Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01573/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-01573-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CLYDETTE WYNNE, et al., CASE NO. CV F 07-1573 LJO DLB

Plaintiffs, ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDED

vs. COMPLAINT

(Doc. 13)

CITY OF FRESNO, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

INTRODUCTION

Defendants City of Fresno (“City”) and City police officers and police chief seek F.R.Civ.P.

12(b)(6) dismissal of plaintiffs’ excessive force and negligent hiring claims or an alternative F.R.Civ.P.

12(e) more definite statement of plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs contend that their claims are plead

sufficiently or may be amended. This Court considered defendants’ alternative F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and

F.R.Civ.P. 12(e) motions on the record and VACATES the March 17, 2008 hearing, pursuant to Local

Rule 78-230(h). For the reasons discussed below, this Court GRANTS in part defendants’ requested

F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and F.R.Civ.P. 12(e) relief.

BACKGROUND

The Parties

Plaintiff Clydette Wynne (“Ms. Wynne”) is the mother and guardian ad litem for minor plaintiffs

Alexis Martin (“Alexis”) and Charles Williams (“Charles”). Plaintiff Rosie Sanders (“Ms. Sanders”)

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Ms. Wynne, Ms. Sanders, Charles and Alexis are black and will be referred to collectively as “plaintiffs.” 1

The City Police Department will be referred to as the “Department.” 2

The 11 defendant police officers will be referred to collectively as “defendant officers.” The City, Chief 3

Dyer and the defendant officers will be referred to collectively as “defendants.”

The following factual recitation of the subject vehicle stop is derived generally from plaintiffs’ first 4

amended complaint (“FAC”), the subject of defendants’ challenges.

2

is an adult.1

Defendants comprise the City, City Police Department Chief Jerry Dyer (“Chief Dyer”) and 11 2

Department police officers, including Officer Joel Santos (“Officer Santos”).3

Vehicle Stop4

In July 2006, Ms. Wynne’s vehicle was reported as stolen, was recovered a few days later by the

Department, and was returned to Ms. Wynne. Plaintiffs are unaware whether the Department continued

to list Ms. Wynne’s vehicle as stolen in that the Department had not cleared its stolen status from its

database or whether an agency within the Department had updated information which could have been

retrieved by Department officers, including Officer Santos.

On August 18, 2006, Officer Santos stopped Ms. Wynne, then seven months pregnant, in her

vehicle. Alexis, then age 5, and Charles, then age 3, and Ms. Sanders were passengers in Ms. Wynne’s

vehicle. Ms. Wynne reached for and obtained her vehicle registration, insurance card and driver’s

license. Officer Santos did not approach Ms. Wynne’s car, raised his weapon from behind his police

car, and instructed Ms. Wynne to put her arms out the window. Ms. Wynne complied and put her

vehicle registration, insurance card and driver’s license on the dash board. Eleven officers responded

to Officer Santos’ backup call. 

Ms. Wynne complied with Officer Santos’ gunpoint demands to exit her vehicle and walk

backwards. Ms. Wynne used a walker because of hip dislocation from her pregnancy. A female

Hispanic officer in her mid-30s handcuffed Ms. Wynne, pulled her backwards, and placed her in a police

car toward which other officers approached with drawn guns. No officer asked for vehicle registration

or other documents. No officer examined Ms. Wynne’s documents although she stated that such

documents were on the dash board and that the vehicle had been stolen and returned.

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At one point, a male Caucasian officer in his mid-30s held a gun to Ms. Sanders’ head. Ms.

Wynne heard officers tell Ms. Sanders, Charles and Alexis not to move or the officers would shoot.

After an hour and 45-minute detention, defendant officers learned that Ms. Wynne’s vehicle was

no longer stolen and that Ms. Wynne was the vehicle’s owner. Defendant officers released plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs allege on information and belief that: (1) when Officer Santos contacted Department

dispatch or used his on board computer, he was advised to confirm with a Department agency the status

of Ms. Wynne’s vehicle; and (2) Officer Santos did not follow directions to confirm by phone the

vehicle’s status. If Officer Santos had done so, he would have learned that the Department had

recovered the vehicle and had returned it to Ms. Wynne.

