Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01005/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-01005-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

STEVEN DANIEL DEJARLAIS, 

 Petitioner, 

v. 

AUDREY KING, Warden, et al., 

 Respondents. 

Case No.: 15-cv-1005-BEN-MDD 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION OF 

UNITED STATES 

MAGISTRATE JUDGE RE: 

PETITION FOR WRIT OF 

HABEAS CORPUS 

I. INTRODUCTION 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States 

District Judge Roger T. Benitez pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and 

Local Civil Rule 72.1(c) of the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of California. 

 After reviewing the Petition (ECF No. 1), Respondent’s Answer 

and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support thereof 

(“Answer”) (ECF Nos. 9, 9-1), supporting documents and pertinent 

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state court Lodgments, the Court RECOMMENDS the Petition be 

DENIED for the reasons stated below. 

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

A. Federal Proceedings 

 On May 4, 2015, Steven Daniel DeJarlais (“Petitioner”), a state 

prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF No. 1). Petitioner sets forth three 

claims: (1) there was insufficient evidence to sustain the finding he is a 

sexually violent predator (“SVP”); (2) California’s Sexually Violent 

Predator Act (“SVPA”) violates constitutional protections of due 

process, double jeopardy, and the bar on ex post facto punishment; and 

(3) the SVPA violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. 

(ECF Nos. 1 at 43-54). On July 27, 2015, Respondent filed an Answer 

and lodgments in support thereof.1 (ECF Nos. 9, 10, 11, 12, 13). 

Petitioner did not file a traverse. 

B. State Proceedings 

 On April 4, 2011, the San Diego County District Attorney filed a 

petition to civilly commit Petitioner as an SVP pursuant to California 

Welfare and Institutions Code § 6600. (Lodg. No. 6 at 1). On October 

 

1 Respondent misinterpreted the Petition to include two additional 

claims that Petitioner raised in the Court of Appeal, but not in the 

California Supreme Court: the SVPA is void for vagueness and the trial 

court made a reversible error in oral instruction of CALCRIM 224. 

(ECF No. 9-1 at 3). Petitioner explains the grounds for relief raised are 

in the “addendum” to the Petition. (ECF No. 1 at 8). The addendum 

attached does not raise the vagueness or CALCRIM 224 grounds for 

relief. Id. at 15. 

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19, 2012, a jury found the petition to be true, and the court committed 

Petitioner to the California Department of Mental Health for an 

indeterminate period. (Id.). 

On November 5, 2012, Petitioner timely appealed. Id. On April 

4, 2014, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s 

judgment. (Lodg. No. 8 at 17). Petitioner timely filed a petition for 

review with the California Supreme Court. (Lodg. No. 9). On June 18, 

2014, the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for 

review. (Lodg. No. 10). 

III. STATEMENT OF FACTS 

 “[A] determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall 

be presumed to be correct.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Petitioner has the 

“burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and 

convincing evidence.” Id.; see Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 

(9th Cir. 1997) (stating that federal courts are required to “give great 

deference to the state court’s factual findings.”), overruled on other 

grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). Accordingly, the 

following facts are taken from the California Court of Appeal’s opinion: 

 [Petitioner] stipulated he was convicted of two 

qualifying offenses: raping K.S. in 1994, and raping M.K. in 

1996. Additionally, based on a 1990 incident, he pleaded 

guilty to corporal injury to his spouse, T.D. In 1990, he 

pleaded guilty to corporal injury to his cohabitant, D.G. 

 [Petitioner] was paroled from prison in 2004, and met 

his next victim, J.G., in May 2005. One month after 

knowing her, he proposed marriage. J.G. soon learned about 

[Petitioner’s] criminal history on the Internet. Therefore, 

around July 22, 2005, she first told [Petitioner] she was 

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ending the relationship. But [Petitioner] pressured her into 

