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Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 14, 2005 Decided May 27, 2005

No. 04-5082

LAWRENCE STEPHEN MAXWELL, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

JOHN W. SNOW, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF

THE TREASURY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 00cv01953)

(No. 01cv00246)

Lawrence S. Maxwell, appearing pro se, argued the cause on

his own behalf and was on the joint briefs for appellants. With

him on the joint briefs were Vasilios S. Lambros representing 55

legal entities and 507 other pro se individuals.

Laurie Snyder, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for appellee. With her on the brief were

Kenneth L. Wainstein, U.S. Attorney, and Jonathan S. Cohen,

Attorney.

Before: SENTELLE, HENDERSON and ROGERS, Circuit

Judges.

USCA Case #04-5082 Document #897006 Filed: 05/27/2005 Page 1 of 10
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Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SENTELLE.

SENTELLE, Circuit Judge: Appellant Lawrence S. Maxwell

and approximately 562 other individuals and entities filed this

action in the United States District Court for the District of

Columbia seeking, inter alia, tax return information and

declaratory and injunctive relief. The District Court granted the

government’s motion to dismiss most of the claims, ruling that

Appellants’ requests had not complied with Freedom of

Information Act (“FOIA”) requirements and that the declaratory

and injunctive relief prayed was frivolous. Appellants

contended that 26 U.S.C. § 6103 provides a basis to request

“return information” not subject to FOIA; that their claims for

injunctive and declaratory relief were improperly dismissed

because there remained unresolved issues of fact; and

furthermore, that their claims were not frivolous. For the

reasons more fully set forth below, we conclude that the District

Court was correct and affirm its dismissal of Appellants’ claims.

I. Background 

In June of 2000, Appellant Lawrence S. Maxwell sent a tenpage letter to the National Office of the Internal Revenue

Service (“IRS”) Disclosure Unit seeking tax-related information

for the tax years 1987-2000. He sought disclosure of at least

nineteen types of information pertaining to himself including (1)

“return information” as described in the Internal Revenue Code,

26 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(2), (2) records showing how his “taxable

income” was determined, (3) records showing that he was given

notice of a duty to file a tax, (4) records identifying him as an

individual subject to taxation, (5) records indicating his

citizenship and residency, purportedly because as a citizen and

resident of the U.S. he would not be liable for income tax, (6)

records showing that he “resided or worked within one of the

specified areas of federal jurisdiction of the United States

USCA Case #04-5082 Document #897006 Filed: 05/27/2005 Page 2 of 10
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government,” purportedly because only such records would

establish federal jurisdiction to tax him, and (7) records

indicating the specific code sections showing him liable for a

particular tax or requiring him to fill out certain forms. Maxwell

cited the provisions of § 6103, relying on this Court’s decision

in Lake v. Rubin, 162 F.3d 113 (D.C. Cir. 1998), a case in which

he was a party, for the proposition that “individuals seeking

‘return information’ . . . must do so pursuant to § 6103 . . . rather

than the Privacy Act.” Id. at 116. The other Appellants sent

letters to the IRS that were identical to Maxwell’s in all relevant

respects. The IRS did not grant or deny the requests, but

informed Appellants by letters that their “Freedom of

Information/Privacy Act” requests did not comply with the

“published procedures for making a request under the Privacy

Act,” advising them how to cure the error. 

FOIA outlines procedures for agencies to make information

available to the public under certain conditions. 5 U.S.C. § 552.

Subsection (b)(3) provides that information need not be given

out when it is specifically exempted from disclosure by another

statute (“Exemption 3”). Id § 552(b)(3). Section 6103 of the

Internal Revenue Code specifically exempts tax returns from

disclosure except in specified circumstances. For example, an

individual may request inspection of his tax return or “return

information,” 26 U.S.C. § 6103(e)(1), (7), including

a taxpayer's identity, the nature, source, or amount of his

income, payments, receipts, deductions, exemptions,

credits, assets, liabilities, net worth, tax liability, tax

withheld, deficiencies, overassessments, or tax payments,

whether the taxpayer's return was, is being, or will be

examined or subject to other investigation or processing, or

any other data, received by, recorded by, prepared by,

furnished to, or collected by the Secretary with respect to a

return or with respect to the determination of the existence,

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or possible existence, of liability (or the amount thereof) of

any person under this title for any tax, penalty, interest,

fine, forfeiture, or other imposition, or offense. . . .

26 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(2)(A). Section 6103 thus “does not

supersede FOIA but rather gives rise to an exemption under

Exemption 3” and FOIA procedures must still be followed in

applying § 6103. Church of Scientology of California v. IRS,

792 F.2d 146, 149-50 (D.C. Cir. 1986).

 Appellants disputed the IRS requirement that they must

follow FOIA or Privacy Act procedures, and filed suit against

the Secretary of the Treasury, seeking access to the requested

information under § 6103, as well as fees, costs, and money

damages. Appellants also requested declarations by the court

that, among other things, Appellants are not citizens, that Texas

is not a part of the United States, and that the United States itself

is unconstitutional because it is not a republican form of

government. The United States moved to dismiss the cases,

arguing lack of subject matter jurisdiction under § 6103 and that

Appellants had failed to make a proper FOIA request to exhaust

their administrative remedies. Appellants responded that, under

Lake, § 6103 provides jurisdiction independent of FOIA. 

