Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-55484/USCOURTS-ca9-12-55484-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 360
Nature of Suit: Other Personal Injury
Cause of Action: 

---

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FLOR MARINA CHAVARRO

SALDANA; HECTOR JULIO MARTINEZ

CHAVARRO; FLOR AIDE MARTINEZ

CHAVARRO; ANA MILENA

MARTINEZ CHAVARRO; LUCY

ESPERANZA GONZA SANTAFE;

PAOLA ANDREA GOYENECH

GONZALEZ; EUFROSINA DEL

CARMEN GOYE G.; ROSA MARIA

RAMIREZ GOMEZ; NELSON PRIETO

RAMIREZ; MIREYA PRIETO RAMIREZ;

YUDITH PRIETO RAMIREZ;

MAXIMINA CHAMUCERO DE PRIETO;

BELSY YASMIN SOLANO; JAZMIN

ALEJANDRA PRIETO SOLANO;

H.N.M.C.; T.K.G.G.; R.A.P.S.;

J.E.P.S.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM

CORPORATION,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 12-55484

D.C. No.

2:11-cv-08957-

PA-AJW

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Percy Anderson, District Judge, Presiding

 Case: 12-55484, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348538, DktEntry: 60-1, Page 1 of 43
2 SALDANA V. OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM

Argued and Submitted

June 4, 2014—Pasadena, California

Filed December 15, 2014

Before: Alex Kozinski, Stephen S. Trott, and

Consuelo M. Callahan, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam Opinion;

Concurrence by Judge Trott

SUMMARY*

Political Question Doctrine

The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal of an

action brought under the Alien Tort Statute and California

tort law by family members of three union leaders killed in

Colombia in August 2004 by members of the Colombian

National Army’s 18th Brigade.

Plaintiffs contended that Occidental Petroleum Corp.

should be held liable for the 18th Brigade’s alleged war

crimes, crimes against humanity, and assorted torts arising

out of the 18th Brigade’s murder of the three union leaders. 

Plaintiffs’ theory was that Occidental, via its Colombian

subsidiary, provided funding to the 18th Brigade, which gave

Occidental operational control over the 18th Brigade,

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

 Case: 12-55484, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348538, DktEntry: 60-1, Page 2 of 43
SALDANA V. OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM 3

knowing full well that the 18th Brigade was committing

murders and other human rights abuses.

The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the

complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) on the ground

that it raised nonjusticiable political questions. The panel

concluded that plaintiffs’ claims were inextricably bound to

the inherently political question of the propriety of the United

States’ decision to provide $99 million worth of training to

the 18th Brigade at the same time and for the same purpose

as Occidental allegedly providing $6.3 million.

Concurring, Judge Trott wrote separately to augment the

background material that demonstrated that the complaint

raised nonjusticiable political questions, thus depriving the

courts of jurisdiction to entertain it.

COUNSEL

Terrence P. Collingsworth (argued), Conrad & Scherer, LLP,

Washington, D.C., for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Matthew T. Kline (argued) and Dimitri D. Portnoi,

O’Melveny& Myers LLP, Los Angeles, California; Jonathan

Hacker and Anton Metlitsky, O’Melveny & Myers LLP,

Washington, D.C., for Defendant-Appellee.

 Case: 12-55484, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348538, DktEntry: 60-1, Page 3 of 43
4 SALDANA V. OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Family members of three union leaders killed in

Colombia in August 2004 by members of the Colombian

National Army’s (“CNA”) 18th Brigade brought this lawsuit

in 2011 in Los Angeles, California, against Occidental

Petroleum Corporation (“Occidental”), a Delaware

corporation with headquarters in Los Angeles. Plaintiffs’

complaint contains ten causes of action, three under

28 U.S.C. § 1350, known as the Alien Tort Statute, and the

rest under California tort law. As correctly summarized by

the district court, Plaintiffs contend that “Occidental should

be liable for the 18th Brigade’s alleged war crimes, crimes

against humanity, and assorted torts arising out of the 18th

Brigade’s murder of the three union leaders.” Plaintiffs’

theory is that Occidental provided funding to the 18th

Brigade, which gave Occidental operational control over the

18th Brigade, knowing full well that the 18th Brigade was

committing murders and other human rights abuses. The

district court dismissed the complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.

P. 12(b)(1) on the ground that it raised nonjusticiable political

questions. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291, and we affirm.

I

A

This case has its genesis in a complex internal armed

conflict that Colombia, often with the United States’

assistance, has struggled with for decades. Since the 1960s,

leftist guerrilla groups such as the Revolutionary Armed

 Case: 12-55484, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348538, DktEntry: 60-1, Page 4 of 43
SALDANA V. OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM 5

Forces of Colombia (las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de

Colombia, or the “FARC”) and National Liberation Army (el

Ejército de Liberación Nacional, or the “ELN”) have fought

to overpower the Colombian government, often resorting to

drug trafficking and kidnaping to fund their efforts. The

violence in Colombia peaked in the late 1990s, and, in 1997,

the U.S. Department of State designated both the FARC and

ELN as foreign terrorist organizations. In 2002, Colombian

President Álvaro Uribe, with the United States’ backing,

militarized much of the country in an effort to eradicate the

guerrillas. Plaintiffs’ claims dissect one small fraction of this

conflict.

B

Occidental de Colombia, Inc. (“OxyCol”), a Colombian

subsidiary of Occidental, and Ecopetrol, Colombia’s stateowned oil company, began oil exploration efforts in the

Arauca region of northeast Colombia in the 1980s. They

discovered one of the largest oil fields in the country, and

began extracting oil in 1986. Together, OxyCol and

Ecopetrol built the Caño Limón pipeline (the “Pipeline”) to

transport the oil to the coast. Ecopetrol, OxyCol, and a

Spanish company, Repsol, own the oilfield and Pipeline, and

OxyCol operates the Pipeline.

The Pipeline begins in the Arauca region near the border

with Venezuela and ends at the Carribean port of Coveñas. 

The first 110 miles of the Pipeline cut through especially

volatile guerrilla territory. The guerrillas targeted the

Pipeline to sabotage the Colombian economy and protest the

exploitation of one of Colombia’s most lucrative resources. 

Plaintiffs allege that OxyCol paid millions of dollars in “war

taxes” to the ELN and FARC, starting in the 1980s and

 Case: 12-55484, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348538, DktEntry: 60-1, Page 5 of 43
6 SALDANA V. OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM

continuing through at least 2000, so that it could operate the

Pipeline without interference. After the United States

declared the ELN and FARC terrorist organizations in 1997,

these payments became illegal.

