Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-00045/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-00045-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Petition for Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NATHANIEL JONES,

Plaintiff,

v.

MR. COOPER MORTGAGE, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:19-cv-0045 JAM DB PS

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Plaintiff, Nathaniel Jones, is proceeding pro se in this action. Therefore, the matter was 

referred to the undersigned in accordance with Local Rule 302(c)(21) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

Pending before the undersigned are defendants’ motions to dismiss the amended complaint 

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 12(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (ECF Nos. 25 

& 26.) For the reasons stated below, the undersigned will recommend that defendants’ motions to 

dismiss be granted and that plaintiff’s amended complaint be dismissed without leave to amend. 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, commenced this action on November 13, 2018, by filing a 

complaint in the Sacramento County Superior Court. (ECF No. 1 at 4.1) The original complaint 

asserted state law causes of action for breach of contract, negligence, violation of California 

 

1 Page number citations such as this one are to the page number reflected on the court’s CM/ECF 

system and not to page numbers assigned by the parties.

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Business & Professions Code § 17200, and numerous alleged violations of California Civil Code 

sections. (Id.) On January 4, 2019, defendant Real Time Resolutions, Inc. (“Real Time”)

removed the matter to this court pursuant to diversity jurisdiction. (Id. at 1.) 

On June 17, 2019, the undersigned issued an order dismissing the original complaint with 

leave to amend. (ECF No. 22.) Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on July 6, 2019. (ECF No. 

23.) Therein, plaintiff alleges as follows. Plaintiff purchased a home in Elk Grove, California—

the subject property—in 2005 with a mortgage through Countrywide LLC, (“Countrywide”). 

(Am. Compl. (ECF No. 23) at 4.) On February 23, 2006, plaintiff “entered into an agreement” 

with Countrywide for a home equity line of credit (“HELOC”). (Id.) Plaintiff, however, “never 

received a call, check, or credit card or access,” and “never spent one cent of the line of credit, but 

was charged a premium.” (Id.) 

In 2009, Bank of America, N.A. (“BANA”) acquired Countrywide. (Id. at 5.) In 

February of 2009, plaintiff spoke with BANA “loan officer Mr. Long . . . to discuss the disputed 

HELOC.” (Id.) BANA later informed plaintiff that they “couldn’t find any expenditures” and 

would issue plaintiff a “forgiveness letter” and “will report to all three credit agenc[ies] debt 

cleared with 0 balance paid in full.” (Id.) BANA “did as they said with the exception of the 

letter.” (Id.) Thereafter, BANA offered plaintiff “to modify Plaintiff[’s] loan.” (Id.) 

On November 13, 2013, “NOW COMES” defendant Nationstar Mortgage, LLC d/b/a Mr. 

Cooper (“Nationstar”), BANA, and Deutsche Bank (“DB”), “as servicer[.]” (Id.) In this 

transition, BANA “misplaced” plaintiff’s third payment under the terms of the loan modification 

“and terminated the mod.” (Id.) Plaintiff “sued” in 2015 “and settled with a principal reduction 

of 180,000.00 divided over three years[.]” (Id.) “All litigation ceased [and] Plaintiff released his 

attorney 1-2017.” (Id.) Defendant Nationstar issued plaintiff the final cancellation in April of 

2018, “after Plaintiff had filed with IRS . . . this act cause Plaintiff to loss (sic) financially.” (Id.

at 5-6.) 

On May 24, 2015, plaintiff entered into an “agreement” with Keep Your Home CA, 

(“KHYC”). (Id. at 6.) Thereafter, KHYC disbursed “funds to Nationstar/Deutsche Bank upon 

receipt of monthly statement[.]” (Id.) “During this period Nationstar changes its name 

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unknowingly to Plaintiff due to Mr. Cooper failure to notify plaintiff . . . in violation of 12 USC 

2601(a)[.]” (Id.) From November of 2017, through January of 2018, Mr. Cooper Mortgage, 

(“Mr. Cooper”), sent plaintiff’s monthly statement to an “unauthorized address[.]” (Id.) 

In late January of 2018, plaintiff “received a notice of default[.]” (Id.) At the “end of Jan. 

2018” plaintiff was informed that “Mr. Cooper force placed insurance without contacting 

Plaintiff.” (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff contacted a representative for Mr. Cooper “by phone on or about 

Feb. 2 2018 to discuss the default.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff spoke with a “Mr. Lake” who “stated Plaintiff was 3 months behind and didn’t 

know why Plaintiff mail went to a unauthorized address[.]” (Id.) Plaintiff was told to submit a 

payment in the amount of $6,529.56. (Id.) “Plaintiff agreed and told Mr. Lake [plaintiff] would 

send those payments immediately[.]” (Id.) On February 26, 2018, plaintiff sent a payment in the 

amount of $2,715 “which made Plaintiff current[.]” (Id.) 

