Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_06-cv-07767/USCOURTS-cand-5_06-cv-07767-14/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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* E-filed 5/12/08 *

NOT FOR CITATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

DWIGHT WATSON; DANIEL FARIAS;

LAUREN WATSON; and NICOLE WATSON,

Plaintiffs,

v.

GLENN ALBIN; DAVID MENDEZ; FRANK

ST. CLAIR; MIKE D'ANTONIO; MIKE

RUBINO; SANTA CLARA COUNTY; STATE

OF CALIFORNIA, and DOES 1-50,

Defendants. /

No. C-06-07767 RMW

ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION

TO COMPEL AND MOTION FOR

ATTORNEY'S FEES

Re: Docket Nos. 84 and 86

The allegations in plaintiffs' complaint stem from a probation search conducted by the Santa

Clara County Specialized Enforcement Team. The plaintiffs are Dwight Watson and his three

children: Daniel Farias, Lauren Watson and Nicole Watson. The only remaining defendant is agent

Glenn Albin. A jury trial is set to begin on May 19, 2008. Defendant moves to compel certain

discovery and for attorney's fees. Having considered the papers and arguments of counsel, the court

orders as follows: 

I. MOTION TO COMPEL

Following the probation search, Watson was incarcerated in a Santa Clara County jail. One

of the original defendants (who has since been dismissed) issued a subpoena to the Santa Clara

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County Department of Corrections (DOC) for the release of telephone call recordings made by

Watson to his family's residence. The DOC objected to the subpoena because the conversations

might contain privileged information. Thereafter, the parties agreed to have the recordings released

to plaintiffs' counsel to review them for "attorney-client privileged or personal privacy

communications." After that review, plaintiffs produced some conversations, but withheld others

on the basis of privilege. The withheld recordings are the subject of the motion to compel. 

1. Marital Communication Privilege

Defendant Albin was understandably surprised when he received plaintiffs' privilege log

listing the redaction of twenty-one conversations on the basis of a marital communications

privilege. To begin, Dwight Watson and Margaret Farias admit that they have never entered into a

formal marital contract or had a legally recognized marriage ceremony. And, when the parties

agreed to the review of the recordings, plaintiff's counsel made no mention of marital privilege. 

Despite this, plaintiffs say the redaction was proper because Watson and Farias formed a common

law marriage while living in Washington D.C. which is legally recognized in California. They

argue that these conversations were thus protected by the marital communications privilege. 

In order to assert the marital communicational privilege there must be a valid and viable

marriage. See United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 737, 747-48 (9th Cir. 1977). In addition, the

communication must be made in confidence. See e.g., United States v. Strobehn, 421 F. 3d 1017

(9th Cir. 2005). Although common law marriages cannot be formed under California law, if validly

formed in another jurisdiction then such a marriage would be recognized here. Colbert v. Colbert,

28 Cal. 2d 276, 280 (1946) (common law marriages legally created in other states are recognized). 

a) Did Watson and Farias have a "valid and viable marriage"? 

Under Washington D.C. law, a common-law marriage can be established by cohabitation as

husband and wife, which follows an expressed mutual agreement which must be in words of the

present tense. See Mesa v. United States, 875 A.2d 79, 83 (D.C. 2005); see also Dickey v. Office of

Personnel Management, 419 F.3d 1336, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2005). However, in Coates v. Watts, the

court held that “since ceremonial marriage is readily available and provides unequivocal proof that

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1 After the reply was filed, plaintiffs submitted a declaration from Margaret Farias. 

Defendant objected. Although plaintiffs should have sought leave to file this declaration,

good cause has been shown to permit its consideration here.

3

the parties are husband and wife, claims of common-law marriage should be closely scrutinized.”

622 A.2d 25, 27 (D.C. 1993).

Plaintiffs rely on two forms of evidence to establish of a common law marriage between

Watson and Farias: (1) the declarations of Dwight Watson, Beatrice Watson (Dwight's mother), and

Margaret Farias,1

 and (2) the deposition testimony of Watson and Farias. No extrinsic evidence

supporting the existence of a marriage was submitted.

