Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01128/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01128-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHARLES McKINLEY MOORE,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-03-1128 GEB DAD P

vs.

WARDEN ADAMS,

Respondent. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS 

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with an application for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges a judgment of conviction

entered against him on September 26, 2000 in the Sacramento County Superior Court on charges

of attempted murder and assault with a deadly weapon. He seeks relief on the grounds that: (1)

the trial court erred by directing the jury to continue deliberations on one of the counts against

him after the jury informed the judge that they were unable to reach a unanimous verdict on that

count; and (2) his right to due process was violated when the trial court failed to give a jury

instruction concerning petitioner’s mental condition. Upon careful consideration of the record

and the applicable law, the undersigned will recommend that petitioner’s application for habeas

corpus relief be denied.

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 The following summary is drawn from the published opinion in People v. Moore, 96 1

Cal. App. 4th 1105, 1108-1111 (2002).

 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 2

2

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND1

A jury convicted defendant Charles McKinley Moore of attempted

murder (Pen.Code, §§ 664, 187, subd. (a)), Count One, and found 2

the attempted murder to be willful, deliberate and premeditated (§§

664, subd. (a), 187, 189.) The jury also convicted defendant of

assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)), Count Two. 

The jury also found true that during the commission of both

offenses defendant used a deadly weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1))

and inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). Defendant

received a sentence of life with the possibility of parole plus a

consecutive four-year term.

* * *

On the morning of February 7, 2000, the victim, Christine S.,

arrived in her vehicle in the area near McClatchy Park in

Sacramento. The victim was to attend a meeting scheduled to take

place at 11:30 a.m.

The victim parked her vehicle on 35th Street and, because she was

early, decided to remain in her vehicle to finish the apple she was

eating. While sitting in her vehicle, the victim noticed defendant

standing approximately a block away, “kind of hanging out,” and

looking in her direction. A brown car then pulled up and parked

near where defendant was standing. The victim observed

defendant walk toward the front of the brown vehicle. When

defendant got within three feet of the vehicle he stopped, then

backed away to his original position while still facing the car. The

victim continued to eat her apple, losing track of defendant.

After approximately 10 to 15 minutes, the victim got out of her car

with the intention of attending her meeting. As she walked toward

the entrance of the building where the meeting was to take place,

defendant came out of a doorway and lunged at her with a knife,

sticking it into her abdomen. The victim likened the impact to

being hit by a train, claiming defendant stabbed her with all of his

might and effort.

The victim, a green belt in martial arts, reacted by striking

defendant with her elbow, backing him off of her. The victim

credited this maneuver with saving her life. After being stabbed,

the victim entered the building and emergency personnel were

called to assist.

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Security guard Ruben Cantu responded to the scene and made

contact with defendant, who admitted he had stabbed the victim. 

Cantu described defendant as quiet and cooperative.

Sacramento Police Officer Larry Barja also responded. When

Barja arrived, he noticed defendant on the ground, with Cantu

holding defendant at gun point. Barja handcuffed defendant and

placed him in the patrol car. Defendant told Barja that he stabbed

the victim because he “‘just felt like doing it.’” Defendant did not

know the victim, but stabbed her because “‘she was here at the

time. Wrong place, wrong time, so to speak.’” If the victim had

not been present, defendant would have stabbed someone else: he

“‘just wanted to stab somebody.’” Barja described defendant's

mood as quiet, calm and cooperative. Defendant had no trouble

relating personal information to the officer upon request, including

that he had no mental history and was not under a doctor's care.

The knife used in the stabbing had a brown and white handle and

was eight inches long, with a blade that was approximately four

inches long.

Amy G., who worked at the building where the meeting was to

take place, made contact with defendant immediately after the

stabbing. Amy testified defendant's eyes looked glazed and he

appeared to be under the influence.

As she was being wheeled to an ambulance, the victim identified

defendant as the person who stabbed her.

The medical testimony established the victim sustained a single

stab wound to the right abdomen. The wound, three to four inches

deep, penetrated the victim's fascia and abdominal cavity, causing

injury to a kidney and the mesentery of her colon. The victim

required surgery, and eventually spent eight days in the hospital

and over eight weeks convalescing. The stab wound posed a

substantial risk of death.

DEFENSE

Testifying on his own behalf, defendant claimed he had a good

recollection of the events that occurred on February 7, 2000. 

Defendant had never met or spoken to the victim prior to that time,

had never been under the care of a psychiatrist or psychologist, nor

had he been prescribed any type of medication.

Defendant testified he had been homeless and was not getting

much sleep. He had no money, nor had he eaten in the day or so

leading up to the stabbing.

Defendant claimed he had used rock cocaine on and off since 1991. 

He estimated he had smoked it one to two thousand times. 

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However, he had not smoked the drug for two months prior to the

evening of February 6, when he met some men in downtown

Sacramento and together they smoked rock cocaine through most

of the night. Defendant believed he smoked between

three-quarters to one gram of rock cocaine, taking his last hit

around the time the sun came up on February 7, 2000.

