Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-02476/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-02476-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights (Employment Discrimination)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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28 1 Pursuant to Civ. L.R. 7-13, this order may not be cited exceptas provided by Civ.

L. R. 3-4(e).

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

NOT FOR CITATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIAM J. WHITSITT,

Plaintiff, No. C 04-2476 PJH

v. ORDER

JIM KROHOMER, et al.,

Defendants.

_______________________________/

Defendants’ motion to dismiss and plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment came on for

hearing on August 17, 2005 before this court. Defendants appeared through their counsel,

Patricia Shepherd, and plaintiff Whitsitt appeared pro per. Having read all submitted papers

and carefully considered the relevant legal authority, the court rules as follows.1

BACKGROUND

Pro per and IFP plaintiff Whitsitt was laid off by defendant BK Mill and Fixtures. Whitsitt

now sues BK Mill and Fixtures; his former boss Jim Korhummel (sued under the name “Jim

Krohomer” and “Jim Kruhommer”); two other employees, Sandra Barclay and Pete Duranleau;

and another company, Installit, Inc. Originally, the complaint stated claims for age

discrimination and harassment under the ADEA, wrongful discharge in violation of public

policy, retaliation, violation of the Administrative Procedures Act and plaintiff’s procedural due

process rights, slander, and conspiracy. 

Defendants conceded that Whitsitt’s ADEA and wrongful discharge claims properly

stated a claim, and that Whitsitt had properly stated a claim for retaliation against Korhummel

and Duranleau. Defendants moved to dismiss the remainder of Whitsitt’s claims. 
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For the Northern District of California

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On January 6, 2005, the court dismissed all claims against defendant Installit; all claims

of discrimination and wrongful termination in violation of public policy as to all the individual

defendants; all claims against Sandra Barclay; the procedural due process and Administrative

Procedures Act claims; the slander claims; and the conspiracy claims. The claims against

Installit and the slander claim were dismissed with leave to amend, but all other claims were

dismissed with prejudice. The court also denied Whitsitt’s motion for summary judgment as

untimely and because it was not properly noticed under the Local Rules, and informed Whitsitt

that he could renew the motion only after discovery closed. 

Whitsitt then appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit, which dismissed the appeal for

lack of jurisdiction on April 26, 2005. Whitsitt then filed a second amended complaint

(“SAC”), which realleged age discrimination and harassment under the ADEA, wrongful

discharge in violation of public policy, retaliation, violation of the Administrative Procedures

Act and his procedural due process rights, and added claims asserting violations of his equal

protection and Title VII rights. Whitsitt did not renew his slander or conspiracy claims. 

Defendants concede that the ADEA and wrongful discharge claims are valid as to BK

Mills and that the ADEA retaliation claim against Korhummel may proceed, but move to

dismiss all other claims in the SAC. Defendants also move to strike certain statements from

the SAC. Whitsitt in response renewed his motion for summary judgment.

ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard

1. Motion to Dismiss

A court should dismiss a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim

only where it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the

claim which would entitle the plaintiff to relief. See, e.g., Broam v. Brogan, 320 F.3d 1023,

1033 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). 

At the hearing, Whitsitt argued that he was entitled to discovery before a motion to

dismiss could be filed. However, in evaluating a motion to dismiss, all allegations of material

fact made in the complaint are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the
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nonmoving party. Burgert v. Lokelani Bernice Pauahi Bishop Trust, 200 F.3d 661, 663 (9th

Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). Extrinsic evidence submitted in support of a motion to dismiss

must be disregarded, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b), and therefore discovery is unnecessary. 

2. Motion to Strike 

A motion to strike is brought under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f), and may be used to remove

insufficient defenses as well as “redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter” that

might otherwise prejudice a party. See also, e.g., Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524,

1527 (9th Cir. 1993), rev’d on other grounds, 510 U.S. 517 (1994). 

B. Previously-Dismissed Claims

Whitsitt argues that as a pro per, he is not bound by the legal standards that apply to

represented parties. This is incorrect. While the court construes Whitsitt’s arguments as

liberally as possible given his pro per status, Whitsitt must still state a claim as a matter of law

and remains required to comply with the court’s rulings. 

