Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-00371/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-00371-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

AQUILLA T. JASE, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

)

v. )

)

)

JAMES A. YATES, et al., )

)

Respondents. )

 )

1:09-cv-00371-OWW-JLT HC 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO

GRANT RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS FOR LACK OF EXHAUSTION AND

FAILURE TO STATE A HABEAS CLAIM (Doc.

12)

ORDER REQUIRING THAT OBJECTIONS BE

FILED WITHIN TWENTY DAYS

Petitioner is a prisoner proceeding with a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

The instant petition was filed on February 24, 2009. (Doc. 1). In his petition, Petitioner

contends that, as a state prisoner with an outstanding federal warrant, he has properly and timely

filed a request for disposition of untried charges arising from that warrant, and that Respondent has

failed to grant Petitioner’s request. (Doc. 1, pp. 2-3). Petitioner asks the Court for an order

transferring him to federal custody so that he can answer those charges arising from the federal

warrant. 

On July 23, 2009, the Court ordered Respondent to file a response to the petition. (Doc. 11). 

On September 14, 2009, Respondent filed the instant motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer,

1

Case 1:09-cv-00371-OWW -JLT Document 19 Filed 05/21/10 Page 1 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

contending that Petitioner’s claim had not been fully exhausted in state court and that Petitioner’s

claim does not state a cognizable federal habeas claim. (Doc. 16). On December 25, 2009,

Petitioner filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss, Petitioner contends that the federal charges

now pending against him do not need to be exhausted nor have they ever been “removed” to state

court. (Doc. 18, pp. 1-2). 

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a

petition if it “plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the

petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section

2254 Cases.

The Ninth Circuit has allowed Respondents to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer if

the motion attacks the pleadings for failing to exhaust state remedies or being in violation of the

state’s procedural rules. See, e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9 Cir. 1990) (using Rule th

4 to evaluate motion to dismiss petition for failure to exhaust state remedies); White v. Lewis, 874

F.2d 599, 602-03 (9 Cir. 1989) (using Rule 4 as procedural grounds to review motion to dismiss for th

state procedural default); Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (same). 

Thus, a respondent can file a motion to dismiss after the Court orders a response, and the Court

should use Rule 4 standards to review the motion. See Hillery, 533 F. Supp. at 1194 & n. 12.

In this case, Respondent's Motion to Dismiss is based on Respondent’s contentions that the

petition fails to state claims upon which habeas relief can be granted and that Petitioner has never

presented his claims to the California Supreme Court. These claims are similar in procedural

standing to a motion to dismiss for lack of exhaustion or for procedural default. Accordingly, the

Court will review Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to its authority under Rule 4. 

O’Bremski, 915 F.2d at 420. 

B. Failure To State A Cognizable Federal Habeas Claim.

The Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act (“IADA”) governs the disposition of charges

2

Case 1:09-cv-00371-OWW -JLT Document 19 Filed 05/21/10 Page 2 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

between different jurisdictions. The Supreme Court provides this summary of the IADA:

In 1970 Congress enacted the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, 18 U.S.C. App.,

pp. 1395-1398 (1976 ed.), joining the United States and the District of Columbia as parties to

the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (Agreement). The Agreement, which has also been

enacted by 46 States, is designed "to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of . . .

charges [outstanding against a prisoner] and determination of the proper status of any and all

detainers based on untried indictments, informations, or complaints." Art. I. It prescribes

procedures by which a member State may obtain for trial a prisoner incarcerated in another

member jurisdiction and by which the prisoner may demand the speedy disposition of certain

charges pending against him in another jurisdiction.

United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 343 (1978). 

When the United State files a detainer against a state prisoner and then obtains his custody,

the United States activates the provisions of the IADA and is bound them. Mauro, 436 U.S. at 349.

Once the United States obtains custody of the state prisoner, trial must commence within 120 days of

her arrival in federal court. Id. at 362; 18 U.S.C. App. 2 § 2, art. IV(c). Failure to abide by the time

provisions requires dismissal of the indictment. Mauro, 436 U.S. at 362. If the United States merely

lodges a detainer against a state prisoner, the prisoner has the right to be brought to trial within 180

days after the prisoner causes to be delivered “written notice of . . . h[er] request for a final

disposition to be made of the indictment, information, or complaint.” 18 U.S.C. App. 2 § 2, art.

