Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-00985/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-00985-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PAUL RALPH KOVACICH,

Petitioner,

v.

M. E. SPEARMAN, Warden,

Respondent.

No. 2:13-cv-0985 KJM DAD P

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel with a petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges a judgment of conviction 

entered against him on January 27, 2009, in the Placer County Superior Court on charges of first 

degree murder with use of a firearm. He seeks federal habeas relief on the following grounds: 

(1) there was insufficient evidence introduced at his trial to support his conviction for murder 

with use of a firearm; (2) evidentiary rulings made by the trial court violated his right to due 

process; (3) prosecutorial misconduct violated his right to due process; (4) jury instruction error 

violated his right to due process; (5) incompetence and prejudicial behavior by law enforcement 

authorities violated his federal constitutional rights; (6) witness tampering by a federal law 

enforcement officer violated his federal constitutional rights; (7) his trial and appellate counsel 

rendered him ineffective assistance; (8) he was not advised of his constitutional rights at any of 

his police interrogations, in violation of the decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966);

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(9) the prosecutor’s suppression of evidence before the grand jury violated his federal 

constitutional rights; and (10) jury misconduct violated his right to a fair and impartial jury. 

Upon careful consideration of the record and the applicable law, the undersigned recommends 

that petitioner’s application for habeas corpus relief be denied.

I. Background

In its published memorandum and opinion affirming petitioner’s judgment of conviction 

on appeal, the California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District provided the following 

factual summary:

In 1982, Janet Kovacich disappeared after telling her husband that 

she was leaving him and taking their two young children with her. 

The husband, defendant Paul Ralph Kovacich, Jr., was controlling 

and abusive in the marriage; he admitted to cheating on her and was 

seen in the arms of another woman within two days of her 

disappearance; he played no active role in searching for her despite 

the fact that he was a trained dog handler with the Placer County 

Sheriff's Department; and he told his new girlfriend that his wife 

“wasn't coming back.” In 1995, a portion of Janet’s skull was 

discovered near Rollins Lake, a place defendant had experience 

patrolling. The skull, which was not determined to be Janet’s until 

2007, had a hole that was consistent with an entrance wound caused 

by a gunshot from a large caliber handgun, similar to the weapon 

defendant had been issued as a law enforcement officer.

More than 26 years after Janet’s disappearance, a jury convicted 

defendant of first degree murder and found that he personally used 

a firearm during the commission of the crime. The trial court 

sentenced defendant to state prison for an indeterminate term of 25 

years to life plus a consecutive determinate term of two years for 

the firearm enhancement.

On appeal, defendant raises several contentions challenging the

conviction: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the 

conviction; (2) the trial court committed reversible error by 

admitting out-of-court statements that Janet feared defendant; (3) 

the trial court committed reversible error by admitting out-of-court 

statements that defendant kicked the family dog to death; (4) the 

trial court prejudicially erred by allowing expert testimony on 

intimate partner abuse and the prosecution engaged in misconduct 

by eliciting certain responses from the expert that violated an in 

limine ruling; (5) defendant’s trial counsel rendered ineffective 

assistance by failing to proffer certain evidence purported to 

undermine the prosecution’s case; and (6) the trial court 

prejudicially erred by excluding evidence that the chief investigator 

harbored a bias against defendant and by refusing a requested 

instruction that would have highlighted the defense theory that the 

murder investigation was not conducted in good faith. We disagree 

with each contention and affirm the judgment.

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FACTS

The circumstantial nature of the evidence requires that we set forth 

the facts of this case in unusual detail. We do so in the light most 

favorable to the verdict, resolving all conflicts in its favor. (People 

v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206, 26 Cal. Rptr.2d 23, 864 P.2d 

103; People v. Vu (2006) 143 Cal. App.4th 1009, 1013, 49 Cal.

Rptr.3d 765.)

Background

Defendant and Janet were married in 1973. Janet’s parents, Leo 

and Jean Gregoire, did not approve of Janet's relationship with 

defendant and did not attend the wedding.1The marriage produced 

two children. Kristi was born in 1975. John was born in 1977. 

The family moved to Auburn in 1980.

Defendant worked as a sergeant in the Placer County Sheriff’s 

Department. He received a bachelor’s degree in police science, 

completed a master’s thesis entitled, “Case Study of the 

Development of a Police K–9 Unit,” and was certified as a dog 

handler by the Commission on Peace Officers Standards and 

Training. Janet was primarily responsible for raising the children 

and was a devoted and loving mother. As Joyce White–Janoski, 

one of her closest friends, recalled: “She had a very strong bond 

with [her children]. She was always hugging them. They would be 

sitting on her lap. She - her children were very important to her. 

She built her life around her children.” Janet’s older brother, Gary 

Gregoire, observed: “She loved her children, and that was very, 

very, very important to her. You can tell by the photos we just 

went through, Janet just loved the kids, and they were very - that 

was the most important thing in her life [was] her two children.” 

Glenda Shields, one of Janet’s neighbors, also recalled: “She was 

very caring, very devoted to her children, spent a lot of time playing 

with them, interacting with them.”

Marital Relationship

The relationship between defendant and Janet was marred by 

marital discord, including verbal and physical abuse. Defendant 

routinely called Janet “stupid shit” and spoke to her in a demeaning 

tone. He also criticized Janet’s physical appearance, particularly 

the size of her breasts, something she was “very self-conscious 

about.”

At times, defendant’s disparaging words turned into physical 

violence. On several occasions, Janet was observed with bruises on 

her arms. On one occasion, while White–Janoski was at their 

house, defendant hit Janet with a large metal utility chain. On 

another occasion, while boating at Rollins Lake, what began as a 

water fight ended with a welt on Janet’s leg as defendant threw 

 

1

 For simplicity, members of the Gregoire family will be referred to by their first names or by 

their relationship to Janet.

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handfuls of mud at her while she begged him to stop. On another 

boating trip, defendant’s close friend, Steven Kassis, cut his foot on 

some trash Janet had left on the boat; defendant responded by 

angrily shoving her into the water.

Defendant also exercised control over the marriage. According to 

defendant’s own account of the marriage, he “took the role of a 

parent” with respect to Janet. Janet confirmed that she felt as 

though defendant “treated her more like his daughter rather than his 

wife.” During the fall of 1979, Janet took a human sexuality course 

at Sierra College and confided in her instructor that defendant was 

“very demanding and controlling,” but that she was too afraid to 

leave him at that time because she thought defendant’s position in 

law enforcement would enable him to keep the children. According 

to Elaine Cunningham, one of Janet’s neighbors, Janet was “very 

nervous all the time,” particularly when defendant was on his way 

home because she “needed to be home when he came home.”

In 1980, Janet’s brother Gary took some leave time from his service 

in the Army to visit his parents. During the visit, Gary and Janet 

went out to lunch together. As they drove to the restaurant, 

defendant pulled them over in his patrol car. Janet was “very 

nervous” as defendant approached the car. When Gary asked why 

he had been pulled over, defendant responded that “he could pull 

[Gary] over when he wanted to,” and that if Gary disagreed, 

defendant could “find something wrong with the car” and write him 

a ticket. Gary did not argue with defendant, who walked back to 

his patrol car and waited for Gary to drive away. Gary and Janet 

continued to the restaurant, where Janet told her brother that she 

was “concerned” about her marriage to defendant and felt as though 

he monitored her movements.

In December 1981, Janet told Gary that “she didn’t feel like she 

loved [defendant] anymore, that the relationship was not what she 

wanted in her life.” She also said that she planned to leave 

defendant and was embarrassed by the fact that her family had 

warned her not to marry him. At the beginning of 1982, she told 

Gary that “she wished that she would have gone to school and 

gotten her degree and did things like that.” Around this time 

period, she also told one of her friends, Christine Milam, that she 

was “miserable” in her marriage, “afraid” of defendant, and that she 

“wanted to leave [him].” Milam witnessed firsthand defendant’s 

controlling and abusive behavior during a trip to the movie theater 

with Janet, Milam’s son, and Janet’s children. As Milam described: 

“[Defendant] followed [them] all the way to the movies, and he 

came barreling up in his truck behind [them]. He jumped out of the 

truck, grabbed ahold of [Janet], was screaming profanities at her.” 

Milam held her son and Janet’s children away from the 

confrontation while defendant dragged Janet a short distance. Janet 

was “[c]rying, upset, scared to death.”

Death of the Family Dog

Defendant’s abusive behavior extended to the family dog. He and 

Janet owned two German Shepherds, Adolph and Fuzz. Adolph 

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was defendant’s police dog and Fuzz was the family dog. In 

August 1982, about a month before Janet disappeared, Fuzz was 

taken to the veterinary clinic in critical condition. The dog died on 

the examination table, “reflexively gasping [for air] because its 

brain [was] deprived of oxygen and blood.” As defendant 

explained the events leading up to Fuzz’s death, the dog got into 

some garbage and defendant kicked the dog several times in order 

to discipline the animal. He admitted that he “went overboard,” but 

denied causing the dog’s death. He also admitted that Janet and the 

children witnessed the assault, as they had on numerous prior 

occasions.

Janet believed that Fuzz’s death was caused by the beating. In 

tears, she told her brother Gary about the dog’s death and explained 

that “she was starting to feel threatened at home, and she was 

worried for her safety, and she was worried for Kristi and John.” 

At a Placer County Deputy Sheriff’s Association barbeque, Janet 

cried as she told Gail Easter, the wife of another Placer County 

Sheriff’s Department sergeant, that defendant had kicked the dog to 

death and that she was “very frightened” of defendant. She also 

told Frances Myres and Glenda Shields, two of her neighbors, that 

defendant had kicked the dog to death. Myres described her 

demeanor as “very sad and very upset.” Shields described it as 

“hysterical, crying, extremely distraught.”

Janet's Decision to Leave Defendant

Janet decided to leave defendant shortly after Fuzz’s death. While 

she had left defendant twice before, this time her resolve appeared 

to be stronger. She enrolled in pre-nursing courses at Sierra 

College two days after the dog died. Janet also called a close 

friend, Kim Johnson, discussed her marital problems, asked how 

Johnson had ended her marriage, and asked for the name of 

Johnson’s divorce attorney. She then asked whether she could stay 

with Johnson, which left Johnson with the impression that she was 

“setting up a network of places she could go if she left [defendant].”

Janet also told her friend White - Janoski: “I’m finally going to 

leave [defendant]. I am really going to do it this time.” She 

explained that she wanted to leave because defendant was 

demeaning and abusive towards her, and that she also planned to 

take the children when she left. Janet talked about going back to 

school and sounded “more confident” and “more like her old self.” 

About the same time, Janet began researching the prospect of 

removing Kristi and John from their current school, St. Joseph’s 

Catholic School, and placing them in a different private school, 

Forest Lake Christian School.

About a week later, Janet called her brother Gary and informed him

that she planned to leave defendant, go back to school, and move 

herself and the children out of the house they shared with 

defendant. She also told Gary that she planned to change the 

children’s school. According to Gary, his sister sounded “more 

sure of herself” during this conversation.

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The Days Leading up to Janet’s Disappearance

In September 1982, six days before she disappeared, Janet had 

breast augmentation surgery. Janet was “bright and cheerful” and 

told the surgeon that she would be enrolling her children in a new 

school the following week, and would be going “back to college 

herself.” Following the procedure, she was informed that recovery 

would take at least six weeks, and that she should restrict the 

movement of her arms and refrain from driving. The next day, 

Janet returned to the surgeon for a follow-up appointment and 

seemed “pleased with the results.” Two days before she 

disappeared, Janet told a friend, Jeannette Baldwin, that she was 

“excited about going back to school” and also mentioned that she 

was transferring her children from St. Joseph's to Forest Lake, but 

“was anticipating a conflict” with defendant.

The day before Janet disappeared, which was the day after Labor 

Day and the first day of school at St. Joseph’, Janet spoke to Janice 

Reynolds-Gage, another parent at the school who had left an 

abusive relationship of her own. Janet shared that “she felt 

emotionally and mentally abused, that there was taunting going on 

in her relationship about her appearance,” that she “had some 

plastic surgery done and was going to have further plastic surgery 

done” because “she was feeling fairly low in self-esteem,” and that 

she was “frightened” of defendant and “considered filing a 

restraining order against [him].” That night, Janet spoke to her 

neighbor Myres on the phone and told her that she was “excited 

about going [to school], anxious to get going on it, and looking 

forward to a new phase in her life, a career, and the fun of going 

back to school and a career and making something important of 

herself.”

Meanwhile, during the early morning hours the day before Janet 

disappeared, defendant had finished his Labor Day shift patrolling 

the California State Fair and was attending a law enforcement party 

in celebration of “getting through the fair.” At the party, defendant 

was seen “embracing and kissing” another woman. This was not 

the first time defendant had ventured outside the marriage. 

Defendant himself admitted to having sexual encounters of the “one 

night stand” variety with other women.

Janet’s Disappearance

On September 8, 1982, the morning Janet disappeared, her children 

were picked up for school around 8:00 a.m. by Brenda Krch, one of 

Janet’s neighbors and participant in a multi-family carpool 

arrangement. Around 9:00 a.m., Janet called Forest Lake Christian 

School and told Marion Entz, the registrar, that she wanted to enroll 

her children in the school, but because of her recent surgery, she 

could not drive herself and would need to call back to schedule an 

appointment when she had secured a ride. About an hour later, 

Janet called back, told Entz that she had found a ride to the school, 

and scheduled an appointment for 11:10 a.m. Janet neither showed 

up for the appointment nor cancelled it. She was never seen again.

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According to defendant’s version of the morning’s events, told to 

homicide detectives a week later, after the children were picked up 

for school, Janet went upstairs to their master bedroom, where 

defendant was still in bed, and began to do her hair and makeup in 

the master bathroom. She then started yelling about her father 

“going out on [her] mother” and “drinking again.” Defendant told 

her to “give the guy a break,” and said, “he’s got cancer . . . . I’m 

sure he doesn’t have all that much longer to live.” He then got up 

and began to get ready for the day.

According to defendant, a short time later, Janet told defendant that 

she was “unhappy” with their marriage, but offered no specific 

grievances. Defendant, feeling “a little cocky” because “a couple 

girls looked at [him]” while he was at the State Fair, suggested that 

they get a divorce. As defendant explained, he wanted to “beat her 

to the punch and . . . mentally push her in a corner to see how 

serious” she was about leaving. After some “vague back and 

forth,” Janet agreed to a divorce and they calmly discussed property 

division, custody of the children, and visitation rights. After a 

pause in the discussion, Janet brought up changing the children’s 

school from St. Joseph’s to Forest Lake. Defendant nonchalantly 

agreed, “again pushing her in a corner.” Janet then made two 

phone calls to Forest Lake. After the first phone call, defendant 

offered to drive Janet to the school, but she refused explaining that 

she would get her own ride. She then called the school again and 

scheduled an appointment for 11:15 a.m. Defendant assumed that 

Janet’s mother would be taking her to the appointment and left to 

run some errands.

The next time defendant’s location was confirmed by a witness was 

after 11:30 a.m. at his gym. This was according to an aerobics 

instructor who testified that she saw him at the gym either before or 

after her two aerobics classes, which ran from 9:00 to 11:30 a.m.2

Defendant was then seen between 12:00 p.m. and 12:30 p.m., when 

he stopped by the jail to check his mailbox.

Around 3:00 p.m., Krch drove the children home from school and 

saw defendant outside washing his truck. Defendant asked: “Is 

Janet with you?” Then he said: “Oh, no. She wouldn’t be. That’s 

right. She’s with her mother.” Around 4:00 p.m., defendant called 

Forest Lake and angrily demanded: “Where’s my wife?” Entz 

explained that Janet never made it to the appointment. About the 

same time, defendant called their neighbor Myres and asked 

whether “she had seen Janet or seen anything like cars leaving the 

house.” Myres responded in the negative. Around 7:00 p.m., Entz 

called defendant to check on Janet. Defendant said: “I think she 

might be at her mother’s. She often goes there.” Around 8:00 p.m., 

defendant called Janet’s parents' house, and spoke to Janet's father. 

Janet was not there.

/////

 

2

 Because defendant’s own timeline of events places him at home prior to and during Janet’s two 

phone calls to Forest Lake, this would preclude him from being at the gym before 9:00 a.m.

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Janet’s mother worked as the vice principal at San Juan High 

School in Citrus Heights. The school’s principal testified that she 

was present at the school on September 8, 1982. He also explained 

that the first few weeks of school was a “very busy time” for 

administrators, requiring them to work “10, 11 hours each day 

trying to get the kids in classes, get them registered, get schedules 

out, talking to parents, just making all the adjustments in the 

schedule that have to occur.” That night, Janet’s mother also had a 

meeting with parents regarding the school’s new attendance policy.

The Days Following Janet’s Disappearance

On September 9, 1982, defendant went to work at the jail and 

calmly informed Sergeant Stephen Butts that his wife was missing. 

He stated that there was a “minor altercation” over changing the 

children’s school, that Janet “advised him that she was upset with 

her role in life,” and that “she wanted to separate.” In front of 

Butts, defendant called Janet’s mother on the phone, asked if she 

knew where Janet was, and told Butts that she was not with her 

mother. Defendant then told Butts that Janet was “depressed over 

her plastic surgery” and that “she may have committed suicide.” 

Despite this dire suggestion, defendant told Butts to “hold off on 

filing a report to see if he could locate her.”

If defendant was attempting to locate his wife, he kept it a secret 

from friends and neighbors. Aside from the handful of inquiries 

recounted above, defendant neither asked whether anyone had seen 

Janet nor asked for help finding her. When Reynolds-Gage found 

out that Janet was missing, she called defendant to see if there was 

anything she could do to help. He responded: “I don't need 

anything. We’ve got it covered.” However, despite being a trained 

dog handler, he never participated in the search that was conducted 

in the days following his wife’s disappearance.

Nor did defendant show concern for his wife during this time 

period. He missed no days of work following Janet’s disappearance 

and the children missed no days of school. The aerobics instructor 

who provided defendant with a partial alibi for the morning Janet 

disappeared spoke to him after learning of her disappearance and 

expressed her concern. Defendant responded: “Remember, I was 

here that day.” His demeanor was “cold” and “aloof,” showing “no 

apparent concern for his wife.” Defendant's friend Kassis also 

described his demeanor as “nonemotional” when talking about his 

wife. Defendant told Kassis that Janet “just left” and mentioned 

that he believed her parents had something to do with her 

disappearance. He also said that “he would make sure [her parents] 

never had access to their grandkids.” And six days after Janet 

disappeared, defendant had a document notarized that transferred 

custody of the children to defendant’s parents in the event that an 

accident or injury rendered him unable to properly care for them.

