Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_14-cv-02029/USCOURTS-azd-4_14-cv-02029-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Maurice Finney, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Louis W. Winn, Jr., 

Respondent.

No. CV-14-02029-TUC-DCB (BPV)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION 

On April 17, 2014, Maurice Finney (“Petitioner”), presently confined in the 

United States Penitentiary – Tucson in Tucson, Arizona (“USP-Tucson”), filed a pro se

Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in Federal 

Custody. (Doc. 1.)1

 On May 7, 2014, Petitioner filed an Amended § 2241 Petition 

(“Amended Petition”). (Doc. 5.) Pending before the court is the Amended Petition (id.), 

Respondent’s answer with exhibits (“Exs.) 1 through 2 attached (Doc. 13) (“Answer”), 

and Petitioner’s brief in reply (“Reply”) (Doc. 22). 

Petitioner raises one ground for relief. He claims that a federal court judge 

sentenced him to a 120-month term of imprisonment, to be served concurrently with his 

state court sentence. He alleges that “[f]rom the time of indictment until transfer to [the 

Federal Bureau of Prisons’] custody[,] Petitioner served 1235 days in state custody.” 

 

1

 “Doc.” refers to the documents in this Court’s file. 

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Petitioner asserts that the Bureau of Prisons has denied him the credit for these days and 

has failed to “execute [the] sentence as ordered by [the federal] court to give concurrent 

credit for [the] state sentence.” (Id. at 4.) 

Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was referred to 

Magistrate Judge Bernardo P. Velasco for a Report and Recommendation. (Doc. 7.) 

For the reasons discussed below, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the 

District Court enter an order denying the Petition on the merits. 

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

Petitioner was arrested by state authorities on December 13, 2007, and released the 

same day on bond. Ex. 1, Declaration of Alan Ray (“Ray Declaration”), ¶ 3 and 

Attachment (“Ex.1 Att.”) 1 at p.4.2

 On January 31, 2008, petitioner was arrested on a 

state probation violation and his state probation was revoked on February 7, 2008. Ray 

Declaration ¶¶ 4-5 and Ex.1 Att. 1 at p.5, and Ex.1 Att. 2 at p.10. Petitioner was ordered 

by the state court to serve a term of six years imprisonment. Id. Petitioner completed this 

state sentence on June 20, 2011. Ray Declaration ¶ 9. 

On February 13, 2008, Petitioner was indicted on a federal charge of Felon in 

Possession of a Firearm, in violation of 19 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924. See Ex. 1 Att. 2 

at pp.1-2; see also United States v. Finney, CR 3:08-0041 (M.D. Tenn., January 29, 

2014)(Doc. 3).3

 On March 31, 2008, Petitioner was “borrowed” from state custody 

 

2

 State charges arising from the December 13, 2007 incident were dropped on February 6, 2008. Ex.1 Att. 2 at p. 4. 

3

 The undersigned hereby takes judicial notice of the records in case United States 

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pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum and temporarily taken into federal 

custody by the United States Marshals Service (“USMS”). Ray Declaration, ¶ 6 and Ex.1 

Att. 3. On June 8, 2010, Petitioner entered a guilty plea to a charge of Felon in Possession 

of a Firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(c)(1), and the United States 

District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee sentenced Petitioner to a term of 

imprisonment of 120 months, to be served concurrent with his state sentence. Ray 

Declaration, ¶ 7 and Ex.1 Att. 4. 

Petitioner was returned to state custody from July 2, 2010, until June 20, 2011, at 

which time Petitioner had completed his state sentence and he was taken into federal 

custody to complete the remainder of his 120 month federal sentence. Ray Declaration, 

¶¶ 8-9 and Ex.1 Att. 3 at p.2 and Ex.1 Att. 4. Petitioner has received credit toward his 

federal sentence for all of the time spent in state custody after June 8, 2010. Ray 

Declaration, ¶ 10, Ex.1 Att. 6 at p.2. 

Since July 19, 2011, Petitioner has been incarcerated at USP-Tucson. Ex. 2, 

Declaration of Theresa T. Talplacido (“Talplacido Declaration”) ¶ 2 and Ex.2Att. 1. On 

January 27, 2014, Petitioner filed a motion for clarification of the execution of his 

sentence before the sentencing court. See Amended Petition, at 3; see also Finney, CR 

3:08-0041 (M.D. Tenn., January 29, 2014) (Doc. 60). 

