Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-02454/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-02454-8/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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28 ORDER - 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PAUL ANTHONY RUPE,

 Plaintiff,

 vs.

M. CATE, R.J. SUBIA, M.

MARTEL, D. LONG, KNIPP, P.

VANNI, G. MACHADO, KUDLATA,

CHAMBERLAIN, V. BUENO, B.

BUENO, GREEN, RUTHERFORD, J.

TEXEIRA, L. MARTINEZ,

BAPTISTA, BARNHAM, KURIC,

MUHAMMED, TAKEHARI, and

LOCKHART,

 

 Defendants.

NO. CV-08-2454-EFS

ORDER GRANTING AND DENYING IN PART

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS AND

GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

STRIKE

Before the Court, without oral argument, are Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss (Ct. Rec. 33) and Motion to Strike (Ct. Rec. 34). Plaintiff

filed his Prisoner Civil Rights Complaint on October 16, 2008.

Defendants filed the motions under consideration on August 10, 2009.

For the reasons stated below, the Court grants and denies in part

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss with prejudice in part and without

prejudice in part, and grants Defendants’ Motion to Strike.

Case 2:08-cv-02454-EFS Document 48 Filed 02/01/10 Page 1 of 24
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 The following facts from Plaintiff’s complaint are accepted as 1

true. See Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1028 (9th Cir. 2003); see

also Chang v. Chen, 80 F.3d 1293 (9th Cir. 1996).

ORDER - 2

I. Background1

Plaintiff is a California state inmate and a practicing Druid.

Druidism is a Neo-pagan religion that revives the beliefs and practices

of the druids, who were the religious and educational leaders in ancient

Gaul. Plaintiff has been in contact with the Order of Bards, Ovates,

and Druids (“OBOD”), a Druid organization based in England, from which

he obtained a correspondence course to assist his spiritual development.

(Ct. Rec. 1 at 1–2.) Plaintiff also associated with members of other

Pagan denominations while he was an inmate at Mule Creek State Prison

(“MCSP”), including William Rouser and Douglas Hysell. Id. at 1. These

two had founded a Pagan practice group, which Plaintiff joined.

After prison officials began harassing other members of the Pagan

group, Plaintiff became concerned that he too would be victimized. On

March 17, 2007, he wrote to State Senator Gloria Romero requesting

various items necessary for Pagan religious worship. Id. at 4. A copy

of the letter was given to Defendant Subia, the Warden at MCSP. Id. On

the same day, Plaintiff filed an administrative grievance with MCSP

officials in which he requested accommodations for Pagan worship. Id.

That grievance was heard on April 2, 2007. Id. At the hearing,

Defendant Long, an Associate Warden, informed Plaintiff that MCSP would

approve the Pagan group's practices and would grant them a worship area.

When Plaintiff complained that the proposed area was too small to

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28 ORDER - 3

accommodate all the Pagan worshipers, Long told Plaintiff to reduce his

numbers. Id. Defendant then sent another letter to several state

senators in which he described how Defendants failed to accommodate

Pagan worship. Certain unspecified Defendants intercepted this letter.

Afterward, things only got worse for Plaintiff, as the letter led

to more religious persecution designed to snuff out Pagan worship at

MCSP. Plaintiff was subjected to a series of allegedly retaliatory

actions for writing the letter and continuing to assert his rights to

practice his religion. Plaintiff alleges Defendant Rutherford

repeatedly strip-searched him, once in front of a female nurse, without

any justification. Id. On June 6, 2007, Defendants Takehari and

Lockhart searched Plaintiff’s cell and removed several religious

articles. Id. at 5. Plaintiff was placed in Administrative Segregation

for complaining about the earlier adverse actions he suffered.

Additionally, Plaintiff was issued a Rules Violation Report and

penalized with yard and phone restrictions, but was not told what

violation he committed. Defendant Kudlata allegedly told Plaintiff he

would like to “lock all you Pagans up.” Id. at 8. Defendants B. Bueno

and Sgt. Green ordered all non-Wiccans off the Pagan worship area,

effectively barring Druids from practicing their faith. Finally,

Plaintiff filed multiple grievances related to the restrictions on his

religious practice; the grievances were denied on appeal. Id. at 9–10.

