Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01738/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01738-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 445
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Walter Thomas Sowell, Jr.

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Freescale Semiconductor, Inc., 

Defendant. 

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No. CV 07-1738-PHX-JAT

ORDER

Currently pending before the Court is Defendant Freescale Semiconductor's

("Freescale") Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #6) that, pursuant to Rule 12(d), the Court converted

to a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 (Doc. # 17). As part of the conversion, the

Court ordered briefing on two issues: (1) whether equitable tolling applies in this case; and

(2) whether the General Release (Doc. #6, Ex. #1) effectively bars Plaintiff’s claims. In

addition to briefing those issues in his supplemental briefing (Doc. # 18), Plaintiff Walter

Thomas Sowell sought leave to file an amended complaint pursuant to Rule 15(a). The Court

now rules on the pending motion and Sowell's request for leave to amend his complaint. 

I. BACKGROUND 

On September 11, 2007, Sowell, proceeding pro se, filed a complaint against

Freescale alleging disability- and race-related discrimination, retaliation, and wrongful

termination under the American with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and Title I of the Civil Rights

Act of 1991. Sowell is an African-American diagnosed with hyperparathyroidism. He

Case 2:07-cv-01738-JAT Document 22 Filed 07/25/08 Page 1 of 13
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alleges this disability "result[s] in severe, debilitating muscular and skeletal pain, chronic

myofascial pain, migraine headaches, fatigue, flu-like symptoms, chronic depression,

osteoporosis/osteopenia, and other symptoms." (Compl. ¶ 5.) Sowell worked for Freescale

as an engineer and manager since June of 1992. (Compl. ¶ 12.) He claims Freescale

discriminated against him on the basis of his race and disability prior to and as part of his

termination on June 24, 2005.

In response to Sowell's complaint, Freescale filed a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 6)

asserting that Sowell's claims are barred by applicable statute of limitations and by Sowell's

release of all employment-related claims against Freescale through his acceptance of the

Freescale Semiconductor Involuntary Severance Plan General Release (the "Release") (Doc.

# 19, Ex. #2) and severance package (Doc. #19, Exs. #1, 3). Either as part of or sometime

after Sowell's termination, Freescale gave Sowell the Release paperwork which he signed on

October 24, 2005. The Release, in part, states:

I am signing this Release knowingly and voluntarily, I acknowledge that: (1) I have

been advised in writing to consult an attorney before signing this Release . . . (3) the

severance allowance and severance benefit provided under the Freescale, Inc.

Involuntary Severance Plan . . . which I will receive for signing this release are

consideration . . . (4) I have been given up to forty-nine (49) days to consider this

Release, and an additional seven (7) days after signing to revoke it in writing; (5) I

have read and understand this Release and further understand that it includes a general

release of any and all known and unknown claims to date I may have against

Freescale . . . (7) no statement or conduct by Freescale have in any way coerced or

unduly influence me to execute this Release.

(Doc. # 19, Ex. #2) The Release also specifies that it "includes, but is not limited to, any

claim . . . arising under any federal law," mentioning as examples Title VII, the ADA, and

the FMLA. Id. In exchange for signing the Release, Freescale gave Sowell severance

benefits and pay in the amount of $32,268 on November 4, 2005. (Doc. #19, Ex. #1.)

Freescale maintains and Sowell doesn't dispute that Sowell has not returned the severance

money to Freescale.

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1

 For purposes of this motion, the Court will assume he alleged a Title VII violation.

2

 In his complaint, Sowell alleged violations of Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.

However, part of Title I amended 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Thus, Freescale moved to dismiss by

arguing that some of Sowell's claims had exceeded the statute of limitations for § 1981–as

if Sowell had alleged its violation in his complaint. Now that Sowell has counsel, he wants

to re-label the Title I violation into, at least, two separate § 1981 violations. For the purposes

of the present motion, the Court considers the alleged Title I violations as § 1981 violations.

