Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-00185/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-00185-28/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 05:552 Freedom of Information Act

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIAM LEONARD PICKARD,

Plaintiff,

 v.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

Defendant.

 /

No. C 06-00185 CRB

ORDER DENYING

ADMINISTRATIVE MOTION TO

SET A FURTHER CASE

MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

Plaintiff William Pickard has filed an Administrative Motion asking the Court to set a

case management conference. See generally Admin. Mot. (dkt. 271). The Motion asserts

that, while the Court’s November 15, 2016 Order Granting Motion for De Novo Review and

Holding that Government May Withhold Materials (hereinafter “Order”) (dkt. 268) resolved

some of the issues in this case, it did not resolve all of them. Id. Pickard argues that the

Order only resolved the parties’ dispute about three categories of materials (DEA informant

Gordon Skinner’s name, his NADDIS number, and the information Skinner voluntarily

disclosed to the public), but did not “countenance the government’s decision to withhold

every word from every page of hundreds of pages of responsive records.” Id. at 1. Pickard

asks for a CMC “so that the parties may seek the Court’s guidance concerning further

briefing and resolving the remaining issues in the case.” Id. at 2. The government responds

that there is nothing left for the Court to decide, and asks the Court to direct entry of 

Case 3:06-cv-00185-CRB Document 273 Filed 02/13/17 Page 1 of 6
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 The Court borrows heavily from its last Order in relaying the procedural history herein. See

Order at 2–5.

2

judgment in its favor. See generally Opp’n (dkt. 272). 

I. Procedural History

Resolving the parties’ latest dispute requires a (further) recitation of the extensive

procedural history of this case.1

 In January 2005, Plaintiff submitted a request to the DEA,

seeking information and documents pertaining to Skinner. D 4th MSJ (dkt. 184) at 2. 

Specifically, he sought any information on 

(1) Skinner’s criminal history (including records of arrests, convictions, warrants, or

other pending cases), (2) records of all case names, numbers, and judicial districts

where he testified under oath, (3) records of all monies paid in his capacity as a

federal government informant, (4) all records of instances where the DEA intervened

on his behalf to assist him in avoiding criminal prosecution, (5) all records of

administrative sanctions imposed for dishonesty, false claims, or other deceit, (6) all

records of any benefits of any nature conferred, (7) all records of deactivation as a

confidential informant and the reasons for deactivation, and (8) all records concerning

Skinner’s participation in criminal investigations.

Id. In February 2005, the DEA denied this request, citing FOIA Exemptions 6 and 7(C),

without confirming or denying the existence of any records about Skinner. Id. The Office of

Information and Privacy upheld that response. Id. 

In 2006, Plaintiff brought suit in this court. Id. The government moved for summary

judgment, and, in 2007, the Court denied the motion without prejudice, holding that the DEA

had not adequately demonstrated that a Glomar response (a refusal to confirm or deny the

existence of records pertaining to an individual) was appropriate. Order Denying MSJ (dkt.

62) at 5–6. The government then brought a second motion for summary judgment, fully

briefing the Glomar response issue. See Pickard v. Dep’t of Justice, 653 F.3d 782, 784–85

(9th Cir. 2011). The Court granted that motion in 2008, finding that Skinner’s identity as a

confidential informant had not been “officially confirmed” under the Privacy Act, and that a

Glomar response was appropriate under Exemptions 7(C) and 7(D). Id. at 785. 

In July 2011, the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that, because the

government had publicly disclosed Skinner’s status as a confidential informant in open court

in the course of official proceedings, a Glomar response was no longer appropriate. Id. at

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787–88. The court explained, “[t]his is not to say that the DEA is now required to disclose

any of the particular information requested by Pickard.” Id. at 788. The government was to

produce a Vaughn index, “raise whatever other exemptions may be appropriate, and let the

district court determine whether the contents, as distinguished from the existence, of the

officially confirmed records may be protected from disclosure under the DEA’s claimed

exemptions.” Id.

In March 2012, the government filed its third Motion for Summary Judgment but did

not file a Vaughn index. See generally D 3rd MSJ (dkt. 140). Plaintiff filed a cross-motion

for summary judgment. See generally P 3rd MSJ (dkt. 152). The Court denied both motions

and ordered the government to file a Vaughn index within 5 days. See Minutes (dkt. 165). 

The government did so. See Vaughn Index (dkt. 166). 

