Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00068/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00068-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity Action

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALICIA NORIEGA, an individual,

Plaintiff,

v.

LOEWS HOTEL HOLDING 

CORPORATION, a Delaware 

corporation, LOEWS CORONADO 

HOTEL CORPORATION, a California 

corporation; and DOES 1 through 50, 

inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:19-cv-0068-GPC-NLS

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION TO REMAND

[ECF No. 4]

Before the Court is Alicia Noriega’s (“Plaintiff”) to remand. ECF No. 4. Plaintiff 

filed the motion on February 8, 2019, and 51st Street & 8th Ave. Corp., LOEWS HOTELS 

HOLDING CORPORATION, AND LOEWS CORONADO HOTEL CORPORATION’s 

(collectively, “Defendants”) filed an opposition on April 26, 2019. ECF No. 8. Plaintiff 

subsequently filed her reply on May 10, 2019. ECF No. 9. For the reasons set forth 

below, the Court DENIES the motion to remand.

I. Background

Plaintiff filed this action against Defendants in the Superior Court of the State of 

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California in San Diego County on August 30, 2018. ECF No. 1 at 2. The complaint 

alleges fourteen causes of action, all arising under California law: (1) Failure to Provide 

Meal Breaks; (2) Failure to Provide Rest Breaks; (3) Failure to Pay Wages; (4) Failure to 

Pay Overtime; (5) Failure to Provide Accurate Itemized Wage Statements; (6) Violation 

of Business and Professions Code Sections 17200-17208; (7) Intentional Infliction of 

Emotional Distress; (8) Discrimination in Violation of the Fair Employment and Housing 

Act; (9) Retaliation in Violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act; (10) Failure to 

Accommodate; (12) Failure to Engage in the Interactive Process of Accommodation; (13) 

Hostile Work Environment in Violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act; and 

(14) Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy. Id.

According to the Complaint, Plaintiff was employed by Defendants as a kitchen 

‘Cook II.’ Id. As a Cook II, Plaintiff was responsible for setting up and stocking 

stations, preparing food, cooking menu items, complying with nutrition and sanitation 

regulations and safety standards. Id. In addition to these duties, she was occasionally 

given other ad hoc tasks by her supervisors. Id. at 2. On or about July 30, 2018, Plaintiff 

asserts that she suffered serious ailments during the scope of her employment. Id. 

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that in addition to bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, she 

suffered lasting injuries to her left and right hands, left and right wrists, shoulders, upper 

extremities, and other organs. Id. Plaintiff contends that she continues to suffer from 

these disabilities. Id. 

That same day, Plaintiff asserts that she filed a workers’ compensation claim based 

on her injuries. Id. She allegedly sought and was granted working restrictions that 

included: (1) repetitive right and left hand motions for no more than forty-five cumulative 

minutes per hour; and (2) no lifting, carrying, pushing, and pulling more than ten pounds. 

Id. According to Plaintiff, these restrictions are still in effect today. Id. Plaintiff 

contends that she also requested reasonable accommodations and uninterrupted meal and 

rest breaks. Id. Those requests were allegedly dismissed. Id. On or about August 3, 

2018, Defendants purportedly contacted Plaintiff and explained that as a result of her 

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restrictions, she could not return to work. Id. 

On or about August 6, 2018, Plaintiff contacted Defendants’ Human Resources 

representative to resolve those additional requests. Id. However, Defendants purportedly

reiterated that they were unable to accommodate Plaintiff unless she could “have your 

doctor remove your restrictions, and we can see about putting you back to work.” Id. 

According to the Complaint, Plaintiff considered this exchange to be evidence of 

retaliation through wrongful termination. Id. 

In addition, Plaintiff alleges that Executive Chefs Chris Aguira and Antonio 

Archeta engendered a hostile working environment during the course of her employment. 

Aguira allegedly behaved in an “outlandish and physical threatening” manner, subjecting 

Plaintiff to “inappropriate language, thrown objects throughout the kitchen area, and 

grotesque scenes.” Id. Archeta, Plaintiff’s immediate manager, purportedly directed 

sexually inappropriate comments at Plaintiff, including stating that she would be less 

upset if her husband pleased her often. According to Plaintiff, Archeta also called her 

“fat,” “disgusting,” and “big butt.” Id. 

Although she regularly worked in excess of eight hours per day and forty hours per 

week, Plaintiff contends that she was never paid any overtime compensation. Id. at 4. 

