Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-05-05156/USCOURTS-caDC-05-05156-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 17, 2006 Decided March 17, 2006

No. 05-5156

LAMAR JOHNSON,

APPELLANT

v.

PAUL A. QUANDER, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 04cv00448)

Timothy P. O'Toole, Attorney, Public Defender Service of

the District of Columbia, argued the cause for appellant. With

him on the briefs was Todd A. Cox, Attorney.

Jane M. Lyons, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause

for appellees. With her on the brief were Kenneth L. Wainstein,

U.S. Attorney, and Michael J. Ryan, Assistant U.S. Attorney. R.

Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered an

appearance.

Before: SENTELLE, BROWN and GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SENTELLE.

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SENTELLE, Circuit Judge: Lamar Johnson, a former District

of Columbia probationer, appeals from a District Court

judgment dismissing his action seeking to enjoin the application

of the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000 (“DNA

Act” or “the Act”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 14135-14135e. Johnson

argued that the Act violated his constitutional rights under the

Fourth Amendment and violated other of his constitutional and

statutory rights. Because we conclude that the District Court

correctly held that the Act is neither facially unconstitutional nor

unconstitutional as applied to Johnson, we affirm.

I

On March 27, 2001, Johnson stole two cars while suffering

from “previously untreated emotional and mental health

problems.” Shortly after his arrest, Johnson was taken to a

hospital because he was found sitting in a puddle eating dirt. On

December 20, 2001, he was convicted in the Superior Court of

the District of Columbia on two counts of unarmed robbery in

violation of D.C. Code § 22-2801, for which he received a

suspended sentence and two years probation. 

While Johnson was on probation, the Appellees—agents

from the District of Columbia Court Services and Offender

Supervision Agency (“CSOSA”)—demanded that Johnson

provide a DNA sample for inclusion in the Combined DNA

Index System (“CODIS”). The CSOSA agents did not have a

warrant and did not have individualized suspicion that Johnson

had committed a crime (other than the two counts of unarmed

robbery for which he had been convicted and placed on

probation). However, the agents claimed that Johnson was

obligated under the Act to submit his DNA for inclusion in the

CODIS database. 

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The Act provides that CSOSA officials “shall collect a

DNA sample from each individual under the supervision of the

Agency who is on supervised release, parole, or probation who

is, or has been, convicted of a qualifying District of Columbia

offense . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 14135b(a)(2). Congress left to the

District of Columbia the responsibility of determining which

offenses should be deemed “qualifying District of Columbia

offenses.” Id. § 14135b(d). In turn, the District designated

forty-nine separate crimes as “qualifying . . . offenses” under the

DNA Act, including robbery and carjacking. See D.C. Code §

22-4151(27), (29).

 

Despite the fact that Johnson was convicted on two counts

of a “qualifying offense,” he refused to provide a DNA sample

to the CSOSA. A Superior Court judge then ordered Johnson to

show cause why his probation should not be revoked because of

this refusal to comply with the DNA Act. Prior to the probationrevocation proceeding, Johnson filed a complaint in the United

States District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking a

temporary restraining order (“TRO”) to prevent the Appellees

from requiring him to provide a DNA sample. Before the

District Court could rule on the TRO, the parties proposed to

resolve the need for emergency injunctive relief. The parties

filed a joint motion, under which Johnson agreed to provide a

blood sample. The Appellees agreed to delay processing that

sample until after his claims in this action and any subsequent

appeals had been resolved. The District Court granted the

parties’ joint motion and denied Johnson’s motion for a TRO.

Thereafter the Appellees filed a motion to dismiss under

FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) and FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). The

District Court concluded—after “[b]alancing the private and

public interests” under the totality of the circumstances—that

because probationers have diminished expectations of privacy,

Johnson did not state a viable Fourth Amendment claim. The

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court also rejected Johnson’s claims under the Ex Post Facto

Clause, the Fifth Amendment, the Health Insurance Portability

and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”), Pub. L. No.

104-191, 110 Stat. 1936, and the International Convention on

the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination

(“CERD”). Accordingly, the court granted the Appellees’

motion in full and dismissed the case. This appeal ensued. 

II

Johnson raises two claims under the Fourth Amendment.

