Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-6_04-cv-06128/USCOURTS-arwd-6_04-cv-06128-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1983 Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

HOT SPRINGS DIVISION

LAWANA ENGLAND-WHALEY and

WHALEY CONSTRUCTION, INC. PLAINTIFFS

vs. CASE No. 04-6128 

LAKE HAMILTON SCHOOL DISTRICT;

RALPH PINKERTON, Individually and 

as President of Lake Hamilton School 

Board; GARY MCGREW, Individually and 

as Vice President of the Lake Hamilton 

School Board; MARK CURRY, Individually 

and as Secretary of the Lake Hamilton 

School Board; DON HENSON; Individually 

and as Member of the Lake Hamilton 

School Board; DON SMITH, Individually 

and as Member of the Lake Hamilton 

School Board DEFENDANTS/THIRD

PARTY PLAINTIFFS

vs.

PATRICK M. MCGETRICK, MCGETRICK 

and MCGETRICK, INC. THIRD PARTY DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This case stems from Plaintiffs’ claim that Defendants

violated their civil rights in discriminating against them

because of Lawana England-Whaley’s gender. There comes on for

consideration today the Motion for Summary Judgment (Docs. 27-

29) filed by Defendants/Third Party Plaintiffs Lake Hamilton

School District; Ralph Pinkerton, Individually and as

President of Lake Hamilton School Board; Gary McGrew,

Individually and as Vice President of the Lake Hamilton School

Board; Mark Curry, Individually and as Secretary of the Lake

Hamilton School Board; Don Henson, Individually and as Member

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of the Lake Hamilton School Board; and Don Smith, Individually

and as Member of the Lake Hamilton School Board (collectively,

Lake Hamilton Defendants). Also before the Court is a

supplement filed by the Lake Hamilton Defendants (Doc. 31),

Plaintiffs’ Response (Docs. 41-42 & 44-46) and the Lake

Hamilton Defendants’ Reply (Docs. 47-48). Further before the

Court is a Motion to Dismiss filed by Third Party Defendants

Patrick M. McGetrick and McGetrick and McGetrick, Inc.

(McGetrick Defendants) (Docs. 34-35) and the Lake Hamilton

Defendants’ Response (Docs. 39-40). 

The Lake Hamilton Defendants contend Plaintiffs’ claims

should be dismissed as Plaintiffs have no proof of

discriminatory intent on the part of the Lake Hamilton

Defendants, either individually or in their official capacity.

The McGetrick Defendants contend the Third Party Complaint

should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted. For the reasons that follow, we

determine the Lake Hamilton Defendants’ motion (Doc. 27) is

GRANTED and Plaintiffs’ Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

Further, the McGetrick Defendants’ motion (Doc. 34) is GRANTED

and the Third Party Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 

A. Background

Plaintiff, Whaley Construction, Inc. is an Arkansas

corporation and construction company. Plaintiff, Lawana

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England-Whaley is a female and President of Whaley

Construction. Plaintiffs filed their complaint under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 and the Equal Protection clause contending that

the Lake Hamilton Defendants violated their civil rights by

rejecting two construction bids by Whaley Construction on an

athletic field project for the school district.

The Lake Hamilton Defendants admit that Whaley

Construction’s bids on the project were rejected and that the

project was awarded to another contractor. However, the Lake

Hamilton Defendants deny that the rejection of the bids had

anything to do with the gender of Ms. England-Whaley.

Further, the Lake Hamilton Defendants contend there were

legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for rejecting Whaley

Construction’s bids; i.e., it did not have sufficient

references or past work experience and was not qualified for

the project.

Muriel Lewis, an architect, was retained by the School

Board to design a plan for the project. Upon his

recommendation, the School Board approved the plan and

authorized McGetrick and McGetrick to begin the bidding

process. During the first round of bidding, Plaintiffs

submitted the lowest bid, and Mr. Lewis requested that Mr.

McGetrick inquire about the history and experience of Whaley

Construction in similar projects. According to Mr. Lewis,

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See Doyle v. Coombe, 976 F.Supp. 183 (W.D.N.Y. 1997)(finding 1

claims partially barred by qualified immunity thus invoking

inherent power to grant summary judgment sua sponte though

defendants failed to raise qualified immunity as a basis for

summary judgment) citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317

(1986) and Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960 (2d Cir.

