Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00143/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00143-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN MADRID,

Plaintiff,

v.

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF 

CORRECTIONS, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:16-cv-00143-AWI-JLT (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT 

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND 

(Doc. 1) 

30-DAY DEADLINE

Plaintiff alleges that, because he was falsely charged with assaulting a peace officer with a 

weapon, his personal and legal property was wrongly destroyed in connection with his term in the 

Security Housing Unit. Because his allegations fail to state any cognizable claims, the 

Complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend. 

A. Screening Requirement

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 

frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary 

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2); 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). If an action is dismissed on one of these three basis, a strike is imposed 

per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). An inmate who has had three or more prior actions or appeals dismissed 

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as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and has 

not alleged imminent danger of serious physical injury does not qualify to proceed in forma 

pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Richey v. Dahne, 807 F.3d 1201, 1208 (9th Cir. 2015).

B. Summary of Plaintiff=s Complaint

Plaintiff raises three counts: (1) violation his right to petition the government and 

retaliation under the First Amendment as well as his due process rights under the Fourteenth 

Amendment (Doc. 1, pp. 5-11); (2) violation of his rights to equal protection under the Fourteenth 

Amendment (id., p. 12); and (3) violation of his rights to due process under the Fourteenth 

Amendment (id., p. 13), for which he seeks a declaration that his rights were violated, injunctive 

relief to prevent implementation of section 3191 of Title 15, and money damages(id., p. 14).

For background purposes,1Plaintiff states that in 2010, Defendants Joseph Burnes and S. 

Pease were involved in an incident where another guard beat Plaintiff, which required him to be 

airlifted to a trauma center and rendered him unconscious for 18 days. (Doc. 1, p. 5.) Plaintiff 

states that those three officers conspired and falsely charged Plaintiff with assaulting Defendant 

Burnes with a weapon. (Id.) Plaintiff also states that he is a “known jailhouse lawyer.” (Id.) 

Under Count I, Plaintiff alleges that, on February 11, 2014, he was placed in ASU at 

PVSP and that Defendant Lawry used this circumstance to order Defendants I. Tasi and C. 

Cavasos to dispose of Plaintiff’s personal and legal property. (Id., at p. 6.) On February 14th and 

15th, Defendants I Tasi and C. Cavasos sorted through Plaintiff’s property and claimed that he 

had to downsize his legal property to one banker’s box and his personal property to 6 cubic feet. 

(Id.) Plaintiff states that his property was supposed to be stored until he was released from ASU, 

(id., at n. 1), but that on February 15, 2014, Defendants I. Tasi and C. Cavasos cited his black 

footlocker as being “unserviceable” and disposed of it and 170 pounds of legal paperwork to 

Plaintiff’s active cases as well as his parole plan with supporting certificates and letters for use at 

 

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Plaintiff does not give any further detail related to this altercation, nor does he attempt to state any claims based on 

the 2010 altercation. (Doc. 1, p. 5.) In fact, Plaintiff states that he is pursuing claims related to this incident in 

Madrid v. Pease, et al., Eastern District Case Number 1:15-cv-00770-LJO-BAM and in In re John Madrid, Fresno 

County Superior Court Case Number 15CRWR68301B. (Id.) Thus, his allegations regarding the 2010 incident are 

not analyzed here.

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his upcoming parole board review hearing. (Id., at p. 6.) Plaintiff states that he filed an inmate 

grievance on February 27, 2014 challenging disposal of his property as retaliation for his legal 

activities against the officers who were involved in the 2010 beating and because he helped other 

inmates with their legal problems. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges this grievance was denied at all levels 

because Defendant C. Cavasos noted that Plaintiff elected to dispose of his property rather than 

mail the items to friends or family; however, Plaintiff states that he did not elect to have his 

property destroyed, rather he did not have the funds in his account to pay the shipping costs as 

required under section 3191(c)(1) & (2). (Id., at p. 7.)

