Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02504/USCOURTS-casd-3_17-cv-02504-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:1383 Review of HHS Decision (regarding payment of benefits)

---

1 

17cv2504-GPC-LL 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

VICENTE F. TORRES, 

Plaintiff,

v. 

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security, 

Defendant.

 Case No.: 17cv2504-GPC-LL 

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION RE CROSSMOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT 

[ECF Nos. 18 and 19] 

Plaintiff Vicente Torres brought this action for judicial review of the Social Security 

Commissioner’s (“Commission”) denial of his claim for disability insurance benefits. 

ECF No. 1. Before the Court are Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 18-

1 (“Pl.’s Mot.”)], Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and Opposition to 

Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF Nos. 19-1 (“Def.’s Mot.”)], and Plaintiff’s 

“Submission In Lieu of Reply” [ECF No. 20 (“Pl.’s Reply”)]. 

 This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge 

Gonzalo P. Curiel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Civil Local Rule 72.1(c) of the 

United States District Court for the Southern District of California. For the reasons set 

forth below, this Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment 

Case 3:17-cv-02504-GPC-LL Document 22 Filed 12/18/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 1 of 25
2 

17cv2504-GPC-LL 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

be GRANTED, Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment be DENIED and the 

case be remanded for further proceedings. 

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

On October 1, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Title II application for a period of disability and 

disability insurance benefits, alleging disability beginning on October 8, 2011. See 

Administrative Record (“AR”) at 192-198. The claim was denied initially on 

April 22, 2013, and upon reconsideration on February 21, 2014, resulting in Plaintiff’s 

request for an administrative hearing. Id. at 92-93, 108-13, 118-23, 124-125. 

On December 17, 2015, a hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge 

(“ALJ”) Keith Dietterle. Id. at 48-71. Plaintiff was represented by an attorney, Linh 

Nguyen, at the hearing. Id. at 48-50. An interpreter, Concepcion Bateman, was also 

present at the hearing. Id. Plaintiff and an impartial vocational expert, John Kilcher, 

testified at the hearing. See id. at 48-71. In a written decision dated March 16, 2016, ALJ 

Dietterle determined that Plaintiff had not been under a disability, as defined in the Social 

Security Act, from October 8, 2011 through the date of the ALJ’s decision. Id. at 28-47. 

Plaintiff, represented by a different attorney than at the hearing, Monica Perales, requested 

review by the Appeals Council. Id. at 188-191. In an order dated November 2, 2017, the 

Appeals Council denied review of the ALJ’s ruling, and the ALJ’s decision therefore 

became the final decision of the Commissioner. Id. at 1-9. 

On December 13, 2017, Plaintiff filed the instant action seeking judicial review by 

the federal district court. See ECF No. 1. On August 17, 2018, Plaintiff filed a timely 

motion for summary judgment alleging the ALJ committed legal error by failing to 

properly consider Plaintiff’s testimony at the hearing. See Pl.’s Mot. Plaintiff asks the 

Court to overturn the final decision of the Commissioner and award Plaintiff his disability 

insurance benefits without remand, or alternatively, to remand the case to the Social 

Security Administration (“SSA”). Id. at 9-10. On September 21, 2018, Defendant filed an 

opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and a cross-motion for summary 

Case 3:17-cv-02504-GPC-LL Document 22 Filed 12/18/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 2 of 25
3 

17cv2504-GPC-LL 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

judgment asserting that the ALJ properly evaluated Plaintiff’s testimony and the ALJ’s 

decision is supported by substantial evidence and free from reversible legal error.1

 See 

Def’s. Mot. On October 9, 2018, Plaintiff timely filed a “Notice of Submission in Lieu of 

Reply.” Pl.’s Reply. 

I. DISABILITY HEARING 

On December 17, 2015, Plaintiff, represented by counsel, appeared at the hearing 

before the ALJ. See AR at 51-72. During the hearing, the ALJ questioned Plaintiff 

regarding his work experience and alleged disability. Id. at 52-70. The first question the 

ALJ asked Plaintiff is “Mr. Torres, you speak English?” Id. at 52. Plaintiff said “Yes,” and 

then clarified with “[a] little bit, but . . . yes.” Id. The ALJ explained “we’ll start the hearing 

in English” but “if you need help from the interpreter, just let me know.” Id. Plaintiff 

testified that he was born on February 2, 1957. Id. at 53. He testified that he had a twelfthgrade education, and that he was not working at the time of the hearing. Id. at 54. Plaintiff 

stated that he last worked in 2010 as a caregiver to his parents. Id. Plaintiff described his 

responsibilities as a caregiver to his parents as “mak[ing] sure they have these medicines 

and the food.” Id. In response to specific questions from the ALJ about his responsibilities 

in caring for his parents, Plaintiff testified that he did not have to carry them, or bathe them, 

but he cooked for them. Id. at 54-55. The ALJ asked Plaintiff whether he had “any jobs 

before he [was] a caregiver?” Id. at 55. Plaintiff said “No.” Id. The ALJ asked Plaintiff 

whether he was a driver. Id. Plaintiff said “Yeah, before.” Id. Plaintiff testified that he was 

                                               

1

 On June 13, 2018, the Court granted the parties’ joint motion for an extension of time for Plaintiff to 

file a motion for summary judgment on or before June 29, 2018. ECF No. 14. Defendant was required to 

file an opposition and cross-motion for summary judgment by August 10, 2018. Id. On July 17, 2018, 

the Court granted the parties’ second joint motion for an extension of time for Plaintiff to file a motion for 

summary judgment on or before August 17, 2018. ECF No. 17. Defendant was required to file an 

opposition and cross-motion for summary judgment by September 21, 2018. Id. Plaintiff was required to 

file any opposition to the cross-motion for summary judgment by October 5, 2018, and Defendant was 

required to file any reply brief on or before October 12, 2018. Id. 

Case 3:17-cv-02504-GPC-LL Document 22 Filed 12/18/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 3 of 25
4 

17cv2504-GPC-LL 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

a delivery driver for automotive parts. Id. Plaintiff testified that he had to lift and carry 

“around 20 pounds” in that job. Id. Plaintiff then clarified that it was “15, 20 pounds.” Id. 

The ALJ then asked Plaintiff a series of questions about his health history. First, the 

ALJ asked Plaintiff whether he “ha[s] any difficulty, any problems with [his] back.” Id. 

Plaintiff said “Yes.” Id. Plaintiff further testified that he has “a herniated disc - - and [] 

arthritis in [his] back.” Id. Regarding pain in his back, Plaintiff stated that he has pain in 

his back at a level “like a two—three.” Id. at 55-56. Plaintiff testified that he takes a 

medication called Naproxen for the pain in his back and that it helps. Id. at 56. The ALJ 

asked Plaintiff whether he has any side effects from the Naproxen. Id. Plaintiff said that he 

does have side effects including “sleep” and “upset stomach.” Id. The ALJ asked Plaintiff 

whether he was “treating with a doctor for [his] back problem at the present time.” Id. 