According to Plaintiff, MCSP officials deny Druids and other Pagans

many of the benefits they provide to other religious groups. Prison

officials required the Druids to get copyright permission before making

copies of the Druid correspondence course but had no similar

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28 ORDER - 4

requirements for other religious practitioners. Id. at 10. Even after

the Druids obtained copyright permission, Defendants did not allow them

to make copies. Id. Additionally, Druids were denied funds to order

religious items because they lack a chaplain, unlike other groups. Id.

Similarly, Native American groups had ceremonial sweat lodges while

Druids did not; all other religious groups had classroom time and statefunded religious feasts twice a year while Druids received neither; and

the smaller Judeo-Christian groups had sufficient worship space for

ninety individuals while the much-larger Druid group had enough space

for only ten. Id.

Plaintiff brings six groups of claims against Defendants: 1)

Defendants Cate, Martel, Long, Barnham, Baptista, Muhammad, and Korik

violated his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and

Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) by

failing to accommodate Plaintiff’s religious practices; 2) Defendants

Long, R. Bueno, and Baptista violated Plaintiff’s Equal Protection

rights by attempting to reduce the number of Pagan practitioners at

MCSP; 3) Defendants Long, V. Bueno, Takehara, Rutherford, Lockhart,

Chamberlain, and Green retaliated against Plaintiff for First Amendmentprotected activities; 4) Defendant Kudlata violated Plaintiff’s First

and Fourteenth Amendment rights by finding Plaintiff guilty of a rules

violation; 5) Defendants Martinez, Texeira, Machado, Knipp, Long, Vanni,

and Martel conspired to transfer Plaintiff out of MCSP in retaliation

for First Amendment-protected activities; and 6) Defendants Martel,

Subia, Long, and Knipp failed to supervise or correct their

subordinates’ violations of Plaintiff’s First and Fourteenth Amendment

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28 ORDER - 5

rights.

II. Discussion

A. Standard

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

tests the legal sufficiency of the pleadings. Navarro v. Block, 250

F.3d 729, 731 (9th Cir. 2001). A complaint may be dismissed for failure

to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) where the factual allegations do

not raise the right to relief above the speculative level. Bell Atl. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937

(2009). Conversely, a complaint may not be dismissed for failure to

state a claim where the allegations plausibly show that the pleader is

entitled to relief. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. In ruling on a motion

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a court must construe the pleadings in the

light most favorable to the plaintiff, and must accept all material

factual allegations in the complaint, as well as any reasonable

inferences drawn therefrom. Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1028 (9th

Cir. 2003); see also Chang v. Chen, 80 F.3d 1293 (9th Cir. 1996). 

B. Sufficiency of the Pleadings

Defendants allege that Plaintiff’s pleadings are inadequate in

three respects: 1) Plaintiff has not pled any facts supporting his

claims against Defendants Cate, Muhammad, Martinez, Texeira, Knipp, and

Vanni; 2) Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the remaining Defendants are

vague and conclusory; and 3) Plaintiff has not pled sufficient facts to

hold Defendants in supervisory positions liable under § 1983.

1. Defendants Cate, Muhammad, Martinez, Texeira, Knipp, and Vanni

Plaintiff has not adequately pled his claims against these

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28 ORDER - 6

Defendants. Aside from the section detailing his causes of action, see

(Ct. Rec. 1 at 10–13), Plaintiff does not mention these Defendants by

name in his entire recitation of facts. Defendants correctly point out

that Plaintiff concludes that these Defendants violated his rights, but

nowhere indicates any specific action they took that constituted a

violation. In the section of his complaint detailing the damages he

requests, Plaintiff includes a "formulaic recitation of the elements" of

liability, but this is insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.

Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against

these Defendants are dismissed without prejudice. If Plaintiff wishes

to file an amended complaint that will survive a motion to dismiss, he

must include factual allegations showing a plausible basis for relief.

