Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-03145/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-03145-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Breach of Contract

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1

 Plaintiff’s claims for intentional infliction of emotional

distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and wrongful

termination were dismissed with prejudice on October 10, 2006, and

January 8, 2007, pursuant to the stipulation of the parties. See

Docket No. 41. Plaintiff originally named American Express Company,

the Chubb Corporation, and the Federal Insurance Company as defendants

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

REBECCA OBUCHOWSKI, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIV 05-03145 PHX MEA

)

SPRAYLAT CORPORATION, ) MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

)

Defendant. )

_____________________________ )

All of the parties have consented to the exercise of

magistrate judge jurisdiction over this case, including the

entry of final judgment. Before the Court is Defendant’s motion

for summary judgment [Docket No. 65].

I Procedural Background

Plaintiff filed a suit against Defendant on April 22,

2005, alleging Defendant wrongfully denied her employment

benefits and that Defendant wrongfully terminated Plaintiff’s

employment. Plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that Defendant was

liable to Plaintiff for breach of contract and pursuant to her

detrimental reliance on a promise made by Defendant.1 A

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in this matter. Those defendants were dismissed without being served

by notice of dismissal. See Docket No. 19. 

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scheduling order was issued September 12, 2006. The parties

engaged in discovery and on July 5, 2007, Defendant filed a

motion for judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiff filed a

response to the motion on July 13, 2007, and Defendant filed a

reply to the response on July 27, 2007. The Court concludes

oral argument regarding Defendant’s motion is not necessary to

the expedient resolution of the motion. 

II Standard for granting judgment as a matter of law

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

provides that judgment shall be entered if the pleadings,

depositions, affidavits, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file show that there is no genuine dispute

regarding the material facts of the case and the moving party is

entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2509-10

(1986). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial

burden of informing the Court of the basis for its motion, and

identifying those portions of the record which it believes

demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact.

See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct.

2548, 2553 (1986).

The party opposing the motion may not rest upon the

mere allegations or denials of their pleadings, but instead must

produce some significant, probative evidence tending to

contradict the moving party’s allegations, thereby creating a

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genuine question of fact for resolution at trial. Anderson, 477

U.S. at 248, 256-57; 106 S. Ct. at 2510, 2513-14.

For purposes of deciding a motion for summary

judgment, “genuine” means that the evidence

about the fact is such that a reasonable jury

could resolve the point in favor of the

non-moving party, and “material” means that

the fact is one that might affect the outcome

of the suit under the governing law. 

United States v. One Parcel of Real Prop. with Bldgs., 960 F.2d

200, 204 (1st Cir. 1992). A fact is material if it could affect

the outcome of the suit under the governing substantive law.

See, e.g., Miller v. Glenn Miller Prod., Inc., 454 F.3d 975, 987

(9th Cir. 2006). When the Court’s jurisdiction is premised on

the diversity of the parties, the Court applies the substantive

law of the State of Arizona. See, e.g., Stilwell v. Smith &

Nephew, Inc., 482 F.3d 1187, 1193-94 (9th Cir. 2007); Medical

Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. American Broad. Cos., Inc., 306 F.3d

806, 812 (9th Cir. 2002).

A principal purpose of summary judgment is “to isolate

and dispose of factually unsupported claims.” Celotex, 477 U.S.

at 323-24, 106 S. Ct. at 2553. Summary judgment is appropriate

against a party who “fails to make a showing sufficient to

establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s

case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at

trial.” Id., 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S. Ct. at 2552; see also

Citadel Holding Corp. v. Roven, 26 F.3d 960, 964 (9th Cir.

1994). When determining if a plaintiff has met her burden of

producing evidence regarding an element on which she will bear

the burden of proof at trial, the Court may only consider

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evidence which would be admissible at trial. See, e.g., Ballen

v. City of Redmond, 466 F. 3d 736, 745 (9th Cir. 2006); Orr v.

Bank of Amer., NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002).

Additionally, the evidence presented in opposition to a motion

for summary judgment must be probative and properly supported.

See Zoslaw v. MCA Distrib. Corp., 693 F.2d 870, 883 (9th Cir.

1982). 

Because Plaintiff bears the burden of proof at trial,

Defendant has no burden to negate Plaintiff’s claims to prevail

on a motion for summary judgment. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323,

106 S. Ct. at 2552- 53. A defendant moving for summary judgment

does not have the burden to produce any evidence showing the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 325, 106 S.

