Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-06-05113/USCOURTS-caDC-06-05113-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

---

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 11, 2006 Decided May 18, 2007

No. 06-5113

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES,

AFL-CIO, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

v.

ROBERT M.GATES,

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AND

LINDA M. SPRINGER, DIRECTOR, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY,

APPELLANTS

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 05cv02183)

William G. Kanter, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were

Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey A. Taylor,

U.S. Attorney, Gregory G. Katsas, Deputy Assistant Attorney

General, Thomas M. Bondy, Lewis S. Yelin, and Eric

Fleisig-Greene, Attorneys, Frank R. Jimenez and Michael E.

Reheuser, Attorneys, Department of Defense, and David B.

Scholl and Robin M. Richardson, Attorneys, Office of Personnel

Management. Joseph W. LoBue and Tara L. Grove, Attorneys,

U.S. Department of Justice, entered appearances.

USCA Case #06-5113 Document #1041400 Filed: 05/18/2007 Page 1 of 47
2

Joe Goldberg argued the cause for appellees. With him on

the brief were Mark D. Roth, Susan Tsui Grundmann, Sally M.

Tedrow, Keith R. Bolek, and Daniel M. Schember. Charles A.

Hobbie entered an appearance.

Gregory O’Duden, Elaine Kaplan, Larry J. Adkins, and

Robert H. Shriver III were on the brief for amicus curiae

National Treasury Employees Union in support of appellees.

Barbara A. Atkin entered an appearance.

Before: TATEL and KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judges, and

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge KAVANAUGH,

in which Senior Circuit Judge WILLIAMS joins. 

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.

KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge: This case arises out of a

contentious dispute over the collective bargaining rights of

hundreds of thousands of civilian employees of the Department

of Defense. Our limited judicial task is to determine whether the

Department of Defense has acted consistently with its statutory

authority in promulgating certain regulations. The primary legal

question we must decide is whether the National Defense

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 authorizes DoD to

curtail collective bargaining rights that DoD’s civilian

employees otherwise possess under the Civil Service Reform

Act of 1978. We hold that the National Defense Authorization

Act grants DoD temporary authority to curtail collective

bargaining for DoD’s civilian employees. By its terms, the Act

authorizes DoD to curtail collective bargaining through

November 2009. But after November 2009, with certain

specified exceptions, DoD again must ensure collective

bargaining consistent with the Civil Service Reform Act of

USCA Case #06-5113 Document #1041400 Filed: 05/18/2007 Page 2 of 47
3

1978. We reverse the District Court’s judgment, and we uphold

the DoD regulations at issue in this appeal. 

I

1. To put together the pieces of the statutory puzzle in this

case, one must first appreciate the difference between Chapter

71 and Chapter 99 of Title 5 of the U.S. Code. 

Chapter 71 of Title 5 codifies the Civil Service Reform Act

of 1978 and establishes the right of federal civilian employees,

including civilian employees at the Department of Defense, “to

engage in collective bargaining with respect to conditions of

employment through representatives chosen by employees.” 5

U.S.C. § 7102(2). The Act generally requires agency

management to “meet and negotiate” in good faith with

recognized unions over conditions of employment “for the

purposes of arriving at a collective bargaining agreement.” Id.

§ 7114(a)(1), (a)(4). The Act exempts various matters from

collective bargaining, such as hiring, firing, suspending, paying,

and reducing the pay of employees. See id. §§ 7103(a)(14)(C),

7106(a). Therefore, the Civil Service Reform Act ensures

collective bargaining for federal employees, albeit more limited

than the collective bargaining rights for private employees. See

Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Chertoff, 452 F.3d 839,

860-61 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

Chapter 99 of Title 5 codifies a section of the National

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 and sets out a

new labor relations framework for Department of Defense

employees. Chapter 99 differs from the Chapter 71 model in

several respects. In particular, Section 9902(a) of Chapter 99

establishes procedures for DoD, in coordination with the Office

of Personnel Management, to “establish, and from time to time

adjust, a human resources management system for some or all

USCA Case #06-5113 Document #1041400 Filed: 05/18/2007 Page 3 of 47
4

of the organizational or functional units of the Department of

Defense.” 5 U.S.C. § 9902(a). (Hereafter, for ease of reference,

we will refer only to DoD and not also to OPM.) The “human

resources management system” is called the “National Security

Personnel System.” Id. Within the National Security Personnel

System, the Act authorizes DoD to establish a “labor relations

system” to structure bargaining between management and

employees. Id. § 9902(m)(1).

Section 9902 of Chapter 99 in turn contains a complicated

set of authorizations and requirements for DoD to follow in

establishing the National Security Personnel System and the

labor relations system, many of which are important to this case:

! General Requirements for National Security Personnel

System – Subsections (b)(3), (b)(4), and (d)(2).

Subsection 9902(b) lists general “system requirements” for

the National Security Personnel System. Of relevance here,

subsection (b)(3)(D) states that the system “shall . . . not waive,

modify, or otherwise affect . . . any other provision of this part

(as described in subsection (d)).” Subsection (d)(2) in turn says

that the “provisions of this part referred to in subsection

(b)(3)(D) are (to the extent not otherwise specified in this title)

. . . [Chapter] 71 . . . and this chapter” (emphasis added).

Taken together, therefore, subsections (b)(3) and (d)(2)

mean that DoD’s National Security Personnel System may not

waive or modify Chapter 71, which is the provision codifying

the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978’s limited collective

bargaining rights for federal civilian employees, unless the

authority to waive or modify Chapter 71 is “otherwise specified”

in the statute.

USCA Case #06-5113 Document #1041400 Filed: 05/18/2007 Page 4 of 47
5

Subsection (b)(4) of Section 9902 similarly requires DoD

to “ensure that employees may organize, bargain collectively as

provided for in this chapter, and participate through labor

organizations of their own choosing in decisions which affect

them, subject to the provisions of this chapter” (emphases

added). Therefore, subsection (b)(4) requires that DoD’s

National Security Personnel System ensure collective

bargaining, but only “as provided for in” and “subject to the

provisions of” the statute. 

! Authorization to Create Labor Relations System –

Subsections (m)(1) and (m)(8). 

Subsection (m) of Section 9902 authorizes DoD to create a

new labor relations system within the National Security

Personnel System. Specifically, subsection (m)(1) states:

“Notwithstanding section 9902(d)(2), the Secretary . . . may

establish and from time to time adjust a labor relations system

for the Department of Defense to address the unique role that the

Department’s civilian workforce plays in supporting the

Department’s national security mission.” 

The “notwithstanding” clause in subsection (m)(1) indicates

that the generally non-waivable provisions listed in subsection

(d)(2) – including Chapter 71 and its protection of limited

collective bargaining rights – do not constrain DoD’s authority

to develop a labor relations system under subsection (m). 

Furthermore, subsection (m)(8) broadly states that the labor

relations system developed and from time to time adjusted by

DoD under subsection (m) “shall be binding on all bargaining

units within the Department of Defense” and “shall supersede all

other collective bargaining agreements for bargaining units in

the Department.”

USCA Case #06-5113 Document #1041400 Filed: 05/18/2007 Page 5 of 47
6

Subsection (m)(9) provides, however, that the authority

under subsections (m)(1) and (m)(8) runs out in November

2009: “Unless it is extended or otherwise provided for in law,

the authority to establish, implement and adjust the labor

relations system developed under this subsection shall expire six

years after the date of enactment of this subsection [that is, six

years after November 2003], at which time the provisions of

chapter 71 will apply.” 

! Additional Authorization – Subsection (k)(1). 

Subsection (k) of Section 9902 provides additional specific

authority for DoD to act in certain specified areas of labor

relations. Subsection (k)(1) states: “Notwithstanding subsection

(d), the Secretary of Defense . . . shall not be limited by any

provision of this title or any rule or regulation prescribed under

this title in establishing and implementing regulations relating

to – (A) the methods of establishing qualification requirements

for, recruitment for, and appointments to positions; (B) the

methods of assigning, reassigning, detailing, transferring, or

promoting employees; and (C) the methods of reducing overall

agency staff and grade levels . . . .” 

Subsection (k)(1) is not subject to the sunset date of

subsection (m)(9). Therefore, DoD will retain the targeted

authority conferred by (k)(1) even after the broader general

authority under subsection (m) runs out in November 2009.

2. After Congress enacted the National Defense

Authorization Act in November 2003, DoD began developing

the National Security Personnel System. On February 14, 2005,

DoD published a proposed system in the Federal Register. See

National Security Personnel System, 70 Fed. Reg. 7552. After

various DoD employee representatives submitted comments,

DoD held several meetings with employee representatives in the

USCA Case #06-5113 Document #1041400 Filed: 05/18/2007 Page 6 of 47
7

spring of 2005. On November 1, 2005, DoD promulgated final

regulations setting up the National Security Personnel System.

See Department of Defense Resources Management and Labor

Relations System, 70 Fed. Reg. 66,116.

The regulations curtail the scope of Chapter 71 collective

bargaining in several ways relevant to this appeal:

! The regulations permit certain DoD officials to issue

“implementing issuances” to abrogate any provision of an

existing collective bargaining agreement or effectively take

any topic off the table for future bargaining purposes. 5

C.F.R. §§ 9901.905(a), 9901.917(d)(1). DoD may also

promulgate “issuances” that take topics off the table. Id.

§ 9901.917(d)(1). (Issuances and implementing issuances

are documents issued to carry out DoD policies;

implementing issuances relate to the National Security

Personnel System, while issuances relate to any DoD

policy. See id. § 9901.903.) Under the regulations, both

issuances and implementing issuances can have prospective

effect, but only implementing issuances can abrogate

existing collective bargaining agreements. See id.

§§ 9901.905(a), (c), 9901.917(d)(1).

