Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_07-cv-05793/USCOURTS-cand-5_07-cv-05793-17/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 370
Nature of Suit: Other Fraud
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Fraud

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California 

** E-filed May 25, 2010 ** 

NOT FOR CITATION 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SAN JOSE DIVISION 

NATHAN NYGREN, STEPHEN 

SHIFFLETTE, and AMY FROMKIN, on 

behalf of themselves and all others similarly 

situated, 

 Plaintiffs, 

 v. 

HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY, a 

Delaware corporation, 

 

 Defendant. 

____________________________________/

No. C07-05793 JW (HRL) 

ORDER (1) GRANTING IN PART 

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO UNSEAL 

AND (2) GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ 

ADMINSTRATIVE MOTION TO 

SEAL 

[Re: Docket Nos. 171, 192] 

Nathan Nygren, Stephen Shifflette, and Amy Fromkin sued Hewlett-Packard Company 

(“HP”) on behalf of themselves and a putative class of consumers, alleging that HP sold laptop 

computers with defective wireless devices. Plaintiffs now move to unseal seven exhibits that they 

filed under seal as part of their motion for class certification. HP opposes the motion, but indicates 

that it no longer seeks to seal six of the exhibits. (Opp’n 2.) Therefore, the only document still at 

issue is a settlement agreement (“Agreement”) between HP and third-party NVIDIA Corporation 

(“NVIDIA”). Upon consideration of the motion papers and the arguments presented at the hearing, 

the court GRANTS IN PART plaintiffs’ motion to unseal and GRANTS plaintiffs’ administrative 

motion to seal. 

Case 5:07-cv-05793-JW Document 226 Filed 05/25/10 Page 1 of 6
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United States District Court

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BACKGROUND 

In February 2010, plaintiffs moved to seal exhibits they had filed in support of their Motion 

for Class Certification. (Docket No. 115.) The exhibits were documents produced by HP and were 

subject to a protective order. Judge Ware granted that motion (Docket No. 126), but a few weeks 

later, plaintiffs moved to unseal those same exhibits, setting a hearing before Judge Ware. (Docket 

No. 131.) At the same time, plaintiffs moved to seal portions of the motion itself. (Docket No. 

133.) On April 16, 2010, Judge Ware denied plaintiffs’ motion to seal, finding that “the documents 

pertain generally to the quality of certain hardware at issue in this case.” (Docket No. 163.) He 

referred the parties to this court to resolve disputes concerning whether a document is subject to a 

protective order. (Docket No. 163.) 

Plaintiffs then filed the instant motion in an unredacted form before this court. HP 

immediately sought a stay of Judge Ware’s April 16 order, arguing that the order effectively allowed 

disclosure of portions of the exhibits “before HP has had the opportunity to attempt to demonstrate 

that sealing of the [exhibits] is appropriate.” (Docket No. 172, at 3.) Judge Ware granted HP’s 

request, and stayed the April 16 order “pending a determination by the assigned Magistrate Judge as 

to whether the documents at issue violate the Protective Order in this case.” 

DISCUSSION 

Plaintiffs seek to unseal the Agreement on grounds that it “shed[s] important light on this 

case and the defects” that plaintiffs allege exist in HP’s computers. (Mot. 8.) They assert that a 

motion for class certification is dispositive; accordingly, they argue, HP must meet a “compelling 

reasons” standard—rather than a “good cause” standard—to overcome the presumption of public 

access. They claim that HP has failed to meet this standard, but that in any case, Judge Ware 

“already has ruled that the information in question is not sealable.” (Mot. 2.) 

HP counters that the “compelling reasons” standard does not apply because a motion for 

class certification is not dispositive. It asserts that it has shown good cause to keep the Agreement 

under seal because it “reveals confidential, competitively sensitive financial matters between HP 

and non-party NIVIDIA.” (Opp’n 2.) It avers that disclosure would provide its competitors with 

“competitively sensitive information to which they otherwise would not have access” and also 

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California 

“potentially reduce[] HP’s leverage in negotiations with component suppliers and other business 

partners.” (Id. at 6; see also Nussbaumer Decl.) It argues that the Agreement has little-to-no 

bearing on the merits of plaintiffs’ claims and that no public policy supports its public disclosure. 

