Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01958/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01958-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1981 Civil Rights

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Darrell James Hill, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Promise Hospital of Phoenix., Jane Doe 1-

3; Secretary et al of the Treasury for the

Internal Revenue Service; Commissioner

et al for the Social Security

Administration, 

Defendant. 

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No. cv-09-1958-PHX-JAT

ORDER

Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Rule 60 Relief from Judgment due to the

Court’s sua sponte dismissal without prejudice of Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant

Promise Hospital of Phoenix, Inc. (“Defendant”). (Doc. #17). For the reasons identified

below, the Court affirms its order to dismiss without prejudice because of Plaintiff’s untimely

service of process. 

I. Background 

Plaintiff applied to work for Defendant as a registered nurse in February 2009. (Doc.

#1). Plaintiff alleges that he was not hired by Defendant due to Plaintiff’s religious beliefs

against working with a social security number. (Doc. #1; Doc. #20). Plaintiff further asserts

that his “religious beliefs and conscientious objections to reverence to support of the mark,

or number, of the ‘mark of the beast’ religious system includes, but is not limited to any

forced possession of or use of a Ssa/n [social security number].” (Doc. #20). Last, Plaintiff

alleges that Defendant has continued to hire similar or lesser qualified candidates for the

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1

Although Plaintiff refers to being “terminated,” the Court assumes that Plaintiff is

actually asserting that he was not hired due to his religious convictions rather than being fired

for his religious beliefs. 

2

On February 9, Plaintiff had served only Defendant Secretary of the Treasury for the

Internal Revenue Service, Defendant Commissioner for the Social Security Administration,

and the United States Attorney General. Plaintiff’s evidence indicating service states

“Acceptance, February 08, 2010, 5:05pm, PHOENIX, AZ 85013.” (Doc. 16, p. 5). 

3

This method of service does comply with Fl. Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 1.070 for

effectuating service. However, the Court need not reach the method of service, only the

timeliness. 

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same work from which Plaintiff was “terminated.”1

 (Doc. #16). 

Plaintiff filed his complaint on September 18, 2009. (Doc. #1). The Clerk of the

Court issued Summons as to the Commissioner of Social Security, Promise Hospital of

Phoenix, Inc., and the Secretary of the Treasury. 

On January 19, 2010, Plaintiff made a Motion for Extension of Time for Service.

(Doc. #5). Two days later, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion. (Doc. #6). The Court

instructed Plaintiff to complete service by February 8, 2010, per Plaintiff’s request of twenty

extra days. (Doc. #6). A copy of the Court’s order was mailed to Plaintiff the day the order

was filed. 

On February 8, 2010, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint against Defendants. (Doc.

#7). The Clerk of the Court issued another summons for the Amended Complaint. Also on

February 8, Plaintiff served the Defendant Secretary of the Treasury for the Internal Revenue

Service, Defendant Commissioner for the Social Security Administration, and the United

States Attorney General by certified mail. (Doc. #10). The next day, Plaintiff moved for

another extension of time for remaining postal delivery to Defendants.2

 

On February 16, 2010, the Court ordered that Plaintiff show cause why the case

should not be dismissed for failing to serve Defendants within the time limits proscribed by

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) as extended by the Court. (Doc. #9 (citing Doc. #6)).

On February 17, 2010, Plaintiff served Promises Hospital in Florida by certified mail.3

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By dismissing the claim against this Defendant, the Court rendered Plaintiff’s Motion

for Extension moot. (Doc. #13). 

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(Doc. #11). 

The Show Cause Hearing occurred on March 1, 2010. (Doc. #13). After the Show

Cause Hearing, the Court acknowledged that service upon both the U.S. Treasury and Social

Security Administration was accomplished. (Id.). The Court dismissed without prejudice

Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Promise Hospital for failure to serve in a timely fashion.4

(Id.). Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration from this interlocutory order follows. (Doc. #

17; see also Doc. #21). 

II. Discussion

A. Rule 60 Motion 

Plaintiff’s Motion for FRCP Rule 60 Relief of Judgment is in error because the Court

has not issued a final judgment. Rather, the Court dismissed Defendant in an interlocutory

order, not a final judgment. (Doc. #13). An interlocutory order can only be reconsidered.

