Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-02026/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-02026-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 365
Nature of Suit: Personal Injury - Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1332pl Diversity-Product Liability

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

CATALINA CAMPOS-EIBECK, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

C R BARD INCORPORATED AND BARD 

PERIPHERAL VASCULAR INCORPORATED, 

Defendants. 

Case No.: 19cv2026-W(BLM) 

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION TO COMPEL FOR AN ORDER 

ALLOWING PLAINTIFF TO SERVE 

ADDITIONAL GENERAL DISCOVERY 

ON DEFENDANTS 

[ECF No. 21] 

Currently before the Court is Plaintiff's January 14, 2020 motion to compel [ECF No. 21 

"MTC"], Defendant's January 21, 2020 opposition to the motion [ECF No. 25 ("Oppo.")], and 

Plaintiff's January 28, 2020 reply [ECF No. 26 ("Reply")]. For the reasons set forth below, 

Plaintiff's motion is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

This matter was originally part of a multidistrict litigation proceeding ("MDL") in the 

District of Arizona and was transferred to this Court on October 22, 2019. See ECF No. 4. The 

MDL involved personal injury cases alleging that defects in various models of Defendants’ inferior 

vena cava ("IVC") filters caused serious harm or death. ECF No. 3. The MDL closed on May 31, 

2019 after more than 8,000 cases had been filed. Id. at 1. Thousands of the cases settled and 

more than 500 were transferred to the appropriate district. Id. Throughout the life of the MDL, 

the court issued at least forty-five Case Management Orders some of which governed discovery. 

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Id. at 5-6. In the Suggestion of Remand and Transfer Order issued by Judge David G. Campbell, 

the court noted that 

[b]ecause all general fact and expert discovery has been completed in this MDL, 

the courts receiving these cases need not be concerned with facilitating general 

expert, corporate, and third-party discovery. This observation is not meant to 

restrict the power of receiving courts for good cause or in the interest of justice to 

address issues that may be unique and relevant a [sic] in remanded or transferred 

case. 

Id. at 30. 

On November 22, 2019, the Court held a telephonic Case Management Conference 

(“CMC”). ECF No. 15. Mr. Paul Stoller appeared on behalf of Plaintiff and Mr. Tyler Andrews 

appeared on behalf of Defendants. Id. In preparation for the Conference, the parties filed a 

Joint Status Report. ECF No. 13. In the Joint Status Report, the parties raised several issues 

regarding discovery. Id. On December 2, 2019, the Court issued an Order Following Telephonic, 

Attorneys-Only Case Management Conference requiring the parties to meet and confer regarding 

their discovery dispute. ECF No. 16. On January 7, 2020, counsel for Plaintiff, Mr. Gregory 

Rueb, and counsel for Defendants, Mr. Syed Ishrak, contacted Judge Major’s law clerk and 

explained that they were unable to resolve the issue. ECF No. 20. In light of counsel’s 

representations, the Court issued a briefing schedule. Id. The parties timely filed their motion, 

opposition, and reply. See MTC, Oppo., and Reply. 

LEGAL STANDARD 

 The scope of discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is defined as follows: 

Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant 

to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, 

considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in 

controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ 

resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether 

the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. 

Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to 

be discoverable. 

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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Fed. R. Civ. P.”) 26(b)(1). 

District courts have broad discretion to determine relevancy for discovery purposes. See 

Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002). District courts also have broad discretion 

to limit discovery to prevent its abuse. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C) (instructing that courts 

must limit discovery where the party seeking the discovery “has had ample opportunity to obtain 

the information by discovery in the action” or where the proposed discovery is “unreasonably 

cumulative or duplicative,” “obtain[able] from some other source that is more convenient, less 

burdensome, or less expensive,” or where it “is outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1)”). 

A party may request the production of any document within the scope of Rule 26(b). 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a). “For each item or category, the response must either state that inspection 

and related activities will be permitted as requested or state with specificity the grounds for 

objecting to the request, including the reasons.” Id. at 34(b)(2)(B). The responding party is 

responsible for all items in “the responding party’s possession, custody, or control.” Id. at 

34(a)(1). Actual possession, custody or control is not required. Rather, “[a] party may be 

ordered to produce a document in the possession of a non-party entity if that party has a legal 

right to obtain the document or has control over the entity who is in possession of the 

document.” Soto v. City of Concord, 162 F.R.D. 603, 619 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 

DISCUSSION 

 Plaintiff seeks an order from the Court permitting her to conduct additional limited general 

discovery regarding literature and medical studies that were published after the MDL closed. 

