Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00794/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00794-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

---

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JESSE I. SANTANA, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

THE COUNTY OF YUBA, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:15-cv-00794-KJM-EFB 

ORDER 

1 Attorneys Jesse Santana and David Vasquez allege they were tried for 

2 crimes they did not commit because local prosecutors, a judge, another attorney, 

3 and Yuba County itself wanted to prevent Santana’s appointment to the Sutter 

4 County Superior Court. Santana and Vasquez are Hispanic, and they attribute 

5 the prosecution to racial discrimination. The defendants move to dismiss Santa6 na’s and Vasquez’s first amended complaint. 

7 The court held a hearing on June 17, 2016. Jaime Leaños appeared for 

8 Santana and Vasquez. Jeffrey Norlander appeared for Yuba County, Patrick 

9 McGrath, John Vacek, Mary Barr, and Gene Stober. John Whitesides appeared 

10 for Randall Elliot. Michael Fox appeared for Judge Julia Scrogin. Wendy Green 

11 appeared for Timothy Evans. 

12 The motions are granted in part. 

13 I. ALLEGATIONS 

14 The defendants move to dismiss the first amended complaint under Fed15 eral Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). When considering a motion to dismiss un16 der that rule, the court assumes the events alleged actually occurred. See, e.g., 

17 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Santana and Vasquez allege as follows. 

Case 2:15-cv-00794-KJM-EFB Document 59 Filed 08/19/16 Page 1 of 33
2 

1 A. Santana’s Judicial Candidacy 

2 In 2007, Jesse Santana, who is Hispanic, was a prominent attorney 

3 whose law practice primarily entailed the representation of criminal defendants. 

4 First Am. Compl. ¶ 44, ECF No. 40. A vacancy opened on the Sutter County 

5 Superior Court bench, and Santana submitted his application to the Governor’s 

6 Office for a judicial appointment to the vacant seat. Id. He had strong support 

7 among the local Hispanic community, which made up about a quarter of both 

8 Sutter County and the neighboring Yuba County. Id. ¶¶ 44–45. David Vasquez, 

9 another local attorney, was among his supporters. Id. ¶ 44. 

10 Despite the substantial Hispanic population in Sutter and Yuba counties, 

11 the membership of neither the Yuba nor Sutter County Superior Court bench had 

12 included a Hispanic judge. Id. ¶ 45. This disparity is, Santana and Vasquez al13 lege, the result of a racist custom and practice within the Yuba and Sutter County 

14 administrations. Id. ¶ 46. This custom and practice extends to the Yuba County 

15 District Attorney’s Office, whose attorneys and investigators have a policy to re16 sist the judicial appointment of any ethnic minority group, including Hispanic 

17 judges. Id. ¶ 46. 

18 In 2007, only one other application had been filed for the vacancy on the 

19 Sutter County Superior Court, by Sutter County Deputy District Attorney Susan 

20 Green, who is Caucasian and not Hispanic. Id. Green had the support of several 

21 friends in the Yuba County District Attorney’s Office. Id. Their support was at22 tributable to a policy of keeping the local judiciary entirely White Caucasian, and 

23 they feared that the Governor’s office would appoint Santana in an effort to add 

24 diversity to the local judiciary. Id. ¶ 47. They knew the Governor would make a 

25 decision in June 2008, so in late 2007, they agreed on a plan to thwart Santana’s 

26 appointment by filing false criminal charges against him. See id. ¶ 48. They knew 

27 that if Santana became the object of a criminal investigation, he would be dis28 qualified. Id. ¶ 49. 

29 B. Santana and Vasquez Negotiate a Civil Release for Socorro 

30 Acevedo 

31 In November 2007, Socorro Acevedo met with Marysville Police Detec32 tive Randall Elliott to report that her boss, Joseph Griesa, had sexually assaulted 

33 and physically abused her. Id. ¶ 30. Acevedo was a minor at the time. Id. She 

34 showed Elliott text messages and bruises to corroborate her allegations, but El35 liott thought the case would be difficult to prosecute and recommended she pur36 sue a civil claim against Griesa instead. Id. ¶¶ 31–32. 

Case 2:15-cv-00794-KJM-EFB Document 59 Filed 08/19/16 Page 2 of 33
3 

1 Acevedo sought out an attorney: Jesse Santana. Id. ¶ 33. He confirmed 

2 that she could file a civil case against Griesa. Id. ¶ 34. Acevedo wanted to take 

3 care of the matter privately because she wanted to avoid testifying in court, she 

4 didn’t want her father and brother to find out about it, and she wanted to put the 

5 events behind her and move away to college. Id. ¶ 33. Santana confirmed the 

6 matter could probably be resolved privately with the approval of a judge and 

7 agreed to represent Acevedo without charge. Id. ¶¶ 34–35. 

8 Meanwhile, Detective Elliott phoned Griesa to tell him about Acevedo’s 

9 allegations and advised him to hire a lawyer. Id. ¶ 36. Griesa hired David 

10 Vasquez. Id. Vasquez and Griesa discussed the possibility of a criminal or civil 

11 case against Griesa. Id. ¶ 38. Vasquez explained that the District Attorney may 

12 be less likely to prosecute him criminally if he reached a prompt civil settlement 

13 agreement with Acevedo. Id. Griesa authorized Vasquez to pursue a civil settle14 ment and deposited $50,000 into Vasquez’s client trust account so Vasquez could 

15 use the money to make a good-faith settlement offer. Id. 

16 In November and December 2007, Santana and Vasquez negotiated a 

17 civil settlement agreement. Id. ¶ 40. A tentative agreement to settle the case for 

18 $100,000 was solidified, and draft releases were prepared. Id. Eventually, the fi19 nal version of the release included the following language: 

20 In consideration of the sum of one hundred thousand dollars 

21 ($100,000.00), Socorro Acevedo will request that criminal charges 

22 not be filed against Joe Griesa, and will exercise any privilege she 

23 may have pursuant to law, not to testify in any proceedings, and she 

24 will not file any civil action, arising out of the underlying facts, 

25 against Joe Griesa. Joe Griesa will pay $50,000.00 now and the re26 maining $50,000.00 within 60 days. In exchange, Socorro Acevedo 

27 forever releases and discharges Joe Griesa from all claims, demands, 

28 actions, and causes of action of every kind and nature in any way re29 lated to Joe Griesa’s interactions with Socorro Acevedo. 

30 Id. Everyone understood a judge would have to approve this agreement in light 

31 of Acevedo’s youth. Id. 

32 Vasquez told Detective Elliott about the proposed agreement, and Elliott 

33 generally approved of this resolution. Id. ¶ 41. Vasquez also told Yuba County 

34 Deputy District Attorney Melanie Bendorf about the proposal. Id. Santana like35 wise contacted Elliott. Id. He explained Acevedo’s motivations, including her 

36 desire to keep the matter out of public view and put the case behind her, and he 

37 asked to be present if Elliott interviewed Acevedo. Id. Griesa and Elliott also 

38 spoke about the proposed release and $100,000 payment, and Elliott suggested 

39 Griesa get a second opinion from another attorney, Timothy Evans. Id. 

Case 2:15-cv-00794-KJM-EFB Document 59 Filed 08/19/16 Page 3 of 33
4 

1 C. The Criminal Investigation and Prosecution of Santana and 

2 Vasquez 

3 In December 2007, Susan Green (Santana’s competitor for judicial ap4 pointment), Patrick McGrath (Yuba County District Attorney), Melanie Bendorf 

5 (the Yuba County Deputy District Attorney mentioned above), Julia Scrogin (a 

6 Judge on the Yuba County Superior Court), and Timothy Evans (the attorney 

7 recommended by Elliott) met over lunch. Id. ¶ 48. McGrath proposed a plan to 

8 investigate and prosecute bribery charges against Santana. See id. ¶¶ 48–50. The 

9 group agreed they would falsely characterize the settlement negotiations between 

10 Acevedo, Griesa, and their attorneys as clandestine attempts at persuading 

11 Acevedo to withhold information from investigators, prosecutors, and the courts 

12 in return for money. Id. ¶ 50. Green, McGrath, Bendorf, and Scrogin ignored 

13 their understanding and evidence showing 

14  Acevedo had not agreed to withhold information; rather, she 

15 agreed not to file a civil case, to ask that the criminal prosecution 

16 end, and to exercise any privilege she had against testifying; 

17  Santana had informed Elliott that Acevedo would agree to an in18 terview with the detective and asked only that her attorney be 

19 present; 

20  The settlement negotiations were not secret, considering that 

21 Vasquez had informed Elliott and Bendorf about a potential civil 

22 settlement agreement; and 

23  The negotiations between Acevedo, Griesa, and their attorneys 

24 were consistent with a longstanding practice among police, pros25 ecutors, and private attorneys, who had in the past facilitated sim26 ilar agreements between the victims and perpetrators of sexual as27 sault at a victim’s request. 

28 To ensure this investigation and prosecution appeared bona fide, the 

29 group agreed Vasquez would also be charged. Id. ¶ 50. Soon after this meeting, 

30 Green, McGrath, Bendorf, and Scrogin sought out the assistance of John Vacek, 

31 another Deputy District Attorney, and of Mary Barr and Gene Stober, investiga32 tors, who all agreed to join in the plan. Id. ¶ 48. 

33 Elliott filed a report of his investigation, but made no recommendation 

34 on whether criminal charges should be filed against Griesa. Id. ¶ 42. He noted his 

35 understanding that Griesa and Acevedo had negotiated a settlement agreement 

36 with Santana’s and Vasquez’s help, and he recommended that the District Attor37 ney’s Office consider bribery charges against the two attorneys. Id. His report 

Case 2:15-cv-00794-KJM-EFB Document 59 Filed 08/19/16 Page 4 of 33
5 

1 included the false assertion that Santana had instructed Acevedo not to speak to 

2 him. Id. Santana and Vasquez believe the other defendants pressured him into 

3 including this false assertion, or at least encouraged the misstatement. Id. The 

4 District Attorney’s Office began investigating possible bribery charges against 

5 Santana and Vasquez. Id. 

6 In the meantime, Acevedo and her mother had signed the civil release, 

7 but Griesa did not sign it because he had no guarantee against a criminal prose8 cution. Id. ¶ 43. Acevedo had also reconsidered her decision after her father 

9 learned about the alleged abuse and told her he wanted a criminal prosecution. 

