Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_97-cv-00580/USCOURTS-azd-2_97-cv-00580-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 535
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Death Penalty
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Ptn for Writ of H/C - Stay of Execution

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1 “Dkt.” refers to documents in this Court’s case file. T he Court denied

Petitioner’s initial motion for evidentiary hearing, without prejudice to refiling, because the

motion lacked the specificity and evidentiary support necessary to properly determine

whet her Petitioner had been diligent in state court in developing the factual basis of t he

claims for which he sought a federal evidentiary hearing, as required by 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(e)(2). (Dkt. 82.)

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Eldon M. Schurz, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora Schriro, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV-97-580-PHX-EHC

DEATH PENALTY CASE

ORDER RE: RENEWED MOTION FOR 

EVIDENTIARY HEARING

Eldon M. Schurz (“Petitioner”) is a state p risoner under sentence of death. Pending

before the Court is Petitioner’s renewed motion for evidentiary hearing. (Dkt. 109.)1

Petitioner seeks an evidentiary hearing wit h regard to Claims 4, 5, 7, 9 and 10. Respondents

filed an opposition to the motion, and Petitioner filed a reply. (Dkts. 114, 115.)

LEGAL STANDARD FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING

The decision whether to grant an evidentiary hearing when there are material facts

in dispute is generally at the discret ion of t he district court judge. See Townsend v. Sain,

372 U.S. 293, 312, 318 (1963), overruled in part by Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1

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(1992), and limited by § 2254(e)(2); Baja v. Ducharme, 187 F.3d 1075, 1077 (9th Cir. 1999);

Rule 8, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254 (providing that the district

court judge shall determine if an evidentiary hearing is required). However, a judge’s

discretion is significantly circumscribed by § 2254(e)(2) of the Antiterrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420 (2000). 

Section 2254 provides that:

If the applicant has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State

court proceedings, the court shall not hold an evidentiary hearing on the

claim unless the applicant shows that –

(A) the claim relies on – 

(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on

collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously

unavailable; or

(ii) a factual predicate t hat could not have been previously discovered

 through the exercise of due diligence; and 

(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear

and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable

factfinder would have found t he applicant guilty of the underlying offense.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (emphasis added). 

As interp reted by the Supreme Court, subsection (e)(2) precludes an evidentiary

hearing in federal court only if the failure to develop a claim’s factual basis is due to a “lack

of diligence, or some greater fault, attributable t o t he prisoner or the prisoner’s counsel.”

Williams, 529 U.S. at 432. “The purpose of the fault component of ‘failed’ is t o ensure t he

prisoner undertakes his own diligent search for evidence.” Id. at 435. The Court found

that this rule served AEDPA’s goal of furthering comity in that “federal courts sitting in

habeas are not an alternat ive forum for trying facts and issues which a prisoner made

insufficient effort to pursue in state proceedings.” Id.; see also Cardwell v. Netherland, 971

F. Supp. 997, 1008 (E.D. Va. 1997) (“Ordinarily, a § 2254 petition is limited to the factual

record developed in state court proceedings”), aff’d Cardwell v. Greene, 152 F.3d 331 (4th

Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds, Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149 (4th Cir. 2000). In

correlation, subsection (e)(2) allows factual develop ment when a petitioner diligently

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at t emp t s t o develop the factual basis of a claim in state court and is “thwarted, for example,

by the conduct of another or by happenstance was denied the opportunity to do so.”

Williams, 529 U.S. at 432; see Baja, 187 F.3d at 1078-79.

In comp liance with § 2254(e)(2), when the factual basis for a particular claim has not

been fully develop ed in state court, the first question for a district court in evaluating

whether to grant an evidentiary hearing on t he claim is whether the petitioner was diligent

in attempting to develop its factual basis. See Baja, 187 F.3d at 1078 (quoting Cardwell v.

Greene, 152 F.3d 331, 337 (4th Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds, Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d

149 (4th Cir. 2000)). The Supreme Court set an object ive standard for determining

“diligence,” such that the requirement is dependent upon whether a p etitioner “made a

reasonable attempt, in light of the information available at the time, t o investigate and

pursue claims in state court .” Williams, 529 U.S. at 435. For example, when there is

information in the record that would alert a reasonable attorney to the existence and

importance of certain evidence, the at t orney “fails” to develop the factual record if he does

not make reasonable efforts to sufficiently investigate and present the evidence to the

state court. See id. at 438-40 (counsel lacked diligence because he was on notice of

possibly material evidence and conducted only a cursory investigation); Alley v. Bell, 307

F.3d 380, 390-91 (6th Cir. 2002) (lack of diligence because p etitioner knew of and raised

claims of judicial bias and jury irregularities in state court, but failed to investigate all the

factual grounds for such claims). 

