Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-01217/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-01217-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MYRA M. SAMIERE,

Plaintiff, No. C 07-1217 PJH

v.

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S

SAN FRANCISCO UNIFIED SCHOOL MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE

DISTRICT, PLEADINGS AND SETTING CASE

MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

Defendant.

________________________________/

Defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings came on for hearing before this

court on July 25, 2007. Plaintiff Myra M. Samiere (“Samiere”) appeared in propria persona,

and defendant San Francisco Unified School District (“SFUSD”) appeared by its counsel

Nicholas T. Hua. Having read the parties’ papers and carefully considered their arguments

and the relevant legal authorities, the court DENIES defendant’s motion as follows and for

the reasons stated at the hearing. 

On August 31, 2006, Samiere filed a charge of discrimination in employment with the

Federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). The EEOC issued a rightto-sue letter, dated November 27, 2006, which Samiere asserts that she received on

December 27, 2006. Samiere filed the present action on March 1, 2007. SFUSD now

seeks judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the action is time-barred because

Samiere filed her complaint more than ninety days after the giving of the Notice. 

A motion for judgment on the pleadings, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(c), “challenges the legal sufficiency of the opposing party’s pleadings.” William

Schwarzer et al., Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial ¶ 9:316 (2006); Fed. R. Civ. Proc.

12(c). Judgment on the pleadings is “proper when the moving party clearly establishes on

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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the face of the pleadings that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and that it is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner and

Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). 

In considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court must accept all

allegations of the non-moving party as true, while the allegations of the moving party which

have been denied are assumed to be false. Id. Moreover, all inferences reasonably drawn

from the material facts must be construed in favor of the non-moving party. General

Conference Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. Seventh-Day Adventist Congregational

Church, 887 F.2d 228, 230 (9th Cir. 1989). Thus, a “defendant is not entitled to judgment

on the pleadings if the complaint raises issues of fact which, if proved, would support

recovery” for the plaintiff. Schwarzer et al. at ¶ 9:336. 

However, a judgment on the pleadings is “improper when the district court goes

beyond the pleadings” and relies on extrinsic evidence “to resolve an issue; such a

proceeding must properly be treated as a motion for summary judgment.” Hal Roach

Studios, 896 F.2d at 1550 (citing Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(c). Here, the Notice attached to

Samiere’s complaint is treated as part of the complaint, not extrinsic evidence, and can

therefore be properly considered on the present motion for judgment on the pleadings. 

See Schwarzer et al. at ¶ 9:339.1. 

Before a claimant may file an employment discrimination complaint, she must file a

timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC. Nelmida v. Shelly Eurocars, Inc., 112 F.3d

380, 383 (9th Cir. 1997). If the EEOC dismisses the charge and issues a right-to-sue letter,

a claimant has ninety days “after the giving of such notice” to file a civil action against her

employer. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (emphasis added). “This ninety-day period is a

statute of limitations.” Nelmida, 112 F.3d at 383 (citing Scholar v. Pacific Bell, 963, F.2d

264, 266-67 (9th Cir. 1992)). 

At issue in the present motion is the date of the “giving” of the notice. Samiere

asserts that she received the Notice on December 27, 2006, that this date constitutes the

“giving” of the notice, and that this date should trigger the statute of limitations analysis. 

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Conversely, SFUSD asserts that the right-to-sue letter was sent on November 27, 2006,

the date printed on the top of the letter. SFUSD argues that under the authority of the

Ninth Circuit’s decision in Scholar, this date constitutes the “giving” of the notice and that

this date should therefore be operative in the statute of limitations analysis. 

The court finds, however, that Scholar does not support the argument that the date

printed on the notice, November 27, 2006, should trigger the start of the ninety-day period. 

In Scholar, the EEOC sent the notice-of-right-to-sue letter to the claimant by certified mail

on October 26, 1988. The right-to-sue letter was received and signed for by the claimant’s

daughter on November 1, 1988. However, the claimant did not actually read the letter until

a few days after it was delivered to her home. The claimant filed her action on February 2,

1989, which was within ninety days of the date she received the right-to-sue letter and read

the notice, but not within ninety days of the date her daughter received and signed for the

letter. Scholar, 963 F.2d at 267. 

The Ninth Circuit rejected the claimant’s argument that the day she personally

received the letter constituted the date of the “giving” of the notice. Id. Finding that the day

the claimant’s daughter received and signed for the letter was the operative date in the 

analysis, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the claimant’s action had been filed three days after

that statute of limitations expired and that her action was therefore time-barred. Id. 

The Ninth Circuit in Scholar did not hold that the date printed on the right-to-sue

letter constitutes the “giving” of the notice. Moreover, in the present case, even if the

EEOC sent the right-to-sue letter to plaintiff on November 27, 2006, it does not necessarily

follow from Scholar that the ninety-day period began to run on that date. This is evinced by

the fact that the Scholar court did not hold that the ninety-day period began to run on the

date that the EEOC sent the right-to-sue letter to the claimant by certified mail. Instead, the

Ninth Circuit in Scholar, following the Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits, drew a distinction

between the date the letter was received at the claimant’s residence and the date the

claimant actually received the letter in hand, and held that the former constituted the

“giving” of the notice of the right-to-sue letter. Scholar, 963 F.2d at 267 (citations omitted).

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From the facts presented in the papers, the present case is not one in which the

right-to-sue letter arrived at the claimant’s residence one day and was then received inhand by the claimant on a later date. SFUSD provides no evidence establishing the date

the right-to-sue letter arrived at plaintiff’s residence, and this court must accept plaintiff’s

allegations as true and make all reasonable inferences in her favor. Thus, under Scholar,

the Notice was given to plaintiff on December 27, 2006 and the statute of limitations

expired on March 27, 2007. Samiere therefore timely filed her civil action in this court.

The court’s conclusion today is also consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in

Mann v. American Airlines, 324 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2003). In that case, the claimant

“received [the] ‘right-to-sue’ letter from the [EEOC]” on August 2, 2000 and filed his action

eighty-nine days later on October 30, 2000. Id. at 1089 (emphasis added). The Ninth

Circuit held that the filing of the complaint was within the limitations period set forth in 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).” Id. Here, again, the Ninth Circuit determined that the date notice

was “given” was the date the right-to-sue letter was received by the claimant, not the date 

the EEOC sent it. 

For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that the notice was “given” to Samiere on

December 27, 2006 for the purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) and that the statute of

limitations expired on March 27, 2007. Therefore, Samiere timely filed her civil action in

this court, SFUSD’s motion must be DENIED. 

The court will conduct an initial case management conference in this case on August

23, 2007 at 2:30 P.M.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 30, 2007

______________________

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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