Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00094/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00094-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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 1 Petitioner was convicted in Maricopa County Superior Court; thus, pursuant to LR

Civ 5.1(b), the case should have been filed in the Phoenix division of this Court. Petitioner

properly mailed his Petition to the Phoenix courthouse and stated in an attached

memorandum that Phoenix was the proper division. (See Doc. 1 at 12; Doc. 1-1 at 2.)

However, on the first page of his Petition, he erroneously identified his conviction as having

been entered in Pima County. (Doc. 1 at 1.) Presumably because of that error, the case was

assigned to the Tucson division. Because Petitioner complied with the local rules and is

incarcerated in this division, Respondent did not object, and this division also has

jurisdiction, the Court has retained the case in this division. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Douglas D. Grant, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV-12-094-TUC-CKJ-DTF

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner Douglas D. Grant has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.1

 In accordance with the Rules of Practice of the Court, this matter was

referred to Magistrate Judge Ferraro for Report and Recommendation. Before this Court are

the Petition (Doc. 1), Respondents’ Answer (Doc. 13), and Petitioner’s Reply (Doc. 14). The

Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after its independent review of the

record, dismiss the petition.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner was convicted of manslaughter. During trial, the State disclosed its intent

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to prove aggravators for purposes of Petitioner’s sentence, and the trial court conducted the

aggravation hearing six days later. (Doc. 13 at 6; Doc. 14 at 1.) At the hearing, the State

presented evidence of three aggravators: (1) the offense was committed in an especially cruel

manner; (2) the offense was committed for pecuniary gain; and (3) the offense caused

emotional or financial harm to the victim’s immediate family. (Doc. 13, Ex. A at 3; Doc. 1

at 2.) In addition, several of the victim’s family members testified for the State, and Petitioner

testified on his own behalf. (Doc. 13, Ex. A at 3.) The jury found that the State proved all

three aggravators. (Id.) At this point, the adult probation department submitted a report

recommending a sentence greater than the presumptive; along with the report there were

letters from the victim’s family and other interested parties requesting a prison sentence and

several requested the maximum allowed. (Id. at 3-4.) Petitioner submitted a packet with

letters from some of the victim’s family and other interested parties requesting that he be

placed on probation. (Id. at 4.) In the mitigation hearing that followed, Petitioner presented

supportive testimony from relatives and friends. (Id.) After considering the previously

submitted materials and the testimony presented at the hearing, the judge found that the

aggravators and mitigators balanced. (Id.) Petitioner was sentenced to the presumptive term

of 5 years. (Id.) Petitioner contested only his sentence on appeal. (Id. at 2.) The Arizona

Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence on appeal. (Id.) The Arizona Supreme Court denied

review. (Doc. 13, Ex. E.) 

DISCUSSION

Respondents do not contest the petition’s timeliness nor that Petitioner exhausted the

one claim before this Court. Therefore, the Court evaluates the claim on the merits.

LEGAL STANDARD FOR RELIEF UNDER THE AEDPA

The AEDPA established a “substantially higher threshold for habeas relief” with the

“acknowledged purpose of ‘reducing delays in the execution of state and federal criminal

sentences.’” Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473-74 (2007) (quoting Woodford v. 

Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 206 (2003)). The AEDPA’s “‘highly deferential standard for

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evaluating state-court rulings’ . . . demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of

the doubt.” Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam) (quoting Lindh v.

Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 n.7 (1997)).

Under the AEDPA, a petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on any claim

“adjudicated on the merits” by the state court unless that adjudication:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of

the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The relevant state court decision is the last reasoned state decision

regarding a claim. Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Ylst v.

Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991)); Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 664

(9th Cir. 2005).

“The threshold question under AEDPA is whether [the petitioner] seeks to apply a rule

of law that was clearly established at the time his state-court conviction became final.”

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390 (2000). Therefore, to assess a claim under subsection

(d)(1), the Court must first identify the “clearly established Federal law,” if any, that governs

the sufficiency of the claims on habeas review. “Clearly established” federal law consists of

the holdings of the Supreme Court at the time the petitioner’s state court conviction became

final. Williams, 529 U.S. at 365; see Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74 (2006).

