Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01192/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01192-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Bruno Arthur Lopez, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Warden Bock, et al., 

Respondent. 

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No. CV 07-1192-PHX-JAT

ORDER

Pending before this Court is Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

(“Petition”), which was filed on June 18, 2007. (Doc. # 1.) On January 18, 2008, Magistrate

Judge Aspey issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) in which he recommended that

the Petition be denied and dismissed as untimely filed. (Doc. # 17.) On February 4, 2008,

Petitioner filed a Notice of Objection to the R&R. (Doc. # 18.)

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or

recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). It is “clear that the

district judge must review the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations de novo if

objection is made, but not otherwise.” United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121

(9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (emphasis in original); Schmidt v. Johnstone, 263 F. Supp. 2d 1219,

1226 (D. Ariz. 2003) (“Following Reyna-Tapia, this Court concludes that de novo review of

factual and legal issues is required if objections are made, ‘but not otherwise.’”). District

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courts are not required to conduct “any review at all . . . of any issue that is not the subject

of an objection.” Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985) (emphasis added). The Petitioner

has filed a Notice of Objection (Doc. # 18), and the Court reviews de novo the portions of

the R&R to which objections were filed. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The R&R sets forth the background of this case, to which neither party objected, so

the Court adopts it as an accurate recital. (Doc. # 17.) In brief, Petitioner was convicted of

six counts of sexual conduct with a minor under the age of fifteen in June of 1989. The

Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences on July 2, 1991.

Petitioner sought review by the Arizona Supreme Court, which denied review on January 21,

1992. Petitioner did not seek a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court.

Petitioner timely filed his first action seeking post-conviction relief in state court on March

22, 2004.

III. DISCUSSION

A. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

In the R&R, Magistrate Judge Aspey recommends that the Petition be denied and

dismissed as untimely filed. Because the Petition was filed in 2008, it is governed by the

statute of limitations prescribed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

(“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), which provides: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.

The limitation period shall run from the latest of--

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created

by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United

States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such

State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to

cases on collateral review; or

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 Arizona Supreme Court denied review on January 21, 1992. (Doc # 11, Ex. D.) R&R

states that Petitioner’s conviction became final on or about April 20, 1992. Petitioner does

not dispute this in his Objection to the R&R.

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(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence.

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or

claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under

this subsection.

For purposes of § 2244(d)(1)(A), Petitioner’s conviction became final on April 20, 1992,

ninety days after the Arizona Supreme Court denied review of Petitioner’s convictions and

sentences, when the time expired for seeking certiorari regarding his convictions and

sentences from the United States Supreme Court.1 Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1158-59

(9th Cir. 1999) (“We hold that the period of ‘direct review’ in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)

includes the period within which a petitioner can file a petition for a writ of certiorari from

the United States Supreme Court, whether or not the petitioner actually files such a petition.

Therefore, when a petitioner fails to seek a writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme

Court, the AEDPA's one-year limitations period begins to run on the date the ninety-day

period defined by Supreme Court Rule 13 expires.”). Since Petitioner’s conviction was

finalized prior to the AEDPA’s effective date of April 24, 1996, the one-year grace period

is applied and Petitioner’s limitations period expired on April 24, 1997, assuming the absence

of statutory tolling. Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2001). 

The one-year statute of limitations is tolled during the time that a “properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); see also Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S.

4, 6 (2000). An application for collateral review is pending during all of the time in which

a state prisoner is “attempting, through proper use of state court procedures, to exhaust state

remedies . . . .” Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999).

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Petitioner had no actions that could toll the limitations period pending in state court

during the AEDPA grace period. Further, Petitioner did not file this Petition during the

AEDPA grace period. While Petitioner did file an action in state court for post-conviction

relief on March 22, 2004, the limitations period had already run at the time of that filing. A

limitations period cannot be restarted by the filing of a state court action that would have

tolled that limitations period. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003)

(citing Tinker v. Moore, 255 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 2001)) (holding that “section 2244(d) does

not permit the reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended before the state petition

was filed.”). Therefore, the Petition filed on June 18, 2007 is more than ten years untimely

and not subject to statutory tolling.

