Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_16-cv-00420/USCOURTS-cand-5_16-cv-00420-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 422
Nature of Suit: Bankruptcy Appeals Rule 28 USC 158
Cause of Action: 28:0158 Notice of Appeal re Bankruptcy Matter (BAP)

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

JOHN VITALICH,

Appellant,

v.

THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, 

fka BANK OF NEW YORK,

Appellee.

Case No. 16-cv-00420-BLF 

ORDER AFFIRMING BANKRUPTCY

COURT’S ORDER ON MOTION FOR 

AN ORDER CONFIRMING NO 

AUTOMATIC STAY IN EFFECT

Debtor/Appellant John Vitalich, proceeding pro se, has appealed an order of the 

Bankruptcy Court holding that the automatic stay terminated on December 6, 2015 with respect to 

the interest of Appellee BNY Mellon1in certain property of the bankruptcy estate, specifically, a 

parcel of real property located in Seaside, California (“the Seaside property”). The appeal turns on 

the question of whether the Bankruptcy Court properly applied 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(A) to 

terminate the automatic stay not only as to the debtor and the debtor’s property, but also as to the 

property of the bankruptcy estate. For the reasons discussed below, the Bankruptcy Court’s order 

is AFFIRMED.

 I. BACKGROUND

Vitalich has filed serial bankruptcy cases and adversary proceedings which have prevented 

BNY Mellon from foreclosing on the Seaside property for more than eight years. Vitalich filed 

the Chapter 11 petition in the current case on November 6, 2015. Petition, Appellee’s Suppl. 

 

1

For the sake of convenience, the Court uses the shortened name “BNY Mellon” to refer to 

Appellee The Bank of New York Mellon, fka Bank of New York, as Trustee, on behalf of the 

registered holders of Alternative Loan Trust 2006-OC3, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, 

Series 2006-OC3, its assignees and/or successors, by and through its servicing agent Select 

Portfolio Servicing, Inc.

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Appx. Tab BDE #1, ECF 27-2.2 On December 1, 2015, Vitalich filed a “Motion for an Order to 

Extend or Impose the Automatic Stay in Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3) [or (4)],” stating that 

absent further order of the Bankruptcy Court, the automatic stay would terminate on December 6, 

2015. Motion for an Order to Extend or Impose the Automatic Stay, Appellee’s Suppl. Appx. Tab 

BDE #21, ECF 27-4. The statute referenced in the caption of Vitalich’s motion, 11 U.S.C. § 

362(c)(3), provides in relevant part that when a debtor files a second bankruptcy case within one 

year after dismissal of an earlier bankruptcy case, the automatic stay “shall terminate with respect 

to the debtor on the 30th day after the filing of the later case.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(A). Upon 

the motion of any party in interest, and if notice is given and a hearing held before expiration of 

the thirty-day period, the court may extend the stay as to any or all creditors if the moving party 

demonstrates that the filing of the later case is in good faith as to the creditors to be stayed. 11 

U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(B).3

Vitalich stated in his motion before the Bankruptcy Court that he had filed a prior Chapter 

11 case in August 2015 which had been dismissed in September 2015, less than one year before 

his filing of the current Chapter 11 case. Motion for an Order to Extend or Impose the Automatic 

Stay, Appellee’s Suppl. Appx. Tab BDE #21, ECF 27-4. Vitalich stated that as a result of the 

prior bankruptcy case, the automatic stay in the present case would terminate on December 6, 

2016. Id. He requested that the Bankruptcy Court extend or impose the automatic stay as to all 

creditors. Id. The Bankruptcy Court denied Vitalich’s motion and his subsequent motion for 

reconsideration of that ruling. BR Docket, Appellee’s Suppl. Appx. Tab BDE DKT, ECF 27-1. 

Both the initial ruling and the denial of reconsideration were made orally on the record without 

written order. Id. 

 

2 Appellee’s Supplemental Appendix uses tabs keyed to the bankruptcy docket. Thus Vitalich’s 

Chapter 11 petition, the first document filed in the bankruptcy case, is identified by a tab marked 

“BDE #1,” which stands for “Bankruptcy Docket Entry No. 1.”

