Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00629/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00629-14/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 16:1538 Endangered Species Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

HOME BUILDERS ASSOCIATION OF

NORTHERN CALIFORNIA, BUILDING

INDUSTRY LEGAL DEFENSE

FOUNDATION, CALIFORNIA

BUILDING INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION,

CALIFORNIA STATE GRANGE, and

GREENHORN GRANGE,

NO. CIV. S-05-0629 WBS-GGH

Plaintiffs,

and

CITY OF SUISUN, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Plaintiff-Intervenor,

and

TSAKOPOULOS INVESTMENTS, 

TSAKOPOULOS FAMILY TRUST, 

DROSOULA TSAKOPOULOS, and 

GEORGE TSAKOPOULOS,

Plaintiff-Intervenors,

v.

UNITED STATES FISH AND

WILDLIFE SERVICE; H. DALE

HALL, Director of the United

States Fish and Wildlife

Service; UNITED STATES

DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR; and

GALE A. NORTON, Secretary of

the United States Department

of Interior,

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Defendants,

and

DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, BUTTE 

ENVIRONMENTAL COUNCIL, AND 

CALIFORNIA NATIVE PLANT 

SOCIETY,

Defendant-Intervenors.

 

BUTTE ENVIRONMENTAL COUNCIL, 

DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, 

CALIFORNIA NATIVE PLANT 

SOCIETY, SAN JOAQUIN RAPTOR AND 

WILDLIFE RESCUE CENTER, SIERRA 

FOOTHILLS AUDUBON SOCIETY, and 

VERNALPOOLS.ORG,

Plaintiffs,

v.

GALE A. NORTON, Secretary of 

the Interior, and U.S. FISH 

AND WILDLIFE SERVICE,

Defendants.

 

----oo0oo----

Plaintiffs brought this action pursuant to the

Endangered Species Act (“ESA”), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531 et seq.; the

National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et

seq.; and the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. §§

701 et seq. Plaintiffs challenge the United States Fish and

Wildlife Service’s (hereafter “FWS”) critical habitat designation

of over 800,000 acres of land in California and Oregon for

fifteen vernal pool species. Currently pending before the court

are five cross-motions for summary judgment filed by plaintiffs,

Home Builders Association of Northern California, et al. (“Home

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In enacting 16 U.S.C. § 1533 of the Endangered Species 1

Act, Congress directed that the Secretary of Commerce shall

determine whether species are threatened or endangered species,

and inform the Secretary of the Interior of such determinations. 

In turn, the Secretary of Interior shall list species that are

threatened or endangered and “designate any habitat of such

species which is then considered to be critical habitat.” 16

U.S.C. § 1533.

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Builders”); plaintiffs and defendant-intervenors, Butte

Environmental Council, et al. (“Environmental Groups”);

plaintiff-intervenor, the City of Suisun (“Suisun”); plaintiffintervenors Tsakopoulos Investments, et al. (“Tsakopoulos

Investments”); and defendants, the United States Fish and

Wildlife Service, H. Dale Hall, and Gale A. Norton (“Federal

Defendants”). Defendant-intervenor, Placer Ranch, Inc. (“Placer

Ranch”) filed an opposition to the Environmental Group’s motion

for summary judgment. Also pending before the court is a motion

to strike filed by the Federal Defendants. 

I. Factual and Procedural History

Beginning in 1978 and continuing through 1997, pursuant

to the Endangered Species Act, the FWS listed as endangered

fifteen species of plants and animals that live in vernal pool

environments. See 43 Fed. Reg. 44,810 (Sept. 28, 1978); 57 Fed. 1

Reg. 24,192 (June 8, 1992); 59 Fed. Reg. 48,136 (Sept. 19, 1994);

62 Fed. Reg. 14,338 (Mar. 26, 1997); 62 Fed. Reg. 33,029 (June

18, 1997). The fifteen species are four crustaceans (the

Conservancy fairy shrimp, the longhorn fairy shrimp, the vernal

pool fairy shrimp, and the vernal pool tadpole shrimp), and

eleven plants (the Butte County meadowfoam, Contra Costa

goldfields, Hoover’s spurge, succulent or fleshy owl’s clover,

Colusa grass, Greene’s tuctoria, hairy Orcutt grass, Sacramento

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Orcutt grass, San Joaquin Valley Orcutt grass, slender Orcutt

grass, and Solano grass). 67 Fed. Reg. 59,884 (Sept. 24, 2002). 

These fifteen species are distributed in vernal pool complexes

located throughout southern Oregon, parts of California, and

parts of northern Mexico. 70 Fed. Reg. 46,925 (Aug. 11, 2005).

A. The Vernal Pool Habitat 

The vernal pool ecosystem in which these species are

found is a unique form of wetland that is rendered distinctive by

its temporary existence. 67 Fed. Reg. at 59,884. Vernal pools

typically form when precipitation pools above a soil layer that

is virtually impermeable to water. Id. at 59,885. The pools

usually occur in complexes, or clusters, that are fed with water

by “low drainage pathways” called swales. Id. They are

generally found in Mediterranean climates that have dry seasons

when evaporation exceeds rainfall, and wet seasons with mild

temperatures, during which animals and plants reach maturity and

reproduce. Id. Vernal pools cycle through four different

phases: the wetting phase, when the soil becomes saturated; the

aquatic phase, when the pool is filled with water; the waterlogged drying phase, when the water begins to evaporate and seep

into the surrounding soil, keeping the soil moist; and the dry

phase, when the pool has disappeared and the soil becomes

completely dry. Id. Because the existence of a pool is

dependent on rainfall, there are years when vernal pools fill to

a lesser or greater extent, and years when they do not fill at

all. Id. This feature of the ecosystem effectively excludes

fish and other predators, and allows species that can survive

during the dry phase to flourish in their absence. Id. at

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59,884.

Many of the nutrients on which the vernal pools depend

come from detritus, organic matter that washes into the pools

through the swales from nearby uplands. 70 Fed. Reg. at 46,925. 

The four crustacean species consume detritus as one of their

primary sources of food. Id. The crustacean species inhabiting

vernal pools have also adapted to the dry phase of their

environment by developing a dormant stage. Id. at 59,887. After

being fertilized, the eggs develop a thick shell with many

layers. Id. At a late stage of embryonic development, the

embryo stops growing and its metabolism slows dramatically, and

the egg becomes known as a “cyst.” Id. In its desiccated state,

a cyst can remain viable for many years and is able to withstand

fire, freezing, temperatures near boiling, oxygen deprivation,

and exposure to enzymes inside another animal’s digestive tract. 

Id. It is not clear what signals the cysts to hatch, but not all

dormant cysts will hatch in a given season–-some cysts will

remain dormant, thus protecting against complete reproductive

failure if the vernal pool dries up prematurely. Id. at 59,887. 

Vernal pool plants are similarly well-adapted to the

vernal pool environment. They are annuals, which means that they

germinate, grow, and propagate in the span of a year. Id. at

59,889. Much like the cysts of the vernal pool crustaceans,

vernal pool plants produce seeds that may remain dormant, but

still viable, for many years; additionally, there is a “seed

bank” of dormant seeds continuously maintained to ensure survival

in the event that the aquatic stage of the pool ends prematurely. 

Id. Vernal pool plants are able to resist invasion by non-native

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plants because of the severe conditions ensure that native plants

are uniquely able to survive. Id. at 59,885. 

The physical, geographic, and biological

characteristics of vernal pools are somewhat varied, and for this

reason, scientists have developed different classifications for

vernal pools based on the nature of the underlying soil layer

that traps the water and enables the pools to form. Id. at

59,886 (citation omitted). Vernal pool habitats are jeopardized

by urban development, encroachment upon the water supply,

activities to control flooding, and the conversion of land to

agricultural use. Id. at 59,889.

B. The Critical Habitat Designation

In September, 1994, when the FWS listed four species of

fairy shrimp as endangered, it determined that critical habitat

designation for the fairy shrimp was “not prudent” because “such

designation likely would increase the degree of threat from

vandalism or other human activities.” 59 Fed. Reg. at 48,151. 

In February, 2001, this court joined other courts’ findings in

determining that the FWS’ deviation from its statutory mandate to

designate critical habitat, concurrently with the listing of a

species as endangered, violated the APA. Butte Envtl. Council v.

White, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1185 (E.D. Cal. 2001). At that

time, this court ordered the defendants to designate critical

habitat for the Conservancy fairy shrimp, longhorn fairy shrimp,

vernal pool fairy shrimp, and the vernal pool tadpole shrimp, and

publish its final designation by August 15, 2001. Id. However,

on July 23, 2001, the parties stipulated to a one-year extension

for the critical habitat designation and the additional

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designation of critical habitat for eleven vernal pool plant

species. Butte Envtl. Council v. Norton, slip op., 04-0096, at 3

(N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2004). The FWS did not comply with this

deadline. Id.

The FWS published a proposed rule to designate

1,662,762 acres of critical habitat for the fifteen vernal pool

species on September 24, 2002. 67 Fed. Reg. 59,884. The

proposed rule excluded land from the critical habitat designation

if the economic benefits of exclusion were found to outweigh the

economic benefits of inclusion, if areas were already under the

supervision of the state (e.g., areas within National Wildlife

Refuges), or if the lands belonged to the Department of Defense

or a Native American tribe. 68 Fed. Reg. at 46,746-54. 

Pursuant to a settlement agreement, the FWS was to

issue a critical habitat designation by July, 2003. The FWS

issued an “initial” final critical habitat designation on August

6, 2003, that diminished the amount of critical habitat by more

than one million acres. 68 Fed. Reg. 46,684; see Butte Envtl.

Council, No. 04-0096 at 4. In January, 2004, Environmental

Groups challenged these exclusions from the critical habitat

designation in this court. Butte Envtl. Council, No. 04-0096, at

4. The court remanded for reconsideration, but did not set aside

the critical habitat designation in the interim. Id. Instead,

the court required that the FWS “reconsider the exclusions from

the final designation of critical habitat for the 15 vernal pool

species, with the exception of those lands within the five

California counties that were excluded based on potential

economic impacts, and publish a new final determination as to

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those lands within 120 days.” Id. Additionally, the FWS was to

“reconsider the exclusion of the five California counties based

on potential economic impacts and publish a new final

determination no later than July 31, 2005.” Id. 

On December 28, 2004, the FWS published notice that it

would reopen the comment period and solicit public comment on the

economic and non-economic exclusions of land made in the proposed

rule published on September 24, 2002. 69 Fed. Reg. 77,700,

77,702-03 (Dec. 28, 2004). This comment period occurred in two

parts–-the FWS accepted comments on the non-economic exclusions

and on the fifteen vernal pool species first, and then on the

economic exclusions. Id. at 77,700. On March 8, 2005, the FWS

confirmed its non-economic exclusion determinations in the

August, 2003, final rule. 70 Fed. Reg. 11,140 (Mar. 8, 2005). 

On June 30, 2005, the FWS published notice of a consulting firm’s

economic analysis of the critical habitat designation proposed in

2002, which concluded that the designation would cost $992

million over the next twenty years. 70 Fed. Reg. at 37,739. The

consulting firm also ranked the census tracts based on the

opportunity costs that would result if they were designated as

critical habitat. 70 Fed. Reg. at 37,740. 

In its June 30 notice, the FWS noted that it was

contemplating the exclusion of either 20, 35, or 50 of the census

tracts that would suffer the greatest economic impact. 70 Fed.

Reg. at 37,740. Accordingly, the FWS solicited additional

comments on this economic analysis for twenty days. Id. at

37,741. The comment period was abbreviated to ensure compliance

with the July 31, 2005, deadline set by this court for a final

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designation. Id.

On August 11, 2005, the FWS published its final rule

designating approximately 858,846 acres of critical habitat in 34

California counties and one county in southern Oregon. 70 Fed.

Reg. 46,924 (Aug. 11, 2005). This final rule excluded the 20

census tracts that would suffer the greatest economic impact,

along with three for which the economic benefits of exclusion

outweighed the benefits of inclusion. Id. at 46,931-32, 46,948-

52. On February 10, 2006, the FWS published an administrative

rule that more specifically indicated the species-specific unit

descriptions and maps for the protected species. 71 Fed. Reg.

7,119 (Feb. 10, 2006). 

II. Discussion

In their cross-motion for summary judgment, the Federal

Defendants argue that the court is divested of jurisdiction over

certain claims brought by Home Builders, Tsakopoulos Investments,

and Suisun because of a failure to give 60-days notice to the

agency of their respective claims. The Environmental Groups echo

these arguments with respect to certain claims brought by

plaintiffs Home Builders. The court will address these arguments

first, as it must entertain jurisdictional matters before all

others. Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 709

F.2d 597, 600 (9th Cir. 1983).

A. Jurisdiction

1. Notice Requirement under the ESA

The Endangered Species Act (ESA) authorizes citizen

suits under 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44. The section that is relevant

here, 1540(g)(2)(A)(i), authorizes citizen suits with the

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following limitation: “No action may be commenced under

subparagraph (1)(A) of this section . . . prior to sixty days

after written notice of the violation has been given to the

Secretary, and to any alleged violator of any such provision or

regulation . . . .” Compliance with this provision of the ESA is

a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing suit. Sw. Ctr. for

Biological Diversity v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 143 F.3d 515,

520 (9th Cir. 1998). “A failure to strictly comply with the

notice requirement acts as an absolute bar to bringing suit under

the ESA.” Id. (citing Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S.

