Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01914/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01914-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 Petitioner’s objections in footnote 5 are overruled.

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jeremy Daniel Bach, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, 

Respondent. 

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No. CV 09-1914-PHX-JAT

ORDER

On August 8, 2012, the Magistrate Judge to whom this case was assigned issued a

Report and Recommendation (Doc. 50) recommended that the Petition in this case be denied.

On August 27, 2012, Petitioner filed objections to the R&R (Doc. 53).

I. Factual Background

The R&R at pages 3-11 details the factual background of this case. The Court adopts

that background.1

 In summary, Petitioner was convicted, following a jury trial, of second

degree murder. R&R at 1. Specifically, Petitioner was convicted of shooting and killing a

13 year old, Brad. Id. at 3. After shooting Brad on November 10, 1995, Petitioner failed to

render aid, failed to call for aid, concealed the body (which was never recovered), cleaned

the area where Brad was shot, and denied knowing Brad’s whereabouts until February 17,

1996. Id. at 3-4. At the time of the offense, Petitioner was 13 years old. Id. at 1.

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2

 Petitioner would have been entitled to statutory tolling for any period of time that

he had a properly filed proceeding pending in state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); R&R

at 12, n.1. Petitioner concedes that his Petition is untimely even after applying statutory

tolling. Also, in some circumstances a petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling. Holland v.

Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2560-63 (2010). The R&R concluded that Petitioner was not

entitled to equitable tolling because he had not been exercising due diligence. R&R at 13-14.

Petitioner did not object to this conclusion and the Court adopts it.

3

 Schlup recognized an actual innocence gateway for procedurally defaulted claims.

Lee, 653 F.3d at 934.

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II. Legal Standard - Statute of Limitations

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d),

created a one-year statute of limitations from when a conviction became final to file a

petition for writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner concedes that his Petition in this case, which

was filed in 2009, is outside this statute of limitations.2

Petitioner argues that under the exception to the statute of limitations for actual

innocence recognized in Lee v. Lampert, 653 F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc), he is

entitled to “gateway” around the statute of limitations. The Lee Court adopted the actual

innocence gateway previously recognized in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 314-15 (1995).3

For Petitioner to meet the actual innocence gateway of Schlup, the Court must

determine, “how reasonable jurors would react to the overall, newly supplemented record,”

and whether, “it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him.”

Lee, 653 F.3d at 945 (quoting House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 538 (2006) and Schlup, 513 U.S.

at 327). Here, Petitioner argues that he can meet the actual innocence gateway based on: 1)

the insufficiency of the evidence at trial, or alternatively, 2) new evidence that he obtained

after trial.

A. Insufficiency of the Evidence

Petitioner argues that he can show actual innocence based solely on the evidence used

to convict him at his original trial. The R&R rejects this theory finding that the gateway

around the statute of limitations requires “new” evidence. R&R at 15-16. Petitioner objects

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4

 Moreover, even if the Court were to consider the merits of this claim, the Court

finds there was sufficient evidence at trial to convict Petitioner and adopts the R&R on this

claim. R&R at 15-25. The Court overrules Petitioner’s objections to this recommendation.

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to the legal conclusion that “new” evidence is required to make the actual innocence

showing. The Court agrees with the R&R and overrules the objection.

Specifically, Lee states: “Schlup requires a petitioner, “to support his allegations of

constitutional error with new reliable evidence — whether it be exculpatory scientific

evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence — that was not

presented at trial.’” 653 F.3d at 938 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324). Stated another way,

“...to pass through the Schlup gateway, a petitioner must show reliable evidence of his

innocence that was not, and could not have been, presented at trial.” Lee, 653 F.3d at 945

(C.J. Kozinski concurring). The Court finds that these statements of what a petitioner must

show foreclosure Petitioner’s argument that no “new” evidence in required. To hold

otherwise would allow any theory of innocence argued at trial to later gateway around the

statute of limitations. The AEDPA, which created a statute of limitations, intended to avoid

just this result. Accordingly, the Court will not consider Petitioner’s insufficiency of the

evidence claim as a basis for finding actual innocence.4

B. New Evidence

Alternatively, Petitioner argues that he has new evidence that is sufficient to pass

through the Schlup gateway. Before the Court turns to this evidence, however, the Court will

consider the R&R’s suggestion that this claim fails to meet a diligence requirement.

1. Diligence

In footnote 2 of the R&R the Magistrate Judge notes that in footnote 9 of the opinion,

the Lee court did note foreclose a requirement that a petitioner be acting diligently to qualify

for the Schlup gateway. R&R at 13, n.2. However, the Lee court expressly declined to

decide this issue. Id. (quoting Lee, 653 F.3d at 934, n9). Petitioner objects to the legal

conclusion that he is required to show diligence to pass through the Schlup gateway.

Here, determining whether Petitioner is required to show diligence impacts whether

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Petitioner can meet the Schlup gateway. Petitioner’s trial was in 1997. R&R at 1.

