Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-02914/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-02914-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

---

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 1 Pursuant to Civ. L.R. 7-13,this order shall notbe cited except as provided by Civ.

L. R. 3-4(e). 

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

NOT FOR CITATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VICHIP CORPORATION,

Plaintiff, No. C 04-2914 PJH

v. ORDER RE SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING

ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO AMEND

TSU-CHANG LEE,

Defendant.

_______________________________/

Before this court is defendant’s supplemental letter brief seeking leave to add HsiSheng Chen as a counterclaim defendant. Plaintiff has filed an opposition. On April 18,

2005, the court granted defendant Lee leave to add ViChip Taiwan as a counterclaim

defendant. At the subsequent case management conference, the parties requested and were

granted leave to file supplemental briefs to clarify their respective positions on whether the

court should permit an amendment to Lee’s counterclaims adding Chen as a counterclaim

defendant on his intentional interference with contract and economic advantage claim. Having

read the papers and carefully considered the relevant legal authority, the court hereby DENIES

the request, for the reasons that follow.1

As discussed in the court’s previous order, Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) requires that a plaintiff

obtain either consent or leave of court to amend its complaint once the defendant has

answered, but “leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.” See, e.g., Morongo Band

of Mission Indians v. Rose, 893 F.2d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 1990) (leave to amend granted with

“extreme liberality”). Leave to amend is thus ordinarily permitted unless the amendment is

futile, untimely, would cause undue prejudice to the defendants, or is sought by plaintiffs in bad

Case 4:04-cv-02914-PJH Document 146 Filed 05/09/05 Page 1 of 2
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

faith or with a dilatory motive. DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 186 (9th

Cir.1987); Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). 

Lee’s counterclaim states that Chen “intentionally and without justification terminated

Dr. Lee from certain of his management positions and duties at ViChip and ViChip California

. . . in order to gain ownership of Dr. Lee’s valuable intellectual property . . .” Counterclaim ¶

68. However, there are no factual allegations in the counterclaim that Chen had any

involvement in the decision to terminate Dr. Lee. See, e.g., Counterclaim ¶ 17 (only allegation

concerning Chen’s actions, stating that Chen suggested hiring NeoParadigm engineers as

consultants to ViChip); ¶¶ 24-27 (detailing the circumstances of Lee’s firing, without naming or

alluding to Chen). ViChip is correct that it appears that Lee simply added Chen’s name to its

claims against ViChip for intentional interference without any factual support for the claim.

Therefore, there are no facts alleged that support a claim for intentional interference

with contract or economic advantage. These claims require Lee to allege, among other

things, facts showing that Chen deliberately acted to disrupt either a contractual relationship or

prospective economic advantage of Lee’s. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Bear

Stearns & Co., 50 Cal.3d 1118, 1126 (1990) (intentional interference with contract); Della

Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., 11 Cal.4th 376, 380 n. 1 (1995) (intentional interference

with economic advantage). Because the counterclaims contain no information about any

actions taken specifically by Chen other than through ViChip as a board member, Lee cannot

state a claim against Chen as a matter of law, and the motion to amend is thus futile. Miller v.

Rykoff-Sexton, Inc., 845 F.2d 209, 214 (9th Cir. 1988). 

The motion to amend Lee’s proposed counterclaims to add Chen as a counterclaim

defendant is DENIED. Lee’s counterclaims must be filed no later than 10 days after the filing

of this order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 9, 2005

______________________________

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

Case 4:04-cv-02914-PJH Document 146 Filed 05/09/05 Page 2 of 2