Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00170/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00170-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CLINTON J. FORRISTER, JR.,

Petitioner,

v.

JEANNE WOODFORD, DIRECTOR,

Respondent.

 /

1: 05-CV -00170 OWW WMW HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS RE

MOTION TO DISMISS

[Doc. 8]

Petitioner is a prisoner proceeding with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. Section 2254. The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72-302. Respondent moves to dismiss the petition on the

ground that it is barred by the statute of limitations, or, alternatively, on the ground that it is a mixed

petition containing both exhausted and unexhausted claims. Petitioner has not opposed or otherwise

responded to the motion to dismiss.

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a

Petition if it “plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the

Petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule

5 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases state that “an alleged failure to exhaust state remedies may

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be raised by the Attorney General, thus avoiding the necessity of a formal answer as to that ground.”

The Ninth Circuit has referred to a Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss as a request for the Court to

dismiss under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases. See, e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915

F.2d 418, 420 (1991); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602-03 (9 Cir. 1989); Hillery v. Pulley, 533 th

F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12 (E.D. Cal. 1982). Based on the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases

and case law, the Court will review Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to its authority under

Rule 4.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 24, 2000, Petitioner was convicted, following a jury trial, of seven counts of sexrelated crimes. On February 23, 2000, Petitioner was sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment of

nine years, eight months on four of the counts, and an indeterminate sentence of fifteen years to life

on three of the counts.

On July 6, 2000, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the California

Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District (“Court of Appeal”). On April 29, 2002, in an

unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeal remanded the matter for resentencing on one count, and in

all other respects affirmed the judgment.

On June 10, 2002, Petitioner filed a petition for review with the California Supreme Court,

which the court denied on July 31, 2002.

On July 2, 2002, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of mandamus/prohibition with the Court

of Appeal. The Court of Appeal denied the petition on July 3, 2002.

On July 9, 2002, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of mandamus/prohibition/stay with the

California Supreme Court. The court construed this as a second petition for review and denied the

petition July 16, 2002.

On July 30, 2002, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the Kings County

Superior Court. The court denied the petition August 19, 2002.

On August 23, 2002, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the Court of

Appeal. The Court of Appeal denied the petition on September 16, 2002.

On September 19, 2002, Petitioner filed another petition for writ of habeas corpus in Kings

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County Superior Court. The court denied the petition on January 27, 2003.

On October 12, 2002, Petitioner was resentenced.

On April 25, 2003, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the California

Supreme Court. The court denied the petition on February 18, 2004.

On February 8, 2006, Petitioner filed the present petition with this court.

LEGAL STANDARD

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (AEDPA). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of habeas

corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063

(1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 586 th

(1997). The instant petition was filed on February 8, 2005, and thus, it is subject to the provisions of

the AEDPA. 

The AEDPA imposes a one year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a federal

petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, Section 2244, subdivision

(d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending

shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

In most cases, the limitation period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct

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In California, the Supreme Court, intermediate Courts of Appeal, and Superior Courts all have original habeas 1

corpus jurisdiction. See, Nino 183 F.3d at 1006, n. 2 (9 Cir. 1999). Although a Superior Court order denying habeas corpus th

relief is non-appealable, a state prisoner may file a new habeas corpus petition in the Court of Appeal. Id. If the Court of

Appeal denies relief, the petitioner may seek review in the California Supreme Court by way of a petition for review, or may

instead file an original habeas petition in the Supreme Court. See, id. 

review became final. The AEDPA, however, is silent on how the one year limitation period affects

cases where direct review concluded before the enactment of the AEDPA. The Ninth Circuit has

held that if a petitioner whose review ended before the enactment of the AEDPA filed a habeas

corpus petition within one year of the AEDPA’s enactment, the Court should not dismiss the petition

pursuant to § 2244(d)(1). Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283,1286 (9th

Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 899 (1998); Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Kelly), 127 F.3d

782, 784 (9 Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 1395 (1998). In such circumstances, the limitations th

period would begin to run on April 25, 1996. See, Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1245 (9th

Cir. 2001).

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed application

for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward” the one year limitation period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In

Nino v. Galaza, the Ninth Circuit held that the “statute of limitations is tolled from the time the first

state habeas petition is filed until the California Supreme Court rejects the petitioner’s final

collateral challenge.” Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9 Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1 th

1846 (2000); see, also, Taylor v. Lee, 186 F.3d 557 (4th Cir. 1999); Barnett v. Lemaster, 167 F.3d

1321, 1323 (10 Cir. 1999). The Court reasoned that tolling the limitations period during the time a th

petitioner is preparing his petition to file at the next appellate level reinforces the need to present all

claims to the state courts first and will prevent the premature filing of federal petitions out of

concern that the limitation period will end before all claims can be presented to the state supreme

court. Id. at 1005. 

