Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-17-56304/USCOURTS-ca9-17-56304-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

NICOLAS Z. MORALES,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

STUART SHERMAN, Warden,

Respondent-Appellee.

No. 17-56304

D.C. No.

2:17-cv-04384-

BRO-AGR

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Beverly Reid O’Connell, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted January 9, 2020*

Pasadena, California

Filed January 30, 2020

Before: Paul J. Watford, Mark J. Bennett, and

Kenneth K. Lee, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam Opinion

* The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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2 MORALES V. SHERMAN

SUMMARY**

Habeas Corpus

The panel reversed the district court’s judgment 

summarily dismissing, as an unauthorized “second or 

successive” petition, Nicolas Z. Morales’s 2017 habeas 

corpus petition challenging his 2009 California attemptedrobbery conviction and three-strikes sentence.

The district court dismissed Morales’s 2012 habeas 

petition as untimely. In 2016, the state trial court granted 

Morales’s petition for relief in light of Proposition 47 – a 

ballot initiative, approved by California voters in 2014, 

reducing certain theft offenses from felonies to 

misdemeanors – and issued an amended abstract of judgment 

reflecting the reclassification of grand and petty theft counts.

Agreeing with Morales and the State of California, the 

panel held that Morales’s successful effort to obtain relief 

under Proposition 47 resulted in the issuance of a new, 

intervening judgment for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b), 

such that the 2017 federal habeas petition is the first petition 

challenging the new judgment. The panel held that the 

district court therefore erred by dismissing the petition on the 

basis that the 2017 petition is an unauthorized “second or 

successive” petition under § 2244(b)(3)(A), and remanded.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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MORALES V. SHERMAN 3

COUNSEL

Hilary Potashner, Federal Public Defender; Margaret A. 

Farrand, Deputy Federal Public Defender; Office of the 

Federal Public Defender, Los Angeles, California; for 

Petitioner-Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General; Gerald A. Engler, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General; Lance E. Winters, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General; Michael R. Johnsen and 

Stephanie C. Brenan, Supervising Deputy Attorneys 

General; Office of the Attorney General, Los Angeles, 

California; for Respondent-Appellee.

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

In 2009, petitioner Nicolas Morales was convicted in 

California state court of one count of attempted robbery, one 

count of grand theft, and two counts of petty theft, among 

other offenses. The state trial court sentenced him to 

35 years to life on the attempted robbery count under 

California’s three-strikes law, two years’ imprisonment on 

the grand theft count and one of the petty theft counts, and 

six months’ imprisonment on the other petty theft count, 

with those sentences to be served concurrently with the 

sentence on the attempted robbery count. Morales did not 

pursue a direct appeal; he later unsuccessfully sought state 

post-conviction relief.

In 2012, Morales filed a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus in federal court. His petition challenged the 

sufficiency of the evidence supporting his attempted robbery 

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4 MORALES V. SHERMAN

conviction, as well as the trial court’s refusal to dismiss the 

prior-conviction allegations that led to his being sentenced 

as a three-strikes offender. The district court dismissed his 

petition with prejudice on the ground that it was untimely.

In 2014, California voters approved Proposition 47, a 

ballot initiative that, as relevant here, reduces certain theft 

offenses from felonies to misdemeanors when the value of 

the property taken does not exceed $950. Cal. Penal Code 

§ 490.2(a); see People v. Buycks, 422 P.3d 531, 535 (Cal. 

2018). The initiative authorizes retrospective relief for 

offenders convicted, prior to its enactment, of felonies that 

would now be classified as misdemeanors. An offender 

eligible for such relief may petition the court to recall the 

original sentence and to resentence him as a misdemeanant. 

Cal. Penal Code § 1170.18(a). If the court grants the 

requested relief, the scope of its resentencing authority 

extends to all counts, even those not affected by Proposition 

47. Buycks, 422 P.3d at 549–51.

In 2015, Morales filed a petition under California Penal 

Code § 1170.18(a) asking the state trial court to reduce his 

grand and petty theft convictions from felonies to 

misdemeanors. In 2016, the court granted his request. The 

court reclassified Morales’ grand and petty theft convictions 

as misdemeanors, recalled his original sentence, and 

resentenced him to 180 days in county jail on each of those 

counts, with the sentences again to run concurrently with his 

undisturbed 35-years-to-life sentence on the attempted 

robbery count. The court then issued an amended abstract 

of judgment reflecting the reclassification of the grand and 

petty theft counts.

In 2017, Morales filed another federal habeas petition, 

which raised the same two claims he asserted in his 2012 

federal habeas petition. The district court concluded that the 

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MORALES V. SHERMAN 5

petition constituted an unauthorized “second or successive” 

petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A), a provision that 

bars district courts from entertaining a second or successive 

petition unless its filing has first been authorized by the court 

of appeals. On that basis, the court summarily dismissed 

Morales’ petition without reaching the merits.

On appeal, Morales argues that the district court erred 

because his petition does not qualify as a second or 

successive petition under § 2244(b). A petition can be 

deemed “second or successive” under § 2244(b) only if it 

challenges the same state court judgment challenged in an 

earlier petition. See United States v. Buenrostro, 895 F.3d 

1160, 1165 (9th Cir. 2018). Thus, when a new judgment 

intervenes between the filing of two federal habeas petitions, 

a petition challenging the new, intervening judgment is not 

considered “second or successive.” Magwood v. Patterson, 

561 U.S. 320, 341–42 (2010). Morales contends that his 

successful effort to obtain relief under Proposition 47 

resulted in issuance of a new, intervening judgment, and that 

his 2017 federal habeas petition therefore was not second or 

successive. The State agrees with Morales on this point, and 

so do we.1

Our circuit has previously held that “a petition is not 

second or successive when there is an amended judgment 

and the petition is the first one following that amended 

1 The State contends that our court should reconsider Wentzell v. 

Neven, 674 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2012), which held that a petition 

challenging a new, intervening judgment is “not second or successive 

even if the petition challenges only undisturbed portions of the original 

judgment.” Gonzalez v. Sherman, 873 F.3d 763, 768 (9th Cir. 2017) 

(citing Wentzell, 674 F.3d at 1126–28). As the State acknowledges, 

however, we have no authority as a three-judge panel to reconsider 

whether Wentzell was correctly decided.

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6 MORALES V. SHERMAN

judgment.” Gonzalez v. Sherman, 873 F.3d 763, 768–69 

(9th Cir. 2017). That is precisely the situation we have here. 

Morales’ successful petition for relief under Proposition 47 

resulted in the reclassification of his grand and petty theft 

convictions as misdemeanors. That reclassification rendered 

his original prison sentences on those counts invalid, which 

explains why the court recalled his original sentence and 

resentenced him as a misdemeanant to 180 days in county 

jail. As was true in Gonzalez, because these actions “led to 

a change in the sentence and judgment, the abstract of 

judgment had to be amended as well so as to reflect that 

change.” Id. at 770.

Issuance of the amended abstract of judgment 

represented the issuance of a new, intervening judgment for 

purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). Morales’ 2017 federal 

habeas petition is the first petition challenging that new 

judgment, so it is not an unauthorized “second or successive” 

petition under § 2244(b)(3)(A). The district court erred by 

dismissing the petition on that basis.

In light of our disposition, we need not address whether 

Morales’ unsuccessful effort to obtain relief under a different 

California ballot initiative, Proposition 36, also resulted in 

issuance of a new, intervening judgment for purposes of 

§ 2244(b).

Morales’ unopposed motion to take judicial notice of 

various court transcripts and documents (Dkt. No. 25) is 

GRANTED.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

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