Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01605/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01605-49/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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 The undersigned notes that the motion is wide-ranging because it sets forth eleven

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grounds upon which defendants contend they are entitled to summary judgment in their favor. 

However, the motion does not address the legal standards governing motions for summary

judgment. Nor do the very brief arguments presented by counsel in support of each of the eleven

grounds advanced make reference to how summary judgment standards apply to the undisputed

facts in this case. The court feels that it cannot address the arguments in the same abbreviated

fashion counsel has presented them. On the other hand, plaintiff’s voluminous, and often

irrelevant and repetitive, submissions are equally unhelpful in resolving the pending motion.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANDREW R. LOPEZ,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-03-1605 GEB DAD P

vs.

S. COOK, et al.,

Defendants. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a civil rights action pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Before the court is a wide-ranging motion for summary judgment filed on

behalf of defendants Adams, Babich, Bartos, Cook, Garate, Gilliam, Harrison, Holmes, Johnson,

McClure, McKean, Martinez, Morton, Nergenah, Shaver, Statti and Vanderville. Plaintiff has 1

filed an opposition to the motion. Defendants have not filed a reply.

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 Defendants Woodford and Drew were dismissed by order filed December 7, 2005. See 2

also Findings and Recommendations filed November 4, 2005. The claims against defendants

Farris, Singletary and Hansen were dismissed without prejudice by amended order filed on

March 14, 2007. See also Findings and Recommendations filed on November 14, 2006.

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BACKGROUND

The operative pleading in this action is plaintiff’s third amended complaint filed

on October 6, 2004. Therein, plaintiff set forth twenty-one causes of action and named twentytwo defendants. Five of those defendants have already been dismissed from this action. Six of 2

the causes of action set out in plaintiff’s third amended complaint have also been dismissed. In

this regard, pursuant to the court’s order filed December 7, 2005, plaintiff’s third, fourth,

seventh, eleventh, thirteenth and twenty-first causes of action were dismissed in their entirety. 

That same order dismissed plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim set forth in his eighth, ninth

and tenth causes of action.

The incidents giving rise to this action took place while plaintiff was incarcerated

at High Desert State Prison (HDSP). The claims presented in plaintiff’s third amended

complaint can be broadly categorized as involving allegations of retaliation, errors in the gang

validation process, conspiracy and state law violations. The undersigned has previously

summarized those claims as follows:

Plaintiff’s remaining substantive claims are the following. First,

plaintiff claims that he was retaliated against for filing a civil rights

lawsuit in 1994, submitting administrative grievances while

imprisoned and engaging in jailhouse lawyering activities. 

Plaintiff contends that in retaliation for his engaging in this

protected conduct, prison officials placed him in administrative

segregation, validated him as a gang associate and placed him in a

security housing unit (S.H.U.), denied him access to documents

needed to challenge his confinement in administrative segregation,

lost or denied his inmate appeals, coerced other inmates to

fabricate evidence for use in validating plaintiff as a gang associate

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 Plaintiff also contends that in retaliation for engaging in protected conduct, his legal 3

property was stolen and the theft was covered-up by Correctional Officer Singletary who

allegedly signed a false affidavit contending that plaintiff had received all of his property. 

However, as noted above, officer Singletary has been dismissed from this action. For this reason,

the court will not address any claim of retaliation brought by plaintiff against Officer Singletary. 

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and threatened plaintiff’s safety. Second, plaintiff alleges that the 3

gang validation determination in his case was unsupported, the

evidence relied upon was fabricated and based on false statements,

he did not receive administrative review of the determination, was

denied both an opportunity to present his views and the evidence

needed to defend himself and was denied meaningful classification

reviews all in violation of his right to due process. Third, plaintiff

alleges that defendants have conspired to deprive him of his

constitutional rights. In this regard, plaintiff contends that because

of engaging in protected conduct, he was placed in administrative

segregation on February 2, 2000, under the “false pretext” that

there was pending [an] investigation of his gang affiliation. (Third

Am. Compl. ¶ 49 at 3.) Plaintiff alleges this was done so that

defendants could conspire to fabricate evidence against him. (Id.) 

Fourth, plaintiff alleges that defendants violated the California

Constitution by placing and retaining him in administrative

segregation, failing to provide him due process and equal

protection and by suspending his “habeas corpus guarantees[.]” 

(Third Am. Compl., ¶¶ 127-132 at 17.)

(Findings and Recommendations (F&R) filed January 9, 2008, at 2-3.)

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS UNDER RULE 56

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that there exists “no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party 

always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). “[W]here the

nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary

judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers

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to interrogatories, and admissions on file.’” Id. Indeed, summary judgment should be entered,

after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that

party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See id. at 322. “[A] complete failure of proof

concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts

immaterial.” Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment should be granted, “so long as

whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for entry of summary

judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied.” Id. at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the

opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to

establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the

allegations or denials of its pleadings but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the

form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the

dispute exists. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The opposing party

must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome

of the suit under the governing law, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir.

1987), and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the nonmoving party, see Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433,

1436 (9th Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party

need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the

claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing

versions of the truth at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the “purpose of summary

judgment is to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a

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 This is the second summary judgment motion filed in this action. The first such motion 4

was filed by plaintiff and was denied by order filed February 22, 2008.

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genuine need for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory

committee’s note on 1963 amendments).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

any. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed. See Anderson,

477 U.S. at 255. All reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the

court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. 

Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s obligation to

produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen

Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir.

1987). Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing party “must do more than simply

show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . . Where the record taken

as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no

‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (citation omitted).

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT4

Defendants have moved for summary judgment in their favor with respect to all of

plaintiff’s remaining causes of action. Below the court will address each of those causes of

action in the groupings defendants have addressed them in their motion.

I. Retaliation Claims (First, Second, Eighth and Ninth Causes of Action) 

In his third amended complaint plaintiff alleges that he was retaliated against for

engaging in protected conduct. Specifically, plaintiff has alleged as follows:

First Cause of Action (First Amendment - Jailhouse Lawyer Activities)

Defendants have violated plaintiff’s rights guaranteed by the First

Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in that his (A) confinement in

the S.H.U., (B) the false reports, (C) the theft of his property and

affidavits to cover up that theft, (D) the false statements and

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 Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim was dismissed by order filed December 7, 5

2005. 

 See fn. 5, supra. 6

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documentation used to retain plaintiff in ad-seg, (E) the refusal to

provide documentation necessary to defend confinement in ad-seg,

(F) the repeated loss of and denial of plaintiff’s administrative

appeals, (G) the coersion [sic] and attempted coersion [sic] of

inmates to fabricate evidence against plaintiff, (H) the threats, (I)

are based wholly or in part upon plaintiff’s legal and legitimate

jailhouse lawyer activities related to and in furtherance of

providing legal assistance to other prisoners, (J) and of pursuing

his own claims, (K) and in that said jailhouse lawyer activities did

not consist of and were not in furtherance of any illegal prison gang

or activity whatsoever. 

Second Cause of Action (First Amendment - Retaliation)

Defendants, and each of them, have further violated plaintiff’s First

Amendment rights in that his confinement in the S.H.U., and the

false documentation placed in plaintiff’s prison files, constitute

retaliatory action taken against plaintiff for the exercise of his

constitutionally protected right to engage in legal and legitimate

jailhouse lawyer activities related to and in the furtherance of

pursuing his own claims and providing legal assistance to other

prisoners, where such jailhouse lawyers activities were not for the

purpose of engaging in or furtherance of any illegal activity

whatsoever.

Eighth Cause of Action (First Amendment - False Allegations)

Defendant McKean violated plaintiff’s First and Fourteenth

Amendment rights when he retaliated against plaintiff for 5

exercising protected jailhouse lawyer activities by falsely alleging

that plaintiff breached regulations.

Ninth Cause of Action (First Amendment - False Allegations)

Defendant Bartos violated plaintiff’s First and Fourteenth

Amendment rights when he retaliated against plaintiff for 6

exercising protected jailhouse lawyer activities by falsely alleging

that plaintiff breached regulations.

(Third Am. Compl. at 14-15.)

Plaintiff contends that these acts were taken against him in retaliation for

engaging in litigation and utilizing the prison administrative grievance procedure. Specifically,

plaintiff alleges that defendants retaliated against him for filing a § 1983 civil rights lawsuit in

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 Plaintiff alleges that this civil action stemmed from an incident at an institution other 7

than HDSP and that a verdict in favor of defendant Hada following a three-day trial was

eventually entered. 

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the case of Lopez v. Hada, CIV S-94-0891 FCD JFM P (E.D. Cal.) on June 7, 1994 , and for 7

filing more than twenty grievances against HDSP staff from 1997 through 1999. (Third Am.

Compl. ¶34 at 2.) 

A. Legal Standards Governing Claims of Unlawful Retaliation 

Retaliation by a state actor for the exercise of a constitutional right is actionable

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 even if the act, when taken for different reasons, would have been

proper. Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 283-84 (1977). Although

retaliation is not expressly referred to in the Constitution, it is actionable because retaliatory

actions may tend to chill the exercise of constitutional rights. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593

(1972). 

“Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails

five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an

inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the

inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a

legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005)

(footnote omitted). A prisoner must establish that the protected conduct was a substantial or

motivating factor for the alleged retaliatory acts. See Mt. Healthy City Board of Ed., 429 U.S. at

285-86. However, retaliatory motive may be inferred from the timing and nature of the alleged

retaliatory activities. See Soranno's Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314-16 (9th Cir.

1989). Nonetheless, a mere allegation of a retaliatory motive is insufficient to defeat a motion

for summary judgment. See Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 815-16 (9th Cir. 1994).

Prisoners may not be retaliated against for exercising their right of access to the

courts. Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 461 (9th Cir. 1995); Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d

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527, 532 (9th Cir. 1985) (retaliation for prisoner’s work as jailhouse lawyer is prohibited). “The

right of access to the courts is subsumed under the first amendment right to petition the

government for redress of grievances[.]” Soranno’s Gasco, Inc., 874 F2d at 1314. This

constitutional prohibition bars retaliation for initiating litigation (Soranno’s Gasco, Inc., 874 F.2d

at 1314) as well as for using a prison grievance system (Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 267 (9th

Cir. 1997) and Bradley v. Hall, 64 F.2d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir. 1995)).

For purposes of evaluating a retaliation claim, an adverse action is action that

"would chill a person of ordinary firmness" from engaging in that activity. Pinard v. Clatskanie

School Dist., 467 F.3d 755, 770 (9th Cir. 2006); White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1228 (9th Cir.

2000).

The Ninth Circuit has found that preserving institutional order, discipline and

security are legitimate penological goals that, if they provide the motivation for an official act

taken, will defeat a claim of retaliation. Barnett, 31 F.3d at 816; Rizzo, 778 F.2d at 532; see also

Martin v. Hurtado, Civil No. 07cv0598 BTM (RBB), 2008 WL 4145683, *6 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 3,

2008). The burden is on plaintiff to demonstrate that legitimate correctional purposes did not

motivate the actions by prison officials about which he complains. Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d

802, 808 (9th Cir. 1995). The Ninth Circuit has also held that, “prison officials may not defeat a

retaliation claim on summary judgment simply by articulating a general justification for a neutral

process, when there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the action was taken in

retaliation[.]” Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1289 (9th Cir. 2003).

