Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01683/USCOURTS-casd-3_09-cv-01683-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 29:201 Fair Labor Standards Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHAWNDA JACK, individually and on

behalf of other members of the general public

similarly situated,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 3:09-cv-1683-MMA(JMA)

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR

FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS

ACTION SETTLEMENT;

[Doc. No. 43]

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

UNOPPOSED MOTION FOR

ATTORNEYS’ FEES

[Doc. No. 44]

vs.

HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE

COMPANY, a Connecticut corporation and

DOES 1-50, Inclusive

Defendant.

Currently before the Court are Plaintiff’s unopposed motion for final approval of

settlement [Doc. No. 43] and Plaintiff’s unopposed motion for attorney fees, litigation expense

award, approval of administrative expenses, an enhancement award for the named plaintiff and

PAGA penalties [Doc. No. 44]. 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Shawnda Jack (“Plaintiff”) commenced the above-referenced wage and hour class

action (“Action”) against Defendant Hartford Fire Insurance Company (“Defendant”) on August 3,

2009, and filed the operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on February 22, 2010. Plaintiff

worked as a customer care representative for Defendant from August 2004 to February 2009. 

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Plaintiff’s FAC alleges Defendant’s employment practices violated state and federal law, including

the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) of 1938, the California Wage Orders, the California

Business & Professions Code, the California Labor Code, and California’s Private Attorneys

General Act (“PAGA”) of 2004. 

The parties engaged in extensive discovery and then participated in mediation in front of

Robert Kaplan, Esq. The parties ultimately reached a settlement. On December 15, 2010, the

parties filed a joint motion for preliminary approval of settlement. [Doc. No. 38.] On January 20,

2011, the Court granted preliminary approval of the settlement (“Preliminary Approval Order”)

[Doc. No. 40], appointing Class Counsel and provisionally certifying the Class for settlement

purposes only, defined as: 

Any person who worked for Hartford Fire Insurance Company in a non-exempt

position in California at any time between August 4, 2005 and January 20, 2011.

After the preliminary approval of the settlement, the claims administrator sent via firstclass U.S. mail to all Class Members a Notice Form, Claim Form, and Request for Exclusion

Form. The claims administrator performed an address trace prior to the initial mailing, and again

upon receipt of returned/undeliverable mail. The claims administrator also traced and re-sent

returned mailings; the obligation to trace and resend ceased after the two mailings or 25 days after

the initial mailing. Heirs of Class Members were entitled to participate, but notices were only sent

to Class Members’ last known addresses. 

Class Members had 45 days from the initial mailing to exercise their option to: (1) object to

the settlement; (2) opt out of the class; (3) submit a claim; (4) not respond and be bound to the

terms of the Agreement, but not recover or be entitled to any portion of the settlement. The notice

informed Class Members that by submitting a claim they agreed to release their California and

federal claims; if they did not timely submit opt-out forms, their California-based claims would be

released. 

On April 24, 2011, Plaintiff filed the present motions for final approval of settlement and

for attorneys’ fees. As set forth in the parties’ joint stipulation of class action settlement and

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release of class action claims (“Stipulation of Settlement”), Defendant established a settlement

fund of $1,200,000, allocated as follows: (1) net settlement amount, aka “Payout Fund” $801,100;

(2) attorneys’ fees $360,000; (3) cost reimbursement $15,000; (4) enhancement award to Class

Representative $2,500; (5) claims administration $18,400; and (6) penalties pursuant to Private

Attorneys General Act of 2004 $3,000. On June 3, 2011, the parties submitted supplemental

briefing in support of the motions. [Doc. No. 50.]

On October 3, 2011, the parties appeared before the Court for a final approval hearing. 

Plaintiff was represented by William Sullivan of Sullivan & Christiani, LLC. Defendant was

represented by David Dow of Littler Mendelson. No individual appeared at the hearing to object

to the proposed settlement. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court took the motions under

submission.

