Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00022/USCOURTS-casd-3_07-cv-00022-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GABRIEL JOHN BRADWAY,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 07cv0022 – IEG (POR)

ORDER:

(1) ADOPTING THE

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT

(Doc. No. 9);

(2) REJECTING PETITIONER’S

OBJECTIONS (Doc. No. 11); 

(3) DENYING THE PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

(Doc. No. 1); and

(4) ISSUING CERTIFICATE OF

APPEALABILITY.

vs.

JAMES E. TILTON, Secretary, et al.,

Respondents.

On January 3, 2007, petitioner Gabriel John Bradway, a state prisoner proceeding through

counsel, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his

February, 2004 conviction for first degree murder with the special circumstance of lying in wait.

(Doc. No. 1.) This matter was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Louisa S. Porter pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). On October 31, 2007, Magistrate Judge Porter issued a Report and

Recommendation (“Report”) recommending the Court deny the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Petitioner filed objections to the Report on December 3, 2007. (Doc. No. 27.) 

Following de novo review of petitioner’s claim, the Court finds Magistrate Judge Porter’s

Report to be thorough, complete, and an accurate analysis of the legal issues presented in the petition.

Case 3:07-cv-00022-IEG-POR Document 13 Filed 02/15/08 Page 1 of 7
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For the reasons explained below, the Court: (1) adopts in full Magistrate Judge Porter’s Report; (2)

rejects the petitioner’s objections, (3) denies the petition for writ of habeas corpus, and (4) issues a

certificate of appealability. 

BACKGROUND

State Proceedings

The Court hereby incorporates by reference the magistrate judge’s accurate recitation of the

facts as determined by the California Court of Appeal. (Report at 2-5.) As the magistrate judge

correctly noted, the Court presumes state court findings of fact to be correct. In summary,

petitioner planned to kill his friend Julie Kelin for about a month. He arranged, as a ruse, to go to

Kelin’s apartment to pick up his pager, but his real reason was to kill her. Petitioner sawed off the

handle of a sledgehammer so he could hide it in his waistband, concealed it, and went to her

apartment at a time petitioner knew Kelin’s daughter would be at school. Kelin let him in and

petitioner was nice to her so that she would be comfortable. Then, when Kelin kneeled to place

paper in her printer, petitioner caught her by surprise, hitting her on the head several times with his

hammer. When Kelin fought back, petitioner threw her on the bed and strangled her with both of

his hands and a telephone cord. After being arrested on the day of the murder, petitioner confessed

in full. His video-taped confession was played to the jury, and the defense presented no testimony

at trial. 

On November 16, 2001, petitioner was charged with first degree murder in violation of

California Penal Code Section 187(a). (Lodgment No. 2 at 1-3.) The complaint also alleged

petitioner used a deadly weapon (a sledgehammer) in the commission of the murder within the

meaning of California Penal Code Section 12022(b)(1), and alleged the murder was committed by

means of lying in wait within the meaning of California Penal Code Section 190.2(a)(15). Id.

On May 24, 2002, the trial court granted petitioner’s motion to dismiss the lying-in-wait

allegation, finding the allegation unconstitutionally vague. A divided panel of the California Court

of Appeal reversed in a published opinion dated January 16, 2003. People v. Superior Court

(Bradway), 105 Cal. App. 4th 297, 309-11 (2003) (hereinafter Bradway). Petitioner filed a petition

for review in the California Supreme Court, which denied the petition over the dissent of three

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Justices who would have granted review. (Lodgments 3 & 4). 

On February 4, 2004, a jury found petitioner guilty of first degree murder. (Lodgment No. 1

at 405-06.) The jury also found true the allegations petitioner personally used a deadly weapon and

killed the victim by means of lying in wait. (Id.) On April 1, 2004, petitioner was sentenced to life

imprisonment without the possibility of parole plus one year. (Id. at 444.)

Petitioner appealed and the California Court of Appeal affirmed his conviction in an

unpublished opinion. (Lodgment No. 8.) Petitioner filed a petition for review with the California

Supreme Court which was denied on January 4, 2006. 