III(a). The written notice and request for final disposition “shall be given or sent by the prisoner to

the warden, commissioner of corrections, or other official having custody of him, who shall promptly

forward it together with the certificate to the appropriate prosecuting official and court . . . .” 18

U.S.C. App. 2 § 2, art. III(b). Here, two federal detainers, served upon Petitioner, form the subject

matter for the instant petition.

However, the basic scope of habeas corpus is prescribed by statute. Subsection (c) of Section

2241 of Title 28 of the United States Code provides that habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner

unless he is “in custody in violation of the Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) states that the federal

courts shall entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus only on the ground that the petitioner “is in

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. See also, Rule 1 to

the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Court. The Supreme Court has

held that “the essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that

3

Case 1:09-cv-00371-OWW -JLT Document 19 Filed 05/21/10 Page 3 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

custody . . .” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). Furthermore, in order to succeed in a

petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, Petitioner must demonstrate that the adjudication of his claim

in state court resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or resulted

in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2). 

Petitioner does not allege a violation of the Constitution or federal law, nor does he argue that

he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law. Petitioner does not allege that the

adjudication of his claims in state court “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, . . . or resulted in a decision that was

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner raises only a

state law claim, i.e., that Respondent has not followed the procedures set forth in California Penal

Code §1381. That section provides, inter alia, that a state prisoner serving a prison term who has, at

the time he commences his prison term, other pending state charges, may request disposition of

those charges, through a trial or dismissal, within ninety days. 

On its face, it does not appear that §1381 is applicable to this case since Petitioner does not

allege that he has pending state criminal charges he wishes to dispose of and nothing in that section

suggests it is applicable to outstanding federal charges or to the federal detainer process. However,

assuming, arguendo, that it is applicable, it nevertheless raises only an issue of state law, i.e.,

Respondent’s failure to follow the procedures set forth in § 1381. Generally, issues of state law are

not cognizable on federal habeas review. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991)(“We have

stated many times that ‘federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.’”), quoting

Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990); Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 348-349

(1993)(O’Connor, J., concurring)(“mere error of state law, one that does not rise to the level of a

constitutional violation, may not be corrected on federal habeas”). Indeed, federal courts are bound

by state court rulings on questions of state law. Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th

Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 942 (1989). 

4

Case 1:09-cv-00371-OWW -JLT Document 19 Filed 05/21/10 Page 4 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

On the other hand, Petitioner attaches Exhibit B to his petition which demonstrates that

prison officials have forwarded his request for disposition of the untried federal charges to the “US

Crt and US Attorney.” (Ex. B, 2 page dated 12/2/08.) nd

Therefore, for these reasons Respondent’s motion to dismiss should be granted on the ground

that Petitioner has failed to allege a cognizable federal claim upon which habeas relief could be

granted.

C. Exhaustion.

Respondent also contends that, assuming the petition’s claims are cognizable, said claims

have not been exhausted. The Court agrees.

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to collaterally challenge his conviction by a

petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). The

exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives the state court the initial

opportunity to correct the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501

U.S. 722, 731 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158,

1163 (9th Cir. 1988). 

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court with a

full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court. Duncan v.

Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88

F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court was given a full

and fair opportunity to hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the highest state court with the

claim's factual and legal basis. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365 (legal basis); Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504

U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 1719 (1992) (factual basis).

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the state court that he was raising a

federal constitutional claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669

(9th Cir. 2000), amended, 247 F.3d 904 (2001); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir.

1999); Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir. 1998). In Duncan, the United States

Supreme Court reiterated the rule as follows: 

5

Case 1:09-cv-00371-OWW -JLT Document 19 Filed 05/21/10 Page 5 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

In Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 . . . (1971), we said that exhaustion of state

remedies requires that petitioners “fairly presen[t]” federal claims to the state courts in order

to give the State the “opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of the prisoners'

federal rights” (some internal quotation marks omitted). If state courts are to be given the

opportunity to correct alleged violations of prisoners' federal rights, they must surely be

alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting claims under the United States Constitution.

If a habeas petitioner wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied

him the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must say so, not

only in federal court, but in state court. 

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. The Ninth Circuit examined the rule further, stating:

Our rule is that a state prisoner has not “fairly presented” (and thus exhausted) his

federal claims in state court unless he specifically indicated to that court that those claims

were based on federal law. See Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2000).

Since the Supreme Court's decision in Duncan, this court has held that the petitioner must

make the federal basis of the claim explicit either by citing federal law or the decisions of

federal courts, even if the federal basis is “self-evident," Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882,

889 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7 . . . (1982), or the underlying

claim would be decided under state law on the same considerations that would control

resolution of the claim on federal grounds. Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F3d 1098, 1106-07 (9th Cir.

