Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-05808/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-05808-14/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FINJAN, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

PROOFPOINT, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 13-cv-05808-HSG 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART MOTION TO 

STRIKE INFRINGEMENT 

CONTENTIONS

Re: Dkt. No. 118

This action arises from eight patents granted to Finjan, Inc., all of which involve software 

technologies concerning behavior-based internet security (i.e., the asserted patents “protect 

networks and endpoints by identifying suspicious patterns and behaviors of content delivered over 

the Internet”). See Dkt. No. 104 at ¶ 7. Finjan filed the instant lawsuit on December 16, 2013, 

alleging that numerous products sold by Proofpoint, Inc. and Armorize Technologies, Inc. (the 

“Defendants”) infringe these patents. See Dkt. No. 1.

Finjan served its infringement contentions on April 17, 2014. Defendants moved to strike 

those contentions as deficient under this District’s Patent Local Rules. See Dkt. No. 118. 

Defendants seek an order striking Finjan’s infringement contentions in their entirety and with 

prejudice, and request the Court stay the case until Finjan demonstrates good cause to amend. See 

id. For its part, Finjan asserts that its infringement contentions meet all requirements of the Patent 

Local Rules but, even if they do not, it should be permitted to amend its contentions without a stay 

and without prejudice. See Dkt. No. 121.

The Court has read and considered the arguments and evidence offered by the parties, both 

in their written submissions to the Court and at the hearing held on March 19, 2015. For the 

reasons explained below, this Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants’ 

motion to strike Finjan’s infringement contentions.

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I. LEGAL STANDARD

The requirements of Patent Local Rule 3–1 provide a “streamlined mechanism to replace 

the series of interrogatories that accused infringers would likely have propounded in its absence.” 

FusionArc, Inc. v. Solidus Networks, Inc., 2007 WL 1052900, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2007) 

(quoting Network Caching Tech., LLC v. Novell Inc., 2002 WL 32126128, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 

13, 2002)). The Rule “require[s] parties to crystallize their theories of the case early in litigation 

and to adhere to those theories once they have been disclosed.” Nova Measuring Instruments Ltd. 

v. Nanometrics, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1123 (N.D. Cal. 2006). This early disclosure 

“provide[s] structure to discovery and enable[s] the parties to move efficiently toward claim 

construction and the eventual resolution of their dispute.” Creagri, Inc. v. Pinnaclife Inc., LLC, 

2012 WL 5389775, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2012) (citation omitted). The Rule reads, in pertinent 

part:

[A] party claiming patent infringement shall serve on all parties a 

‘Disclosure of Asserted Claims and Infringement Contentions[ ]’ . . . 

[which] shall contain the following information:

(a) Each claim of each patent in suit that is allegedly infringed 

by each opposing party, including for each claim the applicable 

statutory subsections of 35 U.S.C. § 271 asserted;

(b) Separately for each asserted claim, each accused apparatus, 

product, device, process, method, act, or other instrumentality 

(“Accused Instrumentality”) of each opposing party of which the 

party is aware. This identification shall be as specific as possible. 

Each product, device, and apparatus shall be identified by name or 

model number, if known. Each method or process shall be identified 

by name, if known, or by any product, device, or apparatus which, 

when used, allegedly results in the practice of the claimed method or 

process;

(c) A chart identifying specifically where each limitation of each 

asserted claim is found within each Accused Instrumentality, 

including for each limitation that such party contends is governed by 

35 U.S.C. § 112(6), the identity of the structure(s), act(s), or 

material(s) in the Accused Instrumentality that performs the claimed 

function.

(d) For each claim which is alleged to have been indirectly 

infringed, an identification of any direct infringement and a 

description of the acts of the alleged indirect infringer that 

contribute to or are inducing that direct infringement. Insofar as 

alleged direct infringement is based on joint acts of multiple parties, 

the role of each such party in the direct infringement must be 

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described.

(e) Whether each limitation of each asserted claim is alleged to 

be literally present or present under the doctrine of equivalents in the

Accused Instrumentality;

. . . 

(h) If a party claiming patent infringement alleges willful 

infringement, the basis for such allegation.

Pat. L.R. 3-1.

For infringement contentions to satisfy the Local Rule, “plaintiff [must] compare an 

accused product to its patents on a claim by claim, element by element basis for at least one of 

each defendant’s products . . . reverse engineering or its equivalent are required.” Network 

Caching, 2002 WL 32126128 at *5; InterTrust Tech. Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 2003 WL

23120174, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2003) (“The purpose of Patent Local Rule 3–1, however, is in 

fact to be nit picky, to require a plaintiff to crystalize its theory of the case and patent claims.”); 

Bender v. Maxim Integrated Prods., 2010 WL 1135762, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2010) 

(“[P]laintiff bears the burden of providing infringement contentions that specify the location of 

every claim element within the accused products, so that the Court can make a principled decision 

on whether discovery will proceed.”). The party claiming infringement is required to include in its 

infringement contentions “all facts known to it, including those discovered in [its] pre-filing 

inquiry.” Renesas Tech. Corp. v. Nanya Tech. Corp., 2004 WL 2600466, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 

10, 2004).