First, Johnson argues it was unconstitutional for the CSOSA to

collect his blood while he was still on probation. Second,

Johnson argues it is unconstitutional for the government to

retain his DNA profile and “re-search” it in the CODIS database

after his probationary term expires (which it now has). We

reject both claims. 

A

Johnson’s first claim is that collection and storage of his

DNA is unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment, which

guarantees that the people shall be “secure in their persons,

houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and

seizures . . . .” In Johnson’s view, the collection and storage of

a probationer’s DNA “[s]trik[es] at the heart of the Fourth

Amendment’s most inviolate zone,” and as a result, “these

searches must always be predicated on some measure of

individualized suspicion.” Because the Act requires every

prisoner, probationer, and parolee convicted of a “qualifying

offense” to submit his DNA sample without any showing of

individualized suspicion, Johnson argues the Act is

unconstitutional. For the reasons set forth below, we disagree.

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There is no question that the compulsory extraction of blood

for DNA profiling constitutes a “search” within the meaning of

the Fourth Amendment. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’

Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989) (“We have long recognized that

a compelled intrusion into the body for blood to be analyzed for

alcohol content must be deemed a Fourth Amendment search.”

(internal quotation marks, alteration, and citation omitted)); see

also Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985); Schmerber v.

California, 384 U.S. 757, 767-68 (1966). The question before

us, therefore, is whether the search was “reasonable.” See

Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-09 (1977) (“The

touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is

always ‘the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the

particular governmental invasion of a citizen’s personal

security.’” (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968))). 

Although ordinarily the reasonableness vel non of a search

depends on governmental compliance with the Fourth’s

Amendment’s Warrant Clause, see, e.g., United States v. U.S.

Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 315-16 (1972), the Supreme Court

has applied the “special needs” exception to the warrant

requirement to uphold the warrantless search of a probationer’s

residence, see Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 879-80

(1987). In Griffin, a police detective contacted Griffin’s

probation officer’s supervisor with information that Griffin

might have weapons in his apartment. The supervisor, another

probation officer, and three plainclothes policemen went to

Griffin’s apartment, searched it, and found a weapon. Id. at 871.

Griffin was arrested and charged with possession of a firearm by

a felon. He eventually moved to suppress the evidence

uncovered during the warrantless search of his residence. Id. at

872. 

After he was convicted, Griffin appealed. Affirming his

conviction, the Supreme Court explained: 

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A State’s operation of a probation system, like its

operation of a school, government office or prison, or its

supervision of a regulated industry, likewise presents

‘special needs’ beyond normal law enforcement that may

justify departures from the usual warrant and probablecause requirements. Probation, like incarceration, is a form

of criminal sanction imposed by a court upon an offender

after verdict, finding, or plea of guilty. . . . [I]t is always

true of probationers (as we have said it to be true of

parolees) that they do not enjoy the absolute liberty to

which every citizen is entitled, but only conditional liberty

properly dependent on observance of special probation

restrictions. 

These restrictions are meant to assure that the probation

serves as a period of genuine rehabilitation and that the

community is not harmed by the probationer’s being at

large. These same goals require and justify the exercise of

supervision to assure that the restrictions are in fact

observed. 

Id. at 873-75 (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citations

omitted). While Griffin may not establish that every

suspicionless search of a parolee is a constitutionally sound

“special need,” Griffin does permit the search of a probationer

based on no more than reasonable suspicion—even where the

search at issue is triggered by a desire to obtain law enforcement

information and motivated by ordinary law enforcement

purposes. Id. at 880. Thus, even though Griffin does not

establish the constitutionality of suspicionless searches of

probationers, it does stand for the proposition that probationers

are entitled to fewer Fourth Amendment protections than are

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1

 Subsequent to Griffin the Court has recognized some limits

to the “special needs” exception in the context of law enforcement

searches. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 79 (2001);

City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000). Because we

conclude the statute passes constitutional muster under the totality of

the circumstances, we need not explore the somewhat unclear

boundaries of the limits on the “special needs” doctrine. 

ordinary citizens, and it does suggest that the special needs

exception can apply to law enforcement searches.1

Notwithstanding Griffin, Johnson argues that “all law

enforcement searches [must] be premised on some quantum of

individualized suspicion.” Appellant’s Br. at 20 (emphasis in

original). But the Supreme Court has “long held that ‘the Fourth

Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of

[individualized] suspicion.’” Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S.

