Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00316/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00316-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

MARGO DIANE HOCKING, ALEX 

HAZZAA, 

 Plaintiffs, 

 v. 

CITY OF ROSEVILLE, PATRICK 

BLAKE, CHRIS NOWICKI, and DOES 

1 through 100, inclusive, 

 

 Defendants. 

______________________________/

No. Civ. S-06-0316 RRB EFB 

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

AND ORDER

Margo Diane Hocking (“Hocking”) and Alex Hazzaa (“Hazzaa”) 

(collectively “Plaintiffs”) brought an action against the City 

of Roseville (“City”) and Officers Patrick Blake (“Blake”) and 

Chris Nowicki (“Nowicki”) alleging civil rights violations and 

state law claims. The City moves for summary adjudication. For 

the reasons stated below, the court GRANTS the motion.1

 

1

 Inasmuch as the court concludes the parties have submitted 

memoranda thoroughly discussing the law and evidence in support 

of their positions, it further concludes oral argument is 

neither necessary nor warranted with regard to the instant 

matter. See Mahon v. Credit Bureau of Placer County, Inc., 171 

F.3d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1999)(explaining that if the parties 

provided the district court with complete memoranda of the law 

and evidence in support of their positions, ordinarily oral 

argument would not be required). 

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I. BACKGROUND 

On February 14, 2004, at approximately 12:00 a.m., Officers 

Blake and Nowicki effected a traffic stop of a BMW automobile on 

suspicion of driving under the influence after allegedly 

observing the BMW swerving. First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) 

¶¶ 4, 22-23, 25.2 Hazzaa was the driver, Hocking was seated in 

the front passenger seat and Travis, Hocking’s son, was seated 

in the rear passenger seat.3 Id. ¶ 22. Officer Blake approached 

the driver’s side window and asked Hazzaa whether he had been 

drinking. Id. ¶¶ 24-25. When Hazzaa replied that he had drank 

one beer, Officer Blake directed him to get out of the vehicle 

so he could administer field sobriety tests. Id. ¶¶ 25, 27-28. 

After Hazzaa allegedly performed poorly on these tests, Officer 

Blake attempted to administer a Passive Alcohol Screening test 

(i.e., breath test), warning Hazzaa that his refusal to take the 

test would result in his arrest for driving under the influence. 

Id. ¶ 28-30. Following Hazzaa’s refusal to take the test, he 

was arrested, handcuffed and escorted to the patrol car. Id.

¶ 30. 

 

2

 Hocking, Hazzaa and Hocking’s son, Travis, were returning 

home from dinner at Black Angus and drinks at the Owl Club. FAC 

¶ 21. 

3

 Hocking and Hazzaa are married and reside in Sacramento 

County. Compl. ¶ 20. Hocking is Caucasian while Hazzaa is of 

Lebanese descent. Id. 

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Officer Blake then returned to the BMW and advised Hocking 

that she would need to find a ride home since she was too drunk 

to drive. FAC ¶ 31. However, before Hocking could contact 

anyone, Officer Blake directed her to get out of the BMW. Id.

¶¶ 34-35. When Hocking did not respond quickly enough, Officers 

Blake and Nowicki pulled her from the BMW and forcefully placed 

her arms behind her back. Id. ¶ 35. Hocking was then wrestled 

to the ground after she allegedly attempted to pull her arms 

away. Id.4 At this time, Travis got out of the BMW and pleaded 

with the officers to stop hurting his mother. Id. ¶ 37. 

Officer Nowicki then allegedly slammed Travis into the BMW, 

“body-slammed” him into the ground, and choked him. Id. Travis 

subsequently broke free and fled across the freeway. Id. ¶ 39. 

Sometime later, Travis was located, arrested, and brought to 

jail in Roseville along with Hazzaa and Hocking. Id. ¶ 40. At 

the jail, Hazzaa blew into an Intoxilyzer 5000 machine, which 

calculated his blood-alcohol level at 0.00%. Id. ¶ 42. A blood 

sample was also taken and later revealed that Hazzaa’s blood 

alcohol level was 0.00%. Id.

