Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-11-35796/USCOURTS-ca9-11-35796-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 

---

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ELVEN JOE SWISHER,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 11-35796

D.C. Nos.

1:09-cv-00055-BLW

1:07-cr-00182-BLW-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Idaho

B. Lynn Winmill, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted En Banc

September 9, 2015—San Francisco, California

Filed January 11, 2016

Before: Sidney R. Thomas, Chief Judge and Stephen

Reinhardt, Alex Kozinski, M. Margaret McKeown, Marsha

S. Berzon, Richard R. Clifton, Jay S. Bybee, Sandra S.

Ikuta, N. Randy Smith, Jacqueline H. Nguyen and Paul J.

Watford, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Ikuta;

Dissent by Judge Bybee

 Case: 11-35796, 01/11/2016, ID: 9821892, DktEntry: 99-1, Page 1 of 48
2 UNITED STATES V. SWISHER

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

Reversing the denial of a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255,

the en banc court held that the reasoning in United States v.

Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012), invalidating on First

Amendment grounds a statute prohibiting lying about being

awarded military medals, also applied to 18 U.S.C. § 704(a)

(2002 ed.), a provision of the Stolen Valor Act that previously

criminalized the unauthorized wearing of such medals.

The en banc court held that the defendant’s challenge to

his conviction under § 704(a) was not barred by Teague v.

Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), because Alvarez was a decision

holding that a substantive federal statute did not reach certain

conduct, and thus could be applied retroactively. In addition,

the government waived a procedural default defense based on

the defendant’s failure to raise his constitutional claim at trial

or on direct appeal.

The en banc court held that § 704(a) regulated speech

because wearing a medal conveys a message. The court held

that § 704(a) was a content-based restriction of false symbolic

speech because its purpose was to stop a particular message:

the misappropriation or distortion of the message of valor

conveyed by a medal. Accordingly, the tests applicable to

content-neutral regulations did not apply.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

 Case: 11-35796, 01/11/2016, ID: 9821892, DktEntry: 99-1, Page 2 of 48
UNITED STATES V. SWISHER 3

Considering the intermediate-scrutiny standard set forth

in Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion in Alvarez, the en banc

court interpreted § 704(a) as proscribing unauthorized

persons from wearing military medals for the purpose of

falsely communicating that they have been awarded such

medals. The court held that this narrowing interpretation

diminished the extent to which § 704(a) endangered First

Amendment values, but the statute lacked limiting features

such as a requirement of proof of specific harm to identifiable

victims. Accordingly, under Justice Breyer’s test, § 704(a)

created a significant risk of First Amendment harm. The en

banc court concluded that the government had a compelling

interest in enacting § 704(a), but there were other, less

restrictive ways of achieving those objectives.

The en banc court concluded that § 704(a) failed Justice

Breyer’s intermediate scrutiny test, and therefore also failed

under the Alvarez plurality’s exacting scrutiny test.

The en banc court overruled United States v. Perelman,

695 F.3d 866 (9th Cir. 2012), to the extent inconsistent with

this opinion.

Dissenting, Judge Bybee, joined by Judges N.R. Smith

and Watford, wrote that the defendant’s conduct was not a

form of speech entitled to the same protection as the speech

in Alvarez, and that he would uphold the constitutionality of

§ 704(a) under Justice Breyer’s intermediate-scrutiny

analysis.

 Case: 11-35796, 01/11/2016, ID: 9821892, DktEntry: 99-1, Page 3 of 48
4 UNITED STATES V. SWISHER

COUNSEL

Joseph Theodore Horras, Boise, Idaho, for DefendantAppellant.

John M. Pellettieri (argued), Attorney, Appellate Section;

Leslie R. Caldwell, Assistant Attorney General; Sung-Hee

Suh, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, United States

Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for PlaintiffAppellee.

OPINION

IKUTA, Circuit Judge:

This appeal requires us to determine whether the

reasoning in United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012),

which invalidated a statute prohibiting lying about being

awarded military medals, see 18 U.S.C. § 704(b) (2011 ed.),1

also applies to a statute criminalizing the unauthorized

 

1

 The then-applicable provision read:

Whoever falsely represents himself or herself, verbally

or in writing, to have been awarded any decoration or

medal authorized by Congress for the Armed Forces of

the United States . . . shall be fined under this title,

imprisoned not more than six months, or both.

18 U.S.C. § 704(b) (2011 ed.).

 Case: 11-35796, 01/11/2016, ID: 9821892, DktEntry: 99-1, Page 4 of 48
UNITED STATES V. SWISHER 5

wearing of such medals, see 18 U.S.C. § 704(a) (2006 ed.).2

We hold that it does, and therefore reverse the district court.3

 

2

 The provision read in full:

Whoever knowingly wears, purchases, attempts to

purchase, solicits for purchase, mails, ships, imports,

exports, produces blank certificates of receipt for,

manufactures, sells, attempts to sell, advertises for sale,

trades, barters, or exchanges for anything of value any

decoration or medal authorized by Congress for the

armed forces of the United States, or any of the service

medals or badges awarded to the members of such

forces, or the ribbon, button, or rosette of any such

badge, decoration or medal, or any colorable imitation

thereof, except when authorized under regulations made

pursuant to law, shall be fined under this title or

imprisoned not more than six months, or both.

18 U.S.C. § 704(a) (2002 ed.).

Before we agreed to rehear this case en banc, § 704(a) was amended

to remove the word “wears” from the list of prohibited actions with

respect to decorations and medals authorized by Congress. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 704(a) (2013 ed.). That is, § 704(a) no longer prohibits the conduct for

which Swisher was convicted. Because Swisher was convicted under the

prior version of the statute, however, the case is not moot. See Carafas v.

LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 239 (1968) (holding that a challenge to a criminal

conviction is not moot when the defendant continues to face adverse

consequences from the conviction).

3 Swisher’s other claims were previously addressed in an unpublished

memorandum disposition. United States v. Swisher, 585 F. App’x 605

(9th Cir. 2014). We agree with the three-judge panel’s reasons for

rejecting Swisher’s other arguments, and we adopt them as our own.

 Case: 11-35796, 01/11/2016, ID: 9821892, DktEntry: 99-1, Page 5 of 48
6 UNITED STATES V. SWISHER

I

Defendant Elven Joe Swisher enlisted in the United States

Marine Corps on August 4, 1954, a little over a year after the

Korean War ended. In August 1957, he was honorably

discharged from the Marine Corps into the reserves. Upon

discharge, Swisher was given a DD-214 discharge document,

a typewritten form that provided his name, education, type of

discharge, last duty assignment, last date of service, and

similar information regarding his military service. The form

required a listing of Swisher’s “decorations, medals, badges,

commendations, citations and campaign ribbons awarded or

authorized.” In the authenticated copy of Swisher’s original

DD-214, the term “N/A” (not applicable) is written in the

field.

In 2001, more than forty years after his discharge,

Swisher filed a claim for service-related Post-Traumatic

Stress Disorder (PTSD). In his application, Swisher claimed

he suffered from PTSD as a result of his participation in a

secret combat mission in North Korea in August or

September 1955. Along with his application, Swisher

provided a self-published narrative that described the North

Korea operation. According to the narrative, Swisher was

wounded in battle, and subsequently presented with a Purple

Heart by an unnamed captain who visited him in the hospital. 

The same captain told him he was “entitled to and should

wear the National Defense Medal, Korean War Service

Medal and the Korean War U.N. Service Medal and

Ribbons.” Swisher claims he also received a Silver Star and

a Navy Commendation Medal and Ribbon with a Bronze

“V.”

 Case: 11-35796, 01/11/2016, ID: 9821892, DktEntry: 99-1, Page 6 of 48
UNITED STATES V. SWISHER 7

After reviewing Swisher’s application for PTSD benefits

and the accompanying narrative, the VA denied the claim

because Swisher failed to provide corroborating evidence

beyond his own statement that his PTSD was service

connected.

Swisher appealed the denial and submitted a photocopy

of a second DD-214, which included the typewritten

comment that “[t]his document replaces the previously issued

transfer document” and “[c]hanges and additions have been

verified by Command.” The new form stated that Swisher

had received the Silver Star, Navy and Marine Corps Medal

with Gold Star, Purple Heart, and Navy and Marine Corps

Commendation Medal with Bronze “V.” Based on this

information, the VA reversed its previous decision in July

2004, ruled that Swisher’s PTSD was a compensable

disability, and granted Swisher a total of $2,366 a month in

benefits.4

About a year later, the VA received information from the

military personnel division that the replacement DD-214 was

fraudulent. In July 2006, after further investigation

confirmed that the DD-214 was forged, the VA reversed its

determination that the PTSD was service connected and

required Swisher to pay back the PTSD benefits that he had

received.

4 Swisher’s claim that he was awarded a Purple Heart became a key

issue in a criminal trial involving defendant David Hinkson, who was on

trial for solicitation of murder. See United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d

1247, 1254–57 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). The parties agreed that any

evidence related to the Hinkson trial would be excluded from Swisher’s

trial.

 Case: 11-35796, 01/11/2016, ID: 9821892, DktEntry: 99-1, Page 7 of 48
8 UNITED STATES V. SWISHER

In July 2007, a grand jury indicted Swisher for four

violations of federal law: (1) wearing unauthorized military

medals in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 704(a); (2) making false

statements to the VA regarding his military service,

disabilities, and honors, in an effort to obtain benefits in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2); (3) forging or altering his

certificate of discharge, also in an effort to obtain benefits, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(3); and (4) theft of

government funds, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641.

