Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_02-cv-06525/USCOURTS-caed-1_02-cv-06525-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHONGYEE LENGNOU XIONG, )

)

Plaintiff, )

v. )

)

ANN M. VENEMAN, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

)

 )

1: 02-cv-6525-SMS

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR

SUMMARY ADJUDICATION (DOC. 26)

ORDER STRIKING DOCUMENTS FILED BY

PLAINTIFF ON AUGUST 4, 2005

(Docs. 30 through 33)

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

REQUEST TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF’S

JURY DEMAND 

Plaintiffs are proceeding with a civil action in this Court.

The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the Magistrate

Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), and the case has been

assigned to the Magistrate Judge to conduct all further

proceedings, including trial and the entry of a final judgment. 

I. Background

Plaintiff, who was and is represented by counsel, filed a

complaint on December 6, 2002, and an amended complaint on May 2,

2003; a stipulated order further amending the first amended

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complaint was filed on June 9, 2004. Plaintiff, a citizen of the

United States of Asian race, whose native language is Hmong,

claims discrimination based on his national origin of Lao-Hmong

in connection with his employment of the United States Forest

Service (USFS), Department of Agriculture. He complains of

Defendant’s termination of his appointment as a student trainee

on January 31, 1999, at an advanced firefighting academy in the

Wildland Firefighter Apprentice Program (WFAP); conversion of

Plaintiff’s employment from permanent to temporary on May 9,

1999; and termination of his employment on or about November 20,

1999. (Complt. at 2.)

Plaintiff complains that during testing for the Fire Methods

and Procedures portion of the academy, S-234, he had trouble

understanding a question or questions, all of which were printed

exclusively in the English language; he asked the instructor or

proctor to explain the questions because of difficulty in

understanding them; and despite the Defendant’s practice of

explaining and clarifying questions, Plaintiff was denied the

requested explanation and clarification; he failed the written

test because the written English format in which the questions

were presented caused him difficulty in understanding them, and

because he was denied the requested assistance. (Complt. at 6.)

When Plaintiff retested, he requested the assistance of a

Hmong interpreter, but the Apprentice Coordinator refused his

request because she asserted that the interpreter might give the

test taker the answer rather than just an interpretation of the

question. When Plaintiff retested without the assistance of an

interpreter, he failed the test because of the English format and

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the refusal of his request for an interpreter.

On January 31, 1999, Plaintiff was terminated from the

academy because he failed the written test. He alleges that he

was otherwise well qualified.

Thereafter, Plaintiff continued to work for Defendant, who

then adopted a policy to require apprentices to write and speak

English fluently as a basic safety requirement; this policy was

not a bona fide occupational qualification and was adopted

deliberately to formalize the earlier practice that had been

recognized as having a likely discriminatory impact, and which

locked Plaintiff out from re-applying to regain employment. 

As a result of the discriminatory testing and English

fluency requirement, Defendants terminated Plaintiff’s employment

on the basis of his national origin. (Id. at 7-9.)

Plaintiff seeks special damages (back pay, front pay, and

damages for loss of earning capacity), general damages,

attorney’s fees, and costs. (Cmplt. at 9-10.)

Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, statement of

undisputed facts, declarations of Shirley Sutliff, Russell R.

Bennion, and Kristi Kapetan, and a memorandum of points and

authorities on March 25, 2005, pursuant to the Court’s schedule

as set by its order of October 4, 2004, which provided that 1)

the deadline for filing the response to the motion for summary

judgment was no later than May 27, 2005, and 2) the deadline for

filing a reply was June 24, 2005. The motion was originally set

for hearing on August 1, 2005, a day of the week on which law and

motion is not customarily heard; the hearing was reset for August

5, 2005, by the Court’s minute order of March 31, 2005, which did

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not modify the Court’s schedule for the filing of a response to

the motion.

Plaintiff did not file timely opposition. On June 23, 2005,

Defendant nevertheless served and filed a reply in which it noted

that Plaintiff had not filed opposition and thus was precluded

from oral argument pursuant to the local rules of court. In the

reply Defendant further cited authority to the effect that the

Court is not required independently to search the record for

evidence establishing a material issue of fact where no factual

showing is made in opposition to a motion for summary judgment.

On August 4, 2005, at 3:37 p.m., Plaintiff filed a separate

statement, memorandum in opposition to the motion, and two

declarations of James C. Holland: one authenticating exhibits,

and another regarding the late filing of opposition. No formal

motion or request for an extension of time or to permit the late

filing of the opposition was made by Plaintiff.

Due to the unanticipated unavailability of the Court on the

morning of August 5, 2005, the hearing on the motion was

initially continued by minute order to September 9, 2005;

however, the Court solicited input from the Defendant with

respect to the propriety of the Court’s considering the

Plaintiff’s late opposition. Defendant filed a statement of its

position on August 19, 2005. On August 30, 2005, the Court

vacated the hearing pursuant to Rule 78-230(c) of the Local Rules

of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern

District of California because Plaintiff, who had filed untimely

opposition, was not entitled to be heard in opposition to the

motion at a hearing.

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II. Consideration of Late Opposition

The Court had considered the instant motion on the basis of

the timely filed papers before Plaintiff filed its late

opposition. The Defendant had completed its written preparation

for the motion before Plaintiff filed its late opposition.

