Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05515/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05515-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 29:1801 Farmworker Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GEORGE HERNANDEZ, JR.; JOE A.

HERNANDEZ; MANUEL A. HERNANDEZ;

and ARMANDO PULIDO,

Plaintiffs,

v.

KOVACEVICH “5” FARMS; KENNETH

KOVACEVICH, JR.; MARK J.

KOVACEVICH; CAROL K. YINGST;

MARSHA RITCHIE; ANN K.

TARTAGLIA; and KENNETH

KOVACEVICH, SR.,

Defendants.

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1:04-cv-5515 OWW DLB

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND

ORDER RE PRELIMINARY

APPROVAL OF CLASS

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND

APPROVAL OF NOTICE.

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter is before the court on Plaintiffs’ unopposed

motion for preliminary approval of the Parties’ class action

settlement agreement (“Settlement Agreement”) and approval of the

notice of settlement (“Notice”). The proposed Settlement

Agreement would resolve a dispute between the Plaintiff Class of

seasonal agricultural workers and Defendants Kovacevich “5”

Farms, its individual partners, and Kenneth Kovacevich, Sr.

(“Kovacevich, Sr.”) (collectively, “Defendants” or “K5 Farms”). 

Plaintiff Class alleged that Defendants required Class members to

perform unpaid, “off-the-clock” work in violation of federal and

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state worker protection laws. (Doc. 162, Settlement at 2:27).

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

1. Background Union Activity at K5 Farms.

This lawsuit arises in the context of an ongoing effort by

the United Farm Workers of America, AFL-CIO (“UFW”) to organize

the employees of K5 Farms. (Doc. 37, Defendants’ Opp. at 2:2-3). 

This effort led to a secret ballot election supervised by the

California Agricultural Labor Relations Board, held on August 19,

2003. (Id. at 2:3-5). In the end, the employees voted 160-95

against UFW representation. (Id. at 2:6-7). All of the Named

Plaintiffs in this lawsuit, while not union members, are members

of the UFW’s “Organizing Committee,” a group actively engaged in

promoting union representation on behalf of the UFW. (Id. at

2:11-14). Moreover, Thomas P. Lynch, who is one of Plaintiffs’

counsel, works for the law firm headed by Marcos Camacho. Marcos

Camacho himself, according to an exhibit attached to Defendants’

Opposition, serves as General Counsel to the UFW. (Id. at Ex.

5).

2. Facts under which this Case Arises.

Representative Plaintiffs George Hernandez, Jr., Manual A.

Hernandez, Joe. A. Hernandez, and Armando Pulido (collectively,

“Named Plaintiffs”) brought this class action under the Migrant

and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (“AWPA”), 29

U.S.C. § 1801 et seq. and California state law, on behalf of

themselves and all similarly-situated field laborers to recover

unpaid wages, accrued interest and penalties, attorneys’ fees and

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costs, and injunctive relief from Defendants. (Doc. 162,

Settlement at 2:21-26). Defendants are engaged jointly in the

business of growing table grapes and other agricultural

commodities, including persimmons, on land located primarily in

Tulare County, California. (Doc. 88, Second Am. Compl. at 2:16-

19). The Named Plaintiffs are seasonal farm workers who have

worked in Defendants’ table grape fields. (Id. at 2:19-20). One

of the Named Plaintiffs, Armando Pulido, along with a Subclass,

has also harvested other crops for Defendants. (Id. at 2:20-21).

On behalf of themselves and the Class, Plaintiffs complained that

Defendants required Class members to perform unpaid, off-theclock preparation work before the start of their official work

shifts each morning during the harvest, in violation of federal

and state wage and hour laws. (Id. at 2:21-23). Plaintiffs also

complained that Defendants violated other state law by failing to

keep accurate records of all hours worked, failing to post

required signs, and failing to provide Class members with all

necessary tools and equipment. (Id. at 2:23-26).

The Parties reached a Settlement Agreement on May 4, 2005. 

