Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00067/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-00067-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Brian K. Stallings, 

Plaintiff, 

 vs. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Defendants. 

 No. CV 13-0067-PHX-SMM (MEA) 

 O R D E R 

 Plaintiff Brian K. Stallings brought this pro se civil rights Complaint under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 against three Arizona Department of Corrections officials—Director 

Charles L. Ryan, Dr. Thomas Bell, and Nurse Martin—and Wexford Health Solutions, 

the prison’s contracted healthcare provider (Doc. 40). Stallings alleged four counts of 

deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs related to treatment for his feet (id.). 

Before the Court are Ryan and Martin’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 53), Bell 

and Wexford’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute and in the Alternative, Motion 

to Compel Plaintiff’s Deposition (Doc. 69), and Stallings’ Motion to Dismiss Without 

Prejudice (Doc. 71). 

 The Court will grant Stallings’ motion, dismiss the action without prejudice, and 

deny Defendants’ motions as moot. 

I. Procedural Background 

 On March 30, 2014, Ryan and Martin filed a Motion for Summary Judgment in 

which they argued that Martin was not deliberately indifferent to Stallings’ medical needs 

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and Ryan cannot be liable because he did not participate in Stallings’ treatment (Doc. 53). 

The Court issued a Notice informing Stallings of the procedural rules governing summary 

judgment and setting a response deadline of April 27, 2014 (Doc. 56). Stallings 

immediately moved for a 90-day extension to file his response; he stated that due to a 

murder in the prison unit in March 2014, Stallings’ unit was on lockdown and the prison 

law library was closed indefinitely (Doc. 57). The Court “granted” his motion, but then 

set a new deadline of April 28, 2014 (Doc. 58). On April 24, 2014, the Court received a 

motion for a 30-day extension from Stallings, who stated that the library was still 

unavailable and his unit was still on lockdown (Doc. 61). The Court granted his motion 

and extended the response deadline to May 30, 2014 (Doc. 62). 

 Meanwhile, Bell and Wexford filed a Notice of Deposition, indicating that 

Stallings’ deposition was set for May 8, 2014, at his prison unit (Doc. 60). On April 28, 

2014, Stallings moved for an extension to respond to discovery and to submit to a 

deposition so that he could retain counsel (Doc. 63). Bell and Wexford opposed the 

motion (Doc. 64), and on May 5, 2014, Stallings filed his reply in support of the 

requested extension (Doc. 67). However, the Court did not receive Stallings May 5, 2014 

reply until May 12, 2014, by which time it had already denied the motion (Doc. 65, May 

6, 2014 Order). 

 On May 20, 2014, Bell and Wexford filed their Motion to Dismiss for Failure to 

Prosecute on the grounds that Stallings had not responded to discovery requests and 

refused to submit to the deposition on May 8, 2014 (Doc. 69). 

 On May 22, 2014, Stallings filed his Motion to Dismiss Without Prejudice, stating 

that he is unable to afford medical experts at this time and that the murder that occurred 

in his unit in March 2014 had made it nearly impossible to go to the law library to work 

on his case and all his requests for counsel have been denied (Doc. 71). Stallings stated 

that the lockdown in his unit remains in effect (id.). 

 Ryan and Martin filed their opposition to Stallings’ Motion to Dismiss, which Bell 

and Wexford joined (Docs. 74-75). Defendants argued that they have already filed a 

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summary judgment motion to which Stallings has not responded and they have answered 

numerous discovery requests and attended the deposition that Stallings refused to 

participate in (Doc. 74 at 1-2). For these reasons, they request that Stallings’ motion be 

denied and their summary judgment motion be granted (id. at 2-3). 

II. Motion for Voluntary Dismissal 

 A. Legal Standard 

Because a motion for summary judgment was filed before Stallings submitted his 

motion for voluntary dismissal, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2) governs. Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 41(a). Under Rule 41(a)(2), an action may be dismissed at the plaintiff’s 

request only by a court order. A motion to dismiss under Rule 41(a)(2) is committed to 

the sound discretion of the Court. Sams v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 625 F.2d 273, 277 (9th 

Cir. 1980). A court should grant a Rule 41(a)(2) motion for voluntary dismissal unless 

the defendant shows that he will suffer legal prejudice as a result. Smith v. Lenches, 263 

F.3d 972, 975 (9th Cir. 2001). “‘[L]egal prejudice’ means ‘prejudice to some legal 

interest, some legal claim, some legal argument.’” Id. at 976 (quoting Westlands Water 

Dist. v. United States, 100 F.3d 94, 96 (9th Cir. 1996)). For example, prejudice may be 

the loss of a federal forum, the right to a jury trial, or a statute-of-limitations defense. See 

Westlands, 100 F.3d at 97. Legal prejudice does not result because the dispute remains 

unresolved, there is a threat of future litigation, or a plaintiff may gain a tactical 

advantage by the dismissal. Smith, 263 F.3d at 976. Nor does the expense incurred in 

defending against a lawsuit amount to legal prejudice. Westlands, 100 F.3d at 97 (citing 

Hamilton v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 679 F.2d 143, 146 (9th Cir. 1982)). 

