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Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

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In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 15-1763 

TRACY WILLIAMS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

BRANDON BROOKS, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division. 

No. 1:13-CV-1592 — Jane E. Magnus-Stinson, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED DECEMBER 4, 2015 — DECIDED JANUARY 5, 2016 

____________________ 

Before POSNER, FLAUM, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges. 

FLAUM, Circuit Judge. Defendant Officer Brandon Brooks 

conducted a traffic stop of plaintiff Tracy Williams for failing 

to activate his turn signal prior to changing lanes. Williams 

did not cooperate with the instructions of Officer Brooks and 

Defendant Officer Kehl, which led to a physical confrontation. Defendant Sergeant Shannon Trump then arrived at the 

scene. Officer Brooks arrested Williams for resisting law enforcement, and after a bench trial, a state court judge granted 

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2 No. 15-1763 

Williams’s motion to dismiss the charge. Williams sued defendants in federal district court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983, alleging false arrest, excessive force, and failure to 

protect in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district 

court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment. 

We affirm. 

I. Background 

A. Factual Background 

The facts presented here are taken from the videotape evidence of the incident, the officers’ affidavits, and Williams’s 

deposition testimony. 

On October 5, 2011, at approximately 1:15 AM, Officer 

Brooks of the Noblesville, Indiana Police Department observed Williams’s vehicle pull into the left turn lane without 

signaling his lane change. Williams later testified in a deposition that his normal habit is to signal as he enters a turn 

lane but that he had no present memory of activating his 

turn signal on this specific night. Once Williams was in the 

left turn lane, he activated his turn signal and made a left 

turn. Officer Brooks turned on his police vehicle’s overhead 

lights, which triggered his dashboard camera. Williams 

pulled into a gas station parking lot, and Officer Brooks 

pulled in behind him. Officer Kehl also arrived at the scene. 

When Officer Brooks approached Williams’s vehicle, Williams’s window was only rolled down two inches. Officer 

Brooks asked Williams to lower his window, and Williams 

rolled it down approximately one more inch. Based on his 

training and experience, Officer Brooks knew that this was 

common behavior for intoxicated persons attempting to preCase: 15-1763 Document: 39 Filed: 01/05/2016 Pages: 17
No. 15-1763 3

vent officers from smelling their breath or the inside of their 

cars. 

After telling Williams that he had been pulled over for 

failing to signal before changing lanes, Officer Brooks asked 

for his license and registration. He also asked Williams 

whether he had been drinking, and Williams said he had 

not. Officer Brooks said, “You’re acting like you kind of have 

an attitude with me right now. Like I pulled you over for no 

reason.” Williams responded that he normally puts his turn 

signal on and that it had been a long day. Officer Brooks took 

Williams’s license and registration, told Williams to “hang 

tight,” and said he would be right back. 

Officer Brooks returned to his police vehicle, ran Williams’s license plate and registration, and did not find any 

problems. He decided to issue Williams a warning for his 

failure to signal. Officer Brooks told Officer Kehl that he 

could leave the scene. 

As Officer Brooks exited his vehicle to give Williams the 

warning ticket, Williams stepped out of his vehicle and 

started walking toward the center of the gas station. Officer 

Brooks had never encountered a person getting out of his 

vehicle during a traffic stop. Additionally, he had learned in 

training that being away from his vehicle without cover is 

one of the most vulnerable positions for an officer during a 

traffic stop. Williams is significantly larger than Officer 

Brooks: Officer Brooks is 5’9 and 170 pounds, and Williams 

is 6’3 and 195 pounds. Officer Brooks asked Williams to get 

back in his car, but Williams ignored him. Officer Brooks repeated this command six more times. Williams did not comply until Officer Brooks drew his taser. 

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Officer Brooks radioed Officer Kehl to return to the scene. He asked Williams why he would get out of his car during a traffic stop, and Williams responded that he wanted to 

get a paper towel to clean his side mirror. Officer Brooks 

again asked Williams if he had been drinking, and Williams 

again responded that he had not. 

Because Williams had exited his vehicle and because of 

his demeanor, Officer Brooks believed that Williams might 

be intoxicated or otherwise mentally impaired. He decided 

to perform a pat down search followed by a field sobriety 

test. He asked Williams to step out of his car at least six 

times before Williams complied. Williams finally exited his 

vehicle and stood facing Officer Brooks. 

