Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01099/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01099-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 790
Nature of Suit: Other Labor Litigation
Cause of Action: 28:1346 Tort Claim

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28 1 All further references to a “Rule” are to the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure.

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

DEBORAH HENSON, 

Plaintiff,

NO. CIV. 05-CV-1099-FCD-KJM

v.

LASSEN COUNTY, et al.,

Defendants.

__________________________/

----oo0oo----

This matter comes before the court on defendants’ motion to

dismiss plaintiff Deborah Henson’s third amended complaint

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).1 Plaintiff

includes additional claims in her complaint, which the court

interprets as a motion for leave to amend pursuant to Rule 15(a). 

For the reasons set forth below, defendants’ motion to dismiss is

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2 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. 

E.D. Cal. Local Rule 78-230(h).

2

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, and plaintiff’s motion for

leave to amend is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.2 

BACKGROUND

In April of 2003, plaintiff submitted her resume to the

California Merit Systems Board for consideration for the position

of supervisor or director of a Child Protective Services (“CPS”)

division. (Pl.’s Third Am. Compl. (“TAC”) ¶ 16, filed March 27,

2006.) Thereafter, plaintiff was contacted by Margaret Crosby to

interview for the position of CPS Supervisor in defendant Lassen

County (“Lassen”). (TAC ¶ 17.) After plaintiff interviewed for

the position, she was offered the job by defendant Crosby,

Lassen’s Deputy Director of Health and Human Services. (TAC ¶¶

18-19.) Before accepting the position, plaintiff informed Crosby

that she was in remission from panic/anxiety disorder and that

such condition could recur if more than ordinary levels of stress

were involved in her position at CPS. (TAC ¶ 20.) 

Plaintiff commenced employment on May 12, 2003, relying on

Crosby’s assurances that CPS was in good order and provided

health insurance benefits to its managerial employees while on

disability leave. (TAC ¶¶ 34, 25-28, 30.) However, plaintiff

later learned that CPS was subject to a grand jury investigation

and was in a state of non-compliance with the California

Department of Social Services. (TAC ¶¶ 40.) This was not

disclosed to plaintiff during her interview process; rather

defendants Crosby and Margolies, Lassen’s Personnel Director,

intentionally withheld this information from plaintiff. (TAC ¶¶

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9, 26-27.) Plaintiff later learned that CPS was understaffed by

more than half of its required full-time employees, which

dictated that plaintiff work between 70 and 80 hours per week. 

(TAC ¶¶ 37-38.) 

Plaintiff was promoted to Director of CPS in November 2003. 

(TAC ¶ 45.) Around the same time, plaintiff completed her 6-

month probationary period and became a permanent employee. (TAC

¶ 48.) Shortly after she was promoted, a coworker, Deanna Bovee,

lodged a female-on-female sexual harassment complaint against

plaintiff. (TAC ¶ 57.) During this time, plaintiff also became

the subject of sexually-orientated slurs by members of CPS staff. 

(TAC ¶ 49.) In early January 2004, plaintiff demanded that

action be taken regarding the allegedly false sexual harassment

claim filed against her. (TAC ¶ 58.) Although Bovee’s

allegation was recanted, no action was taken to remedy such

accusations or clear plaintiff’s name. (TAC ¶¶ 59-61.) In

addition, these allegations were investigated by Jim Jackson in

March and April 2004. (TAC ¶ 73.) Jackson found that plaintiff

was injured by the false allegations and that disciplinary action

should be taken against the complainant. (Id.) However, no

action was taken in response to Jackson’s report. (TAC ¶ 74.)

In early 2004, plaintiff sought to hire a CPS social worker. 

(TAC ¶ 63.) Defendant Mannel, Lassen’s Director of Mental

Health, demanded that plaintiff hire his wife. Plaintiff refused

because Mannel’s wife did not apply for the position through the

proper channels. (TAC ¶¶ 5, 54-55.) Instead, plaintiff offered

the position to Bill Snitkin. (Id. at 63.) Defendant Margolies

directed plaintiff to rescind the job offer to Snitkin, or in the

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alternative, prepare for his termination by “starting a paper

trail,” because Snitkin was HIV positive. (TAC ¶¶ 64.) 

Plaintiff refused to rescind the offer. (TAC ¶ 65.) On February

17, 2004, defendants Whiteman, Mannel and Margolies met with

Plaintiff and again demanded she hire Mannel’s wife. (TAC ¶ 66.) 

At this time, Whiteman was Lassen’s Chief Administrative Officer. 

(TAC ¶ 8.) Following another demand to hire Mannel’s wife in

March 2004, plaintiff sought medical care for anxiety induced

chest pains. (TAC ¶ 71.) 

Thereafter, plaintiff believes that defendants Whiteman,

Mannel, and others attempted to solicit negative information

about plaintiff, which may have resulted in the filing of a

second female-on-female sexual harassment complaint against

plaintiff. (TAC ¶¶ 72, 75.) Again, the complaint was later

recanted. (TAC ¶ 78.) Plaintiff believes that Chapman, a member

of Lassen’s Board of Supervisors, as well as Whiteman and Mannel,

met with Woody Morgan, managing editor of the Lassen County News. 

(TAC ¶¶ 8, 76.) Plaintiff also believes that these defendants

made defamatory statements and provided false and misleading

information to Morgan regarding plaintiff’s professionalism and

management of CPS. (TAC ¶ 77.) Thereafter, plaintiff was

“shocked and humiliated” by the call for plaintiff’s termination

in Morgan’s article published in the Lassen County News on May

11, 2004. (TAC ¶¶ 79-80.)

Plaintiff believes that, as a result of her complaints

regarding the allegedly false sexual harassment claims, her

refusal to hire defendant Mannel’s wife, her refusal to rescind

the job offer to Snitkin, and her refusal to engage in

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discriminatory conduct toward Snitkin, defendants Whiteman,

Chapman, Mannel, and others conspired to create intolerable

working conditions and to interfere with her civil rights so as

to cause her to quit her job or take a disability leave. (TAC ¶¶

67, 69.) 

Plaintiff also believes Whiteman discriminated against women

employed by Lassen. (TAC ¶ 81.) In April 2004, Whiteman told

plaintiff she should “leave the bigger issues to the men in

management.” (TAC ¶ 82.) Mannel, a male employee with the same

level of responsibility, the same title and comparable duties

earned approximately $20,000 more per year than Plaintiff. (TAC

¶ 84.)

On June 1, 2004, defendant Bixby, Lassen’s Chief

Administrative Officer, informed plaintiff by memorandum that he

was placing the operations of CPS under the control of defendant

Mannel. (TAC ¶ 87.) On that same date, plaintiff began a 14 day

medical leave as a result of work-related stress. (TAC ¶ 88.) 

Subsequently, plaintiff sought the care of a psychiatrist, who

diagnosed plaintiff as suffering from post traumatic stress

disorder. (TAC ¶ 93.) As a result of her mental and emotional

condition, plaintiff has been unable to seek suitable reemployment after July 27, 2004. (TAC ¶ 96.) 

While plaintiff took medical leave, Mannel prohibited CPS

staff from contacting her and repeatedly made false, degrading

comments about her professional abilities during staff meetings. 

(TAC ¶¶ 89-90.) During this time, Mannel removed and destroyed

her diplomas and other personal property from her office. (TAC ¶

91.) Defendant Bixby demanded by letter on June 15, 2004 that

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plaintiff refrain from contacting any member of the staff at CPS. 

