Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00059/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00059-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAMON MERVIN STUTESMAN,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-05-0059 LKK JFM P

vs.

ROSANNE CAMPBELL, et al.,

Respondents. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with an application for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondents have moved to dismiss on the grounds

that this action is barred by the statute of limitations.

On April 24, 1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)

was enacted. The AEDPA amended 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) so that it now provides:

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ

of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment

of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion

of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such

review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application

created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of

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the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from

filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively

applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Section 2244(d)(2) provides that “the time during which a properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this

subsection.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).

For purposes of the statute of limitations analysis, the relevant chronology of this

case is as follows:

1. On June 3, 1996, petitioner pleaded guilty to one count of continuous sexual

abuse of a child in violation of California Penal Code § 288.5. (Document 1, Abstract of

Judgment filed in Shasta County Superior Court case number 96F2915 on August 21, 1997.) 

Petitioner was sentenced to 12 years in state prison and ordered to pay a $200 restitution fine. 

(Document 2, Opinion of the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District case number

C027399 on June 18, 1998.) Execution of the sentence was suspended and petitioner was placed

on probation. (Id.) Thereafter, a petition was filed alleging that petitioner had violated the

conditions of his probation. (Id.) Ultimately, probation was revoked and on August 21, 1997,

petitioner was sentenced to 12 years in prison and two restitution fines were imposed. 

(Documents 1 and 2.)

2. On June 18, 1998, the California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate

District affirmed petitioner’s conviction, reduced one restitution fine, and struck the other. 

(Document 2.) An amended abstract of judgment was filed on August 26, 1998. (Document 3.)

Petitioner did not seek direct review in the California Supreme Court.

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3. On November 18, 2003, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in

the Shasta County Superior Court. (Document 4.) That petition was denied on November 20,

2003. (Document 5.) 

4. On December 11, 2003, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in

the California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District. (Document 6.) That petition was

denied on December 23, 2003. (Document 7.)

5. On January 23, 2004, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

California Supreme Court. (Document 8.) That petition was denied on December 15, 2004. 

(Document 9.) 

6. On January 11, 2005, petitioner filed the instant action. 

Petitioner’s conviction became final on July 23, 1998, forty days after the

California Court of Appeal filed its opinion on petitioner’s direct appeal. See Smith v. Duncan,

809, 812-13 (9 Cir. 2002). Pursuant to § 2244(d)(1)(A), the statute of limitations began to run th

against petitioner the next day, on July 24, 1998. Id. at 813 (citing Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d

1243, 1246 (9 Cir. 2001)). Petitioner therefore had until July 23, 1999 to file a federal habeas

th

corpus petition. Smith, at 813. Petitioner did not file any petition for post-conviction relief in

any court until after the limitation period expired. Accordingly, unless the deadline is equitably

tolled, this action is time-barred.

 Section 2244(d) is a statute of limitations subject to equitable tolling, but only on

a showing of “extraordinary circumstances.” Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9 Cir. th

1999). Petitioner contends that the statute of limitations should not operate to bar his claims

because those claims go to the state court’s subject matter jurisdiction over the criminal

proceedings against him. Specifically, petitioner contends that the criminal complaint filed

against him was invalid because it consistent only of the affidavit sworn to by a Redding police

officer in support of a warrant for petitioner’s arrest and was not a valid criminal complaint for

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 In his petition, petitioner contends that he did not discover that the criminal complaint 1

was invalid until July 2003, when he sought the assistance of a jailhouse lawyer “because he felt

that his court appointed attorney had coerced him into pleading guilty.” (Petition, filed January

11, 2005, at 3.) Petitioner offers no explanation for the lapse of four years between the time the

limitation period expired and his request for assistance from the jailhouse lawyer. 

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purposes of a state criminal prosecution. It is not at all clear that a challenge to a state court’s 1

jurisdiction over criminal proceedings is exempt from the provisions of the federal habeas corpus

statute of limitations. Even assuming arguendo that such an exemption might arise, such

circumstances are not present in the instant case. 

At least one California court of appeal has held that “due process of law” requires

that the filing of criminal complaints “must be approved, authorized or concurred in by the

district attorney before they are effective in instituting criminal proceedings against an

individual.” People v. Municipal Court, 27 Cal.App.3d 193, 206 (1972). Although the felony

criminal complaint filed against petitioner on April 29, 1996 is signed only by Redding Police

Officer Terry Nielsen, it identifies the District Attorney of Shasta County as the attorney for the

People of the State of California, and includes an informal discovery request by the People. (Ex.

A to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.) Moreover, the plea agreement that led to petitioner’s

conviction was signed by a Shasta County District Attorney. (Ex. A to Document 4, at 13.) Cf.

People v. Municipal Court, supra, at 207 (“[h]ad the district attorney approved of or instituted

criminal proceedings . . . we can assume that he would have actively prosecuted the case. . . .)

The record before the court shows that the Shasta County District Attorney “approved,

authorized or concurred in” the filing of the criminal complaint against petitioner and prosecuted

the charges against him. Petitioner’s contention that the state court lacked jurisdiction and,

therefore, that the statute of limitations should not bar this action, is without merit.

For all of the foregoing reasons, respondents’ motion to dismiss should be

granted.

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In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Respondents’ July 27, 2005 motion to dismiss be granted; and 

2. This action be dismissed as barred by the statute of limitations.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised 

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: November 16, 2005.

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stut0059.157

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