Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-95-07180/USCOURTS-caDC-95-07180-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 17, 1998 Decided June 2, 1998

No. 94-7227

LaShawn A., By her next friend, Evelyn Moore, et al.,

Appellees

v.

Marion S. Barry, Jr., Mayor, As Mayor of the District of

Columbia, et al.,

Appellants

Consolidated with

Nos. 94-7251, 95-7141, 95-7180, 95-7215, 96-7002, 96-7234

-----------

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(89cv01754)

Lutz Alexander Prager, Assistant Deputy Corporation

Counsel, argued the cause for appellants, with whom John M.

Ferren, Corporation Counsel, Charles L. Reischel, Deputy

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Corporation Counsel, and Donna M. Murasky, Assistant

Corporation Counsel, were on the briefs.

Marcia Robinson Lowry argued the cause for appellees,

with whom Craig R. Levine and Arthur B. Spitzer were on

the brief.

Before: Wald, Silberman, and Rogers, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Silberman.

Silberman, Circuit Judge: The Mayor of the District of

Columbia and other District government officials (collectively,

the District), challenge seven orders issued by the district

court related to its appointment of receivers to manage the

District's child welfare system. The focus of their challenge

is an order which empowers the general receiver to disregard

District law to the extent that it unreasonably interferes with

the discharge of her responsibilities. Because that order is

too broad, we remand it to the district court. The balance of

the appeals are moot.

I.

Nine years ago, appellees filed this case on behalf of two

groups of District children: (1) those in the District's foster

care system and (2) those known to the District to be in

danger of abuse or neglect. Seeking injunctive relief, they

alleged widespread violations of these children's rights under

the Constitution as well as various federal and District statutes. Following a lengthy trial, the district court, in 1991,

concluded that the evidence presented in the case was "nothing less than outrageous" and that "[t]he District's dereliction

of its responsibilities to the children in its custody [was] a

travesty." LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F. Supp. 959, 998

(D.D.C. 1991). The court determined that, due to inept

management and the indifference of the mayor's administration, "the District had failed to comply with reasonable professional standards in almost every area of its child welfare

system." Id. at 997. With respect to children outside of the

foster care system, the District failed to investigate reports of

abuse or neglect in a timely manner or provide needed

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services. Id. at 989. And once children entered the foster

care system, it did not place them appropriately, monitor

their care, or adequately ensure permanent homes. As a

result, the District failed to protect the children in its custody

from physical, emotional, and psychological harm. Id. at 996.

The court held District officials liable under 42 U.S.C.

s 1983 (1988) for both constitutional and federal statutory

violations. It concluded that the District had deprived children in its foster care system of their due process rights

under the Fifth Amendment, and that the District had

abridged both groups of children's rights under two statutes:

the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 42

U.S.C. ss 620-27 and ss 670-79 (1988), and the Child Abuse

Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. ss 5101-5106

(1988). It further determined that the District had violated

various local statutes and regulations that conferred constitutionally protected liberty interests 1 whose deprivation, without due process, violated s 1983.

The parties agreed, after lengthy negotiations, to an 84-

page remedial consent decree approved by the district court

which regulated every aspect of the District's child neglect

and foster care system. The District, however, expressly

reserved the right to appeal the district court's judgment of

liability; to the extent that any part of the district court's

opinion was vacated on appeal, the portions of the remedial

order directly based on that part of the opinion would become

"null and void."

The District appealed, attacking the constitutional and

federal statutory basis of the district court's judgment. We

noted, however, that the District of Columbia's statutory

scheme for "the protection and care of foster children, and

__________

1 The pertinent District laws were the Prevention of Child

Abuse and Neglect Act of 1977, D.C. Code Ann. ss 2-1351 to -1357,

ss 6-2101 to -2107, ss 6-2121 to -2127, and ss 16-2351 to -2365

(1991); the Youth Residential Facilities Licensure Act of 1986, D.C.

Code ss 3-801 to -808 (1991); and the Child and Family Services

Division Manual of Operations (September 1985).

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children reported to be abused or neglected [was] equally as

comprehensive as that provided by the federal statutes...."

