Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-04392/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-04392-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Before the Court is Defendant Christopher Turiano’s (“Turiano”) Motion to Dismiss 

(“Motion”) (Doc. 17), which is fully briefed. For the reasons that follow, the motion will 

be granted with prejudice.

I. Background

Plaintiff Joshua Cobin (“Cobin”) initiated this action on June 6, 2019. The 

complaint initially named the City of Phoenix and other Defendants, bringing four claims 

for relief. Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint (“FAC”) on July 26, 2019 which 

contains one claim for relief against Defendant Christopher Turiano alone, and does not 

mention any other previously named Defendant. (Doc. 16)

In the FAC, Plaintiff alleges that on the evening of August 22, 2017, he was 

participating in a peaceful protest during President Trump’s visit at the Phoenix 

Convention Center. (Doc. 16 at 3, ¶¶ 5-6) At one point during the evening, Plaintiff alleges 

that members of the Phoenix Police Department wearing riot gear started marching toward 

Joshua Cobin,

 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

City of Phoenix, et al.,

Defendants. 

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No. CV-19-04392-PHX-SPL

ORDER

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the crowd without proffering any order to disperse or leave the area. (Doc. 16 at 3, ¶ 7) 

Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff alleges that the police officers began shooting less-lethal 

ammunitions and tear gas toward the protesters. (Doc. 16 at 3-4, ¶¶ 8,11) Plaintiff, wearing 

a gas mask, kicked back a gas cannister away from the crowd and in the police officers’ 

direction. (Doc. 16 at 3-4, ¶ 11) Defendant Turiano then shot a less-lethal ammunition, 

more commonly known as a “pepper ball round,” toward Plaintiff, hitting him the genital

area. (Doc 16 at 4 ¶¶ 14-16) Plaintiff drove himself to a hospital emergency room following 

the encounter where he was treated for exposure to chemical agents from the tear gas and 

for the pain and bruising caused by the “pepper ball round.” (Doc. 16 at 4-5, ¶ 17) 

Following the incident, Plaintiff took to social media and identified himself as the 

individual who was broadcasted on television kicking back gas cannisters at the police and 

being shot by a police officer during the protest. (Doc. 17 Ex. 1) This led to Plaintiff’s 

arrest and indictment for two counts of aggravated assault and one count of unlawful 

assembly. (Doc. 17 Exs. 2, 3) Plaintiff pled guilty to a reduced charge of disorderly 

conduct, a class 1 misdemeanor, in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S”) §§ 13-

2904, 13-2901, 13-707, and 13-802. (Doc. 17 Ex. 4) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant 

Turiano used excessive force in violation of Plaintiff’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment 

rights when firing a “pepper ball round” which resulted in physical and reputational 

damages.

II. Standard of Review

Rule 8(a)(2) requires a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief,” so that the defendant has “fair notice of what the ... claim is 

and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) 

(internal quotations omitted). Also, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 

which, if accepted as true, states a claim to relief that is “plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Facial plausibility exists if the pleader pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged. Id. Plausibility does not equal “probability,” but plausibility 

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requires more than a sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully. Id. “Where a 

complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops 

short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’” Id. (citing 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

Although a complaint attacked for failure to state a claim does not need detailed 

factual allegations, the pleader’s obligation to provide the grounds for relief requires “more 

than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action 

will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations omitted). Rule 8(a)(2) “requires 

a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief. Without some factual 

allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant could satisfy the requirement 

of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of the nature of the claim, but also ‘grounds’ on which 

the claim rests.” Id. (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 

1202, pp. 94, 95 (3d ed. 2004)). Thus, Rule 8’s pleading standard demands more than “an 

unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 

(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

In deciding a motion to dismiss the Court must construe the facts alleged in the 

complaint in the light most favorable to the drafter of the complaint and must accept all 

well-pleaded factual allegations as true. OSU Student Alliance v. Ray, 699 F.3d 1053, 1061 

(9th Cir. 2012); Shwarz v. United States, 234 F.3d 428, 435 (9th Cir. 2000). Nonetheless, 

the Court does not have to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation. 

Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). 

Furthermore, a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) must rely solely on the 

contents of the pleadings. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). A court may, however, consider 

“matters of judicial notice” without converting a motion to dismiss into one for summary 

judgment. United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003). Furthermore, a court 

need not accept as true “allegations that contradict matters properly subject to judicial 

notice” or “allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or 

unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 

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2008) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

A court may take judicial notice of documents referenced in the complaint, as well 

as matters in the public record. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688–89 (9th Cir. 

2001), overruled on other grounds by Galbraith v. Cty. of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 

1125–26 (9th Cir. 2002). In addition, the Court may take judicial notice of matters that are 

either “generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction” or “can be 

accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 

questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). Public records, including judgments and other court 

documents, are proper subjects of judicial notice. See, e.g., United States v. Black, 482 F.3d 

1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2007). However, “[j]ust because the document itself is susceptible to 

judicial notice does not mean that every assertion of fact within that document is judicially 

noticeable for its truth.” Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 999 (9th Cir. 

