Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00205/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00205-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EMELITO EXMUNDO,

Plaintiff,

v.

SCRIBNER, et. al.,

Defendants.

 /

CV F 06-205 AWI NEW (DLB) P

ORDER DISREGARDING MOTION FOR

LEAVE TO AMEND (Doc. 12.)

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH

LEAVE TO AMEND (Doc. 1 )

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO

SEND PLAINTIFF BLANK CIVIL RIGHTS

FORM 

Plaintiff Emelito Exmundo (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed the instant action

on February 23, 2006. On January 30, 2007, Plaintiff moved for leave to amend his Complaint to

add parties and actions under the Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act. 

A. SCREENING STANDARD

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

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governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding,

467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also Palmer v.

Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass'n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing a

complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in

question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the

pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor. 

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). 

B. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT

Plaintiff alleges a constitutional violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from

excessive force, retaliation and to have personal safety. Plaintiff’s factual allegations, however,

are unclear. Plaintiff states that certain cell searches were conducted that evidences staff’s

responsibility for missing personal property. Although Plaintiff states that he was retaliated

against, he provides little factual basis for such a statement. Plaintiff does state that on October

5,2005, he suffered a battery by prison officials. Plaintiff is seeking injunctive and monetary

relief. 

C. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

1. Linkage Requirement

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

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to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between

the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

(1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a

constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates

in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that

causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th

Cir. 1978). In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, the plaintiff must link each

named defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of

plaintiff’s federal rights.

In this case, although Plaintiff names several Defendants, he fails to link any of the

individuals to an act or omission giving rise to a constitutional violation. With regard to Doe

Defendants, although naming individuals in such a capacity is permissible, Plaintiff must allege

specific facts linking each Doe Defendant to acts or omissions giving rise to a constitutional

violation in order to maintain an action against an unknown individual. Plaintiff fails to link any

named Defendant, Doe or otherwise, to any act or omission such that he states cognizable claims

for relief.

2. Excessive Force

When a prison security measure is undertaken in response to a incident such as occurred

in this case, the question of whether the measures taken inflicted unnecessary and wanton pain

and suffering depends on "whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore

discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm." Hudson v.

McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 4, 5-7, 112 S.Ct. 995, 999 (1992). Factors relevant to the analysis are the

need for the application of force, the relationship between the need and the amount of force that

was used and the extent of the injury inflicted. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 106 S.Ct. 1078 

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(1986). Other factors to be considered are the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and

inmates, as reasonably perceived by the responsible officials on the basis of the facts know to

them, and any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response. Id., at 321. The

infliction of pain in the course of a prison security measure "does not amount to cruel and

unusual punishment simply because it may appear in retrospect that the degree of force

authorized or applied was unreasonable, and hence unnecessary." Whitley v. Albers, supra at

319; see also, Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 995 (1992). Prison administrators

"should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and

practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to

maintain institutional security." Id. at 321-322 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547, 99

S.Ct. 1861 (1970).

Here, Plaintiff states that he experienced excessive force, however, he provides no facts

that would give rise to such a violation. Plaintiff states that he experienced a battery by prison

officials on October 5, 2005, but he does not link any of the named Defendants to any act that

would give rise to an excessive force claim. Thus, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief. 

3. Retaliation

An allegation of retaliation against a prisoner’s First Amendment right to file a prison

grievance is sufficient to support a claim under Section 1983. Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283,

1288 (9 Cir. 2003. "Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation th

entails five elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an

inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner's protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the

inmate's exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a

legitimate correctional goal." Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567 (9th Cir.2005) (citations

omitted). 

Again, Plaintiff states generally that he experienced retaliation but alleges no facts giving

rise to a retaliation claim. Accordingly, he fails to state a cognizable claim for relief against any

named defendant. 

///

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4. Personal Safety - Eighth Amendment

An allegation of retaliation against a prisoner’s First Amendment right to file a prison

grievance is sufficient to support a claim under Section 1983. Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283,

1288 (9 Cir. 2003. "Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation th

entails five elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an

inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner's protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the

inmate's exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a

legitimate correctional goal." Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567 (9th Cir.2005) (citations

omitted). 