“[A]ll courts agree that the degree of specificity under Local Rule 3–1 must be sufficient to 

provide reasonable notice to the defendant [as to] why the plaintiff believes it has a ‘reasonable 

chance of proving infringement.’” Shared Memory Graphics LLC v. Apple, Inc., 812 F.Supp.2d 

1022, 1025 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (citation omitted) (quoting View Eng’g, Inc. v. Robotic Vision Sys., 

Inc., 208 F.3d 981, 986 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). While the patent rules do not “require the disclosure of 

specific evidence nor do they require a plaintiff to prove its infringement case, . . . a patentee must 

nevertheless disclose what in each accused instrumentality it contends practices each and every 

limitation of each asserted claim to the extent appropriate information is reasonably available to 

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it.” DCG Sys. v. Checkpoint Techs., LLC, 2012 WL 1309161, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2012); see 

also Shared Memory Graphics, 812 F. Supp. 2d at 1025 (stating that patent holder “must map 

specific elements of Defendants’ alleged infringing products onto the Plaintiff's claim 

construction”).

II. ANALYSIS

Defendants contend that Finjan’s infringement contentions do not comply with this 

District’s Patent Local Rules because they: (1) improperly combine multiple products into single 

claims charts; (2) do not address all accused products; (3) fail to provide a theory of infringement 

for several allegedly infringing products; (4) fail to sufficiently identify how each accused product 

infringes each claim element in each asserted patent; and (5) fail to sufficiently assert the doctrine 

of equivalents, willful infringement, and indirect infringement. A careful review of Finjan’s 

infringement contentions reveals that they suffer from many of the deficiencies asserted by the 

Defendants.

A. Finjan’s Combination Claim Charts

Under Patent Local Rule 3-1(c), the party claiming infringement must serve a “chart 

identifying specifically where each limitation of each asserted claim is found within each Accused 

Instrumentality, including for each limitation that such party contends is governed by 35 U.S.C. § 

112(6), the identity of the structure(s), act(s), or material(s) in the Accused Instrumentality that 

performs the claimed function.” 

Finjan attempted to satisfy this obligation by dividing the Defendants’ products into two 

groups—“Proofpoint Products” and “Armorize Products”— and then creating one claim chart per 

group per asserted patent. See Opposition at 3. Finjan defines “Proofpoint Products” as 

“Proofpoint products and services that utilize the Zero-Hour Threat Detection and Malware 

Analysis Service including but not limited to Proofpoint Enterprise Protection, Proofpoint’s 

Malvertising Protection, Proofpoint’s SafeImpressions, Proofpoint’s Targeted Attack Protection, 

Proofpoint Essentials (including the packages of Beginner, Business, and Professional), Proofpoint 

Protection Server, and Proofpoint Messaging Security Gateway.” See, e.g., Dkt. No. 118-3 at 1. 

“Armorize Products” is defined to mean: HackAlert Anti-Malware, CodeSecure Automated Static 

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Source Code Analysis, SmartWAF Web Application Firewall, SafeImpressions and Malvertising 

Protection. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 118-8 at 1. 

As an initial matter, a separate claim chart for each accused product is not mandatory under 

Patent Local Rule 3-1(c). Combination claim charts (whereby the party asserting infringement 

describes how multiple products infringe the asserted patent(s) in a single chart) can provide the 

required specificity under Patent Local Rule 3-1(c), if each accused product allegedly infringes in 

the same way. See, e.g.,Creargi, 2012 WL 5389775 at *3 (finding a single claim chart for 

multiple accused products sufficient where the plaintiff specified that all the identified products 

contained the same chemical compound, which plaintiff asserted was the infringing element of 

each of the identified products); see also Network Prot. Sciences, LLC v. Fortinet, Inc., 2013 WL 

5402089, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2013) (“[W]hen supported by adequate analysis showing that 

the accused products share the same critical characteristics, representative infringement 

contentions may suffice.”). 

The issue before Court is whether the two categories of products identified by Finjan’s 

combined claim charts meet this standard. According to the Defendants, Finjan has provided no 

showing that the accused products are so functionally identical that they infringe on each claim of 

each of the eight patents in the exact same way. Defendants therefore argue that Finjan must 

provide separate charts detailing its theory of infringement as to each individual product. Finjan 

responds with two counter-arguments. As to its Proofpoint Products chart, Finjan asserts that 

combining seven products into a single chart is appropriate because “[e]ach of the ‘Proofpoint 

Products’ utilize the Zero-Hour Threat Detection and Malware Analysis Service solutions, which 

Finjan contends is the infringing aspect of the ‘Proofpoint Products.’” Opp. at 11. Second, for the 

Armorize Products, Finjan claims that it “separately mapped each individual product within the 

group, so Defendants’ arguments do not even apply to these products.” Id. The Court addresses 

each counterargument in turn.

1. Proofpoint Products

On its face, Finjan’s Proofpoint Products grouping appears to be permissible, in that it 

identifies common infringing components in the grouped products. Like the plaintiff in Creargi, 

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who represented that the same infringing chemical compound existed in each accused product, 

Finjan has represented that all seven Proofpoint Products utilize the allegedly infringing ZeroHour Threat Detection or Malware Analysis Service solutions. Dkt. No. 121 at 4. However, this 

case differs from Creargi in that Finjan’s Proofpoint Products category groups together products 

that allegedly use one of two infringing solutions, and there is no representation that those two 

solutions infringe the asserted patents in the exact same way. Accordingly, in order to comply 

with Patent Local Rule 3-1(c), Finjan must, at a minimum, break the Proofpoint Products claim 

charts into two: one for those products that allegedly contain Zero-Hour Threat Detection, and 

another for those that allegedly contain Malware Analysis Service. See Hr’g Tr. at 7:20-21 (“We 

can specify that. That’s not a problem. We can separate out those charts.”).