Significant resources of the Court and the parties were thus

expended before Plaintiff filed its opposition.

Plaintiff received sufficient notice of the pertinent

deadlines. The scheduled dates were set in October 2004.

Reference to Defendant’s counsel’s declaration reveals that the

electronic record shows that Plaintiff’s counsel received

electronic service of the motion; when no opposition was filed by

the deadline of May 27, 2005, counsel for Defendant telephoned

counsel for Plaintiff, but the call was not returned, and

Plaintiff’s counsel never attempted to contact Defendant’s

counsel before he filed the late opposition on August 4, 2005.

Even the service and filing of Defendant’s “reply” in June 2005,

which referred to the lack of opposition, did not prompt timely

efforts on the part of Plaintiff’s counsel.

The declaration of James C. Holland, Plaintiff’s counsel,

regarding the late filing of the opposition to the motion for

summary judgment was submitted to explain the late filing of the

opposition and to request a continuance of the hearing and an

allowance of time to Defendant to file a reply so that the

tardily filed matter could be considered in connection with the

merits of the motion. Plaintiff’s counsel stated that when the

hearing date was continued for a four-day period to August 5, he

assumed that the opposition would not need to be filed until

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 It appears that the parties were serving documents electronically in this action.

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fourteen days before the hearing. However, the scheduling order

provided for an earlier deadline, and the scheduling order had

not been amended. Further, although Local Rule 78-230(c) provides

for filing of opposition fourteen days before a hearing, the

electronic or mail service1 of opposition is required to be

effected no less than seventeen days before the hearing, not

fourteen days.

Plaintiff declared that he had just begun working on the

opposition as fourteen days before the hearing approached; he

then became ill, developed a sinus and/or ear infection within

two days, and received ten days of antibiotic treatment which did

not prevent the spread of the infection into counsel’s chest.

Counsel was exhausted, had a nearly constant headache, and had

much difficulty concentrating; his recovery was slow, and he was

only able to complete the opposing papers on the eve of the

hearing.

Counsel states no facts explaining why he assumed that the

scheduled due dates had been changed, or why he could not have

communicated with Defendant’s counsel or sought an extension of

time from the Court. The Court’s initial scheduling order filed

on July 22, 2003, provides that if the parties determine that the

schedule cannot be met, counsel are to notify the Court

immediately so that adjustments may be made by stipulation or

subsequent status conference; it further provides that failure to

comply with the order “SHALL RESULT IN THE IMPOSITION OF

SANCTIONS.” Although the parties previously engaged in

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stipulations to modify the schedule, Plaintiff’s counsel failed

to initiate this process with respect to the deadline for the

opposition, and indeed failed even to respond to Defendant’s

service and filing of a reply that noted the absence of timely

opposition.

The Court sympathizes with the position of a practitioner

dealing with illness while involved in litigation. However, the

Court is likewise concerned with the efficient administration of

justice and the intelligent and economical use of the Court’s

resources.

There is an absence of any indication why Plaintiff’s

counsel could not have communicated with counsel or the Court to

have timely sought an extension of time with respect to opposing

the motion. The Court emphasizes that even if there were a basis

for granting a timely sought extension of time, the failure of

counsel to seek such an extension rendered the motion unopposed

and put the Court, which must adhere to the schedule set by the

pertinent rules and notices, in the position of expending

resources in considering the motion without input from

Plaintiff’s counsel. Although the opposition has apparently now

been completed, this does not address the Court’s concerns

regarding the efficient administration of justice.

Local Rule 6-144(d) provides that counsel shall seek to

obtain a necessary extension from the Court or from other counsel

or parties in an action as soon as the need for an extension

becomes apparent. Requests for Court-approved extensions brought

on the required filing date for the pleading or other document

are looked upon with disfavor. Counsel here has not shown an

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excuse or justification for failing to comply with this local

rule or with the Court’s scheduling order. Significant resources

of the Court and of the moving party have been expended.

A court has inherent power to control its docket and the

disposition of its cases with economy of time and effort for both

the court and the parties. Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S.

248, 254-255 (1936); Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260 (9th

Cir. 1992). Further, a court has broad discretion to interpret

and apply its local rules. Dulange v. Dutro Construction, Inc.,

183 F.3d 916, 919 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1999). Local Rule 78-230 requires

that opposition to a motion be filed not less than fourteen days

preceding the hearing date and served not less than fourteen or

seventeen days (personal service, or electronic and mail,

respectively) preceding the hearing date. The Court in its

discretion may refuse to consider matters that are not timely

filed as a result of inexcusable neglect. Cusano v. Klein, 264

F.3d 936, 950-51 (9th Cir. 2001) (not considering evidence

submitted late in response to a motion for summary judgment).

Plaintiff’s counsel has not established any excuse for his

noncompliance with the Court’s rules and its scheduling order. It

would require the expenditure of substantial amounts of the time

of the Court and its staff as well as significant resources of

the opposing party if the Court and the parties were required to

review serially filed submissions on motions without regard to

any schedule or deadlines. If the Court were to allow unlimited

filings in the manner apparently sought by Plaintiff, the Court

could never be sufficiently certain of the parties’ positions to

be able to rule on a motion presented to it. The Court would not

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 This statement is derived from Plaintiff’s Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in Support of

Motion for Summary Judgment (SUF).

