Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-02474/USCOURTS-caed-2_04-cv-02474-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BENJAMIN ADAMS, 

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-04-2474 MCE GGH P

vs.

TERESA SCHWARTZ , et al.,

Defendant. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, 

 /

Introduction

Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1983. Pending before the court is defendant’s motion for summary judgment, or, in the

alternative, summary adjudication of issues, filed on July 20, 2007, to which plaintiff filed an

opposition, after which defendant filed a reply.

Allegations

In his amended complaint, plaintiff names Correctional Officer (C/O) Brida,

employed at California Medical Facility -Vacaville (CMF-Vac), as the defendant. Plaintiff states

that defendant Brida, the correctional officer (C/O) assigned to wing H2 where plaintiff is

housed, is responsible for making sure that porters assigned to clean and mop the floors put

caution signs out at all times when the floors are wet from being mopped. First Amended

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 Plaintiff’s allegations, with minor modification herein, were set forth in a previous 1

Order, filed on February 2, 2007, p. 2.

2

Complaint (FAC), p. 2. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Brida failed to instruct the porters to

fulfill their assigned duties for the entire period of time that he was the assigned wing officer in

H2. Id. 

On or about April 14, 2004, defendant Brida refused to perform his duties by

failing to instruct the porters to place caution signs out while the floor was wet. FAC, p. 2. As a

result, plaintiff slipped and fell, cracking his tailbone, injuring his back, kidneys, neck and head,

and suffering severe pain. Id. Defendant Brida continues to refuse to enforce the rules regarding

caution signs when floors are being mopped in H2 wing. Id. 

Plaintiff has been provided a cervical collar by non-defendant Dr. Low to try to

ease plaintiff’s neck pain. FAC, p. 2, 8. Plaintiff includes exhibits to his amended complaint

which he avers demonstrate that three facility doctors have confirmed that plaintiff has sustained

serious injuries from his fall. FAC, pp. 3, 6-7. 

Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive money damages, as well as any

declaratory or injunctive relief found to be appropriate. FAC, p. 4. 

1

Motion for Summary Judgment

Defendant Brida moves for summary judgment on the ground that he was not

deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s health and safety and did not intentionally subject plaintiff to

any known risk of serious harm, contending that there is no triable issue of fact and that he is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Motion for Summary Judgment (MSJ), pp. 2. Further,

defendant claims entitlement to qualified immunity. MSJ, pp. 8-11. 

Legal Standard for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated that the standard set

forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) is met. “The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if . . .

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment

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as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party 

always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct., 2548, 2553 (1986). “[W]here the

nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, a summary

judgment motion may properly be made in reliance solely on the ‘pleadings, depositions, answers

to interrogatories, and admissions on file.’” Id. Indeed, summary judgment should be entered,

after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing

sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that

party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See id. at 322, 106 S. Ct. at 2552. “[A] complete

failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily

renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment should be

granted, “so long as whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for entry

of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied.” Id. at 323, 106 S. Ct. at 2553. 

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the

opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356

(1986). In attempting to establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may

not rely upon the allegations or denials of its pleadings but is required to tender evidence of

specific facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its

contention that the dispute exists. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11,

106 S. Ct. at 1356 n. 11. The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is

material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, see

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986); T.W. Elec.

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Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987), and that the

dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the

nonmoving party, see Wool v. Tandem Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir. 1987).

In the endeavor to establish the existence of a factual dispute, the opposing party

need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor. It is sufficient that “the

claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties’ differing

versions of the truth at trial.” T.W. Elec. Serv., 809 F.2d at 631. Thus, the “purpose of summary

judgment is to ‘pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a

genuine need for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S. Ct. at 1356 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(e) advisory committee’s note on 1963 amendments).

In resolving the summary judgment motion, the court examines the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

any. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The evidence of the opposing party is to be believed. See Anderson,

477 U.S. at 255, 106 S. Ct. at 2513. All reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts

placed before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. See Matsushita, 475 U.S.

at 587, 106 S. Ct. at 1356. Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the

opposing party’s obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be

drawn. See Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985),

aff’d, 810 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1987). Finally, to demonstrate a genuine issue, the opposing

party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material

facts . . . . Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the

nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct.

1356 (citation omitted).

On April 11, 2005, the court advised plaintiff of the requirements for opposing a

motion pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rand v. Rowland, 154

F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1035 (1999), and Klingele v.

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Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409, 411-12 (9th Cir. 1988).

