Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_05-cv-03088/USCOURTS-azd-3_05-cv-03088-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Daniel J. DeRienzo, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Yavapai County, Yavapai County Board

of Supervisors, Chip Davis and Lorna

Street,

Defendants. _________________________________

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Case No. CIV 05-3088-PCT-SMM

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Daniel J. DeRienzo’s Motion for Relief from

Order filed pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Dkt. 18). The

parties have presented their arguments, and the motion is now ripe for determination.

BACKGROUND

On October 4, 2005, Daniel J. DeRienzo (Plaintiff) filed a Complaint alleging inter

alia that Yavapai County, Yavapai County Board of Supervisors, Chip Davis, and Lorna

Street (Defendants) violated his civil rights. (Dkt. 1). On December 5, 2005, Defendants,

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP), filed a Motion to

Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint for failure to state a claim. (Dkt. 7). After a series of events

that included an extension to respond to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, this Court dismissed,

without prejudice, Plaintiff's Complaint on July 10, 2006, pursuant to Rule 8 FRCP. (Dkt.

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8-14). Additionally, the Court granted Plaintiff until August 11, 2006, to file an Amended

Complaint. (Dkt. 14). Plaintiff did not comply with the Court's Order, and on October 23,

2006, this Court dismissed Plaintiff's Complaint with prejudice, according to Rule 41(b)

FRCP. (Dkt. 16). Thereafter, on November 3, 2006, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Relief from

Order pursuant to Rule 60(b). (Dkt. 18). Defendants then filed a Response on November

20, 2006, and Plaintiff filed a Reply to Defendant's Response on November 28, 2006. (Dkt.

19-20). Plaintiff's motion is now ripe for disposition by this Court.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Rule 60(b) permits reconsideration of a district court order based on: (1) mistake,

inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly-discovered evidence which by due

diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59; (3)

fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct by an adverse party;(4) circumstances under which

a judgment is void; (5) circumstances under which a judgment has been satisfied, released,

or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been has been reversed or

otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective

application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) - (b)(6). 

According to Ninth Circuit authority, reconsideration under FRCP 60 is generally

appropriate in three instances: (1) when there has been an intervening change of controlling

law; (2) when new evidence has come to light; or (3) when necessary to correct a clear error

or prevent manifest injustice. School District No. 1J v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262 (9th

Cir. 1993). Motions for relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) are within the sound

discretion of the district court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. SEC

v. Coldicutt, 258 F.3d 939, 941 (9th Cir. 2001). A Rule 60(b) motion must be brought within

a "reasonable" time, which cannot exceed more than one year if the motion is based on

mistake, newly-discovered evidence, or fraud. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). 

DISCUSSION

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Plaintiff is seeking relief from this Court's final judgment on the grounds that a staff

member employed by his attorney did not file an amended complaint as ordered by the Court.

(Dkt. 18). In support of his argument, Plaintiff focuses on Rule 60(b), sections (1) and (6),

and the factors set forth by the Ninth Circuit in Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier. Id. For the reasons

outlined in the following sections, Plaintiff's motion is DENIED. 

Rule 60(b)(1)

Rule 60(b)(1) provides that, "the court may relieve a party or a party's legal

representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for . . . mistake, inadvertence,

surprise or excusable neglect." In this case, Plaintiff asserts that a "reliable" staff member

employed by his attorney failed to file Plaintiff's Amended Complaint by the Court ordered

date of August 11, 2006. (Dkt. 18). Plaintiff further alleges that this employee ceased

working, moved to Washington, and did not notify anyone in the office that she failed to file

the Amended Complaint. Id. Subsequent to the dismissal under Rule 41(b) FRCP, Plaintiff

moved for relief from the judgment stating, "the facts giving rise to the untimely filed

amended complaint evidence excusable neglect." Id. However, as a general rule, "parties are

bound by the actions of their lawyers, and alleged attorney malpractice does not usually

provide a basis to set aside a judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1)." Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co.