Absent unusual circumstances, diligence requires “that the prisoner, at a minimum,

seek an evidentiary hearing in state court in the manner prescribed by state law.” Williams,

529 U.S. at 437; see Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082, 1090 (9th Cir. 2001), amended on denial

of reh’g, 253 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2001) (“inactions show insufficient diligence” on ineffective

counsel claim because petitioner did not request an evidentiary hearing, and brought claim

only on appeal not in a collateral proceeding). However, t he mere request for an

evidentiary hearing may not be sufficient to establish diligence if a reasonable person

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would have taken additional steps. See Dowthitt v. Johnson, 230 F.3d 733, 758 (5th Cir.

2000) (petitioner requested hearing but found not diligent because he failed to present

affidavits of family members that were easily obtained wit hout court order and with minimal

expense); see also Koste v. Dormire, 345 F.3d 974, 985-86 (8th Cir. 2003) (lack of diligence

despite hearing request because petitioner made no effort to develop the record or assert

any facts to support claim that his counsel was ineffective for knowing of and failing to

investigate his psychiatric condition), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 2070 (2004). If an evidentiary

hearing is requested, a petitioner’s inability to persuade a state court to conduct such a

hearing does not in itself demonstrate lack of diligence. See Cardwell, 152 F.3d at 338.

In sum, if this Court determines that a petitioner has not been diligent in establishing

the factual basis for his claims in state court, then the Court may not conduct a hearing

unless t he petitioner satisfies one of § 2254(e)(2)’s narrow exceptions. If, however, the

petitioner has not failed to develop the factual basis of his claim in state court, the Court

will then proceed to consider whether a hearing is appropriate or required under the criteria

set forth by t he Sup reme Court in Townsend. 372 U.S. 293; see Baja, 187 F.3d at 1078

(quoting Cardwell, 152 F.3d at 337). 

Pursuant to Townsend, a federal district court must hold an evidentiary hearing in

a § 2254 case when the facts are in dispute if: (1) the petitioner “alleges facts which, if

proved, would entitle him to relief,” and (2) the state court has not , “after a full hearing

reliably found t he relevant facts.” Townsend, 372 U.S. at 312-13. In addition, the Court

established six circumstances under which there is presumptively no “full and fair hearing”

at the state level: 

 (1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state hearing;

(2) the state factual det erminat ion is not fairly supported by the record as a

whole;

(3) the fact-finding procedure employed by the state court was not adequate

to afford a full and fair hearing; 

(4) there is a substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence;

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(5) the material facts were not adequately developed at the state-court

hearing; or

(6) for any reason it appears that the state trier of fact did not afford the

habeas applicant a full and fair fact hearing.

See id. at 313. In any other case in which the facts are in dispute and diligence has been

established, the district court judge “has the power, constrained only by his sound

discretion, to receive evidence bearing upon the applicant’s constitutional claim.” Id. at

318 (noting that if a “habeas applicant was afforded a full and fair hearing by the state

court resulting in reliable findings, [the judge] may, and ordinarily should, accept the facts

as found in the hearing”).

DISCUSSION

Claim 4 The Trial Court’s Failure to Appoint an Expert to Examine Petitioner

and Assist in his Defense Vi ol ate d Petitioner’s Due Process Right

to Meaningful Psychiatric Assistance Under Ake v. Oklahoma.

Claim 5 The Trial Court’s Failure to Fi nd Petitioner’s Intoxication as a

Statutory Mitigating Circumstance and the Trial Court’s Failure to

Consider Petitioner’s Intoxicati on as a Non-Statutory Mitigating

Circumstance Violated the Eighth Amendment.

Claim 7 As Applied to the Facts of this Case, the Death Penalty is Cruel and

Unusual Punishment in Violation of the Eighth Amendment.

Petitioner raised the substance of Claims 4, 5 and 7 on direct appeal. (Dkt. 29 at 27-

28, 35.) Regarding Claim 4, Petitioner seeks an evidentiary hearing to present the testimony

of his school teachers, family members and friends, all of whom will test ify concerning the

circumst ances that led to his mental health disorders. (Dkt. 109 at 16.) Regarding Claims

4 and 5, Petitioner seeks to present expert testimony from a mitigation specialist,

psychologist, psychiatrist, addiction specialist and cultural expert regarding his possible

organic brain disorder, brain damage, intellectual deficit and fetal alcohol syndrome. (Id.

at 16-18.) Regarding Claim 7, Petitioner wishes to present all of the above mitigation to

show that his death sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. (Id. at 23-24.)