During the one-week trial, Lieutenant Colonel Elaine

Hensen, the assistant head for the Military Awards Branch at

Headquarters Marine Corps, discussed her review of the

Marine Corps files and her determination that the files

contained no record of Swisher receiving or being awarded

the Purple Heart or any other medal or award. The

government also introduced Exhibit 67, a photograph

showing Swisher and another man in Marine Corps League

uniforms.5In the photograph, Swisher is wearing several

military medals and awards, and shaking hands with a person

in civilian garb. The parties stipulated that the photograph

was authentic. Lt. Col. Henson testified that the photograph

showed Swisher wearing the Silver Star, Navy and Marine

Corps Ribbon, Purple Heart, Navy and Marine Corps

Commendation Medal with a Bronze “V,” and UMC

Expeditionary Medal. She reiterated that there was nothing

“in the United States Marine Corps’ files . . . to substantiate

Mr. Swisher’s entitlement to wear any of those awards.” In

addition, Jeffrey Shattuck, the head of the Records

Correspondence Section for the Personnel Management

5 The Marine Corps League is a Congressionally chartered veterans

organization that has its own Marine-related uniforms. See 36 U.S.C.

§§ 140101–04.

 Case: 11-35796, 01/11/2016, ID: 9821892, DktEntry: 99-1, Page 8 of 48
UNITED STATES V. SWISHER 9

Support Branch of the Marine Corps, outlined in detail the

numerous indicia of fraud on Swisher’s replacement DD-214

that Swisher had used to verify his awards.

At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Swisher

guilty on all counts. The court imposed a below-guidelines

sentence of 12 months and one day, with a three-year term of

supervised release. We affirmed Swisher’s conviction and

sentence on appeal. United States v. Swisher, 360 F. App’x

784 (9th Cir. 2009).

Swisher subsequently challenged his conviction through

a motion under 18 U.S.C. § 2255 and claimed that his

conviction for wearing the medals violated the First

Amendment under the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit’s

intervening decision in United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d

1198 (9th Cir. 2010). The district court denied the motion and

an appeal followed. See United States v. Swisher, 790 F.

Supp. 2d 1215, 1245–46 (D. Idaho 2011); United States v.

Swisher, 771 F.3d 514 (9th Cir. 2014).

While Swisher’s appeal was pending, the Supreme Court

affirmed our decision in Alvarez, and held that § 704(b)

unconstitutionally infringes upon speech protected by the

First Amendment. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct.

2537 (2012). Nevertheless, we subsequently distinguished

Alvarez, and held that § 704(a) survived First Amendment

scrutiny. United States v. Perelman, 695 F.3d 866, 871–72

(9th Cir. 2012) (as amended). Bound by Perelman, a threejudge panel rejected Swisher’s constitutional challenge to

§ 704(a). Swisher, 771 F.3d at 524. In his petition for

rehearing, Swisher argued that § 704(a) was unconstitutional

under the reasoning set forth in Alvarez and asked us to

 Case: 11-35796, 01/11/2016, ID: 9821892, DktEntry: 99-1, Page 9 of 48
10 UNITED STATES V. SWISHER

overrule our contrarydecision in Perelman. We took the case

en banc to reconsider this issue.

II

We review de novo a district court’s denial of relief to a

federal prisoner under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. United States v.

Aguirre-Ganceda, 592 F.3d 1043, 1045 (9th Cir. 2010). 

Section 2255 is a substitute for habeas corpus relief for

federal prisoners, see Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333,

343 (1974), and allows a petitioner to file a motion to

“vacate, set aside or correct” the petitioner’s conviction or

sentence “upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in

violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or

that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such

sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum

authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral

attack,” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).

In evaluating a § 2255 motion, we are not constrained by

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), which precludes federal courts from

granting habeas relief to a state prisoner with regard to any

claim adjudicated on the merits unless the adjudication

“resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established” Supreme

Court precedent, or “resulted in a decision that was based on

an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” Section

2255 does not have a similar restriction on review of claims

by federal prisoners.

Although Swisher’s challenge to his conviction is based

on a Supreme Court decision decided after his conviction

became final, we are not barred from considering his claim. 

 Case: 11-35796, 01/11/2016, ID: 9821892, DktEntry: 99-1, Page 10 of 48
UNITED STATES V. SWISHER 11

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), generally precludes the

application of “new constitutional rules of criminal

procedure” to cases that “have become final before the new

rules are announced.” Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S.

614, 619–20 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

While Teague is applicable in the § 2255 context, see United

States v. Sanchez-Cervantes, 282 F.3d 664, 667–68 (9th Cir.

2002), Teague does not bar the retroactive application of

decisions holding “that a substantive federal criminal statute

does not reach certain conduct,” Bousley, 523 U.S. at 620. 

Alvarez is a substantive decision of that sort.

Nor does Swisher’s failure to raise his constitutional

claim at trial or on direct appeal prevent us from reviewing

his claim. Although federal prisoners are generally barred

from raising claims on collateral review that they could have

raised on direct appeal, see Bousley, 523 U.S. at 621, the

government can waive a procedural default defense by failing

to raise it, see United States v. Barron, 172 F.3d 1153,

1156–57 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc). Here, the government

failed to raise the procedural default on appeal and does not

dispute that it is waived.

III

To address Swisher’s arguments, we begin with a review

of the reasoning in Alvarez and our subsequent interpretation

of Alvarez in Perelman.

A

Alvarez considered the appeal of a defendant who was

convicted under § 704(b) for introducing himself at a public

meeting with a series of lies, including the false statement

 Case: 11-35796, 01/11/2016, ID: 9821892, DktEntry: 99-1, Page 11 of 48
12 UNITED STATES V. SWISHER

that “[b]ack in 1987, I was awarded the Congressional Medal

of Honor.” 132 S. Ct. at 2542 (Kennedy, J., plurality

opinion). The defendant challenged his conviction on the

ground that § 704(b) was invalid under the First Amendment. 

Id. He won on appeal, and the government petitioned for

certiorari. Id.

Because § 704(b) criminalized specific statements based

on their falsity, the government did not dispute that the statute

imposed a content-based restriction on speech. Rather, the

government argued that false statements had “no First

Amendment value in themselves,” id. at 2543, and so were

protected “only to the extent needed to avoid chilling fully

protected speech,” id. The Supreme Court rejected the

government’s argument, and agreed that § 704(b) violated the

First Amendment. Id. The Court could not, however, agree

on the appropriate level of scrutiny for the sort of lies targeted

by § 704(b). Id. at 2548 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion),

2552 (Breyer, J., concurring).

Justice Kennedy, writing for four Justices, held that

§ 704(b) was subject to the “most exacting scrutiny.” Id. at

2548 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion) (quoting Turner Broad.

Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994)). In reaching this

conclusion, the plurality rejected the government’s argument

that false statements had “no First Amendment value” and

merited protection “only to the extent needed to avoid

chilling fully protected speech.” Id. at 2543. While

conceding that “content-based restrictions on speech have

been permitted” for certain historical categories of speech, id.

at 2544, the plurality concluded that the “Government has not

demonstrated thatfalse statements generallyshould constitute

a new category of unprotected speech.” Id. at 2547. Nor did

the plurality agree with the government’s argument that

 Case: 11-35796, 01/11/2016, ID: 9821892, DktEntry: 99-1, Page 12 of 48
UNITED STATES V. SWISHER 13

§ 704(b) was analogous to regulations on false speech “that

courts generally have found permissible,” such as laws

prohibiting a false statement made to a Government official,

laws punishing perjury, and prohibitions on falsely claiming

to speak on behalf of the government. Id. at 2545–46. These

examples, the plurality determined, were confined to

circumscribed contexts. Id. at 2546. Certain statutes

prohibiting impersonation of a government official, for

instance, “protect the integrity of Government processes,

quite apart from merely restricting false speech,” and may be

limited to “maintain[ing] the general good repute and dignity

of . . . government . . . service itself.” Id. at 2546 (quoting

United States v. Lepowitch, 318 U.S. 702, 704 (1943)

(alterations in original)). The plurality concluded that these

types of permissible speech regulations did not encompass the

“sweeping, quite unprecedented reach” of § 704(b). Id. at

2547.

Having concluded that false statements of the sort

proscribed in § 704(b) constituted protected speech, the

plurality subjected the statute to “exacting scrutiny,” which

required that (1) the government have a compelling interest;

(2) “the Government’s chosen restriction on the speech at

issue be actually necessary to achieve its interest,” and

(3) “[t]here must be a direct causal link between the

restriction imposed and the injury to be prevented.” Id. at

2549 (internal quotation marks omitted). Applying this test

to § 704(b), the plurality held that the statute served a

compelling government interest in protecting “the integrity of

the military honors system,” id. at 2548, but the statute’s

restriction was not “actually necessary” because the

government’s interest could be satisfied by counterspeech,

including a “Government-created database [that] could list

Congressional Medal of Honor winners.” Id. at 2549–51. 

 Case: 11-35796, 01/11/2016, ID: 9821892, DktEntry: 99-1, Page 13 of 48
14 UNITED STATES V. SWISHER

Further, the government had not shown “[t]he link between

the Government’s interest in protecting the integrity of the

military honors system and the Act’s restriction on the false

claims of liars,” because it failed to support “its claim that the

public’s general perception of military awards is diluted by

false claims.” Id. at 2549. Accordingly, the plurality

concluded that § 704(b) violated the First Amendment. Id. at

2551.

Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment on the ground

that § 704(b) “works disproportionate constitutional harm”

under his formulation of intermediate scrutiny. Id. at 2556

(Breyer, J., concurring). In his concurrence, Justice Breyer

stated that to determine whether a statute violates the First

Amendment, the Court generally examines “the fit between

statutory ends and means.” Id. at 2551. In conducting a

review of a governmental enactment under this standard, a

court must (1) take “account of the seriousness of the

speech-related harm the provision will likely cause”;

(2) consider “the nature and importance of the provision’s

countervailing objectives,” and (3) weigh “the extent to

which the provision will tend to achieve those objectives, and

whether there are other, less restrictive ways of doing so.” Id.

