Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02152/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02152-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Alvin J. Robinson, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Arizona, State of, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-14-02152-PHX-SRB (BSB)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

 On September 29, 2014, Petitioner Alvin J. Robinson filed a pro se “Appeal to the 

Denial of the Requ[e]st for Credit of Time Served and the Dismissal of Appeal,” seeking 

“credit for time served, earned and deserved while on supervised probation.” (Doc. 1.) 

On November 6, 2014, the Court construed the filing as a Petition for Writ of Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and dismissed it because Petitioner did not use the 

court-approved form. (Doc. 4.) The Court gave Petitioner thirty days to file an amended 

petition on the proper form. On November 17, 2014, Petitioner filed an Amended 

Petition that contained two grounds for relief. (Doc. 5.) The Court screened the 

Amended Petition and dismissed Ground Two for failure to allege that Petitioner was in 

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws and treaties of the United States. (Doc. 8 

at 3 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)).) The Court directed Respondents to answer Ground 

One of the Amended Petition. (Id.) 

 On April 7, 2015, Respondents filed an answer asserting that federal habeas 

corpus review of Ground One is procedurally barred and, alternatively, Ground One is 

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not cognizable on federal habeas corpus review. (Doc. 15.) Petitioner filed a reply 

arguing that he properly exhausted his state remedies on Ground One. (Doc. 16.) He 

also argues that Ground One presents a federal claim because “state law cannot conflict 

with federal law or the Constitution,” and “therefore, state law would have to be a direct 

reflection of federal law.” (Id. at 3.) As discussed below, the Court concludes that 

Ground One is not cognizable on federal habeas corpus review. Alternatively, Ground 

One is procedurally barred from federal habeas corpus review. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background 

A. State Proceedings 

 On November 19, 2002, Petitioner was indicted in Maricopa County Superior 

Court, case number CR 2002-019557 (CR 2002), on one count of illegally conducting an 

enterprise, a class three felony, one count of fraudulent schemes and artifices, a class two 

felony, and four counts of theft, class six felonies. (Doc. 15, Ex. A.) On August 1, 2013, 

Petitioner was charged by information in Maricopa County Superior Court, case number 

CR 2003-018596 (CR 2003), with illegally conducting an enterprise, a class three felony, 

fraudulent schemes and artifices, a class two felony, and theft, a class two felony.1

 

(Doc. 15, Ex. B.) 

 On January 30, 2014, Petitioner pleaded guilty in CR 2002 to illegally conducting 

an enterprise. (Doc. 15, Ex. D.) The court suspended the imposition of sentence and 

placed Petitioner on five years’ probation. (Id. at 1-2.) As a condition of probation, the 

court required Petitioner to serve twelve months in the Maricopa County Jail. (Id. at 2.) 

On January 30, 2014, Petitioner also pleaded guilty in CR 2003 to fraudulent schemes 

and artifices. (Doc. 15, Ex. E.) The court suspended the imposition of sentence and 

placed Petitioner on seven years’ probation to run concurrently with the term of probation 

imposed in CR 2002. (Id. at 2.) Additionally, as a condition of probation, the court 

required Petitioner to serve twelve months in the Maricopa County Jail. (Id.) 

 

1

 The events giving rise to the charges in both cases are summarized in a probation violation report. (Doc. 15, Ex. C.) 

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 On June 22, 2009, the State moved to revoke Petitioner’s probation in both cases. 

(Doc. 15, Exs. F, G.) The State alleged that Petitioner committed several crimes while on 

probation, including fraudulent schemes and artifices, a telephone solicitation violation, 

and insurance fraud. (Id.) Additionally, Petitioner had absconded and failed to report to 

his probation officer for several months. (Id.) During the disposition hearing, Petitioner 

admitted violating probation. (Doc. 15, Ex. H.) The trial court reinstated probation and 

extended the total term of probation by three years. (Id.) 

 On October 14, 2011, the State moved to revoke probation in both cases because 

Petitioner had absconded. (Doc. 15, Exs. I, J.) During the December 19, 2013 

disposition hearing, Petitioner admitted violating probation. (Doc. 15, Exs. K, L.) The 

court revoked probation and court sentenced Petitioner to three-and-a-half-years’ 

imprisonment (with credit for 425 days of incarceration) for his conviction in CR 2002. 

