Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca2-15-00455/USCOURTS-ca2-15-00455-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 

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15‐455‐cv

Georges v. United Nations

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Second Circuit    

AUGUST TERM 2015

No. 15‐455‐cv

DELAMA GEORGES, individually and on behalf of the ESTATE OF

DESILUS GEORGES and all others similarly situated; ALIUS JOSEPH,

individually and on behalf of the ESTATE OF MARIE‐CLAUDE LEFEUVE

and all others similarly situated; LISETTE PAUL, individually and on

behalf of the ESTATE OF FRITZNEL PAUL and all others similarly

situated; FELICIA PAULE, individually and on behalf of all others

similarly situated; JEAN RONY SILFORT, individually and on behalf of

all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs‐Appellants,

v.

UNITED NATIONS; UNITED NATIONS STABILIZATION MISSION IN HAITI;

EDMOND MULET, former Under‐Secretary‐General of the United

Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti; BAN KI‐MOON, Secretary‐

General of the United Nations,

Defendants‐Appellees.

   

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of New York

   

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ARGUED: MARCH 1, 2016

DECIDED: AUGUST 18, 2016

   

Before: CABRANES, PARKER, and LYNCH, Circuit Judges.

   

On appeal from the January 15, 2015 judgment of the United

States District Court for the Southern District of New York (J. Paul

Oetken, Judge) dismissing plaintiffs’ action for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction under the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities

of the United Nations (the “CPIUN”), Apr. 29, 1970, 21 U.S.T. 1418.

The principal question presented by this appeal is whether the

UN’s fulfillment of its obligation under Section 29 of the CPIUN to

“make provisions for appropriate modes of settlement

of . . . disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of a private

law character to which the [UN] is a party,” as well as “disputes

involving any official of the [UN] who by reason of his official

position enjoys immunity, if immunity has not been waived by the

Secretary‐General,” is a condition precedent to its immunity under

Section 2 of the CPIUN, which provides that the UN “shall enjoy

immunity from every form of legal process except insofar as in any

particular case it has expressly waived its immunity.”

Because we hold that the UN’s fulfillment of its Section 29

obligation is not a condition precedent to its Section 2 immunity—

and because we find plaintiffs’ other arguments unpersuasive—we

AFFIRM the District Court’s judgment.

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BEATRICE LINDSTROM (Brian Concannon, on

the brief), Institute for Justice & Democracy

in Haiti, Boston, MA, for Plaintiffs‐

Appellants.

Ira Kurzban, Kurzban Kurzban Weinger

Tetzeli & Pratt P.A., Miami, FL, for

Plaintiffs‐Appellants.

Jeffrey Brand, Center for Law & Global

Justice, University of San Francisco School

of Law, San Francisco, CA, for Plaintiffs‐

Appellants.

ELLEN BLAIN (Jeannette Vargas, on the brief),

Assistant United States Attorneys, for Preet

Bharara, United States Attorney for the

Southern District of New York, New York,

NY, for Amicus Curiae the United States of

America.

Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy

Assistant Attorney General, and Sharon

Swingle, Attorney, Appellate Staff, Civil

Division, United States Department of

Justice, Washington, DC, for Amicus Curiae

the United States of America.

Mary E. McLeod, Principal Deputy Legal

Adviser, and Henry Azar, Jr., Attorney

Case 15-455, Document 257-1, 08/18/2016, 1844574, Page3 of 22
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Adviser, United States Department of State,

Washington, DC, for Amicus Curiae the

United States of America.

   

JOSÉ A. CABRANES, Circuit Judge:

The principal question presented by this appeal is whether the

fulfillment by the United Nations (“UN”) of its obligation under

Section 29 of the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the

United Nations (the “CPIUN”), Apr. 29, 1970, 21 U.S.T. 1418, to

“make provisions for appropriate modes of settlement of”

certain disputes1 is a condition precedent to its immunity under

Section 2 of the CPIUN, which provides that the UN “shall enjoy

immunity from every form of legal process except insofar as in any

particular case it has expressly waived its immunity,”2 such that the

 1 Section 29 reads as follows:

The [UN] shall make provisions for appropriate modes of

settlement of

(a) disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of a

private law character to which the [UN] is a party;

(b) disputes involving any official of the [UN] who by

reason of his official position enjoys immunity, if

immunity has not been waived by the Secretary‐General.