3

 Sowell's complaint did not mention equitable tolling, nor did his response to

Freescale's motion to dismiss explain how it might apply. Thus, the Court ordered

supplemental briefing on this and the issue of the Release when the Court converted the

motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment.

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After acquiring counsel, Sowell responded to Freescale's motion by arguing that, in

his complaint, he had alleged facts that would entitle him for relief under Title VII1

 and 42

U.S.C. § 1981,2

 in addition to the ADA. (Doc. # 10 at 2-3.) Sowell argues that the statute

of limitations for his § 1981 claims has not run. He concedes, however, that he did not file

within the statutes of limitations for his other non-§ 1981 claims. (Doc. # 18 at 5.) But, he

asks this Court to apply the doctrine of equitable tolling to the other claims because his

disability prevented him from filing within the limitations period.3

 Furthermore, he argues

that the Release is not enforceable because the same disability caused him to lack the

capacity to enter into a legally enforceable contract.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure

materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact

and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see

also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). Initially, the movant bears the

burden of pointing out to the Court the basis for the motion and the elements of the causes

of action upon which the non-movant will be unable to establish a genuine issue of material

fact. Id. at 323.

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The burden then shifts to the non-movant to establish the existence of material fact.

Id. The non-movant “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt

as to the material facts” by “com[ing] forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a

genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

586-87 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). A dispute about a fact is “genuine” if the

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The non-movant’s bare

assertions, standing alone, are insufficient to create a material issue of fact and defeat a

motion for summary judgment. Id. at 247-48. However, in the summary judgment context,

the Court construes all disputed facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.

Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 2004).

1. Statute of Limitations for the ADA and Title VII Claims

Freescale moved to dismiss on the basis that Sowell's ADA and Title VII claims were

"untimely for failure to timely file a charge of discrimination and failure to file suit within

90 days of receiving a right-to-sue letter." (Doc. # 16 at 1.) Sowell does not dispute that the

statute of limitations has run, but contends that he is entitled to equitable tolling.

For Title VII and ADA actions, a claimant must file a charge with the EEOC within

300 days of the date of the discriminatory act if proceedings were initially instituted with a

qualified State or local agency. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); see Hernandez v. Spacelabs

Med. Inc., 343 F.3d 1107, 1115-16 (9th Cir.2003) (applying the 300-day filing period to Title

VII claims); Douglas v. Cal. Dept. of Youth Auth., 271 F.3d 812, 823 (9th Cir. 2001)

(applying the 300-day filing period to ADA claims). Additionally, after the EEOC issues a

right-to-sue letter, a claimant must bring a civil action against the respondent named in the

charge within 90 days. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); see Scholar v. Pac. Bell, 963 F.2d 264,

266-67 (9th Cir. 1992). The Ninth Circuit "measure[s] the start of the limitations period from

the date on which a right-to-sue notice letter arrived at the claimant's address of record."

Payan v. Aramark Management Services Ltd., 495 F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 2007).

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4

 Because Sowell concedes that he filed past the statutory period, the Court assumes

that the EEOC right-to-sue letter arrived at his address within 13 days after its mailing.

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The latest discriminatory act alleged by Sowell was his wrongful termination on June

24, 2005. Sowell filed the charge with the EEOC and the Arizona Attorney General's Office,

Civil Rights Division, 672 days later, on April 27, 2007. (Doc. # 19, Ex. #4.) The EEOC

mailed the right-to-sue letter on May 30, 2007. Sowell filed suit 104 days later, on

September 11, 2007. Because Sowell filed more than 300 days from the alleged wrongful

termination and filed his complaint over 90 days after receiving notice from the EEOC,4

 his

ADA and Title VII claims are time-barred. 

Sowell concedes that his non-§ 1981 claims would be time-barred but for equitable

tolling.

2. Equitable Tolling for the ADA and Title VII Claims

Sowell argues that the doctrine of equitable tolling should apply because his disability

prevented him from filing within the limitations period for his ADA and Title VII claims.

