Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01563/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01563-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 29:1132 E.R.I.S.A.-Employee Benefits

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Wayne Bryant, 

Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, 

v. 

Arizona Pipe Trades Pension Trust Fund, et 

al., 

Defendants/Counterclaimants.

No. CV-13-01563-PHX-GMS

ORDER 

 Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification. (Doc. 44.) For the 

following reasons, the Court grants this Motion in part and denies it in part. 

BACKGROUND 

 This is a putative class action on behalf of participants in the Pension Plan for the 

Arizona Pipe Trades Defined Contribution Plan brought pursuant to the Employee 

Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., to recover 

benefits that Plaintiff Bryant believes were improperly withheld and miscalculated by 

Defendants, pension plans and their respective trustees and administrators. Plaintiff 

Bryant alleges the following facts in support of his claims. 

 For a number of years, Mr. Bryant worked in the pipe trade profession subject to 

collective bargaining agreements. He is a member of the America Pipe Trades Pension 

Trust Fund (“Pension Plan”), a defined benefits plan, and the Arizona Pipe Trades 

Defined Contribution Plan (“DC Plan”) (together, the “Plans”). Pursuant to local union 

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contracts, Mr. Bryant’s employers were required to make contributions to the Plans on 

Mr. Bryant’s behalf. Like many union members, Mr. Bryant’s trade frequently required 

him to work for employers outside of his local jurisdiction, including in states such as 

Nevada and Colorado that are covered by the United Association Reciprocity Program 

for Pension Funds. To protect employees who work in multiple jurisdictions from losing 

benefits or being unable to accumulate them in one pension fund, the Reciprocity 

Program permitted the transfer of reciprocal contributions to the Plans on behalf of the 

participants working out of state. In many cases, the rates paid by out-of-state employers 

and transferred to the Plans exceeded those required to be contributed by Arizona 

employers under the Arizona collective bargaining agreements. Under the terms of the 

Reciprocity Program and the Plans, the full value of the out-of-state contributions would 

be prorated between the Plans at the current contribution rates. 

 In 2004, the Trustees of the Plans allegedly approved Amendment 11

 to the 

pension Plans, which provided that, for employees on whose behalf reciprocal 

contributions were made at rates higher than those required under the collective 

bargaining agreements, any excess over the current hourly contribution rate would be 

paid into participants’ individual accounts in the DC Plan and “credit for the full amount 

of such excess contributions shall be given to the participant.” (Doc. 1 at 4.) Thus, upon 

adoption, excess contributions received by the Pension Plan on behalf of any DC Plan 

participant would have constituted accrued benefits for those participants in the DC plan. 

Amendment 1 was made retroactive to June 1, 2002. Plaintiff alleges that the Pension 

Plan failed to make contributions to the DC Plan as required by the terms of Amendment 

1, and that the DC Plan and its administrators and trustees took no action to collect such 

contributions on behalf of the trust and deserving participants. As a result, participants on 

or after June 1, 2002 for whom excess contributions should have been made suffered 

 

1

 For reasons of clarity and brevity only, the Court refers to these actions by the Trustees as “Amendments” rather than “Memoranda of Understanding.” The Court recognizes that Defendants dispute the Plans were amended, within the meaning of ERISA, prior to “Amendment 2.” (See Doc. 47 at 4.) 

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losses to their individual accounts, and all DC Plan participants lost out on the earnings 

that would have been realized had the excess contributions been properly allocated to the 

DC Plan and invested with the other pooled assets. 

 In May of 2004, the Plans were purportedly amended again (“Amendment 2”) to 

provide that if a participant had not earned a full pension credit during a year that 

reciprocal contributions were paid on his behalf, all reciprocal contributions would be 

paid into the Pension Plan and no money would be paid into the DC Plan until after the 

participant had earned a full pension credit. As a result, excess contributions were 

withheld from the DC Plan for months longer than authorized under Amendment 1, 

without interest. Amendment 2 also permitted the Pension Fund to keep reciprocal 

contributions over and above those required to earn a full pension credit and, even where 

a full pension credit had been earned, the Pension Fund only allocated reciprocal 

contributions to the DC Plan on a percentage basis: the current contribution rate for the 

DC plan under Arizona contracts divided by the total hourly contribution to the Plans. 