MTC at 4. Specifically, Plaintiff seeks to serve the following Requests for Production (“RFPs”) 

on Defendants 

All documents that evince, relate, or refer to any review or analysis conducted by 

anyone at Bard or anyone acting on its behalf of any medical studies or literature 

relating to IVC filters that were published or otherwise came to Bard’s attention 

after February 3, 2017. 

[] All documents that evince, relate, or refer to any communications, internally or 

externally, by anyone at Bard or anyone acting on its behalf regarding any medical 

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studies or literature relating to IVC filters that were published or otherwise came 

to Bard’s attention after February 3, 2017. 

[] All documents that evince, relate, or refer to any actions taken by Bard or anyone 

acting its behalf in response to any medical studies or literature relating to IVC 

filters that were published or otherwise came to Bard’s attention after February 3, 

2017. 

MTC at Exh. A. Plaintiff explains that depending upon the responses received, she may want to 

depose key defense witnesses who were “involved in Bard’s review and analysis of, 

communications about, and responses to post-February 2017 medical studies relating to IVC 

filters.” Id. at 4. This would likely require two or three depositions. Id. Plaintiff argues that 

the additional discovery is warranted because it is relevant to allegations regarding design 

defect, failure to warn, and punitive damages. Id. at 5-6. Plaintiff notes that the requested 

discovery is narrow, required under Defendants’ duty to supplement its responses to discovery 

served in the MDL, and not prohibited by Judge Campbell’s MDL order. Id. at 9. 

 Defendants contend that Plaintiff has failed to establish good cause to reopen discovery 

and notes that Plaintiff could have raised this issue prior to the October 2019 remand order or 

before the MDL bellwether trials, but chose not to do so. Oppo. at 6. Defendants also contend 

that the transfer order is clear that general discovery has closed and the District Court should 

only be concerned with case specific discovery as evidenced by Judge Campbell’s interpretation 

of the transfer order and the “overwhelming majority of District Courts” that have considered 

the issue and declined to re-open general discovery. Id. at 8-9. Finally, Defendants contend 

that (1) Plaintiff’s request is contrary to the Law of the Case Doctrine, (2) re-opening general 

discovery defeats the purpose of the MDL, (3) Plaintiff’s request is not proportional to the needs 

of the case, (4) Plaintiff has failed to make the requisite showing to compel supplemental 

responses under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e), and (5) Defendants’ knowledge and response to new 

studies about the efficacy and safety of IVC filters is neither unique nor relevant to Plaintiff’s 

claims. Id. at 10-18. 

Plaintiff replies that (1) her request is narrowly tailored, (2) Judge Campbell’s remand 

order permits additional general discovery with good cause, (3) two other District Courts in 

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Missouri have recently agreed with Plaintiff’s position and ordered additional general discovery, 

and (4) the evidence she seeks is very relevant to her design defect claims, the risk benefit 

analysis performed by Defendants, and the impeachment of Defendants regarding the efficacy 

of the IVC filters. 

A. Judge Campbell’s Remand Order 

While the Court agrees that Judge Campbell’s remand order does not restrict the Court’s 

ability to permit additional general discovery for good cause, the Court finds Judge Campbell’s 

conclusion that “general fact and expert discovery [was] completed in the MDL” and that the 

Court “need not be concerned with facilitating general expert, corporate, and third-party 

discovery” to be persuasive and further finds that Plaintiff has not demonstrated good cause for 

disregarding those conclusions. The Court notes that due to the nature of scientific studies and 

research, general discovery of the type Plaintiff seeks could be never-ending as the potential for 

new studies and research always remains. In sum, Judge Campbell’s order supports a ruling 

denying Plaintiff’s motion. 

B. Plaintiff has not Demonstrated Good Cause for Reopening Discovery 

Typically when a party seeks to reopen discovery or to modify a scheduling order, the 

party must provide good cause for the relief. The primary factor courts consider in making a 

good cause determination is whether the moving party was diligent in its attempts to complete 

discovery in a timely manner. Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th 

Cir. 1992). There are several factors a court may consider in deciding whether to reopen 

discovery: “1) whether trial is imminent, 2) whether the request is opposed, 3) whether the nonmoving party would be prejudiced, 4) whether the moving party was diligent in obtaining 

discovery within the guidelines established by the court, 5) the foreseeability of the need for 

additional discovery in light of the time allowed for discovery by the district court, and 6) the 

likelihood that the discovery will lead to relevant evidence.” City of Pomona v. SQM N. Am. 

