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Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 

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In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 14‐3389

RAYMOND E. KING,

Petitioner‐Appellant,

v.

RANDY PFISTER, Warden,

Respondent‐Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Central District of Illinois.

No. 1:11‐cv‐01155 — Sara Darrow, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED JANUARY 5, 2016 — DECIDED AUGUST 24, 2016

____________________

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and KANNE and ROVNER, Cir‐

cuit Judges.

KANNE, Circuit Judge. In 2004, Petitioner Raymond King

was convicted by a jury of first‐degree murder. He was sen‐

tenced by the state trial court to life imprisonment. The trial

court judge that presided over King’s trial and sentencing

had represented King over fifteen years prior as an assistant

public defender.

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King appealed his conviction and sentence, which were

affirmed on direct appeal and denied review by the Illinois

Supreme Court. King then filed for post‐conviction relief,

which was dismissed by the trial court, affirmed on appeal,

and denied review by the Illinois Supreme Court.

Subsequently, King petitioned for a writ of habeas cor‐

pus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, in federal district court,

which was denied.  

On appeal, King argues that his trial and appellate coun‐

sel were ineffective under Strickland. v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668 (1984), because they did not seek substitution of the trial

court judge. In doing so, he challenges the Illinois Appellate

Court’s decision in People v. King, No. 03‐08‐0875, slip op. (Ill.

App. Ct. June 21, 2010), which was the last state court to ad‐

dress his claims on the merits. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

On September 7, 2002, Nina Buckner was found brutally

murdered in her home. Her head had been smashed with a

hammer, and she had suffered multiple cuts and broken

bones. A blue backpack was found near Buckner’s home,

containing her purse, her identification, and a bloody ham‐

mer and knife. Forensic testing confirmed that the blood on

the hammer and knife belonged to Buckner, and the blood

was also found on King’s clothes. Buckner’s neighbors re‐

ported seeing King near Buckner’s home with a blue back‐

pack on the night of Buckner’s murder. When questioned by

police, King gave multiple, very different, versions of his ac‐

tions during the night of Buckner’s murder. King was even‐

tually charged with the first‐degree murder.

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No. 14‐3389 3

A. Trial and Direct Appeal

King’s case was assigned to Judge Michael E. Brandt on

September 17, 2002. Two days later, King first appeared be‐

fore the trial court, represented by counsel.

Prior to trial, while represented by counsel, King en‐

gaged in several pro se actions. He wrote two pro se letters to

the trial court, on January 29, 2003, and April 27, 2003, com‐

plaining about the defense counsel’s unavailability to dis‐

cuss the case. Also, on October 2, 2003, King filed a pro se

motion for change of venue, arguing that the trial judge was

prejudiced because he had represented King in connection

with a prior criminal conviction. This motion was not heard

prior to trial. Finally, King wrote a pro se letter, dated No‐

vember 24, 2003, to the “Chief Judge” stating that he had

been repeatedly denied the chance to have “several motion

[sic] filed and heard.”

Following a jury trial, King was convicted of first‐degree

murder on June 1, 2004. Afterwards, King, represented by

counsel, filed a motion for a new trial. Additionally, on June

29, 2004, King filed a pro se motion for a new trial, alleging

ineffective assistance of trial counsel because of a failure to

object to evidence involving a crime that King had been

charged with but was then acquitted of at trial.

On August 12, 2004, the trial court conducted King’s sen‐

tencing hearing. The trial court began by denying the mo‐

tions for a new trial. The trial court then commented on

King’s pro se motion for change of venue, noting that it was

not timely, not supported by an affidavit, and not noticed for

hearing. The trial court declared that it “hardly” recalled

representing King in the 1986 case:

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[U]pon reviewing that motion [for change of ven‐

ue], after reviewing the common law record in

preparation for sentencing here, the Court went

back to [the 1986 case] and reviewed it to deter‐

mine if it refreshed my recollection on even repre‐

senting him. It hardly did. It was quite some time

ago. Like [present defense counsel], I was acting as

public defender. It looks as if I was his third public

defender in that particular case. It proceeded to tri‐

al. The defendant was acquitted of home invasion,

found guilty of armed violence. He appealed his

conviction. That was affirmed by the Appellate

Court.