This Settlement comes after several months of negotiations,

aggressively litigated motions, and a failed settlement attempt

in February 2005. (See Doc. 161, Support for Settlement at 4:5-

5:16). The Named Plaintiffs and Class counsel believe that the

Settlement is fair, adequate, reasonable, and in the best

interests of the Class. (Id. at 3:1-4).

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1 Defendant Kovacevich Sr. controls and owns, as a sole

proprietor, an agricultural business that includes the

cultivation and harvest of persimmons, pomegranates, and other

crops. He has also been, during the relevant period, actively

involved in the management and operation of K5 Farms and has

exercised control over the terms and conditions of employment of

Class members. It does not appear from the Settlement Agreement

that work performed on Kovacevich, Sr.’s individual agricultural

operations are implicated in this action. Rather, Kovacevich

Sr.’s role in the operations only of K5 farms is implicated.

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III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Three of the four Named Plaintiffs, and another plaintiff

whose subsequent withdrawal as a Class representative was

approved by the Court, filed the original complaint on April 2,

2004 on behalf of themselves and a proposed Class of more than

500 similarly situated field laborers. On August 13, 2004,

Plaintiffs moved for a protective order regarding Defendants’

communications with putative Class members. (Doc. 20). This

motion was denied on September 10, 2004. (Doc. 29). Plaintiffs

amended their complaint on September 30, 2004 to add Plaintiff

Pulido as a Class representative and to add a Subclass, of which

Plaintiff Pulido is a member. (Doc. 35). The allegations of the

Subclass encompass unpaid work performed by K5 Farm workers who

also harvested persimmons and other crops for Defendant

Kovacevich, Sr. (Id. at ¶ 24).1 

Plaintiffs also moved for Class certification on September

30, 2004. (Doc. 31, Plaintiffs’ Motion). On December 2, 2004,

the Court certified a Class of “all persons who worked at K5

Farms as agricultural field laborers and who were not paid for

time worked at the beginning of the day.” (Doc. 44 at 3:15-17). 

The Court held that the Class includes persons who are owed

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“wages that first became due on April 2, 2001 and continuing up

to the date that damages are awarded.” (Id. at 3:17-19). 

On February 16, 2005, representative Plaintiff Jesus

Gutierrez moved to withdraw as a Class representative. (Doc.

55). The motion was granted on March 15, 2005. (Doc. 68). 

Plaintiffs again amended their complaint on April 7, 2005 to

clarify certain claims. (Doc. 88). On March 11, 2005, Class

counsel mailed the first court-approved Class Notice to 541

persons. (Doc. 162, Settlement at 4:4-6). The Notice informed

potential Class members of the lawsuit and provided them an

opportunity to exclude themselves by completing a Class Exclusion

Form enclosed with the Notice and filing it with the Court on or

before May 10, 2005. (Id. at 4:6-8). By May 20, 2005,

approximately 50 of the 541 recipients had filed the courtapproved Class Exclusion Form. (Id. at 4:9-11). An additional

25 signatures of persons who did not sign individual Exclusion

Forms appeared on a petition-style exclusion document also filed

with the Court. (Id. at 4:12-14). 

On April 1, 2005, Plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary

restraining order for alleged “interference by [D]efendants’

agents with the right of [C]lass members to participate in this

[action].” (Doc. 74, Motion for Restraining Order at 1:22-25). 

The Parties later stipulated to a temporary restraining order and

the motion was taken off calendar. (See Doc. 87, Stipulation and

Order).

On April 15, 2005, the Parties filed cross-motions for

partial summary judgment and responded to these motions on April

29 (Defendants) and May 2 (Plaintiffs), 2005. (Doc. 162,

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Settlement at 4:15-17). On May 4, 2005, while the cross-motions

for summary judgment were still pending, the Parties reached a

compromise on the terms of the Settlement Agreement and, by

stipulation, the Parties withdrew their summary judgment motions. 

