Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-01-05307/USCOURTS-caDC-01-05307-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 

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Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 11, 2003 Decided May 16, 2003

No. 01-5307

NARAYANAN KRISHNAN, FOR NARAYANAN DEVIPRASAD,

APPELLANT

v.

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, COMMISSIONER,

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 98cv02059)

Paul Schiff Berman, appointed by the court, argued the

cause and filed the briefs for appellant.

Fred E. Haynes, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause

for appellee. With him on the brief were Roscoe C. Howard,

Jr., U.S. Attorney, R. Craig Lawrence, Mark E. Nagle,

Kenneth Leonard Wainstein, Doris D. Coles–Huff and Paul

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

USCA Case #01-5307 Document #749702 Filed: 05/16/2003 Page 1 of 17
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Mussenden, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, and Daniel Balsam,

Attorney, Social Security Administration.

Before: RANDOLPH and ROGERS, Circuit Judges, and

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: The underlying issue in this case is

whether a non-U.S. citizen applying for disability benefits

under the Social Security Act has satisfied an exception to the

general rule that alien beneficiaries cannot receive benefits if

they have resided outside the United States for six consecutive calendar months, 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(t)(1)(A); 402(t)(4)(A–

B) (2000). As the case comes to this court on appeal from a

judgment affirming the denial of benefits following a remand

to the Social Security Administration (‘‘SSA’’), it involves an

unauthorized remand by the district court to an agency that

failed to fulfill its regulatory responsibilities to assist the

applicant. Notwithstanding these procedural errors, because

the claimant has failed to make a prima facie showing that he

was entitled to receive benefits, we affirm the judgment

affirming the agency’s denial of benefits.

I.

The qualification for benefits at issue revolves around the

claimant’s assertion that he had worked the requisite time in

qualified employment to come within an exception to the

general ban on alien beneficiaries receiving benefits. Title II

of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq., provides

monthly insurance benefits to ‘‘qualified’’ individuals who the

SSA determines are unable to work because of a disability.

See also id. at § 423. Whether a person ‘‘qualifies’’ for

benefits depends largely on whether he has acquired the

requisite number of ‘‘quarters of coverage,’’ or ‘‘QCs.’’ See

id. at § 413; 20 C.F.R. § 404.101(a) (2002). For calendar

years since 1978, the number of QCs that a worker earns is

based on a comparison of his total ‘‘covered’’ earnings to the

amount designated in SSA’s regulations as sufficient to qualify for one QC during that year. 42 U.S.C. § 413; 20 C.F.R.

USCA Case #01-5307 Document #749702 Filed: 05/16/2003 Page 2 of 17
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§§ 404.140(c), 404.143(a); see also 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt.

B, App. Thus, a worker earns one QC if his total covered

earnings equal the amount designated in the regulations as

sufficient to qualify for one QC during that year, and a

worker receives two QCs by earning twice the amount specified in the regulations for a single QC. 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.143(a). A worker cannot earn more than four QCs in

any given year, id., but because the system is based on total

annual earnings, an individual need not work the entire year

to earn four QCs. For instance, a person could work for one

quarter of the calendar year and earn four QCs if his covered

earnings during that period were four times the amount

required by regulation for one QC. Similarly, a person could

earn two QCs if his covered earnings were twice the amount

required for one QC whether he worked for three days or half

of the year or for the full calendar year.

Importantly, only earnings that are ‘‘covered’’ under social

security count toward the calculation of a worker’s QCs. See

id. at §§ 404.1001, 404.1012. Work performed within the

United States is generally covered, subject to a few exceptions. Id. at § 404.1004. The earnings of students who work

as employees of the school they are attending, for example,

are not ‘‘covered’’ under social security. Id. at § 404.1028.

Likewise, on-campus work performed by foreign students

attending school in the United States is excluded from employment that is covered for purposes of calculating QCs. Id.

at § 404.1036.