2. Remaining Defendants

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s pleadings against the other

Defendants are insufficient because, in the final section detailing all

of Plaintiff’s causes of action, they do not reference paragraphs

detailing specific actions by each of these Defendants that give rise to

Plaintiff’s claims. Although this is true, the Court finds good cause

to construe Plaintiff’s complaint liberally. The facts section of

Plaintiff’s complaint describes specific actions these Defendants took

to violate Plaintiff’s rights. (Ct. Rec. 1 at 3–10.) Merely because

references to specific paragraphs in the facts section are not included

with the causes of action is not a reason to rule that Plaintiff’s

allegations are vague and conclusory. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion

is denied with respect to claims against Defendants Subia, Martel, Long,

Machado, Kudlata, Chamberlain, V. Bueno, B. Bueno, Green, Rutherford,

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28 ORDER - 7

Baptista, Barnham, Kuric, Takehari, and Lockhart, subject to the

limitations described below.

3. Supervisor Liability

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has pled insufficient facts for

Defendants Martel, Subia, Long, and Knipp to be liable under § 1983 for

their subordinates’ constitutional violations. There is no respondeat

superior liability under § 1983: liability arises only if the defendant

personally participated in the violation in some way. Ybarra v. Reno

Thunderbird Mobile Home Vill., 723 F.2d 675, 680 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing

May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980)); Fayle v. Stapley,

607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979). Supervisors are liable for their

subordinates’ actions only if the supervisor participated in or directed

the violations, or knew of the violations and did not prevent them.

Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989).

The Court finds that Plaintiff sufficiently pled that Defendants

Martel, Subia, and Long were aware of the violations and failed to

prevent them. Plaintiff alleges that he wrote to Defendants Subia,

Long, and Martel about the alleged violations. (Ct. Rec. 1 at 3–6.)

Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that all these Defendants were “made

completely aware of the inappropriate actions of their subordinates . .

. but actively chose to be deliberately indifferent to these actions.”

(Ct. Rec. 1 at 14.) As discussed above, Plaintiff has not pled

sufficient facts to support a claim against Defendant Knipp. But

Plaintiff has pled that the rest of the supervisor Defendants are liable

in their supervisory capacity for their failure to prevent known

violations.

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28 ORDER - 8

C. Mootness

Plaintiff requests injunctive relief as part of his damages. (Ct.

Rec. 1 at 11–12.) Defendants argue that Plaintiff has been transferred

from MCSP to Los Angeles County State Prison, and his claims for

injunctive relief are therefore moot.

Federal courts may hear only live cases and controversies. See

U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 397 (1980). Prisoners who

have been released from prison or transferred to a different prison may

not sue for injunctive relief because they would no longer benefit from

having the injunction issued. See Dilley v. Gunn, 64 F.3d 1365, 1368

(9th Cir. 1995) (citing Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 402–03 (1970);

Johnson v. Moore, 948 F.3d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 1991); and Darry v.

Kincheloe, 783 F.2d 874, 876 (9th Cir. 1986)). Because Plaintiff is no

longer housed at the institution where many of the alleged violations

occurred, he may not sue to enjoin those violations specific to MCSP

from recurring in the future. Although Plaintiff claims the transfers

among prisons make the violations a wrong capable of repetition but

evading review, the case law does not support this position. Even now,

Plaintiff does not allege that he will likely be transferred back to

MCSP. Although he claims others' rights are violated there now and all

those who have attempted to sue have been transferred away, he does not

allege that his rights are likely to be violated there again. Cf.

Dilley, 64 F.2d at 1369 (holding that a prisoner's claim is moot if he

has no reasonable expectation that he will be transferred back to the

prison where it occurred). Plaintiff may amend his complaint to sue for

injunctive relief if the conditions at the prison where he is currently

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28 ORDER - 9

housed are similarly dissatisfactory.

On the other hand, Plaintiff may sue for injunctive relief to the

extent he claims systemic discrimination against Pagans throughout the

California Department of Corrections (“DOC”). Plaintiff alleges that

the DOC has a policy of not providing “equal treatment or reasonable

accommodations” to members of non-traditional religious groups. (Ct.

Rec. 1 at 12.) Presumably, this policy forms the basis of his claim

against Defendant Cate. Because Plaintiff is still incarcerated in a

prison run by the DOC, his claims based on this alleged policy are not

moot.