On July 6, 2005, Class counsel informally requested an expedited

preliminary approval of the proposed Settlement Agreement and

approval of the proposed Notice of Settlement. This request was

not granted and the previously scheduled July 11, 2005

preliminary approval hearing was left on the calendar. 

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

1. Settlement Agreement.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) requires court approval for all class

action settlements. A court may approve a settlement only after

a hearing and on finding that it is fair, reasonable, and

adequate. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(C). Before conducting a full

hearing, a court ordinarily holds a preliminary hearing to

determine whether there is a likelihood it could approve the

settlement. In re Jiffy Lube Sec. Litig., 927 F.2d 155, 158 (4th

Cir. 1991). At the preliminary approval stage, a court examines

the submitted materials to determine whether the proposed

settlement seems fair on its face as a whole, and worth

submitting to the class members. Id.

2. Notice of Settlement.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B) requires that “the best notice

practicable under the circumstances” be provided to class

members. Notice must satisfactorily apprise class members of the

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2 (a)$850,000.00 on November 30, 2005 (“first

installment”); (b)$850,000.00 on November 30, 2006 (“second

installment”)

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terms of the settlement in sufficient detail to afford them the

opportunity to decide whether they should accept the benefits

offered, opt out and pursue their own remedies, or object to the

settlement. Churchill Village, L.L.C. v. General Elec., 361 F.3d

566, 575 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150

F.3d 1011, 1029 (9th Cir. 1998).

V. LEGAL ANALYSIS

1. Settlement Agreement.

A. Terms of Proposed Settlement Agreement.

i. Class Settlement Fund.

Defendants will make two separate installment payments into

a settlement fund (“Settlement Fund”), totaling $1.7 million,2

which will be processed and distributed by Miner, Barnhill &

Galland, P.C. (“MBG”). (Doc. 162, Settlement at 5:9-13). No

portion of the Settlement Fund will revert to any of the

Defendants under any circumstances. (Id. at 5:14-15). 

Upon preliminary approval by the Court of the Settlement

Agreement, a Notice of Class Action Settlement will be mailed to

all non-exempt Class members, which will include a Claim Form. 

(Id. at 5:23-25). The Claim Form will explain that the deadline

for submitting claims will be 75 days from the date the Forms are

mailed. (Id. at 5:26-27). 

Class members who timely submit their claims will be

considered “Claiming Class Members.” (Id. at 5:27-28). Class

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3 The Settlement Agreement does not define the standard for

what will be considered “meaningful.” The specific standard for

what is “meaningful” needs to be specified within the Settlement

Agreement.

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counsel will make two distribution payments to Claiming Class

Members promptly upon receipt of each of Defendants’ two

installment payments into the Settlement fund. (Id. at 6:26-

7:4). 

Any money remaining in the Settlement Fund six months after

the second distribution, whether resulting from the accrual of

interest on the Fund or settlement checks not cleared within six

months from issuance, will be used first to pay late claims. 

(Id. at 7:5-8). Late claims will be paid only after the second

distribution and only if residual money exists in the Fund at

that time. (Id. at 7:8-10). If money remains in the Fund after

full satisfaction of all late claims, it will be applied to

defray costs incurred by Class counsel in locating Class members

and/or distributing payments to Class members who reside outside

the U.S. at the time of distribution. (Id. at 7:11-14). If any

money still remains, Class counsel will distribute it pro rata

among Claiming Class Members, except that if such money is

insufficient to provide a “meaningful”3 pro rata distribution, it

will be tendered to the California Labor Commissioner for deposit

in the state Unpaid Wage Fund. (Id. at 7:15-19). 

ii. Injunctive Relief.

Defendants agree that neither they nor any of their agents

will retaliate in any manner against any person involved in the

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prosecution of this action. (Id. at 7:20-28). Defendants will

ensure that their record-keeping practices are consistent with

Wage Order No. 14 and the California Labor Code. (Id. at 8:1-5). 