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be able to maintain the orderly administration of justice, and

substantial resources of the Court would be wasted. Such

procedures would be unfair to the parties and the Court.

Accordingly, the Court in its exercise of its discretion

DECLINES TO CONSIDER the late opposition, and the Plaintiff’s

materials filed on August 4, 2005 (Docs. Nos. 30-33) submitted in

response to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment ARE STRICKEN.

III. Undisputed Facts2

1. Plaintiff was employed by the Forest

Service as a temporary seasonal firefighter

beginning in 1996. In 1998, he was selected

to participate in the Wildland Firefighter

Apprentice Program (WFAP). The WFAP is

an accredited educational program which

provides apprentices who complete the

program to be converted from student

apprentice status to career conditional status.

(Deposition of Chongyee Lengnou Xiong,

(“Xiong Depo.”) 29:1-2; 32:2-17.

Declaration of Shirley Sutliff, (“Sutliff Dec.”)

¶ 3, 5.)

2. In order to complete the WFAP,

apprentices must complete the Basic and

Advanced formal training academies,

participate in supplemental training to be

provided by their home unit, and complete a

minimum number of hours of practical work

experience in wildland fire management

activities.

(Sutliff Dec., ¶4.)

3. In March, 1998, Plaintiff entered the Basic

Academy and successfully completed it,

including successfully completing a number

of written tests.

(Sutliff Dec., ¶ 5.)

4. In January, 1999, Plaintiff entered the

Advanced Academy. Among the

requirements to successfully complete the

Advanced Academy was passing a written

exam in each of four classes with a score of

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80%. At the time that Plaintiff was an

apprentice in the WFAP, apprentices who

failed an exam were allowed to re-take the

exam once.

(Sutliff Dec., ¶ 6.)

5. At both the Basic and Advanced

Academy, all written tests were printed

exclusively in the English language. The first

course at the Advanced Academy was Fire

Behavior, S-290. Four apprentices failed the

S-290 test: 2 white, 1 Asian and 1 African

American.

(Sutliff Dec., ¶ 7.)

6. Plaintiff was the Asian who failed the S290 test the first time and he failed it with a

score of 60%.

(Sutliff Dec., ¶8.)

7. On re-take, three apprentices passed the

exam, including the Plaintiff, and one failed.

Plaintiff passed with a score of 93%; the

individual who failed on re-take was white.

(Sutliff Dec., ¶ 8.)

8. The second course with an exam was

Firing Methods and Procedures, S-234. Two

apprentices failed the first S-234 exam;

Plaintiff (with a score of 57%) and another

apprentice who was not Asian. On re-take,

the other individual passed and the Plaintiff

failed the re-take with a score of 66.3%.

8. Sutliff Dec., ¶ 9.

9. Because he failed to pass the exam in S234, plaintiff was dismissed from the WFAP

on January 25, 1999, and returned to his

home unit, the Sequoia National Forest.

(Sutliff Dec., ¶ 10.)

10. There were two additional tests taken by

the apprentices; the S-205 and S-200. Four

apprentices failed the S-200; two Asians and

two non-Asians.

(Sutliff Dec., ¶11.)

11. On re-take, the two non-Asians passed

and the two Asians failed. It is unknown

whether the other two Asians at the academy

were non-native English speakers.

(Sutliff Dec., ¶12; Declaration of Russell

Bennion (“Bennion Dec.) ¶ 3, 4.)

12. It is unknown whether there were other

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non-native English speakers at the academy

who were not Asian.

(Bennion Dec., ¶3, 4.)

13. On January 31, 1999, Plaintiff was

placed in non-pay status. This was normal

for him as he was not generally paid during

the “off season”; he was a seasonal

firefighter. On April 11, 1999, when fire

season approached in the Spring, Plaintiff

was placed in pay status.

(Xiong Depo., 28:1-30:26; 31:1-24;

34:12-35:26; 36:4-11; 52:2-55:5.)

14. However, because he was no longer

enrolled in an educational program, on May

9, 1999, plaintiff’s excepted student

appointment was converted to a temporary

appointment. On November 20, 1999, at the end of

fire season, Plaintiff’s temporary position was

terminated. This “termination” was not

unusual as Plaintiff was generally laid off in

November until the next fire season, except

for the times he attended the Academy.

However, after this “termination,” Plaintiff

did not return to federal service.

(Xiong Depo., 28:1-30:26; 31:1-24;

34:12-35:26; 36:4-11; 37:18:-38-21; 46:5-17; 47:20-26;

52:2-55:5.)

15. Plaintiff testified at deposition that on the

first take of the S0234 exam, that he failed at

the Advanced Academy, he asked an

instructor to explain the questions during the

exam. The instructor told him there was no

more time left and he could not assist him in

answering the question. Plaintiff testified that

he did not believe the instructor was lying; he

did not have any time left on the exam and

believed that was why the instructor declined

to assist him.

(Xiong Depo., 69:7-70:26; 86.)

16. Although in the Complaint Plaintiff

states he requested a Hmong interpreter for

the re-test, at deposition he stated he did not

want an interpreter, he just wanted someone

to explain the questions to him in English.

(Xiong Depo., 241:12–242:7.)

17. There were five Asians, three African

Americans, three Hispanics, one American

Indian, 22 Non-minority and ten persons of

unknown ethnicity from Region 5 at the

Academy the same time as Mr. Xiong.