2. Armorize Products

The Court also agrees with Defendants that combining the five Armorize Products into a 

single claim chart for each asserted patent is improper under Patent Local Rule 3-1(c). Unlike the 

Proofpoint Products, Finjan does not assert that the Armorize Products all contain a common 

infringing solution (or solutions) and thus infringe each patent in the exact same way. Instead, 

Finjan asserts that, despite producing only one claim chart per asserted patent, Finjan “actually 

[has] a separate paragraph for each product within that single claim chart . . . . So we really did go 

element-by-element and address each of those individual products.” Hr’g Tr. at 8:2-13. In 

essence, Finjan claims that it has already disclosed its specific theories of infringement concerning 

the five distinct Armorize Products, and that the only difference between its single combined 

claim chart and the separate charts demanded by Defendants is a matter of formatting. 

As an initial matter, the Court questions whether lumping information about five products 

into a single claim chart (absent a common infringing element) could ever satisfy the language or 

purpose of Patent Local Rule 3-1(c). The object of the Rule is to delineate and crystalize theories 

of infringement as to each accused product, which is not well-served by creating charts that 

address multiple distinct products at once. InterTrust, 2003 WL 23120174 at *3 (“The purpose of 

Patent Local Rule 3–1, however, is in fact to be nit picky, to require a plaintiff to crystalize its 

theory of the case and patent claims.”). 

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Regardless, even assuming the idea could be sound in theory, Finjan faltered in its

execution. Contrary to Finjan’s representation at the March 19, 2015 hearing, its combination 

charts do not “have a separate paragraph for each [of the Armorize Products].” Hr’g Tr. at 8:2-3. 

For example, while a product called “SafeImpressions” is listed as one of the five products that 

constitute the Armorize Products group, Finjan’s contentions do not discuss the SafeImpressions

product in the portion of its chart devoted to Claim 1a of the ’154 Patent. See Dkt. No. 118-13 at 

1-6. The only time the word “SafeImpression” appears in those six pages is in a website link on 

page two, which is not accompanied by any explanatory discussion. Id. at 2. The same is true of 

Claims 1b, 4a, 6a, and 10a of the ’154 Patent. See id. at passim. This is facially insufficient under 

Patent Local Rule 3-1. See, e.g., Digital Reg of Texas, LLC v. Adobe Systems Inc., 2013 WL 

3361241, *4 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 3, 2013) (infringement contentions that “incorporate[] screen shots in 

lieu of explanatory text” are improper). Similarly, the words “Malvertising Protection” (another 

of the five named Armorize Products) do not appear in even one cell of the 66-page claims chart 

addressing how the Armorize Products allegedly infringe the ’154 Patent. See Dkt. No. 118-13. 

Given these deficiencies, Finjan’s combined Armorize Products claim charts do not 

provide the level of specificity required by this District’s Patent Local Rules. In order to do so, 

Finjan must create separate claim charts for each Armorize Product and disclose exactly which 

features of each product allegedly infringe each claim element of each asserted patent. 

B. Finjan’s Claim Charts Do Not Address All Accused Products

Defendants have identified five products that, while included in either Finjan’s definition 

of Proofpoint Products or Armorize Products, do not appear in Finjan’s claim charts for many of 

the asserted patents: Proofpoint Protection Server, Proofpoint Messaging Security Gateway, 

Proofpoint Enterprise Protection, Armorize Malvertizing Protection and Proofpoint Essentials. 

See Memorandum at 9-10. Finjan admits that its infringement contentions do not expressly 

discuss these products. Instead, it attempts to justify its failure by arguing: (1) that Proofpoint 

Protection Server, Proofpoint Messaging Security Gateway, and Proofpoint Enterprise Protection 

are all different names for the same product; (2) that Proofpoint Enterprise Protection and 

Proofpoint Essentials are “similar;” and (3) that Finjan provided notice to Defendants that several 

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products were identified by different names, despite the Defendants’ alleged failure to provide 

“key discovery” that would describe the overlap. See Opposition at 13.

Finjan’s counter-arguments are unpersuasive. To the extent any of Finjan’s explanations 

justify its complete failure to address the missing products, those explanations should have been 

provided in its infringement contentions. Finjan may not serve infringement contentions as 

required by the Patent Local Rules and then informally supplement them after the fact (either 

through correspondence with Defendants or through briefing to the Court). The Patent Local 

Rules provide a mechanism to supplement contentions after service, which Finjan has not 

followed. See Patent L.R. 3-6. 

C. Finjan’s “ProofPoint Products” Category is Improper Under Rule 3-1(b)

As described above, Finjan’s infringement contentions are grouped into two charts for each 

patent, one that applies to Proofpoint Products and a second that applies to Armorize Products. 

See Opposition at 3. Finjan defines Proofpoint Products as “Proofpoint products and services that 

utilize the Zero-Hour Threat Detection and Malware Analysis Service including but not limited to 

[seven identified products].” See, e.g., Dkt. No. 118-3 at 1. Defendants argue that this 

formulation is improper, as it purports to identify infringing products by their functionality (i.e., 

the use of the Zero-Hour Threat Detection and Malware Analysis Service), not their name or 

model number. The Court agrees. 

This District’s Patent Local Rules require a party claiming infringement to identify each 

“accused apparatus, product, device, or other instrumentality (‘Accused Instrumentality’) of each 

opposing party of which the party is aware.” Pat. L.R. 3-1(b). This identification must be “as 

specific as possible” and, where known, include the “name or model number” of each accused 

apparatus. Id. The Local Rules do not permit “broad categorical identifications” nor 

“representative examples.” See Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 2011 WL 4479305, at *2 (N.D. 

