Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-02342/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-02342-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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The state also asserts that the period between the time the state court of appeal denied

Kingdom’s habeas petition on June 5, 2002, until October 21, 2002, approximately 138 days,

when Kingdom filed a habeas petition with the California Supreme Court, is also untolled.

This, however, is a closer call in terms of the gap between Kingdom’s petitions; and the court,

therefore, has not assumed for purposes of this motion, that those 138 days were untolled.

See id.

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MILTONOUS KINGDOM,

Petitioner, No. C 04-2342 PJH

v. ORDER GRANTING MOTION 

TO DISMISS

A.A. LAMERQUE,

Respondent.

_______________________________/

Petitioner Miltonous Kingdom (“Kingdom”) is a California prisoner currently

incarcerated at Folsom State Prison, who filed the instant federal habeas petition on June

15, 2004. On September 26, 2006, this court issued an order for further briefing regarding

the timeliness of Kingdom’s federal petition because it appeared to the court that

Kingdom’s petition was filed at least 549 days late. In response to the court’s order, the

state filed a motion to dismiss, which Kingdom opposed, and the state then filed a reply. 

In addition to the 549 days already noted by the court, the state correctly notes in its

motion to dismiss that an additional 365 days were not tolled between the time that the

state superior court denied Kingdom’s state habeas petition on May 10, 2001, and Kingdom

filed another state habeas petition with the California Court of Appeal on April 26, 2002. 

See Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189 (2006); see also Delhomme v. Ramirez, 340 F.3d 817,

821 (9th Cir. 2003).1

 Accordingly, Kingdom’s federal habeas petition was filed at least 914

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days, or more than 2.5 years late. In other words, AEDPA required Kingdom to file his

federal habeas petition no later than December 12, 2001.

Kingdom does not dispute that the instant petition was at least 914 days late. 

Instead, Kingdom’s counsel, Charles Gretsch, argues that Kingdom is entitled to equitable

tolling based on Gretsch’s egregious conduct in filing the petition. Gretsch asserts that he

was retained by Kingdom’s family in late March or early April 2000, approximately 8 months

prior to the expiration of AEDPA’s statute of limitations. Gretsch then details a list of his

other professional and personal commitments that prevented him from filing a timely federal

habeas petition. The commitments and conflicts included the trials of six murder cases;

Gretsch’s wife, Maureen Kallins’ legal problems, which Gretsch asserts required him to

assist with her defense; Gretsch’s parental obligations; Gretsch’s 59th birthday; residential

and work-related moves; Gretsch’s father’s hospitalization; and Gretsch’s repairs to his

father’s house. Gretsch argues that his egregious conduct constitutes extraordinary

circumstances entitling Kingdom to equitable tolling, such that Kingdom’s federal habeas

petition, at least 914 days late, should be considered timely. 

AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations may be equitably tolled if extraordinary

circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time. 

Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). Equitable tolling is

justified in few cases, and “the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling under

AEDPA is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.” Id. It is the petitioner’s burden

to show that he is entitled to such tolling, and the determination is a “fact-specific inquiry.” 

The first question for the court is whether or not Gretsch’s conduct constitutes

extraordinary circumstances. Id. at 801-02. If the court concludes that it does, then the

second inquiry is whether, in addition to the existence of extraordinary circumstances

based on his counsel’s conduct, Kingdom can demonstrate that he personally exercised

reasonable diligence in pursuing his federal habeas petition. See id. (directing district court

to consider on remand the separate question of whether petitioner exercised reasonable

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diligence).

Ordinary attorney negligence, such as the miscalculation of the statute of limitations

deadline, the provision of misinformation regarding the deadline, and/or simple delay, will

not constitute extraordinary circumstances. Id. at 800 (citations omitted). However, “where

an attorney’s misconduct is sufficiently egregious, it may constitute an ‘extraordinary

circumstance’ warranting equitable tolling.” Id.

In Spitsyn, the Ninth Circuit held that the conduct of the inmate's attorney was

sufficiently egregious to justify equitable tolling of the one-year limitation period.

The attorney was hired nearly a full year in advance of the deadline, and he completely

failed to prepare and file a petition. Id. at 798-99. The inmate, in addition to his family

members, contacted the attorney numerous times, by telephone and in writing, but the

efforts were fruitless. Id. Despite a request that the attorney return the inmate's file, the

attorney retained it for the duration of the limitations period and more than two months

beyond. Id. The court held that the Spitsyn attorney’s conduct was so deficient as to

distinguish it from the merely negligent performance of counsel. Id. at 801-02. After

concluding that the attorney’s conduct constituted “extraordinary circumstances,” the

Spitsyn court then remanded the case to the district court to determine ""whether Spitsyn

[himself] exercised reasonable diligence.'' Id. at 800, 802.

Whether or not Gretsch’s conduct in this case may be considered “egregious,” thus

constituting “extraordinary circumstances,” is a close call for the court. The fact that

Gretsch was retained for nearly four years prior to filing the petition, and at least eight

months prior to the expiration of AEDPA’s statute of limitations, without any evidence that

he was actively pursuing Kingdom’s case, suggests egregious behavior. However, this

case is missing a key element that existed in Spitsyn: evidence of Kingdom’s own diligence

and efforts in pursuing federal habeas relief. In Spitsyn, one of the factors that made the

attorney’s conduct particularly egregious was his failure to respond to the petitioner’s active

efforts to pursue his case and the petitioner’s pleas for the return of his file. Here, there is

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absolutely no evidence of diligence on Kingdom’s part, an essential requirement in order for

this court to conclude that he is entitled to equitable tolling. 

Because the court finds that Kingdom has not established that he exercised

reasonable diligence in pursuing his federal habeas petition, which was filed at least 914

days late, the court GRANTS the state’s motion to dismiss.

The clerk shall close the file.

Dated: February 22, 2007

IT IS SO ORDERED.

__________________________________

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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