Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00609/USCOURTS-casd-3_19-cv-00609-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 820
Nature of Suit: Copyright
Cause of Action: 17:0501 Copyright Infringement

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CATHY REIS d/b/a CPS,

Plaintiff,

v.

TAVANT TECHNOLOGIES, 

INC.; and HASSAN RASHID,

Defendants.

Case No.: 19-cv-609-WQH-JLB

ORDER

HAYES, Judge:

The matter before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint filed by 

Defendants Tavant Technologies (“Tavant”) and Hassan Rashid. (ECF No. 3).

I. BACKGROUND

On April 2, 2019, Plaintiff Cathy Reis d/b/a CPS, proceeding pro se, initiated this 

action by filing a Complaint. (ECF No. 1). Reis alleges that CPS entered into a contract 

with Defendant Tavant on or about January 12, 2013 (the “Agreement”).1 Reis alleges that 

 

1 Defendants request the Court “incorporate by reference” the Agreement between Tavant and CPS. (ECF 

No. 3-1 at 8 n. 2). Defendants attach a copy of the Agreement as “Exhibit A” to the Declaration of Eric J. 

Ball in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. (Ball Decl., ECF No. 3-3, Exhibit A). Under the 

doctrine of incorporation by reference, “[a] district court ruling on a motion to dismiss may consider 

documents whose contents are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which

are not physically attached to the plaintiff’s pleadings.” Parrino v. FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 705 (9th Cir. 

1998) (quotation omitted). The “incorporation by reference” doctrine has been extended “to situations in 

which the plaintiff’s claim depends on the contents of a document, the defendant attaches the document 

to its motion to dismiss, and the parties do not dispute the authenticity of the document, even though the 

plaintiff does not explicitly allege the contents of that document in the complaint.” Knievel v. ESPN, 393 

F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 2005). Reis references the Agreement in the Complaint, her claims relate to the 

contents of the Agreement, and no party questions the authenticity of the Agreement. Defendants’ request 

is granted. 

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CPS expanded Tavant’s client base. Reis alleges that Tavant “signed the prospect 

agreement for commissions and has failed to compensate CPS.” (ECF No. 1 at 2).

Reis alleges that “The Copywrite Program LOANPlus” is “CPS trade secrets and 

ReisIP.” Reis alleges that she is the copyright holder and “assigned” the “1991 registered 

copyright model” to CPS. Reis alleges that she “introduced her 1991 copyright [] and CPS 

TRADE SECRET protected models to Tavant Technologies, as a way to increase its usage 

and began its implementation.” (ECF No. 1 at 2). Reis alleges that LOANPlus is an “exact 

replica” of Tavant’s “finconnect velox program.” Reis alleges that the finconnect velox 

program has been adopted nationwide. Reis alleges that Tavant is using her copyright 

model without her express permission, along with others in the mortgage industry. Id.

Reis alleges that prior to the Agreement with Tavant, she entered into a contract with 

Defendant Rashid. Reis alleges that her contract with Rashid is an “email MUTUAL NDA 

dated 2004.” Id.

Reis alleges “VIOLATIONS OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 

COPYRIGHT ACT, 17 U.S.C. § 501, ET SEQ.; AND VIOLATION OF CPS TRADE 

SECRETS.” Id. Reis seeks injunctive relief and “royalties owed” for the “adoption of Reis 

1991 Registered Copyright business model.” Reis also seeks damages and “related relief” 

against Tavant. (ECF No. 1 at 3).

On June 26, 2019, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint 

pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(3). (ECF No. 3).

Defendants contend that Reis fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted 

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Defendants contend that Reis’s Complaint is conclusory, fails 

to allege essential elements of the claims, and fails to allege facts establishing that

Defendants engaged in wrongful conduct. Defendants contend that venue in this district is 

improper under Rule 12(b)(3). Defendants contend that Reis’s claims are based on a 

contract with Tavant that contains a forum selection clause in which the Parties agreed to 

file suit in the Northern District of California. In the alternative, Defendants request that 

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the Court order Plaintiff to provide a more definite statement under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(e). (ECF No. 3 at 1).

On July 23, 2019, Reis filed a Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to 

Dismiss and a “Motions for Injunctions Declaration in Support of Motion for Injunctions.” 

(ECF No. 9). Reis contends that her Complaint meets the pleading standards of Rule 

12(b)(6). Id. at 10. Reis contends that venue is proper because the registered copyright has 

a San Diego address. Reis is not a party to the Agreement with Tavant, so she is not bound 

by the forum selection clause. Id. at 6.

