Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-4_04-cv-00380/USCOURTS-ared-4_04-cv-00380-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWW)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

WESTERN DIVISION

JOAN F. BOREL Plaintiff

v. 4:04CV00380 JLH/HLJ

JO ANNE B. BARNHART,

Commissioner, Social

Security Administration, Defendant

PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION

INSTRUCTIONS

This recommended disposition has been submitted to United States

District Judge J. Leon Holmes. The parties may file specific written

objections to these findings and recommendations and must provide the

factual or legal basis for each objection. An original and two

copies of the objections must be filed with the Clerk no later than

eleven (11) days from the date of the findings and recommendations.

A copy must be served on the opposing party. The District Judge,

even in the absence of objections, may reject these findings and

recommendations in whole or in part.

DISPOSITION

Plaintiff, Joan F. Borel, has appealed the final decision of the

Commissioner of the Social Security Administration to deny her claim

for Disability Insurance benefits. Both parties have submitted

appeal briefs and the case is ready for decision.

The Court's function on review is to determine whether the

Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence on the

record as a whole and whether it is based on legal error. Long v.

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Chater, 108 F.3d 185, 187 (8th Cir. 1997); see also, 42 U.S.C.

§ 405(g). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Reynolds v. Chater,

82 F.3d 254, 257 (8th Cir. 1996).

 In assessing the substantiality of the evidence, the Court must

consider evidence that detracts from the Commissioner's decision as

well as evidence that supports it; the Court may not, however,

reverse the Commissioner's decision merely because substantial

evidence would have supported an opposite decision. Sultan v.

Barnhart, 368 F.3d 857, 863 (8th Cir. 2004); Woolf v. Shalala, 3 F.3d

1210, 1213 (8th Cir. 1993).

"Disability" is the "inability to engage in any substantial

gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or

mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which

has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not

less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). A "physical or

mental impairment" is "an impairment that results from anatomical,

physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable

by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic

techniques." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3).

Plaintiff alleged disability based on high blood pressure, high

cholesterol, thyroid problems, depression with job-related stress,

chronic neck pain caused by stress and symptoms of transient ischemic

attacks (blurred vision, memory loss, slurred speech and problems

walking). (Tr. 106) The Commissioner found that she was not

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The Hon. Henry Ginger.

 2The Appeals Council remanded after an earlier ALJ opinion following

a hearing. (Tr. 79-82

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disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. The only

issue before this Court is whether the Commissioner's decision that

Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Act is supported

by substantial record evidence.

After conducting an administrative hearing, the Administrative

Law Judge1

 (ALJ) concluded that Plaintiff had not been under a

disability within the meaning of the Social Security Act at any time

through November 30, 2001, the date of his decision. (Tr. 35) On

March 6, 2004, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for a

review of the ALJ's decision, making the ALJ's decision the final

decision of the Commissioner. (Tr. 8-10) Plaintiff then filed her

complaint initiating this appeal. (Docket #2)

After consideration of the record as a whole, the Court finds

that the decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial

evidence.

Plaintiff was 50 years old at the time of the supplemental

hearing.2

 (Tr. 326) She obtained a General Equivalency Diploma.

(Tr. 112, 326) She has past relevant work as a secretary. (Tr. 34,

119-23, 326-27)

The ALJ considered Plaintiff's impairments by way of the

required five-step sequential evaluation process. The first step

involves a determination of whether the claimant is involved in

substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). If the

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In regulations that became effective September 25, 2003, the Social

Security Administration amended and clarified certain aspects of the

sequential evaluation process in ways not material to this opinion.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e) and (f) were redesignated 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520(f) and (g), respectively. 68 Fed. Reg. 51153, 51161-62

(August 26, 2003).

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claimant is, benefits are denied; if not, the evaluation goes to the

next step.

Step 2 involves a determination, based solely on the medical

evidence, of whether the claimant has a severe impairment or

combination of impairments. Id., § 404.1520(c); see 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1526. If not, benefits are denied; if so, the evaluation

proceeds to the next step.

Step 3 involves a determination, again based solely on the

medical evidence, of whether the severe impairment(s) meets or equals

a listed impairment which is presumed to be disabling. Id.,

§ 404.1520(d). If so, benefits are awarded; if not, the evaluation

continues.

Step 4 involves a determination of whether the claimant has

sufficient residual functional capacity, despite the impairment(s),

to perform past work. Id., § 404.1520(e).3

 If so, benefits are

denied; if not, the evaluation continues.

Step 5 involves a determination of whether the claimant is able

to perform other substantial and gainful work within the economy,

given claimant's age, education and work experience. Id.,

§ 404.1520(f). If so, benefits are denied; if not, benefits are

awarded.

The ALJ found that Plaintiff had engaged in substantial gainful

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activity though March 26, 1999, after her alleged onset date of

September 15, 1998 (Tr. 87), but not thereafter (Tr. 34). He found

that she had a “severe” impairment, cerebrovascular disease and a

history of stroke (TIA); chronic neck and back pain for which a

reduction mammoplasty had been recommended and depressive syndrome

(Tr. 27), but that she did not have an impairment or combination of

impairments that met or equaled a Listing (Tr. 34). He judged that

Plaintiff’s allegations regarding her limitations were not borne out

by the overall evidence and were not fully credible. Id. 

