Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-00301/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-00301-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TERRANCE AMONS, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

PITTSBURG CITY OF, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 4:19-cv-00301-KAW 

ORDER REGARDING DISCOVERY 

LETTER BRIEFS PERTAINING TO 

PMK DEPOSITIONS

Re: Dkt. Nos. 41, 45

On February 21, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a discovery letter brief seeking to compel the 

depositions of Defendants’ persons most knowledgeable pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 30(b)(6), and did so unilaterally in violation of the undersigned’s standing order, 

because it was the last day to file a joint discovery letter pursuant to Civil Local Rule 37-3. (Pls.’ 

Letter, Dkt. No. 41 at 1.) Plaintiffs admit that they waited until 3:30 p.m. to request that 

Defendants file a joint letter, but were informed that Defendants were unable to accommodate 

their request. See id. On February 28, 2020, Defendants filed a discovery letter in response, in 

which they argue that Plaintiff’s PMK deposition notice was untimely and unreasonable. (Defs.’ 

Letter, Dkt. No. 45.)

The fact discovery deadline in this case was February 14, 2020. On February 6, 2020,1 

Plaintiffs noticed the depositions of Defendants’ person most knowledgeable for seven topics to be 

held on February 14, 2020, eight days later. (Pls.’ Joint Letter, Ex. 1.) Defendants objected to the 

deposition notice on the grounds that it was too broad and that not enough notice was given, due to 

1 Defendants note that the notice was emailed to them at 9:47 p.m., so it was not received until the 

following day—February 7, 2020—only one week before fact discovery closed. (Defs.’ Letter at 2 

n. 1.) The Court agrees that this only constitutes seven days notice.

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United States District Court

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the need to identify and prepare the various witnesses for deposition. (Pls.’ Letter at 2, Ex. 2; 

Defs.’ Letter at 2.)

At issue is whether seven calendar days is reasonable. Pursuant to Rule 30(b)(1), “[a] party 

who wants to depose a person by oral questions must give reasonable written notice to every other 

party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(1). Plaintiffs argue that eight days is reasonable, and Defendants 

should be compelled to produce PMK witnesses, because courts have found five days notice to 

constitute “reasonable notice” so long as the subpoena does not require the production of 

documents. (Pls.’ Letter at 3.) The cases cited by Plaintiffs are not persuasive and are factually 

inapposite. In fact, Guzman v. Bridgepoint Education, Inc. cited Millenium Laboratories, Inc. v. 

Allied World Assurance, Co. for the proposition that five days was “reasonable notice.” Guzman v. 

Bridgepoint Educ., Inc., 2014 WL 1670094, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2014). Millenium 

Laboratories, however, only found that five days was reasonable “[g]iven the continuances 

granted to date and the [] fact discovery deadline,” which was more than two weeks away. 

Millennium Labs., Inc. v. Allied World Assur. Co. (U.S.), 2014 WL 197744, at *2 n. 1 (S.D. Cal. 

Jan. 15, 2014). Furthermore, in Guzman, the Court, in denying the relief sought by Plaintiff, 

stated:

[r]ealizing that these two deadlines were rapidly approaching when 

the dispute arose, the Court would have expected the parties, 

especially Plaintiff, to react with far more alacrity than what was 

displayed here. Choosing instead to file the Joint Statement right at 

the very deadline of the 30-day window, the parties, especially 

Plaintiff, now must face the consequence of their dilatory actions.

2014 WL 1670094, at *3. Similarly, here, the parties had met and conferred and, after noting that 

the undersigned does not permit motions to compel, Defendant suggested that they prepare a joint 

letter to be filed the week of February 21. (Defs.’ Letter at 4.) Instead of quickly drafting a joint 

letter, Plaintiffs waited until 3:30 p.m. on February 21, the last day to file a joint letter, and, when 

Defendants could not accommodate their tardiness, filed their letter unilaterally. That Plaintiffs 

did not familiarize themselves with the Court’s standing order does not excuse them from the 

deadline or from the requirement that all discovery letters be joint. The Court also notes that 

Plaintiffs had ample time to notice the 30(b)(6) depositions prior to the deadline, but chose not to 

do so. The Court is not convinced that the depositions of Officers Arellano and Tindall 

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necessitated the 30(b)(6) deposition, as Defendants informed the Court that Plaintiffs failed to 

obtain their training and personnel records prior to the deposition, which could have been used to 

refresh their recollection. (Pls.’ Letter at 1; Defs.’ Letter at 3 n. 3.)

Moreover, in opposition, Defendants cite to Tyler v. City of San Diego, 2015 WL 1956434, 

at *2 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2015), in which the court found that seven days was insufficient notice 

for the City to adequately prepare for a 30(b)(6) deposition. (Defs.’ Letter at 2.) Identifying and 

preparing a 30(b)(6) witness is a more difficult undertaking for a municipality, and, 

understandably, requires more notice.

Finally, Plaintiffs argues that Defendants should be compelled to produce witnesses, 

because Plaintiffs agreed to schedule Plaintiffs’ depositions after the fact discovery deadline. (Pls.’ 

Letter at 3.) Plaintiffs, however, misrepresent this agreement as a concession, as it was made after 

Defendants timely noticed the depositions of the named plaintiffs in January, but, due to 

scheduling conflicts, the plaintiffs were not available until after the fact discovery cut-off. (See 

Pls.’ Letter, Ex. 3 at 1.) Thus, Plaintiffs’ agreement to make themselves available for deposition

due to scheduling considerations is not reason to compel Defendants to produce 30(b)(6) witnesses

on such short notice.

For the reasons set forth above, the Court denies Plaintiffs’ request to compel Defendants 

to comply with the February 6, 2020 deposition subpoena. The subpoena is, therefore, quashed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 13, 2020

__________________________________

KANDIS A. WESTMORE

United States Magistrate Judge

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