Plaintiff alleges that on July 7, 2014, he was transferred to CSP-Cor with 3 boxes of his 

personal property and 27 boxes of legal property. (Id.) On August 21, 2014, Plaintiff received a 

third of his personal property that had been “transpacked at PVSP,” but it did not include any 

electrical appliances. (Id.) On September 4, 2014, additional personal and legal property was 

issued to Plaintiff with a notice that other items of his property (including a battery charger and 

batteries, hardcover law books, and family photographs) were not being provided since “NonSHU Allowable.” (Id., at p. 8.) On September 25, 2014, Plaintiff’s SHU term ended, but his 

personal and legal property had not been disposed of yet, so Plaintiff was held in the SHU until 

“defendants were able to accomplish their goal of permanently depriving Plaintiff of his personal 

and legal property as punishment and retaliation for allegedly assaulting Defendant Burnes with a 

weapon.” (Id.) Upon Plaintiff’s release from the SHU in January of 2015, a “building by 

building cell search was conducted” and Plaintiff’s cell was searched on March 31, 2015 at which 

Defendant Burnes was present. (Id.) The next day, Defendant Burnes filed a complaint that 

Plaintiff was a threat to Defendant Burnes’ safety because of the 2010 incident. (Id.) This caused 

Plaintiff to be placed in a “caged ‘dry’ cell” for 2-3 hours while a “lock-up order” was prepared to 

move Plaintiff to the ASU pending his transfer to another facility. (Id.) Defendants John Doe #1 

& #2 packed Plaintiff’s property from in his cell, but the lock-up order was not issued so Plaintiff 

was returned to his cell and given back his property minus a number of toiletry items. (Id., at p. 

9.) Plaintiff alleges that this targeting of his personal and legal property shows malicious intent 

and that it is also evident by Defendant M. Magana giving him a cracked bowl and lid that did not 

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match despite the fact that the one that prison official confiscated from him were new (and 

presumably, matched). (Id.) Plaintiff also alleges that his television was maliciously targeted a 

“non-SHU allowable” because of the electrical cord, but his radio with a similar cord was not. 

(Id., at p. 10.) Plaintiff alleges he was not in the SHU when Defendant M. Magana disposed of 

his property out of retaliation for allegedly having assaulted2 Defendant Burnes. (Id.) 

In Count II, Plaintiff alleges that on September 4, 2014, Defendant Magana came to his 

SHU cell and told Plaintiff that CSP-Cor uses Fed Ex to ship out inmate property. (Doc. 1, p. 

12.) Plaintiff asked if his items could be held until September 26, 2014 when he would be 

released from the SHU, but Defendant Magana declined to do so. (Id.) Plaintiff stated a friend 

had offered to pay the shipping cost, but Defendant Magana stated that Fed Ex does not accept 

prepayment and that section 3191 states that payment is only accepted from an inmate’s trust 

account. (Id.) On September 20, 2014, Plaintiff’s friend contacted Defendant Magana requesting 

information on how to pay for the shipment of Plaintiff’s property, but “Obviously the offer to 

pay postage was rejected.” (Id.) On December 11, 2014, Plaintiff wrote to Fed Ex and received a 

response from them on January 6, 2015 indicating that they would accept prepayment for 

shipments. (Id.) As a result, Plaintiff alleges that he was permanently deprived of his personal 

and legal property solely because he lacked the funds for shipping. (Id.)

In Count III, Plaintiff alleges that prior to the disposal of his personal and legal property 

he filed an inmate grievance which was declined at all levels to “rubber-stamp” the denial of his 

property at the lower levels. (Id., at p. 13.) Plaintiff also alleges he directly contacted CDCR 

Secretary, Jeffrey Beard; PVSP Warden Scott Frauenheim; CSP-Cor Warden, Dave Davey; CSPCor CCI, T. Wyman; PVSP Sergeant S. Pease; and CSP-Cor Sergeant D.B. Hernandez to report 

the incident but he received no assistance. (Id.) 

Plaintiff has not stated any cognizable claims, but may be able to correct the deficiencies 

in his pleading so as to state a cognizable claim. Thus, he is being given the pleading 

requirements and legal standards for his claims and leave to file a first amended complaint. 

 

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Plaintiff asserts that the District Attorney dismissed the criminal charge of “attempted murder of a police officer” 

against him when evidence of perjury and falsification of evidence came to light. (Id., at p. 10, n. 3.) 