 In Bruce the district court had granted summary judgment in favor of defendants

on plaintiff’s claim that when prison officials validated him as a prison gang affiliate, they did so

in retaliation for his jailhouse lawyering activities. 351 F.3d at 1286. The Ninth Circuit

reversed, finding that the plaintiff had presented some evidence that the accusation of gang

activity was improperly motivated and, when coupled with the suspect timing of the investigation

and stale nature of the evidence relied upon, raised a triable issue of fact regarding whether the

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26 Referred to by plaintiff as the “S.H.U.,” an acronym for a Secured Housing Unit. 8

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motive behind the gang validation was retaliatory. Id at 1288-89. In this regard, the court

observed:

But, if, in fact, the defendants abused the gang validation procedure

as a cover or a ruse to silence and punish Bruce because he filed

grievances, they cannot assert that Bruce’s validation served a valid

penological purpose, even though he may have arguably ended up

where he belonged.

Bruce, 351 F.3d at 1289. See also Powell v. Miles, No. CV 03-1819-PHX-JAT, 2006 WL

2547359, *6-7 (D. Az. Aug. 30, 2006) (summary judgment in favor of defendant denied because

inconsistent explanations created a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether the

defendant segregated plaintiff in the secured housing unit for retaliatory purposes). 

Below, the court will apply these legal standards to each aspect of plaintiff’s

retaliation claim.

B. Placement and Retention in Administrative Segregation

As noted above, plaintiff contends that he was placed in administrative

segregation in retaliation for his litigation and jailhouse lawyer activities. He also alleges that 8

false statements and documentation were used to place him in the administrative segregation and

retain him there. 

1. Defendants’ Arguments

Defendants move for summary judgement in their favor on this aspect of

plaintiff’s retaliation claim. Defendants argue that they did not have plaintiff placed and retained

in administrative segregation to retaliate against him for engaging in any protected conduct but

instead acted in furtherance of the legitimate penological goal of isolating and segregating gang

members from the general prison population. (Defs.’ P. & A. at 4-6.) They also assert that the

evidence before the court, in the form of the defendants’ declarations, establishes that none of the

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 This latter citation form will be used to refer to supporting documents as they appear in

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the court’s CM/ECF docket.

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defendants involved in plaintiff’s validation as a gang member and placement in administrative

segregation were even aware of his previous complaints against prison staff. (Id.) 

According to defendants Adams, Babich, Cook, Garate, Gilliam, McClure,

Morton, Nergenah and Vanderville, the evidence establishes that their involvement in plaintiff’s

placement and retention in administrative segregation was limited to the following. On February

2, 2000, defendant Garate issued a CDC 114-D, ordering that plaintiff be placed in

administrative segregation based on confidential information received on January 30, 2000,

implicating plaintiff as part of the Northern Structure gang hierarchy. (Defs.’ Statement of

Undisputed Facts (DSUF), Ex. D) (Doc. No. 157, Part 4 at 2 - Adseg Placement Notice). On 9

February 10 and March 2, 2000, defendant Vanderville attended plaintiff’s classification

committee hearings and agreed with the committee’s decision to retain plaintiff in administrative

segregation pending the outcome of the investigation into his gang affiliation. (Vanderville Decl.

in Support of MSJ, ¶ 3 of 2) (Doc. No. 157, Part 10 at 6). 

On March 22, 2000, defendant Morton, a now retired former classification staff

representative, approved the classification committee’s request that plaintiff be retained in

administrative segregation while the gang investigation continued. (Morton Decl. in Support of

MSJ, ¶¶ 1, 3 at 1-2) (Doc. No. 157, Part 9 at 8). He also approved two extensions to retain

plaintiff in administrative segregation. In his declaration filed in support of the pending motion,

Morton states:

I did not conspire with any other correctional officer to violate

Lopez’s constitutional rights, nor were any of my actions taken for

the purpose of retaliating against him for exercising his

constitutional rights. . . . Releasing Lopez from administrative

segregation before the IGI investigator could complete his work

might have released an active gang member into the general 

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population, endangering the safety and security of the institution,

inmates and staff.

(Id. ¶ 4 at 2.)

Defendant Captain Cook attended classification committee (ICC) meetings with

respect to plaintiff on March 30, 2000, April 27, 2000, May 25, 2000, June 22, 2000, and July

20, 2000. (Cook Decl. in Support of MSJ, ¶ 4 at 2) (Doc. No. 157, Part 7 at 10). In his

declaration Cook states: 

At each of those hearings, I put on the record that IGI had

discovered eleven points for validation and was in the process of

preparing a validation package. To the best of my knowledge, that

statement was true each time it was entered in the record. My

verification of the information in his file had nothing to do with

any grievances or lawsuits Lopez filed against me or other staff. 

As a member of the committee, I was obligated to review Lopez’s

central file and present information to the committee relevant to

determining whether Lopez should be retained in administrative

segregation. The status of the investigation into Lopez’s gang

affiliation was a relevant consideration.

(Id.)

Defendant Nergenah is a classification staff representative. On July 5, 2000, he

approved the classification committee’s May 25, 2000 request for a 120-day extension of

plaintiff’s placement in administrative segregation while the gang investigation continued. 

(Nergenah Decl. in Support of MSJ, ¶ 3 at 2) (Doc. No. 157, Part 9 at 10). Defendant Nergenah

likewise declares that he did not retaliate against plaintiff but rather took steps to retain plaintiff

in administrative segregation only for safety and security reasons while the gang affiliation

investigation continued. (Id. ¶ 4 at 2.)

Defendant Correctional Lieutenant Adams attended plaintiff’s October 12, 2000

classification hearing and declares as follows: 

I verified the information that was recorded on the CDC 128-G

form, including the fact that the institutional gang investigation

unit had found 11 points for validating Lopez. As a member of the

committee, I was obligated to review Lopez’s central file and

present information to the committee relevant to determining

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whether Lopez should be retained in administrative segregation. 

The status of the investigation into Lopez’s gang affiliation was a

relevant consideration.

(Adams Decl. in Support of MSJ, ¶ 4 at 2) (Doc. No. 157, Part 7 at 3.) The CDC 128-G

classification chrono referred to by Lieutenant Adams noted: 

LOPEZ was initially placed into ASU on 2/2/00 from Facility A

due to information that was received that implicates you as being

part of the Northern Structure hierarchy on Facility A and

confidential information as indicated on CDC 1030. LOPEZ is

currently pending IGI investigation, noting IGI has discovered 11

points for validation, and will be retained pending the outcome. 

(Pl.’s Decl. in Support of Pl.’s MSJ filed April 18, 2007, Ex. 46-G) (Doc. No. 122 Part 2 at 73). 

Correctional counselor defendant Babich attended plaintiff’s November 9, 2000

classification hearing and “verified the information that was recorded on the CDC 128-G form,

including the fact that the institutional gang investigation unit had found 11 points for validating

Lopez.” (Babich Decl. in Support of MSJ, ¶ 3 at 2) (Doc. No. 157, Part 7 at 5-6). At that time

the classification committee decided to retain plaintiff in administrative segregation “pending

outcome of the validation process.” (Pl.’s Decl., Ex. 46-H) (Doc. No. 122, Part 2 at 75). 

Defendant Captain McClure attended plaintiff’s classification hearings on March

2, 2000, December 7, 2000 and January 4, 2001 and declares that his actions at the hearings

“were motivated only by a desire to appropriately house Lopez in light of all his case factors,

including but not limited to his gang validation.” (McClure Decl. in Support of MSJ, ¶ 3 at 2)

(Doc. No. 157, Part 9 at 2). Defendant McClure also declares that plaintiff’s transfer from HDSP

“had nothing to do with any pending legal matters” but rather “[h]e was transferred in order to

place him in a SHU unit, pursuant to his validation as a member of the Northern Structure prison

gang.” (Id. ¶ 4 at 2.) 

Defendant Gilliam is a correctional counselor at HDSP and during 2000 acted as a

recorder at some of plaintiff’s classification hearings. (Gilliam Decl. in Support of MSJ ¶ 3 at

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29) (Doc. No. 157, Part 8 at 4). He declares merely that “[a]t all such hearings, I did my best to

record information accurately.” (Id.) 

In short, each of the defendants have declared that when they took actions related

to plaintiff’s placement and retention in administrative segregation they were not aware of his

prior complaints or grievances brought against prison staff and were instead motivated to act in

furtherance of the legitimate penological goal of isolating and segregating gang members from

the general prison population. Given the undisputed nature of the evidence in this regard,

defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment in their favor. 

2. Plaintiff’s Arguments

In his opposition to the pending motion for summary judgment plaintiff contends

that his placement in administrative segregation was extended several times by the classification

committee due to defendant Cook “falsely alleging that I.G.I. had 11 points to validate me[.]”

(Opp’n at 6.) Similarly, plaintiff argues that defendants McClure and Babich kept him in

administrative segregation under the “false pretext that 11 points existed to validate me as a gang

member. . . .” (Id. at 20.) As to defendants’ declarations stating that they were unaware of his

previous complaints made against prison staff, plaintiff argues that such statements are not

credible because he also lodged administrative complaints while incarcerated at HDSP and those

grievances were in his central files which the classification committee and CSR members were

required to review. (Id. at 11.) 

The court notes that in his third amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that

defendant Cook demonstrated a retaliatory motive by making statements concerning plaintiff’s

legal activities, such as, telling plaintiff that his grievances “made him like a grain of sand in

staff[’]s eyes” and that Cook added, “‘What do you do? You remove it.’” (Third Am. Compl. ¶

81 at 9.) Plaintiff also alleged that at the conclusion of the February 8, 2001, classification

hearing where he was designated for indeterminate placement in the S.H.U., defendant Cook

leaned close to plaintiff and said, “‘File on that, you’ll never get out now.’” (Id. ¶ 84 at 10.)

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 Quint also states in his declaration that another correctional sergeant asked, “Where is 10

the legal begal (sic) Lopez, the one we could not get on ‘C’ yard?” (Pl.’s Decl. in Support of

Pl.’s MSJ filed April 18, 2007, Ex. 54.) 

14

The court also notes that in his declaration in support of his own previously filed

motion for summary judgment, plaintiff states that on December 10, 1999, defendant McKean

took plaintiff into an office and, in connection with plaintiff’s filing of lawsuits, said that “we

won’t be having that around here.” (Pl.’s Decl. in Support of Pl.’s MSJ filed April 18, 2007, at

9.) According to plaintiff, McKean also threatened plaintiff by warning him that both McKean

and other officers in the guard tower had shot prisoners before. (Id.) Plaintiff has submitted the

declaration of fellow inmate Daniel Quint in which Quint states that on January 28, 2000,

defendant Garate threatened to bring a false disciplinary charge against him and other inmates

unless they provided information against plaintiff, whether true or not. (Pl.’s Decl. in Support of

Pl.’s MSJ filed April 18, 2007, Ex. 54.) In another declaration previously submitted by 10

plaintiff, inmate Everett Gonzalez states that when they met in 2000 plaintiff was knowledgeable

in the law and helped Gonzalez in defending against disciplinary charges and pursuing prison

grievances. (Pl.’s Decl. in Support of Pl.’s MSJ filed April 18, 2007, Ex. 83.) Gonzalez

declares that he saw numerous correctional officers “harass, provoke and mock” plaintiff and that

on one occasion defendant Bartos yelled in front of the entire section of inmates, “just to let

everyone know, pretty soon all these TV’s will be out of here due to that guy [plaintiff] rattings

(sic) on C/O’s and fileing (sic) 602's.” (Id.) Gonzalez also states that he told another

correctional officer about these incidents. (Id.) Finally, plaintiff has previously submitted the

declaration of inmate Jesse Washington who declares that from 2002 through 2004, he has

witnessed prison officials at HDSP erroneously validate African American and Latino

(Northerner) inmates, including plaintiff, as gang members under the guise of institutional

security grounds. (Pl.’s Decl. in Support of Pl.’s MSJ filed April 18, 2007, Ex. 96.)

