Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-04134/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-04134-40/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 15:1126 Patent Infringement

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Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNWIRED PLANET, LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.

APPLE INC,

Defendant.

Case No. 13-cv-04134-VC 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER

Docket No: 311, 317

I. Introduction

Unwired Planet has sued Apple for patent infringement. Unwired asserts claims from four 

different patents: U.S. Patent No. 6,317,831 ('831 patent), U.S. Patent No. 6,532,446 ('446 patent), 

U.S. Patent No. 6,646,260 ('260 patent), and U.S. Patent No. 6,321,092 ('092 patent). The parties 

have cross-moved for summary judgment on various issues. 

Apple's motion for summary judgment of noninfringement is granted with respect to the 

'831 patent, the '446 patent, and the '260 patent. This means several of the parties' summary 

judgment arguments on those patents are moot. Further, Apple has informed the Court that in the 

event the Court grants Apple's motions for summary judgment of noninfringement, Apple will no 

longer pursue its invalidity counterclaims with respect to those patents at the upcoming trial, 

provided that it can still pursue them if the case is remanded on appeal. Therefore, the only 

remaining patent-in-suit will be the '092 patent. 

And on the '092 patent, Apple's motion for summary judgment of noninfringement is 

denied with respect to literal infringement, but is granted with respect to induced and contributory 

infringement. Unwired's motion for summary judgment on Apple's invalidity defense based on 

anticipatory prior art is granted. And both parties' motions for summary judgment on Apple's on–

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sale bar defense are denied. 

II. '831 Patent

The '831 Patent describes a technique for more efficiently enabling secure data transactions

using a narrowband channel. Each of the asserted claims – claims 17, 23, and 25 – requires a 

wideband channel to first exchange security information, and a narrowband channel to then 

transmit the relevant data over the secure connection. The primary difference between the two 

types of channels is the rate at which they transfer data. At claim construction, the parties agreed 

to the Court’s proposed construction of narrowband channel as "channel with a meaningfully 

lower data transfer rate or bandwidth than the wideband channel." 

Unwired Planet alleges that the Apple Push Notification System (APNS) infringes the 

asserted claims of the '831 patent. APNS is an Apple feature that allows app providers to send 

push messages to an iOS device via APNS servers. Rather than connecting with multiple app 

provider servers, an iOS device need only connect to the APNS servers, because the app provider 

servers send messages to the APNS servers, which then send messages on to the iOS device. It is 

undisputed that APNS servers send push notifications to iOS devices using TCP/IP protocols, 

which are the standard communication protocols for transmitting data over the Internet. 

When an APNS server sends a push notification to an iOS device, the message includes 

both a "payload" and a "header." The payload is the portion of the message that contains the 

information to be presented to the user (if the push notification is from StubHub, for instance, the 

payload might say "Tickets for tonight’s Golden State Warriors game"). The header includes 

information related to accurate delivery of the message, such as the identity of the iOS device that 

should receive the message. 

Apple contends that APNS does not meet the "narrowband channel" claim limitation as a 

matter of law. Unwired responds that the channel used to send push notification messages from 

the APNS servers to an iOS device is a narrowband channel, and it contends that APNS uses a 

wideband channel when APNS exchanges security information with an iOS device that later 

allows the APNS servers to send the push notification to the correct device. 

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As a threshold matter, to prevail on this infringement claim Unwired must be able to prove 

that APNS uses two separate channels, as required by the '831 patent. It's debatable whether 

Unwired has provided sufficient evidence of this. There is no dispute that the exchange of both 

the security information (performed by the alleged wideband channel) and the push notification 

message (performed by the alleged narrowband channel) occur over a single Internet connection 

using TCP/IP protocols, which seems to belie the suggestion that they occur over different 

channels. 

Unwired contends these APNS channels are different because they have different 

endpoints. Unwired's expert, Dr. Mark Jones, claims the security information channel (alleged 

wideband channel) runs only from the iOS device to the APNS servers, whereas the push 

notification channel (alleged narrowband channel) extends back to the application provider 

servers. And he contends this makes them different channels. But as Apple correctly points out, 

"the asserted claims require both channels to connect to the same 'server' with the same 'client,' 

and Unwired contends that the 'server' is the APNS server and the 'client' is the iOS device." 

Therefore, all that matters is the channel between the APNS servers and the iOS device; the 

communication that extends from the APNS servers to the application provider servers is not part 

of the accused system. And Unwired has given no real explanation (or evidence) of how the backand-forth communication between the APNS servers and the iOS device occurs over different 

channels.

But even assuming for the sake of argument that APNS does use two separate channels, 

these channels cannot be distinguished based on meaningfully different data transfer rates, which 

is the fundamental difference between a narrowband and wideband channel in the '831 patent. Dr. 

Jones asserts that push notification messages are sent at a lower data transfer rate than the security 

information, but his analysis is based on a faulty premise, and once this is recognized it becomes 

clear that there is no genuine issue of material fact.