Freescale argues and the Court agrees that Sowell has failed to meet his burden of

establishing "extraordinary circumstances" that would entitle him to equitable tolling.

Equitable tolling of the statute of limitations applies "when extraordinary

circumstances beyond the plaintiff's control made it impossible to file a claim on time." Stoll

v. Runyon, 165 F.3d 1238, 1242 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Alvarez-Machain v. United States,

107 F.3d 696, 700 (9th Cir. 1996)). Aside from this and few other exceptions, "[e]quitable

tolling is unavailable in most cases" because of the "high hurdle" to its application. Corjasso

v. Ayers, 278 F.3d 874, 877 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted);

see also Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 152 (1984) ("Procedural

requirements established by Congress for gaining access to the federal courts are not to be

disregarded by courts out of a vague sympathy for particular litigants.").

For example, in Grant v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., the plaintiff, claiming mental

incompetency, failed to offer adequate evidence to survive summary judgment and entitle

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him to equitable tolling. 163 F.3d 1136, 1138 (9th Cir. 1998). The plaintiff's only evidence

was "a letter from a child psychologist stating only that Grant's (undefined) condition

interfered with his ability to pursue his legal claim." Id. The Ninth Circuit held that the letter

was insufficient proof to justify equitable tolling because it "present[ed] no explanation for

his failure to pursue his claim within the prescribed limitations period, and is too hypothetical

and speculative . . ." Id.

Despite the "high hurdle" of the "extraordinary circumstances" exception for equitable

tolling, the Ninth Circuit upholds its use when the "impossibility of filing on time" is clear

from the evidence. Stoll, 165 F.3d at 1242 (9th Cir. 1999) In Stoll, the Ninth Circuit held

that the plaintiff–an ex-postal worker who claimed she was mentally incompetent during the

statutory period as a result of having been repeatedly raped and harassed by fellow

employees and supervisors–was entitled to equitable tolling as a matter of law. Id. at 1242.

The court found that the plaintiff had "presented overwhelming evidence that she was

completely psychiatrically disabled during the relevant limitation period." Id.

Even taking the evidence offered in a light most favorable to Sowell, the Court finds

that Sowell has failed to offer sufficient evidence or allege specific facts that would create

a "genuine issue of material fact" of "extraordinary circumstances" that made it "impossible"

for him to file within the statutory period. Although he relies on Stoll, he has offered nothing

to compare to its "extraordinary circumstances." Sowell submited affidavits from his

treating physicians and a nurse that confirm his diagnosis of hyperparathyroidism and that

he reports and is being treated for chronic fatigue, depression, headaches, back pain, and

anxiety disorder. (Doc. # 18, Ex. #2.) He also offers an article on hyperparathyroidism that

suggests his disease "affect(s) the quality of [his] life." (Doc. # 18, Ex. #1 at 2) The

affidavits and article, however, do not explain "his failure to pursue his claim within the

prescribed limitations period, and is too hypothetical and speculative . . ." Grant, 163 F.3d

at 1138. Morever he makes no such explanation in his brief on summary judgment, stating

only that:

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5

 As Freescale points out, however, Sowell has had since at least the moment he

acquired counsel on March 15, 2008 to prepare his claims. Thus when the Court ordered

supplemental briefing on June 2, 2008, Sowell already had, at a minimum, 80 days.

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he will present admissible evidence . . . to prove that equitable tolling should be

applied because of his disabling hyperparathyroidism and resulting symptoms

including, inter alia, cognitive function impairments which effectively prevented him

from tending to his business and legal affairs between the date of his termination of

employment until he filed his Complaint . . . .

(Doc. # 18 at 5) (emphasis added). This single conclusion is the extent of Sowell's argument

for equitable tolling. He uses the rest of his brief to argue that he should be given the

opportunity to present evidence that equitable tolling should apply. 

