Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_00-cv-00156/USCOURTS-caed-2_00-cv-00156-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1 This matter was referred to a United States magistrate

judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 636(b)(1)(B) and Eastern

District Local Rule 72-302.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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DOUGLAS J. WINSTON,

NO. S-00-0156 FCD GGH P

Petitioner,

v.

CALIFORNIA BOARD OF 

PRISON TERMS, et al., MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Respondents.

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This matter is before the court on review of the findings

and recommendations (“F&R”) of the magistrate judge,1 filed

August 15, 2005, addressing a petition for a writ of habeas

corpus based upon claims relating to parole. The Ninth Circuit

previously remanded the case, directing the court to consider

petitioner’s vagueness challenges to the statutory language

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2 The BPT is now known as the Board of Parole Hearings.

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guiding parole decisions. Petitioner, Douglas J. Winston, and

respondent, the California Board of Prison Terms (“BPT” of

“board”),2 filed objections to the magistrate judge’s findings

and recommendations. For the reasons set forth below, the court

does not adopt the findings and recommendations in their

entirety; however, the court concurs with the magistrate judge’s

denial of petitioner’s request for a writ of habeas corpus.

BACKGROUND

The court adopts the factual and procedural background set

forth by the magistrate judge in his findings and

recommendations. (See F&R, filed Aug. 15, 2005, at 6-7.)

STANDARD

When timely objections to findings by a magistrate judge are

filed, the district court must conduct a de novo determination of

the findings and recommendations as to issues of law. 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1). The district court may adopt, reject, or modify in

part or in full the findings and recommendations. 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1)(C). For the reasons set forth below, the court adopts

the magistrate’s recommendation, but modifies his findings.

ANALYSIS

Petitioner Winston challenges the March 31, 1998, decision

by the BPT, which found him unsuitable for parole. Winston

raises two claims in his amended petition for a writ of habeas

corpus, filed March 8, 2001: (1) petitioner has a liberty

interest in having a parole date set; and (2) the BPT regulations

contain vague criteria for determining prisoner suitability for

parole. (See F&R at 1).

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On March 27, 2002, the court adopted the previous F&R of the

magistrate judge, which found that petitioner did not have a

liberty interest in having a parole date set under Cal. Pen. Code

§ 3041. The Ninth Circuit reversed, based upon its holding in

Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 914-15 (9th Cir. 2005), that

every inmate has “a cognizable liberty interest in parole which

is protected by the procedural safeguards of the Due Process

Clause.” Winston v. BPT, Slip. Op. 02-15963 (9th Cir., filed

Feb. 24, 2005). The Ninth Circuit therefore remanded the case

for consideration of Winston’s claim that the language contained

in parole suitability regulation § 2402(c)(1) is

unconstitutionally vague. Id. 

A. Liberty Interest in Parole

The Ninth Circuit has found that the California parole

statute codified in § 3041 of the Penal Code gives rise to a

cognizable liberty interest in release on parole. Biggs, 334

F.3d at 914-15; McQuillon v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 902 (9th Cir.

2002). The California Supreme Court has also held that prisoners

have a protected liberty interest in parole under the due process

protections of the California Constitution. In re Rosenkrantz,

29 Cal. 4th 616, 655-58 (2002). However, in January 2005, the

California Supreme Court issued its opinion in In re Dannenberg,

34 Cal. 4th 1061 (2005), which respondents contend construe

California’s parole regulations in such a manner as to preclude

the finding of a protected liberty interest in parole. Because

of the California Supreme Court’s decision in Dannenberg, the

court will also address petitioner’s claim that he has a federal 

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3 The effect of Dannenberg on a prisoner’s legitimate

expectation of parole is not well-settled. The Ninth Circuit

heard oral argument on this issue on March 16, 2006. However,

the recent authority from the district courts in the Ninth

Circuit weighs in favor of finding a federal liberty interest in

parole. See e.g., Fredericks v. Knowles, No. CV 05-0334, 2006 WL

449105 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2006); Machado v. Kane, No. C 05-1632,

2006 WL 449146 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2006); McCauley v. Brown, No.

C 05-1817, 2006 WL 83050, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2006); Lewis

v. Solis, No. C 04-2152, 2005 WL 3454137 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 14,

2005). But see, Sass v. Cal. Board of Prison Terms, 376 F. Supp.

