Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_17-cv-05759/USCOURTS-cand-3_17-cv-05759-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:44 Trademark Infringement

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BLANQI, LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.

BAO BEI MATERNITY, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 3:17-cv-05759-WHO 

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 

JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

Re: Dkt. No. 20

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Blanqi LLC (“Blanqi”), a manufacturer and seller of support wear products, owns

the trademark SPORTSUPPORT. It claims that defendant Suzanne Koval and her company Bao 

Bei Maternity infringed that mark with Instagram posts referencing a “Sport Support Underbust 

Tank” and marketing a sports bra using an alleged trademark of “sporty support.” Defendants 

respond that they used the terms “otherwise than as a mark,” in their descriptive sense, and are 

therefore entitled to a fair use defense. They also insist that the two instances of alleged 

infringement provide an insufficient basis for Blanqi to prevail on its claim under the Lanham Act, 

and urge that Blanqi’s claim under California’s Unfair Competition Law is preempted by the 

Copyright Act. Although defendants’ arguments may prove meritorious down the road, they fail 

to derail Blanqi’s claims at the pleading stage. Defendants’ motion is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

Blanqi manufactures and sells support wear products, including maternity shapewear, 

under the BLANQI trademark. Compl. ¶ 11. It owns the trademark SPORTSUPPORT, subject of 

U.S. Trademark Serial No. 86560797 (“the ’797 application”), for use with apparel, including 

maternity clothing, sports bras, and tank tops. Id. ¶ 12. It has used the SPORTSUPPORT mark to 

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market sports bras and tank tops. Id. ¶ 13.

Defendant Suzanne Koval owns defendant Bao Bei Maternity (“Bao Bei”), a retailer and 

distributor of supportive maternity wear. Compl. ¶¶ 2–3, 14. On October 27, 2016, Blanqi sent 

Bao Bei a letter indicating that its use of the term “Sporty Support” constituted infringement of its 

SPORTSUPPORT mark.1 Id. ¶¶ 16–17. 

In May 2017, “Bao Bei marketed a sports bra on Instagram in connection with the 

trademark SPORTY SUPPORT[.]” Compl. ¶ 19. Blanqi alleges that Bao Bei continues to 

willfully infringe Blanqi’s SPORTSUPPORT mark through Bao Bei’s marketing of sports bras 

with the SPORTY SUPPORT mark. Id. ¶ 21. It further alleges that defendants have “copied 

various original text and the overall appearance, including color schemes, fonts, and the general 

layout and style, created by Blanqi on Instagram, Facebook, Twitter, and Blanqi’s company 

website[.]” Id. ¶ 22. Blanqi provided examples of Bao Bei’s copying close in time to Blanqi’s use 

of certain phrases, including: Bao Bei posted “motherhood inspired” the same day Blanqi posted 

“Inspired by Motherhood; Bao Bei posted “360 degrees” the same day as Blanqi; and Bao Bei 

posted “the most coveted maternity support” just over a week after Blanqi posted “the most 

coveted ... support[.]” Id. ¶ 24.2

On October 5, 2017, Blanqi filed suit, asserting claims for false designation of origin under 

15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (“the Lanham Act”), Compl. ¶¶ 25–28, and unfair competition under 

California Business and Professional Code § 17200 et seq. (“the UCL”), id. ¶¶ 29–32.

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) 

utilizes the same standard as a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Cafasso, United States ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 

 

1 Blanqi’s complaint and opposition inappropriately cited certain pre-complaint negotiations 

between the parties. Blanqi may feel justified in these references, but, as mentioned during the 

hearing, settlement negotiations are irrelevant to the validity or invalidity of Blanqi’s claims. See

Fed. R. Evid. 408. It should stop referencing settlement negotiations.

2 Blanqi attached an exhibit purporting to list specific examples of copying. Compl., Ex. A (Dkt. 

No. 4); see Compl. ¶24.

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1047, 1055 n.4 (9th Cir. 2011). Under both provisions, the court accepts the facts alleged in the 

complaint as true and must determine whether the facts entitle the plaintiff to a legal remedy. 

Chavez v. United States, 683 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). Either motion 

may be granted only when it is clear that “no relief could be granted under any set of facts that 

could be proven consistent with the allegations.” McGlinchy v. Shull Chem. Co., 845 F.2d 802, 

810 (9th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). Dismissal may be based on either the lack of a cognizable 

legal theory or absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Robertson v. 

Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F. 2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984).

