Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-01233/USCOURTS-casd-3_08-cv-01233-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 370
Nature of Suit: Other Fraud
Cause of Action: 15:1640 Truth in Lending

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROSARIO TINA, and JESUS G. TINA,

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 08 CV 1233 JM (NLS)

ORDER DENYING APPLICATION

FOR TEMPORARY

RESTRAINING ORDER AND

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

vs.

COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS, INC., et

al.,

Defendants.

Plaintiffs Rosario Tina and Jesus G. Tina filed this action on July 10, 2008. The case was

originally assigned to U.S. District Judge Marilyn Huff. Concurrent with the filing of the complaint,

Plaintiffs filed an ex parte application for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and preliminary

injunction staying the foreclosure of their property scheduled for July 11, 2008. On July 11, 2008,

Judge Huff issued an order declining to grant ex parte injunctive relief and setting a briefing schedule

regarding the application. The case was transferred to this court pursuant to the low-number rule on

July 14, 2008. Defendants filed an opposition on July 15, 2008. The court finds this application

appropriate for submission without oral argument. See Civ. L.R. 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons set forth

below, the court hereby DENIES the application for a TRO and preliminary injunction.

I. BACKGROUND

According to the complaint, Plaintiffs owned property located at 1720 East Fourth Street in

National City, California. (Compl. at 3 ¶ 5.) In August 2006, Plaintiffs obtained a loan from

defendantsCountrywide Home Loans,Inc.(“Countrywide”), and America’s Wholesale Lender. (See

Case 3:08-cv-01233-JM-NLS Document 12 Filed 08/05/08 Page 1 of 3
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id.) Defendant Reconstruct Co. is Countrywide’s trustee for foreclosure servicing. (Id. at 3 ¶ 8.)

When Plaintiffs “fell behind” on theirloan payments, Defendantsinstituted a non-judicialforeclosure

and trustee’s sale. (Id. at 8 ¶ 24.) The foreclosure sale occurred on July 11, 2008. (Opp’n at 2.)

Plaintiffs assert four claims for relief. First, they seek a declaratory judgment that, inter alia,

Plaintiffs deserve relief under the Fair Debt Collections Practices Act and 15 U.S.C. § 1692. Second,

they seek injunctive relief pursuant to Cal. Bus. and Prof. Code § 17203. They allege that Defendants’

unlawful business practices include a violation of Cal. Civ. Code ¶ 2924. Third, they seek accounting

relief arising out of an alleged controversy regarding the amount of money Plaintiffs owe Defendants.

Fourth, they seek relief for “deceptive fraud and unfair business trade practices and other statutory

relief.” The fourth claim alleges violations of the following five statutes: (1) the Truth in Lending Act

(“TILA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1611, et seq.; (2) the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”), 26

U.S.C. § 2605, et seq.; (3) the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994 (“HOEPA”), 15

U.S.C. § 1602, et seq.; (4) 15 U.S.C. § 1692; and (5) Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standards

In the NinthCircuit, the tests governing preliminary injunctions also apply to TROs. See, e.g.,

Superior Servs., Inc. v. Dalton, 851 F. Supp. 381, 384-85 (S.D. Cal. 1994). Preliminary injunctive

relief is available if the party meets one of two tests: (1) a combination of probable success and the

possibility of irreparable harm, or (2) the party raises serious questions and the balance of hardship

tips in its favor. Arcamuzi v. Cont’l Air Lines, Inc., 819 F.2d 935, 937 (9th Cir. 1987). “These two

formulations represent two points on a sliding scale in which the required degree of irreparable harm

increases as the probability of success decreases.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Under both

formulations, however, the party must demonstrate a “fair chance of success on the merits, or

questions serious enough to require litigation,” and a “significant threat of irreparable injury.” Id.;

see also Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 13 F.3d 1313, 1320 (9th Cir. 1994) (party seeking preliminary

injunction must demonstrate inadequacy of legal remedies). A TRO “should be restricted to serving

[its] underlying purpose of preserving the status quo and preventing irreparable harm[.]” Granny

Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers, 415 U.S. 423, 439 (1974).

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B. Analysis

According to Defendants, the foreclosure sale occurred at 10:00 a.m. on July 11, 2008. (Decl.

of K. Braithwaite at 4 ¶ 12.) Because a TRO would no longer preserve the former status quo, the

application for a TRO and preliminary injunction is moot. 

Even if the application were not moot, Plaintiffs fail to satisfy the requirements for emergency

injunctive relief. The court agrees with Plaintiffs’ contention that legal remedies are inadequate

because only equitable relief can prevent a foreclosure sale. Nevertheless, the record presented by

Plaintiffs consists largely of conclusory arguments with no factual evidentiary support. This showing

falls far short of demonstrating a “fair chance of success on the merits.” Arcamuzi, 819 F.2d at 937.

Plaintiffs also have not demonstrated that the possibility of irreparable harm to them outweighs the

likely hardship to Defendants. While foreclosure would cause Plaintiffs to lose their property, an

injunction would prevent Defendants from proceeding with the long-scheduled sale of a property

which, for Defendants, constitutes their exclusive remedy. Plaintiffs’ inadequate showing of a “fair

chance of success on the merits” bolsters the conclusion that Plaintiffs do not show a “significant

threat” of irreparable harm. Arcamuzi, 819 F.2d at 937. Thus, on the “sliding scale” contemplated

by Arcamuzi, 819 F.2d at 937, Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate a degree of relative hardship sufficient

to offset their showing regarding success on the merits.

In sum, because the application is moot and the current evidentiary record does not form an

adequate basis for injunctive relief, the court denies the application for a TRO and preliminary

injunction.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court hereby DENIES the application for a temporary

restraining order and preliminary injunction.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 5, 2008

 Hon. Jeffrey T. Miller

 United States District Judge

Case 3:08-cv-01233-JM-NLS Document 12 Filed 08/05/08 Page 3 of 3