(Doc. 15, Ex. K.) For his conviction in CR 2003, the court sentenced Petitioner to five 

years’ imprisonment (with 454 days of credit) to run concurrently with his sentence in 

CR 2002. (Doc. 15, Ex. L.) 

 On February 10, 2014, Petitioner sent a letter to the trial court requesting a 

reduction in his sentences. (Doc. 15, Ex. M.) The letter did not cite any legal authority 

for Petitioner’s request. Petitioner contended that the time he spent in the county jail as a 

condition of probation, and the time he spent on supervised probation, should have been 

credited against his sentences of imprisonment. (Id.) On May 5, 2014, the trial court 

denied Petitioner’s request, explaining, “[t]his factor was already taken into consideration 

when fashioning the appropriate sentence.” (Doc. 15, Ex. N.) 

 On August 18, 2014, Petitioner filed an “Appeal to the Denying of Defendant[’]s 

Request” in the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc. 15, Ex. O.) Petitioner argued that the 

trial court did not explain how it considered Petitioner’s jail time when sentencing him to 

prison. (Id.) On August 29, 2014, the court of appeals dismissed the appeal because the 

trial court’s order denying Petitioner’s request for a reduction in sentence was not an 

“appealable order,” and Petitioner did not identify any appealable order that had been 

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entered within the previous twenty days. (Doc. 15, Ex. P.) There is no evidence in the 

record indicating that Petitioner sought further review in the state courts. 

B. Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

 In Ground One, Petitioner alleges that he is “in custody in violation of the 

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States” because the trial court did not give 

him credit for time served on supervised probation or in county jail when it sentenced 

him to prison. (Doc. 5 at 6.) As discussed below, Ground One does not sufficiently 

allege a federal claim and, therefore, is not cognizable on federal habeas corpus review. 

Alternatively, assuming Ground One adequately alleges a violation of federal law, review 

of Ground One is procedurally barred because Petitioner did not present a federal claim 

to the Arizona Court of Appeals. 

II. Ground One is Not Cognizable on Federal Habeas Corpus Review 

 Only claims that allege a violation of the United States Constitution, laws, or 

treaties are cognizable on federal habeas review. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Estelle v. 

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). The petitioner must specify which Constitutional 

right was violated, and how it was violated; conclusory allegations of constitutional 

violations are insufficient. See Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 205 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating 

that a petitioner’s conclusory suggestion that a Constitutional right has been violated falls 

“far short of stating a valid claim of constitutional violation.”). 

 In Ground One, Petitioner follows the language of § 2254(a), which provides that 

the court “shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person 

in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, only on the ground that he is in 

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” (See

Doc. 5 at 6 (“Am in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the 

United States”).) Ground One also states that Petitioner’s custody “is illegal or 

excessive.” (Doc. 5 at 6.) Ground One, however, does not allege a violation of a 

particular federal right. A writ of habeas corpus is available under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) 

“only on the basis of some transgression of federal law binding on the state courts.” 

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Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir.1985) (citing Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 

107, 119 (1982)). 

 Petitioner’s recitation of § 2254(a) and his general assertion that his custody is 

“illegal or excessive,” and do not state a cognizable claim for federal habeas relief. See 

Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Gray v. Netherland, 518 

U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996) (“general appeals to broad constitutional principles, such as due 

process, equal protection, and the right to a fair trial, are insufficient to establish 

exhaustion”)). In his reply, Petitioner asserts that Ground One alleges a federal claim 

because state law is a reflection of federal law. (Doc. 16 at 3.) However, similarity 

between state and federal law does not transform a state law claim into a federal claim. 

See Hiivala, 195 F.3d at 1106. Accordingly, Ground One should be dismissed for failure 

to state a cognizable claim for federal habeas relief. 

III. Federal Review of Ground One is Procedurally Barred 

 However, even assuming that Petitioner’s references to the language of § 2254 and 

his assertion that his custody is illegal and excessive are sufficient to properly plead a 

federal claim, federal habeas corpus review would be procedurally barred because 

Petitioner did not present a federal claim to the state courts. 

