Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-03015/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-03015-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MOSES J. DURON,

Plaintiff,

v.

GEORGE BEATTY, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-03015-YGR (PR)

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS; AND 

GRANTING PLAINTIFF LEAVE TO 

FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Moses J. Duron, a state prisoner currently incarcerated at the California Substance 

Abuse and Treatment Facility, filed the present pro se prisoner complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

regarding incidents that took place at San Quentin State Prison (“SQSP”), where he was 

previously incarcerated. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief and monetary damages.

The Court screened the complaint and found that “Plaintiff’s allegation that since February 

5, 2015, he has suffered ‘great pain’ to his left knee (which initially required an M.R.I. and for 

which a knee replacement is now recommended due to a ‘torn meniscus’) support[ed] an inference 

that he has serious medical needs.” Dkt. 6 at 2 (citing Dkt. 1 at 3). The Court further found that 

Plaintiff had stated a claim of deliberate indifference to medical needs against SQSP employees 

stemming from inadequate treatment for his left knee pain. Id. The Court ordered the complaint 

served on the following three Defendants: SQSP Physician George Beatty, M.D.; SQSP 

Registered Nurse Bill Honey; and SQSP Chief Medical Officer E. Tootell. 

Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

on the grounds that Plaintiff has not exhausted his administrative remedies. Dkt. 13. Plaintiff has 

filed an opposition, and Defendants have filed a reply. Dkts. 14, 17. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Failure to state a claim is a grounds for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules 

of Civil Procedure. Dismissal for failure to state a claim is a ruling on a question of law. Parks 

Case 4:15-cv-03015-YGR Document 18 Filed 11/14/16 Page 1 of 7
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

School of Business, Inc., v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1483 (9th Cir. 1995). “The issue is not 

whether plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether he is entitled to offer evidence to support his 

claim.” Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the 

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” “Specific facts are not necessary; the 

statement need only give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . . claim is and the grounds upon 

which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations and internal quotations 

omitted). Although in order to state a claim a complaint “does not need detailed factual 

allegations, . . . a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of 

action will not do. . . . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the 

speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 553-56 (2007) (citations 

omitted). A complaint must proffer “enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its 

face.” Id. at 1986-87. A motion to dismiss should be granted if the complaint does not proffer 

“enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570.

Review is limited to the contents of the complaint, Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 

F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1994), including documents physically attached to the complaint or 

documents the complaint necessarily relies on and whose authenticity is not contested. Lee v. 

County of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001). In addition, the court may take judicial 

notice of facts that are not subject to reasonable dispute. Id. at 688 (discussing Fed. R. Evid. 

201(b)). Allegations of fact in the complaint must be taken as true and construed in the light most 

favorable to the non-moving party. Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th 

Cir. 2001). The court need not, however, “accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, 

unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Ibid.

A pro se pleading must be liberally construed, and “however inartfully pleaded, must be 

held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

570 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Allegations of fact in the complaint 

Case 4:15-cv-03015-YGR Document 18 Filed 11/14/16 Page 2 of 7
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

must be taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. 

Symington, 51 F.3d at 1484. 

B. Analysis

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. 

The Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”) amended 42 U.S.C. § 1997e to 

provide that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional 

facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). 

Exhaustion of all “available” remedies is mandatory; those remedies need not meet federal 

standards, nor must they be “plain, speedy, and effective.” Porter, 534 U.S. at 524; Booth v. 

Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739-40 (2001). Even when the prisoner seeks relief not available in 

grievance proceedings, notably money damages, exhaustion is a prerequisite to suit. Booth, 532 

U.S. at 741. A prisoner “seeking only money damages must complete a prison administrative 

process that could provide some sort of relief on the complaint stated, but no money.” Id. at 739. 

The PLRA requires proper exhaustion of administrative remedies. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 

U.S. 81, 83 (2006). “Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and 

other critical procedural rules because no adjudicative system can function effectively without 

imposing some orderly structure on the course of its proceedings.” Id. at 90-91. Thus, 

compliance with prison grievance procedures is required by the PLRA to exhaust properly. Id. 

