Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01447/USCOURTS-azd-2_11-cv-01447-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Employment Discrimination

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Stanna Lee Sperling, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Werner Enterprises, Inc., 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-11-01447-PHX-NVW

ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum of Points and

Authorities in Support (Doc. 5) and Plaintiff’s Motion to Cancel/Rescind Stipulation; Motion

to Not Dismiss Complaint; Motion for Leave to Amend; Motion for Doctrine of Equitable

Tolling; and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support (Doc. 6).

I. Background

Plaintiff, a sixty-seven year old woman, was employed by Defendant as a truck driver.

Over the course of her employment, she claims she was the subject of various instances of

employment discrimination due to her age and gender and was ultimately dismissed on these

grounds. Plaintiff claims that she was treated differently than male employees and that

various male trainers made sexually explicit comments to her. She states that although she

complained about these incidents, no action was ever taken. Specifically, Plaintiff claims

that she informed her supervisor on September 15, 2010 of the discrimination to which she

was being subjected, and that as a result of this complaint, Plaintiff was terminated.

After her termination, Plaintiff filed two claims with the Equal Employment

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Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”): one on October 18, 2010, charging Defendant with sex

discrimination, age discrimination, and retaliation; and one on April 4, 2011, charging

Defendant with an additional claim of retaliation. Her first EEOC complaint alleged that one

of Defendant’s employees made sexually harassing comments to Plaintiff, and that after she

reported the incident, Defendant “tested [Plaintiff’s] driving skills and then discharged me

in retaliation for reporting the sexual harassment.” (Doc. 5-1 at 3.) Her second EEOC

complaint again states that Defendant terminated Plaintiff in retaliation for “filing a

complaint of sexual harassment.” (Id. at 9.) Plaintiff further states that Defendant committed

another act of retaliation against Plaintiff by placing false information on her

accident/incident driving record. Plaintiff states that because of the allegedly false

information on her driving record, she has been unable to secure another position as a truck

driver. The EEOC sent Plaintiff a notice of right-to-sue letter regarding her first EEOC claim

on December 28, 2010 (Id. at 5), and another notice of right-to-sue letter regarding her

second EEOC claim on April 21, 2011 (Id. at 11). 

On July 21, 2001, Plaintiff filed this complaint against Defendant, alleging

“sex/gender discrimination,” sexual harassment, age discrimination, retaliation and/or

wrongful employment determination (Doc. 1). Plaintiff claims that as a result of her

termination and inability to secure employment, she has lost property in Scottsdale, Arizona,

Phoenix, Arizona, and California. As damages, Plaintiff seeks back pay for lost wages,

attorney fees, reinstatement, “compensation as related to loss of property,” and

“reimbursement, etc. & related expenses associated with emotional, pain-related costs.”

(Doc. 1 at 6.) On August 28, 2011, Defendant filed the currently pending motion seeking

dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (Doc. 5). Plaintiff then filed a

motion (1) seeking to cancel a previously entered stipulation; (2) responding to Defendant’s

motion to dismiss; (3) seeking leave to file an amended complaint; and (4) moving for

“doctrine of equitable tolling.” (Doc. 6.)

II. Legal Standard

A. Rule 8, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

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A claim must be stated clearly enough to provide each defendant fair opportunity to

frame a responsive pleading. McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 1996).

“Something labeled a complaint . . . , yet without simplicity, conciseness and clarity as to

whom plaintiffs are suing for what wrongs, fails to perform the essential functions of a

complaint.” Id. at 1180. A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Each allegation must

be simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). A complaint having the factual

elements of a cause of action present but scattered throughout the complaint and not

organized into a “short and plain statement of the claim” may be dismissed for failure to

satisfy Rule 8(a). Sparling v. Hoffman Constr. Co., 864 F.2d 635, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). 

B. Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

On a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), all allegations of material fact

are assumed to be true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.

Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2009). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) can

be based on “the lack of a cognizable legal theory” or “the absence of sufficient facts alleged

under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th

Cir. 1990). To avoid dismissal, a complaint need contain only “enough facts to state a claim

for relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007). The principle that a court accepts as true all of the allegations in a complaint does

not apply to legal conclusions or conclusory factual allegations. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.

1937, 1949 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. “A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility standard is not akin to

a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has

acted unlawfully.” Id. To show that the plaintiff is entitled to relief, the complaint must

permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct. Id.

III. Analysis

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A. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

Defendant claims Plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed because (1) her claims are

time-barred; and (2) to the extent her retaliation claim is not time-barred, Plaintiff fails to

state a plausible claim for relief.

