Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-7_19-cv-00265/USCOURTS-alnd-7_19-cv-00265-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000 Job Discrimination (Race)

---

Page 1 of 32

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

WESTERN DIVISION 

 

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

Plaintiff Lyndain Williams (“Plaintiff” or “Williams”) brings suit against his 

former employer Mercedes-Benz U.S. International, Inc. (“Defendant” or 

“MBUSI”), alleging racial discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of 

the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq, and 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1981. Before the Court is Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 12.) 

The motion has been briefed and is ripe for review. For the reasons stated below, 

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is due to be granted. 

LYNDAIN WILLIAMS, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

MERCEDES BENZ US 

INTERNATIONAL, INC., 

 Defendant. 

7:19-cv-00265-LSC 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

FILED

 2020 Jun-10 PM 03:34

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 7:19-cv-00265-LSC Document 19 Filed 06/10/20 Page 1 of 32
Page 2 of 32

I. BACKGROUND1

Plaintiff is a black male who formerly worked for Defendant as a Team 

Member in its Assembly Plant 2, Trim 5 Line, B-Shift. (Def’s Ex. A at 34–35, 160.)2

During his employment with Defendant, Plaintiff worked under the supervision of 

various Team Leaders. At the time of his termination, Plaintiff’s Team Leader was 

James Solomon, a black male. (Id. at 47.) Prior to working under Solomon’s 

supervision, Plaintiff worked under the supervision of Team Leader James Sadberry, 

a white male. (Id.) 

Defendant utilizes a system of progressive discipline referred to as its 

Corrective Performance Review (“CPR”) policy. (Def’s Ex. C at ¶ 4.) Under this 

progressive disciplinary policy, a Team Member could progress through several 

penalties including a Level I CPR, a Level II CPR, a Level III CPR, and finally a 

 

1

 The facts set out in this opinion are gleaned from the parties’ submissions of facts claimed 

to be undisputed, their respective responses to those submissions, and the Court’s own examination 

of the evidentiary record. These are the “facts” for summary judgment purposes only. They may 

not be the actual facts. See Cox v. Adm’r U.S. Steel & Carnegie Pension Fund, 17 F.3d 1386, 1400 

(11th Cir. 1994). The Court is not required to identify unreferenced evidence supporting a party’s 

position. As such, review is limited to exhibits and specific portions of the exhibits specifically 

cited by the parties. See Chavez v. Sec’y, Fla. Dept. of Corr., 647 F.3d 1057, 1061 (11th Cir. 2011) 

(“[D]istrict court judges are not required to ferret out delectable facts buried in a massive record . 

. . .” (internal quotations omitted)). 

2

 Plaintiff’s response fails to controvert any material facts set forth in Defendant’s Statement 

of Facts. (See doc. 17.) Under this Court’s Uniform Initial Order, all such facts are therefore 

deemed admitted. (Doc. 5 at 16–17 (“All material facts set forth in the statement required of the 

moving party will be deemed to be admitted for summary judgment purposes unless controverted 

by the response of the party opposing summary judgment.”).) 

Case 7:19-cv-00265-LSC Document 19 Filed 06/10/20 Page 2 of 32
Page 3 of 32

Termination CPR. (Id. at ¶ 5.) 

A. PLAINTIFF’S LEVEL I CPR FOR IMPROPER CELL PHONE USAGE3

In the summer of 2016, Defendant began to place new emphasis on its policy 

of not permitting workers to use cell phones while on the production line (“the 

Line”). (Def’s Ex. A at 54–55.) The policy made exemptions for Team Leaders, who 

might need to use their cell phones to document or report quality defects that 

occurred on the Line. (Id.) Plaintiff received training on this new cell phone policy 

and understood that non-Team Leaders should not use their cell phones while on 

the Line. (Id. at 55, 57.) 

On November 18, 2016, Plaintiff received a Level I CPR for using his cell 

phone to text while the Line was running. (Def’s Ex. B – DX 5.) James Sadberry, 

Plaintiff’s Team Leader at the time claims to have observed Plaintiff leaning against 

a rack and texting while the Line was running, prompting him to issue the Level I 

CPR. (Def’s Ex. D at ¶¶ 4–5.) Team Relations Manager Zina Cooper, a black female, 

authorized the CPR on this occasion. (Def’s Ex. C at ¶¶ 1, 6.) 

Plaintiff disputes that he made improper use of his cell phone on this occasion. 

Specifically, he claims that (1) he was not texting on the Line, and (2) even if he was 

 

3

 Plaintiff previously received a Level II CPR in November 2015 for engaging in a physical 

altercation with Jimmie Jones, a black male Team Member. (Def’s Ex. A at 43, 49–50, 52.) 

However, that CPR expired on October 30, 2016, and it does not appear to have contributed 

towards the termination of Plaintiff’s employment. (See Def’s Ex. B – DX 2.) 

Case 7:19-cv-00265-LSC Document 19 Filed 06/10/20 Page 3 of 32
Page 4 of 32

using his cell phone, he had a right to do so because he was acting as a Team Leader 

on that date. (Def’s Ex. A at 63.) However, Plaintiff did not dispute his cell phone 

usage or claim to be acting as a Team Leader in the space of his CPR that is reserved 

for Team Member comments. (Def’s Ex. B – DX 5.) Instead, he wrote a comment 

alleging that Sadberry should not have issued the CPR because Sadberry allowed 

other Team Members to use their cell phones on the Line. (Id.) Moreover, Sadberry 

himself denies that Plaintiff had stepped up to cover for a Team Leader on that date. 

(Def’s Ex. D at ¶ 6.) 

In addition to the Level I CPR issued to Plaintiff, James Sadberry has issued 

CPRs to other Team Members, black and white, for using their cell phones in 

violation of Defendant’s policy. (Id. at ¶ 7.) Plaintiff has admitted to having no 

knowledge of why Sadberry would have falsely accused Plaintiff on this occasion, and 

he admits that he got along well with Sadberry. (Def’s Ex A at 52, 62.) He does recall 

hearing David Foreman mention in December 2014 or 2015 that Sadberry is a racist. 