CPIUN art. VIII, § 29.  

2 Id. art. II, § 2.

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UN’s alleged disregard of its Section 29 obligation “compel[s] the

conclusion that the UN’s immunity does not exist.”3  

We hold that the UN’s fulfillment of its Section 29 obligation

is not a condition precedent to its Section 2 immunity. For this

reason—and because we find plaintiffs’ other arguments

unpersuasive—we AFFIRM the January 15, 2015 judgment of the

United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (J.

Paul Oetken, Judge) dismissing plaintiffs’ action against defendants

the UN, the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (“MINUSTAH”), UN

Secretary‐General Ban Ki‐moon (“Ban”), and former MINUSTAH

Under‐Secretary‐General Edmond Mulet (“Mulet”) for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction.

BACKGROUND  

Plaintiffs are citizens of the United States or Haiti who claim

that they “have been or will be sickened, or have family members

who have died or will die, as a direct result of the cholera” epidemic

that has ravaged the Republic of Haiti since October 2010.4 In this

putative class action, plaintiffs seek to hold defendants responsible

for their injuries, and to that end, assert various causes of action

sounding in tort and contract against them.5  

 3 Pls.’ Br. 26.

4 See A‐17–18.

5 A‐66–78.

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Specifically, plaintiffs allege that, in October 2010,

“[d]efendants knowingly disregarded the high risk of transmitting

cholera to Haiti when . . . they deployed personnel from Nepal to

Haiti, knowing that Nepal was a country in which cholera is

endemic and where a surge in infections had just been reported.”6

According to plaintiffs, defendants not only failed to test or screen

these Nepalese personnel prior to their deployment, allowing them

to carry into Haiti the strain of cholera that is the epidemic’s source;

they also stationed them at a base on the banks of the Meille

Tributary, which flows into the Artibonite River, the primary water

source for “tens of thousands” of Haitians.7 From this base,

defendants allegedly “discharged raw sewage” and “disposed of

untreated human waste,” which “created a high risk of

contamination.”8 Eventually, plaintiffs contend, “human waste from

the base seeped into and contaminated the Meille Tributary” and,

ultimately, the Artibonite River, “resulting in explosive and massive

outbreaks of cholera . . . throughout the entire country.”9  

Defendants did not enter an appearance before the District

Court. But on March 7, 2014, the executive branch of the United

States government (the “Executive Branch”) submitted a statement

 6 A‐16.

7 See id.

8 A‐16–17.

9 A‐17. Developments surrounding these allegations remain ongoing. See,

e.g., Jonathan M. Katz, Facing Stern Report, U.N. Admits Role in Haiti Cholera

Outbreak, N.Y. Times, Aug. 18, 2016, at A1.   

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of interest pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 517, in which it took the position

that defendants are “immune from legal process and suit” pursuant

to the UN Charter, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031; the CPIUN; and the

Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (the “VCDR”), Apr. 18,

1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227.10

The District Court agreed with the Executive Branch.

Accordingly, on January 9, 2015, it dismissed plaintiffs’ action for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction.11 With respect to the UN and

MINUSTAH, the District Court relied on Section 2 of the CPIUN. To

reiterate, Section 2 provides that the UN “shall enjoy immunity from

every form of legal process except insofar as in any particular case it

has expressly waived its immunity.”12 The District Court reasoned

that, because “no party contend[ed] that the UN ha[d] expressly

waived its immunity,” the UN was “immune from [p]laintiffs’

suit.”13 With respect to Ban and Mulet, the District Court relied on

Article 31 of the VCDR, which provides that “[a] diplomatic agent

shall enjoy immunity . . . from [a receiving State’s] civil and

 10 Executive Branch Statement of Interest at 1, Georges v. United States, No.

13‐CV‐7146 (JPO) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2014), ECF No. 21. Section 517 provides that

“[t]he Solicitor General, or any officer of the Department of Justice, may be sent

by the Attorney General to any State or district in the United States to attend to

the interests of the United States in a suit pending in a court of the United States,

or in a court of a State, or to attend to any other interest of the United States.” 28

U.S.C. § 517.

