Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01145/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01145-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

William W. Castle, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Dora B. Schriro, et al.,

Respondents. 

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No. CV 08-1145-PHX-MHM (MHB)

ORDER

 Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. §

2254. (Dkt. # 1.) The matter was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Michelle H.

Burns, who issued a Report and Recommendation recommending that the Court deny and

dismiss the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus with prejudice. (Dkt. # 16.) Petitioner filed

a written objection to the Report and Recommendation (Dkt. # 22), and Respondents filed a

response (Dkt. # 23). Petitioner then filed a document titled “Reply to Respondents’

Response to Petitioner’s Objections to Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation.” (Dkt. #

24.)

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner, William Windsor Castle, was indicted in Maricopa County Superior

Court for: (1) one count of Fraudulent Schemes and Artifices, a class 2 felony; (2) one

count of Illegal Control of an Enterprise, a class 3 felony; and (3) one count of

Participating in a Criminal Syndicate, a class 2 felony. (Dkt. # 11, Exh. A.) On March 23,

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2005, Petitioner pled guilty to one count of Fraudulent Schemes and Artifices. (Dkt. # 11,

Exhs. B, C, D.) In exchange for his plea, the other two counts in the Indictment were

dismissed, and the parties agreed that Petitioner would serve between 5 and 10 years

in prison, concurrent with his sentence in case #CR2004-022529-001 DT. (Dkt. # 11,

Exh. B.)

The fraudulent scheme involved Petitioner and others procuring two

liquor licenses by concealing Petitioner’s controlling interest in the entities seeking

licenses. (Dkt. # 11, Exh. F at 3.) If Petitioner and his associates had been truthful

about Petitioner’s involvement with the liquor licenses, the licenses would have been

denied since Petitioner was a convicted felon. (Dkt. # 11, Exh. F at 3.) The trial court

accepted Petitioner’s guilty plea and, on July 22, 2005, sentenced him to a presumptive

term of 5 years imprisonment, concurrent with his sentence in case #CR2004-022529-001

DT. (Dkt. # 11, Exhs. G, H.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court reviews, de novo, the Magistrate Judge’s proposed findings and

recommendations to which objections are filed. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); United

States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). “Failure to object

to a Magistrate Judge’s recommendation waives all objections to the judge’s findings of

fact.” Jones v. Wood, 207 F.3d 557, 562 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S.

140, 149 (1985) (district courts are not required to conduct “any review at all . . . of any

issue that is not the subject of an objection”). A district court has authority to accept,

reject, or modify the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation. 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1)(C).

III. DISCUSSION

Habeas Corpus affords relief to persons in custody in violation of the Constitution

or laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2241. A one-year limitation period

applies to persons in custody pursuant to a state court judgement. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 

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Petitioner filed his timely Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on June 19, 2008. (Dkt. #

1.)

In his petition, Petitioner asserts that: (1) Arizona’s fraudulent schemes statute is

unconstitutionally vague, and (2) Petitioner’s conduct failed to “embrace all the elements

of the criminal offense of which he was convicted and there was no factual basis for his

conviction.” (Dkt. # 1 at 6-7.) Magistrate Judge Michelle H. Burns issued a Report and

Recommendation in which she recommended Petitioner’s habeas petition be denied and

dismissed with prejudice. (Dkt. # 16.) Petitioner did not object to the finding that

Petitioner’s vagueness claim is limited to a facial challenge based on his guilty plea.

Petitioner also did not object to the finding that Ground Two is barred by his guilty plea. 

Therefore, we do not review these findings. With respect to Ground One, Petitioner

asserts that the Report erred in concluding that: (1) Petitioner did not fairly present his

vagueness claim, (2) Petitioner could not show “cause and prejudice,” (3) Arizona’s

fraudulent schemes statute is not unconstitutionally vague on its face, and (4) Arizona’s

fraudulent schemes statute is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Petitioner’s

conduct. (Dkt. # 22.)

A. Exhaustion and Procedural Default (Objections One and Two)

To have a meritorious federal writ of habeas corpus, a state prisoner first must

exhaust his remedies in the state courts. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-30

(1991). To properly exhaust a federal habeas claim, the petitioner must afford the state the

opportunity to rule upon the merits of the claim by “fairly presenting” the claim to the

state’s highest court in a procedurally correct manner. See Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S.

346, 351 (1989); Rose v. Palmateer, 395 F.3d 1108, 1110 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 545 U.S.