Additional provisions of the Social Security Act apply to

non-U.S. citizens attempting to receive disability insurance

benefits. As pertinent here, § 402(t) of the Act provides that

alien beneficiaries cannot receive benefits for any month that

occurs after they have been outside the United States for six

consecutive calendar months. 42 U.S.C. § 402(t)(1)(A); see

also 20 C.F.R. § 404.460(a). This so-called ‘‘non-payment

provision’’ has two relevant exceptions: An alien beneficiary

who has accrued at least forty QCs, or who has resided in the

United States for a period totaling at least ten years, is

eligible for benefits regardless of his absence from the United

States. 42 U.S.C. § 402(t)(4)(A–B); see also 20 C.F.R.

USCA Case #01-5307 Document #749702 Filed: 05/16/2003 Page 3 of 17
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§ 404.460(b)(2)(I). These two exceptions to the nonpayment

provision do not apply, however, if the beneficiary is a citizen

of a foreign country that has a social insurance or pension

program of general application, 42 U.S.C. § 402(t)(2), or if the

beneficiary resides in a foreign country to which the mailing

of U.S. government benefits is prohibited, 42 U.S.C.

§ 402(t)(10).

An individual who is certified as disabled by the SSA,

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 421, must file an application to

receive benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 404.603. As part of the application, the claimant must provide the SSA with evidence of

eligibility. Id. at § 404.704. By definition, evidence is ‘‘any

record, document, or signed statement that helps to show

whether [the claimant is] eligible for benefits.’’ Id. at

§ 404.702. With regard to proof of a claimant’s earnings,

however, the only conclusive evidence is an official statement

of earnings provided by the SSA, 20 C.F.R. § 404.803, which

maintains an earnings record for each person whose employment is covered under the social security program. 42 U.S.C.

§ 405(c)(2)(A). (If there is an error in the earnings record, it

may be corrected pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.822.) A claimant, or his legal representative, can obtain, on request, a copy

of the claimant’s official SSA earnings statement from the

agency free of charge. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(c)(2)(a), 1320b–

13(a)(3)(A–C); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.810(a), 422.125(b).

II.

Narayanan Krishnan appeals on behalf of his brother and

next friend, Narayanan Deviprasad,1

 the district court’s affirmance of SSA’s denial of disability benefits to the claimant on

the basis of his failure to meet an exception to the general

rule that alien beneficiaries cannot receive benefits if they

have resided outside the United States for six consecutive

1 Throughout the administrative and judicial proceedings, Deviprasad and Krishnan Narayanan have been referred to as Narayanan Deviprasad and Narayanan Krishnan, respectively, inverting

their given first names and surname. In this opinion we will refer

to them as claimant and brother, respectively.

USCA Case #01-5307 Document #749702 Filed: 05/16/2003 Page 4 of 17
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calendar months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(t)(1)(A); 402(t)(4)(A–B).

The brother also appeals the denial of his motion to vacate its

earlier remand allowing SSA to supplement the administrative record on which it based its eligibility decision. Through

appointed counsel,2

 the brother urges the court not only to

reverse the judgment of the district court, but also to provide

equitable relief in the form of disability benefits to the

claimant. We hold that the district court erred in remanding

the case to SSA, and that SSA violated its regulations. These

errors, however, are insufficient to overcome the fact that the

original administrative record demonstrates the claimant’s

ineligibility for benefits; hence, the cases on which his brother relies for equitable relief are inapposite.

A.

The claimant is a citizen of India who came to the United

States on August 26, 1981 to pursue a masters degree at

Worcester Polytechnic Institute (‘‘Polytechnic’’). From September 1981 through May 1983, when he graduated, the

claimant worked as a teaching assistant at Polytechnic. Following graduation, he worked in the United States as a

computer software engineer. In May 1986, the claimant was

diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia. Over the next five

years, he traveled to India periodically for psychiatric treatment and evaluation, but he suffered relapses each time he

returned to the United States. Since April 25, 1991, the

claimant has been living in India continuously, where he

remains in the care of his brother.