After due consideration of the evidence and arguments presented to the Court in the

parties’ moving papers as well as at the October 3, 2011 hearing, the Court concludes that good

cause supports final approval of the proposed settlement. Therefore, for the reasons set forth

below, the Court GRANTS final approval of the settlement and GRANTS the motion for

attorneys’ fees, subject to the Court’s revision of Plaintiff’s proposed fee award. Additionally, the

Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion for costs, enhancements for the Class Representative, claims

administration expenses and PAGA penalties. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Collective Class Action under FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)

Under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), an aggrieved employee may bring a

collective action on behalf of himself and other employees “similarly situated” based on an

employer’s failure to adequately pay overtime wages. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); Adams v. Inter-Con

Sec. Sys., 242 F.R.D. 530, 535-36 (N.D. Cal. 2007). The FLSA limits participation in a collective

action to only those parties that ‘opt-in’ to the suit. § 216(b) (“No employee shall be a party

plaintiff to any such action unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a party and such

consent is filed in the court in which such action is brought”). 

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The standards for a collective action are set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23

(“Rule 23”). Courts have found that collective action is proper under a two-part test. Under the

first part, a court must determine whether the proposed class should be notified of the action and

whether the putative Class Members were subject to a single illegal policy, plan or decision. 

Murillo v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 2010 WL 2889728 * 2 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (internal marks and

citation omitted). The second part usually occurs after discovery is complete, at which time the

defendants may move to decertify the class. Id. In this step, the court makes a factual

determination about whether the plaintiffs are similarly situated by weighing such factors as “(1)

the disparate factual and employment settings of the individual plaintiffs, (2) the various defenses

available to the defendant which appeared to be individual to each plaintiff, and (3) fairness and

procedural considerations.” Misra v. Decision One Mortg. Co., 673 F. Supp. 2d 987, 993 (C.D.

Cal. 2008) 

Here, the notice provides that if a Class Member does not timely submit opt-out forms, the

California-based claims are released [Hanson Dec., Doc 43-3, P. 7-8, § III, ¶ 1]. However, if a

Class Member returns a valid Claim Form (thereby opting-in), the Class Member releases both

California-based and FLSA claims [Id. at P. 7-8, § III, ¶ 2]. Accordingly, the notice complies with

the FLSA requirements by requiring the Class Members to affirmatively consent to releasing

FLSA claims through the opt-in procedure. 

The requirement that the putative Class Members were subject to a single illegal policy,

plan, or decision is also satisfied. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated the FLSA by failing to

pay and properly calculate overtime to Plaintiff and all other employees similarly situated. 

Defendant admits that it relied solely upon FLSA members’ timesheets and ignored several more

accurate time records such as phone log-in reports and computer log-in/out reports. In addition,

Defendant relied on time schedules–as opposed to actual work-time–to calculate compensable

time. According to Plaintiff, these policies and practices led to inaccurate compensation of

Defendant’s employees. Defendants’ failure to take into account the more accurate time records

that were readily available constitutes a single illegal policy, to which all Class Members were

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subjected. 

Finally, because this case settled prior to the close of discovery, Defendant did not move to

decertify the Class. See Misra v. Decision One Mortg. Co., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119468, 2009

WL 4581276, at *4 (C.D. Cal. April 13, 2009). Since the analysis required by the second step,

including issues of factual similarities between the employees and their claims, largely overlaps

with class certification analysis under Rule 23(a) and (b), the Court now considers the propriety of

class certification under Rule 23. See id.

B. Certification of the Settlement Class under Rule 23(a) and (b)

Rule 23(e) requires that a court approve a class action settlement. “[I]n the context of a

case in which the parties reach a settlement agreement prior to class certification, courts must

peruse the proposed compromise to ratify both the propriety of the certification and the fairness of

the settlement.” Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 952 (9th Cir. 2003). A court must confirm the

propriety of certification by assessing the following Rule 23(a) prerequisites: “(1) numerosity of

plaintiffs; (2) common questions of law or fact predominate; (3) the named plaintiffs claims and

defenses are typical; and (4) the named plaintiff can adequately protect the interests of the class.”

Hanlon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 508 (9th Cir.1992) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)).