11 See Georges v. United Nations, 84 F. Supp. 3d 246, 247 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).

12 CPIUN art. II, § 2.

13 Georges, 84 F. Supp. 3d at 249.

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administrative jurisdiction,” except in circumstances undisputedly

not presented here.14 The District Court concluded that, because Ban

and Mulet both held diplomatic positions at the time plaintiffs filed

their action, they were immune as well.15

Plaintiffs timely appealed.16 Defendants did not enter an

appearance before this Court either, but the Executive Branch

“submit[t]ed an amicus curiae brief, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 517 . . . ,

in [their] support.”17

DISCUSSION

Under principles of long standing, “[w]hen this Court reviews

the dismissal of a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,

we review factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de

novo, accepting all material facts alleged in the complaint as true and

drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.”18  

On appeal, plaintiffs raise three principal arguments. First,

they argue that the District Court erred in holding that the UN and

 14 VCDR art. 31.

15 See Georges, 84 F. Supp. 3d at 250.

16 See A‐502–03.

17 Letter on Behalf of Amicus Curiae United States of America at 1,

Georges v. United Nations, No. 15‐455‐cv (2d Cir. June 29, 2015), ECF No. 179; see

also Brief for Amicus Curiae United States of America, Georges v. United Nations,

No. 15‐455‐cv (2d Cir. Aug. 27, 2015), ECF No. 199 (“Government’s Br.”).

18 Mantena v. Johnson, 809 F.3d 721, 727 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

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MINUSTAH are immune because the UN’s fulfilment of its

obligation under Section 29 of the CPIUN to provide for appropriate

dispute‐resolution mechanisms is a condition precedent to its

Section 2 immunity.19 Second, they argue that the District Court’s

holding was in error because the UN materially breached the

CPIUN by failing to fulfill its Section 29 obligation, such that it is no

longer entitled to the benefit of immunity under Section 2. Third,

they argue that the District Court’s application of the CPIUN to

dismiss their action violated their constitutional right of access to the

federal courts. We address each argument in turn.  

I. Condition Precedent

Plaintiffs’ first argument requires us to interpret the CPIUN,

so we begin by describing the framework that governs any such

inquiry. “The interpretation of a treaty, like the interpretation of a

statute, begins with its text,”20 and “[w]here the language of . . . [a]

treaty is plain, a court must refrain from amending it because to do

 19 As discussed above, Section 29 requires the UN to “make provisions for

appropriate modes of settlement of . . . disputes arising out of contracts or other

disputes of a private law character to which the [UN] is a party,” as well as

“disputes involving any official of the [UN] who by reason of his official position

enjoys immunity, if immunity has not been waived by the Secretary‐General.”

CPIUN art. VIII, § 29.

20 Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 10 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted);

accord United States v. Alvarez‐Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 663 (1992) (“In construing a

treaty, as in construing a statute, we first look to its terms to determine its

meaning.”).

Case 15-455, Document 257-1, 08/18/2016, 1844574, Page9 of 22
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so would be to make, not construe, a treaty.”21 Additionally, because

“[a]s a general matter, a treaty is a contract . . . between nations,” it is

“to be interpreted upon the principles which govern the

interpretation of contracts in writing between individuals.”22

Further, “while the interpretation of a treaty is a question of law for

the courts, given the nature of the document and the unique

relationships it implicates, the Executive Branch’s interpretation of a

treaty is entitled to great weight.”23  

 21 Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Alitalia Airlines, S.p.A., 347 F.3d 448, 457 (2d

Cir. 2003); see Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. James N. Kirby, Pty Ltd., 543 U.S. 14, 32 (2004)

(“Where the words of a . . . treaty . . . have a plain and obvious meaning, all

construction, in hostility with such meaning, is excluded.” (brackets and internal

quotation marks omitted)); Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 134 (1989)

(“We must . . . be governed by the text[,] . . . whatever conclusions might be

drawn from the . . . drafting history . . . .”).

