Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00684/USCOURTS-casd-3_06-cv-00684-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 28:1338 Patent Infringement

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LUCENT TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,

and MULTIMEDIA PATENT TRUST

Plaintiffs,

CASE NO. 06-CV-0684-H

(CAB)

ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR

JUDGMENT AS A MATTER

OF LAW OR NEW TRIAL,

REGARDING UNITED

STATES PATENT NUMBERS

5,227,878; 5,438,433; 6,339,794;

5,917,499; 5,977,971; AND

6,565,608;

[Doc. Nos. 861-64, 866-67, 870.]

vs.

MICROSOFT CORPORATION,

Defendant.

AND RELATED CLAIMS

This order addresses post-trial motions following a jury trial involving six United

States patents: 5,227,878 (“Puri ‘878”); 5,438,433 (“Reifman ‘433”); 6,339,794

(“Bolosky ‘794”); 5,917,499 (“Jancke ‘499”); 5,977,971 (“Guzak ‘971”); 6,565,608

(“Fein ‘608”). Multimedia Patent Trust (“MPT”), a Delaware trust with Lucent

Technologies Inc. (“Lucent”) as the primary beneficiary, asserted the Puri ‘878 patent

against Microsoft Corporation (“Microsoft”). Microsoft brought counterclaims against

Lucent and its parent company, Alcatel Lucent. At trial, Microsoft asserted the Reifman

‘433, Bolosky ‘794, and Jancke ‘499 patents against Lucent only. Microsoft asserted

the Guzak ‘971 and Fein ‘608 patents against both Lucent and Alcatel Lucent.

The parties filed their initial briefs on these matters on June 27, 2008. MPT filed

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1None of the parties’ post-trial motions addressed the Jancke ‘499 patent.

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a motion for judgment as a matter of law (“JMOL”) or new trial regarding the Puri ‘878

patent. (Doc. No. 867.) Regarding the Puri ‘878 patent, Microsoft filed a conditional

motion for JMOL of invalidity in the event that the Court disturbs the jury’s finding of

no infringement. (Doc. No. 862.) Microsoft also filed motions for JMOL or new trial

regarding the Reifman ‘433, Bolosky ‘794, and Guzak ‘971 patents. (Doc. Nos.

863-64, 870). Lucent and Alcatel Lucent each filed motions for JMOL or new trial

regarding the Guzak ‘971 and Fein ‘608 patents, including conditional motions

regarding infringement of the Guzak ‘971 patent should the Court disturb the jury's

finding on validity. (Doc. Nos. 861, 866.)1

The parties filed their responsive briefing on July 11, 2008 and their reply briefs

on July 18, 2008. (See Doc. Nos. 882-86, 893-94, 898, 900-03, 906-08.) The Court

held a hearing on these motions on July 25, 2008. The Court concludes that these

motions are suitable for decision without oral argument and submits them on the papers

pursuant to its discretion under Local Civil Rule 7.1(d)(1).

Background

I. Overview of the Verdict

The jury returned a special verdict on June 4, 2008, that did not award any

infringement damages to either side. (Doc. No. 851.) With the exception of the Guzak

‘971 patent, the jury found no infringement. With the Guzak ‘971 patent, the jury

found infringement by both Lucent and Alcatel Lucent, but it also found the asserted

claims invalid due to anticipation and obviousness. The jury did not find any of the

other patents invalid.

II. Puri ‘878

The Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) issued the Puri ‘878 patent, entitled

“Adaptive Coding and Decoding of Frames and Fields of Video,” on July 13, 1993,

based on an application filed November 15, 1991. Puri ‘878 relates generally to the

compression and decompression of video signals, which reduce the amount of

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2The PTO, due to its own error, initially issued claim 13 without the phrase “and fields of the

compressed video bit stream” and without the word “digital” in the second means plus function

limitation. Lucent previously asserted the Puri ‘878 patent in a suit against Microsoft without first

seeking a correction. There, the Court declined to correct the patent and determined that claims 13 and

15 were invalid due to indefiniteness. (Order Granting Part Denying Part Mot. Summ. J. Claims of

Puri ‘878 Invalid Under § 112(2), Case No. 02-CV-2060, Doc. No. 325.) Lucent later obtained a

certificate of correction from the PTO, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 254, which permits the Director to

issue a certificate “[w]henever a mistake in a patent incurred through the fault of the Patent and

Trademark Office, is clearly disclosed by the records of the Office . . . .”

3VC-1 is also referred to in the record as WMV-9.

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transmission bandwidth and storage space needed.

Two apparatus claims are at issue here: claim 13 and related dependent claim 15.

The PTO issued a certificate of correction regarding claim 13 on October 25, 2005.2

Claim 13 states, in its corrected form:

An apparatus for decoding a compressed digital video signal, comprising:

a means for receiving a compressed digital video bit stream; and

a means responsive to a motion compensation type signal for selectively

and adaptively performing motion compensated decoding of frames of the

compressed digital video bit stream and fields of the compressed video bit

stream.

