Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-04016/USCOURTS-ca10-89-04016-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 720
Nature of Suit: Labor Management Relations Act
Cause of Action: 

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FI LED 

United States Court of Appeals ·rcnth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

JU1 2 8 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

RONALD BISHOP, LYMAN L. SPENSER, 

D.L. KENISON, KENNETH GATES, 

ERWIN A. BROWN, VERL HARVEY, 

JOSEPH P. SALAZAR, MIKE DEVRIES, 

DAVID FISHER, ALAN S. CULLEY, 

VANCE ALBERT, ROBERT ANTHON, 

MICHAEL W. DAVIS, LARRY BOWMAN, 

and BRENT ROBERTS, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

v. ) No. 89-4016 

) (D.C. No. 87-C-664S) 

KENNECOTT MINING CORPORATION, a 

Delaware Corporation; LOCAL 4347, 

UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA; 

and the UNITED STEELWORKERS OF 

AMERICA, 

) ( D. Utah) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before McKAY, BARRETT, Circuit Judges, and KANE,** District Judge. 

**Honorable John L. Kane, Senior District 

District Court for the District of 

designation. 

Judge, United States 

Colorado, sitting by 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36. 3. 

Appellate Case: 89-4016 Document: 010110037497 Date Filed: 06/28/1990 Page: 1 
The underlying controversy in this case is loss of seniority 

due to a change in the collective bargaining agreement negotiated 

between Kennecott Mining Corporation (the company) and the United 

Steelworkers of America and Local 4347 of the United Steelworkers 

of America (collectively, the union) in 

reopening of a copper smelter after an 

Plaintiffs-appellants (collectively, Bishop), 

anticipation of the 

extended shut-down. 

craft workers who 

suffered significant change in status, brought suit against the 

company under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act 

(LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1988), based on breach of the 

collective bargaining agreement, and against the union for 

of the duty of fair representation and violation 

Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA), 29 

§§ 4ll(a)(l), 414 (1988). After initial discovery, 

submitted a motion to amend the complaint based on 

breach 

of the 

u.s.c. 

Bishop 

newly 

discovered evidence. Bishop attempted to add an additional claim 

against the union for breach of the duty of fair representation by 

intentionally relinquishing Bishop's seniority rights during 

contract negotiations and an additional claim against the company 

for wrongful acquiescence in this alleged breach of duty by the 

union. 

The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment and 

agreed to submit the matter to the court on stipulated facts. 

After oral argument, the district court denied Bishop's motion to 

amend as to the company, dismissed one of the claims against the 

union because it was "not properly before the court," and entered 

summary judgment in favor of the company and the union on all the 

2 

Appellate Case: 89-4016 Document: 010110037497 Date Filed: 06/28/1990 Page: 2 
remaining claims. Bishop v. Kennecott 

(D. Utah Jan. 12, 1989)(the ruling). 

court. 

Corp., No. 87-C-0664-S 

Bishop appealed to this 

The company operates mining operations in numerous locations 

in the western United States, one of which is a copper smelter 

located at Garfield, Utah. The smelter employed approximately 

1,000 employees in 1981, but because of economic difficulties, it 

operated with a gradually reduced workforce until 1985 when it 

completely shut down, retaining a skeleton force of three 

employees. In 1986 the company determined to reopen the smelter 

at a reduced capacity and entered into negotiations with the 

union, which had represented smelter employees since 1937, for an 

amended collective bargaining agreement to govern the employment 

of returning workers. Approximately 400 employees were recalled 

when the plant was reopened. 

Workers at the smelter are divided into twenty-one 

departments, or lines of progression, eleven of which are "craft" 

departments, as opposed to "position" or "non-skilled" 

departments. The craft departments are composed of employees, 

sometimes referred to as "bidmen," with specialized training to do 

particular maintenance or repair work. Employees enter craft 

departments through two routes. One is an internal apprenticeship 

program in which non-skilled employees are "indentured" for four 

years of training at the smelter in craft skills before rising to 

full journeyman status. In addition, the company hires accredited 

journeymen ''through the gate" who have been trained elsewhere. 

