Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01792/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01792-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1442aaf Petition for Removal - Agst members of armed forces

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

FRANCISCO GONZALEZ, 

Petitioner,

v. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Respondent.

Case No.: 16cv1792-MMA (KSC)

ORDER GRANTING 

RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO 

DISMISS 

 [Doc. No. 8]

Petitioner Francisco Gonzalez filed a “Petition for Order that Conservatee’s 

Outstanding Medical Expenses be Paid From Medical Care Trust Established for the Care 

of Conservatee” in the Superior Court of California, County of San Diego. See Doc. No. 

1. Subsequently, Respondent United States of America removed the action to this Court 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442, and moved to dismiss the petition for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Doc. Nos. 

1, 8; Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), (6). For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS

Respondent’s motion to dismiss this action, and DISMISSES the action without 

prejudice. 

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BACKGROUND1

A. Petitioner’s Allegations 

According to the Petition, Luz Maria Gonzalez (hereinafter, “Mrs. Gonzalez”) 

“suffered a permanent neurologic brain injury on February 4, 20100 [sic] at Balboa Naval 

Hospital” during childbirth, leaving her in a “comatose and vegetative” state. See Doc. 

No. 1-2. Petitioner is her husband.2

 Thereafter, Petitioner filed a Federal Tort Claims 

Act (FTCA) action in this district—Luz Gonzalez v. United States of America,

13CV0861-LAB (WVG). Eventually, the parties agreed to settle the FTCA action during 

mediation on July 30, 2014. According to Petitioner, “[a] key component of this 

settlement was to allow [Mrs. Gonzalez] to be transferred to a better facility for 

continuing care.” See Doc. No. 1-2. On August 8, 2014, Mrs. Gonzalez was transferred 

to this new facility, Care Meridian, purportedly in part based on the government’s 

agreement to settle the action and pay for her continuing care in some capacity. The 

Petition states that on September 2, 2014, Petitioner’s attorney filed a motion requesting 

the Court approve the settlement agreement. In support of the motion, Petitioner’s 

counsel submitted a declaration in which he stated that he “was able to negotiate an 

agreement with the U.S. Attorney that the government would pay for [Mrs. Gonzalez’s] 

care at Care Meridian . . . from August 11, 2014 forward, with such sums to be paid after 

the government funded the settlement.” See Doc. No. 1-2. Petitioner states that the 

government did not object to that statement. 

The United States Attorney’s office had reduced the settlement terms into writing 

in a “Stipulation for Compromise and Release Federal Tort Claims Act Claims Pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 2677” (hereinafter, “Stipulation”).3

 See Doc. No. 1-2. In the Stipulation, 

the parties agreed to the creation of an “Irrevocable Reversionary Inter Vivos Grantor 

                                                                

1

 Because this matter is before the Court on a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept as true the 

allegations set forth in the petition. See Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976). 

2

 Petitioner is also a co-conservator for Mrs. Gonzalez, the conservatee. 

3

 Petitioner attached a signed copy of the Stipulation to the Petition as Exhibit 2. See Doc. No. 1-2. 

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Medical Care Trust for the Benefit of Luz Maria Gonzalez.” See Doc. No. 1-2. The 

Trust names Medivest Benefit Advisors, Inc. as Administrator, and Wells Fargo Bank, 

N.A. as Trustee. However, according to the Petition, the Court declined to approve the 

settlement because a portion of the settlement payments would be paid to minors, and the 

minors were required to first obtain minors’ compromises in Superior Court. After the 

minors’ compromises were approved, Petitioner filed another petition for approval of the 

settlement agreement on September 24, 2014, which included the above mentioned 

Declaration, Stipulation, and Trust as exhibits. Subsequently, the magistrate judge 

assigned to the FTCA action submitted a report and recommendation to the assigned 

district judge recommending the Court approve the settlement. On October 3, 2014, the 

Court approved the settlement agreement. 

According to the Petition, “the United States did not sign the Trust until December 

28, 2014” and “did not actually fund the Trust until February 25, 2015.” See Doc. No. 1-

2. Petitioner states that “[t]he reasons for the delay can only be attributed to the fact that 

the Federal Government itself was involved and unfortunately, nothing moves quickly 

within the Federal Government.” See Doc. No. 1-2. Petitioner asserts that “[h]ere, the 

outstanding issue is the payment of the ongoing routine medical services provided to 

[Mrs. Gonzalez] by Care Meridian for the time period from August 8, 2014 until 

February 15, 2015, which represents the day [Mrs. Gonzalez] was transferred to Care 

Meridian’s care, through the last date Medivest Benefit Advisors has not made payment.” 

