Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-4_04-cv-01503/USCOURTS-ared-4_04-cv-01503-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

WESTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES PLAINTIFF

v. Case No. 4:04-cv-1503

 (4:03-cr-00110-01)

PHILLIP RAY MORENO DEFENDANT

ORDER

Presently before the Court is Defendant’s Motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set

Aside, or Correct Sentence, Defendant’s Motion to Amend his Motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255,

the Government’s Motion to file response out of time, and Defendant’s Motion for Appointment

of Counsel. 

I. BACKGROUND

The bank robbery that Defendant was charged with committing occurred on January 7,

2003. According to Defendant’s counsel, First Assistant Federal Public Defender for the Eastern

and Western Districts of Arkansas Jerome Kearney, Defendant surrendered himself to authorities

in California in March 2003, and cooperated with the FBI by giving incriminating statements as

to this bank robbery. Defendant’s counsel states in his affidavit submitted to the Court that he

was assigned to represent Defendant on June 11, 2003, and that Defendant agreed to enter a

guilty plea to the bank robbery charge after exploring various settlement options and sentencing

considerations.

On October 16, 2003, Defendant entered a plea of guilty to Count 1, Armed Bank

Robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) & (d). At the plea hearing, the Court read the

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indictment and asked Defendant, “How do you plead to the charge in the indictment?,” to which

he replied, “Guilty.” The Court reviewed the rights that the Defendant was waiving by entry of a

guilty plea, and Defendant stated that he understood those rights. Then, the Court proceeded to

inform the Defendant of the twenty-five year statutory maximum and the sentencing guideline

range under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1. However, the Court also stated, “You understand we can’t tell

you, until we see the presentence report, precisely how this will work. But do you understand

how it works?,” and the Defendant responded, “Yes, sir, I do.” Then, the Court had the Assistant

United States Attorney state the facts of the case, and the Defendant stated that the statement was

correct and true. Finally, the Court informed the Defendant that it usually takes approximately

seven weeks for the presentence report to be prepared and that, after it has been prepared, he, the

Defendant, and his attorney and the United States Attorney would have the opportunity to

examine it. The Court stated that if there were any factual errors or mistakes in the presentence

report that affect the sentencing, they must be brought to the Court’s attention before sentence is

imposed. 

Defendant’s counsel states in his affidavit that after the preparation of the presentence

report, but prior to his sentencing, Defendant indicated a willingness to cooperate against a codefendant in order to receive a downward departure of up to 50%. Defendant’s counsel also

states that Assistant United States Attorney Linda Lipe offered those terms, and Defendant

appeared before a Grand Jury and offered testimony against his co-defendant in the bank robbery

on January 6, 2004. 

On January 22, 2004, at the sentencing hearing, the Court asked if there were any factual

errors or mistakes in the presentence report, and Defendant’s counsel replied that there were

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The arrest date is stated as 10/5/1989.

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The arrest date is stated as 3/12/1997.

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none. Then, the Court explained, in detail, the consequences of the enhancements because

Defendant was deemed a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 based upon the presentence

report, as (1) the defendant was at least eighteen years old at the time of the offense; (2) the

offense of conviction was a crime of violence; and (3) the defendant had at least two prior felony

convictions of crimes of violence. The presentence report states that on June 5, 1992, the

Defendant pled guilty, at the age of 25, to Second-Degree Armed Robbery, and was sentenced to

seven years’ imprisonment.1

 The presentence report also states that on March 27, 1997, the

Defendant pled guilty to Force/Assault with a Deadly Weapon (not firearm): Great Bodily

Injury.2

The Court stated that the final offense level was 31 and that a career offender’s criminal

history category is always a category VI. However, the Court also noted that due to the

Defendant’s extensive criminal history, he would have fifteen criminal history points, which

would, in any event, result in a criminal history category of VI. The Court stated that, under the

guidelines, this resulted in a sentencing range of 188 to 235 months’ imprisonment. The Court

reviewed the statements by Defendant’s counsel in support of mitigation and the letters submitted

to the Court on behalf of the Defendant and by the victims, the Defendant apologized to the

Court, his mother, and the victims of his crime. He requested that the Court sentence him at the

low end of the guideline range and that the Court recommend a “severe drug treatment program.” 

On January 22, 2004, Defendant was sentenced to two-hundred (200) months’ imprisonment,

five (5) years’ supervised release, $11,607 in restitution, and a $100 special assessment.

