Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-11-99003/USCOURTS-ca9-11-99003-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 

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FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LEZMOND C. MITCHELL,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent-Appellee.

No. 11-99003

D.C. No.

3:09-cv-08089-MHM

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Mary H. Murguia, Circuit Judge, Presiding*

Argued and Submitted February 20, 2014

Submission Vacated February 27, 2014

Resubmitted April 21, 2015

Pasadena, California

Filed June 19, 2015

Before: Stephen Reinhardt, Barry G. Silverman,

and Kim McLane Wardlaw, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Silverman;

Partial Dissent by Judge Reinhardt

 

*

 The Honorable Mary H. Murguia, then a district court judge, was the

original trial judge in 2003 and presided over the 28 U.S.C. § 2255

proceedings that concluded in 2010. She was appointed to the United

States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in 2011.

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2 MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES

SUMMARY**

Habeas Corpus/Death Penalty

The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of federal

prisoner Lezmond Mitchell’s 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion

challenging his convictions under the Major Crimes Act for

multiple offenses committed on the Navajo reservation

including two counts of first-degree murder and multiple

counts of robbery, and his conviction and death sentence

under the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994 for carjacking

resulting in death.

The § 2255 motion claimed that counsel was ineffective

(1) at the guilt phase of the trial in failing to assert an

intoxication defense, and (2) at the penalty phase for

inadequately investigating, and for choosing not to present

evidence of, Mitchell’s mental health, history of substance

abuse, and troubled upbringing. 

The panel agreed with the district court that counsel did

not fall below professional standards in either their

investigation of a possible intoxication defense or their

decision to pursue a different defense strategy of trying to

portray Mitchell’s accomplice as the main malefactor.

With respect to the penalty phase of the case, the panel

also agreed with the district court that Mitchell’s legal team

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES 3

made a more-than-adequate investigation of possible

mitigation, including his mental health and social history. 

Dissenting in part, Judge Reinhardt would grant relief

with respect to the penalty phase because Mitchell was

deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel. 

He wrote that counsel’s “good guy” defense was

unreasonable in light of the facts and circumstances of the

crimes Mitchell committed, and also because the minimal

investigation underlying counsel’s choice of strategy was

constitutionally deficient. 

COUNSEL

Jonathan Aminoff and Gia Kim (argued), Deputy Federal

Public Defenders, Los Angeles, California for PetitionerAppellant.

John S. Leonardo, United States Attorney, Christina

Cabanillas, Appellate Chief, and Vincent Q. Kirby (argued),

Assistant United States Attorney, Phoenix, Arizona for

Respondent-Appellee.

OPINION

SILVERMAN, Circuit Judge:

Defendant Lezmond Mitchell, then 20 years old, plotted

with three others to carjack a vehicle for use in an armed

robbery of a trading post located on the Navajo reservation in

Arizona. On October 28, 2001, Mitchell and his 16-year-old

accomplice, Johnny Orsinger, abducted 63-year-old Alyce

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4 MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES

Slim and her nine-year old granddaughter. Slim and the child

were traveling to New Mexico in Slim’s GMC pickup truck. 

Somewhere near Sawmill, Arizona, Mitchell and Orsinger

killed Slim by stabbing her 33 times. Her dead body was

pulled into the rear of the truck, where the child was made to

sit beside it. Mitchell then drove the truck into the nearby

mountains.

Thirty or forty miles later, Slim’s body was dragged out

of the truck. Mitchell told the little girl to get out and “lay

down and die.” Mitchell then cut her throat twice. When she

did not die, Mitchell and Orsinger each dropped large rocks

on her head. Twenty-pound rocks bearing the child’s blood

were later found at the scene.

Mitchell and Orsinger left the murder scene, but later

returned to hide evidence. While Mitchell dug a hole in the

ground, Orsinger severed the heads and hands of both victims

in an effort to prevent their identification. The dismembered

parts were buried in the hole; the torsos were pulled into the

woods. Mitchell and Orsinger later burned the victims’

clothing and other personal effects. Mitchell washed the

knives with alcohol to remove any blood.

Three days later, on October 31, 2001, Mitchell and two

accomplices (Jason Kinlicheenie and Jakegory Nakai) drove

to the Red Rock Trading Post in the GMC pickup truck stolen

from Slim. The three men wore masks when they entered the

store. Mitchell carried a 12-gauge shotgun. Nakai had a .22

caliber rifle. One of the gunmen struck the store manager in

the head with his gun. When another employee said that she

did not know the combination to the safe, one of the robbers

said, “If you lie to me or you don’t cooperate with us, we are

going to kill you.” Ultimately, the robbers made off with

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MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES 5

$5,530 from the safe and cash registers, and the store

manager’s purse.

The robbers drove the stolen GMC pickup truck back to

Kinlicheenie’s car. Kinlicheenie followed Mitchell in the

truck to an area near Wheatfield, Arizona, where Mitchell set

the truck on fire with kerosene stolen from the trading post. 

They then went to Jakegory and Gregory Nakai’s house and

split up the money.

Mitchell was convicted in federal court of eleven counts

in all, including two counts of first-degree murder, carjacking

resulting in death, and multiple counts of robbery. The two

murders were not punishable by death because they were

committed on the Navajo reservation. Federal jurisdiction

over those counts is based on the Major Crimes Act,

18 U.S.C. § 1153, and the Navajo Nation did not “opt in” to

the death penalty under the Federal Death Penalty Act of

1994, 18 U.S.C. § 3591. However, federal jurisdiction over

carjacking resulting in death does not derive from the Major

Crimes Act; the federal nexus is interstate commerce. It does

not matter that the crime occurred in Indian country, and

therefore, the opt-in provision of the Federal Death Penalty

Act does not apply. In other words, carjacking resulting in

death carries the death penalty regardless of where it was

committed. See William C. Canby,Jr., American Indian Law

in a Nutshell 185–87 (6th ed. 2015).

Mitchell was sentenced to life imprisonment for the two

murder counts, long consecutive prison sentences for the

robbery and related counts, and death for carjacking resulting

in death. His convictions and sentences were upheld on

direct appeal. United States v. Mitchell, 502 F.3d 931 (9th

Cir. 2007). The United States Supreme Court denied a

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6 MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES

petition for a writ of certiorari. Mitchell v. United States,

553 U.S. 1094 (2008).

Which brings us to the subject of this appeal. After

exhausting his direct appeal, Mitchell brought a motion under

28 U.S.C. § 2255 alleging that his team of defense lawyers

rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. The team was

made up of two veteran deputy federal public defenders and

a private lawyer highly experienced in capital cases appointed

as “learned counsel.” The § 2255 motion raised various

issues, but it boiled down to these claims: (1) Counsel was

ineffective in failing to assert an intoxication defense at the

guilt phase of the trial; and (2) Counsel was ineffective at the

penaltyphase for inadequatelyinvestigating, and for choosing

not to present evidence of, Mitchell’s mental health, history

of substance abuse, and troubled upbringing. The trial court

denied the motion in a lengthy and thorough written order.

We agree with the district court that counsel did not fall

below professional standards in either their investigation of

a possible intoxication defense or their decision to pursue a

different defense strategy. They did indeed investigate

whether Mitchell was intoxicated at the time of the offenses. 

Mitchell adamantly denied to them that he was. Even so,

they looked for evidence to contradict their client, such as

liquor bottles left at the crime scene, but they couldn’t find

any. The only other living witness to the murders of Slim and

her granddaughter was Johnny Orsinger, and he wasn’t

talking; he was under indictment himself and invoked his

privilege against self-incrimination. Even assuming for the

sake of argument that there was some evidence of alcohol

involvement, the planning and premeditation of the vehicle

theft as preparation for the pre-planned trading post robbery

are inconsistent with a claim that Mitchell was too drunk to

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MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES 7

know what he was doing. And after Mitchell was

apprehended, he led authorities to the desolate crime scene,

further evidence that he was not so intoxicated that he could

not accurately recall events or appreciate where he was and

what he was doing.

We agree with the district court that counsel conducted an

adequate investigation and then made a reasonable strategic

decision that it would be self-defeating to try to sell a jury on

an intoxication defense on these facts, and that, instead, they

would be better off trying to portray Orsinger as the main

malefactor. Strategic decisions such as these are entitled to

deference and do not support a claim of ineffective assistance.

With respect to the penalty phase of the case, we also

agree with the district court that Mitchell’s legal team made

a more-than-adequate investigation of possible mitigation,

including his mental health and social history. Early in the

case, defense counsel had Mitchell examined by a

psychologist, Susan Parrish, Ph.D. Dr. Parrish diagnosed

Mitchell with antisocial personality disorder and cautioned

counsel against calling her as a witness. Mitchell’s lawyers

also had him examined by a team of doctors led by

psychiatrist BarryMorenz, M.D., at the University of Arizona

medical school Mitchell also was examined by

neuropsychologist Anne Henning, Ph.D., and by neurologist

Ronnie Bergen, M.D. Mitchell underwent brain imaging read

by James Guay, M.D. and an EEG read by Colin Bamford,

M.D. He also had lab work done. Dr. Morenz then produced

a 19-page, single-spaced report, in which he diagnosed

Mitchell with, among other things, depressive disorder,

cognitive disorder, polysubstance abuse, history of head

injuries, and antisocial personality disorder. He also noted a

“mild deficit” in executive functioning likely due to

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8 MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES

emotional factors, not brain trauma. No further testing or

consultation was suggested.

Mitchell’s lawyers also hired an experienced “mitigation

specialist,” Vera Ockenfels, who produced a 42-page, singlespaced “social history” of Mitchell’s life. The report is

thorough in the extreme, containing sections with titles like

“Conception, Pregnancy and Birth,” and recounts not only

Mitchell’s life story and social history, but that of his parents

and grandparents as well.

Only after reviewing all of this data, making numerous

trips to the reservation, conducting many interviews

themselves, and visiting with Mitchell himself, did defense

counsel choose their mitigation strategy: Forego presenting

evidence of Mitchell’s drug use, mental health, and physical

abuse and instead make the case that Mitchell had redeeming

qualities that made his life worth saving, notwithstanding a

rough start in life. Counsel presented evidence that Mitchell

was unloved and rejected by his mother, struggled with his

mixed Navajo and Anglo heritage, and felt caught between

two different cultures. Despite these obstacles, Mitchell

showed highly positive qualities. He was a good student, a

speaker at his high school graduation, and a good athlete,

liked by his teachers, and loved by others. In all, the defense

presented nine witnesses in the penalty phase of the trial.

The defense also presented evidence that Mitchell had

never before been convicted of a crime, that this offense was

an aberrant act for him, and that Orsinger was the instigator

and actual killer. Defense counsel also showed that the death

penalty for Mitchell would create a terrible sentencing

disparity. Besides this crime, Orsinger and Gregory Nakai

had killed two other individuals during an earlier carjacking. 

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MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES 9

Orsinger had pistol whipped the victims and shot one victim

in the head. Nakai had shot the other victim five times. Yet,

neither Nakai nor Orsinger, who was a juvenile, would face

the death penalty.

In addition, counsel presented evidence that the death

penalty offends Navajo values, and the Navajo Nation did not

want the United States Attorney to seek the death penalty in

this case.

Mitchell’s lawyers had to walk a very careful line to avoid

opening the door to highly damaging evidence contained in

the medical report, such as Mitchell’s diagnosis as a

sociopath, his history of swinging dogs and cats by their tails

and then throwing them off of bridges just for fun, and his

having told Dr. Morenz that he and his accomplice had to kill

the little girl to avoid being caught.