22 BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of Arg., 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1208 (2014) (brackets

and internal quotation marks omitted); see Société Nationale Industrielle

Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 533 (1987) (“In

interpreting an international treaty, we are mindful that it is in the nature of a

contract between nations, to which general rules of construction apply.” (citation,

brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted)).

23 Lozano v. Alvarez, 697 F.3d 41, 50 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation

marks omitted), aff’d sub nom. Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 134 S. Ct. 1224 (2014); see

Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 513 (2008) (“It is . . . well settled that the United

States’ interpretation of a treaty is entitled to great weight.” (internal quotation

marks omitted)); Swarna v. Al‐Awadi, 622 F.3d 123, 136 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting the

“well[‐]established canon of deference with regard to Executive Branch

interpretation of treaties” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

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Here, application of two particular “principles which govern

the interpretation of contracts”24 demonstrates why plaintiffs’ first

argument is unavailing.

The first such principle is expressio unius est exclusio alterius—

“express mention of one thing excludes all others”25—which is also

known as the negative‐implication canon.26 This principle has

guided federal courts’ interpretations of treaties for over a century.27

As noted above, Section 2 of the CPIUN provides that the UN

“shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process except

insofar as in any particular case it has expressly waived its

immunity.”28 Especially when coupled with the compulsory

 24 BG Grp., PLC, 134 S. Ct. at 1208 (internal quotation marks omitted).

25 Rivas v. Fischer, 687 F.3d 514, 551 (2d Cir. 2012).

26 See United States v. Bainbridge, 746 F.3d 943, 947 (9th Cir. 2014).

27 See, e.g., Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U.S. 424, 436 (1902) (relying on the

principle in interpreting a treaty between the United States and Russia); United

States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 420 (1886) (“[T]he enumeration of offenses in

most [extradition] treaties, and especially in the treaty now under consideration,

is so specific, and marked by such a clear line in regard to the magnitude and

importance of those offenses, that it is impossible to give any other interpretation

to it than that of the exclusion of the right of extradition for any others.”); Cannon

v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Parole Comm’n, 973 F.2d 1190, 1193 & n.18 (5th Cir.

1992); cf. Luigi Crema, Disappearance and New Sightings of Restrictive

Interpretation(s), 21 Eur. J. Int’l L. 681, 692–93 (2010) (noting that various

international courts, including the International Court of Justice, the European

Court of Human Rights, and certain arbitral tribunals, have relied on the

principle in interpreting treaties).

28 CPIUN art. II, § 2.

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“shall”— which “is universally understood to indicate an imperative

or mandate”29—Section 2’s “express mention of” the UN’s express

waiver as a circumstance in which the UN “shall [not] enjoy

immunity” negatively implies that “all other[ ]” circumstances,

including the UN’s failure to fulfill its Section 29 obligation, are

“exclude[d].”30 It necessarily follows that the UN’s fulfillment of its

Section 29 obligation is not a condition precedent to its Section 2

immunity.

This conclusion is buttressed by the second principle of

contract interpretation relevant to our analysis—that “conditions

precedent to most contractual obligations . . . are not favored and

must be expressed in plain, unambiguous language.”31 To manifest

 29 Dallio v. Spitzer, 343 F.3d 553, 562 (2d Cir. 2003).

30 Cf. Olden v. LaFarge Corp., 383 F.3d 495, 504 n.2 (6th Cir. 2004)

(interpreting the phrase “[e]xcept as provided in subsections (b) and (c)” as

“demonstrat[ing] that Congress intended the exclusions mentioned in those

subsections to be exclusive” (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks

omitted)); Café Erotica of Fla., Inc. v. St. Johns County, 360 F.3d 1274, 1288 (11th Cir.