Initial Investigation

On September 11, 1982, three days after Janet disappeared, 

defendant called Sergeant Butts and calmly stated that he wanted to 

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file a missing persons report because Janet “still hadn't returned 

home” and defendant “believed that she had met with an accident 

due to her absence.” Butts called Janet’s mother, who was “upset” 

because her daughter was missing and she believed defendant “had 

done something to her.” Butts then contacted Chief Nicholas 

Willick and Detective Danny Boon with the Auburn Police 

Department and relayed the information to them.

The next day, Detective Boon interviewed Janet’s mother. As 

Boon described her demeanor: “Emotionally, she was very 

distraught, very - by the time the interview was over, I was nearly 

in tears myself. She was crying off and on. There were times when 

she was angry. It was a very, very - it was a very hard interview for 

her.” Janet’s father was also present for the interview. He was 

“somewhat quiet” but was also “nearly in tears at times.”

Later in the evening, Detective Boon spoke to defendant at the jail. 

In contrast to the demeanor of Janet’s parents, defendant was “very 

calm” and “very placid.” Defendant told Boon that he believed 

Janet’s mother might have hidden her from him. He also told Boon 

that the morning Janet disappeared, they had a “discussion about 

their marriage” and “some of the things they discussed were

divorce, property settlement, kids, and moving the kids from St. 

Joseph’s to Forest Lake.” Defendant explained that he agreed with 

everything Janet brought up because “he was playing head games 

with her.” He also told Boon that Janet had made two phone calls 

to Forest Lake that morning, one at 9:00 a.m. and another at 10:00 

a.m., and that he left the house to run errands after she refused his 

offer to drive her to Forest Lake. Defendant further told Boon that 

he assumed Janet was with her mother because when he called their 

house the night of her disappearance, Janet’s mother was not home 

either.

When Detective Boon asked whether defendant had noticed 

“anything unusual” about the condition of the house when he 

returned home, defendant responded that “he hadn’t looked that 

good” and offered Boon the keys to the house to conduct a search. 

Boon then performed a cursory search of defendant’s house to 

determine whether there were any signs of a struggle and found 

nothing out of the ordinary. He did find a woman’s watch and a 

two-ring wedding set next to the sink in the master bathroom. 

When he returned defendant’s keys and told him about the watch 

and wedding set, defendant seemed surprised and said he had not 

seen them.

The investigation continued September 13, 1982. Phone calls were 

made. The neighborhood was canvassed. Potential witnesses were 

interviewed. Detectives determined that there was no recent bank 

account activity and that Janet did not show up for her college 

classes. Local hotels and various modes of transportation were 

investigated, including rental car companies, the local taxi service, 

the bus depot, a private air service operating out of Auburn, and the 

Sacramento International Airport. No leads were uncovered. The 

media was also informed of Janet’s disappearance. The next day, 

detectives conducted forensic searches of defendant’s house, his 

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cabin in Cisco Grove, and his parents’ property in Lake of the 

Pines. His vehicles were also searched. Nothing useful was 

uncovered in these searches.

On September 15, 1982, defendant was formally interviewed by 

Detective Boon and Inspector Johnnie Smith from the Placer 

County Sheriff’s Department. Defendant provided the version of 

events recounted above, essentially that the morning Janet 

disappeared, they calmly discussed divorce, property division, child 

custody, and transferring the children to Forest Lake, that defendant 

agreed with everything Janet said as a psychological game, and that 

he left the house to run errands after she made two phone calls to 

Forest Lake and refused his offer to drive her to the school. He also 

provided his version of the dog-kicking incident and admitted to 

cheating on Janet.

Defendant further explained that the first two days Janet was 

missing, he believed she was with her mother. After that, he began 

to suspect suicide and was “really down.” But then, he “picked up 

a little bit” in the hope that she “just called a friend that [he was] 

not aware of, ah, and ah, ah, this might be a male, and just took 

off.” While defendant said that he did not suspect Janet of cheating 

on him, he then mentioned that “she goes out shopping a lot” and 

stated: “If she wanted to cheat on me, she could probably do it too 

and be so discreet about it, that I wouldn’t know about it.” Later in 

the interview, defendant stated that he believed Janet had 

previously tried to kill herself. He also said that he “wouldn't put it 

past” Janet’s mother to hide her from him and their children 

regardless of the psychological trauma that would cause the 

children.

Despite the fact the interview was conducted on Janet’s birthday, 

defendant never mentioned this to Detective Boon or Inspector 

Smith. Defendant was calm through most of the interview, raising 

his voice towards the end when he said to Smith: “I don’t want to 

play careers or education against education, but I bet I have more 

background and more, more - other ideas on, on law enforcement 

than you will ever have.” And at the close of the interview, 

defendant said to Smith: “I've heard a lot about you. This is going 

to be an interesting challenge.” At no point during the interview 

did defendant become “teary eyed or choked up or show any sign of 

emotion.”

Later in the day, Inspector Smith interviewed Janet’s parents. In 

contrast to defendant’s demeanor, they were “very emotional and 

upset over the disappearance of their daughter.”

The investigation continued in the following days and weeks. 

Extensive coordinated aerial and grid searches were conducted. As 

already mentioned, defendant was never seen searching for his 

wife. Throughout the investigation, Janet’s mother remained in 

communication with Chief Willick and Detective Boon, repeatedly 

checking on the status of the investigation. Defendant may have 

called once. Janet’s mother also expressed concern about the 

objectivity of the investigation because defendant was a law 

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enforcement officer, prompting Boon to contact several other law 

enforcement agencies to review the case, including the Sacramento 

Police and Sheriff's Departments and the California Department of 

Justice.

Chief Willick also contacted Detective Michael Davinroy from the 

Fullerton Police Department to assist in the investigation. Davinroy 

interviewed defendant on November 23, 1982. This interview 

became heated. Defendant stated that he felt “cheated” that the 

detectives did not talk to the aerobics instructor at the gym about 

his alibi until he “started bitching” about it to Inspector Smith 

several days after Janet disappeared. He also said that he believed 

Janet’s mother paid her to disappear and further stated: “I think 

she’s out there, and I think she’s having a hell of a time.”

In February 1983, defendant began a serious relationship with C.K. 

Martin, who also worked at the Placer County Jail. The 

relationship lasted about five months and included Martin moving 

into defendant’s house. When they first started dating, defendant 

told Martin that he did not know what happened to Janet. Later in 

the relationship, he said that she “left with someone else.” At some 

point, Martin told defendant that she was not comfortable sleeping 

on the same mattress that he slept on with Janet for so many years 

and suggested that he get a new mattress. Defendant responded that 

“he didn’t need to get a new mattress; that she wouldn’t be sleeping 

on it anymore. She wasn’t coming back.” During the time Martin 

lived at the house, defendant discouraged the children from talking 

about their mother in front of her. And on one occasion, when John 

cried about his mother’s absence, defendant told him that “big boys 

don’t cry.” Martin never saw defendant show sadness over his 

wife’s absence. Nor did she see him attempt to locate her. 

Defendant also prevented Janet’s parents from seeing their 

grandchildren.

Around this time period, the Department of Justice assigned an 

agent, Kenneth O’Farrell, to assist in the investigation. O’Farrell 

conducted follow-up interviews with a number of individuals, 

including defendant. Defendant again claimed that Janet’s mother 

was responsible for her disappearance, this time adding that her 

mother was also missing for the first two days. However, as 

already mentioned, the morning after Janet disappeared, defendant 

called Janet’s mother on the phone in front of Sergeant Butts, who 

testified that defendant asked if she knew where Janet was, and then 

said that Janet was not with her. When defendant remembered this 

during the interview, he revised his claim that Janet’s mother was 

missing for two days, but maintained that she was not home when 

he called their house the night of Janet’s disappearance. Defendant 

also repeated his claim that Janet’s mother had offered to pay her to 

leave him.

By the middle of 1983, the investigation was still ongoing, but was 

no longer investigated on a day-to-day basis. Janet’s mother 

continued to call seeking information on the case. Eventually, all of 

the leads dried up, and the investigation was terminated. When 

Agent O’Farrell informed Janet’s mother that they were ending the 

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investigation, she “started sobbing uncontrollably” and “begged 

[him] not to shut the investigation down.”

Discovery of the Skull at Rollins Lake

In 1995, the cranial portion of Janet’s skull was found near Rollins 

Lake, about 18 miles north of Auburn, protruding from the mud at 

the bottom of a recently-drained pond. The cranium, which was not 

determined to be Janet’s until 2007, had an unnatural hole 

measuring .65 of an inch in diameter. According to the testimony 

of two forensic anthropologists, the hole in Janet’s skull was 

inflicted at or about the time of death and was consistent with a 

gunshot wound from a large caliber handgun.

Defendant’s field training with the Sheriff’s Department made him 

familiar with the roads and area surrounding Rollins Lake. He was 

issued a Smith and Wesson .357–Magnum revolver as part of his 

service equipment.

People v. Kovacich, 201 Cal.App.4th 863, 867-879 (2011).3

/////

 

3

 In his traverse, petitioner challenges much of the factual background set forth in the California 

Court of Appeal’s opinion affirming his conviction. Petitioner points to trial testimony and police 

interview responses in an attempt to contradict some of the facts related by the Court of Appeal. 

He also expresses his disagreement with some of the trial testimony and argues that it was not 

based on sufficient information. Petitioner points to other trial testimony which reflects more 

favorably on him and his relationship with Janet Kovacich (Janet) than the facts contained in the 

state appellate court’s opinion. Petitioner informs this court about additional facts in order to 

attempt to explain, to his advantage, some of the facts contained in the state court’s opinion 

and/or to suggest alternative reasons for Janet’s disappearance. Petitioner also blames chief 

police investigator Jerry Johnson for some of these alleged factual inaccuracies, arguing that 

Johnson coached witnesses and fabricated reports. (See ECF No. 30 at 1-44.) A number of 

petitioner’s challenges to the facts set forth in the California Court of Appeal’s opinion are 

contained in his habeas claims, which are discussed below. Under the AEDPA, “[f]actual 

determinations by state courts are presumed correct absent clear and convincing evidence to the 

contrary, § 2254(e)(1), and a decision adjudicated on the merits in a state court and based on a 

factual determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable 

in light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding, § 2254(d)(2).” Miller-El v. 

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). See also Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 972 (9th Cir. 

2004); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), a habeas petitioner “shall 

have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 

This court has reviewed all of the factual “corrections” petitioner seeks in his traverse. The 

undersigned concludes that the decision of the California Court of Appeal affirming petitioner’s 

judgment of conviction was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts of this case 

in light of the evidence presented at trial. In addition, petitioner has failed to show by clear and 

convincing evidence that any of the material facts set forth in the opinion of the California Court 

of Appeal affirming his conviction are objectively unreasonable. 

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After the California Court of Appeal affirmed his judgment of conviction, petitioner filed 

a petition for review in the California Supreme Court. (Resp’t’s Lod. Doc. 41.) Therein, he 

challenged the Court of Appeal’s rulings with regard to the admission of evidence regarding the 

dog kicking incident as well as the admission of expert witness testimony regarding the behavior 

and reactions of victims of domestic violence. The Supreme Court summarily denied that petition 

for review by order dated March 14, 2012. (Resp’t’s Lod. Doc. 42.) Petitioner subsequently filed 

a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court. (Resp’t’s Lod. Doc. 43.) 

That petition was summarily denied by order dated September 24, 2014. (Id.) 

Petitioner filed his federal habeas petition in this court on May 20, 2013. 

II. Standards of Review Applicable to Habeas Corpus Claims

An application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody under a judgment of a 

state court can be granted only for violations of the Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(a). A federal writ is not available for alleged error in the interpretation or 

application of state law. See Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1, 5 (2010); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 

U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000).

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) sets forth the following standards for granting federal habeas 

corpus relief:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be 

granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits 

in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim -

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the 

State court proceeding.

For purposes of applying § 2254(d)(1), “clearly established federal law” consists of 

holdings of the United States Supreme Court at the time of the last reasoned state court decision. 

Greene v. Fisher, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 132 S. Ct. 38, 44 (2011); Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 

859 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)). Circuit court 

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precedent “may be persuasive in determining what law is clearly established and whether a state 

court applied that law unreasonably.” Stanley, 633 F.3d at 859 (quoting Maxwell v. Roe, 606 

F.3d 561, 567 (9th Cir. 2010)). However, circuit precedent may not be “used to refine or sharpen 

a general principle of Supreme Court jurisprudence into a specific legal rule that th[e] [Supreme] 

Court has not announced.” Marshall v. Rodgers, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 133 S. Ct. 1446, 1450 (2013) 

(citing Parker v. Matthews, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 132 S. Ct. 2148, 2155 (2012)). Nor may it be 

used to “determine whether a particular rule of law is so widely accepted among the Federal 

Circuits that it would, if presented to th[e] [Supreme] Court, be accepted as correct. Id. Further, 

where courts of appeals have diverged in their treatment of an issue, it cannot be said that there is 

“clearly established Federal law” governing that issue. Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 

(2006).

A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if it applies a rule 

contradicting a holding of the Supreme Court or reaches a result different from Supreme Court 

precedent on “materially indistinguishable” facts. Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 640 (2003). 

Under the “unreasonable application” clause of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court may grant the 

writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s 

decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case. Lockyer v. 

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003); Williams, 529 U.S. at 413; Chia v. Cambra, 360 F.3d 997, 1002 

(9th Cir. 2004). A federal habeas court “may not issue the writ simply because that court 

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly 

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be 

unreasonable.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. See also Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 

(2007); Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75 (it is “not enough that a federal habeas court, in its independent 

review of the legal question, is left with a ‘firm conviction’ that the state court was ‘erroneous.’”) 

“A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 

‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. 

Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). 

Accordingly, “[a]s a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner 

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must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so 

lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law 

beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 103. 

If the state court’s decision does not meet the criteria set forth in § 2254(d), a reviewing 

court must conduct a de novo review of a habeas petitioner’s claims. Delgadillo v. Woodford, 

527 F.3d 919, 925 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 735 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(en banc) (“[I]t is now clear both that we may not grant habeas relief simply because of § 

2254(d)(1) error and that, if there is such error, we must decide the habeas petition by considering 

de novo the constitutional issues raised.”). 

The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state court 

judgment. Stanley, 633 F.3d at 859; Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). 

If the last reasoned state court decision adopts or substantially incorporates the reasoning from a

previous state court decision, this court may consider both decisions to ascertain the reasoning of 

the last decision. Edwards v. Lamarque, 475 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). “When a 

federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it may be 

presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication 

or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 99. This presumption 

may be overcome by a showing “there is reason to think some other explanation for the state 

court’s decision is more likely.” Id. at 99-100 (citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 

(1991)). Similarly, when a state court decision on a petitioner’s claims rejects some claims but 

does not expressly address a federal claim, a federal habeas court must presume, subject to 

rebuttal, that the federal claim was adjudicated on the merits. Johnson v. Williams, ___ U.S. ___, 

___, 133 S. Ct. 1088, 1091 (2013). 

Where the state court reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to 

support its conclusion, a federal habeas court independently reviews the record to determine 

whether habeas corpus relief is available under § 2254(d). Stanley, 633 F.3d at 860; Himes v.

Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). “Independent review of the record is not de novo 

review of the constitutional issue, but rather, the only method by which we can determine whether 

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a silent state court decision is objectively unreasonable.” Himes, 336 F.3d at 853. Where no 

reasoned decision is available, the habeas petitioner still has the burden of “showing there was no 

reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 98. 

A summary denial is presumed to be a denial on the merits of the petitioner’s claims. 

Stancle v. Clay, 692 F.3d 948, 957 & n. 3 (9th Cir. 2012). While the federal court cannot analyze 

just what the state court did when it issued a summary denial, the federal court must review the 

state court record to determine whether there was any “reasonable basis for the state court to deny 

relief.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 98. This court “must determine what arguments or theories . . . could 

have supported, the state court’s decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded 

jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior 

decision of [the Supreme] Court.” 562 U.S. at 102. The petitioner bears “the burden to 

demonstrate that ‘there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.’” Walker v. 

Martel, 709 F.3d 925, 939 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 98). 

When it is clear, however, that a state court has not reached the merits of a petitioner’s 

claim, the deferential standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) does not apply and a federal 

habeas court must review the claim de novo. Stanley, 633 F.3d at 860; Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 

F.3d 1099, 1109 (9th Cir. 2006); Nulph v. Cook, 333 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2003).

III. Petitioner’s Claims

A. Insufficient Evidence

In his first ground for federal habeas relief, petitioner claims that the evidence introduced 

at his trial was insufficient to support the imposition of the sentencing enhancement against him 

for use of a firearm because there was inadequate proof that Janet died from a gunshot wound. 

(ECF No. 1 at 5-6.)4 In a related argument, petitioner contends that the lack of proof supporting 

the firearm use enhancement also “eliminates the murder conviction.” (Id.) Petitioner notes that 

two expert witnesses called by the defense testified that it was impossible to conclude whether the 

 

4

 Citations to the habeas petition in these findings and recommendations are to the page numbers 

assigned by petitioner in his petition and not to the page numbers contained on the court’s 

CM/ECF system.

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fracture on the skull remnant found at Rollins Lake was caused by a bullet or by something else 

that occurred either before or after Janet’s death. (Id.) 

1. State Court Decision

The California Court of Appeal rejected this insufficient evidence claim by petitioner as 

well as the arguments upon which it was based. The state appellate court reasoned as follows:

Defendant contends that we must reverse the firearm enhancement 

because the evidence was insufficient to establish beyond a 

reasonable doubt that Janet’s death was caused by a firearm. He 

further asserts that, because of this, the evidence was also 

insufficient to support his murder conviction. We disagree.

“‘To determine the sufficiency of the evidence to support a 

conviction, an appellate court reviews the entire record in the light 

most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether it contains 

evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value, from which 

a rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Wallace (2008) 44 

Cal.4th 1032, 1077, 81 Cal. Rptr.3d 651, 189 P.3d 911; Jackson v. 

Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 317–320, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 

560, 572–574.) The standard of review is the same in cases in 

which the prosecution relies on circumstantial evidence. (People v. 

Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 66, 132 Cal. Rptr.2d 271, 65 P.3d 749.) 

“‘Although it is the duty of the jury to acquit a defendant if it finds 

that circumstantial evidence is susceptible of two interpretations, 

one of which suggests guilt and the other innocence [citations], it is 

the jury, not the appellate court which must be convinced of the 

defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” (People v. Stanley

(1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 792–793, 42 Cal. Rptr.2d 543, 897 P.2d 

481.) Accordingly, we must affirm the judgment if the 

circumstances reasonably justify the jury’s finding of guilt 

regardless of whether we believe the circumstances might also 

reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding. (People v. 

Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489, 514, 7 Cal. Rptr.2d 199, 828 P.2d 

101; People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 11, 82 Cal. Rptr.2d 

413, 971 P.2d 618.)

Because defendant’s attack on the sufficiency of the evidence is 

focused on the forensic evidence, we begin by discussing that 

evidence.

Dr. Steven Symes, professor of forensic anthropology at 

Mercyhurst College in Erie, Pennsylvania, testified that the hole in 

the cranium recovered from Rollins Lake was consistent with a 

gunshot wound from a large caliber handgun. He explained that 

there is a difference between ballistic (high velocity) and blunt 

force (low velocity) trauma, and that bone responds differently to 

the two forms of impact. With a blunt force impact, the bone will 

bend and fail in plastic deformation, essentially caving in. With a 

ballistic impact, the higher velocity causes the bone to act more like 

glass, creating a “plug and spall”; the outside of the bone will have 

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a fairly uniform hole where the bone is punched through, causing a 

shock wave that creates a cone-shaped bevel on the inside of the 

bone.

Dr. Symes explained that the hole in Janet’s cranium exhibited the 

characteristics of a ballistic impact, particularly the beveling of the 

bone, a radiating fracture extending from the hole to a natural 

cranial suture, and the separation of the suture as the energy from 

the impact traveled along the fracture line and through the suture. 

The presence of a radiopaque particle embedded in the petrous 

portion of the temporal bone also contributed to Dr. Symes’s 

conclusion that the hole was caused by a ballistic impact. The size 

of the hole, coupled with the fact that the radiating fracture 

followed some of the middle meningeal arteries that extend along 

the inside of the skull, but then turned away from these arteries, 

indicated to Dr. Symes that the hole was likely caused by a large 

caliber lower velocity handgun as opposed to a higher velocity 

weapon.

Dr. Patrick Willey, professor of forensic anthropology at Chico 

State University, also testified that the hole in the Rollins Lake 

cranium was consistent with a gunshot wound. This conclusion 

was also based on the beveling of the bone, the radiating fracture, 

and the radiopaque particle embedded in the bone.

Defendant argues that we must reverse the firearm enhancement 

because this forensic evidence “clearly was consistent with two 

reasonable conclusions: that the defect was attributable to a 

gunshot and that it was due to an agency other than a firearm.” He 

posits that since the cranium had been in the mud near Rollins Lake 

for many years, and since Rollins Lake is a well-frequented 

camping ground, “it certainly was very possible that Janet’s skull, 

which indisputably had been broken in pieces by taphonomic 

forces, had been struck by some sharp digging instrument during 

that time.” We are not persuaded.

While, as defendant points out, Dr. Willey admitted to having never 

seen a pickax injury, he also explained that “if it were a pickax, it's 

going to have some of the properties of blunt force, so instead of 

that beveling and radiating fractures, I think it's going to be a 

penetrating wound . . . . [¶] And my bet would be that it’s going to 

show some of the properties we typically associate with blunt force, 

kind of the caving in of the wound, and we don’t get that with the 

Rollins Lake [cranium].” Dr. Symes, who had seen pickax injuries 

in his career, confirmed that a pickax causes blunt force trauma: “It 

may have a sharp end on it. It could be sharp, but it turns into blunt 

trauma and is a penetrating wound. It could be [the] size of a bullet 

hole, but we know it is [moving more slowly], so you’re going to

see reduced energy.” While a pickax could create a round hole and 

radiating fracture, because the tool expands, it typically creates 

“microfractures around the entrance where it is crushing more.” 

And because of the reduced energy, a pickax injury would not 

create pressure in the skull, and therefore would not create beveling 

on the inside of the bone and separation of the natural sutures.

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Drs. Willey and Symes also testified that the hole in Janet’s 

cranium was sustained at or about the time of death, and was 

inconsistent with an injury occurring long after death, because the 

beveling and radiating fracture would have required the bone to 

possess a certain amount of elasticity. Thus, defendant’s theory 

that Janet’s cranium could have been struck by a camper’s pickax 

following her death would require that camper to have struck the 

cranium with the sharp point of the pickax with enough velocity to 

cause ballistic trauma, while pulling the instrument back before the 

expanded portion of the pickax could crush the edges of the hole. 

Because this injury was inflicted close to the time of death, this 

camper either did not notice striking a decomposing corpse with his 

pickax or chose not to call the police to report that he had found and 

accidentally mutilated a dead body. While Dr. Willey 

acknowledged that “almost anything is possible,” the jury was more 

than justified in concluding that this possibility was not reasonable.

Nor are we persuaded by defendant’s reliance on People v. Allen

(1985) 165 Cal. App.3d 616, 211 Cal. Rptr. 837 (Allen). There, 

two defendants, Allen and Brewer, entered Ainsworth’s house for 

the purpose of executing him and eliminating any witnesses to that 

execution. Two such witnesses, Ainsworth’s wife and cousin, 

survived the encounter. Based on their testimony, Allen and 

Brewer entered the kitchen with Ainsworth. Two shots were fired. 

Allen then entered the bedroom and shot the wife once. Brewer 

shot her several more times after she crawled into the closet to hide. 

Allen fired a final shot at the cousin, who was hiding behind the 

couch; this shot missed, and both defendants left the house. 

Ainsworth died of two gunshot wounds to the head and chest. (Id.

at pp. 621–622, 211 Cal. Rptr. 837.) Allen and Brewer were 

convicted of the first degree murder of Ainsworth and the attempted 

murders of the wife and cousin; each was found to have personally 

used a firearm during the commission of the crimes. (Id. at pp. 

620–621, 211 Cal. Rptr. 837.)

The Court of Appeal reversed the personal-use firearm 

enhancement with respect to the murder count: “Since two .32 

caliber cartridges were found on the kitchen floor, the evidence 

suggested that both of [Ainsworth’s] wounds were inflicted by the 

same gun. Whether that gun was used by Allen, as opposed to 

Brewer, is purely a matter of conjecture. The state had the burden 

of establishing Allen’s personal use beyond a reasonable doubt. 

[Citation.] Since the evidence of what happened in the kitchen 

proved at most a 50 percent probability that he was the user, the 

state’s burden was not met: ‘We ... have a case belonging to that 

class of cases where proven facts give[ ] equal support to each of 

two inconsistent inferences; in which event, neither of them being 

established, judgment, as a matter of law, must go against the party 

upon whom rests the necessity of sustaining one of these inferences 

as against the other . . . . [Citation.]’” (Allen, supra, 165 Cal.

App.3d at p. 626, 211 Cal. Rptr. 837, citing Pennsylvania R. Co. v. 

Chamberlain (1933) 288 U.S. 333, 339, 53 S. Ct. 391, 77 L.Ed. 

819, 823.)

/////

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Defendant misconstrues Allen, supra, 165 Cal. App.3d 616, 211 

Cal. Rptr. 837, to hold that the People must eliminate the 

“possibility” that someone other than defendant is the shooter in 

order for a personal-use firearm enhancement to stand. He then 

argues that because the forensic anthropologists in this case could 

not “absolutely eliminate” every other potential cause of the hole in 

Janet’s cranium, the People did not eliminate the possibility that she 

died from something other than a firearm. Because of this, argues 

defendant, we must reverse. This argument fails for two reasons. 

First, Allen does not require the People to eliminate the possibility 

that someone other than defendant was the shooter or that the 

deceased’s death was caused by something other than a firearm. 

The case merely holds that where the facts supporting two 

inconsistent inferences stand in equipoise, judgment must go 

against the party with whom the burden of sustaining one of the 

inferences resides.

Second, what an anthropologist can conclude from a forensic 

examination of bone is more limited than what a reasonable jury 

may find beyond a reasonable doubt after considering the evidence 

as a whole. (See People v. Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489, 515, 7 

Cal. Rptr.2d 199, 828 P.2d 101.) The fact that Janet vanished about 

an hour before she was scheduled to appear at Forest Lake, left 

behind her children and personal belongings, never contacted her 

friends and family, never withdrew any money from her back 

account, and failed to show up for her college courses, all create a 

reasonable inference that she was killed the morning she 

disappeared. (See People v. Ruiz (1988) 44 Cal.3d 589, 610–611, 

244 Cal. Rptr. 200, 749 P.2d 854; People v. Johnson (1991) 233 

Cal. App.3d 425, 442, 284 Cal. Rptr. 579.) The prosecution also 

provided the jury with substantial evidence indicating that Janet 

was not suicidal and would not have abandoned her children. 

Instead, she was looking forward to getting herself and her children 

away from defendant, going back to school, and “making 

something important of herself.”

Defendant’s relationship with Janet was filled with antagonism and 

enmity, including verbal and physical abuse and two prior 

separations. He was alone with her the morning she disappeared, 

and by his own admission, they had a “minor altercation” after 

Janet told him she was leaving. This was highly probative of 

defendant’s motive to kill her, and thus his identity as the killer. 

(See People v. Cartier (1960) 54 Cal.2d 300, 311, 5 Cal. Rptr. 573, 

353 P.2d 53; People v. De Moss (1935) 4 Cal.2d 469, 473, 50 P.2d 

1031.) Defendant also admitted to cheating on Janet before her 

disappearance, which was also probative of motive to kill. (See

People v. Gosden (1936) 6 Cal.2d 14, 25, 56 P.2d 211; People v. 

Houston (2005) 130 Cal. App.4th 279, 307, 29 Cal. Rptr.3d 818.)

From the testimony of Drs. Symes and Willey, the jury could 

reasonably have concluded that Janet died from a gunshot wound to 

the head from a large caliber handgun. Defendant happened to 

possess such a handgun. He also admitted to offering to give Janet 

a ride to Forest Lake the morning she disappeared, stating that he 

nonchalantly agreed with everything she said in order to play “head 

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games” with her. Based on these statements, and the history of 

abuse in the marriage, the jury was justified in concluding that 

defendant’s mild reaction to the news of her imminent departure 

was not genuine. And based on Janet’s second phone call to Forest 

Lake, in which she confirmed that she had secured a ride and 

scheduled an appointment for 11:10 a.m., the jury could reasonably 

have concluded that she accepted defendant’s offer to drive her to 

the school. Indeed, Janet’s surgery precluded her from driving 

herself, her mother was at San Juan High School all day, and she 

asked no one else for a ride.

Defendant’s location was not confirmed by a witness until after 

11:30 a.m., which gave him plenty of time to drive Janet to Rollins 

Lake, an area he was familiar with, shoot her in the head with a 

large caliber handgun, which he had access to, and return to Auburn 

to make an appearance at the gym. Thus, defendant not only had a 

strong motive to kill Janet, but also had the opportunity to have 

done so. Defendant’s demeanor and actions following Janet’s 

disappearance also were consistent with the jury’s conclusion that 

he killed her. He was “cold” and “aloof.” He did not bother to look 

for her despite his training as a dog handler. He began a serious 

relationship within months of her disappearance and told his new 

girlfriend that Janet “wasn’t coming back.”

Based on all of the circumstantial evidence in this case, the jury 

could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant 

murdered his wife, and that he did so by use of a firearm.

Kovacich, 201 Cal. App.4th at 879-884.

2. Applicable Legal Standards

The Due Process Clause “protects the accused against conviction except upon proof 

beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is 

charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). There is sufficient evidence to support a 

conviction if, “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any 

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). If the evidence supports conflicting 

inferences, the reviewing court must presume “that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in 

favor of the prosecution,” and the court must “defer to that resolution.” Id. at 326. See also Juan 

H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1274, 1275 & n. 13 (9th Cir.2005). “[T]he dispositive question under 

Jackson is ‘whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt.’” Chein v. Shumsky, 373 F.3d 978, 982 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Jackson, 443 

U.S. at 318). Put another way, “a reviewing court may set aside the jury’s verdict on the ground 

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of insufficient evidence only if no rational trier of fact could have agreed with the jury.” Cavazos 

v. Smith, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 132 S. Ct. 2, 4 (2011).

In conducting federal habeas review of a claim of insufficiency of the evidence, “all 

evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution.” Ngo v. Giurbino, 

651 F.3d 1112, 1115 (9th Cir. 2011). “Jackson leaves juries broad discretion in deciding what 

inferences to draw from the evidence presented at trial,” and it requires only that they draw 

“‘reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.’” Coleman v. Johnson,___ U.S. ___, 

___, 132 S. Ct. 2060, 2064 (2012) (citation omitted). “‘Circumstantial evidence and inferences 

drawn from it may be sufficient to sustain a conviction.’” Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1358 

(9th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).5

“A petitioner for a federal writ of habeas corpus faces a heavy burden when challenging 

the sufficiency of the evidence used to obtain a state conviction on federal due process grounds.” 

Juan H., 408 F.3d at 1274. In order to grant relief, the federal habeas court must find that the 

decision of the state court rejecting an insufficiency of the evidence claim reflected an objectively 

unreasonable application of the decisions in Jackson and Winship to the facts of the case. Ngo, 

651 F.3d at 1115; Juan H., 408 F.3d at 1275 & n.13. Thus, when a federal habeas court assesses a 

sufficiency of the evidence challenge to a state court conviction under AEDPA, “there is a double 

dose of deference that can rarely be surmounted.” Boyer v. Belleque, 659 F.3d 957, 964 (9th Cir. 

2011). See also Kyzar v. Ryan, 780 F.3d 940, 948-49 (9th Cir. 2015) (same); Long v. Johnson, 

736 F.3d 891, 896 (9th Cir. 2013) (same).

3. Analysis

The decision of the California Court of Appeal that the evidence introduced at petitioner’s 

trial was sufficient to support imposition of the gun use sentencing enhancement, and therefore 

petitioner’s murder conviction, was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of the 

decisions in Jackson and In re Winship to the facts of this case. Smith, 132 S. Ct. at 4. Viewing 

 

5

 The federal habeas court determines sufficiency of the evidence in reference to the substantive 

elements of the criminal offense as defined by state law. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n.16; Chein, 

373 F.3d at 983.

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the evidence admitted at petitioner’s trial as a whole and in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, a rational juror could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner killed his 

wife with a handgun. This is true even though the evidence introduced at petitioner’s trial could 

also have supported a jury finding that the hole in Janet’s skull was caused by something other 

than a bullet. Notwithstanding the defense evidence suggesting a different possible explanation, 

for the reasons expressed by the California Court of Appeal there was sufficient evidence to 

support the jury’s verdict in this case. Here, the jury decided what inferences to draw from the 

evidence presented at trial and petitioner has not met his heavy burden of establishing that no 

rational trier of fact could have agreed with the jury’s finding in this case. Accordingly, 

petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his claim of insufficiency of the evidence.

B. Trial Court’s Erroneous Admission of Evidence 

Petitioner raises two claims challenging the trial court’s evidentiary rulings at his trial. 

The court will address these two claims in turn below.

1. Dog Kicking Incident

Petitioner claims that the trial court committed “reversible error” in admitting “extensive 

disputed tainted” evidence, including Janet’s statements about the dog kicking incident. (ECF 

No. 1 at 8.) He argues there was no evidence introduced at his trial that he ever abused his own 

or any other police dog. (Id.)

6

 

The California Court of Appeal set forth the background to this claim as follows:

The People presented evidence relating to the dog-kicking incident 

in several forms: (1) Janet’s statements that defendant had kicked 

the dog to death, which were not offered for their truth, but rather as 

circumstantial evidence of her state of mind; (2) defendant’s 

statements to detectives in which he admitted to kicking the dog as 

a form of discipline, but denied causing the animal’s death; (3) 

 

6

 Petitioner also argues that a “media blitz” about Janet’s murder and the killing of the family 

dog was spearheaded by Jerry Johnson, a reserve officer for the Auburn Police Department, who 

had a “limited and biased investigative mentality.” (Id. at 9.) Petitioner provides numerous 

examples of events and trial testimony that he believes demonstrate Officer Johnson’s bias 

against him and the improper nature of the police investigation into Janet’s disappearance. (Id. at 

9-13.) Petitioner’s complaints about Officer Johnson, which run throughout his petition, will be 

addressed later in these findings and recommendations in connection with several of petitioner’s 

other habeas claims.

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testimony from the veterinarian, Dr. Jan Hershenhouse, in which 

she described the dog’s death, stated that she saw no signs of 

external trauma, but also stated that an autopsy had not been 

performed and that she could not rule out that the animal died from

being kicked; and (4) testimony from Dr. Symes in which he 

explained that he had examined the dog’s bones in 2005 and found 

no indication of blunt force trauma, but because the bones had 

deteriorated significantly while in the ground, he could not express

an opinion as to the cause of death.7

Defendant moved in limine to exclude all reference to Janet’s claim 

that defendant was responsible for the death of the family dog. He 

argued that her statements regarding the matter were “not 

trustworthy” and “appear[ed] to be a way by the prosecution to 

introduce proscribed character evidence barred under [section] 

1101.” He also asked the trial court to exclude the portions of his 

statements to police in which he admitted to kicking the dog.

The trial court denied the motion, explaining that Janet’s statements 

that she feared defendant because she witnessed him violently 

assault the dog would be admitted pursuant to section 1250 and as 

circumstantial evidence of her state of mind. The trial court found 

her statements to be trustworthy because defendant admitted to 

kicking the dog. While defendant also denied causing the dog’s 

death, the trial court explained: “Whether the defendant actually 

killed the dog is not relevant in the court[’]s view. What is relevant 

is how [Janet] would have reacted to witnessing the assault and 

whether it was the catalyst for her to decide to leave her husband on 

the morning of September 8th.” The trial court also found the 

evidence to be admissible under section 352 because “defendant’s 

assault on the dog was relatively close in time to [Janet’s] 

disappearance and thus highly probative of her fear and decision to 

terminate the relationship. Thus, the probative value is not 

substantially outweighed by the risk [of] undue prejudice to the 

defendant.”

