Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02593/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cv-02593-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Raymond J. Conroy, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles L. Ryan, et al., 

Respondents.

No. CV-12-2593-PHX-FJM (DKD)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

TO THE HONORABLE FREDERICK J. MARTONE, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE: 

 Raymond J. Conroy filed a timely Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on 

December 6, 2012, challenging his conviction, following a guilty plea, for one count of 

theft, and the trial court’s imposition of a six-year presumptive prison term, to be served 

concurrently with the remainder of a sentence he was serving in another case. Conroy 

raises two grounds for habeas relief. In Ground One, he alleges that the police 

unlawfully seized and searched his vehicle in violation of his fourth amendment rights. 

In Ground Two, he maintains that trial counsel’s erroneous advice that Conroy could still 

raise the fourth amendment claim in a Rule 32 proceeding even after pleading guilty 

caused him to enter into a plea agreement to which he otherwise would not have agreed. 

Respondents contend that Ground One is not reviewable in a federal habeas proceeding, 

and Ground Two is without merit. The Court agrees and recommends that the petition be 

denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

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BACKGROUND

 A police officer observed Conroy trespassing in an area of the Deer Valley Airport 

where “no trespassing” signs were posted, and an area that was not accessible to the 

public. He was near a Phoenix Police Department helicopter, and was attempting to 

enter the helicopter (Doc. 1, Exh1, 2, R.T. 10/31/08, 11-15, 21-16). The police officer 

eventually found him hiding, and arrested him for attempted unauthorized entry into the 

helicopter (Id. at 13-14, 26). At the time of his arrest, Conroy was wearing a fire 

department jacket, and was carrying what looked like a police radio. Conroy was not a 

law enforcement officer or a fire fighter (Id. at 24-27). 

 When Conroy was interviewed by police, the detective learned that Conroy had 

previously been convicted of dealing with stolen radios (Id. at 26). He told police where 

he had parked his car at the airport, and the police located the vehicle and observed what 

appeared to be portable police radios inside the vehicle, visible from the outside (Id. at 

17, 21-22). The car was towed to the police department parking lot in order to conduct 

an inventory search (Id.). 

 Later, responding to two requests from Conroy to move his vehicle, and after 

informing Conroy that a relocation of his vehicle would require an inventory search, the 

police searched the vehicle (Id. at 23, 27-28, 34). The police detective testified at the 

evidentiary hearing that he entered Conroy’s vehicle “[t]o both collect what I believe to 

be with [sic] the evidence and also to inventory the vehicle,” as required by police 

department policy (Id. at 22-23). Inside the vehicle, the police discovered more radios 

that had distinguishable features that led the officer to believe they belonged to the fire 

department (Id. at 13, 22). Although the officer had initially intended to inventory the 

vehicle, his discovery led him to believe that the radios were stolen (Id. at 30). 

 Conroy was indicted on one count of first-degree trafficking in stolen property and 

two counts of theft (Doc. 19, Exh A). He filed a motion to suppress, contending that the 

police unlawfully seized and searched his vehicle in violation of his fourth amendment 

rights (Id., Exh E). The trial court set an evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress, 

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and conducted a Donald1 Hearing in an attempt to settle the case, but the State and 

Conroy did not reach a plea agreement at that time (Id., Exh G, H). At the evidentiary 

hearing, the trial court dismissed the trafficking count, and following the presentation of 

testimony and argument, denied Conroy’s motion to suppress (Id., Exh I-L). Following a 

second settlement conference, the State and Conroy again failed to reach an agreement; 

six days later, they reached an agreement whereby Conroy would plead guilty to one 

count of theft with a prior felony conviction, and the other theft count and sentencingenhancing allegations would be dismissed (Id., Exh P-R). 

 Six weeks later, Conroy filed a request to proceed pro per, and counsel filed a 

motion to withdraw upon learning that Conroy had filed a notice of claim against the 

county and against counsel’s supervisor (Id., Exh S, T). The trial court granted counsel’s 

motion to withdraw, and at a later status hearing, granted Conroy’s waiver of counsel and 

appointed advisory counsel (Id., Exh V-Z). Conroy subsequently filed a motion 

requesting to withdraw from the plea agreement, citing grand jury irregularities and the 

ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Conroy alleged that he involuntarily 

entered into the plea agreement based on false statements made by trial counsel. He 

alleged that counsel had told him that he could still challenge the seizure and search of 

his vehicle in a Rule 32 proceeding despite having entered into the plea agreement (Id., 

Exh AA). 

