary judgment because there were material facts still in dispute. We

agree that there are many still-unresolved facts in this case, but these facts are not

material. Royer also claims that the District Court erred when it sua sponte granted

summary judgment to the defendants. Our review of the record does not support this

claim.

-4-

When we consider a district court's grant of summary judgment, we review any

findings of fact for clear error and conclusions of law de novo. Gen. Trading Int'l,

Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 320 F.3d 831, 835 (8th Cir. 2003).3 Royer's two main

issues on appeal, the freedom of association and due process claims, are considered

in turn.

Royer contends that the District Court erred when it granted summary judgment

to the City on his freedom of association claim. The Supreme Court has explained

that analysis of a freedom of association claim involves a two-part inquiry. First, if

the plaintiff has identified an associational right that is impacted by the state action,

the Court inquires whether the burden on that right is "significant." Boy Scouts of

Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 656 (2000) (finding "that the forced inclusion of Dale

would significantly affect" the Boy Scouts' expressive association); see also Roberts

v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 626 (1984) ("Indeed, the Jaycees has failed

to demonstrate that the Act imposes any serious burdens on the male members'

freedom of expressive association."); Carter v. Nixon, 72 F.3d 633, 636 (8th Cir.

1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996). If the burden is found to be a significant

burden on associational rights, the court must then consider whether a compelling

state interest justifies the governmental practice. Dale, 530 U.S. at 648 (noting that

the governmental entity must have a "'compelling state interest[], unrelated to the

suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means significantly less

restrictive of associational freedoms,'" quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623). Ultimately,

we must balance these competing interests, and the Court has explained that "the

associational interest in freedom of expression has been set on one side of the scale,

Appellate Case: 03-1876 Page: 4 Date Filed: 07/09/2004 Entry ID: 1786235 
-5-

and the State's interest on the other." Id. at 658–59. With this standard in mind, we

turn to Royer's claim. 

We must first identify the associational right that has allegedly been burdened

by the City's action, for only if an associational right exists will we ask whether the

government practice imposes a significant burden. The Supreme Court has

consistently recognized two types of protected associational rights: the right "to enter

into and maintain certain intimate human relationships" and the "right to associate for

the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First

Amendment—speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the

exercise of religion." Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617–18. Royer's allegations clearly fall

into the latter category. Specifically, Royer urges that his First Amendment freedom

of association rights have been burdened because the City's partial ban on his

presence at the Davis Memorial Center limited his ability to carry out his duties as

head of several local non-profit organizations and also limited his ability to meet with

other citizens and foundation members to discuss politics and to discuss the City's

investigation of the foundations. We assume, without deciding, that Royer has

sufficiently alleged the existence of protected associational rights. We must now ask

whether these rights have been significantly burdened. 

We think it self-evident that Royer's rights have not been significantly

burdened. In this case, the extent of the burden on Royer's associational rights is that

the City issued a narrowly drawn order that prohibited him from entering a public

building while the individual he was alleged to have harassed was present. In no

other way has the City taken steps to prevent Royer from associating with (or not

associating with) whomever he wants, wherever he wants, whenever he wants. This

case then is unlike those cases in which a state actor has imposed substantial burdens

on an individual's or a group's associational rights by, for example, compelling

individuals to associate with one another, Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and

Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995), or taking actions that would severely

Appellate Case: 03-1876 Page: 5 Date Filed: 07/09/2004 Entry ID: 1786235 
4

With respect to the freedom of association and due process claims, it might be

a different matter if the state actor banned individuals from meeting at a certain

location in which they had a leasehold (or other property) interest, but this is not the

claim that Royer has made.

5

If we were to consider whether the City of Oak Grove had a compelling state

interest in this limited ban, we would note that under applicable federal law, an

employer must take a sexual harassment complaint seriously for if it fails to act

appropriately, it may face liability even where the harasser was a customer or

unrelated third party. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(e) (2003) ("An employer may also be

responsible for the acts of non-employees . . . where the employer (or its agents or

supervisory employees) knows or should have known of the conduct and fails to take

immediate and appropriate corrective action."); cf. Murray v. New York Univ. Coll.

of Dentistry, 57 F.3d 243, 250 (2d Cir. 1995).

-6-

chill a group's activities, NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).4

 Having found

no significant burden on Royer's First Amendment associational rights, we have no

occasion to consider whether the City has advanced a "compelling state interest" in

the ban it instituted.5

 Accordingly, the District Court did not err when it granted

summary judgment to the defendants on this issue.

