Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-01633/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-01633-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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At the time of the decision, the Board was called the California Board of Prison

Terms.

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FILBERTO TORRES,

Petitioner,

v.

J. SOLIS,

Respondent. ______________________________

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No. C 05-1633 MJJ (PR)

ORDER DENYING

PETITION FOR A WRIT

OF HABEAS CORPUS

Filberto Torres (“petitioner”), California prisoner incarcerated at the California

Training Facility Soledad, filed the above-titled petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging a 2002 decision by the California Board of Parole Hearings

(“Board”)1

 to deny him parole. Respondent has filed an answer, and petitioner has filed a

traverse. 

BACKGROUND

A jury in Los Angeles County Superior Court found petitioner guilty of attempted

murder in 1982. The trial court sentenced him to a term of sixteen years to life in state

prison. In 2002, after petitioner had served twenty years in prison, the Board found petitioner

unsuitable for parole for a ninth time, and set a subsequent parole hearing for one year later. 

Petitioner challenged this decision in habeas petitions filed in all three levels of the California

courts. 

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Petitioner then filed the instant petition claiming, as he did in his state habeas

petitions, that the Board’s decision violates his liberty interest in being released on parole, an

interest protected by the federal constitutional right to due process. The record indicates, and

petitioner does not dispute, that he was provided with an opportunity to be heard at the parole

hearing, that counsel was present, and that he was informed in what respects he fell short of

being found suitable for parole. (See Resp. Ex. 5.) Rather, petitioner claims that his right to

due process was violated because the denial of parole was not supported by any reliable

evidence. 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgement of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or the laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(a); Rose v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21 (1975). Under AEDPA, this Court may grant a

petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on the basis of a claim that was

“adjudicated on the merits” in state court only if the state court’s adjudication of the claim:

“(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams

v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). 

A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established United States Supreme Court

precedent “if it applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court]

cases, ‘or if it confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision’”

of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from Supreme Court

precedent. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06). 

Under the “unreasonable application” clause of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court may

grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from the

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Respondent argues that the Ninth Circuit is wrong in finding Hill’s “some evidence”

requirement applicable to parole denials. This Court may not disregard or overrule the Ninth

Circuit.

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Supreme Court’s decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the

prisoner’s case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. “[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ

simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court

decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that

application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. A federal habeas court may also grant

the writ if it concludes that the state court's adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision

that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); Rice v. Collins, 126 S. Ct.

969, 975 (2006). 

B. Legal Claims

Petitioner argues that the Board’s denial of parole violated his due process rights

because the decision finding him unsuitable was not supported by the evidence. A parole

board's decision satisfies the requirements of due process if “some evidence” supports the

decision. Sass v. California Board of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1128-29 (9th Cir. 2006)

(adopting some evidence standard for disciplinary hearings outlined in Superintendent v.

Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454-55 (1985)); see also Irons v. Carey, 479 F.3d 658 (9th Cir. 2007).2

The standard of “some evidence” is met if there was some evidence from which the

conclusion of the administrative tribunal could be deduced. See Hill, 472 U.S. at 455. An

examination of the entire record is not required nor is an independent assessment of the

credibility of witnesses or weighing of the evidence. Id. The relevant question is whether

there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the

[administrative] board. See id. Additionally, the evidence underlying the Board’s decision

must have some indicia of reliability. McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 904 (9th Cir.

2002).

In assessing whether or not there is “some evidence” supporting the Board’s denial of

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parole, this Court must consider the regulations which guide the Board in making its parole

suitability determinations. California Code of Regulations, title 15, section 2402(a) states

that “[t]he panel shall first determine whether the life prisoner is suitable for release on

parole. Regardless of the length of time served, a life prisoner shall be found unsuitable for

and denied parole if in the judgment of the panel the prisoner will pose an unreasonable risk

of danger to society if released from prison.” The regulations direct the Board to consider

“all relevant, reliable information available.” Cal. Code of Regs., tit. 15, § 2402(b). Further,

they list sets of circumstances tending to indicate whether or not an inmate is suitable for

parole. Cal. Code of Regs., tit. 15, § 2402(c)-(d). 

The circumstances tending to show an inmate’s unsuitability are: (1) the commitment

offense was committed in an “especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner;” (2) previous

record of violence; (3) unstable social history; (4) sadistic sexual offenses; (5) psychological

factors such as a “lengthy history of severe mental problems related to the offense;” and (6)

prison misconduct. Cal. Code of Regs.,tit. 15, § 2402(c). The circumstances tending to show

suitability are: (1) no juvenile record; (2) stable social history; (3) signs of remorse; (4)

commitment offense was committed as a result of stress which built up over time; (5)

Battered Woman Syndrome; (6) lack of criminal history; (7) age is such that it reduces the

possibility of recidivism; (8) plans for future including development of marketable skills; and

(9) institutional activities that indicate ability to function within the law. Cal. Code of Regs.,

tit. 15, § 2402(d). These circumstances are meant to serve as “general guidelines,” giving the

Board latitude in the weighing of the importance of the combination of factors present in

each particular case. Cal. Code of Regs., tit. 15, § 2404(c). 