1983)(“[a] court may grant summary judgment sua sponte when it is

clear that a case does not present an issue of material fact”).

4

Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate they were qualified for the

project; therefore, he never recommended Plaintiffs’ bid to

the School Board for approval. Instead, Mr. Lewis recommended

to the School Board that all three bids be rejected, and that

the entire project be rebid. (Doc. 31). The project was

rebid, but Whaley Construction was not the low bidder and the

project was awarded to another contractor.

B. Discussion

In their Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 27), the Lake

Hamilton Defendants ask the Court to grant summary judgment as

to Plaintiffs’ gender discrimination claim based upon 42

U.S.C. § 1983 and the Equal Protection clause of the United

States Constitution. While the Lake Hamilton Defendants do

not premise their motion on qualified immunity, they have

alleged qualified immunity on behalf of the Defendant School

Board members in their answer to Plaintiffs’ Complaint. (Doc.

3, ¶12). To the extent the Lake Hamilton Defendants have not

moved for summary judgment based upon qualified immunity, the

Court will consider the issue sua sponte.

1

In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate,

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the Court must view the facts and inferences in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party. See Rabushka v. Crane Co.,

122 F.3d 559, 562 (8th Cir. 1997). The moving party bears the

burden of establishing the absence of issues of material fact

in the record and of establishing that it is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c);

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 316 (1986).

Individual Capacity Claims - Qualified Immunity

Public officials, such as governors, prison officials,

parole board members, police officers and school board members

who exercise some discretionary functions while carrying out

their executive duties may have available qualified immunity

from § 1983 actions. Qualified immunity shields defendants

“[f]rom liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct

does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). 

In order for Plaintiffs to survive summary judgment on

qualified immunity grounds, the evidence when viewed most

favorable to Plaintiffs, must (1) allow a reasonable fact

finder to conclude that the individual board members engaged

in a course of conduct that violated Plaintiffs’ clearly

established constitutional rights; and (2) show that no

reasonable official could have thought that such a course of

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The liability of Separate Defendant Lake Hamilton 2

School District is addressed later in this opinion as

the doctrine of qualified immunity is not a defense to

the school district’s liability. See Owen v. City of

Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980).

6

conduct was lawful. See Hudson v. Norris, 227 F.3d 1047 (8th

Cir. 2000). In other words, the Court must find that

Plaintiffs have alleged the deprivation of a constitutional

right and that the right was clearly established at the time

of the violation. Tlamka v. Serrell, 244 F.3d 628 (8 Cir. th

2001). For the reasons discussed below, the Court can not

conclude that a jury could reasonably conclude that the

individual School Board members’ alleged conduct violated

Plaintiffs’ clearly established rights. 

2

The issue of qualified immunity is normally limited to

whether the defendant official knew or should have known that

his or her conduct violated the plaintiff’s constitutional

rights. However, in cases where intent is an element of the

plaintiff’s claim, the plaintiff must produce evidence of the

official’s subjective intent to violate her constitutional

rights to avoid summary judgment on qualified immunity

grounds. See Wright v. South Arkansas Regional Health Center,

Inc., 800 F.2d 199 (8 Cir. 1986). Therefore, to avoid th

dismissal on qualified immunity grounds, Plaintiffs must

produce some evidence that the School Board members

intentionally discriminated against them based on gender.

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Plaintiffs claim that their equal protection rights were

violated, in that they were discriminated against in public

employment on the basis of gender. Gender is a suspect

classification under the Equal Protection clause. See Knapp

v. Hanson, 183 F.3d 786 (8 Cir. 1999). Clearly, the School th

Board members would have known that when it made a hiring

decision that Plaintiffs had a clearly established

constitutional right to be free of gender discrimination. The

remaining question is whether the Board’s conduct violated

this well-established right. 

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

requires the government to treat similarly-situated people

alike. See Ellebracht v. Police Bd. Of Metropolitan Police

Dept. of City of St. Louis, 137 F.3d 563 (8 Cir. th

1998)(citation omitted). Thus, the threshold inquiry in an

equal protection case is whether the plaintiff is similarly

situated to others who allegedly received preferential

treatment. See Domina v. Van Pelt, 235 F.3d 1091 (8 Cir. th

2000)(citation omitted). Assuming that Plaintiffs were

similarly situated to the company that received the job, which

Plaintiffs have not shown, we must determine whether there is

sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the decision to reject

Plaintiffs’ bid was made on the basis of Ms. England-Whaley’s

gender. 

