Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00855/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-00855-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Michael Garcia, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora Schriro, et al., 

Respondents. 

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No. 06-0855-PHX-DGC (DKD)

ORDER

Pending before the Court are Michael Garcia’s petition for writ of habeas corpus and

United States Magistrate Judge David Duncan’s Report and Recommendation (“R&R”).

Dkt. ##1, 11. The R&R recommends that the Court deny the petition. Dkt. #11 at 3.

Petitioner has filed objections to the R&R. Dkt. #12. For the reasons set forth below, the

Court will accept the R&R and deny the petition.

I. Background.

Between January 2000 and July 2001, Petitioner fraudulently filed Arizona tax

returns, using false names, false entries of income and amount of refund due, and false W-2

forms. Dkt. #9, Ex. A at 31. On April 23, 2002, Petitioner entered into a plea agreement for

attempted fraud and filing of a false claim. Id. The parties stipulated to a prison term of not

more than the aggravated sentence of 4 years on the attempted fraud count, but did not

stipulate to a sentence on the false claim count, leaving the sentence to the state court’s

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Respondents argue that although Petitioner’s Rule 32 of-right proceeding was

pending at the time Blakely was decided, Blakely does not apply to Petitioner’s case because

it was not on direct appeal from a guilty verdict. Dkt. #9 at 4-10. As the Court stated in its

April 19, 2006 order, however, a Rule 32 proceeding following a plea bargain is “considered

to be analogous to a direct appeal” for Blakely purposes. Dkt. #5 at 3 (discussing State v.

Ward, 118 P.3d 1122, 1126 (Ariz. 2005)).

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discretion. Id. In the presentence investigation report, Petitioner’s probation officer

recommended aggravated sentences for both counts because Petitioner had previous felony

convictions, had committed the offenses while on parole, and had derived pecuniary gain

from the fraud. Id. at 39. On June 12, 2002, the superior court of Maricopa County

sentenced Petitioner to the aggravated sentences of 4 years on the attempted fraud count and

a consecutive 2.5 years on the false claim count. Id., Ex. C at 2. The aggravating

circumstances on which the court based its decision were (1) the commission of the offenses

for pecuniary gain, (2) Petitioner’s multiple prior convictions, and (3) Petitioner’s prior

incarceration for similar offenses. Id. at 10. 

On August 15, 2002, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief, and on April 9,

2004, filed a petition in which he argued that his consecutive sentences were improper under

A.R.S. § 13-116 and State v. Gordon, 778 P.2d 1204 (Ariz. 1989). Id., Ex. A at 61, 84. In

his reply, Petitioner raised the new argument that the trial court improperly considered

aggravating factors under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), when it sentenced

him to terms greater than the presumptive terms for the offenses committed. Dkt. #9, Ex. A

at 31, 87 (presumptive terms were 3.5 years for attempted fraud and 1.5 years for filing a

false claim). In denying Petitioner’s post-conviction relief claims, the trial court found that

Blakely did not apply retroactively to Petitioner’s case. Dkt. #9, Ex. B at 88. Both the

Arizona Court of Appeals and Supreme Court denied review. Id. Ex. E. On March 13, 2006,

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Dkt. #1. 

II. Discussion.

The R&R states that “assuming arguendo that Blakely is even applicable, Garcia’s

argument is in any event without merit.” Dkt. #11 at 2.1

 The R&R then explains Blakely,

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which held that “any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory

maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Blakely, 542

U.S. at 301 (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)). The “statutory

maximum” is initially the presumptive term and is the “maximum sentence the judge may

impose solely on the basis of facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.”

Id. at 303 (emphasis in original). 

The R&R then examines how Arizona has interpreted Blakely. As a preliminary

matter, prior convictions are exempt from Blakely and may serve as aggravating factors

without further proof. United States v. Quintana-Quintana, 383 F.3d 1052, 1053 (9th Cir.

2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1130 (2005); State v. Martinez, 115 P.3d 618, 621 (Ariz. 2005).

 Next, “once a jury finds or a defendant admits a single aggravating factor [other than a prior

conviction], the Sixth Amendment permits the sentencing judge to find and consider

additional factors relevant to the imposition of a sentence up to the maximum prescribed in

that statute.” Id. at 625. In other words, once an aggravating factor – properly established

through a jury finding, an admission, or a prior conviction – increases a defendant’s

maximum sentence, the court may independently find and consider other aggravating factors

to support a sentence within the new maximum. 