On March 4, 2004, the Placer County District Attorney’s 

Office filed a criminal complaint against Hocking and Hazzaa. 

 

4

 During this altercation, Officer Blake allegedly told 

Hocking: “take that for the Arab.” FAC ¶ 36. 

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FAC ¶ 45. Hocking was charged with, among other things, public 

intoxication and resisting arrest and Hazzaa was charged with 

driving under the influence. Id. On January 23, 2006, a Placer 

County Superior Court judge dismissed all criminal charges 

against Hocking and Hazzaa. Id. ¶ 48. On February 14, 2006, 

Plaintiffs filed the instant action alleging civil rights 

violations and state law claims premised upon Officers Blake and 

Nowicki’s alleged verbal and physical abuse, harassment, and 

unlawful arrest without probable cause. Docket at 1. On 

March 15, 2006, Plaintiffs amended their complaint to allege the 

following civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (1) 

excessive force (2) false arrest; (3) violation of substantive 

due process; and (4) municipal liability. Docket at 9. The FAC 

also alleges the following state law claims: (1) interference 

with civil rights (Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1); (2) false arrest; (3) 

false imprisonment; (4) assault; (5) battery; (6) negligent 

hiring and supervision; and (7) negligence. Id. On September 

19, 2007, the City filed a motion for summary adjudication. 

Docket at 22. 

II. DISCUSSION 

A. Legal Standard

 Rule 56(b) permits a party against whom a claim has been 

asserted to “move at any time, with or without supporting 

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affidavits, for summary judgment on all or part of the claim.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(b). Summary judgment is appropriate if “the 

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 

that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 

the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). An issue of fact is “genuine” if it 

constitutes evidence with which “a reasonable jury could return 

a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). That genuine issue of fact is 

“material” if it “might effect the outcome of the suit under the 

governing law.” See id. (“As to materiality, the substantive 

law will identify which facts are material. Only disputes over 

facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the 

governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary 

judgment.”).

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating 

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex 

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Where the nonmoving 

party will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, the 

movant’s burden may be discharged by pointing out to the 

district court that there is an absence of evidence to support 

the nonmoving party’s case. See id. at 325; Miller v. Glenn 

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Miller Productions, Inc., 454 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2006). 

The moving party need not disprove the other party’s case. 

Miller, 454 F.3d at 987. “Thus, [s]ummary judgment for a 

defendant is appropriate when the plaintiff fails to make a 

showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element 

essential to [his] case, and on which [he] will bear the burden 

of proof at trial.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted and 

alterations in original). 

If the moving party sustains its burden, the burden then 

shifts to the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by 

his or her own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific 

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)); Miller, 

454 F.3d at 987. This burden requires more than a simple 

showing that there is some “metaphysical doubt as to the 

material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith 

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The mere existence of a 

scintilla of evidence is likewise insufficient to create a 

genuine factual dispute. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. “If the 

nonmoving party fails to produce enough evidence to create a 

genuine issue of material fact, the moving party wins the motion 

for summary judgment.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz 

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Companies, Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1103 (9th Cir. 2000). “But if 

the nonmoving party produces enough evidence to create a genuine 

issue of material fact, the nonmoving party defeats the motion.” 

Id.

 On a motion for summary judgment, all reasonable doubt as 

to the existence of a genuine issue of fact should be resolved 

against the moving party. Hector v. Wiens, 533 F.2d 429, 432 

(9th Cir. 1976). The inferences drawn from the underlying facts 

must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing 

the motion. Valadingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1137 (9th 

Cir. 1989). Where different ultimate inferences may be drawn, 

summary judgment is inappropriate. Sankovich v. Insurance Co. 

of North America, 638 F.2d 136, 140 (9th Cir. 1981). The 

purpose of summary judgment is to “pierce the pleadings and 

assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need 

for trial.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. Thus “[w]here the 

record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact 

to find for the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for 

trial.’” Id. 

