Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02221/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02221-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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Criminal Case No. 08-cr-2019 

Civil Case No.: 15-cv-2221

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JOSE ALBERTO MARQUEZ, 

Petitioner,

v. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Respondent.

 Criminal Case No. 08-cr-2019 

Civil Case No.: 15-cv-2221 

ORDER: 

(1) LIFTING STAY; 

 

(2)DENYING MOTION TO 

VACATE, SET ASIDE, OR 

CORRECT SENTENCE 

UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2255; 

(3)DENYING EVIDENTIARY 

HEARING; and 

(4)DENYING CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY 

 Petitioner, proceeding pro se, has filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to 

vacate, set aside, or correct sentence by person in federal custody. The Government filed 

a response in opposition. For the reasons outlined below, the Court DENIES Petitioner’s 

Motion. 

// 

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I. BACKGROUND 

On January 29, 2007, Petitioner Jose Alberto (aka “Bat”) Marquez was extradited to 

the United States from Mexico on federal charges unrelated to the current case. While in 

custody on these other charges, Petitioner orchestrated a methamphetamine transaction 

from his jail cell. The transaction involved his co-defendants, Maria Madriaga and Julia 

Morones, and a confidential informant. At Petitioner’s direction, Morones picked up six 

ounces of methamphetamine from Madriaga at her home, then delivered it to the 

confidential informant at his apartment on April 17, 2007. The informant’s apartment 

was wired for both audio and video recording. 

Petitioner was charged by Indictment on June 17, 2008, with one count of conspiracy 

to distribute methamphetamine under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846, one count of 

possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute under 21 U.S.C. §841(a)(1) and 

aiding and abetting under 18 U.S.C. § 2. On July 22, 2008, the Government filed an 

Information and Notice seeking an enhanced mandatory penalty of life imprisonment 

without release under 21 U.S.C. §§841, 846 and 851, because Petitioner had two or more 

prior convictions for a felony drug offense that had become final. [ECF NO. 29.] 

A jury trial commenced on March 8, 2011. During trial, the Government played a 

video recording of the drug transaction for the jury. The jury also heard Petitioner 

discussing the transaction on recorded phone calls from his jail cell. A chemist testified 

that the weight of the methamphetamine in the deal exceeded 50 grams of actual 

methamphetamine. 

On March 11, 2011, the jury found Petitioner guilty on both counts. [ECF NO. 141.] 

On November 4, 2011, this Court sentenced Petitioner to a life sentence on each count to 

be served concurrently. [ECF NO. 170.] Petitioner appealed his conviction to the Ninth 

Circuit on November 7, 2011 and on August 5, 2014 the appellate court affirmed his 

conviction. United States v. Marquez, case no. 11-50479 (9th Cir. Jul 11, 2014). The 

Supreme Court subsequently denied certiorari. 

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After Petitioner filed this section 2255 Petition, he filed a request to stay the 

proceedings claiming he was unable to conduct research because he was confined to the 

Special Housing Unit. [ECF NO. 271.] The Government did not oppose Petitioner’s 

request, and the Court granted the stay with direction to Petitioner to provide a status 

report no later than April 30, 2018. (Order [ECF NO. 275.]) Petitioner has not filed a 

status report. 

II. DISCUSSION 

As a preliminary matter, the Court LIFTS the stay previously imposed, finding that 

Petitioner did not file a status report as directed and any further delay in the disposition of 

this matter would thwart Congress’ intent in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) “to eliminate delays in the federal habeas review process.” 

Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 144 (2012). 

A. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

Petitioner raises multiple claims that his trial and appellate counsel made errors so 

serious that counsel was not functioning as “counsel” guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. 

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must prove by a 

preponderance of the evidence that: (1) the assistance provided by counsel fell below an 

objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). To satisfy the deficiency prong of the Strickland 

test, the Petitioner must show that his counsel’s performance “fell below an objective 

standard of reasonableness” and was not “within the range of competence demanded of 

attorneys in criminal cases.” Id. at 687 (quoting in part McMahan v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 

759, 771 (1970). In considering this issue, there is a “strong presumption that counsel’s 

conduct falls within a wide range of professional assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 

Moreover, courts typically find that post hoc complaints about the strategy or tactics that 

defense counsel employed are insufficient to satisfy the first prong of Strickland. See, e.g.,

United States v. Simmons, 923 F.2d 934, 956 (2d. Cir. 1991) (holding that appellant’s 

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displeasure with strategy employed by trial counsel was insufficient to establish 

ineffectiveness). Counsel’s poor tactical decisions only amount to ineffective assistance 

when the defendant can produce enough evidence to “overcome the presumption that, 

under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’” 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)). 

