Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01029/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-01029-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Petition for Removal

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FRANCESCA GONZALES, et al.

Plaintiffs,

v.

T-MOBILE, USA, Inc., et al.

Defendants.

 

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Case No. 13cv1029-BEN (BLM)

SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER DENYING

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR A

PROTECTIVE ORDER

[ECF No. 28]

On June 23, 2014, the counsel for all parties jointly contacted the Court regarding

a discovery dispute, for which the Court set a briefing schedule. ECF No. 27. In

accordance with the Court’s Order, Defendant T-Mobile USA, Inc. (“Defendant” or “TMobile”) filed a motion for a protective order on June 24, 2014. ECF No. 28. Plaintiffs

timely filed an opposition on June 27, 2014. ECF No. 29. Defendant filed a reply in support

of its motion for a protective order on July 2, 2014. ECF No. 32.

The parties advised the Court that a ruling on the motion was needed as soon as

possible since Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification had to be filed by July 14, 2014. ECF

Nos. 28-1 at 2; 29 at 5-6, 15-16. To accommodate the parties’ request, on July 3, 2014,

the Court issued an order denying Defendant’s motion for a protective order and granting

13cv1029-BEN (BLM)

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in part Plaintiffs’ motion to continue the class certification deadline. ECF No. 33. In the

order, the Court stated that it was issuing the order to address the timing concerns of the

parties and that it would issue a supplemental order providing additional analysis. Id. at

4 n.1. This order provides the supplemental analysis for the order denying Defendant’s

motion for a protective order.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs brought this class action suit on behalf of “[a]ll employees who worked for

Defendants in California within four years prior to the filing of this complaint until the date

of certification, and who earned and/or received commissions and/or bonuses and/or

incentives as part of their regularly-scheduled compensation on service contracts, renewals

and/or merchandise sales.” ECF No. 1-3 at 5. Plaintiffs assert that T-Mobile’s automated

commission accounting system did not accurately reflect all commissions earned by the

members of the purported class, resulting in a systemic underpayment of commissions and

bonuses. Id. at 3-4.

Plaintiffs state that on October 14, 2013, they served discovery requests on

Defendant which were “designed to find and detect alleged errors in T-Mobile’s

commissioning system.” ECF No. 29-2, Declaration of Janine R. Menhennet (“Menhennet

Decl.”) at 3. Plaintiffs maintain that while their discovery requests were pending,1 the

parties jointly agreed in December 2013, “that staying the formal discovery requests made

sense, while they pursued [a] smaller, narrower data request . . . .” ECF No. 29 at 6; see

also Menhennet Decl. at 3. Defendant alleges that in December 2013 and January 2014,

the parties entered into an agreement to stay general discovery (or written discovery) and

to focus on discovery required for mediation. See ECF No. 28-2, Declaration of Fred M.

Plevin (“Plevin Decl.”) at 2; ECF Nos. 28-1 at 2-3; 32 at 5-6, 8. Defendant further claims

1 Plaintiffs assert that the “formal discovery” in this case consists of “Plaintiffs’ Requests for Production

of Documents, Set One, propounded September 3, 2013, and Plaintiffs’ Special Interrogatories to Defendant,

Set One, propounded October 14, 2013.” Menhennet Decl. at 3. Defendant confirms that as of early December

2013, Plaintiffs “had a variety of pending discovery requests to T-Mobile . . . including document requests and

special interrogatories.” ECF No. 28-2, Declaration of Fred M. Plevin at 2. 

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that in response to Plaintiffs’ requests, and based upon the parties’ agreements, it

conducted specific computer searches, gathered, compiled, and produced to Plaintiffs

relevant data. ECF Nos. 28-1 at 2-3; 32 at 2-3.

