Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_23-cv-01513/USCOURTS-caed-1_23-cv-01513-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JASON LOKERSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

C. PFEIFFER,

Defendant.

Case No. 1:23-cv-01513-KES-HBK (PC)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO 

DENY PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE 

TO AMEND COMPLAINT

FOURTEEN DAY OBJECTION PERIOD

(Doc. No. 22)

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint, filed on 

September 3, 2024. (Doc. No. 22, “Motion”). Plaintiff accompanies his Motion with a proposed 

Third Amended Complaint. (Doc. No. 23). For the reasons stated below, the undersigned 

recommends the Motion be denied. 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis on his Second

Amended Complaint filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. Nos. 13, 15). On March 15, 2024, the 

undersigned issued Findings and Recommendations to dismiss Plaintiff’s SAC because it failed to 

allege a cognizable federal claim. (Doc. No. 17). On March 28, 2024, Plaintiff timely filed 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations” which argues his claim was 

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incorrectly brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and instead should have been brought under the 

Americans with Disabilities Act. (Doc. No. 18 at 2). On June 26, 2024, Plaintiff subsequently 

filed a “Motion to Amend or Dismiss as Moot” in which he stated that due to his transfer from 

Kern Valley State Prison (“KVSP”) to High Desert State Prison (“HDSP”), his claims based on 

KVSP policies were now moot. (Doc. No. 19 at 1-2). Accordingly, Plaintiff either sought leave 

to amend the SAC to allege claims based on similar policies at HDSP, or to dismiss his case 

without prejudice if the Court were not inclined to grant a motion to amend. (Id. at 2). After the 

Court issued an order on August 9, 2024, directing Plaintiff to clarify the relief being sought in 

his “Motion to Amend or Dismiss as Moot,” he filed the instant Motion to Amend and lodged a 

proposed Third Amended Complaint. (Doc. Nos. 22, 23).

APPLICABLE LAW AND ANALYSIS

Under Rule 15, a party “may amend its filing once as a matter of course . . . .” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 15(a)(1). For subsequent amendments, “a party may amend its pleading only with the 

opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave. The court should freely give leave when 

justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). If an otherwise deficient pleading can be remedied 

by alleging other facts, a pro se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend their complaint 

before dismissal of the action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en 

banc); Lucas v. Department of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995). A district court can deny 

leave “where the amendment would be futile . . . or where the amended complaint would be 

subject to dismissal.” See Saul v. United States, 928 F.2d 829, 843 (9th Cir. 1991). 

In the proposed SAC, Plaintiff seeks to challenge HDSP’s personal food policy at the 

prison’s correctional treatment center (“CTC”) on the basis that it violates his right to equal 

protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. (Doc. No. 23 at 4-5). The HDSP policy, which 

applies to both convalescent patients and long-term disabled inmates like Plaintiff who are being 

housed in the CTC, permits those inmates to obtain personal food through either canteen 

purchases or package purchases. (Id. at 4). It does not, however, permit them to purchase 

personal food through food sales offered by local businesses or from the vending machines during 

contact visits. (Id.). 

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Plaintiff concedes that the KVSP policy he previously challenged is “much more

restrictive” than the one he is now challenging at HDSP; KVSP did not permit CTC inmates any

option for obtaining personal food due to the various dietary restrictions of inmate-patients 

housed in CTC at KVSP. (Id. at 5). Nevertheless, Plaintiff acknowledges that the KVSP policy 

was rationally related to the legitimate goal of preventing CTC inmates from circumventing 

dietary restrictions. (Id.). Plaintiff also notes that the personal food policy “is set at the CDCR 

level . . . but it is interpreted at the local level” and that “of the three CTCs [he’s] been to so far, 

none permit the inmates visitor center food or access to food sales.” (Id.).

Plaintiff states that HDSP officials have not provided any justification for the policy, and 

he contends that it cannot be justified under the same rationale as offered for KVSP’s policy. (Id. 

at 5-6). Plaintiff argues that because CTC inmates are housed individually and are “isolated for 

out-of-cell time,” one inmate with no dietary restrictions could not provide unapproved personal 

food to another inmate who was subject to dietary restrictions. (Id.). He argues that the personal 

food restrictions are legitimate as applied to “sick people who will get better” but that they should 

not apply to “disabled inmates [who] are being stuffed here because there is nowhere else to put 

them.” (Id.).

A. Venue is Improper in This Court

Plaintiff’s TAC does not challenge the personal food policies at KVSP due to his transfer 

to HDSP. Instead, the TAC challenges the personal food policies for inmates assigned to the 

CTC unit at HDSP. HDSP is located in Susanville, CA, which is in Lassen County and within 

the jurisdiction and venue of the Sacramento Division of this Court. See Local Rule 120(d). 

