Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01259/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01259-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 1

the Court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal.

Local Rule 78-230(h).

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GEOFFREY A. SCHAFER,

2:06-cv-1259-MCE-DAD

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

EL DORADO COUNTY,

BOB ASHWORTH, an Individual,

and, COUNTY OF EL DORADO, DOES

1 THROUGH 20.

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Through the present action, Plaintiff Geoffrey A. Schafer

(“Plaintiff”) claims that Defendants El Dorado County (“El Dorado

County”), Detective Bob Ashworth (“Ashworth”) and Does 1 through

20, violated his rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 during the course

of executing a valid search warrant on Plaintiff’s home. 

1

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2

Specifically, Plaintiff claims he was subjected to an

unreasonable detention and excessive force. In bringing the

present Motion, Defendants seek to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), or in the

alternative, have the entire action stayed pending final

resolution of the related case of U.S. v. Dale C. Schafer.

For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss for failure to state a claim is DENIED as it relates to

Plaintiff’s unreasonable detention claim. Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss Plaintiff’s excessive force claim and Plaintiff’s claim

against El Dorado County are likewise DENIED. Additionally,

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claim against Ashworth

based on qualified immunity is DENIED. 

BACKGROUND

On September 28, 2001, approximately fifteen law enforcement

officers from the El Dorado County Sheriff’s Department executed

a valid search warrant on Plaintiff’s home. Plaintiff, then

fourteen years old, his mother, and Plaintiff’s ten-month old

niece were home prior to and during execution of the warrant. 

Upon seeing the uniformed officers, Plaintiff and his mother

quickly exited the home with their hands up. The officers

ordered Plaintiff and his mother to lie down on the ground. 

Plaintiff and his mother immediately complied and did not at any

time resist the commands of the officers. Nonetheless, for ten

to fifteen minutes, an officer kept his weapon drawn and pointed

at Plaintiff and his mother. 

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3

Beginning immediately and for a three hour period thereafter,

Plaintiff was restrained in handcuffs.

STANDARD

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under

Rule 12(b)(6), all allegations of material fact must be accepted

as true and construed in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336,

337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). A complaint will not be dismissed for

failure to state a claim “‘unless it appears beyond doubt that

plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of [his or] her

claim that would entitle [him or] her to relief.’” Yamaguchi v.

Dep’t of the Air Force, 109 F.3d 1475, 1480 (9th Cir. 1997)

(quoting Lewis v. Tel. Employees Credit Union, 87 F.3d 1537, 1545

(9th Cir. 1996)).

If the Court grants a motion to dismiss a complaint, it must

then decide whether to grant leave to amend. The Court should

“freely give[]” leave to amend when there is no “undue delay, bad

faith[,] dilatory motive on the part of the movant, ... undue

prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of ... the amendment,

[or] futility of the amendment....” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); Foman

v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Generally, leave to amend is

only denied when it is clear that the deficiencies of the

complaint cannot be cured by amendment. DeSoto v. Yellow Freight

Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992).

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ANALYSIS

Plaintiff’s claims are based on alleged violations of his

Fourth Amendments right to be free from unlawful and unreasonable

detention during the execution of a valid search warrant on his

home as well as a right to be free from excessive force.

1. Unreasonable Detention During a Valid Search

A detention may violate the Fourth Amendment “either because

the detention itself is unreasonable or because it is carried out

in an unreasonable manner.” Meredith v. Erath, 342 F.3d 1057,

1061 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). As such, the Court

must assess the constitutionality of the detention by weighing a

number of factors including whether the officers had authority to

detain Plaintiff, whether the force used to effect the detention

was excessive and whether the detention was unreasonable in

duration. Each of these components will be considered in turn. 

See Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93 (2005).

a. Authorization to Detain

In the Muehler case, the Supreme Court had occasion to

examine the precise issue at hand. Specifically, the Court

considered the constitutionality of a detainment incident to the

execution of a search warrant. See Id. In Muehler, Iris Mena

was detained in handcuffs for three hours during the execution of

a search warrant on a residence she shared with several others.

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 In Tekle v. U.S., the Ninth Circuit also followed Muehler 2

by ruling that an officer’s authority to detain incident to a

search is categorical. 457 F.3d 1088, 1098 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Although the facts in Tekle and Muehler were similar, the Ninth

Circuit distinguished Tekle from Muehler when analyzing the

manner in which the Plaintiffs were detained. 

5

She later sued the officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that

the duration of her detainment together with the use of handcuffs

violated her Fourth Amendment rights.

