Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01175/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01175-5/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Federal Question: Bivens Act

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ISMAEL LOPEZ-RANGEL,

Plaintiff,

v.

PAUL COPENHAVER, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:14-cv-01175 DLB PC

ORDER DISMISSING FIRST 

AMENDED COMPLAINT 

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE

Plaintiff Ismael Lopez-Rangel (“Plaintiff”), a former federal prisoner proceeding pro se and 

in forma pauperis, filed this civil action on July 28, 2014, pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown 

Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), which provides a remedy for 

violation of civil rights by federal actors. 

On January 22, 2015, the Court screened Plaintiff’s complaint and dismissed it with leave to 

amend. Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint on March 22, 2015.

1

 He names the United States, 

USP-Atwater Warden Copenhaver, Health Service Administrator Ms. Mettry, Nurse Franco, Doctors 

Franco, Grossman and Grimm, Physician’s Assistant Wong and Counselor Gardea as Defendants.2

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1

 This action was dismissed without prejudice on December 9, 2015, after Plaintiff was released and deported, but failed 

to keep the Court apprised of his current address. Plaintiff, who now resides in Mexico, filed a notice of change of 

address on January 21, 2016. The Court reopened this action on January 26, 2016.

2

Plaintiff consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge on August 13, 2014.

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A. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 

“frivolous, malicious,” or that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). 

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall 

dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that ... the action or appeal ... fails to state a 

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

Under Bivens, a plaintiff may sue a federal officer in his or her individual capacity for 

damages for violating the plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397. “Actions 

under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 and those under Bivens are identical save for the replacement of a state 

actor under § 1983 by a federal actor under Bivens.” Van Strum v. Lawn, 940 F.2d 406, 409 (9th 

Cir.1991). To state a claim under Bivens, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that a right secured by the 

Constitution of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a 

federal actor. See Van Strum, 940 F.2d at 409.

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader 

is entitled to relief ....” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but 

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, 

do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the 

mere possibility that a defendant committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are accepted 

as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. at 677-78.

B. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff has been released from federal custody and is currently residing in Mexico.

The events at issue occurred while he was incarcerated at USP-Atwater.

Plaintiff alleges that upon arrival at USP-Atwater, he contacted Health Services and 

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requested medical assistance for an eye problem. Plaintiff told Health Services that he needed 

surgery for an eye infection. Medical told him to submit a cop-out. Plaintiff submitted a cop-out, 

but was then told to submit a sick-call form. Plaintiff didn’t understand because Defendant Dr. 

Franco told him to submit a cop-out, but Defendant Mettry of Health Services told him to submit a 

sick-call. 

Plaintiff told Defendant Gardea, his counselor, about his medical problems, but he did not 

help.

Plaintiff then went to Defendant Copenhaver, the Warden. He told Plaintiff that Defendant 

Mettry was going to look into Plaintiff’s eye problem, but she never did. 

Plaintiff submitted another cop-out and Defendant Wong received it. However, seven or 

eight months passed before Plaintiff received his first eye surgery. 

Plaintiff contends that the surgery was the result of his notification that he was going to 

initiate a complaint against Medical.

After his surgery, Plaintiff experienced intense pain, loss of sight, headaches, nausea and 

other painful symptoms. He requested medication and eye drops from Health Services, but he was 

told that he needed to submit a cop-out and would then be seen in two to three days.

Plaintiff followed orders and submitted a cop-out. He did not get a response and submitted 

another one.

After fifteen to twenty days of waiting, the pain forced Plaintiff to remove his bandages. He 

was not able to see properly and discovered that he was losing sight.

Plaintiff submitted another cop-out, but he was not called to Medical and his cop-outs were 

not answered.

Plaintiff submitted three more cop-outs. Eight months later, he was called to Medical and 

informed of a second surgery.

Plaintiff underwent a second eye surgery. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Grossman 

performed the first two surgeries. One surgery was unsuccessful, and his eye worsened. Plaintiff 

also contends that Defendant Grossman failed to inform him of any additional surgeries, and failed 

to provide adequate medical care.

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Plaintiff contends that prior to the second surgery, Defendant Grim administered anesthesia. 

However, he overmedicated Plaintiff, resulting in vomiting, headaches and dizziness. 