In applying this test to § 704(b), Justice Breyer first

considered the “speech-related harm” caused by this

enactment. Id. at 2551–52. Justice Breyer interpreted

§ 704(b) as “criminalizing only false factual statements made

with knowledge of their falsity and with the intent that they

be taken as true.” Id. at 2552–53. He acknowledged that

regulation of false statements “endangers First Amendment

values” less than other restrictions, id. at 2553, and noted that

“manystatutes and common-lawdoctrines make the utterance

of certain kinds of false statements unlawful,” id. at 2253–54. 

 Case: 11-35796, 01/11/2016, ID: 9821892, DktEntry: 99-1, Page 14 of 48
UNITED STATES V. SWISHER 15

But in Justice Breyer’s view, such statutes and doctrines work

less speech-related harm because they typically “narrow the

statute to a subset of lies where specific harm is more likely

to occur.” Id. at 2555. For instance, laws punishing fraud,

defamation, or intentional infliction of emotional distress

generally “requir[e] proof of specific harm to identifiable

victims,” and statutes prohibiting the impersonation of a

public official “may require a showing that, for example,

someone was deceived into following a ‘course [of action] he

would not have pursued but for the deceitful conduct.’” Id.

at 2554 (alteration in original) (quoting Lepowitch, 318 U.S.

at 704). Other similar laws specify “that the lies be made in

contexts in which a tangible harm to others is especially

likely to occur,” such as laws punishing perjury or lying to a

government official, or trademark statutes which are “focused

upon commercial and promotional activities that are likely to

dilute the value of a mark.” Id. Finally, statutes prohibiting

false claims of terrorist attacks or other lies about crimes or

catastrophes, are limited to false statements that “are

particularly likely to produce harm,” and generally require

proof of foreseeability of substantial public harm. Id.

According to Justice Breyer, § 704(b) lacked these

narrowing features because it was not limited to a subset of

lies causing specific harm to identifiable victims, or to a

specific context where foreseeable harm to others is likely to

occur. Id. at 2555–56. Because “[f]alse factual statements

can serve useful human objectives” in a variety of contexts

and “the threat of criminal prosecution” could have a chilling

effect and could encourage or permit selective prosecution for

political ends, id. at 2553, Justice Breyer concluded that

§ 704(b) “risks significant First Amendment harm,” id. at

2555.

 Case: 11-35796, 01/11/2016, ID: 9821892, DktEntry: 99-1, Page 15 of 48
16 UNITED STATES V. SWISHER

Having reached this conclusion, Justice Breyer then

turned to consider “the nature and importance of the

provision’s countervailing objectives,” id. at 2551, and

concluded that § 704(b) has a “substantial countervailing

objective” because “[i]t seeks to protect the interests of those

who have sacrificed their health and life for their country,”

and is aimed at avoiding dilution of “the country’s

recognition of that sacrifice in the form of military honors,”

id. at 2555.

Finally, Justice Breyer turned to his third prong,

consideration of “the extent to which the provision will tend

to achieve those objectives, and whether there are other, less

restrictive ways of doing so.” Id. at 2551. Here, Justice

Breyer concluded that it was “possible substantially to

achieve the Government’s objective in less burdensome

ways.” Id. at 2555. According to Justice Breyer, Congress

could enact a more limited statute that adopted some of the

narrowing strategies used in other statutes and common law

doctrines punishing false speech, such as (1) requiring a

showing that the false statements caused a specific harm,

(2) requiring that the lies be made in a context “where such

lies are most likely to cause harm,” or (3) focusing on the

more important military awards that Congress most values. 

Id. at 2555–56. Such a more narrowly tailored statute could

be combined with “information-disseminating devices,” such

as “an accurate, publicly available register of military awards,

easily obtainable by political opponents.” Id. at 2556. 

Because the government failed to explain why a more limited

statute along with a method for providing more accurate

information would not “significantlyreduce the threat of First

Amendment harm while permitting the statute to achieve its

important protective objective,” Justice Breyer concluded that

“the statute as presently drafted works disproportionate

 Case: 11-35796, 01/11/2016, ID: 9821892, DktEntry: 99-1, Page 16 of 48
UNITED STATES V. SWISHER 17

constitutional harm” and “so violates the First Amendment.” 

Id.

B

In analyzing the constitutionality of § 704(b), Alvarez did

not directly address the closely related section of the Stolen

Valor Act, § 704(a), which is before us here. We first had

occasion to consider a constitutional challenge to that section

in United States v. Perelman, decided two months after the

Supreme Court issued its opinion in Alvarez. 695 F.3d 866.

Before considering the applicability of Alvarez, Perelman

considered the defendant’s overbreadth challenge to § 704(a). 

Perelman rejected this argument by construing the statute

narrowly as criminalizing only the unauthorized wearing of

medals “when the wearer intends to deceive.” Id. at 870

(emphasis omitted).

Perelman then considered whether § 704(a), as construed,

would survive First Amendment scrutiny. Although the

Alvarez plurality had applied “exacting scrutiny” to § 704(b),

Perelman did not use this analytic framework because

§ 704(a) did not criminalize speech, but rather criminalized

“the harmful conduct of wearing a medal without

authorization and with intent to deceive.” Id. at 871. 

Perelman reasoned that “[e]ven if we assume that the

intentionally deceptive wearing of a medal contains an

expressive element—the false statement that ‘I received a

medal’—the distinction between pure speech and conduct

that has an expressive element separates this case from

Alvarez.” Id. Because, in Perelman’s view, § 704(a)

criminalized conduct, it was more akin to the impersonation

statutes discussed in Alvarez, or statutes prohibiting “the

 Case: 11-35796, 01/11/2016, ID: 9821892, DktEntry: 99-1, Page 17 of 48
18 UNITED STATES V. SWISHER

unauthorized wearing of military uniforms.” Id. at 872

(citing Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970)).

Presumably because of its determination that § 704(a)

primarily criminalized conduct, but without further analysis,

Perelman applied the test set forth in United States v.

O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (upholding the conviction

of a draft protester under a content-neutral law prohibiting

knowing destruction of draft cards). 695 F.3d at 872. 

Applying O’Brien’s three-part test, Perelman first held that

the government had “a compelling interest in ‘preserving the

integrity of its system of honoring our military men and

women for their service and, at times, their sacrifice.’” Id.

(quoting Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1216). Second, the

government’s interests were “unrelated to the suppression of

free expression” because the statute “does not prevent the

expression of any particular message or viewpoint.” Id. And

third, “the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment

freedoms” was “no greater than is essential to the furtherance

of that interest,” because, “even if § 704(a) is not the most

effective mechanism, in at least some measure it promotes the

goals of maintaining the integrity of the military’s medals and

preventing the fraudulent wearing of military medals.” Id. at

872–73. Accordingly, Perelman rejected the defendant’s

facial First Amendment challenge to § 704(a). Id. at 873.

IV

Perelman based its conclusion that § 704(a) did not

violate the First Amendment on two grounds. First,

Perelman distinguished between written or spoken speech on

the one hand and expressive conduct on the other. Id. at 871. 

Second, Perelman implicitly determined that expressive

conduct is per se subject to scrutiny under the test set forth in

 Case: 11-35796, 01/11/2016, ID: 9821892, DktEntry: 99-1, Page 18 of 48
UNITED STATES V. SWISHER 19

O’Brien. Id. at 872. Our reconsideration of Perelman

requires us to review both these issues regarding the First

Amendment framework for analyzing communicative

conduct.

A

The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make

no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. Const.

amend. I. While “[t]he First Amendment literally forbids the

abridgment only of ‘speech,’” the Supreme Court has “long

recognized that its protection does not end at the spoken or

written word.” Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989). 

A message “delivered by conduct that is intended to be

communicative and that, in context, would reasonably be

understood by the viewer to be communicative,” Clark v.

Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 294 (1984),

is symbolic speech that falls “within the scope of the First and

Fourteenth Amendments.” Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404; see

also Nunez v. Davis, 169 F.3d 1222, 1226 (9th Cir. 1999)

(“Non-verbal conduct implicates the First Amendment when

it is intended to convey a ‘particularized message’ and the

likelihood is great that the message would be so understood.”

(quoting Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404)). For instance, “the

wearing of an armband for the purpose of expressing certain

views is the type of symbolic act that is within the Free

Speech Clause of the First Amendment” and is “closely akin

to ‘pure speech.’” Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch.

Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969). Similarly, the Court has

“recognized the expressive nature of . . . a sit-in by blacks in

a ‘whites only’ area to protest segregation,” Johnson,

491 U.S. at 404 (citing Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131,

141–42 (1966)), and “of the wearing of American military

 Case: 11-35796, 01/11/2016, ID: 9821892, DktEntry: 99-1, Page 19 of 48
20 UNITED STATES V. SWISHER

uniforms in a dramatic presentation criticizing American

involvement in Vietnam,” id. (citing Schacht, 398 U.S. 58).

While the Court has rejected the notion that “an

apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled

‘speech’ whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends

thereby to express an idea,” O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376, there

is no doubt that the use of recognized symbols, such as

emblems or flags, constitutes symbolic speech, Johnson,

491 U.S. at 404. “The use of an emblem or flag to symbolize

some system, idea, institution, or personality, is a short cut

from mind to mind,” and “a primitive but effective way of

communicating ideas.” W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,

319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943); see also Anderson v. City of

Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1061 (9th Cir. 2010)

(“Tattoos are generally composed of words, realistic or

abstract images, symbols, or a combination of these, all of

which are forms of pure expression that are entitled to full

First Amendment protection.”). In this context, the Court has

frequentlyrecognized “the communicative nature of conduct”

relating to the American flag, which “as readily signifies this

Nation as does the combination of letters found in

‘America.’” Johnson, 491 U.S. at 405–06. Because “[t]he

very purpose of a national flag is to serve as a symbol of our

country,” id. at 405, such acts as attaching a peace sign to the

American flag, Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409–11

(1974), refusing to salute the flag, Barnette, 319 U.S. at

632–33, or burning the flag, Johnson, 491 U.S. at 405–06,

constitute symbolic speech that “may find shelter under the

First Amendment.” Id. at 405.6

6 The dissent’s contention that courts should analyze laws burdening

symbolic speech conveyed by a “physical emblem,” such as a flag or a

medal, differently than they analyze laws burdening oral or written speech,

 Case: 11-35796, 01/11/2016, ID: 9821892, DktEntry: 99-1, Page 20 of 48
UNITED STATES V. SWISHER 21

In adjudicating a First Amendment challenge to a

government enactment that regulates speech, the Supreme

Court considers whether the enactment is content-based or

content-neutral. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct.

