Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01848/USCOURTS-casd-3_12-cv-01848-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CORVETTE ROBINSON,

Petitioner,

v.

DANIEL PARAMO, Warden

Respondent.

 

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Civil No. 12-1848-MMA(WVG)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT 

OF HABEAS CORPUS

Corvette Robinson (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner proceeding

pro se, has filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent Daniel Paramo

(“Respondent”) has filed an Answer to the Petition. Petitioner has

filed a Reply to Respondent’s Answer. The Court, having reviewed

Petitioner’s Petition, Respondent’s Answer, Petitioner’s Traverse,

and all documents lodged therewith and attached thereto, finds that

Petitioner is not entitled to the relief requested. Therefore, the

Court RECOMMENDS that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be

DENIED.

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 I

 BACKGROUND

On September 1, 2010, Petitioner was incarcerated at Richard

J. Donovan Correctional Facility. On that date, at approximately

5:30 p.m., R. Bedolla (“Bedolla”), a housing floor unit officer at

the correctional facility, conducted a random cell search of cell

number 117, where Petitioner was housed.1/ [Respondent’s Answer to

the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) at 2; see also

Rules Violation Report (“RVR”) at 2.]2/ During the search, Bedolla

found numerous medications in Petitioner’s cell. (Answer at 2; see

also RVR at 2.) Bedolla notified Sergeant R. Flores (“Flores”) who

instructed Bedolla to have the medications inspected by Licensed

Vocational Nurse Sinclair (“Sinclair”).3/ Sinclair confirmed that

some of the medications found in Petitioner’s cell were controlled

substances and nurse-administered medications. (Answer at 2; see

also RVR at 2.) Pharmacist T. Nguyen (“Nguyen”) identified fourteen

of the pills as Lyrica, which is a controlled substance included in

Schedule V of California Health & Safety Code § 11058.4/ (Answer at

1/

 Since the Petition does not give a detailed account of the relevant facts

of the case, the Court will provide most of the background using documents filed

by Respondent. 

2/

 All page references to documents contained in the Court’s docket are to

the Court Clerk’s renumbered pages, not the document’s native, pre-filing,

pagination.

3/

 Neither the documents filed by Petitioner nor Respondent list Sinclair’s

first initial.

4/

 California Code of Regulations, Title 15, § 3290(h) states: 

The identification of unauthorized medication, to include any

medication considered to be a controlled substance as

described in section 3000, must be confirmed by a licensed

pharmacist and that confirmation may be used as evidence in a

disciplinary proceeding. There shall be no requirement for

laboratory testing of intact medications when identification

of the controlled medication has been confirmed by a

pharmacist. The pharmacist will indicate whether the

medication contains any of the substances listed (continued) 

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2; see also RVR at 2.) Flores photographed the medications at 7:40

p.m., and secured them in central control evidence locker number

seven.5/ (RVR at 2.) 

The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation

(“CDCR”) issued Petitioner a disciplinary RVR report for possession

of a controlled substance (medications) for the purpose of

distribution, in violation of California Code of Regulations, Title

15, § 3016(c) (“Section 3016").6/ [Answer at 2; see also RVR at 2

(“[Inmate] ROBINSON is aware of this report.”)]. Petitioner “pled

guilty to unauthorized meds. Not distribution.” (Answer at 2; see

also RVR at 3.) Petitioner also said, “I take my pills but

sometime[s] [the nurse] does not check [whether or not I take the

pills at the window] so I take them back to my cell so I can take

them when I want to.” (Answer at 2; see also RVR at 3.)

On September 5, 2010, Correctional Officer C. Wright

(“Wright”), informed Petitioner that he was assigned to assist him

(continued)

in Health and Safety Code (H&SC) section 11007 to

enable the determination of the appropriate

classification level pursuant to section 3323

relative to a disciplinary violation for

unauthorized possession or distribution of the

medication. 

California Code of Regulations, Title 15, § 11007 states that a

“‘controlled substance,’ unless otherwise specified, means a drug,

substance or immediate precursor which is listed in any schedule in

Section... 11058.” Pregablin is a Schedule V non-narcotic controlled

substance pursuant to section 11058. 

5/

 Petitioner asserts that Flores did not take a picture of the medication.

[See Petition at 17 (“The Officer didn’t even take pictures of the medication.”)].

6/

 Section 3016 states, “Inmates shall not distribute, as defined in section

3000, any controlled substance or controlled medication.” Although Respondent

does not cite to California Code of Regulations, Title 15, § 3016(a), the Court

finds this to be the section Petitioner was found guilty of violating. See Cal.

