Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_96-cv-04179/USCOURTS-cand-3_96-cv-04179-231/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 20:1400 Civil Rights of Handicapped Child

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

EMMA C., et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

DELAINE EASTIN, et al., 

Defendants. 

Case No. 96-cv-04179-TEH 

ORDER DENYING STATE 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO SET 

ASIDE 

 

This matter is before the Court on State Defendants’ motion to set aside the Draft 

Corrective Action Plan (“CAP”) developed by the Court’s Monitor with the assistance of 

Court-approved consultants. (Docket No. 2056). Plaintiffs opposed the motion and 

Defendants timely replied. (Docket Nos. 2062, 2071). The Court heard oral argument on 

August 3, 2015. After carefully considering the Parties’ written and oral arguments, the 

Court hereby DENIES Defendants’ motion for the reasons set forth below. 

BACKGROUND

 Plaintiffs filed a class action complaint in 1996 against the Ravenswood City 

School District (“District”) for its failure to provide children with disabilities with a free 

and appropriate public education (“FAPE”), and against the California Department of 

Education (“CDE”) for failing to adequately monitor the District and ensure its compliance 

with state and federal laws. After conducting a comprehensive investigation into the 

allegations raised by Plaintiffs, the CDE determined that it had not “fully implemented 

their Monitoring responsibility to ensure that pupils are provided a [FAPE] and that 

compliance is maintained.” Oct. 4, 2001 Order Re: Contempt at 2 (Docket No. 409) 

(quoting CDE Compliance Report #S-356-96/97 at 45). 

 The original Consent Decree, approved on January 18, 2000, required the CDE to 

implement an effective monitoring system and demonstrate that it was capable of ensuring 

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continued compliance with the law to children with disabilities in the District. Ex. A to 

Consent Decree § A, ¶ 8.0 (Docket No. 232). The Parties thereafter entered into the First 

Amended Consent Decree (“FACD”), which included the Ravenswood Self Improvement 

Plan (“RSIP”) and repeated the original Consent Decree’s requirement that the CDE 

ensure an effective monitoring system. (Docket No. 832). Specifically, the FACD 

provided: 

CDE is responsible under federal and state law to ensure that 

children with disabilities who reside in Ravenswood have a 

[FAPE] provided to them in the least restrictive environment. 

As part of this responsibility, CDE shall implement an 

effective monitoring system and complaint resolution 

procedure. 

FACD § 4.1. Moreover, Section 13.0 of the FACD established the standard for 

determining when the State should be released from Court supervision: 

If, after considering the motion(s) of Defendants and any 

opposition thereto, and after conducting an Evidentiary 

Hearing, if necessary, the Court determines that . . . (2) the 

state-level system in place is capable of ensuring continued 

compliance with the law and the provision of FAPE to children 

with disabilities in Ravenswood, there shall be a rebuttable 

presumption that there exists in . . . CDE a system to 

adequately monitor, supervise and ensure FAPE to Class 

Members. 

 On July 25, 2011, the Court recognized that “[u]nder FACD section 13.0, the Court 

must also eventually determine whether the state-level monitoring system in place is 

capable of ensuring continued compliance with the law and provision of a [FAPE] to 

children with disabilities in Ravenswood.” July 25, 2011 Order at 1 (Docket No. 1640). 

In order to prevent the unnecessarily protracted litigation that would have resulted from 

waiting to address this issue until after the RSIP was fulfilled, the Court instructed the 

Parties to address “the relevance of [Section 13.0], how [CDE’s] compliance with this 

requirement should be measured, and when such measurement should begin.” Id. The 

Court further clarified that the State’s monitoring system must minimally comply with the 

federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). Nov. 26, 2012 Order at 6-7 

(Docket No. 1793). The same Order adopted the Monitor’s proposed “General Standard” 

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to assist in determining the CDE’s compliance with Section 13.0. Id. at 8-9 (“CDE’s 

statewide monitoring system, as applied to Ravenswood, [must be] implemented 

adequately; [identify] both compliance and noncompliance appropriately based on 

adequate evidence and reasoning; and [result] in appropriate corrective actions, the 

implementation of require corrective actions, and the timely correction of identified 

noncompliance.”) (emphasis in original). 

