Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02155/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02155-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ALEXANDER KOLESNIKOV, SR., et 

al., 

 Plaintiffs, 

 v. 

SACRAMENTO COUNTY, et al., 

 

 Defendants. 

______________________________/

No. Civ. S-06-2155 RRB EFB 

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

AND ORDER

Alexander Kolesnikov, Sr., et al. (collectively 

“Plaintiffs”) brought an action against the County of Sacramento 

(“County”) and various state and county law enforcement officers 

(collectively “officers”) alleging civil rights violations and 

state law claims arising out of a warrantless home entry and 

arrest of Sergey Kolesnikov (“Sergey”) and Alexander Kolesnikov, 

Jr. (“Alexander”). Plaintiffs now move for summary 

adjudication. The officers filed cross-motions for summary 

adjudication. For the reasons stated below, Plaintiffs’ motion 

is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, and the officers’ crossmotions are GRANTED.1

 

1

 Inasmuch as the court concludes the parties have submitted 

memoranda thoroughly discussing the law and evidence in support 

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I. BACKGROUND 

On September 21, 2005, California Highway Patrol Officer 

(“CHP”) Don Ackley (“Officer Ackley”) observed Alexander riding 

an off-road quad vehicle (“ATV”) without a helmet. Pls.’ 

Undisputed Material Fact (“UMF”) ¶¶ 1-2, 10.2 When Officer 

Ackley attempted to effectuate a traffic stop by turning on his 

overhead lights and instructing Alexander to pull over with his 

public address system, Alexander fled into an undeveloped field. 

Id. ¶¶ 4-5, 7; Defs.’ Supplemental Undisputed Facts (“SUMF”) ¶¶ 

1, 2. A pursuit ensued and Officer Ackley requested backup, 

including the assistance of a CHP airplane, which ultimately 

directed law enforcement officers to the Kolesnikov residence. 

Id. ¶ 8, 15-16, 26. 

 CHP Officer Steven Johnson (“Officer Johnson”) was the 

first officer to arrive at the Kolesnikov residence, arriving 

just in time to observe the garage door closing. Pls.’ UMF ¶¶ 

26-28. Officer Johnson knocked on the front door, and when no 

 

of their positions, it further concludes oral argument is 

neither necessary nor warranted with regard to the instant 

matter. See Mahon v. Credit Bureau of Placer County, Inc., 171 

F.3d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1999)(explaining that if the parties 

provided the district court with complete memoranda of the law 

and evidence in support of their positions, ordinarily oral 

argument would not be required). 

2

 The material facts relevant to this motion are largely 

undisputed. 

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one answered, he entered. Id. ¶ 29. Shortly thereafter, 

Sacramento County Deputy Sheriff Matt Tallman (“Deputy 

Tallman”), Sacramento County Sergeant Gary Shintaku (“Sergeant 

Shintaku”), Sacramento County Deputy Sheriff Michael Hulsey 

(“Deputy Hulsey”) and Officer Ackley all entered the Kolesnikov 

residence. Id. ¶¶ 30, 37, 42, 48, 116.3 None of the officers 

possessed a warrant, nor did any of the officers attempt to 

secure a warrant prior to entering the residence. 

 Upon entering the Kolesnikov residence, Officer Johnson 

immediately went to the garage where he discovered the ATV. 

Pls.’ UMF ¶ 61. Officer Johnson then went back inside where he 

encountered Alexander Kolesnikov, Sr., who informed him that 

Alexander was the driver of the ATV and that he was upstairs. 

Id. ¶¶ 62-64. As Officer Johnson ascended the stairs, he 

observed an individual peak out from behind a door and then 

close it. Id. ¶ 69. Officer Johnson knocked on this door (a 

bathroom) and advised the individual inside to open it. Id.

¶ 70. When no response was forthcoming, Officer Johnson opened 

the door. Id. ¶¶ 71-72. The individual inside, Sergey, told 

Officer Johnson to “get the fuck out” and kicked the door shut. 

Id. ¶¶ 72, 74. At this time, Officer Johnson observed Alexander 

 

3

 According to Deputy Hulsey, he and Sergeant Shintaku 

followed Deputy Tallman and Officers Ackley and Johnson into the 

Kolesnikov residence. Hulsey Dep. at 21:7-11. 