For safety reasons, Officer Brooks wanted Williams 

against the car so that he could not reach into his pockets 

during the pat down. He pointed in the direction of Williams’s car and said, “Face that way for me.” Williams did 

not comply. Instead, he took a step toward Officer Brooks 

and asked for a breathalyzer. Officer Brooks again said, 

“Face that way for me, turn around,” and grabbed Williams’s 

right arm and pushed him toward his car. Williams pushed 

against the car with his left hand and backed into Officer 

Brooks. Williams said, “If you’re going to do this, you’re going to visit with my attorney, son.” Officer Brooks instructed 

Williams to stop resisting. Williams said, “I’m not resisting,” 

but again pushed against the car with his left hand back toward Officer Brooks. 

Officer Brooks radioed Officer Kehl to “step it up a little 

bit.” He tried to get both of Williams’s hands behind his 

back, but Williams kept pushing against Officer Brooks. Officer Brooks pushed against Williams as Williams leaned inCase: 15-1763 Document: 39 Filed: 01/05/2016 Pages: 17
No. 15-1763 5

to him. Williams hit the side of the car three times during the 

struggle. 

At this point, Officer Kehl arrived at the gas station. Williams pulled his hand free of Officer Brooks’s grip and spun 

around to face Officer Brooks. As Williams pushed Officer 

Brooks away and threw an elbow at him, Officer Brooks 

backed up and drew his taser on Williams. Williams took a 

step toward Officer Brooks, and Officer Brooks instructed 

Williams to turn around. Williams ignored the command. 

Officer Brooks repeated it several times and told Williams to 

put his hands above his head. Williams did not turn to face 

his vehicle but instead made a 360-degree turn so that he 

was still facing Officer Brooks. He briefly put his hands 

above his head and said, “What do you want from me?” 

Officer Kehl approached Williams and ordered him to 

turn around. After Williams ignored two more commands to 

turn around, Officer Kehl grabbed Williams and turned him 

so he was facing his car. He ordered Williams to put his 

hands behind his back multiple times. Williams did not 

comply, so Officer Kehl pulled his hands behind his back 

and handcuffed him. Williams said, “Guys, this is going to 

be really bad. You’re going to put me in handcuffs? For 

what? This is going to be a really bad video for you guys.” 

Officer Kehl responded that he saw Williams assault Officer 

Brooks, and Williams denied having done so. 

Officer Brooks proceeded to pat down Williams. Officer 

Brooks asked Williams again if he had been drinking that 

night. Williams said, “I’ve told you no several times. Why do 

you keep asking me?” Officer Brooks replied, “Because normal people that haven’t been drinking don’t act like you’re 

acting right now.” Williams said that it had been a long day 

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6 No. 15-1763 

at work. Officer Brooks put Williams in the back seat of his 

police vehicle. Williams complained that his handcuffs were 

uncomfortable on his wrists, and Officer Kehl responded 

that they were not supposed to be comfortable. 

Shortly thereafter, Sergeant Shannon Trump, the shift supervisor that evening, came to the scene and spoke with Williams. Williams said Officer Brooks was “very hostile and 

aggressive,” claimed he did not know why Officer Brooks 

had pulled him over, and alleged that he had complied with 

everything Officer Brooks asked of him. When Sergeant 

Trump asked Williams if Officer Brooks had told him not to 

walk away from the car and if Williams had not listened to 

him, Williams responded that Officer Brooks had given him 

contradictory messages by first telling him to stay in the car 

and then telling him to get out of the car. Williams again 

complained about his handcuffs and asked Sergeant Trump 

to remove them, but she declined. Sergeant Trump asked 

Williams if he would be willing to take a field sobriety test, 

and he agreed. Officer Brooks administered a field sobriety 

test. Williams also consented to a breathalyzer, which registered a zero percent reading for blood-alcohol level. 

Sergeant Trump reviewed the video of the incident and 

found that Williams had resisted law enforcement and that 

Officer Brooks had acted appropriately. 

B. Procedural Background 

Williams was arrested and charged with resisting law enforcement, a Class A misdemeanor under Indiana law. Ind. 