Citing delays in data production and analysis, the parties jointly moved the Court on 

three separate occasions (on November 8, 2013, January 31, 2014, and May 29, 2014) to

continue expert disclosure and class certification filing deadlines. See ECF Nos. 16, 21 &

23. After granting the parties’ first two motions and extending the deadlines by five months

[ECF Nos. 17 & 22], the Court declined the parties’ request to extend the class certification

deadline for three more months [ECF Nos. 23 at 6; 22 at 2], and extended the deadline

until July 14, 2014.2

 ECF Nos. 24 & 26. The new deadline for class certification was thus

set before the parties’ scheduled mediation date of July 31, 2014. ECF Nos. 26 at 3; 29 at

8. Plaintiffs subsequently advised Defendant’s counsel about their intention to use some

of the data produced by Defendant after January 14, 2014, to support their motion for class

certification. ECF No. 28-1 at 4; Plevin Decl. at 4-5. Defendant asked Plaintiffs to “enter

into a stipulated protective order prohibiting the use of any information produced by TMobile after January 14, 2014, for any purpose other than mediation.” Id.; see also ECF

No. 28-3 at 1. Plaintiffs did not agree to the proposed stipulation, and Defendant

subsequently refused to produce the last set of data, which was scheduled to occur by June

13, 2014. See Plevin Decl. at 5; see also ECF Nos. 28 at 9 n.3; 29 at 16. 

Defendant alleges that it “informally” provided data compilations in response to

2

 In reaching its decision, the Court stated the following:

After carefully considering the additional facts provided by counsel in support of the motion,

the Court declines to continue the deadlines as requested by the parties. See ECF No. 23 at

6. As stated in this Court’s June 5, 2014 order, the parties can proceed on two tracks and

conduct discovery and prepare for mediation at the same time. See ECF No. 24 at 2. 

Nevertheless, because the last data production will be completed by June 13, 2014, and

because Plaintiffs’ experts will require two to three more weeks to review and prepare their

reports, the Court finds good cause to continue the class certification filing deadline to July 14,

2014.

ECF No. 26 at 2-3 (footnote omitted).

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Plaintiffs’ January 14, 2014 letter3 “for the sole, purpose of allowing [Plaintiffs] to prepare

for mediation.” See ECF No. 28-1 at 2; see also Plevin Decl. at 3-4. Defendant disputes

Plaintiffs’ characterization of the produced data as “raw data.” In support, Defendant

alleges that it expended significant resources searching for, obtaining, and compiling the

data, asserts that it did so in order to accommodate mediation, and claims the documents

it produced were not business records. ECF Nos. 32 at 2-3, 8; 32-2. Defendant filed the

instant motion requesting the Court to issue a protective order “precluding the use by

Plaintiffs of any data produced by T-Mobile in response to Plaintiffs’ counsel’s letter of

January 14, 2014, or any related requests, for any purpose other than mediation.” ECF

No. 28 at 1; see also ECF Nos. 28-1 at 10; 32 at 8. 

Plaintiffs reply that Defendant “is using mediation shield . . . to protect raw data

pulled entirely from contemporaneous business records which existed prior to, and

independent of, the mediation process.” ECF No. 29 at 8. Plaintiffs acknowledge that they

agreed with Defendant to limit the scope of the discovery requested in October 2013, in

order to comply with the Court’s discovery order suggesting that Plaintiffs identify

“systematic errors” relevant to the allegations in this case. Id. at 6-8; Markham Decl. at 3-

4; Menhennet Decl. at 3. Plaintiffs further assert that the disputed computer data “is raw

data, subject to discovery” that was maintained as business records, and, as such, is not

protected by the mediation privilege and could be used by Plaintiffs for class certification

purposes. ECF No. 29 at 8-11, 16. Plaintiffs thus assert that Defendant’s motion for a

protective order should be denied. Id. at 16.

3

 On January 14, 2014, Plaintiff’s counsel, David R. Markham, sent a letter to Defendant’s counsel,

Fred Plevin, captioned “Confidential Settlement Communication.” ECF Nos. 28-3 at 6; 31 at 7. The copy of the

letter provided to the Court has been significantly redacted by the parties, and thus the Court turns to the

parties’ affidavits describing the content of the letter. See ECF Nos. 38-3 at 6-11; 31 at 7. Defendant asserts

that in the letter, Plaintiffs’ counsel expressed his willingness “to further . . . conversations on the subject of

settlement,” and requested Defendant’s production of “customer transaction and commission data for

transactions for specific products that did, and did not, result in a paid commission.” Plevin Decl. at 2-3. 

