Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-15-02453/USCOURTS-ca8-15-02453-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 370
Nature of Suit: Other Fraud
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 15-2453

___________________________

Matthew Carlsen, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated

Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

GameStop, Inc., a Minnesota corporation; Sunrise Publications, Inc., doing

business as Game Informer, a Minnesota corporation

Defendants - Appellees

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of Minnesota - Minneapolis

____________

 Submitted: March 15, 2016

 Filed: August 16, 2016

____________

Before MURPHY, BEAM, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

____________

GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.

Matthew Carlsen, individually and purportedly on behalf of others similarly

situated, brought claims against GameStop, Inc. and Sunrise Publications, Inc.

(collectively, “GameStop”) for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, money had and

received, and violation of Minnesota’s Consumer Fraud Act (CFA), Minn. Stat.

§§ 325F.68, et seq., for GameStop’s alleged disclosure of personal information to a

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third party in violation of an express agreement not to do so. GameStop filed a

motion to dismiss Carlsen’s complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and failure to state a claim under Rule

12(b)(6). The district court granted the motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter

1

jurisdiction, finding that Carlsen lacked standing. We affirm the district court on the

basis that Carlsen’s complaint failed to state a claimupon which relief can be granted.

I.

Matthew Carlsen is a user of print and online materials published by

GameStop, including Game Informer Magazine. Game Informer Magazine offers

news, reviews, and commentary about the video-game industry. Registered

subscribers can access digital versions of the magazine through a website,

www.gameinformer.com, where they also can manage their subscriptions and access

enhanced content and message boards. Carlsen paid a one-year subscription fee of

$14.99 for accessto the magazine and enhanced content. The terms ofservice for the

online subscription include Game Informer’s privacy policy. The policy, in turn,

includes a provision stating that, with certain exceptions, “Game Informer does not

share personal information with anyone.” According to Carlsen, a user must agree

to the terms ofservice and, thus, the privacy policy, in order to purchase subscription

access.

In his complaint, Carlsen alleged that GameStop shared his personally

identifiable information (“PII”) with Facebook in violation of the privacy policy. He

alleged that GameStop shared this information through the Game Informer website,

which includesfeaturesthat allow Game Informer usersto log in to the website using

their Facebook accounts and to use Facebook’s “Like,” “Share,” and “Comment”

1The Honorable Donovan W. Frank, United States District Judge for the

District of Minnesota.

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functions through the Game Informer site. Game Informer providesthese features by

adding a Facebook Software Development Kit (“SDK”) to the source code on the

Game Informer website. Carlsen alleged that this SDK transmitted a user’s unique

Facebook ID and Game Informer browsing history to Facebook if the user previously

had opted to stay logged in to Facebook.

Carlsen further alleged that GameStop breached a term of the privacy policy

by disclosing his Facebook ID and browsing information. He also claimed that this

disclosure constituted a material misrepresentation about Game Informer

subscriptions because he believed his PII would not be disclosed and because part of

his subscription fee paid for the protection of that PII. He alleged that, had he known

about the disclosures, he either would not have paid for the subscription or would

have refrained from accessing the online content for which he paid.

Based on these allegations, Carlsen’s amended complaint sought class

certification and asserted four claims: (1) breach of contract; (2) unjust enrichment;

(3) money had and received; and (4) violation of Minnesota’s CFA, Minn. Stat.

§§ 325F.68, et seq. GameStop filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motion to

dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, finding that Carlsen lacked standing

for failure to allege an injury in fact with respect to his overpayment and would-nothave-shopped theories because his allegations were based on the Game Informer

privacy policy, which applied equally to both paid and non-paid Game Informer

subscriptions.

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II.

A.

“The existence ofsubject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law that this court

reviews de novo.” ABF Freight Sys., Inc. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 645 F.3d 954,

958 (8thCir. 2011). “A court deciding a motion under Rule 12(b)(1) must distinguish

between a ‘facial attack’ and a ‘factual attack’” on jurisdiction. Osborn v. United

States, 918 F.2d 724, 729 n.6 (8th Cir. 1990). In a facial attack, “the court restricts

itself to the face of the pleadings, and the non-moving party receives the same

protections asit would defending against a motion brought under Rule 12(b)(6).” Id.

