Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01499/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01499-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NEHEMIAH ROBINSON, No. CIV S-05-1499-LKK-CMK

Plaintiff, 

vs. ORDER

M. PENNER, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is plaintiff’s complaint (Doc. 1), filed on July 26,

2005. 

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or

malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief

from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover,

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “. . . short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This

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means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d

1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the

complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it

rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff names the following as defendants: Sahota, chief medical physician;

Penner; Todd; Swift; King; and Johnson-Dovey. Plaintiff also sues an unnamed prison official as

well as the Director of the California Department of Corrections and the Warden of California

State Prison, Sacramento. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages. 

Plaintiff states that he suffers from “significant collagen vascular disease” and

“post-traumatic degenerative arthritis.” After submitting a health care service request form

complaining of “severe pain,” plaintiff was examined on February 3, 2005, by defendant Penner, a

prison physician. Plaintiff claims that defendant Penner signed an order that same day

documenting plaintiff’s medical need to be transferred to a prison in a warmer climate. Plaintiff

alleges that he was informed that he would be notified regarding his transfer within two weeks,

but that this was never done. 

Plaintiff states that, on February 18, 2005, he filed a prison grievance requesting to

be transferred. That request was allegedly reviewed by defendant Johnson-Dovey, and that, on

February 23, 2005, defendant Johnson-Dovey requested that plaintiff provide additional

information in support of his request. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that defendant Johnson-Dovey

had requested to see a copy of the February 3, 2005, order from defendant Penner. Plaintiff

asserts that, on February 25, 2005, he spoke with defendant Penner about the February 3, 2005,

order and was told by defendant Penner that the appropriate officials would be provided with the

order. Plaintiff states that he re-submitted his transfer request on February 28, 2005, along with a

statement as to defendant Penner’s response concerning the February 3, 2005, order.

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Plaintiff claims that, on March 10, 2005, he submitted a request for the status of his

transfer request. The next day, plaintiff received a response indicating that he would receive a

decision soon. Meanwhile, plaintiff states that he requested health care services again on March

16, 2005, for “severe pain,” and that he was seen at the prison medical clinic on March 21, 2005. 

Plaintiff asserts that he was informed at that time that he was on the list to be seen by defendant

King, a registered nurse. After waiting over three hours, plaintiff was seen by defendant King,

whereupon plaintiff conveyed the foregoing. Defendant King informed plaintiff that he would be

informed of the status of his transfer request at a later date. 

Plaintiff states that he went to the medical clinic again on March 23, 2005, and was

told that he would be seen by defendant Todd. Plaintiff also states that, while he was in the

medical clinic on March 23, 2005, he went to defendant King’s office and asked about the status

of his transfer request. Defendant King told plaintiff that he would receive a decision within three

weeks. Plaintiff asserts that another inmate present in the medical clinic at the time overheard a

conversation among defendants King, Swift, and Todd concerning plaintiff’s transfer request. 

Specifically, plaintiff learned from this that an unnamed prison official instructed defendant Swift

to discontinue plaintiff’s transfer request. Plaintiff claims that, after he requested a copy of the

discontinuation order, defendant Swift “. . . suddenly became belligerent for no apparent reason”

and informed him that he would not be allowed to see the doctor. Plaintiff states that he told

defendant Swift that he would file an inmate grievance based on denial of medical care and

conspiracy to deprive him of a transfer to a different prison. 

Additionally, plaintiff claims that he was treated by defendant Todd on March 24,

2005, for “severe pain,” but that defendant Todd refused to prescribe pain medication. During

that visit, plaintiff learned that the results of a prior blood test were “positive,” indicating the

possibility of hepatitis B and/or liver disease. 

/ / /

/ / /

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Plaintiff also claims that he was sent to the medical clinic again on April 12, 2005. 

His vital signs were taken and he was led to the doctor’s office. Plaintiff states that he was then

informed by defendant Todd that the February 3, 2005, order from defendant Penner had been

discontinued as unwarranted. Defendant Todd allegedly informed plaintiff that she did this on her

own authority. 

Plaintiff was seen at the medical clinic again on April 20, 2005. Plaintiff states

that his vitals were taken and that he was informed by defendant Todd that the defendant Sahota,

the chief medical officer, instructed that plaintiff be given either Tylenol or Motrin IB for his pain. 

Plaintiff states that he told defendant Todd that his medical file reflects that Tylenol is ineffective

and Motrin IB causes him severe stomach pain. Plaintiff claims that defendant Todd refused to

review his medical file. 

Plaintiff was again seen at the medical clinic on April 28, 2005. At this time,

plaintiff’s blood was drawn in order to determine whether he had hepatitis B or hepatitis C, but

that his blood would not be tested for liver disease.

Finally, plaintiff claims that the director of the California Department of

Corrections and the warden of California State Prison, Sacramento, knew or should have known

of defendant’s alleged misconduct and that it is the policy of the California Department of

Corrections to “. . . forbid prisoners from receiving adequate and effective medical

care/treatment.” 

II. DISCUSSION

The gravamen of plaintiff’s claims against each defendant is that they were

deliberately indifferent with respect to his medical needs. For the reasons discussed below, the

court concludes that plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

/ / /

/ / /

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A complaint, or portion thereof, should only be dismissed for failure to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted if it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set

of facts in support of the claim or claims that would entitle him to relief. See Hishon v. King &

Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)); Palmer v.

Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass'n, 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1981). In reviewing a

complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in

question, construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all doubts

in the plaintiff's favor. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); see also Barnett v.

Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). In determining whether a complaint

states a claim upon which relief can be granted, the court generally may not consider materials

outside the complaint and pleadings. See Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 622 (9th Cir. 1998);

Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 453 (9th Cir. 1994). The court may, however, consider: (1)

documents whose contents are alleged in or attached to the complaint and whose authenticity no

party questions, see Branch, 14 F.3d at 454; (2) documents whose authenticity is not in question,

and upon which the complaint necessarily lies, but which are not attached to the complaint, see

Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001); and (3) documents and materials

of which the court may take judicial notice, see Barron v. Reich, 13 F.3d 1370, 1377 (9th Cir.

1994), except prison regulations, see Anderson v. Angelone, 86 F.3d 932, 934 (9th Cir. 1996).

A. Medical Needs Claims

The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which the

prisoner is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel

and unusual punishment. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth

Amendment “. . . embodies broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity,

and decency.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102. A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only

when two requirements are met: (1) objectively, the official’s act or omission must be so serious

such that it results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities; and (2)

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subjectively, the prison official must have acted unnecessarily and wantonly for the purpose of

inflicting harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Thus, to violate the Eighth Amendment, a prison

official must have a “sufficiently culpable mind.” See id.

Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury, or risks of serious

injury or illness, gives rise to under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105; see also

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. This applies to physical as well as dental and mental health needs. See

Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982). An injury or illness is sufficiently serious

if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the “. . .

unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir.

1992); see also Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994). Factors indicating

seriousness are: (1) whether a reasonable doctor would think that the condition is worthy of

comment; (2) whether the condition significantly impacts the prisoner’s daily activities; and (3)

whether the condition is chronic and accompanied by substantial pain. See Lopez v. Smith, 203

F.3d 1122, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 

The requirement of deliberate indifference is less stringent in medical needs cases

than in other Eighth Amendment contexts because the responsibility to provide inmates with

medical care does not generally conflict with competing penological concerns. See McGuckin,

974 F.2d at 1060. Thus, deference need not be given to the judgment of prison officials as to

decisions concerning medical needs. See Hunt v. Dental Dep’t, 865 F.2d 198, 200 (9th Cir.

1989). The complete denial of medical attention may constitute deliberate indifference. See

Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1111 (9th Cir. 1986). Delay in providing medical

treatment, or interference with medical treatment, may also constitute deliberate indifference. See

Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131. Where delay is alleged, however, the prisoner must also demonstrate

that the delay led to further injury. See McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060.

/ / /

/ / /

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Negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not, however, give

rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. Moreover, a

difference of opinion between the prisoner and medical providers concerning the appropriate

course of treatment does not give rise to an Eighth Amendment claim. See Jackson v. McIntosh,

90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996).

To state an Eighth Amendment claim based on deliberate indifference to medical

needs, plaintiff must allege a serious medical condition. The only condition alleged in the

complaint that possibly meets this requirement is hepatitis. As to this condition, plaintiff states

that blood tests were taken. Plaintiff has not alleged that these tests were positive for hepatitis and

that, notwithstanding such results, defendants failed to treat the condition. Rather, plaintiff’s

allegations concerning hepatitis show that he is, in fact, being evaluated for this condition. To the

extent plaintiff disagrees with the evaluation process or results, such allegations do not state an

Eighth Amendment claim. 

As to plaintiff’s allegations concerning defendants’ alleged conspiracy to deny him

a medically necessary transfer to another prison, plaintiff has not alleged a serious medical

condition necessitating such transfer. Absent a serious condition, no conduct defendants take with

respect to the prison transfer can give rise to an Eighth Amendment claim. In this case, plaintiff

alleges that the prison transfer was necessitated because he is often in “severe pain.” Even if this

amounts to a serious condition, plaintiff states in his complaint that he was prescribed pain

relievers. To the extent plaintiff’s claim is based on his opinion that he should have been

prescribed some other medication, such a claim is not cognizable under the Eighth Amendment. 

For these reasons, the court concludes that plaintiff’s complaint fails to state an

Eighth Amendment claim against any defendant based on medical needs. 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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B. Liability of Supervisory Defendants

Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their

employees. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that there is no

respondeat superior liability under § 1983). A supervisor is only liable for the constitutional

violations of subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations, or knew of

the violations and failed to act to prevent them. See id. When a defendant holds a supervisory

position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically

alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d

438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of

supervisory personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents,

673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

Here, plaintiff asserts that the director of the California Department of Corrections

and the warden of California State Prison, Sacramento, should be held liable because they knew or

should have known of the other defendants’ violation of his constitutional rights, and because it is

the policy of the California Department of Corrections to deprive prisoners medical attention. 

However, as discussed above, the court concludes that plaintiff has failed to state a claim for

deprivation of his Eighth Amendment rights. Therefore, the supervisory defendants identified in

plaintiff’s complaint cannot be held liable. 

III. CONCLUSION

Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by

amending the complaint, plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of the entire

action. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126, 1131. Plaintiff is informed that, as a general rule, an

amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258,

1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, following dismissal with leave to amend, all claims alleged in the

original complaint which are not alleged in the amended complaint are waived. See King v.

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Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, if plaintiff amends the complaint, the court

cannot refer to the prior pleading in order to make plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See

Local Rule 15-220. An amended complaint must be complete in itself without reference to any

prior pleading. See id. 

If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the

conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See

Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how

each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection

between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

(1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743

(9th Cir. 1978). 

Finally, plaintiff is warned that failure to file an amended complaint within the

time provided in this order may be grounds for dismissal of this action. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at

1260-61; see also Local Rule 11-110.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s complaint, filed on July 26, 2005, is dismissed with leave to

amend; and

2. Plaintiff shall file a first amended complaint within 30 days of the date of

service of this order.

DATED: October 20, 2005.

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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