Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00462/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00462-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Ricardo Omar Galindo, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

Charles Ryan; et. al., 

Respondents. 

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No. CV 12-462-TUC-RCC (CRP)

AMENDED REPORT &

 RECOMMENDATION*

Pending before the Court is Petitioner’s pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1). Respondents have filed an Answer (Docs. 10,

11). Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was referred to the

undersigned Magistrate Judge for Report & Recommendation. For the following reasons the

Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court, after its independent review, dismiss

and deny Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of aggravated assault of a law enforcement

officer with a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument, second-degree burglary, and unlawful

use of a means of transportation. The Arizona Court of Appeals summarized the evidence

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*

The Report and Recommendation (Doc. 13) is amended to reflect at p.17, infra, that if

objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived.

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1

Under the mail box rule, a habeas petition is deemed filed on the day that the inmate

delivers it to prison authorities for mailing. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270 (1988).

The Petition in this case reflects that Petitioner delivered it to prison officials for mailing on

March 26, 2012. (Petition, p. 11). The Petition was file-stamped by the Clerk of Court on

June 18, 2012. Respondents do not challenge the timeliness of the Habeas Petition. Because

the Court is not required to raise the statute of limitations sua sponte, the Magistrate Judge

will not further address the timeliness of the Habeas Petition. See Day v. McDonough, 547

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presented at Petitioner’s trial as follows:

According to the evidence at Galindo’s trial, Tucson Police Officer Steven

Pupkoff responded to a burglary-in-progress call and observed two men

 leaving the scene in a stolen vehicle. As Pupkoff activated his emergency

lights, Galindo and the other suspect got out of the stolen vehicle and fled on

foot. When Pupkoff approached, Galindo pointed a handgun toward the

officer. Pupkoff fired at Galindo, wounding him in the knee, Pupkoff’s

marked patrol car was equipped with a dashboard video camera and a

recording of Pupkoff’s interaction with Galindo was admitted into evidence.

(Answer, Exh. A, p. 2). Petitioner was sentenced to a combination of concurrent and

consecutive sentences totaling 14 years. (Id.).

On direct appeal, Petitioner argued that the trial court committed fundamental error

by failing to define “recklessness” for the jury, the requisite mental state for the lesserincluded offense of disorderly conduct. (Petition, Exh. A). The appellate court rejected

Petitioner’s argument and affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. (Id.). 

Thereafter, Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief (“PCR Petition”),

asserting that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction defining

“recklessness,” the requisite mental state for the instruction on the lesser-included offense

of disorderly conduct. (Answer, Exh. D). The PCR court denied relief without a hearing.

(Petition, Exh. C). Petitioner reasserted his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim in

his Petition for Review to the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Answer, Exh. F.). The appellate

court granted review, adopted the PCR court’s ruling, and denied relief. (Petition, Exh. B).

Petitioner did not seek further review. (Answer, p. 4 (citing Exh. H)).

FEDERAL HABEAS PETITION

On March 26, 20121, Petitioner filed the instant Petition raising the following three

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28 U.S. 198, 209 (2006).

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grounds for relief: (Ground 1) ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on counsel’s

failure to request a jury instruction defining recklessness, the requisite mental state for the

lesser included offense of disorderly conduct; (Ground 2) the trial court violated Petitioner’s

right to due process when it failed to instruct the jury on the definition of recklessness; and

(Ground 3) the trial court violated Petitioner’s right to due process when it imposed

consecutive sentences. Respondents argue that the Petition should be dismissed and denied

because: Ground 1 is without merit and Grounds 2 and 3 were not fairly presented in the state

court and, thus, are unexhausted and procedurally defaulted.

EXHAUSTION REGARDING GROUNDS 2 AND 3

Respondents assert that Grounds 2 and 3 are not exhausted. A state prisoner must

normally exhaust available state remedies before a federal district court can grant a writ of

habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981). To

exhaust, a claim must be fairly presented in the proper forum. In Petitioner’s case, he must

fairly present his claims to the Arizona Court of Appeals by properly pursuing those claims

through the state's direct appeal process or through appropriate post-conviction relief.

Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir.1999); Roettgen v. Copeland, 33 F.3d 36,

38 (9th Cir.1994). This requirement of exhaustion is designed to give the state an initial

opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners' federal rights. Picard

v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971).