3 Vitalich’s motion referenced not only § 362(c)(3), discussed above, but also § 362(c)(4). 

However, § 362(c)(4) provides in relevant part that when a debtor files a bankruptcy case within 

one year after dismissal of two or more earlier bankruptcy cases, the automatic stay “shall not go 

into effect upon the filing of the later case.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4)(A). Vitalich’s motion stated 

expressly that he had only one bankruptcy case pending in the one-year period before filing the 

present case, rendering § 362(c)(4) inapplicable. 

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On December 8, 2015, BNY Mellon filed a motion seeking confirmation that under 

§ 362(c)(3)(A) the automatic stay had terminated on December 6, 2015, thirty days after the filing 

of the present bankruptcy case. Motion for an Order Stating no Automatic Stay in Effect or, 

Alternatively, for Relief from Automatic Stay and Sanctions against the Debtor, Appellee’s Suppl. 

Appx. Tab BDE #30, ECF 27-6. BNY Mellon alternatively requested relief from the automatic 

stay. Id. 

On December 31, 2015, the Bankruptcy Court issued the written order that is the subject of 

the present appeal, titled “Order on Motion for an Order Confirming No Automatic Stay in 

Effect.” Order on Motion for an Order Confirming No Automatic Stay in Effect, Appellee’s 

Suppl. Appx. Tab BDE #39, ECF 27-7. In that order the Bankruptcy Court held that “the 

automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362 expired on 12/6/15” with respect to BNY Mellon’s 

interest in the Seaside property, and that BNY Mellon “may complete its foreclosure of said real 

property and proceed with post-foreclosure remedies, including any unlawful detainer action.” Id. 

The Bankruptcy Court did not address BNY Mellon’s alternative request for relief from the 

automatic stay. Id.

Vitalich timely appealed the Bankruptcy Court’s order and elected to have the appeal heard 

by the district court rather than the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel. Notice of Appeal and Statement 

of Election, Appellee’s Suppl. Appx. Tab BDE #43, ECF 27-8. Both the Bankruptcy Court and 

this Court denied Vitalich’s motions for a stay pending appeal. Order on Debtor’s Motion for Stay 

Pending an Appeal, Appellee’s Suppl. Appx. Tab BDE #77, ECF 27-10; Order Denying 

Appellant’s Emergency Motion for Stay Pending Appeal, ECF 23. It is unclear whether BNY 

Mellon has foreclosed on the Seaside property or otherwise acted to enforce its interest in the 

property. The bankruptcy case is ongoing. 

 II. ISSUE PRESENTED 

The single issue on appeal is whether the Bankruptcy Court erred as a matter of law in

holding that the automatic stay expired as to the Seaside property, which is property of the 

bankruptcy estate, thirty days after the present bankruptcy case was filed. While Vitalich’s prior 

filings in the Bankruptcy Court reflected a belief that § 362(c)(3)(A) applied to the Seaside 

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property, he now takes the position that § 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the automatic stay only as to the 

debtor and debtor’s property but not as to property of the estate.4 

 III. JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction to hear appeals “from final judgments, orders, and decrees” of 

bankruptcy courts. 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). The Ninth Circuit has “adopted a pragmatic approach

to finality in bankruptcy . . . [that] emphasizes the need for immediate review, rather than whether 

the order is technically interlocutory.” In re Rosson, 545 F.3d 764, 769 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted) (alterations in original). “[A] bankruptcy court order is 

considered to be final and thus appealable where it 1) resolves and seriously affects substantive 

rights and 2) finally determines the discrete issue to which it is addressed.” Id. (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted) (alterations in original).

Neither party addresses the issue of whether the Bankruptcy Court’s Order on Motion for 

an Order Confirming No Automatic Stay in Effect is a final, appealable order, although BNY 

Mellon asserts conclusorily that this Court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

158. The Court has been unable to discover a case specifically addressing the appealability of a 

bankruptcy court’s order confirming termination of the automatic stay under § 362(c)(3)(A). 