meeting two more times in July 2005. On August 5, 2005, 

J.G. agreed to have sex with [Petitioner] one last time. The 

next day, he went to her house uninvited, and she told him 

not to visit her home anymore. On August 10, 2005, 

[Petitioner] telephoned J.G., saying he was waiting at her 

apartment and wanted to talk to her. In her apartment 

building’s parking area, he grabbed her, shoved her against 

a car, and refused to let her leave, saying he loved her and 

wanted to marry her. J.G. told him to leave her alone 

because she wanted to end the relationship. The next night 

at about 11:00 p.m., [Petitioner] climbed through J.G.’s 

apartment window, grabbed her and covered her mouth with 

his hand. She was afraid to cry because her children were 

home and she was concerned about what he might do to 

them. [Petitioner] was drinking alcohol, and five or six 

times pretended to kiss her but forced alcohol into her 

mouth. She became dizzy and vomited. Afterwards, 

[Petitioner] forcibly had sex with her three times, and 

remained in her room until 8:00 a.m. the next day. At some 

unspecified subsequent date, police found [Petitioner] 

lurking outside J.G.’s apartment, and he fled in his vehicle, 

hitting a police officer. He was convicted of reckless driving, 

felony evasion of a law enforcement officer, and violation of 

parole, and sentenced to seven years in prison. 

Prosecution Experts 

 Psychologist Timothy Salz testified that [Petitioner] 

suffered from paraphilia not otherwise specified and 

antisocial personality disorder, noting that [Petitioner] had 

repeatedly committed sexual offenses against his female 

sexual partners after they rejected him. Dr. Salz explained 

that [Petitioner’s] history of violence started when he was 

ten years old and continued even after he had been convicted 

and incarcerated for sexual offenses, and while he was 

released on parole or probation. 

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 Dr. Salz testified in reference to the SVPA (§ 6600, 

subd. (e)): “Okay. So this to me is the key feature to this 

case. So the statute defines ‘predatory’ as an act directed 

towards a stranger, an acquaintance—a stranger, a casual 

acquaintance with whom no substantial relationship exists 

or an individual with whom a relationship has been 

established or promoted for the primary purpose of 

victimization.” (Emphasis added.) In light of the statutory 

definition, Dr. Salz testified at length regarding his 

conclusion that a “substantial” and well-founded risk existed 

that [Petitioner] would commit a predatory sexual act if he 

were released into the community: “Unfortunately, neither 

the statute nor any of the legal cases that I know about or 

any of the consultants that I consulted with about on this 

were able to give any real solid—real clear guidance as to 

what constitutes a ‘substantial’ relationship. [¶] So I looked 

it up in the dictionary. . . . You get words like, ‘of or having 

substance. Real, actual, true, not imaginary, strong, solid, 

firm, considerable, ample, of considerable worth or value, 

important.’” 

 Dr. Salz analyzed [Petitioner’s] relationships with each 

victim and concluded that except for his marital 

relationship, the others were not substantial. D.G. was a 

stripper or escort. [Petitioner] raped her after he caught her 

in bed with another man. K.S.’s husband was overseas 

during her approximately one-year relationship with 

[Petitioner]. When K.S.’s husband returned home, she 

sought to end her relationship with [Petitioner], who raped 

her. During [Petitioner’s] two-year relationship with M.K., 

she was living with her husband. One day, as M.K. came 

home, [Petitioner] was wearing a mask and surprised her in 

her yard, where he raped her. 

 Dr. Salz testified regarding [Petitioner’s] relationship 

with J.G.: “So they had been dating for, I guess, it turned 

out—in my report I wrote one month. It turns out it was 

actually a couple of months. After they were seeing each 

other for a month, he asked her to marry him. She kind of 

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went ‘Whoa, this is a little odd.’ She wasn’t thinking the 

relationship was that substantial. [Otherwise] she wouldn’t 

have questioned him asking her to marry him.” Dr. Salz 

concluded [Petitioner’s] relationships were “intensely sexual 

relationships as opposed to . . . substantial relationships,” 

noting that [Petitioner] had told a defense psychologist, “All 

of our relationships were built on sex. It was only physical. 

I thought if we would have sex, they wouldn’t leave me.” 

 Dr. Salz clarified, “But the real question is, is 

[Petitioner] likely to commit a predator [sic] offense in the 

future. So the question becomes how well does he have to 

know someone before he would rape them, and I would 

suggest it doesn’t have to be that well. [¶] I can certainly 

imagine [Petitioner] going to a bar—I mean, he obviously 

can be very charming, and women are clearly attracted to 

him—and taking a woman home. How many days or weeks 

would he have to know her before she rejected him, and he 

would rape her? I don’t think it would take that many days 

or weeks. That’s the clear question.” 

