Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02156/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-02156-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983pr Prisoner Civil Rights

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GREGORY L. FLETCHER

C-41111,

Plaintiff,

v.

C/O QUIN; C/O LOPEZ; SERGEANT 

STRICLAND; C/O ROMERO; C/O 

GALVAN; C/O GRISSON; C/O 

SORRANNO; CAPTAIN SANCHEZ,

Defendants.

Case No.: 3:15-cv-02156-GPC-NLS

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION: 

[Dkt. No. 25]

(1) GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS;

[Dkt. No. 22]

(2) EXTENDING THE TIME TO 

EFFECT SERVICE UNDER FED R. 

CIV. P. 4(m)

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Gregory Fletcher, an inmate proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, 

filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants G. Galvan 

(“Galvan”) and F. Quinn

1

(“Quinn”) filed a Motion to Dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 

 

1 The Court observes that Defendant Quinn is also referred to as “Quin” in the case caption and in 

Plaintiff’s submissions to the Court. 

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12(b)(6).2 Plaintiff did not file an Opposition. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), United 

States Magistrate Judge Nita L. Stormes filed a Report and Recommendation granting

Defendants’ motion to dismiss with leave to amend and granting Plaintiff an extension of 

time to effect service. Neither party filed an objection to the Report and 

Recommendation. 

Based on the reasoning below, the Court ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s Report 

and Recommendation. 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On September 24, 2015, Plaintiff filed a complaint against a number of prison 

officials employed at the Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”) in San Diego, 

California. Dkt. No. 1. On October 26, 2015, the Court dismissed the complaint without 

prejudice for failure to pay filing fees. Dkt. No. 4. On December 8, 2015, Plaintiff filed 

a first amended complaint (“FAC”), and on December 28, 2015, Plaintiff filed a motion 

to proceed in forma pauperis. Dkt. No. 6 & 8. The Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to 

proceed in forma pauperis and directed the U.S. Marshal to effect service on Plaintiff’s 

behalf. Dkt. No. 11. 

The FAC alleges that Defendants violated Plaintiff’s (1) Eighth Amendment right 

to be free from cruel and unusual punishment and (2) First Amendment rights to freedom 

of association, free speech, and freedom of religion. FAC, Dkt. No. 6. On June 20, 2016, 

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Defendants Galvan and Quinn. Dkt. No. 22. 

Plaintiff filed no opposition. On July 7, 2016, Magistrate Judge Stormes filed a Report 

and Recommendation granting Defendants’ motion with leave to amend. Report and 

Recommendation (R&R), Dkt. No. 25. The Report and Recommendation also granted 

Plaintiff an extension of time to effect service as a number of the individuals identified as 

defendants have yet to receive service. 

 

2 Hereafter, all references to “Defendants” will refer solely to Galvan and Quinn as they are the only 

Defendants who moved to dismiss. 

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STANDARD OF REVIEW 

In reviewing a Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, “[a] judge of the 

court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report . . . to which 

objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); United States 

v. Remsing, 874 F.2d 614, 617 (9th Cir. 1989). However, in the absence of timely 

objection, “the court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the 

record in order to accept the recommendation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee’s 

notes. When no objections are filed, a district court may assume the correctness of the 

magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations, and decide the motion on the 

applicable law. Campbell v. U.S. Dist. Court, 501 F.2d 196, 206 (9th Cir. 1974); Johnson 

v. Nelson, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1217 (S.D. Cal. 2001). 

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff met with a woman from the Attorney General’s Office on September 9, 

2014. FAC, Dkt. No. 6 at 3. Later that day an unidentified inmate told Officer Romero, 

a correctional officer, that Plaintiff had spoken to the Attorney General’s Office about the 

inmate and Romero. Id. At an undisclosed later time, Romero pushed Plaintiff in his 

chest seven to eight times. Id. Thereafter, when Plaintiff returned to his cell, he noticed 

that his space was “tore up.” Id. He attempted to leave his unit and to speak with a 

superior about what had happened, but Officer Grisson, also a correctional officer, 

blocked him from doing so. Id. At that point, Officer Romero shoved Plaintiff back into 

his cell and punched Plaintiff in his chest. Id. Romero punched Plaintiff so hard that he 

re-broke his thumb trying to catch his fall. Id. Plaintiff then asked Officers Grisson and 

Romero for medical help, but they refused. Id. (“I told c/o Romero and c/o Grisson that 

I need medical help, they told me, that they didn’t care if I died and that I will not get no 

help”). The officers then proceeded to tell Plaintiff that he did not know who he was 

“messing” with and that “no-one [sic] mess with him, Grisson, Galvan, Sorreano.” Id. 