A claim is fairly presented if the petitioner describes both the operative facts and the

federal legal theory upon which the claim is based. Kelly v. Small, 315 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th

Cir.2003), overruled on other grounds, Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir.2007). The

petitioner must have “characterized the claims he raised in state proceedings specifically as

federal claims.” Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 670 (9th Cir.2000) (emphasis in original),

as modified, 247 F.3d 904 (9th Cir.2001). “If a petitioner fails to alert the state court to the

fact that he is raising a federal constitutional claim, his federal claim is unexhausted

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regardless of its similarity to the issues raised in state court.” Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828,

830 (9th Cir.1996). “Moreover, general appeals to broad constitutional principles, such as

due process, equal protection, and the right to a fair trial, are insufficient to establish

exhaustion.” Hivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir.1999) (citing Gray v.

Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162–163 (1996)).

Ground 2. On direct appeal, Petitioner argued that the trial court’s failure “to instruct the

jury on the definition of ‘recklessness’ was fundamental error when the defense in the

aggravated assault charge was that appellant was only guilty of the lesser included offense

of disorderly conduct with a weapon.” (Answer, Exh. B, p. 7 (capitalization omitted)). In

rejecting Petitioner’s claim, the Arizona appellate court did not reference the federal due

process clause. (See Petition, Exh. A). 

Petitioner’s appellate brief made no mention whatsoever of a federal constitutional

violation. (See Answer, Exh. B). Nor did Petitioner cite relevant state or federal cases that

might have alerted the Arizona court that he was raising a federal claim. The state cases

cited by Petitioner address Arizona’s fundamental error review and do not undertake a

federal due process analysis. (See Answer, Exh. B (citing State v. Avila, 217 Ariz. 97, 170

P.3d 706 (App. 2007); State v. Simpson, 217 Ariz. 326, 117 P.3d 1027 (App. 2007)).

Additionally, although Petitioner cited a Supreme Court case, Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 13-

14 (1984), he did so for the purpose of analogizing to the federal standard for cause and

prejudice to excuse procedural default to enhance his argument that “the fundamental error

analysis must take into consideration the likelihood of whether defense counsel’s failure to

object was intentional or an oversight.” (Answer, Exh. B, p. 8). Consequently, Petitioner’s

appellate brief did not raise a federal due process claim. See Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d.

993, 1001-02 (9th Cir. 2005) (habeas petitioner failed to exhaust claim where he did not

reference any specific provision of the U.S. Constitution on which he rested his claim and

did not cite relevant state or federal cases that might have alerted the Arizona court to his

claim). Moreover, Petitioner’s mere assertion of fundamental error under Arizona law does

not equate to raising a federal constitutional argument. Id. (citing Johnson v. Lewis, 929 F.2d

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2

Because these claims are procedurally defaulted pursuant to Rule 32.4(a),

Ariz.R.Crim.P., this Court need not determine whether the claims are of “sufficient

constitutional magnitude” to require a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver. See e.g.

Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614 (9th Cir. 2005). Moreover, the procedural timeliness bar of

Rule 32.4(a), Ariz.R.Crim.P., is clear, consistently applied, and well established. Powell v.

Lambert, 357 F.3d 871 (9th Cir.2004); see e.g., Rosario, 195 Ariz. 264, 987 P.2d 226 (where

petitioner did not raise claims pursuant to Rule 32.1(d) through (g), the petition could be

summarily dismissed if untimely); Jones, 182 Ariz. at 434, 897 P.2d at 736; see also Wagner

v. Stewart, 2008 WL 169639, *9 (D.Ariz. Jan. 16, 2008).

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460, 462 (9th Cir. 1991). Petitioner’s Ground 2 was not fairly presented to the state court and

is, therefore, not exhausted.

GROUND 3. Petitioner claims that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing

“consecutive sentences to separate counts that occurred in the same series of events, and

citing agg[ravating] [and] mitigating factors already used to sentence defendant to a

presumptive.” (Petition, p. 8). Respondents point out, and Petitioner concedes (see Petition,

p. 8), that Petitioner did not present this claim to the state court. Thus, Ground 3 is not

exhausted.

PROCEDURAL DEFAULT OF GROUNDS 2 AND 3

Petitioner’s return to state court to raise Grounds 2 and 3 would be futile given that

the claims are precluded as waived under Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.2(a)(3) because they were not

presented on direct appeal or in Petitioner’s PCR Petition. Further, presentation of such

claims in a second post-conviction relief proceeding would be untimely under Ariz.R.Crim.P.

