Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-05611/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-05611-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1125 Trademark Infringement (Lanham Act)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FIVE STAR GOURMET FOODS, INC., 

et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

FRESH EXPRESS, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 19-cv-05611-PJH 

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 

MOTION TO DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 33

Defendant Plastic Ingenuity, Inc.’s (“Plastic Ingenuity”) motion to dismiss came on 

for hearing before this court on February 19, 2020. Plaintiffs Five Star Gourmet Foods, 

Inc. (“Five Star”) and Direct Pack, Inc. (“Direct Pack”) appeared through their counsel, 

Chris Arledge. Defendant appeared through its counsel, Thomas Brown. Having read 

the papers filed by the parties and carefully considered their arguments and relevant 

authority, and good cause appearing, the court hereby GRANTS defendant’s motion for 

the following reasons.

BACKGROUND

On September 5, 2019, plaintiffs Five Star and Direct Pack filed the original 

complaint in this action against defendants Fresh Express, Inc. (“Fresh Express”), 

Proseal America, Inc. (“Proseal”), Plastic Ingenuity, John Olivo, Kenneth Dively, Fabian 

Pereira, and Doe defendants. Dkt. 1. On October 31, 2019, plaintiffs filed a First

Amended Complaint (“FAC”). Dkt. 13. The FAC asserts ten causes of action: (1) fraud 

and deceit; (2) misappropriation of trade secrets; (3) design patent infringement; (4) 

active inducement of patent infringement; (5) trade dress infringement; (6) active 

Case 4:19-cv-05611-PJH Document 77 Filed 03/16/20 Page 1 of 15
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

inducement of trade dress infringement; (7) common law unfair competition; (8) statutory 

unfair competition; (9) breach of contract; and (10) intentional interference with contract. 

Plaintiffs assert the Third, Fifth, and Sixth through Eighth causes of action against Plastic 

Ingenuity.

On December 19, 2019, defendant Plastic Ingenuity filed the present motion to 

dismiss based on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(3). The motion 

seeks to dismiss all claims asserted against Plastic Ingenuity on personal jurisdiction and 

venue grounds. Prior to the hearing on this motion, the court issued an order granting in 

part and denying in part defendant Fresh Express’ motion to dismiss. Dkt. 59. In 

response to that order plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint (Dkt. 67, the “SAC”),

and the parties have stipulated that the pending motion to dismiss should apply to the 

SAC. Dkt. 71. For purposes of this motion, the SAC is substantially similar to the FAC 

and alleges the same causes of action. 

Plaintiff Five Star is a California corporation that sells pre-packaged salads in 

plastic containers. Those plastic containers are configured with various compartments 

such that the salad’s ingredients are kept separate in the packaging. SAC ¶¶ 17, 23. 

Plaintiff Direct Pack is a co-owner, with Five Star, of U.S. Design Patent Nos. 698,665 

and 698,666. Id. ¶ 40. Defendant Fresh Express also sells pre-packaged snacks and 

salads and also uses plastic packaging that divides salad ingredients into segregated 

compartments while packaged. Plaintiffs allege that Fresh Express infringed on their 

design patents and trade dress. Id. ¶¶ 39–44, 51–61. Defendant Plastic Ingenuity is a 

packaging company that manufactures the allegedly infringing packaging used by Fresh 

Express. Id. ¶ 25.

Plaintiffs’ claims against Plastic Ingenuity derive to a great extent from allegations 

concerning Five Star and Fresh Express. The court’s January 31, 2020 order contains a 

more thorough recitation of the facts between those parties. Dkt. 59. In 2016, a Fresh 

Express executive met a Five Star executive at a trade show and, through later 

communications, Fresh Express stated an interest in exploring how the two companies 

Case 4:19-cv-05611-PJH Document 77 Filed 03/16/20 Page 2 of 15
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

could “develop a fruitful partnership together.” SAC ¶ 16. Five Star agreed to permit 

Fresh Express executives to tour Five Star’s Florida facility in May 2017. Id. ¶ 18. Five 

Star showed them its production process, how it staffs its production lines, the equipment 

and equipment vendors it uses, and provided a comprehensive view of Five Star’s entire 

salad bowl production process, including how it set up its assembly lines and the order of 

operations. Id.

