Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-00306/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cv-00306-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Armando Roberto Aros, III 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Robinson, et al., 

Defendants.

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No. CV-04-306-PHX-SRB (LOA)

ORDER

 This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel and Request for

Sanctions. (Doc. 181) Defendant opposes the motion and requests a protective order

pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c)(1). (Doc. 199) Plaintiff has filed a reply. (Doc. 218,

Attachment A) 

I. Background

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, commenced this civil rights action against several

employees of the Arizona Department of Corrections (“ADC”) in 2004 and amended his

Complaint several times. Pursuant to Court orders, he filed a Third Amended Complaint

in 2005. (Doc. 20) Plaintiff’s Complaint included four counts alleging the following: (1)

Count I - In 2002, Defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to Due Process

by administratively reclassifying him to be housed in level five maximum security units

for the next two years and raising his Public and Institutional Score (“P/I”) from 4/3 to

5/5 (Doc. 20 at 4-4C); (2) Count II - Defendants violated Plaintiff’s substantive due

process rights by administratively reclassifying him to be housed in level five maximum

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security units for the next two years and raising his P/I from 4/3 to 5/5 (Doc. 20 at 5-5C);

(3) Count III - Defendants violated Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment right to equal

protection when he was administratively reclassified to be housed in level-five maximum

security units for two years, and when his classification score was raised from 4/3 to 5/5.

(Doc. 20 at 6-6C); and (4) Count IV - Defendants violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment

right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment by failing to remedy conditions of

confinement at the Central Unit of ASPC-Florence. (Doc. 20 at 7)

On September 12, 2005, the Court dismissed the allegations in Count III for failure

to state a claim. (Doc. 19) The Court subsequently granted Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment on the remaining claims. (Doc. 87) Plaintiff appealed.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the portion of the judgment which

dismissed Plaintiff’s Equal Protection claim, stating that Plaintiff had “alleged that other

inmates systematically received lesser punishment for conspiring to assault other inmates,

and that defendants singled him out for the sole purpose of depriving him of the

evidentiary and procedural safeguards accorded other inmates in his situation. These

allegations are sufficient to state a claim.” (Doc. 103) On remand from the Ninth Circuit,

this Court reinstated Count III and Defendants Robinson, Ray Martinez, Fulton, Fansler,

Conrad Luna, John Doe I, John Doe II, and Donna Clement. (Doc. 108) In accordance

with the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, the only issue before the Court is Plaintiff’s claim that 

Defendants’ reclassification decisions violated his right to Equal Protection. 

 Defendant Fansler was a member of the committee which considered evidence that

Plaintiff had assaulted another inmate, Hank Lazarro, on October 29, 2002. (Doc. 20 at

6) The evidence considered included “a report which includes information from a

confidential informant describing [Plaintiff’s] involvement in an assault on another

inmate with a weapon.” (Doc. 20 at 6A) Based on Plaintiff’s behavior, Defendants

Fansler and Fulton recommended that Plaintiff’s public and institutional (“P/I”) risk

scores be increased from 4/3 to 5/5. (Doc. 20 at 6, 6A-C) Defendants Fulton and Fansler

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also recommended that Plaintiff be housed in level 5 housing units for the next 2 years,

dating from November 12, 2002. (Doc. 20 at 6A) After his reclassification, Plaintiff was

placed in SMU-I. (Id.)

Plaintiff has served a request for production on Defendant Fansler, seeking various

records. Defendant Fansler argues that Plaintiff should not be entitled to discover the

records he seeks. Alternatively, Defendant Fansler argues that the Plaintiff should only

be provided redacted copies of the records. 

II. Applicable Law

Before considering the discovery dispute, the Court will discuss the applicable

law. Local Rule of Civil Procedure 37.1, which governs motions to compel, provides

that:

the moving party shall set forth, separately from a memorandum of

law, the following in separate, distinct numbered paragraphs:

(1) the question propounded, the interrogatory submitted, the 

designation requested or the inspection requested;

(2) the answer, designation or response received; and 

(3) the reason(s) why said answer, designation or response is 

deficient.

LRCiv 37.1(a). Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel does not comply with Local Rule 37.1(a). 

(Doc. 181) Plaintiff’s Motion refers to the subject matter of several discovery requests,

but such references are buried in the text of the motion and are not set forth “in separate,

distinct numbered paragraphs” as Rule 37.1(a) requires. Plaintiff’s failure to comply with

the Local Rule provides an independent sufficient basis to deny his Motion to Compel. 

“‘District courts have broad discretion in interpreting and applying their local rules.’”

Simmons v. Navajo County, 609 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Miranda v. S.