Unpublished decisions of the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (“BAP”) have treated 

such orders as appealable without discussion. See, e.g, In re Genaro, Nos. AK-06-1358-ZRB, 06-

00198, 2007 WL 7535064 (9th Cir. BAP 2007). A published decision of the Ninth Circuit BAP 

addressed the proper interpretation of § 362(c)(3)(A) on appeal, but in the context of an appeal 

from the bankruptcy court’s order denying the debtor’s motion for damages for violation of the 

automatic stay, not in the context of a freestanding order confirming termination of the automatic 

stay. See In re Reswick, 446 B.R. 362 (9th Cir. BAP 2011).

 

4 Vitalich’s briefing identifies a number of other issues that he appears to believe are encompassed 

by his appeal, including whether BNY Mellon has legal standing to seek relief from the automatic 

stay, foreclose on the Seaside property, and institute unlawful detainer proceedings. Vitalich also 

asserts that the Bankruptcy Court erred in denying his motion to extend or impose the automatic 

stay and his motion for reconsideration of the Bankruptcy Court’s ruling. Those issues are outside 

the scope of the appeal, which is limited to the Bankruptcy Court’s Order on Motion for an Order

Confirming No Automatic Stay in Effect, Bankruptcy Docket Entry 39. See Notice of Appeal and 

Statement of Election, Appellee’s Suppl. Appx. BDE #43, ECF 27-8. 

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This Court concludes that an order confirming termination of the automatic stay under 

§ 362(c)(3)(A) is final and appealable, as such an order “resolves and seriously affects substantive 

rights” and “finally determines the discrete issue to which it is addressed.” See Rosson, 545 F.3d 

at 769. This conclusion is consistent with the cases cited above, and with Ninth Circuit cases

holding that “[o]rders granting or denying relief from the automatic stay are deemed to be final 

orders.” In re Nat’l Envtl. Waste Corp., 129 F.3d 1052, 1054 (9th Cir. 1997). While the 

Bankruptcy Court’s order in this case did not grant or deny relief from the automatic stay, but 

rather confirmed its termination as a matter of law, the issues are so closely related that this Court 

is of the view that the Ninth Circuit likewise would conclude that orders confirming termination of 

the automatic stay under § 362(c)(3)(A) are final and appealable.

 IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews the Bankruptcy Court’s conclusions of law de novo and findings of fact 

for clear error. In re Sunnyslope Hous. Ltd. P’ship, 818 F.3d 937, 945 (9th Cir. 2016). Because 

there were no factual disputes regarding the filing date of the current bankruptcy case or the 

pendency of a prior bankruptcy case within the one-year period preceding the filing of the current 

case, the Bankruptcy Court’s order confirming termination of the automatic stay turned on the 

purely legal issue of whether § 362(c)(3)(A) applies to property of the estate such as the Seaside 

property. This Court reviews the Bankruptcy Court’s determination of that legal issue de novo. 

BNY Mellon characterizes the Bankruptcy Court’s Order on Motion for an Order 

Confirming No Automatic Stay in Effect as “an order granting relief from the automatic stay,” and 

based upon that characterization asserts that the standard of review is abuse of discretion. See 

Moldo v. Matsco, Inc. (In re Cybernetic Servs.), 252 F.3d 1039, 1045 (9th Cir. 2001) (“We review 

for abuse of discretion orders granting relief from an automatic stay.”). However, the Bankruptcy 

Court’s order did not grant relief from the automatic stay – it determined that the automatic stay 

had expired. Because the Bankruptcy Court’s order was based upon a conclusion of law rather 

than the exercise of its discretion, this Court concludes that the appropriate standard of review is 

de novo rather than abuse of discretion. See In re Genaro, 2007 WL 7535064, at *1 (applying de 

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novo standard).5

 V. DISCUSSION

A. Untimeliness of Opening Brief on Appeal

BNY Mellon asserts that Vitalich’s appeal should be dismissed for failure to timely file the 

opening brief. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8018(a)(4) (district court may dismiss appeal for failure to 

file brief on time). Vitalich filed his opening brief on April 30, 2016, one day beyond the April 

29, 2016 deadline set by the Court upon Vitalich’s second request for an extension of time. See

Appellant’s Opening Brief, ECF 13; Order Granting Appellant’s Second Request for an Extension 

of Time to File Opening Brief on Appeal, ECF 12. In light of Vitalich’s pro se status, and absent 

any demonstrated prejudice to BNY Mellon, the Court declines to dismiss the appeal on this basis.