2d 975 (E.D. Cal. 2005).

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liberty interest in having a parole date state, in addition to

his vagueness challenges. 

The court is not persuaded by respondent’s discussion of

Dannenberg. The Dannenberg court’s analysis of the language and

structure of both §§ 3041(a) and 3041(b) calls into question the

creation of a cognizable federal liberty by the California parole

statute. However, the issue presented to the Dannenberg court

was whether the petitioner had a protected liberty interest, and

expectation in a “uniform” parole release date, pursuant to §

3041(a). Dannenberg did not expressly answer the question of

whether § 3041(b) creates a liberty interest in the parole

suitability determination. Further, Dannenberg did not expressly

overrule the Supreme Court’s previous holding in Rosenkrantz. 

“In light of the absence of a clear determination by the

California Supreme Court that § 3041(b) grants the BPT limitless

discretion to determine parole suitability, coupled with the

Ninth Circuit’s holding in [Biggs and] McQuillion that a

protected liberty interest is created by § 3041(b),” the court

rejects respondent’s argument that there is no protected liberty

interest in parole for California inmates.3 McCauley v. Brown,

No. C. 05-1817, 2006 WL 83050, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2006).

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B. Parole Board Suitability Regulations 

Petitioner argues that the phrase “heinous, atrocious, or

cruel,” found in California’s parole suitability regulations is

too vague to provide guidance to the BPT and is therefore

unconstitutional. Cal. Code Regs. Tit. 15, § 2402(c)(1). When

setting a parole release date, BPT commissioners are guided by

California Penal Code § 3041 in determining whether or not a

parole release date should be set in the case of an individual

inmate. Section 3041(b) provides that the board “shall set a

release date” unless the “gravity of the offense is such that

public safety requires a lengthier period of incarceration.” Id.

In determining whether or not an inmate is suitable for parole,

the board must make decisions using the framework contained in

Title 15 of California Code of Regulations § 2402. Id. Only

after a prisoner is found suitable for parole can a release date

be set. Id. at § 2402(a).

Section 2402 outlines the procedures and considerations to

be used by the BPT in assessing whether a “life prisoner is

suitable for release on parole.” Id. at § 2402(a). The inquiry

is largely discretionary but must consider all “relevant,

reliable information available to the panel” including social

history, past offenses, behavior in prison, and “any other

information which bears on the prisoners suitability for

release.” See id. at § 2402(b); Allen, 482 U.S. at 375-76;

Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 16. Further, “circumstances which taken

alone may not firmly establish unsuitability for parole may

contribute to a pattern which results in a finding of

unsuitability.” Id. Finally, § 2402 indicates which

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4 While the court determines infra that there are

adequate reasons for the BPT’s determination that petitioner was

unsuitable for parole aside from the board’s finding of the

applicability of the gravity of the offense regulation, the Ninth

Circuit previously remanded this case for a determination

regarding the term “heinous, atrocious, and cruel” as applied in

California’s Parole Regulations. 

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circumstances tend to indicate unsuitability for parole. Id. at

§ 2402(c). Such circumstances include the gravity of the

commitment offense, a previous record of violence, an unstable

social history, sadistic sexual offenses, psychological factors,

and institutional behavior. Id. at § 2402(c)(1)-(6). 

1. Vagueness of the “Gravity Offense” Regulation4

Petitioner has asserted that the language “heinous,

atrocious, or cruel” contained in the gravity of the commitment

offense regulation is unconstitutionally vague. The Ninth

Circuit remanded the case to evaluate whether the challenged

regulation was unconstitutionally vague in the way it was applied

to petitioner.

