Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_12-cv-08115/USCOURTS-azd-3_12-cv-08115-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Shannon E. Foust, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

Page, et al., 

Defendants.

No. CV-12-08115-PCT-DGC

ORDER 

 Defendants City of Page, Officer Wilson and his spouse, and Chief Charles Dennis 

and his spouse (collectively, “Defendants”) have filed a motion for summary judgment. 

Docs. 85, 86. The motion has been fully briefed. Docs. 92, 93, 98. Plaintiffs seek leave 

to amend their complaint to add as Plaintiffs the Estate of William Dale Foust and Brynn 

Foust D’Avello as personal representative of the Estate. Doc. 91. That motion is also 

fully briefed. Docs. 96, 97. For the reasons stated below, Defendant’s motion for 

summary judgment will be granted in part and denied in part and Plaintiff’s motion to 

amend will be denied.1

 

I. Background. 

 Toni Foust and Decedent Bill Foust purported to marry in February 1996. 

Doc. 86, ¶ 1. The Fousts owned a watercraft store in the City of Page, which also served 

 

1

 The request for oral argument is denied because the issues have been fully briefed and oral argument will not aid the Court’s decision. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); 

Partridge v. Reich, 141 F.3d 920, 926 (9th Cir. 1998). 

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as their residence. Id., ¶ 2. During the time the Fousts lived there, Toni Foust called 911 

on a number of occasions and filed for and received two orders of protection against 

Decedent. Id., ¶ 3. Plaintiffs allege that these calls and orders were related to marital 

disputes and verbal abuse by Decedent, but Defendants dispute this, asserting that Toni 

Foust “believes 911 should be called when you need someone to come and help resolve a 

situation” and that she “had a habit of calling the police every time she thought they 

could assist her in a dispute related to her business or with Mr. Foust.” Doc. 92, ¶¶ 4-5. 

Defendants allege that Decedent was an active member of a sovereignty group who took 

issue with police in general, was confrontational, and would not back down. Doc. 86, 

¶¶ 15-18. Defendants dispute these allegations. Doc. 92, ¶¶ 15-18. 

 On the morning of Sunday, June 19, 2011, Decedent spoke with his daughter, 

Brynn Foust D’Avello, and told her that he was thinking about leaving Toni and moving 

to California. Doc. 86, ¶ 21. Later that day Toni called 911 from the shop to report that 

Decedent was loading paperwork from their business into his truck. Id., ¶ 23. The 911 

dispatcher issued a domestic dispute call, to which Officer Wilson responded. Id., ¶ 24. 

Wilson asked the dispatcher whether there was an order of protection in place. Id. 

Wilson entered the Foust’s shop in full uniform, with a camera affixed to his chest. Id., 

¶¶ 26, 28. 

 Upon arrival on the scene, Wilson asked Toni what was going on. Id., ¶ 29. Toni 

told him that Decedent was “pissed off” and was removing paperwork from the house. 

Id., ¶ 30. Wilson then informed her that the removal of the paperwork was a civil matter 

about which he could do nothing, and that only if physical violence was threatened could 

he intervene. Id., ¶¶ 29-32. Toni then described an incident in which Decedent had 

pushed a table at her and called her obscenities. Id., ¶ 33. Decedent then entered the 

shop’s front door and told Wilson that if he wanted to talk with Toni he would need to go 

outside. Id., ¶ 36. Wilson refused and told Decedent “You don’t tell me what to do, you 

go stand over there,” and that he was “good right here man.” Id. Decedent then left the 

building. Id. Toni informed Wilson that Decedent had a gun, to which Wilson replied 

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“That is fine, so do I.” Id., ¶ 38. 

 Decedent re-entered the building and again told Wilson that he was not welcome 

in his shop, to which Wilson replied “I didn’t ask you if I could be in here sir.” Id., ¶ 40. 

