Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02261/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02261-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 290
Nature of Suit: Other Real Property Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1446 Petition for Removal

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 1In a Motion to Dismiss, the court must presume all factual allegations of the Complaint

to be true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Usher v. City of

Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556,561(9th Cir.1987).

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Kathy L. Jamieson, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Lawrence B. Slater, et al.,

Defendants.

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No. CV 06-1524-PHX-SMM

 CV 06-2261-PHX-SMM

ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Kathy Jamieson’s ("Jamieson") Motion to

Dismiss (Doc. 5) Monica Jagelski's Complaint (06-2261) pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted. Jamieson 

BACKGROUND1

On June 13, 2006, Jamieson filed a Complaint against Lawrence B. Slater (“Slater”)

Marchant, and Jagelski alleging three claims: (i) Violation of A.R.S. § 33-420(A), (ii)

Tortious Interference with Business and Contractual Relations; and (iii) Abuse of Process.

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 2Collectively referred to as the "Properties".

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(Dkt. 1.) On September 25, 2006, Jamieson filed an Amended Complaint adding Slater’s law

firm, Lawrence Slater & Associates, P.C. (collectively with Slater, “Slater”), as a named

defendant. (Dkt. 12.) Jamieson alleges that her claims arise out of “Defendants’ malicious

conspiracy to unlawfully acquire [her] real property.” (Dkt. 7 at 2.) She further alleges that,

to accomplish this purpose, Marchant and Jagelski each hired Slater to represent them in

filing “separate, groundless claims against [her] and to prepare and record separate,

groundless lis pendens on [her three parcels of] real property.” (Id.)

In the summer of 1996, Jamieson and Marchant began a romantic relationship, despite

Marchant still being married to Jagelski. (Id.) In December of 1996, Marchant moved in

with Jamieson. In January of 1998, Jamieson purchased a parcel of real property ("Sangria

Property") and in February of 1998, she purchased another parcel of land ("Ellsworth

Property")2

. Both properties are titled in Jamieson's name alone. At the time Jamieson

purchased the properties, Jagelski was married to Marchant; however, Marchant was living

with Jamieson. Jagelski’s and Marchant’s petition for dissolution of marriage was filed in

August 1997, and their divorce decree was granted in June 1998. (Id.) Thereafter, on May

5, 2001, Jamieson and Marchant were married. (Id. at 3.) Jamieson asserts that she never

“gifted, transferred or conveyed any interest in [the Properties] to Marchant before, during,

or after their marriage.” (Id. at 3.)

Divorce of Jamieson and Marchant

On May 27, 2003, Jamieson petitioned for legal separation from Marchant. Marchant

was represented by Slater, and responded by filing lis pendens on the Properties (the “First

lis pendens") and a request for marital dissolution (the “Dissolution Action”). (Id.)

Jamieson alleges that, as a result of the First lis pendens, she was not able to sell the

Properties, despite offers to purchase she received from buyers. (Id.) Consequently,

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Jamieson demanded that the First lis pendens be released, but Marchant failed to comply

(Id.)

In the dissolution action between Jamieson and Marchant, Jamieson filed a motion

for summary judgment regarding her right to sole ownership of the Properties. On February

8, 2006, the dissolution court reaffirmed an earlier order granting Plaintiff’s motion for

summary judgment and awarded the Properties to her alone. The dissolution court rejected

Marchant’s assertion that an oral promise could serve as the basis for a claim to real property,

holding instead that Marchant failed to satisfy the Statute of Frauds, A.R.S. § 33-401(B).

(Dkt. 7, Ex.1 at 3.) Although the dissolution court expressly took no position on whether

Marchant possessed a civil claim against Jamieson, it ordered him to “immediately take all

steps necessary to effectively remove the lis pendens filings currently of record.” (Id. at 4.)

On the same day, Marchant, represented by Slater, filed a quiet title lawsuit against

Jamieson in Pinal County and recorded a second lis pendens on the Properties (the “Second

lis pendens”). (Dkt. 7, Exs. 2-3.) Marchant also filed a motion for new trial on the

dissolution court’s summary judgment ruling, which was denied on April 21, 2006.

Following the denial of his motion for new trial, Marchant removed only the First lis

pendens. (Id. at 4.)

On April 25, 2006, during trial proceedings in the dissolution action, the court learned

about the Second lis pendens and ordered Marchant to release it under threat of being held

in contempt. (Dkt. 7, Ex. 4.) The court specifically informed both Marchant and Slater that

Marchant was not entitled to an ownership interest in the Properties and ordered Marchant

to produce proof that the Second lis pendens had been removed by April 27, 2006. (Id. at

43-45.) The dissolution court further ordered Slater and Marchant not to file or otherwise

record any additional lis pendens on the Properties. (Id. at 44-45.)