The claimant filed an application for social security disability insurance benefits on May 22, 1993, on the basis of

disability stemming from schizophrenia. SSA’s psychiatrist

agreed that the claimant suffers from paranoid schizophrenia,

and determined that his disability began April 2, 1991. By a

memorandum of February 7, 1994, SSA advised the American

Consulate in Bombay of its disability determination, and

requested that the claimant’s physician in India and his

2 The court expresses its appreciation for the able assistance

provided by counsel appointed by this court.

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brother complete the forms necessary to process the benefits

claim. The American Consulate responded on April 14, 1994,

by submitting paperwork to the SSA that showed that the

claimant’s condition is permanent and deteriorating; that he

is a resident of India; and that he had been living outside the

United States since April 25, 1991, had no plans to return to

the United States, and had authorized his brother to serve as

his payee.

On October 11, 1994, the SSA informed the claimant that

his disability claim had been awarded, effective February

1992, but that payments to him had been suspended, pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 402(t)(4), because he had been residing outside

the United States for more than six months. The claimant

requested reconsideration of the SSA’s decision, asserting

that he had earned forty-two QCs. To support his claim, the

claimant attached to his request a handwritten chart with his

place of work and earnings by year. In a series of administrative appeals, SSA rejected the claim, failing on three

separate occasions to respond directly to the claimant’s assertion of forty-two QCs. First, by letter dated February 21,

1995, the Director of SSA’s Office of Disability and International Operations denied reconsideration because the claimant

had not satisfied any of the exceptions to the general rule

that benefit payments are not made to aliens who have lived

outside the United States for more than six months. Second,

an Administrative Law Judge (‘‘ALJ’’), on September 5, 1996,

denied an appeal on the grounds that the claimant had not

lived in the United States for the last six months and did not

qualify under any exceptions to the residency requirement.

Third, in February 1998, the Appeals Council denied a request for review on the same grounds, rendering the ALJ’s

decision the final decision of SSA. In the latter two appeals,

the claimant had requested counsel, but none appeared on his

behalf.

The brother of the claimant filed suit on August 28, 1998.

The district court appointed counsel for the brother, and the

parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The

brother argued that because the claimant had more than

forty QCs, he qualified under an exception to the general bar

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against paying benefits to alien beneficiaries. SSA countered

that the claimant had not accrued forty QCs, and submitted,

as evidence, computerized extracts of his work history that

had not been included in the administrative record, purporting to show that the claimant had accrued only thirty QCs.

At a hearing, the brother argued that he was entitled to a

judgment on the then-existing administrative record, while

SSA argued that the case should be remanded for ‘‘good

cause’’ so that it could supplement the record with the

certified extracts of the claimant’s work history. The brother

responded that there was no good cause for SSA’s failure to

include the earnings history in the original administrative

record. On September 17, 1999, over the brother’s objection,

the district court ruled that ‘‘the new evidence counsels in

favor of additional agency proceedings,’’ and because there

was ‘‘good cause shown,’’ remanded the case ‘‘pursuant to

sentence six of Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42

U.S.C. § 405(g).’’ Krishnan v. Apfel, No. 98–CV–2059 at 2

(D.D.C. Sept. 17, 1999) (emphasis added).

On remand, an ALJ held a hearing on March 27, 2000, at

which the brother, who was represented by counsel, submitted documents, including pay stubs from the claimant’s work

at Polytechnic, purporting to show that the claimant had

earned forty-two QCs. SSA submitted the computerized

employment extracts it had first brought to the district court,

and argued that because social security taxes were not withheld from money paid to the claimant for his work at Polytechnic, he had earned less than forty QCs. By decision of

April 18, 2000, the ALJ agreed with SSA, finding that the

claimant had earned less than forty QCs because ‘‘[o]n campus work which is done by [foreign] students is excluded from

employment (20 C.F.R. 404.1036(a)).’’

