Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-04075/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-04075-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JEROD HARRIS,

Plaintiff,

v.

R.J. REYNOLDS VAPOR COMPANY,

Defendant.

Case No. 15-cv-04075-JD 

ORDER RE: DEFENDANT’S MOTION 

TO DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 44

In this putative consumer class action, plaintiff Jerod Harris seeks injunctive relief and 

damages for defendant R.J. Reynolds Vapor Company’s (“RJRV”) allegedly deceptive, unfair, 

and unlawful sales of VUSE electronic cigarettes in California. Dkt. Nos. 1 & 25. RJRV moved 

to dismiss on several grounds under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure “12(b),” without specifying 

the appropriate subsection. Dkt. No. 44. The Court construes the motion under Rule 12(b)(6) and 

dismisses the complaint with leave to amend to state claims that are not derivative of Proposition 

65.

BACKGROUND

Harris filed an initial complaint on September 8, 2015, alleging violations of the 

Consumers Legal Remedies Act, California Civil Code § 1750, et seq. (“CLRA”) and the 

deceptive and unfair prongs of California’s Unfair Competition Law, Business and Professions 

Code § 17200, et seq. (“UCL”). The claims were based on RJRV’s alleged failure to disclose or 

warn of the presence of carcinogenic chemicals in aerosols produced by VUSE electronic 

cigarettes, particularly formaldehyde and acetaldehyde. Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 18, 53-80. He alleged that 

RJRV misrepresented its products in the course of advertising and marketing in his UCL claim for 

deceptive practices. Id. ¶ 56. Harris requested damages and injunctive relief “requiring Defendant 

to place clear and reasonable warnings on the packaging of the Products that use of the Products 

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exposes the user to formaldehyde and acetaldehyde, chemicals known to the State of California to 

cause cancer.” Id. at 14-15.

On the same day that the complaint was filed, Harris sent out Proposition 65 notices in 

compliance with California Health & Safety Code section 25249.7(d) and California Code of 

Regulations, title 27, section 5903(b). Dkt. No. 25 ¶ 28. The parties later stipulated to the filing 

of an amended complaint and Harris filed an amended complaint on November 20, 2015, adding a 

new claim under the unlawful prong of the UCL for express violation of Proposition 65. Dkt. 

Nos. 15 and 25 ¶¶ 61-67. RJRV moves to dismiss the amended complaint on the grounds that: (1) 

Harris failed to comply with Proposition 65 notice requirements before filing his initial complaint; 

(2) the Court should defer to a pending FDA final rule on electronic cigarettes on the basis of 

primary jurisdiction; and (3) Harris lacks standing to pursue both injunctive relief and reliance 

claims. Dkt. No. 44 at 3, 6, 11. The first ground is dispositive and the Court does not consider the

other arguments at this time. 

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard

A complaint will survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss when it alleges “enough facts 

to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 

570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows 

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In evaluating a motion to dismiss, the Court must 

assume that the plaintiff’s factual allegations are true and must construe all reasonable inferences 

in his favor. Gompper v. VISX, Inc., 298 F.3d 893, 895 (9th Cir. 2002). But the Court will not 

“accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or 

unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(internal quotation omitted).

II. Proposition 65 Notice Requirements

A private plaintiff may sue under the warning section of Proposition 65 only after he has 

provided a 60-day notice of the alleged violation and a certificate of merit to the alleged violator, 

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the California Attorney General, and the district attorney, city attorney, or prosecutor in each 

jurisdiction where the alleged violation occurred. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 25249.7(d)(1). 

The notice requirements are intended to encourage the resolution of disputes without litigation and 

give the Attorney General an opportunity to discourage the filing of frivolous suits. Sciortino v. 

Pepsico, Inc., 108 F. Supp. 3d 780, 788-89 (N.D. Cal. 2015). To these ends, California courts 

strictly enforce the notice requirements and hold that defective notice cannot be cured 

retroactively. Id. at 790 (citing DiPirro v. Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc., 119 Cal. App. 4th 966, 975 

(2004); In re Vaccine Cases, 134 Cal. App. 4th 438, 457 (2005)). A plaintiff cannot sidestep these 

requirements by trying to use the UCL or CLRA to plead around a claim that would be barred 

under Proposition 65. Cel-Tech Commc’ns. v Los Angeles Cellular Tel. Co., 20 Cal. 4th 163, 182 

(1999). A defective Proposition 65 claim should be dismissed with prejudice. Sciortino, 108 F. 