D. RLUIPA Claims

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims under RLUIPA are barred

for three reasons: 1) the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”)

precludes suits for damages when no physical injury has been alleged; 2)

there is no cause of action against a defendant in his individual

capacity under RLUIPA; and 3) claims under RLUIPA against Defendants in

their official capacity are barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign

immunity. Plaintiff alleges some of his claims against Defendants in

both their individual and official capacities, and some in only one or

the other. Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court interprets

his claims liberally as against all Defendants in both capacities. See

Karim-Pandhi v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1998).

1. History of RLUIPA

Passed in 2000, RLUIPA was one of a series of congressional

attempts to protect religious exercise from government regulation.

Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 714 (2005). After Employment

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28 ORDER - 10

Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872

(1990), in which the Supreme Court held that the Free Exercise Clause

does not prohibit valid laws of general applicability that incidentally

burden religious exercise, Congress responded with the Religious Freedom

Restoration Act (“RFRA”). RFRA prohibits government from burdening

religious exercise unless it is the least restrictive means of

furthering a compelling government interest. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1. It

purported to apply to both state and federal governments. Cutter, 544

U.S. at 715. In City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), however,

the Supreme Court held that RFRA was not a valid exercise of Congress’s

Fourteenth Amendment powers, so it is not applicable to the states.

In order to avoid RFRA’s constitutional infirmities, Congress,

using its authority under the Spending and Commerce Clauses, enacted

RLUIPA, which targets burdens on religious exercise in only two

situations: land-use regulation and institutionalized persons. 42

U.S.C. §§ 2000cc, 2000cc-1. Under RLUIPA, government institutions that

receive federal funding are prohibited from imposing a substantial

burden on religious exercise of persons confined in institutions unless

that burden is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling

government interest. Id. § 2000cc-1(a).

2. PLRA

RLUIPA does not modify the PLRA in any way. Id. § 2000cc-2(e).

Under the PLRA, prisoners may not bring an action for mental or

emotional injuries suffered while in custody unless they also can show

physical injury. Id. § 1997e(e). However, the Ninth Circuit held that

this section applies only where a plaintiff alleges mental or emotional

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28 ORDER - 11

injuries. See Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 630 (9th Cir. 2002). If

a plaintiff claims violations of constitutional or statutory rights,

this section does not bar claims for money damages. Id. Because

Plaintiff alleges RLUIPA violations, and not mental or emotional

injuries, § 1997e(e) does not bar his claims.

3. Claims Against Defendants in Their Individual Capacity

Whether RLUIPA allows actions against defendants in their

individual capacity is unsettled. By its terms, the statute is based on

Congress’s legislative authority under the Spending Clause and the

Commerce Clause. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(b). While it may be

theoretically possible, religious exercise in prisons ordinarily does

not implicate interstate or foreign commerce, and nothing alleged does

so here. The Ninth Circuit upheld RLUIPA as a valid exercise of

Congress’s Spending Clause power as to RLUIPA’s prohibitions of

government infringement of religious exercise in prisons. See

Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062, 1066–70 (9th Cir. 2002).

Under the terms of the statute, persons may assert a RLUIPA

violation against “a government.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a).

“Government” includes “any . . . person acting under color of State

law.” Id. § 2000cc-5(4)(A)(iii). Thus, the plain language of the

statute suggests that there is a private cause of action against

defendants in their individual capacity.

Despite this language, all the Courts of Appeals that have

addressed the issue directly concluded that there is no cause of action

against defendants in their individual capacity under RLUIPA. See

Rendelman v. Rouse, 569 F.3d 182, 188 (4th Cir. 2009); Nelson v. Miller,

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28 ORDER - 12

570 F.3d 868 (7th Cir. 2009); Sossamon v. Lone Star State of Texas, 560

F.3d 316 (5th Cir. 2009); Smith v. Allen, 502 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir.

2007). The Fourth Circuit decided that there is no cause of action

against individuals because the statute fails to notify individual

defendants adequately that they could be liable under RLUIPA.

Rendelman, 569 F.3d at 188. That court did not decide whether any

statute passed under the Spending Clause could condition a state’s

receipt of federal funds on subjecting state officials to individual

liability. Id.