Section 2402(c)(1) indicates that a prisoner may be

unsuitable for parole when:

The prisoner committed the offense in an especially 

heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner. 

The factors to be considered include:

(A) Multiple victims were attacked, injured or killed 

in the same or separate incidents.

(B) The offense was carried out in a dispassionate and

calculated manner, such as an execution-style murder.

(C) The victim was abused, defiled or mutilated during 

or after the offense.

(D) The offense was carried out in a manner which

demonstrates an exceptionally callous disregard for 

human suffering.

(E) The motive for the crime is inexplicable or very 

trivial in relation to the offense.

Id. (emphasis added).

Thus, an offense may be considered especially “heinous,

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atrocious, or cruel” if one or more of the factors (A) through

(E) is present in the commitment offense. Id. at § 2402(c).

 A statute or regulation is void for vagueness “if it fails

to give adequate notice to people of ordinary intelligence

concerning the conduct it proscribes or if it invites arbitrary

and discriminatory enforcement.” United States v. Doremus, 888

F.2d 630, 634 (9th Cir. 1989). Subjectivity of the

decisionmaker, however, in the parole context does not render

such regulations invalid. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 9-10 (finding

that parole release decisions are inherently subjective). The

Supreme Court has recognized that parole suitability regulations

may be defined by general and subjective criteria because a

parole suitability decision is “subtle and depends on an amalgam

of elements, some of which are factual but many of which are

purely subjective appraisals by the board members based upon

their experience.” Id. Further, the gravity offense regulations

are neither subjective nor indecipherable. The challenged

regulation lists five factors that are interpreted by examining

the facts and evidence underlying an inmate’s conviction. Cal.

Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(c)(1)(A)-(E). The factors include the

number of victims, the inmate’s mens rea, and whether or not the

victim was abused or defiled. Id. The facts of each case will

determine whether a particular factor is present and thus whether

the commitment offense was “heinous, atrocious, or cruel.”

In the parole determination context, the notice inquiry in

the vagueness analysis applies not to whether the inmate had

sufficient notice of proscribed conduct, but to whether the

decision-makers, in this case the BPT, had sufficient notice of

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what the regulatory factors mean and how to apply them to

particular cases. See Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 361

(1988) (analyzing the notice inquiry as it affects the ability of

jurors to find aggravating circumstances). The proper inquiry is

whether the regulations sufficiently guide and channel the

board’s review of whether or not an inmate is suitable for parole

and “adequately safeguard[] against serious risks of error.” 

Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 15; see Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463,

470 (1993); Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. at 361 (1988).

The Supreme Court has held that an otherwise facially vague

statute may be saved by a construction that narrows the scope of

the statute and channels the discretion of the decision-maker. 

See Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 255-56 (1976)

(interpreting “heinous, atrocious, or cruel” in a state death

penalty aggravating circumstance case); Cf. Maynard, supra, 486

U.S. at 363. The Court upheld the use of the standard “heinous,

atrocious, or cruel,” as an aggravating circumstance when the

language was limited and defined by judicial interpretation. 

Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 255-56 (1976). In Proffitt,

the Court found that Florida state court interpretations of the

facially vague phrase limited application of the aggravating

circumstance to those cases involving “conscienceless or pitiless

crime which is unnecessarily torturous to the victim.” Id. at

255. In reaching this conclusion, the Proffitt Court noted that

the trial judge imposes the sentence of death and in doing so

must weigh aggravating against mitigating circumstances. Id. at

251. In doing so the judge must focus on the “circumstances of

the crime and the character of the individual defendant.” Id.

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Further, the judge must “focus on the individual circumstances of

each homicide.” Id. at 252. Such sentencing procedures ensure

that the application of the death penalty is neither arbitrary

nor capricious. Id. at 253.