Plaintiff submits that she worked “without being provided a meal period of at least thirty 

minutes per five hours worked and without compensation of one hour of pay for each 

workday that a meal period was not provided.” Id. In addition, Plaintiff claims that she 

worked without “being authorized or permitted to take a rest period of at least ten 

minutes per every four hours worked and without compensation of one hour of pay for 

each workday that rest period was not provided.” Id. And finally, Plaintiff alleges that 

she worked without receiving an accurate itemized wage statement that properly reflected 

regular and overtime actually worked or true documentation of meal and rest period 

premium payments. Id. Plaintiff was purportedly subjected to these conditions for at 

least one year prior to the filing of the Complaint. Id. Therefore, Plaintiff brings the 

aforementioned fourteen causes of action against Defendants and seeks damages, interest 

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on losses incurred, prejudgment interest, a finding that Defendants engaged in unfair 

competition in violation of sections 17200, et. seq. of the California Business and 

Professions Code, restitution payments, relevant injunctions, and attorney’s fees. Id. at 

31. 

On January 10, 2019, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441, and 1446, Defendants 

removed Plaintiff’s state court action based upon diversity of citizenship. ECF No. 1 at 

1. According to the notice of removal, this case meets the requirements of diversity 

jurisdiction because the parties are diverse and “while Defendants deny liability as to 

Plaintiff’s claims, Defendants have a reasonable good faith belief that the amount in 

controversy, as alleged and pled to this action by Plaintiff, exceeds $75,000.” ECF No. 1 

at 4. Although the Plaintiff does not specify the amount of damages sought, Defendants’ 

notice provides that the amount in controversy in this case exceeds $75,000 because 

Plaintiff requested $200,000 in her settlement demand. Id. at 5. Defendants allege that 

there is complete diversity of citizenship because the Plaintiff is a citizen of a different 

state from each defendant. According to Defendant, Defendant Loews Hotels Holding 

Corporation (“Loews Hotels”) is a citizen of Delaware and New York, Defendant Loews 

Coronado Hotel Corporation (“Loews Coronado”) a citizen of Delaware and New York, 

and Defendant 51st Street & 8th Ave. Corp. (“51st Street”) is a citizen of New York. Id. at 

4-5. Plaintiff is allegedly a California citizen. Id. 

In response, Plaintiff filed her present motion to remand on February 8, 2019. ECF 

No. 8 at 1. 

II. Legal Standard 

“To remove a case from state court to federal court, a defendant must file in the 

federal forum a notice of removal ‘containing a short and plain statement of the grounds 

for removal.’” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 135 S. Ct. 547, 551 

(2014) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a)). “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” 

Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). “They possess 

only that power authorized by Constitution or a statute, which is not to be expanded by 

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judicial decree.” Id. “It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction 

and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” 

Id. “Consistent with the limited jurisdiction of federal courts, the removal statute is 

strictly construed against removal jurisdiction.” Audo v. Ford Motor Co., 2018 WL 

3323244 *1 (S.D. Cal. July, 2018) (citing Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 

1992)). 

“The strong presumption against removal jurisdiction means that the defendant 

always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper.” Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566. 

“Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in 

the first instance.” Id. Thus, “[i]f a district court determines at any time that less than a 

preponderance of the evidence supports the right of removal, it must remand the action to 

the state court.” Hansen v. Grp. Health Coop., 902 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2018). 

Federal courts have diversity jurisdiction over civil actions where the amount in 

controversy exceeds $75,000 and there is “complete diversity of citizenship” between the 

parties. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. For a federal court to exercise diversity jurisdiction, there 

must be “complete diversity” between the parties. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); Strawbridge 

v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267, 267 (1806). Accordingly, diversity jurisdiction does not exist if 

any defendant is of the same citizenship as any plaintiff. Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 

U.S. 61, 68 (1996). Furthermore, removal on diversity grounds is improper if any 

defendant is a citizen of the forum state. 28 U.S.C § 1441(b)(2). And pursuant to the 

statute, a corporation is a citizen of the state in which it is incorporated and the state 

where it maintains its principal place of business. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c). The principal 

place of business refers to the location “where the corporation’s high level officers direct, 

control, and coordinate the corporation’s activities.” Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 

80-81 (2010). The “nerve center” is also typically located at a corporation’s 

headquarters. Id.