When Plaintiff returned from the surgery, he experienced vomiting, nausea and respiratory 

problems. Medical gave him a shot to reduce the vomiting. After the shot, he did not receive any 

other medication and was sent back to his Unit.

Plaintiff was in pain all night. He notified Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) officials of his pain 

and eye problem, but they ignored his requests for medical attention. Plaintiff was told by the 6AUnit BOP officials to submit another cop-out to Medical so that he could get medical attention.

After three or four days, Medical called Plaintiff to examine his eye. Plaintiff had pain in his 

eye, but he believed that the pain was going away and that he was going to be able to see clearly in a 

couple of days. 

About twenty days later, Plaintiff spoke with Defendant Mettry and informed her that he had 

a blister and what looked like a water bubble in his eye. Defendant Mettry only told Plaintiff that he 

should submit a cop-out.

Plaintiff submitted a cop-out and waited for a month with no answer. He submitted another 

cop-out, but again received no answer. Plaintiff then went to Defendant Copenhaver, Defendant 

Gardea, the Doctor and Physician’s Assistant, as well as other medical personnel, to inform them of 

the blisters, red spots, water bubbles and pain in his eye.

Defendant Mettry told Plaintiff to look at the call-out for scheduling. Plaintiff was called to 

Medical three times, but each time, the eye specialist was not there to see him. He was rescheduled 

each time.

On the fourth appointment, Plaintiff was seen by an eye doctor. The doctor told Plaintiff that 

he was going to perform a third surgery. Plaintiff told the doctor that he did not trust him because it 

was going to be the third surgery. The doctor did not know that Plaintiff had been subjected to two 

previous surgeries. The doctor told Plaintiff that he would not force Plaintiff to have the surgery.

Plaintiff explains that he does not speak, write or understand English, and the eye doctor did 

not speak Spanish. Plaintiff believes that his communication was hindered by the language barrier, 

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though he declined further surgeries because of distrust. Plaintiff told the doctor that he would resort 

to the courts for assistance.

Plaintiff also alleges that at some point, Defendant Wong performed a physical examination, 

but not an eye examination. He states that he “clearly requested an eye exam, but no eye exam was 

ever performed.” ECF No. 11, at 15.

Based on these allegations, Plaintiff alleges violation of his due process rights under the Fifth 

Amendment, and cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. He also 

alleges a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) against the United States.

C. DISCUSSION

The Court notes that Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint offers little, if any, additional 

factual information. While Plaintiff has added, changed and/or deleted certain legal language in his 

claims for relief, the allegations in his First Amended Complaint remain largely the same as those in 

his original complaint.

1. Linkage

To state a claim, Plaintiff must link each named defendant to a violation of his constitutional 

rights; there is no respondeat superior liability under Bivens. Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-08 

(9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 2101 (2012); Serra v. Lappin, 600 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9th Cir. 

2010). 

Although Plaintiff names Defendant Nurse Franco as a Defendant, he fails to allege any 

specific facts against her. In his causes of action, he simply states that she was negligent in failing to 

provide medical care and in training and supervising her staff. He also alleges that she knew of his 

eye problem but did not take any action. Legal conclusions, without factual support, are insufficient 

to state a claim.

Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Defendant Nurse Franco. Plaintiff was 

informed of this deficiency in the prior screening order, but failed to correct it.

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2. Fifth Amendment

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. 

This claim is based on his belief that Defendants provided negligent medical care and/or ignored his 

requests for medical assistance.

When a constitutional amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional 

protection against a particular sort of government behavior, that amendment, not the more 

generalized notion of substantive due process, must govern. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 

523 U.S. 833, 842 (1998). 

Here, Plaintiff’s medical claims are governed by the Eighth Amendment and are therefore 

not cognizable under the Fifth Amendment.

To the extent that Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Gardea’s failure to remedy the situation 

hindered his right to “properly pursue relief through the administrative process,” his claim fails. 

ECF No. 11, at 14. The existence of an administrative remedy process does not create any 

substantive rights and cannot support a claim for relief for violation of a constitutional right. 

Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 

1988); Massey v. Helman, 259 F.3d 641, 647 (7th Cir. 2001). 

3. United States

Plaintiff names the United States as a Defendant “for exposing [him] to pain and suffering,” 

and contends that the United States is liable under the FTCA as the employer of all parties to this 

action. ECF No. 11, at 16.

