Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00148/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00148-23/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MELVIN JONES, JR., )

)

)

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

)

MICHAEL TOZZI, et al., )

)

)

Defendant. )

)

)

No. CV-F-05-148 OWW/DLB

MEMORANDUM DECISION GRANTING

IN PART, DENYING IN PART AND

DEFERRING IN PART MOTION TO

QUASH SUBPOENAS (Doc. 310)

The Honorable Marie Sovey-Silviera, the Honorable Glenn

Ritchey, Jr., and the Honorable Jack Jacobsen, judges of the

Stanislaus County Superior Court, and Michael Tozzi, Court

Executive Office for the Stanislaus County Superior Court, move

to quash trial subpoenas issued to them pursuant to Rule 45,

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, by Defendant John J.

Hollenback, Jr. The grounds for quashing the trial subpoenas

are: (1) movants are state officers who are not subject to

federal subpoena because they have not waived their immunity

under the Eleventh Amendment; and (2) the testimony sought by the

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subpoenas requires disclosure of privileged or other protected

matter and subjects each movant to undue burden. They also

contend, none of them are subpoenaed in their individual

capacities, and, if they were, none has any non-cumulative

information for which each is the sole source.

A. Eleventh Amendment.

1. Applicability.

The Eleventh Amendment provides:

The Judicial power of the United States shall

not be construed to extend to any suit in law

or equity, commenced or prosecuted against

one of the United States by Citizens of

another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of

any Foreign State.

In contending that the subpoenas must be quashed pursuant to

the Eleventh Amendment, movants rely on Estate of Gonzalez v.

Hickman, 466 F.Supp.2d 1226 (E.D.Cal.2006). 

In Estate of Gonzalez, plaintiffs filed an action pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendants employed by the California

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). Plaintiffs

filed a motion to compel compliance with subpoenas served on the

CDCR seeking information concerning Officer Gonzalez’s employment

with CDCR. Defendants objected to the subpoenas on the ground

that Eleventh Amendment immunity precluded Plaintiffs from

compelling the State to produce the requested discovery. 

Magistrate Judge Hollows ruled that absent a waiver from the

State, the Eleventh Amendment bars enforcement of the subpoenas,

but further ruled that the State had waived its right to assert

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sovereign immunity by enacting California Government Code §

68097.1(b), which provides procedures for serving subpoenas on

State employees “required as a witness before any court or other

tribunal in any civil action”. Id. at 1227. In addition, the

Magistrate Judge concluded that the Ex Parte Young exception to

Eleventh Amendment immunity providing an additional ground for

granting the motion to compel. Id. On reconsideration, District

Judge England ruled that “[t]he language of Government Code

section 68097.1(b) does not rise to the level of constituting an

‘unequivocal expression’ of consent sufficient to waive the

State’s sovereign immunity”, that Section 68097.1(b) “was passed

to remedy a procedural and administrative problem unrelated to

jurisdiction”, and that the State “did not use unequivocal

language in Government Code section 68097.1(b) leaving room for

an alternative reasonable construction that it did not intend to

waive its’ immunity.” Id. at 1228-1229. The District Court also

ruled that the Ex Parte Young exception to Eleventh Amendment

immunity did not apply because “Plaintiffs do not have a federal

right to force the State to produce documents that, in a best

case scenario, can only assist Plaintiffs in obtaining relief for

a past wrong” and because “[t]here is no on going [sic] violation

that could support a finding that the present issue falls within

the Ex Parte Young exception ....”. Id.

This court is not bound by Judge England’s decision and, in

fact, has not followed it. See Allen v. Woodford, 2007 WL 309945

(E.D.Cal.2007) at * 3:

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Courts focus on the 11 Amendment’s purpose th

to prevent federal court judgments that would

have to be paid out of a State’s treasury:

“(T)he vulnerability of the State’s purse

(is) the most salient factor in Eleventh

Amendment determinations.” Hess v. Port

Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. (1994) 513 U.S.

30, 47 ...; see also Alaska Cargo Transport,

Inc. v. Alaska R.R. Corp. (9 Cir.1993) 5 th

F.3d 378, 380. Eleventh Amendment immunity

depends on the State’s potential legal

liability, regardless of the entity’s ability

to require indemnification from a third

party. Regents of Univ. of Calif. v. Doe

(1997) 519 U.S. 425, 430-431 ... (breach of

contract action against the University was

barred by 11 Amendment because State was th

legally liable despite University’s right to

indemnification from U.S. Government.) Suits

against state officers in their individual

capacity for damages for violation of federal

law (e.g., a federal civil rights suit) are

not deemed actions against the state, and

hence are not barred by the 11 Amendment. th

Scheuer v. Rhodes (1974) 416 U.S. 232, 237

....

