Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02491/USCOURTS-casd-3_16-cv-02491-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

KENNETH OZUA, 

Petitioner,

v. 

JOHN SUTTON, Warden, 

Respondent.

Case No.: 16cv2491-CAB (NLS) 

1) ORDER GRANTING 

RESPONDENT’S MOTION FOR 

LEAVE TO ASSERT PROCEDURAL 

DEFAULTS IN THE ANSWER 

[Dkt. No. 11]; and 

2) REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION FOR ORDER 

DENYING THE PETITION FOR A 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 

[Dkt. No. 1]. 

Petitioner Kenneth Ozua is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis 

with a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF No. 

1.) Petitioner challenges the sentence imposed following his San Diego Superior Court 

conviction, obtained as a result of a guilty plea, for second degree attempted murder with 

an enhancement for the personal use of a firearm causing great bodily injury. (Pet. at 1-2.) 

He received a stipulated sentence of 7 years-to-life on the attempted murder count and a 

consecutive term of 25 years-to-life for the enhancement. (Id.) He claims that because the 

gang involvement element of the enhancement was not pled or proved, his plea was not 

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knowing and voluntary, and therefore the 25 years-to-life term: (a) violates the plea 

agreement; (b) arose from constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel; (c) violates his 

equal protection rights; and (d) violates his right to be free from cruel and unusual 

punishment. (Id. at 6-6b [ECF No. 1 at 6-8].) 

 Respondent has filed an Answer and lodged portions of the state court record. (ECF 

Nos. 10, 12.) Respondent argues that habeas relief is unavailable because the sole claim 

in the Petition is procedurally defaulted, and is not cognizable as it relies on pre-plea 

constitutional violations. (Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Answer 

[“Ans. Mem.”] at 3-8 [ECF No. 10-1 at 9-14].) Respondent alternately contends that if the 

Court reaches the merits of the claim, relief is unavailable because the state court 

adjudication of the claim, on the basis that the enhancement contains no gang involvement 

element, is neither contrary to, nor involves an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law. (Id. at 8-11 [ECF No. 10-1 at 14-17].) 

Respondent has also filed a Motion for Leave to Assert Procedural Defaults in the 

Answer, requesting permission to raise the procedural default defense in an answer rather 

than in a motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 11.) Respondent reads this Court’s November 14, 

2016 Order directing a response to the Petition as requiring that any procedural default 

defense be raised in a motion to dismiss rather than an answer, and seeks to be relieved of 

that requirement because the Petition raises a single claim which was denied in state court 

on procedural grounds and the merits. (Id. at 1-2.) Petitioner has not filed a Traverse. 

 For the following reasons, the Court finds that Respondent may assert a procedural 

default defense in the Answer and recommends granting Respondent’s Motion. The Court 

also finds that the interests of judicial economy counsel in favor of reaching the merits of 

Petitioner’s claim rather than determining whether it is procedurally defaulted, and that 

federal habeas relief is unavailable because Petitioner has failed to show that the state court 

adjudication of the claim is contrary to, or involves an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law, or that it is based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. 

The Court therefore recommends the Petition be denied. 

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I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 In a five-count amended information filed in the San Diego County Superior Court 

on April 27, 2015, Petitioner was charged with attempted murder in violation of California 

Penal Code § 187(a) and 664 (count one), assault with a firearm in violation of Penal Code 

§ 245(a)(2) (count two), attempted robbery in violation of Penal Code §§ 211 and 644 

(count three), possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of Penal Code § 29800(a)(1) 

(count four), and possession of ammunition by a person prohibited from possessing 

ammunition in violation of Penal Code § 30305(a)(1) (count five). (Lodgment No. 2 at 1-

3 [ECF No. 12-2 at 1-3].) With respect to counts one and three, it was alleged that 

Petitioner personally discharged a semi-automatic handgun and proximately caused great 

bodily injury to the victim within the meaning of Penal Code § 12022.53(d), that he 

intentionally discharged a firearm within the meaning of Penal Code § 12022.53(c), and 

that he personally inflicted great bodily injury upon the victim within the meaning of Penal 

Code § 12022.7(a). (Id. at 2-3.) With respect to count two, the information alleged that 

Petitioner personally used a handgun within the meaning of Penal Code § 12022.5(a), and 

personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim within the meaning of Penal Code 

§ 12022.7(a). (Id. at 2.) 