The district court affirmed SSA’s remand decision. Krishnan v. Massanari, 158 F. Supp. 2d 67 (D.D.C. 2001). Rejecting the brother’s position that he was entitled to judgment

based on the original administrative record, the court noted

that the administrative record had not included a printout of

the claimant’s earnings record – ‘‘a standard exhibit in the

administrative record of nearly every disability case.’’ Id. at

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71. Upon reviewing the supplemented administrative record

on remand, the court found that ‘‘substantial evidence’’ supported the ALJ’s decision that the claimant had not accrued

forty QCs. Accordingly, the district court denied the brother’s motion for summary judgment and motion to vacate the

earlier remand.

B.

On appeal, the brother renews his contention that the

claimant qualified for benefits under an exception to the nonpayment provision for alien beneficiaries because the claimant

had earned more than forty QCs, and contends that the

district court’s remand under sentence six was unlawful and

that he is entitled to benefits based on the original administrative record.

Section 405(g), which governs judicial review of final SSA

decisions, authorizes only two types of remands: those pursuant to sentence four and those pursuant to sentence six.

Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 99–100 (1991). Under

sentence four, a district court may remand for further proceedings in conjunction with ‘‘a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner.’’ 42

U.S.C. § 405(g). A sentence-six remand is ‘‘entirely different.’’ Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617, 626 (1990). The

district court ‘‘does not affirm, modify, or reverse the [Commissioner’s] decision; it does not rule in any way as to the

correctness of the administrative determination.’’ Melkonyan, 501 U.S. at 98. Rather, the district court remands

either because (1) the Commissioner requested a remand

before filing his answer, or (2) there is ‘‘new evidence which is

material and [ ] there is good cause for the failure to incorporate such evidence into the record in a prior proceeding.’’ 42

U.S.C. § 405(g); see also Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292,

297 n.2 (1993). The ‘‘principal feature’’ that distinguishes the

two types of remands is that in a sentence-four remand, the

district court disposes of the action by a final judgment and

relinquishes jurisdiction, whereas in a sentence-six remand,

the district court retains jurisdiction over the action pending

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further development by the agency. Id. at 297, 299. A

sentence-four remand is therefore appealable, Finkelstein,

496 U.S. at 624–25, while a sentence-six remand is considered

interlocutory and thus non-appealable. Accordingly, in a

sentence-six remand, there is no final judgment until SSA

returns to the district court to file SSA’s ‘‘additional or

modified findings of fact and decision,’’ 42 U.S.C. § 405(g),

and the district court enters a judgment. Melkonyan, 501

U.S. at 98.

The brother and SSA are in agreement on appeal that the

district court erred when it remanded his case under sentence

six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) without finding the statutory prerequisites. On de novo review, Herbert v. Nat’l Acad. of Sci., 974

F.2d 192, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Cuddy v. Carmen, 762 F.2d

119, 123 (D.C. Cir. 1985), we agree. Neither of the conditions

for a sentence-six remand were met. SSA did not file a

motion to remand before answering the complaint, and neither the district court nor the parties pointed to any ‘‘new’’

evidence omitted from the administrative record for ‘‘good

cause’’ shown. Evidence is ‘‘new’’ only if it was not ‘‘in

existence or available TTT at [the] time of the administrative

proceeding.’’ Finkelstein, 496 U.S. at 626; see also Melkonyan, 501 U.S. at 98. Here, the evidence to be added on

remand – SSA’s computerized extracts of the claimant’s earnings and any pay stubs or other information in the claimant’s

possession – had been available from the beginning of the

administrative proceedings. The district court’s remand under sentence six was therefore erroneous.