Plaintiffs’ counsel claims that in the letter, he “(1) agreed to mediation, but (2) identified the types of

(non)commissioned transactions which appeared to occur systematically and (3) requested all underlying data

which T-Mobile had on them.” Markham Decl. at 3; see also ECF No. 31 at 7 (containing Plaintiffs’ counsel’s

statement that “it is important that we have all digitally stored information on the subject accounts regardless

of date”).

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LEGAL STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally allow for broad discovery, authorizing

parties to obtain discovery regarding “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s

claim or defense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Also, “[f]or good cause, the court may order

discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action.” Id. Relevant

information for discovery purposes includes any information “reasonably calculated to lead

to the discovery of admissible evidence,” and need not be admissible at trial to be

discoverable. Id. There is no requirement that the information sought directly relate to a

particular issue in the case. Rather, relevance encompasses any matter that “bears on” or

could reasonably lead to matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be presented

in the case. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978). District courts

have broad discretion to determine relevancy for discovery purposes. See Hallett v. Morgan,

296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002). Similarly, district courts have broad discretion to limit

discovery where the discovery sought is “unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be

obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less

expensive.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(c). Limits should be imposed where the burden or

expense outweighs the likely benefits. Id.

A party may request the production of any document within the scope of Rule 26(b).

Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a). “For each item or category, the response must either state that

inspection and related activities will be permitted as requested or state an objection to the

request, including the reasons.” Id. at 34(b)(2)(B). The responding party is responsible for

all items in “the responding party’s possession, custody, or control.” Id. at 34(a)(1). 

Upon a showing of good cause, the Court may “issue an order to protect a party or

person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 26(c). “For good cause to exist, the party seeking protection bears the burden of

showing specific prejudice or harm will result if no protective order is granted.” Phillips ex

rel. Estates of Byrd v. General Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210–11 (9th Cir. 2002), citing

Beckman Indus., Inc. v. Int'l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 470, 476 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Broad allegations

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of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning, do not satisfy the

Rule 26(c) test”); see also Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418, 429 (9th Cir. 1975)

(Under liberal discovery principles of the federal rules, those opposing discovery are required

to carry a heavy burden of showing why discovery should be denied). The court has wide

discretion to determine what constitutes a showing of good cause and to fashion a protective

order that provides the appropriate degree of protection. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart,

467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984).

State law privilege rules apply in a federal proceeding based on diversity. See Fed.

R. Evid. 501; In re California Pub. Utilities Com’n, 892 F.2d 778, 781 (9th Cir. 1989) (“In

diversity actions, questions of privilege are controlled by state law.”). In California, the

mediation privilege is established by statute. See Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1115-1128. California

Evidence Code § 1119(b) provides that “[n]o writing, as defined in Section 250, that is

prepared for the purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to, a mediation . . . is admissible

or subject to discovery, and disclosure of the writing shall not be compelled . . . .” Cal. Evid.

Code 1119(b). A “writing” is defined to include “every other means of recording upon any

tangible thing, any form of communication or representation, including letters, words,

pictures, sounds, or symbols, or combinations thereof, and any record thereby created,

regardless of the manner in which the record has been stored.” Cal. Evid. Code § 250; see

also Rojas v. Superior Court, 33 Cal.4th 407, 416-17 (2004) (California’s mediation privilege

for “writings” extends to analyses of raw data results, prepared for, in the course of, or

pursuant to, a mediation). However, “[e]vidence otherwise admissible or subject to

discovery outside of a mediation . . . shall not be or become inadmissible or protected from

disclosure solely by reason of its introduction or use in a mediation . . . .” Cal. Evid. Code

§ 1120(a).