Thus, Plaintiff should have filed a complaint in the Sacramento Division of this Court. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1391(b); see also Ziegler v. Indian River County, 64 F.3d 470, 474 (9th Cir. 1995) 

(reviewing federal court jurisdiction and venue in a § 1983 action). While Local Rule 120(f),

permits the Court to transfer a civil action which has not been commenced in the proper court to 

the correct court, the Court does not find that the interests of justice warrant a transfer of this case

to the Sacramento Division under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) and Local Rule 120(f) because, as more 

fully set forth below, the lodged TAC fails to state claim.

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B. Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Claim

“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 

laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. “The Equal Protection Clause requires the State to treat all 

similarly situated people equally.” Hartmann v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 

1123 (9th Cir. 2013). There are two different ways in which a plaintiff may state an equal 

protection claim. A plaintiff’s first option is to allege “facts plausibly showing that the 

defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against [him] based upon membership 

in a protected class[.]” Id. (quoting Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1166 (9th Cir. 

2005)). The second way a plaintiff may state a claim is “as a ‘class of one’ by alleging that [the] 

plaintiff has ‘been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is 

no rational basis for the treatment[.]” Koboyashi v. McMulling, 2022 WL 3137958, at *23 (C.D. 

Cal. May 31, 2022) (quoting Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000)). 

“Because ‘the disabled do not constitute a suspect class’ for equal protection purposes, a 

governmental policy that purposefully treats the disabled differently from the non-disabled need 

only be ‘rationally related to legitimate legislative goals’ to pass constitutional muster.” Lee v. 

Cnty. of Los Angeles, 240 F.3d 754, 772 (9th Cir.), opinion withdrawn and superseded sub nom. 

Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668 (9th Cir. 2001)

Because Plaintiff is not a member of a suspect class and does not have a fundamental right 

to personal food, see McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 198 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that 

“[i]nmates . . . have the right to be provided with food sufficient to sustain them in good health 

that satisfies the dietary laws of their religion”); see also LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1456 

(9th Cir. 1993) (“The Eighth Amendment requires only that prisoners receive food that is 

adequate to maintain health; it need not be tasty or aesthetically pleasing”) citing Cunningham v. 

Jones, 567 F.2d 653, 659–60 (6th Cir. 1977) HDSP’s food policy need only be rationally related 

to a legitimate government objective. And the burden is on Plaintiff to show that the policy bears 

no rational relationship to a conceivable legitimate penological objective. See Overton v. 

Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003) (“[t]he burden . . . is not on the State to prove the validity of 

prison regulations but on the prisoner to disprove it.”).

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The Court finds that the same general rationale offered by KVSP officials for their 

personal food policy, i.e. preventing inmates with special medical concerns from having access to 

unapproved personal food, logically applies at HDSP.

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 Preventing CTC inmates, whether 

recovering from an illness or suffering from a long-term disability, from accessing personal food 

through the vending machines during contact visits or through food sales furthers this legitimate 

goal.

While prison officials can condition canteen orders on a doctor’s signature, as Plaintiff 

noted in his proposed amended complaint, (Doc. No. 23 at 5), or control the delivery of a package 

containing unauthorized food, presumably medical staff cannot easily monitor the more informal 

purchases made through community food sales and vending machines during contact visits. 

Limiting the access of CTC inmates to personal food to channels that can be effectively 

monitored and controlled by prison officials, including doctors, canteen personnel, and mailroom 

staff, is rationally related to the legitimate goal of controlling the availability of personal food in 

an area of the prison with special medical needs.

Plaintiff implies that prison administrators could make a distinction between two different 

CTC occupants—those who are convalescent and those who are housed there due to a disability. 

(Id.). But Plaintiff does not provide any persuasive argument why, given the similarity in these 

two populations, prison officials should distinguish between them. Moreover, the Court is very 

reluctant to require that prison administrators add further complexity to the already-challenging 

task of managing a prison. See Overton, 539 U.S. at 132 (“we must accord substantial deference 

to the professional judgment of prison administrators, who bear a significant responsibility for 

defining the legitimate goals of a corrections system and for determining the most appropriate 

means to accomplish them.”); see also Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482 (1995) (“federal 

courts ought to afford appropriate deference and flexibility to state officials trying to manage a 

volatile environment.”). Indeed, the relative simplicity of offering only two options for 

purchasing personal food to CTC inmates, many of whom have special health and dietary needs 

1 Moreover, given that Plaintiff asserts the policy is set at the state level, the same basic rationale should 

apply to a similar policy at another CDCR institution.

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that require monitoring, is itself a rational basis for the policy.