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(Sutliff Dec., ¶12.)

18. The Forest Service uses the categories of

American Indian/Alaskan native,

Asian/Pacific Islander, African American,

Hispanic, Non-minority and Unknown in

keeping its statistics regarding race and

national origin. The Forest Service does not

maintain a record of whether or not

individuals are “non-native English

speakers.”

(Bennion Dec., ¶ 3, 4.)

19. The Forest Service does not break up

Asian ethnicity into various subsets such as

Hmong, Vietnamese, Chinese or Japanese.

Instead, there is merely the category of

“Asian” with no designation of their native

language.

(Bennion Dec., ¶ 5.)

IV. Analysis

A. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that

there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Under summary judgment practice, the

moving party 

[A]lways bears the initial responsibility of

informing the district court of the basis for

its motion, and identifying those portions of

"the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any," which

it believes demonstrate the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). It is the

moving party’s burden to establish that there exists no genuine

issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. British Airways Board v. Boeing Co.,

585 F.2d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 1978).

If a party moves for summary judgment with respect to a

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matter as to which the opposing party has the ultimate burden of

persuasion at trial, then the moving party must show that the

opposing party cannot meet its burden of proof at trial by

establishing that there is no genuine issue of material fact as

to an essential element of the opposing party’s claim or defense;

the moving party must meet the initial burden of producing

evidence or showing an absence of evidence as well as the

ultimate burden of persuasion. Nissan Fire Ltd. v. Fritz Cos.,

Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). In order to carry its

burden of production, the moving party must either produce

evidence negating an essential element of the opposing party's

claim or defense or show that the nonmoving party does not have

enough evidence of an essential element to carry its ultimate

burden of persuasion at trial. Id. (citing High Tech Gays v.

Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 574 (9th Cir.

1990)). In order to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion on

the motion, the moving party must persuade the court that there

is no genuine issue of material fact. Id.

However, “where the nonmoving party will bear the burden of

proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary judgment motion

may properly be made in reliance solely on the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file.”

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323. Indeed, summary

judgment should be entered, after adequate time for discovery and

upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to

that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden

of proof at trial. Id. “[A] complete failure of proof concerning

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an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily

renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. In such a circumstance,

summary judgment should be granted, “so long as whatever is

before the district court demonstrates that the standard for

entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is

satisfied.” Id. at 323. 

 If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the

burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a

genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

586 (1986). In attempting to establish the existence of this

factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the denials

of its pleadings, but is required to tender evidence of specific

facts in the form of affidavits or admissible discovery material

in support of its contention that the dispute exists. Rule 56(e);

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The opposing party must

demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact

that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing

law, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986);

T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809

F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and that the dispute is genuine,

i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a

verdict for the nonmoving party, Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc.,

818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual

dispute, the opposing party need not establish a material issue

of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that "the

claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to

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resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial." 

T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 630. Thus, the "purpose of summary

judgment is to 'pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in

order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.'" 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)

advisory committee's note on 1963 amendments). The evidence of

the opposing party is to be believed, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255,

and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts

placed before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing

party, Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citing United States v.

Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)(per curiam)). 

Nevertheless, it is the opposing party's obligation to produce a

factual predicate from which an inference may be drawn. Richards

v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal.

1985), aff'd, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987). Although the

Court must not weigh the evidence, the Court must draw reasonable

inferences; evidence that is too insubstantial or speculative may

be insufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of

material fact. Coca-Cola Co. v. Overland, Inc., 692 F.2d 1250,

1255 (9th Cir. 1982). A mere scintilla of evidence supporting the

opposing party's position will not suffice; there must be enough

of a showing that the jury could reasonably find for that party.

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52. Where the record taken as a whole

could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving

party, there is no genuine issue for trial. Id. at 587. 

The showings must consist of admissible evidence,

Hollingsworth Solderless Terminal Co. v. Turley, 622 F.2d 1324,

1335 n.9 (9th Cir. 1980), or pleadings, depositions, answers to

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interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits or declarations, Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(c). Affidavits shall be based on personal

knowledge, set forth such facts as would be admissible in

evidence, and show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to

testify to the matters stated therein. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred

to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith.

Id. Declarations pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 may be used with

the same force and effect as affidavits. Pollock v. Pollock, 154

F.3d 601, 611, n.20 (6th Cir. 1998). A plaintiff’s verified

complaint may be considered as an affidavit in opposition to

summary judgment if it is based on personal knowledge and sets

forth specific facts admissible in evidence. Lopez v. Smith, 203

F.3d 1122, 1132 (9th Cir. 2000). Personal knowledge may be

inferred from declarations themselves, such as from facts

concerning a declarant’s position and participation, Barthelemy

v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, 897 F.2d 999, 1018 (9th Cir. 1990);

however, a court cannot draw an inference about facts not

specifically put in the record by a party, and a court will not

assume that general averments embrace specific facts needed to

sustain a complaint, Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497

U.S. 871, 887 (1990). An admission in a pleading, including a

defendant’s failure to deny an allegation in a complaint,

constitutes an admission. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d); Lockwood v Wolf.

Corp., 629 F.2d 603, 611 (9th Cir. 1980). Unauthenticated

documents cannot be considered on a motion for summary judgment.

Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner and Co., 896 F.2d 1542,

1550 (9th Cir. 1990). Legal memoranda and oral argument are not

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evidence and do not create issues of fact capable of defeating an

otherwise valid motion for summary judgment. British Airways Bd.

v. Boeing Co., 585 F.2d 946, 952 (9th Cir. 1978).

The Court is not obligated to consider matters that are in

the record but are not specifically brought to its attention; the

parties must designate and refer to specific triable facts. Even

in the absence of a local rule, for evidence to be considered,

the party seeking to rely on it must specify the fact by

indicating what the evidence is or says and must indicate where

it is located in the file. Although the Court has discretion in

appropriate circumstances to consider other material, it has no

duty to search the record for evidence establishing a material

fact. Carmen v. San Francisco United School Dist., 237 F.3d 1026,

1029 (9th Cir. 2001). In the instant case, the Court has

considered only the evidence which Defendant has specified.

A party moving for summary judgment is entitled to the

benefit of any relevant presumptions that support the motion

provided that the facts giving rise to the presumption are

undisputed. Coca-Cola Co. v. Overland, Inc., 692 F.2d 1250, 1254

(9th Cir. 1982).

B. Discriminatory Treatment

42 U.S.C. § 2000e(2)(a)(1) and (2) provides in pertinent

part that it is an unlawful employment practice for an employer

to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or

otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to

his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,

because of such individual's race or national origin; or to

limit, segregate, or classify employees or applicants for

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employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any

individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely

affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's

race or national origin. 

Proof of discrimination requires proof that an adverse

employment action was suffered because of the protected

characteristic. This may be proved by a theory of disparate

treatment, disparate impact, or failure to accommodate where

there is a duty to do so. 

A plaintiff in a suit for discriminatory treatment pursuant

to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 must prove that

there has been intentional discrimination on prohibited grounds,

that is, that similarly situated individuals were treated

differently because of a protected characteristic, International

Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36

n. 15 (1977); discriminatory motive must be proved, id., and it

must be shown that it was the determinative factor or influence

in the adverse employment action, Hazen Paper Co. v.Biggins, 507

U.S. 604, 610 (1993).

A plaintiff must carry the initial burden to establish a

prima facie case of racial discrimination. Thereafter, the

employer has the burden of proof to articulate a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action. The plaintiff

must then show by a preponderance that the employer's stated

reason for the action was in fact mere pretext. McDonnell Douglas

Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-806 (1973); Texas

Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253

(1981).

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In order to demonstrate a prima facie case, a plaintiff must

offer evidence that gives rise to an inference of unlawful

discrimination. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-54. A plaintiff may

accomplish this by introducing direct evidence of discriminatory

intent (i.e., evidence which, if believed, proves the fact [here

discriminatory animus] without inference or presumption, Godwin

v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1221 (9th Cir. 1998); by

introducing evidence that suggests that the employment decision

was based on an illegal discriminatory criterion; or by using

factors such as those set forth in McDonnell Douglas at 802

(there, showing membership in a protected class, qualification

for a position, rejections despite qualifications, and the

employer's continuing to seek applicants). Cordova v. State Farm

Ins. Companies, 124 F.3d 1145, 1148-49 (9th Cir. 1997).

Because the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact

that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the

plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff, the burden of

persuasion never shifts; rather, a defendant's burden is to rebut

the presumption of discrimination by producing evidence that the

reason for the challenged action was legitimate and

nondiscriminatory. The defendant need not persuade the Court that

it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons; it is

sufficient that the defendant's evidence raises a genuine issue

of fact as to whether it discriminated against the plaintiff.

Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55. This requirement is met if the

defendant clearly sets forth through admissible evidence the

reasons for the challenged action that are legally sufficient to

justify a judgment for the defendant. Id. at 255. Once this

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burden of production is met, the presumption raised by the prima

facie case is rebutted, and it disappears. Id.

The plaintiff's burden at this point is to persuade the

Court that the plaintiff has been the victim of intentional

discrimination, which may be accomplished either 1) directly by

persuading the Court that a discriminatory reason more likely

motivated the employer, or 2) indirectly by showing that the

employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.

Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.

Here, Plaintiff has not identified any direct evidence of

discriminatory animus.

With respect to indirect evidence, Plaintiff has not

produced or pointed to evidence that suggests that any use or

failure to use an interpreter, or any decision to fail him in the

Firing Methods and Procedures, S-234 class and/or in the Advanced

Academy, dismiss him from the Wildland Firefighter Apprentice

Program (WFAP), place him in non-pay status thereafter in January

1999, convert him to a temporary appointment in May 1999, or

terminate his temporary position in November 1999 at the end of

the fire season was based on an illegal discriminatory criterion.

Plaintiff’s work status customarily reverted to non-pay status at

the end of the fire season. 

There is no basis for an inference that exclusive use of the

English language in the written testing program at the Advanced

Academy shows an intent to discriminate against Plaintiff on the

basis of his race or national origin. Even if it is assumed that

a person of Asian race or of Hmong-Lao national origin is more

likely than otherwise to speak an Asian or Lao language, it is

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3

 The Court notes that Plaintiff’s complaints filed in this Court were not verified, and Plaintiff has produced

no evidence that is considered by the Court. Thus, in analyzing the merits of this motion, the Court relies only on the

statement of undisputed facts submitted by Defendant and the evidence specifically referred to therein.

