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Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 21, 2012 Decided May 24, 2013

No. 11-5276

MUKHTAR YAHIA NAJI AL WARAFI,

APPELLANT

v.

BARACK OBAMA,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:09-cv-02368)

S. William Livingston argued the cause for appellant. With

him on the briefs were Brian E. Foster, Jason A. Levine and

David H. Remes. Alan A. Pemberton entered an appearance.

Lowell V. Sturgill Jr., Attorney, U.S. Department of

Justice, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief

were Tony West, Assistant Attorney General, and Douglas N.

Letter and Robert M. Loeb, Attorneys.

Before: BROWN and KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judges, and

SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by SENTELLE, Senior Circuit

Judge.

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Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge BROWN.

SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge: Appellant Mukhtar Al

Warafi, a Guantanamo detainee, appeals from a judgment of the

district court denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Al

Warafi argues that the district court erred in not affording him

protection due “medical personnel” under the First Geneva

Convention. Because the district court properly held that

appellant has not established that he was “medical personnel,”

it did not err in denying his petition, and we affirm for the

reasons set forth more fully below.

BACKGROUND

This is our second occasion to consider the habeas petition

of Mukhtar Al Warafi. The case began with habeas corpus

proceedings in the district court, which concluded with a

judgment against Al Warafi reported as Al Warafi v. Obama,

704 F. Supp. 2d 32 (D.D.C. 2010). Background facts of Al

Warafi’s detention and the district court’s rejection of his habeas

claim are set forth in the district court opinion. The district

court concluded that “petitioner was more likely than not part of

the Taliban,” and “is being lawfully detained.” Id. at 45. 

Upon review, we affirmed the district court’s judgment in

part, but remanded for further proceedings with respect to a

single question. While our prior decision is brief and not

officially published, it is available electronically: Al Warafi v.

Obama, 2011 WL 678437 (D.C. Cir. 2011). We agreed with the

district court that “Al Warafi was more likely than not a part of

the Taliban.” Id. However, we directed the district court on

remand to develop a further record on Al Warafi’s fallback

position that “even if he was a part of the Taliban, the district

court should have granted his petition because he served

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permanently and exclusively as ‘medical personnel’ within the

meaning of Article 24 of the First Geneva Convention and

Section 3-15(b)(1)-(2) of Army Regulation 190-8.” Id.

Article 24 of the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration

of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in

the Field (Aug. 12, 1949), 6 U.S.T. 3114 (“First Geneva

Convention” or “Convention”), directs that “staff exclusively

engaged in the administration of medical units and

establishments . . . shall be respected and protected in all

circumstances.” Article 28 of the First Geneva Convention

declares that “[p]ersonnel designated in Article[ ] 24 . . . who

fall into the hands of the adverse Party, shall be retained only

insofar as the state of health, the spiritual needs and the number

of prisoners of war require.” The cited Army Regulation deals

with the treatment of “retained personnel,” including medical

personnel as described in Article 24. Al Warafi has argued

throughout this proceeding that he is within the category

protected by Article 24. Because the original district court

opinion denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus did not

explicitly analyze this claim, we remanded in the unpublished

decision cited above.

On remand, the district court reconsidered Al Warafi’s

petition in light of our remanding order and concluded that the

petitioner had not “prove[d] that he qualifies as Article 24

personnel.” Al Warafi v. Obama, 821 F. Supp. 2d 47, 56

(D.D.C. 2011). Because we conclude that the district court is

correct, we affirm the second denial of Al Warafi’s petition for

habeas corpus.