“Nevertheless Plaintiff received another default notice at end of Feb. 2018.” (Id.) On 

March 1, 2018, plaintiff spoke with “Specialist Mansfield,” a representative of Mr. Cooper. (Id.) 

Plaintiff again requested “copies of missing monthly statements,” which plaintiff has never 

received. (Id.) Plaintiff was informed that plaintiff “was still in default according to Feb. letter 

and that’s why the ins. was placed on the property.” (Id.) Plaintiff received a monthly statement 

on March 23, 2018, which informed plaintiff “your loan exceeds 90 days past due,” and that 

plaintiff was “no longer eligible to receive KYHC modifications or Pay for performance 

incentive[.]” (Id.) 

Based on these allegations, the amended complaint asserts several new causes of action 

including violation of California’s Rosenthal Fair Debt Collections Practices Act, California 

Business and Professions Code § 17200, et. seq., the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act 

(“FDCPA”), the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act,

California’s Consumers Legal Remedies Act, breach of the implied covenant of good faith, 

negligent misrepresentation, and conspiracy. (Am. Compl. (ECF No. 23) at 1.) On July 24, 

2019, defendant Real Time filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint. (ECF No. 25.) On 

July 29, 2019, defendants Nationstar and DB also filed a motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 26.) 

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Plaintiff filed oppositions on August 16, 2019. (ECF Nos. 27 & 28.) Defendants filed replies on 

August 23, 2019. (ECF Nos. 29 & 30.) Defendants’ motions to dismiss were taken under 

submission on August 26, 2019. (ECF No. 31.) 

STANDARDS

I. Legal Standards Applicable to Motions to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)

The purpose of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the legal 

sufficiency of the complaint. N. Star Int’l v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, 720 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir. 

1983). “Dismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of 

sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 

F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). A plaintiff is required to allege “enough facts to state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A 

claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

In determining whether a complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, the 

court accepts as true the allegations in the complaint and construes the allegations in the light 

most favorable to the plaintiff. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Love v. 

United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1989). In general, pro se complaints are held to less 

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 

520-21 (1972). However, the court need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the 

form of factual allegations. United States ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th 

Cir. 1986). While Rule 8(a) does not require detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than 

an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A 

pleading is insufficient if it offers mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the 

elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 

(“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements, do not suffice.”). Moreover, it is inappropriate to assume that the plaintiff “can prove 

facts which it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated the . . . laws in ways that have 

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not been alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 

459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).

In ruling on a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court is permitted 

to consider material which is properly submitted as part of the complaint, documents that are not 

physically attached to the complaint if their authenticity is not contested and the plaintiff’s 

complaint necessarily relies on them, and matters of public record. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 

250 F.3d 668, 688-89 (9th Cir. 2001).

II. Legal Standards Applicable to Motions For a More Definite Statement Pursuant to 

Rule 12(e)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e) provides:

A party may move for a more definite statement of a pleading to 

which a responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or 

ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response. The 

motion must be made before filing a responsive pleading and must 

point out the defects complained of and the details desired. If the 

court orders a more definite statement and the order is not obeyed 

within 14 days after notice of the order or within the time the court 

sets, the court may strike the pleading or issue any other appropriate 

order.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e); see also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002) (“If a 

pleading fails to specify the allegations in a manner that provides sufficient notice, a defendant 

can move for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e) before responding.”); C.B. v. Sonora 

Sch. Dist., 691 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1190-91 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (“A Rule 12(e) motion is proper only 

if the complaint is so indefinite that the defendant cannot ascertain the nature of the claim being 

asserted, i.e., so vague that the defendant cannot begin to frame a response.”).

“Motions pursuant to Rule 12(e) are generally ‘viewed with disfavor and are rarely 

granted[.]’” Nguyen v. CTS Electronics Manufacturing Solutions Inc., 301 F.R.D. 337, 340 

(N.D. Cal. 2014) (quoting E.E.O.C. v. Alia Corp., 842 F.Supp.2d 1243, 1250 (E.D. Cal. 2012)).