Petitioner first claims that counsel should have objected to the Government’s filing of 

an “Information” which sought to enhance his sentence based on his prior convictions, 

arguing that the prior convictions should have been presented to the Grand Jury and 

included in the indictment as elements of the offense. (Mot. 4) Second, Petitioner 

contends his 1980 conviction under California Health and Safety Code 11352 did not 

qualify as a “felony drug offense” for enhancement purposes because it did not match the 

definition of a federal drug offense under the modified categorical approach. (Mot. 22 

[ECF NO 245-1].) Finally, Petitioner argues that trial counsel should have objected to 

the introduction of his 1980 and 1989 convictions because they were stale under U.SS.G. 

4A1.2(e)(1), (2) and (3). (Id. 15). 

In response, the Government argues that Petitioner’s claims lack merit, and therefore 

he cannot demonstrate that his trial or appellate counsel were ineffective because 

counsel’s performance cannot be deficient for failing to raise meritless arguments. (Oppo. 

7). Additionally, the Government contends that Petitioner is precluded from re-litigating 

challenges to the use of his prior convictions in a section 2255 motion which he already 

raised on appeal. (Id. at 15). 

A. Prior convictions 

Under 21 U.S.C. §851, a defendant may be sentenced to increased punishment if he 

has two or more prior convictions and the Government files an Information outlining the 

previous convictions upon which it intends to rely to increase the sentence. 21 U.S.C. 

§851. Here, the Government filed an Information under section 851 informing the Court 

and Defendant that it would seek enhanced penalties for Petitioner’s 1980 conviction 

under California Health and Safety Code Section 11352 for selling heroin, and his 1989 

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conviction under California Health and Safety Code Section 11378 for possession of 

methamphetamine for sale. (Information at 1-2 [ECF NO. 29.]) 

Petitioner contends that section 851 runs afoul of the protections provided by the 

Grand Jury clause of the 5th Amendment which states that “no person shall be held to 

answer for a capital or infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand 

jury,” because it allows an indictment to be amended and broadened to add additional 

facts which increase punishment without presentment. (Mem. P&A at 1). In support of 

his argument Petitioner looks to cases in which sentencing enhancements were found to 

be elements of the charged offenses, citing Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999) 

and Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204 (2014). He seeks further support in the 

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) line of cases which held that “any fact that 

increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be 

submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Mot. 8; Mem. P& A 20.) 

While Petitioner acknowledges that under the reasoning in Almendarez-Torres v. United 

States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), sentencing factors do not need to be submitted to a jury for 

sentence enhancement purposes, he argues that such cases were decided under the Due 

Process Clause rather than the Grand Jury Clause, and therefore they are inapplicable to 

this case. (Mem. P& A 16). 

Although novel, Petitioner’s argument is not persuasive. Petitioner has not cited to 

any authority suggesting that the inclusion of prior convictions via Information violates 

the Grand Jury clause of the Constitution. Moreover, Petitioner’s argument that the 

addition of his prior convictions via Information is similar to the enhancements in Jones

and Burrage, is unconvincing. (Mem. P&A at 4). In Jones, the Supreme Court analyzed 

a carjacking statute which contained three subsections identifying enhanced penalties if 

the offense resulted in bodily injury or death. 526 U.S. at 230. The Court held that these 

subsections set forth additional elements of the offense, not mere sentencing 

considerations, because the jury had to make a finding that the conduct caused injury or 

death to impose the increased penalty. Id. In a case of similar statutory construction, the 

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Supreme Court in Burrage held that a sentence enhancement contained in the Controlled 

Substances Act was an element that must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a 

reasonable doubt for similar reasons. 571 U.S. at 210. The defendant was charged under 

21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) with heroin distribution that caused death, but it was ultimately 

determined that the victim may have died without the heroin provided by defendant. The 

Court held that the so called “death result” enhancement, or “but for” causation, was an 

element that the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt to enhance defendant’s 

penalty. Id. at 216. 

In contrast, Petitioner’s prior felony drug convictions did not require additional factfinding to determine whether each element of the charged crime had been proven in order 

to warrant an enhancement because they were verified via superior court records. 

Similarly, Petitioner’s prior convictions are not like the so called “death result” 

enhancement at issue in Burrage because there is no statutory enhancement attached to 

the charged conduct in this case which required the jury to determine Petitioner’s guilt of 

the prior convictions to find him guilty of possession of methamphetamine with intent to 

distribute. Instead, Petitioner pled guilty to the prior charges, and the convictions were 

independently established via court documents. 

Furthermore, Apprendi and its brethren do not provide support for Petitioner’s claim. 

