Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-01258/USCOURTS-ca10-89-01258-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED 

United States Court of Appeals TENTH CIRCUIT Tm"t.h clr~•\lt 

TRUSTEES OF THE COLORADO 

LABORERS HEALTH & WELFARE 

TRUST FUND, et al., 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

vs. 

DENVER DRYWALL COMPANY, 

a Colorado corporation, 

Defendant-Appellee, 

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CCT 2 S 1q~O 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 89-1258 

(D.C. No. 87-C-1321) 

(D. Colo.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge, and BRATTON, 

District Judge**· 

This suit was brought under §301 of the Labor Management 

Relations Act, 29 u.s.c. §185 and §§502 and 515 of the Employment 

Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 

1132 and 1145. The plaintiff seeks herein to compel the payment 

of fringe benefit contributions as allegedly required by a 

collective bargaining agreement and federal labor law. 

*This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except for 

purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, res 

judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36 . 3. 

**The Honorable Howard C. Bratton, Senior United States District 

Judge for the District of New Mexico, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 89-1258 Document: 010110064807 Date Filed: 10/23/1990 Page: 1 
The lower court granted defendant's motion for summary 

judgment finding that there existed no express or implied-in-fact 

agreement obligating the defendant to continue fringe benefit 

payments. The lower court also denied plaintiff's cross-motion for 

partial summary judgment. We affirm. 

In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we utilize the same 

standard that the district court employed. Merrick v. Northern 

Natural Gas Co., No. 89-5012, slip op. at 4-5 (10th Cir. Aug. 23, 

1990). If there exists no genuine issue of material fact, summary 

judgment is appropriate. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). This standard is 

met only if "'there exists sufficient evidence favoring the 

nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.'" 

Id., citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 

(1986). 

We agree with the district court that no genuine issue of 

material fact exists as to the continuing obligation to pay fringe 

benefit payments. The terms of the parties' 1981-1984 collective 

bargaining agreement originally mandated the payments. The Union, 

however, served timely "notice of intent to terminate" the 

agreement. 

situated to 

This notice was sent by letter to employers similarly 

the defendant, and the defendant claims to have 

received the notice. A Union official admits there is no reason 

that the defendant would not have been sent the termination notice. 

Consequently, we agree with the district court that the union's 

letter, by its express language, terminated the existing agreement 

and, with it, the obligation to continue fringe benefit payments. 

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Appellate Case: 89-1258 Document: 010110064807 Date Filed: 10/23/1990 Page: 2 
We are in further accord with the lower court's decision that 

the defendant did not become bound to make fringe benefit payments 

by its continuing course of conduct. We have reviewed the conduct 

of the defendant and agree that it is insufficient to find the 

existence of a contract by implication. See NLRB v. J. D. 

Industrial Insulation Co., 615 F.2d 1289 (10th Cir. 1980). 

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the decision of the lower court. 

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Appellate Case: 89-1258 Document: 010110064807 Date Filed: 10/23/1990 Page: 3