Plaintiff said that a physician named Dr. Vrabel was treating him, and another physician 

Dr. Maribel Flores was prescribing him medication. Id. The ALJ asked Plaintiff “how often 

[he] see[s] Dr. Flores.” Id. at 57. Plaintiff responded that he did not see Dr. Flores anymore 

because he sees a new doctor, Dr. Vrabel. Id. In response to the ALJ’s question, Plaintiff 

confirmed that he started seeing Dr. Vrabel “about two weeks ago.” Id. Plaintiff testified 

that when Dr. Flores prescribed him medication, he took it as prescribed. Id. Plaintiff 

further testified that he has diabetes and that he takes insulin for it. Id. Plaintiff said that 

the insulin causes him the side effect of “tiredness” and “sleepiness.” Id. The ALJ then 

asked Plaintiff “[o]ther than the back problems and the diabetes, do you have any other 

problem or problems that keep you from working.” Id. at 57-58. Plaintiff responded 

“glaucoma” and “high blood pressure.” Id. at 58. Plaintiff said that was seeing a doctor for 

the glaucoma and that he has difficulty with his vision. Id. Plaintiff confirmed that he wears 

eyeglasses for farsightedness. Id. Plaintiff said that has a driver’s license and drives a 

vehicle. Id. The ALJ asked Plaintiff whether “there [are] any restrictions on [his] license.” 

Id. Plaintiff testified that he has a restriction on his license for his glasses. Id. The ALJ 

asked Plaintiff whether he has any difficulty sitting. Id. Plaintiff responded, “[s]ometimes, 

yes.” Id. Plaintiff testified that he can sit for “about 30 minutes” and then he “start[s] getting 

Case 3:17-cv-02504-GPC-LL Document 22 Filed 12/18/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 4 of 25
5 

17cv2504-GPC-LL 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

up and start[s] walking for a little bit.” Id. Plaintiff further testified that sometimes he has 

difficulty standing in one position and has pain. Id. at 59. Plaintiff said that he can stand 

for “like 30 minutes,” walk “like a block, block and a half” with a cane. Id. Plaintiff said 

that he has used the cane since 2001 as prescribed by a doctor. Id. The ALJ asked Plaintiff 

why he uses the cane, and the Plaintiff responded “for balance, and for when [he] has 

problems to walk.” Id. The ALJ asked Plaintiff what the heaviest he would lift and carry 

at the present time, and Plaintiff responded “[l]ike about 10 pounds.” Id. at 59-60. 

The ALJ next asked Plaintiff a series of questions about his living situation and his 

daily responsibilities. Id. at 60. Plaintiff testified that he lives with his wife, his son, his 

daughter, and his two grandkids. Id. Plaintiff testified that his son is thirty-two years old, 

his daughter is twenty-eight years old, and his grandkids are eight and seven. Id. Plaintiff 

testified that he does not take care of his grandkids, but he drives them to and from school 

approximately two blocks from the house. Id. Plaintiff testified that he not does do any 

household chores, but he sometimes cooks “like sandwiches or [using the] microwave.” Id. 

Plaintiff responded that he does not do any mopping, sweeping, vacuuming, or helping 

with the laundry. Id. Plaintiff said that he grocery shops and he is able to carry “light 

groceries.” Id. Plaintiff testified that he does not have any difficulty dressing, bathing, or 

showering himself. Id. The ALJ then asked Plaintiff whether there are “[a]ny other problem 

or problems that keep [him] from working, anything else that [they] ha[dn’t] talked about.” 

Id. at 62. Plaintiff responded “[j]ust [his] sickness.” Id. The ALJ did not ask Plaintiff any 

follow-up questions about what he meant by that, but instead the ALJ said “Okay. What 

time do you go to bed at night?” Id. Plaintiff testified that he usually falls asleep around 

“10:00, 10:30” when he “take[s] [his] last dose of medicine.” Id. Plaintiff testified that does 

not sleep all night because the “pain in the back” wakes him “like three or four times.” Id. 

The ALJ asked Plaintiff whether he feels rested when he wakes in the morning. Id. Plaintiff 

responded that he does not and that he usually rests by sleeping “like four or five times” 

during the day. Id. Plaintiff testified that he watches television during the day. Id. at 63. 

The ALJ asked him whether he is “able to concentrate on what [he] watch[es] on 

Case 3:17-cv-02504-GPC-LL Document 22 Filed 12/18/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 5 of 25
6 

17cv2504-GPC-LL 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

television.” Id. Plaintiff responded “sometimes, not all.” Id. Plaintiff said he watches TV 

in English, but reads in Spanish. Id. Plaintiff said he has “a little library” including Spanish 

novels and Spanish books. Id. Plaintiff testified that he does not belong to any clubs or 

social organizations, but he goes to church. Id. at 63-64. Plaintiff said that he has problems 

with his back when he sits down at church. Id. at 64. The ALJ asked Plaintiff how long the 

church services are, and Plaintiff responded “about an hour.” Id. The ALJ asked Plaintiff 

whether he stays for the hour and Plaintiff said “yes.” Id. 

Next, Plaintiff’s attorney, Mr. Nguyen, questioned Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s attorney 

asked him whether he has “any issues with having tremors in [his] hands.” Id. Plaintiff said 

“yes” and testified that he “went to the doctor, and [he] explained to him that [he] ha[s] 

some tremors in [his] head and--[his] head and [his] hands; and he says it’s probably 

Parkinson’s.” Id. Plaintiff further testified that his heads and his hands start shaking a few 

times every day, and that he has difficulty doing things when his hands start to shake. Id. 

at 65. Plaintiff said that the shaking is more frequent in his right hand, so he has to use his 

left hand sometimes. Id. Plaintiff confirmed that Parkinson’s runs in his family, 

specifically, his father had it. Id. Plaintiff said he planned to get tested for it “probably next 

year.” Id. Plaintiff further testified that he has “issues with memory loss” that had worsened 

in the past year. Id. at 66. Plaintiff said his wife noticed that sometimes Plaintiff “forget[s] 

what [he is] saying” and that she has to remind him to take his insulin, which he has to take 

“every two hours.” Id. Plaintiff said that he was also recently prescribed “Metformin” for 

diabetes approximately “two weeks ago.” Id. Plaintiff said he suffers side effects of “upset 

stomach and sleepiness” from that medication. Id. Plaintiff testified that he also has other 

pain in his body, including “[his] neck, [his] back, [his] knees.” Id. Plaintiff said that he 

fell once in the shower from instability in his knees. Id. He testified he was subsequently 

prescribed the cane, which he used whenever he went out and around the house. Id. at 67-

68. Plaintiff responded to questions from his attorney about how his doctors said he needed 

surgeries “for [his] back and [his] eyes.” Id. at 68. Plaintiff confirmed that has had eye 

surgery in the past, but he needed it again for his glaucoma. Id. Plaintiff also testified “the 

Case 3:17-cv-02504-GPC-LL Document 22 Filed 12/18/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 6 of 25
7 

17cv2504-GPC-LL 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

doctor” recommended surgery for his back, but due to risks from the surgery “they don’t 

guarantee that I will not [sic] walk again.” Id. Plaintiff testified that he has difficulty 

concentrating and also has constant numbness and tingling in his fees due to the neuropathy 

from his diabetes. Id. at 69. Plaintiff’s attorney asked Plaintiff whether he graduated from 

high school. Id. at 69-70. Plaintiff said “no.” Id. at 70. Plaintiff’s attorney asked him 

whether he got up through the 12th grade, but he did not graduate, and Plaintiff confirmed 

that was correct. Id. 