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Although counsel for the Defendant states in his affidavit that he does not recall the

specifics of his discussion with the Defendant regarding his right to appeal, “in keeping with

[his] practice, [he] is certain that [he] discussed with him his right to appeal and also indicated to

him that [he] saw no valid basis for an appeal given the facts and circumstances of the case.” 

Defendant’s counsel submitted a letter with his affidavit dated January 23, 2004, in which he

states:

Enclosed with this letter you will find a copy of the Judgment which the

Court entered in your case. You should very carefully review each provision set

forth in the judgment, since you will be held strictly accountable for everything in

it. 

As we discussed after the sentencing hearing, an appeal is not indicated in

your case; so none will be taken. 

On November 26, 2004, Defendant filed his Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct

Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The Government filed a Motion for Reduction of

Sentence on January 12, 2005, and a supplement thereto on January 27, 2005. Pursuant to

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35, the Government requested a 50% reduction in the 200

months sentence imposed on Defendant. On January 31, 2005, after a full review of the record,

the Court reduced Defendant’s sentence from 200 months to 150 months based upon his

substantial assistance to the United States Government. The Court also ordered the Government

to respond on or before February 8, 2005, to the Defendant’s § 2255 motion. The Government

filed a Motion for Order permitting it to file response out of time on February 10, 2005, and

submitted its response to Defendant’s motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 that day. The

Government’s motion to file response out of time is granted. 

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On April 26, 2005, Defendant filed a Motion for Appointment of Counsel. The Court

denies Defendant’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel as moot. On September 22, 2005,

Defendant filed a motion to amend his previous motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Defendant’s

Motion to Amend is granted. 

II. DISCUSSION

In Defendant’s Motion, he states that his conviction was obtained by a plea of guilty

which was unlawfully induced or not made voluntarily or with an understanding of the nature of

the charge and the consequences of the plea. In support of this assertion, Defendant states that

only a jury may enhance a sentence and challenges his criminal history enhancements. He

requests that the Court “reconsider the Supreme Court’s recent ruling on doubling or [e]nhancing

a sentence based on past history,” but provides no citation of authority. 

The Court notes that the sentence of 200 months imprisonment was well below the

twenty-five year statutory maximum. Furthermore, the enhancement under the guidelines was

based upon prior criminal convictions. Defendant does not allege that these convictions fail to

meet the requirements under the career criminal provisions of the guidelines. In United States v.

Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244, 125 S. Ct. 738, 756 (2005), the United States Supreme Court

reaffirmed its holding in Apprendi that “[a]ny fact (other than a prior conviction) which is

necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by a

plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a

reasonable doubt.” (emphasis added). Therefore, Defendant’s argument is without merit.

Second, Defendant alleges that his conviction was obtained by the violation of the

protection against double jeopardy. Defendant states that the Court erred during sentencing by

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Defendant further argues that if there is an appeal waiver provision incorporated into his

plea agreement, to which he is currently unaware of, counsel never advised him of the

consequences of such appellate waiver. However, the Court’s review of the record does not

indicate that a written plea agreement was filed. 

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doubling the sentence allowed by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines when he was “only charged

with one count of bank robbery.” The Court finds that this argument is without merit. See e.g.,

Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 115 S. Ct. 2199 (1995); United States v. Thomas, 930 F.2d

12, 14 (8th Cir. 1991). 

 Finally, Defendant alleges that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. He

states that his attorney of record would not help him during or after “these proceedings,” and “in

criminal cases involving pro-se appellants the Court of Appeals treats notice of appeal as motion

for extension of time due to excusable neglect and will remand case to district court.” Defendant

also states that failure to raise an issue in a prior forum is excusable when due to intervening

change in the law. The Defendant argues that the Supreme Court overturned sentences that were

doubled or enhanced. He states that he did not know that he could challenge his prior criminal

history and requests that the Court reconsider his case or sentence because if he had known this,

he would not have accepted his sentence. However, the Court notes that Defendant was asked if

the presentence report was accurate, so he admitted his prior record. In Defendant’s Motion to

Amend, he states that his counsel was ineffective for failing to notify him of his right to direct

appeal and to file a notice of appeal with a merits brief in support of disputed sentencing issues

raised at the sentencing hearing.3

The Government responds that as applied to guilty pleas, the defendant must show that

there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, “he would not have

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pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). In Hale

v. Lockhart, 903 F.2d 545, 549 (8th Cir. 1990), the Eighth Circuit refused to reverse a guilty plea

where the defendant could not show that counsel’s error concerning parole was a direct cause of

his guilty plea. Additionally, in order to obtain an evidentiary hearing, a 28 U.S.C. § 2255

petitioner must allege sufficient facts to entitle himself to relief. Lewis v. United States, 585 F.2d

915, 917 (8th Cir. 1978). 

