Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_02-cv-01611/USCOURTS-cand-4_02-cv-01611-13/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 410
Nature of Suit: Antitrust
Cause of Action: 15:15 Antitrust Litigation

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

eMAG SOLUTIONS, LLC, et al.,

Plaintiffs, No. C 02-1611 PJH

v. ORDER GRANTING REQUEST FOR

JURISDICTIONAL DISCOVERY

TODA KOGYO CORPORATION, et al.,

Defendants.

_______________________________/

In a joint status statement filed by the parties on October 12, 2006, defendant Titan

Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha (“Titan”) indicated its intention to file a motion to dismiss for lack of

personal jurisdiction, and plaintiffs indicated their intention to serve Titan with jurisdictional

discovery once Titan had filed its motion. The parties proposed a schedule, pursuant to

which Titan would file its motion on October 27, 2006; plaintiffs would serve jurisdictional

discovery by November 3, 2006; and Titan would serve responses to the discovery by

November 17, 2006. 

The parties agreed further that in the event of a dispute regarding the scope of

discovery, or some other discovery-related issue, plaintiffs would have two weeks to file a

letter brief, seeking an order compelling Titan to respond to the discovery, and Titan would

have two weeks after that to file a letter brief in opposition. The court approved the parties’

proposed schedule.

Titan has apparently refused to respond to the proposed discovery, on the ground

that the magistrate judge in the transferee court (the Southern District of Illinois, where the

Case 4:02-cv-01611-PJH Document 284 Filed 12/21/06 Page 1 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 The worldwide service-of-process provision of § 12 of the Clayton Act authorizes the

exercise of personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation in any judicial district in the United

States, so long as the corporation has sufficient minimum contacts with the United States at

large. Go Video, Inc. v. Akai Elec. Co., Ltd., 885 F.2d 1406, 1413-15 (9th Cir. 1989).

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case was originally filed) denied plaintiffs’ request for jurisdictional discovery, and also

based on Titan’s assessment that defendants have not alleged facts that establish a prima

facie case of personal jurisdiction. 

On December 4, 2006, plaintiffs filed a letter brief seeking either a ruling that Titan is

subject to personal jurisdiction in this district (based on the Illinois district court’s order

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), transferring the case to this district, as a district in which

the case “might have been brought”); or an order compelling Titan to respond to

jurisdictional discovery.

On December 15, 2006, Titan filed a responsive letter brief, arguing that the Illinois

magistrate judge “made law of the case” by denying plaintiffs’ request for jurisdictional

discovery before the case was transferred to this district; and also asserting that plaintiffs

are not entitled to jurisdictional discovery because their allegations do not establish a prima

facie case that the alleged injuries arose from contacts between Titan and the United

States.1

 

As an initial matter, the court finds that the Illinois district court’s order transferring

the case to this district does not constitute a finding that this court has personal jurisdiction

over Titan, because the order did not address the individual defendants’ contacts with the

United States. The court simply found that “both venue and jurisdiction would be proper in

the Northern District of California,” as “[s]everal of the defendants have offices or

headquarters in California, and the remaining defendants conduct a substantial portion of

their business in California.” Moreover, the court found that because all the defendants

were alien corporations, “any District in the United States has jurisdiction over the

defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d).” However, § 1391 is a venue statute, not a

statute authorizing personal jurisdiction. Personal jurisdiction in this case is governed by 

§ 12 of the Clayton Act. Accordingly, Titan may proceed with its motion to dismiss for lack

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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2

 In the case cited by Titan, Greenspun v. Del E. Webb Corp., 634 F.2d 1204 (9th Cir.

1980), the issue was whether the plaintiff was prejudiced when the defendants were permitted

to refuse to respond to certain interrogatories. The Ninth Circuit noted that the defendants had

provided “full information on the jurisdictional issues,” and concluded that denying discovery

that allegedly could have supported a prima facie case of conspiracy was not an abuse of

discretion. Id. at 1208 n.5. 

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of personal jurisdiction.

The Ninth Circuit has ruled that when a defendant moves to dismiss a complaint for

lack of personal jurisdiction and the court holds no evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff need

make only a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction to survive the motion. See, e.g.,

Harris Rutsky & Co. Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Bell & Clements Ltd., 328 F.3d 1122, 1128-29 (9th

Cir. 2003). On a motion to dismiss, a court has discretion to allow a plaintiff to conduct

jurisdictional discovery. Id. at 1135. "[D]iscovery should ordinarily be granted where

pertinent facts bearing on the question of jurisdiction are controverted or where a more

satisfactory showing of the facts is necessary." Laub v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 342 F.3d

1080, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).

Here, however, Titan argues that it should not be compelled to respond to plaintiffs’

jurisdictional discovery because plaintiffs have failed to allege facts that establish a prima

facie case of personal jurisdiction. Although the Ninth Circuit has not ruled directly on this

question,2

 other circuits have held that a plaintiff is not entitled to discovery without making

a “colorable or prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction.” Central States, Southeast &

Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Reimer Express World Corp., 230 F.3d 934, 946 (7th

Cir. 2000), cited in Schwarzer, Tashima & Wagstaffe, Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial

(2006) § 9:128; see also Trintec Indus. v. Pedre Promotional Prods., 395 F.3d 1275, 1283

(Fed. Cir. 2005) (where district court concludes that existing record is insufficient to support

personal jurisdiction and plaintiff demonstrates that it can supplement jurisdictional

allegations through discovery, plaintiff is entitled to jurisdictional discovery); United States

v. Swiss American Bank, Ltd., 274 F.3d 610, 625 (1st Cir. 2001) (plaintiff who sues out-ofstate corporation and who makes out colorable case for the existence of personal

jurisdiction “may well be entitled to a modicum of jurisdictional discovery if the corporation

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imposes a jurisdictional defense”). 

However, at least one district court within the Ninth Circuit has ruled that a plaintiff is

not obligated to make out a “prima facie” case of personal jurisdiction before it can obtain

limited jurisdictional discovery, because “[i]t would . . . be counterintuitive to require a

plaintiff, prior to conducting discovery, to meet the same burden that would be required to

defeat a motion to dismiss.” Orchid Biosciences, Inc. v. ST. Louis Univ., 198 F.R.D. 670,

672-73 (S.D. Cal. 2001). Here, plaintiffs have provided some evidence of Titan’s contacts

with the United States, and while the court takes no position now on the question of

personal jurisdiction over Titan, the court also finds the reasoning of the Orchid Biosciences

court to be persuasive. In the absence of any definitive Ninth Circuit authority, the court

finds that it has the discretion to permit limited jurisdictional discovery without a full prima

facie showing of personal jurisdiction by the plaintiffs. 

As a final note, the court finds that the Illinois magistrate judge’s order denying

jurisdictional discovery does not constitute “law of the case” with regard to the question

whether Titan should be compelled to respond to plaintiffs’ discovery requests. In issuing

that order, the magistrate judge appears to have been following Seventh Circuit law, which,

as indicated above, requires a plaintiff to make a prima facie showing of personal

jurisdiction before seeking jurisdictional discovery.

Jurisdictional discovery in this case shall be limited. That is, plaintiffs may propound

discovery requests that are designed to elicit information regarding Titan’s contacts with the

United States – relating to specific jurisdiction, not general jurisdiction – to enable plaintiffs

to oppose Titan’s motion to dismiss. This is not an authorization for discovery into the

merits of the case, or for discovery into the alleged conspiracy among the defendants. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 21, 2006 ______________________________

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

Case 4:02-cv-01611-PJH Document 284 Filed 12/21/06 Page 4 of 4