Kovacich, 201 Cal. App.4th at 890-891.

/////

 

7

 Defendant also presented evidence relating to the dog-kicking incident. He elicited testimony 

from defense expert and veterinary pathologist, Dr. William Spangler, in which the doctor stated 

that he did not believe the dog died from acute trauma, and that multiple fractures in the dog’s 

bones were likely caused by the weight of the soil on the animal’s body after it was buried. He 

also elicited testimony from Detective Boon, in which the detective explained that he was told by 

another officer that Kristi had said that defendant kicked the dog like a soccer ball and threw the 

animal around. Finally, he elicited testimony from Kristi, in which she denied observing her 

father abuse the dog and also stated that she did not remember telling the investigating officers 

anything about his treatment of the animal. Of course, defendant cannot complain that testimony 

he elicited was admitted into evidence. (People v. Williams (2009) 170 Cal. App.4th 587, 620, 

88 Cal. Rptr.3d 401 [challenged testimony was elicited by defendant's counsel; “any error was 

invited, and defendant may not challenge that error on appeal”].)

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The California Court of Appeal concluded that Janet’s statements about the dog kicking 

incident were properly admitted under California law as circumstantial evidence of her state of 

mind. Id. at 891. The court also agreed with the trial court that Janet’s statements were properly 

admitted under Cal. Evidence Code § 352. Id. at 892. The court reasoned that Janet’s statements 

were “highly probative of her fear of defendant, both for herself and for her children, shortly 

before she disappeared,” and that the probative value of the evidence was not outweighed by its 

prejudicial effect because “it was not unreasonable for the trial court to conclude that the jury 

would be able to use the statement solely as evidence of Janet’s state of mind.” Id. The state 

appellate court also concluded that petitioner’s own statements about kicking the dog were 

admissible under the California hearsay rules and did not constitute improper character evidence. 

Id. at 892-93. 

The court reasoned as follows:

The trial court properly admitted Janet’s statements concerning 

defendant’s assault on the dog as circumstantial evidence of her 

state of mind. While several such statements were admitted, for our 

purposes one example will suffice. After the dog-kicking incident, 

Janet called her brother Gary in tears, told him that defendant had 

kicked the dog to death, and explained that “she was starting to feel 

threatened at home, and she was worried for her safety, and she was 

worried for Kristi and John.”

As we have explained, the portion of the statement in which Janet 

expressed concern for her safety and for that of her children was 

admissible hearsay under section 1250 because her mental state was 

at issue in this case. The portion of the statement in which she 

claimed that defendant had kicked the dog to death was not offered 

for its truth, i.e., that defendant had in fact kicked the dog to death, 

but rather as circumstantial evidence of her state of mind. Whether 

true or not, the fact that the statement was made was relevant to 

Janet’s mental state. (Ortiz, supra, 38 Cal. App.4th at p. 389, 44 

Cal. Rptr.2d 914.) The jury was properly admonished that the 

statement was not received for the truth of the matter stated and 

could be used only as evidence of her state of mind.

Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion in concluding that the 

evidence was admissible under section 352. This statement, unlike

the general statements that Janet feared “what might happen” if she 

left defendant or went against his wishes, does assert personal 

knowledge of a past act of the defendant. “In this situation, it is 

more difficult to fashion, and more demanding to expect the jury 

will follow, a limiting instruction. The jury can only legitimately 

conclude the declarant feared [defendant] if the statement is 

truthful. However, the jury would have been instructed not to 

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consider the statement itself as true, because it is not admitted for 

its truth, but only as circumstantial evidence of state of mind. The 

difficulty is compounded the more inflammatory the prior conduct.” 

(Ortiz, supra, 38 Cal. App.4th at p. 390, 44 Cal. Rptr.2d 914.) If 

the trial court concludes that the jury will be unable to follow such 

an instruction, it should exercise its discretion and exclude the 

evidence under section 352. (Id. at p. 392, 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 914.)

Here, as the trial court correctly observed, Janet’s statement that 

defendant kicked the dog to death is highly probative of her fear of 

defendant, both for herself and for her children, shortly before she 

disappeared. As already mentioned, such a fear is inconsistent with 

defendant’s theory that she simply abandoned him and the children. 

While the prior conduct was fairly inflammatory, it was not 

unreasonable for the trial court to conclude that the jury would be 

able to use the statement solely as evidence of Janet’s state of mind. 

The jury would have understood that the entire statement was not 

based on personal knowledge because the veterinarian did not even 

know whether the dog died from being kicked. The only portion of 

the statement based on her personal knowledge was the claim that 

defendant kicked the dog. But defendant admitted to kicking the 

dog. The jury could reasonably have used defendant’s admission 

for its truth, and limited its use of Janet’s statement to prove her 

state of mind. Thus, as was the case in Ortiz, “[t]he statements 

were made under circumstances indicating their trustworthiness. 

While obviously prejudicial to [defendant] (in the sense 

contemplated by section 352), this evidence was also highly 

probative of her attitude toward him. On balance, we cannot say 

the trial court abused its discretion in allowing these statements into 

evidence.” (Ortiz, supra, 38 Cal. App.4th at p. 394, 44 Cal. Rptr.2d 

914.)

Defendant’s Admissions

The trial court also properly admitted defendant’s statements to 

detectives, in which he admitted to kicking the dog, but denied 

causing the animal’s death. Evidence of a statement made by a 

defendant in a criminal action is not made inadmissible by the 

hearsay rule when offered against that defendant, and may therefore 

be admitted for the truth of the matter asserted in the statement. (§

1220; People v. Smith (1984) 151 Cal. App.3d 89, 96, 198 Cal.

Rptr. 623.) Nevertheless, defendant argues admission of evidence 

of the dog-kicking incident violates section 1101 because it 

amounts to evidence of his violent character offered to prove that he 

acted in conformity with that character in killing Janet. We 

disagree.

Section 1101, subdivision (a), generally provides that “evidence of 

a person’s character or a trait of his or her character (whether in the 

form of an opinion, evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific 

instances of his or her conduct) is inadmissible when offered to 

prove his or her conduct on a specified occasion.” However, 

subdivision (b) of that section provides that a specific instance of a 

person’s conduct is admissible “when relevant to prove some fact 

(such as motive, . . . intent, . . . identity, . . . ) other than his or her 

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disposition to commit such an act.” (§ 1101, subd. (b).)

“Where a defendant is charged with a violent crime and has or had 

a previous relationship with a victim, prior assaults upon the same 

victim, when offered on disputed issues, e.g., identity, intent, 

motive, etcetera, are admissible based solely upon the consideration 

of identical perpetrator and victim without resort to a ‘distinctive 

modus operandi’ analysis of other factors.” (People v. Zack (1986) 

184 Cal. App.3d 409, 415, 229 Cal. Rptr. 317; People v. 

Linkenauger (1995) 32 Cal. App.4th 1603, 1612, 38 Cal. Rptr.2d 

868.) This is because evidence showing “quarrels, antagonism or 

enmity between an accused and the victim of a violent offense is 

proof of motive to commit the offense. [Citations.] Likewise, 

evidence of threats of violence by an accused against the victim of 

an offense of violence is proof of the identity of the offender.” 

(People v. Daniels (1971) 16 Cal. App.3d 36, 46, 93 Cal. Rptr. 628; 

People v. Shaver (1936) 7 Cal.2d 586, 592, 61 P.2d 1170; People v. 

De Moss, supra, 4 Cal.2d 469, 473, 50 P.2d 1031.)

Thus, the trial court properly admitted evidence of prior incidents of 

domestic violence perpetrated by defendant against Janet. But the 

question remains as to whether evidence of the incident in which 

defendant violently kicked the family dog amounts to an act of 

abuse against Janet, such that it falls within the above-cited rule. If 

it does, then it is admissible not only under section 1101 to prove 

his motive, but also under section 1109 to prove his propensity to 

commit the murder. For the following reasons, we hold that it does.

Section 1109, subdivision (a)(1), provides: “Except as provided in 

subdivision (e)8or (f)9, in a criminal action in which the defendant 

is accused of an offense involving domestic violence, evidence of 

the defendant’s commission of other domestic violence is not made 

inadmissible by Section 1101 if the evidence is not inadmissible 

pursuant to Section 352.” Subdivision (d)(3) of this section 

provides: “‘Domestic violence’ has the meaning set forth in 

Section 13700 of the Penal Code. Subject to a hearing conducted 

pursuant to Section 352, which shall include consideration of any 

corroboration and remoteness in time, ‘domestic violence’ has the 

further meaning as set forth in Section 6211 of the Family Code, if 

the act occurred no more than five years before the charged 

offense.” (§ 1109, subd. (d)(3).)

Penal Code section 13700, subdivision (b), defines “domestic 

violence” to mean “abuse committed against an adult or a minor 

who is a spouse, former spouse, cohabitant, former cohabitant, or 

person with whom the suspect has had a child or is having or has 

 

8

 Subdivision (e) provides: “Evidence of acts occurring more than 10 years before the charged 

offense is inadmissible under this section, unless the court determines that the admission of this 

evidence is in the interest of justice.”

9

 Subdivision (f) provides: “Evidence of the findings and determinations of administrative 

agencies regulating the conduct of health facilities licensed under Section 1250 of the Health and 

Safety Code is inadmissible under this section.”

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had a dating or engagement relationship.” Subdivision (a) of this 

provision defines “abuse” to mean “intentionally or recklessly 

causing or attempting to cause bodily injury, or placing another 

person in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily 

injury to himself or herself, or another.” (Pen. Code, § 13700, 

subd. (a).)

Family Code section 6211 expands the definition of “domestic 

violence” to include abuse committed against a “child of a party or 

a child who is the subject of an action under the Uniform Parentage 

Act, where the presumption applies that the male parent is the 

father of the child to be protected,” and “[a]ny other person related 

by consanguinity or affinity within the second degree.” Family 

Code section 6203 expands the definition of “abuse” to include 

“engag[ing] in any behavior that has been or could be enjoined 

pursuant to [Family Code] Section 6320.” And Family Code 

section 6320 authorizes the court to issue a protective order 

regarding “any animal owned, possessed, leased, kept, or held by 

either the petitioner or the respondent or a minor child residing in 

the residence or household of either the petitioner or the 

respondent,” and further authorizes the court to enjoin the 

respondent from “molesting, attacking, striking, threatening, 

harming, or otherwise disposing of the animal.”

In People v. Ogle (2010) 185 Cal. App.4th 1138, 110 Cal. Rptr.3d 

913, the Court of Appeal held stalking to be an act of domestic 

violence within the meaning of section 1109, and therefore 

admissible to prove propensity to commit the crime of making 

criminal threats. (Id. at p. 1140, 110 Cal. Rptr.3d 913.) The court 

explained that “[s]ection 1109 applies if the offense falls within the 

Family Code definition of domestic violence even if it does not fall 

within the more restrictive Penal Code definition,” and further 

explained: “Family Code section 6211 defines domestic violence to 

require abuse and Family Code section 6203 defines ‘abuse’ to 

include ‘engag[ing] in any behavior that has been or could be 

enjoined pursuant to Section 6320.’ Family Code section 6320 

authorizes the court to enjoin a party from ‘stalking, threatening, . . 

. harassing, [and] telephoning,’ the other party. Thus, stalking a 

former spouse is domestic violence for purposes of section 1109 as 

defined by Family Code section 6211.” (Id. at p. 1144, 110 Cal.

Rptr.3d 913, citing People v. Dallas (2008) 165 Cal. App.4th 940, 

952, 81 Cal. Rptr.3d 521.)

Similarly, in People v. Brown (2001) 96 Cal. App.4th Supp. 1, 117 

Cal. Rptr.2d 738, the Court of Appeal held that vandalism was an 

act of domestic violence under the Family Code where the 

defendant smashed most of the windows in his wife’s car after an 

argument while the wife walked away from the vehicle. (Id. at pp. 

39–40, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 738.) This was because “Family Code 

section 6203 defines ‘abuse’ in relevant part as ‘[t]o engage in any 

behavior that has been or could be enjoined pursuant to Section 

6320.’ [Citation.] Family Code section 6320 provides in relevant 

part that ‘[t]he court may issue an ex parte order enjoining a party 

from molesting, attacking, striking, . . . destroying personal 

property . . . of the other party. . . .’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 39, fn. 6, 

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117 Cal. Rptr.2d 738.) The court also rejected the defendant’s 

argument that his wife was not the victim of the vandalism, 

explaining that such a position was “inconsistent with 

commonsense, as well as the language and purpose of the relevant 

statutes.” (Id. at p. 39, 117 Cal. Rptr.2d 738.)

In this case, defendant told Detective Boon and Inspector Smith that 

he “went overboard” kicking the dog and “shouldn’t have gone that 

far.” He told them that he kicked the animal as a form of discipline 

after the dog got into some garbage, that he did not believe the dog 

died from the beating, and that Janet did not see anything that she 

had not seen on numerous prior occasions. He confirmed to 

Detective Davinroy that he “often” kicked the dog. He told Agent 

O’Farrell that the children were also present when he kicked the 

dog, and that seeing him kick the animal was not “out of the 

ordinary.”

As already mentioned, Family Code section 6320 authorizes the 

court to issue a protective order regarding “any animal owned, 

possessed, leased, kept, or held by either the petitioner or the 

respondent or a minor child residing in the residence or household 

of either the petitioner or the respondent,” and further authorizes the 

court to enjoin the respondent from “molesting, attacking, striking, 

threatening, harming, or otherwise disposing of the animal.” Thus, 

defendant’s assault on the family dog amounted to “abuse” within 

the meaning of Family Code section 6203. This abuse was 

committed against his wife and children, who witnessed the violent 

assault, and amounted to “domestic violence” within the meaning 

of Family Code section 6211. Indeed, as domestic violence expert 

Marjorie Cusick testified, in an abusive relationship - which 

independent evidence established defendant and Janet’s relationship 

to be - harming an animal is “a very high-level threat to the victim 

as to the ability of the perpetrator to not only threaten to do 

something incredibly harmful but to actually act it out in front of 

them.” Defendant’s statements regarding his assault on the family 

dog were admissible under section 1101 to prove his motive, and 

under section 1109 to prove his propensity to commit the murder.

Nor were the statements rendered inadmissible by section 352. “In 

a case where the identity of a person who commits a crime is 

attempted to be proven by circumstantial evidence, such as in the 

case at bar, evidence of a motive on the part of a defendant charged 

is always a subject of proof, and the fact of motive particularly 

material.” (People v. Argentos (1909) 156 Cal. 720, 726, 106 P. 

65; People v. Daniels, supra, 16 Cal. App.3d at p. 46, 93 Cal. Rptr. 

628.) Evidence of prior acts of domestic violence against Janet, 

including defendant’s statements regarding his assault on the dog, 

was highly probative of motive and identity. The trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in allowing these statements into evidence.

Kovacich, 201 Cal. App.4th at 891-896.

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2. Expert Opinion on Domestic Violence

In his third ground for relief, petitioner claims that the trial court erred in admitting the 

prosecution’s expert testimony on domestic violence. He also claims that the prosecutor 

committed misconduct in “violating the court’s order limiting that testimony.” (ECF No. 1 at 14.) 

The California Court of Appeal rejected this argument, reasoning, in pertinent part, as 

follows:

We also reject defendant’s assertion that the trial court erred by 

allowing expert testimony from domestic violence expert Marjorie 

Cusick. And while Cusick’s testimony did exceed the limitations 

imposed by the trial court, we find no prosecutorial misconduct.

Background

Defendant moved in limine to exclude Cusick’s testimony, which 

the People argued was “relevant and probative to explain to the jury 

why Janet would choose to stay with the defendant for as long as 

she did despite physical and verbal abuse on several prior 

occasions, as well as why she did not immediately report the 

domestic violence to the police.” The trial court denied the motion, 

allowing the testimony with the following restriction: “The witness 

may not, however, express any opinion about the particular facts of 

this case or give her opinion regarding the state of mind of either 

the defendant or his wife.”

During trial, the People provided an additional offer of proof 

regarding Cusick’s testimony, arguing that the testimony was 

needed to disabuse the jury of the common misconception that it is 

easy for a battered spouse to leave an abusive marriage. This 

testimony was crucial because there was evidence that Janet 

expressed her fear of defendant as early as 1979, and “the core 

misconception that the jury might have is that people who are 

fearful will just leave, so if she was so fearful in 1979, why didn't 

she just leave? If she was so fearful on August 22, 1982, why didn't 

she just leave then? Why did she continue to live in that house?” 

The prosecutor also pointed out that the defense had called into 

question Janet’s credibility with respect to her statements of fear by 

asking “if she was so fearful, why did she confront the defendant 

the morning of September 8th?”

The prosecutor argued that Cusick’s testimony would help the jury 

to understand Janet’s seemingly inconsistent conduct by explaining 

the “counterintuitive” fact that “victims of various kind[s] of abuses 

will return to their perpetrator, will stay in the relationship with 

their perpetrator until they’re ready to make that decision” to leave. 

When asked to provide examples of such conduct, the prosecutor 

answered: “For example, that she was so fearful August 22nd, the 

dog dies in front of her, and shortly thereafter she is telling people, 

sobbing, crying, telling them that she’s afraid of the defendant . . . . 

It is the inconsistency that she’s still living at that home after she 

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has observed this and is fearful of the defendant based on that kick 

of the dog.” The prosecutor argued that despite the fact that Janet’s 

death precluded her from testifying at trial, Cusick’s testimony was 

nevertheless necessary to enable the jury to assess the credibility of 

her various out-of-court statements.

