Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01586/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01586-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Michael Gherman, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan; et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV 07-1586-PHX-JAT

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The

Magistrate Judge to whom this case was assigned issued a Report and Recommendation

(R&R) recommending that this Court deny the Petition. Petitioner has filed objections to the

R&R. In addition to his objections and after the Magistrate Judge issued the R&R, Petitioner

filed a motion for appointment of counsel, a motion for discovery, and a request for an

evidentiary hearing.

I. Factual Background

As the R&R quoted, the Arizona Court of Appeals summarized the facts of this case

as follows:

On the afternoon of October 11, 1998, Michael Poduch, a Wal-Mart loss

prevention officer, stopped Gherman for shoplifting after he left a Wal-Mart

store with a television for which he had not paid. Poduch escorted Gherman

to the security office inside the store. When Gherman informed Poduch that

his wife was still in the store, Poduch arranged to have two female managers

stay with Gherman while he went to locate Gherman’s wife. After Puduch left

the security office, Gherman refused to cooperate with the other employees

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and fled from the store.

Once outside, Gherman ran to his vehicle and began driving away.

Poduch and Hans Hummel, another Wal-Mart employee, gave chase in

Poduch’s car. On a couple of occasions, Poduch attempted to cut Gherman off

with his car. Each time, however, Gherman was able to take evasive action

and get away. Gherman eventually stopped his vehicle in a dirt construction

lot several miles away from the Wal-Mart store. After Poduch pulled into the

lot after him, Gherman existed his vehicle with a handgun and shot both

Poduch and Hummel multiple times as they sat in Poduch’s car. Gherman fled

from the scene in his vehicle, but later turned himself in to police.

Gherman was indicted on two counts of first degree murder. Upon trial

to a jury, Gherman advanced a justification defense based on his testimony that

he fired his weapon in self-defense after Poduch attempted to grab the gun

away from him. The jury found Gherman guilty of first-degree murder with

respect to the death of Hummel and guilty of the lesser-included offense of

second degree murder in the death of Poduch.

R&R at 3.

II. Motion for Appointment of Counsel

“There is no constitutional right to counsel on habeas.” Bonin v. Vasquez, 999 F.2d

425, 429 (9th Cir. 1993). Indigent state prisoners applying for habeas corpus relief are not

entitled to appointed counsel unless the circumstances indicate that appointed counsel is

necessary to prevent due process violations. Chaney v. Lewis, 801 F.2d 1191, 1196 (9th Cir.

1986). “In deciding whether to appoint counsel in a habeas proceeding, the district court

must evaluate the likelihood of success on the merits as well as the ability of the petitioner

to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.”

Weygandt v. Look, 718 F.2d 952, 954 (9th Cir. 1983). 

Petitioner previously moved for the appointment of counsel, which the Magistrate

Judge denied. Doc. #52. This Court agrees that the appointment of counsel in this case is

not necessary to prevent a due process violation. Specifically, Petitioner has articulated his

claims very well pro se and the claims are not particularly complex. Further, the Court finds

Petitioner does not have a likelihood of success on the merits. Thus, the motion for

appointment of counsel is denied.

III. Review of Report and Recommendation

This Court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or

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1

 In applying federal law the state courts only need to act in accordance with Supreme

Court case law. See Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003).

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recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). It is “clear that the

district judge must review the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations de novo if

objection is made, but not otherwise.” United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121

(9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (emphasis in original); Klamath Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. U.S.

Bureau of Land Mgmt., 589 F.3d 1027, 1032 (9th Cir. 2009) (the district court “must review

de novo the portions of the [Magistrate Judge’s] recommendations to which the parties

object.”). 

The Petition in this case was filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 because Petitioner is

incarcerated based on a state conviction. With respect to any claims that Petitioner exhausted

before the state courts, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(1) and (2) this Court must deny the

Petition on those claims unless “a state court decision is contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law”1

 or was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts. See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003).

Further, this Court must presume the correctness of the state court’s factual findings

regarding a petitioner’s claims. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Ortiz v. Stewart, 149 F.3d 923, 936

(9th Cir. 1998). If Petitioner failed to exhaust a claim before the state courts (and is now

barred from exhausting the claim resulting in a procedural default of the claim) this Court

must decline to reach the merits of that claim unless Petitioner shows cause and prejudice to

excuse that procedural default. Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 161-62 (1996). However,

“[a]n application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding

the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2)(emphasis added).

