Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00746/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-00746-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 290
Nature of Suit: Other Real Property Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Breach of Fiduciary Duty

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

In re Dennis Andrew Ball, personally and

as Beneficiary of the Eleanor R. Ball

IrreLvg Trust 05/10/01.

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No. CV-08-0746-PHX-GMS

No. CV-09-0065-PHX-GMS

No. CV-09-0066-PHX-GMS

No. CV-09-0085-PHX-GMS

No. CV-09-0086-PHX-GMS

No. CV-09-0122-PHX-GMS

No. CV-09-0123-PHX-GMS

(Consolidated)

ORDER

In this case, Plaintiff Dennis Andrew Ball has sued various individuals, businesses,

and government entities, apparently under the theory that they conspired together to defraud

the trust of which he is a beneficiary. There are a variety of motions outstanding in the case,

all involving to one degree or another the deficiency of the Complaints Mr. Ball has filed.

This Order rules on the motions and attempts to explain to Mr. Ball what precisely would be

required to render his case fit to proceed.

BACKGROUND

Mr. Ball has initiated seven lawsuits in this District against a variety of different

parties. (See Dkt. # 32.) Specifically, Mr. Ball has sued: the estate of Jonathan P. Schubert;

First Mercury Insurance; the State of Arizona; the City of Peoria; the Peoria Police

Department; Morgan Stanley Trust Company; Jaburg & Wilk, P.C.; Kevin Rattay; Carol

Stevens-Gobillard; Arthur Paul Blunt; Southwest Fiduciary, Inc.; Gregory P. Dovico; Peggy

Case 2:08-cv-00746-GMS Document 54 Filed 05/21/09 Page 1 of 18
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1

The Court has declined to consolidate two other cases Mr. Ball has filed in this

District (the first is a case against Mr. Ball’s sister and her husband, and the second is a case

against the City and Police Department of Peoria, which are also parties to this action). (See

Dkt. # 42.)

Also, the Court consolidated the cases under the name “In re Dennis Andrew Ball,

personally and as Benefactor of the Eleanor R. Ball IrreLvg Trust 05/10/01.” (Dkt. # 32 at

3.) The proper title should be “In re Dennis Andrew Ball, personally and as Beneficiary of

the Eleanor R. Ball IrreLvg Trust 05/10/01.” The parties are directed to utilize the amended

caption on all future filings.

2

Mr. Ball amended his Complaint once in the lead case before consolidation. (Dkt.

# 23.)

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Ann Dovico; Diane Levine; Anna Dovico; Fidelity & Deposit Corporation; Encore Senior

Village; and Bruce M. Tripp. (Dkt. # 47.)

In one of these cases, Defendants Southwest Fiduciary, Gregory P. Dovico, Peggy

Ann Dovico, and Anna Dovico filed a Motion to Dismiss. (CV-09-00122 Dkt. # 27.)

Defendants Gregory P. Dovico, Peggy Ann Dovico, and Anna Dovico moved for dismissal

in their individual capacities only. (See id. at 1.) Defendant Fidelity & Deposit Corporation

(“Fidelity”) later joined in the motion to dismiss. (CV-09-00122 Dkt. # 40.)

On March 27, 2009, before the motion to dismiss was ruled on, this Court

consolidated the seven cases.1

 (Dkt. # 32.) In the consolidation Order, the Court directed

Mr. Ball to file a Second Amended Complaint2

 incorporating his various claims. The Court

also pointed out that the Complaints filed by Mr. Ball in the seven cases were “vague,

amorphous, and voluminous, and they do not state clearly either the legal nature of Plaintiff’s

claims against each specific defendant or the factual conduct upon which each claim is

ostensibly predicated.” (Id. at 2.) The Court went on to explain how the Complaints are

deficient under the pleading standards of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8, 9, and 10, and

the Court specifically noted that Mr. Ball must plead certain claims with particularity. The

Court also explained to Mr. Ball that if he failed to comply with the relevant pleading rules

in filing his Second Amended Complaint, the Court could dismiss the action with prejudice

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258,

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1260 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that a district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing

a pro se plaintiff’s complaint for failing to comply with the court’s order directing proper

pleading under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).

The Court also conducted a hearing with Mr. Ball on April 15, 2009, in order to

facilitate resolution of the case. Specifically, the Court explained, as had been noted in

several previous orders (Dkt. ## 7, 17), that Mr. Ball cannot represent the trust before this

Court because he is not an attorney admitted to practice within this District. See C.E. Pope

Equity Trust v. United States, 818 F.2d 696, 698 (9th Cir. 1987). Mr. Ball represented to the

Court at the April 15 hearing that he did not intend to bring any claim on behalf of the trust.