C

Guerrilla attacks on the Pipeline continued to increase

into the early 2000s, with a high of 170 attacks in 2001. In

2002, because of Colombia’s inability to secure the Pipeline

on its own and the importance of the Pipeline to United States

energy security, the United States created a $99 million aid

program to help secure the Pipeline. There can be no doubt

that funding, training and equipping the 18th Brigade became

an important component of that program. On April 10, 2002,

the State Department’s Undersecretary for Public Affairs

testified before a Subcommittee of the Committee of

Appropriations of the House of Representatives in connection

with an appropriation of funds for fiscal year 2003. His oral

testimony and a written statement included the following:

Since July of 2000, the United States has

provided Colombia with $1.7 billion to

combat narcotics trafficking, terrorism,

strengthen democratic institutions and human

rights, foster socioeconomic development and

mitigate the impact of violence on Colombian

civilians.

. . . .

We are also helping municipalities

increase their ability to manage their policies

and their funds. We are working closely with

 Case: 12-55484, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348538, DktEntry: 60-1, Page 6 of 43
SALDANA V. OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM 7

the prosecutor general’s office to set up

human rights units throughout the country to

facilitate the investigation and prosecution of

human rights abuses.

. . . .

Expanding the authorities for the use of

aircraft and other assets to cover terrorist and

other threats to Colombian democracywill, of

course, not ensure that this battle will be won,

because they are working against multiple

threats. However, we believe that if you

approve this proposition, they will give us the

flexibility we need to help the government of

Colombia more efficiently and more

effectively attack the problems that they face.

. . . .

In the longer-term, we are asking for $439

million in . . . funds in our FY-03 budget

request to sustain our Plan Colombia

programs, as well as $98 million in . . . funds

to train and equip Colombian military units

protecting the Caño Limón oil pipeline. The

$439 million request includes $275 million

for the Colombian military and police, and

$164 million for democracy programs,

alternative development, assistance to

vulnerable groups, and promotion of the rule

of law. These funds, together with the

terrorism supplemental, will be crucial as the

next Colombian government works to

 Case: 12-55484, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348538, DktEntry: 60-1, Page 7 of 43
8 SALDANA V. OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM

improve security, build effective democratic

institutions, and foster economic growth.

Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related

Programs Appropriations for 2003: Hearing Before the

Subcomm. on Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and

Related Programs of the Comm. on Appropriations, 107th

Cong. 276–78, 290 (2002).

An assistant secretaryof defense for international security

affairs then provided the Subcommittee with the Defense

Department’s perspective on the United States’ involvement

in Colombia, noting:

The Administration has proposed to

Congress $6 million in FY02 supplemental

funding and $98 million in FY03 Foreign

Military Finance funding to train and equip

vetted Colombian units to protect that

country’s most threatened piece of critical

economic infrastructure – the first 170

kilometers of the Cano-Limon oil pipeline. 

This segment is the most often attacked. U.S.

assistance and training will support two

Colombian Army Brigades, National Police

and Marines operating in the area. These

units through ground and air mobility will be

in a better position to prevent and disrupt

attacks on the pipeline and defend key

facilities and vulnerable points such as

pumping stations.

Id. at 303–04. In addition, the acting commander in chief of

the United States Southern Command provided the

 Case: 12-55484, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348538, DktEntry: 60-1, Page 8 of 43
SALDANA V. OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM 9

Subcommittee with a written statement on the appropriations,

observing:

In addition to counterdrug assistance, the

Administration has proposed to Congress $98

million, for FY 2003, to help Colombia to

enhance the training and equipping of units to

protect the Caño Limón-Covenas oil pipeline,

one of the most vulnerable elements of their

economic infrastructure. The FARC and ELN

are active in carrying out attacks against

Colombia’s energy infrastructure. Attacks on

the Caño Limón-Covenas pipeline cost the

Government of Colombia more that $40

million per month in revenues when the

pipeline is not operational.

. . . .

The Administration has included $6

million in the FY 2002 Supplemental to begin

training. The first unit to be trained for this

program will be the recently human rights

vetted, Arauca-based Colombian Army 18th

Brigade.

Id. at 344–45.

In 2003, the United States and Colombian governments

formalized a program and coordinated security strategy in a

signed memorandum of agreement. The government-togovernment program provided both lethal and non-lethal

support to the 18th Brigade, including helicopters, equipment,

logistical and infrastructure support, and training. The

 Case: 12-55484, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348538, DktEntry: 60-1, Page 9 of 43
10 SALDANA V. OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM

Narcotics Affairs Section and Military Group of the U.S.

Embassy in Bogotá administered the aid program day-to-day.

To implement the policy of assisting Colombia, Congress

appropriated $71 million in 2002 and 2003 to buy helicopters

and related support for the 18th Brigade, and $28 million to

provide the 18th Brigade with equipment and training byU.S.

Special Forces. The training by the U.S. Special Forces

began in January 2003, though the helicopters were delayed

until 2005. A 2005 letter to Congress from the United States

Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) reported that:

U.S. Special Forces provided training and

equipment for about 1,600 Colombian Army

soldiers to improve their ability to act quickly

in minimizing terrorist attacks along the Caño

Limón pipeline. In November 2002, a team of

U.S. Special Forces traveled to Arauca to

assess the area and determine the training

needs of the Colombian Army. In January

2003, U.S. Special Forces started training in

Arauca and planned for training to continue

through December 2004. U.S. Special Forces

focused on helping the Colombian Army take

a more proactive and aggressive approach to

defend the pipeline; regain control of the area

around the pipeline; and prevent, interdict,

and disrupt the insurgents before they attack

the pipeline. Training included developing

quick reaction capabilities, small unit tactics,

planning and conducting operations,

reconnaissance, collecting and analyzing

timely intelligence, and medical support.

 Case: 12-55484, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348538, DktEntry: 60-1, Page 10 of 43
SALDANA V. OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM 11

D

In May 2004, Ecopetrol and the Colombian Ministry of

National Defense entered into an Inter-Institutional

Cooperation Agreement (the “Agreement”). Neither

Occidental nor OxyCol were signatories to this agreement. 

In it, Ecopetrol agreed to provide the Ministry with financial

support in exchange for the Ministry’s increased protection of

the Pipeline. Ecopetrol agreed to provide approximately $6.3

million worth of assistance from its joint account with

OxyCol. The support Ecopetrol pledged to the Colombian

National Army’s 18th Brigade explicitly included support in

kind for land transportation, air transportation, health

services, communications, canine maintenance, and other

general and operational expenses. In exchange, the

Colombian Ministry of Defense would “provide special

attention, based on its own judgment, to the activities aimed

at maintaining the conditions of protection and security of

Ecopetrol’s activities.” The Agreement specified that the

Ministry would not use any of Ecopetrol’s funds for lethal

purposes, would respect human rights and international

humanitarian laws, could divert its attention elsewhere as

needed, and could unilaterally terminate the Agreement for

any reason.