LaShawn A. v. Kelly, 990 F.2d 1319, 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1993)

("LaShawn I"). While the district court had concluded that

the local statutes in question created liberty interests, the

deprivation of which was actionable under s 1983, we held

that District statutes themselves created "a private cause of

action for children in foster care and for children reported to

have been abused or neglected but not yet in the District's

custody." Id. at 1325. As the district court's judgment

appeared to be independently supportable by local law, we

circumvented the constitutional and federal statutory questions and directed the district court "to fashion an equally

comprehensive order based entirely on District of Columbia

law, if possible." Id. at 1326. If the district court determined, on remand, that certain portions of the consent decree

depended entirely on a federal statute, we instructed it to

consider the impact of the Supreme Court's intervening decision in Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347 (1992) 2 before it

included such provisions in a revised remedial order.

The district court simply deleted all references to federal

law and readopted the consent decree. As for the District's

concern that the remedy exceeded the mandates of local law,

the court justified the decree as a "necessary and appropriate

use of its equitable authority" to cure widespread violations of

__________

2 In Suter, the Court held that a single provision of the

Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C.

s 671(a)(15), requiring a state to have a plan providing that "reasonable efforts" will be made to prevent a child from being removed

from his home, and once removed to reunify the child with his

family, imposed only generalized duties on the states and thus

created neither a private right of action nor an enforceable right

under s 1983. Suter, 503 U.S. at 363-64. Although the Court's

holding only reached that single provision of the Adoption Act, its

analysis implicated the provisions of both federal statutes at issue in

this case, which parallel the structure of 42 U.S.C. s 671(a)(15).

See Doe v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 861, 866 (D.C. Cir. 1996)

(noting similarity between Adoption Act and Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act).

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District law. LaShawn A. v. Kelly, Civ. No. 89-1754 (D.D.C.

filed Jan. 27, 1994) (order adopting modified remedial order).

And the district court clarified, in accordance with LaShawn

I, that federal law was "not the basis of the consent decree."

LaShawn A. v. Kelly, Civ. No. 89-1754 (D.D.C. filed Nov. 12,

1993) (order directing plaintiffs to propose modified remedial

order).

The District once again appealed, contending, inter alia,

that the modified remedial order was not solely based on local

law as required by LaShawn I and that the entire order

should be declared "null and void" under the terms of the

parties' initial agreement. Again sidestepping, a divided panel remanded the case to the district court to reexamine the

validity of the federal claims and its exercise of pendent

jurisdiction over the local law claims under the second step of

the test set forth in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S.

715, 726-27 (1966). LaShawn A. v. Barry, 69 F.3d 556 (D.C.

Cir. 1995) ("LaShawn II"). Sitting en banc, however, we

held that the law-of-the-case and law-of-the-circuit doctrines

prevented us from revisiting the LaShawn I panel's implicit

conclusion that the exercise of pendent jurisdiction in this

case was appropriate under Gibbs step two. LaShawn A. v.

Barry, 87 F.3d 1389 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc). After remitting the case to the LaShawn II panel to consider the issues

raised by the District in its appeal, we affirmed the district

court, holding that the decree did not extend beyond District

law any more than it extended beyond federal law and that

"the substitution of District law alone as the basis of the

decree, in place of reliance on federal plus District law, did

not materially undermine the District's consent." LaShawn

A. v. Barry, No. 94-7044 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 30, 1996).

In the meantime, plaintiffs and the district court became

frustrated with the District's recalcitrance in implementing

the consent decree. On November 23, 1994, more than three

years after the entry of the initial remedial order, the district

court appointed three limited receivers to manage the areas

of protective services, resource development, and corrective

action. These receivers soon reported that their efforts to

implement the remedial order were severely hampered by an

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array of obstacles, including the departure of staff due to

budgetary constraints. They complained that the child welfare bureaucracy was suffering from a "severe level of dysfunction" and concluded that the scope of the limited receiverships was insufficient to implement the remedial order. At

about the same time, the District government confronted a

fiscal crisis. In early 1995, the D.C. Council mandated salary

reductions and furloughs for District government employees

in an effort to stem the flow of red ink. The district court,

concerned that this attempt to cut costs would seriously

undermine the receivers' efforts to implement the consent

decree, ordered the adoption of the limited receivers' work

plans which provided that "[a]ll Family Administrative staff

required by the LaShawn Remedial Order shall be exempt

from staff layoffs, furloughs, salary reductions or other similar measures which may be instituted to manage the overall

District budget deficit." See LaShawn A. v. Kelly, Civ. No.

