Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00126/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00126-15/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Other Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IRINA ENGERT, ANNE ENGERT, and RON 

ENGERT, Individually and as Successors-inInterest to Glendon Engert,

 Plaintiffs, 

 v. 

STANISLAUS COUNTY, et al.,

 Defendants.

1:13-CV-00126 LJO BAM

REDACTED1 MEMORANDUM 

DECISION AND ORDER RE 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Docs. 102, 104 

& 133)

I. INTRODUCTION

On April 12, 2012, Deputies Robert Paris (“Paris”) and Michael Glinskas (“Glinskas”) of the 

Stanislaus County Sheriff’s Department were performing an eviction at 2141 Chrysler Drive, Unit #1 in 

Modesto, California (“the Property”). A civilian locksmith, Glendon Engert (“Engert”), was present to 

drill out the lock on the front door. During the course of the eviction, the tenant, Jim Richard Ferrario, 

Jr. (“Ferrario”), shot and killed Paris and Engert. Engert’s wife and parents (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) 

bring this lawsuit against Paris’s estate, Glinskas, Sergeant Manuel Martinez (“Martinez”) (Paris’s and 

Glinskas’s direct supervisor), Lieutenant Cliff Harper (“Harper”) (Martinez’s supervisor), and the 

County of Stanislaus (the “County”), alleging, among other things, that Defendants are liable under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) for violating Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment rights to substantive due 

process under the so-called “danger creation” exception/doctrine by placing Engert in the path of a 

 

1 This unredacted version of this Memorandum Decision and Order is docketed under seal pursuant to the Stipulated 

Protective Order entered August 5, 2014. Docs. 48 & 209. 

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known danger with deliberate indifference to his personal, physical safety. See generally Doc. 37, 

Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). Plaintiffs also bring a state law negligence/wrongful death claim 

against all Defendants. Id.

2

Before the Court are three sets of motions for summary judgment:

(1) Paris and Glinskas move together for summary judgment that: 

(a) the record does not support a danger creation claim; 

(b) because the contours of the danger creation exception are not clearly established, 

Paris and Glinskas are entitled to qualified immunity;

(c) because there is no liability under the federal civil rights claim, there can be no 

liability for wrongful death; and 

(c) no viable negligence claim can exist based on the facts of this case, and/or Paris and 

Glinskas are immune from liability for negligence. Doc. 102-1. 

(2) Martinez moves separately for summary judgment that: 

(a) he is not directly liable under any possible danger creation theory; 

(b) he cannot be held liable on a supervisory liability theory because Plaintiffs cannot 

establish a sufficient causal connection between Martinez’s conduct and any 

constitutional violation; 

(c) he is entitled to qualified immunity because the contours of the danger creation 

exception, particularly when applied to Martinez’s involvement, are not clearly 

established; and

(c) no viable negligence claim can exist in this case against Martinez and/or Martinez is 

immune from liability for negligence. Doc. 202.

 

2 According to Defendants Paris and Glinskas, Plaintiffs have represented that they will be dismissing their state law cause of 

action for violations of California’s Bane Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1 See Doc. 102-1 at 1 n.2. Plaintiffs did not 

object or counter this assertion.

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(3) Harper and the County3 move separately for summary judgment that: 

(a) Harper cannot be directly liable because he was not personally involved in the 

eviction process;

(b) Plaintiffs’ supervisory liability claim against Harper cannot succeed because there 

was no underlying constitutional violation and/or because Plaintiffs cannot establish a 

sufficient causal connection between Harper’s conduct and any constitutional violation;

(c) qualified immunity protects Harper;

(d) Harper cannot be held liable on Plaintiffs’ state law negligence/wrongful death claims 

because they are not premised upon Harper’s personal involvement and public servants 

cannot be held liable for the torts of their inferiors; likewise, because Plaintiffs’ state law 

claims against the County are premised upon Harper’s liability, the County is protected 

against liability under state law; and

(e) the County is immune from liability under state law because Martinez, Glinskas, and 

Paris are immune. Doc. 131. 

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND4

A. Background on Stanislaus County Civil Division and the Eviction Process.

The Stanislaus County Sheriff’s Department Civil Division (“Civil Division”) provides a variety 

of civil process services, including evictions. Joint Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“JUMF”), 

Doc. 104-2 (“JUMF”) #1. As of April 12, 2012, the Civil Division included the following sworn 

personnel: Harper, Martinez, Paris, Glinskas, and Deputy Jennifer Humble (“Humble”). JUMF #4. As of 

that date, Deputy Glinskas had been assigned to the Civil Division for approximately three weeks. 

 

3 The parties stipulated to the dismissal of all federal claims against the County, Doc. 99, meaning that no Monell claims 

remain. 

4 The parties interpose numerous objections to evidence presented, both within the various statements of fact and in standalone objection memoranda. Docs. 195 & 204. The Court has reviewed all such objections and finds them to be immaterial or 

without merit unless a specific finding to the contrary is contained within this memorandum decision and order.

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DUMF #3. The Civil Division is assisted by non-sworn Civil Legal Clerks. JUMF #5. As of April 12, 

2012, the Supervising Clerk was Connie Watson (“Watson”); Sharman Juarez (“Juarez”) was a Civil 

Legal Clerk. Id.

An “eviction” refers to the service and enforcement of a judgment of a Writ of Possession 

obtained by a property owner upon the completion of an unlawful detainer action in California Superior 

Court. JUMF #2. The eviction procedure consists of two main steps: the posting of the Notice of 

Eviction, commonly referred to as a Five Day Notice, and the service of the Notice of Restoration, 

wherein the property owner takes possession of the property. JUMF #3. The property owner normally 

gains access to the property by using their set of keys, or, where the property owner does not have keys, 

by hiring a locksmith to pick or drill, and ultimately change, the locks. Defendants’ Undisputed Material 

Facts (“DUMF”), Doc. 1945, ##1-2.

Civil Division policy provides:

[D]eputies shall recognize that each eviction has the potential for 

becoming an emotional and dangerous situation.

1. The enforcement of an eviction writ shall be accomplished by a 

team composed of two deputies. 

2. The deputies shall exercise officer safety when contacting the 

tenants or other involved individuals, when making entry into the 

property, and during the removal of the occupants. 

3. Every effort shall be made to defuse all hostile situations so that 

peaceful restoration of the property can be effected. 

Stanislaus County Sheriff’s Department Civil Unit Policies and Procedures No. 2.01 IV(A)(1), 

Declaration of Richard Schoenberger (“Schoenberger Decl.”), Ex. 14, Doc. 155 at COUNTY 003142.

 

5 Whenever the Court makes reference to a party’s statement of material fact, it is specifically referring to the last version of 

that document filed. For example, as to the DUMF, the Court is referring to the County’s and Harper’s response to Plaintiffs’

responses to Defendants’ separate statement of undisputed material facts. Doc. 194. The Court notes that, confusingly, 

Defendants Paris and Glinskas filed their own response document containing substantially similar responses to those facts 

material to their case. Doc. 187-1. Because Paris and Glinskas’s response does not appear to differ materially from that of the 

County’s and Harper’s, the Court will refer only to the former, more inclusive document. 

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B. Initiation of the Eviction Process.

In late 2011, RT Financial purchased the Property in a foreclosure sale. JUMF #7. Roni Roberts

(“Roberts”), the President of RT Financial, engaged Paul Tunison (“Tunison”) of Patriot Eviction 

Services to assist with contacting the then-current occupant. JUMF ## 6, 8. Although Tunison 

discovered the occupant was Ferrario, Tunison never was able to make contact with Ferrario. DUMF #4.

RT Financial filed an unlawful detainer action in the Superior Court of California, County of 

Stanislaus, to regain possession of the Property and remove the current occupant. JUMF #9. Judgment 

was granted in favor of RT Financial on April 5, 2012, and RT Financial obtained a Writ of Possession. 

JUMF #10. Prior to April 5, 2015, the Stanislaus County Sherriff’s Department played no role in and 

had no interaction with the Property or its occupant. DUMF #5. 

On April 5, 2012, Tunison commenced the eviction process with the Civil Division. JUMF #12. 

Tunison provided a copy of the Writ of Possession to the Civil Division, filled out the initial information 

sheet, and paid the fee of $125.00. DUMF #6. The Notice of Eviction (Five Day Notice) was scheduled 

for posting on April 6, 2012. JUMF #13. Humble served the Five Day Notice on the Property on April 6, 

2012. JUMF #14. No one answered the door to accept service, DUMF #8, so she posted the Notice on 

the door of the Property with tape. Martinez’s Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts 

(“MUMF”), Doc. 203, #30. Deputy Humble did not note anything dangerous about the Property during 

the time she was completing the posting. DUMF #6.

C. Events Leading Up to the Eviction at the Property.

The second step of the eviction, service of the Notice of Restoration, was scheduled for April 12, 

2012. JUMF #15. To initiate the process, Civil Division Civil Legal Clerks contact the person identified 

on the information sheet the day before the scheduled lockout. JUMF #16. The Legal Clerk assigned to 

calls that day uses an “eviction questionnaire,” which covers a series of questions about the property. Id. 

A “trip ticket” is prepared for the eviction, which is provided to the Deputies who will be completing the 

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eviction procedure. Id.

On April 11, 2012, Civil Clerk Juarez contacted eviction agent Tunison to communicate 

information about the scheduled eviction and to obtain information about the Property. JUMF #17. It is 

undisputed that Tunison communicated the following information to Juarez, which Juarez wrote down 

on the eviction questionnaire: (1) the occupant being evicted from the Property was ex-military; (2) 

there was a camera-video surveillance system at the Property; (3) the occupant had weapons, including 

M16-type guns; (4) there was an extra strength security door on the front of the residence; (5) the 

occupant was “possibly” violent; and (6) was a “weird weirdo.” DUMF ## 9-10. Juarez wrote that

information down on the eviction questionnaire. DUMF #12. It is undisputed that this was not an 

exhaustive list of the information Tunison provided Ms. Juarez. DUMF #10.6

Juarez made additional notes on the eviction schedule for April 12, 2012. DUMF #12. Next to 

the address line the Property, Juarez wrote the phrases “be very cautious” and “is going to have 

problems.” Id. Following the completion of her call with Tunison, Juarez brought the information she 

recorded on the trip ticket to the attention of her supervisor, Watson. DUMF #14. Following Watson’s 

directions, Juarez brought the information recorded on the eviction questionnaire from her call with 

Tunison to Martinez and showed it to him. DUMF ##15-16. Martinez told Juarez to highlight the 

information by circling it with red pen and to reprint the information on the opposite side of the trip 

ticket in black bold print. DUMF #18. Juarez complied. DUMF #19.

Martinez indicated that a Civil Division Clerk would come to him with information of this nature 

“once every other month, but it wouldn’t -- it would be one or two of those items like subject dislikes 

law enforcement, is a gang member. Subject has access to weapons and is not law enforcement friendly, 

 

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For example, Tunison also recalls having told Juarez that the Civil Division was “going to have a fire fight on [its] hands” 

in connection with this eviction, Deposition of Paul Tunison (“Tunison Depo.”) at 136:2-5, and that the occupant had “hand 

grenades.” Id. at 26:8. However, the Court does not believe the additional information Plaintiffs claim Tunison shared with 

Juarez is material to the outcome of this case because Juarez is not a Defendant, nor does Plaintiff claim any other party is

liable for what Juarez did or did not do with any information she may or may not have received from Tunison. Only the 

information that was passed along to Defendants is relevant here. 

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et cetera, et cetera. It would be one or two items, things like that, or has dogs, you know, that are 

vicious.” Deposition of Manuel Martinez (“Martinez Depo.”) at 39:2-8; see also Martinez Decl. at ¶22 

(“It was a common occurrence for the Civil Division to be informed that firearms may be at the presence 

where an eviction is scheduled....”). However, Martinez further indicated that he had asked a Civil 

Division Clerk to highlight information as he instructed Juarez to do perhaps once a year. Id. at 39:17-

40:6.

Juarez taped the eviction questionnaire on the back of the trip ticket so that the information 

communicated by Tunison appeared twice, i.e., on the back and front of one piece of paper. DUMF #20. 

That document is put into a “packet” and then provided to the assigned Deputies the day prior to the 

scheduled eviction. DUMF #21. 

On the morning of April 12, 2012, a training meeting was scheduled for all Civil Division sworn 

staff. DUMF #23. Martinez and Watson led the meeting. DUMF #24. Harper, Glinskas, and Paris

attended the meeting. DUMF #25. The meeting had many purposes, including to “make the whole 

unit...aware of...how they’re supposed to be conducting these [evictions] formally”; and to educate 

Glinskas, who was “new to the unit and had never conducted evictions.” Martinez Depo. 83:25-

84:20.The eviction scheduled for the Property was not mentioned or discussed at the meeting. DUMF 

#26.

Paris and Glinskas were assigned to complete the eviction at the Property. JUMF #18. Juarez 

showed Paris the trip ticket and the questionnaire. Juarez Depo. at 103:24-104-11. Juarez recalls that 

Paris responded by saying, “whatever.” Id. at 105:11.Glinskas reviewed the trip ticket in the car. DUMF 

#27. Glinskas recalls seeing highlighted information that the occupant may be ex-military, that video 

cameras were installed outside the residence, that the occupant may have guns (“M-16-type”) and words 

to the effect of “be very cautious” or “is going to have problems.” Id. According to Harper and 

Martinez, Deputies are given discretion whether to execute or abort an eviction in light of safety

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concerns or other issues. DUMF #28.7

Glinskas considers every eviction high-risk until proven otherwise. MUMF #47. Glinskas did not 

believe the information on the trip ticket and questionnaire was particularly unusual in his law 

enforcement experience. DUMF #29. Glinskas served in the military for seven years and voluntarily 

completed SWAT school. DUMF #30. He believes lay people commonly misidentify long rifles as “M16s” or other automatic weapons. DUMF #31. Therefore, the report of a rare automatic weapon did not 

cause him concern to approach the eviction any differently than previous evictions. DUMF #32. Upon 

learning that the occupant was a veteran, Deputy Glinskas believed that due to his own military 

background, that if Ferrario was present, he could persuade Ferrario to voluntarily leave the residence by 

relating to him “veteran-to-veteran.” DUMF #33. He and Deputy Paris discussed the information on the 

way over to the Property. DUMF #34.