We agree with the district court that Mitchell’s defense

team conducted a professional-caliber investigation and then,

facing unenviable choices, made a reasonable strategic

decision to defend the penalty phase of the trial the way it

did. Strategic decisions such as this do not support a claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984); Mickey v. Ayers, 606 F.3d 1223,

1238–39 (9th Cir. 2010).

We affirm.

I. The Record.

The facts of the crimes are summarized above and set

forth in greater detail in the opinion in the direct appeal,

United States v. Mitchell, supra.

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10 MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES

The facts bearing on Mitchell’s present claims of

ineffective assistance of counsel were submitted to the district

court in numerous declarations, other documents, and in the

lengthy depositions of Mitchell’s three trial lawyers taken by

Mitchell’s habeas counsel. The material facts – that is, what

Mitchell’s lawyers did, what they didn’t do, and why – are not

disputed. What is disputed is whether counsels’ investigation

and strategic decisions were reasonable as a matter of law. In

the analysis that follows, we examine whether counsels’

investigation and strategy fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88. Because the

material facts are not in dispute – they either entitle Mitchell

to relief or they don’t – the district court did not abuse its

discretion in declining to hold an evidentiary hearing. United

States v. Howard, 381 F.3d 873, 877–79 (9th Cir. 2004).

II. Defense counsel adequately investigated the possibility of

an intoxication defense and reasonably decided against

asserting it.

Mitchell argues that his three lawyers – Deputy Federal

Public Defenders Jeffrey Williams and Gregory Bartolomei,

and private lawyer John Sears – failed to adequately

investigate the possibility of an intoxication defense for use

in the guilt-phase of the trial. The facts show otherwise.

Sears, who had practiced for 28 years and was

experienced in criminal defense, was appointed as learned

counsel1and took the lead on the guilt phase. Williams had

15 years of criminal defense experience, had alreadytried two

1

18 U.S.C. § 3005 requires the appointment of at least two defense

counsel in capital cases, including one who is “learned in the law

applicable to capital cases.”

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MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES 11

capital cases and had worked on several other capital cases

when he was appointed in this case. Bartolomei had

practiced for 23 years, mostly as a criminal defense attorney,

and had previously attended the Death Penalty College at the

Santa Clara University law school.2 The Federal Public

Defender’s Office in Arizona is particularlywell-experienced

in defending Indian reservation cases.

Defense counsel were well aware of Mitchell’s history of

substance abuse. They knew about it from various sources,

including the report of Vera Ockenfels, the lawyer whom they

hired who specializes in developing mitigating evidence. 

They confronted Mitchell with his statements to FBI agents

about his substance abuse, but Mitchell “adamantly” denied

that he was under the influence of any substance at the time

of the crimes. Unwilling to take Mitchell’s word for it, his

lawyers dutifully pored over photographs of the crime scene

and visited the scene of the crimes themselves looking for any

evidence of drinking or drugs. Liquor bottles left behind?

Drug paraphernalia? They found nothing.

Mitchell’s lawyers also knew that Johnny Orsinger, the

only other living person present when the crimes were

committed, used drugs and alcohol. Mitchell’s lawyers

sought to interview him, but Orsinger’s lawyer wouldn’t

allow it. When Mitchell’s lawyers subsequently subpoenaed

Orsinger, he repeatedly asserted his Fifth Amendment

privilege and refused to answer questions.

2 Santa Clara Law’s Death Penalty College trains defense attorneys,

along with their mitigation specialists, to represent defendants in death

penalty cases. See http://law.scu.edu/dpc.

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12 MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES

In short, counsel investigated the possibility of asserting

an intoxication defense, but could find no admissible

evidence that Mitchell was intoxicated at the time of the

carjacking and murders.3 To the contrary, Mitchell himself

denied being intoxicated, and the manner in which the crimes

were committed was inconsistent with a supposed inability to

form intent due to intoxication, even if he had been drinking:

the carjacking was premeditated and committed in

preparation for the trading post robbery; the grandmother and

little girl were killed and then dismembered to get rid of

witnesses and dispose of evidence; and, with impeccable

recall, Mitchell gave the FBI a highly detailed account of the

crime and his complicity in it. Mitchell’s ability to lead

investigators back to the desolate scene of the crime is further

indication that Mitchell was not unaware of where he was or

what he was doing when the crimes were committed.

Mitchell’s lawyers did not ignore the possibility of an

intoxication defense. Just the opposite. They investigated it,

they discussed it with Mitchell, they attempted to interview

Orsinger, they looked for extrinsic evidence, they debated it

among themselves, and only then, given the lack of evidence

of intoxication and the strong circumstantial evidence to the

contrary, did they decide that they would be unlikely to

convince a jury to accept voluntary intoxication as a defense

to these premeditated crimes. Lawyers who make

professional decisions of this type, after a reasonable

investigation such as occurred in this case, are “strongly

presumed” to have rendered adequate assistance. Cullen v.

3 Defense counsel tried, but failed, to get into evidence Mitchell’s

statement to the FBI that he had been drinking the day of the murders. 

Counsel then requested an intoxication instruction to preserve the record,

even though they knew the request would be denied for lack of evidence. 

There is no reason to fault counsel for this.

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MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES 13

Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1403 (2011) (internal quotation

marks omitted); Edwards v. Ayers, 542 F.3d 759, 772–73 (9th

Cir. 2008) (counsel acts reasonably by not asserting a defense

that is not supported by sufficient admissible evidence). That

is the situation here. The district court correctly denied

Mitchell’s § 2255 motion with regard to counsels’ decision to

forego an intoxication defense at the guilt phase of the trial.

III. Counsel conducted a thorough investigation of

mitigating evidence – social, medical, and psychiatric

– only after which did they make a reasonable

strategic decision about what evidence to present and

what to forego.

Given the strong evidence of Mitchell’s guilt, including

his well-corroborated confession, and the lack of any realistic

defense, Mitchell’s lawyers knew that the rubber-wouldmeet-the-road in the penalty phase of the trial, so they began

to prepare for that part of the case immediately.

The defense team consistently met throughout the case to

discuss the possible theories of mitigation. Deputy Federal

Public Defender Greg Bartolomei was principally in charge

of this aspect of the case. Early on, Bartolomei spoke to

Mitchell in detail about the case, his childhood, interests,

parents, grandparents, medical history, drug history, and

schooling. The defense also hired Vera Ockenfels, a wellknown and experienced “mitigation specialist,” to marshal 

mitigating evidence. Ockenfels gathered all available records

and interviewed Mitchell’s mother, grandparents, uncle, other

extended family members, friends, acquaintances, football

coach, teachers, and other school employees. She located and

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14 MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES

attempted to interview Mitchell’s father.4 Bartolomei

traveled to the Navajo reservation with Ockenfels to

interview Mitchell’s mother, grandparents, uncle, friends,

football coach and other employees at Mitchell’s school. 

Deputy Federal Public Defender Jeff Williams separately

interviewed Mitchell’s mother, Sherry. Sherry mostly talked

about herself, and she walked out of the interview with

Williams. She had previously told the FBI that Mitchell

belonged in prison.

Six months before the penalty trial, Ockenfels turned in

her 42-page, single-spaced “social history report,” consisting

of a complete, thoroughlydocumented biographyof Mitchell,

his mother, and his maternal grandparents. The report noted

Mitchell’s struggle with his mixed race, large size, and lack

of fluency in the Navajo language and culture; verbal and

physical abuse of Mitchell during his childhood; and

Mitchell’s extensive history of alcohol and drug use. The

report also documented Mitchell’s own violent history: he

joined a gang in third grade, formed his own gang by eighth

grade, was suspended and expelled from school for fighting,

and abused dogs and cats for entertainment. Ockenfels also

obtained psychological records from Mitchell’s school, and

interviewed Dr. Edward Fields, a psychologist for the Chinle

School District, who was Mitchell’s therapist while he was in

high school. The defense team personally met with

Ockenfels and reviewed her report.

Defense counsel also hired several mental health

professionals. Counsel initially hired Susan Parrish, Ph.D.,

a psychologist, who diagnosed Mitchell as a sociopath and

4

 Mitchell never knew his father, and his father died before the defense

team was able to locate and interview him.

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MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES 15

warned counsel against calling her to testify. Following up

on Ockenfels’s hunch that Mitchell may have blacked out or

had a psychotic episode at the time of the crimes, defense

counsel hired Barry Morenz, M.D., and his team of experts at

the University of Arizona medical school to look for medical

or psychiatric evidence that might be helpful. Defense

counsel provided extensive background information to Dr.

Morenz, including all of the prosecution’s evidence in the

case. In addition, Dr. Morenz conducted and documented indepth background interviews of his own with Mitchell,

defense investigator Karl Brandenberger, and mitigation

specialist Ockenfels.

With Dr. Morenz at the helm, Mitchell was examined and

evaluated by a psychiatrist, a neuropsychologist, and a

neurologist at the University of Arizona and underwent

numerous tests and studies. The neurological exams, EEG,

MRI, and laboratory results were normal. Testing established

that Mitchell had average intelligence. When all the data was

in, Dr. Morenz diagnosed Mitchell with: (1) depressive

disorder not otherwise specified based on Mitchell’s

statements that he felt despondent and hopeless; (2)

polysubstance abuse based on abuse of alcohol, marijuana,

cocaine, ecstasy, and other drugs on a regular basis for a

number of years; (3) a cognitive disorder not otherwise

specified based on executive functioning deficits that were

mild and of uncertain etiology and clinical significance; and

(4) an antisocial personality disorder based on Mitchell’s

history of childhood aggression, deceitfulness, frequent rule

violation, cruelty to animals that would have warranted a

conduct disorder diagnosis as an adolescent, a continued

disregard for the rights of others, and a failure to show

remorse for his behavior.

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16 MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES

As already noted, neuropsychological testing by Dr.

Morenz’s team revealed “some mild deficits in executive

functioning, impulsiveness and poor planning,” that “were

more likely related to emotional factors than traumatic brain

injury.” Mitchell now faults his lawyers for not pursuing that

finding further, but it is significant to note that Dr. Morenz

did not recommend further testing, if indeed there is any

further testing that could have been done, relating to these

“mild deficits” of likely “emotional” origin.

Defense counsel reviewed Dr. Morenz’s comprehensive

report, discussed it with him, and ultimately decided not to

present mental health evidence for fear that it would open the

door to even more damaging evidence and do more harm than

good. Defense counsel knew that they would have to turn the

report over to the prosecution if Dr. Morenz testified. They

concluded that the report would open the door to “ugly”

damaging facts that would have a “negative and adverse”

effect on the jury. Specifically, the report documented

Mitchell’s diagnosis of antisocial personalitydisorder, history

of violence, cruelty to animals, gang involvement, that his

gang sold drugs to children, and that Mitchell had been

involved in the shooting of an innocent girl during a dispute

with a rival gang over marijuana. Worse, Mitchell told Dr.

Morenz detailed facts regarding the crime that he had not

already admitted to the police or FBI, including the fact that

he decided to kill the child to prevent her from identifying

him. Mitchell also told Dr. Morenz of his desire to kill the

person who had ratted out their group to the police.

Defense counsel concluded that introducing evidence of

Mitchell’s mental health was fraught with danger, given the

door that would be opened to extremely damaging evidence,

and could negate the positive things that they had to say about

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MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES 17

him. Counsel also decided that it would be wise to stay away

from Mitchell’s history of alcohol and drug abuse. In their

professional opinion, jurors would be turned off by such

evidence and view it as a poor excuse for extremely

horrendous crimes. And, again, such evidence would

contradict the more positive picture they wanted to paint.

