Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-4_19-cv-00914/USCOURTS-ared-4_19-cv-00914-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS 

CENTRAL DIVISION 

JERRY EUGENE KIRSCH, JR. PLAINTIFF 

v. 4:19-cv-00914-DPM-JJV 

ANDREW SAUL, 

Commissioner, 

Social Security Administration, DEFENDANT 

PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION

 

INSTRUCTIONS

 This recommended disposition has been submitted to Chief United States District Judge 

D. P. Marshall Jr. The parties may file specific objections to these findings and recommendations 

and must provide the factual or legal basis for each objection. The objections must be filed with 

the Clerk no later than fourteen (14) days from the date of the findings and recommendations. A 

copy must be served on the opposing party. The district judge, even in the absence of objections, 

may reject these proposed findings and recommendations in whole or in part. 

RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION 

 Plaintiff, Jerry Kirsch, has appealed the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social 

Security Administration to deny his claim for supplemental security income. Both parties have 

submitted appeal briefs1 and the case is ready for a decision. 

 

1 Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and his brief fails to state any issues of reversible error. 

Nevertheless, the Commissioner has proceeded with a defense based on the substantial evidence 

test. Accordingly, I have proceeded by way of a general review on whether or not the ALJ’s 

decision is supported by substantial evidence. 

Case 4:19-cv-00914-DPM Document 14 Filed 04/08/20 Page 1 of 5
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 A court’s function on review is to determine whether the Commissioner’s decision is 

supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole and free of legal error. Slusser v. 

Astrue, 557 F.3d 923, 925 (8th Cir. 2009); Long v. Chater, 108 F.3d 185, 187 (8th Cir. 1997); see 

also 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 

U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Reynolds v. Chater, 82 F.3d 254, 257 (8th Cir. 1996). In assessing the 

substantiality of the evidence, courts must consider evidence that detracts from the 

Commissioner’s decision as well as evidence that supports it; a court may not, however, reverse 

the Commissioner’s decision merely because substantial evidence would have supported an 

opposite decision. Sultan v. Barnhart, 368 F.3d 857, 863 (8th Cir. 2004); Woolf v. Shalala, 3 F.3d 

1210, 1213 (8th Cir. 1993). 

 The history of the administrative proceedings and the statement of facts relevant to this 

decision are contained in the Commissioner’s briefs and are not in serious dispute. Therefore, 

they will not be repeated in this opinion except as necessary. After careful consideration of the 

record as a whole, I find the decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial evidence. 

 Plaintiff is fairly young – only forty-three years old at the time of the administrative 

hearing. (Tr. 32.) He is a high school graduate and attended college. (Id.) He has past relevant 

work as a cook, merchandise deliverer, and stock clerk. (Tr. 20.) 

 The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)1

 found Mr. Kirsch had not engaged in substantial 

 

1

The ALJ followed the required sequential analysis to determine: (1) whether the claimant was 

engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not, whether the claimant had a severe impairment; 

(3) if so, whether the impairment (or combination of impairments) met or equaled a listed 

impairment; and (4) if not, whether the impairment (or combination of impairments) prevented the 

claimant from performing past relevant work; and (5) if so, whether the impairment (or 

combination of impairments) prevented the claimant from performing any other jobs available in 

significant numbers in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)-(g) and 404.1520(a)-(g). 

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gainful activity since March 16, 2016, the alleged onset date. (Tr. 12.) He has “severe” 

impairments in the form of degenerative disc disease and depression. (Tr. 13.) The ALJ further 

found Mr. Kirsch did not have an impairment or combination of impairments meeting or equaling 

an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.2

 (Tr. 13-14.) 

