Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01011/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01011-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:205 Denial Social Security Benefits

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

CRAIG A. BUCKINS, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security 

Defendant. 

No. 2:15-cv-1011-EFB 

ORDER 

Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

(“Commissioner”) denying his applications for a period of disability and Disability Insurance 

Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Titles II and XVI of the 

Social Security Act. The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment. For the 

reasons discussed below, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied and the 

Commissioner’s motion is granted. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff filed applications for a period of disability, DIB, and SSI, alleging that he had 

been disabled since September 1, 2010. Administrative Record (“AR”) 196-208. Plaintiff’s 

applications were denied initially and upon reconsideration. Id. at 127-130, 134-143. On July 14, 

2014, a hearing was held before administrative law judge (“ALJ”) Amita B. Tracy. Id. at 45-70. 

Case 2:15-cv-01011-EFB Document 15 Filed 09/26/16 Page 1 of 10
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

2

Plaintiff was represented by counsel at the hearing, at which he and a vocational expert testified. 

Id.

On September 17, 2014, the ALJ issued a decision finding that plaintiff was not disabled 

under sections 216(i), 223(d), and 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Act.1 Id. at 22-38. The ALJ made the 

following specific findings: 

1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through 

March 31, 2013. 

2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since September 1, 2010, the 

alleged onset date (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1571 et seq., and 416.971 et seq.). 

* * * 

 1

 Disability Insurance Benefits are paid to disabled persons who have contributed to the 

Social Security program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq. Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) is paid 

to disabled persons with low income. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382 et seq. Under both provisions, 

disability is defined, in part, as an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity” due to 

“a medically determinable physical or mental impairment.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(a) & 

1382c(a)(3)(A). A five-step sequential evaluation governs eligibility for benefits. See 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 423(d)(1)(a), 416.920 & 416.971-76; Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987). The 

following summarizes the sequential evaluation: 

Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful 

activity? If so, the claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed 

to step two. 

Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? 

If so, proceed to step three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is 

appropriate. 

Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination 

of impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 

404, Subpt. P, App.1? If so, the claimant is automatically 

determined disabled. If not, proceed to step four. 

Step four: Is the claimant capable of performing his past 

work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step 

five. 

Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional 

capacity to perform any other work? If so, the claimant is not 

disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled. 

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995). 

 

The claimant bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential evaluation 

process. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5. The Commissioner bears the burden if the sequential 

evaluation process proceeds to step five. Id.

Case 2:15-cv-01011-EFB Document 15 Filed 09/26/16 Page 2 of 10
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

3

3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: obesity, diabetic peripheral 

neuropathy, degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, degenerative disc disease of the 

cervical spine, an affective disorder, possible history of acute ischemic cerebrovascular 

accident or similar symptoms, and polysubstance abuse (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c) and 

416.920(c)). 

* * * 

4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or 

medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, 

Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, and 404.1526, 416.920(d), 

416.925 and 416.926). 

* * * 

5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the claimant has 

the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1567(b) and 416.967(b), except he can occasionally climb ramps and stairs, but never 

climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolding. He can occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, 

and crawl. The claimant can occasionally reach in front and laterally with his right upperextremity. He should not work in an environment requiring exposure to extreme 

temperatures, vibrations, and workplace hazards. He requires an environment that is very 

quiet – quiet to moderate noise environments. The claimant retains the ability to engage 

in simple, repetitive, routine tasks. 

* * * 

6. The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1565 and 

416.965). 

* * * 

7. The claimant was born on November 28, 1960, and was forty-nine years old, which is 

defined as a younger individual age 18-49, on the alleged disability onset date. The 

claimant subsequently changed age category to closely approaching advanced age (20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1563 and 416.963). 

8. The claimant has at least a high school education and is able to communicate in English 

(20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1564 and 416.964). 

* * * 

9. Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of disability because using 

the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework supports a finding that the claimant is “not 

disabled,” whether or not the claimant has transferable job skills (See SSR 82-41 and 20 

C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2). 

///// 

Case 2:15-cv-01011-EFB Document 15 Filed 09/26/16 Page 3 of 10
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

4

10. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual functional 

capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the 

claimant can perform (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1569, 404.1569(a), 416.969, and 416.969(a)). 

* * * 

11. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from 

September 1, 2010, through the date of this decision (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g) and 

416.920(g)). 