Plaintiffs allege that Fresh Express has since used Five Star’s confidential 

business information and publicly available information to copy every aspect of Five 

Star’s patented salad bowl product, including the packaging and labeling design. Plastic 

Ingenuity controls every aspect of the manufacturing process for the allegedly infringing 

packaging that is then provided to Fresh Express for resale. Id. ¶¶ 25, 41. Plaintiffs 

further allege that Plastic Ingenuity was aware that Fresh Express’ products infringed on 

Five Star’s trade dress, but nonetheless provided packaging to Fresh Express. Id. ¶¶ 63, 

65.

Plastic Ingenuity is a Wisconsin corporation with its primary place of business in 

Wisconsin. Declaration of Daniel Kuehn, Dkt. 34 (the “Kuehn Decl.”), ¶ 2. The company 

has no employees, offices, facilities, or any other operations or physical presence in 

California. Id. ¶ 3. Plastic Ingenuity manufactured the parts and prototypes of its plastic 

salad container in Wisconsin and shipped its finished plastic salad containers to Georgia. 

Id. ¶ 4. At some point, Plastic Ingenuity shipped prototype salad containers to Fresh 

Express for testing at Fresh Express’s facility in California. Id. ¶ 6. Plastic Ingenuity’s 

employees also travel to California for sales pitches, technical support to customers and 

to attend industry conventions. Id. ¶ 7. The company states that it has never marketed 

the accused salad container in California and none of the company’s sales in the state of 

California (approximately $12 million out of $165 million total sales in 2018) were derived 

from the accused product. Id. ¶¶ 5, 8–9. 

/ / /

/ / /

Case 4:19-cv-05611-PJH Document 77 Filed 03/16/20 Page 3 of 15
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

The party seeking to invoke a federal court’s jurisdiction bears the burden of 

demonstrating jurisdiction. Picot v. Weston, 780 F.3d 1206, 1211 (9th Cir. 2015). A 

federal court may dismiss an action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) for 

lack of personal jurisdiction. When resolving a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(2) on 

written materials, the court accepts uncontroverted facts in the complaint as true and 

resolves conflicts in affidavits in the plaintiffs’ favor. Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs., 

Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1223 (9th Cir. 2011). “Federal courts ordinarily follow state law in 

determining the bounds of their jurisdiction over persons.” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 

U.S. 117, 125 (2014); see Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 4(k)(1)(a). California’s long arm statute 

permits exercise of personal jurisdiction to the fullest extent permissible under the U.S. 

Constitution, therefore, the court’s inquiry “centers on whether exercising jurisdiction 

comports with due process.” Picot, 780 F.3d at 1211; see Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 410.10.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “limits the power of a 

state’s courts to exercise jurisdiction over defendants who do not consent to jurisdiction.” 

Martinez v. Aero Caribbean, 764 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2014). Due process requires 

that the defendant “have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of 

the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe 

Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations 

omitted). Under the “minimum contacts” analysis, a court can exercise either “general or 

all-purpose jurisdiction,” or “specific or conduct-linked jurisdiction.” Daimler, 571 U.S. at 

121–22 (citing Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 

(2011)).

Under general jurisdiction, a nonresident defendant may be subject to suit even on 

matters unrelated to his contacts with the forum. Id. at 126–33. To establish general

jurisdiction, plaintiffs must demonstrate that the defendant has continuous and systematic 

contacts sufficient to approximate physical presence in the state. In re W. States 

Case 4:19-cv-05611-PJH Document 77 Filed 03/16/20 Page 4 of 15
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Wholesale Natural Gas Antitrust Litig., 715 F.3d 716, 741 (9th Cir. 2013). Where the 

defendant is a foreign corporation, the plaintiffs must establish that the defendant has 

“affiliations so continuous and systematic as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum 

State, . . . i.e., comparable to a domestic enterprise in that State.” Daimler, 571 U.S. at 

133 n.11 (citation omitted). The paradigm fora for the exercise of general jurisdiction 

over a corporation are the place of incorporation and the principal place of business, and 

only in an “exceptional case” will general jurisdiction be available elsewhere. Id. at 137–

38 & n.19.

