Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_14-cv-00601/USCOURTS-almd-2_14-cv-00601-30/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:12102 Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA")

---

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

JOSHUA DUNN, et al., )

)

 Plaintiffs, )

) CIVIL ACTION NO.

 v. ) 2:14cv601-MHT

) (WO)

JEFFERSON S. DUNN, in his )

official capacity as )

Commissioner of )

the Alabama Department of )

Corrections, et al., )

)

 Defendants. )

PHASE 2A ADAP SUMMARY JUDGMENT OPINION

The plaintiffs in this putative class-action 

lawsuit are dozens of state prisoners and the Alabama 

Disabilities Advocacy Program (ADAP). The defendants 

are officials of the Alabama Department of Corrections 

(ADOC): the Commissioner and the Associate Commissioner 

of Health Services.1 They are sued in their official 

capacities only.

 

1. ADOC itself is also a party, but with respect 

to only claims under the Americans with Disabilities 

Act (ADA), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq., and 

(continued...)

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In Phase 2A of this case, with which this opinion 

is concerned, ADAP and a subset of individual

plaintiffs assert the following mental-health claims: 

constitutionally inadequate mental-health treatment in 

Alabama prison facilities and involuntary medication 

without due process. They rely on the Eighth and 

Fourteenth Amendments, as enforced through 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive 

relief. Jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 

(federal question) and § 1343 (civil rights).2

 

§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, codified at 29 

U.S.C. § 794, which are nearly settled and therefore 

not discussed in this opinion. See Joint Status Report 

(doc. no. 968) at 968 (“Plaintiffs and Defendants ADOC 

have agreed in substance to a settlement that resolves 

the Phase 2A ADA issues. These parties continue to 

work to resolve the Plaintiffs’ claims for attorneys 

and monitoring fees for these issues.”). To the extent 

that the parties are not successful in reaching a final 

resolution of these claims, they have reserved them for 

later adjudication. See Phase 2 Order on Remaining ADA 

Claims (doc. no. 981).

2. This case has twice been bifurcated for the 

administrative convenience of the court and the 

parties. The claims in Phase 1, which the parties 

settled with a consent decree approved by the court, 

involved ADA claims alleging discrimination on the 

(continued...)

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The issue before the court is whether ADAP has 

associational standing to bring the mental-health care 

claims at issue in Phase 2A of this case.3 The court 

concludes that it does.

 

basis of and non-accommodation of physical 

disabilities. See Dunn v. Dunn, -- F.R.D. --, 2016 WL 

4718216 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 9, 2016) (Thompson, J.). The 

claims in Phase 2B, which are set to go to trial after 

the Phase 2A claims (should they survive summary 

judgment), involve Eighth Amendment claims related to 

medical and dental care.

3. ADAP itself has been a plaintiff in this case 

since its outset. During the course of litigation of 

Phase 1 (concerning discrimination against and failure 

to accommodate prisoners with physical disabilities), 

the court sought clarification as to the precise basis 

for ADAP’s standing--that is, whether it was claiming 

organizational standing, associational standing, or 

both. In response, ADAP represented that it was 

asserting both. It was unnecessary to resolve whether 

ADAP had adequately pled associational standing at the 

time, because the parties settled Phase 1. In order to 

ensure that the basis of ADAP’s asserted standing was 

squarely presented, for purposes of defendants’ 

response and for adjudication, the court instructed 

ADAP to seek leave to amend the complaint to clarify 

the bases for its standing (in advance both of the 

deadline for amendments and the Phase 2 briefing), and 

leave was granted. Dunn v. Dunn, 2016 WL 4169157 (M.D. 

Ala. Aug. 5, 2016) (Thompson, J.). Although defendants 

were offered the opportunity to conduct additional 

discovery regarding standing, id. at *3, they declined 

to do so.

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I. Background

ADAP’s claims are systemic and prospective in 

nature: It contends not that any particular prisoner’s 

rights were violated in the past, but instead that 

defendants’ policies and practices violate and will 

continue to violate the constitutional rights of 

prisoners who have serious mental illness, both by 

creating a substantial risk of serious harm to them and 

by denying them due process.

While defendants have sought summary judgment,

their summary-judgment motion does not mention ADAP, 

but focuses exclusively on ADAP’s co-plaintiffs, 

individual prisoners.4 The court issued an order 

informing the parties that it would, sua sponte, “raise 

for disposition on summary judgment the issue of 

 

4. In defendants’ motion for summary judgment, 

they specify that they are requesting “judgment as a 

matter of law as to the claims of Named Plaintiffs.” 

Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. no. 768) at 2. In a 

footnote, defendants expressly define the phrase “Named 

(continued...)

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whether plaintiff Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program

... has associational standing with respect to any, 

some, or all of the claims to be litigated during Phase 

2 of this case. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 

317, 326 (1986) (recognizing that district courts have 

the authority to raise issues for disposition on 

summary judgment sua sponte, so long as the parties are 

on notice that they must come forward with any and all 

pertinent evidence).” Phase 2 Briefing Order on 

Associational Standing (doc. no. 724) at 1-2.

The court further ordered ADAP to “file a brief 

affirmatively setting forth the basis for its asserted 

associational standing and explaining the scope of this 

standing”; the brief was “to discuss any relevant case 

law and any evidence [ADAP] believes is pertinent to 

its assertion of standing,” and required defendants, 

“[i]f [they] wish to contest” ADAP’s associational

standing, to “do so in the context of their summary 

 

Plaintiffs” by listing every individual prisoner 

plaintiff, but not ADAP. Id. at 2 n.2.

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judgment motion.” Id. at 2. See Wright & Miller, 10A 

Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2720.1 (4th ed.) (“[I]f the 

court determines to enter summary judgment on a ground 

not presented or argued by the parties, the failure to 

give the losing party an opportunity to defend against 

that ground provides a ground for reversal. 

Conversely, as now expressly recognized by Rule 56(f), 

if the parties are provided with an opportunity to 

address the court's alternative ground, then summary 

judgment may properly be entered.”).