The Agreement also created a Supervisory Group and

Coordination Committee to implement the Agreement. The

Supervisory group, made up of three “superior officers”

designated by the Ministry, was charged with overseeing the

“correct allocation of the resources” and “implementation of

the foreseen security operations, maintenance, and protection

plans.” The Coordination Committee, consisting of three

Ecopetrol representatives (including a representative of

OxyCol) and six military representatives, was to “direct the 

 Case: 12-55484, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348538, DktEntry: 60-1, Page 11 of 43
12 SALDANA V. OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM

execution of the Agreement [to achieve] high levels of

efficacy and transparency.” Specifically, the Coordination

Committee would evaluate the Supervisory group, the

efficiencyand impact of the Agreement on oil operations, and

the Agreement’s development and necessary corrective

measures; keep records related to the execution of the

Agreement; ensure that the Agreement would not negatively

affect the relationships between the parties and the

community; and address unforeseen circumstances that could

hinder the execution of the Agreement. Moreover, the

Agreement stated that, notwithstanding the powers vested in

the Coordination Committee, “the strategic and operational

control of the activities carried out by the” Ministry of

National Defense and the various branches of the Colombian

military “shall be the exclusive responsibility of th[ose]

institutions.”

II

A

In August 2004, after the United States and OxyCol had

both begun to provide funding to the CNA, four members of

the 18th Brigade assisted by one civilian murdered the three

union leaders in Caño Seco, roughly sixty kilometers from the

Pipeline. The soldiers, and later high-level officials from the

Colombian government, claimed that the leaders were

guerrilla members who had attacked the soldiers, and that the

soldiers merely returned fire. The union leaders’ family

members, on the other hand, said that the soldiers executed

the leaders after they left one of their homes with their hands

in the air.

 Case: 12-55484, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348538, DktEntry: 60-1, Page 12 of 43
SALDANA V. OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM 13

The union leaders and the social and trade organizations

to which they belonged had protested the environmental

destruction caused by the Pipeline and OxyCol’s plan to drill

for oil on or near land belonging to the U’Wa indigenous

people. They also criticized the CNA for committing “acts of

barbarity” in an effort to protect the Pipeline. According to

the complaint, the CNA retaliated against the leaders because

of their social activism by conducting illegal searches and

detentions of the leaders, their familymembers, and members

of their social and trade organizations.

B

The killings spurred various criminal, disciplinary, and

administrative proceedings in Colombia. All of the actions

that have been formally resolved and are included in the

record found that the soldiers wrongly executed the union

leaders without any provocation, but did not do so at the

direction of the CNA. Plaintiffs imply nevertheless that the

soldiers killed the union leaders because the leaders opposed

OxyCol’s oil exploitation in the region.

C

We note that the Colombian proceedings’ conclusion that

the killings were not instigated by the government was

partially corroborated by Special Rapporteur Philip Alston of

the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for

Human Rights. In 2010, Mr. Alston reported to the General

Assembly on extrajudicial killings of civilians in Columbia. 

He dismissed the idea that such killings “were committed as

part of an official policy or that they were ordered by senior

government officials.”

 Case: 12-55484, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348538, DktEntry: 60-1, Page 13 of 43
14 SALDANA V. OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM

D

In addition, since 2004, the State Department has issued

a series of official certifications to Congress stating “that the

Colombian Government and Armed Forces are meeting

statutory criteria related to human rights and severing ties to

paramalitary groups.” These certifications were required by

law in order to obligate funds appropriated byCongress to the

Colombian Armed Forces. Consolidated Appropriations Act

of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108–199, § 563(a)(1), (3), 118 Stat. 3,

193 (2004).

III

A

Seven years after the killings, Plaintiffs filed suit against

Occidental in the Central District of California under the

Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, and California state

law. Plaintiffs claimed that Occidental, via its Colombian

subsidiary, OxyCol, provided purposeful and substantial

assistance to the 18th Brigade before and after the killings. 

They allege that Occidental hired the 18th Brigade as its

personal security force, and exercised operational control

over the 18th Brigade, all the while knowing that the 18th

Brigade would likely commit human rights abuses. Their

complaint includes the following allegations:

88. Occidental knew or should have

known that for years preceding the decedents’

murders, there were widespread human rights

violations in Arauca committed by the CNA,

especially by the 18th Brigade.

 Case: 12-55484, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348538, DktEntry: 60-1, Page 14 of 43
SALDANA V. OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM 15

89. The CNA, directly or indirectly (by

supporting right-wing paramilitary groups),

participated in numerous massacres of

civilians and the disappearances,

extra-judicial killings, arbitrary detentions,

and beatings of social protestors.

. . . .

111. Given the long and well-publicized

history of the CNA’s human rights violations

(especially those of the 18th Brigade) and

Occidental’s close relationship with it,

Occidental must have known of the CNA’s

human rights abuses.

. . . .

113. Despite this human rights

“problem,” Occidental continued to provide

the CNA with financial and other material

assistance in order to further Occidental’s

financial gains from the Colombian operation.

. . . .

172. When Occidental entered into the

renewed . . . Agreement to support the CNA,

there was no question that Occidental was

providing funding to the CNA to continue its

brutal practices and that additional war crimes

would be committed by the CNA enabled by

Occidental’s funding.

 Case: 12-55484, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348538, DktEntry: 60-1, Page 15 of 43
16 SALDANA V. OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM

173. Occidental intended that, with its

funds, the CNA would expand its war effort

against the FARC and ELN and would focus

its campaign in the areas of Arauca near the

Caño Limón oilfield and Caño LimónCoveñas pipeline where the FARC and the

ELN had attacked so many times before. 

Given CNA’s well publicized record of past

war crimes committed in the name of

providing securityto Occidental, the company

certainly had knowledge that the CNA would

continue to commit war crimes, including

extrajudicial killings of innocent civilians,

like Plaintiffs’ decedents, who lived in and

around the towns Occidental needed the CNA

to attack and pacify.

. . . .

212. The primary war crime that

Occidental aided and abetted was the killings

of innocent civilians (i.e., Plaintiffs’

decedents). In aiding and abetting these war

crimes, Occidental also aided and abetted the

killings themselves, which as alleged above,

were extrajudicial killings because they were

committed by the CNA under color of the

authority of the Government of Colombia.

B

Relying on Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), and

Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 503 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2007), the

district court granted Occidental’s 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss

 Case: 12-55484, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348538, DktEntry: 60-1, Page 16 of 43
SALDANA V. OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM 17

on political question grounds, concluding that Plaintiffs

“advanced no theoryof liability against Occidental that would

not apply with equal force to the foreign policy and national

security determinations made by the political branches.” 

Because Plaintiffs (1) articulated no additional facts or

theories that would avoid the political question, and (2) did

not request additional time or the opportunity to conduct

discovery on this precise issue, the district court did not give

Plaintiffs leave to amend. Plaintiffs appealed and we stayed

Plaintiffs’ appeal pending the Supreme Court’s decision in

Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).