(internal citations omitted). “In a factual attack, the court considers matters outside

the pleadings, and the non-moving party does not have the benefit of 12(b)(6)

safeguards.” Id. (internal citation omitted). The method in which the district court

resolves a Rule 12(b)(1) motion—that is, whether the district court treats the motion

as a facial attack or a factual attack—obliges us to follow the same approach. BP

Chemicals Ltd. v. Jiangsu Sopo Corp., 285 F.3d 677, 680 (8th Cir. 2002). 

Here, the district court discussed both standards but did not state which

approach it followed. Toward the end of its opinion, however, the court stated that

it was “accepting as true all of Plaintiff’s allegations and construing all reasonable

inferencesin Plaintiff’s favor”— i.e., that it wasfollowing the Rule 12(b)(6) standard

used for a facial attack. We thus examine the Rule 12(b)(1) motion as a facial attack

on jurisdiction, affording Carlsen’s complaintRule 12(b)(6) protection by “accepting

as true all facts alleged in the complaint.” See Trooien v. Mansour, 608 F.3d 1020,

1026 (8th Cir. 2010). As such, we “consider[] only the materials that are ‘necessarily

embraced by the pleadings and exhibits attached to the complaint.’” Cox v. Mortgage

Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 685 F.3d 663, 668 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting Mattes v.

ABC Plastics, Inc., 323 F.3d 695, 697 n.4 (8th Cir. 2003)). 

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We begin by addressing the sufficiency of the complaint with respect to

Carlsen’s standing. “Federal jurisdiction is limited by Article III of the Constitution

to cases or controversies; if a plaintiff lacks standing to sue, the district court has no

subject-matter jurisdiction.” ABF, 645 F.3d at 958. “The ‘irreducible constitutional

minimum of standing’ is that a plaintiff show (1) an ‘injury-in-fact’ that (2) is

‘fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant’ and (3) is

‘likely . . . [to] be redressed by a favorable decision’ in court.” Id. (alterations in

original) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)). A

plaintiff has suffered an injury-in-fact if he has experienced “an invasion of a legally

protected interest which is(a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent,

not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted). Further, “[a] ‘legally protected interest’ requires only a

‘judicially cognizable interest.’” ABF, 645 F.3d at 959.

The district court addressed the standing issue by evaluatingCarlsen’s theories

of damages. The court first discussed whether Carlsen’s alleged monetary damages

based on a theory of “overpayment” constituted a cognizable injury in fact. Under

this theory, Carlsen alleged that he would not have paid as much as he did for his

Game Informer subscription had he known GameStop would violate the terms of the

privacy policy by disclosing his PII. The court, analogizing to identity-theft and databreach cases, found this overpayment theory insufficient to establish injury because

Carlsen had failed to allege that he paid any specific amount for the privacy policy

or that he bargained for additional data privacy over that received by non-paying

Game Informer visitors. The court next discussed Carlsen’s alleged injury based on

a “would-not-have-shopped” theory. Under this theory,Carlsen alleged that he would

not have purchased the Game Informer subscription if he had known his data would

be shared. The court likewise found this theory insufficient to establish an injury in

fact because the privacy policy stated that it applied equally to paid and non-paid

Game Informer users, such that any improper disclosure of PII in violation of the

privacy policy was not unique to paid subscribers. Therefore, the court concluded,

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Carlsen’s allegations could not establish that awareness of the disclosure of PII to

Facebook would have impacted his purchasing decision.

