Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_04-cv-00118/USCOURTS-casd-3_04-cv-00118-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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1 04CV00118-J (WMc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RHETT WILKINS

Plaintiff,

v.

RAMIREZ, ET AL.

Defendants.

 

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Civil No. 04cv00118-J (WMc) 

ORDER: 

(1) ADOPTING IN PART

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S R&R [Doc.

No. 31]; 

(2) GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT [Doc. No. 20];

(3) DENYING AS MOOT

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO

STRIKE [Doc. No. 20];

(4) DENYING DEFENDANTS’

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

[Doc. No. 30]; and

(5) CONSTRUING PLAINTIFF’S

“MOTION TO DISMISS SUMMARY

JUDGMENT” AS PLAINTIFF’S

OPPOSITION TO SUMMARY

JUDGMENT [Doc. No. 30]

On January 16, 2004, Plaintiff Rhett Wilkins (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner proceeding pro

se, filed a Complaint with this Court alleging that prison officials violated his civil rights

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. [Doc. No. 1.] Before the Court are Defendants Ramirez et. al.’s

(“Defendants”) Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to Strike. [Doc. No. 20.] Plaintiff

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1

 Due to the liberal construction policy of pro se motions, the Court has an obligation to construe

a pro se petition to the petitioner’s advantage. See United States v. Seesing, 234 F.3d 456, 463 (9th Cir.

2000); see also Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). Thus, although Petitioner entitled

his filing as a “Motion to dismiss summary judgment,” this Court CONSTRUES Plaintiff’s papers as an

Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment for Plaintiff’s advantage. [Doc. No. 30.] 

Plaintiff filed his papers on November 17, 2005, within the briefing schedule for filing an opposition,

which was not due until November 21, 2005. (See Order Extending Time at 3.) Additionally, Plaintiff

did not file any other papers in this time period that can be construed as an Opposition. More

importantly, Petitioner sets forth various arguments in his papers that strongly suggest he intended to

oppose Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. (See Pl.’s Opp’n at 7, 10.) 

2 04CV00118-J (WMc)

has filed an Opposition,1 and Defendants have filed a Reply. [Doc. Nos. 30, 28.] Magistrate

Judge William McCurine Jr. has filed a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) advising the

Court to grant Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, to grant Defendants’ Motion to

Strike Plaintiff’s punitive damages claim, and to deny Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice.

[Doc. No. 31.] Neither party has filed an Opposition to the R&R. The Court reviewed the

papers filed, determined that the issues presented were appropriate for decision without oral

argument, and vacated the hearing date. See S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 7 (2006). For the reasons set

forth below, the Court (1) ADOPTS IN PART the R&R, (2) GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment, (3) DENIES without prejudice Defendants’ Motion to Strike, and

(4) DENIES Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice.

Background

I. Plaintiff’s Version of the Facts

Plaintiff is a state prisoner incarcerated at Richard J. Donavan Correctional Facility

(“RJD”) in San Diego, California. (See German Decl. Ex. A at 3-4; see also Defs.’ Mot. Summ.

J. at 1.) The alleged civil rights violations occurred on September 17, 2003, when the

Correctional Treatment Center (“CTC”) at RJD was evacuated for a fire drill. (See Pl.’s Compl.

at 7.) Plaintiff states he was in the Central Plaza sitting on a cart watching the fire drill like he

was instructed to do by Registered Nurse (“RN”) Denason. (See id.) Defendant Correctional

Officer (“C/O”) Lyman-Clark called Plaintiff over to him and told Plaintiff to stop looking at the

women participating in the fire drill. (See id.) C/O Lyman-Clark reprimanded Plaintiff and told

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3 04CV00118-J (WMc)

Plaintiff to go back to where he was sitting. (See id.) Shortly afterwards, C/O Lyman-Clark

again called Plaintiff over and reprimanded him for allegedly leering at the women. (See id.)

Plaintiff asserts that he responded that he was not looking at the women, and told C/O LymanClark, he had “been working with them for 10 months, they don’t mean anything to me, I have a

wife [and] kids.” (Pl.’s Compl. at 7.) 

According to Plaintiff, this response angered C/O Lyman-Clark, who then told Plaintiff to

put his hands behind his back. (See Pl.’s Compl. at 7.) Plaintiff complied, and C/O LymanClark escorted Plaintiff about five feet, at which point Defendant C/O Bernal came over and

began escorting Plaintiff. (See id.) 

Plaintiff asserts that C/O Bernal suddenly threw Plaintiff on the ground and started

beating him for no apparent reason. (See Pl.’s Compl. at 7.) Plaintiff further alleges that

Defendants C/Os Diaz, Tablos-Espinoza, Lt. Shelar, Sgt. Beauchemin, and MTA Wilson, all

jumped on Plaintiff, beat him, and sprayed Oleresin Capsicum (“O.C.”) spray his face. (See id.) 

Afterwards, Plaintiff claims that C/O Ramirez took him to the CTC, handcuffed his hands and

legs, and beat him. (See id.) Plaintiff states that he requested medical attention for his head

injury several times when he was in administrative segregation, and a doctor did not evaluate

him or take x-rays during the three months he was in segregation. (See Pl.’s Compl. at 8.) 

Plaintiff also points out that he was ultimately found “not guilty” for resisting staff and

battery. The Rules Violation Report, which Plaintiff has provided as an exhibit, concludes that

Plaintiff is not guilty because “this incident was a result of Inmate WILKINS’ mental health

condition, in that he was not taking his prescribed medications.” (Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. L.) 

Finally, Plaintiff asserts that he made various 602-Inmate Appeal Requests, which were

not answered, and that staff refused to give him copies of the 837-Crime/Incident Reports. (See

id.)

II. Defendants’ Version of the Facts

Defendants’ version of events differs from Plaintiff’s. According to Defendants, C/O

Lyman-Clark repeatedly asked Plaintiff to stop leering and making lewd gestures, i.e., holding

his crotch, at the female staff conducting the fire drill. (See Cob Decl. Ex. G at 20.) Plaintiff’s

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2

 As of August 29, 2005, C/O Bernal has not submitted an Incident Report due to him being on

an extended sick leave. (See Cobb Decl. at 3.) However, multiple Incident Reports confirm C/O

Bernal’s presence during the incident described above. (See Cobb Decl. Ex. A at 6; see also Cobb Decl.

Ex. G at 21.) 

4 04CV00118-J (WMc)

alleged response was, “I’ll do what the fuck I want to.” (Cobb Decl. Ex. G at 21.) C/O LymanClark ordered Plaintiff to show his identification card, which Plaintiff refused to do. (See Cobb

Decl. Ex. G at 21.) When C/O Bernal observed the interaction between C/O Lyman-Clark and

Plaintiff, C/O Bernal told Plaintiff to place his hands behind his back. (See id.) C/O Bernal then

began to escort Plaintiff to the Watch Office. (See id.) 

