Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_12-cv-08084/USCOURTS-azd-3_12-cv-08084-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Shawn Christian Reel, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

CV 12-8084-PCT-JAT (JFM)

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court is Petitioner Shawn Reel’s (“Petitioner”) Petition for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus (the “Petition”). (Doc. 1). Respondents filed an Answer to the 

Petition. (Doc. 11). Petitioner filed a Reply. (Doc. 14). The case was assigned to a 

Magistrate Judge and he issued a Report and Recommendation (“R & R”), 

recommending that this Court deny the Petition and the certificate of appealability. 

(Doc. 15 at 1, 25). Petitioner filed objections (“Objections”) to the R & R. (Doc. 17). 

The Court now reviews Petitioner’s Objections, and rules on the Petition and the 

request for certificate of appealability. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background 

 The R & R summarized the factual and procedural history, and Petitioner did 

not object to this history. (Doc. 15 at 1-5; Doc. 17). The Court adopts the R & R’s 

history in this case. For ease of reference, that history is as follows: 

Facts: Petitioner was enlisted by D.M. to supervise her 14 year old 

daughter, K.M., every Wednesday night while the mother worked the grave 

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yard shift. Over the course of the next month or so, Petitioner engaged in 

sexual intercourse with K.M. approximately 30 to 40 times, as well as oral 

sex on each occasion. A suggestive email between Petitioner and K.M. was 

discovered, an investigation ensued, the victim described the conduct, 

Petitioner made incriminating remarks in a phone confrontation with the 

victim, incriminating physical evidence was recovered, and Petitioner 

admitted to the conduct. [Doc. 14 at 3-4]. 

Proceedings at Trial: Petitioner was indicted in Yavapai County Superior 

Court on a 17 count indictment alleging “sexual intercourse or oral sexual 

contact” between Petitioner and the victim on dates ranging from December 

17, 2008 through February 5, 2009. [Doc. 11-1 at 21-23]. An Addendum 

was filed alleging the crimes were “dangerous crimes against children” 

under the Arizona statues. [Id. at 25-26]. 

Subsequently counsel filed a Motion to remand the matter to the grand jury 

for a new finding of probable cause, arguing that: (1) testimony before the 

grand jury about statements by Petitioner’s wife violated the marital 

privilege under Arizona law; (2) there was improper testimony about 

potential punishment; and (3) the testifying office mischaracterized the 

evidence about Petitioner’s motivation and that the emails were sexually 

suggestive. [Id. at 28-40]. The motion was apparently not ruled upon. 

On June 9, 2009, Petitioner entered into a written Plea Agreement, wherein 

Petitioner agreed to plead guilty to one count of sexual conduct with a 

minor, and three counts of attempted sexual conduct with a minor, with the 

stipulation of a minimum sentence of [twenty] years on the first charge, and 

lifetime probation on the remaining charges, and that all prison terms would 

be flat time. [Id. at 51-58]. In exchange, the remaining charges were 

dismissed, and a cap was placed on restitution. [Id.] 

Petitioner entered his guilty plea on the same date. In the course of 

eliciting a factual basis, the Court inquired about Petitioner’s conduct with 

the minor: 

THE COURT: And in the time frame December 17th to 

23rd, 2008, did you engage in sexual intercourse or oral 

sexual conduct with [K.M.]? 

THE DEFENDANT [aka “Petitioner”]: Yes, sir. 

THE COURT: Which was it? Both of those or – 

THE DEFENDANT: Both, sir. 

THE COURT: Okay. So oral sex as well as vaginal sex? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 

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THE COURT: On the time frame December -- Christmas 

Eve, December 24th to December 30th, 2008, did you have 

sex with her in the same fashion or attempt to have sex with 

her in the same fashion? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 

THE COURT: Which was it? Did you in fact engage in oral 

sex? 

THE DEFENDANT: I think it was vaginal sex. 