2018).

III. Analysis

A. Facts Considered and Judicial Notice

The Court first addresses the issue of judicial notice and the facts it considered in 

ruling on the Motion. Defendant does not clearly state what grounds the Motion is based 

on, but the Court reads the Motion as one made under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted and applies the corresponding standard of review.

Plaintiff does not dispute that he pled guilty to disorderly conduct in violation of A.R.S. §§ 

13-2904, 13-2901, 13-707, and 13-802. Although Plaintiff’s plea agreement was not 

attached to or referenced in the FAC, it was attached to the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 17-

5), and the Court can properly take judicial notice of records and judgments in other courts. 

Black, 482 F.3d at 1041. 

B. The Application of the Heck Doctrine

The Court next addresses the argument on the application of the Heck doctrine and 

finds it dispositive of the Motion. In Heck v. Humphrey, the Supreme Court held that 

in order to recover damages . . . for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness 

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would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the 

conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, 

declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into 

question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). The Court noted in dicta that an example of a § 1983 action 

whose successful prosecution would necessarily imply that plaintiff’s conviction was 

wrongful would be one where a defendant is sentenced for the crime of resisting arrest, 

“defined as intentionally preventing a peace officer from effecting a lawful arrest . . . . 

[t]hen brings a § 1983 action against the arresting officer seeking damages for a violation 

of his constitutional rights to be free from unreasonable seizures.” Id. at 486 n.6. The Court 

concluded that the plaintiff would have to negate one of the elements of the offense of 

which he was convicted to prevail in the § 1983 action and that, as a result, such action 

could not survive dismissal. Id.

Additionally, in Smith v. City of Hemet, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that under Heck, 

a plaintiff convicted in state court could bring, and maintain, a subsequent § 1983 action 

for use of excessive force if such use occurred subsequent to the conduct on which his 

conviction was based. 394 F.3d 689, 698 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (emphasis in original).

See also Musselman v. Meelhuysen, 773 Fed. Appx. 417, 418-19 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting 

Beets v. County of Los Angeles and Smith in reasoning that if the use of force by police 

took place after the plaintiff’s criminal activity had ended, then the § 1983 action for use 

of excessive force could proceed and should not be dismissed under Heck); Beets v. County 

of Los Angeles, 669 F.3d 1038, 1044-45 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Smith in support of the 

reasoning that a § 1983 action for use of excessive force cannot survive if the alleged 

excessive use of force arose during the course of plaintiff’s criminal activity and brought 

such activity to an end).

Finally, in determining if the Heck doctrine requires dismissal of Plaintiff’s § 1983 

action for use of excessive force, the Court must determine if it can ascertain the factual 

basis for the guilty plea to the state court offense. In Smith, the Ninth Circuit cited Sanford 

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v. Motts, 258 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2001) in trying to ascertain what the factual basis for Mr. 

Smith’s guilty plea was. Smith, 394 F.3d at 698. The Court was unable to ascertain whether 

Mr. Smith had pled guilty based on actions that impeded the officers’ investigation prior 

to his arrest or his subsequent resistance to their physical attempt to arrest him, or both. Id.

The Court concluded that because it could not determine the factual basis for the plea, his 

§ 1983 action “[did] not necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction and therefore 

[was] not barred by Heck.” Id. at 699 (emphasis in original). See also Sanford, 258 F.3d at

1119-20 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that because there were a variety of accusations against 

the plaintiff which could have formed the basis for the conviction and because the 

challenged conduct was not necessarily the predicate for his plea, Sanford’s § 1983 suit did 

not necessarily imply the invalidity of the conviction) (emphasis in original). 

In this case, Plaintiff argues that there was no finding as to which sub-section in 

A.R.S. § 13-2904 he pled guilty to. (Doc. 18 at 8) As a result, Plaintiff argues that the 

various statements contained in the plea agreement and the sentencing order cannot 

therefore be noticed for their truth by the Court and that the Court can only take notice of 

a plea agreement to disorderly conduct. (Doc. 18 at 8) The Court finds this argument 

unpersuasive. The Court can take judicial notice of the language of a state criminal statute 

because such statutes are “generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction” 

and “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot 

reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). The text of a criminal statute fits such 

definition and the parties are not disputing the text of the statutes referenced in the plea 

agreement and sentencing order. In this instance, the plea agreement and sentencing order 

specifically listed A.R.S. § 13-2901 as part of the committed offense. That section is a 

definition section and contains two definitions: one for “marijuana” and one for “public.” 

A.R.S. § 13-2901. The only applicable definition to Plaintiff’s guilty plea in relation to 

A.R.S. § 13-2904 is the one of “public.” Turning to A.R.S. § 13-2904, and its six subsections, this Court notes that only one of such sub-sections uses the word “public,” subsection (5). See A.R.S. § 13-2904(5) (“Refuses to obey a lawful order to disperse to 

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maintain public safety in dangerous proximity to fire, a hazard, or any other emergency.”)

