Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-01061/USCOURTS-casd-3_05-cv-01061-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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 Rick La Mora was named as a defendant in this suit but has been dismissed due

to Plaintiffs’ failure to serve him with the Summons and Complaint.

1 05cv1061 BTM(NLS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KATHY EPPEL and JARLATH EPPEL,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 05cv1061 BTM(NLS)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

vs.

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, DEPUTY

TIMOTHY MATZKIW, RICK LA MORA,

AND DOES 1-10,

Defendants.

Defendants County of San Diego and Timothy Matzkiw have filed a motion for

summary judgment. For the reasons discussed below, Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment is GRANTED.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Rick La Mora1 and Plaintiffs Kathy and Jarlath Eppel are neighbors in Vista, California.

La Mora has an ingress/egress easement over a road on Plaintiffs’ private property.

According to Plaintiffs, La Mora installed a post with a keypad, which controlled a gate to La

Mora’s property, twenty feet into the easement on Plaintiffs’ land. (Jarlath Eppel Decl., Def.’s

Exh. 2.) Plaintiffs declare that they never gave La Mora permission to install the

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keypad/post, which was not necessary to ingress/egress because La Mora used a remote

control to operate the gate. (Id.) Plaintiffs asked La Mora on a number of occasions to

relocate the keypad/post to his property, but he never did. (Def.’s Exh. 1.)

In 2003, Mrs. Eppel became more insistent about La Mora removing the keypad/post

because the Eppels planned to make some renovations to their property and wanted to make

sure that there were no obstacles in the way of contractors. (Def.’s Exh. 1.) According to

Plaintiffs, La Mora initially agreed to remove the keypad/post. (Id.) However, La Mora

became reluctant to remove the keypad/post due to the expense involved and told the

Eppels on several occasions that they could remove the keypad/post themselves and just

throw it away since it did not work anyway. (Id.) 

Mrs. Eppel consulted several attorneys who advised her that she could lawfully

remove the keypad/post since it was erected on their property without their permission.

(Kathy Eppel Decl.) Mrs. Eppel also called automatic gate companies to learn how to

remove the keypad/post without causing damage to the pavement or the keypad. (Id.) On

April 4, 2004, Mr. Eppel removed the keypad/post as instructed by the automatic gate

companies and placed it at La Mora’s property line. (Def.’s Exh. 2.)

That evening, Karen La Mora arrived home and noticed that the gate was wide open

and that the keypad/post was missing. (Def.’s Exh. 4.) Concerned that there might be a

burglary in progress, Karen La Mora called 911. (Id.) Sheriff’s deputies arrived in response

to the call. 

According to the crime/incident report prepared by Deputy Matzkiw, Mrs. Eppel told

him that she had cut the metal post with a reciprocating saw earlier that day. (Def.’s Exh. 4.)

She said that an attorney told her that she could remove the keypad/post because it was on

her easement and that La Mora had given her permission to take the keypad/post down.

Deputy Matzkiw then spoke with La Mora, who denied ever giving permission for the removal

of the keypad/post. La Mora said that he had spoken with Jarlath Eppel three days ago and

told him that the keypad/post could not be removed because the Vista Fire Department had

informed La Mora that they needed access to his residence via the gate transmitter. La Mora

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estimated the damage to the transmitter to be about $1,000 and insisted that Mrs. Eppel be

prosecuted.

Mrs. Eppel has a different version of the events that night. According to Mrs. Eppel,

during her initial conversation with Matzkiw, she explained that the keypad/post had been

placed on the Eppels’ property without their permission. (Def.’s Exh. 1.) Later, when

Matzkiw returned from the La Mora residence to tell her that the La Moras were demanding

her arrest, Matzkiw asked Mrs. Eppel if she had any papers to prove the keypad was on the

Eppels’ property. Mrs. Eppel tried to show Matzkiw several documents showing the Eppels’

property boundaries and their obligations regarding the easement. However, Matzkiw would

not look at the papers and continued to refer to the Eppels’ private road as a “public road.”