! The regulations broaden the scope of “management

rights” – that is, actions that management can take without

collective bargaining – beyond the management rights

already provided in Chapter 71. In particular, the

regulations permit DoD “to take whatever other actions

may be necessary to carry out the Department’s mission.”

Id. § 9901.910(a)(2). 

! The regulations curtail bargaining over (i) the procedures

DoD must follow when exercising management rights and

(ii) the “appropriate arrangements” that DoD must make for

USCA Case #06-5113 Document #1041400 Filed: 05/18/2007 Page 7 of 47
8

employees affected by exercises of management rights. Id.

§§ 9901.910; 9901.914(a)(2). 

! The regulations limit collective bargaining rights over pay

and benefits for employees of certain DoD units known as

“non-appropriated fund instrumentalities.” These

employees’ compensation is not set by statute and is

therefore traditionally subject to collective bargaining. See

id. § 9901.305.

3. After the regulations were issued, several unions of

DoD civilian employees filed suit in the U.S. District Court for

the District of Columbia. They argued that the DoD regulations

exceeded its statutory authority – a case of “rulemaking

overreach,” as the Unions have put it. Tr. of Oral Arg. 25. The

District Court accepted the Unions’ argument in relevant part.

In particular, the District Court held that DoD’s regulations

violated subsection (b)(4)’s requirement that the National

Security Personnel System ensure employees can bargain

collectively. See Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Employees v. Rumsfeld,

422 F. Supp. 2d 16, 40-45 (2006). The District Court found that

subsection (b)(4) means “the new system must ensure that the

principles of collective bargaining are not totally eviscerated.”

Id. at 40. The District Court therefore enjoined several

components of the regulations (subparts G, H, and I of 5 C.F.R.

§ 9901), including the expansion of management rights and the

authority of the Secretary to issue implementing issuances and

issuances. See id. at 41-45. 

II 

This case centers on interpretation of the National Defense

Authorization Act. The Unions argue that various DoD

regulations “conflict with the Act’s plain language.” Unions’

Br. at 17. 

USCA Case #06-5113 Document #1041400 Filed: 05/18/2007 Page 8 of 47
9

We initially explain the roadmap that guides our analysis.

If the relevant statutory language is plain and supports the

challenged DoD regulations, we must uphold the regulations.

See Health Ins. Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Shalala, 23 F.3d 412, 415

(D.C. Cir. 1994). If the relevant statutory language is plain but

is inconsistent with the DoD regulations, we must hold the

regulations invalid. See Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 122

(1994); cf. Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 359 (2005);

Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004); Hartford

Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, 530 U.S. 1, 6

(2000). To the extent a challenged provision of the statute is

ambiguous, we give deference to DoD’s authoritative

interpretation so long as that interpretation is reasonable. See

Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Chertoff, 452 F.3d 839,

855-56 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citing United States v. Mead Corp.,

533 U.S. 218 (2001), and Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res.

Def .Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).

1. At first glance, the relevant provisions of the National

Defense Authorization Act may seem contradictory. After all,

the five subsections primarily at issue in this case – (b)(3),

(b)(4), (d)(2), (m)(1), and (m)(8) – initially appear to work at

cross-purposes. Subsections (b)(3), (b)(4), and (d)(2) seem to

bestow a right to collective bargaining as traditionally provided

under Chapter 71 of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978,

while subsections (m)(1) and (m)(8) simultaneously appear to

snatch it away. But upon closer examination, the statutory

pieces come together and form a relatively coherent whole, at

least for purposes of this case.

The key to solving the statutory puzzle is the fact that

subsections (b)(3), (b)(4), and (d)(2) together contemplate that

collective bargaining under Chapter 71 is generally available,

but only to the extent not otherwise exempted by separate

provisions of the statute. 

USCA Case #06-5113 Document #1041400 Filed: 05/18/2007 Page 9 of 47
10

Subsection (d)(2) – which is a system requirement as a

result of a cross-reference in subsection (b)(3) – states that

Chapter 71’s protection for collective bargaining is nonwaivable

“to the extent not otherwise specified in this title” (emphasis

added). This qualification indicates that subsection (d)(2) can

be overridden by an exception in another provision of the

statute. 

Subsection (b)(4) similarly states that the Government must

permit employees to “organize, bargain collectively as provided

for in this chapter, and participate through labor organizations

of their own choosing in decisions which affect them, subject to

the provisions of this chapter” (emphases added). The first

italicized phrase – “as provided for in this chapter” – indicates

that subsection (b)(4)’s guarantee of collective bargaining is

contingent on collective bargaining being provided by other

subsections, such as subsection (d)(2)’s incorporation of the

collective bargaining framework of Chapter 71. In addition, the

further qualification in subsection (b)(4) – “subject to the

provisions of this chapter” – indicates that, like subsection

(d)(2), subsection (b)(4) can be overridden by other provisions

of the statute.

To summarize so far, subsections (b)(3) and (d)(2) (which

incorporate Chapter 71 bargaining) and subsection (b)(4) may

be overridden by other provisions of the statute; furthermore,

subsection (b)(4) ensures collective bargaining in the first place

only insofar as another subsection of the statute provides for it.

At this point in our summary of the statutory puzzle, however,

we pause to note an important point: If the National Defense

Authorization Act contained no provisions relevant to collective

bargaining other than subsections (b)(3), (b)(4), and (d)(2), the

Act would require DoD to adhere to the traditional collective

bargaining framework of Chapter 71, just as the Unions have

argued. 

USCA Case #06-5113 Document #1041400 Filed: 05/18/2007 Page 10 of 47
11

Enter subsections (m)(1) and (m)(8). Subsection (m)(1)

states: “Notwithstanding section 9902(d)(2), the Secretary . . .

may establish and from time to time adjust a labor relations

system for the Department of Defense to address the unique role

that the Department’s civilian workforce plays in supporting the

Department’s national security mission.” (emphasis added).

Subsection (m)(8) adds that “[t]he labor relations system

developed or adjusted under this subsection shall be binding on

all bargaining units within the Department of Defense” and

“shall supersede all other collective bargaining agreements.”

The “notwithstanding” clause in (m)(1) expressly states that

the authority to establish a labor relations system overrides

subsection (d)(2). So subsection (d)(2) by its terms may be

overridden where “specified,” and subsection (m)(1) provides

just such a specification. Therefore, when it crafts its labor

relations system, DoD need not follow Chapter 71’s collective

bargaining framework, which otherwise would be required by

subsection (d)(2) (as cross-referenced by subsection (b)(3)). It

is important to note, however, that DoD’s authority under

subsection (m)(1) is temporary: Under subsection (m)(9),

DoD’s authority to establish a labor relations system expires in

November 2009 – at which point subsection (d)(2) will require

that DoD again follow Chapter 71 (subject to certain targeted

exceptions such as in subsection (k)(1)).

The guarantee of collective bargaining in subsection (b)(4)

also does not apply until November 2009. Recall that collective

bargaining under subsection (b)(4) applies insofar as it is

“provided for in this chapter.” Collective bargaining is in fact

provided for in subsection (d)(2), which refers back to Chapter

71 and thus requires collective bargaining. Collective

bargaining is not, however, provided for in the text of subsection

(m)(1). And because subsection (m)(1) expressly permits DoD

to disregard subsection (d)(2), subsection (m)(1) also means that

USCA Case #06-5113 Document #1041400 Filed: 05/18/2007 Page 11 of 47
12

– until November 2009 – nothing in the statute “provide[s] for”

collective bargaining for purposes of subsection (b)(4). As a

result, like subsection (d)(2), subsection (b)(4) does not

constrain DoD’s authority to establish a labor relations system

until November 2009. After November 2009, collective

bargaining is “provided for” in the statute – in subsection (d)(2)

– and again must be ensured by DoD. 

The dissenting opinion contends that the statutory phrase

“as provided for in this chapter” means only “that other

provisions of the bill modify Congress’s traditional

understanding of the term ‘bargain collectively.’” Dissenting

Op. at 4. But that interpretation distorts the plain meaning of the

phrase “as provided for,” reading it to mean “unless otherwise

provided for” – its polar opposite. That interpretation also

renders redundant the second, independent qualification in

subsection (b)(4) – “subject to the provisions of this chapter” –

and would essentially read both qualifications in (b)(4) the same

way, a highly disfavored interpretive result. See, e.g., Indep.

Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Hawke, 211 F.3d 638, 643-44 (D.C.

Cir. 2000). By contrast, our reading gives each phrase

independent meaning: The first qualification requires an

affirmative grant of collective bargaining elsewhere in the

statute (such as in (d)(2)), while the second qualification says

that even where there is such an affirmative grant, it may be

overridden by other provisions. The dissent’s strained reading

appears to be sparked in part by its analysis of a hypothetical

statute of the dissent’s own creation, which would use the phrase

“bargain collectively as provided for in this chapter” without

anywhere else actually providing for collective bargaining. But

the real statute in this case does provide for collective bargaining

– in subsection (d)(2) – and we thus have no need to speculate

about such hypothetical interpretive puzzles. 

USCA Case #06-5113 Document #1041400 Filed: 05/18/2007 Page 12 of 47
13

Even if the dissent were correct that both provisions in

subsection (b)(4) essentially mean that collective bargaining

applies unless otherwise excepted, however, we would reach the

same result. The “subject to the provisions of this chapter”

qualification (which the dissenting opinion glosses over) means

that any right to collective bargaining that otherwise exists under

subsection (b)(4) (whether as a result of the reference to

collective bargaining in (b)(4) itself or because of (d)(2)’s

reference to Chapter 71) is subject to and may be overridden by

other provisions of the statute. And subsections (m)(1) and

(m)(8) by their terms plainly qualify as such exceptions through

November 2009.