B. Scope of § 362(c)(3)(A)

The scope of § 362(c)(3)(A) is an open question which has been addressed by two lines of 

cases. The Ninth Circuit BAP has described those two lines of cases as the “majority” view, under 

which § 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the automatic stay only with respect to the debtor and debtor’s 

property but not with respect to property of the estate, and the “minority” view, under which 

§ 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the automatic stay in its entirety, that is, with respect to the debtor, 

debtor’s property, and property of the estate. See In re Reswick, 446 B.R. 362, 365-66 (9th Cir. 

BAP 2011). The Ninth Circuit BAP adopted the minority view in its Reswick opinion. See id. at 

373. However, decisions of the BAP are not binding on this Court. See In re Silverman, 616 F.3d 

1001, 1005 (9th Cir. 2010) 

Most bankruptcy courts within the Ninth Circuit have followed Reswick in determining 

that § 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the automatic stay in its entirety. See, e.g., In re Wilson, No. 15-

01642-FPC7, 2016 WL 3751620, at *3 n.6 (Bankr. E.D. Wa. July 7, 2016); In re Whitescorn, No. 

13-60159-fra13, 2013 WL 1121393, at *2 (Bankr. D. Ore. Mar. 14, 2013); In re Smith, 481 B.R. 

633, 636 n.4 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2012); In re Jackola, No. 11-01278, 2011 WL 2518930, at *3 

 

5

In this particular case, it makes no practical difference which standard of review is applied. As 

discussed below, this Court affirms the Bankruptcy Court’s order under the de novo standard, and 

thus would affirm under the more deferential abuse of discretion standard as well.

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(Bankr. D. Haw. June 22, 2011). This Court is aware of one bankruptcy court within the Ninth 

Circuit that has declined to follow Reswick and instead has adopted the majority view. See In re 

Rinard, 451 B.R. 12 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2011). Given the lack of binding precedent and the split of 

authority, this Court must perform its own statutory construction of § 362(c)(3)(A). In doing so, 

this Court treats Reswick as persuasive authority. See In re Silverman, 616 F.3d at 1005 (Ninth 

Circuit “treat[s] the BAP’s decisions as persuasive authority given its special expertise in 

bankruptcy issues and to promote uniformity of bankruptcy law throughout the Ninth Circuit”).

Section 362(c)(3)(A) provides as follows:

if a single or joint case is filed by or against a debtor who is an individual in a case 

under chapter 7, 11, or 13, and if a single or joint case of the debtor was pending 

within the preceding 1-year period but was dismissed, other than a case refiled 

under a chapter other than chapter 7 after dismissal under section 707(b)—

(A) the stay under subsection (a) with respect to any action taken with respect to 

a debt or property securing such debt or with respect to any lease shall terminate 

with respect to the debtor on the 30th day after the filing of the later case.

11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(A) (emphasis added). 

1. Principles of Statutory Construction

“It is well established that when the statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the 

courts – at least where the disposition required by the text is not absurd – is to enforce it according 

to its terms.” Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004) (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted). “The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by 

reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the 

broader context of the statute as a whole.” Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997); 

see also Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 942 F.2d 1427, 1432 (9th 

Cir. 1991) (“[W]e must interpret statutes as a whole, giving effect to each word and making every 

effort not to interpret a provision in a manner that renders other provisions of the same statute 

inconsistent, meaningless or superfluous.”). When a statute is ambiguous, a court construing it 

“may seek guidance in the statutory structure [and] relevant legislative history.” Florida Power & 

Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 737 (1985).

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2. Construction of § 362(c)(3)(A)

The majority interpretation concludes that the phrase “with respect to the debtor” draws an 

unambiguous distinction between the debtor and debtor’s property on the one hand and the 

property of the estate on the other. See Reswick, 446 B.R. at 366 (collecting cases). Given this 

distinction, the majority view is that on the thirtieth day after the later bankruptcy case is filed, the 

automatic stay terminates only with respect to the debtor and the debtor’s property but not as to 

property of the estate. See In re Jumpp, 356 B.R. 789, 796 (1st Cir. BAP 2006) (concluding “that 

this portion of section 362(c)(3)(A) is unambiguous”); In re Rinard, 451 B.R. at 20 (“There is no 

mention of the Estate in the text. There are no fuzzy words; there are no hanging paragraphs; 

there are no words requiring a dictionary.”); In re Jones, 339 B.R. 360, 363 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 

2006) (“Section 362(c)(3)(A) provides that the stay terminates ‘with respect to the debtor.’ How 

could that be any clearer?”).