Nor can we sanitize the district court’s error, as SSA

contends, by holding that the district court could have entered a sentence-four remand. The district court made no

substantive ruling on the correctness of SSA’s decision, which

is a necessary prerequisite to a sentence-four remand, Melkonyan, 501 U.S. at 98–101. Neither did the court relinquish

its jurisdiction over the litigation. Its order stated that the

court ‘‘maintains jurisdiction over this action pending completion of the additional agency proceedings,’’ and directed the

parties to appear for a status conference by a date certain.

To conclude that despite the plain language of the court’s

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order, the remand nevertheless could have been entered

pursuant to sentence four, not only threatens to render the

statutory language of that sentence meaningless, but also

threatens to create a judicial quagmire – for a sentence-four

remand might have left the district court without jurisdiction

to enter the judgment now on appeal.

SSA’s reliance on Richmond v. Chater, 94 F.3d 263 (7th

Cir. 1996), to overcome the jurisdictional implications of a

sentence-four remand, is misplaced; the only issue in Richmond was whether the appellate court had jurisdiction to

reach the merits of the appeal, id. at 265, and the court was

not presented with a remand under either sentence four or

sentence six. In Richmond, the district court had remanded

a benefits claim case to SSA without indicating whether the

remand was issued under sentence four or six, and without

entering a final judgment ‘‘affirming, modifying, or reversing

the decision of the Commissioner,’’ 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Id.

The district court later modified the remand order to a final

order to allow the claimant’s counsel to apply for attorney

fees. Id. at 266. Still later, the district court vacated the

final order so that it could retain jurisdiction over the case

after remand. Id. The Seventh Circuit stated that the

district court could not issue a final judgment and retain

jurisdiction, and that if the district court had relinquished

jurisdiction, the appellate court did not have jurisdiction over

the appeal. Id. at 267. The Seventh Circuit concluded that

the district court had intended to retain jurisdiction over the

case and, even though erroneous, that intended jurisdiction

was a sufficient basis for appellate review. Id. at 269–70.

Unlike the instant case, the Seventh Circuit did not need to

consider whether to construe a sentence-six remand under

sentence four (or vice versa); rather, it had to untangle the

circuitous district court orders to determine whether it had

jurisdiction. Like the instant case, however, SSA accepted an

ambiguous remand, and the court in Richmond chastised SSA

for doing so and not challenging the inappropriate jurisdictional decisions of the district court. Id. at 269. Accepting

SSA’s suggestion that this court deem the remand at issue to

be a remand under sentence four would create the kind of

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convoluted outcome that was criticized by the court in Richmond.

In light of the Supreme Court’s instruction that there are

‘‘sharp distinction[s]’’ between sentence-four and sentence-six

remands, Shalala, 509 U.S. at 301, and that the two types of

remands are not interchangeable, we decline to interpret the

district court’s remand to be a remand under sentence four.

Shalala, 509 U.S. at 301; Melkonyan, 501 U.S. at 98; Finkelstein, 496 U.S. at 626; Seavey, 276 F.3d at 12 (1st Cir. 2001);

Buckner v. Apfel, 213 F.3d 1006, 1010 (8th Cir. 2000); Istre v.

Apfel, 208 F.3d 517, 519–20 (5th Cir. 2000); Raitport v.

Callahan, 183 F.3d 101, 104–05 (2d Cir. 1999); Nguyen v.

Shalala, 43 F.3d 1400, 1403 (10th Cir. 1994); Pettyjohn v.

Shalala, 23 F.3d 1572, 1574 (10th Cir. 1994). The Supreme

Court has rejected, in light of clear evidence of legislative

intent, the notion that Congress intended the district court to

retain inherent power to remand SSA claims determinations

for new evidence, Melkonyan, 501 U.S. at 101. In Finkelstein, the Court held that § 405(g) did not expand ‘‘the

district court’s equitable powers’’ but instead restricted them,

496 U.S. at 629. Hence, the failure of a district court to

properly remand under sentence four or six of § 405(g)

cannot be cured by reference to a larger authority to remand.