(Id. at 152–53.) However, Foreman denies ever making such a comment about 

Sadberry. (Def’s Ex. F at ¶ 4.) 

During the time that Sadberry acted as Plaintiff’s Team Leader, Plaintiff 

witnessed David Jones, a white Team Member, using his cell phone multiple times 

while working on the Line. (Id. at 79–80.) Jones faced no discipline for his cell phone 

Case 7:19-cv-00265-LSC Document 19 Filed 06/10/20 Page 4 of 32
Page 5 of 32

use. (Id.) However, it is not clear whether Jones used his cell phone before or after 

Defendant began placing greater emphasis on its cell phone policy. (Id. at 80.)4

Moreover, Plaintiff is unaware of whether Sadberry ever witnessed Jones making 

improper use of his cell phone. (Id. at 80–81.) Sadberry himself denies ever having 

witnessed Jones on his cell phone while on the Line. (Def’s Ex. D at ¶ 8.) Ted 

Solomon, the Team Leader who succeeded Sadberry, also denies having ever 

witnessed Jones violating the cell phone policy. (Def’s Ex. E at ¶ 7.) 

In March 2017, Plaintiff also witnessed Charles Owens, another white Team 

Member, using his cell phone during a start-up meeting. (Def’s Ex. A at 81.) Ted 

Solomon, the Group Leader at the time, witnessed Owens’s cell phone use. (Id. at 

82.) When Solomon looked at Owens, the latter immediately put away his cell phone. 

(Id. at 83.) Solomon did not discipline Owens on this occasion because (1) the Line 

was not running, (2) the start-up meeting had only just begun, and (3) Owens 

immediately put away his cell phone when Solomon noticed him. (Def’s Ex. E at 

¶¶ 8–9.) Plaintiff does not recall seeing Owens using his cell phone on the Line when 

a Team Leader was present. (Def’s Ex. A at 84–85.) 

 

4

 Plaintiff’s response specifies that David Jones improperly used his cell phone while 

working on the Line in February 2017, after Defendant began to place greater emphasis on its cell 

phone policies. (Doc. 17.) However, the portion of the record to which Plaintiff cites does not 

support that assertion. (See Def’s Ex. A at 61.) On the contrary, the record indicates that Plaintiff 

is unaware of when David Jones allegedly used his cell phone while working on the Line. (Id. at 

80–81.) 

Case 7:19-cv-00265-LSC Document 19 Filed 06/10/20 Page 5 of 32
Page 6 of 32

That same month, Plaintiff also witnessed Adam Lewis, another white Team 

Member, using his cell phone during a start-up meeting. (Id. at 85–86.) Like Charles 

Owens, Lewis put away his phone upon catching the attention of Ted Solomon. (Id.

at 86.) Solomon chose not to discipline Lewis because (1) Lewis was new to B-Shift 

and therefore unfamiliar with how those on B-Shift conducted themselves, and 

(2) Lewis’s wife was pregnant and suffering from complications at the time. (Def’s 

Ex. E at ¶ 12.) Instead, Solomon spoke with Lewis after the meeting and explained 

to him that he could not have his cell phone out at the beginning of the start-up 

meeting. (Id.) When Plaintiff later spoke with Solomon about Lewis’s cell phone use, 

Solomon responded that Lewis had put away his phone. (Def’s Ex. A at 89–90.) 

B. TED SOLOMON’S INSPECTIONS OF BLACK TEAM MEMBERS

In December 2016, Team Leader Ted Solomon began conducting checks of 

whether certain black Team Members, including Plaintiff himself, signed in at their 

stations. (Def’s Ex. A at 138–40.) Though he checked the sign-in sheets for several 

black employees, he did not check the sign-in sheet for Charles Owens, a white 

employee. (Id. at 139.) Plaintiff brought this discrepancy to Solomon’s attention, but 

Solomon offered no explanation. (Id. at 140.) However, although Plaintiff claims that 

Solomon did not inspect the sign-in sheets with respect to Charles Owens, it is 

undisputed that Solomon periodically checks the sign-in sheets to make sure that 

Case 7:19-cv-00265-LSC Document 19 Filed 06/10/20 Page 6 of 32
Page 7 of 32

various employees, whether white or black, sign in and out of their stations. (Def’s 

Ex. E at ¶ 15.) 

C. PLAINTIFF’S LEVEL II CPR FOR IMPROPER ABSENCE FROM THE 

MANUFACTURING LINE

In February 2017, Plaintiff received a Level II CPR for unauthorized time away 

and use of a cell phone during working hours. (Def’s Ex. C at ¶ 7.) As with the prior 

Level I CPR, Team Relations Manager Zina Cooper made the decision to issue the 

Level II CPR. (Def’s Ex. C at ¶ 8.) Solomon, as Plaintiff’s Team Leader at the time, 

approved the decision. (Def’s Ex. E at ¶ 6.) David Foreman, a black male Team 

Relations Representative, also was among those who approved the decision. (Def’s 

Ex. C at ¶ 8.) 

Plaintiff had requested and received permission to go to the restroom while 

the Line was operating. (Def’s Ex. A at 65.) Because the restroom near the Line was 

full, Plaintiff instead went to the restroom by the Atrium area. (Id. at 65–66.) After 

using the Atrium restroom, Plaintiff sat down at a table in the Atrium and began 

writing down notes while the Line was still running. (Id. at 71–72.) 

Ted Solomon, Plaintiff’s Team Leader at the time, heard reports from Team 

Leader James Dial and another employee named Randy Fondren that they had 

observed Plaintiff in the Atrium, using his cell phone during working hours. (Def’s 

Ex. E at ¶ 5.) Plaintiff admits that he lacked permission to sit in the Atrium and write 

Case 7:19-cv-00265-LSC Document 19 Filed 06/10/20 Page 7 of 32
Page 8 of 32

notes while the Line was running. (Def’s Ex. A at 76.) He denies only that he was 

using his cell phone, despite James Dial’s claim of witnessing Plaintiff making such 

use. (Id. at 71.) Though he now denies some of the allegations against him, Plaintiff 

wrote no comment on his Level II CPR disputing the fact that he had used his cell 

phone. (Def’s Ex. B – DX 6.) 