822, 829 (2002) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v.

Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976)). “[I]n certain

limited circumstances, the Government’s [interests are]

sufficiently compelling to justify the intrusion on privacy

entailed by conducting such searches without any measure of

individualized suspicion.” Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v.

Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668 (1989); see also Skinner, 489 U.S.

at 624. 

Since Griffin, the Supreme Court has on only one occasion

considered whether law enforcement officials need

individualized suspicion to search a probationer. In United

States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001), the Court considered the

constitutionality of a probation order that required the defendant

to submit to warrantless, suspicionless searches of his person

and residence at any time. See id. at 114. Shortly after Knights

was placed on probation for an unrelated drug offense, someone

committed an arson targeting a Pacific Gas & Electric

(“PG&E”) electrical transformer. Id. at 114-15. Because prior

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crimes against PG&E had coincided with Knights’ court

appearances, law enforcement authorities suspected that Knights

might be involved in the arson. The police staked out Knights’

apartment and observed a suspected accomplice leave with three

cylindrical items—potential pipe bombs—going toward a

nearby waterway. The police heard three splashes and watched

Knights’ compatriot walk back to the residence empty-handed.

Id. at 115. Shortly thereafter, the police approached the

accomplice’s vehicle and saw “a Molotov cocktail and explosive

materials, a gasoline can, and two brass padlocks that fit the

description of those removed from the PG&E transformer

vault.” Id.

Knowing that Knights’ probation was conditioned on his

obligation to submit to suspicionless searches of his person and

residence, the police promptly searched Knights’ home without

a warrant. They uncovered “a detonation cord, ammunition,

liquid chemicals, instruction manuals on chemistry and

electrical circuitry, bolt cutters, telephone pole-climbing spurs,

drug paraphernalia, and a brass padlock stamped ‘PG&E.’” Id.

After Knights was arrested and charged, he moved to suppress

the evidence. Id. at 116. 

The Court analyzed the constitutionality of the search of

Knights’ apartment under a “totality-of-the-circumstances”

standard rather than the “special needs” doctrine. Id. at 117-18.

Balancing the invasion of Knights’ interest in privacy against

the State’s interest in searching his home without a warrant

supported by probable cause, the Court explained that “Knights’

status as a probationer subject to a search condition informs both

sides of that balance.” Id. at 119. On one side of the balance is

Knights’ interest in privacy:

Inherent in the very nature of probation is that probationers

do not enjoy the absolute liberty to which every citizen is

entitled. Just as other punishments for criminal convictions

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curtail an offender’s freedoms, a court granting probation

may impose reasonable conditions that deprive the offender

of some freedoms enjoyed by law-abiding citizens. 

The judge who sentenced Knights to probation

determined that it was necessary to condition the probation

on Knights’ acceptance of the search provision. It was

reasonable to conclude that the search condition would

further the two primary goals of probation—rehabilitation

and protecting society from future criminal violations. The

probation order clearly expressed the search condition and

Knights was unambiguously informed of it. The probation

condition thus significantly diminished Knights’ reasonable

expectation of privacy. 

Id. at 119-20 (internal quotation marks, citations, and footnotes

omitted).

On the other side of the balance is the government’s interest

in keeping tabs on a probationer: 

[T]he very assumption of the institution of probation is that

the probationer is more likely than the ordinary citizen to

violate the law. The recidivism rate of probationers is

significantly higher than the general crime rate. And

probationers have even more of an incentive to conceal

their criminal activities and quickly dispose of

incriminating evidence than the ordinary criminal because

probationers are aware that they may be subject to

supervision and face revocation of probation, and possible

incarceration . . . .

* * *

The State has a dual concern with a probationer. On

the one hand is the hope that he will successfully . . . be

integrated back into the community. On the other is the

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concern, quite justified, that he will be more likely to

engage in criminal conduct than an ordinary member of the

community. . . . [The State’s] interest in apprehending

violators of the criminal law, thereby protecting potential

victims of criminal enterprise, may therefore justifiably

focus on probationers in a way that it does not on the

ordinary citizen. 

