Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-03362/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-03362-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Guadalupe Garcia Cortez,

Petitioner,

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, Attorney General of the 

State of Arizona,

Respondents.

No. CV 18-03362 PHX DJH (CDB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE DIANE J. HUMETEWA:

Petitioner Guadalupe Garcia Cortez, proceeding pro se, filed a petition seeking a 

writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondents docketed a Limited 

Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 10), and Cortez filed a reply. (ECF 

No. 11). Cortez contends that he is entitled to habeas relief because he was denied the 

effective assistance of counsel when entering a guilty plea to two counts of attempted 

molestation of a child. Respondents assert the petition is not timely and that Cortez 

procedurally defaulted his claims in the state courts.

I. Background

A Maricopa County grand jury returned an indictment on April 14, 2016, which 

charged Cortez with child molestation, a class 2 felony, occurring on or between August 

1, 2015, and March 5, 2016. (ECF No. 10-1 at 3). The indictment was later amended to 

allege two counts of molestation of a minor, each alleged as a class 3 felony. (ECF No. 10-

1 at 20). The following facts are taken from the presentence report:

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On March 5, 2016, the female seven-year-old victim disclosed to her

mother that her foster father, [Cortez], had touched her inappropriately on 

her buttocks. Police w[ere] called by a parent aide with the Department of 

Child Services. Officers learned the minor victim had been placed in the care 

of [Cortez] and his wife as foster parents. During a visit with her mother, the 

victim disclosed the defendant had touched her buttocks. During a forensic 

interview, the victim described an incident when she was on the couch at 

[Cortez]’s home[,] and [Cortez] touched her vaginal area with his hand under 

her clothes. She indicated [Cortez] told her not to tell anyone. She also

indicated that she told [Cortez]’s wife what had occurred[,] and his wife said 

[Cortez] did not touch her.

[Cortez] was interviewed by police on March 15, 2016, and denied

touching the victim. He participated in a polygraph on April 4, 2016[,] and 

showed signs of deception. After the polygraph, [Cortez] indicated he did 

touch the victim’s vaginal area over her clothes. He further explained he may 

have touched her under her clothes but did not remember. He told officers he 

did not have a sexual intent when he touched the victim and only wanted to 

scare her so that she would stop bothering him. He indicated he first denied 

touching the victim because of her age and that he knew it was a criminal 

offense. [He] was then taken into custody without further incident.

(ECF No. 10-1 at 21).

The parties entered into a plea agreement on December 9, 2016. (ECF No. 10-1 

at 7-8). Cortez agreed to plead guilty to two class 3 felonies of attempted molestation of a 

child. (ECF No. 20-1 at 6, 8). The written plea agreement noted the presumptive sentence 

of 10 years, the minimum sentence of 5 years, and the maximum sentence of 15 years’

imprisonment for these crimes. (ECF No. 10-1 at 6). The parties stipulated in the plea 

agreement that Cortez would serve “a term” of imprisonment and a term of lifetime 

supervised probation. (Id.). 

Cortez initialed the following paragraph in the written plea agreement:

I have read and understand the provisions . . . of this agreement. I have 

discussed the case and my constitutional rights with my lawyer. My lawyer 

has explained the nature of the charge(s) and the elements of the crime(s) to 

which I am pleading. I understand that by pleading GUILTY I will be 

waiving and giving up my right to a determination of probable cause, to a 

trial by jury to determine guilt and to determine any fact used to impose a 

sentence . . . to confront, cross-examine, compel the attendance of witnesses, 

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to present evidence in my behalf, my right to remain silent, my privilege 

against self-incrimination, presumption of innocence and right to appeal . . . 

(ECF No. 10-1 at 8). The plea agreement also stated:

I have personally and voluntarily placed my initials beside each of the above 

paragraphs and signed the signature line below to indicate that I read, or had 

read to me, understood and approved all of the previous paragraphs in this 

agreement, both individually and as a total binding agreement. My plea is 

voluntary and not the result of force, or threat, or promises other than those 

contained in the plea agreement.

(Id.). Cortez and his counsel signed the plea agreement, and counsel avowed that he had 

“discussed this case with [Cortez] in detail and advised [him] of his ... constitutional rights 

and all possible defenses.” (Id.) Counsel “believe[d] that [Cortez]’s plea [was] knowing, 

intelligent, and voluntary and that the plea and disposition [were] consistent with law.” 

(Id.).