10 Id. Santana informed Detective Elliott and Vasquez of these developments, and 

11 Vasquez returned the $50,000 to Griesa. Id. Acevedo also hired a new lawyer, 

12 Michael Trezza. Id. 

13 A search warrant was obtained for Santana’s and Vasquez’s law offices, 

14 and a search was completed in May 2008, the month before the Governor was 

15 expected to make his decision on Santana’s application. Id. ¶ 51(b). Santana first 

16 learned of the charges when the search warrant was executed, and reported them 

17 immediately to the commission considering his application, as he was obligated 

18 to do. Id. ¶ 52. As a result, he was disqualified as a candidate for the judgeship, 

19 and Green was appointed. Id. 

20 In October 2008, Judge Scrogin presided over a grand jury, which re21 turned an indictment against Santana and Vasquez the next month. Id. ¶ 53. San22 tana and Vasquez were booked, fingerprinted, photographed, arraigned, ordered 

23 to make further court appearances, ordered to surrender their passports, and or24 dered not to leave the state. Id. They appealed the indictment, arguing Judge 

25 Scrogin was biased, and the Court of Appeal agreed Judge Scrogin had acted 

26 without fundamental jurisdiction, rendering the indictment void. Id. ¶ 54. The 

27 California Attorney General’s Office then took over the prosecution, and the case 

28 proceeded on a criminal complaint. Id. ¶ 55. A jury trial was conducted in March 

29 and April 2014. Id. After deliberating for less than an hour, the jury acquitted 

30 Santana and Vasquez of all charges. Id. 

31 D. Procedural Matters 

32 Following their acquittal, Santana and Vasquez filed a complaint in this 

33 court against Yuba County, the City of Marysville, the Marysville Police De34 partment, McGrath, Bendorf, Vacek, Barr, Stober, Elliott, Scrogin, and Evans. 

35 See generally Compl. ECF No. 1. The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal 

36 Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Some defendants also moved to strike the com37 plaint under California Code of Civil Procedure 425.16, which allows motions 

Case 2:15-cv-00794-KJM-EFB Document 59 Filed 08/19/16 Page 5 of 33
6 

1 against “strategic lawsuits against public participation” or SLAPPs, and which 

2 applies in federal court. The court granted the motions to dismiss, partially with 

3 prejudice and partially with leave to amend, and granted the special motions to 

4 strike to the extent those motions challenged the complaint’s legal sufficiency. 

5 Order Mar. 31, 2016 (Prev. Order), ECF No. 37. 

6 Santana and Vasquez filed an amended complaint on April 22, 2016. 

7 ECF No. 40. They assert eleven claims against the remaining defendants—Yuba 

8 County, McGrath, Bendorf, Vacek, Barr, Stober, Elliott, Scrogin, and Evans: 

9 (1) Violation of their Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable 

10 searches and seizures, against all the defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 

11 1983, id. ¶¶ 56–61; 

12 (2) Violation of their Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection 

13 from racial discrimination, against all the defendants under 42 

14 U.S.C. § 1983, id. ¶¶ 62–66; 

15 (3) Violation of their Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process as a 

16 procedural matter, against all the defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 

17 1983, id. ¶¶ 67–71; 

18 (4) Violation of their Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process as a 

19 substantive matter, against all the defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 

20 1983, id. ¶¶ 72–76; 

21 (5) Violation of their Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from ma22 licious prosecution, against all the defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 

23 1983, id. ¶¶ 77–83; 

24 (6) Conspiracy to deprive them of Fourteenth Amendment rights, 

25 against all the defendants under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, id. ¶¶ 

26 84–88; 

27 (7) A claim against Yuba County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the actions 

28 of McGrath, its official policymaker, id. ¶¶ 89–95; 

29 (8) A claim against Yuba County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for maintain30 ing an official policy of racial discrimination, id. ¶¶ 96–102; 

31 (9) Malicious prosecution under California law, against Evans, id. ¶¶ 

32 103–07; 

33 (10) Intentional infliction of emotional distress under California law, 

34 against Evans, id. ¶¶ 108–11; and 

35 (11) Negligence under California law, against Evans, id. ¶¶ 112–14. 

Case 2:15-cv-00794-KJM-EFB Document 59 Filed 08/19/16 Page 6 of 33
7 

1 Santana and Vasquez request damages, attorneys’ fees, costs, and any 

2 other appropriate relief. Id. at 25–26. 

3 The defendants move to dismiss all of these claims. Yuba Mot., ECF No. 

4 44; Elliott Mot., ECF No. 41; Scrogin Mot., ECF No. 43; Evans Mot., ECF No. 

5 42. Santana and Vasquez oppose these motions. Opp’n Yuba Mot., ECF No. 46; 

6 Opp’n Elliott Mot., ECF No. 48; Opp’n Scrogin Mot., ECF No. 50; Opp’n Ev7 ans Mot., ECF No. 49. The defendants replied. Yuba Reply, ECF No. 53; Elliott 

8 Reply, ECF No. 51; Scrogin Reply, ECF No. 52; Evans Reply, ECF No. 55. 

9 II. LEGAL STANDARD 

10 The court’s previous order summarized the applicable legal standard: 

11 A party may move to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon 

12 which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The motion 

13 may be granted only if the complaint lacks a “cognizable legal theo14 ry” or if its factual allegations do not support a cognizable legal theo15 ry. Hartmann v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1122 (9th 

16 Cir. 2013). The court assumes these factual allegations are true and 

17 draws reasonable inferences from them. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 

18 A complaint need contain only a “short and plain statement of the 

19 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

20 8(a)(2), not “detailed factual allegations,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 

21 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). But this rule demands more than una22 dorned accusations; “sufficient factual matter” must make the claim 

23 at least plausible. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In the same vein, concluso24 ry or formulaic recitations of elements do not alone suffice. Id. (quot25 ing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Evaluation under Rule 12(b)(6) is a 

26 context-specific task drawing on “judicial experience and common 

27 sense.” Id. at 679. And aside from the complaint, district courts have 

28 discretion to examine documents incorporated by reference, Davis v. 

29 HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., 691 F.3d 1152, 1159–60 (9th Cir. 2012); af30 firmative defenses based on the complaint’s allegations, Sams v. Ya31 hoo! Inc., 713 F.3d 1175, 1179 (9th Cir. 2013); and proper subjects of 

32 judicial notice, [W. Radio Servs. Co. v. Qwest Corp., 678 F.3d 970, 976 

33 (9th Cir. 2012)]. 

34 Should a motion to dismiss be granted, district courts ordinarily al35 low the plaintiff leave to amend “when a viable case may be present36 ed.” Lipton v. Pathogenesis Corp., 284 F.3d 1027, 1039 (9th Cir. 2002). 

37 However, “liberality in granting leave to amend is subject to several 

38 limitations.” Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 

39 F.3d 1047, 1058 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation and quotation marks omit40 ted). Leave need not be granted where the amendment of the com41 plaint would cause the opposing party undue prejudice, is sought in 

Case 2:15-cv-00794-KJM-EFB Document 59 Filed 08/19/16 Page 7 of 33
8 

1 bad faith, constitutes an exercise in futility, or creates undue delay. 

2 Id. The court’s decision is one of discretion. Id. 

3 Prev. Order at 21–22. 

4 III. YUBA COUNTY DEFENDANTS 

5 The court addresses first the claims against the Yuba County defendants: 

6 the County, McGrath, Bendorf, Vacek, Barr, and Stober. Santana and Vasquez 

7 assert only federal claims against these defendants, all under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

8 The Yuba County defendants argue first that the complaint must be dismissed 

9 because they are absolutely immune. 

10 A. Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity 

11 As discussed in the court’s previous order, state prosecuting attorneys are 

12 absolutely immune from damages under § 1983 when the case concerns acts 

13 within the scope of their duties as prosecutors, Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 

14 410 (1976), carrying out “the traditional functions of an advocate,” Kalina v. 

15 Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 131 (1997). Absolute immunity protects even against 

16 claims of malicious prosecution, use of perjured testimony, and suppression of 

17 material evidence. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430. It is meant to avoid “deflection of 

18 the prosecutor’s energies from his public duties, and the possibility he would 

19 shade his decisions instead of exercising the independence of judgment required 

20 by the public trust.” Id. at 423. 

21 Absolute prosecutorial immunity applies only to conduct “intimately as22 sociated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 

23 478, 486 (1991) (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430). For this reason, when a prose24 cutor argues she is absolutely immune under this rule, the court must determine 

25 whether she performed a “quasi-judicial function.” Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 

26 1023, 1029 (9th Cir. 2003). If so, she is immune, even if she violated the plain27 tiff’s constitutional rights. Id. In making this determination, the court looks not to 

28 the prosecutor’s motivation, but to the “ultimate acts” themselves. See Ashelman 

29 v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc). 

30 When it comes to what a prosecutor says and does while presenting the 

31 State’s case at trial, the rule is clear: absolute immunity bars the claim. Imbler, 

32 424 U.S. at 431. In addition, the Supreme Court has found that some activities 

33 are protected by prosecutorial immunity even if they occur before the trial begins. 

34 Id. at 431 n.33. For example, appearing in court in support of an application for a 

35 search warrant, presenting evidence at a hearing, evaluating evidence, interview36 ing witnesses, and preparing charging documents may all be subject to the proCase 2:15-cv-00794-KJM-EFB Document 59 Filed 08/19/16 Page 8 of 33
9 

1 tection of absolute immunity. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 130; Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 

2 U.S. 259, 273 (1993); Burns, 500 U.S. at 492. But other tasks—administrative or 

3 investigative tasks, for example—are non-prosecutorial and are not protected by 

4 absolute immunity. Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 342–43 (2009). 

5 Santana and Vasquez argue the defendants’ alleged misdeeds fall in the 

6 unprotected, non-prosecutorial category. They allege the defendants acted as in7 vestigators or administrators, gave legal advice to the police, and conducted de8 famatory press conferences, First Am. Compl. ¶ 51, none of which is a task pro9 tected by prosecutorial immunity, see Burns, 500 U.S. at 496; Buckley, 509 U.S. at 

10 273–74 & n.5, 277. 

11 Three of these categories present no difficult questions. First, Santana 

12 and Vasquez allege without detail that the defendants are liable for their actions 

13 as administrators. As clarified at hearing, the only administrative act Santana 

14 and Vasquez identify is McGrath’s direction and supervision of the prosecution. 

15 This is not the type of administrative action excepted from absolute immunity. 

16 See Van de Kamp, 555 U.S. at 343–45 (the direction and supervision of prosecuto17 rial actions is likewise prosecutorial); Genzler, 410 F.3d at 643–44 (same). 

