Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00274/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-00274-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Monte Lee Bridges,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-04-0274 FCD CMK P

vs.

D.L. Runnels, et al., 

Defendant. ORDER AND

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Currently before the court is plaintiff’s “Objections to Order” filed on May 25,

2005. In light of plaintiff’s filing, the court vacates both its January 20, 2005 and its May 10,

2005 order and issues the following findings and recommendations. 

On January 12, 2005, plaintiff filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. On

January 20, 2005, the court denied plaintiff’s request without prejudice due to failure to serve the

document on defendants. On January 31, 2005, plaintiff filed a request to reinstate his motion

for a preliminary injunction and on April 4, 2005, plaintiff filed a request for expedited action on

his request for a preliminary injunction. On May 10, 2005, the court denied plaintiff’s request. 

On May 25, 2005, plaintiff filed objections to the court’s May 10, 2005 order reiterating that he

had in fact properly served his January 12, 2005 motion on defendants. Upon review of the

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record, the court discovered that plaintiff did properly serve his January 12, 2005 motion on

defendants, although the certificate of service was attached to the affidavit in support of the

motion instead of to his motion. Accordingly, the court considers the merits of plaintiff’s motion

for a preliminary injunction. 

Background

Plaintiff is confined at High Desert State prison in Susanville. He filed this

complaint on February 6, 2004, seeking damages and injunctive relief from ten defendants. In an

order filed May 13, 2004, the court denied plaintiff’s request for an expedited preliminary

injunction and recommended that plaintiff’s claims against four of the defendants be dismissed. 

(Doc. 9.) On June 6, 2004, the District Judge issued an order adopting the May 13, 2004 findings

and recommendations in full and stating that this case shall proceed solely on plaintiff’s Eighth

Amendment Claims against the remaining six defendants. (Doc. 13.) 

In his complaint, plaintiff states that he is a sixty-six year old man who has

suffered from extreme anxiety since he had quadruple heart bypass surgery in 1992 and that he

arrived at High Desert State prison in 2001 with a legal addiction to an anxiety medication. He

alleges, among other things, that he has had twenty-one cellmates since 2001, most of whom 

have smoked, which exacerbates plaintiff’s anxiety, raises his blood pressure and causes him to

have trouble breathing and to experience nausea, headaches and eye irritation. Plaintiff states

that since 2002 he has suffered from an earache caused by the earplugs that he wears constantly

to deaden cellmate noise and that he has been deprived of adequate exercise repeatedly during

lengthy lockdowns. Plaintiff’s anxiety caused by cellmates and his lack of exercise are the focus

of his January 12, 2005 request for injunctive relief. 

Plaintiff’s January 12, 2005 injunctive relief request states that “after years of

lockdown confinement with no out-of-cell exercise causing mental and physical atrophy, plaintiff

has been forced to work or receive discipline.” (Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at

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2.) Plaintiff states that he is being denied single-cell status, despite the recommendation of two

doctors that he receive single cells status. In an April 4, 2005 filing seeking expedited action on

his preliminary injunction, plaintiff relates that “if he is not put on single-cell status soon, he will

be killed or forced to kill. Plaintiff alleges that he is suffering injuries from being denied soft

sole shoes, which two doctors recommended for him. Plaintiff states that he has been denied

entry into the mental health program despite “extensive street records of his condition” and that

he has been denied meaningful health care for almost four years, specifically that he has not

received treatment for a back and hip problem. Plaintiff alleges, that, in complete disregard to

his medical problems, he has been forced to work at “hard labor” spending six hours a day

standing and walking on a concrete floor while wearing work (non-soft sole) shoes.

Plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction permanently placing him on single-cell

status, classification as medically disabled, neutral physical exams and appropriate treatment, one

hour of out-of-cell exercise daily, including during lockdown periods, a permanent soft shoe

chrono and judgment for compensatory and punitive damages. 

A review of the exhibits attached to plaintiffs complaint reveal the following. 