2004) (applying the expressio unius principle to the statutory phrase “except those

in residential districts” (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

31 In re Timely Secretarial Serv., Inc., 987 F.2d 1167, 1174 n.7 (5th Cir. 1993);

see Bank of N.Y. Mellon Tr. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Mortg. Capital, Inc., 821 F.3d 297,

305 (2d Cir. 2016) (“Conditions precedent are not readily assumed. . . . Thus, in

determining whether a particular agreement makes an event a condition, courts

will interpret doubtful language as embodying a promise or constructive

condition rather than an express condition.” (brackets and internal quotation

marks omitted)); Navarro v. F.D.I.C., 371 F.3d 979, 981 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Conditions

precedent are generally disfavored; in resolving doubts about whether a contract

contains a condition precedent, interpretations that reduce the risk of forfeiture

are favored.” (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 227(1) (1981))).

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their intent to create a condition precedent, “[p]arties often use

language such as ‘if,’ ‘on condition that,’ ‘provided that,’ ‘in the

event that,’ and ‘subject to.’”32 No such language links Sections 2 and

29 in the CPIUN. Of course, “specific talismanic words are not

required.”33 But “there is [also] no . . . [other] language [in the

CPIUN] which, even straining, we could read as imposing” the

UN’s fulfillment of its Section 29 obligation as a condition precedent

to its Section 2 immunity.34

It is also significant that the Executive Branch’s interpretation

of the CPIUN—an interpretation “entitled to great weight”35—

accords with our own. The Executive Branch sees “[n]othing in

Section 29 . . . [that] states, either explicitly or implicitly, that

 32 Ginett v. Comput. Task Grp., Inc., 962 F.2d 1085, 1100 (2d Cir. 1992) (some

internal quotation marks omitted); see Fed. Labor Relations Auth. v. Aberdeen

Proving Ground, Dep’t of the Army, 485 U.S. 409, 412 (1988) (describing “only if’”

as “the language of . . . a condition precedent” (internal quotation marks

omitted)); Bank of N.Y. Mellon Tr. Co., 821 F.3d at 305 (describing “if,” “on

condition that,” “provided that,” “in the event that,” and “subject to” as the

“recognized linguistic conventions of condition” (internal quotation marks

omitted)); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 226 cmt. a (1981) (observing that,

although “[n]o particular form of language is necessary to make an event a

condition, . . . such words as ‘on condition that,’ ‘provided that’ and ‘if’ are often

used for this purpose”).

33 Bank of N.Y. Mellon Tr. Co., 821 F.3d at 305.

34 See Ginett, 962 F.2d at 1100.

35 Lozano, 697 F.3d at 50 (internal quotation marks omitted).

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compliance with its terms is a precondition to the UN’s immunity

under Section 2.”36 Neither do we.

Plaintiffs’ arguments to the contrary are unconvincing. For

example, plaintiffs argue that “[t]he UN’s post‐

ratification . . . practice pursuant to . . . Section 29 . . . demonstrates

that entitlement to immunity is premised on the provision of

alternative dispute settlement.”37 Plaintiffs’ chief example of this

supposed practice is the UN’s statement before the International

Court of Justice that the UN’s immunity “does not leave a plaintiff

without remedy [because] . . . in the event that immunity is asserted, a

claimant seeking redress against the Organization shall be afforded

an appropriate means of settlement [under Section 29].”38 This

statement, however, suggests at most that the UN views Section 29

as “more than merely aspirational”—as “obligatory and perhaps

enforceable.”39 It does not in any way suggest that the UN views

Section 29 as a condition precedent to Section 2.

Plaintiffs also argue that “foreign signatories to the CPIUN

have repeatedly held that the availability of alternative dispute

settlement is a material condition to international organizations’

 36 Government’s Br. 10.

37 Pls.’ Br. 30.

38 Id. (alterations and emphases in original) (quoting Verbatim Record,

Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the

Commission on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion, 1999 I.C.J. Rep. 62 (Dec. 10,

1998)).