On July 29, 2019, Defendants filed a Reply. (ECF No. 10).

II. RULE 12(b)(6) – FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

Defendants move the Court to dismiss Reis’ Complaint for failure to state a claim 

upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 

(ECF No. 3-1 at 13).

A. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits dismissal for “failure to state a 

claim upon which relief can be granted.” In order to state a claim for relief, a pleading 

“must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 

entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) “is proper only 

where there is no cognizable legal theory or an absence of sufficient facts alleged to support 

a cognizable legal theory.” Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 622 F.3d 1035, 

1041 (9th Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted).

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the 

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 

alleged.” Id. (citation omitted). However, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ 

of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic 

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recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 

(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)). A court is not “required to accept as true allegations that are 

merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell 

v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001).

“In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory factual 

content, and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a 

claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th 

Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted). If both parties advance plausible alternative explanations, 

then the “plaintiff’s complaint survives a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6),” because 

“[t]he standard at this stage of the litigation is not that plaintiff’s explanation must be true 

or even probable.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216-17 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Plaintiff’s 

complaint may be dismissed only when defendant’s plausible alternative explanation is so 

convincing that plaintiff’s explanation is im plausible.”).

B. Copyright Infringement Claim

Defendants contend that Reis fails to state a claim for copyright infringement. 

Defendants contend that Reis fails to identify the copyrighted work at issue. Defendants 

contend that Reis fails to state facts that show Defendants copied protected elements of 

Reis’s copyrighted work. Id. at 15. Reis contends that the Complaint “states factual 

allegations of essential elements of established legal theories. The complaint is not 

conclusory.” (ECF No. 9 at 10).

To state a claim for copyright infringement, a plaintiff must show “that he or she 

owns the copyright and that the defendant copied protected elements of the work.” Cavalier 

v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 822 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). “The protected 

elements of a work are those elements which are ‘original,’ which is to say that they are 

the product of ‘independent creation, not novelty.’” Jada Toys, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 518 

F.3d 628, 636 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 

1106, 1109 (9th Cir. 1970)).

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Reis fails to identify the copyrighted work at issue or state facts from which the 

Court can infer the work at issue. Reis refers to “1) the “1991 copyright;” 2) “the program;” 

3) “Reis 1991 registered copyright model;” and “The Copywrite Program LOANPlus”

(ECF No. 1 at 2) but states that she “authored CPSHUBLINK, Tavant fin connect in 1991 

and received a copyright registration” (ECF No. 9 at 11). Attached to Reis’s Complaint as 

“Exhibit C” is a photocopy of a “Certificate of Copyright Registration.” The Certificate 

shows that the title of the copyrighted work is “Contract [illegible] Center.” The 

handwritten response in the “Nature of Authorship” section of the Certificate is illegible. 

(ECF No. 1, Exhibit 3 at 1). Reis makes no reference to “Contract [illegible] Center” in her 

allegations. The conclusory allegations in Reis’ Complaint are inconsistent with the 

Certificate of Copyright Registration. Reis fails to identify the “work” Defendants 

allegedly copied. 

Reis fails to state facts from which the Court can infer that Reis is the copyright 

owner. Reis alleges that “The Program, ie Reis 1991 registered copyright model is a trade 

secret business model of CPS assigned by Reis, the copyright holder.” (ECF No. 1 at 2). 

Taking this allegation as true, Plaintiff lacks standing to sue for infringement of the 1991 

registered copyright model.2 CPS is the proper plaintiff. See Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. 

Drug Emporium, Inc., 38 F.3d 477, 484 (9th Cir. 1994) (the assignee of a copyright interest, 

rather than the assignor, is the proper plaintiff to assert a copyright infringement claim). 

“Generally, a shareholder does not have standing to redress an injury to the 

corporation.” Shell Petroleum, N.V. v. Graves, 709 F.2d 593, 595 (9th Cir. 1983)

(collecting cases). Similarly, members of a limited liability company do not have standing 

to bring claims for injuries to the company. See Coto Settlement v. Eisenberg, 593 F.3d 

1031, 1036-37 (9th Cir. 2010). CPS is “a Delaware Company.” Reis, as “CEO” of CPS, 

cannot bring suit for enforcement of CPS’s rights. (Ball Decl., Exhibit A, ECF No. 3-3 at 

 

2 To the extent Reis alleges a violation of the Agreement, Reis lacks standing to sue. Reis is not a party to 

the Agreement. (Ball Decl., Exhibit A, ECF No. 3-3).

