Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-09-05005/USCOURTS-caDC-09-05005-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 17, 2009 Decided July 30, 2010 

No. 09-5005 

MENOMINEE INDIAN TRIBE OF WISCONSIN, 

APPELLANT

v. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL., 

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:07-cv-00812-RMC) 

Geoffrey D. Strommer argued the cause for appellant. 

With him on the briefs was Marsha K. Schmidt. 

Donald J. Simon, Arthur Lazarus Jr., and Lloyd B. Miller

were on the brief for amici curiae Arctic Slope Native 

Association, et al. in support of appellant.

Donald E. Kinner, Assistant Director, U.S. Department 

of Justice, argued the cause for appellee United States of 

America. With him on the brief was Jeanne E. Davidson, 

Director. R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered 

an appearance. 

USCA Case #09-5005 Document #1258183 Filed: 07/30/2010 Page 1 of 24
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Before: GINSBURG, TATEL and GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges. 

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GRIFFITH. 

GRIFFITH, Circuit Judge: The district court dismissed the 

breach-of-contract claims of a government contractor, 

concluding they were barred by the statute of limitations in 41 

U.S.C. § 605(a) and the equitable doctrine of laches. For the 

reasons set forth below, we reverse the judgment of the 

district court and remand for further proceedings consistent 

with this opinion. 

I. 

The Contract Disputes Act of 1978 (CDA), 41 U.S.C. 

§§ 601 et seq. (2006), established a comprehensive 

framework for resolving contract disputes between executive 

branch agencies and government contractors. See id. § 602(a). 

In 1994, Congress amended the CDA to require, with one 

exception not relevant here, that all claims relating to a 

government contract be submitted, within six years of accrual, 

to the contracting officer responsible for entering and 

administering contracts on behalf of the relevant agency. See

Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 

103-355, § 2351(a), 108 Stat. 3243, 3322 (codified at 41 

U.S.C. § 605(a)).1 

 

1

 As amended, section 605(a) of Title 41, titled “Contractor 

claims,” reads in relevant part: 

All claims by a contractor against the government relating to a 

contract shall be in writing and shall be submitted to the 

contracting officer for a decision. All claims by the 

government against a contractor relating to a contract shall be 

the subject of a decision by the contracting officer. Each claim 

by a contractor against the government relating to a contract 

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3 

Once the contracting officer issues a decision on a claim 

or is deemed to have denied the claim by failing to issue a 

timely decision, see 41 U.S.C. § 605(a), (c), a dissatisfied 

contractor has two options. The contractor may, within ninety 

days, appeal the decision to the board of contract appeals for 

the relevant agency. Id. § 606. Or the contractor may, within 

twelve months, file suit in the United States Court of Federal 

Claims. Id. § 609(a). Although these two paths are mutually 

exclusive, Tuttle/White Constructors, Inc. v. United States, 

656 F.2d 644, 648–49 (Ct. Cl. 1981), they converge at the 

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which hears appeals 

from both the agency boards and the claims court. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1295(a)(3), (a)(10); 41 U.S.C. § 607(g). 

 This appeal found its way to our court—and not our sister 

circuit—by an unconventional third route, made possible 

because the case involves a contract authorized by the Indian 

Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDEAA). 

See 25 U.S.C. §§ 450 et seq. The ISDEAA permits Indian 

tribes to assume responsibility for federally funded programs 

or services that a federal agency would otherwise provide to 

the tribes’ members. See id. §§ 450b(j), 450f(a). After the 

 

and each claim by the government against a contractor 

relating to a contract shall be submitted within 6 years after 

the accrual of the claim. The preceding sentence does not 

apply to a claim by the government against a contractor that is 

based on a claim by the contractor involving fraud. The 

contracting officer shall issue his decisions in writing, and 

shall mail or otherwise furnish a copy of the decision to the 

contractor. The decision shall state the reasons for the decision 

reached, and shall inform the contractor of his rights as 

provided in this chapter. Specific findings of fact are not 

required, but, if made, shall not be binding in any subsequent 

proceeding. 

41 U.S.C. § 605(a) (emphasis added). 

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tribe and agency memorialize the transfer of authority in a 

“self-determination contract,” they negotiate annual funding 

agreements, which become part of the contract. Id. § 450l(c) 

(subsection (f)(2) of model agreement). Though selfdetermination contracts are governed by the CDA, id.

§ 450m-1(d), the ISDEAA allows a tribe to bring an action 

arising under its contract in the district court rather than the 

Court of Federal Claims. Id. § 450m-1(a). The tribe exercised 

that option in this case. 

 The parties to the contract at issue are the Menominee 

Indian Tribe of Wisconsin and the Indian Health Service 

(IHS), the agency tasked with administering federal health 

programs for American Indians. Pursuant to a contract with 

IHS, Menominee has for many years operated a healthcare 

program for its members. The tribe alleges that the IHS has 

failed to pay all the “contract support costs” (reasonable 

administrative expenses and the like) to which it was 

statutorily entitled for the 1995 to 2004 contract years. Id.