Petitioner entered a guilty plea to count one and admitted the truth of the Penal Code 

§ 12022.53(d) enhancement as to that count.1

 (Lodgment No. 3.) The plea agreement 

included a stipulated sentence of 32 years-to-life in state prison. (Id. at 1 [ECF No. 12-3 

at 1].) Petitioner initialed the boxes on the change of plea form acknowledging and waiving 

his constitutional rights. (Id. at 1-3 [ECF No. 12-3 at 1-3].) The trial judge confirmed with 

Petitioner on the record that he understood those rights and freely waived them in order to 

                                                                

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 That section provides: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any person who, in the commission 

of a felony specified in subdivision (a), Section 246 [shooting at an inhabited vehicle], or subdivision (c) 

or (d) of Section 26100 [shooting from a vehicle], personally and intentionally discharges a firearm and 

proximately causes great bodily injury, as defined in Section 12022.7 [“a significant or substantial 

physical injury”], or death, to any person other than an accomplice, shall be punished by an additional and 

consecutive term of imprisonment in the state prison for 25 years to life.” Cal. Penal Code § 12022.53(d) 

(West 2012). 

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plead guilty. (Lodgment No. 5, Reporter’s Tr. [“RT”] at 4-5 [ECF No. 12-5 at 5-6].) As 

relevant here, immediately after Petitioner pled guilty, he answered “yes” when asked by 

the judge: “And do you admit that it is true under 12022.53 that you intentionally 

discharged a firearm and this caused great bodily injury to the person that you shot at; do 

you admit that’s true?” (RT at 5 [ECF No. 12-5 at 6].) On June 5, 2015, Petitioner was 

sentenced to 7 years-to-life on the attempted murder count, and received a consecutive term 

of 25 years-to-life on the firearm use enhancement. (Lodgment No. 6 at 3 [ECF No. 12-6 

at 3].) He did not appeal. 

 On December 15, 2015, Petitioner filed a pro se habeas petition in the state superior 

court claiming that the trial court failed to properly advise him of his right to counsel, his 

privilege against self-incrimination, his right to confront witnesses, his right to a jury trial, 

and the direct consequences of his guilty plea, that defense counsel was ineffective, and 

that the gang involvement element of the enhancement was not pled or proved. (Lodgment 

No. 7.) The superior court denied the petition after finding that the record clearly showed 

that Petitioner had been properly advised of his rights and had personally waived them on 

the record, but did not address the gang involvement or ineffective assistance aspects of 

the claim. (Lodgment No. 8.) On March 8, 2016, Petitioner filed a pro se habeas petition 

in the appellate court raising the same claims. (Lodgment No. 9.) The appellate court 

denied relief on the basis that Petitioner could have raised his failure to be advised of his 

rights claim on direct appeal if he had obtained a certificate of probable cause, but did not 

do so, and was not permitted to avoid that requirement through habeas. (Lodgment No. 

10.) The court alternatively held that the claim was frivolous because the transcript of the 

plea hearing clearly showed Petitioner “received the advisements regarding his trial rights 

and the consequences of a guilty plea and then made the waivers, as required for a valid 

guilty plea.” (Id. at 1-2 [ECF No. 12-10 at 1-2].) The court did not address the gang 

element and ineffective assistance of counsel aspects of the claim. (Id.) 

Rather than proceed to the state supreme court, Petitioner began a new round of state 

habeas by filing a second pro se habeas petition in the superior court on March 25, 2016, 

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claiming his 25 years-to-life sentence was illegal because the enhancement required a gang 

involvement element which was neither charged nor proved, and again sought to withdraw 

his guilty plea because he had not been informed of his constitutional rights. (Lodgment 

No. 11.) The court denied relief because the firearm use enhancement did not contain a 

gang involvement element, and the claim of not having been informed of his constitutional 

rights had been raised and rejected in his prior petition. (Lodgment No. 12.) 

On June 6, 2016, Petitioner filed a pro se habeas petition in the appellate court 

claiming that the firearm use allegation contained a gang involvement element which had 

not been pled or proved. (Lodgment No. 13.) The court denied relief because the claim 

could have been but was not raised on direct appeal, and could have been but was not raised 

in the first state habeas petition. (Lodgment No. 14.) The court alternately held that even 

if the claim was not procedurally barred it was without merit because the firearm use 

enhancement did not contain a gang involvement element. (Id.) 

On July 8, 2016, Petitioner filed a pro se habeas petition in the state supreme court 

in which he presented the same claim raised here, and argued that any state procedural bar 

should be excused. (Lodgment No. 15.) That court denied the petition in an order which 

stated: “The petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied.” (Lodgment No. 16.) 