The La Moras continued to insist that Mrs. Eppel be arrested. When Mr. Eppel

learned that Mrs. Eppel was going to be arrested, he told Matzkiw for the first time that he,

not she, was the one who had cut the post and removed the keypad. (Def.’s Exh. 2.)

Matzkiw responded that Mrs. Eppel had already admitted to cutting the post down and that

she was the one going to jail. (Id.)

Matzkiw arrested Kathy Eppel, who was booked, released, and subsequently charged

with felony vandalism (Cal. Penal Code § 594(a)(b)(1)). Several months later, Mr. Eppel was

charged with misdemeanor vandalism, and an amended complaint was filed against Mrs.

Eppel, adding an additional charge for delaying or obstructing Matzkiw’s investigation.

(Def.’s Exhs. 6, 9.) Mr. Eppel was never arrested. Instead, he entered his appearance via

a fax arraignment. (Def.’s Exh. 7.)

The criminal cases against Mr. and Mrs. Eppel were consolidated and then were

ultimately dismissed in exchange for an agreement by the Eppels to pay restitution to Mr. La

Mora for the damaged keypad/post and a stipulation that Matzkiw had probable cause to

arrest Mrs. Eppel. (Def.’s Exhs. 10-11.) Subsequently, the Eppels brought a motion for a

finding of factual innocence pursuant to Cal. Penal Code § 851.8(c), which was granted. 

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II. STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure if the moving party demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact

and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322

(1986). A fact is material when, under the governing substantive law, it could affect the

outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Freeman

v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 735 (9th Cir. 1997). A dispute is genuine if a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

A party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial burden of establishing the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The moving party can

satisfy this burden in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence that negates an essential element

of the nonmoving party’s case; or (2) by demonstrating that the nonmoving party failed to

establish an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case on which the nonmoving party

bears the burden of proving at trial. Id. at 322-23. "Disputes over irrelevant or unnecessary

facts will not preclude a grant of summary judgment." T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec.

Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987).

Once the moving party establishes the absence of genuine issues of material fact, the

burden shifts to the nonmoving party to set forth facts showing that a genuine issue of

disputed fact remains. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 314. The nonmoving party cannot oppose a

properly supported summary judgment motion by “rest[ing] on mere allegations or denials

of his pleadings.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. When ruling on a summary judgment motion,

the court must view all inferences drawn from the underlying facts in the light most favorable

to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

587 (1986).

III. DISCUSSION

A. False Arrest

Matzkiw moves for summary judgment against Plaintiffs on the following causes of

action: false arrest under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, false arrest under California law, negligence,

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2

 A release-dismissal agreement whereby a criminal defendant releases his right to

file a civil rights action in exchange for the dismissal of criminal charges is enforceable if the

agreement was voluntary, there is no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct, and enforcement

of the agreement would not adversely affect the relevant public interests. Town of Newton

v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 398 (1987). Plaintiffs have presented evidence that the stipulation

to probable cause was not voluntary and is therefore unenforceable. Accordingly, at this

point in time, the stipulation does not compel a finding that Matzkiw had probable cause to

arrest Mrs. Eppel. The Court need not reach the issue of whether the stipulation may be

considered as an admission under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2).

5 05cv1061 BTM(NLS)

and violation of Cal. Civil Code § 52.1. Matzkiw contends that he is entitled to summary

judgment on these claims because he did not arrest Mr. Eppel and had probable cause to

arrest Mrs. Eppel. 

Plaintiffs do not dispute that Mr. Eppel was never arrested. Therefore, the Court

grants summary judgment in favor of Matzkiw on Mr. Eppel’s § 1983 claim for false arrest,

state claim for false arrest, negligence claim, and claim for violation of Cal. Civil Code § 52.1,

all of which are premised on false arrest. 