Once the prisoner has been found suitable for parole, the regulations set forth a matrix 

to set a base term. 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2403(a). The matrix provides three choices of

suggested base terms for several categories of crimes: for second degree murders, the matrix

of base terms ranges from the low of 15, 16, or 17 years, to a high of 19, 20 or 21 years,

depending on certain facts of the crime. Id. at § 2403. One axis of the matrix concerns the

relationship between murderer and victim and the other axis of the matrix concerns the

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circumstances of the murder. The choices on the axis for the relationship of murderer and

victim are “participating victim,” “prior relationship,” “no prior relationship,” and “threat to

public order or murder for hire.” The choices on the axis for the circumstances of the murder

are “indirect,” “direct or victim contribution,” “severe trauma,” or “torture.” Each of the

choices are further defined in the matrix. See 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2403(c). 

The California Supreme Court has found that the foregoing statutory scheme places

individual suitability for parole above a prisoner’s expectancy in early setting of a fixed date

designed to ensure term uniformity. In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061, 1070-71 (2005).

While subdivision (a) of section 3041 states that indeterminate life (i.e., lifemaximum) sentences should “normally” receive “uniform” parole dates for

similar crimes, subdivision (b) provides that this policy applies “unless [the

Board] determines” that a release date cannot presently be set because the

particular offender’s crime and/or criminal history raises “public safety” concerns requiring further indefinite incarceration. (Italics added.) Nothing in

the statute states or suggests that the Board must evaluate the case under

standards of term uniformity before exercising its authority to deny a parole

date on the grounds the particular offender’s criminality presents a continuing

public danger.

Id. at 1070 (emphasis, brackets, and parentheses as in original). In sum, “the Board,

exercising its traditional broad discretion, may protect public safety in each discrete case by

considering the dangerous implications of a life-maximum prisoner’s crime individually.” 

Id. at 1071. The California Supreme Court's determination of state law is binding in this

federal habeas action. Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 629 (1988). 

In this case, the Board found that petitioner was not suitable for parole because the

commitment offense was “carried out in an especially cruel and callous manner,” petitioner

lacked “realistic parole plans,” and the District Attorney opposed parole. (Resp. Ex. 5 at 35-

37.) 

A. Commitment Offense

Under state law, the Board may determine that the commitment offense was

“especially heinous, atrocious and callous,” and thus serve as a basis for denying parole

pursuant to California Penal Code § 3041(b), based on the following factors: (1) multiple

victims were attacked, injured or killed; (2) the offense was carried out in a dispassionate and

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These facts are included in the “Life Prisoner Evaluation Report” submitted to the

Board, and are not disputed by petitioner herein. (Resp. Ex. 6.) 

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calculated manner, such as an execution-style murder; (3) the victim was abused, defiled, or

mutilated; (4) the offense was carried out in a manner demonstrating an exceptionally callous

disregard for human suffering; (5) or the motive for the crime is inexplicable or very trivial in

relation to the offense. 15 Cal. Code Regs, § 2402(c)(1). 

The California Supreme Court also has determined that the facts of the crime can

alone support a sentence longer than the statutory minimum even if everything else about the 

prisoner is laudable. “While the board must point to factors beyond the minimum elements

of the crime for which the inmate was committed, it need engage in no further comparative

analysis before concluding that the particular facts of the offense make it unsafe, at that time,

to fix a date for the prisoner’s release.” Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1071; see also In re

Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th 616, 682-83 (2002) (“The nature of the prisoner’s offense, alone,

can constitute a sufficient basis for denying parole” but might violate due process “where no

circumstances of the offense reasonably could be considered more aggravated or violent than

the minimum necessary to sustain a conviction for that offense.”). Moreover, the federal

constitutional guarantee of due process does not preclude the parole board from relying on

unchanging factors such as the circumstances of the commitment offense or the parole

applicant's pre-offense behavior in determining parole suitability. Sass, 491 F.3d at 1129

(commitment offenses in combination with prior offenses provided “some evidence” to

support denial of parole); Irons, 479 F.3d at 660, 665 (finding commitment offense and prior

offenses amounted to “some evidence” to deny parole) .

The facts of petitioner’s crime were summarized in a report to the Board as follows:3

Offense Summary: At approximately 0:300 A.M. on 11/28/80 at the

Northeast corner of Seventh and Alvarado Streets, Torres was arrested by Los

Angeles Police Officers for the murder of Ricardo Velasquez. 

Patrolling officers were traveling north bound on Alvarado Street when they

observed Torres and Velasquez near a public telephone booth at the Northeast

corner of Alvarado Street. The pair seemed to be in conversation, but then

Velasquez began to quickly back away from Torres in a defensive manner. 