Defendant then walked to McClatchy Park and, after staying there

for a while, moved across the street to the building where the

victim's meeting was to take place. Defendant denied approaching

the man in the brown car or intending to stab him.

Defendant testified he sat in the alcove for about 10 to 15 minutes. 

He pulled out his knife to clean his fingernails. At that time,

defendant thought of stabbing someone. Defendant claimed he

was feeling anxious, paranoid, and depressed because of the

cocaine he had smoked.

After a short time, defendant got up to walk back downtown. 

When he emerged from the alcove, he again had the thought of

stabbing someone. At that time he saw the victim, just outside the

alcove.

According to defendant, everything happened quickly. He held his

knife in his right hand and as he approached the victim, he stabbed

her and then kept walking. Although he wanted to stab the victim,

he had no intention of killing her. Instead, he just wanted to see

what it would be like to stab someone.

After the stabbing, defendant walked a few steps and then stopped,

dropping the knife to the ground. He then yelled to Amy and

another woman to call the police and “get the lady some help, she

[has] been stabbed.”

On cross-examination, defendant testified it was his intent to stab

someone on the day in question. Defendant believed the “dope”

was the reason he committed the act, although he never mentioned

this fact to the police or to the attending nurse when he was taken

to the hospital immediately after the incident. To the contrary,

defendant denied using drugs when asked by the nurse.

Dr. Fred Rosenthal also testified on behalf of the defense. Dr.

Rosenthal, a physician practicing psychiatry and certified in

psychology and neurology, testified he has treated thousands of

patients involved in the use of cocaine.

Dr. Rosenthal did not interview defendant. Instead, his testimony

consisted of explaining, generally, the effects rock cocaine can

have on people using the drug. Dr. Rosenthal explained rock

cocaine is usually smoked and acts as a stimulant, causing

increases in blood pressure, temperature and heart rate. The drug is

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extremely addictive and produces an abnormal chemical

environment in the brain.

Dr. Rosenthal further testified it is not uncommon for a chronic

user to develop delusional ideas, including becoming psychotic,

hearing voices and having visual hallucinations. A person in a

psychotic state can become irrational, compulsive, and impetuous

and lack control over his behavior. These effects can be

exacerbated by sleep deprivation and by failure to eat properly. 

Memory can also be impaired by the use of cocaine.

On cross-examination, Dr. Rosenthal conceded that not all users

become psychotic or irrational. Dr. Rosenthal further conceded the

effects of rock cocaine can vary from person to person. Because

Dr. Rosenthal did not examine defendant, he did not provide any

opinion whether defendant was suffering from a drug-induced

psychosis at the time of the stabbing.

ANALYSIS

I. Standards of Review Applicable to Habeas Corpus Claims

A writ of habeas corpus is available under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 only on the basis of

some transgression of federal law binding on the state courts. See Peltier v. Wright, 15 F.3d 860,

861 (9th Cir. 1993); Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Engle v.

Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 119 (1982)). A federal writ is not available for alleged error in the

interpretation or application of state law. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991);

Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000); Middleton, 768 F.2d at 1085. Habeas

corpus cannot be utilized to try state issues de novo. Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 377

(1972). 

This action is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997); Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d

1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2003). Section 2254(d) sets forth the following standards for granting

habeas corpus relief:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall

not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on

the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the

claim -

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(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

 See also Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792-93 (2001); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362

(2000); Lockhart v. Terhune, 250 F.3d 1223, 1229 (9th Cir. 2001).

The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state

court judgment. Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). Where the state

court reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, a

federal habeas court independently reviews the record to determine whether habeas corpus relief

is available under section 2254(d). Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003);

Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000). When it is clear that a state court has not

reached the merits of a petitioner’s claim, or has denied the claim on procedural grounds, the

AEDPA’s deferential standard does not apply and a federal habeas court must review the claim

de novo. Nulph v. Cook, 333 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2003); Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160,

1167 (9th Cir. 2002).

II. Petitioner’s Claims

Petitioner raises two claims of jury instruction error. After setting forth the

applicable legal principles, the court will evaluate these claims in turn below.

A. Legal Standards

A challenge to jury instructions does not generally state a federal constitutional

claim. See Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d at 1085 (citing Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. at 119);

Gutierrez v. Griggs, 695 F.2d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir. 1983). Habeas corpus is unavailable for

alleged error in the interpretation or application of state law. Middleton, 768 F.2d at 1085; see

also Lincoln v. Sunn, 807 F.2d 805, 814 (9th Cir. 1987); Givens v. Housewright, 786 F.2d 1378,

1381 (9th Cir. 1986). However, a “claim of error based upon a right not specifically guaranteed

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by the Constitution may nonetheless form a ground for federal habeas corpus relief where its

impact so infects the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates the defendant’s right to due

process.” Hines v. Enomoto, 658 F.2d 667, 672 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Quigg v. Crist, 616 F.2d

1107 (9th Cir. 1980)); See also Prantil v. California, 843 F.2d 314, 317 (9th Cir. 1988) (To

prevail on such a claim petitioner must demonstrate that an erroneous instruction “so infected the

entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.”) The analysis for determining

whether a trial is "so infected with unfairness" as to rise to the level of a due process violation is

similar to the analysis used in determining, under Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623

(1993), whether an error had “a substantial and injurious effect” on the outcome. See McKinney

v. Rees, 993 F.2d 1378, 1385 (9th Cir. 1993). 