IV

We review a district court’s dismissal for lack of

jurisdiction de novo, and we may affirm on any basis fairly

supported by the record. Corrie, 503 F.3d at 979. When

determining whether a political question precludes

jurisdiction, we may look beyond the complaint to facts

properly in the record, id. at 982, and “need not presume the

truthfulness of the plaintiffs’ allegations,” White v. Lee,

227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000). Furthermore, “we ‘need

not . . . accept as true allegations that contradict matters

properly subject to judicial notice or by exhibit.’” Gonzalez

v. Planned Parenthood of L.A., 759 F.3d 1112, 1115 (9th Cir.

2014) (quoting Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d

979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001)); see also Warren v. Fox Family

Worldwide, Inc., 328 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[W]e

are not required to accept as true conclusory allegations

which are contradicted by documents referred to in the

 Case: 12-55484, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348538, DktEntry: 60-1, Page 17 of 43
18 SALDANA V. OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM

complaint.”).1 We also need not accept as true legal

conclusions contained in the complaint. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

V

A

“Questions, in their nature political, or which are, by the

constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never

be made in this court.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.

(1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803). This principle is “primarily a

function of the separation of powers.” Baker, 369 U.S. at

210. “‘The conduct of the foreign relations of our

government is committed by the Constitution to the executive

and legislative [branches] . . . and the propriety of what may

be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject

to judicial inquiry or decision.’” Corrie, 503 F.3d at 982

(quoting Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302

(1918)). But not every case that “touches foreign relations

lies beyond judicial cognizance.” Baker, 369 U.S. at 211.

In this case, our task is to determine whether Plaintiffs’

claims implicate a nonjusticiable political question. To make

this decision, Baker requires us to consider whether each

claim presents:

[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional

commitment of the issue to a coordinate

1 Without objection, the district court took judicial notice of documents

referenced in Plaintiffs’ complaint. We granted Occidental’s motion to

take judicial notice of our government’s formal presentations to Congress

in support of its request to fund these programs.

 Case: 12-55484, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348538, DktEntry: 60-1, Page 18 of 43
SALDANA V. OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM 19

political department; or [2] a lack of judicially

discoverable and manageable standards for

resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of

deciding without an initial policy

determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial

discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court’s

undertaking independent resolution without

expressing lack of the respect due coordinate

branches of government; or [5] an unusual

need for unquestioning adherence to a

political decision already made; or [6] the

potentiality of embarrassment from

multifarious pronouncements by various

departments on one question.

Id. at 217. Using these six tests as a guide, “[w]e undertake

a discriminating case-by-case analysis,” Corrie, 503 F.3d at

982 (internal quotation marks omitted), to determine whether

a political question is so “inextricabl[y]” tied to the case as to

divest the court of jurisdiction. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217; see

also Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 544 (9th Cir.

2005) (“[T]hese tests are more discrete in theory than in

practice, with the analyses often collapsing into one

another.”).

We conclude that the district court’s analysis was correct. 

Each of Plaintiffs’ claims rests on Occidental’s partial

funding of, and alleged control over, the 18th Brigade. Yet

Occidental’s “control,” when stripped of implausible

allegations in the complaint, is premised on nothing more

than partial funding. We can therefore see no principled way

to sever Occidental’s funding from that of the United States. 

It follows that under the fourth, fifth, and sixth Baker tests,

Plaintiffs’ claims are inextricably bound to an inherently

 Case: 12-55484, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348538, DktEntry: 60-1, Page 19 of 43
20 SALDANA V. OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM

political question – the propriety of the United States’

decision to provide $99 million worth of training and

equipment to the 18th Brigade at the same time and for the

same purpose as Occidental allegedly providing $6.3 million

– and thus are beyond the jurisdiction of our courts.

B

Our decision in Corrie, in which we dismissed all of the

plaintiffs’ claims against Caterpillar, Inc. on political question

grounds, informs our analysis. 503 F.3d at 977. The Corrie

plaintiffs sued Caterpillar after the United States paid for, and

Caterpillar supplied, bulldozers to the Israeli Defense Forces

(“IDF”), which the IDF used to injure and kill the plaintiffs’

family members. Id. We dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims as

nonjusticiable because “each claim unavoidably rest[ed] on

the singular premise that Caterpillar should not have sold its

bulldozers to the IDF.” Id. at 982. Because those “sales were

financed by the executive branch pursuant to a

congressionally enacted program calling for executive

discretion as to what lies in the foreign policy and national

security interests of the United States,” the action “would

necessarily require the judicial branch . . . to question the

political branches’ decision to grant extensive military aid to

Israel.” Id.

The same reasoning applies here: each of Plaintiffs’

claims unavoidably rests on the premise that Occidental’s

indirect funding of the 18th Brigade was either knowing or

negligent-and-reckless support for a group of guerrillas

involved in human rights violations. However, the United

States provided much greater funding to the 18th Brigade at

the same time and for the same purpose as Occidental, and

thus this case necessarily requires the judicial branch to

 Case: 12-55484, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348538, DktEntry: 60-1, Page 20 of 43
SALDANA V. OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM 21

question the political branches’ decision to provide extensive

military aid to Colombia and the CNA. See id. Insofar as

Occidental was providing funding to the 18th Brigade, it did

so “cheek to jowl” with the government of the United States

acting in the interests of its national security.

Plaintiffs contend that they need look no further than

Occidental itself in order to make their case. However, as we

noted in Corrie, “resolving their suit will necessarily require

us to look beyond the lone defendant in this case and toward

the foreign policy interests and judgments of the United

States government itself.” 503 F.3d at 984. It is true that in

Corrie we noted the “decisive factor” was that the United

States paid for the bulldozers and thus was a “direct actor.” 

Id. at 982, 983 n.8. However, as the district court explained,

the United States’ purchase of the bulldozers was decisive

because it evidenced the United States’ policy decision to

support the IDF’s use of the bulldozers. Here too, the United

States’ provision of $99 million to the CNA – more than 15

times what Occidental contributed (through Oxycol and

Ecopetrol) – evidences the United States’ support of the 18th

Brigade’s efforts to secure the Pipeline.

C

Plaintiffs cite to a handful of military contractor cases that

purport to argue in favor of finding no political question here. 

But those cases at most required the courts to question the onthe-ground execution of military-related operations, not

underlying foreign-policy choices such as the very decision

to engage in military activity. See Koohi v. United States,

976 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding a claim brought

by family members of those killed when a United States

warship accidentally shot down a civilian airliner justiciable

 Case: 12-55484, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348538, DktEntry: 60-1, Page 21 of 43
22 SALDANA V. OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM

because “governmental operations are a traditional subject of

damages actions”); Lane v. Halliburton, 529 F.3d 548, 562

(5th Cir. 2008) (declining to dismiss the case at the motion to

dismiss stage because the plaintiffs “presented a plausible set

of facts as to the fraud and misrepresentation claims” that

could have been tried without implicating a political

question); Bixby v. KBR, Inc., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1239 (D.