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not necessarily, inherently, or even more likely than not to be

true that the person’s origin renders the person limited or

unskilled in English or even less skilled in English than persons

of other races or national origins would be. The mere fact of

national origin or race, coupled with the use of the English

language in the test, does not logically or rationally permit an

inference of intentional discrimination. 

With respect to the use of an interpreter, or someone to

explain parts of the test, the evidence shows that on the first

attempt, the instructor declined to assist Plaintiff by

explaining the questions because there was no time left;

Plaintiff believed that this was the truth. That there was no

time left to assist Plaintiff during the normal testing process

does not permit an inference that the failure to help him was due

to a discriminatory intent. As to the second test or retesting

process, the evidence brought to the attention of the Court does

not show what the circumstances were. It is not clear that an

interpreter or someone to explain a test was ever provided to

anyone or was not provided to anyone. Plaintiff’s merely failing

the test does not permit an inference of discrimination.3

Finally, using factors such as those set forth in McDonnell

Douglas at 802 (there, showing membership in a protected class,

qualification for a position, rejections despite qualifications,

and the employer's continuing to seek applicants), Plaintiff has

not raised an inference of intentional discrimination. Although

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the evidence brought to the attention of the Court shows that

Plaintiff was Asian and therefore was a member of a protected

class, it does not establish that he was qualified; the mere fact

that he was hired for a position with the Defendant does not

warrant an inference that he was qualified to achieve any

particular rank or status or to pass or achieve any specific

requirement in the WFAP schooling program. Although the evidence

might warrant an inference that he continued to be qualified to

be employed by Defendant, there is no evidence of circumstances

that would provide a basis for inferring that either his

classification or the Defendant’s failure to recall him after the

last fire season was discriminatory.

C. Disparate Impact

 A disparate impact claim under Title VII involves alleged

liability on the theory that the employer is responsible for an

employment practice that is facially neutral in its treatment of

different groups but that in fact falls more harshly on one group

than another and cannot be justified by business necessity; proof

of a discriminatory motive or subjective intent on the part of

the employer is not required. International Brotherhood of

Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n. 15 (1977). A

plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of disparate impact by

showing a significant disparate impact on a protected class

caused by a specific, identified employment practice or selection

criterion. Stout v. Potter, 276 F.3d 1118, 1121 (9th Cir. 2002).

In a disparate impact claim, it is not sufficient to present

evidence raising an inference of discrimination; rather, the

plaintiff is required actually to prove the discriminatory

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impact. Id. at 1122.

Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) provides:

(k) Burden of proof in disparate impact cases

(1)(A) An unlawful employment practice based on

disparate impact is established under this subchapter

only if--

(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent

uses a particular employment practice that causes a

disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion,

sex, or national origin and the respondent fails to

demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related

for the position in question and consistent with

business necessity; or

(ii) the complaining party makes the demonstration

described in subparagraph (C) with respect to an

alternative employment practice and the respondent

refuses to adopt such alternative employment practice.

(B)(i) With respect to demonstrating that a particular

employment practice causes a disparate impact as

described in subparagraph (A)(i), the complaining party

shall demonstrate that each particular challenged

employment practice causes a disparate impact, except

that if the complaining party can demonstrate to the

court that the elements of a respondent's

decisionmaking process are not capable of separation

for analysis, the decisionmaking process may be

analyzed as one employment practice.

(ii) If the respondent demonstrates that a specific

employment practice does not cause the disparate

impact, the respondent shall not be required to

demonstrate that such practice is required by business

necessity.

Thus, the plaintiff cannot challenge the cumulative effect of the

employer’s employment practices generally, but rather must

isolate and identify each particular element or practice within

the process that causes an adverse impact. Wards Cove Packing

Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656-57 (1989); Stout v.

Potter, 276 F.3d at 1124. 

Initially, a plaintiff has the burden of showing that a

particular employment practice caused the exclusion of applicants

for jobs or promotions, etc., because of their membership in a

protected group. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977,

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994 (1988); Stout v. Potter, 276 F.3d at 1122. The statistical

evidence must be of a kind and degree sufficient to show that the

practice in question has caused the exclusion of applicants for

jobs or promotions because of their membership in a protected

group; this is shown by statistical disparities that are

sufficiently substantial to raise an inference of causation.

Watson, 487 U.S. at 994-95 (describing the necessary disparity as

significantly different, a substantially higher rate,

substantially disproportionate, or significantly discriminatory,

but expressly declining to define any specific standard

deviation). It is insufficient merely to show that a practice or

policy has harmed members of the group; rather, a plaintiff must

prove the existence of the employer’s practice or policy; that

the policy has a significant adverse effect on persons of the

protected class; the impact of the policy is on terms,

conditions, or privileges of employment of the protected class;

and the employee population in general is not affected by the

policy to the same degree. Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d

1480, 1486 (9th Cir. 1993). Once the plaintiff meets this burden,

the employer has the burden of persuasion as to the business

necessity of the employment practice or policy. Segar v. Smith,

738 F.2d 1249, 1247 (D.C.Cir. 1984). If the defendant meets that

burden, the Plaintiff has the burden of proving the availability

of an effective business alternative with less disparate racial

impact. Contreras v. City of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 1267, 1275 (9th

Cir. 1981).