As we previously have cautioned, “[i]t is crucial . . . not to conflate Article III’s

requirement of injury in fact with a plaintiff’s potential causes of action, for the

concepts are not coextensive.” ABF, 645 F.3d. at 960 (quoting Braden v. Wal-Mart

Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 591 (8th Cir. 2009)); see also Campbell v. Minneapolis

Pub. Hous. Auth. ex rel. City of Minneapolis, 168 F.3d 1069, 1074 (8th Cir. 1999)

(“We repeat the fundamental principle that the ultimate merits of the case have no

bearing on the threshold question of standing.”). Our court previously has held that

a plaintiff who has “produced facts indicating it was a party to a breached contract”

has a judicially cognizable interest for standing purposes, regardless of the merits of

the breach alleged. ABF, 645 F.3d. at 960; see also Longaker v. Boston Scientific

Corp., 715 F.3d 658, 664 (8th Cir. 2013) (Bye, J., dissenting) (“[Plaintiff] has stated

a personal injury because [Defendant] allegedly breached his employment

contract . . . .”). To assert standing in a breach-of-contract claim, we do not require

facts establishing “the legal conclusion of a valid, enforceable contract.” ABF, 645

F.3d. at 960.

Here, Carlsen has provided sufficient facts alleging that he is party to a binding

contract—the terms of service, which include the Game Informer privacy

policy—with GameStop, and GameStop does not dispute this contractual

relationship. Carlsen also has alleged that GameStop has violated that policy by

“systematically disclos[ing] Game Informer’s users’ PII . . . to third party Facebook

and/or allow[ing] Facebook to directly collect that information itself.” This allegation

of breach is both concrete and particularized, as the breach allegedly already has

occurred, and any consequences of the breach have occurred specifically to Carlsen

as a result of the actions of GameStop’s alleged systematic disclosure via the

Facebook SDK. Additionally, Carlsen alleged that he has suffered damages as a

result of GameStop’s breach in the form of devaluation of his Game Informer

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subscription in an amount equal to the difference between the value of the

subscription that he paid for and the value of the subscription that he received, i.e.,

a subscription with compromised privacy protection. Accordingly, Carlsen has

alleged an “actual” injury. See id. at 961; cf. Ben Oehrleins & Sons & Daughter, Inc.

v. Hennepin Cty., 115 F.3d 1372, 1379-80 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding even indirect

economic injury constitutes an injury in fact where the injury was concrete,

particularized, actual, and in no way hypothetical or conjectural).

Next, Carlsen “must show that [his] injury is‘fairly traceable to the challenged

action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent action of some third

party not before the court.’” ABF, 645 F.3d at 961 (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520

U.S. 154, 167 (1997)). Carlsen has met this element by alleging that the breach and

attendant damages flow directly from GameStop’s disclosure of confidential

information. Finally, Carlsen satisfies the redressability element of standing. He

seeks damagesin the amount equal to the difference between the value ofthe services

he paid for and the services he actually received. See id. We thus conclude that

Carlsen has standing to bring his breach-of-contract claim.

We likewise conclude that Carlsen has standing to bring his other claims. 

Carlsen’s allegation that he did not receive the data protection set forth in

GameStop’s policies suffices to support standing to assert claims related to

GameStop’s unjust retention of his payment. As to the claim brought under the

Minnesota CFA, the Minnesota Supreme Court has held that “the plain and

unambiguous language ofthe [Minnesota CFA] allows ‘any person’ to bring a private

action for redress of violations of the misrepresentation in sales statutes,” whether or

not the plaintiffs purchased the defendant’s goods. Grp. Health Plan, Inc. v. Philip

Morris Inc., 621 N.W.2d 2, 8 (Minn. 2001); Minn. Stat. § 8.31, subdiv. 3a. Here,

Carlsen purchased GameStop’s goods in the formof his Game Informer subscription,

and he thus has standing to bring his claim under the Minnesota CFA. See Grp.

Health, 621 N.W. 2d at 8.

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B.

Our analysis does not end with our conclusion regarding Carlsen’s standing. 

“[W]e may affirm a judgment on any ground supported by the record, whether or not

that ground was urged below or passed on by the District Court.” United States v.