As he himself acknowledges, an indictment “need not set forth factors relevant only to 

the sentencing of an offender found guilty of the charged crime.” Almendarez-Torres, 

523 U.S. at 224. The Supreme Court continued to recognize the narrow exception carved 

for prior convictions even as it expanded Apprendi by holding that any fact that increases 

the mandatory minimum sentence is an element of the offense, not a sentencing factor, 

that must be submitted to the jury. Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 n. 1 (“In 

Almendarez–Torres, 523 U.S. at 224, we recognized a narrow exception to this general 

rule for the fact of a prior conviction... and do not revisit it for purposes of our decision 

today.”) 

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 Petitioner claims that Almendarez-Torres is not binding because it was decided based 

on the Due Process clause and not the Grand Jury clause. While it is true that the Due 

Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury trial guarantees of the 

Sixth Amendment form the foundation of the Court’s finding in Almendarez-Torres and 

the Apprendi line of cases, prior convictions do not raise questions about the Grand Jury 

clause because a defendant’s prior convictions are established during proceedings that 

have their own substantial procedural safeguards. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 488. As a 

result, the due process protections guarded by the Grand Jury clause are not subverted by 

the use of prior convictions to enhance a sentence. Just as in Almendarez-Torres

Petitioner pled guilty to the prior convictions, ensuring procedural safeguards were met. 

 For the foregoing reasons, neither trial nor appellate counsel rendered deficient 

performance for not challenging the introduction and use of Petitioner’s prior convictions 

by Information because the arguments are meritless. Gonzalez v. Knowles, 515 F.3d 

1006, 1016 (9th Cir. 2008) (“counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise [a] 

meritless claim”). Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim is DENIED. 

B. California Health and Safety Code § 11352 Conviction 

Petitioner claims that his July 1980 conviction for distribution of heroin under 

California Health and Safety Code section 11352 did not qualify as a sentence enhancing 

“felony drug offense” as defined under 21 U.S.C. §841(b) and the Taylor/Descamps

analytical framework, therefore appellate counsel provided deficient performance when 

he failed to challenge the Court’s use of this prior conviction to enhance Petitioner’s 

sentence. (Mot. at 22-24). 

In response, the Government contends that there is no merit to Petitioner’s claim 

because the categorical approach as defined under the Taylor/Descamps rubric is 

inapplicable and instead the prior conviction qualified as a “felony drug offense” under 

21 U.S.C. 802(44). (Oppo. at 12-13 ). Therefore, the Government argues that there is no 

basis to challenge appellate counsel’s performance and the claim must fail. (Id.) 

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The Court agrees. First, the Court notes that Petitioner was sentenced in 2011, before 

the Supreme Court outlined the “modified categorical approach” that Petitioner claims 

the Court should have applied to determine whether his prior convictions qualified as 

felony drug offenses for sentencing enhancement purposes. Instead, the Court properly 

determined that Petitioner’s prior convictions qualified as felony drug offenses under 

section 802(44) which specifies that: “The term ‘felony drug offense’ means an offense 

that is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year ... that prohibits or restricts 

conduct relating to narcotic drugs....” 21 U.S.C. § 802(44). Petitioner spent sixteen 

months in state prison for his conviction under section 11352(a) for sale of 

methamphetamine, a narcotic drug, in San Diego Superior Court case number CRS51052, 

therefore the Court found that he satisfied both elements of section 802(44). (Tran. Sent. 

Hearing at 27 [ECF NO. 182]; PSR at 8). 

Even if the Court had been required to use the “modified categorical approach” 

Petitioner’s prior conviction under section 11352 would have qualified as a felony drug 

offense warranting a sentence enhancement. Under the “categorical approach” a court 

must verify that a prior conviction qualifies as a sentence enhancing predicate offense by 

comparing the elements of the statute that forms the basis of the defendant’s conviction 

with the elements of the offense as commonly understood, or the federal “generic” crime.

Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 257 (2013). If the prior conviction’s elements 

are the same as, or more narrow than, the elements of the federal generic offense, it will 

qualify as a predicate offense under the method known as the “categorical approach.” Id. 

In contrast, where a statute sets out one or more elements of the offense in the 

alternative i.e. stating that burglary involves entry into a building or automobile, it is 

considered “divisible” and a court may employ the “modified categorical approach.” 

Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990). Under that method, a court may review the 

charging documents, jury instructions, plea agreement, plea colloquy, and similar sources 

to determine the actual crime of which the defendant was convicted before comparing it 

to the federal generic crime. Id.

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Here, section 11352 provides that “every person who transports, imports into this 

state, sells, furnishes, administers, or gives away, or offers to transport, import into this 

state, sell, furnish, administer, or give away, or attempts to import into this state or 

transport . . . any controlled substance [as defined elsewhere] shall be punished by 

imprisonment...” West’s Ann. Cal.Health & Safety Code §11352. In comparison, federal 

law dictates that “[t]he term ‘controlled substance offense’ means an offense under 

federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that 

prohibits the manufacture, import, export, distribution, or dispensing of a controlled 

substance . . . or the possession of a controlled substance . . . with intent to manufacture, 

import, export, distribute, or dispense.” Id. 4B1.2(b). 