Plaintiff is not aware of anyone else who ever asked to go to the restroom while 

the Line was running and then went to the Atrium and sat at a table writing notes. 

(Def’s Ex. A at 77.) However, he is aware of a white Team Member named Larry 

Roland who left the Line early yet faced no discipline. (Id. at 143–44.) Ted Solomon 

did not discipline Roland because he believed that Roland had made an honest 

mistake in thinking that it was break time. (Def’s Ex. E at ¶ 17.) 

On March 28, 2017, after Plaintiff had already received his Level II CPR, he 

met with David Foreman to discuss what he viewed to be disparate treatment by his 

supervisors. (Def’s Ex. F at ¶ 2.) He told Foreman that he did not think that it was 

fair that he faced discipline for using his cell phone while other white employees 

using their cell phones received no discipline. (Def’s Ex. A at 78–79.) Foreman 

advised Plaintiff to worry about himself and to make sure that he did not use his cell 

phone in violation of Defendant’s policies. (Id. at 78.) Following the meeting, 

Foreman did not communicate this discussion with anyone else. (Def’s Ex. F at ¶ 2.) 

Case 7:19-cv-00265-LSC Document 19 Filed 06/10/20 Page 8 of 32
Page 9 of 32

Nor did he participate in any future proceedings regarding Plaintiff’s disciplinary 

issues. (See Def’s Ex. C at 25.) 

E. PLAINTIFF’S LEVEL III CPR FOR ATTENDANCE VIOLATIONS

In April 2017, Plaintiff received a Level III CPR for attendance violations. 

(Def’s Ex. B – DX 7.) Defendant has an occurrence-based attendance policy. (Def’s 

Ex. C at ¶ 3.) Plaintiff received one occurrence for being not more than two hours 

late yet failing to call in within the 30-minute window before his shift on December 

2, 2016. (Def’s Ex. B – DX 7.) This attendance violation arose because Plaintiff was 

pulled over by the police on that occasion. (Def’s Ex. A at 93.) Plaintiff also received 

two occurrences because he was more than four hours late and did not call in within 

the thirty-minute window before his shift began on April 5, 2017. (Def’s Ex. B – DX 

7.) Plaintiff claims that this attendance violation arose from a situation at home. 

(Def’s Ex. A at 93.) Because Plaintiff received three occurrences within 180 days, 

Defendant’s attendance policy warranted that Plaintiff receive a CPR. (Def’s Ex. C 

at ¶ 9.) 

Team Relations Manager Zina Cooper made the decision to issue a Level III 

CPR to Plaintiff. (Def’s Ex. C at ¶ 11.) As described above, Plaintiff had an existing 

Level II CPR based on his improper absence while the Line was running. 

Defendant’s progressive disciplinary policy therefore mandated that Plaintiff receive 

Case 7:19-cv-00265-LSC Document 19 Filed 06/10/20 Page 9 of 32
Page 10 of 32

a Level III CPR based on the existence of that prior Level II CPR. (Id. at ¶ 12.) 

However, Plaintiff interpreted Defendant’s progressive disciplinary policy to require 

that he receive a Level I CPR because his violation arose from attendance issues, 

unlike his prior violations of the cell phone policy. (Def’s Ex. A at 128–31.) It is 

unclear what led Plaintiff to interpret the policy in such a way. 

Later, on May 15, 2017, Plaintiff filed an EEOC Charge of Discrimination, 

alleging race discrimination and retaliation. (Def’s Ex. B – DX 16.) He is not aware 

of whether any relevant decisionmakers knew that he had filed this EEOC Charge. 

(Id. at 107–08.) Furthermore, several relevant decisionmakers in this case, including 

David Olive, James Sadberry, and Ted Solomon, have all affirmatively denied having 

had any knowledge of Plaintiff’s EEOC Charge at the times in which they 

participated in Plaintiff’s disciplinary proceedings. (Def’s Ex. C at ¶¶ 22–23; Def’s 

Ex. D at ¶ 11; Def’s Ex. E at ¶ 14.) 

F. PLAINTIFF’S TERMINATION CPR FOR FAILING TO FOLLOW PRODUCTION 

PROCEDURES

On May 18, 2017, several supervisors and employees witnessed Plaintiff failing 

to perform the process of “rolling the sill plate” while the Line was running. (Def’s 

Ex. D at ¶ 10; Def’s Ex. E at ¶ 13.) Defendant has standard methods and procedures 

for the processes that must be followed by Team Members. (Id. at 104.) One such 

standard procedure involves “rolling the sill plate.” (Id. at 101–02, 105.) The “sill 

Case 7:19-cv-00265-LSC Document 19 Filed 06/10/20 Page 10 of 32
Page 11 of 32

plate” is a piece of plastic with adhesive that goes in the bottom of a car door where 

the door shuts. (Id. at 102.) Under this process, Plaintiff was required to “roll [the 

sill plate] with a little roller.” (Id. at 102–03.) Plaintiff admitted that he did not roll 

the sill plate on May 18, 2017. (Def’s Ex. A at 103.) 

Plaintiff kept his roller on the “limo,” a box that rides along with a vehicle on 

the Line and carries tools necessary for Team Members to work on the vehicles. (Id.

at 117–18, 121–22.) To allow movement up and down the Line, the limo has a foot 

mechanism. (Id. at 117.) However, the limo used by Plaintiff suffered from technical 

issues: its foot pedal often became stuck and caused the limo to ride down the Line 

and away from Plaintiff’s station. (Id.) Every Team Member who worked at 

Plaintiff’s station on the Line had similar issues with this limo. (Id. at 122.) Plaintiff 

reported this issue to his supervisors several months or even a year before the 

incident on May 18, 2017. (Id. at 165–66.) Prior to that incident, he had, on ten or 

fifteen separate occasions, reacted to problems with the limo by pulling a cord to get 

the attention of a Team Leader. (Id. at 166–67.) He had also attempted to mitigate 

the problems on his own by keeping the roller in his pocket rather than placing it in 

the limo. (Id. 163–64.) However, Ted Solomon prohibited him from keeping the 

roller in his pocket, reasoning that it could damage a vehicle if kept there while 

Plaintiff was working. (Id. at 164.) 

