Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05066/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-05066-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RALPH BERMUDEZ, CASE NO. CV-F-04-5066 OWW WMW HC

Petitioner, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RE

 PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

vs.

A.A. LAMARQUE, Warden, 

Respondent.

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72-302.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 29, 2001, Petitioner was convicted by jury trial in Superior Court of Kern County

of the following: first degree murder of Victor Rodriguez, with a true finding that he personally

discharged a firearm and inflicted great bodily injury; unlawfully taking or driving the victim’s car;

possessing a firearm in violation of probation and with a prior juvenile adjudication; and possessing

methamphetamine. On February 28, 2001, the court denied probation and sentenced him to state prison

for an aggregate term of 50 years to life.

Petitioner filed a direct appeal from his judgment of conviction. The California Court of Appeal

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for the Fifth Appellate District (“Court of Appeal”) affirmed the judgment on November 6, 2002. The

California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for review on January 15, 2003.

Petitioner did not file any petitions for writ of habeas corpus in state court. He filed the present

petition on March 18, 2004. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

JURISDICTION

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody pursuant to

the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the

United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1504

fn.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by the United States

Constitution. In addition, the conviction challenged arises out of the Kern County Superior Court,

which is located within the jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 2241(d). Accordingly, the

court has jurisdiction over the action. 

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its enactment. Lindh v.

Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008, 118 S.Ct. 586 (1997);

Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769

(5th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107, 117 S.Ct. 1114 (1997), overruled on other grounds byLindh

v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059 (1997) (holding AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after

statute's enactment). The instant petition was filed on January 12, 2004, after the enactment of the

AEDPA, thus it is governed by its provisions. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The AEDPA altered the standard of review that a federal habeas court must apply with respect

to a state prisoner's claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court. Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct.

1495, 1518-23 (2000). Under the AEDPA, an application for habeas corpus will not be granted unless

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the adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States;” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light

of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d);Lockyer v. Andrade, 123

S.Ct. 1166, 1173 (2003) (disapproving of the Ninth Circuit’s approach in Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d

1143 (9th Cir. 2000)); Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000). “A federal habeas court may

not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant

state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Lockyer, at

1174 (citations omitted). “Rather, that application must be objectively unreasonable.” Id. (citations

omitted). 

While habeas corpus relief is an important instrument to assure that individuals are

constitutionally protected, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3391-3392 (1983);

Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 1086 (1969), direct review of a criminal conviction

is the primary method for a petitioner to challenge that conviction. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S.

619, 633, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1719 (1993). In addition, the state court’s factual determinations must be

presumed correct, and the federal court must accept all factual findings made by the state court unless

the petitioner can rebut “the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(e)(1); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 115 S.Ct. 1769 (1995); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S.

99, 116 S.Ct. 457 (1995); Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1388 (9

th Cir. 1997). 

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to collaterally challenge his conviction by a

petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). The

exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives the state court the initial opportunity

to correct the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731, 111

S.Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 1203 (1982); Buffalo

v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1163 (9

th Cir. 1988). 

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court with a

full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court. Picard v.

Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276, 92 S.Ct. 509, 512 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir.

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1996).

If the California Supreme Court’s opinion is summary in nature, however, this court "looks

through" that decision and presumes it adopted the reasoning of the last state court to have issued a

reasoned opinion. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804-05 & n. 3, 111 S.Ct. 2590, 115 L.Ed.2d

706 (1991) (establishing, on habeas review, "look through" presumption that higher court agrees with

lower court's reasoning where former affirms latter without discussion); see also LaJoie v. Thompson,

217 F.3d 663, 669 n. 7 (9th Cir.2000) (holding federal courts look to last reasoned state court opinion

in determining whether state court's rejection of petitioner's claims was contrary to or an unreasonable

application of federal law under § 2254(d)(1)). 

DISCUSSION

Petitioner contends that his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated because he

was denied complete jury instructions as to his theory of defense. Specifically, he claims that his

constitutional rights were violated because the jury was not instructed on his claim that he shot

Rodriguez based on his belief that Rodriguez was going to commit the “forcible and atrocious” crime

of rape against him. Respondent disputes this contention.

An allegation that a jury instruction is incorrect under state law does not form a basis for federal

habeas corpus relief. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67, 112 S.Ct. 475 (1991) ("We have stated many

times that federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law."). Rather, a habeas court must

consider "'whether the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction

violates due process' ... not merely whether 'the instruction is undesirable, erroneous, or even

universally condemned.'" Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154, 97 S.Ct. 1730 (1977) (quoting Cupp

v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146-47, 94 S.Ct. 396 (1973)); California v. Roy, 519 U.S. 2, 5, 117 S.Ct.

337, 338 (1996) (challenge in habeas to the trial court’s jury instructions is reviewed under the standard

in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637, 113 S.Ct. 1710 (1993) - whether the error had a substantial

and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.).

The burden of demonstrating that an erroneous instruction was so prejudicial that it will support

a collateral attack on the constitutional validity of a state court's judgment is even greater than the

showing required to establish plain error on direct appeal." Id. Moreover, a petitioner whose claim

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involves the omission of an instruction “bears an especially heavy burden,” because an omission is less

likely to be prejudicial than a misstatement of the law. Reynolds v. Maddock, 1999 WL 354366, *3

(N.D. Cal. 1999). 