The R&R concludes that Garcia’s prior convictions served as an aggravating factor

that allowed the trial judge to sentence him to the statutory maximum. Thus, “based upon

Garcia’s prior convictions alone, the sentencing judge was authorized to find the remaining

aggravating factors, and acted within his discretion in imposing a sentence anywhere within

the statutory range.” Dkt. #11 at 3.

Petitioner’s only objection to the R&R is that because the plea agreement stated that

“[t]he State agrees to withdraw the allegation of prior convictions,” the trial court should not

have considered prior convictions as an aggravating factor that authorized a sentence above

the presumptive term. Dkt. #12 at 2; Dkt. #9, Ex. A at 31. He quotes the trial court as stating

that “[t]he aggravated sentence is limited by the plea agreement” to bolster his argument that

the trial court knew it could not consider his prior convictions, but did so anyway. Dkt. #12

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at 2. Petitioner takes this quote out of context, however, by omitting the second half of the

sentence. The entire sentence reads: “Moreover, the aggravated sentence here is limited by

the plea agreement in cause one or Count 1 to four years, a Class 3 felony.” Dkt. #12, Ex. B.

By this statement, the trial court simply meant that it would not give an aggravated sentence

of greater than four years on the attempted fraud count because the plea agreement required

that it refrain from doing so. 

The record confirms that the prosecution did not violate the plea agreement. The trial

court specifically noted that Petitioner’s prior convictions were not alleged for enhancement

purposes by the state. Dkt. #9, Ex. C at 10. Instead, the court learned of Petitioner’s prior

convictions from the probation officer in the presentence investigation report and from

Petitioner’s own attorney, who told the court “I’d just like to tell you that he has got a record,

obviously.” Dkt. #9, Ex. A at 39, Ex. C at 5-6. The trial court properly considered

Petitioner’s prior convictions as an aggravating circumstance that increased the maximum

allowable sentence under Blakely. Once the new maximum was established, the court was

free to consider the other aggravating circumstances of parole violation and pecuniary gain

in deciding where to sentence Petitioner within the new maximum range. See United States

v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005); Jones v. Schriro, No. CV-05-3720-PHX-JAT, 2006 WL

1794765, at *2 (D.Ariz. June 27, 2006); Martinez, 115 P.3d at 624-25 (interpreting Blakely

and Booker to require that only the aggravating factor that initially increases a sentencing

ceiling must comport with Blakely’s heightened proof requirements). 

Moreover, the State argues that the factual stipulation entered into as part of the plea

agreement served as an admission that allowed the trial court to consider the pecuniary gain

Petitioner derived from his offenses as an independent aggravating factor, even if the trial

court should not have considered his prior convictions. Dkt. #9 at 11-12 n.2. The Court

agrees. The plea agreement stipulated that Petitioner fraudulently “received refund warrant

checks from the State of Arizona which he cashed.” Dkt. #9, Ex. A at 31. This admission

of pecuniary gain is an aggravating factor that satisfies Blakely. See State v. Sansing, 77 P.3d

30, 33-36 (Ariz. 2003) (factual stipulations established aggravating factors justifying

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defendant’s death sentence). The trial court did not violate the Sixth Amendment when it

considered aggravating factors in sentencing Petitioner to a prison term longer than the

presumptive terms for the offenses covered by the plea agreement. See Booker, 543 U.S. at

244 (explaining that a court may consider defendant admissions as aggravating facts); United

States v. Labrada-Bustamante, 428 F.3d 1252, 1261 (9th Cir. 2005) (same); QuintanaQuintana, 383 F.3d at 1053 (holding that courts may consider prior convictions without

violating Blakely); United States v. Morales-Perez, 448 F.3d 1158, 1162 (9th Cir. 2006)

(same); United States v. Brown, 417 F.3d 1077, 1078-79 (9th Cir. 2005) (same).

IT IS ORDERED:

1. The Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation (Dkt. #11) is accepted.

2. Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus (Dkt. #1) is denied. 

DATED this 9th day of November, 2006.

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