Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02055/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02055-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Civil Rights Act

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KM

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Ralph John Chapa, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Matthew B. Barker, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV 12-2055-PHX-DGC (DKD)

ORDER

On November 8, 2011, Plaintiff Ralph John Chapa, who is confined in the Maricopa

County Fourth Avenue Jail, filed a Complaint in the Superior Court of Maricopa County,

Arizona, against Defendant Matthew Barker. On September 27, 2012, Defendant Barker,

who is represented by attorney Klaus Peter Muthig, filed a Notice of Removal (Doc. 1). The

Court will remand this case to Superior Court.

This Court has the duty to consider its subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte. Cf.

Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 345 F.3d 683, 687 (9th Cir. 2003); see 28 U.S.C.

§ 1447(c) (“If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject

matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court

determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the

action.”). “Subject matter jurisdiction may not be waived, and . . . the district court must

remand if it lacks jurisdiction.” Kelton Arms Condominium Owners Ass’n, Inc. v.

Homestead Ins. Co., 346 F.3d 1190, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003).

Case 2:12-cv-02055-DGC--DKD Document 6 Filed 11/13/12 Page 1 of 3
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“The removal statute is strictly construed against removal jurisdiction.” California

ex rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc., 375 F.3d 831, 838 (9th Cir. 2004). The party invoking the

statute bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction. Id.

“The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘wellpleaded complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal

question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar

Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). See also California ex rel. Lockyer, 375 F.3d

at 838. The plaintiff is the master of the claim and “may avoid federal jurisdiction by

exclusive reliance on state law.” Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392. A plaintiff, therefore, may

choose to have a case heard in state court “by eschewing claims based on federal law.” Id.

at 399. See also California ex rel. Lockyer, 375 F.3d at 838-39.

Prior to removal, Plaintiff’s initial state-court Complaint was dismissed with leave to

amend. Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint and Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss

(Defendant’s second such motion). In his Notice of Removal, Defendant states that “[i]n

opposing the Defendant’s second motion to dismiss, Plaintiff indicated for the first time that

he was seeking relief under the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, indicating to

Defendant that the case had become removable to the district court.”

On October 10, 2012, Plaintiff filed a “Reply to Case Assignment, Objection” in

which he states that “in no instance does [Plaintiff] want this case before the Honorable

David G. Campbell or David K. Duncan. Mr. Chapa’s whole purpose of filing the claim in

state court was to keep it out of the hands . . . of the federal courts of Phoenix Arizona.”

Plaintiff further claims that his references to the Eighth Amendment in his response to the

Motion to Dismiss were in error and that he intended to refer to the Arizona Constitution’s

cruel and unusual punishment clauses.

The Court has reviewed the original Complaint and Amended Complaint and finds

no mention of a federal claim in either document. Although Plaintiff does reference the

Eighth Amendment in his response to the Motion to Dismiss, the Complaint and Amended

Complaint are the relevant documents for determining jurisdiction. See Caterpillar, 482 U.S.

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at 392. Moreover, Plaintiff’s objection makes clear that he intended to raise only state law

claims, despite his inartful response to the Motion to Dismiss. See Hearns v. Terhune, 413

F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2005) (the Court must liberally construe pro se pleadings).

Defendant Barker has therefore failed to meet his burden of establishing federal

jurisdiction over this case. The Court will remand this case to the Superior Court of

Maricopa County.

IT IS ORDERED:

(1) This matter is remanded to the Superior Court of Maricopa County, Arizona.

(2) The Clerk of Court must mail a certified copy of this Order to:

Michael K. Jeanes

Clerk of the Superior Court

Maricopa County, Arizona Superior Court

201 West Jefferson

Phoenix, Arizona 85003-2205

(3) The Clerk of Court must close this case.

DATED this 13th day of November, 2012.

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