 Psychologist Marianne Davis testified that [Petitioner] 

suffered from depressive disorder not otherwise specified, 

paraphilia not otherwise specified, and antisocial personality 

disorder. Regarding the paraphilia diagnosis, Dr. Davis 

stated “[Petitioner] didn’t rape just once. We have five 

victims here. Some are raped multiple times, and that’s 

highly significant in the literature [about paraphilias].” Dr. 

Davis added, “ordinary men when faced with a partner who 

is in distress or crying or in pain, will lose their sexual 

arousal. They will not be able to maintain an erection with a 

distressed partner. [Petitioner] clearly, except in one case, 

was able not only to maintain an erection but sometimes 

achieve erection and ejaculation and then go back and do it 

two more times in the space of one night.” 

 Dr. Davis pointed out that [Petitioner] exhibited a 

pattern of sexual violence spanning 16 years: “He hurt [the 

victims] more than was necessary to get them to . . . submit . 

. . to having sex with him. That he hurt them after the fact 

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that he had sex with them.” Dr. Davis concluded [Petitioner] 

was likely to commit other sexually violent predatory acts. 

[Petitioner] told her that since going to prison he had 

learned how to monitor himself and believed he was no 

longer as overpowering and aggressive as before. But that 

comment was a “red flag” to Dr. Davis, indicating 

[Petitioner] had “limited insights” regarding his mental 

disorder. Dr. Davis also stated that although [Petitioner] 

had completed an advanced anger management program in 

the past, he was subsequently paroled then reoffended 

against J.G. He also later violated prison rules by engaging 

in disruptive, violent conduct. 

 Dr. Davis, referring to J.G., concluded: “If [Petitioner 

is] willing to start stalking a woman and behaving this way 

to her when he’s only known her a month, I think that he 

could just as easily get out and do that to someone he’s only 

known for a week. . . . That, to my mind, you, know, we’re 

getting narrower and narrower in terms of our time frame, 

and how long it is before he victimizes a woman.” 

 On redirect examination, Dr. Davis was asked, “Now, 

the fact that [Petitioner and J.G.] knew each other for 

whether it was one month, two months, or three months, 

does that make a difference into [sic] your analysis on 

whether he’s likely in the future to be at risk for committing 

another sexual offense that’s predatory?” Dr. Davis replied, 

“No, it doesn’t; that he—they had actually known each other 

longer than I knew from the original documents I was given 

did not leave [sic] me to change my opinion on that.” 

 

Defense Experts 

 Psychologist Mary Jane Alumbaugh testified that 

based on her interviews with [Petitioner] and her document 

review, he manifested “antisocial behavior” and “sexual 

abuse of an adult.” She clarified she did not regard either 

condition as a “treatable diagnosable disorder,” but used 

those terms descriptively. Dr. Alumbaugh did not find that 

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[Petitioner] was likely to engage in predatory sex crimes, 

commenting that he had not done so in the past. 

 Defense counsel asked Dr. Alumbaugh to explain the 

basis of [Petitioner’s] sexual crimes. She replied that as a 

child, [Petitioner] saw his father inflict domestic violence on 

his mother. Moreover, [Petitioner] was twice sexually 

abused as a child. Dr. Alumbaugh concluded: “It is a 

combination of the modeling behavior of the violence in an 

intimate relationship and a combination layered on, a role 

model that was violent and he learned violence in the home 

modeling, and this kind of basic instability within the 

context of a relationship that when he is threatened with 

abandonment or separation, it triggers all of this. It just 

pulls the plug on this to be violent, to be sexual, because of 

the sexual abuse, and [the victim] will stay with [Petitioner]. 

[¶] [His sexual violence] is only triggered within the context 

of separation. I think what I want to say is on the outside 

[Petitioner] looks like this big tough guy. Internally there’s 

a whole lot of the little boy left that doesn’t want to be left, 

wants to protect his mom, wants to keep his mom with him, 

and doesn’t know what to do but act violently like dad did.” 

 Psychologist Lisa Jeko testified that [Petitioner] 

committed sexual abuse of an adult, and had antisocial 

personality disorder with narcissistic traits. She did not 

diagnose him with paraphilia. Dr. Jeko did not find that 

[Petitioner’s] prior sexual offenses were predatory nor 

believe that he would engage in future predatory sexual 

offenses. 