However, none of this material is relevant because all three claims are based on the

record that was develop ed during trial and sentencing. This Court’s review of the trial

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2

 When considering the merits of Claim 4, if the Court were t o find a

constitutional violation pursuant to Ake and a harmlessness analysis became necessary,

at that time the Court would sua sponte consider whether an evidentiary hearing was

required. See Rule 8, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254 (requiring court

to evaluate whether an evidentiary hearing is warranted).

3 In this Court’s Order Re: Procedural Status of Claims, the Court left

undecided the status of the “failure t o consider” aspect of Claim 5 and directed the parties

to provide supplemental briefing of the issue in t he Merits Briefs. (See Dkt. 29 at 28-33.)

Because Claim 5 is a record-based claim for which an evidentiary hearing is not required,

the Court need not resolve the procedural status of the “failure to consider” asp ect at t his

time. 

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court’s denial of an expert and its consideration of mitigation evidence is necessarily

limited to the factual record developed in state court.2

 Similarly, this Court’s review of the

constitutionality of Arizona’s death penalty statute as applied in Petitioner’s case is

necessarily limited to the record developed at sentencing. “[A]n evidentiary hearing is not

required on issues t hat can be resolved by reference to the state court record.” Totten v.

Merkle, 137 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 1998) (emphasis in original). Therefore, the requests

for an evidentiary hearing on Claims 4, 5 and 7 will be denied.3 

Claim 9 Petitioner was Denied Effective Assistance of Counsel at Trial by

Counsel’s: (A) Lack of Preparati on and Failure to Obtain

Continuance; (B) Ineffective Advi ce to Petitioner not to Testify;

(C) Ineffective Cross-Examination of a Witness; (D) Failure to

Pursue a Mental Condition Defense; and (E) Ineffective Investigation.

In his mot ion for an evidentiary hearing, Petitioner contends that he was diligent in

his attempt to develop the facts of Claim 9 in state court and is therefore entitled to an

evidentiary hearing. (Dkt. 109 at 23.) Petitioner contends that he alleged colorable claims

of ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”) at t rial, which the state court should not have

summarily dismissed without holding an evidentiary hearing. (Id. at 3.) At an evidentiary

hearing in this Court, Petitioner seeks to present the testimony of trial counsel regarding

his trial errors and an IAC expert regarding the standards of professional competence that

existed at the time of his trial. (Id.) 

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4 “ROA doc.” refers to documents in the five-volume record on appeal from

trial, sentencing, and the first and second petitions for post-convict ion relief. Copies of

the record on appeal, as well as the trial transcripts and the pleadings filed in the Arizona

Supreme Court, were provided to this Court by counsel for Respondents. (Dkt. 25.)

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On August 8, 1991, while his direct app eal to the Arizona Supreme Court was

pending, Petitioner (rep resented by counsel) filed his first petition for post-conviction relief

(“PCR”), which included Claim 9. (ROA doc. 154.)4

 In sup p ort of the trial IAC claims, the

petition included an affidavit from Petitioner stating his personal opinion t hat counsel did

not effectively investigate his case, cross-examine a witness or advise him regarding

testifying. (Id.) In a supplemental PCR petition, counsel added legal argument and

requested an evidentiary hearing. (ROA doc. 161 at 10.) PCR counsel did not request any

t y pe of investigative assistance or any expert funding to develop the factual basis of t he

IAC claims. In a comprehensive seven-page order, the state court concluded that

Petitioner had failed to state a colorable claim of trial IAC and was not entitled to an

evidentiary hearing. (ROA doc. 165.) A petition for review of the state court’s order

dismissing Petitioner’s first PCR petition was consolidated with his direct appeal. On Ap ril

15, 1993, the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences and

denied post-conviction relief. St at e v. Schurz, 176 Ariz. 46, 50, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1026

(1993).

In light of this record, the Court finds that PCR counsel’s efforts to develop Claim

9 fall short of that necessary to demonstrate diligence under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2).

Petitioner must have “made a reasonable attempt, in light of the information available at the

time, to investigate and pursue claims in st at e court .” Williams, 529 U.S. at 435. In light of

t he allegations presented in the PCR, Petitioner was aware of the materiality of information

from trial counsel yet did nothing to obtain an affidavit from counsel to support his claims.

