Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00709/USCOURTS-casd-3_14-cv-00709-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHAEL LERAY HERNDON,

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 14cv709-GPC(PCL)

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS

[Dkt. No. 23.]

v.

IMPERIAL COUNTY,

CALIFORNIA, by and through its

Board of Supervisors; CALIPATRIA

STATE PRISON; J. JANDA; FRANK

X CHAVEZ; W.L. MONTGOMERY;

JAMES HATFIELD; H.L. DRAKE;

B.W. BARGANIER; C. IMADA,

D.W. BELL; A. LARA; R. HOPPER;

S. ANDERSEN; JEFFREY A.

BEARD; DOES 1 THROUGH 100,

Defendant.

Plaintiff Michael Leray Herndon (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner proceeding with

counsel, filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his rights

to equal protection and due process and violations of the Eighth Amendment right to

be free from cruel and unusual punishment, and conspiracy to interfere and failure to

prevent a conspiracy. (Dkt. No. 1.) He also alleges a state law violation based on the

failure to adequately train and supervise deputies. (Id.) 

On February 3, 2016, Defendants A. Lara, J. Hatfield, H. Drake, W.

Montgomery, F. Chavez and Calipatria State Prison filed a motion to dismiss. (Dkt.

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No. 23.) An opposition wasfiled on March 11, 2016. (Dkt. No. 28.) A reply wasfiled

on March 18, 2016. (Dkt. No. 29.) On August 11, 2016, the Magistrate Judge filed a

report and recommendation granting in part and denying in part Defendants A. Lara,

J. Hatfield, H. Drake, W. Montomery, F. Chavez and Calipatria State Prison’s motion

to dismiss. (Dkt. No. 32.) No objections were filed. After a careful review of the

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briefing, supporting documentation and the applicable law, the Court ADOPTS the

report and recommendation and GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure

to state a claim. 

Procedural Background

On March 27, 2014, Plaintifffiled a complaint against numerous Defendants for

constitutional violations under 42. U.S.C. § 1983 and related state law claim. (Dkt. No.

1.) Plaintiff failed to serve the defendants in this case and on August 29, 2014, the

Court held an order to show cause hearing. (Dkt. No. 6.) At the hearing, Plaintiff’s

counsel indicated he was in settlement negotiations and requested additional time to

serve the defendants which the Court granted. (Id.) The Court also set a follow up

hearing on October 31, 2014. (Id.) At the October 31, 2014 hearing, Plaintiff’s

counsel did not appear and the complaint had not yet been served. (Dkt. No. 7.) 

Therefore, the Court dismissed the case without prejudice for failing to timely serve the

defendants. (Id.) Almost a year later, on October 30, 2015, Plaintiff filed a motion

to set aside judgment or relief from judgment. (Dkt. No. 9.) On January 4, 2016, the

Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for relief and ordered that Plaintiffserve the complaint

within ten days. (Id. ¶ 10.) The moving Defendants, A. Lara, J. Hatfield, H. Drake, W.

Montomery, F. Chavez and Calipatria State Prison, were served as well as non-moving

Defendants C. Imada and B. Bargainer. (Dkt. Nos. 13-21.) The docket does not reflect

that Defendants J. Janda, D. Bell, R. Hopper, and J. Beard were served. 

/ / / /

While the Magistrate Judge’s order recommended granting in part and denying

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in part Defendants’ motion to dismiss, in fact, the order recommends dismissing the

Complaint. 

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Factual Background

Plaintiff is an inmate housed at Calipatria State Prison. (Dkt. No. 1, Compl. ¶

4.) According to the Complaint, J. Janda was the warden of Calipatria State Prison; F.

Chavez was the Chief Deputy Warden, and W. Montgomery is currently the warden of

Calipatria State Prison. (Id. ¶¶ 7, 8, 9.) The Complaint also alleges that H. Drake was

the Senior Hearing Office (“SHO”) at Calipatria State Prison who heard Plaintiff’s

Rules Violations Report (“RVR”) 115 hearing and found him guilty of the RVR; B.

Bargainer is a Correctional Officer (“CO”) who was the Housing Unit C3 Control

Officer where Plaintiff was housed at the time of the incident; J. Hatfield is a

Correctional Lieutenant and charged Plaintiff with attempted homicide despite the facts

and witness statements which violatedCDCR procedure and training regarding “Crime

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Scene and Evidence Preservation.” (Id. ¶¶ 10, 11, 12.) Hatfield also prepared and

signed an inaccurate RVR 115 against Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 12.) 