The Court also grants summary judgment on Mrs. Eppel’s claims because the

evidence establishes that Matzkiw had probable cause to arrest Mrs. Eppel. In reaching this

decision, the Court does not rely on the stipulation to probable cause.2

Probable cause exists when “the facts and circumstances within [the officers’]

knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to

warrant a prudent man in believing that the [plaintiff] had committed or was committing an

offense.” Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). The defendant officers need only show that

“under the totality of the circumstances known to the arresting officers, a prudent person

would have concluded that there was a fair probability that [the defendant] had committed

a crime.” United States v. Garza, 980 F.2d 546, 550 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting United States

v. Potter, 895 F.2d 1231, 1233-34 (9th Cir. 1990)). 

A person is guilty of vandalism under Cal. Penal Code § 594, if the person maliciously

damages any personal property not his or her own. Matzkiw clearly had probable cause for

believing that Mrs. Eppel had cut down the keypad/post. Matzkiw also had probable cause

to conclude that the keypad/post was the personal property of La Mora and that Mrs. Eppel

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did not have the right to damage such property. 

California, like the majority of American states, does not recognize the ancient

common law privilege to use reasonably necessary force to regain possession of land that

one is entitled to possess. Daluiso v. Boone, 71 Cal. 2d 484 (1969). California’s forcible

entry and detainer statutes are intended “to secure a judicial adjustment of differences

[concerning the right to possession of property] and thus prevent the parties themselves from

redressing or attempting to redress their own wrongs which is likely to lead to serious wrongs

against the public or society.” Id. at 495 (quoting San Francisco & Suburban etc. Soc. v.

Leonard, 17 Cal. App. 254, 262 (1911)). 

In a similar vein, California law does not allow a landowner to resort to self-help when

a good-faith improver affixes something on his land. In general, “[w]hen a person affixes his

property to the land of another, without an agreement permitting him to remove it, the thing

affixed, except as otherwise provided in this chapter, belongs to the owner of the land . . . .”

Cal. Civil Code § 1013. However, under Cal. Civil Code § 1013.5, “[w]hen any person, acting

in good faith and erroneously believing because of a mistake either of law or fact that he has

a right to do so, affixes improvements to the land of another, such person . . . shall have the

right to remove such improvements upon payment . . . to the owner of the land . . . of all their

damages proximately resulting from the affixing and removal of such improvements.”

Based on the facts known to Matzkiw, Matzkiw had good reason to believe that even

if the keypad/post was on the Eppels’ property, La Mora was a good faith improver and

continued to own the keypad/post. La Mora had an easement over the Eppels’ property and

could have believed that the easement gave him the right to install the keypad/post.

Moreover, the keypad/post had been on the land for several years before Mr. Eppel removed

it.

If La Mora was a good faith improver, the Eppels were not legally entitled to damage

the keypad/post, despite the advice of the lawyer Mrs. Eppel consulted. Mr. and Mrs. Eppel

told Matzkiw that La Mora had actually given them permission to take down the keypad/post.

However, La Mora denied giving the Eppels permission. Given how angry La Mora was

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about the damage to the keypad/post, it would have been reasonable for Matzkiw to believe

La Mora over the Eppels.

 Under the totality of the circumstances known to Matzkiw, a prudent person would

have concluded that there was a fair probability that Mrs. Eppel had intentionally damaged

personal property belonging to La Mora. Therefore, probable cause existed, and Matzkiw

is entitled to summary judgment.

Even if there were a triable issue as to the existence of probable cause, Matzkiw is

entitled to qualified immunity. In determining whether qualified immunity applies, the Court

must first consider the threshold question: “Taken in the light most favorable to the party

asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional

right?” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). If a constitutional violation is shown, the

next step is to ask whether the right was “clearly established.” Id. at 201-02. This inquiry

must be “undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general

proposition” — i.e., it is not sufficient to make the general argument that it is clearly

established that arresting someone without probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment.