See Williams, 529 U.S. at 438-40 (stating that when there is information in the record that

would alert a reasonable attorney to the existence and importance of certain evidence, the

attorney “fails” to develop the factual record if he does not make reasonable efforts to

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investigat e and p resent the evidence to the state courts). PCR counsel did not request an

investigator to assist in gathering evidence to support the claim, nor does it appear that

counsel made any effort to interview trial counsel. Petit ioner does not allege that trial

counsel was unavailable or unwilling to cooperate, nor does the record reflect any request

of the PCR court (other t han a generic request for an evidentiary hearing) to assist in

developing evidence from trial counsel. It appears that nothing prevented Petitioner from

obtaining the relevant information from trial counsel to sup p ort his IAC claims; therefore,

it was unreasonable not to do so. Similarly, nothing prevented Petitioner from request ing

expert funding in order to present facts in support of Claim 9. See Baja, 187 F.3d at 1079

(stating that “[s]tate law not only p ermitted but required [petitioner] to come forward with

affidavits or other evidence, to the extent that his claim relied on evidence outside the trial

record.”). Although Pet it ioner argues the state court curtailed his ability to present

evidence in support of Claim 9, the record does not demonstrate any type of curtailment

that prevented Petitioner from develop ing t he factual basis of Claim 9. (Dkt. 109.) Because

Petitioner was not diligent in developing the factual basis of Claim 9 in state court , §

2254(e)(2) prohibits the holding of a federal evidentiary hearing and the motion will be

denied.

Claim 10 Petitioner was Denied Effective Assistance of Counsel at Sentencing

by Counsel’s: (A) Inadequate Mitigation Investigation; and

(B) Failure to Adequately Present Available Mitigation Evidence.

Petitioner attached twelve exhibits to his init ial motion for an evidentiary hearing

that were not part of the state court record. (See dkt. 82.) Petitioner requested that those

exhibits be considered as part of Claim 10. This Court denied t he motion without prejudice

to refiling, ruling that, to satisfy 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2), he must explain why evidence such

as 20-year-old medical records and psychological evaluations was not obtained and

presented in collateral state court proceedings. (Dkt. 82 at 12.) 

In his renewed motion for an evidentiary hearing, Petitioner contends that he was

diligent in his at t emp t t o develop the facts of Claim 10 in state court and is therefore

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entit led to a federal evidentiary hearing. (Dkt. 109 at 23.) Petitioner seeks a hearing to

present the testimony of Arlene Schurz, his mother; Sharon Apkaw, his aunt; Joycelyn

Martinez, his cousin; Sister Martha Mary Carpenter, one of his elementary school teachers;

and Michael Dodd and David Hedgecock, employees of New Foundation, a substance

abuse treat ment center that Petitioner attended between 1977 and 1979. (Dkt. 109 at 21-23.)

Additionally, Petitioner seeks to present testimony from a mit igat ion specialist, a

psychologist, a psychiatrist, an addiction specialist and a cultural expert. (Dkt. 109 at 23.)

State Court Proceedings

After Petitioner’s June 11, 1990 conviction, counsel sought and was granted the

appointment of an mental health expert, Dr. Donald Tatro, for purp oses of sentencing.

(ROA doc. 116.) On September 17, 1990, counsel submitted a 33-page memorandum

outlining relevant mitigating factors. (ROA doc. 134.) Attached to the memorandum were

a 15-page psychological report from Dr. Tatro; letters from Petitioner’s mother and aunt;

copies of Petitioner’s grade school records, GED certificate and certificate of completion

from a substance abuse program; letters from family friend, Cecil Rovie, and Sist er Martha

Mary Carpenter. 

In counsel’s presentation of relevant mitigation (ROA doc. 134), he first discussed

residual doubt about Petitioner’s level of p articipation in the crime. Next, counsel focused

on Petitioner’s intoxication at the time of the crime, arguing that such intoxication rose to

a statutory mitigating circumstance. Petitioner’s alleged intoxication included significant

ingestion of alcohol prior to the crime and an amount of heroin. Counsel argued that

Petitioner not only was intoxicated at the time of the crime but also had a long-term

subst ance abuse problem with alcoholism. Next, counsel emphasized the dramatic

disparity between co-defendant’s sentence of only probation and Petitioner being eligible

for the death penalty. Next, counsel discussed Petitioner’s dysfunctional family history.

Counsel emphasized that Petitioner grew up in an environment of alcoholism. Counsel

discussed that Petitioner was surrounded by alcoholic and abusive parents and by other

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alcoholics visiting their home. After the father left, Petitioner’s mother displayed little

attention for him, as she tried t o sup p ort 5 children. At a young age, Petitioner’s mother

consigned him to an institution. Counsel argued that t he long-term institutionalization of

Pet itioner had an adverse effect upon him and that as a result of his dysfunctional family

history, he developed significant and severe psychological problems. Next, counsel

discussed Petitioner’s potential for rehabilitation and the love of his family and friends.

In support, counsel attached letters from his mother, his aunt, another family friend and an

elementary school teacher, who all care for Petitioner. Finally, counsel reit erat ed the early

offer of a plea-bargain in this case for a life sentence. 