C. Imada is a Correctional Sergeant who was the Incident Commander at the

time of the incident and investigation, and allegedly violated CDCR procedure and

training regarding “Crime Scene and Evidence Preservation.” (Id. ¶ 13.) Defendant D.

Bell is Facility Captain; A. Lara is a Correctional Sergeant at the time of the incident

and investigation; R. Hopper is Correctional Lieutenant at Calipatria, and J. Beard was

the Secretary of the CDCR. (Id. ¶¶ 14, 15, 16, 17.)

In reciting the factual allegations, the Magistrate Judge pieced together what

happened through the administrative record attached to the Complaint. (Dkt. No. 32

at 2-4 & n. 2.) 

Plaintiff alleges that on February 26, 2013, Defendant B. Bargainer

(“Bargainer”), a Control Booth Officer at Calipatria, released Plaintiff from the “lower

A section” of the prison shower to return to his cell for standing count. (Dkt. No. 1,

Compl., Ex. A at 15.) At the same time, an inmate in cell C3-101 requested to be

released from his cell for medical treatment of an established knee injury. (Id. at 17.) 

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation

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An altercation involving Plaintiff and the two occupants of cell 101 ensued which

resulted in serious injuries to all three inmates and required transport to the hospital. 

(Id.) 

According to Plaintiff, contrary to CDCR policy, Bargainer did not sent a floor

staff to cell 101 to verify the inmate’s request but instead released the inmate at

institutional count time for a non serious or non-life threatening injury. (Id.) Two

inmate-produced weapons were found at the scene of the attack. (Id., Ex. B. at 20.) 

Plaintiff alleges he suffers froma permanent injury to his left thumb and chest. (Id., Ex.

A at 17.) He claims that Bargainer violated his Eighth Amendment right by failing to

protect him from serious injury. (Id.)

After the incident, Lieutenant J. Hatfield (“Hatfield”), Bargainer’s supervisor,

issued Plaintiff a Rules Violation Report (“RVR”) to “cover up” Bargainer’s violation

of CDCR policy. (Id.) In fact, Supervisor Sergeant C. Imada (“Imada”) acknowledged

that Bargainer did not follow proper procedure. (Id.) Hatfield also investigated

Bargainer’s alleged misconduct. (Id. at 18.) 

Plaintiff also alleges multiple due process violations during the different stages

of the RVR process. (Id., Ex. C at 27-28.) He claims that the RVR for attempted

homicide or the lesser offense of battery on an inmate with weapon should never have

been issued against him. (Id. at 27-28.) In addition, the investigation of the charge was

unfair and not properly carried out because the Investigative Employee did not question

all of the staff and inmate witnesses, the Senior Hearing Officer (“SHO”) did not

follow due process guidelines and took over 70 days to complete the review process

hindering his ability to timely appeal his ad seg placement, the SHO did not indicate

in the final copy that a hearing was held on June 4 and 5, 2013 and he omitted

questions Plaintiff posed to Bargainer and Imada during their testimony. (Id. at 28.) 

Plaintiff alleges causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his

equal protection and due process rights, cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth

Amendment and conspiracy to interfere and failure to prevent a conspiracy. (Dkt. No.

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1.) The Complaint also alleges failure to adequately train and supervise deputies. (Id.) 

A. Standard of Review

The district court “shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the

report . . . to which objection is made,” and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or

in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1). When no objections are filed, a district court may assume the correctness

of the magistrate judge’s findings of fact and decide the motion on the applicable law.

Campbell v. U.S. Dist. Court, 501 F.2d 196, 206 (9th Cir. 1974); Johnson v. Nelson,

142 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1217 (S.D. Cal. 2001). see also United States v. Raddatz, 447

U.S. 667, 676 (1980); United States v. Remsing, 874 F.2d 614, 617 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Under such circumstances, the Ninth Circuit has held that a failure to file objections

only relieves the trial court of its burden to give de novo review to factual findings;

conclusions of law must still be reviewed de novo. Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d 1143,

1147 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Here, Plaintiff did not file an objection as to the recommendation that the Court

grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the Court may “assume the

correctness of the magistrate judge’s findings of fact and decide the motion on the

applicable law.” See Campbell, 501 F.2d at 206. 

