Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-4_19-cv-00828/USCOURTS-ared-4_19-cv-00828-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS 

CENTRAL DIVISION 

GLEN THOMAS DOTSON PETITIONER 

V. NO. 4:19-CV-00828-JM-JTR 

DEWAYNE HENDRIX, 

Warden, FCI-Low, Forrest City RESPONDENT 

 

RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION

Instructions 

 The following Recommended Disposition (“Recommendation”) has been sent 

to United States District Judge James Moody, Jr. You may file written objections to 

all or part of this Recommendation. If you do so, those objections must: (1) 

specifically explain the factual and/or legal basis for your objection; and (2) be 

received by the Clerk of this Court within fourteen (14) days of this 

Recommendation. By not objecting, you may waive the right to appeal questions of 

fact. 

I. Introduction 

 Pending before the Court is a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 Petition for a Writ of Habeas 

Corpus filed by Petitioner, Glen Thomas Dotson (“Dotson”), who is currently 

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incarcerated at the Federal Medical Center in Springfield, Missouri.1

 Doc. 1. Dotson 

challenges the validity of a sentence imposed by the United States District Court for 

the Eastern District of Missouri in United States v. Jackson, et al., Case No. 4:05-

CR-00605 HEA (“Dotson I”).2

 More specifically, Dotson contends that his 

constitutional rights were violated because: (1) the original Judgment and 

Commitment Order erroneously cited 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) as the statute under 

which he was convicted for “conspiracy to deliver a firearm to a convicted felon” 

and erroneously cited 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) as the statute under which he was 

sentenced for the conviction;3

 (2) after later entering an Amended Judgment that 

cited the correct statutes of conviction and punishment, the trial court erred in not 

allowing Dotson a resentencing hearing; and (3) his co-defendant, Virgil Jackson, 

was sentenced to 120 months, while he was sentenced to 240 months. 

 

1

 Dotson was incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution in Forrest City, Arkansas 

when he filed his Petition. 

2

 A copy of the docket sheet from Dotson I is attached as Exhibit D to Respondent’s 

Response. Doc. 10-4. 

3

 The Judgment and Commitment Order should have specified that Dotson was convicted 

for violating § 922(d)(1) (knowingly receiving and possessing a firearm and then delivering it to a 

known felon) and sentenced under § 924(a)(2), which describes the punishment for violating § 

922(d)(1). 

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 On May 12, 2008, a jury found Dotson guilty of conspiracy to commit murderfor-hire (Count I) and conspiracy to deliver a firearm to a convicted felon (Count 

II). Dotson I. On October 9, 2008, Dotson was sentenced to 120 months of 

imprisonment on each of those counts, which resulted in Dotson receiving an 

aggregate sentence of 240 months. 

 On direct appeal, Dotson challenged the sufficiency of the evidence 

supporting his convictions, and the calculation of his sentencing range on his 

conviction for murder-for-hire. On July 7, 2009, the Eighth Circuit rejected those 

arguments and affirmed his conviction and sentence on both counts. United States 

v. Dotson, 570 F.3d 1067 (8th Cir. 2009). 

 On May 14, 2010, Dotson filed a motion to vacate, set aside or correct his 

sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The trial court rejected all of Dotson’s ineffective 

assistance of counsel and due process claims. See Dotson v. United States, No. 

4:10-cv-00888 HEA (E.D. Mo. April 18, 2013) (“Dotson II”). The Eighth Circuit 

denied Dotson’s request for a certificate of appealability. Dotson v. United States, 

No. 13-2002 (8th Cir. October 31, 2013).4

 

4

 A copy of this Judgment is attached as Exhibit C to Respondent’s Response. Doc. 10-3. 

Case 4:19-cv-00828-JM Document 15 Filed 02/12/20 Page 3 of 12
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 On April 13, 2017, Dotson filed a “Motion to Recall Case Due to Incorrect 

Information on the Judgment and Committal” in Dotson I. Dotson argued that he 

was entitled to be resentenced because the Judgment erroneously cited the wrong 

statute under which he was convicted of “conspiracy to deliver a firearm to a 

convicted felon” and the wrong statute under which he was sentenced for that 

conviction. On May 8, 2017, the trial court entered a text order denying the motion.5

 

Dotson I, Doc. 336, 337. 