§ 450j-1(a)(2) (obligating agencies to reimburse tribes’ 

contract support costs). Menominee submitted its claims to 

the IHS contracting officer on September 7, 2005. After the 

contracting officer denied the claims in their entirety, 

Menominee timely filed this action for breach of contract in 

the district court. 

The government filed a motion to dismiss for lack of 

subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. The 

district court lacked jurisdiction over the claims for 1996, 

1997, and 1998, the government contended, because 

Menominee had not filed those claims with the contracting 

officer until after the six-year limitations period in the CDA 

had expired. Because that deadline does not apply to 

“contracts awarded prior to October 1, 1995,” 48 C.F.R. 

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§ 33.206, the government argued that the tribe’s claim for 

1995 was barred by laches. 

Menominee did not disagree that it filed its claims for 

1996 to 1998 more than six years after their accrual, but 

argued that the limitations period should be tolled. The tribe’s 

argument relied on the fact that in 1999 two other tribes filed 

a putative class action on behalf of all Indian tribes “that were 

not fully paid their contract support cost needs, as determined 

by IHS,” under a self-determination contract. Cherokee 

Nation of Okla. v. United States, 199 F.R.D. 357, 360 (E.D. 

Okla. 2001) (quoting Notice of Filing Revised Proposed 

Notice of Class Action). The district court in that case 

eventually denied class certification. Id. at 366. Menominee 

contended that it fell within the class described in the 

Cherokee complaint and that, under the doctrine of classaction tolling, the limitations period was suspended for two 

years while asserted members of the Cherokee class awaited 

the certification decision. In the alternative, Menominee 

asserted that principles of equitable tolling similarly excused 

the lateness of its claims. If either tolling theory was correct, 

the tribe’s claims for 1996 to 1998 would not be time-barred. 

Menominee also disputed that laches barred its claim for 

1995. 

The district court dismissed the claims for 1995 to 1998. 

See Menominee Indian Tribe of Wisc. v. United States, 539 F. 

Supp. 2d 152 (D.D.C. 2008). The court rejected Menominee’s 

class-action tolling theory on the ground that “presentment to 

the contracting officer is a mandatory jurisdictional 

requirement and was not timely performed by the Tribe for its 

1996–1998 claims.” Id. at 154 n.2 (citation omitted). The 

court also declined to equitably toll the filing deadline, 

reasoning that “[s]tatutory time limits are jurisdictional in 

nature, and courts do not have the power to create equitable 

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exceptions to them.” Id. at 154. With respect to the claim for 

1995, the district court held that laches applied because the 

tribe’s “11-year delay in bringing suit [was] nearly double the 

time allowed under the statute of limitations,” id., and caused 

the government economic prejudice, id. at 154–55. 

After the district court dismissed the tribe’s remaining 

claims, Menominee appealed the dismissal of its claims for 

1995 to 1998. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

II. 

We first consider the timeliness of Menominee’s claims 

for 1996 to 1998, which are subject to the statute of 

limitations in 41 U.S.C. § 605(a). Menominee missed its 

deadline but argues that the limitations period should be 

tolled. The government argues that the limitations period is 

jurisdictional and therefore cannot be tolled, equitably or 

otherwise. We disagree that the limitations period is 

jurisdictional but agree with the government’s alternative 

argument that class-action tolling is unavailable in this case. 

Nevertheless, we conclude that the limitations period in 

§ 605(a) is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate cases 

and remand for the district court to consider whether it would 

be proper here. Our conclusions regarding the availability of 

class-action and equitable tolling under § 605(a) are the same 

as those reached by the Federal Circuit in Arctic Slope Native 

Ass’n v. Sebelius, 583 F.3d 785 (Fed. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 

No. 09-1172 (U.S. June 28, 2010), which issued after the 

parties filed their briefs in this appeal. 

A. Jurisdiction 

The district court treated the six-year deadline in § 605(a) 

as jurisdictional. Menominee, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 154. This 

was error. Filing deadlines, statutory or not, are generally 

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nonjurisdictional. See John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United 

States, 552 U.S. 130, 133 (2008); Day v. McDonough, 547 

U.S. 198, 205 (2006); Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401, 

413–14 (2004); see also Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 

416, 434 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“It is anomalous 

to classify time prescriptions, even rigid ones, under the 

heading ‘subject matter jurisdiction.’” (footnote omitted)). 

The time limit in § 605(a) is no exception. 

“Subject matter jurisdiction defines the [tribunal’s] 

authority to hear a given type of case.” Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. 