Pac. Transp. Co., 710 F.2d 516, 521 (9th Cir. 1983)). “[W]e emphasize that the district

court in this case was under no obligation to undertake a cumbersome review of the

record on the [Plaintiff’s] behalf.” (Id.) Also see, Tran v. Tyco Elec. Corp., 2008 WL

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2037279, at * 2 (D.Or. 2008) (denying motion to compel where plaintiff failed to comply

with Local Rule 37.1’s requirements); Burgess v. Pliler, 2006 WL 278588, at * 3 (E.D.

Cal. 2006) (defective motion to compel denied where party failed to follow local rule

requiring that party set forth the requests propounded and allegedly deficient responses

received). The Court, however, will also consider the merits of the Motion in view of the

considerable time and effort the parties have spent in relation to the Motion. 

Despite Plaintiff’s failure to comply with Local Rule 37.1(a), Defendant Fansler

culled through the Motion to Compel and identified the documents that appear to be at

issue. (Doc. 199 at 6) Defendant Fansler identified the documents as: (1) the victim’s

statement, (2) confidential information (“CI”) statements; (3) the CI Reliability Assessment Questionnaire(s) (“CIRAQ”) for the CIs; (4) photographs of the weapon used in the

assault; and (5) records of medical treatment the victim received after the assault. (Doc.

199) Plaintiff’s reply addresses the discovery of the foregoing materials. (Doc. 218,

Attachment A 18-25) 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 provides that:

[T]he scope of discovery is as follows: The parties may obtain discovery

regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim

or defense - including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition,

and location of any documents or other tangible things and the identity

and locations of persons who know of any discoverable matter. For good 

cause, the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject

matter involved in the action. Relevant information need not be admissible

at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery

of admissible evidence. All discovery is subject to the limitations

imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)(C).

Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1) (emphasis added). Accordingly, the nature of Plaintiff’s claim

defines the scope of discovery. The only claim remaining is Plaintiff’s allegation that his

Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection was violated by his reclassification in

2002. (Doc. 20 at 6-6C) A section 1983 plaintiff alleging an equal protection violation

must prove that: (1) the defendants treated plaintiff differently from others similarly

situated; (2) the unequal treatment was based on an impermissible classification; (3) the

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defendants acted with discriminatory intent in applying this classification; and (4)

plaintiff suffered injury as a result of the discriminatory classification. Moua v. City of

Chico, 324 F.Supp.2d 1132, 1137 (E.D.Cal. 2004); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193,

1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (a section 1983 plaintiff alleging denial of equal protection “must

show that the defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against plaintiff

based on membership in a protected class.”); Van Pool v. City and County of San

Francisco, 752 F.Supp. 915, 927 (N.D.Cal. 1990) (§1983 plaintiff must prove purposeful

discrimination by demonstrating that he “receiv[ed] different treatment from that received

by others similarly situated,” and that the treatment complained of was under color of

state law). To establish a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, Plaintiff must show

intentional discrimination. Sischo-Nowenjad v. Merced Community College Dist., 934

F.2d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 1991). Prisoners are not a suspect classification within the

meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. McQuery v. Blodgett, 924 F.2d 829, 834 (9th Cir.

1990). A mere demonstration of inequality is not enough to establish a violation of the

Equal Protection Clause. Id. 

The Court will consider Plaintiff’s disputed discovery requests in light of Rule 26

and the nature of his claim. 

III. Disputed Discovery Requests

A. Victim Statement

In his disputed discovery requests to Defendant Fansler, Plaintiff seeks to obtain

the “victim’s statement.” (Doc. 181; Exh. L) Plaintiff apparently refers to the victim of

the assault upon which Defendants Fansler and Fulton recommended that Plaintiff’s

public and institutional risk scores be increased from 4/3 to 5/5. (amended complaint,

count III at 6B) 

Defendants object to Plaintiff’s request for the victim’s statement for security

reasons. (Doc. 199 at 6) Defendant Fansler also states that Plaintiff has not explained

why he needs the victim’s statement. Although Defendant Fansler asserts Plaintiff has

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not denied involvement in the assault, in his Reply, Plaintiff contends that he “did not

participate in the assault of that prisoner . . . .” (Doc. 218, Attachment A at 19-20) 

Petitioner’s reclassification at issue in Ground III was based on his conduct in assaulting

the victim. Plaintiff has referred to the victim by name in the Complaint, thus, it does not

appear that protecting the victim’s name is a legitimate security concern when that

individual’s name is already known to Plaintiff and has appeared in the pleadings in this

case. Defendants further argue that releasing the victim’s statement “could be extremely

intimidating and have a chilling effect on any future victims’ willingness to cooperate

with prison authorities in the future.” (Doc. 199 at 7; Exh. B ¶ 10, 31, 34) Defendants

further argue that Plaintiff is familiar with the general content of the victim’s statement

because he was reclassified in a proceeding that relied upon that statement. (Doc. 199 at