39 Georges, 84 F. Supp. 3d at 250.

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entitlement to immunity,” and that “these foreign courts’ views

provide persuasive authority for this case, per the direction of the

U.S. Supreme Court.”40 This argument is misleading. The Supreme

Court has indeed held that, “[i]n interpreting any treaty, the

opinions of our sister signatories are entitled to considerable

weight.”41 But in so holding, the Court was obviously referring to

the opinions of states that are parties to the treaty that is being

interpreted regarding that same treaty, not the opinions of states that

happen to have ratified the treaty at issue regarding another treaty

entirely. Most of plaintiffs’ examples fall into the latter category—

they are cases from the courts of states that have ratified the CPIUN,

 40 Pls.’ Br. 31.

41 Abbott, 560 U.S. at 16 (brackets, ellipsis, and internal quotation marks

omitted). In the foregoing quotation, the Supreme Court was likely using

“signatories” in an informal, almost colloquial way. It is not the opinions of

states that have merely signed a treaty that we should find persuasive; it is the

opinions of states that have ratified the treaty. As the Vienna Convention on the

Law of Treaties provides, “[t]here shall be taken into account, together with the

context” of a treaty, “[a]ny subsequent practice in the application of the treaty

which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation.”

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31(3), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.

331 (emphasis supplied); see Mora v. New York, 524 F.3d 183, 196 n.19 (2d Cir.

2008) (“Although the United States has not ratified the Vienna Convention on the

Law of Treaties, our Court relies upon it as an authoritative guide to the

customary international law of treaties, insofar as it reflects actual state

practices.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). A state does not become a party

until it “ratifies, and thus becomes bound by, the treaty in question,” Hollis v.

O’Driscoll, 739 F.3d 108, 111 n.2 (2d Cir. 2014) (emphases supplied), as its “signing

of [the] treaty serves only to authenticate [the] text, and does not establish [its]

consent to be bound.” Id. (emphasis in original) (alterations and internal

quotation marks omitted).

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but they pertain to unrelated agreements, including the agreement

between France and the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural

Organization;42 and the agreement between Italy and the

International Plant Genetic Resources Institute regarding its

headquarters in Rome.43 Another of the plaintiffs’ examples appears

to have involved the CPIUN, but the portion of the holding relevant

 42 Pls.’ Br. 31; A‐342–43.

43 Pls.’ Br. 31; A‐349–51. Plaintiffs also refer to Maida v. Administration for

International Assistance, Cass., 27 maggio 1955, 39 RDI 546, 23 ILR 510, a decision

from Italy’s highest court that is now over 60 years old. See Pls.’ Br. 32. Plaintiffs

do not include in their appendix a copy of Maida, in English or Italian; instead,

they include a chapter of a book in which Maida is discussed. See A‐359–63

(quoting Riccardo Pavoni, Italy, in The Privileges and Immunities of International

Organizations in Domestic Courts 155, 155–63 (August Reinisch ed., 2013)).

Here is what the chapter’s author has to say about Maida: “As early as

1955, the Supreme Court denied immunity to the International Refugee

Organization (IRO) in a labour dispute, on the grounds that the arbitral process

envisaged in the IRO’s Staff Regulations was unlawful . . . . The Court’s basis for

this pioneering finding is not straightforward. It was probably influenced by its

assumption of an implied waiver of immunity arising from repeated references to the

applicability of Italian legislation in the legal instruments regulating the IRO’s activities

in Italy. But the Court also mentioned the necessity to secure the individual right

of access to justice.” A‐362 (emphasis supplied) (quoting Pavoni, ante note 43, at

160).

The pertinence to the instant appeal of a case in which the CPIUN does

not appear to have been directly discussed—and whose holding is ambiguous

but likely grounded in implied waiver, a concept not at issue here—is, to say the

least, unclear.

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to the plaintiffs’ argument is based on an interpretation of the state’s

constitution rather than the CPIUN itself.44

As we have seen, whether a term constitutes a condition

precedent depends on the particular language of the instrument that

is being evaluated.45 For the most part, plaintiffs have not suggested

that the aforementioned agreements contain language that is even

comparable—much less identical—to that found in Sections 2 and 29

of the CPIUN. Thus, plaintiffs’ reliance on cases interpreting those

agreements is misplaced.46

 44 Pls.’ Br. 31; A‐349–51. That case, Stavrinou v. United Nations, (1992) CLR

992, ILDC 929 (Cyprus 1292), is a 1992 case from the Supreme Court of Cyprus.

