Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-93-01017/USCOURTS-ca10-93-01017-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 720
Nature of Suit: Labor Management Relations Act
Cause of Action: 

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PUBLISH FILBlJ 

United States Courft <]( .~ p;JAAh Tenth Circuit · · · ·· 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

LESLIE V. NELSON, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

HOLMES FREIGHT LINES, INC., and 

INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF 

TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, 

WAREHOUSEMEN, AND HELPERS OF 

AMERICA, LOCAL UNION NO. 17, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

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No. 93-1017 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Colorado 

(D.C. No. 92-B-700) 

OCTO 7 1994 

Jeffrey Menter, Greenwood Village, Colorado, for PlaintiffAppellant. 

R. Keith Hotle, Davis, Graham & Stubbs, (Thomas P. Johnson and 

Katherine A. Cvengros, with him on the briefs), Denver, Colorado, 

for Defendant-Appellee Holmes Freight Lines, Inc. 

Steven M. Segall, Lakewood, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee 

International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local Union No. 17. 

Before MOORE, Circuit Judge, and McWILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge, 

and COOK, 1 Senior District Judge. 

COOK, Senior District Judge. 

1 The Honorable H. Dale Cook, Senior District Judge, United 

states District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, 

sitting by designation. 

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Appellate Case: 93-1017 Document: 01019280428 Date Filed: 10/07/1994 Page: 1 
Appellant challenges the trial court's grant of summary 

judgment to defendants, in which the trial court found that the 

uncontroverted evidence did not support appellant's hybrid 

§301/breach of fair representation claims against the defendants. 

Finding no error in the trial court's determination, we affirm. 

I. 

Appellant was employed as a truck driver by defendant-appellee 

Holmes Freight Lines, Inc. ("Holmes") , a trucking company. The 

International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, 

and Helpers of America, Union, Local No. 17 (the "union") is 

appellant's designated representative under a collective bargaining 

agreement between Holmes and the union. 

On the night of October 14, 1991, a Holmes security guard 

witnessed appellant removing six jars of mustard from a box near a 

dumpster, and placing the jars in his lunch pail. The guard also 

saw appellant moving another case of mustard jars away from the 

dumpster and stowing that box under a nearby truck. The appellant 

stated that he believed that the boxes of mustard jars were in or 

near the dumpster because they were "salvage" goods, which could be 

removed from the dumpster by Holmes employees for their personal 

use. 

The guard notified a Holmes manager, Larry Baker ("Baker") , of 

appellant's actions. Baker investigated the boxes containing the 

mustard jars and ascertained from the Holmes supervisor on duty 

that night that appellant had not been given permission to remove 

the mustard jars, and that the jars were not "salvage" goods. 

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Based upon his investigation, Baker believed that appellant had 

stolen the mustard jars. 

On the next morning, October 15, 1991, the union steward, Gary 

Heitzman ("Heitzman"), contacted the Union business agent, Albert 

Mares ("Mares"), and asked Mares to come to Holmes' facility to 

deal with a labor problem. Upon Mares' arrival at Holmes, Baker 

told Mares that appellant had stolen some mustard jars. Mares then 

made his own investigation of Baker's allegations, interviewing 

other Holmes employees about the alleged theft. 

When appellant arrived for work at Holmes later that day, he 

met with Baker, Mares and Heitzman in Baker's office. Baker 

informed appellant of his belief that appellant had stolen the 

mustard jars, and offered to allow appellant to resign rather than 

face immediate discharge for dishonesty. 2 Mares and Heitzman then 

went with appellant to the dumpster, where appellant repeated his 

belief that the jars were "salvage" goods, available for Holmes' 

employees to take. From his previous investigation that morning, 

Mares accepted appellant's belief that the jars were "salvage" 

goods, and attempted to convince Baker that the jars were such. 

Baker remained convinced that the mustard jars were not "salvage" 

and stated that if appellant did not agree to resign, that 

appellant would be charged with the theft of the jars. Mares then 

took appellant to another room to discuss the situation privately. 

Upon entering the room, appellant announced to Mares that he 

2 The collective bargaining agreement provides in Article 

46 that "dishonesty" is a ground for discharge without warning 

notice. 