 The Parties stipulated to a process for “determining whether CDE’s state-level 

[monitoring] system” was “adequate.” Fifth Joint Statement Re: CDE Monitoring of the 

Provision of FAPE in Ravenswood at 1, 9-10 (“Fifth Joint Statement”) (Docket No. 1799), 

adopted as an Order of the Court (Docket No. 1803). The agreed-upon process provided 

that the CDE was to produce “information necessary to understand the state-level system 

in place,” in accordance with the language of Section 13.0 of the FACD, instead of 

focusing on a specially designed system for the District. Id. at 7. The stipulation also 

provided a process for resolving disputes over the design of the state-level monitoring 

system, any proposed changes, and its implementation in the District. Id. at 9-10. 

 The Court, its Monitor, and the Parties followed this process over the ensuing 

months. Plaintiffs submitted objections to the design of the state-level monitoring system, 

the State responded, the Parties engaged in an unsuccessful meet-and-confer, and the 

Monitor issued his Determinations (Docket No. 1890), which recommended the 

development of a CAP. Pursuant to the process adopted in the Fifth Joint Statement, State 

Defendants filed a motion objecting to and seeking to set aside the Determinations. 

(Docket No. 1911). On July 2, 2014, the Court denied the State’s motion and approved the 

Determinations in full, ordering the following: 

The parties are to proceed with the corrective action steps as 

outlined in the Monitor’s January 9, 2014 determinations 

report. The Monitor is directed to hire consultants as necessary 

to ensure the timely development and effective implementation 

of a corrective action plan in order to achieve the outcomes set 

forth in the determinations. 

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July 2, 2014 Order at 13 (Docket No. 1958). State Defendants appealed the July 2, 2014 

Order, and were denied a stay by this Court and the Ninth Circuit. (Docket Nos. 1968, 

1971, 1982). 

 On January 15, 2015, the Court issued an Order directing the process for developing 

a Draft CAP that would allow the Parties ample opportunity to provide input to the 

Monitor and be heard on any objections. (Docket No. 2013). However, the Court 

specifically instructed the parties not to re-argue the “substance of the Determinations” 

when making objections to the Draft CAP. Id. at 1. 

 The Monitor submitted the Draft CAP on February 12, 2015. To provide State 

Defendants ample opportunity to express their concerns with the Draft CAP, the Court 

extended the deadline for objections until April 10, on which date State Defendants 

submitted a 28-page, single-spaced letter articulating their objections. Meet-and-confer 

sessions were held on April 27 and May 4, but the Parties were unable to resolve their 

differences. The Monitor addressed the State’s objections in a May 14, 2015 

memorandum. (Docket No. 2043). State Defendants thereafter filed the present motion to 

set aside the Draft CAP. (Docket No. 2056). 

DISCUSSION 

 Despite the Court’s clear instruction that Defendants not use this process as an 

opportunity to re-argue the “substance of the [Monitor’s January 2014] Determinations,” 

much of the present motion does just that. As previously explained, the Court has adopted 

the Monitor’s Determinations and rejected Defendants’ objections, which were fully 

briefed and considered last year. The Court’s July 2, 2014 Order on this matter is currently 

on appeal; the Ninth Circuit is now the appropriate forum for Defendants to address their 

concerns. Despite the State’s apparent disregard for the Court’s instruction, the Court will 

address the arguments presented, but will hereafter consider the matter closed, absent an 

adverse decision from the appellate court. 

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I. State Defendants’ request for judicial notice is granted in part and denied in 

part. 

 The Court will first address State Defendants’ request for judicial notice. (Docket 

No. 2056-1). The State seeks judicial notice of four documents: (1) a letter from Acting 

Assistant Secretary Sue Swenson regarding the United States Department of Education’s 

(USDOE) revision of California’s 2014 determination from “Needs Intervention” to 

“Needs Assistance”; (2) another letter from Swenson regarding compliance data to be 

provided to the USDOE by the New York State Education Department; (3) a document 

regarding Indicator 17 of the State Performance Plan and Annual Performance Report for 

Special Education: State Systemic Improvement Plan for Program year 2013-2014; and (4) 

a report from California’s Statewide Task Force on Special education entitled “Our 

System: Reforming Education to Serve All Students.” 

 Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b), judicial notice may be taken of an 

adjudicative fact that is “not subject to reasonable dispute because it (1) is generally known 

within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily 

determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” “The 

contents of records and reports of administrative bodies are proper subjects for judicial 

notice under Rule 201(2).” Jimenez v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., 238 F.R.D. 241, 246 (C.D. 