ANALYSIS

Al Warafi has asserted that he qualifies as medical

personnel under the Geneva Conventions and Army Regulation

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190-8 and that he is therefore entitled to release. In Section 5 of

the Military Commissions Act of 2006, Congress provided,

among other things, that a detainee may not invoke the Geneva

Conventions in a habeas proceeding. However, Army

Regulation 190-8 expressly incorporates relevant aspects of the

Geneva Convention’s medical personnel protection. Army

Regulation 190-8 is domestic U.S. law, and in a habeas

proceeding such as this, a detaineemay invoke ArmyRegulation

190-8 to the extent that the regulation explicitly establishes a

detainee’s entitlement to release from custody. Therefore, for

purposes of determining whether Al Warafi is entitled to release

as medical personnel under Army Regulation 190-8, we may

and must analyze the relevant aspects of the Geneva

Conventions that have been expressly incorporated into Army

Regulation 190-8.

The commentary to the First Geneva Convention declares

that Article 24 personnel “are to be furnished with the means of

proving their identity.” GC Commentary 218. Article 40 of the

First Geneva Convention mandates that “[t]he personnel

designated in Article 24 . . . shall wear, affixed to the left arm,

a water-resistant armlet bearing the distinctive emblem, issued

and stamped by the military authority.” In addition to

mandating the wearing of the armlet, Article 40 further declares

that “[s]uch personnel . . . shall also carry a special identity card

bearing the distinctive emblem.” That card “shall be waterresistant and of such size that it can be carried in the pocket.” It

further “shall be worded in the national language,” and include

the full name, date of birth, rank and service number of the

bearer, and “shall state in what capacity he is entitled to the

protection of the present Convention.” The Article further

requires that “[t]he card shall bear the photograph of the owner

and also either his signature or his finger-prints or both.” Just as

the armlet must bear the stamp of the military authority issuing

it, the card “shall be embossed with the stamp of the military

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authority.” (Emphases added.)

It is undisputed that Al Warafi wore no such armlet and

carried no such card. For that reason, in our remand order, we

stated that “it appears that Al Warafi bears the burden of proving

his status as permanent medical personnel.” Al Warafi v.

Obama, 2011 WL 678437. 

On remand, the district court reviewed the evidence. The

court opined that the Convention created “a straightforward

regime in which proper identification is necessary to prove

one’s protected status as permanent medical personnel.” 821 F.

Supp. 2d at 54 (emphasis in original). In the end, the court

concluded that Al Warafi’s petition “will be denied.”

On appeal, Al Warafi argues, inter alia, that “the district

court’s holding that Article 24 status is conditioned upon

detainee having ‘official identification’ is inconsistent with this

Court’s remand order . . . .” The argument proceeds that

because this court, in our earlier remand decision, stated that we

knew that Al Warafi had no identification card or armlet at the

time of capture, but nonetheless remanded for further

consideration on the question of whether Mukhtar “was

permanently and exclusively engaged as a medic,” we were, in

effect, establishing the law of the case that the lack of such

identification did not deprive petitioner of the ability to establish

his status by other evidence. We do not accept Al Warafi’s

argument.

The law of the case doctrine will not bear the weight Al

Warafi places upon it. “The law-of-the-case doctrine bars us

from considering only questions decided by this Court in this

case.” Coalition for Commonsense in Government Procurement

v. United States, — F.3d —, 2013 WL 45880 (D.C. Cir. 2013)

(emphases added) (other emphasis omitted). See also LaShawn

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A. v. Barry, 87 F.3d 1389, 1393 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc)

(“The same issue presented a second time in the same case in the

same court should lead to the same result.” (emphases omitted)). 

While this is the same question in the same court, we did not

decide the question in the unreported order upon which Al

Warafi relies. Concededly, the unpublished order is consistent

with his interpretation, but it is also consistent with a court

which remained agnostic as to the question at issue. Again, we

did not decide the question. We left the question open and

remanded the case to the district court for further development. 

On remand, the district court reinstated its prior decision with

further discussion of the determinative question, and an apparent

firm conviction that other evidence could not substitute for the

indicia of medical personnel status recited in the Convention and

in the Army Regulation. Upon review, we agree with the

district court.