II. UNDERLYING FACTS 

 The following description of the crime is taken from the probation officer’s report, 

which in turn relied on the preliminary hearing transcript and a police report: 

On 06/12/14 at approximately 1330 hours, police responded to a radio 

call of a shooting that occurred in the east alley at 4000 Ohio Street. When 

officers arrived on scene, they found the 62 year [old] victim, Yong Smith, 

lying on the ground in the alley. She suffered a gunshot wound to her right 

shoulder. 

Through investigation, police learned the victim went to her mother’s 

house to pick her up and take her to the dentist. She parked in the alley, went 

inside to get her mother and then returned to her vehicle. After she placed her 

mother in the back seat of her car, she walked around the rear of the vehicle 

to the trunk to get her mother’s dental records. At that time, a male and a 

female pulled up next to the victim’s vehicle in a 2004 Trailblazer. The male, 

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later identified as the defendant, asked the victim for directions to a coffee 

shop in the area. The victim was not familiar with the coffee shop but gave 

the defendant directions to the nearest intersection where the coffee shop was 

located. After the victim gave the defendant the directions, she turned back 

toward her vehicle, assuming their conversation had ended. The defendant 

then exited his vehicle, approached the victim and whispered in her ear, “give 

me your freaking purse.” The victim looked down and saw the defendant 

holding what she believed to be a fake gun or taser gun. The victim ran 

northbound toward a trashcan when she heard the gunshot and felt immediate 

pain to her right shoulder. The victim fell to the ground screaming in pain 

while the defendant got into his vehicle and drove away. Paramedics 

responded and transported the victim to the hospital. Doctors informed police 

the bullet entered the victim’s right shoulder, went through her humerus bone 

and out the front of her shoulder. The injury required surgery. 

Various individuals in the neighborhood heard the gunshot. A few 

witnesses saw the defendant’s vehicle leave the area. One witness was able 

to provide police with the first three characters of the defendant’s license 

plate. On 06/16/14, police received information from an anonymous source 

who named the defendant as the shooter and reported he fled to Mexico after 

the crime. The anonymous person provided police with the defendant’s 

vehicle information. That same day, the victim identified the defendant as the 

shooter during a photo line-up. She also identified the female passenger as 

Mariela Ozua, the defendant’s wife. Later that day, police detained the 

defendant at the Otay Mesa point of entry as he entered into the United States 

from Mexico with his brother. 

Following admonishment, the defendant told police he took his wife to 

Mercy Hospital that day and only had $4. When they left the hospital, the 

defendant had to pay $2 for parking. He said his wife was upset because she 

had no idea how they were going to feed their children with no money. He 

saw the victim who drove a nice vehicle. He decided to stop and ask the 

victim for directions then snatch her purse. When he exited his vehicle and 

confronted the victim, she ran in an attempt to get away and he “pulled the 

trigger.” He claimed he had the firearm pointing down and tried to fire the 

weapon into the ground. He knew he injured the victim because he heard her 

screaming. He got into his vehicle and drove away. He told police he hid the 

firearm in a bush behind his residence in Tijuana, Mexico. He wrote the 

victim an apology letter. 

(Lodgment No. 1 at 2-3 [ECF No. 12-1 at 2-3].) 

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III. DISCUSSION 

 Petitioner claims his 25 years-to-life sentence on the firearm use enhancement is 

void because the gang involvement element necessary to support the enhancement was not 

pled or proved, and therefore his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary. (Pet. at 6-6b 

[ECF No. 1 at 6-8].) He contends his sentence on the enhancement therefore violates the 

plea agreement, arose from constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel, and violates 

his rights to equal protection and to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. (Id.) 

Respondent answers that the claim is procedurally defaulted because the state court 

denied it on the basis that it was not raised on appeal and was raised in a successive petition, 

and argues that it is not cognizable on federal habeas because it relies on allegations of preplea constitutional violations. (Ans. Mem. at 3-8 [ECF No. 10-1 at 9-14].) Respondent 

alternately contends that, to the extent the Court reaches the merits of the claim, habeas 

relief is unavailable because the state court adjudication is neither contrary to, nor involves 

an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. (Id. at 8-11 [ECF No. 10-

1 at 14-17].) Respondent has also filed a Motion for leave to present the procedural default 

defense in the Answer rather than a motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 11.) 