According to Plaintiff, all of these officers were part of the “Greenwall Officer Mafia 

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Group” and were dangerous, corrupt, and responsible for covering up murders, beatings, 

and more. Id. 

On September 5, 2015, Plaintiff had an encounter with Officer Lopez, another 

correctional officer. Id. at 4. Allegedly, Lopez “set [Plaintiff] up with morphine pills” 

and, at some point, had Plaintiff undress and bend over for Lopez. Id. Lopez then placed 

his hands on Plaintiff’s waist and said “um, that’s nice.” Id. Lopez then began to stalk 

Plaintiff for months, sexually harass, sexually assault, and sexually batter him. Id. At 

one point Plaintiff told Officer Lopez that his hands, feet, and back were hurting badly, 

but Lopez refused to provide Plaintiff with any medical attention. Id. Officer Lopez told 

medical staff that they should “let him [Plaintiff] suffer, he anit [sic] shit, we want him 

dead and we will get him one day, he will died [sic], neglect all his medical care.” Id. 

Lopez then proceeded to get Officer Stricland, also a correctional officer, involved in the 

dispute by asking him (Stricland) to “back him [Lopez] up” by writing a memo. Id.

Finally, at an undisclosed time, Plaintiff states that Captain Sanchez, another 

correctional officer, locked him up for no reason and verbally abused him in order to 

“keep [him] from talking to anyone.” Id. at 5. Lopez allegedly told Plaintiff that she did 

not care about his religion and that he did not have the right to speak. Id. Plaintiff 

alleged that Lopez said these things because he filed a writ of habeas corpus with the 

“U.S. State Supreme Court” that included allegations concerning conspiracy to commit 

murder, killings, set ups, and sexual quid pro quo. See id. Plaintiff goes on to add that 

Captain Sanchez, Lieutenant Williams, and Officer Quinn “all wanted [him] dead” and 

that Captain Sanchez wanted someone to set Plaintiff up because she is corrupt and part 

of the RJD Greenwall Officer Mafia Group. See id. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Every complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing 

that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Accordingly, prior to filing 

a responsive pleading, a party may request by motion that the court dismiss an opposing 

party’s complaint because it failed “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” 

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Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In order “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must 

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Complaints do “not require ‘detailed 

factual allegations,’” but must contain more than “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of 

a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements” to survive a motion to 

dismiss. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible 

claim for relief . . . [is] a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw 

on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. If the court can only infer “the 

mere possibility of misconduct” from the pleaded facts, the complaint falls short of 

meeting the plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 

969 (2009) (“[T]o survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory ‘factual content,’ and 

reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling 

the plaintiff to relief.”)

As Plaintiff is an inmate proceeding pro se, “his complaint must be held to less 

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 

338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotations omitted). Courts, therefore, must “construe 

the pleadings [of pro se litigants ] liberally.” Id. Nonetheless, “vague and conclusory 

allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to state a 

claim.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). The Plaintiff must still 

plead at least “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Hebbe, 

627 F.3d at 342. 

DISCUSSION

Defendants Quinn and Galvan argue that they should be dismissed from Plaintiff’s 

suit because the FAC does not allege that either of them were personally involved in any 

of the events that allegedly violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See generally, Dkt. 

No. 22-1 at 4. The Report and Recommendation agreed and concluded that Plaintiff’s 

FAC failed to state a cause of action against either Defendant. See generally Dkt. No. 25. 

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After having reviewed the Magistrate Judge’s proposed findings and conclusions, the 

Court agrees that Defendants’ motion to dismiss should be granted as to Quinn and 

Galvan because Plaintiff has failed to state an Eighth or First Amendment claim against 

either Defendant. 

A. Eighth Amendment Violation under § 1983

An official that “subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United 

States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 

Constitution” is personally liable for that violation. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because “[b]eing 

violently assaulted in prison is simply not part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay 

for their offenses against society,” “[a] prison official’s ‘deliberate indifference’ to a 

substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate violates the Eighth Amendment.” Farmer v. 