Defendants will also continue to provide pruning shears and

clippers to all of their field laborer employees at or before the

start of any agricultural season, and will make available, at no

charge, protective work gloves for use during pruning season. 

(Id. at 8:6-15). 

iii. Relief for the Named Plaintiffs.

In consideration for their commitment of effort and time,

Defendants agree to a bonus of $1,000 to each of the four Named

Plaintiffs: George Hernandez, Jr., Joe A. Hernandez, Manuel A.

Hernandez, and Armando Pulido. (Id. at 8:18-25). The four Named

Plaintiffs will also be assured continuous seasonal employment,

consistent with their past work history, for a period of two

years. (Id. at 9:3-4). Defendants also agree to resolve

allegations of demotion and retaliation, raised by family members

and close associates of Named Plaintiffs, by restoring their work

positions to the positions held prior to this suit. (Id. at 9:7-

21). 

iv. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs.

Defendants will pay Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees and costs in

three equal installments, totaling $795,000.00. (Id. at 9:23-

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4 The three equal installments of $265,000.00 are due on

May 1, 2006, May 1, 2007, and November 30, 2007.

5 “Significant reduction” in work force accords with the

standards set forth in the WARN Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2101 et. seq.,

and Cal. Lab. Code § 1400 et. seq.

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27).4 Also, Defendants will pay Class counsel up to $25,000.00

for additional attorneys’ fees and costs actually incurred in the

administration of the Settlement and distribution of payments to

Claiming Class Members after final approval of the Settlement. 

(Id. at 10:1-4).

v. Defendants’ Assurance That They Will Meet

Their Obligations Without Job Loss To Class

Members.

Defendants have stipulated that they will meet the foregoing

financial and other obligations of this Settlement without taking

measures which would result in the reduction of their field

laborer work force. (Id. at 10:9-15). In the event that, due to

unforeseeable events or conditions beyond Defendants’ control,

the only way for Defendants to meet their financial obligation to

timely make the second installment payment and also remain in

operation is either to sell real property on which Class members

are working or to reduce their field laborer work force,

Defendants will consult with Class counsel about delaying such

payment. (Id. at 10:15-18). Absent agreement between the

Parties in such event, no significant reduction5 in Defendants’

field laborer work force may occur without advance approval of

the Court. (Id. at 10:19-22).

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vi. Effective Date.

If the Court approves of substantially all the terms

described in the Settlement Agreement, the Settlement is to

become effective thirty-five (35) days after the Court grants a

final judgment order--provided that no notice of appeal is filed. 

(Id. at 10:25-28). If a notice of appeal is filed, the

Settlement is to become effective ten days after all appellate

proceedings pertaining to the action have been completed and

settlement of the action is final and binding. (Id. at 11:1-5).

vii. Mutual Releases.

Plaintiffs release Defendants from liability for all claims

asserted in this action, any allegations of retaliation that have

arisen in connection therewith, and any other claims arising from

the set of facts alleged in this action. (Id. at 11:8-17). 

Defendants likewise discharge Plaintiffs from all claims that

arise from the claims and defenses alleged in this action. (Id.

at 11:18-22). 

B. Approval of Settlement Agreement.

“The court must approve any settlement...of the claims...of

a certified class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(A). The court may

approve a settlement only after a hearing and on finding that it

is fair, reasonable, and adequate. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(C). 

Such approval is required to make sure that any settlement

reached is consistent with plaintiffs’ fiduciary obligations to

the class. Fialora v. Lockheed Cal. Co., 751 F.2d 995, 996 (9th

Cir. 1985). The court also serves as guardian for the absent

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6 It is not the role of the district court to reach any

ultimate conclusions on the contested issues of fact and law

which underlie the merits of the dispute. Officers for Justice,

688 F.2d at 625. It is the uncertainty of the outcome in

litigation and avoidance of wasteful and expensive litigation

that induce consensual settlements. Id.