The trial court again ruled that the testimony was admissible, noting 

that “the prosecution’s theory of the case is that [Janet] was in an 

abusive relationship with her husband wherein he attempted to 

exercise power and control over her causing her to be afraid,” 

which “caused her to make the decision to leave him and take the 

children, which thereby motivated him to kill her.” After ruling 

that there was sufficient foundational evidence that Janet and 

defendant may have been in an abusive relationship, the trial court 

ruled that Cusick’s testimony was admissible under sections 801 

and 1107: “The defendant in this case has attacked the credibility of 

[his wife]. For instance, the defendant contends that her statements 

concerning the fact that the defendant kicked the dog to death were 

fabricated by her. The defendant has suggested that if she was 

really in an abusive relationship, then why did she return or why did 

she not leave him?” The trial court then explained that because 

“marital relationships are often behind closed doors” and involve 

“complex psychological relationships that sometimes defy logic or 

reason,” Cusick’s testimony would help the jury assess Janet’s 

credibility by “dispelling some of the possibl[e] misconceptions 

held about abused women.” This would also help the jury to decide 

“whether the defendant may have had a motive to kill his wife.”

However, the trial court placed additional limitations on the 

testimony, explaining that Cusick “may testify about the 

psychological aspects that occur between victim and abuser at 

points when there may be a separation, but cannot make an opinion 

that this is the particular time when the abuser would kill the 

victim.” The trial court also explained to the prosecutor that “it 

would be inappropriate in this case given the possible prejudicial 

effect to the defendant to give the jury hypotheticals that involve 

actual facts from this trial.”

Prior to Cusick’s testimony, the trial court admonished the jury as 

follows: “Her testimony about intimate partner abuse is not 

evidence that the defendant abused [his wife] or killed her. You 

may consider this evidence only in deciding whether or not 

[Janet’s] conduct was not inconsistent with the conduct of someone 

who has been abused and in evaluating the believability of her 

statements.” We will describe Cusick’s testimony in detail in the 

analysis that follows.

Analysis

Section 801, subdivision (a), permits expert testimony on subjects 

“sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion of an 

expert would assist the trier of fact.” Section 1107, subdivision (a), 

provides: “In a criminal action, expert testimony is admissible by 

either the prosecution or the defense regarding intimate partner 

battering and its effects, including the nature and effect of physical, 

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emotional, or mental abuse on the beliefs, perceptions, or behavior 

of victims of domestic violence, except when offered against a 

criminal defendant to prove the occurrence of the act or acts of 

abuse which form the basis of the criminal charge.”

“The Legislature, courts, and legal commentators have noted the 

close analogy between use of expert testimony to explain the 

behavior of domestic violence victims, and expert testimony 

concerning victims of rape or child abuse.” (People v. Brown

(2004) 33 Cal.4th 892, 905, 16 Cal. Rptr.3d 447, 94 P.3d 574 

(Brown).) In People v. Bledsoe (1984) 36 Cal.3d 236, 203 Cal.

Rptr. 450, 681 P.2d 291, our Supreme Court held expert testimony 

concerning the behavior of rape victims to be admissible under 

section 801 “to rebut misconceptions about the presumed behavior 

of rape victims,” but not “as a means of proving – from the alleged 

victim’s post-incident trauma – that a rape in the legal sense had, in 

fact, occurred.” (Id. at pp. 248, 251, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450, 681 P.2d 

291.) In People v. McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289, 283 Cal. Rptr. 

382, 812 P.2d 563, a case involving the defendant’s sexual abuse of 

a child, our Supreme Court explained: “[E]xpert testimony on the 

common reactions of child molestation victims is not admissible to 

prove that the complaining witness has in fact been sexually 

abused; it is admissible to rehabilitate such witness’s credibility 

when the defendant suggests that the child’s conduct after the 

incident – e.g., a delay in reporting – is inconsistent with his or her 

testimony claiming molestation. [Citations.] ‘Such expert 

testimony is needed to disabuse jurors of commonly held 

misconceptions about child sexual abuse, and to explain the 

emotional antecedents of abused children's seemingly selfimpeaching behavior.’” (Id. at pp. 1300–1301, 283 Cal. Rptr. 382, 

812 P.2d 563; see also People v. Bowker (1988) 203 Cal. App.3d 

385, 394, 249 Cal. Rptr. 886 [“where a child delays a significant 

period of time before reporting an incident or pattern of abuse, an 

expert could testify that such delayed reporting is not inconsistent 

with the secretive environment often created by an abuser who 

occupies a position of trust”].)

* * *

In this case, Cusick testified generally about “intimate partner 

abuse,” defining that term as “a dynamic between two intimate 

partners where one of the partners tries to exert power and control 

over the other, and they try to exert that power and control by using 

a pattern and variety of abuses, and that can be physical abuse, 

emotional, psychological abuse, financial abuse, fear and 

intimidation.” As already mentioned, she explained that abusing an 

animal can be a form of intimidation. She also explained that 

where children are involved, an abuser will often threaten to either 

take or harm the children, which is “the highest form of fear and 

intimidation that’s used in families where there are children.” She 

also provided examples of various forms of psychological abuse, 

emotional abuse, sexual abuse, financial abuse, and physical abuse.

Cusick also testified about the “cycle of violence,” explaining that 

there are three stages: (1) an “acute-battering incident,” followed 

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by (2) a “honeymoon or contrite stage,” followed by (3) a “tensionbuilding phase.” This tension-building phase ultimately leads to 

another acute-battering incident, which continues the cycle 

indefinitely. She also explained that victims generally behave 

differently during the three stages. Immediately following the 

battering incident, the victim will typically reclaim some power 

from the abuser, either by threatening to leave if it happens again or 

by actually leaving the relationship. During the honeymoon stage, 

the victim will recommit to the relationship, which immediately 

relinquishes some power to the abuser. However, some of the 

victim’s power remains, resulting in the reduction of certain aspects 

of control previously present in the relationship, sometimes for 

weeks or months. During the tension-building phase, the abuser 

attempts to reclaim the remainder of the victim’s power by 

increasing the control exercised over the relationship. And because 

the victim does not want to trigger another acute-battering incident, 

he or she typically accommodates the abuser’s demands.

Cusick also described several common misconceptions concerning 

victims of intimate partner abuse, including the idea that “it is easy 

to leave a relationship where there is domestic violence,” and “once 

you leave an abusive relationship that you don’t have to have 

contact with the abuser, and that’s a myth when there’s children 

involved.” As she explained: “They're afraid to leave. Part of the 

intimidation of fear is being told generally quite often that ‘if you 

ever leave me, I will do something really horrible to you. I will do 

something horrible to your family and friends. I will take the 

children or do something horrible to the children.’ [¶] And victims 

read about things like this in the paper, and they see on television 

and they know it's true. They know the most lethal time in a 

[domestic violence victim’s] life is right when they leave, and they 

have to be incredibly careful during that period of time, and they 

are putting themselves and their kids at risk. [¶] Also, if you have 

children, you leave an abuser, you are still connected to the abuser, 

but you have very much pissed the abuser off because many abusers 

say, ‘You can leave, but you can’t leave with the children. And 

you'll never get the kids,’ so in leaving and taking the kids with you 

is a huge risk at escalating the anger of the abuser.”

Cusick further explained that “victims develop what’s known as 

coping strategies or coping mechanisms to allow them to stay in 

these relationships,” including denying, minimizing, or 

rationalizing the abuse. According to Cusick, the abuser will play 

into these coping mechanisms by denying or minimizing the 

victim’s experience, or by blaming the battering incident on the 

victim, which is part of the psychological and emotional abuse that 

exists in these relationships.

Defendant’s challenge to this evidence is two-fold. He argues that 

“the threshold error was the trial court’s ruling permitting Cusick to 

take the stand in the first place.” He then argues that this threshold 

error “resulted in the prosecution running roughshod over the trial 

court’s efforts to prevent the gross misuse of her testimony.”

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The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Cusick’s 

testimony under sections 801 and 1107. As defendant points out, 

this case is different from those discussed above because Janet’s 

death precluded her from testifying at trial. However, we agree 

with the trial court that her credibility was nevertheless at issue. On 

numerous occasions, Janet stated that she was afraid of defendant. 

These statements were admitted for their truth under section 1250. 

Janet also told White–Janoski that defendant hit her with a metal 

chain. This statement was admitted for its truth under section 1240. 

However, defendant claimed that her conduct, i.e., staying in the 

relationship and returning to him on two prior occasions, was 

inconsistent with her stated fear and also inconsistent with her 

statement that he had physically abused her. Cusick’s testimony 

was necessary to disabuse jurors of commonly held misconceptions 

about victims of domestic violence, and to explain the 

psychological reasons for such a victim's seemingly selfimpeaching behavior. (See People v. McAlpin, supra, 53 Cal.3d at 

pp. 1300–1301, 283 Cal. Rptr. 382, 812 P.2d 563.)

And while we agree with defendant that Cusick’s testimony 

exceeded the limits imposed by the trial court, we disagree that this 

amounted to prosecutorial misconduct. “It is, of course, 

misconduct for a prosecutor to intentionally elicit inadmissible 

testimony.” (People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 960, 86 Cal.

Rptr.2d 243, 978 P.2d 1171.) But this record does not disclose any 

intentional misconduct on the part of the prosecutor. Indeed, the 

prosecutor informed Cusick prior to her testimony that she was not 

allowed to testify “that victims of domestic violence are killed 

purposefully at a particular point in time.” Cusick violated this 

directive by testifying that domestic violence victims “know the 

most lethal time in [their] life is right when they leave, and they 

have to be incredibly careful during that period of time, and they 

are putting themselves and their kids at risk.” However, the 

question that triggered this violation was simply, “why don't 

victims of abuse just leave?” This question was properly aimed at 

dispelling a common misconception held about abuse victims, i.e., 

that it is easy for them to leave an abusive relationship. Cusick 

could have answered that question without violating the trial court’s 

ruling.

Defendant also complains that the prosecutor asked Cusick whether 

certain abusers have more education regarding domestic violence, 

prompting Cusick to respond: “Well, generally perpetrators who 

are in position[s] of power and privilege can be educated in terms 

of the court system, in terms of having more resources, in terms of, 

let’s say, a doctor knowing where on the body bruises would occur. 

In terms of a police officer knowing how to use their body and their 

voice and their facial expression to be intimidating.” When the 

prosecutor followed up by asking whether her experience with 

police officer abusers changed any of the types of abuse she had 

already discussed, the trial court sustained a defense objection and 

admonished the prosecutor: “I’m going to limit your direct 

examination to the areas of general abuse the witness has been 

describing and not to the particular possible facts of this case.” 

While expert testimony on domestic violence may include general 

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descriptions of abuser behavior in order to “explain the victim’s 

actions in light of the abusive conduct” (People v. Gadlin (2000) 78 

Cal. App.4th 587, 595, 92 Cal. Rptr.2d 890), this testimony 

specifically referred to police officers and was not aimed at 

elucidating victim conduct in order to dispel any common 

misconception. However, we do not believe that this misstep by the 

prosecution rises to the level of prosecutorial misconduct.10

In any event, there was no prejudice to defendant. All inquiry into 

police officers as abusers was promptly shut down by the trial 

court. And following the statement regarding leaving an abuser as 

being a “lethal time,” the trial court provided the jury with the 

following admonition: “The [c]ourt has allowed the testimony of . 

. . Cusick on the topic of abusive relationships in general. The 

witness has described various types of abuse and how victims 

generally react. This is not evidence, however, that the defendant 

was an abuser or that he killed [his wife], and you must look to 

other evidence presented in this trial to make that determination. 

You may only consider this evidence in deciding whether or not 

[Janet’s] conduct was not inconsistent with the conduct of someone 

who has been abused and in evaluating the believability of her 

statements.” We presume the jury followed this instruction. 

(People v. Sanchez (2001) 26 Cal.4th 834, 111 Cal. Rptr.2d 129, 29 

P.3d 209; People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 662, 63 Cal.

Rptr.2d 782, 937 P.2d 213.) Moreover, to the extent the jury relied 

on Cusick’s testimony to conclude defendant abused his wife, and 

therefore had a motive to kill her, other evidence would likely have 

yielded the same conclusion. (See People v. Bowker, supra, 203 

Cal. App.3d at p. 395, 249 Cal. Rptr. 886.)

People v. Kovacich, 201 Cal.App.4th at 896-904.

/////

/////

 

10

 Defendant also complains that the prosecutor elicited testimony about animal abuse. 

However, as he did not claim that eliciting such testimony amounted to prosecutorial misconduct 

below, he cannot do so on appeal. (See People v. Tafoya (2007) 42 Cal.4th 147, 176, 64 Cal.

Rptr.3d 163, 164 P.3d 590.) In any event, we conclude that Cusick’s testimony concerning 

animal abuse in general was properly admitted. When expert testimony concerning domestic 

violence is properly admitted to explain the victim’s conduct in light of the abuse, “testimony 

about the hypothetical abuser and hypothetical victim is needed for the [victim’s conduct] to be 

understood . . . . [L]imiting the testimony to the victim’s state of mind without some explanation 

of the types of behaviors that trigger the [victim’s conduct] could easily defeat the purpose for 

which the expert is called.” (People v. Gadlin, supra, 78 Cal. App.4th at p. 595, 92 Cal. Rptr.2d 

890.) Cusick’s testimony about animal abuse was part of her general testimony about the types of 

abuses that may or may not exist in abusive relationships. And without this testimony, the jury 

might not have understood that abusing an animal is taken to be a form of threat to the victim, 

which would cause the victim to be afraid of leaving the relationship. Thus, the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in allowing this testimony, and the prosecutor did not engage in misconduct 

by eliciting it.

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3. Applicable Law and Analysis

As noted above, errors of state law do not warrant the granting of federal habeas relief. 

Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67. “The issue for us, always, is whether the state proceedings satisfied due 

process; the presence or absence of a state law violation is largely beside the point.” Jammal v. 

Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919-20 (9th Cir. 1991). “The admission of evidence does not 

provide a basis for habeas relief unless it rendered the trial fundamentally unfair in violation of 

due process.” Johnson v. Sublett, 63 F.3d 926, 930 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-

68). See also Wood v. Ryan, 693 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th Cir. 2012) (“On habeas review, 

constitutional errors of the “trial type,” . . ., warrant relief only if they ‘had substantial and 

injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 

507 U.S. 619, 637-38 (1993)).

A writ of habeas corpus will be granted for an erroneous admission of evidence “only 

where the ‘testimony is almost entirely unreliable and . . . the factfinder and the adversary system 

will not be competent to uncover, recognize, and take due account of its shortcomings.’” 

Mancuso v. Olivarez, 292 F.3d 939, 956 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 

880, 899 (1983)). Evidentiary rules do not violate a defendant’s constitutional rights unless they 

“infring[e] upon a weighty interest of the accused and are arbitrary or disproportionate to the 

purposes they are designed to serve.” Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324 (2006) 

(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the admission of evidence at 

trial violates due process only if “there are no permissible inferences the jury may draw from the 

evidence.” Jammal, 926 F.2d at 920. Put another way, evidence must “be of such quality as 

necessarily prevents a fair trial” for its admission to violate due process. Id. (quoting 

Kealohapauole v. Shimoda, 800 F.2d 1463, 1465 (9th Cir. 1986)). 

Notwithstanding the above, the Ninth Circuit has observed that:

The Supreme Court has made very few rulings regarding the 

admission of evidence as a violation of due process. Although the 

Court has been clear that a writ should be issued when 

constitutional errors have rendered the trial fundamentally unfair 

(citation omitted), it has not yet made a clear ruling that admission 

of irrelevant or overtly prejudicial evidence constitutes a due 

process violation sufficient to warrant issuance of the writ. 

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Holley v. Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th Cir. 2009). The Ninth Circuit has also observed 

that the United States Supreme Court has not squarely addressed whether rules of evidence 

regarding the admissibility of expert testimony, similar to the rule employed by the trial court in 

this case, “infring[e] upon a weighty interest of the accused” or are “arbitrary or disproportionate 

to the purposes [they are] designed to serve.” Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 758 (9th Cir. 2009) 

(quoting United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998)). Therefore, “under AEDPA, even 

clearly erroneous admissions of evidence that render a trial fundamentally unfair may not permit 

the grant of federal habeas corpus relief if not forbidden by ‘clearly established Federal law,’ as 

laid out by the Supreme Court.” Holley, 568 F.3d at 1101. See also Greel v. Martel, No. 10-

16847, 472 Fed. Appx. 503, 504, 2012 WL 907215, *1 (9th Cir. Mar. 19, 2012) (“There is 

likewise no clearly established federal law that admitting prejudicial evidence violates due 

process.”).11 

In light of the authorities cited above, the state appellate court’s rejection of petitioner’s 

claim that the trial court violated his right to due process in allowing the admission of unduly 

prejudicial evidence does not support the granting of federal habeas relief under AEDPA. 

Petitioner has cited no “clearly established federal law” prohibiting the admission of evidence that 

is relevant to the state of mind of a domestic abuse victim, even if that evidence may be viewed as 

inflammatory. Holley, 568 F.3d at 1101

Nor did the admission of the challenged evidence violate petitioner’s right to due process. 

After a careful review of the record, the undersigned concludes that the admission of evidence of 

the dog kicking incident and the effect of domestic violence on the victim of such violence was 

not so unduly prejudicial as to “necessarily” prevent a fair trial, given the other evidence of 

petitioner’s guilt and the relevance of the challenged testimony. Jammal, 926 F.2d at 919-20

(erroneous admission of evidence in a state trial denies a defendant due process only when the 

evidence “so fatally infect[s] the proceedings as to render them fundamentally unfair”). With 

respect to the testimony of expert witness Marjorie Cusick, the jury at petitioner’s trial was 

 

11

 Citation to this unpublished Ninth Circuit opinion issued after January 1, 2007 is appropriate 

pursuant to Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3(b).

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given an appropriate cautionary instruction. (CT at 2498). This federal habeas court must 

presume that the jurors followed this instruction, which would have lessened any possible 

prejudice caused by the admission of Ms. Cusick’s testimony. See Blueford v. Arkansas, 566 

U.S. ___, ___, 132 S. Ct. 2044, 2051 (2012); Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206 (1987); 

Deck v. Jenkins, 768 F.3d 1015, 1023 (9th Cir. 2014); Fields v. Brown, 503 F.3d 755, 782 (9th 

Cir. 2007). 

Petitioner has also failed to show that the prosecutor committed misconduct at his trial by 

the manner in which he questioned Ms. Cusick in light of the trial court’s previous orders limiting 

the scope of her testimony. On habeas review of a prosecutorial misconduct claim, the court may 

grant relief only if the misconduct rises to the level of a due process violation. See Sechrest v. 