 A. Exhaustion and Procedural Bar 

 Ordinarily, a federal court may not grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

unless the petitioner has exhausted available state remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). To 

exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must afford the state courts the opportunity to rule 

upon the merits of his federal claims by “fairly presenting” them to the state’s “highest” 

court in a procedurally appropriate manner.2

 Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) 

(“[t]o provide the State with the necessary ‘opportunity,’ the prisoner must ‘fairly 

 

2

 In Arizona, unless a prisoner has been sentenced to death, the “highest court” requirement is satisfied if the petitioner has presented his federal claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals either through the direct appeal process or post-conviction proceedings. Crowell v. Knowles, 483 F. Supp. 2d 925, 931-33 (D. Ariz. 2007) (discussing Swoopes v. Sublett, 196 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1999)). 

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present’ his claim in each appropriate state court . . . thereby alerting that court to the 

federal nature of the claim”); Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349 (1989) (same). 

 A claim has been fairly presented if the petitioner has described both the operative 

facts and the federal legal theory on which his claim is based. See Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 

33. A “state prisoner does not ‘fairly present’ a claim to a state court if that court must 

read beyond a petition or brief . . . that does not alert it to the presence of a federal claim 

in order to find material, such as a lower court opinion in the case, that does so.” Id. at 

31-32. Thus, “a petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim to the state court for purposes 

of satisfying the exhaustion requirement if he presents the claim: (1) to the proper 

forum . . . (2) through the proper vehicle, . . . and (3) by providing the proper factual and 

legal basis for the claim.” Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir. 2005) 

(internal citations omitted). 

 The requirement that a petitioner exhaust available state court remedies promotes 

comity by ensuring that the state courts have the first opportunity to address alleged 

violations of a state prisoner’s federal rights. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 178 

(2001); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). Principles of comity also 

require federal courts to respect state procedural bars to review of a habeas petitioner’s 

claims. See Coleman, 501 at 731-32. Pursuant to these principles, a habeas petitioner’s 

claims may be precluded from federal review in two situations. 

 First, a claim may be procedurally defaulted and barred from federal habeas 

corpus review when a petitioner failed to present his federal claims to the state court, but 

returning to state court would be “futile” because the state court’s procedural rules, such 

as waiver or preclusion, would bar consideration of the previously unraised claims. See 

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-99 (1989); Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 987 (9th 

Cir. 2002). If no state remedies are currently available, a claim is technically exhausted, 

but procedurally defaulted. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732, 735 n.1. 

 Second, a claim may be procedurally barred when a petitioner raised a claim in 

state court, but the state court found the claim barred on state procedural grounds. See 

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Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. 53 (2009). “[A] habeas petitioner who has failed to meet the 

State’s procedural requirements for presenting his federal claim has deprived the state 

courts of an opportunity to address those claims in the first instance.” Coleman, 501 U.S. 

at 731-32. In this situation, federal habeas corpus review is precluded if the state court 

opinion relies “on a state-law ground that is both ‘independent’ of the merits of the 

federal claim and an ‘adequate’ basis for the court’s decision.” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 

255, 260 (1989). 

 A state procedural ruling is “independent” if the application of the bar does not 

depend on an antecedent ruling on the merits of the federal claim. See Stewart v. Smith, 

536 U.S. 856, 860 (2002); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74-75 (1985). A state court’s 

application of the procedural bar is “adequate” if it is “strictly or regularly followed.” 

See Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d 1005, 1010 (9th Cir. 1994). If the state court occasionally 

excuses non-compliance with a procedural rule, that does not render its procedural bar 

inadequate. See Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 410-12 n.6 (1989). “The independent 

and adequate state ground doctrine ensures that the States’ interest in correcting their own 

mistakes is respected in all federal habeas cases.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 732. Although a 

procedurally barred claim has been exhausted, as a matter of comity, the federal court 

will decline to consider the merits of that claim. See id. at 729-32. 

 However, because the doctrine of procedural default is based on comity, not 

jurisdiction, federal courts retain the power to consider the merits of procedurally 

defaulted claims. See Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 9 (1984). Generally, a federal court will 

not review the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim unless a petitioner demonstrates 

“cause” for the failure to properly exhaust the claim in state court and “prejudice” from 

the alleged constitutional violation, or shows that a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” 

would result if the claim were not heard on the merits. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. 