Amendment 2 amended the Plans retroactively; the parties dispute whether it did so 

without notice to participants. Plaintiff contends that his and others’ future benefits were 

diminished as a result, and that the Defendants’ actions violated various provisions of the 

Plans and ERISA, and amounted to a breach of the Trustees’ fiduciary obligation. 

 Under the terms of the DC Plan, participants each had an individual account for 

accounting purposes that included the contributions made on behalf of an employee, plus 

the annual investment yield determined by the Trustees to be applicable. On December 

18, 2008, the DC Plan was amended retroactively to adopt a mid-year valuation date of 

November 30, 2008 rather than a single end-of-year valuation date as was prescribed by 

the terms of the DC Plan. Individual accounts are calculated each year based on the 

plan’s investment yield as of the valuation date. Consequently, participants’ accounts 

reflected a negative investment yield (-20.2782 percent) for the period between 

November 30, 2008 and May 31, 2009 (that would have been the year-end date), when 

the investment yield was again positive (9.2889 percent). Moreover, Defendants did not 

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add contributions received upon completion of the mid-year valuation to participants’ 

individual accounts, so the account balances of participants for whom contributions were 

paid to Defendants between June 1, 2008 and November 30, 2008 were calculated using 

the depressed investment yield rather than the year-end, positive investment income 

adjustment, and participants’ received reciprocal contributions were never credited with 

the investment gains received during that time frame. 

 On August 24, 2007, Mr. Bryant began receiving installment payments from the 

DC Plan. In January 2012, Defendants asserted that it had overpaid Mr. Bryant and 

requested that he repay the alleged overpayments at eight percent interest. In July 2013, 

Plaintiff filed in the instant action (Doc. 1, amended by Doc. 21) and now seeks class 

certification on behalf of himself and similarly situated participants in the Plans for 

violations of ERISA, for miscalculations of pension contributions in accordance with the 

terms of the Plans, resulting in a loss of entitled benefits for participants, and for breaches 

of the fiduciary duty owed to the putative plaintiff class by Defendants. (Doc. 44.) 

ANALYSIS 

I. Legal Standard 

Class certification under Rule 23 is a two-step process. First, a plaintiff must 

demonstrate that four requirements of Rule 23(a) are satisfied: numerosity, commonality, 

typicality, and adequacy of representation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Second, a plaintiff must 

establish that at least one of the bases for certification in Rule 23(b) is met. Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 23(b). The party seeking certification bears the burden of demonstrating that it has met 

all of these requirements, and “the trial court must conduct a ‘rigorous analysis’” to 

determine whether it has met that burden. Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., 253 F.3d 

1180, 1186 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227, 

1233 (9th Cir. 1996)). 

 In determining whether to certify a class action, the district court may not inquire 

into the merits of the class representatives' underlying claims. Eisen v. Carlisle & 

Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177–78 (1974). The district court is required to take the 

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substantive allegations of the complaint as true. In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings 

in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 691 F.2d 1335, 1342 (9th Cir. 1982) (internal 

citation omitted). However, the court also is required to consider the nature and range of 

proof necessary to establish the allegations in the complaint. Id. 

II. Analysis of Law 

Plaintiff proffers two classes and one sub-class for certification. Class 1 represents 

all DC plan participants who had accrued benefits on or after June 1, 2002 and their 

eligible spouses and beneficiaries. (Doc. 44 at 13; Doc. 48 at 3 n.1.) Sub-Class 1 includes 

all Class 1 members who had an account between June 1, 2002 and June 24, 2004, and 

for whom excess contributions were received by the Pension Plan on or after June 1, 

2002. (Doc. 48 at 3–4 n.1.) Class 2 comprises all participants in the DC Plan as of 

November 30, 2008 (the date specified by the mid-year valuation amendment) for whom 

contributions were received by Defendant Plans between June 1, 2008 and November 30, 

2008 and their eligible spouses and beneficiaries. (Doc 44 at 13.) 

