Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_11-cv-01699/USCOURTS-cand-4_11-cv-01699-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 720
Nature of Suit: Labor Management Relations Act
Cause of Action: 29:185 Employee Pension Plan

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United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ZOOM ELECTRIC, INC., 

 

 Petitioner, 

 

 v. 

INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF 

ELECTRICAL WORKERS, LOCAL 595, 

and DOES 1-20, 

 Respondents. 

________________________________/

No. C 11-1699 CW 

ORDER GRANTING 

COUNTERPLAINTIFFS’ MOTION 

FOR ATTORNEYS’ 

FEES AND COSTS 

(Docket No. 137) 

INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF 

ELECTRICAL WORKERS, LOCAL 595; 

ALAMEDA COUNTY ELECTRICAL 

INDUSTRY SERVICE CORPORATION; 

IBEW LOCAL 595 HEALTH & WELFARE 

TRUST FUND; IBEW LOCAL 595 

PENSION TRUST FUND; IBEW LOCAL 

595 MONEY PURCHASE PENSION TRUST 

FUND; IBEW LOCAL 595 VACATION 

FUND; IBEW LOCAL 595 APPRENTICE & 

TRAINING FUND; ELECTRICAL 

CONTRACTORS TRUST; CONTRACT 

ADMINISTRATION FUND; LABOR 

MANAGEMENT COOPERATION FUND; 

VICTOR UNO; and DON CAMPBELL, 

 

 Counter-Plaintiffs, 

 

 v. 

ZOOM ELECTRIC, INC.; VEIKO HORAK; 

B-SIDE, INC.; and DOES ONE 

through TEN, inclusive, 

 Counter-Defendants. 

________________________________/

 

 

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B-SIDE, INC., 

 

 Cross-Claimant, 

 

 v. 

VEIKO HORAK, doing business as 

ZOOM ELECTRIC, 

 Cross-Defendant. 

________________________________/

 

Counter-Plaintiffs International Brotherhood of Electrical 

Workers, Local 595 (the Union), the employee benefit trust funds, 

Alameda County Electrical Industry Service Corporation (EISC), 

which is the collection agent for the trust funds, and Victor Uno 

and Don Campbell, who are trustees for the trust funds and 

officers of EISC, move for an award of attorneys’ fees and costs 

incurred in prosecuting the instant case. In the present motion, 

Counter-Plaintiffs seek entry of such an award against CounterDefendant B-Side, Inc. only.1

 B-Side opposes their motion. The 

facts and history of this case are set forth in detail in the 

Court’s Order of February 8, 2013. The Court took the motion 

under submission on the papers. Having considered the papers 

filed by the parties, the Court GRANTS Counter-Plaintiffs’ motion. 

DISCUSSION 

I. Entitlement to Attorneys’ Fees 

Counter-Plaintiffs move under section 502 of the Employee 

Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) for attorneys’ fees and 

costs incurred in prosecuting their ERISA claim. They also move 

under California Labor Code section 218.5 and California Code of 

 

1 Counter-Defendants Vieko Horak and Zoom Electric, Inc. 

(ZEI) have both filed for bankruptcy. 

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Civil Procedure section 1021.5 for fees and costs incurred during 

the prosecution of their entire case, including their first cause 

of action to confirm and enforce the Joint Administrative 

Committee (JAC) award for “Payment to workers on the IBEW 595 

Available for Work list of 1648 hours totaling $116,299.36” and 

“Payment on behalf of employees of Zoom Electric, Inc. to the 

IBEW, 595 Trust Funds totaling $42,963.36 for hours worked in 

violation of the” Project Labor Agreement (PLA). CounterPlaintiffs also include in their motion a request for fees and 

costs incurred in filing the instant motion. 

“B-Side concedes that it is liable for the portion of 

attorney’s fees and costs that are attributable to . . . the ERISA 

violation alleged in the Second Cause of Action in the Second 

Amended Counter-Complaint” (2ACC). Opp. at 1 n.2. B-Side also 

concedes that it is liable for part of Counter-Plaintiffs’ 

attorneys’ fees and costs related to the first cause of action 

under California Labor Code section 218.5. Opp. at 4. 