THE COURT: Vaginal sex. And for Count V, talking about 

attempted sexual conduct with a minor, also. December 31st, 

so New Year’s Eve 2008 to January 6th, the first week of 

2009, did you again have sex with [K.M.]? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 

THE COURT: Vaginal sex? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 

THE COURT: And then finally, February 5th, 2009, did you 

have vaginal sex with [K.M.] on that occasion? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 

 

 [Id. at 92-93]. The Court then asked for additions to the factual basis from 

the prosecution and defense counsel. Defense counsel replied: 

MR. GUNDACKER: Judge, for clarification, I think my 

client answered he believed on one of the counts that it was 

sexual intercourse. And I think the reason for that answer is - 

- the indictment is charged the way it is because I think the 

victim stated that they had sex at least twice a week during 

the certain course of a period of time, and that’s the way the 

indictment is charged. And that is why, I think, the plea 

agreement alternates counts that he is pleading to, if you just 

plead to one count per week. And I think that’s what my 

client is basically saying. 

If you are asking him to recall specifically a date, he can’t, 

but he certainly can admit that once a week throughout that 

time frame he had sexual intercourse with the victim. Is that 

correct? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 

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THE COURT: That was how you were answering my 

question, Mr. Reel? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 

[Id. at 93-94]. The Court accepted the plea, and set sentencing. Petitioner 

appeared for sentencing on July 6, 2009 and was sentenced to the 

presumptive sentence of [twenty] years flat time on the completed sexual 

conduct charge, and to a suspended sentence and lifetime probation on the 

remaining counts. [Id. at 99-113, 115-18]. 

Proceedings on Direct Appeal: Petitioner did not file a direct appeal. 

[Doc. 1]. 

Proceedings on Post-Conviction Relief [“PCR”]: On September 28, 

2009, Petitioner filed a [PCR Notice]. [Doc. 11-1 at 120-24]. Petitioner 

then (with the assistance of advisory counsel) filed a pro per [PCR 

Petition], raising arguments that: (1) the court lacked subject matter 

jurisdiction as a result of a fatally flawed indictment; (2) the plea was not 

voluntarily and intelligently made; and (3) counsel was ineffective. [Id. at 

126-44]. 

The PCR court found that none of the claims were colorable and summarily 

denied the petition. [Id. at 146-47]. 

Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review, raising the same issues. [Id. at 

149-61]. The Arizona Court of Appeals summarily denied review on 

March 28, 2012. [Id. at 165]. 

Present Federal Habeas Proceedings: 

Petition - Petitioner commenced the current case by filing his Petition for 

Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on April 30, 2012. 

[Doc. 1]. Petitioner’s Petition asserts the following three grounds for relief: 

(1) the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the indictment 

was “fatally flawed” in violation of the Fifth Amendment; 

(2) [Petitioner] did not enter his plea knowingly and voluntarily in violation 

of the Fourteenth Amendment; and 

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(3) [Petitioner] received the ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of 

his Sixth Amendment rights. [Id.]. 

Response - On August 30, 2012, Respondents filed their Response 

(“Answer”). [Doc. 11]. Respondents argue that Ground [one, jurisdiction] 

is a state law claim and is not cognizable in a federal habeas proceeding. 

[Id.]. Respondents concede exhaustion of and argue the meritlessness of 

Grounds [two and three]. [Id.]. 

Reply - On September 11, 2012, Petitioner filed a Reply. [Doc. 14]. 

Petitioner argues that Ground [one] is cognizable because the underlying 

flaws in the indictment rendered the proceeding fundamentally unfair, that 

challenges to subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time, and [that] 

his plea cannot foreclose his [challenge] to the indictment. [Id.]. Petitioner 

further argues the merits of his Grounds 2 and 3. [Id.]. 

II. Review of Report and Recommendation 

On December 10, 2012, the Magistrate Judge filed an R & R recommending that 

the Petition be denied. (Doc. 15). This Court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole 

or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1)(C). 

 On December 20, 2012, Petitioner filed his Objections to the R & R. (Doc. 17). 

“The court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the [R & R] to 

which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). “[T]he district judge must review 

the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations de novo if objection is made, but 

not otherwise.” United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en 

banc) (emphasis in original); Schmidt v. Johnstone, 263 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1226 (D. 