Case 7:19-cv-00265-LSC Document 19 Filed 06/10/20 Page 11 of 32
Page 12 of 32

On May 21, 2017, after he was seen failing to roll the sill plate, Plaintiff called 

an employee Hot Line regarding potential discrimination. (Def’s Ex. A at 136–37.) 

He did not reach anyone when using the Hot Line number, so he sent a follow-up 

email regarding his concerns the next day. (Id.) He is not aware of whether any 

relevant decisionmakers knew of his Hot Line call. (Id. at 108.) Furthermore, several 

relevant decisionmakers, including David Olive, James Sadberry, and Ted Solomon, 

have each affirmatively denied knowing of the Hot Line call. (Def’s Ex. C. at ¶¶ 22–

23; Def’s Ex. D at ¶ 11; Def’s Ex. E at ¶ 14.) Finally, Plaintiff filed a second EEOC 

Charge of Discrimination on June 2, 2017, alleging only retaliation. (Def’s Ex. B – 

DX 17.) 

During this same period, William Harden, a black male Team Relations 

Representative, investigated Plaintiff’s May 18 violation and supplied his findings to 

Team Relations Manager Zina Cooper. (Def’s Ex. C at ¶¶ 11, 14.) Cooper then 

recommended Plaintiff’s termination based on his existing Level III CPR. (Id. at 

¶¶ 15, 17.) David Olive, Defendant’s HR Senior Manager, approved Cooper’s 

recommendation that Plaintiff be terminated. (Id. at ¶ 16.) As a result, on June 2, 

2017, Defendant issued a Termination CPR to Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶¶ 17–18; Def’s Ex. 

B – DX 11.) 

Plaintiff learned of his termination via a letter dated June 2, 2017. (Def’s Ex. 

Case 7:19-cv-00265-LSC Document 19 Filed 06/10/20 Page 12 of 32
Page 13 of 32

B – DX 11.) He requested peer review regarding his termination. (Def’s Ex. A at 37–

38.) A panel reviewed Plaintiff’s termination on July 27, 2017, upholding his 

termination. (Def’s Ex. B – DX 13.) Because his termination arose from misconduct, 

Plaintiff did not receive unemployment compensation. (Id. – DX 14.) 

In a separate incident, Logan Wright, a white Team Member, also failed to roll 

the sill plate, and he received a CPR for his misconduct. (Def’s Ex. C at ¶¶ 19–20.) 

Unlike Plaintiff, however, Wright had not previously received a CPR. (Id. at ¶ 21.) 

Therefore, Wright received only a Level II CPR, as opposed to the Termination CPR 

that Plaintiff received. (Id.) 

II. STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A dispute is genuine if “the record taken as a 

whole could lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party.” Hickson 

Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., Inc., 357 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004). A genuine 

dispute as to a material fact exists “if the nonmoving party has produced evidence 

such that a reasonable factfinder could return a verdict in its favor.” Greenberg v. 

BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Waddell v. 

Valley Forge Dental Assocs., 276 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir. 2001)). The trial judge 

Case 7:19-cv-00265-LSC Document 19 Filed 06/10/20 Page 13 of 32
Page 14 of 32

should not weigh the evidence, but should determine whether there are any genuine 

issues of fact that should be resolved at trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 

242, 249 (1986). 

In considering a motion for summary judgment, trial courts must give 

deference to the non-moving party by “view[ing] the materials presented and all 

factual inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Animal Legal 

Def. Fund v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 789 F.3d 1206, 1213–14 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing 

Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970)). However, “unsubstantiated 

assertions alone are not enough to withstand a motion for summary judgment.” 

Rollins v. TechSouth, Inc., 833 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir. 1987). Conclusory 

allegations and “mere scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmoving party will 

not suffice to overcome a motion for summary judgment.” Melton v. Abston, 841 F.3d 

1207, 1219 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (quoting Young v. City of Palm Bay, Fla., 358 

F.3d 859, 860 (11th Cir. 2004)). In making a motion for summary judgment, “the 

moving party has the burden of either negating an essential element of the 

nonmoving party’s case or showing that there is no evidence to prove a fact necessary 

to the nonmoving party’s case.” McGee v. Sentinel Offender Servs., LLC, 719 F.3d 

1236, 1242 (11th Cir. 2013). Although the trial courts must use caution when granting 

motions for summary judgment, “[s]ummary judgment procedure is properly 

Case 7:19-cv-00265-LSC Document 19 Filed 06/10/20 Page 14 of 32
Page 15 of 32

regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the 

Federal Rules as a whole.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986). 

III. DISCUSSION

A. RETALIATION

Plaintiff brings a claim for retaliation under Title VII and § 1981.5

 Absent 

direct evidence of retaliatory motive, the Court analyzes this claim using the burdenshifting McDonnell Douglas framework. Kidd v. Mando Am. Corp., 731 F.3d 1196, 1202 

(11th Cir. 2013) (citing McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)).6

 “First, 

the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case, which raises a presumption that the 

employer’s decision was more likely than not based upon an impermissible factor.” 

Richardson v. Leeds Police Dep’t, 71 F.3d 801, 805 (11th Cir. 1995). If the plaintiff 

meets this burden, the defendant has the opportunity to articulate a legitimate nonretaliatory justification for its actions, which the plaintiff can then rebut with 

evidence of pretext. Brown v. Ala. Dep’t of Transp., 597 F.3d 1160, 1181–82 (11th Cir. 

2010). 