As we noted above, the Convention speaks in mandatory

terms. As relevant to this case, and as noted by the district

court, the First Geneva Convention protects personnel who are

“[m]edical personnel exclusively engaged in the search for, or

the collection, transport or treatment of the wounded or sick, or

in the prevention of disease, [and] staff exclusively engaged in

the administration of medical units and establishments.” The

commentary to the Convention expressly provides for the

identification elements we set forth above. It does so in

mandatory terms. See First Geneva Convention Commentary

219. Neither the Convention nor the commentary provide for

any other means of establishing that status. 

The Geneva Conventions and their commentary provide a

roadmap for the establishment of protected status. As the

district court found, Al Warafi was serving as part of the

Taliban. The Taliban has not followed the roadmap set forth in

the Conventions, and it has not carried Al Warafi to the

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destination. We hold that without the mandatory indicia of

status, Al Warafi has not carried his burden of proving that he

qualified “as permanent medical personnel.”

While not necessary to its decision, the district court, in

addition to its legal conclusion that the identification

requirements of Article 24 constitute a sine qua non for

protected status under Article 24, found as fact that petitioner

had been stationed in a combat role before serving in a clinic. 

The court further found that “[p]etitioner was captured with a

weapon.” 821 F. Supp. 2d at 49. It reiterated its earlier finding

that it was more likely than not that Al Warafi was part of the

Taliban. The court further reiterated the well-established law

that in habeas proceedings such as this, the government bears

the burden “to prove that petitioner’s detention is lawful.” That

is, the government must prove “‘that petitioner more likely than

not was part of the Taliban’ at the time of his capture.” 821 F.

Supp. 2d at 53 (citing Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 872

(D.C. Cir. 2010)). The court renewed its conclusion that the

government had met that burden.

The court recalled that: “‘[O]nce the government puts forth

credible evidence that the habeas petitioner meets the enemycombatant criteria, the onus could shift to the petitioner to rebut

that evidence with more persuasive evidence that he falls outside

the criteria.’” 821 F. Supp. 2d at 53–54 (quoting Hamdi v.

Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 534 (2004) (plurality opinion)).

In the end, the question of whether Al Warafi has met his

burden of establishing his status as permanent medical personnel

entitled to protection under the First Geneva Convention is one

of fact, or at least a mixed question of fact and law. Although

the district court believed, and we agree, that military personnel

without appropriate display of distinctive emblems can neverso

establish, it also found facts—e.g., the prior combat deployment

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—inconsistent with that role. These are findings of fact

reviewed by us for clear error. See, e.g., American Soc. for

Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Feld Entertainment, Inc.,

659 F.3d 13, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2011). The evidence in the record

gives credence to the view that Al Warafi is unable to provide

the proof required under the Convention because he was not a

medic.

We would further emphasize that given the strong

mandatory language of the Convention, we affirm the district

court’s decision. As the district court stated:

Nothing prevents parties like the Taliban from providing

medical personnel with the identification materials

mandated by Article 40. But until they do so, their medical

personnel will lack the means by which they can prove their

entitlement to Article 24’s protections.

821 F. Supp. 2d at 56. Without compliance with the

requirements of the Geneva Conventions, the Taliban’s

personnel are not entitled to the protection of the Convention.1

 

CONCLUSION

Because appellant has not established that he was “medical

personnel” as defined in the Geneva Conventions, and because

all other issues have been determined in the previous

proceedings, we affirm the judgment of the district court

denying the petition for writ of habeas corpus. 

So ordered.

We note that we are not addressing the conceivable 1

circumstance in which a detainee claiming medical personnel status

offers evidence that he had been issued the necessary identifiers but

was deprived of them by his captors or inadvertence.

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BROWN, J., concurring: Emphasizing the Geneva 

Convention’s “strong mandatory language,” Op. 8, the panel’s 

opinion rejected Al Warafi’s proposed “functional” test in 

favor of the District Court’s “legal conclusion that the 

identification requirements of Article 24 constitute a sine qua 

non for protected status under Article 24,” Op. 7. “Without 

compliance with the requirements of the Geneva 

Conventions,” we concluded, “the Taliban’s personnel are not 

entitled to the protection of the Convention.” Op. 8. I write 

separately only to draw out the unstated significance of our 

holding. 