B. Municipal Liability 

The City seeks summary adjudication on the basis that 

Plaintiffs have failed to produce sufficient evidence to 

demonstrate that an unconstitutional City policy, custom or 

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practice was the moving force behind the complained of 

constitutional injuries. 

“Local government entities are considered ‘persons’ for 

purposes of § 1983 and can be sued directly for monetary, 

declaratory, or injunctive relief where ‘the action that is 

alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy 

statement, ordinance, regulation or decision officially adopted 

and promulgated by that body’s officers.’” Anderson v. Warner, 

451 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of 

Soc. Servs. of New York City, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978)). A 

municipality cannot be made liable for a constitutional tort by 

application of the doctrine of respondeat superior, i.e.,

liability for constitutional torts cannot be imposed vicariously 

on government bodies solely on the basis of the existence of an 

employer-employee relationship with a tortfeasor. Pembaur v. 

City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 478 (1986); Anderson, 451 F.3d 

at 1070. Rather, municipality liability can be imposed only for 

injuries inflicted pursuant to an official governmental policy. 

Tanner v. Heise, 879 F.2d 572, 582 (9th Cir. 1989). “To impose 

liability on a local governmental entity for failing to act to 

preserve constitutional rights, a section 1983 plaintiff must 

establish: (1) that he possessed a constitutional right of which 

he was deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy; (3) 

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that this policy ‘amounts to deliberate indifference’ to the 

plaintiff’s constitutional right; and (4) that the policy is the 

‘moving force behind the constitutional violation.’” Oviatt v. 

Pierce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 1992); Anderson, 451 F.3d 

at 1070. There also must be a “direct causal link” between the 

policy or custom and the injury, and plaintiff must be able to 

demonstrate that the injury resulted from a “permanent and well 

settled practice.” Anderson, 451 F.3d at 1070. In order to be 

a “moving force” behind a constitutional deprivation, the 

“identified deficiency” in a local governmental entity’s policy 

must be “closely related to the ultimate injury.” See Gibson v. 

County of Washoe, Nev., 290 F.3d 1175, 1196 (9th Cir. 2002).5

Additionally, a municipal entity may be liable for 

constitutional violations resulting from its failure to 

supervise or train, but only where the inadequacy of the 

supervision and training amounts to deliberate indifference to 

the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact. 

 

5

 In the absence of a formal governmental policy, a 

plaintiff must show a “longstanding practice or custom which 

constitutes the standard operating procedure of the local 

government entity.” Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th 

Cir. 1996). The custom must be so “persistent and widespread” 

that it constitutes a “permanent and well settled city policy.” 

Id. “Liability for improper custom may not be predicated on 

isolated or sporadic incidents; it must be founded upon 

practices of sufficient duration, frequency and consistency that 

the conduct has become a traditional method of carrying out 

policy.” Id.

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City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989); Alexander v. 

City and County of San Francisco, 29 F.3d 1355, 1367 (9th Cir. 

1994); see also Anderson, 451 F.3d at 1070 (a failure to train 

or supervise can amount to a “policy or custom” sufficient to 

impose liability on a municipality).6

 A municipality is 

deliberately indifferent when it is “on actual or constructive 

notice of the need to train.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 

841 (1994). In order to establish a municipal policy on a 

failure to supervise and train theory, a plaintiff must produce 

evidence showing that the alleged inadequacy in training was the 

result of a “deliberate” or “conscious” choice. Canton, 489 

U.S. at 389; Alexander, 29 F.3d at 1367. This heightened degree 

of culpability on the party of a municipality may be established 

when “the need for more or different training is so obvious, and 

the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of 

constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the city can 

reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the 

need.” Canton, 489 U.S. at 390. Finally, a plaintiff must show 

that the alleged deficiency in supervision and training 

“actually caused” the constitutional deprivation at issue. Id.

