Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02154/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-02154-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:12101 The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SCOTT SCHUTZA,

Plaintiff,

vs.

ALESSIO LEASING, INC., a California 

Corporation, et al.

Defendants.

CASE NO. 18cv2154-LAB (AGS)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS [Dkt. 14]

Plaintiff Scott Schutza brought this suit against Defendants Alessio Leasing, Inc. 

and New Cingular Wireless PCS, LLC alleging that the conditions at Defendants’ AT&T 

retail store violate the Americans with Disability Act (“ADA”) and California’s Unruh Civil 

Rights Act. Defendants move to dismiss Schutza’s complaint, arguing that he has failed 

to state a claim for violation of the ADA and that the Court should decline supplemental 

jurisdiction over Schutza’s Unruh Act claim. Defendants’ motion is GRANTED IN PART

and DENIED IN PART.

BACKGROUND

Sometime in September 2017, Scott Schutza, a paraplegic who cannot walk and 

who uses a wheelchair for mobility, entered an AT&T service store owned by Defendant 

New Cingular and located on property owned by Defendant Alessio Leasing. According 

to Schutza, most of the sales counters were too tall for him to use and the only counter 

of suitable height did not have the necessary clearance underneath for his wheelchair. 

Schutza brought this suit roughly one year later, alleging that the inaccessible counters

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violate the ADA. As in virtually every other ADA suit brought in California, Schutza alleged 

that, by violating the ADA, Defendants also violated California’s Unruh Act. See Cal. Civ. 

Code § 51(f) (“A violation of the right of any individual under the [ADA] shall also constitute 

a violation of this section.”). 

ANALYSIS

Defendants argue that Schutza’s complaint must be dismissed in its entirety 

because (1) Schutza has failed to state a claim for violation of the ADA and (2) his state 

law claim predominates over his federal claim and constitutes impermissible forum 

shopping.

1. ADA Claim

Defendants first argue that Schutza’s claim for violation of the ADA fails a matter 

of law because he has not plausibly pled that the tables and counters in Defendants’ retail 

store actually violate the clearance requirements of the ADA.

Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination “on the basis of disability in the full and 

equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or 

accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases 

(or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). “To 

prevail on a discrimination claim under Title III, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he is disabled 

within the meaning of the ADA; (2) the defendant is a private entity that owns, leases, or 

operates a place of public accommodation; and (3) the plaintiff was denied public 

accommodations by the defendant because of his disability.” Arizona ex rel. Goddard v. 

Harkins Amusement Enters., Inc., 603 F.3d 666, 670 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Molski v. M.J.

Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 2007)). 

The parties agree that the first two elements of an ADA claim are met here, so the 

only question is whether Schutza has plausibly pled that he was denied public 

accommodations by Defendants because of his disability. Defendants suggest that the 

Court should dismiss the case because Schutza has not spelled out in exacting detail 

how their store violated the ADA. They argue, for example, that only “forward 

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approaching sales and service counters” are required to provide toe clearance under the 

ADA—all other counters, including those with a “parallel approach,” do not. See 2010 

ADAAG §§ 904.4.1, 904.4.2. Because Schutza has not specifically alleged that the 

counter he used was a “forward approaching counter” as opposed to a “parallel counter,” 

he has not, in Defendants’ view, plausibly alleged a violation of the ADA. 

The Federal Rules do not permit dismissal of an ADA complaint based on such 

formalities. The Court must accept well pled allegations as true and draw reasonable 

inferences from those allegations. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 

(2007). Here, Schutza alleges that he visited Defendants’ store and found only one sales 

counter of wheelchair-accessible height. But he was unable to use that counter because 

it had inadequate clearance underneath for his wheelchair. Drawing reasonable 

inferences from his allegations, it is plausible that Defendants violated the ADA by 

providing no sales counters that would accommodate Schutza’s disability. Schutza was 

not required to describe in meticulous detail whether the counters were forward-facing or 

parallel, and the Ninth Circuit has specifically rejected the argument that a Plaintiff is 

required to identify a specific ADA guideline in pleading an ADA violation. See Fortyune 

v. American Multi-Cinema, Inc., 364 F.3d 1075, 1084 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[Defendant] argues 

that to prevail on his ADA claim ‘[plaintiff] must establish that the [public accommodation] 

fails to comply with the specific requirements of the ADAAG.’ But despite its dogged 

insistence on this contention, [defendant] is unable to cite a single authority advancing its 

position.”). 

