Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06680/USCOURTS-caed-1_04-cv-06680-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EON WALDEN, et al., )

)

)

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

)

JANE MOFFETT, et al., )

)

)

Defendant. )

)

)

No. CV-04-6680 AWI/DLB

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS'

MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST,

SECOND AND THIRD CLAIMS FOR

RELIEF IN FOURTH AMENDED

COMPLAINT (Doc. 47) AND

DIRECTING PLAINTIFFS TO FILE

A FIFTH AMENDED COMPLAINT

WITHIN 30 DAYS

On April 12, 2006, an Order was entered dismissing the

Second and Fourth Claims for Relief in plaintiffs’ Third Amended

Complaint with leave to amend.

Plaintiffs, who are proceeding in pro per, filed their

Fourth Amended Complaint (FAC) on May 30, 2006. Plaintiffs are 

Eon Walden and Corey Victor through his guardian ad litem Jumoke

Walden. Defendants are Jane Moffett, principal of Sonoma

Elementary School in Modesto; Marie Lagos, a teacher at Sonoma

Elementary School; James Enochs, Superintendent of Modesto City

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Schools; Jim Pfaff, Assistant Superintendent of Modesto City

Schools; and Modesto City Schools District, alleged to “an entity

engaged in public education and who is the recipient of Federal

financial assistance [and which] was the home school district for

Plaintiff Corey Victor from grades K-4.” The FAC alleges:

Plaintiff Corey Victor is now an 11 year old

student and is described by the Modesto City

Schools as a ‘personable young man of

African-American male heritage who presents

quite friendly.’ Corey has an articulation

disorder, which is below what is expected for

his chronological age and developmental

level. This disorder reduces intelligibility

and significantly interferes with

communication and attracts adverse attention. 

Corey is classified as a Special Education

student. Although not an ADHD or ADD

student, Modesto City Schools did determine

Corey has a ‘problem attending.’ Corey has

never been a discipline problem, either

inside or outside of the home. He attended

Sonoma Elementary School from kindergarten to

fourth grade. His is a member of the

Jehovah’s Witness faith.

Plaintiff Eon Walden is alleged to be Corey’s maternal

grandmother and Corey’s authorized caregiver, to be of AfricanAmerican heritage and an ordained minister in the Jehovah’s

Witness religion. The FAC alleges that the action “arises out of

the racial and religious discrimination and disability-based

discrimination meted out” by defendants; that “as a student and

parent in the Modesto City Schools District, [plaintiffs] were

the victims of assault and battery, harassment, racial, religious

and disability based prejudices and other violations of their

federally protected rights”; that “Modesto City School officials,

teachers and personnel failed to address Plaintiffs’

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victimizations”, that “said failures are due to Defendants’

racial and religious intolerance and disability-based bias”; and

that “the Defendants’ practices have created a disparate impact

on Plaintiffs and have caused them to suffer physical, emotional

and financial harm, that has resulted in the denial of Plaintiff

Victor’s right to a Free and Appropriate Public Education.” 

The First Claim for Relief, captioned “Violation of

Plaintiffs; [sic] First Amendment Right to Religious Freedom”, is

alleged against defendants Moffett, Lagos and MCS and alleges

that defendants “violated Plaintiffs’ right to the free exercise

of Plaintiffs’ religion when Plaintiff Victor was forced to

participate in school sponsored holiday activities” and when

“Defendant Lagos forced Plaintiff Victor to participate in flag

pledging ceremonies.” 

The Second Cause of Action, captioned “Violation of

Plaintiffs’ Right to a FAPE by Denying Plaintiffs’ Right to Due

Process”, alleges in pertinent part:

15. Plaintiffs contend Defendants were

negligent when they failed to enforce

District mandated codes that were designed to

protect all students from physical pain,

verbal attack, fright, nervousness, fear,

humiliation and anxiety.

16. Plaintiffs contend they were denied

procedural due process when the Defendants

refused to convene proceedings on Plaintiffs’

behalf, to hold Plaintiff Victor’s abusers

accountable to established codes of conduct.