HIF Bio, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1862, 1866 (2009). The Supreme 

Court has distinguished between prescriptions that may be 

“properly typed ‘jurisdictional,’” Scarborough, 541 U.S. at 

414, and those better classified as “claim-processing rules,” 

id. at 413. A claim-processing rule may serve to inform a 

plaintiff of the time he has to file a claim, Kontrick v. Ryan, 

540 U.S. 443, 456 (2004), or to “protect a defendant’s casespecific interest in timeliness,” John R. Sand, 552 U.S. at 133, 

but it “does not reduce the adjudicatory domain of [the] 

tribunal,” Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs 

& Trainmen Gen. Comm. of Adjustment, Cent. Region (Union 

Pacific), 130 S. Ct. 584, 596 (2009). See also Dolan v. United 

States, No. 09-367, ___ S. Ct. ___, ___ (2010) (slip op. at 4) 

(noting that a claim-processing rule “do[es] not limit a 

[tribunal’s] jurisdiction, but rather regulate[s] the timing of 

motions or claims”).2

 

2

 In dismissing for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, the district 

court implicitly concluded that the time limitation in § 605(a) 

demarcates the jurisdiction of the reviewing court, not only the 

jurisdiction of the contracting officer. Our holding that the time 

limit is not jurisdictional eliminates the need for us to doubt the 

district court’s conclusion. In any event, the distinction between 

jurisdictional requirements and claim-processing rules applies. See 

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The different treatment of claim-processing rules and 

jurisdictional requirements has significant effects on the scope 

of authority held by adjudicatory tribunals. Claim-processing 

rules “typically permit [tribunals] to toll the limitations period 

in light of special equitable considerations,” John R. Sand, 

552 U.S. at 133, and their protection can be “forfeited if the 

party asserting the rule waits too long to raise the point.” 

Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 456; see, e.g., Eberhart v. United States, 

546 U.S. 12, 19 (2005) (per curiam); Wilburn v. Robinson, 

480 F.3d 1140, 1144–46 (D.C. Cir. 2007). But a tribunal “has 

no authority to create equitable exceptions to jurisdictional 

requirements,” Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007), 

and litigants cannot by waiver or forfeiture confer jurisdiction 

where it is otherwise lacking, see United States v. Cotton, 535 

U.S. 625, 630 (2002); S. Cal. Edison Co. v. FERC, 603 F.3d 

996, 1000 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 

Whether a statutory time limit or other prerequisite to suit 

is jurisdictional is “discerned by looking to the condition’s 

text, context, and relevant historical treatment.” Reed 

Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237, 1246 (2010). We 

begin by considering whether Congress “clearly state[d]” the 

limitation should “rank . . . as jurisdictional.” Arbaugh v. Y & 

H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 516 (2006). If so, our inquiry is over. 

Id. at 515–16. If, on the other hand, the limitation “lacks a 

clear jurisdictional label,” we then ask whether the structure 

of the statute or long-standing judicial precedent “compel[s] 

the conclusion that . . . it nonetheless impose[s] a 

jurisdictional limit.” Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. at 1244. 

 

Union Pacific, 130 S. Ct. at 596–98 (applying the distinction to 

rules governing adjudications by an administrative agency). We 

note, however, that generally “[a] defect in an agency’s jurisdiction 

. . . does not affect the subject matter jurisdiction of the district 

court.” Mitchell v. Christopher, 996 F.2d 375, 378 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 

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The time limit for initiating a claim under the CDA is not 

stated in jurisdictional terms. Section 605(a) provides that all 

claims by a contractor “shall be in writing”; “shall be 

submitted to the contracting officer for a decision”; and “shall 

be submitted within 6 years after the accrual of the claim.” 41 

U.S.C. § 605(a). The statute does not “refer in any way to . . . 

jurisdiction,” Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 

385, 394 (1982), so we must turn to its structure and history. 

The government asks the court to infer from the structure 

of the statutory regime for processing government contract 

claims that the limitations period in § 605(a) is jurisdictional. 

Specifically, the government argues that tolling the six-year 

deadline in § 605(a) would “undermine” 28 U.S.C. § 2501, 

Appellee’s Br. at 25, which generally limits the jurisdiction of 

the Court of Federal Claims to claims filed within six years of 

their accrual. John R. Sand, 552 U.S. at 134–38. It is hard to 

see how. Section 2501 does not even apply to claims arising 

under the CDA, which instead gives contractors six years to 

file a claim with the contracting officer and one year to seek 

judicial review of the contracting officer’s decision. Pathman 

Constr. Co. v. United States, 817 F.2d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 

1987); see also 41 U.S.C. §§ 605(a), 609(a). Regardless of 

whether § 605(a) is tolled, a contractor may have more than 

six years after its claim accrues to file suit in the Court of 

Federal Claims. See Pathman, 817 F.2d at 1574–75, 1580. 

The tolling of the limitations period in § 605(a) simply has no 

bearing on § 2501. 

Likewise, the historical treatment of the type of limitation 

imposed by § 605(a) does not suggest that its six-year filing 

deadline is jurisdictional. In John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. 

United States and Bowles v. Russell the Supreme Court 

recognized the general rule that time requirements do not 

affect subject-matter jurisdiction but concluded that the 

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particular time limits at issue in those cases were 

jurisdictional based on their historical treatment. See John R. 