 

5

 Title VII and § 1981 “have the same requirements of proof and use the same analytical 

framework.” Standard v. A.B.E.L. Servs., Inc., 161 F.3d 1318, 1330 (11th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, 

this Court’s analysis of Plaintiff’s retaliation and race discrimination claims is equally applicable 

under either Title VII or § 1981.

6

 “Direct evidence is evidence that establishes the existence of discriminatory intent behind 

the employment decision without any inference or presumption.” Standard, 161 F.3d at 1330. 

Case 7:19-cv-00265-LSC Document 19 Filed 06/10/20 Page 15 of 32
Page 16 of 32

To establish a prima facie case for retaliation, Plaintiff must show that (1) he 

engaged in a protected activity, (2) he suffered an adverse employment action, and 

(3) there was a causal connection between his protected activity and his injury. 

Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 970 (11th Cir. 2008). There is no dispute regarding 

the first two elements of Plaintiff’s prima facie case. 

Plaintiff has shown that he engaged in a protected activity. “Title VII protects 

not just ‘individuals who have filed formal complaints,’ but also those ‘who 

informally voice complaints to their superiors or who use their employers’ internal 

grievance procedures.’” Shannon v. Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc., 292 F.3d 712, 715 n.2 

(11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Rollins v. Fla. Dep’t of Law Enforcement, 868 F.2d 397, 400 

(11th Cir. 1989) (per curiam)). The record indicates that Plaintiff engaged in 

numerous protected activities, such as complaining to a supervisor, David Foreman, 

of disparate treatment based on his race, filing two separate EEOC Charges of 

Discrimination and Retaliation, and making a Hot Line call regarding the same 

disparate treatment and retaliation. 

Plaintiff has also satisfied the requirement that he suffered from an adverse 

employment action. For a retaliatory act to qualify as an adverse employment action, 

it must be materially adverse such that it might have “dissuaded a reasonable worker 

from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. 

Case 7:19-cv-00265-LSC Document 19 Filed 06/10/20 Page 16 of 32
Page 17 of 32

Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (quoting Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 

(D.C. Cir. 2006)). Following his protected activities, Plaintiff alleges that he faced 

disproportionately harsh forms of discipline. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that (1) he 

received a Level III CPR for attendance violations when only a Level I CPR was 

appropriate, and (2) Defendant terminated his employment following his failure to 

roll the sill plate. A reasonable worker faced with disproportionately harsh forms of 

discipline in response to his protected activity may be dissuaded from engaging in 

further protected activities. Therefore, Plaintiff has satisfied the first two elements 

of his prima facie case. 

Nonetheless, Plaintiff has failed to show a causal connection between his 

protected activities and the adverse employment actions that he faced. To show a 

causal connection, Plaintiff must present “proof that the unlawful retaliation would 

not have occurred in the absence of the alleged wrongful action or actions of the 

employer.” Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 360 (2013). “A 

decision maker cannot have been motivated to retaliate by something unknown to 

him.” Brungart v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 231 F.3d 791, 799 (11th Cir. 2000). 

Thus, Plaintiff “must, at a minimum, generally establish that the defendant was 

actually aware of the protected expression at the time the defendant took the adverse 

employment action.” Raney v. Vinson Guard Serv., Inc., 120 F.3d 1192, 1197 (11th 

Case 7:19-cv-00265-LSC Document 19 Filed 06/10/20 Page 17 of 32
Page 18 of 32

Cir. 1997). However, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that any decisionmaker was 

ever aware of his protected activities prior to the adverse employment actions that 

he claims occurred. Plaintiff’s meeting with David Foreman regarding disparate 

treatment he faced occurred on March 28, 2017, after Foreman participated in the 

decision to issue Plaintiff a Level II CPR. Plaintiff has not shown that Foreman 

participated in any further disciplinary actions taken against him, and Foreman 

himself denies that he communicated the pair’s discussion with anyone else. 

Furthermore, Plaintiff admits that he lacks any knowledge of whether other 

decisionmakers ever learned of his EEOC Charges of Discrimination or his Hot Line 

call. Indeed, decisionmakers, such as James Sadberry, Ted Solomon, and David 

Olive, have affirmatively denied having any knowledge of Plaintiff’s protected 

activities during the time in which Plaintiff faced discipline. Plaintiff thus has 

demonstrated no causal connection between his protected activities and any adverse 

employment action, and he has therefore failed to establish a prima facie case of 

retaliation. 

Furthermore, even if Plaintiff could establish a prima facie case of retaliation, 

he has not provided enough evidence to rebut Defendant’s non-retaliatory 

justifications for its actions. As an initial matter, Plaintiff has produced no evidence 

to support his belief that his attendance violations warranted only a Level I CPR 

Case 7:19-cv-00265-LSC Document 19 Filed 06/10/20 Page 18 of 32
Page 19 of 32

under Defendant’s progressive disciplinary policy. Furthermore, Defendant 

maintains that Plaintiff received a Termination CPR because he failed to follow the 

required procedure for rolling sill plates and had a prior Level III CPR, thus 

necessitating progression to a Termination CPR. Against this justification, Plaintiff 

argues that (1) termination for failure to roll the sill plate was inappropriate due to 

the ongoing issues with the “limo” device, and (2) the EEOC’s findings of evidence 

to support a claim of retaliation make summary judgment inappropriate in this case.7

However, neither of Plaintiff’s arguments warrant denial of summary judgment. 

First, the fact that the limo was non-functional does not excuse the undisputed 

fact that Plaintiff violated Defendant’s requirement that he roll the sill plate. “A 

plaintiff is not allowed to recast an employer’s proffered nondiscriminatory reasons 

or substitute his business judgment for that of the employer.” Chapman v. AI 

Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1030 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff argues that 

Defendant “failed, repeatedly, over an extended period of time, [to provide] the 

tools and/or equipment necessary to accomplish the proper sill applications.” (Doc. 