See Doc. No. 1-2. The Trust Administrator, Medivest Benefit Advisors, denied 

Petitioner’s request that those bills—totaling over $200,000—be paid from the Trust 

funds on the grounds “that the Trust language provides that dates of service prior to the 

establishment of the trust are not payable from trust funds.” See Doc. No. 1-2. Petitioner 

contends that “this is a completely unreasonable position to take.” See Doc. No. 1-2. 

Petitioner argues that the federal government should not be allowed to “take advantage of 

a delay that they alone caused in the first place and more importantly cannot claim they 

were unaware of the Care Meridian lien.” See Doc. No. 1-2. In support, Petitioner 

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points to an exhibit “where counsel for Petitioner in the underlying action explained the 

government’s agreement to the Conservatee’s transfer to Care Meridian where after [sic] 

the cost of her care would be paid out of the Trust once funded.” See Doc. No. 1-2. The 

Petition also states that the Stipulation “provides that Plaintiff is to provide evidence that 

all liens have been paid off yet the US Attorney did not require evidence of the Care 

Meridian lien being paid off because the US Attorney was well aware of the agreement 

that this lien was to be paid from the Trust funds, once funded.” See Doc. No. 1-2. 

Under the heading “Authority for Petition,” Petitioner lists three Probate Code 

sections. The Petition states, “Probate Code 2430 provides that a Conservator may 

petition the court . . . for instructions when there is doubt whether a debt should be paid.” 

See Doc. No. 1-2. Also, it states, “Probate Code section 2403 . . . provides broad 

authority to the court to issue orders concerning the administration of a Conservatorship.” 

See Doc. No. 1-2. Lastly, according to the Petition, “Probate Code section 850 et seq. 

provides that a Conservator may file a Petition where the Conservatee has a claim to 

personal property in possession of another and request that this personal property be 

transferred to the person entitled thereto.” See Doc. No. 1-2. 

B. The Stipulation and Trust Terms4

Pursuant to the Stipulation, the United States agreed to pay $1,994,567.00 in cash 

(deemed “Upfront Cash”), $900,000.00 to purchase annuity contracts, and $2,855,433.00 

to the Trust. See Luz Gonzalez v. United States of America, 13CV0861-LAB (WVG), 

Doc. No. 36, Exhibit A, Stipulation. Under the agreement, the United States was required 

to send a formal request to the United States Department of Treasury requesting that 

$5,750,000.00 “be expeditiously sent by electronic funds transfer” to the client trust 

account. Id. The United States was required to do so within three days after it obtained 

copies of the Stipulation and Trust signed by all parties, relevant Social Security and tax 

                                                                

4

 The Court takes judicial notice of documents filed in the FTCA action, Luz Gonzalez v. United States 

of America, 13CV0861-LAB (WVG), such as the Court-approved Stipulation and Trust, as discussed 

below. 

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identification numbers, court orders approving the settlement, and authorization by the 

Attorney General or his designee. The settlement was expressly conditioned on the 

Attorney General’s or the Attorney General’s designee’s approval of the settlement 

terms, the full agreement by the parties to all terms, and on court approval of the 

settlement. It was also conditioned on the parties’ written agreement to all terms, 

conditions, and requirements. 

The Stipulation states that the plaintiffs “stipulate and agree that they are legally 

responsible for any and all past, present, and future liens and past, present, and future 

claims for payment or reimbursement, including any past, present, and future liens or 

claims for payment or reimbursement by any individual or entity, including an insurance 

company, Medicaid, and Medicare, but excluding Tricare, arising from the injuries that 

are the subject matter of this action.” Id. It further states that the plaintiffs agree to 

satisfy or resolve any such liens, and that, as of the date of signing the Stipulation, they 

certify that they have diligently searched for outstanding liens or claims for 

reimbursement arising out of the action. Id. Under the agreement, the plaintiffs agreed to 

provide the United States with evidence that they have satisfied or resolved liens or 

claims within 30 days of the date of any “past, present, or future lien[s] or claim[s] for 

payment or reimbursement” and within 90 days “from the date the United States has paid 

the Settlement Amount.” Id. The Stipulation states that the plaintiffs and their counsel 

agree to, through their counsel, “satisfy or resolve any and all known claims . . . before 

distributing to the [plaintiffs] any portion of the Upfront Cash.” Id. 