According to Defendants, when C/O Bernal and Plaintiff approached the walkway in

front of the Watch Officer, Plaintiff began to resist and pulled free of C/O Bernal’s grip. 

Plaintiff then allegedly turned to strike C/O Bernal with his elbow.2

 (See id.) C/O Bernal

grabbed Plaintiff with both arms around his upper torso, and both men fell to the ground. (See

id.) 

At this point, Lt. Shelar and C/O Lyman-Clark responded to assist C/O Bernal. (See

Cobb Decl. Ex A at 6.) C/O Lyman-Clark tried to restrain Plaintiff by holding his right arm, but

Plaintiff grabbed C/O Lyman-Clark’s right hand and squeezed and twisted his middle and ring

fingers. (See Cobb Decl. at 21.) Although C/O Lyman-Clark ordered Plaintiff to stop resisting,

Plaintiff continued to struggle. (See id.) 

Sgt. Beauchemin and C/O Wilson responded to the incident by placing leg restraints on

Plaintiff. (See Cobb Decl. Ex. B at 12; Cobb Decl. Ex. C at 13-14 .) At the same time, C/O

Diaz and C/O Tablas-Espinoza also approached to assist officers in placing handcuffs on

Plaintiff. (See Cobb Decl. Ex. E at 18.) 

While C/O Bernal was laying on Plaintiff to hold him still, Plaintiff allegedly bit C/O

Bernal’s left arm. (See Cobb Decl. Ex. B at 12; Cobb Decl. Ex. C at 13-14 .) C/O Bernal yelled

out, “he’s biting me!” and C/O Diaz administered a one second burst of O.C. spray in Plaintiff’s

face. (See Cobb Decl. Ex. E at 18.) At C/O Lynman-Clark’s request, C/O Diaz did not spray

Plaintiff again. (See Cobb Decl. Ex. G at 24.) Plaintiff stopped biting C/O Bernal, but continued

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5 04CV00118-J (WMc)

to resist until C/Os Shelar, Beauchemin, and Lyman-Clark handcuffed Plaintiff. (See Cobb

Decl. Ex. A at 6.)

C/O Hobbs then escorted Plaintiff to the CTC for medical treatment and O.C. spray

decontamination. (See Cobb Decl. Ex. H at 25.) At CTC, RN Belger evaluated Plaintiff, finding

that he suffered an “abrasion on [the right] cheek, rib pain, [and a] small cut inside [his] lower

lip.” (Cobb Decl. Ex. I at 26.) C/O Skelton photographed Plaintiff’s injuries. (See Cobb Decl.

Ex. F at 19.) After Plaintiff was evaluated, C/O Hobbs escorted Plaintiff to the administrative

segregation housing unit. (See Cobb Decl. Ex. H at 25.) Plaintiff received several subsequent

checkups where he complained about having headaches and was proscribed medication for his

injuries. (See generally German Decl. Ex. B.) 

III. Procedural History

On January 16, 2004, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this Court pursuant to the Civil Rights

Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Defendants C/O Bernal, C/O Diaz, C/O Lyman-Clark, C/O

Ramirez, C/O Tablos-Espinoza, Lt. Shelar, Sgt. Beauchemin, MTA Wilson, and Warden

Hernandez. [Doc. No. 1.] Plaintiff in his Complaint alleges the following: (1) Defendants

violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment by

kicking and beating him, (2) Defendants violated Plaintiff’s due process rights by not answering

his inmate appeal requests, and (3) Defendants violated Plaintiff’s due process rights by not

addressing his serious medical needs. (See Pl.’s Compl. at 2-5.)

On March 23, 2004, this Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma paurperis. 

[Doc. No. 5.] On October 29, 2004, Defendants filed their answer. [Doc. No. 12.] On January

21, 2005, Plaintiff requested appointment of counsel. [Doc. No. 15.] Magistrate Judge

McCurine denied Plaintiff’s request for appointment of counsel without prejudice on January 21,

2005, finding no exceptional circumstances warranting appointment of counsel. (See Order Den.

Appt. of Counsel at 2.) 

On March 18, 2004, Defendants filed a complaint against Plaintiff in the Superior Court

of California, County of San Diego South County Division, claiming three counts of battery

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stemming from the September 17, 2003, incident. (Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. H at 3.) The Superior Court

dismissed the Complaint, apparently for “insufficiency of evidence.” (Id.)

On August 31, 2005, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, a Motion to

Strike Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages, and a Request for Judicial Notice. [Doc. No. 19,

22.] In support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants filed declarations by

Deputy Attorney General Michael German and Lt. Robert Cobb along with multiple exhibits,

including Incident Reports completed by Defendants and RJD Staff. (See Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J.

at 2.) 

On September 29, 2005, Plaintiff requested an extension of time to respond to

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, which the Court granted. [Doc. Nos. 25, 26]. 

Additionally, the Court provided notice to Plaintiff pursuant to Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952

(9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), and Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988), which

require that special notice be given to pro se prisoners that the defendant has moved for

summary judgment. [Doc. No. 26.] Plaintiff then filed an Opposition, and Defendants filed a

Reply. [Doc. Nos. 28, 30.] 

On January 17, 2006, Magistrate Judge McCurrine issued a R&R recommending that

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment be granted, Defendants’ Motion to Strike be

granted, and Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice be denied without prejudice. [Doc. No.

31.] On February 9, 2006, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Extend Time to Object to the R&R. [Doc.

No. 33.] 

On April 13, 2006, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss Plaintiff’s case without

prejudice. [Doc. No. 36.] On April 18, 2006, this Court denied Plaintiff’s Motion to Voluntarily

dismiss, and granted Plaintiff’s request for an extension until May 26, 2006, to file an Objection

to the R&R. [Doc. No. 37.] To date, Plaintiff has not filed any Objections to the R&R. 

//

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7 04CV00118-J (WMc)

Legal Standard

I. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

on “all or any part” of a claim where there is an absence of a genuine issue of material fact and

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (2006); see also

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). One of the principal purposes of Rule 56 is

to dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses. See id. at 323-24. A fact is material

when, under the governing substantive law, the fact might affect the outcome of the case. See

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); see also Freeman v. Arpaio, 125

F.3d 732, 735 (9th Cir. 1997). A dispute about a material fact is genuine if “the evidence is

such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S.

at 248. When making its determination, the Court must view all inferences drawn from the

underlying facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. See Matsushita

Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). 

The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of establishing the absence

of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The moving party can satisfy

this burden in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence to negate an essential element of the

nonmoving party’s case; or (2) by demonstrating that the nonmoving party failed to make a

showing sufficient to establish an element of his or her claim on which that party will bear the

burden of proof at trial. See id. at 322-23. If the moving party fails to discharge this initial

burden, summary judgment must be denied and the court need not consider the nonmoving

party’s evidence. See Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159-60 (1970).

If the moving party meets the initial burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to

“set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. 