Royer also argues that the District Court erred when it granted summary

judgment to the City on his due process claim. Specifically, he claims the decision

of the District Court is internally inconsistent because on the one hand, it recognized

that the ban impacted Royer's associational rights to some degree and, on the other

hand, concluded that the City's actions complied with due process. We see no

inconsistency and affirm. 

To implicate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Royer

must show that he has a property or liberty interest that has been affected by the

government action. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972); City of

Pierre v. FAA, 150 F.3d 837, 842 (8th Cir. 1998). Like the District Court, we agree

that Royer can point to no property interest in having unlimited access to a public

Appellate Case: 03-1876 Page: 6 Date Filed: 07/09/2004 Entry ID: 1786235 
-7-

building. Consequently, the only constitutionally protected interest in play is Royer's

right to freedom of association. See Thompson v. Ashe, 250 F.3d 399, 407–408 (6th

Cir. 2001) (concluding that, as to individual banned from visiting public-housing

campus, "[a]t best . . . [plaintiff's] claim that he has been denied procedural due

process hinges on his interest in associating with his family and friends . . . which, as

we have already seen, is not a fundamental liberty interest"). As we have already

noted, Royer's associational rights were not significantly affected; rather, the impact

on his rights was minimal at best. Consequently, we cannot say that any due process

protection was required. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1975) (setting

forth three-part test and noting "due process is flexible and calls for such procedural

protection as the particular situation demands." Id. at 334 (quoting Morrisey v.

Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)); Thompson, 250 F.3d at 408. Moreover, even if

we were to find that Royer was entitled to some procedural due process before the

City instituted its limited ban, we would affirm the District Court's grant of summary

judgment on this claim because the record presented to us reveals that the basic

requirements of the Due Process Clause ("notice and opportunity for hearing

appropriate to the nature of the case") were fulfilled in this case. See Mullane v.

Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 333 (1949). 

Here, the allegation of sexual harassment was made by Hall on September 3,

1999, and an investigation was launched. Hall was then interviewed by phone by the

City's attorney on or about September 8. The City notified Royer and OGSC of the

investigation on September 10 and, in the same letter, asked Royer "to not be in Ms.

Hall's presence while she is at the Center." Hall was interviewed again on

September 13 by the City's attorney and the City Administrator. Roy Meier (who

served as city collector and as a board member of OGSC and OGDF) was also present

for at least part of this meeting and was assigned to investigate the matter further.

The next day, Meier met with Royer and the board of OGSC to discuss this and other

matters. On September 24, Royer and the board of OGSC met with the City

Administrator and the board asked that Hall be transferred, a request they put in

Appellate Case: 03-1876 Page: 7 Date Filed: 07/09/2004 Entry ID: 1786235 
6

We pause here to note that counsel for the appellant goes "far beyond the pale

of reasonable advocacy," Davidson & Schaaff, Inc. v. Liberty National Fire Insurance

Co., 69 F.3d 868, 872 (8th Cir. 1995), when it urges that the District Court's order

"castrates" Royer's due process rights. Appellant's Br. at 23. Nor does counsel

uphold the highest standards of advocacy when it characterizes the District Court's

order as being excessively bold or even rash. Id. ("the District Court has the temerity

to rule . . ."). As we have made clear, the District Court's order was correct on the

merits and is in no way an adventuresome departure from established law.

-8-

writing the next day. During this meeting, Royer did not contest the allegations but

did explain that he felt Hall's performance was deficient because "she's bull-headed."

Depo. of Kenneth Royer at 72 (March 21, 2001). The City determined that Ms. Hall's

complaint had merit during the Board of Alderman's October 4 meeting and filed suit

against Royer on October 18. Simply put, Royer had notice of the allegations, met

with the City Administrator once and met with the person assigned to investigate the

charges (Meier) twice. Royer was afforded ample time and opportunity to contest the

charges and chose not to. Cf. Gentry v. City of Lee's Summit, 10 F.3d 1340, 1345

(8th Cir. 1993) (noting that, where City sought to invoke right to retake possession

of leasehold interest, pre-deprivation exchange of letters might fulfill due process

requirement). The District Court did not err when it granted summary judgment on

this claim.6

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the District Court granting summary

judgment to the defendants is affirmed.

______________________________

Appellate Case: 03-1876 Page: 8 Date Filed: 07/09/2004 Entry ID: 1786235