A. Procedural Default 

 Before addressing the procedural default issue, Respondent has filed a Motion for 

Leave to Assert Procedural Defaults in the Answer. (ECF No. 11.) Respondent requests 

permission to raise the issue of procedural default in the Answer, rather than a motion to 

dismiss, notwithstanding this Court’s November 14, 2016 Order directing a response to the 

Petition, which indicated that if Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the motion must 

address all procedural defenses, and not the merits of the claim, which must be addressed 

in an answer. (See ECF No. 6 at 2.) Respondent argues that judicial economy supports 

combining the two in an answer because the only claim in the Petition was denied in the 

state court both on procedural grounds and on the merits. (Id. at 1-2.) 

“[T]he defense of procedural default should be raised in the first responsive pleading 

in order to avoid waiver.” Morrison v. Mahoney, 399 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 2005) 

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(noting that a motion to dismiss is not a responsive pleading), citing United States v. 

Valdez, 195 F.3d 544, 548 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that a procedural default defense is not 

waived by failing to raise it in a motion to dismiss), abrogated on other grounds by Dodd 

v. United States, 545 U.S. 353 (2005); see also Rule 5(b), Rules foll. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 

(“The answer must . . . state whether any claim in the petition is barred by a failure to 

exhaust state remedies, a procedural bar, non-retroactivity, or a statute of limitations.”) 

Because the Court’s Order directing a response did not require a motion to dismiss, but 

merely informed Respondent that if a motion to dismiss was filed it must include all 

procedural defenses, and because Respondent is required to raise any procedural default 

defense in the Answer, the Court recommends granting Respondent’s Motion and 

permitting the procedural default defense to be raised in the Answer. 

In order to preclude federal habeas review based on a procedural default, a state 

procedural bar must rest on a state ground which is “independent” of federal law and 

“adequate” to forever bar federal review. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 

(1991). To be “independent” the state law basis for the decision must not be interwoven 

with federal law. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983). In order to be 

“adequate,” the state procedural bar must be “clear, consistently applied, and wellestablished at the time of the petitioner’s purported default.” Calderon v. Bean, 96 F.3d 

1126, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). 

 Respondent has the initial burden of pleading as an affirmative defense that a failure 

to satisfy a state procedural rule forecloses federal review. Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 

573, 586 (9th Cir. 2003). The burden then shifts to Petitioner to challenge the independence 

or adequacy of the procedural bar, and if Petitioner does so, the ultimate burden of proof 

falls on Respondent. Id. This Court may still reach the merits of a defaulted claim if 

Petitioner demonstrates cause for the failure to object and prejudice from the default, or 

where a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result from the Court not reaching the 

merits of the defaulted claim. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. 

/ / / 

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 Petitioner filed a pro se habeas petition in the state supreme court in which he raised 

the same claim he presents here. (Lodgment No. 15.) His claim was predicated on the 

contention that the gang involvement element necessary to support the firearm use 

enhancement had not been pled or proved, and argued that his claim should not be 

procedurally barred under state law. (Id. at 3-3(d) [ECF No. 12-15 at 3-7].) That petition 

was denied by an order which stated: “The petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied.” 

(Lodgment No. 16, In re Ozua, No. S235741, order at 1 (Aug. 31, 2016).) Prior to that 

petition, Petitioner filed a pro se habeas petition in the state appellate court. (Lodgment 

No. 13.) Petitioner claimed in that petition, as he did in the state supreme court, that the 

failure to plead and prove the gang involvement element of the firearm use enhancement 

rendered his sentence on the enhancement invalid because he was not given notice of that 

element, which therefore rendered his plea agreement fraudulent, and he again argued that 

any state procedural bars should be excused. (Id. at 3-3c, 4-4a [ECF No. 12-13 at 3-8].) 

The state appellate court, before addressing the merits of the claim in an alternate 

holding, stated: 

Ozua is not entitled to habeas corpus relief. His challenge to the 

firearm enhancement is barred because it could have been raised on direct 

appeal had he obtained the certificate of probable cause required by Penal 

Code section 1237.5 to challenge the validity of his guilty plea, and he 

may not avoid that requirement by attacking the plea by petition for writ 

of habeas corpus. (In re Chavez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 643, 651; In re Brown

(1973) 9 Cal.3d 679, 682-683.) The challenge is further barred because 

it could have been asserted in Ozua’s prior petition for writ of habeas 

corpus, but was not. (In re Reno (2012) 55 Cal.4th 428, 501; In re 

Horowitz (1949) 33 Cal.2d 534, 546-547.) “In this state a defendant is 

not permitted to try out his contentions piecemeal by successive 

proceedings attacking the validity of the judgment against him.” (In re 

Connor (1940) 16 Cal.2d 701, 705.) Ozua’s “failure to affirmatively 

address the applicability of procedural obstacles to consideration of the 

claims raised in (his) habeas corpus petition justifies summary denial 

without the court’s consideration of the merits.” (In re Reno, supra, at p. 