Plaintiff filed a grievance requesting a chrono to wear soft shoe (athletic shoes) due to venous

insufficiency of his left leg as a result of vein harvesting for cardiac by-pass surgery. (Pl.’s

Compl. ex. 1.) The request was reviewed by a clinic physician who recommended that plaintiff

have TED (support) hose to control the swelling in his left leg and a chrono that plaintiff be

allowed to wear athletic shoes “behind the wall” be considered. (Id.) The chrono committee

considered this request and denied it. (Id.) Plaintiff appealed. (Id.) His appeal was denied on

the grounds that plaintiff was allowed to wear athletic shoes on the yard and housing unit but not

to vocational, visiting or to the medical clinic. (Id.) Plaintiff was recommended to have and

granted an appointment with a vascular surgeon. (Id.) Plaintiff’s appeal to the director’s level

was denied on the grounds that he was allowed to wear athletic shoes at certain times and

recommended that plaintiff cooperate with the health care staff to ensure the proper diagnosis

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and treatment of his medical condition. (Id.) 

Exhibit 2 to plaintiff’s complaint is a copy of an accusation against Jeffrey W.

Rohlfiing, M.D and a copy of a stipulated agreement between Dr. Rohlfing and the Division of

Medical Quality of the Medical Board of California. (Id., Ex. 2.) Exhibit 3 is a narrative written

by plaintiff describing prison lockdowns and numerous receipts from cell searches. (Id., Ex. 3.) 

Exhibit 4 relates to plaintiff’s requests for single cell housing. (Id., Ex. 4.) In his grievance,

plaintiff described his disability as heart disease, left arm eighty percent disabled, sciatica,

anxiety, panic disorder, agoraphobia, dysthymia, sun sensitive, melanoma. (Id.) The

accommodation requested by plaintiff was single cell status. (Id.) A memorandum detailing an

interview with plaintiff revealed that Dr. Watson had told a correctional lieutenant that plaintiff

had extreme phobia and that the doctor strongly recommended that plaintiff be single celled. 

(Id.) However, Mental Health denied single cell status. (Id.) On September 4, 2002, plaintiff

received an amended second level appeal response, which stated that Dr. Watson had indicated

that plaintiff’s case should be sent to the psychiatric department for review for single cell status

but that, upon review the psychiatric department had denied plaintiff’s request. (Id.) The

amended response noted that plaintiff was not a participant in the mental health services delivery

system and that, after a review of all the submitted evidence, it was determined that plaintiff did

not meet the criteria for single cell housing. (Id.) 

Plaintiff filed a director’s level appeal regarding his denial of single cell status. 

(Id.) The director’s level appeal was denied on the grounds that plaintiff’s case factors did not

warrant single cell status. (Id.) The denial stated that the medical department and psychiatric

department indicated that plaintiff did not meet the criteria for single cell status at this time. (Id.)

Exhibit five to plaintiff’s complaint is a second grievance concerning single cell

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1Plaintiff filed a second grievance on May 8, 2003, requesting that he be moved

immediately, but this grievance was screened out by the appeal coordinator as a duplicate appeal. 

(Pl.’s Compl. Ex. 5.) 

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housing filed by plaintiff on April 24, 2003.1 (Id., Ex. 5.) In his grievance, plaintiff alleges that

he has been mistreated by guards after requesting to move from his cell block. (Id.) He stated

that doctors have recommended single cell housing for him and that he has many health concerns

that are exacerbated by his current housing. (Id.) Plaintiff requested to be moved from “this

area–preferably upstairs in any unit.” (Id.) On May 15, 2003, plaintiff’s portion of his appeal

that he be moved to a new bed was granted, but his request to be placed on single cell was

denied. (Id.) 

Exhibits six and seven of plaintiff’s complaint are copies of “emergency medical

requests” regarding his back pain. (Pl.’s Compl., Ex. 6 & 7.) Included in exhibit seven is a

grievance filed by plaintiff regarding his back pain, and requesting that he see a new doctor,

receive immediate action to be provided meals in his cell, receive time each day in the day room

or to be allowed out of his cell to try and walk, and be provided a single crutch instead of a cane. 