Id. at 120-21 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Given this balance, the Court held, the government needs “no

more than reasonable suspicion to conduct a search of [a]

probationer’s house.” Id. at 121. Because the government had

reasonable suspicion that the probationer had engaged in

unlawful activity, the Court did not decide whether the

government could have relied exclusively upon the warrantless

search condition in the defendant’s probation order to conduct

a suspicionless search. Id. at 120 n.6. Thus, “it remains entirely

an open question whether suspicionless searches of

[probationers and parolees] pass constitutional muster when

such searches are conducted for law enforcement purposes.”

United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 830 (9th Cir. 2004) (en

banc) (emphasis in original), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1638

(2005). However, every court of appeals that has considered the

issue has concluded that the DNA Act is constitutional. See id.

at 840; Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652 (2d Cir. 2005); United

States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 2005); Jones v.

Murray, 962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1992); Groceman v. U.S. Dep’t

of Justice, 354 F.3d 411 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam); Green v.

Berge, 354 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. Kimler,

335 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 2003); Padgett v. Donald, 401 F.3d

1273 (11th Cir. 2005).

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2

 We note that some of these courts have upheld the DNA Act

under the “special needs” exception to the warrant requirement, see,

e.g., Nicholas, 430 F.3d at 668; Green, 354 F.3d at 678-79, while

others have upheld the Act under the Fourth Amendment’s traditional

“totality-of-the-circumstances” standard, see, e.g., Padgett, 401 F.3d

at 1280; Groceman, 354 F.3d at 413-14. We do not preclude the

possibility that the Act could satisfy the “special needs” analysis.

Today we join this unanimous body of authority,2 and we

conclude that the mandatory collection of Johnson’s DNA

sample was “reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment’s

balancing test. On one side of the balance, it is well settled that

probationers have lesser privacy interests than do ordinary

citizens. See Griffin, 483 U.S. at 875; see also Ferguson v. City

of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 79-80 n.15 (2001) (emphasizing that

Griffin turned on “the fact that probationers have a lesser

expectation of privacy than the public at large”); Knights, 534

U.S. at 119 (“Just as other punishments for criminal convictions

curtail an offender’s freedoms, a court granting probation may

impose reasonable conditions that deprive the offender of some

freedoms enjoyed by law-abiding citizens.”); see also People v.

Reyes, 968 P.2d 445, 450 (Cal. 1998) (“As a convicted felon still

subject to the Department of Corrections, a parolee has

conditional freedom—granted for the specific purpose of

monitoring his transition from inmate to free citizen.”).

Moreover, the privacy invasion caused by a blood test is

relatively small (even when conducted on a free citizen). See

Skinner, 489 U.S. at 625; Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771;

Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 435-36 (1957). In

Schmerber, the Court upheld the warrantless extraction of a

blood sample from a motorist suspected of driving while

intoxicated, despite his refusal to consent to the intrusion. The

Court noted that the intrusion occasioned by a blood test is

minimal because such “tests are a commonplace in these days of

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periodic physical examinations and experience with them

teaches that the quantity of blood extracted is minimal, and that

for most people the procedure involves virtually no risk, trauma,

or pain.” Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771 (footnote omitted).

“Schmerber thus confirmed society’s judgment that blood tests

do not constitute an unduly extensive imposition on an

individual’s privacy and bodily integrity.” Skinner, 489 U.S. at

625 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

In Jones v. Murray, the Fourth Circuit considered the

applicability of the Skinner line of precedent to the collection of

blood for DNA identification bank purposes. That circuit held

that “[w]hile we do not accept even this small level of intrusion

for free persons without Fourth Amendment constraint . . . the

same protections do not hold true for those lawfully confined to

the custody of the state.” 962 F.2d at 306. The Fourth Circuit

went on to note the indisputable principle that “when a suspect

is arrested upon probable cause, his identification becomes a

matter of legitimate state interest and he can hardly claim

privacy in it.” Id.

The Fourth Circuit further reasoned that courts must “accept

this proposition because the identification of suspects is relevant

not only to solving the crime for which the suspect is arrested,

but also for maintaining a permanent record to solve other past

and future crimes.” Id. Therefore, it cannot be denied that the

universal practice of “‘booking’ procedures that are followed for

every suspect arrested for a felony,” including fingerprinting,

ensues without respect to the relevance of fingerprint

identification to the suspect’s particular crime. Id. As with

fingerprinting, we agree with the Fourth Circuit that “the Fourth

Amendment does not require an additional finding of

individualized suspicion before blood can be taken from

incarcerated felons for the purpose of identifying them.” Id. at

306-07. While we need not decide whether the Fourth

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Amendment permits the suspicionless collection of blood

samples from every suspect arrested for a felony, cf. id. at 306,

it certainly permits the collection of a blood sample from a

convicted felon, like Johnson, while he is still on probation.

