Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-05864/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-05864-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

OAKLAND DIVISION

ISAAC RIGGS,

Plaintiff,

 vs.

R.T.C. GROUNDS, et. al.,

Defendants. /

No. C 13-5864 PJH (PR)

ORDER DENYING MOTION

TO DISMISS

This is a civil rights case brought pro se by a prisoner. Defendant has filed a motion

to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on the ground that plaintiff’s

claim is barred by the favorable termination rule in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). 

For the reasons set forth below, the motion is denied.

DISCUSSION

A. Background

Plaintiff was incarcerated at Salinas Valley State Prison at the time of the incident. 

Motion to Dismiss (“MTD”) at 2. Plaintiff alleges that on February 7, 2012, he was exiting

the shower when he stopped at a podium to exchange two old razors for new razors. 

Compl. at 3. He states he held up the two old razors to let the correctional officers know he

was exchanging razors. He contends that defendant correctional officer Cahlander stated

plaintiff was not respecting him and told plaintiff he could not exchange razors, then

Cahlander sprayed plaintiff in the face with pepper spray and pushed him to the ground

causing plaintiff to strike his head. Id. Plaintiff then alleges that Cahlander kicked and hit

plaintiff, with what seemed like a flashlight, causing severe pain to his head, neck, and

back. Id. at 4.

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Plaintiff was assessed 90 days’ loss of time credits as a result of this incident when

he was found guilty of attempted battery. Id. at 4, 12, 41. Plaintiff’s exhibits from his

complaint contain the rules violation report that was issued after the incident and the report

from the hearing where he was found guilty. The correctional officers state that plaintiff

was yelling profanities at guards, then went to the podium and grabbed two razors, and

refused to put them down when ordered to do so. Id. at 12. It is alleged that plaintiff raised

his hands while holding the razors and approached defendant. Plaintiff dropped the razors

after being pepper sprayed and complied with instruction to assume a prone position and

place his hands behind his back to be handcuffed. Id. According to the exhibits, plaintiff

stated at the rules violation hearing that all he did was grab two razors. He said he never

assaulted or attempted to assault any correctional officer and he needs a cane to walk. Id.

at 11. 

B. Legal Standard

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests for the legal

sufficiency of the claims alleged in the complaint. Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 1191,

1199-1200 (9th Cir. 2003). All allegations of material fact are taken as true. Erickson v.

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, legally conclusory statements, not supported by

actual factual allegations, need not be accepted. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

678-79 (2009) (courts are not bound to accept as true "a legal conclusion couched as a

factual allegation"). "A plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitle[ment] to

relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements

of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)

(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, the allegations in the

complaint "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id.

In order to recover damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or

imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a

conviction or sentence invalid, a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or

sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared

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invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by

a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. A claim

for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so

invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. Id. at 487. 

In Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 644 (1997), the United States Supreme Court

applied the doctrine articulated in Heck to prison disciplinary hearings. The Court held that

a claim challenging the procedures used in a prison disciplinary hearing, even if such a

claim seeks money damages and no injunctive relief, is not cognizable under § 1983 if the

nature of the inmate's allegations are such that, if proven, would necessarily imply the

invalidity of the result of the prison disciplinary hearing. Balisok, 520 U.S. at 646. Because

such a challenge, if successful, would invalidate the duration of the inmate's confinement, it

is properly brought as a habeas corpus petition and not under § 1983. Heck, 512 U.S. at

487; Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973).

C. Analysis

Plaintiff stated during the rules violation hearing that he was not the aggressor;

rather, defendant pepper sprayed and assaulted him unprovoked. The hearing officer

found plaintiff guilty of attempted battery. However, the hearing officer did not discuss in

his findings plaintiff’s allegations that he was assaulted while on the ground and if this

assault constituted excessive force or if the pepper spraying itself was excessive.

The Ninth Circuit has clarified that the application of Heck's “favorable termination

rule turns solely on whether a successful § 1983 action would necessarily render invalid a

conviction, sentence, or administrative sanction that affected the length of the prisoner's

confinement.” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 856 (9th Cir. 2003). Heck does not bar all

excessive force actions. See Hooper v. County of San Diego, 629 F.3d 1127, 1132-33 (9th

Cir. 2011) (excessive force claim not barred because plaintiff, who had resisted arrest, was

attacked by a police dog after becoming compliant).