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As noted, defendants elected not to respond to plaintiff’s opposition to the

pending motion.

 3. Discussion

The court has reviewed defendants’ motion and the evidence filed in support

thereof, as well as plaintiff’s third amended complaint, his voluminous declaration filed in

support of his own motion for summary judgment along with the 101 exhibits attached thereto,

and his opposition to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The question here is

whether the defendants, or any of them, are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s claim

that each acted to place him in and retain him in administrative segregation in retaliation for his

protected legal activities. 

Plaintiff has presented no evidence that defendants Bartos and McKean were

involved in any way in his placement and retention in administrative segregation. Accordingly,

those defendants are entitled to summary judgment in their favor on this claim. Likewise, while

defendants Adams, Babich, Gilliam, Harrison, Holmes, Johnson, McClure, Martinez, Morton,

Nergenah, Shaver, Statti and Vanderville apparently played some role in plaintiff’s placement

and retention in administrative segregation, they have declared that they did not take any actions

for the purpose of retaliating against plaintiff for exercising his constitutional rights. Plaintiff has

not responded to those declarations by providing any evidence calling the motivation of these

individual defendants into question. Therefore, they too are entitled to summary judgment in

their favor on this aspect of plaintiff’s retaliation claim.

However, the same cannot be said with respect to defendants Cook and Garate. 

Defendant Garate issued the initial order for plaintiff to be placed in administrative segregation. 

(Garate Decl. in Support of MSJ, ¶ 4 at 2.) Sergeant Garate declares that he issued this order

based on his understanding that confidential information had been received implicating plaintiff

as part of the Northern Structure prison gang hierarchy and not for purposes of retaliating against

plaintiff. (Id.) Defendant Correctional Captain Cook attended five classification committee

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 Defendants have not addressed plaintiff’s evidence, electing not to file a reply brief in

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support of their motion.

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hearings regarding plaintiff’s retention in administrative segregation and at each of those

hearings he placed on the record that Institutional Gang Investigations had discovered eleven

points for validating plaintiff as a gang member and was in the process of preparing a validation

package. (Cook Decl. in Support of MSJ, ¶ 4 at 2.) Captain Cook declares that his actions were

not taken for the purpose of retaliating against plaintiff. (Id.) 

In response plaintiff has presented evidence that within a month of issuing the

order placing him in administrative segregation, defendant Garate threatened to bring a false

disciplinary charge against other inmates unless they provided information implicating plaintiff,

whether true or not. (Pl.’s Decl. in Support of Pl.’s MSJ filed April 18, 2007, Ex. 54.) 

Similarly, plaintiff states that defendant Cook demonstrated retaliatory motives for his actions by

making statements suggesting to plaintiff that he would be “removed” if he continued his

jailhouse lawyer activities and in whispering to plaintiff at the end of the hearing where he was

designated for indeterminate confinement in administrative segregation, “File on that, you’ll

never get out now.” (Third Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 81 & 84.) This conflicting evidence is sufficient 11

to raise a triable issue of fact regarding whether defendant Garate’s motives in placing plaintiff in

administrative segregation and defendant Cook’s motives in acting to retain plaintiff there, were

retaliatory. See Bruce, 351 F.3d at 1289-90 (“Because Bruce raised a jury issue that the stated

penological goals were not legitimate, summary judgment was not appropriate on the retaliation

claim.”); Powell, 2006 WL 2547359 at *6-7. 

Therefore, summary judgment should be granted in favor of defendants Adams,

Babich, Bartos, Gilliam, Harrison, Holmes, Johnson, McClure, McKean, Martinez, Morton,

Nergenah, Shaver, Statti and Vanderville as to plaintiff’s claim that his retention in

administrative segregation was retaliatory and denied as to defendants Garate and Cook.

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C. Plaintiff’s Actual Gang Validation

Plaintiff also claims that his gang validation was carried out by the defendants in

retaliation for his involvement in protected legal activities. The gang validation process was

described by defendant Harrison in his declaration, as follows:

Investigations into an inmate’s gang involvement are conducted by

an Institutional Gang Investigations (IGI) officer at the institution

where the inmate is housed. When the IGI officer has gathered

enough information to present at least three points of validation,

the officer forwards the gang validation package to the Special

Services Unit. An SSU official verifies that the items meet

validation requirements. Under former California Code of

Regulations, title 15, section 3378(c)(4), gang identification

requires at least three independent source items of documentation

indicative of association with validated gang members or

associates. One of those items must show a direct link between the

inmate and a validate[d] gang member or associate. Where

information is obtained from a confidential informant, the SSU

official confirms that the material contains some indicia of

reliability. 

* * *

The SSU official does not determine the housing placement for an

inmate who has been validated. Instead, the official approves the

validation, then sends the 128-B recording that information to the

institution where the inmate is housed. The institution’s

classification committee then determines the housing placement for

the inmate.

* * *

When information from a confidential informant is used to validate

an inmate, the inmate is given a copy of a CDCR 1030 form that

summarizes the content of the information without giving away the

identity of the informant. The 1030 is not used to validate the

inmate, but only to summarize for him the information that is used

to validate him.

The danger that gangs present to the safety and security of prisons

is so immediate and severe that prison officials often cannot wait

until their investigation into an inmate’s gang affiliation is

complete before segregating the inmate from the general

population. By continuing their investigation after the inmate is

segregated, prison officials ensure that they have the time to 

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 Items 1, 2 and 3 above were filed with the court under seal on October 12, 2000. (Doc. 12

No. 161.)

18

conduct a thorough and complete investigation without

endangering the safety and security of the institution, staff, and

other inmates.

(Harrison Decl. in Support of MSJ, ¶¶ 4, 6, 8-9 at 2-3) (Doc. No. 157, Part 8 at 5-8).

On October 10, 2000, defendants Shaver and Johnson issued a gang validation

chrono documenting the following ten items to validate plaintiff as a Northern Structure gang

member:

Item (1) Debrief [sic] dated 07-22-1997 authored by C. King 

(direct link)

Item (2) Confidential Memo dated 12-02-1998 authored by R.S. 

Johnson

Item (3) Debrief dated 12-28-1999 authored by R.S. Johnson 

(direct link)

Item (4) Debrief dated 06-08-2000 authored by R.S. Johnson

Item (5) 128b dated 04-12-2000 authored by K. Holmes (direct 

link)

Item (6) 128b dated 10-03-2000 authored by D.D. Shaver (direct 

link)

Item (7) 128b dated 10-03-2000 authored by D.D. Shaver (direct 

link)

Item (8) 128b dated 10-03-2000 authored by D.D. Shaver (direct 

link)

Item (9) 128b dated 10-05-2000 authored by D.D. Shaver (direct 

link)

Item (10) 128b dated 10-05-2000 authored by M. Martinez 128 b 

dated 10-05-2000 authored by D.E. Hansen.

(DSUF, Ex. F) (Doc. No. 157, Part 4 at 6)12

On November 15, 2000, defendant Harrison, a special agent with the Special

Services Unit of CDCR, reviewed the validation package on plaintiff and concluded that six of

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the ten items met the gang validation requirements. (Id., Ex. G) (Doc. No. 157, Part 4 at 8.) 

Those items were identified as: “Debrief dtd. 07/22/97; Conf. mem dtd 12/2/98; Debrief dtd

12/28/99; Debrief dtd 06/08/00; CDC 128-B dtd 4/12/00; CDC 128-B 10/05/00.” (Id.) Based on

that information, defendant Harrison approved the validation of plaintiff as a member of the

Northern Structure prison gang. (Id.)

1. Defendants’ Arguments

Defendants argue that in validating plaintiff as a gang member, they did not do so

to retaliate against him, but rather acted in furtherance of the legitimate penological goal of

identifying and segregating gang members from the prison population. (Defs.’ P. & A. at 4.) 

Defendants have provided brief declarations affirming their legitimate motives in investigating

plaintiff’s gang involvement, their good-faith belief that the information they relied on was

reliable and their statements that they were unaware of plaintiff’s prior complaints against staff. 

(Id. at 6.) 

Defendant Johnson is retired and a former correctional lieutenant at HDSP. 

(Johnson Decl. in Support of MSJ, ¶ 1 at 1-2) (Doc. No. 157, Part 8 at 12-13). As noted, he

submitted the package on October 10, 2000 setting forth ten points for plaintiff’s gang validation. 

(Id. ¶ 3 at 2; see also DSUF, Ex. F.) Defendant Johnson contends that he “would not have

discharged the duties of my job unless I submitted the validation package for approval.” 

(Johnson Decl. ¶ 4 at 2.)

Along with defendant Johnson, defendant Shaver submitted the gang validation

package on October 10, 2000. (DSUF, Ex. F.) On October 3 and 5, 2000, defendant Shaver also

searched plaintiff’s property for evidence of gang activity and generated a 128-B concerning

those searches which was included in the validation package. (Shaver Decl., ¶ 3 at 2) (Doc. No.

157, part 10 at 2.) Defendant Shaver declares that his actions in this regard were not taken for

the purpose of retaliating against plaintiff for exercising his constitutional rights. (Id. ¶ 4 at 2.) 

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 The relevant contents of inmate Quint’s declaration have been summarized above and 13

will not be repeated here.

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Defendant Harrison represents that his responsibilities were limited to

determining if the items listed in the package satisfied validation requirements. (Harrison Decl.,

¶ 4 at 2.) He determined that six of the ten listed items satisfied the regulatory criteria for gang

validation and based on this information, approved plaintiff’s validation as a Northern Structure

gang member. (Id., ¶ 5 at 2; see also, DSUF, Ex. G. 

2. Plaintiff’s Arguments

Plaintiff argues that the information relied upon for his gang validation was

“fabricated” because inmates were threatened and pressured by the defendants to provide false

information. (Opp’n at 17.) Plaintiff has previously submitted declarations from inmates Chris

Gomez, Daniel Quint, and Tony James in support of his contention that inmates were coerced and

threatened to provide such false information. (Pl.’s Decl. in Support of Pl.’s MSJ filed April 18,

2007, Exs. 54, 55, 56.) Inmate James describes how he was pressured by defendant Garate to 13

provide information implicating other inmates even if he had to lie. (Id., Ex. 55.) Inmate Gomez

has provided a declaration presenting similar allegations as those made by inmate James with

respect to being improperly pressured and threatened by defendant Adams in an effort to obtain

information implicating other inmates. (Id., Ex. 56.) 

Plaintiff also argues that the confidential memorandum and CDC 128-B’s relied

upon in validating him as a gang member were subsequently deemed unreliable by Officer

Comfort who conduced a S.H.U. audit on December 8, 2004. (Opp’n at 17; Pl.’s Decl., Ex. 74.) 