Undisputed and Disputed Facts

Defendant sets forth the following as undisputed facts (DUF), the first two of

which are not disputed by plaintiff. DUF 1. At all relevant times, defendant Brida was employed

as a Correctional Officer by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation

(CDCR), California Medical Facility- Vacaville (CMF-Vac), assigned to the housing unit where

plaintiff was housed. (Declaration of Dave Brida (hereinafter “Brida Dec.”), ¶ 2). DUF 2. 

Defendant Brida’s primary job duties consisted of maintaining order and security of the housing

unit. His duties also included the supervision of inmate porters who were assigned the job of

mopping the floors in the housing unit. (Defendant Brida’s Dec., ¶ 3). 

The facts plaintiff seeks to adamantly dispute are: DUF 3. Inmate porters are

trained to put up “caution” signs when mopping the floors. (Brida’s Dec., ¶ 3). DUF 4. At no

time was defendant Brida aware of any dangerous condition of the floor that resulted in

plaintiff’s slip and fall on April 14, 2004. (Brida’s Dec., ¶ 4). DUF 5. At no time did defendant

Brida deliberately ignore the health and safety of plaintiff or other inmates. (Brida’s Dec., ¶ 5). 

DUF 6. At no time did defendant Brida ever intentionally or knowingly cause plaintiff to

experience any pain, injury or suffering. (Brida’s Dec., ¶ 6). 

Plaintiff does not set forth evidence in his opposition that actually disputes the 

facts as expressed above, but simply states, in essence, that this defendant has never instructed

the porters to put out “caution” signs regarding wet floors, and that in failing to do so, he has

been deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of injury to plaintiff. Opposition (Opp.), pp. 1-

5. In Reply, defendant avers that plaintiff has not submitted admissible evidence to refute the

defendant’s undisputed statement of facts, but has merely relied on unauthenticated documents in

his opposition to support a claim that he has been injured, rather than meeting his burden of proof

to show defendant’s “deliberate indifference.” Reply, pp. 1-4.

\\\\\

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The court observes that notably absent from defendant’s statement of undisputed

facts is any affirmative statement that defendant took any steps whatever to ascertain that the

porters, in fact, placed “caution” signs out when mopping floors in H2 wing, whether on April

14, 2004, or on any date before or after the incident at issue, in the course of his supervisory

duties. On the other hand, as to DUF 3, that the porters are trained to put out wet floor caution

signs when mopping is not disputed by plaintiff when he simply alleges that defendant did not

supervise them properly to make sure that they put out the signs. 

Eighth Amendment Legal Standard

“Prison officials have a duty to ensure that prisoners are provided adequate

shelter, food, clothing, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Johnson v. Lewis, 217

F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000), citing, inter alia, Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832, 114 S. Ct.

1970 (1994). When an inmate has been deprived of necessities, “the circumstances, nature and

duration of a deprivation of these necessities must be considered in determining whether a

constitutional violation has occurred.” Johnson, supra, at 731. 

The Ninth Circuit, in concluding that safety hazards, exacerbated by poor or

inadequate lighting, pervaded a Washington penitentiary’s occupational areas, “seriously

threaten[ing] the safety and security of inmates and creat[ing] an unconstitutional infliction of

pain,” has stated:

Persons involuntarily confined by the state have a constitutional

right to safe conditions of confinement. See Youngberg v. Romeo,

1982, 457 U.S. 307, 315-16, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 2458, 73 L.Ed.2d 28;

Santana v. Collazo, 1 Cir., 1983, 714 F.2d 1172, 1183. Not every

deviation from ideally safe conditions amounts to a constitutional

violation, see, e.g., Santana at 1183. However, the Eighth

Amendment entitles inmates in a penal institution to an adequate

level of personal safety. This is required because inmates, by

reason of their confinement, cannot provide for their own safety.

Santana, supra, 714 F.2d at 1183. See also Estelle v. Gamble,

1976, 429 U.S. 97, at 103-04, 97 S.Ct. 285, 290-91, 50 L.Ed.2d

251.

Hoptowit v. Spellman, 753 F.2d 779, 784 (9 Cir. 1985). th

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Prisoners alleging Eighth Amendment violations based on unsafe conditions must

demonstrate that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to their health or safety by

subjecting them to a substantial risk of serious harm. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 833, 114 S.

