Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_02-cv-05972/USCOURTS-caed-1_02-cv-05972-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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 Plaintiff was notified of the requirements for opposing a summary judgment motion on March 6, 2003. 

(Doc. 15.)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WAYMOND D. HALL,

Plaintiff,

v.

DR. KIM, M.D.,

Defendant.

 /

CASE NO. 1:02-CV-5972-OWW-SMS-P

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDING DEFENDANT’S MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BE GRANTED

(Doc. 54)

I. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

A. Procedural History

Plaintiff Waymond D. Hall (“plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action is proceeding on

plaintiff’s complaint, filed August 9, 2002, against defendant Kim (“defendant”) for acting with

deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s medical needs on November 28, 2001, in violation of the Eighth

Amendment. (Docs. 1, 16, 36.) On March 25, 2005, defendant filed a motion for summary

judgment. (Docs. 54-56.) Plaintiff filed an opposition on June 16, 2005, and defendant filed a reply

on June 29, 2005.1 (Docs. 63, 64, 66, 67.) 

B. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists no genuine issue

as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.

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Civ. P. 56(c). Under summary judgment practice, the moving party 

[A]lways bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on

file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “[W]here the nonmoving party will bear the

burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion may properly be made

in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.’”

Id. Indeed, summary judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and upon

motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.

Id. at 322. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s

case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment

should be granted, “so long as whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard

for entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied.” Id. at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing

party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to establish the existence

of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the denials of its pleadings, but is

required to tender evidence of specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery

material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. Rule 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586

n.11. The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that

might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 248 (1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630

(9th Cir. 1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party, Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436

(9th Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party need not

establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the claimed factual

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dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing versions of the truth at

trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the “purpose of summary judgment is to ‘pierce

the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.’”

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee’s note on 1963

amendments).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any. Rule 56(c).

The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, and all reasonable

inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be drawn in favor of the

opposing party, Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655

(1962) (per curiam). Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing

party's obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. Richards

v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th

Cir. 1987). 

Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than simply show

that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Where the record taken as a whole

could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for

trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

C. Undisputed Facts

1. Defendant Dr. Min J. Kim is, and at all relevant times was, a medical doctor employed by

the California Department of Corrections and assigned to Pleasant Valley State Prison.

2. Defendant Kim saw plaintiff on or about November 28, 2001, in the “Yard Clinic” where she

worked.

D. Discussion

1. Parties’ Objections 

Both parties object to the other’s evidence. Defendant contends that plaintiff has submitted

no admissible evidence and that plaintiff’s declaration is not evidence because it is “self-serving.”

 (Doc. 67, Reply, 2:7-13.) Plaintiff’s declaration consists in large part of mere argument and other

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material not properly set forth in a declaration. The court is aware of this and would not treat the

arguments as evidence. Because the court would in any event consider only paragraphs 3 and 7, and

Exhibit B as evidence, the court will address defendant’s objections as to those three items. Because

the other items will not be considered, the court will not address defendant’s arguments as to those

items.

Defendant objects to the entire declaration because it does not purport to be based on

personal knowledge, and paragraph 3 because it is irrelevant and self-serving. (Doc. 66, Obj., 1:19-

20 & 2:9-17.) Plaintiff’s attestation that on November 28, 2001, he told defendant that he was out

of medication and needed refills, but that she refused to refill the medication is certainly relevant to

the issue of whether or not defendant knew plaintiff needed his medication refilled. Fed. R. Ev. 401.

Further, the attestation is based on plaintiff’s personal knowledge and is therefore properly set forth

in plaintiff’s declaration. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Barthelemy v. Air Lines Pilots Assoc., 897 F.3d 999,

1018 (9th Cir. 1990) (personal knowledge may be inferred from declaration). 

With respect to defendant’s assertion that the declaration is self-serving, the court can discern

no difference between the nature of the attestations set forth in plaintiff’s declaration and the nature

of the attestations set forth in defendant’s declaration. If plaintiff’s declaration is to be described as

self-serving, then defendant’s declaration is equally self-serving. The court declines to preclude

plaintiff’s declaration on this basis, as defendant’s objection is utterly devoid of any argument that

persuades this court such a drastic step is warranted. See Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, 281 F.3d

1054, 1061 (9th Cir. 2002) (courts may refuse to find a genuine issue of material fact where only

evidence is self-serving testimony). 

Defendant objects to paragraph 7 as irrelevant, lacking in foundation, and improper expert

opinion, and Exhibit B as hearsay and lacking in foundation. (Doc. 66, Def. Obj., 3:14-18 & 4:2-4.)

Both paragraph 7 and Exhibit B are offered by plaintiff to establish that his cholesterol increased and

his glucose was 280 on November 29, 2001. Paragraph 7 is relevant to the issue of whether plaintiff

suffered any harm following defendant’s alleged refusal to refill his medication. Fed. R. Ev. 401.

However, plaintiff did not lay a proper foundation for the statement that his cholesterol increased

and his glucose was 280. Fed. R. Ev. 602, 701. Further, plaintiff is not qualified to opine that an

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increase in cholesterol and a glucose level of 280 indicate a diabetic episode. Fed. R. Ev. 702.

Therefore, paragraph 7 of plaintiff’s declaration is excluded.

Plaintiff’s medical records are business records and therefore excepted from the prohibition

on hearsay. Fed. R. Ev. 803(6). Defendant’s objection on the ground that plaintiff did not

authenticate the records is technically correct and the court has no choice but to exclude them on that

ground. Fed. R. Ev. 901. However, the court does not view defendant’s decision to object to the

records on this ground with any favor. The records were compiled on California Department of

Corrections forms and bear plaintiff’s name and identification number. In light of the thousands of

such records that have been submitted to the court over the years, generally by the Attorney

General’s Office itself, the court finds it difficult to believe that defendant seriously questions the

authenticity of these records.