In contrast, the Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits based their

decision on constitutional limits to Congress’s Spending Power. While

Congress has the authority to set conditions on the receipt of federal

funds, see South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987), this power is

limited. In order to be a valid use of the Spending Power, 1) the

exercise must be in pursuit of the general welfare; 2) the conditions

must be unambiguously indicated to the state recipients of federal

funds; 3) the conditions must be related to federal interests in

national programs; and 4) the use must not be otherwise

unconstitutional. Id. at 207–8. Courts commonly liken the use of the

spending power to a contract between the federal government and the

states that receive its funds. See, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp.

v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981). Only the parties to the contract

must abide by its terms; only the states or institutions that receive

the funds, and not their individual employees, must subject themselves

to the federal government’s conditions in order to receive its funds.

See Nelson, 570 F.3d at 889; Sossamon, 560 F.3d at 328–29; Allen, 502

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F.3d at 1275.

The Fifth Circuit went so far as to say that “important

representation interests protected by federalism would be undermined” if

Congress could use the spending power to create a private right of

action against a defendant in his individual capacity." Sossamon, 560

F.3d at 329. The court explained that the states could accept federal

funds with the condition that individuals are liable for money damages

and blame Congress for the undesired liability. Similarly, Congress

could blame the states for accepting the funds. This would allow

Congress to “create liability on the basis of a law never enacted by a

sovereign with the power to affect the individual rights at issue.” Id.

In cases decided before RLUIPA, other circuits held that Title IX,

which was enacted under the Spending Power, creates liability only in

the direct recipients of federal funds, such as states and institutions,

who fail to live up to the conditions: individual employees who do not

receive federal funds directly cannot be liable. See, e.g., Soper v.

Hoben, 195 F.3d 845, 854 (6th Cir. 1999); Kinman v. Omaha Pub. Sch.

Dist., 171 F.3d 607 (8th Cir. 1999); see also Sherez v. Haw. Dep’t of

Educ., 396 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1145 (D. Haw. 2005). The Supreme Court

also held that only the states and institutions that directly receive

federal funds are liable for damages under Title IX. Davis v. Monroe

County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 640–41 (1999) (citing Nat’l

Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Smith, 525 U.S. 459, 467 n.5 (1999)).

These courts recognized that under the Spending Power, Congress may

subject the recipient of funds to personal liability, but not the

individual employees of those recipients because to do so would create

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 District courts within this circuit split on this issue. See,

2

e.g., Mauwee v. Donat, No. 3:06-cv-01220-RCJ-VPC, 2009 WL 3062787, at

*6 (D. Nev. Sept. 18, 2009) (holding that there is no cause of action

under RLUIPA against defendants in their individual capacity); Hundal

v. Lackner, No. EDCV 08-543-CAS (MAN), 2009 WL 2985448, at *4 (C.D.

Cal. Sept. 15, 2009) (same); Harris v. Schriro, No. CV 06-0755-PHX-GMS

(ECV), 2009 WL 2450423 (D. Ariz. Aug. 11, 2009) (same); Sokolsky v.

Voss, No. 1:07 CV-00594 SMM, 2009 WL 2230871, at *6 (E.D. Cal. July

24, 2009) (allowing a RLUIPA claim for damages against defendants in

their individual capacity).

ORDER - 14

constitutional problems.

The Ninth Circuit has not addressed the issue explicitly. In two

opinions, two separate panels seem to have assumed the existence of a

private cause of action against defendants in their individual capacity

under RLUIPA because both panels engaged in a qualified immunity

analysis. See Campbell v. Alameida, 295 Fed. App’x. 130 (9th Cir.

2008); Von Staich v. Hamlet, Nos. 04-16011, 06-17026, 2007 WL 3001726

(9th Cir. Oct 16, 2007). This analysis is necessary only in cases in

which there is a damages claim against a defendant in his individual

capacity because only individual defendants can have qualified immunity.

Nevertheless, these cases are not controlling. They did not hold

explicitly that there is such a cause of action and, as unpublished

dispositions, they are not binding precedent. See 9th Cir. R. 36-3(a).2

The Court agrees with all the Courts of Appeals that have

considered the issue of individual liability explicitly and holds that

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28 ORDER - 15

RLUIPA does not support a cause of action against Defendants in their

individual capacity. Using the Spending Power to hold liable

individuals who do not directly receive federal funds would raise

serious constitutional problems because Congress might exceed its

Spending Clause authority if it did so. Under the avoidance doctrine,

“which requires a statute to be construed to as to avoid serious doubts

as to the constitutionality of an alternate construction,” the Court

finds that Plaintiff has no RLUIPA claims against Defendants in their

individual capacity. Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th

Cir. 2006) (citing INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299–300 (2001)).