B. Legal Standard on Motion to Dismiss 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) permits dismissal for “failure

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Dismissal

under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory

orsufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police

Dep’t., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

8(a)(2), the plaintiff is required only to set forth a “short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” and “give the defendant fair notice

of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A motion to dismiss should be granted if plaintiff

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fails to proffer “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id.

at 570. 

A complaint may survive a motion to dismiss only if, taking all well-pleaded

factual allegations as true, it contains enough facts to “state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, --- U.S. ----, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “While legal conclusions can provide the

framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Id. at 1950. 

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Id. at 1949. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. “In sum, for a complaint

to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory factual content, and reasonable

inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the

plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009)

(quotations omitted). In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court accepts as true

all facts alleged in the complaint, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the

plaintiff. al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 956 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Where a motion to dismiss is granted, “leave to amend should be granted ‘unless

the court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged

pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.’” DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc.,

957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well

Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986)). In other words, where leave to

amend would be futile, the Court may deny leave to amend. See Desoto, 957 F.2d at

658; Schreiber, 806 F.2d at 1401. 

C. Analysis

Here, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has only provided summary allegations and

failed to set forth specific factual allegations regarding each Defendants’ involvement

in the constitutional violation. Plaintiff disagrees. 

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The Court finds that the Complaint is devoid of any facts to support the

numerous causes of action Plaintiff asserts. Plaintiff has clearly failed to comply with

Rule 8 which requiresthat he provide a “short and plain statement of the claimshowing

that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “A plaintiff’s obligation

to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not

do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (2007) (internal citations omitted). “Factual

allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .”

Id. (citation omitted). In this case, Plaintiff fails to comply with Rule 8 because no

factual allegations concerning the incident are plead in the Complaint. As such, the

Complaint is devoid of facts to support any cause of action and the Court GRANTS

Defendants’ motion to dismiss all causes of action. 

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As noted above, the Magistrate Judge pieced together the factual allegations

based on the administrative record that is attached to the Complaint. Alternatively,

even if the Court were to consider the factual allegations extracted from the

administrative record, those facts are not sufficient to state a claim. 

1. Equal Protection

“The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands that no

State shall ‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,’

which is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated

alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). “To state

a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment a plaintiff must show that the defendants acted with an intent

or purpose to discriminate against the plaintiff based upon membership in a protected

class.” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation

While Defendants move to dismiss the entire Complaint, they have not moved 3

to dismiss the state law claim of failure to adequately train and supervise deputies. 

Despite this omission, the Court dismisses the Complaint for failure to allege any facts

about the incident that give rise to Plaintiff’s claims. 

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omitted).

If plaintiff does not allege membership in a class or group, he can assert an equal

protection claim based on a “class of one” by demonstrating that he has “been

intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no

rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Squaw Valley Dev. Co. v. Goldberg,

375 F.3d 936, 944 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Here, on reviewing the Complaint and attached exhibits, it is not clear which

theory of equal protection Plaintiff seeks to assert a claim and no facts are alleged to

support any theory of equal protection. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state an equal

protection cause of action. 

2. Eighth Amendment Failure to Protect 

The Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to “take reasonable measures

to guarantee the safety of the inmates.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27

(1984). This imposes a duty on prison officials to “protect prisoners from violence at

the hands of other prisoners.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994) (citations

omitted); Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2005). The Ninth Circuit

has held that the “failure of prison officials to protect inmates from attacks by other

inmates may rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation when: (1) the

deprivation alleged is‘objectively, sufficiently serious’ and (2) the prison officials had

a ‘sufficiently culpable state of mind,’ acting with deliberate indifference.” Hearns,

413 F.3d at 1040 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 83). “[D]eliberate indifference entails

something more than mere negligence . . . [but] is satisfied by something less than acts

or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will

result.” Id.

Although the moving defendants argue that the Eighth Amendment claim does

not state a claim, it appears that Plaintiff is alleging an Eighth Amendment claim

against Bargainer for failing to protect him, (Dkt. No. 1, Compl. Ex. A. at 17). 

Bargainer, while having been served, has not filed a motion to dismiss. Nevertheless,

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Plaintiff has not alleged facts that Bargainer’s failure to protect him rises to an Eighth

Amendment violation. 