In the Eastern District, the 11 Amendment th

precludes a federal subpoena to the state to

obtain documents in support of a § 1983

claim. If this Court adopts the CDCR

defendants’ position, however, the Eleventh

Amendment would also bar discovery through

them to the State for the same documents. A

Civil Rights plaintiff could, therefore,

never obtain discovery in § 1983 actions. 

This is not a logical inference and the Court

declines to adopt such a wholesale preclusion

of discovery in Civil Rights cases.

In Laxalt v. C.K. McClatchy, 109 F.R.D. 632 (D.Nev.1986),

the plaintiff sued defendant in a diversity action for libel. 

The district court rejected a claim by the Nevada State Gaming

Control Board that the Eleventh Amendment barred compliance with

a federal subpoena for inspection and copying of records in the

Board’s possession relating to the plaintiff and certain business

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entities of which he had been a principal. The Board contended: 

“Whether or not a particular gaming record should be disclosed to

private civil litigants is for the state courts to decide.” Id.

at 633. The District Court held in pertinent part:

The Eleventh Amendment bars discovery

requests against a nonparty state in civil

litigation, according to the Board. They

amount to a ‘suit in law or equity’ for the

purposes of that Amendment, it is argued. 

Actions in which discovery was allowed

against federal agencies are inapposite, the

Board urges, because those agencies are not

protected by the Eleventh Amendment as are

state agencies. The fact that the State

Legislature provided a specific motion

procedure for obtaining a court order

authorizing discovery of confidential records

indicates its intent to retain discovery

under State control, the Board says. It does

not constitute a consent to disclosure in a

federal court case where the State is not a

party. A state’s waiver of its immunity to

suit in its own courts does not mean that the

same waiver subjects it to federal court

jurisdiction. The Board cites Kennecott

Copper Corp. v. Tax Comm’n, 327 U.S. 573,

577-80 ... (1946), for the principle that a

waiver by a state of its sovereign immunity

against tax suits in its own courts is

inapplicable to a federal court suit against

the state in the absence of a clear

declaration of consent. The opinion, at page

577, ... notes that the reason for the rule

is the direct impact of state tax litigation

upon the state’s finances. On page 579 ...,

the Kennecott court also points out that the

particular state (Utah) employs explicit

language to indicate its consent to suit in

federal court in other kinds of litigation. 

The Board contends that the phrase ‘in a

court of competent jurisdiction’ as used in

the Nevada Gaming Control Act should be

construed to mean only State courts, as in

Kennecott.

...

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It is clear that the Eleventh Amendment

establishes that a federal court has no

jurisdiction over any lawsuit against a

state. However, it has been construed to

refer to assertions of liability on the

state’s part and claims for relief against

it. Johnson v. Lankford, 245 U.S. 541, 545

... (1918); Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v.

Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 121 ... (1984). In

Florida Dept. of State v. Treasure Salvors,

Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 699 ... (1982), the

plurality approved the service of process on

state officials to secure possession of

artifacts held by them. The analogy to the

instant proceedings, where inspection and

copying of State records is all that is being

sought, is apparent. Magistrate Atkins’

holding that the Amendment does not bar

discovery is not contrary to law.

Id. at 634-635. 

Although not cited by movants, there is a Ninth Circuit case

of relevance to the resolution of the motion to quash. In United

States v. James, 980 F.2d 1314 (9 Cir.1992), cert. denied, 510 th

U.S. 838 (1993), the defendant was convicted of rape on an Indian

reservation in violation of federal statutes. On appeal, the

Ninth Circuit upheld the quashing, on tribal sovereign immunity

grounds, of a subpoena duces tecum issued by the defendant to the

Quinault Indian Nation for documents related to the victim’s

alleged alcohol and drug problems in the possession of the

Quinault Indian Nation Department of Social and Health Services. 