Or. 2010) (finding the claims against a government contractor

who failed to advise the plaintiffs of hazardous chemicals at

their work site in Iraq justiciable because “the matter

fundamentally at issue [was the] defendants’ performance of

[their] contractual obligations . . . rather than the advisability

of any governmental policy-related decision”). Here, to the

contrary, Plaintiffs’ claims fundamentally question

Occidental’s, and thus the United States’, very decision to

fund the 18th Brigade, rather than Occidental’s supervision

of the Brigade’s on-the-ground operations.

Granted, Plaintiffs’ agency theories of liability and

negligent hiring claim, which require Plaintiffs to prove

Occidental had operational control over the 18th Brigade or

those soldiers who committed the killings, might sever the

political question from this case if plausibly pled. See

generally Lane, 529 F.3d at 562. But Plaintiffs have failed to

plausibly plead those claims, because they have not pleaded

“factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that” Occidental had operational control of the 18th

Brigade. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

The May2004 Inter-Institutional Cooperation Agreement

gives complete operational control over the 18th Brigade to

the Ministry of Defense. Although the Ministry agreed to

give special attention to the Pipeline, it could divert its

attention elsewhere as needed and could unilaterally

 Case: 12-55484, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348538, DktEntry: 60-1, Page 22 of 43
SALDANA V. OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM 23

terminate the Agreement for any reason. Even the

Coordination Committee, to which OxyCol could appoint just

one of its ten members, was explicitly denied “strategic and

operational control” over the CNA.

Much of the information Plaintiffs have put forth to show

control despite the explicit terms of the Agreement consists

of reports from 1997 and 2001, which are of limited worth. 

For example, Plaintiffs point to statements made byOxyCol’s

president regarding the CNA, including that the CNA had the

“obligation” to protect the Pipeline and that Occidental

“rel[ied] exclusively on the government to provide

protection.” They also rely on a footnote in the Government

Accountability Office report on the United States’ aid

program, which explained that Occidental’s pipeline

instrumentation would notify CNA of an attack on the

Pipeline, and the CNA would then respond to that attack. But

most private enterprises must report attacks or crimes before

the government can respond. Plaintiffs also cite the alleged

use of an Occidental-provided helicopter to transport the

union leaders’ bodies after the killings, but reliance and

interdependence do not equal control.

Plaintiffs, while recognizing that they will “likely have to

show that Occidental had a right to control the 18th Brigade,”

have failed to allege sufficient facts to suggest that Occidental

had any control over the day-to-day operations of the 18th

Brigade. Their agency theory of liability and negligent hiring

claim could survive only if we implausibly conclude that

Occidental somehow exercised more control over the 18th

Brigade than the United States did, even though the United

States provided much greater funding, provided actual

training, and oversaw the execution of the aid program,

vetting the 18th Brigade every step of the way. See Warren,

 Case: 12-55484, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348538, DktEntry: 60-1, Page 23 of 43
24 SALDANA V. OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM

328 F.3d at 1139; cf. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. On this record,

the notion that the CNA ceded control of the 18th Brigade to

a Delaware corporation with headquarters in theUnited States

is utterly fanciful. In other words, even accepting Plaintiffs’

factual allegations, they fail to support a “reasonable

inference” that Occidental through its funding had anycontrol

over the operations of the 18th Brigade, or that Occidental’s

“control,” whatever it was, can be distinguished from the

United States’ “control” over the 18th Brigade. 

D

Finally, Plaintiffs incorrectly assert that the State

Department’s failure to submit a statement of interest in this

case “indicates a lack of conflict.” To the contrary, our

circuit precedent clearly states that the State Department’s

silence on this issue is a neutral factor. Alperin, 410 F.3d at

556. Moreover, here, the United States’ funding, training,

and oversight of the 18th Brigade was so obvious as to make

a formal statement unnecessary. The facts of this case simply

cannot be framed in such a way that severs the tie between

the United States’ and Occidental’s funding of the CNA and

the 18th Brigade. Baker and Corrie require that we leave the

issue to the political branches.

VI

We normally will “not consider an issue not passed upon

below,” Dodd v. Hood River Cnty., 59 F.3d 852, 863 (9th

Cir. 1995) (internal quotation mark omitted), including legal

arguments, see USA Petroleum Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co.,

13 F.3d 1276, 1283–84 (9th Cir. 1994). Plaintiffs’ argument

on appeal that the district court should have denied

Occidental’s motion to dismiss so that they could conduct

 Case: 12-55484, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348538, DktEntry: 60-1, Page 24 of 43
SALDANA V. OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM 25

discovery on the political question issue falls into that chasm. 

Plaintiffs did not make that argument below and, thus, have

waived it. Neither did they request an opportunity to amend

their complaint, choosing instead to appeal.2

VII

Occidental’s funding of the 18th Brigade, at the same

time and for the same purpose as the United States, is

inextricably bound to foreign policy decisions which our

Constitution consigns to, and have already been made by, the

political branches. “Whether to grant military or other aid to

a foreign nation is a political decision inherently entangled

with the conduct of foreign relations.” Corrie, 503 F.3d at

983. Here, Congress and the President determined that

economic and military aid and training to Colombia and to

the 18th Brigade of the CNA was necessary and appropriate. 

We cannot adjudicate Plaintiffs’ claims without inquiring into

or passing judgment on those political decisions. Any verdict

or judgment in favor of Plaintiffs would necessarily conflict

with and denounce our government’s official actions. As we

noted in Corrie, we “could not find in favor of the plaintiffs

without implicitly questioning, and even condemning, United

States foreign policy toward [Columbia].” 503 F.3d at 984. 

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ case directly implicates at least the

fourth, fifth, and sixth Baker factors: appropriate respect for

coordinate branches of government; an unusual need to

2

In their opposition to Occidental’s motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs

alternatively requested (1) leave to amend their complaint to include

additional facts showing that Occidental was the correct defendant, and

(2) an opportunity to conduct discovery on the comity issue. But they did

not request leave to amend or an opportunity to conduct discovery

regarding the political question issue specifically, nor regarding the

motion to dismiss generally.

 Case: 12-55484, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348538, DktEntry: 60-1, Page 25 of 43
26 SALDANA V. OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM

adhere to political decisions made in the context of foreign

affairs; and the potential for embarrassment from multifarious

pronouncements by various departments on the same

question.

If, as Plaintiffs allege in paragraph 88 of their complaint,

“Occidental knew or should have known that for years

preceding the decedents’ murders, there were widespread

human rights violations in Arauca committed by the CNA,

especially by the 18th Brigade,” on this record the same

would have to be said of the State Department. Indeed,

Plaintiffs’ allegations are manifestly irreconcilable with the

State Department’s human rights certifications to Congress. 