Dr. Jones' analysis is as follows: Apple limits the size of push notification messages to 256 

bytes, a limitation that is not present when the APNS servers exchange security information with 

an iOS device. This size limitation results in a higher percentage of header information than is 

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typically present in TCP/IP data transmissions. Further, header information should not be 

considered "data"; rather, only the payload – the portion of the push notification that includes the 

actual message to the user – should be considered data. Therefore, because the push notification 

contains significant overhead in the form of header information, and because header is not data, 

the payload (or data) reaches the iOS device at a slower rate than it otherwise would in a message 

with a lower percentage of header information, and thus the data transfer rate is meaningfully 

lower.1

At oral argument, counsel for Unwired analogized its infringement theory to coal trucks 

transporting coal from Point A to Point B. If the road between the two points only allows three 

coal trucks to travel at one time, and if each of those trucks includes a large engine that takes up 

space that could otherwise be filled with coal, then the overall amount of coal reaches Point B 

more slowly than if the road allowed ten trucks to travel at a time, or if the trucks had smaller 

engines and thus more space for coal. Accordingly, under this theory, the transfer rate of coal is 

meaningfully lower due to the overhead of the large engines and the restrictions on the number of 

trucks. 

Rather than supporting Unwired's infringement theory, this analogy shows why APNS 

does not infringe. First, the scenario assumes a need to deliver more coal than what can be carried 

on three trucks. But this is not the way APNS works. A push notification is a self-contained 

message; it includes all the content that an application provider sends to an iOS device. It is not as 

if an application provider intends to send 1000 bytes of data and therefore must send four push 

notifications to the iOS device. Rather, one "trip" from the APNS servers (which receive the data 

from the app provider servers) to the iOS device contains the total amount of data. 

 

1

It is not clear why header information should not be considered data; after all, it is a critical part 

of the push notification message and is necessary to ensure the push notification gets delivered to 

the correct iOS device. However, Unwired points to a section of the '831 Patent, as well to a 

sentence in a technical reference, both of which might suggest that header should not be 

considered data. So for purposes of summary judgment, the Court will assume that header 

information is not data. 

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Second, the coal analogy is not reflective of the '831 patent because the analogy does not 

speak to the rate at which the trucks travel on the road; instead, the hypothetical lower coal 

transfer rate relies solely on the characteristics of the trucks themselves (bigger engines) and on a 

limitation restricting the number of trucks. Dr. Jones' infringement analysis suffers from the same 

defect. He opines that data-size restrictions and overhead in the form of header result in push 

notifications reaching an iOS device at an overall lower transfer rate. But this analysis has nothing 

to do with the capacity of the alleged narrowband channel to transfer data at a lower rate. Yet that 

is precisely how a narrowband channel is defined in the '831 patent. The '831 patent states, "As an 

example, narrowband channels can transfer data at a rate of about 400 bits per second (bps), while 

wideband channels can transfer data at a rate of at least 14400 bps." '831 Patent, 8:12-14. The 

distinction between a wideband and narrowband channel is the different data transfer abilities of 

the channels themselves. Unwired has introduced no evidence to suggest that (assuming there are 

really two channels) the data channel between APNS servers and an iOS device for delivering 

push notifications itself is not capable of transferring data at a rate similar to that of the channel

between APNS servers and an iOS device used to exchange security information. 

Accordingly, there is no evidence that APNS meets the "narrowband channel" limitation of 

the asserted claims. Apple’s motion for summary judgment of noninfringement of the '831 patent 

is therefore granted. 

III. '446 Patent

A. Noninfringement

The '446 patent discloses an invention for extending speech recognition capabilities to 

mobile devices. Under the method taught by the patent, a user speaks into a mobile device, the 

user's speech is sent over a voice channel to a server, the server converts the speech into a 

symbolic data file, and the server then sends the data file back to the mobile device over a data 

channel. The use of two separate channels – a voice channel for sending voice input from the 

device to the server, and a data channel for sending the data file from the server back to the mobile 

device – is a core feature of the invention. As the Court noted in its claim construction order, 

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"[t]he patent consistently maintains the distinction between voice input being sent over a voice 

channel to the server device, and a data file which is then sent back to the mobile device over a 

data channel." Therefore, the court construed "voice input" as "speech provided over a voice 

channel." 

Unwired has accused Apple's "Siri" feature of infringement of claims 15 and 35 of the '446 

patent. Much like the '446 patent, Siri provides for server-based speech recognition; a user speaks 

into an iOS device, that speech is sent to the Siri servers, and then text is returned to the iOS 

device. But Apple argues that unlike the '446 patent, Siri does not use a voice channel to transmit 

voice input from the device to the servers. Instead, Apple argues, Siri sends voice input over a 

data channel, and does so using TCP/IP protocol, which, as mentioned in the previous section, is a 

standard protocol for sending data (not voice) over the Internet. As Apple notes, this is the same 

protocol Siri uses to send the data file back from the Siri servers to the iOS device. 

There is no factual dispute about how Siri works, and Unwired acknowledges that Siri 

sends voice input using TCP/IP protocols. Nonetheless, Unwired argues, Siri uses a voice channel 

because the channel between an iOS device and Siri servers has certain qualities that one normally 

sees in a voice channel. This of course begs the question: what is a voice channel? The patent 

uses the term no less than 16 times, and uses it in a way that suggests that one skilled in the art 

would know what it is. Further, the patent states that a voice channel "is generally established and 

coordinated using the infrastructure and procedures generally known in the art for setting up a 

phone call." '446 Patent, 6:21-24. The patent also suggests, however, that other types of voice 

transmission can potentially be sent over a voice channel. For instance, the patent teaches that 

"palm sized computing devices and personal digital assistants with voice transmission and/or 

reception capabilities" can send voice input over a voice channel to an outside server. Id. at 5:1-

3.2 

 

2 Apple's expert, Mr. Rysavy, provided examples of how, at the time the patent was prosecuted, 

these devices could access the same voice channels used for phone calls. So it may be that the 

only example the patent provides of voice channel transmission is a phone call. But the Court 

need not resolve that question to rule on the summary judgment motion. 

