Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_24-cv-02797/USCOURTS-caed-2_24-cv-02797-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVOOD KHADEMI,

Petitioner,

v.

ROSEVILLE POLICE DEPARTMENT,

Respondent.

No. 2:24-cv-2797 CKD P

ORDER AND 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Petitioner, a county inmate, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 

2254 and a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1, 2.) Examination of the in forma 

pauperis application reveals that petitioner is unable to afford the costs of suit. Accordingly, the 

application to proceed in forma pauperis will be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). However, for 

the reasons set forth below, the petition should be summarily dismissed because the court lacks 

jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claims.

I. Screening Standard

In screening the habeas petition, the court applies the Rule 4 framework of the Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. Under Rule 4’s standard, if it 

plainly appears from the petition, any attached exhibits, and the record of prior proceedings that 

the moving party is not entitled to relief, then the district court is authorized to summarily dismiss 

Case 2:24-cv-02797-TLN-CKD Document 5 Filed 01/16/25 Page 1 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

a habeas petition. Neiss v. Bludworth, 114 F.4th 1038, 1044 (9th Cir. 2024); Herbst v. Cook, 260 

F.3d 1039, 1043 (9th Cir. 2001).

II. Background

In the present petition, petitioner challenges a judgment of conviction entered on April 27, 

2021, in the Placer County Superior Court, case number 62-152196, for assault with a deadly 

weapon. (ECF No. 1 at 1, 5.) Petitioner served time in custody from April 29, 2017, until October 

21, 2020, and again from February 18, 2021, to May 28, 2022. (Id. at 1.) Petitioner asserts two 

grounds for relief as follows: his conviction was obtained by an unlawfully induced no contest 

plea (ground one) and counsel for the plea misinformed him of immigration consequences and 

failed to provide a translator (ground two). (Id. at 4-5.)

The court takes judicial notice of its records in a prior case filed by petitioner, Khademi v. 

Supreme Court of California, E.D. Cal. No. 2:23-cv-2122-CKD (“prior case”). See United States 

v. Wilson, 631 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir. 1980) (“a court may take judicial notice of its own records 

in other cases”). The records in petitioner’s prior case reflect that, as pertaining to case 62-

152196, petitioner was discharged from parole on January 21, 2023. (No. 2:23-cv-2122-CKD, 

ECF No. 22-3 at 2.) The court also takes judicial notice of the online docket for two criminal 

cases currently pending against petitioner in the Placer County Superior Court, discussed further

below. See Headwaters Inc. v. United States Forest Service, 399 F.3d 1047, 1051 n.3 (9th Cir. 

2005) (taking judicial notice of docket in another case).

III. Discussion

A petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 requires that the petitioner be in custody pursuant to the 

conviction being challenged. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The “in custody” requirement is jurisdictional,

and, therefore, “it is the first question” the court must consider. Williamson v. Gregoire, 151 F.3d

1180, 1182 (9th Cir. 1998). Custody means more than the fact of physical incarceration. Bailey

v. Hill, 599 F.3d 976, 980 (9th Cir. 2010) (“physical custody alone is insufficient to confer 

jurisdiction” and there must be “a nexus between the petitioner's claim and the unlawful nature of 

the custody”). A serious restraint on a petitioner’s liberty, such as probation or parole status, 

meets the “in custody” requirement. See id.; Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 492 (1989).

Case 2:24-cv-02797-TLN-CKD Document 5 Filed 01/16/25 Page 2 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

However, “once the sentence imposed for a conviction has completely expired, the collateral 

consequences of that conviction are not themselves sufficient to render an individual ‘in custody’ 

for the purposes of a habeas attack upon it.” Maleng, 490 U.S. at 492.

“[O]nce a state conviction is no longer open to direct or collateral attack in its own right 

because the defendant failed to pursue those remedies while they were available (or because the 

defendant did so unsuccessfully), the conviction may be regarded as conclusively valid.”