Code Regs., title 15, § 3016(a) (“Inmates shall not inhale, ingest, inject, or

otherwise introduce into their body; use possess manufacture, or have under their

control any controlled substance, medication or alcohol, except as specifically

authorized by the institution’s/facility’s health care staff.”).

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in the case. [RVR at 5 (“I explained to... ROBINSON my function was

to gather information, question staff and inmates; screen witness(es), and complete a written report for the Senior Hearing

Officer (SHO)... ROBINSON stated he understood my position and made

no objections to my assignment as the Investigative Employee...”). 

Petitioner told Wright, “This is all my medication prescribed to me,

my name is on it all, the Lyrica is given to me at the window and

the nurse watch[es] me take it with me. It’s all my prescribed

medication...” (RVR at 5.)

On September 30, 2010, at approximately 9:30 a.m., Petitioner

appeared before Senior Hearing Officer (“SHO”) M. F. Steele for

adjudication of the charge (possession of a controlled substance

(medication) for purposes of distribution) against him. (Answer at

2.) The SHO found Robinson guilty of unauthorized possession of

controlled substance (a lesser included offense) and assessed 130

days of lost behavioral credit as Petitioner’s penalty pursuant to

a Division B offense. (Id.) In the RVR, the SHO listed the

evidence indicating Petitioner’s guilt: (1) Petitioner’s plea

statement; (2) witness statement expressing that the medication

belonged to Petitioner; (3) Bedolla’s written report; and (4)

Nguyen’s assertion that Lyrica is a controlled substance. (RVR at

3.)

Petitioner appealed the SHO’s decision to the Second Level of

Review at the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation in hopes

of having his good time credit restored. (See generally Petition at

17.) Chief Deputy Warden, W. Suglich (“Suglich”) denied Petitioner’s appeal because Petitioner’s due process rights were not

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violated and because Lyrica is a controlled substance. (Petition at

18.)

Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the

California Court of Appeal (See Petition at 20.) On March 21, 2012,

the Court of Appeal concluded that there was enough evidence in the

record to deny the Petition. (Id. at 20-21.) 

Petitioner filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus in

the California Supreme Court. On June 20, 2012, the Petition was

denied. (Petition at 23, Respondent’s Lodgment No. 6).

On July 26, 2012, Petitioner filed the Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus that is now before the Court. On November 20, 2012,

Respondent filed an Answer to the Petition. On January 29, 2013,

Petitioner filed a Reply to Respondent’s Opposition.

 II 

 SCOPE OF REVIEW

This Petition is governed by Title 28, United States Code,

§ 2254, as amended by the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). Section 2254(a) sets forth the following

scope of review for federal habeas corpus claims: 

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit

judge, or a district court shall entertain an

application for a writ of habeas corpus in

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court only on the ground

that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treatises of the United

States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

As amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) reads:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus

on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State court shall not be granted

with respect to any claim that was adjudicated

on the merits in State court proceedings unless

the adjudication of the claim12cv1848 5

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(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to,

or involved and unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined

by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of facts in light of

the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2245(d)(1)(2) (emphasis

added).

“AEDPA establishes a ‘highly deferential standard for

evaluating state-court rulings, which demands that state-court

decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.’” Womack v. Del Papa,

497 F.3d 998, 1001 (9th Cir. 2007) [quoting Woodford v. Viscotti,

537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002)]. To obtain federal habeas relief, Petitioner must satisfy either section 2254(d)(1) or section 2254(d)(2). 

See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 403 (2000). The Supreme Court

has ruled that the “contrary to” clause of § 2254(d)(1) permits a

grant of habeas relief “if the state court arrives at a conclusion

opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if

the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a

set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Id. at 412-13. The

Supreme Court has also interpreted the “unreasonable application”

clause of § 2254(d)(1) to allow a grant of “the writ if the state

court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this

Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the

facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. The Supreme Court has

clarified that under § 2254(d)(2), even an erroneous or incorrect

application of clearly established federal law does not support a

habeas grant, unless the state court’s application was “objectively

unreasonable.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). 

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When there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest

court, the Court “looks through” to the underlying appellate court

decision. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 805-06 (1991). If

the dispositive state court order does not “furnish a basis for its

reasoning,” federal habeas courts must conduct an independent review

of the record to determine whether the state court’s decision is

contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Supreme Court law. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 981-82 (9th

Cir. 2000) (overruled on other grounds by Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75-

76.) A state court need not cite Supreme Court precedent when

resolving a habeas corpus claim. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8

(2002). Absent citations to Supreme Court precedent, habeas relief

is not merited if the state court decision neither contradicts the

reasoning nor the result of Supreme Court rulings. Id. 