Cal. Sept. 26, 2011) (finding categorical identification of “mobile devices running Android” 

insufficient under Local Rule 3-1(b) and precluding claims against products not specifically 

identified).

Finjan did not meet this requirement. “Proofpoint products and services that utilize the 

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Zero-Hour Threat Detection and Malware Analysis” is no more specific than “mobile devices 

running Android,” which the Court found insufficient under Rule 3-1(b) in Oracle America. See

2011 WL 4479305 at *2. Accordingly, Finjan’s claims against Proofpoint Products in this action 

are limited to the seven products expressly named in its contentions. The broad phrase “services 

that utilize the Zero-Hour Threat Detection and Malware Analysis” cannot expand the definition 

of Proofpoint Products beyond those seven specifically identified.

Finjan does not contest that allegedly infringing products must be specifically identified 

under Patent Local Rule 3-1(b). Instead, Finjan recasts Defendants’ argument as an attempt to 

preclude it from moving to amend its contentions at any point in the future. See Opposition at 14. 

The Court does not agree with Finjan’s characterization. Finjan’s right to amend does not depend 

on the overbroad categorical language Defendants seek to strike; no “placeholder” language is 

needed to preserve the option of future amendment. When a patentee discovers additional 

potentially infringing products after serving its infringement contentions, the appropriate action is 

to move the Court to amend upon a showing of good cause. See Patent L.R. 3-6 (“Amendment of 

the Infringement Contentions . . . may be made only by order of the Court upon a timely showing 

of good cause.”); see also Seiko Epson Corp. v. Coretronic Corp., 2008 WL 2563383 (N.D. Cal. 

June 23, 2008) (granting motion to amend preliminary infringement contentions after additional 

potentially infringing products were discovered during the course of discovery). Finjan has not 

moved the Court to amend its contentions to add newly discovered infringing products. 

Accordingly, the only Proofpoint products at issue in this case are those expressly identified in 

Finjan’s infringement contentions served on April 17, 2014. 

For these reasons, the Court STRIKES the words “including but not limited to” from 

Finjan’s definition of Proofpoint Products, wherever that definition appears in Finjan’s 

infringement contentions. Finjan’s definition of Proofpoint Products is limited to the seven 

products expressly listed in the definition. This ruling does not prejudice Finjan’s right to move 

the Court to add new potentially infringing products to its contentions upon a showing of good 

cause in compliance with Patent Local Rule 3-6.

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D. Finjan Does Not Identify Where Each Limitation of Each Asserted Claim is 

Found within Each Accused Instrumentality

The core argument in Defendants’ motion is that, even setting aside the issues discussed 

above, Finjan’s infringement contentions do not contain sufficient detail to provide notice of its

theory of infringement as required by Patent Local Rule 3-1. The Court agrees.

The Patent Local Rules “are designed to require parties to crystallize their theories of the 

case early in the litigation and to adhere to those theories once they have been disclosed.” Nova 

Measuring Instruments, 417 F. Supp. 2d at 1123. “At the Patent Local Rule 3-1 Disclosure stage, 

a plaintiff must put forth information so specific that either reverse engineering or its equivalent is 

required.” InterTrust, 2003 WL 23120174 at *3. This burden cannot be met simply by parroting 

claim language or referencing screenshots and/or website content. See Digital Reg of Texas, 2013 

WL 3361241, *4 (infringement contentions that “parrot” claim language and “incorporate[] screen 

shots in lieu of explanatory text” are improper because they leave defendants “to guess what 

particular system (or aspect of a particular system) [the patentee] is accusing of meeting each 

limitation.”); GN Resound A/S v. Callpod, Inc., 2013 WL 1190651, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 

2013) (“[D]irecting Defendant to a video, without describing the content of the video or 

explaining how the content of the video supports its infringement contention, is inadequate to 

satisfy Rule 3-1(c).”).

Here, Finjan’s infringement contentions are largely comprised of generic marketing 

literature and screenshots of the type routinely rejected by courts in this District. These 

unexplained references comprise the majority of Finjan’s over 1,000 pages of claim charts. 

Defendants correctly note that the same handful of screenshots and website addresses are copied 

and pasted into hundreds of cells, often with little or no explanation for what information 

contained in those sources relates to the relevant claim elements. See Dkt. No. 118 at 14-17. For 

example, asserting that support for a particular claim “is demonstrated in Armorize’s public 

documents and at [a list of four website addresses], see Dkt. No. 118-13 at 1, does not meet the 

level of specificity required by this District’s Patent Local Rules. Network Caching, 2002 WL 

32126128, at *4 (rejecting infringement contentions where the patentee “provides no explanation 

of how the proxies described in the literature map onto the claim language.”). If the cited sources

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contain information necessary to understand Finjan’s infringement theories, Finjan must identify 

the particular supporting language in those sources and explain how that language fits into 

Finjan’s theory of infringement. 

Even more troublingly, the little explanation Finjan does provide is framed in high-level 

generalities that do not specifically relate to the claim elements identified in each Claim. See Pat. 