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coming out of a bedroom. Id. ¶ 75. Officer Johnson immediately 

apprehended Alexander and handcuffed him, with the assistance of 

Deputy Tallman, who allegedly struck Alexander once or twice 

with a closed fist. Id. ¶¶ 76, 86. 

While Alexander was being handcuffed, Officer Tallman 

informed Deputy Hulsey and Sergeant Shintaku that another 

suspect was in the bathroom. Pls.’ UMF ¶¶ 88, 118. Deputy 

Hulsey and Sergeant Shintaku subsequently went to the bathroom 

and advised Sergey to stop resisting and to come out. Id. ¶¶ 

98, 104, 123. Sergey refused, telling the officers to “fuck 

off” and to get out of the house. Id. ¶ 124. When Deputy 

Hulsey and Sergeant Shintaku attempted to enter the bathroom, a 

pushing match with the door ensued. Id. ¶ 103. Ultimately, 

Deputy Hulsey and Sergeant Shintaku forced their way into the 

bathroom, placed Sergey on the floor, and handcuffed him. Id.

¶¶ 105, 122, 125, 127. As Sergey was being handcuffed, he was 

allegedly kicked and struck with a Taser weapon by Sergeant 

Shintaku. Id. ¶¶ 106-107. After Sergy was handcuffed, he was 

escorted outside by Sergeant Shintaku and Deputy Hulsey. Id. ¶ 

132. On the way outside, Deputy Hulsey pulled his service 

revolver and pointed it at Sergey’s mother, father and other 

siblings who were screaming in Russian. Id. ¶¶ 134-135. Deputy 

Hulsey claims that he took this action for the purpose of 

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protecting his life, his partner’s life and Sergey’s life. Id.

¶ 135. 

 Alexander was subsequently released to his parents after 

being cited for the following violations: (1) violation of 

Vehicle Code § 23103, misdemeanor reckless driving;4 (2) 

violation of Vehicle Code § 2800.1, misdemeanor evading;5 (3) 

violation of Penal Code § 148(a), misdemeanor resisting arrest;6

and (4) violation of Vehicle Code § 27803(b), an infraction for 

 

4

 California Vehicle Code § 23103(a) provides: “A person who 

drives a vehicle upon a highway in willful or wanton disregard 

for the safety of persons or property is guilty of reckless 

driving.” “Persons convicted of the offense of reckless driving 

shall be punished by imprisonment in a county jail for not less 

than five days nor more than 90 days or by a fine of not less 

than one hundred forty-five dollars ($145) nor more than one 

thousand dollars ($1,000), or by both that fine and 

imprisonment, except as provided in Section 23104 or 23105.” 

Cal. Veh. Code § 23103(c). 

 

5

 California Vehicle Code § 2800.1 provides in pertinent 

part: “Any person who, while operating a motor vehicle and with 

the intent to evade, willfully flees or otherwise attempts to 

elude a pursuing peace officer’s motor vehicle, is guilty of a 

misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for not 

more than one year . . .” 

6

 California Penal Code § 148(a)(1) provides: “Every person 

who willfully resists, delays, or obstructs any public officer, 

peace officer, or an emergency medical technician, as defined in 

Division 2.5 (commencing with Section 1797) of the Health and 

Safety Code, in the discharge or attempt to discharge any duty 

of his or her office or employment, when no other punishment is 

prescribed, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding one 

thousand dollars ($1,000), or by imprisonment in a county jail 

not to exceed one year, or by both that fine and imprisonment.” 

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not wearing a helmet.7 Pls.’ UMF ¶¶ 139-140. On September 28, 

2006, Plaintiffs filed the instant action alleging civil rights 

violations and state law claims. Docket at 1. On January 17, 

2008, Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary adjudication. 

Docket at 39. On February 6, 2008, the officers filed crossmotions for summary adjudication. Docket at 47, 50. 

II. DISCUSSION 

Plaintiffs’ motion for summary adjudication seeks the 

following determinations: (1) the warrantless entry into the 

Kolesnikov residence violated the Fourth Amendment; (2) the 

entry into the Kolesnikov bathroom violated the Fourth 

Amendment; and (3) the officers are not entitled to qualified 

immunity with regard to the warrantless entry claim. The 

officers’ cross-motions for summary adjudication seek a 

determination that the officers are entitled to qualified 

immunity with regard to the warrantless entry claim. These 

issues are discussed individually below. 

