Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-01583/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-01583-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MELISSA B. PETRINI,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,

Defendant.

Case No. 14-cv-01583-JD 

ORDER RE MOTIONS FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. Nos. 16, 19

Plaintiff Melissa B. Petrini challenges a decision by a Social Security Administration 

(“SSA”) administrative law judge (“ALJ”) that denied her disability benefits. Plaintiff and 

defendant have cross-moved for summary judgment seeking to overturn or affirm, respectively, 

the ALJ’s decision. The Court has carefully considered the administrative record (“AR”) and the 

parties’ arguments and finds no reversible error in the ALJ’s determinations. Consequently, 

plaintiff’s motion is denied and defendant’s motion is granted. 

BACKGROUND

In December 2010, Petrini filed an application for disability insurance benefits. AR 151-

59. Petrini, a 31-year-old mother of four, claims disability since June 2009 for depression, 

anxiety, hallucinations, trouble concentrating, mood lability, irritability and discomfort around 

large groups of people. AR 169-70, 173, 216-17, 639. Petrini’s treating physician diagnosed her 

with Bipolar Disorder II in 2010 and prescribed medications. AR 720, 725. Petrini reports that 

the medications stabilized her moods and decreased her anxiety without any side effects. AR 711. 

In November 2011, Petrini requested a hearing on benefits eligibility before an ALJ. AR 

96. Petrini’s request was assigned to ALJ Maxine R. Benmour, an ALJ in the SSA’s Office of 

Disability Adjudication and Review. AR 27, 29. On October 19, 2012, the ALJ held an 

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evidentiary hearing on Petrini’s claim at which Petrini appeared and testified. AR 44-78. Rocko 

Mazenski, a vocational expert, also testified at the hearing. AR 72-77. On November 8, 2012, the 

ALJ issued a decision finding that plaintiff was not disabled. AR 30-38. Petrini appealed this 

adverse decision to the SSA Appeals Council, which declined to review it. AR 1-3. Petrini then 

filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 405(g), which authorizes review of final SSA decisions by a 

district court. 

In the decision, the ALJ followed the five-step sequential evaluation process mandated for 

disability claims under 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 and found that the claimant is not disabled. Step one 

requires the ALJ to determine whether the claimant is working in a “substantial gainful activity.”

AR 31. This step counted in Petrini’s favor because she had been unemployed since applying for 

benefits. AR 32. Step two directs the ALJ to determine whether the claimant has a severe 

impairment or combination of impairments that significantly limits the claimant’s ability to work. 

AR 31. The ALJ found that Plaintiff satisfied this step because her bipolar disorder, anxiety 

disorder and opioid dependence more than minimally affect her ability to perform work related 

activities. AR 32. 

The ALJ found against Petrini at step three. In this step, the ALJ determines whether the 

claimant’s impairment meets, or is medically equal to, the criteria of an impairment listed in 20 

C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d)). “That bureaucratic mouthful 

means the ALJ must see if the claimant’s impairment matches the criteria for disabling conditions 

listed in the regulations.” Presley v. Colvin, No. 14-CV-01814-JD, 2015 WL 2379807, at *2

(N.D. Cal. May 18, 2015). Here, the ALJ focused on Listing 12.04, which addresses affective 

mental disorders, and concluded that Petrini did not manifest the level of difficulty or 

decompensation required to meet or medically equal the 12.04 criteria. AR 32-33. Specifically, 

the ALJ found that Petrini had moderate restrictions in social functioning and concentration, but 

only mild restrictions in activities of daily living. AR 32. Petrini cares for her young children and 

“had no problems with personal care, helped prepare meals, did cleaning and laundry, and did 

grocery shopping.” Id. And although she has “some problems with interaction with others,” she 

lives with her mother and sister, has lived with her younger children and husband in the past, and 

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“can talk to her family when she is taking her medications.” AR 32-33. She “is able to do her 

[autistic] sister’s makeup and hair” and follows written instructions well. AR 33. The ALJ also 

found that Petrini “has experienced no episodes of decompensation of extended duration.” Id. 

The ALJ proceeded to step four, which “entails an assessment of the claimant’s ‘residual 

functional capacity’, another bureaucratic turn of phrase which basically means the claimant’s 

ability to work even with some limitations or impairments.” Presley, 2015 WL 2379807, at *2. 