Sager, 743 F.2d 1261, 1263 n.4 (8th Cir. 1984). Here, as the district court

acknowledged, GameStop filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to both Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6). When a district court erroneously

dismisses under Rule 12(b)(1) a claim that is “clearly meritless,” an appellate court

may affirm under Rule 12(b)(6). Boock v. Shalala, 48 F.3d 348, 353 (8th Cir. 1995);

see also Johnson v. Mott, 376 F. App’x 641 (8th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (affirming

district court under Rule 12(b)(6) after determining that the court erroneously had

dismissed case with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(1)). Furthermore, the parties fully

briefed the Rule 12(b)(6) issue on appeal. We thus turn to the Rule 12(b)(6) motion

even though the district court did not reach it. 

2

To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Cox, 685 F.3d at 668 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

678 (2009)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff [has pleaded] factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Iqbal, 556

Although we have discretion to remand for the district court to rule on the

2

Rule 12(b)(6) motion in the first instance, we are not bound to remand, and we

decline to do so here. Cf. ABF, 645 F.3d at 965 (remanding for the district court to

consider the Rule 12(b)(6) motion in the first instance even though the appellees had

filed a motion to dismiss under both Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6) because “[t]he

district court’s 12(b)(1) ruling resolved factual issues that courts may not resolve on

motions under Rule 12(b)(6), and did not provide proper notice of such a

conversion”).

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U.S. at 678). “We make this determination by considering only the materials that are

‘necessarily embraced by the pleadings and exhibits attached to the complaint.’” Id.

(quoting Mattes, 323 F.3d at 697 n.4).

In order to plead breach of contract under Minnesota law, “the plaintiff must

show (1) formation of a contract, (2) performance by plaintiff of any conditions

precedent to his right to demand performance by the defendant, and (3) breach of the

contract by defendant.” Park Nicollet Clinic v. Hamann, 808 N.W.2d 828, 833

(Minn. 2011). “The construction and effect of a contract is . . . a question of law

unless the contract is ambiguous.” Denelsbeck v. Wells Fargo & Co., 666 N.W.2d

339, 346 (Minn. 2003). “A contract is ambiguous if, based upon its language alone,

it isreasonably susceptible of more than one interpretation.” Id.(quoting Art Goebel,

Inc. v. N. Suburban Agencies, Inc., 567 N.W.2d 511, 515 (Minn. 1997)). “[W]hether

a contract is ambiguous is a question of law . . . .” Id.

Carlsen alleges that, in order to use the Game Informer website and access paid

subscription benefits, he had to agree to the Game Informer terms of service, which

included the privacy policy. Even assuming that Carlsen’s payment in conjunction

with agreeing to the terms ofservice fulfills the first two breach-of-contract elements,

the facts as alleged fail as a matter of law to establish GameStop’s breach. “A breach

of contract is a failure, without legal excuse, to perform any promise that forms the

whole or part of the contract.” Lyon Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Ill. Paper & Copier Co., 848

N.W.2d 539, 543 (Minn. 2014). “[A] breach of contract claim requires only that the

promise at issue be part of the parties’ bargain.” Id. 

Here, Carlsen argues that GameStop promised not to disclose PII and that this

PII included his Facebook ID and browser history. We conclude, however, that the

privacy policy unambiguously does not include those pieces of information among

the protected PII. The privacy policy refers to PII and notes that it:

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may include: your name, home address and zip code, telephone number,

e-mail address and (for those purchasing products online) credit card

or checking account information including billing and shipping

addresses and zip codes.

Although the phrase “may include” appears to create a non-exclusive list, the

definition of personal information occurs as part of a section entitled, “What

Information does Game Informer Collect.” This provision specifies that “Game

Informer may collect information about you, but only if you voluntarily provide it to

Game Informer.” The provision goes on to say, “We may ask you to submit personal

and/or demographic information in connection with any one of” a finite list of

features or services. Accordingly, in order to constitute “personal information,” the

information must have been specifically solicited by Game Informer (“We may ask

you to submit”) and voluntarily provided by the user.