(TAC ¶¶ 6, 92.) This action effectively ended plaintiff’s

authority over CPS. (TAC ¶ 92.) Plaintiff remained on sick

and/or medical leave until July 27, 2004. (TAC ¶ 95.) In

November 2004, plaintiff received a letter from Ronald Vossler,

Lassen County Human Resources Director, notifying plaintiff that

her health care premium payments were overdue and her benefits

would be discontinued effective September 2004. (TAC ¶ 98-99 and

Ex. 14.)

Plaintiff filed a claim for damages with the County on

December 10, 2004. (TAC ¶ 101.) Plaintiff’s claim alleged that

plaintiff was wrongfully terminated on December 1, 2004. (TAC at

Ex. 15.) Plaintiff’s claim also alleged that she was subjected

to a hostile work environment, which caused her to have an

emotional breakdown and to suffer from post traumatic stress

disorder. (Id.) In addition, plaintiff’s claim included

allegations of malicious acts by County officials, slander and

retaliation for whistle blowing. (Id.) Plaintiff alleged that

John Kettleson, all Supervisors of Lassen County, William Bixby,

Margaret Crosby, and others caused her injuries. (Id.) The

County denied plaintiff’s claim on January 11, 2005. (TAC ¶

102.) Plaintiff submitted another claim to Lassen by letter

dated March 10, 2005. (TAC ¶ 113.) She later filed an amended

complaint with Lassen on March 25, 2006. (TAC ¶ 120.)

Plaintiff also filed complaints with the Department of Fair

Employment and Housing (“DFEH”). She called the DFEH on March

14, 2005 to inquire about filing a complaint and scheduled an

interview for June 14, 2005. (TAC ¶ 103.) Plaintiff filed

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charges for discrimination, harassment and retaliation with the

DFEH in June 2005. (TAC ¶ 105 and Ex. 17.) The DFEH issued a

right-to-sue notice on June 27, 2005. (TAC ¶ 106.) Plaintiff

then filed claims for violations of Title VII and the Americans

with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) with the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on July 12, 2005. (TAC ¶ 107.) 

The EEOC issued a right-to-sue notice on September 1, 2005. (TAC

¶ 108.) The Department of Justice issued a right to sue letter

based on plaintiff’s ADA claim October 4, 2005. (TAC ¶ 109.) 

Plaintiff received a final termination letter from Lassen

dated November 18, 2005. (TAC ¶ 110.) After receipt of this

letter, plaintiff requested COBRA benefits. Lassen did not grant

the request. (TAC ¶ 111-12.) Plaintiff submitted an additional

claim to DFEH restating complaints against Mannel on January 28,

2006. (TAC ¶ 115.) The DFEH issued a right to sue notice for

this claim on March 10, 2006. (TAC ¶ 117.) Plaintiff requested

a right to sue notice from the EEOC regarding these restated

complaints on March 13, 2006, which was issued by the Department

of Justice on March 27, 2006. (TAC ¶¶ 118-19.) 

Plaintiff filed her first complaint with this court June 1,

2005. She then filed an amended complaint which defendants moved

to dismiss. On February 22, 2006, this court granted in part and

denied in part defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court denied

defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claims of first

amendment violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court dismissed

plaintiff’s other claims and granted plaintiff’s motion for leave

to amend to add claims pursuant to Title VII, the ADA and

slander. The court also granted plaintiff’s motion for leave to

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3 Defendants do not move to dismiss plaintiff’s seventh

claim for relief for wrongful termination in violation of public

policy. 

4 Plaintiff asserts that her new claims fall within the

March 15, 2006 stipulation and order, which granted plaintiff

leave to amend to add new claims arising out of facts occurring

after October 13, 2005. The facts supporting plaintiff’s new

claims occurred before October 13, 2005. Therefore, the court

did not grant plaintiff leave to amend her new claims, and the

court interprets plaintiff’s inclusion of her new claims as a

request for leave to amend. 

8

amend deficiencies in those claims that were not dismissed with

prejudice. A stipulation order on March 15, 2006 permitted

plaintiff to include additional facts and claims arising out of

events which occurred after filing the second amended complaint. 

Plaintiff filed her third amended complaint April 26, 2006. 

Defendants move to dismiss plaintiff’s claims for: (1)

violations of her due process rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2)

violations of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act

(“FEHA”) for retaliation, harassment and discrimination; (3)

violation of Title VII for retaliation and sexual discrimination;

(4) violation of the ADA; and (5) slander.3 

Plaintiff requests leave to amend4 to add claims for: (1)

Title VII discrimination in compensation; (2) violation of

Federal Equal Pay Act and the California Equal Pay Act; (3)

violation of FEHA for discrimination in compensation; (4)

negligent infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”);(5)

conversion of personal property; and (6) violation of COBRA.

Standard

A. Motion to Dismiss

On a motion to dismiss, the allegations of the complaint

must be accepted as true. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322

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(1972). The court is bound to give plaintiff the benefit of

every reasonable inference to be drawn from the “well-pleaded”

allegations of the complaint. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v.

Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). Thus, the plaintiff

need not necessarily plead a particular fact if that fact is a

reasonable inference from facts properly alleged. See Id. 

A complaint need not plead all elements of a prima facie

case in order to survive a motion to dismiss. Swierkewicz v.

Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510-512 (2002) (rejecting a heightened

pleading standard for employment discrimination and civil rights

cases). Fair notice of the grounds for relief along with a short

and plain statement of the claim are all that is required. Id.

at 508 (citing Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2)).

Given that the complaint is construed favorably to the

pleader, the court may not dismiss the complaint for failure to

state a claim unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff

can prove no set of facts in support of the claim which would

entitle him or her to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45

(1957); NL Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir.

1986). Nevertheless, it is inappropriate to assume that

plaintiff “can prove facts which it has not alleged or that the

defendants have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not

been alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v.

California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). 

Moreover, the court “need not assume the truth of legal

conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.” United

States ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th

Cir. 1986).

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In ruling upon a motion to dismiss, the court may consider

only the complaint, any exhibits thereto, and matters which may

be judicially noticed pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201. 

See Mir v. Little Co. Of Mary Hospital, 844 F.2d 646, 649 (9th

Cir. 1988); Isuzu Motors Ltd. v. Consumers Union of United

States, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1042 (C.D. Cal. 1998). 

Rule 201 permits a court to take judicial notice of an

adjudicative fact “not subject to reasonable dispute,” in that

the fact is either “(1) generally known within the territorial

jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and

ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot

reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). The court can

take judicial notice of matters of public record, such as

pleadings in another action and records and reports of

administrative bodies. See Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d

1190, 1198 (9th Cir. 1988). 

B. Leave to Amend

Pursuant to Rule 15(a), “leave [to amend] is to be freely

given when justice so requires.” “[L]eave to amend should be

granted unless amendment would cause prejudice to the opposing

party, is sought in bad faith, is futile, or creates undue

delay.” Martinez v. Newport Beach, 125 F.3d 777, 785 (9th Cir.

1997). 