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III. Discussion

Plaintiff offers five independent arguments for why this Court should remand the 

case back to state court: (1) Defendants have not sufficiently established that Plaintiff is a 

citizen of California; (2) Defendant Loews Coronado Hotel Corporation is not diverse

because it maintains a principal place of business in California; (3) Plaintiff intends, upon 

amendment, to add defendants who reside in California; (4) Defendants’ improperly used 

settlement communications to support that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000; 

(5) Defendants failed to timely file their notice of removal within 30 days after the receipt 

of the initial pleading. In addressing each of these in turn, the Court concludes that 

Defendants have met their burden to invoke this Court’s diversity jurisdiction. 

A. Plaintiff’s Citizenship

Plaintiff argues that Defendants did not establish that Plaintiff is a citizen of 

California because the Complaint alleges only her residence. ECF No. 4 at 12. The 

Court disagrees. 

To establish citizenship for diversity purposes, a natural person is a citizen in the 

state in which she is domiciled. See Kantor v. Wellesley Galleries, Ltd., 704 F.2d 1088, 

1090 (9th Cir. 1983). The Ninth Circuit has consistently determined that a person’s 

domicile is her permanent home, where she resides with the intention to remain 

indefinitely or where she has resided in the past and intends to return. Kanter v. WarnerLambert Co., 265 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Lew v. Moss, 797 F.2d 747, 

749-50 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting Owens v. Huntling, 115 F.2d, 160, 162 (9th Cir. 1940) 

(“[A] person is ‘domiciled’ in a location where he or she has established a ‘fixed 

habitation or abode in a particular place and [intends] to remain there permanently ore 

indefinitely.’”). Domicile is based on a number of factors, including current residence, 

voting, location of personal and real property, location of brokerage and bank accounts, 

location of spouse and family, place of employment, driver’s license and automobile 

registration, and payment of taxes. Lew, 797 F.2d at 750. 

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Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ allegations of Plaintiff’s residence – without more 

– are insufficient to establish citizenship and confer diversity jurisdiction upon a federal 

court. ECF No. 4 at 13. According to Plaintiff, Defendants must affirmatively allege the 

actual citizenship of the relevant parties. Id. Plaintiff notes that her Complaint does not 

declare her citizenship or domicile and only states that she is “an individual who resides 

in the State of California, San Diego.” ECF No. 1-1 at 1. As such, Plaintiff contends that 

Defendants’ assertion that Plaintiff is a citizen of California is unsubstantiated “sheer 

conclusion” based only “on information and belief.” ECF No. 4 at 13. 

The Court concludes that Defendant has amply proven that Plaintiff is a citizen of 

California. Although “a person residing in a given state is not necessarily domiciled 

there,” Warner-Lamber Co., 265 F.3d at 857, this Court agrees with Defendants that “the 

weight of the allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint plainly support a finding that Plaintiff is 

domiciled in California, and, thus, is a citizen of California.” ECF No. 8 at 3. Plaintiff 

currently resides in California. Id. According to both her Complaint and DFEH 

Complaint, Plaintiff has lived and worked in California for at least 18 years since she was 

hired in 2005. Id. Given the longevity of her residence in California, the Court agrees 

that there is “no doubt that Plaintiff established a fixed habitation in California and 

intends to remain in this State permanently.” Id. And despite Plaintiff’s argument that 

Defendants do not sufficiently establish her citizenship, Plaintiff does not identify that 

she is a citizen of another state. See generally, ECF No. 4. 

Moreover, Plaintiff’s selective employment of the argument that she may – or may 

not – be a California citizen strains credulity in the larger context of her instant motion. 

One of Plaintiff’s primary contentions rests on the basis that Loews Coronado is a nondiverse defendant on account that its principal place of business is in California. That 

assertion is necessarily premised on Plaintiff being a citizen of California. 

Since “[a] party with the burden of proving citizenship may rely on the 

presumption of continuing domicile, which provides that, once established, a person’s 

state of domicile continues unless rebutted with sufficient evidence of chance,” 

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Mondragon v. Capital One Auto Finance, 736 F.3d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 2013), this Court 

finds that Defendants’ Notice of Removal adequately supports that Plaintiff is a long-time 

resident and citizen of California. 