Ct. at 1977. “For a claim ... based on a failure to prevent harm, the inmate must show that he is

incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. at 834, 114 S. Ct. at

1977. The prisoner must also demonstrate that the defendant had a “sufficiently culpable state of

mind.” Id. This standard requires that the official be subjectively aware of the risk; it is not

enough that the official objectively should have recognized the danger but failed to do so. Id. at

838, 114 S. Ct. at 1979. “[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the inference

could be drawn that a substantial risk of harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at

837, 114 S. Ct. at 1979. “[A]n official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have

perceived but did not....” does not rise to the level of constitutionally deficient conduct. Id. at

838, 114 S. Ct. at 1979. “[I]t is enough that the official acted or failed to act despite his

knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. at 842, 114 S. Ct. at 1981. If the risk was

obvious, the trier of fact may infer that a defendant knew of the risk. Id. at 840-42, 114 S. Ct. at

1981. However, obviousness per se will not impart knowledge as a matter of law.

“[D]eliberate indifference entails something more than mere negligence...[but] is

satisfied by something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with

knowledge that harm will result.” Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2005),

quoting Farmer, supra, 511 U.S. at 835, 114 S. Ct. 1970. Prison officials display a deliberate

indifference to an inmate’s well-being when they consciously disregard an excessive risk of harm

to that inmate’s health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837-838, 114 S. Ct. at 1979-80. 

In Osolinski v. Kane, 92 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 1996) a prisoner brought a § 1983

action claiming that the failure of prison officials to repair an oven, the door of which fell off and

burned his arm, violated the Eighth Amendment. In Osolinski, the Ninth Circuit found that it

was not clearly established that a single defective device, without any other conditions

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contributing to the threat of an inmates’ safety, created an objectively insufficiently inhumane

condition sufficient to be violative of the Eighth Amendment. 92 F.3d at 938. In reaching this

finding, the Ninth Circuit noted the following several cases which held that minor safety hazards

did not violate the Eighth Amendment. Id. In Tunstall v. Rowe, 478 F. Supp. 87, 89 (N.D.Ill.

1979), the existence of a greasy staircase which caused a prisoner to slip and fall and injure his

back did not state a constitutional claim under the Eighth Amendment because prison officials

are not under a constitutional duty to assure that prison stairs are not greasy. In Snyder v.

Blankenship, 473 F. Supp. 1208, 1212 (W.D.Va. 1979), the failure to repair a leaking dishwasher

which resulted in a pool of soapy water in which prisoner slipped, injuring his back, did not

violate the Eighth Amendment as “a slip and fall injury is not comparable to a prison-related

injury, such as harm caused by the assault of fellow inmates, for example.” In Robinson v.

Cuyler, 511 F. Supp. 161, 163 (E.D.Pa. 1981), the court found that where a prisoner slipped on a

wet floor and was burned by the contents of an overturned pot an Eighth Amendment violation

was not stated as “[a] slippery kitchen floor does not inflict ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’” 

In Osolinski, 92 F.3d at 938-939, the Ninth Circuit also distinguished the facts of a Second

Circuit case, Gill v. Mooney, 824 F.2d 192, 195 (2d Cir. 1987), wherein plaintiff survived a

motion to dismiss on a claim of an Eighth Amendment violation, where plaintiff averred that

defendant had ordered him to continue working on a ladder after plaintiff had told defendant it

was unsafe, because “[t]he order to remain on the ladder in Gill exacerbated the inherent

dangerousness of the defective ladder, rendering the ladder a serious safety hazard, akin to those

found in Hoptowit.”2

Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit has stated flatly that slippery prison floors do not

set forth a constitutional violation. Jackson v. State of Ariz., 885 F.2d 639, 641 (9th Cir. 1989)

(superseded on another ground) (inmate’s complaint about slippery prison floors does not state

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 The legal standard applicable to plaintiff’s claim has previously been set forth by this

3

court (in adjudicating defendant’s motion to dismiss) and is largely recapitulated here with

appropriate modification and enhancement. See Order & Findings and Recommendations, filed

on Jan. 31, 2006, pp. 5-7, adopted by Order, filed on March 17, 2006.

9

even an arguable Eighth Amendment violation), citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349,

101 S. Ct. 2392, 2400 (1981) (“the Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons....”).

On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit has also found that slippery floors without

protective measures could constitute a condition of deliberate indifference. Frost v. Agnos, 152

F.3d 1124, 1129 (9th Cir. 1998), citing LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1457 (9th Cir. 1993)

(inmates entitled to protection from unsafe prison conditions). In LeMaire, while the Ninth

Circuit found that an injunction could be issued to protect inmates from unsafe conditions before

a serious injury had occurred, the court nevertheless stated that “shackling a dangerous inmate in

a shower” does not create a “sufficiently unsafe condition[,] [e]ven if the floors to the shower are

slippery and LeMaire might fall while showering....” quoting Jackson, supra, 885 F.2d at 641

(“‘slippery prison floors...do not state even an arguable claim for cruel and unusual

punishment.’”) 