The PLRA’s exhaustion requirement cannot be satisfied “by filing an untimely or otherwise 

procedurally defective administrative grievance or appeal.” Id. at 84. 

The State of California provides its inmates and parolees the right to appeal 

administratively “any departmental decision, action, condition or policy perceived by those 

individuals as adversely affecting their welfare.” See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(a). It also 

provides its inmates the right to file administrative appeals alleging misconduct by correctional 

officers. See id. § 3084.1(e). 

In order to exhaust available administrative remedies within this system, a prisoner must 

proceed through several levels of appeal: (1) formal written appeal on a CDCR 602 inmate appeal 

Case 4:15-cv-03015-YGR Document 18 Filed 11/14/16 Page 3 of 7
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

form (“602 appeal”), (2) second level appeal to the institution head or designee, and (3) third level 

appeal to the Director of the CDCR (i.e., Director’s Level). See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.71; 

Barry v. Ratelle, 985 F. Supp. 1235, 1237 (S.D. Cal. 1997). If an inmate pursues his claims 

through the third-level review, the inmate has satisfied the administrative remedies exhaustion 

requirement under section 1997e(a). See id. at 1237-38. 

An action must be dismissed unless the prisoner exhausted his available administrative 

remedies before he or she filed suit, even if the prisoner fully exhausts while the suit is pending. 

McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir. 2002). However, where an amended complaint 

has been filed, a prisoner satisfies the exhaustion requirement as long as he exhausted his 

administrative remedies prior to its filing. See Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1006 (9th Cir. 

2010) (amended complaint raised new claims which arose after the original complaint was filed);

Cano v. Taylor, 739 F.3d 1214, 1220-21 (9th Cir. 2014) (amended complaint raised new claims 

which arose prior to the filing of the initial complaint). 

In the rare event that a failure to exhaust is clear on the face of the complaint, a defendant 

may move for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 

1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). Otherwise, defendants must produce evidence proving 

failure to exhaust in a motion for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. 

Id.2 

Here, Defendants have brought a dismissal motion under Rule 12(b)(6). Dkt. 13. As 

explained above, exhaustion must ordinarily be decided in a summary judgment motion, although 

in the “rare” event that a failure to exhaust is clear on the face of the complaint, a defendant may 

move for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). Albino, 747 F.3d at 1166. 

 

1 Under the regulations, as amended effective January 28, 2011, the informal grievance 

level has been omitted and there are now only three levels: first level appeal, second level appeal, 

and third level appeal. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.7. 

2

In Albino, the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, overruled Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 

1119 (9th Cir. 2003), which held that failure to exhaust available administrative remedies under 

the PLRA, should be raised by a defendant as an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion. Albino, 747 

F.3d at 1166. “[A] failure to exhaust is more appropriately handled under the framework of the 

existing rules than under an ‘unenumerated’ (that is, non-existent) rule.” Id.

Case 4:15-cv-03015-YGR Document 18 Filed 11/14/16 Page 4 of 7
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Defendants allege that Plaintiff’s verified complaint “claims that for his left knee 

treatment, which started on ‘February 5, 2015,’ and ended on May 11, 2015, he filed a Form-602 

grievance, ‘on September 21, 2014,’ the year prior.” Dkt. 17 at 2 (emphasis added). Defendants 

argue that Plaintiff thus “failed to exhaust his administrative remedies because he fails to allege he 

filed a Form-602 grievance after his ‘February 5, 2015,’ left knee treatment.” Id.