DISCUSSION

Defendant asserts that all of the data and documents it produced after January 14,

2014, are protected by the mediation privilege under California Evidence Code § 1119(b) and

asks the Court to prevent Plaintiffs from using or disclosing the challenged data for any

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purpose other than mediation. ECF Nos. 32 at 3-4, 8; 28 at 1; 28-1 at 5-6, 10. Defendant

claims that the produced spreadsheets containing data “only exist” because Plaintiffs

requested Defendant to “locate, compile and customize sets of data for the upcoming

mediation.” ECF No. 32 at 2-3. In support, Defendant provides the declaration of Jerry

Beharry, an Application Support Analyst for the Billing Operations Department at T-Mobile. 

See ECF 32-2, Declaration of Jerry Beharry (“Beharry Decl.”) at 1-3. Mr. Beharry maintains

that he pulled the disputed data from five separate tables in T-Mobile’s internal computer

system based on the subscriber numbers provided by Plaintiffs. Id. at 2. Mr. Beharry

describes the process of data extraction as follows: “I had to create queries for each

separate category of information. I prepared similar queries for the other categories of

information. . . . [W]hen I finished the queries, I compiled, formatted and exported the data

into an excel spreadsheet.” Id. Defendant argues that because the spreadsheets containing

the requested data were created after a lengthy and time-consuming process, they are not

business records kept in the company’s normal course of business operations. Id.; ECF

No. 32 at 2. Defendant relies on California Evidence Code 1119(b), the California Supreme

Court’s decision in Rojas, and public policy supporting mediation and confidentiality

agreements in asserting that the challenged data is entitled to statutory protection. ECF

Nos. 32 at 3-5, 8; 28 at 1; 28-1 at 5-6, 10; see also Rojas, 33 Cal.4th at 407. Defendant

thus asserts that the Court should grant its motion for a protective order. ECF Nos. 28 at

1; 28-1 at 10; 32 at 8.

Plaintiffs counter that the challenged data is “raw data in the form of a

contemporaneous business record, existing independently of the mediation process,” that

the data was otherwise discoverable, Defendant had agreed to produce the data before

mediation discussions began, and that Plaintiffs would be irreparably harmed if they are

prevented from using Defendant’s raw data. ECF No. 29 at 8-15. Plaintiffs assert that the

“raw lines of data” in the form of a contemporaneous business record existed “independently

of the mediation process” and “well before the present litigation commenced.” Id. at 8, 11. 

In support, Plaintiffs explain that Defendant’s records at issue in this case were prepared to

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bill T-Mobile’s customers and to pay its employees based on those transactions. Id. at 8-9. 

Plaintiffs further argue that the fact that they requested a portion of Defendant’s business

records did not make the records “prepared for” or “compiled for” the purpose of mediation,

because the records existed independently of and before the mediation was proposed in

October 2013. Id. at 8. As such, Plaintiffs assert that the data does not contain “opinions,

admissions, analyses, or reports,” was not “prepared for the purpose of, in the course of,

or pursuant to, a mediation,” and thus is not protected by the mediation privilege. Id. at 8-

9. Plaintiffs therefore ask the Court to deny Defendant’s motion for a protective order. Id.

at 16.

1. Application of California Privilege Law

Because this action is brought to federal court under diversity jurisdiction, the Court

is required to apply California privilege laws. See ECF No. 1; Fed. R. Evid. 501; In re

California Pub. Utilities Com’n, 892 F.2d at 781. The spreadsheets produced by Defendant

with the requested data extracted from its internal computer system, qualify as a “writing.” 

See Cal. Evid. Code § 250 (providing that a “writing” is defined to include “every other

means of recording upon any tangible thing, any form of communication or representation,

including letters, words, pictures, sounds, or symbols, or combinations thereof, and any

record thereby created, regardless of the manner in which the record has been stored.”);

see also Rojas, 33 Cal.4th at 416-17. 

Defendant relies on California Evidence Code § 1119(b) and Rojas, and asserts that

the documents it produced after January 14, 2014, are protected by the mediation privilege,

because the spreadsheets containing the requested data were created after a lengthy and

time-consuming process for mediation purposes. ECF Nos. 32 at 3; 28-1 at 5-6, 10; see also

Cal. Evid. Code 1119(b) (“No writing, as defined in Section 250, that is prepared for the

purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to, a mediation . . . is admissible or subject to

discovery, and disclosure of the writing shall not be compelled . . . .”); Rojas, 33 Cal.4th 407. 