4. Sovereign Immunity

The Court understands from Plaintiff’s complaint that he claims

RLUIPA violations against Defendants in their official capacity. The

Eleventh Amendment bars private citizens’ claims against state

governments. U.S. Const. amend. XI. As agents of the state, state

employees sued in their official capacity also are protected by Eleventh

Amendment immunity. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 (1985).

There are three principal exceptions to sovereign immunity. First,

Congress may authorize the suit in a statute enacted under its

Fourteenth Amendment powers. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517

U.S. 44, 59 (1996). Second, a state may waive its sovereign immunity by

consent. See Fla. Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Fla.

Nursing Home Ass’n, 450 U.S. 147, 150 (1981). Third, a plaintiff may

sue a state official for injunctive relief under Ex Parte Young, 209

U.S. 123 (1908).

To begin, the first exception will not apply because RLUIPA was

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enacted under Congress’s Article I powers of the Spending and Commerce

Clauses, not the Fourteenth Amendment. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(b).

Legislation passed under Congress’s Article I powers does not abrogate

Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 73. As

detailed above, the third exception for injunctive relief applies to the

extent that Plaintiff seeks a change in statewide policy regarding

incarcerated Pagans’ status, but not insofar as Plaintiff seeks to

redress violations peculiar to MCSP.

The second exception applies to all of Plaintiff’s claims, however.

RLUIPA binds any “program or activity that receives Federal financial

assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(b)(1). It permits an action for

“appropriate relief against a government” accepting these funds. Id.

§2000cc-2(a). Courts construed these provisions to condition receipt of

these funds upon waiver of immunity by the recipients. See, e.g.,

Sossamon, 560 F.3d at 331. This Court agrees.

Although RLUIPA requires states that receive federal funds to waive

sovereign immunity, it does not address the breadth of that waiver. It

certainly is unclear that this waiver includes suits for money damages,

and notice of all conditions on receipt of federal funds must be stated

unambiguously. Dole, 483 U.S. at 206. Moreover, Congress may condition

funds on a waiver of immunity from liability without requiring the

recipients to waive immunity from suits for damages. Lane v. Pena, 518

U.S. 187, 196 (1996). Indeed, of the Courts of Appeals that considered

the issue, one held that RLUIPA requires waiver of sovereign immunity in

suits for money damages and two held that it does not. See Sossamon,

560 F.3d at 331 (holding that RLUIPA does not clearly require waiver of

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immunity to suits for money damages); Madison v. Virginia, 474 F.3d 118,

131 (4th Cir. 2006) (same); Benning v. Georgia, 391 F.3d 1299, 1305–07

(11th Cir. 2004) (holding that states are on clear notice that they have

waived their immunity from suits for damages under RLUIPA by accepting

federal funds).

Federal sovereign immunity cases inform this analysis because they

are closely analogous to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity cases

involving states. See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Ed.

Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 682 (1999). A waiver of federal sovereign

immunity is strictly construed in favor of the federal sovereign. Lane,

518 U.S. at 192.

Because the language in the statute is unclear, the Court agrees

with the Fourth and Fifth Circuits that recipients of federal funds are

not subject to suits for money damages under RLUIPA. While the statute

does say that aggrieved persons under the statute may receive

“appropriate relief,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a), this is hardly an

unambiguous indication that the recipient states will be liable for

money damages. See Williams v. Beltran, 569 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1062–63

(C.D. Cal. 2008) (comparing Title IX, which explicitly contemplates

remedies at law, with RLUIPA, whose “appropriate relief” statement is

vague). Because there must be a clear statement requiring states to

waive immunity from liability for money damages and waiver of immunity

will not be implied, the Court finds that RLUIPA does not require

recipients of federal funds to consent to money-damages suits.

The magistrate judge whose decision was reviewed in Beltran

suggested that reading RLUIPA to require federal grant recipients to

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 Suits against state officials in their official capacity are 3

barred by the Eleventh Amendment, however. See Quern v. Jordan, 440

U.S. 332, 338 (1979).