The District Court, reading Lake in the context of Church

of Scientology, found that while § 6103 may supercede the

Privacy Act, it does not supercede the procedural provisions in

FOIA. It ruled that, while Appellants had failed to send their

requests to the proper local bureau under FOIA, 31 C.F.R. §

1.5(b)(3), that error only tolled the Government’s time to

respond while the request was transferred to the correct bureau.

It also found that the Appellants may have failed to “reasonably

describe the records” sought, 31 C.F.R. § 1.5(b)(4), but that the

IRS could not simply dismiss the entire request because some of

the nineteen requests were incomplete or consisted of “pseudoUSCA Case #04-5082 Document #897006 Filed: 05/27/2005 Page 4 of 10
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1The nineteen challenged Appellants are: Ed Francis Bradley,

Ed Francis Bradley II, Ronald Lance Bradley, Roy Claudius Bradley,

J.C. Chisum, Adam E. Chudzikiewicz, Edward Chudzikiewicz, Jack

E. Fyke, Brenda G. Lacy, Neil T. Lacy, Debra L. LaRue, Steven R.

Lutz, Terrence M. McLoughlin, J.J. Miller-Wagenknecht, David M.

Shipley, Cherie D. Teeple, Stephen B. Teeple, Petrona A. Williams,

and Vernon F. Williams. 

requests” attempting to challenge tax laws rather than seek

information. It then reviewed the requests and found all to be

overly broad or burdensome with the exception of the portion

seeking “return information” as described in 26 U.S.C. § 6103.

The District Court thus directed the IRS to process the portion

of Appellants’ requests for “return information” according to

FOIA, granting the motion to dismiss as to the other requests.

The other claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were

dismissed as frivolous. Appellants filed this present appeal. 

II. Analysis

Where, as here, we are reviewing a ruling on a motion to

dismiss, we will “accept as true all facts alleged by the

nonmoving party and . . . draw all inferences in favor of the

nonmoving party.” Center for Law & Educ. v. Dep’t of Educ.,

396 F.3d 1152, 1157 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Because the District

Court did not make any evidentiary findings of its own, we

apply this standard de novo. Helmer v. Doletskaya, 393 F.3d

201, 204-05 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 

A. Standing of Challenged Appellants

Before addressing the substantive merits of Appellants’

claims, we must determine the proper parties to this case. The

IRS has moved to dismiss two groups of individuals as

Appellants. The first group consists of nineteen Appellants1

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who allegedly were not parties to the District Court case because

they did not sign the original complaint or either amended

complaint. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(a), all pleadings by a pro

se plaintiff must be signed by the party and, if not, must be

stricken unless corrected promptly after being notified of the

omission. The IRS moved to dismiss claiming that in this case

notification at an earlier time was essentially impossible because

of the large number of plaintiffs and the disorganized

presentation of names and signatures in the complaint.

Appellants did not make a timely response and failed to address

the issue in their merits brief although instructed to do so. We

therefore will consider this issue conceded for lack of response

by Appellants, and dismiss the nineteen challenged Appellants

for lack of standing because they were not parties to the

appealed proceeding.

The second set of Appellants that the government has

moved to dismiss are two individuals, Runar Dean Johnson and

Lavina Rae Johnson, who have outstanding sanctions against

them in the Ninth Circuit for filing a frivolous appeal on the

grounds that the IRS does not legally exist. The sanctions were

affirmed by the Ninth Circuit in June of 2003, but the Johnsons

have failed to pay them despite repeated requests. Other circuits

have dismissed actions and refused to entertain future litigation

if sanctions or costs incurred in an earlier proceeding, or in prior

actions involving the same parties and the same or similar

subject matter, remain unpaid. See, e.g., Hymes v. United States,

993 F.2d 701, 702 (9th Cir. 1993); Christensen v. Ward, 916

F.2d 1485 (10th Cir. 1990); Zerman v. Jacobs, 814 F.2d 107,

109 (2d Cir. 1987); Stelly v. Commissioner, 804 F.2d 868, 871-

72 (5th Cir. 1986). This rule provides for sanctions against

frivolous appeals under FED. R. APP. P. 38 to be made effective

and helps protect the courts from abuse. It is uncontested that

the Johnsons have incurred and failed to pay these sanctions,

and the subject matter of their sanctioned appeal is similar to the

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claims in this case. We therefore dismiss Runar Dean Johnson

and Lavinia Rae Johnson’s appeal because of their failure to pay

sanctions for filing a frivolous appeal in a similar matter.