Code § 35-44-3-3(a)(1) (repealed 2012). On March 20, 2012, 

Williams signed a diversion agreement, wherein he “admit[ed] the truthfulness of the charges against [him]” and 

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No. 15-1763 7

acknowledged that “such admission may be used against 

[him] if there is a resumption or prosecution of these charges 

by reason of termination from the pretrial diversion program.” A condition of the diversion agreement was that Williams complete anger management training. Williams did 

not fulfill this condition, so the State revoked the agreement, 

and the case went to a bench trial in Hamilton County Criminal Court on April 25, 2013. The State presented the video of 

the incident and the testimony of Officer Brooks. The state 

court granted Williams’s motion to dismiss the resisting law 

enforcement charge. 

On October 4, 2013, Williams filed suit in federal district 

court against Officer Brooks, Officer Kehl, and Sergeant 

Trump. Williams asserted the following Fourth Amendment 

claims pursuant to § 19831: unlawful stop and arrest claims 

against Officer Brooks and Officer Kehl, an excessive force 

claim against Officer Brooks, and failure to protect claims 

against Officer Kehl and Sergeant Trump. Williams alleged 

that he suffered from back pain and digestive problems from 

being pushed against the car, but he stated in a deposition 

that he was not taking aspirin or other medication and that 

he did not seek medical treatment aside from one appointment for x-rays, which did not reveal any injuries. 

After the close of discovery, the district court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment, holding that Officer Brooks reasonably concluded that Williams had en-

 1 42 U.S.C. § 1983 states: “Every person who ... subjects ... any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the 

party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ... .”

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8 No. 15-1763 

gaged in a traffic violation justifying the traffic stop. Because 

Officer Brooks could arrest Williams for the traffic violation, 

the arrest for resisting law enforcement was constitutionally 

permissible. The court also found that the arrest for resisting 

law enforcement was independently supported by probable 

cause. Additionally, the court found that Officer Brooks’s use 

of force was reasonable given the circumstances and that no 

reasonable jury could find otherwise. Since the court found 

that neither Officer Brooks nor Officer Kehl violated Williams’s constitutional rights, it concluded that the failure to 

protect claims failed as a matter of law. Also relevant to this 

appeal, the district court concluded that it was not bound by 

the state court judge’s findings and briefly referred to the diversion agreement. Williams appeals. 

II. Discussion 

We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment, construing all facts in the light most favorable to 

the nonmoving party. Harper v. C.R. England, Inc., 687 F.3d 

297, 306 (7th Cir. 2012). However, we will not draw inferences that are “supported by only speculation or conjecture.” 

Argyropoulos v. City of Alton, 539 F.3d 724, 732 (7th Cir. 2008) 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Summary 

judgment is proper when “there is no genuine dispute as to 

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A material fact is one that 

“might affect the outcome of the suit ... .” Anderson v. Liberty 

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 

A twist on the usual standard of review is at play here: 

When the evidence includes a videotape of the relevant 

events, the Court should not adopt the nonmoving party’s 

version of the events when that version is blatantly contraCase: 15-1763 Document: 39 Filed: 01/05/2016 Pages: 17
No. 15-1763 9

dicted by the videotape. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 379–80 

(2007). Accordingly, we rely primarily on the video from the 

dashboard camera of Officer Brooks’s vehicle. Williams argues that relying on the video is improper because the video 

is ambiguous, creating a factual dispute that should go to a 

jury. We disagree. The video clearly depicts the incident. 

On appeal, Williams raises three main arguments. First, 

he argues that there are material questions of fact as to the 

unlawful stop and arrest claims, excessive force claim, and 

failure to protect claims. Next, he argues that the district 

court erred in not considering the state court’s findings. Finally, Williams argues that the district court improperly used 

and relied on the pretrial diversion agreement. 

A. Genuine Disputes of Material Fact 

1. Unlawful Stop and Arrest 

Williams argues that there is a genuine issue of material 

fact as to whether he committed a traffic infraction such that 

Officer Brooks had probable cause to stop and arrest him. 

The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches 

and seizures, but the existence of probable cause renders 

traffic stops and resulting warrantless arrests permissible. 

