Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_10-cv-01004/USCOURTS-cand-3_10-cv-01004-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CEDRIC LYNN STRUGGS,

Plaintiff,

 v.

MIKE EVANS, Warden, et al.,

Defendants. _______________________________ 

 

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No. C 10-1004 MMC (PR) 

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

On March 9, 2010, plaintiff, a California prisoner incarcerated at Salinas Valley State

Prison (“SVSP”) and proceeding pro se, filed the above-titled civil rights action under 42

U.S.C. § 1983. By separate order filed concurrently herewith, plaintiff has been granted

leave to proceed in forma pauperis.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner

seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and

dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See id.

Case 3:10-cv-01004-MMC Document 6 Filed 06/15/10 Page 1 of 3
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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§ 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings must, however, be liberally construed. See Balistreri v.

Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the

Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was

committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42,

48 (1988).

B. Plaintiff’s Claims

Plaintiff alleges that on February 18, 2009, following the completion of cell searches

of the entire D7 housing unit at SVSP, plaintiff returned to his cell to discover that his radio

and the strainer to his hot-pot were missing. Plaintiff filed administrative appeals claiming

the items had been confiscated by correctional officers who failed to follow proper

procedures for conducting cell searches and providing receipts for property removed from

cells. Plaintiff’s grievances were investigated and denied. 

Plaintiff seeks $15,000.00 in damages for the confiscation of his property and the

rejection of his administrative appeals.

Ordinarily, due process of law requires notice and an opportunity for some kind of

hearing prior to the deprivation of a significant property interest. See Memphis Light, Gas &

Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 19 (1978). Neither the negligent nor intentional deprivation

of property states a due process claim under § 1983, however, if the deprivation was random

and unauthorized. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535-44 (1981) (finding no claim

under § 1983 where state employee negligently lost prisoner’s property), overruled in part on

other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986); Hudson v. Palmer, 468

U.S. 517, 533 (1984) (finding no claim under § 1983 for intentional destruction of prisoner’s

property). The availability of an adequate state post-deprivation remedy, such as a state tort

action, precludes relief, because such remedy provides sufficient procedural due process. 

See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 128 (1990) (holding state statutory provision for postdeprivation hearing or common law tort remedy for erroneous deprivation satisfies due

process where state cannot foresee, and therefore provide meaningful hearing prior to,

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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deprivation of property); King v. Massarweh, 782 F.2d 825, 826 (9th Cir. 1986) (same). 

California law provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy. See Barnett v. Centoni, 31

F.3d 813, 816-17 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 810-895). 

Here, plaintiff alleges that his personal property was confiscated without warning and

in contravention of prison regulations. Allegations of such nature, i.e., allegations of

essentially random and unauthorized deprivations of personal property, do not allege a

violation of a federal constitutional right. Although such unauthorized deprivations of

personal property may amount to state law violations, they do not constitute federal due

process violations. Consequently, plaintiff’s allegations regarding the confiscation of his

personal property fail to state a claim for relief under § 1983. Plaintiff’s allegation that

appeals administrators wrongly denied his administrative appeals likewise fails to state a

cognizable claim for relief, as a prisoner has no constitutional right to have his prison appeal

processed or decided in a particular manner. See Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th

Cir. 2003). Accordingly, as plaintiff’s claims are deficient as a matter of law, and leave to

amend would be futile, the complaint will be dismissed with prejudice.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the above-titled action is hereby DISMISSED with

prejudice. 

The Clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 15, 2010 _________________________

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge 

Case 3:10-cv-01004-MMC Document 6 Filed 06/15/10 Page 3 of 3