In reversing the Ninth Circuit’s judgment in favor of the

plaintiff, the Supreme Court clearly ruled that detentions are

appropriate during valid searches because the justifications for

detentions are substantial and the intrusion is minimal.2

Muehler, 544 U.S. at 98. The Court went on to explain that an

officer’s authority to detain incident to a search is

categorical; it does not depend on the “quantum of proof

justifying detention or the extent of the intrusion to be imposed

by the seizure." Id. (quoting Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692,

705, n. 19 (1981)). 

Here the Parties concede, as they must, that Defendants were

authorized to detain Plaintiff because a valid warrant, issued by

a neutral magistrate, existed to search the residence of which

Plaintiff was an occupant.

b. Use of Force to Effect the Detention

Inherent in the authorization to detain an occupant of the

place to be searched is the authority to use reasonable force to

effectuate the detention. Muehler, 544 U.S. at 98-99 (citing

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).

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While it is clear the officers were authorized to use force to

detain Plaintiff, “[P]olice do not ... have unfettered authority

to detain a building’s occupants in any way they see fit.” 

Dawson v. City of Seattle, 435 F.3d 1054, 1066 (9th Cir. 2006).

Rather, the detention must be conducted “in a reasonable manner.”

Id.; Tekle, 457 F.3d at 1098.

Plaintiff claims the detention was not conducted in a

reasonable manner given the application of handcuffs for the

duration of the two to three hour search. In assessing

Plaintiff’s claims, the Court must consider whether the

governmental interests in using handcuffs in effecting this

detainment outweighed the intrusion. Muehler, 544 U.S. at 99.

The Supreme Court has recognized that the execution of a

warrant to search for drugs “may give rise to sudden violence or

frantic efforts to conceal or destroy evidence” raising the

governmental interest. Summers, 452 U.S. at 702-703. Here, the

underlying warrant was, indeed, a search for drugs heightening

the Defendants’ right to use handcuffs to detain Plaintiff. In

addition, when officers must detain multiple occupants, as was

the case here, the use of handcuffs is all the more reasonable. 

Mena, 544 U.S. at 100.

Conversely, the Defendants were dealing with a minor giving

rise to “particular concerns that must be assessed with the other

circumstances.” See Tekle, 457 F.3d at 1098. Further, Plaintiff

was unarmed and was not resisting arrest. Finally, while the

officers were detaining multiple occupants, Plaintiff and his

mother were vastly outnumbered by the officers lessening the

governmental interest in this case.

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Finding all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiff, as

is proper at this stage in the litigation, the Court concludes

this factor weighs in favor of denying Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss.

c. Duration

The duration of a detention can affect the balance of

interests. As noted above, however, the Supreme Court in Meuhler

held that an officer’s authority to detain incident to a search

is categorical. Meuhler, 544 U.S. at 98. In Dawson, the Ninth

Circuit interpreted the foregoing language to mean that no

further justification is required for the “duration of a

detention [to] be coextensive with the period of a search.” 435

F.3d at 1066. The Parties do not contend that the duration of

the detainment exceeded the duration of the search of the

Schafer/Fry home. Accordingly, the duration of Plaintiff’s

detainment alone does not infringe his Fourth Amendment rights.

In sum, the Court finds that while the authority to detain

as well as the duration of the detainment are plainly permissible

for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, the Court cannot say as a

matter of law that the use of force in this case was

constitutionally permissible. Taking all reasonable inferences

in favor of Plaintiff, the Court finds that a reasonable jury

could conclude that Defendants’ detainment was unreasonable based

on a totality of the circumstances. Consequently, Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for unreasonable detention is

DENIED.

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2. Use of Excessive Force

When determining whether the Plaintiff has stated an

excessive force claim for which relief can be granted, the Court

must ascertain whether the facts could prove that Defendants

acted unreasonably when implementing forceful tactics. As in

other Fourth Amendment contexts, the question posed in excessive

force claims is “whether the officers’ actions are objectively

reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting

them.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 397. The infliction of pain or

physical injury are facts considered but are not necessary to

establish an excessive force claim. For instance, the pointing

of a gun at someone may be excessive force, even if it does not

result in physical injury. Tekle, 457 F.3d at 1095. 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claim for excessive force

fails because Plaintiff did not allege an infliction of pain or

physical injury as a result of the Defendants’ actions. As

explained in Tekle, neither the infliction of pain nor physical

injury are necessary components of an excessive force claim. 