Analysis

A. Motion to Dismiss

1. Defendant Crosby

Defendant Crosby moves to dismiss all claims because

plaintiff’s third amended complaint does not state any specific

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claim for relief against her. Plaintiff does not oppose

dismissing all claims against defendant Crosby. Therefore,

defendant Crosby’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

Defendants Lassen, Mannel, Bixby, Whiteman, Margolies, and

Chapman move to dismiss plaintiff’s due process claim on the

grounds that plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged a property

interest in her continued employment. Plaintiff asserts that she

has sufficiently pled a due process claim because she has alleged

that after passing her 6-month probationary period she became a

tenured employee with a valid property interest in her

employment.

“The Due Process Clause provides that certain substantive

rights — life, liberty, and property — cannot be deprived except

pursuant to constitutionally adequate procedures.” Cleveland Bd.

of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985). Due process

guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment are implicated only when a

constitutionally protected property or liberty interest is at

stake. Sanchez v. City of Santa Ana, 915 F.2d 424, 428 (9th Cir.

1990) (citations omitted). Property interests are not created by

the constitution. Id. (citing Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.

564 (1972)). Rather they are created “by existing rules or

understandings that stem from an independent source such as state

law.” Id. 

 The California Civil Service Act, Cal. Gov’t Code § 18500,

et seq., provides that an employee who attains permanent status

has a statutory right to continued employment. Duncan v. Dep’t

of Personnel Admin., 77 Cal. App. 4th 1166, 1175 (2000) (citing

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Skelly v. State Personnel Bd., 15 Cal. 3d 194 (1975)). This

status requires the state to comply with procedural due process

requirements. Id. Permanent status is achieved when an

employee, who is lawfully retained, completes the requisite

probationary period. Cal. Gov’t Code § 18528. The length of the

probationary period is either six months, or a time period

determined by the board not to exceed one year. Id. § 19170.

Defendants argue that plaintiff’s position as Director of

CPS was not a permanent employment position. Defendants request

the court to take judicial notice of the Lassen County job

description for Director of CPS and the Lassen County Personnel

Rules and Regulations as evidence that plaintiff was an “at will”

employee. (Defs.’ Req. for Judicial Notice ¶¶ 7, 8.) Rule 12(b)

states, “[if] matters outside the pleading are presented to and

not excluded by the court, the motion [to dismiss] shall be

treated as one for summary judgment...and all parties shall be

given reasonable opportunity to present all material made

pertinent to such a motion under Rule 56.” However, a court may

look beyond the complaint to uncontested matters of public record

when deciding a motion to dismiss. Mack v. South Bay Beer

Distributors, Inc., 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986),

overruled on other grounds by Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v.

Solimino, 501 U.S. 104 (1991).

The court will not take notice of these documents for the

purposes of this motion to dismiss. In this case, the public

entity in control of the documents is also a defendant. The

court cannot assume the authenticity and applicability of the

documents without following the provisions of Rule 56, which give

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5 Plaintiff makes very serious, and presently

unsupported, accusations that the proposed documents from Lassen

are doctored. (Pl.’s Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss 9.) The court

does not consider these accusations at this time and makes no

ruling on the matter. 

13

both parties a reasonable opportunity to refute the authenticity

and content of the documents.5 Because the court does not convert

this motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment, the

documents are not relevant to the present motion. 

Plaintiff alleges that she commenced working for Lassen CPS

as a supervisor on May 19, 2003, and was promoted to Director of

CPS in November 2003. Plaintiff further alleges that she

completed her six month probationary period in November 2003 and

became a “tenured” employee. (TAC ¶ 48.) Pursuant to the

California Civil Service Act, plaintiff acquired a property

interest in her employment once she passed the probationary

period and became a permanent employee with a legitimate claim of

entitlement to continued employment. Accepting all allegations

in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in

favor of the plaintiff, the complaint adequately alleges a

property interest in plaintiff’s employment with the county which

is protected under due process. Therefore, defendants’ motion to

dismiss plaintiffs § 1983 claim for failure to allege a valid

property interest is DENIED. 

3. Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”) Claims

a. Individual liability of defendants

Defendants Mannel, Bixby, Whiteman and Chapman move to

dismiss plaintiff’s FEHA claims against them as individuals. 

Defendants contend that plaintiff cannot hold them individually

liable for discrimination under FEHA. Under California law,

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individual employees cannot be held liable for violations of

employment discrimination. Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(a); Reno v.

Baird, 18 Cal. 4th 640 (1998). Only an employer may be held

liable for discrimination. Id. Therefore, to the extent

plaintiff claims employment discrimination under FEHA, defendants

Mannel, Bixby, Whiteman and Chapman’s motion to dismiss in their

individual capacities is GRANTED. 

Individuals may be held liable under FEHA for harassment or

retaliation. Winarto v. Toshiba America Electronics Components,

Inc., 274 F.3d 1276, 1288 (9th Cir. 2001); Walrath v. Sprinkel,

99 Cal. App. 4th 1237, 1240 (2002). Plaintiff’s third amended

complaint includes FEHA claims of retaliation and harassment

against defendants Mannel, Bixby, Whiteman and Chapman. (TAC ¶¶

130-44.) Therefore, plaintiff’s inclusion of individual

defendants to these claims is permissible. 

b. Timeliness of FEHA claims

Defendants Lassen, Mannel, Bixby, Whiteman, and Chapman move

to dismiss plaintiff’s FEHA claims because she did not timely

file a claim with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing

(“DFEH”). This court dismissed plaintiff’s earlier FEHA claims

for failure to allege timely exhaustion of administrative

remedies required by FEHA. Pursuant to Rule 15(a), the court

granted plaintiff leave to amend her second amended complaint to

correct any deficiencies found in the pleading. Plaintiff argues

that her third amended complaint repairs the deficiencies present

in the previous complaint and properly alleges timely exhaustion

of administrative remedies.

///// 

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FEHA prohibits discrimination or harassment based on sexual

orientation. Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 12940(a), 12940(j). FEHA

further prohibits retaliation against an employee who opposes

discrimination or harassment. Id. § 12940(h). In order to

pursue a judicial remedy for a violation, a claimant must file an

administrative claim with the DFEH within one year of the

violation’s occurrence. Id. § 12960(d). When a series of

incidents occur, California courts may consider these actions as

a single event for purposes of beginning the period of

limitations under the continuing violation doctrine. Richards v.

CH2M Hill, Inc., 26 Cal. 4th 798, 801 (2001). The continuing

violation doctrine applies when (1) the actions are sufficiently

similar in kind; (2) they occur with sufficient frequency; and

(3) they have not acquired a degree of permanence, such as the

employee’s resignation. Id. This doctrine also applies to

claims for retaliation and harassment. Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA,

Inc., 36 Cal. 4th 1028, 1059 (2005). 

In Richards, an employee brought suit against her employer

for disability discrimination. Richards, 26 Cal. 4th at 801. 

Plaintiff alleged multiple instances of discriminatory conduct

and refusal to accommodate throughout her employment and until

her resignation. Many of the incidents plaintiff relied on

occurred outside the period of limitations defined by FEHA. Id.

The court determined the series of incidents should be considered

a single action if (1) the actions are sufficiently similar in

kind, (2) they occur with sufficient frequency, and (3) they have

not acquired a degree of permanence. The court found the

employer’s continued pattern of harassment throughout plaintiff’s

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employment met the first and second elements. Id. at 824. For

the final element, the court held permanence is achieved when the

employer stops the discriminatory conduct, the employee resigns,

or the employee is on notice that further efforts to end the

unlawfully conduct are in vain. Id. at 823. 