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Unwired urges the Court to think about different types of transmissions as existing on a 

spectrum; some types of transmissions clearly use voice channels, others clearly use data channels, 

and still others are somewhere in between. As Unwired states, different types of transmissions "lie 

on a spectrum between a data transfer, on one end, and a telephone call over a voice channel, on 

the other end. Determining where a voice channel ends and becomes a data channel requires an 

overall assessment of these factors." And according to Unwired, this overall assessment involves 

a "fact-intensive multifactor analysis." 

Unwired's argument seems to belie the teachings of the '446 patent, which suggests that a 

voice channel is a fairly simple and well-understood concept. Indeed, the only description of a 

voice channel from the patent is the basic one mentioned above: a voice channel "is generally 

established and coordinated using the infrastructure and procedures generally known in the art for 

setting up a phone call." But regardless of whether Unwired is correct about the need for a multifactor analysis, there must still be some discernible limit as to what constitutes a voice channel. In 

other words, even if there is a spectrum where it is obvious that certain transmissions, such as cell

phone calls, use a voice channel, while for other transmissions that determination is a closer call, 

there nonetheless must be a recognizable line that separates what is a voice channel from what is 

not. A voice channel must be an actual, identifiable type of channel, not some ambiguous channel 

that can be labeled a voice channel merely because it transports voice. Otherwise, the '446 patent, 

which teaches the use of a voice channel, would be rendered meaningless.

This is underscored by a passage in Unwired's supplemental brief, which attempts to 

explain how one would decide whether something is a voice channel or a data channel: 

For example, one can analyze possible hypothetical variations of the 

example offered above of downloading a MP3 file of oral arguments 

recorded the day before. A person of ordinary skill might come to a 

different conclusion if the user were listening to the MP3 file as it 

downloaded, or if it was being streamed instead of downloaded, or if 

it was being streamed live during oral arguments, or if it was being 

streamed live via Skype during the oral arguments, or if the user 

listened and responded using Skype, or if the user is listening and

responding by dialing in over a normal telephone line. Each of these 

variations presents a slightly different analysis, possibly yielding 

different results dependent on the specific details of the 

hypothetical. All of these circumstances lie on a spectrum between 

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a data transfer, on one end, and a telephone call over a voice 

channel, on the other end. Determining where a voice channel ends 

and becomes a data channel requires an overall assessment of these 

factors.

If Unwired is correct that the distinction between a voice channel and a data channel in the '446 

patent is so blurry, it seems unlikely that a person skilled in the art could read the patent and 

determine (for purposes of avoiding infringement) what is and is not a voice channel. This would 

raise a serious concern that the patent could be invalid for indefiniteness. See Nautilus, Inc. v. 

Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014).

But assuming for the sake of argument that the '446 patent delineates a "spectrum" between 

"voice channel" and "data channel," and even assuming, as Unwired asserts, that there is no clear 

dividing line on this spectrum, no reasonable juror could conclude, on this record, that Siri uses a 

"voice channel" as that term is used in the patent. Even adopting Unwired's construct, a voice 

channel is defined by how it treats voice communications. Namely, a voice channel transmits 

voice without delays; otherwise, two participants on a cellular phone call – the undisputed classic 

example of a voice channel – would be unable to communicate effectively. As explained by 

Apple's expert, Mr. Rysavy, a voice channel accomplishes this goal in three ways. First, it uses 

different transmission protocols from data channels. Specifically, voice channels use shorter 

transmission intervals, typically 20 millisecond intervals, to ensure that voice is transmitted 

without delay. Second, voice channels use different error correction mechanisms than data 

channels. A voice channel is more focused on transmitting information quickly, whereas a data 

channel is more focused on transmitting information accurately. As a result, a voice channel will 

tolerate errors in voice packets, because to retransmit those packets would cause delay. A data 

channel, on the other hand, will retransmit a data packet that contains errors, even if that 

retransmission causes delay, because retransmission is necessary for accuracy. Third, voice 

channels receive dedicated network resources from wireless carriers such that voice channels are 

prioritized over data channels. This ensures that voice transmission occurs first, and is not 

disturbed by data transmission. Otherwise, voice transmission could be interrupted and delayed. 

With this understanding of some of the hallmarks of a voice channel, no reasonable juror 

could conclude that Siri transmits voice input over a voice channel, because it is undisputed that 

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the Siri channel does not include these features. With respect to transmission protocols, whereas a 

voice channel typically uses 20 millisecond intervals for transmitting voice, Siri records 200 

milliseconds of voice input before transmission to the Siri servers. As for error correction 

mechanisms, there is no evidence that Siri transmits packets including errors to ensure real-time 

delivery. And the Siri channel does not receive any priority from wireless carriers or any 

dedicated network resources to ensure real-time transmission. In fact, the opposite is true –

wireless carriers treat Siri usage as data usage, not as voice minutes, and Siri only works if an iOS 

device is connected to the Internet. 

Not only does the Siri channel lack these features, but, as even Dr. Jones acknowledges, 

TCP/IP, the protocol used to send voice input over the channel, "is not concerned with whether it 

is transmitting voice or non-voice data." This indicates that the channel does not treat voice and 

non-voice data differently, as would be the case if the channel was a voice channel. What's more, 

the '446 patent itself identifies TCP/IP as the type of protocol that can be used on the data channel 

to send input back to the mobile device, not as the protocol that can exist on the voice channel. 

