Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-00239/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-00239-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CLEMENT BROWN, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

KEN CLARK, )

)

Respondent. )

 )

1:09-CV-00239 AWI JMD HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

OBJECTIONS DUE WITHIN THIRTY (30)

DAYS

Clement Brown (hereinafter “Petitioner”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition

for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation pursuant to a 1985 conviction for first degree murder. The trial court sentenced

Petitioner to a term of twenty-six years to life in prison. Petitioner is not challenging his conviction

in this instant action; rather, Petitioner challenges the decision by the California Board of Parole

Hearings (the “Board”), whom he appeared before on January 24, 2008, to deny him parole. 

Petitioner contends that the Board violated his constitutional rights when they denied him parole. 

On May 30, 2008, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the Orange

County Superior Court challenging the Board’s denial of parole. (See Resp’t Answer Ex. A. ) The 1

Superior Court issued a reasoned opinion denying the petition on June 27, 2008. (See Resp’t Ex. B.) 

While Respondent refers to numerically labeled exhibits in Respondent’s Answer, Respondent actually labeled the

1

exhibits alphabetically; the Court refers to the exhibits as they are labeled.

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Petitioner also filed petitions for writ of habeas corpus with the California Court of Appeal

and the California Supreme Court. (Resp’t Answer Exs. C, E.) On September 17, 2008, the

California Court of Appeal summarily denied the habeas petition. (See Resp’t Ex. D.) The

California Supreme Court issued a summary denial on November 12, 2008. (See Resp’t Ex. F.) 2

On February 6, 2009, Petitioner filed the instant federal petition for writ of habeas corpus.3

Respondent filed a response to the petition on June 22, 2009 and Petitioner filed a traverse on

July 27, 2009. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND4

The Orange County Superior Court recited the facts of the commitment offense, stating:

During the early evening hours of February 6, 1985, petitioner agreed to participate in

his girlfriend’s plan to burglarize an apartment and rob its occupants of cocaine. 

Petitioner armed himself with a sawed off shot gun and recruited his brother in law

for this caper. The three assailants gained entry into the apartment and proceeded to

take money from the occupants at gunpoint. A fight ensued after one of the

apartment’s occupants grabbed petitioner’s shot gun. During the ensuing scuffle,

petitioner and the victim fought over possession of a butcher’s knife found in the

kitchen. Petitioner gained control of the knife and fatally stabbed the victim twice in

the chest and once in the head. The point of the knife broke off in the victim’s skull. 

Another occupant in the apartment sustained a severe cut to his arm. All three

assailants fled in petitioner’s vehicle taking with them about $700 and some cocaine. 

During their escape, the assailants stopped to buy beer at a convenience store.

(Answer Ex. B, Op. Super. Ct. Orange County, at 2-3.) 

The Superior Court’s summary of the offense is supported by the record of the parole

hearing. (Tr. Parole Hearing at 12-13.) 

DISCUSSION

I. Jurisdiction

A person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court may petition a district court for

relief by way of a writ of habeas corpus if the custody is in violation of the Constitution, laws, or

Respondent admits that Petitioner has exhausted his state court remedies. (Resp’t Answer at 3.)

2

Respondent admits that the petition was timely filed. (Resp’t Answer at 4.)

3

These facts are derived from the Orange County Superior Court’s opinion issued on June 27, 2008. (Answer Ex.

4

B.) Pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, a determination of fact by the state court is

presumed to be correct unless Petitioner rebuts that presumption with clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1);

see Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th Cir. 2004); Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 746 n.1 (9th Cir. 2009).

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treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 529

U.S. 362, 375 n.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by

the United States Constitution and Petitioner is currently incarcerated at Corcoran Substance Abuse

Treatment Facility, which is located in Kings County. As Kings County falls within this judicial

district, 28 U.S.C. § 84(b), the Court has jurisdiction over Petitioner’s application for writ of habeas

corpus. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d) (vesting concurrent jurisdiction over application for writ of habeas

corpus to the district court where the petitioner is currently in custody or the district court in which a

State court convicted and sentenced Petitioner if the State “contains two or more Federal judicial

districts”).

II. AEDPA Standard of Review

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for a writ of habeas corpus filed after the statute’s

enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326-327 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499

(9th Cir. 1997). The instant petition was filed after the enactment of the AEDPA and is consequently

governed by its provisions. See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70 (2003). Thus, the instant

petition “may be granted only if [Petitioner] demonstrates that the state court decision denying relief

was ‘contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.’” Irons v. Carey, 505 F.3d 846, 850 (9th Cir.