In order to warrant federal habeas relief, a challenged jury instruction “cannot be

merely ‘undesirable, erroneous, or even “universally condemned,”’ but must violate some due

process right guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.” Prantil, 843 F.2d at 317 (quoting Cupp

v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146 (1973)). In making its determination, this court must evaluate

the challenged jury instructions “‘in the context of the overall charge to the jury as a component

of the entire trial process.’” Prantil, 843 F.2d at 817 (quoting Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228,

1239 (9th Cir. 1984)). The United States Supreme Court has cautioned that “not every

ambiguity, inconsistency, or deficiency in a jury instruction rises to the level of a due process

violation.” Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 437 (2004). Further, in reviewing an allegedly

ambiguous instruction, the court “must inquire ‘whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the

jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way’ that violates the Constitution.” Estelle, 502

U.S. at 72 (quoting Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380 (1990)). See also United States v.

Smith, 520 F.3d 1097, 1102 (9th Cir. 2008).

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B. Allen Charge

Petitioner’s first claim is stated, in full, as follows:

The court instructed the jury to further deliberate on count one with

an Allen like charge. When a jury has deliberated actively over a

period of days informs the court that it can not reach a unanimous

verdict, should not the court at least inquire of the jurors whether

there is a reasonable probability further deliberation will likely

result in a unanimus (sic) verdict.

(Second Amended Petition, filed on October 18, 2004 (hereinafter Pet.) at 5.) Petitioner is

claiming, in essence, that the trial judge gave an improper Allen charge to the jurors upon being

informed that they were unable to reach a verdict on the count of attempted murder, and that the

Allen charge effectively coerced the jury to reach a unanimous verdict against him on that count

in violation of his right to an impartial jury. 

The California Court of Appeal fairly explained the background to petitioner’s

claim in this regard as follows:

Jury deliberations began on the morning of August 24, 2000. The

jury continued to deliberate through the afternoon and recessed

after requesting defendant's testimony to be reread. On the

morning of August 25, 2000, the jury advised the court in writing

that they were able to reach a verdict on Count Two, but could not

reach a unanimous vote on Count One.

In response, and over a defense objection, the court directed the

jury to deliberate further as to Count One, reading them the

following instruction:

“What I am going to do right now, ladies and gentlemen, is I have

further instructions and directions to give you as to Count One....

“It has been my experience on more than one occasion that a jury

which initially reported it was unable to reach a verdict was

ultimately able to arrive at verdicts on one or more of the counts

before it. To assist you in your further deliberations, I'm going to

further instruct you as follows:

“Your goal as jurors should be to reach a fair and impartial verdict

if you are able to do so based solely on the evidence presented and

without regard for the consequences of your verdict regardless of

how long it takes to do so.

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“It is your duty as jurors to carefully consider, weigh and evaluate

all of the evidence presented at the trial, to discuss your views

regarding the evidence, and to listen to and consider the views of

your fellow jurors.

“In the course of your further deliberations, you should not hesitate

to re-examine your own views or to request your fellow jurors to

re-examine theirs. You should not hesitate to change a view you

once held if you are convinced it is wrong or to suggest other jurors

change their views if you are convinced they are wrong.

“Fair and effective jury deliberations require a frank and forthright

exchange of views.

“As I previously instructed you, each of you must decide the case

for yourself, and you should do so only after a full and complete

consideration of all of the evidence with your fellow jurors. It is

your duty as jurors to deliberate with the goal of arriving at a

verdict on the charge if you can do so without violence to your

individual judgment.

“Both the People and the defendant are entitled to the individual

judgment of each juror.

“As I previously instructed you, you have the absolute discretion to

conduct your deliberations in any way you deem appropriate. May

I suggest that since you have not been able to arrive at a verdict

using the methods that you have chosen, that you consider to

change the methods you have been following, at least temporarily

and try new methods.

“For example, you may wish to consider having different jurors

lead the discussions for a period of time, or you may wish to

experiment with reverse role playing by having those on one side

of an issue present and argue the other side's position and vice

versa. This might enable you to better understand the other's

positions.

“By suggesting you should consider changes in your methods of

deliberations, I want to stress I am not dictating or instructing you

as to how to conduct your deliberations. I merely find you may

find it productive to do whatever is necessary to ensure each juror

has a full and fair opportunity to express his or her views and

consider and understand the views of the other jurors.