 According to the declarations, Watson and Farias began dating in 1988, had their first son

(Daniel Farias) in 1990 while living in California, and lived in Washington D.C. from October 1992

to January 1994. It was during this relatively short time in D.C. that the two say they "agreed to

live together as husband and wife indefinitely." Their second daughter was born January 20, 1994

in Alabama. Apparently, she was born "Lauren Farias," but a few days later Watson and Farias had

the hospital change Lauren's last name to Watson. The deposition testimony indicates that the two

believe they have a common law marital arrangement, but also shows that Watson and Farias do not

consistently hold themselves out to be husband and wife. The testimony does not shed any light on

how or when the supposed marriage began. 

Based on the evidence, the court is skeptical that a valid common law marriage was formed

between Watson and Farias. However, the marriage question need not be resolved. Even assuming

that a valid and viable marriage exists, the court finds (as set forth below) that the communication

lacked the requisite confidentiality for the privilege to apply. 

b) Were the monitored telephone conversations "confidential"?

Communications made in the presence of a third party are generally not made in

confidence, and thus, not protected by the spousal communications privilege. Wolfle v. United

States, 291 U.S. 7 (1934). The marital communication privilege requires the communications be

made with the intention of confidence. Id. at 13. If it appears from the nature of the

communication or the circumstances under which it is made that it was not intended to be

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2 In North, a husband and wife were offered a detective's private office to have a

conversation under circumstances which seemed to show that the couple were "lulled into

believing that their conversation would be confidential." On those facts, the marital

communications privilege was not waived, despite the presence of an "eavesdropper."

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confidential, then this will not constitute privileged information. Id. at 14. The subject

conversations were made on a monitored telephone line at the jail facility. Therefore, the court

must decide whether the presence of the recording device is the "functional equivalent of the

presence of a third party." United States v. Lentz, 419 F.Supp.2d 820, 828-29 (E.D.Va. 2005). 

When Watson entered the DOC facility, he signed a document with the statement: 

I fully understand that if I choose to use the inmate telephones in any of the Santa Clara

County Department of Correction jail facilities, I am doing so with the knowledge that the

telephone call may be monitored and/or recorded.

All inmate telephones had signs posted above them advising that all calls may be monitored or

recorded. Furthermore, the introductory message on all inmate telephone calls from this facility

advises the calling or called parties that the call may be monitored or recorded.

Plaintiffs first take issue with the "random" aspect of this monitoring policy, arguing that it

was uncertain which calls would be monitored. This argument is unpersuasive given the

"well-known need for correctional institutions to monitor inmate conversations." United States v.

Madoch, 149 F.3d 596, 602 (7th Cir. 1998). Furthermore, the Santa Clara County DOC policy

language is identical to the policies in other cases addressing privacy interests as related to prison

phone calls. All of those cases found, either implicitly or explicitly, that this language was

sufficient to put a caller on notice that the communication would not be private.

Plaintiffs next argue that the potential for the call to be monitored is the equivalent of an

eavesdropper. They then cite to a California case for the authority that the presence of an

eavesdropper does not destroy the marital communication privilege. North v. Super. Ct., 8 Cal. 3d

301, 310-12 (1972). However, that case is factually distinguishable.2

 Significantly, it noted that

under California law, "ordinarily the fact that a communication is made under circumstances

where others could easily overhear is a strong indication that the communication was not intended

to be confidential and is, therefore, unprivileged." Id. (internal citations omitted). 

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3

 As discussed in the attorney-client privilege section, this statement was qualified in

a footnote for calls made to an attorney on unmonitored lines. Van Poyck, 77 F.3d at 291, n.

9.

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The final argument made by plaintiffs is that the marital privilege should not be defeated

for lack of confidentiality where Watson had no means of communicating with Farias except on

the monitored phone line during his time in prison. (The unmonitored phone lines were only

available for pre-approved calls made to the inmate's attorney.) It appears that this privilege

question has not yet been addressed in this circuit, although other circuit courts and district courts

have considered it. The overwhelming theme from those cases is that an inmate should recognize

that any "privacy interests ... in telephone calls placed from a jail facility are tenuous." United

States v. Solomon, 2007 WL 2702792 (unpublished) (W.D.Pa. 2007) (denying a motion to

suppress jail phone calls, court found no reasonable expectation of privacy with recording of calls

from prison to non-attorneys). Cases specifically addressing the spousal privilege question have

found that for conversations on monitored prison phone lines, the marital communications

privilege is waived for lack of confidentiality. See e.g., Madoch, 149 F.3d at 602 (holding that the

marital communications privilege did not apply where the wife knew that her husband was in jail

when they spoke over the phone). 

Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit has considered the privacy interests of inmates on

monitored phone lines in the Fourth Amendment context and of spousal privilege implications for

written correspondence. These cases are instructive. In a case dealing with Fourth Amendment

rights, the Court found that the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in

outbound phone calls made from the facility.3

 United States v. Van Poyck, 77 F.3d 285, 290-91

(9th Cir. 1996), cert denied, 519 U.S. 912 (1996). The court noted that Van Poyck knew of the

monitoring policy before making phone calls and that under such circumstances, "it is hard to

believe he thought his calls were private." Id. Furthermore, "[e]ven if Van Poyck believed that his

calls were private, no prisoner should reasonably expect privacy" in those circumstances. Id. In

United States v. Griffin, the Court mentions that California state law does not provide an inmate

with a right to correspond confidentially with his or her spouse. 440 F.3d 1138, 1144 (9th Cir.

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4

 After this motion was argued and under submission, defendant filed a supplemental

declaration on this issue. Plaintiffs objected. Good cause was not shown for leave to file

that late declaration and it will not be considered here. 

6

2006). Although "correspondence" in that context referred to written correspondence sent through

the mail and the court relied in part on a California regulation authorizing authorities to read

outgoing mail, the situation here is certainly analogous. 

The evidence suggests that Watson was on notice that the conversations were being

recorded and that Watson and Farias could not reasonably expect their conversations to remain

private. The recording device operated as the "functional equivalent" of the presence of a third

party. Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED as to the marital communications privilege

redactions. Plaintiffs shall produce the documents by May 14, 2008.

c) Alternatively, assuming a privilege applies, was it otherwise waived?

Defendant also says that plaintiffs waived the marital communications privilege by failing

to object during Margaret Farias' deposition to questions about conversations between Farias and

Watson while he was incarcerated.4

 Because of the finding that the communications were not

confidential, the court need not reach this alternative argument.

2. Attorney-Client Privilege Redactions

Portions of five conversations were redacted on the basis of attorney-client privilege. These

recordings were the subject of an interim order by this court. [Docket No. 139]. Pursuant to that

order, plaintiffs produced the conversations for in camera review. It had been argued that although

no attorney was present, these redacted conversations fell within the "joint prosecutorial" or

"common interest" realm of the attorney-client privilege. See Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch &

Lomb, Inc., 115 F.R.D. 308, 310-312 (N.D. Cal. 1987). Upon review, it has been determined that

some of the conversations fall within the joint prosecutorial doctrine. 

However, because these conversations were over the monitored phone line, questions over

the confidentiality must be resolved. The confidentiality analysis in the attorney client privilege

context differs slightly from the spousal privilege analysis because courts are typically more

protective of the attorney-client privilege. For this reason, most correctional facilities (including

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the Santa Clara County DOC) have an alternative unmonitored phone system for when inmates

have conversations with attorneys. 

Plaintiffs say that because the monitored system was the only means for Watson to

communicate with his co-plaintiffs while incarcerated, the attorney-client privilege should not be

waived. As with the prior discussion in the spousal privilege context, relevant caselaw is

instructive, but not necessarily controlling. For example, the Eighth Circuit reversed a trial court

decision upholding attorney-client privilege, holding that prisoners and their attorneys had no

reasonable expectation of privacy since they knew their conversations were being recorded. United

States v. Hatcher, 323 F.3d 666, 674 (8th Cir. 2003). Two district court reached similar

conclusions. Lentz, 419 F.Supp.2d at 828-29 (inmate's telephone conversations with counsel are not

protected by attorney-client privilege where, as here, the inmate is notified the calls are recorded

and subject to monitoring); United States v. Eye, (unpublished opinion) No. 05-00344-01 CRW,

