Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_04-cv-00710/USCOURTS-alsd-1_04-cv-00710-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1

 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

CALVIN ALPHONSE LEE, :

Plaintiff, :

vs. : CIVIL ACTION 04-00710-BH-B

JUDGE JAMES WOOD, et al., :

Defendants. :

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, an Alabama prison inmate proceeding pro se and in

forma pauperis, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Docs. 8,

13). This action has been referred to the undersigned for a report

and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local

Rule 72.2(c)(4). After consideration of the pleadings, and for the

reasons set forth below, it is recommended that this action be

dismissed with prejudice as to Defendant Judge James Wood and

Defendant City of Mobile Police Department and dismissed without

prejudice as to Defendant Probation Officer Reginald Tate, prior to

service of process, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and

(ii) because Plaintiff’s claims are either frivolous or fail to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

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 The predecessor to these sections is 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). 

Although Congress made many substantive changes to § 1915(d) when

it enacted 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)and 1915A(b) in the Prison

Litigation Reform Act of 1996 (“PLRA”), the frivolity and the

failure to state a claim analysis contained in Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989), was unaltered. See Bilal v.

Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001); Brown v. Bargery,

207 F.3d 863, 866 n.4 (6th Cir. 2000); Looney v. Hetzel, 2001 WL

395153, *2 n.2 (S.D. Ala. 2001) (unpublished). However,

dismissal under §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b) is now mandatory. 

Bilal, 251 F.3d at 1348-49; Gladney v. Pendleton Corr. Facility,

302 F.3d 773, 775 (7th Cir. 2002).

2

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis against a

government officer, the Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s Complaint

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.1 “Section

1915A requires the court to review a complaint filed by a prisonerplaintiff against a government officer and to dismiss the complaint

if it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant

who is immune from such relief.” Baxter v. Washington, 2006 WL

2591483, *1 (11th Cir. 2006). “A complaint fails to state a claim

when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff could prove no set

of facts that would entitle him to relief.” Id. (citing Brower v.

County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 598 (1989)). “Section 1915 requires

the court to dismiss a complaint on the same grounds when a

prisoner-plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis.” Id.

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II. FACTS

For screening purposes, the Court assumes as true the

allegations contained in Plaintiff’s Complaint. (Doc. 1).

According to Plaintiff, on November 1, 2004, he appeared in the

Mobile County Circuit Court and Judge James Wood revoked his

parole. Plaintiff contends that this revocation was a direct

result of the fact that his attorney was appointed only “5 minutes

before [the] hearing.” (Id.). Additionally, Plaintiff contends

that he was falsely incarcerated from September 9, 2004, until

October 27, 2004, by Defendant Probation Officer Reginald Tate

based on allegedly false reports. (Id. at 5-6). Plaintiff states

that he was later acquitted of all charges. 

Plaintiff also alleges very vaguely that on September 4, 2004,

“Mobile Police officers refused Plaintiff medical attention,” for

a stab wound in his right hand. (Id. at 5, 7). Plaintiff further

alleges that his Due Process rights were denied, the “Requested

trail (sic) denied,” and that the “Probation Officer Lied under

oath, prepared false documents and incomplete document. Also

Unqualified to Preform Job Description (sic).” (Id. at 5).

Plaintiff is currently serving time in prison because of the parole

violation, and requests the following relief:

[a]ppeal the Hearing, Set Another Hearing and

grant Plaintiff Adquate Counsel, and time to

prepare for hearing. Review entire hearing

and grant trail for Plaintiff. Have Perjury

charge’s applied to guilty party and victim. 

Release Plaintiff from jail (sic).

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The Court notes that Plaintiff has previously filed at

least five civil rights actions in the United States District

Courts for the Southern, Middle and Northern Districts of

Alabama, including the following, Lee v. Tillman, Southern

District of Alabama, CV-04-0823-WS-M (filed on December 29, 2004,

asserting § 1983 claims against Mobile County Sheriff Jack

Tillman, Warden Mike Haley, Dr. Sonnier, and Dr. Smith, regarding

Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement at the Mobile County Metro

Jail, and dismissed prior to service because it was frivolous or

failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii)); Lee v. Tillman,

Southern District of Alabama, CV-04-700-WS-C (filed on November

2, 2004, alleging under § 1983 that Plaintiff was being subjected

to cruel and unusual punishment, false imprisonment, and that his

civil rights were offended by his conditions of confinement at

the Mobile County Metro Jail, and dismissed prior to service of

process as a result of Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute the

action); Lee v. Owens, Northern District of Alabama, CV-99-AR3282-J (filed on December 21, 1999, alleging violations of § 1983

regarding Plaintiff’s lack of access to a law library while

incarcerated at the Hamilton Community Based Facility, and

dismissed prior to service of process for failure to state a

claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(A)(b)(1); Lee v. Alabama Dept.

of Corrections, Northern District of Alabama, 99-CV-3398

(dismissed prior to service for Plaintiff’s failure to comply

with court order); Lee v. Alabama Dept. of Corrections, Middle

District of Alabama, Civil Action No. 2:07-CV-82-MHT (filed on

4

(Id. at 8).

