Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_16-cv-00061/USCOURTS-alsd-1_16-cv-00061-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 720
Nature of Suit: Labor Management Relations Act
Cause of Action: 29:151 Labor: Review of Agency Action

---

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS )

BOARD, )

)

Applicant, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION 16-0061-WS-N

 )

LEAR CORPORATION EEDS AND )

INTERIORS, )

)

Respondent. )

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on the National Labor Relations Board’s 

Applications for Order Enforcing Subpoenas Duces Tecum (doc. 1; doc. 7, at 3-11). On May 10, 

2016, the Magistrate Judge entered a Report and Recommendations (doc. 16), wherein she 

recommended that both Applications be granted, that respondent’s objections be overruled, and 

that respondent’s request for entry of a protective order be denied. Respondent, Lear 

Corporation EEDS and Interiors (“Lear”), has filed timely Objections (doc. 17) to the Report and 

Recommendations, along with a supporting memorandum of law (doc. 18).1

I. Background.

A. History of the Administrative Subpoenas.

The material facts and circumstances culminating in this dispute over enforcement of 

administrative subpoenas are uncontested. Lear operates a manufacturing facility in Selma, 

 1 Also pending is Lear’s “Motion to Stay Magistrate’s [sic] Report and 

Recommendation” (doc. 19). In that filing, Lear states, “The Report and Recommendation 

directs Lear to fully comply with the ten (10) administrative subpoenas” (doc. 19, ¶ 1), and asks 

that such directive be stayed until Lear’s objections are resolved. However, the Report and 

Recommendations did not direct Lear to do anything, but simply recommended that the NLRB’s 

Applications be granted and that Lear’s objections be overruled. Such recommendations are 

nothing more than that, unless and until such time as they may be adopted, modified or rejected 

by this Court. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); General L.R. 72(c). Because the Report and 

Recommendations imposes no compliance duties on Lear antecedent to a final ruling by this 

Court, the Motion to Stay is unnecessary and, therefore, moot.

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Alabama, where it makes automotive seats. In approximately May 2014, three employees at this 

facility (Kim King, Letasha Irby, and Denise Barnett) complained to the Occupational Safety and

Health Administration (“OSHA”) about workplace exposure to an organic compound called 

toluene diisocyanate (“TDI”). These individuals also voiced their concerns publicly through 

various media, including an NBC News story, a YouTube video, and other news articles. Lear 

reassigned the three complaining employees to the warehouse (a different building at the Selma 

facility) in September 2014, prompting all three employees to file OSHA § 11(c) whistleblower 

complaints challenging their transfers as retaliatory. OSHA’s investigation into those 

whistleblower complaints is apparently ongoing at this time.

2

On or about November 3, 2014, nonparty International Union, United Automobile, 

Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, AFL-CIO (“UAW”), filed an unfair 

labor charge against Lear with the NLRB. The stated basis of the charge was that Lear had 

“interfered with, restrained and coerced employees Letasha Irby, Kim King and Denise Barnett 

in the exercise of their section 7 rights by threatening them with termination, transferring them to 

different positions because of their protected concerted activity regarding their working 

conditions and union activities, threatened them with and initiated discipline against them ... and 

engaged in surveillance.” (Doc. 7, at 132.) In early 2015, the NLRB received two other unfair 

labor practice charges against Lear, involving allegations that, inter alia, Lear had unjustly 

disciplined Irby and King. (Doc. 1-1, at 1-14.)

In its ensuing investigation of these three unfair labor practice charges (the “ULP 

Charges”), the NLRB issued a total of ten administrative subpoenas to Lear seeking production 

of books, records and documents, and commanding certain Lear supervisors to appear and testify 

before an NLRB representative concerning the subject incidents. The NLRB issued these 

 2 Indeed, the Department of Labor has filed suit against Lear in this District Court 

in an action styled Thomas E. Perez, Secretary of Labor v. Lear Corporation EEDS and 

Interiors, et al., Civil Action 15-0205-CG-M, for relief under § 11(c) of OSHA. The Perez suit 

involves OSHA’s claims that Lear retaliated against the three employees for complaining about 

TDI exposure at the Selma facility. Such retaliation is alleged to have taken the form of transfers 

to the warehouse facility, as well as other retaliatory acts (suspension, termination, denial of 

leave, commencement of litigation for defamation and interference with business relations, 

directives that they perform job duties differently and in a more onerous manner than other 

employees).