When the Court converted Freescale's motion to one for summary judgment and

ordered supplemental briefing, the Court gave Sowell the exact opportunity to which he

argues he is entitled. He contends that five days was not enough to gather the necessary

evidence to survive summary judgment.5

 Everything he would need, however, is within his

control. Moreover, Sowell was able to acquire three affidavits from Sowell's treating health

care practitioners. These affidavits could have demonstrated how Sowell's diagnoses

prevented him from proceeding with his claims. 

For example, the Court notes that in Dr. Kimbel's affidavit, Dr. Kimbel reports that

Sowell was diagnosed with hyperparathyroidism in October 2005 and underwent surgery for

it in December 2005, both within 6 months of his termination. (Doc. # 18, Ex. #2 at 2)

Without speculating, however, a diagnosis and the report of a surgery does not convey

"extraordinary circumstances" such that Sowell was either so physically incapacitated or

mentally incompetent that he was unable to manage his legal affairs during the entire

statutory period. This affidavit does not even begin to explain why Sowell missed the time

for filing an EEOC complaint by 372 days.

Pointedly, Sowell himself does not offer either by an affidavit or in his brief, an

explanation for specifically how this surgery and diagnosis made it impossible for him to file

on time. To the contrary, Dr. Kimbel reports that, although Sowell required continued

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6

 Although the questionnaire was presented by Freescale, Sowell does not dispute its

veracity or accuracy.

7

 Sowell did not have to file with the EEOC before alleging 1981 claims, so the 300-

day requirement does not apply.

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treatment, his symptoms improved after surgery. (Doc. # 18, Ex. #2 at 2.) Dr. Kimbel also

states that Sowell was able "to return to work in late 2006 but [was] unable to maintain [his]

job because of health problems." Id. Although this supports the notion that Sowell was

disabled, it also suggests that he was at least able to procure new employment. Moreover,

in his Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") Intake Questionnaire (Doc.

# 20, Ex. # 6),6

 Sowell reported that, after being laid off, he met with an attorney. He dated

the questionnaire April 23, 2007. Thus, sometime within the period that Sowell alleges his

disability "prevented him from tending to his business and legal affairs," Sowell had the

cognitive and physical ability to acquire a new job, meet with an attorney, and file a charge

with the E.E.O.C.. This is far from being "completely psychologically disabled" as was the

plaintiff in Stoll. 165 F.3d at 1242.

Sowell has failed to offer sufficient evidence that would justify equitable tolling.

Accordingly, his claims under the ADA and Title VII are time-barred.

3. Statute of Limitations for § 1981

In its motion to dismiss, Freescale argue that Sowell's § 1981 claims are time-barred

because the applicable statute of limitations is 2 years. (Doc. # 6 at 4.) Sowell counters that

these claims are not time-barred because the applicable statute of limitations is 4 years.7

 Section 1981 does not have its own statute of limitations. 42 U.S.C. § 1981. To avoid

varied treatment amongst the states, Congress passed 28 U.S.C. § 1658 to provide a uniform

statute of limitations for causes of actions that fall under acts or amendments passed by

Congress after December 1, 1990. Jones v. R.R. Donelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 382

(2004). Section 1658(a) states that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, a civil action

arising under an Act of Congress enacted after the date of the enactment of this section may

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not be commenced later than 4 years after the cause of action accrues." In Jones, the

Supreme Court specifically held that the 4-year statute of limitations provided by § 1658

applies to § 1981 claims of racially motivated wrongful termination and hostile work

environment because these claims were made possible under § 1981 by the 1991 Civil Rights

Act. 541 U.S. at 382.

Relying on Cholla Ready Mix, Inc. v. Civish, 382 F.3d 969, 974 (9th Cir. 2004),

Freescale contends that because § 1981 "does not have its own statute of limitations, courts

borrow from the most appropriate state statute of limitations." (Doc. # 6 at 4.) Cholla,

however, is inapposite. There the Ninth Circuit specified that § 1658 did not apply to

plaintiff's § 1981 claims because they did not arise out of any post-1990 amendment of §

1981. 382 F.3d at 977-78 (holding that the plaintiff failed to allege facts from which one

could infer racial discrimination).

