Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-00778/USCOURTS-azd-2_10-cv-00778-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 740
Nature of Suit: Railway Labor Act
Cause of Action: 45:151 Railway Labor Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Gerald Scarbrough, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Northwest Airlines, Inc.; Delta Airlines,

Inc., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-10-0778-PHX-LOA

ORDER

Pro se Plaintiff commenced this lawsuit in the Maricopa County Superior

Court on January 19, 2010. (docket # 1) On April 7, 2010, Defendants removed this action

to this District Court. (Id.) This case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Lawrence O.

Anderson. (docket # 4) On April 12, 2010, Magistrate Judge Anderson issued a Notice of

Assignment and Order, directing Plaintiff and Defendants to file their written elections either

consenting to magistrate-judge jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) or electing to

proceed before a United States district judge on or before April 22, 2010. (docket # 11) 

Defendants complied with Magistrate Judge Anderson’s April 12, 2010 Order; Plaintiff has

not.

In an April 27, 2010 Order to Show Cause, Magistrate Judge Anderson

forewarned Plaintiff that, pursuant to Rule 41(b), Fed. R. Civ. P., and Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963

F.2d 1258, 1260 (9th Cir. 1992), trial courts have the inherent power to control their dockets

Case 2:10-cv-00778-LOA Document 16 Filed 05/12/10 Page 1 of 4
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 Rule 41(b), Fed. R. Civ. P., permits a district court to sua sponte dismiss an action

for failure to comply with its orders. Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 629-30 (1962);

Alexander v. Pacific Maritime Ass’n, 434 F.2d 281, 283-84 (9th Cir. 1970);Gonzales v.

UNUM Life Ins. Co. of America, 2008 WL 2610552 (N.D.Cal. 2008).

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and in the exercise of that power, they may impose sanctions including, where appropriate,

dismissal of a case without prejudice for failure to prosecute his case or failure to comply

with court orders. (docket # 15) “The threat of sanctions promotes compliance with a court’s

orders even if the sanctions threatened are never imposed.” Green v. Lisa Frank, Inc., 221

Ariz. 138, 152, 211 P.3d 16, 30 (Az.Ct.App. 2009) (concluding the trial court did not abuse

its discretion in striking plaintiff’s reply, dismissing his cross-claim, and entering judgment

in favor of defendant) (collecting of federal and state cases of dismissals for failure to comply

with court orders).

The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 (“CJRA”), 28 U.S.C. § 471 et seq., 

mandates the early and on-going judicial management of the pretrial process. Under the

CJRA mandate, “[f]ederal trial courts are now required, by statute, to implement techniques

and strategies designed to dispose of cases in an efficient and inexpensive manner.”

Schwarzkopf Technologies Corp. v. Ingersoll Cutting Tool Co., 142 F.R.D. 420, 423 (D. Del.

1992). Additionally, federal judges “are subject to the injunction of Rule 1 [Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure] that [the Rules] ‘be construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive

determination of every action.’” Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 177, (1979) (emphasis in

original). Plaintiff’s failure to timely comply with Magistrate Judge Anderson’s April 12 and

27, 2010 Orders is frustrating the speedy and inexpensive resolution of this case.

 “It is well established that the district court has the authority to dismiss or to

enter default judgment, depending on which party is at fault, for failure . . . to comply with

its orders.” Flaksa v. Little River Marine Constr. Co., 389 F.2d 885, 887, 887 (5th Cir. 1968)

(citing cases); Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44-45 (1991) (court may “fashion

appropriate sanction for conduct” including “outright dismissal”). “While the authority is

reiterated in some of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for particular situations,1

 the

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power is one inherent in the courts ‘in the interest of the orderly administration of justice.’

It may be exercised sua sponte under proper circumstances. The exercise of the authority is

discretionary, and is subject to review for abuse of discretion.” Flaksa, 389 F.2d at 887. 

A district court’s inherent authority to sanction parties for failing to comply

with its orders exists, in part, to prevent “‘disobedience [of] the orders of the Judiciary,

regardless of whether such disobedience interfered with the conduct of trial.’” Chambers,

501 U.S. at 44 (quoting Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils, S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 798

(1987)). “Dismissal of the complaint for failure to comply with the rules [is] within the

court’s discretion.” Sergio Bautista et al. v. Los Angeles County, 216 F.3rd 837, 841 (9th Cir.

2000) (citing Original Ballet Russe, Ltd. v. Ballet Theatre, Inc., 133 F.2d 187, 188 (2nd Cir.

1943)). Because a district court has the inherent power to control its docket, it may exercise

that power by imposing sanctions including, where appropriate, dismissal of a case. Ferdik,

963 F.2d at 1260; Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Natural Beverage Distribs., 69 F.3d 337, 348 (9th

Cir. 1995) (public interest “in expeditious resolution of litigation,” court’s need to manage

docket, risk of prejudice to party seeking sanctions, public policy favoring disposition on the

merits, availability of lesser sanctions, bad faith of violating party, relationship between

conduct and merits justify sanction); Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863,

868 (3d Cir. 1984) (personal responsibility of party, prejudice to other party, history of

dilatory conduct, willfulness or bad faith, other sanctions, merits of claim or defense). 

In determining whether to dismiss a case for failure to comply with court

orders, district courts weigh five factors: (1) the public interest; (2) the court’s need to

manage the docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendant; (4) the public policy favoring

disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives. 

Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1260-61. Additionally, Plaintiff’s failure in this case to comply with court

orders is frustrating the Court’s responsibilities mandated by Rule 1, FED.R.CIV.P., (“These

rules . . . shall be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive

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determination of every action.”) (emphasis added), and by the Civil Justice Reform Act of

1990, 28 U.S.C. §471 et seq., such as, “setting early, firm trial dates, such that the trial is

scheduled to occur to occur within eighteen months after the filing of the complaint. . . .” 28

U.S.C. §473(a)(2) (emphasis added). A pro se plaintiff’s status does not discharge his

obligation to “abide by the rules of the court in which he litigates.” Carter v. Commissioner

of Internal Revenue, 784 F.2d 1006, 1008 (9th Cir. 1986).

 After considering the adequacy of lesser sanctions and weighing all five

Ferdik factors to determine if dismissal is appropriate due to Plaintiff’s failure to comply

with the court orders, the Court concludes that dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint without

prejudice is appropriate and just under the circumstances of this case. 

Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Complaint is hereby dismissed without

prejudice. The Clerk is kindly directed to terminate this case.

DATED this 12th day of May, 2010.

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