Lackawanna Cnty. Dist. Att’y v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394, 403 (2001) (citing Daniels v. United States, 

532 U.S. 374, 382 (2001)). This rule is subject to three “possible” exceptions:

First, the rule might be inapplicable “in a case where, ‘after the time 

for direct or collateral review has expired, a defendant may obtain 

compelling evidence that he is actually innocent of the crime for 

which he was convicted, and which he could not have uncovered in 

a timely manner.’” Second, the rule might be inapplicable “where 

there was a failure to appoint counsel in violation of the Sixth 

Amendment[.] .... [A]nother exception to this rule may be available 

in “rare cases in which no channel of review was actually available 

to a defendant with respect to a prior conviction, due to no fault of 

his own.”

Roberts v. Broomfield, 637 F. Supp. 3d 872, 986 (E.D. Cal. 2022) (citations omitted). These 

“[e]xceptions to Lackawanna are seldom applied.” Id. “Whatever such a petitioner must show to 

be eligible for review, the challenged prior conviction must have adversely affected the sentence 

that is the subject of the habeas petition.” Lackawanna, 532 U.S. at 406.

Petitioner does not allege the challenged prior conviction has adversely affected any new 

sentence. A search of the Placer County Superior Court’s website1 using petitioner’s name yields 

results indicating he is a pretrial detainee on 2023 felony charges in Case No. 62-192738 and on 

2023 misdemeanor charges in Case No. 62-194312. Thus, petitioner is currently held as a pretrial 

detainee. 

Petitioner’s challenge to his conviction in Placer County Superior Court Case No. 62-

152196 lacks any nexus to his present custody, as required by the plain text of 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(a). As set forth above, petitioner was discharged from parole on January 21, 2023. The 

1 This information is available online at https://www.placer.courts.ca.gov/online-services/onlineportal, last visited 1/13/25.

Case 2:24-cv-02797-TLN-CKD Document 5 Filed 01/16/25 Page 3 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

instant action was constructively filed on October 4, 2024, subsequent to his discharge from 

parole. See Rule 3(d), Rules Governing Habeas Corpus Cases Under Section 2254.

Petitioner does not assert a nexus between case No. 62-152196 and the unlawful nature of 

his present custody as a pretrial detainee. To any extent petitioner would argue he may suffer

collateral consequences on either pending criminal case from case No. 62-152196, that does not 

constitute a nexus between his claims and the unlawful nature of his present custody. A petitioner 

is not “in custody” under a conviction after the sentence imposed has fully expired merely 

because the prior conviction could be used to enhance a sentence imposed for a future conviction. 

Maleng, 490 U.S. at 493; see also Lackawanna, 532 U.S. at 403-04.

Because petitioner’s parole was terminated prior to the filing of this action, and the 

challenged prior conviction has not adversely affected any new sentence that is the subject of the 

habeas petition, it is clear that none of the Lackawanna exceptions apply. The court is without 

jurisdiction to consider petitioner’s claims in the petition. See Maleng, 490 U.S. at 492 (“once the 

sentence imposed for a conviction has completely expired, the collateral consequences of that 

conviction are not themselves sufficient to render an individual ‘in custody’ for the purposes of a 

habeas attack upon it.”); Bailey, 599 F.3d at 980 (section 2254(a)’s language “explicitly requires 

a nexus between the petitioner’s claim and the unlawful nature of the custody”).

IV. Order and Recommendation

For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:

1. Petitioner’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is granted.

2. The Clerk of the Court shall assign a district judge to this case.

In addition, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the petition for writ of habeas corpus 

be summarily dismissed.

These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, petitioner may file written

objections with the court. In any objections, petitioner may address whether a certificate of 

appealability should issue in the event he files an appeal of the judgment in this case. See Rule 

Case 2:24-cv-02797-TLN-CKD Document 5 Filed 01/16/25 Page 4 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

11, Federal Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases (the district court must issue or deny a 

certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant). Petitioner is 

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the 

District Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: January 16, 2025

8, khad2797.scrn.fr

_____________________________________

CAROLYN K. DELANEY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 2:24-cv-02797-TLN-CKD Document 5 Filed 01/16/25 Page 5 of 5