Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_19-cv-00290/USCOURTS-azd-4_19-cv-00290-39/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Greg Moore; et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

Sean Garnand; et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 19-00290 TUC RM (MAA)

Report and Recommendation

Pending before the court is the defendants’ motion, filed on August 2, 2024, to stay

this action and vacate all pending deadlines pursuant to the Younger abstention doctrine.

Doc. 512; see Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971). The plaintiffs filed a response on

August 12, 2024. Doc. 515. The defendants filed a reply on August 22, 2024. Doc. 518.

This case was referred to the Magistrate Judge for pretrial proceedings and report and

recommendation in accordance with the Local Rules. Doc. 16. The Magistrate Judge

recommends that the motion be granted.

Background

The plaintiffs in this action (“the Moores”) claim their constitutional rights were

violated when the defendants obtained and executed two search warrants in connection with

an arson investigation into the destruction of the Forgeus Apartments on June 8, 2017.

Complaint, Doc. 1; see Doc. 391, p. 2 (“The remaining claims in this matter are Counts One,

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Three and Four of the Plaintiffs’ Complaint.”). The first warrant, for DNA and other

personal effects, was executed on June 9, 2017. Doc. 1, p. 8. The second warrant, for

financial documents, was executed on June 14, 2017. Doc. 1, pp. 9-10. 

On May 24, 2019, the Moores filed a complaint in this court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1983. Doc. 1, p. 4. They claim, among other things, that the warrant applications were not

supported by probable cause and contained “material misrepresentations and omissions.”

Doc. 1, pp. 16-18.

At first, discovery was limited due to the law enforcement investigatory privilege.

Doc. 74; Doc. 515, pp. 1-2. The defendants maintained that unfettered discovery would

“undermine the integrity of the open criminal investigation.” Doc. 74, p. 2.

On February 3, 2022, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on the

issue of qualified immunity. Doc. 348. On February 16, 2022, the Moores filed a motion to

stay briefing on the defendants’ motion “until Plaintiffs have had a full and fair opportunity

to obtain the discovery necessary” to meaningfully oppose it. Doc. 353, p. 1.

On May 10, 2022, a state grand jury returned an eight-count felony indictment against

plaintiff Greg Moore. Doc. 512, p. 2; Doc. 369, p. 3. “The Indictment charges Greg Moore

with Arson of an Occupied Structure . . . ; Fraudulent Schemes and Artifices . . . ; Fraudulent

Fire Insurance Application or Claim . . . ; and Illegally Conducting an Enterprise . . . .” Doc.

512, pp. 2-3.

On August 1, 2022, this court granted the Moores’ motion to stay briefing, denied

without prejudice the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the issue of qualified

immunity, and allowed discovery to proceed. Doc. 374. On August 10, 2022, the defendants

filed an interlocutory appeal with the Ninth Circuit objecting to this court’s denial without

prejudice of their motion for summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity. Doc.

375; Doc. 389. The Ninth Circuit held that the defendants were entitled to summary

judgment on the plaintiffs’ First Amendment retaliation claims. Doc. 388-1, p. 4. The Ninth

Circuit further stated that the second search warrant was overbroad and improperly

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authorized the seizure of financial information and electronic data unrelated to the arson

under investigation. Doc. 389, pp. 6-7. The court has since reset the dispositive motion

deadline to September 15, 2024. Doc. 503.

On July 12, 2024, the defendants filed the pending motion to stay all proceedings in

this action pending the resolution of the state’s criminal case against the plaintiff Greg Moore

pursuant to the Younger abstention doctrine. Doc. 512; see Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37,

41 (1971). The court agrees; this action should be stayed pursuant to Younger.

 

Discussion

In Younger, the Supreme Court explained that while “the National Government [was]

anxious . . . to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, [it] always endeavors

to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States.”

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44, 91 S. Ct. 746, 750-751, 27 L. Ed. 2d 669 (1971).