1. Statute of Limitations

Defendant claims that all of Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed because they are

barred by the relevant statute of limitations. “The requirement for filing a Title VII civil

action within 90 days from the date EEOC dismisses a claim constitutes a statute of

limitations.” See Scholar v. Pacific Bell, 963 F.2d 264, 266-67 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing

Edwards v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 892 F.2d 1442, 1445 (9th Cir.1990)). The start of the

limitations period is measured “from the date on which a right-to-sue notice letter arrived at

the claimant’s address of record.” Payan v. Aramark Mgm’t Serv., 495 F.3d 1119, 1222 (9th

Cir. 2007). “Where the actual date of receipt [of the right-to-sue notice letter] is unknown

but receipt itself is not disputed,” the letter is presumed to have arrived within three days of

its issuance. Id. If a claimant does not file suit within the limitations period, her action is

accordingly barred. Scholar, 963 F.2d at 267.

Here, Plaintiff filed two EEOC claims, and received two right-to-sue notice letters

from the EEOC. Although the first right-to-sue letter is dated December 28, 2010, Plaintiff

claims that she did not receive that letter until April 4, 2011 because the EEOC did not send

the letter by certified mail (Doc. 6 at 4). Even assuming Plaintiff did not receive the letter

until more than three months after it is dated, Plaintiff’s claims raised in her first EEOC filing

are still barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiff did not bring her claim in this Court

until July 21, 2011, 108 days after she purportedly received the notice of right-to-sue letter

which clearly states that she has ninety days in which to file a federal suit. Therefore,

Plaintiff’s claims raised in her first EEOC complaint for age discrimination, sex

discrimination, and retaliation are barred.

Plaintiff’s second EEOC right-to-sue letter is dated April 21, 2011; Plaintiff filed her

complaint in this Court exactly ninety-one days after the issuance of the right-to-sue letter.

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However, it is not clear from Plaintiff’s pleadings if she actually received the letter on April

21, 2011. Considering the Payan rule that a letter is deemed received within three days of

its issuance where the exact date of receipt is unknown, it is plausible that Plaintiff filed her

lawsuit in this Court within the ninety-day allotment. Therefore, in this motion to dismiss

posture, there is no basis to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims raised in her second EEOC complaint

as time-barred.

2. Retaliation Claim

Defendant alternatively contends that if Plaintiff’s retaliation claim is not barred by

the statute of limitations, it should be dismissed for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ.

P. 12(b)(6). As evidence of retaliation, Plaintiff claims that Defendant placed an incident on

Plaintiff’s driving record report that may prevent Plaintiff from obtaining employment with

another company. Plaintiff does not deny that an incident occurred that required the truck

she was driving to be moved, but claims that Defendant only chose to report this incident

months after it occurred, when the standard practice is to report such an incident within thirty

days of its occurrence. Plaintiff further claims Defendant chose to place the incident on her

record in retaliation for “filing the complaint of sexual harassment and the charge of

discrimination.” (Doc. 5-1 at 9.) Defendant argues that the retaliation claim fails because

(1) if the claim of retaliation is in reference to the filing of Plaintiff’s EEOC complaint,

Defendant placed the incident on Plaintiff’s report on October 13, 2010, five days before

Plaintiff filed her complaint with the EEOC; and (2) if the claim of retaliation is in reference

to the report of sexual harassment made to Plaintiff’s supervisor on September 15, 2010, the

claim still fails because there is no evidence to indicate Defendant did anything other than

follow standard protocol in lawfully reporting a valid incident.

Assuming Plaintiff is claiming retaliation in response to the September 15, 2010

report, and not to the EEOC filing – since retaliation in such instance would be impossible,

considering the incident was placed on Plaintiff’s report before the EEOC complaint was

filed – Plaintiff has not stated a plausible claim for relief on these pleadings. Although

Plaintiff claims that there would have been no reason for Defendant to report an incident

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months after the fact unless it was for retaliatory purposes, she provides no basis to support

that claim. Nor does she dispute that the incident reported did in fact occur, or that it fell

within the category of events which Defendant could properly report on Plaintiff’s driving

record. Further, while Plaintiff speculates that the standard practice in reporting such an

incident would have been to report the incident within thirty days (Doc. 6 at 7), she also

indicates that she was informed that Defendant could place or remove information on a

driver’s report at any time (id. at 8). Without more specifics of a retaliatory motive behind

the incident reporting, Plaintiff has not provided enough factual allegations to raise her right

to relief beyond the merely speculative level. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Plaintiff’s

retaliation claim will therefore be dismissed for failing to state a plausible claim for relief.

B. Plaintiff’s Motion

In addition to responding to Defendant’s motion to dismiss, in her September 9, 2011

filing Plaintiff also requested that the Court (1) cancel or rescind an earlier stipulation by the

parties, (2) apply the doctrine of equitable tolling to allow her claims to go forward; and (3)

allow her leave to amend her complaint.