Having been placed on notice that the court would 

consider resolving the issue of associational standing 

on summary judgment, the parties filed briefs as 

directed, and the court has considered the arguments 

and evidence put forward. For the reasons explained 

below, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

56(f), the court will grant summary judgment to ADAP on 

the issue of associational standing, and, as ADAP 

requested, “uphold its associational standing to bring 

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its claims” in Phase 2A of this case. Pl. ADAP’s Br. 

on Associational Standing (doc. no. 754) at 25.

II. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment, which can be granted not only as 

to a claim or defense but also as to any “part” of a 

claim or defense, is appropriate under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 56(a) if “there is no genuine dispute 

as to any material fact” and one party “is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” Only record 

evidence--not assertions in pleadings--can create a 

dispute of material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). 

The evidence is to be viewed in the light most 

favorable to the party against which summary judgment 

is being sought or considered. Coleman v. Smith, 828 

F.2d 714, 717 (11th Cir. 1987).

III. Associational Standing

ADAP, the State’s protection and advocacy 

organization (P&A), contends that it has associational 

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standing to litigate claims that are, in essence, 

identical to those the individual plaintiffs endeavor 

to bring on behalf of the plaintiff classes.5 The court 

agrees for the following reasons.

 

5. ADAP is not only representing itself as an 

association but also serving as counsel to the 

individual named plaintiffs who represent the putative 

plaintiff class or classes. Notably, “class 

certification under Rule 23 and associational standing 

are evaluated on two different rubrics,” and an 

organization may well have associational standing even 

if the requirements of Rule 23 could not be met. See

Bhd. of Maint. of Way Emps. Div. of Int'l Bhd. of 

Teamsters v. Ind. Harbor Belt R.R. Co., 20 F. Supp. 3d 

686, 691 (N.D. Ind. 2014) (Simon, J.). Defendants also 

argue, relying on Access 4 All, Inc. v. Trump Int’l 

Hotel & Tower Condo., 458 F. Supp. 2d 160, 172-73 

(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (Karas, J.), that, even if ADAP does 

have standing to bring claims that are coextensive with 

those brought by the putative plaintiff class or 

classes, it should be denied prudential standing 

because its claims would be duplicative. This argument 

holds no water. Since ADAP’s claims mirror those of 

the class or classes, and ADAP also represents the

individual named plaintiffs, defendants will hardly be 

put to any extra trouble defending against both. If 

defendants did not contest that the individual named 

plaintiffs can proceed on their claims (both 

individually and as a class or classes), ADAP would 

presumably feel no need to continue to assert its own 

standing, essentially in the alternative.

ADAP also asserts organizational standing pursuant 

to Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982), 

(continued...)

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The Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with 

Mental Illness Act (PAIMI) authorizes P&As to bring 

litigation to address systemic problems in the 

treatment of people with mental illness.6 Specifically, 

42 U.S.C. § 10805(a)(1)(B) authorizes P&As to “pursue 

administrative, legal, or other appropriate remedies to 

ensure the protection of the rights of individuals with 

mental illness who are receiving care or treatment in 

the State”; meanwhile, § 10805(a)(1)(B) authorizes P&As 

to “pursue administrative, legal, and other remedies on 

 

and Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. 

Governor of Ga., 691 F.3d 1250, 1257 (11th Cir. 2012). 

See Fifth Am. Compl. (doc. no. 805) at 24 (“Prior to 

commencement of this lawsuit, ADAP spent significant 

time and resources advocating on behalf of prisoners 

with disabilities [including mental illness] in ADOC 

custody, monitoring and investigating the treatment and 

accommodation of prisoners with disabilities in ADOC 

custody. ADAP’s prelitigation efforts and expenditures 

of recourse were necessitated by the ADOC policies and 

practices challenged, which policies and practices 

serve to frustrate and perceptibly impair ADAP’s 

advocacy efforts and its ability to accomplish the 

statutory purposes for which it was created.”). The 

court need not address this alternative basis for 

standing at this time.

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behalf of an individual ... with mental illness” under 

certain circumstances. As many courts have explained,

and as many others have recognized in the course of 

finding that P&As have standing to bring claims on 

behalf of identifiable groups of similarly situated 

constituents, “PAIMI authorizes [P&As] to pursue claims 

for system-wide change” under subsection (a)(1)(B), in 

addition to claims on behalf of individuals pursuant to 

subsection (a)(1)(C). Univ. Legal Servs., Inc. v. St. 

Elizabeth’s Hosp., 2005 WL 3275915, at *5 (D.D.C. July 

22, 2005) (Hogan, J.); see also Brown v. Stone, 66 F. 

Supp. 2d 412, 425 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (Block, J.) 

(“Essentially, subdivision B is apparently designed to 

address systemic issues affecting the rights of 

multiple individuals. ... By contrast, subdivision C 

addresses the rights of particular individuals, and is 

significantly more restrictive....” (citations 

omitted)). As the court explained in Brown, “if

 

6. Oddly, the case law sometimes refers to this 

statute with the acronym PAMII.

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Congress merely intended for state [P&A] systems to act 

as advocates on behalf of [specific] mentally [ill] 

individuals, it would not have included (a)(1)(B) in 

the statute in addition to (a)(1)(C).” Id. at 425 

(E.D.N.Y. 1999) (Block, J.) (citation omitted). “Given 

‘the broad remedial purposes of the Act,’” the court in 

Brown concluded, the plaintiff P&A had standing to 

bring claims on behalf of “a particular group of 

individuals” it had “identified,” not by name but by 

what amounted to a description of a class: “all those” 

indigent patients in state psychiatric hospitals being 

assessed full charges for their care based on the 

defendants’ policy of charging for care any patients 

who sued for injuries arising out of their psychiatric 

treatment. Id. (quoting Rubenstein v. Benedictine 

Hosp., 790 F. Supp. 396, 409 (N.D.N.Y. 1992) (Cholakis, 

J.)).