Accordingly, there are times when the federal courts should abstain from adjudicating a civil

action and allow the States an opportunity in the first instance to decide important federal

constitutional issues. By filing their motion, the defendants implicitly assert that the State

of Arizona should be allowed to decide without federal court interference whether the search

warrants violated the Moores’ federal constitutional rights.

Younger “abstention is required whenever (1) there are ongoing state judicial

proceedings; (2) the proceedings implicate important state interests; [] (3) the state

proceedings provide the plaintiff with an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims,” and

the federal court action (4) “would enjoin the proceeding, or have the practical effect of

doing so.” AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Roden, 495 F.3d 1143, 1149 (9th Cir. 2007)

(punctuation modified). If the federal action is one for damages, Younger only requires that

the action be stayed, not dismissed. Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 2004).

The court agrees with the defendants that Point (1) is satisfied here. Younger

abstention was originally applied when the state court proceeding was filed before the federal

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1

 The defendants assert that the state proceeding was initiated when the indictment

was returned against the defendant Greg Moore. Doc. 512, p. 6. The court assumes without

deciding that they are correct. But see, Nick v. Abrams, 717 F. Supp. 1053, 1056 (S.D.N.Y.

1989) (“[A] ‘pending state proceeding’ exists when a state attorney general executes a search

warrant authorized by a judge during a criminal investigation prior to arrest or indictment.”).

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action. Since then, the Supreme Court has explained that, under certain circumstances,

“federal courts must defer even to state court proceedings that are filed after the federal

action.” M&A Gabaee v. Cmty. Redevelopment Agency of City of Los Angeles, 419 F.3d

1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2005) (emphasis in original) (citing Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332,

349, 95 S.Ct. 2281 (1975)). If the state court proceeding is filed after the federal action, the

“ongoing state proceeding” prong is satisfied if the state proceeding was initiated “before any

proceedings of substance on the merits have taken place in the federal court.” Hicks v.

Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 349, 95 S.Ct. 2281, 2292 (1975), overruled on other grounds,

Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 97 S.Ct. 2238 (1977).1 Such is the case here. 

When the state court indictment was returned on May 10, 2022, approximately three

years had passed since the Moores filed their complaint in this court on May 24, 2019.

Discovery, however, was not far advanced due to the court’s application of the law

enforcement investigatory privilege. Doc. 74. The Moores filed motions for partial summary

judgment early in the case, but they were withdrawn before any further briefing. Doc. 512,

p. 2; Docs. 167, 211. On February 3, 2022, the defendants filed a motion for summary

judgment on the issue of qualified immunity, but there was no further briefing before the

indictment was returned. Id. The Moores filed a motion arguing that the court should stay

briefing on the defendants’ motion “until Plaintiffs have had a full and fair opportunity to

obtain the discovery necessary” to meaningfully oppose it. Doc. 353, p. 1. On August 1,

2022, this court granted the Moores’ motion, denied the defendants’ motion for summary

judgment without prejudice, and let discovery proceed. Doc. 374. This court concludes that

proceedings of substance on the merits had not already taken place when the state court

returned the indictment against the plaintiff Greg Moore on May 10, 2022. See, e.g., Fresh

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Int’l Corp. v. Agric. Lab. Rels. Bd., 805 F.2d 1353, 1358 (9th Cir. 1986) (“[T]he court heard

arguments on the cross-motions for summary judgment, which constituted the first

proceedings of substance on the merits in federal court.”). Accordingly, the court finds that

there are “ongoing state proceedings” for the purposes of Younger. See Hicks v. Miranda,

422 U.S. 332, 349, 95 S.Ct. 2281, 2292 (1975).

The Moores argue to the contrary that Point (1) is not satisfied. They assert that “[i]f

the federal action is filed before the state case, abstention is not appropriate ‘after the federal

court proceedings have moved beyond an “embryonic stage”’” quoting Hoye v. City of

Oakland, 653 F.3d 835, 844 (9th Cir. 2011) quoting Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922,

929, 95 S. Ct. 2561, 256 (1975). Doc. 515, p. 8. Doran, however, says something a bit

different.

