Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-04874/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-04874-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (SSID)

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JENNIFER SORRELL,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

Case No. 13-cv-04874-SI 

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 

ATTORNEYS’ FEES UNDER THE 

EAJA 

Re: Dkt. Nos. 39, 48

Plaintiff has filed a motion for an award of attorneys’ fees under the Equal Access to 

Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). Dkt. Nos. 39, 48. The Court has reviewed the papers 

submitted by the parties and upon careful consideration hereby DENIES plaintiff's motion for the 

reasons set forth below.

BACKGROUND

In December 2010, plaintiff applied for Disability Insurance and Supplemental Security 

Income Benefits under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act.1 Her applications were 

denied originally and upon reconsideration. Administrative Record (“AR”) at 160, 166, 172. 

Plaintiff’s applications were then heard by Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Judson Scott, who 

denied her claims in a decision on May 25, 2012. Id. at 22. 

By the time of the administrative hearing, plaintiff Jennifer Sorrell was a thirty-one-yearold woman with at least a high school education. Id. at 33. Her past work experience included 

 

1

Plaintiff previously applied for Disability Insurance Benefits in December 2006 and 

October 2007. AR 183-87. There is no indication from the record that either application reached 

a decision.

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employment as a cell phone technician, assistant retail manager, and financial institution customer 

service representative. Id. at 32. She had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since May 10, 

2006. Id. at 27. Plaintiff asserted that she was disabled due to fibromyalgia, chronic pain, and 

chronic migraines. Id. at 135, 146. 

The Appeals Council granted two requests from plaintiff for more time before acting on 

plaintiff’s case. AR 8, 13. The Appeals Council finally denied review of plaintiff’s claims on 

August 30, 2013, rendering ALJ Scott’s denial the final decision of the Commissioner. AR 1-4. 

On October 21, 2013, plaintiff filed this action for judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

Dkt No. 1. Plaintiff sought four extensions of time to file her motion for summary judgment, 

which the Court granted. Dkt. Nos. 16, 18, 20, 22. The Court also granted motions extending the 

Commissioner’s deadline to file her cross-motion for summary judgment and granting leave to file 

her cross-motion one day late. Dkt. Nos. 28, 30. Plaintiff sought three extensions of time to file 

her reply, which the Court similarly granted. Dkt. Nos. 30, 32, 34. Plaintiff’s reply brief was filed 

February 16, 2015. Dkt. No. 35. 

On March 13, 2015, the Court granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and 

denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Dkt No. 36. The Court reversed the

Commissioner’s decision and remanded the case for immediate payment of benefits, pursuant to 

sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Id. at 23. That same day, the Court entered judgment in 

favor of plaintiff. Dkt. No. 37. 

On June 13, 2015, plaintiff filed a motion for an award of attorneys’ fees under the EAJA. 

Dkt. No. 39. The Commissioner sought an extension of time to file an opposition, which the 

Court granted. Dkt. No. 43. In her opposition, the Commissioner argued that plaintiff’s motion 

should be denied as untimely because plaintiff filed her motion two days past the deadline. Dkt. 

No. 44. Plaintiff sought and was granted an extension of time to reply. Dkt. No. 47. Plaintiff 

then filed an amended motion for attorneys’ fees and a reply, arguing that the fee application was 

timely and, even if it were not, equitable tolling should apply.2 Dkt. Nos. 48-50.

 

2

The Court takes no position on plaintiff’s contention that her amended motion is 

appropriate under Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401 (2004). See Dkt. No. 48 at 1. In that 

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LEGAL STANDARD

The EAJA provides that the court may award reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses to 

the prevailing party in a civil action against the United States, including a proceeding for judicial 

review of agency action, unless the court finds that the position of the United States was 

substantially justified. 28 U.S.C. § 2412. In Social Security cases remanded under sentence four 

of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the EAJA fee motion “may be filed until 30 days after a judgment becomes 

‘not appealable’ – i.e., 30 days after the time for appeal has ended.” See Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 

U.S. 292, 302 (1993) (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 2412(d)(1)(B), (d)(2)(G); Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 

U.S. 89, 102 (1991)). In cases to which the United States is a party, the period in which to appeal 

lasts sixty days. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1). Thus, the timeline to file a motion for attorneys’ fees 

under the EAJA pursuant to a sentence four remand is sixty days from the entry of judgment (the 

appeals period) plus thirty days (the EAJA period). 