Cal. 2006) (citing Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. S. Cal. Gas Co., 209 F.2d 380, 385 (9th 

Cir. 1953)). However, while a court may take notice of matters of public record, they 

should not take notice “of facts that may be subject to reasonable dispute.” United States 

ex rel. v. Corinthian Colleges, 655 F.3d 984, 999 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

 All the documents for which the State seeks judicial notice are official records of 

the USDOE or the CDE, administrative agencies of the United States and California, 

respectively. They are therefore potentially appropriate subjects of judicial notice. 

Jiminez, 238 F.R.D. at 246. Additionally, the CDE documents are self-authenticating and 

the Court finds that the contents of the USDOE letters establish their genuineness. See 

United States v. Beecroft, 608 F.2d 753, 759 (9th Cir. 1979). 

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 The Court takes judicial notice of the existence of the requested documents and 

their submitted attachments. However, the contents of those documents are another 

matter. Regarding the April 30, 2015 letter from Sue Swenson to Tom Torlakson, the 

Court additionally notices the fact contained therein that the USDOE has revised 

California’s determination from “Needs Intervention” to “Needs Assistance.” The Court 

judicially notices the contents of these documents, except for determinations of adequacy 

or compliance, which the State has not demonstrated are beyond dispute. 

 Regarding the April 27, 2015 letter from Sue Swenson to Elizabeth Berlin, the 

Court takes notice of the letter’s contents to the extent that they establish that the DOE 

made certain findings and set forth certain standards. However, the Court does not adopt 

those findings or standards, which are not beyond dispute, and further notes that the 

contents of the letter provide a very weak point of comparison with the Draft CAP. 

 The Court judicially notices the contents of Indicator 17 of the State Performance 

Plan and Annual Performance Report for Special Education: State Systemic Improvement 

Plan for Program Year 2013-2014. However, the Court does not take notice of any claim 

or finding that these documents are proof of the State’s adherence to OSEP directives or 

that the Local Control Funding Formula is effective in reprioritizing state education 

resources. These are judgments reserved to the Court and not beyond dispute. 

 Finally, the Court takes judicial notice of the contents of the State report, “Our 

System: Reforming Education to Serve All Students.” The Court notes that none of these 

documents were helpful in reaching the Court’s decision on the pending motion. 

 

II. The Court has authority to implement a CAP under the FACD and Fifth Joint 

Statement. 

 State Defendants acknowledged in the moving papers that the Parties have 

previously “stipulated that CDE’s monitoring system was to be evaluated.” Mot. at 5. The 

Court therefore deems waived any argument that the Court lacks the authority to evaluate 

the state-wide monitoring system. Westport Ins. Corp. v. N. California Relief, 2014 WL 

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7185480, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2014) (“California courts will find waiver where a 

party intentionally relinquishes a right, or when that party’s acts are so inconsistent with an 

intent to enforce the right as to induce a reasonable belief that such right has been 

relinquished.”). Moreover, the CDE expressly consented to the evaluation of its state-level 

monitoring system through the Fifth Joint Statement. Accordingly, the only dispute is 

whether the Court has the remedial authority to implement the CAP that resulted from that 

evaluation. 

A. State Defendants consented to the Court’s authority through the FACD. 

 The State consented to the Court’s authority in this matter through its assent to the 

FACD and Fifth Joint Statement. That the FACD contemplates oversight of the CDE’s 

deficient monitoring system is clear from the document’s language. The FACD spells out 

the CDE’s obligation to provide FAPE and, in no uncertain terms, requires the CDE to 

implement an effective monitoring system: 

CDE is responsible under federal and state law to ensure that 

children with disabilities who reside in Ravenswood have a 

[FAPE] provided to them in the least restrictive environment. 

As part of this responsibility, CDE shall implement an 

effective monitoring system and complaint resolution 

procedure. 

FACD § 4.1 (emphasis added). The FACD then instructs the Monitor to ensure 

compliance with these obligations: 

The Monitor shall also monitor the CDE’s performance of its

obligations to ensure the provision of FAPE in the LRE to 

children with disabilities in Ravenswood. 

FACD § 6.1.1 (emphasis added). Moreover, the Fifth Joint Statement expressly provided a 

process for the Court Monitor’s evaluation of the state-wide monitoring system in light of 

any objections raised by Plaintiffs. 

 The Court’s broad power to enforce and implement the FACD, as well as to ensure 

compliance, is also clear from the agreement: 

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The Monitor or the Plaintiffs may request that the Court issue 

an order to implement or effectuate this FACD. . . . The Court 

shall have continuing jurisdiction over this action to ensure 

compliance with this Decree. . . . The Monitor or a Party may 

request that the Court issue any . . . order at any time. 