In Doran, the Supreme Court made the following statements: “When the criminal

summonses issued against M & L on the days immediately following the filing of the federal

complaint, the federal litigation was in an embryonic stage and no contested matter had been

decided. In this posture, M & L’s prayer for injunction is squarely governed by Younger.”

Doran, 422 U.S. at 929, 95 S.Ct. at 2566 (emphasis added). In Doran, the Supreme Court

found that a case in the embryonic stage is “squarely” governed by Younger. Id. The Court

did not find that a case no longer in the embryonic stage would not qualify for Younger

abstention. The Doran Court did not use the term “embryonic” to describe the upper limit

of activity beyond which Younger would not apply.

The Moores maintain that this court should consider “the time that the district court

has spent considering the case, any motions ruled on, any discovery, the number of

conferences held, and any change in the parties’ positions as a result of the federal litigation.”

Doc. 515, p. 9. They assert specifically that the federal case is “far down the road” and there

have been a number of discovery rulings. Id. 

The Moores are correct in their observation that this court has resolved a number of

discovery issues. But the lion’s share of discovery in this case has occurred after the state

court proceeding was initiated, and this court must consider the posture of the federal action

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at the moment that the state court proceeding was initiated. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332,

349, 95 S. Ct. 2281, 2292, 45 L. Ed. 2d 223 (1975) (“[W]here state criminal proceedings are

begun . . . before any proceedings of substance on the merits have taken place in the federal

court, the principles of Younger v. Harris should apply in full force.”); Calvary Chapel San

Jose v. Cody, 2023 WL 2638318, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2023) (rejecting a request “to

look to the current status of the federal proceeding, rather than the status when the state court

case was filed, to determine whether any proceedings of substance of the merits have taken

place”), aff’d sub nom. Calvary Chapel San Jose v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 2024 WL 1635554

(9th Cir. Apr. 16, 2024). When the state court proceeding was initiated, discovery had been

fairly limited. The Moores stated as much when they argued that they should not be required

to respond to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the issue of qualified

immunity because they did not have an opportunity to conduct meaningful discovery. 

Points (2) and (3) are also satisfied. It is difficult to think of a proceeding that more

profoundly implicates a State’s interests than a felony criminal trial. See Kelly v. Robinson,

479 U.S. 36, 49, 107 S. Ct. 353, 361 (1986) (“This Court has recognized that the States’

interest in administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one

of the most powerful of the considerations that should influence a court considering equitable

types of relief.”); Bean v. Matteucci, 986 F.3d 1128, 1133 (9th Cir. 2021) (“[T]he state has

an important interest in prosecuting a murder case.”). Moreover, Greg Moore will have an

opportunity in state court to challenge the search warrants on a motion to suppress evidence.

See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 16.2 (discussing procedure on pretrial motions to suppress evidence

“that was unlawfully obtained due to a constitutional violation.”)

Point (4) also favors abstention. The federal court action “would enjoin the

proceeding, or have the practical effect of doing so.” AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Roden,

495 F.3d 1143, 1149 (9th Cir. 2007). The Moores claim that the defendants conducted a

fraudulent investigation and obtained the search warrants by making material

misrepresentations and omissions. Determining these issues in federal court will necessarily

have the practical effect of enjoining the state court’s proceeding, which ordinarily is

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responsible for ensuring that evidence presented at trial was not gathered in violation of the

defendants’ Fourth Amendment rights. See Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 968 (9th

Cir. 2004) (“[A] determination that the federal plaintiff’s constitutional rights have been

violated would have the same practical effect as a declaration or injunction on pending state

proceedings.”). “It would frustrate the state’s interest in administering its judicial system

[and] cast a negative light on the state court’s ability to enforce constitutional principles . .

. .” Gilbertson, 381 F.3d at 980. 