We remain bound by the Supreme Court’s holding in Oetjen,

246 U.S. at 302, which we reiterated in Corrie, 503 F.3d at

982, that the “conduct of the foreign relations of our

government is committed by the Constitution to the executive

and legislative [branches] . . . and the propriety of what may

be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject

to judicial inquiry or decision.” As the political question

doctrine bars us from considering the merits of Plaintiffs’

claims, the district court’s dismissal of their action is

AFFIRMED.3

3 Because of our resolution of this appeal on the basis of political

question nonjusticiability, we need not address Occidental’s contention

that Plaintiffs’ case also fails under the Supreme Court’s decision in

Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).

 Case: 12-55484, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348538, DktEntry: 60-1, Page 26 of 43
SALDANA V. OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM 27

TROTT, Circuit Judge, concurring:

I agree with my colleagues’ resolution of this case and our

per curiam opinion. I write separately only to augment the

background material that demonstrates that the Plaintiffs’

complaint raises nonjusticiable political questions, thus

depriving us of jurisdiction to entertain it.

To illustrate the direct foreign policy interests of the

United States that envelop every aspect of Plaintiffs’ case, I

turn to relevant excerpts from the testimony and presentation

on April 10, 2002, of Marc Grossman, our State Department’s

Undersecretary for Public Affairs. He delivered this

testimony to a Subcommittee of the Committee of

Appropriations of the House of Representatives in connection

with an appropriation of funds for fiscal year 2003, requested

by President George W. Bush. In Subcommittee Chairman

Kolbe’s opening statement, he set the stage for the

undersecretary’s testimony:

One could have predicted a heated debate

last year about our policy in Colombia, but no

one could have imagined the developments

that have led us to where we are here today. 

After nearly four years of fruitless and onesided negotiations, President Pastrana called

off the peace process a few weeks ago. I

sympathize with the frustration that President

Pastrana expressed at that time and the

frustration of the Colombian people for this

failed attempt to negotiate a settlement to a

40-plus year conflict given the FARC’s

mockery of the peace negotiations by their

continued kidnapping and bombing.”

 Case: 12-55484, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348538, DktEntry: 60-1, Page 27 of 43
28 SALDANA V. OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM

Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related

Programs Appropriations for 2003: Hearing Before the

Subcomm. on Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and

Related Programs of the Comm. on Appropriations, 107th

Cong. 271–272 (2002).

Undersecretary Grossman then explained, in oral

testimony and a written statement, our purpose and policy in

seeking this appropriation from Congress.

For me, this comes down to one thing,

which is that Colombia matters to the United

States. Congress has been a key partner in our

efforts to help Colombia defeat the demons

that it now confronts in narco-trafficking,

underdevelopment, human rights abuses and

terrorism. . . .

. . . .

As Chairman Kolbe said, on March the

21st, we came here and proposed, through a

supplemental, some changes in law and

regulation. We did that because we have

come to believe, as Chairman Kolbe said, that

the problems of narcotics and terrorism in

Colombia are connected. And exactly as the

Chairman said, we seek these new authorities

because we believe that we can do a better

job.

. . . .

 Case: 12-55484, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348538, DktEntry: 60-1, Page 28 of 43
SALDANA V. OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM 29

Mr. Chairman, I think it is very important

to take an overview here on what we are

trying to accomplish in Colombia, which is a

hemispheric vision of democracy, prosperity

and security. I will not go into it in great

detail, but you all know that in Quebec last

year 34 heads of state and governments of this

hemisphere got together and did two very

important things.

First of all, they passed a democracy

clause which said that all countries in this

region to be part of the conversation in the

WesternHemisphere ought to be democracies.

Second, they discussed an improved

action plan to promote economic prosperity,

protect human rights, fight drug trafficking

and organized crime. Additionally, they also

set 2005 as a deadline for the Free Trade Area

of the Americas.

Democracy, security and prosperity. It

seems to me that the question we have to ask

ourselves is, what good are all these

principles if they get trampled in Colombia.

. . . .

. . . The FARC has killed six Colombian

legislators and kidnapped presidential

candidate Ingrid Betancourt. Groups

assassinated 12 mayors in 2001, and the

 Case: 12-55484, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348538, DktEntry: 60-1, Page 29 of 43
30 SALDANA V. OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM

FARC efforts to disrupt the March 10

legislative elections are also well documented.

I also believe that there is an assault on

Colombia’s prosperity as well. The ELN and

FARC bombings of the key Caño Limón oil

pipeline cost the government of Colombia

almost $500 million in lost revenue last year.

. . . .

. . . I just wanted to say that, we think we have

got a hemisphere consensus on security,

prosperity and democracy and that these

principles reallyare under attack in Colombia. 

They are under attack in terms of Colombia’s

democracy, on security and I would say also

– on the Caño Limón pipeline – that there is

an assault by the FARC, the ELN and the

[United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia

(“AUC”)] on Colombia’s prosperity.

As I was saying, Mr. Chairman, the ELN

and FARC bombings of this oil pipeline cost

the government of Colombia about $500

million a year, which is equal to about onethird of Bogota’s spending on health for its

citizens. FARC strikes against the country’s

power grid in February left 45 towns,

including two departmental capitals, without

electricity for days. The FARC also

attempted twice to blow up dams near Bogota,

and had these efforts not been stopped, we

 Case: 12-55484, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348538, DktEntry: 60-1, Page 30 of 43
SALDANA V. OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM 31

believe they would have killed thousands and

thousands of Colombians.

Finally, we have the question of this

assault on Colombia’s security. The terrorist

attacks in Colombia have resulted in over

3,000 Colombians killed in the year 2001. 

Another 2,856 were kidnapped with ELN,

FARC, and AUC responsible for almost 2,000

victims. Again, I show you a chart, over the

years, on kidnapping in Colombia.

. . . .

Since July of 2000, the United States has

provided Colombia with $1.7 billion to

combat narcotics trafficking, terrorism,

strengthen democratic institutions and human

rights, foster socioeconomic development and

mitigate the impact of violence on Colombian

civilians.

. . . .

[T]he government of Colombia has extradited

23 Colombian nationals to the United States

in 2001; an unprecedented level of

cooperation, and I draw your attention to that

chart on extraditions. And I believe that the

reason we have had this increase in

extraditions is the increased engagement we

have had with Colombia.

. . . .

 Case: 12-55484, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348538, DktEntry: 60-1, Page 31 of 43
32 SALDANA V. OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM

We are also helping municipalities

increase their ability to manage their policies

and their funds. We are working closely with

the prosecutor general’s office to set up

human rights units throughout the country to

facilitate the investigation and prosecution of

human rights abuses. Furthermore, the

prosecutor general, as many of you know, was

here a couple of weeks ago, and we had a

chance to talk to him about the progress we

are making in that area as well.