FACD §§ 6.1.7, 7.1, 7.3 (emphasis added). To this end, the FACD provides a process for 

holding Defendants in contempt where they fail to meet their obligations. Id. § 7.2. 

 The State acknowledges that the FACD allows the Court to observe and evaluate 

the CDE’s monitoring system, and even that it obligates the CDE to implement an 

effective monitoring system, but argues that it does not allow the Court to “ensure 

compliance” with that obligation or otherwise impose any remedy upon finding the State’s 

system deficient. This reading of the FACD is untenable, and ignores the clear intent and 

plain language of the agreement. Only a tortured reading of the FACD could find that it 

mandates the Court to merely observe a CDE monitoring system that does not ensure the 

provision of FAPE to students with disabilities. Moreover, under the State’s argument, it 

follows that the Court’s passive observation must continue indefinitely - as the Court can 

neither impose reforms upon the State nor dismiss State Defendants until such reforms 

occur. See FACD § 13.0 (providing that State Defendants cannot be released from case 

until they develop an effective monitoring system). The Court rejects this clearly 

erroneous reading of the FACD. 

 

B. Because of the FACD, a judicial determination of liability is unnecessary. 

 State Defendants argue that the Court cannot impose a CAP because there was no 

evidentiary finding of liability. Reply at 11. This argument is unavailing for multiple 

reasons. First, the Court did make evidentiary findings when it adopted the Court 

Monitor’s Determinations, which were based on evidence submitted by the Parties and 

subject to the Parties’ arguments and objections. However, even assuming no evidentiary 

findings were made, this is without consequence. The State voluntarily entered the FACD 

so as to avoid any ultimate finding of liability. By entering into the FACD and subsequent 

joint stipulations (e.g., the Fifth Joint Statement), State Defendants consented to the 

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Court’s authority in this matter. “[I]n addition to the law that forms the basis of the claim, 

the parties’ consent animates the legal force of a consent decree.” Local No. 93, Intern. 

Ass’n of Firefighters, AFL-CIO C.L.C. v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 525 (1986). 

Having consented to the Court’s authority to avoid a finding of liability, State Defendants 

cannot now eschew the Court’s authority because no finding of liability was made. 

 At bottom, while a judicial determination of liability might be necessary for a court 

to assert plenary authority under a court’s equitable power to address constitutional 

wrongs, 1

see Reply at 2-3 (citing cases), this Court does not need to resort to such 

equitable powers where it has the contractual authority to ensure compliance with the 

provisions of the FACD. See FACD § 7.1 (Court “ha[s] continuing jurisdiction of this 

action to ensure compliance with this Decree”). 

C. Whether Plaintiffs have a private right of action to challenge the CDE’s 

monitoring system is irrelevant in light of the FACD. 

State Defendants argue that “Plaintiffs lack a private cause of action to challenge 

CDE’s monitoring system,” and “[b]ecause no provision in the FACD permits the . . . 

imposition of a CAP . . . plaintiffs must essentially assert a new cause of action to obtain 

such a remedy.” Reply at 4. This argument necessarily fails because its premise - that the 

FACD does not permit remedial action against the CDE - is incorrect. Plaintiffs have 

standing under the FACD to enforce its terms. FACD § 6.1.7 (“The Monitor or the 

Plaintiffs may request that the Court issue an order to implement or effectuate this 

FACD.”). 

 Even were this not the case, the Court has already established that “disabled 

children and their parents [have] a private right of action to enforce their substantive and 

procedural rights under” the IDEA. Nov. 26, 2012 Order at 7 (Docket No. 1793); accord 

Morgan Hill Concerned Parents Ass’n v. Cal. Dep’t of Educ., 2013 WL 1326301, at *6 

 

1

 The Court need not settle this legal question, and therefore reserves judgment. 

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(E.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2013) (“Given the statutory language and structure, and the weight of 

judicial precedent, the court finds plaintiffs have a private right of action to challenge the 

CDE’s alleged systematic noncompliance with its IDEA obligations. The IDEA creates a 

private right of action in subsection 1415(i)(2)(A).”). 

 The cases cited by State Defendants to the contrary are inapposite. Lake 

Washington Sch. Dist. No. 414 v. Office of Superintendent of Pub. Instruction addressed 

whether school districts, not disabled students, have a private right of action under IDEA. 

