Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_17-cv-00014/USCOURTS-azd-4_17-cv-00014-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

JD Merrick, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Michael Linderman, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. CV-17-00014-TUC-DCB

ORDER 

 This case was filed on January 9, 2017, with the Plaintiff filing a First and Second 

Amended Complaint in rapid succession precluding the Court from issuing the screening 

order and the case management scheduling order until after the Second Amended 

Complaint (SAC) (Doc. 19) was filed on June 13, 2017. The Screening Order (Doc. 21) 

issued on August 15, 2017. The Scheduling Order (Doc. 43) issued on December 5, 2017. 

Currently discovery is ongoing and due to be completed by July 5, 2018, with dispositive 

motions to follow within 30 days of the close of discovery. A Motion for Preliminary 

Injunction (Doc. 34) and several other motions are pending. The Court will issue a 

separate Order ruling on the preliminary injunction, but here it denies the Plaintiff’s 

Motion for Ruling (Doc. 99) on the requested preliminary injunction and Motion to 

Compel and for Sanctions (Doc. 91). The Court grants the Defendant’s Motion for a 

Protective Order (Doc. 100). The Court denies the Motion for Service by Publication 

(Doc. 83) on Defendant Richardson. The Court explains its rulings below. 

Case 4:17-cv-00014-DCB Document 112 Filed 04/20/18 Page 1 of 8
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 The Plaintiff stated claims under the First Amendment, the Religious Land Use 

and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and in the SAC, as follows: Count I alleges 

he has been denied a Torah Observant Messianic Judaism (TOMJ) diet; Count II alleges 

he is unable to obtain candles for TOMJ religious rites and rituals, and Count III alleges a 

ten-book limit prevents him from studying the TOMJ Bible, which is set forth in 36 

volumes. The remainder of the SAC states claim under the First Amendment and the 

Due Process Cause, as follows: Count IV alleges he has been prevented from using 

Prison Inmates Online (PIO) because he used it to blog about his religion; Count V 

alleges ASPC-Lewis mailroom has improperly failed to deliver and mail out his mail, 

thereby, denying him the ability to communicate with certain people, including his family 

and attorneys, and Count VI alleges that he has been prevented from communicating 

problems to the American Civil Liberties Union and the Prison Law Office, pursuant to 

his right as a class member in Parsons v. Ryan to monitor health and safety issues. 

 In screening the SAC, the Court noted: “To the extent Plaintiff is attempting to 

assert a separate claim based on a breach of a July 21, 2011 settlement agreement in 

Merrick v. Schriro, CV 08-209 TUC AWT, he has failed to adequately identify the terms 

of and parties to that agreement. Insofar as Plaintiff is relying on the agreement to support 

his constitutional claims, the existence of a settlement agreement does not affect the 

Court’s analysis under § 1983. (Order (Doc. 21) at 5 n. 6) (citations omitted). 

 On October 20, 2017, the Plaintiff filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction 

arguing that he is entitled to a kosher diet under the First Amendment and the 2011 

settlement agreement in Merrick v. Schriro, CV 08-209 TUC AWT. The Court granted 

Plaintiff leave to file a Third Amended Complaint (TAC) for the sole purpose of adding 

the breach of contract claim related to the 2011 settlement agreement. The TAC was 

filed on November 22, 2017. The Motion for Preliminary Injunction was fully briefed 

and ready for a ruling by this Court on January 19, 2018. On March 19, 2018, the 

Plaintiff sought an expedited ruling on the motion before Passover on March 30, 2018. 

The Court has been unable to expedite disposition of the motion. In the event the Court 

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has not ruled on the Motion for Preliminary Injunction by July 19, 2018, the Plaintiff may 

further inquire regarding the status of the pending motion. LRCiv. 7.2(n). 

 The Defendants have now all answered, except for Defendant Richardson. 

Discovery has commenced and the Plaintiff has filed a Motion to Compel and for 

Sanctions. He alleges that discovery has not been forthcoming and certifies that he has 

attempted to personally consult and has made a sincere effort to resolve this conflict with 

counsel for Defendants. He attaches letters he has sent to counsel allegedly reflecting 

these sincere efforts. While he repeatedly requests in his correspondence to Defendants’ 

attorney that counsel call him to discuss the case, it is Plaintiff’s January 8, 2018, letter 

that first mentions that his discovery requests have been sent to Defendants, and he 

complains that in his experience, the lawyers who represent ADC “sandbag” responses to 

discovery. (Motion (Doc. 91) at Ex. A at 25.) He threatens to, without hesitation, file a 

Motion to Compel if proper responses from Defendants are not timely forthcoming. Id.

at 26. He invites counsel to call him if any of the discovery requests are unclear. Id. 

