Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02035/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02035-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 370
Nature of Suit: Other Fraud
Cause of Action: 15:1601 Truth in Lending

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Renee M. Zinni; Marco S. D’Alonzo, 

Plaintiffs, 

vs.

M&I Marshall & Ilsley Bank, et al., 

Defendants. 

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No. CV-09-2035-PHX-FJM

ORDER

Before the court is M&I Bank’s motion for attorney fees (doc. 82), plaintiffs’ response

and motion for damages and attorney’s fees (docs. 87 and 88), the Bank’s response and reply

(doc. 90), and plaintiffs’ reply (doc. 93). 

On May 11, 2011, we granted summary judgment in favor of the Bank on all claims

(doc. 72). Both parties now move for attorney’s fees. 

Plaintiffs simply state a “counter motion for damages and attorney’s fees” in their

response to the Bank’s motion. They make no argument to support the claims. They were

not the prevailing parties in this action. Therefore, plaintiffs’ claim for attorney’s fees and

damages is denied (doc. 88). 

The Bank moves for attorney’s fees as the prevailing party in a matter arising out of

a contract, pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01. It seeks fees in the amount of $68,589.50, and

non-taxable costs in the amount of $6,856.12. 

Case 2:09-cv-02035-FJM Document 111 Filed 09/12/11 Page 1 of 3
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Plaintiffs’ only response to the Bank’s motion is to continue to argue the merits of

their claims. Again, we have already carefully considered each of these arguments and will

not revisit them in a motion for attorney’s fees. Instead, we look to the factors set forth in

Associated Indem. Corp. v. Warner, 143 Ariz. 567, 570, 694 P.2d 1181, 1184 (1985). 

A court has wide discretion is deciding whether to award fees under § 12-341.01. The

award of fees “should be made to mitigate the burden of the expense of litigation to establish

a just claim or a just defense.” Id. § 12-341.01(B). “It need not equal or relate to the

attorney fees actually paid or contracted.” Id. In deciding whether to award fees we consider

whether (1) the unsuccessful party's claims were meritorious; (2) the litigation could have

been avoided or settled; (3) assessing fees would cause extreme hardship; (4) the successful

party prevailed with respect to all relief sought; (5) the legal question was novel; and (6) an

award would discourage other parties with tenable claims from litigating them. Warner, 143

Ariz. at 570, 694 P.2d at 1184. 

After considering each of the Warner factors, we conclude that an award of fees in this

case is appropriate. Many of plaintiffs’ claims, as alleged, were colorable. Others lacked

merit. Therefore, this factor is neutral. Given the parties’ diverse positions, settlement was

not possible. The legal questions presented, involving Arizona’s deed of trust statute, TILA,

RESPA, FDCPA, and HOEPA, breach of contract, and fraud claims were not novel.

Defendants ultimately prevailed on every claim and an award of fees would not discourage

other parties from filing meritorious actions. These factors weigh in the Bank’s favor. Given

plaintiffs’ financial inability to complete the construction project on the property, it is

reasonable to presume that a financial hardship is likely. This factor alone weighs in

plaintiffs’ favor.

We now turn to the reasonableness of the requested fees. The Bank employed a total

of eight lawyers, two paralegals, and two legal secretaries, expended almost 400 hours at the

rate of $200 to $175 per hour on a relatively routine foreclosure matter, and now seeks in

excess of $75,000 in fees and costs. This is a classic example of over-lawyering a case.

Moreover, most of the claimed non-taxable costs consists of “Westlaw legal research”

Case 2:09-cv-02035-FJM Document 111 Filed 09/12/11 Page 2 of 3
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without the specificity required by LRCiv 54.2(e)(2)(B). We think 75 hours at $200 per hour

should be sufficient to litigate a relatively routine matter. We then discount that amount by

plaintiffs’ presumed hardship to yield reasonable fees and costs in the amount of $7,500. 

IT IS ORDERED DENYING plaintiffs’ motion for damages and attorney’s fees

(doc. 88).

IT IS ORDERED GRANTING the Bank’s motion for an award of attorney’s fees

(doc. 82) in the amount of $7,500. 

DATED this 12th day of September, 2011.

Case 2:09-cv-02035-FJM Document 111 Filed 09/12/11 Page 3 of 3