Finally, the Stipulation states that plaintiffs “represent that they have read, 

reviewed and understand this Stipulation and the Reversionary Trust.” Id. 

According to the Trust, its purpose is to “pay allowable benefits, as defined in . . . 

the Trust, to or on behalf of the Beneficiary according to the terms and conditions of the 

Trust.” See Luz Gonzalez v. United States of America, 13CV0861-LAB (WVG), Doc. 

No. 36, Exhibit B, Trust. The Trust states that “[n]o rights, obligations, duties, or 

allowable benefits are created or payable pursuant to the Trust unless and until . . . the 

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Grantor has deposited with the Trustee the initial sum stated or determined by the terms 

of the Stipulation . . . and the Trustee has deposited said sum into a separate account 

opened by the Trustee in the name of the Trust.” Id. Only once those and other 

conditions were satisfied, the Trust was to “be deemed established.” Id. 

In deciding whether to authorize payment of allowable benefits, the Trust requires 

that the Administrator rely “exclusively on the terms of the Trust.” Id. The Trust states 

that “[u]nless otherwise specifically authorized . . . the Administrator shall not authorize 

(and the Trustee shall not pay) [for] . . . goods and services that were provided prior to 

the date the Trust is deemed established [or] goods and services for which an obligation 

to provide such goods and services was incurred prior to the date the Trust is deemed 

established.” Id. The Trust also defines allowable benefits in part as those that are 

“incurred after the date the Trust is deemed established.” Id. 

Regarding dispute resolution, the Trust states that the parties should resolve 

disputes informally where possible, but “[i]f the dispute cannot be resolved informally, 

the Grantor, Trustee, Administrator, or Beneficiary may have the dispute resolved by a 

court of competent jurisdiction.” Id. The Trust states that “any such court of competent 

jurisdiction shall not have the right to alter, amend, or change the terms or conditions of 

the Trust . . . notwithstanding any state or federal law to the contrary.” Id. The parties 

agreed that “[t]he Trust is irrevocable and the terms shall not be amended, modified, 

altered, or changed in any respect.” Id. Finally, the Trust states that it “is a federal 

contract and is to be construed according to federal law.” Id. 

C. Dismissal of the FTCA Action 

On February 17, 2015, the parties moved the Court to dismiss the action with 

prejudice. See Luz Gonzalez v. United States of America, 13CV0861-LAB (WVG), Doc. 

No. 41. In their joint motion, the parties represented to the Court that “[a]ll the terms and 

conditions of the settlement between the Plaintiff and the United States ha[d] been 

satisfied.” Id. The parties also requested that the Court not retain jurisdiction over this 

action “as it pertains to the United States or the settlement with the United States.” Id. 

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On February 24, 2015, the Court granted the parties’ joint motion to dismiss, explicitly 

stating that it would not retain jurisdiction to interpret or enforce the settlement 

agreement. See Luz Gonzalez v. United States of America, 13CV0861-LAB (WVG), 

Doc. No. 42. 

LEGAL STANDARD

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. 

Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). As such, “[a] federal court is presumed to lack

jurisdiction in a particular case unless the contrary affirmatively appears.” Stock West, 

Inc. v. Confederated Tribes, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). 

Without subject matter jurisdiction, a federal court is without “power” to hear or 

adjudicate a claim. See Leeson v. Transamerica Disability Income Plan, 671 F.3d 969, 

975 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 89 

(1998)); Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377. Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), a party may seek 

dismissal of an action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction “either on the face of the 

pleadings or by presenting extrinsic evidence.” Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc., 

328 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2003); see also White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 

2000). 

B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the sufficiency of the complaint. Navarro 

v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). A pleading must contain “a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

8(a)(2). However, plaintiffs must also plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 

570 (2007). The plausibility standard thus demands more than a formulaic recitation of 

the elements of a cause of action, or naked assertions devoid of further factual 

enhancement. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Instead, the complaint “must 

contain allegations of underlying facts sufficient to give fair notice and to enable the 

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opposing party to defend itself effectively.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 

2011). 

 In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), courts must assume the truth 

of all factual allegations and must construe them in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337–38 (9th Cir. 1996). 

The court need not take legal conclusions as true merely because they are cast in the form 

of factual allegations. Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Similarly, “conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are not sufficient to 

defeat a motion to dismiss.” Pareto v. FDIC, 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998). 