 Both prosecution and defense experts who 

administered an actuarial instrument called the Static-99-R 

to determine [Petitioner’s] likelihood of engaging in sexually 

violent predatory behavior gave him a score of six, which 

puts him in the high risk range for reoffending. Both 

prosecution and defense experts also administered the PCLR Hare psychopathy checklist to determine [Petitioner’s] 

level of personality disorder, and he scored between 27 and 

30, which is considered in the high range for psychopathy. 

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Dr. Davis concluded this score indicates, “[Petitioner] is 

undeterred by consequences and that he’s highly 

manipulative and can be very charming . . . making it much 

more likely that he’ll be able to entice another woman into a 

relationship with him.” 

(Lodg. No. 8 at 2-8). 

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 Title 28, U.S.C. § 2254(a) provides the scope of review for federal 

habeas corpus claims: 

The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a 

district court shall entertain an application for a writ of 

habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to 

the judgment of a State court only on the grounds that he is 

in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties 

of the United States. 

As amended by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty 

Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d) provides: 

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a 

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court 

shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was 

adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless 

the adjudication of the claim – 

 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or 

involved an unreasonable application of clearly 

established Federal law, as determined by the 

Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 

evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 

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Clearly established federal law “refers to the holdings, as 

opposed to the dicta, of [the United States Supreme] Court’s decisions . 

. . .” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). A state court’s 

decision may be “contrary to” clearly established Supreme Court 

precedent “if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the 

governing law set forth in [the Court’s] cases” or “if the state court 

confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a 

decision of [the] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different 

from [the Court’s] precedent.” Id. at 404-06. 

A state court decision may involve an “unreasonable application” 

of Supreme Court precedent “if the state court identifies the correct 

governing legal rule from this Court’s cases but unreasonably applies 

it to the facts of the particular state prisoner’s case.” Williams, 529 

U.S. at 407. An unreasonable application may also be found “if the 

state court either unreasonably extends a legal principle from 

[Supreme Court] precedent to a new context where it should not apply 

or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context 

where it should apply.” Id.; Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 

(2003); Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2003). 

An unreasonable application of federal law requires the state 

court decision to be more than incorrect or erroneous. Lockyer v. 

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 76 (2003). Instead, the state court’s application 

must be “objectively unreasonable.” Id. In order to satisfy § 

2254(d)(2), a federal habeas petitioner must demonstrate that the 

factual findings upon which the state court’s adjudication of his claims 

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rests, assuming it rests upon a determination of facts, are objectively 

unreasonable. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). Even if 

a petitioner can satisfy § 2254(d), the petitioner must still demonstrate 

a constitutional violation. Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 119-22 (2007); 

Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 735-36 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). 

Petitioner presented all of his claims raised in his federal habeas 

Petition to the state trial, appellate and supreme courts in direct 

review. (Lodg. Nos. 8, 9). The appellate court denied Petitioner’s 

claims on the merits. (Lodg. No. 8). 

V. DISCUSSION 

A. Claim 1: Insufficiency of Evidence 

1. Relevant Background 

 The SVPA permits indeterminate civil commitment of SVPs. 

CAL. WELF. & INST. §6600. The prosecution must prove that: “(1) the 

person was convicted of a sexually violent offense against one or more 

victims; (2) the person suffers from a current diagnosed mental 

disorder affecting his volitional or emotional capacity; and (3) the 

disorder makes the person a danger to the health and safety of others 

in that it was likely that he will engage in sexually violent predatory 

criminal behavior.” (Lodg. No. 6 at 10) (citations omitted). Predatory 

is defined as “an act [that] is directed toward a stranger, a person of 

casual acquaintance with whom no substantial relationship exists, or 

an individual with whom a relationship has been established or 

promoted for the primary purpose of victimization.” CAL. WELF. &

INST. §6600(e). 

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2. Summary of Arguments 

 Petitioner contends there was insufficient evidence to support 

the finding that he is an SVP. (Lodg. 9 at 29). Petitioner concedes 

that the SVPA does not require his previous acts be predatory and only 

requires that a likelihood exists that his future acts will be predatory. 

(Id. at 30). He argues that because he had substantial relationships 

with each of the victims it is unreasonable to conclude he would 

engage in predatory behavior. (Id.). Petitioner explains, “to infer 

predatoriness from non-predatory offenses, requires something more, 

to suggest the likelihood of future predatory offenses,” and that 

“‘something more’ is absent” from the case. (Id.). 