In the absence of general jurisdiction, a court may exercise specific jurisdiction 

over a defendant if its less-substantial contacts with the forum give rise to the claim or 

claims pending before the court—that is, if the cause of action “arises out of” or has a 

substantial connection with that activity. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250–53 

(1958); see also Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 924–25. The inquiry into whether a forum state 

may assert specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant focuses on the relationship 

among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation. Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 283–

84 (2014) (citation omitted).

To determine whether a defendant’s contacts with the forum state are sufficient to 

establish specific jurisdiction, both the Ninth and Federal Circuits1 employ a three-part 

test:

(1) The non-resident defendant must purposefully direct his 

activities or consummate some transaction with the forum or 

1 Federal Circuit precedent controls the personal jurisdiction analysis for plaintiffs’ design 

patent infringement claim. See Breckenridge Pharm., Inc. v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 444 

F.3d 1335, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Further, when a suit involves both patent and nonpatent claims, Federal Circuit law applies to the non-patent claims if “‘the resolution of the 

patent infringement issue will be a significant factor’ in determining liability under the nonpatent claims.” Id. (quoting 3D Sys., Inc. v. Aarotech Labs., Inc., 160 F.3d 1373, 1377 

(Fed. Cir. 1998)). The patent related claims in this case are not “intimately linked” to 

patent law because plaintiffs’ other claims do not involve patent-related rights. Silent 

Drive, Inc. v. Strong Indus., Inc., 326 F.3d 1194, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). 

Therefore, the court applies Ninth Circuit law to the personal jurisdiction analysis of 

plaintiffs’ non-patent claims.

Case 4:19-cv-05611-PJH Document 77 Filed 03/16/20 Page 5 of 15
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

resident thereof; or perform some act by which he 

purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting 

activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and 

protections of its laws;

(2) the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the 

defendant’s forum-related activities; and

(3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and 

substantial justice, i.e. it must be reasonable.

Morrill v. Scott Financial Corp., 873 F.3d 1136, 1142 (9th Cir. 2017); accord Xilinx, Inc. v. 

Papst Licensing Gmbh & Co. KG, 848 F.3d 1346, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Plaintiffs bear 

the burden of satisfying the first two prongs. Morrill, 873 F.3d at 1142. If plaintiffs do so, 

then the burden shifts to defendant to “set forth a ‘compelling case’ that the exercise of 

jurisdiction would not be reasonable.” CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc., 653 

F.3d 1066, 1076 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 

477–78 (1985)). 

B. Analysis

1. General Jurisdiction

Plaintiffs contend that defendant is subject to general jurisdiction in California. 

Opp. at 4. A corporation will primarily be “at home” for the purposes of general 

jurisdiction in two paradigmatic forums: its place of incorporation and its principal place of 

business. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137. Barring a showing of those two paradigmatic 

forums, general jurisdiction is only appropriate in an “exceptional case” where the 

defendant’s affiliations with the forum are “so substantial and of such nature as to render 

the corporation at home.” Id. at 138 n.19.

Here, defendant Plastic Ingenuity is a Wisconsin corporation with its primary place 

of business in Wisconsin. Kuehn Decl. ¶ 2. Thus, Plastic Ingenuity is at home in 

Wisconsin. Lacking the two paradigmatic forums, plaintiffs must demonstrate that 

defendant’s contacts in California are so substantial that those contacts render defendant 

at home in California, i.e., that this is an “exceptional case” such that the court would find 

general jurisdiction beyond the two paradigmatic forums. Plaintiffs point to the following 

facts to demonstrate such an exceptional case: defendant regularly sends its employees 

to California and the company generates significant revenue from its sales in California. 

