Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_23-cv-00163/USCOURTS-caed-1_23-cv-00163-16/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JASON SCOTT HOUNIHAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

JOSE C. VILLASENOR,

Defendant.

No. 1:23-cv-00163-EPG (PC)

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 

OBJECTING TO DEPOSITIONS AND 

REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENT OF 

COUNSEL

(ECF No. 58)

Plaintiff Jason Scott Hounihan is a prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in 

this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This case proceeds on Plaintiff’s Eighth 

Amendment sexual assault claim against Defendant Villasenor based on Plaintiff’s allegations 

that Defendant instructed medical personnel to inspect Plaintiff’s rectum for contraband even 

though an x-ray revealed no contraband. (ECF No. 5). 

Now before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion related to notices he received from Defendant

for depositions of Plaintiff and two of Plaintiff’s witnesses. (ECF No. 58). Plaintiff states that 

Defendant “should not be one doing the depositions but his defense counsel.” (ECF No. 58 at 3). 

Plaintiff also states that since he is suing Defendant for sexual assault, he does not feel 

comfortable being in the same room as the Defendant. (Id.) Plaintiff also asks that the Court 

appoint counsel for him because Plaintiff’s case “has the merits to prevail at trial” and because 

Case 1:23-cv-00163-KES-EPG Document 63 Filed 12/26/23 Page 1 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

Plaintiff feels “an attorney would be more effective trial.” (Id.) Plaintiff also asks that an attorney 

be present for his deposition. (Id.) 

Pursuant to Court’s order (ECF No. 59), Defendant has filed a response, stating that all 

noticed depositions will be conducted by defense counsel and that Defendant will not be present 

at these depositions either in person or remotely. (ECF No. 60). Defendant attached copies of 

deposition notices served on the Plaintiff, including the notice of Plaintiff’s deposition scheduled 

for January 3, 2024, at 10:30 a.m. at the Bob Wiley Detention Center. (Id. at 4).

The Court interprets Plaintiff’s motion as a motion for a protective order under Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) and a motion to appoint counsel. For the reasons stated below, the 

Court denies both motions. The Court also orders Plaintiff to attend his deposition currently 

noticed for January 3, 2024. Plaintiff is advised that failure to appear and participate in the 

deposition will subject him to sanctions.

I. MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER

A. Legal Standard

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c), a party from whom discovery is sought 

may move for a protective order in the court where the action is pending. The court may, for good 

cause, issue an order to protect a party from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue 

burden or expense. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). Options available to the court include, among other 

things, forbidding the disclosure or discovery, forbidding inquiry into certain matters, or limiting 

the scope of disclosure or discovery to certain matters. Id.

District courts have broad discretion to determine whether a protective order is 

appropriate and, if so, what degree of protection is warranted. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 

U.S. 20, 36 (1984); see also Phillips ex rel. Estates of Byrd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 

1211–12 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that the law gives district courts broad latitude to grant 

protective orders to prevent disclosure of materials for many types of information). The party 

seeking to limit discovery has the burden of proving “good cause,” which requires a showing 

“that specific prejudice or harm will result” if the protective order is not granted. In re Roman 

Catholic Archbishop of Portland, 661 F.3d 417, 424 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Foltz v. State Farm 

Case 1:23-cv-00163-KES-EPG Document 63 Filed 12/26/23 Page 2 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2003)); Westmoreland v. Regents of the Univ. 

of Cal., No. 2:17-cv-01922-TLN-AC, 2019 WL 932220, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2019).

Depositions are governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30, which states in pertinent 

part that “[a] party may, by oral questions, depose any person, including a party, without leave of 

court . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(1). Deposition questions may relate to “any nonprivileged 

matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). A witness is 

required to answer as to matters within his or her own knowledge. A failure to participate in

discovery is in violation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 30 and 37. Under Rule 30(d)(2), the court may impose 

sanctions for impeding, delaying, or frustrating the fair examination of the deponent. Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 37(d) authorizes the court “to impose a wide range of sanctions when a party 

fails to comply with the rules of discovery or with court orders enforcing those rules.” Wyle v. 

R.J. Reynolds Indus., Inc., 709 F.2d 585, 589 (9th Cir. 1983).

Likewise, the Court’s Scheduling Order contemplates Plaintiff’s deposition being taken 

and imposition of sanctions for failure to participate: 

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(a)(2)(B), Defendant(s) may depose 

any witness confined in a prison on the condition that, at least fourteen (14) days 

before such a deposition, Defendant(s) serve all parties with the notice required by 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(1). Plaintiff’s failure to participate in a 

properly noticed deposition could result in sanctions against Plaintiff, including 

monetary sanctions and/or dismissal of this case.

(ECF No. 34 at 2).

B. Analysis

Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of proving good cause for issuance of the protective 

order. Plaintiff claims that he feels uncomfortable in the same room as the Defendant and that 

Defendant’s counsel, not the Defendant himself should be taking the deposition. (ECF No. 58 at 

3). 

However, the Defendant will not be present at his deposition, which will be taken by 

Defendant’s counsel. (ECF No. 60 at 1). Likewise, depositions of the two witnesses will be 

conducted by counsel and Defendant will not be present. (Id. at 2). 

Accordingly, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s motion. 

Case 1:23-cv-00163-KES-EPG Document 63 Filed 12/26/23 Page 3 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

II. Request for Counsel

Plaintiff once again asks the Court to appoint counsel. (ECF No. 58). The Plaintiff filed 

(ECF No. 43) and was recently denied (ECF No. 44) motion to appoint counsel in this case. As in 

its last order, the Court again informs Plaintiff that he does not have a constitutional right to 

appointed counsel in this action, Rand v. Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th Cir. 1997), 

withdrawn in part on other grounds, 154 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1998), and the Court cannot require 

an attorney to represent Plaintiff pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Mallard v. United States 

District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989). However, in certain 

exceptional circumstances the Court may request the voluntary assistance of counsel pursuant to 

section 1915(e)(1). Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525.

Without a reasonable method of securing and compensating counsel, the Court will seek 

volunteer counsel only in the most serious and exceptional cases. In determining whether 

“exceptional circumstances exist, a district court must evaluate both the likelihood of success of 

the merits [and] the ability of the [plaintiff] to articulate his claims pro se in light of the 

complexity of the legal issues involved.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

The Court recently denied a motion for appointment of counsel on October 4, 2023. (ECF 

No. 44 at 2). For the same reasons set forth in the Court’s prior order, the Court will again deny 

Plaintiff’s request for counsel. 

III. CONCLUSIONS AND ORDER

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for protective order and 

appointment of counsel is denied. (ECF No. 58). Plaintiff is ordered to attend and participate in 

his properly noticed deposition by Defendant and warned that failure to do so will subject him to 

sanctions. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 22, 2023 /s/

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:23-cv-00163-KES-EPG Document 63 Filed 12/26/23 Page 4 of 4