Ct. at 2553-54. Instead, the defendant’s burden, as the party

seeking summary judgment, may be discharged by showing that

there is an absence of evidence to support the elements of

plaintiff’s claims. See id. “The mere existence of a scintilla

of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position will be

insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could

reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252,

106 S. Ct. at 2512. 

 The Court must consider a party’s motion for summary

judgment construing all alleged facts with all reasonable

inferences favoring the nonmoving party. See e.g., Genzler v.

Longanbach, 410 F.3d 630, 636 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S.

Ct. 749 (2005). In considering a motion for summary judgment,

the Court must regard as true the non-moving party’s evidence if

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it is supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material.

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S. Ct. at 2548; Eisenberg v.

Insurance Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1289 (9th Cir. 1987). 

III Statement of facts

Plaintiff filed a pleading in opposition to Defendant’s

motion for summary judgment and, in this pleading, referenced a

separately filed statement of facts. However, no separate

statement of facts appears in the civil docket in this matter.

Accordingly, Plaintiff has not, as a matter of law, contradicted

any factual statement made by Defendant, nor has Plaintiff

asserted any additional fact in a manner admissible for purposes

of summary judgment. Rule 56.1(a) of the Local Rules of Civil

Procedure of the United States District Court for the District

of Arizona provides that a pleading in opposition to a motion

for summary judgment must include a separate statement of facts.

The failure to file a separate statement of facts results in the

facts asserted by the moving party being deemed admitted. See

Hagelin for President Comm. of Kan. v. Graves, 25 F.3d 956, 959

(10th Cir. 1994); Anchorage Assocs. v. Virgin Islands Bd. of Tax

Review, 922 F.2d 168, 175-76 (3d Cir. 1990); Jaroma v. Massey,

873 F.2d 17, 20, 21 (1st Cir. 1989).

Plaintiff was employed by Defendant from March of 2001

through July 1, 2004. Docket No. 66 (Defendant’s Statement of

Facts) at 2. Plaintiff traveled from Phoenix to Arkansas on

business for Defendant on April 24, 2003. Id. at 3. Upon her

arrival in Arkansas, Plaintiff rented a vehicle using her

business credit card. Id. Plaintiff was in a car accident

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involving the rental car shortly after renting the vehicle. Id.

The other driver was at fault in the accident. Id., Exh. A.

Plaintiff was treated at a medical center in Arkansas

immediately after the accident. Id.

Plaintiff’s medical expenses regarding the accident

were paid by Defendant’s workers’ compensation insurance. Id.

at 4 & Exh. A at 48. Some of Plaintiff’s medical expenses were

covered by her personal health insurance. Id., Exh. A at 48.

Plaintiff’s personal car insurance paid Plaintiff $100,000 upon

her claim regarding the Arkansas accident. Id. at 4 & Exh. A at

49. The driver of the other vehicle’s liability insurance also

paid Plaintiff $100,000 upon her claim regarding the Arkansas

accident. Id. at 4 & Exh. A at 49. 

Plaintiff ceased working for Defendant on or about July

1, 2004. Id., Exh. A. Plaintiff stated in her deposition that,

in 2004, she paid less than $10,000 in uncovered medical

expenses arising from the accident. Id., Exh. A. Plaintiff did

not seek to collect on a claim based on Defendant’s travel

insurance coverage until April 22, 2005, almost exactly two

years after the accident, when she filed a claim in the Maricopa

County Superior Court. Id. at 4 & Exh. A at 43. Plaintiff

stated in her deposition that she did not file a claim regarding

the insurance policy while she was still employed by Defendant

because “There was still ongoing care that I was receiving for

the accident...” Id., Exh. A. 

When Plaintiff began working for Defendant in 2001,

Plaintiff received a copy of Defendant’s “Travel and

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Entertainment Policy,” which was dated June 26, 1998. Id. The

policy states:

Rental Car Insurance

Under the terms of Spraylat’s corporate card

program with American Express, the following

benefits are available:

$200,000 Business Travel Accident Insurance

– This automatically protects card members

every time they use the Corporate Card to

charge a business trip on a common carrier.

Coverage is for the entire trip from the

moment you leave your home or office to the

moment you return up to 30 days. ...

Additional Travel Insurance

Expenses for additional travel insurance

coverage will not be reimbursed by the

company.

Id., Exh. B. 

Plaintiff received a revised corporate travel policy on

March 3, 2004. Id., Exh. A. The revised policy is

substantially similar to the policy quoted supra, and Plaintiff

averred in her deposition that she acted in reliance on the

policy as quoted. Id. at 2-3.