 

6

 While the Canton decision dealt with an alleged failure to 

train police officers, the same concerns are involved in cases 

like the instant case, involving alleged failures to discipline 

police officers. See, e.g., Strauss v. City of Chicago, 760 

F.2d 765 (7th Cir. 1985). 

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at 391. The appropriate inquiry is therefore whether the injury 

would have been avoided “had the employee been trained under a 

program that was not deficient in the identified respect.” Id. 

Thus, in order to make out a viable claim of inadequate training 

a plaintiff must show three things: (1) that the existing 

program is inadequate; (2) that the training policy, or lack 

thereof, amounts to a “deliberate indifference” to the rights of 

the people with whom the officials come into contact; and (3) 

that the deliberate indifference on the part of the municipality 

actually caused the constitutional violation at issue. Merritt 

v. County of Los Angeles, 875 F.2d 765, 770 (9th Cir. 1989). 

In the present case, Plaintiffs have submitted Roseville 

Police Department General Order 2.05 (“General Order 2.05”), 

entitled “Internal Affairs Investigations,” and Roseville Police 

Department Policy 1019 (“Policy 1019”) also entitled “Internal 

Affairs Investigations,”7

 for the purpose of demonstrating that 

the City has a policy of condoning the use of excessive force 

and other police misconduct. In this regard, Plaintiffs point 

to nearly identical language in each of these documents stating 

that a watch commander is authorized to resolve verbal 

complaints or other inquiries without further action (including 

 

7

 Exhs. 1 & 2, attached to Decl. of Manolo Olaso (“Olaso”). 

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notifying the Police Chief) where the complaint is “of such a 

minor nature” that it can be resolved to the mutual satisfaction 

of all parties.8 Plaintiffs maintain that such a policy deprives 

the City of the opportunity to discover the inadequacy of its 

training and supervision of officers, and fails to inform the 

Police Chief of patterns of abuse that need to be addressed. In 

other words, Plaintiffs contend that this “deficiency” is the 

moving force behind the complained of constitutional injuries. 

The court disagrees. The court finds this evidence insufficient 

to establish a triable issue of material fact as to whether the 

City was deliberately indifferent to police misconduct and that 

such indifference caused the complained of constitutional 

injuries. The police department’s procedure for processing 

minor complaints, without more, does not demonstrate the 

existence of a policy whereby meritorious complaints are ignored 

or improperly disposed of.9

 Moreover, there is no other evidence 

 

8

 Policy 1019 provides: “Verbal complaints or inquiries 

received by the Watch Commander, Support Commander or the 

Professional Services Unit that are of such a minor nature they 

can be resolved to the mutual satisfaction of all the parties, 

no further action need be taken.” Exh. 2, attached to Decl. of 

Olaso. Policy 1019 further provides: “if the [verbal] 

complainant . . . wishes to file a written complaint, the 

complainant will be given a complaint form.” Id. General Order 

2.05 contains nearly identical language. Exh. 1, attached to 

Decl. of Olaso. 

9

 Indeed, the written procedural guidelines of both General 

Order 2.05 and Policy 1019 provide: “[a]ll complaints involving 

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before the court suggesting that this is an inadequate procedure 

resulting in the perfunctorily dismissal of meritorious 

complaints. As such, there is no basis to infer that the City’s 

written policies amounted to a deliberate indifference to the 

risk of constitutional injuries and that this deliberate 

indifference caused the complained of constitutional injuries. 