In sum, subsection (m) of Section 9902 grants DoD

expansive authority to curtail collective bargaining through

November 2009. Subsection (m)’s authority to curtail collective

bargaining is entirely consistent with – not in conflict with –

subsections (b)(3), (b)(4), and (d)(2) of Section 9902, given the

express qualifications in those subsections. After November

2009, however, the authority in subsection (m) runs out, and

collective bargaining under Chapter 71 again will structure the

Department’s labor relations (apart from targeted statutory

exceptions, such as subsection (k)(1)).

2. In response to this straightforward reading of the plain

language of the statute, the Unions have advanced three primary

arguments. None is persuasive.

First, the Unions argue that subsections (b)(3), (b)(4), and

(d)(2) of Section 9902 would have no purpose if subsections

(m)(1) and (m)(8) give DoD broad authority to curtail collective

bargaining. We disagree with the Unions on this point. The

labor relations system authorized under subsection (m) expires

in November 2009, at which point the important Chapter 71

collective bargaining requirements of (b)(3), (b)(4), and (d)(2)

USCA Case #06-5113 Document #1041400 Filed: 05/18/2007 Page 13 of 47
14

will generally apply. In effect, therefore, the Act sets up a

temporary, experimental period through November 2009 during

which DoD has broad leeway to restructure its labor relations

system. But after November 2009, assuming that Congress has

not amended the statute in the meantime, the Chapter 71

collective bargaining requirements referenced in subsections

(b)(3), (b)(4), and (d)(2) again will apply and govern labor

relations for DoD’s civilian workers (subject to targeted

exceptions such as subsection (k)(1)). 

This kind of experimental program is common. To test new

policies or try out novel approaches to difficult issues, Congress

often enacts temporary legislation that sunsets at a certain point.

See, e.g., USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 224(a),

115 Stat. 272, 295 (2001); Ethics in Government Act of 1978,

Pub. L. No. 95-521, § 601(a), 92 Stat. 1824, 1873 (former

independent counsel statute). As in other situations where

Congress has acted to establish a temporary or experimental

program, Congress no doubt will continue to carefully study the

experience under this Act and use it to guide further legislation

governing labor relations at DoD. In short, contrary to the

Unions’ argument, subsections (b)(3), (b)(4), and (d)(2) play a

critical role by generally providing collective bargaining for

DoD’s civilian employees after November 2009.

Second, the Unions relatedly argue that subsection (m),

when interpreted according to its plain terms, allows DoD to

effectively negate collective bargaining through November

2009. The Unions strenuously contend that this cannot possibly

be a correct interpretation of the Act because Congress does not

“hide elephants in mouseholes.” Unions’ Br. at 18 (internal

quotation omitted). 

We agree with the Unions that subsection (m) is a statutory

elephant (in the sense of having a huge impact), but the

USCA Case #06-5113 Document #1041400 Filed: 05/18/2007 Page 14 of 47
15

additional premise of the Unions’ contention is inaccurate:

Subsection (m) was not hidden. To be sure, subsection (m) was

ushered into the legislative arena at a late hour. Indeed, neither

the initial House-passed nor Senate-passed bills (nor the separate

bill on DoD labor relations approved by the Senate Committee

on Governmental Affairs) included subsection (m); the bills

preserved collective bargaining at DoD. See 149 Cong. Rec.

H4460-61 (daily ed. May 21, 2003); 149 Cong. Rec. S14,490

(Nov. 12, 2003) (statement of Senator Lieberman); Am. Fed’n

of Gov’t Employees v. Rumsfeld, 422 F. Supp. 2d 16, 25 (D.C.

Cir. 2006). But the conference negotiations took a rather

dramatic turn in a different direction. The conferees decided to

add subsection (m), and subsection (m) by its terms gives DoD

expansive authority to curtail collective bargaining through

November 2009. See Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Employees, 422 F.

Supp. 2d at 26.

With subsection (m) added, the conference agreement

sparked pointed objections from several Members of Congress.

Their reactions show (contrary to the Unions’ elephants-inmouseholes suggestion) that Members of Congress clearly

recognized subsection (m) for what it is – broad authority for

DoD to curtail collective bargaining for six years from the date

of enactment, that is, through November 2009. For example,

Congressman Waxman stated: “At the same time that the bill

claims to protect collective bargaining, it allows DoD to waive

these requirements for the next 6 years.” 149 Cong. Rec.

H10,988 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 2003). Congresswoman Jackson Lee

added: “This bill claims to protect collective bargaining rights

but removes all of the protections provided under the current

law. . . . During the 6-year period, the Secretary of Defense will

have the authority to decide what issues will be bargained . . . .”

Id. at H10,998. Congressman McGovern stated: “This

Conference Report removes all collective bargaining protections

contained in current law . . . .” Id. at H11,006. Congressman

USCA Case #06-5113 Document #1041400 Filed: 05/18/2007 Page 15 of 47
16

Cardin explained his view that “more than 700,000 civilian

workers in the Defense Department will lose fundamental

protections . . . . . [T]his provision empowers . . . Secretaries of

Defense to create an entirely new personnel system for DoD

civilians.” Id. at H11,003. Congressman Abercrombie said:

“[S]ome 700,000 federal employees will be stripped of their

rights and protections in the current civil service system and

placed at the mercy of political appointees in DoD.” Id. at

H11,004. Congressman Hoyer, responding to another

Representative’s hope that Chapter 71 was non-waivable,

explained: “That is technically true, but the bill allows [Chapter

71] to be suspended for the next [six years].” Id. at H10,997.

And in opposing this provision of the statute, Senator Kennedy

stated his understanding in frank terms: “Defense employees

deserve civil service and collective bargaining rights” and this

statute, Senator Kennedy stated, is a “vehicle to deny these

workers their basic rights.” 149 Cong. Rec. S14,486 (daily ed.

Nov. 12, 2003). Other Members of Congress likewise objected

to subsection (m) while attempting to construct an interpretation

that could require DoD to retain some core of collective

bargaining even before November 2009. See, e.g., id. at

S14,490 (statement of Senator Lieberman); id. at S14,428

(statement of Senator Collins). 

Although the snippets of legislative history are largely in

accord with our reading of the statutory text, we do not rely on

them to shape our interpretation; the Supreme Court has

cautioned against such use of this kind of legislative history.

See Shell Oil Co. v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue, 488 U.S. 19, 29

(1988) (courts do “not usually accord much weight to the

statements of a bill’s opponents”). We cite these various

Member statements simply to show that the enormous

significance of subsection (m) was well understood by Members

of Congress when the Act was passed in 2003, contrary to the

USCA Case #06-5113 Document #1041400 Filed: 05/18/2007 Page 16 of 47
17

premise of the “elephants-in-mouseholes” interpretive objection

put forth by the Unions.

Third, the Unions have pointed to our recent decision in

Chertoff. In that case, we held that the Department of Homeland

Security’s regulations establishing a labor relations system were

inconsistent with the DHS statute that Congress enacted in 2002.

The Unions here have candidly (and correctly) acknowledged

that the statutory language governing DoD’s labor relations

system is quite different from the statutory language governing

DHS’s labor relations system. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 42-43 (“We

acknowledge that the organic act that Chertoff is based upon is

different than the organic act we’re arguing [about] here

today. . . . We acknowledge that the language of the statute is

different. We are not suggesting that Chertoff makes the

question stare decisis.”).

The DHS statute provides, without any relevant

qualification, that DHS must “ensure that employees may . . .

bargain collectively.” 5 U.S.C. § 9701(b)(4). By contrast, the

DoD statute states that DoD must ensure that employees may

“bargain collectively as provided for in this chapter” and makes

clear that Chapter 71 defines the scope of such collective

bargaining. The statute then expressly qualifies the Chapter 71

collective bargaining default by stating that it applies “subject

to the provisions of this chapter” or except as “otherwise

specified” in the statute. The DoD statute in turn includes

subsections (m)(1) and (m)(8), which give DoD broad authority

to create a new labor relations system and to supersede

collective bargaining through November 2009. By contrast, the

DHS statute contains no provision remotely equivalent to

subsection (m) of the DoD statute. As we noted earlier, without

subsection (m) (and without subsection (k)’s targeted limits on

collective bargaining), this case would be decided the same way

as Chertoff. But because of the multiple – and critical –

USCA Case #06-5113 Document #1041400 Filed: 05/18/2007 Page 17 of 47
18

differences in the DHS and DoD statutes, our decision in

Chertoff does not provide any meaningful guidance for our

interpretation of the very different DoD statute. In other words,

we do not believe, contrary to the Unions and the dissent, that

Chertoff’s interpretation of the undefined phrase “bargain

collectively” in the DHS statute can somehow alter the language

of the DoD statute, which expressly indicates that collective

bargaining means the collective bargaining provided for in

subsection (d)(2).

In sum, we hold that the plain language of the National

Defense Authorization Act authorizes DoD to curtail collective

bargaining for DoD’s civilian employees through November

2009. For purposes of our analysis, we find the relevant

statutory terms plain. But even if we found ambiguity in the

relationship of (b)(3), (b)(4), and (d)(2) on the one hand to

(m)(1) and (m)(8) on the other, we would defer to DoD’s

reasonable interpretation and application of the statute as

articulated in the preamble to the regulations. See 70 Fed. Reg.

at 66,117-20, 66,128-30, 66,134, 66,176-85; Chevron U.S.A.

Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 845

(1984). DoD reasonably concluded that “the law provides the

Department and OPM – in collaboration with employee

representatives – authority to establish a flexible and

contemporary system of civilian human resources management

for DoD civilians.” 70 Fed. Reg. at 66,118. DoD explained that

“Congress specifically authorized the Secretary, together with

the Director, to establish and adjust this labor relations system

in support of the overall HR management system

notwithstanding the provisions of the current system as set forth

in chapter 71.” Id. at 66,128. DoD further stated that the statute

did not require that actions to implement the labor relations

system “be subject to collective bargaining or the meet-andconfer process.” Id. at 66,134. DoD reasonably concluded that

its regulations “fulfill” the (m)(1) statutory authorization –

USCA Case #06-5113 Document #1041400 Filed: 05/18/2007 Page 18 of 47
19

namely, that DoD’s labor relations system address the “unique

role that the Department’s civilian workforce plays in supporting

the Department’s national security mission” – while also

“providing employees with the rights envisioned by Congress.”