“I also suggest you reread CALJIC instruction 1.00 on page 1 and

1-A, CALJIC instruction 17.40 on page 40, and CALJIC

instruction 17.41 on page 41. These instructions pertain to your

duties as jurors and make recommendations on how you should

deliberate.

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“The integrity of a trial requires that jurors at all times during their

deliberations conduct themselves as required by the instructions. 

CALJIC instruction 1.00 defines the duties of a juror.

“The decision the jury renders must be based on the fact[s] and the

law. You must determine what facts have been proved from the

evidence received in the trial and not from any other source. A fact

is something proved by the evidence or by stipulation.

“Second, you must apply the law I state to you to the facts as you

determine them and in this way, arrive at your verdict.

“You must accept and follow the law as I state it to you regardless

of whether you agree with the law. If anything concerning the law

said by the attorneys in their arguments or at any other time during

the trial conflict[s] with my instructions on the law, you must

follow my instructions.

“CALJIC 17.40 defines the jury's duty to deliberate. The decisions

you make in this case must be based on the evidence received in

the trial and the instructions given by the Court. These are the

matters this instruction requires you to discuss for the purpose of

reaching a verdict.

“CALJIC 17.41 is an instruction which recommends how jurors

should approach their task.

“You should keep in mind the recommendations this instruction

suggests when considering the additional instructions, comments

and suggestions I have made in the instructions now presented to

you. I hope my comments and suggestions may have some

assistance to you.

“You're ordered to continue your deliberations at this time. If you

have other questions, concerns, requests or any communications

you desire to report to me, please put those in writing on the form

my bailiff has provided you with. Have them signed and dated by

your foreperson and then please notify the bailiff.”

Following the trial court's additional instruction, the jury recessed

for the weekend following the afternoon of August 25, 2000, and

returned on the morning of August 28, 2000, when a verdict of

guilty was reached on Count One after two additional hours of

deliberation.

Moore, 96 Cal. App. 4th at 1118-1120. 

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On appeal, petitioner argued that the trial court's supplemental instruction was

coercive and improper. The California Court of Appeal rejected these arguments, reasoning as

follows:

In Allen v. United States (1896) 164 U.S. 492, 501, 17 S.Ct. 154,

157, 41 L.Ed. 528, 531, the Supreme Court approved a charge (the

Allen charge) which encouraged the minority jurors to reexamine

their views in light of the views expressed by the majority, noting

that a jury should consider that the case must at some time be

decided. In People v. Gainer (1977) 19 Cal.3d 835, 139 Cal.Rptr.

861, 566 P.2d 997, however, our state high court disapproved of

Allen in two respects. The Gainer court found “the discriminatory

admonition directed to minority jurors to rethink their position in

light of the majority's views” was improper, inasmuch as, by

counseling minority jurors to consider the majority view, whatever

it might be, the instruction encouraged jurors to abandon a focus on

the evidence as the basis of their verdict. (Gainer, at pp. 845, 848,

139 Cal.Rptr. 861, 566 P.2d 997.) The second issue with which

the Gainer court took issue was the direction the jury “‘should

consider that the case must at some time be decided,’” noting such

a statement was inaccurate because of the possibility the case

might not be retried. (Id. at pp. 851-852, 139 Cal.Rptr. 861, 566

P.2d 997.) In other words, it is improper to instruct the jury in

language that suggests that if the jury fails to reach a verdict the

case necessarily will be retried. (Ibid.)

The trial court's additional instruction in this case did not constitute

an improper Allen charge. The trial court did not direct the jurors

that “the case must at some time be decided.” To the contrary, the

court instructed that the “goal as jurors should be to reach a fair

and impartial verdict if you are able to do so based solely on the

evidence presented and without regard to the consequences of your

verdict [or] regardless of how long it takes to do so.” (Italics

added.) Nothing in the trial court's charge was designed to coerce

the jury into returning a verdict. (People v. Miller (1990) 50

Cal.3d 954, 994, 269 Cal.Rptr. 492, 790 P.2d 1289.) Instead, the

charge simply reminded the jurors of their duty to attempt to reach

an accommodation.

Additionally, the court directed the jurors to consider carefully,

weigh and evaluate all of the evidence presented at trial, to discuss

their views, and to consider the views of their fellow jurors. 

Finally, the court instructed that it was their duty as jurors to

deliberate with the goal of arriving at a verdict on the charge “if

you can do so without violence to your individual judgment.”

(Italics added.)

Contrary to defendant's argument on appeal, the jury was never

directed that it was required to reach a verdict, nor were any

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constraints placed on any individual juror's responsibility to weigh

and consider all the evidence presented at trial. The trial court also

made no remarks either urging a verdict be reached or indicating

possible reprisals for failure to reach an agreement. In short, it is

clear the trial court took great care in exercising its power “without

coercing the jury into abdicating its independent judgment in favor

of considerations of compromise and expediency.... Nothing in the

trial court's comment in the present case properly may be construed

as an attempt to pressure the jury to reach a verdict....” (People v.

