Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca2-14-00941/USCOURTS-ca2-14-00941-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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14‐941‐cv

Sebrena Robinson v. Concentra Health Services,Inc.

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Second Circuit ________

August Term, 2014

No. 14‐941‐cv

SEBRENA ROBINSON,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

CONCENTRA HEALTH SERVICES, INC.,1

Defendant‐Appellee.

________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Connecticut.

No. 3:11‐cv‐843 (MPS) ― Michael P. Shea, Judge.

________

Argued: February 4, 2015

Decided: March 24, 2015

________

Before: PARKER, HALL, and LOHIER, Circuit Judges.

________

Appeal from a final judgment of the United States District

Court for the District of Connecticut (Michael P. Shea, Judge)

granting summary judgment in favor of appellee.  The district court

held that appellant was judicially estopped from showing that she

1 The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the caption as set forth above.

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was qualified for her position at the time she was terminated, which

is an element of discriminatory discharge claims brought under Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (“Title

VII”) and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (“Section 1981ʺ),  because she applied for,

and received, Social Security disability benefits based on her

statement that she was fully disabled as of a date prior to her

termination.    Because appellant has failed to proffer a sufficient

explanation for the contradictory statements, we AFFIRM.

________

THOMAS W. BUCCI, Willinger, Willinger & Bucci,

P.C., Bridgeport, CT, for Plaintiff‐Appellant Sebrena

Robinson.

RACHEL REINGOLD MANDEL (Nicole S. Corvini, on

the brief), Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak &

Stewart, P.C., Boston, MA, for Defendant‐Appellee

Concentra Health Services, Inc.

________

BARRINGTON D. PARKER, Circuit Judge:

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff‐Appellant Sebrena Robinson worked for Concentra

Health Services, Inc. (“Concentra”) as a medical assistant from June

2003 until she was terminated on September 23, 2010.    Robinson

applied for Social Security disability benefits on September 27, 2010,

four days after being terminated, on the ground that she had

multiple sclerosis that rendered her disabled and unable to work.

The initial application was denied by the Social Security

Administration (“SSA”).  On May 5, 2011, Robinson filed an appeal

of the SSA’s denial of benefits and requested a hearing before an

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Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”).  Robinson, who was represented

by counsel, appeared and testified at a hearing held on April 3, 2012.

On June 12, 2012, the ALJ reversed the SSA, concluding that

Robinson was entitled to benefits because she had been fully

disabled since June 14, 2010 due to her multiple sclerosis.    In

relevant part, the ALJ summarized Robinson’s statements about her

disability as follows:

• “The claimant is alleging disability since June 14, 2010.”

Joint App’x 297.

• “The claimant alleges that multiple sclerosis interferes with

her ability to engage in basic work activities.  Specifically,

she testified at [the] hearing that [she] must use a cane to

walk because of numbness in her legs.    Her multiple

sclerosis affects her vision, and she has poor vision in her

left eye.    The claimant’s hands frequently cramp and she

has difficulty holding objects.    She needs help with all

household chores.”  Joint App’x 300.

• “After considering the evidence of record, the undersigned

finds that the claimant’s medically determinable

impairment could reasonably be expected to produce the

alleged symptoms, and that the claimant’s statements

concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of

these symptoms are generally credible.”  Joint App’x 300‐

301.

On May 23, 2011, Robinson filed this lawsuit against

Concentra.    In an amended complaint, Robinson brought claims

under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the Family and Medical Leave

Act (ʺFMLAʺ).    As relevant here, Robinson claimed that she had

been terminated on the basis of her race and color and in retaliation

for filing a complaint with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity

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Commission and taking FMLA leave.    Robinson also claimed that

Concentra had interfered with her ability to take FMLA leave.