511.) 

(Lodgment No. 14, In re Ozua, No. D070428, slip op. at 2 (Cal.App.Ct. June 8, 2016).) 

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There is a presumption that “[w]here there has been one reasoned state judgment 

rejecting a federal claim, later unexplained orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the 

same claim rest upon the same ground.” Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-06 (1991); 

see also Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Before we can apply 

[the] standards [of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)], we must identify the state court decision that is 

appropriate for our review. When more than one state court has adjudicated a claim, we 

analyze the last reasoned decision.”) There is also a presumption that a silent denial by a 

state supreme court is an adjudication on the merits, which “may be overcome when there 

is reason to think some other explanation of the state court’s decision is more likely.” 

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99-100 (2011), citing Ylst, 501 U.S. at 803. 

The fact that the state appellate court alternately reached the merits of the claim does 

not preclude a finding that the state supreme court adopted the procedural ruling, because 

“a state court need not fear reaching the merits of a federal claim in an alternative holding. 

. . . In this way, a state court may reach a federal question without sacrificing its interest in 

finality, federalism, and comity.” Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 264 n.10 (1989). “State 

procedural bars are not immortal, however, they may expire because of later actions by 

state courts. If the last state court to be presented with a particular federal claim reaches 

the merits, it removes any bar to federal-court review that might otherwise have been 

available.” Ylst, 501 U.S. at 801, citing Harris, 489 U.S. at 262-63 (“[A] procedural default 

does not bar consideration of a federal claim on either direct or habeas review unless the 

last state court rendering a judgment in the case clearly and expressly states that its 

judgment rests on a state procedural bar.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

 Petitioner presented his claim in the superior and appellate courts in his first round 

of state habeas petitions, and received the state procedural bar against raising a claim on 

habeas which should have been raised on appeal. However, he did not file a petition in the 

state supreme court in that first round of state habeas proceedings, but pursued another 

round in the superior and appellate courts, perhaps because they had ignored the claim he 

raises here that the gang involvement element of the enhancement was not pled or proved. 

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It was in that second round that he received the additional state procedural bar of presenting 

his claim in a successive petition. Respondent contends that both state procedural rules are 

independent of federal law and adequate to support the judgment. (Ans. Mem. at 4-7 [ECF 

No. 10-1 at 10-13].) 

However, the state appellate court erred in finding that Petitioner had not raised his 

claim regarding the failure to plead and prove the gang involvement element of the 

enhancement in the first round of state habeas petitions. He presented that claim in the first 

superior court habeas petition (see ECF No. 12-7 at 13), and in his first appellate court 

petition (ECF No. 12-9 at 16). Thus, Respondent has not sufficiently alleged that the state 

procedural bar against successive petitions prevents this Court from addressing the claim. 

See e.g. Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. 307, 320 (2011) (“A state ground, no doubt, may be 

found inadequate when discretion has been exercised to impose novel and unforeseeable 

requirements without fair or substantial support in prior state law.”) (internal quotation 

marks omitted); Lee v. Kemma, 534 U.S. 362, 376 (2002) (recognizing exception to bar 

on federal review where “exorbitant application of a generally sound rule renders the state 

ground inadequate to stop consideration of a federal question.”) 

Respondent has sufficiently alleged that the procedural bar regarding Petitioner’s 

failure to present his claim on direct appeal bars his claim, and the burden has shifted to 

Petitioner to challenge the independence and adequacy of that procedural bar. Bennett, 

322 F.3d at 586. Petitioner has not attempted to do so here, but argued in state court that 

the default should not apply to his claim because there is a well-recognized exception for 

claims alleging fundamental errors, such where the state court entered judgment in excess 

of its jurisdiction, or a structural error such as when a defendant is abandoned by counsel. 