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subpoenas pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 161(1).3 Lear responded by petitioning the NLRB to revoke 

the subpoenas; however, that request was denied by a three-member panel of the Board. When 

Lear still declined to comply, the Board filed a pair of applications in this District Court to 

compel the enforcement of those subpoenas pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 161(2). Lear opposes those 

applications.

Lear’s opposition to the NLRB’s applications for enforcement hinges on a 1975 

Memorandum of Understanding (the “MOU”) between the NLRB and OSHA that was published 

in the Federal Register. The stated purpose of the MOU was “to avoid duplicate litigation and 

insure that the exercise by employees of their rights in the area of health and safety will be 

protected.” 40 Fed.Reg. 26083. The MOU recognized that many employee safety and health 

activities may be protected under both the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) and the 

Occupational Safety and Health Act (“OSH Act”). To address that overlap, the MOU explained 

that “since an employee’s right to engage in safety and health activity is specifically protected by 

the OSH Act and is only generally included in the broader right to engage in concerted activities 

under the NLRA, it is appropriate that enforcement actions to protect such safety and health 

activities should primarily be taken under the OSH Act rather than the NLRA.” Id. On that 

basis, the MOU set forth an interagency “procedural agreement” that where the NLRB receives 

an unfair labor practice charge covering “the same factual matters” as a § 11(c) complaint filed 

with OSHA, the NLRB “will, absent withdrawal of the matter, defer or dismiss the charge.” 

(Id.) Such procedural agreement also included a section under which the NLRB and the Office 

of the Solicitor of Labor “will consult in order to determine the appropriate handling” of an 

unfair labor practice charge including both issues covered by § 11(c) of the OSH Act and issues 

within the NLRB’s exclusive jurisdiction. (Id.) Lear’s position is that the subpoenas are void 

because the NLRB issued them in contravention of the “defer or dismiss” requirement of the 

MOU.

 3 That section provides that the Board “shall at all reasonable times have access to, 

for the purpose of examination, and the right to copy any evidence of any person being 

investigated or proceeded against that relates to any matter under investigation or in question. 

The Board ... shall ... forthwith issue to such party subpoenas requiring the attendance and 

testimony of witnesses or the production of any evidence in such proceedings or investigation 

requested in such application.” Id.

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B. The Report and Recommendations.

In her Report and Recommendations, Magistrate Judge Nelson concluded that Lear’s 

reliance on the MOU to oppose the administrative subpoenas was misplaced. In so doing, she 

examined case law distinguishing between substantive agency rules (which have the force and 

effect of law) and non-substantive / procedural agency rules (which are not judicially enforceable 

and do not create substantive rights enforceable in federal court). (Doc. 16, at 17-19.) The 

Magistrate Judge reasoned that the MOU is “most appropriately considered a non-substantive 

general statement of policy” because there is no evidence that the MOU was promulgated under 

the Administrative Procedure Act’s notice-and-comment requirements, and nothing in the MOU 

purports to confer enforcement rights upon third parties. (Id. at 19.) As the Report and 

Recommendation observed, “the MOU is simply an interagency agreement that sets forth 

procedural steps to guide OSHA and the Board in exercise of their shared statutory authority to 

conduct investigations.” (Id. at 21 (citation and internal marks omitted).) On that basis, the 

Magistrate Judge opined that Lear could not judicially compel the NLRB to adhere to the MOU.