(Pl.’s Compl., Ex. 7.) Plaintiff received a note from the appeals office that his appeal was not

processed as an emergency appeal because it did not meet the criteria for such. (Id.) It is not

clear from the evidence what the final resolution of this grievance was. (Id.) 

Exhibit eleven to plaintiff’s complaint includes a modification request stating that

plaintiff has a disability in his left leg due to vein harvesting and foot problems. (Pl.’s Compl.

Ex. 11.) Plaintiff requested the modified low-cut institution shoes for which he had been issued a

chrono and the stress test which had been recommended by a physician. (Id.) Plaintiff also noted

that he had a painful right ear and sought to have all his problems addressed as soon as possible. 

(Id.) Plaintiff’s request was partially granted. (Id.) The response noted that plaintiff had been

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2On the response, plaintiff crossed out “2" and wrote “1" above it. (Pl.’s Compl., Ex. 11.) 

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issued his modified shoes on April 2, 20022, that the medical authorization review (“MAR”)

committee had voted to defer plaintiff’s stress test because his cardiac condition appeared to have

stabilized and stated that he would be granted an appointment with an ear, nose and throat

specialist. (Id.) The response noted, however, that the stress test was still under consideration by

the committee. (Id.) Plaintiff appealed the first level response on the grounds that he was

dissatisfied that the stress test was deferred by the MAR committee. Plaintiff noted in his appeal

that, prior to coming to prison, he was taking the medications Plavix, Pravachol and Lipitor and

he was not experiencing heart problems until those medications were taken from him by prison

officials. (Id.) The response to plaintiff’s second level appeal noted that all specialty

appointments had to be approved by MAR and that MAR had voted to defer plaintiff’s stress

test. (Id.) Plaintiff was advised that should he have further questions about that action, he should

discuss it with the clinic physician. (Id.) Finally, the response listed the medications that

plaintiff was currently taking in prison and stated that, while these medications may be different

than the ones he previously took, they had the same effect. (Id.) Plaintiff appealed to the

director’s level and the director’s level decision affirmed the second level review decision, noting

that plaintiff was receiving appropriate medical care. (Id.)

Exhibit twelve to plaintiff’s complaint is a grievance concerning skin lesions.

(Pl.’s Compl., Ex. 12.) The staff response noted that plaintiff’s request for plastic surgery was

previously denied and he was supposed to get skin biopsies. (Id.) It stated that his plastic surgery

request would be re-submitted to MAR, that Dr. Watson’s request that plaintiff receive a heatsensitive chrono would be presented to the chrono committee on August 28 and that plaintiff was

granted a double cuff chrono. (Id.) Plaintiff contacted the Office of the Inspector General

regarding his skin lesions, and received a response that the Inspector General had contacted the

prison and learned that plaintiff was scheduled for skin biopsies in the near future. (Id.) 

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Exhibit thirteen to plaintiff’s complaint is a grievance filed concerning plaintiff’s

ear aches, apparently caused by constant wearing of ear plugs to deaden cell noise. (Pl.’s

Compl., Ex. 13.) Plaintiff requested medication for his ear problem. (Id.) The staff response

noted that plaintiff had been prescribed eardrops previously, but had not been prescribed ear

drops in 2003. (Id.) Plaintiff appealed to the second level and the appeal was granted on the

grounds that plaintiff had already been examined by Dr. Rohlfing and received the requested ear

medication. (Id.) 

Standard of Review

The legal principles applicable to a request for preliminary injunctive relief are

well established. “The traditional equitable criteria for granting preliminary injunctive relief are:

1) a strong likelihood of success on the merits; 2) the possibility of irreparable injury to plaintiff;

3) a balance of the hardships favoring the plaintiff; and 4) advancement of the public interest (in

certain cases).” Dollar Rent A Car v. Travelers Indem. Co., 774 F.2d 1371, 1374 (9th Cir. 1985).