A. Legal Standard 

 Rule 56(a) permits a party claiming relief to move for 

summary judgment on all or part of a claim after 20 days from 

 

7

 California Vehicle Code § 27803(b) provides: “It is 

unlawful to operate a motorcycle, motor-driven cycle, or 

motorized bicycle if the driver or any passenger is not wearing 

a safety helmet as required by subdivision (a).” 

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commencement of an action, or after the opposing party serves a 

motion for summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Rule 56(b) 

permits a party against whom a claim has been asserted to “move 

at any time, with or without supporting affidavits, for summary 

judgment on all or part of the claim.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(b). 

Summary judgment is appropriate if “the pleadings, depositions, 

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together 

with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue 

as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 

a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). An 

issue of fact is “genuine” if it constitutes evidence with which 

“a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving 

party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 

(1986). That genuine issue of fact is “material” if it “might 

effect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” See

id. (“As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which 

facts are material. Only disputes over facts that might affect 

the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly 

preclude the entry of summary judgment.”).

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating 

the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex 

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the moving party 

sustains its burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving 

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party to go beyond the pleadings and by his or her own 

affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, 

and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that 

there is a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 

324 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)); Miller v. Glenn Miller 

Productions, Inc., 454 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2006). This 

burden requires more than a simple showing that there is some 

“metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. 

Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 

(1986). The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence is 

likewise insufficient to create a genuine factual dispute. 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. “If the nonmoving party fails to 

produce enough evidence to create a genuine issue of material 

fact, the moving party wins the motion for summary judgment.” 

Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Companies, Inc., 210 F.3d 

1099, 1103 (9th Cir. 2000). “But if the nonmoving party 

produces enough evidence to create a genuine issue of material 

fact, the nonmoving party defeats the motion.” Id.

 On a motion for summary judgment, all reasonable doubt as 

to the existence of a genuine issue of fact should be resolved 

against the moving party. Hector v. Wiens, 533 F.2d 429, 432 

(9th Cir. 1976). The inferences drawn from the underlying facts 

must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing 

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the motion. Valadingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1137 (9th 

Cir. 1989). Where different ultimate inferences may be drawn, 

summary judgment is inappropriate. Sankovich v. Insurance Co. 

of North America, 638 F.2d 136, 140 (9th Cir. 1981). The 

purpose of summary judgment is to “pierce the pleadings and 

assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need 

for trial.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. Thus, “[w]here the 

record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact 

to find for the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for 

trial.’” Id. 

B. Warrantless Entry into the Kolesnikov Residence 

 Plaintiffs argue that the warrantless entry into the 

Kolesnikov residence violated the Fourth Amendment because a 

warrantless intrusion into a private dwelling is presumptively 

unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment and the pursuit of 

Alexander for relatively minor offenses is not an exigent 

circumstance that relieves police officers of the obligation of 

obtaining a warrant. 

 Generally, police may not enter a person’s home to arrest 

him without obtaining a warrant. Fisher v. City of San Jose, 

509 F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir. 2007).8

 “It is axiomatic that the 

 

8

 The Fourth Amendment provides: “The right of the people to 

be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 

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‘physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the 

wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.’ And a principal 

protection against unnecessary intrusions into private dwellings 

is the warrant requirement imposed by the Fourth Amendment on 

agents of the government who seek to enter the home for purposes 

of search or arrest.” Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748 

(1984) (citation omitted); see also Fisher, 509 F.3d at 958 

(observing that at the very core of the Fourth Amendment is the 

right of a man to retreat into his own home and be free from 

unreasonable governmental intrusion); LaLonde v. County of 

Riverside, 204 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting “the home 

is perhaps the most sacrosanct domain and . . . there, Fourth 

Amendment interests are at their strongest”).9

 

 

unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 

no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 

Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 

searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. 

amend. IV. 

9

 “‘The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not 

grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law 

enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable 

men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring 

that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached 

magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the 

often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. Any 

assumption that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate’s 

disinterested determination to issue a search warrant will 

justify the officers in making a search without a warrant would 

reduce the Amendment to a nullity and leave the people’s homes 

secure only in the discretion of police officers. Crime, even 

in the privacy of one’s own quarters, is, of course, of grave 

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It is a basic principle of Fourth Amendment law that 

searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are 

presumptively unreasonable. U.S. v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895, 905 

(9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (citing Payton, 445 U.S. at 586). 