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C. Pleading Requirements

1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)

"Rule 8(a)'s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited 

exceptions," none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 

U.S. 506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). A complaint must contain "a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a). 

"Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and 

the grounds upon which it rests." Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. 

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but A[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a 

cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.@ Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 678 (2009), quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 

Plaintiff must set forth Asufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to >state a claim that is 

plausible on its face.=@ Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Factual 

allegations are accepted as true, but legal conclusions are not. Iqbal. at 678; see also Moss v. U.S. 

Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-557. 

While Aplaintiffs [now] face a higher burden of pleadings facts . . . ,@ Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 

580 F.3d 949, 977 (9th Cir. 2009), the pleadings of pro se prisoners are still construed liberally 

and are afforded the benefit of any doubt. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). 

However, "the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff's factual allegations," Neitze 

v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989), "a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may 

not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled," Bruns v. Nat'l Credit 

Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 

268 (9th Cir. 1982), and courts are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences, Doe I v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). The “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not sufficient, and

“facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability” fall short of satisfying the 

plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

If he chooses to file a first amended complaint, Plaintiff SHALL make it as concise as 

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possible. He should merely state which of his constitutional rights he feels were violated by each 

Defendant and the asserted factual basis for the claims. 

2. Linkage Requirement

The Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. ' 1983) requires that there be an actual connection or link 

between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by 

Plaintiff. See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 

U.S. 362 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that A[a] person >subjects= another to the deprivation 

of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, 

participates in another=s affirmative act, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to 

do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.@ Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 

(9th Cir. 1978). In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, Plaintiff must link each 

named defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of 

Plaintiff=s federal rights. 

Plaintiff names, but fails to link Correctional Guard A. Bustinza to any of his allegations. 

Plaintiff must clearly state which defendant(s) he feels are responsible for each violation of his 

constitutional rights and their factual basis as his complaint must put each Defendant on notice of 

Plaintiff=s claims against him or her. See Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004).

3. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 18(a) & 20(a)(2)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 18(a) allows a party asserting a claim to relief as an 

original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim to join, either as independent or as 

alternate claims, as many claims as the party has against an opposing party. However, Plaintiff 

may not bring unrelated claims against unrelated parties in a single action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a), 

20(a)(2); Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 952 (7th Cir. 2011); George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 

607 (7th Cir. 2007). As an initial matter, Plaintiff may bring a claim against multiple defendants 

so long as (1) the claim(s) arise out of the same transaction or occurrence, or series of transactions 

and occurrences, and (2) there are commons questions of law or fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2); 

Coughlin v. Rogers, 130 F.3d 1348, 1351 (9th Cir. 1997); Desert Empire Bank v. Insurance Co. 

of North America, 623 F.3d 1371, 1375 (9th Cir. 1980). Only if the defendants are properly 

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joined under Rule 20(a) will the Court review the extraneous claims to determine if they may be 

joined under Rule 18(a), which permits the joinder of multiple claims against the same party.

The Court must be able to discern a relationship between Plaintiff’s claims and/or there 

must be a similarity of parties. The fact that all of Plaintiff’s allegations are based on the same 

type of constitutional violation (i.e. retaliation by different actors on different dates, under 

different factual events) does not necessarily make claims related for purposes of Rule 18(a). 

Specifically, it appears that Plaintiff’s allegations based on events that occurred at PVSP are not 

related to those that occurred at CSP-Cor. All claims that do not comply with Rules 18(a) and 

20(a)(2) are subject to dismissal. However, he may file a separate action to address these claims.

Plaintiff is cautioned that if he fails to make the requisite election regarding which 

category of claims to pursue and his amended complaint sets forth improperly joined claims, the 

Court will determine which claims can proceed and which will be dismissed. Visendi v. Bank of 

America, N.A., 733 F3d 863, 870-71 (9th Cir. 2013). Whether any claims will be subject to 

severance by future order will depend on which claims are pled in the amended complaint and 

which, if any, of those pled are viable.