On April 27, 2006, Marchant produced a document to the dissolution court that

purported to show that he had released the Second lis pendens from the Properties. (Dkt. 7

at 5.) Instead of filing the release with the Pinal County Recorder’s Office, however,

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Marchant erroneously filed the release with the Clerk of the Pinal County Superior Court.

(Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Slater knew or should have known that the release Marchant filed

did not actually release the Second lis pendens, which remained a cloud on the Properties’

titles, and knew that the Court believed otherwise. (Id.) 

On May 9, 2006, Jamieson's attorney advised Slater of the misfiling, and demanded

that it be corrected. Neither Slater nor Marchant responded. (Id.) Plaintiff then filed an

Application for Order to Show Cause why Marchant should not be held in contempt for

failing to remove the Second lis pendens. On May 23, 2006, two days before the dissolution

court’s hearing on the Order to Show Cause, Marchant released the Second lis pendens. (Id.)

Jamieson later discovered that, on May 19, 2006, four days before Marchant released

the Second lis pendens, Jagelski, represented by Slater, filed a quiet title lawsuit against

Plaintiff in Pinal County and filed a lis pendens on the Properties (the “Third lis pendens”).

(Dkt. 7, Exs. 5-6.) Jagelski’s complaint alleged that she acquired a community property

interest in the Properties through the ownership interest Marchant acquired from Plaintiff

during the time he was married to Jagelski. (Dkt. 7, Ex. 5.)

Although a final divorce decree had been issued in the dissolution action between

Jamieson and Marchant, Marchant appealed the dissolution court’s decision awarding the

Properties to Jamieson. (Id. at note 3.) 

Disqualification of Slater and Consolidation

Jamieson filed a Motion to Disqualify Slater as Counsel contending that Slater's status

as co-defendant, counsel, and necessary witness in the present case involved concurrent

conflicts of interest that violate Ethical Rules 1.7 and 3.7 of the Arizona Rules of

Professional Conduct, thereby requiring his disqualification as counsel for co-defendants

Marchant and Jagelski. Slater filed an answer on behalf of himself, Marchant, and Jagelski.

(Dkt. 5.) On November 28, 2006, the Court granted the motion. Thereafter, Jamieson moved

to consolidate the action she filed against Defendants (06-1524) with the action filed by

Jagelski against her (06-2261). The motion was granted by the Court after none of the

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Defendants responded to the motion. On December 29, 2006, Jamieson filed a Motion to

Quash the lis pendens filed by Jagelski. On March 20, 2007, this Court denied the Motion

on the grounds that given the detailed circumstances of the case, the decision entailed a more

extensive analysis of the evidence and was therefore better suited for summary judgment.

Jagelski and the Properties

Jagelski knew that the Properties were being purchased, and she asserts that she

"permitted" Marchant to pursue an interest in the properties for the benefit of the children.

The Properties were not listed in the Property Settlement Agreement for Jagelski and

Marchant's Dissolution Decree. Further, Marchant is not an owner of record for the

Properties. Marchant has never given any money to Jagelski for her alleged interest in the

Properties and Jagelski has previously never attempted to obtain money from Marchant for

any alleged interest in the Properties. 

Jagelski's Claims Against Jamieson

On May 19, 2006, Jagelski filed suit against Jamieson in Superior Court. On

September 7, 2006, Jagelski amended her complain prior to service of process on Jamieson.

In the Complaint, Jagelski seeks quiet title or alternatively, partition of the Properties

purchased by Jamieson while Marchant was living with Jamieson and married to Jagelski

based on (1) fraudulent inducement, (2) misrepresentation, (3) constructive trust, (4) implied

contract, and (5) unjust enrichment. (See Amended Complaint, ¶ IV.) Jagelski claims that

Marchant contributed money toward the purchase of the properties and that those sums were

community property in which Jagelski had an interest. (Id. at ¶¶ VI, VIII.) The Properties

have always been titled in Jamieson's name alone. (Id. at ¶¶ VII.) On September 25, 2006,

Jamieson filed the pending Motion to Dismiss. The motion is fully briefed and now ripe for

disposition.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a court to dismiss a claim on the basis of a dispositive issue

of law. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326 (1989). A complaint may not be dismissed

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for failure to state a claim “unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set

of facts in support of [the] claim which would entitle [the plaintiff] to relief.” Usher v. City

of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir.1987) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,

45-46 (1957)). If as a matter of law it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set

of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations, under Rule 12(b)(6) a claim

must be dismissed, without regard to whether it is based on an outlandish legal theory or on

a close but ultimately unavailing one. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. Dismissal may be based

on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a

cognizable legal theory. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Department, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th

Cir.1988).