At the time of the incident, Ms. Wynne went into premature labor and was hospitalized. Her

daughter was born three to four weeks premature. 

Plaintiffs claim they cannot “identify which officers were involved in any specific act without

the opportunity to place a name and a face together” but will seek leave to amend their complaint after

discovery reveals the officers’ identities. Ms. Sanders claimsthat defendant officersrefused her request

for their names and told her to get a police report.

Plaintiffs’ Claims

The FAC alleges:

1. A first cause of action against the defendant officers in their individual capacities that

they used excessive force to detain plaintiffs and to conduct their investigation to violate

the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, Article 1, Sections 7

and 13 of the California Constitution, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 (“section 1983") and 1988, and

California Civil Code sections 52 and 52.1;

2. A second cause of action that the City and Chief Dyer negligently hired, trained and

supervised the defendant officers to deprive plaintiffs’ rights under the Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and protected by section 1983, 42

U.S.C. § 1988 and California Civil Code sections 52 and 52.1;

3. A third false arrest, false imprisonment and excessive force cause of action against all

defendants in their official capacities that plaintiffs’ “detention was conducted with

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excessive force in violation of Plaintiffs’ rights under the U.S. and California

Constitutions”; and

4. A fourth cause of action against all defendants in their individual and official capacities

that they “deprived plaintiffs of their right to be secure in their person against

unreasonable seizure of their person in violation of article 1 sections 7 and 13 of the

California Constitution, and California Civil Code sections 52, 52.1.” 

Plaintiffs seek to recover emotional distress and punitive damages. 

DISCUSSION

F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) Motion To Dismiss Standards

Defendants seek to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims on various substantive grounds discussed below.

A F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is a challenge to the sufficiency of the pleadings set forth in the

complaint. “When a federal court reviews the sufficiency of a complaint, before the reception of any

evidence either by affidavit or admissions, its task is necessarily a limited one. The issue is not whether

a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the

claims.” Scheurer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683 (1974); Gilligan v. Jamco Development

Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 249 (9 Cir. 1997). A F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper where there is either th

a “lack of a cognizable legal theory” or “the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal

theory.” Balisteri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9 Cir. 1990); Graehling v. Village of th

Lombard, Ill., 58 F.3d 295, 297 (7 Cir. 1995). F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper when “plaintiff th

can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Conley v. Gibson,

355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-102 (1957). 

In resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must: (1) construe the complaint in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff; (2) accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true; and (3) determine

whether plaintiff can prove any set of facts to support a claim that would merit relief. Cahill v. Liberty

Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-338 (9th Cir. 1996). “However, conclusory allegations of law and

unwarranted inferences are not sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Pareto v. F.D.I.C., 139 F.3d

696, 699 (9 Cir. 1998). A court need not permit an attempt to amend a complaint if “it determines that th

the pleading could not possibly be cured by allegation of other facts.” Cook, Perkiss and Liehe, Inc. v.

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N. Cal. Collection Serv. Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9 Cir. 1990). th

F.R.Civ.P. 12(e) Motion For More Definite Statement Standards

Defendants pursue an alternative F.R.Civ.P. 12(e) motion which permits a party to seek “a more

definite statement of a pleading to which a responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or

ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response.” A motion for a more definite statement

is proper if “defendant cannot frame a responsive pleading.” Famolare, Inc. v. Edison Bros. Stores, Inc.,

525 F.Supp. 940, 949 (E.D. Cal. 1981); see Boxall v. Sequoia Union High School District, 464 F.Supp.

1104, 1114 (N.D. Cal. 1979). A F.R.Civ.P. 12(e) motion is designed to strike unintelligibility rather

than lack of detail. See Woods v. Reno Commodities, Inc., 600 F.Supp. 574, 580 (D. Nev. 1984); Nelson

v. Quimby Island Reclamation Dist., 491 F.Supp. 1364, 1385 (N.D. Cal. 1980). A F.R.Civ.P. 12(e)

motion should be denied if the pleading provides a “short and plain statement” of the claim showing that

the pleader is entitled to relief. Virgen v. Mae, 2007 WL 1521553, *2 (E.D. Cal. 2007) (citing

F.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)).