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828, 834 (1994) (internal quotations omitted). Any prisoner 

challenging official conduct, therefore, must satisfy two requirements: (1) that the 

deprivation suffered is objectively, sufficiently serious and (2) that the official has a 

sufficiently culpable state of mind to implicate the Eighth Amendment’s protection 

against the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Id. at 834. Prison officials act

with “deliberate indifference” if they act, or fail to act, despite knowing that a substantial 

risk of serious harm threatens the plaintiff-inmate. Id. at 841; see also Solis v. Cnty. of 

Los Angeles, 514 F.3d 946, 957 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Only “deliberate indifference” that actually causes an inmate’s injuries is 

actionable under § 1983. See Clem v. Lomeli, 566 F.3d 1177, 1182 (9th Cir. 2009)

“Personal participation by the prison official” in the challenged event is one way to 

establish that an official subjected a prisoner to a deprivation of their rights. Taylor v. 

List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989)). Additionally, a plaintiff can also establish 

causation by showing that the defendant “set[ ] in motion a series of acts by others which 

the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict the 

constitutional injury.” See Dahlia v. Rodriquez, 735 F.3d 1060, 1078 n.22 (9th Cir. 

2013) (internal citations omitted). 

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1. Analysis 

The FAC fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim against Galvan or Quinn 

because Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that either Defendant acted with “deliberate 

indifference” to Plaintiff’s medical needs, as is required under the second prong of the 

Farmer test, or that the Defendant’s actions or failures to act caused his injuries.5 As the 

Report and Recommendation discussed, the FAC does not set forth any factual 

allegations from which the Court can reasonably infer that either Defendant acted with 

deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s medical needs. 

Plaintiff’s only allegations against Officer Galvan are (1) that Officer Romero told 

Plaintiff that he should not mess with Officer Galvan, among others, and (2) that Officer 

Galvan is part of the “Greenwall Officer Mafia Group,” which is a dangerous and corrupt 

group that has covered up murders, beatings, and other crimes. See FAC, Dkt. No. 6 at 3. 

The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that these conclusory allegations regarding 

Galvan’s allegiances, corruption, and participation in the Greenwall Officer Mafia Group, 

“without further factual basis is insufficient to state a claim for relief” under the standards 

of Ashcroft and Twombly. R&R, Dkt. No. 25 at 5. The FAC is entirely devoid of any 

allegations showing that Officer Galvan personally participated in any assault upon 

Plaintiff or that he had knowledge that there was any risk of substantial harm to Plaintiff. 

The Court further notes that it is also not enough to simply assert that Officer Galvan is a 

member of a group that may have acted with deliberate indifference towards Plaintiff, 

because group liability is an improper alternative ground for liability. See Chuman v. 

Wright, 76 F.3d 292, 295 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding that a team effort theory of liability is 

improper because the it “allows the jury to lump all the defendants together, rather than 

require it to base each individual's liability on his own conduct.”); see also Leer v. 

 

5

If taken as true, Plaintiff’s allegations would arguably be sufficient to demonstrate that he suffered an 

objectively serious injury under the first prong of Farmer. However, because Plaintiff’s claims are 

insufficient under the second prong of Farmer and to demonstrate causation, the Court need not address 

this point. 

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Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988) (“the prisoner must set forth specific facts as 

to each individual defendant’s deliberate indifference.”). Accordingly, the Court 

concludes that Plaintiff has failed to state an Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim 

against Defendant Galvan. 

Plaintiff’s allegations against Officer Quinn are similarly insufficient to state a 

claim for relief. The FAC alleges that Officer Quinn, along with Captain Sanchez, 

Lieutenant Williams, wanted him dead. FAC, Dkt. No. 6 at 5. Yet threats alone do not 

violate the Eighth Amendment. See Gaut v. Sunn, 810 F.2d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 1987) 

(“We find no case that squarely holds a threat to do an act prohibited by the Constitution 

is equivalent to doing the act itself”); see also Babcock v. Clarke, 373 F. App’x 720, 722 

(9th Cir. 2010). Rather, the official must actually participate in, or “set[ ] in motion a 

series of acts by others” that leads to, the act that violates the prisoner’s Eighth 

Amendment rights. See Dahlia, 735 F.3d at 1078. Plaintiff, however, has failed to allege 

that Quinn was personally involved in any deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights or that he had 

knowledge of any substantial risk of harm that Plaintiff faced. Accordingly, Plaintiff has 

failed to state a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Quinn. 

