Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-02298/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-02298-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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Exhibits refer to the exhibits submitted by Respondent with its Answer To Petition

For Writ of Habeas Corpus.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

RUBEN NINO, )

) No. CV 04-02298-PHX-JWS [CRP]

Petitioner, ) 

)

vs. ) 

) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

CHARLES FLANNIGAN, et al., )

)

Respondents. )

________________________________ )

Petitioner Ruben Nino asks this Court to issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondents opposed the Petition, arguing a failure to exhaust these

claims in the state court. For the reasons discussed herein, this Court recommends that the

District Judge, after his independent review and consideration, deny relief on the merits.

I. FACTS: 

On August 19, 2002, the State of Arizona charged Petitioner in a four-count

information with possession of marijuana for sale, possession of drug paraphernalia, and two

counts of aggravated assault [Ex. A]1

. Subsequently, while on release, Petitioner failed to

appear at court proceedings, and a bench warrant issued. Seven months later, he was

apprehended by law enforcement, and briefly escaped from their custody. Petitioner was

apprehended again and charged with escape and resisting arrest [Ex. F]. The State also

alleged seven historical priors. 

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Petitioner pleaded guilty to possession of marijuana for

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sale and to escape in the second degree, with one prior conviction [Ex. G&H]. The State

agreed to dismiss the remaining counts and the other allegations of prior felony convictions.

In the plea agreements, Petitioner waived all motions, defenses and objections that he could

raise. Id.

At the change of plea colloquy, Petitioner's defense attorney provided the factual basis

for the escape charge as follows:

On or about January 13, 2003, officers were attempting to take

my client into custody. He had a felony warrant for his arrest in

the 2002 cause number. As they were attempting to place him

under arrest, my client got free and took off running. The

officers were unable to capture him.

[Ex. I, p.13]. Petitioner admitted those facts were true. Id. No other facts were asserted in

the colloquy concerning interaction between Petitioner and police officers.

At sentencing, Petitioner was sentenced to the presumptive term on the escape charge.

On the marijuana charge, the presumptive term was 4.5 years and the maximum was 6.0

years. Judge Granville sentenced petitioner to 5.5 years, an aggravated sentence, because of

"the criminal history beyond the alleged and proven and the struggle with the officers." [Ex.

K, p.11]. The two sentences were ordered to run concurrent.

Because he pleaded guilty, Petitioner could not take a direct appeal. He instead filed

a timely Notice Of Post-Conviction Relief [Ex L] and Pro Per Petition For Post-Conviction

Relief [Ex. M]. Therein, Petitioner complained that he should have been allowed to

withdraw from the plea agreement, that his lawyer coerced him into pleading guilty, that his

lawyer provided ineffective representation and that the search of the car, which recovered the

marijuana, was illegal. On August 18, 2004, the trial court denied the petition, because the

plea agreement expressly waived defenses and motions, including the challenge to the search

[Ex. P]. Petitioner did not appeal this ruling to the State Court of Appeals.

On August 10, 2004, Petitioner filed a successive petition raising a challenge to his

aggravated sentence for the marijuana charge based on Blakely v. Washington, 524 U.S. 296,

124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004). [Ex. S.] That petition has never been considered by the state trial

court and remains pending.

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2

While Petitioner did not appeal the denial to the Court of Appeals, he did move for

reconsideration by the trial court, which was denied. In any event, the of-right appeal was

pending when Blakely was decided.

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The Petition raises two claims. First, Petitioner argues that his defense counsel was

ineffective for not moving to suppress evidence seized from his car because the search

violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Secondly, Petitioner complains that the aggravated

sentence of 5.5 years violated Blakely. 

Respondent concedes that the Petition is timely. Respondent argues that the

ineffective assistance of counsel claim was not exhausted by appeal to the State Court of

Appeals. Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999). Respondent also asserts

that this claim cannot be raised in state court again, because it was required to be raised in

the original of-right petition for post-conviction relief. Rule 32.1 and 32.2, ARIZ.R.CRIM.P.

Therefore, this claim is procedurally barred. Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir.

2002).

Respondent's analysis as to the first claim is correct. The ineffective assistance of

counsel and unlawful search claim is procedurally barred in state court, was not exhausted

to the state court of appeals, and cannot be considered on the merits by this Court.

Concerning the Blakely claim, Respondent argued that because Petitioner never filed

a direct appeal, his conviction became final on November 7, 2003, well before Blakely was

decided by the Supreme Court on June 24, 2004. Respondent argued that Blakely was not

retroactive, and Teague barred, therefore the claim could not be considered on collateral

review. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060 (1989).

In this Court's order of June 14, 2006, it was noted that under Arizona law, review of

a guilty plea conviction by an of-right initial petition for post-conviction relief was the

equivalent of a direct appeal. State v. Ward, 211 Ariz. 158, 118 P.3d 1122, 1125 (App.

2005). Therefore, the conviction was not final until the trial court denied the Rule 32 petition

on August 18, 2004, well after the Blakely decision was issued.2

 Moreover, Petitioner raised

the Blakely issue in a successive petition on August 10, 2004. The Court ruled that the

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3

Because Petitioner did not object at trial to the failure to have a jury determine the

aggravated factors, had there been a Blakely violation, it would be reviewed on a

fundamental error basis, not a harmless error. State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 115 P.3d

601, 608 (2005).

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Blakely issue was not Teague barred and appeared to remain pending in the state trial court.

