Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_00-cv-01733/USCOURTS-caed-2_00-cv-01733-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JEAN M. MILLER,

Plaintiff,

v.

COUNTY OF BUTTE, et al.,

Defendants.

_____________________________/

CIV. NO. S-00-1733 EJG/JFM

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This matter is before the court for hearing on defendants’

motion for summary judgment. After reviewing the record,

documents filed in connection with the motion, and the applicable

law, the court has determined that oral argument will not be of

material assistance. Accordingly, the hearing set for September

28, 2007 is VACATED, and the matter is submitted. See Local Rule

78-230(h). For the reasons that follow, the motion is GRANTED in

part and DENIED in part.

I. BACKGROUND 

This is a § 1983 civil rights action with supplemental state

law claims in which plaintiff alleges that members of the Butte

County Sheriff’s Office used excessive force during an unlawful

arrest, in violation of her fourth amendment rights. The

incident which forms the basis for the civil rights action

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 The complaint contains sevens claims for relief: 1) § 1983 claim for unlawful arrest and 1

excessive force against PIAZZA, MARSHALL, BURNETT, DUCH and SMITH; 2) § 1983

claim for failure to train and supervise against BUTTE COUNTY; 3) false imprisonment against 

PIAZZA, MARSHALL, BURNETT, DUCH, SMITH, GREY and MACKENZIE; 4) false arrest

against ALL DEFENDANTS; 5) intentional infliction of emotional distress against PIAZZA,

MARSHALL, BURNETT, DUCH and SMITH; 6) tort in essence against ALL DEFENDANTS;

and 7) assault and battery against PIAZZA, MARSHALL, BURNETT, DUCH and SMITH.

2

occurred August 14, 1999 while defendant law enforcement officers

were in the process of towing plaintiff’s unregistered vehicle

from the street in front of her house. According to plaintiff,

she verbally protested their actions and was thrown to the

ground, kicked and assaulted multiple times with a stun gun. 

Defendants’ version of the facts differs substantially and

asserts that the force they used was a direct response to

plaintiff’s combativeness and physical assault on one of the

officers.

As a result of the altercation, both parties initiated

litigation. The Butte County District Attorney filed a

misdemeanor complaint against plaintiff in September of 1999

charging her with one count of resisting, delaying and

obstructing a police officer, in violation of California Penal

Code § 148(a), and two counts of battery against a peace officer,

in violation of California Penal Code § 243(b). Plaintiff filed

the instant civil rights action August 11, 2000. For 1

unexplained reasons, the Butte County criminal action remained

pending and inactive for several years. Meanwhile, plaintiff

refused to participate in discovery in the civil action,

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resulting in a stay of this civil case until the criminal matter

was resolved. 

In May of 2003, almost four years after the incident,

plaintiff was convicted in state court of all three misdemeanor

offenses following a jury trial. Thereafter, pursuant to

stipulation of the parties, the stay in the civil case was

lifted. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment which was

granted based on the court’s finding that plaintiff’s criminal

convictions precluded her civil claims based on the doctrine

espoused by the United States Supreme Court in Heck v. Humphrey,

512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). See Order Granting Defendants’

Motion for Summary Judgment, filed March 1, 2004. Plaintiff

appealed her criminal convictions to the Butte County Superior

Court and the summary dismissal of her civil action to the Ninth

Circuit.

The criminal convictions were reversed on December 9, 2004

for reasons unrelated to the merits. The Appellate Division of

the Butte County Superior Court found that a faulty assistive

listening device violated plaintiff’s constitutional right to

counsel during the trial. Based on the reversal of the criminal

action, the Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded this court’s grant

of summary judgment in the civil case. See Judgment, filed

December 12, 2005. Eighteen months later, discovery in the civil

action was completed and the instant motion for summary judgment

was filed. Meanwhile, during the pendency of the civil appeal in

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the Ninth Circuit, defendant entered a negotiated plea of nolo

contendre in Butte County Superior Court to one count of delaying

an officer in the performance of his duties, in violation of

California Penal Code § 148(a)(1).

II. DISCUSSION 

A. Summary judgment standards

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56( c ). If the moving party meets its initial responsibility,

the burden shifts to the non-moving party to establish the

existence of a genuine issue of a material fact. Matsushita

Electric Industrial Company, Limited v. Zenith Radio Corporation,

475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). A dispute is genuine if the evidence

is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of

the nonmoving party. Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc. 818 F.2d

1433, 1436 (9 Cir. 1987). A fact is material if it might th

affect the outcome of the lawsuit. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc. 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 

While the non-moving party need not conclusively establish a

material issue of fact in its favor, “the claimed factual dispute

[must] be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the

parties’ differing versions of the truth at trial.” T.W.

