Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01472/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-01472-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1985 Consipracy to interfere with civil rights

---

FT LEO

i7M4Rif /jo gj j8

r- 1

2

3

4

m -4. «si» 5

6

7

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10

11 BART D. KIMBER, Case No.: 3:16-cv-01472-BEN-AGS

12 Plaintiff,

ORDER:

13 v.

(1) DENYING MOTION FOR

PRELIMN ARY INJUCTION; 14 TRACY GRANT et al.,

15 Defendants.

(2) DENYING MOTION FOR

APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL; and 16

17

(3) DENYING MOTION TO AMEND

COMPLAINT 18

19

20 Pending before the Court are the Motions for Injunctive Relief, Appointment of

Counsel, and to Amend the Complaint filed by PlaintiffBart Kimber. (Docket Nos. 27,

37, 39.) The Court finds the Motion suitable for determination on the papers without oral

argument, pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1.d.l. For the reasons set forth below, each

Motion is DENIED.

21

22

23

24

25 BACKGROUND

Plaintifffiled a Complaint against Defendants (the United States ofAmerica and

ten individual federal employees or officers), containing twelve claims for reliefrelated

to his allegations ofinvasion ofprivacy, wrongful termination, employment

26

27

28

l

3:16-cv-01472-BEN-AGS

Case 3:16-cv-01472-BEN-AGS Document 40 Filed 03/06/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 6
CA

discrimination, Civil Rights violations, negligent infliction of emotional distress, “reverse

sexual discrimination,” and Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) violations.

(Docket No. 1.)

Plaintiffs 61-page Complaint alleges that, in June 2006, he was wrongfully

terminated from his employment as a firefighter with the Camp Pendleton Fire

Department. (Compl.) According to Plaintiff, beginning in June 2003, after he declined

Defendant Tracy Grant’s invitation to engage in sexual relations, she and Defendant

Dean King created a hostile work environment for him. {Id.) Plaintiffmore generally

alleges that all ofthe Defendants’ acted in some way to conspire to invade his privacy,

engage in employment discrimination, violate his Civil Rights, and violate the ADA,

resulting in his wrongful termination and ongoing emotional distress. {Id.)

DISCUSSION

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13 A. Motion for Injunctive Relief

Plaintifffiled a Motion for Injunctive Relief alleging Defendant Jalynn Peterson is

presently “denying Plaintiffthe right to work by concealing, losing, or destroying his

Official Personal File (OPF).” (Docket No. 27 at 2.) He seeks an order: (a) requiring

Defendant Jalynn Peterson to either produce Plaintiffs Official Personnel File or admit

that she concealed, lost or destroyed it; (b) payment for lost wages, benefits, creditable

service, and interest; and (c) “Sanction Punitive Actions against Defendants to Halt their

Discriminatory practices, and award restitution to Plaintiffto make him whole [sic].” {Id.

at 4.)

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

“A plaintiffseeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to

succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of

preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in

the public interest.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).

“The first factor under Winter is the most important—likely success on the merits.”

Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 740 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Aamer v. Obama, 742

F.3d 1023, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“We begin with the first and most important factor:

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

3:16-cv-01472-BEN-AGS

Case 3:16-cv-01472-BEN-AGS Document 40 Filed 03/06/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 6
n.

whether petitioners have established a likelihood ofsuccess on the merits.”)). If a

plaintiff has failed to show a likelihood ofsuccess on the merits, the court need not

consider the other three Winter elements. Id. (citing Ass'n des Eleveurs de Canards et

d'Oies du Quebec v. Harris, 729 F.3d 937, 944 (9th Cir.2013) (internal citation omitted)).

When a plaintiffseeks a court order requiring another party to take affirmative

action, the reliefis treated as a “mandatory injunction,” which requires the plaintiffto

“establish that the law and facts clearly favor her position not simply that she is likely to

succeed.” Id. (citing Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571

F.3d 873, 879 (9th Cir.2009)). The Ninth Circuit has cautioned that mandatory

injunctions go “well beyond simply maintaining the status quo pendente lite [and] is

particularly disfavored.” Id. (citing Stanley v. Univ. ofS. Cal., 13 F.3d 1313, 1320 (9th

Cir. 1994)).

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

Plaintiff has failed to establish a likelihood ofsuccess on the merits because his

Motion is solely based on conclusory allegations. He provides no legal authority to

support his request, and thus falls well below the requirement to establish that the law and

facts clearly favor his position. Garcia, 786 F.3d at 740 (internal citation omitted).

Moreover, although the Court need not consider the other factors, it notes that

Plaintiffhas also failed to establish a likelihood ofirreparable harm. “The basis of

injunctive reliefin the federal courts is irreparable harm and inadequacy oflegal

remedies.” L.A. Mem 7 Coliseum Comm ’n v. Nat’l Football League, 634 F.2d 1197, 1202

(9th Cir. 1980). In effect, Plaintiffseeks monetary damages and production ofhis

personnel file, the absence ofwhich is preventing him from commencing work. (Docket

No. 27.) Thus, he has not demonstrated that he would suffer irreparable harm without the

injunction because monetary compensation may be awarded ifhe prevails on his claims.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction is DENIED.

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26 III

27 III

28 III

3

3:16-cv-01472-BEN-AGS

Case 3:16-cv-01472-BEN-AGS Document 40 Filed 03/06/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 6
Motion 1

for Appointment of Counsel

Plaintiff also moves for the appointment of counsel, asserting that he has a

meritorious claim, but is unable find an attorney to represent him “on terms that [he] can

afford.” (Docket No. 37 at 1.) Plaintiffwas previously represented by an attorney, but he

indicates his former attorney withdrew after Plaintiffwas unable to pay his fees. (Id. at

9.) He also contacted five other attorneys or firms, three ofwhich were not retained

because he could not afford to pay the deposit; the other two were not retained because

they did not specialize in his type of claims. (Id. at 3, 9.)