This presumption can be overcome, however, when the police 

confront an exigent circumstance like a fleeing felon. Johnson, 

256 F.3d at 905 (citing Welsh, 466 U.S. at 749-50) (a search or 

seizure carried out on a suspect’s premises without a warrant is 

per se unreasonable, unless the police can show the presence of 

“exigent circumstances”). In these situations, the exigent 

circumstance relieves the police of the obligation of obtaining 

a warrant. Johnson, 256 F.3d at 905; see also Fisher, 509 F.3d 

at 958 (absent exigent circumstances, a police officer may not 

enter a home without a warrant).10 Exigent circumstances do not, 

 

concern to society, and the law allows such crime to be reached 

on proper showing. The right of officers to thrust themselves 

into a home is also a grave concern, not only to the individual 

but to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable security 

and freedom from surveillance. When the right of privacy must 

reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be 

decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or Government 

enforcement agent.’ (Footnotes omitted.)” Payton v. New York, 

445 U.S. 573, 586 n. 24 (1980). 

10 Because an arrest in the home involves not only the 

invasion attendant to all arrests but also an invasion of the 

sanctity of the home, this invasion is too substantial to allow 

without a warrant, at least in the absence of exigent 

circumstances, even when it is accomplished under statutory 

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however, relieve the police of the need to have probable cause 

for the search. Id.11 As a result, when the government relies 

on the exigent circumstances exception, it must prove: (1) that 

the officer had probable cause to search the house; and (2) that 

exigent circumstances justified the warrantless intrusion. Id.12 

Exigent circumstances supporting a warrantless arrest should 

seldom be found. LaLonde, 204 F.3d at 956 (“Supreme Court and 

Ninth Circuit cases have strictly limited the exigency 

exception, especially in the context of warrantless arrests in 

the home.”). Such circumstances are narrowly construed and 

limited to emergency situations demanding an immediate response 

to prevent serious injury to the arresting officers or other 

persons. Id. “The exigency exception can excuse a warrant for 

 

authority and when probable cause is clearly present. Fisher, 

509 F.3d at 959. 

11 Although the probable-cause standard is incapable of 

precise definition, the Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he 

substance of all the definitions of probable cause is a 

reasonable ground for belief of guilt,” and that the belief of 

guilt must be particularized with respect to the person to be 

searched or seized. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 

(2003) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

12 “Because the warrant requirement for in-home arrests is 

based on an understanding of the sanctity of the home, it is 

primarily concerned with entries into a home to effect an 

arrest, not with the seizure of the individual. Thus, ‘the 

critical time for determining whether any exigency exists is the 

moment the officer makes the warrantless entry.’” Fisher, 509 

F.3d at 959 (emphasis in original). 

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an in-home arrest when probable cause exists and there is a 

compelling reason for not obtaining a warrant-for example, a 

need to protect an officer or the public from danger, [a] need 

to avoid the imminent destruction of evidence, when entry in hot 

pursuit is necessary to prevent a criminal suspect’s escape, [or 

a need] to respond to fires or other emergencies.” Fisher, 509 

F.3d at 960 (internal quotation marks omitted and alterations in 

original). Exigent circumstances alone, however, are not enough 

to establish exigency and thereby excuse the warrant 

requirement. Id. “Instead, [w]hen an officer undertakes to act 

as his own magistrate, he ought to be in a position to justify 

it by pointing to some real immediate and serious consequences 

if he postponed action to get a warrant.” Id. (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Consequently, a situation is exigent 

for purposes of permitting an arrest without a warrant only if a 

warrant could not be obtained in time to effect the arrest 

safely-that is, without causing a delay dangerous to the 

officers or to members of the public. Id.13 Where exigency is 

 

13 The Ninth Circuit has emphasized that to come within the 

exigency exception, the government must show both that dangerous 

circumstances existed and that it was infeasible to obtain a 

warrant safely. Fisher, 509 F.3d at 966 (emphasis in original). 

To determine whether dangerous circumstances exist for purposes 

of the exigency exception the following factors are considered: 

(1) whether a grave offense is involved; (2) whether the suspect 

is reasonably believed to be armed; (3) whether there exists a 

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claimed, the government is required to either attempt, in good 

faith, to obtain a warrant or to present evidence explaining why 

a telephone warrant was unavailable or impractical. Id. at 961. 