Whether Defendants did in fact have wheelchair-accessible counters—forwardfacing, parallel, or otherwise—is a factual question that will be simple to resolve through 

discovery and summary judgment. For now, though, Schutza has stated a plausible claim 

for relief, so Defendants’ motion to dismiss his federal ADA claim is DENIED.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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2. Unruh Act Claim

Defendants next argue that even if Schutza has stated a plausible claim for relief 

under the ADA, the Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his 

derivative state law Unruh Act claim. 

In general, a district court is required to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a 

state law claim unless “(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, (2) the 

claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has 

original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original 

jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for 

declining jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Because the Court has already determined 

it has jurisdiction over Schutza’s federal ADA claim, only the first, second, and fourth 

exceptions implicated here, and Defendants argue that each is satisfied. Following the 

lead of other courts in this Circuit, the Court concludes that exercising supplemental 

jurisdiction would be improper here in light of the predominance of the state claim and the 

novel and exceptional circumstances presented.

a. Plaintiff’s state law claim substantially predominates.

The Court agrees with Defendants that Schutza’s state law claim substantially 

predominates over his ADA claim. 

The ADA is a purely injunctive statute that does not permit an award of monetary 

damages. See Wander v. Kaus, 304 F.3d 856, 858 (9th Cir. 2002). The Unruh Act, by 

contrast, allows a plaintiff to receive both injunctive relief and money damages. See Cal. 

Civ. Code §§ 52, 55.56 (permitting an award of attorney’s fees and a $4,000 mandatory 

minimum for “each particular occasion that the plaintiff was denied full and equal 

access.”). This financial motivation is a double-edged sword. On one hand, it provides 

additional incentive for disability-access litigants to bring suits to remedy the access 

issues they encounter, furthering the goals of the ADA and Unruh Act. As the California 

legislature has noted, though, this financial incentive has also given rise to a cottage 

industry of litigants and law firms whose primary goal is not the “correction of accessibility 

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violation[s],” but the extraction of “quick cash settlements” from “small businesses on the 

basis of boilerplate complaints.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.55(a)(2). “This practice 

unfairly taints the reputation of other innocent disabled consumers who are merely trying 

to go about their daily lives accessing public accommodations as they are entitled to have 

full and equal access under the [Unruh Act and ADA].” Id. 

Money damages are the primary driver of this suit. While Schutza’s prayer for 

relief contains a request for just $4,000, the statutory minimum, his complaint also notes 

that he will “return to assess ongoing compliance with the ADA. . . . Given the obvious 

and blatant nature of the violations and barriers alleged herein, the plaintiff alleges on 

information and belief, that there are other violations and barriers on site that relate to his 

disability.” Compl., Dkt. 1, at ¶¶ 21, 22. Because Schutza intends to return to the store 

and possibly plead additional violations, the money damages available to him are openended. Other courts considering these types of suits, including suits by Schutza himself, 

have found that the state law claim for money damages predominated over the request 

for injunctive relief. See, e.g., Schutza v. Cuddeback, 262 F.Supp.3d 1025, 1030 (S.D. 

Cal. 2017) (“These nine allegations, if proven, would entitle Plaintiff to a minimum 

monetary award of $36,000. In contrast, under the ADA, Plaintiff would only be entitled 

to injunctive relief. Thus, under the circumstances presented, the Court finds that the 

monetary damages sought by Plaintiff under the Unruh Act substantially predominate 

over federal injunctive relief.”); Schutza v. Lamden, 2018 WL 4385377, at *4 (S.D. Cal. 

