Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01909/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-01909-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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1

 The Honorable Robert L. Myers presided over the change-of-plea hearing and

sentencing.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Milton Lee Tucker, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV-12-1909-PHX-NVW (LOA)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter is before the Court on Petitioner’s pro se Amended Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus (the “Petition”), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, in which Petitioner challenges

his criminal convictions in the Maricopa County Superior Court, State of Arizona, Case No.

CR 110385. (Doc. 7) Respondents have filed an Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (the “Answer”) and Petitioner has filed a Reply. (Docs. 15, 16) As explained below,

the undersigned Magistrate Judge recommends the Petition be denied as untimely. 

I. Background

A. Guilty Plea and Sentencing

On December 8, 1980, Petitioner pled guilty to two counts of Armed Robbery, each

a Class Two dangerous felony under Arizona law. (Doc. 15, Exh. A1

) Petitioner was

sentenced on December 29, 1980, to seven years in prison for each count, the terms to run

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 Under current Arizona law, a defendant who pleads guilty waives his right to a direct

appeal. See A.R.S. § 13-4033(B). At the time Petitioner pled guilty, however, he had the right

to seek direct review of his convictions. See State v. Stevens, 173 Ariz. 494, 495 (Az.Ct.App.

1992) (holding that the Arizona Court of Appeals retained direct appeal jurisdiction over

convictions imposed pursuant to plea agreements entered before September 30, 1992). 

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concurrently. (Doc. 15, Exh. B) Petitioner did not file a direct appeal to the Arizona Court

of Appeals.2

B. State Post-Conviction Proceedings

 According to portions of the state-court record provided by Respondents, Petitioner

filed nothing in the State court challenging his convictions until March 22, 2011. On that day,

he filed in the Superior Court a “Motion of Petition for the Court to Take Mandatory Judicial

Notice.” (Doc. 15, Exh. C) The motion lists two Maricopa County Superior Court case

numbers, the one at issue in the instant Petition, CR-110385, and CR-159112. The second

case number is the subject of a second habeas petition filed by Petitioner in CV-12-1912-

PHX-NVW (LOA), for which a second Report and Recommendation is being issued

simultaneously herewith. 

On October 11, 2011, Petitioner filed in the Superior Court a document titled

“Acceptance of Contract,” which is in the form of a letter to Attorney General Tom Horne.

(Doc. 15, Exh. D) On December 6, 2011, Petitioner filed a Petition for Review in the

Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc. 15, Exh. E) The Court of Appeals dismissed the matter on

December 9, 2011, because “the trial court ha[d] not entered any final order in postconviction relief proceedings.” (Doc. 15, Exh. F) 

On December 15, 2011, the Superior Court issued an order, addressing Petitioner’s

“Motion of Petition for the Court to Take Mandatory Judicial Notice,” filed on March 22,

2011, and Petitioner’s “Acceptance of Contract,” filed on October 11, 2011. (Doc. 15, Exh.

G) The order provides a brief procedural history of both Superior Court cases referenced

above. (Id.) With regard to CR-110385, the case being challenged in the instant Petition, the

Superior Court explained that Petitioner pled guilty to two counts of armed robbery in

December 1980 and was sentenced to prison. (Id.) The court further explained that Petitioner

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 In the same order, the Superior Court dismissed the post-conviction proceedings in

the other case, CR-159112, even though that case number was included on the “Motion of

Petition for the Court to Take Mandatory Judicial Notice.” (Doc. 15, Exh. G) In the other

case, Petitioner had already filed a notice of post-conviction relief on June 6, 1988. (Id.)

Accordingly, the Superior Court treated the new notice of post-conviction relief as successive

and found the claims were precluded. (Id.)

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did not file a direct appeal and did not seek post-conviction relief until he filed the “Motion

of Petition for the Court to Take Mandatory Judicial Notice,” which the Superior Court

construed as a notice of post-conviction relief.3

 (Id.) The Superior Court found the notice to

be timely because it was the first one filed in this matter and, at the time Petitioner was

sentenced, there was no time limit for seeking post-conviction relief. (Id.) (citing Moreno v.

Gonzalez, 192 Ariz. 131, 135, 962 P.2d 205, 209 (Ariz. 1998)). Consequently, the Superior

Court appointed counsel to represent Petitioner and allowed the matter to proceed. (Id.) 