Roberts contacted Engert on the morning April 12, 2012, requesting locksmith services at the 

eviction. JUMF #19. Roberts testified that he had employed Engert to perform locksmith duties on 

properties over 100 times; in 80% of those jobs, Engert changed locks without the presence or assistance 

of law enforcement. MUMF #42. The two exchanged several text messages and spoke twice on the 

phone about the eviction. DUMF #35. Roberts took detailed, contemporaneous notes of each 

conversation on April 12, 2012. DUMF #36. Prior to those calls, Tunison communicated to Roberts that 

the potential occupant of the Property was an “armed weirdo” or “armed wacko,” DUMF #37, but that 

“no one’s ever seen him or talked to him.” MUMF #43. The other details Tunison communicated to the 

Civil Division apparently were not communicated to Roberts prior to the eviction. Id. During their first 

phone conversation, Roberts informed Engert that the occupant might be an “armed weirdo” or “armed 

 

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Plaintiff objects that Harper’s and Martinez’s statement that Deputies are given discretion to execute or abort an eviction in 

light of safety concerns is an improper expert opinion. DUMF #28. The Court disagrees. Harper’s and Martinez’s statements 

are based upon their own personal experience and knowledge as to whether Deputies are required to act in a certain way in 

response to certain circumstances, or whether they have discretion to respond as they see fit. The objection is OVERRULED.

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wacko.” DUMF #38. Roberts also told Engert not to start the eviction until Roberts arrived on scene. Id. 

Engert agreed. Id. During their second phone conversation, Engert advised Roberts that the Deputies 

were on the scene. DUMF #39. Roberts testified at his deposition that he told Engert, “if the guy is 

there, he is an armed wacko, weirdo,” and “please do not start until I [Roberts] arrive,” and “tell the 

Deputies I am running late and [am] just up the street.” DUMF #39. Engert indicated to Roberts that he 

understood Roberts’s directions. Id.

D. The Eviction.

Deputies Paris and Glinskas arrived at the Property early. DUMF #40; Glinskas Depo. at 110:17-

19. Once the deputies parked, an individual came up on the right passenger side of the car. DUMF #42.

The individual identified himself as the locksmith, Engert. Id. Deputy Paris asked Engert where the 

property owner was, and Engert explained he was on his way. DUMF #43. Stanislaus County Sheriff’s 

Department Policy requires deputies to wait “a minimum of ten minutes for the owner’s agent to arrive.” 

Plaintiffs’ Statement of Undisputed Fact (“PUMF”), Doc. 193, #121. According to Martinez, the only 

exception to that rule is where the person actually present (e.g., the locksmith) affirmatively indicates 

they can act on behalf of the property owner. Martinez Depo. 148:10-15. Glinskas testified at his 

deposition that he and Paris assumed Engert was the owner’s agent, and advised Engert that they were 

early, but if Engert wanted to, they could get started. DUMF #44. Glinskas claims that Engert agreed. 

DUMF #45. However, Roberts testified that he had never known Engert to not heed his suggestions, 

which included the instruction to wait for Roberts to arrive. Deposition of Roni Roberts (“Roberts 

Depo.”) at 65:15-67:1. It is undisputed that Glinskas did not discuss with Engert any of the information 

communicated to the Civil Division as listed on the trip ticket/checklist. DUMF #46. Engert went back 

to his truck to obtain his tools. DUMF #47.

The Deputies conducted their initial approach without Engert. DUMF #48. Glinskas noticed a 

camera in the front window that was angled toward the door. MUMF #52. The Deputies traveled at a 

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diagonal angle from the left side of the property, behind a large magnolia tree and walked toward the 

front door. DUMF #49. During his approach, Glinskas looked for anything out of the ordinary, including 

people or things that appeared hostile. DUMF #50. Other than the presence of security cameras, nothing 

appeared to be out of the ordinary to Glinskas. Id. 

 Paris used his ASP collapsible baton to loudly bang on the security door two to three times to 

make their presence known and to get the attention of the occupant. DUMF #54. Paris announced their 

presence, stating “Sheriff’s Department.” DUMF #55. At this time, Paris stood to the left of the pathway 

leading to the front door. MUMF #56. Glinskas stood at a vantage point where he could see both the left 

side of the house and the front door. DUMF #51. At some point, Engert approached the home and 

waited off to the side, away from the door to the side of the house away from the Deputies. DUMF #52. 

After a reasonable time passed with no answer, Paris told Engert to “go ahead,” i.e., that Engert could 

come up attempt to pick and/or drill the lock. DUMF #56. 

Engert began to drill while kneeling in front of the door. DUMF #57; PUMF 136. After drilling 

the metal screen door for approximately 30 seconds, Engert stopped and stated that he thought he heard 

“something” or “someone” inside the house. DUMF #54. The Deputies directed Engert to go back into 

the position of safety to the side of the house. DUMF #59. Paris listened next to the security door and 

Glinskas listened through the window. DUMF #60. The Deputies listened for approximately half a 

minute. MUMF #66. Neither Deputy identified the noise or its originating source, or what type of noise 

Engert may have heard, nor did the Deputies identify any other noise. DUMF #61.8

 The Deputies told Engert he could continue, and Engert began to drill again. DUMF #62; 

Glinskas Depo. at 178:16-23. Shortly thereafter, high-powered “NATO” rounds designed to pierce 

 

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. 

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sheetrock were fired through the front door. DUMF #63. Paris immediately was struck twice near the 

door. DUMF #64. Glinskas returned fire. DUMF #65. Engert stood up from the door and attempted to 

run away down the front path. DUMF #66. As he was running, Engert was struck by gunfire and fell 

down immediately. DUMF #67. Neither Engert nor Deputy Paris showed any signs of life. DUMF #68.9

The following additional “background facts” are presented by Defendants Paris and Glinskas and 

appear to be undisputed: 

Deputy Glinskas took a cover position and broadcasted an “11-99” officer 

down call over the radio frequency at 10:55 a.m. Two hundred plus federal 

and state law enforcement personnel responded to the call and participated 

in a six-hour standoff with the occupant. Ultimately, the occupant took his 

own life and set the entire structure at 2141 Chrysler Drive on fire. 

Following the completion of several investigations, it was determined that 

Ferrario had stashed over twenty firearms (mostly unregistered) including 

his SKS automatic weapon used to murder Deputy Paris and Engert, and 

that Ferrario had procured .762 “FMJ”—full metal jacket—ammunition to 

utilize during his ambush. Those rounds are designed to pierce walls, 

doors, sheetrock and bullet-resistant vests. 

Doc. 102-1 at 8-9 (citations omitted). 

E. Specific Facts Relevant to Supervision. 

 Martinez was employed by the Stanislaus County Sheriff’s Department from 1998 until his 

retirement in 2013. From 2008 on, he was the supervisor of the Civil Division. Martinez’s law 

enforcement career spans over 30 years. MUMF #1. Martinez was Paris’s direct supervisor from 2010 

until Paris’s death. MUMF #2. Martinez became Glinskas’s direct supervisor when he was transferred to 

the Civil Division approximately three weeks prior to the eviction at issue in this case. MUMF #3. 

 

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Plaintiffs point to the deposition testimony of Ken Katsaris, Plaintiffs’ police practices expert, who stated that, under the

circumstances, neither Engert nor Paris should have been in front of the door “where you don’t have any idea whether [the 

occupant] is there or not.” PUMF #150. Defendants interpose numerous objections to the consideration of Mr. Katsaris’s 

testimony. The Court finds it unnecessary to resolve these evidentiary disputes at this time, as the Court did not rely on Mr. 

Katsaris’s testimony in evaluating the pending motions. 

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 Veil trained other deputies, including Paris, that, among other things, a locksmith should be 

directed to kneel down low and off to the side as far as they could. Veil Depo. 46:3-14. Martinez 

confirmed that officers are “taught in the academy not to... stand in front of doors because you’re...[in] 

the funnel of death.” PUMF #80. 

 

10

 

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F. Prior Incidents of Violence During Evictions Conducted by the Civil Division. 

 It is undisputed that in 2001, a shooting occurred during the course of an eviction assisted by 

former Civil Division Deputies Veil and Johnny Valdez. The Civil Division did not have any 

information about the tenants. DUMF #121; PUMF #6. Deputies Veil and Valdez went to the property 

to assist the owners with the eviction. Id. No locksmith was present and the owner did not have keys. 

The owner authorized the Deputies to gain entry to the front door forcibly. Id. The owner’s son assisted 

the Deputies. Id. When the Deputies attempted to open the door, one of the occupants shot through the 

front door and hit the property owner’s son in the arm. Id. The property owner’s son was injured, but did 

not die. Id. Veil imparted this experience both to Martinez and to Paris. Martinez Depo. 55:7-16; PUMF 

#8. 

 In another prior eviction in 2011, where specific threats had been made by a known, quasivigilante group with a history of conflict with law enforcement and tax officials, and where specific, 

written threats had been placed on the lawn of the residence, Martinez called in additional law 

enforcement and the eviction ended safely. PUMF #11. Specifically, “two deputies with long rifles and 

[a Modesto Police Department] officer responded to assist” Veil, Martinez, Harper, and Harris. Martinez 

Depo. at 46. That eviction ended safely. PUMF #11. Martinez concedes that such an approach easily 

could have been followed in the eviction at issue in the present case. Id. 

 

 

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III. STANDARD OF DECISION

Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, disclosure materials, discovery, and any 

affidavits provided establish that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A material fact is one that may affect the 

outcome of the case under the applicable law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 

(1986). A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable trier of fact could return a verdict 

in favor of the nonmoving party.” Id.

The party seeking summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the 

district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, 

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes 

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 

(1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). The exact nature of this responsibility, however, varies 

depending on whether the issue on which summary judgment is sought is one in which the movant or the 

nonmoving party carries the ultimate burden of proof. See Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 

978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). If the movant will have the burden of proof at trial, it must demonstrate, with 

affirmative evidence, that “no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party.” Id. 

(citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). In contrast, if the nonmoving party will have the burden of proof at 

trial, “the movant can prevail merely by pointing out that there is an absence of evidence to support the 

nonmoving party’s case.” Id.

If the movant satisfies its initial burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the allegations in 

its pleadings to “show a genuine issue of material fact by presenting affirmative evidence from which a 

jury could find in [its] favor.” FTC v. Stefanchik, 559 F.3d 924, 929 (9th Cir. 2009) (emphasis in 

original). “[B]ald assertions or a mere scintilla of evidence” will not suffice in this regard. Id. at 929; see 

also Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (“When the 

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moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56[], its opponent must do more than simply show that 

there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”) (citation omitted). “Where the record as a 

whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue 

for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Arizona v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 

253, 289 (1968)).

In resolving a summary judgment motion, “the court does not make credibility determinations or 

weigh conflicting evidence.” Soremekun, 509 F.3d at 984. Instead, “[t]he evidence of the [nonmoving 

party] is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [its] favor.” Anderson, 477 U.S. 

at 255. Inferences, however, are not drawn out of the air; the nonmoving party must produce a factual 

predicate from which the inference may reasonably be drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 

602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 810 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Federal Civil Rights Claims. 

The SAC alleges that Paris, Glinskas, Martinez, and Harper are liable to Plaintiffs under Section 

1983 for violating Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment rights under the so-called “danger creation” 

exception by, among other things, “act[ing] with reckless or conscious disregard for, and deliberate 

indifference to, the creation or increased risk of danger to [] Engert.” SAC ¶ 79. “Section 1983 creates a 

private right of action against individuals who, acting under color of state law, violate federal

constitutional or statutory rights.” Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F .3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001). To state a 

claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the 

Constitution or laws of the United States was violated; and (2) that the alleged violation was committed 

by a person acting under the color of state law.

13 See Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 

 

13 Here, there is no dispute that all Defendants acted under color of state law.

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49-50 (1999). Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for 

vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) 

(citation and quotation marks omitted).

1. Qualified Immunity Standard.

Defendants assert they are entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiffs’ claims. “The doctrine 

of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their 

conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable 

person would have known.’” Mattos v. Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 440 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Pearson v. 

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). “Qualified immunity shields an officer from liability even if his or 

her action resulted from a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of 

law and fact.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). “The purpose of qualified immunity is to strike 

a balance between the competing need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power 

irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they 

perform their duties reasonably.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).

In determining whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity, courts employ a twopronged inquiry. Id. First, a court must determine whether the official violated the plaintiff’s 

constitutional right. Id. If a constitutional violation is present, a court must then determine whether the 

constitutional right was “clearly established in light of the specific context of the case” at the time of the 

events in question. Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 

201 (2001). “For the second step in the qualified immunity analysis—whether the constitutional right 

was clearly established at the time of the conduct—the critical question is whether the contours of the 

right were ‘sufficiently clear’ that every ‘reasonable official would have understood that what he is 

doing violates that right.’” Mattos, 661 F.3d at 442 (quoting Ashcroft v. al–Kidd, ___U.S. ___, 131 

S.Ct. 2074, 2083 (2011)). Courts are “permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of 

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the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances 

in the particular case at hand.” Lal v. California, 746 F.3d 1112, 1116 (9th Cir. 2014). 

