Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_03-cv-01823/USCOURTS-azd-3_03-cv-01823-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 28:1346 Tort Claim

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Elena White, )

)

Plaintiff, ) No. CIV 03-1823 PCT RCB

)

vs. ) O R D E R

)

United States of America and )

Reeverson Descheny, )

)

Defendants. ) )

On April 30, 2004, Plaintiff Elena White, acting individually

and as the parent and next friend of Sherianna White, filed an

Amended Complaint in this matter asserting claims against the

United States of America and Reeverson Descheny. Amend. Complt.

(doc. 22). Thereafter, on September 23, 2005, the law firm of

Rosenfelt & Buffington, P.A. ("Rosenfelt & Buffington" or "the law

firm") filed a motion to intervene in this case. Motion (doc. 79). 

This motion was fully briefed on October 6, 2005. Reply (doc. 86). 

The court, having carefully considered the arguments presented

by the parties, now rules. 

. . .

Case 3:03-cv-01823-RCB Document 105 Filed 06/19/06 Page 1 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 2 -

I. Facts

Rosenfelt & Buffington, formerly Rosenfelt, Buffington & Borg,

P.A., was retained in November 2002 by Plaintiff in this matter to

prosecute claims for injuries sustained by her daughter at Rock

Point Community School. Rosenfelt & Buffington helped Plaintiff

file a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") in January

2003, and litigated the lawsuit until April 2005. On April 25,

2005, Plaintiff discharged Rosenfelt & Buffington and elected to

retain attorney Scott E. Borg ("Borg"), to whom her case had been

assigned until his employment at Rosenfelt & Buffington was

terminated. Borg continues to represent Plaintiff in this lawsuit.

The alleged written representation agreement between Rosenfelt

& Buffington and Plaintiff ("Representation Agreement") calls for

contingent attorney fees in the amount of twenty-five percent (25%)

and thirty-three and one-third percent (33 1/3%) of any recovery

for damages that do not fall within the FTCA. The agreement also

allegedly provides that Plaintiff is separately liable for

reasonable expenses incurred by Rosenfelt & Buffington in

connection with prosecuting her case. Now that Rosenfelt &

Buffington is no longer representing Plaintiff in this matter, the

law firm is concerned that it will not receive the appropriate fees

and costs due to it pursuant to the Representation Agreement. Mot.

(doc. 79) at 3. Rosenfelt & Buffington asserts that it is entitled

to collect a share of the attorney fees that will be due in the

event that Plaintiff receives a settlement or judgment in this

case, and its unreimbursed reasonable expenses in the amount of

$19,250.92. Id. 

In light of this concern, Rosenfelt & Buffington filed an

Case 3:03-cv-01823-RCB Document 105 Filed 06/19/06 Page 2 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

action against Borg in the state district court of New Mexico

seeking a declaratory judgment regarding its entitlement to a share

of attorney fees in certain cases being handled by Borg. See Resp.

(doc. 82) at 2, citing Rosenfelt & Buffington, PA v. Scott E. Borg

v. Rosenfelt & Buffington, PA, Daniel M. Rosenfelt and Forrest

Buffington, CV 2005-05818 (District Court, Bernalillo County);

Reply (doc. 86) at 1. The law firm also requests that the state

court order Borg to provide an accounting of fees showing the

amount of settlement reached or judgment obtained in the cases he

took with him, and order Borg to pay Rosenfelt & Buffington an

equitable portion of the contingency fee and all incurred expenses. 

Resp. (doc. 82) at 2. In response, Borg filed a counter-claim and

cross-complaint raising twelve issues against Rosenfelt &

Buffington. Reply (doc. 86) at 2; Resp. (doc. 82) at 3-4. 

The law firm asserts that, while Borg concedes that it is

entitled to some recovery of attorney fees and costs, he seeks to

subject Rosenfelt & Buffington's "property interest" to adjustment

or offset based upon the numerous counterclaims he has raised in

the New Mexico state court action. Reply (doc. 86) at 4. 

Concerned that resolution of all of these issues will take many

years, Rosenfelt & Buffington now seeks to intervene in the instant

litigation so that this Court can adjudicate Rosenfelt &

Buffington's right to recover its reasonable costs and an equitable

percentage of the attorney fees. Reply (doc. 86) at 2; Mot. (doc.

79) at 2-3.

II. Intervention of Right: Rule 24(a)

Rosenfelt & Buffington first claim that Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 24(a) requires that they be permitted to intervene “of

Case 3:03-cv-01823-RCB Document 105 Filed 06/19/06 Page 3 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

right” in this action. Mot. (doc. 79) at 4. Rule 24(a) provides,

in relevant part, that, 

[u]pon timely application anyone shall be permitted to

intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of the United

States confers an unconditional right to intervene; or

(2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to

the property or transaction which is the subject of the

action and the applicant is so situated that the

disposition of the action may as a practical matter

impair or impede the applicant’s ability to protect that

interest, unless the applicant’s interest is adequately

represented by existing parties. 