Dr. Tatro’s report substantiated Petitioner’s mental health problems, concluding that

he had a mixed personality disorder with passive-aggressive, avoidant and antisocial

features. (ROA doc. 134, Ex. A at 15.) Dr. Tatro discussed Petitioner’s long-term

substance abuse problem, concluding t hat Petitioner had a heroin (opiate) dependance and

alcoholism. Dr. Tatro also recounted Petitioner’s dysfunctional family history growing up

on the Pima Indian Reservation in an environment of alcoholic and abusive parents.

Pet itioner started drinking alcohol and abusing drugs at an early age after his grandmother

died. Such drug abuse included IV use of heroin. Dr. Tatro detailed Petitioner’s contacts

with institutions, with Pet it ioner first being institutionalized at the age of 12 for substance

abuse. Petitioner’s contact with institutions included substance abuse treatment centers,

juvenile institutions, and after turning 18, prison. Dr. Tatro concluded that such long-t erm

institutionalization had an adverse effect upon Petitioner.

At the presentence hearing, both Sister Martha Mary Carpenter and Pet it ioner’s

aunt, Sharon Apkaw, testified as character witnesses for Petitioner. (RT 9/19/90.)

Following their presentation, Petitioner issued a short allocution, declaring his innocence.

(Id.) Additionally, the sentencing court was aware of a March 1990 report from Dr. Jack

Potts, who performed a pre-screening evaluation pursuant to Ariz. R. Crim. P. 11 in order

t o determine Petitioner’s competency to stand trial. (ROA doc. 44.) Dr. Potts determined

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that Petitioner was competent to stand trial. (Id.) In statements to Dr. Potts, Petitioner selfreported using intravenous heroin and drinking alcohol at the time of the crime and relayed

that a prior head injury still bothered him. (Id.) See also Schurz, 176 Ariz. at 53, 859 P.2d

at 163.

In both his first and second PCR petitions, Petitioner raised claims of IAC at

sentencing. In the first petition, he argued that counsel was ineffective for not calling

additional character witnesses to testify at the presentence hearing. (ROA doc. 154 at 4.)

T his claim was denied on the ground that Petitioner failed to state a colorable claim t hat

would justify an evidentiary hearing because Petitioner’s affidavit failed to state what the

witnesses would have said at the presentence hearing. (ROA doc. 165.) The PCR court

concluded it was impossible to determine whether the substance of the proposed

testimony had in fact been presented at sentencing or whether the absence of the

testimony created a reasonable probabilit y that Petitioner would not have been sentenced

to death had the testimony been presented. (Id. at 9-10.)

Counsel was ap p ointed to assist Petitioner in his second PCR proceeding on

January 14, 1994, and was given until May 14, 1994, to file a petition. (ROA doc. 176.) On

April 11, 1994, Petitioner filed a motion for the appointment of an investigator on the

ground that “certain aspects of the case” required investigation that “[c]ounsel is not

qualified to perform.” (ROA doc. 177.) On April 21, 1994, the trial judge denied Petitioner’s

request for an investigator without prejudice because it was “silent as to why an

investigator should be appointed.” (ROA doc. 178.) The court’s order st at ed that the

request would be reconsidered if Petitioner provided “additional information concerning

why an investigator should be appoint ed and/or what matters need to be investigated.”

(Id.)

On May 12, 1994, Petitioner requested a 30-day ext ension of time to file his PCR

pet it ion. (ROA doc. 179.) Before the motion was ruled on, Petitioner filed a separate

request to file his petition “60 days from the date of the appoint ment of t he investigator or

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5 Petitioner’s fourth request for an extension of time is not cont ained in the

record on appeal provided to this Court. However, Petitioner’s reply brief, filed with

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the denial of the renewed request for the appointment of an investigator.” (ROA doc.

179A.) This extension was sought because counsel was preparing a new motion for

investigative assistance in an attempt to “satisfy the court’s concerns about the necessity

of the appointment of an investigator.” (ROA doc. 179A.) The court granted Petitioner’s

request for a 60-day ext ension, and ordered that the petition be filed by July 15, 1994.

(ROA doc. 180.)

On June 15, 1994, t he Office of Court Appointed Counsel approved the funding of

a mitigation specialist, Mary Durand, to assist Petitioner’s counsel with “mit igat ion issues”

in connection with t he second petition. (ROA doc. 189 at ¶ 1; ROA doc. 182.) On July 13,

1994, Petitioner filed a second request for a 60-day extension of time to file his petition on

the grounds that “[t]he Office of Court Appointed Counsel has approved the funding of

a mitigation specialist to assist the defense,” who “has just begun her work on the case.”

(ROA doc. 182.) The court granted Pet itioner’s request and ordered that the petition be

filed by September 15, 1994. (ROA doc. 183.)