The Court of Appeal rejected this claim, reasoning in part as follows:

As respondent correctly notes, the trial court herein extensively instructed the jury as to

the definitions of homicide, first and second degree murder, premeditation and deliberation, and

voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. (CALJIC Nos. 8.00, 8.10, 8.11, 8.20, 8.21, 8.30, 8.31,

8.37, 8.40, 8.42, 8.43, 8.44, 8.45, 8.50, 8.51, 8.55, 8.70, 8.71, 8.72, 8.73, 8.74, 8.75; special

instruction No. 1). More particularly, the jury was instructed as to the definitions of a “forcible

and atrocious” crime (CALJIC No. 5.16), justifiable and excusable homicides (CALJIC Nos.

5.01, 5.10, 5.12, 5.13, 5.15), and several theories of self-defense (CALJIC Nos. 5.17, 5.30, 5.31,

5.50, 5.51, 5.52, 5.53, 5.54, 5.55).

Appellant acknowledges these instructions were correctly given, but asserts the jury was

never informed that his actual but unreasonable belief that Rodriguez was going to sexually

assault him could reduce murder to manslaughter. However, the entirety of the record reveals

that appellant’s defense theory was properly presented to the jury, not only as a complete

defense for justifiable homicide, but also to reduce murder to manslaughter based on appellant’s

actual but unreasonable belief in the necessity to defend himself. CALJIC No. 5.16 defined a

“forcible and atrocious crime” as follows:

“A forcible and atrocious crime is any felony that by its nature and the manner

of its commission threatens, or is reasonably believed by the defendant to threaten, life

or great bodily injury so as to instill in him a reasonable fear of death or great bodily

injury. Rape is a forcible and atrocious crime.” (Italics added.)

The jury was instructed in CALJIC No. 5.13 as follows:

“Homicide is justifiable and not unlawful when committed by any person in the defense

of himself if he actually and reasonably believed that the individual killed intended to

commit a forcible and atrocious crime and that there was imminent danger of that crime

being accomplished. A person may act upon appearances whether the danger is real or

merely apparent.”

The jury was also instructed as to the applicability of appellant’s defense theory to manslaughter.

CALJIC No. 5.17 stated in part:

“A person who kills another person in the actual but unreasonable belief in the necessity

to defend against imminent peril to life or great bodily injury, kills unlawfully, but does

not harbor malice aforethought and is not guilty of murder. This would be so even

though a reasonable person in the same situation seeing knowing the same facts would

not have had the same belief. Such an actual but unreasonable belief is not a defense to

the crime of voluntary or involuntary manslaughter . . . .” (Italics added.)

The relevance of these instructions to voluntary manslaughter was explained in CALJIC No.

8.40, which stated in part:

“Every person who unlawfully kills another human being without malice aforethought

but either with an intent to kill, or in conscious disregard for human life, is guilty of

voluntary manslaughter. . . .

“There is no malice aforethought if the killing occurred upon a sudden quarrel or heat

of passion or in the actual but unreasonable belief in the necessity to defend oneself

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against imminent peril to life or great bodily injury.” (Italics added.)

The relevance of these instructions to voluntary manslaughter was explained in CALJIC No.

8.40, which stated in part:

“Every person who unlawfully kills another human being without malice aforethought

but either with an intent to kill, or in conscious disregard for human life, is guilty of

voluntary manslaughter . . . .

“There is no malice aforethought if the killing occurred upon a sudden quarrel or heat

of passion or in the actual but unreasonable belief in the necessity to defend oneself

against imminent peril to life or great bodily injury.” (Italics added.)

The court’s instructions thus properly informed the jury that appellant’s reasonable belief that

Rodriguez was going to sexually assault him constituted a complete defense to homicide, and

his unreasonable belief could reduce murder to manslaughter.

Unpublished Court of Appeal Opinion in Case No. F037700, 16- 17.

Nothing in Petitioner’s brief demonstrates that the Court of Appeal applied the wrong legal

standard or misstated the facts in addressing Petitioner’s claim. Further, the court notes that contrary

to Petitioner’s claim, the trial court did instruct the jury through CALJIC 5.17 that an unreasonable

belief that he was killing to prevent an atrocious crime such as rape could reduce murder to

manslaughter. This court finds, therefore, that Petitioner has not carried his burden of demonstrating

that the Court of Appeal’s adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States;” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Therefore, this claim presents no basis for habeas corpus relief.

Accordingly, the court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that this petition for writ of habeas corpus

be DENIED and that judgment be entered for Respondent.

These Findings and Recommendation are submitted to the assigned United States District Court

Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of the Local Rules

of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within thirty (30) days

after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with the court and serve a copy on

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all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and

Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served and filed within ten (10) court days (plus

three days if served by mail) after service of the objections. The court will then review the Magistrate

Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez

v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 11, 2006 /s/ William M. Wunderlich 

mmkd34 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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