Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00079/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00079-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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1 Defendants assert that “Placer County Animal Control”

has been “erroneously sued” (Reply, filed May 18, 2005); however,

they have not stated the basis for their assertion or

specifically moved for the agency’s dismissal. Accordingly, the

court makes no finding herein regarding the propriety of

plaintiff’s action against the agency. 

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

JUDI JACKSON,

NO. CIV. S-05-79 FCD KJM

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

PLACER COUNTY, a political

subdivision of the State of

California, PLACER COUNTY 

ANIMAL CONTROL, et al.,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on defendants County of

Placer, Placer County Animal Control,1 Richard Ward, Richard

Stout, and Evelyn Garrett’s motion to dismiss plaintiff Judi

Jackson’s complaint, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

Case 2:05-cv-00079-FCD-KJM Document 13 Filed 05/27/05 Page 1 of 16
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2 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. 

E.D. Cal. L. R. 78-230(h).

3 With the exception of the conversion claim (which

defendants do not move to dismiss), it is these claims which the

court addresses below. While defendants moved to dismiss other

purported claims of plaintiff (including federal claims under

Section 1983 for violation of plaintiff’s privacy rights, the

First Amendment, and the Fifth Amendment, and for defamation and

malicious prosecution, and state law claims for false arrest,

false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and

misrepresentation), plaintiff clearly stated in opposition that

she is not alleging any such claims against defendants. The

court also does not consider any claim for “wrongful disclosure

of arrest or search information.” While plaintiff appears to

suggest in her opposition that she has alleged such a claim and

that it is not barred by the governmental immunity provided in

California Civil Code § 47(c), a plain reading of her complaint

does not reveal this claim. Indeed, there are no specific

allegations pertaining to such a claim, nor can the court

ascertain from the complaint, a legal basis for asserting one.

2

12(b)(6).2 In said complaint, plaintiff alleges federal claims

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of her substantive and

procedural due process rights and for unlawful search and

seizure, and state law claims for negligence, negligent training

and supervision, intentional infliction of emotional distress,

negligent infliction of emotional distress, and conversion. 

(Compl., filed Jan. 13, 2005.)3

For the reasons set forth below, defendants’ motion is

GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. 

BACKGROUND

As alleged in the complaint, plaintiff is the owner and

operator of an equestrian facility located in Roseville,

California. In three trips, on or about November 19, 1999,

December 3, 1999 and July 7, 2000, plaintiff rescued and

transferred 28 horses from Louisiana to Roseville. At the time

of the transfer of these horses, all but four had been seriously

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3

mistreated and malnourished. Plaintiff transferred the horses

for the specific purpose of rehabilitating them and training them

for use in her equine training facility. (Compl., ¶ 20.) 

Upon arrival of the horses, first at a temporary location in

Lincoln, California, then in Roseville, plaintiff began the

process of rehabilitating the horses. While in Lincoln, in June

2000, plaintiff was contacted by defendant Stout, an employee of

defendant Placer County Animal Control, as a result of a report

by a neighbor. No charges were made or filed against plaintiff

after the visit, and the file was closed as an “invalid

Complaint.” (Id. at ¶ 21.) 

Thereafter, on June 7, 2000, Stout again contacted

plaintiff, who was now at the Roseville facility with the horses. 

At that time, Stout found the horses to be “cared for.” (Id. at

¶ 22.)

Between August 23, 2000 and September 12 [sic], 2000, Stout

contacted plaintiff three times regarding the horses. He did not

conduct a thorough inspection of the horses on any of the

occasions. (Id. at ¶ 23.) On August 23, 2000, Stout ordered an

increase of feed for six horses, followed up for the next four

days. He made this order orally. At the time, plaintiff felt

threatened and compelled to follow Stout’s directives. (Id. at ¶

24.)

Later on September 12, 2000, Stout returned to plaintiff’s

property with a veterinarian, Dr. Bartow. A brief visual

inspection was performed of plaintiff’s horses. (Id. at ¶ 25.) 

Then on September 18, 2000, Stout returned again and gave

plaintiff a written feeding plan which he explained was ordered

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4

by the Placer County Superior Court. Again there was no tests of

the animals or investigation of the circumstances. (Id. at ¶

26.)

On September 29, 2000, Stout contacted plaintiff and

relieved plaintiff of the written feeding plan after observing

that plaintiff’s horses had lost weight.