On November 8, 2004, Plaintiff filed the instant § 1983 action

against Defendants, Mobile County Circuit Judge James Wood,

Probation Officer Reginald Tate, and the City of Mobile Police

Department (hereafter “Mobile Police Department”), alleging that

the Defendants violated his “Due Process Rights,” apparently

resulting in his parole revocation, and that the Defendants

violated his “Civil Rights as Prisoner,” apparently stemming from

his alleged lack of medical care by the Mobile Police Department.2

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January 29, 2007, alleging violations of threatening and abusive

language against some individual defendants and the Alabama

Department of Corrections (“ADOC”), and currently recommended to

be dismissed as to the ADOC as frivolous, prior to service of

process). 

5

(Doc. 1 at 5-7; Doc. 13). Having considered Plaintiff’s Complaint

in its entirety, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations fail

to establish any claim against Defendants Judge James Wood,

Probation Officer Reginald Tate, and the Mobile Police Department

for which relief could be granted.

III. DISCUSSION

As discussed above, a prisoner who is allowed to proceed in

forma pauperis in this Court and/or who files a complaint against

a government officer or employee will have his complaint screened

in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and

1915A, respectively. This screening procedure requires the Court

to dismiss a prisoner’s civil action prior to service of process if

it determines that the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary

damages from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii) and 1915A(b)(1)-(2).

A. The Relief Sought by Plaintiff is Unavailable

The Court finds that Plaintiff is challenging his present

incarceration in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. Recently, in the

Supreme Court decision of Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81,

125 S. Ct. 1242, 1247, 161 L. Ed. 2d 253 (2005), the Court

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observed:

[t]hroughout the legal journey from Preiser

to Balisok, the Court has focused on the need

to ensure that state prisoners use only

habeas corpus (or similar state) remedies

when they seek to invalidate the duration of

their confinement – either directly through

an injunction compelling speedier release or

indirectly through a judicial determination

that necessarily implies the unlawfulness of

the State’s custody.

The writ of habeas corpus is the sole means by which to seek

invalidation of a state conviction in federal court. Preiser v.

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 93 S. Ct. 1386, 36 L. Ed. 2d 439 (1973).

In Preiser, the Court determined the specific remedy provided by

the habeas statute § 2254 overrode the general provision of § 1983

as the proper statute by which to challenge the loss of good-time

credits. Id. at 489, 93 S. Ct. at 1836. 

The broad language of § 1983, however, is not

conclusive of the issue before us. The

statute is a general one, and despite the

literal applicability of its terms, the

question remains whether the specific federal

habeas corpus statute, explicitly and

historically designed to provide the means

for a state prisoner to attack the validity

of his confinement, must be understood to be

the exclusive remedy available in a situation

like this where it so clearly applies. The

respondents’ counsel acknowledged at oral

argument that a state prisoner challenging

his underlying conviction and sentence on

federal constitutional grounds in a federal

court is limited to habeas corpus. It was

conceded that he cannot bring a § 1983

action, even though the literal terms of §

1983 might seem to cover such a challenge,

because Congress has passed a more specific

act to cover that situation, and, in doing

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so, has provided that a state prisoner

challenging his conviction must first seek

relief in a state forum, if a state remedy is

available. It is clear to us that the result

must be the same in the case of a state

prisoner’s challenge to the fact or duration

of his confinement, based, as here, upon the

alleged unconstitutionality of state

administrative action. Such a challenge is

just as close to the core of habeas corpus as

an attack on the prisoner’s conviction, for

it goes directly to the constitutionality of

his physical confinement itself and seeks

either immediate release from that

confinement or the shortening of its

duration.