B. Loews Coronado’s Citizenship

Next, Plaintiff contends that Defendant Loews Coronado is a non-diverse 

defendant on the basis that it is “registered with the State of California as a foreign 

corporation doing business in California.” ECF No. 4 at 16. Plaintiff’s argument relies

on counsel’s Lexis search results that indicate the company may have designated a 

“principal office in the State of California located at The Prentice-Hall Corporation 

System, Inc., located at 6430 Sunset Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, 90028.” Id. at 

4. As such, Plaintiff surmises that Loews Coronado is a citizen of California, thus 

defeating diversity for jurisdictional purposes. 

Defendants respond that Plaintiff’s arguments are predicated on her mistaken and 

unverified belief that Loews Coronado’s agent for service of process equates to its 

principal place of business. ECF No. 8 at 4. To rebut Plaintiff’s assertions, Defendants 

contend that their sworn declaration unequivocally evinces that Loews Coronado is a 

Delaware-incorporated entity with its principal place of business in New York. Id. The 

Prentice-Hall Corporation, according to Defendants, functions only as the company’s 

California process server. Kralovich Decl. ¶ 7. Accordingly, Defendants submit the 

Court should accept their sworn statements that Loews Coronado is a citizen of only New 

York and Delaware. 

The Court finds that Defendants have satisfied their burden to establish that Loews 

Coronado is not a California citizen. In their notice of removal, Defendants

unambiguously state that Loews Coronado is a citizen of only two states: Delaware, by 

virtue of its incorporation; and New York, its principal place of business. Under Hertz’ 

‘nerve center test,’ a corporation’s principal place of business is a single place located 

where the corporation’s officers, direct, control, and coordinate the corporation’s 

activities. 559 U.S. at 95. In practice, “the [principal place of business] should normally 

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be the place where the corporation maintains its headquarters.” Id. at 93. Moreover, the 

Supreme Court in Hertz rejected an approach focused on the location of a corporation’s 

business activities. Id. at 95. 

Courts have previously accepted a defendant corporation’s declaration as 

dispositive in demonstrating it’s principal place of business. In General Reinusurance 

Corp. v. City of Vista, another court in this district relied exclusively on a declaration 

from a company’s Assistant Vice President to hold that the Defendant company had 

carried its burden to establish its principal place of business. 295 F. Supp. 3d 1119,

1123-1124 (S.D. Cal.) (April 5, 2018). There, the declaration stated that “GRC ha[d] 

been incorporated under the laws of the state of Delaware” and that “since 1984, GRC 

has had its principal place of business in Stamford, Connecticut,” where “GRC’s officers, 

directors, and executives direct, control, and coordinate the company’s activities” from its 

headquarters. Id. at 1124. Consequently, the Court held that “the record establishe[d] 

that GRC is a citizen of Delaware and Connecticut” for purposes of diversity. Id. 

Here, the Court cannot rely on Plaintiff’s unverified search results and 

unsubstantiated extrapolation in favor of Defendants’ sworn declaration. As a 

preliminary matter, Plaintiff has not properly requested that this Court take judicial notice 

of her search results. In addition, Defendants have provided a number of statements on 

the record that bolster their assertion that New York is Loews Coronado’s principal place 

of business. The Declaration of Sean Clancy attests that Loews Coronado is 

headquartered at 667 Madison Avenue – 8th Floor, New York NY. See ECF No. 1-3. 

Defendants also avouch that the large majority of Loews Coronado’s officers responsible 

for the company’s business decisions reside in the New York area and work from the 

company headquarters. See Declaration of Wendel Kralovich ¶ 6. Moreover, Defendants 

submit that Loews Coronado does not control or conduct its business through the Prentice 

Hall Corporation System and that the entity was retained only as a designated agent for 

service of process in California. ECF No. 8 at 9. This Court finds that these statements 

are sufficient under Hertz to establish that Loews Coronado is a citizen of only Delaware 

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and New York. Accordingly, the Defendants have met their burden to demonstrate that 

there is complete diversity among the parties. 

C. Joinder of Parties Through Amendment 

Plaintiff also argues that this case should be remanded because she intends to 

amend her Complaint to include two additional individual defendants who, as California 

residents, would defeat complete diversity once they are included. ECF No. 4 at 21. 

Defendant responds by arguing that (1) the Court cannot reach the issue because Plaintiff 

has not yet moved to amend her complaint to add Chris Aguira and Antonio Archeta as 

individual defendants; and (2) if Plaintiff does move for leave to amend her Complaint, 

the Court should deny such a motion because the additions would be improper as sham 

defendants included for the sole purpose of defeating diversity jurisdiction. 