Of course, in addition to this statutory 

authorization to bring actions on behalf of mentally 

ill individuals, ADAP must also have standing to sue 

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under Article III. The Supreme Court has articulated a 

three-part test for determining whether an organization 

has associational standing to sue on behalf of its 

members: “an association has standing to bring suit on 

behalf of its members when: (a) its members would 

otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; 

(b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to 

the organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim 

asserted nor the relief requested requires the 

participation of individual members in the lawsuit.” 

Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 

343 (1977). Although the first two prongs of the Hunt

test are constitutional requirements, the third is 

merely prudential and may be eliminated by Congress. 

United Food & Commercial Workers Union v. Brown Grp., 

Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 555-58 (1996).

The Eleventh Circuit has squarely held that P&As 

may sue on behalf of the constituents they serve just 

“like a more traditional association may sue on behalf 

of its members.” Doe v. Stincer, 175 F.3d 879, 885-86 

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(11th Cir. 1999). In so doing, it explained that a P&A 

that meets PAIMI’s requirements, despite not having 

members in a formal sense, functions as a membership 

organization, and can have associational standing to 

represent its constituents.

P&As are required under PAIMI to have a governing 

board and advisory council that include specified 

percentages of individuals or family members of 

individuals who receive or have received mental-health

care; to provide the public with an opportunity to 

comment on its activities and priorities; and to have a 

grievance system for clients and potential clients. 

See id. at 886. ADAP has shown, and defendants have 

not disputed, that ADAP meets these requirements of 

PAIMI and functions as a membership organization for 

purposes of asserting associational standing on behalf 

of its constituents, Alabamians with mental illness.

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Defendants do claim,7 however, that ADAP has not 

demonstrated that it was appropriately designated as 

the P&A that the “State shall have in effect,” per 42 

U.S.C. § 15043(a).8 This is a remarkable argument, in 

 

7. Notably, defendants, in their brief, do not go 

so far as to say that ADAP is not the State’s P&A; they 

merely challenge the adequacy of the evidence it has 

put forward to demonstrate that it was designated as 

such. Accordingly, defendants do not suggest that any 

other organization is instead the P&A, or, for that 

matter, that Alabama does not have a P&A. They also do 

not dispute that ADAP has proven that it receives, 

through the State, the federal funds that the State is 

authorized to collect only if it has a P&A. In fact, 

defendants have not presented any evidence creating a 

factual dispute regarding ADAP’s P&A status; instead, 

they assert that a P&A must be created by a state 

executive or legislative action.

8. P&As have obtained their statutory mandates 

through a series of statutes expanding their purview to 

cover additional forms of disabilities. Therefore, 

considerable cross-referencing is required. 42 U.S.C. 

§ 10805(a)(1)(B) authorizes “a system established in a 

State under section 10803 of this title” to litigate on 

behalf of individuals with mental illness; § 10803 

explains that an “eligible system[]” that receives a 

federal allotment is to “establish and administer [a] 

system ... to protect and advocate the rights of 

individuals with mental illness”; § 10802(2) defines 

the term “eligible system” to mean “the system 

established in a State to protect and advocate the 

rights of persons with developmental disabilities under 

subtitle C of the Developmental Disabilities Assistance 

(continued...)

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light of the fact that both this court and the Eleventh 

Circuit have expressly recognized ADAP as Alabama’s P&A 

for over two decades. Indeed, in Stincer itself, 175 

F.3d at 883, the court of appeals cited its affirmation 

of this court’s decision in Alabama Disabilities 

Advocacy Program v. J.S. Tarwater Developmental Center,

97 F.3d 492, 495 (11th Cir. 1996) (“The Advocacy 

Program is the federally mandated and funded P&A system 

Alabama has established pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 6042(a)(1).”), aff’g 894 F. Supp. 424, 426-27 (M.D. 

Ala. 1995) (Thompson, J.). See also Ala. Disabilities 

Advocacy Program v. SafetyNet Youthcare, Inc., 65 F. 

Supp. 3d 1312, 1321-22 (S.D. Ala. 2014) (Granade, J.), 

on reconsideration in other part, 2015 WL 566946 (S.D. 

Ala. Feb. 11, 2015); Ala. Disabilities Advocacy Program 

v. Wood, 584 F. Supp. 2d 1314, 1315 (M.D. Ala. 2008) 

 

and Bill of Rights Act of 2000”; § 15043, in turn, says 

that in order to receive a federal allotment, a “State 

shall have in effect a system to protect and advocate 

the rights of individuals with developmental 

disabilities.”

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(Thompson, J.). These repeated judicial findings alone 

probably suffice to make this argument a nonstarter.

In addition, defendants’ argument is based on a 

faulty premise. They contend that Governor George 

Wallace’s 1976 designation of the University of 

Alabama’s Legal Aid Clinic as the organization to 

implement a P&A was inadequate, because his 

communication was not labeled as an executive order 

and, in any event, he was not empowered to create a 

state agency by executive order. The rub is this: 

There is no need for a P&A to be a state agency or 

indeed a creation of the State. A State need only 

“have in effect” a P&A, not create one. Moreover, 

defendants have pointed to no state law requiring any 

particular executive or legislative action in order to 

designate a preexisting organization as the one 

authorized to serve functions outlined and receive 

monies appropriated by Congress. Although some P&As in 

other States were created by statute or executive 

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order, the manner of designation employed in Alabama 

was also entirely permissible.