B. First Amendment Violation under § 1983. 

1. Freedom of Speech

In order to prove a retaliation claim in the prison context, a Plaintiff must 

demonstrate that (1) a state actor took adverse action against him or her (2) because of (3) 

that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of 

his First Amendment rights and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate 

correctional goal. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005). At the 

pleading stage, the Plaintiff is not required to “demonstrate a total chilling of his First 

Amendment rights to file grievances and to pursue civil rights litigation in order to 

perfect a retaliation claim.” Id. at 568 (emphasis omitted). Rather, he only has to “show 

that the defendant ‘intended to interfere’ with the plaintiff’s First Amendment rights.” 

Ariz. Students’ Ass’n v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 824 F.3d 858, 867 (9th Cir. 2016). 

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As the Magistrate Judge noted, it is not clear from the face of the complaint 

whether Plaintiff is asserting a First Amendment claim against Quinn.

6

 This lack of 

clarity prevents the Court from concluding that Plaintiff’s allegations state a claim against 

Defendant Quinn. Plaintiff alleged that Captain Sanchez locked him up and told him not

to speak to anyone “all because, [he] sent the U.S. State Supreme Court a writ of habeas 

corpus.” FAC, Dkt. No. 6 at 5. By filing a writ of habeas corpus with the “U.S. State 

Supreme Court,” Plaintiff arguably engaged in protected conduct. The FAC, however, 

fails to establish any of the remaining elements of a retaliation claim as to Quinn. In 

order to state a claim against Quinn, Plaintiff had to demonstrate that Quinn took adverse 

action against him, because of that protected conduct, without a legitimate correctional 

goal, and with the intention of interfering with Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights. Yet 

the only allegation lodged against Officer Quinn is that he “wanted [Plaintiff] dead.” Id. 

Even recognizing that “the mere threat of harm can be an adverse action, regardless of 

whether it is carried out because the threat itself can have a chilling effect,” Brodheim v. 

Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1270 (9th Cir. 2009) (emphasis added), Plaintiff’s claim still fails. 

The FAC offers no facts demonstrating that Quinn ever communicated any threat to 

Plaintiff. Plaintiff has also failed to plead that Quinn made any such threat because 

Plaintiff had filed as habeas petition or that Quinn made such a threat with the intention 

of chilling his right to file a habeas petition or some other protected act. As such, even 

construing the complaint liberally, the FAC does not contain enough facts for the Court 

to conclude that there is a viable First Amendment retaliation claim against Quinn. 

/ / / / 

/ / / / 

/ / / / 

 

6 There is no reasonable basis for arguing that Plaintiff has stated a First Amendment claim against 

Defendant Galvan, as Galvan’s name is not mentioned at all in Plaintiff’s First Amendment allegations. 

See FAC, Dkt. No. 6 at 5. Defendant Quinn, by contrast, is named in Count 3 of Plaintiff’s complaint, 

which addresses the First Amendment claims. 

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2. Right to free exercise & Right to freely associate

Plaintiff additionally alleges that Defendants violated his right to freely practice his 

religion and freely associate.7 FAC, Dkt. No. 6 at 5. Inmates retain their First 

Amendment right to freely exercise religion. Henderson v. Terhune, 379 F.3d 709, 712 

(9th Cir. 2004). Inmates also retain the right to freely associate, though the right is 

substantially curtailed for prisoners. Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131 (2003) 

(“Freedom of association is among those rights least compatible with incarceration”); 

Dunn v. Castro, 621 F.3d 1196, 1201 (9th Cir. 2010) (“prisoners do not enjoy an 

absolute right to receive visits while incarcerated.”). Here, however, Plaintiff has failed 

to state any viable freedom of religion or freedom to associate claim against Quinn.

The only allegation speaking to these claims states that Captain Sanchez told Plaintiff 

“that she will don’t care [sic] about my religion nor do I have the right to speak.” FAC, 

Dkt. No. 6 at 5. This allegation, however, does not implicate Defendant Quinn in any

way. This allegation also fails to even indicate that any injury even occurred, as it is 

unclear whether Plaintiff was actually prevented from practicing his religion or speaking 

with others. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a plausible, cognizable violation of 

Plaintiff’s right to exercise his religion or his right to freely associate. 

C. Leave to Amend

The Magistrate Judge recommended granting Plaintiff leave to amend his 

complaint, as it was not “absolutely clear” that the deficiencies of the complaint could not 

be cured by amendment. R&R, Dkt. No. 25 at 9 (citing Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 

245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995)). The Court agrees. “The court should freely give leave [to 

amend] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). The “rule favoring liberality 

in amendments to pleadings is particularly important for the pro se litigant.” Lopez v. 

