Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-01839/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-01839-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DION ANDERSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

JERRY BROWN, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:12-cv-01839 AWI DLB PC

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 

FOR RECUSAL AND MOTION TO VACATE 

ALL ORDERS ISSUED

[ECF No. 39]

Plaintiff Dion Anderson (“Plaintiff”) is a prisoner in the custody of the California 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”). Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and in 

forma pauperis in this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On August 13, 2012, Plaintiff filed 

his complaint. (ECF No. 1.) On May 17, 2013, the Court screened the complaint and determined 

the complaint failed to state a claim for relief. (ECF No. 15.) The complaint was dismissed and 

Plaintiff was granted leave to file a First Amended Complaint. On February 14, 2014, Plaintiff filed 

a First Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 25.) On March 11, 2015, the Court issued a Findings and 

Recommendation that recommended the action be dismissed for failure to state a cognizable claim.

On March 25, 2015, Plaintiff filed the instant motion for recusal and motion to vacate all 

orders issued by the undersigned. 

As a matter of federal due process, “a judge must recuse himself when he has ‘a direct, 

personal, substantial, pecuniary interest’ in a case. [Citation.]” Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 

Case 1:12-cv-01839-AWI-DLB Document 41 Filed 04/22/15 Page 1 of 2
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Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 876 (2009). Moreover, even when the judge does not have a direct pecuniary 

interest, “‘[e]very procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average man as a judge .

. . not to hold the balance nice, clear and true . . . denies . . . due process of law.’ [Citation.]” Id. at p. 

878.

In this case, Plaintiff claims that the undersigned should recuse himself because the 

undersigned received “Local County Judicial Benefits” during tenure as a Kings County Superior 

Court Judge. Plaintiff states that the undersigned received benefits between the years 1983 to 1985

from Kings County in addition to salary provided by the State. Plaintiff argues that these benefits 

somehow equate to a pecuniary interest in the instant proceedings such that the undersigned cannot 

be impartial.

The Court finds Plaintiff’s argument to be completely without merit. The undersigned has 

not been a Kings County Superior Court judge for thirty years. The undersigned is employed by the 

Federal Judiciary, not the State. Any benefits provided in 1983 to 1985 while a superior court judge 

have no bearing on the instant federal case. In addition, no ruling in this case could possibly affect 

the local supplemental benefits received in 1983 to 1985; thus, the undersigned his no pecuniary 

interest in the outcome of this case. Even assuming all of Plaintiff’s allegations to be true, there is 

no arguable incentive for the undersigned to rule in the County’s favor based on the fact that the 

undersigned was a superior court judge thirty years ago and received a salary partly funded by the 

County. Plaintiff’s arguments present no basis for a reasonable person to entertain a doubt that the 

undersigned would be able to be impartial. 

ORDER

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for recusal is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 22, 2015 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:12-cv-01839-AWI-DLB Document 41 Filed 04/22/15 Page 2 of 2