Plaintiff did not request an explanation regarding the

terms of the travel policy during her employment, prior to the

accident in Arkansas. Id., Exh. A at 59. Plaintiff asserts she

understood the policy to mean that she was entitled to a benefit

of $200,000 based on Defendant’s travel insurance policy

regarding the Arkansas car accident, based on the language

“accident insurance coverage for the entire trip.” Id., Exh. A

at 59-61. 

Plaintiff asserts she is entitled to collect at least

$200,000 from Defendant based on the insurance policy and that

the money will be needed for future medical care for injuries

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2

 In response to Defendant’s interrogatory, Plaintiff stated she

was seeking 

actual damages based upon, but not limited to, the following:

 ...

Plaintiff is entitled to payment from Defendant Spraylat,

for the business travel accident insurance benefit.

Plaintiff believes this amount is $200,000 to $300,000,

based upon the information contained within Defendant

Spraylat’s business travel policy information ...

Docket No. 66, Exh. F. Plaintiff averred: “The travel accident policy

provides a fixed dollar amount and no calculation is required.” Id., Exh. F.

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sustained in the accident. Id., Exh. A. Plaintiff stated in

her deposition that she has permanent injuries as a result of

the accident. Id., Exh. A. Plaintiff also averred in her

deposition that she has not “paid out” $200,000 to medical

providers for care required as a result of injuries sustained in

the accident. Id., Exh. A.2 

IV Discussion

Defendant asserts they are entitled to judgment as a

matter of law because there is no genuinely disputed factual

issue for trial. Additionally, Defendant alleges Plaintiff has

not presented a prima facie case of breach of contract or

detrimental reliance. Defendant also argues Plaintiff’s breach

of contract claim should be dismissed because Plaintiff did not

comply with the relevant statute of limitations for filing suit

this claim. 

Plaintiff asserts summary judgment is not warranted

because Defendant did promise to pay Plaintiff an employment

benefit, i.e., “a $200,000 business travel accident insurance

policy.” Docket No. 68 at 2. Plaintiff argues “a jury could

determine that when Plaintiff charged an airline flight for a

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business trip on her corporate card on an airline that is a

common carrier, the business travel accident insurance benefit

begins at the moment that Plaintiff left her home or office ...

and the coverage remains in effect until she returns home...”

Id. at 2. Plaintiff contends the statements in the employee

policy manual were a promise, and that this determination is a

question of fact for a jury. Id. at 3. 

Plaintiff further argues that her reasonable reliance

on the travel insurance benefit in the manual was foreseeable

and intended by Defendant. Id. at 4. Plaintiff contends she

reasonably construed the statement in the policy manual as a

promise of “additional travel accident insurance,” and that, for

that reason, Plaintiff did not purchase additional travel

accident coverage. Id. at 5. Additionally, Plaintiff contends

she suffered a detriment after relying on the promise, i.e.,

“Plaintiff’s reliance on the promise of business travel accident

insurance precluded her from purchasing similar coverage that

would have provided her with a like benefit amount.” Id. at 5-

6. Plaintiff makes no argument in her pleading in opposition to

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment with regard to

Defendant’s assertion that her breach of contract claim is

barred by the applicable statute of limitations. 

Arizona statutes provide for a one-year statute of

limitations for claims arising from an alleged breach of a

written contract. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-541(3) (2003

& Supp. 2006). Plaintiff offers no response to Defendant’s

argument that her breach of contract claim is barred by the

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3

 Additionally, it is axiomatic that, pursuant to Arizona law,

an employee handbooks does not per se comprise a contract between the

employer and employee. See Taylor v. Graham County Chamber of

Commerce, 201 Ariz. 184, 194, 33 P.3d 518, 528 (Ct. App. 2001),

compare Demasse v. ITT Corp., 194 Ariz. 500, 505, 984 P.2d 1138, 1143

(1999).

4

 Plaintiff’s claim based on promissory estoppel is not barred

by the applicable statute of limitations: “Ordinarily, the statutory

period for a quasi-contractual cause of action is the same as for a

cause of action based upon an oral contract... In Arizona, the statute

of limitations for indebtedness not evidenced by a written contract

is three years.” Anonymous Wife v. Anonymous Husband, 153 Ariz. 573,

578, 739 P.2d 794, 799 (Ariz. 1987).

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applicable statute of limitations. Plaintiff does not dispute

that the date of her accident was April 24, 2003, and Plaintiff

does not dispute that the statute of limitations regarding any

written contract allegedly established by the employment

policies statement is other than one year. Accordingly,

Plaintiff has provided no admissible evidence indicating a

triable issue of material fact with regard to her breach of

contract claim being barred by the statute of limitations. See

53 F.3d 1044. Therefore, Defendant is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law with regard to Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant

is liable for a breach of contract.3

Count II of Plaintiff’s complaint alleges a cause of

action pursuant to “Detrimental Reliance--Quasi-Contract”.4 The

factual predicate for Plaintiff’s claim is Defendant’s alleged

promise to Plaintiff that she had additional travel accident

coverage pursuant to the corporate American Express policy.