2007) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)), overruled in part on other grounds, Hayward v. Marshall,

603 F.3d 546, 555 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc); see Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 70-71.

Title 28 of the United States Code, section 2254 remains the exclusive vehicle for

Petitioner’s habeas petition as Petitioner is in the custody of the California Department of

Corrections and Rehabilitation pursuant to a state court judgment. See Sass v. California Board of

Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1126-1127 (9th Cir. 2006) overruled in part on other grounds,

Hayward, 603 F.3d at 555. As a threshold matter, this Court must “first decide what constitutes

‘clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.’” 

Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). In ascertaining what is “clearly

established Federal law,” this Court must look to the “holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the

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Supreme Court's] decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.” Id. (quoting

Williams, 592 U.S. at 412). “In other words, ‘clearly established Federal law’ under § 2254(d)(1) is

the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court

renders its decision.” Id. Finally, this Court must consider whether the state court’s decision was

“contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law.” Lockyer,

538 U.S. at 72, (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). “Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas

court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the

Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court

has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413; see also Lockyer, 538

U.S. at 72. “Under the ‘unreasonable application clause,’ a federal habeas court may grant the writ if

the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court's decisions but

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. 

“[A] federal court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in its independent

judgment that the relevant state court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or

incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. A federal habeas court

making the “unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the State court's application of

clearly established federal law was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409.

Petitioner bears the burden of establishing that the state court’s decision is contrary to or

involved an unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court precedent. Baylor v. Estelle,

94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996). Although only Supreme Court law is binding on the states, Ninth

Circuit precedent remains relevant persuasive authority in determining whether a state court decision

is objectively unreasonable. Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1072 (9th Cir. 2003) (“While only the

Supreme Court’s precedents are binding on the Arizona court, and only those precedents need be

reasonably applied, we may look for guidance to circuit precedents”); Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200

F.3d 597, 600-01 (9th Cir. 1999) (“because of the 1996 AEDPA amendments, it can no longer

reverse a state court decision merely because that decision conflicts with Ninth Circuit precedent on

a federal Constitutional issue....This does not mean that Ninth Circuit caselaw is never relevant to a

habeas case after AEDPA. Our cases may be persuasive authority for purposes of determining

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whether a particular state court decision is an ‘unreasonable application’ of Supreme Court law, and

also may help us determine what law is ‘clearly established’”). Furthermore, the AEDPA requires

that the Court give considerable deference to state court decisions. The state court's factual findings

are presumed correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). A federal habeas court is bound by a state's

interpretation of its own laws. Souch v. Schaivo, 289 F.3d 616, 621 (9th Cir. 2002).

The initial step in applying AEDPA’s standards is to “identify the state court decision that is

appropriate for our review.” Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2005). Where more

than one State court has adjudicated Petitioner’s claims, a federal habeas court analyzes the last

reasoned decision. Id. (citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991) for the presumption that

later unexplained orders, upholding a judgment or rejecting the same claim, rests upon the same

ground as the prior order). Thus, a federal habeas court looks through ambiguous or unexplained

state court decisions to the last reasoned decision to determine whether that decision was contrary to

or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Bailey v. Rae, 339 F.3d 1107,

1112-1113 (9th Cir. 2003). Here, the Orange County Superior Court, the California Court of

Appeal, and the California Supreme Court reached the merits of Petitioner’s claims. As both the

California Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court summarily denied Petitioner’s claims,

the Court looks through those decisions to the last reasoned decision; namely, that of the Orange

County Superior Court. See Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. at 804. 

III. Review of Petitioner’s Claims

The petition for writ of habeas corpus contains two grounds for relief, both implicating

Petitioner’s right to due process of the law. First, Petitioner contends that the Board’s denial of

parole was not support by any evidence. Secondly, Petitioner argues that the Board’s reliance on his

commitment offense was erroneous. 

The Court analyzes Petitioner’s due process claims in two steps: “the first asks whether there

exist a liberty or property interest which has been interfered with by the State; the second examines

whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally sufficient.’” Sass, 461

F.3d at 1127. The United States Constitution does not, by itself, create a protected liberty interest in a

parole date. Jago v. Van Curen, 454 U.S. 14, 17-21 (1981). Respondent argues that Petitioner does

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not have a federally protected liberty interest in parole. (Resp’t Answer at 4.) The Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals has recognized that “[i]f there is any right to be release on parole, or to release in

the absence of some evidence of future dangerousness, it has to arise from substantive state law

creating a right to release.” Hayward, 603 F.3d at 555. The Ninth Circuit further recognized that

“[t]here is no general federal constitutional ‘some evidence’ requirement for denial of parole, in the

absence of state law creating an enforceable right to parole.” Id. at 559. The Hayward court’s

finding, that there exists no free standing federal due process right to parole or the federal right to

some evidence of current dangerousness, contained the consistent and continual caveat that state law

may in fact give rise to federal protection for those rights. As the Ninth Circuit later reiterated, “state

created rights may give rise to liberty interests that may be enforced as a matter of federal law.”

