Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-94-05056/USCOURTS-caDC-94-05056-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 330
Nature of Suit: Federal Employers' Liability
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 6, 1995 Decided July 28, 1995

No. 94-5056

MADOLYN L. CRUMPTON,

APPELLANT

v.

MICHAEL P.W. STONE,

SECRETARY OF THE ARMY, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 89cv03128)

Brent L. Crumpton argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs was Charles S. Mitchell.

Edith S. Marshall, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the cause for appellees. With her on the

brief were Eric H. Holder, Jr., United States Attorney and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant United

States Attorney. John D. Bates, Assistant United States Attorney, entered an appearance for

appellee.

Before: SENTELLE, HENDERSON and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion of the court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.

TATEL, Circuit Judge: In this case we must decide whether Madolyn L. Crumpton can sue

the Department of the Army under the Federal Tort Claims Act for releasing records that allegedly

caused her great embarrassment and emotional distress. Because no "federal statute, regulation, or

policy specifically [proscribes]" the release of this information in response to a Freedom of

Information Act request, and because the discretion exercised by the Army in evaluating the FOIA

request is of the "nature and quality that Congress intended to shield from tort liability," Cope v.

Scott, 45 F.3d 445, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1995), we agree with the district court that the discretionary

function exemption to the FTCA prevented it from taking jurisdiction over this case.

I.

Nearly ten years ago, the Army Inspector General, and then the ArmyCriminalInvestigations

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Division, conducted an investigation into allegations that Col. Alfred T. Crumpton had padded his

travel expense reports and that he had accepted gratuities while stationed in England as commander

of an Army Standardization Group. Near the close of that investigation, after the Army had

reassigned the Crumptonsto New Jersey, Col. Crumpton committed suicide, an event into which the

CID conducted another investigation. The reports of these investigations, known as "Reports of

Inquiry" or "Reports of Investigation" (ROIs), included information regarding Mrs. Crumpton and

her family. Neither investigation led to criminal charges.

In response to FOIA requests for the ROIs by New Jersey newspapers, the Army concluded

that the reports were not, as a whole, likely to lead to an "unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."

See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) & (7)(C) (1988) (exempting certain information from mandatory release

under the Freedom of Information Act). It thus released the reports, although it redacted certain

portions because of privacy concerns. Mrs. Crumpton claims that even more of the information

should have been withheld because the Army knew itsrelease would cause an "unwarranted invasion

of personal privacy" by revealing to the public both false and intimate information about her and her

family. The portions of the ROI of fraud that the Army released, for example, included reports of

allegations linking Mrs. Crumpton to the alleged fraud as well as statements she made to

investigators. The ROI of death included details regarding the Crumpton family's discovery of, and

immediate reaction to, Col. Crumpton's suicide.

Seeking relief under the Federal Tort Claims Act, Mrs. Crumpton initiated administrative

proceedings, arguing that the release of the ROIs invaded her personal privacy and caused her

significant emotional distress. After the Army rejected her claim, she sued. Following a four-day

trial, the district court ruled that it had no jurisdiction under the FTCA and dismissed the case. Mrs.

Crumpton appeals.

II.

The FTCA waivesthe government'simmunity in suits "for money damages ... for ... personal

injury ... caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government

while acting within the scope of his office or employment." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988). The Act

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containstwo exceptionsthat are at the heart ofthis dispute. The "due care" exemption excludes from

district court jurisdiction "[a]ny claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the

Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such

statute or regulation be valid." 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1988). The "discretionary function" exemption

bars district court jurisdiction over claims "based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to

exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee

of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused." Id.

The district court concluded that both exemptions applied, i.e. that Army officials had

exercised "due care" in determining that the requested information was not exempt, and that the

decision involved in that determination was an exercise of a "discretionary function" that the FTCA

exempts from judicial review. See Crumpton v. United States, 843 F. Supp. 751, 756-57 (D.D.C.

1994). To the extent that it rests on interpretations of law, we review the district court's decision de

novo, see Cope, 45 F.3d at 450, accepting its factual findings unless clearly erroneous. See Herbert

v. National Academy of Sciences, 974 F.2d 192, 198 (D.C. Cir. 1992).