Decedent asked Wilson for his name, to which Wilson gave his last name but refused to 

give his first. Id., ¶ 41. Decedent told Wilson “You better be careful the way you talk to 

me.” Id. During this exchange, Toni gestured to Wilson and mouthed “call for backup.” 

Id., ¶ 43. Wilson and Toni then left the building to continue their conversation. Id., ¶ 44. 

Toni informed Wilson that Decedent had been verbally abusive to her and told her that he 

did not know how much time she has left. Id. 

 While Toni and Wilson were talking, Decedent exited the building and got into his 

truck, which was parked near the shop. Id., ¶ 45. Decedent started his truck and moved 

it backwards as Wilson was passing near the rear of the truck. Id., ¶ 47, Doc. 92, ¶ 47. 

The parties dispute whether Decedent knew Wilson was behind the truck. Wilson 

approached the driver’s side of the vehicle and struck the driver’s side glass window, 

yelling “You don’t run me over,” “[g]et your ass over here right now,” and, after 

Decedent got out of the car, “[g]et on the fuckin’ ground right now.” Doc. 86, ¶¶ 50-52. 

Decedent got back into his vehicle and tried to close the door, but Wilson attempted to 

hold it open, pulling the armrest off. Id., ¶ 54. The door was pulled open and Decedent 

emerged and the two struggled for the next few seconds, Wilson telling Decedent to get 

on the ground and Decedent attempting to get back into the truck. Id. During the 

struggle, Wilson deployed his taser and the two struggled over the taser, falling to the 

ground. Id., ¶¶ 57-59. At some point Wilson lost the taser, pulled his duty weapon, and 

pointed it at Decedent. Id., ¶¶ 60, 63. Officer Wilson fired two shots, striking Decedent 

in the chest and the forehead. Id., ¶ 67. Decedent fell forward and landed face down. Id. 

The entire encounter lasted approximately four and a half minutes from the time Wilson 

arrived at the business to the gunshots. Decedent died as a result of the gunshot wounds. 

 

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 A .45 caliber Glock model handgun was later recovered from the passenger 

compartment of Decedent’s truck, loaded with 12 live rounds. Id., ¶ 69. Two witnesses 

claimed to see at least some portion of the struggle between Wilson and Decedent and 

both gave statements. Id., ¶¶ 71-83. 

II. Legal Standard. 

 A party seeking summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing 

the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] 

which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex 

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Summary judgment is appropriate if the 

evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, shows “that there is 

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment is also appropriate against a 

party who “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element 

essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at 

trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome 

of the suit will preclude the entry of summary judgment, and the disputed evidence only 

raises a genuine issue of fact “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a 

verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 

(1986). 

III. Analysis. 

 A. Assertion of § 1983 Claim by Surviving Daughters. 

 Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim fails because Decedent’s estate was 

not included as a plaintiff, and Plaintiffs, as third parties, did not assert a survival claim 

and cannot assert constitutional claims on Decedent’s behalf. Doc. 85 at 9. 

 Fourth Amendment rights are personal and may not be asserted vicariously. 

Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969). “[T]he general rule is that only the 

person whose Fourth Amendment rights were violated can sue to vindicate those rights.” 

Moreland v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 159 F.3d 365, 369 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing 

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Smith v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411, 1417 (9th Cir. 1987)). “In § 1983 actions, 

however, the survivors of an individual killed as a result of an officer’s excessive use of 

force may assert a Fourth Amendment claim on that individual’s behalf if the relevant 

state’s law authorizes a survival action.” Moreland, 159 F.3d at 369 (citing 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1988(a); Smith, 818 F.2d at 1416–17). “The party seeking to bring a survival action 

bears the burden of demonstrating that a particular state’s law authorizes a survival action 

and that the plaintiff meets that state’s requirements for bringing a survival action.” 

Moreland, 159 F.3d at 369. 

 Arizona law authorizes survival actions, but Plaintiffs did not bring a survival 

action, most likely because only representatives of the estate may bring such an action. 