In that audit, Officer Comfort did not reverse plaintiff’s gang validation but did find that some of

the supporting documentation was confusing, “generic and nonspecific” and that “ICC noted and

relied upon a ‘flimsy file’ in review of inmate’s case factors.” (Pl.’s Decl., Ex. 74 at 1.) 

Accordingly, Comfort referred the case back to the caseworker for follow-up and extended 

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 Similar reports were also authored by Officer King who was not named as a defendant 14

and Officer Hansen who was dismissed earlier from this action.

21

plaintiff’s S.H.U. placement for sixty-days to allow for completion of additional work on the

investigation. (Id.) 

Lastly, plaintiff refers to a classification committee chrono dated November 9,

1999, in which it was noted: 

[I]nmate Lopez was refered [sic] to the CSR and on 11/2/99 this

case [sic] was defered [sic] requesting review by the IGI

[Institutional Gang Investigations]. Committee also notes CDC 128

B dated 11/8/99 from the Investigative Services Unit stating that

there is not enough information to validate Inmate Lopez.

(Pl.’s Decl., Ex. 35.) (See also Defs.’ Response to Pl.’s Statement of Facts in Support of Pl.’s

MSJ, filed Aug. 3, 2007 at ¶¶ 31, 32, 34.) Finally, plaintiff contends that in November of 1999,

defendant Holmes reviewed plaintiff’s prison files and determined that there was insufficient

information upon which to validate him as a gang member. (Opp’n at 3.) 

Based upon this evidence and these allegations, plaintiff contends that defendants

in fact validated him as a gang member in retaliation for his engaging in protected legal activities

and that their motion for summary judgment should be denied in this respect.

3. Discussion

From the evidence before the court it appears that only five of the named

defendants were involved in plaintiff’s actual gang validation. Defendants Johnson and Shaver

submitted the gang validation package which set forth the original ten items for validation. 

Defendant Harrison reviewed the package and ultimately approved plaintiff’s gang validation

based on six of those ten items. Defendants Holmes and Martinez, in addition to defendants

Johnson and Shaver, authored reports documenting confidential information regarding plaintiff’s

gang involvement. Plaintiff has pointed to no evidence before the court that defendants Adams, 14

Babich, Bartos, Cook, Garate, Gilliam, McClure, McKean, Morton, Nergenah, Statti or 

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Vanderville played any role in his validation as a gang member. Accordingly, those defendants

are entitled to summary judgment in their favor on this aspect of plaintiff’s retaliation claim. 

Plaintiff primarily seeks to show a retaliatory motive on the part of defendants

Harrison, Holmes, Johnson, Martinez and Shaver by attacking the reliability of the evidence relied

upon to validate him as a gang member. Plaintiff’s basic premise is that the evidence used to

validate him was unreliable or false and that defendants must have had a retaliatory motive if they

relied on such evidence. See Bruce, 351 F.3d at 1288 (although not conclusive of a retaliatory

motive, reliance on evidence for gang validation that was previously found to be insufficient tends

to show that the validation was not motivated by legitimate purposes). 

It must be kept in mind that plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of showing that

defendants Johnson, Shaver, Harrison, Holmes and Martinez took actions to validate him as a

gang member due to his involvement in protected conduct. Each of those defendants have

submitted declarations stating that they did not do so. Plaintiff has presented no evidence

reflecting a retaliatory motive on their part. Merely presenting evidence that a defendant knew

about plaintiff’s involvement in protected activity prior to taking the challenged action is not

sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact on the question of whether the defendant acted

with a retaliatory motive. Keyser v. Sacramento City Unified School District, 265 F.3d 741, 751

(9th Cir. 2001) (and cases cited therein). For this reason alone, the five identified defendants are

entitled to summary judgment on this aspect of plaintiff’s retaliation claim.

Nonetheless, the court will now turn to plaintiff’s arguments challenging the

reliability of the validation evidence. As noted, plaintiff first argues that the information was

unreliable because inmates were pressured to provide false information about gang activities. 

However, plaintiff has not presented any evidence that false information provided by these

inmates was relied upon by officials in validating him as a gang member. Thus, the inmate

declarations relied upon by plaintiff do not establish a genuine issue of material fact precluding

summary judgment. 

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Second, plaintiff points to the S.H.U. audit conducted by Officer Comfort in

December of 2004, as indicating that his gang validation four years earlier in October of 2000 was

based on unreliable evidence. However, the 2004 audit did not find that the items relied upon for

plaintiff’s validation in 2000 were false, but rather merely determined that the information in

plaintiff’s file needed to be clarified, updated and documented as then required in order to support

the continuation of the S.H.U. term. (Pl.’s Decl., Ex. 74.) For these reasons, action was deferred

at that time and the file was returned to the case worker for completion. (Id.) Such evidence fails

to establish a disputed issue of material fact as to whether the defendants involved in plaintiff’s

validation as a gang member in October of 2000 acted with a retaliatory motive.

Third, plaintiff relies upon the November 9, 1999 classification chrono which

acknowledges that the Investigative Service Unit had reported that as of that time there was not

enough information to validate plaintiff. (Pl.’s Decl., Ex. 33.) This evidence does raise a material

issue of fact as to whether plaintiff’s validation in October of 2000 was carried out in retaliation

for his involvement in protected activity. The chrono merely reports that there was insufficient

evidence to validate plaintiff as a gang member at that time. Approximately a year later, after

further information was obtained, plaintiff was validated. In sum, plaintiff has presented no

evidence suggesting that the five identified defendants participated in the validation process with

a retaliatory motive.

 “[P]risons have a legitimate penological interest in stopping prison gang activity.” 

Bruce, 351 F.3d at 1289. In their declaration defendants Johnson, Shaver, Harrison, Holmes and

Martinez state that they were simply performing their duties when they participated in plaintiff’s

gang validation and were motivated only to serve the legitimate penological goal of identifying

members of prison gangs. Plaintiff has failed to submit any evidence to the contrary. Therefore,

the court finds that plaintiff has failed to establish that there is genuine issue of material fact in

dispute as to whether these defendants acted in a retaliatory fashion when they participated in his

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 Copies of the rules violation reports are attached to defendants’ statement of 15

undisputed facts. (Doc. No. 157.)

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validation as a gang member. Accordingly, all the defendants are entitled to summary judgment

in their favor as to this aspect of plaintiff’s retaliation claim.

D. Rules Violations

Plaintiff alleges in his third amended complaint that rule violation reports were

also issued against him in retaliation for his engaging in his protected jailhouse lawyering

activities. Defendants move for summary judgment in their favor, relying on the declarations of

the three defendants who issued the rule violation reports in which they state that their motives in

issuing the charges in question were legitimate. Defendants’ arguments in this regard are

persuasive. 

Plaintiff received three rules violation reports during the relevant time period. 

15

On June 1, 1998, defendant Holmes issued a rules violation report against plaintiff’s due to his

refusal to submit to photographing of his tattoos. (See DSUF, Ex. H.) The report stated:

On 06-01-98 at approximately 1155 hours, I attempted to

photograph Inmate LOPEZ, D-8627 FC86-114L, for the purpose of

updating his gang affiliation file. When LOPEZ came to the C Unit

Office, for the photographs, he refused to have his picture taken. I

gave Lopez a direct order to allow me to photograph him. LOPEZ

again refused.

(Id.) After a hearing on June 26, 1998, this rules violation was reduced to an administrative level

offense for “disobeying orders.” (Id.) In his declaration in support of the defendants’ motion for

summary judgment, defendant Holmes states that he attempted to photograph plaintiff for the

purpose of updating his gang affiliation file. (Holmes Decl. in Support of MSJ, ¶ 3 at 2) (Doc.

No. 157, Part 8 at 9-11.) Defendant Holmes declares “In my experience as a correctional officer, I

have frequently dealt with members of prison gangs. Such inmates often, though not always, get

tattoos that indicate their gang affiliation.” (Id.) Defendant Holmes also refers to the Department

Operations Manual (DOM) section 52050.18.2 which authorizes clothed body searches of inmates

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on a random basis or when reasonable cause is established. (Id. ¶ 5 at 2.) Defendant Holmes

declares that before being sued by plaintiff he was unaware of any complaints plaintiff had made

against correctional officers at CSP-Sacramento. (Id. ¶ 2 at 1-2.)

On January 2, 2000, defendant McKean issued CDCR 115 log number FA-99-12-

023, charging plaintiff with delaying a peace officer and describing the incident as follows: 

On December 10, 1999, at approximately 1635 hours, while

working as AA4 Floor Officer #1" [I] was requested by “A-4

Control Officer” McFarland to lock up inmate Lopez (D-86271,

FAB4-203U) and inmate Norman (P-17000, FAB4-203L). Prior to

Correctional Officer McFarland asking me to assist him I overheard

Correctional Officer McFarland instruct both inmates via the

“Public Address System” several times to lock it up as showers had

ended. As I came out of the building office I observed inmates

Lopez and Norman talking with an inmate in cell #225 and not

paying any attention to the control officers [sic] instructions. I

proceeded up to the cell and instructed both inmates, Lopez and

Norman, to lock up as it was count time. Norman started toward his

cell while Lopez stepped towards me and stopped in front of me at a

very close distance. Lopez then started arguing in a very loud

manner that he was talking to his brother and that he was not a punk

kid to be yelled at. 

Lopez further stated that us, meaning the officers, were not being

fair to the “Northern Hispanics” on showering and that he would

lock it up when he was ready. As I continued to talk with Lopez in

a calm manner I could see that Lopez was very agitated. Lopez

would continue to argue with me and at times taking steps toward

me even though I would back up one or two steps for my own safety

zone. Lopez continued to argue with clenched fists down to his side

and in somewhat of a “Bladed Stance” as if ready to fight. 

After seeing that this might possibly lead to a physical altercation I

told Lopez to finish his conversation and meet me in my office.

After a few moments Lopez came into my unit office and appeared

some what (sic) calmed down. At this time I explained to Lopez if

(2) to (3) cells are let out we have (6) showers and give ten (10)

minute showers. If (9) cells are let out (One section) that we give

twenty (20) minutes for showers. Lopez continued to argue that we

(The officers) were prejudice against “Northern Mexicans” and

favoring other races by allowing more time. Lopez refused to see

any reasoning in the way that we ran the “Shower Program”.

During the course of my conversation with Lopez I told him that I

expected no further problems over the times on the showers and I

told him there would be no further episodes or displays that he put

on today (December 10, 1999) as I did not want anyone injured over

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showers. I also explained that I expected no further posturing that

could lead to a violent situation.

As this conversation continued Lopez told me that he had a federal

lawsuit against CDC and that he was not afraid of violence and if he

had to he would resort to such actions if he continued to be treated

unfairly.

(DSUF, Ex. I at 1-2.) 

In his declaration submitted in support of the defendants’ summary judgment

motion, defendant McKean states that he wrote the rules violation report on the day of the

December 10 incident, prior to plaintiff filing his 602 appeal on December 13, 1999. (McKean

Decl., ¶ 3 at 2.) He states that the typed report was returned to him for his signature on December

29, 1999. (Id.) Plaintiff was found guilty of this rule violation by defendant Adams and was

assessed 90 days loss of credits and denied canteen privilege for 30 days. (DSUF, Ex. I.) In his

declaration, defendant Adams states that he found plaintiff guilty based on the preponderance of

the evidence. (Adams Decl., ¶ 3 at 2.) The disciplinary action was reviewed by defendant Facility

Captain Cook and defendant Associate Warden Farris. (Id. at 1.) 