Alternatively, Plaintiffs maintain that municipal liability 

attaches based on the City’s custom of inadequately 

investigating and disciplining police officers, and that this 

custom sent a message to Officers Blake and Nowicki that such 

unlawful behavior would be tolerated, thereby facilitating the 

officers’ unlawful actions against Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs argue 

that if the City did not have a flawed citizen complaint 

procedure then it would have discovered a pattern of repeated 

abuses. The City could have then have remedied this problem, 

thereby preventing the complained of constitutional injuries.10 

The City, for its part, moves for summary adjudication on the 

 

possible criminal violations shall be referred to the Police 

Chief’s Office.” Exhs. 1 & 2, attached to Decl. of Olaso. The 

procedural guidelines further provide that both minor and 

serious complaints shall be investigated and the Police Chief 

shall be advised of serious complaints. Id. 

10 In essence, Plaintiffs contend that the City’s custom of 

inadequate investigation procedures illustrates a deliberate 

indifference to Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights and provided 

tacit authorization for police misconduct under which Officers 

Blake and Nowicki acted when they allegedly violated Plaintiffs’ 

constitutional rights.

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basis that Plaintiffs have failed to present sufficient evidence 

to establish a custom on the part of the City rendering the City 

liable for the complained of constitutional injuries. In order 

to survive summary adjudication, Plaintiffs needed to present 

evidence indicating that the City’s officers in general, or 

Officers Blake and Nowicki in particular, have a pattern of 

using excessive force and/or engaging in other misconduct, that 

a responsible policymaker of the City (i.e., Police Chief) was 

aware or should have been aware of and deliberately chose to 

ignore. In this regard, Plaintiffs presented a chart 

summarizing each and every citizen complaint alleged against 

Roseville police officers from January 2002 to November 2007 and 

the action taken on each complaint ostensibly for the purpose of 

demonstrating that City police officers engaged in a pattern of 

abuses for which the Police Chief was or should have been aware 

of and did nothing to remedy. Exh. 3, attached to Decl. of 

Olaso.11 Plaintiffs rely almost exclusively on this evidence to 

establish that the City acquiesced in a custom that tolerated 

 

11 Essentially, Plaintiffs are asking the court to infer 

that the City improperly investigated and resolved citizen 

complaints because only three complaints were sustained from 

January 2002 to November 2007, and, therefore, the City’s police 

officers, including Officers Blake and Nowicki, believed that 

their actions would not be scrutinized, thereby facilitating the 

complained of constitutional injuries. 

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police misconduct by failing to adequately investigate citizen 

complaints and discipline officers, thereby demonstrating a 

deliberate indifference to the risk of constitutional injuries 

resulting from such abuses. The court finds this evidence, 

without more, insufficient to establish a triable issue of 

material fact as to whether the City had a custom that deprived 

Plaintiffs of their constitutionally protected rights to be free 

from the use of excessive force and other police misconduct. 

The chart, and Plaintiffs statistical arguments based thereon, 

does not create an inference that the City was deliberately 

indifferent to Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. Statistics of 

unsustained complaints of excessive force and other police 

misconduct, without any evidence that those complaints had 

merit, does not suffice to establish municipal liability under § 

1983. See Bryant v. Whalen, 759 F.Supp. 410, 423-24 (N.D. Ill. 

1991) (finding that statistical evidence regarding a City’s 

handling of excessive force complaints, without more (such as 

evidence that complaints which were not sustained actually had 

merit), is insufficient to establish an inference of deliberate 

indifference on the part of the City because people may file a 

complaint for many reasons or for no reason at all); see also

Strauss, 760 F.2d at 768-69 (finding statistics insufficient to 

prove municipal liability because people may file complaints 

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“for many reasons, or for no reason at all.”). Thus, because 

Plaintiffs did not present any evidence suggesting that more 

citizen complaints should have resulted in the discipline of 

police officers or that the City conducted biased investigations 

or otherwise ignored or improperly disposed of meritorious 

citizen complaints, Plaintiffs have failed to sustain their 

burden to present evidence from which a reasonable jury could 

infer that the City acquiesced in a custom of tolerating police 

abuses by failing to adequately investigate citizen complaints. 