Claim 15 states:

The apparatus of claim 13, in which the decoding means comprises:

a means responsive to a motion compensation type signal and selectively

responsive to frame motion vectors and field motion vectors for producing

an adaptive motion compensated estimate of a decoded video signal; and

a means responsive to the compressed digital video bit stream for

producing a decoded estimate error signal; and

a means responsive to the adaptive motion compensated estimate and the

estimate error signal for producing a decoded video signal.

MPT accused Microsoft of infringement based on various products containing

MPEG-2 or VC-1 video decoders.3 MPEG-2 and VC-1 are standards for video

compression used in a variety of contexts, including DVDs and HD DVDs. The

accused MPEG-2 products include the Windows Vista operating system and the Xbox

360 video game console. The accused VC-1 products include the Windows Vista

operating system, the Xbox 360 video game console, Windows Media Player versions

10 and 11, Windows Server 2003, Office Communicator, Windows Mobile, and

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Windows CE.

The jury did not find infringement by any of the accused products. Microsoft

raised an obviousness defense for both claims, and the jury did not find either claim

invalid for obviousness.

III. Reifman ‘433

The PTO issued the Reifman ‘433 patent, entitled “System and Method for

Facsimile Cover Page Storage and Use,” on August 1, 1995, based on an application

filed March 31, 1994. Only method claim 1 is at issue here. It states:

A method in a facsimile machine having a display and a user input device,

for storage and use of a facsimile cover page, the method comprising the

steps of:

maintaining at least one facsimile cover page in a first storage location

continuously accessible by any of a plurality of users of the facsimile

machine;

maintaining at least another facsimile cover page in a second storage

location accessible by a selected on of said plurality of users, said selected

user having a corresponding user identification;

sensing if a user inputs a user identification; and

enabling access to said, second storage location only if said sensed user

identification corresponds to said user identification of said selected user,

said first storage area being continuously enabled for any of said plurality

of users and said second storage area being enabled only when said sensed

user identification corresponds to said user identification of said selected

user.

Microsoft claimed that Lucent infringed claim 1 through use of its AnyPath Messaging

System (“APMS”). The jury held that Lucent had not infringed claim 1 of the Reifman

‘433 patent. No affirmative defenses regarding the Reifman ‘433 patent went before

the jury.

IV. Bolosky ‘794

The PTO issued the Bolosky ‘794 patent, entitled “Wire Protocol for a Media

Server System,” to inventors William J. Bolosky et al. based on an application filed

December 8, 1995. The patent describes a protocol for establishing connections

between a media server and a client. Microsoft claimed that Lucent’s APMS infringes

claim 33, which states:

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In a distributed system having a media server storing files holding data of

multiple media, a computer system comprising:

a control connection generator for creating a bidirectional control

connection between the media server and the computer system to enable

control information to be passed between the media server and the

computer system, the control connection utilizing a first transport

protocol; and 

a data connection generator for creating a bidirectional data connection

between the media server and the computer system to enable data to be

passed between the media server and the computer system, the data

connection using a second transport protocol distinct from the first

transport protocol.

The jury held that Lucent had not infringed claim 33 of the Bolosky ‘794 patent. No

affirmative defenses regarding the Bolosky ‘794 patent went before the jury. 

V. Guzak ‘971

The PTO issued the Guzak ‘971 patent, entitled “Tree View Control,” to

inventors Christopher J. Guzak, et al., on Nov. 2, 1999. The patent describes a

computer user interface element, called a tree view control, that enables application

programs to display hierarchical lists of items. Microsoft claimed that three products

infringed claims 2 and 3 of the Guzak ‘971 patent: Lucent’s Vital Suite product, Alcatel

Lucent’s OmniVista 2500/2700 Software, and Alcatel Lucent’s 1300 Convergent

Network Management Center. Claim 3 states:

A computer-readable medium having computer-executable instructions,

which when executed in a computer system having an output device and

an input device, performs a method comprising:

displaying a hierarchical tree of items having at least two levels of items

on the output device as part of a child window control;

in response to a user using the input device, selecting one of the items

displayed in the hierarchical tree of items; and

collapsing the hierarchical tree of items independently of the selecting so

that one of the levels of items of the hierarchical tree that was displayed

in the displaying step is no longer displayed as part of the hierarchical tree

on the output device in response to a user action that does not result on

[sic] a selection of one of the items.

For the most part, Claim 2 is the same, but it involves “expanding” rather than

“collapsing.”

The jury found that Lucent and Alcatel Lucent had infringed both claims, with

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respect to all three products at issue. The jury also found, however, that the claims

were invalid due to anticipation and obviousness.