 The District Court denied Petitioner’s motion without prejudice to refiling in the 

appropriate district after he exhausted administrative remedies within the Federal Bureau 

 v. Finney, CR 3:08-0041 (M.D. Tenn). See Fed.R.Evid. 201(b)(2); see also United States 

v. Wilson, 631 F.2d 118, 119–20 (9th Cir. 1980) (stating that judicial notice may be taken of a court's records in other cases, or the records of an inferior court in another case). 

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of Prisons (“BOP”). See United States v. Finney, CR 3:08-0041 (M.D. Tenn., January 29, 

2014)(Doc. 61). 

 Petitioner was awarded eight days of credit for the time spent in state custody for 

which he did not receive state credit: December 13, 2007, and January 31, 2008 through 

February 6, 2008. 

Petitioner claims in his Amended Petition that he was sentenced on July 2, 20104

to a term of 120 months to be served concurrent with the state sentence from the time “of 

indictment until complete.” (Addendum to Amended Petition, at 3.) The Petitioner argues 

that the correct date to begin running his federal sentence concurrently with his state 

sentence is March 31, 20085

, the date he was placed into USMS custody. (Id. at 3-4.) 

II. JURISDICTION 

“Federal courts are always under an independent obligation to examine their own 

jurisdiction, . . . and a federal court may not entertain an action over which it has no 

jurisdiction.” Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) 

(citations and quotations omitted). Habeas corpus jurisdiction is available under 28 

U.S.C. § 2241 for a prisoner's claims, such as those made in this Petition, challenging the 

 

4

 The record indicates that Petitioner’s sentence was imposed on June 8, 2010. Ex. 1 Att. 4; see also Finney, CR 3:08-0041 (M.D. Tenn.)(Doc. 55). This discrepancy does not change the Court’s analysis of the Amended Petition. 

5

 There is also a minor discrepancy between Petitioner’s request to begin running his sentence on March 31, 2008, and his request to begin running his Federal sentence from the time of indictment. The record indicates that Petitioner was indicted on February 13, 2008. See Ex.1 Att.2 at p.2. Additionally, Petitioner’s claim that he served 1235 days in state custody from the time of indictment until his transfer to BOP’s custody also appears to result in another minor discrepancy regarding the exact relief Petitioner is 

requesting. The analysis of the issue presented in this Amended Petition would be the 

same in any event, thus the magistrate judge does not decide which date Petitioner means to suggest is the correct date for determining the start date of his federal sentence. 

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manner in which his sentence is executed. Tucker v. Carlson, 925 F.2d 330, 331 (9th Cir. 

1991). Because Petitioner was incarcerated at UPS-Tucson at the time he initiated these 

proceedings, this Court has personal jurisdiction over this Respondent. See Francis v. 

Rison, 894 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1990)(“jurisdiction attaches on the initial filing for habeas 

corpus relief, and it is not destroyed by a transfer of the petitioner and the accompanying 

custodial change.”) (citation omitted). 

The Magistrate Judge thus concludes that the Court has jurisdiction over the 

subject matter of the action and over the person of the Respondent. 

III. EXHAUSTION 

There is no statutory requirement, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, that federal 

prisoners must exhaust administrative remedies before filing a habeas corpus petition in 

court, thus it is not a jurisdictional prerequisite. Brown v. Rison, 895 F.2d 533, 535 (9th 

Cir. 1990), overruled on other grounds by Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 54-55 (1995). 

Nevertheless, federal courts “require as a prudential matter, that habeas petitioners 

exhaust available judicial and administrative remedies before seeking relief under § 

2241.” Castro–Cortez v. INS, 239 F.3d 1037, 1047 (9th Cir. 2001), abrogated on other 

grounds Fernandez–Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30, 36 (2006). Thus, while “courts 

have discretion to waive the exhaustion requirement when prudentially required, this 

discretion is not unfettered.” Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 998 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing 

Castro-Cortez, 239 F.3d at 1047. A court may waive the exhaustion requirement where 

administrative remedies are inadequate, futile, or pursuit of them would cause irreparable 

harm. Id. at 1000-01. Accordingly, if the petitioner has not properly exhausted his claims, 

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the district court, in its discretion, may either “excuse the faulty exhaustion and reach the 

merits or require the petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies before proceeding 

to court.” Brown, 895 F.2d at 535. 

