Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-02016/USCOURTS-casd-3_13-cv-02016-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

INDUSTRIAL TECHNOLOGY

RESEARCH INSTITUTE,

Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant,

CASE NO. 3:13-cv-2016-GPC-WVG

ORDER GRANTING LG

ELECTRONICS,INC. AND LG

ELECTRONICS U.S.A. INC.’S

MOTION TO STRIKE AND

PRECLUDE PLAINTIFF FROM

OFFERING CERTAIN UNTIMELY

CLAIM CONSTRUCTIONS

[ECF No. 40]

v.

LG ELECTRONICS, INC., and LG

ELECTRONICS U.S.A., INC.,

Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs.

and

LG DISPLAY CO., LTD.,

Intervenor.

I. INTRODUCTION

Before the court is LG Electronics, Inc. and LG Electronics U.S.A., Inc.’s

(collectively, “LGE”) Motion to Strike and Preclude Plaintiff from Offering Certain

UntimelyClaimConstructions.(ECFNo. 40.) PlaintiffIndustrialTechnology Research

Institute (“ITRI”) opposes. (ECF No. 87.) LGE replied to ITRI’s opposition. (ECF No. 

93.) Based on a review of the moving papers, admissible evidence, and applicable law,

the Court GRANTS LGE’s motion to strike.

/ /

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II. BACKGROUND

On March 25, 2014, the magistrate judge issued the Case Management

Conference Order Regulating Discovery and Other Pretrial Proceedings in a Patent

Case (the “CMC Order”). (ECF No. 22.) The CMC Order set the deadline for initial

proposed constructions asJune 23, 2014, and the deadline for responsive constructions

as July 7, 2014. (Id. at 4–5.) On June 23, 2014, the parties submitted their initial

proposed claim constructions. (See ECF No. 40-3, Ex. 1; ECF No. 40-4, Ex. 2.) LGE’s

initial constructions contained an assertion that the language “sufficiently thinner” was

indefinite, but did not contain proposed constructionsfor the terms “sufficiently thinner

. . .” or “uniform rubbing.” (See ECF No. 40-3, Ex. 1.) ITRI did not initially propose

any constructions. (ECF No. 40-4, Ex. 2.) On July 7, 2014, ITRI submitted its

responsive constructions, including proposed constructions for the terms “sufficiently

thinner . . .” and “uniform rubbing.” (ECF No. 40-5, Ex. 3.)

III. DISCUSSION

LGE argues that ITRI’s proposed construction for the term “uniform rubbing”

was late and should be stricken. (ECF No. 40, at 2.) ITRI responds that its proposed

construction was responsive and thus timely. (ECF No. 87, at 2–3.) Generally, good

cause must be shown for failure to comply with a court deadline. FED. R. CIV. P.

6(b)(1).

ITRI first argues that its proposed construction of the term “uniform rubbing”

was responsive to LGE’s contention that “sufficiently thinner” is indefinite. (ECF No.

87, at 2–3.) However, the CMC Order only allows responsive constructionsin response

to “the other party’s proposed construction,” (see CMC Order, at 5), and LGE did not

offer a proposed construction for the term “uniform rubbing.” Accordingly, the Court

finds that ITRI’s proposed construction of “uniform rubbing” was not responsive and

thus was an initial proposed construction. As the deadline for initial proposed

constructions was June 23, 2014, the Court finds that ITRI’s proposed construction of

“uniform rubbing” is untimely.

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ITRI next argues that its late proposed construction will not prejudice LGE

because ITRI “disclosed and provided extrinsic evidence for ‘uniform rubbing’”

approximately two weeks before the deadline to file the joint claim construction

documents, approximately six weeks before the claimconstruction discovery deadline,

and approximately ten weeks before the deadline to file claimconstruction briefs. (ECF

No. 87, at 5–6.) Merely because the delay will not prejudice LGE does not constitute

“good cause” and ITRI’s contention that construction of “uniform rubbing” is

“significant to the resolution of the case” does not constitute “good cause” for failure

to comply with the CMC Order. (See id. at 5.)

Moreover, LGE could have waited to assert its indefiniteness argument until the

summary judgment stage. See, e.g., Lisle Corp. v. A.J. Mfg. Co., 398 F.3d 1306, 1309

(Fed. Cir. 2005) (affirming a district court order where the issue of indefiniteness was

decided on summary judgment); (see also ECF No. 65-1, at 2 (ITRI argued that the

Court should “preclude LG from arguing indefiniteness of the claim language

‘sufficiently thinner’ during claim construction proceedings and defer such arguments

for the summary judgment stage.”). Indeed, the Court has already ordered that LGE’s

indefiniteness arguments be postponed until the summary judgment stage. (See ECF

No. 148.) The fact that LGE essentially tipped its hand in its initial proposed

constructions does not constitute “good cause” for ITRI’s failure to comply with the

deadline for initial proposed constructions.

Sua sponte, the Court now considers whether it is appropriate to strike ITRI’s

proposed construction of the term “sufficiently thinner . . . .” ITRI’s proposed

construction of the term “sufficiently thinner . . .” appears to be in response to LGE’s

contention that “sufficiently thinner” is indefinite. (See ECF No. 40-5, Ex. 3.)

However, an assertion of indefiniteness is not a proposed construction but rather an

argument regarding validity. See Froessl v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. 01-cv-20924,

2002 WL 34455177, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2002) (“the issue of indefiniteness is

one of validity rather than claim construction”). Thus ITRI’s proposed construction of

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“sufficiently thinner . . .” was not responsive and was an initial proposed construction.

As the Court has already stricken LGE from arguing indefiniteness at the claims

construction hearing, (see ECF No. 148), the Court findsit appropriate to strike ITRI’s

late proposed construction of the term “sufficiently thinner . . . .” Accordingly, the

Court STRIKES ITRI’s proposed constructions for the terms “uniform rubbing” and

“sufficiently thinner . . . .”

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that LGE’s Motion to

Strike is GRANTED and the Court STRIKES ITRI’s construction of the term

“uniform rubbing.” Additionally, the Court also STRIKES ITRI’s construction of the

term “sufficiently thinner . . . .”

DATED: December 8, 2014

HON. GONZALO P. CURIEL

United States District Judge

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