We consider these terms unambiguous. The PII set forth in the privacy policy

does not encompass a user’s Facebook ID and browsing history for two reasons:

(1) not only do a user’s Facebook ID and browsing history fail to appear on the list

of what PII might include, but (2) those data are neither specifically solicited by

Game Informer nor voluntarily submitted in response to such solicitation. 

Additionally, as GameStop notes, the policy contains no specific promise to prevent

Facebook’s social-media plug-in from transferring a Facebook user’s Facebook ID

and browsing activity to Facebook. The policy also states that it “does not extend to

Websites that may be maintained by . . . other companies or organizations to which

we link, or to Websites that contain links to the Site and/or the Service.” Because of

this caveat, the policy further urges users to read the respective privacy policies of

these other websites. Accordingly, the protection Carlsen argues GameStop failed

to provide was not among the protections for which he bargained by agreeing to the

terms of service, and GameStop thus could not have breached its contract with

Carlsen. 

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Carlsen’s Minnesota CFA claim fails for similar reasons. To state a CFA

claim, “the plaintiff need only plead that the defendant engaged in conduct prohibited

by the statutes and that the plaintiff was damaged thereby.” Grp. Health, 621 N.W.2d

at 12. Section 325F.69 of the Minnesota Statutes provides: “The act, use, or

employment by any person of any . . . misrepresentation . . . , with the intent that

others rely thereon in connection with the sale of any merchandise, whether or not

any person has in fact been misled, deceived, or damaged thereby, is enjoinable. . . .” 

Minn. Stat. § 325F.69, subdiv. 1. Moreover, “[a]llegations that the plaintiff relied on

the defendant’s conduct are not required to plead a violation.” Grp. Health, 621

N.W.2d at 12. Here, Carlsen argues that GameStop’s representation in the Game

Informer Privacy Policy that it would not disclose users’ PII to any third-party

companies without the users’ consent or specific authorization constituted a false

representation because of GameStop’s disclosure of that PII to Facebook. As

discussed above, however, Carlsen’s allegation that the PII GameStop promised not

to disclose included his Facebook ID and browser history finds no support in the

language of the Game Informer privacy policy. Carlsen thus has failed to state a

claim under the Minnesota CFA.

We next proceed to Carlsen’s equitable claims. Unjust enrichment requires

“(1) a benefit conferred; (2) the defendant’s appreciation and knowing acceptance of

the benefit; and (3) the defendant’s acceptance and retention of the benefit under such

circumstances that it would be inequitable for him to retain it without paying for it.” 

Dahl v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 742 N.W.2d 186, 195 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007). 

Carlsen claims that the benefit conferred on GameStop “is the money that GameStop

took from[him] in exchange for the Privacy Policy that it chose to ignore.” However,

he does not allege that any specific portion of his subscriber fee went toward data

protection or that GameStop agreed to provide additional protection to paid

subscribers that it did not also provide to non-paid subscribers. Accordingly, taking

Carlsen’s allegations as true, he has alleged neither a benefit conferred in exchange

for protection of his PII, nor has he shown how GameStop’s retention of his

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subscription fee would be inequitable. He thus has not alleged a claim for unjust

enrichment or the related claim of money had and received. See Cady v. Bush, 166

N.W.2d 358, 361-62 (Minn. 1969) (“The theory of unjust enrichment or money had

and received has salutary and beneficial uses and has been invoked in support of

claims based upon failure of consideration, fraud, mistake, and in other situations

where it would be morally wrong for one party to enrich himself at the expense of

another.”).

III.

For the reasons set forth above, we affirm.

BEAM, Circuit Judge, concurring and dissenting.

I concur in the Court's affirmance of the district court's dismissal of Carlsen's

claims in this matter. However, I disagree with the Court's reasoning in reaching this

result.

Defendant Game Stop asserts among other things, two specific defenses–a lack

of subject matter jurisdiction under subsection 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to

subsection 12(b)(6) of the Rule.