. . . .

As I was reporting to Mrs. Lowey, last

week the chief of the Army staff, General

Shinseki, and General Speer, went to the

highest levels of the military and said that,

“Human rights must, must, must be among the

most important of your calculations as you

move forward.” And I believe, Mr.

Chairman, it is right to say that our human

rights message is making a real difference.

The Colombian military captured 590

paramilitary members last year and killed 92

members in combat. Eight military personnel,

including two colonels and a lieutenant

colonel, were charged in civilian courts with

collaborating with paramilitaries or

committing gross human rights violations in

2001, and that list goes on.

 Case: 12-55484, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348538, DktEntry: 60-1, Page 32 of 43
SALDANA V. OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM 33

Still, too many Colombians continue to

suffer abuses by state security forces or by

terrorist groups acting in collusion with state

security units, and those responsible must be

punished.

. . . .

Expanding the authorities for the use of

aircraft and other assets to cover terrorist and

other threats to Colombian democracywill, of

course, not ensure that this battle will be won,

because they are working against multiple

threats. However, we believe that if you

approve ths proposition, they will give us the

flexibility we need to help the government of

Colombia more efficiently and more

effectively attack the problems that they face.

. . . .

The FARC and ELN also represent a

danger to the $4.3 billion in direct U.S.

investments in Colombia. They regularly

attack U.S. interests, including the railway

used by the Drummond Coal Mining facility

and Occidental Petroleum’s stake in the Caño

Limón Pipeline. Terrorist attacks on the Caño

Limón pipeline also pose a threat to U.S.

energy security. Colombia supplied 3% of

U.S. oil imports in 2001, and possesses

substantial potential oil and natural gas

reserves.

 Case: 12-55484, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348538, DktEntry: 60-1, Page 33 of 43
34 SALDANA V. OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM

. . . .

Our request for new authorities does not

signify a retreat from our concern about

human rights nor signal an ill-guided U.S.

commitment in Colombia. Our proposal

expressly states that we will continue to do

human rights vetting of all Colombian

military units receiving U.S. training or

equipment and will maintain the 800 person

cap on U.S. military personnel and

contractors providing training and other

services in Colombia.

. . . .

In the longer-term, we are asking for $439

million in [International Narcotics Control

and Law Enforcement (“INCLE”)] funds in

our FY-03 budget request to sustain our Plan

Colombia programs, as well as $98 million in

[Foreign Military Financing (“FMF”)] funds

to train and equip Colombian military units

protecting the Caño Limón oil pipeline. The

$439 million request includes $275 million

for the Colombian military and police, and

$164 million for democracy programs,

alternative development, assistance to

vulnerable groups, and promotion of the rule

of law. These funds, together with the

terrorism supplemental, will be crucial as the

next Colombian government works to

improve security, build effective democratic

institutions, and foster economic growth.

 Case: 12-55484, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348538, DktEntry: 60-1, Page 34 of 43
SALDANA V. OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM 35

107th Cong. 273–278 (Grossman Testimony), 284–290

(Grossman Statement) (emphasis supplied).

Peter Rodman, assistant secretary of defense for

internationalsecurityaffairs, then provided the Subcommittee

with the Defense Department’s perspective on the United

States’ involvement in Colombia:

Continuing to link U.S. Aid to Colombia

to a narrow counternarcotics focus means that,

by law, we must refrain from providing

Colombia certain kinds of military assistance

and intelligence support that could

immediately strengthen the government’s

position throughout the country. Hundreds of

attacks by the ELN and FARC have been

directed at electrical, natural gas and oil

infrastructure. As Ambassador Grossman has

noted, the guerrillas’ sabotage of oil pipelines

alone has cost the Government of Colombia

lost revenue on the order of $500 million per

year. The pipeline was bombed 170 times in

2001, spilling 2.9 million barrels of oil –

eleven times the amount of the Exxon Valdez.

The Administration has proposed to

Congress $6 million in FY02 supplemental

funding and $98 million in FY03 Foreign

Military Finance funding to train and equip

vetted Colombian units to protect that

country’s most threatened piece of critical

economic infrastructure – the first 170

kilometers of the Cano-Limon oil pipeline. 

This segment is the most often attacked. U.S.

 Case: 12-55484, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348538, DktEntry: 60-1, Page 35 of 43
36 SALDANA V. OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM

assistance and training will support two

Colombian Army Brigades, National Police

and Marines operating in the area. These

units through ground and air mobility will be

in a better position to prevent and disrupt

attacks on the pipeline and defend key

facilities and vulnerable points such as

pumping stations. These units will also send

a message that the Colombian State is

committed to defending its economic

infrastructure – resources that provide sorely

needed employment and revenue – from

terrorist attacks.

Basic security throughout Colombia’s

national territory is the essential but missing

ingredient. The Pastrana administration’s

Plan Colombia was an admirable start toward

resolving Colombia’s interrelated problems,

of which the security component is only one

part. But there can be no rule of law,

economic development and new job creation,

strengthening of human rights or any other

noble goals, where there is no basic security.

Therefore, our policy in Colombia should

augment traditional counterdrug programs

with programs to help Colombia enhance

basic security. A friendly democratic

government in our hemisphere is struggling to

preserve its sovereign authority under assault

from extremists of both left and right. U.S.

policy towards Colombia requires a

bipartisan consensus at home for a long-term

 Case: 12-55484, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348538, DktEntry: 60-1, Page 36 of 43
SALDANA V. OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM 37

strategy aimed at strengthening Colombia’s

ability to enforce effective sovereignty and

preserve democracy. The new and more

explicitly legal authorities that the

Administration is proposing are intended to

serve these goals.

107th Cong. 303–04 (emphasis supplied).

Major General Gary Speer, acting commander in chief of

the United States Southern Command, provided the

Subcommittee with a written statement on the appropriations,

which included the following:

In addition to counterdrug assistance, the

Administration has proposed to Congress $98

million, for FY 2003, to help Colombia to

enhance the training and equipping of units to

protect the Caño Limón-Covenas oil pipeline,

one of the most vulnerable elements of their

economic infrastructure. The FARC and ELN

are active in carrying out attacks against

Colombia’s energy infrastructure. Attacks on

the Caño Limón-Covenas pipeline cost the

Government of Colombia more that $40

million per month in revenues when the

pipeline is not operational. During the past

year, the pipeline was offline for more than

266 days. In addition, the amount of oil

spilled during these attacks is eleven times

greater than the Exxon Valdez spill, creating

significant environmental damages.

