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Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

JAMES TUCKER LEVIER, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

) 

) 

) 

) 

FI LED 

United States Court of Appeals 

lPnth Cif"<11!t 

FEB 12 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. ) No. 88-2051 

) (D.C. No. 84-3015) 

HERBERT MASCHNER; and THE ATTORNEY 

GENERAL OF THE STATE OF KANSAS, 

Respondents-Appellees. 

) ( D. Kan.) 

) 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before TACHA, BALDOCK, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this pane l 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The cause is therefore ordered 

Petitioner appeals from an order of the district court 

entered June 21, 1988, dismissing, for a second time, his 28 

U. S . C. § 2254 petition challenging a second 

conviction obtained in Kansas. 

degree murder 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir . R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 88-2051 Document: 01019963037 Date Filed: 02/12/1990 Page: 1 
Petitioner was convicted under state law requiring the 

prosecution to prove not only his deliberate conduct in beating 

the decedent but also, specifically, his intent to cause her 

death. On a prior appeal to this court, petitioner argued that 

his constitutional rights were violated when the jury in his 

criminal trial was instructed that it could presume that 

petitioner "intended the natural and probable consequences" of his 

actions, i.e., the very mens rea necessary for his conviction. By 

order and judgment filed February 18, 1987, this court held that 

petitioner had established a violation of the constitutional 

strictures recognized in Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 

(1979), and Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985), and remanded 

the cause for further consideration under Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 

570, 581-82 (1986}(Sandstrom error does not warrant overturning 

conviction if deemed harmless under standard established in 

Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)) 1 . On remand, the 

district court concluded that "the court is convinced beyond a 

reasonable doubt that defendant committed the acts resulting in 

the victim's death and that he had the requisite intent necessary 

1 We note that while intent, in terms of insanity, diminished 

capacity, and simple lack of the requisite mens rea, was the 

central issue in petitioner's criminal trial and,--uierefore, the 

presumption of intent permitted the jury certainly could not be 

deemed facially harmless, compare Francis, 471 U.S. at 325-26 

(Sandstrom error impermissibly prejudiced jury's determination of 

contested issue of intent} with Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 

73, 87 (1983}(Sandstrom error may be harmless if defense conceded 

issue of intent}, the Supreme Court made it quite clear in Rose 

that the mere fact that the defense contested intent at trial 

"does not dispose of the harmless-error question [in the 

defendant's favor]." Rose, 478 U.S. at 583-84. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2051 Document: 01019963037 Date Filed: 02/12/1990 Page: 2 
to constitute murder in the second degree," and dismissed the 

instant petition on harmless error grounds. District court 

memorandum and order filed June 21, 1988, at 6. We reverse. 

The critical language quoted above, on which the district 

court's disposition ultimately rests, indicates that the district 

court applied the wrong standard in reviewing the evidence for 

harmless error. The issue is not whether the court is convinced, 

even beyond a reasonable doubt, of the petitioner's criminal 

intent, but rather whether the court can, with equal confidence, 

conclude that the jury's determination of the issue was not 

affected by the improper instruction, i.e., that the evidence is 

so dispositive of intent that the court can say beyond a 

reasonable doubt that the jury would have found it unnecessary to 

rely on the impermissible presumption contained in the 

instructions. See Rose, 478 U.S. at 583; Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24; 

House v. Lavoie, 843 F.2d 474, 475 (11th Cir. 1988). While the 

circumstantial evidence of criminal intent presented at 

petitioner's trial, particularly the brutal and persistent manner 

in which the victim was beaten, might well, standing alone, 

support a harmless error determination under this standard, see 

Rose, 478 U.S. at 581 (in some cases inference of requisite intent 

drawn from defendant's conduct may be overpowering), two 

additional considerations compel a different conclusion here. 

The prosecution and defense each called one expert witness to 

provide testimony relating to petitioner's mental state at the 

time of the homicide. However, while both witnesses discussed the 

insanity issue at length, only defendant's expert, Dr. Shelton, 

3 

Appellate Case: 88-2051 Document: 01019963037 Date Filed: 02/12/1990 Page: 3 
related any opinion regarding petitioner's criminal intent. Dr. 

Shelton's undisputed opinion that petitioner did not intend to 

kill the decedent at the time he beat her, see trial tr. at 360, 

367, 381-82, which was overlooked in the district court's order 

below, obviously weighs against a determination that the state's 

case on the issue was overwhelming. 

A second factor not considered by the district court concerns 

the jury's request, during the course of its deliberations, for 

reinstruction on the nature of the intent necessary to convict on 

second degree murder. Specifically, the jury asked the trial 

court whether the crime required an intent to kill or simply 

deliberate conduct ultimately resulting in death, and was told the 

former. The Supreme Court has expressly recognized that such an 

inquiry, which points up the jury's focus on the very element the 

impermissible instruction permits it to presume, "lends further 

substance to the ... conclusion that the evidence of intent was 

far from overwhelming in this case.'' Francis, 471 U.S. at 326; 

see also Alexander v. Foltz, 838 F.2d 140, 148 (6th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 108 S. Ct. 2017 (1988). 

For the above reasons, the district court's dismissal of 

petitioner's § 2254 petition on harmless error grounds was 

erroneous. On the record before us, we cannot allow petitioner's 

second degree murder conviction to stand. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

District of Kansas is REVERSED and the cause REMANDED with 

instructions to issue a writ of habeas corpus providing for 

petitioner's release from incarceration on the subject offense 

4 

Appellate Case: 88-2051 Document: 01019963037 Date Filed: 02/12/1990 Page: 4 
unless the State of Kansas elects to retry petitioner within sixty 

days of the date of the district court's ensuing order. If 

petitioner is timely retried, the instant petition shall thereupon 

be dismissed by the district court. All motions currently pending 

before this court are DENIED as moot. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

PER CURIAM 

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