Thus, “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmoving party’s

position is not sufficient.” Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D. Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir.

1995) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252); see also Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 (if the moving

party meets this initial burden, the nonmoving party cannot defeat summary judgment by merely

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demonstrating “that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts”). Moreover, it is

insufficient for the party opposing summary judgment to “rest upon the mere allegations or

denials of [his or her] pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Rather, the party opposing summary

judgment must “by [his or her] own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories,

and admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’ ”

 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P 56(e)).

Furthermore, a court is not obligated “to scour the records in search of a genuine issue of

triable fact.” Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Richards v. Combined

Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 1995)). “[T]he district court may limit its review to the

documents submitted for purposes of summary judgment and those parts of the record

specifically referenced therein.” Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026,

1030 (9th Cir. 2001).

II. Reviewing a Magistrate Judge’s R&R

In deciding a Motion for Summary Judgement in connection with a magistrate judge’s

R&R, a district court must “make de novo determination of those portions of the report . . . to

which objection is made,” and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or

recommendations made by the magistrate.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 72(b)

(2006); see also United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676 (1980) (“[I]n providing for a ‘de

novo’ hearing, Congress intended to permit whatever reliance a district judge, in exercise of

sound discretion, chose to place on a magistrate’s proposed findings and recommendations.”) 

When no objections are filed to the R&R, as is the case here, the district court may

assume the correctness of the magistrate judge’s findings of fact and decide the motion based on

the applicable law. See Campbell v. U.S. Dist. Court, 501 F.2d 196, 206 (9th Cir. 1974). The

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held that, under such circumstances, “a failure to

file objections only relieves the trial court of its burden to give de novo review to factual

findings; conclusions of law must still be reviewed de novo.” Barilla v. Ervin, 886 F.2d 1514,

1518 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Britt v. Simi Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 708 F.2d 452, 454 (9th Cir.

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1983)), overruled on other grounds by Simpson v. Lear Astronics Corp., 77 F.3d 1170, 1174 (9th

Cir. 1996).

Discussion

I. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

Defendants have moved for Summary Judgment as to all of Plaintiff’s claims based on

the following arguments: (1) Plaintiff has provided no proof to support his Eighth Amendment

excessive force claim; (2) Plaintiff cannot show Defendants were deliberately indifferent to

Plaintiff’s medical needs; (3) Plaintiff does not have a protected due process right in a prison

grievance procedure; (4) Defendants have qualified immunity from Plaintiff’s claims; and (5)

Plaintiff has improperly named Warden Hernandez and C/O Ramirez as Defendants. The

Magistrate Judge in his R&R recommends granting summary judgment as to all of Plaintiff’s

claims. (See R&R at 1.) Plaintiff has not filed any objections to the R&R. For the reasons set

forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. 

A. Eighth Amendment Excessive Force Claim

In the Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot produce

relevant, competent, and admissible evidence to prove that Defendants violated Plaintiff’s

Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. (See Defs.’ Mem. Supp.

Mot. for Summ. J. at 5.) Defendants also argue that as government officials, they have qualified

immunity. (See id. at 9.) In response, Plaintiff asserts that he suffered a significant blow to the

head and that “officers acted in a malicious and wanton fashion.” (See Pl.’s Opp’n at 7, 10.) To

support his argument, Plaintiff points to medical reports (see Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. I at 1; Defs.’ Mot.

Summ. J. Cobb Decl. Ex. I at 26), a not guilty finding for Plaintiff as stated in the Rules

Violation Report CDC-115 (see Pl.’s Opp’n at 4, see also Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. G), and the dismissal

of the criminal charges against Plaintiff for battery of the C/Os (see Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. H). In

addition, Plaintiff states that “a medical staff member alleged unnecessary and excessive force

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3

 Although Defendants address Plaintiff’s argument about the two incident reports creating a

genuine issue of material fact in their Reply brief (see Defs.’ Reply at 2), the R&R does not address this

evidence. Thus, the Court reviews this evidence de novo. 

10 04CV00118-J (WMc)

was utilized by staff during this incident.”3 (See Pl.’s Opp’n at 6, 11; Cobb Decl. Ex. P at 37;

Cobb Decl. Ex. Q at 48.) For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion

for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim. 

The Supreme Court in Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992) (citing Whitley, 475

U.S. at 320-21) held that the “settled rule [is] that ‘the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain

. . . constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.’ ” The

relevant inquiry for determining whether prison officials accused of using excessive physical

force inflicted “unnecessary and wanton pain” is whether force was applied in a good faith effort

to maintain or restore discipline, or, instead, was applied maliciously and sadistically for the

very purpose of causing harm. See id. at 6; see also Martinez v. Stanford, 323 F.3d 1178, 1184

(9th Cir. 2003). To determine whether the defendant’s use of force was malicious and sadistic,

the Hudson Court laid out five factors derived from Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986), for

courts to consider: (1) the extent of injury suffered by an inmate, (2) the need for application of

force, (3) the relationship between that need and the amount of force used, (4) the threat

reasonably perceived by the responsible officials, and (5) any efforts made to temper the severity

of a forceful response. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7 (citing to Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321.) In weighing

these factors, “[u]nless it appears that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff, will support a reliable inference of wantonness in the infliction of pain under the

standard . . . the case should not go to the jury.” See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 322.

1. Extent of Injury 

“[T]he extent of injury suffered by an inmate is one factor that may suggest ‘whether the

use of force could plausibly have been thought necessary’ in a particular situation, ‘or instead

evinced such wantonness with respect to the unjustified infliction of harm as is tantamount to a

knowing willingness that it occur.’ ” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. Although the extent of a prisoner’s

injury is relevant in determining whether excessive force was used in violation of the Eighth

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Amendment, it is not decisive because a prisoner can state a claim even if he or she did not

suffer a significant injury. See id. at 4. “Otherwise, the Eighth Amendment would permit any

physical punishment, no matter how diabolic or inhuman, inflicting less than some arbitrary

quantity of injury.” Id. at 9. The standard for an excessive force constitutional violation

depends on contemporary standards of decency. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9 (“When prison

officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary standards of

decency always are violated. This is true whether or not significant injury is evident.”) 

Applying this rule, the Hudson Court held that there was an Eighth Amendment violation

even though the prisoner’s injuries were minor, consisting of “bruises, swelling, loosened teeth,

and a cracked dental plate.” Id. at 10. The Court based its holding on the prisoner having

presented evidence weighing in favor of the other Whitley factors to show that the defendant

officers acted maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing the prisoner harm. 

See id.; see also Martinez, 323 F.3d at 1180 (holding that a prisoner, who suffered lacerations on

his left leg and finger, an abrasion on his head, bruises, and red welts on his back, stated a claim

under the Eighth Amendment because the prisoner provided evidence in support of the other

Whitley factors). 