The overarching theme in Lear’s filings is that the NLRB’s efforts to enforce the 

administrative subpoenas in this case are nothing more than a strong-arm tactic calculated “to 

advance the UAW’s agenda [against Lear] through costly and protracted litigation.” (Doc. 7, at

102.) Lear brands the NLRB as “serving as the litigation arm of the Union” and asserts that the 

NLRB’s failure to abide by the MOU “casts suspicion on its true intentions.” (Id. at 110-11.) 

The Magistrate Judge correctly acknowledged that the NLRB’s motivations matter, and that 

enforcement of subpoenas issued for an illegitimate purpose may properly be denied. (Doc. 16, 

at 22-23.)4 Nonetheless, she concluded that Lear had failed to make a persuasive showing that 

 4 See, e.g., University of Pennsylvania v. E.E.O.C., 493 U.S. 182, 191, 110 S.Ct. 

577, 107 L.Ed.2d 571 (1990) (when a court is asked to enforce administrative subpoena issued 

by EEOC, “its responsibility is ... more generally to assess any contentions by the employer that 

the demand for information is too indefinite or has been made for an illegitimate purpose”) 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 58, 85 

S.Ct. 248, 13 L.Ed.2d 112 (1964) (“It is the court’s process which is invoked to enforce the 

administrative summons and a court may not permit its process to be abused. Such an abuse 

would take place if the summons had been issued for an improper purpose ....”) (footnote 

omitted); E.E.O.C. v. Homenurse, Inc., 2013 WL 5779046, *8 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 30, 2013) (in 

administrative subpoena context, “a court may refuse enforcement where to do so would be a 

(Continued)

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the NLRB’s actions here were “a capricious, oppressive, or otherwise illegitimate use of its 

subpoena power.” (Id. at 23.)

Because the Magistrate Judge determined that the MOU was non-substantive and not 

judicially enforceable by Lear, and because she rejected Lear’s assertion that the NLRB had 

issued the subpoenas for an improper purpose, the Report and Recommendations concluded that 

the NLRB’s application for enforcement should be granted, and that Lear’s objections should be 

overruled. (Id. at 24-25.)5 Lear’s ensuing objections to the Report and Recommendations were 

referred to the undersigned for disposition.

II. Analysis.

A. Legal Standard.

Where, as here, a party objects to a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation 

concerning a dispositive matter,6 the district judge “shall make a de novo determination of those 

portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is 

made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). “A judge of the court may also accept, reject, or modify, in 

 

gross abuse of the EEOC’s discretion, such as when the subpoena was issued for an improper 

purpose”).

5 The Report and Recommendations also addressed Lear’s alternative request for 

entry of a protective order “to clarify the information sought by the NLRB and necessarily limit 

it in order to eliminate the duplicate overlap with OSHA’s § 11(c) whistleblower investigation.” 

(Doc. 7, at 119-20.) The Magistrate Judge opined that the request for protective order was “in 

effect, simply another way of asking the Court to enforce Lear’s view of the MOU,” and 

therefore recommended that it be denied. (Doc. 16, at 24.)

6 The parties appear to be in agreement that adjudication of the NLRB’s requests 

for enforcement of its administrative subpoenas constitutes a dispositive matter for purposes of § 

636(b)(1) review. Case law is in accord with that principle. See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Frazier, 966 

F.2d 812, 818 (3rd Cir. 1992) (“[I]n this case the question of subpoena enforcement is not 

ancillary to the Board’s main action in the district court. Rather, the Board applied to the district 

court in a special proceeding, under 29 U.S.C. § 161(2) .... The magistrate judge’s decision was 

not a pretrial determination of a motion collateral to the main proceeding before the district 

court, but a final decision which disposed entirely of the Board’s business before the court. The 

district court should have reviewed the magistrate judge’s decision accordingly.”); N.L.R.B. v. 

Edwards, 2012 WL 235522, *1 n.1 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 10, 2012) (in action brought by NLRB to 

compel compliance with subpoena, the magistrate judge “proceeds by recommendation because 

the matter referred is case dispositive”).

