Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-02389/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-02389-17/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 42:6901 Resource &amp; Recovery Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF TOXIC

SUBSTANCES CONTROL,

Plaintiff,

v. NO. CIV. S-02-2389 LKK/DAD

PAYLESS CLEANERS; COLLEGE

CLEANERS; HEIDINGER CLEANERS;

NORGE VILLAGE CLEANERS; CAVA,

INC., a California corporation;

LOBDELL CLEANERS; CITY OF CHICO;

NORVILLE R. WEISS; JANET L. WEISS; 

PAUL A. TULLIUS; VICTORIA TULLIUS;

ROBERT H. HEIDINGER; INEZ N. O R D E R

HEIDINGER; 5TH AND IVY, a general

partnership; RICHARD C. PETERS and

RAMONA W. PETERS, individually and

as Trustees of the Peters Family

Trust; BETTY M. ROLLAG; RANDALL 

ROLLAG; and TAMI ROLLAG,

Defendants.

 /

AND RELATED COUNTER-CLAIMS.

 /

Third party plaintiffs Richard Peters and Ramona Peters

(the “Peters” or “plaintiffs”) are defendants in a cost recovery

Case 2:02-cv-02389-LKK -DAD Document 305 Filed 07/30/07 Page 1 of 4
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suit regarding perchloroethylene (“PCE”) contamination in the

city of Chico, California. The Peters have brought third party

claims for contribution and indemnity pursuant to CERCLA, 42

U.S.C. §§ 9601 et seq., as well various state law claims against

third party defendants Maytag Corporation and Fedders

Corporation.

Pending before the court is Maytag and Fedders’ motion for

summary judgment on four of the Peters’ state law claims: (1)

strict products liability, (2) negligence, (3) negligence per

se, and (4) nuisance per se. Defendants assert that the claims

are barred by the applicable three year statute of limitations

because they accrued in 1989, when the Peters were informed via

letter by the Department of Health Services (now the Department

of Toxic Substances Control (“DTSC”)) that their property was

found to contain high concentrations of PCE in the soil.

The Peters, in contrast, contend that their claims did not

accrue upon the mere knowledge of PCE’s presence on their

property, but rather upon a determination that PCEs contaminated

it. Because they believe such contamination did not occur until

2002, when DTSC named the Peters in the present case, plaintiffs

argue their claims filed in 2003 are timely under the three year

statute of limitations.

Previously, on March 18, 2005, the court held that there

was a distinction between the mere presence of PCE, which would

not give rise to suit, and the contamination of property by PCE,

which would. This “mere presence” versus “contamination”

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distinction was based upon precedent from asbestos cases holding

that only contamination of property, not the mere presence of

asbestos, constitutes the physical damage necessary for accrual

of negligence and strict liability claims in California. San

Francisco Unified School Dist. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 37 Cal. App.

4th 1318, 1335 (1995). 

Based upon the court’s independent research, however, it

appears that California case law now requires plaintiffs to

allege physical damage to property beyond economic costs related

to contamination in order to state negligence and strict

liability claims. See County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic

Richfield Co., 137 Cal. App. 4th 292, 320 (2006) (concluding

that economic “costs for the abatement, removal, replacement,

and/or remediation of lead” contamination do not constitute

cognizable physical injury to property), interpreting Aas v.

Superior Court 24 Cal. 4th 627 (2000). Plaintiffs do not

allege, and it is not clear that they could allege, such

physical damage.

Because the parties have not addressed this subsequent

development in case law, the court hereby orders as follows:

1. The Peters and Maytag and Fedders are ORDERED to file

supplemental briefs, no longer than 10 pages in length, by

August 9, 2007 at 5:00 p.m. addressing the issue set forth

above.

2. The hearing on the motion for summary judgment (Doc.

219) is hereby CONTINUED to August 13, 2007 at 10:00 a.m.

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3. The hearing on the motion to dismiss (Doc. 225) is

hereby CONTINUED to August 13, 2007 at 10:00 a.m.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 30, 2007.

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