Finally, at multiple prior points in the course of 

this very case, defendants have recognized ADAP as the 

State’s P&A. In advance of filing this litigation, 

ADAP investigated the treatment of prisoners with 

disabilities and mental illness in ADOC prisons across 

the State; during and in order to facilitate this 

investigation, ADAP, along with plaintiffs’ counsel, 

the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), entered into a 

“Memorandum of Understanding” with ADOC. This document 

clearly reflects the State’s understanding that ADAP is 

the State’s P&A. It states that ADOC “recognizes and 

appreciates the mission of the Alabama Disabilities 

Advocacy Program and its desire to assist and advocate 

for individuals in institutions who are identified as 

mentally ill and/or developmentally disabled.” Memo. 

of Understanding (doc. no. 754-10) at 2. Furthermore, 

the memorandum recognizes that SPLC--which was 

assisting ADAP in carrying out its functions--“may 

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request copies of inmate records,” and that “[t]hese 

will be supplied in accordance with the applicable 

authorization required by or granted under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 10805 or 42 U.S.C. § 15043.” Id. These statutory 

provisions authorize P&As--and only them--to access the 

records of their constituents. By entering into this 

agreement, ADOC necessarily recognized that ADAP was 

the State’s P&A.

Additionally, when the court asked defendants for 

their position as to whether a guardian ad litem should 

be appointed to represent the interests of a subset of 

the Phase 1 settlement class at the fairness hearing, 

the State expressed in writing its belief that this was 

unnecessary, explaining as follows: “[O]ne of the Phase 

1 Plaintiffs is [ADAP]. As stated in the complaint, 

the Amended Agreement and elsewhere in the record, ADAP 

is the duly authorized protection and advocacy agency 

in the state of Alabama for disabled persons. Given 

its unique position in this regard, ADOC believes that 

ADAP will adequately represent and protect the 

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interests of all putative class members....” Notice of 

Resp. (doc. no. 531) at 1-2. In light of the 

foregoing, defendants’ argument that ADAP is not the 

State’s P&A is meritless.

That sideshow behind it, the court turns to 

application of the first prong of Hunt--whether the 

association’s members would otherwise have standing to 

sue in their own right. In Stincer, the Eleventh 

Circuit explained that all a representative entity must 

do under Hunt’s first prong is to show “that one of its 

members or constituents has suffered an injury that 

would allow it to bring suit in its own right”; one 

constituent is enough, and he or she (and any 

additional constituents) need not be named. 175 F.3d

at 884-85; see also id. at 882 (explaining that this is 

a requirement that the member or constituent have 

“standing”). Hence, ADAP has plainly satisfied the 

first Hunt prong with respect to the Eighth Amendment 

and due-process claims the individual named plaintiffs 

have standing--as recognized in the court’s separate 

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summary-judgment opinion--to bring, because the

individual named plaintiffs are constituents of ADAP on 

whose behalf it has brought precisely the same claims 

they have brought on their own behalves.9

Furthermore, even were there no individual named 

plaintiffs in the case (either as class representatives

or as individual plaintiffs), ADAP would have standing 

to bring these claims. Stincer requires only that a 

P&A show that it has one constituent with standing to 

 

9. Defendants argue that ADAP has not satisfied 

Hunt’s first prong because the named plaintiffs have 

not exhausted available administrative remedies. A 

failure to exhaust does not impact standing because 

standing is jurisdictional, while the PLRA’s exhaustion 

requirement, the Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit 

have explained, is not. See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 

81, 101 (2006) (“[It is] clear that the PLRA exhaustion 

requirement is not jurisdictional.”); Bryant v. Rich, 

530 F.3d 1368, 1374 & n.10 (11th Cir. 2008) (same). 

Thus, even if defendants were correct (as discussed in 

the separate opinion on summary judgment with respect 

to the individual named plaintiffs, they are not) that 

the individual named plaintiffs had failed to exhaust 

available administrative remedies, and were therefore 

barred from bringing their claims by the Prison 

Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), this 

failure to exhaust would have no effect on these 

plaintiffs’ standing, and would therefore be irrelevant 

(continued...)

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bring the claim--not that an individual named plaintiff 

in the case has standing to bring the claim. (Indeed, 

there need not be any plaintiff other than the P&A; 

this is the very crux of associational standing.) 

Although not required to do so, plaintiffs have in fact 

identified, through their experts’ reports, a 

significant number of particular prisoners other than 

the individual named plaintiffs who are mentally 

ill--and are therefore constituents of ADAP and who

together have been subjected to each of the policies 

and practices being challenged here. Because this 

expert evidence demonstrates that at least one mentally 

ill prisoner has been directly exposed to and affected 

by each of these policies and practices, it further 

undergirds the court’s conclusion that ADAP has 

constituents with standing to bring its claims, and 

thus that ADAP has satisfied the first prong of Hunt.

 

to their ability to support ADAP’s associational 

standing.

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Further, plaintiffs’ experts’ systemic evidence of 

the risk of harm to mentally ill prisoners would alone, 

even absent their identification of individual 

prisoners, be sufficient to meet Hunt’s first prong;

the Eleventh Circuit has explained that, at least when 

seeking relief from a prospective harm, associations 

need only show the high likelihood of the existence of 

a member who will be harmed by the challenged policy or 

practice, but need not identify any particular member 

with such standing. See Stincer, 175 F.3d at 884 

(“[U]nder Article III’s established doctrines of 

representational standing, we have never held that a 

party suing as a representative must specifically name

the individual on whose behalf the suit is brought and 

we decline to create such a requirement in PAMII.”).

Thus, for example, in Fla. State Conference of 

N.A.A.C.P. v. Browning, 522 F.3d 1153, 1160 (11th Cir. 

2008), the court held that two organizations had 

associational standing to challenge a 

voter-registration law because, although they could not 

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identify a specific member who would be injured, it was 

highly likely that one of their members would be. See

also id. at 1160 (“When the alleged harm is 

prospective, we have not required that the 

organizational plaintiffs name names because every 

member faces a probability of harm in the near and 

definite future.”); id. at 1163 (“[P]robabilistic harm 

is enough injury in fact to confer ... standing in the 

undemanding Article III sense. ... To satisfy the 

requirements of associational standing, all that 

plaintiffs need to establish is that at least one 

member faces a realistic danger [of being harmed by the 

challenged policy].” (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted)); see also Arcia v. Fla. Sec'y of State, 

772 F.3d 1335, 1342 (11th Cir. 2014) (describing 

Browning as recognizing that associations with a large 

number of constituents can show associational standing 

based on the high probability that at least one of them

will suffer an injury).