In Frost, by contrast, the inmate was disabled and on crutches, had fallen and

injured himself several times on slippery shower floors; prison guards were aware of this and

plaintiff had submitted several grievances to jail officials, advising them of the risk he faced. 152

F.3d at 1129. Moreover, a prison doctor had stated that Frost should be placed in the

handicapped unit, but prison officials had failed to accommodate him. Id. 

3

Discussion

Defendant concedes that the facts show negligence, but argues that his omissions

do not rise to deliberate indifference, seeking to confine them to the specific date of the incident

on which plaintiff suffered his injury. MSJ, p. 5-8. 

In his amended complaint, plaintiff herein has made an effort to allege

circumstances that are more like those of Frost, supra, than those of Osolinski, supra, LeMaire,

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supra, or Jackson, supra. Plaintiff makes the blanket claim that defendant Brida failed to instruct

the porters to fulfill their assigned duties for the entire period of time that he was the assigned

wing officer in H2, and continued to fail to do so following plaintiff’s slip and fall injury. 

Defendant sets forth in DUF 2 that his duties include supervising inmate porters assigned the job

of mopping the floors in the housing unit and in DUF 3 that porters are trained to put out wet

floor caution signs. Although not explicitly set forth, it is a logical inference that though

defendant’s duties included supervision of the porters, defendant was not the one who actually

instructed them with regard to putting out the caution signs for wet floors and may have never

done so; nor do defendant’s undisputed facts make clear whether defendant has ever actually

monitored whether the inmate porters ever put wet floor caution signs out when mopping in the

wing at issue, notwithstanding his supervisory duties. It is a short leap to conclude that this

omission resulted in the porters’ failure to use the caution signs when mopping and that

defendant Brida must have had some awareness of this. The question then arises whether such

conduct constitutes deliberate indifference to a substantial risk.

Defendant attempts to frame the claim as one where plaintiff merely alleges the

defendant failed to post a “caution” sign on a wet floor, in one instance, where plaintiff slipped

and fell. MSJ, p. 7. Defendant points out (MSJ, p. 9) that in Osolinski, wherein the denial of

summary judgment was reversed and qualified immunity granted, that three prior maintenance

requests for repair of the defective oven door therein at issue had been made prior to the

appellee’s (plaintiff’s) burn injury. 92 F.3d at 935. However, that court also noted that the

appellee had “not pled conditions which rendered him unable to ‘provide for [his] own safety in

the sense that they precluded him from avoiding the faulty oven door or rendered him unable to

perceive its defective condition.” Id., at 938. Defendant also argues that, unlike as in Frost,

plaintiff did not have a mobility impairment prior to his fall. MSJ, p. 10. 

In opposition, plaintiff basically reiterates the allegations of his amended

complaint, emphasizing that defendant’s “deliberate indifference,” resulted in his serious injury,

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submitting unauthenticated documents, which appear to be copies of plaintiff’s medical records,

following the date of his slip and fall injury. Opp., pp. 1-20. He states that he has been

diagnosed by three prison doctors, Dr. Kofoed; Chief Medical Officer Dr. Bick; and Dr. Liou, all

of whom confirm the diagnosis of Dr. Shellcroft, an Orthopedic Surgeon. Opp., p. 1. Plaintiff

maintains that it is undisputed that he has had institutional chronos signed by doctors, as well as

daily physical therapy, and has used a “tens unit” with a battery charger for his neck. Id.

In a copy of a document, noted as an “Outpatient Health Record,” copied to

plaintiff’s central file, dated 5-12-04, apparently signed by Dr. Shellcroft, consulting Orthopedic

Surgeon and Dr. Bick, the following is stated:

Mr. Adams is suffering an apparent acute fracture and separation of

the coccygeal joint and severe arthritis of the spine. He is under

evaluation and has been referred to the orthopedic surgeon. He

requires an elevator pass and a cane to aid him with walking. The

chrono is valid for six months (through October 19, 2004). 

Opp., p. 7. 