32.4. See Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir 2002) (a state post-conviction action

is futile when it is time-barred). Nor do the claims qualify for any of the timeliness

exceptions. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1(d)-(h). Thus, any additional petition would be subject

to summary dismissal. See State v. Rosario, 195 Ariz. 264, 266, 987 P.2d 226, 228 (App.

1999); State v. Jones, 182 Ariz. 432, 897 P.2d 734 (App. 1995); Moreno v. Gonzalez, 192

Ariz. 131, 135, 962 P.2d 205, 209 (1998) (timeliness is a separate inquiry from preclusion).

Under such circumstances, the claims are procedurally defaulted.2 Smith v. Baldwin, 510

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F.3d 1127, 1139 (9th Cir.2007) (“[W]here a petitioner did not properly exhaust state

remedies and ‘the court to which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in

order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred,’

the petitioner's claim is procedurally defaulted.”) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S.

722, 735 fn. 1 (1991)); Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1150-51 (9th Cir. 2000) (federal

habeas review is precluded where petitioner has not raised his claim in the state courts and

the time for doing so has expired). 

 When a petitioner has procedurally defaulted his claims, federal habeas review can

occur only in limited circumstances. “A prisoner may obtain federal review of a defaulted

claim by showing cause for the default and prejudice from a violation of federal law.”

Martinez v. Ryan, __ U.S. __, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 1316 (2012) (citing Coleman, 501 U.S. at

750). “Cause” requires a showing of “some objective factor” which impeded compliance

with a procedural rule, such as “a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not

reasonably available to counsel” or that there was “some interference by officials.” Murray

v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986) (internal citations omitted). Prejudice requires

“showing, not merely that the errors at his trial created a possibility of prejudice, but that they

worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of

constitutional dimensions.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982) (emphasis in

original). Additionally, a habeas petitioner “may also qualify for relief from his procedural

default if he can show that the procedural default would result in a ‘fundamental miscarriage

of justice.’” Cook v. Schriro, 538 F.3d 1000, 1028 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Schlup v. Delo, 513

U.S. 298, 321 (1995)). This exception to the procedural default rule is limited to habeas

petitioners who can establish that “a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the

conviction of one who is actually innocent[.]” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327. See also Murray, 477

U.S. at 496; Cook, 538 F.3d at 1028. “‘To be credible, such a claim requires petitioner to

support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence—whether it be

exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eye-witness accounts, or critical physical

evidence—that was not presented at trial.’” Cook, 538 F.3d at 1028 (quoting Schlup, 513

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U.S. at 324).

 Petitioner incorrectly asserts he raised Ground 2 on direct appeal. (See Petition, p. 7).

As discussed supra, the record is clear that he did not do so. Petitioner asserts no facts

supporting cause or prejudice to excuse failure to exhaust the federal claim raised in Ground

2. Nor does he has demonstrated prejudice, or a fundamental miscarriage of justice.

Petitioner asserts that his failure to exhaust Ground 3 was due to ineffective assistance

of counsel for failure to raise the claim. (Petition, p. 8). To rely on ineffective assistance

of counsel to excuse a procedural default, the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for

failure to raise the defaulted claim must itself have been fairly presented to the state court.

See Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451–54 (2000) (allegation of ineffective assistance

of counsel as cause for procedural default “is itself an independent constitutional claim” and

is subject to the same exhaustion requirement as other habeas claims). Although Plaintiff

argued ineffective assistance of counsel during the PCR proceeding, he did not argue that

counsel was ineffective for failure to raise a due process claim challenging the imposition of

consecutive sentences. See Moormann v. Schriro, 426 F.3d 1044, 1056-57 (9th Cir. 2005),

(new allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel not previously raised before the state

court cannot be addressed on habeas review). Moreover, Petitioner has not demonstrated

prejudice, or a fundamental miscarriage of justice.

 Petitioner’s procedural default of Grounds 2 and 3 cannot be excused.

MERITS REVIEW OF GROUND 1

Respondents concede that Petitioner exhausted his Ground 1 claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel and, thus, Ground 1 should be addressed on the merits. (Answer, p. 8).

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), the Court may

grant a writ of habeas corpus only if the state court proceeding:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme

Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

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28 U.S.C. §2254(d). Section 2254(d)(1) applies to challenges to purely legal questions

resolved by the state court and section 2254(d)(2) applies to purely factual questions resolved

by the state court. Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 978 (9th Cir. 2004). Therefore, the

question whether a state court erred in applying the law is a different question from whether

it erred in determining the facts. Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333 (2006). 

