Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01064/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01064-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Personal Injury

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ALISA GLEASON, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

UNITED AIRLINES, INC., 

Defendant. 

No. 2:13-cv-01064-MCE-DAD 

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 

Through this action, Plaintiff Alisa Gleason (“Plaintiff”) alleges seven state 

common law causes of action against Defendant United Airlines (“Defendant”). Pending 

before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 26). Because 

the Airline Deregulation Act preempts Plaintiff’s claims, Defendant’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment is GRANTED.1

/// 

/// 

/// 

/// 

/// 

 1

 Because oral argument would not have been of material assistance, the Court ordered this 

matter submitted on the briefs. See E.D. Cal. Local Rule 230(g). 

Case 2:13-cv-01064-MCE-DAD Document 50 Filed 05/20/15 Page 1 of 5
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

2

BACKGROUND2

Plaintiff claims to suffer from a “severe, grave allergy to [] peanut[s] and peanutrelated products . . . .”3

 Prior to boarding one of Defendant’s Chicago-bound planes in 

Orlando, Florida, on May 28, 2011, Plaintiff notified several of Defendant’s employees of 

her alleged allergy. At least one of those employees informed Plaintiff that the flight 

attendants would make an announcement asking passengers to refrain from consuming 

peanuts and peanut-related products during the flight. But when Plaintiff notified the 

crew members actually on the plane of her alleged allergy, they informed her that they 

would not make any such announcement. 

An hour into the flight, Plaintiff “began to experience initial physical symptoms of a 

severe peanut allergy attack.” She subsequently observed an individual seated four 

rows behind her eating peanuts. Plaintiff consumed Benadryl and used her inhaler, but 

her condition worsened. Flight attendants and medical personnel tended to Plaintiff and 

eventually informed the pilot that Plaintiff would not survive if the plane continued on to 

Chicago (approximately forty-five minutes away). The pilot made an unscheduled 

emergency landing in St. Louis, Missouri, because of Plaintiff’s medical condition. Upon 

landing, Plaintiff was transported by ambulance to DePaul Health Center. There, 

Plaintiff received emergency medical care and was placed in an intensive care unit for 

two days. 

Plaintiff alleges that she suffered permanent physical and emotional injury, and 

she asserts the following causes of action in her First Amended Complaint: negligence, 

negligent infliction of emotional distress, promissory estoppel, fraudulent 

misrepresentation, breach of contract, tortious breach of contract, and breach of the 

implied convent of good faith and fair dealing. 

 2

 The following statement of facts is based on the allegations in Plaintiff’s operative First 

Amended Complaint (ECF No. 6) and Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment 

(ECF No. 41). 

3

 Defendant disputes the legitimacy of Plaintiff’s alleged allergy. 

Case 2:13-cv-01064-MCE-DAD Document 50 Filed 05/20/15 Page 2 of 5
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

3

STANDARD 

A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each 

claim or defense—or the part of each claim or defense—on 

which summary judgment is sought. The court shall grant 

summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment is procedurally proper when a case presents 

only a question of law, Asuncion v. District Director of U.S. INS, 427 F.2d 523, 524 (9th 

Cir. 1970), and pre-emption is a question of law, Aguayo v. U.S. Bank, 653 F.3d 912, 

917 (9th Cir. 2011). See also Gibson v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 915 F.2d 414, 418 

(9th Cir. 1990) (affirming grant of summary judgment on the ground that federal law preempted plaintiff’s state law claims). 

ANALYSIS 

Defendant argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because the Airline 

Deregulation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b) (“ADA”), expressly pre-empts Plaintiff’s claims. 

The Court agrees.4 

The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution provides that federal law 

is “the supreme law of the land.” U.S. Const. Art. VI. “[U]nder the Supremacy Clause, 

from which our pre-emption doctrine is derived, any state law, however clearly within a 

State’s acknowledged power, which interferes with or is contrary to federal law, must 

yield.” Gade v. Nat’l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

/// 

 4

 Defendant also argues that the Federal Aviation Act impliedly pre-empts Plaintiff’s claims, and 

that Plaintiff fails to state a viable claim. Because the Court finds that Defendant is entitled to summary 

judgment on the grounds that the ADA expressly pre-empts Plaintiff’s claims, any discussion of 

Defendant’s additional arguments is unnecessary. 

Case 2:13-cv-01064-MCE-DAD Document 50 Filed 05/20/15 Page 3 of 5
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

4

The ADA is the federal law relevant to this case, and it includes an express preemption provision. Specifically, the ADA prohibits states from “enact[ing] or enforc[ing] a 

law . . . related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier . . . .” 49 U.S.C. § 

41713(b)(1); see also Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. 1422, 1429 (2014) 

(explaining that “state common-law rules fall comfortably within the language of the ADA 

pre-emption provision”). “[T]he key phrase ‘related to’ expresses a ‘broad pre-emptive 

purpose.’” Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. at 1428 (quoting § 41713(b)(1) and Morales v. Trans 

World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992)). A claim relates to rates, routes, or 

services under the ADA if the claim “has a connection with, or reference to, airline rates, 

routes, or services.” Ginsberg, 134 S. Ct. at 1428 (quoting Morales, 504 U.S. at 384) 

(bracketing and internal quotation marks omitted). 

The Court here has no difficulty concluding that each of Plaintiff’s claims relate to 

the service of an air carrier. First, there is no dispute that Defendant is an air carrier 

under the ADA. Second, each of Plaintiff’s claims is based on the service that 

Defendant provided (or, more accurately, did not provide) during the flight on May 28, 

2011; specifically, Defendant’s refusal to make an announcement asking passengers to 

refrain from consuming peanuts and peanut-based products during the flight. Because 

Plaintiff’s claims relate to the service of an air carrier, they are pre-empted by ADA. See 

Khan v. American Airlines, Inc., No. 08 CV 5246 (NRB), 2008 WL 5110852 (S.D.N.Y. 

2008) (reaching the same conclusion on similar facts). The Court must therefore grant 

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. 

/// 

/// 

/// 

/// 

/// 

/// 

/// 

Case 2:13-cv-01064-MCE-DAD Document 50 Filed 05/20/15 Page 4 of 5
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

5

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 

26) is GRANTED. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case and enter 

judgment in favor of Defendant. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: May 19, 2015 

Case 2:13-cv-01064-MCE-DAD Document 50 Filed 05/20/15 Page 5 of 5