Id. Here, Rosenfelt & Buffington does not assert the existence of

a statute of the United States that confers an unconditional right

to intervene. Thus, the Court shall review the law firm's request

under Rule 24(a)(2). 

Courts in the Ninth Circuit have recognized that the

requirements of Rule 24(a)(2) may be broken down into four

elements, each of which must be demonstrated in order to provide a

non-party with a right to intervene: (1) the application must be

timely; (2) the applicant must have a “significantly protectable”

interest relating to the transaction that is the subject of the

litigation; (3) the applicant must be so situated that the

disposition of the action may, as a practical matter, impair or

impede the applicant's ability to protect its interest; and (4)

the applicant's interest must be inadequately represented by the

parties before the court. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v.

Wilson, 131 F.3d 1297, 1302 (9th Cir. 1997). A failure by the

intervenor to establish any of the above elements will preclude

intervention under this rule. Id. 

In the case at bar, the primary concerns facing Rosenfelt &

Buffington's application is whether it has a “significantly

Case 3:03-cv-01823-RCB Document 105 Filed 06/19/06 Page 4 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

protectable” interest in this litigation, whether a disposition in

this case may, as a practical matter, impair or impede its ability

to protect such an interest, and whether its interest is not

already adequately represented by the existing parties. The

timeliness of the motion is not contested by the parties.

The Ninth Circuit has held that the “significantly

protectable interest” element of Rule 24(a) requires an applicant

to show that he asserts an interest that is protected under some

law, and that there is a “relationship” between his legally

protected interest and the plaintiff's claims. Donnelly v.

Glickman, 159 F.3d 405, 409 (9th Cir. 1998). This interest must

be threatened with a “direct, immediate, and harmful [effect]” by

the results of the underlying lawsuit. See Southwest Center for

Biological Diversity v. Berg, 268 F.3d 810, 818 (9th Cir. 2001). 

In Dilks v. Aloha Airlines Inc., 642 F.2d 1155, 1156-57 (9th Cir.

1981), the Ninth Circuit held that the interest asserted by an

intervenor must be a “direct, non-contingent, substantial, and

legally protectable” interest. However, to trigger a right to

intervene, an economic interest must be concrete and related to

the underlying subject matter of the action. United States v.

Alisal Water Corporation, 370 F.3d 915, 919 (9th Cir. 2004). 

A mere interest in property that may be impacted

by litigation is not a passport to participate in

the litigation itself. To hold otherwise would

create a slippery slope where anyone with an

interest in the property of a party to a lawsuit

could bootstrap that stake into an interest in the

litigation itself.

Id. at 920.

Here, Rosenfelt & Buffington asserts that it has the

necessary interest in this lawsuit, because a "[s]ettlement or

Case 3:03-cv-01823-RCB Document 105 Filed 06/19/06 Page 5 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 6 -

judgment would have a direct and immediate effect upon Rosenfelt &

Buffington's right to recover its advanced costs and its equitable

share of the contingency fees." Mot. (doc. 79) at 4. This

interest, however, is several degrees removed from the tort claims

that are the backbone of this litigation. In its reply, the law

firm asserts that the court in Stockton v. United States, 493 F.2d

1021 (9th Cir. 1974), held that "[a] law firm's putative interest

that the judgment fund of the principal litigation not be

dissipated prior to its collection of its fees satisfies the

requirement of Rule 24(a)(2) that the applicant claim [sic] an

interest relating to the property or transaction which is the

subject of the action." Reply (doc. 86) at 2-3. The Court,

however, finds this assertion misguided, as the court in Stockton

specifically stated that it withheld from "decid[ing] whether as a

general proposition an attorney's interest in a fee is a

sufficient interest to call for intervention of right under Rule

24(a)(2)." Stockton, 493 F.2d at 1024. 

There is simply no right to intervene based on the fact that

the outcome of a case may increase or decrease the collectability

of a third-party’s claim against a party. Hawaii-Pacific Venture

Capital Corp. v. Rothbard, 564 F.2d 1343, 1346 (9th Cir. 1977). 

Moreover, in its motion, Rosenfelt & Buffington asserts no claims

against any parties in this lawsuit. All of the law firm's claims

are alleged against Borg who is Plaintiff's attorney and a nonparty to this matter. 

Additionally, the Court is not convinced that a disposition

in this case would impair Rosenfelt & Buffington's ability to

protect any alleged interest in its attorney fees and costs. In

Case 3:03-cv-01823-RCB Document 105 Filed 06/19/06 Page 6 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

Blake v. Pallan, 554 F.2d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 1977), the court held

that an intervenor could not show that his interest would be

impaired when he was free to simply bring another action to

protect that interest. In other words, if a party has another

avenue available to it through which it may seek protection of its

purported interest, it cannot “as a practical matter” claim that

its interest will be impaired without intervention. 