With these standards in mind, this Court turns to defendants’ challenges to plaintiffs’ claims.

Merits Of First Cause Of Action Against Defendant Officers

Fourth Amendment Claims

In their first cause of action against the defendant officers in their individual capacities, plaintiffs

allege that there are questions whether Ms. Wynne’s vehicle was listed as stolen because the Department

had not cleared its stolen status or whether a Department agency had updated information which Officer

Santos could have learned had he telephoned the agency. The cause of action later alleges that had

Officer Santos contacted the Department agency, he would have learned that the Department had

recovered and returned Ms. Wynne’s vehicle. 

Defendants argue that the cause of action is vague and appears to challenge defendant officers’

actions after the stop, not the stop itself. Defendants argue that Officer Santos was entitled to rely on

dispatch information to detain and even arrest plaintiffs until he completed his investigation. Defendants

argue that the hour and 45-minute detention alone is insufficient to indicate use of excessive or

unreasonable force. Defendants contend that Officer Santos’ “verbal force” to gain Ms. Wynne’s

compliance was reasonable.

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Plaintiffs point out that during the one hour 45-minute detention, no defendant officer asked for

Ms. Wynne’s vehicle registration or driver’s licence, which were readily available when defendant

officers approached her vehicle with guns drawn. Ms. Wynne equates her gunpoint handcuffed status

to an arrest. Plaintiffs argue that the Fourth Amendment claims are sufficient to plead use of excessive

force and absence of probable cause for arrest. 

There is “no bright line rule for determining when an investigatory stop crosses the line and

becomes an arrest.” United States v. Parr, 843 F.2d 1228, 1231 (9 Cir. 1988). The point of an

th

investigatory stop “is to allow police to investigate.” Gallegos v. City of Los Angeles, 308 F.3d 987,

991 (9 Cir. 2002) (italics in original). Whether a police detention is an arrest or an investigatory stop th

is a fact-specific inquiry, Washington v. Lambert, 98 F.3d 1181, 1185 (9 Cir. 1996), guided by the th

general Fourth Amendment requirement of reasonableness, Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739, 103

S.Ct. 1535 (1983). Such inquiry requires a court to consider “all the circumstances surrounding the

encounter” between the individual and police, Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439, 111 S.Ct. 2382

(1991), “by evaluating not only how intrusive the stop was, but also whether the methods used [by

police] were reasonable given the specific circumstances,” Washington, 98 F.3d at 1185 (italics in

original).

The facts of a detention must be viewed in the context of the totality of circumstances in that “the

scope of the intrusion permitted [by the Fourth Amendment] will vary to some extent with the particular

facts and circumstances of each case.” Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319 (plurality

opinion); see Gallegos, 308 F.3d at 991. A court looks at the situation as a whole and does not isolate

each fact “in a vacuum.” Allen v. City of Los Angeles, 66 F.3d 1052, 1057 (9 Cir. 1995); see Gallegos,

th

308 F.3d at 991. 

“The ‘reasonableness’ and hence constitutionality of a warrantless arrest is determined by the

existence of probable cause.” Barry, 902 F.2d 770, 772 (9 Cir. 1990). The “question of whether a th

reasonable officer could have believed probable cause (or reasonable suspicion) existed to justify a

search or an arrest is ‘an essentially legal question’ that should be determined by the district court at the

earliest possible point in the litigation.” Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 873 (9 Cir. 1993) th

(quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2815 (1985)). 

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The “crucial inquiry” is whether there was “probable cause to make the arrest.” Barry, 902 at

772; see McKenzie v. Lamb, 738 F.2d 1005, 1007 (9 Cir. 1984). Whether an arrest is “constitutionally th

valid depends in turn upon whether, at the moment the arrest was made, the officers had probable cause

to make it – whether at that moment the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which

they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that

the petitioner had committed or was committing an offense.” Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct.