 In his Petition, Petitioner raised four theories for habeas relief: 1) that the jury

instruction on premeditation was inadequate, 2) that the prosecutor committed prosecutorial

misconduct, 3) that his attorney was ineffective, and 4) that he should be entitled to

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resentencing under Ring and/or Blakely. The Court will review the theories on which

Petitioner filed an objection de novo.

A. Jury Instruction on Premeditation

Petitioner argues that the jury instruction on premeditation was unconstitutional and

violated his right to due process. R&R at 2 & n.2 (quoting the instruction). The R&R then

notes that the instruction given by the trial court tracks the Arizona statutory definition of

premeditation. R&R at 6. The R&R recounts the law governing this claim as follows:

A habeas petitioner who seeks to demonstrate constitutional error from a jury

instruction that quotes a state statute has an “especially heavy” burden.

Waddington v. Sarausad, 129 S.Ct. 823, 831 (2009).... A petitioner, “must

show both that the instruction was ambiguous and that there was ‘a reasonable

likelihood’ that the jury applied the instruction in a way that relieved the State

of its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable

doubt.” Waddington, 129 S.Ct. at 831.... A mere possibility that the jury

misapplied the instruction is not enough; the relevant question is, “whether the

ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting

conviction violated due process.” Waddington, 129 S.Ct. at 832.

R&R at 6.

Petitioner does not dispute this recounting of the governing law. Instead, in his

objections, Petitioner essentially argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the

jury finding premeditation. Objections at 4-6. Thus, Petitioner concludes that because, in

his opinion, there was insufficient evidence of premeditation for him to be convicted of first

degree murder which requires premeditation, yet he was nonetheless convicted of first degree

murder, the premeditation instruction must have been inadequate. Objections at 6 (Petitioner

states: “In as much that there was no evidence that Petitioner reflected between shots, ...

[coupled] with the ambiguity and vagueness of the premeditation instruction regarding the

element of reflection, created a reasonable likelihood that the jury [misapplied the

instruction]... .”).

First, a sufficiency of the evidence claim has not been raised in this case and the Court

will not consider an argument that roundaboutly advances this claim for the first time in the

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2

 Even if the Court extremely liberally construed the objections as an attempt to

amend the Petition to add a sufficiency of the evidence claim, such a request to amend would

be denied as untimely. The Petition in this case has been pending since August 2007 and the

answer was filed in January 2008; the Court finds any implied request to amend in December

2009, after the R&R was issued, to be too late. See Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 846 (9th

Cir. 1995) (district court may deny a request to amend that is futile, late, duplicative, or

patently frivolous); see also See Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 662-64 (2005) (disallowing

an amendment to a habeas petition under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(2)’s relation

back analysis when the newly added claims would be barred by the Anti-Terrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act’s one-year statute of limitations as of the date of the

amendment).

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objections.2

 Second, the Court does not find that Petitioner’s arguments regarding other

possible interpretations of the evidence show that the jury in this case misapplied the

instruction. Finally, even if the Court accepted the Petitioner’s argument that the jury

misapplied the instruction, the Court does not find the instruction to be inadequate, much less

so inadequate as to rise to the level of a due process violation. Accordingly, the Petition on

this claim will be denied.

B. Prosecutorial Misconduct

The R&R recounted the law governing prosecutorial misconduct claims in the habeas

context as follows:

The Supreme Court set forth the constitutional standard for prosecutorial

misconduct claims in Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974)

and Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 180-81 (1986). The Court explained

in Darden that “undesirable or even universally condemned” remarks by a

prosecutor are insufficient to show a constitutional violation. Darden, 477

U.S. at 180-81. Rather, the court must ask whether the prosecutor’s comments

“so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a

denial of due process.” Id. (quoting Donnelly, 416 U.S. 637, 643).

R&R at 8.