Plaintiff alleges that defendants engaged in retaliatory

conduct against her because of her complaints regarding sexual

harassment by Bovee and her refusal to discriminate against

Snitkin. (TAC ¶¶ 133.) Plaintiff also alleges that various

employees of Lassen engaged in ongoing sexual orientation

harassment by making derogatory comments about her and other

homosexuals. (TAC ¶ 139-40.) Plaintiff asserts that these

events began in November 2003 and continued through her cessation

of employment as Director of Lassen CPS in July 2004 and until

her termination. (TAC ¶¶ 130-44.) Accepting plaintiff’s

allegations as true, plaintiff sufficiently alleges that

defendants created an ongoing environment of harassment,

retaliation and discrimination over a period of several months. 

These actions may be sufficiently similar in type and frequency

to constitute a single event thereby giving rise to application

of the continuing violation doctrine. 

Plaintiff argues that defendants’ alleged denial of benefits

in November 2004 would delay the period of limitations under the

continuing violation doctrine. Plaintiff alleges that she was

diagnosed by a psychiatrist as suffering from post traumatic

stress disorder, major depression, panic anxiety disorder and

agoraphobia. (TAC ¶ 93.) She further asserts that she has had a

disability from July 27, 2004 until the date of filing this

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6 Plaintiff filed an additional complaint with the DFEH

on January 28, 2006. Because plaintiff has alleged sufficient

facts to support timely filing of her FEHA claims based on her

June 2005 DFEH complaint, the court does not consider the

timeliness of her January 28, 2006 DFEH complaint at this time. 

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action. (TAC ¶ 96.) Plaintiff alleges that she was assured

during her interview process that Lassen maintained group health

benefits while managerial employees were on disability leave. 

(TAC ¶ 30.) Assuming these facts to be true, plaintiff has

sufficiently asserted facts that lead to a reasonable assumption

that plaintiff was on disability leave after July 27, 2004. 

Plaintiff also asserts that her benefits were denied because of

the ongoing discrimination, harassment and retaliation of

defendants. (TAC ¶¶ 134, 143.) The court can reasonably infer

from these allegations that permanence regarding the violation of

plaintiff’s rights may not have occurred until her benefits were

denied during disability leave. Such a showing could give rise

to the application of the continuing violation doctrine. 

Plaintiff filed a complaint with the DFEH in June 2005.6 November

2004 falls within one year of June. Therefore, plaintiff has

sufficiently pled timely compliance under FEHA. 

Alternatively, plaintiff also alleges that, at a minimum,

she was on sick leave and/or vacation until July 27, 2004. (TAC

¶ 95.) Assuming that plaintiff was still an employee until July

27, 2004, she has alleged sufficient facts to argue that

permanence was not achieved before that time, thereby giving rise

to application of the continuing violation doctrine. July 27,

2004 falls within one year of June 2005. Therefore, even if

plaintiff had not alleged timeliness regarding the November 2004 

/////

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7 Plaintiff further contends that the March 2004 phone

call to DFEH raises issues of equitable tolling. Because

plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to survive a motion to

dismiss under the continuing violation doctrine, the court does

not address her equitable tolling argument. However, this does

not preclude plaintiff from raising the argument later in the

litigation.

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denial of benefits, she has still pled timely compliance under

FEHA.7

b. Harassment

Defendants Lassen, Mannel, Bixby, Whiteman, and Chapman move

to dismiss plaintiff’s sexual orientation harassment claim for

failure to state a claim. Defendants argue that plaintiff does

not allege a sufficiently severe and/or pervasive environment to

claim hostile work environment harassment. Defendants also argue

that the complaint does not allege that any of the individual

defendants engaged in discriminatory name-calling. 

FEHA prohibits harassment based on sexual orientation. Cal.

Gov’t Code §12940(j). However, when pleading employment

discrimination, a plaintiff need not allege a prima facie case

with particularity so long as the allegations give defendants

notice of and the basis for the charges against them. 

Swierkiewicz v. Soreman, 534 U.S. 506, 508, 512 (2002). To

sufficiently plead a prima facie case for a violation of FEHA

based on hostile work environment, plaintiff must allege that the

“workplace [was] permeated with discriminatory intimidation ...

that [was] sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the

conditions of [her] employment and create an abusive working

environment.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21

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8 Because the anti-discrimination objective and relevant

wording of Title VII and § 1981 are similar to those of FEHA,

“California courts often look to federal decisions interpreting

these statutes for assistance in interpreting the FEHA.” 

Richards, 26 Cal. 4th at 812.

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(1993) (internal citations omitted);8 Fisher v. San Pedro

Peninsula Hosp., 214 Cal. App. 3d 590, 609 (1989). Acts of

harassment cannot be occasional, isolated, sporadic or trivial. 

Id. The severe and pervasive requirement applies to sexual

orientation harassment. Murray v. Oceanside Unified School

Dist., 79 Cal. App. 4th 1338, 1361 (2000). A plaintiff

personally subjected to derogatory remarks may sufficiently

establish a hostile work environment. Hope v. California Youth

Auth., 134 Cal. App. 4th 577, 590 (2005) (citing Fisher, 214 Cal.

App. 3d at 610-11). Supervisors with the authority to control

the environment may be held personally liable for harassment in

violation of FEHA if they tacitly approved of the actions or if

they were aware of the harassment and failed to take action to

prevent it. Matthew v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. App. 4th 598, 604

(1995). 

Plaintiff alleges that employees of Lassen directed

derogatory comments regarding her sexual orientation toward her

and others while in her presence. (TAC ¶¶ 49-50.) Plaintiff

asserts that this behavior was ongoing and frequent. (TAC ¶¶

139-40.) Plaintiff alleges that she repeatedly contacted

defendants Margolies and Whiteman complaining about this ongoing

sexual orientation harassment and that they did nothing to

resolve the issue. (TAC at Ex. 7.) Plaintiff includes a letter

alleging that defendant Bixby knew about the harassing behavior

when he became her supervisor and was complicit in the plan to

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9 Plaintiff also claims her refusal to hire Mannel’s wife

was a motivating factor. This refusal is not a protected

activity under FEHA. However, plaintiff has sufficiently alleged

that defendants relied on prohibited motivations as well. 

10 Defendant Mannel argues that plaintiff did not include

his derogatory comments in her DFEH complaint; therefore, she

cannot raise a FEHA complaint based on those actions. This

argument is unpersuasive. Plaintiff included “harassment” as a

base for her complaint, and Mannel’s alleged comments could be a

form of harassment. 

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force her out of CPS. (TAC at Ex. 11.) Plaintiff alleges that

defendants Mannel, Whiteman and Chapman entered into an agreement

to create intolerable working conditions because of her sexual

orientation and gender.9 (TAC ¶¶ 67-68.) Plaintiff asserts

defendants Mannel, Whiteman and Chapman then provided defamatory

information to the Lassen County Times regarding her performance

at CPS. (TAC ¶ 77 and Ex. 11.) Plaintiff asserts that Mannel

made defamatory comments about her during staff meetings while

she was on leave. (TAC ¶ 90.) Plaintiff also asserts that

Mannel destroyed her personal property, such as diplomas and

certificates.10 (TAC ¶ 91.) These allegations sufficiently

assert that defendants Lassen, Mannel, Bixby and Whiteman engaged

in conduct that could have created a severe and pervasive hostile

work environment. As supervisors, defendants Bixby and Whiteman

are personally liable if they knew of the harassing behavior and

did nothing to stop it. Matthews, 39 Cal. App. 4th at 604. In

regards to plaintiff’s claims against defendant Mannel, plaintiff

has alleged that he committed specific acts of harassment through

his comments and destruction of property. Under the broad notice

pleading standard set forth by the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, plaintiff has alleged a scenario where it may be

reasonably inferred that the defendants’ conduct was harassing

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and, at least in part, motivated by her sexual orientation. 