634 F.3d 1065, 1069 (9th Cir. 2011). Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center was a 

Medicaid case wherein the Court considered whether there was an implied right of action 

under the Supremacy Clause. 135 S.Ct. 1378 (2015). And C.O. v. Portland Public 

Schools addressed the private right of action for nominal and compensatory damages, 

which are not at issue in this case. 679 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2012). 

 Finally, State Defendants’ reliance on M.M. v. Lafayette School District, 767 F.3d 

842 (9th Cir. 2014), is misplaced. Reply at 5. Lafayette merely held that there is no 

express private right of action under 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(a) and 1415(a); it did not address 

other sections of the IDEA. 767 F.3d at 860. Moreover, the appellate court declined to 

“reach whether a private right of action can be implied in § 1412 and 1415 of the IDEA.” 

Id. at 860, n. 8. Consequently, Lafayette did not overrule the finding of this Court, which 

is in accord with Morgan Hill, that the IDEA allows a private right of action for disabled 

students. 

III. State Defendants are not entitled to an evidentiary hearing under FACD § 13.0. 

 Under FACD § 13.0, State Defendants may receive an evidentiary hearing “if 

necessary” for the Court to determine whether they have met their legal obligations in this 

case such that they are entitled to release. However, the State “must first demonstrate that 

the state-level system is capable of ensuring continued compliance.” July 2, 2014 Order at 

4. The State has not made any demonstration that it is capable of ensuring compliance. 

Indeed, the Court’s July 2, 2014 Order determined just the opposite. Until State 

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Defendants make meaningful progress toward compliance with the Court’s Orders, they 

will not receive an evidentiary hearing merely because one is demanded. The Court finds 

a Section 13 hearing unnecessary at this juncture, and therefore DENIES Defendants’ 

request. 

IV. The Court Monitor is fully qualified to develop and oversee the implementation 

of the CAP. 

 State Defendants continue their attack on the Court’s Monitor, now arguing that he 

is not qualified to design and implement a CDE CAP. Mot. at 15-18. The Court disagrees. 

When the Court appointed Mr. Mlawer in 1999, it noted his “extensive and varied 

experience in the field of special education,” and “his experience assisting in the remedial 

phases of other special education class action cases.” Nov. 2, 1999 Order at 4 (Docket No. 

223). Ironically, it was Mr. Mlawer that co-authored the white paper on focused 

monitoring that the CDE asserts provided the foundation for the CDE’s current monitoring 

system. Acknowledging these credentials, Mr. Mlawer was appointed “to monitor . . . the 

obligations of the defendants under the settlement agreement.” Id. at 3. This includes 

“monitor[ing] the CDE’s performance of its obligations to ensure the provision of FAPE in 

the LRE to children with disabilities in Ravenswood.” FACD § 6.1.1. And more 

specifically as it relates to the present motion, the CDE’s obligation to “implement an 

effective monitoring system.” Id. § 4.1. In this capacity, the Monitor has overseen this 

case for fifteen years, and has developed extensive insight and institutional knowledge 

regarding the District and State Defendants that uniquely qualify him to draft and 

implement the CDE CAP. 

 Moreover, the State’s attack on the Monitor’s qualifications makes little sense given 

previous concessions. In the FACD, the State agreed that the Court Monitor would 

“monitor the CDE’s performance of its obligations to ensure the provision of FAPE in the 

LRE to children with disabilities in Ravenswood.” FACD § 6.1.1. Evidently, however, 

the State now feels that while Mr. Mlawer is qualified to monitor and evaluate the CDE, he 

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is not qualified to help reform it. Despite the State’s recent protests, the Court has been 

presented no reason to question the Monitor’s credibility or qualifications. Furthermore, 

the State itself has recognized that the consultants hired by the Monitor to develop the 

CAP have “well-regarded expertise in state monitoring systems.” Mot. at 17. The 

combination of the Monitor’s unique qualifications and his consultants’ “well-regard 

expertise” in this area is more than sufficient to render them capable of drafting and 

implementing a CDE CAP. 

 Finally, State Defendants provide no legal support for their request that this Court 

hold a Daubert hearing to determine the Monitor’s qualifications as an expert before 

allowing him to fulfill his responsibilities under the FACD, including the development and 

oversight of the CAP. Id. at 6. Daubert generally applies to expert testimony, not court 

monitors or special masters. To the extent that this Court needs to find that Mr. Mlawer is 

an expert, it does so now, having worked with him for nearly two decades and being fully 

aware of his considerable experience in the field of special education. If State Defendants 

have further questions about the Monitor’s qualifications, the Court attaches his curriculum 

vitae for reference. 