18 Second, the legal advice allegedly offered here was not actually legal ad19 vice. Santana and Vasquez allege an unnamed member of the Yuba County Dis20 trict Attorney’s Office pressured Detective Elliott into making false statements 

21 and unfounded charges in his police report. First Am. Compl. ¶ 42. An attorney 

22 can hardly be said to offer legal advice by telling a detective to invent facts. Cf. 

23 Burns, 500 U.S. at 482, 492–93 (a prosecutor offered legal advice to the police 

24 about whether hypnosis was an acceptable investigative technique). Even assum25 ing “advice” is the right designation for this instruction, it was certainly not “le26 gal advice.” This same reasoning shows it was not an act protected by prosecuto27 rial immunity—it was nothing the defendants did as part of their role as advo28 cates. This allegation may therefore support the plaintiffs’ claims that the defend29 ants acted outside their role as advocates, but it cannot support a claim for un30 constitutional legal advice unprotected by prosecutorial immunity. 

31 Third, McGrath did not act as a prosecutor when he told a newspaper af32 ter the trial that his office stood by its investigation and prosecution. First Am. 

33 Compl. ¶ 55. “Comments to the media have no functional tie to the judicial pro34 cess just because they are made by a prosecutor.” Buckley, 509 U.S. at 277. At 

35 most, this statement is protected by qualified immunity. Id. at 278. But it is un36 clear how this statement would support the § 1983 claims against McGrath, aside 

Case 2:15-cv-00794-KJM-EFB Document 59 Filed 08/19/16 Page 9 of 33
10 

1 from, perhaps, the substantive due process claim, which is dismissed, as dis2 cussed below. Any immunity attached to this statement is moot. 

3 This leaves the fourth category, investigative actions akin to those per4 formed by a detective or police officer, which makes for a closer call. The distinc5 tion between prosecutor and investigator can be a murky one, see Genzler, 410 

6 F.3d at 637–38; Broam, 320 F.3d at 1029, and its application is an “inexact sci7 ence,” Lacey v. Maricopa Cty., 693 F.3d 896, 912 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). The 

8 complaint includes the following relevant allegations: 

9 (1) Santana and Vasquez allege McGrath and Bendorf participated in 

10 the December 2007 lunch meeting where it was first agreed that the 

11 District Attorney’s Office would investigate and prosecute bribery 

12 charges. First Am. Compl. ¶ 48. Soon after the meeting, McGrath 

13 secured Vacek’s participation in the plan. Id. At this time, Detective 

14 Elliott’s investigation was ongoing and no charges had been filed. 

15 See id. ¶ 42. 

16 (2) In May 2008, Yuba County Investigator Mary Barr, with help from 

17 the District Attorney’s office, prepared and filed an application for a 

18 search warrant authorizing the search of Santana’s, Vasquez’s, and 

19 Trezza’s law offices. Id. ¶ 51(b). The warrant application falsely de20 scribed the proposed civil settlement as a bribe and ignored that 

21 Acevedo had never wanted to testify, regardless of the settlement. Id.

22 The warrant application also omitted an important detail: Acevedo 

23 had alleged that Griesa raped her and sodomized her while she was 

24 unconscious. Id. This allegation could have allowed her to invoke 

25 California Code of Civil Procedure section 1219(b), which provides 

26 that “a court shall not imprison or otherwise confine or place in cus27 tody the victim of a sexual assault or domestic violence crime for 

28 contempt if the contempt consists of refusing to testify concerning 

29 that sexual assault or domestic violence crime.” Id.; see also id. § 

30 1219(d)(1) (defining sexual assault to include rape under California 

31 Penal Code section 261 and sodomy under section 286). This infor32 mation undermines a description of the settlement agreement as a 

33 bribe or an attempt to obstruct justice. 

34 (3) In July 2008, Bendorf, Vacek, and Stober “interrogated” Acevedo. 

35 Id. ¶ 51(d). At this time, criminal charges not had been filed against 

36 Santana and Vasquez, but search warrants had been obtained for 

37 their law offices, and the warrants had been executed. See id. ¶¶ 

Case 2:15-cv-00794-KJM-EFB Document 59 Filed 08/19/16 Page 10 of 33
11 

1 51(b), 52. Santana and Vasquez had not been indicted, see id. ¶ 53, 

2 and they had not been arraigned, see id. ¶ 58. The interrogation con3 cerned a suspected bribe, and Acevedo was the supposed recipient of 

4 the bribe. Id. ¶ 51(d). She was therefore theoretically at risk for pros5 ecution. Id. But the defendants refused her request that her attorney 

6 be present. Id. During the interrogation, Acevedo explained that she 

7 had never intended to testify against Griesa, regardless of any set8 tlement agreement. Id. She explained their negotiations had con9 cerned only the compensation she would receive from Griesa for her 

10 personal injuries. Id. Bendorf and Vacek ignored and suppressed this 

11 testimony, which tended to exonerate Santana and Vasquez. Id. 

12 Acevedo also told the defendants that Griesa had sedated her, that 

13 she had lost consciousness, and that he then raped her and sodo14 mized her. Id. Bendorf and Vacek covered up the alleged rape in an 

15 attempt to induce Griesa’s cooperation in their investigation and 

16 prosecution of Santana and Vasquez. Id. Griesa was never charged 

17 in connection with these allegations. Id.; see also id. ¶ 51(c) (the Dis18 trict Attorney’s office at large knew about these events and decided 

19 not to prosecute in an effort to obtain Griesa’s cooperation). 

20 (4) The complaint alleges generally that McGrath, Bendorf, and Vacek 

21 suppressed evidence that showed (a) Elliott had initially discouraged 

22 Acevedo from seeking criminal prosecution; (b) Elliott had ex23 pressed his approval of the proposed civil settlement to Vasquez; and 

24 (c) Vasquez told Bendorf that Griesa would not sign the proposed 

25 settlement agreement if criminal charges were filed against him. Id. ¶ 

26 51(e). This evidence tended to exonerate Santana and Vasquez. Id. 

27 The complaint does not allege when or at what stage of the criminal 

28 case this suppression occurred. 

29 The defendants are absolutely immune if these allegations do not allow a 

30 reasonable inference that they were acting as investigators. “A prosecutor neither 

31 is, nor should consider himself to be, an advocate before he has probable cause to 

32 have anyone arrested.” Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274. But “a determination of proba33 ble cause does not guarantee a prosecutor absolute immunity from liability for all 

34 actions taken afterwards.” Id. at 274 n.5. Neither does an investigation necessari35 ly become a prosecution when a grand jury is empaneled. See id. at 275. And a 

36 prosecutor must not be allowed the unfair benefit of hindsight: 

37 A prosecutor may not shield his investigative work with the aegis of 

38 absolute immunity merely because, after a suspect is eventually arCase 2:15-cv-00794-KJM-EFB Document 59 Filed 08/19/16 Page 11 of 33
12 

1 rested, indicted, and tried, that work may be retrospectively de2 scribed as “preparation” for a possible trial; every prosecutor might 

3 then shield himself from liability for any constitutional wrong 

4 against innocent citizens by ensuring that they go to trial. 

5 Id. In other words, absolute immunity does not protect “every litigation-inducing 

6 conduct.” Burns, 500 U.S. at 494. 

7 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has explained that, on the one hand, 

8 “[p]rosecutors are absolutely immune from liability for gathering additional evi9 dence after probable cause is established or criminal proceedings have begun 

10 when they are performing a quasi-judicial function.” Broam, 320 F.3d at 1030. 

11 But on the other hand, “even after the initiation of criminal proceedings, a prose12 cutor may receive only qualified immunity when acting in a capacity that is ex13 clusively investigatory . . . .” Id. at 1031. “Witness interviews may serve either an 

14 investigative or an advocacy-related function, as may other methods of gathering 

15 or manufacturing evidence prior to trial.” Genzler, 410 F.3d at 638. Thus in 

16 Broam v. Bogan, where the plaintiffs’ complaint did not explain whether the pros17 ecutors’ alleged unconstitutional conduct occurred before or after they deter18 mined probable cause existed to support an arrest, the Ninth Circuit remanded 

19 and ordered the district court to allow an amendment. 320 F.3d at 1033-34. And 

20 in Genzler, after explaining that timing is “relevant, but not necessarily determina21 tive,” the Ninth Circuit found that the prosecutor-defendant was not protected by 

22 absolute immunity during witness interviews because investigations were ongo23 ing and a criminal complaint had not been filed. 410 F.3d at 639–43. 

24 The defendants also offer a citation to Hampton v. City of Chicago, 349 F. 

25 Supp. 2d 1075, 1081 (N.D. Ill. 2004). In Hampton, the district court found that 

26 the defendant prosecutor was entitled to absolute immunity for claims related to 

27 “interviewing witnesses, deciding what information was necessary for trial, pre28 paring a felony review card, interviewing plaintiff, reading plaintiff his Miranda

29 rights and approving charges against plaintiff.” Id. at 1081 (citing Miranda v. Ari30 zona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)). These duties were “all part of initiating a judicial pro31 ceeding and part of [the defendant’s] job as a felony review prosecutor,” and 

32 were “not typically performed by police officers.” Id. The timing of these events 

33 is not entirely clear from the district court’s decision, but it is clear that the plain34 tiff in Hampton had been arrested before the prosecutor interviewed him. Id. at 

35 1077. 

36 These authorities demonstrate the Yuba County defendants are entitled 

37 to only qualified immunity with respect to the alleged December 2007 lunch 

38 meeting, the May 2008 warrant application, and the July 2008 interrogation. At 

Case 2:15-cv-00794-KJM-EFB Document 59 Filed 08/19/16 Page 12 of 33
13 

1 those times, Santana and Vasquez had not been arrested, they had not been in2 dicted, and they had not been arraigned. The investigation was ongoing, and the 

3 defendants were gathering evidence. The court may reasonably infer they were 

4 not acting as advocates. The same may be true of the complaint’s general allega5 tions that the defendants suppressed exonerating evidence if this suppression oc6 curred within the same time period. 

7 In summary, the claims against the Yuba County defendants are not 

8 barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity because Santana and Vasquez allege 

9 adequately that these defendants were acting as investigators, not advocates. 

10 B. Qualified Immunity 

11 A prosecutor or investigator who is not entitled to absolute prosecutorial 

12 immunity may nonetheless enjoy qualified immunity against a § 1983 claim. See, 

13 e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982). Likewise Barr and Stober, 

14 who are not prosecutors, but state officers, enjoy qualified immunity. See id.