Sand, 552 U.S. at 134–38 (construing 28 U.S.C. § 2501); 

Bowles, 551 U.S. at 209–11 (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 2107 

and FED. R. APP. P. 4). In each case, the Court rested its 

decision on a line of Supreme Court precedent dating back 

more than a century. John R. Sand, 552 U.S. at 134 (citing

Kendall v. United States, 107 U.S. 123 (1883)); Bowles, 551 

U.S. at 210 (citing United States v. Curry, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 

106 (1848)). Section 605(a) lacks a comparable lineage. 

Indeed, it was not until 1994 that Congress enacted any 

statute of limitations for submitting claims to contracting 

officers. See Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, 

Pub. L. No. 103-355, § 2351, 108 Stat. at 3322. As originally 

enacted, the CDA contained no time limit on the filing of 

claims. Pub. L. No. 95-563, § 6(a), 92 Stat. 2383, 2384 

(1978). Although government contracts sometimes specified 

how long the parties would have to submit their claims, see 41 

U.S.C. § 605 note, these contractual deadlines were not 

considered jurisdictional, see Do-Well Mach. Shop, Inc. v. 

United States, 870 F.2d 637 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (holding that 

failure to submit a timely claim is an “affirmative defense” 

that “does not oust a tribunal of jurisdiction”); cf. JACK PAUL,

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS AND 

SUBCONTRACTS 227–28 (1964) (“[I]f the contracting officer 

decides the contractor’s claim on the merits without raising 

the issue of untimeliness of notice, the notice requirement is 

deemed waived.”). 

The government also makes a broader argument: that 

§ 605(a) “run[s] for the benefit of the Government” and this 

type of time limit has “long been considered jurisdictional.” 

Appellee’s Br. at 13. The government has it precisely 

backwards. Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs

established a “general rule” that time limits for suing the 

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government are presumptively subject to equitable tolling, 

498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990), and therefore nonjurisdictional. The 

government’s categorical argument that statutes of limitations 

running for the benefit of the Government are jurisdictional in 

nature lacks merit. 

Finally, the government argues that the limitations period 

in § 605(a) is jurisdictional because it facilitates 

administrative review and promotes judicial efficiency. That 

may be so, but such virtues do not make the limitations period 

jurisdictional. Many time limitations—including claimprocessing rules—serve “system-related goal[s] such as 

facilitating the administration of claims,” John R. Sand, 552 

U.S. at 133. A limitations period should not “be ranked as 

jurisdictional merely because it promotes important 

congressional objectives.” Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. at 1248 n.9. 

Because the time limit in § 605(a) is not jurisdictional in 

nature, the district court erred in dismissing Menominee’s 

claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. We may still 

affirm, however, if we conclude that the district court should 

have dismissed for failure to state a claim. EEOC v. St. 

Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 

1997). Because Menominee failed to meet the filing deadline 

and the government has not waived or forfeited its defense of 

untimeliness, such a dismissal would be proper unless the 

limitations period can be tolled. We now turn to that question. 

B. Class-Action Tolling 

In American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, the 

Supreme Court held “that the commencement of a class 

action” will in some cases “suspend[] the applicable statute of 

limitations as to all asserted members of the class who would 

have been parties had the suit been permitted to continue as a 

class action.” 414 U.S. 538, 554 (1974). In this case we 

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consider whether the time limit for filing an administrative 

claim should be tolled under American Pipe when filing that 

claim is a jurisdictional prerequisite to participation in the 

class action. 

A party generally must exhaust administrative remedies 

before seeking relief in federal court. See McCarthy v. 

Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144–45 (1992); see also Myers v. 

Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50–51 (1938). 

That rule “applies to class actions,” in which courts typically 

require “exhaustion by at least one member of the class.”

Phillips v. Klassen, 502 F.2d 362, 369 (D.C. Cir. 1974); see, 

e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 414 n.8 

(1975). Where exhaustion is a jurisdictional requirement, 

however, every class member must exhaust its administrative 

remedies. Blackmon-Malloy v. U.S. Capitol Police Bd., 575 

F.3d 699, 704–05 (D.C. Cir. 2009); see, e.g., Weinberger v. 

Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 764 (1975). 

