Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00180/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-00180-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LEROY WILLIS, JR.,

Petitioner,

v.

SINGH, Warden,

Respondent.

Case No. 12-180-DMS (PCL)

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION ON:

1) PETITIONER’S MOTION

FOR STAY AND ABEYANCE 

2) RESPONDENT’S MOTION

TO DISMISS

(Docs. 22 and 33.)

I.

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Leroy Willis, Jr. (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner proceeding pro se, and in forma

pauperis, filed a First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2254. (Doc. 19.) Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss on May 25, 2012. (Doc. 22.) Petitioner

filed his Response to the Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Complaint on June 4, 2012.

(Doc. 24.) Subsequently, on August 7, 2012, Petitioner filed a Motion to Stay and Abey

proceedings. (Doc. 33.) Respondents filed a Response in Opposition to the Motion to Stay on

November 7, 2012. (Doc. 37.)

After a review of the moving papers, the opposition and all supporting documents, the

Court recommends that the Motion for Stay and Abeyance be DENIED and that the Motion to

Dismiss Petitioner’s First Amended Complaint be GRANTED.

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II.

BACKGROUND

A jury convicted Petitioner of three drug-related offenses, and the California Superior

Court sentenced him to 15 years in state prison. (Lod. No. 1, at 1-2). The conviction and

sentence were affirmed on appeal by the California Fourth Appellate District on January 14,

2011. (Id. at 36). Petitioner then filed a petition for review with the California Supreme Court.

(Lod. No. 2, at 2.) The California Supreme Court denied the petition for review on April 13,

2011. (Id.)

On February 16, 2011, Petitioner filed a petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus with the

Supreme Court of California, asserting ineffective assistance of trial court counsel on five

grounds. (Lod. No. 3, at 3-8.) The Supreme Court of California dismissed the petition on July

20, 2011, citing People v. Duvall, 9 Cal. 4th 464, 474 (Cal. 1995), and In re Swain, 34 Cal. 2d

300, 304 (Cal. 1949). (Lod. No. 3, at 1.)

On January 12, 2012, Petitioner filed a petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254 in the Eastern District of California. (Doc. 1). The case was then transferred to the

Southern District of California. (Doc. 5.) By order dated January 25, 2012, the Court granted

Petitioner’s application to proceed in forma pauperis, dismissed the case for Petitioner’s failure

to name a proper respondent, and notified Petitioner of options to avoid future dismissal for his

failure to allege complete exhaustion of state court remedies. (Doc. 7.) 

On March 21, 2012, Petitioner filed a First Amended Petition asserting four claims of

ineffective assistance of counsel. (Doc. 19.) Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on May 25,

2012, arguing that the petition should be dismissed because all claims in Petitioner’s First

Amended Petition remain unexhausted. (Doc. 22.) On June 4, 2012, Petitioner filed an

opposition to the motion to dismiss. (Doc. 24.) 

On July 23, 2012, Petitioner filed a Motion to Stay and Abey federal proceedings to allow

him to return to state court to exhaust his unexhausted claims. (Doc. 33.) Respondent filed a

Response in Opposition to Petitioner’s Motion to Stay and Abey on November 7, 2012. (Doc.

37.) Petitioner filed his Reply to Respondent’s Opposition on November 16, 2012. (Doc. 38.)

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While the Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Stay and Abey were pending before this

Court, Petitioner filed a new petition for Writ of Habeaes Corpus with the California Supreme

Court on July 25, 2012. (Lod. No. 5.) Petitioner then filed a Notice with this Court on

September 10, 2012 purporting to inform the Court that Petitioner had exhausted all ineffective

assistance of counsel claims contained in his pending federal habeas petition. (Doc. 35.) The

California Supreme Court denied the second petition on October 17, 2012, again citing People v.

Duvall, 9 Cal. 4th 464, 474 (Cal. 1995) and In re Swain, 34 Cal. 2d 300, 304 (Cal. 1949). (Lod.

No. 5.) This Court now addresses the Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Stay and Abey pending

before it.

III.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

The exhaustion of available state remedies is a prerequisite to a federal court’s

consideration of claims presented in a habeas proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (West Supp.

2007); see Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982); McQueary v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 833

(9th Cir. 1991). The exhaustion requirement is satisfied “if the state courts have had the first

opportunity to hear the claim sought to be vindicated in a federal habeas proceeding.” Picard v.

Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971). 

For exhaustion purposes, a petitioner must “fairly present” the substance of his claim to

the state court. Id. at 275-76. A claim is fairly presented if the way it is stated in the federal

habeas petition is the “substantial equivalent” of how it was presented in the state courts. Schiers

v. People of State of Cal., 333 F.2d 173, 174 (9th Cir. 1964). “The state courts have been given a

sufficient opportunity to hear an issue when the petitioner has presented the state court with the

issue’s factual and legal basis.” Weaver v. Thompson, 197 F.3d 359, 364 (9th Cir. 1999). Claims

are not exhausted when denied by the state court on mere procedural grounds, because a

procedural denial is not on the merits and does not satisfy the “fair presentation” requirement.

Harris v. Superior Court of the State of Cal., Los Angeles County, 500 F.2d 1124, 1126 (9th Cir.

1974). 

