Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06489/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06489-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANGELO JONATHAN JOHNSON, )

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Petitioner, )

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v. )

)

)

ANTHONY KANE, Warden, )

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Respondent. )

 )

CV F 04 6489 AWI SMS HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING RESPONDENT’S MOTION

TO DISMISS 

[Doc. #12]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections pursuant to

a judgment of the Superior Court of California, County of Kern, following his conviction by guilty

plea on December 21, 2001, to the offense of petty theft with a prior in violation of Cal. Penal Code

§ 666. See Document 1, Exhibits to Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (hereinafter

“Exhibits”). The Court also found true the allegations that Petitioner had six prior prison terms for

felony convictions within the meaning of Cal. Penal Code § 667.5(b). Petitioner was sentenced to

serve a determinate term of twelve years in state prison. Id.

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Petitioner did not pursue a direct appeal.

On May 19, 2003, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in Kern County

Superior Court. See Document 2, Exhibits. On June 11, 2003, the Superior Court denied the petition.

See Document 3, Exhibits. 

On October 16, 2003, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California

Court of Appeals, Fifth Appellate District (hereinafter “5th DCA”). See Document 4, Exhibits. The

petition was summarily denied on October 30, 2003. See Document 5, Exhibits. 

On December 1, 2003, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California

Supreme Court. See Document 6, Exhibits. The petition was summarily denied on September 29,

2004. See Document 7, Exhibits.

On October 14, 2004, Petitioner filed the instant federal petition for writ of habeas corpus in

this Court. 

On March 24, 2005, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition as being filed outside

the one-year limitations period prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

Petitioner did not file an opposition to Respondent’s motion to dismiss.

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

Respondent has filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition as being filed outside the one year

limitations period prescribed by Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Rule 4 of the Rules Governing

Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a petition if it “plainly appears from the face of

the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district

court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.

The Ninth Circuit has allowed Respondent’s to file a Motion to Dismiss in lieu of an Answer

if the motion attacks the pleadings for failing to exhaust state remedies or being in violation of the

state’s procedural rules. See, e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 1990) (using Rule

4 to evaluate motion to dismiss petition for failure to exhaust state remedies); White v. Lewis, 874

F.2d 599, 602-03 (9th Cir. 1989) (using Rule 4 as procedural grounds to review motion to dismiss for

state procedural default); Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (same). 

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Thus, a Respondent can file a Motion to Dismiss after the court orders a response, and the Court

should use Rule 4 standards to review the motion. See Hillery, 533 F. Supp. at 1194 & n. 12.

In this case, Respondent's Motion to Dismiss is based on a violation of 28 U.S.C.

2244(d)(1)'s one year limitation period. Because Respondent's Motion to Dismiss is similar to a

motion to dismiss based on state procedural default and Respondent has not yet filed a formal

Answer, the Court will review Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to its authority under Rule

4. 

B. Limitation Period for Filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (AEDPA). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of habeas

corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063

(1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 586

(1997). The instant petition was filed on October 14, 2004, and thus, it is subject to the provisions of

the AEDPA. 

The AEDPA imposes a one year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a federal

petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, § 2244, subdivision (d)

reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall

not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

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28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

In most cases, the limitation period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct

review became final. Here, the Petitioner was convicted on December 21, 2001, and the sentence

was pronounced on January 22, 2002. Petitioner did not file an appeal. Pursuant to Rule 31(a) of the

California Rules of Court, Petitioner had sixty (60) days in which to file a notice of appeal. Rule

31(a), Cal.R.Ct.; People v. Mendez, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 301, 302, 19 Cal.4th 1084, 1086, 969 P.2d 146,

147 (1999). Because Petitioner did not file a notice of appeal, his direct review concluded on March

23, 2002, when the sixty-day period for filing a notice of appeal expired. Thus, Petitioner had one

year until March 23, 2003, absent applicable tolling, in which to file his federal petition for writ of

habeas corpus. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir.2001). Petitioner did not file

his federal petition until October 14, 2004, over a year and a half after the limitations period had

expired.

C. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed application

for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward” the one-year limitation period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In

Carey v. Saffold, the Supreme Court held the statute of limitations is tolled where a petitioner is

properly pursuing post-conviction relief, and the period is tolled during the intervals between one

state court's disposition of a habeas petition and the filing of a habeas petition at the next level of the

state court system. 122 S.Ct. 2134, 2135-36 (2002); see also Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006

(9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1846 (2000); Welch v. Newland, 267 F.3d 1013, 1016 (9th

Cir.2001) (“tolled period includes intervals between the disposition of a state court petition and the

filing of a subsequent petition at the next state appellate level”); Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243,

1247 (9th Cir.2001) (stating that the "AEDPA's one-year grace period is tolled during the pendency

of properly filed state petitions challenging the judgment or claim at issue."); cf. Dils v. Small, 260

F.3d 984, 986 (9th Cir.2001) (Court found no tolling between consecutive filings at the same level);

Lewis v. Mitchell, 173 F.Supp.2d 1057, 1061 (C.D. Cal.2001) (holding that the interval between a

motion for sentence modification in the state superior court and a habeas petition in the superior

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court was not tolled pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)).

As stated above, the statute of limitations began to run on March 23, 2002, and expired on

March 23, 2003. Although Petitioner filed three post-conviction collateral challenges with respect to

the pertinent judgment or claim in state court, the petitions did not operate to toll the statute of

limitations. The first collateral challenge was not filed until May 19, 2003, nearly two months after

the limitations period had expired. Because the limitations period had already expired, the collateral

challenge had no tolling consequences. Green v. White, 223 F.3d 1001, 1003 (9th Cir.2000)

(Petitioner is not entitled to tolling where the limitations period has already run); see also Webster v.

Moore, 199 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir.2000); Rendall v. Carey, 2002 WL 1346354 (N.D.Cal.2002). For

the same reasons, Petitioner is not entitled to tolling for the time his subsequent state habeas

petitions were pending. Therefore, the instant petition remains untimely.

D. Equitable Tolling

The limitations period is subject to equitable tolling if “extraordinary circumstances beyond a

prisoner’s control” have made it impossible for the petition to be filed on time. Calderon v. U.S.

Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 541 (9th Cir. 1998), citing Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107

F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1996), cert denied, -- U.S. –, 188 S.Ct. 60, 139 (1997); (Beeler), 128 F.3d at

1288 (noting that "[e]quitable tolling will not be available in most cases, as extensions of time will

only be granted if 'extraordinary circumstances' beyond a prisoner's control make it impossible to file

a petition on time"). "When external forces, rather than a petitioner's lack of diligence, account for

the failure to file a timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may be appropriate."

Id.; Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Petitioner does not argue that there were any circumstances beyond his control which

prevented him from timely complying with the limitations period. As there exists no circumstances

sufficient to justify equitably tolling the limitations period, the petition is untimely and must be

dismissed. 

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that the motion to dismiss be

GRANTED and the habeas corpus petition be DISMISSED with prejudice for Petitioner’s failure to

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comply with 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)’s one year limitation period.

These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the Honorable Anthony W. Ishii,

United States District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and

Rule 72-304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of

California. 

Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections

with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served and

filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the objections. 

The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 17, 2005 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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