The Court requested further briefing "concerning the lack of exhaustion of State remedies

on the Blakely issue, or whether there is an absence of state corrective process."

Petitioner's "Brief in Response To Court Order" argued the merits of his Blakely

claim. Petitioner asked that the case not be sent back to state court, and that this Court decide

the matter on the merits.

Respondent's "Response To Court Order of June 14, 2006," presented a lengthy,

convoluted and self-contradictory analysis of why for Federal habeas purposes, State v.

Ward, supra, is irrelevant, the judgment was final November 7, 2003, when no direct appeal

was taken, and thus the Blakely claim is Teague-barred. Respondent's argument, such as it

is , has been rejected by the recent decision in Summers v. Schriro, ___ F.3d ___, 2007 WL

738447 (9th Cir. 2007), which held that an Arizona state prisoner's of-right Rule 32

proceeding was direct review within the meaning of the habeas limitations statute.

Respondents also disagreed with the Court's conclusion that any failure to exhaust the

Blakely claim, which was clearly presented in the August 10, 2004 Rule 32 petition, was not

the fault of Petitioner. Relying on Rule 32.9(c), Ariz.R.Crim.P., Respondent argues "it was

incumbent on Petitioner to pursue the matter." This Court finds no authority, including that

cited by Respondent, to support that premise.

Finally, Respondent agrees that returning this case to state court is a futile exercise,

and, if the Court determines the Petition is not time-barred, asks the Court to determine the

matter on the merits. In so doing, Respondent argues that no jury would fail to find the

aggravating circumstances, had they been asked to do so and, therefore, any error is

harmless.3

 Thus, the aggravated sentence should be sustained.

Before applying either a harmless error or fundamental error analysis, it must first be

determined if error occurred. In this case, it is apparent from the record that no Blakely

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violation occurred in connection with Petitioner's sentencing.

Under Blakely, a jury must determine beyond a reasonable doubt any fact which is

"legally essential to the punishment." Blakely, 542 U.S. at 313, 124 S.Ct. at 2543. In

Arizona's sentencing scheme, if one or more aggravated factors is found, an aggravated

sentence is permitted. A.R.S. § 13-702(D). In applying Blakely to this sentencing scheme,

the Arizona Supreme Court reasoned as follows:

[8, 9] ¶26 The Sixth Amendment requires that a jury find

beyond a reasonable doubt, or a defendant admit, any fact (other

than a prior conviction) necessary to establish the range within

which a judge may sentence the defendant. If, however,

additional facts are relevant, merely to the exercise of a judge's

discretion in determining the specific sentence to impose on a

defendant within a given statutory sentencing range, the Sixth

Amendment permits the judge to find those facts by a

preponderance of the evidence. Under A.R.S. § 13-702, the

existence of a single aggravated factor exposes a defendant to an

aggravated sentence. Therefore, once a jury finds or a defendant

admits a single aggravated factor, the Sixth Amendment permits

the sentencing judge to find and consider additional factors

relevant to the imposition of a sentence up to the maximum

prescribed in that statue.

State v. Martinez, 210 Ariz. 578, 115 P.3d 618, 625 (2005).

In this instance, the trial judge considered two aggravated circumstances, "the criminal

history beyond the alleged and proven and the struggle with the officers." [Ex. K, p.11].

Blakely does not require that the fact of a prior conviction be presented to and found by a jury

beyond a reasonable doubt. Blakely, supra, at 301, 124 S.Ct. at 2536 (citing Apprendi v. New

Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348(2000)). A history of prior convictions is Blakely

exempt. Therefore, since one Blakely exempt factor supports the aggravated sentence,

consideration of other factors imposing sentence does not violate Petitioner's Fifth and Sixth

Amendment rights established in Blakely. Moreover, the other issue considered by the

sentencing judge was admitted by the Petitioner. The factual basis stated in part:

"As they were attempting to place him under arrest, my client

got free and took off running."

[Ex. I, p.13]. While a more detailed factual basis would have been more clear, this admission

supports the trial judge's consideration of the "struggle" with the officers. Petitioner's

argument that he never admitted the struggle with officers [Brief in Response to Court Order,

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p.4], is contradicted by his guilty plea colloquy.

Of the two factors considered by the sentencing judge in aggravating Petitioner's

sentence by one year, from 4.5 to 5.5 years, one was Blakely-exempt and the other was

admitted by Petitioner. Therefore, there was no Blakely error in connection with the

sentencing. 

The Petition should be denied on the merits.

IT IS, THEREFORE, the Report and Recommendation of the Court that the District

Judge, after his independent review and consideration, enter an order as follows:

1. Finding that the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was not exhausted, is

procedurally-barred, and should be DISMISSED.

2. Finding that the Blakely claim is not barred for failure to exhaust state remedies.

3. Finding that no Blakely error took place in aggravating Petitioner's sentence on the

marijuana charge.

4. Ordering that the relief requested in the Petition be DENIED, and that the Petition be

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), any party may file and serve written objections within

ten (10) days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. If

objections are not timely filed, the party’s right to de novo review may be waived. See

United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.2003) (en banc), cert. denied, 540

U.S. 900 (2003). If objections are filed, the parties should direct them to the District Court

by using the following case number: CV 04-02298-PHX-JMS.

The Clerk of the Court is directed to send a copy of this Report and Recommendation

to all parties.

DATED this 17th day of April, 2007.

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