On November 13, 2000, defendant Bartos issued CDCR 115 log number ASU-00-

11-0027, charging plaintiff with delaying a peace officer by refusing to exit the yard when ordered

to do so. (DSUF, Ex. J.) The report describes the incident at issue as follows:

On 11/13/00, at approximately 1130 hours, while performing my

duties as D6 Yard Observation Officer I ordered yard recall to the

CC#3 Northern Hispanic/Black yard. At approximately 1140 hours

the inmates on the yard informed me that they were refusing to

come off of the yard until they spoke to the captain. I notified

Correctional Sergeant Thompson and he tried to communicate with

the inmates who continued to refuse orders to exit the yard. At

approximately 1150 hours, I ordered the inmates off the yard

individually by calling their names and CDC numbers in the order

that they went to yard; Inmate’s LOPEZ, D-86271; PEREZ J-74133;

MONTENEGRO, K-32878; GUZMAN, K-87999; SPARKS, H90171; OWENS, E-92965; BOR, K-4269; WILLIAMS, K-42603;

JACKSON, D-47735. All of the inmates on the yard refused to

exit. At approximately 1200 hours Captain Briddle addressed the

inmates on the yard [.] After Captain Briddle addressed the inmates 

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I again ordered the inmates to exit the yard. At approximately 1300

hours the inmates exited the yard without further incident. All of

the inmates addressed in the report are aware of this report. 

(Id.) The report notes that although there was a video tape recording of the incident, Lieutenant

Granish did not review it or rely upon it in finding plaintiff guilty of the rule violation. (Id. at 2.) 

Plaintiff was assessed 90 days loss of credit based on his involvement in this incident. (Id. at 3.)

Plaintiff offers a number of arguments in opposition to defendants’ motion for

summary judgment on this aspect of his retaliation claim. As to the rule violation report issued by

defendant Holmes, he argues that the charge served no legitimate penological interest because

there is no rule requiring inmates to submit to such photographs. (Opp’n at 2, 19.) Thus, plaintiff

asserts that he has a “right not to be punished for disobeying a direct order . . . when no published

rule required I submit to photographs other than for my identification card . . . .” ( Id. at 43.) 

With respect to the rule violation charge issued by defendant McKean, plaintiff

complains that the log book shows the time when showers ended, when his section was released

and when count was conducted without identifying the significance of these events. Plaintiff also

argues that the charge was untimely filed and claims that defendant Garate reviewed and approved

the violation report only after plaintiff had filed a grievance against defendant McKean. (Opp’n at

19.) Lastly, plaintiff argues in general that the hearing on this rule violation charge did not

comport with due process. (Id.)

Finally, as to the rules violation charge issued by defendant Bartos, plaintiff merely

argues that “[n]o legitimate or penelogical [sic] justification exists for defendant Bartos’s issuing

of false charges . . . for my filing complaints against prison staff. . . .” (Opp’n at 23.) In this

regard, plaintiff has alleged that on the day of this incident, he was approached by yard inmates

who described “conduct by rogue D-6 building staff” and sought plaintiff’s advice about how “to

seek redress.” (Third Am. Compl. ¶ 77 at 8.) Plaintiff contends that defendant Bartos was the

control booth officer at the time, that he issued the rules violation because of plaintiff’s 

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 In his seventh cause of action plaintiff presented similar allegations in support of his 16

claim that defendants conducted an unlawful search of his cell in violation of the Fourth

Amendment. That seventh cause of action, however, was dismissed on December 7, 2005, for

failure to state a cognizable claim.

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“counseling other inmates in protected and lawful redress activities” and then destroyed the

videotape of the incident that would have proved that the disciplinary charge was false. (Id.)

Plaintiff’s explanations for his conduct and his arguments attacking the rule

violation reports on procedural grounds miss the mark. Of significance for purposes of the

pending motion is that plaintiff does not dispute that he failed to comply with orders to submit to

photographing (Holmes disciplinary charge), to lock up after showers (McKean disciplinary

charge) or to leave the yard as directed (Bartos disciplinary charge). Plaintiff has failed to present 

any evidence showing that these three defendants acted with a retaliatory motive in issuing these

rule violation reports or that the disciplinary actions taken did not serve legitimate penological

goals. Therefore, the court will recommend that defendants’ motion for summary judgment be

granted as to plaintiff’s retaliation claim based on the issuance of these three rules violation

reports. 

E. Other Retaliation Claims

In his first cause of action, plaintiff also listed several additional acts taken against

him in retaliation for his engaging in protected legal activities, including “the theft of his property

and affidavits to cover up that theft[.]” (Third Am. Compl. at 14.) In opposing defendants’

motion for summary judgment, plaintiff contends that defendants Shaver, Holmes, and Hansen

rummaged through his “stored property” outside his presence. (Opp’n at 22.) Plaintiff asserts 

that the defendants’ actions were, 

intended to fabricate “points” to support the false claims relied upon

to retain me[,] that 11 points existed to validate me, to validate me

[sic], to unlawfully detain me, and to conspire with one another to

do the same. None served any legitimate or penelogical [sic]

justification. 

(Id.) 

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 Plaintiff also alleges that he was retaliated against when not provided documents 17

necessary to challenge his placement in administrative segregation and when prison officials lost

or denied his administrative appeals. This allegation will be addressed in conjunction with the

due process claim set forth as the fifteenth cause of action of plaintiff’s third amended complaint.

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As noted above, defendant Hansen has previously been dismissed from this action

and defendants Holmes and Shaver have submitted declarations stating that their actions were

taken in furtherance of specified legitimate penological goals. In response plaintiff merely makes

conclusory assertions that the challenged actions were retaliatory but fails to provide any evidence

in support of his claim. Therefore, summary judgment should be granted in favor of defendants

with respect to these aspects of plaintiff’s retaliation claim. 

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II. Fifth and Sixth Causes of Action

In his fifth cause of action plaintiff alleges that his Eighth Amendment rights were

violated when defendant Hansen ordered him placed on contraband watch, causing him to be kept

in physical restraints and “constant illumination of bright lights for over 26 hours[.]” (Third Am.

Compl. at 15.) In the sixth cause of action, plaintiff claims that his rights under the Fourth

Amendment were violated when defendant Hansen had him placed on contraband watch “without

legitimate, probable, or reasonable cause.” (Id.)

Defendants argue that defendant Hansen was dismissed from this action by order

filed March 14, 2007. In opposition, plaintiff argues that he was unable to serve defendant

Hansen because he is no longer employed with CDCR but that because Hansen was a “key

participant,” the court should order service of the third amended complaint on him. (Opp’n at 24.)

Pursuant to Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court is

authorized to dismiss claims against a defendant who has not been served with process within 120

days after the filing of the complaint, unless the plaintiff shows good cause for failing to effect

service. Plaintiff was provided several extensions of time to obtain the needed information to

effect service on defendant Hansen. See Orders filed June 27, 2006 and Sept. 12, 2006; Findings

and Recommendations filed Nov. 14, 2006. Plaintiff simply failed to procure the necessary

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information through discovery and never sought leave of court to amend to add Hansen as a

defendant in this action after he was dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

41(b). See Amended Order filed March 14, 2007. 

Since the fifth and sixth causes of action of plaintiff’s third amended complaint set

forth allegations only with respect to Hansen, who has previously been dismissed from this action,

the motion for summary judgment in favor of the remaining defendants should be granted with

respect to those causes of action.

III. Tenth Cause of Action - “First Amendment - False Labeling”

In his tenth cause of action, plaintiff claims that defendant Bartos retaliated against

him for engaging in protected legal activity by calling him a “snitch” in front of other inmates. 

(Third Am. Compl. at 15.) This specific incident allegedly took place in December of 2000 and is

described by plaintiff as follows:

Defendant Bartos threatened and put plaintiff’s safety in jeopardy

when he loudly told inmates Terry and Gonzalez, while in

proximity of other inmates with H.D.S.P.’s D-6 ad-seg building,

that “Inmates are ratting on officers and pretty soon these T.V’s will

be out of here” while he pointed at plaintiff. “Ratting” is generally

known as “snitching” or being an “informant” and it is generally

known that putting such a label on a person in prison greatly

increases that persons [sic] chances of harm or other adversities

such as being ostrisized [sic]. Similarly, putting plaintiff’s welfare

in jeopardy as defendant Bartos’s attributing the potential loss of the

ad-seg televisions to plaintiff. [sic] In addition Defendant Bartos’s

acts, actions, and omissions served no penological or legitimate

justification; and violated California Constitution’s Art. 1 §§ 7(a)

and 15's due process clause; and 15 C.C.R. §§ 3004, 3084.1 et seq.,

3270, 3271, 3291.

(Third Am. Compl. ¶ 77 at 8.) 

Defendants argue that such allegations of verbal harassment or abuse do not state a

cognizable claim under § 1983 and that they are entitled to summary judgment on this cause of

action.

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In opposition to defendants’ motion for summary judgment plaintiff points to a

previously submitted declaration from inmate Everett Gonzalez in which it is stated:

I remember on one occassion [sic] a correctional officer Barto’s

[sic] pointing at inmate Lopez cell and grabing [sic] everyone

attention in the section and yelling “just to let everyone know, pretty

soon all these TV’s will be out of here due to that guy ratting on

c/o’s and fileing [sic] 602's.”

Due to this statement by c/o Bartos the entire section began to yell,

kick the door and some inmates threatened inmate Lopez, openly

yelling on the tier. c/o Bartos seeing the reaction was excited and

was sure to point exactly at Lopez [sic] cell. 

(Pl.’s Decl. in Support of Pl.’s MSJ filed April 18, 2007, Ex. 83 at 2-3.) Plaintiff argues that the

physical injury requirement does not apply to First Amendment claims such as his and that

defendant Bartos’s comments were made with the intent to cause plaintiff physical harm at the

hands of other inmates. (Opp’n at 24-25.)

Defendants’ perfunctory motion for summary judgment on this claim misses the

mark. Plaintiff’s allegations do not involve a mere claim of verbal harassment. Rather, the

allegation is that defendant Bartos retaliated against plaintiff due to his involvement in protected

legal activity by making a statement about plaintiff in front of other inmates with an intent to have

those other inmates threaten or due harm to plaintiff. Such an allegation states a cognizable claim

and, contrary to defendants’ brief argument, is actionable. Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d

1135, 1137-39 (9th Cir. 1988) (reversing grant of summary judgment where plaintiff alleged and

supported with an affidavit that in retaliation for filing grievances the defendant correctional

officers conspired to label him a “snitch” thereby subjecting him to threats of harm by other

inmates); see also Gornick v. California Department of Corrections, No. 1:06-cv-0296 AWI DLB

PC, 2008 WL 3941683, *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2008) (acknowledging that the allegations in

Valandingham involved action that were clearly adverse to plaintiff sufficient to constitute an

actionable retaliation claim). Here, the allegations of plaintiff’s third amended complaint are

supported by the declaration of inmate Gonzalez. Defendants have presented no evidence to the

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 This is not to say there is evidence before the court supporting the claim that plaintiff’s

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exercise of his First Amendment rights was chilled by the action allegedly taken by defendant

Bartos. But see Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567 n.11 (9th Cir. 2005) (suggesting that in

this context an allegation of harm alone would be sufficient). However, defendants have not

moved for summary judgment on this ground and therefore have presented no evidence or

argument on the issue. 