Here, like the prisoners in Hudson and Martinez, Plaintiff’s injuries stemming from the

incident were relatively minor. RN W. Belger stated in her medical report, which was

completed ten minutes after the altercation on September 17, 2003, that Plaintiff suffered an

“abrasion on [the right] cheek, rib pain, [and a] small cut inside [his] lower lip.” (Cobb Decl.

Ex. I at 26.) Dr. Gomez evaluated Plaintiff, and prescribed Tylenol for Plaintiff’s injuries. (See

German Decl. Ex. B at 7.) As the Magistrate Judge found from reviewing the record,

“subsequent visits by Plaintiff after the initial visit to the CTC show[ed] Plaintiff had no

lingering head injury from the incident.” (R&R at 14.) 

However, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the evidence indicates

that Plaintiff did suffer headaches after the incident. C/Os Shelar and Talbert noted in their Use

of Force Incident Report that Plaintiff suffered a “[b]low to the head.” (Cobb Decl. Ex. O at 34;

Cobb Decl. Ex. P at 36.) As a result of the blow to his head, Plaintiff suffered from headaches

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for three-months. (See R&R at 14; German Decl. Ex. B at 12, 14-16.) Medical documents

submitted by Defendants’ in support of their Motion for Summary Judgment show Plaintiff was

treated for his complaints of headaches on September 26, 2003, October 6, 2003, and October 9,

2003. (See R&R at 14; German Decl. Ex. B at 12, 14-15.) On November 7, 2003, an

optometrist also treated Plaintiff for chronic headaches. (See id. at 16.) However, Plaintiff’s

headaches were not permanent because on December 8, 2003, Dr. Hunt evaluated Plaintiff and

reported that he exhibited no symptoms. (See id. at 17.) 

Although Plaintiff’s injuries were not severe, he did suffer headaches for a three-month

period. Accordingly, the Court FINDS that viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, this

factor weighs slightly in Plaintiff’s favor. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 10. 

2. Need for Force

The Ninth Circuit has held that “the force that was applied must be balanced against the

need for that force: it is the need for force which is at the heart of the [excessive force

determination].” Alexander v. City and County of San Francisco, 29 F.3d 1355, 1367 (9th Cir.

1994). Where is no need for force, any force used is objectively unreasonable for constitutional

purposes. See P.B. v. Koch, 96 F.3d 1298, 1303-04 & n. 4 (9th Cir. 1996).

 Here, there was a need for force because even viewing inferences in the light most

favorable to Plaintiff, the facts show that Defendants exerted force to restrain Plaintiff, not to

maliciously and sadistically inflict pain. It is undisputed that a physical altercation resulted

while C/O Bernal escorted Plaintiff from the Central Plaza to the Watch Tower office. As the

Magistrate Judge noted in his R&R, the incident reports consistently state that while C/O Bernal

was escorting Plaintiff to the Watch Tower, Plaintiff began to struggle and allegedly turned to

strike C/O Bernal. (See R&R at 6-7.) Moreover, Plaintiff does not dispute the following facts,

which Defendants have supported with declarations: the C/Os were trying to restrain him by

handcuffing and shackling his arms and leg; C/O Bernal used his hands to grab Plaintiff around

the torso area and bring him to the ground (see Cobb Decl. Ex. G at 21); Lt. Shelar and C/O

Lyman-Clark grabbed and twisted Plaintiff’s arm and hand (see id.); and Sgt. Beauchemin and

C/O Wilson tried to put leg restraints on Plaintiff (see Cobb Decl. Ex. B at 12; Cobb Decl. Ex. C

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at 13-14 ). Thus, the facts undisputed by Plaintiff and supported by declarations submitted by

Defendants show that Defendants were exerting force to restrain Plaintiff.

In response to Defendants’ argument that they were exerting force to restrain Plaintiff,

Plaintiff attempts to create a genuine issue of material fact by claiming that C/O Bernal beat him

for no reason. (See Pl.’s Compl. at 8.) However, Plaintiff’s argument fails because his

allegation that he was beat for no reason is not corroborated by any other testimony or other

persuasive evidence. See Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1061 (9th Cir.

2002) (“this court has refused to find a ‘genuine issue’ where the only evidence presented is

‘uncorroborated and self-serving’ testimony”) (citations omitted). In contrast, Defendants have

submitted incident reports that all consistently state that Plaintiff was resisting. 

In addition, the facts show that Defendant Diaz sprayed Plaintiff with one shot of O.C.

spray to subdue Plaintiff when he was biting C/O Bernal. (See Cobb Decl. Ex. E by Diaz at 18;

See Pl.’s Compl. at 7.) The Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit has held that in a prison, tear

gas may legitimately be used in small quantities to prevent small disturbances from becoming

dangerous to other inmates or personnel. See Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 195 (9th Cir.

1979); see also Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898. 903-04 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that two bursts

of pepper spray to stop fighting in a cell was not considered excessive force and did not violate

prisoners’ Eighth Amendment rights). Although Plaintiff does not discuss whether he bit C/O

Bernal in his briefing papers, Plaintiff admits to biting a C/O in one of the exhibits he attached to

his Opposition brief. Plaintiff submitted a Rules Violation Report which reports that when

Plaintiff pleaded not guilty to resisting staff and battery, he stated, “ ‘[a]n arm was across my

throat and I had to bite to breathe.’ ” (Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. L at 8.) In addition, medical reports after

the incident show C/O Bernal was treated for what appeared to be a human bite. (See Cobb

Decl. Ex. M at 30). Thus, Plaintiff’s version of the events do not contradict, but rather supports

the fact that Defendant Diaz sprayed Plaintiff with O.C. spray to stop his biting of O/C Bernal. 

In response to Defendants’ argument that force was needed to restrain Plaintiff, Plaintiff

argues that he was found not guilty by the prison for resisting officers and battery. (See Pl.’s

Opp’n at 4.) However, Plaintiff’s argument fails because Correctional Lieutenant W.F. Steele in

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the Rules Violation Report found Plaintiff not guilty for reasons not related to whether he

actually resisted and committed battery. (See Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. L.) Rather, Correctional

Lieutenant Steele based his decision on Plaintiff not having taken his medication. Specifically,

Correctional Lieutenant Steele concluded “this incident was the result of Inmate WILKINS’

mental health condition, in that he was not taking his prescribed medications.” (Id. at 7.) Thus,

Plaintiff has not offered evidence to demonstrate that there is an issue of material fact as to the

need for force. 

Plaintiff also does not create a genuine issue of material fact by referencing a decision by

the Superior Court of California in which prosecutors decided to not pursue Defendants’

complaints of battery against Plaintiff. (See Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. H.) In order to show that force was

needed, prison officials are not required to produce evidence rising to the level required to hold a

prisoner liable for battery in a court of law. Rather, the court must determine whether in making

a decision under pressure and with haste, the facts viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff

show that Defendants saw a need for force. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6. Incident reports and

reviews of the incident all consistently state that Defendants saw a need for force because

Plaintiff was resisting the Officers and was biting C/O Bernal. 