20, 26-28 (1989); Lone Rock Timber Co. v. U.S. Dept. of Interior,

842 F. Supp. 433, 440 (D. Or. 1994)) (emphasis added). 

Accordingly, “[t]he citizen suit notice requirements cannot be

avoided by employing a ‘flexible or pragmatic construction.’” 

Kern County Farm Bureau v. Badgley, No. 02-5376, 2002 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 24125, at *20 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2002) (quoting Hallstrom,

493 U.S. at 26). 

Although claims against the Secretary that do not fall

within the scope of the ESA may be brought under the APA, 5

U.S.C. § 704, this section “authorizes review only when ‘there is

no other adequate remedy in a court.’” Bennett v. Spear, 520

U.S. 154, 173-74, 161-162 (quoting 5 U.S.C § 704). Thus, if a

claim falls within the scope of the citizen-suit provision, that

is, if it alleges violations of § 1533, the APA is unavailable

and cannot be used to circumvent the ESA’s notice requirements. 

See Hawaii County Green Party v. Clinton, 124 F. Supp. 2d 1173,

1193 (D. Hawaii 2000) (“Although the APA does not contain the 60

day notice provision, a plaintiff cannot claim that the suit

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falls under the APA in order to avoid the notice requirement . .

. . A rule that allowed a plaintiff to choose between bringing a

claim under the APA or the ESA would allow plaintiffs to

circumvent the 60 day notice requirements of the ESA.”). 

2. Plaintiffs Home Builders

The Federal Defendants contend that the court lacks

jurisdiction over Home Builders’ fifth and sixth causes of action

because they failed to give 60 days’ notice to the Secretary

about the substance of those claims. The Environmental Groups

make the same argument with regard to claims one, two, and three.

In November and December, 2004, plaintiffs Home

Builders sent Federal Defendants notice of their intent to

challenge the August, 2003 Final Rule. (Doc. # 31, Ex. 1 & 2

(Home Builders’ Notice to FWS).) Home Builders listed six legal

challenges, including two challenges that are relevant here--

namely, that Federal Defendants failed to conduct the required

exclusion analysis in violation of § 1533(b)(2) and failed to

adequately evaluate the economic impact of designating critical

habitat, also in violation of § 1533(b)(2). (See id., Ex. 1 at

6.) Subsequently, Federal Defendants reopened the public comment

period with respect to the economic analysis and the exclusions

in the August, 2003 Final Rule, prompted by an order from this

court. In August, 2005, Federal Defendants published the 2005

Final Rule designating critical habitat.

Upon review of the record, it is apparent that the 2005

Final Rule is a hybrid of new analysis and previous analysis

taken from the 2003 Rule. The record reflects that the 2003 Rule

was adapted and revised after the Federal Defendants reexamined

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Although Home Builders’ sixth claim for relief alleges 2

that Federal Defendants improperly limited their exclusion

analysis to twenty-three of the most affected census tracts,

which plaintiffs admit was not expressly noticed, plaintiffs’

noticed arguments regarding the FWS’ approach to cost-benefit

analysis apply with equal force to this claim. 

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the exclusions and economic impact. See 70 Fed. Reg. 46,924

(Aug. 11, 2005) (“We, the [FWS], have re-evaluated the economic

analysis made in our previous final rule . . . .”); 70 Fed. Reg.

11,140 (Mar. 8, 2005) (“We, the [FWS], confirm the non-economic

exclusions made to our previous final rule . . . .”).

For the reasons discussed below, the court concludes

that Home Builders’ notice was sufficient. Home Builders’ notice

specifically alleged that Federal Defendants failed to make

proper exclusions and failed to appropriately analyze the

economic impact of the designation. Home Builders subsequently

filed suit alleging a claim for failure to adequately evaluate

economic impacts of the critical habitat designation (claim five)

and a claim for failure to properly conduct the mandatory

exclusion analysis (claim six). (See Pls. Home Builders’ First

Am. Compl. ¶ 13.) A simple comparison between the allegations in

the notice and the allegations in the complaint reveal that the

Federal Defendants had notice of Home Builders’ intentions. 

2

As discussed previously, the purpose of the notice

requirement is to give the federal government an opportunity to

comply with the allegations, thereby rendering a citizen suit

unnecessary. Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1068, 1072

(9th Cir. 1996). Implicit in the notice provision is that,

should the Federal agency not comply or rectify the violation,

the citizen will bring suit. That is exactly what happened here:

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Federal Defendants failed to rectify the alleged violations in a

manner satisfactory to Home Builders. It does not follow,

however, that Home Builders must now file a new notice of intent

to sue.

For the purposes of the notice requirement, it is 

sufficient that Home Builders gave Federal Defendants notice of

the issues they would pursue in litigation and subsequently filed

suit on those exact issues. There is certainly no statutory

language in the ESA citizen-suit provisions that requires a

citizen to renew their notice each and every time the FWS

reevaluates its previous rule. In Marbled Murrelet, plaintiff

filed a notice that did not clearly delineate which section of

the ESA the defendant allegedly violated. The court determined

that although the relevant section of the statute was “referenced

in only one part of the letter, the letter as a whole provided

notice sufficient to afford the opportunity to rectify the

asserted ESA violations[, and t]his was sufficient to satisfy the

jurisdictional requirement of notice.” Id. at 1074. 

Additionally, in relation to the Clean Water Act, which has a 60-

day notice provision that is similar to the ESA, the Ninth

Circuit has held that a notice given before the rule it

challenged was amended, which substantially provided the agency

with the requisite notice, did not need to be re-filed. Natural

Resources Def. Council v. Sw. Marine, Inc., 236 F.3d 985, 996

(9th Cir. 2000). 

Similarly, Home Builders’ letter to Federal Defendants

“as a whole provided notice sufficient to afford” Federal

Defendants the opportunity to rectify the violations. The fact

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that Federal Defendants attempted to respond to the allegations

to some degree does not mean that Home Builders must refile a

notice to sue. See Water Keeper Alliance v. U.S. Dept. of

Defense, 152 F. Supp. 2d 163, 174 (1st Cir. 2001) (concluding

that an environmental group’s notice of intent to sue Department

of Defense under the ESA regarding a biological opinion was

adequate notice, even where a new biological assessment was

issued in the interim--the notice made clear that group intended

to challenge an ongoing delinquency in the preparation of a

biological assessment).

Southwest Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S.

Bureau of Reclamation, on which Federal Defendants rely, is

distinguishable. 143 F.3d 515, 521 (9th Cir. 1998). There, the

court concluded that none of plaintiff’s notice letters informed

the Service that plaintiff had a grievance about the specific

habitat at issue in the litigation. The court found that, as a

result of this deficiency, “neither party was able to resolve

that particular grievance in the litigation-free window provided

for under the ESA notice provision.” Id. The court explained

that the plaintiff “was obligated to provide sufficient

information of a violation so that the [FWS] could identify and

attempt to abate the violation.” Id. 

Likewise, Moden v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service does 

not support Federal Defendants’ contention that Home Builders did

not provide defendants with sufficient notice. 281 F. 

Supp. 2d 1193, 1206 (D. Or. 2003). In Moden, the plaintiffs’

initial notice charged the agency with a duty to remove certain

endangered species from the list. Id. at 1205. However, the

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agency had not considered, let alone rejected, the petition to

delist the species, so the plaintiffs’ notice that it would sue

the agency for committing an unlawful action was premature. Id.

at 1206. Finally, Federal Defendants cite a decision by Judge

Ishii that is expressly distinguishable from this case. In Kern

County Farm Bureau v. Badgley, the plaintiff filed notice of its

intent to sue the agency for a final rule regarding the listing

of an endangered species before the agency’s final rule issued. 

No. 02-5376, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24125, at *35-36 (E.D. Cal.

Oct. 10, 2002). Distinguishing Natural Resources Defense

Council, Judge Ishii indicated that “[t]his is not a case in

which the Secretary submitted two final rules–-one before the

notice letter was sent and one afterwards.” Id. at *36.

Here, Home Builders filed its notice with regard to a

final rule promulgated by the agency, and the final rule was

amended after the notice was filed. Home Builders’ notice

clearly informed the Federal Defendants of the very allegations

Home Builders planned to raise, and subsequently did raise, in

the instant litigation. The fact that the parties’ use of the

“litigation-free” window failed to resolve Home Builders

allegations does not render Home Builders’ notice moot. Rather,

it merely signifies that the parties failed to reach an agreement

to resolve the dispute. For these reasons, the court concludes

that Home Builders complied with the notice requirement, and this

court therefore has jurisdiction over the claims in their

complaint.

3. Plaintiff-Intervenors Tsakopoulos Investments

The Federal Defendants further argue that Tsakopoulos

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Investments did not provide the FWS with notice of its claims 60

days before bringing suit, as required under the ESA. 

Tsakopoulos Investments sent notice to the FWS on March 6, 2006. 

(Kate O’Leary Decl. Ex. 4 (Formal Petition to the FWS) (Doc.

#68).) Tsakopoulos Investments filed suit and moved to intervene

in the case on March 14, 2006, only eight days after providing

the Secretary with notice. Tsakopoulos Invs. v. Allen, slip op.,

No. 06-542 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2006); (Mar. 14, 2006 Mot. to

Intervene as Pls.).

Tsakopoulos Investments maintains that its claims were

brought pursuant to the APA and not the ESA because the “ESA does

not provide a cause of action in situations like this, where the

Fish and Wildlife Service has executed its mandatory duty to

designate critical habitat, but has done so in an arbitrary and

capricious manner.” (Tsakopoulos’ Reply 3:12-25.) In making

this argument, Tsakopoulos Investments incorrectly contends that

it can avoid the ESA’s notice requirement by manipulating the

nature of claims that arise under the ESA. See Hawaii County

Green Party, 124 F. Supp. 2d at 1193 (D. Hawaii 2000) (concluding

that “a particular claim may only be brought under either the APA

or the ESA--a plaintiff may not chose her statutory weapon”).

Tsakopoulos Investments further misconstrues what

constitutes a “non-discretionary decision.” Contrary to

Tsakopoulos Investments’ contentions, the terms of § 1533 are

“plainly those of obligation rather than discretion.” Assoc. of

Cal. Water Agencies (“ACWA”) v. Evans, 386 F.3d 879, 883 (9th

Cir. 2004). Among other things, the statute states that the

“Secretary shall designate critical habitat . . . on the basis of

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the best scientific data available and after taking into

consideration the economic impact. . . .” § 1533(b)(2) (emphasis

added). In other words, § 1533 sets out required considerations

for the determination of critical habitat and the section is

crafted in mandatory language. 

In Bennett v. Spear, the Supreme Court confirmed that

the citizen suit provisions of the ESA apply to allegations that

the Service ignored requisite considerations set forth by § 1533. 

520 U.S. at 171-72. As in this case, the plaintiffs in Bennett

challenged an FWS decision on the basis that defendants had

failed to take into account the possible economic impact of the

decision, as specifically required by § 1533. In Bennett, the

government argued that the citizen suit provision did not apply

to the failure to consider economic impact. The court rejected

that argument and confirmed that § 1533 sets forth mandatory,

non-discretionary requirements, that terms stating that the

Secretary “shall” take specific action “are plainly those of

obligation rather than discretion,” and that claims alleging

failure to comply with such a mandate come within §

1540(g)(1)(C). Id. 

Similarly, plaintiffs’ allegations here invoke the

requirements of § 1533. Indeed, a plain reading of Tsakopoulos

Investments’ complaint reveals allegations of the Federal

Defendants’ failure to take specific actions that are “plainly

those of obligation rather than discretion.” Id. As the Federal

Defendants point out, Tsakopoulos Investments’ third cause of

action is almost identical to the issue presented in ACWA, in

which the Ninth Circuit concluded that the claim fell squarely

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within the scope of the citizen suit provision. 386 F.3d at 884.

The Ninth Circuit concluded that the failure to conduct an

economic review pursuant to § 1533 (b)(2) was a claim governed by

the citizen suit provision of the ESA. See id. Tsakopoulos

Investments’ third cause of action alleges that Federal

Defendants violated the ESA by failing to adequately evaluate the

economic impact of designating critical habitat in violation of §

1533(b)(2). Thus, like the plaintiffs in ACWA, Tsakopoulos

Investments’ third claim seeks to enforce mandatory duties

imposed by the ESA, and this claim is therefore subject to the

notice requirement. 