15 Qualified immunity is evaluated using a two-part test. Tolan v. Cotton, ___ U.S. 

16 ___, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1865 (2014) (per curiam). The court has discretion to begin 

17 with either part, Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 242 (2009), but typically de18 termines first whether the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the party 

19 asserting an injury, show that each defendant violated one or more of the plain20 tiffs’ federally protected rights. Tolan, 134 S. Ct. at 1865; Johnson v. Bay Area Rap21 id Transit Dist., 724 F.3d 1159, 1168 (9th Cir. 2013). If the answer to this question 

22 is “no,” nothing further is necessary—the absence of any violation means no 

23 claim can proceed. Johnson, 724 F.3d at 1168. 

24 The second part of the inquiry tests whether the federal right asserted was 

25 “clearly established” at the time of the alleged violation. Tolan, 134 S. Ct. at 

26 1866. This determination hinges on whether the law as it was gave the defend27 ants fair warning that their conduct was unconstitutional. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 

28 730, 741 (2002). “A clearly established right is one that is ‘sufficiently clear that 

29 every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates 

30 that right.’” Mullenix v. Luna, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (per curi31 am) (quoting Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2093 (2012)). 

32 “Put simply, qualified immunity protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those 

33 who knowingly violate the law.’” Id. (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 

34 (1986)). The court must take care not to define “clearly established law” too gen35 erally. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011). The correct definition ac36 counts for the “specific context of the case.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 

37 (2001), overruled in part on other grounds, Pearson, 555 U.S. 223. 

Case 2:15-cv-00794-KJM-EFB Document 59 Filed 08/19/16 Page 13 of 33
14 

1 The Yuba County defendants challenge the complaint’s first, second, 

2 third, fourth, and fifth claims. The court considers whether the defendants’ quali3 fied immunity precludes each of these claims. 

4 1. Unconstitutional Search or Seizure (First Claim) 

5 “The Fourth Amendment safeguards ‘[t]he right of the people to be se6 cure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 

7 and seizures.’” Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 326 (2001) (quoting 

8 U.S. Const. amend. IV) (alteration in Atwater). This right applies against states 

9 and state agencies. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223–24 (1960). It goes 

10 without saying that an unreasonable search or seizure is an element of any § 1983 

11 claim for violation of the right to be free from unreasonable searches and sei12 zures. See Karam v. City of Burbank, 352 F.3d 1188, 1193 (9th Cir. 2003). 

13 Here, Santana and Vasquez do not allege they were detained before their 

14 trial, and they do not allege they were released on bail. In fact, judicially noticea15 ble state court records suggest they were always at liberty on their own recogni16 zance. Prev. Order at 31–32. As summarized in the court’s previous order, feder17 al law does not clearly establish whether a person who is charged with a felony 

18 and released on her own recognizance is “seized” within the meaning of the 

19 Fourth Amendment. See id. at 32–34. This absence of authority contrasts with the 

20 clear majority of federal circuit courts, including the Ninth Circuit, which have 

21 held that “a pre-arraignment, non-felony summons requiring no more than a lat22 er court appearance does not constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure.” Burg v. 

23 Gosselin, 591 F.3d 95, 99–101 (2d Cir. 2010) (collecting authority); see also Karam, 

24 352 F.3d at 1193–94. In 2010, another judge of this district concluded that “[t]he 

25 fact of a felony charge, of itself, is not determinative of a seizure in violation of 

26 the Fourth Amendment. It is the fact of the felony charge with other restrictions 

27 that is important.” Fenters v. Chevron, No. 05-1630, 2010 WL 5477710, at *23 

28 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 30, 2010). And in 2015, the Ninth Circuit expressly declined to 

29 address whether a felony charge makes a difference. Yousefian v. City of Glendale, 

30 779 F.3d 1010, 1015 n.6 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 135 (2015); see also 

31 McCabe v. Hart, 357 F. App’x 151, 153 (9th Cir. 2009) (unpublished). 

32 After considering these authorities, the court concluded in its previous 

33 order that whether a seizure occurred depends on the restrictions the person fac34 es, not on the charges against her. Prev. Order at 34. Santana and Vasquez allege 

35 they were seized when they were booked, fingerprinted, photographed, ar36 raigned, ordered to make further court appearances, ordered to surrender their 

37 passports, and ordered not to leave the state without the court’s permission. It is 

Case 2:15-cv-00794-KJM-EFB Document 59 Filed 08/19/16 Page 14 of 33
15 

1 certainly arguable that restrictions like these could amount to a Fourth Amend2 ment seizure. In Evans v. Ball, for example, the Fifth Circuit held that pretrial re3 lease conditions amounted to a “seizure” because the person was required to ap4 pear in court, obtain permission before leaving the state, report regularly to pre5 trial services, sign a personal recognizance bond, and give financial and other 

6 identifying information to officers. 168 F.3d 856, 860–61 (5th Cir. 1999), abrogat7 ed on other grounds, Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939 (5th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 

8 Similarly, in 1997, the Second Circuit held that a person had been “seized” be9 cause he was forbidden from leaving the state and was required to appear in 

10 court many times. See Murphy v. Lynn, 118 F.3d 938, 946 (2d Cir. 1997). And in 

11 1975, the Supreme Court held that “pretrial release may be accompanied by bur12 densome conditions that effect a significant restraint of liberty,” referring to a 

13 now-recodified section of the U.S. Code that allowed restrictions on travel. Ger14 stein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3416(a)(2), revised and 

15 recodified, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B)(iv)). 

16 Santana and Vasquez argue persuasively that the restrictions they faced 

17 were meaningfully harsher than the “de minimis” restrictions the Ninth Circuit 

18 shrugged off in Karam. Opp’n Yuba Mot. at 9 (citing 352 F.3d at 1193–94). Be19 tween the time Santana and Vasquez were charged and the time they were ac20 quitted, seven years passed. Serious felony charges loomed over them. Their rep21 utations and careers suffered. They were compelled to make court appearances. 

22 Nevertheless, as highlighted above, no clearly established law put the defendants 

23 on notice that these conditions amounted to a Fourth Amendment seizure. Last 

24 year, the Ninth Circuit held that the law was uncertain on this point and declined 

25 to address the uncertainty. Yousefian, 779 F.3d at 1015 n.6. The Yuba County 

26 defendants are therefore entitled to qualified immunity, and the first claim 

27 against them is dismissed. 

28 2. Equal Protection of the Law (Second Claim) 

29 Qualified immunity first depends on whether a constitutional violation 

30 occurred. The defendants argue the court cannot infer that a constitutional viola31 tion occurred because Santana and Vasquez do not allege any similarly situated, 

32 non-Hispanic person was treated differently than they were. Yuba Mot. at 10–11; 

Elliott Mot. at 10–11.1 33 Santana and Vasquez respond by citing Awabdy v. City of 

 

1

 In the interest of clarity, the court addresses here arguments presented by 

both the Yuba County defendants and Detective Elliott. 

Case 2:15-cv-00794-KJM-EFB Document 59 Filed 08/19/16 Page 15 of 33
16 

1 Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2004). See Opp’n Yuba Mot. at 10–12. In 

2 Awabdy, the Ninth Circuit held that a plaintiff may pursue an equal protection 

3 claim under § 1983 by alleging a defendant “purposefully caused the state to in4 stitute proceedings against him because of his race or ethnicity,” regardless of 

5 whether any similarly situated person was treated differently. 368 F.3d at 1071. 

6 a. Selective Prosecution or Express Discrimination? 

7 These competing arguments set up two possible interpretations of the 

8 complaint. The defendants interpret the complaint to allege selective prosecution, 

9 and emphasize that plaintiffs who allege selective prosecution claims must allege 

10 similarly situated persons were treated differently. See Yuba Mot. at 10–11; El11 liott Mot. at 10–11. Santana and Vasquez disagree and explain that they do not 

12 allege selective prosecution, but direct, intentional, and express discrimination. 

13 See Opp’n Yuba Mot. at 10–12. Express discrimination claims need not be sup14 ported by comparative allegation. See Awabdy, 368 F.3d at 1071. 

15 As a preliminary matter, the plaintiffs’ arguments support Santana’s 

16 claims, but not Vasquez’s. The court cannot infer the defendants pursued 

17 Vasquez because he is Hispanic; rather, he was allegedly charged in an effort to 

18 lend legitimacy to Santana’s prosecution. See First. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 50, 63; but cf. 

19 id. ¶¶ 3, 16, 45. If this was in fact the defendants’ motivation, Vasquez would 

20 have suffered the same fate if he belonged to any other racial or ethnic group, 

21 majority or minority. Vasquez’s equal protection claim is dismissed. Santana, by 

22 contrast, alleges straightforwardly that the defendants pursued charges against 

23 him because he was Hispanic. This leaves the question of whether the complaint 

24 is best understood as alleging selective prosecution or intentional, express dis25 crimination. A bit more detail about Awabdy, similar cases, and selective prosecu26 tion claims is necessary to explain the court’s reasoning. 

27 A selective prosecution claim consists of the allegation that a prosecutor 

28 or another officer enforced facially neutral laws with discriminatory effect and 

29 purpose, regardless of probable cause. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 

30 456, 465 (1996). A plaintiff must allege other similarly situated persons were not 

31 prosecuted. Id. This pleading requirement is born of respect for federalism or the 

32 separation of powers and the differing competencies of prosecutors and judges. 

33 See id. at 464–65. Prosecutors have broad discretion to enforce criminal laws and 

34 look to a variety of circumstances when deciding when and how to charge a 

35 crime. Id. at 465. Undue judicial interference may cause delay and uncertainty or 

36 even reveal the government’s strategy. Id. The Supreme Court therefore requires 

37 plaintiffs to allege and prove disparate treatment “to dispel the presumption that 

Case 2:15-cv-00794-KJM-EFB Document 59 Filed 08/19/16 Page 16 of 33
17 

1 a prosecutor has not violated equal protection” by providing “clear evidence to 

2 the contrary.” Id. (citation omitted). 

3 In Awabdy, the Ninth Circuit saw no need to require the plaintiff to allege 

4 similarly situated persons were treated differently. The plaintiff there targeted 

5 neither the prosecutors nor the prosecution itself, but the local administrators 

6 who had allegedly trumped up false charges against him. See 368 F.3d at 1071. 