Menominee contends that the pendency of the Cherokee 

class action brought by other Indian tribes against the IHS 

tolled the limitations period in § 605(a) for all putative class 

members, including Menominee, under American Pipe. At the 

same time, Menominee acknowledges that it did not submit 

its claims to the contracting officer until after class 

certification was denied, and it concedes that the submission 

of such a claim is a jurisdictional prerequisite to judicial 

review. Appellant’s Br. at 42 n.17.3

 It follows that 

 

3

 The concession is well taken. The Federal Circuit and the Court of 

Claims have long held that the court may not exercise jurisdiction 

until the contracting officer either issues a decision on the claim or 

is deemed to have denied it. See Bath Iron Works Corp. v. United 

States, 20 F.3d 1567, 1578–79 & n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Paragon 

Energy Corp. v. United States, 645 F.2d 966, 971 (Ct. Cl. 1981) 

(“Absent this ‘claim,’ no ‘decision’ is possible and, hence, no basis 

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Menominee should have been excluded from the Cherokee

class, had one been certified, because the tribe had not 

satisfied the jurisdictional exhaustion requirement. In arguing 

otherwise, the tribe relies on cases permitting class-action 

tolling of the administrative filing deadlines in Title VII and 

the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). See 

Armstrong v. Martin Marietta Corp., 138 F.3d 1374, 1392–93 

(11th Cir. 1998) (en banc); Griffin v. Singletary, 17 F.3d 356, 

359–61 (11th Cir. 1994); Andrews v. Orr, 851 F.2d 146, 148–

49 (6th Cir. 1988). Those cases are inapposite, however, 

because neither Title VII nor the ADEA incorporates a 

jurisdictional exhaustion requirement. See Zipes, 455 U.S. at 

395 n.11, 397. Also unhelpful is Menominee’s citation to 

McDonald v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 834 

F.2d 1085 (1st Cir. 1987), in which all unnamed class 

members had already satisfied “the non-waivable 

jurisdictional requirement of having presented ‘a claim for 

benefits . . . to the Secretary,’” id. at 1092 n.4 (quoting 

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 328 (1976)). Accord 

Arctic Slope, 583 F.3d at 794 & n.1. 

 

for jurisdiction in this court.”), aff’d, 230 Ct. Cl. 884 (1982). Their 

conclusion is confirmed by the structure of the CDA. By its plain 

terms, § 8(d) of the Act makes a decision by the contracting officer 

a jurisdictional prerequisite to review by the agency board of 

contract appeals. 41 U.S.C. § 607(d) (titled “Jurisdiction”). 

Section 10, which permits contractors to file a direct action in the 

Court of Federal Claims “in lieu of appealing the decision of the 

contracting officer . . . to an agency board,” id. § 609(a)(1), is not 

similarly framed in jurisdictional terms. Yet the jurisdiction of the 

agency boards and the court of claims are clearly coterminous. See 

Garrett v. Gen. Elec. Co., 987 F.2d 747, 750 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 

Because a decision from the contracting officer or a “deemed 

denial” of the claim is a prerequisite to the board’s exercise of its 

jurisdiction, it is likewise necessary for the court to act. 

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Menominee further argues that even if the Cherokee

court could not have exercised jurisdiction over its claims, 

class-action tolling of the period for filing an administrative 

claim is nevertheless required. In keeping with this court’s 

“functional reading of American Pipe,” McCarthy v. 

Kleindienst, 562 F.2d 1269, 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1977), we 

consider whether tolling under these circumstances would 

serve the purposes underlying the class-action tolling 

doctrine. We hold that the limitations period for submitting an 

administrative claim is not tolled under American Pipe for 

asserted class members who, because of their failure to satisfy 

a jurisdictional exhaustion requirement, are ineligible to 

participate in the class action at the time class certification is 

denied. 

American Pipe addressed what effect, if any, the timely 

filing of a complaint on behalf of an asserted class should 

have on the statute of limitations governing the claims of 

absent class members—a problem that arises from the delay 

between the commencement of the action and the district 

court’s determination “whether to certify the action as a class 

action” and how to “define the class and the class claims.” 

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(B). If the statute of limitations on the 

claims of putative class members continued to run in the 

meantime, the unnamed plaintiffs would face a choice: act to 

preserve their rights (by moving to intervene or join or by 

initiating a separate action) or run the risk of forfeiting their 

rights if class certification is denied after their claims have 

grown stale. The American Pipe Court held that, where a class 

is certified, the commencement of the action by the named 

plaintiff satisfies the statute of limitations “as to all those who 

might subsequently participate in the suit.” 414 U.S. at 551. If 

certification is denied, then the limitations period is 

suspended between the filing of the class complaint and the 

denial of class status. Id. at 554. The tolling rule of American 

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Pipe permits members of the asserted class to safely await the 

certification decision before filing a motion to intervene in the 

action brought by the named plaintiff, id., or a separate 

lawsuit, Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 

353–54 (1983). 

A contrary rule would defeat Rule 23’s objectives of 

“efficiency and economy of litigation” by forcing putative 

class members to file protective motions to intervene in the 

pending action or run the risk of their claims growing stale. 

American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 553. “[R]equiring successful 

anticipation of the determination of the validity of the class 

would breed needless duplication of motions,” the Court 

explained, because that determination in some cases turns on 

“such subtle factors as experience with prior similar litigation 

or the current status of a court’s docket.” Id. at 553–54. The 

need for class-action tolling thus rests on the uncertainty of 

putative class members regarding whether the court will 

certify a class that will protect their interests. If putative class 

members knew in advance that a class would not be certified 

or that they would be excluded from the class action, there 

would be no need for tolling. 

