Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-05640/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-05640-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:44 Trademark Infringement

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ROSS DRESS FOR LESS, INC., et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

DALY CITY PARTNERS II, L.P., et al., 

Defendants. 

Case No. 15-cv-05640-JSW 

ORDER DENYING, WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE, APPLICATION FOR 

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 

Re: Docket No. 12 

Now before the Court for consideration is the application for a temporary restraining order 

(“TRO”), filed by Plaintiffs Ross Dress for Less, Inc. and Ross Stores, Inc. (collectively “Ross”). 

The Court has considered Ross’ papers, and it finds a response from Defendants is not required.1 

For the reasons that follow, the Court DENIES Ross’ application for a TRO without prejudice to 

filing a properly noticed motion for a preliminary injunction. 

BACKGROUND 

On or about February 5, 1997, Ross and Defendant Daly City Partners II, L.P. 

(“Landlord”)2

 entered into lease for space for a Ross Dress for Less Store at Serramonte Plaza (the 

“Store”), which is due to expire in January 2018. (Compl. ¶¶ 10-12 & Ex. 1 (Lease); Declaration 

of John Fox (“Fox Decl.”); ¶¶ 1-4, Ex. A (Lease).) Based on the record, it appears that the lease 

will not be extended. (Compl. ¶ 12; Fox Decl., ¶¶ 4, 8 & Ex. F.) 

 

1

 Ross’ brief contains footnotes that do not comply with Northern District Civil Local Rule 

3-4(c)(2). The Court HEREBY ADVISES all parties that failure to comply with that rule in the 

future, shall result in the Court striking offending pleadings and briefs from the record without 

further notice. 

2

 Defendant Prism Capital Corporation is alleged to be Landlord’s general partner. (Compl. 

¶ 6.) The Court shall refer to Prism and Daly City collectively as the “Landlord Parties” for ease 

of reference. 

Case 4:15-cv-05640-JSW Document 22 Filed 12/16/15 Page 1 of 4
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United States District Court 

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“The ‘Ross’ name has been a registered trademark of Ross since June 2003.” (Compl. ¶ 

23; Declaration of Gregg McGillis (“McGillis Decl.”), ¶ 5, Ex. A (USPTO printout noting filing 

date of June 20, 2013 and registration date of July 27, 2004).) The instant dispute arises because 

the Landlord Parties have advertised the fact that the Store space is for lease by posting signs 

stating: “Ross Space for Lease 415-273-0398.” The Landlord parties posted one such sign on the 

exterior of the Store and subsequently posted a similar sign at two other locations on Serramonte 

Plaza property. (Compl. ¶¶ 16, 19-21 & Exs. 2-3; Fox. Decl. ¶¶ 5-9 & Exs. B-D, G.) 

Ross alleges that, by these actions, the Landlord Parties have diluted the “Ross” trademark 

and have breached various provisions of the lease, including a covenant of quiet enjoyment. 

(Compl. ¶¶ 22-56.) Ross asks the Court to enter a temporary restraining order that would prohibit 

the Landlord Parties from using the Ross trademark to advertise the fact that the Store space is for 

lease. 

According to Ross, if the Landlord Parties continue to engage in this conduct, “customers 

and potential customers will continue to form the mistaken belief that the Store is about to close, 

or has already closed,” and “the perception that the Store is performing poorly and about to close 

will do irreparable harm to Ross’ goodwill and reputation among customers in the area.” (See 

Declaration of Greg McGillis, ¶¶ 3-4.) 

ANALYSIS 

Ross seeks a TRO based on each of its claims for relief. It contends that the irreparable 

harm that would justify issuance of the TRO is harm to its goodwill and reputation, and its fear 

that customers may take their business elsewhere, which materially interferes with its right to quiet 

enjoyment under the Lease. 

In order to obtain a TRO, Ross “must establish that [it is] likely to succeed on the merits, 

that [it is] likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of 

equities tips in [its] favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Natural 

Resources Defense Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (citations omitted). The Winter court also 

noted that, because injunctive relief is “an extraordinary remedy,” it “may only be awarded upon a 

clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Id. at 22 (citing Mazurek v. Armstrong, 

Case 4:15-cv-05640-JSW Document 22 Filed 12/16/15 Page 2 of 4
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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

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520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam)). Thus, “[i]n each case, courts ‘must balance the 

competing claims of injury and must consider the effect on each party of the granting or 

withholding of the requested relief.’” Id. at 24 (citing Amoco Production Co. v. Gambell, 480 

U.S. 531, 542 (1987)). “‘In exercising their sound discretion, courts of equity should pay 

particular regard for the public consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of 

injunction.’” Id. (citing Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982)). 

The Ninth Circuit has stated its “serious questions” sliding scale approach survives Winter, 

whereby a court may grant preliminary injunctive relief if a plaintiff demonstrates “that serious 

questions going to the merits were raised and the balance of the hardships tips sharply in the 

plaintiff’s favor.” Alliance For The Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011) 

(hereinafter “Cottrell”) (quoting The Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 987 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(“Lands Council”), overruled on other grounds by Winter, 555 U.S. at 22). Whether a plaintiff 

establishes a likelihood of success on the merits or establishes serious questions going to the 

merits, that plaintiff still must show the likelihood of irreparable harm and that the public interest 

favors an injunction. Cotrell, 632 F.3d at 1135. 

 The Ninth Circuit has held that a trademark owner is no longer entitled to a presumption 

of irreparable harm if it demonstrates likelihood of success on the merits of its claim. Herb Reed 

Enterprises, LLC v. Florida Entertainment Management, Inc., 736 F.3d 1239, 1250 (9th Cir. 

2013). Thus, even upon a showing of likelihood of success on the merits, a plaintiff must put forth 

evidence that irreparable harm is likely, and not merely speculative or possible. 

The Court finds that Ross has not met its burden to show that a temporary restraining order 

is required. First, Ross has not shown that any exigency exists that would require emergent and 

immediate relief in the form of a temporary restraining order. Second, assuming for the sake of 

argument that Ross would meet its burden to show a likelihood of success on the merits of its 

claims, Ross’ showing of irreparable harm is based on statements set forth in the McGillis 

declaration. “Evidence of loss of control over business reputation and damage to goodwill could 

constitute irreparable harm.” Herb Reed Enterprises, 736 F.3d at 1250. However, the Court finds 

that the McGillis declaration is not sufficient to establish that irreparable harm based on injury to 

Case 4:15-cv-05640-JSW Document 22 Filed 12/16/15 Page 3 of 4
United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

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Case 4:15-cv-05640-JSW Document 22 Filed 12/16/15 Page 4 of 4