Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_07-cv-00264/USCOURTS-azd-4_07-cv-00264-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

CHRISTY WHITAKER,

Plaintiff, 

vs.

ERICK MALDONADO, et al.,

Defendants. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

 No. CIV 07-264-TUC-CKJ

ORDER 

Pending before the Court are Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine [Doc. # 75] and Plaintiff’s

Motion to Preclude Witness Katsaris [Doc. # 80]. Also pending before the Court is

Plaintiff’s oral motion to preclude evidence that the vehicle driven by decedent was stolen.

Counsel presented argument to the Court on July 1, 2009.

Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine (Doc. # 75)

Plaintiff seeks to preclude any evidence of the existence of a warrant for decedent’s

arrest for a Texas probation violation. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants were unaware of this

information at the time of the incident and it is, therefore, irrelevant and is substantially

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Fed.R.Evid. 402 and 403. "Relevant

evidence" is "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of

consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would

be without the evidence." Fed.R.Evid. 401; United States v. Federico, 658 F.2d 1337 (9th

Cir. 1981), overruled on other grounds (relevance is established by any showing, however

slight, which makes a fact to be proven to the jury more likely than it was before the

Case 4:07-cv-00264-CKJ Document 90 Filed 07/02/09 Page 1 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 2 -

admission of the evidence).. However, relevant evidence should be excluded "if its probative

value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." Fed.R.Evid. 403.

Defendants assert, however, that such information is relevant to complete the story

of decedent’s criminal activities on the day of his death, by explaining his motive, reasons

for fleeing from the police, and refusal to surrender. Further, Defendants assert such

information is relevant to the claims of future loss of financial support and companionship

of the decedent and claims as to future earning capacity (employability). Specifically,

Defendants assert that, because Arizona is a comparative fault jurisdiction and Defendants

are alleging that decedent’s death was his own fault, including fleeing and refusing to

surrender, the information is admissible to explain decedent’s motive and reasons for fleeing

and refusing to surrender. It completes the story and is evidence of fault that caused or

contributed to decedent’s death. Defendants cite to Arizona case law that provides that

“completes the story” is an additional exception to Ariz.R.Evid. 404(b). State v. Richmond,

114 Ariz. 186, 193, 560 P.2d 41 (1976). However, the Federal Rules of Evidence are

procedural and, therefore, apply in this case. See e.g., Stroud v. Cook, 931 F.Supp. 733, 736

(D.Nev. 1996); In re Dow Corning Corp., 244 B.R. 634 (Bkrtcy.E.D.Mich. 1999).

Although evidence of other acts is not admissible to prove the character of an

individual to show he or she acted in conformity therewith, evidence of other acts may be

"admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,

plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident[.]" FRE 404(b). However,

evidence that is inextricably intertwined with the crime charged is not considered "other acts"

evidence. "Evidence is "inextricably intertwined" if it "constitutes a part of the transaction

that serves as the basis for the criminal charge" or "was necessary to . . . permit the

prosecutor to offer a coherent and comprehensible story regarding the commission of the

crime." United States v. Williams, 291 F.3d 1180, 1189 (9th Cir. 2002), quoting United

States v. Vizcarra-Martinez, 66 F.3d 1006, 1012-13 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Elliot v. Turner

Const. Co., 381 F.3d 995, 1003-1004 (10th Cir. 2004) (in injured worker’s negligence action

Case 4:07-cv-00264-CKJ Document 90 Filed 07/02/09 Page 2 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 3 -

against contractor, evidence of subcontractor’s alleged mistakes committed prior to installing

bridge was intrinsic and essential to plaintiff’s claim).

Whether labeled as “complete the story” or “inextricably intertwined,” evidence of

the probation violation and warrant is relevant to the motive and conduct of decedent.

Although Plaintiff argues that it is speculative that decedent knew of the warrant and that its

existence was a motive for fleeing and refusing to surrender to law enforcement, the parties

may argue reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence. See Blankenship v.