Accordingly, on January 20, 2017, Cortez was sentenced to a term of seven years’

imprisonment followed by a term of lifetime probation. (ECF No. 10-1 at 10-14, 17-19).

Cortez signed a Notice of Rights of Review After Conviction and Procedure. (ECF No. 10-

1 at 28). The notice advised that because he pled guilty, he lacked the right to appeal and 

could seek relief “only by petition for post-conviction relief.” (Id.). The notice warned 

Cortez that to preserve his post-conviction rights he had to file any “Notice of Post

Conviction Relief . . . within 90 days of the entry of judgment and sentence.” (Id.). 

Cortez filed a Notice of Post Conviction Relief on May 17, 2018, more than fifteen 

months after sentencing. (ECF No. 10-1 at 30-32). Cortez alleged a claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel, stated he was not seeking the appointment of counsel in his Rule 32 

proceeding, and acknowledged the notice was untimely. (ECF No. 10-1 at 31-32). Cortez 

further indicated he was not challenging his conviction, but he was seeking a reduction in 

both his sentence and in his sex offender level. (ECF No. 10-1 at 32) (“[Cortez] was 

determined to be a level one sex offender as a result of the A.S.O.S. assessment yet [his] 

defense counsel allowed [him] to sign for level[-three] plus intensive [probation]. Without 

overturning conviction, I am seeking a sentence reduction and level[-one] status.”).

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The state trial court dismissed Cortez’s Rule 32 action on June 6, 2018. (ECF No. 

10-1 at 34). The trial court determined:

Under [Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure] 32.4(a)(2)(C) . . . the Notice of 

Request for Post-Conviction Relief must be filed within 90 days of the entry 

of judgment and sentencing. This date is clearly stated in the “Notice of 

Rights of Review After Conviction and Procedure” form that [Cortez] 

received at sentencing. Because this Court sentenced [him] on January 20, 

2017, the deadline for [his] Notice of Request for Post-Conviction Relief was 

April 20, 2017. This Rule 32 proceeding is thus untimely by more than one 

year.

(Id.). The state court also concluded: “Nevertheless, [Cortez] contents that the untimeliness 

of this Rule 32 proceeding is without fault on his part and [that] he is entitled to relief under 

Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1(f). . . . He fails to supply an adequate factual or 

legal basis for relief.” (ECF No. 10-1 at 35). 

The state trial court also found Cortez’s substantive claim procedurally barred:

. . . Moreover, [Cortez] cannot raise these Rule 32.1(a)1and Rule 

32.1(c) claims in an untimely Rule 32 proceeding because the [N]otice may 

only raise claims pursuant to Rule 32.1(d), (e), (f), (g), or (h).2 Ariz. R. Crim. 

 

1 Rule 32.1(a) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure provides the defendant may seek 

relief if their “conviction was obtained or the sentence was imposed in violation of the United 

States or Arizona constitutions.” Rule 32.1(c) provides the defendant may seek relief if “the 

sentence imposed exceeds the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise not in accordance with 

the sentence authorized by law.”

2 These subsections of Rule 32.1 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure provide:

(d) the defendant continues to be in custody after his or her sentence expired;

(e) newly discovered material facts probably exist and those facts probably would 

have changed the verdict or sentence.

Newly discovered material facts exist if:

(1) the facts were discovered after the trial or sentencing;

(2) the defendant exercised due diligence in discovering these facts; 

and

(3) the newly discovered facts are material and not merely 

cumulative or used solely for impeachment, unless the impeachment 

evidence substantially undermines testimony that was of critical 

significance such that the evidence probably would have changed 

the verdict or sentence.

(f) the failure to file a notice of post-conviction relief of-right or a notice of appeal 

within the required time was not the defendant's fault;

(g) there has been a significant change in the law that, if applied to the defendant's 

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P. 32.4(a)(2)(A); see generally State v. Petty, [238 P.3d 637, 641, ¶ 11] 

([Ariz.] App. 2010) (holding ineffective assistance of counsel claims are 

“cognizable under Rule 32.1(a)”). The Rule 32.1(a) and Rule 32.1(c) claims

[Cortez] has asserted were required to be raised in a timely Rule 32

proceeding. In sum, [Cortez] fails to state a claim for which relief can be 

granted in an untimely Rule 32 proceeding. [Cortez] must assert substantive

claims and adequately explain the reasons for their untimely assertion. Ariz. 

R. Crim. P. 32.2(b). [Cortez] has failed to meet this standard.

(Id.).