VI. Fein ‘608

The PTO issued the Fein ‘608 patent, entitled “Method and System for

Customizing Alert Messages,” to inventors Ronald Fein, et al., on May 20, 2003. The

application was filed on December 16, 1998. The patent relates to the use of alert

messages in computer systems. Microsoft claimed infringement of method claim 25

by Lucent's Vital Suite product and Alcatel Lucent’s Air Control System. Claim 25

states:

A computer-implemented method for providing custom content that

supplements static content displayed in an alert message for a software

program module running on a local machine, comprising the steps of:

detecting one of a plurality of predetermined conditions;

displaying the alert message in response to the detected predetermined

condition;

opening a hyperlink from the alert message to access an external

information source that maintains the custom content, the external

information source operating in a location separate from the local

machine;

displaying the custom content to present supplemental information that is

related to the detected predetermined condition.

The jury found no infringement by either Lucent or Alcatel Lucent. The jury also

found that claim 25 of the ‘608 patent was not invalid due to obviousness.

Discussion

I. Standards for JMOL and New Trial

In patent cases, the standards on motions for judgment as a matter of law or new

trial are questions of regional circuit law. Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Group, Inc., 523

F.3d 1323, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Judgment as a matter of law is available where “a

reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find for the

party on that issue.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1). A party may renew the motion when not

granted at trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b). A court must uphold the jury’s verdict if it is

supported by substantial evidence. Wallace v. City of San Diego, 479 F.3d 616, 624

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(9th Cir. 2007). “Substantial evidence is evidence adequate to support the jury's

conclusion, even if it is also possible to draw a contrary conclusion from the same

evidence.” Id. (quoting Johnson v. Paradise Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 251 F.3d 1222,

1227 (9th Cir. 2001)). Substantial evidence requires only “such relevant evidence as

a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Blanton v.

Anzalone, 813 F.2d 1574, 1576 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac

Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001, 1014 (9th Cir. 1985)). The court must not

weigh the evidence and must “disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that

they jury is not required to believe.” Wallace, 479 F.3d at 624. Furthermore, the court

draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. Judgment as a

matter of law is appropriate only if, once the court has applied this standard, it

concludes that the evidence permits only one reasonable conclusion that is contrary to

the jury’s verdict. Id.

A party may also move for a new trial when requesting judgment as a matter of

law following a jury trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b), 59. Whether to grant a new trial is a

matter of the trial court’s discretion. City Solutions, Inc. v. Clear Channel

Communications, 365 F.3d 835, 843 (9th Cir. 2004). The court may grant a new trial

if “the verdict is contrary to the clear weight of the evidence, or is based upon evidence

which is false, or to prevent, in the sound discretion of the trial court, a miscarriage of

justice.” United States v. 4.0 Acres of Land, 175 F.3d 1133, 1139 (9th Cir. 1999)

(quoting Oltz v. St. Peter’s Cmty. Hosp., 861 F.2d 1440, 1452 (9th Cir. 1988)). To

make a “clear weight of the evidence” determination, the court weighs the evidence as

the court saw it. Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting

Murphy v. City of Long Beach, 914 F.2d 183, 187 (9th Cir. 1990)).

II. Puri ‘878

A. Claim Construction and Allegedly Improper Argument

MPT argues that Microsoft’s noninfringement theories focused on two elements

that should have been excluded from the corresponding structure for the second meansplus-function element of claim 13: Block Type Declassifier 80 and Motion Vector

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4MPT also argues that Block Type Declassifier 80 should be excluded because it is not

“responsive to a motion compensation type signal.” In the Court’s view, however, Block Type

Declassifier 80 is responsive to a motion compensation type signal. The motion compensation type

signal originates in the encoder and is incorporated into the combined signal sent to Block Type

Declassifier 80. (See, e.g., ‘878 Fig. 1A, 12:60-64 (indicating that a motion compensation type signal

is one of the inputs to Block Type Classifier 44 in the disclosed encoder).) The Court construed

“motion compensation type signal” as “a signal that identifies one of two or more available modes of

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Predictor 94. The Court identified the function for this element as “selectively and

adaptively performing motion compensated decoding of frames of the compressed

digital video bit stream and fields of the compressed video bit stream,” and MPT does

not challenge this. (See Jury Instruction 14, Ex. A.) Instead, MPT argues that the

disputed elements are not required to perform the claimed function. The Court

concludes that it appropriately included elements 80 and 94 in the claim construction.

The corresponding structure of a means-plus-function element “must include all

structure that actually performs the recited function,” though it “need not include all

things necessary to enable the claimed invention to work.” Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc.

v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 296 F.3d 1106, 1119 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Corresponding structure

must be “necessary to perform the claimed function.” Omega Eng’g, Inc. v. Raytek

Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2003). “Features that do not perform the recited

function do not constitute corresponding structure and thus do not serve as claim

limitations.” Northrop Grumman Corp. v. Intel Corp., 325 F.3d 1346, 1352 (Fed.

Cir. 2003).