In amending the habeas corpus laws in 1948,

Congress clearly required exhaustion of

adequate state remedies as a condition

precedent to the invocation of federal

judicial relief under those laws. It would

wholly frustrate explicit congressional

intent to hold that the respondents in the

present case could evade this requirement by

the simple expedient of putting a different

label on their pleadings. In short, Congress

has determined that habeas corpus is the

appropriate remedy for state prisoners

attacking the validity of the fact or length

of their confinement, and that specific

determination must override the general terms

of § 1983. 

The policy reasons underlying the habeas

corpus statute support this conclusion. The

respondents concede that the reason why only

habeas corpus can be used to challenge a

state prisoner’s underlying conviction is the

strong policy requiring exhaustion of state

remedies in that situation - - to avoid the

unnecessary friction between the federal and

state court systems that would result if a

lower federal court upset a state court

conviction without first giving the state

Case 1:04-cv-00710-BH-B Document 15 Filed 08/03/07 Page 7 of 19
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court system an opportunity to correct its

own constitutional errors. Fay v. Noia,

supra, at 419-420 of 372 U.S., 83 S. Ct. at

838-839. 

Id. at 489-90, 93 S. Ct. at 1836. 

Since Preiser, additional cases have been decided regarding

this issue. For instance, if Plaintiff were seeking damages for

his incarceration, the decision in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,

114 S. Ct. 2364, 129 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1994), would govern. In Heck,

the United States Supreme Court ruled:

[w]e hold that, in order to recover damages

for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or

imprisonment, or for other harm caused by

actions whose unlawfulness would render a

conviction or sentence invalid, (footnote

omitted), a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that

the conviction or sentence has been reversed

on direct appeal, expunged by executive

order, declared invalid by a state tribunal

authorized to make such determination, or

called into question by a federal court’s

issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28

U.S.C. § 2254. 

Id. at 486-87, 114 S. Ct. at 2372. The Heck decision has been

applied to probation and parole revocations. Jackson v. Vannoy, 49

F.3d 175, 177 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 851, 116 S. Ct.

148, 133 L. Ed. 2d 93(1995); accord McGrew v. Texas Bd. of Pardons

& Paroles, 47 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 1995) (dismissed action

pursuant to Heck because the sentence imposed after the revocation

of his mandatory supervision had not been invalidated). Because

Plaintiff has not shown that his probation revocation has been

invalidated, Heck would preclude a claim by Plaintiff for damages,

Case 1:04-cv-00710-BH-B Document 15 Filed 08/03/07 Page 8 of 19
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and such a claim would be frivolous. 

However, in the present § 1983 action, Plaintiff is seeking

injunctive and declaratory relief by his request to “Appeal the

Hearing, Set Another Hearing and grant Plaintiff adequate Counsel,

and time to prepare for hearing. Review entire Hearing and grant

trail for Plaintiff. Have Perjury charges applied to guilty party

and victim. Release Plaintiff from jail (sic).” (Doc. 1 at 8).

Plaintiff is seeking to be released from jail which implies a

request for the invalidation of his probation revocation and for

his release from his present incarceration. A claim for injunctive

and declaratory relief in a § 1983 action where a plaintiff

challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks his

immediate release is not cognizable in a § 1983 action. Abella v.

Rubino, 63 F.3d 1063, 1066 (11th Cir. 1995).

In Abella, a federal prisoner brought a Bivens action

challenging his conviction. The prisoner sought damages and

injunctive and declaratory relief. Observing that § 1983 law is

commonly applied to Bivens actions, the Eleventh Circuit found that

under Heck the prisoner’s damages claims were not ripe because the

prisoner’s convictions had not been invalidated. Id. at 1065.

Regarding the prisoner’s claims for injunctive and declaratory

relief, the Eleventh Circuit held:

Heck reaffirmed that, under Preiser v.

Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 475, 93 S. Ct. 1827, 36

L. Ed. 2d 439 (1973), “habeas corpus is the

exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who

Case 1:04-cv-00710-BH-B Document 15 Filed 08/03/07 Page 9 of 19
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challenges the fact or duration of his

confinement and seeks immediate or speedier

release.” 512 U.S. at ---, 114 S. Ct. at

2364. Thus, declaratory or injunctive relief

claims which are in the nature of habeas

corpus claims - - i.e., claims which

challenge the validity of the claimant’s

conviction or sentence and seek release - -

are simply not cognizable under § 1983. 

(Footnote omitted.) Id. This rule applies

equally to Bivens actions. (Citation

omitted.) 

Id. at 1066. “Therefore, injunctive and declaratory relief claims

which challenge the fact or duration of confinement are simply

never cognizable in § 1983 or Bivens actions. Id. at n.4.