The ALJ spent a considerable portion of the decision analyzing this issue. The ALJ found that,

based on the evidence in the record, Petrini’s impairments could reasonably be expected to cause 

the claimed symptoms. AR 34. But the ALJ also found that “the claimant’s statements 

concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely 

credible.” Id. For example, Petrini reported to an examining physician that she used drugs only as 

a teenager, while the record reflects “a great deal of substance abuse.” Id. And Petrini said she 

would stay in bed all day twice a week but described activities inconsistent with that claim, for 

example, that her medications allowed her “to get up and get dressed and be around people.” Id. 

The ALJ found that Petrini has the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work 

when limited to simple, repetitive tasks with occasional contact with supervisors, co-workers and 

the public. AR 33. 

The ALJ then addressed step five, the final step. This step requires the ALJ to determine 

whether the claimant can do any substantial gainful activity in the national economy with her 

limitations. Relying on the testimony of a vocational expert, and “considering the claimant’s age, 

education, work experience, and residual functional capacity,” the ALJ concluded that there are a 

significant number of jobs in the national economy that Petrini can perform. AR 37-38 (citing 20 

C.F.R. § 416.969 and 416.969(a)). These include, as examples, working as a hand packager, 

hospital housekeeper, or office helper. AR 37. With that finding, the ALJ declared Petrini “not 

disabled.” AR 38. 

DISCUSSION

I. LEGAL STANDARD

The Court’s review of the ALJ’s decision is guided by several well-established principles. 

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Presley, 2015 WL 2379807, at *3. The bedrock principle is that the Court does not do a de novo 

review of the disability claim. Id. Rather, the Court may set aside a denial of benefits only when 

it is “not supported by substantial evidence in the record or if it is based on legal error.” Merrill ex 

rel. Merrill v. Apfel, 224 F.3d 1083, 1084–85 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 

F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008) (same). “Substantial evidence is ‘such relevant evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 

1038 (internal citation omitted). That evidence “must be more than a mere scintilla but not 

necessarily a preponderance.” Id. The Court may not simply supplant an ALJ’s reasonable 

judgment with its own. “Where evidence exists to support more than one rational interpretation, 

the Court must defer to the decision of the ALJ.” Drouin v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1255, 1258 (9th 

Cir. 1992).

The Court also defers to the ALJ’s fact and credibility determinations. “Credibility 

questions, conflicts in the medical testimony, and all other ambiguities are resolved by the ALJ.” 

Presley, 2015 WL 2379807, at *3 (citations and quotations omitted). But the Court is no mere 

rubber stamp when reviewing SSA decisions. Id. While subject to these principles of deference, 

it still is charged with reviewing the administrative record as a whole to ensure that substantial 

evidence does in fact support the ALJ’s determinations. Id. 

II. THE ALJ’S TREATMENT OF MEDICAL OPINIONS

In the Ninth Circuit, courts “distinguish among the opinions of three types of physicians: 

(1) those who treat the claimant (treating physicians); (2) those who examine but do not treat the 

claimant (examining physicians); and (3) those who neither examine nor treat the claimant 

(nonexamining physicians).” Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). The opinion of a 

treating physician is entitled to greater weight than that of an examining physician, and the 

opinion of an examining physician is entitled to greater weight than that of a non-examining 

physician. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1012 (9th Cir. 2014). When a treating physician’s 

opinion is not contradicted by another physician’s opinion, it may be rejected only for “clear and 

convincing” reasons supported by “substantial evidence” in the record. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 

625, 632 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations and quotations omitted). When a treating or examining 

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physician’s opinion is contradicted by another physician’s opinion, an ALJ may only reject it by 

providing “specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in the 

record.” Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31. 

Here, in making the disability determination, the ALJ relied on the state agency assessment 

conducted by consulting physician Dr. Harvey Bilik, an assessment conducted by examining 

physician Dr. Richard Palmer, and the record as a whole. Petrini contends that the ALJ should 

have placed greater weight on the medical opinions of her treating physician, Dr. Peter Rutter, and 

the opinions of Dr. Palmer and Dr. Les Kalman, a second examining physician. Dkt. No. 16. 

A. Dr. Rutter

Petrini began receiving psychiatric medication management with psychiatrist Peter Rutter 

in July 2010, “over a year after her alleged onset date.” AR 34. In December 2011, Dr. Rutter 

completed a mental impairment questionnaire, diagnosed Petrini with bipolar disorder, and 

assessed a GAF (Global Assessment of Functioning) score of 41 out of 100, which can indicate

serious symptoms. AR 35; see also 720. The month before, during an office visit with Petrini in 

November 2011, Dr. Rutter opined that Petrini was “disabled” due to her “mood instability” but 

observed at the same time that she was appropriately dressed and groomed, well-organized, goaloriented and free of any “evident cognitive disturbance.” AR 35; see also AR 707, 709. Dr. 

