Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01723/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01723-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1981 Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIENE D. DAVIS, et al.,

Plaintiffs, No. CIV S-05-1723 MCE GGH PS

vs.

THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al., 

Defendants. ORDER & FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Plaintiffs, proceeding in this action pro se, filed an ex parte request for a

temporary restraining order on August 25, 2005, to enjoin defendants from refusing to “file the

default application and judgment against Rob Feckner” and requesting that “defendants be

restrained from violating plaintiffs’ civil rights.” Plaintiffs have named as defendants the State

of California and the “Superior Court of California, County of Sacramento Clerk’s Office.” 

Plaintiffs did not provide defendants with notice as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). The matter

was referred to the undersigned by order of district judge Lawrence K. Karlton, as the assigned

district judge, Morrison C. England, Jr., was unavailable. 

Plaintiffs filed a complaint with their ex parte request. Based on the complaint, it

appears plaintiffs filed suit in the Superior Court of California, County of Sacramento against

Rob Feckner (“Feckner”) on October 22, 2002. Plaintiffs allege that Feckner failed to appear or

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answer the complaint in a timely manner, and that they therefore filed an application for notice of

default against Feckner. Plaintiffs allege that the clerk of courts refused to enter default as

required by statute. Plaintiffs allege they were escorted from the clerk’s office by several

sheriffs’ deputies after they confronted the clerk about the refusal to enter default. Plaintiffs

allege they tried two more times to file for default against Feckner, and both times were refused. 

Plaintiffs allege that their treatment by the court and its personnel was discriminatory based on

their race; plaintiffs are African-American. In essence, plaintiffs’ request for a temporary

restraining order is a request for the district court to compel the superior court to enter default

judgment against Feckner. 

A federal district court does not have jurisdiction to review legal errors in state

court decisions. Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476, 103 S. Ct.

1303, 1311-12 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415, 44 S. Ct. 149, 150

(1923). “The district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction either to conduct a direct review of

state court judgment or to scrutinize the state court’s application of various rules and procedures

pertaining to the state case.” Samuel v. Michaud, 980 F. Supp. 1381, 1411-12 (D. Idaho 1996); 

see also, Branson v. Nott, 62 F.3d 287, 291-92 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding no subject matter

jurisdiction over § 1983 claim seeking inter alia, implicit reversal of state trial court action);

MacKay v. Pfeil, 827 F.2d 540, 544-45 (9th Cir. 1987) (attack on state court judgment because of

substantive defense improper under Rooker-Feldman). That the federal district court action

alleges the state court’s action was unconstitutional does not change the rule. See Feldman, 460

U.S. at 486, 103 S. Ct. at 1316-17. The Ninth Circuit clarified the doctrine in Noel v. Hall, 341

F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2003). A federal plaintiff who asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly

erroneous decision is barred by Rooker-Feldman because the federal court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction. Id. at 1164. 

The relief plaintiffs request in their ex parte request for a temporary restraining

order is nothing more than a request for this court to order the Superior Court to enter a default

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 Plaintiffs allege causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and 42

U.S.C. § 1985(2). 

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judgment. This court has no jurisdiction to grant such relief, and must accordingly recommend

that plaintiffs’ request for a temporary restraining order by denied.

As to the complaint, plaintiffs allege that defendants violated their civil rights by

refusing to enter default judgment in their case and escorting them from the clerk of court’s

office.1

“The Eleventh Amendment bars suits against the State or its agencies for all types

of relief, absent unequivocal consent by the state.” Romano v. Bible, 169 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th

Cir.1999) (citing Pennhurst v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100, 104 S. Ct. 900 (1984)); see also

Durning v. Citibank, N.A., 950 F.2d 1419, 1422-23 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating the Eleventh

Amendment bars virtually all suits seeking relief against a state, an “arm of the state,” or its

agencies). Section 1983 does not abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit. 

See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 344-45, 99 S. Ct. 1139, 1147 (1979). Accordingly, as a

general rule, states (or arms of the state) cannot be sued in federal court for violating § 1983. A

California Superior Court and its employees are an arm of the state. Simmons v. Sacramento

County Superior Court, 318 F.3d 1156. 1161 (9th Cir. 2003). The Eleventh Amendment

likewise, in general, bars suits for damages against state officials in their official capacities,

because such a suit is in effect one against the state. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 105 S.

Ct. 3099 (1985). 

Eleventh Amendment immunity also is consistent with the general rule that states

or governmental entities that are considered ‘arms of the State’ for Eleventh Amendment

purposes are not ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Doe v. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 131

F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 109 S.

Ct. 2304, 2311 (1989)). 

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Notwithstanding Eleventh Amendment immunity, state officials nevertheless may

be sued for federal violations in their individual capacities for both damages and injunctive relief. 

See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 31, 112 S. Ct. 358, 365 (1991); Graham, 473 U.S. at 165-67,

105 S. Ct. at 3105-06; see also Ellis v. University of Kansas Medical Center, 163 F.3d 1186,

1196 (10th Cir.1998) (“[A] suit for prospective injunctive relief against a state official acting in

her official or individual capacity may still be brought in federal court . . .”); but see Idaho v.

Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 269, 117 S. Ct. 2028, 2034 (1997) ( to “interpret Young to

permit a federal court action to proceed in every case where prospective declaratory and

injunctive relief is sought against an officer, named in his individual capacity, would be to adhere

to an empty formalism and to undermine the principle . . . that Eleventh Amendment immunity

represents a real limitation on a federal court’s federal-question jurisdiction.”). Moreover, in a

case based on an ongoing violation of federal constitutional or statutory rights, a plaintiff may

obtain prospective injunctive relief by naming a state official in his or her official capacity. Ex

parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-56, 28 S. Ct. 441, 452 (1908); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,

665, 94 S. Ct. 1347, 1357 (1974). 

The defendants named in the complaint are the State of California and The

Superior Court of California, Sacramento County, Clerk’s Office. These defendants are immune

from suit, as explained above. Plaintiffs have not alleged any claims against the defendants that

comport with any Eleventh Amendment immunity exceptions. Accordingly, plaintiffs’

complaint must be dismissed. 

Accordingly, IT IS RECOMMENDED that plaintiffs’ request for a temporary

restraining order, filed August 25, 2005, be DENIED; and, 

IT IS ORDERED that plaintiffs’ complaint be dismissed, with leave to file an

amended complaint within thirty days from the date of service of this order. Failure to file an

amended complaint will result in a recommendation that the action be dismissed.

\\\\\

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These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within ten

(10) days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten (10) days after service of the objections. The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the

District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: 9/8/05 

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

____________________________________

 GREGORY G. HOLLOWS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

GGH:mb

Davis1723.fr

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