Here, Plaintiff has not clearly articulated the specific

employment practice. In the complaint, he recounts not being

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4 The declarations establish that the Forest Service does not keep a

record of whether or not students are native English speakers or not. Further,

it does not break up Asian ethnicity into various subsets such as Hmong,

Vietnamese, Chinese, or Japanese; it simply records an Asian category of

Asian/Pacific Islander. Thus, the most precise degree of identification of the

sample that may be ascertained is Asian ancestry.

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permitted a Hmong interpreter, who could interpret in Plaintiff’s

native language, for a retest that was written in English. In

contrast, he testified that he did not want an interpreter, but

rather wanted someone who spoke English to explain the questions

to him in English. (SUF 16.) If it is assumed that the employment

practice is testing in English without access to an English

speaker to explain the questions, the evidence brought to the

attention of the Court does not establish that this was the

practice of the employer either in the first S-234 testing (where

Plaintiff admits that there was no time for someone to explain), 

in the retesting (regarding which there is an absence of evidence

cited to the Court regarding the circumstances of the testing),

or otherwise. 

Further, it is not clear what the protected class is. If the

protected class is non-native English speakers, then the

statistical evidence, which does not indicate the native language

of the academy students, does not demonstrate a disparity on that

ground. Likewise, the statistical evidence does not break down

subsets of Asian ancestry.4 Both the complaint and the statistics

do refer to Asian ancestry, however.

If it were assumed that the practice in question is testing

in English and denying the assistance of a person to explain the

English question in English, and if it were further assumed that

the protected class is persons of Asian origin, then the Court

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must consider whether or not Defendant has established that it is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

First, to demonstrate a significant discrepancy in the

impact of testing in English without access to someone to explain

the questions to persons of Asian origin, the initial inquiry

should be whether there is a discrepancy in the rate of passage

as between persons in the protected group and those in other

groups. See Fudge v. City of Providence Fire Dept., 766 F.2d 650,

657 (1st Cir. 1985). Disparate impact should generally be measured

against the actual pool of applicants or eligible employees.

Moore v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 708 F.2d 475, 482 (9th Cr.

1983).

The statistical evidence provided by the declarations of

Bennion and Sutliff generally reveals that with respect to the

Asian students from region 5 at the advanced academy, two of

five, or forty per cent, passed the advanced academy. Twenty-one

of twenty-two non-minority students passed, or 95.5 per cent. The

overall pass rate of all categories other than Asians was 99.1

per cent. The passage rate of each of the African, Hispanic, and

American Indian minority groups was 100 per cent. The Asian

students’ passing score of 40 per cent was only 42 per cent of

the non-minority students’ 95.5 per cent pass rate, and it was

40.36 per cent of the 99.1 per cent pass rate of the combined

non-Asian categories. The Asian students’ pass rate is thus less

than eighty per cent of the passing rate of the highest group and

indeed of each group and all the other groups combined. Such a

statistical showing is generally sufficient to show a

significantly disparate impact. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S.

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440, 443-44 n.4 (1982); see 28 C.F.R. § 50.14, 29 C.F.R. §

1607.4. Based on the numbers alone, one reasonable conclusion is

that a prima facie case of disparate impact of the English

language testing on students of Asian origin has been

established. 

Defendant points to defects in the statistical evidence. The

appropriate use of statistical evidence is conditioned by the

presence of proper supportive facts and the absence of variables

which would undermine the reasonableness of the inference of

discrimination which is drawn. Contreras v. City of Los Angeles,

656 F.2d 1267, 1272 (9th Cir. 1981). Here, there is no information

on the ethnic makeup of students and pass rates of students at

the basic academy. Even if the appropriate focus were on only the

advanced academy, there are no data for the third class of

testing (S-205), and it is unclear if everyone passed or if there

were additional reductions in the size of the class. (See Sutliff

Decl. at ¶¶ 10-12.)

Further, even drawing all inferences in favor of Plaintiff,

the nonmoving party, with respect to the advanced academy

program, only part of the population of students is represented.

The statistics submitted by Defendant represent only the part of

the student population in the WFAP program that were from region

5; persons from other regions with various ethnic backgrounds

were attending, but no statistics are submitted for them.

(Sutliffe Decl. at ¶ 12.) Thus, there is no complete or

definitive evidence regarding the actual pool of students

relevant to the drawing of the pertinent comparison.

Further, even within the limited region 5 sample, the ethnic

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makeup of ten of the forty-four students, who constitute nearly

twenty-five per cent of the sample, is unknown.

The sample, which as previously noted is not the full,

actual pool in question, is very small. See Kim, 772 F.2d at 523-

24 (despite comparative pass rates on an oral language

proficiency test of less than eighty percent, the sample of 12,

including four Germans and eight other non-native English

speakers, was very small such that it was not statistically

significant) (citing Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educational

Equality League, 415 U.S. 605, 620-21 (1974)); Contreras v. City

of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 1267, 1273 (9th Cir. 1981) (five of

seventeen Spanish-surnamed applicants compared with twenty-two of

forty non-Hispanic applicants not significant despite expert

statistical opinion evidence); White v. City of San Diego, 605

F.2d 455, 460 (9th Cir. 1979) (in view of expert opinions

regarding the significance of statistical evidence, and in the

absence of expert statistical evidence to the contrary, the

appellate court upheld the district court’s conclusion that rates

of fifteen out of twenty-eight and nine out of twenty-two were

not significant because of the small size of sample).

