Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_13-cv-08071/USCOURTS-azd-3_13-cv-08071-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America,

Plaintiff/Respondent, 

v. 

Nathan Brooks Manuelito,

Defendant/Movant.

CV 13-8071 PCT PGR MEA

CR 09-8073 PCT PGR

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE PAUL G. ROSENBLATT:

On or about April 1, 2013, Mr. Nathan Manuelito (“Movant”), who is incarcerated 

in Kentucky, filed a pro se Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2255, with regard to a criminal conviction entered by the Court.

1

 On May 5, 

2014, Respondent filed an exceptionally thorough and well-reasoned Response in 

Opposition to Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

2255 (“Response”) (Doc. 14 & Doc. 16). On June 16, 2014, Movant docketed a pleading 

captioned as a motion for a hearing, which was denied insofar as Movant sought a 

hearing and granted insofar as Movant sought additional time to file a reply to the 

response to his motion. See Doc. 19. In the order at Doc. 19 the Court allowed Movant 

until August 1, 2014, to docket a reply to the response to his section 2255 motion. On 

August 4, 2014, Movant docketed a pleading captioned as one seeking an evidentiary 

 

1 Movant initiated two prior section 2255 actions, 3:10 cv 8063 and 3:12 cv 8078, which 

were both dismissed without prejudice.

Case 3:13-cv-08071-PGR Document 22 Filed 08/14/14 Page 1 of 10
- 2 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

hearing with regard to all of the claims stated in his section 2255 motion. See Doc. 20. 

In the pleading at Doc. 20 Movant re-urges the merits of his claims for relief from 

conviction and sentencing and contends that non-constitutional claims are a basis for 

relief.

I Procedural History

On July 1, 2009, an Arizona federal grand jury indicted Movant on one count of 

assault with a dangerous weapon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153 and 113(a)(3) (Count 

1), and one count of assault resulting in serious bodily injury, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 

1153 and 113(a)(6) (Count 2). See Criminal Doc. 1. At Movant’s trial an eyewitness and 

the victim testified that, on April 22, 2009, Movant stabbed the victim, who was known 

to him, without provocation. The victim was stabbed three times, resulting in serious, 

life-threatening injuries. As summarized, a witness at Movant’s trial testified:

Defendant ran towards Danny [the victim, who had already been stabbed,]

and Nicole [the victim’s sister, who was on the porch of her mother’s 

home] with the knife. (RT 10/14/09 160; RT 10/15/09 282.) Both Danny 

and Nicole picked up wood from a nearby wood pile and threw it at 

Defendant. (RT 10/14/09 206.) Defendant then turned around and ran the 

other way. (RT 10/15/09 295.) Jay Dee had seen Danny and Nicole throw 

wood at Defendant, and tried to follow him when he ran away, but later 

decided not to because he thought Defendant might still be mad and stab 

him. (RT 10/14/09 205-07.)

Doc. 16 (Response) at 4.

 Movant also testified at his trial, asserting that he was frightened of the victim 

and that he acted in self-defense. Id. at 6. Movant also testified, however, that he never 

saw the victim brandish a weapon prior to or after stabbing the victim. Id.

The jury found Movant not guilty on Count 1, assault with a dangerous weapon, 

but found him guilty on Count 2, assault resulting in serious bodily injury. See Criminal 

Doc. 40. On March 22, 2010, pursuant to this conviction, Movant was sentenced to a 

term of 110 months imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release. See

Criminal Doc. 53.

Case 3:13-cv-08071-PGR Document 22 Filed 08/14/14 Page 2 of 10
- 3 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Movant was appointed counsel to represent him in his direct appeal. Counsel filed 

an opening brief raising both a non-frivolous issue and issues pursuant to Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396 (1967).2The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 

granted a motion urged by the government and ordered Movant to “file an opening brief 

raising any non-frivolous issues.” Movant filed another opening brief raising only one 

non-frivolous issue, i.e., whether the trial court’s jury instruction on self-defense was 

erroneous. See Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals No. 10-10133 at Doc. 41. The Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals held that the jury instruction was correct and affirmed Movant’s 

conviction and sentence. See Criminal Doc. 83 (Mandate of Ninth Circuit court of 

Appeals).