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While a Title VII analysis is not always identical to a 3

constitutional analysis, the Eighth Circuit has applied

the McDonnell Douglas analysis to a claim of employment

discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a violation of

the Fourteenth Amendment. See Richmond v. Board of

Regents of Univ. of Minn., 957 F.2d 595(8th Cir. 1992). 

8

In presenting a case of gender discrimination, a

plaintiff may present either direct evidence as set forth in

Price-Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) or utilize

the burden shifting analysis described in McDonnell Douglas

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The parties do not

indicate which test the Court should use in this case. While

the Court believes Plaintiffs’ attempt to establish direct

evidence fails, it will analyze Plaintiffs’ gender

discrimination claim under both tests.

Under the familiar three-step analysis in McDonnell

Douglas, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of

establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. Once a

prima facie case is established, a rebuttable presumption

shifts the burden to the employer to articulate a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.

If the employer articulates such a reason, the presumption

disappears and the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that

the employer’s proffered reason is merely a pretext for

discrimination. See Cronquist v. City of Minneapolis, 237

F.3d 920 (8 Cir. 2001)(citation omitted). th 3

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To establish a prima facie case, Plaintiffs must show:

(1) they belonged to a protected class; (2) they applied and

met the minimum qualifications for the job; (3) they were

rejected; and (4) the defendants hired a similarly qualified

applicant who was not a member of the protected group. See

Peterson v. Scott County, 406 F.3d 515 (8 Cir. 2005). There th

is no dispute that Plaintiffs submitted bids on the project,

both bids were rejected, and another company was hired.

However, to establish a prima facie case, Plaintiffs must show

that they were qualified for the job. 

Plaintiffs submitted affidavits of Plaintiff Lawana

England-Whaley and her husband, Jay Whaley, both stating that

Ms. England-Whaley “prepared a bid packet to be submitted to

the school, which included all necessary documentation

demonstrating Whaley Construction, Inc.’s qualifications.

Specifically, the bid packet included documentation showing

that the company was properly bonded and licensed by the State

of Arkansas.” (Docs. 45-46, ¶2). These conclusory statements

by Ms. England-Whaley and her husband are not sufficient to

establish that Plaintiffs were qualified for the job.

Further, Plaintiffs offer no evidence that the defendants

ultimately awarded the project to someone similarly situated

to Plaintiffs and outside of the protected group.

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Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs cannot establish

a prima facie case. 

Even if Plaintiffs were able to establish a prima facie

case, the School Board members may rebut the presumption by

presenting evidence that Plaintiffs were rejected, or that

someone else was preferred, for a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason. See Texas Department of Community

Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). The School Board

members have met this burden. Each of the School Board

members, as well as Muriel Lewis and Barbara Wood, the

Superintendent of the Lake Hamilton School District, provided

affidavits stating that they were not aware that a female was

the president of Whaley Construction at the time Plaintiffs’

bids were rejected and Plaintiffs have provided no proof to

the contrary. (Doc. 27, Exs. 3-7, 9, Doc. 31, Ex. 8). Each

School Board member explained, in their affidavits that: (1)

Muriel Lewis was retained to handle the bidding process and to

make a recommendation to the School Board as to who to award

the contract for the project; (2) the reason that Whaley

Construction, Inc’s bid was not accepted was because Mr. Lewis

could not recommend it to the School Board because he lacked

adequate knowledge and information about Whaley Construction,

Inc. and its qualifications; and (3) that the School Board

members knew nothing about Whaley Construction, Inc. or its

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“The McDonnell Douglas framework only shifts the burden 4