Defendant, in his Motion to Amend states that this Court should follow the Fourth,

Seventh, and Ninth Circuits in finding that “a failure to appeal after a plea does, indeed, result in

ineffective assistance of counsel, without a specific showing of prejudice.” United States v.

Stearns, 68 F.3d 328, 330 (9th Cir. 1995); Castellanos v. United States, 26 F.3d 717, 719 (7th

Cir. 1994); United States v. Peak, 992 F.2d 39, 42 (4th Cir. 1993). However, in Roe v. FloresOrtega, 528 U.S. 470, 478-81, 484-86, 120 S. Ct. 1029, 1035-40 (2000), the United States

Supreme Court abrogated Stearns, stating:

The Courts of Appeals for the First and Ninth Circuits have answered that

question with a bright-line rule: Counsel must file a notice of appeal unless the

defendant specifically instructs otherwise; failing to do so is per se deficient. See,

e.g., Stearns, 68 F.3d, at 330; Lozada, supra, at 958; Tajeddini, supra, at 468.

Such a rule effectively imposes an obligation on counsel in all cases either (1) to

file a notice of appeal, or (2) to discuss the possibility of an appeal with the

defendant, ascertain his wishes, and act accordingly. We reject this per se rule as

inconsistent with Strickland's holding that “the performance inquiry must be

whether counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the

circumstances.” 466 U.S., at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052. 

. . . 

We cannot say, as a constitutional matter, that in every case counsel's failure to

consult with the defendant about an appeal is necessarily unreasonable, and

therefore deficient. Such a holding would be inconsistent with both our decision

in Strickland and common sense. See id., at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (rejecting

mechanistic rules governing what counsel must do). For example, suppose that a

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defendant consults with counsel; counsel advises the defendant that a guilty

plea probably will lead to a 2 year sentence; the defendant expresses

satisfaction and pleads guilty; the court sentences the defendant to 2 years'

imprisonment as expected and informs the defendant of his appeal rights; the

defendant does not express any interest in appealing, and counsel concludes

that there are no nonfrivolous grounds for appeal. Under these

circumstances, it would be difficult to say that counsel is “professionally

unreasonable,” id., at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052, as a constitutional matter, in not

consulting with such a defendant regarding an appeal. Or, for example,

suppose a sentencing court's instructions to a defendant about his appeal rights in

a particular case are so clear and informative as to substitute for counsel's duty to

consult. In some cases, counsel might then reasonably decide that he need not

repeat that information. We therefore reject a bright-line rule that counsel must

always consult with the defendant regarding an appeal.

We instead hold that counsel has a constitutionally imposed duty to consult

with the defendant about an appeal when there is reason to think either (1)

that a rational defendant would want to appeal (for example, because there

are nonfrivolous grounds for appeal), or (2) that this particular defendant

reasonably demonstrated to counsel that he was interested in appealing. In

making this determination, courts must take into account all the information

counsel knew or should have known. See id., at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (focusing on

the totality of the circumstances). Although not determinative, a highly relevant

factor in this inquiry will be whether the conviction follows a trial or a guilty plea,

both because a guilty plea reduces the scope of potentially appealable issues and

because such a plea may indicate that the defendant seeks an end to judicial

proceedings. Even in cases when the defendant pleads guilty, the court must

consider such factors as whether the defendant received the sentence bargained for

as part of the plea and whether the plea expressly reserved or waived some or all

appeal rights. Only by considering all relevant factors in a given case can a court

properly determine whether a rational defendant would have desired an appeal or

that the particular defendant sufficiently demonstrated to counsel an interest in an

appeal.

. . . 

The second part of the Strickland test requires the defendant to show

prejudice from counsel's deficient performance.

. . . 

[T]o show prejudice in these circumstances, a defendant must demonstrate

that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficient failure

to consult with him about an appeal, he would have timely appealed.

. . . 