Rule 60 states that: 

On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal

representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following

reasons:

(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; 

(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have

been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); 

(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation,

or misconduct by an opposing party; 

(4) the judgment is void; 

(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an

earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively

is no longer equitable; or 

(6) any other reason that justifies relief.

FED.R.CIV.P. 60 (emphasis added). As indicated in the text, Rule 60 is only appropriate

when there has been a final judgment or order. When composing Rule 60(b), the Advisory

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If a rule of civil procedure requires interpretation, a court may refer to the Advisory

Committee Notes accompanying Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule

1 et seq., 28 U.S.C.A.

6

The Court notes that Plaintiff is a pro se litigant. As such, the Court will address

arguments Plaintiff could have made. 

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Committee5 noted: 

The addition of the qualifying word ‘final’ emphasizes the character of the

judgments, orders or proceedings from which Rule 60(b) affords relief; and

hence interlocutory judgments are not brought within the restrictions of the

rule [60], but rather they are left subject to the complete power of the court

rendering them to afford such relief from them as justice requires.

Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure

§ 2852; see Catlin v. U.S., 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945) (holding that because the court’s order

did not end the litigation on the merits and leave nothing for the court to do but execute the

judgment, the challenged order is not a final judgment or appealable interlocutory order). 

Because interlocutory orders, like the Court’s sua sponte dismissal are not final

judgments for the purposes of Rule 60, Plaintiff cannot avail himself of FED.R.CIV.P. 60.

B. Reconsideration

Instead of relief from judgment, Plaintiff presumably moves the Court to reconsider

a previous order.6

 This Court has adopted standards for when motions for reconsideration

should be granted based upon common Ninth Circuit authority. According to this Court’s

precedent, one of the following four factors must be met in order for a motion for

reconsideration to be granted:

(1) There are material differences in fact or law from that presented to the

Court and, at the time of the Court's decision, the party moving for

reconsideration could not have known of the factual or legal differences

through reasonable diligence; 

(2) There are new material facts that happened after the Court's decision; 

(3) There has been a change in the law that was decided or enacted after the

Court's decision; or 

(4) The movant makes a convincing showing that the Court failed to consider

material facts that were presented to the Court before the Court's decision. 

No motion for reconsideration shall repeat in any manner any oral or written

argument made in support of or in opposition to the original motion.

Motorola, Inc. v. J.B. Rogers Mech. Contractors, Inc., 215 F.R.D. 581, 586 (D. Ariz. 2003).

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7

 Plaintiff’s evidence of certified mail stated “Acceptance, February 17, 2010, 3:29pm,

MESA, AZ 85206.”

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The underlying policy rationale for this test is that the Court will not consider motions for

reconsideration based on arguments already presented to and rejected by the Court. 

Plaintiff has not asserted, nor do there exist, material differences in fact or law from

the time the Court ordered dismissal. Furthermore, Plaintiff reasserts many of the same

arguments made at the Show Cause Hearing on March 1, 2010. (Doc. #17; Doc. #21; see Tr.

p.10-11). As a result and because service was untimely as outlined below, the Court denies

Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration and affirms its March 1, 2010 Order to dismiss

Plaintiff’s claim without prejudice. 

C. Timeliness

Plaintiff asserts that his service upon Defendant wastimely under FED.R.CIV.P. 4(m).

However, Plaintiff did not abide by the strictures of Rule 4(m) for serving the complaint

upon Defendant Promise Hospital, Inc. (See Doc. #11; see also Doc. #13). As such, the

Court affirms its dismissal. Rule 4(m) states: 

If a defendant is not served within 120 days after the complaint is filed, the

court — on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff — must dismiss

the action without prejudice against that defendant or order that service be

made within a specified time. But if the plaintiff shows good cause for the

failure, the court must extend the time for service for an appropriate period.

This subdivision (m) does not apply to service in a foreign country under Rule

4(f) or 4(j)(1). 

FED.R.CIV.P. 4(m). 

Plaintiff asserts that he is in compliance with FRCP rules 4(b) and 4(m) because “the

complaint was filed on February 8, 2010.” (Doc. # 17, p. 8, line 8). Plaintiff is mistaken.