Case 4:19-cv-05611-PJH Document 77 Filed 03/16/20 Page 6 of 15
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Id. ¶ 7. 

These contacts are insufficient to establish general jurisdiction. Daimler teaches 

that “the general jurisdiction inquiry examines a corporation’s activities worldwide—not 

just the extent of its contacts in the forum state—to determine where it can rightly be 

considered at home.” Ranza v. Nike, Inc., 793 F.3d 1059, 1070 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing 

Daimler, 571 U.S. at 139 n.20). Two cases illustrate the contours of this requirement. In 

Ranza, the Ninth Circuit held that general jurisdiction did not lie where the defendant sent 

employees on an average of 47 trips per month to the forum state. Id. at 1069. In 

addition to business trips, the defendant also had between twenty and thirty employees 

working in the forum state, but those contacts were minimal limited compared to its 

worldwide contacts. See id. at 1069–70. In Martinez v. Aero Caribbean, 764 F.3d 1062, 

1070 (9th Cir. 2014), the defendant, a French entity, did not have office, staff, or other 

physical presence in California and was not licensed to do business in California. The 

court found that the defendant’s California contacts—contracts worth between $225 and 

$450 million to sell airplanes to a California corporation; contracts with eleven California 

component suppliers; sending representatives to California to attend industry 

conferences, promote products, use of defendant’s aircraft by third-parties in California; 

and advertising in California—to be minor compared to its other worldwide contacts. Id. 

These facts here are similar to Ranza and Martinez, where some business activity 

occurred in the forum state, but not a sufficient amount to render the corporation at home

there. The Kuehn Declaration states that defendant does not have any employees, 

offices, or any other operations or physical presence in California. Kuehn Decl. ¶ 3. The 

majority of defendant’s revenue did not occur in California. Id. ¶ 8 (stating $12 million in 

sales in California out of $165 million in total sales in 2018). While plaintiffs point to some 

employee travel to California, they do not draw a comparison against defendant’s 

worldwide activities, including its other business travel. These facts are indicative of 

defendant “doing business” in California rather than being “at home” in California. 

Daimler, 571 U.S. at 138–39, n.20 (“A corporation that operates in many places can 

Case 4:19-cv-05611-PJH Document 77 Filed 03/16/20 Page 7 of 15
8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

scarcely be deemed at home in all of them. Otherwise, ‘at home’ would be synonymous 

with ‘doing business’ tests framed before specific jurisdiction evolved in the United 

States.” (citation omitted)).

Thus, plaintiffs have not demonstrated general jurisdiction over Plastic Ingenuity.

2. Specific Jurisdiction

As stated previously, the court applies a three-part test to determine whether 

specific jurisdiction is appropriate in California: 

(1) The non-resident defendant must purposefully direct his 

activities or consummate some transaction with the forum or 

resident thereof; or perform some act by which he 

purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting 

activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and 

protections of its laws;

(2) the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the 

defendant’s forum-related activities; and

(3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and 

substantial justice, i.e. it must be reasonable. 

Morrill, 873 F.3d at 1142; accord Breckenridge Pharm., 444 F.3d at 1363. Plaintiffs have 

the burden to meet the first two prongs. Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 

F.3d 797, 802 (9th Cir. 2012). 

The first prong of the three-part test involves two possible analytical avenues: “[f]or 

claims sounding in contract, a purposeful availment test is used; for claims sounding in 

tort a purposeful direction test is used.” In re Boon Glob. Ltd., 923 F.3d 643, 651 (9th Cir. 

