Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-04592/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-04592-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 510
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Vacate Sentence
Cause of Action: 28:2255 Motion to Vacate / Correct Illegal Sentence

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Docket entries reference in the underlying criminal case, CR 05-0886, will be

referred to as “CRDoc.”

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Devon Mitchell, 

Movant/Defendant, 

vs.

United States of America, 

Respondent/Plaintiff. 

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No. CV 16-4592-PHX-DGC (MHB)

 (CR 05-00886-2-PHX-DGC)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE DAVID G. CAMPBELL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

Movant was convicted after a jury trial of one count of armed bank robbery, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d), three counts of unarmed bank robbery, in violation

of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), and one count of possessing a firearm during and in relation to a

crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(I). (CRDocs.1

 41, 226.) On July

16, 2008, Movant was sentenced to a total of 222 months in prison, consisting of concurrent

terms of 162 months on the bank robbery counts, followed by 60 months on the 924(c) count.

(CRDoc. 278.) Movant appealed his judgment and sentence, and on October 2, 2009, the

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. (CRDoc. 325-1.) The mandate issued on

December 1, 2009. (CRDoc. 325.) 

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That 2255 proceeding was assigned civil case number 11-cv-00580.

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On March 28, 2011, Movant filed a motion to vacate, set aside or correct sentence

under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (CRDoc. 327; 11-cv-005802

, Doc. 1.) On April 1, 2011, Movant

filed a motion for permission to amend. (11-cv-00580, Doc. 4.) On April 5, 2011, the Court

denied Movant’s first 2255 motion with leave to amend, and denied his motion for

permission to amend as moot. (11-cv-00580, Doc. 5.) Movant filed an amended 2255

motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence on May 17, 2011. (11-cv-00580, Doc. 6.)

In his amended 2255 motion, Movant raised the claims of (1) constructive amendment of the

indictment, (2) the government’s failure to prove each essential element of the offenses

charged in Counts 2, 3, 5, and 6, (3) insufficient evidence to sustain the charge in Count 4,

(4) prejudice resulting from the trial court’s failure to give an alibi instruction, (5) abuse of

discretion by the trial court in failing to respond promptly to jury notes requesting

clarification of legal issues, and (6) ineffective assistance of counsel. On May 17, 2012, the

trial court denied and dismissed Movant’s amended 2255 motion. (Id. at 18, 29.) Movant

did not appeal the denial.

Thereafter, Movant filed a request with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to file a

successive 2255 motion, which was denied on May 29, 2014. (11-cv-00580, Doc. 25.) On

June 26, 2016, Movant, through counsel, filed a successive 2255 motion, asserting that his

conviction pursuant to 924(c) is now illegal pursuant to the intervening United States

Supreme Court case, Johnson v. United States, __U.S. __; 135 S.Ct. 2551(2015). (Doc. 13

at 2-14.) The Ninth Circuit granted Movant’s application to file this successive 2255 motion,

and deemed the date of his 2255 motion filing as June 27, 2016. (Doc. 13-1.) Thereafter,

Movant filed a First Amended 2255 motion. (Doc. 21.)

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As permitted by the Court, Respondent limited its Answer to affirmative defenses.

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On May 8, 2017, this Court granted Respondent’s motion for a stay of the proceedings

pending the United State Supreme Court decision in Lynch v. Dimaya, __ U.S.__; 137 S. Ct.

31 (2018). Thereafter, on July 31, 2017, Respondent filed its Limited Answer3

, asserting

therein that Movant’s 2255 motion was untimely, and his claim pursuant to Johnson is

procedurally defaulted without excuse. (Doc. 28.) The Court granted Movant’s several

unopposed motions for extensions to file his Reply, as the Supreme Court had decided

Dimaya, but the Ninth Circuit was yet due to decide United States v. Begay. (Docs. 30, 32,

34, 36, 38.) On June 26, 2018, Movant filed his Reply. (Doc. 45.) On September 19, 2018,

Respondent filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority. (Doc. 48.) 

On November 5, 2018, Movant filed an unopposed Motion to Stay Proceedings,

pending the possible rehearing of United States v. Blackstone, 2018 WL 4344096 (9th Cir.