Id. at 24-37. 

Plaintiff’s request for Appeals Council review was denied on March 30, 2015, leaving the 

ALJ’s decision as the final decision of the Commissioner. Id. at 1-6. 

II. LEGAL STANDARDS 

The Commissioner’s decision that a claimant is not disabled will be upheld if the findings 

of fact are supported by substantial evidence in the record and the proper legal standards were 

applied. Schneider v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 223 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2000); 

Morgan v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999); Tackett v. Apfel, 

180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). 

 The findings of the Commissioner as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are 

conclusive. See Miller v. Heckler, 770 F.2d 845, 847 (9th Cir. 1985). Substantial evidence is 

more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 521 (9th 

Cir. 1996). “‘It means such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.’” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. 

N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). 

 “The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical 

testimony, and resolving ambiguities.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 

2001) (citations omitted). “Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 

interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.” 

Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). 

///// 

Case 2:15-cv-01011-EFB Document 15 Filed 09/26/16 Page 4 of 10
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

5

III. ANALYSIS 

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by (1) rejecting his examining physician’s opinion 

without providing legally sufficient reasons, and (2) concluding that there were a sufficient 

number of jobs in the national economy that plaintiff could perform. ECF No. 12 at 5-12. 

 A. The ALJ Properly Evaluated the Medical Opinion Evidence 

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in rejecting his examining physician’s opinion that he 

needed a cane for walking long distances and on uneven terrain. ECF No. 12 at 5-8. The weight 

given to medical opinions depends in part on whether they are proffered by treating, examining, 

or non-examining professionals. Lester, 81 F.3d at 834. Ordinarily, more weight is given to the 

opinion of a treating professional, who has a greater opportunity to know and observe the patient 

as an individual. Id.; Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1285 (9th Cir. 1996). To evaluate whether 

an ALJ properly rejected a medical opinion, in addition to considering its source, the court 

considers whether (1) contradictory opinions are in the record; and (2) clinical findings support 

the opinions. An ALJ may reject an uncontradicted opinion of a treating or examining medical 

professional only for “clear and convincing” reasons. Lester, 81 F.3d at 831. In contrast, a 

contradicted opinion of a treating or examining medical professional may be rejected for “specific 

and legitimate” reasons that are supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 830. While a treating 

professional’s opinion generally is accorded superior weight, if it is contradicted by a supported 

examining professional’s opinion (e.g., supported by different independent clinical findings), the 

ALJ may resolve the conflict. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing 

Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989)). However, “[w]hen an examining 

physician relies on the same clinical findings as a treating physician, but differs only in his or her 

conclusions, the conclusions of the examining physician are not ‘substantial evidence.’” Orn v. 

Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 632 (9th Cir. 2007). 

 Plaintiff was evaluated by Dr. Jenna Brimmer, an examining physician. AR 707-710. Dr. 

Brimmer diagnosed plaintiff with history of stroke with right-sided weakness, type 2 diabetes not 

controlled with symptoms of neuropathy, high blood pressure being medically managed, and high 

cholesterol being medically managed. Id. at 709. It was her opinion that plaintiff could stand and 

Case 2:15-cv-01011-EFB Document 15 Filed 09/26/16 Page 5 of 10
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

6

walk up to six hours, sit without limitation, and lift 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds 

frequently. Id. She further opined that plaintiff could occasionally climb, balance, stoop, kneel, 

crouch, and crawl; occasionally reach with his right upper-extremity; but was limited with 

working at heights due to a risk of falling. Id. at 709-710. It was also Dr. Brimmer’s opinion that 

plaintiff would need a cane for long distances and uneven terrain. Id. at 709. 

 The record also contains opinions from two non-examining physicians. Based on his 

review of plaintiff’s medical records, Dr. Lloyd Anderson opined that plaintiff could lift 50 

pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; stand and/or walk for about 6 hours in an 8-hour 

workday; sit for about 6 hours in an 8-hour workday; frequently climb ramps and stairs, but never 

ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; and frequently balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. Id. at 91-92. 

 Dr. J.R. Saphire, also a non-examining physician, opined that plaintiff could lift 20 

pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; stand and/or walk about 6 hours in an 8-hour 

workday; sit for about 6 hours in an 8-hour workday; frequently climb ramps and stairs, but never 

ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; and frequently balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. Id. at 119-

120. Dr. Saphire further opined that plaintiff was limited to frequently reaching in front and 

laterally, and that he should avoid concentrated exposure to extreme temperatures, vibrations and 

workplace hazards. Id. at 120. 