Plaintiff filed his complaint on September 18, 2009. (Doc. #1). Plaintiff then filed his

amended complaint on February 8, 2010. (Doc. #7) (emphasis added). Plaintiff then served

Defendant Promise Hospital Inc. on February 17, 2010 as indicated on the certified mail

postmark.7

 (Doc. #11, p. 2). 

Presumably, Plaintiff argues that filing an amended complaint on February 8, 2010

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8

 Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint does not add any new defendants. (Compare Doc.

#1 with Doc. #7).

9

 The Court notes that Plaintiff did effectuate the proper method of service to

Defendant as per FRCP 4(h)(1)(A) and FRCP 4(e)(1). Because Defendant is incorporated

in Florida, Plaintiff is permitted to serve the Defendant corporation following the state law

of Florida as per FRCP 4(e)(1). Florida Rules of Civil Procedure 1.070(I) states, “(I)

Service of Process by Mail. A defendant may accept service of process by mail.”

Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.070(I). Plaintiff served Defendant on February 17, 2010 by USPO CMN

(certified mail) (Doc. #11). Defendant accepted service of process on February, 19, 2010.

(Doc. #11). This method complies with Florida rules; however, service is still untimely.

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restarted Rule 4(m)’s requirement of 120 days to serve defendants. However, Rule 4(m)

clearly states that the complaint, not the amended complaint, must be served within 120 days.

FED.R.CIV.P. 4(m). “[T]he 120-day period provided by Rule 4(m) is not restarted by the

filing of an amended complaint except as to those defendants newly added in the amended

complaint.”8

 Bolden v. Cty. of Topeka, 441 F.3d 1129, 1148 (10th Cir. 2006) (citing Charles

Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1137, at 377 (3d ed.

2002)). As this Court has already articulated at the Show Cause Hearing (Tr. p. 10, lines 15-

25), Plaintiff failed to serve the complaint on Defendant within the requisite 120 days from

September 18, 2009 and by the extended time frame of February 8, 2010 granted by the

Court. Therefore, dismissal without prejudice is warranted for Plaintiff’s claim against

Defendant Promise Hospital of Phoenix, Inc.9

D. Extension of Time for Cause

Although Plaintiff has not explicitly argued for an extension of time because of good

cause, Plaintiff makes reference to his due process rights in his motion. (Doc. #17). In

addition, Plaintiff noted in his original Motion for Extension of Time for Service that “[his]

42 U.S.C. § 1983 cause of action is a complex case for Plaintiff.” (Doc. #5). But because

Plaintiff has not stated good cause for why his service upon Defendant Promise Hospital of

Phoenix, Inc. was untimely, the Court affirms its dismissal.

 A district court must grant an extension where good cause is shown, it may also grant

a discretionary extension absent such showing. See Zapata v. City of N.Y., 502 F.3d 192,

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196 (citing Henderson v. U.S., 517 U.S. 654, 662-63 (1996)). Because the authority to grant

an extension absent a showing of good cause is purely discretionary, the District Court is not

required to grant an extension pursuant to Henderson. See id. at 197-99. On January 19,

2010, Plaintiff made a motion for extension of time for service. (Doc. #5). In his motion,

Plaintiff requested twenty days. (Doc. #5, ¶ 6). The Court granted Plaintiff’s exact request

of twenty days. (Doc. #6). 

Plaintiff has not shown good cause for why service of process could not have been

served in a timely fashion by the extended deadline of February 8, 2010. Furthermore, the

Court did not find the requisite excusable neglect to justify allowing more time during the

Show Cause Hearing. (Tr. p. 9, line 7-8). The Court therefore affirms its denial of another

extension of time. Plaintiff asserts that the Court’s dismissal of Defendant prejudices

Plaintiff’s substantive rights. However, enforcing the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does

not violate Plaintiff’s substantive rights. Nor is prejudice a basis for granting a motion for

reconsideration. 

III. Conclusion

The Court affirms its Order of March 1, 2010 to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim against

Defendant Promise Hospital of Phoenix, Inc. because Plaintiff did not timely serve Promise

Hospital.

Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Rule 60 Relief. (Doc. #17). 

DATED this 28th day of June, 2010.

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