Histori c ally, craft positions carried better benefits than 

3 

Appellate Case: 89-4016 Document: 010110037497 Date Filed: 06/28/1990 Page: 3 
positions in non-skilled departments. One such difference, key to 

this case, was that craft employees retained their departmental 

seniority if they were laid off for less than thirty days, while 

non-skilled employees did not retain their departmental seniority 

after such layoff. 

Each employee has more than one seniority descriptor. One 

type of seniority is "plant seniority," the date that the employee 

was hired at the smelter. Another is "departmental seniority," 

the date that the employee achieved full status in his or her 

department. For a craft employee who advanced under the 

apprenticeship program, the plant seniority date was years, and 

could even be decades, before the departmental seniority date. 

For a craft employee who was hired "through the gate," the plant 

seniority date and the departmental seniority date generally 

correspond. Seniority dates have a direct impact on the working 

lives and careers of smelter employees because many aspects of 

employment at the smelter, such as area and shift preferences, pay 

and vacation benefits, and layoff and recall priority, are 

determined by seniority. 

During the 1986 negotiations, 

employees, the union proposed a 

without 

change in 

consulting the 

the terms of the 

collective bargaining agreement to provide that all employees who 

had been laid off for at least thirty days would lose departmental 

seniority, and that plant seniority would govern in all situations 

in which seniority was decisive, such as requests for transfer 

between departments and the order of layoffs and recalls. This 

decision affected virtually all employees because of the plant's 

4 

Appellate Case: 89-4016 Document: 010110037497 Date Filed: 06/28/1990 Page: 4 
long shut-down. This change was reflected in article 7(F)(2) of 

the local agreement. 1 That article in previous agreements had 

provided that "[b]idmen who are returned to their former 

departments by reduction shall hold rights for thirty (30} days 

without bidding in the case of another vacancy in that 

department." (emphasis added). The agreement renegotiated in 

1986 (the 1986 agreement) changed the article to provide that 

"[e]mployees who are returned to their former departments by 

reduction shall hold rights for thirty (30) days without bidding 

in the case of another vacancy in that department." (emphasis 

added). The company and the union intended this change of 

language to change the seniority ranking disparity between 

craftsmen hired through the gate and craftsmen who worked up 

through the apprentice system, from a hierarchy based on 

departmental seniority to a hierarchy based on plant seniority. 

Bishop was among those adversely affected by the change. 

Following his recall, when he realized that his seniority had 

changed, Ronald Bishop, individually, filed a grievance with the 

union. The president of the local union rewrote the grievance in 

the form of a class action grievance, specifically intended to 

resolve the seniority issue within the craft departments. Eight 

months later, after the company denied the grievance, the 

international union withdrew or abandoned it without Bishop's 

knowledge or consent. 

1 The international union, United Steelworkers of America, 

negotiated the master agreement, an umbrella agreement which 

covered the company's operations in numerous locations. The local 

supplement, which was negotiated with Local 4347 of the USWA, 

contained measures of purely local interest. 

5 

Appellate Case: 89-4016 Document: 010110037497 Date Filed: 06/28/1990 Page: 5 
Bishop alleged two causes of action in his original complaint 

and attempted to add two more through amendment of his complaint. 

The claims, broken out by subpart, were: 

1. Breach of the 1986 agreement by the company when it 

applied plant seniority to returning craft employees as well as 

returning non-skilled employees; 

2. Breach of the duty of fair representation by the union in 

the negotiation process by proposing the change in the seniority 

syst em while negotiating the 1986 agreement with the company; 

3 . Breach of the duty of fair representation by the union 

when it withdrew or abandoned Bishop's grievance regarding loss of 

seni ority; 

4. Breach of the duty of fair representation by the union by 

failing to give sufficient explanation of the change in the 

seniority provisions to Bishop during the ratification process; 

5. Violation of t he LMRDA by the union for failing to 

provide copies of the 1986 agreement to Bishop upon his request 

after the plant reopened; and 

6. Breach of the duty of fair representation by the union in 

permitting pooled voting in the ratification of the 1986 

agreement. 

The district court granted the company's motion for summary 

j udgment as to claim no. 1 above, as well as the union's motion 

f or summary judgment as to c l aims no. 

judgment is proper if the record 

2 through 5. "Summary 

before the court shows that 

'there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 

moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.' 