2. Danger Creation Doctrine Generally.

The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause states: “...nor shall any State deprive any 

person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 2. This 

“guarantees more than fair process, and the ‘liberty’ it protects includes more than the absence of 

physical restraint.” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997). Due process encompasses 

certain “fundamental” rights. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-302 (1993). This so-called “substantive 

due process” right “forbids the government from depriving a person of life, liberty, or property in such a 

way that shocks the conscience or interferes with the rights implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” 

Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 568 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal citations and quotations omitted). The 

substantive component of the Due Process Clause is violated by executive action only when it “can 

properly be characterized as arbitrary, or conscience shocking, in a constitutional sense.” Collins v. City 

of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 128 (1992). 

However, substantive due process typically “does not impose a duty on government officers to 

protect individuals from third parties.” Morgan v. Gonzales, 495 F.3d 1084, 1093 (9th Cir. 2007). In 

DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, the Supreme Court recognized that

nothing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the State 

to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by 

private actors. The Clause is phrased as a limitation on the State’s power 

to act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security.

489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989). Since the Due Process Clause does not require the state to provide its citizens 

with a minimum level of security, it follows that the state cannot be held liable for failing to do so. Id. at 

196-97. Accordingly, the general rule is that officials cannot be held liable under Section 1983 for an 

injury inflicted by a third party. L.W. v. Grubbs, 974 F.2d 119, 121 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Grubbs I”). There 

are, however, “two exceptions [to this rule]: (1) the ‘special relationship’ exception; and (2) the ‘danger 

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creation’ exception.” Id. Plaintiffs do not assert that the special relationship exception applies in this 

case, at least not in the context of their Fourteenth Amendment claims.14 Plaintiffs do assert that the 

danger creation exception applies. 

The danger creation exception is spelled out in detail in Kennedy v. City of Ridgefield, 439 F.3d 

1055 (9th Cir. 2006). The plaintiff in Kennedy contacted police to report that a thirteen-year-old

neighbor had molested her nine-year-old daughter. Id. at 1057. At the time of the report, the plaintiff, the 

mother of the nine-year-old, warned officers that the neighbor had violent tendencies. Id. The police 

assured the mother that she would be given notice prior to any police contact with the neighbor’s family 

about the allegations. Id. at 1058. However, breaking this promise, the police questioned the neighbor 

about the allegations before officers warned plaintiff. Id. Later that night, and before plaintiff was 

warned by police, the neighbor broke into plaintiff’s home, shot plaintiff, and fatally shot plaintiff’s 

husband. Id. 

Plaintiff alleged that the involved officer violated her Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive 

due process by placing her in a known danger with deliberate indifference to her personal physical 

safety. The Ninth Circuit reviewed the applicable standards and existing precedent, summarizing it as 

follows:

It is well established that the Constitution protects a citizen’s liberty 

interest in her own bodily security. See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 

651 (1977); Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 589 (9th Cir. 1989). It is 

also well established that, although the state’s failure to protect an 

individual against private violence does not generally violate the guarantee 

of due process, it can where the state action “affirmatively place[s] the 

plaintiff in a position of danger,” that is, where state action creates or 

exposes an individual to a danger which he or she would not have 

otherwise faced. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 489 

U.S. 189, 197, 201 (1989); Wood, 879 F.2d at 589–90.

 

14 Plaintiffs do argue that a “special relationship” exception applies to their state law negligence claims, but no party suggests 

the standard applicable to the “special relationship” exception in California negligence jurisprudence is analogous to the 

special relationship exception under the Fourteenth Amendment danger creation exception.

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This circuit first recognized such “danger creation” liability in Wood v. 

Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989). In Wood, a state trooper 

determined that the driver of an automobile was intoxicated, arrested the 

driver and impounded the car. The officer’s actions allegedly left Wood, a 

female passenger, stranded late at night in a known high-crime area. 

Subsequently, Wood accepted a ride from a passing car and was raped. 

This court held that Wood could claim § 1983 liability, since a jury 

presented with the above facts could find “that [the trooper] acted with 

deliberate indifference to Wood’s interest in personal security under the 

fourteenth amendment.” Id. at 588.

Since Wood, this circuit has held state officials liable, in a variety of 

circumstances, for their roles in creating or exposing individuals to danger 

they otherwise would not have faced. See L.W. v. Grubbs, 974 F.2d 119 

(9th Cir. 1992) [] (holding state employees could be liable for the rape of a 

registered nurse assigned to work alone in the medical clinic of a mediumsecurity custodial institution with a known, violent sex-offender); Penilla 

v. City of Huntington Park, 115 F.3d 707 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding as 

viable a state-created danger claim against police officers who, after 

finding a man in grave need of medical care, cancelled a request for 

paramedics and locked him inside his house); Munger v. City of Glasgow, 

227 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding police officers could be held liable 

for the hypothermia death of a visibly drunk patron after ejecting him from 

a bar on a bitterly cold night). These cases clearly establish that state 

actors may be held liable “where they affirmatively place an individual in 

danger,” Munger, 227 F.3d at 1086, by acting with “deliberate 

indifference to [a] known or obvious danger in subjecting the plaintiff to 

it,” L.W. v. Grubbs, 92 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 1996) [].

Kennedy, 439 F.3d at 1061-62 (footnotes omitted). Kennedy delineated a two-part test to determine 

whether the danger creation doctrine applies, requiring: (1) official (state) action that affirmatively 

placed an individual in danger; and (2) deliberate indifference to that danger.15 Id. at 1062-64.

 

15 The County and Defendant Harper cite County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 846-48, 852-53 (1998), for the 

proposition that a substantive due process claim must be supported by evidence of actions that “shock the conscience” --

conduct that is defined as being “malicious” and “sadistic” and undertaken “for the very purpose of causing harm.” See Doc. 

131 at 10-11. Lewis draws a distinction between circumstances in which “deliberation is practical” from those in which the 

government actor must make split-second decisions about an evolving situation. Where deliberation is practical, a “deliberate 

indifference” standard applies. Id. at 853. However, where split-second decisions are at issue, for example those made by 

officers involved in a high speed police chase, “intent to harm ... physically or worsen [an individual’s] legal plight” must be 

present. Id. at 854. Here, however, the record, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, suggests deliberation was 

possible in connection with the events surrounding the eviction at issue in this case. The bulk of the information about the 

risk present was in the hands of Defendants well before the eviction began. Even limiting the examination only to Paris’s and 

Glinskas’s conduct after Engert indicated that he might have heard something inside the house, there was still time for Paris

and Glinskas to deliberate prior to inviting Engert to the door again. Therefore, the Court declines to apply the “intent to 

harm” standard articulated in Lewis. 

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This two-part test will be applied as to each set of Defendants to determine whether Plaintiffs 

have met their burden on summary judgment to establish the existence of a constitutional violation. 

Where a constitutional violation is established for purposes of summary judgment, the Court will 

proceed to the second inquiry in the qualified immunity analysis: whether the contours of the right 

alleged to have been violated were sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have 

understood that what he is doing violates that right. 

3. Paris and Glinskas. 

a. Affirmative Conduct.

“In examining whether an officer affirmatively places an individual in danger, [a court does] not 

look solely to the agency of the individual, nor [should it rest its] opinion on what options may or may 

not have been available to the individual. Instead, [the court must] examine whether the officer left the 

person in a situation that was more dangerous than the one in which they found him.” Id. at 1062 

(internal citations and quotations omitted); see also Jamison v. Storm, 426 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1155 

(W.D. Wash. 2006) (requiring more than an “omission or failure to act” to satisfy the first element). 

Evaluating the officer’s motion for summary judgment, the Ninth Circuit in Kennedy found that by 

informing the neighbor of the allegations without first warning plaintiff, the officer involved 

“affirmatively created an actual, particularized danger [plaintiff] would not otherwise have faced.” 

Kennedy, 439 F.3d at 1063.

Other examples further illustrate this principle. In Munger, the Ninth Circuit permitted a claim to 

survive summary judgment where the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, 

demonstrated that police officers ejected Munger from a bar late at night when the outside temperatures 

were below freezing, knowing that he was wearing only a t-shirt and jeans, was intoxicated, was 

prevented by the officers from driving his truck or re-entering the bar, and was walking away from 

nearby open establishments. 227 F.3d at 1087. Munger died of hypothermia. Id. at 1086. Under those 

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circumstances, the Ninth Circuit concluded the officers left Munger “in a situation that was more 

dangerous than the one in which they found him.” Id. at 1086. 

In Penilla, when a man became seriously ill on the porch of his home, his neighbors called 911 

and requested emergency medical assistance. 115 F.3d at 708. When police officers arrived, they 

examined Penilla and found him to be in grave need of medical attention, but moved him inside his 

home, locked the door, and cancelled the call for paramedics. Id. Penilla subsequently died. Id. The 

Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of a motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds, finding that the 

officers “allegedly took affirmative actions that significantly increased the risk facing Penilla.” Id. at 

710.

In contrast, in Campbell v. State Department of Social and Health Services, 671 F.3d 837 (9th 

Cir. 2011), a developmentally disabled adult with a known seizure disorder, Justine, died after nearly 

drowning in the bathtub at her group home. The Ninth Circuit found that, while her caregivers were 

responsible for coordinating her care and monitoring her regularly, “none of them acted affirmatively to 

place [her] in the way of a danger they had created.” Id. at 847. Rather, “a long bath was one of [her] 

favorite activities--one she frequently enjoyed.” Id. Her “death was caused by the dangers inherent in 

her own physical and mental limitations.” Id. 

[The majority of the panel] respectfully disagree[d] with the dissent that 

Defendants may be liable for a constitutional violation “[b]y ordering 

Justine to take a bath without direct supervision” or that “the ‘routine’ of 

having Justine bathe herself without any necessary precautions was of the 

state’s making.” [671 F.3d] at 848. The only facts in the record show that 

Mitchell had checked on Justine in the tub several times and that, on 

finding her not breathing, called for help, pulled her from the tub, and 

dialed 911. Those facts might show a “lapse in judgment” but not a 

finding of “deliberate indifference,” or an intent “to expose [Justine] to 

such risks without regard to the consequences.” 

Id. (citations omitted).

Similarly, in Johnson v. City of Seattle, 474 F.3d 634, 636-41 (9th Cir. 2007), the Ninth Circuit 

upheld summary judgment for the City of Seattle on a danger creation claim brought by the plaintiffs 

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who were assaulted by members of a crowd at a Mardi Gras celebration. Although Seattle did not have a 

history of violent Mardi Gras celebrations, escalating public violence in the weeks leading up to the 

celebration prompted the police department to develop an aggressive plan to keep the peace. Id. at 636. 

In response to two quiet, peaceful nights preceding the celebration, the police department scaled back its 

officer presence. Id. at 637. Nonetheless, violence broke out in Seattle’s Pioneer Square and expanded to

such an extent that the police officers were ordered to “evacuate” and to remain at the perimeter of the 

crowd. Id. Eventually officers cleared the crowd with chemical agents, but the violence left one person 

dead and dozens injured, including the plaintiffs. Id. The plaintiffs alleged the police department could 

be liable under the danger creation doctrine for abandoning its aggressive plan for crowd control and 

implementing a passive plan to remain at the perimeter of the crowd. Id. at 636. After reviewing Ninth 

Circuit decisions on the danger-creation exception and the Supreme Court’s decision in DeShaney, the 

Ninth Circuit held:

In contrast to the plaintiffs in Wood, Penilla, Munger, Grubbs and 

Kennedy, the Pioneer Square Plaintiffs have failed to offer evidence that 

the Defendants engaged in affirmative conduct that enhanced the dangers 

the Pioneer Square Plaintiffs exposed themselves to by participating in the 

Mardi Gras celebration. The decision to switch from a more aggressive 

operation plan to a more passive one was not affirmative conduct that 

placed the Pioneer Square Plaintiffs in danger, because it did not place 

them in any worse position than they would have been in had the police 

not come up with any operational plan whatsoever.

***

Even if proved not the most effective means to combat the violent conduct 

of private parties, the more passive operational plan that the police 

ultimately implemented did not violate substantive due process because it 

“placed [the Pioneer Square Plaintiffs] in no worse position than that in 

which [they] would have been had [the Defendants] not acted at all.” 

Id. at 641 (quoting Deshaney, 489 U.S. at 201).

Grubbs I, 974 F.2d 119, also is instructive. In that case, a registered nurse employed by a staterun, medium-security custodial institution for male offenders was raped and terrorized by an inmate. Id. 

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at 120. The Ninth Circuit found that Defendants “created the danger” to which the nurse fell victim by 

assigning her attacker to work with her that day. Id. at 121. Defendants knew the attacker “had an 

extraordinary history of unrepentant violence against women and girls; was likely to assault a female if 

left alone with her;... would be alone with [the nurse] during her rounds.” Id. The Ninth Circuit also 

noted that the defendants knew that the plaintiff would be alone with the dangerous coworker, would 

“not be prepared to defend against or take steps to avert an attack because she had not been informed at 

hiring that she would be left alone with violent offenders,” id., and in fact had been led to believe she 

would not be required to work alone with violent sex offenders. Id. at 120. Although the decision in 

Grubbs I does not articulate clearly the nature of the “affirmative act” in that case, the Ninth Circuit 

appears to have relied on both the assignment of the attacker to work with his victim and the related

misrepresentation of the risks inherent to her job as affirmative acts.16

Here, the record plausibly supports a finding that Paris and Glinskas engaged in affirmative 

conduct that was more than a mere omission or failure to act, and that their conduct left Engert “in a 

situation that was more dangerous than the one in which they found him.” The undisputed facts indicate 

that on two occasions Engert was in a position of relative safety away from the door of the house,

waiting for the Deputies to signal him to approach and begin his work. A reasonable jury could find that 

Paris and Glinskas signaling to Engert to approach, both the first and second times, were affirmative acts

that brought Engert into a situation that was more dangerous than the position of relative safety. 