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Electrical Services, Inc. v. Pacific Electrical Contractors

Association, 809 F.2d 626, 631 (9 Cir. 1987). In other words, th

the opposing party “must do more than simply show that there is

some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita,

475 U.S. at 586-87. 

The court’s role at this stage is not to weigh the evidence,

only to determine if a genuine issue exists for trial. In doing

so, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable

to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in her

favor. Id. at 587. However, where “opposing parties tell two

different stories one of which is blatantly contradicted by the

record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court

should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling

on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 127 S.Ct.

1769, 1776 (2007).

B. Statement of Facts

The facts are taken from plaintiff’s deposition and

declaration, since the court is mindful, as noted above, that on

summary judgment, all facts must be viewed in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party and all inferences drawn in her

favor. 

On August 9, 1999, plaintiff had a conversation with

defendant Piazza in which he told her, among other things, that 

her Nissan automobile, parked in front of her house could be

towed. On August 14, 1999, plaintiff arrived home to find her

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Nissan automobile in the process of being towed by defendants

Piazza and Marshall. Defendant Duch arrived on the scene shortly

thereafter. Plaintiff challenged the officers’ authority to tow

her car. When it became apparent to plaintiff that, despite her

protestations, her car would be towed, she requested and received

permission from the officers to retrieve personal items from

inside the vehicle. After an undetermined period of time,

defendant Duch approached plaintiff and instructed her to get out

of the vehicle or she would be arrested. While plaintiff was

exiting the vehicle she was told to move away from the car. 

At this point, the facts as related by the parties,

dramatically differ. According to plaintiff, as she moved away

from the car with personal items in her arms, she was told by

defendant Piazza that she was “charging” him and could be

arrested for that action. Plaintiff states she remembers seeing

Piazza’s fists coming toward her, but does not remember what

happened after that point. Deposition of Jean Miller, Volume 2,

39:8, 11-12, 22. Her next memory is of lying on her back, seeing

defendant Marshall standing behind her, and feeling him kicking

her head. After that, she recalls waving her arms and legs, and 

being flipped over and handcuffed, then stunned with a stun gun

multiple times. She alleges her injuries were debilitating and

permanent. In support of her allegations, plaintiff relies on

the declaration of D.P. Van Blaricom, a police practices

consultant and expert witness in police-related litigation, and

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county records suggesting that the stun gun used on plaintiff by

defendant Duch was not approved by the Butte County Sheriff’s

Office, a matter for which Duch was reprimanded. See Deposition

of Andrew Duch.

C. Defendants’ arguments in support of summary judgment

1. Probable cause to arrest

Defendants contend they had probable cause to arrest

plaintiff. She concedes this issue and withdraws her § 1983

causes of action to the extent they allege false arrest. 

Therefore, defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the issue

of false arrest contained in the 1 and 2 causes of action is st nd

GRANTED. Although defendants have not specifically addressed the

state law claims in this motion, the court notes that plaintiff’s

concession effectively ends her 3 and 4 causes of action for rd th

false imprisonment and false arrest. Accordingly, the 3 and 4 rd th

causes of action are DISMISSED.

2. Liability of defendants Burnett and Smith

Defendants contend these defendants had no connection with

the incident of excessive force that forms the basis for

plaintiff’s complaint. Plaintiff concedes that Burnett has no

liability. Accordingly, defendants’ motion for summary judgment

in favor of Burnett and against plaintiff is GRANTED. As to

defendant Smith, plaintiff argues that liability is premised on

his failure to conduct an adequate investigation of her afterthe-fact citizen’s complaint of excessive force. However, even

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assuming the truth of these allegations, plaintiff’s citizen’s

complaint followed her arrest; therefore, an investigation of

that complaint could not form any part of the basis of a § 1983

action for excessive force that occurred during the arrest. 

Based on the foregoing, defendants’ motion for summary judgment

in favor of defendant Smith and against plaintiff is GRANTED.