1144 (2005). A claim has not been fairly presented unless the operative facts and federal

legal theory upon which the claim is based have been described. See, e.g., Picard v.

Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275-78 (1971).

/ / /

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Petitioner argues that he fairly presented his vagueness claim as a facial challenge

in the Arizona courts because he cited Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman

Estates Inc., 455 U.S. 489 (1982), in his post-conviction relief (“PCR”) petition, and

Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983), in his Reply in support of his PCR petition.

(Dkt. # 22.) Petitioner also points to a hypothetical in his PCR petition regarding a failure

to be truthful about one’s weight on a driver license application. Petitioner argues that his

hypothetical supported a facial claim because “he was seeking to vindicate not only his

own rights, but those of others who may also be adversely impacted by the statute in

question.” (Dkt. # 22.)

The Court is not persuaded that Petitioner fairly presented his vagueness claim as a

facial challenge in the Arizona courts. Petitioner’s mere citation of potentially relevant

cases is insufficient to fairly present a claim. See Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993,

1003 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Exhaustion demands more than drive-by citation, detached from

any articulation of an underlying federal legal theory.”). Petitioner’s hypothetical also did

not equate to an argument that the statute was “impermissibly vague in all its

applications,” as required by Village of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 494-95, in order to

succeed on a facial challenge. Rather, his hypothetical provided one instance where

application of the statute could create an issue of notice. Finally, Petitioner titled his

argument as follows: “The Arizona Fraudulent Schemes Statute is unconstitutionally

vague in this case.” (Dkt. # 11, Exh. K at 3) (emphasis added). This title suggests

Petitioner’s argument was an as-applied challenge, not a facial challenge.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Petitioner did not fairly present his vagueness

claim as a facial challenge in the Arizona courts and, as a result, failed to properly exhaust

his available state remedies as required under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

If a petitioner’s claims are procedurally defaulted, the petitioner may not raise the

claim in federal habeas unless the petitioner can (1) demonstrate a miscarriage of justice,

or (2) show cause and prejudice that would excuse the default. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at

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750-51; Ellis v. Armenakis, 222 F.3d 627, 632 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Wells v. Maass, 28

F.3d 1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 1994)). A miscarriage of justice occurs when a Constitutional

violation has resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent. See Murray v.

Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986). “[C]ause is an external impediment such as

government interference or reasonable unavailability of a claim’s factual basis.” 

Robinson v. Iganacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1052 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations and internal

quotations omitted). The Court need not examine the existence of prejudice if the

petitioner fails to establish cause. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 134 n.43 (1982); and

Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 n.10 (9th Cir. 1991).

Petitioner argues that the Arizona Department of Corrections failed to provide him

with the “necessary tools” to fairly present his vagueness claim as a facial challenge and

that this is sufficient to show cause. Petitioner defines “necessary tools” as case reporters,

legal treatises, and paralegals that provide more than notarial and copy services. (Dkt. #

22 at 5.)

Petitioner has not argued that a miscarriage of justice has occurred, nor has he

demonstrated that cause and prejudice excuse the default. Prisoners do not have an

abstract “freestanding right to a law library or legal assistance.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S.

343 at 351 (1996). Instead, prisoners must show that they have suffered actual injury as a

result of alleged shortcomings in prison libraries. Id. Here, Petitioner stated the

requirements of a facial challenge in his PCR petition by quoting Village of Hoffman

Estates, which provides a lengthy analysis of the difference between facial and as-applied

challenges. Village of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 494-98. Based on Petitioner’s

citation in his PCR, the Court does not agree that Petitioner lacked the “necessary tools” to

present a facial challenge.

Accordingly, the Court does not find a miscarriage of justice, or cause and

prejudice that would excuse the default.

/ / /

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In lieu of the Court granting Petitioner’s habeas claim, Petitioner requests an

evidentiary hearing to show that Petitioner did not have access to appropriate case law. 

(Dkt. # 24.) Petitioner argues that cause has been shown because he did not have counsel

to assist him with case law. However, Petitioner waived his right to counsel and filed a

pro per petition for PCR relief. (Dkt. # 11, Exhs. J, K.) The Court has already determined

that Petitioner had the necessary case law to present a facial challenge because he cited it

in his PCR petition. Therefore, the Court does not agree that an evidentiary hearing is

necessary.