Arguably, Johnson’s privacy interests differ somewhat from

those at stake in Skinner, Schmerber, and Jones: A probationer

may have stronger privacy interests than a prisoner, and an

individual may have a stronger privacy interest in his permanent

identity than he has in the temporary toxicity of his blood.

However, we have never held that an innocent individual has a

Fourth Amendment right to expunge the government’s records

of his identity. See Stevenson v. United States, 380 F.2d 590

(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 962 (1967). In Stevenson, we

held that an individual has no constitutional right to the

expungement of his mugshots and fingerprints, notwithstanding

the fact that his conviction was subsequently set aside. Id. at

593-94. A fortiori, a felon like Johnson—whose privacy

interests have been diminished by his probationary status—has

no viable objection to the government’s retention of his

identifying information.

On the other side of the balance, the government is “quite

justified” in taking steps to keep tabs on ex-convicts, to deter

recidivism, and to solve past and future crimes. Knights, 534

U.S. at 121; see also Reyes, 968 P.2d at 450 (“The state has a

duty not only to assess the efficacy of its rehabilitative efforts

but to protect the public, and the importance of the latter interest

justifies the imposition of a warrantless search condition.”

(emphasis added)). The need to ensure that the community “is

not harmed by the probationer’s being at large” permits the

government “a degree of impingement upon [a probationer’s]

privacy that would not be constitutional if applied to the public

at large.” Griffin, 483 U.S. at 875. Balancing Johnson’s

reduced privacy interests against the government’s interests in

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monitoring probationers, deterring recidivism, and protecting the

public, we hold it was reasonable for the Appellees to collect

Johnson’s DNA while on probation. 

B

Johnson’s second argument is that the Fourth Amendment

prohibits the government from storing his “genetic fingerprint”

in the CODIS database and “re-searching” it after he has left the

probationary rolls (as he now has). In Johnson’s view, “[o]nce

probation ends, the individual’s privacy interest is restored to the

level of other citizens while the government’s penal interest

disappears.” Appellant’s Br. at 34. Given this reshuffling of the

parties’ interests, Johnson argues, the post-probation balance

makes it unreasonable to “re-search” ex-convicts’ DNA profiles.

For the reasons set forth below, we disagree. 

1

After a donor’s DNA is collected under the Act, it is

analyzed “in accordance with publicly available standards that

satisfy or exceed the guidelines for [the FBI’s] quality assurance

program for DNA analysis.” 42 U.S.C. § 14132(b)(1). Using

“short tandem repeat” (“STR”) technology, the government

creates a “genetic fingerprint” for each donor by looking for the

presence of genic variants known as alleles at thirteen specific

loci on DNA present in the specimen. See Kincade, 379 F.3d at

818. A copy of the donor’s “genetic fingerprint” is then

uploaded to the CODIS database, 42 U.S.C. § 14132(a)(1),

which allows government officials to match a “genetic

fingerprint” with its donor’s identity only for “law enforcement

identification purposes,” “judicial proceedings,” and “criminal

defense purposes,” id. § 14132(b)(3). Unauthorized uses or

disclosures of DNA information stored in the database are

punishable by fines and imprisonment. Id. § 14133(c). 

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We conclude that accessing the records stored in the CODIS

database is not a “search” for Fourth Amendment purposes. As

the Supreme Court has held, the process of matching one piece

of personal information against government records does not

implicate the Fourth Amendment. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480

U.S. 321 (1987). In Hicks, a police officer found an expensive

stereo while searching an apartment under exigent

circumstances. Suspecting that the stereo system was stolen, the

officer wrote down the serial numbers of some of its

components. The officer then conveyed the numbers to

headquarters and confirmed a match between the serial numbers

and stereo components stolen during an armed robbery. Id. at

323-24. The Supreme Court held that copying the serial

numbers constituted a “search” (insofar as the officer moved the

equipment to see the serial numbers), but matching the copied

serial numbers against those of the stolen stereo components did

not independently implicate the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 324-

25.