Hearts Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 427 (9th Cir. 1975); see also United States v. Landrau-Lopez,

444 F.3d 19 (1st Cir. 2006).

Furthermore, the evidence is relevant to the issue of damages:

The general rule appears to be that the trier of fact is entitled to consider, on the issue

of damages, decedent’s characteristics and habits including his general ability, other

occupations he was qualified to fulfill, his industriousness, disposition to earn,

intelligence, manner of living, sobriety or intemperance, frugality or lavishness, and

other personal characteristics that are of assistance in securing business or earning

money, his age and life expectancy.

Sheehan v. Pima County, 135 Ariz. 235, 239, 669 P.2d 486, 490 (App. 1982). The Court

finds that evidence of decedent’s probation violation and arrest warrant are relevant.

Plaintiff also asserts that the evidence should be excluded as more prejudicial than

probative:

Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusions of the issues, or misleading

the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation

of cumulative evidence.

Rule 403, Fed.R.Evid. “Of course, all relevant evidence is prejudicial; Rule 403 is concerned

only with limiting ‘unfair’ prejudice.” United States v. Simpson, 910 F.2d 154, 158 (4th Cir.

1990). Indeed, 

[r]elevant evidence is inherently prejudicial; but it is only unfair prejudice,

substantially outweighing probative value, which permits exclusion of relevant matter

under Rule 403. Unless trials are to be conducted as scenarios, or unreal facts tailored

and sanitized for the occasion, the application of Rule 403 must be cautious and

sparing. Its major function is limited to excluding matter of scant or cumulative

probative force, dragged in by the heels for the sake of its prejudicial effect.

Case 4:07-cv-00264-CKJ Document 90 Filed 07/02/09 Page 3 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 4 -

United States v. Hankey, 203 F.3d 1160, 1172 (9th Cir. 2000); see also United States v.

LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1026 (9th Cir. 2001) (“All evidence introduced against a criminal

defendant might be said to be prejudicial if it tends to prove the prosecution’s case.”). Unfair

prejudice “mean an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly,

though not necessarily, an emotional one.” Fed.R.Evid. 403, Adv. Comm. Notes; Old Chief

v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180, 117 S.Ct. 644, 650 (1997).

The evidence regarding decedent’s probation violation and arrest warrant is relevant

to raise an inference explaining decedent’s conduct on the date of the incident. Furthermore,

such evidence is highly relevant to the issues of damages. While the evidence may be

prejudicial to Plaintiff, the Court finds that the danger of unfair prejudice does not

substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence. The Court will deny the motion.

Plaintiff’s Motion to Preclude Witness Katsaris [Doc. # 80]

Plaintiff argues that expert witness Katsaris’s testimony would be cumulative, unfairly

prejudicial, and not helpful to the jury. Plaintiff asserts that the decision of reasonableness

in an excessive force claim is best left to the jury:

Although not necessarily barred by Fed.R.Evid. 704(a), expert testimony as to the

reasonableness of the officer’s action is only admissible to the extent that it will assist

the trier of fact . . . Additionally, the Court is under a duty to avoid the needless waste

of time in presentation of evidence and to avoid any unfair prejudice that substantially

outweighs the probative value of the evidence, or which could mislead the jury in the

same fashion, Fed.R.Evid. 611(a) and 403.” 

Wells v. Smith, 778 F.Supp. 7 (D.Md. 1991). Further, “[t]he question of reasonableness is

quintessentially a matter of applying common sense and the community sense of the jury to

a particular set of facts and, thus, it represents a community judgment. It would interfere

inappropriately with that judgment process, mandated by Graham v. Connor, to allow expert

testimony as to what reasonableness is, either abstractly or as applied.” Id. Indeed, Plaintiff

argues that expert testimony on the reasonableness of an officer’s action is not “otherwise

admissible” when it is based upon facts presented to the expert by the party offering the

Case 4:07-cv-00264-CKJ Document 90 Filed 07/02/09 Page 4 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 5 -

expert’s opinion. Shahid v. City of Detroit, 889 F.2d 1543 (6th Cir. 1989).

Defendants assert, however, that other cases find that the admission of such expert

testimony is appropriate. See Kopf v. Skyrm, 993 F.2d 374, 378 (4th Cir. 1993); Richman v.

