Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00519/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00519-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FRANK E. SISNEROZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

WHITMAN, et. al.,

Defendants.

 /

1:05-cv-00519-AWI-GSA (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED

COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

(Doc. 23) 

I. SCREENING ORDER

Frank E. Sisneroz (“Plaintiff”) is a civil detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis

in this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

The original complaint in this action was filed on April 20, 2005. Doc. 1. On August

4,2005, this Court issued an Order severing plaintiff’s claims from those of other plaintiffs listed

in the original complaint. Plaintiff was also ordered to file an amended complaint within thirty

(30) days of service of the Order. Doc. 10. 

On August 30, 2005, plaintiff filed a pleading titled “Motion of Response and Objection

to Magistrate Order,” which was denied. Doc. 14 & 15. 

On March 15, 2006, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause why the case should not be

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dismissed for plaintiff’s failure to file an amended complaint. Doc. 19. Plaintiff responded to

the Order on April 11, 2006, that he did not understand the requirement to file an amended

complaint. Doc. 20. On April 13, 2006, the Court issued an Order dismissing the original

complaint with leave to amend. Doc. 21. On May 25, 2006, plaintiff filed his first amended

complaint. Doc. 23. 

A. Screening Requirement

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in

support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding,

467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); see also Palmer v.

Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass'n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing a

complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in

question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construe the

pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts in the plaintiff's favor. 

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). 

B. Summary of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint

It appears that all of plaintiff’s allegations pertain to his confinement while in the custody

of the Tulare County Sheriff. 

Plaintiff’s first amended complaint states numerous generic allegations in support of the

one stated cause of action - which entails violation of his rights to substantive due process and

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equal protection of the law. For example plaintiff generally states that his rights were violated

due to defense: “failure to provide access to County Mental health Legal Advisors, or similar onsite or no-call legal representations;” “failure to provide conditions of life which are normal

enough to promote rather than to detract from Plaintiff (sic) chance of lining (sic) with fewer

restrictions;” “failure to provide access to a Civil Rights Information Officer;” “failure to provide

non-submissive detention indistinguishable and undifferentiated from the incarceration of a

convicted criminal;” “failure to provide a less-restrictive alternative that would adequately

protect the public, while best promoting Plaintiff (sic) rehabilitation, as was available;” and

“failure to provide more considerate treatment and less onerous conditions of confinement than

that provided to criminals serving prison terms and persons serving penal county terms.” Doc.

23, pp. 10-11. 

As in screening plaintiff’s original complaint, the Court, cannot find that the first

amended complaint states any cognizable claim(s) for relief against any named defendant. The

Court hereby provides plaintiff with what appears to be the relevant legal authority so that he

may draft an adequate second amended complaint. The legal standards provided below are not

intended to be an exhaustive list of claims that may or may not be raised in plaintiff’s second

amended complaint. Plaintiff should note that failure to state a cognizable claim in his second

amended complaint will result in dismissal of his case. 

C. Legal Authority

1. Linkage Requirement

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between

the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

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(1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a

constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates

in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that

causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th

Cir. 1978). In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, plaintiff must link each named

defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of plaintiff’s

federal rights.

Plaintiff’s first amended complaint fails to link a named defendant to the allegedly

unconstitutional acts or omissions.

2. Rule 8(a)

Further, a plaintiff’s complaint must satisfy the requirement of Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 8(a), which calls for a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader

is entitled to relief.” Rule 8(a) expresses the principle of notice-pleading, whereby the pleader

need only give the opposing party fair notice of a claim. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46

(1957). Rule 8(a) does not require an elaborate recitation of every fact a plaintiff may ultimately

rely upon at trial, but only a statement sufficient to “give the defendant fair notice of what the

plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Id. at 47. 

The Court finds that the allegations of plaintiff’s first amended complaint are too generic

to put defendants on notice of the actions that allegedly violated plaintiff’s rights. In his second

amended complaint, plaintiff is urged to list each claim separately and provide a brief statement

of facts indicating what acts or omissions he attributes to each defendant that allegedly violated

his constitutional rights. Plaintiff should complete the form complaint as completely as possible. 

Plaintiff is further directed to refrain from using legal references, arguments, and/or jargon as

they are inappropriate at the pleading stage. 

In addition, plaintiff is not required to tender evidence at this stage in the proceedings and

should refrain from submitting attachments. It is inappropriate to attach exhibits to a complaint. 

