Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-04675/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-04675-9/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

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UNITED 

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DISTRICT 

COURT

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SEMICONDUCTOR ENERGY LABORATORY CO.,

LTD,

Plaintiff,

v.

CHI MEI OPTOELECTRONICS CORP. et al.,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 04-04675 MHP

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

Re: Motion for Clarification

Plaintiff Semiconductor Energy Laboratory Co. brought this patent infringement action

against defendants Chi Mei Optoelectronics Corp. et al., alleging infringement of four United States

patents related generally to the design and manufacture of liquid crystal display (“LCD”) devices. 

On March 27, 2006 the court issued a memorandum and order construing several disputed terms in

the asserted patents. Now before the court is defendants’ motion for clarification as to two of the

court’s constructions.

The parties disagree at the outset about the proper characterization of defendants’ motion. 

Plaintiff argues that the instant motion is, in substance, a motion for reconsideration, which is

subject to strict threshold requirements under Civil Local Rule 7-9. Defendants argue that they are

merely requesting clarification of perceived inconsistencies in the court’s Markman ruling. See,

e.g., Mosaid Techs., Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 01-CV-4340, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27635, at

*16 (D.N.J. June 10, 2004) (granting motion for clarification where court’s claim construction order

and

opinion were inconsistent).

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COURT

For the Northern District of California

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The court agrees with plaintiff that defendants’ motion does not depart greatly from the

arguments already advanced through claim construction briefing and argument and can be denied on

that basis alone. Indeed, the two constructions offered by defendants as “clarifications” of the

court’s previous ruling are nearly identical to the constructions previously offered by defendants and

rejected by this court. Nonetheless, the court briefly considers the merits of defendants’ arguments.

The first claim term for which defendants seek clarification is “conductive spacer,” used in

U.S. Patent No. 6,404,480 (the “‘480 patent”). According to defendants, the court’s construction is

confusing because it finds that the term “spacer” standing alone means an object “placed in the

region between the substrates in order to maintain a uniformly wide gap,” but concludes that a

“conductive spacer” need not contribute to maintaining a uniformly wide gap. Defendants claim that

the current construction is fatally inconsistent.

While it is true that terms used in a patent should generally be given consistent meaning

throughout, see Rexnord Corp. v. Laitram Corp., 274 F.3d 1336, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001), this

principle is not rigid or absolute. Here, the court has already found that “spacers” and “conductive

spacers” are distinct structures in the specification of the ‘480 patent and have different functions. 

The description of the embodiment cited by the court in its Markman order makes the distinction

plain; when the two substrates are brought together, the conductive spacers are deformed until the

cell gap is reduced to 3 micrometers—the diameter of the spacers. ‘480 patent at 11:47–61. While

it may be that in some embodiments the conductive spacers as well as the spacers help to maintain

the cell gap, according to this passage they need not always do so.

The second claim term for which defendants seek clarification is “exposed,” as used in the

claims of U.S. Patent No. 6,756,258 (the “‘258 patent”). Here, defendant illogically argues from its

own false assumption to make the leap to a conclusion which, of course, is erroneous. The court

defined “exposed” to mean “made subject to etching”. The court then explained the reason for its

broad reading of the claim, rejecting defendant’s narrow reading.. The court concluded that the

extent of the “exposed” portion of the second semiconductor film would depend on the type of

etchant used. Defendants now argue that the court must have improperly defined the claim term in

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For the Northern District of California

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light of the accused process, which is contrary to settled law. See SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec.

Corp., 775 F.2d 1107, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 1985).

As defendants know, however, the court was presented with no evidence about the accused

process during claim construction, made no reference to it in its claim construction, and certainly did

not rely on the accused process as extrinsic evidence of the meaning of the disputed terms. The

court relied upon the claim language, which is broadly stated, noting it encompasses the use of both

wet and dry etchants; the description in the specification of the use of different types of etchant; and

the parties’ stipulations in their papers and at argument that one of ordinary skill in the art would

understand that a wet etchant will remove a different part of the surface of a semiconductor device

than a dry etchant. No part of this reasoning depends on reference to the accused process and that

should be apparent from the court’s order.

If defendants are suggesting that the claim as interpreted is invalid under 35 U.S.C. section

112, whether for lack of enablement, lack of adequate written description, or indefiniteness, they can

pursue this on a motion for summary judgment, to the extent their argument has merit. The motion

for clarification, however, has none and is therefore DENIED.

Defendants’ motion for clarification is therefore denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 27, 2006 

MARILYN HALL PATEL

District Judge

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Case 3:04-cv-04675-MHP Document 144 Filed 07/28/06 Page 3 of 3