Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-01563/USCOURTS-caed-2_02-cv-01563-16/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARK WAYNE SPRINKLE,

NO. CIV. S-02-1563 LKK/EFB P

Plaintiff,

v. O R D E R

ROBINSON and PIERCE,

Defendants.

 /

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis against the defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The

plaintiff’s complaint alleged that the defendants denied him access

to the courts by refusing to photocopy documents that he wished to

attach to his habeas corpus petition in state court. On August 20,

2007, the Magistrate Judge recommended that the plaintiff’s motion

for summary judgment on the issue of liability be granted and

defendants’ motion for summary judgment be denied. The court

adopted the recommendations. 

The Magistrate Judge subsequently ordered the parties to brief

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the issue of how damages should be determined and, specifically,

whether the issue of damages could be resolved on cross motions for

summary judgment. Based upon this briefing, on February 12, 2008,

the Magistrate Judge concluded that damages could not be resolved

based on cross motions for summary judgment and set the matter for

pretrial conference. Defendants moved the court for reconsideration

of the Magistrate Judge’s order, which was denied.

Pending before the court is the defendants’ motion for

certification for interlocutory appeal and a stay of all

proceedings in this action. The court denies the motion. 1

II. STANDARD

A district judge may certify an order for interlocutory appeal

if: (1) the order presents a controlling question of law, (2) there

is substantial ground for a difference of opinion on that

controlling question, and (3) an immediate appeal will materially

advance the litigation. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b); see also In re. Cement

Antitrust Litigation, 673 F.2d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 1982). 

III. ANALYSIS

Here, the defendants appear to seek certification to appeal

the Magistrate Judge’s February 12, 2008 order, specifically the

holding that the plaintiff may seek damages for mental and

emotional distress for his claim. The court agrees that this

presents a controlling question of law, as it could materially

affect the outcome of the litigation by defining what damages are

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recoverable as a matter of law. See In re. Cement, 673 F.2d at

1026.

Nevertheless, the defendants have not shown that there is

“substantial ground for difference of opinion” on the question of

law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). As the court explained in its denial

of the motion for reconsideration, the Magistrate Judge applied

clear Ninth Circuit precedent in holding that the plaintiff,

because his claim alleged violations of his First Amendment rights,

could seek damages for emotional and mental distress. This was the

plain and straightforward holding of Canell v. Lightner, 143 F.2d

1210 (9th Cir. 1998), which has been confirmed, albeit in dicta,

in a subsequent case. See Phillips v. Hust, 477 F.3d 1070, 1082 n.

6 (9th Cir. 2007). Where there position of the Circuit court has

been unequivocal, there is no substantial ground for difference of

opinion meriting interlocutory review. See, e.g., Transport Workers

of America, Local 100 v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 358 F. Supp. 2d

347 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Salim Oleochemicals, Inc. v. M/V SHROPSHIRE,

177 F. Supp. 2d 159 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Brown v. Mesirow Stein Real

Estate, Inc., 7 F. Supp. 2d 1004 (N.D. Ill. 1998); Johnson v.

Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 773 F. Supp. 449 (D.D.C.

1991); see also In re. Flor, 79 F.3d 281 (2d Cir. 1996) (that an

issue was one of first impression did not create a substantial

ground for difference of opinion meeting section 1292's standard).

Mere disagreement with the court’s ruling does not suffice. See

Kern-Tulare Water Dist. v. Bakersfield, 634 F.Supp. 656, 667 (E.D.

Cal. 1986), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 828

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F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1015(1988).

Because the court holds that the defendants have not shown

that there is a substantial grounds for a difference of opinion on

a controlling question of law, it need not consider whether the

appeal would materially advance the litigation.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, defendants’ motion for certification for

interlocutory appeal and to stay the proceedings is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 2, 2008.

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