A court should deny a motion for a more definite statement “if the complaint is specific enough to 

notify [a] defendant of the substance of the claim being asserted” or “if the detail sought by a 

motion for more definite statement is obtainable through discovery.” C.B., 691 F. Supp. 2d at 

1191. A Rule 12(e) motion “is likely to be denied where the substance of the claim has been 

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alleged, even though some of the details are omitted.” Neveu v. City of Fresno, 392 F. Supp. 2d 

1159, 1169 (E.D. Cal. 2005). This liberal pleading standard is consistent with Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 8(a) which allows pleadings that simply contain a “short and plain statement of 

the claim.” Id. 

ANALYSIS

Review of plaintiff’s amended complaint finds that it should be dismissed for failure to 

state a claim. The undersigned’s order issued June 17, 2019, advised plaintiff that although the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure adopt a flexible pleading policy, a complaint must give the 

defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claims and must allege facts that state the elements of each 

claim plainly and succinctly. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Jones v. Community Redev. Agency, 733 

F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic 

recitation of the elements of cause of action will not do.’ Nor does a complaint suffice if it 

tenders ‘naked assertions’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancements.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557). A plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of 

particularity overt acts which the defendants engaged in that support the plaintiff’s claims. Jones, 

733 F.2d at 649. Here, the amended complaint fails to meet these standards. 

Instead, the amended complaint identifies four defendants and references dates spanning 

April of 2005 to December of 2018. (Am. Compl. (ECF No. 23) at 4, 10.) The amended 

complaint begins by alleging as follows:

Plaintiff is ignorant of true names and capacities of all Def’s sued. 

Def’s are contractually, strictly, negligently, intentionally, 

fraudulently, vicariously liable and or otherwise legally responsible 

in some manner for each and every act, omission, obligations, event 

or happening set forth in this Amend Complaint, and that each of said 

fictitiously name Def’s is indebted to Plaintiff as hereinafter alleged. 

The use of the term “Def’s” in any of the allegations in the complaint, 

unless specially otherwise set forth, it intended to include and charge 

all jointly and severely, not only named Def’s, but all who [are] 

silent.

Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that, at all times 

mentioned herein Def’s were agents, servants, employee’s, alter 

egos, supervisors, dedicated specialist, successors, in the interest,

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joint venture and/or co-def’s, conspirators with permission and 

consent of their co Def’s[.]

(Id. at 2-3.) 

None of the amended complaint’s nine asserted causes of action identifies specifically 

which defendant or defendants the cause of action is asserted against. Nor do the causes of action 

state the elements of the claim with factual allegations offered in support. Moreover, in alleging 

the specific causes of action the amended complaint frequently uses the vague and ambiguous 

“Def.’s” instead of referring to a specific defendant or defendants. (Id. at 12-17.)

The amended complaint ends by concluding:

Plaintiff is a victim of predatory lending business practices, ID theft, 

by employees of said entities for 14 years and has suffered . . . at 

hands of all defendants aiding, assisting each other contractional, 

strictly, negligently, intentionally, fraudulently, vicariously liable 

and otherwise legally responsible in some manner for each and every 

acts, omissions, obligations, events, or happenings, set forth in this 

Amend Complaint herein. 

(Id. at 17.) 

Moreover, it is entirely unclear from the amended complaint’s vague and conclusory 

factual allegations that the moving defendants engaged in any wrongful conduct. In this regard, 

the amended complaint alleges that defendant Nationstar/Mr. Cooper failed to send plaintiff 

monthly statements from November of 2017, to January of 2018, and that defendant “had no right 

or authority or responsibility to send mortgage statements to anyone other than Plaintiff[.]” (Id. at 

6.) 

However, the amended complaint also alleges that plaintiff “sued BOA 2015,” and that 

“litigation ceased” in January of 2017. (Id. at 5.) Attached to plaintiff’s original complaint is a 

February 1, 2018 letter from plaintiff’s former attorney asking defendant Nationstar/Mr. Cooper

to “cancel our prior designation and communicate with the borrower[] directly[.]”2 (ECF No. 1 at 

 

2 The court may take judicial notice of its own files and of documents filed in other courts. 

Reyn’s Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 n. 6 (9th Cir. 2006) (taking 

judicial notice of documents related to a settlement in another case that bore on whether the 

plaintiff was still able to assert its claims in the pending case); Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena 

Airport Auth. v. City of Burbank, 136 F.3d 1360, 1364 (9th Cir. 1998) (taking judicial notice of 

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29.) Also attached is a January 31, 2018 letter from this same attorney to defendant asking them 

to “not send any further mortgage statements . . . on behalf” of plaintiff. (Id. at 30.) And attached 

to the amended complaint is a January 29, 2018 IRS “Cancellation of Debt” form reflecting that 

on May 5, 2017, defendant Nationstar/Mr. Cooper discharged $61,423.00 of plaintiff’s debt. 