89-1754 (D.D.C. filed Mar. 29, 1995).

A couple of months later, on May 22, 1995, the district

court found appellants in contempt and placed the child

welfare system into general receivership. The district judge

had become troubled by the limited receivers' reports and

discouraged by a 32-page list of more than 130 areas in which

the District had missed deadlines or was in noncompliance

with the remedial order, LaShawn A. v. Kelly, 887 F. Supp.

297 (D.D.C. 1995). In response to the District's argument

that a federal court should not institute a general receivership

to remedy violations of local law, the district court referred

back to its original 1991 opinion finding violations of federal

law. To the extent that our LaShawn I opinion required it to

address the impact of the Supreme Court's Suter opinion

before reviving the federal claims, the district court asserted,

in a footnote, that Suter had been "at least partially overturned" by intervening legislation. LaShawn A., 887

F. Supp. at 315 n.125. In the same opinion, the district court

also denied appellants' motion for reconsideration of its earlier order exempting child welfare staff from pay cuts and

furloughs. Id. at 316.

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On August 24, 1995, the district court outlined the general

receiver's (Receiver's) responsibilities and powers, which incorporated all of the authority previously given to the limited

receivers. In its most expansive grant of authority, the

district court, over appellants' vigorous objection, ordered

that:

the Receiver will make reasonable efforts to exercise its

authority in cooperation with District of Columbia officials and in a manner consistent with local law whenever

possible. However, to the degree that local law governing lines of authority, budgeting, governmental structure

and organization, procurement, and personnel unreasonably interfere with the Receiver's discharge of its

responsibilities, local law is superseded by the Receiver's

authority.

LaShawn A. v. Barry, Civ. No. 89-1754 (D.D.C. filed Aug. 24,

1995) (general receivership order) (emphasis added).3 The

parties dispute whether the Receiver, in any instance, has

transgressed local law, but no such violations appear in the

district court record below.

Although appellants initially challenged seven district court

orders, they concede that three of their appeals are now

moot.4 A fourth, objecting to powers given the limited receivers, need not be evaluated separately as their general powers

have been merged into the power of the Receiver. We,

therefore, are left to consider three orders: the March 29,

1995 order exempting Family Services Administrative Staff

__________

3 In a partial modification of its order, the district court later

directed the Receiver to "contract and procure goods and services

consistent with the District's existing procurement law and procedures." LaShawn A. v. Barry, Civ. No. 89-1754 (D.D.C. filed Dec.

8, 1995) (order transferring child welfare funds to Receiver's bank

account).

4 These involve challenges to: (1) a June 26, 1995 order setting

deadlines to execute contracts for creation of a management information system; (2) the December 8, 1995 order transferring the

Initial Operating Fund to the general receiver; and (3) a September

26, 1996 order denying the District's motion to stay the May 1995

receivership order.

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from salary reductions and furloughs, the May 22, 1995 order

denying appellants' motion for reconsideration of the March

order, and the August 24, 1995 order directing the Receiver

to disregard District law when it "unreasonably interfere[s]

with the Receiver's discharge of [her] responsibilities."

II.

Appellees argue that challenges to the March 29, 1995 and

May 22, 1995 orders are also moot. Appellants admit that

the furlough and salary reduction legislation adopted to deal

with the District's fiscal crisis has expired, therefore appellees contend that no live controversy exists with respect to

the orders which permitted the Receiver to override these

laws. The District responds that these orders fall within the

"capable of repetition yet evading review" exception to mootness doctrine. For this exception to apply, the District must

show: "(1) the challenged action was in its duration too short

to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2)

there [is] a reasonable expectation that the same complaining

party [will] be subjected to the same action again." Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975). Assuming arguendo that the temporary nature of the salary reduction and