Proctor (1992) 4 Cal.4th 499, 539, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 340, 842 P.2d

1100.)

Defendant criticizes the trial court for not ascertaining whether

there was a reasonable probability the jurors could agree on a

verdict before giving them additional instructions. However,

section 1140 vests the trial court with discretion to determine

whether there is a reasonable probability of agreement among

jurors who have reported an impasse. (People v. Proctor, supra, 4

Cal.4th at p. 539, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 340, 842 P.2d 1100; People v.

Carter (1968) 68 Cal.2d 810, 815-816, 69 Cal.Rptr. 297, 442 P.2d

353.) In this case, and presumably because of the relatively brief

duration of deliberations conducted by the jurors before they

announced they could not reach a verdict on Count One, the trial

court concluded further deliberations might be beneficial without

questioning the jury regarding the impasse. The fact the jury was

able to reach a verdict relatively quickly after being further

instructed reflects the court properly exercised its discretion.

The trial court did not err in giving the challenged instruction.

Indeed, the trial judge (Judge Michael G. Virga) should be

commended for fashioning such an excellent instruction.

Moore, 96 Cal. App. 4th at 725-28.

Whether the comments and conduct of a state trial judge infringe a defendant's

due process right to an impartial jury and fair trial turns upon whether "the trial judge's inquiry

would be likely to coerce certain jurors into relinquishing their views in favor of reaching a

unanimous decision." Locks v. Sumner, 703 F.2d 403, 406 (9th Cir. 1983). See also Jiminez v.

Myers, 40 F.3d 976, 979 -980 (9th Cir. 1993) (inquiry into numerical division in balloting

amounted to a “de facto Allen charge”). A reviewing court considers whether the court's actions

and statements were coercive in the totality of the circumstances. See Locks, 703 F.2d at 406-07

("the inquiry by the judge must be viewed in light of the context in which it was made, not in

isolation") (citations omitted); United States v. Seawell, 550 F.2d 1159, 1163 (9th Cir. 1977)

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("the general test of whether a supplemental jury instruction is in error is to consider all the

circumstances to determine if the instruction was coercive") (citation omitted); Marsh v. Cupp,

536 F.2d 1287, 1290 (9th Cir. 1976) (test for jury coercion is "'whether in its context and under

all the circumstances of this case the statement was coercive'") (quoting Jenkins v. United States,

380 U.S. 445 (1965)).

An “Allen charge” is 

the generic name for a class of supplemental jury instructions given

when jurors are apparently deadlocked; the name derives from the

first Supreme Court approval of such an instruction in Allen v.

United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501-02, 17 S.Ct. 154, 41 L.Ed. 528

(1896). In their mildest form, these instructions carry reminders of

the importance of securing a verdict and ask jurors to reconsider

potentially unreasonable positions. In their stronger forms, these

charges have been referred to as “dynamite charges,” because of

their ability to “blast” a verdict out of a deadlocked jury. The

charge has also been called the “third degree instruction,” “the

shotgun instruction,” and “the nitroglycerin charge.”

United States v. Berger, 473 F.3d 1080, 1089 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Mason,

658 F.2d 1263, 1265 n.1 (9th Cir. 1981)). The Allen charge, “while productive of continued

comment and debate, is nevertheless an instruction that has been accepted for many years.” 

Mason, 658 F.2d at 1265. The Allen instruction is most often used in cases of “apparent juror

deadlock” to “admonish jurors to keep trying.” Id. “In the archetypal Allen charge context, the

judge instructs a deadlocked jury to strive for a unanimous verdict.” Weaver v. Thompson, 197

F.3d 359, 365 (9th Cir. 1999). “So long as the defendant has offered facts that fairly support an

inference that jurors who did not agree with the majority felt pressure from the court to give up

their conscientiously held beliefs in order to secure a verdict,” a reviewing court must “proceed

to the Allen charge analysis.” Id. This court will assume that the trial court’s supplemental jury

instruction in this case constituted an “Allen charge.”

“There is . . . nothing talismanic about any single element either making the

[Allen] charge valid or invalid; the fundamental question is whether the jury was improperly

coerced, thus infringing the defendant's due process rights.” Id. The Ninth Circuit Court of

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Appeals has identified four factors to assist a reviewing court in determining whether a

supplemental jury instruction of this kind violates due process: “(1) the form of the instruction,

(2) the time the jury deliberated after receiving the charge in relation to the total time of

deliberation and (3) any other indicia of coerciveness.” Berger, 473 F.3d at 1090 (quoting United

States v. Steele, 298 F.3d 906, 911 (9th Cir. 2002)). See also Weaver, 197 F.3d at 366. 

