Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-01369/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-01369-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IVAN V. CLEVELAND, H60545, 

Plaintiff(s),

 vs.

DR. LAM,

Defendant(s). 

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No. C 14-1369 CRB (PR)

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(Dkt. #27 & 34)

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, a California state prisoner incarcerated at the Correctional

Training Facility in Soledad (CTF), filed the instant pro se civil rights action

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging his classification as a high-risk medical case

subject to transfer to a medical facility. Plaintiff alleges that the classification is

incorrect, and that Defendant Dr. Lam falsified documents to support it in an

effort to have Plaintiff transferred to another facility in retaliation for Plaintiff

previously having filed suit against Dr. Lam. 

Per order filed on June 3, 2014, the Court found that, liberally construed,

Plaintiff’s allegations appear to state a cognizable § 1983 claim for retaliatory

medical classification/transfer, and ordered the U.S. Marshal to serve Dr. Lam. 

Defendant now moves for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 56 on the ground that Plaintiff failed to properly exhaust his claim

before filing suit, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995

(PLRA). Plaintiff has filed an opposition and Defendant has filed a reply.

(Plaintiff also filed an unsolicited surreply.) 

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MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A. Standard of Review

“The PLRA mandates that inmates exhaust all available administrative

remedies before filing ‘any suit challenging prison conditions,’ including, but not

limited to, suits under § 1983.” Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1171 (9th Cir.

2014) (en banc) (citing Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006)). To the extent

that the evidence in the record permits, the appropriate procedural device for

pretrial determination of whether administrative remedies have been exhausted

under the PLRA is a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56. Id. at 1168. 

The burden is on the defendant to prove that there was an available

administrative remedy that the plaintiff failed to exhaust. Id. at 1172. If the

defendant meets that burden, the burden shifts to the prisoner to present evidence

showing that there is something in his particular case that made the existing and

generally available administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him. Id.

The ultimate burden of proof remains with the defendant, however. Id.

If undisputed evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the prisoner

shows a failure to exhaust, a defendant is entitled to summary judgment under

Rule 56. Id. at 1166. But if material facts are disputed, summary judgment

should be denied and the district judge rather than a jury should determine the

facts in a preliminary proceeding. Id. 

B. Analysis

The PLRA amended 42 U.S.C. § 1997e to provide that “[n]o action shall

be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any

other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional

facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Although once within the discretion of the district court,

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exhaustion in prisoner cases covered by § 1997e(a) is now mandatory. Porter v.

Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002). All available remedies must now be

exhausted; those remedies “need not meet federal standards, nor must they be

‘plain, speedy, and effective.’” Id. (citation omitted). Even when the prisoner

seeks relief not available in grievance proceedings, notably money damages,

exhaustion is a prerequisite to suit. Id.; Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741

(2001). Similarly, exhaustion is a prerequisite to all prisoner suits about prison

life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and

whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong. Porter, 534 U.S. at

532. PLRA’s exhaustion requirement requires “proper exhaustion” of available

administrative remedies. Woodford, 548 U.S. at 93. Proper exhaustion requires

using all steps of an administrative process and complying with “deadlines and

other critical procedural rules.” Id. at 90.

The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR)

provides any inmate or parolee under its jurisdiction the right to appeal “any

policy, decision, action, condition, or omission by the department or its staff that

the inmate or parolee can demonstrate as having a material adverse effect upon

his or her health, safety, or welfare.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(a). To

initiate an appeal, the inmate or parolee must submit a CDCR Form 602

describing the issue to be appealed to the appeals coordinator’s office at the

institution or parole region for receipt and processing. Id. § 3084.2(a)–(c). The

appeal must name “all staff member(s) involved” and “describe their involvement

in the issue.” Id. § 3084.2(a)(3). CDCR’s appeal process consists of three formal

levels of appeals: (1) first formal level appeal filed with one of the institution’s

appeal coordinators, (2) second formal level appeal filed with the institution head

or designee, and (3) third formal level appeal filed with the CDCR director or

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designee. Id. §§ 3084.7, 3084.8. A prisoner exhausts the appeal process when he

completes the third level of review. Id. § 3084.1(b); Harvey v. Jordan, 605 F.3d

681, 683 (9th Cir. 2010). A “cancellation or rejection” of an appeal “does not

exhaust administrative remedies.” Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(b). 

Defendant properly raises nonexhaustion in a Rule 56 motion for summary

judgment and argues that Plaintiff failed to properly exhaust available

administrative remedies as to his retaliatory medical classification/transfer claim

before filing suit, as required by § 1997e(a). In support, Defendant submits

evidence showing that Plaintiff submitted three relevant inmate appeals—CTF

HC 14039982, CTF HC 14040027, CTF HC 14040206—of which one made it

through the third level of review, but not until after Plaintiff filed this suit. 