 Respondent argues that this Court may not disagree with a 

California Court of Appeal decision regarding a state law claim, such 

as this question regarding the SVPA. (ECF No. 9-1 at 15). 

Respondent argues that upholding the finding that Petitioner is an 

SVP means the statutory requirement of predatoriness, as defined by 

the SVPA, was met. (Id.) 

3. Legal Standards 

 Under California law, the test for sufficiency of evidence to 

support a commitment under the SPVA is the same test for sufficiency 

of evidence to support a criminal conviction. People v. Mercer, 70 Cal. 

App. 4th 463, 466 (1999). The court must “review the entire record in 

the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether 

substantial evidence supports the determination below.” Id. (citing 

People v. Johnson, 26 Cal. 3d 557, 576-578 (1980)). To be substantial, 

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evidence must be “of ponderable legal significance . . . reasonable in 

nature, credible and of solid value.” Johnson, 26 Cal. 3d at 576 (citing 

Estate of Teed, 112 Cal. App. 2d 638, 644 (1952)). The court “may not 

redetermine the credibility of witnesses, nor reweigh any of the 

evidence, and must draw all reasonable inferences, and resolve all 

conflicts, in favor of the judgment.” People v. Poe, 74 Cal. App. 4th 

826, 830 (1999) (citing Mercer, 70 Cal. App. 4th at 466). 

 The California Supreme Court explained that the SVPA “does 

not prohibit the trier of fact at the trial, in deciding whether the 

defendant is likely to commit sexually violent acts upon release, from 

taking into account past acts of sexual violence, even if the victims 

were not strangers, casual acquaintances, or persons cultivated for 

victimization.” People v. Torres, 25 Cal. 4th 680, 686 (2001). 

 California’s sufficiency of evidence standard is the same under 

federal due process clauses. People v. Berryman, 6 Cal. 4th 1048, 

1082-83 (1993). Under clearly established federal law, the question is 

“whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 

elements . . . beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 

U.S. 307, 319 (1979); see Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 362 

(1972). 

4. Analysis 

 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution shows a rational trier of fact could have found the evidence 

against Petitioner was sufficient to prove a substantial likelihood he 

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would engage in future predatory acts. As stated by the California 

Court of Appeal: 

 As noted, the record evidence supports the finding that 

[Petitioner] is likely to commit a predatory sexual offense if 

he is released to the community: Three psychologists, 

including a defense expert, testified that [Petitioner] scored 

high on the actuarial instrument used to measure just such 

a likelihood. Further, [Petitioner] was incarcerated and 

released on parole on different occasions, and was not 

deterred from committing sexual offenses. Dr. Davis 

testified in reference to the J.G.’s case that the time between 

when [Petitioner] meets a woman and victimizes her is 

narrowing. Dr. Davis also noted [Petitioner] had not 

acquired sufficient insight into his violent behavior. As 

noted, Dr. Salz correctly identified the statutory requirement 

and testified regarding [Petitioner’s] likelihood of 

committing a violent sexual act with a stranger. The 

discussion regarding whether [Petitioner’s] past relations 

were substantial did not affect the analysis regarding the 

specific question of future offenses. 

 [Petitioner] also argues, “Two defense experts said 

[Petitioner] was simply showing his sociopathic traits in 

raping the victims, like any domestic abuser or criminal 

might do. Neither saw evidence [Petitioner] was aroused by 

his victims’ lack of consent, as opposed to being oblivious of 

it.” However, in light of the substantial evidence supporting 

the jury’s finding and the applicable standard of review, it is 

immaterial that defense experts reached a different 

conclusion. It is also unavailing that Dr. Salz used a 

dictionary to define the word “substantial,” which appears in 

the SVPA. As noted, Dr. Salz correctly set forth the SPVA’s 

requirement that he find [Petitioner] would commit future 

predatory sexual acts. “‘The credibility of the experts and 

their conclusions [are] matters [to be] resolved . . . by the 

[trier of fact]’ and ‘[w]e are not free to reweigh or reinterpret 

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[that] evidence.’” (People v. Poulson (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 

501, 518.) 

(Lodg. No. 8 at 12-13). 

 Three psychologist experts testified Petitioner tested high on the 

actuarial instrument used to measure likelihood of recidivism. (Id.). 