Specifically, B-Side concedes that it is liable for fees and costs 

that are attributable to the portion of the JAC award requiring 

payment on behalf of employees of ZEI. Id. Thus, B-Side disputes 

only that Cross-Plaintiffs are entitled to fees and costs 

attributable to the portion of the JAC award requiring payment to 

workers on the available for work list. B-Side also seeks to 

limit its liability to fees and costs incurred after the 2ACC was 

filed, joining B-Side to this action. B-Side has not challenged 

Counter-Plaintiffs’ entitlement to fees and costs incurred in the 

filing of the instant motion. 

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A. Liability for fees and costs attributable to the portion 

of the JAC award requiring payment to workers on the 

available to work list 

Counter-Plaintiffs seek an award of fees and costs for this 

portion of their fees under both California Labor Code section 

218.5 and California Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. 

Under section 1021.5, which codifies the private attorney 

general doctrine, a court may, under certain circumstances, “award 

attorneys’ fees to a successful party against one or more opposing 

parties in any action which has resulted in the enforcement of an 

important right affecting the public interest.” Fees may be 

awarded under this code section if three requirements are met: 

(a) a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or 

nonpecuniary, has been conferred on the general public 

or a large class of persons, 

(b) the necessity and financial burden of private 

enforcement . . . are such as to make the award 

appropriate, and 

(c) such fees should not in the interest of justice be 

paid out of the recovery, if any. 

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1021.5. “The burden is on the claimant to 

establish each prerequisite to an award of attorney fees under 

section 1021.5.” Ebbetts Pass Forest Watch v. Dep’t of Forestry & 

Fire Prot., 187 Cal. App. 4th 376, 381 (2010) (citation omitted). 

“The decision whether the claimant has met his burden of proving 

each of these prerequisites and is thus entitled to an award of 

attorney fees under section 1021.5 rests within the sound 

discretion of the trial court and that discretion shall not be 

disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse.” Ryan v. California 

Interscholastic Fed’n, 94 Cal. App. 4th 1033, 1044 (2001). 

 B-Side argues that it was not an “opposing party” for much of 

this litigation because it was not added as a party until after 

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Counter-Plaintiffs filed the 2ACC. However, B-Side provides no 

authority that section 1021.5 requires that it was an opposing 

party for the entirety of the litigation to be responsible for 

attorneys’ fees or that such fees should be limited to that time 

period. California courts have construed “the term ‘opposing 

party’ as used in section 1021.5 to mean a party whose position in 

the litigation was adverse to that of the prevailing party.” 

Nestande v. Watson, 111 Cal. App. 4th 232, 240-241 (2003). 

“Simply put, an ‘opposing party’ within the meaning of section 

1021.5 is a losing party.” Id. Here, B-Side indisputably took a 

position adverse to that of Counter-Plaintiffs and was thus an 

opposing party within the meaning of the statute. 

 Counter-Plaintiffs have met their burden to show that a 

significant benefit was conferred on the general public or a large 

group of people through the results that they obtained. B-Side 

argues that the “general public are not members of labor unions 

that participate from time-to-time in project labor agreements.” 

Opp. at 5. However, as Counter-Plaintiffs correctly point out, 

the general public does benefit from a ruling that general 

contractors are responsible for this type of malfeasance by their 

unlicensed subcontractors because it “spares the public from 

bearing the costs of supporting unpaid or improperly paid 

workers.” Reply at 11. It also effectuates the legislative 

intent in California Labor Code section 2750.5 by helping to “end 

the ‘subterranean economy’ where contractors hire unlicensed 

subcontractors and pay them in cash, resulting in the ‘loss of 

large sums in taxes, employee social insurance contributions, and 

employee pension funds,’” or colluding to cheat workers out of 

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their due wages and benefits. Sanders Constr. Co., Inc. v. Cerda, 

175 Cal. App. 4th 430, 435 (2009); see also Folsom v. Butte Cnty. 

Assn. of Gov’ts., 32 Cal. 3d 668, 671 (1982) (recognizing, in a 

case in which the defendants ultimately agreed to establish four 

transit systems, that the plaintiffs “vindicated legislative 

intent and thus benefited not only those who are transit-dependent 

in Butte County but the citizenry as a whole”). 

B-Side also argues that Counter-Plaintiffs were sufficiently 

motivated by their own pecuniary interest to pursue these claims 

on their own. In considering this factor, courts have recognized 

that “an award is appropriate where the cost of the legal victory 

transcends the claimant’s personal interest; in other words, where 

the burden of pursuing the litigation is out of proportion to the 

plaintiff’s individual stake in the matter.” Ryan, 94 Cal. App. 