L.R. 3-1(c) (requiring the patentee to identify “the structure(s), act(s), or material(s) in the 

Accused Instrumentality that performs the claimed function.”); Shared Memory Graphics, 812 

F.Supp.2d at 1025 (holding that the patentee “must map specific elements of Defendants’ alleged 

infringing products onto the Plaintiff’s claim construction”); Bender, 2010 WL 1135762, at *2 

(“[P]laintiff bears the burden of providing infringement contentions that specify the location of 

every claim element within the accused products, so that the Court can make a principled decision 

on whether discovery will proceed.”). For example, “Claim 1a” of the ’154 Patent discloses:

A system for protecting a computer from dynamically generated 

malicious content, comprising: a content processor (i) for processing 

content received over a network, the content including a call to a 

first function, and the call including an input, and (ii) for invoking a 

second function within the input, only if a security computer 

indicates that such invocation is safe;

Dkt. No. 118-13 at 1. In order to satisfy Patent Local Rule 3-1(c) as to Claim 1a, Finjan was 

required to identify what structure, act, or material in each of the Armorize Products infringes each 

claim element. In other words, what constitutes the “first function,” “second function,” and the 

“input” in the allegedly infringing Armorize Products?

These are questions that Finjan’s infringement contentions do not answer. The words 

“first function,” “second function” and “input” do not appear in Finjan’s Claim 1a claims chart at 

all. Instead, the substantive portion of Finjan’s contentions describes how the Armorize Products

work in a general sense, without tying the explanation to the specific claim elements identified in 

the 1a Claim:

By the way of example, and not limitation, Armorize Products meet 

the recited claim language because Armorize Products dynamically 

analyzes exploit kits, exploit code, obfuscated scripts within web 

content, to prevent delivery of a payload or dropper from another 

server to a client computer. Armorize Products use a cloud system 

to analyze the dynamic threats. For example, HackAlert uses a 

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behavior-based scanning engine to send downloadable content to 

run in an isolated sandbox hosted at the Armorize datacenter to be 

analyzed for behavioral characteristics that indicate malware 

injections. If there is an active drive-by download, the download is 

analyzed and the behavior and remediation guidance is reported 

back to the end user.

Id. 

Finjan’s theory of infringement as to each specific element of Claim 1a may be hidden

somewhere in that paragraph, but it is not readily apparent to the Court. At the March 19, 2015 

hearing, Finjan attempted to explain this language, asserting that “within these obfuscated scripts

there’s a first function and a second function. It’s very clear from the narrative, and also it ties 

directly to the screen shots.” Hr’g Tr. at 11:3-6. The Court disagrees with Finjan’s assessment of 

the clarity of its explanation. It is Finjan’s obligation to “map specific elements of Defendants’ 

alleged infringing products onto the Plaintiff's claim construction.” Shared Memory Graphics, 

812 F. Supp. 2d at 1025. At a minimum, Finjan was required to expressly discuss the particular 

claim elements identified in each Claim and map those elements onto the features of the allegedly 

infringing products. In other words, if Finjan believes that the first and second functions are 

contained within the obfuscated scripts, it was obligated to say so explicitly in its infringement 

contentions. Neither the Court nor the Defendants should be required to guess which aspects of 

the accused products allegedly infringe each claim element. See Digital Reg of Texas, 2013 WL 

3361241 at *4. 

Finjan’s failure to provide a cognizable theory of infringement for each element of each 

claim is apparent when its contentions are broken down accused product by accused product. At 

the March 19, 2015 hearing, Finjan represented that its charts went “element-by-element” and 

addressed each individual Armorize Product. See Hr’g Tr. at 8:12-13. That representation is not 

accurate. For example, there is no explanatory text describing how SafeImpressions infringes 

Claim 1a, 1b, 4a, 6a, and 10a of the ’154 Patent, let alone an explanation that maps the features of 

that product to each claim element. See Dkt. No. 118-13. Perhaps even more concerning, when 

SafeImpressions is mentioned, Finjan merely pastes the same two sentences into each cell, without 

any reference to the claim elements to which those sentences are ostensibly addressed. The 

following language is the only discussion of the SafeImpressions product in the entire 66-page 

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’154 Patent claim chart:

In another example, Armorize SafeImpression provides detail 

information about the type of malware. In the example below, the 

malware advertisement includes information about malicious 

behaviors detected and information about the source of the drive-by 

download.

Id. at passim. Finjan makes absolutely no attempt to tie these two sentences to any of the dozens 

of claim elements of the ’154 Patent. See id. (identical language contained in claim chart cells 

purportedly explaining Finjan’s infringement theory as to Claims 1c, 2, 3, 4b, 4c, 4d, 5, 6b, 6c, 6d, 

7, 8, 10b, 10c, 10d, and 11 of the ’154 Patent). No reasonable reading of these sentences could 

possibly disclose how SafeImpressions allegedly infringes each element of Claim 1c, Dkt. No. 

118-13 at 9 (“a receiver for receiving an indicator from the security computer whether it is safe to 

invoke the second function with the input”), as well as Claim 8, id. at 48 (“The system of claim 6 

wherein the input variable is dynamically generated by said content processor prior to being 

transmitted by said transmitter.”). 

Even Armorize Products that receive somewhat more detailed treatment suffer from the 

same underlying disconnect. Like Finjan’s discussion of SafeImpressions, its description of 

Armorize HackAlert (which constitutes the bulk of Finjan’s infringement contentions), is largely 

comprised of rote descriptions divorced from the specific claim elements of each asserted Claim. 

For example, the following paragraph is repeated verbatim in each of the 21 Claims identified in 

Finjan’s claim chart for the ’154 Patent:

Armorize HackAlert analyzes, detects, prevents, and mitigates 

against malware infections. HackAlert is a system to protect a 

computer from dynamically generated malicious content. A 

computer attempts to access web content with that input sent to 

HackAlert, the content processor. If HackAlert determines the web 

content to be safe, the client computer is able to load the web 

content. “HackAlert focuses on special malware, such as 0-day 

exploits or exploits used in APT (Advanced Persistent Threat) 

attacks, that are undetectable by typical virus or malware scanners. 

