Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cv-00089/USCOURTS-azd-4_11-cv-00089-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Gabriel Ignacio Salazar, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

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CV-11-89-TUC-DCB (JCG)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner, Gabriel Ignacio Salazar, who is presently confined in the Manzanita Unit

of the Arizona State Prison Complex in Tucson, Arizona, has filed a Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court,

this matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Guerin for Report and Recommendation. Before

the Court are the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) (Doc. No. 1) and

Respondents’ Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”). (Doc. No. 7.)

Petitioner did not file a reply. The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court deny

the Petition.

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1

 It appears from the record that Count 3 of the indictment was dismissed. (Answer, Ex. H,

pg. 7.) 

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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On April 30, 2009, the State charged Petitioner with possession of marijuana for sale

having a weight of more than four pounds, a Class 2 felony (Count 1); transportation of

marijuana for sale having a weight of more than two pounds, a Class 2 felony (Count 2);

possession of drug paraphernalia (packaging material), a Class 6 felony (Count 3); unlawful

flight from law enforcement vehicle, a Class 5 felony (Count 4) and resisting arrest, a Class

6 felony (Count 5). (Answer, Ex. A.) The State amended the indictment to allege one

historical prior conviction and aggravating circumstances other than prior convictions.

(Answer, Exs. B & C.)

On December 17, 2009, Petitioner’s trial counsel at the Cochise County Public

Defender’s Office filed a Notice of Trial Conflict, indicating that Petitioner’s January 26,

2010 trial date conflicted with other hearings. (Answer, Doc. 7-1, pg. 70.) On January 19,

2010, trial counsel moved to withdraw from representation of Petitioner due to Petitioner’s

failure to stay in contact with his attorney. (Answer, Ex. D.) The motion to withdraw

included a request to vacate Petitioner’s trial. (Answer, Doc. 7-1, pg. 66.) On that same

date, the motion to withdraw was set for hearing on January 25, 2010; the order setting the

hearing advised the parties to continue preparing for the January 26, 2010 trial in the event

the motion was denied. (Id.) On January 25, 2010, at the hearing on the motion to withdraw,

the State notified the Court of its intent to try Petitioner in abstentia. (Answer, Ex. E.) The

Court confirmed the January 26, 2010 trial date. (Answer; Doc. 7-1, pg. 67.) 

Petitioner failed to appear for trial; the trial court found his absence voluntary and

empaneled a 9-person jury. (Answer, Ex. F.) Following a one-day trial, the jury convicted

Petitioner on Counts 1, 2, 4 and 5 of the indictment.1

 (Id.) 

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Petitioner was arrested on a bench warrant and on March 8, 2010 a consolidated

sentencing hearing on three cause numbers convened. (Answer, Ex. H.) The trial court

sentenced Petitioner as a repetitive offender (one historical prior) to the presumptive

sentences of 9.25 years on the possession for sale conviction, 9.25 years on the transportation

for sale conviction, 2.25 years on the unlawful flight conviction and 1.75 years on the

resisting arrest conviction, with all sentences to be served concurrently. (Id.) 

Petitioner filed a notice of appeal; on September 29, 2010, appointed counsel filed a

brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) avowing that she could not

discover any meritorious issues to raise on review. (Answer, Ex. I.) On October 29, 2010,

Petitioner filed a supplemental appellate brief in which he raised four claims: (1) the trial

court violated Petitioner’s federal due process rights by conducting his trial in abstentia; (2)

Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment rights were violated because he was not provided a 12-person

jury; (3) the jury instructions violated Petitioner’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights;

and (4) Petitioner’s conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence in violation of his

Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Answer, Ex. J.) The appellate court required the parties to

provide supplemental briefing on the issue of whether Petitioner’s convictions for sale and

transportation of marijuana for sale violated double jeopardy. (Answer, Ex. K.) The parties

complied; Petitioner’s court-appointed appellate counsel filed a brief arguing that the

convictions violated Petitioner’s double jeopardy rights under the United States and Arizona

Constitutions and the State conceded that argument in its response brief. (Answer, Exs. L

& M.) On January 19, 2011, the Court of Appeals issued a decision rejecting the arguments

raised in Petitioner’s October 29, 2010 appellate brief but vacating the conviction and

sentence for the possession of marijuana for sale conviction based on the supplemental

briefing provided by the parties. (Answer, Ex. N.)

Petitioner did not seek review of the Court of Appeals’ decision, nor did he seek postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 32, Ariz. R. Crim. P.

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On February 2, 2011, Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus,

in which he raises the same four claims raised in his appeal: 

Ground 1: the trial court violated Petitioner’s federal due process rights by

conducting his trial in abstentia;

Ground 2: Petitioner’s Sixth Amendment rights were violated because he was not

provided a 12-person jury;

Ground 3: the jury instructions violated Petitioner’s Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights; and

Ground 4: Petitioner’s conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence in

violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. 