Rutter’s notes also indicate that Petrini expressed “mild mood lability and irritability but denied 

depression, suicidal or homicidal ideation, acting out, loss of impulse control, racing thoughts, 

excessive anger, grandiosity, and auditory or visual hallucinations” and said that she felt “more 

stable than the last visit.” AR 35; see also 707. Her appetite was good and her insight and 

judgment were improving. AR 707. These fairly positive assessments echoed Dr. Rutter’s 

observations from his first meeting with Petrini in July 2010. At that time, Dr. Rutter found that 

Petrini had a “very good memory,” was “attentive,” although her concentration was impaired, and 

had good eye contact and a pleasant and cooperative attitude. AR 742, 744. 

The ALJ cited the disconnect between Dr. Rutter’s disability opinion and the mild and 

benign symptoms expressed by Petrini to discount his conclusion. The ALJ found the opinion “is 

mostly inconsistent with the symptoms that [Dr. Rutter] observed in his treatment notes...and the 

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mild symptoms described by the claimant.” AR 35. The ALJ also found that Dr. Rutter “had 

gone over the disability questionnaire with the claimant, which brings into question his ability to 

be completely objective.” Id. 

Petrini’s main argument on appeal is that the ALJ was wrong to limit the force of Dr. 

Rutter’s opinion. Specifically, Petrini argues that his disability opinion is entirely consistent with 

his treatment notes, and that the ALJ’s finding of inconsistency mischaracterizes the record. Dkt. 

No. 16 at 12. But Petrini fails to point to any material fact errors or mischaracterizations in the 

ALJ’s decision, and she basically ignores the evidence in the record that supports the ALJ’s reason

for discounting Dr. Rutter’s opinion. As the record shows, Dr. Rutter’s observations and Petrini’s 

own statements about her condition are in tension with his disability opinion. This incongruity is a 

specific and legitimate reason for the ALJ to discount that opinion. See Valentine v. Comm’r Soc. 

Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 692-93 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1041; Nelson 

v. Astrue, No. 08-2924 JF, 2009 WL 1699660, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 17, 2009) (finding a treating 

physician’s report that was contradicted by claimant’s own statements to constitute a specific and 

legitimate reason for discounting the report). 

The ALJ also discredited Dr. Rutter’s opinion because he helped Petrini answer the 

disability questionnaire. AR 35. The Court doubts that is a valid reason to slight the opinions of a 

treating physician but the issue need not be formally addressed because the ALJ provided other 

credible reasons that are supported by law and by substantial evidence. Where, as here, the ALJ’s 

reasons are supported by substantial evidence in the record, the Court defers to the ALJ’s 

resolution of ambiguities and conflicts in Dr. Rutter’s medical testimony, and her decision to give 

his opinion limited weight. 

B. Dr. Palmer

In April 2011, examining physician Dr. Richard Palmer conducted an independent 

psychological consultative evaluation of Petrini. Dr. Palmer diagnosed an anxiety disorder and 

major depressive order and assigned a GAF score of 55, indicating moderate symptoms. AR 662; 

see also AR 36. Dr. Palmer opined that the claimant could perform one or two-step simple, 

repetitive tasks as well as complex tasks, but that she had a poor ability to interact with coworkers 

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and the public. AR 662. The ALJ afforded partial weight to Dr. Palmer’s evaluation because it 

seemed generally consistent with the record as a whole. AR 36. 

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly incorporated some but not all of Dr. Palmer’s 

opinions into the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) determination at step four. Dkt. No. 16 at 

21. Specifically, Petrini argues that the ALJ failed to incorporate Dr. Palmer’s opinions that the 

plaintiff has a “fair ability” to (1) maintain regular attendance in the workplace, (2) complete a 

normal workday or workweek, and (3) to handle normal work related stress. Dkt. No. 16 at 22 

(citing AR 662-63). This contention is not well taken. The ALJ need not recount each of the 

assessed limitations in order to have properly considered them. Rather, the ALJ may synthesize 

and translate the assessed limitations into an RFC. Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 

1174 (9th Cir. 2008). Here, the RFC limitations to simple, repetitive tasks with occasional contact 

with supervisors, co-workers, and the public “‘[bears] a logical nexus’ to the physician’s opinions 

that the claimant was arguing had been omitted or rejected.” Hann v. Colvin, No. 12-CV-06234-

JCS, 2014 WL 1382063, at *22 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2014) (citing Gentry v. Colvin, No. 1:12-CV01825-SKO, 2013 WL 6185170, at *16 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2013)). The ALJ properly concluded 

that Petrini’s “fair ability” to maintain regular hours and handle workplace stress would be 

mitigated if she were limited to such simple, repetitive tasks involving only occasional social 

interaction. 

