Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-03055/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-03055-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO BL

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jason Johnathan Lewis, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Moore, et al.,

Defendants. 

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No. CV 04-3055-PHX-SMM

ORDER

Plaintiff Jason Johnathan Lewis filed a Motion to Amend. The Court construes the

motion as a request for reconsideration of the Court’s order granting summary judgment in

favor to Director of the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC) Dora Schriro, Assistant

Deputy Warden L. Schweitzer, Major R. Hoover, Capt. S. Miller, Sgt. Carroll, and

Corrections Officers S. Demsey and Moore and dismissal of Plaintiff’s action (Doc. #28).

The Court will grant reconsideration and modify its prior order to the extent that Defendants

will be granted summary judgment in the alternative on the merits.

I. Motion for Reconsideration

Plaintiff filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Defendants alleging that his equal

protection and due process rights were violated when he was improperly charged with a

disciplinary violation (Doc. #1). Plaintiff, an African-American, argued that (1) Miller

refused to provide him a copy of the statement against him, found him guilty based on

insufficient evidence, denied him a defense, and failed to provide him with an adequate

written disposition; (2) Schweitzer improperly denied his appeal; (3) Dempsey and Hoover

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improperly processed his appeal and failed to rectify the situation; and (4) Schriro failed to

rectify the situation (Id.). 

Both parties moved for summary judgment, and the Court determined that Plaintiff’s

claims were barred under Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997) because Plaintiff sought

damages for the loss of good time credit as a result of the disciplinary charges, but he had not

prevailed in challenges to the disciplinary charges (Doc. #26). Plaintiff has moved to amend

his complaint and now argues that even though he lost good time credit the sanction did not

effect his release date because he was serving a sentence of natural life (Doc. #28). The

Court treats Plaintiff’s motion as one seeking reconsideration.

The Court may relieve a party from a final judgment for: (1) mistake, inadvertence,

surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence; (3) fraud; (4) the judgment is

void; (5) the judgment is satisfied, released, or discharged; or (6) any other reasons justifying

relief from the operation of the judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). Because Plaintiff is serving

a sentence of natural life, success on the merits of his claim will not necessarily result in an

earlier release. See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81 (2005) (providing that if success

in a § 1993 action would not necessarily result in a speedier release, an inmate’s claims may

not be barred under Edwards). Accordingly, the Court will grant reconsideration of the

grounds for granting Defendants summary judgment and address whether Defendants are

entitled to summary judgment on the merits of Plaintiff’s due process claim.

II. Motion for Summary Judgment

“Under Rule 56(c), summary judgment is proper ‘if the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show

that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

a judgment as a matter of law.’” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).

“[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate

time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient

to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party

will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Id.

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“Due process in a prison disciplinary hearing is satisfied if the inmate receives written

notice of the charges, and a statement of the evidence relied on by the prison officials and the

reasons for disciplinary action.” Zimmerlee v. Keeny, 831 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1987),

citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). “Due process does not require that an

informant’s identity be revealed to an inmate.” Id. Further, “[f]indings that result in the loss

of liberty will satisfy due process if there is some evidence which supports the decisions of

the disciplinary board.” Id.

On August 7, 2004, a weapon made of epoxy was located in the common area of one

of the dorms (Doc. #21, ex. 3). An investigation was conducted and Moore determined that

Plaintiff made and provided the weapon to another African-American inmate (Id.). The

maintenance work crew members were interviewed; and, on August 11, 2004, Moore

verbally notified Plaintiff that he was being placed on disciplinary report (Doc. #17, attached

declaration, ex. A, B; Doc. #21, ex. 3). Later that day, Carroll notified Plaintiff in writing

that he was charged with conspiracy to commit and prevent the discovery of a violation (Doc.

#17, attached declaration, ex. B). Carroll specifically notified Plaintiff in writing that Carroll

was relying on three confidential sources who had identified Plaintiff as the inmate who had

made weapons as evidence of the disciplinary violation (id.).

A hearing was conducted on September 8, 2004 (id. attached declaration, ex. C).

Based on Moore’s written report and information from a confidential informant, Plaintiff was

found guilty of the disciplinary charge (id.). Plaintiff received a copy of the disciplinary

results with a statement of the evidence relied upon: the officer’s report and the confidential

informant’s statement (id., ex. C). Plaintiff was not given a written statement regarding

exactly what the informant stated. Schweitzer denied Plaintiff’s appeal (Id., attached

declaration, ex. E). Plaintiff subsequently attempted to appeal his charge to Schriro; but for

unexplained reasons, his appeal was never properly processed (Id., attached declaration, exs.

F, G, I). Plaintiff then submitted an untimely appeal (Id., exs. H, J).

Based on the summary judgment evidence, Plaintiff received notice of a hearing

approximately one month prior to the hearing, and was informed what evidence would be

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relied upon at the hearing. Plaintiff alleged that he was denied due process because he did

not receive a copy of the confidential informant’s statement. Inmates do not have a due

process right to learn the identity of a confidential informants or to obtain a copy of the

confidential statement reports. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 565-67; King v. Wells, 760 F.2d 89,

93-94 (6th Cir.1985); see also Zimmerlee, 831 F.2d at 186. Plaintiff also received notice of

the results of the disciplinary action and the reasons for the action. Plaintiff was then

allowed to appeal the decision. Plaintiff received the process due in connection with the

disciplinary charge. Further, Defendants’ determination in regard to the disciplinary action

was properly based on “some evidence.” See Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir.

2003) (providing that the Due Process Clause only requires that the ADC have “some

evidence” of a disciplinary violation); see also Hill v. Superintendent, 472 U.S. 445, 453

(1985). Thus, Plaintiff’s due process rights were not violated.

Plaintiff also argues that his equal protection rights were violated because he was

found guilty based solely on his race. The Constitution does not require that the law treat

every individual exactly alike in order to withstand constitutional attack. Mlikotin v. City

of Los Angeles, 643 F.2d 652, 653 (9thCir. 1981). Equal protection only requires that “all

persons similarly situated shall be treated alike.” Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982);

Gilbrook v. City of Westminister, 177 F. 3d 839, 871 (9th Cir. 1999) (providing that to state

an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must allege “unequal treatment of people similarly

situated”). Plaintiff has not and cannot demonstrate that he was treated differently than

similarly situated persons because Defendants had some evidence that Plaintiff, not the other

members of his crew, possessed the weapon.

On reconsideration of the grounds for granting Defendants summary judgment in its

prior order, the Court concludes that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the

merits of Plaintiff’s due process claim. The Court accordingly modifies its previous order

to the extent set forth herein

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IT IS ORDERED:

(1) Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend (Doc. #28) is construed as a Motion to Reconsider

and is granted.

(2) The prior Order entered is modified to the extent that Defendants are granted

summary judgment on the merits of Plaintiff’s claims.

DATED this 21st day of August, 2007.

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