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Defendants do not dispute that ADAP satisfies the 

second Hunt prong--that the interests ADAP seeks to 

protect in the lawsuit are germane to its purpose--with 

good reason. ADAP has been entrusted by Congress with 

the protection of and advocacy for the interests at 

issue in this litigation. See Stincer, 175 F.3d at 884 

(“The very purpose of [the enabling statutes) was to 

confer standing on protection and advocacy systems ... 

as representative bodies charged with the authority to 

protect and litigate the rights of individuals with 

[disabilities].”). One of ADAP’s priorities is 

protecting people with mental illness housed in 

institutional settings (including prisons) from abuse 

and neglect. In serving this advocacy function, ADAP 

can bring claims not only pursuant to its enabling 

statutes, but also pursuant to other statutes and 

constitutional provisions. See Ind. Prot. & Advocacy

Servs. Comm’n v. Comm’r, Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 642 F. 

Supp. 2d 872, 874 (S.D. Ind. 2009) (Hamilton, J.) 

(Eighth Amendment, ADA, and Rehabilitation Act claims); 

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25

Stincer, 175 F.3d at 880 (ADA); N.J. Prot. & Advocacy, 

Inc. v. Davy, 2005 WL 2416962, at *4 (D.N.J. Sept. 30, 

2005) (Chesler, J.) (due process); Or. Advocacy Ctr. v. 

Mink, 322 F.3d 1101, 1105 (9th Cir. 2003) (due 

process); Aiken v. Nixon, 236 F. Supp. 2d 211, 220-21 

(N.D.N.Y. 2002) (McAvoy, J.) (Fourth Amendment, ADA, 

and Rehabilitation Act); Unzueta v. Schalansky, 2002 WL 

1334854, at *3 (D. Kan. May 23, 2002) (Rogers, J.) (due 

process); Risinger v. Concannon, 117 F. Supp. 2d 61, 64 

(D. Me. 2000) (Carter, J.) (unspecified civil rights 

claims brought pursuant to § 1983); Brown, 66 F. Supp. 

2d at 416 (First Amendment and equal protection); 

Rubenstein, 790 F. Supp. at 398 (due process and equal 

protection); Goldstein v. Coughlin, 83 F.R.D. 613, 614 

(W.D.N.Y. 1979) (Curtin, J.) (Rehabilitation Act and 

unspecified constitutional claims).

As for Hunt’s prudential third prong--that neither 

the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires 

the participation of individual members in the 

lawsuit--the Eleventh Circuit appears to have 

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26

recognized in Stincer, and other courts have since 

squarely held, that Congress, by granting P&As the 

authority to pursue legal remedies to ensure the 

protection of those with disabilities, abrogated this 

requirement.10 In Oregon Advocacy Center, 322 F.3d at

1110-12, the court discussed at some length, and 

endorsed, the reasoning of Stincer. Then, it concluded 

that Congress had, by passing statutes that “explicitly 

authorize[] [P&As] to bring suit on behalf of their 

constituents,” abrogated Hunt’s third, prudential 

prong. Id. at 1113 (reasoning based on United Food, 

517 U.S. at 548-49, in which the Supreme Court held 

that Congress, “by specifically authorizing the union 

to sue for its members’ damages,” had “without doubt” 

abrogated the third prong of Hunt). Numerous other 

 

10. In Stincer, the court explained that the third 

prong could be abrogated by Congress, and, in not 

addressing it further, suggested that the plaintiff P&A 

would not need to meet it. 175 F.3d at 882-83. 

However, because the court remanded the case after 

finding that the record did not yet establish that the 

P&A had met Hunt’s first prong, Stincer did not 

(continued...)

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27

district courts have reached the same conclusion. See

Ind. Prot. & Advocacy Servs. Comm’n, 642 F. Supp. 2d at

878; Joseph S. v. Hogan, 561 F. Supp. 2d 280, 307 

(E.D.N.Y. 2008) (Cogan, J.); N.J. Prot. & Advocacy, 

Inc., 2005 WL 2416962, at *2; Univ. Legal Servs., Inc.,

2005 WL 3275915, at *4; Unzueta, 2002 WL 1334854, at 

*3; Pa. Prot. & Advocacy, Inc. v. Houston, 136 F. Supp. 

2d 353, 364-65 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (Antwerpen, J.); 

Risinger, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 68-70.

This is not to say that the claims ADAP has brought 

could not satisfy Hunt’s third prong--that they do not 

required the participation of individual constituents

in the litigation. Indeed, ADAP’s claims would

generally pass that test, for much the same reason that 

they present common questions suitable for class-wide 

resolution. Because ADAP seeks uniform injunctive 

relief throughout the prison system rather than 

individualized relief, and because its most critical 

 

explicitly and conclusively hold that the third prong 

does not apply to P&As.

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evidence consists of expert testimony, deposition 

testimony of mental-health providers and ADOC 

employees, and documentary evidence such as medical 

records and audits, the participation of any particular 

prisoner in the litigation is unnecessary. See Univ. 

Legal Servs., 2005 WL 3275915, at *5 (“[R]ather than 

seeking individualized relief, ULS seeks injunctive 

remedies that would bring institution-wide relief for 

its constituents. ULS could meet its burden by 

presenting evidence of its claims of institutional 

neglect and other problems through the use of medical 

records, audits, depositions of Defendants, expert and

fact witness testimony, and other relevant documents 

and written discovery. The mere need to show 

individualized harm to the patients is not enough to 

offend Hunt’s third prong without a clear need for 

their direct participation in the litigation itself.”).