of production; the burden of persuasion rests at all

times with the plaintiff.” Dammen v. UniMed Medical

Center, 236 F.3d 978 (8 Cir. 2001). “This burden [of th

production] is not onerous, and the explanation need

not be demonstrated by a preponderance. The defendant

need not persuade the court that it was actually

motivated by the proffered reasons. Rather, it is

sufficient if the defendant’s evidence raises a genuine

issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against

plaintiff that would allow the trier of fact rationally

to conclude that the employment decision had not been

motivated by discriminatory animus. If the defendant

offers a facially nondiscriminatory explanation,

regardless of its persuasiveness, the presumption in

plaintiff’s favor evaporates and it is left for the

trier of fact to determine whether the plaintiff has

proven that the defendant’s action was motivated by

discrimination.” McCullough v. Real Foods, Inc., 140

F.3d 1123 (8 Cir. 1998)(quoting Buckholz v. Rockwell th

Int’l Corp., 120 F.3d 146 (8 Cir. 1997). th

11

qualifications. (Doc. 27, Exs. 3-7). This evidence is

clearly sufficient to rebut the presumption of discrimination

that would be created if Plaintiffs were able to establish a

prima facie case.4

The burden shifts back to Plaintiffs to establish the

existence of facts which if proven at trial would permit a

jury to conclude that the defendants’ reasons are pretextual

and that intentional discrimination was the true reason. The

only evidence submitted by Plaintiffs in this regard is a

statement from Jay Whaley that Mr. McGetrick told him that the

School Board rejected Plaintiffs’ bids because they did not

think Plaintiffs were qualified as Ms. England-Whaley was

female. (Doc. 46, ¶3). Plaintiffs’ bald assertions are

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insufficient to support an inference of pretext. See RoseMaston v. NME Hospitals, Inc., 133 F.3d 1104 (8 Cir. th

1998)(“Conclusory affidavits, standing alone, cannot create a

genuine issue of material fact precluding summary

judgment.”)(citations omitted); Palesch v. Missouri Com’n on

Human Rights, 233 F.3d 560 (8 Cir. 2000)(plaintiffs’ general th

allegations and unsubstantiated opinion testimony were

insufficient to raise a material fact issue as to pretext);

Davenport v. Riverview Gardens School Dist., 30 F.3d 940 (8th

Cir. 1994)(unsubstantiated deposition testimony did not create

genuine dispute on the issue of pretext or on the ultimate

issue of intentional discrimination). “For a plaintiff to

survive summary judgment, she must adduce enough admissible

evidence to raise genuine doubt as to the legitimacy of a

defendant’s motive, even if that evidence does not directly

contradict or disprove a defendant’s articulated reasons for

its actions.” Buettner v. Arch Coal Sales Co., Inc., 216 F.3d

707 (8 Cir. 2000)(emphasis added). th

Further, as the Lake Hamilton Defendants point out in

their motion for summary judgment, the only evidence

Plaintiffs offer is a hearsay statement that would be

inadmissible at trial. Plaintiffs have no evidence of alleged

discriminatory intent of the Lake Hamilton Defendants.

Plaintiffs cannot rely on affidavits based on hearsay to

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Defendants assume, for purposes of their summary 5

judgment motion that Mr. McGetrick actually made the

alleged statement, therefore, no affidavit or testimony

from Mr. McGetrick denying the statement was provided. 

Since the Court concludes the statement is inadmissible

hearsay, this does not affect the Court’s conclusions

in this opinion. However, it is noted that Mr.

McGetrick has denied making the statement in his motion

to dismiss the Third Party Complaint. (Doc. 35).

13

defeat a motion for summary judgment. See Cronquist, supra at

920 (8 Cir. 2001)(citations omitted). Plaintiffs contend th

that the alleged statement by Mr. McGetrick is not hearsay as 5

Mr. McGetrick made the alleged statement as an agent of the

Lake Hamilton Defendants and the statement is, therefore, an

admission of a party-opponent. 

Rule 801(d)(2)(D) of the Federal Rules of Evidence

provides that statements made “by [a] party’s agent or servant

concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or

employment, made during the existence of the relationship” are

deemed admissions by a party opponent and not hearsay. In

order for the alleged statement to be an admission, therefore,

Plaintiffs must show through evidence other than the statement

itself either that Mr. McGetrick was authorized by the School

Board to make the statement or that he was the School Board’s

agent and the statement concerned a matter within the scope of

his employment, made while he was employed. 

Plaintiffs offer no evidence that Mr. McGetrick was

authorized by the School Board to act on its behalf or that

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When a witness is not an expert, his “testimony in the 6

form of opinions or inferences is limited to those

opinions and inferences, which are (a) rationally based

on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a

clear understanding of the witness’ testimony or the

understanding of the witness’ testimony or the

determination of a fact in issue.” Fed.R.Evid. 701. 