B. EQUITABLE TOLLING

The R&R also recommends that equitable tolling be denied. It applies the Supreme

Court’s recent decision in Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360 (2007), to the AEDPA’s statute

of limitations and concludes § 2254 petitioners are not entitled to equitable tolling. (Doc. #

17, at 7.) Bowles states that time limits enacted by Congress are jurisdictional and that federal

courts have no authority to create equitable exceptions to jurisdictional requirements. 127 S.

Ct. at 2366. This Court disagrees with the R&R’s conclusion that equitable tolling is

therefore not available. Prior to Bowles, the Supreme Court assumed, without deciding, that

equitable tolling is available under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). See Lawrence v. Florida, 127 S. Ct.

1079, 1085 (2007). Further, the Ninth Circuit has continued to apply equitable tolling to the

AEDPA’s statute of limitations post-Bowles. Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2008);

accord Coker v. Quarterman, No. 05-10020, 2008 WL 724042, at *5 n.1 (5th Cir. Mar. 17,

2008) (expressly holding that equitable tolling of AEDPA’s statute of limitations survives

Bowles); Diaz v. Kelly, 515 F.3d 149, 153 (2d Cir. 2008) (same). Accordingly, this Court will

allow Petitioner the potential for equitable tolling.

For Petitioner to be entitled to equitable tolling, he must show “‘(1) that he has been

pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way’

and prevented timely filing.” Lawrence, 127 S. Ct. at 1085 (citing Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544

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U.S. 408, 418 (2005)). First, Petitioner claims that his lack of access to legal assistance

constitutes an extraordinary circumstance that prohibited him from filing his writ of habeas

corpus in a timely manner. Petitioner’s lack of familiarity with the law and lack of legal

assistance do not toll the limitations period. Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th

Cir. 2006). The Supreme Court has held that there is no right to legal assistant in seeking any

type of post-conviction relief, and, as a result, lack of legal assistance in seeking postconviction relief cannot form the basis for equitable tolling. Lawrence, 127 S. Ct. at 1085

(“Attorney miscalculation is simply not sufficient to warrant equitable tolling, particularly

in the postconviction context where prisoners have no constitutional right to counsel.”). 

Second, Petitioner claims the removal of state and federal case law prohibited him

from timely filing. The Court notes that in some cases inadequate legal materials can be an

“impediment” that justifies late filing, or can form the basis of equitable tolling. See

Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146, 1148 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). However, Petitioner

alleges only that case law was removed, not statutory materials, so the AEDPA was likely

available to him. Additionally, Petitioner fails to allege diligence in pursing his rights.

Nothing in his objection indicates what steps, if any, he took in attempting to timely pursue

habeas relief. Further, considering this Court’s finding regarding statutory tolling, Petitioner

would need more than ten years of equitable tolling in order for his Petition to be timely.

Petitioner alleges his access to legal assistance and materials was taken away at some point,

but fails to allege a specific timeline in order to establish equitable tolling.

In some cases, specific factual allegations can necessitate an evidentiary hearing to

determine if available legal materials were insufficient and when Petitioner’s access to said

materials was denied. “A habeas petitioner . . . should receive an evidentiary hearing when

he makes ‘a good faith allegation that would, if true, entitle him to equitable tolling.’ Laws

v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919, 919 (9th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added).” Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d

964, 969 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Allen v. Lewis, 255 F.3d 798, 800-01 (9th Cir. 2001)

(holding that Petitioner “must show that the extraordinary circumstances were the but-for and

proximate cause of his untimeliness”). Petitioner makes no allegations, which, if true, would

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entitle him to relief. Further, Petitioner did not request an evidentiary hearing. Accordingly,

this Court finds no hearing is necessary in this case.

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, 

IT IS ORDERED that the Court overrules Petitioner’s objections (Doc. # 18) and

accepts in part and modifies in part the Report and Recommendation (Doc. # 17) as indicated

above;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. #

1) is denied, terminating this case; and the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment

accordingly.

DATED this 23rd day of June, 2008.

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