 A. Rule 23(a)(1): Numerosity 

The first prerequisite of Rule 23 is that the class be “so numerous that joinder of 

all members is impracticable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1); see also See Jordan v. Los 

Angeles County, 669 F.2d 1311, 1319 (9th Cir. 1982) vacated on other grounds 

by County of Los Angeles v. Jordan, 459 U.S. 810 (1982) (“A proposed class of at least 

forty members presumptively satisfies the numerosity requirement.”). Here, the 

jurisdiction of the Plans extends throughout Arizona and includes participants in New 

Mexico, California, and Nevada. (Doc. 44 at 14.) Hundreds of DC Plan participants on 

whose behalf reciprocity contributions were made between June 1, 2002 and June 24, 

2004 were affected by Amendment 2. (See Docs. 51 and 52.) It stands to reason that 

putative Class 1, which includes the aforementioned DC Plan participants, is even more 

numerous. Moreover, hundreds of DC Plan participants received reciprocity contributions 

during the six month period preceding Defendants’ mid-year valuation and allegedly did 

not have those contributions credited. (Doc. 44, Ex. 4 at 4.) Defendants do not contest 

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that numerosity is satisfied as to any of the proposed classes. 

 B. Rule 23(a)(2): Commonality 

 A Rule 23 class is certifiable only if “there are questions of law or fact common to 

the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). For the purposes of Rule 23, even a single common 

question is sufficient. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2556 (2011) 

(internal quotations omitted). The common contention, however, “must be of such a 

nature that it is capable of class-wide resolution—which means that determination of its 

truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims 

in one stroke.” Id. at 2551. “What matters to class certification . . . is not the raising of 

common ‘questions'—even in droves—but rather the capacity of a class-wide proceeding 

to generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation.” Id. (internal 

citation omitted). “Dissimilarities within the proposed class are what have the potential to 

impede the generation of common answers.” Id.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ enactment of Amendment 2 violated §§ 1054(g) 

and (h) of ERISA by significantly decreasing Plan participants’ “accrued benefits” 

without adequate notice. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1054(g), (h). Plaintiff also argues that 

Defendants’ allocation of reciprocal contributions under Amendments 1 and 2 and their 

valuation of the accounts of participants who received such reciprocal benefits between 

June 1, 2008 and November 30, 2008 were contrary to the terms of the Plans and 

constituted a breach of Defendants’ fiduciary obligations to Plan participants. Plaintiff 

contends that these injuries entitle the Plaintiff classes to various injunctive and monetary 

remedies, such as the reallocation of affected reciprocal contributions as well as the 

payment of benefits wrongfully withheld. See id. § 1132(a)(1), (3). 

 With respect to Sub-Class 1—participants for whom excess contributions were 

received by the Pension Plan between June 1, 2002 and June 24, 2004— and Class 1, all 

putative class members’ right to relief under §§ 1054(g) and (h) arises out of the same 

alleged misconduct. Whether class members had accrued rights and benefits under 

Amendment 1 and whether the Trustees violated the terms of the Plans and ERISA by 

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failing to provide adequate notice prior to the adoption of Amendment 2 is a question of 

law common amongst the members of the proposed class sufficient to meet the 

requirements of Rule 23(a)(2). Similarly, the determination of whether Defendants’ 

implementation of Amendment 2 amounted to a breach of fiduciary duty would bear 

equally on each member of Class 1 and Sub-Class 1’s claims. 

 Defendants argue that some members of the proposed Class 1 were not entitled to 

notice of Amendment 2 under ERISA because they were not “participants” as defined in 

the Rules and Regulations of the Arizona Pipe Trades. (See Doc. 47 at 5–6.) However, 

the availability of a defense to the merits of some class members’ claims does not defeat 

the existence of a common question of law or fact within the meaning of Rule 23; rather, 

the defense itself may be a common question, the resolution of which would be equally 

applicable to each member of Sub-Class 1. Rule 23 does not require that class 

certification be denied when a defendant may be able to assert unique defenses against 

putative class members. See Cameron v. E.M. Adams, & Co., 547 F.2d 473, 478 (9th Cir. 

1976) (“[T]he presence of individualized issues of compliance with the statute of 

limitations . . . does not defeat the [presence] of the common questions.”). Thus, 

Defendants have not demonstrated that the questions concerning Sub-Class 1 are of such 

an individualized nature that class treatment would be inappropriate. 