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whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” Id. This 

Court’s review of Lear’s objections to the Report and Recommendations proceeds in recognition 

of these statutory directives. That said, the Court also hews to the principle that “[n]either the 

Constitution nor the statute requires a district judge to review, de novo, findings and 

recommendations that the parties themselves accept as correct.” United States v. Woodard, 387 

F.3d 1329, 1334 (11th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).

B. Lear’s Objection that the Subpoenas are a Clear Violation of the MOU.

The focal point of Lear’s Objections is that the Magistrate Judge erred in “finding that the 

investigative subpoenas are enforceable, despite the NLRB’s clear failure to follow its stated 

protocol published in the Federal Register.” (Doc. 17, at 2.) In lieu of discussing the Report and 

Recommendations head-on in its Objections and explaining specifically why it believes the 

Magistrate Judge’s findings are incorrect, Lear block-quotes (with only modest edits and without 

attribution) significant chunks of its previous briefing. (Compare doc. 18, at 6-12, with doc. 7, at 

110-11 & 115-19.)

Nonetheless, the gravamen of Lear’s argument is that the administrative subpoenas 

should not be enforced because the NLRB issued them in blatant disregard of the MOU’s 

requirements. Upon de novo review, the Court is not persuaded that the MOU requires denial of 

the NLRB’s applications for enforcement of the subject subpoenas. Simply put, Lear’s 

contention that the NLRB subpoenas are incompatible with the Board’s obligations under the 

MOU is unsupported by the text of the MOU, the NLRB’s interpretations of same, or extant case 

authority. To be sure, the MOU provides that where, as here, an unfair labor practice charge 

filed with the NLRB covers “the same factual matters” as a § 11(c) complaint filed with OSHA, 

the NLRB “will, absent withdrawal of the matter, defer or dismiss the charge.” Likewise, there

can be no reasonable dispute that the ULP Charges filed with the NLRB against Lear overlap in 

significant factual respects with the three § 11(c) whistleblower complaints filed with OSHA 

against Lear; indeed, they all allege that Lear retaliated against employees Letasha Irby, Kim 

King and Denise Barnett for complaining about TDI exposure in the Selma manufacturing 

facility. It also appears undisputed that the ULP Charges touch on additional matters beyond the 

scope of the § 11(c) OSHA complaints. 

The fatal flaw in Lear’s argument lies in its unsupported logical leap from these 

uncontroversial propositions to its conclusion that the MOU prohibits the NLRB from taking any 

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investigative steps as to covered matters. Here is why: Although the MOU does specify that the 

NLRB is to “defer or dismiss” an unfair labor practice charge involving the same factual matters

as a § 11(c) complaint filed with OSHA, it does not say when the NLRB must defer or dismiss 

that charge. On its face, the MOU does not forbid the NLRB from conducting any investigation 

prior to such deferral or dismissal. Nor has Lear cited a single instance in which the Board or 

any court in the last four decades has ever construed the MOU as manifesting an absolute, per se

ban on NLRB investigative activity.7 Thus, Lear’s position is predicated on a reading of the 

MOU that neither courts nor the Board have ever embraced, and that would require additional 

restrictions and covenants to be judicially inserted into the MOU where they do not presently 

exist.

Far from being barred by the MOU, the NLRB maintains that its issuance of subpoenas to 

Lear is actually in furtherance of the NLRB’s obligations under that agreement. After all, the 

MOU directs the NLRB to “defer or dismiss” a charge covering the same factual matters as a § 

11(c) complaint to OSHA. On its face, then, the MOU gives the NLRB two options: (i) deferral, 

or (ii) dismissal. The NLRB’s common-sense, reasonable position throughout this dispute has 

been that it cannot make an informed determination as to whether deferral or dismissal of the 

ULP Charges is the appropriate option in this case without first conducting its own investigation; 

 7 To the contrary, the majority opinion of a three-member panel of the NLRB that 

reviewed Lear’s request to revoke the subpoenas in this case interpreted the MOU in exactly the 

opposite manner. That majority opinion concluded as follows: “[W]e find that the MOU does 

not require the Region to determine whether to defer or dismiss such charges, or engage in 

consultations with the Solicitor of Labor concerning deferral or dismissal, without having 

investigated the facts and circumstances surrounding the allegations.” (Doc. 1-1, Exh. L, at 1-2.) 