 On June 21, 2017, the district court, sua sponte, entered an Amended 

Judgment that corrected the citation errors to reflect that Dotson was sentenced on 

Count II for “violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1), and punishable under 18 U.S.C. § 

924(a)(2).” Both the original Judgment and Amended Judgment correctly stated that 

Dotson was serving two consecutive 120-month sentences for his convictions on the 

offenses charged in Counts I and II of the Indictment. See Judgment and Amended 

Judgment, copies of which are attached as Exhibits A and B to Respondent’s 

Response, Docs. 10-1 and 10-2. 

 

5

 The original Judgment and Commitment Order correctly described the offense for which 

Dotson was convicted in Count II of the Indictment: “knowingly receive[ing] and possess[ing] a 

firearm, then deliver[ing] it to a known felon,” but incorrectly cited the statutory offense as “18 

U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)” and incorrectly cited the corresponding punishment statute as 18 U.S.C. § 

924(e)(1). 

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 Thus, the trial court acknowledged and corrected the citation error in the 

original Judgment, but rejected Dotson’s argument that this clerical error required 

him to be resentenced. See Fed. R. Cr. Pr. 36 (“After giving any notice it considers 

appropriate, the court may at any time correct a clerical error in a judgment, order, 

or other part of the record, or correct an error in the record arising from oversight or 

omission.”). 

 Dotson appealed from the trial court’s entry of the Amended Judgment. The 

Eighth Circuit summarily affirmed the trial court. United States v. Dotson, No. 17-

2564 (8th Cir. Jan. 22, 2018).6

 

 On May 5, 2017, Dotson filed a § 2241 habeas action in which he argued that, 

based on the clerical error in the original Judgment, he was convicted and sentenced 

for a crime that was not charged in Count II of the Indictment. Dotson v. Beasley, 

E.D. Ark. No. 2:17-cv-00077-KGB (“Dotson III”). On August 18, 2017, United 

States District Court Judge Kristine G. Baker entered an Order holding that Dotson 

was not entitled to the benefit of § 2255’s savings clause, which meant the Court 

lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Dotson’s habeas action. Dotson III, Docs. 

10, 12, & 13. 

 

6

 A copy of the Eighth Circuit’s Judgment is attached as Exhibit F to Respondent’s 

Response, Doc. 10-5. 

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 On January 24, 2019, Dotson filed a second motion to vacate his conviction 

under § 2255 in the Eastern District of Missouri. Dotson v. United States, E. D. Mo. 

No. 4:19-CV-113 HEA (“Dotson IV”). Dotson argued that he was “sentenced under 

the wrong charges” and his sentence was amended without a resentencing. The trial 

court summarily dismissed this motion because Dotson had not obtained the required 

certification from the Eighth Circuit to pursue a second or successive § 2255 motion. 

Dotson IV, 2019 WL 1254696 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 19, 2019). 

 On May 15, 2019, Dotson requested permission from the Eighth Circuit to file 

a second or successive § 2255 motion. On October 3, 2019, the Eighth Circuit 

denied Dotson’s request. Dotson v. United States, No. 19-1985 (8th Cir. Oct. 3, 

2019). 

 On November 15, 2019, Dotson initiated this § 2241 habeas action in which 

he claims that: (1) he was sentenced on the wrong charges; (2) his due process 

rights were violated by the entry of the Amended Judgment without a new 

sentencing hearing; and (3) he was charged and convicted of an unconstitutionally 

vague offense under § 924(e)(1).7

 Doc. 1. On January 8, 2020, Respondent filed a 

 

7

 On its face, Dotson’s challenge to § 924(e)(1) is frivolous. As previously explained, the 

original Judgment erroneously cited § 924(e)(1) as the statute under which Dotson’s sentence was 

imposed. In the Amended Judgment, the sentencing court corrected that clerical error to reflect 

that Dotson’s sentence was imposed under § 924(a)(2). 

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Motion to Dismiss. Doc. 10. On January 31, 2020, Dotson filed a Response 

opposing Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss and raising the new claim that the Bureau 

of Prisons (“BOP”) erred in its “sentence classification,” without explaining 

anything about the alleged “classification” error. Doc. 14 at 4. 