Therefore, defendants Lassen, Mannel and Whiteman’s motion to

dismiss plaintiff’s FEHA claim for harassment is DENIED.

However, plaintiff has not sufficiently asserted a claim of

harassment by defendant Chapman. Plaintiff’s only allegation

against defendant Chapman is that he made defamatory statements

to the Lassen County Times. This allegation by itself does not

sufficiently give rise to a claim for harassment in violation of

FEHA against Chapman. Furthermore, plaintiff has not alleged

that Chapman was a supervisor with any control over the hostile

environment. Cf. Matthew, 34 Cal. App. 4th at 604. As such,

defendant Chapman’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s claim of

harassment in violation of FEHA is GRANTED.

c. Retaliation

Defendants Lassen, Mannel, Bixby, Whiteman, and Chapman move

to dismiss plaintiff’s FEHA retaliation claim because she does

not assert sufficient facts to state a claim for relief. 

Specifically, defendant Mannel asserts that the allegations in

the complaint do not sufficiently link the alleged retaliatory

conduct to any protected activity. 

FEHA prohibits retaliation against an employee who opposes

discrimination or harassment. Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(h). In

the instant case, plaintiff asserts that her constructive

termination resulted from defendants retaliation against her for

her refusal to discriminate against Snitkin based on his HIV

status and her complaints regarding Bovee’s harassment. 

Plaintiff’s third amended complaint specifically alleges that

defendants Mannel, Whiteman and Chapman entered into an agreement

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to force plaintiff to quit or take disability leave. (TAC ¶¶ 68-

69.) The allegations of harassing conduct by defendants Lassen,

Mannel and Whiteman described above could have contributed to

plaintiff’s eventual constructive termination. Plaintiff also

alleges defendant Bixby was involved in a plan to force her out

in retaliation for her refusal to hire Snitkin and her complaints

about Bovee. (TAC ¶ 133.) Specifically, plaintiff alleges Bixby

ended her authority over CPS by demanding that she refrain from

contacting any CPS staff. (TAC ¶ 92.) At the pleading stage,

the court may reasonably infer that the alleged actions of

Mannel, Whiteman and Bixby contributed to plaintiff’s

constructive termination. It may also be reasonably inferred

from plaintiff’s allegations that those actions were taken, at

least in part, in retaliation for plaintiff’s refusal to

discriminate against Snitkin and her complaints about Bovee. As

such, plaintiff’s complaint sufficiently alleges that defendants

Lassen, Mannel, Whiteman and Bixby engaged in conduct in

retaliation for plaintiff’s protected activities under the broad

notice pleading standard set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. Therefore, defendants Lassen, Mannel, Whiteman and

Bixby’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s FEHA claim for retaliatory

conduct is DENIED.

However, plaintiff has again not sufficiently asserted a

claim of retaliation by defendant Chapman. Plaintiff alleges

that Chapman may have contributed to defamatory statements to the

Lassen County Times and also stated that plaintiff “would be gone

in 30 days”. (TAC ¶¶ 76-77 and Ex. 11.) These allegation do not

sufficiently allege that Chapman took any actions that

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contributed to plaintiff’s constructive termination. Nor does

plaintiff allege that Chapman had any authority over her

employment at CPS. As such, defendant Chapman’s motion to

dismiss plaintiff’s claim of retaliation in violation of FEHA is

GRANTED.

4. Title VII Claims

Defendant Lassen moves to dismiss plaintiff’s claims for

hostile work environment and retaliation violations under 42

U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”). Defendant asserts that

plaintiff did not comply with a mandatory provision to timely

pursue an administrative remedy with the EEOC. 

Title VII claims must comport with EEOC filing requirements. 

42 U.S.C. § 12117(a). When a state claim has been filed, the

EEOC filing deadline is 300 days after the alleged violation. 

Id. § 2000e-5(e)(1). Therefore, a party must file a charge

within 300 days of the date of the act or lose the ability to

recover for it. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536

U.S. 101, 110 (2002). The Supreme Court differentiates between

discrete acts of discrimination and ongoing acts of work

environment harassment. Id. at 117. If an act contributing to a

hostile work environment claim occurs within the filing period,

the entire time period of the hostile environment may be

considered by the court. Id. In contrast, for claims of

discrimination or retaliation: 

discrete discriminatory acts are not actionable if time

barred, even when they are related to acts alleged in

timely filed charges. Each discrete discriminatory act

starts a new clock for filing charges alleging that

act. The charge, therefore, must be filed within the

... 300-day time period after the discrete

discriminatory act occurred.

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11 Plaintiff filed an additional complaint with the EEOC

on March 13, 2006. Because plaintiff has alleged sufficient

facts to support timely filing of her EEOC claims based on her

July 12, 2005 EEOC complaint, the court does not consider the

timeliness of her March 13, 2006 complaint at this time.

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Porter v. California Dept. of Corr., 419 F.3d 885, 891-92 (9th

Cir. 2005) (citing Morgan, 536 U.S. at 122). However, events

outside of the 300-day time period may be used as supporting

evidence to show that actions occurring within the period of

limitations were discriminatory or retaliatory. Id.

In the present case, plaintiff’s third amended complaint

asserts hostile work environment and retaliation claims under

Title VII. Plaintiff filed her Title VII claims with the EEOC on

July 12, 2005.11 (TAC ¶ 107.) Because plaintiff filed a state

claim, the EEOC filing deadline requires all claims to have

accrued within the preceding 300 days. In this case, plaintiff’s

claims must have accrued on or after September 14, 2004. The

court reviews each claim in turn. 

a. Hostile Work Environment

Plaintiff asserts that she was subject to a hostile work

environment because of Lassen’s sex-based harassment. A Title

VII hostile work environment claim may include events occurring

before the period of limitations if an event contributing to the

claim occurs within the filing period. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 117. 

Plaintiff alleges that Lassen employees discriminated against and

harassed her because of her gender. (TAC ¶¶ 67-68, 82-84, 90,

91.) Plaintiff also alleges that Whiteman, Lassen’s Chief

Administrative Officer, sought to create an environment where men

held positions of power and authority. (TAC ¶ 81.) Plaintiff

also alleges Lassen had a pattern of harassing and discriminating

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against women. (TAC at Ex. 9.) Finally, plaintiff alleges that

defendant Lassen denied her benefits in November 2004 as part of

an ongoing practice that created a hostile work environment. 

(TAC ¶ 99.) Taken together, these allegations may reasonably

support the claim that plaintiff was subjected to a hostile work

environment by employees of Lassen because she was a woman. 

Plaintiff’s alleged denial of benefits in November 2004 may be

considered a final component of the cumulative harassment that

led to her terminations. As such, plaintiff has sufficiently

pled sufficient actions to support a claim of harassment that

occurred within the period of limitations. Therefore,

defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s Title VII hostile work

environment claim is DENIED.

b. Retaliation

Plaintiff asserts a claim for retaliation in violation of

Title VII. Defendant argues that plaintiff has not pled

sufficient facts to support a Title VII retaliation claim. 

Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of race,

color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a)(1). When pleading employment discrimination in violation of

Title VII, a plaintiff does not need to allege a prima facie

case. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 508. The complaint must contain

only a short and plain statement stating what the claim is and

the grounds upon which it rests. Id. at 512. 

Plaintiff alleges that defendant Lassen harassed her with

the intention of forcing her to quit work because of the

complaints she made about the behavior of Bovee and other

employees. (TAC ¶ 165-66). Drawing all reasonable inferences

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from the allegations in the complaint in favor of plaintiff,

plaintiff alleges that Bovee’s false sexual harassment claim was

a form of harassment against her because of her sexual

orientation and gender. Title VII does not prohibit

discrimination or harassment based on sexual orientation, but

does prohibit harassment on the basis of gender. 42 U.S.C. §

2000e-2(a)(1). Plaintiff asserts that she complained about the

false sexual harassment claims by Bovee and that she was

subsequently terminated because of these complaints. Under the

broad pleading standard required for employment discrimination,

plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a claim of retaliation in

violation of Title VII. Therefore, defendant’s motion to dismiss

plaintiff’s Title VII retaliation claim is DENIED.

5. Americans with Disabilities Act.

Plaintiff alleges discrimination and failure to accommodate

in violation of the ADA. Defendant Lassen argues that

plaintiff’s claim is invalid because it does not meet the EEOC

filing requirements. Defendant also argues that the claim is not

supported by facts asserted in the complaint.

The time requirements for plaintiff’s EEOC filing for claims

of ADA violations are the same requirements as under her claims

of Title VII violations; thus, events occurring before September

14, 2004 are not actionable as an ADA claim. However, plaintiff

may assert facts occurring before September 14, 2004 as evidence

in support of other timely claims. Porter, 419 F.3d at 891-92. 

As set forth above, plaintiff alleges that she had a disability

from July 27, 2004 through the date of filing the instant action. 

Plaintiff also alleges that defendant discontinued her health

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benefits in November 2004 because of her disability. As such,

Plaintiff sufficiently alleges that a discrete act of

discrimination occurred within the EEOC filing period. 

Therefore, plaintiff has sufficiently pled timely compliance with

the EEOC filing requirement.

To state a claim for relief under the ADA, a plaintiff must

establish: (1) that she is a disabled person within the meaning

of the ADA; (2) that she is able to perform the essential

functions of the job (with or without accommodation); and (3)

that the employer terminated her because of her disability. 

Nunes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 164 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir.

1999). An ADA claim must follow the same EEOC filing deadlines

as the Title VII claims described above. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a). 

Plaintiff alleges that she is disabled and was capable of

performing her job duties with reasonable accommodations. (TAC

¶¶ 20, 21, 88, 93, 95, 97, 155, 156, 159.) Plaintiff also

alleges that defendant Lassen was aware of and failed to

accommodate her disability and that she was fired because of her

disability. (TAC ¶¶ 20, 21, 157-61.) Plaintiff asserts that she

repeatedly asked Lassen supervisors and managers to investigate

false sexual harassment charges against her and that their

failure to do so exacerbated her disability. (TAC ¶¶ 58, 62.) 

Taking all plaintiff’s allegations as true, she has sufficiently

pled substantive facts that could give rise to a claim for

violation of the ADA. 

Defendant argues that plaintiff’s claim fails because she

did not adequately inform Lassen of her required accommodations. 

Defendant also argues that requesting an accommodation to provide

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a stress-free environment would be ludicrous. These arguments

seeking for the court to adjudicate the merits of plaintiff’s

claims are not appropriately considered by the court on a motion

to dismiss. Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged elements

necessary for an ADA claim. Therefore, defendant’s motion to

dismiss plaintiff’s ADA claim is DENIED.

6. Slander

Defendants move to dismiss plaintiff’s slander claim on the

grounds that plaintiff failed to sufficiently plead the substance

of her slander claim. Under California Civil Code § 46, “slander

is a false publication, orally uttered...which...(3)tends

directly to injure him in respect to his office, profession,

trade or business, either by imputing to him general

disqualification in those respects which the office or other

occupation peculiarly requires.” The statutory definition of

slander is very broad and includes any language which, on its

face, has a natural tendency to injure a person with respect to

her occupation. Sempler v. Andrews, 27 Cal. App. 2d 228, 232

(1938). 

Plaintiff alleges that defendants Mannel, Whiteman, Bixby

and Chapman made, or conspired to make, false, defamatory

statements regarding her professionalism. (TAC ¶¶ 203-205.) 

Defendants claim plaintiff has not pled sufficient facts to

support a claim of slander. However, defendants’ reliance on the

unreported case Jones v. Thyssenkrupp Elevator Corp. is

unpersuasive. 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13978 (N.D. Cal. 2006). In

Jones, the plaintiff failed to identify the speakers, the

recipients or the timing of the defamatory remarks. Id. at *17. 

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Here, plaintiff specifically asserts that Whiteman, Mannel,

Chapman and “possibly others” made false and defamatory comments

about her management of CPS. (TAC ¶76.) These statements

resulted in a newspaper article calling for the replacement of

plaintiff as director of CPS. (TAC at Ex. 13.) Plaintiff gives

an approximate date of April or May 2004 regarding the comments

to the Lassen County Times. Plaintiff also gives a date range

from June 1, 2004 through August 15, 2004 regarding derogatory

comments made by Mannel at staff meetings. (TAC ¶¶ 76, 206.) As

such, plaintiff’s claim properly asserts a claim of slander. The

complaint provides sufficient notice to defendants of what they

are charged with and the grounds for relief as required by Rule

8(a). Therefore, defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s

slander claim is DENIED. 

B. Leave to Amend

The court interprets plaintiff’s third amended complaint as

a request for leave to amend with regard to plaintiff’s

previously unidentified claims. At this early stage of

litigation, granting leave to amend will not unduly burden

defendants. Further, there is no evidence that the request is

made in bad faith. Plaintiff makes a legitimate request

following substitution of counsel. Consequently, plaintiff’s

request for leave to amend requires an analysis of whether the

claims are futile. 

1. Equal Pay

a. Title VII

Plaintiff includes a new claim under Title VII

discrimination in compensation. This claim follows the EEOC

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filing requirements discussed above. Plaintiff sufficiently

alleges facts that may support the assertion she was an employee

on disability leave until November 2004. As such, defendant’s

alleged discrimination in compensation would extend into the

period of limitations required by the EEOC filing deadline. The

court cannot at this time consider defendant’s assertion that

plaintiff received her last discriminatory paycheck outside the

period of limitations. Because plaintiff has asserted facts

which, if true, would show timely compliance with the EEOC filing

deadline, her Title VII discrimination in compensation claim is

not futile. Therefore, plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend is

GRANTED.

b. Federal Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206 and

California Equal Pay Act, Labor Code § 1197.5

Plaintiff seeks to amend her complaint to add a claim for

unequal pay based on gender in violation of the Federal Equal Pay

Act and the California Equal Pay Act. (TAC ¶¶ 181-92.) These

acts prohibit an employer from discriminating between employees

on the basis of sex by paying different wages. 29 U.S.C. §

206(d); Cal. Labor Code § 1197.5. If employees of the opposite

sex are employed in equal work on jobs requiring equal skill,

effort and responsibility, and those jobs are performed in

similar working conditions, then the employer must pay them

equally. Id.