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Appellate Case: 93-1017 Document: 01019280428 Date Filed: 10/07/1994 Page: 3 
would resign rather than having a criminal record. Although Mares 

informed appellant that he could not advise appellant whether or 

not to resign, Mares stated that if he were in appellant's 

position, he would not resign. Mares also told appellant that he 

would file a grievance on appellant's behalf, whether appellant 

resigned or was discharged. 

The collective bargaining agreement between Holmes and the 

union provides that an employee's exclusive remedy for an 

employer's alleged breach of the agreement is to have the dispute 

heard before a grievance panel known as the Joint State Committee. 

The decision of the panel is final and binding upon the company and 

the employee. This grievance procedure in the agreement addresses 

situations involving discharge only; situations involving 

resignations or "constructive discharge" as alleged by appellant 

are not addressed in the agreement. 

After appellant resigned from Holmes, the union processed his 

grievance, which resulted in the matter being brought before the 

grievance panel specified in the collective bargaining agreement, 

the Colorado-Wyoming Joint State Committee. That committee heard 

appellant's grievance against Holmes on November 6, 1991. The 

union, through Mares, represented appellant at that proceeding. 

The Joint Committee determined that appellant's grievance was 

improperly before it, since appellant had resigned, rather than 

being discharged from Holmes. 

Appellant then filed this action in the U.S. District Court 

for the District of Colorado, alleging that Holmes had breached the 

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Appellate Case: 93-1017 Document: 01019280428 Date Filed: 10/07/1994 Page: 4 
collective bargaining agreement by forcing appellant to resign. 

Appellant also alleged that the union had breached its duty of fair 

representation to him, by Mares' failure to properly inform 

appellant that his grievance rights would be forfeited if appellant 

resigned, rather than be discharged. The district court determined 

that appellant had failed to demonstrate the union's breach of fair 

representation and granted summary judgment to Holmes and the union 

on all claims of appellant's complaint. 3 

II. 

We review the district court's entry of summary judgment de 

novo, applying the same standard used by the district court. 

Applied Genetics Int'l, Inc. v. First Affiliated Sec., Inc., 912 

F.2d 1238, 1241 (lOth Cir. 1990). We view the record and all 

inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party 

opposing the motions for summary judgment. Deepwater Inv. , Ltd. v. 

Jackson Hole Ski Corp., 938 F.2d 1105, 1110 (lOth cir. 1991). 

However, the mere existence of an alleged factual dispute will not 

defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 u.s. 242, 256 (1986). 

Appellant's suit may be characterized as a "hybrid" action 

3 In his second amended complaint, appellant listed a third 

claim for relief which alleged that Holmes had blacklisted 

appellant and prevented him from being hired by other employers, in 

violation of Colorado state law, C.R.S. §8-2-114. The Magistrate 

Judge in his recommendation to the district court found that that 

Colorado statute provided no private right of action to appellant. 

Appellant did not object to the Magistrate Judge's recommendation 

and the district court adopted the Magistrate Judge's 

recommendation to dismiss the blacklisting claim. On appeal, 

appellant has not contested the dismissal of the blacklisting 

claim. 

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Appellate Case: 93-1017 Document: 01019280428 Date Filed: 10/07/1994 Page: 5 
under §301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (29 u.s.c. §185). 

In a hybrid action, an employee's claims are directed against both 

the former employer and the union, and allege a violation of the 

collective bargaining agreement by the employer and a breach of the 

duty of fair representation by the union. Mock v. T.G.& Y. Stores 

Co., 971 F.2d 522, 530 {lOth Cir. 1992). Although the claims 

against the employer and the union are "inextricably 

interdependent," DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 

462 u.s. 151, 164-65 (1983), the appellant must establish the 

failure of the union to fulfill its duty of fair representation to 

succeed in his hybrid action. Mock, 971 F.2d at 531. 