Pearson v. Muntz, 606 F.3d 606, 609 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (citing Wilkinson v. Austin, 545

U.S. 209, 221 (2005)). The Pearson court found that, “Hayward necessarily held that compliance

with state requirement is mandated by federal law, specifically the Due Process Clause” as “[t]he

principle that state law gives rise to liberty interests that may be enforced as a matter of federal law is

long-established.” Id. 

The next question is whether California’s parole scheme gives rise to a liberty interest

enforced as a matter of federal law. The Ninth Circuit has definitively concluded that “California

has created a parole system that independently requires the enforcement of certain procedural and

substantive rights, including the right to parole absent ‘some evidence’ of current dangerousness.” 

Id. at 611 (citing Hayward, 603 F.3d at 562); see also Cooke v. Solis, 606 F.3d 1206, 1213 (9th Cir.

2010) (noting that “California’s ‘some evidence’ requirement is a component of the liberty interest

created by the parole system of that state”). Consequently, the inquiry that a federal habeas court

must undertake in determining whether the denial of parole comports with the requirement of federal

due process is “whether the California judicial decision approving the governor’s [or parole board’s]

decision rejecting parole was an ‘unreasonable application’ of the California ‘some evidence’

requirement, or was ‘based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence.’”

Hayward, 603 F.3d at 563 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2)) (footnotes omitted). 

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A. State Court Decision

Thus, the Court now examines whether the Orange County Superior Court’s decision was an

unreasonable application of the California some evidence standard. The Orange County Superior

Court upheld the Board’s denial, finding that there was some evidence to support the Board’s

findings regarding the commitment offense, Petitioner’s recent institutional misconduct, and

Petitioner’s lack of fully developed parole plans. (Resp’t Answer Ex. B at 2-4.) 

The Court finds the analysis undertaken by the Orange County Superior Court to be an

unreasonable application of the California some evidence standard as articulated by the California

Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. As the Ninth Circuit recently observed in

Cooke:

Under California law, “the paramount consideration for both the Board and the

Governor” must be “whether the inmate currently poses a threat to public safety and

thus may not be released on parole,”[citation], and “the facts relied upon by the Board

or the Governor [must] support the ultimate decision that the inmate remains a threat

to public safety.

Cooke, 606 F.3d at 1214 (quoting In re Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th 1181, 1210, 1213 (2008)); see also

Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 2402(a) (“[I]f in the judgment of the panel the prisoner will pose an

unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from prison,” the prisoner must be found unsuitable

and denied parole). The California Supreme Court held in Lawrence that, “[t]he relevant

determination for the Board and the Governor is, and always has been, an individualized assessment

of the continuing danger and risk to public safety posed by the inmate.” In re Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th.

at 1227 (noting that “mere recitation of the circumstances of the commitment offense, absent

articulation of a rational nexus between those facts and current dangerousness, fails to provide the

required “modicum of evidence” of unsuitability”). In setting forth the standard for federal habeas

courts, the Ninth Circuit reiterated this principle, stating that “a reviewing court must consider

‘whether the identified facts are probative to the central issue of current dangerousness when

considered in light of the full record before the Board or the Governor.’” Cooke, 606 F.3d at 1214

(emphasis in original) (quoting In re Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th at 1221). 

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The Orange County Superior Court’s decision focused exclusively on whether there was

evidence in the record to support the factors relied upon by the Board. The Superior Court’s decision

does not even mention Petitioner’s current dangerousness, much less examine whether there is

evidence to support a finding that Petitioner is currently dangerous. Consequently, the Court finds

the State court’s decision to be an objectively unreasonable application of the California some

evidence standard as the California Supreme Court rejected this very test concluding “that current

dangerousness (rather than the mere presence of a statutory unsuitability factor) is the focus of the

parole decision.” In re Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th at 1210. 