3. Due Process

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“The requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of

interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty and

property.” Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). State law can provide

a prisoner liberty interests sufficient to invoke due process protections. Meachum v.

Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 226-27 (1976). 

In Sandin, the United States Supreme Court held that whether a state has created

a liberty interest is determined by focusing on the nature of the deprivation. Sandin v.

Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). A prisoner can show a liberty interest under the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment only if he alleges a change in

confinement that imposes an “atypical and significant hardship . . . in relation to the

ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 484 (citations omitted). In Sandin, the

Supreme Court considered three factors in determining whether the plaintiff possessed

a liberty interest in avoiding disciplinary segregation: “1) whether the challenged

condition ‘mirrored those conditions imposed upon inmates in administrative

segregation and protective custody,’ and thus comported with the prison’s discretionary

authority; 2) the duration of the condition, and the degree of restraint imposed; and 3)

whether the state’s action will invariably affect the duration ofthe prisoner’s sentence.” 

Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 861 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486-

87). 

Once a protected liberty interest is established, the Court next determines

Defendant argues that it appears that Plaintiff is alleging his procedural due

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process rights were violated during the disciplinary hearing. The Complaint alleges

“Defendants, jointly and severally, engaged in a course of conduct that resulted in the

violation of the Plaintiff’s . . . .right to procedural and substantive due process of the

law pursuant to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendmentsto the Constitution of the United

States of America.” (Dkt. No. 1, Compl. ¶ 28.) Based on this allegation, it is not clear

whether Plaintiff is alleging a substantive due process claim. If Plaintiff files an

amended complaint, he must clarify whether he seeks to allege a procedural and/or

substantive due process claim. 

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whether the plaintiff was provided all the process due under Wolff v. McDonnell, 418

U.S. 539, 556 (1974). “Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal

prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does

not apply.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556. In prison disciplinary proceedings, the minimum

requirements of due process include written notice of the claimed violation, at least 24

hours notice before the hearing, “a written statement of the factfinders as to the

evidence relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary action taken”, an opportunity

to “call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense when permitting

him to do so will not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals”

and if an inmate is illiterate or the issues are complex, an inmate should have the

opportunity to seek staff or inmate assistance. Id. at 563, 566, 570. 

In this case, Plaintiff has failed to allege or identify a liberty interest to invoke

the protections of the due process clause. Accordingly, on this threshold issue, the

procedural due process claim fails to state a claim. 

4. Conspiracy to Interfere with Civil Rights, 42 U.S.C. § 19855

To recover under § 1985, a plaintiff must prove: “(1) a conspiracy; (2) to deprive

any person or a class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal

privileges and immunities under the laws; (3) an act by one of the conspirators in

furtherance of the conspiracy; and (4) a personal injury, property damage, or a

deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States.” Gillespie v.

Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 641 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S.

88, 102-103 (1971)). To deprive any person or a class of persons of the equal

protection of the laws, or of equal privileges or immunities under the laws “there must

be some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus

behind the conspirators’ action.” Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102. “The conspiracy, in other

words, must aim at a deprivation of the equal enjoyment of rights secured by the law

TheComplaint also alleges an action for neglect orfailing to prevent conspiracy 5

under 42 U.S.C. § 1986. However, Defendants do not move to dismiss this cause of

action. 

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to all.” Id. 

In addition, “[a] claim under [§ 1985] must allege facts to support the allegation

that defendants conspired together.” Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839

F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988). “A mere allegation of conspiracy without factual

specificity is insufficient.” Id. To be liable, each participant in the conspiracy must

share the common objective of the conspiracy. United StatesSteelworks of Am. v.

Phelps Dodge Corp., 865 F.2d 1539, 1540-1541 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc). 

In this case, Plaintiff improperly presents a summary formulaic recitation of the

cause of action and does not allege any racial or class based discriminatory animus

behind the conspirators’ action. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Moreover, facts are

not sufficiently plead to state a claim of conspiracy under § 1985. 

In sum, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Complaint. 

D. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Defendants also argue that they are immune from liability in their official

capacities under the Eleventh Amendment. Plaintiff disagrees. 

The Eleventh Amendment bars a plaintiff from bringing damages claims in

federal court against state officials in their official capacities, but not in their personal

capacities. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); Hafer v.

Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 31 (1991). 

Here, Plaintiffseeks monetary damages against Defendants in their personal and

official capacities. To the extent Plaintiff seeks damages against Defendants in their

official capacity, they are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and the Court GRANTS

Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages against them

in their official capacities. 