We agree with the Federal Circuit that the American Pipe

doctrine does not require courts to toll the time putative class 

members have to satisfy a jurisdictional prerequisite to 

judicial review when the failure to do so precludes them from 

obtaining relief via the class action. See Arctic Slope, 583 

F.3d at 797. Until they satisfy the jurisdictional preconditions 

to class membership, putative class members have no reason 

to anticipate whether or not class certification will be granted 

and face none of the uncertainty class-action tolling is meant 

to ameliorate. Regardless of whether certification is granted, 

every contractor must submit its claim to the contracting 

officer. Only once a contractor’s claim is denied by the 

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contracting officer does the contractor have a choice between 

participating in the class or proceeding individually—the 

choice with which the class-action tolling doctrine is 

concerned. Because Menominee could not have participated 

in the Cherokee class action without first presenting a claim to 

the contracting officer, the purposes of Rule 23 would not be 

advanced by tolling the limitations period in § 605(a). “Where 

the rationale for a rule stops, so ordinarily does the rule.” 

United States v. Textron Inc., 577 F.3d 21, 31 (1st Cir. 2009) 

(Boudin, J.). 

Menominee contends that extending class-action tolling 

to the time limitation in § 605(a) would advance the goal of 

“efficiency and economy of litigation” described by the Court 

in American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 553. Unless tolling applies, 

Menominee asserts, contractors will be forced to file claims 

with the contracting officer “merely to preserve their rights to 

participate in [a] proposed class [action].” Appellant’s Br. at 

17. Yes and no. It is true that contractors must file 

administrative claims in order to participate in a class action 

brought under the CDA. But every asserted class member 

must submit a claim to the contracting officer because of the 

general rule that one cannot obtain relief as a member of a 

class action without first satisfying the jurisdictional 

prerequisites to judicial review, not because class-action 

tolling is inapplicable to § 605(a). Menominee also suggests 

that, under our rule, contractors that submit claims to the 

contracting officer must then file individual actions or 

motions to intervene within twelve months of the contracting 

officer’s decision. This argument fails, too. The tribe would 

be correct if the time limit for seeking judicial review in § 609 

were not subject to tolling under American Pipe, but nothing 

in our decision precludes application of class-action tolling to 

that deadline. 

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Menominee further argues that the district court in 

Cherokee “conclusively decided the parameters of the 

putative class[,] . . . that the Tribe was a member of that 

class,” and that the issue “cannot be re-litigated.” Reply Br. at 

4–5 & n.1. That argument has no merit. The Cherokee court 

denied class certification and therefore never defined a class. 

See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(B). 

Finally, Menominee contends that class-action tolling 

should apply here because the tribe’s failure to present a 

timely claim resulted from its reliance upon the Cherokee

class action and arguments the government allegedly made in 

the course of that litigation. See Appellant’s Br. at 17; Reply 

Br. at 6. But Menominee’s purported reliance on the 

pendency of the class action is not germane to the availability 

of class-action tolling, which benefits even those “asserted 

class members who were unaware of the proceedings brought 

in their interest or who demonstrably did not rely on the 

institution of those proceedings.” American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 

552. The various defenses raised by the government in the 

Cherokee litigation similarly have no bearing on the 

availability of class-action tolling. 

In sum, Menominee advocates extending the benefit of 

tolling to all members of the class described by the named 

plaintiff, including those jurisdictionally barred from 

participation due to their failure to exhaust administrative 

remedies. Such a rule would serve only one function: 

Permitting plaintiffs who could not have participated in the 

class to initiate actions against the government after their 

claims have grown stale. Adopting the rule Menominee 

advances would not further the objectives of Rule 23 but 

rather “invit[e] abuse” of the class device by encouraging 

lawyers “to frame their pleadings . . . [to] save members of 

the purported class who have slept on their rights.” Crown, 

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Cork & Seal, 462 U.S. at 354 (Powell, J., concurring) 

(quoting American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 561 (Blackmun, J., 

concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted). We join the 

Federal Circuit in holding that class-action tolling is not 

available under these circumstances. 

C. Equitable Tolling 

In the alternative, Menominee argues that the CDA’s sixyear limitations period should be equitably tolled. We agree 

that the statute is subject to tolling and remand for the district 

court to consider whether tolling is appropriate in this case. 

“It is hornbook law that limitations periods are 

customarily subject to equitable tolling unless tolling would 

be inconsistent with the text of the relevant statute.” Young v. 

United States, 535 U.S. 43, 49 (2002) (internal citations and 

quotation marks omitted). Indeed “a nonjurisdictional federal 

statute of limitations is normally subject to a rebuttable 

presumption in favor of equitable tolling.” Holland v. Florida, 

No. 09-5327, ___ S. Ct. ___, ___ (2010) (slip op. at 13) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). That presumption applies 

in litigation against the United States, Irwin, 498 U.S. at 95, 

where “the injury to be redressed is of a type familiar to 

private litigation,” Chung v. DOJ, 333 F.3d 273, 277 (D.C. 