2019) (citing Picot, 780 F.3d at 1212). Plaintiffs’ trademark claims generally sound in tort

(Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 246 F.3d 675, 675 (9th Cir. 2000)

(unpublished opinion)), and the Federal Circuit generally applies purposeful direction 

analysis to patent claims. See, e.g., Fujitsu Ltd. v. Belkin Int’l, Inc., 782 F. Supp. 2d 868, 

883 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (applying purposeful direction to direct and indirect patent 

infringement claims). Purposeful direction is often evaluated using the Calder “effects”

test. See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984). Plaintiffs proceed under a

straightforward application of the Calder effects test, but first advance a “stream of 

commerce” theory, as an alternate method of establishing specific jurisdiction. 

Case 4:19-cv-05611-PJH Document 77 Filed 03/16/20 Page 8 of 15
9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

i. Stream of Commerce

Plaintiffs contend that a stream of commerce theory is appropriate to find specific 

jurisdiction. Opp. at 5. Stream of commerce does not lend itself to a clear statement of 

law because the leading Supreme Court opinions, Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior 

Court of California, Solano County, 480 U.S. 102 (1987), and J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. 

v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011), were plurality opinions and resulted in competing

standards. In Asahi, Justices O’Conner and Brennan issued opinions, each garnering 

the support of four Justices. The opinions differed over whether a plaintiff must 

demonstrate something more than a defendant’s awareness that the stream of 

commerce may result in the product being marketed in the forum state. Asahi, 480 U.S. 

at 112 (plurality opinion) (The placement of a product into the stream of commerce, 

without more, is not an act of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum 

State. . . .” (citations omitted)); id. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring 

in the judgment) (“As long as a participant in [the stream-of-commerce] process is aware 

that the final product is being marketed in the forum State, the possibility of a lawsuit 

there cannot come as a surprise . . . .”). Both opinions predicated their different analyses 

on the same end result: the product in question would end up in the forum state. 

Decades later, J. McIntyre Machinery, also resulted in a plurality opinion and no clear 

holding. Yet, the predicate requirement of the product reaching the forum state 

remained. J. McIntyre Machinery, 564 U.S. at 881–82 (plurality opinion) (“[A] defendant’s 

placing goods into the stream of commerce ‘with the expectation that they will be 

purchased by consumers in the forum State’ may indicate purposeful availment.” (quoting 

World–Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 298 (1980))). 

Plaintiffs’ stream of commerce theory does not satisfy McIntyre or Asahi. The 

critical element running throughout the various stream of commerce tests is that the

defendant places goods in the stream of commerce “with the expectation that they will be 

purchased by consumers in the forum State.” J. McIntyre Machinery, 564 U.S. at 881–

82; see also Asahi, 480 U.S. at 117 (“As long as a participant in [the stream-ofCase 4:19-cv-05611-PJH Document 77 Filed 03/16/20 Page 9 of 15
10

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

commerce] process is aware that the final product is being marketed in the forum State, 

the possibility of a lawsuit there cannot come as a surprise . . . .”). Applying here, it is 

clear that defendant Plastic Ingenuity did not place its product into the stream of 

commerce for purchase by California consumers. It only sent prototypes to California so 

that Fresh Express could test the prototypes—they were not for consumer purchase. 

Notably, the finished product was shipped for resale to Georgia and defendant never 

marketed the accused salad container in California. Kuehn Decl. ¶¶ 4–5. Further, 

defendant states that “[n]one of Plastic Ingenuity’s California sales were derived from the 

accused product at issue in this lawsuit.” Id. ¶ 9. The facts demonstrate an isolated 

incident, sending prototypes to Fresh Express’ facility, that did not seek to serve the 

California market.