Even viewing inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, the evidence shows that there was a need for

force because Plaintiff was resisting Defendants. Thus, the Court FINDS the factor of need for

force weighs against Plaintiff.

 3. Relationship Between Need for Force & Force Used

“Whether the disturbance is a riot or a lesser disruption, correction officers must balance

the need to ‘maintain or restore discipline’ through force against the risk of injury to inmates.” 

Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6. In analyzing the relationship between the need for force and the force

used, the Whitley Court has emphasized that simple overreaction by an officer is not enough to

establish an Eighth Amendment violation: 

[i]t is obduracy and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good faith, that

characterize the conduct prohibited by the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause,

whether that conduct occurs in connection with establishing conditions of

confinement,supplying medical needs, orrestoring official control over a tumultuous

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cellblock. The infliction of pain in the course of a prison security measure, therefore,

does not amount to cruel and unusual punishment simply because it may appear in

retrospect that the degree of force authorized or applied for security purposes was

unreasonable, and hence unnecessary in the strict sense. 

475 U.S. at 319. Thus, “under the Eighth Amendment, we look for malicious and sadistic force,

not merely objectively unreasonable force.” Clement, 298 F.3d at 903.

Here, Plaintiff asserts that there is a triable issue of material fact because “a medical staff

member alleged unnecessary and excessive force . . . was utilized by staff during this incident.” 

(Pl.’s Opp’n at 6.) This statement is taken from first and second reviews of the incident. (See

Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. J, Cobb Decl. Ex. P-Q.) In his “Manager’s Review - Second Level, Use of

Force Incidents,” Associate Warden E.A. Contreras described the steps taken by the prison to

investigate the September 17, 2003, incident:

A videotaped interview was conducted by Lieutenant A. Atrushi due to injuries

sustained by Inmate Wilkins, his allegations of unnecessary force utilized by Officer

Lymon-Clark and a staff member’s allegations of excessive force utilized by staff

during the incident. During the interview with Inmate Wilkins he stated he requested

[Correctional Treatment Center] Officer Frisch, BMW D. Hosey and SRN (A) Dennis

be interviewed. All three staff were interviewed by Lieutenant Atrushi and confirmed

they observed Inmate Wilkins resisting staff which resulted in the use of emergency

force to restrain Inmate Wilkins. All additional reports by staff supported Inmate

Wilkins did resist staff’s instruction’s to cease resisting which resulted in the

emergency use of force.

(Cobb Decl. Ex. Q) (emphasis added). According to this review of the incident, the unidentified

staff member’s allegations along with Plaintiff’s claims of excessive force prompted the

videotape interview of Plaintiff to investigate the incident. However, after reviewing the reports

and the interviews conducted, Associate Warden Contreras concluded that staff’s actions during

the incident were in compliance with policy, procedure and training. In his “Manager’s Review

- First Level, Use of Force Incidents,” Correctional Captain J. Talbert also made the same

finding after stating that an investigation was conducted in part because “a medical staff member

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4

 Although Defendants discuss this argument by Plaintiff in their Reply brief (Defs.’ Reply at 2),

the R&R does not address this evidence. Thus, the Court reviews this evidence de novo. 

5

 Moreover, even if Plaintiff could establish that the force used violated the Eighth Amendment;

Defendants are still immune from suit due to qualified immunity. To avoid qualified immunity, a

plaintiff must make the following showing: (1) defendant violated a constitutional right, and (2) the

right violated was clearly established such that it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his or her

conduct was unlawful. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201-02 (2001). Here, even if Plaintiff’s

Eighth Amendment right was violated, he cannot establish that it would be clear to a reasonable officer

that using excessive force to restrain Plaintiff was unlawful under the circumstances. Reasonable

16 04CV00118-J (WMc)

alleged unnecessary and excessive force was utilized by staff during this incident.”4 (See Pl.’s

Opp’n at 6, 11; Cobb Decl. Ex. P at 37; Cobb Decl. Ex. Q at 48.) 

Upon a careful review of the record, it appears that the claim of excessive force

referenced in the first and second reviews was not actually made by a staff member based on his

or her personal knowledge. No where in the record is there a statement directly made by a

medical staff member that Defendants used excessive force, e.g., in an incident report or a

medical report. Rather, the evidence indicates that the statement was made by Plaintiff to RN

Belger during his medical exam right after the incident. (See Cobb Decl. Ex. I.) In particular,

under the part of the report entitled “Brief Resume in Patient’s Words of the Circumstances of

the Injury or Unusual Circumstances,” RN Bernal reports that Plaintiff states, “Police beat me

up.” (Id.) That the complaint was made by Plaintiff and not a staff member, as discussed further

below, accounts for why none of the staff members interviewed at the request of Plaintiff

supported his claim that there was excessive force.

However, even assuming that the statement was made by a staff member, and not by

Plaintiff himself, Plaintiff’s argument fails to establish a genuine issue of material fact. An

allegation of excessive force by a staff member is not enough to establish an Eighth Amendment

violation because objectively unreasonable force, without more, is not a violation. See Clement,

298 F.3d at 903. Rather, to establish an Eighth Amendment violation, the force used must have

been malicious and sadistic for the very purpose of causing harm. See id. Here, there is no

evidence in the record that the staff member asserted that the amount of force used in light of the

need for force was malicious and sadistic for the purpose of causing harm.5

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to restrain him, particularly when that prisoner is biting an officer. 

17 04CV00118-J (WMc)

Further, the allegation by the staff member does not even create a genuine issue that

excessive force was used. The first and second reviews state that the identified staff member

merely alleges that unnecessary and excessive force was used, but there is no evidence that the

staff member provided any facts to support his or her allegation of excessive force. For

example, there is no evidence in the record that the staff member stated Plaintiff was not

resisting staff members, that the staff member witnessed Defendants exerting specific acts of

excessive force, or that Plaintiff sustained injuries of the type indicating excessive force. 

Moreover, the staff member’s allegation does not create a genuine issue of material fact

because it is not corroborated by any other witnesses, including medical staff members. As

stated in the first and second levels of review, in response to the allegation of excessive force by

Plaintiff and the unidentified staff member, Correction Lieutenant Atrushi conducted three

interviews with staff members whom Plaintiff requested be interviewed, including medical staff

members Senior Registered Nurse R. Dennis and Correctional Treatment Center Officer M.

Frisch. (Cobb Decl. Ex. P at 37; Cobb Decl. Ex. Q at 48.) However, none of the staff

interviewed at the request of Plaintiff gave any statements supporting his allegation of excessive

force. To the contrary, they all confirmed that “Inmate Wilkins resist[ed] staff during the escort

which resulted in the need for the emergency use of force.” (See id.) Based on these interviews

and the incident reports, which consistently state that force was exerted to restrain Plaintiff as a

result of his resistance, it is difficult to disagree with Officer Talbert and Warden Contreras’

conclusion that “staff were in compliance with emergency use of force policy and procedures.” 