Shalala, 509 U.S. at 296; Melkonyan, 501 U.S. at 101; Istre,

208 F.3d at 520–21; Raitport, 183 F.3d at 105.

Accordingly, we hold that the district court erred in remanding the case to SSA pursuant to sentence six and that

there is no alternative ground on which to conclude that the

district court’s remand was proper.

C.

The question remains what consequences should follow.

Although the parties appear to agree on appeal that SSA

erred by failing to ensure from the beginning that there was

a complete administrative record containing the claimant’s

computerized earnings record, and that SSA also erred by

failing to provide any significant explanation for its denial of

benefits prior to the remand, SSA maintains that the brother

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is entitled to no relief because there is no evidence that he

could refute SSA’s reasons for denying the claimant’s claim.

The brother contends first, that because the district court’s

decision to deny benefits was based on information gathered

during an unlawful remand, this court should reverse the

district court and compel SSA to provide benefits because, in

his view, the evidence in the original administrative record

demonstrates the claimant’s entitlement to benefits. Alternatively, he contends second, that because the SSA’s failure to

follow its regulations prejudiced the claimant, the court

should provide equitable relief.

To conclude that the brother is entitled to relief under his

first contention, the court must be able to find that there was

substantial evidence in the original administrative record that

the claimant qualified for an exception to the non-payment

provision. Smith v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 1120, 1121 (D.C. Cir.

1987). Substantial evidence is ‘‘more than a mere scintilla’’

and is ‘‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might

accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’’ Richardson v.

Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (citation omitted). Because

it is undisputed that, when the claimant applied for benefits,

he had lived in the United States for less than ten years and

was therefore ineligible for the ten-year residency exception

to the non-payment provision, the issue is whether the record

contained sufficient proof that he had earned forty QCs. See

42 U.S.C. §§ 402(t)(1)(A); 402(t)(4)(A–B).

The brother relies solely on the handwritten chart submitted to SSA by the claimant for the proposition that SSA had

uncontested evidence that the claimant had earned more than

the forty QCs necessary to bypass the non-payment provision.

Id. at § 402(t)(4)(A). On its face, however, the chart includes

less than forty QCs of ‘‘covered’’ employment. The handwritten chart lists, for periods from September 1981 through

April 1991, the claimant’s place of work, approximate earnings, and the number of ‘‘social security credits’’ he earned.

Assuming that the claimant used the phrase ‘‘social security

credits’’ to mean QCs, as the parties presume, the chart

purports to show that he earned forty-two QCs. Id. The

chart states that the claimant worked at Polytechnic from

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September 1981 through May 1983, the same period during

which he was a student at Polytechnic. Under 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1028, the earnings of students who work as employees

of the school they are attending are not ‘‘covered’’ under

social security. Similarly, under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1036, oncampus work performed by foreign students attending school

in the United States is not ‘‘covered’’ under social security.

The record, including the claimant’s letter of November 8,

1994, to SSA stating that he had been admitted to Polytechnic

and awarded an assistantship in June 1981, which he accepted, is clear that the claimant was a student while working at

Polytechnic.

Once the period of time the claimant worked at Polytechnic

is removed from consideration, the remaining periods of

employment noted on the chart are from September 1983

through April 1991. A person can earn, at most, four QCs

per calendar year. 20 C.F.R. § 404.143(a). It follows that

from September 1983 through April 1991 the claimant could

not have earned more than thirty-six QCs. Thus, even

without the SSA’s certified earnings record, which showed

that no FICA had been withheld from 1981 to 1983 and

became part of the administrative record only upon the

unlawful remand, there is substantial evidence to show that

the claimant had not earned the forty QCs required to qualify

for benefits. To that extent, the district court’s reliance on

the remanded information was harmless because the original

administrative record demonstrated that the claimant was

ineligible for benefits.