The Moores argue in their response that Point (4) is not satisfied. Doc. 515. They

quote AmerisourceBergen for the proposition that “interference with ongoing state

proceedings” is not necessarily established whenever there is a risk of inconsistent judgments

because “[t]he possibility of a race to judgment is inherent in a system of dual sovereigns and

. . . that possibility alone is insufficient to overcome the weighty interest in the federal courts

exercising their jurisdiction over cases properly before them.” AmerisourceBergen Corp. v.

Roden, 495 F.3d 1143, 1151 (9th Cir. 2007). That case, however, is distinguishable. 

In AmerisourceBergen, the Ninth Circuit held that the defendant’s newly filed federal

claim for breach of contract should not have been stayed pending resolution of the earlier

filed state action in which the plaintiff claimed that his former employer was not complying

with a previously concluded settlement agreement. Id. There was clear overlap between the

issues to be considered in the two lawsuits, but these issues are not the type that traditionally

commands Younger deference. The parties’ constitutional rights were not contested. The

only thing at stake was whether, or how soon, the individual plaintiff was responsible for

repaying a loan he received in connection with his former employment. In fact, the

AmerisourceBergen court also found that Younger was not implicated for the additional

reason that an “important state interest” was not present. AmerisourceBergen, 495 F.3d at

1150.

The case at bar, however, implicates “the States’ interest in administering their

criminal justice systems free from federal interference.” See Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36,

49, 107 S. Ct. 353, 361, 93 L. Ed. 2d 216 (1986). When this is the interest at stake, the

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federal courts’ level of deference to the States is at its highest. See Wright, Miller, Cooper

& Amar, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction 3d § 4252. In these circumstances,

Federal courts are particularly sensitive to the possibility that their rulings could undermine

the public’s faith in the States’ criminal justice system. And, they are more likely to find that

federal court action “would enjoin the proceeding, or have the practical effect of doing so.”

AmerisourceBergen, 495 F.3d at 1149; see also Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124, 95 S.

Ct. 1524, 1531, 44 L. Ed. 2d 15 (1975) (“Only if ‘extraordinary circumstances’ render the

state court incapable of fairly and fully adjudicating the federal issues before it, can there be

any relaxation of the deference to be accorded to the state criminal process.); see, e.g.,

Gakuba v. O'Brien, 711 F.3d 751, 753 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Gakuba’s claims of damages

resulting from illegal searches, seizures, and detentions [should have been stayed under

Younger because] they involve constitutional issues that may be litigated during the course

of his criminal case . . . and [d]eciding those issues in federal court could undermine the state

court proceeding.”); Emberton v. San Francisco City Gov't, 2023 WL 3983809, at *9 (N.D.

Cal. June 13, 2023) (Younger required dismissal where “Emberton’s Fourth Amendment

claim . . . appears to seek a determination that the proceeding at large is illegal because the

initial investigation and search of her property was illegal.”) (punctuation modified); Bigford

v. Lakewood Police Dep’t, 2013 WL 1944509, at *1-2 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 29, 2013) (“[T]his

[§ 1983] action [alleging lack of probable cause to search his vehicle] would unduly interfere

with the state criminal proceeding in a way Younger disapproves. Assuming Mr. Bigford

were awarded damages in this civil matter before his underlying criminal matter is resolved,

such an award would have the practical effect of invalidating any would-be conviction.”),

report and recommendation adopted, 2013 WL 1944580 (W.D. Wash. May 9, 2013);

Kirkham v. Belford, 2005 WL 2656585, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 14, 2005) (“Because it

appears likely that plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim will be litigated in his state court

criminal proceedings . . . Younger abstention principles apply.”).

The Moores argue in the alternative that even if the four Younger points are satisfied,

the defendants have waived their right to raise the issue. Doc. 515, p. 6. They assert that “[a]

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State may waive its right to raise Younger abstention where the State expressly urges the

District Court to proceed to an adjudication of the constitutional merits.” Id. (citing

Columbia Basin Apartment Ass’n v. City of Pasco, 268 F.3d 791, 800 (9th Cir. 2001)). The

court assumes without deciding that the individual defendants in this case have the ability to

waive the State’s interest in Younger abstention.