A claim under the FTCA is a civil action against the United States, “for injury or loss of 

property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any 

employee” of the federal government while acting within the scope of his office or employment.328 

U.S.C. § 1346(b). The FTCA, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680, waives the sovereign immunity of 

the United States for certain torts committed by federal employees. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 

114 S.Ct. 996, 1000, 127 L.Ed.2d 308 (1994). As a jurisdictional prerequisite, the FTCA bars 

claimants from bringing suit in federal court until they have exhausted their administrative remedies. 

 

3

 Plaintiff is informed that violation of state tort law, such as negligence, is not sufficient to state a claim for relief under 

Bivens.

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McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113, 113 S.Ct. 1980, 124 L.Ed.2d 21 (1993). A lawsuit filed 

prior to the exhaustion of a claimant’s administrative claim is premature and must be dismissed. 

McNeil, 508 U.S. at 113.

The claim presentation requirement is a jurisdictional prerequisite to bringing suit and must 

be affirmatively alleged in the complaint. Gillispie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 640 (9th Cir. 1980). 

Here, Plaintiff fails to allege that he presented a claim to the appropriate federal agency. His general 

allegation that he “exhausted all administrative remedies” does not satisfy this requirement with 

respect to his FTCA claim. ECF No. 11, at 7.

The Court will permit Plaintiff leave to amend this claim. Plaintiff bears the burden of 

establishing jurisdiction under the FTCA, and he must specifically allege compliance with the 

FTCA’s administrative exhaustion requirement. Industrial Tectonics, Inc. v. Aero Alloy, 912 F.2d 

1090, 1092 (9th Cir.1990);Gillespie, 629 F.2d at 640.

4. Eighth Amendment

While the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution entitles Plaintiff to medical 

care, the Eighth Amendment is violated only when a prison official acts with deliberate indifference 

to an inmate’s serious medical needs. Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 2012), 

overruled in part on other grounds, Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1082-83 (9th Cir. 2014); 

Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012); Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th 

Cir. 2006). Plaintiff “must show (1) a serious medical need by demonstrating that failure to treat 

[his] condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of 

pain,” and (2) that “the defendant’s response to the need was deliberately indifferent.” Wilhelm, 680 

F.3d at 1122 (citing Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096). Deliberate indifference is shown by “(a) a purposeful 

act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need, and (b) harm caused by the 

indifference.” Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122 (citing Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096). The requisite state of mind 

is one of subjective recklessness, which entails more than ordinary lack of due care. Snow, 681 F.3d 

at 985 (citation and quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122. 

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a. Defendants Dr. Franco, Mettry, Gardea and Copenhaver

Insofar as Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Dr. Franco and Mettry ignored his medical needs, 

his facts show that he asked them for medical treatment and they instructed him to submit medical 

requests. In one instance, Defendant Mettry instructed Plaintiff to “look at the call-out for 

scheduling.” ECF No. 11, at 11. Although Plaintiff may not have liked their instructions on how to 

obtain medical care, there is no indication that they acted with the requisite state of mind. Mere 

negligence or inadvertence, or a difference in medical judgment or opinion does not amount to 

deliberate indifference. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06; see also McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060 (“A 

defendant must purposefully ignore or fail to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need 

in order for deliberate indifference to be established.”) (emphasis added). 

Similarly, Plaintiff alleges that he asked Defendant Copenhaver for help with his eye 

problem, and that Defendant Copenhaver told him that Defendant Mettry would look into the issue. 

Again, Defendant Copenhaver responded to Plaintiff’s inquiry and there is no indication that he 

acted with deliberate indifference. While Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Mettry did not follow-up, 

he does not link this failure to Defendant Copenhaver, nor does he provide sufficient facts about 

Defendant Mettry’s failure to establish that she acted with deliberate indifference. Estelle, 429 U.S. 

at 105-106. 

As to Defendant Gardea, Plaintiff contends that he “informed Counselor Gardea about 

Plaintiff’s medical problems, but he never did anything to help Plaintiff with Plaintiff’s eye 

problem.” ECF No. 11, at 9. Again, these allegations are too vague to demonstrate that Defendant 

Gardea’s failure was deliberately indifferent. There is no indication that Defendant Gardea’s actions 

were purposeful.