3

Cortez sought review of the trial court’s denial of Rule 32 relief in the Arizona Court 

of Appeals. (ECF No. 10-1 at 40-41). In an order entered September 20, 2018, the Court 

of Appeals granted review but summarily denied relief, finding that Cortez did not 

“establish an abuse of discretion.” (Id.).

On October 12, 2018, Cortez placed his petition seeking a federal writ of habeas 

corpus in the prison mailbox. (ECF No. 1 at 11). Cortez alleges he was denied his Sixth 

Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. Cortez asserts his counsel’s 

performance was deficient because counsel let him “sign for a level 3 intensive probation” 

despite his status, pursuant to the “A.S.O.S. testing program,” as a level-one sex offender. 

(ECF No. 1 at 6). Cortez further contends his sentence “was not in accordance with Arizona 

rules of criminal procedure 32.1 (sic),” despite counsel representing to Cortez that his 

sentence was in compliance with Arizona’s procedural rules. (Id.). Cortez maintains that,

but for counsel’s “unproffesional (sic) errors,” the “result of the plea agreement would be 

in heavily favor of the defendant.” (Id.). 

 

case, would probably overturn the defendant's conviction or sentence; or

(h) the defendant demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the facts 

underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish that no reasonable fact-finder 

would find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, or that the death penalty 

would not have been imposed.

3 Fifteen days after the court denied his Notice of Request, Cortez wrote the court, asking 

it how he could confirm the type of probation he would serve upon his release from prison. (ECF 

No. 10-1 at 37-38).

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Cortez acknowledges that his § 2254 petition is untimely, but asserts: “When it 

comes to the timeliness of this case there is only one approach to be made and that is which 

is more important, the timeliness of a case versus what needs to be done.” (ECF No. 1 at 

11). As to the relief he seeks from the Court, Cortez states: “Without overturning the 

conviction Petitioner is requesting a sentence reduction along with severing the lifetime 

probation to regular standard probation.” (Id.)

II. Analysis

A. Statute of limitations

Relief on the merits of Cortez’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus is barred by the 

statute of limitations provision of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 

(“AEDPA”). The AEDPA imposed a one-year statute of limitations on state prisoners 

seeking federal habeas relief from their state convictions. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The oneyear statute of limitations on federal habeas petitions generally begins to run on “the date 

on which the judgment became final by conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the 

time for seeking such review.” Id. § 2244(d)(1)(A). 

“Arizona’s Rule 32 of-right proceeding for plea-convicted defendants is a form of 

direct review within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).” Summers v. Schriro, 481 

F.3d 710, 717 (9th Cir. 2007). Accordingly, Cortez’s conviction because final, and the 

AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations began to run, on April 20, 2017, when the time 

expired for him to seek review of his convictions and the sentences imposed January 20, 

2017, by means of a petition for state post-conviction relief. The one-year statute of 

limitations expired on April 20, 2018. Cortez did not file his federal habeas petition until 

October 12, 2018, more than five months after the AEDPA statute of limitations expired.

The AEDPA provides for tolling of the limitations period when a “properly filed 

application for State post-conviction or other collateral relief with respect to the pertinent 

judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). However, Cortez did not have any 

properly filed application for state post-conviction relief pending in the state courts from 

April 20, 2017, through April 20, 2018. Cortez’s state action for Rule 32 relief, filed May 

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17, 2018, after the AEDPA’s statute of limitations expired, could not and did not “revive” 

the limitations period with regard to his federal habeas petition. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 

321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003), citing Tinker v. Moore, 255 F.3d 1331, 1333 (11th Cir. 

2001); Preston v. Gibson, 234 F.3d 1118, 1120 (10th Cir. 2000). A state-court action that 

is filed after the expiration of the AEDPA statute of limitations does not revive the running 

of the limitations period. See Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001); Fisher v. 

Gibson, 262 F.3d 1135, 1142-43 (10th Cir. 2001); Payton v. Brigano, 256 F.3d 405, 408 

(6th Cir. 2001). Nor could Cortez’s Rule 32 action, which the state court dismissed as 

untimely and procedurally barred, toll the AEDPA statute of limitations because it was not 

a “properly filed” action for state post-conviction relief. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 

408, 413 (2005) (holding that a state petition that is not filed within the state’s required 

time limit is not “properly filed.”). See also Allen v. Siebert, 552 U.S. 3, 5-7 (2007) (holding 

that the Pace rule applies even where there are exceptions to the state-court filing deadlines, 

and reaffirming that a state court’s rejection of a petition as untimely is “the end of the 

matter”); Zepeda v. Walker, 581 F.3d 1013, 1018 (9th Cir.2009) (rejecting a contention 

that the state must prove that rules concerning time bars are “firmly established and 

regularly followed before noncompliance will render a petition improperly filed for 

AEDPA tolling”).