The ALJ then questioned the vocational expert, Mr. Kilcher. Id. at 70. The ALJ 

asked Mr. Kilcher to categorize Plaintiff’s past job history. Id. He categorized Plaintiff’s 

past work as a “home attendant” at “the light level” but noted that Plaintiff “performed it 

at the medium level” “semiskilled, SVP: 3.” Id. at 71. Mr. Kilcher testified that Plaintiff 

“also worked as a driver,” “classified at the medium level,” but noted that Plaintiff 

performed it “at the medium and heavy level” “semiskilled, SVP: 3.” Id. The ALJ 

presented to Mr. Kilcher the first hypothetical of an individual “of advanced at [sic] with 

an 11th-grade education, literate, speaks English, and the work experience as outlined by 

yourself.” Id. at 71. The ALJ further noted that in hypothetical number one the “person 

can do a do a [sic] full range of medium work.” Id. The ALJ asked Mr. Kilcher “would that 

person be able to return to either of the past jobs?” Id. Mr. Kilcher said “Yes, with the 

exception of the driver’s job” “when he performed it on the second time” “at the heavy 

level.” Id. at 72. Next the ALJ asked Mr. Kilcher a second hypothetical as follows: “We 

have an individual, same type of individual, who can do a full range of light work. Would 

that person be able to return to either of the jobs?” Id. Mr. Kilcher testified, “No, they could 

not.” Id. The ALJ asked whether there were “[a]ny transferable skills from the home 

attendant to light –other light jobs?” Id. Mr. Kilcher attested that there would be no 

hypothetical work for that individual. Id. 

II. ALJ’S DECISION 

On March 16, 2016, the ALJ issued a written decision in which he determined that 

Plaintiff was not disabled as defined in the Social Security Act. AR at 35-48. Initially, the 

Case 3:17-cv-02504-GPC-LL Document 22 Filed 12/18/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 7 of 25
8 

17cv2504-GPC-LL 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since October 

8, 2011, the alleged onset date. Id. at 35. He then considered all of Plaintiff’s medical 

impairments and determined that the following impairments were “severe” as defined in 

the Regulations: “degenerative disc disease of the cervical, thoracic and lumber spine, 

obesity and diabetes mellitus (20 CFR 404.1520(c)).” Id. at 37. At step three, the ALJ 

found that Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments or combination of impairments 

did not meet or medically equal the listed impairments. Id. at 37-41. In reaching this 

decision, the ALJ noted that “the claimant’s back impairment, while severe, does not meet 

or medically equal listing level severity to meet or medically equal Listing 1.04 (pertaining 

to disorders of the spine).” Id. at 40. The ALJ further noted that although “the claimant has 

some neck stenosis and a large osteophyte, [it] does not meet any of the criteria including 

significant disc herniation, or significant involvement with the thecal sac or nerve roots.” 

Id. The ALJ noted that “there is no specific Section or ‘listing’ in the ‘Listing of 

Impairments,’ for diabetes mellitus,” but the ALJ still considered this severe condition and 

its potential risks limitations, restrictions and co-morbidities. Id. at 40-41. Finally, the ALJ 

noted that there is “no specific listing or Section in the ‘Listing of Impairments, for obesity, 

per se, the undersigned ALJ has taken the claimant’s obesity into consideration, including 

its potential restrictions, limitations, co-morbidities and risks.” Id. at 41. 

To determine at step four whether Plaintiff could return to his past work, the ALJ 

performed a residual functional capacity (“RFC”) analysis. See id. at 41-43. The ALJ 

considered Plaintiff’s severe impairments and determined that his RFC permitted a “full 

range of medium work.” Id. at 41. The ALJ found that Plaintiff has the RFC “to lift and 

carry up to 50 pounds occasionally and up to 25 pounds frequently; stand and walk up to 6 

hours in an 8-hour workday; sit up to 6 hours in an 8-hour workday.” Id. at 41. In reaching 

this decision, the ALJ “considered all symptoms and the extent to which these symptoms 

can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and other 

evidence” and he “also considered opinion evidence in accordance with the requirements” 

of the regulations. Id. at 41. The ALJ noted that Plaintiff alleged disability due to “neck, 

Case 3:17-cv-02504-GPC-LL Document 22 Filed 12/18/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 8 of 25
9 

17cv2504-GPC-LL 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

back, hip, shoulder, elbow, wrist, and knee and ankle pain. Id. at 41. However, the ALJ 

found that Plaintiff’s “statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects 

of these symptoms are not entirely credible.” Id. at 42. Having completed the RFC 

findings, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff could return to his past work as a Home 

Attendant because this work is not precluded by his functional limitations. Id. at 43. The 

ALJ therefore found that Plaintiff was not disabled. Id. 

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Section 405(g) of the Social Security Act permits unsuccessful applicants to seek 

judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The scope of 

judicial review is limited in that a denial of benefits will not be disturbed if it is supported 

by substantial evidence and contains no legal error. Id.; see also Batson v. Comm’r Soc. 

Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004). 

 Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla, but may be less than a 

preponderance.” Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 509 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal citation 

omitted). It is “relevant evidence that, considering the entire record, a reasonable person 

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (internal citation omitted). “In 

determining whether the [ALJ’s] findings are supported by substantial evidence, [the court] 

must review the administrative record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports 

and the evidence that detracts from the [ALJ’s] conclusion.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 

715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted). Where the evidence can reasonably 

be construed to support more than one rational interpretation, the court must uphold the 

ALJ’s decision. See Batson, 359 F.3d at 1193. This includes deferring to the ALJ’s 

credibility determinations and resolutions of evidentiary conflicts. See Lewis, 236 F.3d at 

509. 

 Even if the reviewing court finds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s 

conclusions, the court must set aside the decision if the ALJ failed to apply the proper legal 

standards in weighing the evidence and reaching his or her decision. See Batson, 359 F.3d 

at 1193. Section 405(g) permits a court to enter judgment affirming, modifying, or 

Case 3:17-cv-02504-GPC-LL Document 22 Filed 12/18/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 9 of 25
10 

17cv2504-GPC-LL 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

reversing the Commissioner’s decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The reviewing court may also 

remand the matter to the Social Security Administration for further proceedings. Id. 