Federal Proceedings

Petitioner filed a timely petition for writ of habeas corpus on January 3, 2007, alleging the

single claim that California’s lying in wait special circumstance is unconstitutionally vague. (Doc.

No. 1.) After an extension of time, respondent filed an answer on May 9, 2007. (Doc. No. 6.) On

June 8, 2007, petitioner filed a traverse. (Doc. No. 7.) Magistrate Judge Porter issued a Report on

October 31, 2007 (Doc. No. 9), and on December 3, 2007, petitioner filed objections (Doc. No. 11).

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standards

The magistrate judge set forth the appropriate standard of review with regard to the petition. 

(Report at 5-7.) Where, as here, the California Supreme Court summarily denied petitioner’s

request for review, the Court analyzes the California Court of Appeal’s opinion as the “last

reasoned decision” on the merits of petitioner’s case. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04

(1991); Medina v. Hornung, 386 F.3d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 2004). A petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254

can be granted only if the California courts decided petitioner’s case in a manner that was either

“contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or “based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.” 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 403, 412-13 (2000). 

The Court reviews de novo those portions of the Report to which petitioner objects. 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Holder v. Holder, 392 F.3d 1009, 1022 (9th Cir. 2004). 

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B. Standing

Neither party has objected to the magistrate judge’s recommendation the Court find

petitioner has standing to raise his due process claim. (Report at 7.) Accordingly, the Court adopts

the Report in this regard. 

C. Due Process Claim

Petitioner’s Claim

Under California law, murder perpetrated by means of “lying in wait” is one type of first

degree murder. Calif. Penal Code § 189. California law also defines “special circumstances” in

which the penalty for first degree murder is “death or imprisonment in the state prison for life

without the possibility of parole.” Id. § 190.2(a). One such special circumstance applies when

“[t]he defendant killed the victim by means of lying in wait.” Id. § 190.2(a)(15). Petitioner was

convicted of first degree murder by lying in wait and the jury also found the special circumstance of

lying in wait to be true. Accordingly, petitioner was sentenced to life without the possibility of

parole rather than twenty-five years to life. Petitioner argues his conviction violates the due

process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because California’s special circumstance of “lying in

wait” is materially indistinguishable from the “lying in wait” element of first-degree murder. 

The California Court of Appeal rejected petitioner’s argument on the merits in an

interlocutory appeal. Bradway, 105 Cal. App. 4th at 297. The appellate court held the special

circumstance of “lying in wait” requires intent to kill, but the element of “lying in wait” does not. 

Id. at 309-10. The appellate court further held petitioner’s vagueness challenge failed when

evaluated in light of the facts of his case. Id. at 309 (citing Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356,

361-62 (1988)). The court found the facts showed:

Bradway decided to kill his victim, established a ruse to take her by surprise,

prepared a weapon he could conceal when he went to her home under the ruse,

where he watched and waited for an opportune time to strike his unsuspecting victim

from a position of advantage, and when she kneeled on the floor with her back to

him, did so strike her according to his plan. 

Id. Given these facts, the court found the statute was not vague as applied to petitioner, because

“[a]ny reasonable person considering [petitioner]’s conduct, or planning similar acts, would know

that those acts constituted murder by means of lying in wait and that the special circumstance could

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be alleged if the person in addition specifically intended to kill his victim by such means.” Id. at

310. 

Petitioner argues the Court of Appeal’s decision is contrary to clearly-established federal

law as interpreted by the Ninth Circuit in Houston v. Roe, 177 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 1999). In

Houston, the Ninth Circuit upheld California’s special circumstance of “lying in wait” against a

state prisoner’s vagueness challenge in his habeas petition. The court found the special

circumstance was not void for vagueness because of the “thin but meaningfully distinguishable line

between first degree murder lying in wait and special circumstances lying in wait.” Id. at 907. The

court interpreted the special circumstance to require the lying in wait to directly lead to the murder,

a requirement not existing in the first degree murder element of lying in wait. Id. California voters,

however, removed this temporal requirement from the special circumstance allegation by voter

initiative in 2000. Petitioner argues the thin distinction approved by Houston has now been

removed and the intent distinction identified by the appellate court in petitioner’s case is not

meaningful. Petitioner argues intent to kill is required for the “lying in wait” element of first

degree murder, and prosecutors always argue intent to kill can be inferred from lying in wait. In

petitioner’s view, this identity between the “lying in wait” definitions gives prosecutors unfettered

discretion in deciding whether to charge the special circumstance of lying in wait and thus increase

the penalty from life with parole to life without the possibility of parole. 

