Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-03001/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-03001-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMAL A. DAVIS,

Petitioner,

v.

MARTIN BITER, Warden, Kern Valley State

Prison,

Respondent.

 

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Case No. 12cv3001-BEN (BLM)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

FOR ORDER (1) DENYING

RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS ON BASIS THAT FAP IS

UNTIMELY AND (2) FINDING

MIXED PETITION AND ISSUING

SECOND OPTIONS ORDER IN LIEU

OF DISMISSAL

[ECF No. 16]

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge Roger

T. Benitez pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Civil Local Rules 72.1(d) and HC.2 of the

United States District Court for the Southern District of California. On March 26, 2012,

Petitioner Jamal Davis, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a First Amended Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus. ECF No. 1 (“FAP”). Petitioner challenges his state court conviction

of conspiracy to commit murder. Id. Currently before the Court is Respondent’s Motion to

Dismiss the FAP for being untimely. ECF No. 16 (“MTD”). Petitioner did not file any

opposition to the instant motion. The Court has considered the Petition, Respondent’s

Motion to Dismiss, and all of the supporting documents submitted by the parties. For the

reasons set forth below, the Court finds that the FAP is timely and RECOMMENDS that

Respondent’s motion to dismiss be DENIED. However, a sua sponte review of the FAP

12cv3001-BEN (BLM)

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reveals that it contains both exhausted and unexhausted claims and therefore finds that

dismissal of the FAP is appropriate but RECOMMENDS that, prior to dismissal, Petitioner

again be advised about the options available to him with regards to a mixed petition and

that he be given one last opportunity to select one of those options.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On December 11, 2009, Petitioner was convicted of one count of conspiracy to

commit second degree murder in violation of California Penal Code section 182(a)(1). ECF

No. 17-3 at 444. The jury also found true a special allegation that Petitioner committed the

crime for the benefit of a criminal street gang in violation of California Penal Code section

186.22(b)(1). Petitioner subsequently was sentenced to 25 years to life in state prison. Id.

On August 27, 2010, Petitioner appealed his conviction to the California Court of

Appeal. ECF No. 17-7, Lodgment 3. On June 29, 2011, the California Court of Appeal

affirmed the judgment in a written opinion. ECF No. 17-10, Lodgment 6. Petitioner

subsequently filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court, which the Court

denied on August 31, 2011. Lodgments 7 & 8. Petitioner did not file any state habeas

petitions seeking collateral relief. FAP at 8.

On November 14, 2012, Petitioner filed his initial federal petition. ECF No. 1 at 12. 1

On January 3, 2013, District Judge Roger T. Benitez dismissed the petition without prejudice

for Petitioner’s failure to pay the requisite filing fee and for Petitioner’s failure to allege

complete exhaustion of his state court remedies. ECF No. 3. On March 20, 2013, Petitioner

filed his FAP, asserting the same four claims set forth in his initial petition. ECF No. 8. 

Respondent filed the instant MTD on June 25, 2013, arguing that the FAP should be

dismissed as untimely. ECF No. 17-16. Petitioner did not file an opposition.

In determining the filing date of a petition, pro se prisoners generally are entitled to the benefit of 1

the “mailbox rule,” which dictates that the statutory filing date is the date a document was presented to prison

authorities for mailing to the court. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988); Stillman v. LaMarque, 319

F.3d 1199, 1201 (9th Cir. 2003). Here, the record does not reflect the date on which Petitioner presented his

petition to prison authorities. Because the presentation date is unavailable, and to provide Petitioner the

greatest benefit of the doubt, this Court will use the date the document was signed as the filing date. See

Lopez v. Felker, 536 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1155 n.1 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (filing date is date on which petition was

signed). 

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SCOPE OF REVIEW

Title 28, United States Code, § 2254(a), sets forth the following scope of review for

federal habeas corpus claims:

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall

entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he

is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (West 2012).

DISCUSSION

Respondent moves to dismiss the FAP on the grounds that it is barred by AEDPA’s

one-year statute of limitations. Specifically, Respondent argues that Petitioner had one year

from November 29, 2011 to file for federal habeas relief, and since Petitioner did not file his

FAP until March 4, 2012, the FAP should be dismissed as untimely. MTD at 7. Respondent

further argues that Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling since he did not file any state

habeas petitions. Id. at 8. In addition, Respondent contends Petitioner is not entitled to

equitable tolling because he fails to show that some extraordinary circumstance beyond his

control prevented him from timely filing a federal petition. Id. at 8-10. 

A. Petitioner’s FAP is Timely

The AEDPA imposes a one-year statute of limitations on federal petitions for writ of

habeas corpus filed by state prisoners. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (West Supp. 2012). Section

2244(d)'s one-year limitations period applies to all habeas petitions filed by persons in

"custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court." Id. § 2244(d)(1). The one-year

limitations period runs from the latest of:

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created

by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is

removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by

the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral

review; or

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(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

Id. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D). 

Here, the statute of limitations began to run on "the date on which the judgment

became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking

such review." Id. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Added to this is ninety days in which to file a petition

for writ of certiorari. Wixon v. Washington, 264 F.3d 894, 897-98 (9th Cir. 2001). Thus,

the latest possible date the statute of limitations began to run was November 30, 2011. 