The remainder of the claims in Tsakopoulos Investments’

complaint similarly refer to mandatory duties that the FWS must

perform under the ESA. Tsakopoulos Investments’ first claim

alleges that the Federal Defendants failed to adequately identify

physical or biological features essential to conservation, as

required by the ESA; the second claim also alleges that the

Federal Defendants failed to identify the geographic areas

identified by the species, as required by the ESA; the third

claim is for the failure to comply with the ESA’s direction that

“the Secretary shall designate critical habitat . . . after

taking into consideration the economic impact, the impact on

national security, and any other relevant impact;” the fourth

claim relates to the FWS’ failure to consider the best available

scientific and commercial data as required by the ESA; the fifth

claim relates to the failure to conduct the mandatory exclusion

analysis; and the sixth and seventh claims allege that the FWS

failed to adequately comply with the notice and comment

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In its seventh cause of action, Tsakopoulos Investments 3

does not clarify what statutory provision was violated by the

FWS’s failure to adequately respond to public comments, but it

alleges it arises under the APA. This claim could relate to the

failure to provide a meaningful notice and comment period and to

the economic exclusion analysis, both of which are mandatory

duties under the ESA that are subject to the notice requirement. 

However, because the statutory basis for the claim is somewhat

unclear, it may be that this claim alone is not subject to the

ESA’s notice requirement, and therefore may not be

jurisdictionally foreclosed. Even if Tsakopoulos Investments is

not barred from alleging the seventh claim in its complaint,

however, the claim is meritless. In this claim, Tsakopoulos

Investments alleges that,

 Defendants failed to adequately respond to 

significant comments, in violation of the 

APA. Defendants received Blueprint growth 

projections to 2025 by census tract for 

Sacramento County, but declined to use these 

growth figures in the August 2005 Final Rule. 

This failure to comply with the APA constitutes 

agency action that is arbitrary and 

capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 

otherwise not in accordance with law.

(Compl. ¶¶ 67-68.) Tsakopoulos Investments is referring to a

“vision” developed by the Sacramento Area Council of Government

(“SACOG”) regarding growth in Sacramento County over the next

fifty years, called a “Preferred Blueprint Alternative.” (Admin.

R. Vol. 2, Doc. # 291, at 17021719.) 

The FWS received this comment and considered it, but

ultimately rejected it as lacking merit. 70 Fed. Reg. at 46,931. 

The economic analysis the FWS commissioned was a twenty-year

analysis, not a fifty-year analysis like the Blueprint. 

Therefore, it would have been difficult to integrate the

Blueprint’s analysis into the existing analysis the FWS

conducted. Additionally, SACOG indicated that the Blueprint was

not in a form where it could be considered “likely to occur” 

(Admin. R. Vol. 2, Doc. # 291, at 17021707), and it was only a

version that would be prepared in the year 2030 that would

“represent the land use pattern that is most likely to be built

in the region.” (Id. at 17021707, 17, 19.) For these reasons,

even if the court had jurisdiction over this claim, it would

conclude that the FWS’s decision to disregard the Blueprint was

not arbitrary or capricious. 

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requirement as required by the APA and the ESA. (Id.) Thus, 3

the court concludes that the notice requirement applies to the

claims in Tsakopoulos Investments’ complaint. 

Tsakopoulos Investments additionally argues that the

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Federal Defendants contradict themselves by contending on the one

hand that the mandatory nature of their critical habitat

designation subjects Tsakopoulos Investments’ claims to the ESA’s

notice requirement, and on the other hand that this court should

review the agency decision under a discretionary standard. The

Supreme Court has rejected this very argument, explaining that:

[T]he fact that the Secretary’s ultimate decision is

reviewable only for abuse of discretion does not alter

the categorical requirement that, in arriving at his

decision, he “take into consideration the economic

impact, any other relevant impact” and “use the best

scientific data available.” It is rudimentary

administrative law that discretion as to the substance

of the ultimate decision does not confer discretion to

ignore the required procedures of decisionmaking.

Bennett, 520 U.S. at 172. 

The court further finds persuasive that on March 6,

2006, Tsakopoulos Investments sent Federal Defendants a letter in

which it stated, “[t]his letter also constitutes our 60-Day

Notice of Violation in accordance with 16 U.S.C. § 1540 (g)(2)(A)

and (c).” In this letter, Tsakopoulos Investments appears to

admit that the 60-day notice applied to its complaint and that it

was in fact bringing suit pursuant to the citizen suit provision

of the ESA. Yet, despite the apparent admission in this letter,

Tsakopoulos Investments filed its complaint only eight days

later. 

Finally, this conclusion is in keeping with the very

purpose of the citizen-suit provision, which is to give

defendants an “opportunity to review their actions and take

corrective measures if warranted. The provision therefore

provides an opportunity for settlement or other resolution of a

dispute without litigation.” Southwest Center, 143 F.3d at 520. 

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For these reasons, the court concludes that it lacks jurisdiction

over all causes of action alleged by Tsakopoulos Investments and

cannot consider their merits.

4. Plaintiff-Intervenor City of Suisun

The Federal Defendants also contend that the court

lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff-Intervenor City of Suisun’s

claims. On March 3, 2006, the court permitted intervention by

the City but restricted the City’s involvement “to raising

arguments which relate to the issues concerning the species which

are on the 88-acre parcel of land that is within the sphere of

influence and the area designated as critical habitat.” (Mar. 3,

2006 Order 5-6.) Plaintiff-intervenor City of Suisun alleges

eight claims for relief, the first seven of which refer to

mandatory duties for the FWS under 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3) &

(b)(2). As previously discussed, under the ESA, “any person may

commence a civil suit on his own behalf” beginning “sixty days

after written notice of the violation has been given to the

Secretary.” 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1) (emphasis added). The United

States Supreme Court has established that this notice requirement

is a mandatory condition precedent for suit, and that the

requirement is to be “strictly construed.” See Hallstrom, 493

U.S. at 26.

There is no indication that the City provided the

Secretary with the requisite 60-day notice. Instead, the City

alleges that “[p]laintiffs Home Builders Association et al.

timely provided Defendants written notice of violation in

accordance with 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(2)(C). The claims in the

City’s instant action were all raised by Plaintiffs Home Builders

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Because the City additionally has joined in plaintiffs 4

Home Builders’ motion for summary judgment, rather than filing

its own motion for summary judgment, there are no arguments

before the court on the City’s behalf. 

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Association et al.’s notice of violation and amendment thereto.” 

(Compl. ¶ 3.) Additionally, allowing Home Builders’ notice to 4

suffice as joint notice for the City of Suisun’s claims would

frustrate one of the primary purposes of the notice requirement–-

“the facilitation of a negotiated resolution.” Idaho Sporting

Congress, 952 F. Supp. 690, 695 (D. Idaho 1996). Finally, the

court’s order limiting the scope of the City’s claims expressly

provided that the claims only cover an 88-acre parcel land owned

by the City and designated as critical habitat. There is no

reference to this land in plaintiffs Home Builders’ notice (see

Home Builders’ Compl. Ex. 2), and therefore, even assuming that

notice by proxy is permissible, Home Builders’ notice would not

suffice to provide the Secretary with notice of the City’s

claims. 

Like the court in Kern County, this court is aware that

“a strict construction of the 60-day notice requirement may

appear to be inequitable and a waste of judicial resources.” 

2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24125, at *22 (citing Hallstrom, 493 U.S.

at 32; Washington Trout v. McCain Foods, Inc., 45 F.3d 1351,

1354-55 (9th Cir. 1995)). Yet, it is inescapable that, in this

situation, courts “lack authority to consider the equities.” Id.

Additionally, if this court exercised jurisdiction over claims

that had not been properly disclosed to and noticed before the

agency, the court “would usurp the right of the applicable

governmental agencies to evaluate and act upon the merits of the

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The only remaining claim by the City of Suisun is that 5

the critical habitat designation is void because of the FWS’s

failure to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act, 42

U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370.

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claims prior to judicial review.” ONRC Action v. Columbia

Plywood, Inc., 286 F.3d 1137, 1144 (9th Cir. 2002). For these

reasons, the court does not have jurisdiction to reach the merits

of the arguments made by the City of Suisun in its first seven

claims.5

B. Federal Defendants’ Motion to Strike

The Federal Defendants move to strike extra-record

evidence proffered by Tsakopoulos Investments and the

Environmental Groups. In the Ninth Circuit, materials not

present in the administrative record may be considered by a court

reviewing an agency decision in only four situations: (1) when

they are “necessary to determine whether the agency has

considered all relevant factors and has explained its decision,”

(2) “when the agency has relied on documents not in the record,”

(3) “when supplementing the record is necessary to explain

technical terms or complex subject matter,” or (4) “when

plaintiffs make a showing of agency bad faith.” Sw. Ctr. for

Biological Diversity v. U.S. Forest Service, 100 F.3d 1443, 1450

(9th Cir. 1996) (internal quotations omitted). Additionally,

where specific facts must be presented in the form of affidavits

or other evidence to establish standing, the court will take

these facts to be true for the purposes of a summary judgment

motion. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561

(1992); see also Nw. Envt’l Def. Ctr. v. Bonneville Power Admin.,

117 F.3d 1520, 1528 (9th Cir. 1997) (considering extra-record

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affidavits for the purpose of determining whether the plaintiffs

had standing to sue). 

The court has not considered the documents submitted by

Tsakopoulos Investments, as they were immaterial to the

jurisdictional issues that prevented the court from reviewing

Tsakopoulos Investments’ first six claims, and also immaterial to

the seventh claim. Therefore, the motion to strike is

unnecessary as to those documents.

Additionally, the Environmental Groups submitted extrarecord declarations in order to establish standing. To the

extent that the declarations could be used in support of other

arguments, the court has not relied upon them, and the

Environmental Groups have indicated that they do not intend the

declarations be used for any other purpose. Therefore, the court

declines to strike these declarations.

Federal Defendants also move to strike (1) the study,

“Report: Initial Assessment of Habitat Characteristics and

Conservation Potential in Western Placer County,” which is

attached as Exhibit 3 to the Delfino Declaration, and (2)

portions of the Delfino Declaration that refer to this study and

lines of the environmental groups’ summary judgment brief that

discuss it. The Environmental Groups contend that consideration

of this study is “necessary to determine whether the agency has

considered all relevant factors and has explained its decision,”

because it demonstrates that the FWS has failed to consider the

economic benefits of designating critical habitat. The court

will therefore consider this extra-record evidence.

The parties also dispute whether the court can consider

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an article entitled “Habitat Cave-In?,” which addresses an

attempt by Riverside County to develop protected land and notes

the effect of political considerations on a habitat conservation

plan. The court is not persuaded that an article published in

the Riverside Press-Enterprise is “necessary” to demonstrate that

FWS considered all relevant factors when it appears to be

irrelevant. Therefore, the court will strike this extra-record

evidence that is attached to the Environmental Groups’ motion for

summary judgment as Exhibit 4. 

Finally, Federal Defendants move to strike the second

exhibit to the Delfino Declaration, a settlement agreement that

resulted in the Placer County Report, and the accompanying

discussion of the circumstances that led to settlement agreement. 

“Federal courts may ‘take notice of proceedings in other courts,

both within and without the federal judicial system, if those

proceedings have a direct relation to the matters at issue.’” 

Cactus Corner, LLC v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, 346 F. Supp. 2d

1075, 1092 (E.D. Cal. 2004) (quoting United States ex rel

Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d

244, 248 (9th Cir. 1992)). It is unclear whether a settlement

can be considered a proceeding, and it is additionally unclear

that this settlement has a direct relation to the proceedings

here. Therefore, the court will not take judicial notice of the

settlement agreement. The court therefore grants Federal

Defendants’ motion to strike this report and the related

discussion beginning on page 16 at line 20 of the Environmental

Groups’ motion for summary judgment and continuing through page

17, line 3.

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C. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c). A material fact is one that could affect the outcome of

the suit, and a genuine issue is one that could permit a

reasonable jury to enter a verdict in the non-moving party’s

favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial

burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material

fact, and can satisfy this burden by presenting evidence that

negates an essential element of the non-moving party’s case. 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). 

Alternatively, the movant can demonstrate that the non-moving

party cannot provide evidence to support an essential element

upon which it will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id.

1. Administrative Procedure Act

Judicial review of actions by administrative agencies

is generally governed by the Administrative Procedure Act, 5

U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), which states that a reviewing court must set

aside agency actions found to be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse

of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.” See

Wetlands Action Network v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs,

222 F.3d 1105, 1114 (9th Cir. 2000). 

This is a “deferential standard . . . designed to

ensure that the agency considered all of the relevant factors and

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that its decision contained no clear error of judgment.” Pac.

Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns, Inc. v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries

Serv., 265 F.3d 1028, 1034 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotations

omitted). An agency action should only be overturned when the

agency “has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it

to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of

the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs

counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible

that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the

product of agency expertise.” Id. (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs.

Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43

(1983)). The court must ask whether the agency considered “the

relevant factors and articulated a rational connection between

the facts found and the choice made.” Natural Res. Def. Council

v. United States Dep’t of the Interior, 113 F.3d 1121, 1124 (9th

Cir. 1997). 

The court is not empowered to substitute its judgment

for that of the agency. Az. Cattle Growers’ Ass’n v. U.S. Fish &

Wildlife Serv., 273 F.3d 1229, 1236 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,

416 (1971)). Moreover, the court should review the agency’s

actions based on the administrative record presented by the

agency. See Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Fish &

Wildlife Serv., 450 F.3d 930, 943 (9th Cir. 2006) (“When

reviewing an agency decision, the focal point for judicial review

should be the administrative record already in existence, not

some new record made initially in the reviewing court.”)

