Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_16-cv-00907/USCOURTS-almd-2_16-cv-00907-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

JOSEPH LEE LEWIS, #142696, )

 )

 Plaintiff, )

 )

 v. ) CASE NO. 2:16-CV-907-WKW 

 ) (WO) 

 )

CORIZON HEALTH, )

 )

 Defendant. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION 

This 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action is before the court on a complaint filed by Joseph Lee 

Lewis (“Lewis”), a convicted state inmate, in which he challenges the adequacy of medical 

treatment provided to him for treatment of Hepatitis C during his confinement in the 

custody of the Alabama Department Corrections. Doc. 1 at 2–3. Lewis names Corizon 

Health, the contract medical care provider for the state prison system, as the sole defendant 

in this cause of action. Lewis seeks declaratory and injunctive relief for the alleged 

violation of his constitutional rights. 

The defendant filed a special report and relevant evidentiary materials in support of 

its report addressing the claim presented by Lewis. In these filings, the defendant denies 

it acted with deliberate indifference to Lewis’ medical needs. After receipt of the 

defendant’s special report, the court issued an order directing Lewis to file a response to 

the report, supported by affidavits or statements made under penalty of perjury and other 

Case 2:16-cv-00907-WKW-GMB Document 13 Filed 02/10/17 Page 1 of 12
2

evidentiary materials. Doc. 12 at 2. The order specifically cautioned Lewis that “unless 

within fifteen (15) days form the date of this order a party . . . presents sufficient legal 

cause why such action should not be undertaken . . . the court may at any time [after 

expiration of the time for the plaintiff filing a response] and without further notice to the 

parties (1) treat the special report and any supporting evidentiary materials as a motion for 

summary judgment and (2) after considering any response as allowed by this order, rule on 

the motion for summary judgment in accordance with the law.” Doc. 12 at 3. Pursuant to 

this order, the court deems it appropriate to treat the defendant’s report as a motion for 

summary judgment and concludes that summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of 

the defendant.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

“Summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no 

genuine [dispute] as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment 

as a matter of law.’” Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th 

Cir. 2007) (per curiam); Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 56(a) (“The court shall grant summary 

judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and 

the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”). The party moving for summary 

judgment “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis 

for its motion, and identifying those portions of the [record, including pleadings, discovery 

materials and affidavits], which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue 

Case 2:16-cv-00907-WKW-GMB Document 13 Filed 02/10/17 Page 2 of 12
3

[dispute] of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Jeffery v. 

Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590, 593 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that moving party has 

initial burden of showing there is no genuine dispute of material fact for trial). The movant 

may meet this burden by presenting evidence indicating there is no dispute of material fact 

or by showing that the nonmoving party has failed to present appropriate evidence in 

support of some element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Celotex, 

477 U.S. at 322–24; Moton v. Cowart, 631 F.3d 1337, 1341 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that 

moving party discharges his burden by showing that the record lacks evidence to support 

the nonmoving party’s case or that the nonmoving party would be unable to prove his case 

at trial).

The defendant has met its evidentiary burden. Thus, the burden shifts to the plaintiff 

to establish, with appropriate evidence beyond the pleadings, that a genuine dispute 

material to his case exists. Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991); 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(3); Jeffery, 64 F.3d at 593–94 (holding that, 

once a moving party meets its burden, “the non-moving party must then go beyond the 

pleadings, and by its own affidavits [or statements made under penalty of perjury], or by 

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,” demonstrate that there is 

a genuine dispute of material fact). This court will also consider “specific facts” pled in a 

plaintiff’s sworn complaint when considering his opposition to summary judgment. 

Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1098 (11th Cir. 2014). A genuine 

dispute of material fact exists when a party produces evidence that would allow a 

Case 2:16-cv-00907-WKW-GMB Document 13 Filed 02/10/17 Page 3 of 12
4

reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in its favor such that summary judgment is not 

warranted. Greenberg, 498 F.3d at 1263; Allen v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. for Bibb Cnty., 495 

F.3d 1306, 1313 (11th Cir. 2007). “The mere existence of some factual dispute will not 

defeat summary judgment unless that factual dispute is material to an issue affecting the 

outcome of the case.” McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th 

Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). “[T]here must exist a conflict in substantial evidence to pose 

a jury question.” Hall v. Sunjoy Indus. Group, Inc., 764 F. Supp. 2d 1297, 1301 (M.D. Fla. 

2011) (citation omitted).

Although factual inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff 

and pro se complaints are entitled to liberal interpretation, a pro se litigant does not escape 

the burden of establishing by sufficient evidence a genuine dispute of material fact. See 

Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 525 (2006); Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 670 (11th 

Cir. 1990). Thus, the plaintiff’s pro se status alone does not compel this court to disregard 

elementary principles of production and proof in a civil case. 