223 (1964). “Probable cause for a warrantless arrest arises when the facts and circumstances within the

officer’s knowledge are sufficient to warrant a prudent person to believe ‘that the suspect has committed,

is committing, or is about to commit an offense.’” Barry, 902 F.2d at 773 (quoting Michigan v.

DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37, 99 S.Ct. 2627, 2632 (1979)).

A stolen vehicle report alone furnishes sufficient grounds to arrest the driver. Rohde v. City of

Roseburg, 137 F.3d 1142, 1144 (9 Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 817, 119 S.Ct. 54 (1998); Lipton v. th

United States, 348 F.2d 591, 594 (9 Cir. 1965.) A “stolen vehicle report justifies the arrest of the driver th

even if the report is later discovered to be erroneous.” Rohde, 137 F.3d at 1144. “If an officer has

reliable information, such as a police report, indicating that the vehicle has been stolen, he thus has

probable cause to believe that the driver has committed the crime of either stealing the car or knowingly

operating a stolen car.” Rohde, 137 F.3d at 1144.

Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit has further explained:

In this nation, all people have a right to be free from the terrifying and

humiliating experience of being pulled from their cars at gunpoint, handcuffed, or made

to lie face down on the pavement when insufficient reason for such intrusive police

conduct exists. The police may not employ such tactics every time they have an

“articulable basis” for thinking that someone may be a suspect in a crime. The

infringement on personal liberty resulting from so intrusive a type of investigatory stop

is simply too great. Under ordinary circumstances, when the police have only reasonable

suspicion to make an investigatory stop, drawing weapons and using handcuffs and other

restraints will violate the Fourth Amendment.

Washington, 98 F.3d at 1187.

Plaintiff’s first cause of action alleges unlawful detention and excessive force claims. The cause

of action alleges that “Defendant officers unlawfully detained and threatened plaintiffs” and “used

excessive force in detaining Plaintiffs and in conducting their investigation.” The cause of action

reflects plaintiffs’ uncertainty as to the status the Department attributed to Ms. Wynne’s vehicle and

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whether updated information was available within the Department. At this stage, plaintiffs are not

expected to know of such information, which is easily available to defendants and which plaintiffs are

able to learn during discovery. Claimed vagueness will be cleared during discovery. Factual questions

exist whether the methods used by the defendant officers were reasonable under the alleged

circumstances. Defendants fail to support their challenge to plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claims,

including those of Charles and Alexis who, according to the FAC, were subjected to gunpoint detention.

This Court DENIES dismissal of the first cause of action’s Fourth Amendment claims against the

defendant officers. 

Fourteenth Amendment Claims

The defendant officers note that although the first cause of action references a Fourteenth

Amendment violation, it lacks allegations of violations of substantive or procedural due process or equal

protection rights and facts to support a Fourteenth Amendment violation. Plaintiffs respond that their

Fourteenth Amendment claims based on “treatment difference from those similarly situated or were

discriminated because of their race. All the Plaintiffs are black.”

A Fourteenth Amendment due process claim under section 1983 may address “substantive”

rights, including freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures, and “certain arbitrary, wrongful

government actions.” Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125, 110 S.Ct. 975 (1990). “The concept of

‘substantive due process,’ semantically awkward as it may be, forbids the government from depriving

a person of life, liberty, or property in such a way that ‘shocks the conscience’ or ‘interferes with rights

implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’” Nunez v. City of Los Angeles, 147 F.3d 867, 871 (9 Cir. th

1998). The substantive component of the Due Process Clause is violated by executive action only when

it “can properly be characterized as arbitrary, or conscience shocking, in a constitutional sense.” Collins

v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 128, 112 S.Ct. 1061, 1070 (1992).