Plaintiff failed to demonstrate Mr. McGetrick’s alleged

statement was either.

14

the School Board had the right to control the manner and means

of Mr. McGetrick’s services. Further, there is no evidence

that Mr. McGetrick was involved in the decision to reject

Plaintiffs’ bids. The Court finds that Mr. McGetrick was an

independent contractor and had no authority to act on behalf

of the School Board and his statement is therefore not

excluded from the hearsay rule. See Horton v. Rockwell

International Corp., 93 F.Supp.2d 1048 (N.D. Iowa 2000).

Further, it is unclear whether the alleged statement by Mr.

McGetrick was that some or all of the School Board members

actually stated that they did not hire Plaintiffs because Ms.

England-Whaley is a female or whether Mr. McGetrick’s alleged

statement to Jay Whaley was Mr. McGetrick’s own opinion that

Ms. England-Whaley’s gender was a factor in the decision not

to hire Plaintiffs. Either way, the Court finds that the

statement would be inadmissible at trial, and Plaintiffs have

failed to provide evidence of intentional discrimination by

the Board Members.6

The two-stage Price Waterhouse standard applies when

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direct evidence is produced that an illegitimate criterion

played a motivating part in the employment decision. Once the

plaintiff establishes such direct evidence, the burden then

shifts to the employer to demonstrate by a preponderance of

the evidence that the employer would have reached the same

employment decision absent any discrimination. See Cronquist,

237 F.3d at 924. 

Initially, the Court notes that Plaintiffs have presented

no direct evidence of discrimination as the statement

allegedly made by Mr. McGetrick to Jay Whaley is inadmissible

hearsay. However, even if the statement should be admissible,

Plaintiffs’ claim still fails. Plaintiffs contend that Mr.

McGettrick told Jay Whaley that “the Board...did not think

[Ms. England-Whaley] was qualified to do the project because

she was female. (Doc. 46, ¶3). It cannot be reasonably

inferred from this statement alone, however, that Ms. EnglandWhaley’s gender was a motivating factor in the decision to

reject Plaintiffs’ bid. This is because the evidence shows

that none of the School Board members ever told Mr. McGetrick

that Ms. England Whaley’s gender was a motive for not

accepting Plaintiffs’ bid; Mr. Lewis never recommended

Plaintiffs’ bid to the Board for approval because based on the

information provided by Plaintiffs, Mr. Lewis was not

satisfied that Plaintiffs were qualified to complete the

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project; and none of the School Board members knew that Whaley

Construction’s president was a woman at the time the bid was

rejected. 

Further, School Board members cannot be held personally

liable for the rejection of Plaintiffs’ bid as Mr. Lewis made

the decision to not recommend Plaintiffs to the School Board

for hiring. Therefore, the School Board members never

received Plaintiffs’ bid to approve or disapprove the hiring.

See Stalhut v. City of Lincoln, 145 F.Supp.2d 1115 (Neb.

2001)(chief of police not personally liable for promoting

female officer rather than male officer where male officer was

eliminated from final consideration by his failure to receive

any nominations as top candidate by the command staff). See,

also Reynolds v. Glynn County Bd. of Educ., 968 F.Supp. 696

(S.D. Ga. 1996)(members of county board of education were

entitled to qualified immunity from liability in job

applicant’s claim under § 1983 resulting from their hiring

decision, where they were not connected with selection

committee’s decision to cut applicant in first round, so that

he was not among candidates they considered), aff’d, 119 F.3d

11 (11 Cir. 1997); Hamilton v. Montgomery County Bd. of th

Educ., 122 F.Supp.2d 1273(school board member could not be

held liable under §1983 for black applicant’s non-selection as

school’s head basketball coach unless plaintiff could show a

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17

causal connection between board member’s discriminatory animus

and superintendent’s decision to recommend a different

candidate); Cardenas v. AT&T Corp., 245 F.3d 994 (8 Cir. th

2001)(finding no liability on part of senior company official

who signed the approval papers for promotions which were

effectively made at a lower level. Cf. Morse v. Southern Union

Co., 174 F.3d 917 (8 Cir. )(company president’s statements th

to supervisors, expressing a strong preference for younger

employees, were sufficient evidence of intentional

discrimination even though he was not involved in the decision

to terminate the plaintiff’s employment), cert dismissed, 527

U.S. 1059 (1999). 

