Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01757/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cv-01757-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Robert Carrasco Gamez, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, Lance R. Hetmer, Greg 

Fizer, Kathy Ingulli, Unknown Barnes, 

Blaine Moore, Unknown Quintero, D 

Gidcumb, L Brass, V Cisneros, Karyn 

Klausner, Dawn Northup, Dennis Kendall, 

Stacy Crabtree, Unknown Washburn, 

Antoinette Gatlin, Unknown Gornal, 

Unknown Winterbauer, Unknown Randal, 

Unknown Garcia, 

Defendants.

No. CV 13-01757-PHX- JJT (DMF)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

TO THE HONORABLE JOHN J. TUCHI: 

 Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend (Doc. 42). This matter 

is before the undersigned on referral from the District Judge. The Court has a continuing 

obligation to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against an officer or 

employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The screening 

requirement extends to proposed amended complaints. Because a magistrate judge 

cannot decide a “matter dispositive of a claim or defense or a prisoner petition 

challenging the conditions of confinement,” Rule 72(b)(1), Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure, the undersigned recommends as follows. 

Case 2:13-cv-01757-JJT Document 47 Filed 09/15/15 Page 1 of 13
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

I. Background 

 Plaintiff filed a prisoner civil rights complaint and a motion for leave to proceed in 

this matter in forma pauperis on August 27, 2013. In an order (Doc. 9) entered March 

24, 2014, the Court granted the motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and 

dismissed the complaint with leave to amend. Plaintiff docketed a First Amended 

Complaint (Doc. 16) and Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 27), both of which were 

dismissed with leave to amend (Docs. 24 and 28). 

 Plaintiff docketed a Third Amended Complaint (Doc. 29) on March 4, 2015. In a 

service order (Doc. 31) issued April 20, 2015, the Court dismissed without prejudice 

Counts One, Two, Four, and Five of the Third Amended Complaint, and dismissed 

without prejudice Defendants Ryan, Hetmer, Fizer, Quintero, Crabtree, Washburn, 

Gidcumb, Brass, Cisneros and Garcia. The Court ordered Defendant Gatlin to answer 

Count Three of the Third Amended Complaint, an allegation that Defendant Gatlin was 

deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs, in violation of Plaintiff’s 

Eighth Amendment rights. Service was executed on Defendant Gatlin on July 21, 2015 

(Doc. 44). 

 On June 12, 2015, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to Amend (Doc. 42), 

attaching his proposed Fourth Amended Complaint (“FAC”). Because Plaintiff has 

docketed three prior complaints, Plaintiff is not entitled to amend his complaint without 

leave of the Court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). 

II. Standard for Granting or Denying a Motion to Amend 

 Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 governs amendments to pleadings generally. Except when an 

amendment is pleaded as a “matter of course,” as defined by the rule, “a party may 

amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Courts must “freely give leave when justice so requires.” Id. 

Requests for leave are generally granted with “extreme liberality.” Moss v. U. S. Secret 

Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 972 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). However, granting a plaintiff 

leave to amend “is subject to the qualification that the amendment not cause undue 

Case 2:13-cv-01757-JJT Document 47 Filed 09/15/15 Page 2 of 13
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

prejudice to the defendant, is not sought in bad faith, and is not futile.” Bowles v. Reade, 

198 F.3d 752, 757 (9th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). 

 The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires dismissal of allegations that fail to state 

a claim upon which relief can be granted prior to ordering service of an amended 

complaint on the added defendants. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1); see, e.g., O’Neal v. Price, 

531 F.3d 1146, 1153 (9th Cir. 2008). Futility of amendment is sufficient to justify denial 

of a motion for leave to amend. See Gordon v. City of Oakland, 627 F.3d 1092, 1094 

(9th Cir. 2010). A proposed amended complaint is futile if it would be immediately 

“subject to dismissal” pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim on 

which relief may be granted, accepting all of the facts alleged as true. See Steckman v. 