On or about October 4, 2000, defendant Gentile, also an

employee of Placer County Animal Control, contacted plaintiff at

her property and ordered plaintiff to return her horses to the

feed plan which had been discontinued by Stout. Gentile did not

conduct any tests on the horses and did not make a thorough

inspection of them. On October 9, 2000, defendant Carter,

another employee of Placer County Animal Control, contacted

plaintiff at her property to verify she was following the feeding

plan ordered by Gentile. No thorough examination or tests were

conducted on the horses. On October 10, 2000 defendant Garrett,

also an employee of Placer County Animal Control, contacted

plaintiff at her property to inform plaintiff that she was taking

the case over and ordered plaintiff to begin anew on the feeding

plan. Nevertheless, as a result of the County’s feeding plan,

the horses continued to lose weight and showed visible signs of

losing weight. (Id. at ¶s 28-31.)

As a result of the physical appearance of plaintiff’s

horses, on November 6, 2000 plaintiff was arrested on one charge

of felony cruelty to animals, and the 28 horses were seized and

confiscated by defendants with no pre-seizure hearing. (Id. at

¶s 32-33.)

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5

On May 25, 2001, the Placer County District Attorney amended

the original complaint adding one felony count of perjury and one

felony count of submitting false evidence at the post-seizure

hearing. Plaintiff’s trial on the three felony counts began on

October 21, 2001 in Placer County Superior Court. Plaintiff

alleges that in order to support the charges brought against her,

defendants altered, destroyed and tampered with evidence

presented at the trial. After lengthy testimony, plaintiff was

found guilty on all three counts. (Id. at ¶s 36-37.) 

In February 2002, plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial,

asserting ineffective assistance of counsel on the basis of her

counsel’s failure to provide a defense of entrapment. (Id. at ¶

38.) Plaintiff’s motion was granted as to all counts on May 11,

2002. (Id. at ¶ 39.)

The County appealed, and on January 19, 2004, the Third

District Court of Appeal affirmed the grant of a new trial. (Id.

at Ex. A.) The court of appeal found that, on the evidence

presented, entrapment was a viable defense which should have been

presented to the jury. (Id.)

The Placer County District Attorney then offered plaintiff a

plea bargain in which she pled “no contest” to two misdemeanors

of “concealing or destroying evidence.” The animal cruelty and

perjury charges were dismissed. As part of the plea bargain, the

horses were to be returned to plaintiff. (Id. at ¶ 43.) 

Prior to the criminal trial, in December 2000, Placer County

Court Commissioner Ross ruled that the horses seized by

defendants were the personal property of and owned by plaintiff. 

At the time of the seizure, one mare was in foal and subsequently

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4 On May 5, 2005, Commissioner Ross ruled that the horses

were to be returned to plaintiff, however, defendants have not

yet returned them. (Opp’n, filed May 13, 2005 at 6.)

6

delivered, bringing the total number of horses to 29. 

Commissioner Ross ruled that if plaintiff was convicted of felony

animal cruelty, the horses would not be returned to her, but if

she was acquitted or not convicted of a felony then the horses

would be returned to her. (Id. at ¶ 45.)4

In May 2004, plaintiff discovered that ownership of three of

her horses had been transferred by defendants to other persons.

(Id. at ¶ 49.) The transfer of ownership was done without notice

to plaintiff and without any court proceeding or order. (Id. at

¶ 50.) By the transfer, defendants specifically intended to

deprive plaintiff of her personal property. (Id. at ¶ 51.) 

In June 2004, plaintiff was informed that four of the horses

seized by defendants had died since being confiscated and while

in the custody of defendants. (Id. at ¶ 48.)

STANDARD

On a motion to dismiss, the allegations of the complaint

must be accepted as true. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322

(1972). The court is bound to give plaintiff the benefit of

every reasonable inference to be drawn from the “well-pleaded”

allegations of the complaint. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v.

Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). Thus, the plaintiff

need not necessarily plead a particular fact if that fact is a

reasonable inference from facts properly alleged. See id. 

Given that the complaint is construed favorably to the

pleader, the court may not dismiss the complaint for failure to

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7

state a claim unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff

can prove no set of facts in support of the claim which would

entitle him or her to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45

(1957); NL Industries, Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th

Cir. 1986).

Nevertheless, it is inappropriate to assume that plaintiff

“can prove facts which it has not alleged or that the defendants

have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged.” 

Associated Gen. Contractors of Calif., Inc. v. Calif. State

Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). Moreover, the

court “need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the

form of factual allegations.” United States ex rel. Chunie v.

Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986).