Thus, Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive and declaratory relief

is not available in this § 1983 action. Id. at 1066 & n.4.

Plaintiff’s claim is only recognized in habeas corpus and must be

brought in a habeas corpus action under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive and declaratory

relief lacks an arguable basis in law and is, therefore, frivolous.

B.Alternatively, Claims Still Due to be Dismissed

Even if Plaintiff’s claims were not frivolous based upon the

standards of Preiser, Heck and Abella, Plaintiff’s action would

still be due to be dismissed prior to service of process. In this

42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, Plaintiff asserts a Due Process claim

against Mobile County Circuit Court Judge James Wood, alleging that

although he did appoint legal counsel for Plaintiff prior to

Plaintiff’s parole revocation hearing, he did not allow Plaintiff

Case 1:04-cv-00710-BH-B Document 15 Filed 08/03/07 Page 10 of 19
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sufficient time to confer with said counsel, causing Plaintiff’s

parole to be revoked. Plaintiff also claims that Defendant

Probation Officer Reginald Tate incarcerated him based upon false

reports, presumably also resulting in his parole revocation. (Doc.

1 at 5-7). Plaintiff’s final complaint is against the Mobile

Police Department, alleging Plaintiff does not seek monetary

damages, but instead asks the Court to grant him another hearing,

review his hearing, and ultimately release him from jail.

Plaintiff has acknowledged that his probation revocation has not

been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order,

declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such

determination, nor called into question by a federal court’s

issuance of a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 22 U.S.C. § 2254.

1. Defendant Judge James Wood

Plaintiff has named Judge Wood in his §1983 action for his

actions taken during Plaintiff’s parole revocation hearing. In a

§1983 action, a judge is entitled to absolute judicial immunity

from damages for those acts taken while he was acting in his

judicial capacity unless he acted in the “clear absence of all

jurisdiction.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 357, 362, 98 S. Ct.

1099, 55 L. Ed. 2d 331 (1978) (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S.

335, 13 Wall. 335, 351, 20 L. Ed. 646 (1871)); Simmons v. Conger,

86 F. 3d 1080, 1084-85 (11th Cir. 1996); Scott v. Hayes, 719 F. 2d

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3

The Court notes that under Alabama law, “[t]here is no

automatic right to counsel in probation revocation proceedings.” 

Spence v. State, 766 So. 2d 206, 208 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999). 

Further, 

[c]ounsel should be provided when a

probationer makes a colorable claim that he

did not commit the alleged violation or shows

justification or mitigating reasons for the

violation that are complex or otherwise

difficult to develop or present. 

Id. See also Coon v. State, 675 So. 2d 94 (Ala. Crim. App.

1995); Rule 27.6(b), Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure.

12

1562, 1563 (11th Cir. 1983). A judge is entitled to this immunity

even though he acts “in excess of [his] jurisdiction, and [his

actions] are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly.”

Stump, 435 U.S. at 356. Absolute judicial immunity ensures “that

a judicial officer, in exercising that authority vested in him,

[is] free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of

personal consequences to himself.” Stump, 435 U.S. at 355 (quoting

Bradley, 13 Wall. at 347), which is a “principle of the highest

importance to the proper administration of justice[.]” Id.

Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Wood is that he denied his

motion for an attorney prior to his parole revocation hearing, and,

although Plaintiff acknowledges that he did in fact receive counsel

prior to the hearing, Plaintiff apparently contends that he did not

have adequate time to prepare with his attorney.3 In a response

filed by Plaintiff to interrogatories issued by this Court,

Plaintiff states that his revocation resulted because of the

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4

Ala. Code § 12-11-30(2) provides the following: 

 (2) CRIMINAL. The circuit court shall have

exclusive original jurisdiction of all felony

prosecutions and of misdemeanor or ordinance

violations which are lesser included offenses

within a felony charge or which arise from

the same incident as a felony charge; except,

that the district court shall have concurrent

jurisdiction with the circuit court to

receive pleas of guilty in felony cases not

punishable by sentence of death. The circuit

court may, on conviction of a defendant, upon

a showing of inability to make immediate

payment of fine and costs, continue the case

from time to time to permit the fine and

costs to be paid. 

13

following criminal charges: Domestic Violence 2nd, three counts of

Domestic Violence 3rd, and according to Plaintiff, “Threaten

Letter,” and “Failure to Pay Court Ordered Monies.” (Doc. 13). 