(Lodgment No. 11 at 3-3d [ECF No. 12-11 at 3-7]; Lodgment No. 15 at 3b [ECF No. 12-

15 at 5].) Because Petitioner did in fact argue that his failure to raise the claim on direct 

appeal should be excused, to the extent the appellate court was not commenting on the 

veracity of his argument that the default should be excused, the appellate court incorrectly 

found that his “failure to affirmatively address the applicability of procedural obstacles to 

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consideration of the claims raised in (his) habeas petition justifies summary denial without 

the court’s consideration of the merits.” (Lodgment No. 14 at 2 [ECF No. 12-14 at 2].) 

Nevertheless, the adequacy of a state procedural rule “is not within the State’s prerogative 

finally to decide; rather, adequacy ‘is itself a federal question.’” Lee, 534 U.S. at 375, 

quoting Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 422 (1965). The Ninth Circuit has found that 

the failure to obtain a certificate of probable cause to appeal a guilty plea in California state 

court is an adequate and independent procedural ground for purposes of a federal 

procedural default. Strong v. Sullivan, 265 Fed.Appx. 489, 490 (9th Cir. 2008). Thus, to 

the extent this procedural bar was properly applied, Petitioner must demonstrate cause and 

prejudice to excuse the default, or show that a fundamental miscarriage of justice would 

result from the failure to reach the merits of his claim. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. 

Even if federal habeas review of the claim is foreclosed due to a default with respect 

to most of the aspects of Petitioner’s claim, the Court would be required to determine 

whether the ineffective assistance of counsel aspect of the claim is “substantial,” because 

Petitioner raised it in state court while proceeding pro se. See Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 

1, 18 (2012) (“Where, under state law, claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel must 

be raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding, a procedural default will not bar a 

federal habeas court from hearing a substantial claim of ineffective assistance at trial if, in 

the initial-review collateral proceeding, there was not counsel or counsel in that proceeding 

was ineffective.”) The merits of the claim must also be addressed in order to determine 

whether Petitioner can show prejudice arising from the default, as well as to determine the 

validity of his allegation that an element of the offense was not pled and proved. White v. 

Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that a petitioner can demonstrate 

prejudice to overcome a default by showing “that the errors . . . worked to his actual and 

substantial disadvantage, infecting the entire [proceeding] with errors of constitutional 

dimension.”); Vosgien v. Persson, 742 F.3d 1131, 1134 (9th Cir. 2014) (“One way a 

petitioner can demonstrate actual innocence [sufficient to overcome a procedural bar] is to 

show . . . that he cannot, as a legal matter, have committed the alleged crime.”) 

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 Thus, in order to determine if federal review is foreclosed here, the Court must 

determine: (1) whether the silent denial by the state supreme court should be presumed: 

(a) to be a decision on the merits under Richter, (b) as having adopted the state appellate 

court’s (apparently erroneous) finding that the claim is defaulted as successive, (c) as 

having adopted the appellate court’s (apparently erroneous) finding that the claim is 

defaulted due to Petitioner’s failure to argue that the default for failing to raise the claim 

on appeal should be excused, or (d) as having adopted the appellate court’s alternate merits 

holding; (2) whether Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim is substantial as 

required to overcome the procedural bar under Martinez; and (3) whether Petitioner can 

overcome the procedural default by showing cause and prejudice or the existence of a 

fundamental miscarriage of justice. The Ninth Circuit has indicated that: “Procedural bar 

issues are not infrequently more complex than the merits issues presented by the appeal, 

so it may well make sense in some instances to proceed to the merits if the result will be 

the same.” Franklin v. Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1232 (9th Cir. 2002), citing Lambrix v. 

Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 525 (1997) (“We do not mean to suggest that the procedural-bar 

issue must invariably be resolved first; only that it ordinarily should be.”) 

As set forth below, Petitioner’s claim clearly fails on the merits because the sentence 

enhancement which he admitted during his guilty plea does not contain a gang involvement 

element. The Court finds that the interests of judicial economy support addressing the 

merits of Petitioner’s claim without determining whether it is procedurally defaulted. 

B. Merits 

 In order to obtain federal habeas relief with respect to a claim which was adjudicated 

on the merits in state court, a federal habeas petitioner must demonstrate that the state court 

adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 

Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d) (West 2006). Even if § 2254(d) is satisfied, or does not apply, a 

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petitioner must still show a federal constitutional violation occurred in order to obtain 

relief. Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 119-22 (2007); Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 735-36 

(9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). 

 A state court’s decision may be “contrary to” clearly established Supreme Court 

precedent (1) “if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth 

in [the Court’s] cases” or (2) “if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially 

indistinguishable from a decision of [the] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different 

from [the Court’s] precedent.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). A state 

court decision may involve an “unreasonable application” of clearly established federal 

law, “if the state court identifies the correct governing legal rule from this Court’s cases 

but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular state prisoner’s case.” Id. at 407. 