Hart Brewing, Inc., 143 F.3d 1293, 1298 (9th Cir. 1998). In screening complaints, the 

Court must liberally construe an incarcerated pro se plaintiff’s complaint. See, e.g., 

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). 

 Plaintiff’s proposed FAC attempts to cure the deficiencies in two counts of his 

Third Amended Complaint that were previously dismissed pursuant to the Court’s 

Service Order at Doc. 31. Plaintiff attempts to cure his claim for threat to safety or 

failure to protect and his procedural due process claim. Plaintiff’s proposed FAC also 

seeks to add Charles L. Ryan, Director at ASPC-Florence, and D. Shamblin as defendants 

in his claim for inadequate medical care. 

 Plaintiff alleges that he was an inmate at ASPC-Florence and on September 7, 

2011, Plaintiff had to walk unescorted and handcuffed through the basement on his way 

to recreation. Plaintiff claims that the basement area is dark and secluded and does not 

have audio or visual surveillance. Plaintiff had to walk sideways between the door and 

other inmate cells in order to pass through the narrow walkway. Plaintiff went to 

recreation, apparently without incident, but when Plaintiff reached the narrow walkway 

in the basement on his way back to his cell from recreation, he was immediately grabbed 

by inmate Garcia, who pulled Plaintiff toward his cell. Garcia stabbed Plaintiff once in 

the chest and once in the face and punched Plaintiff once in the back of Plaintiff’s head. 

Case 2:13-cv-01757-JJT Document 47 Filed 09/15/15 Page 3 of 13
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Plaintiff tried to escape, but Garcia held onto Plaintiff’s handcuffs and continued to 

assault him. Plaintiff saw Officer Cisneros running toward Plaintiff from the key control. 

Plaintiff yelled for assistance, but Officer Cisneros began spraying Plaintiff with pepper 

spray. Plaintiff felt an intense burning sensation, worsened by his asthma, which made 

him feel as if his respiratory system has “collapsed.” 

 Plaintiff was escorted to medical following the assault, where he was treated for 

his stab wounds and given a breathing treatment. Plaintiff was cleared by medical and 

advised by D. Shamblin, a registered nurse, that a doctor’s appointment would be 

scheduled the next morning to examine Plaintiff and provide pain medication. Despite 

Plaintiff submitting several health needs requests seeking cleaning supplies to avoid 

infection, Plaintiff was not treated again for his injuries for approximately twenty days. 

Defendant Gatlin refused to provide treatment and was visibly upset because Plaintiff’s 

mother had called the Facility Heath Administrator due to the visible infection and lack 

of health care. 

III. Inadequate Medical Care 

 The Court previously held that Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint sufficiently 

stated a medical care claim against Defendant Gatlin. Plaintiff reasserts his claim for 

inadequate medical care in Count One of his proposed FAC, and seeks to add Charles 

Ryan and D. Shamblin, R.N., as defendants. The only facts Plaintiff adds in his proposed 

amended complaint are that “[d]ue to inadequate health care staffing levels, Plaintiff was 

‘seen’ by a Nurse Practitioner, such practice is attributed to Defendant Ryan’s systemic 

elimination of health care staffing positions in recent years. Defendant Ryan’s failure to 

actively recruit, hire, train, supervise and retain sufficient and competent health care staff 

has resulted in a deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s health care needs.” (Doc. 42 at 12). 

 With regard to a claim that a defendant violated the plaintiff’s Eight Amendment 

right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment with regard to a prisoner’s medical 

treatment, the plaintiff must show the defendant was “deliberately indifferent” to the 

plaintiff’s “serious medical need.” See, e.g., Cano v. Taylor, 739 F.3d 1214, 1217 (9th 

Case 2:13-cv-01757-JJT Document 47 Filed 09/15/15 Page 4 of 13
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Cir. 2014). A prison official acts with “deliberate indifference . . . only if the [prison 

official] knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety.” Gibson 

v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted). Under this standard, the prison official must not only “be aware of facts 

from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,” 

but that person “must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 

(1994). “If a [prison official] should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the 

[official] has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.” 