 Defendants contend that Class 1 is too broadly defined in the record to render the 

questions common to the §§ 1054(g) and (h) claims suitable for resolution as to every 

member. Class 1 comprises all DC Plan participants on or after June 1, 2002 and their 

eligible spouses and beneficiaries, regardless of whether they had reciprocal contributions 

paid into their Plan accounts. As a result, Class 1’s sweep is such that it also encompasses 

individuals who were not actively accruing benefits before Amendment 2 was enacted. 

ERISA § 204(g) prohibits the decrease of accrued benefits by amendment and § 204(h) 

states in part that “[a]n applicable pension plan may not be amended so as to provide for 

a significant reduction in the rate of future benefit accrual unless the plan administrator 

provides the notice described in paragraph (2) to each applicable individual.” 29 U.S.C. 

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§ 1054(g), (h)(1) (emphasis added). Thus, the statute, on its face, only regulates 

amendments to plans. If plan participants join a plan after it has been amended, they have 

not had their rate of future benefit accrual reduced and they are not entitled to notice 

under the statute. Plaintiff’s proposed Class 1 includes individuals who became 

participants in the DC Plan after the date Amendment 2 was allegedly adopted. Because 

these individuals have no cause of action under § 204(g) or (h), Defendants argue, 

Plaintiff’s proposed class is overbroad. 

 Nevertheless, Plaintiff sufficiently alleges that even those DC Plan participants 

who were not affected by Amendment 1 were harmed by Defendants’ breach of fiduciary 

duty in implementing Amendment 2 because the understatement of certain participants’ 

individual account balances (1) diminished the entire corpus of the DC trust—that is by 

understating or artificially withholding for an excessive period from the DC trust that 

percentage of the reciprocal contributions that should have been allocated to it under 

Amendment 1, the Defendants reduced the investment yields for all DC Plan participants; 

and (2) “required all participants to shoulder a greater portion of the expenses” associated 

with maintaining the Plans. (Doc. 44 at 8.) Thus, Plaintiff argues, aggregating claims is 

still appropriate because every class member had a vested interest in the aggregated trust 

assets, which should have included contributions that Plaintiff alleges were improperly 

withheld by the defined benefit plan and, therefore, has suffered a cognizable injury, even 

if the extent of that injury may be subject to individual variation. Moreover, if the 

administrative fees associated with maintaining the DC Trust were distributed amongst 

Plan participants proportionately to the amount of each participant’s account balance, 

then it follows that a misallocation of individual benefits could have led to an inaccurate 

apportionment of the Trust’s operating costs as well. At the hearing on this matter on 

December 8, 2014, Defendants conceded that the disproportionate deduction of trust 

expenses may well constitute a violation of ERISA for which the statute authorizes 

private suit. Consequently, the claims of Class 1 and Sub-Class 1 are sufficiently 

common such that the class action mechanism would facilitate their resolution. 

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 As Class 2 is limited to participants who received reciprocal contributions over a 

six month period between the 2008 mid-year and end-of-year valuation dates the Court 

finds that Class 2 is also sufficiently tailored to generating common questions for 

litigation. For instance, whether Defendants breached the fiduciary duties they owed to 

the prospective Plaintiff classes and whether they miscalculated participants’ individual 

account balances by not including employer contributions at the mid-year valuation date 

are central questions all class members seek to resolve in this litigation. Although the 

effect of Defendants’ actions on the account balances of Plan participants may vary 

amongst class members, resolution of the common legal questions in Counts II and III 

would facilitate disposition of the all class members’ claims. 

 Defendants advance an additional argument that all classes are insufficiently 

defined because they include DC Plan participants who cashed out of the Plan by 

receiving a payment of the entire balance in their account within the time periods covered 

by the proposed classes, and thus lack standing to bring a civil action against former 

employers for alleged violations of ERISA because they are no longer members of any 

statutorily-defined Plan. (Doc. 47 at 11.) ERISA permits “participants” to bring civil 

actions for relief against employers who have violated the substantive provisions of the 

statute. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a). ERISA further defines “participant” as “any employee 

or former employee of an employer, or any member or former member of an employee 

organization, who is or may become eligible to receive a benefit of any type from an 

employee benefit plan which covers employees of such employer or members of such 

organization. . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7). In LaRue v. DeWolff, the Supreme Court clarified 

that “[a] plan ‘participant,’ as defined by . . . § 1002(7), may include a former employee 

with a colorable claim for benefits.” LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 552 U.S. 