Jones v. City of Elkhart, 737 F.3d 1107, 1114 (7th Cir. 2013) (noting that probable cause is an absolute defense to false arrest 

claims in § 1983 actions). “When a police officer reasonably 

believes that a driver has committed a minor traffic offense, 

probable cause supports the stop.” Id. (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. HernandezRivas, 513 F.3d 753, 759 (7th Cir. 2008) (concluding that when 

an officer observes a vehicle changing lanes without signaling, the officer has probable cause for a traffic stop). AddiCase: 15-1763 Document: 39 Filed: 01/05/2016 Pages: 17
10 No. 15-1763 

tionally, it is “not a violation of the Fourth Amendment to 

arrest an individual for even a very minor traffic offense.” 

Jackson v. Parker, 627 F.3d 634, 639 (7th Cir. 2010); see also Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 323 (2001) (holding 

that the Fourth Amendment does not forbid “a warrantless 

arrest for a minor criminal offense, such as a misdemeanor 

seatbelt violation punishable only by a fine”). 

Officer Brooks testified that he initiated Williams’s traffic 

stop because he observed Williams violate Indiana Code § 9-

21-8-25 by failing to signal before changing lanes.2 Williams 

argues that his deposition testimony that his habit is to put 

his turn signal on as he enters a turn lane is enough to prove 

that he complied with the law. This argument is unconvincing. Williams did not testify that he signaled on the night in 

question. Rather, he said that he did not have a present 

memory of putting on his turn signal before changing lanes. 

He stated, “I wasn’t consciously thinking of [putting on my 

turn signal] that night” and also said, “I’m human. I’m fallible. I mean, I could have maybe forgot to turn my signal on.” 

Given the testimony of Officer Brooks and Williams, Williams’s statement about his normal habit is not enough for us 

to infer that he signaled this particular lane change. See Jones, 

737 F.3d at 1114 (noting that plaintiff’s assertion that he usu-

 2 Indiana Code § 9-21-8-25 provides: 

A signal of intention to turn right or left shall be given 

continuously during not less than the last two hundred 

(200) feet traveled by a vehicle before turning or changing lanes. A vehicle traveling in a speed zone of at least 

fifty (50) miles per hour shall give a signal continuously 

for not less than the last three hundred (300) feet traveled by the vehicle before turning or changing lanes. 

Case: 15-1763 Document: 39 Filed: 01/05/2016 Pages: 17
No. 15-1763 11

ally does not speed was not enough to rebut the officer’s 

statement that he saw plaintiff swerving and that his radar 

gun indicated that plaintiff was speeding, when plaintiff 

could not positively state that he was not speeding on the 

day in question and did not offer any evidence on which a 

reasonable jury could rely); Argyropoulos, 539 F.3d at 734 

(noting that inferences based on speculation or conjecture 

are beyond the scope of our obligation to draw reasonable 

inferences in favor of the nonmovant). Thus, Officer Brooks’s 

testimony that he saw Williams change lanes without signaling establishes probable cause for the traffic stop, and Officer Brooks could lawfully arrest Williams for this traffic infraction. No reasonable jury could find that this was an unlawful stop and arrest. 

Williams’s next argument is that Officer Brooks did not 

have probable cause to arrest him for forcibly resisting law 

enforcement. This argument fails because once Officer 

Brooks had probable cause to conduct the traffic stop, Officer Brooks could arrest Williams without violating the 

Fourth Amendment, even if Williams was not resisting law 

enforcement. See Jackson, 627 F.3d at 638–39 (“[A]n arrest is 

reasonable under the Fourth Amendment so long as there is 

probable cause to believe that some criminal offense has been 

or is being committed, even if it is not the crime with which 

the officers initially charge the suspect.” (alteration and emphasis in original) (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted)); Williams v. Rodriguez, 509 F.3d 392, 401 (7th Cir. 