See Rule 8, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court cannot serve as a repository for the

parties' evidence. Originals or copies of evidence (i.e., prison or medical records, witness

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affidavits, etc.) should not be submitted until the course of litigation brings the evidence into

question (for example, on a Motion for Summary Judgment, at trial, or when requested by the

court). 

3. Conditions of Confinement

To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prison

conditions must involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain . . . .” Rhodes v.

Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Although prison conditions may be restrictive and harsh,

prison officials must provide prisoners with food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and

personal safety. Id.; Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986); Hoptowit v.

Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982). Where a prisoner alleges injuries stemming from

unsafe conditions of confinement, prison officials may be held liable only if they acted with

“deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm.” Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124,

1128 (9th Cir. 1998). 

The deliberate indifference standard involves an objective and a subjective prong. First,

the alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms, “sufficiently serious . . . .” Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Second,

the prison official must “know[] of and disregard[] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety . .

. .” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Thus, a prison official may be held liable under the Eighth

Amendment for denying humane conditions of confinement only if he knows that inmates face a

substantial risk of harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it. 

Id. at 837-45. Prison officials may avoid liability by presenting evidence that they lacked

knowledge of the risk, or by presenting evidence of a reasonable, albeit unsuccessful, response to

the risk. Id. at 844-45. Mere negligence on the part of the prison official is not sufficient to

establish liability, but rather, the official’s conduct must have been wanton. Id. at 835; Frost, 152

F.3d at 1128. 

“What is necessary to show sufficient harm for purposes of the Cruel and Unusual

Punishment Clause depends upon the claim at issue . . . .” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8

(1992). “The objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim is . . . contextual and

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responsive to contemporary standards of decency.” Id. at 8 (quotations and citations omitted). 

“[E]xtreme deprivations are required to make out a[n] [Eighth Amendment] conditions-ofconfinement claim.” Id. at 9 (citation omitted). With respect to this type of claim, “[b]ecause

routine discomfort is part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against

society, only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are

sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation.” Id. (quotations and

citations omitted). 

“[E]xtreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim.” 

Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

The Eighth Amendment guarantees sanitation, Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246

(9th Cir. 1982) including personal hygiene supplies such as soap and toothpaste. Keenan v. Hall,

83 F.3d 1083, 1091 (9th Cir. 1996). 

The Eighth Amendment guarantees adequate heating.” Keenan, 83 F.3d at 1091. 

Inadequate ventilation and air flow violates the Eighth Amendment if it undermines the health of

inmates and the sanitation of the penitentiary.” Keenan, 83 F.3d at 1090 (internal quotations and

citation omitted). 

Requiring inmates to live in constant illumination, under certain circumstances, rise to the

level of an Eighth Amendment violation. See Keenan, 83 F.3d at 1090-91. 

The denial of adequate clothing may, under certain circumstances, rise to the level of an

Eighth Amendment violation. Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1421 (9th Cir. 1994).

The conclusory allegation that plaintiff was deprived of hot food does not support a claim

for violation of the Eighth Amendment. See LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1456 (9th Cir.

1993).

Temporarily unconstitutional conditions of confinement do not rise to the level of

constitutional violations. See Anderson v. County of Kern 45 F.3d 1310 (9 Cir. 1995) and th

Hoptowit v. Ray 682 F.2d 1237 (9 Cir. 1982). th

The few instances that plaintiff does state specific facts relate primarily to unsanitary

conditions of confinement. Plaintiff makes no allegations as to any infliction of pain. Most of

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plaintiff’s factual allegations pertain to sanitation – linens with holes in them, washing of

clothing, access to cleaning/sanitation supplies, and the like. Plaintiff does not state whether he

requested replacement items and/or what response, if any, was received. Further, plaintiff does

not address the frequency and/or durations of his allegations. Therefore, he fails to state a

cognizable claim regarding the conditions of his confinement. 

 4. Access to Law Library and Legal Assistance

Plaintiff states that he “was not afforded fair access to legal materials and not allowed to

do legal research,” was not provided “access to County Mental Health Legal Advisors, or similar

on-site or no-call legal representation,” and was not provided “access to a Civil Rights

Information Officer.” Doc. 23, pg. 10. 

Inmates have a fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts. Lewis v. Casey,

518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996). The right of access is merely the right to bring to court a grievance the

inmate wishes to present, and is limited to direct criminal appeals, habeas petitions, and civil

rights actions. Id. at 354. The State is not required to enable the inmate to discover grievances

or to litigate effectively once in court. Id. 