Petitioner asserts that he has exhausted his administrative remedies. Addendum to 

Amended Petition, at 2-3. Contrary to this assertion, the Amended Petition and facts set 

forth in the Ray Declaration demonstrate that Petitioner did not fully exhaust by pursuing 

relief through all levels of review because he failed to file an appeal with the General 

Counsel. See 28 C.F.R. § 542.15 (“Appeal to the General Counsel is the final 

administrative appeal”); see also Addendum to Amended Petition, at 2-3, and Ray 

Declaration ¶ 14. Respondent, however, does not urge the Court to dismiss Petitioner’s 

claim for failure to exhaust, nor does Respondent contest Petitioner’s assertion, raised in 

the Amended Petition, that the denial of his claim based on official BOP policy excuses 

his failure to exhaust. See Answer and Amended Petition at 2-3. As Petitioner asserts, 

exhaustion may be waived in instances where the initial request for an administrative 

remedy was denied based on official BOP policy and further appeal would almost 

certainly have been denied based upon the same policy. See Fraley v. United States 

Bureau of Prisons, 1 F.3d 924, 925 (9th Cir. 1993) (per curiam). Although it is not evident 

based on the record before the Court that Petitioner’s requests for administrative remedy 

were denied based on official BOP policy, Respondent does not contest or refute this 

assertion, and the undersigned recommends that the District Court excuse Petitioner’s 

failure to exhaust, as further appeal would almost certainly have been futile. See id. 

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IV. PRIMARY JURISDICTION 

 From February 7, 2008, until Petitioner was released into federal custody on June 

19, 2011, Petitioner was in the primary custody of the State of Tennessee. 

 A federal sentence does not commence upon pronouncement of a federal sentence 

while a state retains primary custody over a prisoner. Taylor v. Reno, 164 F.3d 440, 445 

(9th Cir. 1998); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3585 (a federal sentence does not commence on the 

date it is imposed, but rather it commences “on the date the defendant is received in 

custody awaiting transportation to, or arrives ... at, the official detention facility at which 

the sentence is to be served”). Thus, Petitioner remained in the primary custody of the 

state authorities until his state sentence concluded and he was transferred into federal 

custody on June 20, 2011. 

 Pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, Petitioner spent 

approximately 26 months in BOP custody from March 31, 2008 to the time he was 

sentenced in federal court on June 8, 2010, at which point he was returned to state prison 

to serve the remainder of his state sentence. This temporary transfer of Petitioner from 

state prison to BOP's custody for purposes of federal prosecution did not interrupt his 

primary state custody. See Schleining v. Thomas, 642 F.3d 1242, 1243 n.1 (quoting 

Thomas v. Brewer, 923 F.2d 1361, 1367 (9th Cir. 1991) (“When an accused is transferred 

pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum he is considered to be ‘on loan’ to 

the federal authorities so that the sending state's jurisdiction over the accused continues 

uninterruptedly.”)); see also Reynolds v. Thomas, 603 F.3d 1144, 1152 (9th Cir. 2010), 

abrogated on other grounds by Setser v. United States, --- U.S. ---, 132 S.Ct. 1463, 1473 

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(2012), (noting that where a defendant is brought from state custody into BOP custody to 

appear in federal court pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, the 

defendant is still primarily in state custody and the state's priority of jurisdiction is not 

interrupted). Thus, despite his brief transfer to BOP's custody pursuant to a writ of 

habeas corpus ad prosequendum, Petitioner was in primary “state custody” for the 

approximate 40–month period from revocation of his state probation (February 7, 2008) 

to his sentencing in federal court (June 8, 2010). 

VI. PRIOR CUSTODY CREDIT 

When Petitioner was sentenced, the District Court stated that Petitioner’s federal 

sentence was to be served concurrently with his state sentence. See Ray Declaration, ¶ 7, 

and Ex.1 Att. 4. “[A] federal sentence cannot commence until a prisoner is sentenced in 

federal district court.” Schleining, 642 F.3d at 1244. Thus, the earliest date that 

Petitioner’s federal sentence could begin is June 8, 2010, the date the District Court 

imposed sentence. 

Although the earliest date a federal sentence may commence is the date a 

defendant is sentenced, pursuant to federal statute, a federal sentence does not actually 

commence until “ ‘the date the defendant is received in custody awaiting transportation 

to, or arrives ... at, the official detention facility at which the sentence is to be served,’ 18 

U.S.C. § 3585, not when sentence is imposed.” Taylor, 164 F.3d at 445 (alterations in 

original). As such, “[a]ny statement by the court prescribing when a sentence will begin 

to run is mere surplusage.” Id. (citations omitted). 