MPT argues that Block Type Declassifier 80 is irrelevant to the claimed function

involving “motion compensated decoding” because it merely parses an incoming bit

stream into separate control signals. The Court disagrees. Unpacking the various

control signals in the incoming bit stream is a necessary part of the disclosed approach

to motion compensated decoding of a video signal. Block Type Declassifier 80

performs part of that process along with other components such as Decoder and

Demultiplexer 54. (See, e.g., ‘878 15:1-10.) Without the declassifier, necessary

information about the motion compensation mode would not be extracted from the

incoming bit stream and made available to the other components.4

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motion compensation to be used in motion compensated decoding of a video signal.” This definition

does not exclude a combined signal that conveys the motion compensation mode along with other

information. Microsoft did not advocate this approach, presumablybecauseone ofits noninfringement

arguments treats the bit stream, block class signal, and motion compensation type signal as completely

separate entities. In the Court’s view, the motion compensation type signal remains part of the higher

level signals, though it must be extracted by appropriate circuitry before other components can make

use of it.

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The Court also concludes that Motion Vector Predictor 94 is part of the

corresponding structure for the second means-plus-function element of claim 13. MPT

argues that the generation of motion vectors is not part of the claimed function of

motion compensated decoding. To the contrary, the Court sees this is a vital

component of the claimed function. Without Motion Vector Predictor 94, the only

motion vector information reaching estimation circuit 100 would be the differential

motion vector signal at line 90. (See, e.g., ‘878 Fig. 2, 15:11-28.) The differential

motion vectors are merely one part of the information necessary to construct the motion

vectors used in the disclosed form of motion compensated decoding. Standing alone,

the differential motion vector signal does not represent actual motion, and relying only

of this one piece would not result in decoding that could reasonably be considered

“motion compensated.” Also, there can be no doubt that Motion Vector Predictor 94

is “responsive to a motion compensation type signal” since the patent makes this point

explicitly. (See ‘878 15:17-22.) Microsoft raised a number of other arguments

supporting the Court’s claim construction, but the Court declines to reach them. The

reasons stated here are sufficient to reject MPT’s arguments.

Additionally, MPT argues that it should receive a new trial because Microsoft

made improper “component-by-component” arguments that a product must have a

block type declassifier and motion vector predictor, rather than treating the

corresponding structure as a whole. See, e.g., Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Tech. Corp, 185

F.3d 1259, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“The individual components, if any, of an overall

structure . . . are not claim limitations. Rather, the claim limitation is the overall

structure corresponding to the claimed function.”) The Court properly instructed the

jury that the corresponding structure of a means-plus-function element is viewed as a

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5Microsoft’s opposition to MPT’s Puri ‘878 JMOL motion did not dispute that the Intervideo

decoder performs the function of the second means-plus-function element.

6Regarding the Puri ‘878 patent, the Court also instructed the jury regarding the doctrine of

equivalents. (See Jury Instructions 20-21.) The parties present briefs do not address doctrine of

equivalents theories.

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whole. (See Jury Instruction 20 (“Determination of structural equivalence does not

require a component-by-component analysis . . . Rather, you should consider whether

the structure in the accused product for performing the function is equivalent to the

overall structure . . . identified in the claim construction.”).) MPT also had a sufficient

opportunity to respond to Microsoft’s arguments and point out the Court’s instruction

on the law. Viewing the totality of the record, the Court declines to grant a new trial.

B. Alleged Infringement by the MPEG-2 Products

Microsoft introduced evidence sufficient for the jury to reasonably conclude that

Microsoft’s accused MPEG-2 products did not infringe claim 13. In particular,

Microsoft introduced substantial evidence that its MPEG-2 products do not have

structure identical or equivalent to the corresponding structure for the second meansplus-function element.5

Literal infringement of a means-plus-function claim “requires that the relevant

structure in the accused device perform the identical function recited in the claim and

be identical or equivalent to the corresponding structure in the specification.” Odetics,

Inc., 185 F.3d at 1267. “[T]he claim limitation is the overall structure corresponding

to the claimed function.” Id. at 1268. An accused structure is equivalent if it “performs

the claimed function in substantially the same way to achieve substantially the same

result.” Id. at 1267. “The proper test is whether the differences between the structure

in the accused device and any disclosed in the specification are insubstantial.”

Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Indus., Inc., 145 F.3d 1303, 1309

(Fed. Cir. 1998).6

The accused MPEG-2 products use a decoder based on source code that

Microsoft acquired from Intervideo. Microsoft introduced substantial evidence of

differences between Motion Vector Predictor 94 and corresponding portions of the

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7Here, “blocks” are subdivisions of a single frame or field of video, such as an 8x8 square of

pixels. The parties also refer to “decision blocks,” which describes subsections of Motion Vector

Predictor 94’s internal circuitry that determine the approach to motion vector prediction in response

to the motion compensation type signal. (See ‘878 Figs. 15-16.)

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Intervideo decoder, from which the jury could have reasonably concluded that the

Intervideo decoder did not contain identical or equivalent structure, viewing the claim

element as a whole.