The plaintiffs rely on Stavrinou for the proposition that the Supreme Court of

Cyprus only granted immunity to the UN because an alternate forum was

available.  Pls.’ Br. 31. We note, however, that the availability of an alternate

forum was held relevant only to the question of whether the grant of immunity

to the UN violated the Cypriot constitution. Id. (describing the Supreme Court of

Cyprus as holding that the grant of absolute immunity to the UN “did not

encroach upon the right of access to courts as protected by the Cypriot

Constitution, because the mechanism internal to the UNFICYP for settling

disputes with its local personnel ensured that ‘[t]he applicant was not left

without a remedy’”). That decision did not purport to interpret the CPIUN and is

therefore inapplicable to the instant case.  

45 See Clukey v. Town of Camden, 797 F.3d 97, 101 (1st Cir. 2015) (“To

determine whether the . . . provision . . . creates a condition precedent, we

necessarily must focus closely on its specific language.”); see also ante notes 20–22

and accompanying text (discussing the importance of focusing on the particular

language of a treaty).

46 An agreement’s “overall structure” may also inform whether a term

constitutes a condition precedent. Univ. Emergency Med. Found. v. Rapier Invs.,

Ltd., 197 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 1999); see Suburban Transfer Serv., Inc. v. Beech

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Plaintiffs do argue that the agreement between France and

UNESCO, at issue in UNESCO v. Boulois, Cour d’Appel [CA] [Court

of Appeal] Paris (Fr.), June 19, 1998, is “virtually identical” to the

CPIUN.47 Notwithstanding textual similarities between the two

treaties, we do not find the French court’s interpretation relevant to

this case. The France‐UNESCO agreement arose in a materially

different context than the CPIUN: it is a bilateral agreement between

France and UNESCO whereas the CPIUN is a multilateral treaty

signed by a number of countries. That a French court interpreting an

agreement between France and a UN agency found that the

agreement required the establishment of an alternative forum for

dispute resolution has little bearing on the interpretation of the

CPIUN in this case.

For these reasons, we hold that the UN’s fulfillment of its

Section 29 obligation is not a condition precedent to its Section 2

immunity.48

 

Holdings, Inc., 716 F.2d 220, 225 (3d Cir. 1983) (relying on “the structure of the

Agreement as a whole” in determining that one of the agreement’s provisions

was a condition precedent). But plaintiffs have also not argued that the structures

of the cited agreements are similar to that of the CPIUN.

47 Pls.’ Reply Br. 17.

48 The foregoing analysis is consistent with our decision in Brzak v. United

Nation, 597 F.3d 107, 112 (2d Cir. 2010), in which we held that the purported

inadequacies of the UN’s dispute resolution mechanism did not result in a

waiver of absolute immunity from suit.

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II. Material Breach

Plaintiffs next argue that “[t]he District Court’s finding of

immunity was erroneous . . . because Section 29 is a material term to

the CPIUN as a whole.”49 According to plaintiffs, the UN’s material

breach of its Section 29 obligation means that it “is no longer entitled

to the performance of duties owed to it under” the CPIUN,

including its Section 2 immunity.50 We need not reach the merits of

this argument, however, because plaintiffs lack standing to raise it.

As we have recently reiterated, “absent protest or objection by

the offended sovereign, [an individual] has no standing to raise the

violation of international law as an issue.”51 The plaintiffs have not

identified any sovereign that has objected to the UN’s alleged

material breach. To the contrary, the United States has asked us to

affirm the District Court’s judgment, and no other country has

expressed an interest in this litigation.52

 49 Pls.’ Br. 35.  

50 Id. at 37.

51 United States v. Garavito‐Garcia, —F.3d—, 2016 WL 3568164, at *3 (2d

Cir. July 1, 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted); see United States v.

Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377, 390 (6th Cir. 2001) (“It is well established that

individuals have no standing to challenge violations of international treaties in

the absence of protest by the sovereign involved.” (internal quotation marks

omitted)).