The minority interpretation acknowledges that the construction urged by the majority is 

reasonable but concludes that there are other reasonable constructions. See Reswick, 446 B.R. at 

366 (collecting cases). Noting that § 362(c)(3) begins by referencing “a single or joint case,” the 

cases following the minority view point out that the phrase “with respect to the debtor” in § 

362(c)(3)(A) may simply distinguish between the debtor and the debtor’s spouse. See In re 

Daniel, 404 B.R. 318, 326 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2009) (“In a joint case, it may be that one of the 

spouses (a ‘serially-filing’ spouse) had a prior bankruptcy case dismissed within a year of the 

pending filing, while the other (a ‘newly-filing’ spouse) did not.”); In re Jupiter, 344 B.R. 754, 

759 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2006) (“[I]n a joint case, a ‘debtor’ may not necessarily mean both debtors if 

one debtor did not have a case dismissed within the year prior to the current petition date.”). 

Under this interpretation, on the thirtieth day after the later bankruptcy case is filed, the automatic 

stay terminates entirely, but only as to the debtor who filed the earlier bankruptcy case. The joint 

debtor who did not file the earlier bankruptcy case would remain fully protected.

This Court agrees that both the interpretations discussed above are reasonable and thus that 

the plain reading approach urged by the majority does not resolve the question of how § 

362(c)(3)(A) should be construed. “A statute is ambiguous . . . if it is subject to more than one 

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reasonable interpretation.” John v. United States, 247 F.3d 1032, 1042 (9th Cir. 2001). The 

Court therefore seeks guidance in the statutory structure and the legislative history.

Section 362(c)(3) and the following section, § 362(c)(4), were added to the Bankruptcy 

Code by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (“BAPCPA”), 

which was enacted by Congress “to correct perceived abuses of the bankruptcy system.” Milavetz, 

Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 231-32 (2010); Reswick, 446 B.R. at 372. 

Section 302 of the BAPCPA, which added §§ 362(c)(3) and 362(c)(4), was titled “Discouraging 

Bad Faith Repeat Filings.” Reswick, 446 B.R. at 372. Under preexisting § 362(a), a debtor who 

files a bankruptcy case ordinarily is entitled to the protection of the automatic stay during the 

pendency of the bankruptcy proceedings. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). Section 362(c)(3), added by the 

BAPCPA, limits that protection for a repeat filer who files a bankruptcy case within one year of 

dismissal of an earlier bankruptcy case, terminating the automatic stay on the thirtieth day after the 

filing of the later case. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(A). Section 362(c)(4), also added by the BAPCPA,

eliminates the protection altogether for a repeat filer who files a bankruptcy case within one year 

of dismissal of two or more earlier bankruptcy cases, providing that the automatic stay “shall not 

go into effect upon the filing of the later case.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(4)(A). 

It appears inconsistent with this scheme of deterrence to permit a repeat filer falling within 

§ 362(c)(3)(A) to retain the protection of the automatic stay for property of the bankruptcy estate, 

which as a practical matter usually consists of all significant assets. The Reswick court observed 

that such an interpretation “would provide no meaningful relief to creditors in chapter 13 cases, 

where repeat filings are most prevalent.” Reswick, 446 B.R. at 368. The Reswick court explained 

that “[c]reditors in a chapter 13 case could take no action against property that the debtor owned at 

the time the case was commenced, because it is property of the estate under section 541(a)(1), and 

they could take no action against property that the debtor acquired post-petition because it would 

also constitute property of the estate under section 1306(a).” Id. (footnotes omitted).

