Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02031/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-02031-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DANIEL LICEA JIMENEZ, Civil No. 09cv2031 BTM (NLS)

Petitioner,

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION RE

GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN

PART MOTION TO DISMISS PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

vs.

LARRY SMALL, Warden, et al., 

Respondents.

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Daniel Licea Jimenez has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his conviction for second degree murder and use of a firearm in San Diego

Superior Court case number SCD 143996. Respondent has filed a motion to dismiss the petition,

arguing that it was filed beyond the statute of limitations and is unexhausted. (Mem. of P. & A. Supp.

Answer.)

The Court has considered the Petition, Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum of

Points and Authorities in Support of the Motion to Dismiss, Petitioner’s Opposition to the Motion,

Petitioner’s Supplemental Documents in Support of the Opposition, the Lodgments submitted by

Respondent, and all other supporting documents submitted by the parties. Based upon the documents

and evidence presented in this case, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court recommends that the

Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED.

/ / /

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II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Jimenez pleaded guilty to second degree murder, use of a firearm and being a felon in possession

of a firearm on May 25, 1999. (Lodgment No. 3, Exh. 22 at 11-21.) He also admitted a prior serious

felony conviction. (Id. ) Jimenez sought to withdraw his plea shortly thereafter. (Lodgment No. 3, Exh.

24.) The motion was denied and he was sentenced to twenty-eight years-to-life in state prison.

(Lodgment No. 3, Exh. 20; Lodgment No. 1 at 1.) According to Respondent, there is no record of

Jimenez appealing his conviction.

On May 7, 2007, Jimenez filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the San Diego Superior

Court, which denied the petition in a written, unpublished opinion dated June 29, 2007. (Lodgment Nos.

1, 2.) He then filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the California Court of Appeal for the

Fourth Appellate District, Division One, which denied the petition in a written, unpublished opinion

dated September 17, 2008. (Lodgment Nos. 3, 4.) Finally, he filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

in the California Supreme Court on August, 21, 2009 which was still pending at the time Jimenez filed

the instant federal petition. (Lodgment Nos. 5, 6.) The California Supreme Court denied the petition

during the pendency of this case. (Pet’rs Supp. Docs.: Update on Cal. Sup. Ct.’s Action [doc. no. 15].)

Jimenez filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in this Court on

September 17, 2009. (Doc. No. 1.) Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum of Points

and Authorities in Support of the Motion to Dismiss on December 9, 2009. (Doc. Nos. 11, 11-1.)

Petitioner filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss on January 5, 2010 and a document entitled

“Supplemental Documents: Update on California Supreme Court’s Action” on January 22, 2010. (Doc.

No. 15.)

III. DISCUSSION

In the motion to dismiss, Respondent argues Jimenez’s petition is both untimely and

unexhausted. (Mem. P. & A. Supp. Mot. to Dismiss at 3-6.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court

concludes that Jimenez’s petition is exhausted but time barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that the motion be granted in part and denied in part and that

the petition be DISMISSED with prejudice.

/ / /

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1

 Sixty days after August 11, 1999 is October 10, 1999, which fell on a Sunday.

2

 In its opinion denying Jimenez’s habeas corpus petition, the San Diego Superior Court stated that

Jimenez’s direct appeal was denied on September 14, 2000. According to Respondent, however, there is no

record of any direct appeal having been filed by Jimenez, Jimenez states in his petition that he did not appeal and

an independent search by the Court of the California Court of Appeal website and Westlaw failed to locate any

direct appeal by Jimenez. (See Lodgment No. 2 at 2; Mem. P. & A. Supp. Mot. to Dismiss at 2; Pet. at 2.) The

statement by the Superior Court appears to be a simple error.

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A. Timeliness

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), a petitioner has one year from the date his or her conviction is final

to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d). The statute of limitations, however, is subject to both statutory and equitable tolling. See

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1); Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir.

1997), overruled on other grounds by Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 540

(9th Cir. 1998). 

1. Commencement of the One-Year Statute of Limitations

Jimenez’s conviction became final on October 11, 1999, sixty days after the San Diego Superior

Court pronounced judgement.1

 See Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809, 813 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that

a conviction becomes final, within the meaning of section 2244(d)(1)(A), on the last day the defendant

can seek review).2

 Absent any statutory or equitable tolling, Jimenez had until October 10, 2000 to file

his federal habeas petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d); Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir.

2001) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(a), which states “[i]n computing any period of time

prescribed . . . by any applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default from which the designated

period of time begins to run shall not be included” to AEDPA). The instant petition was filed on

September 17, 2009.

2. Statutory Tolling

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) provides that “[t]he time during which a properly filed application for

State post-conviction or other collateral review . . .is pending shall not be counted toward any period

of limitation under this subsection.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Jimenez is not entitled to any statutory

tolling under this provision, however, because the statute of limitations had expired six and a half years

before he filed his first state habeas corpus petition on May 7, 2007. (Lodgment No. 1.) 

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3. Equitable tolling

“To be entitled to equitable tolling, [Petitioner] must show ‘(1) that he has been pursuing his

rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way’ and prevented timely

filing.” Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336-37 (2007), quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408,

418 (2005). Equitable tolling is unavailable in most cases, and “the threshold necessary to trigger

equitable tolling is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063,

1066 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Jimenez has not alleged he is entitled to equitable tolling, nor are there in any facts in the record

before the Court which would appear to entitle him to such tolling. The Court therefore concludes the

petition is untimely, and must be dismissed with prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 224(d).

B. Exhaustion

Habeas petitioners who wish to challenge either their state court conviction or the length of their

confinement in state prison, must first exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c);

Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 133-34 (1987). Ordinarily, to satisfy the exhaustion requirement,

a petitioner must “fairly present[] his federal claim to the highest state court with jurisdiction to consider

it . . . or . . . demonstrate[] that no state remedy remains available. Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829

(9th Cir. 1996) (citing Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971); Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4,

6 (1982)). Moreover, to properly exhaust state court remedies a petitioner must allege, in state court,

how one or more of his or her federal rights have been violated. For example, “[i]f a habeas petitioner

wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him [or her] the due process of law

guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he [or she] must say so, not only in federal court, but in state

court.” See Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995) (emphasis added). 

Respondent argues the petition must be dismissed because the claim it contains is unexhausted.

(Mem. P. & A. Supp. Mot. to Dismiss at 5-6.) Jimenez filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

California Supreme Court on August 21, 2009 which contained the same claim as he seeks to bring in

the current federal petition. (See Lodgment Nos. 5, 6.) At the time the instant petition was filed, the

California Supreme Court had not yet ruled on the petition. During the pendency of this case, however,

the court issued a denial of the petition on January 21, 2010. (See Pet’rs Supp. Docs: Update on Cal.

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Sup. Ct.’s Action [doc. no. 15].) Petitioner’s claim is therefore exhausted, and the Court recommends

the motion to dismiss be DENIED on exhaustion grounds.

IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United States Chief District Judge Barry

Ted Moskowitz under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the United States District

Court for the Southern District of California. For the reasons outlined above, IT IS HEREBY

RECOMMENDED that the Court issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and

Recommendation, and (2) directing that Judgment be entered granting in part and denying in part the

Motion to Dismiss and dismissing the Petition with prejudice. 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than March 9, 2010, any party to this action may file written

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the Court and

served on all parties no later than March 19, 2010. The parties are advised that failure to file objections

within the specified time may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court’s order.

See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th

Cir. 1991).

DATED: February 16, 2010

Hon. Nita L. Stormes

U.S. Magistrate Judge

United States District Court

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