Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00026/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00026-13/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID F. JADWIN, D.O., )

)

)

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

)

COUNTY OF KERN, et al., )

)

)

Defendant. )

)

)

No. CV-F-07-026 OWW/TAG

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S

REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION

OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S RULING

(Doc. 134)

Plaintiff seeks reconsideration of the Magistrate Judge’s

“Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion to Compel

Production and Further Responses”, filed on May 9, 2008 (Doc.

124; hereafter referred to as the May 9 Order). Plaintiff

contends that the May 9 Order is clearly erroneous and contrary

to law with respect to Request Nos. 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 28, 29,

30, 32, 33, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 45, 51, 58, 59, 60, 61, 63,

65, 66, 67, 70, 71, 72, 73, and 78.

Pursuant to Rule 72-303, a District Judge upholds a

Magistrate Judge’s ruling on a referred matter unless it is

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“clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” See Rule 72(a), Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure; 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). The “clearly

erroneous” standard applies to a Magistrate Judge’s findings of

fact. Concrete Pipe & Prods. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust,

508 U.S. 602, 623 (1993). “A findings is ‘clearly erroneous’

when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing

[body] on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm

conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Id. at 622. The

“contrary to law” standard allows independent, plenary review of

purely legal determinations by the Magistrate Judge. FDIC v.

Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md., 196 F.R.D. 375, 378

(S.D.Cal.2000); Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 91

(3 Cir.1992). “An order is contrary to law when it fails to rd

apply or misapplies relevant statutes, case law, or rules of

procedure.” DeFazio v. Wallis, 459 F.Supp.2d 159, 163

(E.D.N.Y.2006).

The May 9 Order ruled in pertinent part:

E. Right of Privacy

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b) excludes privileged

matters from discovery. Federal courts

generally recognize a constitutionally-based

right of privacy that may be asserted

response [sic] to discovery requests. 

Johnson ex rel. Johnson v. Thompson, 971 F.2d

1487, 1497 (9 Cir.1992); Megargee v. th

Wittman, 2007 WL [2462097] * 2

(E.D.Cal.2007)(citations omitted). ‘Although

the right to privacy is not a recognized

privilege, many courts have considered it in

discovery disputes.’ Ragge v. MCA Universal

Studios, 165 F.R.D. 601, 604, n.3

(C.D.Cal.1995)(citations omitted). The right

of privacy is not an absolute bar to

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discovery. Instead, it is subject to a

balancing test that requires courts to

balance the need for privacy against the need

for disclosure in litigation. Ragge, 165

F.R.D. at 604 (C.D.Cal.1995). Here, nearly

all of Defendants’ discovery responses assert

a ‘confidential personnel privilege’ without

citing a specific source of law for the

privilege. At the hearing on the motion,

Defendants’ counsel relied on California

Evidence Code §§ 1040 and 1157 as the source

of this privilege.

To the extent that Defendants assert a

‘confidential personnel privilege’ as a state

law privilege, it is inapplicable for the

same reasons that the state law peer review

privilege is inapplicable. Agster, 433 F.3d

at 838-839. However, given the nature of the

documents requested and the reasons given for

objecting to their disclosure, the Court

construes the assertion of this privilege as

also raising a right of privacy. 

Accordingly, the Court will apply the

requisite balancing test in determining

whether the need for disclosure outweighs the

privacy issues, and will also consider

whether additional orders are necessary to

protect a party or person from annoyance,

embarrassment, oppression, or under [sic]

expense in connection with any disclosure

that may be ordered as to such documents.

Plaintiff argues that the Magistrate Judge erred in

construing the “confidential personnel privilege” set forth in

California Evidence Code § 1040 as supporting a federal right to

privacy privilege. California Evidence Code § 1040 provides in

relevant part:

(a) As used in this section, ‘official

information’ means information acquired in

confidence by a public employee in the course

of his or her duty and not open, or

officially disclosed, to the public prior to

the time the claim of privilege is made.

(b) A public entity has a privilege to refuse

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to disclose official information, and to

prevent another from disclosing official

information, if the privilege is claimed by a

person authorized by the public entity to do

so and:

(1) Disclosure is forbidden by an 

act of the Congress of the United States or a

statute of this state; or

(2) Disclosure of the information 

is against the public interest because there

is a necessity for preserving the

confidentiality of the information that

outweighs the necessity for disclosure in the

interest of justice; but no privilege may be

claimed under this paragraph if any person

authorized to do so has consented that the

information by disclosed in the proceeding. 

In determining whether disclosure of the

information is against the public interest,

the interest of the public entity as a party

in the outcome of the proceeding may not be

considered.

Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s assertion of the “confidential

personnel privilege” set forth in Section 1040:

concerns the conditional governmental

privilege against disclosure of official

information by public entities and public

employees whenever such disclosure is against

the public interest. Put another way, it is

a privilege that is intended to enable the

government to protect its state secrets.

Plaintiff refers to Garrett v. City and County of San Francisco,

818 F.2d 1515, 1519 n.6 (9 Cir.1987): th

Defendants also contend that the sought after

documents are protected by state-created

privileges. In a Title VII action, of

course, the federal common law of privilege

controls. F.R. Evid. 501. This court has

held that personnel files are discoverable in

federal question cases, including Title VII

actions, despite claims of privilege. Guerra

v. Board of Trustees, 567 F.2d 352 (9th

Cir.1977); Kerr v. United States District

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Court, 511 F.2d 192, 197 (9 Cir.1975), th

aff’d, 426 U.S. 394 ... (1976). 

Plaintiff further cites Yee v. Multnomah County, 1990 WL 96720

(D.Or.1990), where the District Court granted a motion to compel

production of relevant performance evaluations of other employees

subject to a protective order.

Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the May 9 Order is

clearly erroneous or contrary to law. Plaintiff’s discovery

requests were not denied; they were granted subject to protective

order. A district court has very broad discretion under Rule

26(c), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in fashioning discovery

orders. Discovery restrictions may be even broader where the

target is a non-party. See Dart Indus. Co. v. Westwood Chemical

Co., 649 F.2d 646, 649 (9 Cir.1980). th

Plaintiff argues that the Magistrate Judge raised the

federal right of privacy privilege sua sponte in the May 9 Order. 

Plaintiff contends that Defendants did not assert such a

privilege during the meet and confer process, in their opposition

to Plaintiff’s motion to compel, or at the hearing on the motion

to compel. Plaintiff asserts:

Plaintiff was not afforded any opportunity to

submit briefing or be heard on the federal

privacy privilege or the balancing test as to

all of the above Requests, with the exception

of Request No. 40. Even with respect to

Request No. 40, Plaintiff is still ignorant

of the privacy concerns which Defendant has

been construed to raise since Defendant did

not specify any privacy objections beyond a

boilerplate assertion of ‘confidential

personnel privilege’ in meet and confers,

motion briefing and at the hearing itself.

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It should be noted that, during the four

months preceding the Court’s issuance of the

Order, Defendant chose to produce most of the

documents responsive to the above Requests. 

In so doing, Defendant engaged in little to

no redaction of personal identifying

information. Nevertheless, Plaintiff remains

concerned about the application of the

Court’s protective order to future

supplemental productions by Defendant.

On May 20, 2008, the following “Stipulation Re: Balancing of

Privacy Interests and Protective Order” was filed (Doc. 137):

Pursuant to the Order of the Court issued by

Magistrate Judge Goldner on May 9, 2008 (Doc.

124), IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED by and between

the parties hereto through their respective

counsel that, with regard to balancing the

privacy interests of the Defendants against

the Plaintiff’s need for disclosure, the

Plaintiff’s need for disclosure prevails as

to documents that reveal the nature of

interpersonal work relationships at KMC

between core physicians and others, on-thejob behavior towards other members of KMC

staff by core physicians, complaints against

core physicians regarding their behavior at

KMC and the County’s actions in response.

IT IS FURTHER STIPULATED that documents

produced in response to this Stipulation

shall be disclosed only to Plaintiff’s legal

counsel and retained experts and shall be

kept separate from all other files and

documents in this action and clearly marked

‘Confidential Pursuant to Protective Order.’ 

Upon the conclusion of this action, all such

documents shall be returned to Defendants or

destroyed and Plaintiff shall not retain any

copies. Defendants shall provide Plaintiff

with a written receipt for the returned

documents or Plaintiff shall provide

Plaintiff with a written receipt for the

returned documents or Plaintiff will provide

Defendants with a written certification that

the documents have been destroyed,

respectively, and that receipt or

certification shall be conclusive proof of

Plaintiff’s compliance with the requirement

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that the documents be returned to Defendants

or destroyed.

The foregoing notwithstanding, the parties

acknowledge that Plaintiff has filed a

request for reconsideration of the abovereferenced Order which challenges Judge

Goldner’s directive to the parties to enter

into this privacy-based protective order. 

Plaintiff’s agreement to this stipulation is

therefore conditioned on such motion.

Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the challenged aspects

of the May 9 Order are contrary to law or clearly erroneous. As

discussed above, the Magistrate Judge has broad discretion to

fashion protective orders in connection with discovery requests. 