2018), and a decision in United States v. Begay, No. 14-10080. (Doc. 49.) This Court

granted the stay. The Ninth Circuit issued its decision in Begay, 934 F.3d 1033 (9th Cir.

2016) (finding that the defendant’s conviction for second-degree murder in Indian country

did not qualify as a categorical crime of violence). Thereafter, Respondent filed an Amended

Response, and Movant filed a Reply to the Amended Response. (Docs. 57, 58.) 

ISSUES

Movant asserted, initially, in his 2255 motion that the Supreme Court’s decision in

Johnson rendered his bank robbery conviction pursuant to § 2113(a) no longer a crime of

violence, and thus rendering his conviction for possession of a firearm during a crime of

violence unlawful. In Respondent’s initial answer, Respondent argued that Movant’s 2255

motion was untimely because, although it was filed within one year of the Supreme Court’s

decision in Johnson, the decision did not invalidate the residual clause of § 924(c).

Respondent also claimed that Movant’s Johnson claim is procedurally defaulted without

excuse, as Movant did not raise the issue on appeal. In his initial Reply, Movant asserted that

the Johnson decision has been made retroactive to cases final on direct review, and, because

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his 2255 motion was filed within a year of that decision, the motion was timely filed.

Movant also asserted that his failure to raise the issue on appeal is excused, as any attempt

to raise the issue would have been futile, given the current Supreme Court precedent. 

During the time this case was stayed for the second time, Respondent filed a notice

of supplemental authority to support Respondent’s argument that Movant’s 2255 motion was

untimely filed. See, Blackstone, 903 F.3d 1020, 1026-28 (9th Cir. 2018) (agreeing with other

circuit courts that Johnson did not recognize a new right relating to 924(c)’s residual clause

as a new right applicable on collateral review). After the stay was lifted, Respondent filed

its Amended Response to Movant’s amended 2255 motion. Respondent reiterated its initial

timeliness and procedural default arguments, but additionally addressed two Ninth Circuit

decisions that had been rendered subsequent to its initial answer. See, United States v.

Gutierrez, 876 F.3d 1254 (9th Cir. 2017); United States v. Watson, 881 F.3d 782 (9th Cir.

2018) (per curiam), cert. denied, 139 S.Ct. 203 (2018) (both affirming that federal bank

robbery is a crime of violence under the elements clause of § 924(c)). 

In his Reply to Respondent’s Amended Response, Movant reiterates his assertion that

his failure to raise the issue on appeal is excused because of the “absence of the decision in

Johnson 2015 during [his] prior appellate and collateral proceedings.” (Doc. 58 at 5.) He

also claims actual innocence as an excuse for procedural default. And, Movant posits that

the Watson and Gutierrez decisions are distinguishable and “cannot be reconciled with []

Johnson 2010, or other Ninth Circuit precedent.” (Id. at 8.) 

ANALYSIS

Habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is only available to a person in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States. Under § 2255, “a district court may

grant a hearing to determine the validity of a petition brought under that section, [u]nless the

motions and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled

to no relief.” United States v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 1465 (9th Cir. 1994). “The standard

essentially is whether the movant has made specific factual allegations that, if true, state a

claim on which relief could be granted.” United States v. Withers, 638 F.3d 1055, 1062 (9th

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Cir. 2011). A district court may dismiss a § 2255 motion based on a facial review of the

record “only if the allegations in the motion, when viewed against the record, do not give rise

to a claim for relief or are palpably incredible or patently frivolous.” Id. at 1062-63.

Because this Court finds that Movant’s 2255 motion does not give rise to a claim for relief,

for the reasons set forth herein, this Court will recommend that Movant’s 2255 motion be

denied and dismissed with prejudice.

