Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_02-cv-05449/USCOURTS-cand-4_02-cv-05449-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1

 Petitioner also filed a "Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus" on March 15, 1999 in the

California Supreme Court seeking substitution of appellate counsel (Case No. S077369), which was

denied on June 30, 1999.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DANNY LEE CAESAR,

Petitioner,

v.

JOE McGRATH, Warden,

Respondent. _______________________________________

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No. C 02-5449 SBA (pr)

ORDER GRANTING

RESPONDENT'S MOTION

TO DISMISS PETITION AS

UNTIMELY

(Docket No. 19)

Respondent moves to dismiss the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus as untimely

under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), the statute of limitations established by the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (hereinafter "AEDPA"). Petitioner opposes the motion. 

Respondent filed a reply to Petitioner's opposition.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner Danny Lee Caesar, a State prisoner, filed the instant pro se petition for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On July 1, 1998, he was convicted of two counts of

assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury, one count of battery causing serious injury,

and one count of misdemeanor battery. It was found that his two previous convictions of

residential burglaries were prior strikes under California's Three Strikes law, and that he had two

prior prison terms. He was sentenced on August 14, 1998 to twenty-seven years to life in prison. 

Appointed counsel filed a direct appeal on August 19, 1998 in the California Court of

Appeal (Case No. H019011) in which he asserted a single claim that the trial court abused its

discretion in failing to strike one of his prior strikes. Petitioner alleges that he urged his

appointed appellate counsel to raise additional claims on appeal, but the attorney refused. On

March 25, 1999, Petitioner also filed a motion seeking substitute appellate counsel in the

California Court of Appeal.1

 He specifically requested a hearing pursuant to People v. Marsden,

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2

 Petitioner also filed numerous petitions for a writ of mandamus in both the state appellate

court and the state supreme court:

On May 20, 1998, Petitioner filed a "Petition for Writ of Mandate" in the California Court of

Appeal (Case No. H018557). On May 22, 1998, the California Court of Appeal denied the petition.

On October 12, 1999, Petitioner filed a "Petition for Writ of Mandate" in the California

Supreme Court (Case No. S082779). On October 19, 1999, the California Supreme Court

transferred Case No. S082779 to the California Court of Appeal for consideration in light of Hagan

v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d 767 (1962). On October 25, 1999, the California Court of Appeal

received the petition for a writ of mandamus that was transferred from the California Supreme Court

(Case No. H020643). The Court of Appeal denied the petition on November 1, 1999.

On October 13, 1999, Petitioner filed a "Petition for Writ of Mandate" in the California

Supreme Court (Case No. S082820). On December 1, 1999, the California Supreme Court denied

the petition.

On June 7, 2000, Petitioner filed a "Petition of Writ of Mandate" in the California Supreme

Court (Case No. S088946). On June 12, 2000, the California Supreme Court transferred Case No.

S088946 to the California Court of Appeal. On June 20, 2000, the California Court of Appeal

received the petition for a writ of mandamus that was transferred from the California Supreme Court

(Case No. H021649). The Court of Appeal denied the petition on August 14, 2000. In that same

order, the appellate court also denied Petitioner's motion for appointment of investigative services.

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2 Cal. 3d 118 (1970). On April 16, 1999, the appellate court took no action and instead sent a

letter to Petitioner, explaining that the right to such a hearing applied only to trial court

proceedings. See Resp't Ex. C (Pet. filed on Aug. 23, 1999 in Cal. App. Ct., Ex. J). The

appellate court informed Petitioner that it would send a copy of his motion seeking substitute

appellate counsel to the Sixth District Appellate Program to see if they could address his

concerns. Id. In May 1999, Petitioner's appointed counsel sent Petitioner a letter explaining his

rights to seek collateral review. See id. (Pet. filed on Aug. 23, 1999 in Cal. App. Ct., Ex. I). 

On August 23, 1999, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the

California Court of Appeal (Case No. H020401, Resp't Ex. C). The appellate court denied his

petition on September 1, 1999.2

On April 20, 2000, Petitioner's conviction was affirmed by the California Court of

Appeal. Petitioner did not file a petition for review with the California Supreme Court.

On September 11, 2000, Petitioner filed his first petition for a writ of habeas corpus in

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3

 In its initial order, the Court reviewed the petition and dismissed the claims that failed to

assert cognizable federal grounds for relief. The Court granted Petitioner thirty days to amend his

petition. Petitioner filed his amended petition on May 1, 2002. On May 7, 2002, the Court

dismissed the entire action because it appeared to be completely unexhausted. See Order dated May

7, 2002 in Case No. C 00-3271 SBA (pr) at 3.