Plaintiff alleges that (1) she was engaged in jobs with men

requiring equal skill, effort and responsibility, (2) the jobs

were performed under similar working conditions, and (3) Mannel,

a man, was paid a higher wage than her for such work. (TAC ¶¶

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181-86.) Based upon the allegations in the proposed complaint,

the court cannot determine that the claims are futile. Therefore

plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend is GRANTED.

c. FEHA Discrimination in Compensation

Plaintiff seeks to amend her complaint to assert

discrimination in compensation in violation of Cal. Gov’t Code §

12940(a). FEHA prohibits an employer from discriminating in

compensation or privileges of employment because of sex. Id. As

described above, FEHA requires a claimant to exhaust

administrative remedies within one year of injury. Id. §

12960(d).

Plaintiff alleges that Lassen paid her lower compensation

because she is a woman. (TAC ¶¶ 193-200.) Plaintiff alleges

that Mannel was paid more for the same level of responsibility

and job duties. (TAC ¶ 83.) She further alleges that Lassen

gave preferential treatment to men regarding positions of

authority. (TAC ¶ 81.) These allegation could give rise to a

claim for which relief may be granted under FEHA. Plaintiff

submitted a copy of her gender discrimination and equal pay

complaint to the DFEH dated June 27, 2005. (TAC Ex. 17.) The

complaint identified “denied equal pay” as one of the categories

of harm. (Id.) For the reasons set forth in this order

regarding plaintiff’s other FEHA claims, plaintiff sufficiently

alleges timely compliance with FEHA’s administrative filing

requirement. As such, plaintiff’s claim is not futile, and her

motion for leave to amend is GRANTED.

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2. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

Plaintiff moves to amend her complaint to include a claim

against defendants for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress

(“NIED”) against defendants Lassen, Mannel, Bixby, Whiteman,

Chapman, Margolies and the Lassen Board of Supervisors. (TAC ¶¶

210-12.) Defendants contend that the exclusive remedy clause of

the California Workers’ Compensation Act bars the claim. 

The California Workers’ Compensation Act provides the

exclusive remedy for injuries sustained under the normal

conditions of employment. Cal. Lab. Code § 3601. Where an

employee falls within the protection of the Workers’ Compensation

scheme, as laid out in Labor Code § 3600, the code precludes a

cause of action against the employer. Id. This prohibition

extends to emotional injuries such as intentional infliction of

emotional distress and NIED. Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection

District, 43 Cal. 3d 148, 160 (1987). 

The California Supreme Court warned that exceptions to the

exclusive remedy provision risks undermining the legislative

compromise of the Workers’ Compensation Act by permitting the

employee to pursue a cause of action merely by tailoring the

claim to fall within the scope of the exception. Id. at 160. 

The doctrine therefore requires emotional injuries to fall within

the exclusive remedy provision of § 3601 so long as the basic

conditions of § 3600 are met and the employer’s conduct does not

contravene fundamental public policy or exceed the risks inherent

in the employment relationship. Livitsanos v. Superior Court, 2

Cal. 4th 744, 815 (1992).

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The California Supreme Court held that a claim alleging

violation of FEHA and a claim of wrongful discharge due to

discrimination both fall outside the scope of Labor Code §§ 3600

and 3601. City of Moorpark v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 4th 1143,

1148 (1998). Emotional injuries arising from discrimination and

harassment are by nature outside the scope of the employment

relationship and are not precluded by the exclusive remedy

provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act. Taylor v. Beth Eden

Baptist Church, 294 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1080 (N.D. Cal. 2003)

(citing Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 131 Cal. Rptr. 2d 575

(2003) (holding that exclusivity did not apply to claim for

negligent infliction of emotional distress against employer based

on allegation that employer had retaliated against plaintiff for

refusing to fire female sales associate who plaintiff's

supervisor thought was unattractive); Fretland v. County of

Humboldt, 69 Cal. App. 4th 1478, 1491-92 (1999) (holding that

work-related injury discrimination is not a normal risk of the

compensation bargain and therefore, claims for negligent and

intentional infliction of emotional distress against employer

were not barred by exclusivity rule); Accardi v. Superior Court,

17 Cal. App. 4th 341 (1993)(holding that claim for intentional

infliction of emotional distress against employer based on

alleged harassment was not barred by the exclusivity rule because

sexual harassment was "outside the normal employment

environment")). By properly pleading a harassment claim, a

plaintiff will also have sufficiently pled facts supporting an

emotional injury claim. See, Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula

Hosp., 214 Cal. App. 3d 590, 609 (1989); Maffei v. Allstate

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California Ins. Co., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1056 (finding that

plaintiff’s allegations that defendant terminated them for

failure to engage in illegal action was sufficient allegation

that defendant’s conduct contravened public policy such that

claim was not barred by the exclusive Workers’ Compensation

remedies).

Defendants argue that plaintiff’s NIED claim should be

barred because plaintiff did not oppose defendants’ motion to

dismiss her intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”)

claim in the second amended complaint. This argument is

unpersuasive. Plaintiff’s NIED claim is a different claim for

relief than IIED and is based on different theories with

different elements. As such, plaintiff has not conceded that it

is barred by the Workers’ Compensation Act. 

As described above, plaintiff has properly pled claims for

violations of FEHA against defendants Lassen, Mannel, Bixby and

Whiteman. Discrimination and harassment in violation of FEHA

fall outside the scope of the employment relationship. 

Therefore, plaintiff has already pled facts that could give rise

to a claim of NIED against Lassen, Mannel, Bixby and Whiteman. 

Similarly, plaintiff has also asserted a claim against Margolies,

as well as the previously named defendants, for violation of her

first amendment rights and due process rights under 42 U.S.C. §

1983. Therefore, plaintiff has pled facts that could give rise

to the assertion that Margolies’ actions contravened public

policy and were outside the employment relationship. 

Because plaintiff’s claim for NIED against defendants

Lassen, Mannel, Bixby, Whiteman, and Margolies might not be

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12 Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed all claims against

defendants Pyle, Keifer, Dahle, and Hanson in their official

capacities as members of the Lassen Board of Supervisors. 

Chapman is the sole member of the Board of Supervisors who is

still a party to this action. 

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barred by the Workers’ Compensation Act, it is not futile. 

Therefore, plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend regarding her

NIED claim against defendants Lassen, Mannel, Bixby, Whiteman,

and Margolies is GRANTED. 

Plaintiff has not asserted that defendants Chapman or the

Lassen Board of Supervisors12 acted in contravention of public

policy. Consequently, plaintiff’s NIED claim against Chapman and

the Lassen Board of Supervisors is barred by the exclusive remedy

provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act. See Cole, 43 Cal. 3d

at 160. Therefore, plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend

regarding her NIED claim against defendants Chapman and the

Lassen Board of Supervisors is DENIED.

3. Conversion of Personal Property

Plaintiff seeks to include a claim for relief against Mannel

for conversion of personal property. (TAC ¶¶ 213-15.) Defendant

contends that the conversion claim is futile because plaintiff

failed to comply with the California Tort Claims Act (“CTCA”). 

Specifically, defendant asserts that plaintiff did not file a

timely claim notifying Lassen County of the property damage. 

(Id. at 25.) 