17. Plaintiffs contend said refusal

constituted negligence on the parts of the

Defendants, and that said negligence made

Plaintiff Victor an ongoing target for

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continued abuse, thereby creating a hostile

learning environment and constituting a

denial of Plaintiff Victor’s right to a FAPE

as mandated by the IDEA and the Americans

with Disabilities Act of 1990. (20 U.S.C. §

1415(a). [sic]

18. Plaintiffs further contend a FAPE is an

education that takes place in a school

environment that addresses a disabled

student’s ‘unique educational needs,’ and

that such ‘needs’ are broadly construed to

include the handicapped child’s academic,

social, health, emotional, communicative,

physical and vocational needs.’ (H.R.Rep.

No. 410, 98 Cong.)(Hall v. Vance County th

Board of Education.)

19. Plaintiffs contend the Defendants were

aware of Plaintiff Victor’s disability, and

that said awareness included knowledge his

disability is greatly exasperated when he is

under duress, and that at such times he is

incapable of providing succinct verbal

responses.

20. Plaintiffs contend Defendants denied

Plaintiffs the right to due process regarding

Plaintiff Victor’s verbal reports of

victimization, when Defendants:

! Failed to convene proceedings in

a supportive atmosphere where the

young Plaintiff could successfully

verbalize the facts surrounding his

victimizations;

! Failed to convene proceedings

with appropriate law enforcement

agencies on Plaintiff Victor’s

behalf regarding his reports of

abuse; and when they 

! Failed to convene proceedings on

Plaintiff Victor’s behalf, to

institute District initiated

investigations into his allegations

of abuse and mistreatment.

21. Plaintiffs contend such negligent

failures also contributed to the creation of

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a hostile learning environment thereby

creating further denials of Plaintiff

Victor’s right to a FAPE as mandated by the

IDEA and the Americans with Disabilities Act

of 1990. (20 U.S.C. § 1415(a). [sic]

22. Plaintiffs contend Corey Victor’s right

to a FAPE was further breached when the

Defendants (contrary to District policy)

repeatedly denied Plaintiffs’ requests to

meet and confer with District personnel in an

attempt at creating a District sponsored plan

to protect Plaintiff Victor’s on campus

physical health and emotional safety.

23. Plaintiffs contend the example of one

such denial was the District’s refusal to

convene proceedings that included Plaintiff

Walden and schoolyard aide Glenda Hyde, to

discuss the validity of Plaintiff Victor’s

allegations. Hyde dragged him across the

schoolyard by his ear calling a ‘black boy.’ 

[sic]

24. Plaintiffs contend such proceedings

should have been convened because Plaintiff

Victor was repeatedly victimized by way of

physical attacks, verbal assaults, harassment

and intimidation by Modesto City Schools’

students and personnel.

25. Plaintiffs contend that in light of

Corey Victor’s ongoing physical

victimizations and the young Plaintiff’s

inability to verbally convey his needs, the

Defendants’ refusal to convene formal

proceedings was contrary to established

District policy and stonewalled Plaintiff

Victor’s Victor’s [sic] ability to have his

‘unique’ health, emotional and physical needs

met, and therefore constitute gross

negligence.

26. Plaintiffs contend the Defendants’

refusal to allow such proceedings, encumbered

Plaintiff Victor’s ability to fully benefit

from the educational plan and further

violated his right to FAPE as mandated by the

IDEA and the Americans with Disabilities Act

of 1990. (20 U.S.C. § 1415(a). [sic]

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...

27. Plaintiffs contend this lawsuit does not

allege abuses of the educational component of

Corey Victor’s education, and as such, is not

an attempt to seek redress for the District’s

failure to provide adequate educational

services.

28. Plaintiffs contend that although Corey

Victor was a Special Education student in the

Modesto City Schools system, any of the

IDEA’s procedural safeguards that would have

applied to him, can only make application in

matters concerning his educational program

and/or placement.

29. Plaintiffs contend the source and

natures [sic] of the injuries alleged in this

lawsuit are not such that they could have

been redressed to any degree by the IDEA’s

administrative procedures and remedies.

30. Plaintiffs contend Corey Victor’s

injuries are pain and suffering (with regard

to his physical injuries), emotional distress

(with regard to his physical injuries),

fright and humiliation ... all suffered as a

direct and proximate result of the

Defendants’ negligence, and all of which

helped contribute to his being denied a FAPE.