 In determining the propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, courts generally may not 

look beyond the complaint for additional facts. United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 

908 (9th Cir. 2003). “A court may, however, consider certain materials—documents 

attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in the complaint, or 

matters of judicial notice—without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for 

summary judgment.” Id.; see also Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 

2001). Where dismissal is appropriate, a court should grant leave to amend unless the 

plaintiff could not possibly cure the defects in the pleading. Knappenberger v. City of 

Phoenix, 566 F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2009). 

DISCUSSION

 Respondent United States moves to dismiss the instant Petition on the grounds that 

the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, and that Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), (6). 

A. Judicial Notice 

As an initial matter, Respondent requests the Court take judicial notice of all 

relevant documents filed in the FTCA action—Luz Gonzalez v. United States of America,

13CV0861-LAB (WVG). A court may take judicial notice of matters submitted as part 

of a complaint, or those that are not but whose authenticity is not contested and where the 

plaintiff’s complaint relies on them. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 

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(9th Cir. 2001) overruled on other grounds by Galbraith v. Cnty. Of Santa Clara, 307 

F.3d 1119, 1125–26 (9th Cir. 2002). A court may also take judicial notice of matters of 

public record. Id. at 688–89 (citing Mack v. South Bay Beer Distrib., 798 F.2d 1279, 

1282 (9th Cir. 1986) (internal quotations omitted). Petitioner relies on the filings in the 

prior FTCA action, which are public record and relevant to disposition of the issues 

before the Court. Further, Petitioner does not contest the authenticity of those documents 

that Respondent requests the Court judicially notice. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS 

Respondent’s request for judicial notice. 

B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 

Regarding subject matter jurisdiction, Respondent argues that the state court lacked 

jurisdiction over this action because the Court of Federal Claims has exclusive 

jurisdiction over claims arising out of express or implied contracts with the United States 

and seeking monetary relief in excess of $10,000. Thus, Respondent argues, the Court 

did not acquire jurisdiction upon removal pursuant to the doctrine of derivative 

jurisdiction. Likewise, even if Petitioner had originally filed this action here, the 

government argues that the Court of Federal Claims has exclusive jurisdiction. 

Petitioner argues Respondent mischaracterizes his claim as a contract claim. 

Petitioner states he does not allege a contract claim. He states, “[r]ather, the United 

States, the grantor of the subject Reversionary Trust, has already funded the subject 

Reversionary Trust, and as such, Petitioner, on behalf of the Beneficiary, is merely 

seeking the Beneficiary’s own property be appropriately disbursed.” See Doc. No. 12. 

Petitioner states that the California Probate Code “provides that a Conservator may file a 

petition where the Conservatee has a claim to personal property in the possession of 

another and request that this property be transferred to the person entitled thereto.” See

Doc. No. 12. Further, Petitioner argues that the United States does not own the Trust 

funds and thus, Petitioner is not seeking damages from the United States. 

However, in reviewing the Petition, Stipulation, and Trust, the Court can only 

reasonably interpret Petitioner’s claim as one for breach of an express or implied 

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contract. This is particularly so where Petitioner does not appear to dispute that “the 

Trust language provides that dates of service prior to the establishment of the trust are not 

payable from trust funds.”5

 See Doc. No. 1-2. Rather, Petitioner argues that the 

provision is “unreasonable” for essentially equitable reasons—mainly, that the 

government itself caused the delay in establishing the Trust, and that Petitioner’s attorney 

in the FTCA action understood that money from the Trust would be used to retroactively 

pay Care Meridian bills. Thus, Petitioner does not appear to rely on an argument that 

enforcement of the written terms of the Trust would result in the relief that Petitioner 

seeks. Instead, it appears that Petitioner’s grievance is that there was either an oral or an 

implied agreement that bills for care under Care Meridian would be paid from the Trust 

despite the contrary—and unambiguous—Trust language. 

Insofar as Petitioner seeks monetary relief for breach of an express or implied 

contract, the Court does not have jurisdiction over this action as Respondent contends. 

Specifically, pursuant to the Tucker Act,6

 the Court of Federal Claims has exclusive 

jurisdiction over claims arising out of contracts with the United States and requesting 

monetary relief in excess of $10,000. See Winchell v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 790 F. Supp. 