(internal quotations and citations omitted). 

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2. Endangered Species Act

The FWS is subject to additional regulations when it

lists a species as threatened or endangered. Under § 4(a) of the

Endangered Species Act (“ESA”), when the FWS lists a species, “to

the maximum extent prudent and determinable,” it must also

designate a critical habitat for that species. 16 U.S.C. §

1533(a)(3). “Critical habitat” refers to geographic areas that

are “essential” for the conservation of the species. 16 U.S.C. §

1532(5)(A). Land is considered critical habitat when it is “a

specific area within the geographical area occupied by the

species” that has physical and biological features essential to

conservation and that “may require special management

considerations of protection.” Id. Specific areas outside of

the geographical area occupied the species may also be designated

as critical habitat if the Secretary determines they are

“essential for the conservation of the species.” Id. In other

words, critical habitat is land essential to the conservation of

the species, but it includes the habitat occupied by the species

as well as land on which the species cannot be found, provided

the Secretary determines that land unoccupied by the species is

nevertheless necessary for its conservation.

Pursuant to § 4(b)(2) of the ESA, the FWS must

designate critical habitat based on the “best scientific data

available and after taking into consideration the economic

impact, and any other relevant impact, of specifying any

particular area as critical habitat.” 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2)

(emphasis added). The FWS may exclude an area from critical

habitat when it “determines that the benefits of such exclusion

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outweigh the benefits of specifying such areas as part of the

critical habitat,” provided exclusion will not result in the

extinction of the species. Id. § 1533(b)(2). The FWS is

prohibited from designating lands owned by the Department of

Defense and subject to an integrated natural resources management

plan “if the Secretary determines in writing that such a plan

provides a benefit to the species. Id. § 1533(a)(3)(B)(i). The

FWS must publish regulations in the Federal Register regarding

its critical habitat designation after a notice and comment

period. Id. § 1533(a)(3)(A). A court reviewing the FWS’s

actions taken pursuant to the ESA must ask whether the agency

considered “the relevant factors and articulated a rational

connection between the facts found and the choice made.” Natural

Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 113 F.3d 1121,

1124 (9th Cir. 1997). 

3. Home Builders’ Motion for Summary Judgment

Home Builders argue that, in making the critical

habitat designation, the FWS: (1) failed to describe the specific

areas occupied by the species within the subunits designated as

critical habitat, (2) improperly included structures and other

developed areas that do not contain the primary constituent

elements (PCEs) essential to conservation of the fifteen species,

(3) inadequately described the species’ PCEs, and (4) conducted

economic impact analysis without considering coextensive or

cumulative impacts or explaining why certain tracts were excluded

and others were included. Home Builders contends that these

actions constitute violations of the ESA, the APA, and the NEPA,

and that the critical impact designation should therefore be set

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aside.

a. Failure to Distinguish Unoccupied Habitat

Home Builders argue that the FWS did not distinguish

between unoccupied and occupied habitat as required under the

ESA. As noted above, there are different standards for critical

habitat designation of occupied areas than for designation of

unoccupied areas. In short, there is a higher standard for

critical habitat designation of areas unoccupied by the species–-

the Secretary must make a determination that such areas are

essential to the conservation of the species. 16 U.S.C. §

1532(A)(ii). 

Although the FWS determined that each of the critical

habitat units is occupied by the species, it admittedly included

some unoccupied subsections within the critical habitat units. 

(Fed. Defs.’ Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. 19 (citing 70 Fed. Reg. at

46,945; 68 Fed. Reg. at 46,721, 46,722-44).) The FWS recognized

that some unoccupied areas were likely to have been included,

defining the term “unoccupied” as “an area that contains no

hatched vernal pool crustaceans or observed above-ground plants,

and that is unlikely to contain a viable cyst or seed bank.” 70

Fed. Reg. 46,924, 46,929; 68 Fed. Reg. at 46,715.

The FWS points out that it is difficult to distinguish

between occupied and unoccupied areas due to the nature of vernal

pools. Vernal pools are ephemeral in nature, and vernal pool

species are characterized by their ability to remain in a dormant

phase for years at a time. The size of a vernal pool also

fluctuates from year to year, and in some years, the pool itself

may never form. As previously discussed, vernal pools exist in

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clusters that are fed with water by “low drainage pathways”

called swales. Thus, the FWS concluded it “cannot quantify in

any meaningful way what proportion of each critical habitat unit

may actually be occupied by the vernal pool crustaceans or vernal

pool plants at any one time,” and had likely included some

unoccupied areas for that reason. Id. 

The FWS’s duty under the ESA is to make a critical

habitat designation “on the basis of the best scientific data

available.” Id. § 1333(b)(2) (emphasis added). Accordingly, the

FWS need not conduct its own studies to improve upon existing

scientific data. Sw. Center for Biological Diversity v. Babbit,

215 F.3d 58, 60-61 (D.C. Cir. 2000); see also Building Indus.

Ass’n v. Norton, 247 F.3d 1241, 1246 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“the

Service must utilize the ‘best scientific . . . data available,’

not the best scientific data possible” (quoting §

1533(b)(1)(A))). Moreover, the FWS was required to publish its

critical habitat designation concurrently with the regulation

listing the species as threatened or endangered, or, if critical

habitat was not determinable at the time of listing, no later

than a year after the listing of the species. 16 U.S.C. §

1533(b)(6)(C)(ii). Even if the FWS delays its critical habitat

designation for a year, the designation should then be made

“based on such data as may be available at that time.” Id. 

Moreover, “[t]he designation of critical habitat is to coincide

with the final listing decision absent extraordinary

circumstances.” Natural Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Dept. of the

Interior, 113 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting N. Spotted

Owl v. Lujan, 758 F.Supp. 621, 626 (W.D. Wash. 1991)). Thus,

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because of the statutory constraints the FWS faced and the unique

characteristics of vernal pools and the species that inhabit

them, the FWS appropriately made its critical habitat designation 

in a manner consistent with the scientific evidence available. 

The significance of Home Builders’ argument is that the

FWS may not have properly designated habitat because it did not

precisely follow the statutory definition. However, the

distinction between the two types of habitat is that unoccupied

habitat must be more carefully designated. Cape Hatteras Access

Pres. Alliance v. U.S. DOI, 344 F. Supp. 2d 108, 119 (D.D.C.

2004) (“[B]oth occupied and unoccupied areas may become critical

habitat, but, with unoccupied areas, it is not enough that the

area’s features be essential to conservation, the area itself

must be essential.”). Given the difficulty in determining

whether a particular habitat is occupied or unoccupied by a

vernal pool species, the FWS reasonably determined whether

habitat was critical according to the more exacting of the two

standards. 

Moreover, there is theoretically no limit to the degree

of precision agencies could be compelled to undergo before

designating critical habitat under Home Builders’ argument. 

Within a critical habitat unit, it is entirely possible that a

single square inch of the land at issue would be wholly

unoccupied by the relevant species. Clearly, an agency should

not have to make a critical habitat determination on such a fine

scale, but the logical extension of Home Builders’ argument would

seem to impose just such a requirement on the agency. Therefore,

the critical habitat designation will pass muster regardless of

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Home Builders argue that at some points the FWS 6

described critical habitat units as “important,” “unique,” or

“unusual,” instead of as “essential.” (Home Builders’ Mot. for

Summ. J. 25.) However, the FWS’ variation in word choice does

not change the fact that the FWS did determine that each of the

critical habitat units was essential to the conservation of the

species. See 68 Fed. Reg. at 46,715-16 (“[W]e determined that

all currently known extant occurrences of the 11 vernal pool

plants and 2 of the 4 vernal pool crustaceans (Conservancy fairy

shrimp and longhorn fairy shrimp) are essential to the

conservation of the species, due to their limited geographic and

ecological distributions (criteria 1 and 2), low overall number

of populations (criterion 1), and the seriousness of the threats

posed to remaining populations, including fragmentation of

habitat. For the other two vernal pool crustaceans (vernal pool

fairy shrimp and vernal pool tadpole shrimp), we were able to

meet the criteria listed above without designating all occupied

areas . . . ” (emphasis added)).

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whether the habitat designated was occupied or unoccupied. The 6

court will defer to the agency’s reasonable judgment on this

issue, and finds that the fact that the FWS did not expressly

delineate which portions of the habitat were occupied and which

portions were unoccupied does not constitute a violation of the

ESA. 

b. Failure to Adequately Identify PCEs

For occupied critical habitats, the FWS is required to

identify “physical or biological features essential to the

conservation of the species,” that “may require special

management considerations or protection.” 16 U.S.C. §

1532(5)(A)(i). In FWS regulations, the “physical and biological

features” are also referred to as “primary constituent elements”

or “PCEs” of the critical habitat. 50 C.F.R. § 424.12(b)(5). 

Home Builders argue that the PCEs identified by the FWS are

inadequate and are not described with sufficient particularity. 

The PCEs listed by the FWS for the Conservancy fairy

shrimp in its August, 2005 final rule are:

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(i) Topographic features characterized by 

mounds and swales, and depressions within a 

matrix of surrounding uplands that result in 

complexes of continuously, or intermittently, 

flowing surface water in the swales connecting 

the pools described in PCE (ii), providing for

dispersal and promoting hydroperiods of 

adequate length in the pools.

(ii) Depressional features including isolated 

vernal pools with underlying restrictive soil 

layers that become inundated during winter rains 

and that continuously hold water for a minimum 

of 19 days (Helm 1998), in all but the driest 

years; thereby providing adequate water for 

incubation, maturation, and reproduction. 

As these features are inundated on a seasonal 

basis, they do not promote the development of 

obligate wetland vegetation habitats typical of

permanently flooded emergent wetlands.

(iii) Sources of food, expected to be detritus

occurring in the pools, contributed by overland 

flow from the pools’ watershed, or the results 

of biological processes within the pools 

themselves, such as single-celled bacteria, 

algae, and dead organic matter, to provide for 

feeding.

(iv) Structure within the pools described in 

PCE (ii), consisting of organic and inorganic

materials, such as living and dead plants from 

plant species adapted to seasonally inundated

environments, rocks, and other inorganic debris 

that may be washed, blown, or otherwise 

transported into the pools, that provide shelter.

70 Fed. Reg. at 46,934-35. The only difference between this PCE

and the PCEs of the remaining three vernal pool crustaceans is

the minimum number of days the vernal pool must be filled with

water in all but the driest years, as described in section (ii). 

Id. at 46,934-37. The PCEs for the eleven plants are similar to

sections (i) and (ii) above, and are identical to each other. 

Id. at 46,937-42. According to the relevant federal regulations,

“[p]rimary constituent elements may include, but are not limited

to, the following: roost sites, nesting grounds, spawning sites,

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Home Builders additionally contend that the FWS’s 7

definitions would allow land with only one PCE to be designated

as critical habitat, citing the following language in the August,

2005 Final Rule: “PCEs described for each species do not have to

occur simultaneously within a unit for the unit to constitute

critical habitat for any of the 15 vernal pool species.” Home

Builders argue that a PCE cannot be “essential” for species

conservation if it need not be present in a given critical

habitat. 

However, as discussed in the text, vernal pools must be

fed by upland areas, and the first PCE describes “[t]opographic

features characterized by mounts and swales, and depressions

within a matrix of surrounding uplands that result in complexes

of continuously, or intermittently, flowing surface water in the

swales connecting the pools.” These upland areas may not be

occupied by the species, and may not contain a vernal pool,

although they may be linked to one or several. Regardless of

whether they contain a vernal pool, or other PCEs, they are still

essential to the conservation of the 15 vernal pool species. 

Home Builders simply pose hypotheticals suggesting that

a plain of uplands unconnected to a vernal pool or a “homeowner’s

backyard studded with bits of ‘inorganic debris’” may constitute

a critical habitat under this definition. The PCEs are

sufficiently specific to preclude such an outcome–-the first PCE

describes a matrix of uplands that result in water that flows to

pools, and the fourth PCE requires structure within the pools

consisting of organic and inorganic materials. Moreover, Home

Builders do not present scientific data to the contrary, and when

prompted to do so during oral argument, counsel for Home Builders

could not explain how vernal pools could be better described in

light of the evidence available. 

35

feeding sites, seasonal wetland or dryland, water quality or

quantity, host species or plant pollinator, geological formation,

vegetation type, tide, and specific soil types.” 50 C.F.R. §

424.12. The PCEs chosen by the FWS describe the seasonal

character of the pools, the shelter they provide for crustacean

species, their underlying soil and the manner of formation, and

also note that the pools themselves are sites where the species

feed, reproduce, and mature. 

Home Builders argue that the identification of a

“matrix of surrounding uplands” necessary for the periodic flow

of water into the pools is not sufficiently specific. In 7

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particular, they contend that there is no indication of the size

of the uplands or the mounds or swales they contain, and no

explanation of what kind of food in the form of detritus would be

acceptable. Home Builders cite other situations in which the FWS

has provided limits on uplands essential to the conservation of

other species, including the California tiger salamnder and the

California red-legged frog. (Pls.’ Home Builders’ Mot. for Summ.

