Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00184/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00184-10/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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 Plaintiff was provided with notice of the requirements for opposing an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion 1

on March 20, 2007. Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1120 n.14 (9th Cir. 2003). (Doc. 25.)

 In light of the granting of defendants’ motion to dismiss, and the failure of plaintiff to address the merits of 2

defendants’ motion in his opposition, there is no prejudice to defendants in the issuance of this order prior to receipt

of their reply, if any. Local Rule 78-230(m).

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHAKLA JOSEPH,

Plaintiff,

v.

J. S. WOODFORD, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:05-cv-00184-LJO-SMS PC

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS AND DISMISSING

THIS ACTION, WITHOUT PREJUDICE, FOR

FAILURE TO EXHAUST

(Doc. 35)

I. Procedural History

Plaintiff Shakla Joseph (“plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 (Religious Land Use and

Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”)). This action is proceeding on plaintiff’s

amended complaint, filed December 5, 2005, against defendants Daviega, Pursell, Hooker, Fulks,

Anderson, Flore, and Adams (“defendants”) for violation of plaintiff’s rights under RLUIPA. On

August 24, 2007, defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust. Fed. R.Civ. P. 12(b).

Plaintiff filed an opposition on October 15, 2007.1,2

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II. Exhaustion Requirement

Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, “[n]o action shall be brought with

respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner

confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are

available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Prisoners are required to exhaust the available

administrative remedies prior to filing suit. Jones v. Bock, 127 S.Ct. 910, 918-19 (2007); McKinney

v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199-1201 (9th Cir. 2002). Exhaustion is required regardless of the relief

sought by the prisoner and regardless of the relief offered by the process, Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S.

731, 741 (2001), and the exhaustion requirement applies to all prisoner suits relating to prison life,

Porter v. Nussle, 435 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). 

Section 1997e(a) does not impose a pleading requirement, but rather, is an affirmative

defense under which defendants have the burden of raising and proving the absence of exhaustion.

Jones, 127 S.Ct. at 921; Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). The failure to

exhaust nonjudicial administrative remedies that are not jurisdictional is subject to an unenumerated

Rule 12(b) motion, rather than a summary judgment motion. Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119 (citing Ritza

v. Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, 837 F.2d 365, 368 (9th Cir. 1998) (per curium)).

In deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the Court may look

beyond the pleadings and decide disputed issues of fact. Wyatt, 315 F.3d at 1119-20. If the Court

concludes that the prisoner has failed to exhaust administrative remedies, the proper remedy is

dismissal without prejudice. Id. 

III. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust

The California Department of Corrections has an administrative grievance system for

prisoner complaints. Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15 § 3084.1 (2007). The process is initiated by submitting

a CDC Form 602. Id. at § 3084.2(a). Four levels of appeal are involved, including the informal

level, first formal level, second formal level, and third formal level, also known as the “Director’s

Level.” Id. at § 3084.5. Appeals must be submitted within fifteen working days of the event being

appealed, and the process is initiated by submission of the appeal to the informal level, or in some

circumstances, the first formal level. Id. at §§ 3084.5, 3084.6(c). In order to satisfy section

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1997e(a), California state prisoners are required to use this process to exhaust their claims prior to

filing suit. Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 2383 (2006); McKinney, 311 F.3d at 1199-1201. 

The events at issue in the instant action allegedly occurred at the California Substance Abuse

Treatment Facility and State Prison-Corcoran in 2004. Plaintiff alleges that he is a Rastafarian

Nazarite and is prohibited by his religion from cutting his hair. Plaintiff alleges that the California

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) has a grooming regulation which mandates

that male inmates’ hair be no longer than three inches. Plaintiff alleges that he has been subject to

progressive discipline for failing to comply with the grooming regulation, which burdens the exercise

of his religion.

In his amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that although his inmate appeal form indicates

he received it back from the second level of review on August 20, 2004, he did not receive it back

until September 13, 2004. (Doc. 14, C.R. pg. 6.) In submitting his appeal to the third and final level

of review, plaintiff stated on the form that the appeal was submitted on October 4, 2004, instead of

September 28, 2004, because of law library abnormalities. (Id., C.R. pg. 25.)