 3. Heck v. Humphrey

Defendants argue that plaintiff’s recent conviction bars her

civil action for damages under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477

(1994), the same basis on which the court granted summary

judgment in 2004. Under Heck, “to recover damages for

unconstitutional conviction or . . . harm caused by actions whose

unlawfulness would render a conviction . . . invalid, a § 1983

plaintiff must prove that the conviction . . . has been reversed

. . . A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a

conviction . . . that has not been so invalidated is not

cognizable under § 1983.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. at 486-87

(emphasis added). Stated another way, when damages are sought in

a § 1983 action, the court must consider “whether a judgment in

favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of

the conviction . . . ; if it would, the complaint must be

dismissed. . . .” Id.

While Heck applied to defendants’ initial summary judgment

motion; factual and procedural circumstances, as well as the law,

have changed requiring a different result. Plaintiff’s initial

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jury trial in 2003 resulted in convictions of battery on a law

enforcement officer, as well as resisting, delaying and

obstructing an officer in the performance of his duties. Such a

result nullifies any charge of excessive force since, by

definition, an arrest is not lawful if made with excessive force.

See e.g., Susag v. City of Lake Forest, 115 Cal. Rptr.2d 259

(Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (excessive force is not within performance

of an officer’s duties); People v. White, 161 Cal. Rptr. 541, 544

(Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (arrest made with excessive force is

unlawful). Accordingly, plaintiff’s § 1983 fourth amendment

claims were barred, and summary judgment in favor of defendants

was appropriate under the law of the Ninth Circuit in 2004. 

“California law leaves us no choice but to regard a § 148

conviction as incompatible with an allegation that the arrest was

unlawful.” Smith v. City of Hemet, 356 F.3d 1138, 1142 (9 Cir. th

2004), vacated on rehearing en banc, 394 F.3d 689 (9 Cir. th

2005). 

Following reversal of plaintiff’s conviction on appeal, and

in lieu of a retrial, the parties negotiated a plea agreement in

which plaintiff pled nolo contendre to one count of “delaying an

officer in the performance of his duties”, in exchange for

striking the “resisting” and “obstructing” language of the §

148(a) count, and a dismissal of the two battery counts. In

addition, and of particular relevance, is the factual basis for

the plea. The delay to which plaintiff pled, “is the delay

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getting out of the car that was being towed.” Transcript of

Plea, 2:11-12, August 24, 2005, attached as Exhibit G to

Declaration of Michael Deems. When questioned by the judge as to

whether she understood her plea, plaintiff asked: “Well are we

talking about my not getting out of the vehicle?” This

understanding was confirmed by her attorney and by the court. 

Exhibit G, 3:18-25.

This factual basis precludes the application of Heck v.

Humphrey. In 2005, the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed

the three-judge panel in Smith v. City of Hemet on which this

court had relied in granting defendants’ motion for summary

judgment. The court found a distinction between § 148 conduct

which occurred prior to the process of making an arrest, and that

which occurred during and subsequent to the arrest. In Smith the

plaintiff engaged in conduct violative of § 148 both before and

during his arrest. Even though he pled guilty to that section he

argued that his claim for excessive force was not barred because

it was based on acts occurring before the arrest. The court

reversed the grant of summary judgment, finding an absence of

information in the record as to which of the plaintiff’s actions

constituted the basis for his plea. “A conviction based on

conduct that occurred before the officers commence the process of

arresting the defendant is not necessarily rendered invalid by

the officers’ subsequent use of excessive force in making the

arrest.” Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 696 (9 Cir. th

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2005) (emphasis in original). Similarly, in Sanford v. Motts,

258 F.3d 1117 (9 Cir. 2001), another case in which a civil th

rights plaintiff entered a nolo plea to a violation of § 148, 

the court held that if an officer’s use of force occurs after the

time at which the plaintiff interfered with the performance of

his duties, Heck is no bar to a § 1983 claim for excessive force. 

Sanford v. Motts, 258 F.3d at 1119-20.