The United States Supreme Court has recognized the sanctity 

of the home, emphasizing that the exceptions to the warrant 

requirement are few in number and are carefully delineated, and 

that the police bear a heavy burden when attempting to 

demonstrate an urgent need that might justify warrantless 

searches or arrests. Welsh, 466 U.S. at 749-50.14 In Welsh, the 

Court stated that it would be particularly hesitant to find 

exigent circumstances in the context of a warrantless arrest in 

the home where the underlying offense for which there is 

probable cause to arrest is relatively minor. Id. at 750; 

accord Johnson, 256 F.3d at 908 (recognizing that where the 

police are in hot pursuit of defendant who has committed the 

misdemeanor of resisting arrest, the relatively minor nature of 

the offense “weighs heavily against” the reasonableness of a 

warrantless entry onto a suspect’s property based on exigent 

 

clear showing of probable cause; (4) whether there is a strong 

reason to believe that the suspect is in the premises; (5) 

whether there is a likelihood that the suspect will escape; and 

(6) whether peaceable entry is made onto the premises. Id.

14 To meet the “heavy burden” imposed by Welsh, the police 

must set forth specific and articulable facts justifying the 

finding of exigent circumstances. LaLonde, 204 F.3d at 957. 

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circumstances). When the government’s interest is only to 

arrest for a minor offense, the presumption that searches and 

seizures inside a home without a warrant are unreasonable is 

difficult to rebut because the government usually should be 

allowed to make such arrests only with a warrant issued upon 

probable cause by a neutral and detached magistrate. Welsh, 466 

U.S. at 750.15 The government bears the burden of demonstrating 

exigent circumstances that overcome the presumption of 

unreasonableness that attaches to all warrantless home entries. 

Id.; see also United States v. Tarazon, 989 F.2d 1045, 1049 (9th 

Cir. 1993) (“The government bears the burden of showing the 

existence of exigent circumstances by particularized 

evidence.”). 

 In the present case, it is undisputed that the officers 

entered the Kolesnikov residence without a warrant and without 

attempting to obtain a warrant prior to entering the residence. 

Therefore, because it is clear that the officers had probable 

 

15 In Welsh, the Court observed that because the 

government’s interest in a warrantless intrusion is necessarily 

less compelling in cases involving minor offenses, the gravity 

of the underlying offense is “an important factor to be 

considered when determining whether any exigency exists.” 

Welsh, 466 U.S. at 750-53. There, the Court concluded that 

“application of the exigent-circumstances exception in the 

context of a home entry should rarely be sanctioned when there 

is probable cause to believe that only a minor offense . . . has 

been committed.” Id. at 753.

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cause to believe that Alexander had committed several crimes and 

was inside the Kolesnikov residence, the question is whether 

exigent circumstances existed to justify the warrantless entry. 

Based on the record in this case, the court concludes that the 

officers failed to sustain their burden to demonstrate exigent 

circumstances by particularized evidence to overcome the 

presumption of unreasonableness that attaches to all warrantless 

entries. Although it is clear that the officers were in “hot 

pursuit”16 of Alexander, the fact that Alexander was only wanted 

for relatively minor offenses (e.g., misdemeanor reckless 

driving, misdemeanor evading, misdemeanor resisting arrest and 

failure to wear a helmet)17 weighs heavily against a finding of 

exigent circumstances. Thus, while the officers had the right 

to pursue Alexander, they were required, based on the severity 

of the offenses and the lack of dangerous circumstances, to 

attempt to obtain a warrant prior to entering the Kolesnikov 

residence or to present particularized evidence demonstrating 

why a telephone warrant was unavailable or impractical under the 

 

16 See United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43 (1976) 

(hot pursuit means some sort of a chase); Johnson, 256 F.3d at 

907 (hot pursuit means an “immediate” and “continuous” pursuit 

of a suspect from the scene of the crime). 

17 See Johnson, 256 F.3d at 908 (characterizing the 

misdemeanor offense of resisting arrest as a minor offense that 

“weighs heavily against” a finding of exigent circumstances in 

the context of a warrantless home entry). 