Here, Rosenfelt & Buffington asserts that it "is so situated

that a disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair

or impede its ability to protect [its] interest." Mot. (doc. 79)

at 4. Beyond this conclusory statement and the contention that a

resolution in the New Mexico lawsuit may take "many years" to be

reached, Rosenfelt & Buffington provide no other evidence or

argument to support its assertion. 

While Rosenfelt & Buffington may be owed money under the

Representation Agreement, the law firm has other remedies

available to it to protect its interests. Such remedies have

already been initiated, as Rosenfelt & Buffington filed an action

in the New Mexico state court involving the same issues presented

in their motion to intervene. The fact that a resolution in that

matter may take longer to reach than Rosenfelt & Buffington

desires does not show that its interest in attorney fees and costs

would be impaired if intervention in this matter is denied. See

Blake, 554 F.2d at 954 ("Mere inconvenience...caused by requiring

[a party] to litigate separately is not the sort of adverse

practical effect contemplated by Rule 24(a)(2)"). Thus, finding

that Rosenfelt & Buffington does not have a “significantly

protectable” interest in this litigation whose protection will be

Case 3:03-cv-01823-RCB Document 105 Filed 06/19/06 Page 7 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 -

impaired by a disposition in this case, intervention under Rule

24(a) shall be denied. Accordingly, the Court need not analyze

the remaining element of Rule 24(a). 

III. Permissive Intervention: Rule 24(b)

Alternatively, Rosenfelt & Buffington seeks to join in this

case under the "permissive intervention" provisions of Rule 24(b),

FED. R. CIV. P. As such, this court's initial inquiry is whether a

statute gives a conditional right to intervene, or whether the

"applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a question

of law or fact in common." Id. If either of these elements are

established, the decision of whether to permit intervention lies

within the district court's sound discretion. Id., see also,

Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, 313 F.3d 1094, 1110 (9th Cir.

2002). Pursuant to Rule 24(b)(2), FED. R. CIV. P., in exercising

its discretion, the court must consider "whether the intervention

will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of

the original parties." Id.

In its motion, Rosenfelt & Buffington fails to make any

arguments that its claim for attorney fees and costs and the main

tort action in this case have a question of law or fact in common. 

Rosenfelt & Buffington's sole argument in support of permissive

intervention is that the FTCA "confers a conditional right to

intervene." Mot. (doc. 79) at 4. In its motion, Rosenfelt &

Buffington cites Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b)(1) to

support this assertion, however, in its reply, the law firm cites

28 U.S.C. § 2678 as "the federal statute that confers a

conditional right to intervene[.]" Reply (doc. 86) at 5. The

Court finds that neither of these authorities, nor any other cited

Case 3:03-cv-01823-RCB Document 105 Filed 06/19/06 Page 8 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 9 -

by the law firm, give Rosenfelt & Buffington a conditional right

to intervene.

First, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b)(1) merely states

the rule that anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action

"when a statute of the United States confers an unconditional

right to intervene[.]" Second, 28 U.S.C. § 2678 provides the

limitations placed on attorney fees received from FTCA actions. 

No attorney shall charge, demand, receive, or

collect for services rendered, fees in excess of

25 per centum of any judgment rendered pursuant to

section 1346(b) of this title or any settlement

made pursuant to section 2677 of this title, or in

excess of 20 per centum of any award, compromise,

or settlement made pursuant to section 2672 of

this title.

Any attorney who charges, demands, receives, or

collects for services rendered in connection with

such claim any amount in excess of that allowed

under this section, if recovery be had, shall be

fined not more than $2,000 or imprisoned not more

than one year, or both.

Id. Furthermore, all of the case law cited by Rosenfelt &

Buffington in support of their argument discuss only a court's

ability to allocate attorney fees, not the existence of a

conditional right to intervene. See Reply (doc. 86) at 5, citing

Schwartz v. United States, 381 F.2d 627 (3rd Cir. 1967); Jaslow v.

United States, 308 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D.N.Y., 1970); Harley & Browne

v. Ressler & Ressler, 957 F. Supp. 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Venegas v.

Skaggs, 867 F.2d 527, 531 (9th Cir. 1989). The Court finds that

Rosenfelt & Buffington has failed to show the existence of a

statutory conditional right to intervene. 

Therefore, 

IT IS ORDERED that Rosenfelt & Buffington's motion to

Case 3:03-cv-01823-RCB Document 105 Filed 06/19/06 Page 9 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 10 -

intervene (doc. 79) is DENIED. 

DATED this 19th day of June, 2006.

Copies to counsel of record.

Case 3:03-cv-01823-RCB Document 105 Filed 06/19/06 Page 10 of 10