V. The CAP provides ample Due Process. 

 Due Process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard. Mullane v. Cent. 

Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). State Defendants have had both, 

which they implicitly acknowledge. See Mot. at 6 (acknowledging steps taken by the 

Court to ensure State Defendant’s due process rights, including the issuance of an order 

that provided a “process for CDE’s objections to the Draft CAP to be heard.”). This Court 

has entertained State Defendants’ multiple objections to the substance and process of the 

Monitor’s Determinations that formed the basis for the Draft CAP. Further, the CAP itself 

provides the State the opportunity to demonstrate compliance under FACD § 13.0 and 

otherwise challenge future determinations of noncompliance with the CAP’s provisions. It 

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is unclear to the Court what more could be done to secure Defendants’ due process rights 

while still exercising meaningful oversight. 

 Aside from having an opportunity to be heard, State Defendants also contend that 

the standards established in the Draft CAP are “vague.” Mot. at 18-21. However, the 

Determinations applied court-approved standards and IDEA requirements, which the State 

itself agrees the monitoring system must be based upon. See Mot. at 7. Moreover, State 

Defendants’ argument against the “standards of measurement” adopted by the Draft CAP, 

Mot. at 19-20, fails to acknowledge that these “vague” standards are found in the 

controlling law and regulations. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1416(a)(3) (“. . . the State must use 

quantifiable indicators and such qualitative indicators as are needed to adequately measure 

performance in the priority areas”) (emphasis added); see also Monitor’s Mem. at 4-6 

(Docket No. 2043) (noting same). Insofar as the standards articulated in the Draft CAP are 

vague, it is only because the governing law provides that they be so. 

As the Monitor also notes, the State has made no effort to propose more specific 

language to replace the language to which it objects. See id. at 5. Additionally, the Draft 

CAP provides that the first step toward compliance with each provision begins with the 

CDE proposing the development of adequate monitoring policies, procedures, training 

documents, data validation procedures, etc., that are responsive to each requirement. The 

CDE can also support its proposed approach with a rationale prior to any application of the 

Draft CAP standards by the Monitor. Where the State disagrees with the Monitor’s 

findings, it can appeal to the Court. In essence, the State is given the first bite at each 

apple in the Draft CAP, as it has the opportunity to provide substance to what it considers 

vague standards by making its own proposals to meet them. 

 The CDE attempts to demonstrate its due process concerns by pointing to two 

instances in which it has disagreed with the Monitor’s decisions. Reply at 7-9. First, the 

CDE complains about the Monitor’s claim that the FACD vests him with the authority to 

decide what evidence can be considered in determining compliance. Id. at 7-8 (referencing 

Monitor’s June 19, 2015 Mem. at 3 (Docket No. 2066)). However, the Monitor’s claim 

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was correct: the FACD provides him “plenary authority to monitor Ravenswood’s 

compliance,” including the ability to decide what documentation is “necessary or relevant 

to determine” that compliance. FACD §§ 6.1.2, 6.2. The State next argues that it is denied 

due process by virtue of the Monitor’s monitoring of Determination (Corrective Action) 5. 

Reply at 8-9. According to the CDE, the Monitor, “with no justification,” required 

documentation of compliance for the 2013-14 school year even though the CDE had 

submitted the data for the three school years originally required by the Monitor in the 

Determinations. Id. However, the Monitor explained very clearly in his April 23, 2014 

Memorandum that the CDE did not submit documents showing the adequacy of the 

process used in 2012 and 2011 for monitoring compliance with Indicators 11 and 12. 

Mem. at 3-4 (Docket No. 1922). Therefore, as compliance had not been demonstrated for 

two of the three specified years, the Monitor required information for two additional years. 

The Court again agrees with the Monitor’s assessment and finds that the State had an 

adequate opportunity to raise and receive a fair adjudication of its concerns. The Court is 

confident that the same due process will be provided under the administration of the CAP. 