Our jurisdictional analysis begins with the two-part test the Supreme Court usesto determine

whether the discretionary function clause of section 2680(a) applies to the facts of a case. First, we

ask whether a "federal statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a course of action for an

employee to follow." United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322 (1991) (quoting Berkovitz v.

United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988)). If so, then the "due care" clause applies and the

government is exempt from suit as long as the employee has exercised due care in following the

dictates of the statute or regulation. If there is no specific prescription, then some choice is involved

in the employee's action, and we move to the second step, under which we must determine whether

that choice qualifies as a discretionary function under the FTCA. If the discretion exercised by the

agency involves "political, social, or economic judgments," Cope, 45 F.3d at 448 (internal

punctuation and citation omitted), it is the type of decision that is of "the nature and quality that

Congressintended to shield fromtort liability" through the discretionary function exemption. United

States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 813 (1984); see also Cope, 45 F.3d at 448-50. In assessing

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the "discretionary" nature of the decision, we look not to what the decisionmaker in a particular case

wasthinking, but to "whether the type of decision being challenged" implicates policy judgments. See

Cope, 45 F.3d at 449 (emphasis added).

Mrs. Crumpton arguesthat the Army's decision to release the information about her husband

was specifically proscribed by FOIA, Army regulations, and the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)

(1988 & Supp. V 1993). We disagree, concluding in section III that no statute or regulation,

standing alone, specifically limits the Army's discretion. Mrs. Crumpton further argues that any

discretion that the Army did have was not the type of discretion that Congressintended to shield from

tort liability. We address this argument in section IV, concluding, as did the district court, that the

Army's discretion was not of the "nature and quality" that Congress intended to subject to tort

liability.

III.

We begin with the Freedom of Information Act, the first of the three authorities that Mrs.

Crumpton claims limited the Army's discretion to release the reports on her husband. Under FOIA,

an agency "shall" make available to any person records that the person "reasonably describes" in a

request to the agency "in accordance with published rules" governing such requests. 5 U.S.C. §

552(a)(3) (1988). An agency is excused from this requirement only with respect to materials that fall

within one of FOIA's nine specific exemptions. See § 552(b)(1)-(9). If the agency determines that

the information is not exempt, it must release it. If an exemption applies, the agency may withhold

the information, although FOIA itself does not require an agency to do so. As this court stated

almost two decades ago, "the exemptionsto the FOIA are permissive rather than mandatory." Mead

Data Central, Inc. v. United States Dept. of the Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 258 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see

also Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 293 (1979) ("Congress did not design the FOIA

exemptions to be mandatory bars to disclosure."); Mobil Oil Corp. v. EPA, 879 F.2d 698, 700 (9th

Cir. 1989) ("The exemptions are permissive, and an agency may voluntarily release information that

it would be permitted to withhold under the FOIA exemptions."). Enacted to encourage the

disclosure and limit the withholding of government-held records, FOIA allows an agency to withhold

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information in certain circumstances, but it "[does] not limit an agency's discretion to disclose

information." Chrysler, 441 U.S. at 294. FOIA, therefore, does not "specifically prescribe" an

agency's decision to release information pursuant to a FOIA request. See Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 322.

Mrs. Crumpton argues that even if FOIA leaves agencies with discretion to release

information, Army regulations limited that discretion. She claims, for example, that section 5-101

of the Army's general FOIA regulations sets forth the only conditions under which certain types of

records may be released pursuant to FOIA requests. See Release of Information and Records from

Army Files, Army Reg. No. 340-17 (Oct. 1, 1982), in Joint Appendix (J.A.) I at 234, 262 (codified

at 32 C.F.R. § 518.14(b) (1986)). We do not read that section so broadly. Section 5-101(b) merely

outlines those instances in which personnel records "will" be released. Id., in J.A. I at 262 (codified

at 32 C.F.R. § 518.14(b)(2)). It does not limit the Army's discretion to release information in other

instances when it concludes, after subjecting requests to the standard FOIA review process, that

release is either necessary or appropriate. It is true that section 5-101(d)(2) states that certain

information about criminal investigations will be released "only" in certain circumstances. Id., in J.A.