ORDER - 18

waive immunity only for injunctive relief would render Ex Parte Young

superfluous. See 569 F. Supp. 2d at 1063. As the court noted in

Beltran, however, the remedies under RLUIPA go further than the relief

allowed under Ex Parte Young. RLUIPA imposes heightened scrutiny on

government burdens of religious exercise, and allows relief against

state governments. Id. at 1063 n.5. Accordingly, the Court finds that

RLUIPA requires state recipients of federal funds to waive immunity only

as to suits for injunctive relief. Plaintiff has no claim for damages

against Defendants under RLUIPA.

E. First Amendment Claims

Plaintiff’s claims for damages under the First Amendment through §

1983 do not face the same problems as his RLUIPA claims. Section 1983

provides a private right of action against defendants in their

individual capacity, and therefore these claims are not barred by

sovereign immunity. The Court must decide whether Plaintiff has 3

properly pled a cause of action under § 1983.

1. Free Exercise

In order to state a claim under the Free Exercise Clause, a

plaintiff must show that a defendant has burdened the exercise of his

religion. Neutral laws of general applicability that incidentally

burden religious exercise do not violate the Free Exercise Clause. See

Smith, 494 U.S. 872. But the government may not discriminate against

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religious beliefs or prohibit conduct because of its religious

significance. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508

U.S. 520 (1993).

“[W]hen a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional

rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to

legitimate penological interests.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89

(1987). There are four factors the court must balance to make this

determination: 1) whether there is a valid connection between the

regulation and the legitimate government interest to justify it; 2) what

alternative means of exercising the right inmates have; 3) whether

accommodating the right impacts prison officials, other inmates, and

prison resources generally; and 4) whether there are available

alternatives. Id. at 90.

Here, Plaintiff claims that Defendants attempted to squelch Druid

religious practices and failed to accommodate that faith reasonably.

Under no circumstances is a pattern of conduct designed to eliminate a

certain religious practice at the institution constitutionally valid.

As to the alleged failure to accommodate Plaintiff’s religious

practices, Defendants have not addressed any of the factors to be

considered under the Turner balancing test. At this stage, it is

impossible to determine what interest justifies Defendants’ alleged

failure, existing and potential alternatives for Pagan religious

exercise, and the impact of the accommodations Plaintiff requested on

prison officials and other inmates. Therefore, Defendants’ motion as it

relates to this claim is denied.

2. Retaliation

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Plaintiff also claims that Defendants retaliated against him for

First Amendment-protected conduct. According to Plaintiff, Defendants

subjected him to disciplinary proceedings and ultimately transferred him

in response to his Druid practices and his attempts to force prison

officials to accommodate those practices.

A claim for retaliation by prison officials for conduct protected

by the First Amendment has five elements: 1) adverse action 2) prompted

by 3) protected conduct 4) that chilled the exercise of rights and 5)

did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal. Rhodes v.

Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567–68 (9th Cir. 2005). Defendants do not

dispute that Plaintiff alleged their actions were adverse or the conduct

for which they retaliated was protected by the First Amendment.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not pled the other three elements

adequately.

a. Causation

The Court finds that Plaintiff has adequately pled that Defendants

retaliated against him because of his protected conduct. For example,

Plaintiff asserts that he believes he was strip-searched as “harassment”

for writing letters to prison and government officials in which he

complained of the lack of accommodations for his religion. (Ct. Rec. 1

at 4–5.) Additionally, he alleges that Defendants Kudlata and V. Bueno

conspired to place him in Administrative Segregation and ultimately to

transfer him to requite his complaints about their previous adverse

actions against him. Id. at 6–7.

b. Chill

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Defendants allege that Plaintiff has not pled that his religious

practice or his ability to file grievances was affected by Defendants’

adverse actions. However, as long as a plaintiff alleges adverse

action, chilling effect necessarily follows. See Rhodes, 408 F.3d at

568 n.11 (". . . harm that is more than minimal will almost always have

a chilling effect"). Here, Plaintiff's sufficiently alleged that

Defendants chilled his religious exercise.

c. Legitimate Correctional Goal

Although Defendants are correct that the adverse actions against

Plaintiff, such as cell searches, body searches, administrative

segregation, and disciplinary proceedings, theoretically serve the

legitimate correctional objectives of maintaining order and security in

prison, this misses the point. Plaintiff alleges that the actions taken

against him were motivated solely by Defendants’ desire to inhibit his

religious worship. Suppression of religious exercise is not a

legitimate penological goal. Accordingly, at this stage, Plaintiff has

pled sufficient facts to maintain a claim for retaliation based on the

First Amendment.

