Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-5_04-cv-05283/USCOURTS-arwd-5_04-cv-05283-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION

TAMMIE J. HERRIN PLAINTIFF

v. CIVIL NO. 04-5283

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, Commissioner

Social Security Administration DEFENDANT

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Tammie J. Herrin appealed the Commissioner's denial of benefits to this court.

On March 7, 2006, judgment was entered remanding plaintiff's case to the Commissioner pursuant

to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Doc. # 8). Plaintiff now moves for an award of $4,436.62

in attorney's fees and costs under 28 U.S.C. § 2412, the Equal Access to Justice Act (hereinafter

"EAJA"), requesting compensation for 30.65 hours of work before the court at an hourly rate of

$144.00, and $23.02 in expenses. (Doc. # 9-10). Defendant has filed a response, expressing no

objection to this award. (Doc. # 11).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), the court must award attorney's fees to a prevailing

social security claimant unless the Commissioner's position in denying benefits was substantially

justified. The burden is on the Commissioner to show substantial justification for the government's

denial of benefits. Jackson v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 127, 128 (8th Cir. 1986). Under Shalala v.

Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 302 (1993), a social security claimant who obtains a sentence-four

judgment reversing the Commissioner's denial of benefits and remanding the case for further

proceedings is a prevailing party. 

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An award of attorney’s fees under the EAJA is appropriate even though at the conclusion

of the case, plaintiff’s attorney may be authorized to charge and collect a fee pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 406(b)(1). Recovery of attorney’s fees under both the EAJA and 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1) was

specifically allowed when Congress amended the EAJA in 1985. Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S.

789, 796, 122 S.Ct. 1817, 1822, 152 L.Ed.2d 996 (2002), citing Pub.L. 99-80, § 3, 99 Stat.

186 (1985). 

To permit a fee award under the EAJA, assuming, of course, that the necessary

standard is met, in addition to that allowed by the district court out of a claimant’s

past-due benefits does no more than reimburse the claimant for his or her expenses

and results in no windfall for the attorney.

Meyers v. Heckler, 625 F.Supp. 228, 231 (S.D.Ohio 1985). Furthermore, awarding fees under

both acts facilitates the purposes of the EAJA, which is to shift to the United States the prevailing

party’s litigation expenses incurred while contesting unreasonable government action. Id. See

also, Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978 (8th Cir.1984).

In determining a reasonable attorney's fee, the court will in each case consider the

following factors: time and labor required; the difficulty of questions involved; the skill required

to handle the problems presented; the attorney's experience, ability, and reputation; the benefits

resulting to the client from the services; the customary fee for similar services; the contingency or

certainty of compensation; the results obtained; and the amount involved. Allen v. Heckler, 588

F.Supp. 1247 (W.D.N.Y. 1984). 

However, the EAJA is not designed to reimburse without limit. Pierce v. Underwood, 487

U.S. 552, 573 (1988). The district court is "in the best position to evaluate counsel’s services and

fee request, particularly when the court has had the opportunity to observe firsthand counsel’s

representation on the substantive aspects of the disability claim." Hickey v. Secretary of HHS, 923

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F.2d 585, 586 (8th Cir.1991), quoting Cotter v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 359, 361 (8th Cir.1989). The

court can determine the reasonableness and accuracy of a fee request, even in the absence of an

objection by the Commissioner. See Decker v. Sullivan, 976 F.2d 456, 459 (8th Cir.1992)

("Although the issue was not raised on appeal, fairness to the parties requires an accurately

calculated attorney’s fee award.").

The Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, passed on March 29, 1996, amended

the EAJA and increased the statutory ceiling for EAJA fee awards from $75.00 to $125.00 per

hour. See 28 U.S.C. § 2 412(d)(2)(A). 

The EAJA further requires an attorney seeking fees to submit "an itemized

statement...stating the actual time expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses were

computed." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). Attorneys seeking fees under federal fee-shifting statutes

such as the EAJA are required to present fee applications with "contemporaneous time records of

hours worked and rates claimed, plus a detailed description of the subject matter of the work." Id.