As a result of the April 15 hearing, the Court extended the time limit for Mr. Ball to

file a Second Amended Complaint consolidating his various claims. (Dkt. # 42.) The Court

reiterated that Mr. Ball’s Second Amended Complaint must conform to the requirements of

the federal and local rules. The Court further pointed out that Mr. Ball must be represented

by an attorney if he intends to bring claims on behalf of the trust. The Court also extended

the time for Mr. Ball to respond to the pending motion to dismiss through May 4, 2009. On

May 4, Mr. Ball filed a response to the motion to dismiss (Dkt. # 49, 50), a Motion to Deny

Fidelity’s Joinder in the Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. # 48), and a Second Amended Complaint

(Dkt. # 47).

DISCUSSION

The Court will first discuss Mr. Ball’s motion to deny Fidelity’s joinder in the motion

to dismiss and will then evaluate the motion to dismiss itself. The Court will conclude by

explaining to Mr. Ball the nature of the deficiencies in his pleadings and will grant him leave

to replead with specific instructions on how to do so.

I. The Motion to Deny Joinder

Mr. Ball argues that counsel for Fidelity has failed to file a notice of appearance in

this matter, and thus its joinder in the motion to dismiss is improper. (Dkt. # 48.) Mr. Ball

is correct. Although Fidelity has filed a notice of filing waiver of service of summons (CV09-00122 Dkt. # 31), its counsel has never filed a notice of appearance either in this case or

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Mr. Ball appears to request a jury trial on the motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 38. (Dkt. # 49 at 1.) Mr. Ball is not entitled to a jury trial on a

motion to dismiss. Pouncy v. First Va. Mortgage Co., No. 94-2086, 1995 WL 140729, at *3

n.2 (4th Cir. 1995) (affirming a district court’s denial of a jury trial on a motion to dismiss

because “ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion involves only questions of law, [and thus] there

is no role for a factfinder at this stage of the litigation”).

4

Defendants make several new arguments in their reply brief. (See CV-09-00122 Dkt.

# 44.) The Court will not consider these arguments. See Zamani v. Carnes, 491 F.3d 990,

997 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The district court need not consider arguments raised for the first time

in a reply brief.”).

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in the original case that has been consolidated into this action. Thus, the joinder was not

properly filed. LRCiv 83.3 (“[N]o attorney shall appear in any action or file anything in any

action without first appearing as counsel of record.”) (emphasis added). Fidelity therefore

will not be permitted to join in the instant motion to dismiss.

II. The Motion to Dismiss3

Defendants make four arguments in their motion to dismiss: (1) that there is no

diversity jurisdiction; (2) that Mr. Ball’s Complaint is too incomprehensible to state a claim;

(3) that Mr. Ball’s Complaint is barred by res judicata; and (4) that federal courts cannot

exercise subject matter jurisdiction over guardianship and conservatorship actions.4

Defendants assert that diversity jurisdiction is not present in this case for two reasons.

Defendants first argue that Mr. Ball “waived his diversity argument by voluntarily submitting

to the jurisdiction of the Superior Court of Arizona . . . by noticing his appearance in such

Court.” (CV-09-00122 Dkt. # 27 at 7.) Defendants cite no authority for the proposition that

a party “waives” the right to assert diversity jurisdiction simply by appearing in a court

proceeding, nor will the Court find such waiver on its own. See Doty Props., LLC v. APC

Partners II, LLC, No. 3:06CV62-P-A, 2006 WL 1580000, at *2 (N.D. Miss. June 2, 2006)

(rejecting the argument that a party waived the right to diversity jurisdiction in federal court

simply by filing a suit in state court). Defendants also argue that there is an insufficient

amount in controversy: “According to the final accounting submitted by the Conservator

[Southwest Fiduciary] and approved by the Probate Court on June 27, 2007, there were no

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assets remaining in the Conservatorship upon determination of the issues related to the

Conservatorship administration, [and] thus there was no controversy involving $75,000.00

or more.” (CV-09-00122 Dkt. # 27 at 8.) Mr. Ball’s various Complaints, however, allege

that Defendants are responsible for the loss of over $800,000 in assets. Because the Court

does not yet have a basis on which to conclude that this amount was claimed in bad faith, Mr.