Here, although Plaintiff lists “personal safety” as a constitutional violation, he provides

no facts that would give rise to an Eighth Amendment claim. As such, he fails to state a claim for

relief. 

5. Supervisory Liability

Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under Section 1983 for the actions of their

employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant holds a

supervisory position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation must

be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v.

Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). To state a claim

for relief under Section 1983 based on a theory of supervisory liability, Plaintiff must allege

some facts that would support a claim that supervisory Defendants either: personally participated

in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed to act to

prevent them; or promulgated or “implemented a policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a

repudiation of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation.’” 

Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted); Taylor v. List,

880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Although federal pleading standards are broad, some facts

must be alleged to support claims under section 1983. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County

Narcotics Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993). 

Plaintiff has not alleged any facts indicating that Defendants Moore and Warden Scribner

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personally participated in the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations

and failed to act to prevent them; or promulgated or “implemented a policy so deficient that the

policy ‘itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the

constitutional violation.’” Hansen v. Black at 646. Although Plaintiff makes the general

assertion that these individuals “knew,” he provides no facts to support the allegation. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff does not state a cognizable claim for relief against Defendants Moore and

Scribner. 

6. ADA/RA

As Plaintiff has moved to amend his Complaint to add new individuals and claims for

relief, the Court provides Plaintiff with the relevant law in order to assist him in formulating his

Amended Complaint. As the original Complaint is being dismissed with leave to amend, the

Court will disregard the pending Motion to Amend the Complaint. 

Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act

(RA) “both prohibit discrimination on the basis of disability.” Lovell v. Chandler, 303 F.3d

1039, 1052 (9th Cir. 2002). Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a

disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the

benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subject to discrimination

by such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Section 504 of the RA provides that “no otherwise qualified

individual with a disability . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from

the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any

program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .” 29 U. S. C. § 794. Title II of the

ADA and the RA apply to inmates within state prisons. Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v.

Yeskey, 118 S.Ct. 1952, 1955 (1998); see also Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019, 1023 (9th

Cir. 1997); Duffy v. Riveland, 98 F.3d 447, 453-56 (9th Cir. 1996).

“To establish a violation of Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must show that (1) [he] is a

qualified individual with a disability; (2) [he] was excluded from participation in or otherwise

discriminated against with regard to a public entity’s services, programs, or activities; and (3)

such exclusion or discrimination was by reason of [his] disability.” Lovell, 303 F.3d at 1052. 

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“To establish a violation of § 504 of the RA, a plaintiff must show that (1) [he] is handicapped

within the meaning of the RA; (2) [he] is otherwise qualified for the benefit or services sought;

(3) [he] was denied the benefit or services solely by reason of [his] handicap; and (4) the program

providing the benefit or services receives federal financial assistance.” Id. 

7. Eighth Amendment Medical 

A prisoner’s claim of inadequate medical care does not constitute cruel and unusual

punishment unless the mistreatment rises to the level of “deliberate indifference to serious

medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). The “deliberate indifference”

standard involves an objective and a subjective prong. First, the alleged deprivation must be, in

objective terms, “sufficiently serious.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citing

Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second, the prison official must act with a

“sufficiently culpable state of mind,” which entails more than mere negligence, but less than

conduct undertaken for the very purpose of causing harm. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 837. 

A prison official does not act in a deliberately indifferent manner unless the official “knows of

and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. 

In applying this standard, the Ninth Circuit has held that before it can be said that a

prisoner’s civil rights have been abridged, “the indifference to his medical needs must be

substantial. Mere ‘indifference,’ ‘negligence,’ or ‘medical malpractice’ will not support this

cause of action.” Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir. 1980), citing

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06. “[A] complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or

treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the

Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely

because the victim is a prisoner.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 106; see also Anderson v.

County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995); McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1050

(9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136

(9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). Even gross negligence is insufficient to establish deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs. See Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir.

