Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01329/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01329-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:145 Patent Infringement

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

TECHNOLOGY LICENSING

CORPORATION, a California

corporation, and AV

TECHNOLOGIES LLC, an Illinois

Limited Liability Company,

NO. CIV. S-03-1329 WBS PAN

Plaintiffs,

v.

 ORDER RE: COSTS

THOMSON, INC., a Delaware

corporation,

Defendant.

----oo0oo----

On August 1, 2005, the court entered final judgment as

to some of plaintiffs’ claims, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 54(b), in favor of defendant Thomson, Inc. The order

specifically granted summary judgment to defendant on plaintiffs’

infringement claims for U.S. Patent No. 5,495,524 (‘524 patent)

and U.S. Patent No. 4,573,070 (‘070 patent). Additionally, the

court issued a stay for defendant’s counterclaims regarding the

‘524 and ‘070 patents. Defendant then submitted a bill of costs

totaling $11,523.98 for transcription expenses related to the

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depositions of Joseph Gemini, Walter Zelhofer, Michael Hauke,

David Jordahl, Raymond Bryars, Jeffery Brooks, Peter Symes,

George Strong Jr., Anthony Davis, Charles Freeland, and J. Carl

Cooper (twelve depositions in all because the Cooper deposition

spanned two days). (Def.’s Bill of Costs at 1; Id. Ex. A at 1).

Plaintiffs object to the amount submitted in its

entirety, arguing that defendant’s transcript costs were not 

necessarily obtained for use in the case, as required by 28

U.S.C. § 1920. (Pl.’s Objection to Def.’s Bill of Costs at 3). 

In the alternative, plaintiffs urge the court to exercise its

discretion to not award costs based on plaintiffs’ good faith in

bringing suit and defendant’s “clear[] . . . ability to meet the

expenses of this litigation.” (Id. at 6).

I. Legal Standard

Rule 54(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

and Local Rule 54-292(f) govern the taxation of costs to losing

parties, subject to limits set under 28 U.S.C. § 1920. See 28

U.S.C. § 1920 (enumerating taxable costs); Fed. R. Civ. P.

54(d)(1) (“costs other than attorneys’ fees shall be allowed as

of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise

directs”); L.R. 54-292(f) (items taxable); Crawford Fitting Co.

v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 441 (1987)(limiting taxable

costs to those enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 1920). Relevant to this

case, 28 U.S.C. § 1920(2) allows the court to tax as costs

“[f]ees of the court reporter for all or any part of the

stenographic transcript necessarily obtained for use in the case

. . . .” The district court has discretion to determine what

constitutes a taxable cost within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. §

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1920. Amarel v. Connell, 102 F.3d 1494, 1523 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Deposition costs, however, have already been identified as

taxable costs available under § 1920(2). See Alflex Corp. v.

Underwriters Labs., Inc., 914 F.2d 175, 177 (9th Cir. 1990)

(“[T]here is much support for the proposition that section

1920(2) covers the costs of deposition transcripts . . . .”). 

In general, the losing party has the burden of

overcoming a strong presumption in favor of awarding costs to the

prevailing party. Miles v. California, 320 F.3d 986, 988 (9th

Cir. 2003); Russian River Watershed Protection Comm. v. City of

Santa Rosa, 142 F.3d 1136, 1144 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that the

presumption “may only be overcome by pointing to some impropriety

on the part of the prevailing party”). However, the Ninth

Circuit “has not clearly allocated between the prevailing and

losing party the burden of demonstrating whether deposition costs

are ‘necessarily obtained’ under 28 U.S.C. § 1920.” Smith v.

Hughes Aircraft Co., 22 F.3d 1432, 1438 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting

that “out-of-circuit cases . . . appear to place the burden on

the losing party”). Instead, the Ninth Circuit allows the

district court to independently determine that deposition costs

were necessary. Id.

II. Discussion

Plaintiffs argue that defendant “cannot now recover its

expenses for deposition transcripts and documents which were not

used in its summary judgment motion.” (Pl.’s Objection to Def.’s

Bill of Costs at 3). Their argument boils down to an assertion

that because the depositions listed in defendant’s bill of costs

were not cited in defendant’s motion for summary judgment, these

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depositions were not “necessarily obtained”, as required by 28

U.S.C. § 1920(2). No legal authority binding on this court

supports plaintiffs’ position. On the contrary, in the Ninth

Circuit, documents need not actually be entered into the record

to justify awarding the costs of obtaining them. Haagen-Dazs Co.

v. Double Rainbow Gourmet Ice Creams, Inc., 920 F.2d 587, 599

(9th Cir. 1990); see also Hudson v. Nabisco Brands, Inc., 758

F.2d 1237, 1243 (7th Cir. 1985), overruled on other grounds by

Provident Bank v. Manor Steel Corp., 882 F.2d 258 (7th Cir. 1989)

(addressing a cost award for depositions and noting that “the

fact that a court disposes of a case at the summary judgment

stage is no impediment to an award of costs”); Or. Azaleas, Inc.

v. W. Farm Serv., Inc., No. Civ. 00-1348, 2002 WL 31432771, at *2

(D. Or. Jan. 9, 2002) (applying Haagen-Dazs to depositions). 