In support of his Petition, Petitioner attached and incorporated by reference his October 29,

2010 appellate brief.

DISCUSSION

The Magistrate Judge recommends that the Petition be denied. Grounds 2 and 3 fail

to state a cognizable claim. Grounds 1 and 4, although exhausted, are without merit. 

A. Non-Cognizable Claims

In Ground 2, Petitioner alleges that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated because

he was not provided a 12-person jury. However, the Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury

does not include a right to a 12-person jury. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 86-103

(1970). Because 28 U.S.C. § 2254 permits the Court to entertain a Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus “only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or

laws or treaties of the United States,” and because Constitutional law does not guarantee a

12-person jury, Ground 2 fails to state a cognizable claim. 

In Ground 3, Petitioner contends that the jury instructions violated Petitioner’s Sixth

and Fourteenth Amendment rights. In both his direct appeal and his federal Petition,

Petitioner fails to identify which jury instructions were deficient or provide facts in support

of the claim. This deficiency alone is sufficient for denial of Ground 3, as “conclusory

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2 The Court of Appeals reviewed the instructions and concluded that they were proper under

Arizona law. 

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allegations which are not supported by a statement of specific facts do not warrant habeas

relief.” James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994). In addition, the correctness of jury

instructions are a matter of state law and involve no federal constitutional question that

would entitle Petitioner to relief.2

 See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 71-72 (1991). Jury

instructions may be challenged on federal habeas review only if “the ailing instruction by

itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.” Cupp v.

Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973). Petitioner has not presented a due process claim with

respect to Ground 3. Because Petitioner has failed to allege a violation of federal law,

Ground 3 fails to state a cognizable claim. 

B. Exhaustion

Ordinarily, before a federal court will consider the merits of a habeas petition, the

petitioner must exhaust the remedies available to him in state court. 28 U.S.C.

§2254(b)(1)(A); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971). First enunciated in Ex parte

Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886), the exhaustion requirement is designed "not to create a

procedural hurdle on the path to federal habeas court, but to channel claims into an

appropriate forum, where meritorious claims may be vindicated and unfounded litigation

obviated before resort to federal court." Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 10 (1992).

The requirement is grounded in principles of comity, and reflects a desire to protect state

courts' role in the enforcement of federal law. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349 (1989)

(citation omitted). The requirement is also based on a pragmatic consideration that fully

exhausted claims will usually be accompanied by a complete factual record once they reach

federal court. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 519 (1982). 

A petitioner must exhaust his claims by fairly presenting them to the state's highest

court, either through a direct appeal or collateral proceedings, before a federal court will

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consider the merits of habeas corpus claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Rose, 455

U.S. at 519. A petitioner must have also presented his claim in a procedural context in which

its merits will be considered. See Castille, 489 U.S. at 351. A habeas petitioner's claims may

be precluded from federal review on exhaustion grounds in either of two ways. First, a claim

may be procedurally defaulted in federal court if it was actually raised in state court but

found by that court to be defaulted on state procedural grounds. See Coleman v. Thompson,

501 U.S. 722, 729-30 (1991). Second, the claim may be procedurally defaulted in federal

court if the petitioner failed to present the claim in a necessary state court and "the court to

which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion

requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred." Id. at 735 n.1. If a petitioner

has procedurally defaulted a claim in state court, a federal court will not review the claim

unless the petitioner shows "cause and prejudice" for the failure to present the constitutional

issue to the state court, or makes a colorable showing of actual innocence. See Gray v.

Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162 (1996); Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 337 (1992); Murray

v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485 (1986).

Petitioner raised Grounds 1 and 4 in his direct appeal. Thus, they are properly

exhausted and will be considered on the merits.

C. Merits

On habeas review, a state court's findings of fact are entitled to a presumption of

correctness when fairly supported by the record. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 426

(1985). The presumption of correctness also applies to a state appellate court's findings of

fact. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546 (1981). The question presented in a state prisoner's

petition for a writ of habeas corpus is “whether the state proceedings satisfied due process.”

Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919-20 (9th Cir. 1991). 

 Federal courts may entertain a state prisoner’s petition for habeas relief only on the

grounds that the prisoner’s confinement violates the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the

United States. Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339 (1994). General improprieties occurring in state

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proceedings are cognizable only if they resulted in fundamental unfairness and consequently

violated the petitioner’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. Estelle v. McGuire,

502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (“[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine

state court determinations on state law questions.”); Bonin, 77 F.3d at 1158. The Supreme

Court has held in the habeas context that "this Court will not review a question of federal law

decided by a state court if the decision of that court rests on a state law ground that is

independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment." Coleman v.

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991). 

The provisions of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)

govern this case and pose special burdens. Chein v. Shumsky, 373 F.3d 978, 983 (9th Cir.