 In assessing plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ adopted significant portions of Drs. Brimmer and. 

Saphire’s opinions. See id. at 29. However, the ALJ rejected Dr. Brimmer’s opinion that plaintiff 

would require a cane for long distances and uneven terrain. Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred 

in doing so. ECF No. 12 at 5-8. As this opinion was contradicted by the opinions of Dr. Saphire 

and Dr. Anderson, the ALJ was required to provide a legitimate and specific reason for 

disregarding this examining opinion. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. 

 In determining that plaintiff did not require the use of a cane, the ALJ found that “there is 

no probative evidence that the claimant has used a walker or cane with any sort of regularity.” Id. 

at 31. The ALJ further stated, “It seems that Dr. Brimmer echoed the claimant’s report that he 

uses a cane but the record is devoid of any use or even possession of a cane or walker since July 

or August 2011.” 

Case 2:15-cv-01011-EFB Document 15 Filed 09/26/16 Page 6 of 10
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

7

 An ALJ may discount a physician’s opinion if it is not supported or is inconsistent with 

other substantial evidence of record. See Orn, 495 F.3d at 631. Plaintiff contends that contrary to 

the ALJ’s finding, there is evidence in the record demonstrating that he needed a cane for 

ambulation. ECF No. 12 at 7. 

 In July 2011, plaintiff was admitted to the hospital with concerns that he had a stroke. AR 

428. He was diagnosed with possible transient ischemic attack, with no evidence of stroke on 

magnetic resonance imaging. Id. at 425. He underwent physical therapy and reported that he 

could ambulate without a walker. Id. at 426. At the time of discharge, his symptoms had 

resolved and plaintiff was informed that he could “either choose to or not choose to use the 

walker as tolerated.” Id. A psychosocial assessment form, which was completed approximately a 

week after his discharge, indicates that plaintiff was prescribed a wheelchair, but not a walker or 

cane. Id. at 622. The form, however, does not include any clinical findings suggesting that 

plaintiff was confined to a wheelchair. Id. Furthermore, there is nothing in the record to suggest 

that plaintiff’s condition worsened after his discharge. Treatment notes from September 2011 

reiterated that at the time plaintiff was discharged “his deficits mostly resolved [and] he was left 

with a mild limp requiring walking with a cane.” Id. at 574; see also id. at 562. 

 This evidence establishes that plaintiff was prescribed an assistive device for ambulation 

after his July 2011 hospitalization. But there is evidence indicating that notwithstanding the 

prescription, use of such a device proved unnecessary. Treatment notes from July 2012 reflect 

that plaintiff continued to have a slow gait with a slight limp. Id. at 507. As noted by the ALJ, 

despite this impairment plaintiff reported that he had not used his walker or cane since being 

discharged from the hospital because “it’s embarrassing.” Id. at 32, 504. Thus, plaintiff 

functioned without a cane from the time of his discharge in late July or August of 2011 to the date 

of the treatment notation in July 2012. The fact that he did so is entirely consistent with the 

functional capacity opinions of Dr. Saphire and Dr. Anderson, neither of which indicated that 

///// 

///// 

///// 

Case 2:15-cv-01011-EFB Document 15 Filed 09/26/16 Page 7 of 10
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

8

plaintiff required the use of a cane.2 This is adequate evidence to support the ALJ’s finding that 

plaintiff did not require the use of a cane. 

 Accordingly, the ALJ gave a specific and legitimate reason for rejecting Dr. Brimmer’s 

opinion in this limited regard. 

 B. The ALJ’s Step-Five Finding is Supported by Substantial Evidence 

 Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ erred at the fifth-step of the sequential evaluation 

process by concluding that there were a sufficient amount of jobs in the national economy that he 

could perform. ECF No. 12 at 9-12. 

 At step five of the sequential evaluation process, the Commissioner bears the burden of 

showing that the plaintiff has the ability to perform work available in the national economy. 

Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5. To meet this burden, an ALJ may utilize a vocational expert “to 

testify as to (1) what jobs the claimant, given his or her functional capacity, would be able to do; 

and (2) the availability of such jobs in the national economy.” Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 

1101 (9th Cir. 1999). 