J. 15.) As the Federal Defendants note, however, in both of

these instances, the FWS placed limitations on the upland habitat

based on the available scientific evidence. See 70 Fed. Reg.

74,138, 74,146-47 (Dec. 14, 2005) (circumscribing the tiger

salamander’s upland range because “[t]he only known study we are

aware of that specifically investigated movement of California

tiger salamanders between breeding ponds projected that 0.70 mi

(1.1 km) would encompass 99 percent of interpond dispersal”); 70

Fed. Reg. 66,906, 66,912 (Nov. 3, 2005) (delimiting “[u]pland

habitat that contains the features essential to the conservation

of the species” to 200 feet surrounding the aquatic habitat

“based on the dispersal capabilities of the subspecies” and on

two studies that indicated that the subspecies could inhabit

upland habitats in a 200 foot radius of the acquatic habitats for

between twenty and seventy-seven days).

By contrast, Home Builders do not reference scientific

data with regard to the species or PCEs in this case that the FWS

should have considered and disregarded. See Kern County Farm

Bureau v. Allen, 450 F.3d 1072, 1081 (9th Cir. 2006) (concluding

that a plaintiff’s argument that the FWS failed to rely on the

best scientific data available was insufficient because the

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plaintiff “point[ed] to no data that was omitted from

consideration,” and “absent superior data . . . occasional

imperfections do not violate § 1533(b)(1)(A)” (quoting Building

Indus. Ass’n of Superior Cal. v. Norton, 247 F.3d 1241, 1246

(D.C. Cir. 2001)) (modification removed)). The scientific

evidence the agency relied on merely indicated that uplands and

detritus are crucial to the survival of the species, but did not

indicate the size of the uplands or the kinds of detritus

necessary. See, e.g., 70 Fed. Reg. at 46,924-25 (“Upland areas

associated with vernal pools are also an important source of

nutrients to vernal pool organisms (Eriksen and Belk 1999; Wetzel

1975). 

Vernal pool habitats derive most of their nutrients

from detritus (decaying matter) washed into pools from adjacent

uplands, and these nutrients provide the foundation for a vernal

pool aquatic community's food chain. Detritus (both living and

dead organic matter) is a primary food source for the vernal pool

crustaceans addressed in this rule (Eriksen and Belk 1999).”); 68

Fed. Reg. at 46,704 (noting that the matrix of surrounding

uplands “contribute to the filling and drying of the vernal pool,

maintain suitable periods of pool inundation, and maintain water

quality and soil moisture to enable the 15 vernal pool species to

carry out their lifecycles.”); 68 Fed. Reg. at 46,688 (“Fairy

shrimp are filter feeders, and consume algae, bacteria, protozoa,

rotifers, and bits of detritus as they move through the water.”). 

Thus, the FWS’s description of these PCEs is reasonably specific,

and the court has no cause to disturb the agency’s finding.

Home Builders additionally argue that the length of the

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Additionally, Home Builders contend that elements (i) 8

and (ii) of the PCEs are contradictory–-element (i) describes

“complexes of continuously or intermittently flowing surface

water in the swales connecting the pools,” whereas element (ii)

denotes vernal pools that are inundated only seasonally. This

argument is largely semantic. Swales are “shallow drainages that

carry water seasonally,” but they may “remain saturated for much

of the wet season.” 68 Fed. Reg. at 46,685. It is entirely

reasonable to describe a drainage that is continuously saturated

during a particular time of year as having “continuously flowing

surface water” at that time. Therefore, the court is not

persuaded that this superficial inconsistency renders the

description of the PCEs unreasonable. 

38

hydroperiods are insufficiently identified, but do not present

scientific evidence that the FWS neglected to consider. (Home

Builders’ Mot. for Summ. J. 15.) Under element (ii), the pools

must be inundated for different amounts of time, depending on the

species, ranging from eighteen to forty-one days. As described

in the PCEs themselves, the length of time the pools are

inundated is an element necessary to ensure “vernal pool

crustacean hatching, growth, and reproduction,” during at least

some years. The amount of time required for these activities

varies by species. See 70 Fed. Reg. at 46,934-36 (tailoring the

hydroperiod length to the minimum maturation times for fairy

shrimp based on a 1998 study). Moreover, the amount of annual

precipitation in the Mediterranean climates where vernal pools

are found fluctuates from year to year. 67 Fed. Reg. at 59,885. 

Thus, as with the elements of the PCEs in general, the FWS’s

determination of this PCE is based upon scientific evidence, and

Home Builders’ arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive because

they have no scientific basis.8

c. Failure to Identify the Point at which

Conservation will be Achieved

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Home Builders contend that because the FWS has not

determined when the protected species will be deemed conserved,

the FWS is unable to make a determination as to what PCEs are

essential to the conservation of the species. In support of this

argument, Home Builders rely on Home Builders Ass’n of N. Cal. v.

FWS (“HBANC”), 268 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1214 (E.D. Cal. 2003), in

which Judge Ishii concluded that “if the Service has not

determined at what point the protections of the ESA will no

longer be necessary for the [conservation of the listed species],

it cannot possibly identify the physical or biological features

that are an indispensable part of bringing the [species] to that

point.” The court in HBANC did not cite any caselaw for this

proposition and instead arrived at it through the application of

logic. After examining the statutory provisions of the ESA, this

court is unpersuaded by the logic in HBANC, and will therefore

take a different approach.

PCEs are simply “physical or biological features

essential to the conservation of the species” that “may require

special management considerations or protection.” 16 U.S.C. §

1532(5)(A)(i). It is true that a PCE described in a critical

habitat designation must be “essential to the conservation of the

species.” 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A)(i). Further, under the ESA,

“the terms ‘conserve’, ‘conserving’, and ‘conservation’ mean to

use and the use of all methods and procedures which are necessary

to bring any endangered species or threatened species to the

point at which the measures provided pursuant to this chapter are

no longer necessary.” 16 U.S.C.A. § 1532. Although PCEs must be

described in a critical habitat designation, there is no

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indication in the ESA that the agency must simultaneously prepare

objective, measurable criteria indicating when the ultimate goal

of conservation of the species will be achieved.

By contrast, the subsections of the ESA relating to the

development of recovery plans do contain such a requirement:

The Secretary shall develop and implement plans 

(hereinafter in this subsection referred to as 

“recovery plans”) for the conservation and 

survival of endangered species . . . The 

Secretary, in developing and implementing 

recovery plans, shall, to the maximum extent

practicable –-

. . . .

(B) incorporate in each plan–-

(i) a description of such site-specific 

management actions as may be necessary 

to achieve the plan’s goal for the

conservation and survival of the species;

(ii) objective, measurable criteria which,

when met, would result in a determination,

in accordance with the provisions of this 

section, that the species be removed from 

the list . . . .

16 U.S.C. § 1533(f)(1). Thus, in the context of recovery plans,

the ESA contains a requirement that the FWS incorporate in their

recovery plan the objective, measurable criteria that will

indicate when conservation has been achieved. The lack of a

similar provision in the context of critical habitat designation

indicates that Congress did not intend to require conservation

criteria to be determined at that stage or in that context. See 

Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395, 404 (1991) (stating

that “[w]here Congress includes particular language in one

section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same

Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally

and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion”) (quoting

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Moreover, a Draft Recovery Plan prepared by the FWS in 9

October, 2004, does contain a section devoted to “Recovery

Criteria.” This section denotes species-specific recovery

criteria, including criteria related to species occurrence and

habitat protection, reintroduction, and seed banking. (Supp. to

the Admin. Record (Documents Cited in the Admin. Record), Draft

Recovery Plan at III-84 through III-113 (October, 2004).)

Home Builders make this point themselves, although in 10

the context of a different argument. They note, “[i]t does not

require a science degree to recognize that no species can survive

without food. . . . How will these species survive, let alone

recover, without food?” (Home Builders’ Mot. Summ. J. 19.)

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Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)). Thus, Home

Builders’ argument appears to be inconsistent with Congressional

intent.9

Additionally, it not clear why the determination of the

point at which conservation will be achieved is necessary to

identify the elements of a habitat that are essential to

conservation of the species. An element of the environment that

is necessary to the survival of a species, such as food, shelter,

or any necessary condition for its habitat to exist, would be

essential to conservation of the species regardless of when or if

conservation is achieved. Simply put, if the food a species

needs to survive was not present in a particular area, the goal

of conserving that species in that area would be unattainable.10

Therefore, the court must disagree with the conclusion in HBANC

and will not require the FWS to have determined the point at

which conservation of the vernal pool species would be achieved.

d. Failure to Adequately Identify the Specific Areas

within the Geographic Area Occupied by the Species

Where the Essential Physical or Biological

Features are Found

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“For any federal action that may affect a threatened or 11

endangered species (or its habitat), the agency contemplating the

action [] must consult with the consulting agency . . . .” 

Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, 378

F.3d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 2004). The purpose of the consultation

is to ensure that the federal action is unlikely to jeopardize

the continued existence of the species and will not result in the

destruction or adverse modification of the critical habitat

designated for the species. Id.

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Home Builders argue that the FWS improperly designated

critical habitat by including areas that do not contain the

essential physical or biological features for the species. The

FWS admittedly did not exclude every developed area within the

critical habitat designation, although it “made every effort to

avoid designating developed areas such as buildings, paved areas,

boat ramps, and other structures that lack the PCEs for the 15

vernal pool species.” 70 Fed. Reg. at 46,930. To this, Home

Builders responds that relying upon Section 7 consultations to

resolve the issue improperly delays the critical habitat

designation. However, the FWS also noted that any structures 11

inadvertently left inside the critical habitat designation would

not be subject to Section 7 consultation unless they had some

effect on the species or PCEs. Id. (“Any such structures

inadvertently left inside critical habitat boundaries are not

considered part of the unit . . . [and] would not trigger section

7 consultations.”). 

Because of the exhaustive methods used by the FWS to

designate critical habitat, and Home Builders’ silence on whether

there would be another method to obtain a more precisely

delineated critical habitat, the court cannot conclude that the

agency’s actions were unreasonable or an abuse of discretion. 

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The FWS explained their procedures for designating 12

critical habitat in the August, 2003 and August, 2005 rules, and

the Federal Defendants concisely reiterate these procedures in

their motion for summary judgment. 

The FWS generated legal descriptions of critical 13

habitat units on Universal Transverse Mercator gridlines set

every 328 feet, based on the implementing regulations of the ESA,

which require the agency to use “reference points and lines as

found on standard topographic maps of the area.” 68 Fed. Reg. at

46,704; 50 C.F.R. § 424.12(c). 

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The FWS initially used a computer program that evaluated

Geographic Information System data from governmental agencies, as

well as private sources. 68 Fed. Reg. at 46,713. The following 12

information was included in the Geographic Information System

data: (1) current and historical species locations obtained from

the California Natural Diversity Database, (2) maps of vernal

pool grassland habitats, and (3) published species occurrence

data in the FWS’s possession. Id. These data were mapped onto 13

satellite aerial photography for the vernal pool regions that had

been identified in the relevant scientific literature. Id.

Following an initial determination of the areas derived

from these data, the FWS refined their maps using satellite

imagery, watershed boundaries, geological information,

elevational modeling data, soil type information, vegetation/land

cover data, and agricultural and urban land use data. Id. They

refined the areas selected by eliminating areas that did not have

the appropriate plant species and developed areas that did not

contain the PCEs. Id. After publication of the September 24,

2002, proposed rule and a notice and comment period, the FWS

evaluated its proposed critical habitat units once more based on

information it had received. Id. This included information from

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local experts regarding the vernal pool habitats and species,

detailed aerial photography sent in by county planning

departments, computer-generated images of aerial photographs

manipulated to have the geometric properties of a map, and inperson examinations of various locations. Id. The FWS used

additional data from the Geographic Information System, including

local data sets for specific areas; topographical information

from the U.S. Geological Society; and smaller scale mapping

efforts from regional entities. Id. Yet the FWS recognized that

even this effort would not produce a perfect result, and that

some developed areas would have inadvertently been incorporated

into the critical habitat units. 70 Fed. Reg. at 46,930, 46,943. 

Arguing that the FWS did not sufficiently specify the

boundaries of the designation, Home Builders cites HBANC for the

proposition that a critical habitat designation that includes

“buildings, roads, canals, railroads, and large bodies of water”

that do not contain “habitat components” or “one or more of the

primary constituent elements” is an improper designation. 268 F.

Supp. 2d at 1216. In HBANC, however, the defendants simply

relied on the fact that section 7 consultation would not occur on

developed areas, and argued that plaintiffs were seeking “an

impracticable level of certainty in regard to the designation of

the critical habitat.” Id. 

Federal Defendants, by contrast, have expressly

described the careful procedures by which they determined what

land constitutes critical habitat and sought to avoid designating

developed areas as critical habitat. They simply have conceded

that their methods are likely to be somewhat fallible, and Home

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As its sole alternative proposal, Home Builders 14

indicates that Caltrans provided information regarding

transportation rights-of-ways that should be excluded, and the

FWS noted that it “did not have the time, resources, or

appropriate GIS data layers to segregate these areas from

adjacent vernal pool habitat . . . .” 68 Fed. Reg. at 46,698. 