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Whether a stay and abeyance can be granted depends first on the extent to which

Petitioner has perfected his petition. If all claims are unexhausted, the federal court should

dismiss the petition outright. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). The Supreme

Court has found that a “mixed petition,” or a petition that included both exhausted and

unexhausted claims, is subject to dismissal. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 510 (1982). With

regard to a fully-exhausted petition, the Ninth Circuit has found that a district court has the

authority to issue a stay and abeyance to allow the petitioner to exhaust other unlisted claims in

state court. See Calderon v. United Dist. Court, 134 F.3d 981, 988 (9th Cir. 1988). A stay is

“particularly appropriate when an outright dismissal will render it unlikely or impossible for the

petitioner to return to federal court within the one-year limitation period imposed by

[AEDPA]1/.” Jackson v. Roe, 425 F.3d 654, 659 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Kelly v. Small, 315

F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2003)). Although district courts are given broad discretion to grant a

stay when dealing with fully exhausted petitions, the Ninth Circuit has indicated that the exercise

of such discretion is still subject to certain limits. For example, in Calderon, the Ninth Circuit

determined that a district court could not indefinitely stay proceedings pending exhaustion in

state court or “hold in abeyance the application of a petitioner who merely sought to stall the

habeas [proceedings].” Calderon, 134 F.3d at 988 n.11. 

Therefore, determining whether a stay and abeyance order is appropriate first requires a

threshold determination as to whether Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus is fully

unexhausted, fully exhausted, or mixed.

B. Exhaustion of Petitioner’s State Claims

Petitioner has twice brought state petitions for Writ of Habeas Corpus before the

California Supreme Court. In his first petition filed on February 16, 2011, Petitioner asserted

ineffective assistance of trial court counsel on four grounds. (Lod. No. 3, at 1-4). The California

Supreme Court denied the petition on July 20, 2011, citing People v. Duvall, 9 Cal. 4th 464, 474,

and In re Swain, 34 Cal. 2d 300, 304 (1949). (Id. at 1.) Petitioner filed his second petition for

1. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2244.

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writ of habeas corpus with the California Supreme Court on July 25, 2012. (Lod. No. 5.) The

California Supreme Court denied the second petition on October 17, 2012, again citing People v.

Duvall, 9 Cal. 4th 464, 474 (Cal. 1995) and In re Swain, 34 Cal. 2d 300, 304 (Cal. 1949). (Lod.

No. 5.) In both instances, the California Supreme Court issued brief denial orders stating only

“Petition for writ of habeas corpus denied” and citing People v. Duvall, 9 Cal. 4th 464, 474 (Cal.

1995) and In re Swain, 34 Cal. 2d 300, 304 (Cal. 1949). (Lod. No. 3; Lod. No. 5).

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has provided clear guidelines for determining when

such brief denials by the California Supreme Court constitute a determination based on the

merits and when the denial is merely procedural:

“If the denial of the habeas corpus petition includes a citation of an authority which

indicates that the petition was procedurally deficient or if the California Supreme Court

so states explicitly, then the available state remedies have not been exhausted as the

California Supreme Court has not been given the required fair opportunity to correct the

constitutional violation. However, when the California Supreme Court denies a habeas

corpus petition without opinion or citation, or when it otherwise decides on the merits of

the petition, the exhaustion requirement is satisfied.” 

Harris v. Superior Court of State of Cal., Los Angeles County, 500 F.2d 1124, 1128-29

(9th Cir. 1974) (internal citations omitted).

Here, the California Supreme Court’s citations clearly indicate that Petitioner’s petitions

were denied on procedural grounds, not on their merits. The referenced pin cite to People v.

Duvall directs the reader to case law requiring that petitioners “state fully and with particularity

the facts on which relief is sought” and “include copies of reasonably available documentary

evidence supporting the claim, including pertinent portions of trial transcripts and affidavits or

declarations.” People v. Duvall, 9 Cal. 4th 464, 474 (Cal. 1995). Similarly, the referenced pin cite

to In re Swain directs the reader to case law requiring habeas petitioners to “allege with

particularity the facts upon which he would have a final judgment overturned and that he fully

disclose his reasons for delaying in the presentation of those facts.” Ex parte Swain, 34 Cal. 2d

300, 304 (Cal. 1949). By denying the petitions and referencing procedural requirements for

drafting a proper habeas petition, it is clear that the California Supreme Court denied both of

Petitioner’s habeas claims on mere procedural grounds. Further, Petitioner has offered no

alternate interpretation, either in his Response to Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss, or in his own

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Motion to Stay and Abey proceedings. (Doc. 24; Doc. 33.)

Therefore, the California Supreme Court has yet to dispose of any of Petitioner’s habeas

claims on the merits. As a result, all claims contained in Petitioner’s petition before this Court

remain unexhausted, and the Court must deny Petitioner’s motion to stay and abey. Accordingly,

this Court recommends that Petitioner’s Motion to Stay and Abey proceedings be DENIED. 

C. Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss

On a Motion to Dismiss, Federal Courts are “‘obliged to dismiss immediately’” habeas

corpus petitions containing no exhausted claims. Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 481 (9th Cir.

2001) (quoting Greenawalt v. Stewart, 105 F.3d 1268, 1274 (9th Cir. 1997)). Respondents assert

that Petitioner had failed to exhaust state remedies because his petitions have been twice denied

on procedural grounds. (Doc. 22.) Petitioner failed to address the exhaustion issue at all. (Doc.

24.) 

This Court agrees with Respondents, and finds that Petitioner has failed to exhaust any

claims at the state level per the analysis above. This Court therefore recommends that

Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED. 

III.

CONCLUSION

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United States District Judge Dana

M. Sabraw under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 72.1(c)(1)(c) of the United States

District Court for the Southern District of California. For the reasons outlined above, IT IS

HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this

Report and Recommendation, (2) directing that Judgment be entered DENYING Petitioner’s

Motion to Stay and Abey Federal Proceedings, and (3) directing that Judgment be entered

GRANTING Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than February 12, 2013 any party to this action may file

written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be

captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the

Court and served on all parties no later than February 22, 2013. The parties are advised that

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections

on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998);

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 29, 2013

Peter C. Lewis

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

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