Although Engert was aware of at least some of the background threat information given to the Civil 

 

16 This interpretation is supported by Davis v. Oregon, No. 3-12-cv-635-SI, 2014 WL 2574489, at *2 (D. Or. June 9, 2014), 

which concerned a caregiver who worked at a state-run home for persons who suffer from mental health conditions that cause 

them to act out in violent and aggressive ways such that they are considered dangerous to themselves and others on a daily 

basis. The plaintiff was assigned to work with a resident who eventually brutally attacked her. Id. After recovering from the 

attack and returning to work, Davis was later assigned to work with that resident again. Id. The district court found that 

summary judgment was appropriate as to the period of time before the initial attack because: (1) Davis’s job was inherently 

dangerous and she consented to and had full knowledge of the staffing procedures at the home; and (2) there was nothing that 

would have indicated to the defendants that the risk to Davis was anything beyond the “ordinary, understood, or disclosed 

risks.” Id. at *6. However, summary judgment was inappropriate as to the decision to re-assign Davis to work with her 

attacker again because a reasonable trier of fact could find that the re-assignment placed Davis at a heightened risk because, 

among other things, there was evidence to suggest that the attacker was targeting Davis specifically. Id. at *7. 

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Division, a reasonable jury also could find that Paris’s and Glinskas’s conduct suggested to Engert that 

they had made a potentially dangerous scene safe. This is sufficient for purposes of summary judgment 

to establish the first element of a danger creation claim. 

b. Deliberate Indifference.

As to the second prong of the test articulated in Kennedy, a court “must decide the related issues 

of whether the danger to which” the defendant exposed plaintiff “was known or obvious, and whether 

[defendant] acted with deliberate indifference to it.” 439 F.3d at 1064. “[D]eliberate indifference is a 

stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious 

consequence of his actions.” Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997). To establish the state 

officials acted with deliberate indifference to a danger they allegedly created, a plaintiff must show “(1) 

an unusually serious risk of harm, ... (2) defendant’s actual knowledge of (or, at least, willful blindness 

to) that elevated risk, and (3) defendant’s failure to take obvious steps to address that known, serious 

risk.” L.W. v. Grubbs, 92 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Grubbs II”).

(1) Unusually Serious Risk of Harm/Defendants’ Knowledge Thereof.

The first two steps of the deliberate indifference analysis—whether there is an unusually serious 

risk of harm and whether Defendants had knowledge of that risk—can be evaluated together in this case 

by focusing only on the information that was recorded on the eviction questionnaire, as it is undisputed 

Paris and Glinskas both read and considered that information.

Defendants make much of the fact that there was no specific threat (e.g., a specific verbal or 

written threat by the occupant to act violently toward the eviction personnel). However, there need not 

be a specific threat to the plaintiff. In Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989), for example, 

police arrested an intoxicated driver and impounded his automobile, leaving a female passenger on the 

side of the road five miles away from her home on a cold night in a high-crime area without a jacket or 

money. The passenger accepted a ride from a stranger who drove her to a secluded area and raped her. 

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Id. at 586. The Ninth Circuit held that because the defendant officer knew the area had a high crime rate 

and, “as a matter of common sense,” understood the risks faced by the plaintiff, a jury could reasonably 

find the officer acted with deliberate indifference. Id. at 590.

It is undisputed that Paris and Glinskas were aware of the warnings presented on the eviction 

questionnaire, namely that: (1) the occupant being evicted from the Property was ex-military; (2) there 

was a camera-video surveillance system at the Property; (3) the occupant had weapons, including M16-

type guns; (4) there was an extra strength security door on the front of the residence; (5) that the 

occupant was “possibly” violent; and (6) was a “weird weirdo.” DUMF ## 9-10. A reasonable juror 

could find that, “as a matter of common sense,” this presented an unusually serious risk of harm, 

especially in light of record evidence suggesting that numerous employees within the Civil Division, 

including Juarez and Martinez, found the information alarming enough to warrant special steps be taken 

to flag the information. 

(2) Failure to Take Obvious Steps to Address the Risk.

The final factor to be considered is whether Defendants failed to take obvious steps to address 

the risks. The undisputed evidence indicates that Paris and Glinskas did take some obvious steps to 

address the risks at the Property. They approached the house without Engert and looked for signs of the 

occupant. Only after this did Paris and Glinskas invite Engert to approach the house. Moreover, when 

Engert said he heard a noise, they directed him to a position of safety and did not allow him to resume 

until they had checked for danger. 

However, a reasonable jury could find that Paris and Glinskas failed to take additional, obvious 

steps to address the risk. For example, in another eviction in 2011, where specific threats had been made 

by a known, quasi-vigilante group with a history of conflict with law enforcement and tax officials, and 

where specific, written threats had been placed on the lawn of the residence, Martinez called in 

additional law enforcement and the eviction ended safely. MUMF #11. Martinez concedes that such an 

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approach easily could have been followed in the eviction at issue in the present case. Id. A reasonable 

jury could find that this was an obvious step that could have been taken to address the risks presented by 

this eviction.17

(3) Proximate Cause. 

Relatedly, in danger creation exception cases, the Ninth Circuit has required the injury caused to 

Plaintiff be a foreseeable consequence of the risk. For Example, in Lawrence v. United States, 340 F.3d 

952 (9th Cir. 2003), the Ninth Circuit refused to impose danger creation liability upon two officers who 

approved the request of a convicted drug trafficker to work as a counselor at a group home for juveniles. 

The felon later sexually abused a youth at the group home. Id. at 954. Because the felon’s criminal 

history consisted of a drug trafficking conviction and no crimes of violence or sexual abuse, while it 

might have been foreseeable that the felon would distribute illegal drugs to the residents of the group 

home, it was not foreseeable that he would sexually abuse them. Id. at 957. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit 

concluded that plaintiff failed to show the defendant officer’s conduct was the proximate cause of her 

injuries. Id. 

Kennedy clarified the standard, stating in a footnote that the Ninth Circuit has “never required 

that, for a danger to exist, the exact injury inflicted by a third party must have been foreseeable. Instead, 

the state actor is liable for creating the foreseeable danger of injury given the particular circumstances.” 

439 F.3d at 1064 n. 5. The Ninth Circuit cited Wood as an example: 

In Wood, we did not speculate, nor require, that [the defendant officer] 

foreseeably knew Wood would in fact be raped by a passing motorist. We 

held he could be liable, however, for leaving Wood in a situation more 

dangerous than the one she already faced, i.e., for stranding her alone in a 

known high-crime area at 2:30 a.m. See Wood, 879 F.2d at 590. 

Id. 

 

17

 

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Here, if the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, Engert’s death was the 

foreseeable consequence of the risks known to Paris and Glinskas at the time of the eviction. They had 

information to suggest there might be an armed, possibly violent “weirdo” at the Property. A jury need 

not find that Paris and/or Glinskas knew Ferrario would in fact shoot Engert, just that Engert’s death was 

a foreseeable consequence of exposing him to the risks identified in the trip ticket. 

In sum, Plaintiffs have presented evidence that could support a jury verdict in their favor on a 

danger creation claim against Paris and Glinskas.

4. Was the Right Clearly Established?

Having found that the record could support a finding that Paris and Glinskas committed a 

constitutional violation, the Court proceeds to the second step of the qualified immunity analysis. “For 

the second step in the qualified immunity analysis—whether the constitutional right was clearly 

established at the time of the conduct—the critical question is whether the contours of the right were 

‘sufficiently clear’ that every ‘reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates 

that right.’” Mattos, 661 F.3d at 442 (quoting al–Kidd, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. at 2083). 

“[W]hether the law was clearly established must be undertaken in light of the specific context of 

the case[.]” Estate of Ford v. Ramirez–Palmer, 301 F.3d 1043, 1050 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation and 

internal marks omitted). In making this determination, courts consider the state of the law at the time of 

the alleged violation and the information possessed by the official to determine whether a reasonable 

official in a particular factual situation should have been on notice that his or her conduct was illegal. 

Inouye v. Kemna, 504 F.3d 705, 712 (9th Cir. 2007); Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002) (the 

“salient question” to the qualified immunity analysis is whether the state of the law at the time gave “fair 

warning” to the officials that their conduct was unconstitutional). “[W]here there is no case directly on 

point, ‘existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.’ ” 

C.B. v. City of Sonora, 769 F.3d 1005, 1026 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing al–Kidd, 131 S.Ct. at 2083). An 

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official’s subjective beliefs are irrelevant. Inouye, 504 F.3d at 712. However, “closely analogous 

preexisting case law is not required to show that a right was clearly established.” Clairmont v. Sound 

Mental Health, 632 F.3d 1091, 1109 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal citations and quotations omitted). While 

“there must be some parallel or comparable factual pattern[,] ... the facts of already decided cases do not 

have to match precisely the facts with which [the government employer] is confronted.” Id. 

The Court finds the Ninth Circuit’s qualified immunity analysis in Kennedy informative, 

although not precisely analogous. The Ninth Circuit articulated the general state of the law as of 1998, 

the year of the incident at issue in Kennedy: 

It is beyond dispute that in September 1998, it was clearly established that 

state officials could be held liable where they affirmatively and with 

deliberate indifference placed an individual in danger she would not 

otherwise have faced. This court first recognized the theory of statecreated danger liability almost ten years before the events in this case in 

Wood. In the interim, we published three decisions explicitly recognizing 

such liability under three distinct factual scenarios. See Grubbs, 974 F.2d 

119; Koon, 34 F.3d 1416; Penilla, 115 F.3d 707. Indeed, almost three 

years before the actions at issue in this case, we concluded “the law was 

clearly established that officers may be liable where they affirmatively 

place an individual in danger.” See Munger, 227 F.3d at 1086.8 We have 

explained before that the responsibility for keeping abreast of 

constitutional developments rests “squarely on the shoulders of law 

enforcement officials. Given the power of such officials over our liberty, 

and sometimes over our lives, this placement of responsibility is entirely 

proper.” Wood, 879 F.2d at 595 (quoting Ward v. County of San Diego, 

791 F.2d 1329, 1332 (9th Cir. 1986)). 

439 F.3d at 1065.

18 In light of these general principles, the Ninth Circuit concluded “that no reasonable 

officer in Shields’s position, knowing what he knew, could have concluded that Kennedy had no right 

not to be placed in physical danger by his deliberately indifferent action.” Id. Responding to the 

dissent’s call for a “finer resolution” of analysis, the Ninth Circuit first implicitly rejected the idea that 

any finer resolution was required. Id. Then, assuming arguendo that finder resolution was needed, the 

 

18 Defendants argue that the Ninth Circuit’s jurisprudence on the danger creation exception is in contravention of that of the 

Supreme Court and other Circuits. Doc. 131 at 18. This is an argument that must be directed to the Court of Appeals or a 

higher court. This Court is bound to apply Ninth Circuit precedent. 

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Ninth Circuit concluded that the facts in Kennedy were not “meaningfully distinguishable” from those 

articulated in Grubbs I.

In Grubbs, a registered nurse working at a medium security custodial 

institution brought a § 1983 claim against her supervisors after she was 

allegedly raped and terrorized by a young male inmate. According to the 

plaintiff, her employer had told her she would not be working alone with 

violent sex offenders. Notwithstanding that representation, her employer 

subsequently allowed an inmate prone to violence against women to work 

with her unsupervised. The plaintiff, relying upon that representation, did 

not take all the precautions she might otherwise have taken, and was 

subsequently assaulted.

In Grubbs, as in this case, a state official affirmatively acted: supervisor 

Grubbs assigned a violent sex offender to work closely with L.W., and 

Officer Shields notified Burns, leaving Kennedy unable to protect her 

family. In Grubbs, as in this case, those state actions left plaintiffs exposed 

to the danger of the subsequent physical assault and injury they in fact 

suffered. And in both cases the plaintiff relied upon the state actor’s 

representation and did not take protective measures she otherwise would 

have taken, and the state’s action made plaintiffs vulnerable to a 

particularized danger they would not have faced but for that action.

Indeed, in this case, as in Grubbs, Shields used his “authority as a state ... 

officer to create an opportunity for [Burns] to assault [Kennedy] that 

would not have otherwise existed.” Grubbs, 974 F.2d at 121. Moreover, 

Kennedy, like L.W., “is not seeking to hold Defendant[ ] liable for 

[Burns’s] violent proclivities. Rather, [she] seeks to make Defendant[ ] 

answer for [his] acts that independently created the opportunity for and 

facilitated [Burns’s] assault on her.” Id. at 122. At bottom Kennedy’s 

claim is exactly like L.W.’s, i.e., that a state actor “enhanced [her] 

vulnerability to attack by misrepresenting to her the risks” she faced. Id. at 

121. No reasonable officer in Shields’s position, knowing what he 

allegedly knew and what he must be charged with knowing, could have 

concluded otherwise than that Kennedy had a right not to be placed in 

obvious physical danger as a result of his deliberately indifferent action.

Kennedy, 439 F.3d at 1065-67.