Courts have discretion to appoint counsel for indigent civil litigants upon a

showing of exceptional circumstances. See Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th

Cir. 1991); Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc. ofSan Diego, 662 F.2d 1301, 1318 (9th Cir.

1981). “A finding of exceptional circumstances requires an evaluation ofboth the

likelihood ofsuccess on the merits and the ability ofthe petitioner to articulate his claims

pro se in light ofthe complexity ofthe legal issues involved.” Terrell, 935 F.2d at 1017

(9th Cir. 1991) (internal citations omitted); see also Bradshaw, 662 F.2d at 1318.

“Neither ofthese factors is dispositive and both must be viewed together before reaching

a decision.” Terrell, 935 F.2d at 1017 (internal citations omitted).

1 B.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18 III

19

20

i Plaintifftechnically filed two separate requests for appointment of counsel, one

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), and one pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2000e 5(f)(1).

(Docket No. 73.) However, because the Court’s determination is based on essentially the

same analysis, the Court treats the two motions as a single motion. See Terrell v. Brewer,

935F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991) (“A finding of exceptional circumstances requires an

evaluation of both the likelihood ofsuccess on the merits and the ability ofthe petitioner

to articulate his claims pro se in light ofthe complexity ofthe legal issues involved.”);

Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc. ofSan Diego, 662 F.2d 1301,1318 (9th Cir. 1981)

(appointment of counsel pursuant to the 1964 Civil Rights Act requires a court to assess

“(1) the plaintiffs financial resources, (2) the efforts made by the plaintiffto secure

counsel, and (3) whether the plaintiffs claim has merit.”) (internal citations omitted).

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

3:16-cv-01472-BEN-AGS

Case 3:16-cv-01472-BEN-AGS Document 40 Filed 03/06/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 6
ft

At this time, the Court cannot say there is any likelihood ofsuccess on the merits.

First, Plaintiffs Complaint acknowledges his claims may be barred by the statute of

limitations as it requests the Court “allow equitable tolling ofthe statute oflimitations.”

(Compl. at 12.) Second, although Plaintiffmarked that his Equal Opportunity

Commission Right-to-Sue Letter did not show the Commission found “no reasonable

cause” to believe the allegations made in the charge were true, he did not attach the letter

to his request for appointment of counsel. Moreover, Plaintifffails to demonstrate an

inability to represent himselfbeyond the ordinary burdens encountered by plaintiffs

representing themselves pro se.

Therefore, the Court finds that the exceptional circumstances required for the

appointment of counsel are not present. Plaintiffs Motion is DENIED.

Motion to Amend Complaint

Finally, Plaintiffmoves to amend his complaint, attaching his proposed First

Amended Complaint (“FAC”) and supporting exhibits. (Docket No. 39.)

Before trial, and after the time has elapsed for which a party may amend its

pleading as a matter of course, Rule 15(a)(2) ofthe Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure

provides that: “a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party's written

consent or the court's leave.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Leave to amend under Rule 15(a)(2)

should be “freely give[n]... when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).

Courts consider “undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure

deficiencies by previous amendments, undue prejudice to the opposing party, and futility

ofthe proposed amendment” in deciding whetherjustice requires granting leave to amend

under Rule 15. Moore v. Kayport Package Express, Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 538 (9th Cir.

1989) (citing Foman v. Davis, 370 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). Although each factor may

warrant consideration, “prejudice to the opposing party ... carries the greatest weight.”

Eminence Capital, 316 F.3d at 1052.

Plaintiffs Motion to Amend lacks any explanation as to why he should be granted

leave. Instead, in a single paragraph, Plaintiffreiterates his claims for reliefs. (Docket

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 C.

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

3:16-cv-01472-BEN-AGS

Case 3:16-cv-01472-BEN-AGS Document 40 Filed 03/06/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 6
No. 39 at 3.) Additionally, Plaintiffs proposed FAC fails to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2) ofthe

Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure, which requires “a short and plain statement ofthe

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2). Facially,

Plaintiffs proposed 119-page FAC is nearly twice as long as the operative 61-page

Complaint, not including the additional 219 pages ofsupporting exhibits.2 (Compare

Docket Nos. 1, 39.) Substantively, Plaintiffs Complaint contains various accusations

and legal conclusions spanning multiple time frames, and it is unclear whether he has

stated a claim for relief. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2). Therefore, he has not met Rule

15(a)(2)’s requirement to obtain consent to amendment by the opposing parties, or

demonstrated why justice requires the Court to grant him leave. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).

Accordingly, Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Complaint is DENIED.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs Motions for Preliminary Injunction, Appointment ofCounsel, and to

Amend Complaint are DENIED. Defendants shall file their answer, or otherwise

respond to Plaintiffs Complaint (docket no. 1) within twenty-one (21) days ofthis

Order.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17 IT IS SO ORDERED.

18

19 DATED: March ,2017

HONvJS-OGER T. BENITEZ

United States District Judge 20

21

22

23

24

25

2 The Court further notes Plaintiff did not provide “a version ofthe proposed amended

pleading that shows—through redlining, underlining, strikeouts, or other similarly

effective typographic methods—how the proposed amended pleading differs from the

operative pleading,” as required by Civil Local Rule 15.l.b.

26

27

28

6

3:16-cv-01472-BEN-AGS

Case 3:16-cv-01472-BEN-AGS Document 40 Filed 03/06/17 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 6