Although such a situation is clearly not ideal, the court cannot 

say from this evidence that the agency’s determination was

arbitrary or capricious. 

Additionally, Home Builders contend that the FWS must 15

separately identify the geographical area occupied by the species

prior to designating critical habitat. Home Builders cites no

authority for this requirement, aside from Webster’s Third New

International Dictionary and its own reading of the statute. For

the reasons discussed in the text, the court concludes that the

FWS did not make its critical habitat determination in an

arbitrary or capricious manner, and this unsupported argument

does not disturb the court’s conclusion.

45

Builders have taken that admission to mean more than it does. 

The court cannot conceive of additional methods that the Federal

Defendants could have reasonably undertaken to attain a higher

degree of precision in their critical habitat designation, and

Home Builders have not described any alternatives that would

improve the designation. For these reasons, the court finds 14

that the FWS adequately identified the critical habitat units.15

e. Improper Economic Impact Analysis

The ESA provides that, “The Secretary shall designate

critical habitat . . . after taking into consideration the

economic impact . . . of specifying any particular area as

critical habitat.” 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2). The Secretary “may

exclude any area from critical habitat” if “the benefits of such

exclusion outweigh the benefits of specifying such area as part

of the critical habitat . . . .” Id. The ESA thus provides a

standard by which to measure an agency’s choice to exclude an

area based on economic or other considerations. The agency’s

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Home Builders argue that, based on the Federal 16

Defendants’ concession that the critical habitat designation

inadvertently included some developed areas, the economic

benefits of designation are overstated and the cost-benefit

analysis is flawed. As discussed, supra, it is unclear how the

FWS could have avoided the inclusion of some developed areas in

its critical habitat designation, and the court cannot say that

consideration of some area inadvertently included in the critical

habitat designation led to an economic analysis that was

arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.

46

decision to exclude is not mandatory, but permissive.

As the Federal Defendants point out, the legislative

history of the statute confirms this reading, and clarifies that

the Secretary “is not required to give economics or any other

‘relevant impact’ predominant consideration in his specification

of critical impact. . . . The consideration and weight to be

given to any particular impact is completely within the

Secretary’s discretion.” H.R. Rep. No. 95-1625, at 16-17 (1978),

1978 U.S.C.A.N. 9453, 9466-67. Where there are no substantive

standards by which a court can review an agency’s action, that

action is committed to agency discretion. See Selman v. United

States, 941 F.2d 1060, 1063-64 (10th Cir. 1991). Here, the court

has no substantive standards by which to review the FWS’s

decisions not to exclude certain tracts based on economic or

other considerations, and those decisions are therefore committed

to agency discretion. Thus, to the extent that any of Home

Builders’ arguments relate to the FWS’s decisions not to exclude

tracts, the court will not consider them. 

16

Home Builders also argue that the FWS erred by using a

methodology contrary to the Tenth Circuit’s guidance in New

Mexico Cattle Growers v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, 248 F.3d

1277, 1285 (10th Cir. 2001). New Mexico Cattle Growers requires

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that, to evaluate a critical habitat designation, an agency must

take into account “all of the economic impacts of a critical

habitat designation regardless of whether those impacts are

attributable co-extensively to other causes.” Id. at 1284-85. 

In other words, the FWS must consider both the economic impact of

the critical habitat designation itself and the economic impact

of listing a species. Id. 

The FWS expressly indicated that it followed the

guidance provided by the Tenth Circuit in Cattle Growers, and

that its “draft economic analysis estimates the total cost of

species conservation activities without subtracting the impact of

pre-existing baseline regulations (i.e., the cost estimates are

fully co-extensive).” 70 Fed. Reg. at 46928. Moreover, to

estimate the potential economic impact of the critical habitat

designation, the FWS retained a consulting firm, CRA

International. CRA International projected the economic effects

that would occur in the census tracts affected by the

designation, above and beyond the baseline of the existing

regulatory and economic burden landowners and managers currently

bear. (Admin R., Vol. 2, Doc. 358 at 45-46.) CRA International

also determined the administrative costs that would be associated

with Section 7 consultations, which were the primary impacts

expected. (Id. at 10, 44.) CRA International considered costs

attributable to the jeopardy standard (relating to the listing of

a species) and costs due to the adverse modification standard

(relating to the designation of critical habitat). (Id. at 10.) 

Because the vernal pool species occupy the critical habitat, it

was “difficult [to] mak[e] a credible distinction between listing

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Although the FWS expressly indicated in its analysis 17

that it took into account both the economic impact of listing the

species and the economic impact of the critical habitat

designation, see Admin. R. at 17022653 (Economic Impacts of

Critical Habitat Designation for Vernal Pool Species (June 2005)

at 7), Home Builders argue that other portions of the report

imply otherwise. In particular, Home Builders note that the

analysis makes mention of only critical habitat designation, and

not listing a species, in two separate places. See id. at

17022697 (“If such effects would not have occurred in the absence

of critical habitat (i.e., “but for” critical habitat), then they

are considered by this analysis to be an impact of the

designation.”); id. at 17022698 (“To the extent that delays

result from the designation, they are considered in the

analysis.”). 

It does not follow from these sentences that the FWS

did not consider the economic impact of listing a species, and

the court is not persuaded that it should infer from these minor

omissions that the FWS has mischaracterized its analysis in a

more favorable light. The same reasoning also applies to Home

Builders’ suspicions that, despite its statements to the

contrary, the FWS did not consider costs associated with Sections

9 and 10. (See Home Builders’ Mot. for Summ. J. 34.)

48

and critical habitat effects within critical habitat boundaries.” 

(Id.) Thus, CRA determined that “[t]he administrative costs of

these consultations, along with the costs of project

modifications resulting from these consultations, represent

compliance costs associated with the listing of the species and

the designation of critical habitat.” (Id. at 10, 44.) 

Therefore, this analysis clearly considers the co-extensive

costs. 

17

Relatedly, Home Builders argue that the FWS’s exclusion

of twenty-three census tracts was erroneous because the FWS did

not explain the basis for its decision to exclude only twentythree of 158 tracts, and because the FWS failed to consider the

relative costs of the negative economic impacts, based on the

socioeconomic profile of each individual tract. Significantly,

the Congressional record indicates that “[t]he consideration and

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weight given to any particular impact is completely within the

Secretary’s discretion.” H.R. Rep. No. 95-1625, at 16-17 (1978),

1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 9466-67. 

The FWS took into account the co-extensive costs

previously discussed, and determined that the estimated cost of

the designation was $965 million over the next 20 years, due to

the “opportunity costs associated with the commitment of

resources required to accomplish species and habitat

conservation.” Id. at 10, 47-53. Based on the weighing of these

costs, the FWS excluded twenty-three census tracts from the final

critical habitat designation. The FWS decided to exclude twentythree tracts because they would result in the potential avoidance

of approximately eighty percent of the potential costs of

critical habitat designation, and would not result in extinction

of a species. 70 Fed. Reg. 46,948-52. More specifically, the

FWS determined that by excluding the 20 areas that would suffer

the greatest economic loss if designated as critical habitat

(alternatively, twenty-five percent of the critical habitat), it

could avoid approximately 80 percent of the total costs. 70 Fed.

Reg. at 37740. Thus, the FWS rationally excluded the twenty

tracts projected to have the most detrimental economic impact. 

This decision clearly involved weighing the benefits and costs of

exclusion, and this is the type of decision to which this court

must defer. 

The FWS also excluded three additional tracts: a tract

in Merced county associated with the construction of the

University of California at Merced that would have suffered a $10

million impact, a tract in Tehama county that would suffer a $6

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The court notes that this choice did take into 18

consideration, to some degree, the relative harm that the

individual tracts would suffer based on their socioeconomic

profiles. Among the twenty-three census tracts ultimately

excluded are eleven of the twelve counties that were projected to

suffer the highest impact relative to aggregate household income. 

70 Fed. Reg. at 46,949-50. Moreover, to the extent Home

Builders’ argument that the agency should have considered the

relative impact of the economic costs is a disagreement with the

methodology used by FWS, “[m]ere disagreement with an agency’s

policies, methodologies, and conclusions does not render the

decision arbitrary and capricious.” Sierra Club v. Dombeck, 161

F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1070-71 (D. Ariz. 2001).

50

million impact because of an ongoing transportation project, and

a tract in Placer county adjacent to another excluded tract

because a development plan extending over both tracts would

result in a significant portion of the growth projected to occur

in the area. 70 Fed. Reg. 46,948-52. 

18

Although the FWS did provide a logical reason for the

exclusion of the twenty most-impacted tracts, the explanation

provided for two of the three additional tracts that were

excluded is inadequate. In its final rule, issued on August 11,

2005, the FWS noted as follows:

As we finalized the economic analysis, we

identified high costs associated with the 

critical habitat designation to public 

projects in Tehama and Merced County. These

public projects were the development of the

UC Merced Campus and the widening of Highway

99 in Tehama County. The final economic 

analysis indicates additional costs in census 

tracts in which these projects were located 

were $10,000,000 for UC Merced and $6,093,965

for Highway 99. On the basis of the

significance of these costs, we determined that 

these two census tracts also should be excluded.

In addition, information received during the 

comment period indicated that the Placer 

Vineyards Specific Plan was located in two 

census tracts in Placer County, one of which 

was identified in the Draft Economic Analysis

as being in one of the 20 highest cost areas,

and one of which was not. As a result, 

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impacts for the two affected census tracts were

aggregated in the final analysis, which 

significantly increased the costs in the second

census tract. For this reason, it too, is

being excluded from the final critical habitat 

designation.

70 Fed. Reg. 46,950. 

Thus, as to the University of California at Merced and

Tehama county tracts, the FWS merely highlighted the monetary

benefit to excluding these tracts, and provided no additional

explanation. There is no indication that these two tracts are

among the twenty-two most impacted tracts. The FWS simply

concludes that the high cost of inclusion justifies exclusion,

without making a relative comparison amongst all tracts. This

appears to be inconsistent with the rest of the logic employed by

the FWS in its exclusion analysis. Thus, the two tracts relating

to public works projects that were excluded as the FWS “finalized

the economic analysis” appear to have been excluded arbitrarily. 

“The agency is obligated to ‘articulate[ ] a rational connection

between the facts found and the choices made.’” Pac. Coast Fed’n

of Fishermen’s Assocs. v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 426 F.3d

1082, 1091 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting NRDC v. Dep’t of Interior,

113 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1997)). Because the FWS failed to

do so adequately with respect to these two tracts, the court

concludes that their exclusion should be set aside. 

However, the FWS did articulate a reason for excluding

an additional tract in Placer county because of a development

plan that encompassed that tract and would result in a

significant portion of growth in the area. The FWS’s exclusion

of the twenty most-impacted tracts depended in part upon a

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Plaintiffs Home Builders have made this argument in 19

order to preserve their right to challenge Douglas County on

appeal. 

52

development project that extended past one of those twenty tracts

and into another tract that was not excluded. The FWS noted that

“[s]ince a single development accounts for a significant fraction

of growth in this area, segregating impacts by Census Tract may

be artificial. Thus, impacts for tracts 06061020902 and

06061021301 are aggregated in the final analysis.” 70 Fed. Reg.

at 46,931. The FWS logically excluded this tract in order to

maintain the remainder of the exclusions, and the court cannot

conclude that this additional exclusion was arbitrary and

capricious.

f. NEPA Violation

Home Builders and the City of Suisun contend that the

FWS violated the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), 42

U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370, by failing to prepare an Environmental

Impact Statement or an Environmental Assessment for its critical

habitat designation. NEPA is “our basic national charter for

protection of the environment. . . . [I]t establishes policy,

sets goals . . . and provides means for carrying out the policy.” 

40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(a). NEPA requires that an Environmental

Impact Statement be prepared for all “major Federal actions

significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.” 

Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)). However, the Federal

Defendants point out, and plaintiffs Home Builders concede (Pls.’

Home Builders’ Mot. for Summ. J. 42-43), that there is binding 19

Ninth Circuit authority that precludes a challenge under NEPA for

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a critical habitat designation made pursuant to the ESA. In

Douglas County v. Babbit, the Ninth Circuit found that 

NEPA does not apply to the Secretary’s decision

to designate a habitat for an endangered or 

threatened species under the ESA because (1) 

Congress intended that the ESA critical habitat 

procedures displace the NEPA requirements, 

(2) NEPA does not apply to actions that do 

not change the physical environment, and 

(3) to apply NEPA to the ESA would further 

the purposes of neither statute.

 

48 F.3d 1495, 1507-08 (9th Cir. 1995). Accordingly, plaintiffs

Home Builders’ arguments that the FWS should have complied with

the requirements of NEPA fail as a matter of law.

4. Environmental Groups’ Motion for Summary Judgment

The Environmental Groups argue that the FWS’s costbenefit analysis was flawed because the agency improperly weighed

excessive economic costs against inadequately-determined

benefits, and improperly made non-economic exclusions to the

Carrizo Plain National Monument, National Wildlife Refuges, lands

subject to Habitat Conservation Plans, and lands subject to other

management plans. 

a. Data Regarding Economic Benefits

The Environmental Groups make several arguments

regarding the arbitrariness of the FWS’s cost and benefit

calculations with regard to critical habitat designation. 