(Am. Compl. (ECF No. 23) at 29.) The letter was sent to plaintiff “C/O” plaintiff’s former 

attorney. (Id.) In this regard, it appears defendant could not directly communicate with plaintiff 

during the time period alleged and was instead communicating with plaintiff’s attorney. 

The amended complaint also alleges that after plaintiff learned that “Plaintiff was 3 

months behind” and owed $6,529.56, “Plaintiff agreed [to] send those payments immediately[.]” 

(Id. at 7.) But plaintiff did not send those payments. Instead, the amended complaint alleges 

plaintiff sent only $2,175. (Id.) Thus, plaintiff was not “current.” (Id.) To the contrary, attached 

to the amended complaint is a February 19, 2019 Informational Statement from defendant Mr. 

Cooper to plaintiff reflecting that plaintiff owes $31,347.60 in unpaid monthly payments. (Id. at 

46.) 

With respect to defendant Real Time, the amended complaint’s allegations are equally, if 

not more, confusing. The amended complaint alleges defendant “RTR alleges that they are a debt 

collector and are 2nd lien holders and collectors on said property.” (Id. at 10.) After filing the 

complaint in this action, plaintiff was contacted by Real Time’s “In House Attorney . . . to discuss 

a settlement[.]” (Id.) During this call plaintiff “shared information regarding BOA forgiveness of 

debt” and Real Time’s attorney “said he would get back to” plaintiff. (Id.) 

In a subsequent phone call “regarding settlement” plaintiff “asked who was the stake 

holders RTR was representing in this 2nd lien” and Real Time’s attorney “replied BOA” leaving 

plaintiff “stunned and outraged[.]” (Id.) The amended complaint alleges “BOA made a promise 

to forgive the 2nd lien . . . but hired or created RTR to service the loan[.]” (Id.) Even assuming,

////

 

court filings in a state court case where the same plaintiff asserted similar and related claims); 

Hott v. City of San Jose, 92 F.Supp.2d 996, 998 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (taking judicial notice of

relevant memoranda and orders filed in state court cases).

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arguendo, these allegations are true it is entirely unclear what plaintiff is alleging defendant Real 

Time did wrong. 

LEAVE TO AMEND

For the reasons stated above, plaintiff’s amended complaint should be dismissed. The 

undersigned has carefully considered whether plaintiff could further amend the complaint to state 

a claim upon which relief could be granted. Valid reasons for denying leave to amend include 

undue delay, bad faith, prejudice, and futility.” California Architectural Bldg. Prod. v. Franciscan 

Ceramics, 818 F.2d 1466, 1472 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Klamath-Lake Pharm. Ass’n v. Klamath 

Med. Serv. Bureau, 701 F.2d 1276, 1293 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that while leave to amend shall 

be freely given, the court does not have to allow futile amendments). 

In light of the deficiencies noted above, and plaintiff’s prior inability to successfully 

amend the complaint, the undersigned finds that it would be futile to grant plaintiff further leave 

to amend. Therefore, the undersigned will recommend that plaintiff not be granted further leave 

to amend.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Defendant Real Time Resolution, Inc.’s July 24, 2019 motion to dismiss (ECF No. 25) 

be granted;

2. Defendants Nationstar Mortgage LLC and Deutsche Bank National Trust Company’s 

July 29, 2019 motion to dismiss (ECF No. 26) be granted;

3. The amended complaint be dismissed without further leave to amend3; and

3. This action be closed.

 

3 Although the amended complaint names an additional defendant who has not appeared, where 

appropriate the court may sua sponte dismiss an action with prejudice in favor of a party that has 

not appeared where that party is in a similar position to the moving defendant. See Abagninin v. 

AMVAC Chem. Corp., 545 F.3d 733, 742-43 (9th Cir. 2008) (upholding dismissal in favor of a 

party which had not appeared, on the basis of facts presented by other defendants which had 

moved to dismiss) (citations omitted); Omar v. Sea-Land Serv., 813 F.2d 986, 991 (9th Cir. 1987) 

(“A trial court may dismiss a claim sua sponte under [Rule] 12(b)(6). Such a dismissal may be 

made without notice where the claimant cannot possibly win relief.”).

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These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections 

shall be served and filed within fourteen days after service of the objections. The parties are 

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the 

District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: February 21, 2020

DLB:6

DB/orders/orders.pro se/jones0045.mtd.f&rs

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