Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-04966/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-04966-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1981 Housing Discrimination

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Sharon D. Harden,

Plaintiff,

v. 

CPLC Estancia LLC, et al.,

Defendants.

No. CV-19-04966-PHX-DWL

ORDER 

Pending before the Court is Sharon Harden’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). 

(Doc. 9.) By prior order, the Court granted Harden’s Application for Leave to Proceed In 

Forma Pauperis but dismissed her complaint with leave to amend because the complaint 

was illegible. (Doc. 7.) The Court will screen Harden’s FAC pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2)1 before it is allowed to be served. Pursuant to that screening, the FAC will be 

dismissed with leave to amend.

A. Statutory Screening Of Complaints Filed By Pro Se Litigants

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), a complaint is subject to dismissal if it contains

claims that are “frivolous or malicious,” that “fail[] to state a claim upon which relief 

maybe granted,” or that “seek[] monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from 

such relief.” Id. Additionally, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading 

must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled 

to relief.” Id. Although Rule 8 does not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands

 

1 Although section 1915 largely concerns prisoner litigation, section 1915(e) applies

to all in forma pauperis proceedings. Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001)

(“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”).

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more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. 

“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content 

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for 

relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 

experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific factual 

allegations may be consistent with a claim, a court must assess whether there are other 

“more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 681.

The Ninth Circuit has instructed that courts must “construe pro se filings liberally.” 

Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010). A “complaint [filed by a pro se litigant] 

‘must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. 

(quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)). “A district court should 

not dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to amend unless it is absolutely clear that the 

deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.” Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 

F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotations omitted). Additionally, “before 

dismissing a pro se complaint the district court must provide the litigant with notice of the 

deficiencies in his complaint in order to ensure that the litigant uses the opportunity to 

amend effectively.” Id. (internal references omitted). Conclusory and vague allegations, 

however, will not support a cause of action. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 

673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). A liberal interpretation may not supply essential 

elements of the claim that were not initially pled. Id.

B. The FAC

Harden alleges mistreatment by Defendants Chicanos Por La Causa Estancia LLC 

(“CPLC”), Tiempo Development and Management (“Tiempo”), and the Residences at 

Camelback West (“Camelback West”) (collectively, “Defendants”) in the context of a 

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landlord-tenant relationship. (Doc. 9.) Camelback West is the apartment complex itself, 

Tiempo and CPLC own the property, and Harden was a tenant at the time she filed her 

complaint. (Id. ¶ 11, 35.) 

The FAC alleges that Harden is disabled. (Id. ¶ 7.) The impairments from which 

she allegedly suffers—“status post right ankle fracture with hardware implantation, 

multiple arthritic joints with arthralgia, lumbar degenerative disc disease, osteoarthritis in 

multiple locations, and right shoulder torn rotator cuff status post-surgery”—prohibit her 

from lifting things, performing repetitive motions such as climbing stairs, and reaching 

over her head. (Id. ¶¶ 7, 9.) Camelback West, a three-story apartment complex with stairs 

to the leasing office and inside the entry gate, has no elevator or ramp. (Id. ¶¶ 12, 14.) The 

FAC alleges that the property is “classified as an Elderly/Handicapped Housing 

Development.” (Id. at 2.)

On October 18, 2018, Harden signed a six-month lease for apartment N21 at 

Camelback West. (Id. ¶¶ 19, 20.) After receiving the keys to her apartment and locating 

the unit, she discovered that N21 was located on the second floor. (Id. ¶¶ 31-32.) Access 

to this apartment required climbing at least ten stairs. (Id.) 

The FAC alleges that Harden previously requested a first-floor apartment and 

Camelback West representatives had told her that a first-floor apartment would be available 

at her move-in date. (Id. ¶ 29.) The FAC also alleges that these representatives didn’t tell 

Harden that unit N21 was a second-floor apartment at any time during the leasing process. 

(Id. ¶ 31.) Upon making this discovery, Harden “immediately informed Leasing Office of 

the medical necessity of occupying a Downstairs dwelling,” and Camelback West 

representatives responded by telling her there were no such apartments available but she 

would be put on the waiting list. (Id. ¶ 33.)

On April 3, 2019, Harden renewed her lease of unit N21 for 12 more months. (Id. 

¶ 34.) At that time, she again inquired about the availability of an apartment that would 

not require the daily use of stairs. (Id.) The request to switch apartments was apparently 

refused. (Id.) Additionally, the FAC alleges that at the time Harden renewed her lease, 

her rent and security deposit increased. (Id. ¶¶ 25, 26.)

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Sometime in April 2019, Harden “began experiencing chronic pains, discomfort in 

her Left Sciatic Nerve, swelling and instability in her Right Knee and Ankle,” which the 

FAC attributes to the daily climbing of stairs. (Id. ¶ 35.) Harden again communicated her 

need for a first-floor apartment to representatives of Camelback West, who told her to get 

a doctor’s note. (Id.) Despite presenting this documentation, Harden remains in unit N21. 

(Id.)

The FAC concludes by requesting declaratory, injunctive, monetary, and other 

equitable relief for violations of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (“FHHA”), 42 

U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1), (2)(B), and (3)(B). (Id. at 12.) The FAC also includes references to 

other laws but does not appear to allege a violation of those laws. (Id. at 2.)