Here, Sowell alleges racial discrimination in a hostile work environment and wrongful

termination. As in Jones, because these claims were made possible by a post-1990

amendment of § 1981, § 1658 applies and provides a 4-year statute of limitations for Sowell's

§ 1981 claims. Freescale terminated Sowell on June 24, 2005. Less than 3 years later,

Sowell filed his complaint on September 11, 2007. Accordingly, Sowell's 1981 claims are

not time-barred. The only question remaining is whether Sowell released his legal right to

assert these claims against Freescale when he agreed to the Release.

4. Release

Sowell does not dispute that the Release covered his claims. Instead, his sole

contention is that "the same cognitive disabilities . . . which entitle him to equitable tolling

. . . also give him the defenses [sic] of 'lack of capacity' to invalidate or make the release

agreement unenforceable." (Doc. # 18 at 7.) Beyond this single statement, Sowell offers no

specific evidence or facts as to how his disability made him incapable of "understanding in

a reasonable manner, the nature and effect of "signing the release "at the time of execution

of the document." Golleher v. Horton,715 P.2d 1225, 1228-29 (Ariz. App. 1985). Freescale

argues that Sowell has not met his burden of proving lack of capacity. Even if the Court

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were to conclude that Sowell had met his burden, Freescale further argues that he ratified the

agreement by retaining the severance money. Because the Court concludes that Sowell has

not met his burden, the Court does not reach the issue of whether Sowell ratified the Release

by retaining the consideration for the Release.

“A general release of [a federal right] does not ordinarily violate public policy. To

the contrary, public policy favors voluntary settlement of employment discrimination claims

brought under Title VII.” Stroman v. West Coast Grocery Co., 884 F.2d 458, 460-61 (9th

Cir. 1989) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (holding plaintiff's "release of 'all

claims' against [employer] . . . was a deliberate, voluntary, and knowing waiver of his Title

VII and related claims.") Stroman established the standard for evaluating whether an

employee has legally waived a federal right in the context of an employment termination

agreement: 

the determination of whether a waiver of a federal right was voluntary, deliberate, and

informed is predicated upon an evaluation of several indicia arising from the

circumstances and conditions under which the release was executed, including the

clarity and lack of ambiguity of the agreement, the plaintiff's education and business

experience, the presence of a noncoercive atmosphere, and whether the employee had

the benefit of legal counsel. 

Nilsson v. City of Mesa, 503 F.3d 947, 952 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal brackets and ellipses

omitted) (quoting Stroman, 884 F.2d at 462) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Although the Stroman inidicia do not specifically include the "lack of capacity" defense,

whether a "person is capable of understanding in a reasonable manner, the nature and effect

of his act," Golleher,715 P.2d at 1228, would necessarily go towards "whether a waiver of

a federal right was voluntary, deliberate, and informed . . . ." Stroman, 884 F.2d at 462

(emphasis added). Also, for determining whether someone lacked capacity to execute an

agreement, "[i]n Arizona there is a presumption of competency which continues despite a

subsequent period of incompetency since such persons may have lucid intervals."

Golleher,715 P.2d at 1229.

Here, Sowell has failed to offer sufficient evidence or allege specific facts that would

create a "genuine issue of material fact" to overcome the presumption that he was "capable

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8

 At the time of filing his supplemental brief, Sowell did not need to seek leave to file

an amended complaint because Freescale had not yet served Sowell with a responsive

pleading. Freescale had only filed its motion to dismiss, which is not a responsive pleading

for purposes of Rule 15(a). Rhoades v. Avon Prods., Inc., 504 F.3d 1151, 1158 n.5 (9th Cir.

2007) (quoting Miles v. Dep't of Army, 881 F.2d 777, 781 (9th Cir. 1989)). Thus, Sowell had

the right to amend his complaint "once as a matter of course." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1).

Freescale filed an answer on June 27, 2008. (Doc. # 21.) Freescale's filing of an

answer cut off Sowell's automatic right to amend. The Court, therefore, will consider the

request under Rule 15(a)(2).