The ALJ found that Plaintiff retained the residual functional

capacity for a wide range of unskilled light work requiring no more

than simple, repetitive tasks under simple, direct, concrete

supervision where interpersonal contact was no more than necessary to

carry out simple, direct and concrete instructions. (Tr. 35) He

found that she was unable to perform her past relevant work. (Tr.

34) The ALJ correctly noted that, once Plaintiff was determined to

be unable to perform her past relevant work, the burden shifted to

the Commissioner to show a significant number of jobs within the

economy that she could perform, given her residual functional

capacity, age, education and past work. Id. 

Based on the testimony of a vocational expert witness in

response to a hypothetical question, the ALJ found that there were a

significant number of jobs in the economy which Plaintiff could

perform, notwithstanding her limitations, for example, light

assembler of small products, light housekeeping cleaner and light

fast food worker. (Tr. 35) Consequently, the ALJ concluded that

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Plaintiff was not disabled. Id.

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ did not give proper weight to

the opinion of her treating psychiatrist. (Br. 7) In June of 1999,

Kenneth Vest, M.D., wrote a To Whom It May Concern letter which

concluded,

Based on my evaluation of the patient, I feel that she

could not be expected to keep a regular schedule of

activities, to work without frequent direction or handle

any interpersonal work related stress. Given patient’s

lack of response [to anti-depressants prescribed by him and

by her family physician], I feel that this situation is

likely to persist. For this reason, I am asking you to

consider her for disability.

(Tr. 239)

Plaintiff also emphasizes the opinion of Dan Donahue, Ph.D., a

reviewing psychologist employed by the Social Security

Administration. (Br. 8) Plaintiff contends that professional

opinions of those two were “glaringly and erroneously ignored” by the

Commissioner. (Br. 8) Clearly, the ALJ did not ignore the opinions

of Drs. Vest and Donahue; in fact he devoted over a page of his

decision to them. (Tr. 31-32) 

At the time that he wrote his To Whom It May Concern letter, Dr.

Vest had been seeing Plaintiff less than four months. (Tr. 239-50)

It appears that at least part of her depression was situational.

(Tr. 243, 247) Less than four months later, Plaintiff reported not

being as depressed, and she was not tearful, hopeless and helpless.

(Tr. 284) Dr. Vest noted that she was a “partial responder” to

medications. Id. By December, 1999, he observed that she was

stable, but still not back to her best level of functioning. (Tr.

283) In January of 2000, Plaintiff told Dr. Vest that she and he

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husband were doing well with a recent move and were active in their

church. (Tr. 282) She reported her overall mood had “improved

considerably.” Id. His impression was “Patient improving.” Id. 

Although Dr. Donahue noted in May of 1999 that Plaintiff was

moderately limited in some components of her residual functional

capacity (mental), he was of the opinion that she could perform work

where interpersonal contact was incidental to the work performed,

such as assembly work; complexity of tasks would be learned and

performed by rote with few variables and little judgment involved;

supervision required is simple, direct and concrete. (Tr. 226-28)

Depression is not necessarily disabling. Trenary v. Bowen, 898

F.2d 1361, 1364 (8th Cir. 1990).

The ALJ’s hypothetical question to the vocational expert

properly incorporated Plaintiff’s limitations as Drs. Vest and

Donahue noted them. (Tr. 346) To the extent that Dr. Vest’s To Whom

It May Concern letter indicated that Plaintiff was disabled, the ALJ

properly reached his own conclusion. (Tr. 57) An opinion that

Plaintiff could not be gainfully employed is not a medical opinion,

but an opinion on the application of a statute, a task assigned

solely to the discretion of the Commissioner. Krogmeier v. Barnhart,

294 F.3d 1019, 1023 (8th Cir. 2002).

Medical sources often offer opinions about whether an

individual who has applied for title II or title XVI

disability benefits is "disabled" or "unable to work," or

make similar statements of opinions. In addition, they

sometimes offer opinions in other work-related terms; for

example, about an individual's ability to do past relevant

work or any other type of work. Because these are

administrative findings that may determine whether an

individual is disabled, they are reserved to the

Commissioner. Such opinions on these issues must not be

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disregarded. However, even when offered by a treating

source, they can never be entitled to controlling weight or

given special significance.

SSR 96-5p, at 5.

It is not the task of this Court to review the evidence and make

an independent decision. Neither is it to reverse the decision of

the ALJ because there is evidence in the record which contradicts his

findings. The test is whether there is substantial evidence in the

record as a whole which supports the decision of the ALJ. E.g.,

Mapes v. Chater, 82 F.3d 259, 262 (8th Cir. 1996); Pratt v. Sullivan,

956 F.2d 830, 833 (8th Cir. 1992).

There is ample evidence in the record as a whole that "a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support [the] conclusion"

of the ALJ in this case. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. at 401; see

also Reutter v. Barnhart, 372 F.3d 946, 950 (8th Cir. 2004). The

Commissioner's decision is not based on legal error.

THEREFORE, the Court hereby affirms the final determination of

the Commissioner and dismisses Plaintiff's complaint with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 18th day of July, 2005.

 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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