Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01441/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01441-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ED ONTIVEROS,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-07-1441 JAM DAD P

vs.

R.J. SUBIA, Warden, 

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, has filed a petition for writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging the July 28, 2004 decision by the Board of

Parole Hearings (hereinafter “Board”) to deny him parole. On March 3, 2008, the undersigned

ordered respondent to file and serve a response to petitioner’s petition. On April 2, 2008,

respondent filed the pending motion to dismiss. Petitioner has filed an opposition to the motion 

and respondent has filed a reply. Petitioner has also filed an unauthorized response to

respondent’s reply. E.D. Cal. Local Rule 78-230(m).

BACKGROUND

In 1984, petitioner was convicted in the Alameda County Superior Court of first

degree murder and sentenced to twenty-five years to life in state prison. (Pet. at 2.) Petitioner’s

minimum eligible parole date was October 20, 2001. (Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. 3.) On July

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28, 2004, petitioner appeared before the Board which found him unsuitable for parole and issued

a two-year denial. (Id.) The Board’s decision became final on November 25, 2004. (Id.) 

On October 21, 2005, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

Amador County Superior Court challenging the Board’s decision. (Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss, Ex.

1.) Shortly thereafter, the Superior Court transferred the case to the Alameda County Superior

Court, where petitioner was convicted and sentenced. (Id.) On December 8, 2005, the Alameda

County Superior Court denied the petition finding that it failed to state a prima facie case for

relief. The court explained that petitioner failed to provide sufficient information for the court to

review his claims. (Id.) On or about January 2, 2006, petitioner filed an amended petition in the

same court. On January 6, 2006, the court denied the petition, again, finding that it failed to

include sufficient information to state a prima facie case for relief. (Id.) 

On January 16, 2006, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

California Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District. (Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. 2.) 

On February 9, 2006, the Court of Appeal denied the petition, explaining that petitioner was

required to provide the court with a copy of the transcript of the Board hearing. (Id.) 

Subsequently, petitioner submitted a transcript of the hearing to the court. (Id.) On July 31,

2006, the Court of Appeal summarily denied the petition. (Pet. Attach.) 

On July 16, 2006, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

California Supreme Court. (Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. 4.) On February 7, 2007, the

California Supreme Court summarily denied that petition. (Id.) 

On July 7, 2007, petitioner filed his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus in

this court. Therein, he contends that the Board’s decision denying him parole violates his due

process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. (Pet. at 5-6.) 

RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

Respondent argues that petitioner’s habeas petition is time-barred and contains

unexhausted claims. (Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss at 1.) First, respondent argues that when a

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petitioner challenges an administrative decision, such as a decision denying parole, the AEDPA

one-year limitations period begins to run when “the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1)(D). Respondent contends that the statute of limitations began to run in this case on

November 26, 2004, the day after the Board’s decision denying petitioner parole became final. 

(Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss at 3.)

Respondent acknowledges that “[t]he time during which a properly filed

application for state post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted” toward the AEDPA statute of limitations. 

(Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss at 3.) However, respondent contends that petitioner waited until

October 21, 2005, 327 days after the Board’s final decision, to file his first habeas petition in the

Superior Court. Respondent concedes that the limitations period was then tolled until the

California Supreme Court denied petitioner habeas relief on February 7, 2007. (Id. at 3-4.) 

Respondent argues that petitioner did not file his federal petition until July 7, 2007, 149 days

after the California Supreme Court’s denial. According to respondent’s calculation, a total of

476 days lapsed before petitioner filed his federal petition, rendering that petition untimely. (Id.

at 4.)

Respondent also argues that petitioner has presented unexhausted claims to this

court. (Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss at 4.) In his federal petition, petitioner raises the following four

grounds for relief: (1) the Board failed to prepare a new psychological evaluation report before

the 2004 hearing; (2) the Board was biased; (3) the Board’s decision was not supported by some

evidence; and (4) the Board impermissibly altered its regulations. (Id.) Respondent argues that,

in petitioner’s petition to the California Supreme Court, he argued only that the Court of Appeal

had not responded to his petition and raised no other grounds for relief. (Id. at 5.) Accordingly,

respondent concludes that petitioner failed to exhaust his state court remedies. 