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contrary and in his declaration before the court defendant Bartos does not even address the

incident in question.18

Therefore, the court will recommend that defendants’ motion for summary

judgment be denied with respect to plaintiff’s tenth cause of action in which he claims that

defendant Bartos retaliated against him for engaging in protected legal activity.

IV. Twelfth Cause of Action

In his third amended complaint plaintiff makes the following convoluted

allegation:

Defendant P. Statti violated plaintiff’s First Amendment rights

when retaliating against plaintiff for plaintiff’s submitting

documentation of defendant Statti’s interfering with plaintiff’s

protected investigative services relevant to the false charges brought

by defendant Bartos when he illegally falsified the ultimate findings

or that false charge, when he had plaintiff and his cellmate moved to

another building, and when he denied plaintiff’s appeal challenging

the violations of the investigative impediments.

(Third Am. Compl. at 16.) 

The record concerning this claim reflects as follows. As noted above, on

November 13, 2000, defendant Bartos issued a CDCR 115, identified as log number ASU-00-11-

0027, charging plaintiff with delaying a peace officer by refusing to exit the yard when ordered to

do so. (DSUF, Ex. J.) On December 18, 2000, plaintiff filed a inmate appeal (log 00-03364)

complaining that his investigative employee provided an incomplete report concerning this rule

violation charge. (Id., Ex. K.) On January 11, 2001, plaintiff’s first level appeal was withdrawn

based on his interview with Sergeant Kelley. (Id.) Plaintiff’s appeal was denied at both the

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 The committee members were Colon, Evans, McClure, Nolan and Gilliam, with Cook 19

as recorder. (Pl.’s Decl., Ex. 59.) 

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second level by Chief Deputy Warden Colon and at the Director’s Level by Linda Rianda, Chief

of the Inmate Appeals Branch. (Id.)

In his third amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that on February 2, 2001,

defendant Statti had plaintiff and his cellmate’s property moved from administrative segregation

D-6 to D-7 while they were at the prison law library. (Third Am. Compl. ¶ 96, at 12.) Plaintiff

declares that he was then retained in D-7 until February 15, 2001, when he was transferred to

CSP-Corcoran. (Pl.’s Decl. in Support of Pl.’s MSJ filed April 18, 2007, ¶ 102, at 16.) 

Plaintiff alleges that inmates housed in D-7 “were known throughout the prison as

being protective custody inmates, snitches, etc.” and that defendant Statti actions were “in

retaliation for plaintiff’s complaining about Statti’s violating plaintiff’s investigative rights . . . .”

(Third Am. Compl., ¶ 96 at 12.) Plaintiff claims that defendant Statti “was told I was moved

because I ‘filed complaints against staff, and defendant Adams said ‘Lt. Statti signed the 154'

(move form).” (Opp’n at 26.) Plaintiff contends that defendant Statti conspired with defendant

Bartos and “as retalliation [sic] for my filing grievances, Statti denied the complaint.” (Id.) 

Among the exhibits submitted by plaintiff are copies of documents generated by the classification

committee following hearings on retaining plaintiff in administrative segregation during the gang

validation investigation. See Pl.’s Decl., Ex. 46, Attach. A-I; Ex. 59. On January 4, 2001, the

committee recommended that plaintiff be retained in administrative segregation, noting that

plaintiff’s “next classification appearance shall be before ASU-ICC for Subsequent Review of his

Ad-Seg housing placement on 02/01/01.” (Id., Ex. 46, Attach. I.) On February 8, 2001, plaintiff

appeared before the classification committee for subsequent review of his placement in

administrative segregation. (Id., Ex. 59.) The committee retained plaintiff on “Controlled 19

Compatible Exercise Yard #3, double cell status and single escort,” noting that he had been

validated as a Northern Structure prison gang member and endorsed for adverse transfer. (Id.) 

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At that time, plaintiff asked the committee to record his complaint that “‘rogue staff’ had caused

him problems with unit D-6 when he was removed to D-7, he states that it was adverse as he was

helping the inmates file case law issues in D-6 and upset the staff.” (Id.) 

In moving for summary judgment on this claim, defendants have submitted a

declaration by defendant Statti in which he denies that plaintiff was rehoused in retaliation for his

administrative appeal filed against defendant Bartos. (Statti Decl. in Support of MSJ, ¶ 3 at 2)

(Doc. No. 157). Defendants argue that plaintiff’s the administrative appeal regarding this matter

was denied at the second level by Chief Deputy Warden Colon, not by defendant Statti. (MSJ at

8) (citing DSUF, Ex. K). They also note that Chief Deputy Warden Colon found no evidence to

support plaintiff’s claim of staff misconduct. 

After reviewing the record to determine the chronology of events, the court

concludes that plaintiff has failed to carry his burden of presenting some evidence that defendant

Statti took any adverse action against him in retaliation for his engaging in protected activity. In

this regard, defendant Statti has submitted a declaration denying any such conduct. In response,

plaintiff has failed to present any evidence that defendant Statti had plaintiff rehoused in D-7 for

thirteen days prior to plaintiff’s adverse transfer to CSP-Corcoran. Moreover, the evidence before

the court establishes that defendant Statti did not deny plaintiff’s grievance concerning the

investigative employee assigned with respect to the rule violation issued by defendant Bartos. 

Given plaintiff’s complete failure of proof in this regard, defendants are entitled to summary

judgment in their favor as to plaintiff’s twelfth cause of action.

V. Fourteenth and Nineteenth Causes of Action

In the fourteenth and nineteenth causes of action, plaintiff names only defendant

Singletary who was previously dismissed from this action by order filed on March 14, 2007. 

Plaintiff having made no factual allegations with respect to any of the remaining defendants in

connection with these claims, summary judgment should be granted in favor of the moving

defendants as to plaintiff’s fourteenth and nineteenth causes of action. 

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VI. Fifteenth Cause of Action

In his fifteenth cause of action, described by him as a “Federal Due Process” claim,

plaintiff alleges as follows: 

Plaintiff’s indeterminate term in the S.H.U. violates the due process

clause of the Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution in

that defendants Garate, Farris, Cook, Hansen, Shaver, Holmes,

McClure, Martinez, Babich, Gilliam, Vanderville, Johnson,

(“Defendants”):

(i) placed plaintiff in the S.H.U. on the basis of erroneous,

unreliable and untrue information that does not constitute “some

evidence.” (ii) Fabricated evidence. (iii) made false statements to

retain plaintiff. (iv) never gave plaintiff an administrative review. 

(v) failed to give plaintiff [an] opportunity to present his views to

the officials making the determination that plaintiff is a gang

member. (vi) denied evidence needed to defend against the

retention and allegations. (vii) failed to provide meaningful

classification reviews.

Furthermore, by placing plaintiff in the SHU when he is not a gang

member, defendants have placed plaintiff in an inescapable position

that violates the fundamental principles of due process. Because

defendants have incorrectly labeled plaintiff a gang member,

plaintiff can only be released by divulging information that he does

not have.

(Third Am. Compl. at 16-17.) 

Below, the court will consider plaintiff’s claim that his due process rights were

violated at the following three separate stages of the gang validation process: his initial placement

in administrative segregation, his retention in administrative segregation, and his ultimate

validation as a gang member.

A. Initial Placement in Administrative Segregation

As noted above, plaintiff alleges that his due process rights were violated by his

initial placement in administrative segregation on February 2, 2000. (Third Am. Compl. at 16-

17.) Specifically, plaintiff alleges that he was placed in administrative segregation based upon

false or unreliable evidence, denied access to evidence and thus the ability to refute the action

taken against him and was not allowed the opportunity to make his views known to the prison

officials making the decision to transfer him to administrative segregation. (Id. at 3, 16-17.)

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 Defendants state that the classification committee hearing was held on January 11, 20

2001. However, it appears that the hearing date was actually January 4, 2001. See Pl.’s Decl.,

Ex. 46 (Ex. I to Def. Cook’s Response to Pl.’s First Req. for Admissions).

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In moving for summary judgment, defendants concede that a prisoner is entitled to

some due process protections prior to placement in administrative segregation. (Defs’ P. & A. at

11.) Nonetheless, defendants argue that summary judgment in their favor is appropriate because

plaintiff received all of the procedural protections to which he was entitled when on November

28, 2000, almost ten months after his placement in administrative segregation, he was provided

information regarding the nature of the claim against him before being recommended for an

adverse transfer. (Id. at 11.) Defendants contend that at the January 2001 classification 20

committee hearing, plaintiff was informed of the reasons underlying his transfer, was provided the

opportunity to state his views and to request documents as well as to enter documents into the

record, and informed of his right to appeal. (Id.) Defendants note that the classification

committee provided the following summary of that hearing:

Since his initial placement, he has been validated per the CDC 128-

B-2 dated 11/15/00. Committee elects to reaffirm the 12/07/00

CSR referral, recommending indeterminate SHU adverse transfer to

PBSP with an extension through date of transfer.

***

Inmate LOPEZ was an active participant with this Committee and

stated he was indifferent with [sic] Committee’s decision and

understood his rights to appeal. 

(Pl.’ Decl., Ex. 46) (Ex. I to Def. Cook’s Response to Pl.’s First Req. for Admissions, Ex. I).

Based on this evidence, defendants argue that plaintiff was provided all the procedural process

due him and that they are entitled to summary judgment in their favor.

Plaintiff responds that before the validation packet prepared by the Institutional

Gang Investigators (IGI) was submitted to the Law Enforcement and Investigation Unit (LEIU)

and reviewed by defendant Harrison, he had the right to contest his alleged gang affiliation. 

(Opp’n at 33-34.) Plaintiff contends that he was denied that procedural protection. (Id.) He

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argues that he was not validated until November 15, 2000, he was not interviewed prior to that

date and did not receive the notice of the items of evidence relied upon until later still. (Opp’n at

34.) Plaintiff asserts that the fact that he was seen by the classification committee prior to his

transfer, does not cure the due process violation because once validated as a gang member,

assignment to the S.H.U. is routine. (Id. at 34, 36.) Plaintiff argues that defendants’ assertions

that at some point he understood the nature of the allegations regarding his gang activity is

irrelevant because if plaintiff had received timely notice of the evidence being relied upon, he

would have been able to exercise his right to present his views prior to his validation. (Id. at 36.)

The evidence before the court reflects as follows. On February 2, 2000, defendant

Garate issued an Administrative Segregation Unit Placement Notice (CDC Form 114-D) placing

plaintiff in administrative segregation pending “further investigation conducted by High Desert

Gang Investigation Unit.” (DSUF, Ex. D.) On March 30, 2000, plaintiff appeared before the

classification committee. (Pl.’s Decl., Ex. 46, Cook’s Response to Pl.’s First Req. for

Admissions, Ex. A). The committee’s recommendation, set forth on an ICC 128-G form,

provides the following summary of that hearing: 

Inmate LOPEZ appeared before HDSP/ASU-ICC on this date for

the purpose of Subsequent Review of his Ad-Seg placement. 

Subject as placed in Ad-Seg on 02/02/2000 behind Confidential

Information implicating him as being part of the ‘Northern

Structure’ hierarchy on Facility ‘A’. ASU placement due process

rights have been met. CDC 1030 in Central file and disclosed on

02/02/2000. It is noted that case is pending IGI. . . . Inmate LOPEZ

actively participated in Committee discussion and adamantly denied

‘Northern Structure’ association, however was appreciative of the

restoration of credit on this RVR. LOPEZ was advised of his

appeal rights and stated he understood them. Next appearance

before ICC on or before 04/27/2000 for Subsequent Review of his

Ad-Seg placement. 