A plaintiff’s complaint must allege facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its 

face. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009). A claim has “facial plausibility” when the 

party seeking relief “pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference 

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Although the court must accept as 

true the well-pleaded facts in a complaint, conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted 

inferences will not defeat an otherwise proper Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Sprewell v. Golden State 

Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). “[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds' 

of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation 

of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right 

to relief above the speculative level.” See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) 

(citations and footnote omitted).

DISCUSSION

Defendants argue that Blanqi’s false designation of origin claim under the Lanham Act 

must fail because Blanqi has yet to use the mark and the allegations amount to “de minimis, noninfringing use, ‘otherwise than as a mark’ under 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4).” Mot. for J. on Pl. at 2 

(“Mot.”)(Dkt. No. 20). They also urge that Blanqi’s claim under the UCL is preempted “because 

it alleges rights equivalent to copyright[.]” Id.

I. FALSE DESIGNATION OF ORIGIN CLAIM

Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act provides civil liability for 

Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, ... 

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uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any 

combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, ... which--

(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as 

to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with 

another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or 

her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person[.]

15 U.S.C. § 1125. “To be liable for trademark infringement under § 1125(a), a person must (1) 

use in commerce (2) any word, false designation of origin, false or misleading description, or 

representation of fact, which (3) is likely to cause confusion or misrepresents the characteristics of 

his or another person’s goods or services.” Freecycle Network, Inc. v. Oey, 505 F.3d 898, 902 

(9th Cir. 2007).

Blanqi insists that it has stated a claim for relief because it alleges ownership of the 

SPORTSUPPORT mark, and defendants’ use of a SPORTY SUPPORT mark in a way likely to 

cause confusion among consumers. Opp’n at 3–4 (Dkt. No. 24). It brushes off defendants’ 

attacks by insisting that they are relegated to summary judgment arguments.

Defendants attached to their answer plaintiff’s Request for Extension of Time to File a 

Statement of Use, which it filed in the trademark office the same day it filed this complaint. See

Answer, Ex. A (Dkt. No. 19-1). Defendants argue that this pending intent-to-use application 

demonstrates that the designation does not function as a trademark and cannot act as a symbol of 

Blanqi’s goodwill. Mot. at 5–6. They cite to Omega S.A. v. Omega Engineering, Inc., 396 F. 

Supp. 2d 166, 174 (D. Conn. 2005) for support. But in that case, the court addressed whether the 

defendant had used the allegedly infringing mark in commerce. The court stated, “[n]either the 

application for a trademark registration nor the existence of a pending trademark application give 

rise to a claim of trademark infringement or false designation of origin.” Id. Blanqi’s intent-touse application is irrelevant to whether the defendants have used an allegedly infringing mark in 

commerce. To the extent defendants highlighted the application to challenge the registration 

status of the SPORTSUPPORT mark, that argument is also irrelevant because “infringement lies 

for both registered and unregistered trademarks when the alleged infringer’s use ‘is likely to cause 

confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.’” Stone Creek, Inc. v. Omnia Italian Design, Inc., 

875 F.3d 426, 431 (9th Cir. 2017)(citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1)(a), 1125(a)(1)(A)). Blanqi’s 

complaint includes factual allegations that it has used the SPORTSUPPORT mark in commerce, 

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which is sufficient to establish that element of the claim at the pleading stage.

Defendants next argue that Blanqi’s trademark claim must fail because the infringement 

allegations are directed to their use of the words “sport,” “sporty,” and “support” in the descriptive 

sense and not as trademarks. Mot. at 6–7. They insist that this entitles them to a fair use defense. 

Id. To recover under the Lanham Act, an owner of a registered mark must prove infringement as 

defined in section 1114, and is subject to certain affirmative defenses, including:

That the use of the name, term, or device charged to be an 

infringement is a use, otherwise than as a mark, ... of a term or 

device which is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only 

to describe the goods or services of such party, or their geographic 

origin[.]

15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4); see also KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 

U.S. 111, 118 (2004)(describing this affirmative defense as fair use). 

Blanqi disputes the extent to which defendants’ use of the words is merely descriptive, and 

it highlights its allegation that defendants “marketed a sports bra on Instagram in connection with 

the trademark SPORTY SUPPORT” and designated their underbust tank as a “Sport Support 

Underbust Tank.” Compl. ¶ 19 (emphasis added); Compl., Ex. A at 9; see Opp’n at 6–7. It 

appears that defendants’ usage of the words attacked by Blanqi are “otherwise than as a mark” 

because they are descriptive of Bao Bei’s own products, but Blanqi clearly disputes this fact. This 

issue should be left for summary judgment.3

Last, defendants insist that their use of “sporty support” and “sport support” as identified 

by Blanqi is a “de minimis” use that does not amount to infringement under the law. Mot. at 7–8. 