Petitioner’s conviction became final for purposes of the AEDPA’s statute of limitations in

2001. R&R at 12, n.1. Petitioner filed this habeas Petition in 2009.

Petitioner’s new evidence consists of two affidavits obtained in 2006. One affidavit

is from Susan Downs Parrish, Ph.D, who met and interviewed Petitioner in 1997 and testified

at his sentencing. R&R at 25. The other affidavit is from Mark Wellek, M.D., who has

never met with nor interviewed Petitioner. R&R at 26. Both affidavits involve the doctors’

expert opinions on whether Petitioner would have been able to form the necessary mens rea

to be guilty. R&R at 25-26.

The diligence inquiry in this case has two time frames: 1) how was Petitioner diligent

in not obtaining these expert medical opinions between his trial and 2006; and 2) how was

Petitioner diligent in obtaining these expert medical opinions in 2006, but not filing his

habeas Petition until 2009. As note above, Petitioner objects to any diligence requirement

being part of the Schlup-statute-of-limitations gateway. Doc. 53 at 2. In making this

objection, Petitioner relies on cases finding diligence is not required to meet the Schlupprocedural-default gateway. Doc. 41 at 5 (citing Souter v. Jones, 395 F.3d 577, 601, n. 16

(6th Cir. 2005); Lopez v. Trani, 628 F.3d 1228, 1230-31 (10th Cir. 2010)). Petitioner then

states that if such a requirement were imposed, it would require an evidentiary hearing. Doc.

41 at 6, n.5.

In declining to adopt a diligence requirement, the Sixth Circuit stated:

We decline to adopt the approach outlined by the Eighth Circuit in Flanders, which imposes a requirement that the petitioner show “action or inaction on

the part of the respondent that prevented him from discovering the relevant

facts in a timely fashion or ... that a reasonably diligent petitioner could not

have discovered these facts in time to file a petition within the period of

limitations.” 299 F.3d at 978. The requirement imposed by the Eighth Circuit

has the effect of reducing actual innocence claims to only those which are

timely under § 2244(d)(1)(D), the new evidence provision. That provision

states the one-year limitations period begins to run from the date on which the

new factual predicate “could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence.” § 2244(d)(1)(D). Presumably, if the respondent is preventing the

discovery of evidence as required by Flanders, that evidence could not have

been discovered through the exercise of due diligence, and therefore, the

limitations period would not begin to run until it becomes available. The

Flanders exception would not cover situations as in this case where the

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5

 If diligence were required, Petitioner would have failed to meet it. Petitioner makes

no showing that he was diligent in bringing this claim to the federal court from when he

actually obtained the evidence in 2006, nor from when he could have discovered it. Further,

Petitioner arguing that he would need an evidentiary hearing on this point, without any facts,

is inadequate to qualify for an evidentiary hearing. For example, “[a] habeas petitioner ...

should receive an evidentiary hearing when he makes ‘a good-faith allegation that would, if

true, entitle him to equitable tolling.’ “ Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir.2006)

(quoting Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 921 (9th Cir.2003)). Here, Petitioner did not

allege any facts that would entitle him to a hearing, and therefore, the Court would consider

this record wherein no showing has been made that Petitioner exercised diligence in bringing

this claim.

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petitioner had collected sufficient evidence to demonstrate a credible claim of

actual innocence but failed to file within the one-year limitations period.

Souter, 395 F.3d at 601, n. 16.

As recounted by the Sixth Circuit, the AEDPA has an exception to the statute of

limitations for newly discovered evidence; which is one year from when the new evidence

could have been discovered. Thus, the Sixth Circuit decided that the Schlup gateway would

be defined as something more than the exception to the statute of limitations already

provided by the AEDPA. 

This case raises strong policy concerns for having a diligence requirement.

Specifically, one of these doctors has been known to petitioner and testified on his behalf in

1997 — 12 years before he filed his habeas petition. The other doctor offered testimony on

his behalf, by way of an affidavit, three years before his petition. However, the Sixth Circuit

correctly notes that the AEDPA already has an exception for newly discovered evidence, so

for the Schlup statute of limitations gateway to be meaningful, it would have to be broader

than the AEDPA’s exception. Because the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals did not impose

a mandatory diligence requirement in Lee, and given the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit case,

the Court will sustain Petitioner’s objection that he is not required to make a showing of

diligence in discovering and/or presenting to the Court his “new” evidence.5

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2. Actual Innocence Gateway

a. Definition of “New” Evidence

As discussed above, Petitioner has two affidavits that he claims qualify as new

evidence and are sufficient to allow him to pass through the Schlup gateway. Although the

Court has rejected a diligence requirement in the time between Petitioner’s trial and

Petitioner bringing this habeas petition, the Court nonetheless will consider Chief Judge

Kozinski’s definition of “new” evidence. Specifically, Chief Judge Kozinski’s requires that

the new evidence be evidence that the petitioner could not have presented at his original trial.

Lee, 653 F.3d at 945 (C.J. Kozinski concurring). 