This may include for example malicious binaries, document exploits 

(PDF, Word, Excel, PowerPoint, Flash), Java exploits, browser 

exploits, BHO (browser helper object) exploits, drive-by downloads, 

click-to downloads, etc.” http://www.armorize.com/index.php?link_

id=hackalert.

Dkt. No. 118-13 at passim. The same is true of the following description of the Armorize website:

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See also, http://blog.armorize.com/2010/12/hdd-plus-malware-sprea

dthrough.html showing Armorize Products decoding malvertising 

and drive-by download exploits on msn.com. In the example below, 

the banner contains obfuscated javascript code, which loads iframes 

that include exploits to cause drive-by downloads. Armorize’s 

HackAlert can use multiple behavioral and static analysis techniques 

coupled to detect potential malware and make a call to Armorize’s 

media reputation database. If the downloadable is safe, HackAlert 

will allow the file to be downloaded, otherwise it will prevent the 

file from being downloaded or it will make the file safe.

Id. Of course, inserting the same generic descriptions into all 21 Claims contained in Finjan’s

infringement contentions for the ’154 Patent does not approach the level of specificity required by

Patent Local Rule 3-1(c), whereby the plaintiff must identify “where each limitation of each 

asserted claim is found within each Accused Instrumentality.” Finjan’s infringement contentions 

fall well below the requirements of this District’s Patent Local Rules.

Finjan’s defense of its infringement contentions is unpersuasive. Finjan first asserts that 

Defendants selectively quote its contentions to mischaracterize its claim charts. See Dkt. No. 121 

at 15-16. The argument is not well-taken. The portions of Finjan’s infringement contentions 

omitted by the Defendants largely consist of screenshots and marketing literature that do nothing 

to enlighten the reader as to Finjan’s theory of infringement. For example, Finjan’s chart of Claim 

1a in the ’146 Patent spans six pages. Dkt. No. 118-13 at 1-6. However, the last five pages are 

almost exclusively comprised of screenshots and quotations to marketing literature that are not in 

any way tethered to the actual language used in the Claim. Id. at 2-6. Notably, while Finjan 

criticizes the Defendants for omitting pages of its claim charts, it does not identify anything 

contained in those pages that would assist the Court in understanding its theory of infringement. 

The Court has reviewed those pages and agrees with the Defendants that, at least as currently 

framed, they do not disclose an understandable theory.

Next, Finjan argues that its contentions should be found sufficient under Patent Local Rule 

3-1(c) because it provided as much detail as possible given the publicly available information

concerning the allegedly infringing products. See Dkt. No. 121 at 16 (citing Creagri, 2012 WL 

5389775, at *3). Finjan emphasized this point at the March 19, 2015 hearing, explaining that 

detailed information about how computer security software works is not regularly disclosed in the 

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public arena and that, “once [it has] a chance to really get into all the other technical information, 

[it] can provide more.” See Hr’g Tr. at 4:11-15. In support of its position, Finjan directed the 

Court to the Network Caching case, which noted that initial infringement contentions involving 

software programs cannot be expected to identify the source code containing the allegedly 

infringing routines, as that information will generally not yet be available to the plaintiff. See

Network Caching, 2002 WL 32126128, at *6 (noting that the “quintessential case [for] allowing 

amendment of [infringement contentions]” is where source code is solely in the defendants’ 

possession).

Finjan is correct insofar as this District generally does not require parties asserting 

infringement of a software patent to identify specific infringing routines prior to the production of 

source code. See France Telecom. S.A. v. Marvell Semiconductor, Inc., 2013 WL 1878912, at *4 

(N.D. Cal. May 3, 2013) (“there are times when [a] plaintiff's preparation is restricted by 

defendants’ sole possession of the information plaintiffs need”); Theranos, Inc. v. Fuisz Pharma 

LLC, 2012 WL 6000798, at *6 n.7 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2012) (citation omitted) (noting “courts’

‘recognition’ that there are situations where a plaintiff is constrained by defendants’ sole 

possession of information” which “relates to cases involving allegedly-infringing source code”). 

However, the flexibility provided in cases involving software patents does not mean that a party 

may delay providing any comprehensible theory of infringement until that source code is 

provided. Prior to filing an action for patent infringement, Rule 11 “requires that a plaintiff 

compare an accused product to its patents on a claim by claim, element by element basis for at 

least one of each defendant’s products.” Network Caching, 2002 WL 32126128 at *5 (discussing

View Eng’g, Inc., 208 F.3d 981); see also Bender v. Infineon Technologies North Am. Corp., 2010 

WL 964197, at *1 (N.D. Cal. March 16, 2010) (“[P]laintiff is required to include [in its] 

infringement contentions all facts known to it, including those discovered in its Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 

pre-filing investigation.”). Finjan’s infringement contentions do not on their face reflect the 

results of the “claim by claim, element by element” investigation required by Rule 11. 