1990). 

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The California Department of Corrections has an administrative grievance system for prisoner complaints. 1

Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15 § 3084.1. The process is initiated by submitting a CDC Form 602. Id. at § 3084.2(a). Four

levels of appeal are involved, including the informal level, first formal level, second formal level, and third formal

level, also known as the “Director’s Level.” Id. at § 3084.5. Appeals must be submitted within fifteen working days

of the event being appealed, and the process is initiated by submission of the appeal to the informal level, or in some

circumstances, the first formal level. Id. at §§ 3084.5, 3084.6(c).

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8. Exhaustion Requirement

Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, “[n]o action shall be brought with

respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner

confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are

available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). The section 1997e(a) exhaustion requirement

applies to all prisoner suits relating to prison life, Porter v. Nussle, 435 U.S. 516, 532 (2002), and

requires prisoners to complete the prison’s administrative process, regardless of the relief sought

by the prisoner and regardless of the relief offered by the process, as long as the administrative

process can provide some sort of relief on the complaint stated, Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 1

741 (2001). “All ‘available’ remedies must now be exhausted; those remedies need not meet

federal standards, nor must they be ‘plain, speedy, and effective.’” Porter, 534 U.S. at 524 (citing

to Booth, 532 U.S. at 739 n.5). “Proper exhaustion[, which] demands compliance with an

agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules . . . .” is required, Woodford v. Ngo, 126

S.Ct. 2378, 2386 (2006), and may not be satisfied “by filing an untimely or otherwise

procedurally defective . . . appeal,” id. at 2382. Finally, exhaustion must occur prior to filing

suit. McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199-1201 (9th Cir. 2002).

The California Department of Corrections has an administrative grievance system for

prisoner complaints. Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15 § 3084, et seq. “Any inmate or parolee under the

department’s jurisdiction may appeal any departmental decision, action, condition, or policy

which they can reasonably demonstrate as having an adverse effect upon their welfare.” Id. at

3084.1(a). Four levels of appeal are involved, including the informal level, first formal level,

second formal level, and third formal level, also known as the “Director’s Level.” Cal. Code

Regs. tit 15, § 3084.5 (2004). 

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D. CONCLUSION

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint does not contain any claims upon which relief

can be granted under § 1983 against any of the Defendants. The Court will provide Plaintiff with

time to file an Amended Complaint curing the deficiencies identified above should he wish to do

so. Because the Court is dismissing the original complaint with leave to amend, Plaintiff’s

Motion to Amend the Complaint will be DISREGARDED. 

Plaintiff must demonstrate in the Amended Complaint how the conditions complained of

resulted in a deprivation of his constitutional rights. See, Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9 Cir. th

1980). The Amended Complaint must specifically state how each Defendant is involved. 

Further, there can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or

connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423,

U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9 Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 th

F.2d 740, 743 (9 Cir. 1978). th

Finally, Plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 15-220 requires that an Amended Complaint

be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading and cannot incorporate by reference. 

As a general rule, an Amended Complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay,

375 F.2d 55, 57 (9 Cir. 1967). Once an Amended Complaint is filed, the original Complaint no th

longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an Amended Complaint, as in an original

Complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. The

Amended Complaint should be clearly and boldly titled “AMENDED COMPLAINT,” reference

the appropriate case number, and be an original signed under penalty of perjury. 

E. ORDER

The Court HEREBY ORDERS: 

1. The Motion to Amend is DISREGARDED;

2. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to SEND Plaintiff a blank civil rights

complaint form;

3. The Complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend. WITHIN THIRTY (30) days

from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff SHALL: 

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a. File an Amended Complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court

in this Order, or

b. Notify the Court in writing that he does not wish to file an Amended

Complaint and pursue the action but instead wishes to voluntary dismiss

the case. See, Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(1).

Plaintiff is forewarned that his failure to comply with this Order may result in a

Recommendation that the Complaint be dismissed pursuant to Local Rule 11-110.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: April 19, 2007 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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