In January 2014, the government filed a fourth motion for summary judgment as to all

of the records at issue. See D 4th MSJ at 1 (“Did the Drug Enforcement Administration . . .

properly withhold the requested documents under applicable FOIA exemptions?”). Pickard

cross-moved for partial summary judgment, requesting release of three categories of

information. See P 4th MSJ (dkt. 188) at 1 (“Pickard seeks partial summary judgment for

withholdings that are demonstrably improper, even on the meager factual basis the agency

now provides. These withholdings include Skinner’s name, information Skinner has

voluntarily disclosed to the public, and his NADDIS number.”). In May 2014, the Court

denied the government’s fourth motion for summary judgment after finding its Vaughn index

“supremely unhelpful.” MSJ Order (dkt. 198) at 1, 7, 11. The Court also denied Pickard’s

cross-motion. Id. at 11. The Court found that without an adequate Vaughn index, “the Court

[could not] know if releasing something as basic as Skinner’s name would compromise an

important privacy interest, endanger any individual’s (including Skinner’s) physical safety,

or run afoul of one of the other claimed exemptions.” Id. at 9. The Court then ordered the

government “to submit (1) an adequate Vaughn index and (2) all of the responsive

documents that the government continues to withhold in full or in part to Magistrate Judge

Nathanael Cousins for review of ‘whether the contents, as distinguished from the existence,

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 See also 11/16/15 Letter from Pickard’s counsel to Judge Cousins (dkt. 223) (opining that in

camera review of withheld records was ripe for court’s consideration, and relying on briefing from

Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (dkt. 188) and Reply (dkt. 191)).

3 The government notes that the Cousins Order provided that “the government may redact any

part of the 325 documents that is not responsive to this order.” Opp’n at 2 (citing Cousins Order at 1).

The government argues that it “objected to the portion of [the Cousins Order] requiring disclosure, but

not to the portion allowing the government to redact the other materials,” and that, because Pickard did

not object to the Cousins Order, it is too late for him now to argue that he is entitled to any of the other

materials not covered by the three categories. Id. at 2. The Court rejects this argument. It makes little

sense for Pickard to have objected to the Cousins Order, as it granted Pickard relief as to the only three

categories of material that were at issue.

4

 The government also argues that it warned Pickard “in its first request for de novo review” that

“to the extent Plaintiff suggests he may seek the release of additional information later, he cannot,

because he did not object to the Magistrate Judge’s order holding that only information in the Three

Categories must be released and that other information may be redacted.”). See Opp’n at 2 (citing Reply

re D. Mot. De Novo (dkt. 247) at 5 n.2). Again, the Court would not have expected Pickard to object

to the Cousins Order. Moreover, a warning located in a footnote in the Reply brief that the Court later

struck carries little weight with the Court. Nor does the government’s assertion that “Plaintiff did not

respond to this point in his opposition,” see Opp’n at 2, given that the government made the point in its

Reply. 

5

 See 2d Mot. for De Novo Review at 1 (“Specifically, Defendant requests that the Court

determine de novo whether documents in the following three categories . . . must be released, and rule

that they are properly withheld.”); id. at 22 (“this Court should review de novo the [Cousins Order’s]

requirement to release documents in the Three Categories, and rule those documents may be withheld.”);

P Opp’n to 2d Mot. for De Novo Review (dkt. 264) at 1 (“. . . warrants disclosure from the withheld

records of three narrow categories of information”); id. at 25 (“Mr. Pickard respectfully urges the Court

to order the disclosure of the Three Categories of information from the withheld records.”); Reply re

2d Mot. for De Novo Review (dkt. 265) at 1 (“The Court should hold de novo that documents in the

Three Categories are properly withheld.”); Order at 6 (“The government argues that Judge Cousins erred

in ordering the release of the three categories of material sought.”); id. at 24 (concluding that the

government could withhold the three categories of materials).

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of the officially confirmed records may be protected from disclosure under the DEA’s

claimed exemptions.’” Id. at 11 (citations omitted). 

Judge Cousins understood his task as determining “whether, per Pickard’s request, the

Court should release three categories of materials in the 325 documents.” Cousins Order

(dkt. 243) at 1.2

 Following an in camera review, he ordered the three categories of materials

released. Id. at 1–2, 4.3

 The government then sought de novo review of the Cousins Order. 