 On February 16, 2018, Plaintiff writes again to note that responses are due on 

February 19, 2018, and if they are late or incomplete, he will not hesitate to file a motion 

to compel. Id. He claims that this letter is his “attempt to informally resolve our 

discovery disputes,” which according to him is not premature because most of his 

“discovery requests were tendered since December and early January.” Id. at 30. On 

February 21, 2018, the Defendants responded with the following discovery: 1) Garcia’s 

Answers to Interrogatories and Requests for Production; 2) Irby’s responses to Requests 

for Production, and 3) Ryan’s Responses to Requests for Production. Counsel for 

Defendants said that Ryan’s Responses to Interrogatories would be sent within a week 

because he had been unavailable to review and sign them. Irby had been asked for 

additional documents, which would be forthcoming as soon as received.1

 The Plaintiff 

filed the Motion to Compel and for Sanctions on March 5, 2018. He complains that of 

ten discovery requests, there were only four responses and three of these were incomplete 

 1

 Plaintiff tendered interrogatories to Defendant Irby on February 5, 2018. (Motion (Doc. 

91) at Ex. A at 28.) 

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or intentionally vague. The Plaintiff complains about the five late responses. Where 

responses were made, the Plaintiff outlines the problems as he sees them. His motion 

also includes hyperbole related to past unsatisfactory experiences he has had with 

Defendants and Defendants’ attorney in other cases. 

 The Defendant responds to the merits of Plaintiff’s assertion of incompleteness 

and vagueness. More importantly, the Defendant reports that within two weeks of the 

Motion to Compel, Plaintiff was provided with “responses to all his discovery requests 

and explanations about the responses he [] received to which he objected.” (Response 

(Doc. 96) at 4.) The Plaintiff files a Reply, admitting he has received such discovery but 

reports another set of issues with this subsequent discovery. (Reply (Doc. 104)). Of 

course there has been no response from the Defendant’s to Plaintiff’s Reply. The Court 

is not able to rule, even if it wanted to, regarding the changed status of the discovery in 

this case. 

 The Court will not rule on the merits of Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel because 

Defendants are correct, he has not made a sincere effort to resolve discovery conflicts 

before filing the Motion to Compel. The Court will treat his Reply as his effort to 

personally resolve with the Defendants the issues that he believes remain with their 

disclosures. The Defendants may communicate with the Plaintiff in writing or call him, 

whichever form of communication they believe will be the most efficient way to 

expeditiously resolve his remaining complaints. Subsequent to Defendants’ response to 

the issues raised by the Plaintiff in his Reply, the Plaintiff may file a Motion to Compel if 

he continues to believe there are any discovery issues which must be resolved by the 

Court. The Court will not entertain filings made for the sole purpose of making a record 

for some future request for sanctions. If and when such a motion for sanctions is filed, 

the record supporting it may be attached to it. At this point, the Plaintiff should confine 

any Motion to Compel to specific issues and eliminate narrative haranguing about past 

discovery offenses unrelated to this case. 

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 In regard to the Plaintiff’s complaint that the Defendants’ discovery responses are 

late, the Court notes that on January 22, 2018, the Court gave the Defendants’ 30 days to 

respond to any then pending discovery requests from the Plaintiff because the Court had 

issued two scheduling orders in the case causing some confusion. (Order (Doc. 69)), see 

also Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(2)(A). Defendants admit some responses were late but 

complains that Plaintiff’s discovery requests were voluminous. That is not an excuse for 

Defendants’ failure to contact the Plaintiff, inform him as to how much more time was 

needed and why more time was needed for responses, and ask him to agree to an 

extension of time. In the future, the Defendants shall make such communications when 

they are unable to comply with deadlines. 

 The Court denies the Defendants’ Motion for a Protective Order because it 

pertains to the merits of the Motion to Compel. The Court orders the accompanying en 

camera evidentiary submission filed under seal. The Motion for a Protective Order may 

be reurged in the event that discovery related to Garcia’s inmate-death investigation is an 

issue in any future Motion to Compel. 

 The Court denies Plaintiff’s Motion to Serve Defendant Richardson by publication 

at this time. The Plaintiff has attempted to have Defendant Richardson served by the 

United States Marshal at the Department of Corrections (DOC), but service was 

unsuccessful because she is no longer employed there. (Doc. 33.) Next Plaintiff asked 

this Court to order the DOC to provide Richardson’s last known address, which the Court 

so ordered. Again service was unsuccessful because Richardson no longer lived at that 

address. (Doc. 74). Service by publication is an option under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1) 

because service may be accomplished by following state law, and the State of Arizona 

allows for service by publication in some limited instances. “A party may serve a person 

by publication only if: [] the last-known address of the person to be served is within 

Arizona but [] the serving party, despite reasonably diligent efforts, has been unable to 

ascertain the person’s current address; or [] the person to be served has intentionally 

avoided service of process, and [] service by publication is the best means practicable in 

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the circumstances for providing the person with notice of the action’s commencement.” 