Moreover, Plaintiff has not alleged any injury from the policy that would confer standing 

to sue. See Moore v. California Corr. Health Care Servs., 2017 WL 1408154, at *2 (E.D. Cal. 

Apr. 20, 2017) (recommending dismissal of inmate’s claim on standing grounds where any injury 

asserted by plaintiff was “entirely speculative”). “Standing to sue is a doctrine rooted in the 

traditional understanding of a case or controversy.” Spokeo Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 

(2016). To establish Article III standing, three elements must be satisfied: a “plaintiff must have 

(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the 

defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Id. (citing Lujan 

v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)). The plaintiff, as the party invoking federal 

jurisdiction, bears the burden of establishing these elements. Id. (citing FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 

493 U.S. 215, 231, (1990)). Where, as here, a case is at the pleading stage, the plaintiff must 

“clearly . . . allege facts demonstrating” each element. Id. (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 

518 (1975)). 

Here, Plaintiff cannot satisfy the first element of standing—an injury in fact. Even assuming 

that mere inability to access personal food constituted a cognizable injury, Plaintiff’s TAC notes 

that the HDSP policy still permits two methods for accessing personal food. And unlike his 

initial Complaint, which alleged that KVSP’s policy resulted in Plaintiff losing a package of 

personal food, here Plaintiff alleges no specific harm from HDSP’s policy. Accordingly, the 

Court finds that Plaintiff’s TAC fails to remedy the deficiencies in his Fourteenth Amendment 

equal protection claim. 

C. Americans with Disabilities Act Claim

Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act apply 

to inmates within state prisons. Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206

(1998); see also Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019, 1023 (9th Cir.1997); Duffy v. Riveland, 98 

F.3d 447, 453–56 (9th Cir. 1996).

In order to state a claim under the ADA, a plaintiff must have been “improperly excluded 

from participation in, and denied the benefits of, a prison service, program, or activity on the 

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basis of his physical handicap.” Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019, 1023 (9th Cir. 1997).

“To establish a violation of [Section] 504 of the RA, a plaintiff must show that (1)[he] is 

handicapped within the meaning of the RA; (2)[he] is otherwise qualified for the benefit or 

services sought; (3)[he] was denied the benefit or services solely by reason of [his] handicap; and 

(4) the program providing the benefit or services receives federal financial assistance.” Id.

“Title II of the ADA incorporates the ‘nondiscrimination principles’ of Section 504 and extends

them to state and local government without regard to the receipt of federal financial assistance.”

Does 1-5 v. Chandler, 83 F.3d 1150, 1152 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal citation omitted).

“[A]lthough “[i]ncarceration itself is hardly a ‘program’ or ‘activity’ to which a disabled 

person might wish access, . . . there is no doubt that an educational program is a program, and 

when it is provided by and in a state prison it is a program of a public entity.” Armstrong v. 

Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019, 1023 (9th Cir. 1997) citing Crawford v. Indiana Dep’t of Corrections, 

115 F.3d 481, 483 (7th Cir. 1997). “In addition, since Congress has directed that the ADA and 

RA be construed consistently, see 42 U.S.C. § 12134(b), the term “program” in the ADA can also 

be read, in light of our prior cases concerning the RA, to encompass prison activities. Armstrong, 

124 F,3d at 1023; see also Collings v. Longview Fibre Co., 63 F.3d 828, 832 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1995) 

(cases involving the RA are “instructive” for claims under the ADA); cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1048 

(1996).

Here, Lokerson does not specify the nature of his disability, but asserts that he is a 

“permanently disabled inmate[] who require[] nursing assistance.” (Doc. No. 23 at 5). For 

purposes of these findings and recommendation, the Court will assume for purposes of analysis 

that Plaintiff is handicapped within the meaning of the RA and ADA.

Given the broad understanding courts have ascribed to the term “prison service, program, 

or activity”2 within the ADA, the Court assumes arguendo that access to personal food is such a 

2 See, e.g., Hernandez v. Cnty. of Monterey, 110 F. Supp. 3d 929, 935–36 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“Because of 

the unique nature of correctional facilities, in which jail staff control nearly all aspects of inmates’ daily 

lives, most everything provided to inmates is a public service, program or activity, including sleeping, 

eating, showering, toileting, communicating with those outside the jail by mail and telephone, exercising, 

entertainment, safety and security, the jail’s administrative, disciplinary, and classification proceedings, 

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service, program or activity. However, Plaintiff’s TAC does not establish that Plaintiff was 

“excluded from participation in” or “denied the benefits of” access to all personal food, even if 

personal food consitutes a prison “program.” Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d at 1023. Plaintiff’s 

TAC indicates that the HDSP personal food policy limits him and other CTC inmates to two 

viable methods for obtaining personal food. The TAC does not allege that Plaintiff is being 

excluded from obtaining personal food altogether, only that two methods for doing so—

community food sales and vending machine purchases—are not available to him as a CTC 

inmate. As with his Fourteenth Amendment claim, Plaintiff does not identify in what way he is 

being denied the benefits of a prison program merely because he is limited to purchasing personal 

food through the canteen or package deliveries.