The Supreme Court has provided guidance in applying each prong of § 2254(d)(1).

The Court has explained that a state court decision is “contrary to” the Supreme Court’s

clearly established precedents if the decision applies a rule that contradicts the governing law

set forth in those precedents, thereby reaching a conclusion opposite to that reached by the

Supreme Court on a matter of law, or if it confronts a set of facts that is materially

indistinguishable from a decision of the Supreme Court but reaches a different result.

Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06; see Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (per curiam). In

characterizing the claims subject to analysis under the “contrary to” prong, the Court has

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observed that “a run-of-the-mill state-court decision applying the correct legal rule to the

facts of the prisoner’s case would not fit comfortably within § 2254(d)(1)’s ‘contrary to’

clause.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 406; see Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 974 (9th Cir.

2004). 

Under the “unreasonable application” prong of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court

may grant relief where a state court “identifies the correct governing legal rule from [the

Supreme] Court’s cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular . . . case” or

“unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context

where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context

where it should apply.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 407. For a federal court to find a state court’s

application of Supreme Court precedent “unreasonable,” the petitioner must show that the

state court’s decision was not merely incorrect or erroneous, but “objectively unreasonable.”

Id. at 409; Landrigan, 550 U.S. at 473; Visciotti, 537 U.S. at 25.

Under the standard set forth in § 2254(d)(2), habeas relief is available only if the state

court decision was based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts. Miller-El v.

Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240 (2005) (Miller-El II). A state court decision “based on a factual

determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in

light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. 322, 340

(2003) (Miller-El I); see Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir. 2004). In considering

a challenge under § 2254(d)(2), state court factual determinations are presumed to be correct,

and a petitioner bears the “burden of rebutting this presumption by clear and convincing

evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Landrigan, 550 U.S. at 473-74; Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at

240.

MERITS ANALYSIS

Petitioner alleges one claim, which the Court will address as two subparts. First, that

there was not adequate notice of the aggravators to be used at sentencing, and second, that

Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) requires that those aggravators be charged

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 2 Petitioner also alleges state law claims. Those claims are not cognizable, see 28

U.S.C. § 2241(c), and will not be addressed.

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within an indictment.2

Claim 1(a)

Petitioner alleges that there was not adequate notice of the aggravators used at

sentencing in violation of the Sixth Amendment. Petitioner relies on Cole v. Arkansas, 333

U.S. 196 (1948) and Gautt v. Lewis, 489 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2007) to support this claim. The

State rebuts this claim, first, by arguing that Petitioner had a chance to challenge the

aggravators, which he did. (Doc. 13 at 6.) Second, they argue that the trial court stated at the

hearing that, “the parties had ‘settled’ the aggravating factors ‘a long time ago.’” (Doc. 13

at 6 (quoting Doc. 13, Ex. E at 39).) Finally, they go on to state that Petitioner did not object

to that statement, or to a lack of notice at trial. (Doc. 13 at 6.)

There is little law in this area that qualifies as “clearly established”for purposes of the

AEDPA. As the Ninth Circuit noted in Gautt, the Supreme Court has been relatively quiet

on a defendant’s right to notice under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Gautt, 489 F.3d

at 1004 n.11. Through the Sixth Amendment, a criminal defendant is guaranteed the right to

be informed of the charges against him to permit adequate preparation of a defense. Id. at

1002. The case that is most on point is Cole, where in 1948, the Supreme Court held that the

accused has a right to be charged with the crime for which he is to be tried. Cole, 333 U.S.

at 202.