6 

Appellate Case: 89-4016 Document: 010110037497 Date Filed: 06/28/1990 Page: 6 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)." Flanagan v. Munger, 890 F.2d 1557, 1561 

(10th Cir. 1989). "In reviewing the district courts' grants of 

summa ry judgment in these cases, we apply the same standard as the 

courts .below ••.. " United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l Union 

v. Gold Star Sausage Co., 897 F.2d 1022, 1024 (10th Cir. 1990). 

As a preliminary argument on appeal, Bishop asserts that the 

district court erred in its assessment that there were no disputed 

material facts. We disagree. The parties submitted this matter 

to the district court under an agreement that there were no 

disputed material questions of fact. Ruling at 1-2; R. Vol. I 

tab 35. In response to this agreement, the district court judge 

established a list of undisputed facts under the procedure 

described in Rule 5(e) of the Civil Rules of Practice of the 

United States District Court for the District of Utah. 2 Under the 

Utah procedure, 

2 Local Rule 5(e) provides in pertinent part: 

The memorandum in support of a motion for summary 

judgment shall begin with a section that contains a 

concise statement of material facts as to which movant 

contends no genuine issue exists. The facts . 

shall refer with particularity to those portions of the 

record upon which movant relies. 

A memorandum in opposition to a motion for summary 

judgment shall begin with a section that contains a 

concise statement of material facts as to which the 

party contends a genuine issue exists. Each fact in 

dispute shall .•. refer with particularity to those 

portions of the record upon which the opposing party 

relies. . All material facts set forth in the 

statement of the movant shall be deemed admitted for the 

purpose of summary judgment unless specifically 

controverted by the statement of the opposing party. 

The statements required by this subsection shall be 

in addition to the material required by these Rules and 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

7 

Appellate Case: 89-4016 Document: 010110037497 Date Filed: 06/28/1990 Page: 7 
facts which were properly set forth in the memoranda in 

support of the motions for summary judgment, which were 

not specifically refuted with reference to the record, 

[were] considered undisputed. Likewise, alleged facts, 

which were not properly set forth in the memoranda with 

specific references to the records, were not considered. 

Where factual issues were raised in the memoranda, the 

court, based upon the representations of the parties, 

conclude[d] that the disputes were either immaterial or 

unsupported in the record. 

Ruling at 2. A thorough review of the parties' motions for 

summary judgment, compared with the district court's findings of 

fact, reveals no material error by the district court. 

A. Claim no. 1: The company breached the 1986 agreement. 

Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 

§ 185(a} provides jurisdiction in the federal district court for 

claims of contract violations between an employer and a labor 

organization. An employee may pursue a section 301 claim directly 

against the employer if the employee complains of a breach of 

contract to his or her union and the union fails in its duty to 

arbitrate the claim. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 185-86 

(1967). 

Bishop's section 301 claim against the company fails because 

the company did not breach the 1986 agreement. Bishop relies on 

the seniority provisions of the master agreement 3 to supersede the 

provisions of the local agreement. However, the local agreement 

was signed by the international union's representative as well as 

3 The master agreement provides, in pertinent part, "Except as 

provided in paragraph C above [loss of all seniority in cases of 

discharge, resignation, retirement, absence from active work for 

more than three years, and transfer or 'bid out' of a bargaining 

unit for more than sixty days], employees' seniority will not 

change while on layoff status." Master agreement, article 

7(F}(3}. 

8 

Appellate Case: 89-4016 Document: 010110037497 Date Filed: 06/28/1990 Page: 8 
by the representative of the local union, and by its own terms is 

incorporated by reference into the master agreement through 

article 30 of the master agreement as a supplement to certain 

provisions of the master agreement. Brief of Appellants, appendix 

Eat 1. Both parties to the contract negotiations set forth in 

sworn testimony that it was their intent to change the 

after-restoration hierarchy by the revision of article 7(F}(2}. 

Ruling at 7, undisputed facts nos. 22-25. Thus, the company was 

not liable for implementing the provision, although the master 

agreement did not contain a similar provision. We will not 

disturb summary judgment in favor of the company on this claim. 

B. Claim no. 2: The union should not have proposed the change in 

the seniority system. 

