Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00867/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-00867-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 445
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Employment
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilities Act

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

April Rue, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Hickman's Egg Ranch Incorporated, 

Defendant.

No. CV-14-00867-PHX-GMS

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment by Defendant 

Hickman’s Egg Ranch Incorporated (“Hickman’s”). (Doc. 41.) Also pending is the 

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment by Plaintiff April Rue. (Doc. 43.) For the 

following reasons, the Court grants Defendant’s motion and denies Plaintiff’s motion. 

BACKGROUND 

 On March 28, 2013, Hickman’s hired Rue to work in the accounting department. 

On Monday, April 15, two weeks after starting her new job, Rue fractured her right ankle 

in a car accident. Rue provided her supervisor a note from West Valley Hospital stating 

“No work until follow up w/ ortho” and requested time off. (Doc. 42-1 at PDF 60.) 

Hickman’s gave Rue the requested time off. 

 On April 18, Rue came to work and used a wheelchair. The parties dispute 

whether she was able to perform the non-sedentary aspects of her work. Following her 

return to work, she frequently arrived late and occasionally left early.1

 Rue provided her 

 

1

 Rue was also frequently late during her two weeks of employment before she was injured but was never disciplined for her tardiness. She testified that after her injury, her 

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supervisor with a note dated April 25 from a physician’s assistant at Maricopa Integrated 

Health System that read, “It is my medical opinion that April Rue may return to sedentary 

work and must remain non-weight bearing to her right leg.” (Doc. 42-1 at PDF 62.) 

Hickman’s placed Rue on unpaid leave of absence until she was able to perform in her 

position without restrictions. Rue went on unpaid leave and never indicated to 

Hickman’s that she could return to work. Rue alleges that Hickman’s “effectively 

terminated” her and seeks relief under the Americans with Disabilities Act. (Doc. 48 at 

8.) 

DISCUSSION 

I. Legal Standard 

 The Court grants summary judgment when the movant “shows that there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In making this determination, the Court views the 

evidence “in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Warren v. City of 

Carlsbad, 58 F.3d 439, 441 (9th Cir.1995). Where the parties have filed cross-motions 

for summary judgment, the Court “evaluate[s] each motion independently, ‘giving the 

nonmoving party in each instance the benefit of all reasonable inferences.’” Lenz v. 

Universal Music Corp., 2015 WL 5315388, at *2 (9th Cir. Sept. 14, 2015) (quoting 

ACLU v. City of Las Vegas, 333 F.3d 1092, 1097 (9th Cir.2003)). “[A] party seeking 

summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court 

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes 

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 

477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 

 The party opposing summary judgment “may not rest upon the mere allegations or 

denials of [the party’s] pleadings, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there 

is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); see Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. 

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986); Brinson v. Linda Rose Joint Venture, 

 supervisor permitted her to arrive late. 

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53 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir. 1995). Substantive law determines which facts are material, 

and “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the 

governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. 

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “A fact issue is genuine ‘if the evidence is 

such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Villiarimo v. 

Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1061 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. 

at 248). Thus, the nonmoving party must show that the genuine factual issues “can be 

resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of 

either party.” Cal. Architectural Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. Franciscan Ceramics, Inc., 818 

F.2d 1466, 1468 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250). 

II. Analysis 

 “To state a prima facie case under the ADA, a plaintiff must prove that he is a 

qualified individual with a disability who suffered an adverse employment action because 

of his disability.” Sanders v. Arneson Products, Inc., 91 F.3d 1351, 1353 (9th Cir. 1996). 

The threshold question is whether the plaintiff’s “impairment is a ‘disability,’ as that term 

is used in the ADA.” Id. at 1354. 

 “Disability” as used in the ADA is defined as: “(A) a physical or mental 

impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual; 

(B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an 

impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). The non-exhaustive list of “major life activities” 

includes “walking,” “standing,” and “working.” Id. § 12102(2)(A). 

A. “Substantially Limits” 

 “An impairment is a disability within the meaning of [the ADA] if it substantially 

limits the ability of an individual to perform a major life activity as compared to most 

people in the general population.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii). Congress provided that 

“[t]he term ‘substantially limits’ shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive 

coverage” and that “[a]n impairment need not prevent, or significantly or severely 

restrict, the individual from performing a major life activity in order to be considered 

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substantially limiting.” Id. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i)-(ii). “Nonetheless, not every impairment 

will constitute a disability.” Id. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii). “The determination of whether an 

impairment substantially limits a major life activity requires an individualized 

assessment.” Id. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iv). 