Johnson attempts to avoid the implications of Hicks by

arguing that the installation of a video camera inside someone’s

home constitutes one “search,” and a new “search” occurs every

time a government official monitors the camera. In Johnson’s

view, “[t]he harm from the government’s ability to indefinitely

search and re-search [an ex-probationer’s] genetic information

[is no different] than placing a video camera in a citizen’s

home.” Appellant’s Br. at 30. We reject the analogy. 

Monitoring an in-home video camera raises Fourth

Amendment concerns where it is tantamount to repetitive,

surreptitious surveillance of a citizen’s private goings on. Cf.

United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 716 (1984)

(“Indiscriminate monitoring of property that has been withdrawn

from public view would present far too serious a threat to

privacy interests in the home to escape entirely some sort of

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Fourth Amendment oversight.”). And because a video feed is

constantly updated, it implicates the Fourth Amendment each

time a government official monitors it to spy on otherwise

private matters. Cf. id. at 713-14. By contrast, a felon’s DNA

fingerprint is more akin to a snapshot: It reveals identifying

information based on a blood test conducted at a single point in

time. Of course, even snapshots can raise Fourth Amendment

concerns. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 389-92 (1978).

However, if a snapshot is taken in conformance with the Fourth

Amendment, the government’s storage and use of it does not

give rise to an independent Fourth Amendment claim. See

California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213-15 (1986); Dow Chem.

Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986).

Accordingly, we conclude that accessing the DNA

snapshots contained in the CODIS database does not

independently implicate the Fourth Amendment. We note that

the consequences of the contrary conclusion would be

staggering: Police departments across the country could face an

intolerable burden if every “search” of an ordinary fingerprint

database were subject to Fourth Amendment challenges. The

same applies to DNA fingerprints.

To be sure, genetic fingerprints differ somewhat from their

metacarpal brethren, and future technological advances in DNA

testing (coupled with possible expansions of the DNA Act’s

scope) may empower the government to conduct wide-ranging

“DNA dragnets” that raise justifiable citations to George Orwell.

See, e.g., Kincade, 379 F.3d at 849 (Gould, J., concurring); id.

at 873-74 (Kozinski, J., dissenting); Appellant’s Br. at 36-40.

Today, however, the DNA Act applies only to felons, and

CODIS operates much like an old-fashioned fingerprint database

(albeit more efficiently). As the Supreme Court has noted: 

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if such dragnet-type law enforcement practices as [Johnson]

envisions should eventually occur, there will be time

enough then to determine whether different constitutional

principles may be applicable. Insofar as [Johnson’s]

complaint appears to be simply that scientific devices such

as [DNA testing and CODIS] enable[] the police to be more

effective in detecting crime, it simply has no constitutional

foundation. We have never equated police efficiency with

unconstitutionality, and we decline to do so now.

United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284 (1983) (citation

omitted). We therefore reject Johnson’s claim that the Fourth

Amendment applies to each “search” of the CODIS database. 

2

Johnson also challenges the government’s retention of his

blood sample, which he claims might be retested with new

technologies in the future. Nothing in the record suggests such

future testing is imminent, nor can we analyze its invasiveness

until it appears. It is surely not uncommon that evidence of

every sort obtained by a lawful search and retained may be

useful or provide additional information in the future. If

something about some undefined future technology raises

constitutional issues, that is a problem for another day.

We are nonetheless advertent to the Supreme Court’s

teaching in Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). There

the Court considered whether the use of thermal imaging

technology to examine the interior of a dwelling constitutes a

“search.” After noting that the Fourth Amendment does not

“leave the homeowner at the mercy of advancing

technology—including imaging technology that could discern

all human activity in the home,” id. at 35-36, the Court held that

“[w]here . . . the Government uses a device that is not in general

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public use, to explore details of the home that would previously

have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the

surveillance is a ‘search’ . . . .” Id. at 40. 

This is not such a case. Not only is blood testing in

common use, Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771, but a “search” is

completed upon the drawing of the blood: Any future test on a

stored blood sample will not “discern [any] human activity,” nor

will it constitute a “physical intrusion.” Neither Kyllo nor any

other decision that we have found suggests that evidence

becomes any less subject to search, seizure, or retention simply

because it might yield additional information in the future. 

