Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-03983/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-03983-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

OAKLAND DIVISION

EUGENIO PENA,

Petitioner,

vs.

MARION SPEARMAN, Warden,

Respondent.

Case No: C 13-3983 SBA (PR)

ORDER GRANTING 

RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO 

DISMISS; AND DENYING 

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Petitioner, a state prisoner currently incarcerated at the Correctional Training 

Facility, has filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, 

challenging the constitutionality of an adverse disciplinary finding in 2009. This matter is 

before the Court on Respondent’s motion to dismiss. Having read and considered papers 

filed in connection with this matter, and being fully informed, the Court hereby GRANTS 

Respondent’s motion and dismisses the petition.

I. BACKGROUND

In 1993, Petitioner was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of life with the 

possibility of parole plus eleven years. Dkt. 1 in Case No. C 11-6692 SBA (PR) at 2. His 

minimum eligible parole date was in 2005. Dkt. 6, Exs. 1, 3. 

Petitioner filed the instant federal habeas petition on August 27, 2013. Dkt. 1. He 

challenges a prison disciplinary hearing held at San Quentin State Prison in 2009, which 

resulted in a guilty finding for possessing a controlled substance for distribution. Dkt. 6, 

Ex. 2. Petitioner was assessed 180 days of credit loss. Id. The petition alleges several 

procedural due process violations with respect to his 2009 disciplinary hearing. Id. 

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Respondent now moves to dismiss the petition on the grounds that it: (1) fails to 

invoke federal habeas corpus jurisdiction; (2) fails to implicate a federally protected liberty 

interest; (3) is unexhausted; and (4) is untimely. Dkt. 6. Petitioner has filed an opposition 

to the motion, Respondent has filed a reply, and Petitioner has filed a sur-reply. Dkts. 9, 

11, 12.

II. DISCUSSION

A. FAILURE TO INVOKE FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS JURISDICTION

Respondent contends that habeas jurisdiction is lacking because a successful 

challenge will not result in Petitioner’s release or otherwise shorten his confinement. 

Petitioner responds that habeas jurisdiction is proper because the 2009 disciplinary finding 

could lengthen his confinement. Specifically, Petitioner argues that the Board of Parole 

Hearings generally grants postconviction credits1once he is deemed suitable for parole, but 

that the disciplinary finding could prevent him from earning such credits. He cites Title 15 

of the California Code of Regulations, which states, in relevant part: “No annual 

postconviction credit shall be granted in the case of any prisoner who commits serious . . . 

or numerous infractions of departmental regulations, violates any state law, or engages in 

other conduct which could result in rescission of a parole date . . . .” Dkt. 9 at 3 (quoting 

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2410(d)).

“‘Federal law opens two main avenues to relief on complaints related to 

imprisonment: a petition for habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and a complaint 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Challenges to the validity of any confinement or to particulars 

affecting its duration are the province of habeas corpus.’” Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 

573, 579 (2006) (quoting Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004)). “An inmate’s 

challenge to the circumstances of his confinement, however, may be brought under 

 

1 “The suggested amount of postconviction credit is zero to 4 months for each year 

served since the date the life term started[,] excluding any time during which service of the 

life term is tolled.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2410(b).

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[section] 1983.” Id. 

The Supreme Court has consistently held that any claim by a prisoner attacking the 

fact or duration of his confinement must be brought under the habeas sections of Title 28 of 

the United States Code. See Calderon v. Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740, 747 (1998); Edwards v. 

Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648 (1997); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). 

Likewise, a claim that would necessarily imply the invalidity of a prisoner’s conviction or 

continuing confinement must be brought in a habeas petition. See id. The Supreme Court, 

however, has declined to address whether a challenge to a condition of confinement may be 

brought under habeas. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 526 n.6 (1979); Fierro v. Gomez, 

77 F.3d 301, 304 n.2 (9th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 519 U.S. 918 (1996). 

Meanwhile, the Ninth Circuit has held that “habeas jurisdiction is absent, and a [section] 

1983 action proper, where a successful challenge to a prison condition will not necessarily 

shorten the prisoner’s sentence.” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 859 (9th Cir. 2003).