Sheahan, 415 F.Supp.2d 929, 940 (N.D.Ill. 2006); United States v. Perkins, 470 F.3d 150,

159-60 (4th Cir. 2006); see also Davis v. Mason County, 927 F.2d 1473 (9th Cir. 1991),

superceded by statute on other grounds (expert permitted to testify that sheriff was “reckless”

in failing to train deputies and that there was a causal link between that recklessness and

plaintiff’s injuries); Samples v. City of Atlanta, 916 F.2d 1548 (11th Cir. 1990). Indeed,

“[u]nder the Federal Rules of Evidence expert testimony on police practices should ordinarily

be admissible, on the ground that it will be of assistance with respect to issues with which

the average juror is less familiar than the expert.” Michael Avery, David Rudovsky, Karen

Blum, Police Misconduct: Law and Litigation § 11:15 (2008). “The trial judge maintains

wide discretion in determining whether expert testimony would aid the jurors in their

understanding of the issues even where they might have a general knowledge of the subject

matter. Doubts about the usefulness of expert testimony should be resolved in favor of

admissibility.” Lane Goldstein, Trial Technique § 14:3 (2009). 

Plaintiff also argues that testimony about the reasonableness of an officer’s actions

in an excessive force case may amount to a legal conclusion, which is impermissible, and

should be precluded. Shahid v. City of Detroit, 889 F.2d 1543, 1547-48 (6th Cir. 1989).

While expert may not give an opinion as to a legal conclusion, McHugh v. United Serv. Auto.

Ass’n, 164 F.3d 451, 454 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Duncan, 42 F.3d 97, 101 (2nd Cir.

1994) (“When an expert undertakes to tell the jury what result to reach, this does not aid the

jury in making a decision, but rather attempts to substitute the expert’s judgment for the

jury’s.”), that does not preclude the expert here – the expert can present “testimony

comparing conduct of parties to the industry standard” without making a legal conclusion.

Estate of Bojcic v. City of San Jose, 2007 WL 3314008 *2 (N.D.Cal. 2007). The Court finds

that preclusion of the expert testimony is not appropriate.

Case 4:07-cv-00264-CKJ Document 90 Filed 07/02/09 Page 5 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 6 -

Plaintiff’s Oral Motion to Preclude Evidence that the Vehicle was Stolen 

Plaintiff has also requested that evidence that the vehicle driven by decedent was

stolen, as opposed to reported stolen, as irrelevant. Counsel for Defendants stated during that

hearing that it was his intention to present the testimony of the owner of the truck; the owner

would testify that the truck had been stolen the night before, the truck had a Lojack system,

the owner did not know the decedent, and the decedent did not have authorization or

permission to use the truck. Defendants argue that precluding the admission of this evidence

would permit Plaintiff to suggest that the decedent was in lawful possession of the vehicle.

As previously stated, relevant evidence is "evidence having any tendency to make the

existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable

or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Fed.R.Evid. 401. Whether the

vehicle was stolen or reported as stolen is not a fact that is of consequence to the

determination of the action. There is no reason to conclude that this fact would have changed

the conduct of any person involved in the incident. The Court finds, therefore, that evidence

(through the owner of the vehicle or otherwise) that the truck had been stolen the night

before, that the owner did not know the decedent, and that the decedent did not have

authorization or permission to use the truck is not relevant. Moreover, any potential

relevance is substantially outweighed by considerations of unfair prejudice, undue delay and

waste of time. See Fed.R.Evid. 403.

However, the Court agrees with Defendants that, if Plaintiff presents any evidence

suggesting that decedent was in lawful possession of the vehicle, such evidence would

become relevant. Further, should the door be opened in this manner, considerations of unfair

prejudice, undue delay and waste of time would not substantially outweigh the relevance.

The Court, therefore, will grant the oral motion. If the door is opened by Plaintiff, counsel

shall seek to discuss this issue outside the presence of the jury.

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine [Doc. # 75] is DENIED.

Case 4:07-cv-00264-CKJ Document 90 Filed 07/02/09 Page 6 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 - 7 -

2. Plaintiff’s Motion to Preclude Witness Katsaris [Doc. # 80] is DENIED.

3. Plaintiff’s oral Motion to Preclude Evidence that the Vehicle was Stolen is

GRANTED.

DATED this 2nd day of July, 2009.

Case 4:07-cv-00264-CKJ Document 90 Filed 07/02/09 Page 7 of 7