Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_06-cv-00089/USCOURTS-azd-4_06-cv-00089-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 350
Nature of Suit: Motor Vehicle Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:2671 Federal Tort Claims Act

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 Clerk’s record number.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Allstate Insurance Company, a

Corporation, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

United States of America; United States

Air Force; Thomas E. Stephenson, and if

married, Jane Doe Stephenson, husband

and wife; et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CIV 06-089-GEE

ORDER

Pending before the court is an amended motion to dismiss filed on July 10, 2006, by

the defendants, United States of America and United States Air Force (the government).

[#14]1

. The plaintiff, Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate), filed a response, and the

government filed a reply.

The plaintiff in this case, Allstate, is subrogating the claim of its insured, Lisa Carzoli

whose vehicle was rear-ended by a vehicle operated by the defendant, Stephenson. Allstate

alleges that, at the time of the accident, Stephenson was acting within the scope of his

employment as a member of the United States Air Force and brings this action pursuant to

Case 4:06-cv-00089-GEE Document 26 Filed 11/21/06 Page 1 of 6
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the Federal Tort Claims Act. The government moves that this court dismiss the complaint

pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Magistrate Judge Edmonds presides over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1)

having received the written consent of all parties.

Neither party requested a hearing, and the court finds the motion suitable for decision

without oral argument. The motion to dismiss will be granted. Stephenson was not acting

within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident.

Factual and Procedural Background

The defendant, Thomas E. Stephenson, is a captain in the U. S. Air Force.

(Defendants’ response, Exhibit 1.) At the time of the accident, Stephenson was stationed at

Vandenberg Air Force Base in California, but he was sent to Davis Monthan Air Force Base

(the Base) in Tucson, Arizona, for a ninety-day temporary duty assignment. (Defendants’

response, p. 3.) Stephenson was assigned to the 612th Air Operations Group which was

“engaged in command and control of air operations for military security and stabilizations

operations in Haiti.” (Defendants’ response, Exhibit 1.) 

Stephenson was housed in an apartment rented by the U.S. Air Force for visiting

personnel located 25 minutes north of the Base. Id. Because visiting personnel do not have

their own personal vehicles, they are allowed to drive a government-owned vehicle to

commute between their apartments and the Base. Id. They are allowed to use these vehicles

for “grocery shopping and to accomplish tasks required for their sustenance, as long as it was

within a reasonable proximity to the military installation or the apartments.” Id. “The

vehicles were not authorized to be used for recreational, entertainment or any other purpose.”

Id.

On May 5, 2004, Stephenson finished his duty shift and drove one of these

government owned vehicles to his apartment. Id. He changed out of his uniform and into

civilian clothes. Id. He then decided to drive to the mall for dinner. Id. While en route to

the mall, Stephenson rear-ended the vehicle driven by Lisa Carzoli. Id.

Case 4:06-cv-00089-GEE Document 26 Filed 11/21/06 Page 2 of 6
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 It claims in the alternative that the accident was caused by negligent hiring, training,

supervision or maintenance. (Complaint, ¶ 7.) 

3

 The complaint also references 39 U.S.C. § 409 and 28 U.S.C. § 1339, but these statutes

apply to actions against the U.S. Postal Service and are inapposite to the instant action.

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Carzoli’s vehicle sustained approximately $ 8,000 in damage. (Complaint.) Allstate,

as her insurer, paid this sum (less a deductible) to Carzoli, and accordingly, her claim is now

subrogated to Allstate. (Complaint.)

On February 23, 2006, Allstate filed a complaint alleging, among other things2

, that

Stephenson caused the accident “unlawfully, recklessly, and negligently” while acting within

the course and scope of his employment with the U.S. Air Force. (Complaint, ¶¶ 9, 10.)

Accordingly, it brings this action pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§

2671-2680.3

 (Complaint, ¶ 1.)

On July 10, 2006, the government filed the instant motion to dismiss pursuant to

FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(1). The government argues Stephenson was not acting within the course

and scope of his employment when he caused the accident. Allstate filed a response, and

the government filed a reply.

Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

A motion to dismiss pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(1) challenges this court’s subject

matter jurisdiction. Because federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, the party

invoking the jurisdiction of the court has the burden of proof. Thornhill Pub. Co., Inc. v.

General Tel. & Electronics Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979).

If the motion challenges the factual basis for jurisdiction and is supported by affidavits

or other evidence, the non-moving party may not rely on allegations made in the complaint

but must produce evidence sufficient to establish jurisdiction. Id. The court is ordinarily free

to weigh the evidence and determine its jurisdiction. Id.

If the jurisdictional facts at issue go to the merits of the claim, however, the court

should employ an analysis similar to that used in analyzing a motion for summary judgment.

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Trentacosta v. Frontier Pacific Aircraft Industries, 813 F.2d 1553, 1558 (9th Cir.1987).