Here, Respondent argues that a successful challenge to the 2009 disciplinary finding 

would not affect the fact or length of Petitioner’s incarceration. This Court agrees. Habeas 

is not the proper avenue of relief for Petitioner’s claim. Petitioner is serving an 

indeterminate life sentence, and his minimum eligible parole date passed in 2005. In that

situation, a loss of time credits would not delay Petitioner’s release date or the date of his 

parole eligibility. In contrast, if Petitioner were serving a determinate sentence, his claim 

would be cognizable and appropriate for federal habeas corpus review because the loss of 

credits would have delayed his release date, and success on his claim would necessarily 

shorten his time in custody. Alternatively, if Petitioner had not yet reached his minimum 

eligible parole date, such a claim might also be cognizable because loss of time credits 

would delay the first date he would be eligible for parole and possibly obtain a release date. 

However, neither is the case here.

In any event, Petitioner’s claim that the 2009 disciplinary finding could affect the 

length or duration of his confinement is conclusory and speculative. Even if this Court 

were to vacate the disciplinary violation, Petitioner may nonetheless have been denied 

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postconviction credits under Title 15, section 2410(d), of the California Code of 

Regulations. As such, it is questionable whether Petitioner would succeed on his claim that 

the absence of a disciplinary violation would “necessarily shorten” his sentence. See

Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 859.; cf. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 487 (1995) (finding that the

mere possibility of a denial of parole on the basis of disciplinary findings is too speculative 

where there are a host of other factors that inform a parole determination). Accordingly, 

the Court finds that habeas jurisdiction is lacking and therefore GRANTS Respondent’s 

motion to dismiss without prejudice to Petitioner’s bringing his due process claim in a civil 

rights action, as explained below.

B. FAILURE TO IMPLICATE A FEDERALLY-PROTECTED LIBERTY INTEREST

Assuming arguendo that Petitioner had established the presence of federal habeas 

corpus jurisdiction, the Court turns to Respondent’s alternative argument that the petition 

should be dismissed because it fails to implicate a federally protected liberty interest.

The Due Process Clause protects individuals against governmental deprivations of 

“life, liberty or property” without due process of law. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 

564, 570-71 (1972). In the prison context, the triggering interest is usually the one 

pertaining to liberty. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972) (holding 

that revocation of parole is a deprivation of liberty that requires the provision of due 

process). 

A liberty interest can arise from either the Due Process Clause itself or from state 

law. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-27 (1976). Changes in conditions so severe that 

they affect the sentence imposed in an unexpected manner implicate the Due Process 

Clause itself. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995) (citing Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 

480, 493 (1980) (finding liberty interest where prisoner was transferred to mental hospital); 

Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990) (finding liberty interest where prisoner 

was involuntarily administered psychotropic drugs)). States may create liberty interests for

less-severe deprivations through statutes or regulations, but “[those] interests will generally 

be limited to freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an 

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unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force, 

nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the 

ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484 (citations omitted).

Sandin established that less-severe deprivations authorized by state law will create a 

liberty interest only where the inmate can show that the liberty in question is one of “real 

substance.” Id. at 477-87. Generally, “real substance” is limited to freedom from (1) a 

restraint that imposes “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the 

ordinary incidents of prison life,” id. at 484, or (2) state action that “will inevitably affect 

the duration of [a] sentence,” id. at 487. 

Petitioner claims that he was denied due process at his 2009 prison disciplinary 

hearing because he was not afforded all the procedural protections mandated by the 

Supreme Court in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). In Wolff, the Supreme Court 

held that although prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution and 

the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply, where serious 

rules violations are alleged and the sanctions to be applied implicate state statutes or 

regulations which narrowly restrict the power of prison officials to impose the sanctions 

and the sanctions are severe, the Due Process Clause requires various minimum procedural 

protections. See 418 U.S. at 556-57, 571-72 n.19. But after Sandin, a prisoner’s claim that 

he was denied due process in connection with a prison disciplinary proceeding must satisfy 

the “real substance” test in order to implicate a liberty interest and require any sort of 

procedural protection—the deprivation suffered as a result of the discipline imposed must 

be a deprivation of “real substance.” See, e.g., Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 448-49 

(9th Cir. 2000) (placement in secured housing unit pending disciplinary hearing did not 

give rise to protected liberty interest where plaintiff’s conditions of confinement were not 

materially different from those imposed on inmates in administrative segregation or in the 

general population). 

Respondent argues that Petitioner’s due process claim fails to implicate a federally 

protected liberty interest because the deprivations he suffered as a result of the discipline 

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imposed—a 180-day loss of time credit—did not amount to a deprivation of “real 

substance” under Sandin. The Court agrees.