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PETITIONER’S OPPOSITION

In opposition, petitioner argues that he has had limited access to the law library

due to prison lockdowns and did not have assistance in preparing his petition. He also argues

that respondent’s calculation of the statute of limitations does not account for the delay in

petitioner actually receiving the transcript of the Board’s hearing. (Pet’r’s Opp’n to Resp’t’s

Mot. to Dismiss at 2.) Petitioner concludes that the court should deny respondent’s motion to

dismiss and reach the merits of his petition.

RESPONDENT’S REPLY

In reply, respondent argues that a prisoner’s pro se status or lack of assistance

from counsel or fellow inmates is not grounds for tolling the AEDPA statute of limitations. 

(Resp’t’s Reply at 1.) In addition, respondent argues that a lockdown does not justify a late filing

unless petitioner can show that the lockdown was unrelated to a legitimate penological interest. 

(Id.) Here, respondent argues that petitioner has only stated in conclusory fashion that

lockdowns caused him to file his petition late. (Id.) Finally, respondent notes that petitioner

received a copy of his parole hearing transcript well before the statute of limitations began to run. 

(Resp’t’s Reply, Ex. A.) Respondent has attached to his reply a copy of a general chrono signed

by petitioner and dated August 30, 2004, stating “The above list inmate acknowledges the receipt

of final transcripts from his recent parole consideration hearing.” (Id.) 

ANALYSIS

I. The AEDPA Statute of Limitations

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted AEDPA which amended 28 U.S.C. § 2244

by adding the following provision:

 (d) (1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application

for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the

latest of – 

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(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for

seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an

application created by State action in violation of the Constitution

or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was

prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been

newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or

claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise

of due diligence.

 (2) The time during which a properly filed application for State

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the

pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward

any period of limitation under this subsection.

The one-year AEDPA statute of limitation applies to all federal habeas corpus petitions filed

after the statute was enacted and therefore applies to the pending petition. See Lindh v. Murphy,

521 U.S. 320, 322-23 (1997). 

II. Application of § 2244(d)(1)(D)

The Ninth Circuit has determined that the one-year period of limitation set forth in

28 U.S.C. § 2244 “applies to all habeas petitions filed by persons in ‘custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court,’ even if the petition challenges an administrative decision rather than a

state court judgment.” Shelby v. Bartlett, 391 F.3d 1061, 1062 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).

See also Redd, 343 F.3d at 1080-83 (9th Cir. 2003) (assuming without deciding that the AEDPA

statute of limitations applies to collateral attacks on Parole Board decisions). When a habeas

petitioner challenges an administrative decision, § 2244(d)(1)(D) governs the date on which the

limitation period begins to run. Shelby, 391 F.3d at 1066; Redd, 343 F.3d at 1081-83. Under 

§ 2244(d)(1)(D), the limitation period begins to run on “the date on which the factual predicate of

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 Only the Fifth Circuit has held that the limitations period begins to run “when the initial 1

administrative decision is made, before any administrative appeals.” Redd, 343 F.3d at 1084 n.11

(citing Kimbrell, 311 F.3d at 363-64).

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the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.”

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D).

In Redd, a California state prisoner challenged the parole board’s determination

that he was unsuitable for parole. The district court dismissed the prisoner’s federal habeas

petition as untimely on the ground “that ‘the factual predicate’ of Redd’s claims was the Board’s

denial of Redd’s administrative appeal on December 7, 1998, and that the limitations period

began to run on the following day.” Redd, 343 F.3d at 1080. The Ninth Circuit affirmed,

explaining that the date of the factual predicate was to be determined “by inquiring when Redd

could have learned of the factual basis for his claim through the exercise of due diligence.”

Redd, 343 F.3d at 1082. The Ninth Circuit concluded:

We agree with the district court that the factual basis of Redd’s

habeas claims was the Board’s denial of his administrative appeal

on December 7, 1998. Redd does not dispute that he received

notice of the Board’s decision on December 7. The limitations

period therefore began to run the following day.

Id.

The Ninth Circuit also noted in Redd that four other federal courts of appeals had

held that 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D) applies to habeas petitions challenging the decisions of

administrative bodies such as parole and disciplinary boards. Id. at 1082 n.8 (citing Wade v.