1. Motion to Cancel/Rescind Stipulation

Plaintiff requests that the Court cancel a stipulation that she entered into with

Defendant wherein the parties agreed to extend Defendant’s time to file and serve a

responsive pleading to Plaintiff’s complaint (Doc. 3). Plaintiff claims that Defendant

represented that it would work with Plaintiff to pursue a settlement agreement and that

Defendant’s attorney would fax Plaintiff a signed copy of the stipulation if Plaintiff

consented to the stipulation. After the stipulation was granted, Plaintiff claims Defendant

did not follow up with settlement discussions and did not fax her a copy of the stipulation

submitted to the Court as promised. Regardless of whether there were in fact false

representations made in order to secure Plaintiff’s consent to the stipulation, Defendant has

now filed a responsive pleading. The litigation has moved beyond the stage where a

stipulation allowing Defendant additional time in which to respond to Plaintiff’s complaint

is relevant; rescinding the stipulation would have no consequence. Indeed, Defendant could

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have simply filed a motion asking for an extension of time, which the Court would have

granted if it was supported by good cause; therefore, whether Plaintiff stipulated to an

extension of time to answer or not, the litigation would likely have, and has in fact, advanced.

Because this request is effectively meaningless to the proceeding, the Court will deny it.

2. Motion for Doctrine of Equitable Tolling

Plaintiff also requests that the Court apply the doctrine of equitable tolling to allow

her to maintain her time-barred claims. While “[a] statute of limitations is subject to the

doctrine of equitable tolling...it has been applied sparingly[.]” Scholar, 963 F.2d at 267. The

doctrine of equitable tolling may apply where “the statute of limitations was not complied

with because of defective pleadings, when a claimant was tricked by an adversary into letting

a deadline expire, and when the EEOC’s notice of the statutory period was clearly

inadequate.” Id. at 268. However, “[c]ourts have been generally unforgiving...when a late

filing is due to claimant’s failure to ‘exercise due diligence in preserving [her] legal rights.’”

Id. (citing Irwin v. Veterans Admin., 498 U.S. 89, 94 (1990)).

In this case, Plaintiff has offered no justifiable reason for why she allowed the statute

of limitations on her claims to run. While she notes that she did not receive the right-to-sue

letter on her first EEOC complaint until April 4, 2011, Plaintiff still waited more than ninety

days to file her claim with this Court. Plaintiff has not provided the Court with any reason

explaining or justifying that delay. Accordingly, because it appears Plaintiff simply failed

to “exercise due diligence” by timely filing her complaint, the Court will not apply the

doctrine of equitable tolling.

3. Motion for Leave to Amend

Finally, Plaintiff asks that she be given leave to file an amended complaint. Although

leave to amend should be freely given “when justice so requires[,]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2),

Plaintiff will not be given leave to amend her complaint as to the claims raised in her first

EEOC complaint because those claims are clearly barred by the statute of limitations. Any

leave to amend these claims would therefore be futile. See Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815,

845 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Futility of amendment can, by itself, justify the denial of a motion for

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leave to amend.”).

Plaintiff will, however, be given an opportunity to amend her complaint regarding the

retaliation claim raised in her second EEOC letter. Plaintiff shall make clear her allegations

in short, plain statements that provide enough detail to state a plausible claim for relief. Any

amended complaint must conform to the requirements of Rule 8 and Rule 12(b)(6) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff is warned that if she elects to file an amended

complaint and fails to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the action may be

dismissed. See Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 41(b); McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1177 (affirming dismissal

with prejudice of prolix, argumentative, and redundant amended complaint that did not

comply with Rule 8(a)); Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673-74 (9th Cir.

1981) (affirming dismissal of amended complaint that was “equally as verbose, confusing,

and conclusory as the initial complaint”); Corcoran v. Yorty, 347 F.2d 222, 223 (9th Cir.

1965) (affirming dismissal without leave to amend of second complaint that was “so verbose,

confused and redundant that its true substance, if any, [was] well disguised”).

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 5) is

granted.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Cancel/Rescind Stipulation;

Motion to Not Dismiss Complaint; Motion for Leave to Amend; Motion for Doctrine of

Equitable Tolling; and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support (Doc. 6) is denied

as to the Motion to Cancel/Rescind Stipulation; Motion to Not Dismiss Complaint; and

Motion for Doctrine of Equitable Tolling and granted as to the Motion for Leave to Amend.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff may file an amended complaint by October

21, 2011. The Clerk is directed to terminate this case without further order if Plaintiff does

not file an amended complaint by October 21, 2011.

DATED this 7th day of October, 2011.

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