Petitioner also argues that he has shown a First Amendment violation as cause to

excuse the procedural default. (Dkt. # 24.) Petitioner did not explain or support this

argument. Accordingly, the Court finds the argument is without merit.

B. Merits Analysis (Objections Three and Four)

1. Standard of Review

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), a

federal court “shall not” grant habeas relief with respect to “any claim that was adjudicated

on the merits in State court proceedings” unless the State court decision was (1) contrary

to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the

U.S. Supreme Court, or (2) based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

the evidence presented in the State court proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Williams

v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000) (O’Connor, J., delivering the opinion of the Court

as to the AEDPA standard of review). 

A state court’s decision is “contrary to” clearly established precedent if (1) “the state

court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases,”

or (2) “if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a

decision of [the Supreme Court] and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [its]

precedent.” Taylor, 529 U.S. at 405-06. Indeed, “[a] state court’s decision can involve an

‘unreasonable application’ of federal law if it either (1) correctly identifies the governing

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rule but then applies it to a new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or (2)

extends or fails to extend a clearly established legal principle to a new context in a way

that is objectively unreasonable.” Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1142 (9th Cir.

2002). Thus, a state court’s application of federal law must be more than incorrect or

erroneous, it must be objectively unreasonable. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75

(2003). Furthermore, “[w]hen applying these standards, the federal court should review

the ‘last reasoned decision’ by a state court . . . .” Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044,

1055 (9th Cir. 2004).

2. Facial Challenge

Although this Court finds Petitioner’s facial challenge to Arizona’s fraudulent

schemes statute procedurally defaulted, the Court will, in the alternative, address the

merits of Petitioner’s facial challenge.

When a facial challenge is presented based on overbreadth and vagueness, the court

must “determine whether the enactment reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally

protected conduct.” Village of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 494-95. If the law does not

reach a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct, “then the overbreadth

challenge must fail.” Id. Next, the court should consider the facial challenge based on

vagueness and “uphold the challenge only if the enactment is impermissibly vague in all of

its applications.” Id. Where a statute is not found to be impermissibly vague in all of its

applications, “it may be impermissibly vague because it fails to establish standards for the

police and public that are sufficient to guard against the arbitrary deprivation of liberty

interests.” City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 55 (1999) (quoting Kolender v.

Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983)).

Arizona’s fraudulent schemes statute provides, in relevant part, as follows:

A. Any person who, pursuant to a scheme or artifice to defraud, knowingly obtains 

any benefit by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises or

material omissions is guilty of a class 2 felony.

A.R.S. §13-2310(A) (emphasis added).

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The Court finds that Arizona’s fraudulent schemes statute is not unconstitutionally

vague on its face. The statute prevents false or misleading representations, and therefore,

does not implicate the First Amendment. See Illinois, ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing

Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 618-21 (2003). Because the First Amendment is not

implicated by Arizona’s fraudulent schemes statute, Petitioner must show that the statute is

“impermissibly vague in all of its applications.” See Washington State Grange v.

Washington State Republic Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184, 1190 (2008) (citation and internal

quotations omitted).

Arizona’s fraudulent schemes statute is not impermissibly vague in all of its

applications. The statute was modeled after the federal mail fraud statute. See State v.

Henry, 68 P.3d 455, 459 (Ariz. App. 2003). The federal mail fraud statute has

constitutional applications. See Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 710-15 (1989). 

Similarly, the court in State v. Proctor, 2 P.3d 647, 654, ¶ 26 (Ariz. App. 1998), found

constitutional applications of Arizona’s fraudulent schemes statute. In that case,

Petitioners argued that two provisions of the statute were inconsistent and, as a result, that

the statute was impermissibly vague in all of its applications. Id. at 650-51. The court

found that the two provisions were not inconsistent, but instead required that a defendant

“engage in fraudulent behavior to be convicted of violating the statute.” Id. at 651. The

court held that “[b]ecause appellants made false representations and promises, in addition

to material omissions, their conduct was clearly proscribed by the [Arizona fraud] statute.” 

Id. at 654. Therefore, the Court finds that Arizona’s fraudulent schemes statute is not

impermissibly vague in all of its applications. 

As Petitioner correctly points out, our analysis does not end here. Rather, we must

consider whether the statute proscribes standards for the police and public in order to

prevent arbitrary enforcement. Morales, 527 U.S. at 55.