Where documentation is inadequate, the court may reduce the award accordingly. Hensley v.

Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). 

Plaintiff requests attorney's fees under the EAJA at a rate of $144.00 an hour based on an

increase in the cost of living. Attorney's fees may not be awarded in excess of $125.00 per hour -

the maximum statutory rate under § 2412(d)(2)(A) - unless the court finds that an increase in the

cost of living or a special factor such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys justifies a

higher fee. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). The decision to increase the hourly rate is not automatic

and remains at the discretion of the district court. McNulty v. Sullivan, 886 F.2d 1074 (8th Cir.

1989). In Johnson v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1990), the court stated that the hourly rate

may be increased when there is "uncontested proof of an increase in the cost of living sufficient

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(Rev. 8/82)

Plaintiff indicated in her request that she was attaching a copy of the CPI as an exhibit but this exhibit was not 1

 attached to the documents submitted to the court. 

4

to justify hourly attorney's fees of more than $75.00 an hour," such as a copy of the Consumer

Price Index. Plaintiff's counsel did not attach a summary of the Consumer Price Index or present

evidence of an increase in the cost of living. Accordingly, we find that plaintiff's counsel is not

1

entitled to an award above the maximum statutory $125 per hour.

We next address the number of hours plaintiff's counsel claims she spent working on this

case. Plaintiff's counsel seeks a total of 3.00 hours of work from September 21, 2004, through

November 14, 2004. The Complaint was not filed in this court until November 19, 2004. (Doc.

# 1). We note, time spent at the administrative level is not compensable under the EAJA. See

Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978, 988-89 (8th Cir. 1984). However, some of the time

submitted on the above referenced dates was clearly in preparation for the filing of the Complaint

with this court. Therefore, we will allow 2.00 hours. Accordingly, 1.00 hour must be deducted

from the total compensable time sought by counsel.

Plaintiff’s counsel seeks 0.50 hour on December 9, 2004, February 3, 2005, February 15,

2005, and April 6, 2005, and 0.75 hour on February 22, 2006, for writing letters explaining issues

and the process to plaintiff. We find the time sought to be excessive and reduce each of the time

periods sought to 0.25 hour. Accordingly, 1.50 hours must be deducted from the total

compensable time sought by counsel.

Plaintiff’s counsel seeks a total of 19.50 hours for reviewing the transcript, researching and

writing plaintiff’s appeal brief. The brief submitted to the court consisted of fourteen pages of

procedure and facts and four pages of argument and discussion. Plaintiff’s counsel frequently

represents social security plaintiff’s before this court and should be well versed in social security

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law and we find that the time submitted for preparing this brief to be excessive. There were also

no unique or complex issues to be developed in this particular case. Therefore we are reducing the

number of hours submitted for the preparation of plaintiff’s brief to 12.00 hours. 

Finally, counsel seeks reimbursement for $23.02 in expenses incurred with regard to

postage. Such expenses are recoverable under the EAJA and we find $23.02 to be a reasonable

award. See Kelly v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 1333, 1335 (8th Cir. 1988).

Based on the above, we recommend awarding plaintiff's attorney fees under the EAJA for:

20.65 (30.65-10.00) attorney hours, at the rate of $125 per hour, and $23.02 in expenses for a total

attorney's fee award of $2,604.27. This amount should be paid in addition to, and not out of, any

past due benefits which plaintiff may be awarded in the future. The parties have ten days from

receipt of our report and recommendation in which to file written objections pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely objections may result in waiver of the right to

appeal questions of fact. The parties are reminded that objections must be both timely and

specific to trigger de novo review by the district court.

The parties are reminded that the award herein under the EAJA will be taken into account

at such time as a reasonable fee is determined pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406, in order to prevent

double recovery by counsel for the plaintiff.

Dated this 7th day of June 2006.

/s/ Beverly Stites Jones 

HON. BEVERLY STITES JONES

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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