7) 

As Plaintiff admits, the name of victim of the 2002 assault is known to him, and

thus the name of victim need not be obtained by discovery. Additionally, Plaintiff has not

shown that the victim’s statement is relevant to his Equal Protection claim or otherwise

established good cause to support his request to discover the victim’s statement. 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b). Defendants argument that disclosing the victim’s statement would

have a chilling effect is well taken. Courts have long recognized that the right to know

evidence supporting prison disciplinary rulings is not absolute. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418

U.S. 539, 564- 565 (1974). As the Supreme Court has noted, prison disciplinary

proceedings “take place in tightly controlled environments peopled by those who have

been unable to conduct themselves properly in a free society.” Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S.

491, 497 (1985). The risks of “violence or intimidation directed at either other inmates or

staff” are real. Id. at 495. Thus, when the disclosure of evidence presents such risks,

hearing officers may properly decline to inform an inmate of the adverse evidence. Wolff,

418 U.S. at 565. In view of the foregoing, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s motion to

compel Defendants to produce the victim’s statement. 

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B. Confidential Informant Statements and Reliability Questionnaires

Plaintiff also requests disclosure of the Confidential Informant statements and the

Confidential Informant Reliability Assessment Questionnaires (“CIRAQs”). (Doc. 199 at

7; doc. 219, attachment A at 20) Defendants object to this request because release of

confidential informant statements could expose the informants to the risk of retaliation. 

Defendants further argue that, if ADC is unable to keep the identity of the informants

confidential, it could have a devastating impact on ADC’s ability to obtain such

information in the future. Defendants further argue that the CIRAQs permit prison

officials to determine whether the statements of confidential informants are credible. In

this case, Plaintiff’s due process challenge to his reclassification hearing was dismissed

on summary judgment and affirmed on appeal. Thus, as Defendants argue, the quality

and quantum of evidence Defendants relied upon in deciding to reclassify Plaintiff has

already been challenged and determined to have been adequate. Thus, the credibility of

the confidential informant statements is not at issue. 

The Court agrees. Plaintiff, has not shown good cause to discover the confidential

informant statements or the CIRAQ’s and has not shown how such information is relevant

to his Equal Protection claim. Defendants arguments that disclosing the confidential

informant statements would have a chilling effect on the informants and expose them to

possible retaliation is well taken. Courts have long recognized that the right to know

evidence supporting prison disciplinary rulings is not absolute. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564-

565. As the Supreme Court has noted, prison disciplinary proceedings “take place in

tightly controlled environments peopled by those who have been unable to conduct

themselves properly in a free society.” Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S. at 497. The risks of

“violence or intimidation directed at either other inmates or staff” are real. Id. at 495. 

Thus, when the disclosure of evidence presents such risks, hearing officers may properly

decline to inform an inmate of the adverse evidence. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 565. In view of

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the foregoing, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Defendants’ to produce

the confidential informant statements and the CIRAQs. 

C. Photograph of Weapon used in Assault

Plaintiff next seeks a photograph of the weapon, a three-hole punch, used in the

2002 assault. Defendants state that there is no photograph of that item, thus, there is

nothing to produce to Plaintiff. The Court cannot order Defendants to produce materials

that do not exist. McBride v. Rivers, 2006 WL 622591 at *11 (11th Cir., March 14, 2006)

(holding that the defendant was not obligated to produce documents that could not be

retrieved). 

D. The Victim’s Medical Records

Finally, Plaintiff seeks the victim’s medical records depicting the nature and extent

of the injuries. Plaintiff claims that the “weapon use” was “made up” by officials to

justify the application of separate protocols to Plaintiff. (Doc. 218, Attachment A at 22) 

He argues that the medical records will “fail to evince the types of injuries to be expected

following an all-out-attack with a heavy metallic object like the one claimed to be have

been yielded in this case.” (Id.) Defendants argue that Plaintiff was reclassified based on

his behavior in participating in the assault, not based on the extent of the injuries caused. 

Thus, even if the victim authorized release of his confidential medical records, they are

not relevant to his Equal Protection claim. The Court agrees. Plaintiff has not shown that

the victim’s medical records are relevant to his Equal Protection Claim. 

IV. Summary

After consideration of this matter, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s Motion to

Compel in its entirety. Plaintiff also requests the imposition of sanctions pursuant to

Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(4)(A). In view of the determination that Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel

will be denied, the Court need not consider Plaintiff’s Request for Sanctions. Likewise,

Defendants’ Motion for Protective Order is moot. 

Accordingly,

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IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel and Request for Sanctions,

doc. 181, is DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Protective Order, doc.

199, is DENIED as moot.

Dated this 11th day of February, 2011.

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