Bishop claims that the change in the seniority system was 

prejudicial to a minority contingency of the union and that it was 

initiated by the union arbitrarily. In Humphrey v. Moore, 375 

U.S. 335 (1964), the Supreme Court explored the complications that 

can arise when a single union represents employees who have 

differing interests. Humphrey held that such union has a duty to 

serve both majority and minority factions without fraud, deceit or 

misrepresentation, acting on the basis of relevant considerations. 

Id. at 349-50 . In addition, the Court cautioned that unions must 

avoid capricious or arbitrary decisions. Id. at 350. The Court 

in Vaca v. Sipes set the standard for reviewing whether the union 

had breached this duty. The Vaca Court stated that a breach 

occurred if union conduct "toward a member of 

9 

Appellate Case: 89-4016 Document: 010110037497 Date Filed: 06/28/1990 Page: 9 
the collective bargaining unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in 

bad faith." 386 U.S. at 190. 

Bishop relies on the Seventh Circuit case of Barton Brands, 

Ltd. v. NLRB, 529 F.2d 793 (7th Cir. 1976), to support his 

proposition that the union arbitrarily chose to benefit the 

ma jority of its members, the non-skilled employees, at the expense 

o f t he minority, the craft employees. Indeed, Barton Brands holds 

that 

a union may make seniority decisions within "a wide 

range of reasonableness ..• in serving the [interests 

of the] unit it represents," such decisions may not be 

made solely for the benefit of a stronger, more 

politically favored group over a minority group. To 

allow such arbitrary decision-making is contrary to the 

union's duty of fair representation which compensates 

employees for the opportunity to bargain for themselves 

which they lost when the union became the exclusive 

bargaining representative for the unit. 

Id. at 798-99 (citations omitted). However, Barton Brands is 

readily distinguishable on its facts from the case before us 

today. Barton Brands involved a union official who supported a 

senior ity change to gain personal advantage in upcoming union 

elec ti o ns. There is no hint of such activity in this case. 

The district court acknowledged the historical and continuing 

hostility between the craft employees who were trained as 

apprentices and those who had entered through the gate. This 

discord was sufficient rationale to support the union's decision 

t o benefit the interests of one faction of members at the expense 

o f those of another faction. The union's decision was not 

ar bi trary and capricious, nor was it discriminatory or made in bad 

f a ith. The district court's summary judgment in favor of the 

union on this claim was correct. 

1 0 

Appellate Case: 89-4016 Document: 010110037497 Date Filed: 06/28/1990 Page: 10 
c. Claim no. 3: The union should not have withdrawn Bishop's 

grievance before arbitration. 

The initial question with relation to this claim is whether 

the district court had jurisdiction to hear it. The National 

Labor Relations Act (NLRA) preempts federal and state court 

jurisdiction over most suits involving unfair labor practices. 

See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 

(1959); A. Cox, Recent Developments in Federal Labor Law 

Preemption, 41 Ohio State L.J. 277, 277-78 & n.6 (1980). 

Section 301 claims against the employer for breach of the 

emp l oyment agreement, however, are exceptions to this general 

pr e emp tion , as are claims of breach of the duty of fair 

representation. See Vaca, 386 U.S. at 179-81. 

Federal court jurisdiction over claims of breach of the duty 

of fair representation based on the union's failure to bring a 

grievance to arbitration was circumscribed by the Court in Vaca. 

The duty of fair representation does not require unions to 

arbitrate every grievance with which they are presented. Vaca, 

386 U.S. at 191; Evangelista v. Inlandboatmen's Union, 777 F.2d 

13 90, 1395 (9th Cir. 1985); Foust v. International Bhd. of Elec. 

Workers, 572 F.2d 710, 715 (10th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other 

grounds, 442 U.S. 42 (1979). Failure to pursue a grievance of a 

member of the collective bargaining unit to arbitration must be 

"arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith" to constitute breach 

o f the duty of fair representation. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 190. In 

Foust, 572 F.2d at 714, the Tenth Circuit approved jury 

instructions that defined the words describing the union's duty 

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Appellate Case: 89-4016 Document: 010110037497 Date Filed: 06/28/1990 Page: 11 
of fair representation in the following manner: 

[A] union may not arbitrarily ignore a meritorious 

grievance or process it in a perfunctory manner. 