Inmates do not have the right to a law library or legal assistance. Id. at 351. Law libraries

and legal assistance programs are only the means of ensuring access to the courts. Id. Because

inmates do not have “an abstract, freestanding right to a law library or legal assistance, an inmate

cannot establish relevant actual injury by establishing that his prison’s law library or legal

assistance program is subpar in some theoretical sense.” Id. Rather, an inmate claiming

interference with or denial of access to the courts must show that he suffered an actual injury. Id. 

Plaintiff has no cognizable right to the legal materials and/or assistance to which he

allegedly was denied access. 

5. Equal Protection

Plaintiff makes a very general statement that defendants violated his Equal Protection

Rights. Doc. 23. Pg. 10. 

Equal protection claims arise when a charge is made that similarly situated individuals are

treated differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. See San Antonio

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School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1972). In order to state a § 1983 claim based on a

violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff must show that

defendants acted with intentional discrimination against plaintiff or against a class of inmates

which included plaintiff. Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (equal

protection claims may be brought by a “class of one”); Reese v. Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208

F.3d 736, 740 (9 Cir. 2000); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998); Federal th

Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Henderson, 940 F.2d 465, 471 (9th Cir. 1991); Lowe v. City of Monrovia,

775 F.2d 998, 1010 (9th Cir. 1985). “A plaintiff must allege facts, not simply conclusions, that

show that an individual was personally involved in the deprivation of his civil rights.” Barren at

1194.

6. Substantive Due Process

“The concept of substantive due process . . . forbids the government from depriving a

person of life, liberty, or property in such a way that shocks the conscience or interferes with

rights implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” Nunez v. City of Los Angeles, 147 F.3d 867,

871 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation and internal quotation marks). To establish a claim, “a plaintiff

must, as a threshold matter, show a government deprivation of life, liberty, or property.” Id. 

“The Due Process Clause takes effect only if there is a deprivation of a protected interest.” Id. at

874 (emphasis in original).

“The federal judiciary is not a good-government watchdog: the Due Process Clause is not

the ‘Fairness Clause.’” Nunez v. City of Los Angeles, 147 F.3d 867, 874 (9th Cir. 1998). 

“There is no general liberty interest in being free from capricious government action.” Nunez v.

City of Los Angeles, 147 F.3d 867, 873 (9th Cir. 1998). “Put simply, not every social injustice

has a judicial remedy.” Nunez v. City of Los Angeles, 147 F.3d 867, 874 (9th Cir. 1998).

Plaintiff alleges, without elaboration, that defendants’ actions also violated the Due

Process Clause. However, “[t]o establish a violation of substantive due process . . . , a plaintiff is

ordinarily required to prove that a challenged government action was clearly arbitrary and

unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general

welfare. Where a particular amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional

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protection against a particular sort of government behavior, that Amendment, not the more

generalized notion of substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing a plaintiff’s

claims.” Patel v. Penman, 103 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations, internal quotations, and

brackets omitted), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1845 (1997); County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523

U.S. 833, 842 (1998). 

7. Mail

Plaintiff alleges only that he “was not afforded the right to send receive sealed, unopened,

uncensored mails.” Doc. 23, pg. 8. 

Censorship of outgoing prisoner mail is justified if the following criteria are met: (1) the

regulation furthers “an important or substantial government interest unrelated to the suppression

of expression” and (2) “the limitation on First Amendment freedoms must be no greater than is

necessary or essential to the protection of the particular governmental interest involved.” 

Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974) (overturned by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S.

401, 413-14 (1989) only as test relates to incoming mail - Turner test applies to incoming mail). 

8. Freedom of Religion

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “Congress shall

make no law respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . .

.” U.S. Const., Amend. I. Prisoners “retain protections afforded by the First Amendment,”

including the free exercise of religion. O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348, 107

S.Ct. 2400 (1987). However, “‘[l]awful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or

limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying

our penal system.’” Id. (quoting Price v. Johnson, 334 U.S. 266, 285, 68 S.Ct. 1049, 1060

(1948)). “In order to establish a free exercise violation, [a prisoner] must show the defendants

burdened the practice of his religion, by preventing him from engaging in conduct mandated by

his faith, without any justification reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” 

Freeman v. Arpaio,125 F.3d 732, 736 (9th Cir. 1997). “In order to reach the level of a

constitutional violation, the interference with one’s practice of religion ‘must be more than an

inconvenience; the burden must be substantial and an interference with a tenet or belief that is

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central to religious doctrine.’” Freeman, 125 F.3d at 737 (quoting Graham v. C.I.R., 822 F.2d

844, 851 (9th Cir. 1987)).