The one-year statute of limitations for filing a federal habeas petition may be 

equitably tolled if extraordinary circumstances beyond the petitioner’s control prevented 

them from filing their petition on time. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010); 

Gibbs v. Legrand, 767 F.3d 879, 884-85 (9th Cir. 2014). To be entitled to equitable tolling 

the petitioner must establish both that he diligently pursued his rights and that “some 

extraordinary circumstance” beyond his control prevented the timely filing of his habeas 

petition. Pace, 544 U.S. at 418; Forbess v. Franke, 749 F.3d 837, 839-40 (9th Cir. 2014); 

Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 1048-49 (9th Cir. 2010). Equitable tolling is also 

available if the petitioner establishes their actual, factual innocence of the crimes of 

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conviction. See McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 386 (2013); Stewart v. Cate, 757 F.3d 

929, 937-38 (9th Cir. 2014).

Equitable tolling is to be rarely granted. See, e.g., Yow Ming Yeh v. Martel, 751 F.3d 

1075, 1077 (9th Cir. 2014); Waldon-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1011 (9th Cir. 

2009). It is Cortez’s burden to establish that equitable tolling is warranted in his case. See, 

e.g., Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 959 (9th Cir. 2010); Waldon-Ramsey, 556 F.3d at 

1011; Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2004). To be 

entitled to equitable tolling Cortez must show “extraordinary circumstances were the cause

of his untimeliness and that the extraordinary circumstances made it impossible to file a 

petition on time.” Porter, 620 F.3d at 959 (emphasis added and internal quotations 

omitted).

In reply to Respondents’ assertion that his petition is not timely, Cortez now alleges:

Petitioner understood his right for review after conviction and 

procedure. What he did not understand is that [at] sentencing his attorney 

stated to him that he would submit the PCR on his behalf. Of course that was 

never the intention nor was it submitted. So in the afterthought it did take the 

Petitioner once he understood it was never done for him almost a years time 

to understand and submit the PCR on his own. (sic)

The Petitioner was determined to be a level 1 offender as a result of 

the A.S.O.S.4assestment. (sic) Defense counsel never took this under 

consideration allowed Petitioner to sign the same punishment as a level 3 

predator on top of this was not only given life time probation, but also under 

the term of intensive. 

(ECF No. 11 at 1-2). 

 

4 Cortez is apparently referencing a sex offender assessment, used to assign sex offender 

levels. Level one is assigned to people who have the lowest risk of reoffending and Level three 

sex offenders are deemed to have the highest risk of reoffending and of being potential threats to 

public safety in their communities. The risks are based on the information that is available about 

the sex offender and can impact the length of time that an offender will be required to register in 

Arizona as a sex offender. An offender’s risk level can be increased for multiple convictions for 

the same or similar sex crimes. If an offender is assigned a level three risk, they must register with 

the local sheriff’s department and residents who live in the surrounding neighborhoods will be 

notified that the offender resides in the area and the offender’s employer will be notified that they

are a registered sex offender. A level three offender may not live within one thousand feet of a 

school, child care facility, or the residence of their victim, unless their residence was established 

before 2007 or before the school or child care facility is located within the stated boundary. 

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Cortez also asserts:

When it comes to extraordinary circumstances the State contends that 

oversight, miscalculation or neglegence (sic) should not preclude the 

Petitioner once again for seeking justice. The Petitioner has done his due 

diligence since his understanding that he had to present his case in his own 

defense.

In conclusion it is up to the Court if a Petitioners (sic) justice 

overweighs procedural bar. The Petitioner only asks of the Court to review 

his case without State interference, and let the Court decide fair or not.

(ECF No. 11 at 2). 

Cortez has not established he diligently pursued his claims for relief or that some 

extraordinary circumstance prevented his timely filing of his federal habeas petition. 