Arbitrary and capricious were said to be synonymous and 

were defined as an act done without adequate principle 

or an act not done according to reason and judgment. 

Arbitrary and capricious were defined as requiring 

judgment on the basis of whether the act complained of 

is reasonable or unreasonable under the circumstances. 

Bad faith was described as implying a breach of faith. 

Id. at 714. The probable success of the outcome of a potentially 

arbitrable dispute is not a factor in determining whether a union 

has breached its duty of fair representation. See Vaca, 386 U.S. 

at 192-93; Freeman v. O'Neal Steel, Inc., 609 F.2d 1123, 1126 

(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 833 (1980). The focus of the 

inquiry should be the manner in which the union handles the 

grievance. If the union refuses to pursue a grievance, it must at 

least postulate a reason for doing so. See R. Gorman, Labor Law 

714-15 (1976). "[ P ]roof of unfair representation must demonstrate 

'substantial evidence of fraud, deceitful action or dishonest 

conduct.'" Freeman, 609 F.2d at 1128 n.9 (quoting Amalgamated 

Ass'n of Street Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 299 (1971)); 

cf. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 570-71 

(1976)(burden of demonstrating breach of duty by union "involves 

more than demonstrating mere errors in judgment''). 

The district court resolved this claim by summary judgment in 

favor of the union, finding that: "[T]he undisputed facts fail to 

establish that the unions' abandonment of plaintiffs' grievance, 

which lacked contractual merit, was hostile, irrational, arbitrary 

or discriminatory. See Chernak v. Southwest Airlines Co., 

778 F.2d 578 (10th Cir. 1985)(holding an employee cannot compel a 

12 

Appellate Case: 89-4016 Document: 010110037497 Date Filed: 06/28/1990 Page: 12 
union to pursue a meritless grievance)." Ruling at 15. Since the 

company was accurately following the 1986 agreement's terms, this 

decision by the district court judge was correct. Bishop failed 

to establish a breach of the duty of fair representation for 

failing to pursue his grievance. 

D. Claims no. 4 & 5: The union did not explain the change in the 

provisions during the ratification process and it failed to 

provide copies of the 1986 agreement to Bishop upon request. 

Bishop contends that the union breached its duty of fair 

representation by failing to call the union membership's attention 

to the import of the change from "bid men" to "employees" in 

article 7(F)(2) of the local agreement. The union responds that 

the provision was read aloud at a union meeting before 

ratification, and that copies of the provision were available in 

the room during that evening. Bishop asserts that these actions 

were "insignificant." In addition, Bishop complains of repeated 

failure to receive requested copies of the 1986 agreement from the 

union. 

The district court examined the union constitution, the local 

un i on by-laws and case law, all of which require exhaustion of 

internal union remedies before claims may be brought in court. 

Ruling at 16. Further, the district court found that: 

The allegations that union officials 1) denied 

plaintiffs a meaningful ratification vote by 

misrepresenting or omitting information concerning the 

change in seniority and 2) failed their alleged legal 

duty to provide copies of the 1986 agreement, were 

actionable pursuant to internal union remedies provided 

in the USWA Constitution, articles XII and XIII, and 

Local 4347 By-Laws. 

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Id. The court went on to find there was insufficient evidence to 

indicate that union remedies were attempted, that resort to the 

remedies would have been futile, or that Bishop was otherwise 

justified in failing to pursue internal remedies. Id. 

Bishop asserts that he exhausted internal union remedies. 

Bishop's attorney wrote to the union asking it what he should do 

to file an internal complaint and received no answer. He claims 

that this letter was sufficient to exhaust union remedies. The 

district court correctly noted that the letter did not mention 

misrepresentation by the union before the ratification vote nor 

did it .request copies of the 1986 agreement. The letter 

exclusively complains of the union's withdrawal of Bishop's 

grievance. 

In addition, Bishop claims that the internal union remedies 

would have been futile in restoring Bishop's seniority or back 

pay. However, the claims here relate to the misrepresentation 

which Bishop claimed occurred during the voting procedure, and the 

alleged failure of the union to send him a copy of the 1986 

agreement on request. Bishop does not establish the probable 

futility of success on these claims nor does he relate how success 

on these claims would have resulted in the remedies of restoration 

of seniority or back pay. The district court was correct in 

finding that Bishop's attorney's letter did not constitute 

exhaustion of union remedies. 

