Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-01311/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-01311-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Dean Franklyn Soares,

Petitioner,

v. 

Charles L Ryan, et al.,

Respondents.

No. CV-19-01311-PHX-DWL

ORDER 

On February 22, 2019, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 

28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1.) Petitioner thereafter filed an amended petition (Doc. 4) and 

an “addendum” that purports to assert additional grounds for relief (Doc. 11). On April 

27, 2020, Magistrate Judge Bibles issued an amended Report and Recommendation 

(“R&R”) concluding the petition should be denied. (Doc. 18.) Afterward, Petitioner filed 

objections to the R&R (Doc. 27) and Respondents filed a response (Doc. 29). For the 

following reasons, the Court will overrule Petitioner’s objections, adopt the R&R, and 

terminate this action.

I. Background

The Underlying Crime. Petitioner, who was “forty-seven years old at the time of 

his arrest . . . and possessed multiple advanced educational degrees,” “paid to subscribe to 

particular websites that sold child pornography.” States v. Soares, 2010 WL 532370, *7

(Ariz. Ct. App. 2010). “The images consisted of . . . minors posing in elaborate settings 

and costumes, such as those of a duchess or a pirate.” Id. at *1.

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In June 2006, Petitioner “voluntarily invited two plain clothes police officers into 

his home after they identified themselves as police, displayed their badges, and informed

him they were looking for child pornography on computers.” Id. at *3. “After they were 

inside his house, they asked [Petitioner] for written consent to inspect his computer for 

child pornography. At that time, [Petitioner] voluntarily signed a consent to search form 

that explicitly authorized police to conduct only a limited search of his laptop computer for 

child pornography.” Id. at *4. 

When Petitioner went to his bedroom to retrieve his laptop, he deleted some of the 

images stored on it. Id. at *1. Nevertheless, during the officers’ resulting search, they 

discovered at least one image that appeared to be child pornography. Id. “Before retrieving 

any additional images, the officers took [Petitioner] into custody and obtained a Miranda

waiver.” Id. During an ensuing interview, which was videotaped, Petitioner admitted “that 

similar images of children, some as young as ten years old, would be found on his laptop”

but argued, among other things, “that he considered the images ‘art.’” Id.

Following this interview, a detective used specialized software to retrieve additional 

images from Petitioner’s computer. Id. All told, the police extracted at least 10 images 

(including three videos) from the computer. Id. “[A]ll of the images were copied and saved 

between August and November 2005, and last accessed between April and June 2006, the 

same day the police went to [Petitioner’s] house.” Id. “[A]ll of the girls in the images 

appeared to be under thirteen years of age.” Id.

The Charges, Trial, And Sentencing. In July 2006, Petitioner was indicted on 10 

counts of sexual exploitation of a minor. (Doc. 18 at 2.) 

Petitioner was represented by retained counsel during his pretrial and trial 

proceedings. (Id.) Before trial, Petitioner moved to suppress the evidence found on his 

computer, arguing that the officers who obtained his consent to enter his home had violated 

the Arizona Constitution by failing to affirmatively advise him of his right to refuse. 

Soares, 2010 WL 532370 at *3-5. After holding an evidentiary hearing, the trial court 

denied the suppression motion. Id.

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Before trial, Petitioner also secured a court order “precluding evidence of the federal 

investigation that precipitated” the officers’ visit to his home. Id. at *5-6. During trial, 

however, one of the officers stated (in response to the question “What is a knock-andtalk?”) that “[b]asically, we knock at a person’s house, and we ask them if we can come in 

and talk to them about a crime that we think has occurred.” Id. Petitioner’s counsel moved 

for a mistrial based on this answer, arguing that it violated the pretrial order barring any 

reference to the underlying investigation, but the trial court denied the motion and 

instructed the jury to disregard the officer’s statement. Id.

The jury ultimately convicted Petitioner of two counts, hung on a third count, and 

acquitted on the remaining seven counts. (Doc. 18 at 3.) 

On May 1, 2008, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to a sentence of 10 years on 

each of the two counts of conviction, to be served consecutively. (Id.)

The Direct Appeal. In his direct appeal, Petitioner was represented by new retained 

counsel. (Id.) He agued (1) there was insufficient evidence to support one of the counts

of conviction, (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress, (3) the trial court 

erred in denying his motion for mistrial, (4) the trial court erred in precluding the admission 

of evidence reflecting that the websites he visited contained “legal disclaimers,” and (5) 

his sentence was unconstitutional. (Id.)

On February 16, 2010, the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s 

convictions and sentences. (Id.)

On September 21, 2010, the Arizona Supreme Court summarily denied Petitioner’s 

petition for review. (Id.)