2218, 2226–27 (2015). This threshold inquiry is the same for

symbolic speech as it is for enactments that regulate spoken

or written words. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 403 (holding that

if the conduct at issue is communicative in nature, the Court

must first determine “whether the State’s regulation is related

to the suppression of free expression”). Even where an

enactment “contains no explicit content-based limitation on

the scope of prohibited conduct,” United States v. Eichman,

496 U.S. 310, 315 (1990), a court must consider whether the

law “suppresses expression out of concern for its likely

communicative impact,” id. at 317. See also Nordyke v.

King, 319 F.3d 1185, 1189–90 (9th Cir. 2003) (rejecting a

First Amendment challenge to an ordinance barring the

possession of firearms on County-owned property because it

was not aimed at the communicative impact of firearm

possession).

If the purpose of a law regulating conduct is aimed at the

conduct itself, rather than at the message conveyed by that

conduct, the regulation is subject to the lesser scrutiny given

to content-neutral restrictions. Put differently, lesser scrutiny

applies if the government’s interest in such a regulation “is

unrelated to the suppression of free speech.” Clark, 468 U.S.

at 294. In such circumstances, and only in such

circumstances, the O’Brien test is applicable. See Doe v.

Reed, 586 F.3d 671, 678 (9th Cir. 2009) (assuming that

signing a referendum petition is expressive conduct subject to

Dis. op. at 39–40, is inconsistent with these precedents. Indeed, the

dissent cites no case supporting its views.

 Case: 11-35796, 01/11/2016, ID: 9821892, DktEntry: 99-1, Page 21 of 48
22 UNITED STATES V. SWISHER

the O’Brien test); Corales v. Bennet, 567 F.3d 554, 567 (9th

Cir. 2009) (analyzing “the school’s policy of disciplining

truancies and leaving campus without permission” under

O’Brien’s “intermediate scrutiny applied to content-neutral

rules of conduct.”). To pass the O’Brien test, however, the

regulation must be “narrowly drawn to further a substantial

governmental interest.” Clark, 468 U.S. at 294.7

On the other hand, where the government’s aim is to

regulate the message conveyed by expressive conduct, the

content-neutral O’Brien test is not applicable. Nor may it be

applied unless “the conduct itself may constitutionally be

regulated.” Id. As explained in Johnson, “[i]f the State’s

regulation is not related to expression, then the less stringent

standard we announced in United States v. O’Brien for

regulations of noncommunicative conduct controls,” but “[i]f

it is, then we are outside of O’Brien’s test” and the regulation

must survive “under a more demanding standard.” 491 U.S.

at 403; see also Spence, 418 U.S. at 412, 414 n.8 (concluding

that the state’s interest in “preserving the national flag as an

unalloyed symbol of our country” was directly related to

expression, and accordingly “the four-step analysis of United

States v. O’Brien is inapplicable”); Nordyke, 319 F.3d at 1189

(stating that if an ordinance barring the possession of firearms

on County property is “related to the suppression of free

expression” then a First Amendment challenge to the

ordinance must be analyzed under Johnson; if not, the

7 The test for “time, place, or manner restrictions” may also be

applicable to a content-neutral regulation of symbolic conduct. Clark,

468 U.S. at 293. There is, however, “little, if any, differen[ce]” between

the two tests. See Clark, 468 U.S. at 298; see also Vlasak v. Super. Ct. of

Cal., 329 F.3d 683, 691 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that O’Brien is “nearly

identical to the time, place and manner test”). Because Perleman applied

O’Brien, we focus on the O’Brien standard.

 Case: 11-35796, 01/11/2016, ID: 9821892, DktEntry: 99-1, Page 22 of 48
UNITED STATES V. SWISHER 23

O’Brien test applies.). Accordingly, if a government

enactment is “directed at the communicative nature of

conduct” then it is content-based, and “must, like a law

directed at speech itself, be justified by the substantial

showing of need that the First Amendment requires.” 

Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Cmty.

for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt, 703 F.2d 586, 622–623

(D.C. Cir. 1983) (Scalia, J., dissenting), rev’d sub nom. Clark,

468 U.S. 288).

The Supreme Court has recently provided authoritative

direction for differentiating between content-neutral and

content-based enactments. See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2226–27. 

Reed explained that “[g]overnment regulation of speech is

content based if a law applies to particular speech because of

the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed.” Id. at

2227. If “a regulation of speech ‘on its face’ draws

distinctions based on the message a speaker conveys,” it is a

content-based regulation. Id. Laws that are facially contentneutral, but “cannot be justified without reference to the

content of the regulated speech, or that were adopted by the

government because of disagreement with the message [the

speech] conveys,” are also content-based and subject to

scrutiny under a higher standard. Id. (alteration in original)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Government

regulations of symbolic speech frequently fall into this

second category of content-based prohibitions. For instance,

where a state prohibited burning the American flag because

it might lead people to believe that the flag does not stand for

the positive concepts of “nationhood and national unity,” the

Court was quick to conclude that such “concerns blossom

only when a person’s treatment of the flag communicates

some message, and thus are related to the suppression of free

expression.” Johnson, 491 U.S. at 410 (internal quotation

 Case: 11-35796, 01/11/2016, ID: 9821892, DktEntry: 99-1, Page 23 of 48
24 UNITED STATES V. SWISHER

marks omitted). Such a content-based regulation is “outside

of O’Brien’s test altogether.” Id.

Even if a challenged restriction is content-based, it is not

necessarily subject to strict scrutiny. Although “[c]ontentbased regulations are presumptively invalid,” the Court “has

permitted restrictions upon the content of speech in a few

limited areas, which are of such slight social value as a step

to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is

clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and

morality.” R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382–83

(1992) (internal quotation marks omitted) (indicating that

obscenity, defamation, and fighting words fall within this

category). Both the plurality and concurring opinions in

Alvarez recognized the existence of “historical” and

traditional categories of content-based restrictions that are not

subject to strict scrutiny under the First Amendment and

which courts have generally found permissible. Alvarez,

132 S. Ct. at 2544 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion) (explaining

that content-based restrictions on speech have been permitted

only for a “few historic and traditional categories” of speech,

including incitement, obscenity, defamation, speech integral

to criminal conduct, so-called “fighting words,” child

pornography, fraud,true threats, and “speech presenting some

grave and imminent threat the government has the power to

prevent”); id. at 2553–54 (Breyer, J., concurring) (internal

quotation marks omitted) (referencing additional “statutes

and common-law doctrines” that make “utterance of certain

kinds of false statements unlawful,” including torts involving

intentional infliction of emotional distress, lying to a

government official, false claims of terrorist attacks or other

lies about the commission of crimes or catastrophes,

impersonation of an officer, and trademark infringement,

among others).

 Case: 11-35796, 01/11/2016, ID: 9821892, DktEntry: 99-1, Page 24 of 48
UNITED STATES V. SWISHER 25

B

Applying these principles to Swisher’s facial challenge to

§ 704(a), we first ask whether this statute regulates speech. 

It clearly does. According to the government, the purpose of

a military medal is to communicate “that the recipient has

served the military efforts of the United States with valor,

exceptional duty, or achievement worthy of commendation.” 

The value of a military medal lies not in the materials of

which it is comprised, but in its message; it is “a primitive but

effective way of communicating ideas,” Barnette, 319 U.S. at

632. Wearing a medal, like wearing a black armband or

burning an American flag, conveys a message “by conduct

that is intended to be communicative and that, in context,

would reasonably be understood by the viewer to be

communicative,” Clark, 468 U.S. at 294. Specifically,

wearing a medal communicates that the wearer was awarded

that medal and is entitled to the nation’s recognition and

gratitude “for acts of heroism and sacrifice in military

service.” Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2548 (Kennedy, J., plurality

opinion) (internal quotation mark omitted). Wearing a medal

without authorization, therefore, generally communicates the

false message that the wearer is entitled to such recognition

and gratitude. Because wearing a medal is symbolic speech,

and § 704(a) precludes the unauthorized wearing of a medal,

we conclude that § 704(a) regulates speech.

We next determine whether § 704(a) is a content-based or

content-neutral restriction of symbolic speech. See Johnson,

491 U.S. at 403. As in Johnson, the purpose of § 704(a) is to

stop a particular message: the misappropriation or distortion

of the message of valor conveyed by a medal. See Alvarez,

132 S. Ct. at 2549 (noting the government’s argument that the

purpose of the Stolen Valor Act is to avoid diluting “the value

 Case: 11-35796, 01/11/2016, ID: 9821892, DktEntry: 99-1, Page 25 of 48
26 UNITED STATES V. SWISHER

and meaning of military awards”). Because these “concerns

blossom,” Johnson, 491 U.S. at 410, only when a person’s

unauthorized wearing of a medal communicates a false

message, we conclude that § 704(a) “suppresses expression

out of concern for its likely communicative impact,”

Eichman, 496 U.S. at 317, and is a content-based restriction

on speech.