 For the reasons explained below, all of Dotson’s habeas claims should be 

dismissed. 

II. Discussion 

 A. The Court Lacks Jurisdiction to Consider Dotson’s 

 Challenges to His Conviction and Sentence 

 Jurisdiction over a federal prisoner’s collateral attack on his conviction or 

sentence is governed by the well-recognized distinction between claims that attack 

the validity of a federal conviction or sentence, and claims that challenge the 

execution of a federal sentence. As a general rule, collateral challenges to a federal 

conviction or sentence must be raised in a motion to vacate filed in the sentencing 

court under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, rather than by a habeas petition filed in the court of 

incarceration under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Lopez-Lopez v. Sanders, 590 F.3d 905, 907 

(8th Cir. 2010); Abdullah v. Hedrick, 392 F.3d 957, 959 (8th Cir. 2004). Because a 

§ 2255 motion attacks the validity of the conviction or sentence, it is “a further step 

in the movant’s criminal case,” and subject matter jurisdiction lies with the court 

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which convicted and sentenced the federal prisoner. DeSimone v. Lacy, 805 F.2d 

321, 323 (8th Cir. 1986); Thompson v. Smith, 719 F.2d 938, 940 (8th Cir. 1983). 

 A limited exception to this rule is found in the “savings clause” of § 2255(e), 

which permits a federal court in the district of incarceration to entertain a § 2241 

habeas petition challenging the validity of a conviction or sentence only if the remedy 

under § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” Hill 

v. Morrison, 349 F.3d 1089, 1091 (8th Cir. 2003). However, a habeas petitioner 

bears the burden of demonstrating that the § 2255 remedy is inadequate or 

ineffective. Lopez-Lopez, 590 F.3d at 907; Hill, 349 F.3d at 1091. 

 For the “savings clause” to apply, “more is required than demonstrating that 

there is a procedural barrier to bringing a § 2255 motion.” United States v. Lurie,

207 F.3d 1075, 1077 (8th Cir. 2000). A § 2255 motion is not “inadequate or 

ineffective” merely because: (1) “§ 2255 relief has already been denied;” (2) the 

“petitioner has been denied permission to file a second or successive § 2255 motion;” 

(3) “a second or successive § 2255 motion has been dismissed;” or (4) the “petitioner 

has allowed the one year statute of limitations and/or grace period to expire.” Id. 

 In addition, the Eighth Circuit has consistently held that the “savings clause” 

may not be invoked to raise an issue under § 2241 which could have been, or actually 

was, raised in a direct appeal or a § 2255 motion in the sentencing district. LopezCase 4:19-cv-00828-JM Document 15 Filed 02/12/20 Page 8 of 12
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Lopez, 590 F.3d at 907; Hill, 349 F.3d at 1092; Nichols v. Symmes, 553 F.3d 647, 

650 (8th Cir. 2009). 

Dotson, once again, has initiated a § 2241 action in the Eastern District of 

Arkansas which seeks to challenge his conviction and sentence imposed by the trial 

judge in the Eastern District of Missouri in Dotson I. All of his claims challenging 

his conviction and sentence are based on the same or similar arguments that he 

unsuccessfully raised in his first and second § 2255 motions filed with the sentencing 

court. 

Dotson has failed to establish that the § 2255 remedy he pursued, 

unsuccessfully, was inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his sentence. 

Thus, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, under § 2241, to consider any of 

the claims in this action. 

B. The Court Lacks Jurisdiction to Review or Alter 

 the BOP’s Sentence Classification. 

 In Dotson’s new habeas claim, he makes the entirely conclusory allegation 

that the BOP erred in its “sentence classification.” This Court lacks subject matter 

jurisdiction to consider that claim under § 2241. 

 If a habeas petitioner is not challenging the validity of his criminal conviction 

or sentence, or the length of his confinement, a habeas court lacks jurisdiction to 

grant relief. Spencer v. Haynes, 774 F.3d 467, 469-70 (8th Cir. 2014) (use of 

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restraints); Kruger v. Erickson, 77 F.3d 1071, 1073-74 (8th Cir. 1996) (taking of 

blood sample) (“Where a petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus and fails to attack 

the validity of his sentence or the length of his state [or federal] custody, the district 

court lacks the power or subject matter jurisdiction to issue a writ.”). 