Initial PCR Proceedings. On October 21, 2010, Petitioner (through retained 

counsel) filed a notice of post-conviction relief (“PCR”). (Id.) Petitioner’s retained 

counsel subsequently withdrew and was replaced by appointed counsel. (Id.) Afterward, 

appointed counsel filed a PCR petition asserting that (1) the statute of conviction, A.R.S. 

§ 13-3553, was unconstitutional, and (2) Petitioner received ineffective assistance because 

his trial counsel failed to timely obtain and produce the “legal disclaimers” from the 

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website. (Id. at 3-4.)

On February 3, 2012, the trial court summarily denied PCR relief. (Id. at 4.)

Petitioner thereafter filed a pro se petition for review with the Arizona Court of 

Appeals. (Id.) On August 12, 2013, that court summarily denied relief. (Id.)

Petitioner did not seek review in the Arizona Supreme Court. (Id.) Thus, the 

Arizona Court of Appeals issued its mandate on October 15, 2013. (Id.) However, that 

court subsequently vacated the mandate and reinstated the appeal for the sole purpose of 

correcting a typographical error. (Id.) After the typographical error was corrected, 

Petitioner petitioned for review in the Arizona Supreme Court. (Id.) On June 12, 2014, 

that court denied review. (Id.)

Successive PCR Proceedings. On January 9, 2014, Petitioner filed a pro se “writ of 

habeas corpus ad subjiciendum,” which attempted to challenge his sentence. (Id.) The 

trial court construed the writ as a Rule 32 action and dismissed it as both untimely and 

successive, noting that the claims were also precluded by Petitioner’s failure to raise them 

in his first PCR action. (Id.)

On July 28, 2014, Petitioner filed another notice of Rule 32 relief. (Id.) On August 

21, 2014, the trial court dismissed the action as untimely and successive. (Id.)

On January 6, 2017, Petitioner filed a fourth petition for state habeas relief. (Id.) In 

it, Petitioner asserted he had “new” and “first-hand” witnesses, i.e., two roommates (Dr. 

Endres and “Mr. Craig”), who had “vital, reliable and exculpatory case information”

regarding the search of his residence. (Id.) Attached to the petition was a statement from 

Dr. Endres that, after the police executed the search warrant, “the computer that my father 

and I owned” had been removed. (Id. at 4-5.) The trial court, after construing the petition 

as asserting claims of actual innocence and prosecutorial misconduct, concluded that the 

petition was untimely (because the “newly” discovered facts were known to Petitioner at 

the time of trial and not exculpatory) and alternatively that the claims for relief were 

precluded. (Id. at 5.)

On November 28, 2017, the Arizona Court of Appeals denied relief, “noting the 

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instant petition was [Petitioner’s] fourth Rule 32 petition and concluding the trial court did 

not abuse its discretion in denying relief.” (Id.) 

Petitioner did not seek review in the Arizona Supreme Court. (Id.) Accordingly, 

the Arizona Court of Appeals issued its mandate on February 29, 2018. (Id.)

The Habeas Claims. Between his petition, amended petition, and addendum, 

Petitioner asserts a Brady claim, various unlawful search claims, various due process 

claims, a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge, a malicious prosecution claim, and a 

Confrontation Clause claim. (Id. at 5-7.)

The R&R. The R&R concludes that Petitioner’s claims are barred by AEDPA’s 

one-year statute of limitations. (Id. at 7-11.) Specifically, the R&R explains that 

Petitioner’s state-court conviction became final on December 20, 2010, which is 90 days 

after the Arizona Supreme Court denied relief in his direct appeal, and that Petitioner is 

only entitled to statutory tolling through June 12, 2014, which is when the Arizona 

Supreme Court denied relief in Petitioner’s first PCR action. (Id. at 7-8.) Thus, the R&R 

concludes that Petitioner’s initiation of this action in February 2019 came far too late. (Id.) 

The R&R clarifies that Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling during his second 

and third PCR actions because those actions “were deemed successive and untimely by the 

state court.” (Id. at 8.) Additionally, the R&R notes that Petitioner “had no state actions 

for post-conviction relief of any kind pending for more than two years, until January 6, 

2017, when he filed a fourth Rule 32 petition,” and thus “[t]he fourth Rule 32 petition. . . 

could not and did not restart the limitations period on [Petitioner’s] federal habeas 

petition.” (Id.) 