Ignacio, 549 F.3d 789, 807 (9th Cir. 2008) (“On federal habeas review, the narrow issue before us 

is whether the prosecutor’s comments violated the defendant’s due process right to a fair trial . . . 

.”); see also Deck, 768 F.3d at 1022; Wood, 693 F.3d at 1113. For the reasons expressed by the 

California Court of Appeal, the questions asked by the prosecutor of Ms. Cusick did not call for 

testimony in violation of the trial court’s in limine ruling and did not render petitioner’s trial 

fundamentally unfair. 

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the decision of the California Court of Appeal 

rejecting these due process claims was contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. 

He has certainly failed to show that the state appellate court’s thoughtful and thorough opinion 

was “so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in 

existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 103. 

Accordingly, he is not entitled to federal habeas relief with respect to these claims that his right to 

due process was violated.

C. Trial Court’s Erroneous Exclusion of Evidence

Petitioner also raises several claims regarding the trial court’s alleged improper exclusion 

of evidence. In his fourth ground for relief, petitioner claims that the trial court violated his 

federal constitutional rights in: (1) failing to allow the defense to introduce evidence regarding an 

alleged “sighting” of a woman matching Janet’s description on the afternoon of September 8, 

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1982 by Lyle Fullerton, an employee of a grocery store frequented by Janet; (2) failing to allow 

the defense to introduce evidence regarding another alleged sighting of Janet by Roberto Taneida, 

who related to police that a woman matching Janet’s description told him she was being forced to 

“go with” a person who had “threatened to harm her children;” and (3) failing to allow the

defense to introduce evidence from a person named Kelly Ray Thompson, who admitted to 

killing a woman in the Rollins Lake Area and “cutting off her head and throwing the head into the 

lake.” (ECF No. 1 at 17-18.) 

In his fifth ground for relief, petitioner claims that the trial court ‘erred” in excluding from 

trial defense evidence concerning the “bias” of Jerry Johnson, the chief police investigator, “and 

many other investigative defects.” Petitioner also claims the trial court erred in refusing to give a 

jury instruction requested by the defense “concerning the bias” of Officer Johnson. (Id. at 20.) 

As he did in support of his second claim for relief, petitioner includes numerous examples of 

events and trial testimony that he believes demonstrate Officer Johnson’s bias against him and the 

improper nature of the police investigation into Janet’s disappearance. (Id. at 22-32.) Petitioner

also complains, again, that a “media blitz” about his case was improperly instigated by Officer 

Johnson, who was only a reserve police officer and who harbored “animosity” towards petitioner. 

(Id.) Petitioner contends that Officer Johnson fed “damaging and false information to potential 

witnesses in the case” which led to misleading testimony at his trial. (Id. at 20-32.) In his 

opening brief on appeal, petitioner’s appellate counsel had the following to say about Jerry 

Johnson and his involvement in the investigation of this case:

In 2002 a major push to reopen the case came from two retired 

sheriff’s deputies, one of whom, Dave Milam, died of cancer soon 

thereafter, and the other of whom, Jerry Johnson, had been involved 

in civil litigation against Paul Kovacich in the mid 1980s. As a 

volunteer reserve officer for the Auburn Police Department, 

Johnson conducted many interviews, often providing information 

about the case to potentially favorable witnesses, advising them to 

exchange information among themselves, and to review reports 

about the case on the internet; on the other hand, Johnson avoided 

conducting interviews of persons who might have exculpated Paul. 

Johnson obtained warrants for wiretaps on Paul Kovacich’s phones 

and for tracking devices attached to his vehicles, but no 

incriminating information was obtained therefrom. Nonetheless, In 

September of 2006, through Johnson’s efforts, the Placer County 

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District Attorney’s office obtained an indictment of Paul Kovacich 

for the murder of Janet Kovacich.

(Resp’t’s Lod. Doc. 37 at 2.)

All of the above-described claims were raised for the first time in a habeas petition filed 

by petitioner in the California Supreme Court. That petition was summarily denied. (Resp’t’s 

Lod. Doc. 43.) Accordingly, this court must review the state court record to determine whether 

there was any “reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 98. In 

doing so this court “must determine what arguments or theories . . . could have supported, the 

state court’s decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree 

that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of [the 

Supreme] Court.” Id. at 102. 

“The Constitution guarantees criminal defendants ‘a meaningful opportunity to present a 

complete defense’ and the right to present relevant evidence in support thereof. Nevada v. 

Jackson, ___U.S.___, ___, 133 S. Ct. 1990, 1992 (2013) (quoting Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 

683, 690 (1986)). See also Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324 (2006). Nonetheless, 

the United States Supreme Court has not “squarely addressed” whether a state court’s exercise of 

discretion to exclude testimony at trial violates a criminal defendant’s right to present relevant 

evidence. Moses, 555 F.3d at 758-59; see also Brown v. Horell, 644 F.3d 969, 983 (9th Cir.

2011) (“Between the issuance of Moses and the present, the Supreme Court has not decided any 

case either ‘squarely address[ing]’ the discretionary exclusion of evidence and the right to present 

a complete defense or ‘establish[ing] a controlling legal standard’ for evaluating such 

exclusions.”), cert. denied, ___U.S.___, 132 S. Ct. 593 (2011)). However, the Supreme Court has 

rejected the argument that due process necessarily requires the exclusion of prejudicial or 

unreliable evidence. See Perry v. New Hampshire, ___U.S.___, ___ 132 S. Ct. 716, 728 (2012); 

Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 563-564 (1967).

Accordingly, the decision of the California Supreme Court rejecting petitioner’s challenge 

to the trial court’s decision to exclude from introduction at trial the evidence described above was 

not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law and may not be 

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set aside. Id. See also Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 112 (2009) (“it is not ‘an 

unreasonable application of’ ‘clearly established Federal law’ for a state court to decline to apply 

a specific legal rule that has not been squarely established by [the United States Supreme 

Court]”); Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 126 (2008) (relief is “unauthorized” under Section 

2254(d)(1) when the Supreme Court’s decisions “give no clear answer to the question presented, 

let alone one in [the petitioner’s] favor,” because the state court cannot be said to have 

unreasonably applied clearly established federal law); Hedlund v. Ryan, 750 F.3d 793, 799 (9th 

Cir. 2014).

Here, petitioner has also failed to demonstrate that any of the trial court’s challenged 

evidentiary rulings violated his right to due process. 

As applied to a criminal trial, denial of due process is the failure to 

observe that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of 

justice. In order to declare a denial of it we must find that the 

absence of that fairness fatally infected the trial; the acts 

complained of must be of such quality as necessarily prevents a fair 

trial. 

Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1991) (holding that admission of coerced confession 

violates due process). The United States Supreme Court has “defined the category of infractions 

that violate ‘fundamental fairness’ very narrowly.” Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 443 

(1992) (quoting Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352 (1990)). See also Hayes v. Ayers, 

632 F.3d 500, 515 (9th Cir. 2011).

With regard to the trial court’s exclusion of defense evidence of alleged “sightings” of 

Janet, the undersigned notes the following. Petitioner’s trial counsel argued during a hearing on 

motions in limine that the investigation into this case had not been sufficiently thorough. 

(Reporter’s Transcript on Appeal (RT) at 856-57.) He noted that store clerk Lyle Fullerton 

reported seeing a woman matching Janet Kovacich’s picture at his store shortly after her 

disappearance. (Id. at 857.) Defense counsel stated that this evidence was not pursued by the 

prosecution and that Fullerton was now deceased and could not appear as a trial witness. (Id. at 

858-59.) Defense counsel argued that this lack of follow-up demonstrated that petitioner had

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been prejudiced by “the lack of investigation and the passage of time that’s occurred here.” (Id.

at 861.) 

The prosecutor, on the other hand, noted that Mr. Fullerton had in fact been interviewed 

and told police he could not be certain the woman he saw was the same woman on the missing 

person poster and that he did not think he could pick the woman out of a photo lineup. (Id.; ECF 

No. 1, Ex. 9.) When the trial judge asked defense counsel whether he was seeking to introduce 

the testimony of Mr. Fullerton at trial and, if so, how he would “propose to do it,” defense 

counsel conceded that he was not “certain that there’s any sort of evidentiary foundation that 

allows its introduction.” (RT at 861.) In the end, petitioner’s trial counsel did not seek to have 

evidence about Mr. Fullerton’s alleged possible sighting of Janet admitted into evidence at trial. 

Therefore, the trial court was not asked to, and did not, issue any ruling on the matter. 

In another discussion during the hearing on pretrial motions in limine, the prosecution 

moved to exclude from the trial evidence that a Robert Taneida had reported seeing a person 

matching Janet’s description. (Id. at 908.) Petitioner’s counsel noted the police had obtained Mr. 

Taneida’s statement in 1983 but that “no discovery is provided to the defense, and we do not 

learn about this except just by happenstance.” (Id. See also ECF No. 1, Ex. 11.) Petitioner’s trial 

counsel argued that the information was relevant because it “goes to the investigation conducted 

originally back in 1982 and 1983 as to what was done, what was not done, what was followed up 

on, what was not followed up on,” and that it was also relevant to “the competence or the quality 

of the investigation.” (RT at 908-09.) 

Later, during the same hearing on motions in limine, the prosecution sought to exclude 

from the trial evidence that a person named Kelly Ray Thompson had confessed “to about eight 

murders, and one of those murders he said he committed – he said he committed the murder in 

September or October of 1995 . . . this murder happened near this lake in Placer County; that it 

was a woman, and that he cut off her head, and that . . . the woman was driving a small pickup.” 

(Id. at 896.) The prosecutor explained that Placer County detectives were unable to corroborate 

“anything that Mr. Thompson said” and were unable to connect Thompson’s confession with

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Janet’s murder. (Id. at 896-98.) Petitioner’s counsel, on the other hand, argued that this evidence 

was “certainly relevant” to petitioner’s defense. 

The following colloquy then took place between the court and counsel:

THE COURT: Well, Part 2 of my inquiry, then, goes back to you, 

Mr. Spurling [petitioner’s trial counsel]. If your – I thought you 

said that you may attempt to introduce this as a third party’s –

evidence of a third party by way of possibly a declaration as to an 

interest. But don’t you have a problem if it turns out that the officer 

who prepared this statement is really hearsay, because he talked to 

the investigator from Washington, and that person spoke to Mr. 

Thompson? So in other words, you don’t – you have, like, a layer 

of hearsay built in there. So if you were to proffer this, you would 

have that problem, as far as I can tell, possibly, legally. Further, it 

seems that you don’t have the actual statement the guy made, so –

MR. SPURLING: That would be my –

THE COURT: - it puts the Court in a quandary [sic] as to how I 

was to rule on this when I – when I don’t have any evidence as to 

what the exact statement was. Because if you were asking me to 

introduce that under that theory, then the Court would have to 

review the particular statement to make a finding of whether or not 

it is a declaration against his penal interests, or whether it’s 

trustworthy, whether I would allow that to go to the jury. So that’s 

two inquiries.

I wanted to further see the statement that the prosecution had, if 

both parties would agree to that.

Secondly, I ask you, Mr. Spurling, how do you – what I see as 

possibly, a legal hurdle, before I can even get to that issue, how 

would you intend to overcome that.

MR. SPURLING: Well, I would tend to share the Court’s 

perception as to the multiple layers, possibly, of hearsay in that

regard.

THE COURT: Have you made any effort to locate Mr. Thompson 

or subpoena him or have him brought down or anything?

MR. SPURLING: No.

(Id. at 938-39.) Ultimately, the trial court asked petitioner’s trial counsel whether he wanted to 

“get [Thompson’s] confession into evidence somehow.” Defense counsel responded to that 

inquiry by stating “I would concede that there does appear to be some hearsay issues with that.” 

(Id. at 942.)

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After hearing extensive argument from the parties on the motions in limine, the trial court 

refused to admit evidence at petitioner’s trial regarding statements allegedly made by Kelly Ray 

Thompson, as well as all the other proposed defense evidence suggesting possible third-party 

culpability, on the grounds that petitioner had not “proffered any direct or circumstantial evidence 

linking any third party to the murder of Janet Kovacich.” (Id. at 1030.) The trial court ruled that 

petitioner would not “be permitted to cross-examine investigators concerning the details of 

unsolved murders or disappearances, other bones or bodies not connected to this, or statements of 

others” on the basis that “to allow this would likely require the prosecution to respond by 

introducing further evidence concerning these unconnected incidents and would consume an 

undue consumption of time on a collateral matter that has little relevance.” (Id. at 1033.) 

Evidence of potential third-party culpability must only be admitted at trial when, under the 

“facts and circumstances” of the individual case, its exclusion would deprive the defendant of a 

fair trial. The Ninth Circuit has determined that where the proffered evidence of third party 

culpability simply affords a possible ground of suspicion pointing to a third party and does not 

directly connect that person with the actual commission of the offense, such evidence may 

properly be excluded. People of Territory of Guam v. Ignacio, 10 F.3d 608, 615 (9th Cir. 1993) 

(citing Perry v. Rushen, 713 F.2d 1447, 1449 (9th Cir. 1983)); see also United States v. Bowman, 

215 F.3d 951, 962 (9th Cir. 2000). Under the circumstances of this case, the trial judge’s ruling 

with regard to possible evidence suggesting third party culpability, including evidence about the 

alleged “confession” of Kelly Ray Thompson and/or alleged sightings of Janet after her 

disappearance, did not render petitioner’s trial fundamentally unfair. Petitioner has not provided 

this federal habeas court any competent evidence directly connecting Kelly Ray Thompson or any 

other person with the disappearance and murder of Janet Kovacich.

Petitioner’s trial counsel also sought to introduce extensive evidence regarding the alleged 

bias of Officer Jerry Johnson and his conduct of the investigation into Janet’s murder. (RT at 

962, et seq.) The trial judge ruled that the defense would be allowed to cross-examine 

government witnesses on the issue of their bias against petitioner. The trial judge also stated he 

was willing to give petitioner “wide latitude in that regard.” (Id. at 1032-33.) The trial court 

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made the following rulings with respect to Officer Johnson in particular:

Jerry Johnson. The defendant may inquire of the prosecution 

witness, Jerry Johnson, whether Johnson once sued the defendant in 

a small claims court regarding – over costs regarding payment of 

pasture costs. If the witness conceded that such a suit occurred, the 

Court will limit the scope of further inquiry to that fact. The Court 

feels this evidence may bear upon the witness’ bias and a limited 

inquiry will be permitted.

Pursuant to Evidence Code 352, the Court will exclude the crossexamination of other – or other evidence that witness Johnson was 

the subject of some form of disciplinary hearing from Sheriff Nunes 

wherein the sheriff authored a letter stating that Mr. Johnson was 

misleading. It appears that this involved a dispute over personnel 

action and is not connected to this case. The Court is concerned of 

the confusion of issues possibility and the undue consumption of 

time in this regard, and I will not allow it.

Apparently, the defendant – Mr. Johnson was also involved in the 

investigation of the defendant more recently in 2005 over an 

allegation that the defendant may have misappropriated funds from 

a bank account for a police association where he was the chairman. 

No charges were ever filed against the defendant for this conduct. 

The defendant wishes to cross-examine Mr. Johnson concerning 

this investigation on the grounds it may show a bias on behalf of 

Mr. Johnson.

Because the defendant and Mr. Johnson apparently have known one 

another since before the disappearance of Janet Kovacich, the 

defendant does have a right to a thorough cross-examination of Mr. 

Johnson regarding any personal bias or animosity he may hold 

against the defendant. Again, the Court is concerned, however, that 

cross-examination by the defendant on collateral matters may 

consume an inordinate amount of time, particularly involving issues 

that could confuse the jurors. However, the Court will permit the 

defendant to conduct only a limited cross-examination into the area 

of this 2005 investigation of fraud by the defendant. The Court, 

however, will not allow extensive inquiry concerning the 

underlying facts. Mr. Johnson will be permitted to explain to the 

jury his reasons for conducting the investigation. The Court will 

not permit extrinsic evidence of whether or not the defendant did, in 

fact, commit some form of fraud.

(Id. at 1036-38.) 

Petitioner has failed to show that these trial court’s rulings, with respect to the extent the 

alleged bias of Officer Johnson could be explored at trial, violated his right to due process. The 

undersigned also notes that, regardless of Officer Johnson’s motives in reviving the investigation 

into Janet Kovacich’s murder and/or his methods of investigation, a jury found petitioner guilty of 

this murder beyond a reasonable doubt after hearing all of the admissible evidence at his trial. 

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Petitioner has not demonstrated that the investigation conducted by Jerry Johnson, or Johnson’s

possible bias against petitioner, resulted in petitioner being convicted of crimes he did not 

commit. While petitioner may be unhappy or disappointed that Officer Johnson re-opened the 

police investigation of this matter many years after the initial investigation was closed, he has not 

demonstrated before this court that any of Officer Johnson’s actions in conducting that re-opened 

investigation rendered the proceedings fundamentally unfair. 

For all of the reasons set forth above, petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on 

his claims challenging the trial court’s exclusion of defense evidence at his trial. 

D. Presentation of Evidence to the Grand Jury 

Petitioner raises several claims concerning the presentation of evidence before the grand 

jury that indicted him. The court will address these claims in turn below.

1. Suppression of Exculpatory Evidence 

In his sixth ground for relief, petitioner claims that the prosecution “knowingly suppressed 

exculpatory evidence” before the Grand Jury of “sightings” of Janet Kovacich occurring after her 

disappearance. (ECF No. 1 at 34-35.) In the body of this claim, petitioner provides numerous 

examples of evidence he believes should have been presented to the grand jury by the prosecutor. 

(Id. at 53-85.) Petitioner also attaches a motion filed by his trial counsel seeking to dismiss 

portions of the amended indictment brought against him on the grounds that the prosecutor 

violated state and federal law in failing to inform the grand jury that: (1) Donald Henrickson, a 

forensic pathologist with the Placer County Office of the Sheriff-Coroner, had opined that the 

hole in Janet’s skull could have been caused by a bullet or blunt-force trauma; (2) the presence of 

metallic fragments in the skull were consistent with the “film developing process” and were not 

necessarily suggestive of a gunshot wound; and (3) it was not possible to determine whether the 

fracture in Janet’s skull occurred before or after her death. (Id. at 41-42.) Petitioner argues that 

“he would assume it was the duty of the prosecutor . . . to disclose all evidence, testimony and 

any and all facts that may expose the truth so as the Grand Jury could properly and correctly 

adjudicate the case before them.” (Id. at 54.) This claim was raised for the first time in 

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petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus filed in the California Supreme Court. That 

petition was summarily denied. 