The Court finds that Ala. Code § 13A-6-131 prohibits the crime

of domestic violence in the second degree, and classifies such

crime as a Class B felony. Ala. Code § 13A-6-132 prohibits domestic

violence in the third degree, and classifies such crime as a Class

A misdemeanor. An Alabama circuit judge has exclusive original

jurisdiction over all felony proceedings. Ala. Code § 12-11-30.4

Moreover, a probation violation is a violation of a court order.

See Ronet v. Foster, 2006 WL 1980273, *3 (M.D. Fla. 2006)(“Whenever

within the period of probation...there are reasonable grounds to

believe that a probationer...has violated his or her probation...in

a material respect, any law enforcement officer who is aware of the

probationary...status of the probationer...or any parole or

Case 1:04-cv-00710-BH-B Document 15 Filed 08/03/07 Page 13 of 19
5

The Court notes that Plaintiff’s claim for relief consists

simply of a new parole revocation hearing, a review of his prior

parole revocation hearing, and release from prison. (Doc. 1 at

8).

14

probation supervisor may arrest or request any county or municipal

law enforcement officer to arrest such probationer or offender

without warrant wherever found and forthwith return him or her to

the court granting such probation or community control.”).

Clearly, Defendant Judge Wood was acting within his jurisdiction as

a circuit judge when he handled the felony parole revocation

proceedings involving Plaintiff. Ala. Code § 12-11-30; see

generally McCoo v. State, 921 So. 2d 450 (Ala. 2005). Because both

prongs of the Stump test are satisfied, i.e., Defendant Wood acted

within his jurisdiction and in his judicial capacity, Judge Wood is

entitled to absolute judicial immunity from any damage claim,

assuming Plaintiff had asserted a monetary damage claim.5

Therefore, the claims against Defendant Wood are due to be

dismissed as frivolous. 

2. Defendant Probation Officer Reginald Tate

Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendant Officer Tate are

very vague, even with the addition of his answers to

interrogatories propounded by this Court. (Docs. 1, 13). Plaintiff

seeks relief from Defendant Probation Officer Reginald Tate,

alleging that Officer Tate lied under oath, relied upon and

possibly prepared false documents, had Plaintiff falsely

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incarcerated and is unqualified to perform his job. Again, the

relief Plaintiff seeks is essentially release from prison which

makes this claim frivolous pursuant to Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411

U.S. 475, 93 S. Ct. 1386, 36 L. Ed. 2d 439 (1973); Heck v.

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 129 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1994);

and Abella v. Rubino, 63 F.3d 1063, 1066 (11th Cir. 1995). However,

assuming that Plaintiff had made a claim for compensatory damages,

his allegations against Defendant Officer Tate would still fail to

state a claim.

Based upon Plaintiff’s Complaint and answers to this Court’s

interrogatories, it appears that Plaintiff’s parole revocation

resulted from several domestic violence charges. (Docs. 1 and 13).

Plaintiff contends that his rights were infringed upon because some

of the domestic violence charges against him were dropped after the

victim recanted her story, and informed the court that she no

longer wanted to pursue the charges. Plaintiff claims in his

interrogatory responses that Defendant Tate relied on police

reports which were false when preparing his own report. (Doc. 13

at 2). Plaintiff also states that although the domestic violence

charges were dropped, and he did not have to answer in court on

those charges, they were used to revoke his probation. Plaintiff

complains that since he did not accept the State’s offer of a deal

of serving 3 years, he is now serving a fifteen year sentence.

(Doc. 13 at 2). Notably, Plaintiff has acknowledged that his

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probation revocation has not been reversed on direct appeal,

expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal

authorized to make such determination, nor called into question by

a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to

22 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 13). 

Assuming Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendant Officer Tate

gave false testimony in court are true, Plaintiff’s allegations

still fail to state a claim. “The law is well settled that 42

U.S.C. § 1983 does not authorize the assertion of a claim against

a police officer or other individual for committing perjury during

state court proceedings.” Cooper v. Carter, 2007 WL 215572 (M.D.

Ala. 2007), citing Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983). “[I]n

litigation brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ..., all witnesses-police

officers as well as lay witnesses-are absolutely immune from civil

liability based on their testimony in judicial proceedings.”

Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. at 328, citing Briscoe v. LaHue, 663

F.2d 713 (7th Cir. 1981). Moreover, regarding Plaintiff’s claim

that Defendant Tate relied on false police reports, this allegation

clearly fails to state a claim. Plaintiff has asserted very vague

and generalized allegations against Defendant Tate, and, as

discussed above, these allegations fail to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted. 