As such, the tests applicable to content-neutral regulations

(the time, place, or manner test, and the O’Brien test) are not

applicable here. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 410 (stating that a

content-based regulation is “outside of O’Brien’s test

altogether”). Instead, § 704(a) “must, like a law directed at

speech itself, be justified by the substantial showing of need

that the First Amendment requires,” Johnson, 491 U.S. at

406. In light of this analysis, we conclude that Perelman

erred in applying the test set forth in O’Brien, which applies

only to content-neutral enactments.8

C

Because § 704(a) is a content-based regulation of false

symbolic speech, it is closely analogous to § 704(b). Indeed,

8 United States v. Hamilton, 699 F.3d 356 (4th Cir. 2012), engaged in a

similar analysis, correctly noting that “the key factor that determines

whether we apply the ‘relatively lenient’ test employed in O’Brien, or the

‘most exacting scrutiny’ standard set forth in Johnson, is whether the

statute being reviewed is related to the suppression of free expression.” 

Id. at 370. The Fourth Circuit further acknowledged that when § 704(a)

is construed as requiring an intent to deceive, it “could reach conduct that

solely involves free expression, within the holding of Johnson.” Id. at

371. The Fourth Circuit ultimately did not determine whether § 704(a)

was symbolic speech because it concluded, erroneously in our view, that

§ 704(a) survived strict scrutiny. See id.

 Case: 11-35796, 01/11/2016, ID: 9821892, DktEntry: 99-1, Page 26 of 48
UNITED STATES V. SWISHER 27

both statutes bar lies about having received a military medal. 

Accordingly, we review the constitutionality of § 704(a)

under the tests enunciated in the plurality and concurring

opinions in Alvarez. If they apply to § 704(a) in the same

manner as they apply to § 704(b), the reasoning of Alvarez

requires us to hold that § 704(a) is also unconstitutional.

We begin by considering the standard set forth in Justice

Breyer’s concurring opinion, which reviewed the

constitutionality of § 704(b) under a less demanding test than

the plurality required. As a threshold matter, Justice Breyer

interpreted § 704(b) favorably to the government as

proscribing “only false factual statements made with

knowledge of their falsity and with the intent that they be

taken as true.” Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2552–53 (Breyer, J.,

concurring). We adopt the same narrowing construction of

§ 704(a), and interpret it as proscribing unauthorized persons

from wearing military medals for the purpose of falsely

communicating that they have been awarded such medals. 

See also Perelman, 695 F.3d at 871 (concluding that a person

violates § 704(a) only “if he or she has an intent to deceive”).

The first prong of Justice Breyer’s intermediate scrutiny

test requires consideration of “the seriousness of the

speech-related harm the provision will likelycause.” Alvarez,

132 S. Ct. at 2551. Justice Breyer noted that the narrowing

interpretation of § 704(b) “diminishes the extent to which the

statute endangers First Amendment values.” Id. at 2553. 

Because we have adopted the same narrowing interpretation

for § 704(a), the same conclusion applies.9

9 Because both § 704(a), see supra at 26–27, and § 704(b), see Alvarez,

132 S. Ct. 2552–53, prohibit only lies made knowingly and with an intent

to deceive, both provisions impose an identical speech-related harm:

 Case: 11-35796, 01/11/2016, ID: 9821892, DktEntry: 99-1, Page 27 of 48
28 UNITED STATES V. SWISHER

But like § 704(b), § 704(a) lacks the limiting features that,

in Justice Breyer’s view, justified other statutes and common

law doctrines punishing the communication of false

statements. Id. at 2553–54. Section 704(a) does not require

“proof of specific harm to identifiable victims,” or that

“someone was deceived into following a course [of action] he

would not have pursued but for the deceitful conduct,” or

specify “that the lies be made in contexts in which a tangible

harm to others is especially likely to occur.” See id. at 2254

(alteration in original) (internal citations and quotation marks

omitted). Nor is § 704(a) limited to false statements that “are

particularly likely to produce harm.” See id. Accordingly,

we conclude that under Justice Breyer’s test, § 704(a), like

§ 704(b), “creates a significant risk of First Amendment

harm.” Id. at 2555.

Arguing against this conclusion, the government asserts

that § 704(a) is analogous to statutes prohibiting trademark

infringement such as the Lanham Act, since it prevents

misappropriation of governmental property. Justice Breyer

rejected a similar argument, concluding that § 704(b) had a

broader reach than trademark statutes, which are typically

“focused upon commercial and promotional activities that are

likely to dilute the value of a mark,” and would “typically

require a showing of likely confusion, a showing that tends to

assure that the feared harm will in fact take place.” Id. at

burdening the speech of a person who intentionally chooses to lie, see

Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2555–56. And in prosecuting either statute, the

government would be required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that

the defendant had the requisite mens rea. Therefore, we reject the

dissent’s argument that § 704(b) would have a greater chilling effect and

pose a greater risk ofselective prosecution than § 704(a) because a person

could thoughtlessly lie but could not thoughtlessly wear an unauthorized

medal. Dis. op. at 41.

 Case: 11-35796, 01/11/2016, ID: 9821892, DktEntry: 99-1, Page 28 of 48
UNITED STATES V. SWISHER 29

2554. Because § 704(a) has the same broad reach as

§ 704(b), and likewise does not require that a specified harm

(such as public confusion) will take place, the same analysis

applies here, and we likewise reject the government’s

contention.

In reaching the conclusion that suppressing a symbolic

communication threatens the same First Amendment harm as

suppressing a spoken communication, we again part ways

with Perelman. Although Perelman distinguished § 704(a)

from § 704(b) on the ground that “[t]he use of a physical

object goes beyond mere speech and suggests that the wearer

has proof of the lie, or government endorsement of it,”

695 F.3d at 871, we see no basis for Perelman’s conclusion

that wearing a medal is more probative than speaking a lie. 

Cf. Kevin Jon Heller, The Cognitive Psychology of

Circumstantial Evidence, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 241, 248–52

(2006) (noting, as an empirical matter, that jurors give more

weight to testimony, such as eyewitness identifications and

confessions, than to physical evidence, such as blood and

fingerprints). As a practical matter, the government’s

concession at oral argument that military medals are freely

available for purchase confirms that the probative value of

owning a medal or other military decoration is minimal. In

any event, wearing a medal has no purpose other than to

communicate a message. We therefore see no principled

basis for distinguishing a spoken communication from a

symbolic communication in this context.

We also reject Perelman’s reasoning that § 704(a) is like

the statutes described in Alvarez that prohibit impersonation

of government officials, like 18 U.S.C. § 912, or the

unauthorized wearing of military uniforms, like 18 U.S.C.

§ 702, which the Court assumed (without deciding) was valid. 

 Case: 11-35796, 01/11/2016, ID: 9821892, DktEntry: 99-1, Page 29 of 48
30 UNITED STATES V. SWISHER

See 695 F.3d at 872 (citing Schacht, 398 U.S. at 61). As

Justice Breyer pointed out, “[s]tatutes forbidding

impersonation of a public official typically focus on acts of

impersonation, not mere speech, and may require a showing

that, for example, someone was deceived into following a 

course [of action] he would not have pursued but for the

deceitful conduct.” Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2554 (Breyer, J.,

concurring) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks

omitted). But § 704(a), like § 704(b), requires no act beyond

the false communication itself. While there is a quantum of

conduct involved in pinning on a medal, it is not materially

different from the quantum of conduct involved in speaking

or writing. Nor does § 704(a) require proof that anyone was

deceived into taking a course of action. We also reject

Perelman’s reliance on Schacht to support its conclusion that

§ 704(a) survives First Amendment scrutiny. Schacht itself

merelyheld that even if the government could constitutionally

prohibit a person from wearing a military uniform without

authorization, Congress may not make “it a crime for an actor

wearing a military uniform to say things during his

performance critical of the conduct or policies of the Armed

Forces.” 398 U.S. at 62–63; see also R.A.V., 505 U.S. at

430–31 (interpreting Schacht as precluding viewpoint

discrimination). Neither Schacht nor any other Supreme

Court case examined a First Amendment challenge to statutes

precluding wearing military uniforms without authorization,

and both the Alvarez plurality and concurring opinion

indicated that laws prohibiting impersonation of an officer are

distinguishable from false claims of entitlement to a military

 Case: 11-35796, 01/11/2016, ID: 9821892, DktEntry: 99-1, Page 30 of 48
UNITED STATES V. SWISHER 31

medal. See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2546 (Kennedy, J., plurality

opinion); id. at 2254 (Breyer, J., concurring).10

The second prong of Justice Breyer’s intermediate

scrutiny test requires an evaluation of “the nature and

importance of the provision’s countervailing objectives.” Id.

at 2551. We conclude that the government had the same

compelling interest in enacting § 704(a) as it did in enacting

§ 704(b): in both cases, the government has a “substantial

countervailing objective” of avoiding dilution of “the

country’s recognition of [award recipients’] sacrifice in the

form of military honors.” Id. at 2555; see also Hamilton,

699 F.3d at 371 (“Accordingly, we hold that the

government’s interest in preserving the integrity of the

system honoringmilitarymembers for their achievements and

sacrifices is compelling.”).11

Finally, we consider the third prong of Justice Breyer’s

test: “the extent to which the provision will tend to achieve

those objectives, and whether there are other, less restrictive

ways of doing so.” Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2551. As explained

in Alvarez, Congress could adopt narrowing strategies to limit

10 Contrary to the dissent, our analysis does not necessarily invalidate

18 U.S.C. § 709. Cf. Dis. op at 37–38. Because § 709 is limited to

precluding false representations in certain limited contexts (such as in the

field of banking, finance, or law enforcement) where “a tangible harm to

others is especially likely to occur,” Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2554 (Breyer,

J., plurality opinion), it is distinguishable from § 704(a).