17.) However, the record does not indicate that Plaintiff lacked the roller necessary 

to roll the sill as required. Instead, Plaintiff has shown only that the mechanism on 

 

7

 The EEOC’s letter of determination specifically provides that “it was determined that the 

evidence obtained during the investigation established that there is reasonable cause to conclude 

that the Charging Party was discriminated against on the basis of race, Black and retaliation, in 

violation of Title VII.” (Pl’s Ex. 2 at 2.) 

Case 7:19-cv-00265-LSC Document 19 Filed 06/10/20 Page 19 of 32
Page 20 of 32

which the roller was required to be kept often malfunctioned and moved away from 

Plaintiff’s workstation. It is undisputed that, on several occasions prior to May 18, 

2017, Plaintiff resolved issues with the limo by alerting his supervisors when it 

malfunctioned. Plaintiff has not produced any evidence explaining why he could not 

alert his supervisors on May 18, 2017, in the same manner that he had alerted them 

on numerous prior occasions. Thus, the record indicates that the malfunctioning 

limo only made the required procedure of rolling the sill plate inconvenient, rather 

than impossible. Under these circumstances, the Court will not question the 

business judgment of Defendant in terminating Plaintiff’s employment for failure to 

perform a required—albeit inconvenient—task. 

Second, even the EEOC’s finding of evidence to support a claim for retaliation 

does not warrant a different outcome in this case. To be sure, a district court may 

rely upon an EEOC finding of reasonable cause to bolster its own finding that a 

genuine dispute of fact exists for a claim of retaliation. See Horne v. Turner Constr. 

Co., 136 F. App’x 289, 292 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (noting that EEOC’s 

findings bolstered other direct and circumstantial evidence of discrimination 

produced by plaintiff). However, Plaintiff has not cited any authority indicating that 

EEOC findings in his favor, without more, are sufficient to create a genuine dispute 

of material fact. Moreover, as a general matter, “EEOC findings are not binding with 

Case 7:19-cv-00265-LSC Document 19 Filed 06/10/20 Page 20 of 32
Page 21 of 32

regard to subsequent discrimination suits in federal court.” Danielle-DiSerafino v. 

Dist. Sch. Bd. of Collier Cty, Fla., 756 F. App’x 940, 944 (11th Cir. 2018) (per curiam). 

“The probative value of EEOC findings is left to the district court’s discretion.” Id.

(citing Barfield v. Orange Cty., 911 F.2d 644, 649–51 (11th Cir. 1990)). Upon 

comparison of the EEOC’s findings with the remainder of the record, the Court finds 

that the EEOC’s findings are too incomplete to hold probative weight. For example, 

in support of its conclusion that a reasonable basis for a finding of retaliation exists, 

the EEOC’s letter notes that “on observation, the employees after [Plaintiff’s] 

dismissal were not adhering to the [sill rolling] process and no action was taken.” 

(Pl’s Ex. 2 at 2.) However, it is undisputed by the parties that Logan Wright, a white 

Team Member, faced disciplinary action after he, like Plaintiff, failed to roll the sill 

plate as required under Defendant’s policies. The EEOC’s findings are thus 

inconsistent with other undisputed evidence in the record, and they carry little 

probative weight in this proceeding. 

Plaintiff has thus failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact regarding his 

retaliation claim. Accordingly, summary judgment is due to be granted for Defendant 

as to this claim. 

B. RACE DISCRIMINATION

Plaintiff also brings a claim of race discrimination under Title VII and § 1981, 

Case 7:19-cv-00265-LSC Document 19 Filed 06/10/20 Page 21 of 32
Page 22 of 32

alleging that Defendant treated white employees more favorably than himself. “A 

plaintiff may prove a claim of intentional discrimination through direct evidence, 

circumstantial evidence, or through statistical proof.” Rioux v. City of Atlanta, Ga., 

520 F.3d 1269, 1274 (11th Cir. 2008). Absent direct evidence or statistical proof of 

discrimination, the Court analyzes a disparate treatment claim under the McDonnell 

Douglas framework. Carter v. Three Springs Residential Treatment, 132 F.3d 635, 642 

(11th Cir. 1998). However, a “plaintiff will always survive summary judgment if he 

presents circumstantial evidence that creates a triable issue concerning the 

[defendant’s] discriminatory intent.” Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 

1328 (11th Cir. 2011). 

Because Plaintiff relies only on circumstantial evidence of discrimination, the 

Court considers his claim under the McDonnell Douglas framework. See Carter, 132, 

F.3d 635 at 642. Under that framework, a plaintiff has the initial burden of 

establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. 

To establish a prima facie case, a plaintiff must show “(1) that she belongs to a 

protected class, (2) that she was subjected to an adverse employment action, (3) that 

she was qualified to perform the job in question, and (4) that her employer treated 

‘similarly situated’ employees outside her class more favorably.” Lewis v. City of 

Union City, Ga., 918 F.3d 1213, 1220–21 (11th Cir. 2019) (en banc). Once a plaintiff 

Case 7:19-cv-00265-LSC Document 19 Filed 06/10/20 Page 22 of 32
Page 23 of 32

has established a prima facie case, the burden then shifts “to the [defendant] to 

articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for its actions. McDonnell 

Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. Finally, if the defendant articulates a non-discriminatory 

reason, then the plaintiff is afforded an opportunity to show that the stated reason 

was a pretext for discrimination. Id. at 804. 

Plaintiff’s race discrimination claim rests on two basic types of disparate 

treatment that he allegedly experienced. First, Plaintiff argues that Team Leader 

Ted Solomon deliberately inspected the sign-in sheets of certain black Team 

Members, including Plaintiff, while choosing not to inspect the sign-in sheet of 

Charles Owens, a white Team Member. Second, and much more broadly, Plaintiff 

argues that Defendant took several disciplinary actions against him that it did not 

take against similarly situated white employees. 

Regarding the inspections that Ted Solomon conducted of black employees’ 

sign-in sheets, Plaintiff has not established a prima facie case of race discrimination. 