Id. at 66,129. No doubt realizing that DoD’s interpretation and

approach is perfectly reasonable if the statute is considered

ambiguous, the Unions do not even attempt to make such a

“Chevron step 2” argument. Instead, the Unions try to

demonstrate that DoD’s regulatory interpretations are

inconsistent with the clear meaning of the statute. For the

reasons explained above, however, we see no conceivable way

to conclude that DoD’s regulations violate the unambiguous

terms of the statute. See Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Employees, Local

446 v. Nicholson, 475 F.3d 341, 354-55 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Ass’n

of Bituminous Contractors, Inc. v. Apfel, 156 F.3d 1246, 1251

(D.C. Cir. 1998). 

Because we conclude that the National Defense

Authorization Act authorizes DoD to curtail collective

bargaining, we reverse the contrary judgment of the District

Court.

3. One additional point warrants mention with respect to

the so-called “implementing issuances” contemplated by the

DoD regulations (those are the documents that enforce DoD

labor relations policies and may curtail collective bargaining).

Section 9902 sets out two different sets of procedural

requirements that DoD must follow when taking action under

the statute: (i) one set of procedural requirements for adopting

or amending regulations issued under the statute, and (ii) another

set of procedural requirements for taking certain action under

those regulations. 

First, subsections (f)(1)(A)-(C) and (m)(3) define stringent

“meet and confer” requirements that DoD must follow when (i)

USCA Case #06-5113 Document #1041400 Filed: 05/18/2007 Page 19 of 47
20

proposing a new system by adopting regulations or (ii) making

an adjustment to the existing system by amending regulations.

Those requirements include: a 30-day period for employee

representatives to make recommendations regarding any DoD

proposal (absent extraordinary circumstances), full and fair

consideration of any such recommendations, a 30-day

meet-and-confer period with employee representatives regarding

any rejected recommendations, and notice to Congress when

recommendations by the employee representatives are rejected.

(In this court, it is not disputed that DoD complied with these

requirements in promulgating the regulations at issue here.) 

Second, subsection (f)(1)(D) sets out less rigorous

“continuing collaboration” requirements that DoD must follow

for taking certain actions under the regulations. In particular,

subsection (f)(1)(D) requires that DoD “develop a method for

the employee representatives to participate” and “give the

employee representatives adequate access to information to

make that participation productive.” 

When the Secretary promulgates an implementing issuance

under the regulations, however, the Unions suggest that DoD

must follow the full meet-and-confer procedures of subsections

(f)(1)(A)-(C) and (m)(3). By contrast, DoD believes that only

the “continuing collaboration” requirements of (f)(1)(D) instead

apply. As DoD explained in the preamble to the final

regulations, “we did not adopt the [Unions’] suggestion to

require that implementing issuances be subject to collective

bargaining or the meet-and-confer process. Collective

bargaining is inappropriate for the development of HR system

implementing issuances, since it is inconsistent with the

requirements of Section 9902(f)(4). . . . The continuing

collaboration process [in the regulations] does meet the

requirements of 5 U.S.C. 9902(f)(1)(D) . . . .” 70 Fed. Reg. at

66,134. 

USCA Case #06-5113 Document #1041400 Filed: 05/18/2007 Page 20 of 47
21

We agree with DoD on this point. The most natural reading

of the statute is that the more stringent meet-and-confer

requirements apply only when DoD adopts regulations to

establish the new system or amends those regulations to adjust

the existing system. See 5 U.S.C. § 9902(a) (“[T]he Secretary

may, in regulations . . ., establish, and from time to time adjust,

a human resources management system . . . .”) (emphases

added). Put another way, meet-and-confer requirements apply

to promulgating regulations or to revising existing regulations.

But the less stringent statutory requirement of “continuing

collaboration” applies when DoD takes actions pursuant to

regulations – such as implementing issuances. This reading of

the statute is buttressed by the fact that requiring the full

panoply of meet-and-confer obligations when the Department

takes actions under the regulations would tie the system in knots

and greatly hinder (if not prevent) the Department’s exercise of

any discretionary authority set forth by the regulations. Cf. Time

Warner Cable v. Doyle, 66 F.3d 867, 877 (7th Cir. 1995)

(permitting agency to take into account how burdensome one

interpretation of a statute would be). 

Even if we assume that the statute is ambiguous as to which

kind of procedural requirements apply to implementing

issuances, however, we could not say that DoD’s interpretation

of these ambiguous provisions is an unreasonable way of

harmonizing the two statutory provisions. Therefore, under the

deferential Chevron framework for reviewing agency

interpretation of ambiguous statutes, we would uphold this

particular regulation even if it were unclear which statutory

collaboration requirement applied to implementing issuances.

See Nicholson, 475 F.3d at 353-55; Ass’n of Bituminous

Contractors, Inc., 156 F.3d at 1251. 

USCA Case #06-5113 Document #1041400 Filed: 05/18/2007 Page 21 of 47
22

III

Next, we address three miscellaneous challenges by the

Unions relating to: the National Security Labor Relations Board,

the standard of conduct for employee representatives, and the

appeals process.

1. Under § 9902(m)(6), the labor relations system

established by the Secretarymust “provide for independent third

party review of [labor relations] decisions, including defining

what decisions are reviewable by the third party, what third

party would conduct the review, and the standard or standards

for that review.” Under that subsection, DoD by regulation has

created the National Security Labor Relations Board, which

must decide issues related to unfair labor practices, the scope of

bargaining, the duty to bargain in good faith, exceptions to

arbitration awards, and negotiation impasses. See 5 C.F.R.

§§ 9901.907, 9901.908(b). The regulations authorize the

Secretary to appoint the members of the Board who serve for

three-year terms. Id. § 9901.907(b)(1). Under the regulations,

the members must be “independent, distinguished citizens of the

United States who are well known for their integrity,

impartiality, and expertise in labor relations, and/or the DoD

mission and/or other related national security matters.” Id.

§ 9901.907(b)(2). The Secretary will consider nominees

submitted by labor organizations that represent Department

employees. Id. § 9901.907(d)(1). 

The Unions argue that the regulations do not ensure that the

Board members are independent. We disagree. Under the

regulations, members of the Board “may be removed by the

Secretary only for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance

in office.” Id. § 9901.907(b)(2). This language mirrors the key

feature of federal statutes that create what are commonly

referred to as “independent” federal agencies. See, e.g., 5

USCA Case #06-5113 Document #1041400 Filed: 05/18/2007 Page 22 of 47
23

U.S.C. § 1202(d) (Merit Systems Protection Board); 15 U.S.C.

§ 41 (Federal Trade Commission); 42 U.S.C. § 5841(e) (Nuclear

Regulatory Commission); 49 U.S.C. § 701(b)(3) (Surface

Transportation Board); see also Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United

States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935). So too, the Federal Labor

Relations Authority, which handles labor disputes, is considered

independent because of its similar good cause removal

constraint. In light of the good cause removal provision in the

regulations, DoD’s Board meets the statutory requirement of

independent review.

The Unions offer two counter-arguments. First, they assert

that the Board is not independent because the Board can “both

investigate and adjudicate labor disputes.” Unions’ Br. at 33.

Yet the Unions do not explain how the separation of these

functions would make the Board more independent from DoD.

Nothing in the statute or in logic requires a separation of

functions within the “independent third party.” See Withrow v.

Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975); United Steelworkers of Am.,

AFL-CIO-CLC v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189, 1215 n.28 (D.C. Cir.

1980). What is more, many independent federal agencies

combine these functions. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(b), 46

(Federal Trade Commission); 47 U.S.C. §§ 204, 208 (Federal

Communications Commission). Second, the Unions claim that

the Board is not independent because it possesses unreviewable

authority to decide negotiation impasses (in contrast to its other

decisions, which are reviewed by the Federal Labor Relations

Authority). See Unions’ Br. at 34. But insulating the Board

from review by another government body does not render the

Board itself any less independent. 

In sum, the Unions have not shown that the Board lacks

independence for purposes of the statute, and we therefore reject

the Unions’ challenge to the regulation establishing the Board.

USCA Case #06-5113 Document #1041400 Filed: 05/18/2007 Page 23 of 47
24

2. The Unions have challenged the DoD regulation

providing that “[e]mployee representatives employed by the

Department are subject to the same expectations regarding

conduct as any other employee, whether they are serving in their

representative capacity or not.” 5 C.F.R. § 9901.914(a)(4). The

Unions believe that this regulation will prevent employee

representatives from engaging in “vigorous advocacy” on behalf

of DoD employees, as is required to ensure effective bargaining.

Unions’ Br. at 28-29. In response, DoD explained that “[t]he

only conduct the revised standard is intended to stop is the rare,

but utterly unacceptable use of vulgar or sexually explicit

language, as well as physical intimidation by union officials.”

Department of Defense Human Resources Management and

Labor Relations System, 70 Fed. Reg. 66,116, 66,182 (Nov. 1,

2005). According to this explanation, the Department’s intent

was “not to prevent honest and open discussion, but rather to

ensure that such discussions are undertaken in a professional and

courteous manner.” Id. We accept and defer to DoD’s

reasonable interpretation of its own regulation. As we have

often stated, “an agency’s interpretation of one of its own

regulations commands substantial judicial deference.” Drake v.

FAA, 291 F.3d 59, 68 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citing Bowles v.

Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945)). The

Department’s proffered interpretation here is a reasonable

construction of the regulation’s text and represents the

Department’s “fair and considered” judgment, given that it was

published in the Federal Register. Id. (internal quotation

omitted); cf. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 463 (1997). This

regulation does not contravene any provision of the statute, and

we uphold it. 

3. Finally, we address the Unions’ contention that the labor

relations system does not comply with the “fair treatment”

requirement of subsection (h)(1)(A) of Section 9902. That

subsection provides that “[t]he Secretary . . . may establish an

USCA Case #06-5113 Document #1041400 Filed: 05/18/2007 Page 24 of 47
25

appeals process that provides employees of the Department of

Defense organizational and functional units that are included in

the National Security Personnel System fair treatment in any

appeals that they bring in decisions relating to their

employment.” 

Under the regulations, an employee first appeals an adverse

employment decision to an administrative judge. After the

administrative judge issues an initial decision, the losing party

may appeal to designated DoD officials. See 5 C.F.R.

§ 9901.807(a), (g). After this appeal to the Department, further

appeal may be taken to the independent Merit Systems

Protection Board. Id. § 9901.807(h). Finally, the decision of the

Merit Systems Protection Board is subject to judicial review in

the courts. Id. § 9901.807(i). The appeals scheme is very

similar to that used in many other agencies, with the exception

that these regulations add a level of Merit Systems Protection

Board review.

The phrase “fair treatment” is not defined in the statute. We

believe “fair treatment” is a quintessential example of a vague

statutory standard that requires significant judicial deference to

the agency’s reasonable interpretation. See Aurora Packing Co.

v. NLRB, 904 F.2d 73, 76 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“Chevron

presumes that Congress delegated primarily to executive branch

agencies the interpretation of ambiguous terms . . . .”). Given

that deferential standard of review, we conclude that the

extensive review process outlined above easily qualifies as “fair

treatment.” 

We do not consider the Unions’ other “fair treatment”

challenges because we agree with DoD that they are not yet ripe

for judicial review under our decision in Chertoff. In Chertoff,

a regulation prevented the Merit Systems Protection Board from

mitigating a penalty that DHS imposed on an employee unless

USCA Case #06-5113 Document #1041400 Filed: 05/18/2007 Page 25 of 47
26

the penalty was “wholly without justification.” Nat’l Treasury

Employees Union v. Chertoff, 452 F.3d 839, 850 (D.C. Cir.

2006) (quoting 5 C.F.R. § 9701.706(k)(6)). We held that the

challenge to that mitigation provision was unripe for review. Id.

at 855. We stated that judicial review would benefit from a

specific application of the “wholly without justification”

mitigation standard. We also found important that the Unions

would suffer no harm from delaying review because the

mitigation standard did not have a “direct and immediate”

impact on their “primary conduct.” Id. (citing Toilet Goods

Ass’n, Inc. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158 (1967), and quoting Better

Gov’t Ass’n v. Dep’t of State, 780 F.2d 86 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). 

Here, the Unions challenge a similar mitigation standard

established in the regulations, which permits an administrative

judge to mitigate a penalty only if it is “totally unwarranted in

light of all pertinent circumstances.” 5 C.F.R.

§ 9901.807(f)(2)(ii). The Unions also object to the regulations

that give the Secretary unreviewable discretion to define

“[m]andatory removal offenses.” Id. §§ 9901.712(a),

9901.808(c). And the Unions challenge the Secretary’s

discretion to modify interim relief ordered by the Merit Systems

Protection Board. Id. § 9901.807(f)(5)(i). As in Chertoff, we

do not know how the Secretary may choose to apply these

particular regulations in specific cases. As in Chertoff, we lack

a concrete factual context to consider these challenges. And as

in Chertoff, the Unions will not be harmed by delayed review

because the “disputed procedures do not have any direct and

immediate impact on the Unions’ primary conduct.” Chertoff,

452 F.3d at 855 (internal quotations omitted). Therefore, in

light of Chertoff, we find that these provisions of the regulations

are not yet ripe for judicial review. 

* * *

USCA Case #06-5113 Document #1041400 Filed: 05/18/2007 Page 26 of 47
27

We reverse the judgment of the District Court and uphold

the DoD regulations at issue in this appeal.

So ordered.

USCA Case #06-5113 Document #1041400 Filed: 05/18/2007 Page 27 of 47
TATEL, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part: In authorizing the

Secretary of Defense to establish a new personnel system,

including a temporary labor-management relations subsystem,

the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004,

codified in relevant part at 5 U.S.C. § 9901 et. seq. (Chapter 99),

directs—in subsection (b)(4)—that any such system must

“ensure that employees may . . . bargain collectively as provided

for in this chapter.” 5 U.S.C. § 9902(b)(4). According to the

court, despite this system requirement, subsection (m), which

authorizes the Secretary to create the temporary labor relations

subsystem, empowers him to abolish collective bargaining

altogether—a position with which even the Secretary disagrees.

Because I believe that subsection (m) does no such thing, I

respectfully dissent from Parts I and II of the court’s opinion. 

I.

Chapter 99 permits the Secretary to create a new “human

resources management system.” 5 U.S.C. § 9902(a). Any new

system the Secretary creates must comply with a series of

“system requirements.” Id. § 9902(b). For example, the new

personnel system must be “flexible” and “contemporary,” may

not impinge on certain antidiscrimination and whistleblower

protections, and must include a “performance management

system” that incorporates a “fair, credible, and transparent

employee performance appraisal system.” Id. § 9902(b)(1),

(b)(2), (b)(3)(C), (b)(6)(B). At issue here is subsection (b)(4)’s

system requirement—that any new personnel system “ensure

that employees may organize, bargain collectively as provided

for in this chapter, and participate through labor organizations

of their own choosing in decisions which affect them, subject to

the provisions of this chapter and any exclusion from coverage

or limitation on negotiability established pursuant to law.” Id.

§ 9902(b)(4).

Proceeding under Chevron’s first step, the court concludes

(1) the phrase “bargain collectively as provided for in this

USCA Case #06-5113 Document #1041400 Filed: 05/18/2007 Page 28 of 47
2

chapter” unambiguously “ensures collective bargaining in the

first place only insofar as another subsection of the statute

provides for it,” Maj. Op. at 10 (emphasis added), and (2) the

only other subsection that “provides for” collective bargaining

is (d)(2), which prohibits the Secretary from waiving Chapter

71. See Maj. Op. at 10-12. Chapter 71, in turn, contains

provisions relating to and protecting federal-sector collective

bargaining. Given that subsection (m)(1) waives subsection

(d)(2), the court holds that the Secretary may create a temporary

labor relations subsystem free from subsection (b)(4)’s

collective bargaining guarantee. For several reasons, I believe

that this reading of Chapter 99 does not reflect the

“unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Chevron U.S.A.

Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843

(1984). 

To begin with, subsection (b)(4) would be entirely

superfluous if, as the court holds, it protects only the collective

bargaining provided for in subsection (d)(2). Subsection (d)(2)

incorporates Chapter 71, which declares that employees enjoy

the right “to engage in collective bargaining with respect to

conditions of employment through representatives chosen by

employees under this chapter.” 5 U.S.C. § 7102(2). If this is all

subsection (b)(4) refers to, then its guarantee of collective

bargaining “as provided for in this chapter” adds nothing to the

statute. Given this surplusage, the court’s interpretation runs

afoul of a fundamental canon of statutory construction, i.e., that

all language in a statute be given meaning. See, e.g., TRW Inc.

v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001). This surplusage, moreover,

and the ambiguity it produces are fatal to the court’s effort to

resolve this case at Chevron step one. As we held in NLRB v.

FLRA, 952 F.2d 523 (D.C. Cir. 1992), a Chevron step one

analysis is not “plausibl[e]” where it yields statutory surplusage.

Id. at 532; see also Peter Pan Bus Lines, Inc. v. Fed. Motor

Carrier Safety Admin., 471 F.3d 1350, 1354 (D.C. Cir. 2006)

USCA Case #06-5113 Document #1041400 Filed: 05/18/2007 Page 29 of 47
3

(“[The statute] contains surplusage under either reading and, as

a result, we cannot say that either proffered construction reflects

the Congress’s unambiguously expressed intent.”).

Second, the court’s interpretation produces a serious

structural defect. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco

Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000) (“In determining whether

Congress has specifically addressed the question at issue, a

reviewing court should not confine itself to examining a

particular statutory provision in isolation. The meaning—or

ambiguity—of certain words or phrases may only become

evident when placed in context.”). As the court acknowledges,

the temporary labor relations subsystem authorized by

subsection (m) is a component of the overall personnel system

authorized by subsection (a). See Maj. Op. at 5 (“Subsection

(m) of Section 9902 authorizes DoD to create a new labor

relations system within the National Security Personnel

System.”). Each of subsection (b)’s requirements, including

(b)(4)’s guarantee of collective bargaining, is a “system

requirement” for the overall personnel system. Because the

subsection (b) system requirements limit the Secretary’s

authority under Chapter 99, subsection (m)’s authorization to

create a temporary labor relations subsystem cannot, by itself,

empower the Secretary to create a subsystem free from the

statute’s system requirements. Congress could have exempted

subsection (m)’s temporary labor relations subsystem from

subsection (b)(4)’s system requirement by providing that the

authority granted by subsection (m)(1) exists notwithstanding

both subsection (d)(2) and (b)(4). But this Congress did not do.

Third, subsection (b)(4) cannot refer only to the collective

bargaining rights protected by subsection (d)(2)’s incorporation

of Chapter 71 because Chapter 71’s protections, including its

protections of collective bargaining, were waived by the very

House bill in which subsection (b)(4) originated. See Bell Atl.