C. Analysis

To the extent the FAC alleges a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1)(B), that claim 

is easily rejected. This provision of the FHAA “forbids discrimination in the sale or rental

of housing, which includes making unavailable or denying a dwelling to a buyer or renter 

‘because of a handicap of . . . a person residing in or intending to reside in that dwelling 

after it is sold, rented, or made available.’” Budnick v. Town of Carefree, 518 F.3d 1109, 

1113 (9th Cir. 2008) (emphasis added). Here, Harden doesn’t allege that Defendants 

refused to allow her to rent an apartment due to her disability—instead, she alleges they 

gave her the wrong apartment. Section 3604(f)(1)(B) doesn’t apply in this circumstance. 

Whether the FAC has plausibly alleged a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2)(B),

which prohibits discrimination “in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a 

dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection with such dwelling, 

because of a handicap,” is a closer question. As used in this provision, discrimination 

includes “a refusal to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices, or 

services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person equal 

opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B). 

To prevail on such a claim, a “plaintiff must prove all of the following elements: (1) 

that the plaintiff or his associate is handicapped within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h); 

(2) that the defendant knew or should reasonably be expected to know of the handicap; (3) 

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that accommodation of the handicap may be necessary to afford the handicapped person 

an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling; (4) that the accommodation is 

reasonable; and (5) that defendant refused to make the requested accommodation.” Dubois 

v. Ass’n of Apartment Owners of 2987 Kalakaua, 453 F.3d 1175, 1179 (9th Cir. 2006). 

The Ninth Circuit has “repeatedly interpreted this language as imposing an ‘affirmative 

duty’ on landlords and public agencies to reasonably accommodate the needs of disabled 

individuals.” McGary v. City of Portland, 386 F.3d 1259, 1261 (9th Cir. 2004).

Here, the FAC includes plausible allegations concerning most, but not all, of these 

elements. As for the first element, the FAC plausibly alleges that Harden is handicapped 

based on the medical conditions identified in the FAC and the degree to which these 

conditions may interfere with major life activities. See 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h) (defining 

handicap as a “physical . . . impairment which substantially limits one or more of such 

person's major life activities”). 

As for the second element, the FAC plausibly alleges that Defendants knew of 

Harden’s handicap because it alleges she told them about it on multiple occasions and 

provided medical documentation. 

As for the third element, the FAC plausibly alleges that a transfer to a first-floor 

apartment may be necessary to afford Harden an equal opportunity to use and enjoy her 

dwelling. Bezi v. Camacho, 2012 WL 5519386, *17 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (plaintiff with 

difficulty ascending stairs “sufficiently alleged that . . . relocation to a first floor apartment 

may have been necessary to allow plaintiff an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the 

apartment”). To be sure, the fact that Harden renewed her lease for unit N21, a secondfloor apartment, tends to undermine, at first blush, any claim of necessity. However, 

Harden seems to have anticipated—incorrectly, as it turns out—that her relocation to a 

first-floor apartment was imminent throughout her first lease and upon her presentation of 

a doctor’s note. Furthermore, a relocation to the first floor appears to have become more 

necessary following the renewal of her lease—the FAC alleges she began experiencing 

chronic pain, nerve discomfort, and swelling in her knee and ankle at that time. (Doc. 9 ¶ 

35.) So, although Harden’s lease renewal is a fact that cuts against her claim, it does not 

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make her claim implausible as a matter of law.

As for the fifth element, the FAC plausibly alleges a “refus[al] to make the requested 

accommodation” based on Defendants’ ongoing failure to act on Harden’s relocation 

request. Groome Res. Ltd., L.L.C. v. Par. of Jefferson, 234 F.3d 192, 199 (5th Cir. 2000) 

(“an indeterminate delay has the same effect as an outright denial”); but see Elliott v. QF 

Circa 37, LLC, 2018 WL 2933467, *11 (S.D. Cal. 2018) (holding that a one-month delay 

did not raise a triable issue regarding constructive denial). 

However, as for the fourth element, the FAC fails to allege facts that plausibly 

suggest the requested accommodation was reasonable. Notably, the FAC does not allege 

that any first-floor apartments became available at Camelback West during Harden’s 

tenancy or suggest it was otherwise feasible for Camelback West to make one available to 

her. The FAC’s only allegations on this issue are (1) the fact that Harden has not yet been 

able to change apartments—a single data point that sheds no light on what options were 

available to Defendants—and (2) Harden’s speculation that her landlord was disinterested 

in helping her move to the first floor because she was never asked to fill out any forms to 

facilitate transfer. Evans v. ForKids, Inc., 306 F. Supp. 3d 827, 838-39 (E.D. Va. 2018) 

(plaintiff was not denied a reasonable accommodation where the defendants did not have 

available handicapped-accessible units at the time of her request, took affirmative steps to 

make a unit available, and had a plan for moving the plaintiff). 

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the FAC (Doc. 9) is dismissed with leave to 

file a second amended complaint (“SAC”) by February 21, 2020. The SAC must adhere 

to LRCiv 7.1.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if Harden fails to file an SAC by February 21, 

2020, the Clerk of Court shall terminate the action.

Dated this 21st day of January, 2020.

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