Since Plaintiffs have failed to show a causal connection

between the School Board members’ allegedly discriminatory

remarks and the decision to reject Plaintiffs’ bids, the

defendants need not demonstrate that they would have made the

same decision regardless of any discriminatory motives.

Plaintiffs have failed to present a prima facie case for

gender discrimination under either the McDonnell Douglas or

Price Waterhouse tests. Therefore, Plaintiffs have failed to

establish the violation of a constitutional right.

Accordingly, the School Board members are entitled to

qualified immunity against Plaintiffs’ claims and Plaintiffs’

claims against Separate Defendants Ralph Pinkerton, Gary

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McGrew, Mark Curry, Don Henson and Don Smith in their

individual capacities are DISMISSED.

Official Capacity Claims

As the Lake Hamilton Defendants point out in their brief,

the claims against the individual board members in their

official capacities are essentially claims against Lake

Hamilton School District. See Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464

(1985). Therefore, Plaintiffs’ official-capacity claims

against Separate Defendants Ralph Pinkerton, Gary McGrew, Mark

Curry, Don Henson and Don Smith are DISMISSED as redundant.

Lake Hamilton School District

To state a gender discrimination claim against the school

district under the Equal Protection Clause pursuant to Section

1983, Plaintiffs must show implementation or execution of an

unconstitutional policy or custom by school officials or

employees. See Johnson v. Outboard Marine Corp., 172 F.3d 531

(8 Cir. 1999). Municipalities and other bodies of local th

government can be held liable for the unconstitutional acts of

its employees if a municipal policy or custom was the moving

force behind the constitutional violation. See Monell v.

Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Plaintiffs

contend the School Board members’ decision to reject

Plaintiffs’ bids reflects a policy or custom on the part of

Lake Hamilton School District. Further, Plaintiffs argue that

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Lake Hamilton School District is liable as the alleged policy

led to the alleged violation of Plaintiffs’ constitutional

rights. 

Plaintiffs have offered no evidence that Lake Hamilton

School District has a policy or custom of discriminating in

employment on the basis of gender. In her deposition, Ms.

England-Whaley testified that “several contractors” told her

“it would be a waste of [her] time [to bid on the Lake

Hamilton School District project] because [the school

district] do[es] not award contracts to minority

contractors.... (Doc. 27, Ex. I, p. 23). Ms. England-Whaley

stated she could not provide any names of the contractors who

told her that but it was “general scuttlebutt around the

coffee shop.” Id. at p. 24. The overwhelming evidence

indicates that none of the Board members or Muriel Lewis knew

that the President of Whaley Construction, Inc. was Lawana

England-Whaley, a female, at any time throughout the bidding

process for the project.

Accordingly, summary judgment as to Separate Defendant

Lake Hamilton School District is GRANTED.

McGetrick Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

The McGetrick Defendants move to dismiss the Third Party

Complaint filed against them by Defendants/Third Party

Plaintiffs. The Third Party Complaint alleges a claim for

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20

indemnification from the McGetrick Defendants should

Plaintiffs receive a judgment against Defendants/Third Party

Plaintiffs. As Plaintiffs’ Complaint is being dismissed with

prejudice, the basis for the Third Party Complaint no longer

exists. Accordingly, the McGetrick Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss (Doc. 34) is GRANTED and the Third Party Complaint is

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the Court finds Plaintiffs’ officialcapacity claims against Separate Defendants Ralph Pinkerton,

Gary McGrew, Mark Curry, Don Henson and Don Smith are

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Summary judgment is GRANTED as to

Plaintiffs’ individual-capacity claims against Separate

Defendants Ralph Pinkerton, Gary McGrew, Mark Curry, Don

Henson and Don Smith based upon qualified immunity. Summary

judgment is GRANTED as to Plaintiffs’ claims against Separate

Defendant Lake Hamilton School District. Therefore,

Plaintiffs’ Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Finally,

Third Party Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED and the

Third Party Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 18 day of April, 2006. th

/s/ Robert T. Dawson 

Honorable Robert T. Dawson

United States District Judge

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