In this case, however, the defendants have not urged the court to proceed to “an

adjudication of the constitutional merits.” Id. The defendants did urge the court to rule on

their claim to qualified immunity, but that issue did not go to the constitutional merits. 

In fact, it would be quite incorrect to conclude that the defendants have shown a desire

to address the Moores’ claims in this forum. Throughout this litigation, the defendants have

been adamant that the Moores are improperly using a federal civil action to circumvent the

discovery limitations that a defendant faces in a state criminal action. They remind the court

that “[i]n their Answer, filed five years ago, Defendants warned Plaintiffs that ‘Abstention

by this Court under Younger v. Harris . . . may be required at some point during the pendency

of this case.’” Doc. 518, p. 4, n. 1 (citing Answer, Doc. 17, 12:19 -20, ¶ 14).

The Moores maintain that the Ninth Circuit’s decision following the defendants’

interlocutory appeal did affect the merits of the case. Doc. 515, p. 7, n. 1. The defendants

dispute this assertion, arguing that the Ninth Circuit had no jurisdiction to opine on whether

the second search warrant was unconstitutionally overbroad. Doc. 518, p. 8. This court,

however, need not decide the jurisdictional issue and finds only that the Moores have not

shown that the defendants raised any constitutional issues in their interlocutory appeal and

therefore have not shown that the defendants urged the federal courts to address the

constitutional merits of this action.

The Moores further note that Mrs. Moore is not a defendant in the State’s case. They

argue that a “state defendant’s inability to bring a federal action because of a pending state

prosecution does not affect other potential federal plaintiffs who are not themselves the

subject of pending prosecution.” Doc. 515, p. 12 (quoting Ripplinger v. Collins, 868 F.2d

1043, 1049 (9th Cir. 1989)). The Moores acknowledge, however, that “parties with a

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sufficiently close relationship or sufficiently intertwined interests may be treated similarly

for purposes of Younger Abstention.” Doc. 515, p. 12 (quoting Canatella v. California, 404

F.3d 1106, 1116 (9th Cir. 2005)). The court believes that such is the case here. 

Mrs. Moore claims that the second search warrant was secured and executed in a

manner that violated her Fourth Amendment rights. Doc. 1, pp. 17-19. Her interest in a

judgment invalidating that search warrant is sufficiently intertwined with her husband’s that

Younger exemption should apply to her claims as well. See, e.g., Dortch v. Reid, 2015 WL

179791, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2015) (Where “the claims of the other family members are

based on the same operative facts leading up to Dortch’s arrest and criminal charges . . . [a]n

adjudication of the other family members’ claims also risks interfering with the state criminal

case in the manner prohibited by Younger.”). “Moreover, permitting [Mrs. Moore] to litigate

[her] claims on a piecemeal basis would not promote judicial economy and would create a

risk of inconsistent results in the instant case.” Dortch v. Reid, 2015 WL 179791, at *7 (C.D.

Cal. Jan. 12, 2015); see also Leyva v. Certified Grocers of Cal. Ltd., 593 F.2d 857, 863 (9th

Cir.1979) (The court “may, with propriety, find it is efficient for its own docket and the

fairest course for the parties to enter a stay of an action before it, pending resolution of

independent proceedings which bear upon the case.”).

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RECOMMENDATION

The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after its independent review

of the record, enter an order GRANTING the defendants’ motion, filed on August 2, 2024,

to stay this action and vacate all pending deadlines pursuant to the Younger abstention

doctrine. Doc. 512. All other outstanding motions should be denied without prejudice.

 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636 (b), any party may serve and file written objections within

14 days of being served with a copy of this report and recommendation. If objections are

not timely filed, the party’s right to de novo review may be waived. The Local Rules permit

the filing of a response to an objection. They do not permit the filing of a reply to a response

without the permission of the District Court.

DATED this 17th day of September, 2024.

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