In addition to the orders for summary judgment, the district 

court denied Bishop's motion to amend his complaint as to the 

company for ''wrongfully acquiescing" in the 

14 

alleged union 

Appellate Case: 89-4016 Document: 010110037497 Date Filed: 06/28/1990 Page: 14 
violation of its duty of fair representation when it initiated 

negotiations for the forfeiture of Bishop's seniority status. 

Whether to grant or deny a motion to amend a complaint is 

within the discretion of the trial court. Las Vegas Ice & Cold 

Storage Co. v. Far West Bank, 893 F.2d 1182, 1185 (10th Cir. 

1990). 

Several factors 

in determining 

complaint. 

are typically considered by the courts 

whether to allow amendment of a 

These include whether the amendment will result in 

undue prejudice, whether the request was unduly 

and inexplicably delayed, was offered in good 

faith, or that the party had sufficient 

opportunity to state a claim and failed. Where 

the party seeking amendment knows or should have 

known of the facts upon which the proposed 

amendment is based but fails to include them in 

the original complaint, the motion to amend is 

subject to denial. 

Id. (quoting State Distributors, Inc. v. Glenmore Distilleries 

Co., 738 F.2d 405, 416 (10th Cir. 1984)). 

Although Bishop's motion to amend was based on newly 

discovered evidence, was not prejudicial to the company or the 

union in their defense preparation and was offered in good faith, 

it does not state a claim under the facts of this case. The 

autho rities cited in Bishop's brief to this court and below do not 

s upport his theory that the company has a duty to protect union 

members from internal union decisions. For example, he relies on 

American Postal Workers Union Headquarters Local 6885 v. American 

Postal Workers Union, 665 F.2d 1096 (D.C. Cir. 1981). There, the 

court initially described possible causes of action against an 

employer in association with a claim that a union breached its 

d u ty of fair representation: 

15 

Appellate Case: 89-4016 Document: 010110037497 Date Filed: 06/28/1990 Page: 15 
[A]n employer may sometimes be joined in a suit 

involving duty of fair representation claims against a 

union. In all such cases, however, the employer somehow 

acted improperly and infringed the rights of the 

individual aggrieved employees .... 

Similarly, an employer that knowingly acquiesces to 

union pressure and takes discriminatory action against 

an employee may be joined as a defendant. In each of 

these cases, the court required that the employer have 

actual notice of, or might reasonably be charged with 

notice of, the union's breach of duty to its members. 

The employer was then liable for retaliatory action 

taken against the plaintiff-employees in violation of 

their rights under the collective bargaining agreement 

or their organizational rights under [the NLRA]. 

Id. at 1109 (citations omitted). 

The American Postal Workers court held, however, under the 

facts of that case, no such cause of action lay against the 

company. Id. at 1110. Likewise, the facts of the case before us 

do not support such a cause of action. Because, as has been 

demonstrated earlier in this order and judgment, the union's 

negotiations were not a breach of its duty fairly to represent 

union membership, the company's actions in accepting and 

implementing the proffered amendment to the bargaining agreement 

bore no direct or derivative liability. 

Finally, the court noted Bishop's claim that the union had 

improperly utilized a pooled voting procedure appeared in his 

memorandum in support of his motion for summary judgment but not 

in the complaint or amended complaints. It stated that the claim 

was "therefore[] not properly before the court." Ruling at 17. 

The union and the company responded to all the issues in 

Bishop's motion 

dissatisfaction 

for 

with 

summary judgment, including his 

the pooled voting procedure, without 

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Appellate Case: 89-4016 Document: 010110037497 Date Filed: 06/28/1990 Page: 16 
rejecting the claim as ''new," thereby implying consent to Bishop's 

somewhat tardy attempt to amend. 

However, even if the claim was viable, Bishop did not exhaust 

internal union remedies before making this claim in the federal 

court. Although the more precise judicial response to this claim 

would have been dismissal for failure to exhaust internal union 

remedies, because the court's method of handling the matter was 

within the court's sound discretion and because either response by 

the court would result in the same outcome, we will not disturb 

the district court's ruling as to this claim. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

District of Utah is AFFIRMED. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

PER CURIAM 

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