Additionally, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2), the court may dismiss plainly meritless 

claims regardless of whether the claim was properly exhausted in state court. See Rhines

v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277 (2005) (holding that a stay is inappropriate in federal court 

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to allow claims to be raised in state court if they are subject to dismissal under 

§ 2254(b)(2) as “plainly meritless”). 

B. Petitioner Did Not Properly Exhaust Ground One 

 After his sentencing, on February 10, 2014, Petitioner sent a letter to the trial court 

requesting a reduction in his sentences. (Doc. 15, Ex. M.) Petitioner argued that the trial 

court should give him credit for time he spent in county jail and on supervised probation. 

(Id.) Petitioner, however, did not cite federal law in support of his claim. (Id.) On May 

5, 2014, the trial court denied Petitioner’s request for a reduction in his sentence. 

(Doc. 15, Ex. N.) On August 18, 2014, Petitioner sought review of the trial court’s ruling 

in the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Doc. 15, Ex. O.) Petitioner did not present a federal 

claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals. (Id.) Rather, he generally argued that the court 

should have given him credit for time spent on supervised probation and in county jail. 

(Id.) The appellate court denied review because it concluded that the trial court’s May 5, 

2014 ruling was not an appealable order. (Doc. 15, Ex. P.) 

 Petitioner did not present a federal claim to the trial and appellate courts. 

Therefore, even assuming Petitioner now presents a federal claim in Ground One, 

Petitioner did not properly exhaust that claim. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 297-99; Coleman, 

501 U.S. at 735 n.1 (stating that “if the petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies and the 

court to which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the 

exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred . . . there is a 

procedural default for purposes of federal habeas.”). 

 It would be futile for Petitioner to return to the state courts to try to exhaust 

Ground One. Any attempt to present that claim to court of appeals would be barred 

because a petition for appellate review would be untimely and successive. See Ariz. R. 

Crim. P. 31.1, 31.3, and 32.2(a). Petitioner is also time-barred from a filing a petition for 

post-conviction relief under Rule 32. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.4(a); McKinney v. Ryan, 

730 F.3d 903, 913 n.6 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding claims procedurally defaulted because 

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petitioner was barred from exhausting his claims in the first instance by Rules 32.2(a)(3) 

and 32.4(a)). 

 Additionally, Petitioner’s claim does not implicate any exceptions to the 

timeliness rules referred to in Rule 32.4(a) and Rule 32.2(b), including being held in 

custody after the imposed sentence expired, the presentation of newly discovered material 

facts that probably would have changed the verdict or sentence, the failure to file a timely 

notice of post-conviction relief or a notice of appeal that was not the defendant’s fault, a 

change in the law, or the petitioner’s actual innocence. See Rule 32.1(d), (e), (f), (g) and 

(h). Accordingly, federal habeas corpus review of Ground One is procedurally barred.3

 C. Petitioner has not Established a Basis to Overcome the Procedural Bar

 Because Petitioner’s claim asserted in Ground One is procedurally defaulted, 

federal habeas corpus review is unavailable unless Petitioner establishes “cause and 

prejudice” or a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” to overcome the procedural bar. See 

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 749. For the reasons below, the Court finds that Petitioner has not 

established a basis to overcome the procedural bar. 

 1. Cause and Prejudice 

 A federal court may review the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if a 

petitioner establishes “cause” and “prejudice.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. To establish 

“cause,” a petitioner must establish that some objective factor external to the defense 

impeded his efforts to comply with the state’s procedural rules. Teague, 489 U.S. at 298. 

A showing of “interference by officials,” constitutionally ineffective assistance of 

counsel, or “that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available” may 

constitute cause. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). 

 

3

 Respondents also argue that Ground One is procedurally barred because the appellate court denied review of Petitioner’s challenge to his sentence based on state law and dismissed the appeal because Petitioner did not seek review of an appealable order. (Doc. 15 at. 8) Because the Court concludes that federal habeas corpus review of Ground 

One is barred on a different basis, the Court does not address this alternative ground for finding federal review of Ground One procedurally barred. 

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 “Prejudice” is actual harm resulting from the constitutional violation or error. 

Magby v. Wawrzaszek, 741 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 1984). To establish prejudice, a 

habeas petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that the alleged constitutional 

violation “worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with 

error of constitutional dimensions.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982) 

(emphasis in original); see Thomas v. Lewis, 945 F.2d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1991). If 

petitioner fails to establish cause for his procedural default, then the court need not 

consider whether petitioner has shown actual prejudice resulting from the alleged 

constitutional violations. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986). 