Id. 

Plaintiff appeared before the classification committee on a monthly basis over the

next four months, voiced his objection to the process, denied any gang affiliation and was told that

he would continue to be held in administrative segregation pending the outcome of the

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investigation by the Institutional Gang Investigators. Neither defendant Garate, who originally

ordered defendant into administrative segregation, nor any of the defendant officers from the IGI

Unit were apparently present at these classification committee hearings. Defendants Shaver and

Johnson, of the IGI Unit, finally submitted a validation package with respect to plaintiff on

October 10, 2000. Defendant Harrison approved the validation thereafter. Eventually, on January

4, 2001, the classification committee recommended plaintiff for an adverse transfer based on the

gang validation. That action was endorsed on February 7, 2001 and the adverse transfer was

ultimately executed on February 15, 2001, over one year after plaintiff was first placed in

administrative segregation. 

 It appears to the undersigned that defendants’ motion for summary judgment is

misguided with respect to this aspect of plaintiff’s due process claim. Defendants have properly

conceded that a prisoner is entitled to due process protections prior to placement in administrative

segregation. However, in this context due process requires only the following procedural

protections:

Prison officials must hold an informal nonadversary hearing within

a reasonable time after the prisoner is segregated. The prison

officials must inform the prisoner of the charges against the prisoner

or their reasons for considering segregation. Prison officials must

allow the prisoner to present his views.

We specifically find that the due process clause does not require

detailed written notice of charges, representation by counsel or

counsel-substitute, an opportunity to present witnesses, or a written

decision describing the reasons for placing the prisoner in

administrative segregation. We also find that due process does not

require disclosure of the identity of any person providing

information leading to the placement of a prisoner in administrative

segregation.

Toussaint, 801 F.3d at 1100-01 (internal citations and footnote omitted). See also Mathews v.

Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (due process requires that an inmate be given notice of the

charges against him and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful

manner); Bruce, 351 F.3d at 1287 (holding that due process requires that prison officials provide

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 Pursuant to Ninth Circuit Local Rule 36-3 unpublished dispositions issued on or after 21

January 1, 2007, may be cited to the courts of the Ninth Circuit in accordance with Fed. R. App.

P. 32.1 but are not precedent.

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the inmate with notice of the charges and an opportunity to present his views to the prison official

charged with deciding whether to transfer him to the SHU). The prisoner may present his views

by providing a written statement or oral presentations if prison officials believe a written

statement would be ineffective. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 476 (1983). “So long as this

occurs, and the decisionmaker reviews the charges and then-available evidence against the

prisoner, the Due Process Clause is satisfied.” Id. 

A recent Ninth Circuit decision addressed a similar issue and is instructive here. 

See Guizar v. Woodford, No. 07-15743, 2008 WL 2403000 (9th Cir. June 11, 2008). In that 21

case the plaintiff was retained in administrative segregation for over a year pending investigation

of his gang affiliation. Guizar, 2008 WL 2403000 at *1. Plaintiff filed suit alleging that prison

officials had violated his due process rights throughout the lengthy process. Id. The Ninth Circuit

determined that the investigation by an institutional gang investigator, “was as a practical matter

the decisive basis for Guizar’s gang validation and in turn for his transfer to administrative

segregation.” Id. The court observed that due process requires that a prisoner have an opportunity

to present his views before an official decides to transfer him to administrative segregation. Id.

(citing Toussaint, 926 F.2d at 803). Although it was disputed whether the plaintiff’s requests in

that case for an opportunity to refute the gang validation evidence had been denied, the court

found that any “failure to allow Guizar to present his views regarding his gang status would

violate Guizar’s right to due process of law.” Id. (citing Toussaint v. Rowland, 711 F. Supp. 536,

542 (N.D. Cal. 1989)). See also Dawkins v. Peterson, No. CIV S-02-2038 LKK KJM P, 2007

WL 333818, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2007) (denying defendants’ motion for summary judgment

and holding that before an inmate is transferred to administrative segregation for purposes of a

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gang validation investigation, he is entitled to an informal hearing with the institutional gang

investigator where the inmate can present his views ).

Here, the evidence currently before the court indicates that plaintiff was not given

the opportunity to refute the evidence against him prior to his transfer to administrative

segregation nor during his year in administrative segregation prior to his adverse transfer. He also

apparently never received the opportunity to present his views to the gang investigators who, in

effect, were deciding his status. The fact that “he may have arguably ended up where he

belonged” is irrelevant. Bruce, 351 F.3d at 1289. On this record, defendants have not established

that they are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s due process claim with respect to his

initial placement in administrative segregation. 

Defendants have also moved for summary judgment by arguing generally that they

are entitled to qualified immunity. (P. & A. at 14-15.) In this regard they argue that all of the

defendants acted out of a desire to preserve the safety and security of the prison and that

reasonable correctional officers in their position could have believed that their conduct in

segregating and validating plaintiff was lawful. (Id.) Plaintiff opposes the granting of qualified

immunity on the grounds that prison officials are presumed to be aware of the law governing their

conduct and that he had a right to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. 

(Opp’n at 40-41.) 

It may be that defendants could be entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff’s due

process claim. See Guizar, 2008 WL 2403000 at *1. However, defendants have not moved for

summary judgment with any degree of specificity on qualified immunity grounds with respect to

this aspect of plaintiff’s claim. Moreover, as previously noted, defendants elected not to file a

reply brief in support of the pending motion in which they may have addressed the issue. 

Therefore, the court will recommend that defendants’ motion for summary judgment be denied

with respect to this aspect of plaintiff’s due process claim.

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B. Retention in Adseg

After his initial placement in administrative segregation on February 2, 2000,

plaintiff had several classification hearings where it was decided that he should be retained in

administrative segregation while the gang validation investigation continued. Plaintiff alleges that

his due process rights were violated by his retention in administrative segregation.

A prisoner in administrative segregation may be retained in such a placement if the

following procedural protections are provided:

Prison officials must engage in some sort of periodic review of the

confinement of such inmates. This review will not necessarily

require that prison officials permit the submission of any additional

evidence or statements. The decision whether a prisoner remains a

security risk will be based on facts relating to a particular prisoner -

which will have been ascertained when determining to confine the

inmate to administrative segregation - and on the officials’ general

knowledge of prison conditions and tensions . . . . Likewise, the

decision to continue confinement of an inmate pending

investigation . . . depends upon circumstances that prison officials

will be well aware of - - most typically, the progress of the

investigation. 

Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 477 n.9. See also Toussaint, 926 F.2d at 803 (due process satisfied by review

of confinement in segregation every 120 days); Tapia v. Alameida, No. 1:03-CV-5422-AWI-SMS,

2006 WL 842470, *10 (E.D. Cal. March 29, 2006) (due process requires meaningful review of an

inmate’s S.H.U. confinement every 120 days); Lopez v. Marshall, No. C-93-2790 DLJ, 1995 WL

355592, *3 (N.D. Cal. June 2, 1995) (finding due process satisfied where “[p]laintiff has received

periodic reviews of the decision to place him in segregated housing” due to gang affiliation).

The evidence before the court establishes that plaintiff received meaningful

periodic reviews of his placement in administrative segregation. (See DSUF at 3.) However, if

plaintiff did not receive the process to which he was due under the Fourteenth Amendment when

initially placed in administrative segregation by being denied the opportunity to refute the reason

for his segregation, then the periodic reviews of that initial decision are meaningless. For the

reasons explained above, the court concludes that this is such a case. Therefore, defendants’

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 In this cause of action plaintiff names defendants Garate, Farris, Cook, Hansen, 22

Shaver, Holmes, McClure, Martinez, Babich, Gilliam, Vanderville and Johnson. (Third. Am.

Compl. at 16.) As noted above, however, Farris and Hansen have previously been dismissed

from this action. See fn. 2, infra.

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motion for summary judgment with respect to this aspect of plaintiff’s due process claim should

be denied as well. 

C. Gang Validation

Finally, plaintiff alleges that his due process rights were violated by his validation

as a gang member which he contends was not based on reliable evidence. (Third Am. Compl. at 22

16-17.) In addition, plaintiff alleges that the defendants failed to allow him a timely opportunity

to present his views in defense against the gang allegations prior to being placed in administrative

segregation. Defendants do not dispute that plaintiff has a liberty interest in avoiding

indeterminate confinement in the S.H.U. However, defendants have moved for summary

judgment on this claim, arguing that there was “some evidence” to support plaintiff’s validation as

a gang member and that he was provided all of the procedural protections to which he was entitled

under the Fourteenth Amendment. 

1. Some Evidence Standard

The Ninth Circuit has held that the determination that an inmate is a gang member,

and therefore appropriate for assignment to an indefinite term in segregated housing, must be

supported by some evidence. Bruce, 351 F.3d at 1287. The some evidence standard sets a low

bar, consistent with the recognition that assignment of inmates within prisons is “essentially a

matter of administrative discretion, subject to minimal legal limitations. Id. (citations omitted).

Even a single piece of evidence may be sufficient to meet the some evidence requirement, if that

evidence has sufficient indicia of reliability. Id. at 1288; see also Cato v. Rushen, 824 F.2d 703,

705 (9th Cir. 1987) (the relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that could

support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board); Toussaint, 926 F.2d at 803 (articulating

sufficient indicia of reliability standard). In Bruce, for example, the court acknowledged three

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 Defendants acknowledge that some of the information relied upon for plaintiff’s gang 23

validation was developed after he was initially placed in administrative segregation. They

contend, however, that a suspected gang member is typically segregated as the validation

investigation continues so as to ensure a thorough and complete investigation without

endangering the safety and security of the institution, staff and other inmates. (P. & A. at 10;

Harrison Decl. at 2-3.) Defendants contend that plaintiff’s argument - that the information relied

upon for his validation must be false because it was generated after his segregation while

information initially relied upon was later omitted - is misplaced. (Id.) Defendants argue that

further investigation often properly results in some initial information being proved to be

unreliable or less persuasive than initially thought and that fact does not call into question the

conclusions ultimately reached. (Id.)

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pieces of evidence as supporting the identification of the plaintiff as a gang member: a sheriff's

department report that he was a gang associate; a probation report indicating that his codefendant

on the underlying charge had been validated as a gang member; and a statement from a

confidential informant. Bruce, 351 F.3d at 1288. The Ninth Circuit found that any of these three

pieces of evidence would have sufficed to support the validation because each has sufficient

indicia of reliability. Id.

Here, defendants assert that Special Agent Harrison reviewed plaintiff’s gang

validation package and confirmed that there were at least three pieces of evidence from

independent sources validating plaintiff as a gang member. (Defs’ P. & A. at 10.) Because some

of that information was obtained from a confidential source, defendant Harrison confirmed that

the reliability of the sources had been evaluated and addressed by the authors of the confidential

reports. (Id.) Defendants have submitted the evidence from confidential sources for the court’s 23

review. Based upon defendant Harrison’s declaration stating that he verified six items validating

plaintiff as a member of the Northern Structure prison gang and refuting plaintiff’s challenges to

the evidence, apparently as well as the evidence from confidential sources filed under seal, the

defendants argue that the governing “some evidence” standard was met with respect to plaintiff’s

validation as a gang member. 