In this section 2255 action Movant asserts that: (1) he was denied his right to be 

free from double jeopardy; (2) the government withheld exculpatory evidence, i.e., DNA 

test results, in violation of Movant’s rights pursuant to Brady v. Maryland; (3) the trial 

court gave an erroneous jury instruction and the prosecutor committed misconduct in the 

form of vouching; (4) the trial court erred in imposing sentence; (5) he was denied his 

right to the effective assistance of trial counsel; and (6) he was denied his right to the 

effective assistance of appellate counsel. 

 

2 Pursuant to the decision in Anders, appointed appellate counsel for an indigent defendant in a 

direct appeal may inform the court that all of the defendant’s grounds for appeal are frivolous 

and they may move to withdraw as counsel. Defense counsel must first file an “Anders brief “on 

behalf of the indigent defendant presenting the strongest arguments in favor of the client 

supported by citations to the record and to applicable legal authority. See United States v. 

Griffy, 895 F.2d 561, 563 (9th Cir. 1990). After receiving an Anders brief, “the court-not 

counsel-then proceeds, after a full examination of all the proceedings, to decide whether the case 

is wholly frivolous.” Anders, 386 U.S. at 744, 87 S. Ct. at 1400. If the court concludes that the 

appeal is frivolous, it may grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and dismiss the appeal. “On the 

other hand, if it finds any of any of the legal points arguable on their merits (and therefore not 

frivolous) it must, prior to decision, afford the indigent the assistance of counsel to argue the 

appeal.” Id “[A]an attorney may file an Anders brief only when, after reviewing the entire 

record, he finds an appeal ‘wholly frivolous.’” Anders, 386 U.S. at 744, 87 S.Ct. 1396.” Graves 

v. McEwen, 731 F.3d 876, 880 (9th Cir. 2013).

Case 3:13-cv-08071-PGR Document 22 Filed 08/14/14 Page 3 of 10
- 4 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

To the extent Movant did not raise the claims stated as Movant’s first, second, 

third and fourth claims for collateral relief in his direct appeal, Movant has procedurally 

defaulted his first, second, third, and fourth claims. To the extent these claims were 

raised in his direct appeal and decided by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Court 

should not revisit the merits of those issues. Movant’s claims regarding ineffective 

assistance of trial and appellate counsel may be denied on the merits.

II Analysis

Because “[h]abeas review is an extraordinary remedy and will not be allowed to 

do service for an appeal,” Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621, 118 S. Ct. 1604, 

1610 (1998), absent a showing of cause and prejudice a section 2255 movant 

procedurally defaults all claims not raised in his direct appeal, other than claims asserting 

that the movant was deprived of the right to the effective assistance of counsel. See

United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-68, 102 S. Ct. 1584, 1594 (1982); United 

States v. Ratigan, 351 F.3d 957, 964 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Skurdal, 341 F.3d 

921, 925 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Johnson, 988 F.2d 941, 945 (9th Cir. 1993). 

“[T]o obtain collateral relief based on trial errors to which no contemporaneous 

objection was made, a convicted defendant must show both (1) ‘cause’ excusing his 

double procedural default, and (2) ‘actual prejudice’ resulting from the errors of which he 

complains.” Frady, 456 U.S. at 167-68, 102 S. Ct. at 1594. See also Ratigan, 351 F.3d at 

964; Skurdal, 341 F.3d at 925. 

Generally, to demonstrate “cause” for procedural default, an appellant must 

show that “some objective factor external to the defense” impeded his 

adherence to the procedural rule. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 

S. Ct. 2639, [] (1986). However, if the record shows that an appellate 

counsel's performance fell below the standard of competency of counsel set 

forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, [] (1984), 

or that he was denied representation by counsel on appeal altogether, he has 

demonstrated cause for his procedural default.

Skurdal, 341 F.3d at 925. 

Case 3:13-cv-08071-PGR Document 22 Filed 08/14/14 Page 4 of 10
- 5 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, Movant must 

show that (1) his appellate counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness, and (2) the deficiency in appellate counsel’s performance prejudiced him. 

See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 692, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2065, 2067

(1984); Skurdal, 341 F.3d at 925; United States v. Baker, 256 F.3d 855, 862 (9th Cir. 

2001). To succeed on a claim that appellate counsel’s performance was 

unconstitutionally ineffective, the defendant “must first show that his counsel was 

objectively unreasonable,” in other words, that “counsel unreasonably failed to discover 

nonfrivolous issues and to file a merits brief raising” those issues. Smith v. Robbins, 528 

U.S. 259, 285 & 288, 120 S. Ct. 746, 762 & 764 (2000). The defendant must then 

demonstrate that his counsel's errors were prejudicial. Id., 528 U.S. at 285, 120 S. Ct. at 

765-66. To establish prejudice the defendant “must show a reasonable probability that, 

but for his counsel's unreasonable failure...he would have prevailed on his appeal.” Id. 

To establish that his appellate counsel’s performance was unconstitutionally 

deficient Movant must show that result of his direct appeal would have been different had 

his appellate counsel raised what Movant asserts is a meritorious claim. Appellate 

counsel’s decision to not raise a weak issue on appeal indicates simultaneously that 

counsel’s performance was objectively reasonable and that counsel’s performance did not 

prejudice the defendant. See Baker, 256 F.3d at 862; Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 

840 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[A]ppellate counsel’s failure to raise issues on direct appeal does 

not constitute ineffective assistance when appeal would not have provided grounds for 

reversal.”). Generally, what claims to be raised on appeal are presumed to be left to the 

expertise of appellate counsel and the alleged “failure” to raise a meritless issue on appeal 

is not ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. “Experienced advocates since time 

beyond memory have emphasized the importance of winnowing out weaker arguments 

on appeals.” Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751, 103 S. Ct. 3308, 3312-13 (1983). 

Consequently, “absent contrary evidence,” the federal courts may “assume that appellate 

counsel’s failure to raise a claim was an exercise of sound appellate strategy.’” United 

States v. Brown, 528 F.3d 1030, 1033 (8th Cir. 2008). However, “[b]ecause denial of 

Case 3:13-cv-08071-PGR Document 22 Filed 08/14/14 Page 5 of 10
- 6 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

effective [appellate] counsel is prejudicial per se,” if a movant establishes that their 

appellate counsel failed to raise a meritorious claim in their direct appeal they have 

“demonstrated cause and prejudice for the failure to raise the contentions on direct appeal 

that” they then present in their section 2255 motion. Skurdal, 341 F.3d at 927-28, citing 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692, 104 S. Ct. at 2067 and Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 88-89,

109 S. Ct. 346, 354 (1988) (“[T]he presumption of prejudice must extend as well to the 

denial of counsel on appeal.”).

Defendant contends that his appellate counsel. Marc Victor, was ineffective 

for failing to raise the following issues on appeal: (1) sentencing—namely, 

the sub-claims regarding use of his current conviction as a crime of 

violence; use of his prior conviction for career criminal status; 4-level 

enhancement for use of a dangerous weapon; denial of adjustment for 

acceptance of responsibility, and restitution; (2) Brady violation concerning 

the DNA evidence; (3) precluded evidence in government’s motions #29 

and #34; and (4) double jeopardy. (CV 13-08071-PCT-PGR, CR 1 at 27-

28.) Because the government has already demonstrated that these claims are 

meritless, and thus Mr. Victor was not ineffective for failing to raise these 

claims—thereby undercutting his claim that he has cause to excuse his 

procedural default on these claims—no further response on these claims is 

necessary.

Response at 61.