furlough measures allows the District to meet its burden on

the first prong, it cannot satisfy its obligation with respect to

the second. Although the District claims that temporary pay

cuts and furloughs may be instituted again in the event of

future budget deficits, it offers no support for the proposition

that the District again will run budget deficits during the

lifetime of the receivership,5 let alone for its implicit claim

that the congressionally created Control Board, despite the

existence of the consent decree, would approve of pay cuts

and furloughs so severe that the Receiver would find it

necessary to exempt child welfare personnel from such mea-

__________

5 We note that the District's own budget projections currently

forecast budget surpluses in the range of $150 million to $200

million for the next five years. David A. Vise, D.C. Fiscal Future

Glows; Rosy Outlook May Mean Tax Cuts, Wash. Post, Mar. 8,

1998, at A1.

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sures. The District simply has not demonstrated that there

is a reasonable expectation a similar controversy will recur

and we therefore agree that the appeals of these, two orders

are moot.6

What remains is the gravamen of the District's case: its

complaint that the district court abused its discretion in its

August 24, 1995 order by authorizing the Receiver to violate

District law in several areas to the extent local law "unreasonably interfere[d] with the Receiver's discharge of [her]

responsibilities." The District claims that because the district court is enforcing a decree based exclusively on local

law, it is essentially in the same position as a local court.

And like all other institutions of government, local courts are

subject to valid restrictions imposed by local legislatures.

The district court, therefore, may not remedy one violation of

local law by permitting other violations of local law.

We are not persuaded by appellees' suggestion that, since

the District has not pointed to any specific instance in which

the Receiver has transgressed local law, the district court's

order should be affirmed if we can imagine any set of

circumstances in which the district court would be justified in

authorizing the Receiver to override local law. We must

review whether the broad scope of authority granted to the

Receiver under the present circumstances is proper, not

whether a more narrowly drawn authorization under a hypo-

__________

6 The District's alternative claim, that it is entitled to reimbursement of the funds spent complying with the disputed orders,

does not save the controversy. By including this contention as a

throwaway line in its reply brief, the District has not satisfied our

requirement that parties' arguments be sufficiently developed lest

waived. In any event, the District does not suggest from whom this

reimbursement would come or on what basis it would be made.

The disputed money has already been paid out in salary to District

employees, and we do not see how the district court could order its

return. We think it remarkable to suggest that the Receiver,

seeking to implement the terms of the consent decree, could, at this

point, be required to transfer millions of dollars from the child

welfare budget to other parts of the District government.

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thetical set of future conditions might be within the district

court's discretion.

In that regard, we admit that while avoiding the federal

statutory and constitutional claims seemed prudent at the

time, our prior dispositions have led us into a most unusual

predicament. We have before us a federal district court

order that purports to override local law in order to implement a consent decree based solely on local law. The case

appears to be unique; we cannot find any other instance

where we or one of our sister circuits have dealt with an

analogous dispute. This is partially because the Eleventh

Amendment denies federal courts jurisdiction to order state

officials to conform their conduct to state law. Pennhurst

State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 117-21

(1984).7 As support for the district court's order, appellees

point to several circuits which have held that federal courts

possess the power to override local law to enforce consent

decrees in instances where there have been no findings or

admissions of federal liability. See, e.g., Stone v. City and

County of San Francisco, 968 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1992);

Badgley v. Santacroce, 800 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1986); Brown v.

Neeb, 644 F.2d 551 (6th Cir. 1981). Once a local government

consents to a remedial order in a case where violations of

federal rights have been alleged, they argue, a federal court

obtains the authority to override conflicting local law in order

to enforce the decree, regardless of whether there are any

formal findings or admissions of liability on federal grounds.

As the Second Circuit has stated:

The respect due the federal judgment is not lessened

because the judgment was entered by consent. The

plaintiffs' suit alleged a denial of their constitutional

__________

7 The term "state" in the Eleventh Amendment also has been

interpreted to include Puerto Rico, see De Leon Lopez v. Corporacion Insular de Seguros, 931 F.2d 116, 121 (1st Cir. 1991), but not

the District of Columbia. See LaShawn A. v. Barry, 87 F.3d 1389,

1394 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc). Nevertheless, we continue to

operate under the assumption that District law under Gibbs should

be treated as state law, rather than inferior federal law. Cf. id. at

1398 (Silberman, J., concurring).

