Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_02-cv-02257/USCOURTS-cand-3_02-cv-02257-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JANEITH GLENN-DAVIS,

Plaintiff,

 v.

OAKLAND CITY OF,

Defendant.

 /

No. C 02-02257 SI

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

On September 23, 2005, the Court heard argument on defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

Having considered the arguments of counseland the papers submitted, the Court hereby DENIES defendants’

motion.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Janeith Glenn-Davis brings this employment action under federal and California law alleging

that defendants denied her a promotion to Captain at the Oakland Police Department because of her gender

and/or pregnancy. In an order filed May 22, 2003, this Court applied the burden shifting framework laid out

in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and granted summaryjudgmentinfavor

of defendants. The Court held that Glenn-Davis established a prima facie case of discrimination, and that

defendants met their burden to show a legitimate reason for not promoting Glenn-Davis to captain by

introducing evidence that a hiring freeze was in place during the relevant time period. The Court concluded that

plaintiff failed to carry her burden of showing pretext on the part of defendants. Plaintiff appealed.

The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded this case for further proceedings in an unpublished

memorandum disposition filed March 15, 2005. The Ninth Circuit’s decision states, in relevant part: 

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This Court recently considered a similar situation in McGinest v. GTE

Service Corp., 360 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 2004). In reversing the district

court’s grant of summary judgment for failure to promote, we held that “the

absence of any documentation confirming that a company hiring freeze was in

place during the relevant time period [was] sufficient to raise a genuine factual

dispute as to whether the asserted reason was pretextual.” Id. at 1123. The

complete absence of any Memoranda, meeting notes, or other evidence

provided circumstantial evidence that the hiring freeze never existed and was

pretext for racial discrimination. See id.

Premised upon McGinest, and recognizing that the district court did not have

the benefit of its factual scenario, the grant of summary judgment will be

reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Following remand, defendants have filed a renewed motion forsummary judgment. Defendants argue

summary judgment is appropriate, despite the Ninth Circuit’s remand, because this case is factually

distinguishable from McGinest and because they have submitted additional evidence in the form of new and

expanded declarations showing that the hiring freeze was in place during the relevant time period. These

declarations do not contain evidence that the hiring freeze was documented in writing. Plaintiff opposes the

motion on several grounds, arguing that summary judgment is precluded by the law of the case doctrine and

because there are numerous triable issues of fact, including whether the “hiring freeze” was legitimate or

pretextual.

LEGAL STANDARD

A. Summary Judgment

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary adjudication when “the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there

is no genuine issue as to any materialfact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 

In a motion forsummary judgment, “[if] the moving party forsummary judgment meets itsinitialburden

ofidentifying forthe court those portions of the materials on file that it believes demonstrate the absence of any

genuine issues ofmaterialfact, the burden ofproduction then shiftsso that “the non-moving party mustsetforth,

by affidavit or as otherwise provided in Rule 56, ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue fortrial.’”

See T.W. Elec. Service, Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing

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Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S. Ct. 317 (1986)). 

In judging evidence at the summaryjudgmentstage, the Court does notmake credibility determinations

or weigh conflicting evidence, and draws all inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See

T.W. Electric, 809 F.2d at 630-31 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475

U.S. 574, 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986)); Ting v. United States, 927 F.2d 1504, 1509 (9th Cir. 1991). The

evidence presented by the parties must be admissible. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Conclusory, speculative

testimony in affidavits and moving papers is insufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and defeat summary

judgment. See Falls Riverway Realty, Inc. v. City of Niagara Falls, 754 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1985); Thornhill

Publ’g Co., Inc. v. GTE Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 738 (9th Cir. 1979). Hearsay statements found in affidavits

are inadmissible. See, e.g., Fong v. American Airlines, Inc., 626 F.2d 759, 762-63 (9th Cir. 1980).

B. Gender and Pregnancy Discrimination

The burden-shifting method of proof set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. 792, 802-05

(1973), governs plaintiff’s claims of gender and pregnancy discrimination under Title VII and FEHA. That

process requires the plaintiff first to establish a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation. See Wallis v.

J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 889-91 (9th Cir. 1994). Once a plaintiff meets this burden of production, the

employer must offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment decision. See Reeves

v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000); Collings v. Longview Fibre Co., 63

F.3d 828, 833-34 (9th Cir. 1995); Smith v. Barton, 914 F.2d 1330, 1340 (9th Cir. 1990). If the employer

meets this burden, then the plaintiff must produce “specific, substantial evidence” that the proffered reason is

pretextual. Collings, 63 F.3d at 834 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The plaintiff bears the

ultimate burden ofestablishingthatshe has been discriminated against on the basis of a protected characteristic.

See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506-11 (1993). However, the trier of fact may infer the

existence ofa discriminatory motive fromthe plaintiff’s proofthat the employer’s proffered explanation is false.

See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 146-47. 