Robinson, 327 F.3d 328, 332 (4th Cir. 2003); Cook v. New York State Div. of Parole, 321 F.3d

274, 280 (2d Cir. 2003); Burger v. Scott, 317 F.3d 1133, 1138 (10th Cir. 2003); Kimbrell v.

Cockrell, 311 F.3d 361, 364 (5th Cir. 2002)). The Ninth Circuit observed that three of those four

courts had decided that the AEDPA statute of limitations begins running in such cases on the

date the administrative decision becomes final. Id. at 1084 (citing Wade, Cook, and Burger).

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Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit decided what it had assumed in Redd: 

§ 2244’s one-year limitation period applies to all habeas petitions

filed by persons in ‘custody pursuant to the judgment of a State

court,’ even if the petition challenges a pertinent administrative

decision rather than a state court judgment. 

Shelby, 391 F.3d at 1062-63 (citation omitted). In Shelby the Ninth Circuit again cited the

decisions in Cook, Wade, and Kimbrell, finding them consistent with the language of AEDPA,

rules of statutory construction, and purposes of the AEDPA. Id. at 1063. The court considered

and rejected the Seventh Circuit’s rule that the limitation period does not apply to petitions

contesting administrative decisions. Id. at 1063-65 (discussing Cox v. McBride, 279 F.3d 492,

493-94 (7th Cir. 2002)). The Ninth Circuit then affirmed the dismissal of Shelby’s habeas

petition as untimely because he had challenged a prison disciplinary decision that resulted in loss

of good time credits but failed to file his federal petition within a year after his administrative

appeal was denied. Id. at 1062. 

In Shelby, it was undisputed that the petitioner’s disciplinary decision became

final on July 12, 2001, and the district court therefore concluded that the petitioner had until July

12, 2002, to file his federal habeas petition. Id. at 1065-66. On appeal, the petitioner argued that,

if the one-year statute of limitations applied, his case should be remanded for a finding as to the

date he discovered or could have discovered the agency’s final action. Id. 1066. However, the

court concluded that “[h]ere, as in Redd, Shelby does not dispute that he received timely notice

of the denial of his administrative appeal on July 12, 2001, and he offers no evidence to the

contrary.” Id. On that record, the Ninth Circuit held that the statute of limitations began to run

on July 13, 2001, and expired on July 12, 2002, almost six months before the petitioner filed his

federal habeas petition. Id.

Applying the holdings of Shelby and Redd, as is required, this court must

determine when petitioner could have learned of the factual basis for his claims through the

exercise of due diligence. See Shelby, 391 F.3d at 1066; Redd, 343 F.3d at 1082 & 1084. As

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noted above, the “factual predicate” for habeas challenges of parole board decisions is the day the

administrative decision becomes final, subject to the petitioner receiving proper notice. Shelby,

391 F.3d at 1066; Redd, 343 F.3d at 1084; Burger, 317 F.3d at 1138.

In this case, the evidence establishes that the Board conducted a parole hearing

and found petitioner unsuitable for parole on July 28, 2004. (Resp’t’s Mot. to Dismiss, Ex. 3.) 

Petitioner received a copy of the hearing transcript and decision on August 30, 2004. (Resp’t’s

Reply, Ex. A.) The Board’s decision became final on November 25, 2004. (Resp’t’s Mot. to

Dismiss, Ex. 3.) For purposes of federal habeas relief, the one-year statute of limitations began

to run no later than November 26, 2004, the day after the Board’s decision became final. See

Wade, 327 F.3d at 333; see also Shelby, 391 F.3d at 1066 (limitation period began running day

after petitioner received notice of denial of appeal); Redd, 343 F.3d at 1082 (same).

III. Application of § 2244(d)(2)

As respondent acknowledges, “[t]he time during which a properly filed

application for state post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted” toward the AEDPA statute of limitations. 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Here, the court finds that the one-year limitation period was tolled from the

time petitioner filed his first state habeas petition on October 21, 2005, until the California

Supreme Court denied petitioner habeas relief on February 7, 2007. Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S.

