Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01849/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01849-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 463
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Alien Detainee
Cause of Action: 08:1153 Immigration: Allocation of Immigrant Visas

---

1

18-cv-1849-JAH-BGS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ADAM RABINSKY,

Petitioner,

v.

GREGORY J. ARCHAMBEAULT, 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement

San Diego Field Office Director;

JAMES DOBSON, Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement Acting Assistant 

Field Office Director for Otay Detention 

Facility; THOMAS D. HOMAN, Acting 

Director of Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement; KRISTJEN NIELSEN, 

Secretary of Homeland Security; 

JEFFERSON BEAUREGARD 

SEESSIONS III, Attorney General of the 

United States, 

Respondents.

Case No. 18-cv-1849-JAH-BGS

ORDER GRANTING TEMPORARY 

RESTRAINING ORDER AND 

SETTING HEARING DATE 

Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Petition for writ of habeas corpus. [Doc. No. 1]. 

Plaintiff requests, in relevant part, that this Court issue an order preventing Petitioner from 

being removed from the Southern District of California while his petition remains pending. 

Id. As such, the Court construes this request as a motion for temporary restraining order. 

Case 3:18-cv-01849-JAH-BGS Document 3 Filed 08/10/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 5
2

18-cv-1849-JAH-BGS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order is 

GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

On May 19, 2013, Petitioner was admitted to the United States without a visa under 

the Visa Waiver Program outlined in 8 U.S.C. 1187, which authorized him to stay in the 

country until August 16, 2013. See Doc. No. 1, pg. 2. On or about August 1, 2013, 

Petitioner applied to the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) 

for permanent residence based on his marriage to a United States citizen. Id. The USCIS

granted Petitioner conditional permanent residence status on October 15, 2003. Id. Prior to 

celebrating twenty-four (24) months of marriage, Petitioner and his wife jointly filed a 

petition to remove the condition on his permanent residence status. Id. Before a decision 

was issued on their petition, the marriage between Petitioner and his wife failed and the 

couple divorced. Id. On April 3, 2016, USCIS denied the petition to remove the condition

of residence, which effectively terminated Petitioner’s permanent residence status. Id. On 

August 2, 2018, Petitioner was arrested by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) 

officers and has been detained at the Otay detention facility since his arrest. Id. at 3.

Petitioner has been informed that he would be deported “within the next week or so” and

would not be afforded a hearing before an immigration judge. Id. Respondent James 

Dobson contacted Petitioner’s counsel on August 8, 2018 indicating that ICE would be 

going forward with the removal. Id.

DISCUSSION

1. Legal Standard

The purpose of a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) is to preserve the status quo

before a preliminary injunction hearing may be held; its provisional remedial nature is 

designed merely to prevent irreparable loss of rights prior to judgment. See Granny Goose 

Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers, 415 U.S. 423, 439 (1974) (noting 

that a TRO is restricted to its “underlying purpose of preserving the status quo and 

preventing irreparable harm just so long as is necessary to hold a hearing, and no longer”). 

Case 3:18-cv-01849-JAH-BGS Document 3 Filed 08/10/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 5
3

18-cv-1849-JAH-BGS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

As such, an applicant for a TRO is required to demonstrate “immediate and irreparable 

injury, loss or damage.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b); see also Caribbean Marine Serv. Co., Inc. 

v. Baldrige, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988).

The standard for issuing a TRO is similar to the standard for issuing a preliminary 

injunction. Lockheed Missile & Space Co., Inc. v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 887 F. Supp. 1320, 

1323 (N.D. Cal. 1995). The Ninth Circuit recognizes two tests for demonstrating 

preliminary injunctive relief: the traditional test or an alternative sliding scale test. Cassim 

v. Bowen, 824 F.2d 791, 795 (9th Cir. 1987). Under the traditional test, a party must show: 

“1) a strong likelihood of success on the merits, 2) the possibility of irreparable injury to 

plaintiff if preliminary relief is not granted, 3) a balance of hardships favoring the plaintiff, 

and 4) advancement of the public interest (in certain cases).” Save Our Sonoran, Inc. v. 

Flowers, 408 F.3d 1113, 1120 (9th Cir. 2005). Where a party demonstrates that a public 

interest is involved, a “district court must also examine whether the public interest favors 

the plaintiff.” Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Lujan, 962 F.2d 1391, 1400 (9th Cir. 1992).

Alternatively, a party seeking injunctive relief under Fed.R.Civ.P. 65 must show 

either (1) a combination of likelihood of success on the merits and the possibility of 

irreparable harm, or (2) that serious questions going to the merits are raised and the balance 

of hardships tips sharply in favor of the moving party. Immigrant Assistance Project of the 

L.A. County of Fed’n of Labor v. INS, 306 F.3d 842, 873 (9th Cir. 2002); Sun 

Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 188 F.3d 1115, 1119 (9th Cir. 1999); Roe v. 