On January 18, 2012, Petitioner filed a Petition for Review in the Arizona Court of

Appeals in which he challenged the trial court’s dismissal of post-conviction proceedings as

to CR-159112. (Doc. 15, Exh. I) Petitioner “reserve[d] the opportunity” to seek review in

CR-110385 if it became necessary at a later time. (Id.) The Court of Appeals treated the

Petition for Review as a Petition for Special Action, at least as to CR-159112, and declined

jurisdiction on February 3, 2012. (Doc. 15, Exh. J) As to CR-110385, it appears the Court

of Appeals treated the filing as a Petition for Review. (Doc. 15, Exh. K) On August 8, 2013,

the Arizona Court of Appeals denied the Petition for Review. (Doc. 17 at 4) 

Although the trial court appointed counsel to represent Petitioner in his postconviction proceedings in CR-110385, Petitioner stated in a letter filed in the trial court that

he did not want court-appointed counsel to assist him. (Doc. 15, Exh. L) On February 13,

2012, the attorney appointed to represent Petitioner filed a Notice of Completion of Post

Conviction Review by Counsel; Request for 45-Day Extension of Time to Allow Defendant

to File Pro Per Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. (Doc. 15, Exh. N) Counsel stated in the

Notice of Completion that, based on Petitioner’s letter, he did not conduct a review of the

record to determine if there were any grounds for post-conviction relief. (Id.) Counsel

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4

 Petitioner submitted the original Petition on August 31, 2012. (Doc. 1) The docket

reflects the original Petition was actually filed on September 10, 2012. (Id.) The August 31,

2012 filing date is the date Petitioner signed the original Petition, doc. 1 at 18-19, and reflects

the application of the prison mailbox rule, i.e., a petition is deemed filed on the date it is

delivered to prison authorities for mailing. See Jenkins v. Johnson, 330 F.3d 1146, 1149 n.

2 (9th Cir. 2003).

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further requested Petitioner be granted an extension of time to file his own post-conviction

petition. (Id.) The trial court subsequently issued an order on February 28, 2012, granting

Petitioner time to file a pro per post-conviction petition and directing counsel to remain on

the case in an advisory capacity until the trial court issued a final ruling on Petitioner’s postconviction proceedings. (Doc. 15, Exh. O) 

In the meantime, Petitioner filed a Notice to Court on February 21, 2012, which was

construed as a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. (Doc. 15, Exhs. P, Q) On March 9,

2012, the State of Arizona filed a Motion to Dismiss Post-Conviction Relief Petition Without

Prejudice, in which the State argued Petitioner failed to comply with the applicable rules for

post-conviction petitions in the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Doc. 15, Exh. R) In

a March 15, 2012 minute entry, the trial court granted the State’s motion and struck the postconviction petition. (Doc. 15, Exh. R) The trial court granted Petitioner thirty days to file a

revised petition that complied with the applicable rules. (Id.) When Petitioner failed to file

a revised petition by the deadline, the trial court dismissed the post-conviction proceedings

on May 11, 2012. (Doc. 15, Exh. T) There is nothing to indicate Petitioner sought review

of the trial court’s decision in the Arizona Court of Appeals.

C. Federal Habeas Petition

On December 6, 2012, Petitioner filed his Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus in this District Court.4

 (Doc. 7) Petitioner raises fifteen grounds for relief in the

Petition. In Ground One, Petitioner alleges the Maricopa County Superior Court had no

jurisdiction over his case because it failed to prove its jurisdiction in response to Petitioner’s

jurisdictional challenge. In Ground Two, Petitioner alleges the Superior Court improperly

construed his “Motion of Petition for the Court to Take Mandatory Judicial Notice,” filed on

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March 22, 2011, as a petition for post-conviction relief. In Ground Three, Petitioner alleges

the Superior Court defaulted when it failed to address a motion he filed on January 19, 2011,

entitled “Motion for Void Judgment and Motion to Dismiss: No Contract.” In Ground Four,

Petitioner alleges the State statutes used to convict him in this matter did not have enacting

clauses. Thus, he contends the Superior Court had no subject matter jurisdiction. In Ground

Five, Petitioner alleges the Superior Court Judge who presided over the change-of-plea

hearing and sentencing “did not have a valid and lawful oath of office secured by a fidelity

bond on file.” In Ground Six, Petitioner claims the Superior Court lacked subject matter

jurisdiction because there are no original charging documents including an arrest warrant,

an information, and a supporting affidavit. In Ground Seven, Petitioner alleges the United