D. Plaintiff’s Claims 

1. Retaliation

Prisoners have a First Amendment right to be free from retaliation for filing grievances 

against prison officials. Waitson v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114-15 (9th Cir. 2012); Brodheim v. 

Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 (9th Cir.2009). A retaliation claim has five elements. Id. at 1114. 

First, the plaintiff must show that the underlying conduct is protected. Id. The filing of an inmate 

grievance is protected conduct, Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 568 (9th Cir. 2005), as are the 

rights to speech or to petition the government, Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir. 

1985); see also Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir. 1989); Pratt v. Rowland, 65 

F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995). Second, the plaintiff must show the defendant took adverse action 

against the plaintiff. Rhodes, at 567. Third, the plaintiff must show a causal connection between 

the adverse action and the protected conduct. Waitson, 668 F.3d at 1114. Fourth, the plaintiff 

must show that the “official’s acts would chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness from 

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future First Amendment activities.” Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 568. Fifth, the plaintiff must show “that 

the prison authorities’ retaliatory action did not advance legitimate goals of the correctional 

institution. . . .” Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 532 (9th Cir.1985). 

It bears repeating that while Plaintiff need only show facts sufficient to support a plausible 

claim for relief, the mere possibility of misconduct is not sufficient, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79, 

and the Court is “not required to indulge unwarranted inferences,” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 

572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009). The conduct identified by Plaintiff as retaliatory must have 

been motivated by his engaging in a protected activity, and the retaliatory conduct must not have 

reasonably advanced a legitimate penological goal. Brodheim, 584 F.3d at 1271-72. 

For these reasons, Plaintiff’s mere allegation that he was a “known jailhouse lawyer,”

without demonstrating a connection between this and the resulting acts by the defendants, is 

insufficient to show that Plaintiff=s protected activity was the motivating factor behind any of the 

Defendants’ alleged actions. For example, Plaintiff does not allege facts to support that 

Defendants Lawry, I. Tasi, or C. Cavasos had any knowledge of his protected activities while he 

was jailed at PVSP. Plaintiff does not allege that he was placed in ASU at PVSP on February 11, 

2014 in retaliation for any protected conduct. Further, Plaintiff also does not allege any chilling 

actions by any of the Defendants at PVSP. It appears that Plaintiff’s property was not disposed of 

at PVSP since he was transferred to CSP-Cor in July with 3 boxes of personal property and 27 

boxes of legal property, more of his property arrived in September excluding items that were 

“Non-SHU Allowable,” and he alleges that on September 25, 2014, his SHU term ended, but his 

personal and legal property had not been disposed of yet. (Doc. 1, pp. 7-8.) Thus, Plaintiff fails 

to state a cognizable retaliation claim against Defendants Lawry, I. Tasi, and C. Cavasos based on 

the handling of his property while he was in the SHU at PVSP. 

Plaintiff likewise fails to allege facts to show that any of the actors at CSP-Cor had 

knowledge of his prior grievance and/or litigation activities. Further, Plaintiff alleges that he was 

held in the SHU at CSP-Cor beyond his SHU term for disposal of his property “as punishment 

and retaliation for allegedly assaulting Defendant Burnes with a weapon.” (Doc. 1, p. 8.) 

Plaintiff also alleges that his property was targeted and that the malicious intent is evidenced a 

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cracked bowl and mismatched lid he received when Defendant Magana returned his property to 

Plaintiff since Plaintiff’s bowls that were confiscated were all new. (Id., p. 9.) Plaintiff also 

alleges that his TV was maliciously targeted as “Non-SHU Allowable” because of its cord, but 

his radio with a similar cord was not. (Id., p. 10.) Plaintiff finishes his allegations pertaining to 

his property at CSP-Cor by alleging that he was no longer in the SHU when Defendant M. 

Magana disposed of his property out of retaliation for allegedly having assaulted Defendant 

Burnes. (Id.) However, assaulting Defendant Burnes is not protected activity upon which he may

state a claim for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. Thus, Plaintiff fails to state a 

cognizable retaliation claim based on events that occurred pertaining to his property at CSP-Cor. 