 Prior to sentencing, Conroy filed a notice of post-conviction relief. Following 

counsel’s notice of completion of review, finding no claims for relief, Conroy filed a pro 

se petition, raising three claims of ineffective assistance, again arguing that counsel 

misled him. In support of this claim, he attached a question-and-answer-sheet, in which 

trial counsel indicated that Conroy would not waive his right to file a Rule 32 challenging 

the denial of the motion to suppress by entering into the plea agreement (Id., Exh TT). 

Conroy argued that but for counsel’s error, he would not have pleaded guilty, and the 

 

1 State v. Donald, 198 Ariz. 406 (App. 2000). 

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court of appeals “more likely than not” would have reversed the trial court’s denial of his 

motion to suppress (Id.). The trial court concluded that Conroy’s claim lacked merit 

because any confusion about Conroy’s right to appeal the ruling on the motion to 

suppress was “cured by the plea agreement itself and the Court’s plea colloquy” (Id., Exh 

WW at 2). Conroy petitioned for review in the Arizona Court of Appeals, and sought 

leave to amend his petition with newly discovered evidence. The court of appeals denied 

the motion, without prejudice to his filing another post-conviction petition in state court 

(Id., Exh AAA, BBB). He filed another petition, which the trial court denied as 

precluded and without merit (Id., Exh CCC, DDD). The court of appeals denied review 

of the dismissal of his original post-conviction petition (Id., Exh III). 

DISCUSSION

 In Ground One, Conroy argues that the police unlawfully seized and then searched 

his vehicle in violation of his fourth amendment rights. The Court initially notes that 

Conroy failed to raise his fourth amendment claim on direct review because he was 

precluded from doing so by the express terms of his plea agreement. Therefore, the claim 

is unexhausted. However, the Court need not rule on the exhaustion issue because a 

fourth amendment claim is not cognizable in a federal habeas proceeding, as long as 

Conroy had a full and fair hearing in state court. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 

(1976). A review of the record indicates that Conroy received such a hearing. Although 

a fourth amendment claim is not reviewable in a federal habeas proceeding, the Court 

will review the merits of Conroy’s fourth amendment claim as it relates to his claim of 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 

 In Ground Two, Conroy argues that counsel was ineffective by erroneously 

advising him that he could pursue his fourth amendment claim in a post-conviction 

proceeding, despite his decision to enter into a plea agreement. Conroy argues that if he 

had been correctly advised that pleading guilty would waive the fourth amendment claim, 

he would not have accepted the plea agreement, and there is a reasonable probability that 

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the court of appeals would have reversed his conviction, finding that the trial court erred 

in denying the motion to suppress. The Court concludes that this ground is without merit. 

 Conroy does not allege that the police violated his fourth amendment rights by 

peering inside his vehicle, or that any other constitutional protection was violated. The 

officer was in a public parking lot, looking into Conroy’s vehicle, conduct that any 

member of the general public could lawfully perform. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 

740 (1983). The officer testified at the evidentiary hearing that he observed evidence 

inside the vehicle that he suspected was contraband: at least one police-style radio in a 

vehicle that did not belong to a police officer. Conroy had no legitimate expectation of 

privacy regarding that “portion of the interior of an automobile which may be viewed 

from outside the vehicle by either inquisitive passersby or diligent police officers.” Id. 

Thus, the view into the vehicle was not a search within the meaning of the fourth 

amendment. Id. In addition, police acted lawfully in seizing the vehicle, having 

observed contraband in plain view, and having lawfully arrived “at the spot from which 

the observation of the evidence is made.” Kentucky v. King, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 

1849, 1858 (2011). Once the vehicle had been lawfully seized, the subsequent search 

was also lawful as either an automobile search exempt from the warrant requirement, see 

California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991), or as a proper inventory search 

conducted pursuant to police department policy. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 374 

(1987). Because Conroy has no valid fourth amendment claim, he cannot establish that 

trial counsel’s erroneous advice regarding the waiver of his right to challenge that claim 

caused him any prejudice. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Raymond J. Conroy’s petition for 

writ of habeas corpus be denied and dismissed with prejudice (Doc. 1). 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that a Certificate of Appealability and 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal be denied either because dismissal of the 

Petition is justified by a plain procedural bar and jurists of reason would not find the 

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ruling debatable, or because Conroy has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right. 

 This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules 

of Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. 

The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this 

recommendation within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See, 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, 

the parties have fourteen days within which to file a response to the objections. Failure 

timely to file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may 

result in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the district court without 

further review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Failure timely to file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will 

be considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an 

order or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 

72, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

 Dated this 12th day of February, 2014. 

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