In Rojas, an owner of an apartment complex sued the contractors and subcontractors who

built the complex alleging certain construction defects that resulted in toxic molds on the

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property. Rojas, 33 Cal.4th at 411. The parties mediated the dispute and reached a

settlement. Id. at 412. After the settlement, the apartment complex tenants sued the

owners and the builders of the complex alleging health problems caused by the toxic molds

and sought discovery of the mediation materials. Id. Defendants argued that the items

sought by the tenant-plaintiffs were protected by Cal. Evid. Code § 1119, because they were

prepared for mediation in the underlying action. Id. The trial court sustained mediationconfidentiality objections to discovery, and the Court of Appeal reversed, holding that Cal.

Evid. Code § 1119 did not protect the type of evidence sought by the tenants. Id. at 413-15. 

The California Supreme Court reversed and found that the Court of Appeal “erred in holding

that photographs, videotapes, witness statements, and ‘raw test data’ from physical samples

collected at the complex–such as reports describing the existence or amount of mold spores

in a sample–that were ‘prepared for the purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to, [the]

mediation’ in the underlying action are not protected under section 1119.” Id. at 422-23. 

 The issue in this case is whether the computer data produced by Defendant after

January 14, 2014, was prepared for the purpose of mediation. Although the California

Supreme Court in Rojas focused on the kinds of evidence protected by Cal. Evid. Code

§ 1119 and the scope of the exceptions to that protection, it did not address the standard

for determining whether a piece of evidence was “prepared for the purpose of, in the course

of, or pursuant to, a mediation.” See Rojas, 33 Cal.4th at 424 (“the Court of Appeal . . . sent

the case back to the trial court without addressing Tenants’ argument that many of the

documents in question had not been ‘prepared for the purpose of, in the course of, or

pursuant to, a mediation.’ (§ 1119, subd. (b).) We likewise express no opinion on this

question.”); see also id. at 415-24; Cal. Evid. Code § 1119(b).

The California Supreme Court in Rojas did, however, analyze Cal. Evid. Code

§ 1120(a), which provides that “[e]vidence otherwise admissible or subject to discovery

outside of mediation . . . shall not be or become inadmissable or protected from disclosure

solely by reason of its introduction or use in a mediation,” and the section’s interplay with

Cal. Evid. Code § 1119:

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Read together, sections 1119 and 1120 establish that a writing—which qualifies as “ ‘[e]vidence’ ” (§ 140)—is not protected “solely by reason of its

introduction or use in a mediation” (§ 1120, subd. (a)), but is protected only

if it was “prepared for the purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to, a mediation.” (§ 1119, subd. (b).) In other words, under section 1120, a party

cannot secure protection for a writing—including . . . an analysis of a test

sample—that was not “prepared for the purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to, a mediation” (§ 1119, subd. (b)) simply by using or introducing

it in a mediation or even including it as part of a writing—such as a brief or a

declaration or a consultant's report—that was “prepared for the purpose of, in

the course of, or pursuant to, a mediation.” [T]his construction does not

render section 1120 “surplusage” or permit parties “to use mediation as a

shield to hide evidence.” Rather, consistent with the Legislature's intent, it

applies section 1120 as a “limit[ ]” on “the scope of [s]ection 1119” that

“prevent[s] parties from using a mediation as a pretext to shield materials

from disclosure.”