I at 262 (codified at 32 C.F.R. § 518.14(b)(4)(ii)). That section, however, explicitly addresses the

rights of the accused "before the determination of the case;" it does not create a general privacy right

for those referred to in the records. Id. at § 5-101(d), in J.A. I at 262 (codified at 32 C.F.R. §

518.14(b)(4)). After Col. Crumpton's death and the close of the investigation, therefore, any

restriction this section placed on release was no longer controlling.

Mrs. Crumpton pointsto an Army pamphlet entitled "A Guide for the Survivors of Deceased

Army Members," arguing that it established an Army policy that precluded the release of portions of

the reports on her husband. According to the pamphlet, "Out of respect for the privacy of the

[primary next of kin,] the Report ofInvestigation is not released to other family members without the

written consent of the [primary next of kin.]" Government Brief at 23 (quoting Department of the

Army Pamphlet 608-4). We do not think that this pamphlet, which was apparently drafted by the

Army's "Casualty Affairs" office as a guide to the Army's relationship with a deceased's family, is a

definitive statement of Army policy with respect to the Army's treatment of third-party requests for

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information under FOIA. We can find no evidence that the Army used this pamphlet as a guide for

evaluating FOIA requests. Indeed, according to testimony in the district court, the Criminal

Investigations Division told the Casualty Affairs office that the pamphlet appears to be "an absolute

guide on everything and it is not." See Transcript at 79, Crumpton v. Stone, No. 89cv3128 (D.D.C.

June 15, 1993) (testimony of Jeffrey Porter, CID employee), in J.A. I at 133.

Nor are we persuaded, as Mrs.Crumptonargues, that ArmyRegulation 195-2, which governs

the Army's criminal investigation activities, limits the release of information from investigative files

except in limited cases that are not present here. See, e.g., Criminal Investigation Activities, Army

Reg. No. 195-2, § 3-14(d) (Oct. 30, 1985), in J.A. I at 304, 310 (stating, in section on

"Coordination," that "[d]erogatory information that mentions or can be tied to particular individuals

will be released only to those persons whose official duties create a definite need to have access to

the information"). Only section 4-3(j) of this regulation addresses the release of material in the

context of a media request, and that section is procedural only, allowing requests for CID

investigative information "not resolved at the investigating element's level [to] be directed to the

Commander [of the CID]." Id., § 4-3(k), in J.A. I at 314. This procedure was apparently followed

in this case. The request for release was, according to the district court, reviewed by the Staff Judge

Advocate for the CID, "technical advisor to the commanding general," who then applied the Army's

general regulations governing FOIA requests. See Crumpton, 843 F. Supp. at 756. Because Army

Regulation 195-2 simply refers FOIA requests to the CID for further FOIA processing, it does not

independently limit the Army's discretion to release information.

Mrs. Crumpton argues, finally, that even if Army regulations did not specifically limit the

Army's discretion to release the reports on her husband, the PrivacyAct did. According to subsection

(b) of that statute, "No agency shall disclose any record which is contained in a system of records by

any means of communication ... except pursuant to a written request by, or with the prior written

consent of, the individual to whom the record pertains." 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b). Subsection (b)(2),

however, explicitly permits an agency to disclose information if its disclosure is "required under

[FOIA]." § 552a(b)(2). That language, this court concluded in 1982, "represents a Congressional

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mandate that the Privacy Act not be used as a barrier to FOIA access." Greentree v. United States

Customs Service, 674 F.2d 74, 79 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Two years later Congress incorporated that

holding into the Privacy Act by adding subsection (t)(2), which states that "No agency shall rely on

any exemption in [the Privacy Act] to withhold from an individual any record which is otherwise

accessible to such individual under the provisions of [FOIA]." 5 U.S.C. § 552a(t)(2) (1988). The

Privacy Act, therefore, does not specifically limit the agency's discretion to withhold records unless

those records are exempt from release under FOIA. Since the Army released the records relating to

Col. Crumpton because it decided that they were not exempt under FOIA, however, Mrs. Crumpton

can maintain an FTCA suit only if she can challenge the Army's decision that the information that

allegedly injured her was not exempt. And since no statutes or regulations specifically required the

Army to classify this material as exempt, district court jurisdiction over the classification depends

solely upon whether it is a "discretionary function" under the FTCA. It is to that issue that we now

turn.

