Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-1_20-cv-01473/USCOURTS-cand-1_20-cv-01473-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EUREKA DIVISION

JAMES LESHAWN BOONE,

Plaintiff,

v.

ELDA OLIVEROS, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 20-cv-01473-RMI 

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE 

TO AMEND

Plaintiff, a state prisoner, filed a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He 

has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis and he has consented to the jurisdiction of a 

Magistrate Judge.

DISCUSSION

Standard of Review

Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek 

redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 

1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and dismiss any claims 

which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. at 1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se

pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th 

Cir. 1990).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the 

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” “Specific facts are not necessary; the statement 

need only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it 

rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations omitted). Although in order to state a 

claim a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff's obligation to provide 

the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a 

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formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do . . . . Factual allegations must 

be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). A complaint must proffer “enough facts to state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. The United States Supreme Court has 

recently explained the “plausible on its face” standard of Twombly: “While legal conclusions can 

provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there 

are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine 

whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 

(2009). 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) 

that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the 

alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 

487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 

Legal Claims 

Plaintiff alleges that defendants retaliated against him for his protected conduct by 

improperly opening his legal mail.

The inspection for contraband of non-legal mail does not violate a prisoner’s constitutional 

rights. See Witherow v. Paff, 52 F.3d at 264, 265-66 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding inspection of 

outgoing mail); Smith v. Boyd, 945 F.2d 1041, 1043 (8th Cir. 1991) (upholding inspection of 

incoming mail); Gaines v. Lane, 790 F.2d 1299, 1304 (7th Cir. 1986) (upholding inspection of 

outgoing and incoming mail). Neither the Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit has determined 

whether prison officials are entitled to read inmates’ outgoing and incoming non-legal mail. 

Prison officials may institute procedures for inspecting “legal mail,” e.g., mail sent 

between attorneys and prisoners, see Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 576-77 (1974) (incoming 

mail from attorneys), and mail sent from prisoners to the courts, see Royse v. Superior Court, 779 

F.2d 573, 574-75 (9th Cir. 1986) (outgoing mail to court).1 However, “prisoners have a protected 

1 Mail from the courts, as contrasted to mail from a prisoner’s lawyer, is not “legal mail.” See Keenan v. 

Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1094 (9th Cir. 1996), amended, 135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998). 

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First Amendment interest in having properly marked legal mail opened only in their presence.” 

Hayes v. Idaho Correctional Center, 849 F.3d 1204, 1211 (9th Cir. 2017); see also O’Keefe v. Van 

Boening, 82 F.3d 322, 325 (9th Cir. 1996) (the opening and inspecting of “legal mail” outside the

presence of the prisoner may have an impermissible “chilling” effect on the constitutional right to 

petition the government). The Sixth Amendment also protects the right of a prisoner to be present 

while legal mail relating to criminal proceedings is opened. Mangiaracina v. Penzone, 849 F.3d 

1191, 1195 (9th Cir. 2017). A plaintiff need not allege a longstanding practice of having his mail 

opened outside his presence in order to state a claim for relief. Hayes, 849 F.3d at 1218 (allegation 

that protected mail was opened outside plaintiff’s presence on two separate occasions sufficient to 

state First Amendment claim); Mangiaracina, 849 F.3d at 1202 (absence of a clear pattern beyond 

two incidents of mail opening did not preclude Sixth Amendment relief). Nor is a plaintiff 

required to show any actual injury beyond the violation itself. Hayes, 849 F.3d at 1212. If prison 

officials open legal mail outside a prisoner’s presence, they must establish that legitimate 

penological interests justify the policy or practice. Hayes, 849 F.3d at 1213; see also O’Keefe, 82 

F.3d at 327 (mail policy that allows prison mailroom employees to open and read grievances sent 

by prisoners to state agencies outside prisoners’ presence reasonable means to further legitimate 

penological interests).

“Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five basic 

elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) 

because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate's 

exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate 

correctional goal.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (footnote omitted); 

accord Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1995) (prisoner suing prison officials under § 

1983 for retaliation must allege that he was retaliated against for exercising his constitutional 

rights and that the retaliatory action did not advance legitimate penological goals, such as 

preserving institutional order and discipline). The prisoner must show that the type of activity he 

was engaged in was constitutionally protected, that the protected conduct was a substantial or 

motivating factor for the alleged retaliatory action, and that the retaliatory action advanced no 

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legitimate penological interest. Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 267-68 (9th Cir. 1997) (inferring 

retaliatory motive from circumstantial evidence).

“In a § 1983 or a Bivens action – where masters do not answer for the torts of their servants 

– the term ‘supervisory liability’ is a misnomer. Absent vicarious liability, each Government 

official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.” Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 677 (finding under Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544, and Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure, that complainant-detainee in a Bivens action failed to plead sufficient facts “plausibly 

showing” that top federal officials “purposely adopted a policy of classifying post-September-11 

detainees as ‘of high interest’ because of their race, religion, or national origin” over more likely 

and non-discriminatory explanations). 

A supervisor may be liable under Section 1983 upon a showing of (1) personal 

involvement in the constitutional deprivation or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the 

supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation. Henry A. v. Willden, 678 F.3d 991, 

1003-04 (9th Cir. 2012). Even if a supervisory official is not directly involved in the allegedly 

unconstitutional conduct, “[a] supervisor can be liable in this individual capacity for his own 

culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of his subordinates; for his 

acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation; or for conduct that showed a reckless or callous 

indifference to the rights of others.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1208 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation 

omitted). The claim that a supervisory official “knew of unconstitutional conditions and ‘culpable 

actions of his subordinates’ but failed to act amounts to ‘acquiescence in the unconstitutional 

conduct of his subordinates’ and is ‘sufficient to state a claim of supervisory liability.’” Keates v. 

Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 1243 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Starr, 652 F.3d at 1208) (finding that 

conclusory allegations that supervisor promulgated unconstitutional procedures which authorized 

unconstitutional conduct of subordinates do not suffice to state a claim of supervisory liability).

Plaintiff alleges that his legal mail was opened out of his presence. Compl. at 7. While 

Plaintiff identities three defendants in this case, he fails to describe their specific actions and how 

each defendant participated in the violation of his constitutional rights. In addition, many of the 

instances involve opening of mail from courts. Id. at 6. As noted above, this fails to state a federal 

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claim because mail sent from the court to Plaintiff is not legal mail. See Keenan, 83 F.3d at 1094. 

Plaintiff should discuss instances of improper handling of legal mail as set forth in the legal 

standards above. Plaintiff also fails to specifically describe how defendants engaged in this 

conduct in retaliation for his protected conduct. Thus, the complaint is due to be dismissed, and 

Plaintiff is instructed to provide more information and describe the specific actions of each 

defendant. To the extent any defendants are supervisors, Plaintiff must still describe their personal 

involvement. 

CONCLUSION

The complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend in accordance with the standards set 

forth above. The amended complaint must be filed within twenty-eight (28) days of the date this 

order is filed and must include the caption and civil case number used in this order and the words 

AMENDED COMPLAINT on the first page. Because an amended complaint completely replaces 

the original complaint, Plaintiff must include in it all the claims he wishes to present. See Ferdik v. 

Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). He may not incorporate material from the original 

complaint by reference. Failure to amend within the designated time will result in the dismissal of 

this case. 

It is Plaintiff’s responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the court informed 

of any change of address by filing a separate paper with the clerk headed “Notice of Change of 

Address,” and must comply with the court's orders in a timely fashion. Failure to do so may result 

in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

41(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 30, 2020

ROBERT M. ILLMAN

United States Magistrate Judge

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