In order to state a tort claim against a public entity or

public employee, the CTCA requires plaintiff to present claims to

the government entity for money or damages with few exceptions. 

Cal. Gov’t Code § 905. Tort claims such as the instant claim for

personal property damage are not listed among the exceptions to 

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§ 905. Moreover, under Government Code § 945.4,

no suit for money or damages may be brought against a

public entity on a cause of action for which a claim is

required to by presented in accordance with Chapter 1

(commencing with section 900) and Chapter 2 (commencing

with section 910) of Part 3 of this division until a

written claim therefore has been presented to the

public entity and has been acted upon by the board, or

has been deemed to have been rejected by the board.

 

Cal. Gov’t Code § 945.4. The CTCA requires a claimant to file a

request for damages for injury to personal property with the

government entity not later than six months after the accrual of

the cause of action. Id. § 911.2. Under § 950.2, any suit

against a public employee is barred in cases where a plaintiff’s

action against the agency would be barred for failure to present

a claim. The comments to the 1965 Amendment to § 950.2 state

“the presentation of a claim to the employing public entity is a

prerequisite to suit against an employee.” Ann. Cal. Gov’t Code

§ 950.2. 

Plaintiff has the burden of pleading compliance with the

California Tort Claims Act in her complaint. Wood v. Riverside

General Hospital, 25 Cal. App. 4th 1113, 1119 (1994). Moreover,

compliance with the California claims statutes is mandatory. 

City of San Jose v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 3d 4447, 454 (1974). 

Federal courts have recognized these requirements. See Ortega v.

O’Connor, 764 F.2d 701, 707 (9th Cir. 1985), rev’d on other

grounds, 107 S.Ct. 1492 (1987) (failure to comply with claimfiling requirements imposed by California Tort Claims Act bars

pendent state claims). 

The details of the claim need only allege a general

complaint with sufficient detail to reasonably enable the public

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entity to make an adequate investigation. Blair v. Superior

Court, 218 Cal. App. 3d 221, 225 (1990). However, if plaintiff

seeks to recover from a different cause of action based upon an

entirely different set of facts, plaintiff must timely file a

separate claim according to the provisions of the CTCA. Fall

River Joint Unified School District v. Superior Court, 206 Cal.

App. 3d 431, 590 (1988). 

Plaintiff’s third amended complaint identifies Mannel as a

public employee, Lassen County’s Director of Mental Health. (TAC

¶ 5.) Plaintiff alleges that Mannel destroyed diplomas and other

personal property in her office in June of 2004. (TAC ¶¶ 91,

214.) Even if the court assumes these allegations to be true,

the CTCA requires plaintiff to file a damage claim with the

county within six months of the incident. Although plaintiff

filed multiple damage claims with Lassen County, there is no

evidence that she made even a general claim for personal property

damage. (TAC Exs. 15, 22.) Plaintiff must make a separate claim

for property damages before she can pursue the conversion claim. 

No such claim appears in plaintiff’s third amended complaint, and

the time limit for filing the claim has passed. Plaintiff did

not address her failure to comply with th CTCA in her opposition. 

Therefore, plaintiff’s claim for conversion of personal property

is futile. Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend is DENIED 

4. Violation of COBRA

Plaintiff seeks to assert a claim for recovery based on

Lassen’s November 2005 denial of continuing health benefits under

the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (“COBRA”). 

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13 Plaintiff alleges that defendant wrongly denied her

benefits while she was on disability leave. Whether or not

defendant was responsible for maintaining premium payments on

behalf of defendant during a disability leave is irrelevant to

the issue of a COBRA violation. See Roberts v. Union Pacific R.

Co., 16 F. App’x 730, 734 (9th Cir. 2001) (unpublished).

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(TAC ¶¶ 110-11, 216-19.) Defendant contends that plaintiff was

not eligible to receive COBRA benefits when she made the request.

COBRA requires employers to provide employees the option to

continuing health coverage equal to the coverage provided during

employment. 29 U.S.C. § 1162; Coble v. Bonita House, Inc., 789

F. Supp. 320, 322 (N.D. Cal. 1992). However, the employer need

only provide access to the same plan the employee held

previously. The employer does not need to pay the premiums for

the employee. 29 U.S.C. § 1162(3). In the event a beneficiary

fails to make a timely premium payment, the employer may end the

continuation of benefits. Id. § 1162(2)©. 

Plaintiff alleges that Lassen denied her group health care

benefits in November 2004. (TAC ¶ 99.) Plaintiff references

Exhibit 14, a letter from Ronald Vossler, as evidence of this

denial of benefits.13 The letter is a notification of payments

due by plaintiff on premiums under the health plan. (TAC Ex.

14.) COBRA does not require Lassen to make such payments. 29

U.S.C. § 1162(3). Plaintiff was notified that she was

responsible for her own premium payments. Therefore, her failure

to pay those premiums would have forfeited her right to COBRA

benefits. Plaintiff’s third complaint fails to allege facts that

give rise to a violation of COBRA. However, the court cannot

find that plaintiff’s COBRA claim is necessarily futile. It is

possible that plaintiff could amend the complaint to sufficiently

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state a claim for violation of COBRA. Therefore, plaintiff’s

motion for leave to amend is GRANTED.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing analysis, the court makes the

following orders:

A. As to the defendants’ motion to dismiss:

(1) Defendant Crosby’s motion to dismiss all claims against

her is GRANTED.

(2) Defendants Lassen, Mannel, Bixby, Whiteman, Margolies

and Chapman’s motion to dismiss 42 U.S.C. § 1983 due

process claim is DENIED.

(3) Defendants Mannel, Bixby and Whiteman’s motion to

dismiss FEHA claims is:

(a) DENIED as to plaintiff’s FEHA retaliation claim;

(b) DENIED as to plaintiff’s FEHA harassment claim;

(c) GRANTED to the extent plaintiff claims employment

discrimination. 

(4) Defendants Chapman’s motion to dismiss FEHA claims is:

(a) GRANTED as to plaintiff’s FEHA retaliation claim;

(b) GRANTED as to plaintiff’s FEHA harassment claim;

(c) GRANTED to the extent plaintiff claims employment

discrimination.

(5) Defendant Lassen’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s FEHA

retaliation, discrimination and harassment claims is

DENIED.

(6) Defendant Lassen’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s Title

VII hostile work environment and ADA claims is DENIED.

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(7) Defendant Lassen’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s Title

VII retaliation claim is DENIED. 

(8) Defendants Lassen, Mannel, Bixby, Whiteman and

Chapman’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s slander claim

is DENIED.

B. Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend is:

(1) GRANTED as to her claim of Title VII discrimination in

compensation;

(2) GRANTED as to her claim under the Federal Equal Pay

Act;

(3) GRANTED as to her claim under the California Equal Pay

Act;

(4) GRANTED as to her FEHA discrimination in compensation

claim;

(5) GRANTED as to her claim for NIED against defendants 

Lassen, Mannel, Bixby, Whiteman, and Margolies;

(6) DENIED as to her claim for NIED against defendants

Chapman and the Lassen Board of Supervisors;

(7) DENIED as to her claim for conversion of personal

property;

(8) GRANTED as to her claim for denial of COBRA benefits. 

///

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(9) Plaintiff shall file and serve her Fourth Amended

Complaint within ten (10) days of this order. 

Defendants shall file their answer within twenty (20)

days thereafter.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 20, 2006.

/s/ Frank C. Damrell Jr. 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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