214, 216 (D. Mont. 1989), aff’d, 961 F.2d 1442 (9th Cir. 1992); Mathis v. Laird, 483 

F.2d 943, 943 (9th Cir. 1973) (“The Court of Claims has been given exclusive 

jurisdiction for such money claims against the United States when they exceed 

$10,000.”); 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (“the Tucker Act”). It is indisputable that a settlement 

agreement is a contract under the Tucker Act. See Green v. Hood, No. CV-09-112-BLG-

                                                                

5

 Also, in Petitioner’s opposition brief, admits that “the express intent of the parties [was] overlooked in 

drafting the detailed Trust document.” See Doc. No. 12. 

6

 Specifically, the Tucker Act states in relevant part: “The United States Court of Federal Claims shall 

have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded [] upon . . . any 

express or implied contract with the United States.” See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1491. The Little Tucker Act 

states that district courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Federal Claims for the same 

types of claims, but only where the claims do not exceed $10,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (“the Little 

Tucker Act”). 

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RFC, 2011 WL 128792, at *1 (D. Mont. Jan. 14, 2011). Also, a litigant cannot avoid the 

exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Claims Court by disguising its contract claim as 

something else. See Kidwell v. Dep’t of Army, 56 F. 3d 279, 284 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (citing 

Van Drasek v. Lehman, 762 F.2d 1065, 1071 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1985)); Mallard Auto. Grp., 

Ltd. v. United States, 343 F. Supp. 2d 949, 956 (D. Nev. 2004) (stating that courts must 

determine whether a claim is “at its essence” a contract claim in determining proper 

jurisdiction under the Tucker Act). 

Further, insofar as Petitioner petitions the Court to enforce or interpret the written 

terms of the settlement, Petitioner is incorrect that the Court has inherent jurisdiction to 

do so. “[T]he Supreme Court [has] held that federal courts do not have inherent or 

ancillary jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement simply because the subject of that 

settlement was a federal lawsuit.” See O’Connor v. Colvin, 70 F.3d 530, 531–33 (9th 

Cir. 1995) (citing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 381 (1994)). 

Once the initial federal lawsuit is dismissed, a federal court loses subject matter 

jurisdiction over the action and any action to enforce a settlement agreement arising out 

of the original action requires independent grounds for federal jurisdiction. Id. In 

Kokkonen, the Supreme Court stated that a federal court may retain jurisdiction over a 

settlement agreement where the court’s order of dismissal incorporates the terms of the 

settlement agreement, or the order of dismissal explicitly states that the court retains 

jurisdiction over the settlement. See id. “The judge’s mere awareness and approval of 

the terms of the settlement agreement do not suffice to make them part of his order.” 

Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 381. Here, Judge Burns, in his Order granting the parties’ joint 

motion to dismiss the FTCA action, explicitly stated that the Court would not retain 

jurisdiction to interpret or enforce the settlement terms.7

 See Luz Gonzalez v. United 

States of America, 13CV0861-LAB (WVG), Doc. No. 42. The Order of dismissal did not 

                                                                

7

 And in fact, the parties requested Judge Burns not retain jurisdiction. See Luz Gonzalez v. United 

States of America, 13CV0861-LAB (WVG), Doc. No. 41. 

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include or incorporate by reference the terms of the settlement agreement. Thus, the 

Court does not have inherent authority to enforce or interpret the settlement, and did not 

retain jurisdiction to do so.8

 

C. Petitioner’s Request for Modification of the Trust 

As discussed above, the Petition sounds in contract. Nowhere in the Petition does 

Petitioner seek modification of the Trust instrument. However, in Petitioner’s opposition 

to Respondent’s motion to dismiss, Petitioner indicates that it requests the Court modify 

the Trust. Accordingly, the Court construes Petitioner’s opposition brief as requesting 

leave to amend the Petition to add such a request. For the following reasons, the Court 

concludes that it would be futile to allow Petitioner leave to amend to add a request for 

modification of the Trust. 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) states that “leave to amend shall be freely 

given when justice so requires.” See Schmidt v. PNC Bank, NA, 591 F. App’x 642, 643 

(9th Cir. 2015). While liberally granted, “leave to amend is not automatic.” Id. It is 

within the discretion of district courts to deny leave to amend based on various factors, 

including futility of amendment. See id.; Star Patrol Enterprises, Inc. v. Saban Entm’t, 

Inc., 129 F.3d 127 (9th Cir. 1997). A court may deny leave to amend where it considers 

proposed amendments and finds that they would not cure the deficiencies of the 

complaint. See Ward v. Gen. Motors Nat. Ret. Serv., 112 F.3d 518 (9th Cir. 1997); 

Yamauchi v. Cotterman, 84 F. Supp. 3d 993, 1020 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (considering 

additional facts proffered by a plaintiff in an effort to show that they could cure 

deficiencies). 

