Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca5-03-30703/USCOURTS-ca5-03-30703-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 190
Nature of Suit: Other Contract Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

February 19, 2004

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

In the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

_______________

m 03-30703

_______________

MAE LOUISE VICTOR,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

VERSUS

GRAND CASINO-COUSHATTA; COUSHATTA TRIBE OF LOUISIANA;

AND GRAND CASINOS OF LOUISIANA, INC.-COUSHATTA,

Defendant-Appellants.

_________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

_________________________

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, SMITH, and

WIENER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Defendants challenge the remand of this

matter to state court. Because we lack appellate jurisdiction, we dismiss the appeal.

I.

Mae Victor claimed to have won a large

jackpot at Grand Casino-Coushatta. The casino asserted that a malfunction in the slot machine generated the jackpot, so it refused to

pay. Victor sued in state court for breach of

contract, naming as defendants the casino; the

Coushatta Indian Tribe; and Grand Casinos of

Louisiana, Inc. (“Grand Casinos”). Defendants removed to federal court via 28 U.S.C.

§ 1441(a) and based federalsubject matter jur-

 Case: 03-30703 Document: 0051491117 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/19/2004
2

isdiction on diversity of citizenship.1See 28

U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). 

The district court, acting on the recommendation of a magistrate judge, determined that

the parties were non-diverse and that federal

subject matter jurisdiction was lacking. Specifically, the court held that the Coushatta Indian Tribe destroyed diversity both in its presence as a stateless person and in the effect of

its Louisiana origin on the ownership of the

Casino itself. Consequently, the court remanded to state court.2

II.

Defendants challenge the remand on two

grounds related to the parties’ ability to maintain diversity jurisdiction: (1) the determination

that the Indian tribe waived its immunity; and

(2) the determination that an amendment to

the Tribal State Compact did not apply retroactively to bar Victor’s claim. Before considering such questions, however, we must determine whether we have jurisdiction to hear

any element of this appeal.3 

Because the district court remanded based

on lack of subject matter jurisdiction, we lack

the power to hear any element of the subsequent appeal. Title 28 U.S.C. § 1447 addresses the removal of matters to federal court.

Section 1447(c) discussesremanding a case to

a state court.4 Section 1447(d) directly limits

the scope of federal appellate review of remanded cases: “An order remanding a case to

the State court from which it was removed is

not reviewable on appeal or otherwise” (with

the exception of cases removed to federal

courts under a civil rights statute). 

The Supreme Court and this court have interpreted the two statutesto prohibit appellate

jurisdiction over matters remanded to state

court where a district court bases remand on a

lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The language of § 1447(d) is unambiguous. See, e.g.,

Angelides v. BaylorCollege of Med., 117 F.3d

1 Victor is a Louisiana citizen. The casino is a

business entity that consists of the Indian tribe and

GrandCasinos. Defendants assert that the tribe “is

a Federally recognizedGrand Indian Tribe, with its

reservation located in Allen Parish, Louisiana.”

Grand Casinos is a Minnesota corporation with its

principal place of business in Minnesota. The

district court ultimately decided that the tribe destroyed diversity because it was a non-state entity

and because ofits citizenship viewed in conjunction

with its partial ownership in the casino.

2 As part of its remand, the court considered

whether the Indian tribe, by entering into a gaming

compact with the state, had waived its sovereign

tribal immunity. If the tribe retained its immunity,

Victor could recover no damages from it.

Defendants characterized Victor’s inclusion of the

tribeSSwhich inclusion frustrated diversitySSas

fraudulent. The court, however, determined that

the tribe waived its immunity in this kind of suit

and that Victor could, in the abstract, obtain damages from the tribe.

3 Because this appealSSconcerning both appellate jurisdiction and the question of tribal immunitySSconcerns matters ofsubject matter jurisdiction,

we use a de novo standard of review. See, e.g.,

Washington v. Linebarger, Goggan, Blair, Pena

& Sampson, LLP, 338 F.3d 442, 444 (5th Cir.

2003); Bissonnet Invs. LLC v. Quinlan (In re

Bissonnet Invs. LLC), 320 F.3d 520, 522 (5th Cir.

2003) (“We review questions of subject matter

jurisdiction de novo.”).

4

“If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded . . . . The

State court may thereupon proceed with such

case.”

 Case: 03-30703 Document: 0051491117 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/19/2004
3

833, 835 (5th Cir. 1997) (“Appellate courts

are precluded from reviewing remand orders

issued pursuant to § 1447(c), by appeal, mandamus, or otherwise.”).5

 Furthermore, “even

if the district court’s determination of subject

matter jurisdiction was erroneous, it remains

immune from review.” Rio de Janeiro of the

Federated Republic of Brazil v. Philip Morris,

239 F.3d 714, 716 (5th Cir. 2001).6

The Supreme Court has created a narrow

group of remanded cases that fall outside

§ 1447(d). “[W]here a case has been properly

removed and the remand order is issued on

grounds not authorized by § 1447(c),” an appellate court may review the decision to remand. Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 343 (1976). The district

court in Thermtron expressly remanded because of its crowded docket and not because

of jurisdictional concerns. Id. at 340-41. 

The Supreme Court, however, has limited

the possible class of appealable remand orders.

“As long as a district court’s remand is based

on a timelyraised defect in removal procedure

or on lack of subject-matter jurisdictionSSthe

grounds for remand recognized by §

1447(c)SSa court of appeals lacks jurisdiction

to entertain an appeal of the remand order

under § 1447(d).” Things Remembered, 516

U.S. at 127-28. The district court’s entire

reason for remanding Victor’s case centered

on the lack of diversity jurisdiction.7 

III.

The district court ruled on an argument put

before it that directly implicated the subject

matter jurisdiction ofthat court. The court explicitly held “that the joinder of the tribe is not

fraudulent, and that the stateless status of the

tribe therefore destroys complete diversity, and

along with it, this Court’s diversity jurisdiction.” The accompanying remand falls directly

within § 1447(c). Consequently, pursuant to

§ 1447(d), we lack jurisdiction to review the

order of remand. 

The appeal is DISMISSED for want of

jurisdiction.

5 The limitation on appellate review extends

only to matters remanded based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction and pursuant to § 1447(c).

Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S.

124, 127 (1995) (“§ 1447(d) must be read in pari

materia with § 1447(c), so that only remands

based on grounds specified in § 1447(c) are immune from review under § 1447(d).”).

6 The statute and the construing courts have

limited appellate review over such matters because

“federal appeal of remand orders would delay

justice in state courts.” Angelides, 117 F.3d

at 836.

7 Defendants lamely attempt to characterize the

district court’s consideration of the tribe’s sovereign immunity as something that “exceeded its authority [and was] unnecessary in light of the findings of the Magistrate and the remaining conclusions reached by the District Court’s remand order.” The district court’s analysis, however, arose

out of a question involving diversity jurisdiction.

Although the court determined that the inclusion of

an Indian tribe destroyed diversity, it also considered whether Victor may have engaged in some

kind of fraudulent joinder. If the tribe maintained

its immunity, Victor could not possibly recover

from it, and the district court could disregard its

presence for diversity purposes.

 Case: 03-30703 Document: 0051491117 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/19/2004