Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01514/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01514-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 17:101 Copyright Infringement

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WO NOT FOR PUBLICATION 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Humphreys & Partners Architects LP,

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Atlantic Development & Investments 

Incorporated, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV-14-01514-PHX-JJT

ORDER 

At issue are Plaintiff Humphreys & Partners Architects, LP’s (HPA) Amended 

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 113, MSJ), to which Defendants filed a 

Response (Doc. 126, Resp. to MSJ) and HPA filed a Reply (Doc. 128, Reply to MSJ); 

and HPA’s Motion to Strike (Doc. 127, MTS), to which Defendants filed a Response 

(Doc. 129, Resp. to MTS) and HPA filed a Reply (Doc. 130, Reply to MTS). The Court 

finds these matters appropriate for decision without oral argument. See LRCiv 7.2(f). 

I. BACKGROUND

Defendants, including Atlantic Development and Investments, Inc. (ADI)—a 

Connecticut corporation that conducts business in Arizona—and Auburn Ventures, LP 

(AV)—a Colorado limited partnership that conducts business in Arizona—sought to 

develop a plot of land in Castle Rock, Colorado into a senior living center.1

 In November 

2011, Defendants employed architect Paul Hendricks Masse and his firm, PHM Ltd., to 

 

1

 The Amended Complaint, the operative pleading, lists 13 Defendants, including ten entities and three individuals. (Doc. 68, FAC.) All 13 Defendants filed a joint Response to the HPA’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 124.) 

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complete schematic design plans (the “Masse Plans”) and Jones Engineering Associates 

to complete earthwork grading plans (the “Jones Plans”). Once these initial plans were 

complete, Defendants sought further architectural planning services from Plaintiff 

HPA—a Texas firm that conducts business in Texas. On April 25, 2012, Defendants 

accepted a proposal by HPA (“Proposal Agreement”) to provide renderings and plans that 

included elevations and other information necessary to proceed with development at 

Castle Rock. The Proposal Agreement provided as follows: 

All documents furnished by HPA pursuant to this Agreement shall remain 

the property of HPA and may not be used by the Owner for another project 

without HPA’s prior written consent. Payment for design services does not 

allow use of the design for construction documents by others without 

written approval from HPA. There is no implied license granted in this 

Agreement. 

(Doc. 65-4, HPA’s Statement of Facts in Supp. of Its MSJ (PSOF), Ex. F, Proposal 

Agreement.) Defendants agreed to pay HPA $30,000 in compensation and gave HPA 

portions of the Masse and Jones Plans from which to conduct its work. 

After HPA concluded the work described in the Proposal Agreement, Defendants 

and HPA negotiated from June to August 2012 as to whether HPA would provide more 

comprehensive architectural services to Defendants. Defendants ultimately decided to 

retain another architect—Defendants Patrick William Nook and PWN Architects and 

Planners, Inc.—and informed HPA that its work on the project was totally concluded on 

or about August 7, 2012. 

Thereafter, Defendants gave the renderings and plans completed by HPA to PWN 

Architects for the further design and construction process at Castle Rock. HPA claims 

Defendants’ use of the renderings and plans violated HPA’s copyright in the materials, 

and, on July 7, 2014, HPA brought the present suit, raising a single claim of copyright 

infringement under 17 U.S.C. §§ 502-504 against seven Defendants. (Doc. 1, Compl.; 

FAC ¶¶ 48-55.) HPA now moves for partial summary judgment, asking the Court to rule 

that no dispute of material fact remains that HPA owns valid copyrights in the three 

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documents it prepared for Defendants, including that HPA meets the copyright 

requirements of authorship, originality and creativity. (MSJ at 4-12.) 

This case already has an extensive procedural history. The seven original 

Defendants filed an Answer to the Complaint on October 14, 2014, which included a 

single Count Counterclaim. (Doc. 30.) On November 3, 2014, HPA filed a Motion to 

Strike the Counterclaim (Doc. 36), which the Court denied on January 22, 2015 

(Doc. 48). HPA filed an Answer to the one-Count Counterclaim on February 2, 2015. 

(Doc. 54.) 

The Court held a Rule 16 Scheduling Conference (Doc. 45) and entered a 

Scheduling Order on December 9, 2014 (Doc. 46). The original fact discovery deadline 

was June 30, 2015, the expert discovery deadline was October 23, 2015, and the 

dispositive motion deadline was December 4, 2015. (Doc. 46.) “Early discovery” was to 

focus on HPA’s vicarious liability or contributory infringement claim and whether HPA 

holds a valid copyright to its work. (Doc. 46.) On February 17, 2015, pursuant to the 

parties’ request, the Court extended the fact discovery deadline to August 17, 2015, and 

the expert discovery deadline to December 4, 2015. (Doc. 60.) 

