Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-00913/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-00913-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 950
Nature of Suit: Constitutionality of State Statutes
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LINCOLN D. FINLEY,

Plaintiff,

v.

JAMES FISHER, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 14-cv-00913-HSG 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 25

Pending before the Court is a motion filed by Defendants James Fisher and Michael 

Agosta to dismiss pro se Plaintiff Lincoln Finley’s Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). Dkt. 

No. 25. Because the Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff’s § 1983 is not cognizable under 

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the Court GRANTS the motion. To the extent Plaintiff 

is able to state a claim that is not barred by Heck, the Court also GRANTS Plaintiff’s request for 

leave to amend his complaint.

I. BACKGROUND

The following allegations are taken as true for purposes of deciding this motion to dismiss.

A. State Proceeding

On July 25, 2012, Plaintiff was playing basketball with his child. SAC at 5:8-9. A 

bystander, Richard Parker, called the Alameda Police Department to report that he was concerned 

for the child’s safety because Plaintiff was intoxicated and was going to drive home. Id. at 5:3-9. 

A few minutes after the initial 911 call, Mr. Parker called the Alameda Police Department again to 

report that Plaintiff was now in a red Toyota Camry “parked in the middle of the street.” Id. at 

5:12-14.

When Defendants arrived, they “activated [their] emergency lights and conducted a traffic 

stop.” Id. at 5:27-28. Defendant Fisher approached Plaintiff’s car and noticed that he was on his 

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cell phone. Id. at 6:1-3. Plaintiff’s car then “proceeded to drive [westbound] in the 700 Block of 

Central Avenue, approximately 15 to 20 feet, hitting the curb before coming to a complete stop.” 

Id. at 6:5-7. Defendants again approached the car and observed that Plaintiff had “red watery 

eyes” and “a strong odor of an alcoholic beverage about his breath.” Id. at 6:8-11. After Plaintiff 

“failed to complete the Field Sobriety tests as directed,” Defendants arrested Plaintiff and took 

him to North County Jail. Id. at 6:15-16. The child in Plaintiff’s car informed Defendants that he 

was Plaintiff’s son. Id. at 7:12. Defendants called the child’s mother, who came to the police 

station to pick him up. Id. at 7:13-15.

Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Fisher provided the child who was in Plaintiff’s car 

with a “Victims of Domestic Violence” resource pamphlet. Id. at 7:17-18. Defendant Fisher 

advised a nearby hospital “of a sexual assault crime” and advised the child of his right to an 

advocate before “any initial medical, evidentiary, or physical examination per 264.2 P.C.” Id. at 

7:17-23. Defendant Fisher also submitted “APD Form 1- Alameda Police Department Victim 

Confidentiality Request, marking that there had been a sexual assault crime.” Id. at 9:4-6.

On July 27, 2012, Plaintiff first appeared in the Superior Court of Alameda County on a 

charge of driving under the influence of alcohol in violation of California Vehicle Code 

§ 23152(a).1 On August 10, 2012, Plaintiff appeared with his counsel and entered a plea of not 

guilty. On April 18, 2014, Plaintiff filed a motion to suppress evidence, arguing that he was 

arrested “without a warrant and without probable cause.” It is unclear whether this motion was 

ever heard. Plaintiff changed his plea to “no contest” on May 7, 2014, and was subsequently 

found guilty of the charges against him. 

B. Federal Proceeding

On February 28, 2014, Plaintiff initiated this § 1983 lawsuit seeking damages stemming 

 

1 Defendants request that the Court take judicial notice of this and the other facts included herein 

related to Plaintiff’s state criminal proceeding and conviction. Dkt. No. 26. Plaintiff does not 

object. Courts “may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the 

federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.” U.S. ex rel 

Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992) (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted). The Court finds that Plaintiff’s state criminal proceeding 

is directly related to the Heck analysis and therefore grants Defendants’ request.