2007) (holding that since the officer had probable cause to 

arrest plaintiff for a parking offense in violation of an Illinois 

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12 No. 15-1763 

statute, the officer could arrest plaintiff for driving under the 

influence without violating his Fourth Amendment rights).3

Finally, Williams briefly argues that Officer Kehl participated in and facilitated the unlawful arrest when he shoved 

and handcuffed Williams. He alleges that Officer Kehl knew 

or should have known that Officer Brooks did not have a 

sufficient basis to stop or arrest Williams. Since we have already concluded that a reasonable jury must find that Officer Brooks had probable cause to stop and arrest Williams, 

this argument fails. Officer Brooks and Officer Kehl are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the unlawful stop and 

arrest claim. 

 3 We briefly note that a reasonable jury must also find that Officer 

Brooks had probable cause to arrest Williams for resisting law enforcement in violation of Indiana Code § 35-44.1-3-1. Under this statute, “[a] 

person who knowingly or intentionally: (1) forcibly resists, obstructs, or 

interferes with a law enforcement officer or a person assisting the officer 

while the officer is lawfully engaged in the execution of the officer’s duties ... commits resisting law enforcement, a Class A misdemeanor ... .” 

Williams argues that he did not forcibly resist but rather “leaned away 

and twisted in pain.” However, the video blatantly contradicts these allegations. The video shows that Williams was uncooperative and ignored many commands from Officer Brooks. Williams forcefully pushed 

against Officer Brooks, using his arms to push away from the car and 

backing his body into Officer Brooks, preventing Officer Brooks from 

conducting a pat down search and conducting a field sobriety test. These 

actions are enough to establish probable cause for arrest. See Lopez v. 

State, 926 N.E.2d 1090, 1093–94 (Ind. App. 2010) (holding that defendant 

forcibly resisted arrest when he refused to stand to be cuffed, pulled 

away from officer’s attempts to pull him up from the couch, and physically prevented officers from pulling his arms from under him as he lay 

on the ground). 

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No. 15-1763 13

2. Excessive Force 

Williams argues that Officer Brooks used excessive force 

and injured Williams by pushing him against the car during 

his arrest.4 “An officer who has the right to arrest an individual also has the right to use some degree of physical force 

or threat of force to effectuate the arrest ... .” Stainback v. 

Dixon, 569 F.3d 767, 772 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). 

That right is circumscribed by the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard. See id. Factors relevant to the reasonableness inquiry include “the severity of the crime at issue, 

whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety 

of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting 

arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Graham v. 

Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (citation omitted). We “remain cognizant of the fact that police officers are often 

forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances 

that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the 

amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” 

Abbott v. Sangamon Cty., 705 F.3d 706, 724 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Under the first Graham factor, the initial infraction—

failing to signal before changing lanes—was not a significant 

violation. However, resisting law enforcement is a more serious offense. Under the second factor, Williams posed an 

 4 On appeal, Williams also attempts to raise an excessive force claim 

against Officer Kehl. However, the district court correctly held that this 

claim was waived since Williams did not assert it until his response to 

defendants’ motion for summary judgment. See Hancock v. Potter, 531 

F.3d 474, 480 (7th Cir. 2008) (declining to reach the substance of a claim 

that plaintiff did not allege in her complaint and raised for the first time 

in her opposition to defendant’s motion for summary judgment). 

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14 No. 15-1763 

immediate threat to Officer Brooks when he got out of his 

vehicle during the traffic stop and refused six commands to 

get back in the car, especially since Officer Brooks was in a 

vulnerable position away from his police vehicle and without cover. Additionally, Williams was acting strangely and 

resisted Officer Brooks’s attempts to conduct a pat down 

search, creating safety concerns. Under the third factor, Officer Brooks had probable cause to believe that Williams was 

actively resisting arrest. Thus, a reasonable jury must find 

that Officer Brooks used a reasonable amount of force. 

Williams argues that we must infer that Officer Brooks 

intended to hurt Williams. However, an officer’s intent is irrelevant. In analyzing the use of force, we assess the reasonableness “without regard to [the officer’s] underlying intent 

or motivation.” Smith v. City of Chicago, 242 F.3d 737, 743 (7th 

Cir. 2001) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Additionally, the record does not support this inference. 

Even when reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we will 

not draw inferences that are “supported by only speculation 

or conjecture.” Argyropoulos, 539 F.3d at 732 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

3. Failure to Protect 

Williams alleges that Officer Kehl and Sergeant Trump 

failed to intervene and protect Williams from Officer Brooks. 