Such a motion will be granted “only if the material jurisdictional facts are not in dispute and

the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.” Id. “Normally, the question of

jurisdiction and the merits of an action will be considered intertwined where, as here, a

statute provides the basis for both the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal court and the

plaintiff's substantive claim for relief.” Sun Valley Gasoline, Inc. v. Ernst Enterprises, Inc.,

711 F.2d 138, 139 (9th Cir. 1983) (internal punctuation omitted).

In the instant case, the jurisdictional facts at issue go to the merits of the claim, and

the court must employ a summary judgment analysis. See, e.g., Augustine v. United States,

704 F.2d 1074, 1078-79 (9th Cir. 1983). 

Discussion

The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671, et seq., “provides

a limited waiver of the sovereign immunity of the United States for torts committed by

federal employees acting within the scope of their employment.” Nurse v. United States, 226

F.3d 996, 1000 (9th Cir. 2000). The government accepts liability “under circumstances where

the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the

law of the place where the act or omission occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). 

“FTCA scope of employment determinations are made according to the principles of

respondeat superior of the state in which the alleged tort occurred.” Wilson v. Drake, 87 F.3d

1073, 1076 (9th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1142 (1997) (internal punctuation

omitted). In this case, Arizona law applies.

“In Arizona, the conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if it is one

of the kind the employee is employed to perform, it occurs substantially within the authorized

time and space limit, and it is actuated at least in part by a purpose to serve the master.”

Smith v. American Express Travel Related Services Company, Inc., 179 Ariz. 131, 135, 876

P.2d 1166, 1170 (App.1994) (internal punctuation removed); See also Olson v. Staggs-Bilt

Homes, Inc., 23 Ariz.App. 574, 576, 534 P.2d 1073, 1075 (App.1975) (“Arizona ascribes to

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the Restatement (Second) of Agency § 228 (1958) definition of the phrase ‘scope of

employment.’”). In the instant case, the material facts are not in dispute. Stephenson was

not acting within the scope of his employment when the accident occurred. 

Stephenson was deployed to Davis Monthan Air Force Base to assist the 612th Air

Operations Group which was “engaged in command and control of air operations for military

security and stabilizations operations in Haiti.” (Defendants’ response, Exhibit 1.) The

accident occurred when Stephenson was off-duty, in civilian clothes, driving from his

apartment to the mall for dinner. This driving was not the kind of activity he was employed

to perform. See also (Defendants’ response, Exhibit 1) (“While using the vehicles to

accomplish off-base authorized tasks . . . the deployed personnel were not performing air

operations support or other tasks directed by command authority.”). Stephenson’s vehicle

was owned by the Air Force, but it was made available to him primarily as a courtesy and not

because his driving was intended to benefit the Air Force. See Restatement (Second) of

Agency § 229, comment (d) (“The mere fact that the employer supplies a vehicle does not

establish that those who avail themselves of it are within the scope of employment while

upon it, especially if the use is merely casual.”).

The accident occurred after Stephenson completed his duty shift and left the Base.

It did not occur “substantially within the authorized time and space limit[s]” of his

employment. The fact that Stephenson is an active duty officer in the U.S. Air Force does

not enlarge the scope of employment beyond that which would accompany ordinary civilian

employment. Hartzell v. United States, 786 F.2d 964, 967-69 (9th Cir. 1986).

Finally, by driving to the mall for dinner, Stephenson did not intend to assist the 612th

Air Operations Group or further the business of the U.S. Air Force. His conduct was not

“actuated at least in part by a purpose to serve the master.” See Smith, 179 Ariz. at 135, 876

P.2d at 1170. At the time of the accident, Stephenson was not acting within the course and

scope of his employment. See also Clamor v. United States, 240 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2001)

(Civilian employee of the United States Navy temporarily assigned to Pearl Harbor Naval

Base was not acting within the course and scope of employment at the time of the accident

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where the accident occurred on the base, he was off-duty and driving to his temporary

quarters in his rental car, and the cost of the vehicle and the cost of his lodging were

reimbursed by the Navy.); Driscoll v. Harmon, 124 Ariz. 15, 601 P.2d 1051 (1979) (Enlisted

man on active duty with the Air Force was not acting within the course of his employment

at the time of the accident which occurred on the base, after his duty shift, while driving his

personal automobile to his off-base residence.). The United States is therefore immune from

suit. See Nurse v. United States, 226 F.3d 996, 1000 (9th Cir. 2000) Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the amended motion to dismiss filed on July 10, 2006, by the

defendants, United States of America and United States Air Force is GRANTED. [#14] The

FTCA claim based on Stephenson’s alleged conduct within the course and scope of his

employment is dismissed. 

Allstate’s claim that the accident was caused by negligent hiring, training, supervision

or maintenance is not affected by this order. But see Nurse v. United States, 226 F.3d 996,

1001-02 (9th Cir. 2000) (Complaint challenging defendants “allegedly negligent and reckless

employment, supervision and training” was barred by the discretionary function exception

to the FTCA.).

DATED this 21st day of November, 2006.

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