Specifically, Plaintiff cannot show that these inspections, even if done with 

discriminatory bias, constituted an adverse employment action. To qualify as an 

adverse employment action in the context of discrimination, “the employer’s action 

must impact the ‘terms, conditions, or privileges’ of the plaintiff’s job in a real and 

demonstrable way.” Davis v. Town of Lake Park, Fla., 245 F.3d 1232, 1239 (11th Cir. 

Case 7:19-cv-00265-LSC Document 19 Filed 06/10/20 Page 23 of 32
Page 24 of 32

2001) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)). The impact must be “serious and 

material,” such that, under the circumstances presented, a reasonable person could 

find that it was materially adverse. See id. Here, even if Solomon conducted the 

alleged inspections with discriminatory bias, Plaintiff has produced no evidence—

and indeed does not even claim—that these inspections led to any material impact 

on his employment. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of 

race discrimination with respect to the inspections that he faced. 

Regarding the discipline that Plaintiff received, the Court need not devote 

much discussion to several elements of Plaintiff’s prima facie case because there is 

no dispute regarding those elements. For example, the parties do not dispute that 

Plaintiff, as a black male, is a member of a protected class. Nor do they dispute that 

he was qualified for his position or that the forms of discipline he received, including 

termination, constituted adverse employment actions. 

The only area of dispute regarding Plaintiff’s prima facie case concerns 

whether Plaintiff has identified “similarly situated” employees outside his class who 

received more favorable treatment. For this element to be satisfied, Plaintiff and his 

comparators must be “similarly situated in all material respects.” Lewis, 918 F.3d at 

1226. Ordinarily, a similarly situated comparator: (1) “will have engaged in the same 

basic conduct (or misconduct) as the plaintiff;” (2) “will have been subject to the 

Case 7:19-cv-00265-LSC Document 19 Filed 06/10/20 Page 24 of 32
Page 25 of 32

same employment policy, guideline, or rule as the plaintiff;” (3) “will ordinarily 

(although not invariably) have been under the jurisdiction of the same supervisor as 

the plaintiff;” and (4) “will share the plaintiff’s employment or disciplinary 

history.” Id. at 1227–28 (cleaned up). 

In his deposition testimony, Plaintiff identifies numerous white co-workers 

who committed the same acts for which he faced discipline and ultimately 

termination of his employment. First, he identifies David Jones, Charles Owens, and 

Adam Lewis as white Team Members who violated Defendant’s cell phone policies 

without facing discipline. Second, he identifies Larry Roland as a white Team 

Member who faced no punishment for his unauthorized absence from the Line. 

Finally, the record indicates that Logan Wright, another white Team Member who 

failed to roll the sill plate per Defendant’s policy, was not terminated for his violation 

and instead received a Level II CPR. However, none of the comparators identified 

by Plaintiff are “similarly situated in all material respects.” Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1226. 

Plaintiff claims to have witnessed David Jones using his cell phone while he 

was working on the Line. However, he has not shown that Jones did so after 

Defendant began placing greater emphasis on its policy restricting cell phone use. 

Thus, Plaintiff has not shown that he and Jones were “subject to the same 

employment policy, guideline, or rule.” Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1227. Moreover, Plaintiff 

Case 7:19-cv-00265-LSC Document 19 Filed 06/10/20 Page 25 of 32
Page 26 of 32

has no knowledge of whether any of their shared supervisors ever witnessed Jones’s 

improper cell phone use. Indeed, several supervisors have affirmatively denied ever 

having seen Jones violating the cell phone policy while on the Line. A comparator’s 

actions have no relevance in showing discrimination unless they are known to 

Defendant. See Jones v. Gerwens, 874 F.2d 1534, 1542 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding 

plaintiff had failed to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment when he 

could not show that decisionmakers knew about and consciously overlooked prior 

rule violations by comparators). As a result, Plaintiff cannot rely upon Jones as a 

comparator in establishing his prima facie case. 

Plaintiff next identifies Charles Owens and Adam Lewis as comparators for 

having improperly used their cell phones without facing punishment. Specifically, 

Plaintiff claims to have seen Owens and Lewis each using a cell phone at the 

beginning of a team start-up meeting. Regardless, neither Owens nor Lewis is a 

proper comparator. 

Owens cannot be a proper comparator because his actions did not qualify as 

the “same basic conduct (or misconduct) as [Plaintiff].” Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1227. 

The Eleventh Circuit has noted that a plaintiff and her comparator need not have 

engaged in identical conduct, provided that the conduct alleged is materially similar 

under the circumstances. See id. at 1227 n.13 (opining that conduct could be 

Case 7:19-cv-00265-LSC Document 19 Filed 06/10/20 Page 26 of 32
Page 27 of 32

sufficiently similar where a plaintiff is fired for routinely arriving late to work while 

a comparator keeps his job despite routinely leaving work early). However, this 

principle has limits, particularly where there is “some good reason” for treating the 

conduct of a plaintiff and his comparators differently. See id. Here, Plaintiff faced 

discipline for allegations that he had used his cell phone while working on the Line. 

In contrast, the only time during which Owens is alleged to have used his cell phone 

occurred at the beginning of a team start-up meeting, when the Line was not running. 

Given the safety concerns present during the operation of the Line, there is good 

reason to treat the cell phone use of Owens differently from that of Plaintiff. 

Similarly, Lewis’s cell phone use does not make him a proper comparator. 

Like Owens, he used his cell phone at the beginning of a team start-up meeting, 

rather than on the Line. Thus, Lewis did not engage in the same basic misconduct as 

Plaintiff did when he used his cell phone while working on the Line. See Lewis, 918 

F.3d at 1227 n.13. Furthermore, Lewis did not “share [Plaintiff’s] employment or 

disciplinary history” at the times supervisors witnessed each using his cell phone. 

Id. at 1228. Specifically, Plaintiff had received training regarding Defendant’s cell 

phone policy, and he was aware that, unless one was acting as a Team Leader, use of 

a cell phone on the Line violated Defendant’s policies. In contrast, Lewis had just 

transferred to B-Shift and therefore was unfamiliar with how those on B-Shift 

Case 7:19-cv-00265-LSC Document 19 Filed 06/10/20 Page 27 of 32
Page 28 of 32

conducted themselves. Thus, Lewis cannot be a proper comparator in this case. 