A disciplinary conviction for battery on a peace officer is not necessarily inconsistent

with a finding in the inmate's favor on an excessive force claim brought pursuant to a §

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1 The court is aware that other courts have found under similar facts that a plaintiff’s

claim that he was the victim would invalidate the basis of the rules violation report which found

that plaintiff was the aggressor and was therefore Heck-barred. See, e.g., Scott v. Palmer, 2012 WL 396587, at *2–5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2012); Sharp v. Morrison, 2010 WL 2838635, at

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1983 claim such that the latter claim is Heck-barred as a matter of course. Whether a

finding in favor of the inmate on his § 1983 claim will necessarily invalidate the disciplinary

conviction is a fact-specific inquiry regarding the disciplinary conviction and the facts

underlying the § 1983 claim. See Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 697–98 (9th Cir.

2005) (excessive force claim was not Heck-barred where the force occurred subsequent to

the conduct upon which the conviction for willfully resisting, delaying or obstructing peace

officer in performance of duties was based); Cunningham v. Gates, 312 F.3d 1148, 1153-

55 (9th Cir. 2002) (inmate's felony murder conviction Heck-barred any civil claim that he

was not the provocateur of the incident at issue and barred his excessive force claim based

on a danger-creation theory).

California district courts have determined that Eighth Amendment claims under

circumstances similar to those in this case are not foreclosed by Heck. See Williams v.

Young, 2014 WL 505184, at *4-6 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2014) (prisoner’s excessive force

claim not barred by Heck where prisoner was found guilty of refusing to follow an order but

alleged excessive force by guards in their response); Green v. Goldy, 2011 WL 2445872, at

*6-7 (E.D. Cal. June 15, 2011) (prisoner's excessive force claim not Heck-barred because

two factual predicates exist, one giving rise to the disciplinary conviction, and the other

giving rise to a potential civil claim for excessive force); Gipbsin v. Kernan, 2011 WL

533701, at *5-7 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2011) (excessive force claim not Heck-barred because

success on plaintiff's claim would not necessarily negate his disciplinary conviction for

battery on a peace officer or his criminal conviction in state court for battery); Candler v.

Woodford, 2007 WL 3232435, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2007) (excessive force claim not

Heck-barred because “defendants have not shown that if plaintiff were to prevail on his

excessive force claims the validity of the finding that he committed battery on a peace

officer necessarily would be implicated”).1

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*4-5 (E.D. Cal. July 20, 2010); Saffi v. Knight, 2009 WL 4895322, at *3-4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 11,

2009). 

2

 The parties complied with a court order for further briefing regarding the effect of

plaintiff’s loss of credits on his sentence of 119 years. Both parties present valid arguments,

however the court will not look to the issue as it has found that plaintiff’s allegations would not

imply the invalidity of the prison disciplinary finding. 

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In this case, plaintiff could have attempted to assault defendant, but defendant’s use

of pepper spray and the alleged assault that occurred once plaintiff was on the ground

could have violated the Eighth Amendment. Although plaintiff's conduct and defendant’s

alleged excessive use of force arise out of the same incident, two separate factual

predicates exist, the first giving rise to plaintiff's disciplinary conviction, and the second

giving rise to defendant’s potential liability for excessive force. See Hooper, 629 F.3d at

1132 (“Though occurring in one continuous chain of events, two isolated factual contexts

would exist, the first giving rise to criminal liability on the part of the criminal defendant, and

the second giving rise to civil liability on the part of the arresting officer,” quoting Yount v.

City of Sacramento, 43 Cal. 4th 885, 899 (2008)). Therefore, plaintiff’s claim is not barred

by Heck.

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CONCLUSION

1. The motion to dismiss (Docket No. 31) is DENIED.

2. Within 60 days of the date this Order is filed, defendant shall either file a motion

for summary judgment or a notice that the case cannot be resolved by such a motion. All

other provisions of the court's March 19, 2014, Order (Docket No. 5), that are not in conflict

with this Order, remain in effect including the provisions governing a motion for summary

judgment, discovery, and keeping the court updated on any changes in the parties'

addresses.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 13, 2015. 

 PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

G:\PRO-SE\PJH\CR.13\Riggs5864.mtd.wpd

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