The allegation of excessive force by a staff member, without more, does not create a

genuine issue of material fact for trial because objectively unreasonable force is not enough to

establish an Eighth Amendment violation; rather, the force applied must have been malicious

and sadistic. Moreover, no rational trier of fact could find for Plaintiff based on a vague,

conclusory statement by an unidentified medical staff member in light of the consistent, multiple

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reports that Defendants used force to stop Plaintiff from resisisting. Accordingly, the Court

FINDS this element of proportionality weighs against Plaintiff. 

4. Threat Perceived

Another relevant inquiry for determining whether an Eighth Amendment excessive force

violation occurred is “the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates, as reasonably

perceived by the responsible officials on the basis of the facts known to them.” Whitley, 475

U.S. at 321. The Whitley Court cautioned that in weighing this factor, Courts should be mindful

that “in making and carrying out decisions involving the use of force to restore order in the face

of a prison disturbance, prison officials undoubtedly must take into account the very real threats

the unrest presents to inmates and prison officials alike, in addition to the possible harms to

inmates against whom force might be used.” Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320. In addition, “[d]espite

the weight of these competing concerns, corrections officers must make their decisions in haste,

under pressure, and frequently without the luxury of a second chance.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6

(citing Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320).

Defendants were responding to a threat posed to the security of the prison because it is

undisputed that the incident began in the Central Plaza where other inmates were present as the

result of a fire alarm evacuation. (See Pl.’s Opp’n at 6.) Plaintiff admits that the incident began

when he was reprimanded by C/O Lyman-Clark to not look at the women in the Plaza, and

despite the differing accounts of exactly what Plaintiff said to the C/O, both parties state that

Plaintiff verbally disagreed with the instruction he was given. (See Pl.’s Compl. at 7; see also

Pl.’s Opp’n at 6.) Thus, the situation was potentially dangerous to the security at RJD facility

because with inmates and staff evacuated into the yard where the incident took place, Plaintiff’s

disagreement with staff instruction could possibly have incited other inmates. Thus, Warden

Hernandez concluded in his Review of Use of Force report, “[t]he threat also existed that due to

other inmates being present on the Plaza . . . they might become involved, escalating the

situation to a seriously dangerous level.” (Cobb Decl. Ex. R at 39.) Therefore, the Court

FINDS that this factor weighs in favor of Defendants because they reasonably perceived a threat

to prison security. 

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5. Efforts to Temper Force 

During the course of the incident, officers increased the amount of force they used in

response to Plaintiff’s resistance. All four reviews of the incident concluded that Defendants

took reasonable steps to minimize the need for force and the level of force. (See Cobb Decl.

Exs. O-R.) When C/O Plaintiff began to physically struggle with C/O Bernal, C/O Bernal and

others repeatedly warned Plaintiff to stop resisting. (See Cobb Decl. Ex. G at 21-22.) Plaintiff

ignored the officers’ warnings, and continued to struggle; Plaintiff even admits that he bit C/O

Bernal. (See Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. L at 8.) Multiple other C/Os approached to quell the struggle,

using non-deadly force by holding Plaintiff down and trying to put shackles on his legs. (See

Cobb Decl. Ex. B.) Once C/O Bernal shouted out that Plaintiff was biting him, C/O Diaz

administered a one second burst of O.C. spray in Plaintiff’s face. (See Cobb Decl. Ex. E.) 

Moreover, after Plaintiff was sprayed once, C/O Diaz did not spray Plaintiff again at C/O

Lynman-Clark’s request. (See Cobb Decl. Ex. G at 24.) Under the circumstances, the C/Os

made an effort to temper the amount of force they used in response to Plaintiff’s resistance. 

Thus, the Court FINDS this factor weighs in Defendants’ favor. 

In conclusion, four out of five of the Hudson factors weigh in Defendants’ favor. Thus,

the evidence submitted and the facts taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff show that the

Officers did not act maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing him harm. For

the reasons set forth above, the Court ADOPTS the R&R’s recommendation and GRANTS

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff’s excessive force claim.

B. Eighth Amendment Inadequate Medical Care Claim

Plaintiff also alleges that prison officials violated his Eighth Amendment rights by

delaying in providing or denying him medical care. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that a doctor

did not evaluate him or take x-rays of him during the three months he was in administrative

segregation. (See Pl.’s Compl. at 8.) 

The government has an obligation under the Eighth Amendment to provide medical care

to those whom it punishes by incarceration. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir.

2000) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1967). “A correctional officer’s deliberate

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indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury” violates the Eighth Amendment ban against

cruel and unusual punishment. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105. The plaintiff inmate must demonstrate

that he or she was confined under conditions posing a risk of objectively, sufficiently serious

harm that the officials had a culpable state of mind in denying the proper medical care. See

Wallis v. Baldwin, 70 F.3d 1074, 1076 (9th Cir. 1995) (internal quotations omitted). “Prison

officials are deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s serious medical needs when they ‘deny,

delay, or intentionally interfere with medical treatment . . . [m]ere negligence in diagnosing or

treating a medical condition, without more, does not violate a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment

rights.” Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1131 (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104). 

Courts have interpreted serious medical needs to amount to the “existence of an injury

that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment;

the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily activities; or

the existence of chronic and substantial pain.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th

Cir. 1992) overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. V. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir.

1997) (en banc); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

When the alleged indifference to the inmates medical needs is based on delay, the Eighth

Amendment is not violated unless the evidence suggests the delay was harmful. See McGuckin

v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1060 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Hallet v. Morgan, 287 F.3d 1193, 1206

(9th Cir. 2002) (The Eighth Amendment is only violated if “delays occurred to a patient with

problems so severe that delays would cause significant harm that Defendants should have known

. . . .”)

Here, the evidence suggests that there was no denial or delay of medical care. Far from

“deliberate indifference” to Plaintiff’s medical needs, the medical evaluations conducted

immediately after the incident and the follow-ups until the symptoms subsided show that

Plaintiff was treated regularly and his medical complaints were addressed. Authenticated

medical records document submitted by Defendants demonstrate that Plaintiff was taken to the

CTC immediately after the incident for medical evaluation and treatment. (See Cobb Decl. Ex.

I.) In fact, an RN evaluated Plaintiff directly after the incident and stated that Plaintiff’s injuries

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were minor and his prognosis was “good.” (Cobb Decl. Ex. I at 26.) Plaintiff also received

check ups for his complaints of headaches on September 26, 2003, October 6, 2003, October 9,

2003, and November 7, 2003. (See R&R at 14; German Decl. Ex. B at 12, 14-15.) Thus, the

Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge and finds no evidence showing that Defendants acted

with deliberate indifference towards Plaintiff’s medical needs. For the reasons stated above, the

Court ADOPTS the R&R’s recommendation and GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment as to Plaintiff’s inadequate medical care claim.