Ariz. 2003) (“Following Reyna-Tapia, this Court concludes that de novo review of 

factual and legal issues is required if objections are made, ‘but not otherwise.’”); 

Klamath Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 589 F.3d 1027, 1032 

(9th Cir. 2009) (the district court “must review de novo the portions of the [Magistrate 

Judge’s] recommendations to which the parties object.”). District courts are not 

required to conduct “any review at all . . . of any issue that is not the subject of an 

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objection.” Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985) (emphasis added). 

 The R & R recommends that this Court deny the Petition on each ground 

asserted by Petitioner. (Doc. 15). Petitioner objected to the recommendation on each 

ground. (Doc. 17). Therefore, this Court will review the claims for relief de novo.

III. Review of a State Court Judgment 

Petitioner filed his Petition under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 

Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). (Doc. 1 at 1); see 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In this case, Petitioner is 

in custody pursuant to a state court judgment. (Doc. 11-1 at 21, 51). 

 

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted 

with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court 

proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim-- 

 (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

 (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State 

court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Additionally, “[a]n application for a writ of habeas corpus may be 

denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the 

remedies available in the courts of the State.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). 

 To apply the standards of 28 U.S.C. § 2254, a “federal court should review the 

‘last reasoned decision’ by a state court,” which is difficult “when the state court 

provided no rationale for its decision on the merits.” Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 

1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). If the state court provides no rationale for its decision, the 

federal court independently reviews the record to assess whether the state court decision 

was objectively unreasonable under controlling federal law. Himes v. Thompson, 336 

F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct 770, 784-85 

(2011) (holding that a state court decision that did not provide reasons is still on the 

merits and entitled to AEDPA deference). Thus, although the record is reviewed 

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independently, the federal court nevertheless defers to the state court’s ultimate 

decision. Himes, 336 F.3d at 853. 

 Here, the state superior court denied Petitioner’s Petition for Post-Conviction 

Relief (“PCR”). (Doc. 11-1 at 146-47). The court held that there were “no claims 

presenting a material issue of fact or law which would entitle the Defendant to relief 

under Rule 32 and no purpose would be served by any further proceedings.” (Doc. 11-

1 at 146). The court concluded that Petitioner failed to “present a colorable claim for 

relief,” and dismissed the PCR Petition. (Id. at 146-47). The Arizona Court of Appeals 

summarily denied review of the superior court’s decision. (Id. at 165). 

IV. Claims in the Petition 

 A. Ground One—Jurisdiction 

Petitioner originally argued in his Petition that the state court lacked jurisdiction 

because his charges came from a fatally-flawed indictment. (Doc. 1 at 6). Petitioner 

alleged that the indictment was flawed because it lacked sufficient facts for him to 

know the charges against him. (Id.). Petitioner argued that the indictment lacked 

sufficient facts because it included date ranges rather than specific dates and did not 

differentiate between sex acts. (Id.). 

 Respondent answered and argued that a guilty plea precludes a constitutional 

challenge of pre-pleading issues in a federal habeas proceeding. (Doc. 11 at 9-10) 

(citing Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508 (1984) (if advised by competent counsel, a 

defendant’s voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty may not be collaterally attacked in a 

federal habeas proceeding) (overruled in part on other grounds by Puckett v. United 

States, 556 U.S. 129 (2009)); United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 573 (1989) (a guilty 

plea forecloses a collateral challenge); United States v. Lopez-Armenta, 400 F.3d 1173, 

1175 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[I]t is well-settled that an unconditional guilty plea constitutes a 

waiver of the right to appeal all nonjurisdictional antecedent rulings and cures all 

antecedent constitutional defects.”); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56-57 (1985) (when 

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a defendant pleads guilty upon the advice of counsel, he may only attack the voluntary 

and intelligent character of the guilty plea)). 

 The Magistrate Judge recommended that this Court deny relief on Ground One 

for two reasons. First, this Court should deny relief because errors of state law, 

generally, cannot form the basis for habeas relief. And, second, this Court should deny 

relief because, under Tollett v. Henderson,

1

 Petitioner’s properly-entered guilty plea 

was a break in the chain of events that precluded any further challenges to the 

indictment. (Doc. 15 at 7-9). Petitioner objected arguing: (1) jurisdiction can be raised 

at any time, and (2) a guilty plea does not waive a jurisdictional challenge. (Doc. 17 at 

2-3). 