Additionally, Petitioner has a history of reoffending while on parole, 

evincing that serving a prison sentence did not deter him from 

committing sexual offense based crimes. (Id.). One expert recognized 

that Petitioner’s relationships with women have been decreasing in 

length before he commits a sexual offense against them. (Id.). Based 

on this evidence, a rational jury could reasonably find Petitioner is 

substantially likely to commit future predatory acts. 

The California Court of Appeal did not unreasonably apply 

clearly established federal law to Petitioner’s sufficiency of evidence 

claim by determining there was a substantial likelihood he would 

engage in future predatory acts. Accordingly, the Court 

RECOMMENDS claim (1) be DENIED. 

B. Claim 2: Due Process, Ex Post Facto, and Double Jeopardy 

Violations 

1. Statutory Background 

 The California Court of Appeal summarized the relevant 

background as follows: 

Applicable law 

I. Statutory Background 

 The SVPA provides for the involuntary civil 

commitment of persons who, in a unanimous jury verdict 

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after trial, are found beyond a reasonable doubt to be SVP’s. 

(CAL. WELF. & INST. §§ 6603(e)&(f), 6604.) The term 

“‘[s]exually violent predator’ means a person who has been 

convicted of a sexually violent offense against one or more 

victims and who has a diagnosed mental disorder that 

makes the person a danger to the health and safety of others 

in that it is likely that he or she will engage in sexually 

violent criminal behavior.” (CAL. WELF. & INST. § 6600(a)(1).) 

As originally enacted, the SVPA provided for a two-year 

commitment term. The SVPA now provides for an 

indeterminate term of confinement for persons who are 

found to be SVPs. (People v. Shields (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 

559, 562-563; §§ 6604, 6604.1.) 

 The Department [of Mental Health] is required to 

review the mental condition of a committed SVP at least 

annually, and the court may appoint an expert or the 

committed person may retain one. (§ 6604.9(a).) If the 

Department concludes the committed individual no longer 

meets the requirements of the SVPA, or that conditional 

release is appropriate, it must authorize the filing of a 

petition for release by the committed individual. (§ 

6604.9(b)&(d).) After a probable cause hearing, if the court 

determines that the petition has merit, the committed 

person is entitled to a trial, with all constitutional 

protections as provided at the initial commitment hearing. 

At the trial, if the state opposes the petition, it must prove 

beyond a reasonable doubt that the committed individual 

remains an SVP. (§ 6605(a)(2)&(3).) If the trier of fact finds 

in the committed person’s favor, the person must be 

unconditionally released and discharged. (§ 6605(b).) 

(Lodg. No. 8 at 9-10). 

2. Summary of Arguments 

 Petitioner asserts that California’s SVPA violates: (1) federal due 

process by placing the burden on an SVP to prove he is no longer an 

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SVP in order to terminate his commitment; (2) the ex post facto clause

because it is punitive; and (3) federal double jeopardy because an 

indefinite commitment with the burden placed upon him to prove he 

no longer qualifies as an SVP means the SVPA is punitive. (Lodg. No. 

9 at 38). Respondent states that the California Court of Appeal 

reasonably and properly applied controlling law when denying those 

claims based on both California Supreme Court and United States 

Supreme Court precedent. (ECF No. 9-1 at 17). 

3. Legal Standards 

a. Due Process 

 Civil commitment does not violate the due process clause if there 

is proof of dangerousness coupled with proof of some additional factor, 

such as a mental illness or abnormality. People v. McKee, 47 Cal. 4th 

1172, 1188 (2010) (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 357 

(1997)). Additionally, requiring the committed person to prove they no 

longer meet the civil commitment requirements does not violate due 

process. Id. at 1191 (citing Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 367 

(1983)). 

b. Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy 

 The ex post facto clause provides: “No state shall . . . pass any . . . 

ex post facto law . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. It prohibits laws which 

“retroactively alter the definition of crimes or increase the punishment 

for criminal acts.” Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 43 (1990). If an 

act is not punitive, it is not within the scope of the ex post facto clause. 

See McKee, 47 Cal. 4th at 1194 (citing Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 363-64). 

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 The double jeopardy clause provides: “Nor shall any person be 

subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” 

U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Court has interpreted the double jeopardy 

clause to prohibit “punishing twice, or attempting a second time to 

punish criminally, for the same offense.” Witte v. United States, 515 

U.S. 389, 396 (1995). If an act is civil, and not punitive, it cannot be 

considered violative of the double jeopardy clause. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 

at 369. 