“State-court decisions are measured against...[the Supreme] Court’s precedents, as of

the ‘time the state court renders its decision.’” Cullen v. Pinholster, __ U.S. __, 131 S.Ct.

1388, 1399 (2011) (quoting Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72 (2003)). Therefore, to

assess a claim under subsection (d)(1), the Court must first identify the “clearly established

Federal law,” if any, that governs the claims on habeas review. Habeas relief cannot be

granted if the Supreme Court has not “broken sufficient legal ground” on a constitutional

principle advanced by a petitioner, even if lower courts have decided the issue. Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 381 (2000). Nevertheless, while only Supreme Court authority is

binding, circuit precedent may be “persuasive” in determining what law is clearly established

and whether a state court applied that law unreasonably. Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062,

1069 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Additionally, section 2254(d)(1) consists of two alternative tests, i.e., the “contrary

to” test and the “unreasonable application” test. See Cordova v. Baca, 346 F.3d 924, 929 (9th

Cir. 2003). Under the first test, “[a] state-court decision is contrary to... [the Supreme] Court's

clearly established precedents if it applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth

in [the Supreme Court's] cases, or if it confronts a set of facts that is materially

indistinguishable from a decision of...[the Supreme] Court but reaches a different result.”

Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141(2005). “Whether a state court’s interpretation of federal

law is contrary to Supreme Court authority...is a question of federal law as to which [the

federal courts]...owe no deference to the state courts.” Cordova, 346 F.3d at 929 (emphasis

omitted).

Under the second test, “[a] state-court decision involves an unreasonable application

of...[the Supreme] Court's clearly established precedents if the state court applies [the

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Court's] precedents to the facts in an objectively unreasonable manner.” Brown, 544 U.S. at

141. When evaluating whether the state decision amounts to an unreasonable application of

federal law, “[f]ederal courts owe substantial deference to state court interpretations of

federal law....” Cordova, 346 F.3d at 929. Further, a federal habeas court can only look to

the record before the state court in reviewing a state court decision under section 2254(d)(1).

Cullen, __ U.S. at __, 131 S.Ct. at 1400 (“If a claim has been adjudicated on the merits by

a state court, a federal habeas petitioner must overcome the limitation of §2254(d)(1) on the

record that was before that state court.”)(footnote omitted); Holland v. Jackson, 542 U.S.

649, 652 (2004)(“[W]e have made clear that whether a state court’s decision was

unreasonable must be assessed in light of the record the court had before it.”)(citations

omitted).

Under section 2254(d)(2), which involves purely factual questions resolved by the

state court, “the question on review is whether an appellate panel, applying the normal

standards of appellate review, could reasonably conclude that the finding is supported by the

record.” Lambert, 393 F.3d at 978; see also Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir.

2004)(“a federal court may not second-guess a state court’s fact-finding process unless, after

review of the state-court record, it determines that the state court was not merely wrong, but

actually unreasonable.”). In examining the record under section 2254(d)(2), the federal court

“must be particularly deferential to our state court colleagues...[M]ere doubt as to the

adequacy of the state court’s findings of fact is insufficient; ‘we must be satisfied that any

appellate court to whom the defect [in the state court’s fact-finding process] is pointed out

would be unreasonable in holding that the state court’s fact-finding process was adequate.’”

Lambert, 393 F.3d at 972 (quoting Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1000)(emphasis in original). 

Once the federal court is satisfied that the state court’s fact-finding process was

reasonable, or where the petitioner does not challenge such findings, “the state court’s

findings are dressed in a presumption of correctness....” Taylor, 366 F.3d at 1000: see also

28 U.S.C. §2254(c). Thus, factual and credibility determinations by either state trial or

appellate courts are imbued with a presumption of correctness. 28 U.S.C. §2254(e)(1);

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Pollard v. Galaza, 290 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 2002); Bragg v. Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082,

1078 (9th Cir. 2001), amended 253 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2001).

Both section 2254(d)(1) and (d)(2) may apply where the petitioner raises issues of

mixed questions of law and fact. Such questions “receive similarly mixed review; the state

court’s ultimate conclusion is reviewed under section 2254(d)(1), but its underlying factual

findings supporting that conclusion are clothed with all of the deferential protection

ordinarily afforded factual findings under §§ 2254(d)(2) and (e)(1).” Lambert, 393 F.3d at

978.