(Sent. Tr. 14–15, Aug. 12, 2004.) Next, after reading the factu‐

al background from the appellate opinion affirming King’s

conviction, the court observed:  

Similarities are chilling. Of course, the facts therein

even independently if one did not delve into the

particular facts of [the 1986 case] ... the Court has

outlined, the prior convictions in this case, the ne‐

cessity to deter others, and the necessity to protect

the public from Mr. King is clear.

(Id. at 18.) Ultimately, the trial court sentenced King to life

imprisonment.

King appealed, represented by appointed counsel. On di‐

rect appeal, King did not raise a claim of ineffective assis‐

tance of trial counsel for not filing a motion to substitute the

trial court. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed his convic‐

tion and sentence. King filed a pro se petition for leave to ap‐

peal to the Illinois Supreme Court, which was denied.

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No. 14‐3389 5

B. Post‐Conviction Proceedings

On March 28, 2007, King filed a pro se post‐conviction pe‐

tition, 725 ILCS 5/122‐1 et seq., alleging that his trial counsel

and appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by fail‐

ing to “litigate a claim” to substitute the trial judge. In re‐

sponse, the State moved to dismiss the post‐conviction peti‐

tion, and the trial court granted the State’s motion on Octo‐

ber 24, 2008.

King appealed, represented by the state appellate de‐

fender’s office. On appeal, King renewed his argument that

his trial and appellate counsel provided ineffective assis‐

tance by failing to “litigate a claim” to substitute the trial

judge.

On June 2, 2010, the Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the

trial court’s dismissal of King’s post‐conviction petition in

People v. King, No. 03‐08‐0875. The appellate court began by

reciting Strickland’s two‐pronged standard of performance

and prejudice. Turning to the prejudice prong, the appellate

court held that under Illinois law, to warrant substitution of

a judge for cause, the defendant must demonstrate “that the

judge assigned to his case harbors actual prejudice,” which

requires establishing “animosity, hostility, ill will, or distrust

towards this [particular] defendant.” People v. King, No. 03‐

08‐0875, at 5 (alteration in original and internal quotation

marks omitted). Then, the appellate court summarized

King’s allegations—that during the trial judge’s previous

representation of King, he had failed to call certain witnesses

or raise certain objections, he had ignored King, and he did

not have a good attorney/client relationship with King. Id. In

conclusion, the appellate court held that King could not es‐

tablish “animosity, hostility, ill will, or distrust” because his

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allegations were “merely conclusory and lack[ed] any factu‐

al basis.” Id.

Afterwards, King filed a pro se petition for leave to ap‐

peal, again renewing his claim that trial and appellate coun‐

sel were ineffective for failing to pursue substitution of the

trial judge. The Illinois Supreme Court denied review on

September 13, 2010.

C. Federal Habeas Proceedings

On March 16, 2011, King petitioned the district court for

a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, in the

Northern District of Illinois. The case was then properly

transferred to the Central District of Illinois. In his petition,

King asserted numerous claims of ineffective assistance by

his trial counsel, his appellate counsel, and his post‐

conviction trial counsel.

On September 29, 2014, the district court denied King’s

§ 2254 petition. The district court began by finding that King

had procedurally defaulted all of his claims, except Claim 2,

which alleged “that his trial counsel was ineffective because

he failed to file a motion under Illinois law to substitute the

trial judge for bias and his appellate counsel failed to make

this argument on appeal.” (R. 23 at 11.) Next, the district

court found that the Illinois Appellate Court’s decision in

People v. King was not contrary to Supreme Court precedent

because King “does not point to any other specific ruling nor

does he allege that the Illinois courts overlooked any evi‐

dence of prejudice or misunderstood his arguments.” (Id. at

16–17.) Finally, the district court rejected King’s attempt to

characterize his ineffective assistance claim as based on fed‐

eral due process, finding that this claim was “procedurally

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No. 14‐3389 7

defaulted.” (Id. at 17–19.) Accordingly, the district court cer‐

tified only Claim 2 for appeal. King appealed.

II. ANALYSIS

We review de novo the district court’s denial of a habeas

petition. Dansberry v. Pfister, 801 F.3d 863, 866 (7th Cir. 2015).