Microsoft’s expert, Dr. Gibson, testified to several differences between the

Intervideo decoder and Motion Vector Predictor 94. The Intervideo decoder

determines predicted motion vectors from different blocks than those used in the

claim.7 When predicting a motion vector, the Intervideo decoder only looks to the

immediately preceding block, and this does not change in response to a motion

compensation type signal. (See, e.g., Trial Tr. XII 83:18-23 (Dr. Gibson); see also

Trial Tr. XVI 200:21-24 (Microsoft’s expert Dr. Girod agreeing that, in general,

MPEG-2 determines the reference motion vector by looking at the immediately

previous block).) In contrast, the disclosed motion vector predictor selects from a

number of possible blocks based on the motion compensation type signal, not

necessarily the immediately preceding block. (See, e.g., Trial Tr. XII 84:11-23 (Dr.

Gibson); see also Trial Tr. XVI 140:11-141:23 (Dr. Girod).) Dr. Gibson opined that

since the Puri ‘878 patent’s motion vector predictor is not constrained to the

immediately preceding block, it results in less effective motion compensation. (See,

e.g., Trial Tr. XII 84:11-85:9.) Based on Dr. Gibson’s testimony, along with all the

evidence presented, the jury could have reasonably concluded that Intervideo decoder

did not “function in substantially the same way to achieve substantially the same

result.” Odetics, Inc., 185 F.3d at 1267.

MPT raises challenges to Dr. Gibson’s credibility, but none of them rise to a

level sufficient to grant JMOL or a new trial. The competing expert’s opinions

presented a factual question, and the jury could have reasonably accepted one expert’s

views while rejecting the other. Generally, the Court was more persuaded by MPT’s

expert, Dr. Girod, but not to an extent sufficient to overcome the deference afforded to

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8Microsoft distinguishes claim 13 from the Intervideo decoder, claiming that the former

extracts the motion compensation type signal from the block class signal, while the later extracts

control signals directly from the incoming bit stream. This may also be a sufficient basis to uphold

the jury’s verdict.

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the jury’s verdict.

Microsoftraised a number of other theories to support the jury’s noninfringement

finding, but the Court does not reach them since the differences involving the motion

vector predictor provide sufficient reasons to uphold the noninfringement verdict. For

example, Microsoft also argued that: (1) the Intervideo decoder does not have identical

or equivalent structure in light of Block Class Declassifier 80;8 (2) MPT failed to

provide sufficient evidence of indirect infringement; and (3) MPT failed to provide

sufficient evidence of infringement by downloads of Windows Media Player. 

The Court has also weighed the evidence regarding the MPEG-2 products as the

Court saw it and concluded that the verdict is not against the clear weight of the

evidence. Finally, the Court’s discussion of the MPEG-2 products applies equally to

dependent claim 15, which incorporates all the limitations of claim 13.

C. Alleged Infringement by the VC-1 Products

As with the MPEG-2 products, Microsoft argues that its VC-1 decoders do not

have structure identical or equivalent to that in the second means-plus-function element

of claim 13. Microsoft introduced substantial evidence regarding the VC-1 approach

to motion vector prediction from which the jury could reasonably conclude that the

VC-1 decoders did not have identical or equivalent structure. The motion vector

predictor in the patent chooses from several possible approaches based on the motion

compensation type signal. (See, e.g., Trial Tr. XII 84:11-23 (Dr. Gibson); see also

Trial Tr. XVI 140:11-141:23 (Dr. Girod).) In contrast, the VC-1 decoders look at the

average or median of three surrounding blocks, whose locations are predefined and do

not change in response to a motion compensation type signal. (See, e.g., Trial Tr. XII

82:17-83:17 (Dr. Gibson); see also Trial Tr. XVI 152:2-13 (Dr. Girod).) Dr. Gibson

opined that the VC-1 approach results in better motion compensation that the Puri ‘878

patent. (See, e.g., Trial Tr. 84:6-85:9.) The details of VC-1 implementation are

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9This argument is very similar to one made by Microsoft in related case 07-CV-2000. There,

the Court concluded that evidence of differences between the discrete cosine transform and the integer

transforms in VC-1 was sufficient for the jury to reasonably conclude that two decoder structures were

not equivalent. (See Order Regarding Post-Trial Matters, Case No. 07-CV-2000, Doc. No. 852 at

37-38.) Under a similar rationale, the evidence here is likely adequate to support the jury's verdict, at

least as to claim 15, but the Court does not reach this issue since there are other grounds sufficient for

upholding the verdict.

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different than MPEG-2, but the Court reaches the same conclusion. The evidence was

sufficient for the jury to reasonably conclude that the VC-1 decoders did not include

identical or equivalent structure.

