Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-1_13-cv-03437/USCOURTS-cand-1_13-cv-03437-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EUREKA DIVISION

WILLIE MORRIS CLAY,

Plaintiff,

 v.

DAVID LIVINGSTON, et. al.,

Defendants. /

No. C 13-3437 NJV (PR)

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(Doc. 50.)

This is a civil rights case brought pro se by a state prisoner at Pelican Bay State

Prison. Plaintiff alleges that while at Martinez Detention Facility, he and other Muslims who

were fasting during Ramadan did not receive their lunches, even though completely

sacrificing meals is not appropriate. He did not receive lunch for nine days. He contends

that the withholding of his lunch is a free exercise violation of the First Amendment and

seeks monetary and injunctive relief. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment and

plaintiff filed an opposition. For the reasons set forth below, defendants’ motion for

summary judgment is granted.

DISCUSSION

Motion for Summary Judgment

A. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits show

that there is "no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Material facts are those which may

affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 

A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury

to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.

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The moving party for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those

portions of the pleadings, discovery and affidavits which demonstrate the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Nissan

Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). When the moving

party has met this burden of production, the nonmoving party must go beyond the

pleadings and, by its own affidavits or discovery, set forth specific facts showing that there

is a genuine issue for trial. If the nonmoving party fails to produce enough evidence to

show a genuine issue of material fact, the moving party wins. Id.

First Amendment Free Exercise

In order to establish a free exercise violation, a prisoner must show a defendant

burdened the practice of his religion without any justification reasonably related to

legitimate penological interests. See Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 883-84 (9th Cir.

2008). A prisoner is not required to objectively show that a central tenet of his faith is

burdened by a prison regulation to raise a viable claim under the Free Exercise Clause. Id.

at 884-85. Rather, the sincerity test of whether the prisoner's belief is "sincerely held" and

"rooted in religious belief" determines whether the Free Exercise Clause applies. Id.

(finding district court impermissibly focused on whether consuming Halal meat is required

of Muslims as a central tenet of Islam, rather than on whether plaintiff sincerely believed

eating kosher meat is consistent with his faith). The prisoner must show that the religious

practice at issue satisfies two criteria: (1) the proffered belief must be sincerely held and

(2) the claim must be rooted in religious belief, not in purely secular philosophical concerns. 

Malik v. Brown, 16 F.3d 330, 333 (9th Cir. 1994) (cited with approval in Shakur, 514 F.3d at

884). 

A prison regulation that impinges on an inmate's First Amendment rights is valid if it

is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz,

482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987) (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)); see, e.g.,

Walker v. Beard, No. 12-17460, slip op. at 20-21 (9th Cir. June 18, 2015) (prison's

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classification of a white racist inmate as eligible to be housed with a person of a different

race and its refusal to grant him an exemption did not violate Aryan Christian Odinist

inmate's religious rights under the Free Exercise Clause because prison's policy was

reasonably related to the penological interest in avoiding the legal liability of equal

protection suits brought by other inmates). Shakur, 514 F.3d at 887-88 (remanding First

Amendment claim regarding alternative kosher diet requested by prisoner for district court

to make sufficient findings pursuant to Turner as to impact of the accommodation on the

prison and the availability of ready alternatives).

Turner sets forth four factors to be balanced in determining whether a prison

regulation is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests:

(1) Whether there is a “‘valid, rational connection’ between the prison regulation and

the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it”;

(2) Whether there are “alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to

prison inmates”;

(3) Whether “accommodation of the asserted constitutional right” will impact “guards

and other inmates, and the allocation of prison resources generally”; and

(4) Whether there is an “absence of ready alternatives” versus the “existence of

obvious, easy alternatives.”

Turner, 482 U.S. at 89–90.

B. Facts

The following facts are undisputed, unless otherwise noted. 

Plaintiff was incarcerated at Martinez Detention Facility (“MDF”) from April 28, 2009,

to September 13, 2013. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (“MSJ”) at 3. Plaintiff

was transferred to state prison from MDF in September 2013. Id.

Ramadan is an Islamic holiday that lasts for 30 days and involves fasting. Id. at 4. 

MDF allows inmates to be placed on a daytime fasting menu during Ramadan. Id. These

inmates receive their breakfast meals prior to sunrise, do not receive a lunch meal, and

receive dinner after sunset. Id.