Ball’s allegation of damages is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. See St. Paul

Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288 (1938) (“The rule governing

dismissal for want of jurisdiction in cases brought in the federal court is that, unless the law

gives a different rule, the sum claimed by the plaintiff controls if the claim is apparently

made in good faith.”). Thus, the Court will not dismiss the case under this reasoning.

Defendants’ third and fourth arguments fail for the same reason that their second

argument succeeds: the Court simply cannot tell what claims Mr. Ball is attempting to plead,

and which of Defendants are allegedly responsible, either from the original Complaint

against these Defendants or the Second Amended Complaint. The deficiencies of the Second

Amended Complaint are detailed infra at Part III.B, and the deficiencies of the original

Complaint (under which the instant motion to dismiss was filed) are even more glaring. (See

CV-09-00122 Dkt. # 1.) The original Complaint contains no discernable legal theories

beyond the general assertion that Defendants’ conduct somehow damaged Mr. Ball by loss

of trust assets, and it contains an amalgamation of disjointed factual assertions from which

none of Defendants could be expected to be put on notice of the nature of Mr. Ball’s claims.

Defendants are thus correct in arguing that the Complaint is insufficiently definite to state

a claim for relief. Because the pleading of Mr. Ball’s claims is so amorphous, however, the

Court is unable to agree with Defendants that the claims Mr. Ball is attempting to assert are

barred either by the doctrine of res judicata or as state guardianship/conservatorship

proceedings – the Court simply cannot say what Mr. Ball’s claims are. The proper course

of action in these circumstances is to give Mr. Ball the opportunity to replead his claims. See

Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that “a district court should

grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines

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that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts”) (quoting Doe

v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995)). Mr. Ball has had just such an opportunity

in filing his Second Amended Complaint. As discussed below, his pleading nevertheless

remains deficient.

III. The Second Amended Complaint

As explained above, Mr. Ball’s original Complaint – indeed, all seven original

Complaints – fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In order for Mr. Ball to

better understand what he must do to render his case fit to proceed, the Court will first detail

several relevant provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and then explain why Mr.

Ball’s Second Amended Complaint fails to satisfy them.

A. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

Rules 8, 9, 10, and 12(b)(6) are of the greatest importance here, and each will be

discussed in turn.

1. Rule 8

Rule 8 governs the general rules of pleading. Rule 8(a)(1) requires that a plaintiff

provide “a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction.” Likewise,

Rule 8(a)(2) requires a plaintiff to set forth a “short and plain statement of the claim showing

that the [plaintiff] is entitled to relief,” in order to “give the defendant fair notice of what the

claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555

(2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Additionally, under Rule 8(d),

“each allegation must be simple, concise and direct.”

2. Rule 9

Rule 9 governs the pleading of special matters, several of which are at issue in this

case. Rule 9(b) is of particular importance. If a complaint includes allegations of fraud, Rule

9(b) requires the “party [to] state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud.”

This requires that the party alleging fraud include an account of the “time, place, and specific

content of the false representations as well as the identities of the parties to the

misrepresentation.” Edwards v. Marin Park, Inc., 356 F.3d 1058, 1066 (9th Cir. 2004).

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“Rule 9(b) does not allow a complaint to merely lump multiple defendants together but

require[s] plaintiffs to differentiate their allegations when suing more than one defendant and

inform each defendant separately of the allegations surrounding his alleged participation in

the fraud.” Swartz v. KPMG LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 764-65 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation and ellipsis

omitted). “To comply with Rule 9(b), allegations of fraud must be specific enough to give

defendants notice of the particular misconduct which is alleged to constitute the fraud

charged so that they can defend against the charge and not just deny that they have done

anything wrong.” Bly-Magee v. California, 236 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal

quotations omitted).

Additionally, “[t]he Ninth Circuit has held that allegations of predicate acts under

RICO must comply with Rule 9(b)’s specificity requirements.” U.S. Concord, Inc. v. Harris

Graphics Corp., 757 F. Supp. 1053, 1061 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (citing Schreiber Distrib. Co. v.

Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1400-01 (9th Cir. 1986)). This means that the same

pleading requirements for fraud (time, place, specific content, and identity of parties) apply

to the pleading of civil RICO claims as well. Edwards, 356 F.3d at 1066. Furthermore, in

alleging a civil conspiracy, “a plaintiff must plead, at a minimum, the basic elements of a

civil conspiracy if the object of the conspiracy is fraudulent.” Wasco Prods., Inc. v. Sw.