In his objections, Petitioner does not dispute this recounting of the governing law and

the Court accepts and adopts this legal framework. Although Petitioner presents his

objections in a narrative form, they appear to fall into two general categories: 1) it was

prosecutorial misconduct for the prosecutor to discuss Petitioner’s removal of a TV from

Wal-Mart without paying for it because Petitioner was never charged with shoplifting; and

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3

 Moreover, even if Petitioner had framed this argument in terms of Federal Rule of

Evidence 404(b), evidence of “other crimes” is admissible so long as it is not used to show

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2) the prosecutor mischaracterized the evidence in closing argument.

1. Shoplifting

Petitioner devotes a large portion of his objections to his argument that he is entitled

to relief because he was never charged with shoplifting. Objections at 2 ( Petitioner states:

“This Court should grant habeas relief solely on this issue... that [Petitioner] was never

charged or indicted for shoplifting, nor prosecuted for theft, even though 50 to 70 percent of

his trial revolved around what happened in the Wal-Mart store...” (internal quotations

omitted); Objections at 8 (Petitioner further states: “This Court should grant Petitioner’s

habeas petition on the issue of prosecutorial misconduct, because prosecution’s strategy to

try Petitioner for a crime absent from the indictment deprived Petitioner of the constitutional

right to a jury verdict as to guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”). In sum, Petitioner argues that

he was effectively convicted of shoplifting or theft, even though he was never charged with

either crime, and that this result violated his due process rights.

The record from the state court is clear that Petitioner was convicted of first degree

murder with respect to Mr. Hummel and second degree murder with respect to Mr. Poduch.

These convictions are what the jury returned in its verdict and these are the crimes for which

Petitioner was sentenced. Further Petitioner does not dispute that he was put on notice that

he was charged with and on trial for two homicides. Petitioner’s theory that, because he was

not charged with any other crimes, it would be prosecutorial misconduct and a due process

violation for the prosecutor to mention any surrounding facts that could have lead to

additional charges is simply an incorrect statement of the law. Therefore, the fact that the

prosecutor elicited testimony and discussed the facts leading up to the killings, including the

fact that this incident began when Petitioner allegedly removed a television from Wal-Mart

without paying for it, was not prosecutorial misconduct nor a denial of Petitioner’s due

process rights.3

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propensity. Evidence that Petitioner stole a television was relevant to explain his interaction

with the victims and was not used to show the murders were in conformity with his other act;

therefore, even if this argument could have been presented in this manner in this habeas

petition, Petitioner would not have obtained relief.

4

 The detention instruction read to the jury was, “A merchant, or his agent or

employee, with reasonable cause, may detain on the premises in a reasonable manner and for

a reasonable time any person suspected of shoplifting for questioning by or summoning of

a law enforcement officer.” Doc. #44-29 at 36. Petitioner does not dispute that he was an

“assumed” shoplifter. Objections at 8.

5

 The purpose of an indictment is to inform a defendant of “what he is accused of

doing in violation of the criminal law, so that he can prepare his defense.” U.S. v. Adamson,

291 F.3d 606, 616 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting U.S. v. Tsinhnahijinnie, 112 F.3d 988, 991 (9th Cir.

1997).

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For these same reasons, Petitioner’s argument that the detention instruction that was

given to the jury violated his due process rights also fails.4

 Objections at 3. It was not a due

process violation for the jury to know the facts leading up to the killings, even if those facts

show additional crimes with which Petitioner was not charged. Petitioner was not convicted

or sentenced on shoplifting or theft; therefore, the fact that he was not charged with either

crime does not violate his due process rights.5

2. Misstating the Evidence

Next, Petitioner argues that the prosecutor misstated the evidence and that the

misstatement rose to the level of a denial of due process. As the R&R correctly notes, a

prosecutor may argue reasonable inferences from the evidence. R&R at 8 (citing Menendez

v. Terhune, 422 F.3d 1012, 1037 (9th Cir. 2005)). Petitioner does not dispute this law, but

instead argues that the inferences drawn by the prosecutor from the evidence were not

reasonable. Objections at 7-8.

Specifically, Petitioner argues that a witness testified that she was unclear what Mr.

Poduch had in his hand, but the prosecutor argued that Mr. Poduch had a set of keys in his

hand. Objections at 7. However, the actual record shows that the witness in question told

Detective Bukowski that it looked like keys were in the victim’s hand. Doc. #44-9 at 28, 30.