The fact that the assessments and treatments ADAP 

contends will be improved by the systemic reforms they 

seek will necessarily be individualized does not mean 

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that the participation of individual constituents would 

be required. In Joseph S., a case litigated in the 

Eastern District of New York, an advocacy organization 

and two individual named plaintiffs brought ADA claims 

on behalf of mentally ill persons in highly restrictive 

nursing homes. “Although the injunctive relief that 

plaintiffs [sought] would, if granted, require 

individualized evaluations of whether persons with 

mental illness could appropriately receive care and 

treatment in a setting more integrated than a nursing 

home,” the court found that Hunt’s third requirement 

would be met because “these individualized assessments 

would be completed by defendants, not the court,” such 

that the participation of individual members in the 

litigation would not be required. 561 F. Supp. 2d at 

308-09 (relying on Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace 

& Agric. Implement Workers of Am. v. Brock, 477 U.S. 

274 (1986)); see also id. at 308 (explaining that “the 

fact that participation by some individuals may be 

required--for example, to demonstrate the general 

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manner in which defendants fail to ensure that 

individuals discharged from psychiatric wards or 

hospitals are properly screened before they are placed 

in nursing homes--is not fatal to associational 

standing”).

IV. Exhaustion

Defendants raised for the first time at oral 

argument the contention that ADAP itself failed to 

exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit. 

Because exhaustion does not go to standing, the court 

will not resolve this issue on summary judgment. 

Instead, the court will briefly explain why the current 

record strongly suggests that ADAP has adequately 

exhausted.11

 

11. Defendants’ argument that ADAP would lack 

associational standing if the individual named 

plaintiffs had failed to exhaust has been dispatched 

with above. See supra n.9.

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PAIMI explicitly addresses the issue of exhaustion 

by P&As prior to the initiation of legal action in 42 

U.S.C. § 10807, which provides:

“(a) Prior to instituting any legal action in a 

Federal or State court on behalf of an

individual with mental illness, an eligible 

system ... shall exhaust in a timely manner all 

administrative remedies where appropriate. If, 

in pursuing administrative remedies, the system 

... determines that any matter with respect to 

such individual will not be resolved within a 

reasonable time, the system ... may pursue 

alternative remedies, including the initiation 

of a legal action.

“(b) Subsection (a) of this section does not 

apply to any legal action instituted to prevent 

or eliminate imminent serious harm to an 

individual with mental illness.”

There is very little case law interpreting this 

provision, but what does exist makes clear that 

§ 10807’s requirement is not a strict one. In Gonzalez 

v. Martinez, 756 F. Supp. 1533 (S.D. Fla. 1991) 

(Nesbitt, J.), a court in this circuit discussed at 

some length the meaning of the phrase “where 

appropriate.” Recognizing that the plain language was 

not illuminating, the court turned to the legislative 

history of the provision:

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“It is the belief of the Committee that 

conciliation, negotiation, mediation and other 

administrative procedures can work effectively 

in providing protection and advocacy of the 

mentally ill, especially because litigation in 

most instances is costly and time consuming. 

The Committee recognizes the experience of the 

[P&A] System in implementing such negotiation 

and mediation on behalf of persons with 

disabilities, as well as the system’s use of 

other administrative remedies in lieu of 

litigation. The Committee further notes that 

only 5 percent of [P&A] cases in 1984 have 

resulted in court action. The Committee 

intends that the [P&A] System in its new role 

as the eligible protection and advocacy system 

for mentally ill persons under this Act should 

continue the non-litigative approach to 

advocacy and dispute resolution and urges the 

continued use of administrative and alternative 

remedies prior to the initiation of a legal 

action.

“It is not the intention of the Committee that 

the administrative remedies must be pursued for 

an unreasonable duration, but rather that 

whenever possible there should be timely and 

reasonable attempts made to mediate and 

negotiate appropriate administrative remedies. 

If the pursuit of administrative remedies has 

not solved any matter within a reasonable time, 

the eligible system may pursue alternative 

remedies, including the initiation of a legal 

action.”

Id. at 1537-38 (quoting S. Rep. No. 109, 99th Cong., 2d 

Sess., reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1361, 1371); see

also id. at 1538 (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 576, 99th 

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Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1377, 

1382-83 (“The conferees recognize ... that exhaustion 

of administrative remedies may delay action on behalf 

of mentally ill individuals and have authorized the 

system to proceed with legal action when unreasonable 

delays exist. If legal action is initiated, courts 

retain their prerogative to determine that the issues 

are not ripe and to remand the matter for further 

administrative consideration.”)).

The Gonzalez court then went on to reject the 

argument by defendants that § 10807 requires exhaustion 

of all administrative remedies, not only those that

would “prove adequate under the traditional 

judicially-created exhaustion doctrine,” and the court 

noted that the discussion of the court’s “prerogative” 

in the House Report supports the conclusion that courts 

retain “substantial discretion” in determining whether 

a P&A has adequately exhausted. Id. at 1539; see also

Mich. Prot. & Advocacy Serv., Inc. v. Evans, 2010 WL 

3906259, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 30, 2010) (Hood, J.) 

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(agreeing). The court concluded, moreover, that the 

state statutory remedies defendants argued the P&A 

should have exhausted--such as filing individual 

grievances--were not “adequate to provide relief for 

the type of egregious, systemic abuse that [the P&A] 

alleges.” Gonzalez, 756 F. Supp. at 1538 (applying the 

exhaustion doctrine set out in Patsy v. Fla. Int’l 

Univ., 634 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1981)).

Another court has characterized § 10807 as 

“impos[ing] a limited obligation on a [P&A] to make 

some efforts to pursue administrative remedies before 

filing suit.” Mich. Prot. & Advocacy Serv., Inc. v. 

Flint Cmty. Sch., 146 F. Supp. 3d 897, 905 (E.D. Mich. 

2015) (Lawson, J.); see also id. at 906 (“The 

defendants were unable or unwilling, on repeated 

occasions, to complete any satisfactory response to the 

plaintiff’s ... requests in a timely manner, and they 

therefore forfeited any right they had to handle the 

resulting ... disputes with the plaintiff exclusively 

through administrative channels.”); Prot. & Advocacy 

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for Persons with Disabilities v. Armstrong, 266 F. 

Supp. 2d 303, 313 (D. Conn. 2003) (Squatrito, J.) 