See A.R.S. § 14-3110. Plaintiffs do not purport to represent the estate. Plaintiffs do appear 

to assert that they can bring a § 1983 claim on behalf of Decedent because they are his 

children (Doc. 93 at 11), but Plaintiffs cite no authority for this proposition. When a 

Fourth Amendment violation forms the basis of a § 1983 claim, and the state has a 

survival statute, such a claim can be asserted by the estate, but not by children of the 

victim merely by virtue of their status as children. Smith v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d 

1411, 1417 (9th Cir. 1987) (“The children were not directly subjected to the excessive 

use of state force and therefore cannot maintain personal causes of action under section 

1983 in reliance on this Fourth Amendment theory.”) (overruled on other grounds by 

Hodgers-Durgin v. de la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037, 1040 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1999)). Plaintiffs 

cannot, therefore, assert § 1983 claims based on a Fourth Amendment theory. 

 A claim of excessive force under § 1983 has also been recognized as a substantive 

due process claim. Smith, 818 F.2d at 1417. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 

Clause applies to governmental actions that impermissibly deprive one of a life, liberty, 

or property interest of constitutional magnitude. Moreland, 159 F.3d at 370 (citing Board 

of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569–70 (1972); Wedges/Ledges of Cal., Inc. v. City of 

Phoenix, 24 F.3d 56, 62 (9th Cir. 1994)). The Ninth Circuit has recognized that “adult 

and minor children ha[ve] a cognizable liberty interest in their relationship with their 

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father.” Smith, 818 F.2d at 1419. Plaintiffs in this case, however, do not allege that the 

Decedent’s death deprived them of “his love, comfort, and support,” as was alleged in 

Smith. Id. The complaint alleges only that the excessive force killed Mr. Foust; it says 

nothing about injuries suffered by his daughters. Where a party has “identified no life, 

liberty, or property interest of which they were deprived,” the only potential claims are 

those on behalf of the Decedent’s estate. Moreland, 159 F.3d at 370-71. And as noted 

above, claims on behalf of Decedent’s estate have not been properly asserted in this case. 

 B. Motion to Amend. 

 Plaintiffs seek leave to amend their complaint to add the Personal Representative 

(“PR”) of Decedent’s estate as a plaintiff. Doc. 91. While acknowledging that the 

Court’s deadline for amending pleadings passed some seven months before the motion to 

amend was filed,2

 Plaintiffs assert that a “late and wholly unexpected discovery” that 

Toni Foust and Decedent were never legally married, followed by what they allege was 

months of confusion and dissention within the family, prevented them from adding the 

PR until now. Doc. 91 at 1-2. Defendants argue that there is no good cause for 

Plaintiffs’ delay, as Plaintiffs knew about the illegitimacy of the marriage for at least six 

months before they sought to have a PR appointed, and that they made a strategic 

decision not to include the estate as a plaintiff at the outset of the case. Doc. 96. 

Defendants also argue that they will be unduly prejudiced by the addition of the estate as 

a party. Id. 

 When a party seeks leave to amend after the deadline for doing so has passed, the 

Court is confronted with a two-step inquiry: (1) whether Plaintiffs have demonstrated 

“good cause” to modify the Case Management Order under Rule 16(b)(4) of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure, and (2) whether Plaintiffs’ proposed amendment should be 

granted under Rule 15. 

 

 

2

 The Case Management Order set the deadline to add parties as March 30, 2013. Plaintiffs filed their motion to amend on January 30, 2014. 

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 Deadlines established in a case management order may “be modified only for 

good cause[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4); see Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 

F.2d 604, 608 (9th Cir. 1992). “Good cause” exists when a deadline “cannot reasonably 

be met despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 

Advisory Comm.’s Notes (1983 Am.). Thus, “Rule 16(b)’s ‘good cause’ standard 

primarily considers the diligence of the party seeking the amendment.” Johnson, 975 

F.2d at 609; see also Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271, 1294 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Where that party has not been diligent, the inquiry ends. Zivkovic v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 

302 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2002); Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609. 