The question is whether the present case and earlier cases are sufficiently similar that Paris and 

Glinskas would have had fair warning that their actions were unlawful. See Decoria v. County of 

Jefferson, 333 Fed. App’x 171, 173 (9th Cir. 2009). Here, the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable 

to Plaintiffs, reveals two officers who affirmatively cleared an unarmed civilian to participate in an 

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eviction, despite the existence of information suggesting, among other things, that the occupant might be 

violent and might possess high-powered weapons. The Court finds that, taken together, Woods and 

Grubbs I put Defendants on notice that their conduct was potentially unlawful. These cases stand for the 

proposition that officials may not take affirmative actions to place a civilian into a dangerous situation 

where common sense indicates a high risk of serious harm. Here, if Plaintiffs’ facts are accepted, 

Defendants did just that by inviting Engert to begin drilling the front door. Viewing the facts in a light 

most favorable to Plaintiffs, this case cannot meaningfully be distinguished from Woods and Grubbs I. 

Contrary to Defendants’ assertions, this case does not present a mere “qualm” with law 

enforcement strategy akin to that addressed in Johnson. There, the Ninth Circuit found the danger 

creation exception could not apply because there was no evidence of an affirmative act. The adoption of 

a “more passive operational plan ... did not violate substantive due process because it placed [the 

plaintiffs] in no worse position than that in which they would have been had the Defendants not acted at 

all.” 474 F.3d 641. Here, as discussed above, at least one additional affirmative act took place—inviting 

Engert to the door of the Property. Existing Ninth Circuit precedent put Paris and Glinskas on notice that 

this conduct could trigger Fourteenth Amendment liability. 

Paris’s and Glinskas’s motion for summary judgment that they are entitled to qualified immunity 

as to Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claim therefore is DENIED. This denial is without prejudice to 

appropriate post-trial motions, depending on factual findings by the jury.

5. Martinez.

Plaintiffs allege Martinez is liable for his conduct as a supervisor. Plaintiffs also allege Martinez 

is liable directly under the danger creation doctrine for his own conduct. 

a. Supervisory Liability Generally.

It is well-established that supervisory personnel “may not be held liable for the unconstitutional 

conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 

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676 (2009) (italics in original). Rather, a plaintiff must establish that each individual supervisory 

government official defendant, “through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the 

Constitution.” Id. Thus, supervisory liability can be imposed only if (1) the supervisor was personally 

involved in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) there is a sufficient causal connection between the 

supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation. Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th 

Cir. 1989).

“The requisite causal connection can be established ... by setting in motion a series of acts by 

others,” or by “knowingly refusing to terminate a series of acts by others, which the supervisor knew or 

reasonably should have known would cause others to inflict a constitutional injury.” Starr v. Baca, 652 

F.3d 1202, 1207-08 (9th Cir. 2011). “A supervisor can be liable in his individual capacity for his own 

culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of his subordinates; for his 

acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation; or for conduct that showed a reckless or callous 

indifference to the rights of others.” Id. More specifically, the Ninth Circuit has recognized that 

supervisory liability may be imposed: (1) for setting in motion a series of acts by others, or knowingly 

refusing to terminate a series of acts by others, which they knew or reasonably should have known 

would cause others to inflict constitutional injury; (2) for culpable action or inaction in training, 

supervision, or control of subordinates; (3) for acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation by 

subordinates; or (4) for conduct that shows a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others. 

Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir.1991). Because supervisory liability is personal 

liability, an official against whom a claim of supervisory liability is advanced may assert the affirmative 

defense of qualified immunity. al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 963-65 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d on other 

grounds al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074.

//

//

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(1) Supervision and Control.

 

 

19

 

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(2) Acquiescence. 

“[W]here the applicable constitutional standard is deliberate indifference, a plaintiff may state a 

claim for supervisory liability based upon the supervisor’s knowledge of and acquiescence in 

unconstitutional conduct by others.” Hydrick v. Hunter, 669 F.3d 937, 941 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal 

citation and quotations omitted). Plaintiffs assert that Martinez is potentially liable for acquiescing in the 

conduct of his subordinates. 

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However, the record does plausibly support a more narrow acquiescence claim. It is undisputed 

that Martinez was aware of the information on the trip ticket. He conceded that the confluence of 

warnings documented there was unusual, stating that he might see such a combination of factors 

“perhaps once a year.” Nevertheless, Martinez acquiesced in permitting the eviction to proceed under 

normal protocol, as opposed to requiring a more tactical approach, despite his knowledge that a civilian 

locksmith was likely to be present. See Martinez Depo. at 33:14-16. A reasonable finder of fact could 

conclude that Martinez acquiesced in the protocol used to effectuate the eviction at the Property. If the 

finder of fact determines that the protocol utilized supports liability against Paris and Glinskas, 

Martinez’s equal knowledge of the underlying circumstances leading up to the approach to the residence 

exposes him to potential liability as well. The Court does not believe that the qualified immunity 

analysis would differ in any material way from that applicable to the analysis of Paris’s and Glinskas’s 

direct liability, even though Martinez’s liability would be premised on his supervisory role. 

Martinez’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED as to this narrow form of acquiescence 

liability. 

(3) Reckless or Callous Indifference. 

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The Ninth Circuit recently addressed the meaning of “reckless or callous indifference” and 

equated it to “deliberate indifference.” 

The precise distinction between “deliberate indifference” and “reckless or 

callous indifference” remains an open question. As discussed above, 

“deliberate indifference” is defined in this circuit as “the conscious choice 

to disregard the consequences of one’s acts or omissions.” See 9th Cir. 

Civ. Jury Instr. 9.7 (2007). Furthermore, when the Supreme Court 

articulated the deliberate-indifference standard for failure-to-protect 

claims in Farmer, it defined the standard as one of criminal recklessness. 

See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837–39. The circular nature of these definitions 

gives rise to the inference that the terms are synonymous. 

Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, ___ F.3d ___, 2015 WL 1948146, at *9 (9th Cir. May 1, 2015). On the 

present record, because there is sufficient evidence to support a finding of deliberate indifference as to 

the Fourteenth Amendment claims against Paris and Glinskas, Martinez is not entitled to summary 

judgment on the theory that he acted with reckless or callous disregard for Engert’s safety. 

Martinez’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED as to a “reckless or callous indifference” 

theory of liability premised upon the asserted failure to require a more tactical response to the eviction. 

b. Martinez’s Direct Liability. 

Plaintiffs also assert that Martinez is liable under a direct liability theory. As mentioned above, to 

establish Martinez’s direct liability, Plaintiffs must prove: (1) official (state) action that affirmatively 

placed an individual in danger; and (2) deliberate indifference to that danger. Kennedy, 439 F.3d at 

1055. 

Plaintiffs’ direct liability claims against Martinez fail because Plaintiffs cannot establish 

affirmative conduct. 

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The only other “acts” Plaintiffs mention in connection with Martinez are actually omissions. For 

example, Plaintiffs complain that Martinez “t[ook] virtually no precautions to mitigate the risk.”20

Satisfaction of the “affirmative act” element of a danger creation claim requires more than an “omission 

or failure to act.” See Jamison, 426 F. Supp. 2d at 1155. 

Martinez is entitled to summary judgment as to any direct liability claim against him. 

6. Harper. 

Plaintiffs assert Harper is liable under various theories of supervisory liability. As was the case 

with Martinez, Plaintiffs concede that they do not assert a failure to train claim against Harper. 

 

B. State Law Negligence/Wrongful Death Claim. 

1. Allegations in the SAC. 

 Plaintiffs’ seventh cause of action for “Negligence/Wrongful Death”21 is brought under 

California Code of Civil Procedure §§ 377.60 and 377.61. SAC at ¶ 109. Plaintiffs allege that “[p]rior to 

 

20 Martinez did engage in certain affirmative acts in connection with preparation for the eviction at the Property, including 

instructing Juarez to highlight the threat-based information on the trip ticket. However, as all parties appear to concede, this 

precautionary act, although perhaps an insufficient one, did not endanger Engert. See Doc. 182 at 23. 

21 The Court will refer to the claim as “Plaintiffs’ negligence claim.”

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April 12, 2012, Defendants knew or should have known that [] Ferrario was armed, dangerous, mentally 

disturbed, and posed a real and present threat to anyone who approached his residence, especially law 

enforcement personnel and anyone else involved in attempted to evict [him].” Id. at ¶ 110. Plaintiffs 

contend that “Defendants created a special relationship with [] Engert through a promise, either express 

or implied through conduct, that it would be safe for him to be at the Ferrario residence.” Id. “The 

deputies made this express or implied promise both before and after hearing sounds from within the 

[Property], including that they would protect him from any danger,” and Engert “relied on these ... 

promises to his detriment.” Id. at ¶ 111. Plaintiffs assert that Defendants owed Engert “a duty to act with 

due care to avoid unnecessary or unjustified harm,” and they breached that duty. Id. at ¶ 112. 

Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that “Paris and Glinskas recklessly, carelessly and negligently 

approached the [Property] with [] Engert, thereby placing Engert directly in harm’s way and in the line 

of fire.” Id. at ¶ 113. Finally, Plaintiffs assert that the supervisory Defendants owed Engert “a duty to 

hire, train, and supervise its employees so as not to cause harm to Decedent, and to prevent the violation 

of his legal rights,” and they “breached this duty through the hiring, failure to train, and failure to 

supervise Sheriff’s personnel responsible for causing or increasing the risk of harm to [Engert].” Id. at ¶ 

115. 

In sum, Plaintiffs argue that Ferrario’s shooting and killing Engert “were foreseeable and were 

the legal and proximate result of Defendants’ negligence in failing to exercise reasonable care to prevent 

injuries and death to non-law enforcement personnel working alongside and at the direction of Sheriff’s 

deputies and the [P]roperty owner,” id. at ¶ 116, and that, as a result of Defendants’ alleged negligence, 

Plaintiffs have suffered various damages resulting from Engert’s death. Id. at ¶ 117.22

 

22 The SAC also includes RT Financial and Roberts as defendants in this Negligence/Wrongful Death claim. Id. at ¶ 114. 

Roberts and Plaintiffs have entered into a settlement agreement. See Doc. 200. The status of the claims against RT Financial 

remains unclear. RT Financial has not moved for summary judgment. 

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2. Plaintiffs Fail to Oppose Motion for Summary Judgment as to the State Law Claims

Against Harper. 

Harper moved for summary judgment as to all of the state law claims against him. Doc. 131 at 22-

23. Plaintiffs failed to oppose that motion. See Doc. 196 at 9. Harper notes that Plaintiffs’ negligence 

claim against him “is not premised on [his] personal involvement in the actual incident, but rather only 

vaguely alleges that [he] was involved in employment and training decisions.” Doc. 131 at 32 (citing 

SAC at ¶ 115). Under California Government Code 820.8 (“§ 820.8”), “a public employee may not be 

held individually liable based on a respondeat superior theory of liability; supervisors may, however, be 

held liable for injuries caused by their own acts or omissions.” Bass v. City of Fremont, No. C12-4943 

THE, 2013 WL 891090, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2013); Doe v. Beard, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2014 WL 

6473423, at *9 n.8 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2014) (§ 820.8 “does not exonerate a public employee from 

liability for injury proximately caused by his own negligent or wrongful act or omission”). California 

public entities and their employees are immune from negligence claims under California Government 

Code § 815(a), “unless there is a statutory basis for the negligence claim.” Manning v. City of Rohnert 

Park, No. C 06-3435 SBA, 2006 WL 3591149, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2006) (citing Eastburn v. 

Regional Fire Protection Auth., 31 Cal.4th 1175, 1179-80 (2003)). This holding applies to “a common 

law tort claim of negligence against a city and police chief by a plaintiff attempting to hold the police 

chief, not directly involved in the incident in that case, liable for the negligent ‘selection, training, 

retention, supervision, and discipline of police officers.’” Id. (citing Munoz v. City of Union City, 120 

Cal. App. 4th 1077, 1111-12 (2003)); see also Sanders v. City of Fresno, No. 05-469-AWI-SMS, 2006 

WL 1883394, at *8 (E.D. Cal. July 7, 2006) (“The Munoz Court disallowed theories of ‘negligent 

supervision, hiring, etc.’ as against Union City and [Police] Chief [] since such theories are not set forth 

in any requisite statutes, as required by Eastburn.”). Plaintiffs have not provided—and the Court cannot 

find—any statutory basis for finding Harper liable under California law for their negligence claim. 

Accordingly, Harper’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s negligence claim is GRANTED. 

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Likewise, the County is immune from liability for any state claims predicated upon Harper’s 

action. See Cal. Gov. Code § 815.2 (“a public entity is not liable for an injury resulting from an act or

omission of an employee of the public entity where the employee is immune from liability”); 

Kemmemer v. Cnty. of Fresno, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1426, 1435 (1988) (“Though [California Government 

Code] sections 821.6 and 820.2 expressly immunize only the employee, if the employee is immune, so 

too is the County.”). 

3. Immunity Under Cal. Gov. § 820.2.

All remaining Defendants argue they are immune from liability for negligence/wrongful death 

pursuant to California Government Code § 820.2 (“§ 820.2”), which provides in relevant part: “Except 

as otherwise provided by statute, a public employee is not liable for an injury resulting from his act or 

omission where the act or omission was the result of the exercise of the discretion vested in him.” 

“‘Immunity is reserved for those ‘basic policy decisions [which have] . . . been [expressly] committed to 

coordinate branches of government,’ and as to which judicial interference would thus be ‘unseemly.’” 

Gillan v. City of San Marino, 147 Cal. App. 4th 1033, 1051 (2007) (quoting Johnson, 69 Cal.2d at 793) 

(emphasis in original). 

“[N]ot all acts requiring a public employee to choose among alternatives entail the use of 

‘discretion’ within the meaning of section 820.2.” Barner v. Leeds, 24 Cal 4th 676, 684-85 (2000). 

