Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-01440/USCOURTS-ca10-94-01440-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

---

PUBLISH FILED 

Uaited States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL21 1995 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

HIGINIO ROMERO, individually and as 

Personal Representative of the Estate 

of Richard Romero; FRANCES ROMERO, 

individually, 

Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

v. 

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF THE 

COUNTY OF LAKE, STATE OF COLORADO, 

Defendant, 

and 

DAVID DUARTE, Sheriff of Lake County in 

his official capacity; SEAN DEFABBO, 

individually and in his official 

capacity as Deputy Sheriff of Lake 

County, 

Defendants-Appellants. 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

No. 94-1440 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. No. 93-C-1525) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Joseph M. Ricci of Alexander & Ricci, Colorado Springs, Colorado, 

for Plaintiffs-Appellees. 

Theodore 

Schluter 

DeFabbo. 

S. Halaby and Robert M. Liechty of Halaby Cross Liechty 

& Buck, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant 

Appellate Case: 94-1440 Document: 01019277895 Date Filed: 07/21/1995 Page: 1 
Before ANDERSON, BALDOCK, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge. 

The parents of Richard Romero, who is now deceased, brought 

this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit against the sheriff and deputy sheriff 

of Lake County, Colorado, and the Lake County Board of 

Commissioners.! The suit alleges that deputy sheriff Sean DeFabbo 

violated the Fourth Amendment by using deadly force against 

Richard Romero. DeFabbo moved for summary judgment on the ground 

of qualified immunity. The district court denied summary judgment 

and DeFabbo now appeals.2 We exercise jurisdiction under 

28 U.S.C. § 1291, see Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 

(1985), and reverse and remand. 

The record reveals the following. On August 4, 1992, a Lake 

County dispatcher asked DeFabbo to check on a vehicle in need of 

assistance in Eagle County, Colorado.3 At approximately 

1:00 a.m., DeFabbo discovered the vehicle on the side of the road 

with a flat tire. After talking to the driver, Richard Romero, 

1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously to grant the parties' request for a 

decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(f) and lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

2 We consider DeFabbo to be the 

represents that Sheriff Duarte was 

appellant in the notice of appeal. 

sole appellant, as 

incorrectly named as 

he 

an 

3 According to DeFabbo, Lake County occasionally investigates 

accidents in Eagle County, when Eagle County cannot respond 

immediately. 

2 

Appellate Case: 94-1440 Document: 01019277895 Date Filed: 07/21/1995 Page: 2 
DeFabbo suspected that Romero was intoxicated. DeFabbo returned 

to his patrol car and asked the Lake County dispatcher to inform 

Eagle County that the driver was intoxicated and to indicate that 

he would wait until Eagle County responded. 

Romero asked for permission to fix his car. DeFabbo told 

Romero that he could fix his car, but could not drive because he 

appeared to be intoxicated. Romero denied that he was intoxicated 

and refused to submit to any tests. Both men returned to their 

cars. At some point, Romero approached DeFabbo's car. DeFabbo 

got out of his car and asked Romero to return to his car. Romero 

initially turned toward his car, but suddenly turned around and 

punched DeFabbo in the nose. Romero then ran a knife across 

DeFabbo's stomach. DeFabbo retreated a few steps and drew his 

gun. He repeatedly told Romero to drop the knife or he would 

shoot. Romero refused to drop the knife. Instead, he raised the 

knife and walked toward DeFabbo in an attack position. DeFabbo 

fired one shot, after which Romero took another step toward 

DeFabbo. Thinking he had missed with the first shot, DeFabbo 

fired twice more. Romero died from the gunshot wounds. 

Plaintiffs' theory of liability is that DeFabbo contributed 

to the circumstances that led to the use of deadly force. Deadly 

force, plaintiffs claim, would have been unnecessary had DeFabbo 

arrested and handcuffed Romero, an intoxicated driver, as required 

by standard police procedure and state law.4 DeFabbo moved for 

summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. Citing 

4 In support of their argument that DeFabbo should have 

arrested and handcuffed Romero, plaintiffs cite to the Lake County 

Sheriff's manual and Leake v. Cain, 720 P.2d 152 (Colo. 1986). 

3 

Appellate Case: 94-1440 Document: 01019277895 Date Filed: 07/21/1995 Page: 3 
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), DeFabbo claims that his 

use of deadly force in self-defense was not unreasonable. He also 

states that his failure to handcuff Romero did not violate the 

constitution. 

The district court denied DeFabbo's motion for summary 

judgment, ruling that genuine issues of material fact existed 

regarding the reasonableness of the use of deadly force and that 

DeFabbo failed to show he was unaware, or should not have known, 

of law clearly establishing the right to be free from unreasonable 

seizures. The district court did not comment on plaintiffs' 

theory of liability. 

"We review the district court's denial of qualified immunity 

on summary judgment de novo." Romero v. Fay, 45 F.3d 1472, 1475 

(lOth Cir. 1995). When a defendant asserts the affirmative 

defense of qualified immunity, "the plaintiff initially bears a 

heavy two-part burden." Albright v. Rodriguez, 51 F.3d 1531, 1534 

(lOth Cir. 1995). The plaintiff must show (1) "that the 

defendant's actions violated a constitutional or statutory right" 

and (2) that the right "allegedly violated [was] clearly 

established at the time of the conduct at issue." Id. 

"' [P]laintiff must articulate the clearly established 

constitutional right and the defendant's conduct which violated 

the right with specificity.'" Id. (quoting Romero, 45 F.3d at 

1475) . 