Plaintiff’s assertion that Defendants acted unreasonably and in

violation of his constitutional rights by training a weapon on

him for fifteen minutes while he lay on the ground unarmed and

submissive is sufficient to defeat Defendants’ Motion at this

stage of the litigation. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss Plaintiff’s excessive force claim is DENIED.

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3. Qualified Immunity

A private right of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

exists against law enforcement officers who, acting under the

color of authority, violate federal constitutional or statutory

rights of an individual. See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609

(1999). The defense of qualified immunity, however, shields an

officer from trial when the officer “reasonably mis-apprehends

the law governing the circumstances she confronted,” even if the

officer’s conduct was constitutionally deficient. Brosseau v.

Haugen, 543 U.S. 194 (2004) (per curiam). 

Plaintiff argues that any assertion of good faith or

qualified immunity is premature. See Plf.s’ Opp. 2:14-16. On

the contrary, the Supreme Court instructs that where, as here,

some or all of the defendants seek qualified immunity, a ruling

on that issue should be made early in the proceedings so that the

costs and expenses of trial are avoided where the defense is

dispositive. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001). In addition,

the Ninth Circuit clarified that government officials are

entitled to raise the qualified immunity defense immediately, on

a motion to dismiss the complaint, to protect against the burdens

of discovery and other pre-trial procedures. Kwai Fun Wong v.

U.S. INS, 373 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). 

However, the Court must be careful not to eviscerate the notice

pleading standard when ruling on Defendants’ Motion. 

Accordingly, while the factual record is sparse at this stage,

the Court must nonetheless proceed to an analysis of qualified

immunity.

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In Saucier, the Supreme Court laid out the framework for

determining an officer’s entitlement to qualified immunity. The

threshold inquiry requires a court to ask, “taken in the light

most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts

alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional

right?” Id. at 201. The inquiry ends at this stage if no

constitutional right is found to have been violated; the

plaintiff cannot prevail. Id. If, on the other hand, the

plaintiff’s allegations do make out a constitutional injury, then

the court must determine whether that constitutional right was

clearly established at the time of the violation. Id. If the

right was not clearly established, the qualified immunity

doctrine shields the officer from further litigation. Id.

Finally, even if the violated right was clearly established, the

Saucier court recognized that it may be difficult for a police

officer fully to appreciate how the legal constraints apply to

the specific situation he or she faces. Under such a

circumstance, “if the officer’s mistake as to what the law

requires is reasonable, ... the officer is entitled to the

immunity defense.” Id. at 205.

As noted above, the threshold inquiry requires this Court to

ask, taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, do the facts

alleged show a violation of a constitutional right? While the

defense of qualified immunity is generally asserted as shielding

all Defendants, here the defense is asserted only as to Defendant

Ashworth. Accordingly, the Court’s analysis shall be limited as

to that defendant.

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a. Violation of Fourth Amendment

Fourth Amendment violations can be based on either an

unreasonable detention or an unreasonable manner in which the

detention was carried out. As explained earlier, Plaintiff has

asserted both an unreasonable detention claim as well as an

excessive force claim based on Plaintiff’s averment that

“Defendant Ashworth ... [has] violated plaintiff’s Fourth

Amendment rights by knowingly, intentionally, and maliciously

subjecting plaintiff to grossly excessive and entirely

unnecessary force and by falsely and needlessly ... holding him

at gunpoint, for approximately three hours.” Plf.s’ Compl. ¶ 17. 

Given the Court’s conclusion that Plaintiff has sufficiently

stated a cause of action for both unlawful detainment as well as

excessive force, the Court must turn to whether the law as to

those claims was clearly established at the time of the incident. 

B. Clearly Established Law

Since the Plaintiff’s allegations adequately state a

constitutional injury, the Court must determine whether that

constitutional right was clearly established, at the time of the

violation, to put officers on notice that their conduct was

clearly unlawful. Robinson, 278 F.3d at 1015. In the absence of

binding authority, the Court may consider any decisional law

available to determine whether the law is clearly established,

including decisions of state courts, other circuits, and district

courts. Tekle, 457 F.3d at 1096. 

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 Specifically, the Ninth Circuit cited to cases decided 3

prior to 1998 to hold that an eleven year old, non-suspect had a

clearly established right not to have officers direct their guns

at him for fifteen minutes.