IV. DISCUSSION 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed legal error because he did not properly 

consider Plaintiff’s testimony at the hearing. Pl.’s Mot. at 4-6. Plaintiff explains that in 

October 2013, Mr. Torres reported that his conditions have worsened and that Plaintiff 

testified at the hearing that his combination of impairments caused him significant 

limitations in his activity. Pl.’s Mot. at 4 (citing AR 57-58, 233). First, Plaintiff argues that 

notwithstanding his testimony at the hearing regarding his worsened conditions and 

resulting limitations, the “reasons provided [by] the ALJ [for finding Plaintiff’s testimony 

not credible] are not clear or convincing.” Pl.’s Mot. at 6. Second, Plaintiff argues that the 

ALJ’s finding that Mr. Torres’ symptoms were not credible because of the lack of objective 

medical evidence was not supported by “specific, clear and convincing reasons for 

rejecting a claimant’s testimony.” Id. Third, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s finding that 

Mr. Torres was not credible because of the alleged inconsistency2 regarding Mr. Torres’ 

ability to speak or understand English was “an [i]naccurate characterization of the evidence 

warrant[ing] remand.” Id. at 6-7. Plaintiff states that “[h]aving the ability to speak to a 

doctor at a physical examination is completely different than being able to understand what 

is occurring at a hearing that Torres has waited for more than two years.” Id. at 7. Fourth, 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff was not credible due to the “existence 

of different medical opinions” regarding Plaintiff’s condition is inadequate because the 

ALJ did not rely on reasons unrelated to the subjective testimony internal contradictions in 

the testimony, or conflicts between the claimant’s testimony and the claimant’s conduct. 

Id. at 7. Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ “ignore[d] [Plaintiff’s] positive work history” 

                                               

2

 Plaintiff notes that “[t]he ALJ found Torres not credible because he had no issues speaking or 

understanding English in the 2013 [medical] examination; however, at the hearing he stated he spoke little 

English” and had an interpreter present. Pl.’s Mot. at 6. 

Case 3:17-cv-02504-GPC-LL Document 22 Filed 12/18/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 10 of 25
11 

17cv2504-GPC-LL 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

which Plaintiff argues is probative of credibility. Id. at 8 (internal citations omitted). In 

sum, Plaintiff argues that “[t]he vocational expert testified that a person with the limitations 

that Torres alleged would not be able to engage in his past relevant work; and since there 

are no transferable skills a finding of disability is warranted under the vocational-medical 

grid rules.” Id. (citing AR 71). 

Defendant responds that the ALJ articulated specific reasons supported by 

substantial evidence for discounting Plaintiff’s allegations of disabling symptoms and 

functional limitations. Def.’s Mot. at 3. In support, Defendant claims the ALJ 

appropriately noted that the Plaintiff’s allegations of debilitating symptoms and limitations 

were not supported by the medical evidence of record. Def.’s Mot. at 4 (internal citations 

omitted). Second, Defendant claims that “Plaintiff’s orthopedic and neurological 

examinations repeatedly yielded generally negative (normal) findings.” Id. at 5. Third, 

Defendant argues that the ALJ provided a “detailed summary of the facts and medical 

evidence, and his interpretation of and findings based on it” to “sufficiently satisf[y] the 

legal standard.” Id. at 5-6. Fourth, Defendant argues that the “ALJ correctly noted that the 

opinion evidence (specifically the findings of Dr. Sabourin) did not support Plaintiff’s 

alleged level of debilitating symptoms and limitations.” Id. at 6. Fifth, Defendant argues 

that “the ALJ reasonably considered Plaintiff’s daily activities in finding that they were 

inconsistent with the severity of the symptoms he alleged, and Plaintiff does not challenge 

any of the ALJ’s findings with respect to this factor.” Id. at 7. For example, Defendant 

argues that Plaintiff’s testimony at the hearing regarding his activities (e.g., care for his 

personal hygiene and grooming, prepare meals, go grocery shopping and carry light 

groceries) contradicted Plaintiff’s allegations of disabling symptoms and functional 

limitations. Id. Sixth, Defendant argues that “the ALJ permissibly considered Plaintiff’s 

treatment history.” Id. Seventh, Defendant argues that “the ALJ validly considered 

inconsistency between Plaintiff’s statements and the entire record evidence.” Id. at 8. 

Finally, Defendant argues that contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, “prior work record is 

Case 3:17-cv-02504-GPC-LL Document 22 Filed 12/18/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 11 of 25
12 

17cv2504-GPC-LL 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

merely one of the various factors the ALJ may consider in evaluating a claimant’s 

testimony, but it is not a determinative factor.” Id. at 9. 

In his reply, Plaintiff filed a “submission on the record and arguments presented in 

lieu of a reply brief.” Pl.’s Reply at 1. Notably, Plaintiff’s Reply does not contain any 

substantive arguments. 

A. Relevant Law 

The Ninth Circuit has established a two-part test for evaluating a claimant’s 

subjective symptoms. See Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007). 

“First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has presented objective medical 

evidence of an underlying impairment which could reasonably be expected to produce the 

pain or other symptoms alleged.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The 

claimant, however, need not prove that the impairment reasonably could be expected to 

produce the alleged degree of pain or other symptoms; the claimant need only prove that 

the impairment reasonably could be expected to produce some degree of pain or other 

symptom. Id. If the claimant satisfies the first element and there is no evidence of 

malingering, then the ALJ “can [only] reject the claimant’s testimony about the severity of 

her symptoms . . . by offering specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so.” Id. 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “General findings are insufficient; rather, 

the ALJ must identify what testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines the 

claimant’s complaints.” Reddick, 157 F.3d at 722 (quoting 

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995)). The ALJ’s findings must be 

“sufficiently specific to permit the court to conclude that the ALJ did not arbitrarily 

discredit [Plaintiff’s] testimony.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958 (9th Cir. 2002). 

When weighing the claimant’s testimony, “an ALJ may consider . . . reputation for 

truthfulness, inconsistencies in testimony or between testimony and conduct, daily 

activities, and unexplained, or inadequately explained, failure to seek treatment or follow 

a prescribed course of treatment.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 636 (9th Cir. 2007) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). An ALJ also may consider the claimant’s 

Case 3:17-cv-02504-GPC-LL Document 22 Filed 12/18/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 12 of 25
13 

17cv2504-GPC-LL 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

work record and testimony from doctors and third parties regarding the “nature, severity, 

and effect of the symptoms” of which the claimant complains. Thomas, 278 F.3d at 958–

59 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c). If the 

ALJ’s finding is supported by substantial evidence, the court may not second-guess his or 

her decision. See Thomas, 278 F.3d at 959; Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 

F.3d 1155, 1162-63 (9th Cir. 2008) (where the ALJ’s credibility assessment is supported 

by substantial evidence, it will not be disturbed even where some of the reasons for 

discrediting a claimant’s testimony were improper). 