The Ninth Circuit held:

By making individual Indians subject to

federal prosecution for certain crimes,

Congress did not address implicitly, much

less explicitly, the amenability of the

tribes to the processes of the court in which

the prosecution is commenced. Thus, we

conclude that the Quinault Tribe was

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Magistrate Judge Hollows’ ruling in Estate of Gonzalez, Misc. 1

No. S-06-0095 MCE GGH (Doc. 17) concluded that James was

controlling, that Laxalt v. C.K. McClatchy was decided without

reference to James and further stated:

The undersigned has performed a good bit of

research in addition, and cannot find further

on point authority involving the requested

discovery on a non-party state or state agency

in addition to that set forth above.

Nevertheless, the court is bound by James in

this regard, and finds that to the extent that

the subpoenas at issue were directed to a

state or state agency, sovereign immunity

initially precludes their enforcement.

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possessed of tribal immunity at the time the

subpoena was served, unless the immunity had

been waived.

Id. at 1319.1

Defendant argues that application of Eleventh Amendment

immunity to quash these trial subpoenas would bar any percipient

witness, who happens to be a state officer, from testifying

during a Federal civil rights trial. Such preclusion of key fact

witnesses would severely limit a party’s ability to prosecute or

defend a civil rights claim. Defendant represents that the

testimony sought from the movants is not based on their official

duties, but is factual and percipient. Defendant contends:

This is no different than if any of these

Judicial Officers were witnesses to a

personal injury accident (e.g., a slip and

fall in the Courthouse) and later called upon

to offer percipient witness testimony during

trial. The fact that these percipient

observations occurred during their work day

as a Judicial Officer should not,

unilaterally, preclude these Judicial

Officers from honoring these trial subpoenas

and their duty to testify as to what they

saw, what they did, what they heard, what

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they perceived, etc. with respect to the

claims asserted by plaintiff.

Arguably, James is not controlling because it did not

involve Eleventh Amendment immunity. Other than Estate of

Gonzalez and Laxalt, there do not appear to be any other reported

decisions involving the issue raised by the motion to quash. 

Because the Supreme Court has construed Eleventh Amendment

immunity to be liability from suit because of the possibility

that a judgment will be paid out of the State’s treasury, the

Eleventh Amendment, by its terms and purposes, does not apply to

the trial subpoenas at issue.

2. Waiver.

Defendant argues that movants have waived any Eleventh

Amendment immunity because Mr. Tozzi submitted a Declaration in

support of Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Even if,

arguendo, the Eleventh Amendment applies to the trial subpoenas,

his waiver by providing prior testimony in this case is an

independent basis for enforcement of the subpoena issued to Mr.

Tozzi. 

B. Testimony of Judges’ Protected from Disclosure.

Movant judges also seek to quash the subpoenas, contending

that, under both federal and California law, a judge is not

permitted to be questioned about any matter that came before him

or her while he or she was in his judicial capacity.

Movants rely primarily upon United States v. Roth, 332

F.Supp.2d 565 (S.D.N.Y.2004) and United States v. Frankenthal,

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582 F.2d 1102 (7 Cir.1978). th

In Roth, defendants in a criminal case issued a subpoena to

a state trial judge who had accepted a reduced plea in a related

case, seeking his testimony as a fact witness and regarding his

mental processes in accepting the plea. In quashing the

subpoena, the District Court noted:

[T]he overwhelming authority from the federal

courts in this country, including the United

States Supreme Court, makes it clear that a

judge may not be compelled to testify

concerning the mental processes used in

formulating official judgments or the reasons

that motivated him in the performance of his

official duties.

Id. at 567. The District Court then addressed whether Defendants

could require the judge to testify as a fact witness:

... [T]here are limited circumstances where a

judge’s factual testimony is so essential

that the general prohibition against judicial

testimony may be compromised. The Seventh

Circuit has developed an analysis to be

applied when determining whether such

‘limited circumstances’ exist. In United

States v. Frankenthal, 582 F.2d 1102 (7th

Cir.1978), the Seventh Circuit allowed the

introduction of judicial testimony because

the judge ‘possessed factual knowledge that

was highly pertinent to the jury’s task, and

he was the only possible source of testimony

on that knowledge. Id. at 1108. However, in

reaching its decision, the Frankenthal Court

cautioned that ‘calling a judge to give

testimony in any proceeding is a very

delicate matter.’ Id. at 1107. In fact, the

judge’s testimony was only permitted because

the judge was only required to give ‘brief,

strictly factual testimony.’ Id. at 1108

(emphasis added). 

... Accordingly, this Court finds that a

judge may only be required to testify if he

(1) possesses factual knowledge, (2) that

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knowledge is highly pertinent to the jury’s

task, and (3) is the only possible source of

testimony on the relevant factual

information.