 Plaintiffs argue that “once the unexpected situation was discovered, Plaintiff 

moved as swiftly as possible to correct the potential problem.” Doc. 91 at 9. Plaintiffs 

assert that they did not discover that the marriage was invalid until June, 2013 – three 

months after the amendment deadline. At that point, Plaintiffs assert, there were 

“competing claims to the estate” and “a breakdown in the working relationship” between 

Toni and her two stepdaughters, the other Plaintiffs in the case. Doc. 97 at 6. Plaintiffs 

assert that they attempted to initiate probate of the estate throughout the summer of 2013, 

and contacted opposing counsel to inform them of their plans to appoint a PR and amend 

the complaint. Doc. 97-1 at 3. 

 The Court cannot conclude, however, that Plaintiffs acted diligently. Plaintiffs 

concede that they learned in late June of 2013 that Toni was not legally married to 

Decedent. Indeed, Plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss Toni from the case on July 1, 2013. 

Doc. 67. Despite this knowledge, Plaintiffs allowed the fact discovery deadline to pass 

on July 26, 2013, the expert disclosure and deposition deadlines to pass later in 2013, the 

summary judgment deadline to pass on December 13, 2013, and another six weeks to 

pass before they filed a motion to amend their complaint. It was not until after 

Defendants had filed a motion for summary judgment identifying the defect in Plaintiffs’ 

case that they even sought appointment of the PR. Plaintiffs argue that internal family 

issues caused the delay, but they do not explain why these issues prevented them from 

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seeking appointment of the PR and amendment of the complaint, or why they were able 

to act within one week to seek appointment of the PR after Defendants filed their motion 

for summary judgment. Nor do they explain why they allowed seven months to elapse 

without advising the Court that a key party to the case was missing and they would need 

to amend the complaint as soon as the PR was appointed. The Court is not persuaded that 

Plaintiffs acted diligently to resolve the issue that became apparent in June of 2013. 

 Even if the Court did find good cause for the late motion to amend, the motion 

would not pass muster under Rule 15. Although the Court “should freely give leave 

[to amend] when justice so requires,” the liberal policy in favor of amendments under 

Rule 15 has limitations. Motions to amend should not be granted if there has been 

(1) undue delay, (2) bad faith or dilatory motives on the part of the movant, (3) repeated 

failure to cure deficiencies by previous amendments, (4) undue prejudice to the opposing 

party, or (5) futility of the proposed amendment. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 

(1962); see U.S. ex rel. Lee v. SmithKline Beecham, Inc., 245 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 

2001). 

 Plaintiff’s request to amend comes after fact and expert discovery in the case have 

been completed and Defendant’s motion for summary judgment has been filed. 

Defendants have credibly shown that their strategy in discovery and motion practice was 

focused on the existing Plaintiffs and the § 1983 claims asserted in the case. Doc. 96 at 

9-10. To permit Plaintiffs to add a new party and change the legal nature of the § 1983 

claim at this late stage would unduly prejudice Defendants. 

 The motion to amend is denied. The Court will enter summary judgment on 

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims. 

 B. Wrongful Death Claim. 

 Plaintiffs assert state wrongful death claims. “In the usual case in which all 

federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors . . . will point toward 

declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims,” Carnegie-Mellon 

Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988) (citing United Mine Workers of America v. 

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Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966)). Nevertheless, “a federal district court with power to 

hear state law claims has discretion to keep, or to decline to keep, them under the 

conditions set out in [28 U.S.C.] § 1367(c).” Munger v. City of Glasgow Police Dep’t, 

227 F.3d 1082, 1089 (9th Cir. 2000). The Court’s decision whether to dismiss such 

claims should be informed by the values “of economy, convenience, fairness, and 

comity.” Acri v. Varian Assoc., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1001 (9th Cir. 1997) supplemented, 

121 F.3d 714 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Allen, 92 F.3d at 846; Executive Software N. Am. v. 

United States Dist. Court, 24 F.3d 1545, 1557 (9th Cir. 1994)). Because the wrongful 

death claims are factually similar to and based on substantially the same allegations as the 

§ 1983 claims, and because discovery in this case has closed and the Court is familiar 

with the record that has been developed, the Court will retain jurisdiction over these 

claims. 