STANDARD FOR INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. The Supreme Court established

a two-part test for evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel claims in Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To establish that his trial counsel was ineffective under

Strickland, Petitioner must show: (1) that his trial counsel's performance was deficient; and

(2) that trial counsel's deficient performance prejudiced petitioner's defense. Ortiz v. Stewart,

149 F.3d 923, 932 (9th Cir. 1998)(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694).

 To establish deficient performance, Petitioner must show that "counsel made errors

so serious...” that “counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness" under prevailing professional norms.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-688. The

relevant inquiry is not what defense counsel could have done, but rather whether the

decisions made by defense counsel were reasonable. Babbit v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 1170,

1173 (9th Cir. 1998). In considering this factor, counsel is strongly presumed to have

rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable

professional judgment. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. The Ninth Circuit "h[as] explained that

'[r]eview of counsel's performance is highly deferential and there is a strong presumption that

counsel's conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable representation.'" Ortiz, 149 F.3d

at 932 (quoting Hensley v. Crist, 67 F.3d 181, 184 (9th Cir. 1995)). "The reasonableness of

counsel's performance is to be evaluated from counsel's perspective at the time of the alleged

error and in light of all the circumstances, and the standard of review is highly deferential."

Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986). Additionally, "[a] fair assessment of

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attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of

hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate

the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 

Even where trial counsel's performance is deficient, Petitioner must also establish

prejudice in order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. To establish

prejudice, Petitioner "must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. at 694.

Under the prejudice factor, "[a]n error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does

not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on

the judgment." Id. at 691. "The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just

conceivable." Harrington v. Richter, __ U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. 770, 792 (2011). Further,

because failure to make the required showing of either deficient performance or prejudice

defeats the claim, the court need not address both factors where one is lacking. Strickland,

466 U.S. at 697-700. Additionally, under the AEDPA, the federal court's review of the

state court's decision is subject to another level of deference. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685,

689-699 (2002). In order to merit habeas relief, therefore, Petitioner must make the additional

showing that the state court's ruling rejecting an ineffective assistance of counsel claim

constituted an unreasonable application of Strickland. See 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1); see also

Cullen, __ U.S. __, 131 S.Ct. at 1403 (federal habeas court's review of state court's decision

on ineffective assistance of counsel claim is "doubly deferential."); Harrington, __U.S. at __,

131 S.Ct. at 788 ("Federal habeas courts must guard against the danger of equating

unreasonableness under Strickland with unreasonableness under § 2254(d). When § 2254(d)

applies, the question is not whether counsel's actions were reasonable. The question is

whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland's deferential

standard.").

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3

The trial court gave the following instruction on disorderly conduct, which was

submitted by the defense:

A person commits disorderly conduct if, with intent to disturb the peace and

quiet of a neighborhood, family or person, or with knowledge of doing so,

such person: Recklessly handles and/or displays a...weapon or dangerous

instrument.

(Petition, Exh. A, pp. 2-3; see also Answer Exh. J, pp. 78-79). The trial court also instructed

the jury on the crime of aggravated assault upon a police officer with a deadly weapon or

dangerous instrument which requires

one, that the defendant committed an assault which requires proof that the

defendant intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly caused a physical injury to

another person or the defendant intentionally placed another person in

reasonable apprehension of imminent physical injury; and two, the defendant

used a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument; and three, the person assaulted

was a police officer engaged in the execution of his official duty.

(Answer, Exh. J, pp. 77-78). The trial court also defined “intentionally” and “knowingly”.

(Id. at pp. 82-83).

4

Under Arizona law at the time of Petitioner’s case: 

“Recklessly” means, with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by

a statute defining an offense, that a person is aware of and consciously

disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that

the circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree that

disregard of such risk constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of

conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation. 

(Petition, Exh. A, p.,3 n.1 (quoting A.R.S. §13-105(10)(c)).

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GROUND 1. The trial court granted defense counsel’s request for a jury instruction on the

offense of disorderly conduct as a lesser-included offense of aggravated assault.3

 (See

Petition, Exh A, p. 2). Petitioner claims that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by

failing to submit a jury instruction setting out statutory definition of “reckless”4

 as used in

the instruction for disorderly conduct. Petitioner raised this claim in his PCR Petition.