As to the brother’s second contention, he seeks an equitable

award of benefits based on SSA errors throughout the administrative process that prejudiced the claimant. Specifically,

the brother points to SSA’s failure during three separate

administrative appeals to advise the claimant that his chart

was insufficient evidence of his earnings; counsel him on how

to obtain a statement of his earnings from SSA; request

additional information from him; produce evidence that

showed he was ineligible for benefits; or state that the denial

of his claim was based on the determination that he had not

accrued forty QCs. The SSA concedes its errors, but conUSCA Case #01-5307 Document #749702 Filed: 05/16/2003 Page 13 of 17
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tends that they were harmless because the brother has never

disputed that the claimant was a student at Polytechnic when

he worked there and on remand did not present evidence to

prove that the claimant had earned forty QCs.

SSA’s regulations provide that the only conclusive evidence

of a claimant’s earnings is a statement of earnings provided

by SSA. 20 C.F.R. § 404.803. SSA regulations, however,

also provide that SSA may consider, as evidence, ‘‘any record,

document, or signed statement that helps to show whether

[the claimant is] eligible for benefits.’’ Id. at § 404.702.

Although the claimant is responsible for providing evidence of

eligibility, SSA regulations state that it will ‘‘advise [the

claimant] what [evidence] is needed and how to get it and TTT

consider any evidence [the claimant provides].’’ Id. at

§ 404.704. If the evidence the claimant provides ‘‘is not

convincing by itself,’’ SSA is required to ‘‘ask [the claimant]

for additional evidence.’’ Id. at § 404.709.

The claimant submitted a handwritten chart of his earnings

to demonstrate that he had accrued more than forty QCs.

Although insufficient evidence of his earnings, see id. at

§ 404.803, the chart nevertheless qualified as reviewable evidence under the broad definition of ‘‘evidence’’ in § 404.702.

Yet at no point during the three administrative appeals did

SSA inform the claimant that the denial of his claim was

based on its determination that he had not earned forty QCs;

advise him that the chart was insufficient evidence of his

earnings, id. at § 404.704; counsel him on how to obtain a

conclusive statement of earnings from the SSA, id.; or ask

him for additional information. Id. at § 404.709. At most,

the administrative record as supplemented on remand indicates that the claimant submitted W–2 forms in response to a

SSA letter of May 5, 1993, which itself is not part of the

record; another handwritten note by an SSA official that is

referenced in SSA’s brief is illegible. Nor did SSA submit

any contradictory evidence – not even the claimant’s official

earnings record, which the district court noted is ‘‘a standard

exhibit in the administrative record of nearly every disability

case.’’ Krishnan, 158 F. Supp. 2d at 71.

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The glaring nature of SSA’s regulatory violations is underscored by decisions of the Supreme Court as well as the

circuit courts of appeal instructing that in cases involving

disability benefits SSA has an affirmative duty to develop a

complete administrative record, including ‘‘arguments both

for and against granting benefits.’’ Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S.

103, 111 (2000), Richardson, 402 U.S. at 400–01; Poulin v.

Bowen, 817 F.2d 865, 870 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Narrol v. Heckler,

727 F.2d 1303, 1306 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Diabo v. Sec’y Health,

Educ. & Welfare, 627 F.2d 278, 281–82 (D.C. Cir. 1980).

This duty is heightened if ‘‘the claimant is unrepresented by

an attorney,’’ Poulin, 817 F.2d at 870; Narrol, 727 F.2d at

1306; Diabo, 627 F.2d at 282, has limited fluency in English,

Poulin, 817 F.2d at 870, or suffers from mental illness. Id. at

870–71. Thus, in Poulin, the court stated that where a

claimant was not legally represented before the ALJ, was not

a native speaker, and suffered from schizophrenia, the ALJ’s

‘‘duty of record-development most certainly rises to its zenith.’’ Id. at 871. Other circuits have similarly so held. See,

e.g., Seavey v. Barnhart, 276 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2001);

Melville v. Apfel, 198 F.3d 45, 51 (2d Cir. 1999).