Accordingly, the Court finds there is no possible doubt that Plaintiff pled guilty to violating 

A.R.S. § 13-2904(5).1 The facts alleged by Plaintiff that he did not receive a lawful order 

to disperse and did not disobey such order are directly contradictory to his plea agreement 

and violate the Heck doctrine.

Indeed, the only possible basis for Plaintiff’s guilty plea is that he disobeyed a lawful

order to disperse in violation of A.R.S. §§ 13-2901 and 13-2904. This is not like Smith or 

Sanford where a court could not determine the factual basis for the plea. 

Plaintiff’s refusal to obey a lawful order to disperse was the cause of Officer 

Turiano’s actions to fire a “pepper ball round” and such action brought Plaintiff’s criminal 

activity to an end. Indeed, Plaintiff himself admitted that the round inflicted great pain and 

that he drove himself to the hospital emergency room soon thereafter. (Doc. 16 at 4-5, ¶ 

17) This is clearly within the scenario contemplated by Smith, Beets, and Musselman where 

a § 1983 action for use of excessive force must be dismissed because of the lack of any 

temporal gap between the criminal activity and the actions which allegedly violated 

Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Plaintiff further relies on Musselman and Byrd to argue that 

Heck does not bar his excessive force claim. The Court finds both cases to be 

distinguishable.

In Musselman, Plaintiff pled guilty to placing a police officer in reasonable 

apprehension of imminent physical injury and later brought a § 1983 action alleging use of 

excessive force during his arrest. Musselman, 773 Fed. Appx. 417, 418. The court clearly 

agreed with the District Court that any theory based on his alleged peaceful and cooperative 

behavior were barred by Heck because they contradicted his guilty plea. Id. The court then 

held that any theory of liability alleging use of excessive force after the conduct that formed 

the basis for the conviction would not be barred by Heck. Id. This is not the case here. 

1 The Court also notes that Plaintiff has not made any argument challenging his plea 

agreement based on a lack of understanding of the offense, and its elements, he pled guilty 

to. The Court is also not aware of any other proceedings challenging the validity of the plea 

agreement.

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Plaintiff’s refusal to obey a lawful order to disperse is the factual basis for his guilty plea 

and Plaintiff is now arguing that he never received such an order and did not refuse to 

disperse. 

In Byrd, Byrd pled guilty to conspiracy to commit possession of a dangerous drug 

and later brought a § 1983 action alleging illegal search and use of excessive force by police 

officers. Byrd v. City of Phoenix, 885 F.3d 369, 640-41 (9th Cir. 2018). The court held that 

the civil suit could proceed because it “concerns allegations that the police illegally 

searched his person and used excessive force on him—after they discovered the drugs, for 

all we know—which has nothing to do with the evidentiary basis for his conspiracy 

conviction.” Id. at 645. The court also quoted Beets for the proposition that “an allegation 

of excessive force by a police officer would not be barred by Heck if it were distinct 

temporally or spatially from the factual basis for the person’s conviction.” Id. This case is 

clearly distinguishable from Byrd because the factual basis for Plaintiff’s guilty plea is not 

distinct either temporally or spatially from the factual basis for his claim of use of excessive 

force.

Finally, Plaintiff’s assertions in the FAC directly challenge the factual basis for his 

guilty plea, in violation of Heck. Plaintiff asserts in the FAC that the police never gave 

notice to the protestors of an unlawful assembly or order to disperse. (Doc. 16 at 3, ¶ 7) 

This is precisely, and unequivocally, what Plaintiff pled guilty to: “refusing to obey a 

lawful order to disperse issued to maintain public safety.” (Doc. 17 Ex. 4) One of the 

elements of the statute is that the order to disperse was “lawful.” A.R.S. § 13-2904. If 

Plaintiff succeeded on his § 1983 action on the facts asserted, it would necessarily 

invalidate and call into question his guilty plea, in violation of Heck. Furthermore, even 

under the standard of review of the FAC under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court cannot accept those 

factual allegations as true when they directly contradict Plaintiff’s guilty plea. Taking the 

allegations that Plaintiff never received an order to disperse and did not refuse such an 

order out of the FAC because they are barred under Heck and In re Gilead, the Court is left 

with a complaint which does not meet the pleading standard sufficient to survive 

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Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.

Therefore, the FAC must be dismissed with prejudice.

2

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant Turiano’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 17) is

granted. The First Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice in its entirety.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall terminate this action 

and enter judgment accordingly.

Dated this 19th day of February, 2020.

Honorable Steven P. Logan

United States District Judge

2 Because this Court finds that the application of the Heck doctrine supports granting 

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, it does not address other arguments made by the parties, 

such as the application of the qualified immunity doctrine or the merits of the excessive 

force claim.

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