Cir. 2003). Because the time limitation in § 605(a) is 

nonjurisdictional and actions for breach of contract are 

familiar to private litigation, we must presume that § 605(a) is 

subject to equitable tolling. The only question that remains is 

whether there is “good reason to believe that Congress did not 

want the equitable tolling doctrine to apply.” United States v. 

Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347, 350 (1997). 

The requirement that all claims “shall be submitted 

within 6 years after the accrual of the claim,” 41 U.S.C. 

§ 605(a), reads like a run-of-the-mill statute of limitations. 

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Because this provision was enacted after Irwin established the 

presumption in favor of equitable tolling, Congress was on 

notice that courts would read § 605(a) to permit tolling unless 

it provided otherwise. See Holland, ___ S. Ct. at ___ (slip op. 

at 13) (“The presumption’s strength is . . . reinforced by the 

fact that Congress enacted [the statute] after th[e] Court 

decided Irwin . . . .”). Yet Congress included no “[s]pecific 

statutory language” that could be construed to “rebut the 

presumption.” John R. Sand, 552 U.S. at 137–38. That silence 

is a strong indication that Irwin’s default rule governs. Arctic 

Slope, 583 F.3d at 798.

The government argues that § 605(a) is much like the 

statute at issue in United States v. Brockamp, in which the 

Supreme Court held that the Irwin presumption had been 

rebutted even though Congress had not expressly precluded 

tolling. Brockamp involved the time limitation for filing 

claims for tax refunds. See 26 U.S.C. § 6511. In holding that 

Congress did not want the deadline equitably tolled, the Court 

relied on several factors including the provision’s “detail, its 

technical language, the iteration of the limitations in both 

procedural and substantive forms, and the explicit listing of 

exceptions,” 519 U.S. at 352, as well as its “unusually 

emphatic form,” id. at 350, and the “underlying subject 

matter” of tax collection, id. at 352. None of these factors is at 

work in § 605(a). 

The government describes the CDA as “a detailed, 

technical, complex scheme that sets forth precise procedures 

and deadlines for the assertion of a claim.” Appellee’s Br. at 

31. Be that as it may, the government’s focus on the 

regulatory scheme as a whole is misplaced. The Brockamp 

Court did not concern itself with the complexity of the Tax 

Code taken as a whole, but the complexity of the time 

limitations found in § 6511. See 519 U.S. at 350–51. As Irwin

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itself illustrates, a fairly complicated regulatory scheme—in 

that case Title VII—may nevertheless include a limitations 

period that uses “fairly simple language, which one 

can . . . plausibly read as containing an implied ‘equitable 

tolling’ exception.” Id. at 350. As the Federal Circuit 

observed, “[t]he statutory time limitation of section 605(a) is a 

simple provision and does not contain technical language.” 

Arctic Slope, 583 F.3d at 799. 

The Brockamp Court also drew on the several “explicit 

exceptions to [the] basic time limits” in § 6511 to conclude 

that it would be inappropriate to allow equitable tolling. 519 

U.S. at 351. Section 605(a) is similar, the government asserts, 

in that it expressly states that its limitations period does not 

apply “to a claim by the government against a contractor that 

is based on a claim by the contractor involving fraud.” 41 

U.S.C. § 605(a). But this exception is easily explained in a 

way that does not require us to infer that Congress meant to 

preclude equitable tolling. When Congress amended § 605(a) 

to add the limitation period, § 604 already imposed a deadline 

on the government for claims involving fraud. That deadline 

specifies that “[l]iability . . . shall be determined within six 

years of the commission of [the contractor’s] 

misrepresentation of fact or fraud.” 41 U.S.C. § 604. In 

excepting claims involving fraud from the limitations period 

in § 605(a), Congress presumably meant only to avoid 

implicitly abrogating § 604. There is no reason to think that 

the inclusion of an express exception for claims involving 

fraud should be read to exclude an implicit exception for 

equitable tolling.4

 

 

4

 The government also argues that tolling the limitations period in 

§ 605(a) would undermine the statute of limitations for filing 

actions in the Court of Federal Claims, 28 U.S.C. § 2501, which 

cannot be equitably tolled, John R. Sand, 552 U.S. at 137. The 

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 We agree with the Federal Circuit that the time limitation 

in § 605(a) is subject to equitable tolling. Because the parties 

dispute facts relevant to application of the equitable tolling 

doctrine, we remand for the district court to determine 

whether tolling is appropriate under the circumstances of this 

case. 

III.

Neither party suggests that Menominee’s claim for 1995 

is subject to the CDA’s six-year time limit, which is 

inapplicable to “contracts awarded prior to October 1, 1995.” 

48 C.F.R. § 33.206. The district court still dismissed 

Menominee’s claim for 1995, but it did so based on the 

doctrine of laches. 