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class members who will be bound by the settlement, and therefore

must independently determine the fairness of any settlement. Id.

However, the district court’s role in intruding upon what is

otherwise a private consensual agreement is limited to the extent

necessary to reach a reasoned judgment that the agreement is not

the product of fraud or collusion between the negotiating

parties, and that the settlement, taken as a whole, is fair,

reasonable, and adequate to all concerned. Officers for Justice

v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of S.F., 688 F.2d 615, 625 (9th Cir. 1982). 

Therefore, the settlement hearing is not to be turned into a

trial or rehearsal for trial on the merits. Id.6 Ultimately,

the district court’s determination is nothing more than an

amalgam of delicate balancing, gross approximations, and rough

justice. Id.

The court ordinarily holds a preliminary hearing to

determine whether there is a likelihood it could approve the

settlement before conducting a full hearing. Jiffy Lube, 927

F.2d at 158. The court examines the submitted materials and

determines whether the proposed settlement seems fair on its face

and worth submitting to the class members. 

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i. Is the Present Settlement Agreement Fair,

Reasonable, and Adequate?

In determining whether a settlement agreement is fair,

adequate, and reasonable to all concerned, a district court may

consider some or all of the following factors: (a) the expense,

complexity, and likely duration of further litigation; (b) the

amount offered in settlement; (c) the solvency of the defendants;

(d) the extent of discovery completed, and the stage of the

proceedings; (e) the views and experience of counsel; and (f) any

opposition by class members. Molski v. Gleich, 318 F.3d 937, 953

(9th Cir. 2003); see also In re Montgomery County Real Estate

Antitrust Litig., 83 F.R.D 305, 316 (D.C. Md. 1979). This list

of factors is not exclusive and the court may balance and weigh

different factors depending on the circumstances of each case. 

Torrisi v. Tucson Elec. Power Co., 8 F.3d 1370, 1376 (9th Cir.

1993). This necessarily requires the court to make a careful

analysis of all the facts and applicable law. Montgomery County

Real Estate, 83 F.R.D at 316.

a. Expense, Complexity, and Likely Duration

of Further Litigation.

The trial of this action has the potential of being complex,

expensive, and protracted because it involves a large Class with

many causes of action and a high amount in controversy. Trial of

this action will also require significant evidentiary foundation,

requiring large expenditures by counsel of both Parties. The

additional expense of further litigation may also diminish the

likelihood of full or adequate recovery to members of the Class,

whose interests are of paramount concern to the Court. In

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7 Defendants provided financial information, subject to a

stipulated protective order, which was used in determining an

adequate and reasonable award for Plaintiffs. (See Doc. 86,

Protective Order for Financial Info.). 

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contrast, while the Settlement Agreement sets forth a high award,

Defendants’ financial position has been taken into consideration

by both Parties in negotiation, and they believe that the current

Settlement Agreement can be met.7

b. Amount Offered in Settlement.

The Settlement Agreement sets the monetary award to Class

members at $1,700,000.00. (Doc. 161, Support for Approval at

5:4-5). Class counsel asserts that this figure provides Class

damages equal to 100 percent of the Class members’ unpaid wages

plus penalties of four times the unpaid wages. (Id. at 5:5-6). 

Class counsel, however, does not provide any evidence of this

assertion. In the final approval stage, the Court is authorized

to require evidence of the value of recovery vis-a-vis the value

of lost wages. 

c. Solvency of the Defendants.

Class counsel asserts that it was able to maximize the award

for the Class, while at the same time safeguard Class members

from any negative effect an excessive recovery might have had on

the viability of Defendants’ business, or on their continued

employment by Defendants. (Id. at 5:6-11). After careful

analysis of Defendants’ financial records, the Parties agree to

an amount of money and a payment plan that will allow Defendants

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to maintain solvency and sustain their current level of business

operations. (See Doc. 162, Settlement at 12-13).

d. The Extent of Discovery Completed, and

the Stage of Proceedings.