ANALYSIS

1. Heck v. Humphrey

Relying on Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), defendants

maintain that plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims are barred by

virtue of her state criminal prosecution. In Heck, the Court

held that 

in order to recover damages [under Section 1983] 

for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or

imprisonment, or for other harm caused by action 

whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or

sentence invalid, [the plaintiff] must prove that 

the conviction or sentence has been reversed on 

direct appeal, expunged by executive order, 

declared invalid by a state tribunal . . . or 

called into question by a federal court’s issuance 

of a writ of habeas corpus, . . .

Id. at 486-87. Here, defendants emphasize plaintiff’s original

conviction on three felony counts, animal cruelty, perjury, and

falsification of evidence. They assert, without support, that

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the later grant of a new trial did not “complete[ly] exonerat[e]”

plaintiff, and thus her claims are barred by Heck. Defendants

are incorrect. By California statute, Penal Code § 1180, the

granting of a new trial “puts the parties back in the same

position as if no trial had been had.” In other words, while

plaintiff could have been charged and tried again on the same

charges, until a new conviction was achieved, she was presumed

innocent, and the complaint in this case does not therefore run

afoul of Heck. 

Additionally, her ultimate, nolo contendere plea to two

misdemeanors charges does not change the analysis. First, the

plea was to two charges of concealing and destroying evidence at

the post-seizure hearing, charges which are unrelated to the

claims here relating to the unlawful seizure of plaintiff’s

horses without notice or pre-seizure hearing. Moreover,

California courts have specifically held that a conviction based

on a nolo contendere plea may not be used against the defendant

for a collateral purpose, except in limited circumstances not

present in this case. Arneson v. Fox, 28 Cal. 3d 440 (1980); see

also Birnbaum v. Lackner, 82 Cal. App. 3d 284, 287 (1978) (when

the conviction is based on a nolo contendere plea, its

reliability as an indicator of actual guilt is substantially

reduced). Therefore, plaintiff’s nolo contendere plea does not

bar her instant Section 1983 claims.

2. Due Process Claims

Plaintiff alleges two due process claims, one for violation

of her substantive due process rights and one for violation of

her procedural due process rights. (Compl., ¶s 55-75.)

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5 As is apparent from her opposition, plaintiff does not

base this claim on allegations of deliberate fabrication of

evidence by the government or judicial deception under Devereau

v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001) or Butler v. Elle,

281 F.3d 1014, 1024 (9th Cir. 2002). Therefore, the court does

not consider defendants’ arguments in this regard.

9

Defendants move to dismiss both claims. First, with regard to

her claim of a violation of her substantive due process rights,

defendants argue that even assuming the truth of her allegations,

plaintiff has not stated facts which rise to the necessary level

of “shocking the conscience of a civilized society.” See County

of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998). Only fundamental

rights and liberties “‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and

tradition’” and “‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’”

qualify for protection under the substantive due process

provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. Washington v.

Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997). To state such a claim, the

plaintiff must make a careful description of the asserted

fundamental liberty interest involved; vague generalities will

not suffice. Id.

Here, plaintiff bases her claim on the following key facts:5

defendants seized her horses without notice or a pre-seizure

hearing required by law; defendants did so with the specific

intent of depriving her of her personal property and livelihood;

defendants have held the horses without justification for more

than four years; while in their custody, defendants have cared

for the horses in such a way as to cause the death of four of her

horses and to cause the hospitalization of three of her horses;

and without notice to plaintiff or court order, defendants

transferred ownership of three of her horses to other persons. 

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6 Despite some references in her complaint, plaintiff

admits her claim is not based on the criminal charges and/or

criminal trial. (Opp’n at 16.)

7 The court notes that plaintiff cites California Penal

Code § 597.1(f) in her complaint (Compl., ¶ 58) as the basis for

her “right” to a pre-seizure hearing; however, that sub-section

does not provide for such a hearing, rather it discusses the

circumstances wherein only a post-seizure hearing is required. 

It provides:

Whenever an officer authorized under this section

seizes or impounds an animal based on a reasonable

belief that prompt action is required to protect

the health and safety of the animal or the 

health and safety of others, the officer shall,

prior to the commencement of any criminal proceedings

authorized by this section, provide the owner or

keeper of the animal, if known or ascertainable 

after reasonable investigation, with the opportunity

for a postseizure hearing to determine the validity

of the seizure or impoundment, or both.