California relies on decisions interpreting federalnondiscriminationstatutes to interpretthe FEHA. See

Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace and Co., 104 F.3d 267, 272 (9th Cir. 1996). Thus the analyses of federal

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 Defendants object to the fact that plaintiff did not submit affidavits in opposition to defendants’

motion, and that instead she incorporates by reference the opposition papers and supporting evidence filed on

April 25, 2003 in opposition to defendants’ first motion for summary judgment, as well as plaintiff/appellant’s

Ninth Circuit opening brief. The Court finds that plaintiff’s actions are not improper. 

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discrimination claims apply equally to the analogous FEHA claims.

DISCUSSION

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment first contends that plaintiff has failed to establish a prima

facie case of discrimination. For the reasons setforth in the Court’s May 22, 2003 order, the Court concludes

that plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discrimination.

Defendants next argue that, notwithstanding the Ninth Circuit’s reversal or the McGinest decision,

defendants are entitled to summary judgment because the hiring freeze was a legitimate nondiscriminatory

reason for failing to promote Glenn-Davis, and plaintiff has failed to show that the freeze was pretextual.

Defendants contend that the Ninth Circuit’s memorandum simply directed the Court to reevaluate plaintiff’s

failure to promote claim in light of McGinest, and that McGinest is factually distinguishable from the instant

case. 

Defendants also argue that they have submitted “substantial additional evidence” in the form of an

amplified declaration fromdefendant Chief ofPolice Word and a new declaration from Deputy Chief Dunbar.

Defendants contend that these declarations establish that the hiring freeze was in place during the relevant time

period (although not documented in writing), and that the proposed reorganization of the Oakland Police

Department was documented in writing. 

Not surprisingly, plaintiff interprets the Ninth Circuit’s reversal and remand decision much differently,

and contends that the Ninth Circuit has already considered and rejected defendants’ arguments. Plaintiff argues

that the law of the case doctrine prohibits this Court from reconsidering an issue decided by a higher court.

Plaintiffalso argues that even ifthe Court evaluated defendants’ arguments on the merits, the Court should deny

summary judgment because there are numerous issues 

of material fact in dispute, including whether the “hiring freeze” was pretextual.1

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The Court agreeswithplaintiff’sinterpretation ofthe Ninth Circuit’sremand decision. The Court stated

that its reversal was “premised upon McGinest.” Notably, the Ninth Circuit did not direct the Court to

reevaluate the grant ofsummary judgment in light ofMcGinest. The issue in question – namely whether plaintiff

has raised a triable question of fact regarding pretext – “must have been decided explicitly or by necessary

implication in the previous disposition,” and thus the law ofthe case doctrine applies and would bar summary

judgment. United States v. Lummi Indian Tribe, 235 F.3d 443, 452 (9th Cir. 2000). 

This conclusion does not end the inquiry, however, because as both parties agree, the Court’s

application of the doctrine is discretionary. See id. However, even if the Court reaches the merits of

defendants’ motion, the Court arrives at the same result because defendants’ attempts to distinguish McGinest

fromthe instant case are unpersuasive. McGinest held that “the absence of any documentation confirming that

a hiring freeze was in place during the relevant time period is sufficient to raise a genuine factual dispute as to

whether the asserted reason was pretextual.” 360 F.3d at 1123. The McGinest court noted that “even ifsuch

decisions were commonly conveyed to yard managers by word-of-mouth, the fact that a company the size of

GTE does not have a memorandum, meeting notes, or other evidence of this hiring freeze . . . provides

circumstantialevidence that the hiring freeze did not in fact take place.” Id. The McGinest court emphasized

that “very little evidence is necessary to raise a genuine issue offactregarding an employer’s motive,” and that

any uncertainty with respectto motive must be resolved in favor ofthe plaintiff at the summary judgment phase.

Id. at 1124. 

Defendants highlight a number of factual differences between McGinest and this case in an effort to

show that the plaintiff’s case in McGinest was stronger than the case at bar. Even if defendants’

characterization is correct (a question the Court need not decide), these factual differences are irrelevant for

purposes of analyzing the specific issue presented by the Ninth Circuit’s remand: what evidence is necessary

to defeat summary judgment when a defendant claims that a hiring freeze accounted for a failure to promote

the plaintiff. The salient holding of McGinest is that the absence ofwritten documentation of a hiring freeze in

a company the size of GTE was sufficient to raise a dispute regarding pretext. Id. at 1123. As in McGinest,

defendants have notsubmitted any evidence that the “hiring freeze” was documented in writing; the Word and

Dunbar declarations relied on by defendants simply provide further support for defendants’ position that the

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hiring freeze was in place, and that various individuals within the Police Department knew ofthe freeze by word

of mouth. As McGinest holds, the absence of written documentation raises a dispute regarding pretext. Id.

Further, there is no analyticalreason to distinguish between what written documentation might be expected of

“a company the size of GTE” and an organization the size of the Oakland Police Department.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES defendants’ motion for summary judgment. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 23, 2005

 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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