USCA Case #06-5113 Document #1041400 Filed: 05/18/2007 Page 30 of 47
4

Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 131 F.3d 1044, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (noting

the tools of statutory construction used in Chevron step one

analysis “include examination of the statute’s text, legislative

history, and structure”). Subsection (b)(4) first appeared in the

Civil Service and National Security Personnel Improvement

Act, H.R. 1836, 108th Cong. § 102 (2003) (as introduced),

which was later incorporated into the House version of the

Defense appropriations bill, see National Defense Authorization

Act for Fiscal Year 2004, H.R. 1588, 108th Cong. § 1121

(2003) (as passed by the House). Although each bill contained

subsection (b)(4)’s protection of collective bargaining verbatim,

including the phrase “as provided for in this chapter,” neither

included Chapter 71 in its list of nonwaivable provisions nor

protected collective bargaining in any other way. See H.R.

1836 § 102 (listing nonwaivable provisions in proposed

§ 9902(c)(2) and failing to list Chapter 71); H.R. 1588 § 1121

(same). In other words, nothing in subsection (d)(2)’s earlier

versions “provided for” collective bargaining in the way the

court ascribes to those words. 

What, then, did these predecessor bills mean by the phrase

“bargain collectively as provided for in this chapter?” As I shall

explain in more detail in Part II, and as we recently held in

National Treasury Employees Union v. Chertoff, 452 F.3d 839

(D.C. Cir. 2006), the phrase “bargain collectively” is “a term of

art with a well-established statutory meaning.” Id. at 857.

Because that term has meaning to Congress, it had no need to

“provide for” collective bargaining elsewhere in the statute.

Instead, the words “as provided for in this chapter” signal that

other provisions of the bill modify Congress’s traditional

understanding of the term “bargain collectively.” For example,

although the duty to bargain normally attaches only at the level

of exclusive recognition, see, e.g., United Elec., Radio & Mach.

Workers v. NLRB, 986 F.2d 70, 75 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding duty

to bargain exists only with certified local bargaining unit, not its

USCA Case #06-5113 Document #1041400 Filed: 05/18/2007 Page 31 of 47
5

uncertified international), each bill granted the Secretary

authority to choose whether to bargain with national unions or

their local affiliates, see H.R. 1588 § 1121 (proposed

§ 9902(f)(2), permitting the Secretary to choose to bargain at a

level above the level of exclusive recognition); H.R. 1836

(same). Making this point explicit, the House Report states that

the bill would “provide for collective bargaining at the national

level in addition to local collective bargaining.” See H.R. REP.

NO. 108-106, at 367 (2003). Thus, as originally understood by

the House, subsection (b)(4) “provided for” collective

bargaining in ways having nothing at all to do with Chapter 71.

Taking a different approach, the Senate preserved greater

protections for collective bargaining but granted the Secretary

less flexibility in fashioning a new approach to labor relations.

Although the Senate appropriations bill contained no similar

provision establishing a new personnel system for the

Department of Defense (DoD), see H.R. REP. NO. 108-354, at

758 (2003), the Senate Committee on Government Affairs had

reported out the National Security Personnel System Act,

S. 1116, 108th Cong. (2003), which became the Senate’s

starting point for its negotiations with the House, see 149 CONG.

REC. S14,419-20 (daily ed. Nov. 11, 2003) (statement of Sen.

Warner). The Senate bill contained nothing comparable to

subsection (b)(4). See S. 1116 § 9902(b). Instead, that bill

retained the collective bargaining protections found in Chapter

71 by listing that chapter as one of several nonwaivable

provisions. Id. § 9902(c). 

Thus, both the House bill and the most comparable Senate

legislation offered some protection for collective bargaining.

The language that emerged from the Conference Committee

incorporated elements of each bill by (1) listing Chapter 71 as

a nonwaivable provision (as in the Senate bill), (2) waiving

Chapter 71 for six years (as in the House bill), and (3) adding

USCA Case #06-5113 Document #1041400 Filed: 05/18/2007 Page 32 of 47
6

the subsection (b)(4) language (from the House bill). By the

court’s logic, when Congress added Chapter 71’s protections to

subsection (d)(2)’s list of nonwaivable provisions, thereby

strengthening the House bill’s protection of collective

bargaining rights, it actually radically redefined subsection

(b)(4), confining its system requirement to subsection (d)(2) and

freeing the Secretary to eviscerate collective bargaining

altogether—something Congress apparently accomplished

without amending or even referencing subsection (b)(4). I

understand Chapter 99 quite differently. By adding Chapter 71

to subsection (d)(2)’s list of nonwaivable provisions and

then—in subsection (m)—promptly waiving that same chapter

for six years, Congress indicated that the Secretary’s authority

to experiment with a new labor relations subsystem (as

advocated by the House) was time-limited, not that the

Secretary could exercise that authority without regard to

Chapter 99’s system requirements.

The court points to several floor statements in support of

the proposition that Congress understood the conference report

to have radically departed from both the House and Senate

versions of the DoD personnel bill. See Maj. Op. at 15-16. The

views of even these opponents of the bill, however, were far

from unanimous. Key senators made clear that although the

conference report left the Department free to depart from some

elements of Chapter 71, any temporary labor relations

subsystem must still comply with core elements of that chapter.

For example, Senator Collins, the Senate bill’s chief sponsor

and the chief Senate Republican conferee on this issue,

explained that while DoD had initially sought authority “to

waive virtually all personnel laws and regulations,” she was

“pleased we have not included that authority” in the final bill

and noted that she “fully expect[s] the labor relations system

developed by the Department will abide by the principles

enumerated in [C]hapter 71.” 149 CONG. REC. S14,428.

USCA Case #06-5113 Document #1041400 Filed: 05/18/2007 Page 33 of 47
7

Agreeing, Senator Levin stressed that the compromise provided

“substantially better [collective bargaining protections] . . . than

comparable provisions included in the House bill.” Id. at

S14,439.

II.

As mentioned above, our recent decision in National

Treasury Employees Union v. Chertoff, 452 F.3d 839 (D.C. Cir.

2006), is critical to a proper understanding of the phrase

“bargain collectively as provided for in this chapter.” There, we

held that “[i]n the context of federal sector labor-relations,

collective bargaining is a term of art with a well-established

statutory meaning.” Id. at 857. In Chertoff, we dealt with a

statute that, like Chapter 99, permits a federal agency—in that

case, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—to create

a new personnel system. Also like Chapter 99, the DHS statute

requires that any new system “ensure that employees may . . .

bargain collectively.” 5 U.S.C. § 9701(b)(4); see Chertoff, 452

F.3d at 856-57. In determining the scope of this system

requirement, we held that the meaning of the term “bargain

collectively” derives from Chapter 71, which provides “the

framework for basic collective bargaining for most federal

sector employees.” Chertoff, 452 F.3d at 843. We reached this

conclusion despite the fact that the DHS statute permits

DHS—just like Chapter 99 permits DoD—to modify Chapter

71’s provisions regarding labor-management relations, including

those having some relation to collective bargaining. We

explained: 

The Government argues that the Department was free

to “modify the collective bargaining provisions” of

Chapter 71 in promulgating a new HR system

pursuant to the [Homeland Security Act (HSA)]. This

is undoubtedly correct. But nothing in the HSA

USCA Case #06-5113 Document #1041400 Filed: 05/18/2007 Page 34 of 47
8

suggests that the meaning of “collective bargaining”

under Chapter 71 could be disregarded by the

Department in its promulgation of the HR system.

There are many “provisions” relating to collective

bargaining in Chapter 71—e.g., resort to [the Federal

Labor Relations Authority], determination of

appropriate units, handling of refusal-to-bargain

complaints, exceptions to arbitral awards, and use of

an impasses panel—that the Department was free to

ignore in its Final Rule. The core meaning of

“collective bargaining” itself, however, could not be

ignored or supplanted. Why? Because the HSA

states explicitly that, in establishing a new HR system,

the Department “shall” 

ensure that employees may organize, bargain

collectively, and participate through labor

organizations of their own choosing in

decisions which affect them, subject to any

exclusion from coverage or limitation on

negotiability established by law.

5 U.S.C. § 9701(b)(4). This statutory obligation is

mandatory, not optional. And if, as shown above,

“collective bargaining” means the same thing under

both the HSA and the FSLMS, then application of the

term under the latter statute cannot possibly be

irrelevant to an understanding of how the term applies

under the former.

Chertoff, 452 F.3d at 858 (internal citation omitted).

Here we face a similar statute. See also Smith v. City of

Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 233 (2005) (noting “when Congress uses

the same language in two statutes having similar purposes,

USCA Case #06-5113 Document #1041400 Filed: 05/18/2007 Page 35 of 47
9

particularly when one is enacted shortly after the other, it is

appropriate to presume that Congress intended that text to have

the same meaning in both statutes”). Enacted just one year after

the DHS statute, Chapter 99 protects collective bargaining in

language that mirrors the DHS statute word for word, except

that it adds the two emphasized phrases:

(b) Any system established under subsection (a) shall

. . .

(4) ensure that employees may organize,

bargain collectively as provided for in this

chapter, and participate through labor

organizations of their own choosing in

decisions which affect them, subject to the

provisions of this chapter and any exclusion

from coverage or limitation or negotiability

established pursuant to law.

5 U.S.C § 9902(b)(4) (emphasis added); see 5 U.S.C.

§ 9701(b)(4). Congress added this new language not to give

meaning to the term “bargain collectively” (as the court

suggests), but rather to make clear that elsewhere in Chapter 99

it was modifying the “core meaning” of collective bargaining in

order to give the Secretary additional flexibility. For example,

in Chertoff we held that granting an employing agency unilateral

authority to abrogate collective bargaining agreements conflicts

with the core meaning of collective bargaining. Chertoff, 452

F.3d at 860. Yet subsection (m)(8), which provides that the

temporary labor relations subsystem will “supersede all other

collective bargaining agreements,” 5 U.S.C. § 9902(m)(8), gives

the Secretary just this power. Similarly, under Chapter 71,

although employing agencies may not bargain over their

authority to assign employees, see 5 U.S.C. § 7106(a)(2), they

must negotiate over the procedures by which they exercise that

authority, see id. § 7106(b)(2). Chapter 99, however, states that

USCA Case #06-5113 Document #1041400 Filed: 05/18/2007 Page 36 of 47
10

no provision of Title 5 shall limit the Secretary’s authority to

create a personnel system that regulates “the methods of

assigning, reassigning, detailing, transferring, or promoting

employees.” 5 U.S.C. § 9902(k)(1)(B). Through such

provisions, Congress demonstrated just how collective

bargaining “as provided for in this chapter” differs from

collective bargaining’s core meaning. 