In the instant case, the factual basis is part of the record

and specifically states that the § 148 conduct which forms the

basis for the plea was plaintiff’s act of failing to get out of

the car in a timely manner. Exhibit G, 2:11-12. Since the

negotiated plea dismissed the two counts of battery on the

officers, as well as struck the “resisting” and “obstructing”

language, the only claim of excessive force which could be barred

by plaintiff’s plea is that which occurred when she was still in

the car. Her complaint, however, alleges excessive force

occurred after her exit from the car. “Defendants Piazza and

Marshall . . . physically abused [plaintiff] by knocking her to

the ground. One Deputy had his knee and leg on plaintiff’s back

while the other deputy handcuffed her. After plaintiff was

handcuffed, defendants Piazza, Marshall and Duch applied a stun

gun to plaintiff approximately seven times. It is believed that

the voltage was in excess of 400 volts of electricity. This

force was excessive and without justification.” Complaint, 4:10-

16. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff,

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 The Truong case on which defendants rely is inapposite and, furthermore, not 2

controlling. There the California Fourth District Court of Appeal held that Heck barred an

arrestee’s claim that excessive force was used against her during the booking process. The court

found that the plaintiff’s guilty plea to Penal Code § 148 in which she admitted that she “wilfully

and unlawfully resisted and obstructed a peace officer’s lawful order” effectively barred a claim

for excessive force. Truong v. Orange County Sheriff’s Department, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 450, 452

(Cal. Ct. App. 2005). As noted above, no such admission is contained in plaintiff’s plea.

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as the court must do on summary judgment, disputed issues of

material fact preclude summary judgment on the issue of whether

plaintiff’s delay in leaving the car was part of the arrest

process. Accordingly, summary judgment on the theory of a Heck

v. Humphrey bar is DENIED. 

2

4. Qualified Immunity

Defendants move for summary judgment on the basis of

qualified immunity. Although the factual inquiries related to

qualified immunity and excessive force are necessarily bound

together to some extent, the Supreme Court requires the issue of

immunity to be determined early and prior to a merits analysis of

the fourth amendment excessive force claim. See Saucier v. Katz,

121 S.Ct. 2151, 2155-56 (2001). Because the immunity is one from

suit rather than a defense to liability, it should be resolved as

soon as possible in the litigation and is effectively lost if a

defendant is erroneously forced to go to trial. See Mitchell v.

Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). The inquiry on the merits of

the claim should not meld together with the determination of

whether the officers are entitled to qualified immunity. In

Saucier the Supreme Court made clear that before proceeding to a

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merits analysis, the lower courts must first answer this

threshold question: “Taken in the light most favorable to the

party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the

officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right?” Saucier v.

Katz, 121 S.Ct. at 2156. If no constitutional right was

violated, the inquiry ends and there is no need to proceed to a

merits analysis. However, “if a violation could be made out on a

favorable view of the parties’ submissions”, the next inquiry is

whether the right was clearly established. Id.

In the instant case the parties offer polar opposite

versions of the facts. Plaintiff says she was pushed, kicked and

assaulted multiple times with a non-approved stun gun. On the

other hand, the officers present at the scene vehemently deny

plaintiff’s version of the facts, accusing her of being the

aggressor. As is evident, the parties have very different views

of what transpired; however, if plaintiff’s evidence is believed,

a jury could find use of excessive force by defendants. 

Even if there is constitutionally impermissible conduct,

defendants ‘‘may nevertheless be shielded from liability . . . if

their actions did not violate ‘clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known.’” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (quoting Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). In other words, “[t]he

contours of the [constitutional] right must be sufficiently clear

that a reasonable [officer] would understand that what he is

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doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635,

640 (1987). In determining if a defendant would have believed

his conduct lawful, the court, viewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to plaintiff, must consider whether the conduct

was objectively reasonable. Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299,

309 (1996). 

In support of their entitlement to qualified immunity,

defendants offer both evidence and legal authority. Pointing to

the testimony of Wes Brown, a tow-truck driver present at the

scene who disputes plaintiff’s version of the facts, defendants

argue that plaintiff’s story is “blatantly contradicted by the

record” and that no reasonable jury could find in her favor,

citing the Supreme Court’s most recent pronouncement on the

issues of excessive force, qualified immunity and summary

judgment. Scott v. Harris, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 1776 (2007). 

In Scott, the plaintiff was rendered a paraplegic as a

result of injuries he suffered following a high-speed chase in

which his car was rammed by a police officer. Scott v. Harris,

127 S.Ct. 1769, 1773 (2007). He sued, arguing that the officer’s

actions constituted an excessive use of force in violation of his

4 amendment rights. Taking the plaintiff’s view of the facts th

as true, the district court and 11 Circuit Court of Appeals th

denied the officer’s assertion of qualified immunity, finding

that the issue of excessive force was a question for the jury. 

The Supreme Court reversed. Following the step-by-step approach

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of Saucier, the court turned to the threshold inquiry: whether

the officer’s action was a constitutional violation. The initial

step in making that decision, the court stated, was to determine

the relevant facts from two substantially differing versions. 