Furthermore, Whitsitt claims that because he was granted leave to file an amended

complaint, he may refile any claims he wishes. This is also incorrect. The court’s January 6,

2005 order specifically set forth the conditions under which Whitsitt could amend his

complaint, almost none of which Whitsitt has met. 

1. Procedural Due Process and APA Claims

Whitsitt’s procedural due process and Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”) claims

were previously dismissed with prejudice, because procedural due process claims only apply

to public employees and the APA applies only to public administrative agencies. Jan. 6 Order

at 3, citing Merritt v. Mackey, 827 F.2d 1368, 1371 (9th Cir. 1987); 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. 

Because BK Mills is neither a public employer nor a public administrative agency, Whitsitt

was not permitted to pursue these claims as a matter of law. The motion to dismiss is thus

GRANTED, and the procedural due process and APA claims are again dismissed with

prejudice.

2. Claims Against Individual Defendants

Similarly, the court held in January that the claims against the individual defendants for
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For the Northern District of California

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2 Defendants claim this is the first time they have seen Whitsitt’s EEOC complaint.

However, the EEOC complaint was also attached to Whitsitt’s original complaint, filed on June

22, 2004. 

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age discrimination and wrongful discharge in violation of public policy failed as a matter of law

and thus could not be repled, because individuals cannot be held liable for either cause of

action. Jan. 6 Order at 2-3, citing Miller v. Maxwell’s International, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587-88

(9th Cir. 1993); Jacobs v. Universal Development Corp., 53 Cal. App. 4th 692, 704 (1997). 

The motion to dismiss the individual defendants as to these claims is again GRANTED.

C. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Before filing this lawsuit, Whitsitt properly filed an administrative claim with the EEOC. 

In his administrative claim, Whitsitt claimed that Krohommer and BK Mills committed age

discrimination and retaliation. Whitsitt mentions no other persons or companies. SAC Exh.

B.2 Defendants now move to dismiss defendants Barclay and Duranleau on the grounds that

the ADEA claims against them are not exhausted.

1. Legal Standard

Under either the ADEA or FEHA, a plaintiff may file a retaliation claim in court only after

administratively exhausting the claim. This is a jurisdictional requirement. See, e.g., Santa

Maria v. Pacific Bell, 202 F.3d 1170, 1176 (9th Cir. 2000) (ADEA); Romano v. Rockwell Int’l,

Inc., 14 Cal. 4th 479, 492 (1996) (FEHA). 

Under federal law, the district court has subject matter jurisdiction only over allegations

of discriminatory activity that either “fell within the scope of the EEOC’s actual investigation or

an EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of

discrimination.” Freeman v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 291 F.3d 632, 636 (9th Cir. 2002)

(citations omitted). This is broader than the law under FEHA, where the individual defendant

must be specifically named in the EEOC claim for the claim to be considered exhausted. 

Medix Ambulance Serv. Inc. v. Superior Court, 97 Cal.App. 4th 109. 115-18 (2002). 

2. Barclay and Duranleau

In the second amended complaint, Whitsitt now alleges that Barclay and Duranleau are
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individually liable for retaliation. Previously, Whitsitt had claimed that Duranleau alone was

individually liable for retaliation, and defendants did not move to dismiss that claim in the First

Amended Complaint. However, the defendants now argue that the EEOC complaint does not

raise any claims as to Barclay or Duranleau for retaliation, and therefore the retaliation claims

against Barclay and Duranleau cannot now be asserted because they have not been

exhausted. 

Defendants are correct that the EEOC complaint does not mention Barclay or

Duranleau at all. SAC Exh. B. Thus, the retaliation claim under FEHA has not been

exhausted. 

Any claims against Barclay and Duranleau under the ADEA remain unexhausted as

well. The complaint gives no factual allegations in support of the retaliation claim. Id. (stating

only that he was fired “in retaliation for engaging in a protected activity”). It is not reasonable

to expect that the EEOC would have investigated Barclay or Duranleau in regards to their

alleged statements to the EDD, in light of the allegations in the EEOC complaint, which are

limited to Korhummel’s involvement in laying Whitsitt off. Thus, the ADEA claims against

Barclay and Duranleau for retaliation are not exhausted either. 