Relief under the “unreasonable application” clause of § 2254(d) is available “if, and only 

if, it is so obvious that a clearly established rule applies to a given set of facts that there 

could be no ‘fairminded disagreement’ on the question.” White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. ___, 

134 S.Ct. 1697, 1706-07 (2014), quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 103. In order to satisfy 

§ 2254(d)(2), the petitioner must show that the factual findings upon which the state court’s 

adjudication of his claims rest are objectively unreasonable. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 

U.S. 322, 340 (2003). 

Petitioner claims here, as he did in state court, that there was a failure to plead and 

prove the gang involvement element of the firearm use enhancement. (Pet. at 6-6b [ECF 

No. 1 at 6-8].) The last reasoned opinion addressing this claim is the appellate court 

opinion denying Petitioner’s second habeas petition, which stated: 

Even if Ozua’s petition were not procedurally barred, it would fail on 

the merits. At the plea hearing, Ozua pleaded guilty to attempted murder and 

“admit(ted) that it is true under (Penal Code section) 12022.53 that (he) 

intentionally discharged a firearm and this caused great bodily injury to the 

person that (he) shot at.” That admission was sufficient to subject him to the 

enhancement of 25 years to life imposed by the trial court. (Pen. Code, 

§ 12022.53, subds. (a)(1), (18) (section applies to attempted murder), (d) 

(“any person who, in the commission of a felony specified in subdivision (a), 

. . . personally discharges a firearm and proximately causes great bodily injury 

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. . . shall be punished by an additional and consecutive term of imprisonment 

in the state prison of 25 years to life.”).) No pleading or proof the shooting 

was done to promote a criminal street gang was required to impose the 

enhancement. 

(Lodgment No. 14, In re Ozua, No. D070428, slip op. at 2.) 

 Clearly established federal law provides that a guilty plea must be voluntary and 

intelligent, that is, the defendant must enter the plea with full awareness of its “direct 

consequences.” Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 747-55 (1970); Boykin v. Alabama, 

395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969) (requiring the record to reflect the defendant understands, and is 

voluntarily waiving, his rights). The test for determining the validity of a guilty plea is 

“whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative 

courses of action open to the defendant.” Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 29 (1992), quoting 

North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970). 

Before turning to the merits, Respondent contends the claim is not cognizable on 

federal habeas under Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973), because it relies on preplea constitutional violations. (Ans. Mem. at 7-8 [ECF No. 10-1 at 13-14].) The Supreme 

Court stated in that case: 

We thus reaffirm the principle recognized in the Brady trilogy: a guilty 

plea represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in the 

criminal process. When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open 

court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may 

not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of 

constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea. He may 

only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea by 

showing that the advice he received from counsel was [substandard]. 

 

Tollett, 411 U.S at 267. 

Petitioner contends the aspect of his guilty plea which included an admission to the 

California Penal Code § 12022.53 enhancement was not knowing and voluntary due to the 

failure to plead and prove the gang involvement element of the enhancement, and that his 

defense counsel allowed him to plead guilty to an enhancement for which he was not and 

could not be guilty because he was not acting for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in 

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association with a criminal street gang as required by the enhancement. (Pet. at 6-6b [ECF 

No. 1 at 6-8].) Petitioner is not attacking constitutional violations which occurred prior to 

his plea, but is attacking the voluntary and intelligent nature of his plea, as he did in state 

court. Thus, the Court recommends rejecting Respondent’s contention that Petitioner’s 

claim is barred by Tollett. See Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 508 (1994) (a guilty 

plea may be found to be not knowing and voluntary if it is the product of “ignorance” or 

“incomprehension.”); Menna v. New York, 423 U.S 62, 63 n.2 (1975) (“The point of [the 

Brady trilogy] is that a counseled plea of guilty is an admission of actual guilt so reliable 

that, when voluntary and intelligent, it quite validly removes the issue of factual guilt from 

the case.”) (emphasis added); Tollett, 411 U.S. at 266 (“The focus of federal habeas inquiry 

is the nature of the advice and the voluntariness of the plea, not the existence as such of an 

antecedent constitutional infirmity.”) 

Petitioner argues here, as he has throughout the state proceedings, that his guilty plea 

included an admission to California Penal Code § 12022.53(e)(1), which provides: 

“The enhancements provided in this section shall apply to any person 

who is a principal in the commission of an offense if both of the following are 

pled and proved: (A) The person violated subdivision (b) of Section 186.22. 