Plaintiffs cite Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp., 21 F.3d 1558, 1565 

(Fed. Cir. 1994), as an exemplary case where a court found specific jurisdiction based on 

inserting a single product into the stream of commerce. That case does not counsel a 

different result. In Beverly Hills Fan, the defendants shipped a fan, only once, to the 

forum state through an established distribution channel. Id. The Federal Circuit found 

such an intentional act sufficient under either Justice O’Connor’s or Justice Brennan’s

stream of commerce analysis because the defendants placed the fan into commerce, 

knew the likely destination of the fan, and their conduct was such that they should 

reasonably have anticipated being brought to court there. Id. at 1566. Yet, the predicate 

fact in Beverly Hills was that the defendants knew or could have foreseen the product 

would end up in the forum state. Id. at 1564 (“[I]t can be presumed that the distribution 

channel formed by defendants and [their intermediary] was intentionally established, and 

that defendants knew, or reasonably could have foreseen, that a termination point of the 

channel was Virginia.”). Here, defendant has submitted facts, unchallenged by plaintiffs, 

that demonstrate that the product in question was not marketed to California consumers 

and not intended for sale in California. Defendant did not have any sales in California 

relating to the product and thus no expectation of being haled into court in California.

Case 4:19-cv-05611-PJH Document 77 Filed 03/16/20 Page 10 of 15
11

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Thus, a stream of commerce theory does not apply.

ii. Purposeful Direction

Plaintiffs also argue the Calder effects test demonstrates purposeful direction. 

Under the Calder effects test, plaintiffs must show that the defendant (1) committed an 

intentional act, (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, (3) causing harm that the 

defendant knows is likely to be suffered in the forum state. 465 U.S. at 789–90. 

For the first element, plaintiffs have identified an intentional act—sending 

prototype salad containers to Fresh Express’s facility in California for testing—which 

defendant does not contest. Accordingly, plaintiffs meet the first element of the Calder

test.

The second element “asks whether the defendant’s allegedly tortious action was 

‘expressly aimed at the forum.’” Picot, 780 F.3d at 1214 (quoting Brayton Purcell LLP v. 

Recordon & Recordon, 606 F.3d 1124, 1129 (9th Cir. 2010), abrogated on other grounds 

by Walden, 571 U.S. 277). In Walden v. Fiore, the Supreme Court rejected an 

interpretation of Calder predicated on the defendants’ “knowledge of [the plaintiffs’] 

‘strong forum connections,’” combined with the plaintiffs’ “foreseeable harm” suffered in 

the forum State. 571 U.S. at 289 (citation omitted). Instead, a court “must look to the 

defendant’s ‘own contacts’ with the forum, not to the defendant’s knowledge of a 

plaintiff’s connections to a forum.” Axiom Foods, Inc. v. Acerchem Int’l, Inc., 874 F.3d 

1064, 1070 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Walden, 571 U.S. at 289). “Calder made clear that 

mere injury to a forum resident is not a sufficient connection to the forum. . . . The proper 

question is not where the plaintiff experienced a particular injury or effect but whether the 

defendant’s conduct connects him to the forum in a meaningful way.” Walden, 571 U.S. 

at 290. 

This question is especially relevant for intellectual property cases, such as 

plaintiffs’ design patent and trade dress claims. Prior to Walden, courts in this circuit had

found that specific jurisdiction exists where “a plaintiff files suit in its home state against 

an out-of-state defendant and alleges that defendant intentionally infringed its intellectual 

Case 4:19-cv-05611-PJH Document 77 Filed 03/16/20 Page 11 of 15
12

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

property rights knowing [the plaintiff] was located in the forum state.” Adobe Sys. Inc. v. 

Blue Source Grp., Inc., 125 F. Supp. 3d 945, 961 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (alteration in original) 

(quoting Amini Innovation Corp. v. JS Imports, Inc., 497 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1105 (C.D. 

Cal. 2007)). In Axiom Foods, the Ninth Circuit explicitly recognized that Walden clarified

that express aiming requires something more than knowledge of plaintiffs’ connection to 

the forum state and foreseeable harm to plaintiffs, which earlier Ninth Circuit opinions 

characterized as “individualized targeting.” 874 F.3d at 1069 (citing Wash. Shoe Co. v. 