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

(“AEDPA”) of 1996, a federal court may issue a writ of habe‐

as corpus only if the decision of the last state court to exam‐

ine the merits of the petitionerʹs claim: (1) “was contrary to,

or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly estab‐

lished Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of

the United States,” or (2) “was based on an unreasonable de‐

termination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This court’s

review of a state‐court decision under § 2254(d) is “highly

deferential” under a standard that is “difficult to meet.” Cul‐

len v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) (internal quotation

marks omitted); see also Makiel v. Butler, 782 F.3d 882, 896

(7th Cir. 2015).

On appeal, King argues that the Illinois Appellate

Court’s decision in People v. King was “contrary to or in‐

volved an unreasonable application of” the Supreme Court’s

decision in Strickland. Under Strickland, to show ineffective

assistance, in violation of the Sixth Amendment, a defendant

must prove (1) that his counsel’s performance “fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness” and (2) that he suf‐

fered prejudice such that there is a “reasonable probability

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.” 466 U.S. at 687–88,

694.

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Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that, for a habeas

petitioner advancing a claim of ineffective assistance that

was decided on the merits in state court, “relief may be

granted only if the state‐court decision unreasonably applied

the more general standard for ineffective‐assistance‐of‐

counsel claims established by Strickland,” and this is a “dou‐

bly deferential” standard of review. Knowles v. Mirzayance,

556 U.S. 111, 122–23 (2009).

We begin with King’s claim of ineffective assistance for

failing to seek substitution of the trial court under state law,

which was addressed in People v. King, and then we turn to

his ineffective assistance claim for failing to seek substitution

of the trial court based on federal due process.

A. Ineffective Assistance Claims based on State Law

As an initial matter, King attempts to dispute the factual

findings underlying the appellate court’s decision in People v.

King, asserting that he and the trial court had a “poor attor‐

ney‐client relationship.” (Appellant Br. 3, 13–14.) The appel‐

late court had deemed these assertions “unsubstantiated,”

and King does not present any additional evidence to sup‐

port them. Therefore, we easily conclude that King does not

provide “clear and convincing” evidence of an unreasonable

determination of the facts to rebut the appellate court’s fac‐

tual findings. Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 15 (2013) (quoting

§ 2254(e)(1)).

Nor can King show that the appellate court unreasonably

applied “clearly established” federal law because the appel‐

late court’s decision was based on a resolution of state law,

not federal law. It is well‐established that on habeas review,

a federal court cannot disagree with a state court’s resolution

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No. 14‐3389 9

of an issue of state law. See, e.g., Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S.

74, 76 (2005); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 , 67–68 (1991).

In Miller v. Zatecky, 820 F.3d 275, 277 (7th Cir. 2016), this

court affirmed the denial of a § 2254 petition filed by a de‐

fendant convicted of child molestation who received a 120‐

year aggregate sentence in state court. In Miller, the defend‐

ant raised a collateral challenge in state court that his direct

appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to contest the

length of his sentence. In response, the state appellate court

held that the defendant could not demonstrate prejudice

under Strickland because if the appellate counsel had raised

this sentence‐length challenge, the “chance of success was

zero” under the state‐law standard. Id. at 276. On habeas re‐

view, this court held that the state appellate court’s decision

“was not based on federal law at all. ... It rests on a conclu‐

sion that, as a matter of state law, it would have been futile to

contest the sentence’s length on appeal.” Id. at 277. And be‐

cause “[a] federal court cannot disagree with a state court’s

resolution of an issue of state law,” the Miller court affirmed

the denial of the defendant’s § 2254 petition. Id.

The same principle that governed Miller controls the pre‐

sent case. In People v. King, the appellate court held that King

could not demonstrate prejudice under Strickland because if

his trial or appellate counsel had litigated his “unsubstanti‐

ated allegations” under 725 ILCS 5/114‐5(d), the challenge

would have been unsuccessful under the Illinois substantive

standard, which required that “the judge assigned to his case

harbors actual prejudice” such that there was “animosity,

hostility, ill will, or distrust towards this [specific] defend‐

ant.” No. 03‐08‐0875 at 5 (citing People v. Patterson, 735

N.E.2d 616, 638 (Ill. 2000)). In other words, the appellate

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court’s decision “rests on a conclusion that, as a matter of

state law, it would have been futile” for King’s trial or appel‐

late counsel to raise such a claim. Miller, 820 F.3d at 277. And

similar to Miller, we cannot disturb the appellate court’s de‐

cision because a “federal court cannot disagree with a state

court’s resolution of an issue of state law” in the context of

habeas review. Id. At best, King can contend that the appel‐

late court misinterpreted or misapplied Illinois state law.