C. Due Process Claim Regarding Grievance Procedure

Plaintiff also alleges that his due process rights were violated because “[the prison] has

not answered [his] 602 inmate appeals regarding the incident and th[e]y are way overdue.” (Pl.’s

Compl. at 8.) Defendants counter that Plaintiff is not entitled to relief because prisoners have no

due process interest in a particular grievance procedure. (Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. for Summ. J.

at 13.)

The Due Process Clause protects against the deprivation of liberty without due process of

law. See Wolf v. McDonald, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). To determine whether a due process

violation has occurred, a court engages in a two-step analysis. First, a court looks to whether the

person possesses a liberty interest with which the state has interfered. See Sandin v. Conner, 515

U.S. 472, 474 (1995). Second, if the state has interfered with a liberty interest, a court looks to

whether this interference was accomplished by sufficient procedural and evidentiary safeguards. 

See Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989); see also Zimmerlee v. Keeney,

831 F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1987).

Liberty interests may arise from the Constitution or from state law. See Wilkinson v.

Austin, 125 S.Ct. 2384, 2393 (2005). The Constitution itself does not confer on prisoners a

liberty interest in avoiding “more adverse conditions of confinement.” Id.; see also Rizzo v.

Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 530 (9th Cir. 1985) (“An inmate’s liberty interests are sufficiently

extinguished by his conviction so that the state may change his place of confinement even

though the degree of confinement may be different and prison life may be more disagreeable in

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one institution than in another.”) (citation omitted). However, a prisoner may have a liberty

interest pursuant to state law. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 481-84.

Under state law, the existence of a liberty interest created by prison regulations is

determined by focusing on the nature of the deprivation. See id. Such interests are limited to

freedom from restraint which “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in

relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 484. In Sandin, the Court concluded that

a prisoner had no liberty interest against a 30-day assignment to segregated confinement because

the assignment did not “present a dramatic departure from the basic conditions of [the inmate’s]

sentence.” In contrast, in Wilkinson, the Court held that indefinite placement of an inmate in

Supermax prison imposed an atypical and significant hardship on inmates in relation to the

ordinary incidents of prison life because it prohibited almost all human contact, required

constant lighting, allowed exercise for only one hour per day, was an indefinite placement, and

disqualified an otherwise eligible inmate from parole. See Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 209. 

Here, Plaintiff’s three month placement in administrative segregation is more similar to

the 30-day administrative segregation that was held to not be a protected liberty interest in

Sandin than the indefinite Supermax placement in Wilkinson. Moreover, unlike Wilkinson,

Plaintiff has failed to present any evidence that the conditions of confinement in administrative

segregation imposed an “atypical and significant hardship.” See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484. Thus,

Plaintiff has not shown that he has a protected liberty interest in not being held in administrative

segregation for three months.

Moreover, even if Plaintiff has a protected liberty interest, he cannot meet the second

factor required for a due process violation because he received due process for both the charges

against him and his claims against Defendants. Regarding the charges against Plaintiff for

battery, he was afforded a hearing as a result of the internal investigation and appeared before

the Institutional Classification Committee (ICC). (See Pl.’s Opp’n at 4, Ex. G). A mental health

report also was conducted to determine if his mental health conditions caused his behavior

during the altercation. (See Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. C.) As a result of the process he was afforded, the

Rules Violation report found Plaintiff not guilty of battery based on a mental health report that

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showed “the incident was a result of [Plaintiff’s] mental condition . . . in that he was not taking

his prescribed medications.” (Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. L.) 

Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertions in his Complaint, Plaintiff also was afforded due process

because his CDC 602 Inmate Appeals, in which he sought relief for Defendants allegedly having

assaulting him, were reviewed by the prison. Exhibits that Plaintiff attached to his Opposition

show that Plaintiff received four reviews of his complaints, including an initial review by the

Watch Commander, two Manager’s Level reviews, and a Director’s Level Decision. (See Cobb

Decl. Exs. O-R; Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. F.) In his Director’s Level Decision, Chief N. Grannis denied

Plaintiff’s appeal after having reviewed the documentation Plaintiff submitted and finding that

“[t]he appellate has failed to provide any new or compelling information that would warrant a

modification of the decision reached by the institution.” (Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. F. at 1.) Plaintiff

himself even admits that he received these reviews in response to his 602 Complaints. In

arguing that he exhausted all his administrative remedies, Plaintiff admits in his Opposition that

he “use[d] the grievances all the way up to the Director’s level appeal decision.” (Pl.’s Opp’n at

12.) Although Plaintiff may disagree with Chief Grannis’ decision to not grant him relief on

appeal, the evidence shows that Plaintiff did receive due process for his grievances against

Defendants.

Thus, Plaintiff has not presented any evidence showing that the inmate grievance process

violated his due process rights. Accordingly, the Court ADOPTS the R&R’s recommendation

and GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff’s due process claim. 

D. Qualified Immunity

Section 1983 claims against government officials may be subject to the affirmative

defense of qualified immunity. See Harlow Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982). Qualified

immunity ensures that public officials who carry out discretionary executive or administrative

functions are protected from personal monetary liability so long as their actions do not violate

“federal statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Id.

at 818. A correctional officer is not entitled to qualified immunity where (1) “the facts alleged

show that the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right,” and (2) “the constitutional right

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in question was clearly established such that ‘it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his

conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.’ ” Martinez v. Stanford, 323 F.3d 1178,

1182 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201-02 (2001)). 

Here, because the Court agrees with the R&R’s finding that there is no triable issues of

fact regarding Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment and Due Process clams, the Court need not move to

the second step of determining whether the constitutional rights in question were clearly

established. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5 (1998). Thus, the Court

FINDS that qualified immunity applies.

E. Dismissal of Claims Against Warden Hernandez

In opposing Defendants’ argument on summary judgment that Warden Hernandez should

dismissed, Plaintiff states “Warden Hernandez is over his C/Os and there training 100% See

Exhibit S it will show he is over there training so there for he is responsible for them . . .” (Pl.’s

Opp’n at 8.) Plaintiff’s Exhibit S is a memorandum for training C/Os to use a “Monandnock

Expandable Baton (MEB).” (Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. S.) Thus, Plaintiff is arguing that because Warden

Hernandez signed the memorandum requiring that all staff attend the training (see Pl.’s Opp’n

Ex. S at 5), Warden Hernandez is responsible for the C/Os’ conduct in allegedly beating

Plaintiff. In response, Defendants argue that respondeat superior is not a basis for § 1983 relief.

The R&R correctly examined liability for a supervisor under § 1983, which requires “a

showing of personal participation by the defendant.” Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th

Cir. 1979). A supervisor is only liable for constitutional violations of his or her subordinates if

he or she ordered the violations or knew of the violations and failed to intercept. See Ybarra v.