Plaintiff has obtained the discovery he sought subject to the

protective order designed to protect the privacy interests of

those persons whose personnel files or personal information are

the subject of Plaintiff’s discovery requests. If, following

review by Plaintiff of the documents produced in connection with

the May 9 Order and the May 20 Stipulation and Order, Plaintiff

believes that he is entitled to discovery of redacted

information, Plaintiff is entitled to seek that discovery from

Defendants and/or bring a motion to compel. 

Plaintiff asserts that the Magistrate Judge’s protective

order with regard to Request Nos. 32, 33, 63 and 70 is overbroad.

The May 9 Order states:

Request Nos. 32-33

No. 32: Documents relating to your discipline

of any employee against whom a complaint or

grievance of discrimination, harassment,

defamation, retaliation, failure to

accommodate, and/or failure to engage in an

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interactive process in their employment was

made from October 24, 2000 to date.

No. 33: Documents relating to complaints or

grievances made by Defendants’ past or

present employees against Defendants for

defamation, retaliation, disability

discrimination, failure to accommodate,

and/or failure to engage in an interactive

process, including, but not limited to

information or internal complaints,

grievances or charges to any state or federal

agency, and complaints filed in any state or

federal court from October 24, 2004 to date.

Defendants’ Response

Defendant objected on the grounds that these

requests seek documents containing

confidential personnel information and are

not reasonably calculated to lead to the

discovery of admissible evidence. Defendants

also contend that Request No. 33 is vague as

to the phrase ‘informal or internal’, and

overbroad and burdensome because Defendant

County of Kern employees [sic] thousands of

employees.

Ruling:

At the hearing on the motion, Plaintiff’s

counsel proposed to limit this Request No. 

33 to ‘complaints or grievances made by past

or present core physicians at Kern Medical

Center for defamation, retaliation,

disability discrimination, failure to

accommodate, and/or failure to engage in an

interactive process, including but not

limited to any informal or internal

complaints, grievances or charges to any

state or federal agency, and complaints filed

in any state or federal court from October

24, 2004 to date.’ The term ‘core

physicians’ means physicians at Kern Medical

Center who are under contract. Based on that

limitation, Defendants’ counsel agreed to

produce the documents as to ‘core physicians’

in response to Requests [sic] Nos. 32 and 33.

The motion to compel is GRANTED as to the

limitation to ‘core physicians’ at Kern

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Medical Center for Requests [sic] Nos. 32 and

33, and is DENIED as to employees other than

core physicians at Kern Medical Center. To

the extent that Defendants’ assertion of a

right of privacy is subject to a balancing

test, it weighs in favor of limited

disclosure and a protective order. 

Defendants shall redact from the documents

all HIPAA information and all personal

identifying information as to core physicians

at Kern Medical Center other than Plaintiff.

Defendants shall produce the documents,

excluding those that are subject to the

attorney-client privilege. Defendants shall

also produce a detailed privilege log for

those documents that are withheld for the

attorney-client privilege. The documents

shall be produced for Plaintiff’s inspection

and copying, and the privilege log provided

to him, within 20 days from the date of this

order. Plaintiff shall decide what documents

he wants copied, and pay for his own

reproduction costs.

...

Request No. 63

Documents relating to meeting minutes for the

following Kern Medical Center committees or

groups from October 24, 2000 to the present: 

a) Medical Executive Committee, b) Joint

Conference Committee, c) Quality Management

Committee, d) Cancer Committee, e) Second

Level Peer Review Committee, f) Transfusion

Committee, and g) Executive Staff Meetings.

Defendants’ Response

Defendants contend that this request seeks

documents that contain confidential personnel

information, and information protected by

HIPAA and the peer review and attorney-client

privileges. Without waiving these

objections, Defendants agreed to produce

responsive documents subject to redaction fo

confidential or privileged information and

reimbursement for copying costs.

Ruling:

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The motion to compel is GRANTED in part and

DENIED in part as to this request. The peer

review and personnel privileges are

inapplicable. However, to the extent that

Defendants’ assertion of a right to privacy

to personnel information is subject to a

balancing test, it weighs in favor of limited

disclosure and a protective order. Defendant

shall redact from the documents all HIPAA

information and all personal identifying

information of employees other than Plaintiff

with respect to personnel matters. 

Defendants shall produce the documents,

excluding those that are subject to the

attorney-client privilege and those that are

excluded by other provisions of this order. 

Defendants shall also produce a detailed

privilege log for the documents that are

withheld for the attorney-client privilege. 