Tech., Inc., 435 F.3d 989, 991 (9th Cir. 2006); see also id. (citing with approval the Tenth

Circuit’s holding that “allegations of specific facts showing an agreement and concerted

action” were required to allege a civil conspiracy claim) (quoting Montgomery v. City of

Ardmore, 365 F.3d 926, 940 (10th Cir. 2004)).

3. Rule 10

Rule 10 governs the form of pleadings. Rule 10(b) is most applicable here; it provides

that “[a] party must state its claims . . . in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as

practicable to a single set of circumstances.” Rule 10(b) further provides that “[i]f doing so

would promote clarity, each claim founded on a separate transaction or occurrence . . . must

be stated in a separate count.” The import of these rules is that a plaintiff should present each

claim in a distinct, self-contained count, and that each paragraph within that count should be

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composed of only one set of related factual allegations. To the extent a plaintiff desires to

restate factual allegations made earlier, Rule 10(c) permits him to do so by reference.

4. Rule 12(b)(6)

Rule 12(b)(6) is the standard of pleading required to withstand a motion to dismiss for

failure to state a claim, and it governs the factual allegations a plaintiff must provide. To

avoid dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain more than a “formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action”; it must contain factual allegations sufficient

to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “The

pleading must contain something more . . . than . . . a statement of facts that merely creates

a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action.” Id. (quoting 5 Charles Alan Wright &

Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216 (3d ed. 2004)). While “a

complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations . . . it must plead ‘enough facts to state

a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Clemens v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 534 F.3d

1017, 1022 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Likewise, the Court will not

assume that the plaintiff can prove facts different from those alleged in the complaint, see

Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526

(1983); Jack Russell Terrier Network of N. Cal. v. Am. Kennel Club, Inc., 407 F.3d 1027,

1035 (9th Cir. 2005), and “conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are not

sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Pareto v. F.D.I.C., 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir.

1998).

B. Mr. Ball’s Second Amended Complaint

Mr. Ball’s Second Amended Complaint fails to meet the requirements of these rules,

fails to state cognizable claims, and fails to comply with the Court’s previous Orders.

1. Trust Claims

In the Second Amended Complaint, Mr. Ball continues to purport to bring claims on

behalf of the trust. (See, e.g., Dkt. # 47 at 1 (asserting his claims as both “Dennis Andrew

Ball & Trustee for the Eleanor R. Ball Irrevocable Living Trust”).) Moreover, Mr. Ball

continues to assert in various filings that he is acting as “the office of the trustee.” (See, e.g.,

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Dkt. # 51.) The Court has discussed this issue with Mr. Ball, both by written Order (Dkt. ##

7, 17) and in person at the April 15 hearing, at which time Mr. Ball expressly represented to

the Court that he does not intend to assert claims on behalf of the trust. Any complaint Mr.

Ball files therefore should not assert any claims on behalf of the trust. If Mr. Ball wishes to

assert such claims, he must retain an attorney to represent the trust before the Court.

2. Review of State Court Proceedings

Mr. Ball’s Second Amended Complaint provides that “Plaintiff is of the opinion that

Justice delayed is Justice denied in any Court and in this case has been denied in the State

Court on all Counts of the filed Complaint.” (Dkt. # 47 at 3 (emphasis added).) This is but

one of Mr. Ball’s statements that the claims he advances in the Second Amended Complaint

have already been denied in the state courts. Although the precise nature of the state court

proceedings to which Mr. Ball refers is not clear from his pleadings, Mr. Ball should be

aware that this Court lacks jurisdiction to review state court proceedings. See Noel v. Hall,

341 F.3d 1148, 1162-63 (9th Cir. 2003). Likewise, this Court cannot relitigate issues or

claims already decided by a state court. See, e.g., Chao v. A-One Med. Servs., Inc., 346 F.3d

908, 921 (9th Cir. 2003). If that is what Mr. Ball is seeking, the state appellate courts are the

only appropriate forum for pursuing his claims. Any complaint Mr. Ball files must not raise

issues already decided by the state courts.