Against all this, Unwired contends that the channel between an iOS device and the Siri 

servers is a voice channel, both because a voice channel can exist over TCP/IP protocols, and 

because the Siri channel includes a number of voice channel characteristics. As to the first point, 

Unwired points to Skype and other Voice-over-IP (VoIP) technology as examples of TCP/IP 

protocols being used to transmit voice over a voice channel. But reference to VoIP is largely 

irrelevant. No VoIP services use TCP in normal operation; rather, they only use TCP if the 

preferred protocol is not available, presumably because TCP/IP protocols do not include any of the 

transmission protocol, error correction mechanisms, or prioritization properties that are necessary 

for voice to be transmitted without delay. Therefore, it's not clear that a VoIP communication 

which uses TCP/IP even uses a voice channel, at least as that term is used in the '446 patent. 

Further, it is undisputed that Siri is not a VoIP service, so even if VoIP did stand for the general 

idea that a voice channel and TCP/IP could coexist, it would not shed any light on the type of 

channel that Siri uses. 

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Unwired also argues that both voice input from Siri as well as cellular calls from an iOS 

device, the latter of which obviously uses a voice channel, are sent over the same cellular channel. 

It appears Unwired is referring to the fact that cellular networks provide an "uplink channel" for 

all outgoing communications and a "downlink channel" for incoming communications. So from 

this standpoint, of course voice calls and Siri speech input both use the "uplink channel" because 

they are both forms of outgoing communication. But this has nothing to do with whether Siri uses 

a voice channel. And more to the point, in his deposition, Dr. Jones indicated that the "uplink 

channel" is not, on its own, what he alleges to be the voice channel. Therefore, this argument does 

nothing to support the contention that Siri uses a voice channel.

Unwired also contends that Siri uses a voice channel because it configures the channel to 

transmit speech, and this configuration is a characteristic of a voice channel. Here, Unwired relies 

on Siri's use of Speex codec to encode and packetize the user's voice, which, according to 

Unwired, is a type of encoding and packetization designed for VoIP technology. But this evidence 

merely goes to how an iOS device encodes the user's speech prior to transmission, not to the type 

of channel used between the iOS device and the Siri servers. 

Finally, in his opening report, Dr. Jones makes a conclusory assertion that Siri constantly 

streams the user's speech, including silent pauses, and suggests that this "streaming" is indicative 

of a voice channel. But there is no evidence as to what Unwired means by "streaming," or how 

this type of streaming is any different from the way that data is streamed over a data channel. In 

short, this evidence, like the rest of the evidence presented by Unwired Planet, is insufficient to 

lead a reasonable juror to believe that a channel which uses TCP/IP protocols, a channel which 

does not distinguish between voice and non-voice data, and a channel which does any include any 

of the properties needed to ensure real-time transmission, is a "voice channel" as that term is used 

in the '446 patent. 

Accordingly, because Siri does not use a voice channel, Siri does not infringe the '446 

patent, and summary judgment is granted for Apple. 

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B. Invalidity

Apple has also moved for summary judgment of invalidity on the '446 patent. Apple 

alleges that U.S. Patent No. 5,956,681 (the "Yamakita patent") is anticipatory prior art. Like the 

'446 patent and like Siri, the Yamakita patent teaches a system in which a mobile device sends 

voice input to a server to convert that speech into text and then send it back to the mobile device. 

But unlike the '446 patent, the Yamakita patent sends speech input to the server using TCP/IP 

protocols, the same protocols used by Siri. As discussed extensively in the previous section, this 

is not the approach taken by the '446 patent; rather, under the '446 patent, speech travels from the 

mobile device to the server over a voice channel. Therefore, the Yamakita patent does not 

anticipate the '446 patent, and Apple's motion for summary judgment of invalidity is denied. 

IV. '260 Patent

The '260 Patent discloses an invention for "provisioning" the features and services 

available on a mobile communications device, and the Court has construed "provisioning" as 

"enabling or modifying communication capabilities." Unwired has asserted claim 1, "[a] method 

for provisioning a two-way mobile communications device," which comprises, in relevant part, the 

following two steps: "[1] receiving user information required to establish a user account . . . [2] 

generating a provisioning request comprising the user information and the user's selection."3 '260 

Patent, 9:19-20, 27-28.

Unwired accuses Apple of infringement via the App Store, which allows a user of an iOS 

device to purchase and download applications for her device. To purchase apps from the App 

Store, a user must have an iTunes account, which "utilizes a user's Apple ID." As Apple notes, 

"[a]n Apple ID is the email address you use as a login for just about everything you do with 

Apple, including . . . downloading apps from the App Store." 

Dr. Jones argues that the claim term "user account" is met by an Apple user's iTunes 

account. When a user sets up an iTunes account, she provides certain "user information required 

 

3 Unwired Planet has also asserted Claim 16, which depends from Claim 1. 

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to establish" the account: an email address which serves as the Apple ID, a password, birth date,

country or region, challenge questions and responses, and billing information. If a user is signed 

into iTunes and has recently provided her password, then when she requests to purchase an app 

from the App Store, the iOS device generates a buyProduct request for the app. If the user is not 

signed into iTunes, then the device generates an "authenticate" request, which requires the user to 

enter her Apple ID and password, and then a buyProduct request. Because the buyProduct request 

includes the user's selection of an app as well as information about that user – namely, an X-token 

which includes the user's Apple ID password in the form of a hash of that password – Unwired 

Planet argues that the buyProduct request meets the claim limitation of "generating a provisioning 

request comprising the user information and the user's selection." 