Corp., 866 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 2017). “Whether to reopen discovery rests in the court's 

sound discretion.” Bleek v. Supervalu, Inc., 95 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1120 (D. Mont. 2000) (citing 

U.S. ex rel. Schumer, 63 F.3d at 1526). 

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While the instant matter is unusual because the period for all discovery has not expired 

[see ECF No. 17], the period for general discovery has expired and the Court finds the standard 

for reopening discovery to be relevant and useful to the Court’s analysis of Plaintiff’s motion. 

Here, Plaintiff has not demonstrated good cause for reopening general discovery. General 

discovery in the MDL closed on February 3, 2017. MTC at 3. Plaintiff, whose counsel was part 

of the Plaintiff’s Steering Committee during the MDL, seeks general discovery related to scientific 

articles and studies addressing the efficacy of IVC filters published after February 2017. Id.; 

see also Oppo. at 6 n.1. The most recent of these articles was published in July 2019. MTC at 

3. The instant matter was not remanded to this Court until October 2019. ECF No. 3. Prior to 

transfer there were two bellwether trials in the MDL in 2018 and 2019. Oppo. at 6. It appears 

that despite the fact that most if not all of the articles Plaintiff now seeks were published before 

this case was remanded, Plaintiff never requested that discovery be reopened in the MDL. 

Plaintiff does not address this failure except to say 

The situation Plaintiff raises here—discovery relating to narrow, relevant evidence 

that did not exist prior to the close of MDL general fact discovery and could not 

have been discovered in the MDL as a result—provides good cause to permit this 

limited discovery 

Reply at 2. It is unclear to the Court why Plaintiff could not have motioned to reopen discovery 

in the MDL but can do so now, and Plaintiff does not provide any argument, law, or explanation 

for this position. What is clear, is that waiting anywhere from six months to three years to seek 

the reopening of discovery does not demonstrate that Plaintiff “diligently pursued its previous 

discovery opportunities.” Lexington Ins. Co. v. Scott Homes Multifamily, Inc., 2015 WL 751204, 

at *5 (D. Ariz. Feb. 23, 2015) (finding that plaintiff was not diligent in pursuing discovery where 

it learned of additional evidence after the close of discovery but did not motion to reopen 

discovery until four months after the close of discovery). Additionally, most of the factors do 

not support reopening discovery because the request is opposed, Defendant would be 

prejudiced if general discovery is reopened, and Plaintiff was not diligent in seeking the 

additional discovery after learning of its existence. With regard to factor six, Plaintiff has not 

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established that the 2017-2019 studies and Defendants’ knowledge of and response to them are 

relevant to Plaintiff’s claims, are not duplicative or cumulative of earlier studies, and cannot be 

included via expert reports. As such, this factor is neutral. The only clear factor in favor of 

reopening discovery is that trial is not imminent. ECF No. 17 at 7 (Pretrial conference scheduled 

for February 22, 2021 at which time the trial date will be set). Accordingly, the Court finds 

that Plaintiff has not established good cause to reopen general discovery. 

C. Defendants’ Duty to Supplement Its Responses 

Plaintiff argues that Defendants have a duty under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e) to supplement 

their discovery responses. MTC at 7; see also Reply at 4. Plaintiff argues that as part of its 

production of documents during general discovery in the MDL, Defendants produced internal 

communications analyzing medical literature about the safety of the IVC filters, but have failed 

to provide any similar additional information since February 2017. MTC at 3. Plaintiff notes that 

her expert reports were based on the medical literature at the time and on the general discovery 

that took place during the MDL. Id. Because new articles and studies have been published 

since the close of general discovery in the MDL, Defendants should be required to supplement 

their production with the reviews, analyses, and internal communications regarding those new 

studies. Id. at 3-4. Plaintiff does not provide any law or citations in support of her position. 

MTC. 

Defendants contend that “supplementation is only required if the new information renders 

the prior responses materially ‘incomplete or incorrect’” which is not the case here and is not 

something Plaintiff has shown. Oppo. at 13. Defendants further contend that Plaintiff is 

attempting to use the supplementation requirement “as a device to end run discovery cut-offs 

and create an endless, costly and disproportional discovery burden on Defendants.” Id. 

Defendants note that supplementation of this type will “indefinitely postpone trial as every newly 

published study of even the most marginal relevance will necessitate a new round of discovery 

into [Defendant’s] knowledge and analysis of that study” which is not “practical, proportional, 

or fair.” Id. at 14. In support of their position, Defendants cite to Dong AH Tire & Rubber Co. 

v. Glasforms, Inc., 2008 WL 4786671, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2008). The Court in Dong 

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reasoned 

The duty to supplement under Rule 26(e)(1) is directed to documents generated 

during the relevant time frame previously not produced but subsequently 

discovered. To say that the duty to supplement covers documents generated after 

that date would render meaningless any delineated time period for production. 