4. Analysis 

a. Due Process 

In Taylor, the Ninth Circuit explained in regards to due process 

that “the Supreme Court has not definitively addressed the 

constitutionality of release procedures that place the burden of proof 

upon the individual challenging continued commitment.” Taylor v. 

San Diego Cty., No. 12-55030, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 16002, at *21 

(9th Cir. Sept. 9, 2015). In a federal habeas petition, “where there is 

no clearly established federal law, the state court cannot be deemed 

unreasonable.” Id. at *21 (citing Glebe v. Frost, 135 S.Ct. 429, 431 

(2014)). The court concluded that the California Court of Appeal did 

not unreasonably apply federal law in denying a due process claim on 

the SVPA. Id. at *22. 

Petitioner asserts the same due process argument as in Taylor. 

(Lodg. No. 9 at 38). The Court of Appeal found the SVPA did not 

violate the federal Constitution’s due process clause. (Lodg. No. 8 at 

15). Here, as in Taylor, the California Court of Appeal did not 

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unreasonably apply federal law in denying Petitioner’s due process 

claim. 

b. Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy 

The United States Supreme Court found that a Kansas statute 

similar to California’s SVPA did not violate the Constitution’s double 

jeopardy prohibition or its ban on ex post facto lawmaking because 

Kansas’ Sexually Violent Predator Act does not impose punishment. 

See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 370-71. 

If the SVPA is a civil statute and does not impose criminal 

punishment, there is no ex post facto or double jeopardy violation. 

Determining whether a statute is criminal or civil is a question of 

statutory construction. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361. In doing so, the 

court looks to whether a civil proceeding was intended and whether 

the “statutory scheme [is] so punitive either in purpose or effect as to 

negate [the State’s] intention to deem it civil.” Id. (citations omitted). 

California’s SVPA is not punitive. First, it was intended to be a 

civil proceeding. The Act is located within the Welfare and 

Institutions code with other civil commitment procedures and not in 

the Penal code. Landau, 214 Cal. App. 4th at 45. Facially, there is 

nothing to suggest the legislature desired to create anything but a civil 

commitment statutory scheme to protect the public from harm. See 

Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361. Second, the SVPA is not so punitive to 

negate the State’s intention to deem it a civil proceeding. The SVPA 

restricts the freedom of a small segment of society to protect the public 

from dangerously mentally ill persons. People v. Landau, 214 Cal. 

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App. 4th 1, 45 (2013). In the event the person no longer qualifies as an 

SVP, the person is entitled to release. Id. The SVPA does not violate 

the ex post facto clause or the double jeopardy clause. 

 Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS claim (2) be DENIED. 

C. Claim 3: Equal Protection Clause Violation 

 Petitioner argues the SVPA “denies equal protection for a 

defendant confined within its provisions, as compared to defendants 

subject to other civil commitment schemes, who must periodically be 

assessed for danger, like Mentally Disordered Offenders, or those 

found not guilty by reason of insanity.” (Lodg. No. 9 at 39). 

The Ninth Circuit in Taylor held that “the California Court of 

Appeal did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law to 

[the petitioner’s] equal protection claim by determining that sexually 

violent predators are not similarly situated to other civilly committed 

offenders.” Taylor, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS at *21-22. The court 

explained, “[s]exually violent predators are in a special category of 

civilly committed offenders because they have a demonstrated sexually 

violent criminal history and are mentally ill, thereby portending the 

likelihood of future sexually violent behavior. Given the nature of the 

harm they represent to themselves and the community, the state has 

an elevated interest in ensuring that they are identified, treated, and 

detained for as long as they meet the sexually violent predator 

criteria.” Id.

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 Petitioner’s argument is identical to the equal protection 

argument rejected by the Ninth Circuit in Taylor. Accordingly, the 

Court RECOMMENDS claim (3) be DENIED. 

VI. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED

that the District Court issue an Order: (1) Approving and Adopting 

this Report and Recommendation; and (2) DENYING Petitioner’s 

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in its entirety. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any written objections to this 

Report must be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later 

than October 30, 2015. The document should be captioned 

“Objections to Report and Recommendation.” 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objection 

shall be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than 

November 13, 2015. The parties are advised that the failure to file 

objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those 

objections on appeal of the Court’s order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 

F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: October 14, 2015 

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