 Defendants move for summary judgment on the wrongful death claim, arguing 

that there is a statutory presumption under Arizona law that an officer acts reasonably in 

using physical or deadly force when the officer protects himself from the use of physical 

force, and that the evidence is clear that Plaintiffs cannot overcome this presumption. 

Doc. 85 at 21 (citing ARS s. 12-716(A)(1)). Defendants also argue that “no reasonable 

jury could conclude that Officer Wilson acted unreasonably under the circumstances,” 

that Officer Wilson’s actions were justified as a matter of law, and that he cannot be held 

liable for engaging in justified conduct. Doc. 85 at 22 (citing A.R.S. § 13-413; Marquez 

v. City of Phoenix, 693 F.3d 1167, 1176 (9th Cir. 2012); Austin v. City of Scottsdale, 684 

P.2d 151, 153-54 (Ariz. 1984)). 

 Under Arizona law, an action for wrongful death is a statutory negligence action, 

requiring a showing that the tortfeasor breached a reasonable standard of care. Walsh v. 

Advanced Cardiac Specialists Chartered, 273 P.3d 645, 648 (Ariz. 2012); Porter v. 

Arizona Dep’t of Corr., 2:09-CV-2479-HRH, 2012 WL 7180482, at *3 (D. Ariz. 

Sept. 17, 2012). Plaintiffs have submitted expert testimony that Officer Wilson violated 

the standard of care; Defendants’ expert disagrees. Docs. 86, ¶¶ 62, 65; 92, ¶¶ 62, 65, 

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191-93. This factual dispute must be resolved by the jury, not the Court. 

 Further, the Court cannot accept Defendants’ argument that A.R.S. § 13-410(C)(1) 

provides justification for Wilson’s actions as a matter of law. The statute provides that 

“[t]he use of deadly force by a peace officer against another is justified . . . only when the 

peace officer reasonably believes that it is necessary . . . [t]o defend himself or a third 

person from what the peace officer reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of 

deadly physical force.” Id. Again, Plaintiffs’ and Defendants’ experts disagree on 

whether a reasonable officer would have believed Wilson’s actions were necessary. 

Docs. 86, ¶¶ 62, 65; 92, ¶¶ 62, 65, 191-93. This factual dispute precludes summary 

judgment. 

 C. Punitive Damages. 

 Defendants seek summary judgment on Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages. 

Doc. 85 at 22. They argue that a municipality cannot be liable for punitive damages on 

claims under § 1983 or for wrongful death, and public employees sued in their official 

capacities are immune from punitive damages. A.R.S. § 12-820.04; Mitchell v. Dupnik, 

75 F.3d 517, 527 (9th Cir. 1996). Plaintiffs argue that they have submitted sufficient 

evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Officer Wilson acted with the 

intent to harm Decedent, as well as evidence from which the jury could conclude that 

Chief Dennis was aware of and recklessly ignored Officer Wilson’s pattern of erratic and 

malicious behavior. Doc. 93 at 22. 

 The only claims remaining in this case are state law claims. Arizona law holds 

that “[n]either a public entity nor a public employee acting within the scope of his 

employment is liable for punitive or exemplary damages.” A.R.S. § 12-820.04. Punitive 

damages, therefore, are not available. 

 IT IS ORDERED: 

 1. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. 85) is granted in part 

and denied in part. 

 2. Plaintiff’s motion to amend (Doc. 91) is denied. 

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3. Defendants’ motion to file Exhibit F in non-electronic format (Doc. 84) is 

granted. 

 4. The Court will set a final pretrial conference by separate order. 

 Dated this 6th day of May, 2014. 

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