On February 27, 2015, HPA filed a Motion to Amend the Complaint to add six 

new Defendants, and Defendants did not oppose the Motion. (Docs. 62, 66.) On 

March 25, 2015, the Court granted the Motion to Amend and HPA filed the Amended 

Complaint. (Docs. 66, 68.) The same day, HPA also filed a Motion for Partial Summary 

Judgment that was essentially identical to the one presently before the Court. (Docs. 63-

65.) 

On April 27, 2015, the original seven Defendants filed an Answer to the Amended 

Complaint, which again included a single Counterclaim. (Doc. 82.) Considering the 

addition of six new Defendants, the parties jointly requested another Rule 16 Scheduling 

Conference, which the Court held on May 6, 2015. (Docs. 81, 83, 85.) At the Conference 

and on the parties’ request, the Court terminated all pending case deadlines, denied the 

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pending Motion for Partial Summary Judgment with leave to re-file, and reserved setting 

a new case schedule pending the filing of Answers by the six new Defendants. (Doc. 85.) 

Four of the six new Defendants filed an Answer on May 26, 2015 (Doc. 97), and a 

fifth new Defendant filed an Answer on June 22, 2015 (Doc. 101). As for the sixth new 

Defendant, it joined the other 12 Defendants in filing an Amended Answer and 

Counterclaim to the Amended Complaint on July 7, 2015, which included an 11-Count 

Counterclaim against HPA.2

 (Doc. 106.) Defendants’ new claims against HPA are based 

on certain Defendants’ assertion of their own copyright as well as HPA’s alleged 

violations of the Proposal Agreement. 

Defendants then indicated they intended to amend their Amended Answer and 

Counterclaim once again, to try to avoid HPA’s filing of Rule 12(b) Motions to Dismiss 

the Counterclaim, and the Court granted Defendants leave to amend. (Docs. 107, 108.) 

While Defendants did file a “Revised First Amended Combined Answer to First 

Amended Complaint” and Counterclaim on August 24, 2015 (Doc. 110), HPA 

nonetheless filed two Rule 12(b) Motions to Dismiss the Counterclaim on September 3, 

2015 (Docs. 111, 112). The next day, HPA re-filed its Motion for Partial Summary 

Judgment—the Motion presently before the Court. (Doc. 113.) After Defendants timely 

filed a Response and then amended it a week later, HPA filed a Motion to Strike the 

amended Response on November 4, 2015, which is also presently before the Court. 

(Docs. 124, 126, 127.) 

The Court resolved HPA’s two Rule 12(b) Motions to Dismiss on April 15, 2016, 

dismissing Count One of the Counterclaim with prejudice. (Doc. 138.) Counts Two 

through Eleven of the Counterclaim remain pending. The operative pleadings in this 

 

2

 Because the amendment-as-a-matter-of-course period under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) had passed for 11 Defendants who had already filed an Answer and Counterclaim to the Amended Complaint (Docs. 82, 97), they violated Rule 15(b) by neither seeking leave to amend from the Court nor providing the Court with HPA’s written consent for the amendment. They also violated Local Rule 15.1(a) by failing to provide the Court with a copy of the amended pleading indicating in what respects it differed from their previous Answer and Counterclaim. See LRCiv 15.1(a). HPA filed no 

objection to the amended pleading. 

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matter are currently Doc. 68, HPA’s one-Count Amended Complaint, and Doc. 110, 

Defendants’ eleven-Count Amended Counterclaim with the exception of Count One. 

The result of the parties’ extensive pleadings and motion practice is that, while 

almost two years have passed since HPA filed this case on July 7, 2014, no discovery or 

dispositive motion deadlines are currently set. The Court will set the remaining case 

schedule at the next Rule 16 Scheduling Conference on June 6, 2016. (Doc. 139.) 

Although discovery is presumably ongoing in this case, the Court will now turn to HPA’s 

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 113) and related Motion to Strike Response 

(Doc. 127). 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

 Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is 

proper when: (1) the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material 

fact; and (2) after viewing the evidence most favorably to the non-moving party, the court 

finds that the movant is entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Celotex 

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 

1285, 1288-89 (9th Cir. 1987). Under this standard, “[o]nly disputes over facts that might 

affect the outcome of the suit under governing [substantive] law will properly preclude 

the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 

(1986). A “genuine issue” of material fact arises only when the “evidence is such that a 

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. 