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rights. When the defendants chose to consent to a

judgment, rather than have the District Court adjudicate

the merits of the plaintiffs' claims, the result was a fully

enforceable federal judgment that overrides any conflicting state law or state court order.

Badgley, 800 F.2d at 38. There are crucial differences,

however, between the cases cited by appellees and this one.

Unlike those cases, it cannot be said that the District here

implicitly conceded some basis for federal liability; the District expressly reserved its right to appeal its liability under

federal law not withstanding its entry into the consent decree.

And more important, in fashioning its consent decree, we

directed the district court to base its remedial order only on

local law, to the extent possible. In response, the district

court deleted all references to federal law from the consent

decree.

Absent any recognized or implicitly conceded federal basis

to the decree, we simply do not see how the district court has

the power to authorize the Receiver to disregard District law.

While it is true that a consent decree involves an exercise of

federal power, a federal court enforcing a state-created right

becomes, "in effect, only another court of the State" and

cannot employ a remedy that is not available in state court.

See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108-09 (1945);

see also 28 U.S.C. s 1652 (1994). And although Guaranty

Trust was a diversity-jurisdiction case amplifying the principles of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), pendent

jurisdiction jurisprudence is based on the same principles.

See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).

Allowing different remedies in state law cases heard in federal courts on pendent jurisdiction would undermine the "twin

aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of forum-shopping and

avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws." Hanna

v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965).

The courts of a jurisdiction cannot authorize violations of

that jurisdiction's laws, unless pursuant to the command of a

higher law. It is a fundamental tenet of separation-of-powers

doctrine that a court's enforcement powers are restricted by

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the dictates of the legislature. As we have observed, a

district court's remedial powers "are necessarily limited by a

clear and valid legislative command counseling against the

contemplated judicial action." Antone v. Block, 661 F.2d 230,

235 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The Supreme Court has reaffirmed this

basic principle, noting that " '[a] Court of equity cannot, by

avowing that there is a right but no remedy known to the law,

create a remedy in violation of the law....' " INS v. Pangilinan, 486 U.S. 875, 883 (1988) (quoting Rees v. Watertown, 19

Wall. 107, 122 (1874)); see also Hedges v. Dixon County, 150

U.S. 182, 192 (1893) ("[c]ourts of equity can no more disregard statutory and constitutional requirements and provisions

than can courts of law.").

The scope of the Receiver's authority is quite extraordinary. Even were the consent decree explicitly based on

federal law, we would be hesitant to affirm. To be sure, a

federal court has broad equitable powers, see Swann v.

Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971),

and may, in certain instances, override state or local law for

the purpose of enforcing a decree designed to remedy violations of federal law. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S.

33, 52-53 (1990); North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v.

Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 45 (1971). But in this case, the district

court has given the Receiver an open-ended authorization to

disregard numerous important sections of District law. We

think considerable tension exists between its order and the

Supreme Court's admonition that in employing their broad

equitable powers, federal courts must "exercise '[t]he least

possible power adequate to the end proposed.' " Spallone v.

United States, 493 U.S. 265, 280 (1990) (quoting Anderson v.

Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 231 (1821)).

Our review of a district court's choice of equitable remedies

is "highly contextual and fact dependent." Stone v. City and

County of San Francisco, 968 F.2d at 861. But "the remedy

should begin with what is absolutely necessary. If [those]

measures later prove ineffective, more stringent ones should

be considered." Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1145-46 (5th

Cir. 1982), vacated in part on other grounds, 688 F.2d 266

(5th Cir. 1982). We sympathize with the district court's

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frustration with the pace of the District's progress in complying with the remedial order and its desire to empower the

Receiver to accomplish her goals as quickly as possible.