On September 16, 1994, Petitioner filed a third request for a 60-day extension of time

to file his petition on the grounds t hat t he mitigation specialist needs “more time to

complete” the investigation. (ROA doc. 184.) Counsel informed the court that t he

mitigation specialist was now reporting progress in locating members of Petitioner’s family.

(Id.) The motion further provided that, “[b]arring unforeseeable circumst ances,” no further

ext ensions were anticipated. (Id.) The court granted Petitioner’s request and ordered that

the petition be filed by November 15, 1994. (ROA doc. 185.)

On November 9, 1994, Pet it ioner filed a request for a six-month extension of time on

the grounds that “more time is needed for t he . . . ‘mitigation specialist,’ to complete an indepth mitigation investigat ion t hat ‘will yield significantly new material’ which will be

relevant to the Rule 32 Pet it ion.”5 (ROA doc. 187.) The State opposed Petitioner’s request

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respect to his initial motion for an evidentiary hearing, states that this extension request

was filed on November 9, 1994. (Dkt. 80 at 28.)

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for more time on t he ground that Durand’s affidavit failed to “detail what she had done

since her appointment or what leads she p lans to investigate that will lead to relevant

mitigation.” (ROA doc. 187.) The State argued that it “would not object to a reasonable

[investigation] schedule” if Durand were pursuing “the investigation of relevant mit igation

that was unknown to t he defendant and his counsel at time of sentencing,” rather than “a

general exploratory search for informat ion t hat should have occurred prior to sentencing.”

(ROA doc. 187.) “Until an investigative plan” was presented, however, t he State objected

to a six-month extension. (ROA doc. 187.) On November 28, the court granted Petitioner

a 60-day extension and ordered that the second PCR petition be filed on or before January

23, 1995. (ROA doc. 188.) 

On January 23, 1995, counsel filed the second PCR petition and argued IAC at

sent encing because “the original investigation and the presentation of mitigating evidence

in this case was woefully inadequate.” (ROA doc. 189 at 3.) Specifically, Petitioner alleged

that the following areas of mitigation should have been presented: fetal alcohol syndrome,

evidence of organicity in physiological make-up, alcoholism in family, physical abuse,

possible sexual abuse by a priest, serious head injury at age 10, chronic alcohol and

substance abuse (including heroin and IV use), treatment at Camelback Hospital,

institutionalization, drug rehabilitation, and dysfunctional family background. (Id. at 11-

13.) Attached to the second petition was an affidavit of Durand, who averred t hat she had

“read the petition for Post Conviction relief and the factual statements alleged therein can

all be supported by my investigation.” (ROA doc. 189, Durand Aff. at ¶ 6.)

On March 6, 1995, Petitioner filed motions requesting that the Arizona Department

of Corrections (“ADOC”) provide his investigator with copies of his master, juvenile and

medical files. (ROA doc. 190-92.) On M arch 10, 1995, the State asked the court to stay

Petitioner’s document requests until March 17, 1995, in order to allow the ADOC adequate

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6 Arizona Revised Statute Section 31-221 provides that the ADOC “shall not

disclose records or p ort ions of records” from a master file revealing the identity of a

confidential informant, information that would endanger the life or physical safety of a

person, or information that would jeopardize an ongoing criminal investigation.

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time to review the files “and determine whether any protective orders will be required”

pursuant to A.R.S. § 31-221. (ROA doc. 194.) 6 The State questioned the “materiality” of

the records as to Petitioner’s second petition, but did not object t o defense counsel’s

review of them if it was pursuant to court order and in accordance with Arizona law. (ROA

doc. 194 at 2.)

On March 22, 1995, the State agreed that, “[p]ursuant to a court order and upon

payment of statutory fees,” the ADOC would release copies of Petitioner’s master and

juvenile files to his attorney and investigator, “after redacting information about a

confidential informant.” (ROA doc. 195.) The State offered to release Petitioner’s medical

file after receiving copying costs and a signed, notarized release. (ROA doc. 195 at 1-2.)

On March 24, 1995, the trial judge ordered the ADOC to provide copies of

Petitioner’s master and juvenile files to his attorney or investigator. (ROA doc. 197, 198.)

Pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 31-221(C) and (D), t he court prohibited Petitioner’s attorney and

investigator from (i) giving any person access to their copy of the master file; (ii) disclosing

the contents of t he master file to Petitioner; and (iii) disclosing to any person any

information from the master file t hat would (a) “reveal the identity of a confidential

informant;” (b) “endanger the life or p hy sical safety of a person;” or (c) “jeopardize an

ongoing criminal investigation.” (ROA doc. 197.)