Pursuant to § 4(b)(2) of the ESA, the FWS has a mandatory duty to

consider the economic and other impacts of a critical habitat

designation using the “best scientific data available.” 16

U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2). There are no express provisions in the ESA

regarding what “economic impact” means, and nothing is mentioned

about “economic benefits.” See 16 U.S.C. § 1533. This court has

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The Environmental Groups cite this draft economic 20

impact analysis as an example of an attempt to quantify benefits. 

As demonstrated by the parts of the draft report quoted in the

text, it is not clear that the attempt to quantify benefits was

successful.

54

previously explained that “it stands to reason that in order to

consider the economic impact, defendants must consider both the

positive and negative impact.” Butte Environ., No. 04-0096, at

12. The court also indicated that it was unaware of any

authority that explains how to consider economic impact or that

specifically requires that the economic benefits of designation

be quantified. Id. 

The FWS concluded that expressing benefits in economic

terms was prohibitively difficult, noting that the benefits of

designation “reflect broader social values, which are not the

same as economic impacts.” (Admin. R. Vol. 2 at 17021468.) The

FWS therefore determined that “the benefits of critical habitat

designation are best expressed in biological terms.” (Admin. R.

05008574; 17022691.) The FWS further explained this conclusion

in their August, 2003 Final Rule, in which they indicated that

“it is not feasible to fully describe and accurately quantify the

benefits of this designation in the context of this economic

analysis,” and additionally that “no studies have addressed the

non-use values associated with endangered vernal pool species. 

Thus, it is not possible to develop a monetary measure of this

category of benefit.” (Id. Vol. I at 05008400.) The FWS also 20

noted that, “[s]ufficient information does not exist to allow for

quantification of the secondary benefits of habitat protection .

. . .” (Id. at 05008405.)

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The Environmental Groups argue to the contrary that

there was available data regarding the quantification of

benefits, and that the FWS ignored or even buried such data. One

example they provide is the proposed methodologies that

economists submitted that could be used to quantify benefits. 

Thus, the Environmental Groups would have the FWS conduct an

independent study into the quantification of benefits. Notably,

however, “[t]he ‘best available data’ requirement makes it clear

that the Secretary has no obligation to conduct independent

studies.” Sw. Ctr., 215 F.3d at 60-61 (reversing and remanding a

district court’s determination requiring the FWS to generate

better data by conducting a species population count). 

Significantly, other than the benefits provided by mitigation

lands, the Environmental Groups have not identified any specific

type of benefit to be measured. They additionally cite the

review of CRA’s analysis by a leading academic in the field of

urban economics, Professor John M. Quigley at the University of

California at Berkeley, who stated that “[n]owhere in the

analytical paradigm for this work by CRA is there reference to

the benefits of habitat protection.” (Admin. R. Vol. 2 (Doc.

631).) Professor Quigley additionally acknowledged that such

benefits are difficult to measure, but did not indicate how to

measure them. Id. Professor Quigley further indicated that he

found the analysis more generally to be “an impressive piece of

work,” especially “[g]iven the inherent limitations in theory and

data, and the difficulties of translating these regulations into

specific changes in economic outcomes over space.” (Id. (Doc.

630).) It may well be that scientific data regarding other types

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The Environmental Groups also cite extra-record 21

evidence regarding a talk on June 8, 2006, by the author of the

analysis prepared by CRA International. However, the court is

limited to evidence in the administrative record at the time the

decision was made, unless the party seeking to introduce the

extra-record evidence demonstrates that it falls under an

exception to the general rule. (See Motion to Strike analysis,

supra.) The Environmental Groups have not made that argument

here, and the court will not consider this evidence.

Additionally, the Environmental Groups’ arguments

regarding settlement discussions around the economic value of

mitigation lands are not the proper subject of judicial notice,

as discussed supra, and will not be considered by the court.

56

of habitats would allow for the consideration of the economic

benefits of a critical habitat designation. In fact, advances in

scientific knowledge about vernal pool habitats may make it

possible to quantify the economic benefits related to

preservation of these habitats at some point in the future. 

Nevertheless, from the evidence before it, the court concludes

that the FWS’s determination that benefits would not be measured

in terms of their strict economic value appears to be reasonable,

and does not invalidate their evaluation of economic impacts.21

The Environmental Groups further argue that, in its

estimate of the costs of critical habitat designation, the FWS

improperly included the economic costs of multiple conservation

measures (referred to as a “co-extensive analysis”) applicable to

the fifteen vernal pool species, rather than just the costs of

the critical habitat designation. As previously mentioned, the

ESA does not dictate how the FWS should conduct its economic

impact analysis. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2). In deciding to

conduct its co-extensive analysis, the FWS relied on the Tenth

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The court’s prior analysis with regard to Home 22

Builders’ arguments that the FWS did not rely on Cattle Growers

is also instructive here. To the extent that the FWS relied on

Cattle Growers and neglected to consider the effects of the

critical habitat designation on species’ recovery, pursuant to

Gifford Pinchot, the critical habitat designation is not

consistent with applicable Ninth Circuit precedent.

See Cape Hatteras Access Pres. Alliance, 344 F. Supp. 23

2d 108, 130 (D.D.C. 2004) (noting that Cattle Growers was “an

instance of a hard case making bad law,” and examining the

inconsistency between Cattle Growers and Gifford Pinchot).

57

Circuit’s decision in Cattle Growers, 248 F.3d at 1285.22

The Environmental Groups argue that the FWS wrongly

relied upon Cattle Growers, which they contend was a hard case

making bad law, and failed to take adequate account of a relevant

Ninth Circuit decision, Gifford Pinchot, 378 F.3d at 1063. In 23

Gifford Pinchot, the Ninth Circuit rejected FWS’s regulatory

definition of “destruction or adverse modification” for lowering

the standard for critical habitat designation, which requires

consideration of promoting recovery of the species rather than

simply ensuring its survival. The concern in Gifford Pinchot was

that the FWS’s definition with respect to critical habitats

effectively “read out” of the statute the limitations in place

with respect to listing a species. 378 F.3d at 1069-70.

In Gifford Pinchot, the Ninth Circuit concluded that

the FWS had erred by promulgating a regulation defining

“destruction or adverse modification” as “a direct or indirect

alteration that appreciably diminishes the value of critical

habitat for both the survival and recovery of a listed species.”

Id. (citing 50 C.F.R. § 402.02). The court noted that this

regulation allowed changes to the critical habitat designation in

a manner that effectively ignores the recovery requirement,

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because a modification that affects a species’ survival does

greater damage to the species than a modification that would

merely affect the species’ ability to recover. “Because it is

logical and inevitable that a species requires more critical

habitat for recovery than is necessary for species survival, the

regulation’s singular focus becomes ‘survival.’” Gifford

Pinchot, 378 F.3d at 1069. However, the “the purpose of

establishing ‘critical habitat’ is for the government to carve

out territory that is not only necessary for the species’

survival but also essential for the species’ recovery.” Id. at

1070. Accordingly, the court held that this regulation was

impermissible. Id. at 1071. 

Thus, the biological opinions at issue in Gifford

Pinchot evaluated only whether the proposed modifications to

critical habitat would impede the more dire of the two goals--

survival of the species--and ignored whether the proposed

modifications would affect the goal of fostering recovery of the

species. Id. at 1070-71. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit noted

that an agency is afforded a presumption of regularity, meaning

that it is presumed to have followed its own regulations, absent

evidence to the contrary. Id. at 1072 (citing Citizens to

Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971)

(overruled on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99,

105 (1977))). Because there was no evidence in the record to

rebut the presumption that the FWS had followed its flawed

regulation, the Ninth Circuit invalidated the biological opinions

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A similar conclusion was reached by the D.C. Circuit 24

in a careful opinion that parses both Gifford Pinchot and Cattle

Growers as well as the FWS regulation invalidated in Gifford

Pinchot. The D.C. Circuit explained that, 

Under the Service’s regulation, by virtue 

of the ‘and’s, both listing and designation 

result in consultations only when a species’s 

survival is at stake, which makes it impossible 

for an action to bring about a consultation if 

only recovery is at stake. The definition of 

the adverse modification standard, then, fails 

to account for the ESA’s command that critical 

habitat be designated for ‘conservation,’ and 

not merely survival. 

Cape Hatteras Access Preservation Alliance v. U.S. Dept. of

Interior, 344 F. Supp. 2d 108, 129 (D.D.C. 2004).

59

issued by the agency in Gifford Pinchot. Id. at 107. 

24

The Environmental Groups argue that the FWS conducted

an improper economic analysis contrary to Gifford Pinchot because

the FWS conducted a coextensive analysis that measured the impact

of every conservation measure applicable to the fifteen vernal

pool species and because the FWS regulation invalidated by the

Ninth Circuit is still in effect. The FWS has not expressly

withdrawn this invalidated regulation, and the Ninth Circuit also

explained in Gifford Pinchot that it “must [be] presume[d],

unless rebutted by evidence in the record, that the FWS followed

its [own regulation].” 

It is in this legal framework that the court turns to

the evidence in the record to see whether the FWS considered the

recovery benefits that accompany critical habitat designation. 

In its final rule, the FWS explained as follows:

While we have not yet proposed a new 

definition for public review and comment, 

compliance with the Court’s direction [in 

Gifford Pinchot] may result in additional 

costs associated with the designation of 

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critical habitat (depending upon the outcome 

of the rulemaking). In light of the 

uncertainty concerning the regulatory 

definition of adverse modification, our 

current methodological approach to 

conducting economic analyses of our critical

habitat designations is to consider all

conservation-related costs. This approach 

would include costs related to sections 4, 

7, 9, and 10 of the [ESA], and should 

encompass costs that would be considered 

and evaluated in light of the Gifford 

Pinchot ruling.

Id. at 46,948. Thus, the FWS has indicated that it was not

abiding by its invalidated regulation, but rather relying upon an

economic analysis that included the costs of recovery, pursuant

to Gifford Pinchot. The FWS also noted in its final rule that

“each area designated as critical habitat may require some level

of management and/or protection to address the current and future

threats to each of the 15 vernal pool species to ensure that they

may recover. . . .” 70 Fed. Reg. at 46,945. To that end, the

FWS specified several different measures that could be undertaken

to ensure recovery, including preventing invasive species from

crowding out native species, restoring the hydrology of vernal

pool complexes, and managing off-road vehicle use. Id. The FWS

further indicated that, for areas designated as critical habitat,

“[p]rimary constituent elements in these areas would be protected

from destruction or adverse modification by federal actions using

a conservation standard based on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in

Gifford Pinchot. This requirement would be in addition to the

requirement that proposed Federal actions avoid likely jeopardy

to the species continued existence.” Id. at 46,950. 

Additionally, the FWS explained that “[c]ritical habitat is being

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designated for all 11 [plant] species in other areas that will be

accorded the protection from adverse modification by federal

actions using the conservation standard based on the Ninth

Circuit decision in Gifford Pinchot.” Id. 

However, these isolated instances discussing the

recovery standard, and assurances by the FWS that Gifford Pinchot

has been applied to the reasoning in the critical habitat

designation, are contradicted by evidence in the record. 

Significantly, the penultimate version of the rule, issued on

March 8, 2005, does not mention either recovery benefits or the

ruling in Gifford Pinchot regarding the benefits or critical

habitat. (Admin. R. Vol II: 15018098-102.) In early August,

shortly before the final rule was released, the Environmental

Groups point out that there were emails exchanged between staff

members at the FWS, asking whether there was “Gifford-Pinchot

language in [the final rule]?” (Admin. R. Vol. 2 (Docs. 186,

194, 204).) One staffer emailed that the final rule would not be

approved by some members of the agency “unless we demonstrate

that a Gifford Pinchot analysis was completed for this rule, per

Mike it does not have to be in the rule, but must be in the Adm

[sic] Record.” (Id. (Doc. 194).) 

In fact, it appears that new language regarding Gifford

Pinchot was scattered throughout the August, 2005, rule as a

result of the eleventh-hour email exchange amongst FWS staff

members. (Admin R. Vol. 2 (Doc. 204) (The last email in this

series in the record indicated that the following statements

would be added to the final rule: “In light of the uncertainty

concerning the regulatory definition of adverse modification, our

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current methodological approach to conducting economic analyses

of our critical habitat designations is to consider all

conservation-related costs. This approach would include costs

related to sections 4, 7, 9, and 10 of the Act, and should

encompass costs that would be considered and evaluated in light

of (or in response to . . .) the Gifford Pinchot ruling.”).) A

careful examination of the Final Rule reveals that the FWS merely

added language relating to the Ninth Circuit decision, instead of

carefully considering and incorporating the Ninth Circuit’s

guidance in its critical habitat designation. 

In the text of the rule, the FWS stated that “the

designation of statutory critical habitat provides little

additional protection to most listed species, while consuming

significant amounts of available conservation resources. . . .”