 At the hearing, the vocational expert testified that an individual with plaintiff’s RFC 

could perform work as a children’s attendant, a housekeeping cleaner, and a ticket taker. AR at 

66-67. The ALJ’s relied on this testimony in finding that there are a significant number of jobs in 

the national economy that plaintiff can perform. Id. at 37. Plaintiff contends, however, that he 

cannot perform the positions of housekeeping cleaner and ticket taker because these jobs require 

frequent to constant reaching, which is precluded by the ALJ’s RFC determination limiting 

plaintiff to occasional reaching in front and laterally with his right upper-extremity. ECF No. 12 

at 9-11. Thus, plaintiff contends that these are not jobs within his functional capacity. He argues 

that without the availability of these jobs the ALJ’s finding of not disabled cannot be sustained 

because the vocation expert testified that the remaining job of children’s attendant only has 5,104 

available positions nationally, which plaintiff contends is an insufficient number of jobs. Id. at 

11-12. 

 2

 It is also consistent with the discharge instructions from plaintiff’s treating sources that 

he could “either choose to or not choose to use the walker as tolerated.” AR at 426. 

Case 2:15-cv-01011-EFB Document 15 Filed 09/26/16 Page 8 of 10
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

9

 Plaintiff is correct that under the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) both a 

housekeeping cleaner and ticket taker require at least frequent reaching. DOT 323.687-014, 1991 

WL 672783 (Cleaner, Housekeeping), DOT 211.467-030, 1991 WL 671853 (Ticket Seller). 

“However, the DOT does not specify that frequent reaching requires the use of both arms.” 

Powell v. Colvin, 2013 WL 6797569, * at 4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2013) (finding that plaintiff could 

perform a job requiring frequent reaching despite being limited to occasional reaching with left 

arm); see also Carey v. Apfel, 230 F.3d 131, 146 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding that the vocational 

expert’s testimony that plaintiff could perform work as a ticket seller despite amputation of one 

arm was not inconsistent with the DOT’s requirement of frequent handing and finger for the 

position because the DOT does not require bilateral dexterity); Palomares v. Astrue, F. Supp. 2d 

906, 920 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (finding that there was no conflict between the DOT and vocational 

expert’s testimony that a person limited in reaching with his left extremity could perform a DOT 

job requiring constant reaching because “the DOT does not require constant reaching with both 

arms.”). Here, the ALJ’s RFC determination did not include any limitations in reaching with 

plaintiff’s left arm, a finding that plaintiff does not challenge. AR 29. 

Furthermore, the vocational expert testified that an individual with plaintiff’s RFC, 

including the limitation to only occasional front and lateral reaching with the right upper 

extremity, could perform work as a children’s attendant, housekeeping cleaner, and ticket taker. 

Id. at 66-67. Moreover, she stated that her testimony was consistent with the DOT. Id. at 67. 

Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in finding that plaintiff could perform these jobs 

notwithstanding the limitation to his right upper extremity. 

 In light of the availability of the jobs addressed by the vocational expert, the court does 

not reach plaintiff’s further argument that it was error to find that he could perform the position of 

a ticket taker. Plaintiff argues that this job requires level 3 reasoning, which is precluded by the 

ALJ’s finding that he is limited to simple, repetitive, routine tasks. ECF No. 12 at 11. As 

explained above, that ALJ properly concluded that plaintiff maintained the ability to work as a 

housekeeping cleaner. The vocational expert testified that there are more than 137,000 

housekeeping cleaner jobs available nationally. AR 66. This job alone has a sufficient number of 

Case 2:15-cv-01011-EFB Document 15 Filed 09/26/16 Page 9 of 10
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

10

positions available in the national economy to support the ALJ’s step-five finding. Moncada v. 

Chater, 60 F.3d 521, 524 (9th Cir. 1995) (60,000 national jobs is a significant number); Moore v. 

Apfel, 216 F.3d 864, 869 (9th Cir. 2000) (testimony that there was 125,000 jobs nationally that 

plaintiff could perform constituted substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s finding that the 

plaintiff was not disabled). 

 Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in finding that there were a significant number of jobs in 

the national economy that plaintiff could perform. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

 Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that: 

 1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied; 

 2. The Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment is granted; and 

 3. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in the Commissioner’s favor. 

DATED: September 26, 2016. 

Case 2:15-cv-01011-EFB Document 15 Filed 09/26/16 Page 10 of 10