 In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must regard as true the 

non-moving party’s evidence, if it is supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material. 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Eisenberg, 815 F.2d at 1289. However, the non-moving party 

may not merely rest on its pleadings; it must produce some significant probative evidence 

tending to contradict the moving party’s allegations, thereby creating a material question 

of fact. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256-57 (holding that the non-moving party must present 

affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary 

judgment); First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968). 

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 “A summary judgment motion cannot be defeated by relying solely on conclusory 

allegations unsupported by factual data.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 

1989). “Summary judgment must be entered ‘against a party who fails to make a showing 

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on 

which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.’” United States v. Carter, 906 F.2d 

1375, 1376 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322). 

III. ANALYSIS 

To establish copyright infringement, a party must show (1) ownership of a valid 

copyright, and (2) unauthorized copying by another party of the constituent original 

elements of the work. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 

(1991). Registration is not required to possess a valid copyright, but it is a prerequisite to 

bringing a suit for copyright infringement. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). A certificate of 

registration made within five years of the first publication of the work is prima facie 

evidence of a copyright’s validity. 17 U.S.C. § 410(c). 

 HPA moves for summary judgment as to only the first element of its infringement 

claim, and specifically that it owns valid copyrights in the three works it prepared under 

the Proposal Agreement with Defendants: “Auburn Ridge 12208 Architectural Work” as 

documented under U.S. Copyright Office Certificate of Registration Number VAu 1-170-

460 (“Architectural Work”); “Auburn Ridge 12208 Technical Drawing” as documented 

under Certificate of Registration Number VAu 1-170-461 (“Technical Drawing”); and 

“12208 Auburn Ridge Rendering” as documented under Certificate of Registration 

Number VAu 1-190-332 (“Rendering”). (MSJ at 3.) 

 A. Statutory Presumption 

 HPA first argues that the registration of its works with the U.S. Copyright Office 

is prima facie evidence of the validity of its copyright in the works and Defendants have 

produced no reliable evidence to rebut the presumption of validity. (MSJ at 5-6 (citing 17 

U.S.C. § 410(c)).) In response, Defendants contend that (1) HPA’s work was not original 

and (2) HPA’s Certificates of Registration are invalid because HPA failed to inform the 

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Copyright Office that its work was based on preexisting materials, as the Copyright Act 

requires. (Resp. to MSJ at 3-5 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 409(9)).) In reply, HPA argues that its 

work was sufficiently original and Defendants have waived their invalidity contention (1) 

by failing to ask the Court to consult with the Register of Copyrights to determine 

whether the alleged defect in HPA’s copyright applications would have led to the denial 

of copyright registrations, and (2) under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, by failing to 

pursue a remedy in the Copyright Office, the only agency with jurisdiction to invalidate a 

copyright registration. (Reply to MSJ at 9-11.) 

 1. Rebuttal of the Statutory Presumption 

 In resolving a copyright infringement claim, the presumption of copyright validity 

created by a plaintiff’s copyright registrations can be rebutted by the accused infringer’s 

showing that plaintiff’s work is not original. Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 

477, 488-89 (9th Cir. 2000). Where the accused infringer offers evidence that the 

plaintiff’s product was copied from another work or other probative evidence as to 

originality, the burden of proving validity shifts back to the plaintiff. Entm’t Research 

Grp. v. Genesis Creative Grp., Inc., 122 F.3d 1211, 1217-18 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing North 

Coast Indus. v. Jason Maxwell, Inc., 972 F.2d 1031, 1033 (9th Cir. 1992)). 

 “Originality is the indispensable prerequisite for copyrightability. The originality 

requirement, however, does not mean that for valid copyright protection, the copyright 

must represent something entirely new under the sun.” North Coast, 972 F.2d at 1033. 

Originality requires that a work “owes its origin” to the “author,” whose contribution is 

“more than a trivial variation, something recognizably his own.” Id. (quoting Sid & Marty 

Krofft Television v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1163 n.5 (9th Cir. 1977)). 

However, to rebut the statutory presumption, an accused infringer must simply produce 

some probative evidence showing that plaintiff’s work was not original but copied from 

other work. Entm’t Research, 122 F.3d at 1218 (citing Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy 

Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 908 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that the presumption of validity was 

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rebutted where ‘one look’ at the plaintiff’s allegedly copyrightable figures revealed a 

complete absence of any originality)). 

Here, Defendants have produced evidence that they provided the Masse and Jones 

Plans to HPA, who merely revised those Plans, and that HPA’s work is substantially 

similar to the Masse and Jones Plans, the copyright for which Defendants hold.3

 (Resp. to 

MSJ at 6-10; Doc. 125, Defs.’ Revised Statement of Facts (DSOF) at 20-21 ¶¶ 45-46.) 

