Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02524/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02524-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

KIANA PAOLA GARCIA, 

Defendant.

Case No.: 17cr3128-LAB-1 and 

18cv2524-LAB 

ORDER DENYING PETITION 

UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2255 

 Defendant Kiana Paola Garcia pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to 

one count each of importation of methamphetamine, cocaine, and heroin. On 

December 20, 2017, the Court sentenced her to 50 months’ imprisonment on each 

count, to run concurrently, followed by four years’ supervised release on each 

count, also to run concurrently. Under her plea agreement, she waived appeal and 

collateral attack, other than on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. (See 

Docket no. 14 (Plea Agrmt.), at 14.) 

 On November 5, 2018, she filed a petition to vacate her conviction under 28 

U.S.C. §2255. (Docket no. 27 (Pet.).) The Court ordered the government to file, 

as a response, a transcript of Garcia’s change of plea hearing before Magistrate 

Judge William Gallo, which the government has now done. (Docket no. 29.) 

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 Garcia argues that her lawyer, Mr. Schlein, was ineffective, because he 

contacted her mother to ask for some unspecified documents, even though she 

asked him not to. (Pet. at 4.) She also argues that he failed to communicate with 

her before and after her guilty plea. (Id. at 5, 7.) Specifically, she claims he rushed 

her into signing the plea agreement, did not provide her with some unspecified 

discovery documents, and did not confer with her about some unspecified 

concerns she had about the presentence report. (Id.) Garcia also argues that her 

counsel never told her that he could argue with the prosecutor for a lesser sentence 

and did not argue forcefully enough for a lower sentence. (Id. at 7.) She also 

mentions that at sentencing, the prosecutor made some favorable arguments that 

she had never heard her own attorney mention. (Id.) 

 To be entitled to a hearing, a defendant petitioning under § 2255 must allege 

specific facts which, if true, would entitle her to relief. United States v. McMullen, 

98 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 1996). No hearing is required in order to examine 

vague or conclusory allegations. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 72–73 (1977); 

United States v. Johnson, 988 F.2d 941, 945 (9th Cir. 1993). Likewise, under 28 

U.S.C. § 2255(b), if the records and files and the petition itself conclusively show 

that the prisoner is not entitled to relief, no hearing is required. 

 To establish a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must 

show both that her counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness, and that it prejudiced her. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 

668, 687–88, 692 (1984). See also Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985) 

(applying Strickland test to guilty pleas based on alleged ineffective assistance of 

counsel). 

 No hearing is required as to most of Garcia’s claims. Even assuming Garcia’s 

attorney did not have express or implied consent to contact her mother for 

information, Garcia does not point to any prejudice as a result of this alleged 

violation. Claims regarding discovery and unspecified concerns about the 

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presentence report are vague, and Garcia does not identify any prejudice from 

these supposed errors either. She also argues that her lawyer did not visit her 

enough, though she agrees he visited her several times for around fifteen minutes 

and that she was able to contact him. Other than not being given enough time to 

consider her guilty plea (which is discussed below), she has not identified any 

prejudice from lack of communication with her lawyer. 

 Garcia’s claims concerning her lawyer’s allegedly inadequate efforts to 

obtain a lighter sentence do not satisfy either of the Strickland prongs. The record 

makes clear her lawyer obtained a favorable plea offer, and communicated it to 

her, which she accepted. Both her attorney and the government asked the Court 

to give her the benefit of fast track, acceptance of responsibility, minor role, and 

safety valve. (See Docket nos. 22, 24 (Sentencing Summary Charts).) She was 

ultimately sentenced to 51 months, well below the low end of the guideline range 

which was 70 months. She has not alleged any facts suggesting a more favorable 

plea deal was reasonably likely. Other than a conclusory suggestion that her 

lawyer should have argued with the prosecutor, she has not suggested what he 

could have done to obtain a more favorable plea deal. She also claims he was 

ineffective for allowing the prosecutor to make certain arguments at sentencing, 

instead of making them himself. But she has not pled facts suggesting this was an 

ineffective strategy or that it in any way prejudiced her. Nor has she pointed to 

anything her lawyer should have said that the Court was not made aware of. 

 The only reasonably plausible claim was that Garcia’s lawyer rushed her into 

deciding whether to plead guilty, and into signing the plea agreement. Here, the 

transcript of the change of plea hearing belies the unsworn allegations in her 

petition. At that hearing, when Garcia was under oath (Docket no. 29 (Tr.) at 3:11), 

the following colloquy took place between her, Magistrate Judge Gallo, and her 

lawyer, Mr. Schlein: 

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The Court: Before you signed and initialed the plea agreement, did you read 

it over carefully or have it translated and read to you in order to understand 

it? 

. . . 

The Defendant: Yes. 

The Court: Have you had sufficient time to discuss your case and the plea 

agreement with your attorney and have all of your questions answered? 

. . . 

The Defendant: Yes. 

The Court: Are you satisfied with the advice your attorney has given you? 

. . . 

The Defendant: Yes. 

. . . 

The Court: Counsel, do you also believe you’ve had sufficient time to discuss 

the case and the agreement with your client and answer [her] questions? 

Mr. Schlein: Yes, Your Honor. 

. . . 

The Court: Are you satisfied your client understands the agreement? 

Mr. Schlein: Yes, Your Honor. 

(Tr. at 7:19–8:19.) 

Statements made under oath and in open court are accorded significant 

weight, and Garcia’s later contradictory allegations about being rushed and not 

having enough time to consider the agreement are insufficient to overcome that, 

or to require a hearing. See Shah v. United States, 878 F.2d 1156, 1162 (9th Cir. 

/ / / 

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1989) (“[S]olemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity.”) 

(quoting Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 74). 

The petition is DENIED. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: May 6, 2019 

 Hon. Larry Alan Burns 

Chief United States District Judge

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