“[I]ndictment by grand jury is not part of the due process of law guaranteed to state 

criminal defendants by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 

n.25 (1972) (citing Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 534-35 (1884) (no due process right to a 

grand jury indictment before criminal prosecution in state court)). See also Peterson v. 

California, 604 F.3d 1166, 1169-70 (9th Cir. 2010) (denying habeas relief on a claim that 

petitioner’s Sixth Amendment confrontation rights were violated at a preliminary hearing because 

there is no federal constitutional right to a preliminary hearing); Bazzo v. Soto, NO. EDCV 12-

2112-CJC (DTB), 2015 WL 3561733, *31 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2015) (“[T]he right to presentation 

of a criminal case to a grand jury in federal criminal proceedings under the Fifth Amendment has 

not been extended to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment.”), adopted by 2015 WL 3561735 

(C.D. Cal. June 2, 2015). Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief on his claim that the 

prosecutor committed misconduct before the grand jury. 

Even if the Fifth Amendment right to a grand jury did apply to the states, petitioner would 

not be entitled to federal habeas relief with respect to this claim. This is because even if any 

cognizable misconduct12 took place, any claimed constitutional violation was rendered harmless 

by petitioner’s subsequent conviction at trial. United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 70 (1986) 

(“[T]he petit jury’s subsequent guilty verdict means not only that there was probable cause to 

believe that the defendants were guilty as charged, but also that they are in fact guilty as charged 

beyond a reasonable doubt. Measured by the petit jury’s verdict, then, any error in the grand jury 

proceeding connected with the charging decision was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”); see

 

12

 Such appears not to be the case under any circumstances pursuant to federal law. See United 

States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 344-45, 349-52 (1974) (federal prosecutor have no duty to 

withhold inadequate or incompetent evidence from the grand jury); Costello v. United States, 350 

U.S. 359, 361-64 (1956); United States v. Haynes, 216 F.3d 789, 798 (9th Cir. 2000) (Federal 

“prosecutors have no obligation to disclose ‘substantial exculpatory evidence’ to a grand jury, . . .

even if that evidence impeaches the credibility of a key witness.”); United States v. Lasky, 600 

F.2d 765, 768 (9th Cir. 1979) (“the prosecution was not required to present the grand jury with 

evidence which would tend to negate guilt”).

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also Williams v. Stewart, 441 F.3d 1030, 1042 (9th Cir.2006) (“any constitutional error in the 

grand jury proceedings is harmless because [the petitioner] was ultimately convicted of the 

offenses charged); People of Territory of Guam v. Muna, 999 F.2d 397, 399 (9th Cir.1993) ( “If 

. . . a petit jury subsequently convicts a defendant of the charges upon which he was indicted, 

‘any error in the grand jury proceeding connected with the charging decision [is deemed] 

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’” (quoting Mechanick, 475 U.S. at 70)).13

Finally, the undersigned notes that the state trial court concluded that the prosecution’s 

failure to inform the grand jury of arguably favorable evidence regarding the cause of Janet’s 

death did not affect the outcome of the proceedings or result in any prejudice to petitioner. 

Specifically, the trial court ruled as follows:

The question then is this: Is it reasonably probable that a result 

more favorable for the defendant would have been reached had the 

grand jury been informed of Dr. Henrikson’s opinion and the 

apparent problems with the X-ray?

Given the strength of Dr. Willey’s opinion as opposed to the 

equivocal opinion of Dr. Henrikson, the Court – the record does not 

reflect a probability that had the grand jury been informed of the 

omitted items, that it would not have found probable cause to indict.

The Court cannot find that the omissions affected the outcome. For 

that reason, the defendant was not prejudiced by the prosecution’s 

failure to reveal exculpatory evidence to the grand jury. 

Accordingly, that portion of the defendant’s motion seeking 

dismissal of the allegation that the defendant personally used a 

firearm in the commission of the offense described in the 

indictment is denied.

(Resp’t’s Lod. Doc. 15 at 36.) 

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the trial court’s rulings in this regard were

erroneous. He has also failed to show that his trial proceedings were rendered fundamentally 

unfair by the prosecutor’s failure to present the claimed potentially exculpatory evidence to the 

grand jury. For all of the reasons set forth above, petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief

on his claim that his federal constitutional rights were violated by the prosecution’s suppression 

of exculpatory evidence before the grand jury. 

 

13

 Of course, any claim that the prosecution violated California law in failing to present evidence 

to the grand jury is not cognizable in this federal habeas corpus action. 

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2. Presentation of False Information 

In his thirteenth ground for relief, petitioner claims that the prosecutor in his case 

committed misconduct in presenting knowingly false information to the grand jury. (ECF No. 1 

at 143.) In this regard, petitioner argues:

There are strong indications that prosecutors and the court not only 

refused to repress any abuses of the investigatory power exercised 

by the Grand Jury but actually encouraged the misinformation, lack 

of information and knowingly supported the witness untruthfulness. 

Frankly, the prosecution apparently supported the lies of witnesses 

in order to impress the Jury with a false characterization of 

Petitioner.

(Id.) In support of his contention, petitioner provides a lengthy recitation of witnesses who 

appeared before the grand jury and the testimony they gave that he believes was untruthful. (Id.

at 143-49.) As one example, petitioner alleges:

Reserve Officer Jerry Johnson apparently told the Grand Jury that 

Petitioner swung his do[g] like a helicopter at a K-9 training 

session. Refer to Exhibit 49A&B and 50A&B. Defense Attorney 

Tom Leupp confronted District Attorney Gong regarding the 

comment at a pre-trial hearing with Judge Couzens. District 

Attorney Gony [sic] advised the Court that Reserve Officer Jerry 

Johnson’s statement was not relevant as the prosecution was not 

going to use the statement at trial. Might one assume that the 

Grand Jury heard a false deceptive statement with the sole purpose 

of indicting the Petitioner? District Attorney Gong knew that all of 

the existing full-time deputies whom were assigned to the Placer 

County K-9 Unit that would have attended any canine session 

would not have supported such an absurd statement that was given 

by Reserve Officer Jerry Johnson.

(Id. at 145.) Petitioner argues that a prosecutor has a duty “not to permit a person to stand trial 

when he knows that perjury permeates the indictment.” (Id. at 148.) He asks, 

[d]oes not Law Enforcement have a moral and civil duty to followup on claims made in the course of an investigation? Further more 

[sic] doesn’t D.A. Gong have a duty to inform the Grand Jury of 

Law Enforcement’s failure to investigate an apparent crime in a 

complete and thorough fashion?

(Id. at 149.) 

For the reasons set forth above with respect to his claim challenging the prosecutor’s 

alleged failure to present alleged exculpatory evidence to the grand jury, this claim based on the 

alleged presentation of false evidence to the grand jury is not cognizable in these federal habeas 

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proceedings. Moreover, if it was cognizable any such error was rendered harmless as a result of 

petitioner’s conviction at trial. Finally, even assuming arguendo that this claim is cognizable in 

this federal habeas proceeding, petitioner is not entitled to relief. 

A violation of a defendant’s rights occurs if the government knowingly uses false 

evidence in obtaining a conviction. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 299 (1994) (“It is, . . ., wellestablished that adherence to procedural forms will not save a conviction that rests in substance 

on false evidence or deliberate deception.”); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-54 

(1971); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959); Soto v. Ryan, 760 F.3d 947, 957-58 (9th Cir. 

2014). It is clearly established that “a conviction obtained by the knowing use of perjured 

testimony must be set aside if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could 

have affected the jury’s verdict.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 680 n.9 (1985). See

also United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (“the Court has consistently held that a 

conviction obtained by the knowing use of perjured testimony is fundamentally unfair”); Hall v. 

City of Los Angeles, 697 F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2012) (“there is a clearly established 

constitutional due process right not to be subjected to criminal charges on the basis of false 

evidence that was deliberately fabricated by the government.”) (quoting Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 

F.3d 1070, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc)).

The undersigned has read all of the examples provided by petitioner in support of his 

argument that the prosecutor in his case committed misconduct in presenting false testimony to 

the grand jury. Petitioner has filed to demonstrate that any material information was knowingly 

withheld or presented by the prosecutor or that any false evidence could have affected the 

judgment of the jury at his trial. The decision of the California Supreme Court rejecting 

petitioner’s argument on this issue was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of the 

federal authorities cited above, nor was it objectively unreasonable. Accordingly, petitioner is 

also not entitled to federal habeas relief with respect to this claim.

E. Police Investigation

In his seventh ground for relief, petitioner claims that the police investigation Janet’s 

death was incompetent and lacked thoroughness. (ECF No. 1 at 87.) He complains that the 

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police failed to interview “crucial witnesses” or to obtain physical evidence documenting his 

whereabouts on the day of Janet’s disappearance. Petitioner includes numerous suggestions as to 

how the police investigation could have been better pursued and cites numerous examples of 

areas where he believes the investigation was sloppy or incomplete. (Id. at 87-107.) Petitioner 

also once again attacks the credibility and motivations of Officer Jerry Johnson. (Id.) This claim 

was raised for the first time in petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus which he filed 

in the California Supreme Court. As noted above, that petition was summarily denied. 

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the decision of the California Supreme Court 

rejecting this claim was contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. Indeed, 

petitioner has not cited any authority in support of his arguments for federal habeas relief with 

respect to this claim. In particular, petitioner has not cited any federal decision holding that due 

process requires the police to seek and find exculpatory evidence, that prosecutors have a duty to 

seek evidence that is adequate, competent or exculpatory, or that a habeas petitioner’s federal 

constitutional rights are violated by a pretrial investigation that the petitioner believes is not 

sufficiently thorough.14 In light of this lack of authority on point, the state court did not 

unreasonably apply federal law in concluding that petitioner was not entitled to relief with respect 

to this claim. See Brewer v. Hall, 378 F.3d 952, 955 (9th Cir. 2004) (“If no Supreme Court 

precedent creates clearly established federal law relating to the legal issue the habeas petitioner 

raised in state court, the state court’s decision cannot be contrary to or an unreasonable 

application of clearly established federal law.”) (citation omitted). 

Assuming arguendo that this claim of an inadequate police investigation is cognizable in 

this federal habeas action, petitioner has failed to demonstrate prejudice in light of the extensive 

evidence introduced at his trial which supported the jury’s guilty verdict and the fact that he was 

indeed convicted by the jury which heard that evidence at trial. Nor has petitioner made any 

showing that a more thorough investigation by law enforcement would have resulted either in a 

 

14

 In contrast, it has been recognized that at trial prosecutors have a duty under the Fifth 

Amendment due process clause “to bring to the attention of the court or of proper officials all 

significant evidence suggestive of innocence or mitigation.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 

427 n.25 (1976).

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decision by the District Attorney’s Office not to prosecute him for Janet’s murder or in an 

acquittal at trial if charged. Accordingly, he is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his claim

that police investigation of Janet’s death was inadequate.

F. Failure to Turn Over Exculpatory Material to the Defense

In his eighth ground for relief, petitioner claims that the prosecutor failed to disclose the 

following information to the defense:

pre-trial surveillance reports including audio and video information 

that may assist Petitioner in detailing exculpatory evidence. 

Suppression of exculpatory evidence that includes but not limited to 

all surveillance video tapes, audio recordings, statements and 

reports by all undercover officer/agents, all “in house” jail audio 

and video recordings including Placer County Probation Officers 

sentencing interview, recorded telephone conversations with 

Petitioner’s attorney via Foresthill Telephone Co., jail informants 

(including ex-correctional officer) and all of Reserve Officer Jerry 

Johnson’s phone and jail recordings.

(ECF No. 1 at 109.) Petitioner explains that “numerous allied agencies assisted Reserve Officer 

Jerry Johnson in his attempt to discredit the petitioner,” but that “none or very little of this 

potentially crucial information that could prove Petitioner’s innocence was released in the form of 

discovery to defense attornies [sic] prior to Petitioner’s trial or to date.” (Id.) Petitioner also 

provides a lengthy list of generic materials that were, according to him, “potentially crucial 

exculpatory evidence.” (Id. at 109-112.) For example, petitioner alleges that the prosecution 

improperly failed to produce the following to the defense:

Any and all records of requests, reports, surveillance video, audio 

recordings of conversations and interviews by personnel at the 

Santa Monica Police Department specifically in the vicinity of the 

Santa Monica Boardwalk and the adjacent residential area.

* * *

Any and all records of requests, reports, communications, 

surveillance video, cell phone snapshots of Petitioner, audio 

recordings and interviews with the Sugar Bowl Ski Resort 

management and/or employees or any law enforcement agency or 

agencies that involved Petitioner driving and parking his SierraGMC Pick-up at the Sugar Bowl Ski Resort Parking Lot.

(Id. at 110)

/////

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Petitioner’s claim that the prosecution failed to turn over exculpatory material to the 

defense is unduly vague and conclusory and federal habeas relief should be denied on that basis 

alone. “‘Conclusory allegations which are not supported by a statement of specific facts do not 

warrant habeas relief.’” Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 204 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting James v. 

Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994)). In short, petitioner’s overly broad allegations in support of 

this claim of prosecutorial misconduct fail to state a cognizable claim for relief. 

To the extent petitioner is arguing that the prosecution violated its obligations under Brady 

v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), he has not established that he is entitled to relief. The United 

States Supreme Court has held “that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to 

an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to 

punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. 

There are three components of a Brady violation: “[t]he evidence at issue must be favorable to 

the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; the evidence must have 

been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.” 

Comstock v. Humphries, 786 F.3d 701, 708 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 

263, 281-82 (1999)). See also Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 769 (9th Cir. 2012). In order 

to establish prejudice, petitioner must demonstrate that “‘there is a reasonable probability’ that the 

result of the trial would have been different if the suppressed documents had been disclosed to the 

defense.” Strickler, 527 U.S. at 289. See also Runningeagle, 686 F.3d at 769.

A habeas petitioner must do more than “merely speculate” about the substance of the 

Brady material. Runningeagle, 686 F.3d at 769. “The mere possibility that an item of 

undisclosed information might have helped the defense, or might have affected the outcome of 

the trial, does not establish ‘materiality’ in the constitutional sense.” United States v. Olsen, 704 

F.3d 1172, 1184 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1099 (9th Cir. 2005) 

(in turn quoting United States v. Croft, 124 F.3d 1109, 1124 (9th Cir. 1997)). Thus, evidence is 

not “material” under Brady where the defendant has only “a hunch” that the evidence would be 

useful. United States v. Abonce–Barrera, 257 F.3d 959, 970 (9th Cir. 2001). See also Downs v. 

Hoyt, 232 F.3d 1031, 1037 (9th Cir. 2000) (rejecting a Brady claim in part because the 

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petitioner’s arguments were speculative). Accordingly, “[f]or purposes of determining 

prejudice,” therefore, “the withheld evidence must be analyzed ‘in the context of the entire 

record.’” Olsen, 704 F.3d at 1184 (quoting Benn v. Lambert, 283 F.3d 1040, 1053 (9th Cir.

2002) (in turn quoting Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112)).

Here, petitioner has done nothing more than speculate that production of all the material 

he suggests should have been produced to the defense would have led to a different result at his 

trial. However, petitioner has completely failed to demonstrate that any particular item would 

have changed the outcome of these proceedings. As explained above, mere speculation is an 

insufficient basis for establishing a Brady violation. For these reasons, petitioner he is not 

entitled to federal habeas relief on this claim.15

G. Witness Tampering

In petitioner’s ninth ground for relief, he claims that there is “evidence of witness 

tampering” in connection with his case. (ECF No. 1 at 114.) Petitioner explains, 

there is considerable evidence at trial that there were violations of 

any sensible interviewing and interrogation methods. There are 

indications from testimony at trial and reports from private 

investigators that existing reports may have been rewritten and/or 

falsified. 

(Id.) In particular, petitioner alleges that reserve officer Jerry Johnson, “who Petitioner assumes 

never advised any witness or potential witnesses that he was a reserve officer only and therefore 

never experienced a position of a full-time paid civil service position as a police officer in the 

State of California,” did not have the “credibility and experience” to conduct the police 

investigation into this case. Petitioner complains that Officer Johnson misled witnesses and other 

persons about his previous experience and expertise, used “unprofessional interviewing 

techniques,” and gave witnesses and potential witnesses “an extraordinary amount of information 

about the case.” (Id.) Petitioner further contends that there is evidence that “suggests” that 

/////

 

15

 Any claim that the prosecution violated state law in failing to provide discovery materials to 

the defense is, of course, not cognizable in this federal habeas corpus proceeding. Estelle, 502 

U.S. at 67-68; Park, 202 F.3d at 1149.

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“statements that were given to Reserve Officer Jerry Johnson were falsified.” (Id. at 115.) For 

instance, petitioner alleges:

Retired Sergeant Steve Butts advised at trial that his written report 

that described his initial contact with Petitioner was not his report. 

He stated the report that was given to him was typed and on the 

bottom of the report had his name typed. Butz went on to say that 

he did not type his reports and was not aware of the typed report 

until recently. The unanswered question of course is who wrote the 

report and typed Butz’s name on it? Retired Chief Willick was 

asked to enlighten the court concerning a possible explanation. 

However the Retired Chief had no explanation. There no dates 

indicated [sic] at the bottom of the report to indicate when the 

report was typed, written or created. There was also no approving 

supervisors [sic] signature to approve the report. So the question 

remains as to who wrote the face sheet of a missing person report 

that was soon to turn into an alledged [sic] homicide report? Was 

this report with an unknown author typed in 1982 or in 2004 prior 

to the Grand Jury Hearing.

(Id.) 

Petitioner also alleges that Officer Johnson encouraged witnesses to “speak to each other” 

and to “look the case up on the internet,” and that he also may have changed some of the original 

witness statements resulting from the initial investigation into Janet’s disappearance. (Id. at 116-

20.) 

All of petitioner’s allegations in support of his claim based upon alleged witness 

tampering in connection with the underlying investigation concern the conduct of Officer 

Johnson. Petitioner argues that Johnson “tamper[ed] with critical witnesses in a major case in 

order to gain witness testimony to favor his goal of a malicious unlawful prosecution.” (Id. at 

119-20.) However, petitioner cites absolutely no case law in support of his claim for habeas relief 

based upon this alleged “witness tampering.” 