While HPA disputes that Defendants gave HPA all of the Masse and Jones Plans (Reply 

to MSJ at 5-6) and does not admit that it used the Plans in completing its work (Reply to 

MSJ at 2), Defendants have produced sufficient evidence of a lack of originality to shift 

the burden of proving validity back to HPA. 

 2. Remedies in the U.S. Copyright Office

 With regard to Defendants’ assertion that HPA’s copyright registrations are 

invalid because HPA failed to inform the Copyright Office that its work was based on 

other work—contained both in Defendants’ Amended Answer and Counterclaim and in 

Defendants’ Response (Docs. 110, 126)—HPA argues that Defendants must seek relief 

for such a claim from with the Register of Copyrights, via a request from the Court, or 

through the Copyright Office directly, in its primary jurisdiction over such a claim. 

(Reply to MSJ at 9-11.) 

 As HPA points out, 17 U.S.C. § 411(b)(1) provides that a Certificate of 

Registration that contains inaccurate information still complies with the Copyright Act 

 3

 The Court does not sustain any of HPA’s evidentiary objections at this stage. With regard to HPA’s objections to party Defendants’ declarations made for the purpose of their Response (e.g., Reply to MSJ at 6), Rule 56(c) explicitly permits a party to file such declarations in support of a motion for summary judgment or response thereto. With regard to HPA’s objections related to Defendants’ timeliness of production of documents (e.g., Reply to MSJ at 6), discovery is still ongoing in this case, as the Court pointed out above. Indeed, HPA filed the present Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on September 3, 2015, a mere ten days after the newly named Defendants filed their combined Answer to the Amended Complaint—albeit a revision of their initial combined 

Answer filed six weeks before. (Docs. 106, 110, 113.) The newly named Defendants hardly had time to provide discovery to HPA, let alone supplement it, prior to the deadline for filing their Response to HPA’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and the Court will not penalize them by way HPA’s procedural maneuver. 

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unless “(A) the inaccurate information was included on the application for copyright 

registration with knowledge that it was inaccurate; and (B) the inaccuracy of the 

information, if known, would have caused the Register of Copyrights to refuse 

registration.” Pursuant to a 2008 amendment to the Copyright Act, if a party alleges 

inaccurate information, “the court shall request the Register of Copyrights to advise the 

court whether the inaccurate information, if known, would have caused the Register of 

Copyrights to refuse registration.” 17 U.S.C. § 411(b)(2). 

 While this amendment to the Copyright Act states that a request from a court to 

the Register of Copyrights is triggered when inaccurate information in a copyright 

application is “alleged,” the Register of Copyrights has stated, “[B]efore asking the 

Register of Copyrights whether she would have refused to register a copyright . . . a court 

should feel free to determine whether there is in fact a misstatement of fact.” DeliverMed 

Holdings, LLC v. Schaltenbrand, 734 F.3d 616, 625 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Response of 

the Register of Copyrights to Request Pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 411(b)(2) in Olem Shoe 

Corp. v. Wash. Shoe Co., No. 09-cv-23494, 2010 WL 3505100, at *3 n.4 (S.D. Fla. Sep. 

3, 2010)). Indeed, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has cautioned “both courts and 

litigants to be wary of using this device [in § 411(b)(2)] in the future” on account of the 

delay it may cause to the case. Id. That court advises district courts to first determine if a 

litigant has demonstrated the elements of § 411(b)(1), namely, “that (1) the registration 

application included inaccurate information; and (2) the registrant knowingly included 

the inaccuracy in his submission to the Copyright office.” Id.

 Here, a genuine dispute exists as to whether HPA’s work was derivative of the 

Masse and Jones Plans—including the extent to which HPA received copies of the Masse 

and Jones Plans—and thus the Court cannot determine if HPA’s copyright application 

contained inaccurate information, let alone whether HPA knowingly included any 

inaccurate information. (Compare DSOF at 20-21 ¶¶ 45-46 with Docs. 65-5, 65-6, 65-7, 

PSOF Exs. G, H, I.) As a result, the question to the Register of Copyrights as to whether 

HPA’s provision of the alleged inaccurate information would have affected its copyright 

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approval may not be ripe. But, as the Court already noted, Defendants have rebutted the 

presumption HPA’s copyright registration provided by proffering evidence of a lack of 

originality. As a result, HPA’s copyright registration is not dispositive of its ownership in 

a valid copyright; it must make a showing of authorship, creativity and originality. In 

other words, an inquiry into HPA’s copyright registration is moot at this stage.4

 

 Finally, HPA contends that the Court does not have jurisdiction to declare HPA’s 

copyright registrations invalid. The Court agrees that, to the extent Defendants may be 

asking the Court to declare HPA’s copyright registrations cancelled, the Register of 

Copyrights has primary jurisdiction to make such a declaration. See Syntek 

Semiconductor Co., Ltd. v. Microchip Tech. Inc., 307 F.3d 775, 780-82 (9th Cir. 2002). 