However, this contention is meritless because this court has

expressly held that a “claim that the state court misunder‐

stood the substantive requirements of state law does not

present a claim under § 2254. A federal court may not issue

the writ on the basis of a perceived error of state law.” Bates

v. McCaughtry, 934 F.2d 99, 102 (7th Cir. 1991) (internal quo‐

tation marks omitted).

King also contends that his trial and appellate counsel

were ineffective based on 725 ILCS 5/114‐5(a), which grants

the defendant the right to an automatic substitution of the

judge if the motion is filed within 10 days after the case is

filed. The appellate court never adjudicated this theory and

therefore did not interpret state law at all. As such, we re‐

view this point de novo. See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374,

390 (2005). King, however, still cannot prevail. Even if King’s

counsel performed deficiently in failing to pursue automatic

substitution under Section 5/114‐5(a), nothing in this record

shows that King was prejudiced by counsel’s inattention.

King can show prejudice only if he demonstrates that the

judge who heard his case was biased. In order to do that, he

must overcome “a presumption of honesty and integrity in

those serving as adjudicators.” Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35,

47 (1975). Nothing indicates that the trial court was biased

against King; to the contrary, the record shows that the

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No. 14‐3389 11

judge had no independent recollection of him one way or

the other. Furthermore, the evidence against King was

overwhelming. Hence, King can show no prejudice from

counselʹs failure to file a motion under Section 5/114‐5(a).1

Accordingly, King’s claim of ineffective assistance based

on a failure to seek substitution of the trial court under state

law is without merit.

B. Ineffective Assistance Based on Federal Due Process

Next, to the extent that King raises a claim of ineffective

assistance by his trial and appellate counsel for failing to

raise a challenge to the trial court based on federal due pro‐

cess grounds, it is procedurally barred.

“An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a

person in custody ... shall not be granted unless it appears

that ... the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in

the courts of the State.” § 2254(b)(1)(A). “Inherent in the ha‐

beas petitioner’s obligation to exhaust his state court reme‐

dies before seeking relief in habeas corpus, is the duty to

fairly present his federal claims to the state courts. Lewis v.

                                                 

1 Additionally, as part of his ineffective assistance claim, King references

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 63, which provides that a judge shall dis‐

qualify himself if his “impartiality might reasonably questioned.” (Ap‐

pellant Br. 23.) The appellate court also left this point unaddressed.

However, aside from mentioning the rule itself, King fails to develop any

argument that establishes it as a basis for ineffective assistance, and

therefore, we consider this point waived. Williams v. Dieball, 724 F.3d 957,

961 (7th Cir. 2013) (“even arguments that have been raised may still be

waived on appeal if they are underdeveloped, conclusory, or unsupport‐

ed by law”). And even if King had not waived this point, he cannot show

that his counsel’s failure to raise Rule 63 prejudiced him, similar to his

theory under Section 5/114‐5(a).

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12 No. 14‐3389

Sternes, 390 F.3d 1019, 1025 (7th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).

Fair presentment requires assertion of a federal claim

through “one complete round of state‐court review,” which

means that “the petitioner must raise the issue at each and

every level in the state court system, including levels at

which review is discretionary rather than mandatory.” Id. at

1025–26 (citing O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999).

“A habeas petitioner who has exhausted his state court rem‐

edies without properly asserting his federal claim at each

level of state court review has procedurally defaulted that

claim.” Id. at 1026 (citing Boerckel, 526 U.S. at 838–49).

Here, King did not “fairly present” a claim of ineffective

assistance based on federal due process in a complete round

of state court review. If “liberally construe[d],” it appears

that King raised this claim in his pro se post‐conviction peti‐

tion. Ward v. Jenkins, 613 F.3d 692, 700 (7th Cir. 2010). How‐

ever, King failed to assert this claim in his post‐conviction

appellate brief, filed with representation, and his pro se peti‐

tion for leave to appeal. Therefore, he did not assert this

claim in “one complete round of state‐court review,” Lewis,

390 F.3d at 1025, and it is procedurally defaulted.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s denial of

King’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus is AFFIRMED.

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