Under Rule 23(b)(3), the Court also must consider whether common questions of law and fact

predominate, as well as whether the class action offers a superior method of adjudicating the

controversy. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 

Plaintiff adequately demonstrates class treatment is appropriate under Rule 23(a). The

numerosity requirement is met because the settlement encompasses 2,591 Class Members.

[Hanson Dec., Doc. No. 44-4, ¶ 14.] The commonality requirement is met because common

questions of law or fact exist (i.e., nonexempt employees allege they were not properly paid all

regular and overtime wages, not properly paid for earned paid time off, not provided adequate

meal and rest periods, not provided proper itemized wage statements, not timely paid all wages

owed at end of employment). The typicality requirement is met because Plaintiff’s claims are

typical of other non-exempt employees who experienced the same working conditions, and

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Defendant’s payroll policies and practices uniformly applied to all non-exempt Class Members. 

The adequacy requirement is met because there is no conflict of interest between Plaintiff and the

Class Members. 

Furthermore, Plaintiff demonstrates the Rule 23(b)(3) requirements are also satisfied. The

parties agree that common questions predominate in this action. [See P&A in Support of Mot. For

Prelim. Approval of Settlement, p. 10.] A class action is superior because common elements

among the individual claims exist, but the relatively small size of each Class Member’s potential

claim would deter them from individually pursuing their claims.

C. Fairness, Adequacy and Reasonableness of Proposed Settlement under Rule 23(e)

Courts require a higher standard of fairness when settlement takes place prior to class

certification to ensure Class Counsel and defendant have not colluded in settling the case. Hanlon

v. Chrysler Corp, 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998). Ultimately, “[t]he court's intrusion upon

what is otherwise a private consensual agreement negotiated between the parties to a lawsuit must

be limited to the extent necessary to reach a reasoned judgment that the agreement is not the

product of fraud or overreaching by, or collusion between, the negotiating parties, and that the

settlement, taken as a whole, is fair, reasonable and adequate to all concerned.” Officers for

Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 688 F.2d 615, 625 (9th Cir. 1982). 

A court considers several factors in determining whether a proposed settlement is “fair,

adequate and reasonable” under Rule 23(e). Such factors may include: (1) the strength of the case;

(2) the risk, expense, complexity, and likely duration of further litigation and the risk of

maintaining class action status throughout the trial; (3) the stage of the proceedings (investigation,

discovery and research completed); (4) the settlement amount; (5) the experience and views of

counsel; and (6) the reaction of the class to the proposed settlement. Staton, 327 F.3d at 959. The

Court needs only consider some of these factors–namely, those designed to protect absentees. See

Molski v. Gleich, 318 F.3d 937, 954 (9th Cir. 2003) (overruled in part on other grounds). 

The Court concludes that the settlement is fair, adequate and reasonable. The parties

decided to settle this action after assessing the claims and possible defenses. The additional time

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and expense of further litigation also weigh in favor of settlement. Furthermore, the proposed

settlement was reached after completing extensive discovery. Thus, Class Counsel possessed

sufficient information to make an informed judgment regarding the likelihood of success on the

merits and the monetary results that could be obtained through further litigation. The Court also

notes that the settlement was the result of an arms-length negotiation before a neutral and detached

mediator. [William Sullivan Dec., Doc. No. 38-2, ¶ 10.] 

Finally, the Court finds that the settlement in this case of $1,200,000 represents a

substantial benefit for the Class because each Class Member will receive a payment on his or her

claim. The average payout to Class Members is projected to be $391.78 per Class Member. The

highest payout claimed is $791.27. [P&A in Support of Settlement, p. 10.] The Court also notes

that the Class Members’ reaction to the proposed settlement has been favorable. In fact, no Class

Member has filed an objection to the proposed settlement. [Id. at p. 13, ln. 16.] 

Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that the settlement satisfies the FLSA

collective action requirements, the Rule 23(a) and (b) class certification requirements, and the

Rule 23(e) requirements for class action settlement. As such, the Court hereby GRANTS final

approval of the settlement.

III. MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES, COSTS, ENHANCEMENT AWARD AND PAGA PENALTY

Also before the Court is Plaintiffs’ unopposed motion for attorney fees, litigation expense

award, approval of administrative expenses, an enhancement award for the named plaintiff, and

PAGA penalties [Doc. No. 44].

A. Award of Attorneys’ Fees

Rule 23(h) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that, “[i]n a certified class

action, the court may award reasonable attorney’s fees and nontaxable costs that are authorized by

law or by the parties’ agreement.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h). Under the FLSA, an award of attorneys’

fees and court costs is mandatory. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (“The court in such action shall, in

addition to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney's fee to

be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action.”)

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“In common fund cases such as this, [the Ninth Circuit has] established twenty-five percent

(25%) of the common fund as the benchmark award for attorney fees. This benchmark percentage

should be adjusted, or replaced by a lodestar calculation, when special circumstances indicate that

the percentage recovery would be either too small or too large in light of the hours devoted to the

case or other relevant factors.” Torrisi v. Tucson Elec. Power Co., 8 F.3d 1370, 1376 (9th Cir.

1993) (internal marks and citations omitted). “Length and complexity of litigation and degree of

success could be considered relevant factors” in determining whether to adjust the benchmark

award. Wininger v. SI Management L.P., 301 F.3d 1115, 1127 (9th Cir. 2002). If the court

determines a benchmark percentage adjustment is warranted, the Ninth Circuit “caution[s] that it

must be made clear by the district court how it arrives at the figure ultimately awarded.” Paul,

Johnson, Alston & Hunt v. Graulty, 886 F.2d 268, 272 (9th Cir. 1989). While no factor is

dispositive, the following factors are relevant to determining whether the percentage award is

appropriate: (1) the results achieved; (2) the risk of litigation; (3) the skill required and the quality

of work; (4) the contingent nature of the fee and the financial burden carried by the plaintiffs; and

(5) awards made in similar cases. In re Omnivision Technologies, Inc., 2007 WL 4293467 *9

(N.D. Cal. 2007), citing Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 290 F.3d 1043, 1048-50 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Here, Class Counsel requests an award of attorneys’ fees in the amount of $360,000, which

represents thirty percent (30%) of the settlement. Upon due consideration, the Court concludes

that this case does not warrant an upward adjustment above the twenty-five percent benchmark. 

There is no evidence to support Class Counsel’s claims that the results in this case were

exceptional or that this case is extraordinarily factually or legally complex. Although Class

Counsel performed competent work in conducting discovery and negotiating settlement, the

circumstances do not indicate any special justification for an upward adjustment to thirty percent. 

Accordingly, the Court approves an award of attorneys’ fees of $300,000 (25% of the $1,200,000

settlement).

/ / /

/ / /

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B. Litigation and Claims Administration Costs

Reimbursement of taxable costs is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1920 and Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 54. Attorneys may recover their reasonable expenses that would typically be billed to

paying clients in non-contingency matters. See Harris v. Marhoefer, 24 F.3d 16, 19 (9th Cir.

1994). Here, Class Counsel seeks a total reimbursement of $15,000 for expenses, including filing

fees, deposition fees, mediation fees, legal research fees, copies, fax transmittals, and travel and

meal feels in connection with the case. 

In addition, Class Counsel requests $18,400 in claims administration expenses. A thirdparty claims administrator, CAC Services Group, LLC, was hired to mail notice to Class Members

and distribute payments. Class Counsel asserts that CAC Services Group, LLC performed its

functions diligently, and the declaration of Matthew P. Hanson, the claims administrator, supports

this claim. 

Accordingly, the Court approves reimbursement for litigation expenses totaling $15,000,

and approves administrative expenses in the amount of $18,400.

C. Enhancement Award for Class Representative

In evaluating the enhancement award to a class representative, a court should consider all

“relevant factors including the actions the plaintiff has taken to protect the interests of the class,

the degree to which the class has benefitted from those actions, . . . the amount of time and effort

the plaintiff expended in pursuing the litigation . . . and reasonable fears of workplace retaliation.”