In this case, Petitioner’s first affidavit is from a doctor who met with him in 1997 and

testified on his behalf at sentencing. R&R at 25. Thus, this doctor was available to offer her

opinions at the time of Petitioner’s trial, and in fact offered them at sentencing. The second

affidavit is from a doctor who has never examined Petitioner, but offered his opinion

generally about the mental functioning of a person of Petitioner’s age at the time of the

offense. R&R at 26.

The Court finds that neither of these affidavits fall within the definition of “new”

evidence. They are not “scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical

physical evidence.” See Lee, 653 F.3d at 938. Instead, they are expert opinions regarding

Petitioner’s capacity to form the necessary mens rea to commit the crime of which he was

convicted. Petitioner has offered no argument that these opinions were not available at the

time of trial. Accordingly, the Court finds that what Petitioner offers as “new” evidence does

not qualify as “new” evidence as the term is used in Lee. See Lee, 653 F.3d at 945 (C.J.

Kozinski concurring). Therefore, the Petition in this case will be denied because it is barred

by the statute of limitations and does not qualify for the Schlup gateway around the statute

of limitations.

b. Is it more likely than not that no reasonable juror would

have convicted Petitioner?

Alternatively, even if this Court considers the substance of the affidavits, Petitioner

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 The R&R also concluded that the affidavits were not convincing evidence because

they were obtained without cross-examination or the ability to assess credibility. R&R at 26.

Petitioner concedes that affidavits are “weak” forms of evidence, but argues that they should

not be discounted because Petitioner requested an evidentiary hearing that could cure these

deficiencies. Doc. 53 at 9. Though the Court agrees with both parties regarding the

weakness of the affidavits, the Court has not discounted them due to their form. However,

the Court has discounted there overall reliability because the affiants were not given the

entire record that was available to the jury (which was entirely within Petitioner’s control),

which could have materially changed the affiants’ opinions. Further, because what record

was given to the doctors was entirely within Petitioner’s control, Petitioner’s request for an

evidentiary hearing to see if their opinions would be changed by the full record is denied.

See Doc. 26 at 27 (Petitioner states, “And in any event, whether the summary provided to Dr.

Parrish and Dr. Wellek somehow would have undermined their opinions is a question that

should be addressed and an evidentiary hearing on Petitioner’s actual innocence claim,....”).

7

 R&R at 4.

8

 R&R at 26.

9

 R&R at 4–8.

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fails to show that “it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted

him.” See Lee, 653 F.3d at 945; R&R at 26-27. The testimony in the affidavits fails to meet

the this standard for several reasons. First, both doctors were provided with largely

Petitioner’s version of the facts (including that the shooting was an “accident” that occurred

while “playing”), rather than the full trial record. R&R at 26-27.6

 Second, the doctor that

examined Petitioner equivocally said that he “probably” would not have consciously

disregarded a grave risk that taking the guns, playing with the guns and returning the guns

would have resulted in death. Doc. 25. Third, the doctor who opines that Petitioner was

incapable of acting with criminal recklessness has never met with Petitioner to determine his

actual capacity. 

Given all the evidence at trial, including that Petitioner was not “playing” with the

gun, but instead was fighting with the victim,7

 that Petitioner conceded that even if playing

with the gun, pointing it at someone would be “stupid,”8

 and Petitioner’s significant efforts

to conceal the shooting after it occurred,9

 the Court finds that even with these affidavits it is

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not “more likely than not” that a reasonable juror would not have convicted Petitioner. This

conclusion is further supported by the fact that the jury was instructed to consider Petitioner’s

age in determining his culpability. R&R at 27. Accordingly, even if the Court reaches the

merits of Petitioner’s actual innocence gateway around the statute of limitations argument,

Petitioner had failed to meet the actual innocence standard. Therefore, the Petition in this

case will be denied because it is barred by the statute of limitations.

III. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing,

IT IS ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation (Doc. 50) is accepted and

adopted to the extent specified above. The objections (Doc. 53) are overruled or sustained

to the extent specified above.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Petition in this case is denied because it is

barred by the statute of limitations and the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment

accordingly.

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10 The Court notes that at page 10 of his objections, Petitioner defers making his

objections to the R&R’s recommendation that this Court deny a certificate of appealability

until after this Court issues an order accepting or rejecting the R&R. However, the 2009

amendments to the Rules Governing Section 2254 cases mandate that, “The district court

must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the

applicant.” Rule 11(a). Thus, to the extent Petitioner wanted to brief the issue, objecting to

the R&R was his opportunity. Nonetheless, the Court did not deny the certificate of

appealability because Petitioner did not object to the R&R on this point. Instead, the Court

considered the issue de novo and reached the conclusion stated above.

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IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that pursuant to Rule 11 of the Rules Governing

Section 2254 Cases, in the event Petitioner files an appeal, the Court denies issuance of a

certificate of appealability because dismissal of the Petition is based on a plain procedural

bar and jurists of reason would not find this Court’s procedural ruling debatable. See Slack

v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).10

DATED this 12th day of September, 2012.

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