Rojas, 33 Cal.4th at 417-18. Therefore, Cal. Evid. Code § 1120 limits the scope of § 1119,

thereby preventing litigants from using mediation as a pretext to shield materials from

disclosure. See id. at 417-18, 423 n.8.4 

In this case, at this Court’s September 20, 2013, hearing5

 Defendant’s counsel stated

the following:

[W]e can query the database and produce a searchable, sortable file with the

data . . . . If [Plaintiffs] just tell us what transactions they are interested in or

what specific types of transactions for a date . . . for a period of time. It’s a

4 The Supreme Court of California stated the following:

Of course, that witness statements “prepared for the purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant

to, a mediation” are protected from discovery under section 1119 does not mean that the facts

set forth in those statements are so protected. Under section 1120, subdivision (a), because

facts known to percipient witnesses constitute “[e]vidence otherwise admissible or subject to

discovery outside of a mediation,” those facts do not “become inadmissible or protected from

disclosure solely by reason of [their] introduction or use in a mediation” through witness

statements prepared for the purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to, the mediation.

Otherwise, contrary to the Legislature's intent, parties could use mediation “as a pretext to

shield materials from disclosure.” (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 29B pt. 3 West's Ann.

Evid.Code, supra, foll. § 1120, p. 153.)

Rojas, 33 Cal. 4th at 423 n.8.

5 On September 20, 2013, the Court held a hearing in the overlapping case, Kogok et al. v. T-Mobile

USA et al., 13cv838-BEN (BLM) (“Kogok”), regarding Plaintiffs’ motion to compel production of the Electronically

Stored Information (“ESI”) contained on T-Mobile’s computerized system for calculating commissions for the

putative class. See Kogok, ECF No. 36. The Court denied the motion to compel and refused to permit Plaintiffs

to inspect or copy Defendant’s entire electronic database. Kogok, ECF No. 37 at 10, 31. The Court further

stated that Plaintiffs would have to rely on T-Mobile to produce ESI records and directed Plaintiffs to tailor their

discovery requests to identify categories of systemic-type errors. Id. at 30-31.

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SQL system, and you can do queries of SQL, and . . . run queries to extract

data as long as they have specific parameters. 

Kogok, ECF No. 37 at 15. After the hearing, Plaintiffs propounded discovery aimed at

identifying “systemic errors” and seeking the data that Defendant produced.6

 ECF No. 29

at 6; Menhennet Decl. at 3. Accordingly, the challenged data existed before the parties

engaged in mediation discussions in October 2013, Defendant represented to the Court that

it could produce the data pursuant to Plaintiffs’ discovery requests, and Plaintiffs served such

requests on Defendant before the mediation discussions began. Moreover, as pointed out

by Plaintiffs, the produced data was not marked “for mediation purposes only” at the time

of production. Markham Decl. at 4. 

Further, although Defendant’s Application Support Analyst created queries for various

categories of data sought by Plaintiffs in order to extract relevant data from T-Mobile’s

internal computer systems where it was stored, and formatted and exported the data into

excel spreadsheets, the analysis, calculations and compilations of the data was done by

Plaintiffs’ consultant. See Beharry Decl. at 2; Markham Decl. at 4-5. Therefore, the facts

of this case are distinguishable from Rojas, where the challenged data included “reports

describing the existence or amount of mold spores in a sample” prepared by the party

asserting the mediation privilege. See Rojas, 33 Cal.4th at 422-23. The Court thus agrees

with Plaintiffs that the data produced by Defendant after January 14, 2014, is raw data,

which does not contain impressions, opinions or analysis that would categorize the

information as “compiled” or “prepared” for mediation. See ECF No. 29 at 15. The data was

6 Plaintiffs assert the following: 

[A]fter the Court’s September 20, 2013 ruling requesting that Plaintiffs narrow their discovery

requests in the related Kogok matter, both the Kogok plaintiffs and the Gonzales plaintiffs

propounded additional written discovery requests, in conformity with the Court’s directive that

plaintiffs narrow their discovery requests to find more systemic-type errors. Plaintiff

propounded formal discovery requests in October [2013], which were narrower than requests

for the entire ASC database.

ECF No. 29 at 6; Menhennet Decl. at 3; see also Kogok, ECF No. 37. Plaintiffs further claim that “[t]hose

discovery requests, in total, would have covered the data T-Mobile has produced thus far, and has agreed to

continue to produce.” Menhennet Decl. at 3. 