Consequently, despite defendants’ reference to Rule 26(e)(1), nothing in that rule 

imposes a never ending obligation to produce documents continuously as they are 

created, ....” 

Id. at *2. 

Plaintiff replies that “Defendants have a duty under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(e) 

to supplement their discovery responses” but does not address Defendant’s argument or cited 

cases. Reply. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e) states that 

(1) In General. A party who has made a disclosure under Rule 26(a)--or 

who has responded to an interrogatory, request for production, or request 

for admission--must supplement or correct its disclosure or response: 

(A) in a timely manner if the party learns that in some material 

respect the disclosure or response is incomplete or incorrect, and if 

the additional or corrective information has not otherwise been made 

known to the other parties during the discovery process or in writing; 

or 

(B) as ordered by the court. 

(2) Expert Witness. For an expert whose report must be disclosed under 

Rule 26(a)(2)(B), the party's duty to supplement extends both to 

information included in the report and to information given during the 

expert's deposition. Any additions or changes to this information must be 

disclosed by the time the party's pretrial disclosures under Rule 26(a)(3) 

are due. 

“[T]o to trigger the duty to supplement, a party’s initial disclosures must, in some respect, be 

incomplete or incorrect.” Seidman v. American Family Mutual Insurance Company, 2016 WL 

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9735768, at *2 (D. Colo., May 26, 2016). Here, there is no evidence that Defendants’ prior 

disclosures or productions were incomplete or incorrect. Defendants produced general discovery 

that included its “internal communications and analysis of medical literature regarding the safety 

and efficacy of [Defendants’] own filters.” MTC at 3. That discovery was based on Defendants’ 

understanding of the information and studies Defendants had available to them at the relevant 

time. Subsequent studies do not render Defendants’ analyses incorrect or incomplete as the 

analyses were dictated by the studies available at the time the analyses were made. While 

Defendants must of course abide by the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e) throughout this 

case, Plaintiff has not established that Defendants have any duty to supplement in this instance. 

Furthermore, as the cases cited by Defendants note, Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e) is not intended to 

create never ending discovery obligations or continuous rolling discovery. Oppo. at 13 (citing 

Our Children's Earth v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 2015 WL 12964638, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 

2015) (noting that “the duty to supplement under Rule 26(e) does not automatically supersede 

the fact discovery cutoff as to developments thereafter that relate to prior requests for discovery 

made before the cutoff” and that “endless rolling production would undermine” the just, speedy, 

and inexpensive determination of cases and the need of proportionate discovery) and Kuhns v. 

City of Allentown, 2010 WL 4236873, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 26, 2010) (noting that to allow 

supplementation “would be to invite rolling discovery in a way that would unfairly burden 

[Defendant] and indefinitely postpone trial”)). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to compel the 

discovery under this theory is DENIED. 

CONCLUSION 

In light of Judge Campbell’s order and Plaintiff’s failure to demonstrate good cause for 

reopening general fact discovery, Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED. However, the Court recognizes 

that the medical literature and studies published after 2017 may be relevant to expert opinions 

in this case. As a result, the Court agrees with the reasoning of other courts that have resolved 

this issue by allowing limited additional expert discovery. See Oppo. at Exh. 3 (Caldera v. C.R. 

Bard Incorporated, et al., Case No. CV19-4266-PHX (DGC) Case Management Order Dated 

January 10, 2020) and Exh. 8. (Chessman v. C.R. Bard Incorporated, et al., Case No. 

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19CV04014-AT, Wiley v. C.R. Bard Incorporated, et al., Case No. 19CV04766-AT, Scholten v. 

C.R. Bard Incorporated, et al., 19CV04756-AT, and Wondimagegnehu v. C.R. Bard Incorporated, 

et al., 19CV04754-AT, Scheduling Order Dated December 20, 2019). Accordingly, while the 

Court DENIES Plaintiff’s request to reopen general discovery, the parties are permitted to 

supplement their expert reports with information obtained from medical literature published 

after February 3, 2017 and before June 26, 2020 and each party may take a supplemental expert 

deposition of any expert who is going to testify about subsequent studies. This authorization 

does not constitute a ruling on the admissibility of this evidence at trial. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 2/20/2020 

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