For example, the plaintiff in Network Caching, like Finjan here, failed to describe how the 

product literature cited in its infringement contentions mapped onto the specific claim language of 

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the asserted patent. See 2002 WL 32126128 at *6 (noting that the party asserting infringement did 

not “describe how ‘couple cluster technology’ is relevant”). Accordingly, the Court found the 

plaintiff’s infringement contentions “plainly insufficient” despite its recognition that the plaintiff 

need not identify the infringing routines in defendant’s source code. Id. at *6-7. The same finding 

is warranted here. To the extent the publicly available information cited by Finjan does support its 

infringement theory, Finjan has not described that theory with adequate specificity to meet the 

requirements of Patent Local Rule 3-1(c). See, e.g., Dkt. No. 118-13 at 1 (failing to describe how 

“obfuscating scripts” and numerous other language in its claim chart relate to the claim elements 

in Claim 1a of the ’154 Patent). Finjan’s concessions at the March 19, 2015 hearing that it could 

have taken steps to further clarify its infringement contentions buttress (but are not necessary to) 

this conclusion. See Hr’g Tr. at 7:3-4 (“We can break [products using Zero-Hour Threat Detection 

and Malware Analysis Service] out separately.”); id. at 9:24-25 (“[W]e can separate [each 

Armorize Product] out into separate charts.”); id. at 11:1-16 (attempting to explain the location of 

certain claim elements in a way not identified in the claim chart).

Accordingly, the Court finds that Finjan’s infringement contentions do not satisfy the 

requirements of Patent Local Rule 3-1(c). 

E. Doctrine of Equivalents, Willful Infringement, and Indirect Infringement

Defendants argue that Finjan’s infringement contentions are deficient because they fail to 

describe Finjan’s bases for asserting the doctrine of equivalents, willful infringement, and indirect 

infringement. The Court agrees with Defendants that Finjan has not met the requirements of the 

Patent Local Rules with respect to the doctrine of equivalents and willful infringement, but 

disagrees with Defendants that Finjan has failed to sufficiently allege indirect infringement.

1. Doctrine of Equivalents

Patent Local Rule 3-1(e) requires the patentee to state “[w]hether each limitation of each 

asserted claim is alleged to be literally present or present under the doctrine of equivalents in the 

Accused Instrumentality.” Finjan asserts that it met this standard by concluding each section of its 

claim chart with a generic reservation of its right to argue the doctrine of equivalents, completely 

unrelated to specific claim elements or the allegedly infringing technology. See, e.g., Dkt. Nos. 

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118-3 through 118-14, passim (“To the extent that Proofpoint contends that it does not literally 

infringe this claim, Proofpoint infringes under the doctrine of equivalents.”).

Finjan’s rote recitation is not sufficient. “The doctrine of equivalents exists to prevent 

fraud on the patent and not to give a patentee a second shot at proving infringement if it is not 

literally present.” Blue Spike, LLC v. Adobe Systems, Inc., 2015 WL 335842, *6 (N.D. Cal. 2015) 

(citing Creagri, 2012 WL 5289775 at *6) (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff may not 

simply “repeat the same boilerplate language for each of its contentions, noting in the alternative 

that ‘this element infringes directly or under the doctrine of equivalents.’” Id. But that is exactly 

what Finjan has done here.

Finjan does not appear to dispute that its contentions lack the specificity required by the 

Patent Local Rules. Instead, it blames Defendants for their “failure to produce information about 

the accused products until almost a year into the fact discovery period.” Dkt. No. 121 at 22. 

Defendants’ alleged delay is beside the point. Infringement contentions are due no later than 14 

days after the Initial Case Management Conference, see Pat. L.R. 3-1, which in most 

circumstances will be before any formal discovery has taken place. If a plaintiff does not have a 

factual basis to assert the doctrine of equivalents in its infringement contentions at that time, it 

should not do so. It is improper to assert the doctrine of equivalents with generic “placeholder” 

language on the hope that future discovery might support such an assertion. If discovery uncovers 

a basis for the claim, Finjan may move the Court to amend its infringement contentions. See Pat.

L.R. 3-6 (c) (listing recent discovery of nonpublic information as support for a finding of good 

cause to amend infringement contentions).

Accordingly, the Court STRIKES all language in Finjan’s infringement contentions 

asserting the doctrine of equivalents. This ruling does not prejudice Finjan’s right to move the 

Court to assert a claim under the doctrine of equivalents upon a showing of good cause in 

compliance with Patent Local Rule 3-6.

2. Willful Infringement

Defendants seek to strike Finjan’s contentions relating to willful infringement, arguing that 

a plaintiff must assert that the defendant knew of the patent before litigation began in order to 

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properly plead the claim, see Blue Spike, 2015 WL 335842 at *8, and that Finjan has made no

such allegation, see Dkt. No. 118-15 at 31 (asserting Defendants willfully infringed “at least as of 

the time they learned of this action for infringement, which was filed on December 16, 2013.”). 

The Court finds Defendants’ argument—and the inclusion of willful infringement in 

Finjan’s infringement contentions at all—to be premature. As Finjan conceded at the March 19, 

2015 hearing, the operative complaint in this action does not include an allegation of willful 

infringement because Finjan did not “have the discovery or the Rule 11 basis to assert it in the 

complaint at the time.” Hr’g Tr. at 12:15-13:4. Finjan explained that its infringement contentions 

nevertheless include a “basis” for its nonexistent willful infringement claim because “the 

contentions require you to address it specifically” and “because it’s a requirement of the Rule.” 

Id. Finjan misreads the relevant Patent Local Rule. Rule 3-1(h) expressly limits a plaintiff’s 

obligation to provide a basis for a claim of willful infringement to instances where the party 

actually alleges willful infringement in its complaint. See Pat. L.R. 3-1(h) (“If a party claiming 

patent infringement alleges willful infringement, the [infringement contentions must provide a] 

basis for such allegation.”) (emphasis added). No reasonable reading of the Rule requires (or 

permits) a party to include a purported factual basis in its contentions simply as a “placeholder” 

under any circumstances, and this is doubly true where, as here, willful infringement has not even 

been alleged.

