Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00502/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00502-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1441 Petition for Removal- Petition to Quiet Title

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Lisa S. Jackson, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV 12-502-TUC-RCC

ORDER

Before the Court are: (1) Defendant Wells Fargo’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 4); (2)

Defendant Tiffany & Bosco’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 5); and a Report and

Recommendation (“R&R”) issued by Magistrate Judge Hector C. Estrada. The Court accepts

and adopts Magistrate Judge Estrada’s R&R as the findings of fact and conclusions of law

of this Court and will dismiss this case without prejudice.

I. Background

On July 6, 2012, this matter was removed from state court by Defendant Wells Fargo

Bank. The civil cover sheet submitted with the Notice of Removal reflects Plaintiff’s address

as 11200 S. Bell Ranch Road, Pearce, AZ 85625. Defendant Wells Fargo indicated that the

Notice of Removal and accompanying exhibits were mailed to Plaintiff at the Bell Ranch

Road Address. The case was assigned to District Judge Cindy K. Jorgenson. Thereafter, on

July 13, 2012 Defendant Wells Fargo filed the pending Motion to Dismiss. Additionally,

Case 4:12-cv-00502-HCE Document 27 Filed 02/06/13 Page 1 of 5
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Defendants Michael A. Bosco and Tiffany & Bosco, P.A., also filed their pending Motion

to Dismiss on July 13, 2012. Defendants’ respective motions to dismiss were sent to Plaintiff

at the Bell Ranch Road address. On July 24, 2012, the Clerk of Court sent to Plaintiff at the

Bell Ranch Road address, a notice that the case had been reassigned to Magistrate Judge

Estrada. Also, on July 24, 2012, the Clerk of Court sent to Plaintiff at the Bell Ranch Road

address, information and instructions concerning consent to exercise of jurisdiction by the

Magistrate Judge and requiring a form be returned to the Court within 14 days. On July 25,

2012, the Court issued an Order, sent to Plaintiff at the Bell Ranch Road address, wherein

the Court set a deadline of August 13, 2012 for Plaintiff to respond to the pending motions

to dismiss and advised Plaintiff of her duty to keep the Court apprised of her current address.

On August 30, 2012, Defendant Wells Fargo filed a Request for Summary Disposition of its

pending Motion to Dismiss pursuant to LRCiv. 7.2(i), Rules of Practice of the U.S. District

Court for the District of Arizona. That request was sent to Plaintiff at the Bell Ranch Road

Address. On September 13, 2012, the envelope containing the notice of reassignment was

returned to the Court indicating that the addressee “moved left no address unable to forward.”

Review of the record indicates Plaintiff’s address on her Complaint filed in state court

and removed to this Court as follows:

Lisa S. Jackson

In-Care-Of

HC1 Box 162

Pearce, Arizona, 85625

Despite several pieces of Court mail being sent to the Bell Ranch Road address, only

one item has been returned, taking over one month for its return. Moreover,

Court mail sent to that address required Plaintiff: (1) to return the enclosed form to the Court

within 14 days of her appearance in the case; and (2) to submit responses to the

pending motions to dismiss by August 13, 2012 to avoid the Court summarily granting them

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under LR Civ. 7.2(I). The form was not returned to the Court and no responses to

the motions to dismiss were filed. There is no indication in the record that Plaintiff requested

that mail regarding this action be sent to her at the Bell Ranch Road address. Plaintiff not

having so requested, it is questionable whether she received the mail directed to that address.