3. Count One

The gravamen of Mr. Ball’s case has always appeared to be a claim of conspiracy

between various individuals, businesses, and government entities to harm the trust, and by

extension, to harm him. (See Dkt. # 47 at 1 (“[Mr. Ball] affirms, deposes and believes that

the defendants together conspired to defraud the plaintiff by looting the estate and trust [of]

Eleanor R. Ball[.]”).) The Second Amended Complaint’s conspiracy claim (count one),

however, purports to be brought pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 371. (Id. at 6-8.) That statute is a

criminal law prohibiting conspiracy to commit an offense against the United States or to

defraud the United States. Mr. Ball does not represent the United States, nor does he

anywhere allege that the United States has been harmed. Moreover, Mr. Ball cannot state

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18 U.S.C. § 372 prohibits conspiracy to impede or injure an officer of the United

States. As above, Mr. Ball does not purport to bring any claim for injury to an officer of the

United States, and in any event Mr. Ball cannot bring a civil action under this criminal

statute.

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a civil claim under this criminal statute. D’Amato v. Rattoballi, 83 F. App’x 359, 360 (2d

Cir. 2003); see also Rapoport v. Republic of Mexico, 619 F. Supp. 1476, 1480 (D.D.C. 1985)

(“[I]t is clear that no private right of action can exist under 18 U.S.C. § 371.”). Therefore,

the very essence of Mr. Ball’s case, and of his Second Amended Complaint, is improper.

Moreover, count one does not meet the pleading standards of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. Mr. Ball states that “defendants” crafted “a plan” “before, during and after

[a June 8, 2004] meeting to create a plot to cause permanent injury to the trust and estate of

a vulnerable adult and the plaintiff, Dennis Andrew Ball.” (Dkt. # 47 at 7.) He then states

that Jonathan Schubert, a now-deceased attorney, was “present at [a] deposition without

Plaintiff or his Counsel, Nancy D. Petersen, noticed or present” and that as a result “the

defendants damaged the estate and trust of their client and the plaintiff.” (Id.) Mr. Ball then

states that “funds were wasted by the defendants on themselves” and that there was a

“fraudulent conveyance giveaway of Trust property for nothing to [third] party Banks,”

apparently as the result of foreclosure on the properties in the trust. (Id. at 7-8.) Mr. Ball

concludes that Defendants as a group took actions that were “totally and completely

unacceptable to preserve and protect [his mother’s] liquidity and property,” and that “in

violation of Title 18 United States Code, Sections 371 and 2,5

 the defendants have damaged

the plaintiff and handed him a bill to cure the damages they have caused [to] their client’s

trust and estate and the damage inflicted on the plaintiff as her benefactor.” (Dkt. # 47 at 8.)

These allegations are vague, circuitous, and make passing references to unexplained

facts that, although apparently essential to the nature of the claim, are nevertheless left

ambiguous. As explained above, under Rule 9, civil conspiracy claims (and fraud claims,

which Mr. Ball also seems to be alleging) must be pled with particularity, and a plaintiff

cannot simply lump together “the defendants” in asserting his claim. Mr. Ball’s allegations

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that actions were “unacceptable,” or that they violated criminal statutes, likewise do not state

legal claims. Additionally, the allegation that unspecified Defendants planned “before,

during, and after” a meeting is not pleading with particularity. The Court also notes that in

this count Mr. Ball again purports to bring a claim on behalf of the trust (indeed, that seems

to be the essence of Mr. Ball’s claim). As discussed, this is improper because Mr. Ball is

unrepresented. In sum, it is unclear what the precise injury to Mr. Ball was, which of

Defendants caused that injury, and how Mr. Ball can state a claim for relief. Count one

therefore does not raise the right to relief above the speculative level or give Defendants fair

notice of what Mr. Ball’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. See Twombly, 550

U.S. at 555.

4. Count Two

Count two purports to bring claims for “fraud, embezzlement, collusion, conversion,

& diversion of funds,” ostensibly under state law. (Dkt. # 47 at 9.) Mr. Ball suggests that

an audit of the trust took place, from which he concludes that “the defendants” fraudulently

took funds from the trust. (See id.) Mr. Ball alleges that they did so by “collaborating

amongst themselves” in some unspecified way to “use[] the Maricopa County Superior Court

as a legal shield to protect themselves from any and all accountability and prosecution by the

Arizona Appellate and Supreme Courts.” (Id. at 9-10.) The only specific fact in this section

is the statement that, on September 19, 2004, “defendants” transferred money from a bank

without his approval. (Id. at 10.) Mr. Ball then goes on to state that he has not “been given

an evidentiary hearing or ‘due process,’” although the import of these statements is unclear.