Id. at 568.

Movants correctly contend that they cannot be compelled to

explain their thought processes or motivations for their

opinions, rulings or other judicial acts. 

With regard to the subpoenas issued to Judge Jacobsen and

Judge Ritchey, the motion to quash is GRANTED. 

Judge Jacobsen is subpoenaed to provide testimony regarding

Plaintiff’s allegations that Judge Sovey-Silviera entered his

courtroom on April 15, 2004 during a contempt hearing involving

Plaintiff, where Defendant appeared as attorney for an adverse

party; that Judge Sovey-Silviera showed Plaintiff a sign with the

letters “MLK Day” with a circle around it and a line crossing it;

and that Judge Sovey-Silviera looked at Defendant, received a

“thumbs up” sign from Defendant and gave a “thumbs up gesture

back to Defendant. Defendant makes no offer of proof as to what

Judge Jacobsen would testify to if called as a witness, so it

cannot be determined that Judge Jacobsen has factual knowledge of

these allegations. Further, other persons present in Judge

Jacobsen’s courtroom during the April 15, 2004 hearing can

testify whether Judge Sovey-Silviera and Defendant acted in the

manner Plaintiff alleges.

Judge Ritchey is subpoenaed to testify concerning a

conversation Defendant allegedly had with Deputy Sheriff Vivian

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Holliday in Judge Ritchey’s chambers before Plaintiff’s trial on

April 22, 2004, wherein Defendant allegedly referred to 

Plaintiff as a “low life black” and about threatening and racedbased comments allegedly made by Defendant to Plaintiff at the

conclusion of the April 22, 2004 hearing. Although Judge Ritchey

may have information concerning the alleged statements in

chambers prior to trial, there is no offer of proof that Judge

Ritchey witnessed any conversations or confrontation between

Plaintiff and Defendant at the conclusion of the trial. Further,

Judge Ritchey is not the only possible source of this testimony. 

Defendant can call the bailiff as a witness and can call as

witnesses any other persons who were in the courtroom following

the trial. 

With regard to the subpoena issued to Judge Sovey-Silviera,

the motion to quash is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. 

With regard to Plaintiff’s allegations that Judge SoveySilviera made racially offensive comments to Plaintiff during

hearings in December 2002 and April, 2003, Defendant can

introduce the transcript or audio recording of those hearings in

his defense. Therefore, Judge Sovey-Silviera is not the only

possible source of this information. 

However, Judge Sovey-Silviera may appear as a witness in her

individual capacity to testify concerning the allegations that

she entered Judge Jacobsen’s courtroom with the “sign” and

exchanged gestures with Defendant, and she may testify whether

she knows Plaintiff, bears him any racial animus and/or whether

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she was part of the alleged conspiracy.

With regard to the subpoena issued to Michael Tozzi, the

motion to quash is GRANTED IN PART, DENIED IN PART, AND DEFERRED

IN PART.

Although Michael Tozzi is not a judge, he is a quasijudicial officer. Therefore, the factors set forth in

Frankenthal and Roth apply.

To the extent Michael Tozzi is sought as a witness to

testify with regard to racially-motivated statements or actions

made in his presence by Carmichael and Strangio, Michael Tozzi is

not the only source of information. Defendant may call

Carmichael, Strangio and any other persons who were present as

witnesses. 

With regard to Plaintiff’s allegations that Mr. Tozzi failed

to appear at a hearing on March 15, 2004 after being served by

Plaintiff through a process server with a subpoena, Mr. Tozzi is

the only source of information to refute Plaintiff’s allegations. 

Therefore, Mr. Tozzi may be a witness on this issue. In

addition, Mr. Tozzi may testify with regard to Plaintiff’s

allegations that Mr. Tozzi was part of the alleged race-based

conspiracy.

With regard to Plaintiff’s allegations that Leslie Jensen

told Plaintiff that Plaintiff’s letters complaining about Mr.

Tozzi were ineffective, resolution of the motion to quash as to

Mr. Tozzi is deferred until a resolution of the relevance and

admissibility of such evidence is determined. 

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above:

1. The Motion to Quash Subpoenas is GRANTED IN PART, DENIED

IN PART, AND DEFERRED IN PART as stated above;

2. Defendant shall prepare an Order, review it with the

Attorney General, and submit it for review and filing within five

days following service of the Memorandum Decision.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 27, 2007 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

668554 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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