Id. Instead, it is sub-section (g) which supports plaintiff’s

allegations in this case: “Where the need for immediate seizure

is not present and prior to the commencement of any criminal

proceedings . . ., the agency shall provide the owner or keeper

of the animal, if known or ascertainable after reasonable

investigation, with the opportunity for a hearing prior to any

seizure or impoundment of the animal.” Cal. Penal Code §

10

Assuming the truth of these allegations, as the court must,

plaintiff has adequately alleged a substantive due process claim. 

She has alleged the fundamental interest at stake, her personal

property rights, and has described with sufficient particularity

how that right was affected and by what specific conduct of

defendants. Accordingly, defendants’ motion in this regard is

denied.

Second, with respect to plaintiff’s claim of a violation of

her procedural due process rights, her claim is based solely on 

the failure of defendants to provide a pre-seizure hearing before

confiscating her horses.6 Plaintiff alleges she was entitled to

said hearing by law because the circumstances did not support a

“summary seizure” of her animals. Cal. Penal Code § 597.1(g).7

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28 597.1(g). The court therefore construes plaintiff’s complaint as

arising under this sub-section.

11

According to plaintiff there was no immediate need to seize the

horses. On this motion, the court must assume the truth of these

allegations, which under Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319

(1976), are sufficient to state a procedural due process claim. 

Where a person’s property is taken by the government, the

due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires some form

of notice and a hearing. Id. Absent extraordinary circumstances

justifying resort to summary procedures, the hearing must take

place before the property is taken. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S.

67, 81-82 (1972) (“If the right to notice and a hearing is to

serve its full purpose, then, it is clear it must be granted at a

time when the deprivation can still be prevented.”) Plaintiff’s

claim herein is supported by the California court of appeal’s

decision in Carrera v. Bertaini, 63 Cal. App. 3d 721 (1976) where

the court held that absent circumstances justifying summary

seizure of a plaintiff’s farm animals on grounds of animal

cruelty and neglect, the plaintiff was entitled to notice and a

pre-seizure hearing. Here, plaintiff alleges that no such

justifying circumstances were present.

Defendants’ arguments to the contrary must be rejected at

this stage. Defendants attempt, through this motion, to argue

the substantive facts and merits of this claim. According to

them, the circumstances warranted the County’s immediate removal

of the horses from plaintiff’s custody, and that the post-seizure

hearing provided plaintiff was sufficient due process as

contemplated by California Penal Code § 597.1(f). This factual

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8 While plaintiff’s complaint makes vague reference to

the “seizure of plaintiff” and the unreasonableness of her

“incarceration,” her opposition clarifies that the sole basis for

her Fourth Amendment claim is the seizure of her horses.

12

and legal determination cannot be made on the instant motion. 

Therefore, defendants’ motion must be denied.

3. Fourth Amendment Claim

Contrary to defendants’ argument, plaintiff’s Fourth

Amendment claim is not based on her arrest8 but rather the

seizure of her personal property, the horses, without a preseizure hearing, which she alleges is mandated by law in these

circumstances. Thus, for the same reasons as set forth above

regarding plaintiff’s procedural due process claim, plaintiff has

adequately alleged a Fourth Amendment claim for the unlawful

seizure of her horses. See e.g. Carrera v. Bertaini, 63 Cal.

App. 3d 721, 727 (1976) (finding unlawful the impoundment of an

owner’s farm animals without notice or hearing where

circumstances did not support “summary seizure”). Plaintiff

alleges defendants acted unreasonably, in violation of the Fourth

Amendment, when they seized her horses without notice and hearing

to which she was legally entitled. Said seizure caused plaintiff

damages, including emotional distress and loss of wages. 

(Compl., ¶s 76-81.) These allegations sufficiently state a

Fourth Amendment claim.

4. Monell Claim 

Under Section 1983, a public entity cannot be subjected to

vicarious liability or be sued on a theory of respondeat superior

for the acts of its employees. Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs.,

436 U.S. 658 (1978). Instead, a plaintiff is required to prove

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that the deprivation of a federal right occurred pursuant to an

identified governmental policy or custom of the entity

consciously chosen by the entity. Id. at 690-91. Here,

defendants allege that plaintiff has failed to allege any

specific formal governmental policy, or “longstanding practice or

custom which constitutes the standard operating procedure of the

local governmental entity.” Gillete v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342,

1346-47 (9th Cir. 1992). Rather, plaintiff relies exclusively on

the single incident relating to the confiscation of her horses on

November 6, 2000.