But there's one problem – the user information included in the buyProduct request (the 

alleged "provisioning request") is not the same user information required to establish the iTunes 

account (the alleged "user account"). To establish an iTunes account, a user provides the 

information recited above (email address for use as Apple ID, password, birthdate, etc.). The user 

information in the buyProduct request is different. It includes a DSID, which is a unique identifier 

of an Apple user's account generated by Apple servers, as well as an X-token, which includes an 

encryption of the user's Apple password in the form of a hash. The type of user information 

contained in a buyProduct request is not a disputed point. Instead, Unwired contends that the hash

of the password satisfies the claim limitation of "user information" because the hash is effectively 

the same thing as the user's password, just with "a mathematical function applied to [it]." 

But this argument is insufficient in multiple respects. The asserted claim requires that "the 

user information" in the provisioning request be the same "user information required to establish a 

user account." This is evident because there is no type of "user information" mentioned in the 

claim other than that needed to establish a user account, because the inventor's use of "the" in "the 

user information" suggests a reference back to this earlier-cited user information needed to 

establish the account,4and because the same term should be given a consistent meaning within the 

 

4

See, e.g., Motorola Mobility LLC v. ITC, 535 fed. Appx. 971, 975 (Fed. Cir. 2014) ("[T]he claim 

requires that 'the change' be communicated to the fixed portion of the wireless network. Since the 

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same claim.5 Yet here, the user information in the alleged provisioning request is not the same 

user information required to establish a user account. The hash of a password in a buyProduct 

request is a proxy for the user's Apple ID password. As Dr. Jones testified, one can't even figure 

out the password from the hash. At best, therefore, Unwired has a doctrine of equivalents 

argument, not a literal infringement argument. But Unwired has only alleged literal infringement 

against the App Store. 

The above discussion applies to the situation where a user is already signed into iTunes 

and attempts to purchase a product from the App Store. Unwired also argues that infringement 

occurs when a user is not signed into iTunes, which results in the device generating both an 

authenticate request, in which the user enters her Apple ID and password, and then a buyProduct 

request. Unwired alleges that the combination of the authenticate request and the buyProduct 

request is a "provisioning request." But an authenticate request and a buyProduct request are 

indisputably two separate requests, even if they occur successively without any action by the user, 

so they cannot be combined to meet the claim limitation of "provisioning request." And neither of 

these requests contains both the user's selection and the user information needed to establish a user 

account. As explained, the buyProduct request does not contain the user information needed to 

establish a user account, and while the authenticate request contains at least some, but certainly 

not all, of this user information (Apple ID and password), it does not contain the user's selection. 

Accordingly, because the user information in the buyProduct request is different from the 

user information needed to establish an iTunes account, the App Store does not meet the claim 

limitation of "generating a provisioning request comprising the user information and the user's 

 

only antecedent basis for this change derives from the phrase 'a change in accessibility,' the change 

that causes an update to the application registry must be the same change that is communicated to 

the fixed portion of the wireless network.").

5

See, e.g., Digital Biometrics, Inc. v. Identix, Inc., 149 F.3d 1335, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("[T]he 

same word appearing in the same claim should be interpreted consistently."); Phonometrics, Inc. v. 

Northern Telecom, Inc., 133 F.3d 1459, 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("A word or phrase used 

consistently throughout a patent claim should be interpreted consistently."); Frank's Casing Crew 

& Rental Tools, Inc. v. Weatherford Int'l, Inc., 389 F.3d 1370, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (the same 

term appearing in different portions of the claim should be presumptively given the same 

meaning). 

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selection." Summary judgment of noninfringement is granted to Apple with respect to the '260 

patent. 6 

V. '092 Patent

A. Noninfringement

The '092 patent discloses a technology for identifying the location of mobile terminals, 

such as cell phones. To more accurately locate a mobile terminal, the invention gathers location 

inputs from multiple sources, and then responds to a location request by providing the location 

information that is responsive to that request. The patent refers to the sources of the location 

inputs as "location finding equipment." Unwired Planet alleges that the location-finding 

technology of iOS devices infringes claim 20 of the '092 patent, which is a method claim 

comprising, in relevant part, "receiving a plurality of device dependent location inputs provided by

said location finding equipment." '092 Patent, 16:19-20.

Apple has moved for summary judgment on the ground that the accused system does not 

use a plurality of location inputs; rather, Apple argues, its system only uses a single location input: 

GPS. But in his expert report, Dr. Jones identified a number of different pieces of information 

which he alleges are part of Apple's system and which Dr. Jones identifies as "location inputs." 

This is best illustrated by the chart which appears on pages 79-80 of Dr. Jones' opening expert 

report. 

In its motion for summary judgment, Apple only focuses on two of these inputs –

"BSSID," an identification number associated with a Wi-Fi router, and "cell ID," an identification 

number associated with a cell tower. Apple contends that the remaining pieces of information in 

 

6 Because there is no direct infringement of the '831, '446, or '260 patents, Apple's motion for 

summary judgment is also granted on these patents with respect to indirect infringement. See, 

e.g., In re Bill of Landing Transmission and Processing Sys. Patent Lit., 681 F.3d 1323, 1330 

(Fed. Cir. 2012) ("a claim of indirect infringement can only arise when there is direct 

infringement); see also Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111, 2117 

(2014) ("our case law leaves no doubt that inducement liability may arise if, but only if, [there is] . 