Like count one, count two fails to state a claim under the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. It is impossible to determine which of Defendants are supposed to have

committed the various torts listed in the count’s title or in what way they are supposed to

have done so. Mr. Ball’s reference to using the state courts as a “legal shield” is confusing

in the absence of any context, and it further raises the probability that Mr. Ball is attempting

to collaterally attack a state court judgment (as do the references to evidentiary hearings and

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Mr. Ball may also be attempting to refer to bankruptcy proceedings that he alleges

earlier in the Second Amended Complaint. (See Dkt. # 47 at 4.) From the case number

provided by Mr. Ball, it appears that the case was summarily dismissed for failure to pay

required fees. (See No. 2:05-BK-21529-GBN Dkt. # 120.)

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due process).6

 Again, the allegations of fraud must be pled with particularity under Rule

9(b), including a pleading of the “time, place, and specific content of the false representations

as well as the identities of the parties to the misrepresentation.” Edwards, 356 F.3d at 1066.

Count two contains none of these, other than a reference to a bank transfer arranged by

“defendants” without sufficient context from which any Defendant could be put on notice

of the nature of the claim and against which of Defendants it is asserted. In short, Mr. Ball

has not pled factual allegations sufficient to raise the right to relief above the speculative

level or to give Defendants fair notice of this claim. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

5. Count Three

Count three purports to bring a RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt

Organizations) claim, presumably under federal law, 8 U.S.C. § 1964(c), although Mr. Ball

does not so specify. Mr. Ball’s single paragraph on this issue asserts that “defendants have

participated in defrauding other unsuspecting clients” by “engag[ing] in unlawful activities

designed to profit and cause further injury to families of dysfunction and abusive behavior

by sibling rivalry, competition, arrogance or feuding.” (Dkt. # 47 at 11.)

Like the other counts, count three is improperly pled. RICO claims must be pled with

particularity. Mr. Ball’s allegation that “defendants” have violated the RICO Act is

insufficient to state a claim. See Weiszmann v. Kirkland & Ellis, 732 F. Supp. 1540, 1546

(D. Colo. 1990) (“[I]n a complaint alleging a civil RICO violation, the plaintiff must identify

specifically each person who is alleged to be liable under RICO. Merely collectivizing

defendants in an alleged pattern of racketeering activity will not suffice.”) (emphasis added).

On the substance of the RICO claim, Mr. Ball has provided nothing more than a vague and

conclusory allegation that Defendants have committed fraud somehow relating to family

disharmony. This is not sufficient to state a RICO claim. Indeed, this count is so amorphous

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and lacking in factual context that, under Twombly, it fails to state any claim. Furthermore,

the relief Mr. Ball requests is for this Court to order criminal proceedings against Defendants.

(Dkt. # 47 at 11 (“Plaintiff requests relief by ‘Grand Jury’ be convened to investigate these

claims and allegations and make recommendations to the United States Attorney’s Office For

The District of Arizona.”).) This is a civil case; the Court has no authority to provide such

remedies.

6. Count Four

Court four, titled “Legal Negligence Against [a] Vulnerable Adult” (Dkt. # 47 at 12),

is also deficient. This count states that Defendants “induced both the Guardian Southwest

Fiduciary, Inc. et al to abandon their fiduciary duty to their client and engage in a course of

tortuous [sic] conduct to injure the plaintiff and cause their clients [sic] trust and estate to be

irreparably damaged by their actions.” (Id.) It then goes on to state that Mr. Ball “has been

damaged by the defendants Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc. [sic] for their [sic] failure to protect

their client Eleanor R. Ball by the deliberate and methodic plotting to permanently injure the

plaintiff by ‘Mail & Wire Fraud.’” (Id.)

The Court presumes from the title’s reference to a “Vulnerable Adult” that Mr. Ball

is attempting to invoke the Arizona Adult Protective Services Act (“APSA”), see Ariz. Rev.

Stat. § 46-451 et seq., specifically the “Duty to an Incapacitated or Vulnerable Adult”

section, see id. § 46-456. However, such claims must be brought “by or on behalf of an

incapacitated or vulnerable adult.” Id. § 46-456(C). Mr. Ball, however, does not attempt to

assert claims on behalf of his mother or her estate. Rather, the substance of this claim seems

merely to recapitulate Mr. Ball’s belief that he has been injured in some way by someone –

although which of Defendants is unclear. Mr. Ball alleges that “the defendants” are

responsible; then he singles out Defendants Blunt, Stevens-Gobillard, and Schubert “in

particular”; he next states that Southwest Fiduciary “et al.” were “induced . . . to abandon

their fiduciary duty”; and finally he states that he was somehow damaged by “defendants