Likewise, Larry Roland also is not a proper comparator with respect to 

Plaintiff’s unexcused break in the Atrium. To be sure, Roland once left the Line 

without obtaining permission to do so. However, it is undisputed that Roland’s 

absence arose from an honest mistake that break time had begun. In contrast, 

Plaintiff knowingly remained away from the Line without permission: he admits that, 

though he had permission to leave the Line to use the restroom, he did not have 

permission to remain in the Atrium and examine his notes instead of returning to the 

Line. Thus, Plaintiff and Roland did not commit the same basic misconduct and are 

not “similarly situated in all material respects.” Id. at 1227. 

Finally, Logan Wright cannot constitute a proper comparator for Plaintiff’s 

prima facie case, either. Unlike other comparators identified by Plaintiff, Wright was 

seen engaging in the same misconduct for which Plaintiff received a CPR: he too 

failed to roll the sill plate as required under Defendant’s procedures. However, it is 

irrelevant whether Wright is similarly situated with Plaintiff: Wright did not receive 

treatment more favorable than that received by Plaintiff. See id. at 1221. Like Plaintiff, 

Wright received a CPR for his misconduct. To be sure, Wright received only a Level 

II CPR, as opposed to Plaintiff’s Termination CPR, but that discrepancy is 

consistent with Defendant’s progressive disciplinary policy. Plaintiff had three prior 

Case 7:19-cv-00265-LSC Document 19 Filed 06/10/20 Page 28 of 32
Page 29 of 32

CPRs, so he received a Termination CPR. In contrast, Wright had no prior CPRs, so 

he received only a Level II CPR. Furthermore, even if Wright receiving only a Level 

II CPR qualifies as more favorable treatment, he does not “share [Plaintiff’s] 

employment or disciplinary history” and is therefore not similarly situated in all 

material respects. Id. at 1228. Accordingly, Wright is not a proper comparator, and 

Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination. 

Having failed to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination, Plaintiff 

can escape summary judgment only if he has otherwise presented “a convincing 

mosaic of circumstantial evidence that would allow a jury to infer intentional 

discrimination by the decisionmaker.” Smith, 644 F.3d at 1328 (quoting Silverman 

v. Bd. of Educ. of Chicago, 637 F.3d 729, 734 (7th Cir. 2011)). “A ‘convincing mosaic’ 

may be shown by evidence that demonstrates, among other things, (1) ‘suspicious 

timing, ambiguous statements . . ., and other bits and pieces from which an inference 

of discriminatory intent might be drawn,’ (2) systematically better treatment of 

similarly situated employees, and (3) that the employer’s justification is pretextual.” 

Lewis v. City of Union City, Ga., 934 F.3d 1169, 1185 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting 

Silverman, 637 F.3d at 733–34). Regardless of what type of evidence Plaintiff 

presents, it must be sufficient to “raise[] a reasonable inference that the employer 

discriminated against” him. Smith, 644 F.3d at 1328. 

Case 7:19-cv-00265-LSC Document 19 Filed 06/10/20 Page 29 of 32
Page 30 of 32

Plaintiff’s response identifies several pieces of circumstantial evidence that he 

argues could establish intentional discrimination by his superiors. First, Plaintiff 

notes that, as discussed above, Defendant failed to discipline white employees, such 

as Charles Owens and Adam Lewis, for improper cell phone use in violation of 

Defendant’s policies. Second, when he brought this disparate treatment to the 

attention of David Foreman, Foreman took no action and instead instructed Plaintiff 

to worry about himself. Finally, Plaintiff again cites the EEOC’s “Letter of 

Determination” which found a reasonable basis for Plaintiff’s claims that he faced 

discrimination. (Pl’s Ex. 2.) 

Upon review of the record, the Court finds that the evidence presented by 

Plaintiff is insufficient to allow for a reasonable inference that Defendant 

discriminated against Plaintiff based on his race. Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s 

failure to discipline white employees for their cell phone use, regardless of 

justification, “is counter intuitive to its progressive, purportedly, uniform discipline 

structure that the Defendant stands behind.” (Doc. 17.) However, the record 

indicates only that Defendant’s progressive disciplinary policy governs what level of 

discipline should be issued, not when discipline is appropriate in the first place. (See

Def’s Ex. C at ¶¶ 4–5.) Neither party has pointed to any evidence indicating that 

Defendant’s progressive disciplinary policy allows no discretion in determining 

Case 7:19-cv-00265-LSC Document 19 Filed 06/10/20 Page 30 of 32
Page 31 of 32

whether a Team Member’s rule violation warrants discipline. Thus, the fact that 

Defendant did not discipline each violation by white employees does not, without 

more, indicate that its justification for disciplining Plaintiff was merely a pretext for 

racial discrimination. Nor does Foreman’s statement to Plaintiff instructing him to 

worry about himself when Plaintiff raised concerns about disparate treatment; 

Plaintiff has offered no evidence showing that Foreman had any obligation to 

investigate Plaintiff’s claims further. Finally, for the same reasons that the EEOC’s 

findings carry little probative weight in resolving Plaintiff’s retaliation claim, the 

Court does not rely upon those findings in resolving Plaintiff’s race discrimination 

claim. 

Plaintiff has thus failed to present evidence that creates a genuine dispute on 

the question of race discrimination. Accordingly, summary judgment is due to be 

granted for Defendant as to this claim. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s motion (doc. 12) is due to be 

granted. An order consistent with this opinion will be entered contemporaneously 

herewith. 

Case 7:19-cv-00265-LSC Document 19 Filed 06/10/20 Page 31 of 32
Page 32 of 32

DONE and ORDERED on June 10, 2020. 

_____________________________ 

L. Scott Coogler 

United States District Judge 

199455 

Case 7:19-cv-00265-LSC Document 19 Filed 06/10/20 Page 32 of 32