On July 31, 1995, the trial judge issued an eight-page order denying Petitioner’s

second PCR petition on the ground that the court had “been unable to find anything which

would justify an evidentiary hearing in t his case on the issue of [IAC] or any other issue

raised.” (ROA doc. 200 at 71.) With resp ect t o the IAC at sentencing claim, the court ruled

that Pet it ioner had failed to demonstrate “anything which . . . trial counsel should have

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discovered but did not discover because of some sort of deficient conduct.” (ROA doc.

200 at 68.) A petition for review to the Arizona Supreme Court was summarily denied.

Analysis

Respondents contend that 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) bars an evidentiary hearing

because Petitioner was not diligent in state court in developing the facts he now seeks to

present in this Court (Dkt. 114 at 10). See Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 839-40 (9th

Cir. 2001). Petitioner counters that he tried to develop t he record in state court during PCR

proceedings but was unable to do so because: (1) the state court denied his request for

invest igat ive assistance in April 1994; (2) the state court did not grant his full request for

a six-month extension of time to file his second PCR pet it ion in November 1994, and the

shortened time limit for the filing of the petition did not allow his mitigation specialist

enough time to complete her investigation; (3) the state court restricted access to his

ADOC medical and juvenile files in M arch 1995; and (4) the state court failed to hold an

evidentiary hearing. (Dkts. 109 at 6-12; 115 at 6-10.) The Court disagrees.

First, even t hough the state court initially denied funding for an investigator due to

Petitioner’s failure to provide factual support for the request, the denial was without

prejudice. Pet it ioner subsequently renewed the request, specifically asking for a mitigation

specialist to assist the investigation and development of his IAC at sentencing claim, and

the court granted the motion. (ROA docs. 178-80, 182.) Following this appointment, the

court allowed more than seven months for the mit igation specialist to investigate and

collect evidence. (ROA doc. 189.) 

Second, although the PCR court did not expressly grant the full six month

continuance requested by counsel in November 1994, the court provided more than one

y ear for Petitioner to file his second PCR petition. In addition, there is no explanation as

to why the materials presumably gathered by the mitigation investigator during the seven

months between her appointment and the filing of the petit ion could not have been

provided to the court at the time the second PCR petition was filed. The only material

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attached t o t he second PCR petition was an affidavit from the mitigation specialist stating

simply that her investigation sup p ort ed the petition’s allegations. (ROA 189, Durand Aff.

at ¶ 6.) It is evident from the affidavit, however, that at least some materials had been

gathered in support of Petitioner’s claim. (Id.) Petitioner’s failure to provide these

materials to the PCR court violated the requirement that “[a]ffidavits, records, or other

evidence currently available to the defendant supporting the allegations of the petition

shall be attached to it.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.5.

Third, despite Pet it ioner’s claim of curtailment by the ADOC, that agency did in fact

provide the documents Petitioner sought. Even though there was a period of delay, such

delay was reasonable as the ADOC was under a statutory obligation to safeguard

confidential informants listed in its records. See A.R.S. § 32-221. After those legitimate

concerns were resolved, the ADOC turned over Petitioner’s records. (ROA doc. 194-95,

197.) After receipt of these documents, however, Petitioner did not seek to supplement his

previously-filed PCR petition with any relevant records.

Finally, the state court’s failure to hold an evidentiary hearing is due to Petitioner’s

own failure to develop the factual record. Even though Petitioner asserted new potential

areas of mitigation in his second PCR petition, he did not provide sup p ort for these

allegations despite the assistance of a mit igat ion specialist. For example, PCR counsel was

aware, from the sentencing record, of some of the same familial and background witnesses

Petitioner now seeks testimony from in this Court. If t here was additional relevant

information regarding Petitioner’s upbringing and background from t hese witnesses that

should have been presented at sentencing, PCR counsel could have obtained and

presented t his informat ion in the second PCR petition. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 438-40

(st at ing t hat when there is information in the record that would alert a reasonable attorney

to the existence and importance of certain evidence, the at t orney “fails” to develop the

factual record if he does not make reasonable efforts to investigate and present the

evidence to the state courts); see also Cooper-Smith v. Palmateer, 397 F.3d 1236, 1241 (9th

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Cir. 2005) (in the context of a Rule 7 expansion of the record request, concluding that there

was a lack of diligence because informat ion was readily available but petitioner failed to

present it in post-conviction proceedings). 

In addition, Pet itioner did not seek, during his second PCR proceeding, any expert

assistance to investigate fetal alcohol syndrome, organicity or past head injuries. See

Roberts v. Dretke, 381 F.3d 491, 500 (5th Cir. 2004) (reasoning that there is no curtailment

of st at e habeas proceedings unless the state court denies an evidentiary hearing and

denies funding which prevents petitioner from developing his claims) (emphasis added).