F. Equal Protection Claims

Because the Equal Protection claims arise under § 1983, they too do

not face the same barriers as the RLUIPA claims. The Court concludes

that the Equal Protection claims against Defendants as to whom there are

adequate allegations in the complaint should not be dismissed.

In order to maintain a claim for Equal Protection violations, a

plaintiff must show differential treatment from a similarly situated

class. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976). If the class

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is defined along suspect lines, the government’s disparate treatment

must survive strict scrutiny; if it is defined along quasi-suspect

lines, the disparate treatment must be justified by intermediate

scrutiny; and if it is defined along any other basis, the disparate

treatment must have a rational basis. See U.S. R.R. Retirement Bd. v.

Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174 (1980); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).

“The Equal Protection Clause entitles each prisoner to ‘a

reasonable opportunity of pursuing his faith comparable to the

opportunity afforded fellow prisoners who adhere to conventional

religious precepts.’” Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 891 (9th Cir.

2008) (quoting Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972)). The Turner test

described above applies also to Equal Protection claims arising out of

prison. Shakur, 514 F.3d at 891.

Plaintiff pled that he and other Pagans were denied opportunities

to practice their religion that were available to mainstream religions.

He pled that Defendants engaged in a pattern of discrimination against

Pagan practitioners. As with Plaintiff’s First Amendment claims, there

is no justification for intentional discrimination against Pagans, and

Defendants have claimed none. As a matter of law, it is unclear at this

stage that Plaintiff can state no set of facts that would entitle him to

relief for Equal Protection violations.

According to Defendants, Defendant Long’s comment to Plaintiff that

he wanted to lock up all the Pagans was a mere insult, and so could not

constitute a § 1983 violation. They cite Oltarzewski v. Ruggiero, 830

F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir. 1987), for this proposition. That case is

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distinguishable because it involved a prison official who insulted an

inmate with a vulgarity. Id. Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant

Long’s comment was part of a concerted effort to repress his Druid

religious practices. That is sufficient to state a § 1983 claim.

G. Qualified Immunity

Defendants claim that they are entitled to qualified immunity and

so Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims should be dismissed. Qualified

immunity is a fact-specific affirmative defense that a defendant must

raise. It is inappropriate to dismiss a claim on this basis unless it

is clear from the face of the complaint that qualified immunity applies.

Groten v. California, 251 F.3d 844, 851 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Jensen

v. City of Oxnard, 145 F.3d 1078, 1085 (9th Cir. 1998)). Because the

Complaint does not clearly show that Defendants are entitled to

qualified immunity, the Court will not entertain that defense now, but

Defendants may renew it on any motion for summary judgment.

III. Conclusion

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Ct. Rec. 33) is GRANTED AND

DENIED IN PART as follows:

a. Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief based on

conditions specific to MCSP are DISMISSED without prejudice.

b. Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claims for money damages are DISMISSED

with prejudice.

c. Plaintiff’s non-RLUIPA claims against Defendants Cate,

Muhammed, Martinez, Texeira, Knipp, and Vanni are DISMISSED without

prejudice.

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d. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is DENIED with respect to

Plaintiff’s remaining claims against other Defendants.

2. Defendants’ Motion to Strike (Ct. Rec. 34) is GRANTED.

3. Plaintiff shall file an Amended Complaint consistent with this

Order by March 5, 2010.

IT IS SO ORDERED. The District Court Executive is directed to

enter this Order and forward a copy of this Order to Plaintiff and the

California Department of Corrections, Office of Legal Affairs, P.O. Box

942883, Sacramento, CA 94283-0001, to forward to the appropriate agency

having custody of Plaintiff.

DATED this 1st day of February 2010.

 s/Edward F. Shea 

EDWARD F. SHEA

United States District Judge

Q:\Civil\Other Cts\CA-ED\ED.CA.08.2454.dismiss.wpd

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