Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-2_05-cv-02124/USCOURTS-arwd-2_05-cv-02124-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 42:2000e Job Discrimination (Employment)

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(Rev. 8/82)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FORT SMITH DIVISION

WILLIAM HAYES PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 05-2124

EADS BROS. FURNITURE COMPANY DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C 2000(e), et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and

the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of 1983, § 16-123-101, et seq.

Plaintiff contends he was discriminated by Defendant in being

subjected to a hostile work environment, disparate treatment, and

retaliation/constructive termination. Currently before the Court are

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 6), Plaintiff’s

Response (Doc. 14), Defendant’s Motion to Strike (Doc. 18), and

Plaintiff’s Response (Doc. 19). For the reasons stated herein,

Defendant’s Motion to Strike is DENIED and Defendant’s Motion for

Summary Judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

A. Background

William Hayes (“Plaintiff”), an African American male, was

employed by Eads Bros. Furniture Co. (“Defendant”) from August 2002

until his termination on December 14, 2004, as a warehouse worker and

delivery truck driver. Defendant was paid an hourly wage plus any

overtime hours and $50.00 per delivery. To make local deliveries,

Plaintiff drove a small utility truck. Defendant employed drivers

with a commercial driver’s license (“CDL”) as over-the-road non-local

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delivery drivers. 

In March 2004, Plaintiff delivered furniture to Hot Springs,

Arkansas. Plaintiff contends Charles Phelps, Defendant’s sales

representative, referred to Plaintiff as a “nigger”, and told

Plaintiff to “get some of the other ‘nigs’ to go help” unload the

furniture. Plaintiff contends Phelps told him that Plaintiff was

doing “slaves work” and that he, Phelps didn’t have “cotton pickin

hands”. Plaintiff contends the racially derogatory comments were

made in the presence of Sam Miller, Defendant’s Vice President.

Plaintiff contends he complained to Miller who told him to overlook

the comments. Plaintiff contends he also complained to his

supervisor, John McAlister, who reported it to Miller and Bill Eads,

III, Defendant’s President. Plaintiff contends he was told not to

worry about it. Phelps denies making any inflammatory comments, but

admits asking Plaintiff why he was late. (Doc. 6, Exh. C, Phelps

Affidavit) 

In May 2004, Plaintiff contends he was berated by Defendant’s

customer, Herberto Paz with Furniture Palace, who called him a

“nigger,” “black faggot,” and other names. Plaintiff contends the

racial comments were made in front of other Defendant’s employees and

management, but that nothing was done to stop it. Plaintiff contends

he was berated by Paz on three other occasions within a two month

time period, but that Defendant failed to take appropriate action to

stop this conduct, although Defendant knew or should have known about

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Paz’s behavior. When Plaintiff complained of Paz’s behavior, he was

told to “go hide in the rear of the building” while Paz was present.

During one of Plaintiff’s interactions with Paz, Plaintiff says

that Paz drove a vehicle at a high rate of speed at him and missed

him by inches. On another occasion, Plaintiff contends that Paz

brought a large man with him to Plaintiff’s workplace and stated that

he has “somebody for your ass, nigger.” (Doc. 17, Exh. D, p. 76.)

Plaintiff contends he was an over-the-road driver for Defendant

and paid substantially less than Caucasian over-the-road drivers.

Plaintiff contends the Caucasian drivers were paid mileage,

reimbursed for meals and lodging, and paid a “drop fee”. Defendant

contends Plaintiff was not an over-the-road driver, only a warehouse

worker who made local deliveries. Persons hired by Defendant to be

over-the-road drivers held CDLs, and Plaintiff did not hold a CDL.

B. Standard of review

Since “[c]laims premised under the Arkansas Civil Rights Act of

1993 are analyzed in the same manner as Title VII claims,” see

Henderson v. Simmons Foods, Inc., 217 F.3d 612, 615 n.3 (8th Cir.

2000), the analysis under Title VII provides the standard to be

followed in this case as to both the state and federal claims of

discrimination. 