Staton, 327 F.3d at 977 (internal marks and citations omitted).

Here, the settlement provides an enhancement award to the Class Representative, Shawnda

Jack, of $2,500. Plaintiff provided valuable information and documents from her employment at

Hartford, which were instrumental in Class Counsel’s understanding of the case. Plaintiff spent

more than sixty hours helping prosecute the matter, including meeting with counsel, reviewing

documents, clarifying dates and policies, reviewing discovery responses and document production,

confirming the truthfulness of claims her counsel asserted, and offering input into the defenses

alleged by Hartford [Doc 44-2, ¶ ¶ 10-13]. As such, Plaintiff performed a vital role in this

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litigation, and an enhancement award of $2,500 constitutes fair and reasonable compensation.

Therefore, the Court approves the enhancement award of $2,500 to Class Representative

Plaintiff Shawnda Jack.

D. PAGA Penalties

Defendant’s response to Plaintiff’s allegations has virtually negated any “willful”

violations of the California Labor Code, including, but not limited to, section 203, which imposes

a waiting-time penalty where an employer willfully fails to pay wages to an employee who is

discharged or quits. When allegations regarding improper accounting for the amount of time

employees’ worked were brought to Defendant’s attention, Defendant promptly changed its policy

to have its managers meaningfully review its employees’ timesheets for errors, and crosscheck

them with the time reports available to the manager. Nonetheless, the parties have agreed to

allocate $3,000 for PAGA penalties, so that the Labor workforce and development agency can

continue to investigate and prosecute California Labor Code violations. Therefore, the Court

hereby approves PAGA penalties in the amount of $3,000.

III. ORDER

For the reasons outlined above, the Court GRANTS the parties’ joint motion for final

approval of class action settlement [Doc. No. 43] and GRANTS Plaintiffs’ unopposed motion for

attorneys’ fees, litigation expense award, approval of administrative expenses, an enhancement

award for the named plaintiff, and PAGA penalties [Doc. No. 44]. The Court approves the terms

of the parties’ proposed final settlement, subject to the terms and conditions stated herein and set

forth below. Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 

1. All terms used herein shall have the same meaning as defined in the Stipulation of

Settlement. 

2. Consistent with the definitions provided in the Stipulation of Settlement, the terms

“Class” and “Class Members” include: “Any person who worked for Hartford Fire Insurance

Company in a non-exempt position in California at any time between August 4, 2005 and January

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20, 2011.” For purposes of the Settlement and this Final Order, “Defendant” and/or “Released

Parties” include Hartford Fire Insurance Company and its present and former parent companies,

subsidiaries, related or affiliated companies, including but not limited to The Hartford Financial

Services Group, Inc., Specialty Risk Services, LLC, and any parent, subsidiary, and related

companies, joint ventures, partners, shareholders, officers, directors, employees, agents, attorneys,

insurers, successors and assigns, and any individual or entity which could be jointly liable with

Defendant. 

3. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this Action and over all

Parties to this Action, including all Class Members.

4. Distribution of the Notice of Proposed Class Action Settlement and Final Fairness

and Approval Hearing, Claim Form and Request for Exclusion Form directed to the Class

Members as set forth in the Stipulation of Settlement and the other matters set forth therein, has

been completed in conformity with the Preliminary Approval Order, including individual notice to

all Class Members who could be identified through reasonable effort, and constitutes the best

notice practicable under the circumstances. The Notice provided due and adequate notice of the

proceedings and of the matters set forth therein, including the proposed Settlement set forth in the

Stipulation of Settlement, to all persons entitled to such Notice, and the Notice fully satisfied the

requirements of due process. All Class Members and all Released Claims and Released Federal

Claims are covered by and included with the Settlement and this Final Order. 

5. The Court hereby finds the Settlement was entered into in good faith, and further

finds that the Settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate, and that Plaintiff has satisfied the

standards and applicable requirements for final approval of this class action Settlement under

California and federal law, including the provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. 