“To ensure that courts afford appropriate deference to prison officials, . . . prison

regulations alleged to infringe constitutional rights are judged under a ‘reasonableness’ test less

restrictive than that ordinarily applied to alleged infringements of fundamental constitutional

rights.” O’Lone, 382 U.S. at 349. Under this standard, “when a prison regulation impinges on

inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate

penological interests.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254 (1987). First, “there

must be a valid, rational connection between the prison regulation and the legitimate government

interest put forward to justify it,” and “the governmental objective must itself be a legitimate and

neutral one.” Id. A second consideration is “whether there are alternative means of exercising

the right that remain open to prison inmates.” Id. at 90 (internal quotations and citation omitted). 

A third consideration is “the impact accommodation of the asserted right will have on guards and

other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally.” Id. “Finally, the absence of

ready alternatives is evidence of the reasonableness of a prison regulation.” Id.

Prisoners are not required to “objectively show that a central tenet of [their] faith is

burdened” in order to raise a viable free exercise claim. Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 884

(9th Cir. 2008). Rather, the belief must be both “‘sincerely held’” and “‘rooted in religious

belief.’” Id. (citing to and quoting Malik v. Brown, 16 F.3d 330, 333 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting

Callahan v. Woods, 658 F.2d 679, 683 (9th Cir. 1981))).

Equal protection claims arise when a charge is made that similarly situated individuals are

treated differently without a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. See San Antonio

School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1972). Prison officials cannot discriminate against

particular religions. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321-22 (1972) (per curium). Prisons must

afford an inmate of a minority religion “a reasonable opportunity of pursuing his faith

comparable to the opportunity afforded fellow prisoners who adhere to conventional religious

precepts.” Id. at 322. To succeed on an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must allege that

defendants acted with intentional discrimination. Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1010

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(9th Cir. 1985); FDIC v. Henderson, 940 F.2d 465, 471 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Plaintiff’s only allegation regarding his religion is that he “was not afforded a fair

opportunity to exercise his constitutional rights to freedom of religion... .” Doc. 23, pg. 10. This

allegation is not cognizable as it fails to address whether the belief was sincerely held and rooted

in religion. 

II. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, plaintiff’s first amended complaint is dismissed with

leave to file a second amended complaint within thirty days. If plaintiff needs an extension of

time to comply with this order, plaintiff shall file a motion seeking an extension of time no later

than thirty days from the date of service of this order.

Plaintiff must demonstrate in his second amended complaint how the conditions

complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v.

Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The second amended complaint must allege in specific

terms how each named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under section 1983

unless there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the

claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167

(9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

Plaintiff is reminded that Fed.R.Civ.P. 18(a) provides that “‘[a] party asserting a claim to

relief as an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, may join, either as

independent or as alternate claims, as many claims, legal, equitable, or maritime, as the party has

against an opposing party.’ Thus, multiple claims against a single party are fine, but Claim A

against Defendant 1 should not be joined with unrelated Claim B against Defendant 2. Unrelated

claims against different defendants belong in different suits, not only to prevent the sort of

morass [a multiple claim, multiple defendant] suit produce[s], but also to ensure that prisoners

pay the required filing fees-for the Prison Litigation Reform Act limits to 3 the number of

frivolous suits or appeals that any prisoner may file without prepayment of the required fees. 28

U.S.C. § 1915 1915(g).” George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). 

Plaintiff is also reminded that it is inappropriate to attach exhibits to a complaint. See

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Rule 8, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Further, the Court cannot serve as a repository for the

parties' evidence. Originals or copies of evidence (i.e., prison or medical records, witness

affidavits, etc.) should not be submitted until the course of litigation brings the evidence into

question (for example, on a motion for summary judgment, at trial, or when requested by the

court). At this point, the submission of evidence is premature as the plaintiff is only required to

state a prima facie claim for relief. Thus, in amending his complaint, plaintiff should simply

state the facts upon which he alleges a defendant has violated his constitutional rights and refrain

from submitting exhibits.

 Finally, plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 15-220 requires that his second amended

complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, an

amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th

Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no longer serves any

function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim

and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s first amended complaint is dismissed, with leave to amend;

2. The Clerk’s Office shall send plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, plaintiff must file a

second amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the court in this

order; and

4. If plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed for failure

to obey a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: April 10, 2008 /s/ Gary S. Austin 

60kij UNI 8 TED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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