In Arizona, upon a showing that personal service is impracticable, a court “may” on 

motion and without notice to the person to be served—order that service may be 

accomplished in another manner, including service by publication. 

 Allowing Plaintiff to serve Defendant Richardson by publication is at the Court’s 

discretion, which may be exercised only if Plaintiff can show that he has been unable to 

ascertain her current address despite reasonably diligent efforts and this is the best means 

practicable under the circumstances to provide her with notice of the action. A “due 

diligent effort” effort to ascertain Richardson’s address requires such pointed measures as 

an examination of telephone company records, utility company records, and records 

maintained by the county treasurer, county recorder, or similar record keepers.” Sprang 

v. Petersen Lumber, Inc., 798 P.2d 395, 399 (Ariz. App. 1990). 

 Acquisition of jurisdiction through other than personal service of process must be 

strictly construed. Llamas v. Superior Court in and for Pima County, 474 P.2d 459, 460 

(Ariz. App. 1970). The Court must make a finding of fact that the residence is unknown; 

a mere factual allegation is not enough. Brennan v. Western Sav. and Loan Ass’n, 526 

P.2d 1248, 1251 (Ariz. App. 1970). Accordingly, any showing of due diligence must be 

done by filing an affidavit showing in detail probative facts indicating a thorough search 

to locate the defendant, including the dates thereof and any attempts to serve the 

Defendant by another method of service. 

 There is no evidence that Defendant Richardson is evading service. The 

Plaintiff’s efforts to serve her include providing the address of her place of employment 

at DOC and, subsequently, asking this Court to obtain information regarding her last 

known address from DOC. He has not undertaken any of the usual measures such as 

examining public records to determine her address. The Court notes that this Plaintiff has 

family available to assist him in these efforts, see (TAC (Doc. 41) at 49-58) (Count V 

related to mail not being received from his parents and brother), and there are also private 

investigators who can assist in locating a defendant. At this time, there is no evidence in 

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the record showing due diligence by the Plaintiff to ascertain Defendant Richardson’s 

address. 

 The Court notes that 28 U.S.C. § 1915 does not expressly provide for the United 

States Marshal to serve process by publication, and the Court does not decide at this point 

in time whether such service of process will be ordered to be performed by the United 

States Marshal. 

 Service by publication could delay these proceedings for several months. The 

Court does not believe any further delay in this case is warranted at this time given the 

weakness of the claims stated against Defendant Richardson. 

 The allegations against Richardson in Counts Three, Four, and Five are largely 

indistinguishable from the allegations against Ryan in these counts. Plaintiff alleges that 

Defendant Ryan in consultation with Defendant Richardson, the Appeals Officer, denied 

his grievances addressed at the underlying conduct of these three counts. (TAC (Doc. 41) 

¶¶ 28, 44, 53, and 57.) These claims appear related to deficiencies in the processing of 

his grievance appeals. 

 Plaintiff should keep in mind that “inmates lack a separate constitutional 

entitlement to a specific prison grievance procedure.” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 

860 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). Therefore, 

denying inmate appeals generally does not serve as a basis for liability on these claims. 

Id. Section 1983 provides a cause of action only against persons who cause or participate 

in the alleged constitutional violations; ruling on an administrative grievance does not 

cause or contribute to the violation. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609-10 (7th Cir. 

2007). The Court did not dismiss the claims against Defendant Richardson in the 

screening order, however, because a prison administrator cannot willfully turn a blind eye 

to constitutional violations being committed; an individual who denies an inmate appeal 

and who had the authority and opportunity to prevent an ongoing constitutional violation 

could potentially be subject to liability if the individual knew about an existing or 

impending violation and failed to prevent it. Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1098 (9th

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Cir. 2006). It is equally difficult to establish liability under § 1983 based on a claim of 

deliberate indifference by omission. cf. Coles v. Eagle, 2009 WL 2700210, at *6 (D. 

Haw. Aug. 27, 2009) (discussing difficulty of proving deliberate indifference by 

omission). 

 The Court finds that it is unlikely that further delay of this case would ultimately 

benefit the Plaintiff because it is unlikely that the Plaintiff will recover any distinctive 

relief from Richardson. If the claims against Defendant Ryan in Counts Three, Four, and 

Five remain at the conclusion of any summary judgment proceedings, the Court will 

permit Plaintiff to renew his request for service by publication on Defendant Richardson. 

If not, the Court will dismiss the claims against Defendant Richardson for failure to state 

a claim and lack of service. 

Accordingly, 

 IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Service by Publication (Doc. 34) is 

DENIED, without prejudice. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Compel and for Sanctions 

(Doc. 91) is DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion for Ruling on Motion for 

Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 99) is DENIED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion for Protective Order (Doc. 100) is 

MOOT because the Court is not ruling on the merits of the Motion to Compel. The 

attachment submitted by Defendants for in camera review shall be sealed and filed into 

the record. 

 Dated this 19th day of April, 2018. 

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