7 “Accordingly,” the Circuit held, given “the particular defendants involved,” the 

8 plaintiff could prevail despite the absence of any similarly situated person. Id. 

9 The Awabdy panel explained its reasoning by citing Pyke v. Cuomo, 258 

10 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2001), and Farm Labor Organizing Committee v. Ohio State High11 way Patrol, 308 F.3d 523 (6th Cir. 2002). In Pyke, the plaintiffs alleged New York 

12 state officials had purposefully withheld police protection from an Indian reserva13 tion. 258 F.3d at 108. The plaintiffs did not allege any similarly situated, non14 Native-Americans were treated differently, but the Second Circuit found this 

15 shortcoming immaterial. For one, like the Awabdy court, the Pyke court distin16 guished the claim before it from a selective prosecution claim. Id. at 108–09. Sec17 ond, the court explained, if the Pyke plaintiffs were required to prove a similarly 

18 situated non-Indian group was treated differently, they could never succeed. 

19 There is no group situated similarly to a sovereign Indian Tribe, exercising signif20 icant self-governance within its community in New York State. Id. at 109. 

21 In Farm Labor Organizing Committee, the Sixth Circuit reviewed a claim 

22 that the Ohio State Highway Patrol had unconstitutionally singled the plaintiffs 

23 out during a traffic stop because they were Hispanic. 308 F.3d at 533. The court 

24 required the plaintiffs to show the stop had both a discriminatory effect and mo25 tivation. Id. at 533–34. To prove discriminatory intent, the plaintiff would be re26 quired to identify a similarly situated person who was not stopped. Id. at 534. In 

27 the margin the court then explained what the case was not: an alleged instance of 

28 systemic, intentional racial discrimination. See id. at 533 n.4 (“We note that the 

29 record contains no indication that the [Highway Patrol] employs explicit racial 

30 criteria or admits to racially-motivated decision making.”). It cited authority ex31 plaining that “[i]t is not necessary to plead the existence of a similarly situated 

32 non-minority group when challenging a law or policy that contains an express, 

33 racial classification.” Id. (quoting Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 337 (2d 

34 Cir. 2000)). The Pyke court relied on the same authority. See 258 F.3d at 109–10 

35 (citing Brown, 221 F.3d at 337). 

36 These decisions are at first glance difficult to reconcile with a later Ninth 

37 Circuit opinion, Rosenbaum v. City and County of San Francisco, 484 F.3d 1142 (9th 

Case 2:15-cv-00794-KJM-EFB Document 59 Filed 08/19/16 Page 17 of 33
18 

1 Cir. 2007). In Rosenbaum, a group of Christian evangelists had used amplified 

2 sound to proselytize their message in San Francisco streets and parks. Id. at 

3 1147–50. They challenged the city’s enforcement of a noise ordinance. See id.

4 They alleged the city had denied their applications for permits and had shut 

5 down their outreach programs because it disagreed with their message. Id. at 

6 1152. Relying on the Supreme Court’s opinions in Wayte v. United States, 470 

7 U.S. 598 (1985), and United States v. Armstrong, supra, 517 U.S. 456, the Ninth 

8 Circuit began its discussion this way: 

9 A government entity has discretion in prosecuting its criminal laws, 

10 but enforcement is subject to constitutional constraints. To prevail 

11 on its claim under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 

12 Amendment, a plaintiff must demonstrate that enforcement had a 

13 discriminatory effect and the police were motivated by a discrimina14 tory purpose. To establish a discriminatory effect, the claimant must 

15 show that similarly situated individuals were not prosecuted. To 

16 show discriminatory purpose, a plaintiff must establish that the deci17 sion-maker selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at 

18 least in part because of, not merely in spite of, its adverse effects up19 on an identifiable group. 

20 Id. at 1152–53 (citations, quotation marks, footnotes, and alterations omitted). A 

21 few years later, in Lacey v. Maricopa County, the en banc Ninth Circuit quoted 

22 these sentences to explain the applicable legal standard. See 693 F.3d at 920. In 

23 neither Rosenbaum nor Lacey did the Circuit acknowledge or distinguish its deci24 sion in Awabdy. 

25 At a general level, the standard articulated in Rosenbaum conflicts with 

26 the rule of Awabdy. Despite factual similarities between the two cases, the Rosen27 baum court required an allegation of similarly situated persons, but the Awabdy

28 court did not: In neither Awabdy nor Rosenbaum were the plaintiffs prosecuted, in 

29 neither case did the plaintiffs sue a prosecutor, and in both cases the plaintiffs 

30 alleged the defendants had purposefully caused the state to take a discriminatory 

31 enforcement action. Compare Awabdy, 368 F.3d at 1071, with Rosenbaum, 484 

32 F.3d at 1152–53. 

33 But Awabdy does not conflict with Rosenbaum and Lacey when one 

34 acknowledges the Awabdy panel’s meticulous description of the claims before it: 

35 [The plaintiff, Mr. Awabdy,] is not claiming that the defendants 

36 prosecuted him under a facially neutral law in a discriminatory 

37 manner. Indeed, the defendants did not prosecute him at all. They 

38 simply provided information, false or fraudulent as it may have 

39 been, to those charged with that responsibility. 

Case 2:15-cv-00794-KJM-EFB Document 59 Filed 08/19/16 Page 18 of 33
19 

1 368 F.3d at 1071 (citations omitted). In other words, Mr. Awabdy’s focus, like 

2 that of Santana and Vasquez, was with neither a selection nor a prosecution, but 

3 with the lies, rooted in racial animus, that eventually launched the prosecution. 

4 The Awabdy court continued by explaining the plaintiff was not asking 

5 the court “to exercise judicial power over the special province of the Executive, 

6 because he [was] not challenging the prosecutor’s decision to initiate criminal 

7 proceedings.” Id. (citation omitted). In both Rosenbaum and Lacey, by contrast, 

8 the Circuit called on the consideration afforded to prosecutions and prosecutors 

9 by the Supreme Court. See Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607–09; Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 

10 465. The Awabdy court acknowledged this rationale and explained why it did not 

11 fit the case before it, as quoted above. 368 F.3d at 1071. The Second Circuit rea12 soned similarly in Pyke. 258 F.3d at 108–09. The same difference separates the 

13 complaint here from a selective prosecution complaint. Santana does not allege 

14 the defendants exercised their prosecutorial discretion unconstitutionally. He 

15 claims the defendants stepped outside their role as the State’s attorneys and in16 vented a case. 

17 The defendants’ position also essentially invites the conclusion that the 

18 Ninth Circuit overruled Awabdy in Rosenbaum and Lacey. The court declines to 

19 find binding authority has been overruled by silent implication. Cf. Miller v. 

20 Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 2003) (although a second decision need not 

21 rest on the very same foundation as a previous decision before the second may 

22 overrule the first, the second must be “clearly irreconcilable” or “directly at 

23 odds” with the first). 

24 In summary, the complaint’s allegations allow the court to infer the Yuba 

25 County defendants violated Santana’s constitutional right to equal protection of 

26 the laws, but not Vasquez’s. The defendants can therefore enjoy qualified im27 munity only if they demonstrate their alleged actions fell within the bounds of 

28 clearly established law. 

29 b. Clearly Established Law 

30 If it appears here that there is any absence of clearly established law, the 

31 uncertainty is attributable to the legal tangles wrought by the parties’ briefing. A 

32 reasonable officer in the defendants’ situation would not have made the decisions 

33 the Yuba County defendants are alleged to have made. Regardless of any uncer34 tainty about what a plaintiff must plead to reach discovery in a federal lawsuit, 

35 no reasonable officer could conclude that the Constitution permits her to manip36 ulate evidence to support an unsupportable felony charge, particularly when her 

37 goal is to prevent the appointment of a judge whose race or ethnicity the officer 

Case 2:15-cv-00794-KJM-EFB Document 59 Filed 08/19/16 Page 19 of 33
20 

1 finds objectionable. Explicitly discriminatory laws and policies “fall within the 

2 core” of the Equal Protection Clause’s prohibition. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 

3 900, 905 (1995) (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 642 (1993)); accord, e.g., 

4 Pyke, 258 F.3d at 108–09 (“A plaintiff alleging an equal protection claim under a 

5 theory of discriminatory application of the law, or under a theory of discrimina6 tory motivation underlying a facially neutral policy or statute, generally need not 

7 plead or show the disparate treatment of other similarly situated individuals.”). 

8 c. Timeliness of Filing 

9 The defendants raise a further argument for dismissal, and though it is 

10 not a feature of qualified immunity, it is best addressed here: Santana’s second 

11 claim must be dismissed because it is untimely. Santana’s constitutional claims 

12 are brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. That section does not specify its limitations 

13 period. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007). The court therefore applies the 

14 limitations period imposed by California law in personal injury claims. See id. In 

15 California, a two-year limitations period applies to personal injury claims that 

16 were less than one year old as of January 1, 2003. See Canatella v. Van De Kamp, 

17 486 F.3d 1128, 1132 (9th Cir. 2007). 

18 The limitations period begins to run on the date a claim accrues. Lukovsky 

19 v. City & Cty. of S.F., 535 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir. 2008). Federal law determines 

20 when a claim accrues. TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 1999). 

21 “[U]nder federal law, a claim accrues ‘when the plaintiff knows or has reason to 

22 know of the injury which is the basis of the action.’” Lukovsky, 535 F.3d at 1048 

23 (quoting Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Med., 363 F.3d 916, 926 (9th Cir. 2004)). Here, 

24 Santana was injured when the defendants “purposefully caused the state to insti25 tute proceedings against him because of his race or ethnicity.” Awabdy, 368 F.3d 

26 at 1071; accord Yasin v. Coulter, 449 F. App’x 687, 690 (9th Cir. 2011) (un27 published) (holding that a claim under Awabdy accrues at the inception of the 

28 prosecution and distinguishing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484 (1994)). This 

29 occurred at the latest in 2008, when he was arraigned. See Req. J. Not. Ex. B, at 

1, ECF No. 11-2.2 30 Santana’s and Vasquez’s original complaint was filed in this 

 

2

 The court takes judicial notice of this record. See Fed. R. Evid. 201 (governing judicial notice); W. Radio, 678 F.3d at 976 (a court may consider proper subject 

of judicial notice on a motion to dismiss); Reyn’s Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 

442 F.3d 741, 746 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006) (a court may take judicial notice of public filings in other, related cases). 