Neither party contests the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff has the following severe 

impairments: “degenerative disc disease of the cervical, thoracic and lumbar spine, obesity 

and diabetes mellitus.” AR at 26; see also Pl.’s Mot.; Def.’s Mot. The ALJ also took the 

“claimant’s obesity into consideration, including its potential restrictions, limitations, comorbidities and risks.”3

 AR at 41. Because the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s “medically 

determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause some of the alleged 

symptoms”—a finding that is not contested by either party—the first prong of the ALJ’s 

inquiry regarding Plaintiff’s subjective symptoms is satisfied. See AR at 42; see also 

Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1036; Pl.’s Mot.; Def’s Mot. Furthermore, neither party alleges 

that the ALJ found that Plaintiff was malingering. See Pl.’s Mot.; Def.’s Mot. As a result, 

the Court must determine whether the ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons for 

discounting Plaintiff’s subjective claims regarding his symptoms.4

 See Lingenfelter, 504 

F.3d at 1036. 

                                               

3

 An ALJ is required to consider all medically determinable impairments of which he is aware, including 

those that are not “severe,” in assessing an individual’s residual functional capacity. 

20 C.F.R. § 416.945. 

4

 The Court acknowledges that on March 28, 2016, Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 16-3p superseded SSR 

96-7 regarding how the Social Security Administration evaluates a claimant’s subjective symptoms. SSR 

16-3 states in relevant part: 

This SSR, republished in its entirety, includes a revision to clarify that our adjudicators

Case 3:17-cv-02504-GPC-LL Document 22 Filed 12/18/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 13 of 25
14 

17cv2504-GPC-LL 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The Court will consider Plaintiff’s challenges to the ALJ’s reasons. 

B. Specific Testimony 

As an initial matter, the Court finds that the ALJ failed to identify the specific 

statements Plaintiff made that the ALJ decided were not credible, and thus does not provide 

the necessary information for meaningful judicial review. See Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 

806 F.3d 487, 492 (9th Cir. 2015) (“If the ALJ fails to specify his or her reasons for finding 

claimant testimony not credible, a reviewing court will be unable to review those reasons 

meaningfully without improperly ‘substitut[ing] our conclusions for the ALJ's, or 

speculat[ing] as to the grounds for the ALJ's conclusions.’” (citation omitted)); Reddick, 

157 F.3d at 722. 

In the ALJ’s written decision, he acknowledged his duty to consider Plaintiff’s 

symptoms and make a finding on the credibility of the statements based on a consideration 

of the entire case record. AR at 41. Then he paraphrased some of Plaintiff’s testimony 

and statements of record as follows: 

The claimant has reported that he has neck, back, hip, shoulder, elbow, wrist 

and knee and ankle pain. He has stated that his pain is due to diabetic 

neuropathy. At the hearing, the claimant testified that he speaks little English. 

He reported that he is not working presently and last worked in 2010 taking 

care of his parents. His duties included making sure they had their 

medications and food, and he did cook for them. He did not have to lift or 

bathe them. 

At the hearing, the claimant testified that he has back pain, which he rated as 

                                               

will apply SSR 16-3p when we make determinations and decision on or after March 28, 

2016. When a Federal court reviews our final decision in a claim, we also explain that we 

expect the court to review the final decision using the rules that were in effect at the time 

we issued the decision under review. If a court remands a claim for further proceedings 

after the applicable date of the ruling (March 28, 2016), we will apply SSR 16-3p to the 

entire period in the decision we make after the court’s remand. 

SSR 16-3P (S.S.A.) 2017 WL 5180304, at *1 (Oct. 25, 2017). The ALJ’s written decision was issued on 

March 16, 2016; accordingly, the Court has reviewed the ALJ’s decision using the Social Security Ruling 

in effect at the time of his decision, SSR 96-7. AR 28-47; see generally SSR 16-3P (S.S.A.) 2017 WL 

5180304, at *1. 

Case 3:17-cv-02504-GPC-LL Document 22 Filed 12/18/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 14 of 25
15 

17cv2504-GPC-LL 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

a level 2 or level 3. He reported taking pain medications such as Naproxen, 

which helps. The claimant further mentioned that he is a diabetic on insulin. 

He reported side effects of upset stomach from the Naproxen, and tiredness 

and sleepiness from his insulin. The claimant reported that he is able to drive, 

but must wear glasses. He stated that he has difficulty sitting, but can sit for 

30 minutes. He opined that at [sic] he could stand in one position for 30 

minutes and walk 1.5 blocks with his cane. The claimant takes his 

grandchildren to school and has no problems driving. He has no issues with 

his personal hygiene and grooming. He is able to prepare microwave meals 

and carry light groceries. He spends his day resting 4-5 times per day due to 

in part to back pain, and in part due to diabetes. He reported that he enjoys 

reading Spanish novels, and goes to church on Sundays, but stated that sitting 

in church is difficult because as it hurts his back. The claimant reported that 

he has some issues with tremors, episodically. He noted that his right hand 

shakes more frequently. The claimant testified that his father has Parkinson’s. 

The claimant noted that he will be ‘tested for it.’ (Parkinson’s). 

Id. at 41-42. Next, the ALJ stated that although “claimant’s medically determinable 

impairments could reasonably be expected to cause some of the alleged symptoms,” 

Plaintiff’s “statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of these 

symptoms are not fully credible for the reasons explained in this decision.” Id. at 42. Then, 

the ALJ states that “the claimant’s subjective allegations have been significantly worse 

than his subjective findings.” Id. (italicized in original). The ALJ only vaguely referred to 

Plaintiff’s testimony noting that “the claimant has reported constant back pain, which 

reduces his ability to sit, stand and walk.” Id. Then the ALJ gave some examples,5

unsupported by citations to the administrative record, of why the ALJ found Plaintiff’s Xrays, consultative exams and neurological exams to contradict Plaintiff’s testimony. Id. 

                                               

5

 The ALJ noted “[Plaintiff’s] X-rays indicate minimal degenerative disc disease, except at C5-C6.” AR 

at 42. The ALJ also noted that “the claimant was noted to switch his cane and his limp during the 

consultative examination, which the board-certified orthopedist found unusual.” Id. The ALJ further 

noted that during Plaintiff’s consultative examination, his neck was “extremely stiff,” but “when the neck 

was not being examined (or when he was distracted by other range of motion testing, elsewhere), his neck 

was not nearly so stiff.” Id. Finally, the ALJ noted that “[t]he claimant has alleged neuropathy in part due 

to his diabetes, yet his neurological examinations have been negative, including his filament test.” Id. 

Case 3:17-cv-02504-GPC-LL Document 22 Filed 12/18/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 15 of 25
16 

17cv2504-GPC-LL 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Based on no analysis or specific examples from Plaintiff’s testimony from the hearing, the 

ALJ concluded that “[e]ssentially, the undersigned notes significant inconsistencies in the 

claimant’s allegations, and the record as a whole. The undersigned ALJ finds that this is 

erosive of the claimant’s overall credibility.” Id. 

The ALJ’s second reason for finding Plaintiff not credible is because “the claimant 

had no issues whatsoever speaking or understanding English in 2013 with the consultative 

examiner, Dr. Sabourin. However, at the hearing, he testified under oath that he speaks 

‘little English.’” Id. The ALJ’s third reason was that the “opinion evidence” including Dr. 