 1. Habeas relief is not available based on state law errors 

 Petitioner objects to the conclusion in the R & R that this Court cannot review 

the issue of whether the state court had jurisdiction. (Doc. 17 at 2-3) (citing Rojas v. 

Kimble, 361 P.2d 403, 406 (Ariz. 1961) (“jurisdiction may not be waived and can be 

raised at any stage of the proceedings”)). Under Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 

(1991), a federal habeas court cannot reexamine state court determinations of state law 

questions. 

 This Court agrees with the R & R that this Court cannot review the state law 

issue of whether the state court had jurisdiction. (Doc. 15 at 7). This Court reaches this 

 

1

 In Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973), the Supreme Court stated: 

[A] guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which has 

preceded it in the criminal process. When a criminal defendant has 

solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense 

with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims 

relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to 

the entry of the guilty plea. He may only attack the voluntary and 

intelligent character of the guilty plea by showing that the advice he 

received from counsel was not within the standards set forth in McMann

[v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770 (1970)].

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conclusion because, by denying relief on Petitioner’s PCR petition, the state PCR courts 

effectively concluded that the state trial court had jurisdiction. This Court cannot 

review the state court’s decision regarding state law. Accordingly, the R & R is 

accepted and relief on Ground One is denied. 

 2. Guilty plea waiver of jurisdictional challenge 

 As discussed above, this Court has already determined that it generally cannot 

review a question of state law in the habeas context. Petitioner argues, however, that he 

may raise a challenge to jurisdiction at any time. (Doc. 17 at 2). In Wright v. Angelone, 

151 F.3d 151, 158 (4th Cir. 1998), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals suggested that an 

error of state procedural law might be a basis for habeas review if such error resulted in 

a defect in the indictment that resulted in a “complete miscarriage of justice” arising 

from, “a violation of the defendant’s most fundamental rights.” Any such exception 

would not apply in this case because Petitioner waived any defects in the indictment by 

pleading guilty. 

 As discussed above, in Tollett, the United States Supreme Court held that a 

guilty plea is a break in the chain of events that precludes a subsequent constitutional 

challenge. 411 U.S. at 267. As a result, the only available basis for habeas relief in 

Petitioner’s situation would be for Petitioner to show his counsel was ineffective, and 

that as a result of that ineffectiveness, Petitioner’s plea was not voluntarily and 

intelligently entered. Id.

Petitioner argues he never specifically waived a challenge to the indictment in 

his plea agreement. (Doc. 17 at 2). Nonetheless, the waiver was inherent to the entry 

of the plea. See Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267. Under Tollett, Petitioner broke the chain of 

events by pleading guilty and cannot now make claims based on defects in the 

indictment. Accordingly, for this alternative reason, the Court will deny Petitioner’s 

request for habeas relief on his theory that the state court lacked jurisdiction over his 

case. To the extent Petitioner has argued that his plea was not voluntarily and 

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intelligently entered, the Court will address that argument below in Ground Two. 

B. Ground Two—Knowing and Voluntary Plea 

Petitioner alleged in the Petition that he did not enter his plea voluntarily and 

intelligently for two reasons: (1) because the indictment and plea agreement were not 

clear about the crimes committed; and (2) because the plea agreement did not protect 

him from double jeopardy. (Doc. 1 at 7). The Magistrate Judge recommended that this 

Court deny relief on Ground Two because, although Petitioner claimed he did not enter 

his plea voluntarily and intelligently, Petitioner failed to claim that this was due to 

ineffective assistance of counsel. (Doc. 15 at 10). The Magistrate Judge relied on Hill 

v Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56-57 (1985), which held that a defendant who pleads guilty 

with advice of counsel may only attack the knowing and intelligent character of the plea 

by showing ineffective advice from that counsel. (Doc. 15 at 9). 