In the § 2255 proceedings, Mitchell’s new lawyers

produced a new declaration from Dr. Morenz, dated in 2009. 

In this declaration, Dr. Morenz states that he could have

testified that Mitchell “might” have been under the influence

of drugs or alcohol at the time of the crime and that his

perception of reality “might” have been altered. This new

declaration changes nothing. Besides being equivocal, the

problem remained that if Dr. Morenz had testified to such a

possibility, the door would have been opened to a whole

panoply of contrary evidence of which Dr. Morenz was

aware, such as Mitchell telling Dr. Morenz why he and

Orsinger killed the little girl. In his report, Dr. Morenz

quoted Mitchell as telling him, “I’m running this equation in

my head that 9 times out of 10 if we let the little girl go the

cops will be after us.”

In his deposition, defense lawyerJohn Sears testified that

the defense team had used juror questionnaires to determine

prospective jurors’ attitudes towards potential issues,

including their reactions to Native American crimes,

vulnerable victims, and whether the jurors were open to

“excuses,” such as mental problems or substance abuse. The

defense used a series of hypothetical questions to assess

potential jurors’ reactions and then factored those reactions

into Mitchell’s defense. The questionnaire responses by

prospective jurors confirmed counsels’ belief that the jury

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18 MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES

would view both mental health and substance abuse

mitigation defenses in a negative way.

Defense counsel made a reasonable professional

judgment, after a careful investigation, that the introduction

of mental health and drug abuse evidence would be more

damaging than helpful. We do not second-guess strategic

decisions such as this. Mickey, 606 F.3d at 1238–39.

So, if no mental health or substance abuse mitigation,

then what?

Bartolomei, Williams, and Sears decided that the bestway

to save Mitchell from the death penalty was a mitigation

strategy consisting of three main themes: First, Mitchell’s life

should be spared because he is not a worthless human being

– that is, he is a person with significant redeeming qualities,

who has overcome difficult challenges in his life, facts that

weigh against simply discarding him like so much trash. 

Defense counsel presented the testimony of Dr. Robert

Roessel, the executive director of Mitchell’s high school,

who testified that Mitchell had been an excellent student,

respectful, an outstanding athlete, a member of the student

council, and a speaker at graduation. Dr. Roessel testified

that Mitchell was kind, and did well in school despite a

difficult upbringing, a disinterested mother who never loved

him, a school system that failed to nurture him, and confusion

over his mixed Navajo and Anglo heritage. Because

Mitchell’s grandparents were also educators at the school, Dr.

Roessel knew Mitchell’s family. Dr. Roessel testified that

Mitchell had his problems, but had positive qualities, too, and

had the potential to teach others in prison. Dr. Roessel asked

the jury to spare Mitchell’s life.

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MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES 19

The defense also presented the testimonyof Ruth Roessel,

Dr. Roessel’s wife and a school teacher. Mrs. Roessel

testified that she met Mitchell when he moved in with his

grandfather in Round Rock and knew Mitchell at school. 

Mrs. Roessel also knew Mitchell’s family. She testified that

Mitchell was raised in a “cold home,” but that he was always

respectful to her and called her “shima,” which means “my

mother.”

Mitchell’s uncle, Ausca5 Kee Charles Mitchell, testified

that he worked at Mitchell’s schools. Mitchell spent a lot of

time with Uncle Ausca and his family, and was always

respectful. Uncle Ausca and his family attended Mitchell’s

high school graduation ceremony. The defense introduced

into evidence pictures of Mitchell with family on graduation

day, Christmas, and other family gatherings. Uncle Ausca

testified that Mitchell was a fast learner who had computer

and vocational skills. He was a good kid until he met Johnny

Orsinger. Although Uncle Ausca did not know Orsinger, he

knew that Orsinger was dealing drugs at the school dorms. 

The teachers thought highly of Mitchell, but were “scared to

death of Orsinger.”

MartyWilliam Conrad, the athletic director, socialstudies

teacher and head football coach at Mitchell’s high school,

testified that Mitchell was a good football player, a leader on

the team, interacted well with the players, and was wellbehaved. Mr. Conrad testified that Mitchell was good enough

to play college football, and he thought Mitchell was going to

community college to play football. The defense introduced

into evidence a picture of Mitchell with the football team.

 

5

 In the record, the name is also spelled Auska.

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20 MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES

John F. Fontes, Jr., the assistant principal at Mitchell’s

high school, testified that he saw Mitchell daily at school. 

Mitchell was an excellent student, a good football player, and

involved with student government during his senior year. 

Mitchell was never physically violent. The only disciplinary

incident was a brief suspension for possessing a personal

amount of marijuana. Mr. Fontes testified that Mitchell knew

right from wrong, but tended to withdraw or not respond if he

was fearful. Although Mr. Fontes had met Mitchell’s uncle

and grandfather, he had never met Mitchell’s mother Sherry. 

The one time he called Sherry, she called his supervisor and

advised the school not to contact her because she wanted

nothing to do with Mitchell. Mr. Fontes testified that

Mitchell was smart and had the potential to lead others in a

positive way in a structured environment. He believed that

Mitchell’s life should be spared.

Mitchell’s friend, Lorenzo Reed, Jr., testified that he had

known Mitchell since third grade, and that they had attended

high school together. Mitchell’s mother had abandoned him,

and it was painful for Mitchell. Mitchell moved in with Mr.

Reed’s family after he turned 18. Mitchell became part of the

family, was respectful, and helped with the chores. Mitchell

also was respectful while living with Mr. Reed’s uncle in

Phoenix. Mitchell briefly moved to California, but came

back for Mr. Reed’s high school graduation. Mr. Reed also

asked the jury to spare Mitchell’s life.

Sonja Hasley, Mitchell’s high school English teacher,

testified that Mitchell was an excellent student who helped

her and other students in class. Mitchell was gentle, quiet,

and respectful. When confronted with a violent situation,

Mitchell wouldn’t participate either verbally or physically. 

Mitchell’s mother, Sherry, refused to come to the school, and

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MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES 21

his grandparents never came to the school to discuss

Mitchell’s progress, either. Ms. Hasley testified that

Mitchell’s family acted contrary to the Navajo culture, in

which mothers and grandmothers are very important. Ms.

Hasley stated that Mitchell had the potential to be a good

teacher in prison.

Tammy Sebahe, a member of Mr. Reed’s family, testified

that Mitchell lived with them, became part of their family,

and still remained a part of their family. She had been

visiting Mitchell for the previous year at jail, where they

spoke over a phone with a glass wall separating them.

The defense also played the videotaped testimony of

Mitchell’s grandmother, Bobbi. Bobbi mostly talked about

herself, a point that the defense would mention in closing

argument as illustrative of the dysfunction in the family.

In closing argument, Sears argued that these facts showed

that Mitchell had redeeming qualities despite his lack of

family support, responded well to structure, and if sentenced

to life without parole, he would adapt to prison and could

have a positive impact on other inmates.

The second theme of the penalty phase strategy was that

Johnny Orsinger was the mastermind behind these crimes,

and that Mitchell was a follower. The defense introduced

evidence that Orsinger and Gregory Nakai were not only the

brains behind these crimes, but had committed a similar

carjacking and multiple murder two months earlier. In fact,

Orsinger had bragged that he had murdered the victims in this

case — and yet, Orsinger and Nakai would be spared the

death penalty. Orsinger was immune because he was 16, but

the FBI agent could not explain why Nakai, who was the

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22 MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES

same age as Mitchell and had also committed murder during

a carjacking, had not been sentenced to death. Mitchell’s

lawyers hammered home the point that it would create an

intolerable and irrational disparity for the two main culprits

to get life sentences, while Mitchell, the follower, was

sentenced to death.

The third theme was that the Navajo Nation opposes the

death penalty, and did not want Mitchell sentenced to death. 

Mitchell’s defense team even put before the jury a letter from

the Navajo Nation to the United States Attorney – the

prosecuting agency in this very case – stating its opposition

to capital punishment in general, and in this case in particular.

The strategy chosen by Bartolomei, Williams, and Sears

did not come to them in a dream, nor was it the result of a

coin flip. They settled on their strategy only after

commissioning an exhaustive social history of Mitchell and

his family, having Mitchell studied stem-to-stern by a team of

doctors in a variety of specialties at the University of Arizona

medicalschool, conducting personal interviews with potential

witnesses, making numerous trips to the Navajo reservation,

and spending countless hours with Mitchell himself. 

Counsel, who had years of experience defending violent

crimes committed on Indian reservations, also contacted other

lawyers who specialized in death penalty defense and sought

their advice. Counsel affirmatively considered the pros and

cons of other approaches, and then reasonably chose the

strategy that they thought had the best chance of success. 

Such a decision does not support a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel. Elmore v. Sinclair, 781 F.3d 1160,

1170–72 (9th Cir. 2015).

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MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES 23

Apparently recognizing that trial counsel’s strategic and

tactical decisions are entitled to great deference, Mitchell

argues that his lawyers’ investigation was deficient, thereby

tainting their strategy and tactics. For example, Mitchell

contends that when Mitchell’s lawyers learned that Dr.

Morenz had diagnosed Mitchell with antisocial personality

disorder (just as psychologist Dr. Parrish had) counsel should

have had Mitchell examined again by yet another doctor in

search of a less damning diagnosis. We agree with the

district court that defense counsel did not act below

professional standards in relying on the thorough and

authoritative report of the highly qualified experts they hired,

particularly when Drs. Parrish and Morenz independently

agreed on the same primary diagnosis after extensive testing. 

Crittenden v. Ayers, 624 F.3d 943, 965–66 (9th Cir. 2010).

Although Mitchell claims that the investigation was

inadequate, he has come forward with almost no new

evidence not known to defense counsel and fully considered

as possible mitigation. Mitchell’s drug abuse and physical

abuse were documented in detail in the Ockenfels and Dr.

Morenz reports well before the guilt and penalty trials. 

Contrary to Mitchell’s claim, defense counsel knew in 2003

that Mitchell and his friends had been partying and doing

drugs in the months before the crimes. In fact, Dr. Morenz

diagnosed polysubstance abuse based on Mitchell’s extensive

drug use history. The evidence of drug use and physical

abuse was known to the defense team and considered by the

team when it decided not to present intoxication or abuse

mitigation evidence.

Mitchell points out that neither defense counsel’s

investigation, nor that of their mitigation specialist, Vera

Ockenfels, uncovered the fact that Mitchell’s grandfather

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24 MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES

(with whom Mitchell had lived for a time) had molested two

girls in Kansas sometime in the 1950s or *60s, about 20 years

before Mitchell was born. Mitchell himself was never

molested by the grandfather and Mitchell never met the girls. 

This bit of ancient family history was never disclosed to

defense counsel, their investigator Karl Brandenburger, or

Ockenfels, despite their numerous interviews with family

members. The grandfather’s behavior in the *50s or *60s

toward people other than Mitchell, whom Mitchell does not

even know, before he was even born, is of dubious relevance

when it comes to mitigation. In any event, Mitchell was

entitled to a reasonable investigation, not a perfect one. See

Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 8 (2003).

In 2009, habeas counsel managed to find a doctor, Pablo

Stewart. M.D., who would give them a declaration stating

that in 2001 Mitchell suffered from post traumatic stress

disorder and substance-induced psychotic disorder. Dr.