(B) Any principal in the offense committed any act specified in subdivision 

(b), (c), or (d).” 

Cal. Penal Code § 12022.53(e)(1) (West 2012); see also Cal. Penal Code § 186.22(b) 

(providing for additional terms of punishment for persons convicted of a felony which was 

committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with any criminal street 

gang). Petitioner apparently reads the language in § 12022.53(e) which states “if both of 

the following are pled and proved,” as stating “if and only if both of the following are plead 

and proved.” Such an interpretation would not only read out all the other provisions in the 

statute, but ignores the distinction between the application of § 12022.53(e) to: “Any 

principal in the offense [who] committed any act specified in [§ 12022.53(b), (c) or (d)],” 

and, as in Petitioner’s case, the actual perpetrator of an act specified in § 12022.53(b), (c) 

/ / / 

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or (d). See e.g. People v. Favor, 54 Cal.4th 868, 874 (2012) (acknowledging distinction 

between principal and perpetrator under California criminal law). 

The charging document clearly alleged that Petitioner violated § 12022.53(d), and it 

sufficiently informed Petitioner of that charge by alleging that in the commission or 

attempted commission of attempted murder, he “intentionally and personally discharged a 

firearm, to wit: a semi-automatic handgun, and proximately caused great bodily injury and 

death to a person (other than an accomplice), within the meaning of penal code section 

12022.53(d).” (Lodgment No. 2 at 1-2 [ECF No. 12-2 at 1-2].); see Cal. Penal Code 

§ 12022.53(d) (providing for an enhancement to any person who, in the commission of 

attempted murder, “personally and intentionally discharges a firearm and proximately 

causes great bodily injury, . . . , or death, to any person other than an accomplice.”) The 

change of plea form contains Petitioner’s initials in a box indicating he admitted violating 

§ 12022.53(d) as part of his plea. (Lodgment No. 3 at 1 [ECF No. 12-3 at 1].) The plea 

colloquy indicates that Petitioner admitted “that it is true under § 12022.53 that you 

intentionally discharged a firearm and this caused great bodily injury to the person that you 

shot at.” (RT at 5 [ECF No. 12-5 at 6].) 

Although the trial judge omitted the precise subsection of § 12022.53 during the plea 

colloquy, it is obvious from the context of the colloquy, and is specified in the charging 

document and the change of plea form. On the other hand, there is nothing in the record 

whatsoever to indicate Petitioner was charged with or admitted violating § 12022.53(e). 

Thus, there is no basis to support Petitioner’s contention that he was charged with, or 

admitted, shooting the victim for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a 

criminal street gang within the meaning of § 12022.53(e), rather than having personally 

and intentionally discharged a firearm which caused great bodily injury to the victim within 

the meaning of § 12022.53(d). 

Accordingly, the Court finds that the state appellate court’s adjudication of 

Petitioner’s claim that his admission of the enhancement was not knowing and voluntary 

because the gang involvement element was not pled and proved, is neither contrary to, nor 

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involves an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, and is not based 

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state 

court proceedings. Woodall, 134 S.Ct. at 1706-07; Richter, 562 U.S. at 103; Miller-El, 537 

U.S. at 340; Taylor, 529 U.S. at 405-06; Custis, 511 U.S. at 508; Parke, 506 U.S. at 29; 

Marshall, 459 U.S. at 437; Brady, 397 U.S. at 747-55; Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242; Alford, 

400 U.S. at 31. Because that is the only predicate for Petitioner’s claim and it has not been 

established, and because Petitioner alleges no other basis for the invalidity of his plea or 

admission, there is no merit to his contentions that, for the same reason, the imposition of 

the 25 years-to-life sentence on the enhancement violated the plea agreement, the Sixth 

Amendment, his equal protection rights, constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, or 

amounted to cruel and unusual punishment. The Court recommends the Petition be denied. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court 

issue an Order: (1) approving and adopting this Report and Recommendation, (2) granting 

Respondent’s Motion for Leave to Assert Procedural Defaults in the Answer, and 

(3) directing that Judgment be entered denying the Petition. 

IT IS ORDERED that no later than April 21, 2017, any party to this action may 

file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should 

be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.” 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with 

the Court and served on all parties no later than May 1, 2017. The parties are advised that 

failure to file objections with the specified time may waive the right to raise those 

objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th 

Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Dated: March 28, 2017 

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