Cortez signed a Notice of Rights of Review After Conviction and Procedure informing him 

that he had ninety days to file a Rule 32 action after the date of his conviction and 

sentencing, yet he did not pursue his post-conviction rights for a period of fifteen months 

after the date he was sentenced. Notably, although Cortez now implies he did not timely 

file his Rule 32 action because he believed his trial counsel had done so, he did not raise 

this allegation in the state court when acknowledging that his state habeas petition was 

untimely, and he apparently did not make any attempt to ascertain whether his Rule 32 

action had been timely initiated until approximately one year after the deadline for doing 

so expired. Accordingly, Cortez is not entitled to equitable tolling of the statute of 

limitations. Nor does Cortez assert his factual innocence of the crimes of conviction. 

Therefore, Cortez’s request for federal habeas relief is barred by the AEDPA’s 

statute of limitations. 

B. Procedural bar

Review of the merits of Cortez’s federal habeas petition is also barred by the 

doctrine of procedural default. Absent specific circumstances, the Court may only grant 

federal habeas relief on the merits of a claim which has been “properly” exhausted in the 

state courts. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999); Coleman v. Thompson, 

501 U.S. 722, 729-30 (1991). To properly exhaust a federal habeas claim the petitioner 

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must afford the state courts the opportunity to rule upon the merits of the claim by “fairly 

presenting” the claim to the state’s “highest” court in a procedurally correct manner. See, 

e.g., Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989); Rose v. Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 1110 

(9th Cir. 2005). 

To be properly exhausted in the state courts a federal habeas claim must be presented 

to the state court in a procedurally correct manner. If a state court expressly applied a 

procedural bar when a petitioner attempted to raise the claim in state court, and that state 

procedural bar is both “independent” and “adequate,” review of the merits of the claim by 

a federal habeas court is barred. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801 (1991), citing

Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87-88 (1977). A state procedural default rule is 

“independent” if it does not depend upon a federal constitutional ruling on the merits. See 

Stewart v. Smith, 536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002). A state procedural default rule is “adequate” 

if it is “strictly or regularly followed.” Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 587 (1988), 

quoting Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255, 262-63 (1982).

In the instant matter, the state court found Cortez’s ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim barred by his failure to timely file his Rule 32 action. The state court’s ruling that the 

petition was untimely was not based on the merits of the claim asserted in the petition, and 

thus it was “independent” of federal law. See Stewart, 536 U.S. at 860 (holding a procedural 

rule is “independent” if its application does not depend on an antecedent ruling on the 

merits of the federal claim). Furthermore, the Arizona rule regarding timeliness is 

“adequate” because the Arizona courts routinely dismiss post-conviction proceedings 

based on the petitioner’s failure to file a timely petition for relief. See Pollard v. Schriro, 

2006 WL 3512037, at *3 (D. Ariz. 2006); State v. Carillo, 2007 WL 5600602, at * 1 (Ariz.

Ct. App. 2007) (wherein the post-conviction court summarily dismissed a Rule 32 

proceeding based on petitioner’s failure to file a timely petition). The statutory authority 

for post-conviction proceedings, Arizona Revised Statutes § 13-4234, provides that “[t]he 

time limits are jurisdictional, and an untimely filed notice or petition shall be dismissed 

with prejudice.” The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held Arizona’s procedural rules, 

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including its timeliness rules, are “clear” and “well-established.” Simmons v. Schriro, 187 

F. App’x 753, 754 (9th Cir. 2006). Cortez cites no authority demonstrating that Arizona 

courts inconsistently apply the deadlines set forth in Rule 32.4 for filing a petition, or that 

the rule is inadequate. Accordingly, the Court may conclude the state court’s dismissal of 

Cortez’s ineffective assistance claim, raised in his untimely Rule 32 action, is an adequate 

and independent bar to federal habeas relief.

If a prisoner has procedurally defaulted a claim in the state courts he is not entitled 

to a review of the merits of the claim in a federal habeas action absent a showing of cause 

and prejudice. E.g., Ellis v. Armenakis, 222 F.3d 627, 632 (9th Cir. 2000). It is the 

petitioner’s burden to establish both cause and prejudice with regard to their procedural 

default of a federal habeas claim in the state courts. Correll v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 1404, 

1415 (9th Cir. 1998). “Cause” is a legitimate excuse for the petitioner’s procedural default 

of the claim and “prejudice” is actual harm resulting from the alleged constitutional 

violation. Cooper v. Neven, 641 F.3d 322, 327 (9th Cir. 2011). Under the “cause” prong of 

this test, Cortez bears the burden of establishing that some objective factor external to the 

defense impeded his compliance with Arizona’s procedural rules. See Moorman v. Schriro, 

426 F.3d 1044, 1058 (9th Cir. 2005); Vickers v. Stewart, 144 F.3d 613, 617 (9th Cir. 1998);

Martinez-Villareal v. Lewis, 80 F.3d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996). To establish prejudice, 

Cortez must show that the alleged error “worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, 

infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions.” Cooper, 641 F.3d at 327.