 Petitioner objects to the denial of Ground Two, arguing he did not voluntarily 

and intelligently enter his plea because no one at the plea hearing understood the 

charges and because the State did not prove the victim’s age before relying on it for 

sentencing. (Doc. 17 at 3-4). Consistent with Hill, this Court accepts and adopts the 

recommendation of the R & R that this Court cannot consider a direct claim that the 

plea was not voluntarily and intelligently entered when such a claim is not brought as 

an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. To the extend in Ground Three Petitioner 

argues in his objections that his plea was not voluntary and intelligent due to ineffective 

assistance of counsel, the Court will address that claim below. 

C. Ground Three—Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

 Petitioner argues in his Petition that his counsel failed to subject the prosecution 

to meaningful challenge and failed to perform discovery. (Doc. 1 at 8-9). The R & R 

recommends this Court deny relief on these theories. (Doc. 15 at 12-19). The R &R 

makes this recommendation because these challenges (counsel’s failure to move to 

remand to the grand jury, failure to file a motion to suppress, failure to conduct pretrial 

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discovery, failure to discuss strategy, and failure to challenge the sufficiency of the 

indictment) were all waived when Petitioner pled guilty. (Doc. 15 at 13 (citing Moran 

v. Godinez, 57 F.3d 690, 700 (9th Cir. 1994) (pre-plea ineffective assistance of counsel 

unrelated to the plea itself is waived by a guilty plea))). Petitioner does not reassert 

these theories of relief in his Objections. (Doc. 17 at 5-6). The Court hereby adopts 

and accepts the recommendation in the R & R that this Court deny relief on these 

theories. 

 In his Objections, Petitioner argues that the ineffectiveness of his counsel caused 

his plea to not be voluntarily and intelligently entered. (Doc. 17 at 7). Petitioner 

reiterates that in the plea agreement and at the plea hearing, it was impossible to 

establish which crime occurred during what specific time period. (Doc. 17 at 6). 

Petitioner argues that he, his counsel, and the court “merely guess[ed]” to correlate a 

crime to an indictment count, making his plea neither voluntary nor intelligent. (Id.). 

 Under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) and its progeny, “[a]n 

ineffective assistance claim has two components: A petitioner must show that counsel’s 

performance was deficient, and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense. To establish 

deficient performance, a petitioner must demonstrate that counsel’s representation fell 

below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 

(2003) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 

 In his objections, Petitioner acknowledges that generally one must analyze an 

ineffective assistance claim under Strickland. However, Petitioner argues Missouri v. 

Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1405 (2012), extended the requirement of effective assistance of 

counsel to the plea negotiation stage of the case; and claims that analyzing his claim 

under only Strickland is error. (Doc. 17 at 6). Unlike this case, Frye involved an 

attorney who failed to inform his client of a plea offer. Id. at 1405. Here, Petitioner 

accepted a plea offer, so clearly his counsel communicated the plea to him. (Doc. 11-1 

at 57). 

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 Moreover, in Frye, the Supreme Court held that “ineffective assistance of 

counsel in the plea bargain context [is] governed by the two-part test set forth in 

Strickland.” Id. at 1405 (citing Hill, 474 U.S. at 57). Thus, this Court must analyze 

Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel under this two-part test, which, 

as discussed above, requires Petitioner to prove that: (1) counsel’s performance was 

deficient, and (2) that deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 687. 

 1. Deficient Performance 

 To establish deficient performance, Petitioner must show that counsel’s 

representation “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” and was “outside 

the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. at 

521 (citation omitted); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. Petitioner argues that his counsel 

failed to challenge the lack of specificity regarding the sexual acts and dates of 

occurrence in the charges to which Petitioner pled guilty. (Doc. 17 at 5-6). Petitioner 

contends that under United State v. Bradley, 381 F.3d 641 (7th Cir. 2004), a plea is not 

intelligent if everyone involved misunderstood the nature of the charges. (Doc. 17 at 

7). However, in Bradley the prosecutor misstated what was required to prove the 

offense charged. 381 F.3d at 646. Here, unlike Bradley, the plea agreement and 

discussion on the record at the plea hearing were accurate. (Doc. 11-1 at 51, 64). 