Movant has not shown cause nor prejudice with regard to any defaulted claim. 

Movant has not established that his appellate counsel’s performance was 

unconstitutionally deficient or that he was prejudiced by any alleged error. Compare

Skurdal, 341 F.3d at 927-28.3 Accordingly, Movant has not established cause for nor 

 

3

In his motion to withdraw, and the supporting affidavit, Mr. Bevolden failed to set 

forth any grounds that arguably presented non-frivolous issues “supported by 

citations to the record and to applicable legal authority,” as required by Griffy, 

895 F.2d at 563. For example, Mr. Bevolden failed to point out to this court that 

the district court may have erred in denying Mr. Skurdal his Sixth Amendment 

right to represent himself at trial as required by Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 

806, 819-20, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). Mr. Bevolden failed to 

inform this court that the district court may have erred in determining that Mr. 

Case 3:13-cv-08071-PGR Document 22 Filed 08/14/14 Page 6 of 10
- 7 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

prejudice arising from the procedural default of some of his collateral claims which were 

not raised in Movant’s direct appeal.

A section 2255 movant who fails to show cause and prejudice can still obtain 

review of a claim on collateral attack by demonstrating the likelihood of his “actual,” i.e., 

factual, innocence. See Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623, 118 S. Ct. at 1611-12; United States v. 

Braswell, 501 F.3d 1147, 1150 (9th Cir. 2007). To establish actual innocence the movant 

must demonstrate that, in light of all the evidence, including new evidence that might be 

introduced by both sides, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have 

convicted him. See Ratigan, 351 F.3d at 964, quoting Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623, 118 S. 

Ct. at 1611. Movant has not established any likelihood of his actual innocence-Movant 

does not assert that he did not stab the victim, Movant contends he acted in self-defense. 

Accordingly, any claim other than an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim

which Movant did not assert in his direct appeal has been procedurally defaulted and 

should not be considered by the Court.

Furthermore, as a general rule, “[i]ssues disposed of on a previous direct appeal 

are not reviewable in a subsequent § 2255 proceeding.” United States v. Currie, 589 F.2d 

993, 995 (9th Cir. 1979). A section 2255 petitioner may, in limited circumstances, raise 

claims of trial court error that were previously raised and decided on direct appeal. See

Feldman v. Henman, 815 F.2d 1318, 1322 (9th Cir. 1987) (emphasis added), citing

Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 227 n.8, 89 S. Ct. 1068, 1074 n.8 (1969). 

Therefore, to the extent Movant raised any of his section 2255 claims in his direct appeal, 

 

Skurdal was not competent because he lacked the “technical legal knowledge” to 

represent himself. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 400, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 

L.Ed.2d 321 (1993) (holding that a “defendant’s ‘technical legal knowledge’ is 

‘not relevant’ to the determination whether he is competent to waive his right to 

counsel”) (quoting Faretta 422 U.S. at 836, 95 S.Ct. 2525). Mr. Bevolden’s failure 

to file a brief that complied with Anders and Griffy denied Mr. Skurdal his Fifth 

Amendment right to effective counsel on appeal. Because denial of effective 

counsel is prejudicial per se, Mr. Skurdal has demonstrated cause and prejudice 

for the failure to raise the contentions on direct appeal that he presented in his § 

2255 motion.

Case 3:13-cv-08071-PGR Document 22 Filed 08/14/14 Page 7 of 10
- 8 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

because the claims stated in his direct appeal were denied on the merits by the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals they should not be considered by the Court.

With regard to Movant’s ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim,

The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to 

effective assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 

104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).... To prevail on a claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel, petitioner must show 1) his attorney’s 

performance was unreasonable under prevailing professional standards; and 

2) there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s unprofessional 

errors, the results would have been different. United States v. Blaylock, 20 

F.3d 1458, 1465 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 

S. Ct. at 2064). “Strickland defines a reasonable probability as ‘a 

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’” Id.

United States v. Span, 75 F.3d 1383, 1386-87 (9th Cir. 1996). See also United States v. 