The lone dissenting member of the panel wrote, “I believe the MOU required the General 

Counsel to comply with these procedures before the Region conducts any investigation” (id. at 

2), citing the MOU’s objective of “obviat[ing] duplicate litigation.” There is no indication, 

however, that any other Board member, or Board panel, ascribes to this dissenting view. 

Besides, the dissent’s rationale is unpersuasive, because it equates investigation with litigation, 

despite the vast conceptual differences between them. Simply stated, duplicate litigation may be 

avoided even if the NLRB conducts its own investigation of unfair labor practice charges 

encompassing § 11(c) OSHA matters prior to dismissing or deferring them.

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therefore, its issuance of the subpoenas is proper, in good faith, and entirely consistent with the 

MOU.

8

 Lear belittles the NLRB’s stance, but offers no meaningful rebuttal.

The foregoing considerations loom large here because of the narrowly circumscribed role 

that federal courts play in the context of enforcement of administrative subpoenas. See, e.g., 

E.E.O.C. v. Kloster Cruise Ltd., 939 F.2d 920, 922 (11th Cir. 1991) (“It is well-settled that the 

role of a district court in a proceeding to enforce an administrative subpoena is sharply limited; 

inquiry is appropriate only into whether the evidence sought is material and relevant to a lawful 

purpose of the agency.”). The appropriate question is not whether this Court would have seen fit

to issue the challenged subpoenas were it standing in the NLRB’s shoes. Instead, the narrow, 

limited question presented by the NLRB’s Applications and Lear’s Objections is whether the 

NLRB is abusing this Court’s process by seeking enforcement of those administrative subpoenas 

for an improper purpose. See, e.g., United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 58, 85 S.Ct. 248, 13 

L.Ed.2d 112 (1964) (“It is the court’s process which is invoked to enforce the administrative 

summons and a court may not permit its process to be abused.”).9 

In opposing enforcement of the NLRB’s subpoenas in federal court, Lear relies on the 

“improper purpose” rationale for denying enforcement. Indeed, Lear posits that the NLRB has 

been a “willing participant[] to advance the UAW’s agenda through costly and protracted 

 8 Indeed, the NLRB has maintained that “it is impossible for [the Board] to comply 

with the MOU’s guidance to dismiss or defer the ULP allegations” without an investigation, and 

that such an investigation “cannot be completed without the documents and testimony requested 

in the subpoenas at issue.” (Doc. 12, at 2.) Elsewhere, the NLRB has emphasized this defect in 

Lear’s opposition by observing that Lear “fails to propose how [the NLRB] would determine 

whether a charge should be dismissed or deferred without first conducting an investigation.” 

(Doc. 7, at 417.)

9 See also United States v. Whispering Oaks Residential Care Facility, LLC, 673 

F.3d 813, 819 (8th Cir. 2012) (“The court’s process is abused when a subpoena is issued for an 

improper purpose, such as to harass the [respondent] or to put pressure on him to settle a 

collateral dispute, or for any other purpose reflecting on the good faith of the particular 

investigation.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Burlington Northern R. Co. v. 

Office of Inspector General, R.R. Retirement Bd., 983 F.2d 631, 638 (5th Cir. 1993) (“Courts will 

not enforce an administrative subpoena ... if the subpoena was issued for an improper purpose, 

such as harassment.”); United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 788 F.2d 164, 166-67 (3rd Cir. 

1986) (“[I]f a subpoena is issued for an improper purpose, such as harassment, its enforcement 

constitutes an abuse of the court’s process.”).

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litigation,” that the NLRB issued the subpoenas “as the litigation arm of the Union,” that the 

“NLRB’s clear disregard of its own defined protocol casts suspicions on its true intentions in this 

case and the application should be denied,” and the NLRB is acting “in an arbitrary and 

capricious manner” by “ignor[ing] its own published protocols.” (Doc. 7, at 102, 110-11; doc. 