Among the other exhibits is a copy of a trust account withdrawal order for a “Tens

Unit” and rechargeable battery in the amount of $63.89. Opp., p. 8. A copy of a sheet of

“Physician’s Progress Notes,” has an entry, evidently dated 4/29/04, noting plaintiff’s age as 65,

indicating that plaintiff “apparently slipped and fell in shower on 4/14/04 striking coccyx, low

back [] back of his head,” and also evidently noting, inter alia, that plaintiff is an insulindependent diabetic. Opp., p. 9. Plaintiff also includes what appears to be a copy of therapeutic

stretching exercises for the back and ankle, as well as copy of what looks like an order for

rehabilitation services, dated in 2005, and copies of a record of physical therapy treatments for

some periods of time in 2004 (after the date of his fall) and in 2005 and 2006, and a copy of a

document entitled “CMF Physical Therapy Evaluation,” dated 5-9-05/12-19-05. Opp., pp. 10-19.

He also includes a copy of what appears to be a medical chrono, signed by Dr. John Wills and

Dr. Bick, CMO, dated 6/15/07, stating:

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 The court even takes judicial notice of plaintiff’s own motion for summary judgment 4

which was stricken as defective by the undersigned in the Order, filed on 2/2/07, wherein

plaintiff included a grievance, filed on 4/25/04, about slipping on the wet floor and injuring

himself and complaining about the lack of a caution sign. See docket entry # 21. This grievance

submitted by plaintiff occurred after the injury-causing incident. 

12

Inmate has multiple medical problems, consisting mainly of

diabetes, cervical degenerative disease, diabetic nephropathy,

prostatic C.A. He requires a cane for ambulation, an elevator pass,

and low bunk housing. If low bunk is not available at this

institution, he may be transferred to a facility that can meet his

clinical needs. This chrono is valid for one year (through June 14,

2008).

Opp., p. 6.

 Despite the lack of proper authentication of the records plaintiff has submitted to 

which the defendant objects, and the lack of fully developed and supported allegations, the court

accepts that this pro se inmate plaintiff was 65 or thereabouts at the time of his fall, that he

suffered from certain medical conditions such as arthritis and diabetes at the time of his fall, that

he was seriously injured by the fall and that the fall was caused by floors that had just been

mopped but which had no caution signs to warn plaintiff of that fact. The court accepts, as well,

that the lack of cautionary wet floor signs was a routine occurrence on plaintiff’s housing wing. 

It is undisputed that it was defendant Brida’s responsibility to supervise the porters who mopped

the floors in the area at issue, and it is undisputed that this defendant was at least negligent in

failing to have made sure that an appropriate caution sign was posted. It is an unresolved

question whether this defendant ever saw to it that there were warning signs posted for the wet

floors, before or after the injury-causing incident. Notwithstanding all of this, plaintiff neither

alleges or makes any showing of ever having filed a grievance about the condition of the floors

prior to having had his accident. Nor does he allege or submit any evidence of inmate 4

grievances about the failure to put up warning signs for wet floors having been filed and ignored. 

The fact that defendant does not indicate by his statement of undisputed material

facts that he did or did not fail to caution porters himself about the need for warning signs, as

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noted, does lead the inference that he failed regularly, and certainly on the date of the incident at

issue, to do so. Nevertheless, under the circumstances as alleged, defendant is correct that

plaintiff simply has not supported a claim of defendant’s deliberate indifference. To meet the

subjective prong of deliberate indifference, plaintiff must show more than that defendant should

have perceived the risk. “[A]n official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have

perceived but did not....” does not rise to the level of constitutionally deficient conduct. Farmer

v. Brennan,, supra, at 838, 114 S. Ct. at 1979. Nor does obviousness of the risk per se impart

knowledge as a matter of law. Moreover, as also noted earlier, the Ninth Circuit has stated

unequivocally that slippery prison floors do not set forth a constitutional violation. Jackson v.

State of Ariz., supra, 885 F.2d at 641. Plaintiff simply does not meet the burden that was met in

Frost, supra, 152 F.3d at 1129, to show that the defendant was aware of the risk by way of, for

example, previous falls or earlier grievances. Nor does he make clear that he himself was not

alert to what he claims to have been a pervasive risk of wet floors without caution signs such that

he would have taken extra care. 

Because the court has found that the conduct alleged does not state a

constitutional deprivation to which he was subjected, the qualified immunity defense need not be

reached. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that defendant’s motion for

summary judgment, filed on July 20, 2007 (# 34) be granted and judgment entered for defendant.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fifteen

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised 

\\\\\

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that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: 02/25/08

/s/ Gregory G. Hollows

 

 GREGORY G. HOLLOWS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

GGH:009

adam2474.msj

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