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Nature of Suit Code: 140
Nature of Suit: Negotiable Instruments
Cause of Action: 

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FI LED 

United States Courc of Appeals 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS '1".-~d, Ciroiit 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT AUG 14 1989 

-----------ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

BOWIE LIVESTOCK COMMISSION, INC., 

Plaintiff, 

BAGBY LAND AND CATTLE, INC. 

Plaintiff-Intervenor, 

v. 

CONTINENTAL FEDERAL SAVINGS AND 

LOAN ASSOCIATION, 

and 

Defendant-Cross-ClairnantAppellee, 

JERRY LYNN FINLEY, doing business as 

Southern Cross Cattle Co.; ROBERT 

OLIVER; and MOLLY GOETTELMAN, 

Defendants, 

and 

v. 

MARVIN HOLLAND AND OUACHITA PCA, 

Third-party-defendants, 

and 

JOHN ROSSO, doing business as John 

Rosso Cattle Co., 

Third-party-defendantAppellant. 

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) No. 87-2876 

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Appellate Case: 87-2876 Document: 01019975698 Date Filed: 08/14/1989 Page: 1 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before MOORE, ANDERSON, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The cause is therefore ordered 

Appellant Rosso, a third party defendant, appeals from an 

order of the district court granting defendant-cross claimant, 

Continental Federal Savings and Loan Association's cross-motion 

for summary judgment. The court also directed entry of final 

judgment as to this claim pursuant to Rule 54(b). 

Plaintiff Bowie Livestock commenced suit against defendants, 

Continental Federal Savings and Loan, Jerry Lynn Finley, Molly 

Goettleman, and Robert Oliver for collection of a draft executed 

by Finley against his account at Continental Federal. Continental 

Federal deposited $76,440.37, the balance of Finley's account, 

into the court registry and interpleaded third party defendants, 

all of whom had claims against the account. Rosso counterclaimed 

against Continental Federal. He alleged that Continental Federal 

was accountable, as a matter of law, for $75,875.00, the face 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

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Appellate Case: 87-2876 Document: 01019975698 Date Filed: 08/14/1989 Page: 2 
amount of a check Finley had issued to him, because it had failed 

to settle for it before midnight of the banking day of receipt 

amount. See Okla. Stat. tit. 12A, § 4-302. 1 

Rosso deposited the check from Finley with the First National 

Bank of Stigler, Oklahoma, which sent it through normal banking 

channels for collection. Continental Federal returned the check 

unpaid marked "refer to maker." On February 5, 1986, First 

National Bank sent the same check to Continental Federal by 

certified mail. 2 Continental Federal received it February 10 and 

returned it February 11. 

On appeal, Rosso argues that even though Continental Federal 

complied with the second phrase of§ 4-302 by returning the check 

prior to the bank's midnight deadline, it must be held accountable 

because it did not settle for it on the banking day of receipt. 

Rosso argues that § 4-302 contains two deadlines, both of which 

must be met in order for the bank to avoid being held accountable: 

1 Okla. Stat. tit. 12A, § 4-302 provides: 

In the absence of a valid defense such as breach of 

a presentment warranty .•• , settlement effected or the 

like, if an item is presented on and received by a payor 

bank the bank is accountable for the amount of 

(a) a demand item other than a documentary draft 

whether properly payable or not if the bank, in any case 

where it is not also the depositary bank, retains the 

item beyond midnight of the banking day of receipt 

without settling for it or, regardless of whether it is 

also the depositary bank, does not pay or return the 

item or sent notice of dishonor until after its midnight 

deadline. 

2 This is a valid method of presentment. 

12A, § 4-204(2)(a). 

See Okla. Stat. 

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tit. 

Appellate Case: 87-2876 Document: 01019975698 Date Filed: 08/14/1989 Page: 3 
the bank must settle3 for the item before midnight of the banking 

day of receipt 4 and it must pay, dishonor, or return the item 

before its midnight deadline. 5 

When interpreting a statute a court must "seek out and 

ascertain the legislative intent. Where the language of the 

statute is clear, plain and unambiguous, the duty of 

interpretation does not arise and rules designed to aid doubtful 

meanings do not come into play." Pueblo Aircraft Serv. Inc. v. 

City of Pueblo, 679 F.2d 805, 811 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 

459 U.S. 1126 (1983). 

Here the language is clear. The two phrases are separated by 

the word ''or." In the first phrase, the bank has the right to 

conditionally settle an item. This right is taken away in the 

second phrase, and the bank may only pay, dishonor, or return the 

item. We reject the idea that the legislature did not knowingly 

construct the phrases as they appear. If, as Rosso argues, the 

second phrase does something unintended to the first the 

legislature alone has the power to rewrite the statute. Joseph v. 

United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 554 F.2d 1140, 1155 (D.C. Cir. 

1977)("[W]e cannot rewrite the statute to compensate for 

3 Settle means ''to pay in cash, by clearing house settlement, 

in a charge or credit or by remittance, or otherwise as 

instructed. A settlement may be either provisional or final." 

Okla. Stat. tit. 12A, § 4-104(j). 

4 The banking day is defined as "that part of any day on which 

a bank is open to the public for carrying on substantially all of 

its banking functions." Okla. Stat. tit. 12A, § 4-104(c). 

5 The bank's midnight deadline is "midnight on its next banking 

day following the banking day on which it receives the relevant 

item or notice or from which the time for taking action commences 

to run, whichever is later." Okla. Stat. tit. 12A, § 4-104(h). 

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Appellate Case: 87-2876 Document: 01019975698 Date Filed: 08/14/1989 Page: 4 
unforeseen circumstances. That power belongs to the legislature 

alone"). Here the legislature clearly intended "or" to mean "or." 

We are well aware of the rule of statutory construction that the 

courts are not to interpret a statute in a manner to eliminate 

part of the statute. That does not happen here. The phrases are 

separate. Appellant is proceeding on the incorrect premise that 

the phrases are equivalent. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

Western District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED. 

The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Stephen H. Anderson 

Circuit Judge 

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Appellate Case: 87-2876 Document: 01019975698 Date Filed: 08/14/1989 Page: 5