11 We are sympathetic to the dissent’s description of the government’s

powerful interest in protecting the message of valor and heroism that is

conveyed by a medal. Dis. op. at 43–46. But because we already

conclude that the government’s interest in preventing the wearing of

unauthorized medals is compelling, the dissent’s further elaboration does

not affect our First Amendment analysis.

 Case: 11-35796, 01/11/2016, ID: 9821892, DktEntry: 99-1, Page 31 of 48
32 UNITED STATES V. SWISHER

the breadth of the prohibition, and could establish

“information-disseminating devices,” such as “an accurate,

publicly available register of military awards, easily

obtainable by political opponents.” Id. at 2556. These

alternative means to meeting the government’s goals in

enacting § 704(b) would be equally effective to meet the

government’s stated goals for § 704(a), namely to preserve

the integrity of the military honors system and protect the

symbolic value of military medals.12

Given that the statute fails Justice Breyer’s intermediate

scrutiny test, it also fails under the plurality’s exacting

scrutiny test. See id. at 2543 (Kennedy, J., plurality

opinion).13 The plurality’s conclusion that the compelling

interest served by § 704(b) could be satisfied by a database of

medal winners, and that there is an insufficient causal link

between the government’s compelling interest and the

restriction “on the false claims of liars,” is equally applicable

to § 704(a). See id. at 2549–50.

12 The dissent’s arguments to the contrary, see Dis. op. at 47–48, are

based on its view that symbolic speech involving a physical emblem is

qualitatively different than spoken or written speech, a position

inconsistent with Johnson. 491 U.S. at 403–04. For the same reason, we

disagree with Hamilton’s conclusion that § 704(a) survives strict scrutiny

because a database is inadequate to counter symbolic speech involving a

physical object. 699 F.3d at 373.

13 Although Alvarez lacked a majority opinion, we need not determine

whether the plurality opinion or Justice Breyer’s opinion constitutes the

holding of the Court, see Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193

(1977), because we reach the same conclusion under either standard.

 Case: 11-35796, 01/11/2016, ID: 9821892, DktEntry: 99-1, Page 32 of 48
UNITED STATES V. SWISHER 33

V

Alvarez clarified that lies do not fall into a category of

speech that is excepted from First Amendment protection. 

132 S. Ct. at 2546–47 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion); id. at

2553 (Breyer, J., concurring). Given that clarification, our

analysis follows a familiar road. Content-based prohibitions

of speech and symbolic speech are analyzed under the same

framework, and so Alvarez dictates our conclusion that

§ 704(a) violates the First Amendment. Because § 704(a)

was unconstitutionally applied to Swisher’s conduct, the

district court erred in denying Swisher relief under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255. We therefore reverse the district court and overrule

Perelman to the extent inconsistent with this opinion.14

REVERSED.

14 The government also argues that § 704(a) is not subject to the First

Amendment because military medals convey government speech. In

support, the government relies on Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of

Confederate Veterans, Inc., which held that Texas could reject a proposed

design for specialty license plates without violating the First Amendment

because license plate designs constitute government speech. 135 S. Ct.

2239, 2243–45 (2015). But § 704(a) does not regulate the design of

military medals or other government speech; rather, it punishes an

individual’s false communication regarding the entitlement to wear a

military medal. As such, Walker does not help the government here.

 Case: 11-35796, 01/11/2016, ID: 9821892, DktEntry: 99-1, Page 33 of 48
34 UNITED STATES V. SWISHER

BYBEE, Circuit Judge, dissenting, with whom N.R. SMITH

and WATFORD, Circuit Judges, join:

Xavier Alvarez announced in a public meeting that he

was a former Marine and had been awarded the

Congressional Medal of Honor. When the United States

prosecuted Alvarez for “falsely represent[ing] himself . . .

verbally” as having received a military decoration or medal,

18 U.S.C. § 704(b) (2011 ed.), the Supreme Court held that

his speech was protected by the First Amendment. United

States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2551 (2012) (Kennedy, J.)

(plurality opinion); id. at 2556 (Breyer, J., concurring in the

judgment). Elven Swisher took Alvarez one step better: he

not only said he was a decorated soldier, he proved it by

wearing his Marine Corps League uniform with five

medals—including a Silver Star, a Purple Heart, and the

Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal with a bronze

“V.” Like Alvarez, Swisher was an undeserving claimant;

although a veteran, he had not earned a single one of the

commendations he wore. As in Alvarez, the United States

indicted Swisher under the Stolen Valor Act, but this time it

accused him of violating § 704(a), which prohibits

“knowingly wear[ing] . . . any decoration or medal authorized

by Congress . . . except when authorized.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 704(a) (2002 ed.).

The majority today holds that Swisher’s conduct is a form

of speech entitled to the same protection as Alvarez’s actual

speech. I beg to differ. The Supreme Court’s decision in

Alvarez does not compel the result here. The law has always

been able to tell the difference between conduct and speech,

even when the conduct may have some communicative value. 

I respectfully dissent.

 Case: 11-35796, 01/11/2016, ID: 9821892, DktEntry: 99-1, Page 34 of 48
UNITED STATES V. SWISHER 35

I

Alvarez held that false statements are not categorically

unprotected by the First Amendment. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at

2545–47 (Kennedy, J.) (plurality opinion); id. at 2552–53

(Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). As Justice Breyer

explained, the government can have little interest in policing

the “white lies” we tell to “provide the sick with comfort, or

preserve a child’s innocence,” or false statements made “in

technical, philosophical, and scientific contexts, where . . .

examination of a false statement . . . can promote a form of

thought that ultimately helps realize the truth.” Id. at 2553

(Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). But the Court

stopped well short of protecting lying generally. As Justice

Kennedy reminded us, “there are instances in which the

falsity of speech bears upon whether it is protected.” Id. at

2546 (plurality opinion).

The statute at issue here, however, does not police “white

lies,” nor does it prohibit lying generally. Instead, it targets

a very specific lie that implicates a very specific government

interest, an interest which the full court here and the Supreme

Court in Alvarez agrees is significant. And importantly, the

lie the government wishes to punish cannot be uttered with

words; it can only be accomplished by falsely wearing the

nation’s medals. Although the Court in Alvarez found that

the harm caused by the form of the lie regulated by § 704(b)

did not outweigh the First Amendment harm, the interests

implicated by § 704(a) must be weighed differently from

those at issue in Alvarez under § 704(b). The harm to the

government’s interest in upholding the military honors

system caused by the false wearing of its medals is greater

than the harm caused by “bar stool braggadocio.” Alvarez,

132 S. Ct. at 2555 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 

 Case: 11-35796, 01/11/2016, ID: 9821892, DktEntry: 99-1, Page 35 of 48
36 UNITED STATES V. SWISHER

Concomitantly, because § 704(a) requires proof of deceptive

conduct, any harm to First Amendment interests is less than

in Alvarez, and the less restrictive alternatives discussed in

Alvarez, less effective.

The majority today ignores these distinctions, and

discusses the outcome of this case as though Alvarez renders

it a foregone conclusion. But it is not. Alvarez does not

clearly compel the result here—indeed, that was the

conclusion reached by a panel of our court in United States v.

Perelman, 695 F.3d 866, 872–73 (9th Cir. 2012), in which we

upheld § 704(a) under the lesser scrutiny applied to conduct

regulations laid out in O’Brien.

1

It was also the conclusion

reached by the Fourth Circuit, which found that § 704(a)

would survive strict scrutiny. United States v. Hamilton,

699 F.3d 356, 371–74 (4th Cir. 2012). While I do not entirely

agree with the reasoning in these cases, they demonstrate that

the reach—and indeed the holding—of Alvarez is unclear.

Alvarez gives uncertain guidance as to how false statements

should be analyzed, especially if Justice Breyer’s opinion

controls under Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193

(1977).2Justice Breyer, writing for himself and Justice

Kagan, applies what he describes as “intermediate scrutiny,”

Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2556, although without really

explaining why that is the proper test.

 

1 United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).

2

Justice Kennedy, writing for himself and three others, applies strict

scrutiny to § 704(b)’s “content-based restrictions.” Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at

2548 (Kennedy, J.) (plurality). In dissent, Justice Alito, joined by two

others, would have held that Alvarez’s false statement “merit[ed] no First

Amendment protection.” Id. at 2563 (Alito, J., dissenting). Justice

Breyer’s opinion is the narrowest opinion that a majority of the Court

agreed upon. Marks, 430 U.S. at 193.

 Case: 11-35796, 01/11/2016, ID: 9821892, DktEntry: 99-1, Page 36 of 48
UNITED STATES V. SWISHER 37

Part of the analytical challenge of Alvarez is trying to

understand why intermediate scrutiny applies. In Perelman,

the panel used the O’Brien test. 695 F.3d at 872. I can’t

agree with the Perelman panel on that point because § 704(a)

seems to violate at least one prong of O’Brien: The

Government’s interest in § 704(a) is not “unrelated to the

suppression of free expression.” O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377;

see also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 410 (1989). For that

reason, the Fourth Circuit did not apply O’Brien, but

ultimately concluded the statute would survive strict scrutiny. 

Hamilton, 699 F.3d at 371. The anomaly is, as Judge Davis

pointed out, that § 704(a) survives strict scrutiny, but would

fail O’Brien’s version of intermediate scrutiny. Id. at 377

(Davis, J., concurring).3

Despite this ambiguity, the majority goes out of its way

to extend Alvarez where it does not clearly apply. Moreover,

the majority fails to consider the consequences of our

decision. In addition to creating an unnecessary split with the

Fourth Circuit over a statute that is no longer in effect,4

 

3

In my view, § 704(a) should be reviewed under intermediate scrutiny

and treated as an “impersonation of a war hero” statute. See Alvarez,

132 S. Ct. at 2554 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that

§ 704(b) differs from anti-impersonation statutes because they typically

prohibit “acts of impersonation, not mere speech” ); see also id. at

2553–55 (discussing examples of the “many statutes and common-law

doctrines [that] make the utterance of certain kinds of false statements

unlawful”). Unlike § 704(b), we deal here with something more than

“mere speech.”