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2). CPS cannot represent itself, nor can Reis represent CPS. See Civil Local Rule 83.3(j) 

(“Only natural persons representing their individual interests in propria persona may appear 

in court without representation by an attorney . . . . All other parties, including corporations, 

partnerships and other legal entities, may appear in court only through an attorney . . . .”).

Taking the factual allegations in the Complaint as true, Reis fails to state a claim for 

copyright infringement. Defendants’ motion to dismiss Reis’ claim for copyright 

infringement is granted.

C. Trade Secret Misappropriation Claim

Defendants contend that Reis fails to state a claim for trade secret misappropriation. 

(ECF No. 3-1 at 18). Defendants contend that Reis fails to identify any trade secret. 

Defendants contend that Plaintiff fails to state facts showing Reis kept any information 

secret. Defendants contend that Plaintiff fails to state facts showing Defendants 

misappropriated any trade secret. Id. at 19. Reis contends that “[t]he allegations are specific 

and provides the description of the nature of the dispute and provides the essential elements 

of established legal theory.” (ECF No. 9 at 10).

In order to state a claim for trade secret misappropriation under California’s Uniform 

Trade Secrets Act (“CUTSA”) or the federal Defend Trade Secrets Act (“DTSA”), a 

plaintiff must show that 1) the plaintiff owned a trade secret; 2) the defendant acquired, 

disclosed, or used the plaintiff’s trade secret through improper means; and 3) the 

defendant’s actions damaged the plaintiff. CytoDyn of New Mexico, Inc. v. Amerimmune 

Pharm., Inc., 160 Cal. App. 4th 288, 297 (2008) (quoting Sargent Fletcher, Inc. v. Able 

Corp., 110 Cal. App. 4th 1658, 1665 (2003)); 18 U.S.C. § 1836. The DTSA additionally 

requires a connection to interstate or foreign commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(1). A “trade 

secret” under the CTUSA and DTSA is information that “(1) [d]erives independent

economic value . . . from not being generally known to the public or to other persons who 

can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and (2) [i]s the subject of efforts that 

are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.” Cal. Civ. Code. § 

3426.1(d); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1839(3)(A) and (B). The party asserting a misappropriation of 

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trade secrets “must identify the trade secrets and carr[ies] the burden of showing that they 

exist.” MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Comput., Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 522 (9th Cir. 2993).

Reis fails to “identify the trade secret[].” Id. Reis makes the conclusory allegation 

that the 1991 copyright model is a “trade secret.” (ECF No. 1 at 2). Reis fails to state facts 

that show the copyright model derives value from not being generally know and is the 

subject of reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy. Cal. Civ. Code. § 3426.1(d); 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 1839(3)(A) and (B). Reis’s allegations that Tavant uses the copyrighted work “along 

with many others in the mortgage industry” and that the “finconnect velox program has 

now been widely adopted nationwide” undermine any claim Reis asserts for trade secret 

misappropriation. (ECF No. 1 at 2). 

Reis fails to allege facts that show she is the owner of a trade secret. Reis alleges 

that the trade secret belongs to CPS. See ECF No. 1 at 2 (the copyright is a “trade secret 

business model of CPS;” LOANPlus was recognized “as CPS trade secrets;” and Reis 

introduced “CPS TRADE SECRET protected models to Tavant”). Reis’s brings a claim 

for “VIOLATION OF CPS TRADE SECRETS.” Reis cannot bring a trade secret 

misappropriation claim on CPS’s behalf. Shell Petroleum, N.V., 709 F.2d at 595; Coto 

Settlement, 593 F.3d at 1036-37 (9th Cir. 2010). Reis fails to meet her burden to allege

facts sufficient to state a claim for trade secret misappropriation. Defendants’ motion to 

dismiss Reis’ claim for misappropriation of trade secrets is granted. The other issues raised 

by Defendants are moot.

///

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///

///

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III. CONCLUSION

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s 

Complaint (ECF No. 3) is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1) is DISMISSED 

WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiff shall file any motion for leave to amend the Complaint 

within 30 days of the date of this Order pursuant to Civil Local Rule 15.1. If no motion is 

filed, the Clerk of Court shall close the case.

Dated: November 5, 2019

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