Petitioner argues that Cole and Gautt are the governing law for this claim, and he is

correct that Cole qualifies as clearly established law. Because Gautt is not a Supreme Court

case, it is not “clearly established” for purposes of the AEDPA. Williams, 529 U.S. at 365;

see Musladin, 549 U.S. at 74. However, circuit court precedent may be of “persuasive value”

in determining what law is “clearly established” and whether a state court applied that law

unreasonably. See Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600 (9th Cir. 1999). In the absence

of other law in this area, it is worthwhile to review the application of both Cole and Gautt

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here. Neither case supports Petitioner’s argument that there was inadequate notice of

aggravators in this instance. In Cole, the petitioners were not convicted of the offenses for

which they were charged, but instead were convicted of offenses in a related section of state

code. Cole, 333 U.S. at 199. A similar situation occurred in Gautt more recently. There, the

petitioner was convicted under one statute, but the sentence was enhanced under another

similar statute. Gautt, 489 F.3d at 998. In both cases, the key fact is that the petitioners were

not given notice of charges of which they were either convicted or sentenced. This is vastly

different than the situation here, where Petitioner does not dispute the charges themselves,

and there is no question that he was sentenced for the crime for which he was charged and

convicted. Petitioner’s claim is solely based upon the amount of notice he received as to the

aggravators. That is substantially different than either case cited, as there was no notice at

all in either case. Extending these holdings to this case would be beyond the authority of this

Court under the AEDPA. 

Even if Petitioner’s arguments were supported by clearly established law, he still

would be unable to obtain relief because any error in notice was harmless. In the context of

habeas review, an error at trial is harmless unless it had a “‘substantial and injurious effect

or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637

(1993) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)). Most critically, the

trial court imposed a presumptive sentence of five years, and the judge had the discretion to

impose the presumptive sentence without any aggravators. See A.R.S. § 13-702; State v.

Johnson, 111 P.3d 1038, 1041 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005); Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303. Further,

Petitioner fails to argue that with additional notice he could have presented evidence to

undermine the aggravation presentation of the State. Petitioner contends that the amount of

notice hampered his ability to re-call witnesses from outside of Maricopa County. (Doc. 14

at 3-4). However, he fails to allege what any witness would have testified to or that with

additional notice he could have presented a defense and the aggravators would not have been

found by the jury. Finally, though not determinative, Petitioner did not object to notice

regarding the aggravators at trial.

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 The state court’s denial of this claim was not objectively unreasonable.

Claim 1(b)

Petitioner alleges that Blakely requires that aggravators must be charged in an

indictment. Petitioner misreads the holding in Blakely to reach this conclusion. His argument

seems to be based upon a statement made in Justice O’Connor’s dissent that Petitioner cited

in his reply. (Doc. 14 at 10 (quoting Blakely, 542 U.S. at 318 (O’Connor, J. dissenting)).)

Because the statements that Petitioner relies upon are within a dissent, they do not bind any

court. In the majority, there is no mention that aggravators must be charged in an indictment

See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 296. The holding is limited to requiring jury review of aggravators

for sentences beyond the statutorily authorized maximum for a given offense. Id. at 303-04.

In other cases involving federal prosecutions, the Court has stated that “any fact (other than

prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an

indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jones v. United

States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6 (1999). However, that requirement is limited to federal

prosecutions, as the Fifth Amendment requirement of indictment by a Grand Jury has not

been incorporated against the states. See Hurtado v. People of State of Cal., 110 U.S. 516,

538 (1884); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 n.25 (1972).

This claim fails because States are not required to indict criminal cases. Therefore,

there cannot be a requirement that any particular facts must be charged in an indictment.

Thus, it was not an unreasonable application of federal law for the state court to deny

Petitioner’s claim that the aggravators need to be charged in an indictment.

CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATION

Claims 1(a) and 1(b) do not warrant relief under the AEDPA and should be dismissed

on the merits. Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge recommends the District Court

enter an order DISMISSING the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1).

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(2), any party may serve and file

written objections within fourteen days of being served with a copy of the Report and

Recommendation. A party may respond to the other party’s objections within fourteen days.

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No reply brief shall be filed on objections unless leave is granted by the district court. If

objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. Any objections filed should be

captioned with the following case number: CV-12-094-TUC-CKJ.

DATED this 19th day of November, 2012.

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