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prepared for Defendant’s business use before the contemplated mediation, and therefore,

is “evidence otherwise admissible or subject to discovery outside mediation.” See Cal. Evid.

Code § 1120; see also § 1119.

2. Alleged Discovery Stay

Defendant claims that in December 2013 and January 2014, the parties entered into

an agreement to stay general discovery (or written discovery) and to focus on discovery

required for mediation. See ECF No. 28-2, Plevin Decl. at 2; ECF Nos. 28-1 at 2-3; 32 at

5-6, 8. Plaintiffs assert that while their discovery requests were pending, the parties jointly

agreed in December 2013, “that staying the formal discovery requests made sense, while

they pursued smaller, narrower data request . . . .” ECF No. 29 at 6; see also Menhennet

Decl. at 3. As noted by the Court in its original order, this contention is not supported by

the facts:

The Court initially notes that it did not stay discovery to permit the parties to

focus on mediation. Rather, the Court issued a case management order on

July 1, 2013, requiring the parties to conduct discovery and for Plaintiffs to file

their class certification motion by January 31, 2014. ECF No. 9. In their first

request to continue dates, the parties stated, among other reasons, that

Plaintiffs needed additional time to conduct discovery. ECF No. 16. The

parties acknowledged that the instant case was “largely duplicative of Kogok” and that

there was a dispute between the parties in Kogok as to the scope of

permissible ESI discovery. The Court resolved this on September 20,

2013, by ordering plaintiffs to identify categories of systematic errors

of transactions so that defense IT discovery could be limited to those

categories.

The parties in both cases have jointly pursued the Court’s directives, and plaintiffs (in both cases) are identifying the “systematic” errors at

this time, with the defense agreeing to produce data in databases

relevant thereto. This process is expected to take approximately 75

to 90 days.

Id. at 4. The Court relied on this language in granting the parties motion to

continue dates. ECF No. 17. 

In their second motion to continue discovery and motion deadlines, filed

on January 31, 2014, the parties reiterated that they were “identifying

systematic errors at this time, with the defense agreeing to produce data in

databases relevant thereto.” ECF No. 21 at 4. Again, the Court relied on this

language in granting the joint request. ECF No. 22. 

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In their third motion, filed on May 29, 2014, the parties stated “[o]n

January 14, 2014, Plaintiffs requested that T-Mobile produce data related to

14 different types of product codes, pursuant to the Court’s direction at the

September 20, 2013 hearing regarding discovery.” ECF No. 23 at 3. The

parties acknowledged that the discovery was “complicated” and required

“collection and review of the data” from “multiple databases” and that

“personnel [was] required to compile the requested data.” Id.

Based upon the parties’ contemporaneous statements to the Court in their

motions to continue dates, the Court finds that the produced computer data

at issue in this motion, including the required compilation, was compiled and

produced pursuant to case discovery, based at least in part on the Court’s

September 2013 discovery order. While the parties may have agreed to

narrow the scope of the discovery in order to facilitate their preparation for

mediation, the computer data was compiled and produced pursuant to this

Court’s discovery order, and not solely for a pending mediation. The fact that

the computer data was going to be used in mediation does not transform it

into data that is protected by the mediation privilege. The evidence presented

to this Court establishes that the parties were engaging in relevant discovery

and that they agreed to limit the scope of the relevant discovery to facilitate

mediation efforts, but that the discovery was not compiled and produced solely

for mediation. Accordingly, the Court finds that the computer data at issue in

Defendant’s motion is not protected by the mediation privilege. 

ECF No. 33 at 2-4. The Court reaffirms its original finding [see id. at 4] that the disputed

computer data is not protected by the mediation privilege and DENIES Defendant’s motion

for a protective order. See Seattle Times Co., 467 U.S. at 36. Because the challenged data

is not protected by the mediation privilege, Plaintiffs can use it for class certification

purposes.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, as well as in this Court’s July 3, 2014 order, the Court

DENIES Defendant’s motion for a protective order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 14, 2014

BARBARA L. MAJOR

United States Magistrate Judge

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