VI. The CAP is not overbroad. 

 State Defendants argue that the Draft CAP is overbroad because it demands 

statewide action. Mot. at 21. The Court disagrees. The FACD requires the State to 

implement a prospectively effective monitoring system in the District before this case can 

end. The scope of the monitoring system to which this requirement applies is clear from 

the language of the FACD, the Fifth Joint Statement, and previous Court Orders. First, 

FACD § 13.0 explicitly refers to the “state-level system in place.” Second, the Fifth Joint 

Statement provided for a process of “determining whether CDE’s state-level system” was 

adequate, and the State agreed to submit “information necessary to understand the statelevel system in place.” Fifth Joint Statement at 1, 7, 9-10. Finally, this Court’s Order from 

July 25, 2011, stated that the Court “must also eventually determine whether the state-level 

monitoring system” is capable of ensuring FAPE. July 25, 2011 Order at 1. The State has 

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long since passed the opportunity to argue that the scope of the Court’s examination should 

be limited to the district-level system. 

 The State nonetheless raises that argument at this very late hour, quoting the Court’s 

July 2, 2014 Order, which explained that the “determinations and recommendations are 

limited to ensuring CDE’s compliance in Ravenswood, they require no more.” Mot. at 21 

(quoting July 2, 2014 Order at 11). However, the State quotes the Court out of context. In 

fact, this quote comes from a section explicitly rejecting the notion that the Court’s 

monitoring activities should be confined to the District. See Order at 11 (“To the extent 

CDE is arguing that the limitation to Ravenswood prevents the Monitor from reviewing its 

‘state-level’ system at all, such an argument contradicts the plain language of Section 

13.0.”). Indeed, the Court affirmed the Monitor’s determination that he needed to review 

the state-level system in order to evaluate its application in Ravenswood. See id. (“Simply 

because the corrective steps the Monitor recommends may require CDE - due to the nature 

of its administrative scheme, or other internal reasons - to implement changes in other 

districts in addition to Ravenswood, does not mean that the Monitor has exceeded his 

scope.”). Accordingly, the Court finds that the proposed CAP is not overbroad. 

 

VII. The CAP allows the State appropriate flexibility and discretion. 

 The State’s final argument is that the Draft CAP is inflexible and backwards 

looking. Mot. at 22. However, the State willfully ignores the processes contained within 

the CAP that allow for CDE input through its submissions on each CAP requirement. 

Further, the Fifth Joint Statement allows the State to propose any “substantive changes in 

the design of its state-wide monitoring system that will be applied to the District.” Fifth 

Joint Statement at 9-10. The CAP does nothing to change this. For example, the State 

could propose the elimination of an aspect of its current monitoring system, such as 

Verification Reviews (VRs), and its replacement with new components that the State 

believes would be more effective in ensuring compliance with FAPE for students with 

disabilities. If that were to happen, the Fifth Joint Statement calls for a process of 

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objections, if any, from the other Parties, a meet-and-confer between the Parties to discuss 

the proposal and objections, and if the dispute is not resolved, determinations by the 

Monitor. If, as a result of agreement between the Parties or determinations by the Monitor, 

the State’s proposal was regarded as likely to be more effective than the current VR 

process, then Corrective Actions 12-15 would be modified as needed (with input from the 

Parties) to apply to the new components of the State’s monitoring system. By allowing the 

State the chance to work with the Court’s Monitor and the other Parties to modify the CAP 

as conditions necessitate, the State is provided adequate flexibility and discretion while 

still remaining under the Court’s oversight. 

 More importantly, to the extent that the CAP limits the State’s flexibility to any 

degree, the State’s recalcitrance in the face of the Court’s Orders shows that granting it 

continued discretion is unwarranted. Indeed, placing limitations on the flexibility and 

discretion of a defendant is the entire purpose of a corrective action plan. It is partially the 

State’s unfettered exercise of its discretion that resulted in the original denial of FAPE to 

children in Ravenswood. To the extent that the State’s discretion must be reined in to 

ensure compliance with the law, so be it. 

VIII. The Court grants Recommendations 2-4 and denies Recommendation 5. 

At oral argument, the Court asked the Parties to submit simultaneous briefing 

regarding the Monitor’s Recommendations Nos. 2-5 included in the Monitor’s May 14, 

2015 Memorandum regarding the State’s CAP. The Parties submitted those supplemental 

briefs on August 17, 2015. (Docket Nos. 2089, 2092). 

The Monitor’s second recommendation provides: 

In the Determinations, the Monitor wrote that the other parties 

should have the opportunity to comment on CDE submissions 

made pursuant to these corrective actions (at 5, fn. 4). The 

Monitor recommends that the Court issue an Order setting a 

timeline of 30 days after CDE submissions for the parties to 

offer comments. 