“[C]ourts must distinguish between public employees’ policy decisions and their operational, or 

ministerial, decisions.” AE ex rel. Hernandez v. Cnty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 639 (9th Cir. 2012). “An 

act or omission is considered discretionary (and subject to immunity) where it involves planning and 

policymaking.” Nasrawi v. Buck Consultants LLC, 231 Cal. App. 4th 328, 341 (2014) (internal citation 

and quotation omitted). Decisions entitled to immunity under § 820.6 therefore require “comparisons, 

choices, judgments, and evaluations, [which] comprise[] the very essence of the exercise of 

‘discretion.’” Thompson v. Cnty. of Alameda, 27 Cal.3d 741, 749 (1980). 

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“On the other hand, there is no basis for immunizing lower level decisions that merely 

implement a basic policy already formulated.” Barner, 24 Cal.4th at 685. Accordingly, “[t]here is no 

immunity ‘if the injury . . . results, not from the employee’s exercise of discretion vested in him to 

undertake the act, but from his negligence in performing it after having made the discretionary decision 

to do so.” Martinez v. City of Los Angeles, 141 F.3d 1373, 1379 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting McCorkle v. 

City of Los Angeles, 70 Cal.2d 252, 261 (1969)). 

Courts have found the following to constitute discretionary decisions for which police officers 

are immune under § 820.2:

(1) the decision to pursue a fleeing vehicle (Hernandez v. City of Pomona

(2009) 46 Cal.4th 501, 519 & fn. 13 [noting that, while long line of Court 

of Appeal decisions have held that negligence liability may not be based 

on officer’s decision to engage in vehicle pursuit, the California Supreme 

Court has never ruled on question]; Bratt v. City and County of San 

Francisco (1975) 50 Cal. App. 3d 550, 553); (2) the decision to 

investigate or not investigate a vehicle accident (McCarthy v. Frost (1973) 

33 Cal.App.3d 872, 875; (3) the failure to make an arrest or to take some 

protective action less drastic than arrest (Michenfelder v. City of Torrance

(1972) 28 Cal. App. 3d 202, 206); (4) the decision whether to use official 

authority to resolve a dispute (Watts v. County of Sacramento (1982) 136 

Cal. App. 3d 232, 234-235); and (5) the decision whether to remove a 

stranded vehicle (Posey v. State of California (1986) 180 Cal. App. 3d 

836, 850; Bonds v. State of California ex. rel. Cal. Highway Patrol (1982) 

138 Cal. App. 3d 314, 321-322).

Conway v. Cnty. of Tuolumne, 231 Cal. App. 4th 1005, 1015 (2014) (parallel citations omitted).

However, officers “are not immune under section 820.2 when their acts are ministerial or public 

policy dictates against immunity.” Id. Courts have determined discretionary immunity does not apply to:

(1) an officer’s conduct of an accident investigation after the officer made 

the discretionary decision to undertake the investigation (Green v. City of 

Livermore (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 82, 87–89) . . . (2) arresting the wrong 

person while executing a warrant (Bell v. State of California (1998) 63 

Cal. App. 4th 919, 929; (3) deciding to arrest an individual when there was 

no probable cause to do so (Gillan v. City of San Marino (2007) 147 Cal.

App. 4th 1033, 1047, 1051; and (4) using unreasonable force when 

making an arrest or overcoming resistance to it (Scruggs v. Haynes (1967) 

252 Cal. App. 2d 256, 264–268). 

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Conway, 231 Cal. App. 4th at 1015 (parallel citations omitted). 

In applying § 820.2, a court must make determinations regarding “the category into which the 

particular act falls: i.e., whether it was ministerial because it amounted only to an obedience to orders, or 

the performance of a duty in which the officer is left no choice of his own, or discretionary because it 

required ‘personal deliberation, decision and judgment.” McCorkle v. City of Los Angeles, 70 Cal. 2d 

252, 260-61 (1969). Critically, immunity may not be based solely on grounds that “the affected 

employee’s general course of duties is discretionary.” Caldwell v. Montoya, 10 Cal. 4th 972, 983 (1995) 

(internal citations and quotations omitted). Rather, the affirmative defense of discretionary immunity 

“requires a showing that the specific conduct giving rise to the suit involved an actual exercise of 

discretion, i.e., a conscious balancing of risks and advantages.” Id. While “a strictly careful, thorough, 

formal, or correct evaluation” is not required, the party seeking immunity must have made an “actual, 

conscious, and considered collective policy decision....” Id. 

Conway, 231 Cal. App. 4th at 1018-19, provides an excellent summary of the caselaw applied to 

a reasonably analogous situation. In Conway, a SWAT team responded to a report of a known felon 

firing shots at his roommate. Id. at 1009-10. A standoff ensued, and initial efforts to resolve the situation 

peacefully proved unsuccessful. Id. at 1010. The officer who requested the SWAT team then reviewed 

the offender’s criminal history and requested permission to deploy tear gas canisters to resolve the 

standoff. Id. The SWAT team deployed the tear gas, broke down the front door, ignited a flash bang 

device, and entered the house. Id. No one was inside. Id. They later found the shooter in another area. Id. 

at 1011. The tear gas residue, however, could not be removed from the residence, rendering it 

uninhabitable. Id. The owner, George, sued for negligence. Id. Defendants contended they were immune 

from liability pursuant to § 802.2. 

In reviewing the assertion of immunity, California’s Fifth District Court of Appeal examined 

several cases applying these standards to police conduct. Its explanations and reasoning are worth 

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considering in full detail: 

In McCorkle, a police officer was called to the scene of an automobile 

accident. On his arrival, he talked to the plaintiff, who was involved in the 

accident, on the corner of the intersection. Without setting out flares or 

interrupting the sequence of the traffic signals, the officer walked to the 

center of the intersection, followed by the plaintiff, and asked the plaintiff 

to show him the skidmarks. The plaintiff was struck by an automobile that 

entered the intersection on a green light and later sued the officer and 

others for negligence. (McCorkle, supra, 70 Cal.2d at pp. 255, 259–260.) 

The jury found in the plaintiff’s favor and against the City of Los Angeles. 

(Id. at p. 255.) [The California] Supreme Court rejected the city’s 

argument that the officer was immune from liability under section 820.2. 

(McCorkle, supra, at pp. 260–262.) *** The court concluded that, even if 

the officer exercised his discretion in undertaking the accident 

investigation, “section 820.2 did not clothe him with immunity from the 

consequence of his negligence in conducting it. He would have been 

immune if plaintiff’s injury had been the result of [the officer’s] exercise 

of discretion. [Citations.] It was not: it resulted from his negligence after 

the discretion, if any, had been exercised.” (McCorkle, supra, 70 Cal.2d at 

pp. 261–262.) The court [also] held that, because there was no causal 

connection between the exercise of discretion and the injury, statutory 

immunity did not apply. (Id. at p. 262.)

In Bratt, police officers decided to pursue a fleeing vehicle through city 

streets; during the pursuit, the car the officers were chasing collided with 

another vehicle. The occupants of that vehicle sought damages for 

personal injuries and wrongful deaths that occurred in the collision. (Bratt, 

supra, 50 Cal.App.3d at p. 552.) On appeal from a judgment of nonsuit in 

favor of the City and County of San Francisco, the Court of Appeal, 

noting that the only police conduct that caused the accident was the 

decision to pursue the fleeing vehicle, held that decision to be a 

discretionary act protected by section 820.2. (Bratt, supra, at p. 553, 123 

Cal.Rptr. 774.) The court found the case distinguishable from McCorkle, 

as in McCorkle there was no causal connection between the exercise of 

discretion and the injury, while the only negligence alleged was the 

“officers’ decision to give high speed chase rather than in the officers’

execution of that decision.” (Bratt, supra, at p. 554, 123 Cal.Rptr. 774.)

George asserts these cases demonstrate that only the decision to deploy the 

SWAT team, not the SWAT team’s conduct after being deployed, is 

entitled to immunity. But, as explained in Watts, George relies on the false 

assumption that once police decide to intervene in a dispute, any 

subsequent action by the police is ministerial. (Watts, supra, 136 

Cal.App.3d at p. 235.) Instead, each decision must be examined to 

determine whether it constitutes a discretionary or ministerial decision. In 

this case, the decision to use tear gas resulted from choices and judgments 

made in response to changing circumstances; it was not made in blind 

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obedience to orders. The difference between this case and McCorkle is 

that here, the decision to use tear gas was based on personal deliberation, 

decision and judgment, while asking the plaintiff in McCorkle to come 

into the intersection involved no such deliberation, decision, or judgment.

The other cases upon which George relies do not compel a different result. 

In Bell, the appellate court held that officers who executed an arrest 

warrant on the wrong person, without a reasonable basis for concluding 

the arrestee was the man they sought, were not entitled to discretionary 

immunity under section 820.2 because they did not exercise the level of 

discretion required for immunity to apply, as their actions did not involve 

an actual exercise of discretion, i.e., a conscious balancing of risks and 

advantages, or constitute a basic policy decision. (Bell, supra, 63 

Cal.App.4th at p. 929.) In Gillan, the appellate court held section 820.2 

immunity did not apply to the police’s decision to arrest the plaintiff, 

which was found to be without probable cause, as that decision “was not a 

basic policy decision, but only an operational decision by the police 

purporting to apply the law.” (Gillan, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 1051.)

In Ogborn v. City of Lancaster (2002) 101 Cal. App. 4th 448, the plaintiffs 

sued the city and individual city officials for various claims arising out of 

the city’s demolition of their rented home and its contents as part of a 

nuisance abatement program. (Id. at p. 453.) The appellate court held that 

the city employee charged with administering the program, who conducted 

a hearing at which the property on which the house sat was declared a 

public nuisance and sent a letter to that effect, was immune under section 

820.2 because his participation was limited to making the discretionary 

policy decision to declare the property a nuisance. (Ogborn, supra, at p. 

461.) The appellate court, however, held the code enforcement officer who 

actively participated in the implementation of the program with respect to 

the property by giving the order for the bulldozer to demolish the 

plaintiffs’ house and all their belongings was not immune because his 

actions constituted subsequent ministerial actions implementing the basic 

policy decision to declare the property a nuisance. (Id. at pp. 454, 455–

456.) We find the decisions made in the present case very different from 

the ones in these cases. The arrest of a suspected armed assailant mandates 

decisions affecting public safety; liability for such split-second decisions 

conceivably could hamstring officials with unpleasant results. George 

argues that by extending immunity in this case, every action by an officer, 

no matter how minor, will be subject to immunity as long as the officer 

states he or she made a choice between two options. Our decision, 

however, is not that broad. We hold only that, given the importance of the 

decisions involved and the potential impact of liability on these decisions, 

section 820.2 provides immunity for the officers’ actions here under the 

authority set forth in Caldwell.

Conway, 231 Cal. App. 4th at 1018-20 (parallel citations omitted). 

The situation here is not precisely analogous. Among other things, the efficient execution of a 

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Writ of Possession, while an important aspect of civil process, is not nearly as important to society as the 

arrest of a suspected armed assailant. Nonetheless, the Court believes it is appropriate to apply § 802.2 

immunity to some of the acts at issue in this case. 

 

The only remaining act for which Martinez could be liable is his decision to allow the eviction to 

proceed under normal protocols, as opposed to proceeding with the use of a more tactical response. 

However, the undisputed evidence suggests this was the product of deliberation. Martinez reviewed the 

information on the trip ticket, told Juarez to highlight it, and deliberately did not direct the use of a 

tactical team, instead permitting the Deputies assigned to make that call because facts on the ground 

were pertinent to the decision-making. See generally Martinez Depo at 41-41. This was, in effect, a 

deliberate policy decision to defer tactical decision-making to the Deputies in the field. The Court 

cannot find any basis upon which to meaningfully distinguish this situation from those in which § 802.2 

immunity applied. Martinez’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ negligence claim is 

GRANTED.23

With respect to Paris and Glinskas, the Court breaks the eviction down into the following 

separate events, as described by Defendants Paris and Glinskas: 

(1) the initial contact [with Engert] in front of the property, (2) the 

approach to the property, (3) indicating Plaintiff to the side during the 

initial assessment and announcement, and then commencement of the 

eviction, and (4) pointing Plaintiff to the side a second time during the 

 

23 Plaintiffs argue that Defendants may not avail themselves of § 820.2 immunity where there is no causal connection 

between the exercise of discretion and the injury. Doc. 182 at 48. Here, the Court has applied only this form of immunity to 

acts that are causally connected to the injury. Plaintiffs, in fact, argue repeatedly that these acts are causally connected to the 

injury. 

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investigation of the unidentified noise, and resumption of the eviction.

Doc. 102 at 21. 

As to the initial contact with Engert, Plaintiffs assert that Paris and Glinskas failed to provide 

appropriate warnings to Engert about the dangers associated with the eviction. California courts have 

held that “the decision to warn or not warn of foreseeable, latent dangers does not rise to the level of a 

basic police decision” entitled to immunity under § 820.2. Wallace v. City of Los Angeles, 12 Cal. App. 

4th 1385, 1403 (1993) (footnote omitted). In Wallace, for instance, the court held that a detective’s 

“decision to offer [a woman] to the district attorney as a prosecution witness may have been a 

discretionary one . . . [but] his subsequent decisions to refrain from warning her about the danger 

associated with her role as witness and refrain from offering her protection were not.” Id. at n.10. The 

Court therefore finds that, as a matter of law, a failure to warn is not protected by § 820.2 immunity and 

Paris’s and Glinskas’s motion for summary judgment that they are entitled to § 820.2 immunity with 

respect to any failure to warn claim is DENIED.