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6

 To the extent Petitioner argues a third theory of ineffective assistance — that his

counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor’s alleged misconduct (see R&R

at 9) — the Court has already determined that Petitioner’s claims of prosecutorial misconduct

fail. Thus, counsel was not ineffective for failing to make futile arguments. See Rupe v.

Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1445 (9th Cir. 1996).

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Thus, the prosecutor arguing that the victim had keys in his hand was more than a reasonable

inference from the evidence, it was actually one version of the evidence. Thus, the Court

finds that the prosecutor’s arguments were consistent with the evidence in the case and that

Petitioner was not denied due process by the prosecutor’s arguments.

For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner’s petition for habeas relief based on prosecutorial

misconduct will be denied.

C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner claims his trial counsel was ineffective. Petitioner’s theories of ineffective

assistance of counsel fall into two general categories: 1) that counsel’s pretrial investigation

was inadequate; and 2) that counsel had a conflict of interest that adversely affected his

representation of Petitioner.6

Generally, under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) and its progeny, “[a]n

ineffective assistance claim has two components: A petitioner must show that counsel’s

performance was deficient, and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense. To establish

deficient performance, a petitioner must demonstrate that counsel’s representation fell below

an objective standard of reasonableness.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003)

(internal citations and quotations omitted). A deficient performance is one that is “outside

the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. In order

to show prejudice, a petitioner “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Without specifics that cause the court to have such doubts, a

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be denied. See James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20,

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26 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that a petitioner needs to “identify what evidence counsel should

have presented” to show his innocence). 

1. Adequacy of Counsel’s Investigation

“Counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable

decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.” Strickland, 466

U.S. at 691. We evaluate the scope of the duty to investigate in light of the

context of trial. “In any ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to

investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the

circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s

judgments.” Id.

Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d 892, 909 (9th Cir. 2006).

In his objections, Petitioner points to three specific factual investigative deficiencies:

1) counsel’s alleged failure to investigate the blood evidence on Petitioner’s gun; 2)

counsel’s alleged failure to seek DNA tests on the bullet from the car; and 3) counsel’s

alleged failure to investigate the shooting scene and call defense witnesses. Objections at 11.

Initially, the Court notes that Petitioner offers nothing but his own conclusions and

allegations to argue that his counsel did not investigate the case. Petitioner’s speculation

about what counsel allegedly did not do cannot support an ineffective assistance of counsel

claim. See Grisby v. Blodgett, 130 F.3d 365, 373 (9th Cir. 1997).

Additionally, even assuming Petitioner is correct about what his counsel failed to do,

the Court applies a heavy deference to counsel’s judgments. For example, perhaps counsel

did not have the blood on Petitioner’s gun matched because he was concerned that the results

would be inconsistent with Petitioner’s self-defense claim and hurt Petitioner’s case. The

same could be true regarding DNA that may, or may not, have been available off the bullet.

Moreover, Petitioner has not shown that the type of forensic evidence Petitioner claims

counsel should have obtained was even possible science. Thus, for all these reasons, even

assuming Petitioner’s allegations regarding counsel’s investigation were true, the Court finds,

giving counsel’s decisions deference, that counsel was not ineffective.

Finally, it does not appear that Petitioner’s allegations are all true. For example,

Petitioner claims that counsel failed to call witnesses to support Petitioner’s self-defense

argument. Objections at 11. However, Petitioner himself notes that counsel called an expert

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to testify about store policies about pursuit of a shoplifter. Objections at 12. Further, the

defense called at least one witness to the incident in the dirt lot, Jennifer Ketcham, which

shows, inconsistent with Petitioner’s claims, that counsel both investigated and called

witnesses. Doc. #44-8 at 50. Therefore, Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance also fails

because it is belied by the record.

Thus, Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on the alleged

inadequacy of counsel’s investigation fails because counsel’s representation did not fall

below an objective standard of reasonableness. Alternatively, Petitioner’s claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel also fails because Petitioner has failed to show prejudice.