The equitable defense of laches “is designed to promote 

diligence and prevent enforcement of stale claims” by those 

who have “‘slumber[ed] on their rights.’” Gull Airborne 

Instruments, Inc. v. Weinberger, 694 F.2d 838, 843 (D.C. Cir. 

1982) (quoting Powell v. Zuckert, 366 F.2d 634, 636 (D.C. 

Cir. 1966)). Laches “applies where there is ‘(1) lack of 

diligence by the party against whom the defense is asserted, 

and (2) prejudice to the party asserting the defense.’” Pro 

Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 565 F.3d 880, 882 (D.C. Cir. 2009) 

(quoting Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 

101, 121–22 (2002)). The district court stated that 

Menominee’s “11-year delay in bringing suit is nearly double 

the time allowed under the statute of limitations and is 

certainly long enough to satisfy the standards under the first 

prong of the test for laches.” Menominee, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 

 

government offered a substantially similar argument in favor of 

treating the limitations period as jurisdictional, and we reject the 

argument here for the same reasons. See supra, at 9. 

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154. The court also explained that this delay prejudiced the 

government because “[f]unding for the 1995 contract year has 

long since expired.” Id. 

The parties dispute the applicable standard of review. 

Menominee urges us to review the dismissal de novo, and the 

government advocates review under an abuse-of-discretion 

standard. We have observed that “both standards are relevant” 

when the district court’s laches determination comes at 

summary judgment, Harjo, 565 F.3d at 883, but have not 

addressed the standard that governs in an appeal from a 

dismissal. We need not determine here whether our review 

should be de novo or for abuse of discretion because we 

would reverse under either standard. With the following 

observations, we remand for the district court to reconsider 

the matter. 

First, the district court incorrectly calculated the length of 

the tribe’s delay. As the government now acknowledges, the 

tribe submitted its claim for 1995 “nine years and nine months 

after the claims accrued,” Appellee’s Br. at 43, not the eleven 

years suggested by the district court. Cf. Gull Airborne, 694 

F.2d at 843 (stating that the plaintiff’s delay should be 

measured by the “period of time [that] elapses between 

accrual of the claim and suit”).

Second, the district court erred in failing to consider the 

tribe’s arguments that its delay was reasonable. “[L]aches is 

not, like limitation, a mere matter of time,” Holmberg v. 

Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396 (1946), but “attaches only to 

parties who have unjustifiably delayed in bringing suit.” ProFootball, Inc. v. Harjo, 415 F.3d 44, 49 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (per 

curiam) (emphasis added). The doctrine is equitable in nature, 

and its application “turns on whether the party seeking relief 

‘delayed inexcusably or unreasonably in filing suit,’” not 

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simply whether the party delayed. Id. (quoting Rozen v. 

District of Columbia, 702 F.2d 1202, 1203 (D.C. Cir. 1983) 

(per curiam)). On remand, the district court should consider 

Menominee’s arguments that it had good reason for not 

presenting its claims to the contracting officer sooner. 

Third, the district court provided inadequate reasons for 

concluding that Menominee’s delay prejudiced the 

government. The court offered only the terse observation that 

“[f]unding for the 1995 contract year has long since expired.” 

Menominee, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 154. This statement appears to 

be an endorsement of the government’s assertion in its motion 

to dismiss that it was “economically prejudiced” by the delay 

because “the appropriations for 1995 have long since lapsed.” 

Mot. to Dismiss at 9. In support of that position, the 

government cited the Department of the Interior and Related 

Agencies Appropriations Act, 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-332, 108 

Stat. 2499 (1994), which provided that “[n]o part of any 

appropriation contained in this Act shall remain available for 

obligation beyond the current fiscal year unless expressly so 

provided herein,” id. § 304, 108 Stat. at 2536. The 1995 fiscal 

year ended on September 30, 1995. Id. pmbl., 108 Stat. at 

2499. Because Menominee’s claim for 1995 did not accrue 

until several months later, the relevant appropriations would 

have already expired had the tribe filed suit on the day its 

claim accrued. We fail to see how the tribe’s delay prejudiced 

the government. 

We close by noting that “a motion to dismiss generally is 

not a useful vehicle for raising the issue [of laches].” 5 

CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL 

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1277, at 644 (3d ed. 2004). But 

see, e.g., Love v. Stevens, 207 F.2d 32, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1953) 

(per curiam) (affirming a dismissal based “upon plaintiff’s 

laches”). Laches may be the “legal cousin” of the statute of 

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limitations, Daingerfield Island Protective Soc’y v. Babbitt, 

40 F.3d 442, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Wald, J., dissenting), but it 

“involves more than the mere lapse of time and depends 

largely upon questions of fact.” WRIGHT & MILLER § 1277, at 

643. “[A] complaint seldom will disclose undisputed facts 

clearly establishing the defense.” Id. at 643–44. 

IV. 

The dismissal of Menominee’s claims is reversed and the 

case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion. 

So ordered. 

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