 2. Access to Courts

Plaintiff identifies a “First Amendment Right to Petition the Government” as part of his 

first claim which it appears he may have intended to be an infringement on his right to access the 

courts. (Doc. 1, p. 5.) Inmates have a fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts. 

Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996); Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1101 (9th Cir. 

2011); Phillips v. Hust, 588 F.3d 652, 655 (9th Cir. 2009). Claims for denial of access to the 

courts may arise from the frustration or hindrance of Aa litigating opportunity yet to be gained@

(forward-looking access claim) or from the loss of a meritorious suit that cannot now be tried 

(backward-looking claim). Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 412-15 (2002). 

In either instance, Athe injury requirement is not satisfied by just any type of frustrated 

legal claim.@ Lewis, 518 U.S. at 354. Inmates do not enjoy a constitutionally protected right Ato 

transform themselves into litigating engines capable of filing everything from shareholder 

derivative actions to slip-and-fall claims.@ Id. at 355. Rather, the type of legal claim protected is 

limited to direct criminal appeals, habeas petitions, and civil rights actions such as those brought 

under section 1983 to vindicate basic constitutional rights. Id. at 354 (quotations and citations 

omitted). AImpairment of any other litigating capacity is simply one of the incidental (and 

perfectly constitutional) consequences of conviction and incarceration.@ Id. at 355 (emphasis in 

original). 

To assert a forward-looking access claim, the non-frivolous “underlying cause of action 

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and its lost remedy must be addressed by allegations in the complaint sufficient to give fair notice 

to a defendant.” Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 416 (2002). To state such a claim, the 

plaintiff must describe this “predicate claim . . . well enough to apply the ‘non-frivolous' test and 

to show that the ‘arguable’ nature of the underlying claim is more than hope.” Id. It is not 

enough for Plaintiff merely to conclude that the claim was non-frivolous. The complaint should 

instead “state the underlying claim in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) just 

as if it were being independently pursued, and a like plain statement should describe any remedy 

available under the access claim and presently unique to it.” Id. at 417-418.

Moreover, when a prisoner asserts that he was denied access to the courts and seeks a 

remedy for a lost opportunity to present a legal claim, he must show: (1) the loss of a nonfrivolous or arguable underlying claim; (2) the official acts that frustrated the litigation; and (3) a 

remedy that may be awarded as recompense, but that is not otherwise available in a future suit. 

Phillips v. Hust, 477 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir.2007) (citing Christopher, 536 U.S. at 413–414, 

overruled on other grounds, Hust v. Phillips, 555 U.S. 1150, 129 S.Ct. 1036, 173 L.Ed.2d 466 

(2009) (reversed and remanded Phillips v. Hust, on qualified immunity grounds without change 

or discussion of elements for an access to court claim)). 

Plaintiff’s claim that the disposal of his legal documents impaired his access to the courts 

is not cognizable as he has not shown loss of any underlying claim.

3. Due Process

Plaintiff alleges that he was held over in the SHU at CSP-Cor so his personal and legal 

property could be destroyed. The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from being deprived of 

property without due process of law, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974), and 

prisoners have a protected interest in their personal property, Hansen v. May, 502 F.2d 728, 730 

(9th Cir. 1974). However, while an authorized, intentional deprivation of property is actionable 

under the Due Process Clause, see Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532, n.13 (1984) (citing

Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982)); Quick v. Jones, 754 F.2d 1521, 1524 (9th 

Cir. 1985), neither negligent nor unauthorized intentional deprivations of property by a state 

employee Aconstitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of the 

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Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available,@ 

Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). The Due Process Clause is violated only when the 

agency “prescribes and enforces forfeitures of property without underlying statutory authority and 

competent procedural protections,” Nevada Dept. of Corrections v. Greene, 648 F.3d 1014, 1019 

(9th Cir. 2011) (citing Vance v. Barrett, 345 F.3d 1083, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003)) (internal quotations 

omitted). 

It does not appear that Plaintiff’s personal and legal property was destroyed as part of an 

authorized process -- since he alleges that his property was not destroyed during his term in the 

SHU. Rather he alleges that Magana disposed of his property in December of 2014 after he was 

released from the SHU for Magana’s own personal reasons. (Doc. 1, p. 10.) Such an 

unauthorized deprivation of property, either intentional or negligent, by a state employee is not 

actionable under § 1983 if a meaningful state post-deprivation remedy for the loss is available. 

Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). California law provides an adequate postdeprivation remedy for any property deprivations. Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816-817 (9th 

Cir. 1994) (citing Cal. Gov=t Code '' 810-895). Thus, Plaintiff may not pursue a claim based on 

Defendant Magana’s alleged disposal of Plaintiff’s property under § 1983.

4. Equal Protection 

The Equal Protection Clause requires that persons who are similarly situated be treated 

alike. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249 

(1985); Hartmann v. California Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1123 (9th Cir. 2013); 

Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021, 1030 (9th Cir. 2013); Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 891 

(9th Cir. 2008). To state a claim, Plaintiff must show that Defendants intentionally discriminated 

against him based on his membership in a protected class. Hartmann, 707 F.3d at 1123; Furnace, 

705 F.3d at 1030; Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003); Thornton v. City of St. 

Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1166-67 (9th Cir. 2005); Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 

(9th Cir. 2001).

If the action in question does not involve a suspect classification, a plaintiff may establish 

an equal protection claim by showing that similarly situated individuals were intentionally treated 

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differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. Engquist v. Oregon 

Department of Agriculture, 553 U.S. 591, 601-02, 128 S.Ct. 2146 (2008); Village of Willowbrook 

v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000); San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1972); 

Lazy Y Ranch Ltd. v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 592 (9th Cir. 2008); North Pacifica LLC v. City of 

Pacifica, 526 F.3d 478, 486 (9th Cir. 2008), see also Squaw Valley Development Co. v. Goldberg, 

375 F.3d 936, 944 (9th Cir.2004); Sea River Mar. Fin. Holdings, Inc. v. Mineta, 309 F.3d 662, 

679 (9th Cir. 2002). To state an equal protection claim under this theory, a plaintiff must allege 

that: (1) the plaintiff is a member of an identifiable class; (2) the plaintiff was intentionally 

treated differently from others similarly situated; and (3) there is no rational basis for the 

difference in treatment. Village of Willowbrook, 528 U.S. at 564. 

Further, to establish a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, the prisoner must present 

evidence of discriminatory intent. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-240 (1976); 

Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1081-82 (9th Cir. 2003); Freeman v. Arpio, 125 F.3d 732, 

737 (9th Cir. 1997). 

Plaintiff does not state a cognizable Equal Protection claim. He fails to state any 

information to show membership in a protected class; he does not show that he was intentionally 

treated differently from others similarly situated; nor does he show any discriminatory intent on 

the part of the named Defendants.

5. Inmate Appeals

Plaintiff’s third count complains of violation of his rights under the Due Process Clause 

based on the handling and processing of his inmate grievances. 

The Due Process Clause protects prisoners from being deprived of liberty without due 

process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). In order to state a cause of action 

for deprivation of due process, a plaintiff must first establish the existence of a liberty interest for 

which the protection is sought. "States may under certain circumstances create liberty interests 

which are protected by the Due Process Clause." Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995). 

Liberty interests created by state law are generally limited to freedom from restraint which 

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"imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of 

prison life." Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484. 

"[A prison] grievance procedure is a procedural right only, it does not confer any 

substantive right upon the inmates." Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing 

Azeez v. DeRobertis, 568 F. Supp. 8, 10 (N.D. Ill. 1982)); see also Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 

850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (no liberty interest in processing of appeals because no entitlement to a 

specific grievance procedure); Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2001) (existence of 

grievance procedure confers no liberty interest on prisoner); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 

(9th Cir. 1988). "Hence, it does not give rise to a protected liberty interest requiring the 

procedural protections envisioned by the Fourteenth Amendment." Azeez v. DeRobertis, 568 F. 

Supp. at 10; Spencer v. Moore, 638 F. Supp. 315, 316 (E.D. Mo. 1986). 