The court accuses me of “distort[ing] the plain meaning of

the phrase ‘as provided for,’ reading it to mean ‘unless

otherwise provided for.’” Maj. Op. at 12. My reading,

however, is driven by Chertoff, our obligation to avoid statutory

surplusage, and Chapter 99’s legislative history. To be sure,

Congress could have written subsection (b)(4) to read “except

as otherwise provided for” instead of “as provided for.” But

given Chertoff, the current language means exactly the same

thing. Imagine a statute allowing sixteen-year-olds to “drive as

provided for in this statute,” but providing elsewhere that they

may not do so without an adult in the car or after sunset. No

one would say that because this statute fails to “provide for” an

affirmative definition of driving, the DMV could issue

regulations barring all driving by sixteen-year-olds. Nor would

anyone fail to understand that the legislature instead used the

words “as provided for” to clarify that the driving authorized for

sixteen-year-olds differs from the normal rules of the road. The

same is true here. Just as my imaginary legislature understood

the term “drive,” Congress, according to Chertoff, understood

the term “bargain collectively,” leaving it with no need to define

the term elsewhere in Chapter 99. Likewise, just as my

hypothetical statute modifies the common meaning of “driving”

by requiring supervising adults and barring night-time driving,

Chapter 99 modifies collective bargaining’s core meaning by

permitting national-level bargaining and prohibiting bargaining

over the methods of assigning employees.

USCA Case #06-5113 Document #1041400 Filed: 05/18/2007 Page 37 of 47
11

The court finds my hypothetical unhelpful because “the real

statute in this case does provide for collective bargaining.” Maj.

Op. at 12. But this argument merely restates the court’s

conclusion, i.e., that the words “as provided for” make sense

only if they refer to an affirmative definition elsewhere in the

statute. As the hypothetical demonstrates, however, this is

hardly the only plausible interpretation of “as provided for.”

Indeed, the House bill in which subsection (b)(4) first appeared

contained no definition of collective bargaining, thus

demonstrating that the House understood the phrase “as

provided for” to refer not to an affirmative definition of

collective bargaining rights, but rather to limitations on

collective bargaining found elsewhere in the statute. See supra

pp. 3-5.

That said, I recognize that my reading of the statute does

create surplusage within subsection (b)(4) itself because that

subsection also states that its requirements are “subject to the

provisions of this chapter.” See Maj. Op. at 12. Because such

surplusage makes it impossible to resolve this case at Chevron

step one, see supra pp. 2-3, I would proceed to Chevron’s next

step, deferring to the Secretary’s interpretation of the statute so

long as it is “reasonable.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.

The Secretary’s interpretation of the statute is quite clear:

subsection (m)(1)’s waiver of Chapter 71 neither frees him from

subsection (b)(4)’s system requirement nor permits him to

abolish collective bargaining altogether. Describing the scope

of his Chapter 99 authority to create the temporary labor

relations subsystem, the Secretary stated in the preamble to the

challenged regulation that the statute “requir[es] that employees

be authorized to bargain collectively, as provided for in

[C]hapter 99 (not as provided for in [C]hapter 71).”

Department of Defense Human Resources Management and

Labor Relations Systems, 70 Fed. Reg. 66,116, 66,177 (Nov. 1,

USCA Case #06-5113 Document #1041400 Filed: 05/18/2007 Page 38 of 47
12

2005). Far from contending that subsection (b)(4) has no

application to the temporary labor relations subsystem, the

Secretary instead insisted that the subsystem fully complies

with this system requirement:

The labor relations system is consistent with the

general parameters Congress provided, including the

process for involving employee representatives (see 5

U.S.C. 9902(m)(3) and (4)). It mandated that the new

system may not expand the scope of collective

bargaining beyond the scope of bargaining available

today under chapter 71, even where provisions of title

5 are waived or waivable (5 U.S.C. 9902(m)(7)), and

required that employees be authorized to organize and

bargain collectively within the framework established

in chapter 99, that is, within the framework of a

system that promotes a collaborative issue-based

approach to labor relations and which is developed,

established, and implemented to enable the

Department’s civilian workforce to better support the

Department’s national security mission (5 U.S.C.

9902(b)(4)).

Id. at 66,176 (second and third emphases added); see also id. at

66,177 (“Consistent with the enabling legislation, the labor

relations system specifically recognizes the right of employees

to organize and bargain collectively subject to limitations

established by law . . . .”). 

Reiterating this view here, the Secretary argues that “[t]he

NDAA’s requirement that NSPS [the personnel system] ensure

collective bargaining thus contemplates that DoD and [the

Office of Personnel Management] should tailor their new labor

relations system to DoD’s national security mission, in ways that

may differ from the manner in which ‘collective bargaining’ is

USCA Case #06-5113 Document #1041400 Filed: 05/18/2007 Page 39 of 47
13

understood elsewhere.” Appellants’ Br. 30 (emphasis added).

Similarly, at oral argument, DoD counsel stated that “[t]his labor

relations system that Congress authorized to be crafted is not

tied to Chapter 78 [sic], or any other collective bargaining

system, because the statute provides that employees may bargain

collectively as provided for in this chapter, and subject to the

provisions of this chapter, Section 9902(b)(4).” Oral Arg. Tr. 3.

Indeed, asked point blank whether the Secretary has authority to

eliminate collective bargaining altogether, agency counsel

answered no. See Oral Arg. Tr. 7-8. I would defer to this

perfectly reasonable interpretation of Chapter 99.

III.

Although the Secretary agrees with me that subsection

(b)(4)’s protections apply to the temporary labor relations

subsystem, he goes on to assert that in determining the extent of

collective bargaining protected by this system requirement—a

conceptually distinct question—we should look neither to

Chapter 71 nor Chertoff, but rather to DoD’s own regulation.

Relying on subsection (m)(1), the Secretary argues that

Congress granted him “broad authority to redefine collective

bargaining within the framework of DoD.” Appellants’ Br. 31.

Thus, according to the Secretary, the definition of “bargain

collectively as provided for in this chapter” includes not only the

substantive changes to the core meaning of collective bargaining

found in Chapter 99, but also the temporary labor relations

subsystem the Secretary himself creates. See 5 C.F.R.

§ 9901.903 (defining the word “collective bargaining” by

adopting, nearly word for word, the definition of collective

bargaining found in Chapter 71, but qualifying the obligation to

bargain by adding that such obligation must be met “pursuant to

5 U.S.C. [§] 9902 and this subpart” (emphasis added)); compare

with 5 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(12) (defining collective bargaining in

Chapter 71). 

USCA Case #06-5113 Document #1041400 Filed: 05/18/2007 Page 40 of 47
14

As the unions correctly argue, the Secretary’s interpretation

runs counter to Chertoff, which also explains why the court’s

alternative Chevron step two holding fails. In Chertoff, DHS

argued—much as the Secretary does here—that the mere

authority to create a new human resources system freed it from

the statute’s system requirements, including protections for

collective bargaining. See Chertoff, 452 F.3d at 856-57.

Finding that argument “completely unconvincing,” Chertoff

explains that because Congress “specif[ied] ‘system

requirements’ that DHS must follow in promulgating a [human

resources] system,” DHS “does not have a free hand to construct

a [human resources] system entirely as it prefers.” Id. So too

here. Although Chapter 99 authorizes the Secretary to create a

temporary labor relations subsystem that modifies Chapter 71

and “address[es] the unique role that the Department’s civilian

workforce plays in supporting the Department’s national

security mission,” the Secretary may not create that subsystem

free from Congress’s overall system requirements, including

subsection (b)(4)’s protection of collective bargaining. The

addition of the phrases “as provided for in this chapter” and

“subject to the provisions of this chapter” to subsection (b)(4)’s

collective bargaining system requirement does not distinguish

this case from Chertoff. As the Secretary agrees, those phrases

refer to substantive restrictions on collective bargaining rights

found elsewhere in the statute. Subsection (m)(1), however,

contains no substantive modification of core collective

bargaining rights. Just as the statute at issue in Chertoff gave

DHS general authority to promulgate a new personnel system,

subsection (m)(1) vests the Secretary with general authority to

create the temporary labor relations subsystem; it says nothing

at all about collective bargaining. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at

842-43 (“If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the

matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to

the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”).

USCA Case #06-5113 Document #1041400 Filed: 05/18/2007 Page 41 of 47
15

The Secretary, however, is not without significant

flexibility. In devising the temporary labor relations subsystem,

the Secretary has no obligation to comply with any part of

Chapter 71 that does not implicate the core meaning of

collective bargaining. Moreover, he may, pursuant to subsection

(b)(4), depart from the core meaning of collective bargaining to

the extent authorized elsewhere in Chapter 99. Applying these

principles, I would hold that most, but not all, of the challenged

regulation complies with subsection (b)(4)’s system

requirement. I’ll begin with the provisions that comply.

First, as the court notes, the regulation imposes conduct

restrictions on employee representatives, requiring them to meet

the same standards imposed on all DoD civilian employees. See

Maj. Op. at 24; 5 C.F.R. § 9901.914(a)(4). Union-appellants

fear that such a requirement could unduly impede the vigorous

advocacy essential to effective collective bargaining. I agree

with the court, however, that we should defer to the Secretary’s

interpretation of the regulation as barring only “vulgar or

sexually explicit language” and “physical intimidation.” 70 Fed.