Case 2:15-cv-00794-KJM-EFB Document 59 Filed 08/19/16 Page 20 of 33
21 

1 court in April 2015. ECF No. 1. This claim is therefore untimely and is dis2 missed. 

3 3. Malicious Prosecution (Fifth Claim) 

4 A prosecution intended to deprive a person of his right to be free from 

5 unreasonable searches and seizures may serve as the basis for a claim under 

6 § 1983. See, e.g., Awabdy, 368 F.3d at 1069. A plaintiff must allege the defendants 

7 prosecuted him with malice, without probable cause, and for the purpose of de8 priving him of his Fourth Amendment right, see id. at 1066, and he must allege a 

9 Fourth Amendment seizure occurred, Yousefian, 779 F.3d at 1015. Here, because 

10 no clearly established law showed the defendants seized Santana and Vasquez, as 

11 discussed above, their malicious prosecution claim cannot proceed on the basis 

12 of an alleged Fourth Amendment violation. 

13 A claim for malicious prosecution can also rest on an alleged violation of 

14 the plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection, “or the viola15 tion of another such ‘explicit textual source of constitutional protection.’” Id. at 

16 1015 (quoting Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271–75 (1994)). Here, the complaint states a cognizable claim that Santana, but not Vasquez,3 17 was deprived of 

18 his right to equal protection in violation of clearly established law, as discussed 

19 above. In this circuit, a plaintiff may pursue independent claims of direct consti20 tutional violations and malicious prosecution to deprive him of the same consti21 tutional rights. Awabdy, 368 F.3d at 1072. 

22 Unlike Santana’s direct claim for violation of his right to equal protec23 tion, his malicious prosecution claim is not time-barred. A plaintiff can state no 

24 claim for malicious prosecution until the alleged maliciously prosecuted case 

25 terminates in his favor. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 484; RK Ventures, Inc. v. City of Seat26 tle, 307 F.3d 1045, 1060 n.11 (9th Cir. 2002). The jury reached a verdict in San27 tana’s and Vasquez’s criminal case in 2014. The same two-year limitations peri28 od for personal injury claims applies again here. See Lopes v. Fremont Freewheelers, 

29 No. 07-6213, 2008 WL 3304944, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2008), aff’d, 362 F. 

 

3

 However, the complaint could be read to imply Vasquez was targeted specifically because he was Hispanic. Cf. First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 3, 16, 45. He is granted 

leave to amend to clarify whether he indeed advances this theory, as specified in the 

conclusion of this order. He is not granted leave to allege a direct claim of discrimination, however, as that claim would prove untimely, as discussed above. 

Case 2:15-cv-00794-KJM-EFB Document 59 Filed 08/19/16 Page 21 of 33
22 

1 App’x 874 (9th Cir. 2010). Santana’s April 2015 complaint in this respect is 

2 therefore timely, as are his amended claims. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B). 

3 In addition, however, as noted above, to assert a claim for malicious 

4 prosecution, Santana must allege the defendants lacked probable cause. Yousefi5 an, 779 F.3d at 1014. He alleges generally that the defendants lacked probable 

6 cause, First Am. Compl. ¶ 78, but the defendants contend it is clear on the face of 

7 the complaint that their actions were supported by probable cause. See Yuba 

8 Mot. at 14. Specifically, they cite the alleged terms of the proposed settlement 

9 agreement between Griesa and Acevedo: 

10 In consideration of the sum of one hundred thousand dollars 

11 ($100,000.00), Socorro Acevedo will request that criminal charges 

12 not be filed against Joe Griesa, and will exercise any privilege she 

13 may have pursuant to law, not to testify in any proceedings, and 

14 shall not file any civil action, arising out of the underlying facts, 

15 against Joe Griesa. . . . 

16 First Am. Compl. ¶ 40. 

17 Santana and Vasquez were eventually indicted and prosecuted for brib18 ery, obstruction of justice, and dissuading a witness under the following Penal 

Code sections:4 19 

20 [E]very person who attempts to prevent or dissuade another person 

21 who has been the victim of a crime . . . from doing any of the follow22 ing is guilty of a public offense . . . : . . . [c]ausing a complaint, in23 dictment, information, probation or parole violation to be sought 

24 and prosecuted, and assisting in the prosecution thereof. 

25 Cal. Penal Code § 136.1(b)(2). 

26 Every person doing any of the acts described in subdivision (a) or (b) 

27 knowingly and maliciously under any one or more of the following 

28 circumstances, is guilty of a felony . . . : . . . [w]here the act is com29 mitted by any person for pecuniary gain or for any other considera30 tion acting upon the request of any other person. 

31 Id. § 136.1(c)(4). 

 

4

 The court grants the Yuba County defendants’ unopposed request for judicial notice of the grand jury indictment and criminal complaint. See Req. J. Not., Ex. 

B, ECF No. 44-2 (indictment); id. Ex. E (criminal complaint). These documents are 

public records whose existence is subject to no reasonable dispute. See supra note 2. 

Case 2:15-cv-00794-KJM-EFB Document 59 Filed 08/19/16 Page 22 of 33
23 

1 If two or more persons conspire . . . to pervert or obstruct justice . . . 

2 they shall be punishable in the same manner and to the same extent 

3 as is provided for the punishment of that felony. 

4 Id. § 182(a)(5). 

5 Probable cause is an objective standard that considers what reasonable 

6 conclusions a defendant may draw from the facts she knew at the time. Devenpeck 

7 v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004). A defendant has probable cause to believe an 

8 offense has occurred when her knowledge could lead a prudent person to that 

9 conclusion. Yousifian, 779 F.3d at 1014. Her state of mind or intentions are irrel10 evant. Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 154. 

11 Although the terms of the proposed settlement agreement suggest Aceve12 do had agreed to avoid participating in a criminal process in exchange for 

13 $100,000, Santana and Vasquez allege that everyone knew she intended to keep 

14 the matter private regardless of the money and accepted the money only as com15 pensation for personal injury. Moreover, Santana and Vasquez allege the defend16 ants withheld and ignored exonerating evidence, which is a relevant considera17 tion in matters of probable cause. See, e.g., Awabdy, 368 F.3d at 1067 (collecting 

18 authority to show that a civil rights plaintiff may rebut a presumption of probable 

19 cause “by showing that the criminal prosecution was induced by fraud, corrup20 tion, perjury, fabricated evidence, or other wrongful conduct undertaken in bad 

21 faith”). The more specific allegations of the amended complaint also suffice to 

22 overcome the vagueness that proved fatal to the original complaint. See Prev. Or23 der at 56–57; cf. First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 48–52. The court declines to declare at this 

24 early stage that the “totality of the circumstances” gave the defendants probable 

25 cause. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230–31 (1983). 

26 The defendants identify no law that would support an assertion of quali27 fied immunity, and the court finds that the authorities cited above would not 

28 have allowed a reasonable officer in the defendants’ position to act as they did. 

29 Vasquez’s malicious prosecution claim is dismissed in total. Santana’s 

30 malicious prosecution claim is dismissed only to the extent it is based on an un31 constitutional seizure. 

32 4. Due Process Clause—“Right to Fair Notice” (Third Claim) 

33 The Due Process Clause prohibits the government from depriving a per34 son of life, liberty, and property rights without first undertaking an adequate pro35 cess. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985). A person can 

36 therefore succeed in a § 1983 lawsuit against a government actor by showing 

Case 2:15-cv-00794-KJM-EFB Document 59 Filed 08/19/16 Page 23 of 33
24 

1 (1) that she had a liberty or property interest protected by the Constitution, 

2 (2) that the defendant deprived her of that interest, and (3) that the process the 

3 defendant undertook, if any, was lacking. See, e.g., Shanks v. Dressel, 540 F.3d 

4 1082, 1090 (9th Cir. 2008). What “process” is “due” varies from one situation to 

5 the next. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990). But, generally speaking, 

6 “[t]he fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a 

7 meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 

8 333 (1976) (citation and quotation marks omitted). 

9 Here, Santana and Vasquez allege the defendants prosecuted them even 

10 though the settlement agreement they negotiated fit the established practice of 

11 police, prosecutors, and private attorneys. First Am. Compl. ¶ 68. They cite no 

12 clearly established law to support this theory of the defendants’ liability on this 

13 claim, and the court is aware of none. This claim is dismissed. 

14 5. Due Process Clause—Injury to Professional Reputation 

15 (Fourth Claim) 

16 The Due Process Clause also prohibits government officials from arbitrar17 ily depriving a person of certain constitutionally protected fundamental property 

18 or liberty interests. See, e.g., Action Apartment Ass’n, Inc. v. Santa Monica Rent Con19 trol Bd., 509 F.3d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 2007). These interests include the right to 

20 pursue a given profession. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 492 (1959); Meyer v. 

21 Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). But “only ‘egregious official conduct can be 

22 said to be arbitrary in the constitutional sense’: it must amount to an ‘abuse of 

23 power’ lacking any ‘reasonable justification in the service of a legitimate gov24 ernmental objective.’” Shanks, 540 F.3d at 1088 (quoting Cty. of Sacramento v. 

25 Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998)). In other words, only conduct that “shocks the 

26 conscience” violates the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 

27 U.S. 739, 746 (1987). 

28 Here, Santana and Vasquez allege the prosecution prevented both of 

29 them from practicing law. First Am. Compl. ¶ 73.5. The Supreme Court has de-

 

5

 The complaint could also be read to allege Santana was deprived of a judicial appointment, but he agreed at hearing that if he was deprived of this appointment, he would have been deprived of no constitutionally protected right. He is correct. Prospective employment is not a right to which an applicant may assert a “legitimate claim of entitlement.” See, e.g., Kerr v. Marshall Univ. Bd. of Governors, 824 F.3d 

62, 79 (4th Cir. May 24, 2016); Jones v. City Sch. Dist. of New Rochelle, 695 F. Supp. 2d 

Case 2:15-cv-00794-KJM-EFB Document 59 Filed 08/19/16 Page 24 of 33
25 

1 fined the general boundaries of the right to pursue a profession. Engquist v. Or. 

2 Dep’t of Agric., 478 F.3d 985, 997 (9th Cir. 2007), aff’d, 553 U.S. 591 (2008). A 

3 state may not arbitrarily and totally prohibit a person from practicing his chosen 

4 profession. See, e.g., Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 292 (1999) (citing Schware v. 

5 Bd. of Bar Exam’rs of N.M., 353 U.S. 232, 238–39 (1957)). The Court has also sug6 gested the state must not impose a stigma or some other disability on a person 

7 that completely forecloses her future employment. See Bd. of Regents of State Colls. 