Defendants argue that they are entitled to dismissal of this action because plaintiff did not

exhaust his RLUIPA claim against them. In support of their motion, defendants submit evidence that

plaintiff filed an appeal grieving the grooming policy on the ground that it violated his religious

beliefs. (Doc. 35-2, Court Record pg. 17.) The appeal, log number SATF-F-04-02030, was denied

at the second level of review on August 16, 2004, and returned to plaintiff on August 20, 2004. (Id.,

C.R. pgs. 18 & 26.) Plaintiff subsequently submitted it to the third and final level of review, where

it was rejected as untimely in a letter dated December 23, 2004. (Id., C.R. pg. 11.) Defendants

submit evidence that other than this appeal, plaintiff did not submit any other appeals to the third

level of review in 2004 or thereafter, and did not submit any other appeals at the institutional level

in 2004. (Id., Grannis Dec., ¶10, C.R. pg. 4; Hall Dec., ¶14, C.R. pg. 15.) Defendants also contend

that it is unnecessary to access the law library to submit an appeal to the third level. (Id., Hall Dec.,

¶12.) 

“[Proper] exhaustion of administrative remedies is necessary,” Woodford v. Ngo, 126 S.Ct.

2378, 2382 (2006), and “[p]roper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and

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other critical procedural rules . . . ,” id. at 2386. Time limits for completion of appeals commence

upon receipt of the appeal form by the appeals coordinator or the appellant. Tit. 15 §§ 3084.6 (a).

Weekends and state holidays do not count as working days, and in computing days, the first day is

excluded and the last day is included. Tit. 15 § 4003(j). 

If plaintiff received his appeal back from the second level on September 13, 2004, as he

alleges in his amended complaint, the appeal form was due on or before October 4, 2004, and was

dated October 4, 2004, by plaintiff. However, there is no evidence that plaintiff explained to the

appeals coordinator at the third level that the appeal was not received on August 20, 2004, as the

appeal form itself indicates, and there is no evidence that after receiving the rejection letter, plaintiff

sought assistance at the institutional level or at the third level on the ground that his appeal was in

fact timely because it was not received until September 13, 2004. 

Based on the record in this action, the appeals coordinator at the third level of review would

not have known of any dispute over the date the appeal was received by plaintiff, and based on the

applicable regulations and the appeal form itself, did not therefore wrongfully reject the appeal. The

alleged date of receipt of the second level appeal response cannot now shield plaintiff from dismissal

of this suit based on wrongful rejection of his appeal as untimely when he did not seek to shield

himself from the rejection based on untimeliness by (1) notifying the appeals coordinator of the

problem in the appeal itself or (2) challenging the rejection of his appeal as wrongful in light of his

position that he did not receive the appeal response back until September 13, 2004. 

When there are procedural rules in place governing a process, plaintiff bears the

responsibility of informing authorities if things are not what they seem to be in terms of his

compliance with those procedural rules. In this instance, there is no evidence that plaintiff took any

steps to prevent the misunderstanding over the timeliness of his appeal to the third level or to correct

the misunderstanding after it occurred. Plaintiff’s explanation in the appeal that it was submitted

on October 4, 2004, rather than September 28, 2004, is of no service to him, as the appeals

coordinator would have thought the appeal form was due on or before September 13, 2004, tit. 15

§ 4003(j), and there is no evidence or argument that law library access is relevant or even necessary

to submit an appeal. 

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IV. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth herein, defendants have met their burden as the parties moving for

dismissal. Plaintiff has not met his burden of demonstrating that exhaustion occurred or that his

failure to exhaust is excusable under an applicable legal theory. The allegations and exhibits

contained in the amended complaint are not sufficient to raise a dispute and plaintiff’s opposition

does not set forth any relevant arguments or evidence.

Therefore, based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust, filed August 24, 2007, is

GRANTED; and

2. This action is dismissed, without prejudice, for failure to exhaust.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 19, 2007 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

b9ed48 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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