(concluding that the P&A had satisfied the exhaustion 

requirement by “attempt[ing] to request” the relief 

sought in the litigation, which the defendant “declined 

to provide”); Advocacy Ctr. v. Stalder, 128 F. Supp. 2d 

358, 365 (M.D. La. 1999) (Parker, J.) (same).

Therefore, it appears that the pretrial efforts of 

ADAP to bring its claims to the attention of defendants 

and seek to resolve them without litigation were 

sufficient to satisfy § 10807.

On April 9, 2014, a couple of months before this 

lawsuit was filed, ADAP and the SPLC sent the ADOC 

Commissioner a letter reporting the results of a 

lengthy investigation they had conducted.12 As noted in 

the letter, this investigation included interviews with 

dozens of prisoners, facility inspections throughout 

 

12. The Commissioner at the time was Kim Thomas, 

not Jefferson Dunn. Because this is an 

official-capacity suit, they are treated as one and the 

same.

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ADOC’s major institutions, and reviews of thousands of 

pages of medical records, policies, contracts, reports, 

and other documents. The authors of the letter 

asserted that Alabama’s prisoners were not being 

provided constitutionally adequate mental-health care 

because of a shortage of mental-health professionals 

and a regular failure to adequately diagnose and treat 

mentally ill prisoners.

The letter pointed to evidence regarding 

understaffing, including the following: There were just 

6.2 psychiatrists for the entire prison system, which 

left 11,000 prisoners--including 1,166 on the 

mental-health caseload--in a facility with no 

psychiatric staffing at all. It also noted that only 

3.5 psychologists were employed in the prison 

system--roughly half the ratio that existed in the 

1970s, when the level of mental-health staffing was 

found to be unconstitutionally inadequate. The letter 

also cited to the fact that the overall level of 

mental-health staffing present in ADOC facilities was

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37

significantly lower than the minimum level set by ADOC

in its request for proposals.

The letter also asserted that ADOC was 

under-identifying prisoners with mental illness, 

especially those with severe mental illnesses. This 

conclusion, the letter made clear, was based on a

comparison of ADOC statistics to those found in a 2006 

Department of Justice study; ADAP and SPLC also 

identified 853 prisoners who, in light of ADOC’s own 

documentation of their mental illness, should have been 

classified as in need of more intensive mental-health 

treatment. They further reported their findings that 

only 9 % of prisoners received psychotropic medication, 

that many of those prisoners had almost no interaction 

with the prescribing professionals, that prisoners were 

taken off their medications and the mental-health 

caseload despite still needing treatment and despite 

continued self-injury and suicide attempts, that 

prisoners entering custody faced long delays in 

receiving medication, that less effective medications 

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38

were prescribed to save money, and that a shortage of 

custodial staff caused medication delivery to be 

delayed, skipped, and performed incorrectly.

The letter also explained that, according to an 

ADOC report, more than 30 prisoners whom mental-health 

staff had diagnosed as having a serious mental illness 

were housed in the general population in facilities 

with few mental-health staff (including 7 in a facility 

with no psychiatric staffing at all); that 270 

prisoners, who were housed in residential treatment 

units due to their serious mental illnesses, received 

only cursory psychotherapy; and that prisoners who were 

acutely psychotic and a danger to themselves received 

little treatment besides being placed in a suicide cell 

where, once a day, a mental-health provider would stop 

by for less than five minutes. The letter also 

addressed ADOC’s practice of providing razor blades to 

suicidal prisoners, including those housed in the 

residential treatment units and those with a documented 

history of suicide attempts.

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39

Finally, the letter described ADOC’s failure to 

provide due process when involuntarily medicating

prisoners with mental illness. The authors discussed

30 prisoners suffering from mild impairment in mental 

functioning who they contended were unjustifiably 

subject to involuntary-medication orders.

As James Tucker, ADAP’s Executive Director, 

testified, “The demand letter conveyed an 

identification of the issues that needed to be 

remedied.” Tucker Depo. (doc. no. 754-1) at 175. The 

letter explained that while its authors were “ready to 

fully litigate this matter in federal court,” they 

“believe[d] that it would in the best interests of all 

parties at this time to resolve these violations 

through a stipulated injunction,” and requested that 

defendant “let [them] know whether [they were] willing 

to enter into discussion regarding how to resolve the 

issues presented below.” Letter (doc. no. 754-11) at 

2. Because, as Tucker put it, there was not “a meeting 

of the minds about how both sides might work together 

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to achieve a resolution,” plaintiffs filed this 

lawsuit. Tucker Depo. (doc. no. 754-1) at 175.13

The current record reflects that ADAP attempted to 

resolve the issues identified in the letter informally, 

but that it “determine[d]”14 that they would “not be 

resolved within a reasonable time.” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 10807(a).

Moreover, in light of the fact that this lawsuit 

was initiated to challenge a system of inadequate 

mental-health care that plaintiffs contend, and have 

 

13. Although ADAP and plaintiffs’ counsel did have 

a meeting with the Commissioner in late May 2014, 

before the suit was filed, and defendants assert in 

their answer that plaintiffs’ counsel did not 

“express[] any concerns over the ‘urgency’ of the 

issues discussed, and, in fact, refused to provide any 

meaningful information in order to address concerns 

raised because of their commitment to instituting this 

action,” there is no evidence in the current record in 

support of this contention. Defs’ Answer (doc. no. 

834) at 34-35. Indeed, their position appears to be 

belied by the detailed nature of the 26-page letter, 

which concludes by expressing the view that “the 

concerns in this letter are serious issues and should 

be resolved in the most expeditious and effective way.” 

Letter (doc. no. 754-11) at 27.

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41

offered evidence to show, causes serious harm to 

mentally ill prisoners on a daily basis--as one 

example, they challenge inadequacies in crisis care 

including access by suicidal prisoners to razor 

blades--the court further note that the record strongly 

suggests that ADAP was exempt from the exhaustion 

requirement pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 10807(b), which 

allows the immediate filing, without any attempt at 

exhaustion, of “any legal action instituted to prevent 

or eliminate imminent serious harm to a mentally ill 

individual.”