Gibson, 290 F.3d at 1188 (citation omitted). A “serious medical need exists if the failure 

to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary 

and wanton infliction of pain.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992) 

(citation and internal quotations omitted), overruled on other grounds, WMX Techs., Inc. 

v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997). “Indifference may appear when prison 

officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or it may be shown 

by the way in which prison [officials] provide medical care.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). However, the alleged indifference to the 

prisoner’s medical needs must be substantial; mere indifference, negligence, or even an 

allegation of medical malpractice, is insufficient to state an Eight Amendment claim. 

Lemire v. California Dep’t of Corr., 726 F.3d 1062, 1081–82 (9th Cir. 2013) (citation 

omitted). “Even gross negligence is insufficient to establish deliberate indifference to 

serious medical needs.” Id. at 1082 (citation omitted). 

 The Court previously held that Plaintiff sufficiently stated a medical care claim 

against Defendant Gatlin, and ordered Defendant Gatlin to answer Count Three of 

Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint. The Court finds that Plaintiff’s attempts to expand 

the claim to include Defendants Ryan and Shamblin would be futile, as the claims against 

those defendants would be subject to dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Plaintiff 

has not adequately alleged a claim that Nurse Shamblin was deliberately indifferent to 

Plaintiff’s serious medical needs. The facts alleged in Plaintiff’s proposed FAC indicate 

Case 2:13-cv-01757-JJT Document 47 Filed 09/15/15 Page 5 of 13
- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

that Nurse Shamblin merely advised Plaintiff that a doctor’s appointment would be 

scheduled the next morning to examine or provide pain medication. Plaintiff alleges that 

he was seen by a nurse practitioner when he was escorted to medical. If Nurse Shamblin 

was the one providing Plaintiff’s medical care immediately following the assault, there is 

no allegation that this care was inadequate nor is there a showing that Nurse Shamblin 

purposefully acted or failed to respond to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs, nor any harm 

caused by the indifference. Plaintiff has not adequately alleged a claim that Nurse 

Shamblin was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs. 

 Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged a claim that Defendant Ryan himself was 

deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs. An individual capacity 

claim “hinges upon [the individual defendant’s] participation in the deprivation of 

constitutional rights,” unlike an official capacity claim, where the constitutional injury 

“must be attributable to [an] official policy or custom.” Torres v. Goddard, 793 F.3d 

1046, 1057 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 645 (9th 

Cir. 1991)). To state a claim against a defendant, “[a] plaintiff must allege facts, not 

simply conclusions, that show that an individual was personally involved in the 

deprivation of his civil rights.” Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 

1998). For an individual to be liable in his official capacity, a plaintiff must allege that 

the official acted as a result of a policy, practice or custom. See Cortez v. County of Los 

Angeles, 294 F.3d 1186, 1188 (9th Cir. 2001). Further, there is no respondeat superior

liability under § 1983, so a defendant’s position as the supervisor of someone who 

allegedly violated a plaintiff’s constitutional rights does not make him liable. Monell, 

436 U.S. at 691; Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). A supervisor in his 

individual capacity, “is only liable for constitutional violations of his subordinates if the 

supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed 

to act to prevent them.” Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045. 

 Plaintiff has failed to allege facts demonstrating that Defendant Ryan acted with 

deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs. Plaintiff has not alleged that 

Case 2:13-cv-01757-JJT Document 47 Filed 09/15/15 Page 6 of 13
- 7 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Defendant Ryan was actually aware of Plaintiff’s medical needs, nor do the facts show 

that Defendant Ryan established policies that resulted in a denial of medical care to 

Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s “allegation of systemwide understaffing is not only vague but also 

insufficient because a mere delay in medical care, without more, is insufficient to state a 

claim against prison officials for deliberate indifference under the Eight Amendment.” 

Olmos v. Stokes, Case No. CV-10-2564-PHX-GMS, 2011 WL 1792953, at *4 (D. Ariz. 