 

7 Again, as was the case with the retaliation cause of action, it is unclear which individuals Plaintiff has 

implicated in these First Amendment claims besides for Captain Sanchez. See Dkt. No. 6 at 5. Because 

Defendant Quinn is named in count three of Plaintiff’s FAC, which addresses these religious and speech 

violations, the Court will address these claims as to him only. 

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Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (quotations omitted). Thus, when a pleading 

can be cured by the allegations of other facts leave to amend is proper. Id. at 1127. The 

Court finds that Plaintiff may be able to remedy the defects in his complaint if he offers 

additional allegations as to Galvan and Quinn, connecting both officers to the Eighth and 

First Amendment violations. Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to amend his 

allegations as those Defendants. 

D. Extension of Time to Effect Service

On February 2, 2016, the Court approved Plaintiff’s petition to proceed in forma 

pauperis and directed the U.S. Marshal to effect service of summons on the defendants. 

Dkt. No. 11 at 5. To date, however, the only defendants who have been served are 

Quinn, Galvan, and Sanchez. Dkt. Nos. 19-21. The U.S. Marshal was unable to serve 

Grisson, Romero, Sorrano, Lopez, and Stricland/Stricklin8 because the RJD litigation 

coordinator could not identify those individuals without their first initials. Dkt. Nos. 13-

18. The time allotted to serve those five defendants expired on or about May 3, 2016. 

Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m), “[i]f a defendant is not served within 90 days after the 

complaint is filed, the court . . . must dismiss the action without prejudice against that 

defendant or order service be made within a specified time.” The Magistrate Judge took 

note of this problem, and (1) recommended that the Court provide the Plaintiff with an 

extension of time to serve the above-mentioned parties and (2) directed the Deputy 

Attorney General assigned to the case to liaison with the RJD litigation coordinator in 

order to provide the first initials of the unserved defendants to the U.S. Marshal. R&R, 

Dkt. No. 25 at 10. 

Rule 4(m) provides that a court may extend the time for service for an appropriate 

period if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure. Fed. R. Civ. P 4(m); cf. Efaw v. 

Williams, 473 F.3d 1038, 1041 (9th Cir. 2007) (“District courts have broad discretion to 

 

8

In a later submission filed with the Court, Plaintiff explained that “Stricklin” and “Strickland” are the 

same person. Dkt. No. 24 at 2. 

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extend time for service under Rule 4(m).”) Plaintiff filed a document with the Court

indicating that he did not provide the first initials of the various, un-served defendants 

because “none of those officers would give me or tell me their badge numbers nor their 

first initials.” Dkt. No. 24 at 2. He has since attempted to identify each unserved 

defendant as best he could by providing, among other information, the buildings where 

those individuals work and their respective titles. See generally id. Accordingly, the 

Court finds that Plaintiff has demonstrated good cause for failing to effect service on 

those individuals. 

“Attorneys, as officers of the court, have a duty to cooperate with the court to 

preserve and promote the efficient operation of our system of justice.” Chapman v. Pac. 

Tel. & Tel. Co., 613 F.2d 193, 197 (9th Cir. 1979). Given Plaintiff’s good faith effort to 

identify the defendants and in the interest of judicial efficiency, the Court orders the 

Deputy Attorney General assigned to this case to contact the litigation coordinator at RJD 

and provide the coordinator with the description and identifying information contained in 

Plaintiff’s letter (see Dkt. No. 24), for purposes of identifying the first initial of the five 

unserved defendants. In the event that the litigation coordinator is able to identify the 

unserved defendants, the Court directs the Deputy Attorney General to provide the first 

initials of the unserved defendants to the U.S. Marshal in a confidential memorandum. 

The U.S. Marshal should then use that information to serve the summons and First 

Amended Complaint on the unserved defendants that have been identified. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the above, the Court ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation of the 

Magistrate Judge, and: 

A. GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim with leave 

to amend. Plaintiff must file any amended complaint, with additional 

allegations as to Defendants Galvan and Quinn, within sixty (60) days from the 

date of this order. 

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B. GRANTS Plaintiff an additional ninety (90) days to serve the First Amended 

Complaint on the Defendants who never received service under Fed. R. Civ. P. 

4(m); and

C. ORDERS that the assigned Deputy Attorney General contact the litigation 

coordinator at RJD to attempt to identify the remaining, unserved defendants

and take the additional steps set out above. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 3, 2017

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