8 v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972). Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has held that a 

9 person may pursue a constitutional claim in “extreme cases, such as a ‘govern10 ment blacklist, which when circulated or otherwise publicized to prospective em11 ployers effectively excludes the blacklisted individual from his occupation, much 

12 as if the government had yanked the license of an individual in an occupation 

13 that requires licensure.’” Engquist, 478 F.3d at 997–98 (quoting Olivieri v. Rodri14 guez, 122 F.3d 406, 408 (7th Cir. 1997)). 

15 Santana and Vasquez do not allege the criminal prosecution completely 

16 prevented them from practicing law or imposed a functional “government black17 list” on them during the time the prosecution was pending. The court also takes 

18 judicial notice that Santana has appeared a number of times before the under19 signed to represent defendants in criminal cases; Santana conceded as much at 

20 hearing. Because clearly established law forbids only total eclipses of a person’s 

21 right to practice his profession, the plaintiffs’ claims cannot survive on this allega22 tion. Nevertheless, as also discussed at hearing, an alternative due-process formu23 lation of this claim may be possible. See Crowe v. Cty. of San Diego, 608 F.3d 406, 

24 444 (9th Cir. 2010); Herb Hallman Chevrolet, Inc. v. Nash-Holmes, 169 F.3d 636, 645 

25 (9th Cir. 1999); Buckey v. Cty. of L.A., 968 F.2d 791, 795 (9th Cir. 1992). Because 

26 complaints must be dismissed with leave to amend “when a viable case may be 

27 presented,” Lipton, 284 F.3d at 1039, this claim is dismissed with leave to amend, 

28 as specified in the conclusion of this order. 

29 C. Summary 

30 The Yuba County defendants are not entitled to absolute prosecutorial 

31 immunity with respect to Santana’s and Vasquez’s claims that they acted outside 

32 their role as advocates, as described above. Nevertheless, the defendants’ quali33 fied immunity and the applicable limitations period bar several claims. As for the 

 

136, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Parsons v. Pond, 126 F. Supp. 2d 205, 217 (D. Conn. 

2000), aff’d, 25 F. App’x 77 (2d Cir. 2002). 

Case 2:15-cv-00794-KJM-EFB Document 59 Filed 08/19/16 Page 25 of 33
26 

1 Yuba County defendants, (1) the search and seizure claim is dismissed, (2) the 

2 equal protection claim is dismissed, (3) the due process claims (procedural and 

3 substantive) are dismissed, (4) Vasquez’s malicious prosecution claim is dis4 missed with leave to amend, see supra note 3, and (5) Santana’s malicious prose5 cution claim is dismissed to the extent that claim rests on his allegations of un6 constitutional searches and seizures. Santana and Vasquez are granted leave to 

7 amend to allege claims based on a due-process injury to their professional reputa8 tions. 

9 IV. RANDALL ELLIOTT 

10 Many of the claims against Detective Elliott must be dismissed for the 

11 same reasons described above, see supra note 1: 

12  The search and seizure claim is dismissed because no clearly es13 tablished law allows the conclusion that a person is seized if he is 

14 released on his own recognizance; 

15  The equal protection claim is dismissed because it is untimely; 

16  The “fair notice” claim is dismissed because it is supported by no 

clearly established law;6 17 

18  The substantive due process claim is dismissed because no allega19 tions show Santana and Vasquez were unable to practice law; 

20 and 

21  The malicious prosecution claim is dismissed to the extent it is 

22 based on an unreasonable seizure, and it is dismissed to the ex23 tent it is based on racial discrimination against Vasquez, because 

24 the complaint does not allow the court reasonably to infer those 

25 underlying constitutional violations occurred. 

26 This leaves Santana’s claim of malicious prosecution, a potential amend27 ed malicious prosecution claim by Vasquez, and the possibility of an amended, 

28 reputation-related claim. 

29 Only one factual allegation ties Elliott to the Yuba County defendants’ 

30 alleged scheme: that he was pressured to submit an inaccurate investigation re31 port, which recommended charges against Santana and Vasquez. First Am. 

32 Compl. ¶ 42. The remaining allegations are only general statements and conclu-

 

6

 The plaintiffs do not oppose Elliott’s motion with respect to this claim. 

Opp’n Elliott Mot. at 1. 

Case 2:15-cv-00794-KJM-EFB Document 59 Filed 08/19/16 Page 26 of 33
27 

1 sions. See, e.g., id. ¶ 48 (“Soon after [the December 2007 lunch meeting], 

2 McGrath and the other meeting participants enlisted the remaining Defendants 

3 to join in the Derailment Plan.”); id. ¶ 85 (“Defendants entered into a conspiracy 

4 for the purpose of derailing Santana’s candidacy for judicial appointment . . . .”). 

5 As alleged here, as in the original complaint, Elliott’s investigation was largely 

6 complete long before any plan coalesced in December 2007. The court cannot 

7 draw a reasonable inference of Elliott’s liability for the investigation and prosecu8 tion. No allegations show he was motivated by race. 

9 Elliott also moves to dismiss the sixth claim, conspiracy under §§ 1983 

10 and 1985. A conspiracy claim under § 1983 has two elements: (1) an express or 

11 implied agreement to deprive the plaintiffs of constitutional rights and (2) a re12 sulting deprivation of rights. Avalos v. Baca, 596 F.3d 583, 592 (9th Cir. 2010). 

13 The agreement need not be overt, but the complaint must include some factual 

14 basis to support an inference that the agreement propelled the defendant’s ac15 tions. Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v. Mendocino Cty., 192 F.3d 1283, 1301 (9th Cir. 1999). 

16 “[T]he plaintiff must state specific facts to support the existence of the claimed 

17 conspiracy.” Burns v. Cty. of King, 883 F.2d 819, 821 (9th Cir. 1989). Vague 

18 claims that a defendant was involved in a conspiracy do not suffice. See Hansen v. 

19 Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Lacey, 693 F.3d at 937 (noting 

20 conclusory conspiracy allegations do not provide notice to a defendant). 

21 A claim under § 1985(3) has four elements: 

22 “(1) [A] conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly 

23 or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of 

24 the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; and 

25 (3) an act in furtherance of this conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is 

26 either injured in his person or property or deprived of any right or 

27 privilege of a citizen of the United States.” 

28 Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 978 F.2d 1529, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting United 

29 Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am. v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 828–29 (1983)). The 

30 second element requires more specifically that the plaintiff demonstrate the de31 fendants were motivated by “some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, in32 vidiously discriminatory animus.” Id. (quoting Griffith v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 

33 88, 102 (1971)). 

34 Here, the complaint includes no factual allegations that allow the court to 

35 infer Elliott was part of a conspiracy to violate Santana’s constitutional rights. 

36 The allegations do not tie him to the “derailment plan” by any more than general 

37 statements. It is no more than possible that he was motivated by racial animus. A 

38 complaint cannot survive on possibilities and general statements. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

Case 2:15-cv-00794-KJM-EFB Document 59 Filed 08/19/16 Page 27 of 33
28 

1 at 681 (conclusory allegations of racial animus and conspiracy cannot survive a 

2 motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)). The claims against Elliott are dismissed. 

3 V. JUDGE JULIA SCROGIN 

4 The court dismissed Santana’s and Vasquez’s original claims against 

5 Judge Scrogin because their complaint did not allege she acted “in the complete 

6 absence of all jurisdiction.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11–12 (1991) (per curi7 am). They were allowed to amend their complaint to allege Judge Scrogin is lia8 ble for non-judicial actions. Prev. Order at 50; see also Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11 

9 (“[A] judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not 

10 taken in the judge’s judicial capacity.”). The amended complaint includes no al11 legations showing Judge Scrogin’s actions were non-judicial. She allegedly con12 vened a grand jury, excused jurors for cause, and compelled Acevedo to testify 

13 under threat of contempt. First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 53–54. These were judicial ac14 tions. 

15 The case against her cannot proceed alone on the allegation that she at16 tended the December 2007 lunch meeting. See also Ashelman, 793 F.2d at 1078 

17 (“[A] conspiracy between judge and prosecutor to predetermine the outcome of a 

18 judicial proceeding, while clearly improper, nevertheless does not pierce the im19 munity extended to judges and prosecutors.”). Aside from the judicial actions 

20 described above, no factual allegations tie her to the alleged “derailment plan.” 

21 The claims against Judge Scrogin are dismissed. 

22 VI. TIMOTHY EVANS 

23 A. Federal Claims under §§ 1983 and 1985 

24 Any claim under § 1983 must concern the defendants’ actions under col25 or of state law. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 946 (1982). Evans is a 

26 private attorney. “[P]rivate parties are not generally acting under color of state 

27 law,” Price v. State of Hawaii, 939 F.2d 702, 707–08 (9th Cir. 1991), “no matter 

28 how discriminatory or wrongful” their actions may be, Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. 

29 Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999) (citation and quotation marks omitted). But 

30 “[u]nder familiar principals, even a private entity can, in certain circumstances, 

31 be subject to liability under section 1983.” Villegas v. Gilroy Garlic Festival Ass’n, 

32 541 F.3d 950, 954 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). The basic question a court must an33 swer is whether the private person’s conduct “may be fairly characterized as 

34 ‘state action’” or is “fairly attributable to the State.” Lugar, 457 U.S. at 924, 937. 

35 “Something more” is necessary before a private individual may be said to 

36 have acted as the government. Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Med. Ctr., 192 F.3d 

Case 2:15-cv-00794-KJM-EFB Document 59 Filed 08/19/16 Page 28 of 33
29 

1 826, 835 (9th Cir. 1999). This “something more” is not susceptible to any par2 ticular litmus test, and the Supreme Court has suggested a “host of facts” that 

3 may influence a court’s decision: 

4 [A] challenged activity may be state action when it results from the 

5 State’s exercise of coercive power, when the State provides signifi6 cant encouragement, either overt or covert, or when a private actor 

7 operates as a willful participant in joint activity with the State or its 

8 agents. We have treated a nominally private entity as a state actor 

9 when it is controlled by an agency of the State, when it has been del10 egated a public function by the State, when it is entwined with gov11 ernmental policies, or when government is entwined in its manage12 ment or control. 

13 Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 296 (2001) 

14 (citations, quotation marks, and alterations omitted). 

