Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-01693/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-01693-20/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA – FRESNO DIVISION

MATTHEW B. CRAMER,

Plaintiff,

v.

TARGET CORPORATION, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:08-cv-01693-OWW-SKO

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S

"MOTION FOR DEFENDANT

BARRIOS TO RESPOND TO

PLAINTIFF'S FAC"

(Docket No. 87)

I. Procedural Background

Plaintiff Matthew Cramer is a state prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis and pro se with

an action for damages and other relief concerning alleged civil rights violations. Plaintiff filed his

original complaint on November 7, 2008. On December 9, 2008, the complaint was dismissed with

leave to amend. On February 17, 2009, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint ("FAC"). In

Plaintiff's FAC, he sought compensatory and punitive damages from Michael J. Yant and Eric

Heller, two employees of Target Corporation, an unnamed defendant referred to as the manager of

the Target store, and Tulare Police Officer Greg Barrios. 

Officer Barrios was served with the summons and the FAC on January 21, 2010. (Doc. 61).

Officer Barrios did not waive service of process under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("FRCP")

4(d); therefore, under FRCP 12, Defendant Barrios had 21 days to file a response to the FAC. Thus,

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a response was due by February 11, 2010. On February 23, 2010, Officer Barrios filed a motion to

dismiss. On March 16, 2010, Plaintiff filed an opposition to Officer Barrios' motion to dismiss, but

did not present any argument regarding the timeliness of Officer Barrios' motion to dismiss.

On June 3, 2010, the motion to dismiss was considered on its merits by the Court and

Magistrate Judge Sheila K. Oberto issued Findings and Recommendations that the motion to dismiss

be denied. No objection to the Findings and Recommendations was filed and the Findings and

Recommendations were adopted in full on July 1, 2010, by District Judge Oliver W. Wanger. On

July 12, 2010, Defendant Barrios filed an Answer to the FAC. 

Meanwhile, on June 17, 2010, Plaintiff filed a motion "[f]or Defendant Barrios to Respond

to Plaintiff's FAC" and requested that the Court "take judicial notice that Tulare Police Officer

Barrios is subject to default." The Court will construe this motion as a request for default judgment

against Officer Barrios for failure to timely file his response to the FAC. See Haines v. Kerner,

404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam) (pro se pleadings held to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers). It is this motion that is currently pending before the Court.

II. Discussion

Obtaining a default judgment in federal court is a two-step process that includes: (1) entry

of default and (2) default judgment. Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471 (9th Cir. 1986). Rule 55

of the Federal Rules of Procedure states that "[w]hen a party against whom a judgment for

affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by

affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the party's default." Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Afterthe entry

of default has been entered by the clerk of court, the party seeking default may file a motion

requesting a judgment of default. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b). If a party has made an appearance in the

case, Rule 55(b) requires that the court, not the clerk, enter the judgment of default. Fed. R. Civ. P.

55(b)(2); see also Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471 ("[b]ecause McCool had filed a notice of appearance, entry

of judgment by the clerk under Rule 55(b)(1) . . . would have been improper."). 

There is no right to a default judgment; its entry is entirelywithin the discretion of the district

court. See Draper v. Coombs, 792 F.2d 915, 925 (9th Cir. 1986); see also, Rashidi v. Albright, 818

F.Supp. 1354, 1356, n.4 (D.Nev. 1993). Defaults are generally disfavored (see Eitel, 782 F.2d at

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1472), and courts will attempt to resolve motions for entry of default so as to encourage a decision

on the merits. TCI Group Life Ins. Plan v. Knoebber, 244 F.3d 691, 696 (9th Cir. 2001). Courts

consider several factors in exercising discretion as to the entry of default judgment, including: (1)

the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of plaintiff's substantive claim, (3) the

sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the sum of money at stake in the action, (5) the possibility of a

dispute concerning the material facts; (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect, and (7)

the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits. 

Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471-72. 

Here, Officer Barrios has made an appearance in the case; thus, the Clerk of the Court cannot

enter default or default judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Therefore, the Court will consider whether

default judgment is appropriate in this matter. In considering the Eitel factors, the Court notes that

Officer Barrios was twelve (12) days late filing his response to the FAC. First, twelve (12) days is

not the kind of passage of time that would hamper Plaintiff's ability to effectively litigate his case

or route the litigation into an awkward posture such that it would be detrimental to Plaintiff. 

Second, the Court denied Officer Barrios' motion to dismiss, which moots any concern that Officer

Barrios benefitted from his late filing in a manner prejudicial to Plaintiff. Further, Plaintiff had the

opportunity to present this argument in his opposition to the motion to dismiss, but did not do so. 

Therefore, the Court finds that Officer Barrios' untimely response to the FAC was not prejudicial to

Plaintiff's interests and this factor weighs heavily against entry of default judgment in this matter.

The FAC in this matter is sufficiently well-pled, but Officer Barrios has filed an Answer to

the FAC denying the allegations therein. As there is a strong preference for deciding cases on their

merits and because Officer Barrios is defending against Plaintiff's suit, the factors decidedly tilt

against the entry of default judgment. Pena v. Seguros La Commerical, S.A., 770 F.2d 811, 814

(9th Cir. 1985) (default judgments are generally disfavored and a case should be decided on its

merits whenever possible). The Court concludes, therefore, that the applicable Eitel factors strongly

weigh against default judgment as to Officer Barrios for his untimely response to the FAC.

Plaintiff also requests that the Court "take judicial notice" of Officer Barrios' default, and

asks the Court to "take appropriate action immediately for failure to respond to Plaintiff's FAC."

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Plaintiff's Motion at 2:15-16. The court possesses inherent power to sanction a party through

dismissal or default judgment. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764-65 ("The inherent

powers of federal courts are those which are necessary to the exercise of all others," and include "the

well-acknowledged inherent power. . . to levysanctions in response to abusive litigation practices.")

(internal quotations omitted). In the Ninth Circuit, "courts have inherent power to dismiss an action

when a party has willfully deceived the court and engaged in conduct utterly inconsistent with the

orderly administration of justice." Fjelstad v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 762 F.2d 1334, 1338 (9th

Cir. 1985) (internal quotations omitted). However, due process limits the imposition of the severe

sanctions of dismissal or default judgment to "extreme circumstances" and such sanctions are not

to be imposed merely for punishment of an infraction that did not threaten to interfere with the

rightful decision of the case. See Wyle v. R.J. Reynolds Indus., Inc., 709 F.2d 585, 589 (9th Cir.

1983); Fjelstad, 762 F.2d at 1338.

There is no indication in this case that Officer Barrios' failure to timely file a response to the

FAC was anything other than excusable neglect. He did ultimately respond to the FAC by filing a

motion to dismiss, albeit twelve (12) days late. The late filing neither prejudiced Plaintiff nor

disrupted the litigation process. This is not an appropriate case for the issuance of a sanction in the

form of default judgment. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Plaintiff's "Motion for Defendant Barrios

to Respond to Plaintiff's FAC" and Plaintiff's request that the Court "Take Judicial Notice of Default

Against Defendant Barrios" are DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 22, 2010 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto 

ie14hj UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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