B. Parole Board’s Decision

The finding that the State court’s decision was objectively unreasonable does not end a

federal habeas court’s inquiry. See Butler v. Curry, 528 F.3d 624, 641 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing 28

U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) in noting that a federal habeas court’s finding that state court’s decision is

contrary to established federal law does not end that court’s inquiry). A federal habeas court’s

“power to grant the writ of habeas corpus to a state inmate depends on his actually being ‘in custody

in violation of the Constitution or laws ... of the United States.’” Id. Thus, Petitioner is only entitled

to habeas corpus relief if his due process rights were violated by a lack of evidence supporting the

Board’s denial of parole. 

In its decision denying Petitioner parole, the Board relied only on two factors. The Board

found “[f]irst and foremost” that Petitioner’s prison disciplinary record evidenced that he posed a

current risk of danger to society. (Tr. Parole Hearing at 90.) The Board also relied on the

commitment offense in finding that Petitioner was unsuitable for parole. (Id. at 90-93.) 

The Court find that Petitioner’s disciplinary record while incarcerated provides the modicum

of evidence required under the California some evidence standard. See In re Lawrence, 44 Cal. 4th

at 1226. The Court initially notes that the Board’s reliance on Petitioner’s commitment offense is

erroneous as the record does not contain any factors, such as a lack of insight, that would make the

circumstances of the commitment offense currently probative towards Petitioner’s dangerousness. 

Cf. In re Shaputis, 44 Cal. 4th 1241, 1261 (2008) (holding that a habeas petitioner’s lack of insight

and failure to take responsibility made the circumstance so the commitment offense probative of

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current dangerousness). The commitment offense occurred on February 8, 1985. Petitioner

appeared before the Board on January 24, 2008. Considering the almost twenty three years that had

passed between the commission of the crime and the parole hearing, the Court does not find that the

commitment offense constitutes evidence of Petitioner’s current dangerousness. 

Rather, the Court finds that a modicum of evidence regarding Petitioner’s current

dangerousness can be found in Petitioner’s institutional behavior. Institutional behavior, defined as

“[t]he prisoner has engaged in serious misconduct in prison or jail,” is a circumstance tending to

show parole unsuitability. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(c)(6). In the decision denying Petitioner

parole, the Board expressly relied on Petitioner’s disciplinary record as Petitioner received a total of

six CDC 115’s. (Tr. Parole Hearing at 90, 94.) A CDC 115 documents misconduct believed to be a

violation of law or otherwise not minor in nature. See Cal.Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3312(a)(3); In re

Gray, 151 Cal.App.4th 379, 389 (2007). Here, the fact that Petitioner’s six serious disciplinary

infractions all occurred within the last ten years and two of which occurred during the interval

between Petitioner’s most recent parole hearing and the current hearing is probative of current

dangerousness. (See Tr. Parole Hearing at 74-78.) While Petitioner’s most recent disciplinary

infractions were for possession of contraband and are therefore non-violent, Petitioner’s inability to 5

abide by prison rules evidence that he may not be able to abide by society’s law if released into the

community. The Court finds this situation to be distinct from the disciplinary infractions the Ninth

Circuit found not probative toward current dangerousness in Cooke. There, the Ninth Circuit held

that two minor non-violent disciplinary infractions which occurred nearly a decade prior to the parole

hearing could not reasonably be viewed as evidence that the habeas petitioner posed a current risk of

danger to public safety. Cooke, 606 F.3d at 1215. However, unlike in Cooke, where the inmate was

discipline free for the decade subsequent to the disciplinary infractions, all of Petitioner’s

disciplinary infractions have occurred in the decade prior to the hearing. More importantly, while

these disciplinary infractions are non-violent, they are serious disciplinary infractions. The

California legislature mandates consideration of serious disciplinary infractions in the determination

The Board did not delve into what the circumstances regarding the other four disciplinary infractions were.

5

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of whether an inmate is suitable for parole, and consequently whether an inmate is currently

dangerousness. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 2402(c)(6). In light of the California’s regulations, the

Court finds that Petitioner’s inability to remain discipline free in the decade leading up the parole

hearing constitutes a modicum of evidence showing Petitioner is currently dangerous. Consequently,

Petitioner’s constitutional rights were not violated as the record contains “more than the crime or its

circumstances alone to justify the Board’s or the Governor’s finding of current dangerousness.” 

Cooke, 606 F.3d at 1214. 

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that the petition for writ of habeas corpus be

DENIED WITH PREJUDICE and the Clerk of Court be DIRECTED to enter judgment for

Respondent. 

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Anthony W. Ishii, United

States District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of

the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. 

Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with the

court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served and

filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the objections. 

The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 15, 2010 /s/ John M. Dixon 

hlked6 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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