Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_19-cv-08002/USCOURTS-azd-3_19-cv-08002-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Heidi Ann Hosmer,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Commissioner of Social Security 

Administration,

Defendant.

No. CV-19-08002-PCT-JJT

ORDER 

Plaintiff Heidi Ann Hosmer challenges the denial of her Applications for Disability 

Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income by the Social Security 

Administration under the Social Security Act (the Act). Plaintiff filed a Complaint (Doc. 1) 

with this Court seeking judicial review of that denial, and the Court now addresses 

Plaintiff’s Opening Brief (Doc. 14, Pl. Br.), Defendant Social Security Administration 

Commissioner’s Response Brief (Doc. 21, Def. Br.), and Plaintiff’s Reply (Doc. 24, 

Reply). The Court has reviewed the briefs and Administrative Record (Doc. 11, R.) and 

now reverses the Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ) decision (R. at 36–48).

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed an application for Disability Insurance Benefits on March 26, 2015, 

and an application for Supplemental Security Income on February 23, 2016, both for a 

period of disability beginning on August 22, 2014. (R. at 36.) Her claim was denied initially 

on August 19, 2015, and upon reconsideration on January 14, 2016. (R. at 36.) Plaintiff 

appeared by video before the ALJ on September 8, 2017, for a hearing regarding her claim. 

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(R. at 36.) On January 3, 2018, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s claim, and on November 6, 2018, 

the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s Request for Review of the ALJ’s decision. (R. at 1–

4, 36–48.)

The Court has reviewed the medical evidence in its entirety and finds it unnecessary 

to provide a complete summary here. The pertinent medical evidence will be discussed in 

addressing the issues raised by the parties. Upon considering the medical records and 

opinions, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s disability based on the following severe 

impairments: (1) fibromyalgia, (2) mild neurocognitive disorder, (3) depressive disorder, 

(4) posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and (5) anxiety disorder. (R. at 39.) The ALJ also 

found that Plaintiff had the medically determinable condition of kidney stones, which were 

not a severe impairment. (R. at 39.)

Ultimately, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled. (R. at 47.) She 

determined that Plaintiff “does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that 

meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 

404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.” (R. at 39.) Additionally, she determined that Plaintiff has the 

residual functional capacity (RFC) to “perform light work . . . except she can sit for only 

about 4 hours out of an 8-hour workday and stand and/or walk about 4 hours of an 8-hour 

workday,” along with some other physical limitations. (R. at 41.) “She is able to perform 

simple, routine tasks and make simple, work-related decision in an environment with few 

changes and free from fast-paced production requirements.” (R. at 41.) Moreover, Plaintiff 

“can have occasional and superficial interaction with coworkers, supervisors, and the 

public, such that the interaction is incidental to the task performed.” (R. at 41.) 

Accordingly, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could perform unskilled work at a light exertional 

level, such as merchandise marker or office helper, and Plaintiff is not disabled under the 

Act. (R. at 47.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

In determining whether to reverse an ALJ’s decision, the district court reviews only 

those issues raised by the party challenging the decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 

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517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). The Court may set aside the Commissioner’s disability 

determination only if the determination is not supported by substantial evidence or is based 

on legal error. Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is 

relevant evidence that a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion 

considering the record as a whole. Id. To determine whether substantial evidence supports 

a decision, the Court must consider the record as a whole. Id. Generally, “[w]here the 

evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports the 

ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 

954 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).

To determine whether a claimant is disabled for purposes of the Act, the ALJ 

follows a five-step process. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). The claimant bears the burden of 

proof on the first four steps, but the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five. Tackett 

v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). At the first step, the ALJ determines whether 

the claimant is presently engaging in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i). At step two, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has a “severe”

medically determinable physical or mental impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). At 

step three, the ALJ considers whether the claimant’s impairment or combination of 

impairments meets or medically equals an impairment listed in Appendix 1 to Subpart P 

of 20 C.F.R. Part 404. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If so, the claimant is automatically 

found to be disabled. Id. At step four, the ALJ assesses the claimant’s RFC and determines 

whether the claimant is still capable of performing past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). At the fifth and final step, the ALJ determines whether the claimant 

can perform any other work in the national economy based on the claimant’s RFC, age, 

education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If not, the claimant is 

disabled. Id.

. . . . 

. . . . 

. . . . 