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circumstances. The court finds that the officers failed to 

sustain their burden in this regard. There is no evidence 

before the court that any of the officers attempted to obtain a 

warrant prior to entering the Kolesnikov residence, nor have the 

officers presented sufficient evidence demonstrating why a 

telephone warrant was unavailable or impractical under the 

circumstances. The officers did not point to some real 

immediate and serious consequences that would have resulted had 

the officers postponed entry to obtain a warrant. For instance, 

the officers did not present particularized evidence 

demonstrating that a warrant could not be obtained in time to 

effect the arrest safely, i.e., without causing a delay 

dangerous to the officers or to members of the public. Nor did 

the officers present particularized evidence demonstrating that 

entry was necessary to avoid imminent destruction of evidence or 

to prevent Alexander from escaping.18 Accordingly, because the 

 

18 While the officers maintain that there was a “strong 

likelihood” that Alexander could have escaped because he was 

evading law enforcement prior to entering the Kolesnikov 

residence, the court finds this contention, without more, 

insufficient to establish the existence of exigent 

circumstances. In this regard, the officers failed to 

adequately explain why it was impractical to have simply staked 

out the residence while waiting for a warrant. Indeed, given 

the number of officers involved in the pursuit, it appears 

unlikely that Alexander could have escaped undetected. 

Additionally, to the extent that the officers seek to establish 

the existence of exigent circumstances by arguing that Alexander 

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officers did not attempt to obtain a warrant prior to entering 

the Kolesnikov residence or present sufficient evidence 

demonstrating why a telephone warrant was unavailable or 

impractical under the circumstances, the court finds that the 

officers failed to sustain their “heavy burden” to set forth 

specific and articulable facts justifying the warrantless entry. 

The court does not find that this is the “rare” case where 

application of the exigent-circumstances exception to the 

warrant requirement applies in the context of a home entry where 

only relatively minor offenses have been committed, and 

therefore the court concludes that the warrantless entry 

violated the Fourth Amendment. See Johnson, 256 F.3d at 908 n. 

6 (citation omitted) (“In situations where an officer is truly 

in hot pursuit and the underlying offense is a felony, the 

Fourth Amendment usually yields. However, in situations where 

 

posed a threat to officers and/or the public because he evaded 

law enforcement and entered an “unknown” residence, the court 

does not find this argument persuasive. There is no evidence 

before the court suggesting that Alexander was a danger to the 

public or to law enforcement officers such that a warrant could 

not be obtained in time to effect the arrest safely-that is, 

without causing a delay dangerous to the officers or to members 

of the public. Therefore, while there was probable cause and a 

strong reason to believe that Alexander was inside the 

Kolesnikov residence, exigent circumstances did not exist to 

justify the warrantless entry because the offenses involved were 

not “grave,” Alexander was not armed or dangerous, and 

Alexander’s escape was unlikely given the law enforcement 

presence at the Kolesnikov residence. 

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the underlying offense is only a misdemeanor, law enforcement 

must yield to the Fourth Amendment in all but the ‘rarest’ 

cases.”); LaLonde, 204 F.3d at 956 (citing Welsh, 466 U.S. 752-

53) (noting that an exigency related to a misdemeanor will 

seldom, if ever, justify a warrantless entry into the home). 

 For these reasons, summary adjudication is GRANTED in favor 

of Plaintiffs with regard to the warrantless entry claim. 

C. Entry into the Kolesnikov Bathroom 

 Plaintiffs argue that Deputy Hulsey and Sergeant Shintaku’s 

entry into the Kolesnikov bathroom to apprehend Sergey violated 

the Fourth Amendment. However, because Plaintiffs’ neither 

presented compelling argument nor cited to controlling authority 

to support their position, the court concludes that Plaintiffs 

have failed to sustain their burden under Rule 56(c). See

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) (summary adjudication is appropriate if there 

is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party 

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law). 

 For this reason, summary adjudication is DENIED with regard 

to this claim. 

D. Qualified Immunity 

 Plaintiffs argue that the officers are not entitled to 

qualified immunity with regard to the warrantless entry claim 

because it is clearly established that a warrantless intrusion 

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into a private dwelling to arrest a person suspected of having 

committed relatively minor offenses violates the Fourth 

Amendment absent exigent circumstances. 

 “Qualified immunity protects ‘government officials . . . 

from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does 

not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional 

rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” 

Phillips v. Hust, 477 F.3d 1070, 1079 (9th Cir. 2007). 

“Therefore, regardless of whether the constitutional violation 

occurred, the officer should prevail if the right asserted by 

the plaintiff was not ‘clearly established’ or the officer could 

have reasonably believed that his particular conduct was 

lawful.” Romero v. Kitsap County, 931 F.2d 624, 627 (9th Cir. 

