Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01139/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-01139-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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06cv1139

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARK DARULIS,

Petitioner,

v.

VINCENT J. IARIA,

Respondent.

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Civil No. 06cv1139-L(CAB)

ORDER ADOPTING IN PART AND

REMANDING IN PART THE

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner Mark Darulis, proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (“Petition”). The case was referred to United States Magistrate

Judge Cathy Ann Bencivengo for a report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1)(B) and Civil Local Rule 72.1(d). Respondent filed a response and Petitioner filed a

traverse. The Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation, recommending to deny

the Petition. Petitioner timely objected. Respondent did not respond. For the reasons which

follow, the Report and Recommendation is ADOPTED IN PART AND REMANDED IN

PART.

Petitioner pled guilty to driving under the influence. He claims ineffective assistance of

counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment and violation of his due process rights in that his

guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary. The Magistrate Judge recommended denying all of

Petitioner’s claims.

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2 06cv1139

In reviewing a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, the district court “shall

make a de novo determination of those portions of the report . . . to which objection is made,”

and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made

by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Under this statute, “the district judge must

review the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations de novo if objection is made, but

not otherwise.” United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.) (en banc)

(emphasis in original); see Schmidt v. Johnstone, 263 F. Supp. 2d 1219, 1225-26 & n.5 (D. Ariz.

2003) (applying Reyna-Tapia to habeas review). 

The Magistrate Judge recommended to deny Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance

which allegedly took place before his guilty plea. (Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) at 6-

7.) “[A] guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in the

criminal process. When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in

fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent

claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the

guilty plea. He may only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea . . ..” 

Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973); see also Moran v. Godinez, 57 F.3d 690, 700

(9th Cir.1994) ("As a general rule, one who voluntarily pleads guilty to a criminal charge may

not subsequently seek federal habeas relief on the basis of pre-plea constitutional violations"),

overruled on other grounds in Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003). Petitioner does

not object to the recommendation to deny the ineffective assistance claims.

However, Petitioner objects to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation to deny his claim

that his guilty plea was not voluntary. First, Petitioner claims he pleaded guilty under duress of

having imminently to represent himself at trial. 

Initially, a public defender was appointed to represent Petitioner. However, when he was

not satisfied with his counsel’s motion to suppress, Petitioner moved to act as co-counsel. This

motion was denied, the public defender was released, and Petitioner was found competent to

represent himself. Petitioner signed a waiver under People v. Lopez, 71 Cal. App. 3d 568

(1977), but interlineated “concerning the motion hearing PC 1538.5 only. Does not include

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3 06cv1139

trial.” Petitioner then withdrew the public defender’s motion and filed his own motion to

suppress. 

On April 5, 2004, Petitioner’s motion for reappointment of counsel was granted, and the

motion to suppress hearing and trial were set for April 21, 2004. 

At the April 21 hearing, the new public defender indicated he would not pursue the

motion to suppress. Petitioner then requested to represent himself. After a long discussion with

Petitioner, the judge acceded to Petitioner’s request to represent himself for purposes of the

motion and trial. The judge told Petitioner that he would not appoint counsel for him for the

third time, and told Petitioner that trial would begin next morning. Petitioner did not request a

continuance. 

The next day, Petitioner’s motion to dismiss was denied and the trial was continued to

April 23, 2004. On April 23, the case was reset for April 26 and assigned to a new judge where

it was to trail another case.

Petitioner’s case came on for hearing on April 28, 2004. The new judge heard and denied

Petitioner’s motion to suppress. After a hearing on additional motions, Petitioner told the new

judge that he was representing himself and was not ready for trial. Petitioner’s motion for a

continuance was denied. After Petitioner’s peremptory challenge was denied, he requested a

continuance to allow him to obtain counsel. The judge reminded Petitioner that he had requested

to represent himself, and presented him with the choice of proceeding with a jury or court trial,

or pleading guilty. During motions in limine, Petitioner asked if he could plead guilty and

reserve the right to vacate the plea, but was told that he could not. The jury was then summoned.

On April 29, 2004, Petitioner decided to plead guilty. He was sentenced to 5 years of

probation and a fine. Petitioner’s subsequent post-conviction motions and petitions to change or

set aside his plea were denied. (For the foregoing procedural background, see Lodgment No.

11.)

In his Objections, Petitioner first argues that the trial judge violated California law when

he denied his motion for a continuance on April 28, 2004. He claims that under People v.

Maddox, 67 Cal.2d 647, 653 (1967), he had a right to at least five days to prepare for trial. 

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1 Moreover, Petitioner was scheduled to represent himself at trial in April 22, 2004. 

Due to continuances and trailing, his trial did not commence until April 28. Petitioner therefore

had full five days to prepare for trial. 

4 06cv1139

Federal courts reviewing a state habeas corpus petition are not permitted and lack jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to review state court application of state law.1

 Estelle v. McGuire, 502

U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); Poland v. Stewart, 169 F.3d 573, 584 (9th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, this

court is without jurisdiction to review Petitioner’s claims of state law violations.

Petitioner next argues that his guilty plea was not voluntary because just signing the plea

form was not sufficient to establish his voluntariness. Petitioner relies on United States v.

Medina-Silverio, 30 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1994) and McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 467

(1969). Both cases rely on Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and are therefore

not applicable to this proceeding. 

Nevertheless, Petitioner contends that the trial court failed to conduct a colloquy to ensure

a voluntary and knowing plea. (Objections at 3.) The acceptance of a plea of guilty must be

based on a reliable determination on the voluntariness issue which satisfies the defendant’s

constitutional rights. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969). A guilty plea “demands the

utmost solicitude of which courts are capable in canvassing the matter with the accused to make

sure he has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequence. When the

judge discharges that function, he leaves a record adequate for any review that may be later

sought.” Id. at 243-44. The voluntariness of the plea cannot be inferred from an inadequate

record; instead, due process requires an affirmative showing in the record to support that

determination. Id. at 242. The Report and Recommendation points solely to Petitioner’s change

of plea form and does not mention a colloquy or discuss its absence. (See R&R at 8.) 

In addition, Petitioner contends that the trial judge inserted the level of intoxication into

the plea form after Petitioner had already signed and initialed it. Petitioner suggests that the

factual basis he signed and initialed was insufficient to support a guilty plea. The Report and

Recommendation is apparently based on the assumption that the alteration was made before

Petitioner singed and initialed the form. (See id. at 8 n.5.)

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Accordingly, the Report and Recommendation is ADOPTED with respect to Claims 1

and 2 for ineffective assistance of counsel. The Report and Recommendation is REMANDED

with respect to Claim 3 that Petitioner’s guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary. On remand,

the court shall consider and, if necessary, develop the record regarding Petitioner’s guilty plea

and consider whether the alleged alteration of Petitioner’s change of plea form necessitates an

evidentiary hearing.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 26, 2008

M. James Lorenz

United States District Court Judge

COPY TO: 

HON. CATHY ANN BENCIVENGO

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ALL PARTIES/COUNSEL

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