Sabourin’s assessment during the consultative examination was “quite thorough, and 

largely consistent with the record.” Id. Similarly, the ALJ noted that the DDS State Agency 

physicians’ “opined that the claimant is able to perform a wide range of medium level 

exertional tasks.” Id. Fourth, the ALJ considered that Plaintiff “has a Disabled Car 

placard/plates.” Id. at 43. The ALJ noted however, that the handicapped placard was 

recommended and signed for by Plaintiff’s chiropractor, which is “not considered [an] 

acceptable medical treating source[] for the Social Security Administration.” Id. 

Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that he “need not ascribe weight to [the chiropractor’s] 

opinion, in this case, his support of a handicapped placard.” Id. Finally, the ALJ concludes 

“[a]fter reviewing the record including testimony given at the hearing, the undersigned ALJ 

finds that the above-referenced residual functional capacity is consistent with the record, 

and therefore appropriate.” Id. 

 The ALJ’s vague references to “significant inconsistencies in the claimant’s 

allegations and the record as a whole” are not specific identifications of which statements 

are being discredited. Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1208 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding 

that “the ALJ must specifically identify the testimony she or he finds not to be credible and 

must explain what evidence undermines the testimony” (citing Reddick, 157 F.3d at 722)).6

 

                                               

6

 Although the court in Holohan rejected the ALJ’s reason for his adverse credibility finding, it provides 

an example of the level of specificity required in identifying the testimony that the ALJ found 

Case 3:17-cv-02504-GPC-LL Document 22 Filed 12/18/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 16 of 25
17 

17cv2504-GPC-LL 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiff made numerous statements in his testimony about his pain and other symptoms, 

and the ALJ failed to specify which statements he did not believe and to connect each 

statement to the evidence that undermined it.7

 See e.g., AR at 62-69. Accordingly, the 

Court finds that the ALJ committed legal error by failing to identify the specific testimony 

found not credible. See Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 494 (“Because the ALJ failed to 

identify the testimony she found not credible, she did not link that testimony to the 

particular parts of the record supporting her non-credibility determination. This was legal 

error.”); Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1036 (“[T]he Court must determine whether the ALJ 

provided clear and convincing reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s subjective claims 

regarding his symptoms.”). Because the ALJ erred by failing to identify the testimony he 

found not credible, the ALJ’s conclusions concerning Plaintiff’s RFC are therefore not 

supported by substantial evidence and the Court recommends remand on this basis. See 

Trevizo v. Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 674 (9th Cir. Sept. 14, 2017) (“We set aside a denial of 

Social Security benefits only when the ALJ decision is based on legal error or not supported 

by substantial evidence in the record.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); 

Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 495 (finding the ALJ’s failure to identify which testimony she 

found not credible and explain which evidence contradicted that testimony prevented the 

appellate court from determining whether the ALJ’s conclusions were supported by 

substantial evidence); Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1035 (“Lingenfelter argues that substantial 

                                               

unbelievable. In Holohan, “[t]he ALJ found that Holohan's testimony that her symptoms had gotten worse 

since she began treatment with Dr. Oh lacked credibility.” Holohan, 246 F.3d at 1208 (emphasis added). 

 

7

 For instance, Plaintiff testified that he does not sleep all night because the “pain in the back” wakes him 

“like three or four times” [AR 62]; he usually rests by sleeping “like four or five times” during the day 

[id.]; he has tremors in his hands and his hands start shaking a few times every day, and that he has 

difficulty doing things when his hands start to shake [id. at 64]; he has “issues with memory loss” that had 

worsened in the past year [id. at 66]; his doctor recommended surgery for his back, but due to the risks, 

he may not be able to walk again [id. at 68]; and he has difficulty concentrating and also has constant 

numbness and tingling in his feet due to neuropathy from his diabetes [id. at 69]. 

Case 3:17-cv-02504-GPC-LL Document 22 Filed 12/18/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 17 of 25
18 

17cv2504-GPC-LL 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

evidence does not support the ALJ's decision because the ALJ improperly rejected his 

testimony as to the severity of his pain and symptoms. We agree.”). 

 Even if the ALJ had adequately specified the testimony he found not believable, the 

ALJ’s proffered reasons fail to meet the clear and convincing standard, for the reasons set 

forth below. 

C. Plaintiff’s English Language Ability 

The ALJ also found Plaintiff not fully credible because: 

[T]he claimant had no issues whatsoever speaking or understanding English 

in 2013 with the consultative examiner, Dr. Sabourin. However, at the 

hearing, he testified under oath that he speaks ‘little English.’ 

AR at 42. The ALJ found that “the claimant is simply not fully credible secondary to the 

many inconsistencies in the record.” Id. The Court finds that the ALJ’s finding is based 

on an incomplete summary and mischaracterization of Plaintiff’s testimony. The relevant 

excerpt from the hearing is as follows: 

ALJ: Mr. Torres, you speak English? 

CLMT: Yes. 

ALJ: Okay. 

CLMT: A little bit, but – 

ALJ: Okay. 

CLMT: -- yes. 

ALJ: So, we’ll just start the hearing in English. If you need help from the 

interpreter, just let me know. 

CLMT: Okay. 

AR 52. It is clear from the record that when the ALJ asked Plaintiff whether he speaks 

English that he responded “Yes.” Id. The fact that Plaintiff clarified his response by saying 

“[a] little bit, but – yes” does not materially change that his response was “yes.” The Court 

finds that the ALJ mischaracterized and cited to an incomplete excerpt of Plaintiff’s 

Case 3:17-cv-02504-GPC-LL Document 22 Filed 12/18/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 18 of 25
19 

17cv2504-GPC-LL 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

testimony in finding that Plaintiff “testified under oath that he speaks ‘little English.’” Id. 

at 42, 52. Accordingly, the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff is not fully credible on this basis is 

not sufficient under the required standard. 

D. Opinion Evidence8

Next, the ALJ found Plaintiff not credible because he found the opinion evidence of 

Dr. Sabourin and the DDS State Agency physicians’ assessments to be largely consistent 

with the record. Id. at 42-43. Specifically, the ALJ noted that he “reviewed Dr. Sabourin’s 

assessment during the consultative examination and finds it quite thorough, and largely 

consistent with the record.” Id. at 42. Similarly, the ALJ noted that he reviewed “the DDS 

State Agency physicians’ assessments found at Exhibits 4A and 6A” and noted that “they 

have opined that the claimant is able to perform a wide range of medium level exertional 

tasks.” Id. 

Specifically, the ALJ found: 

As for opinion evidence, as noted above, the undersigned ALJ has reviewed 

Dr. Sabourin’s assessment during the consultative examination and finds it 

quite thorough, and largely consistent The undersigned ALJ largely concurs 

with the DDS State Agency physicians’ assessments, but notes that they 

opined the claimant is able to climb ropes and scaffolds only occasionally. 