Ordinarily, the assessment of time credit following a prison disciplinary panel’s 

finding that a prisoner violated prison rules implicates a federally protected liberty interest 

entitled to procedural protections because the assessment “will inevitably affect the 

duration of [the prisoner’s] sentence.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 487. But such is not the case 

here. Because Petitioner is serving a life sentence, the loss of time credit affects only the 

calculation of his minimum eligible parole date, see Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2400. By the 

time the 180 days of time credit at issue were assessed after he was found guilty of the 2009 

disciplinary violation, his minimum eligible parole date had long passed in 2005. In other 

words, the loss of 180 days of time credit in 2009 had no impact on Petitioner’s sentence.

In his opposition, Petitioner argues, in a conclusory fashion, that the challenged 

2009 disciplinary finding amounted to a deprivation of “real substance” under Sandin

because he was “placed in administrative segregation.” Dkt. 9 at 5. He claims that during 

his placement in administrative segregation he suffered “severance of family ties, sleep 

deprivation due to excessive noise directly related to overcrowding, a nervous breakdown, 

unequal treatment of the laws concerning visitation, religious participation and the 

like . . . .” Id. However, Petitioner neither elaborates on the length of his placement in 

administrative segregation, nor does he explain how the placement was related to the 2009 

disciplinary finding. Nowhere in the record does it show that Petitioner was assessed any

specific term of placement in administrative segregation as a result of the disciplinary 

finding.2 Dkt. 6, Ex. 2. 

In November 2009, when Petitioner was first suspected of being involved in 

possession of a controlled substance for distribution, prison staff decided that he needed to 

 

2

If Petitioner has a separate due process claim relating to his alleged placement in 

administrative segregation, he may raise such a claim in a separate civil action. 

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be “moved to administrative segregation . . . .”3 Id. at 3, 7. However, any initial temporary 

placement is irrelevant because no resulting long-term placement in administrative 

segregation was assessed as a result of the disciplinary finding. Instead, the record shows 

that upon being found guilty, Petitioner was assessed a 180-day credit forfeiture, loss of 

visitation, and mandatory random drug testing. Id. Petitioner takes issue with the 

assessment of loss of visitation; however, such an alleged hardship fails to implicate a 

federally protected liberty interest because a prisoner’s interest in unfettered visitation is 

not guaranteed by the Due Process Clause itself. See Kentucky Dep’t of Corrections v. 

Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989); see id. at 464-65 (finding no protected liberty 

interest in Kentucky visitation regulations); see also Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 817 

(9th Cir. 1994) (prisoners have no constitutional right to contact or conjugal visitation). 

Accordingly, Respondent’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED on the alternative 

ground that Petitioner’s due process claim fails to implicate a federally protected liberty 

interest.

III. CONCLUSION

Petitioner’s due process claim fails to invoke federal habeas corpus jurisdiction, or, 

in the alternative, fails to implicate a federally protected liberty interest entitled to 

procedural protections.4 His due process claim is DISMISSED because it is not appropriate 

for federal habeas corpus review. This dismissal is without prejudice to bringing his due 

process claim in a section 1983 action. Accordingly,

 

3

In any event, the Ninth Circuit has held that the hardship associated with 

administrative segregation is not so severe as to violate the Due Process Clause itself. See

Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 1986) (applying Hewitt v. Helms, 

459 U.S. 460 (1983)), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1069 (1987). Moreover, the Due Process 

Clause does not automatically confer on inmates a liberty interest in being placed in general 

population versus administrative segregation. Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 466-68. Therefore, 

Petitioner’s allegation that he was placed in administrative segregation falls short of 

establishing a dramatic departure from the standard conditions of confinement and does not

amount to an imposition of an “atypical and significant hardship.” See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 

487.

4

In light of the above discussion, the Court need not address the remaining 

arguments made by Respondent in support of his motion to dismiss.

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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1. Respondent’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED and the petition is dismissed 

without prejudice to Petitiioner’s bringing his due process claim in a section 1983 action.

2. A certificate of appealability is DENIED. Petitioner has not shown “that 

jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its 

procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Petitioner may seek a 

certificate of appealability from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 

3. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment, terminate all pending motions, 

and close the file.

4. The Clerk shall also send Petitioner a blank civil rights complaint form with 

his copy of this Order.

5. This Order terminates Docket No. 6.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 2, 2015 ______________________________

SAUNDRA BROWN ARMSTRONG

United States District Judge

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