 Liberally construing the Amended Petition, Petitioner argues that he did not 

present a federal claim to the Arizona Court of Appeals because he thought it would be 

futile considering Arizona’s statutes governing the imposition of supervised and 

unsupervised probation. (Doc. 5 at 5 (stating that Petitioner did not file an appeal 

because, “How can a state court make a stance against its own statutes[?]”).) Under the 

futility doctrine, a petitioner is excused from exhausting state remedies when “the highest 

state court has recently addressed the issue raised in the petition and resolved it adversely 

to the petitioner” and there is no “intervening United States Supreme Court decisions on 

point or any other indication that the state court intends to depart from its decisions.” 

Sweet v. Cupp, 640 F.2d 233, 236 (9th Cir. 1981) (adopting the futility doctrine). 

 Petitioner, however, does not identify any recent Arizona Supreme Court decision 

that resolved the issue presented in Ground One adversely to Petitioner. Thus, Petitioner 

has not shown that it would have been futile for him to present a federal challenge to his 

sentence to the state courts. Accordingly, the futility doctrine does not apply here. 

 To establish cause Petitioner also argues that because he presented his claims in 

detail to the trial and appellate courts, “being a layman, [he] believed that he had 

exhausted all of his state remedies . . . .” (Doc. 16 at 2-3.) Petitioner essentially argues 

his lack of legal knowledge as cause to excuse the procedural bar to review of his claim. 

Petitioner’s status as an inmate, lack of legal knowledge, and limited legal resources do 

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not establish cause to excuse the procedural bar to review of his claims. See Tacho v. 

Martinez, 862 F.2d 1376, 1381 (9th Cir. 1988) (petitioner’s reliance upon jailhouse 

lawyers did not constitute cause); Hughes v. Idaho State Bd. of Corr., 800 F.2d 905, 909 

(9th Cir. 1986) (an illiterate pro se petitioner’s lack of legal assistance did not amount to 

cause to excuse a procedural default); see also Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 

(9th Cir. 2006) ( “a pro se petitioner’s lack of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an 

extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling”). Therefore, Petitioner has not 

shown cause for the procedural default of his claim and the Court does not consider 

whether Petitioner has shown prejudice. See Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986). 

 2. Fundamental Miscarriage of Justice

 In addition, a federal court may review the merits of a procedurally defaulted 

claim if the petitioner demonstrates that failure to consider the merits of that claim will 

result in a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 

(1995). A “fundamental miscarriage of justice” occurs when “‘a constitutional violation 

has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.’” Id. (citing 

Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986)). 

 To establish a fundamental miscarriage of justice, a petitioner must present “new 

reliable evidence — whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness 

accounts, or critical physical evidence — that was not presented at trial.” Schlup, 513 

U.S. at 324. The petitioner has the burden of demonstrating that “it is more likely than 

not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the new evidence.” Id.

at 327. Petitioner has not presented new evidence and has not shown that failure to 

consider his procedurally defaulted claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of 

justice. (Docs. 5, 16.) Thus, he has not met Schlup’s high standard and this exception 

does not excuse the procedural bar. 

IV. Conclusion 

 As set forth above, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief because 

Ground One does not present a claim that is cognizable on federal habeas corpus review. 

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Alternatively, federal habeas corpus review of Ground One is procedurally barred and 

Petitioner has not established a basis to overcome that bar. Accordingly, the Court 

recommends that the Amended Petition be denied. 

 Accordingly, 

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

(Doc. 5) be DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be DENIED because the dismissal of the 

Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and reasonable jurists would not find the 

procedural ruling debatable. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 4(a)(1), should not be filed until entry of the District Court’s judgment. The 

parties have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation 

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 and 72. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen days within 

which to file a response to the objections. Failure to file timely objections to the 

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result in the District Court’s 

acceptance of the Report and Recommendation without further review. See United States

v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). 

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 Failure to file timely objections to any factual determination of the Magistrate 

Judge may be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of 

fact in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. 

 Dated this 8th day of June, 2015. 

Case 2:14-cv-02152-SRB Document 17 Filed 06/08/15 Page 13 of 13