With respect to plaintiff’s attack on defendant’s declaration, the issue in this action is

whether defendant knowingly disregarded an excessive risk to plaintiff’s serious medical needs on

November 28, 2001, by refusing to renew plaintiff’s prescriptions for medication. The court must

determine whether there exist any disputed issues of material fact with respect to that claim and in

doing so, the court may not weigh the credibility of either party. Harris v. Itzhaki, 183 F.3d 1043,

1051 (9th Cir. 1999). In light of the fact that it is plaintiff’s position that he was seen by defendant

on November 28, 2001, why defendant agrees or how defendant came to agree with this fact and

offer it as undisputed is, at this juncture, immaterial. (Doc. 64, Hall Dec., p. 1-2.) Further, what

plaintiff could have or should have done differently in light of defendant’s alleged refusal to renew

his prescriptions is immaterial to the resolution of the instant motion. (Id., p. 3.)

2. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Eighth Amendment Claim

In his complaint, plaintiff alleges in relevant part that he has been a diabetic since 1990.

(Doc. 1, Comp., § IV.) On November 15, 2001, plaintiff submitted a request for a refill of his

diabetes medication, which was due to run out on November 24, 2001. (Id.) Plaintiff’s request was

ignored and his medication ran out on November 24. (Id.) At the time plaintiff’s medication ran out,

the institution was on lock-down, so plaintiff was not free to seek medical assistance. (Id.) Plaintiff

alleges that he was seen by defendant Dr. Kim on November 28, 2001. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that

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defendant Kim denied him his medication, which caused him to suffer a “diabetic episode.” (Id.)

To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prison

conditions must involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452

U.S. 337, 347 (1981). A prisoner’s claim of inadequate medical care does not rise to the level of an

Eighth Amendment violation unless (1) “the prison official deprived the prisoner of the ‘minimal

civilized measure of life’s necessities,’” and (2) “the prison official ‘acted with deliberate

indifference in doing so.’” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Hallett

v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted)). A prison official does not act in

a deliberately indifferent manner unless the official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to

inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Deliberate indifference may

be manifested “when prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment,”

or in the manner “in which prison physicians provide medical care.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d

1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133,

1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc).

Defendant Kim argues that she is entitled to summary judgment because she did not act with

deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s medical needs. It is defendant’s position that when she saw

plaintiff on November 28, 2001, plaintiff did not tell her he was out of medication or ask her to refill

his medication, and that if he had done so, she would have renewed the medication. (Doc. 54,

Memo., 5:14-17; Doc. 55, Kim Dec., ¶ 4.) 

Defendant contends that it was not until December 4, 2001, after plaintiff allegedly suffered

the diabetic episode, that she learned plaintiff needed his prescriptions refilled. (Memo, 5:18-19;

Kim Dec., ¶ 7.) Defendant contends that she immediately renewed his prescriptions, and had a

medical technical assistant go by plaintiff’s cell and examine him. (Memo, 5:19-21; Kim Dec., ¶

7.) Defendant contends that there is no evidence of high blood sugar, diabetic ketoacidosis, transient

ischemic attack, or stroke, which would be expected if plaintiff had a diabetic episode. (Memo,

3:23-24; Kim Dec., ¶ 7.) 

It is plaintiff’s position that on November 28, 2001, he informed defendant that his

medications for diabetes and heart disease had run out, and that his prescriptions had not been

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 Defendant did not move for summary adjudication on the issue of whether the alleged failure to renew

plaintiff’s prescriptions on November 28, 2001, posed an excessive risk to plaintiff’s health. Thus, this issue is not

before the court.

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refilled. (Doc. 64, Hall Dec., ¶ 3.) Plaintiff contends that he asked defendant to renew his

medication, but she refused and he was escorted back to his cell. (Id.) 

There exist factual disputes between the parties concerning whether plaintiff informed

defendant that he was out of medication and needed his prescriptions refilled, and whether defendant

then refused to refill the prescriptions. This dispute is clearly material to the issue of whether or not

defendant knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to plaintiff’s health.2 

However, where a prisoner is alleging a delay in receiving medical treatment, as plaintiff is

here, the delay must have led to further harm in order for the prisoner to make a claim of deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060 (citing Shapely v. Nevada Bd.

of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985)). Defendant, a physician, contends that

there is no evidence plaintiff suffered a diabetic episode, which would be indicated by such

conditions as high blood pressure, diabetic ketoacidosis, transient ischemic attack and/or stroke.

Although plaintiff disputes defendant’s contention, plaintiff has submitted no evidence that gives

rise to a triable issue of fact concerning whether the delay in receiving medication led to further

harm. Thus, despite the existence of a dispute over whether plaintiff informed defendant of his need

for medication, there is no evidence that defendant’s alleged failure to renew plaintiff’s medication

on November 28, 2001, led to a diabetic episode, as alleged by plaintiff, or any other further harm.

Accordingly, the court finds that defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on plaintiff’s

claim against her.

The court notes that even if it had considered plaintiff’s evidence that his cholesterol

increased and his glucose was 280, the outcome would not have been different. There was no

evidence submitted demonstrating that the cholesterol increase and blood sugar level were harmful

or that they were the result of the denial of his prescription refill the previous day. Further, because

plaintiff is not a medical doctor, his lay opinion that an increase in cholesterol and a blood sugar

reading of 280 indicate a diabetic episode could not have raised a triable issue of fact concerning

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whether he suffered further harm as a result of defendant’s alleged inaction. 

E. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that defendant Kim’s motion for

summary judgment, filed March 25, 2005, be GRANTED, thus concluding this action in its entirety.

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within thirty (30)

days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, the parties may file written

objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s

Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 19, 2005 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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