248 (2008). The plaintiff in LaRue sued under ERISA after his employer failed to make 

certain changes to the investments in his retirement plan account, resulting in a loss of 

account value. Id. at 1022–23. After the Court granted certiorari, the defendants filed a 

motion to dismiss, arguing that the case was moot because the plaintiff had withdrawn all 

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his funds from the plan. Id. at 1026 n.6. The Court held that the case was not moot for the 

reasons quoted above. Id. Both the plaintiff in LaRue and Mr. Bryant have alleged that 

the Defendants’ violation of ERISA resulted in the receipt of fewer benefits than those to 

which he was legally entitled had defendant not breached his fiduciary duty. 

 In addition, in Harzewski v. Guidant Corp., 489 F.3d 799 (7th Cir. 2007), adopted 

by the Ninth Circuit in Vaughn v. Bay Environmental Management, Inc., 567 F.3d 1021, 

1027 (9th Cir. 2009), the court held that, despite having “cashed out” of the plan, 

plaintiffs were still “participants” because they may become eligible to receive plan 

benefits by winning a money judgment against defendants. Harzewski, 489 F.3d at 804. 

Under this definition of “participant” and plan “benefit,” the Plaintiff class here similarly 

has standing to recover losses occasioned by Defendants’ breach of fiduciary duty that 

allegedly reduced the amount of their benefits. 

 With respect to Count IV of the Complaint, however, the Court finds Plaintiff’s 

claims not sufficiently common with any of the proposed classes to support certification. 

Plaintiff alleges that, after requesting documents concerning the valuation of his 

Individual Accounts, Defendants provided “Mr. Bryant with inconsistent and differing 

information concerning the amount of . . . benefits and the amount that they claimed Mr. 

Bryant was purportedly overpaid. . . .” (Doc. 21 at 9 (emphasis added).) Thus, on the face 

of the pleadings, Count IV—which alleges violations of ERISA’s claims procedure and 

disclosure requirements—amounts to an individual claim for relief and not one suitable to 

class resolution. 

 C. Rule 23(a)(3)–(4): Typicality & Adequacy 

 In certifying a class, courts must find that “the claims or defenses of the 

representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class.” Fed R. Civ. P. 

23(a)(3). “The purpose of the typicality requirement is to assure that the interest of the 

named representative aligns with the interests of the class.” Hanon v. Dataproducts 

Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 508 (9th Cir. 1992). “The test of typicality ‘is whether other 

members have the same or similar injury, whether the action is based on conduct which is 

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not unique to the named plaintiffs, and whether other class members have been injured by 

the same course of conduct.’” Id. (internal citation omitted). While commonality 

examines the relationship of facts and legal issues common to class members, typicality 

focuses on the relationship of facts and issues between the class and its 

representatives. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 509 F.3d 1168, 1184 n.12 (9th Cir. 

2007). 

 Meanwhile, the adequacy of representation prong requires two legal 

determinations: (1) do the named plaintiffs and their counsel have any conflicts of 

interest with other class members; and (2) will the named plaintiffs and their counsel 

prosecute the action vigorously on behalf of the class? In re Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. 

Litig., 213 F.3d 454, 462 (9th Cir. 2000). This inquiry has a tendency to overlap with the 

commonality and typicality criteria of Rule 23(a). Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 

U.S. 591, 626 n.20 (1997). These requirements serve to ensure that “the named plaintiff's 

claim and the class claims are so interrelated that the interests of the class members will 

be fairly and adequately protected in their absence.” Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 

U.S. 147, 158 n.13 (1982). A named plaintiff does not satisfy the typicality or adequacy 

requirements if he is subject to unique defenses that threaten to become the focus of the 

litigation. Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 984 (9th Cir. 2011). 