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of understanding in a reasonable manner, the nature and effect of" signing the release.

Sowell claims that "between the date of his termination of employment until he filed his

Complaint," he was incapable of "tending to his business and legal affairs . . . ." (Doc. # 19,

Ex. #2.) Yet, in his complaint, Sowell claims that "[a]t all relevant times, Walter was able

to perform the essential duties of his position as an engineer or engineering manager with

reasonable accommodation." (Compl. ¶ 13.) In effect, Sowell claims that the day Freescale

terminated him, he was both mentally incompetent and able to perform as an engineer and

manager. Even setting this inconsistency aside, Sowell does not explain how he was

mentally incompetent when he signed the Release in October. Dr. Kimbel's affidavit only

states that "[i]n October 2005, [Sowell was] diagnosed with primary hyperparathyroidism,"

and that "[t]his condition had undoubtedly been present for some time . . . ." (Doc. # 18, Ex.

#2 at 2.) A conclusory diagnostic statement, without explaining how the diagnosis proved

Sowell's mental incompetency, is not enough to create a "genuine issue of material fact." 

Sowell has failed to "set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial" on the

issues of whether he lacked capacity to enter into a legally enforceable contract when he

executed the Release, and whether the statute of limitations for his non-§ 1981 claims should

be equitably tolled. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2). Accordingly, Freescale is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.

B. Leave to Amend Complaint

As noted above, Sowell seeks leave to file an amended complaint pursuant to Rule

15(a).8

 The Court construes this request pursuant to Rule 15(a)(2). Sowell initially filed his

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complaint pro se. Because he has since acquired counsel, Sowell wants to "properly label

his separate claims for relief" to plead seven distinct claims based upon facts already alleged

in his complaint. (Doc. # 18 at 2.) The seven claims would allege violations of: the ADA,

42 U.S.C. §§ 12112, 12203; 42 U.S.C. § 1981; Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), 2000e3(a); and the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2612, 2615. Id.

Leave to amend should be freely given "when justice so requires." Fed. R. Civ. P.

15(a). Whether to grant a motion to amend depends on the following factors: (1) undue

delay, (2) bad faith, (3) prejudice to the opposing party, (4) futility of amendment, and (5)

whether plaintiff has previously amended his complaint. Western Shoshone Nat. Council v.

Molini, 951 F.2d 200, 204 (9th Cir. 1991). "Futility of amendment can, by itself justify the

denial of a motion for leave to amend." Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845-46 (9th Cir.

1995) (affirming the district court's denial because amendment "would be futile.").

Even if Sowell were to amend his complaint to plead his seven distinct claims, it

would not alter the question at hand: whether Sowell's claims are barred by the statute of

limitations and the Release. As discussed above, the ADA and Title VII claims are timebarred for failure to file with the EEOC within 300 days of the last discriminatory act and

failure to file suit within 90 days from receipt of the EEOC right-to-sue letter. The additional

FMLA claim is also time-barred. An FMLA action must be brought no "later than 2 years

after the date of the last event constituting the alleged violation for which the action is

brought." 29 U.S.C. § 2617(c)(1). Even assuming that the wrongful termination was the

"last event constituting the alleged [FMLA] violation," Sowell exceeded the 2-year statutory

period by filing over 26 months later. Moreover, the Release specifically addressed these

types of claims. And, in regards to the § 1981 claims, the Court has considered them and

finds them to be barred by the Release. 

Because the Court concludes that the seven distinct claims are barred, amendment

would be futile. Sowell's request for leave to amend therefore is denied.

///

///

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Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 6), as converted to one

for summary judgment (Doc. # 17), is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's request for leave to amend his

complaint is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's request for attorney's fees is

DENIED without prejudice, with leave to re-file pursuant to LRCiv 54.2.

DATED this 24th day of July, 2008.

Case 2:07-cv-01738-JAT Document 22 Filed 07/25/08 Page 13 of 13