The court has undertaken a thorough and exhaustive review of all the evidence 

contained in the record. After this review, the court finds that Lewis has failed to 

demonstrate a genuine dispute of material fact in order to preclude entry of summary 

judgment in favor of the defendant.

III. DISCUSSION

Lewis complains that Corizon denied him medication and did not otherwise 

undertake appropriate measures for treatment of his Hepatitis C. Corizon adamantly denies 

Case 2:16-cv-00907-WKW-GMB Document 13 Filed 02/10/17 Page 4 of 12
5

that it or any of its employees acted with deliberate indifference to Lewis’ condition. In 

support of this assertion, the defendant maintains that Lewis had continuous access to 

medical treatment provided by health care personnel. The defendant further asserts that 

medical personnel routinely evaluated Lewis regarding his Hepatitis C, conducted 

diagnostic tests to aid in determining necessary treatment, assessed his need for treatment,

and provided treatment in accordance with their professional judgment. 

 To prevail on a claim concerning an alleged denial of medical treatment, an inmate 

must, at a minimum, show that the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to a serious 

medical need. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Taylor v. Adams, 221 F.3d 1254 

(11th Cir. 2000); McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 1999); Waldrop v. Evans, 

871 F.2d 1030, 1033 (11th Cir. 1989). Specifically, medical personnel may not subject an 

inmate to “acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to 

serious medical needs.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; Adams v. Poag, 61 F.3d 1537, 1546 (11th

Cir. 1995) (holding, as directed by Estelle, that a plaintiff must establish “not merely the 

knowledge of a condition, but the knowledge of necessary treatment coupled with a refusal 

to treat or a delay in [the acknowledged necessary] treatment”). 

At least within the Eleventh Circuit, medical malpractice does not equate to 

deliberate indifference:

That medical malpractice—negligence by a physician [or nurse]—is 

insufficient to form the basis of a claim for deliberate indifference is well 

settled. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105–07, 97 S. Ct. 285, 292, 50 

L.Ed.2d 251 (1976); Adams v. Poag, 61 F.3d 1537, 1543 (11th Cir. 1995). 

Instead, something more must be shown. Evidence must support a 

conclusion that a prison [medical care provider’s] harmful acts were 

Case 2:16-cv-00907-WKW-GMB Document 13 Filed 02/10/17 Page 5 of 12
6

intentional or reckless. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833–38, 114 

S. Ct. 1970, 1977–79, 128 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1994); Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 

1480, 1491 (11th Cir. 1996) (stating that deliberate indifference is equivalent 

of recklessly disregarding substantial risk of serious harm to inmate); Adams,

61 F.3d at 1543 (stating that plaintiff must show more than mere negligence 

to assert an Eighth Amendment violation); Hill v. DeKalb Regional Youth 

Detention Ctr., 40 F.3d 1176, 1191 n. 28 (11th Cir. 1994) (recognizing that 

Supreme Court has defined “deliberate indifference” as requiring more than 

mere negligence and has adopted a “subjective recklessness” standard from 

criminal law); Qian v. Kautz, 168 F.3d 949, 955 (7th Cir. 1999) (stating 

“deliberate indifference” is synonym for intentional or reckless conduct, and 

that “reckless” conduct describes conduct so dangerous that deliberate nature 

can be inferred).

Hinson v. Edmond, 192 F.3d 1342, 1345 (11th Cir. 1999).

In order to establish “deliberate indifference to [a] serious medical need . . . , 

Plaintiff[] must show: (1) a serious medical need; (2) the defendant[’s] deliberate 

indifference to that need; and (3) causation between that indifference and the plaintiff’s 

injury.” Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1306–07 (11th Cir. 2009). When seeking 

relief based on deliberate indifference, an inmate is required to establish “an objectively 

serious need, an objectively insufficient response to that need, subjective awareness of facts 

signaling the need and an actual inference of required action from those facts.” Taylor, 221 

F.3d at 1258; McElligott, 182 F.3d at 1255 (holding that, for liability to attach, the official 

must know of and then disregard an excessive risk to the prisoner). As to the objective 

component of a deliberate indifference claim, the plaintiff must first show “an objectively 

‘serious medical need[]’ . . . and second, that the response made by [the defendants] to that 

need was poor enough to constitute ‘an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’ and not 

merely accidental inadequacy, ‘negligen[ce] in diagnos[is] or treat[ment],’ or even 

Case 2:16-cv-00907-WKW-GMB Document 13 Filed 02/10/17 Page 6 of 12
7

‘[m]edical malpractice’ actionable under state law.” Taylor, 221 F.3d at 1258 (internal 

citations omitted). A medical need is serious if it “‘has been diagnosed by a physician as 

mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize 

the necessity for a doctor’s attention.’” Goebert v. Lee Cty., 510 F.3d 1312, 1325 (11th Cir.