As the R&R noted, due to the overwhelming evidence of Petitioner’s guilt, Petitioner cannot

show prejudice. As the R&R recited:

The undisputed evidence at trial demonstrated that both victims died of

multiple gunshot wounds. [citation omitted] Among the gunshot wounds

inflicted, Mr. Poduch received a fatal shot at the base of his skull that traveled

upward and exited from the middle portion of his head on the left side.

[citation omitted] Mr. Hummel received a fatal shot to his left shoulder blade

that exited his right upper chest and a fatal shot to his left temporal scalp that

exited his right temporal scalp with a slight back to front trajectory. [citation

omitted] The physical evidence therefore established that the fatal shots to the

victims came from behind, evidence that strongly supports the jury’s finding

of intentional, unjustified killings. In light of the strong evidence of guilt,

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that,

but for his lawyer’s alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have

been different.

R&R at 10. This Court agrees with the R&R that Petitioner has failed to show prejudice.

Therefore, his ineffective assistance of counsel claim does not justify habeas relief.

2. Conflict of Interest

Petitioner also argues that his attorney had a conflict of interest. Petitioner’s currently

pending motion for discovery is specifically to obtain discovery from his former counsel

regarding this alleged conflict of interest.

a. Discovery Request

i. Timely Raising Issues

The Court notes that Petitioner’s motion for discovery does not come to this Court in

the form of an appeal from an Order of the Magistrate Judge denying Petitioner’s request for

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discovery. Instead, this motion for discovery is really a supplement to Petitioner’s objections

to the R&R.

The district court need not consider contentions not first presented to the

Magistrate Judge. United States v. Armstrong, 951 F.2d 626, 630 (5th Cir.

1992); Borden v. Secretary of HHS, 836 F.2d 4, 6 (1st Cir. 1987); Kirk v.

Meyer, 279 F.Supp.2d 617, 619 (collecting cases). Those cases deal with

principle claims omitted from the petition and sought to be raised first in the

objections to the report and recommendation. This case deals with a factual

contention ... not presented to the Magistrate Judge but which plainly was

called for by Respondents’ answer. The purpose of requiring factual

contentions to be presented first to the Magistrate Judge fully applied here.

Vera v. McDaniel, 2007 WL 2410330, *1 (D. Ariz. 2007). Thus, because Petitioner failed

to raise this discovery request with the Magistrate Judge, the Court will deny the request for

discovery as untimely.

ii. When Discovery is Available

Moreover, even if this Court considered the substance of Petitioner’s request for

discovery, Petitioner has not shown that discovery is warranted in this case.

A habeas petitioner is not entitled to discovery as a matter of ordinary course.

E.g., Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904 (1997). Discovery in habeas actions

under section 2254 is governed by Rule 6 of the Rules Governing Section

2254 Cases (“Rule 6”), which provides:

(a) Leave of court required. A judge may, for good cause,

authorize a party to conduct discovery under the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure and may limit the extent of discovery. If

necessary for effective discovery, the judge must appoint an

attorney for a petitioner who qualifies to have counsel appointed

under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A.

(b) Requesting discovery. A party requesting discovery must

provide reasons for the request. The request must also include

any proposed interrogatories and requests for admission, and

must specify any requested documents.

The good cause requirement of Rule 6 is satisfied where specific allegations

before the court show reason to believe that the petitioner may, if the facts are

fully developed, be able to demonstrate that he is entitled to relief. Bracy, 520

U.S. at 908-09.

James v. Adams, 2009 WL 2905724 (E.D. Cal. 2009).

In this case, as discussed at length above, due to the overwhelming evidence of

Petitioner’s guilt, Petitioner cannot show prejudice as to this theory of ineffective assistance

of counsel. Additionally, as will be discussed below, this theory of ineffective assistance of

counsel also fails because it was not exhausted in state court and because Petitioner has failed

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7

 In the Bragg case, Mr. Bragg was convicted of killing a woman by shooting her

from a moving car. Id. at 1085. Mr. Bragg’s counsel represented Mr. Bragg’s cousin in an

unrelated matter. Id. Counsel learned during Mr. Bragg’s trial that the cousin was a

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to establish an actual conflict. Thus, because Petitioner’s claim fails for all of these reasons,

Petitioner is not able to establish that if the facts were more fully developed he may be

entitled to relief. Accordingly, Petitioner’s motion for discovery is denied.

b. Exhaustion

Petitioner is not entitled to relief on his conflict of interest claim because Petitioner

has not shown that he exhausted this claim in state court. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501

U.S. 722, 729-30; 735 n.1 (1991). And, Petitioner has failed to show cause and prejudice to

excuse his procedural default of this unexhausted claim. See Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S.