Id. The proper inquiry to be made in determining whether a right is clearly established is

“whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the

situation he confronted.” Id. at 2156. “This is not to say that an official action is protected

by qualified immunity unless the very action in question has previously been held unlawful,

but it is to say that in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent.” Hope

v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 540

(1987) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). 

It would not have been clear to a reasonable officer in Matzkiw’s position that it would

be unlawful to arrest Mrs. Eppel. Indeed in a California Superior Court case with facts very

similar to the facts of our case, the court held that the Monterey County District Attorney had

the lawful privilege to arrest the plaintiff for cutting a barbed wire fence erected by his

neighbor on plaintiff’s property even though surveys conducted by the county surveyor’s

office confirmed that the fence was well into plaintiff’s property: “Given the fact that forcible

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3

 The Court notes that this is the second case before the Court in a short period of

time where officers with the Sheriff’s Department have become involved in a dispute between

neighbors over ingress/egress issues, have arrested one neighbor and not the other, and

have been sued after the neighbor who was arrested was found to be innocent of the

charges brought against him/her. See Grassilli v. Rodriguez, Case No. 06cv0047

BTM(BLM).

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entry is unlawful, and that Holmes could have removed his barbed wire, we conclude that the

barbed wire belonged to Holmes. Since Van admitted he damaged the wire, the Monterey

County District Attorney had the lawful privilege to ‘arrest’ Van.” Van v. County of Monterey,

2006 WL 1174355, *8 (Cal. App. 6 Dist. May 4, 2006). 

The Court’s finding that Matzkiw had probable cause to arrest Mrs. Eppel is not a

finding that Matzkiw’s actions were appropriate. Due to the lack of urgent circumstances and

questions regarding ownership of the land and the respective rights and obligations of the

parties, it would have made more sense for Matzkiw to forgo arresting Mrs. Eppel on the spot

and to turn the matter over to the District Attorney’s Office. However, whether Matzkiw

should have arrested Mrs. Eppel under the specific facts of this case is not the standard to

be applied in determining whether Matzkiw violated the Fourth Amendment.3

As explained, by the Supreme Court, “the standard of probable cause ‘applie[s] to all

arrests, without the need to balance the interests and circumstances involved in particular

situations.’” Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001) (quoting Dunaway v.

New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 (1979)). In other words, if probable cause exists, there is no

false arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment, even if the officer’s actions were ill-advised

or even reprehensible:

If we were to derive a rule exclusively to address the uncontested facts of this

case, Atwater might well prevail. . . . In her case, the physical incidents of

arrest were merely gratuitous humiliations imposed by a police officer who was

(at best) exercising extremely poor judgment. Atwater’s claim to live free of

pointless indignity and confinement clearly outweighs anything the City can

raise against it specific to her case. But we have traditionally recognized that

a responsible Fourth Amendment balance is not well served by standards

requiring sensitive, case-by-case determinations of government need, lest

every discretionary judgment in the field be converted into an occasion for

constitutional review.

Id. at 346-47.

Because Matzkiw had probable cause to arrest Mrs. Eppel, Mrs. Eppel cannot prevail

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on her claims premised on false arrest and violation of the Fourth Amendment. Therefore,

the Court GRANTS Matzkiw’s motion for summary judgment as to Mrs. Eppel’s § 1983 false

arrest claim, state false arrest claim, negligence claim, and claim for violation of California

Civil Code § 52.1.

B. Monell Claim 

The Court grants summary judgment on Mr. and Mrs. Eppel’s Monell claims because

they have not raised a triable issue as to the existence of an underlying constitutional

violation. The Court also grants summary judgment on this claim because Plaintiffs have not

presented any evidence that the County had a policy or custom of condoning or tolerating

unlawful arrests or that the County inadequately trained its officers.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment. The Clerk shall enter final judgment in favor of Defendants and against

Plaintiffs on all claims.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 5, 2007

Hon. Barry Ted Moskowitz

United States District Judge

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