70 Fed. Reg. at 46,924. The FWS also indicated its skepticism

about the additional benefits provided by critical habitat

designations. Id. The FWS cited an article that concluded,

“because the Act can protect species with and without critical

habitat designation, critical habitat designation may be

redundant to the other consultation requirements of section 7.” 

Id. (emphasis added). Accordingly, there is insufficient

evidence in the record to conclude that the FWS adequately

considered the recovery benefits of a critical habitat

designation in coming to the conclusions in its Final Rule. 

The FWS’s failure to consider the recovery goal of the

designation is similar to the situation in Center for Biological

Diversity v. Bureau of Land Management, 422 F. Supp. 2d 1115,

1122 (N.D. Cal. 2006). In that case, Judge Illston concluded

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that, by finding “that there were no additional regulatory

benefits to be gained by designating critical habitat in areas

that were ultimately excluded, the Service improperly ignored the

recovery goal of critical habitat.” Id. Judge Illston also

noted that “references to ‘conservation’ in the proposed and

final rules cannot be squared with the reasoning in the final

rule which essential equates ‘jeopardy’ and ‘adverse

modification’ determinations to conclude that the regulatory

benefits of critical habitat in the excluded areas was

negligible.” Id. at 1146. This court is similarly unconvinced

that the FWS actually considered the recovery benefits of

critical habitat designation, notwithstanding the fact that it

referenced Gifford Pinchot, and therefore concludes that the

agency’s critical habitat designation was arbitrary and

capricious because it failed to comply with the applicable legal

standards. 

Finally, the Environmental Groups contend that the

FWS’s relative weighing of costs against benefits failed to

consider the recovery and regulatory benefits to the species upon

critical habitat designation. The FWS did consider many

potential benefits, including certain categories of benefits that

reflect broader social values. (Admin. R. Vol. 2 at 17021468.) 

The FWS noted, however, that explicitly considering broader

social values for the species and the habitat would duplicate the

codification of the societal value of protecting species by

Congress in enacting the ESA. (Id.) Additionally, the FWS did

discuss at length the benefits that would be derived from the

exclusion of the twenty-three census tracts at issue, including

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the fact that vernal pool species would have increased protection

and landowners and the public would become educated about the

conservation value of the vernal pool habitat. (Id. at 17021487-

88.) The FWS also addressed the recovery benefits of designation

by noting that it chose to exclude only twenty-three of the total

158 census tracts it considered designating as critical habitat

to “recognize[] the benefits of including areas beyond the

minimum necessary to avoid extinction, despite significant

economic costs.” (Id. at 17021468.) Because the agency has not

made an “erroneous conclusion of law” and the court cannot say

that the “record contains no evidence on which it could

rationally base that decision,” the court cannot find that the

FWS abused its discretion with regard to its consideration of

benefits. Mendenhall v. Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., 92 F.3d 871,

874 (9th Cir. 1996). 

b. Non-Economic Exclusions

The Environmental Groups contend that the FWS

improperly relied upon the existence of alternative land

management plans in weighing the costs and benefits of exclusion

pursuant to § 4(b)(2). In deciding what land to exclude from its

critical habitat designation, the FWS determined that for certain

lands protected by existing management plans and practices, the

benefits of inclusion are likely to be minimal and outweighed by

the benefits of exclusion. 

 For the proposition that Federal Defendants may not

exclude land based on the existence of alternative land

management plans, the plaintiffs cite caselaw that applies to the

definition of critical habitat provided in another section of the

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Pursuant to ESA § 3(5)(A), “designation of critical 25

habitat is necessary except when designation would not be 

‘prudent’ or ‘determinable.’” 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3).

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ESA. See, e.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Norton, 240 F.

Supp. 2d 1090, 1100 (D. Ariz. 2003) (applying the definition of

critical habitat in ESA § 3(5)(A)); Nat. Res. Def. Council, 113

F.3d at 1127 (same); Conservation Council for Haw. v. Babbit, 2

F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1287 (D. Haw. 1998) (same). By contrast, the 25

relevant provision of the ESA here is § 4(b)(2), which permits

the FWS to conduct a discretionary analysis of its exclusions. 

Thus, the Environmental Groups have not cited any authority that

would preclude the FWS from considering the existence of other

management schemes in deciding whether to exclude land from its

critical habitat designation.

More specifically, the Environmental Groups argue that

the Carrizo Plain National Monument was improperly excluded. The

Bureau of Land Management had a draft management plan in place

for the Carrizo Plain National Monument, which was set to become

final in June, 2006. 70 Fed. Reg. at 46,947. This plan outlines

“management for the long-term conservation and recovery of listed

plants and animals and the natural communities on which they

depend, and to improve and sustain populations of federally

listed species to meet conservation and recovery goals.” Id. 

The species covered by the plan include the two species of fairy

shrimp that would have been protected by the critical habitat

designation. Id. The FWS did not merely defer to the Bureau of

Land Management’s authority; instead, it incorporated the nature

of oversight by the Bureau of Land Management into its weighing

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The Environmental Groups further argue that the FWS did 26

not provide adequate notice of its exclusion of the Carrizo Plain

National Monument lands. “[T]he fact that a final rule varies

from a proposal, even substantially, does not automatically void

the regulations. Rather, [a court] must determine whether the

inclusion of the BMPs in the final rule was in character with the

original proposal and a logical outgrowth of the notice and

comments received.” Rybachek v. United States Environ.

Protection Agency, 904 F.2d 1276, 1287-88 (9th Cir. 1990). Here,

the FWS had indicated in its June, 2005 Federal Register notice

that it was soliticing comments on whether any areas should be

excluded and would reconsider all previously-submitted comments. 

70 Fed. Reg. at 37,740-41. The Bureau of Land Management had

requested the exclusion of Carrizo Plain National Monument lands.

70 Fed. Reg. at 11,145. Thus, exclusion of the National Monument

lands was “a logical outgrowth of the notice and comments

received,” and therefore procedurally adequate.

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of the benefits of inclusion versus exclusion and its

determination of whether the species would become extinct absent

inclusion. Id. at 46,948. The FWS was also responding to

comments that critical habitat designation in the Carrizo Plain

National Monument would “hinder essential voluntary conservation

efforts.” 70 Fed. Reg. at 46,929. 

Additionally, the Environmental Groups contend that

this court’s previous order limited the scope of the exclusions

the agency could make, and the agency improperly took action

exceeding what the court ordered. However, the court merely

required that the FWS complete a reevaluation of the land that

was excluded at the time by March 8, and did not expressly

preclude any other exclusions. Butte Envtl. Council, No. 04-

0096, at 25. Thus, the FWS was not prevented from considering

the exclusion of Carrizo Plain National Monument based on this

court’s previous holding. Accordingly, the court finds the 26

FWS’s exclusion of the Carrizo Plain National Monument to be

reasonable. 

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Similarly, the FWS reasonably determined that the

benefits of exclusion outweighed the benefits of inclusion for

areas within national wildlife refuges and within the Coleman

National Fish Hatchery complex. 70 Fed. Reg. at 11,151. The FWS

also concluded that exclusion would not result in extinction of

the species. Id. The FWS noted that, “[a]ll of these refuges

are developing comprehensive resource management plans that will

provide for protection and management of all trust resources,

including federally listed species and sensitive natural

habitats.” Id. Additionally, the agency explained that “[t]he

comprehensive resource management plan for the Kern National

Wildlife Refuge Complex has been completed and the associated

biological opinion concluded that its implementation would not

jeopardize the continued existence of these species.” Id.

(citation omitted). For these reasons, the FWS’s decision to

exclude the wildlife refuges from its critical habitat

designation was not arbitrary or capricious.

The FWS additionally reasonably excluded areas having

habitat conservation plans (“HCPs”). HCPs are developed as part

of a permitting process for private lands when activities related

to development will result in a taking of an endangered species. 

16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) & (G); § 1539(a)(1)(B), (2)(A) & (B). 

A permit is only allowed if the taking is incidental, the impacts

of the taking are minimized and mitigated, the applicant funds

the plan adequately, the plan will not appreciably reduce the

likelihood of species’ survival and recovery, and other measures

required by the agency are also met. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B). 

In March 8, 2005, the FWS explained its exclusion of lands

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subject to HCPs based on its determination that the benefits of

exclusion outweighed the benefits of inclusion, and the species

would not become extinct as a result. 70 Fed. Reg. at 11,149-51. 

The FWS also examined each individual plan to determine

how it should be weighed, and expressly noted that the Western

Riverside county MSHCP would “address[] the primary conservation

needs of the species by protecting the ecosystem upon which it

relies . . . [and] provide for the longer term conservation of

this pool and vernal fairy shrimp.” Id. at 11,150. In fact, the

FWS explained that, “since the entire habitat area is addressed

under the HCP, preserve, and mitigation bank and not just habitat

with a federal nexus, the existing management already provides

more protection than can be provided by a critical habitat

designation.” Id. Another part of the Western Riverside MSHCP,

proposed unit 34 for the critical habitat designation, is the

Santa Rosa Plateau Ecological Reserve, which is “owned by The

Nature Conservancy (TNC), and is cooperatively managed by TNC,

the Riverside County Regional Park and Open Space District, CDFG

[the California Department of Fish and Game], and the Service.” 

Id. Federal Defendants point out that the designation of

critical habitat is not only less powerful of a protection than

an HCP, but also can adversely affect the partnerships with local

jurisdictions and project proponents that are need to create HCPs

by imposing duplicative regulatory burdens on the people

involved. 70 Fed. Reg. at 11,149. Thus, as with the other noneconomic exclusions, this exclusion was made in the FWS’s

reasonable exercise of discretion.

Finally, the FWS’s exclusion of four areas of land

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belonging to the Department of Defense was proper. Those areas

consisted of Travis Air Force Base (“AFB”), Beale AFB, Fort

Hunter Ligget, and Camp Roberts. Pursuant to 16 U.S.C.A. § 1533,

the FWS provided a determination in writing that these plans

provide a benefit to some of the fifteen vernal pool species for

Travis AFB and Beale AFB. See 70 Fed. Reg. at 11,153 (“Travis

AFB has a Service-approved INRMP in place that provides a benefit

for vernal pool fairy shrimp. . . .”); id. (“Beale AFB has a

Service approved INRMP in place that provides a benefit for the

vernal pool fairy shrimp and the vernal pool tadpole shrimp.”). 

Additionally, both air force bases are now defunct. 

Further, although the ESA provides that Department of

Defense land may be excluded pursuant to 16 U.S.C.A. § 1533, Fort

Hunter Liggett and Camp Roberts were excluded pursuant to ESA §

4(b)(2); in other words, they were excluded under the economic

impact analysis previously discussed. See, e.g., 70 Fed. Reg. at

11,145 (“The two Army National Guard Reserves Bases [Camp Roberts

and Fort Hunter Liggett] were excluded through § 4(b)(2) of the

Act, since the benefits of excluding outweigh the benefits of

including those vernal pool areas within the designation.”); 68

Fed. Reg. at 46,750-52 (weighing the benefits of exclusion

against the benefits of inclusion into the critical habitat

designation for Camp Roberts and Fort Hunter Liggett); id. at

46,700 (“We recognize that designation of critical habitat has

the potential to modify military training operations and the use

or development of base facilities. We have determined that the

benefits of excluding these facilities outweigh the benefits of

including them. Subsequently, Camp Roberts and Fort Hunter

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Liggett have been excluded from this final designation of

critical habitat.”).

III. Conclusion

Home Builders’ motion for summary judgment must be

granted with respect to the exclusions of the two tracts with

ongoing public projects involving the development of the UC

Merced campus and the widening of Highway 99 in Tehama County. 

In all other respects, the motions of Home Builders, Tsakopoulos

Investments, and the City of Suisun for summary judgment are

denied.

The Environmental Groups’ motion for summary judgment

is granted on the limited ground that the FWS failed to consider

the recovery standard under the ESA, pursuant to the Ninth

Circuit’s guidance in Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish &

Wildlife Service, 378 F.3d 1059, 1069 (9th Cir. 2004). In all

other respects, the Environmental Groups’ motion for summary

judgment is denied, and the Federal Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment is granted.

The FWS’s exclusions of critical habitat pursuant to §

4(b)(2) of the ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2), in its Final Critical

Habitat Rule of August 2005, Final Designation of Critical

Habitat for Four Vernal Pool Crustaceans and Eleven Vernal Pool

Plants in California and Southern Origin, and accompanying

economic analysis, must be remanded to the FWS for further action

and consideration consistent with all applicable laws and with

the reasoning in this order. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that this matter be, and the

same hereby is, REMANDED to the FWS for further action and

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The court previously allowed six months for the final 27

designation of critical habitat, and because the necessary

changes here are simply an amendment to a prior final

designation, the court concludes that a 120 day deadline is more

than reasonable for this purpose. See Butte Environ. Council v.

White, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1185 (E.D. Cal. 2001) (allowing six

months for the FWS to complete a final critical habitat

designation and noting that many courts have allowed only 120

days for the same action).

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consideration consistent with this order. The FWS shall submit a

new final critical habitat rule to the Federal Register for

publication therein within 120 days of the date of this order.27

DATED: November 1, 2006

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