. . direct infringement") (internal citation omitted); Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement 

Co., 365 U.S. 336, 341 (1961) ("if there is no direct infringement of a patent there can be no 

contributory infringement"). 

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Dr. Jones' chart are either already covered by Apple's noninfringement arguments because they are 

the same type of information as BSSID and cell ID – namely, equipment identifiers – or else 

Unwired has presented no evidence that Apple actually uses that information as part of its 

location-finding technology in iOS devices. It is not clear that Apple is correct, and therefore 

summary judgment is denied on this ground alone, because Apple has failed to demonstrate that 

all of the inputs identified by Dr. Jones are not in fact location inputs. 

But even with respect to BSSID and cell ID, there is a material dispute about whether they 

meet the claim limitation of "location input." At claim construction, Apple proposed construing 

"location input" as "determinations of the location of a mobile terminal," but the Court found this 

construction "suggests a definiteness which might be misleading to a jury and result in excluding 

certain embodiments." Instead, the Court adopted Unwired's proposed construction of 

"information regarding location." The Court stated: "'Information regarding location' is a 

straightforward phrase that a jury would understand. A location input offers information about the 

location of the wireless station. If the input does not provide information about a wireless station's 

location then it is not a location input."

Here, the parties dispute whether BSSID and cell ID provide information regarding 

location. The parties agree about what BSSIDs and cell IDs are – the former are identification 

numbers for Wi-Fi routers, and the latter are identification numbers for cell towers. Apple 

contends they are not, on their own, information regarding location, because these identification 

numbers must be paired with Apple's own internal database to match up the router and cell ID 

with specific latitude and longitude information. But as Unwired correctly points out, even though

BSSIDs and cell IDs do not in themselves give the precise location of an iOS device, a reasonable 

juror could still conclude that they provide information regarding location. After all, they do 

provide information about routers and cell IDs, both of which typically have fixed locations, and 

the '092 patent itself discusses cell sector IDs as location inputs, so adopting Apple's argument 

could arguably exclude a disclosed embodiment.7 See Broadcom Corp. v. Emulex Corp., 732 F.3d 

 

7 Apple notes that cell ID, which Unwired contends is used by Apple's technology-finding system, 

and cell sector ID, which is disclosed as a location input in the '092 patent, are not the same thing. 

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1325, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 

Accordingly, because Apple has not demonstrated that it has addressed all of the alleged 

location inputs, and because a reasonable juror might conclude that BSSIDs and cell IDs provide 

information regarding location, Apple's motion for summary judgment of no direct infringement 

with respect to the '092 patent is denied.8

Apple has also moved for summary judgment on Unwired's claim of induced or 

contributory infringement. For Apple to be liable for indirect infringement, Unwired must show 

that Apple had knowledge of the patent's existence as well as knowledge that Apple's induced or 

contributory acts caused infringement. See Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 

2060, 2067 (2011). Unwired can satisfy this knowledge requirement by showing either Apple's

actual knowledge of infringement or Apple's willful blindness toward infringement, which occurs 

when a defendant "takes deliberate actions to avoid confirming a high probability of wrongdoing." 

Id. at 2070-71. 

Here, Apple's noninfringement argument – namely, that its devices only use one location 

input rather than a plurality of inputs – is strong enough that no reasonable juror could conclude 

that Apple acted with actual knowledge that it was inducing or contributing to infringement. Nor 

could a reasonable juror conclude that Apple was willfully blind as to infringement, because there 

was no high probability of wrongdoing given the strength of Apple's noninfringement argument. 

Therefore, even though the question of literal infringement of the '092 patent should go to a jury, 

the question of indirect infringement should not, and Apple's motion is granted with respect to 

 

And it argues that they are qualitatively different – a cell ID is an ID for a piece of equipment (a 

cell tower), whereas a cell sector ID identifies a geographical area. But Unwired has presented 

evidence that a cell ID also identifies a geographical area, just in a less accurate way than a cell 

sector ID because a cell ID does not divide the relevant area into four sectors. Because the court 

must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to Unwired, the Court will credit Unwired's 

description of a cell ID. 

8

The question whether BSSIDs are cell IDs are "location inputs," as that term is used in the '092 

patent, is arguably one of further claim construction. However, the Court has already provided a 

claim construction, and there is no way for the Court to further construe the term except in light of 

the accused device, which it should not do. See Vita-Mix Corp. v. Basic Holding, Inc., 581 F.3d 

1317, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Therefore, the jury, armed with the Court's claim construction, must 

decide whether the claim limitations are met by the accused device.

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contributory and indirect infringement. 

B. "Proposal for LFS" as anticipatory prior art

Unwired has moved for summary judgment on Apple's invalidity argument that "Proposal 

for location finding system" ("Proposal for LFS"), a document authored by Bill Pierce of Motorola

in connection with the Motorola agreement discussed below, is a printed publication that 

constitutes anticipatory prior art. "Whether an anticipatory document qualifies as a 'printed 

publication' under § 102 is a legal conclusion based on underlying factual determinations."