The PLRA’s exhaustion requirement, on the other 

hand, does not apply to P&As. As the Eleventh Circuit 

as explained, the plain language of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e 

reveals the scope of its applicability: it requires 

exhaustion by “a prisoner.” “Prisoner” is defined in 

42 U.S.C. 1997e(h) to mean “any person incarcerated or 

detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted 

 

14. The plain text of the provision merely requires 

that the P&A make such a “determin[ation],” not that it 

(continued...)

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42

of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, 

violations of criminal law.” Jackson v. State Bd. of 

Pardons & Paroles, 331 F.3d 790, 795 (11th Cir. 2003). 

As this court has previously explained in another case 

brought by ADAP, “[t]he provisions respecting prisoner 

suits ... do not apply because ADAP is clearly not a 

‘prisoner’ under the statute. ... ADAP is not a 

‘person’ and has neither been incarcerated nor 

detained.” Ala. Disabilities Advocacy Program, 584 F. 

Supp. 2d at 1316.

This accords with the sensible conclusions reached 

by a number of other courts that the estates and 

guardians of prisoners are not “prisoners” and are 

therefore not subject to the PLRA’s exhaustion 

requirement. See Tretter v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 558 F. 

App’x 155, 157–58 (3d Cir. 2014) (administrator of 

prisoner’s estate); Anderson v. Cty. of Salem, 2010 WL 

3081070, at *2 (D.N.J. Aug. 5, 2010) (Bumb, J.) 

(administrator of prisoner’s estate); Torres-Rios v. 

 

be an objectively reasonable one.

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Pereira-Castillo, 545 F. Supp. 2d 204, 206 (D.P.R. 

2007) (Besosa, J.) (administrator of prisoner’s 

estate); Netters v. Tenn. Dep’t of Corr., 2005 WL 

2113587, at *3 n.3 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 30, 2005) (Mays, 

J.) (guardians of prisoner’s minor next-of-kin); 

Rivera-Rodriguez v. Pereira-Castillo, 2005 WL 290160, 

at *6 (D.P.R. Jan. 31, 2005) (Delgado-Colon, M.J.) 

(guardians of minor prisoner).15

A couple of additional points bear mention. First, 

as a practical matter, there is no evidence in the 

current record to suggest that ADAP would be able to 

submit a grievance to MHM on behalf of a prisoner; in 

 

15. The Supreme Court held in Jones v. Bock that 

the PLRA’s requirement of exhaustion does not create a 

total exhaustion rule, wherein the failure of a 

prisoner to exhaust one claim would bar him from 

bringing other, exhausted claims. 549 U.S. 199, 220-21 

(2007). Courts have concluded, by analogy to Jones, 

that the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement is not 

applicable to the claims of non-prisoners brought 

alongside those of prisoners. See Apanovich v. Taft, 

2006 WL 2077040, at *4 (S.D. Ohio July 21, 2006) (King, 

M.J.); Arsberry v. Illinois, 244 F.3d 558, 561-62 (7th 

Cir. 2001) (concluding that the failure of prisoner 

plaintiffs to exhaust their administrative remedies did 

(continued...)

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that very concrete sense, it is not “available” to 

ADAP. Second, it would conflict with ADAP’s statutory 

purpose and the associational standing doctrine just 

discussed to allow ADAP to bring claims only on behalf 

of prisoners who had themselves exhausted an 

administrative grievance process (assuming one were 

available to exhaust). This is because P&As have an 

essential role in advocating on behalf of prisoners 

with disabilities, whether mental or physical, that 

render it difficult or impossible for them to advocate 

for themselves. Although the court has not found and 

need not find that the individual named plaintiffs in 

this case would necessarily be incapable of filing 

grievances, common sense dictates that some severely 

mentally ill prisoners will be unable to do so. 

Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit’s associational standing 

case law recognizes that an association seeking 

prospective injunctive relief need not necessarily 

 

not “dispose of” the claims of the non-prisoner 

plaintiffs).

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identify any particular constituent to show that one 

has standing. If the P&A need not identify any 

particular prisoner by name, it certainly cannot be 

expected to exhaust a particular prisoner’s 

administrative remedies prior to filing suit.

V. Conclusion

Finally, the court pauses to note that litigation 

of the claims in this case by ADAP is not merely an 

alternative, but in significant ways preferable, to

litigation solely by the individual named plaintiffs. 

Review of the individual named plaintiffs’ depositions 

and other record evidence reveals that, although many 

of them are quite lucid, some clearly experience 

difficulties with communication, whether due to 

intellectual disabilities, symptoms of mental illness, 

or a combination. In passing PAIMI, and in authorizing 

P&As to engage in legal advocacy on behalf of mentally 

ill constituents, Congress recognized that these 

constituents’ impairments will often make it difficult 

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for them to recognize, understand, articulate, and 

advocate for their own rights. See Stincer, 175 F.3d 

at 884 (“The very purpose of PAMII was to confer 

standing on protection and advocacy systems ... as 

representative bodies charged with the authority to 

protect and litigate the rights of individuals with 

mental illness.”); see also S. Rep. No. 100-454, 100th 

Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3217, 

3227 (discussing the PAIMI Amendments Act of 1988) 

(“Informing a mentally ill individual of his or her 

rights is a critical function of a protection and 

advocacy system. It is also the Committee’s 

expectation that the system will communicate this 

information to and respond to questions by mentally ill 

individuals in an appropriate, meaningful, and 

effective manner, taking into consideration the nature 

and severity of the particular individual’s 

disability.”).

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***

An appropriate summary judgment in favor of ADAP 

with respect to its associational standing to bring the 

Phase 2A claims in this case will be entered, and 

ADAP’s Phase 2A claims will proceed to trial

DONE, this the 25th day of November, 2016.

 /s/ Myron H. Thompson 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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