v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd., 507 U.S. 380, 397 (1993). Further, parties are to be held

responsible for the acts and omissions of their chosen counsel and "attorney error is

insufficient grounds for relief under . . . Rule 60(b)(1)." Allmerica Fin. Life Ins. & Annuity

Co. v. Llewellyn, 139 F.3d 664, 666 (9th Cir. 1997). According to the Ninth Circuit, an

attorney's failure to follow court procedures and rules does not constitute excusable neglect

under Rule 60(b). Engelson v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co., 972 F.2d 1038, 1043 (9th

Cir. 1992); See also Smith v. Stone, 308 F.2d 15, 18 (9th Cir. 1962). Furthermore, carelessness

and ignorance on the part of the litigant or his attorney are not the type of excusable neglect

contemplated by Rule 60(b). Id. Here, Plaintiff should not be granted relief from the Court's

judgment simply because a staff member employed by his attorney failed to file an amended

complaint before the expiration of the Court ordered deadline. It is clear from Ninth Circuit

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precedent that the conduct of Plaintiff's attorney is not the type contemplated under Rule

60(b)(1). Plaintiff should be held accountable for his own actions and for the actions of his

chosen counsel and this includes innocent, albeit careless or negligent attorney mistakes.

United States v. Prairie Pharmacy, Inc., 921 F.2d 211, 214 (9th Cir. 1990). The Court finds

that the attorney's actions, as well as those of the staff member, amount to carelessness and

ignorance, not excusable neglect. See Engelson v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co., 972

F.2d at 1038. Therefore, Plaintiff will not be granted relief from judgment under FRCP Rule

60(b)(1). Id. 

Rule 60(b)(6)

Alternatively, Plaintiff requests the Court grant relief from judgment pursuant to Rule

60(b)(6), which provides, "the court may relieve a party or a party's legal representative from

a final judgment, order, or proceeding, for . . . any other reason . . . justifying relief from the

operation of the judgment." The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly stated that Rule 60(b)(6) should

be used "sparingly as an equitable remedy to prevent manifest injustice and is to be utilized

where extraordinary circumstances prevented a party from taking timely action to prevent or

correct an erroneous judgment." United States v. Washington, 394 F.3d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir.

2005); See also United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 984 F.2d 1047, 1049 (9th Cir.

1993); Latshaw v. Trainer Wortham & Co., Inc., 452 F.3d 1097, 1103-1104 (9th Cir. 2006).

Plaintiff alleges that his lawyer's lengthy recuperation and staff changes nonetheless

demonstrate "extraordinary circumstances." (Dkt. 18). According to the Ninth Circuit, an

attorney's conduct may amount to extraordinary circumstances if he acts in a way that is

deemed grossly negligent. Community Dental Services v. Tani, 282 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir.

2002). Further, a party may be entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(6) where personal problems

of counsel cause an attorney to grossly neglect a diligent client's case and deliberately mislead

the client. Id. (citations omitted). After careful consideration, the Court finds that such

circumstances are not present in the case at hand. In fact, Plaintiff does not allege any form

of gross negligence. To the contrary, Plaintiff states that his attorney hired two additional

attorneys to help manage his caseload while he was in recovery. (Dkt. 18). Morever, the

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alleged senior staff member who failed to file the amended complaint was described as

"reliable" and "never failing." Id. This evidence does not show that Plaintiff's attorney

"virtually abandoned his client by engaging in inexcusable and inexplicable acts". See

Community Dental Services v. Tani, 282 F.3d at 1169. Rather, this case falls under the

category of "ordinary negligence or neglect," which is chargeable to the client as well as his

counsel. Id. at 1170. (Gross negligence may not be attributable to client whereas ordinary

neglect is). The aforementioned facts show that Plaintiff's counsel was not grossly negligent,

therefore, the Motion for Relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is denied.

Yourish Factors

Under Ninth Circuit precedent, the district court must consider the following factors

in deciding whether to dismiss an action for failure to comply with a court order: (1) the

public's interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court's need to manage its

docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition

of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. Yourish v. Cal.

Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 1999). A court may dismiss an action where at least

four factors support dismissal or where at least three factors "strongly support dismissal." Id.

It is not required that the district court make explicit findings in order to show that it has

considered these factors. Id. 

The first factor is not in controversy as "the public's interest in expeditious resolution

of litigation always favors dismissal." Id. The second factor also greatly weighs in favor of

dismissal because Plaintiff's failure to amend has "caused the action to come to a complete

halt, thereby allowing Plaintiff[] to control the pace of the docket rather than the Court." Id.

Plaintiff has conceded that factors one and two weigh in favor of dismissal, therefore, these

factors do not merit further discussion. (Dkt. 18). Additionally, the Court recognizes that

the fourth factor weighs against dismissal, and therefore, this factor need not be addressed.

(Dkt. 14). 

Regarding the third factor, Plaintiff claims that Defendants would not be prejudiced

by this Court's granting relief from judgment because any delay in furthering litigation would

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only be "slight." Id. However, the risk of prejudice is not always judged by the effect of the

Court's decision. See Yourish v. Cal Amplifier, 191 F.3d at 991. Rather, "the risk of prejudice

to the defendant is related to the plaintiff's reason for defaulting in failing to timely amend."

Id. (emphasis added) Whether prejudice is sufficient to support an order of dismissal is in

part judged by plaintiff's excuse for the default. Malone v. U.S. Postal Service, 833 F.2d 128,

131 (9th Cir. 1987). In this case, Plaintiff's excuse for default was "very poor." See Yourish

v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d at 992. Plaintiff claims that the staff member neglected to file an

amended complaint even though this unidentified employee "never failed." (Dkt. 18).

Further, Plaintiff claims that Defendants have not been prejudiced because had Plaintiff filed

a timely amended complaint, or had he moved for and been granted enlarged time to file it,

Defendants would still be in litigation. Id. While Defendants should expect limited delays

from the pendency of the lawsuit, they should not be expected to endure "unreasonable

delays" from an opposing party's failure to obey court orders. See Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier,

191 F.3d at 992. Here, Plaintiff did not move to for enlarged time, nor did he file the

amended complaint as ordered by the Court. Plaintiff's only excuse for not following the

Court's Order is that an ordinarily reliable staff member failed to file the amended complaint.

Moreover, Plaintiff's Counsel has failed to demonstrate that he had procedures in place to

back-up the staff member or review the matter personally. After careful consideration, the

Court finds that the excuse for Plaintiff's delay is not a "realit[y] of the system" and therefore

unreasonable. Id. Further, the Court finds that there was sufficient prejudice to Defendants

in the form of a delay in litigation and accordingly, factor three strongly favors dismissal. Id.

In addition to the first three factors, the Court finds that the fifth factor weighs in favor

of dismissal. (Dkt. 14). Plaintiff argues that the record does not show that the court

entertained an alternative to dismissal. However, the Court specifically stated, "no other

alternative would compel Plaintiff to participate in the litigation." (Dkt. 14). Further, the

Court is not required to make an explicit finding regarding this factor. See Yourish v. Cal.

Amplifier, 191 F.3d at 990. Hence, this Court affirms its earlier finding that the fifth factor

also favors dismissal of Plaintiff's case. 

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In sum, four of the five factors weigh in favor of dismissal. Additionally, factors one,

two, and three "strongly" favor dismissal. Accordingly, this Court again finds that the interest

in efficient resolution of cases, the need to manage its docket, the apparent prejudice to

Defendants, and the lack of less drastic and appropriate alternatives outweigh the policy of

deciding this case upon its merits. Id. Thus, the Court finds no merit in Plaintiff's argument

that the Yourish factors support his argument that he is entitled to relief from judgment

according to Rule 60(b) FRCP. 

Conclusion

Accordingly, 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Relief from Order (Dkt.

18) is DENIED. 

DATED this 29th day of June, 2007.

 

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