On July 6, 2013, plaintiff submitted a request form to participate in the Ramadan

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meal program. MSJ, Vannoy Decl., Ex. B at 1. Plaintiff stated, “Ramadan is slated for the

8th of July and the Muslim community is requesting the opportunity to participate in the

Holy month by fasting and accommodated by receiving the breakfast before 4:30 am and

allowed to have dinner prepared after sunset, as to meet the obligatory time frame for

fasting.” Id. There was no reference to any lunch meal. Id. Plaintiff was placed on the

Ramadan meal program.

On July 10, 2013, plaintiff submitted a grievance form to defendant correctional

officer Zamora regarding missing lunch while on the Ramadan meal program. MSJ,

Vannoy Decl., Ex. B at 2. Plaintiff stated, “there seems to be a misunderstanding in

regards to the purpose and provisions in reference to sacrifice, meals and fasting. There

are many obligatory provisions for the Holy month of Ramadan, nevertheless sacrificing

your meals is not one of them. Ramadan consists of the daily Fast that is enjoined from

dawn until sunset, during this month. Therefore any policy, rule or regulation that deprives

any Ramadan participant of any meal is arbitrary and in violation of the United States

Constitution....” Id. Zamora responded, “we are going w/ the information the Chaplain

gave us. Please refer this to him.” Id.

On July 11, 2013, plaintiff submitted a grievance to the chaplain noting that Muslims

were not receiving lunches while fasting during Ramadan and they should not be sacrificing

this meal. MSJ, Vannoy Decl., Ex. B at 5-8. Plaintiff received a response from the chaplain

noting that no noon meals are served for Ramadan. MSJ, Vannoy Decl., Ex. B at 8.

On July 12, 2013, plaintiff submitted a grievance that repeated the allegations of his

July 10, 2013, grievance. MSJ, Vannoy Decl., Ex. B at 9-11. On July 16, 2013, defendant

correctional officer Baldwin stated that plaintiff would be offered lunch and may choose to

accept or deny it. Id. at 9. On July 18, 2013, plaintiff’s lunch service resumed. MSJ at 5. 

During the nine days that plaintiff was not provided lunch, he ate already purchased food

that was in his cell which included chicken breasts, refried beans, Spanish rice, and tortilla

chips. Opposition, Decl. at 2.

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Defendants assert that Ramadan involves fasting during daylight hours, with an

exception for pregnant women, women who are nursing, the sick, and travelers. MSJ at 4. 

Plaintiff disputes this and contends that fasting through lunch is not part of Ramadan. 

Opposition at 3. Plaintiff states that the Imam who works with the jail, Dr. Amer Salih Araim

had previously intervened when Muslim inmates were denied lunch during Ramadan. Id. at

2-3. Defendants submit that in his book Understanding Islam: Fifty Questions, Dr. Amer

Salih Araim, the same Iman who plaintiff discusses and who works with the jail, stated that

during Ramadan, Muslims abstain from eating and drinking from dawn to sunset. MSJ,

Whitman Decl., Ex. A.

C. Analysis

Defendants state that they do not dispute the sincerity of plaintiff’s belief in Islam;

rather, defendants assert that plaintiff’s belief that fasting during daylight hours requires

lunch meals does not satisfy the sincerity test as rooted in religious belief. In addition to the

writings of the Imam at MDF that all adults must fast during daylight hours, defendants note

that many federal courts have addressed the observance of Ramadan by prisoners. See

e.g. O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 352 (1987) (“During Ramadan, Muslim

prisoners are awakened at 4 a.m. for an early breakfast, and receive dinner at 8:30 each

evening.”); Washington v. Garcia, 977 F. Supp. 1067, 1072 (S.D. Cal. 1997) (“Here, the

current Muslim Imam at [the prison] confirms the essence of the Islamic practice is fasting

and prayer during daylight hours of Ramadan. Fasting is one of the essential aspects of

practicing Islam, but eating a special daily meal is not.”) (citation omitted); Washington v.

Fannon, 2007 WL 1725653, at *13 (E.D. Cal. June 13, 2007) (“It is also undisputed that

Muslims must abstain from all food and drink during the daylight hours for the entire month

of Ramadan.”); Tyson v. Ratelle, 166 F.R.D. 442, 449 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (“Both parties agree

that a central tenet of the Islamic religion is the observance of the holy month of Ramadan,

which requires adherents to fast.”)