A motion for summary judgment will be granted when “there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is

entitled to judgement as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

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A “material” fact is one “that might affect the outcome of the suit

under the governing law ...” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A “genuine” issue of material fact exists when

there is sufficient evidence favoring the party opposing the motion

for a jury to return a verdict for that party. Id. In determining

whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the evidence is to

be taken in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Adickes

v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). If the moving party

meets the initial burden of establishing the nonexistence of a

genuine issue, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to

produce evidence of the existence of a genuine issue for trial.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The opposing

party “may not rest upon mere allegation or denials of his pleading,

but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine

issue for trial,” and “must present affirmative evidence in order to

defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment.” Anderson,

477 U.S. at 256-7 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).

C. Analysis

1. Hostile work environment

Plaintiff claims that he suffered racial harassment which

created a hostile work environment while working for the Defendant.

An employee experiences a hostile work environment when “the

workplace is permeated with ‘discriminatory intimidation, ridicule,

and insult’ that is ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the

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conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working

environment.’” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)

(quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65, 67

(1986)). To succeed on a hostile work environment claim, a

plaintiff must show that (1) he belongs to a protected group, (2) he

was subject to unwelcome harassment, (3) a causal nexus exists

between the harassment and the protected group status, (4) the

harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of his employment

and (5) the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and

failed to properly respond. Tademe v. St. Cloud State Univ., 328

F.3d 982, 991 (8 Cir. 2003). To determine whether a plaintiff has th

demonstrated that the harassment affected a term, condition or

privilege of his employment, we look at all the circumstances,

including “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity;

whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere

offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an

employee’s work performance.” Woodland v. Joseph T. Ryerson & Son,

Inc., 302 F.3d 839, 843 (8 Cir. 2002) (citing Harris, 510 U.S. at th

21-23). 

Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff

as we are required to do, any remarks attributed to Phelps, on one

isolated occasion, fail to demonstrate a change in terms and

conditions of Plaintiff’s employment. The incident was not frequent,

severe, physically threatening, and did not interfere with his

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performance. “More than a few isolated incidents are required,” and

the harassment must be so intimidating, offensive, or hostile that

it “poisoned the work environment.” Scusa v. Nestle U.S.A. Co., 181

F.3d 958, 967 (8 Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). The “mere th

utterance of an ethnic or racial epithet which engenders offensive

feelings in an employee” does not rise to an actionable level.

Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 67.

In addition to the above conduct, Plaintiff contends that his

workplace was hostile because Defendant is liable for the actions of

its customer, Paz, due to Defendant’s awareness of the harassment and

failure to investigate and/or remedy the situation. Plaintiff

contends that a customer, Paz racially harassed him on at least four

separate occasions, with two occasions involving an implied and/or

actual threat of physical harm.

“[A]n employer must take a [] harassment complaint seriously for

if it fails to act appropriately, it may face liability even where

the harasser was a customer or unrelated third party.” Royer v. City

of Oak Grove, 374 F.3d 685, 687, n.5 (8 Cir. 2004) (citing 29 C.F.R. th

§ 1604.11(e) (2003) (“An employer may also be responsible for the

acts of non-employees . . . where the employer (or its agents or

supervisory employees) knows or should have known of the conduct and

fails to take immediate and appropriate corrective action.”))

(additional citation omitted). 

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The Court finds that there are genuine issues of material fact

as to what Defendant knew or should have known, whether the racial

harassment was severe or pervasive enough to affect a condition of

Plaintiff’s employment, and whether Defendant took appropriate

corrective action. See Williams v. ConAgra Poultry Co., 378 F.3d

790, 795 (8 Cir. 2004). The Court finds that Defendant’s summary th

judgment motion on the hostile work environment claim is DENIED.

2. Retaliation/Constructive Termination

After filing an EEOC complaint, Plaintiff was either terminated

or resigned. Plaintiff contends that he was terminated after he

stated he no longer wished to deliver to the harassing customer, Paz.

Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s termination was the result of his

refusal to make deliveries. Bill Eads III discharged Plaintiff,

saying that he took Plaintiff’s refusal to make deliveries as meaning

“he didn’t want to do his job anymore. So I told him he didn’t have

a job.” (Doc. 17, Exh A, Bill Eads III Affidavit, p. 20.) Plaintiff

denies that he ever refused to make deliveries, but stated that he

did not wish to deliver to the harassing customer. There are factual

disputes as to whether Plaintiff was terminated or resigned and

whether Plaintiff’s termination/resignation was in retaliation to his

complaints regarding racial harassment. Accordingly, Defendant’s

summary judgment motion on the retaliation/constructive termination

claim(s) is DENIED.

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3. Disparate Treatment

Plaintiff contends that he received lower wages than Caucasian

employees for the same work. Plaintiff was paid $50 for each

delivery made, while the Caucasian employees, who held CDLs and drove

the larger 18-wheeler tractor-trailers, were paid by the mile with

additional benefits (such as having sleeping accommodations). To

establish a disparate treatment claim, a plaintiff must provide

circumstantial or direct evidence that the complained-of conduct was

motivated by race discrimination. Because Plaintiff has failed to

provide evidence that the difference in pay was motivated by race

discrimination, we analyze his disparate treatment claim under the

McDonnell Douglas framework. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. V. Green,

411 U.S. 792 (1972).

Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, Plaintiff must establish

a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that (1) he is a

member of a protected class; (2) he met the legitimate expectations

of his employer; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and

(4) similarly situated employees that were not members of his

protected class were treated differently. See Philip v. Ford Motor

Co., 413 F.3d 766 (8 Cir. 2005). The fourth element can be met only th

if Plaintiff proffers “‘specific, tangible evidence’ that employees

who were ‘similarly situated in all respects’ to him received

different treatment from [Defendant].” Id. (quoting Rose-Maston v.

NME Hosp., Inc., 133 F.3d 1104, 1109 n.4 (8 Cir. 1998); Gilmore v. th

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AT&T, 319 F.3d 1042, 1046 (8 Cir.2003)). th

Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case, as he has

not met the fourth element. Plaintiff has shown that he was paid

less than persons hired as over-the-road drivers who have CDLs.

Plaintiff does not hold a CDL, nor was he hired to drive the larger

18-wheeler tractor/trailers, as were the over-the-road drivers.

Plaintiff does not have the skill or licensing necessary to drive the

larger tractor/trailers, thus he has not shown that he is similarly

situated to the Caucasian over-the-road drivers. The Defendant is

entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s disparate treatment

claim, the summary judgment motion on the disparate treatment claim

is GRANTED.

D. Motion to Strike

Defendant has filed a Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Response to

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendant contends that

because Plaintiff’s Response was filed one business day after the

date upon which the Response was due, it should be stricken. We find

that Defendant was not prejudiced by the delay and Plaintiff, in good

faith, attempted to file the Response through the Court’s electronic

case filing system on the day the Response was due. Upon learning

that the Response had not been filed, Plaintiff filed the Response

the next business day. Thus, Plaintiff’s good faith failure to file

the Response on the date due amounts to excusable neglect. See

Pioneer Investment Services Co. V. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd.

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Partnership, 507 U.S. 380, 385 (1993); Wisland v. Admiral Beverage

Corp., 119 F.3d 733, 737 (8 Cir. 1997). Defendant’s Motion to th

Strike is DENIED.

E. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the Motion for Summary Judgment on the claims of

hostile work environment and retaliation/constructive discharge are

hereby DENIED. The Motion to Strike is hereby DENIED. The Motion

for Summary Judgment on the disparate treatment claim is hereby

GRANTED and that claim is dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff’s

claims of hostile work environment and retaliation/constructive

discharge shall proceed to a trial currently scheduled for the week

of September 11, 2006.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 28th day of July 2006.

/S/ Robert T. Dawson 

Robert T. Dawson

United States District Judge

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