1999); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1996); . . . .

In Johnson, we explained that the petitioner must alert the state court to the fact that the

relevant claim is a federal one without regard to how similar the state and federal standards

for reviewing the claim may be or how obvious the violation of federal law is. 

Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-669 (9th Cir. 2000) (italics added). 

 Petitioner has submitted exhibits to his petition establishing that on June 11, 2008,

Respondent notified Petitioner of the existence of two federal detainers for outstanding federal

warrants, nos. CC421129259 and CC421129260, charging, respectively, possession of a weapon and

disrupting government employees, existed. (Doc. 17, Ex. A). The documents advised Petitioner

regarding his right to request a hearing pursuant to California Penal Code § 1381. (Id.). Petitioner

claims that he has properly requested a hearing through a series of inmate requests, but that

Respondent failed to provide such a hearing. The notation on the various inmate requests for

interview suggest that Respondent advised Petitioner that he needed to make such a request on a

specific form that could be obtained from the prison law library. The record is ambiguous as to

whether Petitioner ever filled out this particular form. However, regardless of whether Petitioner

complied with Respondent’s procedural requirements, it appears that, to date, Petitioner has not been

brought to trial on the federal charges as he has requested.

6

Case 1:09-cv-00371-OWW -JLT Document 19 Filed 05/21/10 Page 6 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Respondent has filed a motion to dismiss the petition based on Petitioner’s failure to exhaust

his claim in the state courts. (Doc. 16). Petitioner, in his opposition to said motion, contends that

exhaustion is not required regarding his federal charges. Petitioner misapprehends the issue before

the Court in Respondent’s motion. Respondent is not arguing that Petitioner must exhaust state

remedies for the two federal charges that have not even been tried; rather, Respondent is contending

that Petitioner’s complaint that Respondent has failed to properly follow state law in processing his

request for a trial on the charges listed in the detainer is an issue that must first be exhausted in state

court before it can be raised in a federal habeas proceeding. The Court agrees. 

As discussed above, a petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to the fact or duration of

his confinement in a federal habeas petition must first exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(b)(1). The method for exhausting such claims is by providing the highest state court with a

full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court. Duncan, 513

U.S. at 365; Picard, 404 U.S. at 276; Johnson, 88 F.3d at 829. 

The burden is on the petition to establish that he has exhausted his claims in state court. E.g.,

Cartwright v. Cupp, 650 F.2d 1103, 1104 (9 Cir. 1981). In his petition and his opposition to the th

motion to dismiss, Petitioner does not allege that he has ever presented to the California Supreme

Court his claim challenging Respondent’s failure to follow state law by forwarding his request for a

hearing on the federal detainers to the appropriate federal authorities. Respondent’s motion alleges

that no record exists of any filings by Petitioner to exhaust his claims in state court. (Doc. 16, p. 2). 

The Court has independently accessed the California courts’ electronic database and has not found

any evidence to suggest that Petitioner has ever filed a state habeas petition in either the California

Court of Appeal or the California Supreme Court. 

From the foregoing, the Court concludes that Petitioner has not presented his claim to the

California Supreme Court as required by the exhaustion doctrine. Because Petitioner has not

presented his claim for federal relief to the California Supreme Court, the Court must dismiss the

petition. See Calderon v. United States Dist. Court, 107 F.3d 756, 760 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc); 

Greenawalt v. Stewart, 105 F.3d 1268, 1273 (9th Cir. 1997). The Court cannot consider a petition

7

Case 1:09-cv-00371-OWW -JLT Document 19 Filed 05/21/10 Page 7 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

that is entirely unexhausted. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 521-22 (1982); Calderon, 107 F.3d at

760. Therefore, Respondent’s motion to dismiss should be granted and the petition should be

dismissed for lack of exhaustion.

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS as follows:

1. That Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 16), be GRANTED; and,

2. That the habeas corpus Petition (Doc. 1), be DISMISSED for lack of exhaustion. 

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the United States District Court Judge

assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of the

Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within

twenty (20) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with the Court

and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate

Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections shall be served and filed within

ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the objections. The Court will

then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the

District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 20, 2010 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

9j7khi UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

8

Case 1:09-cv-00371-OWW -JLT Document 19 Filed 05/21/10 Page 8 of 8