2004) (en banc). Under AEDPA, when reviewing a state criminal conviction, a federal court

may grant a writ of habeas corpus only if a state court proceeding "(1) resulted in a decision

that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision

that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Under § 2254(d)(1), a state court decision is "contrary to" clearly established Supreme

Court precedent "if the state court applies a rule that contradictsthe governing law set forth"

in Supreme Court cases or "if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially

indistinguishable from" a Supreme Court decision but "nevertheless arrives at a result

differentfrom" that precedent. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). A state court

decision is an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law if "the state court

identifies the correct governing legal principle" from a Supreme Court decision "but

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. at 413. In

considering whether a state court has unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent, "a

federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its

independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established

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federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable."

Id. at 411; Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). In conducting habeas review, we

"presum[e] that state courts know and follow the law." Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19,

24 (2002). When applying the AEDPA and reviewing whether a state court decision is

contrary to federal law, this court must look to the state's last reasoned decision as the basis

for its judgment. See Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 & n. 6 (9th Cir. 2002).

1. Ground 1 is without merit

In Ground 1, Petitioner contends that the trial court violated Petitioner’s federal due

process rights by conducting his trial in abstentia. The Court of Appeals held that a

defendant’s waiver of his right to appear may be inferred if the defendant had personal

knowledge of the time of the proceeding, his right to be present, and the warning that the

proceeding would take place in his absence if he failed to appear. (Doc. 7-1, pg. 103.) This

statement of the law was in keeping with the Constitutional standard. Although the Sixth

Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to be present at trial, this right can be waived;

such waiver is inferred if the defendant, after sufficient notice, voluntarily fails to appear.

See Smith v. Mann, 173 F.3d 73 (2d. Cir. 1999) (distinguishing constitutional standard and

Rule 43, Fed. R. Crim. P., and denying habeas relief to petitioner who knew the precise time

and place he was to appear for trial, and that the consequence of his failure to appear would

be a trial in absentia). 

The Court of Appeals’ decision with respect to Ground 1 was a reasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. The Court of Appeals noted that

Petitioner had signed a notice explaining that the trial or any other proceeding could occur

in his absence and that his failure to appear could be treated as a voluntary absence.

(Answer, Ex. N.) The Court of Appeals also noted that Petitioner was present at a November

23, 2009 hearing which set the January 26, 2010 trial date. (Id.) Thus, it appears from the

record that Petitioner received sufficient notice of the trial date but then voluntarily failed to

appear. Petitioner’s claim that the trial date was made uncertain by his trial counsel’s filing

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of a motion to withdraw is without merit; the trial court’s January 19, 2010 order specifically

advised the parties to continue preparing for the January 26, 2010 trial. The Court of

Appeals’ reasonably concluded that “nothing in the record suggest[s that Petitioner] could

have believed his trial would not occur as scheduled.” (Id.) Accordingly, Ground 1 is

without merit.

2. Ground 4 is without merit

In Ground 4, Petitioner contends that his conviction was not supported by sufficient

evidence in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights. Petitioner failed to present any

factual allegations in support of this claim; it could be dismissed on that ground alone. See

James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994) (“conclusory allegations which are not

supported by a statement of specific facts do not warrant habeas relief.”) In addition, the

claim is without merit. 

The Court of Appeals properly stated the applicable federal law in considering

whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict, was

sufficient to support the jury’s finding of guilt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319

(1979) (stating that in determining whether a conviction violates due process, “the relevant

question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,

any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt.”) 

The Court of Appeals’ decision with respect to Ground 4 was a reasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. The Court of Appeals

summarized the evidence as follows:

When a police officer drove his marked patrol car behind Salazar’s

automobile, Salazar sped away in excess of the posted speed limit, did not stop

after the officer activated his patrol car’s emergency lights and siren, fled on

foot after driving his vehicle into an alleyway, and struggled with the officer

before being restrained and arrested. . . . During an inventory search of

Salazar’s vehicle, the officer discovered two burlap bags – one in the back seat

and the other in the trunk – each containing three parcels of marijuana

weighing a combined total of 123.4 pounds and having a value between

$43,000 and $55,000.

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Thus, there was ample evidence to support Petitioner’s convictions for transportation of

marijuana for sale (Petitioner was traveling with approximately $50,000 worth of marijuana

in his vehicle), fleeing from a law enforcement vehicle (Petitioner sped away in excess of the

speed limit after the officer activated lights and siren) and resisting arrest (Petitioner fled the

officer on foot and struggled before being restrained and arrested). Accordingly, Ground 4

is without merit.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court enter

an order DENYING the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written objections within

fourteen days of being served with a copy of the Report and Recommendation. If objections

are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. If objections are filed, the parties should

use the following case number: CV-11-89-TUC-DCB.

The Clerk is directed to mail a copy of the Report and Recommendation to Petitioner

and counsel for Respondents.

DATED this 24th day of May, 2011.

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