A-Z Sporting Goods Inc., 704 F.3d 668, 678–79 (9th Cir. 2012); and Brayton Purcell, 606 

F.3d at 1130). The Axiom Foods court held that “while a theory of individualized targeting 

may remain relevant to the minimum contacts inquiry, it will not, on its own, support the 

exercise of specific jurisdiction, absent compliance with what Walden requires.” Id. at 

1070. District courts have recognized that plaintiffs can no longer show express aiming 

simply by alleging the defendant knew of the plaintiff’s forum connections and could 

reasonably foresee the harm in that forum. Cisco Sys. Inc. v. Link US, LLC, No. 18-CV07576-CRB, 2019 WL 6682838, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2019); Graco Minn. Inc. v. PF 

Brands, Inc., No. 18-CV-1690-WQH-AGS, 2019 WL 1746580, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 

2019); Anaya v. Machines de Triage et Broyage, No. 18-CV-01731-DMR, 2019 WL 

1083783, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2019). 

Axiom Foods’ holding is applicable here. According to plaintiffs, defendant knew 

that, once the prototypes were finalized, Fresh Express would then sell imitation products 

in California. Opp. at 7. Plaintiffs argue that California is the focal point of their harm 

because Five Star’s business is centered in California and thus the brunt of the harm Five 

Star suffers from the imitation product is in California. Id. at 7–8. This is precisely the 

sort of plaintiff-centered harm that Walden and Axiom Foods foreclosed. The appropriate 

inquiry is into the defendant’s relationship to California. In Axiom Foods, the Ninth Circuit 

determined that distribution of an email newsletter that allegedly violated trademarks to 

ten California recipients out of 343 total recipients did not meet the express aiming 

requirement. 874 F.3d at 1070. The court found it persuasive that the defendant “sent 

Case 4:19-cv-05611-PJH Document 77 Filed 03/16/20 Page 12 of 15
13

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

one newsletter to a maximum of ten recipients located in California, in a market where 

[the defendant] has no sales or clients.” Id. at 1071. Here, defendant did not have any 

sales of the infringing product in California and the prototypes sent to California have a 

remote connection to the ultimate harm. 

Finally, under the third element of the Calder test, the court must examine whether 

the intentional act caused harm that defendant knew was likely to be suffered in 

California. Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that defendant knew any harm would likely 

be suffered in California. First, defendants have submitted an uncontroverted declaration 

that Plastic Ingenuity did not market the product in question in California and did not 

derive any sales in California from the accused product. Kuehn Decl. ¶¶ 5, 9. This 

demonstrates that defendant did not know of any sales in California, much less any 

potential harm caused by sale of its product. 

Second, plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged that Plastic Ingenuity actually knew 

Five Star, Direct Pack, or their products when defendant shipped the prototypes to Fresh 

Express’ facility. The SAC alleges that Plastic Ingenuity first received notice of possible 

infringement through this litigation. The third cause of action for design patent 

infringement alleges that “Five Star has given notice to Plastic Ingenuity [of the 

infringement] through this complaint.” SAC ¶ 43. The fifth cause of action for trade dress 

infringement contains no allegation that Plastic Ingenuity knew of the infringement prior to 

this case. See id. ¶¶ 51–61. The sixth cause of action for active inducement of trade 

dress infringement contains a conclusory allegation that “Defendants Proseal and Plastic 

Ingenuity were aware of Five Star’s use in commerce of its distinctive trade dress 

packaging.” Id. ¶ 63. The SAC indicates that defendant did not know at the time of the 

intentional act (shipping prototypes) that a harm was likely to be suffered in California. 

When combined with the inadequate express aiming theory, plaintiffs have not carried 

their burden to establish purposeful direction using the Calder effects test.

iii. Arises Out Of or Relates To

Considering the second prong of the specific jurisdiction test confirms that specific 

Case 4:19-cv-05611-PJH Document 77 Filed 03/16/20 Page 13 of 15
14

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

jurisdiction is not appropriate. Plaintiffs contend that, but for defendant’s sending 

prototypes to California in cooperation with Fresh Express’s efforts to make a replica of 

Five Star’s salad container, their claims would not have arisen. Opp. at 8. Defendant 

states that plaintiffs’ claims are based on activities that occur outside California: 

manufacturing the salad container and selling it to Fresh Express. Reply at 4. 