(Opp’n 7–8.) 

In their reply,1 plaintiffs claim that HP’s assertions of potential harm are conclusory and that 

the only reason HP wants to keep the Agreement secret is because “it tends to prove plaintiffs’ 

allegations in the case.” (Reply 1.) They argue that the Agreement is “highly relevant” because it 

shows that HP accepted money from NVIDIA on account of the instant lawsuit. (Reply 10.) To 

that end, they claim that disclosure of the Agreement would “show[] the public that plaintiffs’ class 

action has merit and . . . tend[] to show the monetary scope of the problem.” (Reply 4.) For the first 

time, they submit that the “compelling reasons” standard also applies because they referred to the 

Agreement in their May 10 opposition to HP’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (Reply 3.) 

As a preliminary matter, the court does not find that Judge Ware’s prior orders prevent this 

court from deciding whether the Agreement is sealable. Indeed, there would be no reason for him to 

stay his April 16 order and refer the parties to this court if he had already determined that the 

Agreement was not sealable. As a result, this court will proceed to the merits of the motion. 

There is a strong presumption that the public will have access to judicial records. Kamakana 

v. City of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006). If a party wishes to overcome this 

presumption, the Ninth Circuit applies different standards depending on whether the documents at 

issue are attached to dispositive or non-dispositive motions. Id. at 1180. For dispositive motions, 

the party seeking protection must show “compelling reasons” to maintain secrecy. Id. But for nondispositive motions, a party must only show “good cause” as described under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 26(c). Id. 

When the “compelling reasons” standard applies, the party is “required to present articulable 

facts identifying the interests favoring continued secrecy . . . and to show that these specific interests 

overc[o]me the presumption of access by outweighing the public interest in understanding the 

judicial process.” Id. at 1181 (internal quotations omitted). However, the “good cause” standard 

 

1

 Plaintiffs filed an administrative motion to file portions of their reply under seal, but requested that 

this court deny their motion. 

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California 

allows a judge to “protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue 

burden or expense” during discovery, such as by issuing an order “requiring that a trade secret or 

other confidential research, development, or commercial information not be revealed or be revealed 

only in a specified way.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). 

Plaintiffs insist that the “compelling reasons” standard applies because, they say, a class 

certification motion is “dispositive.” The basis for their argument is that they may choose to 

discontinue the case if Judge Ware does not certify a class. But this court agrees with Judge Fogel’s 

analysis in Rich v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. 06-03361, 2009 WL 216868 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 20, 2009), 

which found that a class certification motion is not dispositive in the context of a motion to seal 

because it involves procedural requirements, rather than the merits of the underlying claim. 

Plaintiffs have not convinced the court that the Agreement is so relevant to their underlying claims 

that this court should hold otherwise.2 

In addition, the court is unpersuaded that HP must articulate a compelling reason merely 

because plaintiffs referred to the Agreement in their opposition to HP’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment—which they filed well after this motion and HP’s opposition to the same. Accordingly, 

the court finds that the “good cause” standard applies in the context of this dispute.

In support of its request to keep the Agreement under seal, HP submitted a declaration, to 

which plaintiffs did not object, averring that HP considers the Agreement to be confidential and that 

disclosure of the Agreement would place it at a competitive disadvantage. (Nussbaumer Decl.) The 

settlement agreement itself supports HP’s assertion that both HP and NVIDIA intended to keep the 

Agreement out of the public record.3

 (Settlement Agmt.) The court is satisfied that HP has 

demonstrated that the Agreement’s public disclosure could harm HP’s financial interests and its 

 

2

 Plaintiffs’ reliance on two out-of-circuit cases that allowed public disclosure of settlement 

agreements are unavailing. In both cases, the courts considered agreements that had been submitted 

to the court for approval, rather than a private agreement such as the one between HP and NVIDIA. 