The second and third steps -- the approach to the Property and the first invitation to Engert to 

begin drilling the door -- can be treated together. The undisputed evidence indicates that Glinskas and 

Paris reviewed the trip ticket and decided to approach the eviction on their own. Glinskas Depo. at 99:5-

14 (Glinskas indicating that he and Paris discussed that if the resident started talking about the military, 

Glinskas would “take the conversation” and discuss “his options as a military veteran”). Their first 

approach to the house, the knock and announce, and the invitation of Engert to the door in the first 

instance were all in accordance with this general plan. Apart from the discretionary decision to approach 

the eviction without further tactical support, nothing in the record, including the testimony of Plaintiff’s 

expert, indicates that Paris and Glinskas acted inappropriately or breached any duty to Engert. See

generally Deposition of Ken Katsaris (indicating throughout that an entirely different tactical approach 

should have been used for this eviction and that Paris and Glinskas should have retreated after Engert 

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said he heard a something inside, but never indicating that, apart from the tactical strategy employed, the 

initial approach was performed in an unreasonable manner).24 Paris’s and Glinskas’s motion for 

summary judgment that they are entitled to § 820.2 immunity for their initial approach to the Property 

and the first invitation to Engert to begin drilling the door is GRANTED.

The result is different as to the final step: Paris’s and Glinskas’s actions after Engert indicated 

that he heard a noise coming from the inside of the property. “There is no immunity ‘if the injury . . . 

results, not from the employee’s exercise of discretion vested in him to undertake the act, but from his 

negligence in performing it after having made the discretionary decision to do so.” Martinez, 141 F.3d at 

1379. Assertion of § 820.2 immunity is an affirmative defense for which Defendants bear the burden of 

proof. See DeJung v. Superior Court, 169 Cal. App. 4th 533, 538 (2008) (characterizing defense 

provided by § 820.2 as “affirmative defense of discretionary immunity”). Defendants have failed to 

point to evidence demonstrating that Paris and/or Glinskas engaged in any deliberation, let alone 

deliberation related to an “actual, conscious, and considered collective policy decision” in connection 

with their actions after Engert indicated he heard something inside the house. Paris’s and Glinskas’s 

motion for summary judgment that they are entitled to § 820.2 immunity for their actions after Engert 

indicated he heard something inside the house is DENIED. 

4. Elements of Negligence.

To prevail on a claim of negligent wrongful death, a plaintiff must establish: (1) existence of a 

duty; (2) breach of that duty; (3) causation (actual and proximate); and (4) damages. Friedman v. Merck 

& Co., 107 Cal. App. 4th 454, 463 (2003). Defendants maintain that they owed Engert no duty of care; 

that they did not breach any duty of care; and that there is no causal connection between any breach and 

 

24 The Court previously indicated that it would not rule on Defendants’ objections to Plaintiff’s reliance on the Katsaris 

Declaration because it had not relied on the declaration. See supra note 8. The Court is nevertheless referencing Katsaris’s 

testimony here, but in a manner that Defendants could not possibly find objectionable, namely, to demonstrate the absence of 

a particular type of evidence therein. 

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Engert’s death. 

a. Duty & Breach.

(1) Special Relationship.

As noted above, Plaintiffs argue there was a “special relationship” between Engert and the 

Deputies. See supra n. 14. Plaintiffs rely on Peterson v. San Francisco Cmty. Coll. Dist., 36 Cal. 3d 799, 

806 (1984), for general the proposition that where a “special relationship” exists between a public 

employee and a civilian, that civilian is entitled to warning and protection. In Peterson, a student at City 

College of San Francisco was assaulted while ascending a stairway in the school’s parking lot. Id. at 

805. The California Supreme Court concluded that the school, a public entity, owed the student a duty of 

care because the school was a “possessor of land who holds it open to the public for entry for business 

purposes” and therefore had a “special relationship” with the student. Id. at 806-807. 

As Defendants were not in possession of the Property (i.e., the locale of Engert’s injury), 

Peterson is not analogous. A somewhat more relevant case is Walker v. County of Los Angeles, 192 Cal. 

App. 3d 1393 (1987). In Walker, a county animal control officer asked appellant to assist her in 

capturing an abandoned dog after she was unable to catch the dog on her own. Id. at 1395. Appellant 

consented, and was injured in his attempt to catch the dog. Id. He then brought an action for negligence 

against the county, alleging that he was owed a duty of due care in connection with his assistance. Id. at 

1396. The court agreed, finding that a special relationship existed between Walker and the county, based 

on the county officer’s request for assistance in the performance of a dangerous task, which was part of 

the officer’s official duties. Id. at 1402-403. 

In Mann v. State of California, a special relationship based on dependency was found. 70 Cal. 

App. 3d 773 (1977). There, a California Highway Patrolman came to the aid of a stranded motorist and 

placed their car with flashing lights behind two cars stalled on the freeway. Id. at 776. After calling the 

tow truck, the officers withdrew without warning; they did not wait for the tow truck to line up behind 

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the stalled car or provide the alternative protection of flares. Id. at 776-77. Minutes later, one of the 

stalled cars was sideswiped by a passing car and the persons nearby were injured. Id. at 777. Because the 

officers stopped to investigate and took affirmative steps to provide assistance, a special relationship 

existed. Id. at 780. When the California Supreme Court later examined Mann, it concluded that a special 

relationship had existed in Mann because the Highway Patrolman had “lull[ed] the injured parties into a 

false sense of security and perhaps prevent[ed] other assistance from being sought.” Williams v. State of 

California, 34 Cal. 3d 18, 25 (1983).

Likewise, a special relationship existed in Wallace, in which a detective had a witness sign a 

statement implicating a suspect in a murder, without warning her that the suspect had been threatening 

witnesses. 12 Cal. App. 4th at 1388-92. The witness was later murdered. Id. at 1392. As a pre-requisite 

to finding any duty existed, the Wallace court found that there was a special relationship between the 

witness and defendants because defendants “enlisted [the witness] to be a prosecution witness... and 

[that role] carried with it a foreseeable risk of harm.” Id. at 1400-01. 

A different result was reached in Hernandez v. City of Pomona, which concerned a witness who 

was knowledgeable of the risks of testifying against others because he was himself a gang member. 49 

Cal. App. 4th 1492, 1503-505 (1996). The Hernandez court reasoned that, unlike in other cases in where 

there was evidence or allegations that the defendants induced a false sense of security, there was no 

special relationship between the gang member witness and the police because the gang member was 

fully aware of the risks associated with testifying against fellow gang members, and never even alleged 

that any action by the police induced a false sense of security. Id. at 1502. 

Here, the facts are most closely analogous to Mann. Unlike the witness in Wallace or the citizen 

in Walker, Engert was not “enlisted” to aid Defendants in the eviction. He was there at the direction of 

the Property owner. But, once Defendants decided to engage in the eviction with Engert present, 

Defendants essentially were aiding Engert in his efforts by, among other things, attempting to make the 

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scene safe for him to do his work. This is like the Highway Patrolman in Mann, who came to the 

motorists’ aid and then allegedly acted in an unreasonable manner by acting to leave the motorists in a 

more dangerous situation than the one in which they found the motorists. Likewise, a reasonable juror 

could conclude, based on the present record, that Defendants’ actions lulled Engert into a false sense of 

security, thereby creating a special relationship between Defendants and Engert. Therefore, Defendants 

are not entitled to summary judgment on the issue of the existence of a special relationship. 

(2) Duty to Warn. 

Plaintiffs assert that, in light of the special relationship between Defendants and Engert, 

Defendants owned Engert a duty to warn. The Wallace court reviewed a number of cases related to the 

duty to warn: 

[A] duty to warn was found in Johnson v. State of California (1968) 69 

Cal.2d 782, where the California Youth Authority placed a minor in the 

foster care of the plaintiff and her husband. The minor had homicidal 

tendencies and a background of cruelty and violence to persons and 

animals, but the Johnsons were not warned about him. The minor attacked 

the plaintiff soon after moving into her home. 

In contrast, no duty to warn was found in Thompson v. County of Alameda

(1980) 27 Cal.3d 741, where a child was killed by a juvenile offender who 

was prone to violence against young children and who, prior to his release 

to his mother’s care from a county institution, had threatened to kill a 

young child residing in his mother’s neighborhood. The juvenile offender 

gave no indication of which child he intended as his victim. The defendant 

county did not warn the local police nor persons in the mother’s 

neighborhood of these facts. In comparing the case before it with the 

Johnson case, the Thompson court stated: “In Johnson we emphasized the 

relationship between the state and plaintiff-victim, and the fact that the 

state by its conduct placed the specific plaintiff in a position of clearly 

foreseeable danger. In contrast with the situation in Johnson, in which the 

risk of danger focused precisely on plaintiff, here County bore no special 

and continuous relationship with the specific plaintiffs nor did County 

knowingly place the specific plaintiffs’ decedent into a foreseeably 

dangerous position. Thus the reasoning of our holding in Johnson would 

not sustain the complaint in this action.” (Id. at p. 751.)

Likewise, the court in Davidson v. City of Westminster, supra, 32 Cal.3d 

197, found that the defendants in that case had no duty to warn. In 

Davidson, the plaintiff had been stabbed in a laundromat which the police 

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had under surveillance at the time of the stabbing. Three stabbings had 

taken place at the same or nearby laundromats and the police had been 

watching their suspect in the laundromat on the night that plaintiff was 

stabbed by him. The police knew that the plaintiff was inside the 

laundromat but did not warn her about their suspect. The Davidson court 

contrasted the case before it with the facts in Johnson, emphasizing that in 

the Johnson case, “the state put the parolee in the victim’s home and failed 

to warn of homicidal tendencies; thus the state placed the victim in danger. 

Here the police were in no way responsible for the presence of either the 

assailant or the victim in the laundromat.” (Id. at p. 207.)

Wallace, 12 Cal. App. 4th at 1396-97 (parallel citations omitted). In light of these cases, a duty to warn 

was found in Wallace because “the government’s actions create[d] a foreseeable peril to a specific 

foreseeable victim, ... when the danger is not readily discoverable by the endangered person.” The 

Wallace court reasoned that the detective had “created a foreseeable peril for [the witness], a peril that 

was not readily discoverable by her,” by having her sign the witness statement and determining that she 

would testify at trial. Id. at 1396-97. “Thereafter, she was in a position of peril. It was a peril not of her 

own making, for unlike the laundromat assault victim in Davidson who had come to her peril of her own 

accord and without any instigation by the police [the witness] was pursued by [the detective], a person 

seeking to make a murder case against [the suspect].” Id. at 1397-98. 

In contrast, in Hernandez, the plaintiff, a gang member, “was wholly aware of the danger he 

faced [in testifying against fellow gang members], perhaps more fully comprehending the extent of that 

danger than did the police or prosecutor.” 49 Cal. App. 4th at 1501-02. Thus, Hernandez did not present 

a case concerning the duty to warn. Id. at 1502. 

Here, the facts fall somewhere in between Wallace and Hernandez. The undisputed evidence 

indicates that Roberts informed Engert that the occupant might be an “armed weirdo” or “armed 

wacko,” but the extent of Engert’s knowledge as to the details of the threats articulated in the trip ticket 

are not clear on the present record. Absent undisputed evidence that Engert was fully aware of the risks, 

the Court will not apply Hernandez to bar a failure to warn claim. 

Defendants argue that no duty to warn exists in this case because, unlike in Wallace, Paris and 

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Glinskas did not create a risk to Engert. That argument has been addressed and rejected above in the 

context of the danger creation doctrine. A reasonable jury could find that Paris’s and Glinskas’s conduct 

– by inviting Engert to approach the door the second time – created a foreseeable peril that was not 

readily foreseeable by Engert. There is also sufficient evidence in the record to support a finding that 

Paris and Glinskas breached the duty to warn Engert. The extent of Engert’s knowledge of the warnings 

provided to law enforcement is disputed. 

(3) Duty to Protect.

Plaintiffs suggest that a “duty to protect” also applies here. Doc. 182 at 44. Peterson held that a 

public entity landowner had a “duty to protect [] and/or warn” students who used its parking lot. 36 

Cal.3d. at 804. More specifically, the public entity had a duty to “take reasonable protective measures to 

ensure [a] [p]laintiff’s safety against violent attack from foreseeable criminal conduct and/or to warn her 

as to the location of prior violent assaults in the vicinity of the subject parking lot and stairway.” Id. at 

805. But the duties to protect in that case arose from the public entity’s role as a landowner. See id. at 

806-807. Wallace and Carpenter v. City of Los Angeles stand for the proposition that the duty to warn 

may be extended to public entities in certain situations other than those arising under the 

landowner/invitee relationship where the public entity creates a peril. See Wallace, 12 Cal. App. 4th at 

1396-97 (finding a duty to warn where the public entity created a risk of peril to witness by involving 

her in prosecution of suspect who police knew posed a threat to the witness); Carpenter, 230 Cal. App 

3d 923, 931-35 (1991)(same). Neither Wallace nor Carpenter addressed whether a duty to protect 

existed in those circumstances. See Hernandez, 49 Cal. App. 4th at 1502. 

The closest case that actually applied a duty to protect is Walker v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 192 

Cal. App. 3d 1393 (1987). In Walker, a county animal control officer asked appellant to assist her in 

capturing an abandoned dog after she was unable to catch the dog on her own. Id. at 1395. Appellant 

consented, and was injured in his attempt to catch the dog. Id. He then brought an action for negligence 

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against the county, alleging that he was owed a duty of due care in connection with his assistance. Id. at 

1396. The court agreed, finding that a special relationship existed between Walker and the county, based 

on the county officer’s request for assistance in the performance of a dangerous task, which was part of 

the officer’s official duties. Id. at 1402-403. 

Hernandez, which concerned a witness who was knowledgeable of the risks of testifying against 

others because he was himself a gang member, distinguished Walker on the ground that, in Walker, the 

plaintiff was asked to assist the officer, whereas the gang member witness in Hernandez was subject to 

being compelled to appear as a witness pursuant to subpoena. 49 Cal. App. 4th at 1504. 