Stewart’s declaration says that he could testify that Mitchell’s

intoxication and mental illness “synergized with each other

resulting in the alteration of Mr. Mitchell’s cognitive and

behavioral function, which severely impaired his ability to

premeditate or intend to commit murder.” (Never mind that

Mitchell stated that he and Orsinger killed and dismembered

the grandmother and little girl to get rid of the witnesses to

the theft of the vehicle they stole for use in the trading post

robbery they planned to commit.) At most, Dr. Stewart’s new

diagnosis of Mitchell’s mental state, eight years after-the-fact,

is a “difference in medical opinion, not a failure to

investigate.” Crittenden, 624 F.3d at 965.

Finally, Mitchell faults defense counsel for not calling his

mother, Sherry, to testify. But, Bartolomei testified that

Sherry refused to cooperate and only wanted to talk about

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MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES 25

how Mitchell’s crimes impacted her. She walked out on her

interview with Williams, and had told the FBI that Mitchell

belonged in prison. Counsel reasonably concluded that

Sherry was a “loose cannon” who was better kept away from

the witness stand.

We agree with the district court that Mitchell’s lawyers

made an adequate investigation and then, with full knowledge

of all of the relevant facts, made reasonable strategic

decisions to present what they did and to stay away from

things that they thought would do more harm than good. 

Elmore, 781 F.3d at 1170–72. The possibility that some of

the evidence rejected by defense counsel “could have assisted

[Mitchell’s] case,” is “little more than a challenge to his

defense attorney’s trial strategywith the benefit of hindsight.” 

Id. at 1171. Like the defense team in Elmore, which

reasonably chose a “remorse strategy” over a mental health

strategy, Mitchell’s defense team made a reasonable strategic

decision to pursue what it believed to be the stronger lifeworth-saving defense, along with evidence of sentencing

disparity and evidence that the Navajo Nation wanted

Mitchell’s life spared. They reasonably chose not to present

evidence that “would detract from, or destroy,” the chosen

strategy. Id. Considering the unusual brutality of these

crimes – committed not in passion but in furtherance of a

planned armed robbery – and that Mitchell himself refused to

attend the penalty phase of the trial, it is a remarkable tribute

to Mitchell’s lawyers that they were able to get the jury to

find several mitigating factors.6 Even assuming for the sake

6 At least one juror found every factor presented by the defense to be

mitigating for both murders. Twelve jurors found that: (1) Mitchell did

not have a significant prior criminal record; (2) another person who was

equally culpable in the crime would not be punished with death; and (3)

Mitchell would be sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of

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26 MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES

of argument that some other lawyer might have preferred a

different strategy, there is no showing that Mitchell’s

lawyers’ strategy was unreasonable. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S.

685, 701–02 (2002). Because Mitchell did not rebut the

presumption that counsel rendered effective assistance, the

district court correctly denied Mitchell’s § 2255 motion with

respect to the penalty phase of the trial.7

IV. Conclusion

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

release if not sentenced to death. Two jurors found that Mitchell

responded well to structure and would adapt to life in prison. One juror

found that Mitchell’s capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his

conduct was so impaired as to constitute a defense to the charge. Six

jurors found that Mitchell’s childhood, background record, character or

other circumstances of the offense mitigated against the death sentence. 

Finally, seven jurors found that the letter fromthe Navajo Nation opposing

the death penalty was mitigating.

7 We decline to grant a certificate of appealability for the uncertified

issues raised in Mitchell’s brief.

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MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES 27

REINHARDT, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part:

I would grant Mitchell’s petition for habeas relief with

respect to the penalty phase of his trial because he was

deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel.

Counsel’s “good guy” defense was unreasonable in light of

the facts and circumstances of the crimes Mitchell committed,

and also because the minimal investigation underlying

counsel’s choice of strategy was constitutionally deficient.

Before delving into the myriad ways in which counsel

performed deficiently, however, I would note that this is a

highly unusual death-penalty case in several respects, all of

which exacerbate the impropriety of sending Mitchell to his

death in violation of his constitutional rights to a fair trial, but

none of which is more disturbing than the failure to give the

jurors the opportunity to understand what made him the

person he became before they voted to have him executed.

I.

Federal executions are quite rare and are normally

reserved for the most heinous of crimes that are of national

significance. There have been only three executions since the

federal death penaltywas reintroduced in 1988—one being in

the Oklahoma City bombing case in which 168 people died

and more than 600 were injured, and another being a drug

kingpin found responsible for at least eight murders. Most

recently, the death penalty was authorized for a perpetrator of

the Boston Marathon bombing. However gruesome the crime

in this case, Mitchell, who was twenty years old at the time

and had no prior criminal record, does not fit the usual profile

of those deemed deserving of execution by the federal

government—a penalty typically enforced only in the case of

mass murderers and drug overlords who order numerous

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28 MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES

killings. Nor is this a case of national interest or significance.

The penalty is possible only by virtue of the fact that Mitchell

and a fellow Navajo, aged sixteen, stole a car in connection

with the murders they committed. The murders by themselves

did not subject Mitchell to the death penalty because, as

explained below, the Navajo Nation has decided that the

death penalty should not apply to intra-Indian crimes

committed on its reservation. As a result, in the absence of

the carjacking, Mitchell would not have been eligible for the

death penalty.

Equally important, none of the people closely connected

to the case wanted Mitchell to be subjected to the death

penalty: not the victims’ family, not the Navajo Nation—of

which the victims and perpetrators were all members and on

whose land the crime occurred—and not the United States

Attorney whose job it was to prosecute Mitchell. So how did

Mitchell nonetheless become one of a relatively small

number of inmates on federal death row over the protestations

of everyone with a personal stake in the case? A bit of

background is necessary to answer that question.

The Navajo Nation is opposed to the death penalty, both

as a general matter and in this case in particular, but it has

only limited power over crimes committed on Navajo land.1

In 1994, however, Congress enacted “a small but important

development toward tribalself-determination” with respect to

prosecutions by the federal government of crimes committed

on tribal lands: the so-called tribal option, which allowed

Native American tribes to decide whether the death penalty

applies to most crimes committed by an Indian against

another Indian on tribal lands (also known as “Indian

 

1

See 18 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(7).

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MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES 29

country”).2In pressing for the tribal option, representatives of

the Navajo Nation explained to Congress:

It is incumbent upon the federal government

to allow Indian tribes the choice of whether

the death penalty should be extended to our

territory. . . . [T]he death penalty is counter to

the cultural beliefs and traditions of the

Navajo people who value life and place great

emphasis on the restoration of harmony

through restitution and individual attention.

The vast majority of major crimes committed

on the Navajo Nation and within other Indian

reservations are precipitated by the abuse of

alcohol. The death penalty will not address

the root of the problem; rather rehabilitation

efforts will be more effective.3

As Kevin K. Washburn, the current Assistant Secretary for

Indian Affairs for the U.S. Department of the Interior, a

former law professor and United States Attorney, wrote,

adoption of the tribal option reflected a “modest step[]” in

 

2

See 18 U.S.C. § 3598.

3 Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Reform Act of 1994: Hearings

on H.R. 3315 before the Subcommittee on Crime and Criminal Justice of

House Judiciary Committee, 103 Cong., 2d Sess., Feb. 22, 1994

(statement of Helen Elaine Avalos, Assistant Att’y Gen., Navajo Dep’t of

Justice, on behalf of Peterson Zah, President of the Navajo Nation)

(emphasis added).

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30 MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES

favor of a policy that “criminal justice in Indian country must

be decolonized.”4

Having been empowered by the tribal option to determine

whether the death penalty should apply to most federal crimes

committed against Navajo people on Navajo land, the Navajo

Nation decided that it should not.5 For this reason, Mitchell

was not eligible for the death penalty with respect to any

crimes for which he was prosecuted under the Major Crimes

Act—including several counts of first-degree murder,

kidnapping, and robbery. Maj. Op. at 5. However,

notwithstanding the fact that his crime was committed “by

one Indian against other Indians in Indian country,” the death

penalty applied to the federal crime of carjacking resulting in

death.6 The theory underlying this anomalous result is that

carjacking is a crime of general, nationwide applicability—

rather than a Major Crimes Act offense—and the tribal option

is not applicable to such crimes. See Mitchell I, 502 F.3d at

4 Kevin K. Washburn, Federal Criminal Law and Tribal

Self-Determination, 84 N.C. L. Rev. 779, 830, 854 (2006).

5

Indeed, only one Native American tribe has exercised the tribal option

to permit the death penalty. See Washburn, supra note 4, at 831.

6 United States v. Mitchell (“Mitchell I”), 502 F.3d 931, 946 (9th Cir.

2007). The Anti Car Theft Act of 1992 established the federal crime of

carjacking, which is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2119. See Pub. L. No. 102-

519, § 101(a), 106 Stat. 3384 (1992). The Violent Crime Control and Law

Enforcement Act of 1994 made carjacking resulting in death subject to the

death penalty. See Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 60003(a)(14), 108 Stat. 1796

(1994).

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MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES 31

946–49.7 Thus, although the Navajo Nation had clearly

voiced its opposition to the death penalty, even in cases of

first-degree murder, the death penalty remained available to

federal prosecutors in Mitchell’s case because he stole a car

in the course of committing his crimes.

Faced with the possibility that federal prosecutors would

seek the death penalty, the daughter and mother of the victims

strongly urged that the death penalty not be imposed and

made a request to the federal prosecutor that he seek only life

without parole. The Attorney General of the Navajo Nation

Department of Justice, Levon B. Henry, also wrote a letter to

the United States Attorney for the District of Arizona, Paul

Charlton, “express[ing] the current positions of the Navajo

Nation with respect to the possibility of the United States

seeking capital punishment” in Mitchell’s case. Henry

explained that although “the details of the case[] were

shocking,” the Navajo Nation “would not support a death

penalty,” because “[o]ur culture and religion teaches us to

value life and instruct against the taking of human life for

vengeance.” Moreover, Mitchell’s execution would be

directly contrary to the Navajo Nation’s belief that

rehabilitation, not the death penalty, is needed to address

 

7 The Ninth Circuit has long held that intra-Indian offenses committed

in Indian country may be prosecuted under federal criminal statutes of

general, nationwide applicability such as § 2119 (absent exceptions not

raised in this case), rather than solely under the Major Crimes Act—a

holding I find to be of somewhat dubious merit but that a three-judge

panel cannot revisit. See, e.g., United States v. Begay, 42 F.3d 486,

497–98 (9th Cir. 1994). Because Congress limited the tribal option’s

application to offenses in which federal jurisdiction “is predicated solely

on Indian country”—namely, Major Crimes Act offenses—the Navajo

Nation’s exercise of the tribal option against the death penalty does not

“turn off” that penalty with respect to § 2119. See Mitchell I, 502 F.3d at

948–49.

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32 MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES

crimes associated with drug and alcohol addiction, in which

category, the Navajo Nation told Congress, the vast majority

of major crimes committed on reservations fall. See supra p.

29 & note 3. As explained below, Mitchell had a long history

of drug and alcohol abuse that contributed to the person he

became and the crimes he committed.

In light of the position of the Navajo Nation and the

family of the victims, United States Attorney Charlton, a

local Arizonan appointed by President George W. Bush, who

was intimately familiar with the relations between the Navajo

tribe and the citizens of the State of Arizona, declined to seek

the death penalty. However, in the words of the victims’

family, the request that the federal government not seek the

death penalty was ultimately “ignored and dishonored.”