31. Plaintiff EON Walden contends the source

and nature of her injuries are emotional

distress (with regard to her grandson’s

physical and emotional injuries), the

intentional infliction of emotional distress

(with regard to her grandson’s physical and

emotional injuries), fright and humiliation

(with regard to her grandson’s physical and

emotional injuries), and money damages

suffered when she was provided no alternative

but to transfer Plaintiff Victor to another

school during his second grade year in

Defendant Lagos’ class; and later when she

felt forced to leave her Modesto home

altogether and relocate her entire family to

a more socially tolerant school district.

32. Plaintiffs contend the remedies

available under the IDEA would not be well

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suited to addressing any of the Plaintiffs’

past injuries, and that the remedies

available under the IDEA include educational

services only. Therefore, Plaintiffs are

precluded from having to exhaust the IDEA’s

administrative remedies prior to filing this

action. Witte v. Clark County School

District, 197 F.3d 1171 (9 Cir.1999). th

The Third Claim for Relief, captioned “Violation of Plaintiff’s

Fourteenth Amendment Right to Equal Protection”, and alleges in

pertinent part:

33. Plaintiffs allege Defendants

systematically engaged in a sexually and

racially biased code of conduct when they

failed to protect the rights of Plaintiff

Corey Victor.

34. Plaintiffs allege that on March 19,

2002, Plaintiff Victor was unfairly

disciplined when he protected himself during

an assault by a female non African-American

student and that no disciplinary action what

so ever [sic] was meted out to Plaintiff

Victor’s female non-African-American

aggressor.

35. Plaintiffs further allege that on

September 25, 2003, Plaintiff Victor reported

to Defendant Moffett that he had been grabbed

by the ear and called a ‘black boy’ by an

Anglo-American adult yard aid [sic].

36. It is Plaintiffs’ contention that

Defendant Moffett did nothing to report the

alleged incident to the appropriate parental

or Law Enforcement authorities.

37. Plaintiffs allege Defendants failed to

apply an Equal Protection of the Law by

refusing to report or stop racially motivated

acts of aggression on Plaintiff Victor; and

when they failed to take the effective

measures to rescind or nullify District

policies that perpetuate racial

discrimination and an unequal application of

the Law.

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The motion to dismiss was noticed for hearing on July 24, 1

2006. Pursuant to Rule 78-230(c), Local Rules of Practice,

plaintiffs’ opposition was due on July 10, 2006. Plaintiffs’

opposition is dated July 1, 2006 and was filed with the court on

July 12, 2006. In the Order filed on April 12, 2006, Judge Coyle

noted:

Plaintiffs are advised that their in propria

persona status does not excuse them from

complying with the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the Local Rules of Practice, and

any court orders. The failure to timely

comply with the rules setting forth the time

to file motions or oppositions to motions

precludes the opposing parties and the court

from being prepared in an efficient manner to

hear matters and resolve them. The court’s

docket does not permit a party to disregard

these rules. Plaintiffs’ continued failure to

so comply will result in the imposition of

sanctions, including the sanction of

dismissal.

Because of plaintiffs’ untimely opposition to the instant motion,

plaintiffs were not entitled to be heard at oral argument and an

Order vacating oral argument has been issued. Plaintiffs again are

warned that their continued failure to comply with the rules and

court orders will result in the imposition of sanctions, including

the sanction of dismissal.

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Among other relief, the FAC prays for punitive damages.

Defendants move to dismiss the First, Second and Third

Claims for Relief pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, for failure to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted.1

A. Governing Standards.

Dismissal of a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is proper if

“it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of

facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” 

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). In testing the

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sufficiency of a claim against a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge, a court

must “accept all material allegations in the complaint as true

and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” 

North Star Int’l v. Arizona Corp. Comm’n, 720 F.2d 578, 580 (9th

Cir. 1983). The court need not, however, “accept legal

conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those

conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged.” 

Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752 (9 Cir. 1994). A th

claim may be dismissed as a matter of law if there is a lack of a

cognizable legal theory or if there are insufficient facts

alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica

Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9 Cir. 1990). Immunities and th

other affirmative defenses may be upheld on a motion to dismiss

only when they are established on the face of the complaint. See

Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d 756, 759 (9 Cir.1999); Jablon v. th

Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9 Cir. 1980) The court th

must determine whether or not it appears to a certainty under

existing law that no relief can be granted under any set of facts

that might be proved in support of plaintiff’s claims. De Le

Crux v. Tormey, 582 F.2d 45, 48 (9 Cir. 1978), cert. denied, th

441 U.S. 965 (1979). Also, the pleadings of pro se litigants

“are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings

drafted by lawyers.” Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 10 (1980). 

B. First and Second Claims for Relief - Failure to Allege

Custom or Policy.

Defendants move to dismiss the First and Second Claims for

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Defendants refer to Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342 (9 2 th

Cir.1992) as authority for the pleading standard applicable to

state a claim for municipal liability under Monell. However,

Delmore involved an appeal following a jury trial and does not

involve the pleadings requirements under Rule 12(b)(6).

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Relief, contending that the FAC does not allege plaintiffs were

deprived of their civil rights pursuant to official policy or

custom. Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 

Pursuant to Monell, a municipal entity cannot be held liable

for the alleged violations of plaintiffs’ civil rights in the

absence of an allegation that plaintiff was deprived of his

rights pursuant to official policy or custom. In the Ninth

Circuit, a claim of municipal liability under Section 1983 is

sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss “‘even if the claim

is based on nothing more than a bare allegation that the

individual officers’ conduct conformed to the official policy,

custom, or practice.’” Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307

F.3d 1119, 1127 (9 Cir.2002), citing Karim-Panahi v. Los th

Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 624 (9 Cir.1988), quoting th

Shah v. County of Los Angeles, 797 F.2d 743, 747 (9 Cir.1986). th 2

In opposing this ground for dismissal, plaintiffs assert in

pertinent part as follows:

15. Plaintiffs have stated a viable claim

against the Modesto City School District, in

that Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaint

clearly states the Defendants’ ‘practices’

have created a disparate impact on Plaintiffs

and have resulted in the denial of Plaintiff

Victor’s right to a Free and Appropriate

Public Education.’

16. The gravamen of Plaintiffs’ 1983 claim

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is that Plaintiff Victor suffered physical

and emotional distress during school hours

and on school grounds. In these

circumstances, the Defendants retained total

control over the offenders. The District’s

failure to exercise disciplinary authority

over the offenders resulted in the District’s

deliberate practice (or custom) of

indifference to Plaintiff Victor’s safety,

injuries, physical needs and religious

preference.

...

18. Plaintiffs contend Defendants’ practices

have been so pervasive and have become so

entrenched in the District method of handling

students of color, that a District-wide

custom clearly has been established.

19. Plaintiffs allege Modesto City Schools

has at least a 30-year history of deliberate

indifference to the health, safety and

welfare of Jehovah’s Witness students,

African American students and other students

of color.

20. Plaintiffs further contend these

practices have become so pervasive, members

of the Modesto community asked Plaintiff

Walden to organize a Department of Justice

sponsored anti-discrimination forum to help

students and parents prepare DOJ

discrimination complaints. 

21. The forum was held on February 10, 2005. 

Plaintiff Walden listened to complaints of

racial and religious discrimination at the

hands of Modesto City School personnel, some

of which extend back as far as 30 years.

22. Plaintiffs contend Corey Victor was a

victim of these practices and that these

practices have indeed become custom.

Plaintiffs’ contentions quoted above are not included as

allegations in the FAC. As noted, in order to withstand

dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

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granted, plaintiffs need only allege that the actions or

inactions of the individual defendants to official policy, custom

or practice. Because the FAC does not contain such allegations

against the Modesto City Schools District, the First and Second

Claims for Relief are dismissed with leave to amend.

C. Third Claim for Relief - Statute of Limitations.

Defendants move for dismissal of the Third Claim for Relief

to the extent that it is brought by plaintiff Eon Walden as

barred by the statute of limitations. Defendants concede that

the Third Claim for Relief is not time-barred to the extent that

it is brought on behalf of plaintiff Corey Victor because of his

status as a minor.