Plaintiff also alleges, as a matter of fact, that she acted in

reliance on this promise, i.e., that she did not purchase

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supplemental travel insurance, but instead relied upon the

“promise of coverage of the automatic Business Travel Accident

Insurance.” In the context of her contract claims, Plaintiff’s

complaint seeks general and special damages, “including medical

expenses to be proven at trial....” 

Arizona courts recognize promissory estoppel as an

alternative remedy to a breach of contract suit.

However, the remedy under this theory may be

more limited than damages for breach of

contract. “The remedy granted ... may be

limited as justice requires.” Restatement §

90(1). “In particular, relief may sometimes

be limited to restitution or to damages or

specific relief measured by the extent of the

promisee’s reliance rather than by the terms

of the promise.” Id. at comment d.

AROK Constr. Co. v. Indian Constr. Servs., 174 Ariz. 291,

299-300, 848 P.2d 870, 878-79 (Ct. App. 1993) (adopting the

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90(1)).

 To succeed on a claim based on promissory estoppel, a

plaintiff must establish that she actually relied on a promise

to her detriment and she can only prevail if she shows she had

a “‘justifiable right to rely’” on the alleged promise.

Higginbottom v. Arizona, 203 Ariz. 139, 144, 51 P.3d 972, 977

(Ct. App. 2002) (stating further that “Reliance is justified

when it is reasonable, but is not justified when knowledge to

the contrary exists.”). 

In response to the facts asserted by Defendant,

Plaintiff has not set forth specific facts showing that there is

a genuine issue of fact remaining for trial regarding this

claim. Plaintiff has not made any showing regarding the

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existence of any element essential to this claim, including

actual reliance or that any reliance was reasonable. See John

C. Lincoln Hosp. & Health Corp. v. Maricopa County, 208 Ariz.

532, 537, 96 P.3d 530, 535 (Ct. App. 2004). Plaintiff has not

presented any evidence that Defendant’s alleged promise induced

her to forbear purchasing additional travel insurance.

Plaintiff has not presented a sworn statement or affidavit to

the Court that she suffered any cognizable detriment as a result

of her alleged reliance on Defendant’s alleged promise. The

record does not include an affidavit regarding the “detriment”

Plaintiff suffered as a result of her alleged reliant action,

i.e., her failure to purchase other insurance which would have

paid on a claim. Plaintiff has not established any detriment,

i.e., unpaid damages, with regard to any reliant act and,

accordingly, Plaintiff has not established that “injustice can

be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.” Restatement

(Second) of Contracts § 90(1). See Employers Reinsurance Corp.

v. GMAC Ins., 308 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1018 (D. Ariz. 2004) (“Under

Arizona law, the prejudice necessary for estoppel must be

substantial; the injury must be real and not technical or formal

in nature”).

Furthermore, it is unclear if, as a matter of state

law, Plaintiff may bring a claim based on promissory estoppel

where Plaintiff has also asserted the promise was contained in

a written contract. See Mann v. GTCR Golder Rauner, L.L.C.,

425 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1032 (D. Ariz. 2006) (“However, as the

Supreme Court of Arizona has clarified, ‘[t]here can be no

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implied contract where there is an express contract between the

parties in reference to the same subject matter.’”); Johnson

Int’l, Inc. v. City of Phoenix, 192 Ariz. 466, 474, 967 P.2d

607, 615 (Ct. App. 1998).

V Conclusion

Plaintiff did not file an affidavit under Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 56(f) stating the reasons why she could not

present facts essential to justify her opposition to summary

judgment. See Douglass v. United Auto Workers Local Union 31,

188 Fed. App. 656, 657 (10th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff makes no

response to Defendant’s argument that her breach of contract

claim is barred by the applicable statute of limitations and it

appears from the uncontested facts of record that the claim is

barred by the statute of limitations. Additionally, Plaintiff

presents no admissible evidence that she did rely, to her

substantial detriment, on Defendant’s alleged promise and,

accordingly, Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law on Plaintiff’s claim premised on promissory estoppel.

THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED THAT Defendant’s motion for

summary judgment, Docket No. 65, is GRANTED. Judgment with

prejudice shall be entered against Plaintiff and in favor of

Defendant with regard to all of the claim for relief stated in

the complaint. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall

enter judgment accordingly and terminate this case.

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DATED this 16th day of August, 2007.

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