Considering the first factor, the trial judge’s supplemental instruction in this case:

(1) informed the jurors that they had “the absolute discretion to conduct your deliberations in any

way you deem appropriate;” (2) emphasized that the jury was the final arbiter of witness

credibility; (3) informed the jurors that their “goal as jurors should be to reach a fair and

impartial verdict if you are able to do so based solely on the evidence presented” and “without

doing violence to your individual judgment;” (4) phrased the judge’s comments as suggestions;

and (5) emphasized that the trial judge was not “dictating or instructing you as to how to conduct

your deliberations.” Moore, 96 Cal. App. 4th at 1119. Further, while the instruction informed

the jurors that they should not hesitate to change their views, it advised them to do so only if they

were “convinced” their prior vote was “wrong.” Id. at 1118. The instruction did not advise the

jurors to acquiesce in the majority decision, but stressed that each juror should carefully weigh

the evidence and “decide the case for yourself.” Id. The form of the instruction, and these

comments in particular, minimized any coercive effect the supplemental instruction may have

otherwise had. See Navellier v. Sletten, 262 F.3d 923, 943 (9th Cir. 2001) (the “essential

question” in determining whether a judge’s comments are coercive “is whether the court made

clear to the jury that all matters of fact are for its determination”). Cf. Jiminez, 40 F.3d at 981 &

n.5 (noting that failure to instruct jurors to hold on to conscientiously held beliefs “weighs

heavily in favor of the conclusion that the defendant's right to a fair trial and impartial jury has

been violated”); Mason, 658 F.2d at 1271 (finding an Allen charge improper where jury was

informed that “[i]f, on the other hand, the majority was for acquittal, the minority ought to ask

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themselves whether they might not reasonably doubt the correctness of the judgment which was

not concurred in by the majority”). 

Turning to the second factor, the length of time the jurors in petitioner’s case

deliberated after receiving the trial court’s supplemental instruction suggests that the instruction

did not influence or coerce the verdict. After receiving the supplemental jury instruction,

petitioner’s jurors deliberated for the rest of that day and returned after the weekend, reaching a

unanimous guilty verdict on the charge of attempted murder within a couple of hours. In similar

situations, the Ninth Circuit has found no coercive effect resulting from an Allen charge. See

e.g., United States v. Bonam, 772 F.2d 1449, 1450-51 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding no coercion where

there was one day in total of deliberation, one-and-a-half hours of which came after Allen

charge); Lorenzo, 43 F.3d at 1307 & n.3 (no coercion with five-and-a-half hours of deliberation

coming after Allen charge). But see Weaver, 197 F.3d at 366 (coercion found to exist when jury

returned with unanimous verdict five minutes after receiving Allen charge). In addition, the

jury’s verdict in this case came after a weekend recess. In Steele, the Ninth Circuit made the

following observation:

The fact the jury reached its verdict half an hour after returning

from a weekend recess could merely reflect that the jurors came to

a resolution during a weekend when they individually pondered the

evidence. The weekend interval itself probably would have diluted

any coercive effect of an Allen charge given the prior Thursday.

Id., 298 F.3d at 911. See also Berger, 473 F.3d at 1093 (no coercion where, among other things,

the jury verdict came after a long holiday weekend). Similarly in this case, any potential for

coercion would have been diluted by the weekend break. 

Turning to the third factor, this court concludes that there is no other indicia of

coercion in this case. The trial court’s supplemental instruction was not directed toward a

specific juror or set of jurors, but was addressed to the entire jury. Further, the judge did not

know which of the jurors were in favor of any particular verdict, and he did not ask for a

numerical breakdown of the jurors’ votes. In fact, “the judge did not even know whether the

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majority position was to convict or acquit.” Berger, 473 F.3d at 1093 (quoting Lorenzo, 43 F.3d

at 1307). Under the circumstances presented here, there is no indication from the record that the

trial court’s charge had a coercive effect on the jury verdict. Cf. United States v. Ajiboye, 961

F.2d 892, 893-94 (9th Cir. 1992) (reversal required if the trial judge “inquires into the numerical

division of the jury and then gives an Allen charge,” or “if the holdout jurors could interpret the

charge as directed specifically at them-that is, if the judge knew which jurors were the holdouts

and each holdout juror knew that the judge knew he was a holdout”). 

The decision of the California Court of Appeal rejecting petitioner’s claim of

coercion of the verdict through jury instruction error is not contrary to or an unreasonable

application of the federal due process standards set forth above and should not be set aside. The

trial judge’s failure to inquire whether further deliberations could produce a verdict does not

change this result. See United States v. Sommerstedt, 752 F.2d 1494, 1497-98 (9th Cir.),

modified, 760 F.2d 999 (9th Cir. 1985) (question of whether to declare a mistrial when a jury

indicates it is deadlocked is left to the sound discretion of the trial court after consideration of all

the relevant circumstances); United States v. Goldstein, 479 F.2d 1061, 1069 (9th Cir. 1973)

(trial court is in the best position to determine the likelihood that a jury will be able to reach a

verdict). Under the circumstances, and looking at the record as a whole, this court concludes that

the trial judge’s supplemental instruction did not unduly coerce the jury to render a unanimous

verdict or otherwise render petitioner’s trial fundamentally unfair. Accordingly, relief on this

claim should be denied. 