The claimant here is the Poulin case writ large. Not only

was he not represented by legal counsel at any level of SSA

review, he is not a native English speaker, lives in a far

distant country, lacks the financial resources to return to this

country, and suffers from a serious, progressive mental illness. Under the circumstances, SSA’s failure to develop a

comprehensive administrative record is inexcusable. Poulin,

817 F.2d at 870–71; Narrol, 727 F.2d at 1306; Diabo, 627

F.2d at 282. At the very minimum, SSA was duty bound to

include a copy of the claimant’s official earnings record,

maintained by SSA pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(c)(2)(A), in

the administrative record. Concessions of such errors on

appeal with promises to do better in the future have a hollow

ring, particularly when SSA’s failure to state a specific reason

for denying benefits could easily have been avoided had SSA’s

form required the identification of both the express reason for

its determination and the specific deficiency in the claimant’s

application.

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We will never know whether, with SSA assistance as

required by its regulations and court decisions, the claimant

could have provided additional information to cure the deficiencies in his chart or otherwise acted to demonstrate that

he qualified for benefits. Had SSA made the type of thorough eligibility inquiry early in the process, consistent with

its regulatory duty, this matter could have been resolved

promptly. At this point, ten years after he filed his application for benefits, the claimant’s mental condition has deteriorated to the point where he cannot assist counsel in pursuing

his claim. As the record stands, the brother cannot rest his

entitlement to benefits on behalf of the claimant on the

illusory grounds that if SSA had fulfilled its responsibilities,

the claimant might have presented evidence of other employment or might have chosen to remain in the United States

longer so as to qualify for benefits based on ten years of

residency rather than forty QCs. The brother did not proffer

any additional employment evidence on remand, and even

now, assisted by counsel, he has not done so. His family’s

repeated statements to SSA that for medical reasons the

claimant ‘‘had no way of surviving’’ in the United States, that

they lacked sufficient financial resources for the brother to

travel back to the United States with the claimant, and that

the claimant had no plans to return to the United States,

dispel the notion that he might have returned to the United

States. Thus, the void in the record to support the claimant’s

prima facie entitlement remains.

Absent a prima facie case of the claimant’s eligibility to

receive disability benefits, the authorities on which the brother relies to obtain equitable relief are inapposite. For example, in Allen, 881 F.2d 37, the Third Circuit chose to award

benefits to the claimant rather than remand where SSA’s

decision was unsupported by substantial evidence on the

record. Id. at 43–44. The claimant in Allen had ‘‘established

a prima faci[e] case of entitlement, the record was fully

developed, and there [was] no good cause for [SSA’s] failure

to adduce all the relevant evidence in the prior proceeding.’’

Id. at 44. Here, the original administrative record betrays

the fact that the claimant had not accrued forty QCs or

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established ten years of residency. The brother’s reliance on

Allen and its progeny is therefore misguided. See, e.g.,

Distasio v. Shalala, 47 F.3d 348, 350 (9th Cir. 1995); Nielson

v. Sullivan, 992 F.2d 1118, 1121–22 (10th Cir. 1993); see also

Stone v. Heckler, 761 F.2d 530, 533 (9th Cir. 1985); Carroll v.

Sec’y of HHS, 705 F.2d 638, 643–44 (2d Cir. 1983). For a

court to award benefits where the administrative record,

including the evidence proffered by the claimant, indicates

that the claimant is ineligible to receive benefits, would

extend the theory of equitable relief beyond its breaking

point. Cf. Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 320 (3d Cir. 2000).

Accordingly, in light of a pre-remand administrative record

that fails to show that the claimant is entitled to disability

benefits and no compelling reason to believe that he or his

brother can produce evidence to prove otherwise, we affirm

the judgment affirming SSA’s denial of benefits, notwithstanding the unlawful remand under sentence six of 42 U.S.C.

§ 405(g) and SSA’s violation of its regulations.

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