214, 222-24 (2002) (a state habeas petition is “pending” during a full round of review in the state

courts, including the time between a lower court decision and the filing of a new petition in a

higher court, as long as the intervals between petitions are “reasonable”).

Thus, the one-year AEDPA statute of limitations ran for 329 days from November

26, 2004 until October 21, 2005 when the statute was tolled until February 7, 2007. The one year

statute began to run again on February 8, 2007 and expired 36 days later on March 16, 2007.

Petitioner did not file his federal petition until July 7, 2007. Because more than one year had run

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on the statute of limitations, 478 days to be exact, petitioner’s federal habeas petition is timebarred.

IV. Equitable Tolling

Because the federal habeas petition is untimely, the court must dismiss it unless

petitioner demonstrates that he is entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. 

Petitioner briefly argues in his opposition to respondent’s motion to dismiss that “any reason for

delay was due to lack of assistance and prison lockdowns.” (Pet’r’s Opp’n to Resp’t’s Mot. to

Dismiss at 2.) The court has construed petitioner’s explanation regarding the untimeliness of his

petition as an argument for equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. 

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that, “a litigant seeking equitable tolling bears

the burden of establishing two elements: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and

(2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408,

418 (2005). See also Lawrence v. Florida, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S. Ct. 1079 (2007) (assuming

without deciding that equitable tolling applies to § 2244(d)); Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051,

1055 (9th Cir. 2008) (“the purpose of equitable tolling ‘is to soften the harsh impact of technical

rules which might otherwise prevent a good faith litigant from having a day in court.”). 

Nonetheless, equitable tolling of the AEDPA statute of limitations will be unavailable in most

cases. See Corjasso v. Ayers, 278 F.3d 874, 877 (9th Cir. 2002); Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104,

1107 (9th Cir. 1999). In the present case, the court finds that petitioner is not entitled to

equitable tolling. 

First, petitioner has not demonstrated that he pursued his rights diligently. As

noted above, petitioner waited almost a year before filing his first state habeas petition

challenging the Board’s decision to deny him parole. In addition, after the California Supreme

Court denied his final state habeas petition, petitioner waited another five months before filing

his federal petition.

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 The court need not address respondent’s argument that petitioner’s claims are unexhausted 2

given the recommendation that the petition be dismissed as time-barred. 

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Second, petitioner has not demonstrated that some extraordinary circumstance

stood in his way thereby preventing him from filing his federal petition in a timely manner. In

this regard, petitioner’s lack of assistance or counsel is not a ground for equitable tolling. See

Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (“a pro se petitioner’s lack of legal

sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling.”). Cf. 

See Nevius v. Sumner, 105 F.3d 453, 460 (9th Cir. 1996) (no absolute right to appointment of

counsel in habeas proceedings). In addition, delay in gaining access to the prison library because

of a lockdown is not a ground for equitable tolling. See United States v. Van Poyck, 980 F.

Supp. 1108, 1111 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (holding that the inability to secure copies of transcripts from

court reporters and lockdowns at prison lasting over one week and allegedly eliminating access to

law library were not extraordinary circumstances and did not equitably toll the one-year statute of

limitations). “Prisoners familiar with the routine restrictions of prison life must take such matters

into account when calculating when to file a federal [habeas] petition.” Boyd v. Kramer, No.

Civ. S-05-00988 ALA HC, 2008 WL 782766, *6 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2008) (quoting Atkins v.

Harris, No. C 98-3188 MJJ (PR), 1999 WL 13719, *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 1999) (reasoning that

lockdowns, restricted library access and transfers do not constitute extraordinary circumstances

sufficient to equitably toll the [AEDPA] statute of limitations.”)). Cf. Lindquist v. Idaho State

Board of Corrections, 776 F.2d 851, 858 (9th Cir. 1985) (“[T]he Constitution does not guarantee

a prisoner unlimited access to a law library.”). 

Under the circumstances set forth above, the court concludes that petitioner’s

federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus is time-barred. Accordingly, respondent’s motion to

dismiss should be granted, and petitioner’s federal petition for writ of habeas corpus should be

dismissed with prejudice.2

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CONCLUSION

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Respondent’s April 2, 2008 motion to dismiss be granted; and

2. This action be closed.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: June 12, 2008.

DAD:9

onti1441.157

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