To the extent that Plaintiffs rely on Larez v. City of Los 

Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding that a jury 

could reasonably find a municipal custom or policy where an 

expert testified that the Los Angeles Police Department (“LAPD”) 

had routinely exonerated officers and suggested that the 

investigations of officers were shams) and Beck v. City of 

Pittsburg, 89 F.3d 966 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that a pattern of 

written complaints of violence against an officer was sufficient 

for reasonable jury to conclude policymaker knew or should have 

known of violations), in support of their position that a 

triable issue of material fact exists regarding municipal 

liability, the court finds such reliance misplaced. Both cases 

are distinguishable insofar as the plaintiffs in those cases 

presented evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that 

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a municipal custom contributed to the complained of 

constitutional injuries. First, in Larez, the plaintiffs 

presented expert testimony that a two year comparative study 

demonstrated that it was almost impossible for a police officer 

to suffer discipline as a result of a complaint lodged by a 

citizen. Larez, 946 F.2d at 647. The plaintiffs’ expert 

witness, “armed with both many years practical police experience 

and empirical data on police department procedures and 

operations nationwide and in Los Angeles specifically,” 

testified that he would have disciplined the officers and would 

have established new procedures so that the violations did not 

occur in the future. Id. at 646. The plaintiffs in that case 

also presented expert testimony that the investigation into 

plaintiffs’ complaint was flawed in that it gave the 

responsibility for investigating the complaint to the unit being 

investigated and contained holes an inconsistencies that any 

reasonable administrator should have seen, including reliance on 

the testimony of an officer not present during some of the 

relevant incidents. Id. at 647. Under these circumstances, the 

Ninth Circuit determined that the LAPD’s treatment of the 

Larezes’ complaint tended to corroborate the expert’s testimony 

about LAPD complaint investigations in general and that “[t]he 

jury was entitled to conclude that this evidence supported the 

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Larezes’ theory that the LAPD’s disciplinary and complaint 

processes, executed by policy or custom, contributed to the 

police excesses complained of because the procedures made clear 

to officers that, at least in the absence of independent, thirdparty witnesses, they could get away with anything.” Id. 

Second, in Beck the plaintiff presented evidence of five prior 

complaints of excessive force against the officer at issue in a 

relatively short period of time and that none of the complaints 

resulted in disciplinary action. Beck, 89 F.3d at 973. There, 

the court stated that because “the complaints, especially [the 

three between April and July of 1991], came in a narrow period 

of time and were of similar nature,12 a reasonable jury could 

have inferred that the Chief of Police knew or should have known 

of the [police officer’s] propensity for violence when making 

arrests.” Id. (footnote added). In addition, while the 

complaints were investigated, the Beck court characterized the 

city’s grievance procedures as “superficial” and “structured to 

curtail disciplinary action,” and noted that the investigations 

resulted in no disciplinary action. Id. at 974. In Beck, the 

plaintiff also presented evidence that the review process itself 

 

12 All five filed complaints were related to the police 

officer’s use of excessive force while arresting civilians, all 

five complaints occurred during a period of three years and 

three months and none of the complaints resulted in disciplinary 

action. Beck, 89 F.3d at 969-70. 

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was flawed. Id. at 968-69. There, an employee of the Office of 

Professional Standards (“OPS”)-the division that investigated 

complaints against officers-testified as to the inadequacy of 

the review process. Id. Under these circumstances, the Third 

Circuit determined that a reasonable jury could conclude that 

the OPS review policy “was inadequate to protect civilians from 

police misuse of force.” Id. at 974. That inadequate policy 

included the absence of formal procedures to track complaints 

against individual officers and a procedure to give special 

consideration to police officers’ statements over a 

complainant’s statements. Id. at 973. Finally, there was an 

end of year report, circulated within OPS that acknowledged a 

problem with excessive force complaints and an inadequacy of the 

procedures to handle such complaints. Id. at 974-75. 