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from his arrest and prosecution in state court for driving while intoxicated by filing a “petition for 

writ of certiorari,” Dkt. No. 1, which the Court construed as a complaint and dismissed with leave 

to amend, Dkt. No. 6. On June 23, 2014, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint, entitled 

“Complaint.” Dkt. No. 16. The Court also dismissed this complaint, finding that it asserted 

claims against state judicial officers who are entitled to absolute immunity and failed to set out 

facts sufficient to support a claim that the police officer defendants—Defendants Fisher and 

Agosta—engaged in any conduct violative of Plaintiff’s rights. Dkt. No. 17. The Court granted 

Plaintiff “one last opportunity to amend.” Id.

On December 29, 2014, Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). Dkt. No. 

18. Because the SAC did not present any facts to show that the district attorney defendants’ 

conduct fell outside of the absolute immunity given to them in their roles as advocates for the 

government, the Court dismissed with prejudice all of Plaintiff’s claims against those defendants. 

See Dkt. No. 20. However, the Court allowed Plaintiff’s suit to proceed against Defendants Fisher 

and Agosta, while noting that Plaintiff’s allegations against those defendants “remain thin.” Id.

(“Without concluding that those allegations necessarily satisfy minimal pleading standards, and 

without prejudice to a dismissal motion on that or any other grounds, however, the SAC will be 

deemed sufficient to permit plaintiff to proceed at this juncture.”).

Defendants responded to the SAC by filing the present motion to dismiss.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court must dismiss a complaint 

if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 

dismiss, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 

face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). This “facial plausibility” standard 

requires the plaintiff to allege facts that add up to “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant 

has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although courts do not require 

“heightened fact pleading of specifics,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, a plaintiff must provide “more 

than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not 

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do,” id. at 555. The plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the 

speculative level.” Id.

B. Plaintiff’s § 1983 Claim Is Barred Under Heck v. Humphrey

In Heck v. Humphrey, the Supreme Court considered a § 1983 claim brought by a plaintiff 

who was simultaneously pursuing an appeal in state court of his conviction for voluntary 

manslaughter. 512 U.S. at 478. In federal court, the plaintiff sought damages resulting from the 

allegedly “unlawful, unreasonable, and arbitrary investigation” conducted by state officials leading 

to his arrest, and the destruction and manipulation of evidence during the state criminal proceeding 

by those same officials. Id. at 479. In affirming the dismissal of the plaintiff’s § 1983 claims, the 

Supreme Court held that “in order to recover damages for . . . harm caused by actions whose 

unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the 

conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared 

invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determinations, or called into question by a 

federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Id. The Court directed district courts to 

“consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his

conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can 

demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” Id. at 487.

While “the Supreme Court left open the question whether Heck’s bar applies to Fourth 

Amendment violations,” the Ninth Circuit has since “answered that question in the affirmative.” 

Whitaker v. Garcetti, 486 F.3d 572, 583 (9th Cir. 2007). In Harvey v. Waldron, the Ninth Circuit 

held that Section 1983 claims that allege “illegal search and seizure of evidence upon which 

criminal charges are based” must be dismissed under Heck. 210 F.3d 1008, 1015 (9th Cir. 2000)

(affirming dismissal of plaintiff’s § 1983 claims seeking damages related to an allegedly unlawful 

search and seizure because the seized gaming devices formed the evidentiary basis of plaintiff’s

criminal conviction for illegal possession of gaming devices); see also Whitaker, 486 F.3d at 584 

(“[Plaintiffs] claim that Defendants committed judicial deception to obtain the wiretap warrants 

and then impermissibly hid the existence of, and evidence produced by, those wiretaps—evidence 

that triggered the police investigations and state prosecutions against them. In other words, they 

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challenge the search and seizure of the evidence upon which their criminal charges and 

convictions were based. Heck and Harvey bar such a collateral attack through the vehicle of a 

civil suit.”); Smithart v. Towery, 79 F.3d 951, 952 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming dismissal of 

plaintiff’s § 1983 claim that defendant police officers lacked probable cause to arrest him and 

brought unfounded criminal charges against him because plaintiff “may challenge the validity of 

his arrest, prosecution and conviction only by writ of habeas corpus”).