 Unless otherwise stated, a dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2) is without prejudice. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). While a dismissal without prejudice is the default position 

stated in Rule 41(a)(2), the court has broad discretion whether to dismiss an action with 

or without prejudice. Hargis v. Foster, 312 F.3d 404, 412 (9th Cir. 2002). In 

determining if an action should be dismissed with prejudice, the court can consider the 

fact that the defendant has filed a motion for summary judgment; “[a]n attempt to avoid 

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an adverse decision on the merits may constitute legal prejudice.” In re Sizzler Rest. 

Int’l, Inc., No. SV 96-16075-AG, 262 B.R. 811, 822 (C.D.Cal. 2001). 

B. Discussion 

 Defendants’ opposition to Stallings’ Motion to Dismiss is based on the time and 

expense they have put into defending this action (Doc. 74). As mentioned above, this 

does not amount to legal prejudice. 

 Defendants also suggest that Stallings has not litigated in good faith. “Ninth 

Circuit caselaw intimates that a district court may refuse to grant dismissal under Rule 

41(a)(2) when exceptional circumstances suggest bad faith and/or vexatious tactics on the 

part of the plaintiff, and that the defendant may suffer the ‘legal prejudice’ of never 

having claims resolved.” Manuel v. Shipyard Holdings, No. C 01-00883 WHA, 2001 

WL 1382050, at *3 (N.D.Cal. Nov. 5, 2001) (citing In re Exxon Valdez, 102 F.3d 429, 

432 (9th Cir. 1996)). According to Defendants, Stallings’ “lawsuit is frivolous,” he 

“willfully refused to participate in” the deposition, and he “defied the Court’s briefing 

schedule” (id. at 2). But the Court screened Stallings’ Complaint and First Amended 

Complaint and specifically determined that his claims were not frivolous (Docs. 5, 39). 

As to the deposition, the Court notes that it appears Stallings did not receive the Court’s 

May 6, 2014 Order denying his motion for an extension related to the deposition before 

the May 8, 2014 scheduled deposition (see Docs. 65, 67). And although Stallings has not 

responded to the summary judgment motion, he has sought extensions in which he 

explained his inability to go to the law library to prepare his response. Thus, the Court 

does not construe his failure to respond as an attempt to “defy” the Court’s briefing 

schedule, nor do these circumstances constitute bad faith or vexatious tactics by Stallings. 

Notably, Defendants do not refute Stallings’ averments that a murder occurred in the 

prison in March 2014, which caused the law library to close, and that Stallings’ prison 

unit has remained in lockdown status. 

 In short, Defendants have not shown they will suffer legal prejudice as a result of a 

dismissal. Moreover, in light of Stallings’ proffered reason for his inability to prepare his 

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response, and given that only two of the four Defendants have moved for summary 

judgment (see Doc. 53), Stallings’ request for dismissal is not viewed simply as an 

attempt to avoid a decision on merits. The Court will therefore exercise its discretion to 

dismiss the action under Rule 41(a)(2) without prejudice. 

 Stallings’ Motion to Dismiss will be granted, the action will be dismissed, and 

Defendants’ pending motions will be denied as moot. 

IT IS ORDERED: 

(1) The reference to the Magistrate Judge is withdrawn as to Defendants Ryan 

and Martin’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 53), Defendants Bell and Wexford’s 

Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute and in the Alternative, Motion to Compel 

Plaintiff’s Deposition (Doc. 69), and Plaintiff Stallings’ Motion to Dismiss Without 

Prejudice (Doc. 71). 

 (2) Plaintiff Stallings’ Motion to Dismiss Without Prejudice (Doc. 71) is granted; 

the First Amended Complaint is dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 41(a)(2). 

 (3) Defendants Ryan and Martin’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 53) and 

Defendants Bell and Wexford’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute and in the 

Alternative, Motion to Compel Plaintiff’s Deposition (Doc. 69) are denied as moot. 

 (4) The Clerk of Court must enter judgment of dismissal and terminate this action. 

 DATED this 8th day of July, 2014. 

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