(Answer, Exh. D). Citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and state cases,

the PCR court denied Petitioner’s PCR Petition without a hearing. (Petition, Exh. C). The

PCR court found Petitioner failed to establish a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel. (Id.). The PCR court further found that defense counsel’s performance was not

deficient pointing out that:

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Defendants are not guaranteed perfect counsel, only competent counsel, and

not every failure ...qualifies as ineffective assistance of counsel....The Court

of Appeals has held that in this case, failure to give a jury instruction as to the

meaning of “reckless” was not fundamental error. In its opinion, the Court of

Appeals found that in this case, “where Galindo expressly argued that he had

been reckless, any distinction between common usage and the statutory

definition would appear irrelevant.” The court went on to state that “we doubt

any error occurred, much less fundamental error.” Decision of the Court of

Appeals in 2CA-CR 2009-0365.

(Petition, Exh. C, pp. 1-2). 

The PCR court went on to state that even if counsel’s failure to request an instruction

defining “reckless” was deficient, Petitioner also failed to establish that the existence of a

reasonable probability that outcome of his trial would have been different. (Id. at p. 2).

Petitioner filed a petition for review of the denial of his PCR Petition and the appellate

court granted review but denied relief. (Petition, Exh. B). Citing Strickland, as well as state

cases, the appellate court stated, in pertinent part, that:

Addressing this very issue on appeal, albeit not in the context of ineffective

assistance of counsel, we found no error in the court's having failed to provide

a recklessness instruction to the jury, and noted that, because “Galindo [had]

expressly argued [to the jury] that he had been reckless, any distinction

between common usage and the statutory definition would appear irrelevant.”

Galindo, No. 2 CA–CR 2009–0365, ¶ 6. Importantly, we also noted the

absence of any prejudicial error; the jury found Galindo guilty of aggravated

assault based on the theory that “the defendant intentionally placed another

person in reasonable apprehension of imminent physical injury.” It therefore

necessarily found he had acted intentionally, a more culpable mental state than

recklessly. Id. ¶ 7.

Based on the record before us, we cannot say the trial court abused its

discretion in denying Galindo's petition for post-conviction relief. In a

well-reasoned minute entry ruling, the court clearly and correctly addressed the

merits of Galindo's claim. We adopt that ruling and find no need to repeat the

court's analysis here. See State v. Whipple, 177 Ariz. 272, 274, 866 P.2d 1358,

1360 (App.1993).

(Petition, Exh. B, pp. 2-3). 

Because the appellate court adopted the PCR court’s ruling, the PCR court’s order

denying Petitioner’s PCR Petition, is the last-reasoned state court decision on this issue. See

Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804 (1991); State v. Whipple, 177 Ariz. 272, 274, 866

P.2d 1358, 1360 (App. 1993)(“Under Ylst and Coleman the federal courts will ‘presume that

no procedural default has been invoked’ when an unexplained order leaves in place an earlier

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decision on the merits. Ylst, 501 U.S. at __, 111 S.Ct. at 2594. We presume that the federal

courts will do as the United States Supreme Court directs and ‘look through’ to the superior

court ruling to determine whether the issues raised in the federal habeas corpus proceeding

were resolved in Arizona courts on the merits or are precluded by procedural default.”).

In Petitioner's case, the state court cited Strickland when evaluating his claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel. The state court, in applying Strickland, applied the

correct law to the issue. See Dows v. Wood, 211 F.3d 480, 484-85 (9th Cir. 2000)

(Strickland "is considered in this circuit to be ‘clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States’ for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)

review."). 

The Supreme Court has held that the inadvertent omission of an element from the

jury instruction is harmless when: (1) the evidence of the omitted element is overwhelming;

and (2) the jury is otherwise properly instructed. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 19

(1999); see also United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 631-34 (2002); cf. Henderson v.

Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 156 (“An omission, or incomplete instruction, is less likely to be

prejudicial than a misstatement of the law.”). Here, Officer Pupkoff testified that Petitioner

pointed his handgun directly at the officer and that the officer “was in fear for [my] life at

that point.” (Answer, Exh. I, pp. 46-48). Moreover, a video of the incident was also

admitted into evidence.