Absent tolling, the AEDPA limitations period expired one year later on November 29, 2012. 

§ 2244(d). Because Petitioner represented himself and was in prison when filing, the prison

mailbox rule dictates that the date he released his petition to prison authorities be used as

the filing date. Houston, 487 U.S. at 271. Here, the only evidence indicating when the

petition was released to prison authorities is the date the petition was signed by Petitioner. 

Lopez, 536 F. Supp. 2d at 1155 n.1 (filing date is date on which petition was signed). The

date on the initial petition is November 14, 2012, which is within the one-year statute of

limitations. ECF No. 1 at 12. Moreover, Petitioner’s FAP relates back to the filing of his

initial petition because he asserts the same four claims in both petitions. See Mayle v. Felix,

545 U.S. 644, 649-50 (2005) (an amended habeas petition relates back to the initial petition

where it raises the same grounds for relief based on the same facts). Accordingly, the Court

finds that the FAP is timely and RECOMMENDS that Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss be

DENIED.

B. Mixed Petition

Although Petitioner’s FAP was timely filed, a sua sponte review of the FAP indicates

that Petitioner fails to allege complete exhaustion of his state judicial remedies. Generally,

the exhaustion of available state judicial remedies is a prerequisite to a federal court’s

consideration of claims presented in habeas corpus proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b);

Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971). Exhaustion of a habeas petitioner’s federal

claims requires that they have been “fairly presented” in each appropriate state court,

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including a state supreme court with powers of discretionary review, and that the petitioner

“alert[] [the state] court to the federal nature of the claim.” Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27,

29 (2004). If state remedies have not been exhausted as to any of the federal claims, the

habeas petition typically should be dismissed. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349 (1989);

Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982) (requiring dismissal of petitions that contain both

exhausted and unexhausted claims, commonly referred to as “mixed” petitions); see also

Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 276-77 (2005) (confirming continued applicability of “total

exhaustion rule” even after AEDPA imposed one-year statute of limitations on habeas

claims). However, a petitioner has the option of formally abandoning his unexhausted

claims and proceeding with the exhausted claims. See Rose, 455 U.S. at 510, 520-21

(stating that a petitioner who files a mixed petition may “resubmit[]the habeas petition to

present only exhausted claims to the district court”). Once a petitioner abandons his

unexhausted claims, though, he may lose the ability to ever raise them in federal court. See

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 486-87 (2000) (noting that if a prisoner decides not to

return to state court to exhaust and instead to proceed with his exhausted claims, any

subsequent petitions may be considered successive and subject to dismissal); see also 28

U.S.C. § 2244 (a)-(b).

Petitioner’s initial federal petition contained four claims, only two of which were

exhausted. ECF No. 1. Consequently, as noted above, District Judge Benitez dismissed

without prejudice the original petition and warned that “[i]f Petitioner reopens this action

by satisfying the filing fee, the Petition will be subject to dismissal for failure to allege

complete exhaustion of state judicial remedies as to all claims presented.” ECF No. 3 at 2. 

Furthermore, the Court provided Petitioner with the four options available to him for

proceeding with the FAP and instructed him to notify the Court of his choice. Id. 2

Despite District Judge Benitez’ warning, Petitioner filed a FAP that appears to be

District Judge Benitez instructed Petitioner to choose one of the following four options: 2

(1) demonstrate exhaustion; (2) voluntarily dismiss the action; (3) formally abandon unexhausted claims; or

(4) file a motion to stay the federal proceedings. ECF No. 3 at 2-5. 

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identical to his initial petition, containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims, and failed

to advise the Court as to which option Petitioner wished to pursue. Petitioner asserts four

grounds for relief in his FAP: (1) the trial court’s sentence constitutes cruel and unusual

punishment under the Eighth Amendment; (2) the trial court violated Petitioner’s

constitutional rights by failing to instruct the jury on lesser charges; (3) there was

insufficient evidence to support the verdict; and (4) “prejudicial trial discrepancies.” FAP

at 6-9. Petitioner’s FAP indicates that claims three and four are unexhausted because

Petitioner did not present them to the California Supreme Court. Id. at 8-9. Because the

FAP contains both exhausted and unexhausted claims, the petition is subject to dismissal

as a mixed petition. See Rose, 455 U.S. at 522 (“a district court must dismiss habeas

petitions containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims”). However, in lieu of

immediate dismissal, the Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner be sent another options

order specifying Petitioner’s options with regard to the mixed petition. If Petitioner does not

elect one of the identified options, then the Court RECOMMENDS that the FAP

DISMISSED. Because this will be the second options order sent to Petitioner, if Petitioner

does not select one of the four options, this Court RECOMMENDS that the dismissal be

with prejudice. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court issue

an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation; (2) denying

Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss; (3) finding the FAP contains exhausted and unexhausted

claims, and (4) issuing a Notice Regarding Possible Dismissal of FAP for Failure to Exhaust

State Court Remedies.

IT IS ORDERED that no later than November 1, 2013 any party to this action

may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document

should be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with the

Court and served on all parties no later than November 22, 2013. The parties are

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advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise

those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455

(9th Cir. 1998).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 2, 2013

BARBARA L. MAJOR

United States Magistrate Judge

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