Further, in her state filing, Plaintiff indicated the HC1 Address on her Complaint, and that

the Notice of Pendency of Action: Lis Pendens, filed the same day as the Complaint, should

be mailed to her at the HC1 address after it was recorded. The Court notes Defendant Wells

Fargo’s statement that the property at the HC1 address was sold upon a Trustee’s Sale in

March 2012. Nonetheless, Plaintiff chose to use the HC1 address when she filed the instant

action in state court in May 2012. Therefore, on October 2, 2012, the Court directed the

Clerk of Court to amend the docket to reflect the HC1 address listed on Plaintiff’s Complaint

that had been removed to this Court. The Court also directed that Documents 7 and 8 be

re-sent to Plaintiff at that address. Defendants were granted five days leave to send their

Notice of Removal and pending motions to the HC1 address. On October 3, 2012,

Defendants filed notices indicating they had served Plaintiff with their motions to dismiss

at the HC1 address. Thereafter, on October 15, 2012, the Court issued an Order advising

Plaintiff, inter alia, that if she failed to respond to Defendants’ motions by November 13,

2012, the Court may deem her failure to file the required responses as her consent to the

granting of the motions. All Court mail sent to Plaintiff at the HC1 address has been returned

to the Court with indications that delivery was “Attempted-Not Known” or “Attempted-Not

Known Unable to Forward.”

Magistrate Judge Estrada recommended that the Court dismiss Plaintiff’s case

pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, under which a court may

dismiss a case for failure to prosecute or failure to comply with a court order. Further, Local

Rule 7.2(i) provides that a party’s failure to file a required response, “such non-compliance

may be deemed a consent to hte denial or granting of the motion and the Court may dispose

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of the motion summarily.” LRCiv. 7.2(i).

II. Discussion

The duties of the district court in connection with a R & R are set forth in Rule 72 of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 U .S.C. § 636(b)(1). The district court may

“accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return

the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. FED.R.CIV.P. 72(b)(3); 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1).

Where the parties object to a R & R, “[a] judge of the [district] court shall make a de

novo determination of those portions of the [R & R] to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1); see Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149-50, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985).

When no objection is filed, the district court need not review the R & R de novo. Wang v.

Masaitis, 416 F.3d 992, 1000 n. 13 (9th Cir.2005); United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d

1114, 1121-22 (9th Cir.2003) (en banc). Therefore to the extent that no objection has been

made, arguments to the contrary have been waived. McCall v. Andrus, 628 F.2d 1185, 1187

(9th Cir.1980) (failure to object to Magistrate's report waives right to do so on appeal); see

also, Advisory Committee Notes to Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 (citing Campbell v. United States Dist.

Court, 501 F.2d 196, 206 (9th Cir.1974) (when no timely objection is filed, the court need

only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the

recommendation).

The Court will not disturb a Magistrate Judge’s Order unless his factual findings are

clearly erroneous or his legal conclusions are contrary to law. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).

“[T]he magistrate judge's decision ... is entitled to great deference by the district court.”

United States v. Abonce-Barrera, 257 F.3d 959, 969 (9th Cir.2001). A failure to raise an

objection waives all objections to the magistrate judge’s findings of fact. Turner v. Duncan,

158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998). A failure to object to a Magistrate Judge’s conclusion “is

a factor to be weighed in considering the propriety of finding waiver of an issue on appeal.”

Id. (internal citations omitted).

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Plaintiff has filed no objections to the R&R, which relieves the Court of its obligation

to review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.2003); Thomas

v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149, 106 S.Ct. 466, 88 L.Ed.2d 435 (1985) (“[Section 636(b)(1) ] does

not ... require any review at all ... of any issue that is not the subject of an objection.”);

Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3) (“The district judge must determine de novo any part of the magistrate

judge's disposition that has been properly objected to.”). However, even conducting a de

novo review of the record, this Court considers the R&R to be thorough and well-reasoned.

Therefore, the Court will adopt the R&R of Magistrate Judge Estrada.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Magistrate Judge Estrada’s Report and

Recommendation (Doc. 22) is hereby ACCEPTED and ADOPTED as the findings of fact

and conclusions of law by this Court.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Defendant Wells Fargo’s Motion to Dismiss

(Doc. 4) as moot.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Defendant Tiffany & Bosco’s Motion to

Dismiss (Doc. 5) as moot.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED this action is dismissed without prejudice, and the

Clerk shall enter judgment and close this case.

DATED this 5th day of February, 2013.

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