Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-00591/USCOURTS-caed-2_01-cv-00591-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

AARON L. LEWIS,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-01-0591 FCD JFM P

vs.

ERNEST ROE, Warden,

Respondent. ORDER

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for a writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On May 13, 2005, petitioner filed a motion for release on

bond and/or his own personal recognizance pending a decision on his petition. 

It is firmly established that it is within the inherent power of a district court to

enlarge a state prisoner on bond pending hearing and decision on his application for a writ of

habeas corpus. See e.g., In re Wainwright, 518 F.2d 173, 174 (5th Cir. 1975); United States ex

rel. Thomas v. New Jersey, 472 F.2d 735, 743 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 878 (1973);

Woodcock v. Donnelly, 470 F.2d 93, 94 (1st Cir. 1972) (per curiam). However, the bail standard

for a person seeking collateral review is markedly different from the standard applied to a pretrial

detainee. Persons accused of crimes and awaiting trial are presumed innocent and thus enjoy an

Eighth Amendment right to be free from excessive bail. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951). In

contrast, a habeas corpus petitioner requesting postconviction relief has already been convicted

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 But see Land v. Deeds, 878 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1989) (defining test as requiring either 1

special circumstances or a high probability of success) (citing Aronson v. May, 85 S. Ct. 3, 5

(1964)). Although the test in Land appears to be different because it requires either special

circumstances or a high probability of success, whereas Benson appears to require both prongs,

Land was not an en banc decision, and cannot overrule another panel. Possibly, Land’s use of

the word “or” was inadvertent. Therefore, Benson remains good law especially in light of

Aronson.

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and thus is no longer presumed innocent and no longer enjoys a constitutional right to freedom,

however conditional. Aronson v. May, 85 S. Ct. 3 (1964) (Douglas, J., in chambers); Glynn v.

Donnelly, 470 F.2d 95, 98 (1st Cir. 1972).

In a Ninth Circuit case decided prior to Aronson, it was held that:

It would not be appropriate for us at this stage of the proceeding to

enlarge this petitioner on bail even if we found that the allegations

of his petition for habeas corpus made out a clear case for his

release. Something more than that is required before we would be

justified in granting bail. (Emphasis added.) (Footnote omitted.)

Benson v. California, 328 F.2d 159, 162 (9th Cir. 1964). In Aronson, which cites the Ninth

Circuit’s decision in Benson, an applicant requested bail pending appeal from the denial of his

petition for writ of habeas corpus. Justice Douglas set forth the following guidelines for

determining when a habeas corpus petitioner could be released on bail:

In this kind of case it is therefore necessary to inquire whether, in

addition to there being substantial questions presented by the

appeal, there is some circumstance making this application

exceptional and deserving of special treatment in the interests of

justice. See Benson v. California, 328 F.2d 159 (9th Cir. 1964).

Aronson, 85 S. Ct. at 5 (emphasis added). Thus, Aronson requires a petitioner to demonstrate

that his underlying claim raises substantial questions and that his case presents exceptional

circumstances.1

Moreover, a number of cases interpreting the first test of the Aronson analysis

have required that petitioner's claims be more than substantial. See, e.g., Calley v. Callaway, 496

F.2d 701, 702 (5th Cir. 1974) (per curiam) (bail should be granted to a military prisoner pending

post-conviction relief only when petitioner raises substantial constitutional claims upon which he

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has a high probability of success and when extraordinary or exceptional circumstances exist);

Glynn v. Donnelly, 470 F.2d 95, 98 (1st Cir. 1972) (court will not grant bail unless petitioner

presents not only a clear case on the law but a readily apparent case on the facts); see also

Richardson v. Wilhelm, 587 F. Supp. 24, 25 (D. Nev. 1984); Monroe v. State Court of Fulton

County, 560 F. Supp. 542, 545 (N.D. Ga. 1983).

Courts have also narrowly construed the second test of the Aronson analysis;

namely, that petitioner show that his case presents exceptional circumstances justifying relief. 

See Calley, 496 F.2d at 702. Exceptional circumstances may be found and, in the court’s

discretion, warrant a petitioner’s release on bail where: (1) petitioner’s health is seriously

deteriorating while he is incarcerated, Woodcock v. Donnelly, 470 F.2d 93 (1st Cir. 1972) (per

curiam); Johnston v. Marsh, 227 F.2d 528 (3rd Cir. 1955); (2) there is an extraordinary delay in

the processing of a petition, Glynn, 470 F.2d at 95; and (3) the petitioner’s sentence would be

completed before meaningful collateral review could be had, Boyer v. City of Orlando, 402 F.2d

966 (5th Cir. 1968) (bail granted where court concluded petitioner should present claims to state

courts, despite state courts’ precedents denying relief for his claim, and feared petitioner’s

sentence would run before exhaustion could be completed); see also Goodman v. Ault, 358 F.

Supp. 743 (N.D. Ga. 1973).

For the reasons set forth in the findings and recommendations issued concurrently

with this order, petitioner’s claims are without merit. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED

that petitioner’s May 13, 2005 motion for release on bond and/or his own recognizance is denied.

DATED: June 16, 2005.

12;lewi0591.113

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