4 Both provisions of the Stolen Valor Act were amended following

Alvarez, subsequent to the events that gave rise to Swisher’s case. 

Congress removed the “wearing” provision in § 704(a), apparently

preemptively, and more substantively revised § 704(b) to comply with the

Court’s holding in Alvarez. See Stolen Valor Act of 2013, Pub. L. No.

 Case: 11-35796, 01/11/2016, ID: 9821892, DktEntry: 99-1, Page 37 of 48
38 UNITED STATES V. SWISHER

today’s decision calls into question the validity of numerous

other statutes that prohibit, for example: the unauthorized

wearing of a military uniform, 18 U.S.C. § 702—which the

Supreme Court has noted is “a valid statute on its face,”

Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58, 61 (1970); the

unauthorized use of the name of federal agencies, 18 U.S.C.

§ 709; or the impersonation of a federal officer, 18 U.S.C.

§ 912—a statute we upheld in United States v. TomshaMiguel, 766 F.3d 1041, 1048–49 (9th Cir. 2014), a case in

which we relied on Perelman (which we now overturn).5 In

light of this, I see no reason to extend Alvarez to § 704(a), in

order to protect deceptive conduct that has no First

Amendment value, and which poses greater harm to the

government’s significant interest in upholding the military

honors system than did the speech covered by § 704(b).

113-12, § 2, 127 Stat. 448 (2013). Thus, the precise provisions at issue

here are no longer in effect. As amended, however, the statute would still

appear to cover Swisher’s conduct. Section 704(b) now reads: “Whoever,

with intent to obtain money, property, or other tangible benefit,

fraudulently holds oneself out to be a recipient of a decoration or medal

. . . shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than one year, or

both.” 127 Stat. 448.

5 Consider also: 18 U.S.C. § 703 (unauthorized wearing of a uniform of

a friendly nation); § 706 (wearing of Red Cross with the fraudulent

purpose of inducing the belief that wearer is a member or agent of the Red

Cross); and § 706a (wearing of Geneva distinctive emblem (Red Crescent

or Red Crystal) with fraudulent purpose of inducing the belief that wearer

is a member or agent of an authorized national society using the emblem,

the International Committee of the Red Cross, or the International

Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies).

 Case: 11-35796, 01/11/2016, ID: 9821892, DktEntry: 99-1, Page 38 of 48
UNITED STATES V. SWISHER 39

II

The majorityconcludes that the Supreme Court’s decision

in Alvarez dictates the outcome of this case, identifying three

factors from Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion in Alvarez,

and mechanically applying them to the statute at issue here. 

Maj. Op. at 26–32. For the reasons I have explained, I agree

with the majority that Justice Breyer’s analysis controls and

that the relevant factors are: (1) “the seriousness of the

speech-related harm the provision will likely cause”; (2) “the

nature and importance of the provision’s countervailing

objectives”; and (3) “the extent to which the provision will

tend to achieve those objectives, and whether there are other,

less restrictive ways of doing so.” Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at

2551. Yet in applying these factors, the majority fails to

account for the crucial differences between § 704(b) and

§ 704(a)—and indeed, fails to engage in much critical

analysis at all. I am going to address each of the factors in

turn.

A

In analyzing the speech-related harm caused by § 704(a),

the majority concludes that § 704(a) works the same speechrelated harm as § 704(b) because it “lacks the limiting

features that, in Justice Breyer’s view, justified other statutes

and common law doctrines punishing the communication of

false statements.” Maj. Op. at 28. I have two points. First,

I part ways with the majority’s premise that speech and

communicative conduct are the same for First Amendment

purposes. In O’Brien, the Supreme Court rejected “the view

that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled

‘speech’ whenever the person engaged in the conduct intends

thereby to express an idea.” 391 U.S. at 376. Here, the

 Case: 11-35796, 01/11/2016, ID: 9821892, DktEntry: 99-1, Page 39 of 48
40 UNITED STATES V. SWISHER

majority doesn’t just blur the lines between conduct and

speech, it simply erases them: It finds that the “quantum of

conduct involved in pinning on a medal . . . is not materially

different from the quantum of conduct involved in speaking

or writing.” Maj. Op. at 30. With all respect, that just isn’t

true. If it were, then we could save ourselves trouble and

money by simply announcing that we are awarding medals

without actually giving the recipients anything. But as

anyone knows who has witnessed the President awarding the

Congressional Medal of Honor or a promotion ceremony

pinning a new officer—or even an Olympic medals ceremony

or a Cub Scout court of honor—there is value, both symbolic

and tactile, in the awarding of a physical emblem. If there is

important value in the act of awarding a physical medal, there

is important value in the wearing of it.6

6 The majority notes, twice, that distinguishing between pure speech,

like false statements, and “symbolic speech” conveyed through conduct,

like the unauthorized wearing of a military medal, is inconsistent with

Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). Maj. Op. at 20–21 n.6, 32 n.12. 

This reference to Johnson is puzzling. Johnson is relevant only if we must

analyze this statute under strict scrutiny as a content-based restriction on

speech. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 411–12 (applying strict scrutiny to a

statute prohibiting the burning ofthe American flag). But Justice Breyer’s

concurrence in Alvarez, on which the majority bases its entire analysis,

clearly departs from this traditional First Amendment framework,

analyzing restrictions on false speech under an intermediate scrutiny,

balancing-of-interests approach Justice Breyer refers to as

“proportionality.” Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2551–52 (Breyer, J., concurring

in the judgment). Moreover, as I have already noted, in analyzing false

speech, Justice Breyer specifically distinguishes between “mere speech”

and “acts of impersonation where an act of impersonation is more likely

to cause harm. Id. at 2554 (emphasis in original). Johnson is irrelevant

here.

 Case: 11-35796, 01/11/2016, ID: 9821892, DktEntry: 99-1, Page 40 of 48
UNITED STATES V. SWISHER 41

Second, even if there isn’t a relevant difference in content

between the lie represented by saying one has a medal and the

deceit communicated by actually wearing it, the majority

never grapples with the speech-related harms that Justice

Breyer focused on in striking down § 704(b), and therefore

fails to consider whether there is any difference between the

two situations that alters the need for the “limiting features”

discussed in Alvarez. For example, Justice Breyer was

particularly concerned with the potential chilling effect of

§ 704(b), because individuals would worry about “being

prosecuted for a careless false statement” even if they lacked

the requisite mens rea, and so would curtail their own speech. 

Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2555. It makes little sense, however, to

extend this principle—that people sometimes thoughtlessly

say things that they don’t really mean—to the context of

§ 704(a). Here, by contrast, it seems unlikely that an

individual could carelessly or negligently wear a military

medal with the intent to deceive. Thus, there is less danger

here that individuals will self-censor their sartorial choices

for fear of being prosecuted for negligent speech.7

There is also much less ambiguity in the wearing of a

military medal, and that diminishes the risk of selective

prosecution under this provision. Id. at 2555 Breyer, J.,

concurring in the judgment) (noting the risk that § 704(b)

7 For reasons the panel explained in Perelman, because we must read

§ 704(a) to prohibit only the wearing of a medal with the intent to deceive,

the statute does not apply to anyone wearing a medal in a theatrical

production, as part of a Halloween costume, or in protest as a political

statement. 695 F.3d at 870 (listing these and other examples). In these

situations, we will readily recognize that the wearer is making no claim to

being a medal recipient. The only person who can be prosecuted under

§ 704(a) is one who is lying and wants us to rely on his possession of the

medal as proof of his valor. There is no First Amendment value in that lie.

 Case: 11-35796, 01/11/2016, ID: 9821892, DktEntry: 99-1, Page 41 of 48
42 UNITED STATES V. SWISHER

may be applied “subtly but selectively to speakers that the

Government does not like,” particularly in the political

arena). Human speech is often ambiguous and subject to

different interpretations. As a result, speech subject to

§ 704(b) must be understood in context, and thus is more

easily subject to manipulation and “the risk of censorious

selectivity by prosecutors.” Id. As judges, we are familiar

with the dangers of reading a cold record and trying to supply

voice inflection, facial expression, and body language.8 For

good reason, we defer to the fact-finders who have actually

seen the witnesses to judge their demeanor as a measure of

their truthfulness. See e.g., Anderson v. Bessemer City,

470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985) (“[O]nly the trial judge can be

aware of the variations in demeanor and tone of voice that

bear so heavily on the listener’s understanding of and belief

in what is said.”); United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667,

679 (1980) (“‘The most careful note must often fail to

convey the evidence fully in some of its most important

elements. . . . It cannot give the look or manner of the

witness: his hesitations, his doubts, his variations of language,

his confidence or precipitancy, his calmness or

consideration.’” (quoting Queen v. Bertrand, 16 Eng. Rep.

391, 399 (1867))).

8 Consider, for example, Charlie Chaplin’s classic exchange in The

Great Dictator (1940). When Chaplin mutters “this is a fine country to

live in,” he is arrested, but escapes punishment by explaining that all he

said was “this is a fine country to live in.” Joseph G. Brennan, A

Handbook of Logic 213 (2d ed. 1961) (describing this an example of the

informal “fallacy of accent”). See also Watts v. United States, 394 U.S.

705, 708 (1969) (overturning the petitioner’s conviction for threatening

the President because his statement, made at a political rally opposing the

Vietnam war, was simply “crude” “political hyperbole,” not a true threat).