As discussed above, the majority view is that the text of the statute is so plain that no 

consideration of legislative history or purpose is required. However, to the extent that the cases 

adopting the majority view take up those issues, they conclude that the majority interpretation “is 

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also consistent with the policies behind bankruptcy law.” Rinard, 451 B.R. at 19 (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). Those cases conclude that the core policy of bankruptcy

law is obtaining equitable distribution for creditors, and they observe that this policy would be 

circumvented “by allowing a single creditor, who may be oversecured, full access to property that 

would otherwise be property of the estate.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

While that concern is a serious one, this Court does not find it likely that Congress would address 

it by offering protection to creditors of a repeat filer with one prior case under § 362(c)(3), while 

offering no protection to creditors of a repeat filer with two or more prior cases under § 362(c)(4). 

Moreover, Congress did address the possibility of a single oversecured creditor by providing that 

any “party in interest” may seek to extend the automatic stay before it terminates under § 

362(c)(3)(A) or to impose the automatic stay that otherwise would not take effect under § 

362(c)(4)(A). See 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(B), 362(c)(4)(B).

Having considered the language of the statute itself, the statutory structure, the legislative 

intent, the cases articulating both the majority and minority views, and in particular the Ninth 

Circuit BAP’s lengthy and well-reasoned opinion discussing all of the above, this Court concludes 

that § 362(c)(3)(A) terminates the automatic stay entirely and not only with respect to the debtor 

and the debtor’s property. Accordingly, this Court concludes that the Bankruptcy Court did not 

err in entering its Order on Motion for an Order Confirming No Automatic Stay in Effect.

C. BNY Mellon’s Alternative Request for Relief from Stay 

BNY Mellon argues that regardless of the correct interpretation of § 362(c)(3)(A), this 

Court may affirm the Bankruptcy’s Court’s Order on Motion for an Order Confirming No 

Automatic Stay in Effect on the alternative ground that the Bankruptcy Court could have granted 

BNY Mellon discretionary relief from the automatic stay. BNY Mellon relies on Keniston v. 

Roberts, 717 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1983), and Leptich v. City College of San Francisco, 134 F.3d 

378, 1998 WL 22037 (Jan. 15, 1998) (table), for the proposition that a lower court’s decision must 

be affirmed if correct, even if the lower court relied upon the wrong reason for its ruling. 

BNY Mellon’s reliance on Keniston and Leptich is misplaced. In Keniston, the Ninth 

Circuit concluded that the district court had erred in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction but 

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went on to determine whether dismissal could be upheld on a different legal ground, failure to 

state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Keniston, 717 F.2d at 1300. The Ninth Circuit 

concluded that dismissal could not be upheld on the basis of failure to state a claim, because it was 

not clear that amendment would be futile. Id. In Leptich, the Ninth Circuit held that the district 

court had erred in dismissing based upon the plaintiff’s failure to raise her Americans with 

Disabilities Act claim in her administrative complaint, but it affirmed the dismissal because the 

plaintiff’s administrative complaint was untimely. Leptich, 1998 WL 22037, at *2. In both 

Keniston and Leptich, the Ninth Circuit considered whether the order of dismissal actually issued

by the district court could be upheld based upon a different legal basis than was articulated in the 

order. In the present case, BNY Mellon requests that this Court consider whether an order 

granting relief from stay that was not issued by the Bankruptcy Court could have been issued

based upon the record that existed at the time. BNY Mellon’s request goes beyond the scope of 

Keniston and Leptich, and this Court declines to determine in the first instance on appeal whether 

discretionary relief from stay could have or should have been granted by the Bankruptcy Court.

Accordingly, this Court concludes that BNY Mellon’s alternative request for relief from 

stay does not provide a basis for affirming the Bankruptcy Court’s order. However, as discussed 

above, the Court affirms the Bankruptcy Court’s order on the basis that the Bankruptcy Court 

correctly interpreted § 362(c)(3)(A).

 VI. ORDER

The Bankruptcy Court’s Order on Motion for an Order Confirming No Automatic Stay in 

Effect is AFFIRMED. The Clerk of the Court shall close the file.

Dated: August 10, 2016

 ______________________________________

BETH LABSON FREEMAN

United States District Judge

Case 5:16-cv-00420-BLF Document 32 Filed 08/10/16 Page 11 of 11