3. Defendant Mobile Police Department 

Plaintiff seeks relief in his § 1983 action from the Mobile

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Police Department for lack of medical care. Plaintiff also states

that the Police Department gave a “false statement against him.”

(Doc. 1 at 7). Nothing further is mentioned by Plaintiff

concerning the alleged false statement. Regarding the medical care

issue, Plaintiff’s Complaint is very vague in that he fails to name

any particular officer, but simply makes the allegation that

“Mobile Police officer’s refused Plaintiff medical attention

(sic).” His only further elaboration is that “[o]n September 4,

2004, Police refuse to take victim or Plaintiff Calvin Lee to

hospital for stab wound in Right hand upon Request (sic).”

In order to bring a viable § 1983 claim against a defendant,

the defendant sued must be an entity that is subject to being sued.

Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 1992). The capacity

of a party to be sued is “determined by the law of the state in

which the district court is held. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b);

see Dean, 951 F.2d at 1214.

A city’s police department in Alabama, however, is not a

suable entity or a proper party under state law or for § 1983

purposes. Hawkins v. City of Greenville, 101 F. Supp. 2d 1356,

1363 (M.D. Ala. 2000); accord Dean, 951 F.2d at 1214 (“Sheriff’s

departments and police departments are not usually considered legal

entities subject to suit.”); Eddy v. Miami, 715 F. Supp. 1553, 1556

(S.D. Fla. 1989) ( “Where a police department is an integral part

of the city government as the vehicle through which the city

Case 1:04-cv-00710-BH-B Document 15 Filed 08/03/07 Page 17 of 19
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government fulfills its policing functions, it is not an entity

subject to suit.”); Reese v. Chicago Police Dept., 602 F. Supp.

441, 443 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (finding a police department does not

have a legal existence separate from the city and, therefore, is

not suable entity). Inasmuch as the City of Mobile Police

Department is not a suable entity under Alabama law, the claim

against Defendant City of Mobile Police Department is frivolous and

due to be dismissed.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that this action

be dismissed with prejudice as to Defendant Judge James Wood and

the City of Mobile Police Department, and dismissed without

prejudice as to Defendant Probation Officer Reginald Tate, pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii) because Plaintiff’s claims

are either frivolous or fail to state a claim upon which relief can

be granted.

DONE this 3rd day of August 2007.

 /s/ SONJA F. BIVINS 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:04-cv-00710-BH-B Document 15 Filed 08/03/07 Page 18 of 19
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S EXPLANATION OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS

AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION

AND FINDINGS CONCERNING NEED FOR TRANSCRIPT

1. Objection. Any party who objects to this recommendation or

anything in it must, within ten days of the date of service of this

document, file specific written objections with the clerk of court.

Failure to do so will bar a de novo determination by the district

judge of anything in the recommendation and will bar an attack, on

appeal, of the factual findings of the magistrate judge. See 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)©); Lewis v. Smith, 855 F.2d 736, 738 (11th Cir.

1988); Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. Unit B,

1982)(en banc). The procedure for challenging the findings and

recommendations of the magistrate judge is set out in more detail

in SD ALA LR 72.4 (June 1, 1997), which provides that:

A party may object to a recommendation entered by a magistrate

judge in a dispositive matter, that is, a matter excepted by

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), by filing a "Statement of Objection

to Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation" within ten days after

being served with a copy of the recommendation, unless a

different time is established by order. The statement of

objection shall specify those portions of the recommendation

to which objection is made and the basis for the objection.

The objecting party shall submit to the district judge, at the

time of filing the objection, a brief setting forth the

party’s arguments that the magistrate judge’s recommendation

should be reviewed de novo and a different disposition made.

It is insufficient to submit only a copy of the original brief

submitted to the magistrate judge, although a copy of the

original brief may be submitted or referred to and

incorporated into the brief in support of the objection.

Failure to submit a brief in support of the objection may be

deemed an abandonment of the objection.

A magistrate judge’s recommendation cannot be appealed to a

Court of Appeals; only the district judge’s order or judgment can

be appealed.

2. Transcript (applicable where proceedings tape recorded).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), the

magistrate judge finds that the tapes and original records in this

action are adequate for purposes of review. Any party planning to

object to this recommendation, but unable to pay the fee for a

transcript, is advised that a judicial determination that

transcription is necessary is required before the United States

will pay the cost of the transcript.

Case 1:04-cv-00710-BH-B Document 15 Filed 08/03/07 Page 19 of 19