18, at 2.) In support of this charged rhetoric, Lear asserts that it is a “patently obvious fact that 

the NLRB’s ongoing investigation” violates the MOU. (Doc. 9, at 2.) Lear also insists that the 

NLRB’s position “defies legitimate explanation” and amounts to “abuse of process,” thereby 

triggering this Court’s duty “to ensure that administrative subpoenas are not the tools of an abuse 

[sic] process.” (Id. at 4, 9.)

A respondent challenging administrative subpoenas bears a heavy burden to show an 

improper purpose. See, e.g., United States v. Whispering Oaks Residential Care Facility, LLC, 

673 F.3d 813, 817 (8th Cir. 2012) (“The respondent bears a heavy burden to disprove the 

existence of a valid purpose for an administrative subpoena.”); Doe v. United States, 253 F.3d 

256, 272 (6th Cir. 2001) (affirming district court decision enforcing administrative subpoena 

where respondent had failed to meet “heavy” burden of “showing institutional bad faith,” that 

DOJ had been motivated by improper purpose in issuing subpoena). To carry this burden, Lear 

points to the NLRB’s purported disregard of the MOU.10 As demonstrated by the foregoing 

discussion, however, the MOU lends no support to Lear’s accusations of bad faith. Again, 

nothing in the MOU (or judicial or administrative interpretations of same) would expressly bar 

the NLRB from investigating an unfair labor practice charge that overlaps with a § 11(c) OSHA 

complaint. The MOU gives the NLRB the option of deferring or dismissing the overlapping 

charges, and the NLRB has made a reasonable showing that it needed to conduct an investigation 

into the charges (and hence issue the administrative subpoenas) to inform its decision of whether 

they should be deferred or, instead, dismissed. As such, the language of the MOU, coupled with 

the NLRB’s conduct in this case, does not satisfy Lear’s heavy burden of showing that the Board 

 10 Viewing its argument through this prism, Lear is not trying to compel the NLRB 

to comply with the MOU or asserting that it possesses a private right to enforce the MOU against 

the Board. Rather, Lear is pointing to the purported divergence between the MOU and the

NLRB’s conduct as evidence of what it characterizes as an improper purpose for the subpoenas, 

such that the Board’s applications for enforcement amount to an abuse of process that this Court 

should not countenance.

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was motivated by an improper purpose or institutional bad faith in issuing the administrative 

subpoenas.11

For all of these reasons, the undersigned finds that the NLRB’s Applications for Order 

Enforcing Subpoenas Duces Tecum (doc. 1; doc. 7, at 3-11) against Lear are properly granted, 

and that Lear’s objections to same are properly overruled. 

C. Lear’s Objection that a Protective Order is Appropriate.

Lear’s Objections also seek de novo review of the Magistrate Judge’s recommended 

denial of Lear’s request for protective order, reasoning that such recommendation “does not take 

into account the pertinent facts and circumstances and is therefore incorrect.” (Doc. 17, at 3.)

In its filings in opposition to the NLRB’s Applications, Lear asserted that, if the 

subpoenas were to be enforced, the Court should exercise its discretion to enter a protective order 

“carving out the subjects clearly covered in the parallel OSHA proceeding” from the ambit of the 

NLRB’s subpoenas. (Doc. 9, at 9; see also doc. 7, at 119-20 (requesting protective order “to 

clarify the information sought by the NLRB and necessarily limit it in order to eliminate the 

duplicate overlap with OSHA’s § 11(c) whistleblower investigation”).) The Report and 

Recommendations found that Lear’s request for protective order was “simply another way of 

asking the Court to enforce Lear’s view of the MOU” and therefore recommended that it be 

denied. (Doc. 16, at 24.)