As with the MPEG-2 decoders, Microsoft raised a number of other theories that

the Court declines to reach. For example, Microsoft also argued that: (1) VC-1

decoders do not have identical or equivalent structure in light of Block Class

Declassifier 80 and Motion Compensated Prediction Selector 100; (2) MPT failed to

provide sufficient evidence of indirect infringement; (3) MPT failed to provide

sufficient evidence of infringement by downloads of Windows Media Player; and (4)

with respect to claim 15, the structure of VC-1 decoders is substantially different

because they use a set of 16-bit integer transforms rather than an inverse discrete cosine

transform.9

The Court has also weighed the evidence regarding the VC-1 products as the

Court saw it and concluded that the verdict is not against the clear weight of the

evidence. Moreover, the Court’s discussion of the VC-1 products applies equally to

dependent claim 15, which incorporates all the limitations of claim 13.

D. Summary

In summary, the Court does not disturb any aspect of its claim construction or

the jury’s verdict regarding the ‘878 patent. The Court denies MPT’s motion for

judgment as a matter of law or a new trial. Since the Court upholds the jury’s finding

of no infringement, the Court denies Microsoft’s conditional motion regarding the

validity of the ‘878 patent as moot.

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III. Reifman ‘433

Microsoft moves for judgment as a matter of law that Lucent’s AnyPath

Messaging System (“APMS”) infringes claim 1 of the Reifman ‘433 patent, or

alternatively for a new trial on this issue. The Court concludes that Lucent introduced

substantial evidence from which the jury could have reasonably concluded that the

APMS does not infringe claim 1.

Lucent introduced substantial evidence that the APMS does not meet language

in claim 1 requiring that the first storage area for a facsimile (“FAX”) cover page be

“continuously accessible by any of a plurality of users” and “continuously enabled for

any of said plurality of users.” (See Jury Instruction 14, Ex. B.) In contrast, the second

storage area is “enabled only when said sensed user identification corresponds to said

user identification of said selected user.” (Id.) The Court construed “continuously” to

mean “without interruption.” (Id.) Lucent offered the opinion of its expert, Dr. Tobagi,

that a subscriber to the APMS system has no access to any FAX capabilities before

signing in, and Microsoft does not dispute this. (See, e.g., Trial Tr. XV 137:3-16.)

Therefore, Dr. Tobagi opined, APMS does not involve a “first storage area” that meets

the “continuously accessible” and “continuously enabled” requirements of claim 1.

(See, e.g., Trial Tr. XV 189:4-190:11.) Dr. Tobagi’s opinion is consistent with the

claim language and the Court’s claim construction. The claim language distinguishes

the first storage location from the second storage location’s requirement of user

identification. In light of all the evidence, the jury could have reasonably accepted Dr.

Tobagi’s opinion and concluded that the APMS does not provide a FAX cover page

that is “continuously accessible” or “continuously enabled” within the meaning of

claim 1.

Accordingly, the Court denies Microsoft’s motion for JMOL of infringement

regarding the Reifman ‘433 patent. Furthermore, the Court concludes that the verdict

was not against the clear weight of the evidence. Since the above reasons are sufficient

to uphold the verdict of no infringement, the Court does not reach Lucent’s other

arguments. For example, Lucent also argued that: (1) Microsoft failed to prove that the

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10The Court notes that it was not persuaded that the alleged lack of a “display” and “user input

device” would be an appropriate basis to sustain the verdict.

11The APMS includes a variety of individual network elements that may be configured in a

variety of ways to meet a particular customer’s needs.

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APMS includes a “display” or “user input device,” and (2) Microsoft failed to prove

that Lucent engaged in conduct constituting direct or indirect infringement.10

IV. Bolosky ‘794

Microsoft seeks JMOL of inducement based on Lucent’s alleged encouragement

of customers to deploy the APMS system to provide Voice over Internet Protocol

(“VoIP”) services in combination with VoIP phones or similar devices.

11 Microsoft

argues that Lucent’s expert, Dr. Tobagi, conceded direct infringement, which is a

necessary element of an inducement claim. See, e.g., Symantec Corp. v. Computer

Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 522 F.3d 1279, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2008). After viewing the testimony

and reviewing the record, the Court concludes that Dr. Tobagi did not concede direct

infringement. For example, Dr. Tobagi did agree that the VoIP server may use two

transport protocols under certain circumstances, but this falls short of conceding that

a system has both control and data connection generators “for creating a bidirectional

control connection between the media server and the computer system.” (See, e.g.,

Trial Tr. XV 148:10-149:14 (Dr. Tobagi agreeing on cross-examination that the APMS

VoIP server may use both UDP and TCP protocols, in some situations).) 

Microsoft also argues that Dr. Tobagi never denied the existence of the required

control and data connection generators. Lucent was not required to do so. The burden

of persuasion was with Microsoft. Though Microsoft offered some evidence of control

and data connections, Lucent countered that Microsoft did not offer any analysis

identifying the generators involved, whether in the APMS VoIP server or in VoIP

devices connected to it. The jury could have reasonably concluded that Microsoft

failed to meet its burden of proof for direct infringement.