Attorney General John Ashcroft overruled Charlton and

forced a capital prosecution based on the carjacking aspect of

the crime, thereby avoiding the application of the tribal

option. The overruling by Ashcroft marked the beginning of

an aggressive expansion of the federal death penalty,

particularly into jurisdictions that did not permit the use of

that penalty. Mitchell was the first object of the new policy.

8

8 The third person against whom the federal death penalty has been

enforced since it was reinstated in 1988 was Louis Jones, Jr., who was

neither a mass murderer nor a drug overlord who ordered numerous

killings. Jones, an African-American war veteran, kidnapped and

murdered an airwoman at an air force base. Jones was a highly decorated

soldier, whose 22-year military career included service as an Army

Ranger. Jones returned home from the first Gulf War with post-traumatic

stress disorder and brain damage likely linked to his exposure to nerve gas

during the war—known as GulfWar Syndrome—and displayed symptoms

of that syndrome during his commission of the crime. He was executed

over vigorous protests by United States Senators and others during the

tenure of Attorney General Ashcroft.

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MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES 33

The arbitrariness of the death penalty in this case is

apparent. Mitchell raises a number of serious constitutional

issues regarding both his conviction and his death sentence.

Some were litigated on his direct appeal and decided against

him by a fiercely contested two to one vote. Another critical

fundamental constitutional question is decided on this appeal

by a similar division and despite equally strong views

expressed by both sides. Whatever a particular jurist, or even

two, may believe regarding these issues, uncertainty remains,

to say the least, as to whether the judicial proceedings

afforded Mitchell comported with the constitutional

protections to which he is entitled. That uncertainty alone is

sufficient to raise serious questions regarding whether

Mitchell should be put to death by his government.9 Further,

although Mitchell committed a horrible crime, it was hardly

one of national import or of particular federal interest other

than the fact that it involved the Navajo Nation, and all of the

persons with the greatest stake in the outcome of the case

9

I was a member of the divided panel that affirmed Mitchell’s death

sentence on direct appeal. I stand by my dissent explaining the

constitutional infirmities in Mitchell’s conviction and sentence that were

considered there and that I still believe warrant relief. Rather than explain

my reasons again here, a summary of the most significant constitutional

violations follows: First, federal prosecutors colluded with tribal

authorities to detain Mitchell and elicit confessions from him in violation

of his federal rights to timely arraignment and to counsel. Mitchell I,

502 F.3d at 998–1002 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). Next, the prosecutor

struck the only African-American juror on the venire in violation of

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, (1986). See Mitchell I, 502 F.3d at

1003–06 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). Then, as to the penalty phase, (1) the

district court allowed Mitchell to be absent from the sentencing phase in

direct contravention of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, meaning

the jurors did not have to face the man they were sending to his death;

(2) the prosecutor made numerous improper statements intended to arouse

the passion of the jury; and (3) the district court failed to instruct the jury

on the proper burden of proof. See id. at 1006–14.

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34 MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES

oppose his execution. The novel use of carjacking as a

loophole to circumvent the tribal option also renders this an

anomalous case. Mitchell will, unless spared by executive

clemency, in all likelihood, suffer the ignominious fate of

being the first person to be executed for an intra-Indian crime

that occurred in Indian country. While this court’s

jurisprudence indeed gives the federal government the legal

authority to exercise jurisdiction over this case for the

purpose of obtaining capital punishment, succeeding in that

objective over the express objections of the Navajo Nation

and the victims’ family reflects a lack of sensitivity to the

tribe’s values and autonomy and demonstrates a lack of

respect for its status as a sovereign entity. Should the federal

government pursue a death warrant for Mitchell, I hope that

it will have better reasons for doing so than adherence to the

wishes of a former attorney general.10

II.

I now turn to the legal question at issue on this appeal:

whether Mitchell was deprived of effective assistance of

counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment.11I would hold

 

10 See Amnesty Int’l, USA Capital Deficit: A Submission on the Death

Penalty to the UN Human Rights Comm., at 8 (Sept. 2013), available at

http://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/amr510622013en.pdf

(“[T]here is nothing to stop any administration, consistent with the

[International Convention on Civil and Political Rights], supporting

reversal of the death sentence . . . .”).

 

11 With respect to the guilt-phase claim at issue on this appeal, I would

hold that Mitchell was not prejudiced by any deficient performance on

counsel’s part. As noted supra note 9, I would have granted guilt- and

penalty-phase relief based on claims raised on direct appeal. Most of the

uncertified claims relate to those claims. I thus find it unnecessary to

address the uncertified claims on this appeal.

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MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES 35

that counsel performed deficiently at the penalty phase for

two independent reasons: First, counsel’s decision to present

a tepid “good guy” defense—that Mitchell’s was “a life worth

saving”—was unreasonable in light of the nature of the

horrific acts Mitchell committed and in light of the mitigating

evidence in counsel’s possession: evidence of drug and

alcohol abuse, physical abuse, and of emotional and mental

problems that would have helped the jury understand what

led up to Mitchell’s commission of those acts. Second,

counsel did not perform a constitutionally adequate

investigation into the mitigating evidence, failing to pursue

obvious leads before deciding to abandon the latter defense.

Counsel thus did not make a reasonable strategic decision to

forego further investigation of mitigating evidence in favor of

presenting a “good guy” defense—a defense it is difficult to

conceive of any reasonable juror crediting. Finally, I conclude

that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s

deficient performance, at least one juror would have found

(1) that the crimes were at least in part attributable to

Mitchell’s exceedinglyunfortunate background, including his

long history of drug and alcohol abuse, the physical and

emotional abuse he suffered as a child, and his ensuing

mental and emotional problems; (2) that these circumstances

collectively rendered him less culpable than he might

otherwise have been; and (3) that life without parole rather

than the extreme penalty of death was the appropriate

punishment.

A.

“[C]ertain defense strategies may be so ill-chosen that

they may render counsel’s overall representation

constitutionally defective.” Silva v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 825,

846 (9th Cir. 2002), as amended (quotation marks omitted).

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36 MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES

The ill-prepared “good guy” defense that counsel presented

at the penalty phase in this case was clearly doomed from the

start. The lead penalty-phase attorney Gregory Bartolomei

had never tried a murder case, much less a capital one, and

his so-called strategy was no strategy at all. After the defense

essentially conceded the guilt phase in a gruesome double

murder (it presented no witnesses), counsel planned a halfday penalty-phase defense seeking to portray Mitchell as

generally a nice fellow. To do so instead of presenting

evidence that his abusive childhood, drug and alcohol abuse,

and mental and emotional problems contributed to his violent

acts was “patently deficient” performance in violation of the

Sixth Amendment. Id.

The majority identifies three “themes” of the penaltyphase defense: (1) that Mitchell had redeeming qualities

making him a “life worth saving” (also known as a “good

guy” defense); (2) “that Johnny Orsinger was the mastermind

behind these crimes”; and (3) that the Navajo Nation did not

want Mitchell sentenced to death. Maj. Opinion at 26–28. In

reality, the defense that counsel presented centered almost

exclusively on the first theme—that Mitchell had been a

“good guy.” That argument had no chance of convincing a

jury to return a sentence other than death. Life without parole

could hardly have been justified by the snippets of normal

conduct which counsel chose to offer to the jury. The latter

two themes were barely included in the defense as presented,

but if properly developed, would have been wholly consistent

with the defense that counsel should have offered: a far more

plausible defense that sought to explain how the crimes

ultimately were attributable in large measure to Mitchell’s

drug and alcohol addiction, wretched upbringing, and the

ensuing mental and emotional difficulties from which he

suffered.

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MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES 37

In light of the shocking facts of the double murder of

which the jury had just convicted Mitchell, the “limited

strategy that [counsel] developed was unreasonably

constricted.” Correll v. Ryan, 539 F.3d 938, 945 (9th Cir.

2008). Focusing the penalty-phase presentation on evidence

that Mitchell was “a ‘good person’ and one who had ‘done

good deeds’ . . . was, in and of itself, unreasonable given the

extreme unlikelihood that any testimony about [Mitchell’s]

character would have been sufficient to ‘humanize[] him

during the time frame of the murder conspiracy at issue.’” Id.

at 946 (citation omitted).12

See also Hamilton, 583 F.3d at

1122. In short, “a good character defense was unlikely to be

persuasive to a jury that had just decided that [Mitchell] had

carried out a grizzly murder.” Bemore v. Chappell, No. 12-

99005 (9th Cir. June 9, 2015).

The “most likely” evidence to sway the jury “was the type

that would portray [Mitchell] as a person whose moral sense

was warped by abuse, drugs [and alcohol] [or] mental

incapacity.” Correll, 539 F.3d at 946. Evidence that a

defendant has these kinds of problems provides the jury with

a coherent picture of the circumstances that led to his

criminal acts, see Sears v. Upton, 561 U.S. 945, 951 (2010),

and may lead the jury to reject a death sentence “because of

the belief, long held by this society, that defendants who

commit criminal acts that are attributable to a disadvantaged

background, or to emotional and mental problems, may be

12

“Defense counsel compounded the errors he committed during the

investigative stage of the penalty phase by presenting almost none of the

little mitigating evidence he had discovered.” Hamilton v. Ayers, 583 F.3d

1100, 1119 (9th Cir. 2009). Moreover, as explained in the next section,

choosing the “good guy” defense was also unreasonable in light of

counsel’s failure to adequately investigate other more compelling

mitigation evidence.

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38 MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES

less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.”

Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989) (citation

omitted). Despite possessing evidence that Mitchell had been

physically abused as a child, had long been addicted to drugs

and alcohol, and had serious mental and emotional problems,

defense counsel presented no evidence of such “explanatory

or exculpatory attributes” to the jury and did not pursue

obvious leads regarding those issues. Allen v. Woodford,

395 F.3d 979, 1005–1007 (9th Cir. 2005). Indeed, counsel

made no effort to explain to the jury how a “good guy” could

also be a murderer, arguing only that “something happened”

to Mitchell but “we are never going to know.”13 Counsel’s

failure to present any explanatorymitigating evidence and, as

discussed below, to adequately investigate the existence and

nature of such evidence, constituted deficient performance in

light of the egregious facts and circumstances of Mitchell’s

crimes. See Hamilton, 583 F.3d at 1113 (“Counsel . . . has an

obligation to present and explain to the jury all available

mitigating evidence.”).

To make matters worse, the “good guy” defense that

counsel presented was weak and inadequately prepared—an

“anemic strategy” at best. Correll, 539 F.3d at 945. Counsel

called a number of witnesses to speak to Mitchell’s good

13 Counsel’s penalty-phase presentation “left the false impression that

[Mitchell’s] childhood, while unhappy, was not unusual.” Hamilton,

583 F.3d at 1120. The witnesses’ testimony made only oblique, passing

references to Mitchell’s difficult home life—that he was raised by his

grandparents, who were both educators, in a home where “the word [love]

was never said” that “didn’t give him love”; that his mother “wanted

nothing to do with [him]”; and that it was a “cold home.” In fact, the

defense team intentionally downplayed evidence of Mitchell’s troubled

background—for example, advising one teacher to “stick to only what

[she] knew about . . . Mitchell [from the] classroom” and not to mention

“that he seemed like a boy without a family . . . .”