Disregarding local law, however, is a grave step and should

not be taken unless absolutely necessary. In Stone v. City

and County of San Francisco, the Ninth Circuit considered a

case where a district court had authorized a local sheriff to

override state laws by ordering the early release of certain

inmates from an overcrowded jail. 968 F.2d at 850. While

the court held open the possibility that such an authorization

might be upheld under certain circumstances, it noted that

"the district court did not make any findings that other

alternatives were inadequate before it authorized the Sheriff

to override applicable state laws." Id. at 864. It therefore

vacated the relevant part of the district court's order.

The equitable remedy here is even more troubling than the

one at issue in Stone. There, the district court authorized a

local government official, the Sheriff, to override state law in

only one narrow field. In this case, the Receiver, a courtappointed official, has been authorized to disregard District

law in a whole host of areas. While it is true that the

Receiver is required to conclude that relevant local laws

"unreasonably interfere" with her ability to discharge her

responsibilities, the district court has never concluded that

compliance with District law, as a general matter, precludes

the Receiver from enforcing the consent decree. And even

were it to make such a finding, we believe that the district

court needs to consider each contemplated violation of District law on a case-by-case basis. Should a situation arise in

which it is alleged that desired action by the Receiver violates

local law, the District should bring this to the attention of the

district court and bear the burden of making the case that a

conflict exists. If the district court concludes that there is

indeed such a conflict, it should only authorize the Receiver to

violate local law in those instances where, considering other

alternatives, it specifically concludes an override is necessary

to enforce the terms of the consent decree.

In such cases, the district court further must consider the

status of the federal statutory claims. If the district court

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had wished, when revising the consent decree in light of

LaShawn I, to retain any provision solely based on federal

law, we instructed it to reexamine the relevant federal claim

in light of the Supreme Court's Suter opinion. Rather than

perform such a reexamination, however, the district court

explicitly disclaimed any federal basis for the consent decree.

The district court's 1995 attempt to revive the federal law

claims in its opinion placing the child welfare system into

receivership was inadequate. Noting the requirements of our

LaShawn I mandate, the district court, speaking generally of

the federal statutory violations, declared that the Supreme

Court's Suter decision "has been at least partially overturned

by congressional action." LaShawn A., 887 F. Supp. at 315

n.125 (emphasis added). We think this treatment of the

matter is insufficient; the district court must instead analyze

the federal claims separately in light of the recent legislation 8

and Supreme Court cases, including Suter and Blessing v.

Freestone, 117 S. Ct. 1353 (1997), in order to determine

whether any survive. A mere observation that Suter may no

longer be relevant due to congressional action does not

comply with our LaShawn I mandate.

Should the district court determine, in accordance with the

framework laid out in this opinion, that empowering the

Receiver to violate District law in a specific instance is

__________

8 The relevant statutory amendment reads:

In an action brought to enforce a provision of this chapter, such

provision is not to be deemed unenforceable because of its

inclusion in a section of this chapter requiring a State plan or

specifying the required contents of a State plan. This section

is not intended to limit or expand the grounds for determining

the availability of private actions to enforce State plan requirements other than by overturning any such grounds applied in

Suter v. Artist M., 112 S. Ct. 1360 (1992), but not applied in

prior Supreme Court decisions respecting such enforceability:

Provided, however, That this section is not intended to alter the

holding in Suter v. Artist M. that section 671(a)(5) of this title

is not enforceable in a private right of action.

42 U.S.C. s 1320a-2 (amended Oct. 20, 1994); id. at s 1320a-10

(amended Oct. 31, 1994) (identical provision).

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warranted, it must identify the specific federal law ground it

is using as the justification for the Receiver's authority to

transcend local law. As the Seventh Circuit noted in Kasper

v. Board of Election Commissioners, 814 F.2d 332, 342 (7th

Cir. 1987), "An alteration of the [state's] statutory scheme ...

depends on an exercise of federal power, which in turn

depends on a violation of federal law." (emphasis added).

Since reintroducing federal claims into the case would constitute a modification of the basis of the consent decree, the

District would, of course, be able to contest such a modification on appeal.

* * * *

As the district court's August 24, 1995 order raises significant separation of powers concerns, we remand with instructions to consider those instances in which desired action by

the Receiver conflicts with local law in accordance with the

procedures spelled out in this opinion. We hold the District's

other appeals to be moot.

So ordered.

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