 “[I]n deciding whether the impairment is substantially limiting, courts must 

consider the nature and severity of the plaintiff’s impairment, the duration or expected 

duration of the impairment, as well as the permanent or long term impact of the 

impairment.” Rohr v. Salt River Project Agric. Imp. & Power Dist., 555 F.3d 850, 858 

(9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotations omitted). “The effects of an impairment lasting or 

expected to last fewer than six months can be substantially limiting.” 29 C.F.R. § 

1630.2(j)(1)(iv). “At the same time, the duration of an impairment is one factor that is 

relevant in determining whether the impairment substantially limits a major life activity. 

Impairments that last only for a short period of time are typically not covered, although 

they may be covered if sufficiently severe.” Id. § Pt. 1630, App. “[T]emporary, nonchronic impairments of short duration, with little or no long term or permanent impact, 

are usually not disabilities. Such impairments may include, but are not limited to, broken 

limbs, sprained joints, concussions, appendicitis, and influenza.” Sanders, 91 F.3d at 

1354 (quoting 29 CFR Part 1630 App., § 1630.2(j)) (emphasis added). 

 Here, Rue declared that as of August 28, 2015 (the date of her Declaration), she 

was “still unable to stand or walk for more than thirty minutes of time before the pain in 

[her] ankle . . . requires [her] to rest” and was “still receiving on-going pain management 

treatment for the pain.” (Doc. 47-2 at ¶ 3-4.) “At the summary judgment stage, . . . ‘a 

plaintiff’s testimony may suffice to establish a genuine issue of material fact.’” Rohr, 

555 F.3d at 858-59 (quoting Head v. Glacier Northwest Inc., 413 F.3d 1053, 1058 (9th 

Cir. 2005)). “However, to survive summary judgment, an affidavit supporting the 

existence of a disability must not be merely self-serving and must contain sufficient detail 

to convey the existence of an impairment.” Id. Rue provides no information about the 

intensity of her pain, the amount of time she must rest, what kind of pain management 

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treatment she is receiving, or from whom. 

 The record of treatment includes an initial consultation on April 24, 2013, a follow 

up appointment two weeks later on May 6, and a second follow up appointment a month 

later on June 5. (Doc. 47-6.) Test results indicated “progressive healing.” (Id. at MIHS 

000016, PDF 14; MIHS 000020, PDF 18.) Rue provides no record of any treatment after 

June 5, 2013, which was less than two months after her injury. 

 Rue conceded during her deposition on June 29, 2015 that she can walk and bear 

weight on her right leg now, and that she no longer uses crutches or a wheelchair and no 

longer has the cart she used to prop her right leg on. (Doc. 47-1 at p. 67, PDF 11.) She 

claims, however, that she is not “at 100%.” (Id. at p. 70, PDF 13.) Rue also conceded 

that no doctor has ever suggested that she is disabled, although her doctor told her she 

could not run a marathon, wear high heels, or go out dancing. (Doc. 47, Exh. 4 at p. 100, 

PDF 47.) 

 Neither the nature nor the severity of Rue’s broken ankle suggests that she is 

disabled. The record establishes treatment for less than two months, her records 

demonstrate progressive healing, and she currently has no medical restrictions from 

walking, standing, or working. Rue’s broken ankle is a “non-chronic impairment[] of 

short duration, with little or no long term or permanent impact” that does not 

substantially limit any major life activities as contemplated by the ADA. Sanders, 91 

F.3d at 1354. 

 Furthermore, Rue was not “regarded as having such an impairment” by 

Hickman’s. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(C). The “regarded as” prong of the disability 

definition does not apply to “transitory and minor” impairments. Id. § 12102(3)(B). “A 

transitory impairment is an impairment with an actual or expected duration of 6 months 

or less.” Id. A broken ankle is a relatively minor impairment that is expected to heal 

within six months. Moreover, the record indicates that Rue’s ankle was healing 

progressively during her two months of treatment and that she no longer sought treatment 

after two months. 

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 “[A] temporary injury with minimal residual effects cannot be the basis for a 

sustainable claim under the ADA.” Because Rue did not have an impairment that 

substantially limited one or more major life activities, nor was she regarded as having 

such an impairment, Rue fails to establish that she had a “disability” under the ADA. 

Summary judgment is therefore appropriate. 

CONCLUSION 

 Rue’s broken ankle was not a “disability” as that term is used in the ADA, and 

therefore she fails to state a prima facie case under the ADA. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment (Doc. 41) is GRANTED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary 

Judgment (Doc. 43) is DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of Court to enter judgment 

accordingly. 

 Dated this 12th day of February, 2016. 

Honorable G. Murray Snow

United States District Judge

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