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character, the vast majority of whom had known him only

briefly, when he was in high school. The consensus was that

Mitchell was a good high school student and athlete; that he

was respectful; and that he might be a good teacher to other

prisoners because he had some “computer skills” and

“vocational skills that he could pass on.” None of the

witnesses offered more than a superficial impression of

Mitchell, and most of them had not had any contact with him

since well before the time of the crimes. Moreover, the

conclusion from this “evidence” that Mitchell was a “good

guy” seems to have been one that could have been drawn by

no one other than his counsel. Cf. Allen, 395 F.3d at 1007

(holding that character witnesses whose “knowledge of [the

defendant] was neither deep nor contemporaneous with [the]

crimes” were unlikely to persuade the jury to choose life).

Anything positive conveyed to the jury by this tepid

testimony was surely undone when counsel referred to

Mitchell in his closing argument as “a jackass,” and said that

“there is the possibility that if Lezmond Mitchell lives on, he

might help someone else[.] Maybe he won’t. Maybe he will.”

“Witness preparation is a critical function of counsel,”

Doe v. Ayers, 782 F.3d 425, 442 (9th Cir. 2015), yet the

character witnesses were woefully ill prepared. Many had no

contact with defense counsel prior to short meetings on the

day of their testimony—meetings at which counsel primarily

showed them photos of the victims’ bodies and asked whether

theywould still testify. Such “spur-of-the-moment mitigation

presentations form no part of constitutionally adequate

representation.” Id. at 443; see also Hamilton, 583 F.3d at

1121 (“[T]he failure to prepare a witness adequately can

render a penalty phase presentation deficient.”). Even those

who had met the defense team prior to the day of testimony

were not prepared “to understand the proceeding in which

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40 MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES

[they were] participating,” Doe, 782 F.3d at 443, as counsel

did not tell them what sorts of questions would be asked.

As a result, much of the good character testimony elicited

was quite damaging. Although identifying Mitchell as a “very

excellent student” and “an outstanding athlete,” Dr. Roessel,

executive director of Mitchell’s high school, testified that

Mitchell “broke into [his] office” to steal a computer and a

shotgun, which he used in a robbery, and that he had been

suspended for having a marijuana joint. His wife, Ruth

Roessel, testified to the singular importance of grandmothers

in Navajo families, which allowed the prosecutor to stress

how devastating Slim’s death must have been to her family.

Mitchell’s uncle testified that Mitchell once “disrespected

[him], [his] wife, [and] [his] kids,” by smoking pot in his

house because “in the Native American church . . . marijuana

is evil.”

Meanwhile, the prosecution used the defense’s “good

guy” evidence to its own advantage, arguing that because

Mitchell was smart and a leader, he would not have gotten

involved in the crime purely by accident or because of

Orsinger’s influence; that he had squandered a chance to go

to college; that his home life was better than average; and that

his experiences and environment did not contribute to his

crimes—concluding that their cruelty was “so inexplicable”

that the only reasonable response was to punish the

perpetrator with death. Defense counsel’s failure to submit

any evidence explaining what went wrong in Mitchell’s life

ensured that “the prosecutor’s main argument to the jury

during sentencing was the dearth of evidence in mitigation of

the crimes.” Silva, 279 F.3d at 830. In fact, not only did

counsel fail to challenge the prosecution’s assertion that

Mitchell’s background could not mitigate his culpability for

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MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES 41

the crimes, “he effectively validated it,” Hamilton, 583 F.3d

at 1121, by stating in closing that “people come from bad

backgrounds all the time and never get involved in anything

like this.”

The other two themes identified by the majority—that

Orsinger was the mastermind and that the Navajo Nation

opposed the death penalty—could not and did not redeem

counsel’s worthless and implausible “good guy” defense for

two reasons. Most important, these two themes were

irrelevant to counsel’s choice between a doomed “good guy”

defense and a far more plausible defense that sought to

explain how and why Mitchell became a criminal, as the two

subsidiaryarguments were fully consistent with either choice.

Counsel’s decision to use them along with the doomed “good

guy” theme did not in any way make the deficient

performance in choosing that theme as the primary defense

any less deficient.

Moreover,these two subsidiarythemes were inadequately

developed and halfheartedly presented to the jury. Virtually

no evidence of the “Orsinger was the mastermind” theme was

introduced in the penalty phase, and neither was a serious

argument to that effect made to the jury. The sum total of

penalty-phase evidence pertaining to this theme was

Mitchell’s uncle’s speculative statement that Mitchell “was

a good kid until he met Orsinger,”14and evidence that

Orsinger had earlier committed a similar crime with someone

else. Then, in closing, counsel asserted that although Mitchell

admitted stabbing Slim, as well as cutting the child’s throat

and throwing rocks on her head, “there is no evidence . . .

14 The uncle admitted on cross-examination that he had no first-hand

knowledge of Orsinger.

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42 MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES

Mitchell began the stabbing,” that it was possible that

Orsinger “threw the first rock,” and that “the cause of death

for that child could have been inflicted by the first rock.”

(emphasis added). These hypothetical suppositions did not

constitute a reasonable argument for sparing Mitchell’s life.

As the prosecution pointed out, Mitchell was death-eligible

whether he delivered the fatal blows or not.

The third theme—the Navajo Nation’s opposition to the

death penalty—could have been quite compelling,

particularly if combined with evidence of Mitchell’s drug and

alcohol addiction. Unfortunately, the only evidence that the

jury heard regarding the Navajo Nation’s opposition to the

death penalty consisted of counsel reading from Henry’s

letter. The jury was unaware that the victims’ family had

asked the prosecutor not to seek the death penalty. No

defense witness testified about why the death penalty

contravenes Navajo conceptions of justice, or about the

tribe’s belief that rehabilitation, not the death sentence, is

needed to address major crimes committed on the reservation,

most of which are associated with alcohol addiction. Indeed,

counsel seems not to have even realized this was a potential

theme; the Navajo Nation’s opposition to Mitchell’s

execution was never formally presented to the jury as a

mitigating factor.15In combination with the missing direct

evidence of drug and alcohol addiction (along with the other

evidence regarding Mitchell’s emotional and mental

problems and the physical abuse he suffered), evidence

relating to the Navajo Nation’s reasons for opposing his death

15 The seven members of the jury who found the Navajo Nation’s

opposition to the death penalty mitigating included it as write-in nonstatutory mitigator on the verdict form. By contrast, the verdict form

included typed questions regarding the prosecution’s non-statutory

aggravating factors.

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MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES 43

sentence could have provided substantial support for a

defense that explained why Mitchell became what he

did—although it provided no support for the “good guy”

argument.

“Defense counsel’s use of mitigation evidence to

complete, deepen, or contextualize the picture of the

defendant presented by the prosecution can be crucial to

persuading jurors that the life of a capital defendant is worth

saving.” Allen, 395 F.3d at 1000. In this case, however,

counsel’s halfhearted attempt at a good character defense

provided no context at all. The jury simply heard mixed

evidence that Mitchell had been an ok guy to a few people at

some point in his life, with no explanation whatsoever

regarding why he committed extremely violent acts that

jurors might well believe no decent human being would

commit. To the contrary, the evidence that counsel failed to

present—that Mitchell was addicted to alcohol and drugs, that

he had been physically abused as a child, and that he had

mental and emotional problems—could have helped persuade

at least one juror that Mitchell was not as culpable as would

have been the good guy from a fine family background that

counsel sought to portray him as being. The strategy

employed by Mitchell’s counsel does not fit with the

commission of the horrific acts of which the jury had just

convicted him. Any reasonable juror would need some

explanation of what was wrong with Mitchell—why what he

did was not simply due to an evil nature. Simply saying he’s

really a good guy with some good qualities could not

conceivably help. Counsel’s strategy—if it can be called

that—was outside “the wide range of reasonable professional

assistance.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.668, 689

(1984); see also Silva, 279 F.3d at 846 (“[A]n attorney’s

performance is not immunized from Sixth Amendment

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44 MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES

challenges simply by attaching to it the label of ‘trial

strategy.’”). I would hold that for this reason alone counsel’s

performance was constitutionally deficient.

B.

Even assuming that counsel’s “good guy” defense

strategy might in some limited circumstances have been

reasonable—and it’s hard to make that assumption given the

nature of the acts that Mitchell committed—the question

remains “whether the investigation supporting their decision

not to introduce mitigating evidence of [Mitchell’s]

background [and to rely on the ‘good guy’ defense] was itself

reasonable.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 511 (2003).

“[S]trategic choices made after less than complete

investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that

reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on

investigation. In other words, counsel has a duty to make

reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision

that makes particularinvestigations unnecessary,” Strickland,

466 U.S. at 690–91, before deciding on the strategy to be

followed at the trial and the penalty phase, with a particular

emphasis on the latter. In fact, “the reasonableness of

counsel’s investigatory and preparatory work at the penalty

phase should be examined in a different, more exacting,

manner than other parts of the trial.” Frierson v. Woodford,

463 F.3d 982, 993 (9th Cir. 2006).

In Mitchell’s case, counsel unduly circumscribed the

scope of the mitigation investigation and prematurely settled

on a “good guy” strategy before obtaining all the facts

necessary to the making of an informed decision. Although

“[n]o particular set of detailed rules” establishes the contours

of competent representation, the Supreme Court and this

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MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES 45

court recognize that “[r]estatements of professional standards

. . . can be useful as ‘guides’ to what reasonableness entails

. . . to the extent they describe the professional norms

prevailing when the representation took place.” Doe,

782 F.3d at 434 (quoting Bobby v. Van Hook, 558 U.S. 4, 7

(2009)) (quotation marks omitted); see also Wiggins, 539

U.S. at 524. Counsel’s investigation clearly fell short of the

professional norms in place at the time of Mitchell’s trial,

which included “the duty to investigate mitigating evidence

in exhaustive detail” and required “that counsel’s

investigation cover every period of the defendant’s life from

‘the moment of conception,’ . . . and that counsel contact

‘virtually everyone . . . who knew [the defendant] and his

family’ and obtain records ‘concerning not only the client, but

also his parents, grandparents, siblings, and children.’”

Bobby, 558 U.S. at 8 (quoting ABA Guidelines for the

Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death

Penalty Cases (“ABA Guidelines”), cmt. to Guideline 10.7

(rev. ed. Feb. 2003)).

Counsel was on notice that Mitchell struggled with drug

and alcohol abuse but unreasonablydecided not to investigate

further. Vera Ockenfels, an experienced capital lawyer and

mitigation specialist hired by the defense, provided a

preliminary report that identified Mitchell as a “heavy” user

of crystal methamphetamine, particularly in the months

preceding the crimes, as well as a user of marijuana, cocaine,

and alcohol.16 She informed counsel “that Mitchell was

16 Contrary to the majority’s contention that Ockenfels’ report was

complete, Maj. Op. at 14, it was clearly a draft—the conclusion section of

the report read “[TO BE DRAFTED FOLLOWING EDITS FROM

ATTORNEYS]” and during post-convictions proceedings Ockenfels

explained that it was a “draft document that [she] expected would be

further developed and revised before it was finalized . . . .”

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46 MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES

addicted to alcohol and drugs and that he had started using

drugs at age eleven,” and recommended that counsel further

investigate Mitchell’s history of addiction in consultation

with a psychopharmacologist. This advice was not followed.

In fact, when Ockenfels informed counsel that Mitchell’s

addiction could be used as mitigating evidence, Mitchell’s

lawyers simply responded that “there was ‘no mitigation’ in

his case,” and “that the team did not intend to pursue

evidence of Mitchell’s significant history of drug and alcohol

abuse . . . because Mitchell had denied being drunk or high on

drugs at the time of the killings.”