In its ensuing Objections to the R & R, Lear for the first time recasts its request for 

protective order as seeking not exclusion of overlapping matters but a directive that the NLRB 

confer with OSHA before pursuing the subpoenas further. (Compare doc. 7 at 120 & doc. 9 at 9 

 11 Nor does Lear advance its cause by lamenting “the potential for contradictory fact 

findings and conclusions of law that could result from dual-track investigations by OSHA and 

the NLRB.” (Doc. 18, at 10.) Implicit in this argument is Lear’s assumption that the NLRB will 

litigate the administrative proceedings concerning the pending overlapping charges to 

conclusion, with the Board ultimately rendering findings of fact and conclusions of law 

concerning same. But Lear points to no evidence that the NLRB harbors any such intention. To 

the contrary, the NLRB has repeatedly represented to this Court that the purpose of the 

subpoenas is “to investigate the allegations brought against [Lear] so a determination can be 

made whether the allegations should be dismissed or deferred.” (Doc. 7, at 417; see also doc. 12, 

at 2.) Thus, the NLRB has professed its intent to investigate the overlapping charges, then 

decide whether to defer or dismiss them in accordance with the MOU. Either way, there would 

be no “contradictory fact findings and conclusions of law,” and Lear’s stated concerns in that 

regard appear unfounded or, at best, purely speculative.

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with doc. 18, at 12.) The Court will exercise its discretion to decline to consider Lear’s attempt 

to raise a new, previously available argument or to request new, previously available relief for 

the first time via objections to the Report and Recommendations. See, e.g., Williams v. McNeil, 

557 F.3d 1287, 1291 (11th Cir. 2009) (“We conclude that the district court has broad discretion in 

reviewing a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, and, therefore, the district court did 

not abuse its discretion in declining to consider Williams’s timeliness argument that was not 

presented to the magistrate judge.”).

12

As originally formulated, Lear’s request for protective order was simply that the Court 

“carv[e] out the subjects clearly covered in the parallel OSHA proceeding” from the scope of the 

subject subpoenas. Both Lear and the Magistrate Judge agree that protective orders are available 

in the administrative subpoena context upon a showing of good cause. See, e.g., In re Alexander 

Grant & Co. Litigation, 820 F.2d 352, 356 (11th Cir. 1987) (“the sole criterion for determining 

the validity of a protective order is the statutory requirement of ‘good cause’”) (citations 

omitted); Farnsworth v. Procter & Gamble Co., 758 F.2d 1545, 1547 (11th Cir. 1985) 

(explaining that federal courts have adopted a “balancing of interests approach” to rule allowing 

protective orders for good cause).

Lear’s only “good cause” argument presented in filings to the Magistrate Judge was that 

“good cause exists to require the NLRB to honor its MOU published limitations and prohibit it 

form [sic] continuing duplicate litigation.” (Doc. 7, at 120.) The Court disagrees. As discussed 

supra, the NLRB has a valid, good-faith reason to conduct an investigation in order to comply

 12 See also United States v. Coulton, 594 Fed.Appx. 563, 568 (11th Cir. Nov. 25, 

2014) (“a district judge need not consider an argument that a party failed to present to the 

magistrate judge”); Shepherd v. Corizon, Inc., 2013 WL 1561513, *1 (S.D. Ala. Apr. 12, 2013) 

(“a district judge has discretion not to consider an argument first raised after a magistrate judge 

has issued an R & R”); Morrison v. United States, 2012 WL 4711863, *3 (S.D. Ala. Oct. 3, 

2012) (“This argument is not properly presented now because Morrison never articulated it to the 

Magistrate Judge.”); United States v. Ezell, 2011 WL 772884, *4 (S.D. Ala. Mar. 1, 2011) 

(“Petitioner apparently having never previously alleged that counsel failed to satisfy his duty to 

consult, he should not be permitted to litigate the issue now via objections to the Report and 

Recommendation, where he never presented that argument to the Magistrate Judge.”); United 

States v. Hale, 2010 WL 2105141, *10 n.18 (S.D. Ala. May 24, 2010) (“Even if Hale’s guiltyplea ineffective assistance claim were timely, the Court would not consider it on the merits 

because Hale never presented this argument to the Magistrate Judge, but instead waited until his 

objections to the Report and Recommendation to assert it for the first time.”).