Plaintiff concedes that her “Monell” allegations against the

defendant County are deficient. She requests leave to amend to

correct them. In support of her request, she describes

additional facts not alleged in the complaint, including other

encounters she had with the County pertaining to her dogs and

cats, as well as the County’s encounters with her then fiance who

were boarded horses at the Roseville property. (Opp’n at 20-21.) 

Plaintiff maintains that these other encounters establish a

practice or custom of the County that is “persistent and

widespread” within the meaning of Monell such that they establish

a “permanent and well-settled [entity] policy” of depriving

persons of their personal property unjustifiably, without notice

or pre-seizure hearing. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691.

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, leave to amend

should be “freely given.” Plaintiff has demonstrated that if

permitted, she can amend her complaint to state facts sufficient

to support a Monell claim against the County. Accordingly, the

court grants defendants’ motion as to this claim; however,

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plaintiff is granted leave to amend to correct the deficiency.

5. Negligence Claims

Defendants are correct that public entities may be held

liable only if a statute declares them to be liable. Van Ort v.

Estate of Stanewich, 92 F.3d 831 (9th Cir. 1996). Thus, the

California Tort Claims Act provides that a public entity is not

liable for injury arising from an act or omission except as

provided by statute. Cal. Gov’t Code § 815(a). Pursuant to

Section 815.6 of the Government Code, “a public entity is liable

for an injury proximately caused by its failure to discharge a

mandatory duty designed to protect against the risk of a

particular kind of injury . . .” 

Here, however, plaintiff has not identified a precise duty

owed by the County to her. Instead, she simply relies on the

case of Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696 (9th

Cir. 1990), alleging that pursuant to that case a “special

relationship” was formed between her and the County, based upon 

the contacts regarding the feeding plan for the horses and the

criminal prosecution, sufficient to support a negligence claim. 

Balistreri does not provide support for plaintiff’s claim. In

Balistreri, the Ninth Circuit considered whether a plaintiff

could maintain a due process claim under Section 1983 against the

police department based on the plaintiff’s allegation that the

police department knew of her plight as a domestic violence

victim, yet did nothing to prevent the attack by her husband. 

While the court recognized that in some circumstances a “special

relationship” may be formed between a plaintiff and the

government sufficient to support such a claim, the facts of that

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case did not support such a claim. Id. at 700. Balistreri did

not involve a negligence claim, and therefore lends no support to

plaintiff’s complaint. Defendants’ motion is granted as to this

claim.

Plaintiff also bases her negligent hiring/supervision claim

on Balistreri; for the same reasons, her claim fails and

defendants’ motion is granted. 

Plaintiff, however, is granted leave to amend these

allegations. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989).

6. Intentional and Negligent Infliction of Emotional

Distress Claims

Defendants move to dismiss plaintiff’s intentional

infliction of emotional distress claim on the ground that

plaintiff has not alleged a requisite element of the claim--that

defendants’ conduct was “so extreme as to exceed all bounds of

that usually tolerated in a civilized society.” Davidson v. City

of Westminster, 32 Cal.3d 197, 209 (1982). Plaintiff alleges

defendants confiscated her personal property, the horses, without

a pre-seizure hearing, specifically provided by law, and without

any showing of exigent circumstances. In so doing, plaintiff

alleges defendants caused the death of at least four of

plaintiff’s horses, and ultimately, transferred to third parties,

without court order or notice to plaintiff, ownership of at least

three of plaintiff’s horses. This alleged conduct of defendants

adequately supports this element of the claim. Fowler v. Varian

Associates, Inc., 196 Cal. App. 3d 34 (1987) (the alleged conduct

of defendants could reasonably be regarded as so extreme and

outrageous so as to permit recovery).

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Contrary to defendants’ argument, these same allegations

also support plaintiff’s negligent infliction of emotional

distress claim, which requires an allegation that plaintiff

suffered “severe” emotional distress. Kelly v. General Telephone

Co., 136 Cal. App. 3d 278, 286 (1982). Albeit unusual

circumstances, the death of the four horses and the involuntary

forfeiture of three other horses sufficiently supports her

general allegation of “severe” emotional distress. (Compl., ¶

97.)

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion to dismiss is

GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Plaintiff is granted leave

to amend her Monell and negligence claims. Said amended

complaint shall be served and filed within 20 days of the date of

this order. Defendants’ response thereto shall be filed and

served within 30 days after service of the amended complaint.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 DATED: May 27, 2005

/s/ Frank C. Damrell Jr. 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:05-cv-00079-FCD-KJM Document 13 Filed 05/27/05 Page 16 of 16