 Case: 12-55484, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348538, DktEntry: 60-1, Page 37 of 43
38 SALDANA V. OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM

The Administration has included $6

million in the FY 2002 Supplemental to begin

training. The first unit to be trained for this

program with be the recently human rights

vetted, Arauca-based Colombian Army 18th

Brigade. Subsequent units to be trained for

infrastructure security include the 5th Mobile

Brigade, designated Colombian National

Police units, and Colombian Marines. The

Colombian units will also be equipped with

weapons and ammunition, vehicles, night

vision devices, and communications

equipment, as well as a helicopter tactical lift

capability for a company-sized quick reaction

force.

If approved, this training will assist the

Colombians to exert effective sovereignty in

the Arauca Department, where those attacks

primarily occur. Through a comprehensive

strategy of reconnaissance and surveillance,

offensive and quick reaction operations, the

Colombian military will be better able to

mitigate the debilitating economic and

financial effects of constant attacks on critical

infrastructure.

107th Cong. 345 (emphasis supplied).

After this hearing, the Subcommittee submitted a written

question to Undersecretary Grossman: “Why would the

Administration choose to fund the training of the Colombian

military to protect an oil pipeline that is owned in part by

 Case: 12-55484, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348538, DktEntry: 60-1, Page 38 of 43
SALDANA V. OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM 39

Occidental Petroleum?” 107th Cong 390. This was

Undersecretary Grossman’s response:

The most significant factor in developing

the Caño Limón pipeline initiative was the

revenues and royalties it generates for

Colombia, not its part-ownership by

Occidental Petroleum. It is in the U.S.

national interest to help Colombia’s

democratic government generate resources to

meet pressing social, developmental, and

security needs. In 2001, the pipeline was

attacked 170 times, causing it to be shut down

for over 200 days and costing Colombia

nearly $500 million in foregone revenues and

royalties.

The proposed training and equipment of

Colombian army, police and marine units will

also serve as a model for Colombia as it

develops additional programs to protect key

infrastructure. Moreover, while Colombia

does export some oil to the United States, its

potential has not been fully developed, in

large part because the security situation

discourages investment. Finally, reducing

attacks against the pipeline will lessen the

serious environmental damage they cause.

107th Cong. 390–91 (emphasis supplied).

In the United States Senate, before the Committee on

Foreign Relations on February 6, 2003, the State

Department’s witness on our foreign affairs budget for 2004

 Case: 12-55484, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348538, DktEntry: 60-1, Page 39 of 43
40 SALDANA V. OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM

was Secretary of State Colin L. Powell. Pertaining to the

issues in this case, he stated as follows:

Mr. Chairman, the 2004 budget proposes

several initiatives to advance U.S. national

security interests and preserve American

leadership. The 2004 foreign operations

budget that funds programs for the

Department of State, USAID, and other

agencies is $18.8 billion. Today, our No. 1

priority is to fight and win the global war on

terrorism. The budget furthers this goal by

providing economic, military, and democracy

assistance to key foreign partners and allies,

including $4.7 billion to countries that have

joined us in the war on terrorism.

. . . .

This budget also includes almost half a

billion dollars for Colombia. The funding will

support Colombian President Uribe’s unified

campaign against terrorists and the drug trade

that fuels their activities. The aim is to secure

democracy, extend security, and restore

economic prosperityto Colombia, and prevent

the narcoterrorists from spreading instability

through the broader Andean region.

. . . .

The President’s request for $731 million

for the Andean Counterdrug Initiative

includes $463 million for Colombia. An

 Case: 12-55484, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348538, DktEntry: 60-1, Page 40 of 43
SALDANA V. OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM 41

additional $110 million in military assistance

to Colombia will support Colombian

President Uribe’s unified campaign against

terrorists and the drug trade that fuels their

activities. The aim is to secure democracy,

extend security, and restore economic

prosperity to Colombia, and prevent the

narcoterrorists from spreading instability

through the broader Andean region. Critical

components of this effort include resumption

of the Airbridge Denial program to stop

internal and cross-border aerial trafficking in

illicit drugs, stepped up eradication and

alternative development efforts, and technical

assistance to strengthen Colombia’s police

and judicial institutions.

Foreign Affairs Budget: Hearing Before the Comm. on

Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 108th Cong. 12–13 (Powell

Testimony), 19 (Powell Statement) (2003) (emphasis

supplied).

To implement our policy of assistingColombia, Congress

appropriated $71 million in 2002 and 2003 to buy helicopters

and related support for the 18th Brigade, and $28 million

dollars to provide the 18th Brigade with equipment and

training by U.S. Special Forces. The training by the U.S.

Special Forces began in January 2003, though the helicopters

were delayed until 2005. In a report requested by both the

House of Representatives and the Senate, the United States

Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) reported that:

U.S. Special Forces provided training and

equipment for about 1,600 Colombian Army

 Case: 12-55484, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348538, DktEntry: 60-1, Page 41 of 43
42 SALDANA V. OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM

soldiers to improve their ability to act quickly

in minimizing terrorist attacks along the Caño

Limón pipeline. In November 2002, a team of

U.S. Special Forces traveled to Arauca to

assess the area and determine the training

needs of the Colombian Army. In January

2003, U.S. Special Forces started training in

Arauca and planned for training to continue

through December 2004. U.S. Special Forces

focused on helping the Colombian Army take

a more proactive and aggressive approach to

defend the pipeline; regain control of the area

around the pipeline; and prevent, interdict,

and disrupt the insurgents before they attack

the pipeline. Training included developing

quick reaction capabilities, small unit tactics,

planning and conducting operations,

reconnaissance, collecting and analyzing

timely intelligence, and medical support.

Of considerable significance in this case is the series of

official certifications to Congress by the State Department

that it had determined “that the Colombian Government and

Armed Forces are meeting statutory criteria related to human

rights and severing ties to paramilitary groups.” These

certifications were required by law in order to obligate funds

appropriated by Congress to the Colombian Armed Forces. 

Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.

108–199, § 563(a)(1), (3), 118 Stat. 3 (2004).

Secretary of State Powell issued the first of these positive

certifications to Congress on September 24, 2004. Secretary

of State Condoleezza Rice issued similar positive

certifications to Congress in 2005, 2006, and 2007; and the

 Case: 12-55484, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348538, DktEntry: 60-1, Page 42 of 43
SALDANA V. OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM 43

State Department followed suit from 2008 through 2011,

when this case began. These State Department human rights

certifications stand in stark contrast to Plaintiffs’ complaint

and theory of liability.

As illustrated by this background material, the Supreme

Court’s authoritative statement in Oetjen v. Cent. Leather

Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918), controls the resolution of this

case:

The conduct of foreign relations of our

government is committed by the Constitution

to the legislative and legislative [branches] ...

and the propriety of what may be done in the

exercise of this political power is not subject

to judicial inquiry or decision.

As my colleagues demonstrate, the Plaintiffs’ complaint

falls squarely within this prohibition.

 Case: 12-55484, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348538, DktEntry: 60-1, Page 43 of 43