2007) (quoting Hill, 40 F.3d at 1187). In addition, “to show the required subjective intent 

. . . , a plaintiff must demonstrate that the public official acted with an attitude of ‘deliberate 

indifference’ . . . which is in turn defined as requiring two separate things[:] ‘awareness of 

facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists 

[] and . . . draw[ing] of the inference[.]’” Taylor, 221 F.3d at 1258 (internal citations 

omitted). Thus, deliberate indifference occurs only when a defendant “knows of and 

disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the [defendant] must both be aware 

of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm 

exists and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; Johnson v. Quinones, 

145 F.3d 164, 168 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that defendant must have actual knowledge of 

a serious condition, not just knowledge of symptoms, and ignore known risk to serious 

condition to warrant finding of deliberate indifference). Furthermore, “an official’s failure 

to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not, while no cause for 

commendation, cannot under our cases be condemned as the infliction of punishment.” 

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838. 

In articulating the scope of inmates’ right to be free from deliberate 

indifference, . . . the Supreme Court has . . . emphasized that not “every claim 

by a prisoner that he has not received adequate medical treatment states a 

violation of the Eighth Amendment.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105, 97 S. Ct. at 

Case 2:16-cv-00907-WKW-GMB Document 13 Filed 02/10/17 Page 7 of 12
8

291; Mandel, 888 F.2d at 787. Medical treatment violates the eighth 

amendment only when it is “so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive 

as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness.” 

Rogers, 792 F.2d at 1058 (citation omitted). Mere incidents of negligence or 

malpractice do not rise to the level of constitutional violations. See Estelle,

429 U.S. at 106, 97 S. Ct. at 292 (“Medical malpractice does not become a 

constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.”); Mandel, 

888 F.2d at 787–88 (mere negligence or medical malpractice ‘not sufficient’ 

to constitute deliberate indifference); Waldrop, 871 F.2d at 1033 (mere 

medical malpractice does not constitute deliberate indifference). Nor does a 

simple difference in medical opinion between the prison’s medical staff and 

the inmate as to the latter’s diagnosis or course of treatment support a claim 

of cruel and unusual punishment. See Waldrop, 871 F.2d at 1033 (citing 

Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 48 (4th Cir. 1977)). 

Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1505 (11th Cir. 1991); Taylor, 221 F.3d at 1258 (citation 

and internal quotations omitted) (holding that, to show deliberate indifference, the plaintiff 

must demonstrate a serious medical need and then must establish that the defendant’s

response to the need was more than “merely accidental inadequacy, negligence in diagnosis 

or treatment, or even medical malpractice actionable under state law”). 

Moreover, “as Estelle teaches, whether government actors should have employed 

additional diagnostic techniques or forms of treatment is a classic example of a matter for 

medical judgment and therefore not an appropriate basis for grounding liability under the 

Eighth Amendment.” Adams, 61 F.3d at 1545 (citation and internal quotations omitted); 

Garvin v. Armstrong, 236 F.3d 896, 898 (7th Cir. 2001) (“A difference of opinion as to 

how a condition should be treated does not give rise to a constitutional violation.”); Hamm 

v. DeKalb County, 774 F.2d 1567, 1575 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that the mere fact an 

inmate desires a different mode of medical treatment does not amount to deliberate 

indifference violative of the Constitution); Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th

Case 2:16-cv-00907-WKW-GMB Document 13 Filed 02/10/17 Page 8 of 12
9

Cir. 1981) (holding that prison medical personnel do not violate the Eighth Amendment 

simply because their opinions concerning medical treatment conflict with that of the 

inmate-patient). 

The evidentiary materials filed by the defendant address the claim made by Lewis

challenging the constitutionality of the medical treatment provided for his Hepatitis C. As 

discussed below, a thorough review of these documents demonstrates that the affidavit 

submitted by the defendant with respect to the material facts is corroborated by the 

contemporaneously compiled objective medical records. The law is well settled that “[s]elf 

serving statements by a plaintiff do not create a question of fact in the face of contradictory, 

contemporaneously created medical records.” Whitehead v. Burnside, 403 F. App’x 401, 

403 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Bennett v. Parker, 898 F.2d 1530 (11th Cir. 1990)).

Dr. Hugh Hood, the Regional Medical Director for Corizon, addresses the claim 

raised by Lewis as follows: 

Hepatitis C is a contagious liver disease that can lead to serious 

problems including cirrhosis (scarring of the liver) and liver cancer. Acute 

Hepatitis C lasts a short time and occurs within the first six months of 

exposure to the Hepatitis C virus. In some cases, the body can get rid of the 

virus on its own. If not, the infection can become chronic. Chronic Hepatitis 

C is serious and long lasting. Hepatitis C is a blood-borne virus, spread by 

blood-to-blood contact. Even a very small amount of infected blood that 

cannot be seen can transmit the virus. Hepatitis C can be diagnosed through 

two tests. The first is the antibody test which shows whether the individual 

has ever been exposed to the Hepatitis C virus. The second is the viral load 

test, also known as the HCV-RNA test. The viral load test can tell if the virus 

is currently in the individual’s blood and can also be utilized to confirm a 

diagnosis and also be used to monitor the individual’s progress with the virus. 