"If the plaintiff fails to carry either part of his two-part 

burden, the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity." Id. at 

1535. If the plaintiff has made the required two-part showing, 

4 

Appellate Case: 94-1440 Document: 01019277895 Date Filed: 07/21/1995 Page: 4 
"'then the defendant bears the burden, as a movant for summary 

judgment, of showing no material issues of fact remain that would 

defeat the claim of qualified immunity.'" Romero, 45 F.3d at 1475 

(quoting Walter v. Morton, 33 F.3d 1240, 1242 (lOth Cir. 1994)). 

We hold that plaintiffs failed to show that DeFabbo violated a 

clearly established constitutional right and that DeFabbo, 

therefore, is entitled to qualified immunity. 

We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party. Id. Because plaintiffs did not present any 

evidence to the contrary, we assume from DeFabbo's evidence that 

Romero punched DeFabbo and ran a knife across his stomach, that 

DeFabbo retreated and drew his gun, that despite warnings to drop 

the knife, Romero approached DeFabbo with the knife, and that 

DeFabbo then shot Romero in self-defense. 

Plaintiffs' excessive force claim must be analyzed under the 

reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment. See Graham v. 

Connor, 490 u.s. 386, 394 (1989). An officer's use of deadly 

force in self-defense is not constitutionally unreasonable. See 

Garner, 471 U.S. at 11 (deadly force may be used if "officer has 

probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of 

serious physical harm either to the officer or to others"). Based 

on the undisputed evidence, we hold that DeFabbo reasonably feared 

for his life when he shot Romero. Romero punched DeFabbo in the 

nose, ran the knife across DeFabbo's stomach, and, with knife in 

hand, pursued DeFabbo as he retreated. Romero continued toward 

DeFabbo even after being fired upon once. DeFabbo's use of deadly 

force under these circumstances was not constitutionally 

5 

Appellate Case: 94-1440 Document: 01019277895 Date Filed: 07/21/1995 Page: 5 
unreasonable. See O'Neal v. DeKalb County, 850 F.2d 653, 655, 

657-58 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding officers did not act unreasonably 

in shooting suspect who charged toward one of them with a knife) . 

Without citing any evidence in the record, plaintiffs claim 

there are disputed issues regarding the use of deadly force which 

preclude summary judgment. Essentially, plaintiffs argue as a 

matter of law that the shooting should not be viewed as an act of 

self-defense because DeFabbo put himself in a dangerous situation 

by not handcuffing Romero. Plaintiffs urge us to look beyond the 

immediate circumstances of the shooting and evaluate the 

reasonableness of DeFabbo's actions from the point DeFabbo told 

Romero he was not free to leave the scene. 

We rejected a similar argument in Wilson v. Meeks, 52 F.3d 

1547 (lOth Cir. 1995). There, we refused to consider whether an 

officer who used deadly force in self-defense had caused the 

suspect to behave in a threatening manner. Id. at 1554. We 

followed other circuits that have confined the reasonableness 

inquiry in excessive force cases "to whether the officer was in 

danger at the moment of the threat." Id. (citing cases). 

Here, the record indicates that DeFabbo waited with Romero 

for at least one-half hour for Eagle County to respond. DeFabbo 

had no reason to fear for his life until Romero threatened him 

with the knife. Evidence that DeFabbo failed to arrest and 

handcuff Romero prior to the threat is not relevant to the 

reasonableness of DeFabbo's decision to shoot Romero.5 

5 Whether an officer acted reasonably in using deadly force is 

"heavily fact dependent." Wilson, 52 F.3d at 1553. We recognize 

(continued on next page) 

6 

Appellate Case: 94-1440 Document: 01019277895 Date Filed: 07/21/1995 Page: 6 
see also Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1150 (7th Cir.) (refusing 

to examine events prior to threat against the officer to determine 

whether officer could have avoided situation which led to use of 

deadly force), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 81 (1994); Greenidge v. 

Ruffin, 927 F.2d 789, 792 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding officer's 

failure to follow standard arrest procedures is not relevant to 

whether officer acted reasonably in using deadly force) . 

DeFabbo's failure to arrest and handcuff Romero does not become 

relevant simply because such actions may be required by state law 

and police procedure. Further, we note that violations of state 

law and police procedure generally do not give rise to a § 1983 

claim. See Jones v. City & County of Denver, 854 F.2d 1206, 1209 

(lOth Cir. 1988) (state law); Wilson, 52 F.3d at 1554 (police 

regulation) . 

Finally, we reject plaintiffs' argument pursuant to DeShaney 

v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 

199-200 (1989), that DeFabbo assumed a constitutional duty to 

protect Romero when he refused to allow Romero to leave the scene. 

Even assuming the premise that DeFabbo had a constitutional duty 

to protect Romero, an intoxicated driver, from the consequences of 

his own actions, plaintiffs cannot show that DeFabbo violated 

clearly established law by ignoring that duty. See McLenagan v. 

(continued from previous page) 

that an officer's conduct prior to the suspect's threat of force 

may be relevant to the reasonableness inquiry if the conduct is 

"immediately connected" to the suspect's threat of force, see 

Bella v. Chamberlain, 24 F.3d 1251, 1256 n.7 (lOth Cir. 1994), 

cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 898 (1995), and the officer is alleged to 

have acted with the state of mind required for liability under 

§ 1983. 

7 

Appellate Case: 94-1440 Document: 01019277895 Date Filed: 07/21/1995 Page: 7 
Karnes, 27 F.3d 1002, 1008 n.9 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 

S. Ct. 581 (1994). 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

District of Colorado is REVERSED and REMANDED for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

8 

Appellate Case: 94-1440 Document: 01019277895 Date Filed: 07/21/1995 Page: 8