A breach of the duty of fair representation occurs when the 

union's conduct toward the employee is "arbitrary, discriminatory, 

or in bad faith." Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967). In 

Aguinaga v. United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l Union, 993 F.2d 

1463 (lOth Cir. 1993), we noted the limited scope of arbitrariness 

and discrimination as applied to actions by the union: 

A union's actions are arbitrary only if, "in light of the 

factual and legal landscape at the time of the union's 

actions, the union's behavior is so far outside a "wide range 

of reasonableness" as to be irrational. A union's 

discriminatory conduct violates its duty of fair 

representation if it is "invidious." 

Id. at 1470 (quoting Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l. v. O'Neill, 499 

u.s. 65, 67 & 81 (1991). Acts by the union which are merely 

negligent do not state a claim for breach of a duty of fair 

representation. United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v. 

Rawson, 495 U.S. 362, 372-373 (1990). 

In his second amended complaint, appellant appears only to 

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Appellate Case: 93-1017 Document: 01019280428 Date Filed: 10/07/1994 Page: 6 
charge the union with arbitrary and discriminatory actions in 

handling his grievance. No allegation of bad faith on the part of 

the union is evident in appellant's second amended complaint. 4 On 

appeal, appellant contends that Mares' failure to apprise appellant 

of the loss of the grievance procedure upon appellant's resignation 

from Holmes breached the duty of fair representation. Appellant 

also asserts that the union, through Mares, failed to make a 

reasonable investigation regarding resignations under the 

collective bargaining agreement, before allowing appellant to 

resign from Holmes. 

However, appellant has not pointed to any specific fact to 

convince us that Mares' failure to ascertain the resignation and 

grievance procedures aspect of the collective bargaining agreement 

was either arbitrary or discriminatory. Even at the time of his 

deposition in this action, Mares still believed that he could bring 

a grievance on behalf of an employee who resigned. Mares testified 

in his deposition that with 25 years of service with the union, he 

had never had to deal with a discharge grievance, much less a 

4 Appellant alleges in his second amended complaint that 

the union acted "perfunctorily" in its handling of his grievance, 

thereby breaching its duty of fair representation. In Vaca v. 

Sipes, 386 u.s. 171 (1967), the Supreme Court recognized that "a 

union may not arbitrarily ignore a meritorious grievance or process 

it in perfunctory fashion." Id. at 191. In Poole v. Budd Co., 706 

F.2d 181 (6th Cir. 1983), the Sixth Circuit stated that a union 

acts arbitrarily only if "it handles a grievance in a 'perfunctory' 

manner, with caprice or without rational e~planation." Id. at 183. 

From our review of the record, we cannot agree with appellant that 

the union handled his grievance in a perfunctory manner. To the 

contrary, the record shows a prompt and diligent effort by the 

union business agent, Mares, to have appellant's grievance heard 

and decided by the panel. 

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Appellate Case: 93-1017 Document: 01019280428 Date Filed: 10/07/1994 Page: 7 
situation involving a resignation. In his deposition testimony and 

his statements on the record to the grievance panel in his 

representation of appellant's grievance, Mares appeared completely 

sympathetic and supportive of appellant's position. Mares also 

told appellant that he would not resign if he were appellant. 

Mares obviously erred in his assessment of the collective 

bargaining agreement's provisions, but appellant has not shown that 

Mares did so arbitrarily or to discriminate against appellant. 

From our review of the facts, we can only conclude Mares' 

interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement was 

erroneous. Even if the error were negligent, such negligence does 

not support a claim for breach of the union's duty of fair 

representation. 

Appellant also contends on appeal that the facts in this case 

present a jury question as to the alleged breach of the duty of 

fair representation, which precluded the district court's grant of 

summary judgment and dismissal of the case. However, appellant has 

not identified a specific factual issue, nor pointed to a single 

fact which might even suggest the presence of a factual issue. The 

record shows no past practices or conduct of the union as to the 

handling of discharges or "constructive discharges" grievances from 

which we could conclude that the union treated appellant's 

grievance arbitrarily or discriminatorily. Appellant admits in his 

brief that he, as the non-moving party, must set forth specific 

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. We find 

that appellant has not done so, and thus the district court 

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Appellate Case: 93-1017 Document: 01019280428 Date Filed: 10/07/1994 Page: 8 
properly entered summary judgment against him on his §301 hybrid 

action. 

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the 

district court. 

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