In response, Whitsitt requests that the court take judicial notice of his response to the

EEOC’s questionnaire, where he provided them with Barclay and Duranleau’s names. 

Evidence I Exh D (in response to question 8, Duranleau named as “Pete”). As an initial

matter, while the court may examine evidence in support of a motion to dismiss for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction, see White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000), this

document lacks sufficient indicia of reliability for the court to rely on it. Not only is it not

authenticated, it is an unsigned, computer generated document and bears nothing more than

a footer stating that it is what Whitsitt claims it to be. This document is thus inadmissible. Cf.

Orr v. Bank of America, 285 F.3d 764, 773-74 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Furthermore, even if the questionnaire answers were admissible, Whitsitt provides no

information as to what context Barclay and Duranleau’s names were disclosed to the EEOC. 

The document states only that their names were disclosed as answers to “question 8,” and
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does not even state what the question was. Whitsitt Evidence I Exh. D at 4. In addition, this

document reiterates that Jim Korhummel (“Jim K”)’s actions were the only basis for Whitsitt’s

retaliation claim. Id. at 3. There are no statements in any of the records provided to the court

that reflect that the EEOC was made aware of Whitsitt’s claims that Barclay and Duranleau

retaliated against him. Therefore, the motion to dismiss the retaliation claims against Barclay

and Duranleau for failure to exhaust is GRANTED, under both the ADEA and FEHA. 

D. Equal Protection 

The court construes Whitsitt’s claim for violations of the “Equal Rights Act” as a claim

for violation of his equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. §

1983. However, a Fourteenth Amendment claim can only be asserted against a party

deemed to be acting under color of state law. See, e.g., Lee v. Katz, 276 F.3d 550, 553 (9th

Cir. 2002). Here, all defendants are private actors, and Whitsitt raises no allegations of state

action in the complaint. Therefore, no Fourteenth Amendment claim exists, and the motion to

dismiss the equal protection claim is GRANTED.

E. Title VII

Whitsitt next claims a violation of Title VII, alleging that Title VII is identical to the ADEA. 

While the two statutes are often interpreted similarly, Title VII deals with race, color, sex,

religion, and national origin discrimination, while the ADEA deals exclusively with age

discrimination. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Title VII) with 29 U.S.C. § 621-634 (ADEA). 

Whitsitt here has only alleged age discrimination. The Title VII claims are thus inapplicable

and the Title VII claims are dismissed. 

In any event, even if Whitsitt were to attempt to allege facts showing discrimination on

the bases covered by Title VII, those claims were not raised before the EEOC, SAC Exh. B,

and would thus be dismissed as unexhausted. 

The Title VII claims are thus DISMISSED. 

F. Installit

Defendants are correct that the SAC contains no allegations as to Installit. Previously,

the court specifically informed Whitsitt that in order to state a claim against Installit in any
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For the Northern District of California

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amended complaint, he was required to allege facts describing who Installit is and the nature

of the actions taken against him. Jan. 6 Order at 2. 

Whitsitt failed to make any such allegations in the SAC. At the hearing, though, Whitsitt

appeared to argue that Installit was an alter ego of BK Mills and therefore all the asserted

claims against BK Mills should be considered asserted against Installit as well. In deference

to Whitsitt’s pro per status, the court will deem Whitsitt’s statement as a motion to amend the

complaint to add those allegations as to Installit, which is GRANTED. 

However, the only claim that may be asserted against Installit is the claim for wrongful

discharge. Because Whitsitt failed to name Installit in the EEOC charge or make any

allegations that would make it reasonably likely that an EEOC investigation would have

reached Installit, Freeman, 291 F.3d at 636 (citations omitted), any ADEA or FEHA claims

against Installit are unexhausted and thus must be dismissed. The remainder of the causes of

action, other than the wrongful discharge claims, have also been dismissed, as discussed

above. Thus, the only viable claim against Installit is the wrongful discharge claim. The motion

to dismiss Installit is thus GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. 