Morgan Stanley & Co” (presumably a reference to Defendant Morgan Stanley Trust

Company). (Dkt. # 47 at 12.) It is impossible to determine from the allegations in this

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7

If Mr. Ball is attempting to assert a claim for alienation of affections, such a claim

does not appear to be cognizable under Arizona law. See McNelis v. Bruce, 90 Ariz. 261,

265, 367 P.2d 625, 627 (1961) (relying on the Restatement of Torts and providing that “[t]he

gist of an action for alienation of affections is founded upon facts which support an injured

spouse’s claim that there has been an unprivileged, intentional interference with the legally

protected marital rights of the aggrieved spouse”) (emphases added); Restatement (Second)

of Torts §§ 699, 702A (1977) (providing that there is no cause of action for alienation of

affections between parents and children).

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section which specific parties are the subject of the claim and the basis on which they could

be responsible to Mr. Ball. Mr. Ball’s invocation of mail and wire fraud is likewise

inexplicable in this context. No Defendant could be expected to be put on notice of the

nature of this claim from the way Mr. Ball has pled it. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

Moreover, Mr. Ball states that he has made “repeated attempts . . . to request Court Action

by the Arizona State Court Commissioners and Judges” but was “overruled and denied on

every count[,] including the current matters brought to this honorable court.” (Dkt. # 47 at

12 (emphasis added).) As explained, Mr. Ball may not pursue his claim in this Court if that

is the case. Rather, he must pursue the issue through the state appellate courts.

7. Count Five

Count five, which is essentially only one sentence in length, is entitled “Contributory

Negligence Against [a] Vulnerable Adult.” (Dkt. # 47 at 13.) It is impossible to determine

from Mr. Ball’s single sentence on the subject precisely what legal right he is attempting to

vindicate, whether it is on behalf of himself or his mother’s estate, and which of Defendants

are supposed to have violated that right. The count’s title suggests an APSA claim, although

Mr. Ball also states that Defendants “contribute[d] to the alienation of affection of [his]

mother.” (Id.) Whichever (if either) is the case, and if such claims are cognizable under

Arizona law,7

 the Court is still unable to determine whether Mr. Ball is attempting to assert

a claim on his own behalf or on behalf of his mother’s estate. Further, Mr. Ball lists as

involved “Encore Senior [Village]”; “Arizona et al.”; the “City of Peoria”; and “Arizona and

City of Peoria Police Department et al.” (Id.) It is unclear to which parties, if any, the “et

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al.” references are meant to refer. It is likewise unclear how any of Defendants are supposed

to have committed any wrong, as there is absolutely no factual context provided by Mr. Ball.

In sum, no Defendant can be expected to have been put on fair notice of the nature of Mr.

Ball’s claim from the pleading of this count. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

IV. Leave to Amend

For the reasons explained above, Mr. Ball’s Second Amended Complaint falls far

short of the pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and fails to

conform to the Court’s Orders. The Court is not compelled to grant Mr. Ball leave to amend

if an amendment would be futile. Bonanno v. Thomas, 309 F.2d 320, 322 (9thCir. 1962).

Although it is unclear whether Mr. Ball can cure the deficiencies of the Second Amended

Complaint, in deference to Mr. Ball’s unrepresented status, and out of an abundance of

caution, the Court will give Mr. Ball ONE more opportunity to file a proper complaint, if in

fact he has claims that can be brought before this Court. If Mr. Ball fails to timely file a

Third Amended Complaint that complies with the dictates of this Order, the Court WILL

dismiss this case with prejudice.

In filing a Third Amended Complaint, Mr. Ball is specifically directed to take note

that:

(1) He cannot represent the trust or his mother’s estate in this

matter, as he is not an attorney licensed to appear in this District.

Mr. Ball has represented to the Court that he does not intend to

bring any claims on behalf of the trust. Given that

representation, Mr. Ball should not assert any claims on behalf

of the trust in the Third Amended Complaint.

(2) This is a civil case. Mr. Ball cannot bring claims pursuant

to criminal statutes unless they authorize civil suits, nor should

Mr. Ball bring claims requesting that this Court pursue criminal

action against any of Defendants.

(3) Mr. Ball must plead any fraud, civil conspiracy, and RICO

claims with particularity. He must also plead sufficient facts on

all of his claims to raise the possibility of relief above the

speculative level. This requires a sufficient factual context from

which each specific Defendant can reasonably be expected to be

put on notice of the nature of Mr. Ball’s claims against that

Defendant. It also requires factual allegations that are

comprehensible and do not presuppose Mr. Ball’s own

knowledge or beliefs.