Upon review of the record, the district court correctly concludes that

"[p]laintiff has failed to allege an injury in fact and as a result has not established

standing under Article III of the Constitution. Plaintiff's complaint is therefore

dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction." The district court further acknowledges in a related

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footnote 5 that in light of its analysis regarding Article III standing, it did not examine

the 12(b)(6) issue.

Then, somewhat inexplicably, the district court ruled that amendment (of the

pleadings) would be futile and dismissed "the claims with prejudice." This, of course,

was error because withoutsubject matter jurisdiction, the district court had no judicial

power to do more than simply dismiss the case.

"[W]hen a federal court concludes that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the

court must dismiss the complaint in its entirety." Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S.

500, 514 (2006). "If the court has no jurisdiction, it has no power to enter a judgment

on the merits and must dismiss the action." Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 769

(2009) (quoting 10A Charles Wright, Arthur Miller, & Mary Kay Kane, Federal

Practice and Procedure § 2713 (3d ed. 1998)) (Thomas, J., dissenting).

"'[J]urisdiction is power to declare the law,' and '[w]ithout jurisdiction the court

cannot proceed at all in any cause .'" Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574,

577 (1999) (second alteration in original) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better

Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998)).

[T]he rule, springing from the nature and limits of the judicial power of

the United States, isinflexible and without exception which requiresthis

court, of its own motion, to deny its own jurisdiction, and, in the

exercise of its appellate power, that of all other courts of the United

States, in all cases where such jurisdiction does not affirmatively appear

in the record on which, in the exercise of that power, it is called to act.

Mansfield, C. & L. M. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884).

The Court determines that the district court erred in holding that Carlsen fails

to adequately plead an "injury in fact" sufficient to produce the case or controversy

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necessary to establish subject matter jurisdiction over his claims in the federal court. 

It is, however, the Court that errs. Carlsen has, indeed, failed to assert the necessary

justiciable controversy required. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547-48

(2016).

I agree with the Court that our analyses bottom upon a "facial attack" on the

matter of subject matter jurisdiction. Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 729 n.6

(8th Cir. 1990). I disagree, however, with the Court'sstatement "'[i]t is crucial . . . not

to conflate Article III's requirement of injury in fact [12(b)(1)] with a plaintiff's

potential causes of action [12(b)(6)], for the concepts are not coextensive.'" Ante at

6, (quoting ABF Freight Sys., Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 645 F.3d 954, 960 (8th

Cir. 2011)). In this circuit, a deficiency in pleadings under either defense receivesthe

same standard of review. Stalley ex rel. U.S. v. Catholic Health Initiatives, 509 F.3d

517, 521 (8th Cir. 2007). That simply means in this case that we apply the pleading

standards set forth in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), to the "injury in fact" question.

Twombly states that "naked assertion[s]" devoid of factual enhancement will

not establish justiciable damages supportive of a litigatable case. 550 U.S. at 557. 

Iqbal, in turn, states "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as

true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Also, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause

of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. The Seventh

Circuit, in Silha v. ACT, Inc., 807 F.3d 169, 174 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 679), defines well pleaded factual allegations as those that discard pleadings

that are "no more than conclusions" and that "plausibly give rise to an entitlement of

relief."

With these standards in mind, we turn to the Court's recitations concerning the

pleadings in Carlsen's claim. The parties concede that they entered into a contractual

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relationship. But, to establish the required "injury in fact" the plaintiff must factually

allege invasion of a legally protectable interest that is concrete, particularized, actual,

imminent, and neither conjectural nor hypothetical. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,

504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Carlson's allegations are the antithesis of virtually every

one of the above requirements, as the district court correctly determined. And the

burden of proof on the matter of subject matter jurisdiction lies wholly with the

plaintiff. At best, Carlsen's pleadings consist of a panoply of imprecise contractual

emanations purporting to illustrate possible economic harm. This is not enough.

Accordingly, I cannot join the Court'sreversal ofthe district court ruling on the

matter ofsubject matter jurisdiction, but otherwise concur in the result reached by the

Court.

______________________________

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