Declining to pursue substance abuse evidence in favor of

a “good guy” defense at this stage was unreasonable for

several reasons: First, Ockenfels had explained that it was

common for young Native American clients to denyaddiction

to their attorneys. Second, “[a] defendant’s lack of

cooperation does not eliminate counsel’s duty to investigate.”

Hamilton, 583 F.3d at 1118; see also ABA Guidelines, cmt. to

Guideline 10.7 (describing duty to conduct a “thorough and

independent” investigation regardless of “client statements

concerning the facts of the alleged crime” (emphasis added)).

Third and most important, whether Mitchell was

intoxicated during the commission of the crime was not the

relevant penalty-phase question. Even if evidence of

substance abuse was “[in]sufficient to demonstrate that [the

defendant] lacked the requisite mental state for the crime,” it

remained an “important mitigating factor” for the jury to

consider in that it would have played a major part in

explaining Mitchell’s life story to the jury. Frierson, 463 F.3d

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at 994 n.12.17 Evidence that Mitchell was a chronic user of

alcohol and drugs from a young age is the kind of “classic

mitigating evidence” that counsel must pursue at the penalty

phase, Correll, 539 F.3d at 952, irrespective of whether the

defendant was under the influence at the time of the crimes.

Substance abuse constitutes “behavior that can be

characterized as self-medication for the everyday trauma of

his life and for the mental health illnesses that were later

diagnosed.” Id. Evidence of Mitchell’s addiction would have

helped a jury to far better comprehend why he committed the

crimes he did—particularly when linked to the abusive

circumstances in which he was raised. Counsel had a duty to

pursue this lead. Further investigation would have revealed

that Mitchell’s drug and alcohol problems escalated

drastically in the months preceding the crimes. He heavily

used crystal methamphetamine, powder and crack cocaine,

ecstasy, LCD, PCP, marijuana, and alcohol, often staying up

for three nights in a row. It would also have revealed a family

history of alcoholism and the ugly and noxious family

environment in which he was raised.

The majority dismisses counsel’s decision not to

investigate or present evidence of Mitchell’s history of

alcohol and drug abuse as a strategic decision based on “their

professional opinion [that] jurors would be turned off by such

evidence . . . .” Maj. Op. at 16–17. This explanation,

however, is not only inconsistent with the many wellestablished judicial conclusions to the contrary, but it is

17 See also Correll, 539 F.3d at 944 (finding ineffective assistance at

penalty phase because “[d]espite his knowledge that [Defendant] was a

drug user . . . defense counsel did not interview witnesses about th[is]

issue[] or obtain records concerning these matters”); ABA Guidelines, cmt.

to Guideline 10.7 (describing “substance abuse” as a mitigating factor

counsel “needs to” explore).

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48 MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES

directly contradicted by counsel’s actions in this case, and

thus can only constitute a “post hoc rationalization of

counsel’s conduct.” Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 526–27. In fact,

counsel did introduce evidence of intoxication at the penalty

phase, albeit ineffectively, through the testimony of FBI

Agent Duncan, who testified on cross-examination that he did

not believe Mitchell’s account of having been intoxicated the

day of the crime. Counsel also requested and received a jury

instruction on the statutory mitigating factor of impaired

capacity and, during closing argument, asserted that

“[Mitchell] was so drunk that he didn’t even remember where

this all happened and he blacked out . . . .” Thus, “counsel

never actually abandoned the possibility” of introducing

evidence of drug and alcohol abuse but instead presented a

“halfhearted mitigation case” on the matter ineptly and

without proper investigation. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 526.

Most important, the weak evidence of drug and alcohol

use that counsel haphazardly introduced was deployed for the

wrong purpose. The point was not that Mitchell was

intoxicated during the crimes to the point that he lost

control—an unsubstantiated claim that likely did “turn off”

the jury. Rather, evidence of Mitchell’s long history of

addiction commencing at an early age—which was easily

corroborated, as post-conviction counsel found—could have

been used effectively to give the jury a complete picture of

why Mitchell became the person he was. Trial counsel,

however, failed to conduct the investigation necessary to

make a reasonably informed decision regarding whether to

present evidence that Mitchell’s struggle with addiction and

his otherwise damaging life history mitigated his culpability.

The resulting unexplored and undeveloped presentation that

he was simply drunk at the time was wholly unbelievable and

served only to undermine the “good guy” defense. Clearly no

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MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES 49

reasonable strategic decision to withhold evidence of

Mitchell’s drug and alcohol addiction or to end the

investigation into such evidence was made; nor could it have

been made without investigating in “exhaustive detail” all

aspects of Mitchell’s life that could have contributed to his

ultimately committing so horrendous an offense. Bobby,

558 U.S. at 8.18

Counsel did not, it is clear, adequately investigate

Mitchell’s family history or make a reasonable decision not

to investigate further. Counsel was on notice from Ockenfels’

draft report that Mitchell’s home life was marked by

abandonment, instability, isolation, and abuse. For example,

Ockenfels found that Mitchell’s mother, with whom he lived

until seventh grade, was physically abusive, as was his

grandmother, with whom he lived periodically. An uncle had

observed that Mitchell “‘never had a chance’ with his

family,” while Dr. Roessell told Ockenfels that Mitchell “was

‘on his own from the time he was born.’” Ockenfels

concluded that by high school “the neglect [Mitchell] had

endured had taken its toll and had hardened him.”

Counsel did not follow up on any of these leads. The

defense team’s view was that “nothing [stood] out . . . . [The

family was] educated. They were, at least . . . by reservation

standards, . . . middle-class.” In short, the attorneys ignored

red flags regarding physical and emotional abuse, instead

taking away from Ockenfels’ report and their own interviews

18 Moreover, the “two sentencing strategies” of (1) good character

evidence and (2) explanatory mitigating evidence of drug and alcohol

abuse, mental illness, or a difficult background “are not mutually

exclusive.” Bemore, No. 12-99005 (quotation marks omitted). Thus,

counsel could not have made a reasonable strategic decision to cut off the

investigation into the latter type of evidence to focus solely on the former.

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50 MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES

with Mitchell’s family only that “he came from basically a

family of educators.” They accordingly ceased investigating

Mitchell’s family background, unreasonably constricting the

mitigation investigation and presentation to good character

evidence.

This premature narrowing of the scope of the mitigation

investigation was not within the range of reasonable

professional conduct. “It is imperative that all relevant

mitigating information be unearthed for consideration at the

capital sentencing phase.” Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223,

1227 (9th Cir. 1999) (quotation marks omitted). “[I]f what

counsel knows or should know suggests further investigation

might yield more mitigating evidence, counsel must conduct

that investigation.” Doe, 782 F.3d at 435. Had counsel

conducted further inquiry, additional mitigating evidence ripe

for presentation at the penalty phase would have been

uncovered. The post-conviction investigation revealed that

Mitchell’s home was far more violent and dysfunctional than

Ockenfels’ incomplete draft report suggested; there was

“constant uncertainty of what would happen . . . because of

the verbal and sometimes physical abuse, and the emotional

abuse . . . .”

One particularly egregious deficiency of the mitigation

investigation into family history bears mention. Even though

the defense team knew that Mitchell’s grandfather George

was “‘the only one who raised [him],” they uncovered only

very elementary background information about him—that he

had ten siblings; that he had held “several teaching and

administrative positions in several Reservation schools”; that

he married Mitchell’s grandmother when she was thirteen and

was twenty years her senior; and that he was a “dour, sour

man.” Critically, counsel failed to investigate Ockenfels’

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MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES 51

finding that both of Mitchell’s grandparents and his uncle had

told him that he was the product of rape and/or that his

grandfather was also his father. Growing up with this

“knowledge,” true or false, is certain to adversely affect an

individual’s emotional well-being.

Had counselfurtherinvestigated George—consistent with

the ABA Guidelines’ requirement of an “extensive and

generally unparalleled investigation into personal and family

history” that includes “[t]he collection of corroborating

information from multiple sources,” ABA Guidelines, cmt. to

Guideline 10.7—they would have learned that there were

“persistent rumors regarding George molesting children.”

Residents of the reservation told post-conviction investigators

that George was fired from a school principal position

because he molested children. His wife’s sisters also alleged

that he raped them when they were nine and twelve years old,

respectively, and his wife told a relative that he molested the

three-year-old child of a neighbor. Mitchell’s mother, Sherry,

told post-conviction investigators that her mother (George’s

wife) repeatedly accused her of having a sexual relationship

with George and that some people thought Mitchell was the

product of incest.19 Sherry also “stated an uncertaintywhether

or not George may have molested [Mitchell].”20

 

19 Although Sherry did not believe that her father had sex with her, she

reported memories of a man with “whiskers” kissing her while she was

asleep and of a vision that her “father had performed a binding ceremony

with [her] when [she] was little” and that the “ceremony meant that . . .

[she] would become his wife, which included having sex with him.”

 

20 Trial counsel “did not get much of a history of [Mitchell]’s life from

his mother” Sherry because she stopped cooperating when Ockenfels,

against her express instructions, told Mitchell certain things she had said.

However, even without Sherry’s cooperation, an adequate investigation

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52 MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES

The majority dismisses the evidence that Mitchell’s

primary caregiver was a pedophile and rapist as of “dubious

relevance” because the alleged conduct took place “sometime

in the 1950s and 1960s, about 20 years before Mitchell was

born,” Mitchell never met the alleged victims, and there was

no allegation that George ever molested Mitchell himself.

Maj. Op. at 23–24. The conduct was not, however, limited to

the 1950s and 1960s. For example, the complaints of sexual

abuse lodged against George when he was a principal

pertained to incidents in 1985 or 1986.

Moreover, the majority’s belief that it is oflittle relevance

that Mitchell was primarily raised by a man who was

probably a child molester is puzzling for several reasons.

First, this court routinely upholds lifetime requirements that

sex offenders avoid any contact with minors, reasoning that

“‘the perpetrators of child sexual abuse crimes’ often have

‘deep-seated aberrant sexual disorders that are not likely to

disappear within a few years . . . .’” United States v. Williams,

636 F.3d 1229, 1234 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).

Second, the sexual abuse allegations against George could

have been presented to the jury as evidence of the degree to

which his family neglected him, as his “mother and

grandmother knowingly gave up his care for extended periods

of time . . . [to] a man whom they knew sexually preyed on

children.” Third, the atmosphere in a home dominated by a

child molester was necessarily fraught with tension, sexual

and otherwise, an atmosphere hardly conducive to the healthy

emotional development of a young child. Fourth and most

important, Mitchell’s attorneys could not reach any

conclusion regarding the relevance or value of mitigating

would likely have uncovered the sexual abuse allegations made by other

family members and residents of the Navajo Reservation.

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MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES 53

evidence pertaining to the sexual abuse allegations until they

reasonably investigated those allegations. It was undoubtedly

constitutionally deficient performance for counsel to fail to

perform any investigation whatsoever into the allegations

after having been alerted to them by Ockenfels’ draft report.

Finally, the investigation into Mitchell’s mental health

was also inadequate. “The presence of certain elements in a

capital defendant’s background, such as a family history of

alcoholism, abuse, and emotional problems, triggers a duty to

conduct further inquiry before choosing to cease

investigating,” Doe, 782 F.3d at 435 (quotation marks and

citation omitted), but counsel failed to pursue clear leads

regarding Mitchell’s mental problems. First, counsel did not

follow up on Ockenfels’ finding that when Mitchell

underwent counseling at age seventeen, a doctor found him

to be “a very troubled young man” in need of “[i]ntensive

psychotherapy” who experienced suicidal ideation when his

family fought. Counsel also ignored Ockenfels’

recommendation that they hire a forensic psychologist to

explain how Mitchell’s upbringing had caused him to turn to

alcohol and drug abuse.