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III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff raises two arguments for the Court’s consideration. Plaintiff argues the ALJ 

erred by: (1) rejecting the assessment of Dr. Horan, an examining psychologist; and

(2) rejecting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony.

In March 2017, Kevin Horan, Ph.D., a licensed psychologist, conducted a detailed 

examination of Plaintiff “for neuropsychological assessment in order to help learn the 

extent to which her fibromyalgia condition may be contributing to her mental health 

diagnosis.” (R. at 552.) Dr. Horan administered 12 psychological tests, conducted a clinical 

interview, and made behavioral observations. (R. at 553.) He opined that Plaintiff “has 

good days and bad days,” but would “work slowly and could be internally 

occupied/distractible and not attentive particularly when she is experiencing pain or 

migraine headaches.” (R. at 561–62.) He also observed that Plaintiff displays “problems 

with immediate, as well as delayed memory and prolonged attention/concentration and 

cognitive stamina.” (R. at 562.)

The ALJ gave Dr. Horan’s opinion “only some weight” because (1) Dr. Horan 

“seemed to place a heavy emphasis on the claimant’s physical conditions as being the cause 

of her mental functional deficits,” which “is outside the expertise of Dr. Horan, a 

psychologist, who has no training in the diagnosis of medical conditions”; (2) “the medical 

evidence did not provide much support for the claimant’s alleged pain”; and (3) 

Dr. Horan’s opinion is inconsistent with treating examinations of record” with regard to 

Plaintiff’s mental limitations, and specifically, “another neuropsychological evaluation in 

June 2016 showed no memory decline.” (R. at 45.) The ALJ also stated that Plaintiff’s 

treating source examinations and the June 2016 evaluation “generally showed good 

functioning,” and while Dr. Horan’s March 2017 neuropsychological evaluation 

constituted “[t]he most significant adverse findings,” it “was only one examination at one 

time, not representative of the claimant’s functioning throughout the entire period.” (R. at 

46.)

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An examining physician’s opinion is generally entitled to greater weight than the 

opinion of a nonexamining physician. Pitzer v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d 502, 506 (9th Cir. 1990). 

An ALJ must provide clear and convincing reasons for rejecting the uncontradicted opinion 

of an examining physician. Id. Even if the opinion of an examining physician is contradicted 

by the opinion of another doctor, the examining physician’s opinion can only be rejected for 

specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence. Andrews v. Shalala, 

53 F.3d 1035, 1043 (9th Cir. 1995).

At first blush, Dr. Horan’s March 2017 psychological evaluation of Plaintiff 

contradicted the evaluation conducted by Aileen A. Lee, Ph.D., in June 2016. As the ALJ 

points out, Dr. Lee opined after an extensive evaluation that Plaintiff’s “concerns regarding 

memory decline [are] not supported by test results.” (R. at 534.) However, in the next 

paragraph, Dr. Lee said Plaintiff “is experiencing significant psychiatric difficulty. She is 

experiencing significant depression coupled with anxiety and tension. It is likely that her 

psychiatric status is contributing to her perception of memory decline as well as chronic 

pain.” (R. at 534.) Dr. Lee recommended “[f]urther exploration of events surrounding the 

time of her pain,” to provide “direction for therapy.” (R. at 534.)

Plaintiff’s reports of pain, to both Dr. Lee and Dr. Horan, were inherently subjective 

reports. See Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 347 (9th Cir. 1991) (pain is “completely 

subjective” and the Agency must consider all available evidence in evaluating reports of 

pain). Dr. Lee gave a clinical impression of those reports tied to Plaintiff’s “significant 

depression coupled with anxiety and tension,” and Dr. Lee did not conclude that Plaintiff 

would have no functional limitations as a result of her “significant psychiatric difficulty.” 

(R. at 534.) Dr. Horan’s evaluation—in which he identified Plaintiff’s functional 

limitations resulting from her mental state—did not contradict Dr. Lee’s evaluation, but 

rather built upon it. Thus, inconsistency with Dr. Lee’s evaluation provided the ALJ with 

neither a “clear and convincing” nor a “specific and legitimate” reason to discount 

Dr. Horan’s assessment of Plaintiff.