Plaintiff also alleges that he informed Defendants Copenhaver, Gardea and Dr. Franco about 

blisters and red spots in his eye. However, Plaintiff’s allegations show that he was then called for 

medical appointments. He states that he was rescheduled three times because the eye specialist 

“never appeared,” but there is no indication that any Defendants were responsible for this. Plaintiff 

eventually saw the eye specialist at his fourth appointment.

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Moreover, Plaintiff cites various delays of weeks or months, but he does not link any named 

Defendant to the actual delay. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Lemire v. California Dep’t of Corr. and 

Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1074-75 (9th Cir.2013).

Finally, insofar as Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Dr. Franco, Mettry and Copenhaver failed 

to train and supervise USP-Atwater medical staff, he fails to state a claim. Supervisory personnel 

may not be held liable under section 1983 for the actions of subordinate employees based on 

respondeat superior, or vicarious liability. Crowley v. Bannister, 734 F.3d 967, 977 (9th Cir. 2013); 

accord Lemire v. California Dep’t of Corr. and Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2013); 

Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 915-16 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). “A supervisor may be 

liable only if (1) he or she is personally involved in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) there is a 

sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional 

violation.” Crowley, 734 F.3d at 977 (citing Snow, 681 F.3d at 989) (internal quotation marks 

omitted); accord Lemire, 726 F.3d at 1074-75; Lacey, 693 F.3d at 915-16. 

Although Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Dr. Franco, Copenhaver and Mettry failed to train 

and supervise medical staff, he does not provide any factual support to either (1) directly link them 

to this failure; or (2) suggest a causal connection between their alleged failures and a constitutional 

violation. A conclusory assertion that Defendants failed to properly train and supervise staff will not 

support a cognizable claim for relief under section 1983. Crowley, 734 F.3d at 977; Lemire, 726 

F.3d at 1074-75.

For these reasons, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Defendants Mettry, Copenhaver, 

Gardea and Dr. Franco. Plaintiff was informed of these deficiencies in the prior screening order, but 

has not corrected them.

b. Defendant Wong

Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant Wong failed to provide care after Plaintiff told her about 

blisters and red spots fails for the reasons noted above.

Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Wong received a cop-out slip, but that seven or eight 

months then passed before Plaintiff received surgery. Plaintiff does not connect Defendant Wong to 

this delay, however.

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Finally, Plaintiff contends that Defendant Wong provided the “wrong” treatment when he 

performed a physical even though Plaintiff specifically requested an eye exam. He does not provide 

facts to show that Defendant Wong acted with deliberate indifference, however. Even assuming that 

Defendant Wong erred, a finding which is not necessarily supported by the record, an Eighth 

Amendment claim may not be premised on even gross negligence by a physician. Wood v. 

Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Plaintiff therefore fails to state a claim against Defendant Wong. Plaintiff was informed of 

these deficiencies in the prior screening order, but has failed to correct them.

c. Defendants Grossman and Grim

Plaintiff argues that Defendant Grossman’s “malpractice” during an unsuccessful eye surgery 

and Defendant Grim’s “negligent actions in overmedicating Plaintiff with anesthesia” violated the 

Eighth Amendment. ECF No. 11, at 16. Again, however, Plaintiff does not provide sufficient facts 

to show that they acted with the requisite state of mind. As explained above, even if Defendants 

Grossman and Grim erred in their treatment, an Eighth Amendment claim may not be premised on 

even gross negligence by a physician. Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Plaintiff therefore fails to state a claim against Defendants Grossman and Grim. Plaintiff was 

informed of these deficiencies in the prior screening order but has failed to correct them.

D. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted 

under section 1983 or the FTCA. The Court will provide Plaintiff with a FINAL opportunity to file 

an amended complaint. Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212-13 (9th Cir. 2012); Lopez v. Smith, 

203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000).

Plaintiff’s amended complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but it must state what 

each named Defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s federal rights and liability may 

not be imposed on supervisory personnel under the theory of mere respondeat superior, Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 676-77; Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-07 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 2101 

(2012). Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a right to 

relief above the speculative level. . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). 

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Finally, an amended complaint supercedes the original complaint, Lacey v. Maricopa 

County, 693 F.3d 896, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), and it must be “complete in itself without 

reference to the prior or superceded pleading,” Local Rule 220. 

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed, with leave to amend, for failure to state a claim

under section 1983;

2. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file an 

amended complaint or a notice of voluntary dismissal; and

4. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, this 

action will be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 29, 2016 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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