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The Court GRANTS this recommendation because it will ensure the most effective 

implementation of the CAP, and provide all of the Parties an opportunity to be heard 

before the Monitor issues any findings related to CDE submissions. A similar process is 

used for the RSIP, and has proven helpful to the Court’s Monitor. The Court is not 

persuaded by the State’s argument against this Recommendation, as it merely reiterates the 

State’s objection to the implementation of a CAP, generally. The Court has ample 

authority to institute this process under the FACD’s provisions allowing the Court to issue 

“any order” to “implement or effectuate” the consent decree. FACD §§ 6.1.7, 7.1, 7.3. 

 The Monitor’s third recommendation provides: 

The Monitor requests that the Court clarify whether the 

Monitor’s authority to issue directives to either Defendant in its 

12/20/07 Order re Directives and CDE technical Assistance, 

Oversight, and Monitoring Regarding Ravenswood’s Delivery 

of Services and Related Issues and its 4/5/11 Order Clarifying 

Directive Procedure applies to Defendant CDE in the context 

of its implementation of the CDE CAP. If these Orders do not 

apply in the context of its implementation of the CDE CAP, the 

Monitor recommends that the Court consider issuing an Order 

extending the Monitor’s directive authority to cover CDE CAP 

implementation. 

The Court’s December 20, 2007 Order granted the Monitor directive authority over the 

Defendants. (Docket No. 1151). As a basis for granting that authority, the Court 

explained that it was “convinced that the Court Monitor should have the same authority to 

issue Directives that he had under the RCAP in order to speed the process of ensuring the 

District can provide services to students with disabilities.” Id. at 4. The same rationale 

militates in favor of granting the Monitor directive authority regarding the CDE CAP. 

Indeed, the CDE CAP is analogous to the RSIP, formerly the RCAP. The Monitor has 

rarely used his directive power, but it is an important authority that allows the Monitor to 

implement necessary reforms. Moreover, the Court notes that the Monitor’s directive 

authority is not plenary, as Defendants have the right to appeal directives directly to the 

Court. The Court therefore GRANTS Recommendation No. 3 under FACD Sections 

6.1.7, 7.1, and 7.3, and hereby grants the Monitor the same authority to issue directives in 

connection with CAP implementation that he has in connection with the RSIP. 

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 The Monitor’s fourth recommendation provides: 

Consent Decree § 6.1.5 sets forth a process to be followed 

when the Monitor hires consultants. Although the process is 

specific to potential objections to proposed consultants from 

Defendant Ravenswood, the Monitor has in the past treated this 

provision as if it also applied equally to Defendant CDE in the 

selection of consultants to assist in oversight of CDE’s 

resolution of complaints concerning the District, and 

development of the draft CAP. The Court may wish to 

formalize the applicability of this provision of the Decree to 

Defendant CDE. 

The Court’s July 2, 2014 Order already instructs the Monitor “to hire consultants as 

necessary to ensure the timely development and effective implementation of a corrective 

action plan . . . .” (Docket No. 1958). Therefore, clarification is unnecessary; the Monitor 

has the Court’s permission to hire consultants to assist in CAP implementation already. In 

addition to the cost savings and efficiencies that would result from the retention of 

consultants for this purpose, the Court notes that adoption of this recommendation 

provides State Defendants with the opportunity to object to the appointment of specific 

proposed consultants. Consequently, the Court GRANTS the Monitor’s recommendation. 

 The Monitor’s fifth and final recommendation provides: 

Consent Decree § 6.1.9 sets forth a process to be followed 

when the District wishes to hire a consultant regarding special 

education. The Monitor recommends that the Court consider 

whether this provision should apply to CDE in any potential 

hiring of consultants in areas affecting its special education 

monitoring system. 

By its terms, Section 6.1.9 clearly applies only to District consultants. The Court is 

informed that Defendants’ retention of consultants has rarely been an issue in this case. 

Moreover, the Court sees no reason at this time to extend the Monitor’s oversight to the 

CDE’s hiring of consultants. Ultimately, the CDE’s compliance with CAP requirements 

will speak to the competency and commitment of its staff. While the Court may need to 

reevaluate this recommendation in the future, it is DENIED at the present time. 

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CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby DENIES State Defendants’ motion to 

set aside the Draft CAP. Additionally, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN 

PART State Defendants’ request for judicial notice, GRANTS Recommendations 2-4, and 

DENIES Recommendation 5, as set forth above. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

Dated: 08/25/15 _____________________________________ 

THELTON E. HENDERSON 

United States District Judge 

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