Lucent also argued that there is substantial evidence from which the jury could

have concluded that Lucent lacked the intent necessary for inducement. The Court

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declines to reach this issue, having concluded that the evidence supports a finding of

no direct infringement. The Court also concludes that the jury’s verdict is not against

the clear weight of the evidence.

V. Guzak ‘971

A. Validity

Microsoft moves for judgment as a matter of law that the Guzak ‘971 patent is

not invalid due to anticipation, or for a new trial on this issue. The anticipation

defense, based on 35 U.S.C. § 102, requires clear and convincing evidence that a single

piece of prior-art contains all limitations of a claim. See, e.g., Glaxo Group Ltd. v.

Apotex, Inc., 376 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Union Carbide Chems. & Plastics

Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 308 F.3d 1167, 1188-89 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The Court

concludes that substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict that both claims 2 and

3 of the Guzak ‘971 patent were anticipated.

The disputed claims describe computer-readable media containing executable

instructions that, when executed, perform methods involving the expansion and

collapse of a hierarchical tree, independently of selecting an item within the tree. The

tree is displayed in a “window control.” The Court construed “window control” as

“computer code, along with an accompanying graphical representation, that sends

notification messages to a parent window when events, like user input, occur within the

window control.” (Jury Instruction 14, Ex. F.) For the present purposes, many

elements of anticipation are undisputed, and resolution of this motion turns on whether

Lucent and Alcatel Lucent offered substantial evidence that XTree for Windows

(“XTree”) includes the use of “notification messages,” thus meeting the Court's

construction of “window control.” Microsoft's motion does not dispute that the other

elements of claims 2 and 3 are part of XTree.

Lucent and Alcatel Lucent offered substantial evidence that XTree for Windows

includes notification messages. Their expert, Dr. Polish, offered his opinion that XTree

includes a “Tree Window” that is a child window residing within the current

“Application Window.” (See, e.g., Trial Tr. XV 29:17-30:24.) Mr. Bogdan, one of the

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named inventors for the Guzak ‘971 patent, provided an explanation of the role of child

and parent windows consistent with Dr. Polish’s testimony. (Trial Tr. VI

216:9-217:12.) Dr. Polish further testified that certain actions within the Tree Window

lead to the near-immediate update of information in the Application Window. (See,

e.g., Trial Tr. at XV 31:2-25.) Therefore, he opined, the code must be sending

notification messages from the child window to the parent window. (See id.) The jury

could have reasonably accepted Dr. Polish’s view, along with the other evidence of

XTree’s behavior, and concluded that there was clear and convincing evidence that

XTree includes notification messages. The verdict is not flawed, as Microsoft

contends, because Dr. Polish did not offer a code analysis identifying notification

messages. The jury could have reasonably accepted Dr. Polish’s expert opinion that

the existence of notification messages was a necessary implication of XTree’s behavior.

Microsoft also moves for judgment as a matter of law that the Guzak ‘971 patent

is not invalid due to obviousness. Since anticipation is the “epitome of obviousness,”

its follows from the Court’s conclusion on anticipation that the jury’s obviousness

verdict is also supported by substantial evidence. TorPharm, Inc. v. Ranbaxy Pharms.,

Inc., 336 F.3d 1322, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (quoting Connell v. Sears, Roebuck, & Co.,

722 F.2d 1542, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). The Court denies Microsoft's request for

judgment as a matter of law that the Guzak ‘971 patent is not invalid. Furthermore, the

Court has weighed the evidence on these invalidity defenses and concluded that a new

trial is not appropriate on this issue. Since the Court upholds the jury’s verdict of

invalidity, the Court declines to reach Lucent and Alcatel Lucent's conditional motions

regarding infringement of the Guzak ‘971 patent.

B. Alcatel Lucent’s OmniStack 6300

Alcatel Lucent argues that Microsoft included its OmniStack 6300 product in the

infringement contentions for the pretrial order, but did not present any infringement

evidence regarding this product at trial. No issues regarding the OmniStack 6300

reached the jury. Microsoft did not oppose this motion, and the Court concludes that

there is good cause to grant Alcatel Lucent’s motion that, as a matter of law, it does not

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infringe claims 2 and 3 of the Guzak patent, with respect to the OmniStack 6300.

VI. Fein ‘608

A. Indefiniteness

Lucent moves for judgment as a matter of law that claim 25 of the Fein ‘608

patent is invalid due to indefiniteness. Microsoft does not dispute that claim 25 of the

patent contains a printing error. The applicants amended claim 25, changing “opening

a hyperlink” to “selecting a control object,” and the PTO approved the patent with this

amendment. (PX 13 (Fein ‘608 file history), Amendment and Response to September

30, 2002 Office Action at 9.) Nevertheless, the PTO issued the patent without the

change. Microsoft asserted claim 25 as issued, without any correction.

However, Lucent and Alcatel Lucent did not raise this issue in the pre-trial order,

which acts as an amended pleading that controls the subsequent course of litigation.