The Court agrees with Defendants that remanding the case at this stage – on the 

basis of a hypothetical motion for leave to amend – would be premature. Plaintiff has not 

properly moved for leave to amend her Complaint. And until Aguira and Archeta are 

added as defendants to this case, the requirements of diversity jurisdiction are satisfied. 

The parties are diverse—Plaintiff is a citizen of California—and, as discussed above, 

Defendant corporations are collectively citizens of New York and Delaware. 

D. Amount in Controversy

Plaintiff next contends that Defendants have not adequately established that the 

amount in controversy is sufficient to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction. Specifically, 

Plaintiffs argue that Defendants improperly provided this court with proprietary 

settlement demands to establish the amount in controversy. ECF No. 4 at 31. As a result, 

Plaintiff advances the theory that this Court may not consider her settlement demand in 

determining whether the amount in controversy threshold has been met. Id. The Court 

finds this argument to be unavailing and contrary to settled law. 

28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) vests federal courts with subject matter jurisdiction over 

cases “where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of 

interests and costs.” In removing a case to federal court, a defendant “need include only 

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a plausible allegation that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional 

threshold.” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, 135 S. Ct. 547, 554 (2014). 

To determine the amount in controversy for diversity purposes, courts have historically 

considered settlement demands in spite of the fact that they constitute confidential 

communications in other contexts. Consider, for example, Cohn v. Petsmart, Inc., 281 

F.3d 837 (9th Cir. 2002), where the Ninth Circuit held $100,000 settlement offer from the 

plaintiff alone was sufficient to meet the $75,000 threshold for removal. Courts in this 

district have likewise utilized settlement communications to determine diversity, holding

that “if damages are not clearly specified in the pleadings, the court may rely upon a 

variety of documents, including written settlement demands” to determine diversity. 

Arellano v. Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc., 245 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1108 (S.D. Cal. 2003). 

The Complaint at issue is silent as to a sum or dollar amount for damages. See 

generally, ECF No. 1-1. Given that courts have used settlement demands to determine 

diversity for removal purposes, the Court concludes that it may look to Plaintiff’s 

settlement offer in this case. Plaintiff’s settlement offer of $200,000 well exceeds the 

$75,000 amount in controversy threshold. ECF No. 1-4. See also Exhibit A, ECF No. 1-

5. Thus, the Court holds that this case is properly before the Court under diversity 

jurisdiction. 

E. Timeliness of Removal

Lastly, Plaintiff contends that Defendants’ removal is untimely because it was not 

filed within thirty days of service of Plaintiff’s Complaint. ECF No. 4 at 25. However, 

the Court finds that removal within thirty days of service is not the applicable standard if 

the initial pleadings do not “affirmatively reveal on its face the facts necessary for federal 

court jurisdiction.” Harris v. Bankers Life & CA’s Co., 425 F.3d 689, 690-91 (9th Cir. 

2005). In looking to this standard, Plaintiff’s initial pleadings make no mention of the 

amount in controversy. As such, this Court concludes that Defendants have reasonable 

cause to state that the amount of controversy – and by extension, jurisdictional availment 

– was not ascertainable on its face. Consequently, the appropriate timeframe for 

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Defendants to file for removal would have been thirty days from the first date which it 

can be ascertained that federal subject matter jurisdiction exists. See 28 U.S.C. §

1446(b)(3). In the notice of removal, Defendants state that they were only able to 

ascertain the amount in controversy through Plaintiff’s December 11, 2018 settlement 

demand. ECF No. 1-4. Defendants’ Notice of Removal was filed on January 10, 2019,

within thirty days of December 11, 2018. See ECF No. 1.. Accordingly, the Court 

concurs with Defendants that removal was timely. 

IV. Conclusion

In sum, this case is properly before the Court: the parties are completely diverse –

Plaintiff is a California citizen and Defendant corporations are collectively citizens of 

only New York and Delaware – and as discussed above, the amount in controversy 

exceeds $75,000. Because the requirements of diversity jurisdiction are satisfied in this 

case, the Court lacks discretion to remand the case to state court. As a result, the Court 

must exercise the original jurisdiction that it possesses over this case and Plaintiff’s 

motion to remand to state court is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 30, 2019

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