1. CTF HC 14039982

On January 6, 2014, Plaintiff submitted his first inmate appeal, CTF HC

14039982, alleging that he was being improperly considered for transfer to a

medical facility based on his mis-classification as a high-risk medical case. 

Robinson Decl. (dkt. #28) ¶ 10, Ex. C. Plaintiff requested emergency processing,

but the appeal was deemed a non-emergency appeal and, on January 22, 2014,

rejected on the ground that it was filed on the wrong form. Id. Plaintiff

resubmitted the appeal on the correct form but, on January 31, 2014, the appeal

was rejected on the ground that it “concern[ed] an anticipated action or decision.” 

Id. ¶¶ 10–11, Ex. D (citing Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.6(b)(1)). Plaintiff

clarified that he only wished to appeal his high-risk medical classification and, on

February 28, 2014, his appeal at the first level of review was granted as to his

request to have a medical exam, but denied as to his request that Dr. Lam be

interviewed and his appeal be granted. Id. ¶ 11, Ex. E. The first-level review

also noted that Plaintiff’s request to be removed from high-risk medical

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classification was being addressed in CTF HC 14040027 (which Plaintiff

submitted on January 14, 2014). Id. 

On March 13, 2014, Plaintiff appealed to the second level of review. Id.

Ex. E. On April 23, 2014, Plaintiff’s appeal again was granted as to his request

to have a medical exam, and denied as to his request that Dr. Lam be interviewed

and his appeal be granted. Id. ¶ 11, Ex. E. The second level review also noted

that Plaintiff’s request to be removed from high-risk medical classification was

being addressed in CTF HC 14040027. Id. Ex. E. 

On May 8, 2014, Plaintiff appealed to the third level of review. Id. Ex. A. 

On July 11, 2014, Plaintiff’s appeal— including his request to be removed from

the high-risk medical classification (which he had stopped pursuing in CTF HC

14040027)—was denied based on his medical conditions, including Parkinson’s

syndrome. Id. Ex. E. The third-level decision made clear that Plaintiff had now

exhausted his administrative remedies. Id.

2. CTF HC 14040027

On January 14, 2014, Plaintiff submitted CTF HC 14040027, his second

appeal regarding his high-risk medical classification. Id. ¶ 12, Ex. F. On

February 4, 2014, Plaintiff’s appeal at the first level of review was granted as to

Plaintiff’s request to have a doctor go over his records to determine medical risk,

but denied as to his request to be removed from the high-risk classification. Id.

The decision noted that Plaintiff properly fell into the high risk medical

classification based on his Parkinson’s diagnosis. Id. Ex. F. 

Plaintiff appealed to the second level of review, but on March 8, 2014, and

March 11, 2014, the appeal was rejected because Plaintiff did not complete the

appeal form by signing and dating it. Id. (citing Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15,

§ 3084.6(b)(13)). Plaintiff was given 30 days to correct and resubmit the appeal,

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id., but he never did, id. ¶ 12. (Instead, it appears that at this point Plaintiff

elected to proceed only with his first appeal, CTF HC 14039982.) 

3. CTF HC 14040206

On February 20, 2014, Plaintiff submitted CTF 14040206, his third

appeal regarding his high-risk medical classification. Id. ¶ 13, Ex. G. In it, he

also asked for all of his medical chronos from 2005 to 2013. Id. On March 12,

2014, the appeal was rejected at the first level of review because it “lack[ed]

specificity” and contained “multiple issues that do not derive from a single

event.” Id. Ex. G (citing Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.6(b)(6) & (8)). Plaintiff

was given 30 days to correct and resubmit the appeal, id., but he never did, id.

¶ 13. (Again, it appears that at this point Plaintiff elected to proceed only with

his first appeal, CTF HC 14039982.) 

The evidence submitted by Defendant meets his burden of proving that

there was an available administrative remedy that Plaintiff failed to exhaust in

connection with his retaliatory medical classification/transfer claim before filing

this suit on March 25, 2014. See Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172. The burden now

shifts to Plaintiff to present evidence showing that there is something in his

particular case that made the existing and generally available administrative

remedies effectively unavailable to him. See id.

Plaintiff claims that prison officials improperly screened his first appeal,

CTF 14039982, on January 31, 2014, when they rejected it at the first level of

review on the ground that it concerned an anticipated action, and thereby made

generally available administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him. The

claim is without merit. Under the law of the circuit, improper screening of a

prisoner’s administrative grievances may render administrative remedies

“effectively unavailable” such that exhaustion is not required under § 1997e(a). 