Despite the arguments and law that support the contention that Ramadan consists of

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 Plaintiff states that the Imam was out of town during Ramadan.

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fasting during daylight hours, which includes not eating lunch during the day, for purposes

of this motion for summary judgment the Court will assume that eating lunch during

Ramadan is plaintiff’s sincerely held religious belief.

Regardless, reviewing the factors set forth in Turner, defendants are entitled to

summary judgment. With respect to the first factor, there are legitimate interests in MDF’s

regulation that allow a specific Ramadan meal schedule. Serving breakfast before dawn,

not serving lunch, and serving dinner after sunset are valid rational regulations to comply

with the daytime fasting rituals of Ramadan. This program was approved by the chaplain

and is consistent with the writings of the Imam who works with the jail. Moreover, serving

lunch to inmates who are known to be observing Ramdan could be considered improper

and burden the religious practices of Muslims who do not want lunch during daytime

fasting.

For the second factor, plaintiff had other means of practicing his faith despite the

withholding of lunch meals for nine days. Plaintiff was permitted to pray and keep a copy of

the Koran in his cell, he had use of a towel as a prayer rug in his cell, and he could meet

with an Imam1 and attend weekly prayer groups. During the nine days that MDF did not

serve him lunch, plaintiff had food in his cell that he was able to eat during daylight hours

and he could purchase food at the commissary.

Looking to the third factor, plaintiff’s requested accommodation would cause

negative impacts on correctional officers, prison resources, and other inmates. Plaintiff first

requested the Ramadan meal program and this was provided to him. When he later

requested lunch, he was informed that lunch was not included in the Ramadan meal

program. When he then requested the Ramadan meal program and lunch, both were

provided to him. While it took several days of submitting requests and receiving replies,

plaintiff was provided with the specific meal plan he requested. The correctional officers

providing the meals noted that plaintiff needed to contact the chaplain to seek guidance on

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2 In his opposition to summary judgment plaintiff argues, for the first time, that his lunch

meal should have been prepared and served after dinner. Plaintiff did not present this

argument in any of his complaints in this case nor was it part of the grievances to jail staff.

Therefore, this allegation was not exhausted, not presented to the Court, and is not part of this

action. See Resnick v. Adams, 348 F.3d 763, 769-71 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that First

Amendment is not violated when the prisoner fails to give notice of his specific religious diet

preference).

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 In addition to the lack of a constitutional violation, plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief

is moot. When plaintiff filed this action he was still at MDF and it was possible that while the

period of Ramadan had passed, he would be observing Ramadan again at that facility,

therefore the case was perhaps capable of repetition yet evading review. However, plaintiff

has since been sentenced to 25 years to life in state prison and is currently incarcerated at

Pelican Bay. There is not a reasonable expectation that plaintiff will be back at MDF in the

future.

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the proper religious accommodations. To the extent plaintiff seeks to decide on each given

day what his meal program should require, that would be untenable for correctional staff

who would have to make on the spot determinations for individual inmates. See Sefeldeen

v. Alameida, 238 Fed. App’x 204, 207 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding that the existing prison meal

program “avoided the budgetary disruption inherent to completely individualizing religious

menus”). To the extent that plaintiff seeks to change the entire Ramadan meal program at

MDF to require the jail to provide lunch for every Muslim prisoner, such a change would fail

to accommodate other Muslim prisoners who do not want lunch during the daily fasting

period.

Finally, with respect to the fourth factor, there is not a ready alternative. Plaintiff

obtained the Ramadan menu he requested along with a daily lunch, after his grievance was

reviewed by the chaplain and once plaintiff made clear what he was requesting. As noted

above, providing each inmate with a specific individualized meal plan that can constantly

change is not an easy alternative compared to the established meals plans that the jail

offers. Thus, looking at all the Turner factors, defendants’ conduct was reasonably related

to legitimate penalogical objectives and did not violate the Free Exercise Clause.2

Furthermore, it is undisputed that plaintiff was provided breakfast prior to sunset and

dinner after sunset for the entire 30 days of Ramadan.3 Plaintiff was only denied lunch for

nine days, during which he ate food that he had stored in his cell. Brief, sporadic

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4 To the extent plaintiff seeks relief under Religious Land Use and Institutionalized

Persons Act (RLUIPA), he is similarly not entitled to relief. Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief

are moot and a claim under RLUIPA may proceed only for injunctive relief against defendants

acting within their official capacities. Wood v. Yordy, 753 F.3d 899, 901 (9th Cir. 2014)

(RLUIPA does not contemplate liability of government employees in individual capacity);

Alvarez v. Hill, 667 F.3d 1061, 1063 (9th Cir. 2012) (money damages not available for RLUIPA

claim against defendants sued in their official capacity).