15 Here, Santana and Vasquez argue Evans is liable under § 1983 because 

16 the Yuba County defendants secured his participation in their plan to prevent 

17 Santana’s appointment on account of his race. “A plaintiff may demonstrate 

18 joint action by proving the existence of a conspiracy or by showing that the pri19 vate party was ‘a willful participant in joint action with the State or its agents.’” 

20 Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 445 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Collins v. Womancare, 

21 878 F.2d 1145, 1154 (9th Cir. 1989)). “To be liable as co-conspirators, each par22 ticipant in a conspiracy need not know the exact details of the plan, but each par23 ticipant must at least share the common objective of the conspiracy.” Id. A “sub24 stantial degree of cooperation” is required between the state actors and the pri25 vate person. Id. 

26 Evans was allegedly part of the December 2007 lunch meeting, and he 

27 preferred Green to Santana because she was not Hispanic. He helped forward 

28 privileged attorney-client material to the Yuba County defendants, and helped 

29 secure Griesa’s cooperation in the prosecution of Santana and Vasquez. The 

30 court concluded in its previous order that Santana and Vasquez had plausibly 

31 alleged Evans was part of a civil conspiracy against them under California law. 

32 See Prev. Order at 54–56. These allegations allow the court to infer Evans was a 

33 “willful participant in joint activity with the State.” Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 296; 

34 accord Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 151–52 (1970) (allowing a § 1983 

35 claim to proceed on the theory that a private person and a policeman reached an 

36 agreement to discriminate on the basis of race). 

37 These allegations also suffice to state the first three elements of a claim 

38 against Evans under § 1985(3): “(1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of deprivCase 2:15-cv-00794-KJM-EFB Document 59 Filed 08/19/16 Page 29 of 33
30 

1 ing, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal pro2 tection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; and 

3 (3) an act in furtherance of this conspiracy.” Sever, 978 F.2d at 1536. The ques4 tion remains, then, for purposes of both § 1983 and § 1985, whether Evans’s ac5 tions deprived Santana or Vasquez of a constitutional right. See id. Evans is no 

6 more liable than the Yuba County defendants. The court also concludes Evans is 

7 protected by qualified immunity to the same extent as the other defendants. See 

8 Filarsky v. Delia, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 1657, 1664–65 (2012). The discussion of 

9 the claims against those defendants therefore applies to Evans just as well: (1) the 

10 search and seizure claim is dismissed, (2) the equal protection claim is dismissed, 

11 (3) the due process claims are dismissed, (4) Vasquez’s malicious prosecution 

12 claim is dismissed with leave to amend; and (5) Santana’s malicious prosecution 

13 claim is dismissed to the extent it is based on an allegedly unconstitutional sei14 zure. Santana and Vasquez may also amend their complaint to allege a reputa15 tion-related claim against Evans under § 1983. 

16 Finally, the court disagrees that Evans may avoid liability because he did 

17 nothing to further the prosecution after May 2008, when Santana disclosed the 

18 criminal charges to the state judicial appointment commission. The allegations 

19 here allow the court reasonably to infer Evans’s participation in a conspiracy of 

20 malicious prosecution that began in December 2007, and the prosecution did not 

21 terminate until 2014. 

22 B. State Law Claims 

23 Santana and Vasquez also allege three state-law claims against Evans: 

24 malicious prosecution, negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional dis25 tress. As a preliminary matter, Evans argues he is protected by California’s litiga26 tion privilege. 

27 1. Litigation Privilege 

28 As summarized in the court’s previous order, California law protects any 

29 “privileged publication or broadcast . . . [i]n any (1) legislative proceeding, 

30 (2) judicial proceeding, (3) in any other official proceeding authorized by law, or 

31 (4) in the initiation or course of any other proceeding authorized by law . . . .” 

32 Cal. Civ. Code § 47(b). This protection does not apply to claims of malicious 

33 prosecution, but it extends to any communication, whether or not a “publica34 tion,” as long as the communication is “required or permitted by law in the 

35 course of a judicial proceeding to achieve the objects of the litigation, even 

36 though the publication is made outside the courtroom and no function of the 

Case 2:15-cv-00794-KJM-EFB Document 59 Filed 08/19/16 Page 30 of 33
31 

1 court or its officers is involved.” Silberg v. Anderson, 50 Cal. 3d 205, 212 (1990). 

2 “The usual formulation is that the privilege applies to any communication (1) 

3 made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other partici4 pants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that 

5 have some connection or logical relation to the action.” Id. Section 47(b) is con6 strued broadly. See, e.g., Thornton v. Cal. Unemp’t. Ins. Appeals Bd., 204 Cal. App. 

7 4th 1403, 1418 (2012). “Any doubt as to whether the privilege applies is resolved 

8 in favor of applying it.” Adams v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. App. 4th 521, 529 (1992). 

9 Here, Santana and Vasquez allege Evans was part of a conspiracy of ma10 licious prosecution. Evans allegedly met with the other defendants in December 

11 2007 to formulate a plan. First Am. Compl. ¶ 48. His role was eventually to for12 ward information from Vasquez’s client files and to secure Griesa’s cooperation. 

13 See id. ¶¶ 51(a), (c). Aside from participation in the lunch meeting, these actions 

14 fall within the litigation privilege: they were communications from an attorney 

15 who, during the representation of a client, forwarded information to prosecutors 

16 in an attempt to secure a favorable result for his client. See, e.g., Home Ins. Co. v. 

17 Zurich Ins. Co., 96 Cal. App. 4th 17, 24 (2002) (the litigation privilege “applies to 

18 statements made by counsel during settlement negotiations”); Dove Audio, Inc. v. 

19 Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman, 47 Cal. App. 4th 777, 782–83 (1996) (statements to 

20 the Attorney General in preparation for an investigation or charge are privi21 leged). Although no previous case appears to be directly on point, doubts are re22 solved in favor of applying the privilege. Adams, 2 Cal. App. 4th at 529. Section 

23 47 therefore protects Evans against the claims for intentional infliction of emo24 tional distress and negligence. 

25 2. Malicious Prosecution 

26 As noted above, the litigation privilege does not apply to claims of mali27 cious prosecution. Silberg, 50 Cal. 3d at 212. “To establish a cause of action for 

28 malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the prior action (1) was 

29 initiated by or at the direction of the defendant and legally terminated in the 

30 plaintiff’s favor, (2) was brought without probable cause, and (3) was initiated 

31 with malice.” Siebel v. Mittlesteadt, 41 Cal. 4th 735, 740 (2007). As before, the 

32 court concludes the first and third elements resolve in Santana’s and Vasquez’s 

33 favor: Santana’s prosecution was the conspiracy’s main event; the co34 conspirators were the prosecutors and investigators; Santana and Vasquez were 

35 acquitted; and the prosecution’s goal was to prevent Santana’s judicial appoint36 ment on account of his race and ethnicity. Prev. Order at 56. 

Case 2:15-cv-00794-KJM-EFB Document 59 Filed 08/19/16 Page 31 of 33
32 

1 Evans’s previous motion to dismiss was granted because the complaint 

2 did not specify which evidence was allegedly fabricated or wrongfully obtained. 

3 Santana’s and Vasquez’s amended complaint alleges more specifically now 

4 (1) the defendants knew Acevedo never intended to testify, regardless of the set5 tlement agreement; (2) her agreement was always intended as a settlement of 

6 possible civil claims against Griesa, and the defendants knew this; (3) the defend7 ants suppressed evidence that suggested state law may have prevented Acevedo 

8 from being held in contempt; (4) the defendants suppressed evidence of a rape in 

9 an attempt to secure Santana’s and Vasquez’s indictment; and (5) the defendants 

10 did all this because they wanted to prevent the judicial appointment of an His11 panic man to an all-White bench. As before, Santana and Vasquez state a plausi12 ble claim of civil conspiracy, so “[e]ach member of the conspiracy becomes liable 

13 for all acts done by others pursuant to the conspiracy, and for all damages caused 

14 thereby.” Berg & Berg Enters., LLC v. Sherwood Partners, Inc., 131 Cal. App. 4th 

15 802, 823 (2005). These allegations paint a plausible picture of malicious prosecu16 tion. The motion in this respect is denied. 

17 VII. CONCLUSION AND LEAVE TO AMEND 

18 The court’s previous order thoroughly discussed the law applicable to this 

19 case and the plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs were allowed an amendment with the 

20 benefit of that order, but their amended complaint again falls short of the stand21 ards the court identified. Except as specifically noted below, the motions to dis22 miss are granted without leave to amend. See, e.g., Cafasso, 637 F.3d at 1058 

23 (leave to amend may be denied when amendment would prove an exercise in 

24 futility); Ascon Props., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1160 (9th Cir. 1989) 

25 (“The district court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad 

26 where plaintiff has previously amended the complaint.”). 

27 (1) The Yuba County defendants’ motion, ECF No. 44, is granted in 

28 part. The first, second, third, and fourth claims are dismissed. The 

29 fifth claim, for malicious prosecution, is dismissed except as asserted 

30 by Santana on an equal-protection basis. The plaintiffs are granted 

31 leave to amend to allege a reputation-related claim against the Yuba 

32 County defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Vasquez is granted 

33 leave to amend to allege a claim of malicious prosecution to deprive 

34 him of equal protection. 

35 (2) Elliott’s motion, ECF No. 41, is granted. 

36 (3) Judge Scrogin’s motion, ECF No. 43, is granted. 

Case 2:15-cv-00794-KJM-EFB Document 59 Filed 08/19/16 Page 32 of 33
33 

1 (4) Evans’s motion, ECF No. 42, is granted in part. The first, second, 

2 third, fourth, tenth, and eleventh claims are dismissed. The fifth 

3 claim, for malicious prosecution, is dismissed except as asserted by 

4 Santana on an equal-protection basis. The plaintiffs are granted 

5 leave to amend to allege a reputation-related claim against Evans 

6 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Vasquez is granted leave to amend to 

7 allege a claim of malicious prosecution to deprive him of equal pro8 tection. 

9 (5) Any amended complaint is due within twenty-one (21) days. 

10 (6) A status (pretrial scheduling) conference is set for October 13, 2016 

11 at 2:30 p.m. in Courtroom No. 3. The parties shall submit, at least 

12 seven (7) days prior to the Status Conference, a Joint Status Report 

13 that includes the Rule 26(f) discovery plan, with all named parties 

14 participating in the preparation and completion of the report. 

15 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

16 DATED: August 18, 2016. 

Case 2:15-cv-00794-KJM-EFB Document 59 Filed 08/19/16 Page 33 of 33