B. Use of FOIA Procedures for § 6103 Requests

Appellants first challenge the District Court’s determination

that their requests for “return information” under 26 U.S.C. §

6103 should be processed according to FOIA procedures. They

argue that the Lake holding made § 6103 the exclusive statutory

route to seek this information. They characterize the

government’s desire to follow FOIA procedures as a “deceptive

shell game” in which the IRS throws up successive procedural

barriers on shifting and “revisionist” legal theories to avoid

answering Appellants’ requests. Appellants also claim, without

citing any support, that FOIA requirements cannot be applicable

to their requests for personal information, but only to requests

for public information. All of these arguments fail, for the

reasons already articulated by the District Court.

The Appellants misread Lake by taking it out of the context

of Circuit precedent and therefore their only legal argument is

without merit. In 1986 this Court decided Church of

Scientology, holding that FOIA is intended as an “across-theboard” statute covering all requests for information unless

specifically exempted in a later statute. 792 F.2d at 149.

Because § 6103 contains no such exemption and has no

procedures or rules of its own implying an exception to FOIA,

the court held that FOIA procedures apply to § 6103 requests.

Id. at 149-50. The Lake court decided in 1998 that 26 U.S.C. §

6103 was the proper vehicle for requesting information rather

than the Privacy Act because 26 U.S.C. § 7852(e) withdrew the

power of the federal courts to force the IRS to comply with the

Privacy Act. See Lake, 162 F.3d at 114. It did not, as

Appellants assume, make § 6103 the exclusive statute governing

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requests for information from the IRS, but only said that § 6103

must be used instead of the Privacy Act. 

As the District Court notes, we must read Lake and Church

of Scientology together and not assume with Appellants that

Lake overruled Church of Scientology. In fact, it could not have

done so because this Court is bound to follow circuit precedent

until it is overruled either by an en banc court or the Supreme

Court. Brewster v. Commissioner, 607 F.2d 1369, 1373 (D.C.

Cir. 1979). Nor is it difficult to read these cases in harmony.

Lake does not speak to whether FOIA requirements should apply

to the processing of Appellants’ § 6103 requests, so Church of

Scientology clearly controls this case in requiring FOIA

procedures. The District Court was thus correct in holding that

FOIA still applies to § 6103 claims. 

C. Dismissal of Frivolous Claims

Appellants finally contend that the District Court erred in

dismissing Appellants’ requests for injunctive and declaratory

relief as frivolous. They maintain that theirs were not simply

“tax protest claims” to be dismissed out of hand, and that eighty

issues of material fact existed at the time of the motion to

dismiss that should have been resolved before dismissal. They

give examples of these alleged issues of fact in their brief,

including “Whether the federal United States government is a

‘corporation’,” and, “Whether a corporation is a republican

form of government” (emphasis in original). These arguments

are without merit. 

First, the examples of “material facts in dispute” put forth

by the Appellants are not issues of fact at all, but issues of law,

and do not appear in the amended complaint in this case or

elsewhere in the record before this Court. Similarly, the

requests for relief denied by the District Court are all patently

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frivolous, including requests for declarations that laws passed by

Congress do not apply to Maxwell as a “sovereign citizen of the

Union State of Texas,” that the United States is not a republican

form of government and therefore must be abolished as

unconstitutional, that the Secretary of the Treasury’s jurisdiction

is limited to the District of Columbia, that Maxwell is not a

citizen of the United States, and so on. 

Most of these claims are only relevant to this case based on

Appellants’ legal theory that the federal government’s

jurisdiction is limited to the District of Columbia and other

federally owned lands by art. I, § 8, cl. 17 of the Constitution.

This is a blatant misreading of this clause which does not limit

the other constitutional grants of authority to the federal

legislature but only limits the places where the federal

government has exclusive legislative power. The other grants of

authority in Article I still hold, including the power to “lay and

collect Taxes . . . throughout the United States.” U.S. CONST.

art. I, § 8, cl. 1. The Sixteenth Amendment further authorizes a

direct nonapportioned income tax upon United States citizens

throughout the country. Brushaber v. Union P. R. Co., 240 U.S.

1, 12-19 (1916). Both of these powers to tax have long been

upheld by the Supreme Court; arguments resting on the

assumption that the federal government has no such power are

frivolous. Appellants’ few remaining claims are based on

similar outright misreadings of various federal statutes and

constitutional provisions and are likewise frivolous. We thus do

not address these and other issues not material to the outcome of

this case.

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III. Conclusion

For the reasons given above we dismiss twenty-one

Appellants from this appeal, affirm the District Court’s holding

that FOIA procedures should apply to requests for return

information under 26 U.S.C. § 6103, and affirm the District

Court’s dismissal of all other claims for relief as frivolous. We

dismiss all other outstanding motions as moot.

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