The limitations period is subject to equitable tolling if “extraordinary circumstances beyond

a prisoner’s control” have made it impossible for the petition to be filed on time. Calderon v. U.S.

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Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 541 (9 Cir. 1998), citing Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 th

F.3d 696, 701 (9 Cir. 1996), cert denied, 522 U.S. 814, 118 S.Ct. 60, 139 (1997); Calderon v. th

United States Dist. Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283,1288 (9 Cir.), overruled in part on other grounds th

by, Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530 (9 Cir. 1998) (en banc) (noting that th

"[e]quitable tolling will not be available in most cases, as extensions of time will only be granted if

'extraordinary circumstances' beyond a prisoner's control make it impossible to file a petition on

time"). "When external forces, rather than a petitioner's lack of diligence, account for the failure to

file a timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may be appropriate." Miles v.

Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9 Cir.1999), citing Kelly, 163 F.3d at 541; Beeler, 128 F.3d at

th

1288-1289.

DISCUSSION

Respondent first moves to dismiss this petition on the ground that it is barred by the statute

of limitations. As stated above, Petitioner has not responded to the motion.

Petitioner’s direct review process became final on October 29, 2002, following the expiration

of the ninety-day time period in which he would have had to file his petition for writ of certiorari

with the United States Supreme Court, following the denial of his petition for review in the

California Supreme Court on July 31, 2002. Therefore, pursuant to the one-year statute of

limitations set out in 28 U.S.C. Section 2244(d)(1), the statute of limitations was set to expire on

October 29, 2003. Petitioner did not file the present petition until February 8, 2006. Thus, absent

tolling of the statute of limitations, this petition is untimely.

Statutory Tolling

Petitioner’s petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed with the Superior Court on July 30, 2002

and with the Court of Appeal on August 28, 2002, have no tolling effect because they were filed and

decided before the judgment became final on October 29, 2002. See 28 U.S.C. Section 2244(d)(1).

Petitioner next filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the Superior Court of

September 19, 2002. Because this petition was pending when the statute of limitations period began

running on October 29, 2002, Petitioner is entitled to statutory tolling for the time period beginning

October 29, 2002, through the Superior Court’s denial of his petition on January 27, 2003. Thus, 

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when the superior court denied the petition on January 27, 2003, Petitioner had a full 365 days

remaining on the statutory clock. Thus, the statute was to expire on January 27, 2004. 

On April 25, 2003, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the California

Supreme Court, eighty-eight days after the Superior Court’s denial of his petition on January 27,

2003. The California Supreme Court denied the petition on February 18, 2004. 

Respondent concedes that Petitioner is entitled to statutory tolling for the period from April

25, 2003, to February 18, 2004, while the petition was pending before the California Supreme Court. 

 Respondent argues, however, that Evens v. Chavis, 126 S.Ct. 846, 852 (2006), Petitioner is not

entitled to tolling for the period between January 27, 2003, and April 25, 2003, because he delayed

filing his petition in the California Supreme Court for eighty-eight days after the Superior Court

issued its decision. The court finds it unnecessary to decide this issue.

With the California Supreme Court’s denial of February 18, 2004, the statute of limitations

began running. Petitioner filed the present petition with this court on February 8, 2006. Thus, even

if the eighty-eight days between the denial of Petitioner’s petition by the Superior Court on January

27, 2003 and the filing of his petition with the California Supreme Court on April 27, 2003, are

tolled, Petitioner filed the present petition almost one year after the statute of limitations period

expired. Accordingly, absent equitable tolling, Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus is

untimely and must be dismissed.

Equitable Tolling

Respondent does not address equitable tolling in her motion, and Petitioner has not

responded to the motion. The court has reviewed the petition filed in this case, and can find nothing

in the petition establishing a basis for equitable tolling. That is, nothing in the petition explains why

it was impossible for Petitioner to file this petition on time. If extraordinary circumstances beyond

Petitioner’s control have made it impossible for the petition to be filed on time, Petitioner should

inform the court of those circumstances in his objections to these findings and recommendations. 

See Kelly, 163 F.3d at 541.

In light of the above, the court finds that the present petition for writ of habeas corpus is

barred by the statute of limitations and must be dismissed. It is therefore unnecessary to address

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Respondent’s second contention that this petition must be dismissed as a mixed petition containing

both exhausted and unexhausted claims.

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Respondent’s motion to

dismiss be GRANTED and that this petition for writ of habeas corpus be DISMISSED as barred by

the statute of limitations.

These Findings and Recommendation are submitted to the assigned United States District

Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of the

Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within

thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with the court

and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate

Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served and filed within

ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the objections. The court will

then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the

District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 9, 2007 /s/ William M. Wunderlich 

mmkd34 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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