[I]t is a duty of citizenship in this country to assist law enforcement in the 

prosecution of crimes, as evidenced by the government's power to 

subpoena witnesses to appear and testify at trial. The benefit citizens 

derive from this arrangement is the enjoyment of living in a society which 

actively and effectively prosecutes crimes. The duty on the part of citizens 

to assist in criminal prosecution does not, however, give rise to a right to 

protection on demand. In a perfect world, that right would be assured, but 

law enforcement and government agencies charged with investigating and 

prosecuting crimes must instead operate in a world of budgetary 

constraints and limited resources.

Id. The analysis in Hernandez is an example of what the California Supreme Court discussed in 

Peterson: 

“[D]uty” is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total 

of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that a particular 

plaintiff is entitled to protection.”

36 Cal. 3d at 805-06. “Whether a duty of care exists is a question of law for the court. Also, whether, 

and the extent to which, a new duty is recognized is ultimately a question of public policy.” See Jones v.

Grewe, 189 Cal. App. 3d 950, 954 (1987). Plaintiffs have not provided any argument or authority to 

support a public policy analysis that would suggest a “duty of protection” akin to that applied in Walker 

should apply here. Walker is at least arguably distinguishable, as it concerned a public official who 

requested the assistance of the plaintiff, rather than, as is the case here, a situation in which Engert’s 

assistance was requested by the owner of the Property. Under these circumstances, the Court declines to 

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expand the reach of the duty to protect. See Hochendoner v. Genzyme, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2015 WL 

1333271 *11 (D. Mass., March 25, 2015) (“A federal court sitting in diversity cannot be expected to 

create new doctrines expanding state law.”). In any event, this conclusion is of little practical import to 

Plaintiffs’ case in light of the undisputed existence of a substantially similar duty not to expose others to 

an unreasonable risk of injury at the hands of third parties. 

(4) Duty Not to Expose to Unreasonable Risk of Injury at the Hands of 

Third Parties. 

There does exist a separate duty “not to expose others to an unreasonable risk of injury at the 

hands of third parties.” Lugtu v. California Highway Patrol, 26 Cal. 4th 703, 717 (2001). For example, 

“California cases uniformly hold that a police officer who exercises his or her authority to direct another 

person to proceed to-or to stop at-a particular location, owes such a person a duty to use reasonable care 

in giving that direction, so as not to place the person in danger or to expose the person to an 

unreasonable risk of harm.” Id. No defendant suggests that this duty does not apply here; they only 

argue that they did not place Engert in danger or expose him to an unreasonable risk of harm. See Doc. 

102 at 21 (citing Lugtu, 26 Cal.4th 703). As discussed above, a reasonable jury could find for Plaintiffs 

on these issues. That is all that is required to establish breach of this duty for purposes of summary 

judgment.

The benefit citizens derive from this arrangement is the enjoyment of 

living in a society which actively and effectively prosecutes crimes. The 

duty on the part of citizens to assist in criminal prosecution does not, 

however, give rise to a right to protection on demand. In a perfect world, 

that right would be assured, but law enforcement and government agencies 

charged with investigating and prosecuting crimes must instead operate in 

a world of budgetary constraints and limited resources.

***

If law enforcement agencies were held to owe a duty to protect every 

witness who is fearful of reprisal, with attendant liability for failure to do 

so, one can easily suppose that criminal investigations will be inhibited 

from the outset. Law enforcement officials will hesitate to question 

potential witnesses without first determining whether the funds exist to 

protect them. These and other considerations compel the conclusion that 

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absent a specific undertaking to protect a witness, there is no duty to do so 

in the course of investigating and prosecuting criminal activity.

Id. at 1504-05. Under these circumstances, the Hernandez court declined to impose a duty to protect.

Accordingly, as to both the duty to warn and the duty not to expose others to an unreasonable 

risk of injury at the hands of third parties, the record precludes summary judgment as to duty and breach. 

b. Causation.

Defendants next argue that the actions of Paris and Glinskas were neither the cause-in-fact nor 

the proximate cause of Engert’s injuries. “Legal cause exists if the actor’s conduct is a substantial factor 

in bringing about the harm and there is no rule of law relieving the actor from liability,” while “[t]he 

doctrine of proximate cause limits liability; i.e., in certain situations where the defendant’s conduct is an 

actual cause of the harm, he will nevertheless be absolved because of the manner in which the injury 

occurred.” Lombardo v. Huysentruyt, 91 Cal. App. 4th 656, 665-66 (2001), as modified on denial of 

reh’g (Sept. 12, 2001) (internal citations and quotations omitted). “Thus, where there is an independent 

intervening act which is not reasonably foreseeable, the defendant’s conduct is not deemed the legal or 

proximate cause.” Id. at 666. 

With regard to the two remaining theories of negligence liability—failure to warn and breach of 

the duty not to expose others to an unreasonable risk of injury at the hands of third parties in connection 

with the second approach to the Property—the record could support a finding that Paris’s and Glinskas’s 

conduct was a substantial factor in causing Engert’s injuries. If Engert was not aware of all the 

information possessed by Paris and Glinskas, informing him of the additional information could have 

altered the outcome because Engert might not have agreed to participate in the eviction. Likewise, a 

reasonable jury could infer from the record that, had Paris and Glinskas acted differently after Engert 

indicated he heard a noise in the house (e.g., by modifying the tactical response to the eviction, or 

finding some other method that did not require Engert to approach the residence until it was made 

secure), Engert might not have died. 

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Likewise, the record can support a finding that Paris’s and Glinskas’s conduct was the proximate 

cause of Engert’s death. For the reasons discussed above in the analysis of the danger creation claim, a 

reasonable jury could conclude that Ferrario’s actions were foreseeable. 

Defendants next maintain that Ferrario’s act was a superseding cause that absolves Paris and 

Glinskas of liability. Doc. 102-1 at 22. However, where an intervening act by a third party was 

foreseeable, it does not amount to a superseding cause relieving the negligent defendant of liability. See 

Ileto v. Glock Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1208 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing California law); Vasquez v. Residential 

Investments, Inc., 118 Cal. App. 4th 269, 289-90 (2004) (“[T]he defendant need only foresee the risk of 

harm, not the particular intervening act ... and where the risk created by the breach of the duty is that the 

plaintiff is exposed to danger from criminal conduct, the criminal conduct is not automatically a 

superseding cause.”). As the California Supreme Court observed in Lugtu:

It is well established that when a defendant’s negligence is based upon his 

or her having exposed the plaintiff to an unreasonable risk of harm from 

the actions of others, the occurrence of the type of conduct against which 

the defendant had a duty to protect the plaintiff cannot properly constitute 

a superseding cause that completely relieves the defendant of any 

responsibility for the plaintiff’s injuries. 

26 Cal.4th at 725. 

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the causation element of Plaintiffs’ negligence 

claim is DENIED. 

5. Cal Gov. Code § 845. 

Defendants argue that they are immune from liability pursuant to California Government Code 

Section 845 (“§ 845”)

25, which provides: “Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for 

 

25 Paris and Glinskas do not actually assert this form of immunity in their motion. See Doc. 102-1. Because the other sets of 

Defendants do so, see Doc. 131 at 25 & Doc. 130-8 at 24, and because the County’s ultimate liability turns on the liability of 

its employees, Cal. Gov. Code § 815.2, the Court addresses the issue. 

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failure to establish a police department or otherwise provide police protection service or, if police 

protection service is provided, for failure to provide sufficient police protection service.” As discussed 

above, while this provision does provide immunity against claims that are narrowly confined to requests 

for additional police protection, Carpenter suggests that related claims, such as claims based upon a 

police officer’s failure to warn, are not barred by § 845. 230 Cal. App. 3d at 934-35. Other cases suggest 

that § 845 would not bar claims based upon a duty to avoid exposing others to an unreasonable risk of 

injury at the hands of third parties. See Hearn v. Los Angeles Sch. Police Dep’t, No. B238195, 2013 WL 

5209874, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2013) (refusing to apply immunity under § 845 where a claim 

can proceed in connection with affirmative acts to increase the risk of harm to the plaintiff).

26

Relatedly, the California Supreme Court has interpreted § 845 to “merely immunize[] a public 

entity’s or employee’s ‘political decision’ concerning the extent to which police protection should be 

provided.” Williams v. State of California, 34 Cal.3d 18, 35 (1983) (quoting § 845). Lopez v. S. Cal. 

Rapid Transit Dist., 40 Cal.3d 780, 792 (1985), reviewed the legislative history of § 845: 

The Law Revision Commission comment to Government Code section 

845 explains the policy considerations underlying that section: “This 

section grants a general immunity for failure to provide police protection 

or for failure to provide enough police protection. Whether police 

protection should be provided at all, and the extent to which it should be 

provided, are political decisions which are committed to the policymaking officials of government. To permit review of these decisions by 

judges and juries would remove the ultimate decision-making authority 

from those politically responsible for making the decision.” As we 

recently explained in Peterson v. San Francisco Community College 

District, supra, 36 Cal.3d at page 815, the immunity provided in section 

845 “is meant to protect the budgetary and political decisions which are 

involved in hiring and deploying a police force.”

The Lopez court reasoned that § 854 is “essence a discretionary immunity statute.” Id. at 806. “As such 

 

26 Although this is an unpublished opinion of the California Court of Appeal, see California Rule of Court 977(a), the court 

may consider its reasoning. See Jerry Beeman and Pharmacy Servs., Inc. v. Anthem Prescription Mgmt., LLC, 652 F.3d 1085, 

1093 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Defendants correctly argue that we are not precluded from considering these unpublished decisions as 

a possible reflection of California law, although they have no precedential value.”).

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it should be given the same restricted scope as section 820.2; affording immunity only for basic policy 

decisions. Id. (internal citation and quotation omitted). Therefore, even if § 845 encompassed claims 

based upon the duty to warn and the duty not to expose others to an unreasonable risk of harm at the 

hands of third parties, the statute would not be triggered here for the same reason the remaining 

negligence claims did not trigger application of § 820.2 immunity: they did not involve discretionary 

acts.

6. Cal. Gov. Code § 821.6.

Finally, Defendants assert they are immune under California Government Code § 821.6 (“§ 

821.6”), see Doc. 102-1 at 24, which provides that “[a] public employee is not liable for injury caused 

by his instituting or prosecuting any judicial or administrative proceeding within the scope of his 

employment, even if he acts maliciously and without probable cause.” Defendants maintain that service 

and enforcement of a Notice of Restoration is akin to prosecuting in a judicial proceeding. In support of 

their assertion that § 821.6 applies in this case, Defendants cite Amylou R. v. Cnty. of Riverside, 28 Cal. 

App. 4th 1205, 1209 (1994), which applied § 821.6 immunity to officers who were accused of 

misconduct committed in the course of investigating crimes. At issue in Amylou was whether 

investigatory activity was covered by § 821.6. Id. at 1209-10. Amylou held that § 821.6 “is not limited to 

the act of filing a criminal complaint. Instead, it also extends to actions taken in preparation for formal 

proceedings.” Id. Since the acts of which Amylou complained were “incidental to the investigation of 

the crimes, and since investigation is part of the prosecution of a judicial proceeding, those acts were 

committed in the course of the prosecution of that proceeding.” Id. at 1211. “[T]he test of immunity is ... 

whether there is a causal relationship between the [action] and the prosecution process.” Ingram v. 

Flippo, 74 Cal. App. 4th 1280, 1293 (1999).

Defendants cite no authority for the proposition that service of a Notice of Restoration is akin to 

investigative activities incidental to prosecution of a criminal case. Rather, California Code of Civil 

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Procedure § 712.020 provides that “writ of possession or sale ... shall require the levying officer to 

whom it is directed to enforce the judgment....” (emphasis added). A prosecutor might be entitled to 

absolute immunity for taking steps to bring a judicial action to enforce a prior court judgment, see 

Schoggins v. San Bernardino Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, No. E030156, 2002 WL 258209, at *3 (Cal. Ct. 

App. Feb. 25, 2002) (applying § 821.6 to bar claim against deputy district attorney for bringing and 

underlying action to enforce child support order); Dorsey v. Orloff, No. C 96-3587 FMS, 1997 WL 

85016, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 1997), aff’d, 131 F.3d 146 (9th Cir. 1997) (applying absolute 

prosecutorial immunity to bar federal claim based upon initiation of judicial proceedings to enforce child 

support order). However, the California Court of Appeal for the Second District found § 821.6 

inapplicable to tort claims brought against a code enforcement officer pertaining to conduct that took 

place during the enforcement of a nuisance abatement warrant because the conduct occurred after the 

judicial procedure he initiated to obtain the warrant was complete. Ogborn v. City of Lancaster, 101 Cal. 

App. 4th 448, 462 (2002). The circumstances in this case are akin to those in Ogborn. The unlawful 

detainer action resulted in a judgment, and therefore was complete by the time the Notice of Restoration 

was enforced. Section 821.6 immunity does not apply here. 

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment that the remaining state law tort claims in this case are 

barred by § 821.6 is DENIED. 

Because the County is vicariously liable for the torts of its employees performed within the scope 

of employment unless that employee is immune from liability, Cal. Gov. Code § 815.2, the County 

remains a defendant in this case.

V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons set forth above:

(1) Defendant Harper’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED IN ITS 

ENTIRETY; 

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(2) the County’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED 

IN PART, as it remains vicariously liable for its non-immune employees under state law;

(3) Defendant Martinez’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED IN PART AND 

DENIED IN PART; and 

(4) Defendants Paris’s and Glinskas’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED IN 

PART AND DENIED IN PART.

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