Reg. at 66,182; see, e.g., Wyo. Outdoor Council v. U.S. Forest

Serv., 165 F.3d 43, 52 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“The agency’s

construction of its own regulation is controlling ‘unless it is

plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.’” (quoting

United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864, 872 (1977))). So

construed, the regulation intrudes not at all on the core meaning

of collective bargaining because it is “preposterous” to think that

“employees are incapable of . . . exercising their . . . statutory

rights without resort to abusive or threatening language or

without resort to a physical response.” Dep’t of the Air Force v.

FLRA, 294 F.3d 192, 201 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted).

Second, under the regulation, “implementing issuances”—

directives that “carry out a policy or procedure implementing”

USCA Case #06-5113 Document #1041400 Filed: 05/18/2007 Page 42 of 47
16

the new personnel system, 5 C.F.R. § 9901.103—supersede any

conflicting provisions contained in collective bargaining

agreements. 5 C.F.R. § 9901.905(a). In Chertoff, we found

such authority to be flatly inconsistent with the core meaning of

collective bargaining. Chertoff, 452 F.3d at 858-60. But unlike

the statute at issue there, Chapter 99 expressly states that “the

labor relations system developed or adjusted under this

subsection . . . shall supersede all other collective bargaining

agreements.” 5 U.S.C. § 9902(m)(8). This provision represents

a clear example of how Congress “provided for” collective

bargaining differently than it had in the statute at issue in

Chertoff.

Third, the challenged regulation expands the range of

management rights issues not subject to collective bargaining to

include procedures governing “hir[ing], assign[ing], and

direct[ing] employees in the Department; . . . assign[ing] work,

mak[ing] determinations with respect to contracting out, and . .

. determin[ing] the personnel by which Departmental operations

may be conducted.” 5 C.F.R. § 9901.910(a)(2), (b). Under

Chapter 71, procedures regarding such issues are negotiable.

See 5 U.S.C. § 7106(b)(2). By contrast, Chapter 99 states that

no provision of Title 5 may limit the Secretary’s authority to

promulgate regulations regarding the “methods of assigning,

reassigning, detailing, transferring, or promoting employees.”

5 U.S.C. § 9902(k)(1)(B). Although I think it not entirely clear

whether Congress, by using the term “methods,” intended to

give the Secretary sole and nonnegotiable authority to determine

the “procedures” for each of these employment actions, the

Secretary’s construction of that term seems quite reasonable,

and the unions offer no basis for concluding otherwise. See

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 (“[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous

with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is

whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible

construction of the statute.”).

USCA Case #06-5113 Document #1041400 Filed: 05/18/2007 Page 43 of 47
17

In certain other respects, however, I agree with the unions

that the regulation’s management rights provision runs counter

to Chapter 99. For example, the regulation allows “any

management official or supervisor . . . to take whatever other

actions may be necessary to carry out the Department’s

mission.” 5 C.F.R. § 9901.910(a), (a)(2). In Chertoff, we

invalidated an identical regulation, explaining that it would

“[p]resumably . . . empower[] DHS to take any matter off the

bargaining table at any time, regardless of what concessions

have already been made by union representatives.” Chertoff,

452 F.3d at 862. As the Secretary wisely concedes, insofar as

this provision extends beyond the authority granted in

subsection (k)(1), the district court correctly determined that the

regulation violates subsection (b)(4). See Appellants’ Br. 33

n.1. 

The new management rights provision also bars negotiation

over the procedures through which management “determine[s]

. . . the technology, methods, and means of performing work.”

5 C.F.R. § 9901.910(a)(2), (b). This provision precludes

bargaining over the procedures regarding many day-to-day

operational matters, yet I see nothing in Chapter 71 recognizing

such a broad management right, see generally 5 U.S.C. § 9701,

nor can subsection (k)(1) be so construed. To be sure,

subsection (k)(1) frees the Secretary from any duty to bargain

over “assigning, reassigning, detailing, transferring, or

promoting employees,” 5 U.S.C. § 9902(k)(1)(B) (emphasis

added), but the subsection says nothing at all about the methods

and means of performing work.

The regulation restricts collective bargaining with respect to

management rights in still another way: it limits the scope of

bargaining over “appropriate arrangements” for employees

adversely affected by the exercise of management rights. See 5

USCA Case #06-5113 Document #1041400 Filed: 05/18/2007 Page 44 of 47
18

C.F.R. § 9901.910(f)(2). Under Chapter 71, such appropriate

arrangements are always negotiable, see 5 U.S.C. § 7106(b)(3),

and even under the challenged regulation, management must

negotiate over appropriate arrangements for employees affected

by the exercise of management rights protected by 5 C.F.R.

§ 9901.910(a)(3), including the authority “[t]o lay off and retain

employees, or to suspend; remove; reduce in pay, pay band, or

grade; or take other disciplinary action against such employees.”

See 5 C.F.R. § 9901.910(a)(3), (f)(1)(i). With respect to the

exercise of other management rights, including the previously

described rights to assign employees and determine the methods

and means of work, the unions assert that the regulation requires

negotiation regarding only “personal hardships and safety

measures.” Appellees’ Br. 27 (quoting 5 C.F.R.

§ 9901.910(f)(1)(ii)). This is incorrect. The regulation states

that the “[a]ppropriate arrangements within the duty to bargain

include proposals on matters such as personal hardships and

safety measures.” 5 C.F.R. § 9901.910(f)(1)(ii) (emphasis

added). By using the word “include,” the Secretary made clear

that this list of negotiable appropriate arrangements is by no

means exclusive. 

The regulation, however, goes on to narrow significantly the

Secretary’s duty to bargain over appropriate arrangements:

“[T]he duty to bargain do[es] not include proposals on matters

such as the routine assignment to specific duties, shifts, or work

on a regular or overtime basis.” Id. § 9901.910(f)(2). In

Chertoff we held that a similar regulation conflicted with

collective bargaining’s core meaning, see Chertoff, 452 F.3d at

862 (invalidating regulation that similarly took these issues off

the table, but also constrained negotiation over all appropriate

arrangements to exercise of management rights that had “a

significant and substantial impact on the bargaining unit, or on

those employees in that part of the bargaining unit affected by

the action or event”); see also 5 C.F.R. § 9701.511(e)(2)(i).

USCA Case #06-5113 Document #1041400 Filed: 05/18/2007 Page 45 of 47
19

Nothing in Chapter 99 authorizes a different result here.

Although subsection (k)(1) does expand management rights,

neither that subsection nor anything else in Chapter 99 permits

the Secretary to restrict the right to negotiate over arrangements

designed to mitigate the effects of the exercise of management

rights.

Finally, the regulation prohibits all employees from

bargaining collectively regarding their pay. See 5 C.F.R.

§§ 9901.305 (providing that pay system is not subject to

bargaining), 9901.903 (barring bargaining regarding “[t]he pay

of any employee or for any position”). Federal law prohibits

U.S. government employees whose wages are set by statute

from bargaining over their compensation. See Fort Stewart Sch.

v. FLRA, 495 U.S. 641, 649 (1990) (“The wages and fringe

benefits of the overwhelming majority of Executive Branch

employees are fixed by law, in accordance with the General

Schedules of the Civil Service Act, and are therefore eliminated

from the definition of ‘conditions of employment’ [that are

subject to a duty to bargain].” (internal citation omitted)).

DoD’s workforce, however, includes employees who work for

what are known as non-appropriated fund instrumentalities

(NAFIs), organizations whose funding comes from user fees and

whose employees have historically bargained over their rate of

pay. See Appellees’ Br. 29. Such employees include those

working in DoD schools, day care centers, and cafeterias. Under

the challenged regulation, NAFI employees no longer enjoy the

right to bargain over their pay. The Secretary offers two

arguments in support of his authority to make this change,

neither of which is convincing. 

First, the Secretary cites his Chapter 99 authority to create

a new “pay for performance evaluation system.” 5 U.S.C.

§ 9902(b)(6)(I). Yet the Secretary nowhere explains how

subsection (b)(4)’s collective bargaining system requirement

USCA Case #06-5113 Document #1041400 Filed: 05/18/2007 Page 46 of 47
20

conflicts with a pay for performance system. In fact, as the

unions explain, the mechanics of how pay for performance

would work, including the base level of pay, the evaluation

criteria, and the degree to which employees are rewarded (or

punished) for their job performance, all represent perfectly

acceptable subjects of collective bargaining. See Appellees’ Br.

30.

Second, falling back on his general argument that subsection

(m)(1) permits him to redefine collective bargaining, the

Secretary asserts that since most federal employees may not

bargain over their pay, nothing inherent in the term “collective

bargaining” protects that right. But this argument ignores the

fact that “most” federal employees may not bargain over their

wages because their compensation is set by statute. The

Secretary never explains how Chapter 99 permits him to prohibit

collective bargaining over compensation by employees whose

pay is not set by statute. 

IV.

In sum, the court’s Chevron step one analysis fails because

nothing in Chapter 99 “unambiguously” permits the Secretary

to abolish collective bargaining altogether. I would defer to the

Secretary’s perfectly reasonable interpretation that subsection

(b)(4) applies to subsection (m)’s temporary labor relations

subsystem. The Secretary’s later conclusion that he may define

subsection (b)(4)’s protections as he sees fit, however, runs

counter to Chertoff. Any departure from the core meaning of

collective bargaining must be authorized by Chapter 99.

Applying this standard, I would vacate several aspects of the

regulation’s expansion of management rights, as well as its

abolition of collective bargaining over NAFI pay.

USCA Case #06-5113 Document #1041400 Filed: 05/18/2007 Page 47 of 47