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court must presume all factual

allegations of the complaint to be true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the

nonmoving party. Usher, 828 F.2d at 561. A court is not required to accept legal

conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations if those conclusions cannot reasonably be

drawn from the facts alleged. McGlinchy v. Shell Chemical Co., 845 F.2d 802, 810 (9th Cir.

1988). The Court declines to consider any materials submitted outside of the pleadings.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b).

DISCUSSION

I. Rule 9(b) Compliance as to Jagelski's Fraud Claims.

Jamieson alleges that Jagelski's Complaint fails to plead with particularity the

necessary details for claims of "fraud and misrepresentation" as required by Fed.R.Civ.P.

9(b). "In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake

shall be stated with particularity." Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b). It is established law, in this circuit and

elsewhere, that Rule 9(b)'s particularity requirement applies to state-law causes of action.

Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 2003). “[W]hile a federal court

will examine state law to determine whether the elements of fraud have been pled sufficiently

to state a cause of action, the Rule 9(b) requirement that the circumstances of the fraud must

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 3Moreover, as to fraudulent misrepresentation, Jagelski has failed to allege any facts that

support a claim that Jamieson made any material misrepresentations which in turn induced

Jagelski to manifest her assent to enter into any agreement or make any specific decision.

REST 2d CONTR § 167.

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be stated with particularity is a federally imposed rule.” Hayduk v. Lanna, 775 F.2d 441, 443

(1st Cir.1985) (emphasis in original).

Jamieson contends that Jagelski has failed to allege facts with particularity that

support her claims of fraudulent inducement or misrepresentation against Jamieson. In her

Complaint, Plaintiff does not allege that Jamieson made any statements to her regarding the

properties. Any alleged communications were made to Marchant, not Jagelski. Further,

Jagelski fails to allege that she relied on any statements made by Jamieson. A showing of

fraud requires (1) a representation; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) the speaker's

knowledge of its falsity or ignorance of its truth; (5) the speaker's intent that it be acted upon

by the recipient in the manner reasonably contemplated; (6) the hearer's ignorance of its

falsity; (7) the hearer's reliance on its truth; (8) the right to rely on it; (9) the hearer's

consequent and proximate injury. Echols v. Beauty Built Homes, Inc., 647 P.2d 629, 631

(Ariz. 1982); Nielson v. Flashberg, 419 P.2d 514 (Ariz.1966). In fact, all of the allegations

in the Complaint regarding communications about the properties pertained to alleged

conversations between Jamieson and Marchant. There were no facts alleged by Jagelski that

pertained to any representations made by Jamieson to Jagelski, whether false or not.

Therefore, Jagelski has failed to state a claim that Jamieson made fraudulent

misrepresentations to her that resulted in damages.3

Rule 9(b) demands that the circumstances constituting the alleged fraud “be ‘specific

enough to give defendants notice of the particular misconduct so that they can defend against

the charge and not just deny that they have done anything wrong.’” Bly-Magee v. California,

236 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Neubronner v. Milken, 6 F.3d 666, 672 (9th

Cir.1993)). Averments of fraud must be accompanied by “the who, what, when, where, and

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how” of the misconduct charged. Vess, 317 F.3d at 1106 (quoting Cooper v. Pickett, 137

F.3d 616, 627 (9th Cir.1997)). A motion to dismiss a complaint or claim “grounded in fraud”

under Rule 9(b) for failure to plead with particularity is the functional equivalent of a motion

to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Id. at 1107. As with Rule 12(b)(6)

dismissals, dismissals for failure to comply with Rule 9(b) should ordinarily be without

prejudice. Id. at 1108. Here, Jagelski was unable to allege facts with sufficient particularity

to put Jamieson on notice of any alleged fraudulent conduct. Therefore, Defendant's Motion

to Dismiss Plaintiff's claims of fraudulent inducement and misrepresentation is hereby

GRANTED for failure to comply with Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b). 

II. Rule 8(a) Compliance as to Jagelski's Non-Fraud Claims

A. Breach of Contract and Unjust Enrichment

In her motion, Jamieson contends that Jagelski failed to set forth a short statement

establishing that she is entitled to relief for breach of contract or unjust enrichment, thereby

failing to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2).

Pursuant to Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a pleading which

sets forth a claim for relief shall contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing

that the pleader is entitled to relief." Complaints that are confusing and conclusory are not

in compliance with Rule 8. See Hatch v. reliance Ins. Co., 758 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1985). In

general, Rule 8 requires "sufficient allegations to put defendants fairly on notice of the claims

against them." McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1991). Dismissal is proper where

there is no cognizable theory or an absence or sufficient facts alleged to support a cognizable

theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1988).