1991). The doctrine of qualified immunity assumes that police 

officers do not knowingly violate the law. Gasho v. U.S., 39 

F.3d 1420, 1438 (9th Cir. 1994). Thus, an officer is presumed 

to be immune from any damages caused by his constitutional 

violation. Id. “To overcome this presumption, a plaintiff must 

show that the officer’s conduct was ‘so egregious that any 

reasonable person would have recognized a constitutional 

violation.’” Id. 

The Supreme Court has established a two step inquiry in 

determining whether an official has qualified immunity. Saucier 

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v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). To determine whether 

officials are entitled to qualified immunity, the threshold 

inquiry is whether, taken in the light most favorable to the 

party asserting injury, the facts show that the officer’s 

conduct violated a constitutional right. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 

201; Inouye v. Kemna, 504 F.3d 705, 712 (9th Cir. 2007). If a 

violation is established, then the court must ask whether the 

law forming the basis of the violation was clearly established 

in light of the context of the case. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201; 

Inouye, 504 F.3d at 712. For the law to be clearly established, 

it is only necessary that the unlawfulness of the official’s act 

be apparent in light of pre-existing law. Anderson v. 

Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). The proper inquiry is an 

objective, fact-specific question determined by examining the 

facts at issue under clearly established law at the time. Id.

at 641. “The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining 

whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be 

clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in 

the situation he confronted.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202; 

Phillips, 477 F.3d at 1079. “If the law did not put the officer 

on notice that his conduct was unlawful, summary judgment based 

on qualified immunity is appropriate.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202 

(To reject a defense of qualified immunity, the court must find 

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that “the contours of the right [are] sufficiently clear that a 

reasonable official would understand that what he is doing 

violates the right.”); see also Blueford v. Prunty, 108 F.3d 

251, 255 (9th Cir. 1997) (A right is clearly established “[i]f 

the only reasonable conclusion from binding authority [was] that 

the disputed right existed.”). For a right to be clearly 

established, “the very action in question” need not “ha[ve] 

previously been held unlawful”; instead, the “unlawfulness must 

be apparent” in light of pre-existing law. Creighton, 483 U.S. 

at 640.19 “The qualified immunity defense allows for mistaken 

judgments and protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those 

who knowingly violate the law.’” Sinaloa Lake Owners Ass’n v. 

City of Simi Valley, 70 F.3d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir. 1995); Malley 

v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). If officers of reasonable 

competence could disagree on the issue, immunity should be 

recognized. Brittain v. Hansen, 451 F.3d 982, 988 (9th Cir. 

 

19 In determining whether a right is clearly established 

there need not be a case on all fours prohibiting the particular 

manifestation of the unconstitutional conduct; rather, the 

determination turns on whether the state of the law at the time 

of the constitutional violation provided a “fair warning” that 

the conduct was unconstitutional. San Jose Charter of Hells 

Angels Motorcycle Club v. City of San Jose, 402 F.3d 962, 975 

(9th Cir. 2005). In the absence of binding precedent, courts 

look to whatever decisional law is available to ascertain 

whether the law is clearly established for qualified immunity 

purposes, including decisions of state courts, other circuits, 

and district courts. Tekle v. U.S., 511 F.3d 839, 847 (9th Cir. 

2007). 

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2006). The qualified immunity analysis is “essentially legal” 

and is appropriately made on summary judgment where the 

underlying facts are undisputed. Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 

437 (9th Cir. 2002) 

 In the present case, there is no doubt that a warrantless 

entry into a private dwelling to arrest a person suspected of 

having committed relatively minor offenses is presumptively 

unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment absent exigent 

circumstances. See Welsh, 466 U.S. at 750; Johnson, 256 F.3d at 

905. Because the court has determined that the officers 

violated the Fourth Amendment by failing to demonstrate exigent 

circumstances to justify the warrantless entry, the question is 

whether the law forming the basis of this Fourth Amendment 

violation was clearly established in light of the context of the 

case, that is, whether it would have been clear to a reasonable 

officer that the warrantless entry was unlawful under the 

circumstances. In this regard, the court concludes that the 

officers reasonably could have believed based on their 

observations, knowledge, and the “hot pursuit” of Alexander, 

that exigent circumstances existed to justify the warrantless 

entry. Alexander committed several misdemeanor offenses in the 

presence of law enforcement officers, including evading and 

resisting arrest, and it has not been “clearly established” that 

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law enforcement officers can never enter a home without a 