Blanqi counters that (1) it provided only examples, not an exhaustive list; (2) the purported 

defense cannot undermine its ability to state a claim; and (3) the de minimis doctrine is a copyright 

principle not applicable to the Lanham Act. Opp’n at 7. In reply, defendants dispute the third 

contention and neglect to address the first two. They have failed to convince me that this defense 

is appropriately addressed at the pleading stage.

Defendants’ arguments raise serious questions as to Blanqi’s ability to succeed on its 

 

3

I note that none of the defendants’ cases resolved the issue of affirmative defenses on a motion 

for judgment on the pleadings.

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Lanham Act claim, but provide no basis to dismiss it at the pleading stage. Defendants’ motion 

for judgment on this claim is DENIED.

II. UNFAIR COMPETITION CLAIM

Defendants urge that Blanqi’s claim under the UCL must fail because it is preempted by 

the Copyright Act. The Copyright Act provides an express preemption clause whereby 

[A]ll legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the 

exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified 

by section 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible 

medium of expression and come within the subject matter of 

copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103, whether created 

before or after that date and whether published or unpublished, are 

governed exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled to 

any such right or equivalent right in any such work under the 

common law or statutes of any State.

17 U.S.C. § 301(a). “To survive preemption, the state cause of action must protect rights which 

are qualitatively different from the copyright rights. The state claim must have an extra element 

which changes the nature of the action.” Laws v. Sony Music Entm't, Inc., 448 F.3d 1134, 1143 

(9th Cir. 2006)(quoting another source).

Blanqi’s unfair competition claim is premised on its allegation that defendants “copied 

various original text and the overall appearance, including color schemes, fonts, and the general 

layout and style” posted on social media. Compl. ¶¶ 22–24; see id. (defining these as “Copied 

Materials”). Defendants argue that Blanqi’s claim attempts to assert rights equivalent to those 

within the scope of the Copyright Act and must be dismissed. But Blanqi insists that defendants 

engaged in unfair and misleading actions prohibited by California’s UCL, including “unfairly 

copy[ing] or closely replicat[ing] the look and feel, layout, style, wording, marks, and slogans of 

Blanqi in connection with [defendants’] advertising and social media campaigns.” Opp’n at 7.

The Ninth Circuit “has consistently held that state common law claims of unfair 

competition and actions pursuant to California Business and Professions Code § 17200 are 

‘substantially congruent’ to claims made under the Lanham Act.” Cleary v. News Corp., 30 F.3d 

1255, 1262–63 (9th Cir. 1994). Blanqi highlights the California Supreme Court’s pronouncement 

that “the unfair competition law’s scope is broad” and its “coverage is sweeping, embracing 

anything that can properly be called a business practice and that at the same time is forbidden by 

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law.” Cel-Tech Commc'ns, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Tel. Co., 20 Cal. 4th 163, 180 (Cal. 

1999)(internal quotation marks omitted). It contends that “defendants’ acts of wholesale copying 

of Blanqi’s creative materials are clearly unfair and deceptive actions that constitute violations of 

the UCL” and “are not related to the copyright laws[.]” Opp’n at 10. 

Blanqi’s UCL claim is not preempted. Although it stresses certain “Copied Materials,” its 

UCL claim focuses on defendants’ use of these materials close in time to Blanqi’s use in a manner 

designed to confuse consumers. In other words, Blanqi alleges that defendants have 

misappropriated Blanqi’s goodwill.4 The subject of its claim is not based on control of 

copyrighted works and therefore does not fall within the scope of the Copyright Act and is not 

preempted.

III. ATTORNEY’S FEES

At this time, I see no basis to find this case exceptional under the Lanham Act so

defendants are not entitled to an award of attorney’s fees. But, as I stated during the hearing, my 

perspective on this issue may change as the case unfolds.

CONCLUSION

In accordance with the forgoing, defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings is 

DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 15, 2018

William H. Orrick

United States District Judge

 

4 Although I note, as defendants did, that no goodwill is referenced in the complaint. See Reply at 

4. But both sides agree that these copied words and slogans are not protected by copyright law. 

See Opp’n at 11 (conceding that these words and short phrases cannot be protected by copyright 

laws); Reply 5 (noting plaintiff’s concession). This fact suggests that Blanqi’s UCL claim does 

not interfere with “the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright... .” 17 U.S.C. § 

301(a); cf. Maloney v. T3Media, Inc., 853 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2017)(“Because plaintiffs 

seek to hold T3Media liable for exercising rights governed exclusively by copyright law, the 

claims are preempted by section 301 of the Copyright Act.”).

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