Concentra moved for summary judgment on all claims,

arguing that Robinson was judicially estopped from showing that

she was qualified for her position at the time she was terminated in

September 2010, because she applied for, and received, Social

Security disability benefits based on her statement that she was fully

disabled as of June 2010.    The district court agreed and granted

summary judgment in favor of Concentra.    Robinson appeals the

grant of summary judgment on her Title VII and Section 1981 claims

based on her race and color, but she does not appeal the dismissal of

her FMLA or retaliation claims.2

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews summary judgment decisions de novo,

“viewing the record in the light most favorable to the non‐moving

party.” Dillon v. Morano, 497 F.3d 247, 251 (2d Cir. 2007). For a court

to grant summary judgment, the movant must “show[ ] that there is

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

While it is true that a court is “required to resolve all

ambiguities and draw all factual inferences in favor of the”

nonmovant,    Nationwide Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Leasing Ass’n., 182

F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted), a plaintiff may not

survive summary judgment merely by conjuring a hypothetical issue

of material fact.  “Where the moving party demonstrates the absence

of a genuine issue of material fact, the opposing party must come

forward with specific evidence demonstrating the existence of a

2 Robinson Br. 14 n.1 (ʺThe plaintiff does not appeal from the district courtʹs

judgment on her FMLA claim to the extent it relies on the plaintiff failing to prove a

violation of the federal FMLAʺ).  See id. at 10‐11.

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genuine dispute of material fact.  More specifically, it must do more

than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the

material facts, and may not rely on conclusory allegations or

unsubstantiated speculation.”  Brown v. Eli Lilly & Co., 654 F.3d 347,

358 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

DISCUSSION

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to discharge any

individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with

respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of

employment, because of such individualʹs race, color, religion, sex,

or national origin.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000e‐2(a)(1).  To overcome a motion

for summary judgment under Title VII, a plaintiff must first satisfy

an initial burden of ʺproving by the preponderance of the evidence a

prima facie case of discrimination.” Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v.

Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252‐53 (1981).  Accordingly, the plaintiff must

demonstrate that: (1) she fell within a protected class under Title VII;

(2) she was qualified for the position she held; (3) she was subjected

to an adverse employment action; and (4) the adverse action

occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of

discrimination. See Reynolds v. Barrett, 685 F.3d 193, 202 (2d Cir.

2012).  

Section 1981 provides, in pertinent part, that “[a]ll persons

within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right

. . . to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens .

. . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a).  “This section thus outlaws discrimination

with respect to the enjoyment of benefits, privileges, terms, and

conditions of a contractual relationship, such as employment . . . .”

Patterson v. Cnty. of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 224 (2d Cir. 2004) (citation

omitted).    To the extent relevant here, the same “core substantive

standards that apply to claims of discriminatory conduct in violation

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of Title VII are also applicable to claims of discrimination in

employment in violation of § 1981 . . . .” Id. at 225.

To qualify for Social Security disability benefits, a claimant

must show she has a disability, defined, as relevant here, as the

“inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of

any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which

can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be

expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.”

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).  Further, the impairment must be “of such

severity that [the claimant] is not only unable to do h[er] previous

work but cannot, considering h[er] age, education, and work

experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work

which exists in the national economy.” Id. § 423(d)(2)(A).

At issue in this case is whether Robinson’s application for, and

receipt of, Social Security disability benefits on the ground that she is

fully disabled due to multiple sclerosis, renders her unable to make a

prima facie showing that she was qualified for the position she held

at the time of termination.    At the summary judgment stage, a

plaintiff may satisfy this burden by showing that she “possesses the

basic skills necessary for performance of [the] job.” Slattery v. Swiss

Reinsurance Am. Corp., 248 F.3d 87, 92 (2d Cir. 2001) (citation

omitted).

Judicial estoppel “prevents a party from asserting a factual

position in a legal proceeding that is contrary to a position

previously taken by [that party] in a prior legal proceeding.” Bates v.

Long Island R.R. Co., 997 F.2d 1028, 1037 (2d Cir. 1993).    “A party

invoking judicial estoppel must show that (1) the party against

whom the estoppel is asserted took an inconsistent position in a

prior proceeding and (2) that position was adopted by the first

tribunal in some manner, such as by rendering a favorable

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judgment.”  Mitchell v. Washingtonville Cent. Sch. Dist., 190 F.3d 1, 6

(2d Cir. 1999) (internal citations omitted).

In Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp., 526 U.S. 795

(1999), the Supreme Court addressed the issue of judicial estoppel as

to statements made in support of an application for Social Security

disability benefits and subsequent claims brought under the

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).    The Supreme Court

concluded that a successful disability application does not

automatically preclude a later claim under the ADA, because a

representation of complete disability in a Social Security proceeding

is not necessarily contradicted by the same person’s ADA claim that

he could perform essential job functions with reasonable

accommodation where the former proceeding did not consider the

effect that reasonable workplace accommodations would have on

the claimant’s ability to work. Id. at 802‐03.  Nevertheless, the Court

acknowledged that an “ADA plaintiff cannot simply ignore the

apparent contradiction that arises out of the earlier . . . total

disability claim,” and held that in such circumstances, a plaintiff

“must proffer a sufficient explanation” for the conflicting statements

in order to survive summary judgment.  Id. at 806.  

As the district court noted in its decision in this case, “courts

have applied the Cleveland analysis to other employment statutes,

including the Age Discrimination and Employment Act, Title VII,

and the FMLA, because . . . claims under such statutes generally

require a showing that the [p]laintiff was qualified for the position.”

SA 23 (collecting cases).    We agree with the district court that

Cleveland provides the proper framework for evaluating whether

judicial estoppel bars Robinson’s Title VII and Section 1981 claims.

Robinson argues on appeal that “the [d]istrict [c]ourt indulged

in impermissible inferences to conclude that the plaintiff must have

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testified before the [ALJ] that she was totally disabled from

performing the essential functions of the position of medical

assistant.”    Robinson Br. 27.    Because her “application for social

security disability benefits has not been introduced into evidence,ʺ

Robinson contends that “any discussion concerning the contents of

the application is based on conjecture.” Id. at 29.    Additionally,

Robinson claims that the district court impermissibly inferred from

Robinson’s August 2012 deposition testimony that she was fully

disabled at the time of her termination, two years earlier.  See id. at

36‐37.

Robinson cannot survive a motion for summary judgment by

raising “metaphysical doubt[s]” as to the contents of the completed

disability application.    Brown, 654 F.3d at 358.    During discovery

Concentra requested additional documentation concerning

Robinson’s application for social security disability benefits,

including the completed application, and Robinson’s counsel

informed Concentra and the district court that she is not in

possession of any additional documentation or information.  Special

App’x 3, 6, 15, 25.  Thus, the only relevant evidence in this record is

the ALJ’s written decision and an August 2012 deposition taken of

Robinson as part of this litigation, where she testified that she is

fully disabled and unable to work.    The district court carefully

analyzed the ALJ’s decision to determine what statements could be

attributed to Robinson and relied, as do we, solely on those

paragraphs.   Additionally, the district court recognized the limited

relevance of the August 2012 deposition, noting that “[b]y itself,

plaintiff’s statement in her deposition would be insufficient to

establish her disability status at the time of her termination.”  Special

App’x 32.  

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Furthermore, Robinson does not deny that she previously told

the SSA and the ALJ that she was fully disabled as of June 2010, nor

does she deny that such a statement is inconsistent with her current

litigation position.    Robinson’s job as a medical assistant required

her to work in both the ‘front’ at the reception desk and in the ‘back’

performing tasks like drug tests and assisting doctors with suturing,

which she could not complete if she were fully disabled.

Cleveland also requires a plaintiff to “proffer a sufficient

explanation” for the contradictory statements.  The only explanation

Robinson proffers is that she was, in fact, able to work at the time of

her termination, because she continued to work at Concentra until

September 2010, and sought additional work in the cosmetology and

other fields.    Although Robinson may have continued to work at

Concentra until September 2010, this fact demonstrates only that her

statements to the SSA and the ALJ may have been false,   but does

not sufficiently explain the contradiction between the statements

and her current litigation position.    As the Seventh Circuit has

explained, a “plaintiff may not, simply by disavowing a prior claim

of total disability, perform an about‐face and assert that [s]he is a

‘qualified individual’ who is capable of working.    Rather . . . the

plaintiff must proceed from the premise that h[er] previous assertion

of an inability to work was true, or that [s]he in good faith believed

it to be true, and [s]he must demonstrate that the assertion was

nonetheless consistent with h[er] ability to perform the essential

functions of h[er] job.”  Lee v. City of Salem, 259 F.3d 667, 674 (7th Cir.

2001).  Robinson has failed to do so.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district

court.

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