State and the State of Arizona are not sovereign. In Ground Eight, Petitioner alleges his

identity was “concealed by novation” and an artificial person was named in the case. In

Ground Nine, Petitioner alleges the United States and the State of Arizona are bankrupt and

cannot participate in court actions. In Ground Ten, Petitioner alleges the statutes used to

charge him in this case are copyrighted and not for public use. In Ground Eleven, Petitioner

alleges the Superior Court was a commercial tribunal and not a criminal tribunal. In Ground

Twelve, Petitioner alleges his criminal sentence in this matter was actually a debt for which

he cannot be imprisoned. In Ground Thirteen, Petitioner alleges his sentence in this matter

was unlawful because the Superior Court Judge’s discretion was unlawfully restricted. In

Ground Fourteen, Petitioner alleges a violation of the Interstate Compact when he was

transported on July 2, 1980, from the Oregon State Penitentiary to the Maricopa County Jail

for prosecution of the charges in this case. Lastly, in Ground Fifteen, Petitioner alleges his

defense counsel from the Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office committed fraud when

he misrepresented the facts of the case to get Petitioner to sign a plea agreement. 

On April 23, 2013, Respondents filed their Answer and supporting exhibits. (Doc. 15)

Petitioner then filed his Reply on June 7, 2013. (Doc. 16) 

II. Discussion

Respondents argue the Petition should be dismissed as time-barred because it was not

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5

 The AEDPA, which was enacted on April 24, 1996, governs federal habeas petitions

filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326-327 (1997).

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filed within one year of the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty

Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). Alternatively, Respondents contend the Petition fails to state any

valid claims for relief as Petitioner’s claims are vague, conclusory, and fail to specify the

nature of any alleged constitutional violation. Respondents also argue Petitioner’s claims are

procedurally defaulted. 

Because the information presented clearly establishes the Petition was filed after the

limitations period expired, the undersigned Magistrate Judge finds the Petition is barred and

recommends it be denied on that basis. It is, therefore, unnecessary to address Respondents’

alternative arguments.

A. Legal Standards

 The AEDPA5

 imposes a statute of limitations on federal petitions for writ of habeas

corpus filed by state prisoners. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The statute provides:

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of–

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for

seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws

of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented

from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been

newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or

claims presented could have been discovered through the

exercise of due diligence. 

Additionally, “[t]he time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

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pending shall not be counted toward” the limitations period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see also

Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 2002). An application for post-conviction relief

remains “pending” for purposes of the tolling provision in § 2244(d)(2) until it achieves final

resolution through the State’s post-conviction procedure. Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214,

219-220 (2002). A post-conviction petition is “clearly pending after it is filed with a state

court, but before that court grants or denies the petition.” Chavis v. Lemarque, 382 F.3d 921,

925 (9th Cir. 2004). In Arizona, post-conviction review is pending once a notice of postconviction relief is filed even though the petition itself may not be filed until later. Isley v.

Arizona Department of Corrections, 383 F.3d 1054, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[W]e hold that

Isley’s state petition was “pending” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) and he was

entitled to tolling from the date when the Notice was filed. The district court erred in

dismissing his petition as untimely.”). Filing a new petition for post-conviction relief,

however, does not reinitiate a limitations period that ended before the new petition was filed.

Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003).

State prisoners whose convictions became final before the AEDPA effective date of

April 24, 1996, had a one-year grace period in which to file their habeas petitions. Patterson

v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 2001). Thus, absent any tolling, the deadline to file

a habeas petition under these circumstances was April 24, 1997. Id. at 1246. 

The AEDPA statute of limitations is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate cases.

Holland v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010). For equitable tolling to apply, a petitioner

must show “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently and (2) that some extraordinary

circumstances stood in his way” that prevented him from filing a timely petition. Id. at 2562

(quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

B. Analysis 

1. Limitations Period

Here, Petitioner’s judgments of conviction and sentences for the two armed robbery

counts were imposed on December 29, 1980. (Doc. 15, Exh. B) At that time, Petitioner had

twenty days to file a notice of appeal. See former Rule 31.3, Ariz. R. Crim. P.; see also State

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v. Williams, 122 Ariz. 146, 153, 593 P.2d 896, 903 (Ariz. 1979) (establishing that the 20-day

time limit to file a notice of appeal at the time of Petitioner’s convictions in 1980). As a result

of Petitioner’s failure to file an appeal, his convictions became final upon the expiration of

the time to seek direct review, which was January 19, 1981. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A);

Hemmerle v. Schriro, 495 F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir. 2007) (judgment became final on the

date the petitioner allowed his time to seek review in the Arizona Supreme Court to expire).