 The ALJ determined Mr. Kirsch had the residual functional capacity to perform a reduced 

range of light work given his mental and physical impairments. (Tr. 15.) Given his residual 

functional capacity assessment, the ALJ determined Plaintiff could no longer perform any of his 

past work. (Tr. 20.) Therefore, the ALJ utilized the services of a vocational expert to determine 

if jobs existed that Plaintiff could perform despite his impairments. (Tr. 39-42.) Given the 

opinion of the vocational expert, the ALJ determined Mr. Kirsch could perform the jobs of small 

parts assembler and inspector and hand packager. (Tr. 21.) Accordingly, the ALJ determined 

Mr. Kirsch was not disabled. (22.) 

 The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for a review of the ALJ’s decision, making 

his decision the final decision of the Commissioner. (Tr. 1-4.) Plaintiff filed the instant 

Complaint initiating this appeal. (Doc. No. 2.) 

 As the Commissioner points out, Plaintiff’s own testimony fails to support an allegation of 

complete disability. Plaintiff testified he has no problems walking, lifting, carrying, or “picking 

things up.” (Tr. 33.) For household chores, Mr. Kirsch mows the yard, helps with his father’s 

barn, takes out the trash, cooks, cleans, washes the dishes, and “bring[s] in food.” (Tr. 32.) He 

also reported he was capable of driving a vehicle. (Tr. 32-33.) 

 When asked, “. . . what is it that keeps you from being able to work full-time,” Plaintiff 

 

2

420 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925, and 416.926. 

Case 4:19-cv-00914-DPM Document 14 Filed 04/08/20 Page 3 of 5
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testified: 

Just like reading some of the paperwork that you sent me, like over a year I haven’t 

held a position, a job position over a year; for a long time. Maybe 2006 was the 

last time that I’ve held one for any length of time. That’s what I was hoping a 

psychiatrist or whatnot could help me decide. But I’m not sure what’s going to 

happen with that, then. 

(Tr. 36.) 

 James A. Simpson, M.D., completed a General Physical Examination of Mr. Kirsch. (Tr. 

322-326.) Dr. Simpson noted nothing disabling - concluding it was a normal physical 

examination and Plaintiff had no physical limitations. (Tr. 326.) 

 With regard to Plaintiff’s allegations of mental limitation, Kenneth Hobby, Ph.D., 

performed a Mental Diagnostic Evaluation of Mr. Kirsch. (Tr. 308-318.) Dr. Hobby diagnosed 

Plaintiff with “Unspecified Anxiety Disorder with mild social anxiety, and reactive features.” 

(Tr. 315.) But Dr. Hobby also noted nothing that could be considered disabling. (Tr. 317.) And 

the reasons Mr. Kirsch gave Dr. Hobby for his inability to work fail to support an allegation that 

Plaintiff is incapable of performing all forms of work activities. 

 “Disability” is the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any 

medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or 

which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A) (emphasis added). A “physical or mental impairment . . . results from 

anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically 

acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3). Although 

Plaintiff has been diagnosed with mental illness, the ALJ’s residual functional capacity assessment 

is supported by substantial evidence of record. 

 I have considered the arguments outlined in Plaintiff’s brief, (Doc. No. 12), and find them 

to be without merit. It is not the task of this Court to review the evidence and make an independent 

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decision. Neither is it to reverse the decision of the ALJ because there is evidence in the record 

which contradicts his findings. The test is whether there is substantial evidence on the record as 

a whole which supports the decision of the ALJ. E.g., Mapes v. Chater, 82 F.3d 259, 262 (8th 

Cir. 1996); Pratt v. Sullivan, 956 F.2d 830, 833 (8th Cir. 1992). 

I have reviewed the entire record, including the briefs, the ALJ’s decision, the transcript of 

the hearing, and the medical and other evidence. There is ample evidence on the record as a whole 

that “a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support [the] conclusion” of the ALJ in this 

case. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); see also Reutter ex rel. Reutter v. 

Barnhart, 372 F.3d 946, 950 (8th Cir. 2004). The Commissioner’s decision is not based on legal 

error. 

 IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that the final decision of the Commissioner be 

affirmed and Plaintiff’s Complaint be dismissed with prejudice. 

 DATED this 8th day of April 2020. 

 ____________________________________ 

 JOE J. VOLPE 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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