The Ninth Circuit, in Gutierrez, affirmed prior precedent, holding that “bank robbery

by intimidation . . . requires at least an implicit threat to use the type of violent physical force

necessary to meet the Johnson [I] standard.” 876 F.3d at 1257. Shortly thereafter, the Ninth

Circuit decided Watson, in which the Court held that armed bank robbery is a crime of

violence under the elements clause of § 924(c). 881 F.3d at 786 (“Because bank robbery ‘by

force and violence, or by intimidation’ is a crime of violence, so too is armed bank

robbery.”). In a subsequent unpublished opinion, United States v. Swanson, the Ninth

Circuit made clear the argument that bank robbery is not a crime of violence under the

elements clause of United States Sentencing Guidelines § 4B1.2, is “foreclosed” by Watson,

744 Fed. App’x 527 (9th Cir. 2018).

Movant attempts to distinguish the decisions in Guittierez and Watson by the holdings

in United States v. Parnell, 818 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2016), United States v. Geozos, 870 F.3d

890 (2017), and United States v. Strickland, 860 F.3d 1224 (9th Cir. 2017). The decision in

Parnell, however, pre-dates both Guittierez and Watson, and involves the analysis of a

Massachusetts statute, not the federal bank robbery statute, and is thus not applicable. See,

United States v. Dixon, 16 CV-04590-SRB, Doc. 28 (December 6, 2018), cert. of app. den.,

United States v. Dixon, No. 18-17344 (March 18, 2019) (appellant has not made a

“substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.”); United States of America v.

Sterling, 16 CV-04602-DLR, Docs. 30, 2018 WL 4963341 (October 15, 2018), cert. of app.

den., United States v. Sterling, No. 18-1790 (December 4, 2018). 

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The Supreme Court in Stokeling held that robbery under the same Florida statute

analyzed in Geozos, Fla. Stat. § 812.13, was a violent felony under the ACCA’s elements

clause. Stokeling v. United States, __ U.S. __, 139 S.Ct. 544 (2019). 

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“A person commits the crime of robbery in the third degree if . . . the person uses or

threatens the immediate use of physical force upon another person . . .” Or. Rev. Stat. §

164.395(1).

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Similarly, the Ninth Circuit in Geozos analyzed a Florida robbery statute, Fla. Stat.

§ 812.13, in reaching its conclusion. The holding in Geozos was called into question in

Ward v. United States, 936 F.3d 914, 919 (9th Cir. 2019) (“Our prior distinction between

‘substantial’ and ‘minimal’ force in the ACCA robbery context in such cases as Molinar and

Geozos cannot be reconciled with the Supreme Court’s clear holding in Stokeling.”4

) In

Strickland, the Ninth Circuit analyzed an Oregon first-degree robbery statute5

 in the context

of the ACCA, finding that the crime could be committed without physically violent force.

That Oregon statute is substantially dissimilar to the federal bank robbery statute, and thus

its holding is inapplicable here. See, Watson, 881 F.3d at 785 (the knowing use of

intimidation, “necessarily entails the knowing use, attempted use, or threatened use of violent

physical force.”). Because the cases cited by Movant are either called into question or are

not applicable, Movant’s argument that the “force and violence” clause of the federal bank

robbery statute does not meet the violent physical force standard set forth in Johnson also

fails.

 Additionally, Movant was convicted of armed bank robbery pursuant to 18 U.S.C.

2113 (a) and (d), the same statutory provisions addressed in Watson. The Court in Watson

made clear that bank robbery pursuant to 2113(a) was a crime of violence, as the “least

violent form” of committing the offence necessarily involves the type of violent physical

force to meet the Johnson standard. 881 F.3d at 787. Thus, bank robbery by “force and

violence” necessarily involves more violent physical force than bank robbery by

intimidation. The Watson Court then concluded that armed bank robbery pursuant to 18

U.S.C. 2113(d) is also a crime of violence. Id. a 786.

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Controlling Ninth Circuit precedent has established that bank robbery and armed bank

robbery are categorically crimes of violence under the elements clause of 18 U.S.C. 924 §

(c)(3), and thus Movant’s claim in his 2255 motion is without merit. As this Court finds

Movant’s 2255 motion without merit, it declines to address Respondent’s affirmative

defenses of timeliness and procedural default.

CONCLUSION

Movant’s claims fail on the merits, and therefore Movant’s 2255 motion should be

denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Movant’s Motion to Vacate, Set

Aside, or Correct Sentence Under 28 U.S.C. §2255, (CVDoc. 21), be denied and dismissed

with prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Court deny a Certificate of

Appealability and leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal because Movant has not

made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen

days within which to file a response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of

Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, objections

to the Report and Recommendation may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. Failure

timely to file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result

in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the district court without further

review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure

timely to file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be

considered a waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order

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or judgment entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 72,

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

DATED this 8th day of January, 2020.

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