4th at 1044; see also Conservatorship of Whitley, 50 Cal. 4th 

1206, 1220-21 (2010) (noting that the relevant inquiry here 

focuses on the litigant’s objective financial incentives to bring 

the litigation, not the actual recovery attained or other 

subjective motivations). This is because “Code of Civil Procedure 

section 1021.5 is intended to provide an incentive for private 

plaintiffs to bring public interest suits when their personal 

stake in the outcome is insufficient to warrant incurring the 

costs of litigation.” Id. at 1221 (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). 

B-Side contends that the JAC award was for a sizable amount 

of money, that Counter-Plaintiffs had the resources to prosecute 

this claim and that they went after B-Side “to find a deep 

pocket,” not to vindicate a public right. Opp. at 6. However, as 

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noted above, the results achieved and Counter-Plaintiffs’ 

subjective motivations are irrelevant to this inquiry. Further, 

that Counter-Plaintiffs had the resources to prosecute their claim 

is also irrelevant. See Am. Fed’n of Labor v. Emp’t Dev. Dep’t, 

88 Cal. App. 3d 811, 822 (1979) (“the code does not make financial 

status of the prevailing party the criteria for awarding fees”). 

In addition, although this portion of the JAC award, $116,299.36, 

collectively was a significant amount of money, it was owed to a 

large number of people who were individually owed small amounts of 

lost wages that it was unlikely that they would pursue on their 

own. The Court finds that, under these circumstances, “the 

additional carrot of shifted fees” is warranted “to ensure that 

the public interest will be vindicated.” Unocal Corp. v. United 

States, 222 F.3d 528, 544 (9th Cir. 2000). Finally, in the 

interest of justice, attorneys’ fees should not be paid out of the 

small recoveries that were achieved on behalf of the various 

individuals on the available for work list. 

Accordingly, Counter-Plaintiffs have met their burden to show 

that they are entitled under section 1021.5 to recovery of this 

portion of their fees. Because Counter-Plaintiffs are eligible to 

receive attorneys’ fees under section 1021.5, the Court need not 

address whether they may also do so under section 218.5. 

B. Special circumstances 

B-Side seeks to use the doctrine of special circumstances to 

limit its liability for attorneys’ fees and costs to only that 

incurred by Counter-Plaintiffs after the 2ACC was filed and B-Side 

was joined in this action. The parties agree that, under both 

federal and state law, an award of attorneys’ fees can be denied 

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if special circumstances would render such an award unjust. Opp. 

at 2; Reply at 6 n.5. The parties also agree that the doctrine of 

special circumstances is narrowly applied. Opp. at 2; Reply at 6 

n.5. 

B-Side contends that, because it “had nothing to do with the 

filing or the prosecution of this action until B-Side was served” 

with the 2ACC, it should not be required to pay for fees and costs 

that Counter-Plaintiffs incurred prior to that time. Opp. at 3. 

It also argues that Counter-Plaintiffs made a “tactical decision” 

to delay in bringing claims against B-Side. Id. 

The Court finds that B-Side’s contentions do not amount to 

special circumstances that justify denial of attorneys’ fees in 

their entirety or for the time period before it was served. 

Counter-Plaintiffs’ efforts in the prosecution of their claims 

against ZEI and Horak were an integral part of the prosecution of 

their claims against B-Side as well and, had they not already 

expended the efforts that they did during that phase of the 

litigation, they would have been required to do so after B-Side 

was made a party. 

II. Reasonableness of Fees 

“‘The most useful starting point for determining the amount 

of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on 

the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.’” 

Nadarajah v. Holder, 569 F.3d 906 (2009) (quoting Hensley v. 

Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1983)); see also Ctr. for 

Biological Diversity v. Cnty. of San Bernardino, 188 Cal. App. 4th 

603, 616 (2010). The parties do not dispute that the lodestar 

amount properly includes expenses ordinarily billed to a client 

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and not included in the hourly rate. “The party seeking an award 

of fees should submit evidence supporting the hours worked and 

rates claimed.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. “Where the 

documentation of hours is inadequate, the district court may 

reduce the award accordingly.” Id. 