The timing requirements for filing a fee motion under the EAJA are non-jurisdictional, 

though it is not yet firmly established whether equitable tolling applies. See Scarborough v. 

Principi, 541 U.S. 401, 413-14, 421 n.8 (2004) (reserving the issue of whether equitable tolling 

applies). But see Townsend v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec, 415 F.3d 578, 583 (6th Cir. 2005) (extending 

Scarborough to equitable tolling). “Equitable tolling focuses on a plaintiff’s excusable ignorance 

and lack of prejudice to the defendant.” Leong v. Potter, 347 F.3d 1117, 1123 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(citing Santa Maria v. Pac Bell, 202 F.3d 1170, 1176 (9th Cir. 2000)). The doctrine may apply 

where a claimant lacked notice of the filing period, “where the claimant has actively pursued his 

judicial remedies by filing a defective pleading during the statutory period,[] or where the 

complainant has been induced or tricked by his adversary’s misconduct into allowing the filing 

deadline to pass.” Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990); Leong, 347 F.3d at 

1123 (citing Leorna v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 105 F.3d 548, 551 (9th Cir. 1997)). Equitable tolling is 

not available in instances of “garden variety . . . excusable neglect.” Irwin, 498 U.S. at 96.

 

case, the Supreme Court allowed amendment of a timely filed EAJA fee application after the 

prescribed timeframe had run. Scarborough, 541 U.S. at 406. That is not the case here and, in 

any event, plaintiff’s amended motion does not cure the original timeliness problem.

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DISCUSSION

The only question at issue in this case is that of the timeliness of plaintiff’s motion for 

attorneys’ fees. Plaintiff filed her motion on June 13, 2015. Dkt. No. 39. She contends that the 

filing deadline was June 13, and that she attempted to file on June 12 but technical difficulties

caused her to file seven minutes after midnight on June 13. See Amended Application at 1. 

Plaintiff argues that she timely filed her motion, and that even if she had not, equitable tolling 

should permit payment of the attorneys’ fees to which she is otherwise entitled. Id.; Reply at 1. 

The government argues that the filing deadline was June 11, 2015, and that plaintiff thus missed 

her deadline by two days. Opposition at 2. 

Because this Court entered judgment on March 13, 2015, the judgment became final sixty 

days later, once the time in which to appeal expired, on May 12, 2015. See Akopyan v. Barnhart, 

296 F.3d 852, 857 (9th Cir. 2002). In her reply, plaintiff miscalculates this date as May 14, 2015. 

See Reply at 2. This explains how plaintiff erroneously reached June 13 as her filing date. Thirty 

days from May 12 brings one to the correct filing deadline of June 11, 2015.

Plaintiff is correct in that one cannot simply compute the filing date by tacking on ninety 

days to the date that judgment was entered. If the sixty-day appeals period expires on a weekend 

or holiday, then the judgment does not become final until the following business day. See Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 6(a)(1)(C); Shalala, 509 U.S. at 302. This is what the courts did in several cases on which 

plaintiff relies. In Sanford-Murray v. Astrue, No. 11-cv-1049, 2013 WL 54018 (D. Or. Jan. 3, 

2013), the filing deadline occurred later than ninety days from entry of judgment because the 

sixty-day appeals period expired on a Saturday. Sanford-Murray, 2013 WL 54018, at *2; see also 

Moua v. Colvin, No. 13-cv-0373, 2015 WL 3991170, at *2 (E.D. Cal. June 30, 2015) (calculating 

thirty-day deadline from the Monday after sixty-day appeals period expired, where appeals period 

expired on a Sunday).

The Court need not reach the question of whether equitable tolling applies to EAJA fee 

applications because even if it does apply, plaintiff cannot avail herself of the doctrine. Her 

miscalculation of the filing date constitutes garden variety excusable neglect. See Irwin, 498 U.S. 

at 96. Plaintiff does not dispute that she had notice of the judgment and of the applicable 

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deadlines. She only takes issue with the method of calculating the deadlines, but the method she 

employed was erroneous. This may have been another matter if plaintiff’s technical difficulties 

electronically filing her motion were the only reason for the delay. However, where plaintiff 

miscalculated the sixty-day appeals period as two days later than it actually was, she may not 

claim equitable tolling. 

CONCLUSION

The missed deadline in this instance amounts at most to excusable neglect. See Irwin, 498 

U.S. at 96. Accordingly, the Court DENIES plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2812(d).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 18, 2015

______________________________________

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

 

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