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 The Court notes that Petitioner did not indicate the exact date that he signed the petition. 

Had Petitioner indicated the date he signed the petition, the Court could have assumed that he

delivered the petition to prison authorities for mailing on that date. The petition could have been

deemed filed on that date. Saffold v. Newland, 250 F.3d 1262, 1268 (9th Cir. 2001), vacated and

remanded on other grounds, Carey v. Saffold, 122 S. Ct. 2134 (2002) (holding that a federal or state

habeas petition is deemed filed on the date the prisoner submits it to prison authorities for filing,

rather than the date it is received by the courts). Therefore, the Court considers the filing date of his

petition to be the date his petition was received by the Court, which is November 18, 2002.

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this Court. See Caesar v. McGrath, Case No. C 00-3721 SBA (PR).3

While his federal petition was pending, Petitioner challenged his conviction by filing state

habeas petitions in the state superior court (Case No. 201282, Resp't Ex. D) on December 14,

2001, in the state appellate court (Case No. H024172) on February 27, 2002, and in the state

supreme court (Case No. S105866, Resp't Ex. E) on April 15, 2002. His last state habeas petition

was denied by the California Supreme Court on October 23, 2002. See Resp't Ex. F.

The instant federal petition was received by the Court and filed on November 18, 2002.4

The Court dismissed the petition with leave to amend on January 23, 2003. The Court found

some of Petitioner's claims to be cognizable claims for relief, but dismissed his remaining claims. 

Petitioner was given thirty days to file a supplement to his petition reasserting any of his

dismissed claims. Petitioner filed a "Supplement to Petition" on February 26, 2003. On

November 18, 2005, the Court entered an order to show cause why the petition should not be

granted as to the claims the Court had previously found to be cognizable. On December 6, 2005,

the Court issued an order for partial dismissal of the claims the Court had previously dismissed. 

Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on grounds of untimeliness on December 21, 2005

(docket no. 19). Petitioner filed an opposition (docket no. 20), and Respondent filed a reply to

Petitioner's opposition (docket no. 21).

//

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DISCUSSION

The AEDPA became law on April 24, 1996 and imposed for the first time a statute of

limitation on petitions for a writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners. Petitions filed by

prisoners challenging non-capital state convictions or sentences must be filed within one year of

the latest of the date on which: (1) the judgment became final after the conclusion of direct

review or the time passed for seeking direct review; (2) an impediment to filing an application

created by unconstitutional state action was removed, if such action prevented petitioner from

filing; (3) the constitutional right asserted was recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right was

newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactive to cases on collateral review; or 

(4) the factual predicate of the claim could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The "time during which a properly filed application for State

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation." Id. § 2244(d)(2).

A state prisoner with a conviction finalized after April 24, 1996, such as Petitioner,

ordinarily must file his federal habeas petition within one year of the date his process of direct

review came to an end. See Calderon v. United States District Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283,

1286 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled in part on other grounds by Calderon v. United States District

Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). The one-year period may start running

from "the expiration of the time for seeking [direct] review." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). If a

petitioner could have sought review by the state appellate court or the state supreme court, but

did not, the limitation period will begin running against him the day after the date on which the

time to seek such review expired. See Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809, 812-13 (9th Cir. 2002)

(limitation period began running day after time to seek discretionary review of California Court

of Appeal's decision in the Supreme Court of California expired, which was forty days after the

Court of Appeal filed its opinion) (citing Cal. Rules of Court 24(a), 28(b), 45(a); Cal. Civ. Proc.

Code § 12a). Because Petitioner did not file a petition for review with the California Supreme

Court, the one-year limitation period began to run against Petitioner on May 30, 2000, forty days

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 Petitioner has also filed state habeas petitions along with numerous petitions for writ of

mandamus in state courts, most of which were filed before his judgment became final on May 30,

2000. These state petitions do not toll the statute of limitations because the limitation period had not

yet commenced. 

Petitioner filed his last "Petition for Writ of Mandate" in the California Supreme Court (Case

No. S088946) on June 7, 2000, which was after his judgment became final. On June 12, 2000, the

California Supreme Court transferred the petition to the California Court of Appeal. Petitioner does

not currently claim that the limitations period should have been tolled while this petition was

pending. Petitioner has previously alleged that this petition requested appointment of an investigator

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after April 20, 2000, the date the California Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's opinion. 