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with the MOU; otherwise, it will not be able to discern whether the appropriate disposition of the 

ULP Charges is deferral or dismissal. The proposed protective order would likely cripple the 

NLRB’s investigation and prevent it from obtaining information it reasonably requires in order 

to make the deferral/dismissal decision. On the other side of the balance, Lear’s only showing of 

harm is its stated, speculative fear of “contradictory fact findings and conclusions of law” if the 

NLRB investigation were allowed to proceed. In its discretion, the Court concludes upon 

balancing the parties’ respective interests that good cause does not exist to justify entry of a 

protective order that effectively stifles the NLRB’s ability to conduct an investigation of the ULP 

Charges and prevents it from complying with the MOU.

13 As such, respondent’s request for 

entry of a protective order is denied.

III. Conclusion.

For all of the foregoing reasons, it is ordered as follows:

1. Respondent’s “Motion to Stay Magistrate’s [sic] Report and Recommendation” 

(doc. 19) is moot;

2. Respondent’s Objections (doc. 17) to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation are overruled;

 13 As noted supra, the Court declines to consider Lear’s brand-new argument that a 

protective order be entered to require consultation between the NLRB and OSHA pursuant to 

section B(4) of the MOU. Even if this contention were considered on the merits, however, the 

result would be unchanged. Lear makes no persuasive showing that the MOU mandates 

consultation between the NLRB and OSHA before any NLRB investigation may occur. Lear 

makes no persuasive showing that such consultation would likely reduce the burdens on Lear in 

responding to the subject subpoenas; after all, the NLRB still remains obligated to determine 

whether it should defer or dismiss the subject charges, which it says (with no rejoinder from 

Lear) it can only achieve after conducting an investigation. And Lear makes no persuasive 

showing that anyone other than a single dissenting member of the NLRB has ever interpreted the 

MOU as requiring such consultation prior to any NLRB investigation of overlapping charges. 

Besides, any request for a protective order directing the NLRB to satisfy the MOU’s consultation 

provision before moving forward with the Lear subpoenas would be tantamount to an attempt to 

advance a private right of enforcement of the MOU. The Report and Recommendations explains 

in some detail why no such private right exists, and Lear has presented no meaningful challenge 

or rebuttal to that determination. For these reasons, the Court in its discretion would find no 

good cause warranting entry of the subject protective order, even if Lear had properly raised the 

consultation variant of its protective order request.

Case 1:16-cv-00061-WS-N Document 20 Filed 06/17/16 Page 12 of 13
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3. After de novo review of those portions to which objections is made, and as 

supplemented by the analysis set forth in this Order, the Magistrate Judge’s 

Report and Recommendations (doc. 16) is adopted by this Court pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b);

4. The National Labor Relations Board’s Applications for Order Enforcing 

Subpoenas Duces Tecum (doc. 1; doc. 7, at 3-11) are granted;

5. Respondent’s request for entry of a protective order is denied;

6. Respondent is ordered to obey the ten administrative subpoenas issued by the 

NLRB, including subpoenas duces tecum B-1-KFU8N5, B-1-NVOXOL and B-1-

NVG15D, and subpoenas ad testificandum A-1-KGCOJP, A-1-KGDB47, A-1-

KGDH05, A-1-KGDVG5, A-1-KGEB05, A-1-KGEOUH and A-1-KGD9T9; and

7. The parties are ordered to work together in good faith to make the necessary 

arrangements for compliance with the subpoenas;

8. Respondent is ordered to comply with the above-referenced subpoenas as soon as 

reasonably practicable, but in no event later than July 8, 2016; and

9. Because this Order resolves all issues and matters joined in this consolidated 

proceeding, the Clerk of Court is directed to close this civil file for administrative 

and statistical purposes.

DONE and ORDERED this 17th day of June, 2016.

s/ WILLIAM H. STEELE 

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:16-cv-00061-WS-N Document 20 Filed 06/17/16 Page 13 of 13