Cooper Cameron Corp. v. Kvaerner Oilfield Prods., 291 F.3d 1317, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2002). To be 

a prior publication, a document must be publicly accessible. See Norian Corp. v. Stryker Corp., 

363 F.3d 1321, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Here, no reasonable jury could find, by clear and 

convincing evidence, that "proposal for LFS" was publicly accessible. The only identified source 

of the document came from the files of a former Unwired employee, James Fitch, who did not 

recognize the document and testified that he did not know whether it had been publicly 

disseminated. Further, Apple has not identified any individual who is aware that the document 

was disseminated, nor did Apple even take the deposition of Bill Pierce, the document's author. In 

fact, Apple's sole evidence is that the proposal states, on its face, that it was for "distribution" to 

two working groups, and that the practice in these working groups was to circulate drafts of 

proposals. But this conclusory evidence is insufficient for Apple to show, by clear and convincing 

evidence, that the proposal was actually publically disseminated. Accordingly, summary 

judgment is granted for Unwired Planet. 

C. On-Sale Bar

Both parties have moved for summary judgment on Apple's on-sale bar defense. Under 35 

U.S.C. § 102(b), a patent is invalid if "the invention . . . was on sale in this country, more than a 

year prior to the date of application for patent in the United States." The '092 patent application 

date is November 3, 1998, so the "critical date" for the on-sale bar is November 3, 1997. 

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Apple alleges that Unwired made nine different offers for sale prior to this date. 9 In their 

summary judgment briefs, the parties primarily focus on one such alleged offer: a license and 

development agreement Unwired entered into with Motorola on March 29, 1996, in which 

Motorola sought to develop an LFS product that it could then market and sell to its customers. 

i. Motorola agreement

In the agreement, titled "License and Development Agreement," Motorola agreed to pay 

Unwired to develop "WLS Software" that would be compatible with Motorola's hardware and that 

could lead to an integrated LFS product. Under the agreement, Unwired also gave Motorola a 

license to use the "WLS Software" that Unwired would develop. And if Motorola sold the 

integrated product to its customers, Motorola would pay a per-unit fee to Unwired. Apple 

contends the "WLS Software" covered by the agreement is the invention embodied by the '092 

patent. And Apple contends that because Unwired licensed this software to Motorola, Unwired 

made an offer to sell (indeed, sold) the invention embodied by the '092 patent before the critical 

date. 

The on-sale bar applies when, prior to the critical date, (1) the invention is the subject of a 

commercial offer for sale, and (2) the invention is ready for patenting. Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 

525 U.S. 55, 67 (1998). Here, Unwired does not dispute the "ready for patenting" prong, because 

documents preceding the critical date include drawings and descriptions that are almost identical 

to those included in the '092 patent. See id. at 67-68 (ready for patenting may be shown "by poof 

that prior to the critical date the inventor had prepared drawings or other descriptions of the 

invention that were sufficiently specific to enable a person skilled in the art to practice the 

invention."). Therefore, the only dispute is whether Unwired made a commercial offer for sale of 

the invention embodied by the '092 patent. This dispute consists of two parts. First, was the 

Motorola agreement, which included a license to Motorola for the "WLS Software," a commercial 

sale of that software? Second, if so, does "WLS Software," as that term is defined in the Motorola 

agreement, include the invention embodied by the '092 patent?

 

9 Much like the parties, the Court uses "Unwired" or "Unwired Planet" to refer not only to the 

current company but also to its predecessor entities, including Signal Soft. 

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On the first question, the Federal Circuit has fairly consistently held that a license to a 

patent right is not in itself a commercial sale that triggers the on-sale bar. See, e.g., Elan Corp. v. 

Andrx Pharms., 366 F.3d 1336, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2004); In Re Kollar, 286 F.3d 1326, 1330 (Fed. 

Cir. 2002). But Unwired did not simply sell Motorola the rights to use a patent; rather, Unwired 

licensed the WLS Software to Motorola, and, as the Federal Circuit has acknowledged, a software 

license in which "[t]he product is . . . just as immediately transferred to the 'buyer' as if it were 

sold" can constitute a commercial offer. In re Kollar, 366 F.3d at 1330 n.3 (quoting Group One, 

Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 254 F.3d 1041, 1053 (Lourie, J., concurring)).10 So the fact that this 

agreement was couched as a "license agreement" does not preclude application of the on-sale bar. 

The complicated part, however, is that the WLS Software was not immediately transferred to 

Motorola. In fact, it was never transferred, because Unwired never actually developed it, so the 

only product licensed to Motorola was a hypothetical one which never became a reality. 

Given this, whether the license of the WLS Software constitutes a commercial sale of that 

software is a somewhat new question. The parties have not cited a case (and the Court is not 

aware of a case) directly on point.11 But it is well established that an invention need not be 

reduced to practice for the on-sale bar to apply. Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 66. Rather, as long as the 

invention is conceived, there can be an offer for sale of it, so it seems immaterial that Unwired 

never actually developed the WLS Software. See August Technology Corp. v. Camtek, Ltd., 655 

F.3d 1278, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2011).

Further, it is hard to imagine how this agreement was not a commercial sale. It is 

undisputed that at the time of the agreement Unwired had been working on Location Finding 

System technology and was developing a suite of software products incorporating this technology. 

In the Motorola agreement, Unwired agreed to use its software technology to develop a software 

 

10 The agreement does, however, in Section 4(f), give Motorola "sole ownership of all right and 

title to any patents rights for any inventions or discoveries . . . developed under this Agreement." 

11 Apple argues that Robotic Vision v. Sys., Inc. v. View Eng'g, Inc., 249 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 

2001) is highly instructive. But as the Federal Circuit later clarified, Robotic Vision dealt only 

with the "ready for patenting" prong. Sparton Corp. v. United States, 399 F.3d 1321, 1324-26. 

Here, by contrast, the dispute centers on the on-sale prong. 