Actions in reviewing prisoner's administrative appeal cannot serve as the basis for liability 

under a § 1983 action. Buckley, 997 F.2d at 495. The argument that anyone who knows about a 

violation of the Constitution, and fails to cure it, has violated the Constitution himself is not 

correct. "Only persons who cause or participate in the violations are responsible. Ruling against 

a prisoner on an administrative complaint does not cause or contribute to the violation. A guard 

who stands and watches while another guard beat a prisoner violates the Constitution; a guard 

who rejects an administrative complaint about a completed act of misconduct does not." George 

v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609-10 (7th Cir. 2007) citing Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 656-57 (7th 

Cir.2005); Reed v. McBride, 178 F.3d 849, 851-52 (7th Cir.1999); Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 

992-93 (7th Cir.1996). Thus, since he has neither a liberty interest, nor a substantive right in 

inmate appeals, Plaintiff fails, and is unable to prove the elements of a constitutional violation 

purely for the processing and/or reviewing of his inmate appeals. 

However, "a plaintiff may state a claim against a supervisor for deliberate indifference 

based upon the supervisor's knowledge of and acquiescence in unconstitutional conduct by his or 

her subordinates." Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (2011). Such knowledge and 

acquiescence may be shown via the inmate appeals process where the supervisor was involved in

reviewing Plaintiff's applicable inmate appeal and failed to take corrective action which allowed 

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the violation to continue. However, such involvement in processing and/or reviewing an inmate 

appeal based on one incident is necessarily insufficient. Further, liability will not attach for a 

supervisor’s knowledge of an acquiescence unless the subordinate’s actions violated Plaintiff’s 

constitutional rights -- which has not been shown here. 

6. Supervisory Liability

It appears that Plaintiff may have named Secretary Beard, Wardens Frauenheim and 

Davey, CCI Wyman, and Sergeant Pease merely because they hold supervisorial positions and he 

wrote to them about his claims.

Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under section 1983 for the actions of their 

employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant holds a 

supervisory position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation must be 

specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 

589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). To state a claim for relief 

under section 1983 based on a theory of supervisory liability, Plaintiff must allege some facts that 

would support a claim that supervisory defendants either: personally participated in the alleged 

deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them; or 

promulgated or "implemented a policy so deficient that the policy 'itself is a repudiation of 

constitutional rights' and is 'the moving force of the constitutional violation.'" Hansen v. Black, 

885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations omitted); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 

(9th Cir. 1989), conduct and the constitutional violation.” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 

(9th Cir.1989). “[A] plaintiff must show the supervisor breached a duty to plaintiff which was the 

proximate cause of the injury. The law clearly allows actions against supervisors under section 

1983 as long as a sufficient causal connection is present and the plaintiff was deprived under 

color of law of a federally secured right.” Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1447 

(9th Cir. 1991)(internal quotation marks omitted)(abrogated on other grounds by Farmer v. 

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994). A mere showing that they learned of the acts later is insufficient.

“The requisite causal connection can be established . . . by setting in motion a series of 

acts by others,” id. (alteration in original; internal quotation marks omitted), or by “knowingly 

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refus[ing] to terminate a series of acts by others, which [the supervisor] knew or reasonably 

should have known would cause others to inflict a constitutional injury,” Dubner v. City & Cnty. 

of San Francisco, 266 F.3d 959, 968 (9th Cir.2001). “A supervisor can be liable in his individual 

capacity for his own culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of his 

subordinates; for his acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation; or for conduct that showed a 

reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.” Watkins v. City of Oakland, 145 F.3d 

1087, 1093 (9th Cir.1998) (internal alteration and quotation marks omitted). Thus, any allegation

that supervisory personnel are liable merely because of the acts of those under his or her 

supervision does not state a cognizable claim. 

E. Relief Sought

In addition to monetary damages, Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief. (Doc. 

1, p. 14.) 

1. Declaratory Relief

AA declaratory judgment, like other forms of equitable relief, should be granted only as a 

matter of judicial discretion, exercised in the public interest.@ Eccles v. Peoples Bank of 

Lakewood Village, 333 U.S. 426, 431 (1948). ADeclaratory relief should be denied when it will 

neither serve a useful purpose in clarifying and settling the legal relations in issue nor terminate 

the proceedings and afford relief from the uncertainty and controversy faced by the parties.@ 

United States v. Washington, 759 F.2d 1353, 1357 (9th Cir. 1985).