2018) (“Considering proof of the presently alleged violations would entitle him to a 

minimum of $12,000—a minimum of $4,000 for each offense, plaintiff’s allegations 

indicate his predominant focus is uncovering as many possible violations as possible and 

recovery of money damages under the Unruh Act.”). Indeed, courts have found that 

money damages predominated even where the prayer for money damages was limited 

to a single count (i.e., $4,000). See, e.g, Molski v. EOS Estate Winery, 2005 WL 3952249, 

at *4 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (“Even though Plaintiffs have submitted a notice of voluntary 

limitation of damages, seeking only an award of $4,000 to [plaintiff], it is still clear that the 

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claim for damages is the predominant focus of this lawsuit.”). Given the number of other 

courts to consider this same issue, there’s no reason to reinvent the wheel here—the 

Court adopts the reasoning of its predecessors and finds that Schutza’s state law claim 

under the Unruh Act substantially predominates over his federal claim for injunctive relief. 

b. Plaintiff’s state law claim raises novel issues of state law that present 

a compelling reason for declining jurisdiction.

Even if the Court were to conclude that the claim for money damages did not 

predominate over the federal claim for injunctive relief, issues of comity would still require 

the Court to decline supplemental jurisdiction. 

In 2012, the California legislature amended the Unruh Act to implement heightened 

pleading requirements for litigants filing claims under that statute. The purpose of those 

amendments was to deter baseless claims by, among other things, requiring litigants to 

verify their allegations, include the exact dates they encountered the barrier, and explain 

the specific way in which the barrier denied the plaintiff full and equal use. See Cal. Civ. 

Proc. Code § 425.50 (effective January 1, 2013). The Unruh Act was amended again in 

2015 to implement additional procedural requirements for “high-frequency litigants” like 

Schutza.1 These plaintiffs—individuals who have filed more than 10 accessibility-related 

complaints in the previous year—are required to pay additional filing fees and plead even 

more specific information in their complaints, such as “the reason the individual was in 

the geographic area of the defendant’s business.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.50(a)(4)(A)

(effective October 10, 2015).

Unfortunately for California, its courts rarely get to interpret the meaning and 

application of these provisions because creative plaintiffs are able to evade the 

heightened standards by bootstrapping an Unruh Act claim to a federal ADA claim, taking

advantage of the lower pleading standards that come with it. While there’s nothing wrong 

with preferring to proceed in federal court, there is no substantive reason to do so in these 

 

1 According to PACER, as of April 4, 2019, Schutza had filed at least 196 cases as a

plaintiff in federal court.

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cases. The only relief available under the ADA is injunctive relief, which can also be 

secured in state court. In attempting to show that his decision to file in federal court is not 

simply an attempt to evade California’s heightened pleading rules, Schutza insists the 

“quality of judges [and] the quality of legal rulings” is higher in federal court. This 

argument, of course, flies in the face of our judicial system’s equal respect for state and 

federal courts. The convenience of electronic filing and the widespread availability of 

published opinions—other arguments Schutza advances—may be creature comforts that 

make filing in federal court more enticing, but they hardly outweigh the disservice that is 

done to California’s efforts to implement and interpret its own law when federal courts 

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these claims. If Schutza were able to articulate a 

persuasive reason for his decision to file in federal court, perhaps this would be a different 

story. As it stands, though, the Court can discern no basis for the state law claim being 

filed in federal court other than to prevent California from being able to apply and enforce 

its own rules. 

Schutza also urges that to decline supplemental jurisdiction here would be an 

inefficient use of judicial resources because two suits concerning the same facts would 

proceed parallel in two separate courts. But this is a problem of his own making. As 

discussed above, there is no relief available to Schutza in federal court that could not be 

secured in state court. Had he brought this suit in state court, there would have been 

only one suit pending and he would have been eligible to receive every form of relief he 

seeks: an injunction, money damages, and attorney’s fees. By being “inefficient” and 

declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state claim, this Court is simply 

recognizing that California has a strong interest in interpreting and enforcing its own rules 

without federal courts serving as a convenient end-around for creative litigants. If that 

results in occasional inefficiency, it’s a worthwhile tradeoff. The Court declines to exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction over Schutza’s Unruh Act claim and therefore DISMISSES THE 

CLAIM WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

/ / /

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Conclusion

Schutza has stated a plausible claim for relief under the ADA. Defendants’ motion 

to dismiss is DENIED as to that cause of action. In the interests of comity, the Court 

declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Schutza’s state law claim under 

California’s Unruh Act, and so GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss as to that claim. 

Plaintiff’s Unruh Act clam is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 5, 2019

HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS

Chief United States District Judge

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