In this summary judgment proceeding, the Court will draw

every reasonable inference possible in favor of Plaintiff, the

non-moving party. The statistical sample is arguably small and

incomplete. However, Defendant has not produced all the pertinent

data regarding the make-up of the academy students. Likewise,

Defendant has not produced expert opinion regarding the

significance of the statistical data submitted by Defendant. The

status of the evidence is that a reasonable person could infer a

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5 There is no expert statistical evidence submitted by either party. As

previously discussed, the only portion of the Defendant’s evidence being

considered by the Court is that expressly pointed out by Defendant, and the

Court has stricken the materials submitted by Plaintiff and thus is not

considering them.

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significant disparity, and yet the Court is uncertain whether or

not an inference of significant disparity is the better inference

from the statistics provided by Defendant.5

Defendant has the initial burden on this motion either to

produce affirmative evidence negating an essential element of

Plaintiff’s case, or to demonstrate that Plaintiff does not have

enough evidence of an essential element of its claim to carry its

ultimate burden of persuasion at trial. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins.

Co. v. Fritz Companies, 210 F.3d 1099, 1106 (9th Cir. 2000).

Defendant has not produced affirmative evidence negating what

would be Plaintiff’s showing that persons of Asian descent who

took the English-only tests, apparently without explanation,

suffered significantly reduced rates of passage of the classes at

the advanced academy. By pointing to omissions or defects in the

statistical picture, Defendant raised some question regarding the

sufficiency of the evidence to demonstrate on behalf of Plaintiff

at trial that students of Asian descent who took tests in the

English language suffered a negative and disparate impact.

However, because of the incomplete statistics submitted by

Defendant and the absence of expert opinion evidence regarding

the strength of the statistical evidence, Defendant did not

succeed in demonstrating that Plaintiff does not have enough

evidence of an essential element of its claim to carry its

ultimate burden of persuasion at trial on a disparate impact

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claim.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate a

causal relationship between the challenged practice (testing in

English without someone to explain or interpret) and the result.

See, Contreras v. City of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 1267, 1273-74. In

view of the testimony regarding Plaintiff’s difficulty with the

questions in English, and further considering the absence of

evidence regarding other reasons for the Asian students’ failure,

the Court concludes that one rational inference is that testing

in the written English language was causally related to the

failure.

In summary, the Court concludes that with respect to a claim

of disparate treatment, Defendant has produced evidence negating

the claim and has shown that any evidence Plaintiff may have

concerning such treatment is inadequate to sustain Plaintiff’s

burden of proof of discriminatory treatment at trial. Defendant

has shown that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on

the discriminatory treatment claim. With respect to Plaintiff’s

claim of disparate impact, Defendant did not meet its initial

burden, so Plaintiff is not required to present additional

evidence. The Court concludes that Defendant has not shown as a

matter of law that it is entitled to judgment on a disparate

impact claim.

V. Jury Trial Demand

Defendant requests that Plaintiff’s jury demand be stricken

because the Court has determined that Defendant has shown that it

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law with respect to

Plaintiff’s disparate treatment claim. The only remaining theory

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of liability is discriminatory impact, with respect to which

Plaintiff is not entitled to a jury trial.

Plaintiff demanded a trial by jury in the complaint. Title

VII extends a right to a jury trial with respect to claims of

intentional discrimination but “not an employment practice that

is unlawful because of its disparate impact.” 42 U.S.C. §

1981a(a). Thus, Plaintiff is not entitled to a jury trial on an

employment discrimination claim that is solely based on a

disparate impact theory and does not involve disparate treatment.

Garcia v. Woman’s Hopital of Texas, 143 F.3d 227, 230 n. 1 (5th

Cir. 1998); Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 423

(5th Cir. 1998).

Fed. R. Civ. P. 39(a) provides that when trial by jury has

been demanded, the trial shall be by jury unless the court upon

motion or of its own initiative finds that a right of trial by

jury of some or all of the issues does not exist under the

Constitution or statutes of the United States. Where a right of

jury trial does not exist as to issues specified in a jury

demand, the appropriate remedy is to strike the demand. United

States v. Missouri River Breaks Hunt Club, 641 F.2d 689, 692 (9th

Cir. 1981). 

Thus, Defendant’s request that the Court strike Plaintiff’s

jury demand will be granted. 

VI. Disposition

Accordingly, it IS ORDERED that

1) Defendant’s motion for summary judgment or summary

adjudication IS GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART; and

2) Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication on

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Plaintiff’s Title VII discrimination claim on a theory of

disparate treatment IS GRANTED; and

 3)Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s

Title VII discrimination claim on a theory of disparate impact IS

DENIED; and

4) The documents filed by Plaintiff on August 4, 2005,

including a separate statement, points and authorities,

declaration of James C. Holland and exhibits, and declaration of

James C. Holland re: Late Filing of Opposition (Docs. 30 through

33), ARE STRICKEN; and

5) Defendant’s request that the Court strike Plaintiff’s

jury demand IS GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 22, 2005 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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