 Additionally, Frye affirmed cases holding that the court and counsel can 

establish a defendant’s understanding of the plea by making a record at the plea 

hearing. 132 S. Ct. at 1406. Accordingly, the record made at the time of the plea 

hearing in this case is evidence that Petitioner voluntarily and intelligently entered his 

guilty plea. 

 Specifically, at the plea hearing, Petitioner’s attorney addressed the court about 

the range of dates and types of sexual acts in the indictment and plea agreement, and the 

judge questioned Petitioner regarding the factual basis of his plea. (Doc. 11-1 at 93-

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94). The judge questioned Petitioner as to whether he had sexual activity with the 

minor during those periods of time; and, Petitioner acknowledged on the record that he 

did. (Id. at 94). This record from the plea hearing establishes that Petitioner’s counsel 

acted reasonably and that Petitioner voluntarily and intelligently entered his plea. 

Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to establish deficient performance by his counsel. 

 2. Prejudice 

 To establish prejudice, a petitioner must show a reasonable probability that the 

outcome would have been different without the alleged deficient performance of 

counsel. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A reasonable probability is one that undermines 

confidence in the outcome. Id. In the case of a petitioner who pled guilty, Petitioner 

must establish reasonable probability that he would not have pled guilty and would 

have insisted on going to trial if his counsel had provided effective assistance. Hill, 474 

U.S. at 60. 

 Petitioner alleges in his Objections that his counsel committed unprofessional 

errors. (Doc. 17 at 5). He argues that but for those errors, he would not have entered 

the guilty plea and would have gone to trial. (Id.). As the R & R notes, Petitioner enter 

a plea with a sentencing range of 13 to 27 years, and Petitioner received a sentence of 

20 years. (Doc. 15 at 23). However, if Petitioner had gone to trial, he faced a minimum 

sentence 221 years and a maximum sentence of 459 years. (Id.). Additionally, there 

was overwhelming evidence of Petitioner’s guilt including the physical evidence and 

Petitioner’s own admissions. 

 Petitioner still fails to offer any factual defense to the charges against him. 

Instead, Petitioner simply claims he would have gone to trial because he did not 

understand his plea.2

 Given how favorable Petitioner’s plea was in the face of the 

 

2

 Specifically, Petitioner’s argument that he would have gone to trial is as follows: 

It’s like a fortuneteller trying to quote scripture to a Christian. In fact, speaking of “fortunetelling,” the [Magistrate Judge] merely denies the 

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evidence against Petitioner and the potential sentence Petitioner was facing, even if 

Petitioner’s counsel’s performance was deficient, Petitioner was not prejudiced. 

Accordingly, relief on this claim will be denied. 

V. Certificate of Appealability (“COA”) 

A judge may issue a COA “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing 

of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). The standards for 

granting a COA are the same for petitions under § 2254 and § 2255. See United States 

v. Martin, 226 F.3d 1042, 1046 n.4 (9th Cir. 2000). “Where a district court has rejected 

the constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) is 

straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483-84 (2000). 

“When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds 

without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a COA 

should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason 

would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the 

denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” 

 Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. at 484. 

 In this case, as to Petitioner’s first two Grounds, the Court finds that jurists of 

reason would not find this Court’s procedural ruling debatable. As to Petitioner’s third 

Ground, the Court finds that Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial 

of a constitutional right. Therefore, the Court will deny Petitioner’s request for a COA. 

 Petitioner relief because somehow the Petitioner did not use his psychic powers in order to see into the future to determine that, “The defendant 

must show [] that but for counsel’s errors, he would have gone to trial or received a better plea bargain.” If even the Petitioner were able to 

accurately predict the outcome, would not this Court then accuse the 

Petitioner of being a “witch”? ... 

(Doc. 17 at 5). 

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VI. Conclusion 

IT IS ORDERED that the R & R (Doc. 15) is accepted and adopted, the 

Objections (Doc. 17) are overruled, the Petition (Doc. 1) is denied, with prejudice; the 

Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment accordingly. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to Rule 11 of the Rules Governing 

Section 2254 Cases, in the event Petitioner files an appeal, the Court denies issuance of 

a certificate of appealability. 

 Dated this 22nd day of May, 2013. 

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