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that was compatible with Motorola's hardware, and Unwired further agreed to give Motorola the 

right to use that software in exchange for per-unit royalty payments. This is clearly an effort by 

Unwired to make money off of its software technology. The fact that the Motorola agreement 

failed to yield an end product to sell to customers is irrelevant, because what matters is whether 

Unwired commercialized its software technology, which is exactly what it did with the Motorola 

agreement. What's more, around the same time as the Motorola agreement, Unwired entered into 

a number of other agreements with different companies, all of which related to Unwired's LFS 

software, further evidencing that Unwired was commercializing its software technology.

On the question whether the agreement reflects a sale, there is no factual dispute. The 

agreement speaks for itself. Therefore, the Court concludes there was a sale. The remaining 

question is whether WLS Software, as the term is used in the agreement, is the invention 

embodied by the '092 patent. On this point, the parties, both in their summary judgment briefs as 

well as in supplemental briefs ordered by the Court, have presented conflicting evidence. 

Accordingly, a jury must decide this question, and therefore the parties' cross-motions for 

summary judgment are denied. 

ii. Other Eight Alleged Offers for Sale

Unwired moved for summary judgment with respect to all nine alleged offers for sale. In 

its cross-motion for summary judgment, Apple only addressed three of those alleged offers: the 

Motorola agreement discussed above, the May 9, 1997 SCC Agreement, and the September 26, 

1997 Agreement. Therefore, because Apple has not created a material dispute with respect to the 

other six alleged offers, summary judgment on those alleged offers is granted for Unwired. 

However, for the other two offers – the May 9, 1997 SCC Agreement and the September 26, 1997 

AT&T Agreement – Apple provided some evidence that they constituted an offer of the invention 

embodied by the '092 patent, and Unwired did not address this evidence in its opposition, so both 

parties' motions for summary judgment are denied with respect to these two agreements. 

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D. Marking

Both parties have moved for summary judgment on Apple's marking defense on all four 

patents-in-suit. But because the Court has granted summary judgment of noninfringement on the 

'831, '446, and '260 patents, these patents are no longer in the case, pursuant to Apple's 

communication with the Court. Therefore, the parties' motions are moot with respect to those 

patents. The only remaining marking defense is against the '092 patent, but Unwired has only 

asserted method claims with respect to the '092 patent, and "[t]he law is clear that the [marking 

requirements] do not apply where the patent is directed to a process or a method." Crown 

Packaging Tech., Inc., v. Rexam Beverage Can Co., 559 F.3d 1308, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 

Accordingly, summary judgment is granted for Unwired with respect to Apple's marking defense 

on the '092 patent. 

E. Laches

Unwired has moved for summary judgment on Apple's laches defense with respect to all 

four patents, but again only the '092 patent remains in the case. To succeed in its laches defense, 

Apple must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) Unwired delayed filing suit for an 

unreasonable and inexcusable length of time from the time that Unwired knew of its claim against 

Apple, and (2) this delay prejudiced Apple. A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Const. Co., 960 

F.2d 1020, 1032 (Fed. Cir. 1992). With respect to the first prong, while a determination of what 

constitutes an unreasonable or inexcusable delay is a question of fact, courts have typically found 

a period of delay could potentially be considered 'unreasonable' only if it substantially exceeded 

four years, and "a delay of three or four years has been deemed 'unreasonable only when that delay 

was accompanied by extraneous improper tactics or misleading conduct by the plaintiff.'" 

Mformation Techs., Inc v. Research in Motion Ltd., 830 F. Supp. 2d 815, 824 (N.D. Cal. 2011)

(quoting IXYS Corp. v. Advanced Power Tech. Inc., 321 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1163 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 

For the '092 patent, the relevant time period of delay is 4 years and 9 months. Even though 

Unwired Planet waited more than four years to sue Apple, there is no evidence that Unwired 

engaged in improper tactics or misleading conduct. But even if this delay could be considered 

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unreasonable or inexcusable, Apple cannot as a matter of law meet the second prong of the laches 

analysis, because it has produced no evidence of material prejudice that it has suffered as a result 

of Unwired's delay. In its opposition brief, Apple argues that because Unwired sold its business 

during the relevant time period, certain witnesses were not able to testify about products relevant 

to this lawsuit. But the 30(b)(6) witness Apple claims couldn't remember information about an 

Unwired product wasn't even designated as a technical witness, and, in any event, such assertions, 

unsupported by specific facts, are insufficient to demonstrate evidentiary prejudice. See Meyers v. 

Asics Corp., 974 F.2d 1304, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1992).12 Accordingly, because Apple's evidence is 

insufficient to convince a reasonable juror that Apple suffered material prejudice as a result of 

Unwired’s delay, summary judgment is granted for Unwired Planet with respect to Apple’s laches 

defense on the '092 patent.

IT IS SO ORDERED

Dated: May 22, 2015

______________________________________

 VINCE CHHABRIA

 United States District Judge

 

12 Unwired contends that the laches clock should not run during the time period that it was 

involved in both licensing discussions and different litigation with Apple, meaning that the 

relevant period of delay on the '092 patent should be roughly 3 years rather than 4 years and 9 

months. But Unwired has not presented evidence that it discussed licensing of the '092 patent in 

particular, nor was the '092 patent involved in other litigation with Apple, so it is not clear that this 

time period should be excluded from the laches analysis. But in any event, whether the 

appropriate time period is 3 years or 4 years and 9 months is irrelevant since Apple has not 

suffered any material prejudice. 

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