Thomas, 417 F. 3d 1053, 1056 (9th Cir. 2005).

The Sixth Amendment entitles a criminal defendant to “a reasonably competent 

attorney, whose advice is within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in 

criminal cases.” United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 655, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 2044-45 

(1984) (internal quotations omitted). In order to find that Movant was deprived of the 

effective assistance of trial counsel and grant him relief on this claim pursuant to section 

2255, the Court must conclude counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient 

performance prejudiced Movant. See, e.g., United States v. Withers, 638 F.3d 1055, 

1066-67 (9th Cir. 2011). It is Movant’s burden to provide the Court with sufficient 

evidence from which the Court can conclude counsel’s performance was 

unconstitutionally ineffective. See, e.g., United States v. Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.3d 

1344, 1348 (9th Cir. 1995). Counsel’s performance is deficient when it is unreasonable, 

or not “within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2054. Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s 

performance must be “highly deferential.” Id., 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065. See

also Carter v. Lee, 283 F.3d 240, 248-49 (4th Cir. 2002). Movant must overcome a 

strong presumption that his counsel’s representation was within a wide range of 

Case 3:13-cv-08071-PGR Document 22 Filed 08/14/14 Page 8 of 10
- 9 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

reasonable professional assistance. See United States v. Ferreira-Alameda, 815 F.2d 

1251, 1253 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Molina, 934 F.2d 1440, 1447 (9th Cir. 

1991). The alleged “failure” to take futile action can never be deficient performance. See

Rupe v. Wood, 93 F.3d 1434, 1445 (9th Cir. 1996). “The failure to raise a meritless legal 

argument does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.” Baumann v. United 

States, 692 F.2d 565, 572 (9th Cir. 1982). A claim of failure to present a viable defense 

may not be supported solely conclusory allegations, but instead must be supported by a 

showing that counsel failed to assert a specific, viable defense. Shah v. United States, 

878 F.2d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 1989). Accordingly, a defendant cannot satisfy the 

Strickland standard by “vague and conclusory allegations that some unspecified and 

speculative” evidence might have established his defense.” Zettlemoyer v. Fulcomer, 923 

F.2d 284, 298 (3d Cir. 1991).

Respondent persuasively and very thoroughly explains in the response to the 

section 2255 motion how each specific “error” asserted by Movant as comprising a 

violation of Movant’s right to the effective assistance of trial counsel was neither 

unconstitutionally deficient performance by trial counsel or prejudicial to Movant. 

III Conclusion

Movant procedurally defaulted some of his section 2255 claims by failing to raise 

them in his direct appeal. Movant has not established that his appellate counsel’s alleged 

“failure” to raise these issues violated Movant’s right to the effective assistance of 

appellate counsel and, accordingly, Movant has not shown cause for nor prejudice arising 

from his procedural default of these claims. Movant arguably raised some of his claims 

in his direct appeal and, accordingly, the Court should not consider the merits of those 

claims in his section 2255 action. Movant has not demonstrated that his trial counsel’s 

performance was deficient or that he was prejudiced by any alleged deficient 

performance and, accordingly, Movant’s assertion that he was denied his right to the 

effective assistance of counsel may be denied on the merits. 

Case 3:13-cv-08071-PGR Document 22 Filed 08/14/14 Page 9 of 10
- 10 -

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Manuelito’s motion for relief 

from his conviction and sentence pursuant to section 2255 be denied and dismissed with 

prejudice.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall have 

fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within 

which to file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the parties have 

fourteen (14) days within which to file a response to the objections. 

Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District 

Court for the District of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not 

exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. Failure to timely file objections to any factual or 

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right 

to de novo appellate consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 

F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file objections to any factual 

or legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right 

to appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law in an order or judgment 

entered pursuant to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge.

Dated this 14th day of August, 2014.

Case 3:13-cv-08071-PGR Document 22 Filed 08/14/14 Page 10 of 10