 As to Sub-Class 1 and Class 2, Plaintiff’s claims are based on the same legal and 

remedial theory as the claims of the other members of the proposed class. In response, 

Defendants assert a number of defenses against Plaintiff, including the failure to exhaust 

administrative remedies and the expiration of the statute of limitations on Plaintiff’s 

claims. (See Doc. 47 at 12–15.) However, these purported defenses are not unique in such 

a way that they would create a distraction or become a major focus of the litigation. See 

Ellis, 657 F.3d at 984. In Medearis v. Oregon Teamster Employers Trust, for example, 

the court reasoned that the named plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies 

before pursuing an ERISA class action did not preclude class certification. CV. 07-723 

PK, 2008 WL 4534108 at *7 (D. Or. Oct. 1, 2008) (accumulating cases). The Medearis 

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court found that “because it [did] not appear that any of the potential class members have 

exhausted their administrative remedies, the named plaintiff’s failure to exhaust [was] not 

a defense unique to [him].” Id. Here, both Mr. Bryant’s alleged failure to exhaust 

administrative remedies and the statute of limitations “are typical of [the defenses] that 

[Defendants] may raise against other members of the class,” thus satisfying the 

requirement for typicality rather than undermining it. Id. at 535 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). There is also nothing to suggest that Mr. Bryant would be an inadequate 

representative of Class 2’s interests. 

 However, there are some potential and perhaps significant conflicts of interest 

within Class 1. The contested Amendments affected the distribution and calculation of 

the pension credits of Plan participants; therefore, the interests of the class members who 

benefited from Amendment 2 irreconcilably conflict with the interests of class members 

who would benefit from the Court’s disregard of Amendment 2. It seems likely that some 

class members would prefer to receive the benefits afforded them by Amendment 2, with 

its alleged ERISA violations, than those that they would have received under Amendment 

1. However, Plaintiff notes that ERISA § 204(h) expressly provides that “in the case of 

any egregious failure to meet any requirement of this subsection with respect to any plan 

amendment, the provisions of the applicable pension plan shall be applied as if such plan 

amendment entitled all applicable individuals to the greater of (i) the benefits to which 

they would have been entitled without regard to such amendment, or (ii) the benefits 

under the plan with regard to such amendment. 29 U.S.C. § 1054(h)(6)(A). Intentional 

violations of ERISA or violations that deprive “most of the individuals with most of the 

information they are entitled to receive” amount to “egregious failures,” among other 

things. Id. § 1054(h)(6)(B). Participants’ ability to elect the better of the two amendments 

would eliminate the potential conflict of interest between class members. Cf. CIGNA 

Corp. v. Amara, 131 S. Ct. 1866, 1881 (2011) (holding that ERISA authorizes 

reformation of a plan as an equitable remedy for improper notice under ERISA §204(h)). 

Moreover, Plaintiffs’ claims center on requests for equitable remedies; any monetary 

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relief that might be available to the Plaintiff class in the form of restored benefits would 

be incidental to the Court’s declaration that Amendment 2 is invalid and enjoining its 

enforcement. Thus, there is nothing to suggest that Bryant would be an inadequate class 

representative for members of Class 1 who are not members of Sub-Class 1, even though 

he states claims for benefits the receipt of which would adversely affect other class 

members. For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff has satisfied the 

requirements of Rule 23(a) with respect to Classes 1 and 2 as well as Sub-Class 1. 

However, if at any point it becomes clear to the Court that the Plaintiffs are primarily 

seeking remuneration, and that granting such relief would harm the interests of other 

class members or otherwise negate the utility of the class action mechanism for resolving 

these claims, Defendants may petition the Court for decertification. See Gen. Tel. Co. of 

Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982) (“Even after a certification order is entered, the 

judge remains free to modify it in light of subsequent developments in the litigation.”). 