C. Failure to Instruct the Jury with CALJIC No. 3.32

Petitioner’s second claim is that the trial court violated his right to due process

when it refused to instruct the jury with CALJIC No. 3.32. (Pet. at 5.) The California Court of

Appeal fairly described the background to this claim and its decision thereon as follows:

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Defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his request to

instruct the jury with CALJIC No. 3.32 (evidence of mental

disease-received for a limited purpose). This instruction states in

relevant part:

“You have received evidence regarding a mental disease, mental

defect or mental disorder of the defendant at the time of the

commission of the crime charged. You should consider this

evidence solely for the purpose of determining whether the

defendant actually formed the required specific intent,

premeditated, deliberated or harbored malice aforethought which is

an element of the crime charged.”

Defendant argues CALJIC No. 3.32 was warranted because his

mental condition was relevant to whether he harbored malice

aforethought and/or premeditated and deliberated his actions. As

we shall explain, the trial court correctly refused the instruction

because there was insufficient evidence that defendant suffered

from any mental disease, defect, or disorder at the time of

commission of the offense.

Defendant's request for CALJIC No. 3.32 flowed from the expert

testimony given by Dr. Fred Rosenthal, which we have recounted

above.

Following the evidentiary phase of the trial, defense counsel

requested the court to instruct with CALJIC No. 3.32. Counsel

believed there was evidence, specifically the testimony of Dr.

Rosenthal, that could allow the jury to find defendant was suffering

from a drug-induced psychosis at the time of the stabbing, and that

such psychosis falls within the definition of mental defect or

mental disease as set forth in CALJIC No. 3.32.

The prosecutor objected to the giving of the instruction, arguing

that no evidence had been presented defendant was suffering from

any psychosis or any bizarre thoughts before defendant carried out

the stabbing. The prosecutor further argued Dr. Rosenthal's

testimony about the generic ramifications for some people from

smoking rock cocaine was not sufficient to allow the defense to

bootstrap an instruction telling the jurors that they had received

evidence that defendant in fact was suffering from a mental defect

or mental disease. The People argued the real issue before the jury

was whether defendant's voluntary intoxication was such as to

impair his mental state, and that the appropriate CALJIC

instruction (No. 4.21.1-which addresses the issue of voluntary

intoxication where relevant to mental state) should be given on that

issue.

In denying defense counsel's request to instruct with CALJIC No.

3.32, the trial court noted there was an insufficient basis warranting

the instruction. The court concluded instructions on voluntary

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 The jury was instructed with CALJIC No. 4.21.1 as follows: 3

“In the crime of attempted murder which the defendant is accused

in Count One, a necessary element is the existence in the mind of

the defendant of the specific intent to kill another human being.

“If the evidence shows that the defendant was intoxicated at the

time of the alleged crime, you should consider that fact in deciding

whether defendant had the required specific intent. If, from all the

evidence, you have a reasonable doubt whether the defendant

formed that specific intent, you must find that he did not have such

specific intent.

“It is also alleged in Count One that the crime attempted was

willful, deliberate and premeditated murder. If you find the

defendant guilty of attempted murder, you must determine whether

this allegation is true or not true.

“If the evidence shows that the defendant was intoxicated at the

time of the alleged crime, you should consider that fact in deciding

whether the crime attempted was willful, deliberate and

premeditated murder.

“Intoxication of a person is voluntary if it results in the willing use

of any intoxicating liquor or any substance knowing that it is

capable of an intoxicating effect or when he willingly assumes the

risk of that effect.

“Voluntary intoxication includes the voluntary ingestion, injecting

or taking by any other means of any intoxicating liquor, drug or

other substance.”

18

intoxication were the only proper instructions to give, although it

further indicated it would not limit counsel's right to comment on 

Dr. Rosenthal's testimony in closing argument. In fact, the trial

court instructed on voluntary intoxication.3

CALJIC No. 3.32 is in the nature of a pinpoint instruction that is

required to be given only on request where the evidence supports

the defense theory. (People v. Ervin (2000) 22 Cal.4th 48, 91, 91

Cal.Rptr.2d 623, 990 P.2d 506.) Indeed, the general rule is that a

trial court need give a requested instruction concerning a defense

only if there is substantial evidence to support the defense. (In re

Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768, 783, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 872

P.2d 574.)

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Defendant claims because he was suffering from a psychotic state

induced by smoking a substantial amount of rock cocaine at the

time he stabbed the victim, it was error for the trial court not to

instruct with CALJIC No. 3.32. In support of this argument, 

defendant relies on People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 86

Cal.Rptr.2d 243, 978 P.2d 1171 (Smithey).