In order for the parole regulations to survive a vagueness

inquiry, the regulation must be sufficiently precise to

adequately guide the board and prevent arbitrary and

discriminatory enforcement. Doremus, 888 F.2d at 634. This can

be achieved through either exactness of language or through

limiting constructions, such as statutory sub-factors or judicial

interpretation, that are known to the decision-maker. See Arave,

507 U.S. at 471. Such limiting constructions must genuinely

narrow the class eligible for punishment from the general class

of inmates. See id. at 475. Finally, the decision-maker must

engage in an individualized inquiry that takes into account both

the individual defendant and particular crime. See Proffitt, 428

U.S. at 251-52. 

In California’s parole suitability scheme, the five subfactors outlined in § 2402(c)(1)(A)-(E) serve to limit the

“heinous, atrocious, or cruel” language of the regulation and

narrow the class of inmates that are found unsuitable for parole. 

The limiting sub-factors contain standards that are based on

evidence in the record of each individual case. The sub-factors

require the board to examine the facts of each inmate’s case,

considering both the inmate and the crime, to determine if any

one of the five evidentiary sub-factors (A)-(E) are present. If

any of the factors are present, the board may properly determine

that the gravity of an inmate’s conviction offense was “heinous,

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5 Petitioner also takes issue with term “unusual” as it

is used in § 2402(c)(4), relating to sadistic sexual offenses. 

However, because the panel did not discuss in detail the aspects

of the petitioner’s crime that could be analyzed under this

subsection, the court does not find that the BPT found petitioner

unsuitable for parole because he had committed a sexually

sadistic offense. As such, the court will not determine the

constitutionality of this subsection as the issue is not properly

before the court.

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atrocious, or cruel” and that the inmate is not suitable for

parole.

Petitioner contends that the terms “dispassionate” and

“exceptionally callous,”5 contained within two sub-factors of §

2402(c)(1), are unconstitutionally vague, and therefore, do not

cure the facial vagueness of the phrase “heinous, atrocious, and

cruel.” The term “dispassionate” is used in § 2402(c)(1)(B)

which provides that a factor in the “heinous, atrocious, or

cruel” analysis is whether “the [commitment] offense was carried

out in a dispassionate and calculated manner, such as an

execution-style murder.” Dispassionate is defined as “free from

the influence of passion or strong feeling.” Webster’s 3d. New

Int’l. Dictionary (1961). By itself, the term makes clear that

the sub-factor does not allow the board to consider crimes

committed out of passion. However, the regulation also provides

an illustration as to what type of manner of committing an

offense qualifies as dispassionate, i.e. “an execution-style

murder.” Finally, the application of the sub-factor is also

limited by the use of the term “calculated.” In this context,

the term “dispassionate” does not render the sub-factor

unconstitutionally vague.

The term “exceptionally callous” is used in § 2402(c)(1)(D)

which provides that a factor in the “heinous, atrocious, and

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6 This is listed as a factor to be considered in the

“heinous, atrocious, and cruel” analysis, pursuant to §

2402(c)(1)(A).

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cruel” analysis is whether “[t]he [commitment] offense was

carried out in a manner which demonstrates an exceptionally

callous disregard for human suffering.” The California Supreme

Court has held that evidence of this sub-factor may be found

where “the violence or viciousness of the inmate’s crime [is]

more than minimally necessary to convict him of the offense for

which he is confined.” Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 440. This

judicial construction is sufficient to give the board notice of

how to apply this sub-factor in its broad discretion such that

there are adequate “safeguards against serious risks of error.” 

Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 15. 

In petitioner’s case, the BPT relied on the gravity of

petitioner’s commitment offense, applying sub-factors (A)-(E) to

determine that Winston’s offense was “heinous, atrocious, and

cruel.” The board found that petitioner was unsuitable for

parole. In making the determination that petitioner’s commitment

offense was “heinous, atrocious, or cruel,” the BPT considered

that 1) petitioner assaulted multiple victims during his crime

spree,6 and 2) displayed an “exceptionally callous disregard for

human suffering.” In finding petitioner’s “exceptionally callous

disregard for human suffering,” the board relied on the fact that

petitioner killed, shot, injured or raped his victims in separate

incidents over a period of time. (Answer, Ex. 3, at 30). 