III

Johnson next argues that the federal DNA Act and the

District of Columbia’s implementation statute (D.C. Code §

22-4151, which defines a “qualifying District of Columbia

offense[]” under the federal DNA Act) violate the Ex Post Facto

Clauses of the United States Constitution, art. I, § 9, cl. 3; § 10,

cl. 1. In Johnson’s view, the legislative histories of both statutes

suggest they were enacted with “punitive intent,” and it is

unconstitutional to apply the statutes retroactively to Johnson’s

crime, which was committed on March 27, 2001. For the

reasons set forth below, we disagree. 

A

At the outset, we note that the application of the federal

DNA Act to Johnson cannot possibly violate the Ex Post Facto

Clause. The federal statute was enacted on December 19,

2000—more than three months before Johnson committed

felonious robbery, and more than one year before Johnson was

convicted. Thus, the federal DNA Act does not operate

retroactively as to Johnson by its own terms. See INS v. St. Cyr,

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533 U.S. 289, 316-26 (2001). Accordingly, the ex post facto

issue arises (if at all) only with respect to the District’s

implementation statute, which was signed into law on June 15,

2001 (a little less than three months after Johnson committed his

crimes). 

Appellees concede that the District’s implementation statute

makes the DNA Act operate retroactively. Thus, the District’s

implementation statute may be unconstitutional under the Ex

Post Facto Clause if it is “punitive.” As the Supreme Court has

held: 

If the intention of the legislature was to impose punishment,

that ends the inquiry. If, however, the intention was to

enact a regulatory scheme that is civil and nonpunitive, we

must further examine whether the statutory scheme is so

punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the

District’s] intention to deem it “civil.” 

Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003) (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted). In Smith, the Court held Alaska’s sex

offender registry law does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause,

notwithstanding the fact that the statute’s registration provisions

were codified in the state’s criminal code, failure to register was

itself a crime, some of the law’s provisions related to criminal

administration, and the state’s criminal pleading rules required

informing a defendant of the statute’s requirements. See id. at

95-96. Emphasizing the statute’s anti-recidivism and public

safety provisions, the Court held the statute was non-punitive in

both purpose and effect. We reach the same conclusion here. 

B

We first consider whether the “purpose” of D.C. Code §

22-4151 was “punitive.” As the Supreme Court has instructed:

“Whether [the purpose of] a statutory scheme is civil or criminal

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is first of all a question of statutory construction.” Smith, 538

U.S. at 92 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Johnson urges us to look for the implementation statute’s

“punitive intent” by construing its legislative history “in the

light most favorable to Mr. Johnson.” Appellant’s Br. at 46.

We reject Johnson’s novel canon of interpretation. As with all

questions of statutory interpretation, “[w]e consider the statute’s

text and its structure to determine the legislative objective.”

Smith, 538 U.S. at 92; see also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah

Servs., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611, 2626 (2005); Barnhart v. Sigmon

Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002).

Nothing in the text or structure of the District’s

implementation statute suggests its purpose was “punitive”—the

law simply defines the offenses subject to DNA collection under

the federal Act. See D.C. Code § 22-4151 (requiring forty-nine

categories of ex-convicts to donate DNA to CODIS, but adding

no substantive requirements—punitive or otherwise—to the

federal DNA Act’s requirements). Given the definitional nature

of the implementation statute, it can be understood only as a

policy judgment by the District’s elected officials regarding

which offenses are serious enough to warrant coverage by the

federal DNA Act. As the Supreme Court has held, such policy

judgments are “an incident of the State’s power to protect the

health and safety of its citizens,” and they should be construed

“as evidencing an intent to exercise that regulatory power, and

not a purpose to add to the punishment.” Flemming v. Nestor,

363 U.S. 603, 616 (1960). Relying on Flemming, the Court

rejected an Ex Post Facto challenge to an Alaska statute that

retroactively forced sex offenders to provide the state with

identifying information (including mugshots and fingerprints),

which the state stored in a massive database. Smith, 538 U.S. at

89-91. The Court emphasized that “even if the objective of the

[sex offender registration statute] is consistent with the purposes

of the Alaska criminal justice system, the State’s pursuit of it in

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a regulatory scheme does not make the objective punitive.” Id.

at 94; cf. United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465

U.S. 354, 364 (1984) (upholding a statute requiring forfeiture of

unlicensed firearms against a double jeopardy challenge because

“[k]eeping potentially dangerous weapons out of the hands of

unlicensed dealers is a goal plainly more remedial than

punitive”). 