When a state court reaches the merits of a claim, but does

not articulate the rationale for its determination, such as by

issuing a silent denial, the court must conduct an independent

review of the record to determine whether the state court clearly

erred in its application of controlling federal law.7/ Pirtle v.

Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that when the state

court reaches the merits of a claim, but provides no reasoning to

support its conclusion, “we independently review the record, [but]

we still defer to the state court’s ultimate decision”); see also

Green v. Lambert, 288 F. 3d 1088, 1089 (9th Cir. 2002) (“While we

are not required to defer to a state court’s decision when that

7/

 The Court of Appeal only addressed Petitioner’s claim that there was not

enough evidence in the record to support his guilt. The California Supreme Court

issued a silent denial. Since Petitioner also contends his due process rights

were violated and the penalty imposed on him was too severe, this Court will

examine these contentions, as well. However, ultimately, the Court defers to the

state courts’ decisions.

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court gives us nothing to defer to, we must still focus primarily on

Supreme Court cases in deciding whether the state court’s resolution

of the case constituted an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law.”) (quoting Fisher v. Roe, 263 F.3d 906 914

(9th Cir. 2001). The silent denials of the state appellate and

supreme courts are considered to be decisions “on the merits of the

claims.” Hunter v. Aispuro, 982 F.2d 344, 347-48 (9th Cir. 1992);

see also Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 965-67 (9th Cir. 2004)

(discussing the meaning of “adjudicating on the merits”); Harrington

v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011) (holding that an unexplained

denial of a claim by the California Supreme Court is an adjudication

on the merits of the claim entitled to AEDPA deference unless “there

is a reason to think some other explanation for the state court’s

decision is likely”). But see Evans v. Chavis, 126 S. Ct. 846, 852

(2006) (holding that Aispuro presumption that silent denial was “on

the merits” does not excuse district court from determining whether

state habeas petition was also untimely for statute of limitations

purposes). 

It is only when a state court could not reach the merits of

a claim (i.e., because a procedural bar prevented it) that “AEDPA’s

standard of review does not apply.” Killian v. Poole, 282 F.3d

1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2002). In such a case, the federal court

reviews de novo. Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167; see also Hayes v. Brown,

399 F.3d 972, 978 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (noting that pre-AEDPA

habeas review provides that “state court judgments of conviction and

sentence carry a presumption of finality and legality and may be set

aside only when a state prisoner carries his burden of proving that

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[his] detention violates the fundamental liberties of the person

safeguarded against state action by the Federal Constitution.”).

In addition, once a petitioner has satisfied the provisions

of AEDPA, the court must determine, applying a de novo standard,

whether there has been a constitutional violation. Frantz v. Hazey,

533 F.3d 724 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc); see also Fry v. Pliler, 551

U.S. 112, 120 (2007) (holding that harmless error analysis is still

required after a showing that the state court opinion was contrary

to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established

federal law, because 28 U.S.C § 2254(d) “sets forth a precondition

to the grant of habeas relief... not an entitlement to it.”).

 III 

 DISCUSSION

Petitioner claims that habeas relief is proper based on the

following grounds: (1) he was deprived of his Fourteenth Amendment

due process rights; (2) there was insufficient evidence to find him

guilty of unauthorized possession of a controlled substance; and (3)

his punishment was too severe. 

A. PETITIONER WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF HIS FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

DUE PROCESS RIGHTS

“A due process claim is cognizable only if there is a

recognized liberty or property interest at stake.” Schroeder v.

McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 462 (9th Cir. 1995) [citing Board of Regents

v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972)]. “[T]he Due Process Clause

itself does not create a liberty interest in credit for good

behavior.” Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 477 (1995). However, a

state statute that rewards prisoners for good behavior, by reducing

the length of their prison term, does create a liberty interest. 

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Id. at 447-78. California has such a statute. California Penal

Code § 4019(b) states:

Subject to the provisions of subdivision (d), for each

four-day period in which a prisoner is confined in or

committed to a facility as specified in this section, one

day shall be deducted from his or her period of confinement unless it appears by the record that the prisoner

has refused to satisfactorily perform labor... 

Prisoners are afforded due process safeguards in prison

disciplinary proceedings, but not necessarily the same safeguards

that apply to “free citizens in an open society.” Wolff v.

McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556, 560 (1974) (“Prison disciplinary

proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full

panoply of rights [to] a defendant in such proceedings does not

apply.”). Procedural due process safeguards in disciplinary

proceedings require that: (1) “written notice of the charges... be

given to the disciplinary-action defendant in order to inform him of

the charges and to enable him to marshal the facts and prepare a

defense”; (2) “a written statement by the factfinders as to the

evidence relied on and reasons for the disciplinary action [is

provided]”; and (3) a defendant has the right “to call witnesses and

present documentary evidence in his defense when permitting him to

do so will not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or

correctional goals.” Id. at 565-566 (citations omitted) (internal

quotations omitted).

Here, Petitioner does not explain how his due process rights

were violated. Rather, he simply states that they were. The Court

disagrees. 

The first prong of procedural due process in a disciplinary

proceeding was met because Petitioner received written notice of the

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charges being brought against him. [RVR at 2 (“Subject acknowledges

he received a copy of the [California Department of Corrections]

115/115A on 9/5/10.”)]. Additionally, the Court agrees with

Respondent that although Petitioner was eventually found guilty of

a lesser included serious rules violation, he was still given

written notice of the more serious charge that was brought against

him. [Answer at 3; see also Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3315(f)(3)

(“Upon completion of the fact-finding portion of the disciplinary

hearing, the inmate may be found: Guilty as charged or guilty of an

included serious rule violation and assessed a credit forfeiture

pursuant to section 3323.”). Here, unauthorized possession of a

controlled substance is the lesser included serious rules violation,

and Petitioner was notified of the charge for the more serious

offense (intent to distribute). See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, §

3315(a)(2)(D) (indicating that unauthorized possession of a

controlled substance is classified as a serious offense).

The second prong of procedural due process was met because

the SHO provided a statement of the evidence that he relied upon.

The statement of evidence was provided to Petitioner in writing. The

evidence consisted of: (1) Petitioner’s guilty plea;8/ (2) inmate

Boone’s9/ (“Boone”) witness statements; (3) Bedolla’s written report;

8/

 Of course, the Court considers Petitioner’s guilty plea as strong

evidence to deny his Petition. Petitioner pled guilty with an explanation. [RVR

at 3 (“I pled guilty to unauthorized [m]eds. Not distribution.”)]. Petitioner

made his admission during his disciplinary hearing for possession of controlled

substances for purposes of distribution. See RVR at 2-3. Petitioner does not

dispute making a guilty plea in any of the documents that he filed with the Court. 

The Court sees no reason not to take his admission, which is highly probative of

his guilt, at face value. 

9/

 Neither party filed any documents indicating Boone’s first name or

initial. Petitioner requested Boone be a witness at the disciplinary hearing, but

that request was denied because Boone had already given statements and answered

Petitioner’s questions. Boone’s statements confirmed that the Lyrica was

Petitioner’s medication, that the medication was issued by a nurse, and that

Petitioner takes his medication. (RVR at 6.) 

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and (4) Nguyen’s determination that Lyrica contained Pregablin,

which is a Schedule V controlled substance. Petitioner was disciplined for unauthorized possession of a controlled substance. (RVR

at 4.) 

The third prong of procedural due process was met because

Petitioner was permitted to obtain and present the witness statement

of Boone, even though Boone was not allowed to testify at the

hearing. (RVR at 3, 6.) Prison officials have discretion to

restrict witness testimony in order keep disciplinary hearings

within a reasonable time limit, if the witness’s statement would be

repetitive or superfluous. Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S. 491, 499 (1985)

(“[P]rison officials must have the necessary discretion to keep the

hearing within reasonable limits and refuse to call a witness that

may create a risk of reprisal or undermine authority, as well as to

limit access to other inmates to collect statements or compile other

documentary evidence.” (citation omitted) (internal quotations

omitted); Bostic v. Carlson, 884 F.2d 1267, 1273 (9th Cir. 1989)

(“[P]rison disciplinary committees may sometimes deny a defendant

the right to call redundant and unnecessary witnesses.”) (citation

omitted). But an automatic denial of a prisoner’s right to call

particular types of witnesses is not permitted. Bartholomew v.

Watson, 665 F.2d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 1982) (“A blanket proscription

against the calling of certain types of witnesses in all cases

involving institutional security is an overreaction which violates

minimal due process.”) Lastly, prison officials must justify a

decision that disallows a witness to testify. Ponte, 471 U.S. at

499. 

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Here, Boone simply confirmed that the Lyrica found in

Petitioner’s cell was Petitioner’s medication, that the medication

was issued by a nurse, and that Petitioner takes his medication. 

(RVR at 6.) Moreover, Petitioner fails to indicate how Boone would

have made substantiated or helpful statements in Petitioner’s favor

at Petitioner’s hearing, or why Boone was a necessary witness. 