2008 WL 1701089, *12 (W.D.Mo. 2008) (defendant waived attorney-client privilege by

communicating with his attorney on the prison phones because facility provided notice - by

informing defendant upon his arrival, through signs on the telephones, and via a recorded message

prior to calls - that calls were subject to monitoring and recording). These cases indicate that

despite the strong protections typically afforded attorney-client privilege, if an inmate calls an

attorney on a monitored phone line, the privilege will be waived for lack of confidentiality. Lentz,

419 F.Supp.2d at 828-29 ("While recognizing the fundamental importance of the [attorney-client]

privilege, courts have nonetheless been careful not to stretch its application to circumstances

beyond its rationale"). 

Even the case cited by plaintiffs, United States v. Pelullo, appears to support finding waiver

of the privilege here. 5 F.Supp. 2d 285, 289 (D.N.J. 1998). In Pelullo, a defendant was at a facility

with a phone monitoring policy similar to the DOC's. The defendant made phone calls on the

monitored phone line to non-attorneys and then an attorney was placed on the line. The district

court rejected the defendant's claim of privilege to those conversations, noting "to the extent that

defendant engaged in telephone conversations with attorneys on the monitored line the

communications were not privileged." Finally, a footnote in the Ninth Circuit decision Van Poyck

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also supports waiving the privilege under the facts presented. 77 F.3d at 290-91. There, the court

noted that "no prisoner should reasonably expect privacy in his outbound telephone calls." Id. 

However, in a footnote this was qualified to exclude "'properly placed' telephone calls between a

defendant and his attorney, which the [facility] does not record or monitor." Id. at 291, n. 9. Thus, it

the key factor was whether the calls were on a monitored or unmonitored phoneline. 

Here, we are not dealing with a "properly placed telephone call" on an unmonitored line. 

This was a conversation between family members (who are co-plaintiffs) on a monitored phone

line. To be fair, Watson had no unmonitored means of engaging in this kind of conversation. But,

as was the case with the marital communications privilege, that unfortunate reality does not mean

that the lack of confidentiality must be ignored. Watson knew that any phone calls he made on that

line were subject to monitoring or recording. To find that these conversations fall within the narrow

confines of attorney-client privilege would be a tenuous application of that legal doctrine. The

motion to compel, as to the conversations redacted for joint prosecutorial privilege, is GRANTED. 

Plaintiffs shall produce the documents by May 14, 2008.

II. MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES

Defendant seeks $1,400 in attorney's fees under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4)(A). According to

Albin, plaintiffs (1) refused to abide by a stipulation entered into by the parties and acted

improperly in not submitting the stipulation to the court for approval as an order, (2) "stonewalled"

the meet and confer process, and (3) were not substantially justified in refusing to produce the

recordings. 

The first two claims are not substantiated by the record. Moreover, plaintiffs were

substantially justified in asserting their position, even if the court did not ultimately agree with it. 

The motion for sanctions in the form of attorney's fees is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 5/12/08 

HOWARD R. LLOYD

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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THIS SHALL CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THIS ORDER WILL BE SENT TO:

Jennifer C. Addams jennifer.addams@doj.ca.gov, chere.deuel@doj.ca.gov 

Mark F. Bernal mark.bernal@cco.sccgov.org 

Michael J. Dodson cao.main@sanjoseca.gov 

Wilfred T. Fong wil.fong@doj.ca.gov 

James Thomas Gotch gotchj@stubbsleone.com 

Sunil R. Kulkarni skulkarni@mofo.com, msousa@mofo.com 

Claudia Leed leedc@stubbsleone.com, suttonk@stubbslx eone.com 

Louis A. Leone lleone@stubbsleone.com, suttonk@stubbsleone.com 

Mark William Martel markmartel@aol.com 

Timothy James Schmal , Esq TSchmal@bvsllp.com, jpl@bvsllp.com 

KC Waldron kcwaldron@mofo.com, klarson@mofo.com 

* Counsel are responsible for providing copies of this order to co-counsel.

Dated: 5/12/08 

 /s/ KRO 

 Chambers of Magistrate Judge Lloyd

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