During closing argument, defense counsel argued that Petitioner “acted foolishly,

he acted stupidly, and he acted recklessly....” (Answer, Exh, J, p. 49; see also id. at 50, 55,

65). Defense counsel also stressed that for Petitioner to be found guilty of aggravated

assault, there would have to be “proof that the defendant intentionally, intentionally, placed

another person in reasonable apprehension of imminent physical injury....The question is,

did [Petitioner] intentionally place Officer Pupkoff in that fear?” (Id. at p. 54; see also id.

at 55 (Petitioner “turns his head, which is a reflexive reaction, and the gun comes across.

Does [Petitioner] intentionally bring that gun across, point it at that officer to scare that

officer, or is this a further indication of [Petitioner’s] recklessness that day, [Petitioner’s]

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unthinking actions that day? And the defense would submit to you that’s entirely what it

was.”); id. at p. 56 (“we are talking about a short period of time...and no evidence, no

evidence [sic] showing that [Petitioner] intentionally tired to put Officer Pupkoff in fear.

Rather, everything seems to point [sic] this was some quick, unthinking, non-thought-out

action.”). During closing argument when defense counsel specifically discussed the lesser

included offense of disorderly conduct, he urged the jury to watch the video “applying the

testimony that you heard from various witnesses...and the defense would submit to you that

everything points to [Petitioner] being reckless in waiving that gun around. And

[Petitioner] is, you know, very lucky to be here based upon the reckless way that he

handled himself that day.” (Id. at pp. 56-57; see id. at p. 65 (Petitioner “is not guilty of

aggravated assault with a deadly weapon on a police officer...but...he is guilty...of

disorderly conduct with that gun. He recklessly handled that gun, no doubt about it.”)).

There is no dispute that the trial court correctly instructed the jury on the elements

of disorderly conduct. Thus, no erroneous instruction was given. Instead, Petitioner claims

counsel was ineffective for not requesting an instruction defining a term used in the

instruction on disorderly conduct. There is no question that the jury instructions given in

this case as a whole instructed on the elements required. “A jury is presumed to follow its

instructions.” Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234 (2000) (citing Richardson v. Marsh,

481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987)). This Court is bound to presume that the jury applied the correct

legal standards in reaching its conclusion. See Hollenback v. Ryan, 2014 WL 1998530, *2

(May 15, 2014) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695 (explaining that in assessing whether

a defendant was prejudiced by ineffective assistance, a court should presume that the

decisionmaker “reasonably, conscientiously, and impartially” applied the correct legal

standards)). Respondents persuasively point out that “[b]ecause the jury found [Petitioner]

guilty of the greater offense–aggravated assault with a deadly weapon or dangerous

instrument–the question of recklessness was moot.” (Answer, p. 16). “In this case, it

would be speculative to reach the conclusion that there was a reasonable probability the

outcome would have been different if ...[“recklessly” had been defined] because this would

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presume the jurors failed to follow their instructions in convicting Petitioner when there

was a reasonable doubt that he committed the charged offense.” Hollenback, 2014 WL

1998530, *2. Moreover, the Arizona appellate court, when denying Petitioner’s direct

appeal, expressly held that the lack of an instruction defining recklessness did not constitute

fundamental error. (Petition, Exh. A, p. 4). In finding that Petitioner failed to establish

fundamental error, the court specifically held that Petitioner failed to establish that the

omission of the instruction was prejudicial–i.e., that absent the error, the jury could have

reached a different result. (Id. at pp. 4-6). 

On the instant record, the state court’s rejection of Petitioner’s ineffective assistance

of counsel claim for the reason that Petitioner failed to establish prejudice under Strickland

is not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, Strickland. Nor did the state court’s

decision result in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts

in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. Petitioner’s Ground 1

should be denied on the merits.

RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court,

after its independent review, dismiss and deny Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus (Doc. 1). The Petition should be dismissed as procedurally defaulted with regard

to Grounds 2 and 3, and the Petition should be denied on the merits with regard to Ground

1.

 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b) and Rule 72(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure and LRCiv 7.2(e), Rules of Practice of the U.S. District Court for the District of

Arizona, any party may serve and file written objections within fourteen (14) days after

being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to

another party’s objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. Fed.R.

///

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///

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Civ.P. 72(b)(2). No replies to objections shall be filed unless leave is granted from the

district court to do so. If objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. If

objections are filed, the parties should use the following case number: CV 12-462-TUCRCC.

DATED this 14th day of August, 2014.

Case 4:12-cv-00462-RCC Document 14 Filed 08/15/14 Page 17 of 17