Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_90-cv-00520/USCOURTS-caed-2_90-cv-00520-385/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

AND THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT COMPOSED OF THREE JUDGES 

PURSUANT TO SECTION 2284, TITLE 28 UNITED STATES CODE

RALPH COLEMAN, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER,

et al.,

Defendants.

NO. CIV S-90-0520 LKK JFM P

THREE-JUDGE COURT

MARCIANO PLATA, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER,

et al.,

Defendants.

NO. C01-1351 TEH

THREE-JUDGE COURT

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO

STAY AUGUST 4, 2009 ORDER

On August 4, 2009, this court issued an opinion and order finding that plaintiffs had

met their burden under the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3626, to establish

that crowding was the primary cause of the constitutionally inadequate medical and mental

health care systems at issue in the underlying cases and that a prisoner release order was

necessary to remedy those violations. The Coleman case, which concerns inmate mental

health care, was filed nearly two decades ago and has been in the remedial phase since 1995. 

The Plata case, which concerns inmate medical care, was filed eight years ago and entered

the remedial phase in 2002, with a receiver appointed in 2006 after the state’s admitted

failure to implement agreed-upon reforms. After hearing fourteen days of live testimony

Case 2:90-cv-00520-KJM-SCR Document 3662 Filed 09/03/09 Page 1 of 5
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commencing on November 18, 2008, and reviewing dozens of trial declarations and expert

reports in addition to hundreds of exhibits, this court concluded that crowding was the

primary cause of the constitutional violations at issue in both cases and that no relief that did

not include a prisoner release order – defined broadly by the statute as any order having “the

purpose or effect of reducing or limiting the prison population, or that directs the release

from or nonadmission of prisoners to a prison,” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(4) – could remedy those

violations. We further found, based on the evidence presented at trial, including reports

commissioned and proposals made by the state itself, that a prisoner population reduction

could be achieved without adversely impacting public safety or the operation of the criminal

justice system and that, in fact, California’s crowded prisons are criminogenic environments

that themselves have a substantial negative impact on public safety.

Rather than ordering any specific mechanisms for reducing California’s prison

population, we instead ordered defendants to present the court with a plan “that will in no

more than two years reduce the population of the CDCR’s adult institutions to 137.5% of

their combined design capacity.” Aug. 4, 2009 Opinion & Order at 183. We determined the

order to be narrowly tailored, to extend no further than necessary, and to be the least

intrusive means possible to correct the constitutional violations at issue. We also recognized

the importance of preserving the state’s discretion, as well as the limited role of the federal

courts. As we noted near the outset of our opinion, “[w]e recognize the gravity of the

population reduction order we issue herein, and we do not intervene in matters of prison

population lightly. Nonetheless, when federal court intervention becomes the only means by

which to enforce rights guaranteed by the Constitution, federal courts are obligated to act.” 

Id. at 9.

Defendants now seek a stay of our order to develop a population reduction plan

pending their appeal of that interlocutory order to the United States Supreme Court. In our

opinion and order, we stated that we “will not grant any stay of the proceedings prior to the

issuance of the final population reduction plan, but will entertain motions to stay

implementation of that plan pending the resolution of any appeal to the Supreme Court.” Id.

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at 183. In other words, we stated that we would entertain motions to stay our final order

once it was issued, to the effect that the state would not be required to put any population

reduction order into effect until after the Supreme Court had the opportunity to consider the

legality of that order; we also stated, however, that we would not stay any interim order

designed to require the state to help inform this court of its position and to allow the court to

develop a plan that would take into account the state’s proposals. After carefully reviewing

the state defendants’ written arguments, we do not find good cause to alter our decision.

As we have explained, our August 4, 2009 order requires simply the development of a

plan; it does not require implementation of any population reduction measures. The first step

towards the development of a plan is the state’s submission of a proposed plan by

September 18, 2009. Plaintiffs and intervenors will then have until October 8, 2009, to file

any objections to the state’s proposal, as well as to propose modifications to the state’s

proposed plan or suggestions for additional actions. Defendants will then have until

October 23, 2009, to file a response to any submissions by the plaintiffs and intervenors.

We have set no fixed time limit for completing the process of developing a final

population reduction plan, although time is of the essence, and we may, after considering all

of the written submissions, find it necessary to obtain additional information from the parties

or intervenors, or to hold further hearings prior to approving a final plan. The state will be

required to take no action with respect to implementing any components of a population

reduction order until all of these proceedings are completed, and then, should it appeal, we

will entertain a motion to stay any action until the Supreme Court has reviewed the final

court-ordered plan.

In considering an application for stay, courts must consider:

(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he

is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will

be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the

stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the

proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.

Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987). Applying these factors to this case, we first

find little, if any, likelihood that the state could prevail on its appeal from our interlocutory

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Were we to apply the Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct.

365 (2008), test for the issuance of a preliminary injunction to the stay sought here, we

would reach precisely the same result with respect to each of the four factors.

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order to provide a population reduction plan. To the extent that defendants would seek a stay

on the merits of an order to implement any such plan, no such order exists. Moreover, as we

have noted, in our August 4, 2009 order, we stated that once a final population reduction plan

has been issued, we will entertain motions to stay implementation of the plan pending

resolution of an appeal to the Supreme Court. Second, developing a plan to resolve the stateacknowledged crisis in the prisons will not under any circumstances constitute irreparable

harm to the state, but will be of benefit to it in its efforts to bring to an end the

unconstitutional conditions in its prisons, as well as the detriments that flow therefrom – to

the state, its prisoners, the prison guards, and the public. Indeed, the state has already

completed much of the necessary work to develop a plan that could satisfy much or all of our

order, with the Governor’s population reduction proposals having been recently considered

and adopted (in full by one house and in part by the other) by the California Legislature. 

Third, the balance of the equities is in favor of development of a plan rather than in delaying

such development for another year or more. Constitutional deprivations are now occurring

and are adversely affecting the health and mental health of many thousands of prisoners in

the California prison system. Plaintiffs have been seeking relief from these deprivations for

almost two decades, and, under the terms of our August 4, 2009 order, the state will have two

more years to resolve crowded prison conditions once a final plan is ordered by this court,

even aside from any delay resulting from a stay issued pending appeal on the merits and the

final resolution of the matter by the Supreme Court. No equitable purpose whatsoever could

be served by further delays in formulating a plan. Finally, the public interest lies in the

state’s making progress towards resolving its prison crisis, which includes the undisputed

crowding that led the Governor to declare a state of emergency in 2006 that remains in effect

to date. Development of a population reduction plan can only further this process and, thus,

the public interest.1

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