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[W]e hold that when counsel's constitutionally deficient performance deprives a

defendant of an appeal that he otherwise would have taken, the defendant has

made out a successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim entitling him to an

appeal.

. . . 

As with all applications of the Strickland test, the question whether a given

defendant has made the requisite showing will turn on the facts of a particular

case. See 466 U.S., at 695-696, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Nonetheless, evidence that there

were nonfrivolous grounds for appeal or that the defendant in question promptly

expressed a desire to appeal will often be highly relevant in making this

determination. We recognize that the prejudice inquiry we have described is not

wholly dissimilar from the inquiry used to determine whether counsel performed

deficiently in the first place; specifically, both may be satisfied if the defendant

shows nonfrivolous grounds for appeal. See Hill, supra, at 59, 106 S.Ct. 366

(when, in connection with a guilty plea, counsel gives deficient advice regarding a

potentially valid affirmative defense, the prejudice inquiry depends largely on

whether that affirmative defense might have succeeded, leading a rational

defendant to insist on going to trial). But, while the performance and prejudice

prongs may overlap, they are not in all cases coextensive. To prove deficient

performance, a defendant can rely on evidence that he sufficiently demonstrated to

counsel his interest in an appeal. But such evidence alone is insufficient to

establish that, had the defendant received reasonable advice from counsel about

the appeal, he would have instructed his counsel to file an appeal.

By the same token, although showing nonfrivolous grounds for appeal may give

weight to the contention that the defendant would have appealed, a defendant's

inability to “specify the points he would raise were his right to appeal reinstated,”

Rodriquez, 395 U.S., at 330, 89 S.Ct. 1715, **1040 will not foreclose the

possibility that he can satisfy the prejudice requirement where there are other

substantial reasons to believe that he would have appealed. See ibid.; see also

Peguero, supra, at 30, 119 S.Ct. 961 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring) (“To require

defendants to specify the grounds for their appeal and show that they have some

merit would impose a heavy burden on defendants who are often proceeding pro

se in an initial [habeas] motion”). We similarly conclude here that it is unfair

to require an indigent, perhaps pro se, defendant to demonstrate that his

hypothetical appeal might have had merit before any advocate has ever

reviewed the record in his case in search of potentially meritorious grounds

for appeal. Rather, we require the defendant to demonstrate that, but for

counsel's deficient conduct, he would have appealed.

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After review of the record, the Court finds that Defendant’s allegations fail to set

forth a valid claim for relief. Based upon the representations by Defendant’s counsel in

his affidavit and the attached letter, it is clear to the Court that Defendant was advised of

his right to appeal. Also, Defendant’s counsel states in his affidavit, “Mr. Moreno never

requested that I file an appeal in his case.” It is also clear that counsel had no reason to

believe that a rational defendant would want to appeal. Defendant entered a guilty plea

without reserving any issues for appeal, which reduced the scope of potentially appealable

issues. There was no written plea agreement in this case. However, as discussed above,

the Court informed the Defendant at the plea hearing that it could not determine his actual

sentencing range until it received the presentence report, and asked Defendant if he

understood how the sentencing process worked. Defendant replied that he understood. 

The Defendant admitted the facts as alleged by the Assistant United States Attorney. The

Court informed the Defendant at the plea hearing that if there were any factual errors or

mistakes in the presentence report, they would have to be brought to the Court’s attention

before sentence is imposed. At the sentencing hearing, the Defendant did not point to any

factual errors in the presentence report. Additionally, review of the transcripts from the

sentencing hearing reveals that at no time during the sentencing hearing did Defendant or

his counsel raise any “disputed sentencing issues.” Importantly, in the motion presently

before the Court, the Defendant still fails to allege that the presentence report contained

any errors. Furthermore, the Defendant does not allege that his counsel knew or should

have known that he was interested in appealing. Therefore, Defendant’s Motion under 28

U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence is denied. 

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Accordingly,

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT Defendant’s Motion to Amend (Docket

No. 42) be, and it is hereby, GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Government’s Motion for Order to File

Response Out of Time (Docket No. 38) be, and it is hereby, GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Defendant’s Motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255

to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence (Docket No. 28) be, and it is hereby, DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Defendant’s Motion for Appointment of

Counsel (Docket No. 40) be, and it is hereby, DENIED as moot.

Dated this 8th day of March, 2007.

/s/Garnett Thomas Eisele__________

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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