IV.

To determine whether a classification decision is a "discretionary function" under section

2680(a), we need not go much beyond the language of exemptions(6) and (7)(C). Those exemptions

allow agencies to withhold information if its release would constitute an "unwarranted invasion of

personal privacy," see 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) & (7)(C), and require agencies to balance the public's

interest in disclosure against the private interest inwithholding. Department of the Air Force v. Rose,

425 U.S. 352, 373 (1976). Balancing the societal concern for personal privacy against the "basic

policy" of the act"disclosure, not secrecy," see id. at 361is "fraught with ... public policy

considerations" that necessarily involve the exercise of "political, social, and economic judgment,"

Sami v. United States, 617 F.2d 755, 767 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Varig, 499 U.S. at 820; see also Cope,

45 F.3d at 448-49. It is, therefore, a quintessential discretionary function, " "of the nature and quality

that Congress intended to shield from tort liability' " and thus exempt from suit under the FTCA.

Cope, 45 F.3d at 448 (quoting Varig, 467 U.S. at 813).

Mrs. Crumpton argues that because FOIA requires courts to review agency decisions to

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withhold information de novo, see 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B), all agency decisions classifying

information under the statutewhether exempt or notare subject to judicial second-guessing in

tort. We cannot agree. Although Congress has allowed courts to review de novo an agency decision

to classify information as exempt, courts conduct that review only under limited circumstances, and

such review is always conducted in light of FOIA's " "general philosophy of full agency disclosure,'

" Rose, 425 U.S. at 360 (citing legislative history). FOIA's carefully circumscribed judicial review

provision does not change the nature of the agency's classification decision; it continues to

"implicate[ ] social ... [and] political policies," Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 332, and is therefore a

discretionary function exempt from suit under the FTCA.

In contrast to FOIA's judicial review provisions, which are intended to ensure that FOIA

accomplishes its purpose of changing public disclosure law from a "withholding statute [to] a

disclosure statute," EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79 (1973), allowing courtsto second-guessin tort the

political and social judgmentsinvolved in classifying records under the act would encourage agencies

to withhold information, thereby completely undermining FOIA's "general philosophy" favoring

release. The Privacy Act already provides some measure of deterrence to "intentional or willful"

agency decisions to release information that could be considered exempt under the act, see 5 U.S.C.

§ 552a(g)(4) (1988), but an agency liable under the FTCA for making a merely negligent decision to

release information would have a significant incentive to withhold information whenever it had any

question about whether the information fell within one of FOIA's exemptions. Agencies would have

little incentive to exercise the political and social judgment that they retain under FOIA because

courts could always second-guessand even impose damages fortheir decision to release

non-exempt information. Because Congress intended the discretionary function clause of 28 U.S.C.

§ 2680(a) to prevent this very type ofjudicialsecond-guessing of agency discretion, we conclude that

Mrs. Crumpton cannot maintain her FTCA suit against the Army.

V.

Our conclusion does not mean that we condone the Army's decision to release the reports on

Col. Crumpton or its classification of the released material as outside the scope of FOIA exemptions

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(6) and 7(C). Indeed, to us some of this material seems extraordinarily private, and we do not

understand why the Army needed to release it to satisfy the public that it vigorously pursued

allegations of fraud relating to one of its officers. Nevertheless, we conclude that Mrs. Crumpton

cannot maintain an FTCA suit against the Army because Congress has not authorized courts to

"second-guess" in tort an agency's decision to release information that it believes it mayor

mustrelease under FOIA. Finding that Mrs. Crumpton's remaining arguments are without merit,

we affirm the decision of the district court.

So ordered.

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