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The ALJ also states that Dr. Horan’s opinion merits little weight because his 

assessment of Plaintiff’s physical pain was outside his area of expertise. Dr. Horan did not 

assess Plaintiff’s physical pain in and of itself, but rather opined on the effect Plaintiff’s 

perception of her physical pain had on her mental state—much like Dr. Lee did. (R. at 530–

534, 552–571.) As a result, Dr. Horan’s opinion was not outside of his specialty, and the 

ALJ erred in discounting the opinion on that basis. 

Finally, the ALJ indicates Dr. Horan’s opinion is inconsistent with Plaintiff’s 

treatment records, identifying specifically psychiatric notes from January 26, 2015 (R. at 

445–46), March 4, 2015 (R. at 433–34), and July 28, 2015 (R. at 481). To the extent those 

notes provided sufficient detail, they stated that Plaintiff is dysphoric, suffers from 

significant depression but does not want to acknowledge it, and has “Anxiety Disorder due 

to General Medical Condition (Fibromyalgia),” “difficulty concentrating,” and “Moderate 

Symptoms of Difficulty in Functioning.” (R. at 433–34, 445–46, 481.) Nothing in these 

notes was inconsistent with Dr. Horan’s assessment of Plaintiff’s functional limitations, 

and the ALJ erred in discounting Dr. Horan’s assessment on that basis as well.1

The ALJ thus failed to give adequate reasons supported by substantial evidence in 

the record to discount Dr. Horan’s assessment, which Dr. Horan made after a thorough and 

detailed examination of Plaintiff. This error was material because, at the hearing, the 

Vocational Expert concluded that a hypothetical person like Plaintiff with the limitations 

identified by Dr. Horan would not be able to work in the national economy. (R. at 79–80.)

Thus, had the ALJ properly incorporated the findings of Dr. Horan in Plaintiff’s RFC, she 

would have been compelled to conclude that Plaintiff is disabled under the Act. Moreover, 

the Court finds that the ALJ erred in failing to fully credit Plaintiff’s testimony as to her 

limitations. See Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014–15 (9th Cir. 2014) (noting that, 

where a claimant’s medically determinable impairments can reasonably be expected to 

cause the reported symptoms, the ALJ may not conclude that the severity or extent of the 

1 To the extent the ALJ relies on the opinions of non-examining state agency reviewers, 

those opinions do not outweigh the opinions of Plaintiff’s treating and examining 

physicians such that they could constitute adequate substantial evidence to support a 

finding that Plaintiff is not disabled. Buck v. Berryhill, 869 F.3d 1040, 1050 (9th Cir. 2017).

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reported symptoms is not supported by the ALJ’s reading of the objective medical 

evidence).

Plaintiff asks that the Court apply the “credit-as-true” rule, which would result in 

remand of Plaintiff’s case for a payment of benefits rather than for further proceedings. 

(Pl. Br. at 25.) The credit-as-true rule only applies in cases raising circumstances that

permit the Court to depart from the ordinary remand rule under which the case is remanded 

for additional investigation or explanation. Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 

F.3d 1090, 1099–1102 (9th Cir. 2014). These circumstances arise when three elements are 

present. First, the ALJ must have failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting 

medical evidence. Id. at 1100. Second, the record must be fully developed, there must be 

no outstanding issues that must be resolved before a determination of disability can be 

made, and the Court must find that further administrative proceedings would not be useful. 

Id. at 1101. Further proceedings are considered useful when there are conflicts and 

ambiguities that must be resolved. Id. Third, if the above elements are met, the Court may 

“find[] the relevant testimony credible as a matter of law . . . and then determine whether 

the record, taken as a whole, leaves ‘not the slightest uncertainty as to the outcome of [the] 

proceeding.’” Id. (citations omitted). 

In this case, the credit-as-true rule applies. As the Court discussed above, the ALJ 

failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting the opinion of the examining 

psychologist. If this evidence is properly credited, the Court sees no significant conflicts 

or ambiguities that are left for the ALJ to resolve. Moreover, considering the record as a 

whole, the Court credits Plaintiff’s testimony as a matter of law and is left with no doubt 

that Plaintiff is disabled under the Act. See Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1022–23; Lingenfelter v. 

Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1040–41 & n.12 (9th Cir. 2007).

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED reversing the January 3, 2018 decision of the 

Administrative Law Judge (R. at 36–48). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED remanding this case to the Social Security 

Administration for a calculation and payment of benefits.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk to enter final judgment 

consistent with this Order and close this case.

Dated this 16th day of March, 2020.

Honorable John J. Tuchi

United States District Judge

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