Accordingly, the Court STRIKES all language in Finjan’s infringement contentions 

asserting willful infringement. This ruling does not prejudice Finjan’s right to move the Court to 

assert a claim of willful infringement upon a showing of good cause in compliance with Patent 

Local Rule 3-6.

3. Indirect Infringement

This District’s Patent Local Rules requires plaintiffs to disclose for each claim “any direct 

infringement and a description of the acts of the alleged indirect infringer that contribute to or are 

inducing that direct infringement.” See Pat. L.R. 3-1(d). Plaintiffs are required to allege facts 

supporting their assertion. See id. (requiring a “description of the acts of the alleged indirect 

infringer” and stating that “the role of each party must be described”). “‘Generic allegations’ are 

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insufficient to disclose a theory of indirect infringement.” France Telecom, 2013 WL 1878912, at 

*5 (citation omitted).

Defendants argue that Finjan is subject to several additional requirements. Defendants 

contend that Finjan must assert (1) the identity of the alleged direct infringer, (2) what acts the 

direct infringer performed that constitute direct infringement, and (3) that a single party performed

every allegedly infringing act. See Dkt. No. 118 at 21. This Court disagrees. Finjan has 

identified advertisements and documents concerning specific products that it alleges advised third 

parties to use Defendants’ products in an infringing manner. See Dkt. No. 118-15 at 12-24. 

Courts in this district have denied motions to strike where plaintiffs have made a similar showing. 

See DCG Sys, 2012 WL 1309161, at *2 (denying motion to strike where “[t]he contentions 

identify a specific product line, the Checkpoint 300–Series, and thus provide Checkpoint with 

notice that Checkpoint indirectly infringes the Asserted Patents when a 300–Series product is 

integrated by a customer with, for example, an automated test system.”). Defendants have cited 

no decision requiring a plaintiff to identify the specific third party committing any underlying act 

of direct infringement in its initial infringement contentions. See id. (noting the same).

The United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai 

Technologies, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014), does not affect this analysis. In Limelight, the 

Supreme Court held that a single person must perform every step of a claimed method patent for a 

third party to be liable for indirect infringement. See id. at 2118. Limelight simply did not address 

the level of specificity required of a plaintiff’s infringement contentions under this District’s 

Patent Local Rules. Under Limelight, Finjan must eventually identify the parties that committed 

the underlying acts of direct infringement in order to prevail on its indirect infringement claim, but 

no authority requires Finjan to do so at this stage of the litigation. 

Defendants’ motion to strike Finjan’s assertion of indirect infringement is DENIED.

III. RELIEF

Defendants argue that Finjan’s infringement contentions should be stricken with prejudice, 

asserting that Finjan’s “egregious conduct” and “bad faith” warrant extraordinary action by the 

Court. See Dkt. No. 118 at 24-25. Striking a patentee’s infringement contentions is a severe 

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sanction that should be used sparingly and only for good cause. See Bender v. Advanced Micro 

Devices, Inc., 2010 WL 363341, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2010) (characterizing such relief as 

“draconian”). The Court finds that such drastic relief is not warranted here. 

Where appropriate, the Court will treat a motion to strike as a motion to compel 

amendment. See Blue Spike, 2015 WL 335842 at *4; France Telecom, 2013 WL 1878912 at *2; 

FusionArc, 2007 WL 1052900 at *2. This is the first time that Defendants have moved to strike or 

compel amendment to Finjan’s infringement contentions, and while Finjan’s contentions are 

clearly deficient, striking them with prejudice is not justified. Courts in this District generally 

allow plaintiffs leave to amend in these circumstances. See France Telecom, 2013 WL 1878912 at 

*5-6 (denying motion to strike but granting motion to compel amendment); Bender, 2010 WL 

964197 at *2 (same); Advanced Micro, 2010 WL 363341 at *2 (same). 

However, there are several exceptions to this ruling. The Court will not provide Finjan 

leave to amend the portions of its contentions expressly stricken, above. To the extent Finjan 

wishes to amend its contentions to add products beyond those specifically identified in its initial 

infringement contentions, or if it wishes to re-allege claims under the doctrine of equivalents or for 

willful infringement, it must comply with Patent Local Rule 3-6. Finjan must file a properlynoticed motion with this Court specifically detailing why, despite its diligence, the new allegations 

could not have been properly asserted before. See Patent L.R. 3-6 (“Amendment of the 

Infringement Contentions or the Invalidity Contentions may be made only by order of the Court 

upon a timely showing of good cause.”).

Finjan must serve an amended set of infringement contentions complying with the Court’s 

ruling no later than 21 days from the date of this Order. If Defendants believe that Finjan has not 

remedied the deficiencies in its amended infringement contentions, it may renew its motion to 

strike within 21 days from the date of service of Finjan’s amended contentions. 

Defendants request for a stay pending the submission of infringement contentions that 

comply with this District’s Patent Local Rules is DENIED. Defendants received Finjan’s 

infringement contentions in April of 2014, but waited almost ten full months to move to strike. Of 

course, the parties’ efforts to informally resolve their disputes can delay the filing of a motion with 

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the Court. But Defendants acknowledge that the parties had very divergent positions from the 

start, which suggests that this motion could have been brought significantly sooner. In any event, 

the schedule now set by the Court provides for prompt resolution of the above-discussed issues 

related to Finjan’s infringement contentions. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 2, 2015

______________________________________

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

United States District Court Judge

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