May 11, 2011) (citing Shapley v. Nevada Bd. Of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 

407 (9th Cir. 1985)). 

IV. Threat to Safety or Failure to Protect 

 The Court previously dismissed Plaintiff’s claim for threat to safety or failure to 

protect, finding that Plaintiff failed to allege facts to support that any of the Defendants 

knew, or should have known, prior to the September 7 assault, that Garcia posed a 

substantial threat to Plaintiff. (Doc. 31 at 10). The Court found that Plaintiff’s assertion 

that his name and inmate number were found on three New Mexican Mafia hit lists on 

November 2 and December 4, 2009, and April 20, 2010, is not sufficient to support that 

Garcia, or anyone else, posed a substantial threat to Plaintiff’s safety on September 7, 

2011. (Doc. 31 at 10, n.1). The Court further held that: 

Plaintiff fails to allege any facts to support that Defendants 

were in any way involved with or aware of his transfer 

through the basement. Plaintiff also fails to allege facts to 

support that the lack of surveillance, poor lighting, or 

inadequate staffing reflected deliberate indifference to a 

substantial threat to safety. Although Plaintiff has asserted 

that an inmate was stabbed in the basement one week prior to 

the assault on Plaintiff, there are no facts to show that the 

prior attack resulted from any failures on the part of 

Defendants, or that they were even aware of that incident. 

Moreover, Plaintiff’s assertion that Defendants have “a 

practice of failing to inform prisoners of legitimate death 

threats to avoid placing prisoners in protective custody” is not 

sufficient to support a claim because he does not allege facts 

to support that the alleged practice amounted to deliberate 

indifference of his constitutional right. 

Case 2:13-cv-01757-JJT Document 47 Filed 09/15/15 Page 7 of 13
- 8 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

(Doc. 31 at 10–11). 

 Plaintiff attempts to cure the deficiency by adding that the 2011 incident itself 

provided notice of systematic failures and that a series of assaults, rapes, stabbings and 

murders occurred during Defendant Ryan’s tenure. (Doc. 42 at 16). Plaintiff also alleges 

that he was assaulted again in 2014. Plaintiff sets forth various instances of inmates who 

requested protective segregation and were assaulted before protective custody was 

provided, and gives examples of instances of prison violence, stating that “these issues 

have been brought to the attention of ADC.” 

 A threat to safety claim requires a sufficiently culpable state of mind by the 

defendant, known as “deliberate indifference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 

(1994). Deliberate indifference is a higher standard than negligence or lack of ordinary 

due care for the prisoner’s safety. Id. at 835. To state a claim of deliberate indifference, 

Plaintiff must meet a two-part test. “First, the alleged constitutional deprivation must be, 

objectively, sufficiently serious”; and the “official’s act or omission must result in the 

denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Id. at 834 (internal 

quotations omitted). Second, the prison official must have a “sufficiently culpable state 

of mind,” i.e., he must act with “deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety.” Id. 

(internal quotations omitted). In defining “deliberate indifference” in this context, the 

Supreme Court has imposed a subjective test: “the official must both be aware of facts 

from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, 

and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837 (emphasis added). 

 To state a § 1983 claim based on a policy, practice, or custom, the Plaintiff must 

show that: (1) plaintiff was deprived of a constitutional right; (2) the entity had a policy 

or custom; (3) the policy or custom amounted to deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s 

constitutional right; and (4) the policy or custom was the “moving force behind the 

constitutional violation.” Mabe v. San Bernardino Cnty., Dep’t of Pub. Soc. Servs., 237 

F.3d 1101, 1110–11 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). 

Case 2:13-cv-01757-JJT Document 47 Filed 09/15/15 Page 8 of 13
- 9 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 Plaintiff cannot point to the September 7 assault and an assault in 2014, or 

unrelated instances of prison violence to show that Defendants were “aware of facts from 

which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists” or that 

Defendants actually drew the inference. Clearly they were not aware of the September 7, 

2011 assault or the 2014 assault prior to the September 7, 2011 assault. Plaintiff does not 

allege facts to support that any of the Defendants knew, or should have known, prior to 

the September 7 assault, that inmate Garcia posed a substantial threat to Plaintiff. 

Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to support an allegation that he was deprived of a 

constitutional right and that a policy or custom was the “motivating force behind the 

constitutional violation.” Plaintiff’s attempt to cure the deficiencies set forth in the 

Court’s prior order is insufficient and the proposed amendment is futile. 

V. Due Process 

 Plaintiff asserts a claim for violation of his Due Process rights against Defendants 

Gidcumb, Cisneros, Quintero, Washburn and Crabtree. Plaintiff alleges that on 

September 8, 2011, Defendants issued a false disciplinary report against Plaintiff in order 

to conceal the September 7th stabbing. Plaintiff was “interrogated” by Defendants 

Gidcumb and Quintero, and Defendant Quintero accused Plaintiff of “throwing punches 

at 4A20.” Plaintiff denied that he had instigated the assault and maintained that he was 

the victim. Defendant Quintero informed Plaintiff that the incident report stated that 

Plaintiff did throw punches. Defendant Brass stated that inmate Garcia had confessed to 

the stabbing. Defendants Gidcumb, Cisneros and Quintero did not include in their 

written reports and disciplinary report that they were not witnesses to the September 7 

incident. On November 15, 2011, Plaintiff appeared before Defendant Washburn, who 

would not allow Plaintiff to call witnesses relevant to his defense because Defendant 

Washburn found that they were “irrelevant.” Therefore, Defendant Washburn convicted 

Plaintiff without proof that he was guilty of the disciplinary infraction. Plaintiff contends 

that Defendants Gidcumb, Cisneros, Quintero and Washburn convicted Plaintiff based on 

“false charges.” Plaintiff was sentenced to a thirty-day loss of privileges and some of 

Case 2:13-cv-01757-JJT Document 47 Filed 09/15/15 Page 9 of 13
- 10 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Plaintiff’s personal property was impounded and subsequently lost. Plaintiff’s sentence 

also included a loss of thirty days of earned release credits, a ninety-day parole class, and 

thirty extra hours of duty. Plaintiff appealed the disciplinary conviction because the 

evidence allegedly did not support the conviction and he was denied his due process right 

to call witnesses. On December 7, 2011, Captain Barnes dismissed the disciplinary 

conviction because he found that the evidence did not support the conviction. On 

December 9, 2011, Defendant Crabtree “by and through [Defendant] Ryan forfeited 

eleven (11) earned release credit days for the alleged assault on inmate Garcia despite the 

conviction being overturn[ed].” Plaintiff claims Defendants did not ensure that the 

disciplinary charge was expunged, which resulted in that disciplinary charge acting “as a 

springboard for aggravating subsequent disciplinary hearings.” 

 Liberty interests which are protected by the Due Process Clause are “generally 

limited to freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an 

unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own 

force . . . nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation 

to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995) 

(internal citations omitted). 

 The Court previously held that Plaintiff was not entitled to any due process 

procedural protections because he did not suffer any atypical and significant hardships. 

(Doc. 31 at 11) (citing Sandlin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 487 (1995) (30 days’ 

disciplinary segregation is not atypical and significant); Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 

641, 654 (3rd Cir. 2002) (seven months of disciplinary confinement “does not, on its 

own, violate a protected liberty interest”); Jones v. Baker, 155 F.3d 810 (6th Cir. 1998) 

(two and one-half years’ administrative segregation is not atypical and significant); Rizzo 

v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 530 (9th Cir. 1985) (prison authorities may change a prisoner’s 

“place of confinement even though the degree of confinement may be different and 

prison life may be more disagreeable in one institution than in another” without violating 

a prisoner’s due process rights); Lucero v. Russell, 741 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir. 1984) 

Case 2:13-cv-01757-JJT Document 47 Filed 09/15/15 Page 10 of 13
- 11 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

(administrative transfer to maximum security without a hearing does not infringe on any 

protected liberty interest)). The Court also held that Plaintiff does not have a 

constitutional right to a particular security classification or to be housed in a particular 

yard. (Doc. 31 at 12) (citing Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976); Hernandez v. 