C. Dr. Kalman

Dr. Kalman was an examining physician who met once with Petrini. Dr. Kalman made a 

diagnosis of bipolar disorder (depressed), panic disorder, generalized anxiety disorder/social 

phobia, and opioid abuse in remission. AR 732. He found a GAF score of 50, which indicates 

serious symptoms, but also found that Petrini had a fairly normal mental status and average 

intellectual functioning. AR 36, 731-32. The ALJ afforded limited weight to Dr. Kalman’s 

opinion, and plaintiff contends that this was improper. Dkt. No. 16 at 17-20. 

The ALJ discounted Dr. Kalman’s opinion because his evaluation was based largely on the 

claimant’s self- reporting. AR 36. This reason, in and of itself, is enough to uphold the ALJ’s 

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decision.1 Dr. Kalman’s opinion was contradicted by Dr. Bilik’s and Dr. Palmer’s; consequently, 

the ALJ need only offer specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence to 

properly discount Dr. Kalman’s opinion. Dr. Kalman’s evaluation consisted of quoted excerpts 

from his interview with the claimant along with a checklist that assesses her functioning in twenty 

work-related areas. AR 729-38. He performed no tests on Petrini and his evaluation contains 

almost no analysis or interpretation of Petrini’s statements, just a repetition of her complaints. See 

id. Dr. Kalman’s opinion is conclusory, brief, and unsupported by objective medical findings, 

which is a specific and legitimate reason for the ALJ to discount it. See Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. 

Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Gontes v. Astrue, 913 F. Supp. 2d 913, 

923 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (“[the treating physician’s] two RFC forms were in check-box form, were 

conclusory, and conflicted with substantial other evidence in the record; the ALJ was entitled to 

reject them on that basis.”).

In addition, the ALJ had serious concerns about the reliability of the statements that Dr. 

Kalman used for his opinions. The ALJ found Petrini’s “statements concerning the intensity, 

persistence, and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely credible,” a finding Petrini 

does not contest. AR 34. It is reasonable for the ALJ to discount medical opinions based almost 

exclusively on less than credible statements. Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1041 (“An ALJ may reject a 

treating physician’s opinion if it is based ‘to a large extent’ on a claimant’s self-reports that have 

been properly discounted as incredible.”).

III. VOCATIONAL EXPERT

Plaintiff’s last argument is that the ALJ posed an incomplete hypothetical to the vocational 

expert because she did not include all the limitations supported by the record. Dkt. No. 16 at 22-

23. The ALJ’s RFC determination was supported by substantial evidence in the record. It follows 

that the ALJ’s hypotheticals, which included the limitations from her RFC determination, were 

proper. The ALJ was not required to rely on responses from the vocational expert to hypotheticals 

that included other limitations. See Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 858 (9th Cir. 2001) 

 

1 While the ALJ cited several other deficiencies in Dr. Kalman’s report, this reason is the strongest 

and clearest, and no other reason cuts against her conclusions or findings. 

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(“Because the ALJ included all of the limitations that he found to exist, and because his findings 

were supported by substantial evidence, the ALJ did not err in omitting the other limitations that 

[the plaintiff] had claimed, but had failed to prove.”).

The vocational expert testified that a person with plaintiff’s RFC as determined by the ALJ 

would be able to perform occupations such as a hand packager, with 400,000 positions nationally 

and 4,200 jobs in the Bay Area, a hospital cleaner with 800,000 jobs nationally and 5,000 in the 

Bay Area, or an office helper with 80,000 jobs nationally and 1,400 in the Bay Area. AR 37, 73-

74. The ALJ was entitled to rely on the vocational expert’s testimony in response to her 

hypotheticals. See Bayliss v. Barhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217–18 (9th Cir. 2005).

CONCLUSION

The Court is sympathetic to Petrini’s conditions and challenges. The ALJ’s decision, 

however, is without legal error and falls within the bounds of substantial evidence. Consequently, 

plaintiff’s motion is denied, defendant’s is granted, and the case is closed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 27, 2015

________________________

JAMES DONATO

United States District Judge

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