Petitioner cites to the Uniform Trust Code and the Restatement of Trusts to argue 

that he has stated a claim upon which relief may be granted, and that the Court should 

                                                                

8

 Even if the Court had retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement, the Court would likely 

only have jurisdiction to enforce the agreement based on its written terms and not any “alleged oral 

promises outside the settlement agreement.” See Saints v. Winter, No. CIV 05CV0806 JAH RBB, 2007 

WL 2481514, at *4–5 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2007). 

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modify the Trust. However, neither the Uniform Trust Code nor the Restatement of 

Trusts applies to this case. Importantly, the Trust in the instant case is not a donative 

trust, but rather one arising out of a settlement agreement. Because consideration was 

involved in the Trust’s creation, its reformation “is dictated by principles of contract 

law.” See Amara v. CIGNA Corp., 775 F.3d 510, 524–25 (2d Cir. 2014); Restatement 

(Third) of Trusts § 62, cmt. a (“Where consideration is involved in the creation of a trust, 

the rules governing transfers for value and contracts are applicable.”); Bilafer v. Bilafer, 

161 Cal. App. 4th 363, 371 (2008) (citing Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 62, cmt. a). 

Thus, as discussed above, Petitioner’s claim is only properly before the Court of 

Federal Claims. Although the Court of Federal Claims cannot generally provide solely 

equitable relief, it has exclusive jurisdiction where a claim in equity is merely incidental 

to a claim for monetary relief. See Hartle v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 479, 484 (1989) 

(stating that the Court of Federal Claims “can exercise equitable power, e.g., rescission 

and reformation of a contract, when the exercise of that power is incidental to the court’s 

general jurisdictional authority to render money judgments”); see also Franklin-Mason v. 

Penn, 616 F. Supp. 2d 97, 100 (D.D.C. 2009) (stating that the Court of Federal Claims 

has exclusive jurisdiction over claims that “explicitly or in essence seek[] money 

damages in excess of $10,000”) (collecting cases). Petitioner’s claim is predominantly a 

claim for a money judgment. To illustrate, in his Petition, Petitioner states that he seeks 

an order “direct[ing] Trustee . . . to make payment of $210,225.00 to Care Meridian, 

LLC.” See Doc. No. 1-2. In his opposition brief, Petitioner states that he “does not seek 

to significantly alter or modify the trust such that any other benefit, cost or expense 

would be affected . . . [but rather,] [t]he relief Petitioner seeks relates to a one-time 

expense, and shall have no bearing on any future expenditure.” See Doc. No. 12; see also 

Johnson v. Potter, No. CIV. L-09-319, 2011 WL 5375052, at *2 (D. Md. Nov. 7, 2011) 

(finding exclusive jurisdiction in the Court of Federal Claims where the plaintiff sought 

specific performance “only insofar as she demand[ed] monetary payment explicitly called 

for by the terms of the contract”); Kidwell, 56 F. 3d at 284 (citing Van Drasek, 762 F.2d 

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at 1071 n.11) (“[J]urisdiction under the Tucker Act cannot be avoided by . . . disguising a 

money claim as a claim requesting a form of equitable relief.”); Amoco Prod. Co. v. 

Hodel, 815 F.2d 352, 361 (5th Cir. 1987) (“It is clear, both in this circuit and elsewhere, 

that a plaintiff cannot avoid Tucker Act jurisdiction simply by characterizing an action as 

equitable in nature.”) (stating that courts must “‘pierce’ the pleadings so that artful 

pleading does not undercut the jurisdiction of the Claims Court”); see Rowe v. United 

States, 633 F.2d 799, 802 (9th Cir. 1980). 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court declines to allow Petitioner leave to amend to 

add a request that the Court modify or reform the Trust. As discussed above, such a 

request would be futile because the Court would lack jurisdiction over this action even if 

such a request were pleaded in the Petition. 

CONCLUSION

 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Respondent’s motion to dismiss, and 

DISMISSES the Petition without prejudice and without leave to amend. The Clerk of 

Court is instructed to enter judgment accordingly and close this action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 22, 2017

 _____________________________ 

 Hon. Michael M. Anello 

United States District Judge 

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