However, there is no seeming associative impairment restriction connected to 

that. Additionally, the DDS has opined that the claimant has positional or 

postural restrictions and limitations. Specifically, the DDS State Agency 

                                               

8

 Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff “conceded” the ALJ’s findings regarding opinion evidence is without 

merit. Def.’s Mot. at 3. Plaintiff has a section in his Motion for Summary Judgment titled “Opinion 

evidence” and argues that “[t]he ALJ focuses on various opinions in the medical file to find Torres’ 

testimony not credible.” Pl.’s Mot. at 7 (citing AR 41-42). The fact that Plaintiff included an argument 

about Plaintiff’s credibility in the same section does not concede the ALJ’s finding on that issue. 

However, the Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff “does not challenge any of the ALJ’s findings 

with respect to [Plaintiff’s daily activities].” Def.’s Mot. at 3; see Pl.’s Mot. Accordingly, the Court will 

not address the ALJ’s findings regarding Plaintiff’s daily activities herein. Similarly, the Court agrees 

with Defendant that Plaintiff concedes the propriety of the ALJ’s finding with respect to Plaintiff’s 

“complian[ce] with his recommended treatment regimen” by “failing to specifically challenge it.” Def.’s 

Mot. at 7-8; see Pl.’s Mot.. Accordingly, the Court will not address the ALJ’s findings regarding Plaintiff’s 

compliance with his treatment regimen and/or whether taking pain medications helped to control his pain 

herein. 

Case 3:17-cv-02504-GPC-LL Document 22 Filed 12/18/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 19 of 25
20 

17cv2504-GPC-LL 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

physicians have opined that the claimant is able to perform tasks such as 

climbing ramps and stairs, stooping, balancing, crouching, kneeling, and 

crawling frequently. The undersigned ALJ finds no consistent objective 

medical evidence to substantiate or undergird that assertion. Accordingly, as 

the undersigned ALJ concurs in part, and disagrees in part, the undersigned 

ALJ gives the DDS State Agency physicians” [sic] assessments some, but not 

great weight. 

Id. 

Whether a claimant’s alleged symptoms are consistent with the medical evidence is 

one of several factors that an ALJ must consider in assessing credibility. Lingenfelter, 504 

F.3d at 1040 (referencing Social Security Ruling 96-7p that requires “ALJs to consider all 

of the evidence in the case record in assessing a claimant’s subjective pain and symptom 

testimony, including: the individual’s daily activities; the location, duration, frequency, and 

intensity of the pain or symptoms; factors that precipitate and aggravate the symptoms; the 

type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medications; any other treatment or 

measures used for relief; functional restrictions; and any other relevant factors” (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted)). However, the Ninth Circuit instructs that a 

plaintiff’s testimony about symptoms may not be discredited “solely because it is not 

substantiated by objective medical evidence.” Trevizo, 871 F.3d at 679. 

Here, the ALJ stated his RFC determination for Plaintiff, claimed that “[a]fter 

reviewing the record including the testimony given at the hearing, the undersigned ALJ 

finds that the above-referenced residual functional capacity is consistent with the record, 

and therefore appropriate;” then he essentially recited the medical evidence that supports 

his RFC finding. See AR at 41-43. The ALJ’s focus on the connection between selected 

medical evidence and the RFC, instead of Plaintiff’s testimony, failed to provide specific, 

clear, and convincing reasons for disbelieving specific statements from Plaintiff’s 

testimony. See Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 489 (“We hold that an ALJ does not provide 

specific, clear, and convincing reasons for rejecting a claimant's testimony by simply 

reciting the medical evidence in support of his or her residual functional capacity 

determination.”) 

Case 3:17-cv-02504-GPC-LL Document 22 Filed 12/18/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 20 of 25
21 

17cv2504-GPC-LL 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Additionally, the ALJ failed to even provide an adequate basis for considering the 

objective evidence of record because he erred by ignoring some medical opinions entirely, 

and not providing the proper weight to other opinions. The ALJ did not even mention in 

the RFC determination and related credibility analysis the medical records of Plaintiff’s 

treating physician, Dr. Mirabel Flores, who treated Plaintiff for approximately four years.9

 

See AR at 42-43. The record contains notes from many of Plaintiff’s appointments with 

Dr. Flores dating from 2011 through 2015 [id. at 274-282, 297, 359-389], but none of them 

are cited in the ALJ’s opinion. As a result, Dr. Flores’ diagnosis and treatment of Plaintiff’s 

impairments and complaints regarding back pain (in connection with his diagnosis for 

degenerative disc disease of the cervical, thoracic and lumbar spine), dizziness, and fatigue 

was ignored by the ALJ in his opinion. The ALJ erred by ignoring Dr. Flores’ medical 

opinions and essentially assigning them little weight.10 Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 

1012–13 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[A]n ALJ errs when he rejects a medical opinion or assigns it 

little weight while doing nothing more than ignoring it, asserting without explanation that 

                                               

9

 Although the ALJ cherry-picked selective findings from Dr. Flores’ reports in his step three analysis 

regarding Plaintiff’s “severe impairments,” the ALJ failed to include other findings by Dr. Flores that did 

not support the ALJ’s RFC determination. AR 37-40. For example, the ALJ focused on Plaintiff’s 

treatment notes to support the finding that Plaintiff’s “diabetes was under control,” [AR 36 (citing Exhibit 

2F, page 2; Exhibit 7F, pages 3 and 5; Exhibit 9F, page 10)], but failed to cite any treatment notes from 

Dr. Flores regarding Plaintiff’s back or other pain. See e.g., AR 275 (Dr. Flores’ March 8, 2012 treatment 

note finding that Plaintiff complained of “back pain, worse in neck area radiates down spine. . . pain 

daily”); AR 278 (Dr. Flores’ August 23, 2011 treatment note finding that Plaintiff complained of “chest 

pains – spontaneously resolve. . . feeling of fatigue, lightheadedness”); AR 281 (Dr. Flores’ June 17, 2011 

treatment note finding that Plaintiff complained of “fatigue, visual blurriness, lightheadedness”); AR 282 

(Dr. Flores’ June 10, 2011 treatment note finding that Plaintiff complained of “dizziness, fatigue”); and 

AR 296 (Dr. Flores’ March 8, 2012 Referral Form for an “urgent” referral to Physical Therapy for Plaintiff 

for a diagnosis of “backache” noting that Plaintiff has “cervical lumbar degenerative disc disease”). 

10 The Code of Federal Regulations define a medical opinion for purposes of Social Security 

determinations as follows: “Medical opinions are statements from acceptable medical sources that reflect 

judgments about the nature and severity of your impairment(s), including your symptoms, diagnosis and 

prognosis, what you can still do despite impairment(s), and your physical or mental restrictions.” 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1527. 

Case 3:17-cv-02504-GPC-LL Document 22 Filed 12/18/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 21 of 25
22 

17cv2504-GPC-LL 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

another medical opinion is more persuasive, or criticizing it with boilerplate language that 

fails to offer a substantive basis for his conclusion.”). 