Because Petitioner’s convictions became final well before the AEDPA was enacted

in 1996, he had a one-year grace period, until April 24, 1997, to file a habeas petition. See

Patterson, 251 F.3d at 1245. As indicated above, Petitioner submitted the original Petition

to this Court on August 31, 2012, more than fifteen years after the deadline. 

Additionally, statutory tolling of the limitations period is inapplicable here.

Petitioner’s “Motion of Petition for the Court to Take Mandatory Judicial Notice,” construed

as a petition for post-conviction relief, was not filed until March 22, 2011, almost fourteen

years after the limitations period had expired. As a result, the petition for post-conviction

relief did not toll, or otherwise have an impact on, the limitations period. See Ferguson, 321

F.3d at 823. For these reasons, the Petition is untimely.

2. Equitable Tolling

As referenced above, the limitations period set forth in § 2244(d) is subject to

equitable tolling where a petitioner shows he has been pursuing his rights diligently and that

extraordinary circumstances prevented him from filing a timely petition. Holland, 130 S.Ct.

at 2562. Equitable tolling is applied sparingly, as reflected by the “extraordinary

circumstances” requirement. Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1011 (9th Cir.

2009). Equitable tolling is not available in most cases. Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063,

1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that “the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under

AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.”) (citation omitted). An “external

force must cause the untimeliness, rather than, as we have said, merely ‘oversight,

miscalculation or negligence on [the petitioner’s] part.’” Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at

1011(quoting Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008)). A pro se petitioner’s

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ignorance of the law and lack of legal sophistication do not constitute “extraordinary

circumstances” warranting equitable tolling. Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th

Cir. 2006) (collecting cases from other circuits and holding that “a pro se petitioner’s lack

of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary circumstance”); see also Johnson v.

United States, 544 U.S. 295, 311 (2005) (in the 28 U.S.C. § 2255 context, rejecting

movant/prisoner’s attempt to justify his lack of diligence on his pro se status and lack of legal

sophistication and stating: “we have never accepted pro se representation alone or procedural

ignorance as an excuse for prolonged inattention when a statute’s clear policy calls for

promptness”); Waldron-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 1013 n. 4 (“a pro se petitioner’s confusion or

ignorance of the law is not, itself, a circumstance warranting equitable tolling”), cert. denied,

558 U.S. 897 (2009). A petitioner seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of demonstrating

it is warranted in his case. Doe v. Busby, 661 F.3d 1001, 1011 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing, inter

alia, Holland, 130 S.Ct. at 2562).

Here, Petitioner has failed to show extraordinary circumstances stood in his way and

prevented him from filing a timely petition. In the section of the Petition that directed

Petitioner to explain why the one-year statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) does not

bar the Petition, Petitioner simply asserted, without explanation, that it does not apply. (Doc.

7 at 24) Petitioner also addressed the timeliness issue in his Reply, writing he had never

heard of the AEDPA and was “suspicious” of whether Respondents are correctly applying

the statute to this case. (Doc. 16 at 8) Thus, Petitioner has presented no basis to apply

equitable tolling.

C. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, this Magistrate Judge finds Petitioner filed the Petition after

the limitations period expired. In addition, this Magistrate Judge finds no basis to apply

statutory tolling or equitable tolling. Consequently, the Petition is barred by the AEDPA’s

statute of limitations.

Based on the foregoing,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus,

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pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, doc. 7, be DENIED;

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and leave

to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because dismissal of the Petition is

justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the procedural ruling

debatable.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, must not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The

parties have 14 days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which

to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P.

6(a), (b), and 72. Thereafter, the parties have 14 days within which to file a response to the

objections. Failure to timely file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and

Recommendation may result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the

district court without further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121

(9th Cir. 2003). Failure to timely file objections to any factual determinations of the

undersigned Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate

review of the findings of fact in an order of judgement entered pursuant to the Magistrate

Judge’s recommendation. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72. 

DATED this 25th day of November, 2013.

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