The Court notes that Plaintiff’s complaint states that “since 2/5/15,” he has suffered “great 

pain” to his left knee and that knee replacement was being recommended due to a “torn 

meniscus.” Dkt. 1 at 3. As mentioned above, the Court found that such an allegation supported an 

inference that he has serious medical needs. Dkt. 6 at 2. The Court then found as follows:

Liberally construed, Plaintiff’s allegations that SQSP prison medical 

staff failed to provide adequate medical treatment for his left knee 

pain—by specifically denying his requests: for an ice pack and a 

walking cane from Defendant Beatty; to be examined by Defendant 

Honey; and to speak with Defendant Tootell—state[d] a cognizable 

deliberate indifference claim against Defendants Beatty, Honey and 

Tootell.

Id. 

In his opposition, Plaintiff now alleges his deliberate indifference claim centers around “an 

injury to his left knee and lower back” that resulted from when he “fell down” on June 18, 2015. 

Dkt. 14 at 3. He also alleges that he submitted his grievance for such injury on June 21, 2015. Id. 

Defendants argue that the new evidence Plaintiff offers to support his “new knee injury 

claim” shows a “Form-602 grievance was submitted on November 13, 2015 (approximately 5 

months after filing this case) and January 1, 2016 (approximately 7 months after filing this case).” 

Dkt. 17 at 2 (citing Dkt. 14-2 at 10-12, 5-8.)

Prior to Albino, failure to exhaust before filing suit would subject the action to dismissal 

without prejudice to filing a new action once a plaintiff had exhausted the prison grievance 

process. See McKinney, 311 F.3d at 1199-1201. Following Albino, the proper procedure is 

unclear, especially in light of the fact that Plaintiff seems to seek to supplement his complaint with 

a claim stemming from the June 18, 2015 incident. The Court need not determine the proper 

procedure here because case law holds that a prisoner may satisfy the exhaustion requirement as 

long as he exhausted his administrative remedies prior to filing an amended complaint. See 

Case 4:15-cv-03015-YGR Document 18 Filed 11/14/16 Page 5 of 7
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Rhodes, 621 F.3d at 1006 (9th Cir. 2010); Cano, 739 F.3d at 1220-21. In the instant matter, it

seems that Plaintiff seeks to supplement his complaint to add events that have occurred since 

Plaintiff filed his complaint, which could relate to his initial alleged denial of treatment to his knee 

and could thus be similar in nature to the violations alleged in the complaint.

In light of Rhodes and Cano, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff leave to file an amended 

complaint, which may include the claims found cognizable in his original complaint as well as the 

claim he seeks to add by way of his proposed supplemental claim mentioned in his opposition. 

Plaintiff is cautioned that the amended complaint may only include claims that have been fully 

exhausted through the highest level of appeal available to him. Once the amended complaint is 

received, the Court will screen it pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is DENIED without prejudice to renewing 

their arguments after Plaintiff has filed his amended complaint and the Court has screened the 

amended complaint.

III. CONCLUSION

In light of the foregoing, the Court orders as follows:

1. Plaintiff is GRANTED leave to file his amended complaint pursuant to the 

instructions above and no later than twenty-eight (28) days of the date of this Order. The 

pleading must include the caption and civil case number used in this order (Case No. 15-3015

YGR (PR)) and the words AMENDED COMPLAINT on the first page. Failure to file an 

amended complaint within the designated time and in accordance with this Order will result 

in dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 41(b).

2. Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. 

“[A] plaintiff waives all causes of action alleged in the original complaint which are not alleged in 

the amended complaint.” London v. Coopers & Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 1981). 

Defendants not named in an amended complaint are no longer defendants. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 

963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). 

3. Defendants’ motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is DENIED without prejudice.

Case 4:15-cv-03015-YGR Document 18 Filed 11/14/16 Page 6 of 7
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Dkt. 13. The denial is without prejudice to refiling it as either another Rule 12(b)(6) motion or a 

motion for summary judgment after the Court has screened Plaintiff’s amended complaint.

4. The Clerk of the Court is directed to send Plaintiff a blank civil rights form along 

with his copy of this Order. 

5. This Order terminates Docket No. 13.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

United States District Judge

November 14, 2016

Case 4:15-cv-03015-YGR Document 18 Filed 11/14/16 Page 7 of 7