warrant to pursue a suspect fleeing from the commission of 

misdemeanor offenses. Although the Supreme Court has noted its 

“hesitation in finding exigent circumstances, especially when 

warrantless arrests in the home are at issue . . . when the 

underlying offense for which there is probable cause to arrest 

is relatively minor[,]” Welsh, 466 U.S. at 750, the Court 

declined to say that there could never be warrantless home 

arrests for misdemeanor offenses. Id. at 749. Moreover, since 

Welsh, it has not been clearly established that there can never 

be warrantless home arrests in the context of a “hot pursuit” of 

a suspect fleeing from the commission of misdemeanor offenses.20 

 

20 In fact, under California law, when an arrest, or in this 

case an attempted arrest, is set in motion in a public place, 

the police may pursue a retreating suspect into a private 

residence, even if the offense is a mere misdemeanor. People v. 

Lloyd, 216 Cal.App.3d 1425, 1428-29 (1989) (defendant’s refusal 

to comply with lawful detention for traffic violations justified 

“hot pursuit” into house to prevent defendant from frustrating 

arrest); see also In re Lavoyne M., 221 Cal.App.3d 154, 158-59 

(1990) (exigency of hot pursuit justified entry to arrest 

suspect for failure to stop at a stop sign, driving without a 

license, and resisting an officer-all misdemeanors). These 

cases bolster the court’s conclusion that a reasonable officer 

could have believed that it was lawful to enter the Kolesnikov 

residence without a warrant to arrest Alexander. The court 

notes, however, that neither the Supreme Court nor Ninth Circuit 

has adopted a similar rule. See Santana, 427 U.S. at 44 

(determining that a felony suspect may not defeat an arrest 

which has been set in motion in a public place by retreating 

into a private residence). Because Santana involved a felony 

and did not discuss whether its holding was limited to felonies, 

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As such, the court cannot conclude that the officers conduct was 

so egregious that any reasonable person would have recognized a 

Fourth Amendment violation. The evidence before the court does 

not support the conclusion that the officers knowingly violated 

the law or that only a “plainly incompetent” law enforcement 

officer would have thought that a warrantless entry was 

permissible at the time of entry. An objectively reasonable 

police officer could have believed that the warrantless entry 

was lawful in light of the clearly established law and the 

information the officers possessed, and therefore the officers 

are entitled to qualified immunity on the warrantless entry 

claim.21

 

and because the officers have not cited, and the court has not 

found, binding authority supporting the extension of this rule 

to misdemeanor offenses, the court will not decide whether the 

hot pursuit of Alexander into his house to prevent him from 

frustrating an arrest that began in public provides an exception 

to the warrant requirement. 

21 Plaintiffs maintain that the officers are not entitled to 

qualified immunity because at the time of the warrantless entry, 

it was “clearly established” that exigent circumstances could 

not justify a warrantless entry into a home to arrest someone 

for the commission of a minor offense. In this regard, 

Plaintiffs rely primarily on Welsh, 466 U.S. 740, in which the 

Supreme Court stated that “application of the exigentcircumstances exception in the context of a home entry should 

rarely be sanctioned when there is probable cause to believe 

that only a minor offense” has been committed. Id. at 753. The 

court, however, does not find that Welsh compels the conclusion 

that the warrantless entry in this case violated a clearly 

established right. In this case, the officers were confronted 

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 For these reasons, the officers are entitled to qualified 

immunity with regard to the warrantless entry claim. 

III. CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs’ motion is GRANTED 

in part and DENIED in part, and the officers’ cross-motions are 

GRANTED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 ENTERED this 21st day of April, 2008. 

 s/RALPH R. BEISTLINE 

 United States District Judge 

 

with circumstances that differed from those in Welsh. The 

offenses, albeit minor, were committed in the officers’ 

presence, there was “hot pursuit,” and Alexander was a “fleeing” 

suspect. Therefore, because Welsh did not impose an absolute 

ban on warrantless home entries for minor offenses, id. at 751-

53, and because no subsequent Supreme Court or Ninth Circuit 

decision has held that similar conduct violates the Fourth 

Amendment, the court finds that the officers are entitled to 

qualified immunity since it cannot be said that the warrantless 

entry into the Kolesnikov residence violated clearly established 

law.

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