Johnston, 833 F.2d 1316, 1318 (9th Cir. 1987); Harbin-Bey v. Rutter, 420 F.3d 571, 577 

(6th Cir. 2005) (increase in security classification does not constitute an atypical and 

significant hardship because “a prisoner has no constitutional right to remain incarcerated 

in a particular prison or to be held in a specific security classification”)). 

 In his FAC, Plaintiff re-alleges the facts that the Court previously found 

insufficient to show that Plaintiff suffered any atypical and significant hardship. Plaintiff 

also alleges that he suffers from a pre-existing mental illness and that the isolated 

confinement of prisoners with serious mental illness violates the Eight Amendment. 

Even considering this allegation as a separate Eighth Amendment claim, Plaintiff fails to 

state a claim. Plaintiff states that “ADC security have classified Plaintiff with a serious 

mental health needs score of 3R, which requires a routine level of mental health services. 

Plaintiff continues to deteriorate while experiencing decreased cognitive functioning, 

severe depression, pepper sprayed repeatedly by chemical agents while on psychotropic 

medications and inadequate nutrition.” (Doc. 42 at 25). Plaintiff has failed to show that 

a defendant was “deliberately indifferent” to the Plaintiff’s “serious medical need.” See 

Hinkley v. Shumate, F. App’x , 2015 WL 5173040, at *1 (9th Cir. Sept. 4, 2015) 

(citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) ((“[A] prison official cannot be 

found liable under the Eighth Amendment . . . unless the official knows of and disregards 

an excessive risk to inmate health or safety[.]”); Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th 

Cir. 2011) (a supervisor is liable under § 1983 only if he is personally involved in the 

constitutional deprivation or there is a “sufficient causal connection between the 

supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation” (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted)); Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) (the 

causation analysis under § 1983 is “individualized and focus[es] on the duties and 

Case 2:13-cv-01757-JJT Document 47 Filed 09/15/15 Page 11 of 13
- 12 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have 

caused a constitutional deprivation”)). “Vague and conclusory allegations of official 

participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” 

Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982) (citations 

omitted). A liberal interpretation of a pro se civil rights complaint may not supply 

essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled. Id. 

VI. Request for Entry of Default 

 Plaintiff filed a Request for Entry of Default (Doc. 46), arguing that default should 

be entered against Defendant Gatlin for failure to defend. The Court’s Order (Doc. 31) 

entered on April 20, 2015, ordered Defendant Gatlin to answer Count Three of Plaintiff’s 

Third Amended Complaint. Before Defendant Gatlin was served, Plaintiff filed the 

current motion for leave to amend (Doc. 42) on June 12, 2015. Service was returned 

executed on Defendant Gatlin on July 21, 2015. Plaintiff’s request for entry of default 

should be denied and Defendant Gatlin should be ordered to answer Count Three of 

Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint at Doc. 29. 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend (Doc. 42), 

seeking leave to file the attached Fourth Amended Complaint, be denied. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s Request for Entry of 

Default (Doc. 46) be denied, and Defendant Gatlin be ordered to answer Count Three of 

Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint (Doc. 29) within 21 days of the District Court’s 

Order ruling on this Report and Recommendation. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. 

 Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall have 

fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within 

which to file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the parties have 

fourteen (14) days within which to file a response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, 

Case 2:13-cv-01757-JJT Document 47 Filed 09/15/15 Page 12 of 13
- 13 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Local Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the District of 

Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation may not exceed seventeen (17) 

pages in length. 

 Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate 

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal 

determinations of the Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to 

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law in an order or judgment 

entered pursuant to the recommendations of the Magistrate Judge. 

 Dated this 14th day of September, 2015. 

Honorable Deborah M. Fine

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 2:13-cv-01757-JJT Document 47 Filed 09/15/15 Page 13 of 13