Further, a declaratory judgment may only issue if there exists Aa case of actual 

controversy@ before the court. 28 U.S.C. ' 2201(a); Societe de Conditionnement en Aluminium v. 

Hunter Engineering Co., Inc., 655 F.2d 938, 942 (9th Cir. 1981). AA case or controversy exists 

justifying declaratory relief only when >the challenged government activity is not contingent, has 

not evaporated or disappeared, and, by its continuing and brooding presence, casts what may well 

be a substantial adverse effect on the interests of the petitioning parties.=@ Headwaters, Inc. v. 

Bureau of Land Management, Medford Dist., 893 F.2d 1012, 1015 (9th Cir. 1989); Super Tire 

Engineering Co. v. McCorkle, 416 U.S. 115, 122 (1974).

In the event that this action reaches trial and the jury returns a verdict in Plaintiff’s favor, 

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that verdict will be a finding that Plaintiff=s constitutional rights were violated. Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s request for a declaration that Defendants violated his rights is dismissed.

2. Injunctive Relief

AA plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on 

the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the 

balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.@ Winter v. 

Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 19 (2008) (citations omitted). Where a 

prisoner challenges conditions of confinement and seeks injunctive relief, transfer to another 

prison renders the request for injunctive relief moot absent some evidence3of an expectation of 

being transferred back. See Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 402-03 (1975); Johnson v. Moore, 

948 F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam); see also Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 

1053, n.5 (9th Cir. 2007). Accordingly, Plaintiff=s transfer, away from CSP-Cor and PVSP, 

rendered any claims for injunctive relief moot and they are dismissed. Thus, Plaintiff is limited to 

seeking damages for the past violation of his rights at CSP-Cor and PVSP. Pinnacle Armor, Inc., 

648 F.3d at 715; Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 565-66 n.8 (9th Cir. 2005).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed with leave to file a first

amended complaint within 30 days. If Plaintiff files an amended complaint and fails to state any 

cognizable claims, the Court will recommend that the action be dismissed with prejudice based on 

his failure to state a claim -- which will count as a strike for purposes of his eligibility for in 

forma pauperis status under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See Richey, 807 F.3d at 1208. Thus, if 

Plaintiff no longer desires to pursue this action, he may file a notice of voluntary dismissal instead 

of an amended complaint which would not count as a strike. 

Plaintiff must demonstrate in any first amended complaint how the conditions complained 

of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 

 

3 Mere allegations that a Plaintiff might be transferred back to the offending facility, or that such 

is always a possibility, are remote and speculative and insufficient to cast the Acontinuing and 

brooding presence@ required to grant injunctive relief. See Preiser, 422 U.S. at 403. 

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227 (9th Cir. 1980). The first amended complaint must allege in specific terms how each named 

defendant is involved. There can be no liability under section 1983 unless there is some 

affirmative link or connection between a defendant's actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo 

v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. 

Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

Plaintiff's first amended complaint should be brief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Such a short and 

plain statement must "give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon 

which it rests." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) quoting Conley v. 

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). Although accepted as true, the "[f]actual allegations must be 

[sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . ." Twombly, 550 U.S. 127, 555 

(2007) (citations omitted).

Plaintiff is further advised that an amended complaint supercedes the original, Lacey v. 

Maricopa County, Nos. 09-15806, 09-15703, 2012 WL 3711591, at *1 n.1 (9th Cir. Aug. 29, 

2012) (en banc), and must be "complete in itself without reference to the prior or superceded 

pleading," Local Rule 220.

The Court provides Plaintiff with one, final opportunity to amend to cure the deficiencies 

identified by the Court in this order. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his first

amended complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no "buckshot"

complaints). Based on the foregoing, the Court ORDERS:

1. Plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend;

2. The Clerk's Office is directed to send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

3. Within 30 days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff must file a first

amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in this order or 

a notice of voluntary dismissal; and

///

///

///

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4. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed for failure 

to obey a court order and for failure to state a claim.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 16, 2016 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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