The documents and the privilege log shall be

produced within 20 days from the date of this

order. Plaintiff shall inspect the

documents, decides what he wants copied, and

pay his own reproduction costs.

...

Request No. 70

Documents relating to peer review of Kern

Medical Center’s Pathology Department during

the time period from January 1, 1995 to the

present.

Defendants’ Response:

Defendants contend that this request seeks

documents that contain confidential personnel

information that is not relevant to any

issues in this case and is not reasonably

calculated to lead to the discovery of

admissible evidence. Defendants also object

to disclosure of information protected by

HIPAA and the peer review, personnel, and

attorney-client privileges.

Ruling:

The motion to compel is GRANTED in part and

DENIED in part as to this request. The peer

review and personnel privileges are

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inapplicable, and the relevancy objection is

overruled. Defendants’ objection based on

HIPAA is appropriate, as is its assertion of

the attorney-client privilege. To the extent

that Defendants’ assertion of a right of

privacy to personnel information is subject

to a balancing test, it weighs in favor of

limited disclosure and a protective order. 

Defendants shall redact from the documents

all HIPAA information and all personal

identifying information for employees other

than Plaintiff. Defendants shall produce a

detailed privilege log for all documents that

are withheld for the attorney-client

privilege. The documents and the privilege

log shall be produced within 20 days from the

date of this order. Plaintiff shall inspect

the documents, decide what he wants copied,

and pay his own reproduction costs.

Plaintiff argues that the Magistrate Judge erred in

construing the assertion of a federal privacy privilege to these

requests because Defendants did not assert the “confidential

personnel privilege” set forth in California Evidence Code § 1040

to these discovery requests.

This ground for reconsideration is without merit in part. 

Defendants’ responses to Request Nos. 32, 33 and 63 attached to

Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration as Exhibit 3 specifically

referred to confidential personal information. Defendants’

response to Request No. 70 objected to production on the basis of

privileged peer review information and information that is

confidential under HIPAA. 

Plaintiff further argues that the protective order redacting

all personal identifying information for all employees of Kern

Medical Center with regard to Request Nos. 32, 33, 63 and 70 is

overbroad and “will render the documents requested effectively

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useless.” Plaintiff further contends that “it is difficult to

discern what federal privacy interest is implicated by

Plaintiff’s knowing the identities of the persons who, with

regard to Request No. 63 for instance, transcribed meeting

minutes or attended certain committee meetings.”

Given Plaintiff’s representations that Defendants have

provided most of the requested information without redaction and

given the May 20 Stipulation and Order, the Court concludes that

Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the May 9 Order is clearly

erroneous or contrary to law. The same conclusion is reached in

connection with Plaintiff’s contention that Defendants agreed to

withdraw their objections to Requests No. 32 and 33. 

Plaintiff seeks reconsideration of the May 9 Order to the

extent it addresses Request No. 40. The May 9 Order states:

Request No. 40

Documents relating to the removal of Dr.

Royce Johnson from the position of Chair or

Chief of Medicine at Kern Medical Center.

Defendants’ Response:

Defendants objected on the ground that the

requests seek documents containing

confidential personnel information that is

not relevant to any issues in the case and is

not reasonably calculated to lead to the

discovery of admissible evidence. Defendants

also object to disclosure based on HIPAA, and

the peer review and attorney-client

privileges.

Ruling:

At the hearing on this motion, Defendants’

counsel withdrew the objections to this

request and agreed to produce the documents,

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without 1) waiving the personnel privilege or

privacy claims as to other persons, and 2)

reserving the right to object to their

admissibility at trial. Accordingly, the

motion to compel is GRANTED in part and

DENIED in part as follows: Defendants shall

produce the documents pertaining to the

removal of Dr. Royce Johnson as the Chair or

Chief of Medicine at Kern Medical Center for

Plaintiff’s inspection, but it shall be

subject to a protective order. Defendants

shall not produce documents that are subject

to the attorney-client privilege and provide

a detailed privilege log. The documents

shall be produced for Plaintiff’s inspection

and copying, and the privilege log provided

to him, within 20 days from the date of this

order. Plaintiff shall inspect the

documents, decide what he wants copied, and

pay for his own reproduction costs.

Plaintiff apparently believes that the May 9 Order applies

the federal privacy privilege to Request No. 40. A close reading

of the May 9 Order establishes that Plaintiff’s reading of the

May 9 Order is in error; the protective order imposed by the May

9 Order with respect to Request No. 40 refers to documents

protected by the attorney-client privilege.

For the reasons stated:

1. Plaintiff’s Request for Reconsideration of Magistrate

Judge’s Ruling is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 24, 2008 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

668554 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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