Attached hereto is the medical chart of Joseph Lee Lewis. The 

medical records indicate that at one point in time Mr. Lewis had tested 

positive for the Hepatitis C virus. Mr. Lewis’ blood was regularly checked 

Case 2:16-cv-00907-WKW-GMB Document 13 Filed 02/10/17 Page 9 of 12
10

during his incarceration with the Alabama Department of Corrections. 

However, prior to Mr. Lewis being released from his incarceration with the 

Alabama Department of Corrections [on December 6, 2016], Mr. Lewis’ 

liver function test returned to normal. 

Therefore, Mr. Lewis was in a class of individuals whose body may 

have rid itself of the Hepatitis C virus. A repeat viral load was not done 

before he was paroled.

Mr. Lewis was closely monitored during his incarceration with the 

Alabama Department of Corrections to determine whether in fact he would 

be a candidate for Hepatitis C treatment. However, as stated above, blood 

tests performed on Mr. Lewis suggested that his body had rid itself of the 

Hepatitis C virus and therefore Mr. Lewis was in fact not a candidate for 

Hepatitis C treatment. 

Mr. Lewis condition was never ignored and necessary medical 

treatment for Mr. Lewis was at no time denied or delayed. 

Mr. Lewis was carefully monitored during his incarceration with the 

Alabama Department of Corrections and his medical condition closely 

monitored and regularly tested. 

Doc. 11-1 at 3–4. The affidavit submitted by Dr. Hood is corroborated by the objective 

medical records contemporaneously complied during the treatment process, as explained 

below. 

Under the circumstances of this case, the court concludes that the actions of the 

defendant did not violate Lewis’ constitutional rights. Specifically, neither the defendant 

nor its employees acted in a manner that was “so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or 

excessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to the fundamental fairness.” 

Harris, 941 F.2d at 1505. Rather, the evidence before the court demonstrates that Lewis 

had continuous access to medical treatment from health care personnel employed by 

Corizon through the sick call process and chronic care clinic appointments. Doc. 11-1 at 

8–44 & 54–58. Moreover, Lewis received regular blood tests in order to monitor his 

Hepatitis C. Doc. 11-1 at 46–52. As a result, the court concludes that Lewis’ treatment did 

Case 2:16-cv-00907-WKW-GMB Document 13 Filed 02/10/17 Page 10 of 12
11

not constitute deliberate indifference. Lewis’ self-serving claims of lack of due care and 

deliberate indifference do not create a question of fact in the face of contradictory, 

contemporaneously created medical records. Whitehead, 403 F. App’x at 403 (11th Cir.

2010); see also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (“When opposing parties tell two 

different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable 

jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling 

on a motion for summary judgment.”); Feliciano v. City of Miami Beach, 707 F.3d 1244, 

1253–54 (11th Cir. 2013) (same). In addition, Lewis has failed to present any evidence 

showing that the manner in which medical personnel addressed his condition created a 

substantial risk to his health and that with this knowledge consciously disregarded such 

risk. The record is therefore devoid of evidence—significantly probative or otherwise—

showing that the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to any serious medical need 

experienced by Lewis. Consequently, summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of 

the defendant. Carter, 352 F.3d at 1350.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:

1. The defendant’s motion for summary judgment be GRANTED.

2. Judgment be GRANTED in favor of the defendant.

3. This case be DISMISSED with prejudice.

4. The costs of this proceeding be taxed against the plaintiff.

Case 2:16-cv-00907-WKW-GMB Document 13 Filed 02/10/17 Page 11 of 12
12

It is further ORDERED that on or before February 24, 2017 the parties may file 

objections to this recommendation. A party must specifically identify the factual findings 

and legal conclusions in the recommendation to which the objection is made; frivolous, 

conclusive, or general objections will not be considered. 

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in 

the Magistrate Judge’s report shall bar a party from a de novo determination by the District 

Court of factual findings and legal issues covered in the report and shall “waive the right 

to challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal 

conclusions” except upon grounds of plain error if necessary in the interests of justice. 11th 

Cir. R. 3-1; see Resolution Trust Co. v. Hallmark Builders, Inc., 996 F.2d 1144, 1149 (11th 

Cir. 1993); Henley v. Johnson, 885 F.2d 790, 794 (11th Cir. 1989).

Done this 10th day of February, 2017.

 /s/ Gray M. Borden 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 2:16-cv-00907-WKW-GMB Document 13 Filed 02/10/17 Page 12 of 12