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food-delivery problems are insufficient to establish a substantial burden on plaintiff's free

exercise of religion. See Canell v. Lightner, 143 F.3d 1210, 1215 (9th Cir. 1998) (“relatively

short-term and sporadic” intrusions did not constitute substantial interference with

prisoner's free exercise of religion) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Taylor v. Pelican

Bay, 2010 WL 2671989, at *8 (N.D. Cal. July 2, 2010) (holding that the failure to provide

twenty-five religious diet meals to an inmate over a twenty-two-month period was

insufficient to establish a substantial burden on the Free Exercise right); Thompson v.

Boldt, 2015 WL 263478, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2015) (holding that “brief, sporadic

food-delivery problems are insufficient to establish a substantial burden on Plaintiff’s free

exercise of religion”); see also Davitashvili v. Schomig, 2012 WL 12767, at *12-13 (D. Ariz.

Jan. 4 2012) (plaintiff's receipt of nonkosher meals “on some occasions” did not violate First

Amendment or RLUIPA because “no evidence . . . show[ed] that these instances were

anything more than periodic service-delivery related problems”).

It is undisputed that plaintiff first requested the Ramadan meal plan, which does not

provide for lunch, and he was placed on that meal plan. Plaintiff’s later requests for lunch

were confusing because he did not make clear that he wanted to stay on the Ramadan

meal plan. He stated that sacrificing meals is not part of Ramadan but he did not specify

that he wanted defendants to provide lunch as opposed to other relief. When it became

clear that he desired the Ramadan meal plan and lunch, both were provided to him for the

remaining 21 days of Ramadan. This brief nine-day period when he was not served lunch

does not demonstrate a constitutional violation.4

Qualified Immunity

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The defense of qualified immunity protects "government officials . . . from liability for

civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The rule of "qualified immunity protects 'all but the

plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.'" Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S.

194, 202 (2001) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). Defendants can

have a reasonable, but mistaken, belief about the facts or about what the law requires in

any given situation. Id. at 205. A court considering a claim of qualified immunity must

determine whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right

and whether such right was clearly established such that it would be clear to a reasonable

officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted. See Pearson v.

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (overruling the sequence of the two-part test that

required determining a deprivation first and then deciding whether such right was clearly

established, as required by Saucier). The court may exercise its discretion in deciding

which prong to address first, in light of the particular circumstances of each case. Pearson,

555 U.S. at 236. 

As discussed above, the Court finds that plaintiff was not deprived of an actual

constitutional right. Even assuming that there was a deprivation of a constitutional right, it

would not have been clear to a reasonable person that his or her conduct was unlawful in

this situation. It is undisputed that plaintiff requested the Ramadan meal program and was

placed on that program. It is undisputed that at the time he made that request, plaintiff did

not request lunch. The Ramadan meal program does not include lunch because observing

Ramadan involves daylight fasting. When plaintiff subsequently submitted grievances

regarding the meal program, it was not clear what relief he sought. Once plaintiff clearly

specified that he wanted lunch while he was on the Ramadan meal plan, defendants

provided him with lunch. Although the entire process to determine what plaintiff was

requesting took time and plaintiff was not served lunch for nine days, it was not clear to any

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of the defendants that their actions were unlawful. Based on all of these reasons-plaintiff’s

confusing requests, the fact that the established Ramadan meal plan that plaintiff

requested did not include lunch, and that plaintiff was provided lunch once defendants

understood his request-defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

CONCLUSION

1. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 50) is GRANTED. 

2. Plaintiff’s Rand notice motion (Docket No. 70) is DENIED. 

3. The Clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 31, 2015. 

NANDOR J. VADAS

United States Magistrate Judge

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