Anderson, 134 F.3d 1400, 1402 (9th Cir. 1998). “‘These two formulations represent two 

points on a sliding scale in which the required degree of irreparable harm increases as the 

probability of success decreases.’” Roe, 134 F.3d at 1402 (quoting United States v. Nutricology, Inc., 982 F.2d 394, 397 (9th Cir. 1992); accord Sun Microsystems, 188 F.3d at 

1119). “Thus, ‘the greater the relative hardship to the moving party, the less probability of 

success must be shown.” Sun Microsystems, 188 F.3d at 1119 (quoting Nat’l Ctr. for 

Immigrants Rights v. INS, 743 F.2d 1365, 1369 (9th Cir. 1984)).

Case 3:18-cv-01849-JAH-BGS Document 3 Filed 08/10/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 5
4

18-cv-1849-JAH-BGS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The Ninth Circuit makes clear that a showing of immediate irreparable harm is 

essential for prevailing on a TRO. See Caribbean Marine, 844 F.2d at 674. “Speculative 

injury does not constitute irreparable injury sufficient to warrant granting a preliminary 

injunction.” Id. Moreover, “a plaintiff seeking an injunction against a local or state 

government must present facts showing a threat of immediate, irreparable harm before a 

federal court will intervene.” Midgett v. Tri-County Met. Transp. Dist., 254 F.3d 846, 851 

(9th Cir. 2001). Thus, a plaintiff must show the presence of an “immediate threatened 

injury as a prerequisite to preliminary injunctive relief.” Id., citing Los Angeles Memorial 

Coliseum Commission v. National Football League, 634 F.2d 1197, 1201 (9th Cir. 1980).

ANALYSIS

As a preliminary matter, this Court acknowledges that the REAL ID Act of 2005 has

eliminated district court jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions challenging final orders 

of removal. See Puri v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 1038, 1041 (9th Cir. 2006). However, district 

courts do retain subject matter jurisdiction over section 2241 petitions “that do not involve 

final orders of removal.” See Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069, 1075 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Here, the Court is unaware of whether a final order of removal has been issued. Regardless, 

this petition involves “constitutional questions or questions of law” as to whether Petitioner

is statutorily entitled to a formal immigration proceeding prior to being deported. See id.

Petitioner contends that he is suffering and will continue to suffer irreparable injury 

due to the government’s actions. See Doc. No. 1, pg. 5. Moreover, Petitioner maintains that 

his deportation will “likely bar his return” to the country because a USCIS determination 

that his marriage was not “bona fide” results in a permanent ineligibility to return to the 

United States. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. 1154(c)). Petitioner argues that pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 

1186a(c)(3)(D), “ . . .[a]ny alien whose permanent resident status is terminated . . . may 

request a review of such determination in a proceeding to remove the alien.” Petitioner 

contends that without this formal removal proceeding he is deprived of his sole remaining 

forum to demonstrate that his marriage was bona fide, thereby preventing “permanent 

banishment” from the United States. Id. The Court agrees with Petitioner that a strong 

Case 3:18-cv-01849-JAH-BGS Document 3 Filed 08/10/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 5
5

18-cv-1849-JAH-BGS

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

possibility of “irreparable harm” exists in this case, and as such, the status quo should be 

maintained. Should Petitioner be deported without a statutorily authorized immigration

proceeding he may be denied reentry into the United States in perpetuity. For those same 

reasons, and the limited nature of this temporary restraining order, the Court further finds 

that the balance of hardships tips sharply in favor of Petitioner. Moreover, Petitioner has, 

at the very least, raised serious questions as to whether he is entitled to an immigration 

proceeding pursuant to § 1186a(c)(3)(D).

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Petitioner’s request for a temporary restraining order is GRANTED; 

2. Respondents shall not remove Petitioner from the Southern District 

of California during the pendency of this temporary restraining

order;

3. This temporary restraining order is entered on August 10, 2018 and 

will expire on August 20, 2018 at 5:00 p.m.;

4. A hearing is scheduled for a Motion for Preliminary Injunction on

August 17, 2018 at 2:30 p.m., before this Court;

5. Respondents’ shall file a written response to Petitioner’s writ of 

habeas corpus no later than August 15, 2018;

6. The Clerk of Court shall serve upon Respondents a copy of 

Petitioner’s writ of habeas corpus [Doc. No. 1] and this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 10, 2018

 

_________________________________

JOHN A. HOUSTON

United States District Judge

Case 3:18-cv-01849-JAH-BGS Document 3 Filed 08/10/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 5