A. Reasonable hourly rate 

“The reasonable market value of the attorney’s services is 

the measure of a reasonable hourly rate.” MBNA America Bank, N.A. 

v. Gorman, 147 Cal. App. 4th Supp. 1, 13 (2006) (citing Ketchum v. 

Moses, 24 Cal. 4th 1122, 1139 (2001)). The parties dispute the 

reasonable market value for the services of Counter-Plaintiffs’ 

counsel, the law firm of Leonard Carder LLP. 

Counter-Plaintiffs assert that reasonable market rates in 

labor and employment cases are $675 per hour for partners, between 

$300 and $400 per hour for associates, and between $180 and $225 

per hour for law clerks and paralegals. In support of this, they 

submit two declarations from Philip C. Monrad, a partner at 

Leonard Carder, with twenty-two years of experience, including 

sixteen years of experience practicing labor and employment law. 

Monrad Decl. ¶ 2. Mr. Monrad attests that, in his “experience and 

knowledge of the market rates for labor and employment attorneys, 

as well as paralegals and law clerks, the hourly rates sought 

. . . reflect[] the market rates for the services rendered by the 

attorneys, paralegals, and law clerks.” Monrad Reply Decl. ¶ 3; 

see also Monrad Decl. ¶ 3. He also states that he and members of 

Leonard Carder previously have been awarded these rates and that, 

in his experience as a labor and employment lawyer, such rates 

have been found to be reasonable. Id. He cites this Court’s 

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decision in Gilmer v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist., Case No. 

08-1586, Docket No. 269, a collective action brought under the 

Fair Labor Standards Act in which this Court granted the 

plaintiffs’ unopposed motion for approval of a settlement 

agreement and request for attorneys’ fees and costs for Leonard 

Carder. In Gilmer, the Court described rates sought by Leonard 

Carder as reasonable market rates, based on a declaration 

submitted by Mr. Monrad so asserting. Id. at 5. CounterPlaintiffs have also submitted copies of Leonard Carder’s billing 

records which show that it charged them between $235 and $250 per 

hour for attorneys’ time and $150 per hour for law clerks and 

paralegals. Hwang Decl. ¶ 7, Ex. B. 

B-Side responds, without citation to any supporting legal 

authority, that the evidence provided by Counter-Plaintiffs is 

insufficient and “submits that comparing market rates in class 

action and market rates in this action is an apples and 

watermelons comparison.” Opp. at 8 (errors in original). B-Side 

does not argue that the appropriate rate is that contained in 

Leonard Carder’s billing records. See Ctr. for Biological 

Diversity, 188 Cal. App. 4th at 619 (that a “firm accepts reduced 

rates from plaintiffs . . . does not affect its right to seek 

reasonable market rates”). Instead, it contends that the Court 

should use the billing rate that its counsel, Last & Faoro, has 

been charging it, $325 per hour. In support of this argument, BSide offers the declaration of its attorney, William C. Last, Jr., 

a partner at Last & Faoro. Mr. Last attests that he has been a 

member of the California bar since 1978 and that his “practice has 

consisted primarily of construction related litigation.” Last 

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Decl. ¶ 2. He further states that the hourly rate charged by his 

firm is “consistent with the market rates for similar services 

charged by attorneys in the San Francisco Bay Area.” Id. at ¶ 3. 

The evidence provided by Counter-Plaintiffs is sufficient to 

establish that the rates requested are reasonable market rates for 

the services provided. See Quinones v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 2011 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145199 (S.D. Cal.), at *8 (“The moving party 

satisfies its burden through its own affidavits and no additional 

evidence is needed.”) (citing Gorman, 147 Cal. App. 4th Supp. at 

13). Mr. Monrad’s declaration does not provide the hourly rate 

for representation in class or collective action cases only and 

instead provides evidence of the market rates charged by labor and 

employment attorneys in general. Although B-Side’s counsel may 

have charged it a lower rate, it has provided no evidence that 

this lower rate was in keeping with the prevailing market rate for 

employment and labor attorneys. Instead, it attests that it is 

consistent with the services of attorneys who practice 

construction law, which is irrelevant. Accordingly, the Court 

finds that Counter-Plaintiffs’ requested hourly rates are 

reasonable. 