6. The Court hereby approves the Settlement as set forth in the Stipulation of

Settlement, and finds that the Settlement is, in all respects, fair, adequate and reasonable, and

directs the Parties to effectuate the Settlement according to the terms outlined in the Stipulation of

Settlement. The Court finds that the Settlement has been reached as a result of intensive, serious

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and non-collusive arms length negotiations. The Court also finds that the Class is properly

certified for settlement purposes only. 

7. The Court hereby finds the One Million Two Hundred Thousand Dollars

($1,200,000.00) Gross Settlement Amount provided for under the Settlement to be fair and

reasonable. 

8. The Court ORDERS the calculations and the payments to be made and

administered from the Gross Settlement Amount in accordance with the terms of the Stipulation of

Settlement to each Participating Class Member who submitted a timely and valid claim in

accordance with the Stipulation of Settlement. 

9. The Court hereby confirms Sullivan & Christiani, LLC as Class Counsel.

10. Pursuant to the terms of the Stipulation of Settlement, and the authorities, evidence

and argument submitted by Class Counsel, the Court hereby AWARDS Class Counsel attorneys’

fees and costs in the amount of three hundred fifteen thousand dollars ($315,000.00), to be paid

from the Maximum Settlement Payout, as final payment for and complete satisfaction of any and

all attorneys' fees and costs incurred by and/or owed to Class Counsel.

11. The Court also hereby approves as Class Representative, and ORDERS payment

to, the named Plaintiff, Shawnda Jack, for her services as a Class Representative the sum of two

thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500.00), to be paid from the Maximum Settlement Payout and as

provided by the terms of the Stipulation of Settlement.

12. The Court also hereby ORDERS payment of the sum of three thousand dollars

($3,000.00) to the California Labor Workforce Development Agency, to be paid from the

Maximum Settlement Amount and as provided by the terms of the Stipulation of Settlement.

13. The Court also hereby ORDERS the payment of the sum of eighteen thousand four

hundred dollars ($18,400.00) to the CAC Services Group, LLC, to be paid from the Maximum

Settlement Payout and as provided by the terms of the Stipulation of Settlement, for its services as

Claims Administrator.

14. As of the date of this Final Order, each and every Released Claim of each Class

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Member and Released Federal Claim of each Participating Class Member is and shall be deemed

to be conclusively released as against the Released Parties. All Class Members as of the date of

this Final Order and the Effective Date are hereby forever barred and enjoined from prosecuting

the Released Claims (as defined in the Stipulation of Settlement and as set forth below) against the

Released Parties. In addition, all Participating Class Members as of the date of this Final Order

and the Effective Date are hereby forever barred and enjoined from prosecuting the Released

Federal Claims (as defined in the Stipulation of Settlement and as set forth below) against the

Released Parties.

15. As of the date of this Final Order, the Settlement Class, and each Class Member

who has not submitted a valid Request for Exclusion Form, fully releases and discharges the

Released Parties from any and all claims, debts, liabilities, demands, obligations, guarantees, costs,

expenses, attorneys' fees, damages, causes of action and allegations of any nature, known or

unknown, suspected or unsuspected, that were alleged or that could have been alleged, in the

Action, and that arise or could have arisen out of the facts alleged in the Action, including the

claims brought and the claims which could have been brought in the Action, including, but not

limited to claims that arise out of any alleged violations of the wage and hour provisions of the

California Labor Code or the California Wage Orders, or any other wage and hour provisions of

any other state law, regulation or statute, including, but not limited to claims for the failure to

provide payment for all hours worked, the failure to properly calculate the regular rate of pay, the

failure to provide meal periods, the failure to provide rest periods, the failure to provide accurate

pay stubs and itemized wage statements, the failure to keep and maintain accurate payroll records,

the failure to properly administer paid time off, the rounding of employee time records and wage

rates, the administration of make-up time, the failure to timely pay all wages owed to terminated

and resigned employees, the failure to pay any penalties, claims for unfair, unlawful, and

fraudulent business practices under the California Business and Professions Code section 17200 et

seq., claims for penalties arising under PAGA, and/or related violations of the California Labor