In this case, as opposed to Larez and Beck, Plaintiffs did 

not present sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury 

could infer that the City had a custom that contributed to the 

complained of constitutional injuries. Plaintiffs, for 

instance, did not present any expert testimony demonstrating 

that the City is responsible for creating or maintaining a 

policy whereby civilian complaints are meaningless. Nor did 

Plaintiffs present any other evidence demonstrating that the 

investigations into citizen complaints against police officers 

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in general, or Officers Blake and Nowicki in particular, were 

cursory, inadequate or meaningless.13 Further, Plaintiffs did 

not present evidence demonstrating the existence deficiencies 

and/or improprieties in the police department’s investigation 

procedures, such as evidence that the responsibility for 

investigating citizen complaints was given to the unit being 

investigated, as opposed to a separate internal affairs unit,14

or evidence demonstrating that the investigative process 

contains holes and/or inconsistencies that any reasonable 

administrator should have seen (e.g., reliance on testimony of 

officers not present during the relevant incidents). Nor did 

 

13 In this regard, Plaintiffs presented evidence of a single 

written informal complaint alleged against Officer Blake and 

police department memoranda pertaining to the investigation of 

this complaint. Exhs. 4 & 5, attached to Decl. of Olaso. A 

review of this evidence reveals that this complaint was not 

sustained because videotape evidence and the testimony of 

another officer corroborated the testimony of Officer Blake. 

Exh. 5, attached to Decl. of Olaso. In contrast, the plaintiff 

in Beck presented a series of actual written civilian complaints 

of similar nature, containing specific information pertaining to 

the use of excessive force and verbal abuse by a particular 

officer, not evidence of mere isolated events by a particular 

officer or mere statistics of the number of complaints alleged 

against a police department. See Beck, 89 F.3d at 973-76. 

14 Policy 1019 provides that: “All complaints received in 

writing will be forwarded to the Professional Standards Unit. 

The PSU will receive and review complaints and inquiries by 

contacting the complainant and determining whether a Department 

member is involved; whether possible criminal misconduct is 

alleged; and exactly what are the circumstances of the 

allegation.” Exh. 2, attached to Decl. of Olaso. 

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Plaintiffs present evidence that the City lacked formal 

procedures to track complaints against individual officers or 

that the City had a procedure of giving special consideration to 

statements made by police officers over statements made by 

complainants.15 Finally, Plaintiffs did not present any evidence 

showing that the Police Chief acted in any way to condone the 

use of excessive force or other police misconduct against the 

Plaintiffs or others. Accordingly, because Plaintiffs have 

failed to present sufficient evidence from which a reasonable 

jury could infer that the City acquiesced in a custom of 

tolerating police misconduct by failing to adequately 

investigate citizen complaints, summary adjudication is GRANTED 

in favor of the City. 

 

15 To support their position that the City had a policy of 

giving special consideration to statements made by police 

officers over statements made by complainants, Plaintiffs 

presented evidence of an informal complaint alleged against 

Officer Blake and police department memoranda pertaining to the 

City’s investigation of this complaint. Exhs. 4 & 5, attached 

to Decl. of Olaso. The court, however, does not find this 

evidence sufficient to establish a triable issue of material 

fact as to whether the City had a custom of inadequately 

investigating citizen complaints. The evidence presented in 

this regard does not indicate that police officer statements are 

given special consideration over the statements made by 

complainants. Rather, the evidence indicates that Officer 

Blake’s statements were credited over the complainant’s 

statements because Officer Blake’s version of the events was 

corroborated by videotape evidence as well as the testimony of a 

another officer. Exh. 5, attached to Decl. of Olaso. 

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III. CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons stated above, the motion is GRANTED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

ENTERED this 21st day of April, 2008. 

 s/RALPH R. BEISTLINE 

 United States District Judge 

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