Section 11352(a) is considered a “divisible” statute because it includes a list of 

controlled substances, therefore, a sentencing court may look to underlying documents to 

determine whether the prior conviction met the elements of a “felony drug offense” for 

purposes of sentence enhancement United States v. Huitron-Rocha, 771 F.3d 1183, 1184 

(9th Cir. 2014). Here, the Court looks to the pre-sentence report (“PSR”) to determine the 

exact nature of the prior conviction. The PSR stated that Petitioner pled guilty to sale of 

heroin, a controlled substance, and served sixteen months in state prison pursuant to 

California Health and Safety code section 11352(a). (PSR at 8 [ECF NO. 152.]) This 

conviction falls squarely within the definition of a “felony drug offense” under the 

modified categorical approach because it was a term of imprisonment of over a year for a 

narcotic related crime. The conviction was properly used to enhance his sentence and 

appellate counsel did not render deficient performance for failing to raise the issue on 

appeal as it was meritless. Gonzalez, 515 F.3d at 1016. 

C. Staleness of prior convictions 

Although trial counsel argued at sentencing that the prior convictions were too old to 

qualify as enhancements under United States v. Amezcua-Vasquez, 567 F.3d 1050, 1055 

(9th Cir. 2009), Petitioner contends that his attorney should have also argued that the 

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conviction was stale under U.S.S.G. §4A1.2(e) which prohibits the use of any conviction 

that occurred more than fifteen years before the current offense. (Mem. P&A 14) 

In response, the Government argues that section 4A1.2 is inapplicable because 

Petitioner was sentenced under 21 U.S.C. 841(b) which requires only that the court verify 

that the prior convictions were felonies and were drug offenses. (Oppo. at 16). The 

Court complied with section 841(b), therefore, Petitioner cannot successfully argue that 

his trial counsel was ineffective for not raising a meritless issue and his claim must be 

denied. (Id. 16-17). 

Under section 4A1.2, a court may consider a defendant’s prior criminal convictions 

when computing the defendant’s criminal history points for sentencing purposes only if 

the prior sentence “was imposed within fifteen years of the defendant's commencement 

of the instant offense.” U.S.S.G. §4A1.2. Here, the PSR calculated Petitioner’s criminal 

history score using section 4A1.2 but assigned no points for his prior convictions from 

1978, 1979, 1980 and 1982 because they were too remote in time under 4A1.2(e)(3). The 

Court followed the PSR and did not include the prior convictions in Petitioner’s criminal 

history score. Accordingly, any argument that his convictions were too stale under 

section 4A1.2 to count toward criminal history points would have been moot, and counsel 

did not render deficient performance for failing to raise this meritless claim. Gonzalez, 

515 F.3d at 1016. 

III. EVIDENTIARY HEARING 

Under section 2255, a petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing “[u]nless the 

motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled 

to no relief.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255(b). A petitioner does not need to “detail his evidence, 

but must only make specific factual allegations which, if true, would entitle him to 

relief.” Baumann v. United States, 692 F.2d 565, 571 (9th Cir. 1982). If the allegations 

concern facts which can be “conclusively decided on the basis of documentary testimony 

and evidence in the record” the Court is not required to hold a hearing. Watts v. United 

States, 841 F.2d 275, 277 (9th Cir. 1988). It follows that if the claims concern only legal

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issues, an evidentiary hearing is not required. Bryan v. United States, 721 F.2d 572, 577 

(9th Cir. 1983). 

The claims in the current Motion do not raise factual allegations, but instead, they 

challenge the performance of trial and appellate counsel for failing to make certain legal 

arguments. As a result, an evidentiary hearing is not required. Watts, 841 F.2d at 277. 

IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 

A certificate of appealability is authorized “only if the applicant has made a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To 

meet this standard, Petitioner must show that “jurists of reason could disagree with the 

district court’s resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the 

issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v. 

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003). Petitioner does not have to show “that he should 

prevail on the merits. He has already failed in that endeavor.” Lambright v. Stewart, 

220 F.3d 1022, 1025 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation omitted). 

 Having reviewed the matter, the Court finds that Petitioner has not made a 

substantial showing that he was denied a constitutional right and the Court is not 

persuaded that jurists could disagree with the Court’s resolution of his claims or that the 

issues presented deserve encouragement to proceed further. Accordingly, a certificate of 

appealability is DENIED. 

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the stay formerly imposed is LIFTED, Petitioner’s Motion 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence is DENIED, and a 

Certificate of Appealability is DENIED. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: November 16, 2018 

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