A Fourteenth Amendment due process claim under section 1983 may also address “procedural

rights” of “guarantee of a fair procedure” to address deprivation of a “life, liberty or property” interest

“without due process of law.” Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 125, 110 S.Ct. 975. To state a procedural due

process claim, a plaintiff must allege: (1) a liberty or property interest protected by the Constitution; (2)

a deprivation of the interest by the government; and (3) lack of process. Wright v. Riverland, 219 F.3d

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905, 913 (9 Cir. 2000). th

“The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no state shall ‘deny

to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,’ which is essentially a direction that

all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,

473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249 (1985). The “purpose ofthe equal protection clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment is to secure every person within the State’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary

discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through

duly constituted agents.” Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441, 445, 43 S.Ct. 190

(1923).

A section 1983 plaintiff alleging an equal protection violation must prove: (1) the municipal

defendants treated them differently from others similarly situated; (2) the unequal treatment was based

on an impermissible classification; (3) the municipal defendants acted with discriminatory intent in

applying this classification; and (4) plaintiffs suffered injury as a result of the discriminatory

classification. Moua v. City of Chico, 324 F.Supp.2d 1132, 1137 (E.D. Cal. 2004); see Van Pool v. City

and County of San Francisco, 752 F.Supp. 915, 927 (N.D.Cal.1990) (section 1983 plaintiff must prove

purposeful discrimination by demonstrating that he “receiv[ed] different treatment from that received

by others similarly situated,” and that the treatment complained of was under color of state law). Equal

protection claims may be brought by a “‘class of one,’ where the plaintiff alleges that she has been

intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the

difference in treatment.” Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564, 120 S.Ct. 1073 (2000).

Unlawful detention and excessive force claims are the thrust of the first cause of action. No

Fourteenth Amendment claim is apparent from the complaint. There are no facts for a procedural due

process or equal protection claim. Plaintiffs request leave to allege an equal protection claim that as

blacks, “they were treated differently than white women and/or children similarly situated.” As such,

this Court DISMISSES with leave to amend the first cause of action’s Fourteenth Amendment claims

against the defendant officers.

Second Cause Of Action Against Officer Dyer In His Official Capacity

The (second) negligent hiring, training, staffing and supervision cause of action is against the

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City and Chief Dyer in his official capacity. Since the cause of action names the City as a defendant,

Chief Dyer argues that he is a redundant defendant.

Official-capacity suits “generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an

entity of which an officer is an agent.” Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658,

690, n. 55, 98 S.Ct. 2018 (1978). Local government officials sued in their official capacities are

“persons” under section 1983 in cases where a local government would be suable in its own name.

Monell, 436 U.S. at 690, n. 55, 98 S.Ct. 2018. “For this reason, when both an officer and the local

government entity are named in a lawsuit and the officer is named in official capacity only, the officer

is a redundant defendant and may be dismissed.” Luke v. Abbott, 954 F.Supp. 202, 203 (C.D. Cal. 1997)

(citing Vance v. County of Santa Clara, 928 F.Supp. 993, 996 (N.D. Cal. 1996)).

 “[I]t is no longer necessary or proper to name as a defendant a particular local government

officer acting in official capacity.” Luke, 954 F.Supp. at 204. As the district court in Luke, 954 F.Supp.

at 204, explained:

A plaintiff cannot elect which of the defendant formats to use. If both are named, it is

proper upon request for the Court to dismiss the official-capacity officer, leaving the

local government entity as the correct defendant. If only the official-capacity officer is

named, it would be proper for theCourt upon request to dismiss the officer and substitute

instead the local government entity as the correct defendant.

Plaintiffs fail to justify redundancy to name Chief Dyer in his official capacity in the (second)

negligent hiring, training, staffing and supervision cause of action given that the City is also a defendant.

As such, this Court DISMISSES Chief Dyer in his official capacity from the (second) negligent hiring,

training, staffing and supervision cause of action.

Merits Of Third False Arrest, False Imprisonment And Excessive Force Cause Of Action

Vagueness

The complaint’s third cause of action is against the City and Chief Dyer and the defendant

officers in their official capacities and is entitled “False Arrest, False Imprisonment and Excessive

Force.” Incorporating prior allegations, the cause of action alleges that the “City utilized numerous

officers to scare, intimidate and threaten Plaintiffsin a manner that was unnecessary and excessive, both

in the number of officers present with guns and the mannerin which they conducted their investigation.”