See Jessup v. Luther, 277 F.3d 926, 929 (7th Cir. 2002); Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust v. Hotel 

Rittenhouse Assocs., 800 F.2d 339 (3d Cir. 1986). 

3

 The fact that the Agreement permitted disclosure as required by law to the Securities and 

Exchange Commission does not discount HP’s and NVIDIA’s articulated expectation that the 

Agreement would not be disclosed in private litigation. (See Reply 8.) 

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United States District Court

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ability to maintain its competitive standing, showing good cause to maintain the Agreement under 

seal.4

 

Despite plaintiffs’ protests to the contrary, the court does not find that the public will be 

harmed by this decision. Plaintiffs boldly assert that unsealing the Agreement is necessary to 

“show[] the public that plaintiffs’ class action has merit.” (Reply 4.) Yet plaintiffs’ case is 

proceeding in a court of law, not a court of public opinion. Nothing in this court’s order prevents 

Judge Ware from considering the Agreement for either plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification or 

HP’s Motion for Summary Judgment.5 Plaintiffs’ class action either has merit, or it does not, 

regardless of whether the public approves. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, plaintiffs’ motion to unseal the Agreement is GRANTED IN PART 

as follows: Exhibits 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 24 to the Michael F. Ram Declaration, Docket No. 108, 

shall be unsealed in this court’s record; Exhibit 1 shall remain under seal. In addition, Docket No. 

171 shall be removed from this court’s electronic docket and plaintiffs shall file a new version that 

redacts the sentence as it appears on page 7, line 24 to page 8, line 2 that begins with “This 

document” and ends with “Dollars.” 

Finally, for the same reasons discussed above, plaintiffs’ Administrative Motion to Seal their 

reply brief is GRANTED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: May 25, 2010 

HOWARD R. LLOYD 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

 

4

 Furthermore, under the circumstances of this case, HP’s reasoning would also meet a compelling 

reasons standard. See Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978) (holding that 

compelling reasons exist where the documents would be “sources of business information that might 

harm a litigant’s competitive standing”); see also In re Electronic Arts, Inc., 298 Fed. App’x 568, 

569 (9th Cir. 2008). 

5

 In any case, the Federal Rules of Evidence will likely have a greater limiting effect on the value of 

the Agreement to plaintiffs’ case. See Fed. R. Evid. 408 (prohibiting the admission of settlement 

agreements to prove liability). 

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California 

C07-05793 JW (HRL) Notice will be electronically mailed to: 

Daniel Emmett McGuire dmcguire@morganlewis.com 

David Felderman dfelderman@srkw-law.com 

Franco A Corrado fcorrado@morganlewis.com 

Howard Holderness hholderness@morganlewis.com, cgreenblatt@morganlewis.com, 

 mweiler@morganlewis.com 

Jeffrey L. Kodroff jkodroff@srkw-law.com 

John A. Macoretta jmacoretta@srk-law.com 

Karl Olson kolson@ramolson.com, awilliams@ramolson.com 

Kristofor Tod Henning khenning@morganlewis.com 

Marc H. Edelson medelson@edelson-law.com 

Meredith Ann Galto mgalto@morganlewis.com 

Michael Francis Ram mram@ramolson.com, awilliams@ramolson.com 

Monique Olivier molivier@sturdevantlaw.com, arocha@sturdevantlaw.com, 

 bnuss@sturdevantlaw.com, kbecker@sturdevantlaw.com 

Robert A. Particelli rparticelli@morganlewis.com 

Thomas R. Green thomas.green@usdoj.gov, daniel.charlier-smith@usdoj.gov, lily.c.ho- 

 vuong@usdoj.gov 

Counsel are responsible for distributing copies of this document to co-counsel who have not 

registered for e-filing under the court’s CM/ECF program. 

 

Case 5:07-cv-05793-JW Document 226 Filed 05/25/10 Page 6 of 6