A reasonable attorney, after reviewing Dr. Potts’s report concerning Petitioner’s head

injury at age 10 and discussing the possibility of fetal alcohol syndrome and organicity

with a mitigation specialist, would have sought additional assistance from t he PCR court

to develop t hese facts. Indeed, Petitioner asserts in the instant motion that a federal

evidentiary hearing is necessary to present testimony from a psychologist, a psychiatrist,

an addiction specialist, and a cultural expert to support his IAC at sentencing claim, yet did

not request the assist ance of such experts during the state PCR proceedings, despite

having more t han one year to develop and present such evidence. See McNair v.

Campbell, 416 F.3d 1291, 1299 (11th Cir. 2005) (concluding that petitioner’s failure to timely

request expert funding in state PCR proceedings demonstrated a lack of diligence); Koste,

345 F.3d at 985-86 (concluding that PCR counsel was not diligent because he did not

develop assertion during PCR proceedings that petitioner had a personality disorder). 

The mere request for an evidentiary hearing in state court may not be sufficient to

establish diligence if a reasonable person would have taken additional steps. See Dowthitt,

230 F.3d at 758. Here, a reasonable attorney would have sought expert assistance from the

state court to develop evidence concerning fet al alcohol syndrome, organicity and brain

injuries. In addition, a reasonable attorney would have proffered available relevant

background materials, gathered by a mitigation specialist during p ost -conviction

proceedings, to bolster the claim that counsel provided ineffective assistance at

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sentencing. See Baja, 187 F.3d at 1079 (concluding there was a lack of diligence because

petitioner failed in post-conviction proceeding t o advance evidence in support of his

federal claim and that nothing had curtailed him from prop erly supporting his claim). The

PCR court’s failure to hold an evidentiary hearing based on unsupported allegations did

not curt ail Pet it ioner’s ability to develop these facts in state court. The Court finds that

Petitioner did not diligently seek to develop the factual basis of Claim 10 in state court. 

Finally, Petitioner contends that even if he did fail to diligently develop t he factual

basis of Claim 10 in state court, he is still entitled to an evidentiary hearing because he

meets the exception framework established by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(A) and (B). (Dkt. 80

at 31-33.) Under this statutory exception framework, in order to be ent it led to an

evidentiary hearing, Petitioner must establish both prong (A) and (B), as follows: 

(A) the claim relies on – 

(i) a new rule of const itutional law, made retroactive to cases on

collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously

unavailable; or

(ii) a factual predicate that could not have been previously discovered

 through the exercise of due diligence; and 

(B) the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear

and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable

factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(A), (B). Citing Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992), Petitioner

argues that he is entitled to present additional mitigation evidence that he is innocent of

the death penalty and that prong (B) is satisfied by p roving his innocence of the death

penalty, without having also to prove that he is innocent of the underlying offense. (Dkt.

80 at 31-33.) 

Contrary to Petitioner’s argument, the Court in Sawyer only determined whether a

fundamental miscarriage of justice allowed a petitioner to overcome a procedurally

defaulted claim based on actual innocence. To meet the fundament al miscarriage of justice

standard, a petitioner must show by clear and convincing evidence t hat, but for a

constitutional error, no reasonable juror would have found the existence of an aggravating

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circumstance or some other condition of eligibility for the death sentence under the

applicable state law. Id. at 336, 345. The Sawyer Court went on to conclude that claims

regarding errors in the submission of mitigation evidence do not relate to a “condition of

eligibility” and cannot form a basis for relief under this exception. Id. at 345-47. Thus,

Sawyer does not provide support for Petitioner’s argument that he is entitled to present

additional mitigation evidence.

Further, the “due diligence” provision of (e)(2)(A)(ii) does not support Petit ioner’s

argument . The “due diligence” provision of (e)(2)(A)(ii) applies to situations in which

“efforts to discover the fact s would have been in vain,” and provides an opportunity for

a petitioner to obtain a hearing if the factual basis of the claim “did not exist at the time of

state-court proceedings.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 435-36. Petitioner does not suggest that

any of the fact s necessary to this claim were not discoverable. Thus, absent Petitioner

being able to satisfy prong (A), Petitioner’s actual innocence claim fails. Accordingly, his

motion for an evidentiary hearing on Claim 10 will be denied. 

Based on the foregoing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner’s Renewed Motion for Evident iary

Hearing (Dkt. 109) is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court forward a copy of this Order to

all counsel of record and to the Clerk of the Arizona Supreme Court, 1501 W. Washington,

Phoenix, AZ 85007-3329.

DATED this 29th day of September, 2005.

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