The second prong of the specific jurisdiction analysis requires the court to 

determine whether plaintiffs’ claims “arise[] out of or relate to” a defendant’s forum related 

conduct. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 473 (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, 

S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984)). The Ninth Circuit has characterized the second 

specific jurisdiction prong as a “but for” test. In re W. States Wholesale Natural Gas 

Antitrust Litig., 715 F.3d at 742 (citing Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 385 

(9th Cir.1990), rev’d on other grounds, Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585

(1991)). The Federal Circuit appears to take a more flexible approach than a “but for” 

test, having held that the words “relate to” permit a more relaxed standard than the arise 

out of standard. See Inamed Corp. v. Kuzmak, 249 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 

(citing Akro Corp. v. Luker, 45 F.3d 1541, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).

Plaintiffs’ direct and indirect trade dress and design patent infringement claims 

arise out of Fresh Express’ alleged infringing product. See, e.g., SAC ¶ 57 (“Plastic 

Ingenuity has manufactured and sold to Fresh Express . . . pre-packaged products . . . 

that infringe on Five Star’s trade dress.”); ¶ 65 (“Plastic Ingenuity has provided the 

infringing packaging to Fresh Express with the express intention of aiding Fresh Express 

in its use of the infringing packaging in commerce.”). That product is manufactured in 

Wisconsin and then shipped for resale to Georgia. Kuehn Decl. ¶ 4. Plaintiffs’ claims do 

not arise out of defendant’s California activities.

Even if the court were to take a more flexible view (as indicated by the Federal 

Circuit for the design patent claim) of the causal connection between the prototypes and 

the final infringing product, plaintiffs’ argument suffers from a further defect. Fresh 

Express, rather than defendant, made the ultimate decision as to where the allegedly 

Case 4:19-cv-05611-PJH Document 77 Filed 03/16/20 Page 14 of 15
15

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

infringing product was to be sold. As the SAC alleges, “Plastic Ingenuity has 

manufactured and sold to Fresh Express, and Fresh Express has sold and offered for 

sale to retailers and the general public, packaging to which the patented design, or a 

colorable imitation thereof, has been applied, and has thereby infringed the ’665 and ’666 

patents. SAC ¶ 41 (emphasis added); see also id. ¶ 57 (“Plastic Ingenuity has 

manufactured and sold to Fresh Express, Fresh Express has offered for sale and sold, 

pre-packaged products, as exemplified in Exhibit 5 hereto that infringe on Five Star’s 

trade dress.” (emphasis added)). Any causal impact of the prototypes on the final 

product is further disassociated from plaintiffs’ claims due to Fresh Express’ resale of the 

product to the general public. 

Accordingly, plaintiffs have not demonstrated how their claims arise out of or relate 

to defendant’s lone contact with the forum. The court finds that plaintiffs have not 

satisfied the first two prongs of the specific jurisdiction analysis and, therefore, the court 

need not consider the third prong or the Rule 12(b)(3) motion for improper venue. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that it lacks personal jurisdiction over 

Plastic Ingenuity. Accordingly, the court GRANTS defendant’s motion to dismiss and 

plaintiff’s claims against defendant Plastic Ingenuity, Inc. are DISMISSED WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE. See Grigsby v. CMI Corp., 765 F.2d 1369, 1372 n.5 (9th Cir. 1985) 

(holding that district courts without personal jurisdiction should dismiss claims without 

prejudice). Plaintiff may refile in another jurisdiction that may properly exercise personal 

jurisdiction over Plastic Ingenuity. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 16, 2020

/s/ Phyllis J. Hamilton

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

Case 4:19-cv-05611-PJH Document 77 Filed 03/16/20 Page 15 of 15