G. Statements to the EDD

Defendants also move to strike any allegations of retaliation that are based on

statements made to the EDD, on the grounds that the court has already held that those

statements are absolutely privileged under Cal. Civ. Code § 47(b) and therefore cannot form

the basis of any claim for liability. See Jan. 6 Order at 3, citing Williams v. Taylor, 129 Cal.

App.3d 745, 754 (1982). 

Statements that cannot form the basis of a liability claim under Cal. Civ. Code § 47(b),

may nonetheless be admitted into evidence to reflect state of mind. Oren Royal Oaks Venture

v. Greenberg, Bernhard, Weiss & Karma, 42 Cal.3d 1157, 1168 (1986) clarifies that while

Cal. Civ. Code § 47(b) serves as a limitation on liability, it does not exclude the use of the

statements at issue in evidence. “Thus, while section 47(2) [now 47(b)] bars certain tort

causes of action which are predicated on a judicial statement or publication itself, the section

does not create an evidentiary privilege for such statements.” Thus, the request to strike the
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allegations concerning statements made to the EDD is DENIED, and those statements may

be admitted insofar as they are relevant to the remaining claims. 

H. Miscellaneous Matters

1. Court Reporter

Whitsitt indicates in his opposition that he plans to request a copy of the transcript of

the Jan. 5, 2005 hearing, which he failed to attend. He is welcome to do so, through the court

reporter, but he should note that simply being granted IFP status does not entitle him to a

transcript of district court proceedings at no cost. IFP status permits him to file his complaint

without filing a fee, and entitles him to service of the complaint by the U.S. Marshals, and

certain other benefits. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), (c) (IFP plaintiff entitled to free copy of the record

on appeal and transcripts of appearances before magistrate judges only). It does not confer

on Whitsitt any additional benefits, such as a free copy of the hearing transcript. 

2. Motion to Disqualify Counsel and Recuse Judge

Whitsitt indicates in his opposition brief that he may allege a conflict of interest on

defendants’ counsel’s part, and also that he may move to recuse the undersigned judge. If

Whitsitt chooses to raise these issues, the way to do so is by filing a properly-noticed motion

to disqualify and/or a motion to recuse. 

I. Summary Judgment

Finally, Whitsitt moves again for summary judgment. As previously indicated, Whitsitt

may not file a motion for summary judgment until discovery has closed. Jan. 6 Order at 4. In

any event, it is inappropriate to move for summary judgment based on defendants’ failure to

file an answer in response to the second amended complaint, because filing a motion to

dismiss is a permissible response to an amended complaint and does not waive any of the

defendants’ rights. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12. 

At the hearing, Whitsitt argued that he was only required to give 10 days notice to the

defendants for the filing of a summary judgment motion. While it is true that Fed. R. Civ. P. 56

requires only 10 days notice, this rule has been superseded in this district by the court’s local

rules, which require a minimum of 35 days notice for the filing of any motion. Civ. L. R. 7-2. 
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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CONCLUSION

Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The

motion to dismiss the procedural due process claims, the APA claims, the equal protection

claims, and the Title VII claims is GRANTED. The motion to dismiss all individual defendants

from the ADEA and wrongful discharge claims is GRANTED. The motion to dismiss the

ADEA retaliation claims against defendants Barclay and Duranleau is GRANTED. 

The court deems Whitsitt to have moved to amend his complaint to add his allegations

of alter ego liability for Installit, and GRANTS the request. The motion to dismiss Installit is

GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. All claims against Installit are DISMISSED,

except for the wrongful discharge claim. 

Defendants’ motion to strike the allegations of statements made to the EDD is

DENIED. 

Whitsitt’s motion for summary judgment is again DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to its

refiling after discovery has closed.

No further amended complaints may be filed. Within 30 days of the filing of this order,

defendants shall file a response to the remaining claims at issue in the SAC. Defendants shall

deem the complaint to allege a wrongful discharge claim against Installit as well. The parties

shall appear for case management conference on September 15, 2005 at 2:30 p.m. 

This order fully adjudicates the matters listed at nos. 42 and 45 on the clerk’s docket for

this case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 22, 2005

______________________________

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge