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Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 18, 1996 Decided February 18, 1997

No. 95-5166

ROY E. BOWDEN,

APPELLANT

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 94cv01832)

Lawrence E. Williams, Jr., argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant.

Claire M. Whitaker, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause for appellee. With her on the brief

were Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney.

Before: WALD, GINSBURG and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.

TATEL, Circuit Judge: This case involves a dispute between appellant and his former

employer, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, over a Title VII settlement agreement. In a

three-count complaint, appellant alleged that the INS breached the agreement by failing to bear

appellant's entire tax liability on the settlement payment, that the agency violated the Back Pay Act

by failing to pay interest on the award, and that it injured him by negligently failing to fulfill the legal

duties alleged in the first two counts. The district court dismissed the complaint, finding that

appellant had failed properly to exhaust administrative remedies required to bring the first and third

counts and that the second count failed to state a claim under the Back Pay Act. Concluding that the

government waived its exhaustion defense concerning appellant's first claim, we reverse the district

court's dismissal of that count and remand for further proceedings. We affirm the dismissal of

appellant's Back Pay Act and tort claims.

I

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Appellant, Roy Bowden, worked for the INS from 1975 to 1982 as a detention enforcement

officer. In 1978, after the INS declined to select him for several vacancies as a criminal investigator,

Bowden filed a race discrimination complaint with the agency. The complaint moved slowly through

the administrative process. On January 10, 1990, over a decade after filing his complaint, Bowden

settled his claim in exchange for a lump-sum back-pay award. Under the settlement agreement, the

INS paid Bowden $190,000 on January 31, 1990. That figure represented approximately $242,000

in back pay for the period from April 1978, the date on which Bowden had been passed over for the

criminal investigator positions, to the date of the agreement, minus deductions for payroll taxes.

In April 1991, Bowden learned from the Internal Revenue Service and the Maryland Tax

Department that he owed additional tax on the settlement payment. Eight months later, in December

1991, Bowden wrote to the INS, claiming that the agency had agreed to pay all taxes on the

settlement payment. The INS did not respond. Bowden wrote again in May 1992, reiterating his

claimand explaining that the INS staff personwithwhomhe had negotiated the settlement agreement

had assured him that the agency would pay all taxes due on the settlement amount, but that this oral

agreement had inadvertently been left out of the written agreement. This time the INS responded,

claiming in a July 24 letter that it had already paid the appropriate payroll taxesin accord with federal

regulations and that the settlement agreement made clear that it bore no additional tax liability. One

month later, on August 24, Bowden again wrote to the INS, repeating his allegations and stating that

his letter should serve as the thirty-day notification required by 29 C.F.R. § 1613.217(b) (1991). In

relevant part, that regulation provides: "If the complainant believes that the agency has failed to

comply with the terms of the settlement agreement, the complainant shall notify the [agency's]

Director of Equal Employment Opportunity, in writing, of the alleged noncompliance with the

settlement agreement, within 30 days of when the complainant knew or should have known of the

alleged noncompliance." 29 C.F.R. § 1613.217(b) (1991) (recodified at 29 C.F.R. § 1614.504(a)

(1996)).

In October 1992, Bowden filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.

Agreeing with the Government that the first two counts of Bowden's complaintthose for breach

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of the settlement agreement and for violation of the Back Pay Actwere within the exclusive

jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims and that Bowden had failed to exhaust his administrative

remediesregarding the tort claims alleged in the third count, the district court dismissed the complaint

without prejudice. Bowden then filed a new, identical complaint before the Court of Claims. There,

the Government argued, directly contrary to its position in the district court, that the first two counts

were not within the Court of Claims's jurisdiction. Agreeing, the Court of Claims transferred the

entire matter back to the district court.

In February 1995, the district court dismissed the complaint, this time with prejudice. Again

agreeing with the Government, the district court found that Bowden's attempts to exhaust his

administrative remedies relating to Count One had been untimely; that Bowden had failed, as a

matter of law, to establish his entitlement to interest under the Back Pay Act, as alleged in Count

Two; and that Count Three was barred by the district court's earlier dismissal order finding that

Bowden had failed to exhaust the administrative remedies necessary to bring a case under the Federal

Tort Claims Act. Our review is de novo. See, e.g., Wilson v. Pena, 79 F.3d 154, 160 n.1 (D.C. Cir.

1996).

II

Section 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1994), gives the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission broad authority to enforce the Act's antidiscrimination

mandate within the federal government, including responsibility for issuing regulations to control

federal agencies' processing of discrimination complaints. Id. § 2000e-16(b). Pursuant to that

authority, the EEOC has established detailed procedures for the administrative resolution of

discrimination complaints, including a series of time limits for seeking informal adjustment of

complaints, filing formal charges, and appealing agency decisions to the Commission. 29 C.F.R. §§

1613.201-283 (1991) (recodified at 29 C.F.R. part 1614 (1996)). Complainants must timely exhaust

these administrative remedies before bringing their claims to court. Brown v. GSA, 425 U.S. 820,

832-33 (1976); Bayer v. United States Dept. of the Treasury, 956 F.2d 330, 332 (D.C. Cir. 1992).

Like the suit-filing time limits contained in the Act, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (1994), the

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administrative time limits created by the EEOC erect no jurisdictional bars to bringing suit. Rather,

functioning like statutes of limitations, these time limits are subject to equitable tolling, estoppel, and

waiver. Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95-96 (1990) (statutory time limit);

Jarrell v. United States Postal Serv., 753 F.2d 1088, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (administrative time

limit); see also Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982) (establishing same

equitable principles apply to Title VII complaints against employers other than federal government).

The district court dismissed Count One because Bowden, by failing to comply with the

thirty-day complaint-filing requirement contained in 29 C.F.R. § 1613.217(b) (1991), had not timely

exhausted his administrative remedies. Because untimely exhaustion of administrative remedies is an

affirmative defense, the defendant bearsthe burden of pleading and proving it. Brown v. Marsh, 777

F.2d 8, 13 (D.C. Cir. 1985). If the defendant meets its burden, the plaintiff then bears the burden of

pleading and proving facts supporting equitable avoidance of the defense. Bayer, 956 F.2d at 333;

Jarrell, 753 F.2d at 1091-92; cf. 29 C.F.R. § 1613.214(a)(4) (1991) (recodified as amended at 29

C.F.R. § 1614.204(c)).

In this case, the pleadings and undisputed documents in the record establish that Bowden

failed to meet the thirty-day notification requirement. As his brief concedes, Bowden did not write

to the INS about its alleged failure to pay all the required taxes on the settlement award until

December 1991, nearly a year after Bowden received payment from the Government and, as his

complaint acknowledges, eight months after noticesfromthe IRS and the Maryland Tax Department

alerted him that he owed tax on the settlement award.

Bowden argues, as he did in his August 24, 1992, letter, that because he could not know that

the INS had failed to comply with the settlement agreement until the agency clearly denied his

allegations, the thirty-day clock did not begin to run until the INS first responded to his allegations

of noncompliance on July 24, 1992. In some cases, notably where a complainant's knowledge of

agency noncompliance depends on information in the government's possession, action by the agency

may indeed be the appropriate trigger for the running of the thirty-day clock. See, e.g., Aiken v.

Reilly, No. 90-0987-LFO, 1991 WL 126000, at *3 (D.D.C. June 26, 1991), aff'd sub nom. Aiken v.

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Browner, No. 92-5151, 1993 WL 267511 (D.C. Cir.July 7, 1993); cf. Loe v. Heckler, 768 F.2d 409,

418-19 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding that when, because of information withheld by the government, a

complainant neither knew nor reasonably could have known that the government had made a

discriminatory employment decision, the limitations period for filing a discrimination complaint is

tolled); Stoller v. Marsh, 682 F.2d 971, 974 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (same). But this is not such a case.

As both Bowden's pleading in the district court and brief on appeal admit, the documents that clearly

notified him that the agency had failed to pay taxes he believed it had agreed to paytax bills from

the IRS and the Maryland Tax Departmentwere in his possession, not the INS's. Because

Bowden's receipt of those tax bills in April 1991 marked the beginning of the thirty-day limitations

period, his December 1991 letter to the INS was untimely.

Attempting to escape the consequences of his failure to comply with the thirty-day

complaint-filing requirement, Bowden relies on two equitable doctrines: tolling and waiver. In Title

VII cases, equitable tolling ofstatutes oflimitations can occur in several circumstances. For example,

courts have excused parties, particularly those acting pro se, who make diligent but technically

defective effortsto act within a limitations period. Irwin, 498 U.S. at 96. Like other courts, we have

excused parties who were misled about the running of a limitations period, whether by an adversary's

actions, id.; see also Gray v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 858 F.2d 610, 616 (10th Cir. 1988), by a

government official's advice upon which they reasonably relied, Jarrell, 753 F.2d at 1092, or by

inaccurate or ineffective notice from a government agency required to provide notice of the

limitations period, Wilson, 79 F.3d at 162; Williams v. Hidalgo, 663 F.2d 183, 187-88 (D.C. Cir.

1980). More generally, and in accord with EEOC regulations, see 29C.F.R. § 1613.214(a)(4) (1991)

(recodified as amended at 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c) (1996)), we have tolled time limits in Title VII

cases when complainants neither knew nor had reason to know about the limit. Bayer, 956 F.2d at

334.

Bowden advancesseveral argumentsfor equitable tolling in his case, only one of whichthat

the INS failed to give him notice of the thirty-day charge-filing time limitrequires discussion. An

agency's failure to give notice does not excuse the untimeliness of a complaint, unless the absence of

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notice misled the complainant about the time limit's operation. Yet Bowden makes no allegation that

the INS's failure to give notice misled him. Moreover, we think the agency had no responsibility to

notify himin the first place. Although either the Act or EEOC regulations require employing agencies

or the Commission to give complainants notice of virtually every other time limit in the Title VII

complaint process, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(b)-(c) (1994); 29 C.F.R. §§ 1613.214(a)(1),

1613.217(d), 1613.233(a), 1613.235(b) (1991), they do not require notice of the time limit on

allegations of noncompliance with settlement agreements. While giving such notice would have been

both sensible and simplefor example, when the INS negotiated the agreement or when it sent

Bowden his settlement paymentthe agency had no duty to do so.

Bowden'sfailure to exhaust his administrative remediesin a timelyfashion, however, does not

end this matter. As in Brown v. Marsh, 777 F.2d at 18, for a combination of equitable considerations,

we think the INS waived this defense. To begin with, the agency never raised the thirty-day time limit

during the administrative proceedings. Although agencies do not waive a defense of untimely

exhaustion merely by accepting and investigating a discrimination complaint, id. at 15; see also Boyd

v. United States Postal Serv., 752 F.2d 410, 414 (9th Cir. 1985); Oaxaca v. Roscoe, 641 F.2d 386,

390 (5th Cir. 1981), we have suggested that if they not only accept and investigate a complaint, but

also decide it on the meritsall without mentioning timelinesstheir failure to raise the issue in the

administrative process may lead to waiver of the defense when the complainant files suit. See Saltz

v. Lehman, 672 F.2d. 207, 208 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see also Brown, 777 F.2d at 18 & n.2 (Starr, J.

dissenting); cf. Boyd, 752 F.2d at 414; Scott v. Claytor, 469 F. Supp. 22, 24 & n.7 (D.D.C. 1978);

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(2) (allowing raising of properly preserved statute oflimitations defense through

trial). Because the INS responded to the merits of Bowden's complaint without ever questioning its

timeliness, we think the agency now has no legitimate reason to complain about a judicial decision

on the merits. Had it been concerned that information needed to resolve Bowden's complaint was

stale or that deciding his case would upset settled expectationstraditional objectives ofstatutes of

limitationsit could easily have raised the thirty-day limitation during the administrative process.

What we have repeatedly stated regarding Title VII exhaustion requirements applies here as well:

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They are " "practical and pragmatic' ... and should not be invoked when [they] serve[ ] no practical

purpose." Wilson, 79 F.3d at 165 (quoting Brown, 777 F.2d at 14 (quoting President v. Vance, 627

F.2d 353, 363 (D.C. Cir. 1980))).

Not only did the INS fail to question Bowden's timeliness during the administrative process,

but it did not raise the issue either in response to Bowden's initial suit in district court or later when

Bowden took his case to the Court of Claims. Moreover, the government's plainly contradictory

responses to those two complaintsasserting before each court that the other had exclusive

jurisdiction over Bowden's suit, arguments the Court of Claims denounced as creating a

"jurisdictionalmerry-go-round"prolonged Bowden's quest for resolution of his complaint by three

years.

As in Brown, we do not intend to create a sweeping principle concerning waiver of

administrative time limits under Title VII. Also as in Brown, however, a balancing of equities in this

casewhere the agency definitively responded to the merits of an employee's complaint without

mentioning untimeliness, failed to raise untimeliness until the third round in court, and prolonged the

litigation for years by shifting legal positionsleads us to conclude that the INS waived its defense

of untimely exhaustion. The time has come for the Government's procedural run-around of Bowden

to end and for a court to address his claim on the merits.

III

Bowden's breach-of-settlement-agreement claim rests on his allegation that he and the INS

officialwith whomhe negotiated the settlement orally agreed that the agencywould pay all taxes, but

that this oral agreement was inadvertently omitted from the written agreement. Arguing that the

parol evidence rule bars the court from considering evidence of prior oral agreements, the

Government points out that the settlement agreement includes an integration clause, which statesthat

the agreement "sets forth the entire Agreement between the parties ... and fully supersedes any and

all prior agreements or understandings...." Appellee's Br., app. A at 4. The resolution of Bowden's

claim thus turns on the proper application of the parol evidence rule. In view of the delay the

Government's behavior has already caused, we wish we could resolve this issue now, but we cannot.

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Whether we rely on District of Columbia law or fashion a rule offederal common lawas have other

circuits in interpreting Title VII administrative settlement agreements, see Brewer v. Muscle Shoals

Bd. of Educ., 790 F.2d 1515, 1519 (11thCir. 1986); Eatmon v. Bristol Steel &Iron Works, Inc., 769

F.2d 1503, 1516-17 (11th Cir. 1985); Snider v. Circle K Corp., 923 F.2d 1404, 1407 (10th Cir.

1991); Fulgence v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 662 F.2d 1207, 1208-09 (5th Cir. 1981)we are

convinced that application of the parol evidence rule turns on a preliminary factual determination,

resolution of which requires remand to the district court.

We reach this conclusion whether we look to District law or to the principles of the

Restatement (2d) of Contracts, from which we would be inclined to fashion a federal common law

rule since those principles represent the "prevailing view" among the states, E.A. FARNSWORTH,

FARNSWORTHONCONTRACTS § 7.3 (1990), and are consistent with the remedial policies ofTitle VII,

see, e.g., United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 729-30 (1979). Under both these

sources of legal principles, the applicability and scope of the parol evidence rule depend on whether

the agreement is integrated, and if so, whether partially or fully. See RESTATEMENT (2D) OF

CONTRACTS § 213 (1981). Although reducing an agreement to "a writing which in view of its

completeness and specificity reasonably appears to be a complete agreement" creates a presumption

that the agreement isintegrated, id. § 209(3), the ultimate determination of integration is "a question

of fact to be determined in accordance with all relevant evidence," id. cmt. c, not on the basis of the

text of the agreement alone. See Ozerol v. Howard University, 545 A.2d 638, 641-42 (D.C. App.

1988) (stating same principle as District law); see also Federal Deposit Ins. Co. v. Hadid, 947 F.2d

1153, 1155-56 (4th Cir. 1991). While the presence of an integration clause suggests that the

agreement is fully integrated, it does not by itself dictate that conclusion.

We therefore remand this claim to the district court to determine whether the agreement

between Bowden and the INS is integrated, and ifso, whether partially or fully. If the district court

finds that the agreement is fully integrated, it may not consider extrinsic evidence about the alleged

prior oral agreement, since the subject of that agreement clearly falls "within [the] scope" of the

written agreement. See RESTATEMENT (2D) OF CONTRACTS § 213(2). If it finds that the agreement

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is only partially integrated, then it may consider extrinsic evidence about the alleged oral agreement,

but only if it finds the oral agreement consistent with the rest of the writing. See id. § 213(1).

IV

Turning to Bowden's Back PayAct and FederalTort Claims Act claims, we affirmthe district

court's dismissal of both. The Back Pay Act provides, in relevant part, that:

(b)(1) An employee of an agency who, on the basis of a timely appeal or an

administrative determination (including a decision relating to an unfair labor practice

or a grievance) is found by appropriate authority under applicable law, rule,

regulation, or collective bargaining agreement, to have been affected by an unjustified

or unwarranted personnel action which hasresulted in the withdrawal or reduction of

all or part of the pay, allowances, or differentials of the employee

(A) is entitled, on correction of the personnel action, to receive for the period

for which the personnel action was in effect

(i) [back pay]

(ii) [attorney's fees]

....

(2)(A) An amount payable under paragraph (1)(A)(i) of this subsection shall be

payable with interest.

5 U.S.C. § 5596(b) (1994). According to Bowden, these provisions require that he receive interest

on the settlement payment from the INS. We disagree. The Act's text and one of our recent

decisions interpreting it make clear that the settlement payment in this case does not fall within the

scope of the Act's interest requirement.

As to the statute's text, no "appropriate authority" found that Bowden had been "affected by

an unjustified or unwarranted personnel action." See id. The EEOC never made such a

determination. The only EEOC decision in the record simply concluded that the INS's investigation

ofBowden's discrimination complaint had been flawed because the INS misinterpreted the complaint

as alleging disparate treatment rather than disparate impact. Without making a finding on the merits,

the EEOC remanded the matter to the agency for more complete investigation. Appellant's Br., app.

C at 2-4. Nor did the INS ever conclude that Bowden had been improperly passed over for the

criminal investigator positions for which he applied. In fact, the settlement agreement specifically

disclaims any admission by the agency that it violated Title VII. Appellee's Br., app. A at 1.

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Even if the INS or the EEOC had determined that Bowden suffered an unjustified personnel

action, the Back Pay Act still would not apply to hissettlement. We have squarely held that the Back

Pay Act does not cover denials of discretionary promotions; it covers only denials of otherwise

mandatory promotions, such as upgrades required under seniority systems. Brown v. Secretary of

the Army, 918 F.2d 214, 220-21 & n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1990); see also Edwards v. Lujan, 40 F.3d 1152,

1154 (10th Cir. 1994) (adopting same interpretation of Back Pay Act). Although the employment

decisions at issue in Bowden's race discrimination complaint were not, strictly speaking, denials of

promotionsthe criminal investigator positions for which Bowden applied carried a lower GS level

than his job as a detention enforcement officer, Appellant's Br., app. C at 1we believe Brown still

controls this case. The selection process for the positions for which Bowden applied was

competitive, and the agency's hiring decision was discretionary. Bowden does not allege, nor does

anything in the record suggest, that his selection for these positions was in any sense mandatory.

Bowden argues that his claim nonetheless falls within the scope of the Back Pay Act because

the EEOC decision remanding his discrimination complaint to the INS stated that compliance with

the decision was mandatory. This argument reflects a misunderstanding of Brown's holding. Even

an EEOC order to promote Bowden would not have brought his claim within the scope of the Back

Pay Act. Whether a claim falls within the scope of the Act turns not on the mandatory character of

the remedyagencies must always comply with final EEOC decisions, 29 C.F.R. § 1613.237(a)

(1991) (recodified at 29 C.F.R. § 1614.502(a) (1996))but on the mandatory nature of the denied

promotion. Because the promotion denied Bowden was not mandatory, the district court properly

dismissed his Back Pay Act claim.

The dismissal ofBowden's claimunder the FederalTort Claims Act also warrants affirmance,

though not for the reason given by the district court. The district court based its dismissal of that

claim on its earlier dismissal of the identical claim in Bowden's initial suit. Because the earlier

dismissal was without prejudice, however, it cannot provide the foundation for the dismissal that is

before us now.

By its terms, Bowden's tort claim rests on the first two counts of his complaint. Because we

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have already found the Back Pay Act count to be meritless, we necessarily conclude that the portion

of his tort claim that relies on his Back Pay Act count likewise has no foundation. The remainder of

Bowden's tort claim fails because Bowden did not exhaust one of the administrative remedies that

function as jurisdictional prerequisites to suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act. See 28 U.S.C. §

2675 (1994). Before initiating suit, claimants must "file [with the agency] (1) a written statement

sufficiently describing the injury to enable the agency to begin its own investigation, and (2) a

sum-certain damages claim." GAF Corp. v. United States, 818 F.2d 901, 919 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

Bowden failed to satisfy the second of these requirements because he never informed the INS of the

amount of damages he sought for its alleged failure to bear the entire tax liability on his settlement

payment.

We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the district court for proceedings consistent

with this opinion.

So ordered.

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