Similarly here, the District’s implementation statute simply

carried out part of the state’s power to protect the health and

safety of its citizens by keeping track of (and deterring future

crimes by) ex-convicts. Despite the fact that the statute is

codified in the District’s criminal code, it did not create new

punishments or increase extant punishments. The statute did

create a new obligation for ex-convicts to donate their DNA to

the CODIS database; however, a minimally invasive blood test,

Skinner, 489 U.S. at 625, is no more of a “punishment” than

forcing convicted sex offenders to disclose their identities or

confiscating unlicensed firearms. Moreover, the Supreme Court

has held that the revocation of probation (which was the

threatened sanction that prompted Johnson’s motion for a TRO)

does not constitute a “punishment” for purposes of the Ex Post

Facto Clause. See Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 700-

01 (2000). Therefore, the “purpose” of the statute was nonpunitive. 

C

We next consider whether the “effect” of D.C. Code §

22-4151 is “punitive,” notwithstanding its non-punitive

“purpose.” As the Supreme Court has instructed, our inquiry

into the effects of the District’s implementation statute should

be guided by seven factors, which are “neither exhaustive nor

dispositive.” 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. at 365 n.7 (internal

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quotation marks and citation omitted). Specifically, we must

consider:

[w]hether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or

restraint, whether it has historically been regarded as a

punishment, whether it comes into play only on a finding of

scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional

aims of punishment—retribution and deterrence, whether

the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, whether

an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be

connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears

excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned.

Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963)

(footnotes omitted). In Johnson’s view, a mandatory DNA test

constitutes “an affirmative disability or restraint,” which is

“excessive in relation to [any] alternative purpose” that can be

assigned to it. Yet again, we disagree. 

A blood test differs mightily from “an affirmative disability

or restraint.” Like a sex-offender registry, the DNA Act

“imposes no physical restraint, and so does not resemble the

punishment of imprisonment, which is the paradigmatic

affirmative disability or restraint.” Smith, 538 U.S. at 100; see

also id. at 99-101 (requiring sex offenders to disclose their

identities does not constitute an affirmative disability or

restraint); Flemming, 363 U.S. at 617 (eliminating deportees’

Social Security benefits does not constitute an affirmative

disability or restraint); Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93,

104 (1997) (debarring an individual from an entire occupation

does not constitute an affirmative disability or restraint). The

collection and retention of a felon’s fingerprints (genetic or

otherwise) is far less of an impingement on his liberty than a

permanent employment ban or the mandatory disclosure of a sex

offender’s identity. Cf. Breithaupt, 352 U.S. at 435-38 (holding

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an involuntary blood test does not implicate an individual’s

liberty interests). Accordingly, the DNA Act does not impose

an “affirmative disability or restraint.” 

Finally, Johnson argues that the statutes are “excessive in

relation to [any] alternative purpose” that might be assigned to

them. However, as the District Court correctly pointed out, the

statutory text suggests the DNA Act was enacted, in part, to

facilitate DNA-based exonerations. See 42 U.S.C. §

14132(b)(3)(C) (allowing the use and disclosure of CODIS

records for “criminal defense purposes”). The statutory means

for accomplishing this “alternative purpose” need not be

narrowly tailored: As the Supreme Court has instructed, “[a]

statute is not deemed punitive simply because it lacks a close or

perfect fit with the nonpunitive aims it seeks to advance.”

Smith, 538 U.S. at 103. Instead, Johnson must show that the

Act’s non-punitive, alternative purpose is a “sham or mere

pretext.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Nothing in the record or the parties’ briefs suggests anything of

the sort. Accordingly, the DNA Act’s sanction is not

“excessive in relation to [its] alternative purpose.”

In sum, the DNA Act and the District’s implementation

statute are “punitive” in neither purpose nor effect.

Accordingly, we hold the dismissal of Johnson’s ex post facto

claim was proper. 

IV

We have considered Johnson’s other arguments—which

include claims under the Due Process and “equal protection”

Clauses of the Fifth Amendment, as well as HIPAA and the

CERD—and conclude that they are without merit and do not

warrantseparate discussion. For the reasons set forth above, the

judgment of the District Court is

Affirmed.

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