“[F]ailure to use a deposition in a summary judgment motion does

not render it unnecessary.” Fields v. Gen. Motors Corp., 171

F.R.D. 234, 235 (N.D. Ill. 1997). 

Depositions that are “merely useful for discovery” are

not taxable. Indep. Iron Works, Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 322

F.2d 656, 678 (9th Cir. 1963). Beyond this requirement though,

“[a] deposition need not be absolutely indispensable to justify

an award of costs; rather, it must only be reasonably necessary

at the time it was taken, without regard to later developments

that may eventually render the deposition unneeded at the time of

trial or summary disposition.” Frederick v. City of Portland,

162 F.R.D. 139, 143 (D. Or. 1995) (citations omitted). This

interpretation is consistent with the language of the statute,

which requires that costs be “necessarily obtained for use in the

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case,” 28 U.S.C. § 1920(2) (emphasis added), and not necessarily

obtained for use in the particular motion that determines the

outcome of the case. 

The twelve depositions included in defendant’s bill of

costs were not merely useful for discovery and were undoubtedly

necessary. For example, although plaintiffs would have the court

find that the deposition of Joseph Gemini, plaintiffs’ damages

expert, should not be taxed because defendant’s questions focused

on royalties and not infringement, (Pl.’s Objection to Def.’s

Bill of Costs at 4), this information would have been of crucial

importance if defendant had lost on the infringement claim. 

While plaintiffs’ damages were irrelevant once defendant

prevailed on the infringement claims related to the ‘524 and ‘070

patents, defendant’s inquiries were “reasonably necessary at the

time . . . , without regard to later developments that . . .

eventually render[ed] the deposition unneeded.” Frederick, 162

F.R.D. at 143.

Plaintiffs do not specifically attack depositions other

than Gemini’s, but instead argue that, based on this one example,

the court should find the other eleven depositions unnecessary. 

(Pl.’s Objection to Def.’s Bill of Costs at 5). As determined

above, the court finds that even the Gemini deposition fails to

exemplify a deposition that was unnecessary for use in the case,

whether or not it was referenced in the motion for summary

judgment. The remaining depositions were even more obviously

necessary for the case. Leading up to trial, defendant conveyed

to the court its intent to call, or possibly call, nine of the

deponents (Zelhofer, Hauke, Jordahl, Bryars, Brooks, Symes,

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Strong, Davis, and Freeland) as witnesses. (Def.’s Disclosures

Pursuant to Rule 26(a)(3) at 2). Likewise, plaintiffs documented

their intent to offer portions of the depositions of these same

people at trial. (Pl.’s Statement Designating Answers at 3-9). 

Given both parties’ intent to use the testimony and/or

depositions of these deponents at trial, the court finds

plaintiffs’ arguments against taxing the costs of their

depositions disingenuous. Unquestionably, these depositions were

“necessarily obtained for use in the case.”

The final two depositions left to address, both from J.

Carl Cooper, were likewise necessary. Cooper was plaintiffs’

technical expert on infringement and the paper trail left by this

case is peppered with references to his opinions. Plaintiffs

cannot seriously contend that deposing Cooper was unnecessary.

Having rejected plaintiffs’ argument that defendant’s

depositions were not necessarily obtained, the court also

declines to exercise its discretion to deny costs. Plaintiffs

appear to take the position that because defendant did not

expediently move for summary judgment on plaintiffs’ claims

against it, the court should now penalize defendant by denying

costs. (See Pl.’s Objection to Def.’s Bill of Costs at 6). 

However, “[n]o rule requires a motion for summary judgment.” 

Pantry Queen Foods, Inc. v. Lifschultz Fast Freight, Inc., 809

F.2d 451, 455 (7th Cir. 1987). In the alternative, plaintiffs

urge the court to deny costs because defendant “clearly has the

ability to meet the expenses of this litigation.” Id. However,

Rule 54(d)(1) directs the court to assign costs to the prevailing

party, not the party in the best position to bear them. Fed. R.

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Civ. P. 54(d)(1). Rejecting defendant’s bill of costs on either

of these grounds would thus be improper and unfair.

After reviewing the bill, the court finds taxable the fees of the

court reporter, as itemized by defendant. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant recover its

costs of in the amount of $11,523.98.

DATED: September 23, 2005

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