This case has been aggressively litigated, generating an

extensive record and resulting in several pre-trial motions and

orders. From December 2004 through March 2005, the Parties

engaged in intensive merits discovery, including Plaintiffs’

procurement of nearly 60 declarations and eleven depositions

taken by Defendants’ principals, their foremen, and the Named

Plaintiffs. (Doc. 162, Settlement at 4:1-3). Both Parties have

filed numerous motions, including motions for a protective order

and temporary restraining order by Plaintiffs, two amended

complaints submitted by Plaintiffs, and motions for summary

judgment submitted by both Parties. The Settlement proposal was

not hastily arrived at, and indeed, comes after several months of

negotiations and a failed settlement attempt in February 2005. 

After conducting extensive discovery, the strengths and

weaknesses of each side’s position and their respective trial

risks were exposed, leading to the proposed Settlement Agreement

now presented to the Court. (Doc. 161, Support for Settlement at

4:22-5:2). 

e. The Views and Experience of Counsel.

Plaintiffs’ attorneys recommend the Settlement Agreement as

a significant victory for the Class and an excellent resolution

of Class claims. (Id. at 5:4-5). They believe that the

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8 Miner, Barnhill & Galland represented farm laborers in a

class action suit brought before this court in November, 2001. 

(See Quevedo v. Dole, 1:01-cv-6443, Doc. 1). 

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Settlement Agreement is “fair and reasonable and that it is in

the best interests of the [C]lass.” (Doc. 162, Settlement at Ex.

A-1, 4). Plaintiffs’ counsel may present evidence to the court

at the final approval stage of proceedings to show experience and

skill in farm labor class action suits, which will give their

opinion of the Settlement Agreement more weight. Although it

appears that Class counsel has experience in farm labor disputes,

based on prior representation in this Court,8 substantive

evidence may be submitted by Class counsel to establish their

expertise.

f. Opposition by Class Members.

The response of the class to the settlement plan is

particularly helpful in cases in which the court believes that

the settlement is widely understood and intelligently considered

by the class. Although Class members have not yet had an

opportunity to respond, the court may consider any objections or

dissatisfaction expressed by Class members in the final approval

stage, at which point Class members will have knowledge of the

terms of the Settlement Agreement.

ii. Are the Attorneys’ Fees Reasonable?

Attorneys’ fees provisions included in proposed class action

settlement agreements are, like every other aspect of such

agreements, subject to the court’s scrutiny for fairness,

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reasonableness, and adequacy. Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d

938, 963 (9th Cir. 2003). “Thus, to avoid abdicating its

responsibility to review the agreement for the protection of the

class, a district court must carefully assess the reasonableness

of a fee amount spelled out in a class action settlement

agreement.” Id. If fees are unreasonably high, there is a

“likelihood [] that the defendant obtained an economically

beneficial concession with regard to the merits provisions, in

the form of lower monetary payments to class members or less

injunctive relief for the class than could otherwise have [been]

obtained.” Id. at 964. However, the court’s task in reviewing

negotiated fees is different from the court’s task in fashioning

fee awards from scratch. Robbins v. Alibrandi, 127 Cal. App. 4th

438, 444 (2005). The court’s task in reviewing negotiated fees

is simply to determine whether they are facially fair and

reasonable. Id. This task requires the court to review the

settlement agreement as a whole, including the fee award, to

ensure that it was fairly and honestly negotiated, is not

collusive, and adequately protects the interests of the parties. 

Id. Plaintiffs’ attorneys have a duty to limit fees to an amount

that represents the value of the work done. Id. Therefore,

although a negotiated fee may represent a reasoned business

decision to settle, a negotiated fee that exceeds a reasonable

fee for the attorneys’ contribution may not be approved. Id.

In calculating attorneys’ fees in civil class action suits,

the district court has discretion to use either the percentage

method or the lodestar/multiplier method. Hanlon, 150 F.3d at

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9 When a settlement agreement creates a large fund for

distribution to a class, as is the case here, courts may use

either of these two options in determining what is fair and

reasonable. 