See id. Petitioner had until May 30, 2001 to file the instant petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 

Therefore, the instant petition filed on November 18, 2002 -- more than one year after the

limitation period had expired -- is untimely absent tolling.

I. Statutory Tolling

The petition may nonetheless be timely if the limitation period was tolled under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(2) for a substantial period of time. As noted earlier, AEDPA's one-year limitation

period is tolled under § 2244(d)(2) for the "'time during which a properly filed application for

State post-conviction or other collateral review [with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim]

is pending.'" Dictado v. Ducharme, 244 F.3d 724, 726 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(2)). In Carey v. Saffold, 122 S. Ct. 2134, 2138 (2002), the Supreme Court held that the

limitation period is also tolled during the time between a lower state court's decision and the

filing of a notice of appeal to a higher state court. In California, where prisoners generally use

the State's "'original writ' system," this means that the limitation period remains tolled during the

intervals between a state court's disposition of an original state habeas petition and the filing of a

further original state habeas petition in a higher court, provided the prisoner did not delay

unreasonably in seeking review in the higher court. See id. at 2139-41.

A. Statutory Tolling Under Section 2244(d)(2)

Petitioner filed his first state habeas petition in the state superior court on December 14,

2001, however, he is not entitled to tolling under Section 2244(d)(2) because the limitation

period had already run on May 30, 2001.5

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to gather evidence to establish his equal protection challenge to the jury pool, and that it eventually

was denied in the California Court of Appeal (Case No. H021649). See Order dated March 29, 2002

in Case No. 00-3271 SBA (pr) at 3. Because Petitioner fails to allege that statutory tolling should

apply or even that his "Petition for Writ of Mandate" is an "application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review" within the meaning of § 2244(d)(2), the Court will not consider whether the

time period during which this petition was pending tolls the limitation period.

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A state habeas petition filed after AEDPA's statute of limitation ended cannot toll the

limitation period. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003) ("[S]ection

2244(d) does not permit the reinitiation of the limitation period that has ended before the state

petition was filed," even if the state petition was timely filed) (holding that Oregon's two-year

limitation period for the filing of state habeas petitions does not alter the operation of the

AEDPA, even though prisoners who take full advantage of the two-year period will forfeit their

right to federal habeas review). Section 2244(d)(2) cannot "revive" the limitation period once it

has run (i.e., restart the clock to zero); it can only serve to pause a clock that has not yet fully run. 

"Once the limitation period is expired, collateral petitions can no longer serve to avoid the statute

of limitation." Rashid v. Kuhlmann, 991 F. Supp. 254, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).

Accordingly, the state petition filed on December 14, 2001 does not revive the limitation

period that has already run. Therefore, the instant petition is untimely because statutory tolling

does not apply.

B. Instant Petition Relates Back to Filing Date of Previous Federal Petition

Petitioner argues that he is entitled to statutory tolling because his second habeas petition

should relate back to his first habeas petition filed on September 11, 2000. (Opp'n at 2.) He

argues that the limitation period should have been tolled for the time during which his first

federal habeas petition was pending. (Id.)

The period when a federal petition is pending, however, is not subject to statutory tolling

under § 2244(d)(2). Duncan v. Walker, 121 S. Ct. 2120, 2129 (2001) (holding that a federal

petition is not an "application for State post-conviction or other collateral review" within the

meaning of § 2244(d)(2)). Furthermore, a federal petition does not relate back to the filing date

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of a prior federal petition that had been properly dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies. 

See Green v. White, 223 F.3d 1001, 1003 (9th Cir. 2000) ("A second habeas petition does not

relate back to a first habeas petition when the first habeas petition was dismissed for failure to

exhaust state remedies."); Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1148 (9th Cir. 2000); Henry v.

Lungren, 164 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir. 1999). Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to statutory

tolling under this theory.

Absent some grounds for equitable tolling, the limitation period expired on May 30, 2001,

and the instant petition was untimely filed.

II. Equitable Tolling

The one-year limitation period can be equitably tolled because § 2244(d) is a statute of

limitation and not a jurisdictional bar. Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1288. "When external forces, rather

than a petitioner's lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a timely claim, equitable tolling

of the statute of limitation may be appropriate." Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir.

1999). Equitable tolling will not be available in most cases because extensions of time should be

granted only if "extraordinary circumstances beyond [a] prisoner's control make it impossible to

file a petition on time." Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1288 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

The prisoner must show that "the 'extraordinary circumstances' were the cause of his

untimeliness." Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). The

Ninth Circuit has said that the petitioner "bears the burden of showing that this extraordinary

exclusion should apply to him." Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Whether equitable tolling is in order turns on an examination of detailed facts. Lott v.

Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 923 (9th Cir. 2002). Petitioner claims that he suffers from "disabled

mobility" due to "frostbites [sic] residuals" on his feet. (Opp'n at 4.) He also claims that he

"cannot walk for a continuous 30 feet without enduring excruciating pain, let alone the required 5

to 600 yards to the library." (Id. at 5.) He alleges that "[a]t present, Petitioner have [sic] no

access [to the law library] because [the prison's] medical [staff] continue[s] to deny Petitioner the

aid of a cane or wheelchair." (Id.) Finally, he alleges that the prison guards threw all his past

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court records in the garbage, which is the basis of a civil rights suit against those prison guards. 

See Case No. 05-1098 SBA (pr). Based on the aforementioned arguments, Petitioner argues that

such "extraordinary circumstances" entitle him to equitable tolling. 

Petitioner has not demonstrated that he is entitled to equitable tolling. It cannot be said

that the alleged problems Petitioner allegedly encountered in accessing the law library and his

court records "were the cause of his untimeliness." Spitsyn, 345 F.3d at 799. Nor has Petitioner

demonstrated that he faced "extraordinary circumstances" while he was allegedly suffering from

his alleged limitations.

The Court finds that Petitioner did not allege individual facts warranting equitable tolling

on the aforementioned grounds. As an initial matter, Petitioner has failed to provide any

documentation of his medical problems. Petitioner merely complains that his medical problems

limited his access to the law library, but he fails to show that these same medical problems

rendered him unable to pursue his legal rights. Because all issues must first be exhausted in state

court before they are raised in a federal petition, preparing a federal petition should not require

much, if any, access to the law library for additional research. Moreover, access to personal

property and legal materials is often necessarily restricted in prison. In any event, and

conclusively, the Court notes that Petitioner's alleged medical problems did not prevent him from

filing numerous petitions in state court -- including a previous petition in federal court -- from

1998 to 2002. In short, Petitioner has failed to establish that his alleged limitations made it

impossible for him to file the instant federal petition on time, therefore, he is not entitled to

equitable tolling on this theory.

Petitioner has not met his burden of showing that his alleged limitations constituted

extraordinary circumstances that made it impossible for him to file a federal petition on time. 

See Miranda, 292 F.3d at 1068. While Petitioner asserts that (1) his medical problems limited his

access to the law library and (2) that his problems with prison guards disposing of court records

limited his access to his legal materials, he fails to show how these limitations prevented him

from timely filing his federal petition. Rhodes v. Senkowski, 82 F. Supp. 2d 160, 169-70

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6

 Petitioner filed several petitions in both state and federal court which were well within the

limitation period, but none of these petitions allowed him to benefit from statutory tolling. See

supra Part I.A-B and note 5. The filing of these petitions indicate that Petitioner initially lacked the

understanding of what he needed to accomplish in order to exhaust his state court remedies and file

his federal petition within the limitation period. However, the Court finds that Petitioner's pro se

status and ignorance of the law are not extraordinary circumstances warranting equitable tolling

either. See Felder v. Johnson, 204 F.3d 168, 172-73 & n.10 (5th Cir. 2000) (mere ignorance of the

law or lack of knowledge of filing deadlines does not justify equitable tolling of AEDPA's limitation

period) (citing cases); Cantu-Tzin v. Johnson, 162 F.3d 295, 299-300 (5th Cir. 1998) (pro se status

during state habeas proceedings did not justify equitable tolling).

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(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (prisoner must show that medical/mental problems rendered him unable to

pursue his legal rights during relevant time period). 

After spending his time filing various petitions in state and federal court, Petitioner

waited until after his one-year limitation period had expired before he began to use the correct

avenue to exhaust his state court remedies by filing a state habeas petition in state superior court

on December 14, 2001.6

 Unfortunately for Petitioner, it was his delay in pursuing his state court

remedies, rather than any extraordinary circumstances, that led him to exceed the limitation

period. Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling because he has not shown "that this

extraordinary exclusion should apply to him." Miranda, 292 F.3d at 1065.

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to either statutory or equitable tolling, and his

petition is therefore untimely.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Respondent's motion to dismiss the petition as untimely

(docket no. 19) is GRANTED. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in favor of

Respondent and close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 9, 2006 _______________________________

SAUNDRA B. ARMSTRONG

United States District Judge

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