152, 161-62 (1996). Petitioner’s reason for failing to exhaust this claim as of his 2007

petition is unclear given that Petitioner acknowledges that he became aware of this alleged

conflict in 2005. Doc. #66 at 5 (Petitioner states: “In the autumn of 2005, Petitioner learned

from another inmate ... who had been represented by [Petitioner’s trial counsel’s] law firm,

that [defense counsel’s] mansion had been paid, in part or in full, as a result of a Wal-Mart

settlement.”). Thus, due to this failure to exhaust, Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of

counsel claim based on an alleged conflict of interest fails.

c. Merits of the Conflict of Interest Claim

Even if this Court were to allow an amendment and reach the merits of this claim,

Petitioner has not shown ineffective assistance. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (“An application for

a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the

applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State.”).

To establish a Sixth Amendment violation based on conflict of interest,

[Petitioner] must show (1) that [his attorney] actively represented conflicting

interests; and (2) that this adversely affected [the attorney’s] performance.

[footnote omitted]... Without a showing of prejudice, a “theoretical” or

“potential” conflict is insufficient to constitute actual conflict; instead, [the

attorney] must have actively represented conflicting interests.

Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082, 1086-87 (9th Cir. 2001).7

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passenger in the vehicle, but because of the conflict, counsel expressed concern that he was

precluded from arguing that the cousin, rather than Mr. Bragg, was the shooter. Id. The trial

court then ruled that Mr. Bragg’s attorney had to withdraw from the representation of the

cousin so that he could go forward with the defense of Mr. Bragg. Id. at 1086. In his habeas

petition, Mr. Bragg failed to show that his attorney did not comply with the trial court’s

order. Id. at 1087 & n.2. The Court of Appeals concluded that this was not an “actual”

conflict. Id. at 1087. 

8

 In the Miller case, counsel represented both Mrs. Miller in her criminal case and

defended her husband in an unrelated criminal case. Id. Mrs. Miller alleged in her habeas

petition that this conflict caused her attorney to not call her husband as a witness at her trial.

Id. The Court of Appeals concluded the trial counsel did not have an “actual” conflict of

interest. Id. at 456.

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In other words,

The mere possibility of a conflict of interest is insufficient to support a holding

of ineffective assistance. Rather, “a defendant who raised no objection at trial

must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his

lawyer’s performance.” [citation omitted] An actual conflict must be proved

through a factual showing on the record. [citation omitted] As we have

explained, “while we cannot indulge in nice calculations about the amount of

prejudice which results from a conflict of interest... neither can we create a

conflict of interest out of mere conjecture as to what might have been shown.”

[citation omitted].

Morris v. California, 966 F.2d 448, 455 (9th Cir. 1991).8

In this case, Petitioner alleges that in addition to defending Petitioner in his criminal

case, his counsel also represented Petitioner’s wife in a civil suit against Wal-Mart arising

from this same incident. Similar to Petitioner’s other theory of ineffective assistance,

Petitioner offers nothing other than his own self-serving allegations about what witnesses

might say or what might be true to “prove” this second alleged representation. As quoted

above, Petitioner claims another inmate told him that his counsel received a fee for settling

a case with Wal-Mart. Petitioner has no evidence that this settlement actually occurred, or

if it occurred, that it had anything to do with Petitioner’s wife. Speculative evidence of this

nature is insufficient to establish ineffective assistance of counsel based on an alleged

conflict of interest. See id. at 455-56 (“Although [Petitioner’s] brief on appeal is heavy with

speculation as to the contents of [her husband’s] unsolicited testimony, her wishful

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9

 Petitioner’s conviction became final on September 20, 2002; Blakely was decided

on June 24, 2004. R&R at 12.