The cause of action further alleges that “detention was conducted with excessive force in violation of

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Plaintiffs’ rights under the U.S. and California Constitutions.”

Defendants correctly note that the third cause of action’s reference to “false arrest” is vague in

that the complaint appears to characterize the events at issue as a detention. Defendants further note lack

of clarity whether plaintiffs, in particular minors Alexis and Charles, were arrested. Chief Dyer

challenges the cause of action for alleging no facts that he “caused” or directly “participated in” conduct

to violate plaintiffs’ civil rights. Defendants’ points are well taken. The third cause of action is vague

as to whether and how plaintiffs claim an unreasonable detention or false arrest. Plaintiffs are granted

an opportunity to replead the third cause of action with greater specificity to demonstrate whether and

how they proceed on a unreasonable detention or false arrest theory and the grounds for Chief Dyer’s

liability. This Court DISMISSES with leave to amend the third false arrest, false imprisonment and

excessive force cause of action.

The City’s Liability

Construing the third cause of action as a section 1983 claim, defendants fault the cause of

action’s absence of a “cognizable theory orsupporting facts” to hold the City liable for false arrest, false

imprisonment or excessive force. A local government unit may not be held liable under a section 1983

claim for the acts of its employees under a respondeat superior theory. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691, 98 S.Ct.

2018; Davis v. Mason County, 927 F.2d 1473, 1480 (9 Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 899, 112 S.Ct. 275 th

(1991); Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9 Cir. 1989). “[A] municipality cannot th

be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 691, 98 S.Ct. at 2018. The

local government unit “itself must cause the constitutional deprivation.” Gilette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d

1342, 1346 (9 Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 932, 114 S.Ct. 345 (1993). Because liability of a local th

governmental unit must rest on its actions, not the actions of its employees, a plaintiff must go beyond

the respondeat superior theory and demonstrate that the alleged constitutional violation was the product

of a policy or custom of the local governmental unit. City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385,

109 S.Ct. 1197 (1989); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 478-480, 106 S.Ct. 1292 (1986).

To maintain a section 1983 claim against a local government, a plaintiff must establish the requisite

culpability (a “policy or custom” attributable to municipal policymakers) and the requisite causation (the

policy or custom as the “moving force” behind the constitutional deprivation). Monell, 436 U.S. at 691-

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694, 98 S.Ct. 2018; Gable v. City of Chicago, 296 F.3d 531, 537 (7 Cir. 2002). th

Plaintiffs argue that the third cause of action alleges state law claims to which the City is immune

only if its employees are immune. Plaintiffs point of California Government Code section 815.2(a): “A

public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of an employee of the public

entity within the scope of his employment if the act or omission would, apart from this section, have

given rise to a cause of action against that employee or his personal representative.” Under California

Government Code section 815.2(b), a public entity is not liable for injury resulting from the wrong of

its employee “where the employee is immune from liability.” 

California Government Code section 815.2 “makes a public entity vicariously liable for its

employee’s negligent acts or omissions within the scope of employment.” Eastburn v. Regional Fire

Protection Authority, 31 Cal. 4 1175, 1180, 80 P.3d 656 (2003); Hoff v. Vacaville Unified Sch. Dist.,

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19 Cal.4th 925, 932, 80 Cal.Rptr.811 (1998). However, liability of the employer only attaches if and

when it is adjudged that the employee was negligent,” and, although “public entities always act through

individuals, that does not convert a claim for direct negligence into one based on vicarious liability.”

Munoz v. City of Union City, 120 Cal.App.4th 1077, 1113-1114, 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 521, 547 (2004).

Nonetheless, “a governmental entity can be held vicariously liable when a police officer acting

in the course and scope of employment uses excessive force or engages in assaultive conduct.” Mary

M. v. City of Los Angeles, 54 Cal.3d 202, 215, 285 Cal.Rptr. 99 (1991). “California cases have

consistently held that a peace officer making an arrest is liable to the person arrested for using

unreasonable force.” Scruggs v. Haynes, 252 Cal.App.2d 256, 264, 60 Cal.Rptr. 355 (1967).