In it’s reasoned decision denying petitioner’s habeas

petition, the Superior Court of California for the County of San

Joaquin found that the regulations applied in petitioner’s case

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are valid and were properly applied. Under the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act’s standard of review which applies to

the court’s review of this petition for habeas corpus, and in

light of the Supreme Court’s analysis in both Greenholtz and

Proffitt, the court cannot find that the state court’s decision

is contrary to or an unreasonable application of established

Supreme Court authority. See Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3 (2002). 

Therefore, the regulation challenged by the petitioner, §

2402(c)(1) and its sub-sections, are not vague and were not

unconstitutionally applied to the petitioner.

Petitioner argues that “heinous, atrocious, and cruel” was

held to be impermissibly vague by the United States Supreme

Court. Petitioner relies upon Maynard v. Cartwright, which

involved application of the standard in describing an aggravating

circumstance which allowed a jury to impose the sentence of death

in a capital murder case. 486 U.S. at 363-64. Maynard is

distinguishable from this case, however, because the facially

vague language was not limited, whether by statutory factors or

judicial construction, to channel the discretion of the decisionmaker. Id. at 364-65. The Court held, in the absence of any

limiting construction, that the language “heinous, atrocious, or

cruel” used in an aggravating circumstance was unconstitutionally

vague because it allowed arbitrary or capricious imposition of

the death penalty. Id. at 365.

Petitioner also cites People (Engert) v. Superior Court in

support of the proposition that the phrase, “heinous, atrocious,

or cruel” is unconstitutionally vague. 31 Cal. 3d 797, 802 (Cal.

1982). This case is also inapplicable to the facts presented by

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7 The magistrate judge concluded that the unstable social

history criterion in § 2402(c)(3) is unconstitutionally vague. 

However, petitioner did not challenge this regulation or any

terms in this regulation a unconstitutionally vague in his habeas

petition. As such, the court will not decide the merits of a

claim not properly before it.

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petitioner’s claims. In Engert the phrase was used as an element

of the first degree murder offense rendering a defendant eligible

for death or life without the possibility of parole. Id. The

court held that the phrase was not precise enough to give

adequate notice of what the state commands or forbids. Id. at

801. The California court distinguished Proffitt on two grounds. 

First, the California statute must be found beyond a reasonable

doubt by a unanimous jury verdict. Id. at 803. Second, the

California statute was analyzed under general due process

considerations which require the statute to give notice that

certain conduct is proscribed by the state. Id. at 801-02. In

contrast, the Proffitt Court examined the language of the

aggravating circumstance “only insofar as it is necessary to

determine whether there is substantial risk that the Florida

capital sentencing system” results in “capricious or arbitrary

imposition of the death penalty.” Id. at 805. Because

petitioner’s claims involve discretionary decisions closer akin

to post-conviction aggravating factors than to elements of the

offense, Engert is inapplicable. 

2. Other Factors Indicating Unsuitability for Parole

The board considered other factors apart from the gravity of

petitioner’s commitment offense. Such considerations included,

inter alia, petitioner’s previous record of violence and his

unstable social history.7 These factors, without regard to the

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8 Respondent also objects to the magistrate judge’s

finding regarding mootness. The court adopts the magistrate

judge’s analysis as it applies to this issue.

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commitment offense regulation are sufficient to substantiate the

BPT’s determination that the petitioner was unsuitable for

parole. The court does not find that any of the parole

suitability regulations are unconstitutionally vague, but also

finds that there are other sufficient bases, apart from the

gravity of the offense, to deny petitioner Winston’s habeas

petition. Therefore, petitioner’s habeas petition must be denied 

because the board provided other adequate grounds for the denial

of parole to petitioner.8

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court adopts the magistrate

judge’s recommendation but modifies his findings. Petitioner’s

request for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED:March 30, 2006

/s/ Frank C. Damrell Jr. 

FRANK C. DAMRELL JR.

United States District Judge

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