While the court noted that this usually means adopting the

plaintiff’s version, the existence of a videotape of the high

speed chase, presented an unusual situation. Scott, 127 S.Ct. at

1775.

The videotape, to which no objection was made, portrayed

quite a different story than that told by the plaintiff and

adopted by the lower courts. As the Supreme Court noted, “[f]ar

from being the cautious and controlled driver the lower court

depicts, what we see on the video more closely resembles a

Hollywood-style car chase of the most frightening sort, placing

police officers and innocent bystanders alike at great risk of

serious injury.” Id. 

Drawing upon the summary judgment precedent of Anderson and

Matsushita, the court began its analysis by stating that only

genuine factual disputes preclude summary judgment, and that when

the record, “taken as a whole”, cannot lead a rational trier of

fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue. 

Continuing, the court said that when one story “is blatantly

contradicted by the record so that no reasonable jury could

believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts

for purposes of . . . summary judgment.” Id. at 1776. In

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reversing the order of the lower courts, and directing the

granting of summary judgment for the officer on qualified

immunity grounds, the Supreme Court concluded, “[plaintiff’s]

version of events is so utterly discredited by the record that no

reasonable jury could have believed him.” Id. 

In the nine months since Scott was decided, courts have

wrestled with what constitutes uncontested, incontrovertible

evidence, like a videotape. See e.g., Blaylock v. City of

Pennsylvania, 504 F.3d 405, 414 (3d Cir. 2007) (similar

photographs do not rise to the level of uncontradicted evidence);

Steele v. McMahon, 2007 WL 2758026 (E.D. Cal, filed Sept. 21,

2007) (sworn statement of defendant, when contradicted by sworn

statement of plaintiff, does not constitute uncontroverted

evidence). 

The facts in the record before this court are neither

indisputable nor uncontroverted, as they were in Scott. 

Plaintiff’s version of the facts, while appearing to strain

credulity, especially in light of the eyewitness testimony of

percipient witness Wes Brown, still raises genuine disputes about

the nature and duration of the force applied. That is enough to

defeat a claim of qualified immunity on the issue of excessive

force. “[I]f an excessive force claim turns on which of two

conflicting stories best captures what happened on the street,

Graham will not permit summary judgment in favor of the defendant

official. And that is as it should be. When a plaintiff

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proffers evidence that the official subdued her with a chokehold

even though she complied at all times with his orders, while the

official proffers evidence that he used only stern words, a trial

must be had.” Saucier, 121 S.Ct. at 2164 (Ginsburg, J.,

concurring).

5. Liability of MacKenzie, Grey & County of Butte

Defendants argue that plaintiff has failed to produce

evidence of a policy, practice or custom of the County of Butte

sufficient to find municipal liability against these defendants,

pursuant to Monell v. New York City Department of Social

Services,436 U.S. 658 (1978). In response, plaintiff cites

evidence that defendant Duch used an unapproved stun gun, and was

not in compliance with county certification policies at the time

of the events which form the basis for this lawsuit. Defendants

Grey and MacKenzie occupied the office of County Sheriff during

this time and can be held responsible for inadequate training and

supervision of subordinates if there is a causal connection

between their wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation. 

See Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9 Cir. 1989). It is th

for a jury to determine whether a policy regarding stun guns was

in place and applicable, and whether defendants MacKenzie and

Grey are liable for failure to train and supervise.

III. CONCLUSION

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted in part

and denied in part as follows: 

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A. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the claims of

false arrest contained in the 1 and 2 causes of action is st nd

GRANTED.

B. Pursuant to plaintiff’s concession that the defendants

had probable cause for the arrest, the 3 and 4 causes of rd th

action are DISMISSED. 

C. Defendants BURNETT and SMITH’s motion for summary

judgment in all claims in which they are named is GRANTED.

D. Defendants MARSHALL, PIAZZA, DUCH, MACKENZIE, GREY and

COUNTY OF BUTTE’S motion for summary judgment on the excessive

force claim contained in the 1 and 2 causes of action is st nd

DENIED.

E. A status conference to select new dates for final

pretrial conference and trial will be held at 10:00 a.m., March

14, 2008. The parties shall file status reports no later than

March 7, 2008, addressing future proceedings in the case.

 IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 22, 2008

/s/ Edward J. Garcia 

EDWARD J. GARCIA, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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