D. Rule 23(b) 

 In addition to meeting the requirements under Rule 23(a), class action plaintiffs 

must also establish that one or more of the grounds for maintaining the suit as a class 

action are met under Rule 23(b): (1) there is a risk of substantial prejudice from separate 

actions; (2) declaratory or injunctive relief benefitting the class as a whole would be 

appropriate; or (3) common questions of law or fact predominate and the class action is 

superior to other available methods of adjudication. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b). Plaintiff seeks 

certification of the classes under Rules 23(b)(1) and (2), and, alternatively, under Rule 

23(b)(3). The Defendants argue that certification is inappropriate under all three prongs. 

 i. Rule 23(b)(1) 

 Rule 23(b)(1) provides for class litigation if separate actions by individual class 

members would create a risk of “inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to 

individual class members.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(A). Here, the members of all classes 

all allegedly suffered the same ERISA violations and the same lack of notice. If 

successful on the merits, they will be entitled to the same type of relief. In addition, the 

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theory underlying the alleged breach of fiduciary duties is the same on which Counts I 

and II are based. Further, adjudication of Plaintiff’s claims by different courts carries a 

substantial risk of varying orders, particularly given the injunctive nature of the relief 

sought. See, e.g., In re Citigroup Pension Plan ERISA Litig., 241 F.R.D. 172, 179–80 

(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (applying Rule 23(b)(1) in the context of an ERISA § 204(h) action and 

noting that Rule 23(b)(1)(A) “speaks directly to ERISA suits”). Thus, certification of 

Class 1, 2 and Sub-Class 1 is appropriate under 23(b)(1). 

 ii. Rule 23(b)(2) 

 Rule 23(b)(2) allows class certification when “the party opposing the class has 

acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making 

appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the 

class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). The primary remedy sought under Count I is a 

declaration that Amendment 2 was ineffective. Thus, since the Plaintiff alleges that the 

Plan “acted . . . on grounds generally applicable to the class,” declaratory relief with 

respect to the whole class may be appropriate. Although the ultimate outcome may also 

include remuneration to class members, certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(2) is still 

permissible because such monetary damages would be “merely incidental to [the] 

primary claim for [declaratory] relief.” Probe v. State Teachers' Retirement Sys., 780 

F.3d 778, 780 (9th Cir. 1986). Thus, Class 1 and Sub-Class 1 may also be properly 

certified under Rule 23(b)(2) to maintain the claims alleged in Counts I. 

 iii. Rule 23(b)(3). 

 Class certification is also appropriate under Rule 23(b)(3). Rule 23(b)(3) requires 

that “[common] questions of law or fact . . . predominate over any questions affecting 

only individual members” and “class action is superior to other available methods for 

fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Plaintiff has 

established that common questions of law and fact would predominate under Counts I, II 

and IV as those counts relate to Classes 1, 2 and Sub-Class 1. These claims are dominated 

by the determination of whether the amendment was invalid, whether benefits were 

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miscalculated, and whether passing the challenged amendments breached the Plan's 

fiduciary duty to plan participants. Although individual issues arise in the calculation of 

what damages flow from an invalid amendment, the aforementioned questions dominate 

the resolution of the case, and the Ninth Circuit recognizes that “the amount of damages 

is invariably an individual question and does not defeat class action treatment.” Stearns v. 

Ticketmaster Corp., 655 F.3d 1013, 1026 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Yokoyama v. Midland 

Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 594 F.3d 1087, 1091 (9th Cir. 2010)). Further, in answering these 

questions, all the claims of all class members are resolved. For this reason, certification is 

also proper under FRCP 23(b)(3). 

CONCLUSION 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification 

(Doc. 44) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The following classes are 

certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 for prosecution of Counts I, II, and III. 

1. Class 1: All DC plan participants who had accrued benefits on or after June 

1, 2002 and their eligible spouses and beneficiaries. (Counts I, II, III) 

2. Sub-class 1: All Class 1 members who were DC Plan participants between 

June 1, 2002 and June 24, 2004, and for whom excess contributions were received by the 

Pension Plan on or after June 1, 2002. (Counts I, II, III) 

3. Class 2: All participants in the DC Plan as of November 30, 2008 for whom 

contributions were received by the Plans between June 1, 2008 and November 30, 2008 

and their eligible spouses and beneficiaries. (Counts II, III) 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Wayne Bryant is hereby appointed as the 

Class Representative. 

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the law firm of Martin & Bonnett P.L.L.C. is 

appointed as Class Counsel. 

 Dated this 22nd day of January, 2015. 

Honorable G. Murray Snow

United States District Judge

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