10 The Ninth Circuit has established 25% as a benchmark

award for attorneys’ fees. Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1029.

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1029.9 Under the percentage method of determining attorneys’

fees, “the court simply awards the attorneys a percentage of the

fund sufficient to provide class counsel with a reasonable fee.” 

Id.10 Class counsel here use the lodestar/multiplier method to

calculate their proposed fees.

Under the lodestar/multiplier approach, the lodestar is

calculated by multiplying the reasonable hours expended by a

reasonable hourly rate. 

This calculation provides an objective basis on

which to make an initial estimate of the value of a

lawyer’s services. [Attorneys] should submit

evidence supporting the hours worked and rates

claimed. Where the documentation of hours is

inadequate, the district court may reduce the award

accordingly.

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). The district

court should exclude from this initial fee calculation hours that

were not “reasonably expended.” Id. at 434. Also, “the product

of reasonable hours times a reasonable rate does not end the

inquiry. There remain other considerations that may lead the

district court to adjust the fee upward or downward...” through

use of multipliers. Id. Multipliers, which come from a

percentage of the value of the class recovery fund, may be added

to account for such considerations as risk, magnitude and

complexity of the litigation, the quality of the services

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provided, and the beneficial result achieved. Arenson v. Board

of Trade of Chicago, 372 F. Supp. 1349, 1351 (D.C. Ill. 1974). 

However, a strong presumption exists that the lodestar figure

represents a reasonable fee, and upward adjustments of the

lodestar by use of multipliers are proper only in rare and

exceptional cases. Jordan v. Multnomah County, 815 F.2d 1258,

1262 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiffs’ attorneys in this case do not

seek additional payment through use of multipliers. Therefore,

the fees here are based solely on the product of reasonable hours

worked times a reasonable hourly rate. 

The Settlement Agreement sets attorneys’ fees at

$795,000.00. Plaintiffs argue that these fees are reasonable and

that the Parties negotiated the attorneys’ fees provision after

agreement on relief for the Class had been reached. (Doc. 161,

Support for Approval at 5:11-13). Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees of

$795,000.00 amount to almost half of the amount Plaintiffs will

receive from the settlement. This figure appears high, and is

subject to scrutiny during the final approval stage. Class

counsel will need to show how the attorneys’ fees lodestar figure

was arrived at by submitting documents and/or declarations that

evidence a reasonable hourly rate for their services and

establish the number of hours reasonably spent working on the

case. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. At this point in the

proceedings, however, attorneys’ fees are sufficiently fair and

reasonable--within the context of the entire settlement

agreement--not to preclude preliminary approval of the Settlement

Agreement. 

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iii. Conclusion.

Based on the posture of the case at the time settlement was

proposed, the extent of discovery that had been conducted, the

circumstances surrounding the negotiations, and the experience of

Class counsel, it appears that the Settlement Agreement was

reached as a result of good-faith bargaining at arm’s length and

without collusion. See Jiffy Lube, 927 F.2d at 158-159. 

Additionally, the amount offered in the Settlement Agreement

appears fair, reasonable, and adequate on its face. Although

some factors cannot be ascertained at this point in the

proceedings, the Settlement Agreement as a whole appears to be

fair, reasonable, and adequate on its face. Preliminary approval

of the Settlement Agreement is GRANTED. 

2. Notice of Settlement.

A. Terms of the Proposed Notice of Settlement.

The Notice of the proposed Settlement is addressed to “all

persons who worked in the grape fields for Kovacevich ‘5’ Farms

at any time from April 2, 2001 to the present.” (Doc. 162,

Settlement at Ex. A-1, 1). The Notice includes sections on:

“What is the purpose of this Notice?” “What is the class action

about?” “Who is in the Class?” “How much money will Defendants

pay to the Class under the Settlement and how much will I

receive?” “Can I hire my own lawyer?” “What should I do if I do

not want to be part of the Settlement” “How could the Settlement

affect me?” and many other sections. (Id. at Ex. A-1, 1-2).