Plaintiffs assert that the Third Claim for Relief is brought

solely by plaintiff Corey Victor and that plaintiff EON Walden

does not seek relief pursuant to the Third Cause of Action.

Given these representations, defendants’ motion to dismiss

the Third Claim for Relief as barred by the statute of

limitations is denied.

D. Second Claim for Relief - Failure to Exhaust

Administrative Remedies.

Defendants move to dismiss the Second Cause of Action to the

extent that it is based on the Individuals with Disabilities in

Education Act (IDEA) and the Americans with Disabilities Act

(ADA) because of plaintiffs’ failure to allege exhaustion of

administrative remedies.

In Robb v. Bethel School Dist. #403, 308 F.3d 1047 (9 Cir. th

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2002), a student with cerebral palsy and her parents brought an

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for damages for lost

educational opportunities, emotional distress, humiliation,

embarrassment, and psychological injury after the student was

removed from the classroom for extended tutoring. The Ninth

Circuit held that a plaintiff who seeks only money damages is

required to exhaust administrative remedies before instituting a

claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 predicated on a violation of the

IDEA. In so holding, the Ninth Circuit explained:

The IDEA provides federal money to state and

local education agencies to assist them in

educating disabled children, on the condition

that the state and local agencies implement

the substantive and procedural requirements

of the Act. The principal purpose of the Act

is ‘to ensure that all children with

disabilities have available to them a free

appropriate public education that emphasizes

special education and related services

designed to meet their unique needs ... [and]

to ensure that the rights of children with

disabilities and parents of such children and

protected.’ 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d).

To carry out these objectives, the IDEA

provides procedural safeguards to permit

parental involvement in all matters

concerning the child’s educational program

and allows parents to obtain administrative

and judicial review of decisions they deem

unsatisfactory or inappropriate ... Under

this scheme of procedural protections,

parents are entitled to (1) examination of

all relevant records pertaining to evaluation

and educational placement of their child; (2)

prior written notice whenever the responsible

educational agency proposes, or refuses, to

change the child’s placement; (3) an

opportunity to present complaints concerning

any aspect of the local agency’s provision of

a free appropriate public education; and (4)

an opportunity for an ‘impartial due process

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hearing’ with respect to any such complaints

... If a party is dissatisfied with or

aggrieved by the findings and decisions made

after the impartial due process hearing, that

party may obtain additional administrative

review by the state educational agency. 20

U.S.C. § 1415(g). 

The IDEA requires a plaintiff to exhaust his

or her administrative remedies before

commencing suit if that person is ‘seeking

relief that is also available under’ the

IDEA. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l). Because money

damages are not ‘available under’ the IDEA

..., it might seem that a plaintiff can avoid

the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement merely by

limiting the prayer for relief to money

damages ....

With the First, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and

Eleventh Circuits, we hold that a plaintiff

cannot avoid the IDEA’s exhaustion

requirement merely by limiting a prayer for

relief to money damages. We understand

‘available’ relief to mean relief suitable to

remedy the wrong done the plaintiff, which

may not always be relief in the precise form

the plaintiff prefers ... Our primary concern

in determining whether a plaintiff must use

the IDEA’s administrative procedures relates

to the source and nature of the alleged

injuries for which he or she seeks a remedy,

not the specific remedy requested. The

dispositive question generally is whether the

plaintiff has alleged injuries that could be

redressed to any degree by the IDEA’s

administrative procedures and remedies. If

so, exhaustion of those remedies is required. 

If not, the claim necessarily falls outside

the IDEA’s scope, and exhaustion is

unnecessary. Where the IDEA’s ability to

remedy a particular injury is unclear,

exhaustion should be required to give

educational agencies an initial opportunity

to ascertain and alleviate the alleged

problem. 