Nor does the HDSP personal food policy limit participation on the basis of disability. The 

policy applies to all inmates in the Correctional Treatment Center, many of whom are only 

housed there temporarily following medical care and are not disabled. Plaintiff contends that 

“disabled CTC inmates [should] get access to purchase the same food as other similarly-situated 

HDSP inmates”; but arguably he wants to be treated differently than other HDSP inmates housed 

in the CTC, who are likewise governed by the personal food policy. Indeed, the fact that both 

disabled and non-disabled inmates in the CTC are subject to the same policy arguably defeats 

Plaintiff’s claim that he is suffering discrimination based on his disability. See Baughman v. 

Bowman, 2024 WL 1248135, at *12 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 7, 2024) (“where disabled and non-disabled 

prisoners are subjected to the same conditions, an ADA or RA claim fails”), report and 

recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 1251497 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 22, 2024).

For reasons set forth above, the undersigned finds that permitting Plaintiff to allege his 

claim under the ADA does not make it viable; accordingly, he fails to show that his TAC would 

medical, mental health and dental services, the library, educational, vocational, substance abuse and anger 

management classes and discharge services.”); see also Armstrong v. Schwarzenegger, 622 F.3d 1058,

1068 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting that jails provide inmates “with various positive opportunities, from 

educational and treatment programs, to opportunities to contest their incarceration, to the fundamentals of 

life, such as sustenance, the use of toilet and bathing facilities, and elementary mobility and 

communication.”).

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remedy the deficiencies in his Second Amended Complaint.

D. Damages Claim for Lost Package

Finally, Plaintiff’s TAC realleges the property claim that the Court previously advised him 

was not cognizable in his initial Complaint. As the Court stated in its initial November 28, 2023 

screening order:

An action [for damages based on loss of his personal food package] 

is barred because California provides state prisoners adequate postdeprivation remedies through the Government Claims Act to satisfy 

the due process clause. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 

(1984) (finding that “a negligent or intentional deprivation of a 

prisoner’s property fails to state a claim under section 1983 if the 

state has an adequate post deprivation remedy.”); Barnett v. 

Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that California 

has an adequate post-deprivation remedy through the Government 

Claims Act process.). Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot state a Fifth 

Amendment Due Process Claim based on the taking of his property. 

Instead, Plaintiff should seek a monetary remedy for his Fifth 

Amendment property claim through California’s Government 

Claim Act process.

(Doc. No. 9 at 6). Plaintiff seeks to reassert this claim in this TAC, however for the same reasons 

the Court previously identified, this claim is not cognizable under Section 1983 and again 

Plaintiff fails to cure the deficiencies in his Second Amended Complaint. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend and proposed Third Amended 

Complaint fails to show that he can cure the deficiency in his operative complaint. Each of his 

proposed claims, under the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause, the Americans With 

Disabilities Act, and the Fifth Amendment takings clause would be subject to dismissal. 

Accordingly, the undersigned finds that granting Plaintiff further leave to amend his complaint 

would be futile. See Saul v. United States, 928 F.2d 829, 843 (9th Cir. 1991) (A district court can 

deny leave “where the amendment would be futile . . . or where the amended complaint would be 

subject to dismissal”). The undersigned therefore recommends denying Plaintiff’s Motion to 

Amend. See Wolgin, 722 F.2d at 394-95.

Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED:

The district court deny Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend. (Doc. No. 22).

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NOTICE TO PARTIES

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 

Judge assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 days 

after being served with a copy of these Findings and Recommendations, a party may file written 

objections with the Court. Id.; Local Rule 304(b). The document should be captioned, 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations” and shall not exceed fifteen 

(15) pages. The Court will not consider exhibits attached to the Objections. To the extent a party 

wishes to refer to any exhibit(s), the party should reference the exhibit in the record by its 

CM/ECF document and page number, when possible, or otherwise reference the exhibit with 

specificity. Any pages filed in excess of the fifteen (15) page limitation may be disregarded by 

the District Judge when reviewing these Findings and Recommendations under 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(l)(C). A party’s failure to file any objections within the specified time may result in the 

waiver of certain rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014).

Dated: December 19, 2024 

HELENA M. BARCH-KUCHTA

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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