The City’s confusion over its basis of liability under the third cause of action highlights

plaintiffs’ need to clarify its liability theories. The FAC references government tort claims exhibits

which are not attached to the court-filed FAC. If plaintiffs in the third cause of action proceed against

the City under a government tort claim, plaintiffs must better plead as much and clear confusion that they

do no proceed under a section 1983 Monell claim. As such, this Court DISMISSES with leave to amend

the third false arrest, false imprisonment and excessive force cause of action against the City.

Official Capacities

Chief Dyer and the defendant officers argue that they should be dismissed from the cause of

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action as redundant defendants given that the cause of action also names the City as a defendant.

“[W]hen both an officer and the local government entity are named in a lawsuit and the officer is named

in official capacity only, the officer is a redundant defendant and may be dismissed.” Luke, 954 F.Supp.

at 203.

Plaintiffs respond that they are entitled to pursue government tort claims against Chief Dyer and

the defendant officers in their official capacities. Plaintiffs argue that Chief Dyer and the defendant

officers are properly named in their official capacities given the absence of dispute that they acted in the

course and scope of their Department employment at the time of alleged wrongdoing.

As noted above, plaintiffs are granted an opportunity to better allege that the third cause of action

proceeds as government tort claims. Assuch, this Court DISMISSES with leave to amend the third false

arrest, false imprisonment and excessive force cause of action against Chief Dyer and the defendant

officers in their official capacities. 

Merits Of Fourth Cause Of Action For Violation Of California Statutes

The complaint’s fourth cause of action alleges that all defendants in their official and individual

capacities deprived plaintiffs’ right to be secure in their person against unreasonable seizure to violate

California Civil Code sections 52 (“section 52") and 52.1 (“section 52.1"). The City and Chief Dyer

fault the cause of action for failure connect them to the alleged wrongs. Plaintiffs respond that their

section 52 claims based on “treatment different from those similarly situated or were discriminated

because of their race. All the Plaintiffs are black.” Plaintiffs argue that their section 52.1 claim is based

on prolonged detention without due process and probable cause.

Section 52 establishes statutory penalties for discrimination contrary to California Civil Code

sections 51, 51.5 and 51.6. Defendants correctly note the complaint’s absence of discrimination

allegations.

Section 52.1 permits a civil action against a person who interferes or attempts to interfere by

threats, intimidation or coercion with “exercise or enjoyment” of rights secured by the U.S. and

California Constitutions and laws. Section 52.1 in intended to “stem a tide of hate crimes.” Jones v.

Kmart Corp., 17 Cal.4th 329, 338, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 844 (1998). “Section 52.1 does not provide any

substantive protections; instead, it enables individuals to sue for damages as a result of constitutional

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violations.” Reynolds v. County of San Diego, 84 F.3d 1162, 1170 (9 Cir. 1996). th

Defendants correctly argue that the fourth cause of action fails to satisfy section 52 or 52.1

elements. The cause of action fails to allege facts of discrimination or interference with federal or state

rights to support section 52 and 52.1 claims. Plaintiffs are granted an opportunity to replead the fourth

cause of action with greater specificity to allege section 52 and 52.1 elements and to identify which

defendants participated in alleged wrongful conduct. This Court DISMISSES with leave to amend the

fourth cause of action for violation of California statutes.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons discussed above, this Court:

1. DENIES dismissal of first cause of action Fourth Amendment claims against the

defendant officers;

2. DISMISSES with leave to amend the first cause of action’s Fourteenth Amendment

claims against the defendant officers;

3. DISMISSES Chief Dyer in his official capacity from the second negligent hiring,

training, staffing and supervision cause of action;

4. DISMISSES with leave to amend the third false arrest, false imprisonment and excessive

force cause of action;

5. DISMISSES with leave to amend the fourth cause of action for violation of California

statutes; and

6. ORDERS plaintiffs, no later than April 2, 2008, to file and serve a second amended

complaint which complies with this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 12, 2008 /s/ Lawrence J. O'Neill 

66h44d UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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