B. Copyright Validity 

As an alternative to relying on the statutory presumption of copyright validity 

through registration, HPA argues that no genuine dispute of material fact as to the 

validity of its copyrights exists, entitling it to summary judgment as to the first element of 

its infringement claim. (MSJ at 6-11.) Specifically, HPA argues that (1) even if its works 

were derivative of the Masse and Jones Plans, Defendants provided the Plans to HPA and 

its works have the requisite originality, and (2) the Masse and Jones Plans, upon which 

Defendants contend HPA based its works, were uncopyrightable ideas. (MSJ at 6-11; 

Reply to MSJ at 4-9.) In response, Defendants contend that (1) HPA’s works were simply 

revisions to Defendants’ copyrighted works, and (2) to the extent HPA added new 

elements to the Masse and Jones Plans, they were either co-authored by Defendants or 

standard features not subject to copyright protection. (Resp. to MSJ at 6-15.) 

 

4

 HPA also argues that Defendants have waived any challenge to the validity of its copyright registrations by failing to ask the Court to make the requisite request of the Register of Copyrights under § 411(b)(2) by now. This argument is similarly moot at this stage, but even if it were not, HPA provides no legal support for such a proposition. Indeed, in a case in which neither party raised § 411(b)(2), the Seventh Circuit Court of 

Appeals indicated the opposite to be true: “[I]gnoring a clear statutory directive due to the inadvertence of the parties would defeat the purpose of 17 U.S.C. § 411(b)(2) and deprive the Register of its right to weigh in on precisely this issue.” DeliverMed, 734 F.3d at 624. 

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 The resolution of these issues comes down to an examination of the originality of 

HPA’s works, the “sine qua non of copyright.” See Feist Publ’ns, 499 U.S. at 345. HPA 

essentially asks the Court to rely on the case law holding that just because a work is 

substantially similar to another work does not mean it is not original and that originality 

requires only slightly more than a trivial variation, but HPA does not point the Court to 

specific, undisputed examples of originality in its works. (See, e.g., MSJ at 6-7; Reply to 

MSJ at 6-7, 9.) Apart from conclusory statements regarding the originality of its works, 

HPA attempts to demonstrate originality in its briefs by drawing a comparison between 

its unit plans and Defendants’ Masse and Jones Plans, but this comparison lacks any 

citation to the record and is therefore abstract. (See Reply to MSJ at 9.) 

 Otherwise, HPA and Defendants produce controverting evidence of originality 

through, for example, testimony of an HPA architect that she “did not copy anything 

from any other source” when she created the HPA plans and drawings (PSOF Ex. H ¶ 5) 

and Defendants’ expert’s testimony regarding the identical nature of the copyrightable 

elements of the Masse and Jones Plans and HPA’s plans and drawings (DSOF at 20-21 

¶¶ 45-46). On a motion for summary judgment, the Court may not weigh the 

controverting evidence and make a factual finding. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. 

Defendants have produced sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute as to whether 

HPA’s works contain the requisite originality for copyright protection, and the Court 

must therefore deny HPA’s request for summary judgment as to that issue. 

C. Motion to Strike Response 

After Defendants filed their Response to HPA’s Motion for Summary Judgment, 

they filed an Amended Response a week later with the principal purposes of changing the 

numbering system of their exhibits and providing additional pin cites to the record. 

(Resp. to MSJ at 1 n.1.) HPA moved to strike the Amended Response as a tardy and 

impermissible second Response. (MTS at 1-2.) Because HPA was not prejudiced by 

Defendants’ filing of the Amended Response and it served to facilitate both HPA’s and 

the Court’s use of the Response, the Court will deny HPA’s Motion to Strike. However, 

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Defendants are warned that, in the future, they must seek leave of Court to make any 

amendment not as-of-right after a deadline. 

 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED denying Plaintiff Humphreys & Partners 

Architects, LP’s Amended Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 113). 

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Plaintiff Humphreys & Partners Architects, 

LP’s Motion to Strike (Doc. 127). 

 Dated this 27th day of April, 2016. 

Honorable John J. Tuchi

United States District Judge

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