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Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813, 823 (9th Cir. 2010). But to fall within this

exception, the prisoner must show “that he attempted to exhaust his

administrative remedies but was thwarted by improper screening.” Id. Plaintiff

does not. The undisputed evidence in the record shows that the January 31, 2014

rejection of Plaintiff’s first appeal did not “thwart” his ability or attempts to

exhaust. Plaintiff promptly resubmitted the appeal with an explanation that he

only sought consideration of his high-risk medical classification and the appeal

was accepted and decided at the first level of review. 

The March 2014 rejections of Plaintiff’s second and third appeals, CTF

HC 14040027 and CTF HC 14040206, did not thwart Plaintiff’s ability or

attempts to exhaust either. The undisputed evidence shows that Plaintiff was

afforded an opportunity to correct and resubmit both appeals, but he elected not

to do so and instead proceeded only with his first appeal, CTF HC 14039982,

which he exhausted all the way through the third level of review. In that appeal,

the third level of review considered Plaintiff’s request to be removed from the

high-risk medical classification (which Plaintiff had stopped pursuing in CTF HC

14040027) and denied it based on Plaintiff’s medical conditions. Plaintiff

therefore properly exhausted available administrative remedies in connection

with his retaliatory medical classification/transfer claim when CTF HC 14040027

was denied at the third level of review on July 11, 2014.

Unfortunately for Plaintiff, he filed this suit on March 25, 2014, more than

three months before he properly exhausted available administrative remedies, and

it is well established that a prisoner action must be dismissed unless the prisoner

exhausted his available administrative remedies before he filed suit. See

McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir. 2002) (also noting that

dismissal should be without prejudice to refiling after proper exhaustion). It

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matters not that the prisoner fully exhausts while the suit is pending. See id.; see

also Vaden v. Summerhill, 449 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2006) (where

administrative remedies are not exhausted before prisoner sends complaint to

court, complaint should be dismissed, even if exhaustion is completed by time

complaint is actually filed). 

Plaintiff tries to get around his premature filing of this suit by arguing that

under Harvey v. Jordan, 605 F.3d 681 (9th Cir. 2010), he was not obligated to

appeal his first and second appeals beyond the first level of review because both

appeals were partially granted at the first level of review. In Harvey, inmate

Harvey filed an appeal requesting a hearing on a disciplinary charge, access to a

video recording of the incident and/or dismissal of the charge. Id. at 683. Prison

officials partially granted his appeal, stating in writing that Harvey would receive

a hearing and have access to the video. Id. Five months later, however, prison

officials still had not held a hearing nor allowed Harvey access to the video, and

Harvey filed an appeal. Id. The prison rejected Harvey’s appeal as an untimely

appeal of their earlier partial grant, and the district court dismissed Harvey’s suit

for failure to properly exhaust available administrative remedies through the third

level of review. Id. Reasoning that Harvey was not required to appeal a decision

that he believed had resolved his grievance, the Ninth Circuit held that “[a]n

inmate has no obligation to appeal from a grant of relief, or a partial grant that

satisfies him, in order to exhaust his administrative remedies.” Id. at 685

(emphasis added). 

Here, Plaintiff’s first and second appeals were classified as “partially

granted” at the first level of review because prison officials granted Plaintiff’s

requests for a medical examination. Robinson Decl. Exs. E, F. But neither the

first nor the second appeal granted relief at the first level of review that would

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have satisfied Plaintiff, namely removal from the high-risk medical classification. 

Plaintiff’s case is distinguishable from Harvey because at no point was Plaintiff

led to believe that he would be removed from the high-risk medical classification

and, as evidenced by his continued appeals in CTF 14039982, at no point was

Plaintiff satisfied by the partial grant of his appeals at the first level of review. 

In sum, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s

retaliatory medical classification/transfer claim on the basis of nonexhaustion. 

Defendant has met his ultimate burden of proving that Plaintiff did not properly

exhaust available administrative remedies in connection with the claim before

filing suit, as required by the PLRA. See Albino, 747 F.3d at 1166, 1172. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment 

(dkt. #27) for failure to properly exhaust available administrative remedies before

filing suit is GRANTED. But under the law of the circuit, the action is

DISMISSED without prejudice to refiling after proper exhaustion.

The clerk shall enter judgment in accordance with this order, terminate all

pending motions (see, e.g., dkt. #34) as moot, and close the file.

SO ORDERED.

DATED: Feb. 12, 2015 

CHARLES R. BREYER

United States District Judge

G:\PRO-SE\CRB\CR.14\Cleveland, I.14-1369.msj.final.wpd

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