The opinion of a treating doctor generally should be given more weight than 

opinions of doctors who do not treat the claimant. See Turner v. Comm'r. of Soc. Sec., 613 

F. 3d 1217, 1222 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830-31 (9th Cir. 

1995)). If the treating doctor's opinion is not contradicted by another doctor, it may be 

rejected only for "clear and convincing" reasons supported by substantial evidence in the 

record. Id. (citing Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31). Even when the treating doctor's opinion is 

contradicted by the opinion of another doctor, the ALJ may properly reject the treating 

doctor's opinion only by providing "specific and legitimate reasons" supported by 

substantial evidence in the record for doing so. Id. (citing Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31). This 

can be done by "setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting 

clinical evidence, stating [his] interpretation thereof, and making findings." Tommasetti 

v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 

751 (9th Cir. 1989). "The ALJ must do more than offer his conclusions. He must set forth 

his own interpretations and explain why they, rather than the doctors', are correct." Orn v. 

Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 632 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Embrey v. Bowen, 849 

F.2d 418, 421-22 (9th Cir. 1988)). “The opinion of a non-examining physician cannot by 

itself constitute substantial evidence that justifies the rejection of the opinion of either an 

examining physician or a treating physician; such an opinion may serve as substantial 

evidence only when it is consistent with and supported by other independent evidence in 

the record.” Townsend v. Colvin, 2013 WL 4501476, *6 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2013) 

(quoting Lester, 81 F.3d at 830–31); Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 

595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999)). If a treating doctor’s opinion is not afforded controlling weight, 

[t]he ALJ must consider the “length and the treatment relationship and the 

frequency of examination” as well as the “nature and extent of the treatment 

relationship.” . . . In addition, the ALJ must still consider the other relevant 

factors such as “the amount of relevant evidence that supports the opinion and 

Case 3:17-cv-02504-GPC-LL Document 22 Filed 12/18/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 22 of 25
23 

17cv2504-GPC-LL 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the quality of explanation provided” and “the consistency of the medical 

opinion with the record as a whole.” 

West v. Colvin, 2015 WL 4935491, at *8 (D. Or. Aug. 18, 2015) (quoting Orn, 495 F.3d 

at 631; 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.927(c), 404.1527(c)). 

Here, the ALJ erred by giving “substantial weight” to non-treating doctor Dr. 

Thomas Sabourin, but little (or no) weight to the opinion of Plaintiff’s primary treating 

doctor, Dr. Flores.11 AR at 42. Similarly, the ALJ gave “some weight” to the DDS State 

Agency physicians’ assessments. Id. Notably, Dr. Flores’ name or treatment history was 

not even mentioned in the ALJ’s analysis of the “opinion evidence.” Id. Dr. Flores was 

Plaintiff’s primary treating doctor and as such, her opinion should generally have been 

given more weight than a non-treating doctor such as Dr. Sabourin. See Turner v. Comm'r. 

of Soc. Sec., 613 F. 3d at 1222. Accordingly, the ALJ erred by failing to provide specific 

and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record for giving 

controlling weight to Dr. Sabourin and the DDS State Agency physicians’ opinions and 

little weight to Dr. Flores. See Turner, 613 F. 3d at 1222. 

E. Plaintiff’s Work History 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by failing to consider Plaintiff’s “work history 

[of] over 25 years.” Pl.’s Mot. at 8. Defendant opposes on the grounds that “[p]rior work 

record is merely one of the various factors the ALJ may consider in evaluating a claimant’s 

testimony, but it is not a determinative factor. Def.’s Mot. at 9 (citing 20 C.F.R. 

§404.1529(c)(3)). The Court finds that although the ALJ did not explicitly mention 

Plaintiff’s prior work history in the opinion, he may have considered it in accordance with 

the applicable regulations. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion on this 

ground. 

                                               

11 The Court notes that the ALJ considered the opinions of Plaintiff’s podiatrist, John Chisolm, DPM, and 

Dr. Julio Echegoyne, M.D., Ph.D. AR 39-40. 

Case 3:17-cv-02504-GPC-LL Document 22 Filed 12/18/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 23 of 25
24 

17cv2504-GPC-LL 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Notwithstanding this, the Court concludes that none of the additional reasons 

provided by the ALJ constitute a clear and convincing basis for finding Plaintiff less than 

fully credible. Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Motion for 

Summary Judgment on this issue be GRANTED, and Defendant’s Cross-Motion for 

Summary Judgment on this issue be DENIED. 

F. Remand v. Reversal 

“The decision whether to remand for further proceedings or simply to award benefits is 

within the discretion of [the] court.” McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 

1989). “Remand for further administrative proceedings is appropriate if enhancement of 

the record would be useful.” Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 593 (9th Cir. 2004). On 

the other hand, if the record has been fully developed such that further administrative 

proceedings would serve no purpose, “the district court should remand for an immediate 

award of benefits.” Id. “More specifically, the district court should credit evidence that 

was rejected during the administrative process and remand for an immediate award of 

benefits if (1) the ALJ failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting the evidence; 

(2) there are no outstanding issues that must be resolved before a determination of disability 

can be made; and (3) it is clear from the record that the ALJ would be required to find the 

claimant disabled were such evidence credited.” Id. (citing Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 

1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2000), McCartey v. Massanari, 298 F.3d 1072, 1076-77 (9th Cir. 

2002), and Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1292 (9th Cir. 1996)). The Ninth Circuit has 

not definitely stated whether the “credit-as-true” rule is mandatory or discretionary. See 

Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 593 (9th Cir. 2009) (acknowledging that there is a split 

of authority in the Circuit but declining to resolve the conflict); Luna v. Astrue, 623 F.3d 

1032, 1035 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding rule is not mandatory where “there are ‘outstanding 

issues that must be resolved before a proper disability determination can be made’”); Shilts 

v. Astrue, 400 F. App’x 183, 184-85 (9th Cir. 2010) (explaining that “evidence should be 

credited as true and an action remanded for an immediate award of benefits only if [the 

Smolen test is satisfied]”). 

Case 3:17-cv-02504-GPC-LL Document 22 Filed 12/18/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 24 of 25
25 

17cv2504-GPC-LL 

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Here, the Court finds that further administrative proceedings would be beneficial as 

it is not clear from this record that the ALJ would be required to find Plaintiff disabled. 

Accordingly, this Court RECOMMENDS REVERSING the decision of the ALJ and 

REMANDING for further proceedings to address the errors noted above. 

V. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons set forth above, this Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Motion 

for Summary Judgment be GRANTED, and Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary 

Judgment be DENIED. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any written objections to this Report and 

Recommendation must be filed with the Court and served on all parties no later than 

January 7, 2019. The document should be captioned “Objections to Report and 

Recommendation.” 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with 

the Court and served on all parties no later than January 14, 2019. The parties are advised 

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those 

objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 

1998); Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991). 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: December 18, 2018 

Case 3:17-cv-02504-GPC-LL Document 22 Filed 12/18/18 PageID.<pageID> Page 25 of 25