B. Hours reasonably expended 

B-Side contends that the fee motion should be denied because 

Counter-Plaintiffs have failed to provide “a statement describing 

the manner in which time records were maintained.” Opp. at 7 

(citing Civil Local Rule 54-5(b)(2)). However, Counter-Plaintiffs 

have stated that Leonard Carder tracked its time using “detailed 

computerized contemporaneous time records” and that it utilized 

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“unique client reference numbers.” Hwang Decl. ¶¶ 6, 8; see also 

Hwang Reply Decl. ¶ 6. 

B-Side does not seek to exclude any particular hours that 

Counter-Plaintiffs have included in their billing statement and 

for which they seek compensation. Instead, it argues that it 

should only be required to pay an amount of the fees and costs 

that is proportionate to the amount of damages that CounterPlaintiffs were awarded for the claims for which they can recover 

fees and costs. However, as discussed above, the Court finds that 

they can recover fees and costs related to all of their claims. 

Further, even if the Court had found that Counter-Plaintiffs were 

not entitled to recover fees and costs attributable to the portion 

of the JAC award requiring payment to workers on the available to 

work list, “fees need not be apportioned when incurred for 

representation of an issue common to both a cause of action for 

which fees are permitted and one for which they are not.” Akins 

v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co., 79 Cal. App. 4th 1127, 1133 (2000). 

Here, based on the history of the litigation before this Court, 

the covered and uncovered portions of the first cause of action 

were both factually and legally intertwined. Thus, the research 

and work that Counter-Plaintiffs’ counsel devoted to one cannot be 

separated from that devoted to the other and can be properly found 

to have been reasonably incurred in prosecution of the covered 

portion. Accordingly, the Court finds no basis for apportionment 

of the fees and costs here. 

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Thus, the Court concludes that, prior to the instant motion, 

Counter-Plaintiffs reasonably expended 410.4 attorney hours2 and 

18.1 law clerk and paralegal hours in this litigation. This 

includes: 37.9 attorney hours at a rate of $675 per hour; 269.6 

attorney hours at a rate of $400 per hour; 102.9 attorney hours at 

a rate of $300 per hour; 12.3 law clerk hours at a rate of $180 

per hour; 0.20 paralegal hours at a rate of $225 per hour; 2.5 

paralegal hours at a rate of $200 per hour; and 3.1 paralegal 

hours at a rate of $180 per hour. The total cost of these hours 

at the rates found reasonable above is $167,609.50. 

The Court also finds that the Counter-Plaintiffs have shown 

that they reasonably expended 36.7 attorney hours and 9.1 law 

clerk and paralegal hours in the preparation of the instant motion 

through February 28, 2013. This includes: 9.4 attorney hours at a 

rate of $675 per hour; 27.3 attorney hours at a rate of $300 per 

hour; and 9.1 paralegal hours at a rate of $200 per hour. See 

Hwang Reply Decl. ¶ 5, Exs. A & B. The total cost of these hours 

is $16,355.00. Counter-Plaintiffs, however, have not made a 

sufficient showing for hours expended in March 2013. Although 

Counter-Plaintiffs’ counsel states that she estimates that an 

additional twenty-five hours of attorney time was spent on this 

motion during the month of March, she bases this estimate “on the 

time and billing records for the time spent on this motion during 

February 2013” rather than those for March 2013. Hwang Reply 

 

2 This number reflects the hours contained in Exhibit A to 

the Hwang declaration. See Hwang Decl. ¶ 3 & Ex. A. The Court 

notes that Counter-Plaintiffs appear to have inadvertently added 

an additional half hour of attorney time elsewhere. See Hwang 

Decl. ¶ 4. 

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Decl. ¶ 5. Further, because the Court took the motion under 

submission on the papers and vacated the hearing, the Court does 

not award the five additional hours that Counter-Plaintiffs 

estimated they would spend preparing for and attending the 

hearing. 

Finally, Counter-Plaintiffs have also shown that they 

reasonably spent $4,351.26 for expenses not included in the bill 

of costs. Hwang Decl. ¶ 8 & Ex. D; Hwang Reply Decl. ¶ 7 & Ex. C. 

As previously noted, B-Side has not challenged this amount. Thus, 

the total reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs awarded is 

$188,315.76. 

CONCLUSION 

For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS CounterPlaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees and costs (Docket No. 137). 

Counter-Plaintiffs are entitled to $188,315.76, payable within 

fourteen days of the date of this Order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: CLAUDIA WILKEN 

United States District Judge

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