Petitioner’s wide ranging and conclusory allegations fail to state a claim cognizable in 

these federal habeas corpus proceedings. To the extent petitioner is attempting to raise a broad

due process claim that Officer Johnson’s actions during the investigation of the case and the 

subsequent trial rendered petitioner’s criminal proceedings fundamentally unfair, he has failed to 

demonstrate any prejudice. “Even where constitutional error is found, ‘in § 2254 proceedings a 

court must [also] assess the prejudicial impact of constitutional error’ under the Brecht [v. 

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Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) ] standard.” Dixon v. 

Williams 750 F.3d 1027, 1034 (9th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted). Under Brecht, a habeas 

petitioner is entitled to relief only if “the error ‘had substantial and injurious effect or influence in 

determining the jury's verdict.” 507 U.S. at 637. None of the examples that petitioner provides in 

support of this claim or the questions that petitioner raises concerning Officer Johnson’s actions 

rise to the level of a due process violation. The incidents petitioner describes, even if true, could 

not have had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict,” 

given the extensive evidence introduced at his trial supporting the jury’s verdict and the fact that 

petitioner was convicted by the just who heard that evidence at trial. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 619. 

Nor is there any evidence that petitioner was found guilty based on the introduction of false 

evidence. See Owens v. Foltz, 797 F.2d 294, 296 (6th Cir. 1986) (“In a habeas corpus review, a 

court can reverse for inadequate investigation only when the petitioner can show a deprivation of 

due process tantamount to a suppression of relevant evidence.”)

The decision of the California Supreme Court rejecting petitioner’s claim of “witness 

tampering” was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. Accordingly, 

petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief with respect to this claim. 

H. Ineffective Assistance of Trial and Appellate Counsel

Petitioner raises one claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and one claim of 

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. After setting forth the applicable legal standards, the 

court will address both claims in turn below.

1. Legal Standards

The clearly established federal law governing ineffective assistance of counsel claims is 

that set forth by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To 

succeed on a Strickland claim, a defendant must show that (1) his counsel’s performance was 

deficient and that (2) the “deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Id. at 687. Counsel is 

constitutionally deficient if his or her representation “fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness” such that it was outside “the range of competence demanded of attorneys in 

criminal cases.” Id. at 687–88 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Counsel’s errors must be ‘so 

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serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.’” Richter, 562 at

104 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). A reviewing court is required to make every effort “to 

eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s 

challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 669. See also Richter, 562 U.S. at 107 (same). Reviewing courts must 

“indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 

professional assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. There is in addition a strong presumption 

that counsel “exercised acceptable professional judgment in all significant decisions made.” 

Hughes v. Borg, 898 F.2d 695, 702 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). This 

presumption of reasonableness means that the court must “give the attorneys the benefit of the 

doubt,” and must also “affirmatively entertain the range of possible reasons [defense] counsel 

may have had for proceeding as they did.” Cullen v. Pinholster, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 131 S. Ct. 

1388, 1407 (2011) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).

The Strickland standards apply to appellate counsel as well as trial counsel. Smith v. 

Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 535-36 (1986); Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1433 (9th Cir. 1989). 

However, an indigent defendant “does not have a constitutional right to compel appointed counsel 

to press nonfrivolous points requested by the client, if counsel, as a matter of professional 

judgment, decides not to present those points.” Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983). 

Counsel “must be allowed to decide what issues are to be pressed.” Id. Otherwise, the ability of 

counsel to present the client’s case in accord with counsel’s professional evaluation would be 

“seriously undermined.” Id. See also Smith v. Stewart, 140 F.3d 1263, 1274 n.4 (9th Cir. 1998) 

(Counsel is not required to file “kitchen-sink briefs” because it “is not necessary, and is not even 

particularly good appellate advocacy.”) There is, of course, no obligation to raise meritless 

arguments on a client’s behalf. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88 (requiring a showing of 

deficient performance as well as prejudice). Thus, appellate counsel is not deficient for failing to 

raise a weak issue. See Miller, 882 F.2d at 1434. In order to establish prejudice in this context, 

petitioner must demonstrate that, but for appellate counsel’s errors, he probably would have 

prevailed on appeal. Id. at 1434 n.9. 

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2. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

In his tenth ground for relief, petitioner claims that his appellate counsel rendered him 

ineffective assistance in failing to inform the California Court of Appeal that: (1) Jerry Johnson 

was only a reserve officer and therefore did not receive the training given to full time police 

officers; and (2) the family dog, Fuzz, was also a trained police canine and was therefore 

expected to exhibit exemplary behavior and discipline. (ECF No. 1 at 125.) 

Petitioner notes that his appellate counsel referred to Johnson only as a “retired officer” 

and he argues that his counsel’s failure to inform the California Court of Appeal that Johnson was 

actually merely a reserve officer and had not received the full training provided to full time police 

officers “may have been” a factor in the state appellate court’s decision to uphold his judgment of 

conviction. (Id. at 126-27.) Petitioner argues that an accurate depiction of Johnson’s status 

would have alerted the appellate court to “the unprofessional and inaccurate biased investigation 

that was prompted by the inexperience and questionable status that this so called reserve officer 

had with the Placer County Sheriff’s Office.” (Id. at 127.)

 With regard to the family dog actually being a trained police canine, petitioner argues that 

his appellate counsel should have informed the California Court of Appeal that the dog had a 

“high level of expected obedience directly relate[d] to a public safety issue and a liability issue 

for the public agency if that canine does not perform at the highest level.” (Id.) Petitioner argues 

that these facts “should have been instrumental in the Appellate court reversing the trial court’s 

conviction.” (Id.) 

Respondent counters that, under state law, appellate counsel was precluded from citing 

facts that were not in the trial record. 

Simply put, petitioner has failed to demonstrate any prejudice stemming from these claims 

of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. There is no reasonable likelihood that, but for 

appellate counsel’s alleged error in failing to advise the California Court of Appeal that Officer 

Johnson was a reserve officer and that Fuzz was a trained police canine, petitioner probably 

would have prevailed on his appeal in state court. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to 

federal habeas relief on his ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim.

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3. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

In his twelfth ground for relief, petitioner claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective 

assistance in failing to investigate the whereabouts of Janet’s mother, Jean Gregoire, for the first 

several days after Janet disappeared, as well as Gregoire’s history of “violent behavior.” (ECF 

No. 1 at 134.) Petitioner contends that the prosecution conducted interviews of Jean Gregoire in 

1982 and that the transcripts of these interviews “should have disclosed Jean’s location the first 

two or three nights of Janet’s disappearance.” (Id.) Petitioner notes that Janet’s mother, 

Gregoire, was asked to take a polygraph test because petitioner had suggested to police that 

Gregoire was possibly “hiding [Janet] out.” (Id. at 135.) Petitioner argues that “reports that lead 

up to the suggestion of the polygraph should have been disclosed to the defense. (Id.)

Petitioner also informs this court that a Placer County Superior Court judge denied Jean 

Gregoire’s request for visitation rights to her grandchildren, because “he apparently felt the 

children would be in danger.” (Id.) Petitioner points to an FBI interview with Gregoire’s “distant 

supervisor,” wherein the supervisor stated that Gregoire was a “hard core, neo-nazi type.” (Id.) 

Petitioner provides several examples of incidents which he contends show that Gregoire was 

volatile and abusive to her daughter and antagonistic to petitioner, that Janet Kovacich frequently 

visited her mother’s house, and that Jean Gregoire wanted her daughter to leave petitioner and 

flee to Europe. (Id. at 136-41.) Petitioner appears to be claiming, or at least suggesting, that his 

trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to conduct sufficient investigation into 

whether Jean Gregoire was responsible for Janet’s death. 

Petitioner’s conclusory allegations that investigation into Jean Gregoire’s whereabouts

around the time of Janet’s disappearance or Gregoire’s reputation would have resulted in a 

different verdict in his case are insufficient to establish either deficient performance by his trial 

counsel or prejudice. See Jones, 66 F.3d at 205 (“conclusory suggestions” and “bald assertions” 

fall short of stating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim and do not entitle the petitioner to 

an evidentiary hearing). Likewise, a general assertion that further investigation by counsel may 

have uncovered exculpatory evidence is insufficient to establish prejudice. Villafuerte v. Stewart, 

111 F.3d 616, 632 (9th Cir. 1997) (petitioner’s ineffective assistance claim denied where he 

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presented no evidence concerning what counsel would have found had he investigated further, or 

what lengthier preparation would have accomplished). Simply speculating, or baldly stating, that 

further investigation would have led to evidence that could have led to a different verdict does not 

establish prejudice. Bible v. Ryan, 571 F.3d 860, 871 (9th Cir. 2009); Gonzalez v. Knowles, 515 

F.3d 1006, 1015-16 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Such speculation is plainly insufficient to establish 

prejudice.”) 

Petitioner has presented no evidence to this habeas court that his trial counsels’ failure, if 

any, to conduct investigation into Jean Gregoire’s whereabouts around the time of Janet’s 

disappearance or Gregoire’s prior actions was objectively unreasonable. He has also certainly 

failed to provide any evidence that Gregoire was responsible for the death of her daughter. See

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 (“Counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a 

reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.”) In addition, there is no 

evidence before this court that petitioner’s counsel did not conduct investigation into the areas 

now suggested by petitioner and/or that he simply concluded that those areas of investigations 

were not fruitful. Of course, “counsel need not undertake exhaustive witness investigation.” 

Matylinsky v. Budge, 577 F.3d 1083, 1092 (9th Cir. 2009). See also Mickey, 606 F.3d at 1237 

(“At the same time, of course, counsel need not investigate interminably.”) 

Petitioner has failed to adequately allege or establish either deficient performance or 

prejudice with respect to this claim of ineffective assistance of his trial counsel based on a failure 

to investigate. Accordingly, he is not entitled to federal habeas relief with respect to this claim. 

I. Miranda Claim

In his eleventh ground for relief, petitioner claims that he was never advised of his 

constitutional rights pursuant to the decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), even 

though he was interviewed numerous times by law enforcement and his residence was searched

after Janet’s disappearance. (ECF No. 1 at 129.) Petitioner claims that although he did not know 

it at the time, he was considered a suspect in the crime during these law enforcement interviews. 

(Id. at 129-32.) Petitioner alleges that “during any one of these interrogations there were 

absolutely no rights to counsel or rights to remain silent disclosed to the Petitioner.” (Id. at 130.) 

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Petitioner also notes that at one such interview, “the interrogation became heated, Petitioner got 

up from the interrogation and left the building.” (Id.) 

Respondent argues that petitioner’s claim is conclusory and is not supported by the state 

court record. (ECF No. 28 at 44.) Respondent also notes that petitioner did not raise any 

arguments based on an alleged Miranda violation at or prior to his trial. Accordingly, according 

to respondent, the record with regard to any such issue was not “properly developed.” (Id.) 

Respondent also argues that petitioner has not established he was “in police custody” during any 

of these interviews or that he was “not free to leave” at his first formal police interview conducted 

on September 15, 1982. (Id.) Respondent points out that prior to the September 15, 1982 

interview, petitioner spoke voluntarily with law enforcement and agreed to a search of his home. 

(See Resp’t’s Lod. Doc. No. 24 at 2756-58.) Respondent also notes that petitioner was never 

arrested after the initial investigation into Janet’s death and that the investigation was first closed 

in 1983. (ECF No. 28 at 44.)

In Miranda v. Arizona, the United States Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment 

privilege against self-incrimination prohibits the admission into evidence of statements given by a 

suspect during “custodial interrogation” without a prior warning. 384 U.S. at 444. Custodial 

interrogation means “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been 

taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” 

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. “To determine whether an individual was in custody, a court must, 

after examining all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, decide whether there [was] 

a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal 

arrest.” United States v. Kim, 292 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2002) (alteration in original) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). See also United States v. Craighead, 539 F.3d 1073, 1082 

(9th Cir. 2008) (The court must “examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding the 

interrogation.”). 

Whether a suspect is “in custody” for purposes of Miranda requires application of an 

objective test. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2402 (2011); 

Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 662-63 (2004). The custody determination is not based 

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upon “the subjective views of the officers or the individual being questioned.” Kim, 292 F.3d at 

973. Rather, two inquiries are necessary for a determination of an individual’s “in custody” status 

under this test: (1) what were the overall circumstances surrounding the interrogation; and (2) 

given those circumstances, would a reasonable person in the suspect’s situation have felt free to 

terminate the interrogation and leave. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2402; Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 662-

63; Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995); Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 

(1994). 

The Ninth Circuit has recently addressed this area, stating as follows: 

Facts relevant to the determination of whether a person is in 

custody “include the language used by the officers, the physical 

characteristics of the place where the questioning occurs, the degree 

of pressure applied to detain the individual, the duration of the 

detention, and the extent to which the person was confronted with 

evidence of guilt.” United States v. Hernandez, 476 F.3d 791, 796 

(9th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Butler, 249 F.3d 1094, 

1099 (9th Cir. 2001)); accord United States v. Hayden, 260 F.3d 

1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Factors relevant to whether an accused 

is ‘in custody’ include the following: (1) the language used to 

summon the individual; (2) the extent to which the defendant is 

confronted with evidence of guilt; (3) the physical surroundings of 

the interrogation; (4) the duration of the detention; and (5) the 

degree of pressure applied to detain the individual.”). “While 

determining whether a defendant is constitutionally entitled to 

Miranda warnings is subject to de novo review, it is nevertheless a 

fact-intensive inquiry.” United States v. Wright, 625 F.3d 583, 602 

(9th Cir.2010) (citing Craighead, 539 F.3d at 1082, 1084).

United States v. Cazares, 788 F.3d 956, 980-81 (9th Cir. 2015).

Here, petitioner has failed to show that he was “in custody” for purposes of the Miranda

rule at the time of any of his interactions with police after Janet disappeared. Although petitioner 

provides some details from two of these police interviews, the facts he highlights do not establish 

that he was “in custody” at the time they took place. For instance, petitioner notes that Chief 

Willick testified that in the first several days after Janet’s disappearance the police “had some 

reason to possibly suspect Mr. Kovacich” and that the investigation was initiated “as a homicide.” 

(ECF No. 1, Exs. 88, 89.) However, as noted above, whether petitioner was “in custody” for 

purposes of Miranda analysis is not based on the subjective views of the questioning officers. 

Petitioner has come forward with no evidence suggesting that a reasonable person in his 

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circumstances would have believed he was not free to “terminate the interrogation and leave”

during those interviews with law enforcement. See J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2402. See also Howes v. 

Fields, ___U.S.___, ___, 132 S. Ct. 1181, 1189 (2012). Specifically, petitioner has failed to show 

that he was prevented from leaving the interrogation room, that he was subjected to lengthy

questioning, that he was physically restrained, or that he was told he was required to answer 

questions. Indeed, petitioner himself states that after one of the interview sessions became 

heated, he simply left the police station. This implies that petitioner reasonably believed he was, 

and was in fact, free to leave. Finally, having failed to show that Miranda warnings were called 

in connection with his law enforcement interviews, petitioner fails to show that any evidence 

obtained from an unlawful interrogation was introduced at his trial or played any part in his 

conviction. 

Petitioner’s conclusory allegations that police officers violated the Miranda rule during his 

interrogations in 1982 are insufficient to demonstrate his entitlement to federal habeas relief with 

respect to this claim. Jones, 66 F.3d at 204; James, 24 F.3d at 26. 

J. Juror Misconduct 

In petitioner’s fourteenth ground for relief, he claims that his rights under the Sixth and 

Seventh Amendments were violated by juror misconduct. (ECF No. 1 at 151.) He explains:

Although numerous jurors would be sleeping during trial, it was at 

one point that apparently the only African-American Female on the 

jury (lower seat/middle of the row) approached the bench during a 

break in trial to inform the presiding judge that she apologized for 

falling asleep during trial as she had just flown in from Chicago. 

Petitioner applauds the juror’s honesty and concern, but cannot help 

but question the presiding Judge’s lack of interest in the Petitioner’s 

violation of his Constitutional Rights to a fair trial. The presiding 

Judge, to Petitioner’s knowledge failed to attempt to correct the 

flagrant inattentiveness of the jury. 

(Id.)

The Sixth Amendment right to fair and impartial jury requires that jurors be “capable and 

willing to decide a case solely on the evidence before it.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 

738 (1993) (quoting Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982)). See also Irvin v. Dowd, 366 

U.S. 717 (1961). A juror who falls asleep during trial is not, however, per se incompetent. See

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Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 126–27 (1987); United States v. Springfield, 829 F.2d 

860, 864 (9th Cir. 1987). A sleeping juror only rises to the level of a constitutional violation 

requiring a new trial if the juror missed essential portions of the trial and thus was unable to fairly 

consider the evidence. United States v. Barrett, 703 F.2d 1076, 1083 n.13 (9th Cir. 1983)

(“[E]ven if the juror in the present case is found to have been asleep during portions of the trial, a 

new trial may not be required if he did not miss essential portions of the trial and was able fairly 

to consider the case.”).

Here, petitioner fails to identify the “numerous jurors” he now alleges were sleeping 

during his trial and there is no evidence in the record before this court that any of the jurors at 

petitioner’s trial missed essential, or any, portions of the trial. Although petitioner identifies one 

specific juror who informed the judge that she fell asleep during one point in the trial, he also fails 

to show with respect to this juror that she missed any essential portions of the trial and/or was 

unable to fairly consider the evidence. Under these circumstances, petitioner has failed to 

demonstrate that his right to a fair and impartial jury was violated by juror misconduct. 

The California Supreme Court's denial of petitioner’s juror misconduct claim is not an 

unreasonable determination of the facts or contrary to clearly established federal law. 

Accordingly, petitioner is also not entitled to federal habeas relief on this claim.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s 

application for a writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections 

shall be served and filed within fourteen days after service of the objections. Failure to file 

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 

Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 

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1991). In his objections petitioner may address whether a certificate of appealability should issue 

in the event he files an appeal of the judgment in this case. See Rule 11, Federal Rules Governing 

Section 2254 Cases (the district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it 

enters a final order adverse to the applicant). 

Dated: August 14, 2015

DAD:8:

Kovacich985.hc

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