Supp. 3d at 790. 

There is no dispute that Harris failed to comply with Proposition 65 notice requirements 

prior to filing his initial complaint. Dkt. No. 25 ¶ 28. The question before the Court is whether 

the claims asserted in Harris’s initial complaint “are entirely derivative of an unspoken Proposition 

65 violation, or whether they assert claims independent of Proposition 65.” Sciortino, 108 F. 

Supp. 3d at 792. Harris says that the complaint alleges nondisclosure and failure to warn of 

substances not regulated by Proposition 65, Dkt. No. 47-1 at 6-7, and that his initial complaint 

alleges a failure to disclose formaldehyde and acetaldehyde independent of a failure to warn under 

Proposition 65, Id. at 6-8.

These arguments are unconvincing. Harris makes no adequate allegation about any

substances other than formaldehyde or acetaldehyde. The single passing reference to “high 

concentrations of ultrafine particles,” Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 18, is far too cursory to state a plausible 

independent claim under the UCL and CLRA for fraudulent omissions or failure to disclose.

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

Harris also has not adequately alleged “material omission claims” for formaldehyde or 

acetaldehyde information “irrespective of Proposition 65.” Dkt. No. 47-1 at 5. A duty to disclose 

a Proposition 65 listed chemical may arise independent of Proposition 65 if a plaintiff identifies a 

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legal duty beyond the omission of the required health-warning label. See Sciortino, 108 F. Supp.

3d at 794 (finding an independent duty when plaintiff alleged specific misrepresentations of 4-MeI 

levels in public statements and a duty to disclose the presence of 4-MeI levels “irrespective of 

Proposition 65, including, e.g., in its advertising and public statements.”); Cortina v. Goya Foods, 

Inc., 94 F. Supp. 3d 1174, 1183-85, n.3 (S.D. Cal. 2015) (finding an independent cause of action 

when the plaintiff expressly disclaimed any Proposition 65 violation and briefly mentioned a 

Proposition 65 safe harbor level in the original UCL and CLRA claims.) But the original 

complaint makes clear that the legal duty to disclose was predicated solely on the failure to warn 

under Proposition 65. See Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 1-3, 9, 23, 26-28, 57, 64, 73. 

Harris seeks to fill in the gaps in his case by asking the Court to take judicial notice of two

documents that purportedly show independent misrepresentations by RJRV. Dkt. No. 34 (Exhibit 

1, “Frequently Asked Product Related Questions” on RJRV’s website; Exhibit 2, FDA 

Memorandum re: Summary of Write-in Campaigns to Submissions). A court generally looks only 

to the face of the complaint when ruling on a motion to dismiss, but may consider certain 

documents attached to the complaint, incorporated by reference, or matters of judicial notice 

without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. United States v. 

Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 907-08 (9th Cir. 2003). Courts may not take judicial notice of facts that are 

subject to reasonable dispute. Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 

(9th Cir. 2001). 

Harris did not attach or incorporate by reference either the Product FAQ or FDA 

memorandum to the initial complaint. The website Product FAQ is not a document whose

relevance and authenticity is uncontested. See Coto Settlement v. Eisenberg, 593 F.3d 1031, 1038

(9th Cir. 2010). RJRV argues that the FAQ document is missing key disclaimer language from 

the website and that Harris has also not alleged when, or if, he encountered the particular language 

on the website before filing the complaint. Dkt. No. 46 at 2-3. Judicial notice is denied. The 

FDA memorandum is arguably appropriate for judicial notice because it is an administrative 

agency summary of public information from a government website. Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2). But 

because it summarizes comments, rather than undisputed facts, the Court will not take notice

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beyond the fact that it exists, which does nothing helpful for Harris’s argument. Lee, 250 F.3d at 

689-90.

CONCLUSION

The amended complaint is dismissed with leave to amend. Harris may allege facts 

sufficient to state a claim independent of Proposition 65. The Court is advised that the FDA 

issued Final Rule on e-tobacco products effective as of August 8, 2016. FDA Tobacco Products

Final Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. 28,974 (May 10, 2016) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 1100, 1140, 1143). 

Harris should be cognizant of the rule as he considers an amended complaint. If Harris chooses to 

amend, the complaint is due by October 31, 2016. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 30, 2016

JAMES DONATO

United States District Judge

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