Plaintiff asserts that the “some evidence” requirement is a standard for review and

is not the standard prison officials are permitted to employ in ordering placement in administrative

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segregation. (Opp’n at 34.) Plaintiff also argues that, under the holding in Toussaint, it was

required that he be given the opportunity to challenge the gang validation evidence before it was

deemed sufficient by defendant Harrison. (Id. at 34-35.) Plaintiff contends that the following

documents established that the evidence relied upon by defendants was insufficient: (1) the 

December 8, 2004 S.H.U. audit referring the investigation for casework follow-up because

documentation was unclear and non-specific, could not be located in the file and appeared on the

wrong form, with the comment that there was a “flimsy file.” (Pl.’s Decl. in Support of Pl.’s MSJ

filed April 18, 2007, Ex. 74); (2) the classification review dated November 9, 1999, in which it

was reported, “Committee also notes CDC 128 B dated 11/8/99 from the Investigative Services

Unit stating that there is not enough information to validate Inmate Lopez.” (Id., Ex. 35); and (3)

the declarations from three inmates in which they state they were threatened by prison officials to

induce them to provide false information regarding plaintiff. (Id., Exs. 54-56). (Opp’n at 35.) 

Plaintiff argues that instead of merely pointing to “some evidence,” due process requires that the

defendants provide three independent source items to support his gang validation. (Id.)

Plaintiff’s argument that unreliable evidence was used to validate him as a gang

member is based in large part on the declarations of the three inmates who contend they were

pressured to provide false information to prison officials about suspected gang activity. The

inmate declarations do not raise a genuine dispute as to the reliability of the information relied

upon in connection with plaintiff’s validation. The declarants stated that although they were

pressured to do so, they did not provide false information to prison officials. (See Pl.’s Decl. in

Support of Pl.’s MSJ filed April 18, 2007, Exs. 54-56.) In addition, plaintiff’s gang validation

was based on information derived from debriefings and actual physical evidence. 

Plaintiff’s contention that the 2004 S.H.U. audit determined that documentation

with respect to his validation was lacking, thus calling into question that validation, is likewise

unpersuasive. That audit did not find evidence relied upon for plaintiff’s validation to be false,

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fabricated or unreliable. Rather, the auditor merely pointed out that there were document issues in

connection with the file and referred the case for updating and follow-up. (Pl.’s Decl., Ex. 74.)

Finally, plaintiff’s contention that his due process rights were violated because in

November of 1999, it was determined that evidence supporting his gang validation was

insufficient, is equally misplaced. At that time the classification committee did not determine that

any evidence of plaintiff’s gang involvement was false, fabricated or unreliable. Instead, the

committee simply found that there was not enough information at that time to validate plaintiff as

a gang member. In this regard, the classification committee made the following comments:

Inmate Lopez appeared before Facility C UCC this date for his

program review. Committee notes: inmate Lopez was refered [sic]

to the CSR and on 11/2/99 thiscase [sic] was defered [sic]

requesting review by the IGI. Committee also notes CDC 128 B

dated 11/8/99 from the Investigative Services Unit stating that there

is not enough information to validate Inmate Lopez. Committee

acts to refer to CSR recommending transfer to DVI III or SOL III

due to classification score and his request. 

(Pl.’s Decl., Ex. 35.) 

The court has examined the documents submitted by defendants under seal on

October 12, 2007 (Doc. No. 161). Having done so, the court finds based on those documents that

the minimal “some evidence” standard was met with respect to plaintiff’s validation as a gang

member. Plaintiff’s substantive due process rights were not violated by the validation. Therefore,

defendants are therefore entitled to summary judgment in their favor on this aspect of plaintiff’s

due process claim. 

2. Procedural requirements

Above, in Section VI (A), the court has addressed plaintiff’s procedural due

process claim with respect to his initial placement in administrative segregation. The legal

standards and discussion set forth above will not be repeated here.

Suffice it to say, there is currently no evidence before the court that plaintiff was 

allowed the opportunity to meaningfully contest the evidence against him during the lengthy

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period between his placement in administrative segregation on February 2, 2000 and November

28, 2001, when he was given the forms describing the confidential information relied upon to

validate him. Rather, at each appearance before the classification committee during that time

plaintiff was limited to making a general denial of gang affiliation and inquiring how long it

would take prison officials to decide whether they would validate him or not. (Pl.’ Decl., Ex. 46)

(Exs. A-H to Defendant Cook’s Response to Pl.’s First Req. for Admissions, Ex. I). For the

reasons set forth above, this lengthy delay after his commitment to administrative segregation

without a meaningful opportunity to refute the gang validation evidence, unaddressed by

defendants in their pending motion, does not appear to comport with the due process requirements

set forth above.

At the very least, defendants have failed to establish that they are entitled to

summary judgment in their favor on this aspect of plaintiff’s due process claim. Accordingly, the

court will recommend that the pending motion be denied in this respect.

VII. Sixteenth, Seventeenth and Eighteenth Causes of Action - State Law Claims

Plaintiff’s sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth causes of action allege claims

based on provisions of the California Constitution and California Penal Code. (Third Am. Compl.

at 17.) Plaintiff seeks to invoke this court’s supplemental jurisdiction over these causes of action

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). 

Defendants move for summary judgment in their favor with respect to these state

law claims on numerous grounds. The court is persuaded by the argument that the claims name

only the State of California as a defendant. (See Third Am. Compl. at 17.) The State of

California is not a proper defendant in this action and the court has not authorized service of the

third amended complaint upon the State. Plaintiff has not effectively addressed this deficiency.

Accordingly, the court will recommend that defendants’ motion for summary

judgment in their favor as to plaintiff’s state law claims be granted.

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 In the pending motion defense counsel suggests that defendant Vanderville is the lone 24

defendant who has not filed such a declaration. Counsel, and plaintiff, are mistaken in this

regard. Defendant Vanderville has filed a declaration denying that he conspired with any

correctional officials to violate plaintiff’s rights and also stating that none of his actions were

taken for purposes of retaliating against plaintiff. (Doc. No. 157, Part 10 at 5-6) (Vanderville

Decl. in Support of Mot. for Summ. J., ¶ 4 at 2). 

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VIII. Twentieth Cause of Action - Conspiracy

In this cause of action plaintiff alleges that the defendants conspired to deprive him

of his constitutional rights. (Third Am. Compl. at 18.) 

Defendants move for summary judgment arguing that although plaintiff had

multiple encounters with the defendants over the years, he has not presented any evidence that

there was an agreement among the defendants to violate his rights. (Defs.’ P. & A. at 14.) In

addition, all defendants have filed declarations in which they deny participation in any conspiracy

to violate plaintiff’s rights.

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In opposition, plaintiff erroneously argues that defendant Vanderville has not

denied his involvement in a conspiracy. (Opp’n at 39.) Therefore, plaintiff asks that counsel be

appointed and that discovery be reopened to allow him to depose witnesses. (Id.) Plaintiff also

asserts that the defendants’ declarations denying the existence of a conspiracy are self-serving. 

Plaintiff argues that defendants acted in concert in the following ways: 

[T]hey sat in I.C.C. together confirming the false allegation that 11

points existed to validate me, and they jointly participated in the

false disciplinary related actions, they fabricated evidence to

validate me, and approved those false claims and fabricated items,

etc. They approved ad-seg retention extension without any real

underlying evidence. They unlawfully placed me on a contraband

survellaince [sic] watch, then issued and approved false documents. 

They breached my confidential legal product, misrepresented

portions of it as a gang link, then approved the same. They

submitted, and approved, a validation package - - of fabricated and

unreliable items - - without providing due process protections of

notice of the items and opportunity to present my views prior to

submitting the packet. They denied me evidence, and made such

disappears [sic], needed to prove my innocence. And they routinely 

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threatened inmates in order to produce false, confidential,

information - - including specifically against me.

(Opp’n at 39-40.) 

In order to prevail on a conspiracy claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege and

prove some deprivation of a constitutional right which resulted from the alleged conspiracy. See

Woodrum v. Woodward County, Okla., 866 F.2d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1989). “A conspiracy

occurs only when the parties have reached ‘a unity of purpose or a common design and

understanding, or a meeting of minds in an unlawful arrangement.’” William Inglis & Sons

Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1055 (9th Cir. 1981) (quoting

American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809-10 (1946)). Thus, a plaintiff must

show that there was an agreement by the defendants to violate his constitutional rights. See

Woodrum, 866 at 1126; Fonda v. Gray, 707 F.2d 435, 438 (9th Cir. 1983). While it is not

necessary to prove that each participant in a conspiracy know the exact parameters of the plan,

they must at least share the general conspiratorial objective. See Fonda, 707 F.2d at 438; see also

Margolis v. Ryan, 140 F.3d 850, 853 (9th Cir. 1998). Vague and conclusory allegations with no

supporting factual averments or evidence will not withstand an adequately supported motion for

summary judgment. Woodrum, 866 F.2d at 1126; Fonda, 707 F.2d at 438. Rather, in order to

survive summary judgment on a conspiracy claim, plaintiff must provide evidence of specific

facts showing that a conspiracy existed. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Here, plaintiff has provided only vague and conclusory allegations that defendants

agreed together to violate his rights. Such bare allegations are not sufficient to avoid summary

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under § 1985, a plaintiff must “show . . . that ‘some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based,

invidiously discriminatory animus [lay] behind the conspirators’ action.’” Bray v. Alexandria

Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 267-68 (1993) (quoting Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S.

88, 102 (1971)). Accord Butler v. Elle, 281 F.3d 1014, 1028 (9th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff has 

presented no evidence establishing the existence of a conspiracy or of some racial or class-based

discrimination. 

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judgment in light of the declarations filed by defendants. Therefore defendants are entitled to 25

summary judgment in their favor with respect to plaintiff’s conspiracy claim. 

CONCLUSION

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that defendants

October 11, 2007 motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 157) be granted in part and denied in

part as follows.

1. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment be granted with respect to:

a. Plaintiff’s claim that his placement and retention in administrative

segregation was retaliatory as to defendants Adams, Babich, Bartos, Gilliam, Harrison, Holmes,

Johnson, McClure, McKean, Martinez, Morton, Nergenah, Shaver, Statti and Vanderville;

b. Plaintiff’s claim that the defendants acted in a retaliatory fashion when

they participated in his validation as a gang member;

c. Plaintiff’s claim that defendants acted in a retaliatory fashion in issuing

three rules violation reports;

d. Plaintiff’s claims in his first and seventh causes of action that defendants

acted in a retaliatory fashion in several other instances listed in those claims;

e. Plaintiff’s fifth and sixth causes of action; 

f. Plaintiff’s twelfth, fourteenth, sixteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth, 

nineteenth and twentieth causes of action; and

g. The substantive due process aspect of plaintiff’s fifteenth cause of action

attacking the sufficiency of the evidence relied upon for his gang validation.

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2. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment be denied with respect to:

a. Plaintiff’s retaliation claim against defendants Garate and Cook with

respect to his placement and retention in administrative segregation;

b. Plaintiff’s tenth cause of action in which he alleges that defendant

Bartos retaliated against him for engaging in protected legal activity by falsely labeling him; and

c. All procedural due process aspects of plaintiff’s fifteenth cause of action

challenging his initial placement and retention in administrative segregation and his ultimate gang

validation.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: September 26, 2008.

DAD:4

lope1605.msj2

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