D. Calipatria State Prison

Defendants further argue that Calipatria State Prison is immune pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) & (iii) because it is not a “person” subject to suit but is

entitled to absolute immunity frommonetary damages under the Eleventh Amendment.

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A state prison, which is an arm of the state government, is not a “person” subject

to suit under § 1983. Allison v. California Adult Auth., 419 F.2d 822, 822-23 (9th Cir.

1969); see Hale v. State of Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1398-99 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding

that a state department of corrections is an arm of the state, and thus, not a “person”

within the meaning of § 1983); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978) (per

curiam) (“There can be no doubt . . . that [a] suit against the State and its Board of

Corrections is barred by the Eleventh Amendment, unless [the State] has consented to

the filing of such a suit.”). 

Plaintiff has not alleged that California has consented to the filing of this suit.

Thus, the Court concludes that any claims against Calipatria State Prison must be

dismissed pursuant to both 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b) for both failing to

state a claim and for seeking damages. Therefore, the Court GRANTS Defendants’

motion to dismiss Calipatria State Prison. 

E. Exhaustion

Defendants finally argue that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust certain claims

because it is clear on the face of the complaint that he did not exhaust; therefore,

exhaustion may be raised in a motion to dismiss and not on a motion for summary

judgment. They contend that Plaintiff’s inmate appeal does not mirror the allegations

in the Complaint and therefore, his claims are not exhausted. According to Defendants,

the allegations and facts alleged in the inmate appeals attached to the Complaint are

limited to Defendants Bargainer, Hatfield, Imada, Drake; therefore only those claims

are exhausted and the claims against Defendants Lara, Chavez, and Montgomery are

unexhausted. Plaintiff alleges he alleged exhaustion in the Complaint which are

supported by the exhibits attached to the Complaint. 

Recently, the Ninth Circuit overruled Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir.

2003) and held that exhaustion should be raised either through (1) a motion to dismiss

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), in the rare occasion that failure to exhaust is clear on the

face of the complaint; or (2) a motion for summary judgment. Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d

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1162, 1168-69 (9th Cir. 2014). An unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion, as held in Wyatt,

is no longer the procedural method to raise the exhaustion issue. Id. 

Contrary to Defendants’ argument, it is not clear from the face of the complaint

that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies because determining

exhaustion will require a review of the attached exhibits to the Complaint. Moreover,

as stated above, Plaintiff does not provide any facts in the Complaint to support his

allegations; therefore, a determination of exhaustion is not possible. Accordingly, the

Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust. 

F. Failure to Serve Remaining Defendants

While Defendants do not move to dismiss based on failing to serve certain

defendants, the Magistrate Judge recommends dismissing the unserved Defendants. 

In their motion, Defendants state that Defendants Bargainer, Beard, Bell, Hopper, 

Imada, Janda, and Imperial County have not yet been served. (Dkt. No. 23-1 at 8 n.1.)

However, the docketshowsthat Defendants Bargainer and Imada were served and that

the County of Imperial has been dismissed from the case. (Dkt. Nos. 17, 18, 26.) 

Therefore, the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation of dismissal for failing to

serve and comply with the Court’s order to serve would apply only to the unserved

defendants who appear to be Defendants Beard, Bell, Hopper and Janda. Because the

Court dismisses the complaint and is granting Plaintiff leave to file an amended

complaint, the service issue is now moot. However, the Court admonishes Plaintiffthat

if he files an amended complaint, he must also timely comply with service of the

amended complaint or the unserved defendants will be subject to dismissal. 

G. Leave to Amend

Leave to amend, whether or not requested by the plaintiff, should be granted

unless amendment would be futile. Schreiber Distrib. Co., 806 F.2d at 1401. While

Plaintiff does not seek leave to amend, the Court concludes that it would not be futile

to allow leave to amend and GRANTS Plaintiff leave to amend the complaint. See id.

/ / / /

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Conclusion

Based on the above, the Court ADOPTS the report and recommendation and

GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Complaint.

Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint within 20 days of the

filing of this order. Plaintiff’s counsel is warned that this will be Plaintiff’s last

opportunity to amend the complaint. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint

within the prescribed deadline, the Complaint will be subject to dismissal. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: September 22, 2016

HON. GONZALO P. CURIEL

United States District Judge

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