Second, the majority overstates its case when it asserts

that Dr. Morenz, who oversaw the team evaluating Mitchell,

“did not recommend further testing.” Maj. Op. at 16.21 Rather,

21 The majority erroneously relies on the purported evaluation of

psychologist Susan Parrish in ruling that counsel reasonably decided not

to further investigate Mitchell’s mental problems. See Maj. Op. at 14–15.

It is unclear whether Dr. Parrish actually performed a complete psychiatric

evaluation of Mitchell. Although one attorney stated in a post-conviction

deposition that Dr.Parrish diagnosed Mitchell as a sociopath and indicated

that she would not serve as a witness, Bartolomei, the attorney in charge

of the penalty phase, testified that her role was “more to assist in

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54 MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES

in addition to finding polysubstance abuse and “significant

depressive symptoms,” Dr. Morenz concluded that Mitchell

may “have some subtle brain dysfunction in the frontal lobes

caused by his head injuries . . . [that] might have contributed

to Mr. Mitchell being more impulsive . . . including . . .

during the time of the alleged instant offenses.” He suggested

that “[a] PET scan could be obtained that could, if abnormal,

contribute further corroborating evidence to the diagnosis of

a cognitive disorder not otherwise specified.” Counsel neither

discussed Dr. Morenz’s report with him, followed up on these

leads, nor presented any evidence of Mitchell’s mental

problems to the jury.

The majority asserts that counsel made a reasonable

decision not to further investigate or to present mental health

evidence for fear that doing so would open the door to

damaging aspects of Dr. Morenz’s report. Maj. Op. at 16–17.

However, the question is not, as the majority appears to

believe, whether it was reasonable not to call Dr. Morenz to

the stand. There may be good reasons not to call a particular

witness, but counsel cannot forego an entire line of inquiry on

that basis unless there is no way, other than the problematic

witness, to get that evidence before the jury. See Karis v.

Calderon, 283 F.3d 1117, 1140 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that

even if “[i]t was within the range of reasonable tactics not to

put [a certain witness] on the stand, . . . that does not excuse

the failure to present the evidence of abuse through other

witnesses”); see also Doe, 782 F.3d at 439 (“Other witnesses,

such as those whom habeas counsel was able to find, were

‘easily within [counsel’s] reach,’ and would have been

discovered by trial counsel, ‘[h]ad [he] only looked.”)

coordinating or reviewing materials or giving ideas” and stated, “I don’t

believe she . . . ever [made] a DSM-IV assessment.”

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MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES 55

(quoting Wallace v. Stewart, 184 F.3d 1112, 1116 (9th Cir.

1999)) (some alterations in original); Wiggins, 539 U.S. at

527 (“[A] court must consider not only the quantum of

evidence already known to counsel, but also whether the

known evidence would lead a reasonable attorney to

investigate further.”). Nothing suggests that Dr. Morenz was

the only mental health witness available. Indeed, Ockenfels

referred counsel to a forensic psychologist whom she

believed could provide a helpful synthesis of Mitchell’s

history to the jury. There is no indication in the record that

counsel ever contacted him.

Moreover, at the penalty phase, “counsel has an

affirmative duty to provide mental health experts with

information needed to develop an accurate profile of the

defendant’s mental health.” Caro v. Woodford, 280 F.3d

1247, 1254 (9th Cir. 2002). In this case, however, the

inadequacy of counsel’s investigation into Mitchell’s

personal and family history tainted the mental health

investigation. For example, Dr. Morenz stated during postconvictions proceedings that he “would have developed

further” whether Mitchell’s “perceptions of reality might

have been altered” at the time of the crimes had he known the

full extent of Mitchell’s addictions and Dr. Stewart, a

psychiatrist who examined Mitchell post-conviction, reached

a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder based in part on

the evidence uncovered post-conviction regarding the

“severity and frequency” of the abuse Mitchell experienced

as a child.

“[A]ll potentially mitigating evidence is relevant at the

sentencing phase of a death case” and thus counsel had a duty

to investigate further once put on notice that Mitchell

struggled with addiction, that he had a troubled childhood,

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56 MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES

and that he had mental and emotional problems. Wallace,

184 F.3d at 1117 n.5 (emphasis added). Counsel failed to

appreciate, however, that evidence of these mitigating

circumstances “may help” the penalty-phase defense “even if

they don’t rise to a specific, technically-defined level.” Id. In

short, “counsel were not in a position to make a reasonable

strategic choice as to whether to focus on” a “good guy”

defense, “the sordid details of [Mitchell’s] life history, or

both, because the investigation supporting their choice was

unreasonable.” Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 536. Iwould accordingly

hold that for this reason as well counsel’s performance was

constitutionally deficient.

C.

In order to establish a violation of the defendant’s Sixth

Amendment right to effective counsel, it is not enough that

counsel performed deficiently. The defendant must also have

been prejudiced. In this case, when one evaluates “the totality

of the available mitigation evidence—both that adduced at

trial, and the evidence adduced in the habeas proceeding” and

reweighs it against the aggravating evidence, “there is a

reasonable probability that at least one juror would have

struck a different balance between life and death” but for

counsel’s deficient performance. Hamilton, 583 F.3d at 1131

(quotation marks and citation omitted).

A number of factors tell us that a death sentence was far

from a foregone conclusion in this case: (1) Notwithstanding

the attorneys’ deficient performance, the jurors found a

number of mitigating factors, including, for example, a

unanimous finding that Mitchell’s lack of a prior record was

mitigating and a finding by seven jurors that the Navajo

Nation’s opposition to the death penalty was mitigating.

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MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES 57

(2) Neither the Arizona United States Attorney, the Navajo

Nation, nor the victims’ family wanted to see Mitchell

executed. (3) Neither Orsinger, who was a minor at the time

of the crime, nor his adult accomplice in another strikingly

similar double murder were sentenced to death.

Most important, “there was a substantial amount of

classic mitigating evidence that could have been presented,

but was not.” Correll, 539 F.3d at 952. Evidence that Mitchell

suffered from severe drug and alcohol abuse problems, was

raised by a child molester, experienced physical and

emotional abuse, and had mental problems is “precisely the

type of evidence we have found critical for a jury to consider

when deciding whether to impose a death sentence,” Douglas

v. Woodford, 316 F.3d 1079, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003), yet the

case that counsel presented gave the mistaken impression that

no such mitigating circumstances were present. See supra

note 13. Indeed counsel gave the jurors precisely the opposite

impression—that Mitchell simply came from a middle-class

home of educators and had a rather unremarkable upbringing

that made his inexplicably heinous crimes deserving of

punishment by death.

“[B]oth this court and the Supreme Court have

consistently held that counsel’s failure to present readily

available evidence of childhood abuse, mental illness, and

drug addiction is sufficient to undermine confidence in the

result of a sentencing proceeding, and thereby to render

counsel’s performance prejudicial.” Lambright v. Schriro,

490 F.3d 1103, 1121 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Hamilton,

583 F.3d at 1113 (“In a capital case, such evidence [of a

disadvantaged background, emotional or mental problems]

can be the difference between a life sentence and a sentence

of death.”). Here, evidence of Mitchell’s abusive history, as

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58 MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES

well as his addiction and mental problems, would have been

especially compelling when combined with evidence that the

Navajo Nation opposes the death penalty in part because

addiction plays a substantial role in most “major crimes

committed on the Navajo Nation” and the Navajos fervently

believe that treatment, not execution, is the proper long-term

answer. Supra p. 29 & note 3.

True, “[t]he aggravating evidence in [Mitchell’s] case was

strong, but it was not so overwhelming as to preclude the

possibility of a life sentence. Heinous crimes do not make

mitigating evidence irrelevant.” Hovey v. Ayers, 458 F.3d

892, 930 (9th Cir. 2006);see also Hamilton, 583 F.3d at 1134

(“[E]ven the gruesome nature of a crime does not necessarily

mean the death penalty [i]s unavoidable.” (quotation marks

and citations omitted)). In my view, notwithstanding

Mitchell’s terrible criminal acts, the likelihood of a different

outcome (which required the casting of only a single vote

against the imposition of the death penalty) had counsel

competently investigated and presented the mitigation case

that could have been put before the jury is “sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 694. Thus, in my opinion, counsel’s constitutionally

deficient performance was indeed prejudicial.

In this respect, I would add a final thought. This is a

purely federal habeas case—a federal court’s review of a

federal conviction. Any concern that we might have

regarding the doctrine of comity when we review a state

conviction does not apply. That is, this case involves

prosecution and judicial review by one sovereign—the

federal government—and not a federal court’s review of the

criminal adjudication of a second sovereign government—a

state. In this case, we owe no deference to what another

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MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES 59

sovereign’s court has done and we are perfectly free to review

the important questions in this case de novo. The majority,

however, fails to recognize this key distinction from the usual

habeas cases heard by our court seeking relief from a state

conviction, inappropriately relying on cases in which the

Antiterrorism and Effective Death PenaltyAct applies. In this

case, the only other sovereign government to which comity

might apply is the Navajo Nation, which vigorously opposes

Mitchell’s death sentence. Although there is no obligation to

defer to its legal rulings, perhaps the jury would have given

more weight to its pleas had Mitchell’s counsel presented a

case that helped explain how his disadvantaged background,

addiction, and mental and emotional difficulties contributed

to his commission of his crimes and rendered him less

culpable, even though the federal government itself seemed

totally unmoved by the concerns and interests of the

sovereign primarily affected.

Conclusion

The majority tragically errs in sending Mitchell on to his

death notwithstanding the fact that he was deprived of

effective representation and a fair trial. I sincerely hope that

the executive branch will not compound the error by carrying

out Mitchell’s execution in violation of the Constitution, as

well as in contravention of the wishes of the Navajo Nation

and the family of the victims. It is time for those with the

ultimate power to decide the fate of federal prisoners to arrive

at a more sensible policy regarding the execution of our

citizens by the federal government and to apply it to

Mitchell’s case. At the very least, arbitrariness must not be a

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60 MITCHELL V. UNITED STATES

factor.22 There are currently fifty-nine inmates on federal

death row awaiting execution, yet just three executions have

been carried out since the reinstatement of the federal death

penalty in 1988. There is little value in adding to this backlog

someone like Mitchell who committed a crime solely of local

interest to the Navajo Nation, brutal as that crime may have

been. Most important, there is still a place in our federal

system for clemency—for the commutation of a death

sentence to life without the possibility of parole (or even,

given Mitchell’s age at the time of the crimes, life

simpliciter). A very recent ABC News/Washington Post poll

shows that for the first time a majority of our citizens favors

life without parole over the government’s taking of human

life.23I am hopeful that if and when the President is required

to determine whether capital punishment is the appropriate

remedy for Mitchell’s offenses, he (or she) will bear in mind

both the interests of justice and the wishes of the victims’

family, the Navajo Nation, and the American people.

I dissent.

22 President Obama ordered the Justice Department to consider a formal

moratorium on federal executions, but that effort stalled when Attorney

General Holder announced his plans to resign. See Matt Apuzzo, U.S.

Backed Off on Push to End Death Penalty, N.Y. Times, April 30, 2015,

at A1.

23 Damla Ergun, New Low in Preference for the Death Penalty, ABC

News (June 5, 2014), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2014/06/newlow-in- preference-for-the-death-penalty/.

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