In the matter presently before the Court, Jagelski's Amended Complaint fails to allege

sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory for a claim against Jamieson for breach

of an implied contract or unjust enrichment. Jagelski merely states that she is "entitled to

claim interest in these properties...based on ...implied contract, and unjust enrichment." She

does not set forth facts to support the execution of a contract or facts to support the existence

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 4In fact, quite the opposite has occurred. Jamieson asserts that "a court of

competent jurisdiction has already determined Marchant has no ownership interest in the

properties on the basis of constructive trust." (Doc. 11, p. 4)

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The Statute of Frauds provides in pertinent part:

(A) No estate of inheritance, freehold, or for a term of more than one

year, in lands or tenements, shall be conveyed unless the conveyance

is by an instrument in writing, subscribed and delivered by the party

disposing of the estate, or by his agent thereunto authorized by writing.

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of an implied contract. Nor does she establish facts supporting a claim for unjust enrichment.

Consequently, the Motion to Dismiss Jagelski's claims of breach of contract and unjust

enrichment is GRANTED for failure to comply with Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a).

B. Constructive Trust

Jagelski claims that "Marchant acquired a right to the properties by constructive trust,

and Jagelski has a community property interest in the property acquired by Marchant during

the marriage." Despite the fact that this is at the motion to dismiss stage, a plaintiff must still

provide the Court with support for its assertions. In this instance, the Court was provided

with no factual allegations to support the conclusion that Marchant acquired any such

property right.4

 

Moreover, the remedy of constructive trust arises out of operation of law as a remedial

devise when property has been obtained through some form of fraud. Here, Jagelski has

failed to allege facts sufficient to support a claim of fraud against Jamieson. Therefore,

Jagelski is not entitled to the remedial remedy of a constructive trust. Accordingly,

Jamieson's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED as to Jagelski's request for a constructive trust.

III. Standing to Assert a Breach of Implied Contract Claim

In her Complaint, Jagelski requests quiet title and/or partition of the properties based

on the claim of an implied contract. However, there exists no privity of contract, express or

implied, between Jagelski and Jamieson. On the face of the Complaint, Jagelski asserts an

alleged oral contract between Jamieson and Marchant.5

 Jagelski does not allege that she was

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(B) Every deed or conveyance of real property must be signed by the

grantor and must be duly acknowledged before some officer

authorized to take acknowledgements. 

A.R.S. § 33-401(A),(B).

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a party to this contract or that she was an intended third party beneficiary to the oral contract.

For a third party to maintain an action on a contract, the contract must have been entered into

for the express benefit of the third party; the party cannot be merely an incidental beneficiary.

See Araiza v. U.S. West Bus. Resources, Inc., 904 P.2d 1272, 1278 (Ariz. App. 1995) citing

Maganas v. Northroup, 663 P.2d 565, 567 (Ariz. 1983). The benefit must be both intentional

and direct, and “ ‘it must definitely appear that the parties intend to recognize the third party

as the primary party in interest.’ ” Norton v. First Fed. Sav., 624 P.2d 854, 856 (Ariz. 1981),

quoting Irwin v. Murphey, 81 Ariz. 148, 154, 302 P.2d 534, 538 (1956). 

Even while presuming all factual allegations of the Complaint to be true and drawing

all reasonable inferences in favor of Jagelski, Jagelski has failed to allege facts to support an

allegation that she was an intended third party beneficiary to a valid contract between

Jamieson and Marchant. Therefore, Jamieson's Motion to Dismiss Jagelski's claim of breach

of an implied contract is GRANTED.

IV. Statutes of Limitation

Because the Court has determined that Jagelski has not properly alleged a claim

against Jamieson, the Court need not determine whether Jagelski's claims are barred by the

applicable statutes of limitation. Therefore, Jamieson's Motion to Dismiss as to whether

Jagelski's claims are barred by the applicable statutes of limitation is MOOT.

V. Attorney's Fees

The Court will refrain from deciding the issue of attorney's fees until there is a final

judgment in the case.

///

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CONCLUSION

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED GRANTING without prejudice Jamieson's Motion to

Dismiss (Doc. 5) as to fraudulent inducement and misrepresentation.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED GRANTING without prejudice Jamieson's Motion

to Dismiss (Doc. 5) as to breach of contract.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED GRANTING without prejudice Jamieson's Motion

to Dismiss (Doc. 5) as to unjust enrichment.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED GRANTING without prejudice Jamieson's Motion

to Dismiss (Doc. 5) as to Jagelski's request for the remedial remedy of a constructive trust.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Jamieson's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 5) as to

whether Jagelski's claims are barred by the applicable statutes of limitation is MOOT.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if Jagelski chooses to amend any of the foregoing

claims she must file an amended Complaint no later than April 27, 2007.

DATED this 12th day of April, 2007.

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