In this case, BOP has essentially effectuated the sentencing court’s intention by 

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designating Petitioner’s term of imprisonment to begin at the time Petitioner was 

sentenced by the federal court, on June 8, 2010, but while he remained in primary state 

custody.6

 This is consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Setser v. United States, 

--- U.S. ---, 132 S.Ct. 1463, 1468 (2012) which recognized the authority of the federal 

court to order its sentence to run concurrently or consecutively to a state sentence, though 

it may be a windfall in this case where Petitioner’s specific offense is concerned. See 18 

U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii) (A sentence imposed under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) cannot run 

concurrently with any other term of imprisonment); United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 

1, 11 (1997) (“[T]he plain language of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) forbids a federal district court 

to direct that a term of imprisonment under that statute run concurrently with any other 

term of imprisonment, whether state or federal.”); United States v. Fontanilla, 849 F.2d 

1257, 1258 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting that 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) “specifically states a section 

924 sentence cannot run concurrently ‘with any other term of imprisonment’ without 

exception”).7

 

 

6

 Alan Ray states in his Declaration (Ex. 1) that “[t]he time spent on Federal writ was still applied towards his sentence.” Ray Declaration, ¶ 12. This is not confirmed entirely by the record, see Ex.1 Att. 6, at p. 2 (calculating expiration of Petitioner’s full 

term as May 30, 2020, or 10 years from June 8, 2010, minus the eight days Petitioner was credited with for time spent in state custody but not credited toward a state sentence) and is inconsistent with Mr. Ray’s declaration that BOP policy prohibits crediting the awarding of this sentence credit twice. See Ray Declaration, ¶ 16. 

7

 Respondent did not raise this opposition to Petitioner’s claim, and because the 

undersigned recommends the District Court deny relief on other grounds, will not address 

the propriety of BOP granting Petitioner any credit towards his federal sentence for time 

that was also counted towards Petitioner’s state sentence. Additionally, it is not evident that Petitioner is entitled to credit any time spent in state custody prior to the conclusion 

of his state sentence and subsequent transfer to federal custody, to his federal sentence. See also Clark v. Floyd, 80 F.3d 371, 373 (9th Cir. 1996) (defendant did not begin to serve federal sentence where order did not require immediate federal confinement); see 

also Taylor, 164 F.3d at 445 (federal sentence commences on date when defendant is 

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 With the exception of eight days for which Petitioner received credit,8 Petitioner is 

not entitled to any custody credits prior to June 20, 2011 because the record reflects that 

the state credited all of that time toward his state sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b); 

United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 327 (1992) (“Congress made clear that a 

defendant could not receive a double credit for his detention time.”); Allen v. Crabtree, 

153 F.3d 1030, 1033 (9th Cir. 1998) (section 3585(b) disallows double crediting for time 

served); see also Boniface v. Carlson, 856 F.2d 1434, 1436 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam). 

This rule of sentence computation is also contained in the BOP’s Program Statement 

5880.28, entitled Sentence Computation Manual. Ray Declaration ¶12 and Ex. 1 Atts. 3 

and 8. 

Because Section 3585, 18 U.S.C., makes clear “that a defendant could not receive 

a double credit for his detention time[,]” and Petitioner has received credit either toward 

his state or federal sentences for all of the time he has been in custody, the Court finds 

that his Petition is without merit. Wilson, 503 U.S. at 337. 

VI. RECOMMENDATION 

For the reasons stated above, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District 

Court, after its independent review, enter an order DENYING the Amended Petition. 

 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written objections 

 received in custody awaiting transportation to or arrives at federal detention facility); Smith v. Swope, 91 F.2d 260, 261-62 (9th Cir. 1937) (defendant began serving sentence on date it was imposed where order required the prisoner delivered to the prison “forthwith”). 

8

 The record indicates that Petitioner was given credit for the eight days he spent in state custody prior to June 8, 2010, (December 13, 2007, and January 31, 2008 to February 6, 2008) for time that was not credited toward his state sentence. 

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within fourteen days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. 

A party may respond to another party's objections within fourteen days after being served 

with a copy thereof. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). No reply to any response shall be filed. See id.

 If objections are filed the parties should use the following case number: CV 14-

2029-TUC-DCB. If objections are not timely filed, then the parties' right to de novo 

review by the District Court may be deemed waived. 

 Dated this 11th day of March, 2015. 

 

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