The Magistrate Judge’s Report

The magistrate judge correctly identified the clearly-established federal law. The Due

Process Clause requires “that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness

that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not

encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357

(1983); see also Houston v. Roe, 177 F.3d 901, 907 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Kolender). In cases

not involving First Amendment interests, “[o]bjections to vagueness under the Due Process Clause

rest on the lack of notice, and hence may be overcome in any specific case where reasonable

persons would know that their conduct is at risk.” Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 361-62

(1988). 

As the magistrate judge found, to establish a violation of the Due Process Clause at

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1

Because petitioner was not sentenced to death, he may not challenge the law under the Eighth

Amendment. Houston v. Roe, 177 F.3d 901, 907 (9th Cir. 1999). The Eighth Amendment requires

laws imposing the death penalty to provide a “meaningful basis for distinguishing”capital and noncapital cases. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976). Sentencing procedures may not “create

a substantial risk that the punishment will be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious matter.” Godfrey

v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980). 

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petitioner’s trial, petitioner must show a reasonable person would not have known his conduct was

at risk of being charged as first degree murder with the special circumstance of “lying in wait.” 

Because petitioner did intend to kill Kelin, as stated in his confession and found to be true by the

jury and the appellate court, a reasonable person pursuing his course of conduct would have

received adequate notice the special circumstance applies to him.

Petitioner’s Objections

Petitioner objects that his as-applied challenge should nevertheless succeed because the

statute creates too much prosecutorial discretion and enables arbitrary and discriminatory

enforcement. (Objections at 3.) Petitioner cites Kolender, in which the Court stated “actual

notice” is less important than “the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to

govern law enforcement.” 461 U.S. at 357. The Court explained its “concern here is based upon

the ‘potential for arbitrarily suppressing First Amendment liberties.’” Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358

(internal citations omitted). 

In this case, the state court did not unreasonably apply clearly-established federal law in

focusing on lack of notice, rather than curbing prosecutorial discretion. After deciding Kolender,

the Supreme Court reaffirmed that outside the First Amendment context, cases must be evaluated

based on their facts, and “[o]bjections to vagueness under the Due Process Clause rest on the lack

of notice.” Maynard, 486 U.S. at 361-62. In applying Maynard, rather than Kolender, to

petitioner’s non-First Amendment case, the state court thus acted in accordance with federal law.1

See also United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 92-93 (1975) (holding statute was not void for

vagueness because it gave defendant adequate warning); Alderman v. S.E.C., 104 F.3d 285, 289

(9th Cir. 1997) (rejecting vagueness challenge under due process clause where reasonable persons

would know conduct is at risk). 

//

//

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D. Certificate of Appealability

The magistrate judge recommended the Court issue a certificate of appealability because

reasonable jurists can disagree about the application of the void-for-vagueness doctrine to

California’s lying in wait special circumstance. In petitioner’s case, Judge McDonald dissented

from the Court of Appeal’s decision and three justices of the California Supreme Court dissented

from that court’s denial of review. Bradway, 105 Cal. App. 4th at 311-14. The Court agrees with

the magistrate judge that petitioner has shown the issue is debatable among jurists of reason. 

Lambright v. Stewart, 220 F.3d 1022, 1024-25 (9th Cir. 2000). 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court (1) ADOPTS the magistrate judge’s Report in its

entirety; (2) REJECTS petitioner’s objections; (3) DENIES the petition for writ of habeas corpus,

and (4) ISSUES a certificate of appealability. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 15, 2008

IRMA E. GONZALEZ, Chief Judge

United States District Court

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