Code or Wage Orders, and any other claims whatsoever alleged, or that could have been alleged,

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in the Action, including without limitation all claims for restitution and other equitable relief,

injunctive relief, statutory damages, liquidated damages, exemplary damages, punitive damages,

waiting-time penalties, or penalties of any nature whatsoever, arising from employment by

Defendant and/or the Released Parties, and/or any of their predecessors in interest from August 4,

2005 up to and including January 20, 2011 (collectively, “Released Claims”). This Release and

the Released Claims are specifically intended to cover and release any and all claims, including

any and all wage and hour claims as set forth above, that arose, or could have arisen during the

Class Period.

16. As of the date of this Final Order, in addition to releasing the Released Parties from

the Released Claims as described above, each Settlement Class Member who has submitted a valid

Claim Form (“Participating Class Member”), shall fully release and discharge the Released Parties

from any and all claims, debts, liabilities, demands, obligations, guarantees, costs, expenses,

attorneys’ fees, damages, causes of action and allegations of any nature, known or unknown,

suspected or unsuspected, that were alleged or that could have been alleged, in the Action, and that

arise or could have arisen out of the facts alleged in the Action, including the claims brought and

the claims which could have been brought in the Action, including, but not limited to claims that

arise out of any alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, including, but not

limited to claims for the failure to provide payment for all hours worked, the failure to properly

calculate the regular rate of pay, the failure to properly administer paid time off, the rounding of

employee time records and wage rates, the administration of make-up time, and any other claims

whatsoever alleged, or that could have been alleged, in the Action under federal law, including

without limitation all claims for restitution and other equitable relief, injunctive relief, statutory

damages, liquidated damages, exemplary damages, punitive damages, penalties of any nature

whatsoever, arising from employment by Defendant and/or the Released Parties, and/or any of

their predecessors in interest from August 4, 2005 up to and including January 20, 2011

(collectively “Released Federal Claims”). This Release and the Released Federal Claims are

specifically intended to cover and release any and all claims, including any and all wage and hour

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claims, that arose, or could have arisen during the Class Period. 

17. The Released Claims and Released Federal Claims include any unknown and

unsuspected claims arising out of or in connection with the claims alleged in the Action and any

claims based on the same operative facts that the Class Members and Participating Class Members

do not know or suspect to exist in their favor at the time of this release, which, if known by them,

might have affected their settlement with, and release of, the Released Parties or might have

affected their decision not to object to this Settlement. With respect to the Released Claims and

Released Federal Claims, the Class Members and Participating Class Members have expressly

waived and relinquished to the fullest extent permitted by law, the provisions, rights and benefits

of Section 1542 of the California Civil Code, or any other similar provision under state and federal

law.

18. Neither the Settlement nor any of the terms set forth in the Stipulation of Settlement

are admissions by Defendant, or any of the other Released Parties, nor is this Final Order a finding

of the validity of any claims in the Action, or of any wrongdoing by Defendant, or any of the other

Released Parties. 

19. The Court hereby ORDERS the entry of final judgment and DISMISSES the

Action. The claims and causes of action in Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint alleged under

federal law on behalf of putative class members employed outside of California are dismissed

without prejudice. Except as so excluded, the remaining claims and cause of action and the

remainder of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint are dismissed with prejudice as to all Parties,

including all Class Members and Participating Class Members. 

20. Without affecting the finality of this Final Order in any way, the Court hereby

retains continuing jurisdiction over the interpretation, implementation and enforcement of the

Settlement and all orders entered in connection therewith.

21. Neither this Final Order nor the Stipulation of Settlement shall be construed as an

admission by Defendant or finding by the Court regarding the propriety of the certification of any

class in this or any other matter other than for purposes of settlement of this Litigation.

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22. If the Settlement does not become final and effective in accordance with the terms

of the Stipulation of Settlement, then this Final Order and all orders entered in connection herewith

shall be rendered null and void and shall be vacated.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 13, 2011

Hon. Michael M. Anello

United States District Judge

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