See Motion for De Novo Review (dkt. 244); Order Terminating Motion (dkt. 255); 2d Mot.

for De Novo Review (dkt. 260).4

 The parties and the Court understood that the Second

Motion for De Novo Review was only about the three categories of materials at issue in the

Cousins Order.5

 The Court even observed in its Order that Pickard’s only seeking “the three

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 The Court also noted repeatedly that while Pickard sought materials that “Skinner has

voluntarily disclosed to the public,” the Court did “not know which portions of which documents

represent [such] material.” See id. at 2, 9, 19, 20.

7

 The exception to the standard practice of resolving FOIA cases by summary judgment is that

“some FOIA cases require resolution of disputed facts.” Animal Legal Defense Fund, 836 F.3d at 989.

Pickard has not demonstrated that this FOIA case required resolution of disputed facts.

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categories that he [did made] the Court’s task unusual. . . . [and] more difficult.” See Order

at 2.6

 

II. Discussion

The Court therefore accepts Pickard’s contention that the Order only adjudicated

whether the government could withhold the three categories of materials. See Admin. Mot.

at 1. But the Court rejects Pickard’s suggestion that, having chosen to pursue disclosure of

only a subset of all of the materials responsive to his initial FOIA request, he may now

pursue other subsets. 

FOIA cases are almost always resolved on summary judgment, rather than trial. See

Animal Legal Defense Fund v. U.S. F.D.A., 836 F.3d 987, 989 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Most FOIA

cases are resolved by the district court on summary judgment, with the district court entering

judgment as a matter of law.”); Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights of S.F. Bay Area v. U.S.

Dep’t of the Treasury, 534 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1131 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (“As a general rule, all

FOIA determinations should be resolved on summary judgment.”).7

 Plaintiff chose to file a

motion for partial summary judgment. “Partial motion for summary judgment is a

mechanism through which the court deems certain issues established before trial,” and is

“‘intended to avoid a useless trial of facts and issues over which there was never any

controversy. . . .’” See Holguin v. City of San Diego, 135 F. Supp. 3d 1151, 1158 (S.D. Cal.

2015) (quoting Lies v. Farrell Lines, Inc., 641 F.2d 765, 769 n.3 (9th Cir. 1981)). Pickard

had no reasonable expectation that the remaining materials—those not falling within the

three categories—would be the subject of a FOIA trial. 

Instead, Pickard made a strategic decision to pursue what he perceived to be lowhanging fruit: Skinner’s name, NADDIS number, and information Skinner voluntarily

disclosed. See P 4th MSJ at 1 (“Pickard seeks partial summary judgment for withholdings

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 The Court recognizes that—by virtue of Pickard’s framing—its Order had to reach a

conclusion on Exemption 7(D) in the absence of any “particularly relevant precedent from the Ninth

Circuit.” See Order at 12–13 (noting that neither Ninth Circuit case “involves a confidential informant

who has testified in criminal proceedings and disclosed some information.”). The Ninth Circuit might

still disagree with this Court’s conclusion on appeal. But assuming that the Court is correct as to the

application of Exemption 7(D) to information Skinner has publicly disclosed, see Order at 19 (“Because

this Court finds persuasive the numerous courts to focus on whether information was originally given

in confidence, regardless of whether or not that information later becomes public, this Court holds that

Exemption 7(D) justifies the withholding of Skinner’s name and the information he has publicly

disclosed.”), then it follows a fortiorari that Pickard is not entitled to the information Skinner has not

publicly disclosed. 

G:\CRBALL\2006\185\Pickard - order re admin motion for cmc.wpd 6

that are demonstrably improper, even on the meager factual basis the agency now

provides.”). Whether he intended to move subsequently for partial summary judgment on the

remaining materials, see Joint Case Management Statement of 3/2/16 (dkt. 236) at 4

(Plaintiff’s Statement: “Following the government’s compliance with [Judge Cousins’s

tentative order requiring disclosure of the three categories], the parties should meet and

confer to determine if further litigation will be necessary and, if so, whether it is possible to

narrow the issues or documents that remain in dispute”), is of no matter.8

 He has not done

so. Nor does this Court permit the seriatim filing of motions for summary judgment. See

Standing Order of 6/11/15 (“Each party is limited to filing one summary judgment motion.”). 

In sum, Pickard chose to seek three categories of materials. The Court ruled on those

three categories of materials. Pickard has not renewed his request for the remaining

materials, even though the government has claimed throughout this litigation a right to

withhold them. The Court hereby considers Pickard’s request for the remaining materials

withdrawn, and will separately enter judgment for the government. Pickard may appeal the

Order on the three categories if he wishes to do so.

The Administrative Motion is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 13, 2017 

CHARLES R. BREYER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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