Since no reasonable jury could find that Officer Brooks violated Williams’s constitutional rights, this argument must 

fail. 

B. The State Court’s Findings 

Williams argues that the district court erred as a matter 

of law by not giving that state court’s findings any controlCase: 15-1763 Document: 39 Filed: 01/05/2016 Pages: 17
No. 15-1763 15

ling or preclusive weight. At the end of the state court trial, 

Williams moved to dismiss the charge against him for resisting law enforcement, arguing that the state did not prove its 

case beyond a reasonable doubt. The state court judge granted the motion and said: “[I]t’s pretty clear that the officer is 

not attempting to pat down ... . What the officer is doing is 

attempting to get both of the Defendant’s hands behind his 

back, apparently for the purpose of handcuffing him.” The 

state court judge also stated that the officers “had no basis 

that I heard in my record for handcuffing.” 

Williams argues that the state court’s dismissal of the 

charge should have been binding on the district court. In 

other words, he argues that the district court should have 

found—based on the state court’s dismissal—that Williams 

did not resist law enforcement and therefore, the arrest for 

resisting law enforcement was unlawful. 

Williams’s argument misstates the law. “Evidence of acquittal in a criminal action is generally irrelevant and inadmissible in a civil case involving the same incident since it 

constitutes a negative sort of conclusion lodged in a finding 

of failure of the prosecution to sustain the burden of proof 

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Estate of Moreland v. Dieter, 395 

F.3d 747, 755 (7th Cir. 2005) (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted). Therefore, the district court correctly decided that it was not bound by the state court’s findings. Additionally, even if the district court adopted the state court’s 

finding that Williams did not resist law enforcement, it 

would be irrelevant to his unlawful arrest claim. As explained above, a reasonable jury must find that since Officer 

Brooks had probable cause for the traffic stop, he could arCase: 15-1763 Document: 39 Filed: 01/05/2016 Pages: 17
16 No. 15-1763 

rest Williams—for the traffic infraction or for resisting law 

enforcement—without violating the Fourth Amendment. 

Next, Williams argues that the contrast between the state 

court’s and the district court’s findings demonstrates that 

there is a genuine issue of material fact that should go to a 

jury. The state court found that Officer Brooks had acted inappropriately by trying to handcuff Williams, whereas the 

district court found that Officer Brooks’s actions were lawful. 

However, this argument fails because the factual dispute 

about whether Officer Brooks was trying to conduct a pat 

down or trying to handcuff Williams does not create a genuine issue of material fact. A material fact is one that “might 

affect the outcome of the suit ... .” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The outcome of Williams’s suit 

against the officers is not affected by whether or not Officer 

Brooks was trying to handcuff Williams. Even if Officer 

Brooks was attempting to handcuff Williams, that action 

would have been lawful, and no reasonable jury could find 

otherwise. Since Officer Brooks had probable cause to stop 

and arrest Williams, he could handcuff Williams without violating the Fourth Amendment. Thus, the district court 

properly decided not to consider the state court’s findings. 

C. The Diversion Agreement 

Williams’s final argument is that the district court improperly used and relied on the pretrial diversion agreement 

in violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 408. Rule 408 states 

that evidence of “accepting ... valuable consideration in 

compromising ... the claim” is inadmissible “either to prove 

or disprove the validity or amount of a disputed claim or to 

impeach by a prior inconsistent statement or a contradiction[.]” Fed. R. Evid. 408. This argument is unconvincing beCase: 15-1763 Document: 39 Filed: 01/05/2016 Pages: 17
No. 15-1763 17

cause the district court did not rely on the diversion agreement in granting summary judgment. 

The district court only briefly referred to the diversion 

agreement. The court noted that defendants pointed to the 

agreement to support their claim that Williams was resisting 

law enforcement. The court also noted Williams’s argument 

that the agreement is not admissible. Without ruling on the 

admissibility of the diversion agreement and without mentioning it further, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. Thus, the district court did not 

rely on the diversion agreement to prove the validity of a 

claim—namely, defendants’ claim that Officer Brooks had 

probable cause to believe that Williams was resisting law enforcement—or to impeach Williams with a prior inconsistent 

statement. 

III. Conclusion 

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s 

decision. 

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