 Case: 11-35796, 01/11/2016, ID: 9821892, DktEntry: 99-1, Page 42 of 48
UNITED STATES V. SWISHER 43

By contrast, wearing clothing, particularly with the

precision demanded when one dons a military uniform, is far

less ambiguous than the vagaries of human speech. The very

nature of a uniform suggests that once we recognize the

distinctive colors and insignia, we know immediatelywhether

we are dealing with the local constabulary or a member of the

nation’s armed forces, whether the service member is wearing

the camouflage of the ground forces or the crisp whites of the

navy, whether the service member belongs to the armored

division or the medical corps, and whether the member is

commissioned or non-commissioned. In the same vein, we

can discern, without any words being exchanged, the

campaigns in which the member has participated and whether

the member has been decorated for actions in combat. 

Indeed, so clear is our understanding of the meaning of the

uniform that no voice inflection or body language can

countermand what we have seen for ourselves. Elven

Swisher didn’t have to tell anyone that his Purple Heart meant

that he had been wounded in battle, or that his Navy and

Marine Corps Commendation Medal was awarded for valor.

Contrary to the majority’s assertion that there is no

principled distinction between § 704(a) and § 704(b), Maj.

Op. at 29, § 704(a) engenders less potential constitutional

harm than § 704(b), because there is less risk to the First

Amendment in the government identifying and policing

specific instances of deceptive conduct than in trying to

police the line between false and true statements.

B

The false wearing of military medals poses significantly

greater harm to the government’s interests than does mere

false speech. That means that, contrary to the majority’s

 Case: 11-35796, 01/11/2016, ID: 9821892, DktEntry: 99-1, Page 43 of 48
44 UNITED STATES V. SWISHER

assertion, Maj. Op. at 31, the government’s objectives here

are not precisely the same as those at issue under § 704(b). 

The United States has a powerful interest in protecting the

integrity of its military decorations. Indeed, Congress has

punished the wearing, manufacture, or sale of military

decorations without authorization since 1923. See Act of

Feb. 24, 1923, ch. 110, 42 Stat. 1286. The wearing of an

unearned military medal dilutes the message conveyed by the

medal itself. Even if the wearer is later exposed as a liar, the

utility of the medal as a symbol of government

commendation has been undermined. The public can no

longer trust that the medal actually is a symbol of government

commendation, i.e., that the person wearing the medal has

actually earned it. This results in a different, more concrete

harm than that which may arise from the false statement that

one has earned a military medal. It is one thing to say that

one has been decorated; it is quite another to produce the

evidence for it by appropriating a symbol that the

government, through decades of effort, has imbued with a

particular message. Unlike false statements, which maywork

harm by giving the public the general impression that more

personnel earn military honors than actually do, the false

wearing of medals directly undermines the government’s

ability to mark out specific worthy individuals, because the

symbol the government uses to convey this message can no

longer be trusted. This may also mean that those who

rightfully wear a military medal are less likely to be believed.

In this respect, a military medal is akin to a trademark: a

symbol that denotes a particular level of quality, or

worthiness. See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2554 (Breyer, J.,

concurring in the judgment) (“Statutes prohibiting trademark

infringement present, perhaps, the closest analogy to the

present statute.”). As Justice Breyer recognized in Alvarez,

 Case: 11-35796, 01/11/2016, ID: 9821892, DktEntry: 99-1, Page 44 of 48
UNITED STATES V. SWISHER 45

a false claim regarding a military medal “creates confusion

about who is entitled to wear it, thus diluting its value to

those who have earned it, to their families, and to their

country.” Id. Although in Alvarez, Justice Breyer ultimately

concluded that the confusion caused by false statements was

not sufficient to outweigh the constitutional harm caused by

the statute, here, the calculus is different, because § 704(a)

creates less risk of constitutional harm, and because the

wearing of an unearned medal offers more convincing proof

of the lie than a mere false statement.

The false and deceptive wearing of military medals

“dilutes the value” of military honors generally, by conveying

the impression that “everyone” earns them. Moreover, such

conduct also dilutes the symbolic value of the medal itself,

hampering the government’s ability to reward those it has

concluded are worthy of recognition. The purpose of a

military medal is not only that it conveys the government’s

appreciation for an individual’s service to the individual, but

that it conveys the government’s commendation of that

individual to others, identifying the medal winner “as an

example worthy of emulation.” United States v. Alvarez,

617 F.3d 1198, 1234 (9th Cir. 2010) (Bybee, J., dissenting). 

The value of the militarymedal, like the value of a trademark,

is that it is both recognizable and publicly understood to

convey a specific message: in this case, the message that the

wearer has done something worthy of admiration. When

those who are unworthy are allowed to wear the medal, the

government can no longer identify its heroes in a way that is

easily discernible by the public.

To be clear, this harm does not occur when an unearned

medal is worn for purposes of art, theater, political

expression, or the like. It is only when the medal-wearer

 Case: 11-35796, 01/11/2016, ID: 9821892, DktEntry: 99-1, Page 45 of 48
46 UNITED STATES V. SWISHER

wears the medal in order to appropriate the message

conveyed by the medal—that the wearer has actually earned

a military honor—that the medal’s symbolic value is diluted. 

Elven Swisher, however, was not wearing his false military

medals for purposes of art, political expression, intellectual

debate, or even any of the “innocent” reasons people may lie. 

He wore his medals to support the elaborate story he had

concocted to fraudulently obtain disability benefits from the

government. He even wore his fraudulent medals to

embellish his credibility when testifying at a criminal trial

(not his own). See United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247

(9th Cir. 2009) (en banc), as amended, 611 F.3d 1098 (9th

Cir. 2010).9

It is absurd to argue that allowing someone like

Swisher to wear unearned military honors in the course of

impersonating a war hero does not do significant damage to

the value of the genuine honor bestowed on those who have

sacrificed for their country.

9 Swisher testified as a government witness in a federal murder-for-hire

case, appearing on the witness stand with a Purple Heart pinned to his

lapel. Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1254. Swisher testified that the defendant in

that case, David Hinkson, had heard about his impressive military service

record and had wanted to hire him to torture and kill a federal judge, an

AUSA, and an IRS agent. During the course of the trial, Hinkson’s

lawyers called Swisher’s credibility into serious question, on the basis that

his “reissued” military discharge papers, which detailed the military

honors Swisher had supposedly won, could not be authenticated. See id.

at 1251–57 (recapping the Hinkson trial and Swisher’s role); see also

United States v. Hinkson, 611 F.3d 1098 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc)

(amending the original en banc opinion); id. at 1099 (W. Fletcher, J.,

dissenting) (discussing in even more detail Swisher’s relationship with

Hinkson and the Hinkson trial). The parties here agreed that Swisher’s

conduct at the Hinkson trial would not be introduced at his own trial. 

Swisher was indicted based on a photograph showing that he had worn his

false medals to a Marine Corps League event.

 Case: 11-35796, 01/11/2016, ID: 9821892, DktEntry: 99-1, Page 46 of 48
UNITED STATES V. SWISHER 47

C

Finally, there are fewer less restrictive regulatory

alternatives available to the government where the

unauthorized and deceptive wearing of a military medal is

concerned. To be sure, the statutory provision at issue here

punishes the same kind of lie at issue in Alvarez. But the fact

that the lie here is told in a more effective way, with physical

proof in the form of the medal to support the false claim of

entitlement, increases the harm caused by the lie and also

means that other, less restrictive means are less likely to be

effective. Justice Breyer noted that many statutes punishing

false statements require some showing of actual or likely

harm resulting from the lie and suggested that “a more finely

tailored statue might . . . insist upon a showing that the false

statement caused specific harm or at least was material, or

focus its coverage on lies most likely to be harmful or on

contexts where such lies are most likely to cause harm.” 

Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2556 (Breyer, J., concurring in the

judgment). Section 704(a) satisfies Justice Breyer’s

concerns. First, the harm caused by the false wearing of

military medals is material. It is material to the message

conveyed by the medals themselves. When pretenders wear

medals, the medal itself can no longer be taken as a sign that

the wearer has earned it and is therefore worthy of

commendation. Second, § 704(a) is confined to a single

context—the intentional wearing of medals when the wearer

intends to deceive—where it is most likely to cause harm.

Moreover, “counterspeech” will be less effective in

correcting the falsehood conveyed by deceptively wearing an

unearned military decoration. See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at

2549–50 (Kennedy, J.) (plurality opinion); id. at 2556

(Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). One could denounce

 Case: 11-35796, 01/11/2016, ID: 9821892, DktEntry: 99-1, Page 47 of 48
48 UNITED STATES V. SWISHER

Swisher as an impostor, but as the Fourth Circuit explained,

“speech may not effectively counter that which a person

sees.” Hamilton, 699 F.3d at 373. One could, perhaps,

engage in a war of words with Alvarez, but Swisher, who has

the medals on his uniform, occupies the high ground.

Finally, the majority, following Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at

2550–51 (Kennedy, J.) (plurality opinion); id. at 2556

(Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment), proposes a database

of medal winners as a means to counteract Swisher’s

deception.10 Maj. Op. at 31–32. To my mind, this is no

solution at all to the problem of individuals falsely wearing

medals. If the public has to check the database to confirm

that a medal wearer actually earned the medal, the purpose of

the medal itself is utterly defeated. If we can no longer trust

what we can see, the only honor the United States can confer

on its heroes is a listing in a database. Once wearing the

medal itself doesn’t signify anything more than a

presumption of a property right, the nation’s highest honors

will have become, literally, virtual.

III

I would uphold the constitutionality of §704(a). I

respectfully dissent.

10 The majority, quoting Alvarez, refers to the database as an

“‘information-disseminating device’” for confirming that the medal wearer

has actually earned the military honor. Maj. Op. at 31–32 (quoting

Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2556 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment)). 

Although it is low-tech, we already have such an “informationdisseminating device”: the medal.

 Case: 11-35796, 01/11/2016, ID: 9821892, DktEntry: 99-1, Page 48 of 48