Reno Thunderbird Mobile Home Village, 723 F.2d 675, 680-81 (9th Cir. 1984). 

Here, Plaintiff sets forth no facts to show that Warden Hernandez ordered the Officers

conduct against Plaintiff or knew of the conduct and failed to intercept. While the memo

Plaintiff provides may show Warden Hernandez instructed Officers on how to use the

expandable baton, Plaintiff does not allege that Officers used a baton during the incident. In

addition, the MEB memo is dated September 23, 2005, over two years after the September 17,

2003, incident that gave rise to Plaintiff’s lawsuit. Thus, the Court ADOPTS the Magistrate

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Judge’s R&R recommendation, and GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to

Plaintiff’s claim against Warden Hernandez. 

F. Dismissal of Claims Against Officer Ramirez

In his Complaint, Plaintiff makes a disturbing allegation that C/O Ramirez assaulted him

after he was taken to CTC in handcuffs directly after the incident. (See Pl.’s Compl. at 7.) 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims against C/O Ramirez should be dismissed because

“there is no indication that Ramirez was in any way involved in any of the incidents giving rise

to Plaintiff’s complaint . . .” (Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Mot. for Summ. J. at 13.) 

It is well-settled law that to avoid summary judgment, the opposing party cannot rely

solely on conclusory allegations. See Berg v. Kinchole, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986). 

“Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the

nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’ ” Id. at 587 (citing First Nat'l Bank of

Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968)). 

Plaintiff’s claim that C/O Ramirez assaulted him when he was in handcuffs, if true, may

be ground for an Eighth Amendment claim of excessive force. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S.

730, 737 (2002) (“[a]mong ‘unnecessary and wanton’ inflictions of pain are those that are

‘totally without penological justification.’ ”) However, Defendants have met their burden of

establishing that there is no genuine issue of material fact that C/O Ramirez was not involved in

the incident because as they point out, none of the incident reports implicate or even mention

C/O Ramirez. In fact, the incident reports state that it was C/O Hobbs, not C/O Ramirez that

escorted Plaintiff to CTC. (See Cobb Decl. Exs. A, B, D, H.) The burden then shifts to Plaintiff

to establish that there is a genuine issue as to whether C/O Ramirez beat him. The only evidence

Plaintiff asserts to support his claim are medical records in which he complained of headaches. 

However, Plaintiff has provided no evidence indicating that C/O Ramirez caused his headaches. 

Moreover, although Plaintiff complained of headaches, none of the medical reports found that

Plaintiff sustained any head injuries from the incident. 

Thus, Plaintiff has failed to provide any evidence or to provide specific facts that support

his bare allegation against C/O Ramirez. (See generally Pl.’s Compl.; Pl.’s Opp’n.) The Court

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agrees with the R&R and GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff’s

claim against C/O Ramirez. 

 

II. Defendants’ Motion to Strike 

In conjunction with their Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants also filed a Motion

to Strike Plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages on the grounds that there is no evidence that

Defendants acted with evil intent. (See Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J at 15.)

Although the Magistrate Judge in the R&R advises granting Defendants’ Motion to

Strike, the Court declines to adopt this recommendation. Rather, the Court DENIES without

prejudice Defendant’ Motion to Strike on mootness grounds because the Court has granted

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to all of Plaintiff’s claims. 

III. Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice

On August 31, 2005, Defendants filed a Request for Judicial Notice in Support of their

Motion for Summary Judgment (“Request”). [Doc. No. 22.] Defendants request that the “Court

take judicial notice of the complete files and records in this action,” “the exhibits to the

Declarations of Michael G. German and Lt. R. Cobb” as well as “the administrative and judicial

records of the state of California supplied therein . . . .” (Defs.’ Req. for Judicial Notice at 1.) 

Plaintiff has not filed an Objection to Defendants’ Request. 

As the R&R correctly stated, a party may request judicial notice of certain matters in

connection with a motion for summary judgment. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). Judicial notice

constitutes evidence of the matters noted. See id. A court may take notice of a fact that is “not

subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial

jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to

sources whose accuracy cannot be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); see also Parrino v. FHP,

Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 706 (9th Cir. 1998). 

As to Defendants’ Request regarding the record submitted in support of their Motion for

Summary Judgment, the request is over broad because the records are neither generally known to

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the Court or capable of easy corroboration. The documents consist mostly of medical reports

and incident reports completed by prison staff, which are not readily known to the Court. 

Likewise, the Court cannot easily confirm the truth or accuracy of the reports. 

However, on a motion for summary judgment, a court may consider “affidavits or

declarations of persons with personal knowledge through whom they could be introduced at

trial.” Zoslaw v. MCA Distributing Corp., 693 F.2d 870, 883 (9th Cir. 1982). Thus, a court need

not take judicial notice of declarations in order to consider them on a motion for summary

judgment. 

Here, the declarations Defendants submitted by Michael German and Lt. Robert Cobb are

based on personal knowledge, so they may be properly considered by the Court even though

they do not warrant judicial notice. Michael German, Deputy Attorney General and counsel for

Defendants, submitted a declaration in support of Exhibits A and B. [Doc. No. 21.] Exhibit A

contains abstracts of judgments against Plaintiff, and Exhibit B consists of excerpts from

Plaintiff’s medical records. (See German Decl. at 1.) As Deputy Attorney General, Mr. German

has knowledge of the judgments against Plaintiff to authenticate documents provided in Exhibit

A. Additionally, as a RJD employee working in the medical records department, Rebecca Solis,

has knowledge of the medical records to attest that they are correct copies from Plaintiff’s

medical file. (See German Decl. Exh B at 5.) 

Lt. Cobb, Litigation Coordinator at RJD, also submitted a declaration in support of

Exhibits A through R. [Doc. No. 23.] Exhibits A though R consist of crime/incident reports,

medical reports of injury or unusual occurrence, and incident review forms regarding

crime/incidents that occurred at RJD. (See Cobb Decl. at 1.) As a Litigation Coordinator, Lt.

Cobb has personal knowledge of the preparation and maintenance of these documents, and has

affirmed the documents were true copies of the originals. (See Cobb Decl. at 1-2.) Thus, both

Mr. German and Lt. Cobb’s declarations are admissible for consideration on a summary

judgment motion despite the fact that they cannot be judicially noticed.

For the reasons stated above, the Court ADOPTS the R&R’s recommendation and

DENIES Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice. 

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Conclusion

 In conclusion, the Court (1) ADOPTS IN PART the R&R, (2) GRANTS Defendants’

Motion for Summary Judgment, (3) DENIES without prejudice Defendants’ Motion to Strike

Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages, (4) DENIES Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice,

and (5) CONSTRUES Plaintiff’s “Motion to dismiss summary judgment” as Plaintiff’s

Opposition to summary judgment.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 2, 2006

HON. NAPOLEON A. JONES, JR.

United States District Judge

cc: Magistrate Judge William McCurine, Jr.

 

 All Parties

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