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Petitioner asserts that Arizona’s fraudulent schemes statute is impermissibly vague

because it does not clearly define “benefit.” (Dkt. # 22 at 7.) Petitioner argues that the

statute “authorizes and even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement in

violation of Kolender” by using the term “benefit” rather than more narrowly defined

terms. (Dkt. # 22 at 6.) Petitioner provides a hypothetical where one calls an emergency

hotline and “knowingly misrepresents that a fire is occurring, and receives the benefit of

laughter.” Petitioner asserts that this conduct would satisfy Arizona’s fraudulent schemes

statute. (Dkt. # 22 at 6.)

The Court is not persuaded by Petitioner’s argument that the term “benefit” allows

for arbitrary enforcement. In Morales, the ordinance at issue prohibited gang members

from loitering in any public place. Morales, 527 U.S. at 45-6. The Court found that

because the ordinance was “a criminal law that contained no mens rea requirement, and

infringe[d] on constitutionally protected rights” it was subject to facial attack. Id. at 55. 

Arizona’s fraudulent schemes statute differs from the ordinance in Morales because it

contains a mens rea requirement–the defendant must “knowingly” obtain benefit by fraud. 

A.R.S.§13-2310(A). The statute in this case also does not infringe on constitutionally

protected rights, supra, like the statutes in both Morales and Kolender. Morales, 527 U.S.

at 53; see also Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357. Therefore, the Court finds that Arizona’s

fraudulent schemes statute does not permit arbitrary enforcement.

Accordingly, the Court denies Petitioner’s facial challenge on the merits.

3. As-Applied Challenge

Petitioner also asserts an objection to the Magistrate Judge’s finding that Arizona’s

fraudulent schemes statute is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Petitioner’s

conduct. Petitioner, however, did not object to the finding that an as-applied challenge

was barred by his guilty plea. (Dkt. # 22.) Nonetheless, the Court will address the merits

of Petitioner’s as-applied challenge.

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A statute is vague as applied if (1) it “fails to give [a] person of ordinary intelligence

a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly” or

(2) it fails to “provide explicit standards for those who apply [the statute].” Grayned v.

City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). The Supreme Court “has recognized that a

scienter requirement may mitigate a law’s vagueness, especially with respect to the

adequacy of notice to the complainant that his conduct is proscribed.” Village of Hoffman

Estates, 455 U.S. at 499. When a mens rea requirement exists, a defendant must

consciously behave “in a way the law prohibits, and such conduct is a fitting object of

criminal punishment.” United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 445

(1978).

Petitioner asserts that Arizona’s fraudulent schemes statute does not define “benefit”

in a way that includes a government-issued license. Petitioner argues that obtaining a

government-issued liquor license does not qualify as a “benefit” because the license is not

an economic advantage in a Government-citizen relationship. (Dkt. # 22 at 11.)

The Court does not agree that Arizona’s fraudulent schemes statute is

unconstitutionally vague as applied to Petitioner’s conduct. Arizona’s Criminal Code

defines “benefit” as “anything of value or advantage, present or prospective,” A.R.S. § 13-

105(3), and there is a clear advantage to obtaining a liquor license because it allows the

holder to sell liquor. Petitioner’s argument that the “benefit” must be within the scope of

his relationship with the Government is unsupported. The plain language of the statute

does not limit “benefit” to that which is received directly from the defrauded party, and

Petitioner does not cite case law to support this proposition. Moreover, Arizona’s

fraudulent schemes statute contains a mens rea requirement because the defendant must

“knowingly” obtain benefit by fraud. A.R.S.§13-2310(A). Petitioner has not shown that

the statute fails to provide a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited or that it

fails to provide explicit standards for those who apply the statute.

Accordingly, the Court denies Petitioner’s as-applied challenge on the merits.

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IV. CONCLUSION

The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s determination that the claims in

Petitioner’s habeas petition are barred by Petitioner’s guilty plea, procedurally defaulted,

or fail on the merits.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED adopting the Magistrate Judge's Report and

Recommendation (Dkt. # 16) in its entirety as the Order of the Court.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Dkt. # 1)

is denied and dismissed.

The Court has reviewed Petitioner’s “Request for Any Court Orders Entered After

June 8, 2009; and Notice of Change of Address.” The Court having previously updated

Petitioner’s address with the correct zip code, and Petitioner having timely filed his

Objection,

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying said motion as moot. (Dkt. # 21.)

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary

hearing. (Dkt. # 24.)

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of the Court to enter judgement

accordingly.

DATED this 21st day of October, 2009.

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