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8

The Court will withhold judgment on Defendants’ request for sanctions under Rule

11 pending submission of Mr. Ball’s Third Amended Complaint. So that Mr. Ball is aware

of his obligations, the Court notes that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b) provides:

By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other

paper . . . an attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to the

best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed

after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances:

(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose,

such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly

increase the cost of litigation; 

(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are

warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for

extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for

establishing new law; 

(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if

specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support

after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or

discovery; and 

(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the

evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on

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(4) A complaint is simply a means of informing the Court and

Defendants of what specific claims Mr. Ball is asserting and, to

the extent necessary, the factual background for those claims.

Mr. Ball should therefore not include any ad hominem asides

attacking Defendants. Mr. Ball also need not employ

exclamation points or quotation marks (other than to enclose an

actual quotation) in pleading his claims.

(5) Each legal claim Mr. Ball brings should be asserted in its

own separate count of the Third Amended Complaint. Each

count should contain a citation to or explanation of the legal

right on which the claim is based, and Mr. Ball must not seek

relief under any statute or legal theory that does not authorize

such relief. The Court directs Mr. Ball to carefully consider the

legal assessments provided in this Order in crafting any further

pleadings. Specifically, Mr. Ball must not assert any claims he

has or could have brought in the state court proceedings.

Mr. Ball must also keep in mind that, like an attorney, he is subject to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 11.8

 If Mr. Ball cannot, in good faith, advance any or all of the claims he

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belief or a lack of information.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c) further provides that if a court concludes that a party

has violated Rule 11(b), the court may impose sanctions “to deter repetition of the conduct

or comparable conduct by others similarly situated.”

9

A list of lawyer referral services and legal services organizations is available on the

District’s internet page, http://www.azd.uscourts.gov, under “Self-Help Tools” and “Filing

on Your Own Behalf.” This list may also be obtained by visiting or calling the Clerk’s

office, with which Mr. Ball is already familiar.

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asserted in the Second Amended Complaint (for instance, if the statute or legal theory on

which they are based provides no remedy or if they are claims that have already been

litigated in state court), then Mr. Ball must not assert them in the Third Amended Complaint.

If he does so, he may be subject to sanctions, including monetary sanctions, pursuant to Rule

11.

This Court is permitted to recommend that Mr. Ball retain an attorney. See, e.g.,

Cunningham v. Ridge, 258 F. App’x 221, 223 (10th Cir. 2007) (“The magistrate judge wisely

recommended Cunningham retain a lawyer to assist with the procedural requirements . . . .”);

Kim v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, No. 1:06-CV-683, 2007 WL 844871, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Mar.

16, 2007) (“The court strongly recommends that plaintiff retain a competent attorney to

represent him in this matter.”). Because it appears from the pleadings on file that Mr. Ball

may not fully appreciate the nature of his claims, the requirements of the procedural rules,

and how the two interact, the Court strongly recommends that Mr. Ball retain an attorney to

represent him in this matter.9

However, the Court also wishes to make it very clear to Mr. Ball that he has had

ample time to either retain an attorney or to craft a proper complaint on his own in this

matter. Thus, the Court is disinclined to grant Mr. Ball any additional extensions of time,

and will not do so absent a showing of good cause. If Mr. Ball wishes to file a Third

Amended Complaint or to retain an attorney to do so for him, he should act promptly on this

matter so that he does not miss the filing deadline.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons:

IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss of Defendants Southwest Fiduciary,

Gregory P. Dovico, Peggy Ann Dovico, and Anna Dovico (CV-09-0122 Dkt. # 27) is

GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mr. Ball’s Motion to Deny Joinder (Dkt. # 48)

is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mr. Ball’s Motion for Leave to Amend (Dkt. #

46) is DENIED AS MOOT.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all future case filings in this matter shall utilize

this amended caption: In re Dennis Andrew Ball, personally and as Beneficiary of the

Eleanor R. Ball IrreLvg Trust 05/10/01.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Mr. Ball shall have until June 22, 2009 in which

to file a Third Amended Complaint that conforms to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

the District’s Local Rules, and the dictates of the Court’s Orders.

IT IS FURTHER ORDER that if Mr. Ball does not comply with this Order, the

Clerk of the Court is directed to dismiss this action without further notice.

DATED this 21st day of May, 2009.

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