In Smithey, three defense experts examined and tested defendant

and concluded defendant had organic brain damage, a generally

diffused brain dysfunction, and mild mental retardation. In

addition, the evidence at trial, which included a toxicology analysis

of defendant's blood, indicated defendant was suffering from

classic amphetamine-psychosis syndrome. Defendant also had

amnesia with regard to the events on the day of the crime. The

experts opined absent these disorders defendant would not have

committed the crime. In Smithey, the trial court instructed with

CALJIC No. 3.32.

Defendant also relies on People v. Aguilar (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d

1556, 267 Cal.Rptr. 879 (Aguilar ) (disapproved on other grounds

in People v. Ervin, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 90-91, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d

623, 990 P.2d 506), which held the trial court erred in not

instructing with former CALJIC No. 3.36 (current No. 3.32). In

Aguilar, defense psychology experts examined defendant and

reached specific conclusions regarding his mental state;

specifically, defendant suffered from paranoid personality traits

which could have been caused or exacerbated by his cocaine use,

and which would have impaired his judgment or caused him to

overreact if he felt threatened. (Aguilar, supra, 218 Cal.App.3d at

p. 1569, 267 Cal.Rptr. 879.)

In contrast to the personal observations made by the experts in

Smithey and Aguilar, in this case Dr. Rosenthal did not examine

defendant. As a result, Dr. Rosenthal testified only as to the

general effects rock cocaine may have on chronic users, and even

then he admitted the effects can vary from person to person. Dr.

Rosenthal did not examine, test, nor evaluate defendant, nor did he

opine defendant was suffering from a mental disease, mental

defect, or mental disorder when defendant stabbed the victim.

Given the foregoing, the trial court did not err in refusing to

instruct with CALJIC No. 3.32. “Mental illness [or mental defect]

is a medical diagnosis ....” (People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495,

540, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 677, 822 P.2d 385, italics added.) Expert

medical testimony is necessary to establish a defendant suffered

from a mental disease, mental defect, or mental disorder because

jurors cannot make such a determination from common experience. 

(See Conservatorship of Torres (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 1159,

1163, 226 Cal.Rptr. 142.)

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The cases we have found that approve the giving of CALJIC No.

3.32 have all done so where expert medical testimony was adduced

on the question of defendant's mental disease, etc. (See People v.

Musselwhite (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1216, 1229-1230, 1247-1249, 74

Cal.Rptr.2d 212, 954 P.2d 475 [expert testimony defendant

suffered from mental disease; trial court properly gave an

instruction consistent with CALJIC No. 3.32]; People v. Cox

(1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 980, 987, 270 Cal.Rptr. 730 [same]; People

v. Molina (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 1168, 1171, 249 Cal.Rptr. 273

[same]; People v. Young (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 891, 907-909 and

fn. 6, 234 Cal.Rptr. 819 [same].)

Defendant requested an instruction that would have stated to the

jury that it had received evidence of a mental disease, mental

defect, or mental disorder of the defendant at the time of the

commission of the crime charged, even though no such competent

evidence was presented. Without expert medical testimony

establishing that defendant was suffering from a mental disease,

defect, or disorder at the time of the commission of the crime, there

was no evidentiary or legal basis for the trial court to instruct with

CALJIC No. 3.32. (See People v. Maxey (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d

190, 199, 104 Cal.Rptr. 466 [no expert testimony as to defendant's

“unsound mind”]; compare People v. Williams (1971) 22

Cal.App.3d 34, 52, 99 Cal.Rptr. 103 [psychiatrists testified as to

defendant's “abnormal brain, one even of his being insane, of his

mind being temporarily gone”].)

In light of the evidence presented, defendant was entitled to

instructions on voluntary intoxication and such instructions were

given by the court. In our view, these instructions fully and

properly allowed the jury to consider defendant's claimed

intoxicated state at the time of the incident and whether, because of

that state, defendant actually formed the specific intent to kill, or

premeditated or deliberated his criminal conduct. (§ 28.)

The trial court correctly instructed on voluntary intoxication and

correctly refused to instruct on mental disease, defect, or disorder

with CALJIC No. 3.32.

Murphy, 96 Cal. App. 4th at 1114-17.

The conclusion of the California Court of Appeal that the trial court’s refusal to

instruct the jury with CALJIC No. 3.32 did not violate state law is not reviewable in this federal

habeas corpus proceeding. Middleton, 768 F.2d at 1085. With regard to petitioner’s federal due

process claim, this court agrees with the state court's conclusion, based on its careful review of

the evidence, that petitioner’s right to a fair trial was not violated by the failure of the trial court

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to instruct the jury with CALJIC No. 3.32. Given the evidence introduced at trial, petitioner’s

jury was appropriately instructed concerning his mental state at the time of the crime. In light of

the instructions given with respect to voluntary intoxication and the jury’s consideration of such

evidence in determining both specific intent and whether the crime attempted was willful,

deliberate and premeditated murder, petitioner was not prejudiced by the trial court’s refusal to

give CALJIC No. 3.32. See Turner v. Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 867 (9th Cir. 2002). 

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s application for

a writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: June 12, 2008.

DAD:8

moore1128.hc

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