 Dotson’s challenge to the BOP’s classification decision does not attack the 

duration of his confinement or the constitutionality of his detention. Sentence 

classification errors may impact a prisoner’s conditions of his confinement (such as 

what programs he is eligible to participate in or where he is housed), but they do not 

affect the length, duration, or validity of a prisoner’s sentence. 

 Thus, properly characterized, Dotson is asserting a conditions of confinement 

claim that is not cognizable in a § 2241 habeas action.8

 See Rodebaugh v. Haynes, 

 

8

 The Court has considered whether Dotson’s challenge to the BOP’s classification 

decision states a “potentially viable” conditions of confinement claim under Bivens v. Six Unknown 

Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). See Spencer, 774 F.3d at 469-70 (8th Cir. 2014) 

(when a habeas petition asserts conditions of confinement claims that are not cognizable in habeas, 

before dismissing the petition, the court should consider whether a petitioner raises a “potentially 

viable” constitutional claim and, if so, offer petitioner the opportunity to recharacterize the claim 

and to convert the action into a civil rights action). 

 Because Dotson’s challenge to his BOP classification does not constitute a potentially 

viable due process claim, it would be futile to offer him the opportunity to convert this case into a 

Bivens action. Numerous courts have rejected similar constitutional challenges to the BOP’s 

classification decisions. Wilks v. Mundt, 25 Fed. Appx. 492, 2002 WL 113837 (8th. Cir. 2002) (§ 

2241 habeas petitioner's claim that BOP wrongfully refused to remove a Sex Offender PSF 

designation, thus making him ineligible to participate in a drug treatment program that could have 

resulted in his early release, “failed to implicate a protected liberty interest upon which he could 

base his procedural due process claim”) (unpublished decision); Marti v. Nash, 227 Fed. Appx. 

148, 150 (3rd Cir. 2007) (federal prisoner’s challenge to his “Greatest Severity” PSF failed because 

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No. 2:13-cv-00011-DPM-BD, 2013 WL 1001436 (E.D. Ark. March 13, 2013) 

(Order adopting Recommended Disposition and dismissing, for lack of habeas 

corpus jurisdiction, Rodebaugh’s § 2241 Petition challenging the BOP’s Sex 

Offender PSF designation); Butler v. Outlaw, No. 2:08-cv-00192-JLH/JTR, 2010 

WL 1417910 (E.D. Ark. April 6, 2010) (Order adopting Recommended Disposition 

concluding petitioner’s due process challenge to his Sex Offender PSF failed to state 

a cognizable § 2241 claim, especially since the only adverse consequences alleged 

were inability to participate in certain programs and ineligibility for transfer to a 

camp facility).9

 

had no due process right to any particular security classification) (unpublished decision); Day v. 

United States Dep’t of Justice, 275 Fed. Appx. 90, 91 (3rd Cir. 2007) (district court did not err in 

rejecting federal prisoner’s claim that assignment of PSF deprived him of liberty without due 

process: “[prisoner] had no liberty interest in the degree of his confinement”) (unpublished 

decision). 

9

 See also Levi v. Ebbert, 2009 WL 2169171 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (§ 2241 habeas petitioner 

who claimed that the BOP’s Public Safety Factor calculation violated his due process rights failed 

to state a habeas claim: Petitioner’s claim was in substance a conditions of confinement claim 

cognizable in a civil rights lawsuit, and “not cognizable in a § 2241 habeas petition”) (unpublished 

decision); Pinkney v. United States Dep't of Justice, 2009 WL 277551 (N.D. W.Va. 2009) (§ 2241 

habeas petitioner’s claim that the BOP improperly assigned higher Public Safety Factor scores to 

District of Columbia inmates was not cognizable in a habeas action: “Because the remedy to this 

challenge would be a recalculation of [the petitioner’s] security level, rather than a recalculation 

of the duration of his confinement ... the claim properly should be raised in a civil rights complaint, 

not raised through § 2241.”). 

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III. Conclusion 

 IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that, because the Court lacks subject 

matter jurisdiction over all of the claims asserted in Petitioner Glen Thomas 

Dotson’s Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, Doc. 1, this action be DISMISSED, 

without prejudice. 

 Dated this 12th day of February 2020. 

 ____________________________________ 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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