 

In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006), the Court 

interpreted Common Article 3 — so-called because it appears 

in all four Geneva Conventions — to “afford[] some minimal 

protection[] falling short of full protection under the 

Conventions” to members of Al Qaeda, id. at 631, “a 

transnational terrorist organization whose actions and actors 

do not fit existing legal norms and sanctions,” Fionnuala Ní 

Aoláin, Hamdan and Common Article 3: Did the Supreme 

Court Get It Right?, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1523, 1548 (2007). 

While it is not clear that the text and purpose of Common 

Article 3 will bear the weight the Supreme Court assigns to it, 

that question is now one for the academy, see, e.g., Ingrid 

Detter, The Law of War and Illegal Combatants, 75 GEO.

WASH. L. REV. 1049, 1079–86 (2007), given we are dutybound to apply Hamdan in a manner consistent with its 

holding. 

How Hamdan translates to present facts, however, may 

not be obvious. This case differs from the majority of detainee 

cases to have come before this court in one very significant 

way: the protections invoked emanate not from Common 

Article 3, but a specific, highly intertwined suite of Articles in 

the First Geneva Convention. Does Hamdan’s atextual and 

quixotic reading of the Common Article, we thus ask, provide 

a coherent framework for addressing and applying the 

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Convention’s supplemental protections to the present detainee 

context? This point was certainly not lost on Al Warafi. In 

asking this court to forego the plain language of the 

Convention to adopt and apply a purely functional test to the 

“medic” status determination, Al Warafi pressed an 

interpretation divorced from the text that inures to the benefit 

of terrorists and other irregular forces. In other words, Al 

Warafi has effectively argued that the expansive interpretation 

of treaty language begun in Hamdan should now reverberate 

through every Article of the Geneva Convention — all 

protections, not just the minimum protections of Common 

Article 3, should be made accessible to terrorists and their 

ilk.1

Hamdan, of course, requires no such thing. The Court’s 

analysis focused on the specific jurisdictional language of 

Common Article 3, see Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 630–31, and the 

Article’s “important purpose,” id. at 631 (observing that “the 

commentaries also make clear ‘that the scope of application 

of the Article must be as wide as possible’ ”). This reasoning 

simply does not extend to Article 24 and the companion 

provisions. 

And therein lies the true significance of today’s holding: 

in determining how the Convention operates and to whose 

benefit, courts must run a discrete calculus for each Article 

 1

 There was a suggestion at oral argument that as the de facto

government of Afghanistan, a signatory to the Geneva Convention, 

the Taliban should also be accorded signatory status. Because Al 

Warafi has failed to produce the requisite indicia of protected 

status, however, we need not reach the vexing questions whether Al 

Warafi was a member of a transnational terrorist organization or the 

armed forces of a High Contracting Party, and if the former, 

whether he is categorically barred from invoking the supplemental 

protections of Article 24. 

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(or related series of Articles) that considers the treaty’s 

language, structure, history, and purpose. For all the reasons 

outlined in the District Court opinion, see Al Warafi v. 

Obama, 821 F. Supp. 2d 47 (D.D.C. 2011), I believe the court 

got it right in adopting a bright-line test. In addition to its 

“strong mandatory language,” Op. 8, Article 24 reflects an 

intricate regulatory scheme that implicates a unique balancing 

of interests; imposes potentially burdensome affirmative 

obligations; attempts to remedy a particular historical wrong; 

and, among other things, both implicitly and explicitly 

recognizes the role that formal military corps must play on 

both sides of the repatriation. Compliance, it follows, is a 

necessary condition to invoke Article 24 protections. 

Hamdan’s willingness to bend the Geneva Convention to 

favor those who openly disregard the laws of war need not 

extend past Common Article 3. 

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