52 See Government’s Br. 22 (“Because [plaintiffs] are not a party to [the

CPIUN] . . . , they may not independently assert an alleged breach and insist

upon their own preferred remedy.”).

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It is true that there is an exception to this rule where a treaty

contains “express language” “creat[ing] privately enforceable

rights . . . , or some other indication that the intent of the treaty

drafters was to confer rights that could be vindicated in the manner

sought by . . . affected individuals,” such as plaintiffs in this case.53

“[B]ut [plaintiffs have] not identified, nor can we locate,” any such

indication in the CPIUN, and “[s]tanding is therefore lacking.”54

It is plaintiffs’ position that the case law described above is

“inapposite.”55 They contend that, “[r]egardless of whether a treaty

provides an enforceable private right of action, individuals may

invoke breach in a responsive posture.”56 In support of this position,

plaintiffs cite a law review article stating that “case law is consistent

with [the] understanding that a treaty may be enforced defensively

even when there is no private right of action.”57 But the same article

makes clear what it means by “defensive enforcement,” which it

 53 United States v. Suarez, 791 F.3d 363, 367 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal

quotation marks omitted).  

54 Garavito‐Garcia, 2016 WL 3568164, at *3; see Medellín, 552 U.S. at 506 n.3

(“[T]he background presumption is that international agreements, even those

directly benefiting private persons, generally do not create private rights or

provide for a private cause of action in domestic courts.” (brackets and internal

quotation marks omitted)).

55 Pls.’ Reply Br. 20.

56 Id. at 21.

57 Id. at 22 (alteration omitted) (quoting Oona A. Hathaway, Sabria

McElroy & Sara Aronchick Solow, International Law at Home: Enforcing Treaties in

U.S. Courts, 37 Yale J. Int’l L. 51, 84 (2012)).

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contends “can be found in two types of cases”: those in which a

private party uses a treaty (1) “to defend against a claim by the

United States government” or (2) “to defend against a claim by

another private party under state or federal law.”58 Neither of these

situations is presented here. No claim has been asserted against

plaintiffs; rather, it is plaintiffs who have asserted the claims

underlying this action. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ argument fails even

on its own terms.59

III. Right of Access to Federal Courts

Lastly, plaintiffs argue that the District Court erred  

“because it violated the U.S. citizen Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights to

access the federal courts by applying immunity in this case.”60 This

argument fails to convince.

As we stated in Brzak v. United Nations, in which we rejected a

virtually indistinguishable challenge to an application of Section 2 of

the CPIUN, plaintiffs’ argument does little more “than question why

immunities in general should exist.”61 But “legislatively and

judicially crafted immunities of one sort or another have existed

since well before the framing of the Constitution, have been

 58 Hathaway et al., ante note 57, at 84.

59 We express no opinion regarding the soundness of the distinction

drawn in the article between the offensive and defensive enforcement of treaties.

60 Pls.’ Br. 49.

61 See Brzak, 597 F.3d at 114.

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extended and modified over time, and are firmly embedded in

American law.”62 Plaintiffs’ argument, if correct, would seem to

defeat not only the UN’s immunity, but also “judicial immunity,

prosecutorial immunity, and legislative immunity.”63 Plaintiffs do

not persuasively differentiate the quotidian and constitutionally

permissible application of these doctrines from application of

Section 2 of the CPIUN here.64

CONCLUSION

We have considered all of plaintiffs’ arguments on appeal and

find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the District

Court’s January 15, 2015 judgment dismissing plaintiffs’ action for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the CPIUN.

 62 Id.

63 Id.

64 Plaintiffs also argue that “[t]he District Court further erred in holding

that [individual defendants] Ban and Mulet are immune from suit.” Pls.’ Br. 47.

But plaintiffs’ only contention in support of this argument is that “UN officers

are not entitled to immunity under the CPIUN when the UN itself is not entitled

to immunity under the CPIUN.” Id. Because we have already rejected plaintiffs’

argument that the UN is not entitled to immunity, we must reject their argument

that Ban and Mulet are not entitled to immunity as well.

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