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suggestions cannot substitute for declaratory or other evidence. In the absence of any record

evidence as to the existence of an actual conflict of interest, the district court was correct to

reject her claim that such a conflict existed.”)

Additionally, as the above cases recount, a theoretical conflict is insufficient to

establish a conflict of interest. Here, a theoretical conflict is all that is present. Specifically,

Petitioner hypothesizes that because his counsel was going to represent someone in a

subsequent suit against Wal-Mart, counsel focused a significant portion of Petitioner’s trial

on what occurred at Wal-Mart. First, applying Strickland, the Court will not second guess

counsel’s trial strategy in which he chose to focus on the pursuit of Petitioner at Wal-Mart

rather than on Petitioner shooting two people in a dirt lot. Second, on this record, where

there is no evidence that counsel either actually represented Petitioner’s wife, nor that such

alleged representation in any way prejudiced Petitioner, the Court finds there was no actual

conflict of interest. Thus, habeas relief on this theory of ineffective assistance of counsel will

be denied.

D. Ring/Blakely

Petitioner did not object to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation on this claim.

Accordingly, the Court accepts and adopts the recommendation that relief be denied on this

claim. Moreover, even reviewing the claim de novo, the Court agrees with the R&R that

Petitioner is not entitled to relief under Ring because, although the state tried the case as a

death eligible case, the Judge did not sentence Petitioner to death; therefore, the sentence did

not violate Ring. R&R at 11 (citing Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 597 (2002)).

Additionally, the Court agrees with the R&R that because Petitioner’s conviction became

final well before Blakely was decided,9

 and because Blakely is not available in a collateral

attack under Schardt, Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this claim. R&R at 12 (citing

Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004); Schardt v. Payne, 414 F.3d 1025, 1038 (9th

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Cir. 2005)).

IV. Request for Evidentiary Hearing

Finally, Petitioner has filed a motion for an evidentiary hearing. He does not identify

a particular theory of relief on which he seeks an evidentiary hearing, but instead argues that

the facts of his case are in dispute and that he did not receive a full evidentiary hearing in

state court. Doc. #67.

In order to qualify for an evidentiary hearing, Petitioner must both: “(1) allege facts

which, if proven, would entitle him to relief, and (2) show that he did not receive a full and

fair hearing in a state court, either at the time of the trial or in a collateral proceeding.”

Belmontes v. Brown, 414 F.3d 1094, 1124 (9th Cir. 2005)(rev’d on other grounds Ayers v.

Belmontes, 549 U.S. 7 (2006)). Petitioner must also show that he exercised reasonable

diligence in developing the factual record in the state proceedings. Williams v. Taylor, 529

U.S. 420, 434-37 (2000). No hearing is necessary, however, if this Court “is able to

determine without a hearing that the allegations are without credibility or that the allegations

if true would not warrant a new trial . . . .” United States v. Navarro-Garcia, 926 F.2d 818,

822 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Siripongs v. Calderon, 35 F.3d 1308, 1314 (9th Cir. 1994) (In a

capital case, a habeas petitioner who asserts a colorable claim to relief, and who has never

been given the opportunity to develop a factual record on that claim, is entitled to an

evidentiary hearing in federal court.). By way of example, a petitioner’s “bare allegation of

a conflict of interest is insufficient to entitle her to an evidentiary hearing on the question.”

Morris v. California, 966 F.2d 448, 455 (9th Cir. 1991).

Based on the Court’s analysis of Petitioner’s various claims in this case, the Court

finds that Petitioner has failed to alleged facts that, if true, would entitle him to a new trial.

Therefore, the Court denies the request for an evidentiary hearing.

V. Conclusion

IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s motion for discovery (Doc. #55), motion for

appointment of counsel (Doc. #55) and motion for evidentiary hearing (Doc. #67) are denied.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation is accepted and

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adopted (Doc. #51), the objections are overruled (Doc. #56), the Petition in this case is

denied, with prejudice, and the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment accordingly.

IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that pursuant to Rule 11 of the Rules Governing

Section 2254 Cases, in the event Petitioner files an appeal, the Court denies issuance of a

certificate of appealability because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the

denial of a constitutional right. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).

DATED this 19th day of April, 2010.

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