12

The Defendant asserts that the constitutional right in

question was not clearly established law because cases

establishing such a right were not decided until 2002, one year

after the Defendants’ alleged conduct. Although the Defendants

are correct that Tekle was not decided until after 2001, the

Court finds the rationale in Tekle instructive since it utilized

cases prior to 1998 to establish the constitutional right at

issue here. Tekle, 457 F.3d at 1097. 3

In regard to the claim for unlawful detention, the Ninth

Circuit held that handcuffing a child detainee was clearly

established. Id. at 1100. Here, like in Tekle, the detainee was

a minor, was vastly outnumbered and was complying with officers’

commands. Accordingly, the Court finds that the law with respect

to detaining minors in handcuffs for two to three hours was

clearly established.

With respect to the excessive force claim, the Ninth Circuit

has held “since 1984 that pointing a gun at a suspect’s head can

constitute excessive force in this circuit.” Id. Accordingly,

at the time of this incident, it was clearly established law in

the Ninth Circuit that officers may not train a weapon on a

suspect without violating the Fourth Amendment. Consequently,

the Court finds that as early as 1984, the law was established

that a claim for excessive force can be entertained when an

officer points a weapon at a citizen during the course of a

search.

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C. Reasonableness

The Court acknowledges that it is sometimes difficult for

officers to ascertain how relevant legal principles apply to

situations he or she may confront. Thus, even if the violated

right was clearly established, an officer’s mistake is entitled

to the immunity defense if it was reasonable under the

circumstances. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205. 

 The facts do not support Defendants’ claim that the

officers’ alleged mistake was reasonable. As explained

repeatedly above, the Plaintiff’s age together with his

cooperation during the detainment and the number of officers at

the scene should have alerted a reasonable officer that pointing

a gun at a non-suspect detainee for fifteen to twenty minutes and

handcuffing him for two to three hours was unconstitutional. 

Therefore, the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claim

against Ashworth based on qualified immunity is DENIED.

4. Group Liability Theory

The Plaintiff does not assert a group liability theory, but

rather claims that “each defendant, including Ashworth, took

actions that render them liable to Plaintiff ... in that each

defendant proximately harmed plaintiff by actual participation in

the acts and omissions alleged ...” Plf.s’ Oppos. ¶¶ 16-19. 

Thus, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss a claim based on group

liability is inapplicable as no such claim has been asserted. 

Consequently, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss this claim is DENIED.

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5. Government Policy

Under section 1983, a county may only be liable “when

execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its

lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to

represent official policy, inflicts the injury.” Meehan v.

County of L.A., 856 F.2d 102, 106 (1988). Additionally, proof of

unconstitutional conduct is insufficient to impose liability on

the county unless it was caused by an existing, unconstitutional

local government policy. Id. at 107. Thus, a county may not be

liable on a theory of respondeat superior under section 1983. 

Id.

Defendants move to dismiss on the ground that the Complaint

fails to specify the exact policies and customs in which the

officers’ conduct was based. When considering a motion to

dismiss, the Court must only determine whether the facts alleged

by Plaintiff are sufficient to state a claim for relief. Any

consideration beyond the foregoing would improperly lead to a

discussion of the merits of the claim. Here, Plaintiff asserted

that the alleged illegal conduct was pursuant to El Dorado

County’s policy. Nothing more need be alleged at this point in

the litigation. Defendant will have an opportunity to challenge

the validity of this claim at a later stage. Thus, the

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claim based on an

unconstitutional government policy must be DENIED.

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6. Stay the Action

In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994), the United

State Supreme Court held that:

“when a state prisoner seeks damages in a section 1983

suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment

in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the

invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would,

the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can

demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already

been invalidated.

In Harvey v. Waldron, the Ninth Circuit extended Heck to apply to

pending criminal cases. 210 F.3d 1008, 1014 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Thus, Harvey and Heck pertain to actions brought by a plaintiff

that would invalidate the plaintiff’s pending prosecution or

criminal conviction. In the present case, however, the Plaintiff

does not have a pending criminal charge, but rather the criminal

charges are pending against the Plaintiff’s parents. Any ruling

favoring Plaintiff’s claims would have no bearing on the pending

criminal proceedings against his parents. Thus, the rationale

announced in Heck for barring collateral section 1983 claims is

inapplicable. In addition, Defendants have provided no authority

for extending the Heck doctrine in the manner advocated by

Defendant here and the Court has found none. Accordingly, the

Defendants’ Motion to Stay this action is DENIED.

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CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s unreasonable detention claim is DENIED. Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s excessive force claim is DENIED. 

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claim against El Dorado

County is DENIED. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s

claim against Ashworth based on qualified immunity is DENIED. 

Finally, Defendants’ Motion to Stay this action is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 9, 2007

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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