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B. Approval of the Notice of Settlement.

Adequate notice is critical to court approval of a class

settlement under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e). Hanlon, 150 F.3d at

1025. “The best notice practicable under the circumstances” must

be provided to class members. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B). 

The notice must concisely and clearly state in plain,

easily understood language:

• the nature of the action,

• the definition of the class certified,

• the class claims, issues, or defenses,

• that a class member may enter an appearance

through counsel if the member so desires,

• that the court will exclude from the class

any member who requests exclusion, stating

when and how members may elect to be

excluded, and

• the binding effect of a class judgment on

class members under Rule 23(c)(3).

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B). Notice is satisfactory in the

context of settlement if it fairly apprises class members of the

terms of the settlement in sufficient detail to afford them the

opportunity to decide whether they should accept the benefits

offered, opt out and pursue their own remedies, or object to the

settlement. Churchill Village, L.L.C. v. General Elec., 361 F.3d

566, 575 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1025.

The Notice presented meets the requisite standards of

clarity and conciseness as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. It

explains the nature of the action, the definition of the Class, a

brief summary of the Class claims, and that a Class member may

enter an appearance through counsel if the member so desires. 

(See Doc. 162, Settlement at Ex. A-1). The Notice provides

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Class members with the opportunity to opt-out of the Settlement

Agreement, giving specific instructions of when and how they may

do so. (See id. at Ex. A-1, 4). In addition, the Notice

explains the binding effect of the Settlement Agreement on Class

members, stating that they “will be bound by it, and [] will not

be able to bring a separate lawsuit alleging the same or similar

claims.” (See id. at Ex. A-1, 2). 

Although the Notice is sufficiently clear and concise, the

method by which Class counsel intends to notify Class members of

the Settlement has not been justified. The Parties’ have

stipulated that Notice will be sent to the Class by first-class

mail, and that a notice of the settlement will also be published

in the local Spanish-language newspaper, “Noticiero Semanal”, of

Porterville, California. (Doc. 167, Stipulation at 2:18-20). 

Plaintiffs’ counsel provides no evidence or justification for why

these two methods are the best “practicable” way to reach Class

members, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 23(c)(2)(B). Class

counsel shall provide justification for using these methods

instead of other methods. 

Approval of the Notice of Settlement is GRANTED subject to

Class counsel providing sufficient justification for the method

of notification.

VIII. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above:

1. Preliminary approval of the Settlement Agreement is

GRANTED;

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2. Approval of the Notice of Settlement is GRANTED,

subject to further order of the Court upon receipt of

Class counsel’s justification for the method of

notification; 

A. Class counsel will send Notice by first-class mail

to Class members at their last-known addresses

within seven days after receipt of this Order, and

will promptly thereafter file a certificate of

mailing with the Court;

B. Class counsel will have a notice of the Settlement

published in the “Noticiero Semanal” of

Porterville, California, on or before August 10,

2005;

3. The Court will hold a Fairness Hearing for final

approval of the Settlement on September 26, 2005 at

10:00 a.m.; The Court will consider any objections to

the fairness, reasonableness, or adequacy of the

Settlement and any pleadings or other materials filed

in support of or opposition to the Settlement; No

objection may be considered unless a written statement

of the objection is filed with the Clerk of the Court

no later than two weeks before the Fairness Hearing;

The above dates shall be set forth in bold type with a

warning, where indicated in the Notice to the Class;

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4. Any pleadings or other materials in support of or

opposition to the Proposed Settlement shall be filed

with the Court no later than one week before the

Fairness Hearing; The above date shall be set forth in

bold type with a warning, where indicated in the Notice

to the Class;

5. Requests for exclusion must be filed no later than two

weeks before the date of the Fairness Hearing.

SO ORDERED.

________________________________

 Oliver W. Wanger

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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