See, e.g., Northwest Acceptance Corp. v Lynnwood Equip., Inc., 841 F.2d 918, 924

(9th Cir. 1988). To the extent that the Court has discretion to consider the merits of

this matter now, it declines to do so. Lucent and Alcatel Lucent had adequate

opportunities to raise this issue at an appropriate stage of these proceedings, such as

claim construction or summary judgment. As Lucent and Alcatel Lucent did not

properly preserve this issue, the Court denies their motion that claim 25 is invalid due

to indefiniteness.

B. Obviousness

Lucent and Alcatel Lucent move for judgment as a matter of law that the Fein

‘608 patent is invalid for obviousness, or for a new trial on this issue. The Court

concludes that Microsoft introduced substantial evidence from which the jury could

reasonably conclude that the patent was not invalid due to obviousness. Though the

ultimate determination of obviousness is a question of law, courts give deference to the

jury’s underlying findings of fact. See Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Group, Inc., 523 F.3d

1323, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[T]his court reviews a jury’s conclusions on

obviousness, a question of law, without deference, and the underlying findings of fact,

whether explicit or implicit within the verdict, for substantial evidence.”) (quoting

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Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). These underlying

findings include “the scope and content of the prior art, the differences between the

prior art and the claims at issue, the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art . . . .” Id.

at 1338-39. Here, there were material factual disputes about the content of the prior art,

and there is evidence sufficient to support the jury’s verdict.

The obviousness defense requires proof by clear and convincing evidence.

Takeda Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. Alphapharm Pty., Ltd., 492 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir.

2007). When considering this defense, courts should determine whether the “objective

reach of the claim” encompasses obvious subject matter. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex

Inc., 550 U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1727, 1741-42 (2007). This may include “noting that

there existed at the time of invention a known problem for which there was an obvious

solution encompassed by the patent’s claims.” Id.

Lucent and Alcatel Lucent rely on the combination of two references: United

States Patent No. 5,845,120 (“Reddy”), and the article “Help File Web Links” by

Robert Lord (“Lord”). (PX 1121 (Reddy); PX 1122 (Lord).) The parties’ dispute

centers on whether the Reddy patent discloses “custom content,” as used in claim 25.

Microsoft offered the opinion of its expert, Dr. Porter, who testified that Reddy does

not disclose custom content. (See, e.g., Trial Tr. VIII 73:4-16.) He explained, for

example, that Reddy discloses a compiler that does not customize anything for specific

users, while “custom content” in the context of the Fein ‘608 patent is something that

provides supplemental information for particular users. (See, e.g., id.; Trial Tr. VIII

45:23-46:4 (explaining “custom content” in the Fein ‘608 context).) This view of

custom content is consistent with the Court's claim construction, which did not

construe “custom content” beyond its ordinary meaning. The jury could have

reasonably accepted Dr. Porter’s opinion, particularly given the burden of clear and

convincing evidence that applies to this defense in litigation.

The fact that the examiner viewed Reddy as disclosing “custom content” does

not require a different result. When initially rejecting claim 25, the examiner stated

that “[t]he content of Reddy et al. meets the ‘broadest reasonable interpretation’ of

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custom content because it MUST have been authored, at least in part, for the particular

application being used.” (PX 13, Office Action of September 30, 2002 at 11 (emphasis

in original).) The applicants avoided the obviousness rejection by asserting a

conception date earlier than another piece of prior art with which the examiner had

combined Reddy. The “broadest reasonable interpretation” standard used by the

examiner is not applicable in the context of litigation. See Atlantic Thermoplastics Co.,

Inc. v. Faytex Corp., 970 F.2d 834, 846 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Dr. Porter offered his opinion

that “custom content” in the Fein ‘608 context requires something customized for users,

not just a particular application. (See, e.g., Trial Tr. VIII 45:23-46:4.) Under the

standards appropriate to litigation, Microsoft offered substantial evidence from which

the jury could have reasonably rejected the obviousness theory offered by Lucent and

Alcatel Lucent.

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12If there are any other pending motions, the Court denies them at this time.

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Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS Alcatel Lucent’s unopposed

motion for judgment as a matter of law that its OmniStack 6300 product does not

infringe claims 2 and 3 of the Guzak ‘971 patent. The Court DENIES all other pending

motions for judgment as a matter of law or new trial.

As in related case 07-CV-2000, the Court again compliments all attorneys

involved for their excellent work in this matter. (See Order on Post-Trial Matters, Case

No. 07-CV-2000, Doc. No. 852 at 56 (“Counsel for all parties worked diligently to

accommodate the Court’s schedule, prepared their materials thoroughly, and conducted

themselves in a professional and courteous manner that does credit to their

profession.”).) That commendation applies equally here. Furthermore, the Court notes

that a number of the attorneys had limited time between this trial and the related patent

trial in 07-CV-2000. By preparing for these trials in rapid succession, the parties

helped the Court to manage its calendar efficiently.12

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 23, 2008

_______________________________

MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

COPIES TO:

All parties of record.

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