Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01726/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01726-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 791
Nature of Suit: Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Cause of Action: 28:1132 E.R.I.S.A.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BRENDA DIMARO; and HALLIE

LAVICK,

NO. CIV. S-05-1726 LKK/GGH

Plaintiffs,

v. O R D E R

HOLLISTER, INC.; SAMUEL

BRILLIANT; JAMES J.

McCORMACK; JAMES A. KARLOVSKY;

RICHARD T. ZWIRNER; MICHAEL C.

WINN; LORETTA L. STEMPINKSI;

DONNA J. MATSON; ALAN F. HERBERT;

HOLLISTER EMPLOYEE SHARE OWNERSHIP

TRUST; and THE FIRM OF JOHN

DICKSON SCHNEIDER, INC.,

Defendants.

 /

The court is in receipt of plaintiff’s motion for partial

summary judgment as well as defendants’ request for a continuance

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f). The court has also received the

declaration of Scott Hubbard in opposition to defendants’ request

for a continuance and defendants’ reply declaration in support of

Case 2:05-cv-01726-WBS-GGH Document 41 Filed 11/10/05 Page 1 of 4
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1 Defendants must show (1) that they have set forth in

affidavit form the specific facts that they hope to elicit from

further discovery, (2) that the facts sought exist, and (3) that

these sought-after facts are “essential” to resist the summary

judgment motion. Campbell, 138 F.3d at 779. 

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their request for a rule 56(f) continuance. 

“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) provides a device for

litigants to avoid summary judgment when they have not had

sufficient time to develop affirmative evidence.” Burlington

Northern & Santa Fe R.R. Co. v. The Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes

of the Fort Peck Indian Reservation, Montana, 323 F.3d 767, 773

(9th Cir. 2003); Metabolife Int'l, Inc. v. Wornick, 264 F.3d 832,

846 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Although district courts have “wide latitude in controlling

discovery,” State of California v. Campbell, 138 F.3d 772, 779 (9th

Cir. 1998), the Supreme Court has required allowing discovery

“where the nonmoving party has not had the opportunity to discover

information that is essential to its opposition.” Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 n. 5 (1986). A Rule 56(f)

motion must be brought before the summary judgment hearing, AshtonTate Corp. v. Ross, 916 F.2d 516, 520 (9th Cir. 1990), and the

facts supporting a Rule 56(f) motion must be set forth in an

accompanying affidavit. Campbell, 138 F.3d at 779 (9th Cir. 1998).1

In the case at bar, plaintiff brings suit against defendants

Hollister, Inc., Hollister Employee Share Ownership Trust, John

Dickinson Schneider, Inc., Samuel Brilliant, James A. Karlovsky,

James J. McCormack, Richard T. Zwirner, Michael C. Winn, Loretta

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L. Stempinski, Donna J. Matson, and Alan F. Herbert for violating

the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C.

§§ 1001 et seq., in the profit sharing plan known as the Hollister

Employee Share Ownership Trust for the Hollister Incorporated Group

of Companies (hereafter “HolliShare” or “the Plan”). 

Plaintiffs filed their initial complaint on August 25, 2005.

On October 21, 2005, plaintiffs filed their partial motion for

summary judgement. There has not yet been a Status Conference in

this case and there has been no discovery in this case. The Status

Conference is currently scheduled for January 9, 2006. 

The declaration of William Gould, defendants’ counsel, sets

forth specific facts that the defense hopes to elicit from

discovery and makes clear that these facts are essential to resist

the summary judgement motion. Gould submits that defendants will

need discovery pertaining to the allegations that the retirement

plan is in violation of ERISA. Specifically, defendants will need

discovery regarding plaintiffs’ contention that the current

trustees of the retirement plan should be removed because they are

allegedly harming the interests of the Plan’s beneficiaries. See

Decl. of W. Gould, at 5:17-27. Similarly, defendants need to

conduct discovery as to the “interrelationship between the various

cited provisions of ERISA and the terms of the Plan documents.”

See Decl. of W. Gould, at 6:1-2. 

Given that discovery has not even begun, any motion for

summary judgment by plaintiff is premature. Knowing exactly how

the plan in question operates constitutes sought-after facts

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clearly essential to the defendants’ ability to respond to the

plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. Therefore, plaintiffs’

motion for summary judgment is denied without prejudice to renewal,

following the close of discovery, that date to be set at the

January 9, 2006 Status Conference. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: November 9, 2005

/s/Lawrence K. Karlton 

LAWRENCE K. KARLTON

SENIOR JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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