Boone’s statements did not help Petitioner’s case; they simply

reiterated Petitioner’s unsuccessful arguments. Therefore, the SHO

was within his discretion to deny Petitioner’s request to have Boone

as a witness at the disciplinary hearing because Boone’s testimony

simply would have been redundant. [See RVR at 3 (“Statement of

witness, stipulation or reason for denial: Boone gave statements and

answered ROBINSON’s in the [internal investigation] report.”)]. As

a result, the Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s claim in this

regard be DENIED.

B. THERE WAS “SOME EVIDENCE” OF PETITIONER’S GUILT

In Superintendent v. Hill, the Supreme Court held that “the

requirements of due process are satisfied if some evidence supports

the decision by the prison disciplinary board to revoke good time

credits.” 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985). “This standard is met if ‘there

was some evidence from which the conclusion of the administrative

tribunal could be deduced...’” Id. [quoting United States ex rel

Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, 273 U.S. 103, 106 (1927)]. 

To determine whether the “some evidence standard” was met in the

administrative proceeding, a reviewing court just looks at whether

there is some evidence in the record to support the disciplinary

board’s findings. Hill, supra at 455-56 (“Ascertaining whether this

standard is satisfied does not require examination of the entire

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record, independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses, or

weighing of the evidence.”). The Supreme Court expressly declined

to adopt a more rigid standard because “[p]rison disciplinary

proceedings take place in a highly charged atmosphere.” Id. at 456. 

Here, Petitioner claims that there was not enough evidence to

find him guilty of unauthorized possession of a controlled substance. The Court of Appeal found that there was “some evidence to

support the disciplinary finding.” (Respondent’s Lodgment 4 at 3.)

This Court agrees with the Court of Appeal. 

The SHO concluded that there was not enough evidence to find

Petitioner guilty of possession of a controlled substance with

intent to distribute. (RVR at 4.) But, the SHO found that there

was enough evidence to find Petitioner guilty of unauthorized

possession of a controlled substance based on the following

evidence: Petitioner pled guilty to possession of unauthorized

medication, Bedolla found the medication in Petitioner’s cell, and

Nguyen confirmed that the Lyrica found in Petitioner’s cell

contained Pregablin, which is a controlled substance. Taken

together, this is “some evidence” of Petitioner’s guilt. See Hill,

472 U.S. at 457; Sass v. California Board of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d

1123, 1129 (9th Cir. 2006) [overruled on other grounds by Hayward v.

Marshall, 603 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2006)]. The Court of Appeal’s

denial of Petitioner’s claim was neither contrary to, nor an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. As a

result, the Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s claim in this regard

be DENIED.

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C. DEPRIVING PETITIONER OF 130 DAYS OF GOOD TIME CREDIT WAS

NOT EXCESSIVE

Petitioner asserts that his penalty of 130 days forfeiture of

good time credits was excessive. [Petition at 6 (“Petitioner’s

lesser charge [possession of a controlled substance] is a Div. F

offense which [sic] only 30 days credit loss [sic].”)].10/ In

essence, Petitioner argues that the 130-day penalty assessed to him

was 100 days too many. The Court disagrees.

California Code of Regulations, Title 15, § 3323(d)(6)(A)

states that first time offenders found guilty of unauthorized

possession of a controlled substance are penalized with a credit

forfeiture of 121 to 130 days. Petitioner was deprived of 130 days

of good time credit, which is at the high end, but still within this

range. The deprivation of good time credits was not excessive. As a

result, the Court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s claim in this regard

be DENIED.

IV 

 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The Court, having reviewed Petitioner’s Petition for a Writ

of Habeas Corpus, Respondent’s Answer, Petitioner’s Reply, and all

documents lodged therewith and attached thereto, finds that

Petitioner’s due process rights were not violated. Further, the

Court finds there was some evidence in the record to support a

finding that Petitioner possessed a controlled substance without

authorization, and his punishment was not excessive. Therefore, the

10/

 Unauthorized possession of a controlled substance is a Division B

offense. Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3323(d)(6).

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court RECOMMENDS that Petitioner’s Petition for a Writ of Habeas

Corpus be DENIED.

This Report and Recommendation of the undersigned Magistrate

Judge is submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to

this case, pursuant to the provision of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than March 10, 2013, any party to

this action may file written objections with the Court and serve a

copy on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections

to Report and Recommendation.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall

be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than

March 24, 2013. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise

those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst,

951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

 

DATED: February 7, 2013

 Hon. William V. Gallo

 U.S. Magistrate Judge

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