308 F.3d at 1048-1050. The Ninth Circuit in Robb specifically

distinguished an earlier decision, Witte v. Clark County School

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District, 197 F.3d 1171 (9 Cir. 1999). The distinction is th

explained in Robb:

Despite the apparent benefits of the

exhaustion requirement, the Robbs argue that

controlling precedent permits them to opt out

of the IDEA simply by proclaiming that it

does not offer them anything of value. They

argue that language in our decision in Witte

v. Clark County School District ... suggests

they can avoid the IDEA’s exhaustion

requirement simply by limiting their prayer

for relief to money damages. The Robbs point

to the following language: ‘Because plaintiff

seeks only monetary damages, which is “not

relief that is available under” the IDEA, ...

exhaustion of administrative remedies is not

required. Witte, 197 F.3d at 1275-76. But

the Robbs have taken this quotation out of

context. The context makes it clear that in

Witte we did not rely merely on the fact that

the plaintiff had requested money damages. 

We stressed:

Because Plaintiff seeks only

monetary damages, which is ‘not

relief that is available under’ the

IDEA, and because all educational

issues already have been resolved

to the parties’ mutual satisfaction

through the IEP process, Plaintiff

is not ‘seeking relief that is also

available’ under the IDEA, 20

U.S.C. § 1415(l).

Id. at 1275 (emphasis added). Before filing

suit, the plaintiff in Witte already had

agreed with the defendant school district -

through informal processes available under

the IDEA or through its formal procedures -

to new educational plans and services that

would address the educational component of

his injuries. Witte, 197 F.3d at 1275-76. 

We stated, in other words, that the

‘[p]laintiff in fact ha[d] used

administrative procedures to secure the

remedies that are available under the IDEA.’ 

Id. at 1276. Moreover, the plaintiff was

seeking only retrospective damages, not

damages to be measured by the cost of

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remedial services (such as those offered

under the IDEA). Id. Finally, and perhaps

most importantly, the plaintiff’s allegations

centered around physical abuse and injuries. 

We wrote, ‘The remedies available under the

IDEA would not appear to be well suited to

addressing past physical injuries adequately;

such injuries typically are remedied through

an award of monetary damages.’ Id. In

Witte, neither the genesis nor the

manifestations of the abuse were educational. 

There was no reason to believe the

plaintiff’s injuries could be redressed to

any extent by the IDEA’s administrative

procedures and remedies. So we permitted the

plaintiff to avoid the IDEA’s exhaustion

requirement. We did not intend to chart a

course away from the holdings of our sister

circuits.

The Robbs are in a very different position

from the claimant in Witte. They have not

taken full advantage of the IDEA

administrative procedures to secure the

remedies available thereunder. They do not

claim physical injury. And they request

money damages to compensate them for

psychological and educational injuries the

IDEA may remedy. Because their injuries

could be redressed to some degree by the

IDEA’s administrative procedures and

remedies, the Robbs’ complaint must be

dismissed. We agree with our sister circuits

that where, as here, a plaintiff has alleged

injuries that could be redressed to some

degree by the IDEA’s administrative

procedures and remedies, then the courts

should require exhaustion of administrative

remedies.

308 F.3d at 1051-1054. See also Blanchard v. Morton School

District, 420 F.3d 918 (9 Cir. 2005), wherein the Ninth Circuit th

held that exhaustion of administrative remedies under the IDEA is

not required prior to a parent bringing an action under Section

1983 for damages for emotional distress and lost wages damages 

caused to the parent:

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Blanchard’s complaint sought money damages

for emotional distress and for lost wages

caused by the District’s alleged deliberate

indifference toward her son’s IDEA claims and

the District’s alleged violations of the

IDEA. Money damages for retrospective and

non-educational injuries are not available

under the IDEA ... That alone is not

dispositive, for a plaintiff cannot avoid the

IDEA’s exhaustion requirement simply by

limiting the prayer for relief to money or

services that are not provided under the IDEA

... The dispositive question therefore is

whether Blanchard is seeking remedy for

injuries that could be redressed to any

degree by the IDEA’s administrative

procedures ....

The remedies available under the IDEA include

educational services for disabled children

... They do not provide an adequate remedy

for Blanchard.

We held in Witte that a plaintiff seeking

monetary relief for alleged past physical and

emotional abuse by school staff was not

required to exhaust administrative remedies

under the IDEA ... We emphasized that ‘all

educational issues already have been resolved

to the parties’ mutual satisfaction through

the [administrative] process.’ ... That is

true here, as well. Following Witte, we hold

that Blanchard had no remedies under the IDEA

to exhaust. Blanchard has resolved the

educational issues implicated by her son’s

disability and has obtained the educational

relief available under the IDEA on behalf of

her son. 