Finally, the R&R concludes that Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling based 

on “new” evidence (i.e., the declaration from his former roommate, Dr. Endres) because 

(1) “none of Dr. Endres’ statements belie the legitimacy of the search warrant resulting in 

the seizure of evidence introduced at [Petitioner’s] trial,” (2) “the statement does not 

establish [Petitioner’s] innocence of the crimes of conviction,” (3) Petitioner “does not 

explain how this ‘evidence’ could not have been discovered through the exercise of due 

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diligence prior to the expiration of statute of limitations,” as he “presumably knew or could 

have known that his roommate was at the apartment on the day of the search, and that the 

police presumably seized Dr. Endres’ computer as well as [his] computer,” (4) Petitioner 

is also “unable to establish due diligence because he knew of this ‘evidence’ at the time he 

filed his fourth Rule 32 action and nonetheless let eleven months pass after the termination 

of that action before filing his federal habeas petition,” and (5) “to the extent [Petitioner] 

asserts this ‘new’ evidence, i.e., Dr. Endres’ statement, warrants consideration of the merits 

of his Fourth Amendment claims by this Court, a Fourth Amendment claim is not 

cognizable in a federal habeas action.” (Id. at 8-10.) 

II. Legal Standard

A party may file written objections to an R&R within fourteen days of being served 

with a copy of it. Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases 8(b) (“Section 2254 Rules”). Those 

objections must be “specific.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2) (“Within 14 days after being 

served with a copy of the recommended disposition, a party may serve and file specific

written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations.”).

District courts are not required to review any portion of an R&R to which no specific 

objection has been made. See, e.g., Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149-50 (1985) (“It does 

not appear that Congress intended to require district court review of a magistrate’s factual 

or legal conclusions, under a de novo or any other standard, when neither party objects to 

those findings.”); United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(“[T]he district judge must review the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations 

de novo if objection is made, but not otherwise.”). Thus, district judges need not review 

an objection to an R&R that is general and non-specific. See, e.g., Warling v. Ryan, 2013 

WL 5276367, *2 (D. Ariz. 2013) (“Because de novo review of an entire R & R would 

defeat the efficiencies intended by Congress, a general objection ‘has the same effect as 

would a failure to object.’”) (citations omitted); Haley v. Stewart, 2006 WL 1980649, *2 

(D. Ariz. 2006) (“[G]eneral objections to an R & R are tantamount to no objection at all.”).1

1 See generally S. Gensler, 2 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules and 

Commentary, Rule 72, at 422 (2018) (“A party who wishes to object to a magistrate judge’s 

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III. Analysis

Petitioner’s objections to the R&R (Doc. 27) are difficult to decipher. Petitioner’s 

arguments appear to be that (1) the Court should overlook the untimeliness of his habeas 

petition pursuant to the “actual innocence” gateway (id. at 1-3); (2) he is entitled to 

equitable tolling because “the level of diligence [he] has forever exhibited exceeds that 

expected of someone of ordinary prudence” and because he didn’t learn until June 1, 2015 

that the Arizona Court of Appeals had denied relief (id. at 3-6); (3) he is entitled to equitable 

tolling because he diligently sought legal representation from various attorneys (id. at 6-

7); (4) he is entitled to equitable tolling because he acted diligently in searching for Dr. 

Endres (id. at 7-9); (5) he is entitled to equitable tolling because certain documents were 

mailed to his parents and they didn’t timely forward the documents to him (id. at 9-10); (6) 

the magistrate judge made “an erroneous assessment” when rejecting his actual innocence 

claim (id. at 10-15); and (7) he is entitled to a Martinez hearing (id. at 15-17).

Petitioner’s objections are unavailing. As an initial matter, the Endres declaration 

does not come close to establishing actual innocence. Charitably construed, the declaration 

might, at most, support some of Petitioner’s arguments related to the legality of the search

that led to the discovery of the child pornography on his computer. But “[c]hallenging the 

search and seizure of the [underlying] evidence, even if successful, would not show actual 

innocence—that [the habeas petitioner] did not commit the [underlying] offense.” Warren 

v. United States, 707 Fed. App’x 509, 512 (10th Cir. 2017). 

Petitioner’s various arguments concerning equitable tolling also lack merit. The 

Court has carefully reviewed the R&R’s analysis of this issue and adopts it in full. Many 

of Petitioner’s objections relate to his pro se status, ignorance of the law, and lack of 

representation, but as Respondents correctly point out (Doc. 29 at 5-6), such considerations 

do not trigger equitable tolling. 

...

ruling must make specific and direct objections. General objections that do not direct the 

district court to the issues in controversy are not sufficient. . . . [T]he objecting party must 

specifically identify each issue for which he seeks district court review . . . .”).

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Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that:

(1) Petitioner’s objections to the amended R&R (Doc. 27) are overruled.

(2) The amended R&R’s recommended disposition (Doc. 18) is accepted.

(3) The habeas petition (Doc. 1), amended habeas petition (Doc. 4), and 

addendum thereto (Doc. 11) are denied.

(4) A Certificate of Appealability and leave to proceed in forma pauperis on 

appeal are denied because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right and because dismissal is justified by a plain procedural bar and 

reasonable jurists would not find the procedural ruling debatable.

(5) The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly and terminate this action.

Dated this 9th day of November, 2020.

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