The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Ove v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817 (2001), adds a wrinkle to the 

Heck analysis. In Ove, the plaintiffs were separately arrested for suspicion of driving under the 

influence of alcohol. 264 F.3d at 820. The plaintiffs consented to blood tests, which were then 

taken by nurses who contracted with the municipality defendants to administer such tests. Id. 

After pleading guilty to and being convicted of the criminal charges against them, the plaintiffs 

brought a § 1983 action challenging the qualifications of the nurse contractors to draw their blood 

and handle syringes. Id. The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim was not barred 

by Heck because

it is apparent that the plaintiffs’ lawsuit, even if successful, would 

not necessarily imply the invalidity of [plaintiffs’] DUI convictions. 

Their lawsuit concerns the way in which their blood was drawn. But 

blood evidence was not introduced against them. No evidence was 

introduced against them. They pleaded guilty or nolo contendere, 

respectively. Their convictions derive from their pleas, not from 

verdicts obtained with supposedly illegal evidence. The validity of 

their convictions does not in any way depend upon the legality of 

the blood draws. Conspicuously missing from this case is any 

contention that [plaintiffs’] pleas were illegal, involuntary or without 

factual bases.

Id. at 823 (emphasis in original).

As alleged in the SAC, Plaintiff bases his § 1983 claim on Defendants’ alleged lack of 

probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for driving while intoxicated and resulting false imprisonment of 

Plaintiff. See SAC at 3:19-25. The Court finds that Plaintiff’s claim is more similar to those at 

issue in Whitaker and Smithart than the claim at issue in Ove, because finding in Plaintiff’s favor 

on his § 1983 claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of his arrest, on which his criminal 

charges and conviction were based. Plaintiff challenges the very existence of evidence that would 

justify his arrest, criminal charges, and conviction, as opposed to challenging the way in which 

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such evidence was obtained or used.

The Court concludes that, under Heck, Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim must be dismissed. See 

Heck, 512 U.S. at 487; Whitaker, 486 F.3d at 584; Harvey, 210 F.3d at 1015; Smithart, 79 F.3d at 

952. As such, the Court does not reach the merits of Plaintiff’s claim. Unless and until his 

conviction is “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state 

tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s 

issuance of a writ of habeas corpus,” Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim as currently pled is not cognizable. 

Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. The Court grants Plaintiff one final opportunity to amend his complaint to 

the extent he can state a claim that is not barred by Heck. For the reasons set out above, any 

amended complaint cannot be based on a claim that the Defendants did not have probable cause to 

arrest Plaintiff.

C. The SAC Otherwise Fails To State A Claim Under Twombly

The only facts alleged by Plaintiff that could possibly fall outside the reach of Heck’s bar 

are that Defendant Fisher 1) “provided the victim with a ‘Victims of Domestic Violence resource 

pamphlet,’” 2) “advised Highland Hospital of a sexual assault crime, prior to any initial medical, 

evidentiary, or physical examination,” and 3) “falsified evidence” by submitting a “Victim 

Confidentiality Request” that indicated that Plaintiff’s child had been the victim of a sexual assault 

crime. SAC at 7:17-23, 9:4-6. Since Plaintiff’s criminal charge of driving while intoxicated was 

not based on this evidence, finding in Plaintiff’s favor would not disturb his criminal conviction. 

However, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not stated a claim on the basis of these facts. 

Plaintiff does not allege that he was deprived of any specific legal right by Defendant Fisher’s 

actions. Nor does Plaintiff allege that he suffered any resulting damage. Therefore, Plaintiff has 

not stated a claim under Twombly. The complaint does not sufficiently identify for Defendants (or 

the Court) why and how these facts could give rise to a claim under section 1983 or any other law.

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III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss the SAC 

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. The Court cautions Plaintiff to carefully consider the above 

analysis when amending his complaint. To the extent Plaintiff is able to state a claim that 

comports with the requirements of Twombly and is not barred by Heck, such amended claim shall 

be filed within 21 days of the date of this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 1, 2015

______________________________________

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

United States District Judge

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