...

We emphasize that our holding is a narrow

one: that there is no procedural barrier to

Blanchard’s claim that the defendants’ acts

(as distinct from her child’s disability)

have caused her to incur damages for

emotional distress .... We hold only that,

because the IDEA provides no remedy for

Blanchard, she need not exhaust

administrative remedies before filing suit.

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420 F.3d at 921-922.

Defendants argue that the allegations of the FAC are

controlled by the holding in Robb because of the allegations in

paragraphs 22 and 26 of the FAC. Defendants argue:

These allegations clearly demonstrate that,

in addition to the damages being sought by

Plaintiffs in connection with their Due

Process claim, that Plaintiffs base their

claim on the alleged failure on the part of

the Defendant to provide Plaintiff Victor

‘educational services’ as mandated by the

IDEA. Such educational services could have -

indeed should have - been sought by way of

the administrative procedures set forth in

the IDEA. 

Defendants further argue that plaintiffs’ reliance on Witte is

misplaced because plaintiffs cannot allege that all educational

issues have already been resolved to the parties mutual

satisfaction through the IEP process given the allegations in

paragraphs 22 and 26 of the FAC.

Plaintiffs respond that they are not complaining about any

“faultiness” in plaintiff Victor’s IEP plan and that they have no

objection to the educational plan offered to Victor as the result

of IEP meetings and consultations. Plaintiffs assert that when

they alleged in paragraph 26 that defendants’ actions “encumbered

Plaintiff Victor’s ability to fully benefit from the educational

plan and further violated his right to FAPE as mandated by the

IDEA and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990", they were

not referring to the IEP plan, but “rather the entirely [sic] of

the program, plan, or method worked out before hand by federal

officials to afford every child the right to a public education.” 

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In their opposition to the motion to dismiss, plaintiffs contend:

33. Plaintiffs claim that the Defendants

failed to provide Corey Victor ‘fair

treatment’ when Defendants refused to protect

the Plaintiff from student and staff bullies

who repeatedly victimized him during school

hours and on school grounds.

34. Plaintiffs contend the victimizations

were sparked by Plaintiff Victor’s inability

to communicate his needs, and were so severe

they rose to the level of ‘discrimination.’ 

Defendants’ failures in this regard created a

hostile learning environment for Plaintiff

Victor.

...

36. Plaintiffs contend the victimizations

were so severe, pervasive and objectively

offensive, they undermined and detracted from

the young Plaintiff’s educational experience

thereby effectively denying Plaintiff Victor

equal access to a FAPE.

Plaintiffs argue that the claims that defendants failed to

protect Victor from bullying and assaults are issues to be

resolved by school disciplinary and police authorities outside

the IEP procedures and that the IDEA does not provide a remedy

for these types of claims.

Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Second Claim for Relief on

this ground is denied. Although the FAC refers to the IDEA and a

FAPE, the allegations are sufficiently clear that plaintiffs’

claim is not based on the failure to comply with the requirements

of the IDEA but rather on the failure of defendants to protect

plaintiff Victor from harassment and assault which prevented

plaintiff Victor from taking advantage of the IEP plan. These

allegations are sufficiently like those involved in Witte and

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Blanchard to negate dismissal for failure to exhaust

administrative remedies.

E. Prayer for Punitive Damages against Modesto City Schools

District.

Defendants move to strike the prayer for punitive damages to

the extent that the FAC seeks punitive damages against the

Modesto City Schools District.

There is no question that punitive damages are not

recoverable in a Section 1983 action against a municipality, City

of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981), or

against a public entity under California law, California

Government Code § 818. Therefore, the prayer for punitive

damages against the Modesto City Schools District is stricken 

with prejudice.

ACCORDINGLY:

1. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the First, Second and

Third Claims for Relief in the Fourth Amended Complaint is

granted in part and denied in part with leave to amend.

2. Plaintiffs are ordered to file a Fifth Amended Complaint

in accordance with the rulings herein within 30 days of the

filing date of this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 28, 2006 /s/ Anthony W. Ishii 

0m8i78 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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