The criteria are traditionally treated as alternative tests. For example, a court may issue a

preliminary injunction if the moving party demonstrates either a combination of probable success

on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury or that serious questions are raised and the

balance of hardships tips sharply in his favor. See Martin v. Int’l Olympic Comm., 740 F.2d 670,

675 (9th Cir. 1984). The Ninth Circuit has reiterated that under either formulation of the

principles, if the probability of success on the merits is low, preliminary injunctive relief should

be denied:

Martin explicitly teaches that “[u]nder this last part of the alternative test, even if

the balance of hardships tips decidedly in favor of the moving party, it must be

shown as an irreducible minimum that there is a fair chance of success on the

merits.” 

Johnson v. California State Bd of Accountancy, 72 F.3d 1427, 1430 (9th Cir. 1995)(quoting

Martin, 740 F.2d at 675. In cases involving conditions of confinement, any preliminary

injunction “must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the harm the

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court finds requires preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to correct the

harm.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2). 

Discussion

In determining whether injunctive relief is appropriate, the focus of the court’s

inquiry is on the likelihood of plaintiff’s success on the merits of his complaint. See Martin, 740

F.2d at 675. Plaintiff’s complaint is proceeding solely on Eighth Amendment claims.

The Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to provide prisoners with

necessary medical care. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). However, the mere

failure to provide medical care does not give rise to a constitutional violation. See Wilson v.

Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991). To establish an Eighth Amendment violation an inmate must

satisfy a two-prong test that includes an objective and subjective element. See Helling v.

McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993). He must show: 1) that he suffered from a serious medical

condition; and 2) that prison officials were “deliberately indifferent” to the prisoner’s medical

needs. See Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297. 

An injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of

comment or treatment, the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an

individual’s daily activities or the existence of chronic and substantial pain are indications that a

patient has an objectively “serious” need for medical treatment. McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d

1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992)(abrogated on other grounds). Plaintiff has shown that a reasonable

doctor or patient would find his cardiac complaints, skin lesions and ear pain worthy of

treatment and he has shown that his foot problems affect his daily living and apparently cause

him chronic pain. Accordingly, plaintiff demonstrates a strong likelihood of demonstrating that

he has a serious medical condition. See id. Plaintiff has not, however, demonstrated a strong

likelihood of demonstrating that defendants’ responses to that need were constitutionally

deficient. 

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The evidence shows that prison officials responded to plaintiff’s medical needs. 

When plaintiff requested a chrono to wear soft sole shoes due to his vascular problem, plaintiff

was granted a chrono for a TED device to reduce swelling in his legs, but was denied his request

to wear soft sole shoes in all areas of the prison. Plaintiff received medical care for his cardiac

problem, and although he was not granted a stress test because objective evidence indicated that

his condition was improving, he was informed that he could discuss this issue further with his

physician. Plaintiff was granted an appointment with an ear, nose and throat specialist after his

complaints about an ear problem, and in response to another grievance, he was allowed to visit

the prison physician and received medication. The record shows that although prison officials

did not respond the way that plaintiff perhaps would have wanted them to respond, they did in

fact respond to his medical issues. See e.g., Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 (the Eighth Amendment

does not protect prisoners from diagnosis or treatment that is merely negligent.) Given the

evidence, there is not a high likelihood of success that plaintiff can demonstrate deliberate

indifference to his medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See Toussaint v.

McCarthy , 801 F.2d 1080, 1111 (9th Cir. 1986.) 

The record shows that defendants have responded to plaintiff’s concerns about his

medical care with treatment, and the court cannot find that plaintiff has demonstrated a

likelihood of irreparable injury if injunctive relief is not granted. See Dollar Rent a Car, 774

F.2d at 1374. Plaintiff has not shown that serious questions of public interest are raised and that

the balance of hardships tips in his favor. See Martin, 740 F.2d at 675. Accordingly, injunctive

relief is not appropriate. 

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, it is ORDERED THAT the court’s orders of January 20,

2005 and May 10, 2005 are vacated.

IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT the plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunctive

relief be denied. These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States

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District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within

twenty days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file

written objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be

captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the

objections shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties

are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal

the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: June 6, 2005.

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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