Torres was making punching motions towards Velasquez’s chest while

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The Court is aware of the concern expressed by the Ninth Circuit in Biggs, that “over

time” the Board’s “continued reliance in the future on an unchanging factor, the

circumstance of the offense and conduct prior to imprisonment” would “raise serious

questions involving his liberty interest in parole.” 334 F.3d at 916. However, the Ninth

Circuit has recently criticized this statement as beyond the scope of the dispute before the

court: "Under AEDPA it is not our function to speculate about how future parole hearings

could proceed." Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129. Moreover, although the Board’s denial of parole

may have been in large part based upon Petitioner’s commitment offense, there were other

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Velasquez appeared to be fending off the blows. Velasquez tripped over a fire

hydrant and fell on his back in the street. Torres then straddled Velasquez on

the street and plunged an eight (blade) butcher knife several times into

Velasquez’s chest area. The officers stopped the attack and took Torres into

custody at gun point. An officer tried to render first aid, but without success. 

An ambulance arrived and Velasquez was pronounced dead at 0410 A.M. Torres was interviewed by police on 11/28/80 and stated he asked Velasquez to

call a friend for him (via pay phone). Velasquez dialed the wrong number

which angered Torres and fight resulted. Torres acknowledged he had the

knife in his pants, took it out, and “did it to him (Velasquez)”. Torres also

stated during the interview that he did not know Velasquez and had never seen

Velasquez prior to the incident. 

Prisoner’s Version: Torres states he was intoxicated from beer, tequila and

marijuana at the time of the offense. He states he had been drinking for many

hours prior to the offense. Torres states Velasquez and he talked; Torres gave

him a beer and Velasquez threw it in his face. They then argued. Torres told

him to go away. Velasquez then swore at Torres and punched him in the face. 

Torres states they were both drunk and Torres does not remember stabbing

him. “I blacked out from too much drink.” Torres states he is sorry the

incident happened. 

(Resp. Ex. 6 at 1-2; see also Resp. Ex. 5 at 9-10at 2-4.)

The foregoing facts of the offense provided sufficient evidence that petitioner

demonstrated an “exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering” under Cal. Code of

Regs., tit. 15, § 2402(c)(1)(C). After the victim had fallen to the ground, petitioner continued

to attack him, straddled him, and stabbed him in the chest with a butcher knife. The attack

was stopped by police officers, not by petitioner himself. Furthermore, murdering the victim

because he had dialed the wrong number, or perhaps had struck petitioner once in the face,

was certainly a trivial motive compared to the gravity of the offense, see Cal. Code of Regs.,

tit. 15, § 2402(c)(1)(E). Consequently, there was “some evidence” that the facts of the

commitment offense met the factors set forth in the state’s regulations for indicating that

petitioner was not suitable for parole.4

 

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reasons for their denial of parole as well. Therefore, the instant case does not implicate the

concerns raised in Biggs. 

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B. Additional Factors

Under the pertinent regulations, the Board may consider whether the inmate had an

“unstable social history” in reaching its parole decision. See 15 Cal. Code Regs. §§

2402(c)(3); 2402(d)(6). Petitioner had previously been convicted, in 1973, of driving under

the influence, and had also been arrested in 1974 and 1977 for driving under the influence

and obstructing justice. (Resp. Ex. 6 at 2; Ex. 5 at 11, 36.) As noted above, there was also

undisputed evidence that at the time of the offense, petitioner had been using marijuana and

was intoxicated. This constituted “some evidence” of an unstable social history. 

Petitioner cites his completion of self-help, educational and vocational training

programs in prison, his positive evaluation by a psychologist, and the fact that his last serious

disciplinary violation in prison was in 1989. The Board commended petitioner for these

accomplishments, but also found petitioner had no “realistic” parole or educational plans

either in this country or in Mexico (petitioner’s country of origin), (Resp. Ex. 5 at 21-22, 37-

38.) See 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(d)(8) (allowing consideration of parole plans following

release in making parole determination). Although petitioner had vocational and educational

skills, he had no plans for housing, employment, or other means to support himself after his

release from prison. Finally, the Board noted the prosecution’s opposition to parole as a

factor in its decision. See Cal. Pen. Code. § 3042.

Under these circumstances, the facts of the commitment offense and petitioner’s lack

of parole plans was enough evidence to satisfy Hill’s standard of “some evidence”. As a

result, the Board’s decision did not violate Petitioner’s due process rights in denying him

parole. Consequently, neither the Board’s decision nor the state court opinions upholding

such decision, are “contrary to” or an “unreasonable application of “clearly established

Federal law” withing the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Further, the decision was not

based on “an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding,” because there was “some evidence” in the record to support the

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finding of Petitioner’s unsuitability for parole. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief.

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. 

The Clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: MARTIN J. JENKINS

United States District Judge 

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