The Court may also consider the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if the failure to 

consider the merits of the claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. 

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750; Atwood v. Ryan, 870 F.3d 1033, 1059 (9th Cir. 2017). A

petitioner meets the “fundamental miscarriage of justice” exception by “establish[ing] that 

under the probative evidence he has a colorable claim of factual innocence.” Sawyer v. 

Whitley, 505 U.S. 333. 339 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).

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Even if Cortez could establish cause for his procedural default of his federal habeas 

claim in the state courts, he is unable to establish any prejudice arising from the state court’s 

alleged failure to consider the merits of his claim. To succeed on a claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel the petitioner must establish his counsel’s performance was both 

deficient and prejudicial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Clark v. 

Chappell, 936 F.3d 944, 968 (9th Cir. 2019). The Strickland test also applies when a

petitioner who pled guilty asserts an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Hill v. 

Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985). In that context Strickland’s prejudice test “focuses on 

whether counsel’s constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of the 

plea process,” i.e., the petitioner “must show there is a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to 

trial.” Id. at 59. The assessment of prejudice also depends on whether going to trial would 

have given the defendant a reasonable chance of obtaining a more favorable result. (Id.) 

(noting that the assessment of prejudice will depend “in large part on a prediction whether 

the evidence likely would have changed the outcome of trial”).

Cortez is unable to establish his counsel’s performance was deficient with regard to 

negotiating the guilty plea or advising Cortez to accept the plea. Counsel’s performance 

was not deficient because the plea agreement was advantageous to Cortez, who had 

admitted his guilt of the charged crimes during the investigation of the crimes. Had he gone 

to trial Cortez would likely have received at least the presumptive sentence, i.e., a sentence 

greater than that he received as a result of the plea agreement. Cortez is also unable to 

establish any prejudice as a result of his counsel’s alleged errors because he is unable to 

show, and he does not assert, that he would have proceeded to trial had his counsel advised 

him that he could have been assessed as a level three offender after sentencing. Nor has 

Cortez established that he was eligible for a term of supervised release as a level one

offender; or that under any circumstance he would have been assessed as a level one

offender; or that the State would have offered a plea agreement allowing him to receive the 

supervised release terms of a level one offender.

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Arizona law provides:

G. If a person is convicted on or after November 1, 2006 of a dangerous 

crime against children as defined in § 13-705, a term of probation is imposed, 

the person is required to register pursuant to § 13-3821 and the person is 

classified as a level three offender pursuant to § 13-3825 . . .

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-902. Because Cortez was charged with, admitted to, and pled

guilty to the charge that he committed a dangerous crime against a child, he was not eligible 

to maintain his level one offender status.

Because Cortez is unable to establish any cause for, or prejudice arising from, his 

procedural default of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim in the state court, nor does 

he assert his factual innocence of the crimes of conviction, he is unable to overcome his 

procedural default of this claim in the state courts and federal habeas relief on this claim is 

barred.

III. Conclusion

Cortez’s federal habeas petition is not timely. Furthermore, Cortez procedurally 

defaulted his federal habeas claim in the state courts and he has not established cause for 

or prejudice arising from his procedural default. Cortez does not assert his factual 

innocence of the crimes of conviction. As a result, relief on his claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel is barred. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Cortez’s petition seeking a writ of 

habeas corpus be denied.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment.

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall have 

fourteen (14) days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which 

to file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen (14) 

days within which to file a response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2 of the Local 

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Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, 

objections to the Report and Recommendation may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in 

length.

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or legal determinations of the 

Magistrate Judge will be considered a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate 

consideration of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th 

Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to file timely objections to any factual or legal determinations 

of the Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the 

findings of fact and conclusions of law in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the 

recommendation of the Magistrate Judge.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, R. 11, the District Court must “issue or deny a 

certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” The 

undersigned recommends that, should the Report and Recommendation be adopted and, 

should Cortez seek a certificate of appealability, a certificate of appealability should be 

denied because he has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.

Dated this 31st day of October, 2019.

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