Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-01366/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-01366-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 315
Nature of Suit: Airplane Product Liability
Cause of Action: 28:1332 Diversity-Personal Injury

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IN RE:

DEEP VEIN THROMBOSIS

LITIGATION

This Document Relates To:

05-1366 VRW

Rasmussen v Northwest Airlines,

Inc, et al

 /

MDL Docket No 04-1606 VRW 

 ORDER

On March 11, 2005, the court issued an order dismissing

as preempted all non-Warsaw claims against airline defendants. (04-

1606 VRW) Doc #151 (the “preemption order”). Subsequent to the

preemption order, on April 5, 2005, the present case was

transferred to this court from the United States District Court for

the Western District of Washington pursuant to the Judicial Panel

on Multidistrict Litigation’s transfer order of June 22, 2004. 

(O5-1366 VRW) Doc #1. On May 18, 2005, the court ordered plaintiff

to show cause why her non-Warsaw claims against defendant Northwest

Airlines (Northwest) should not be dismissed pursuant to the

preemption order. (05-1366 VRW) Doc #10 (OSC). 

On June 2, 2005, plaintiff filed her response to the OSC. 

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(05-1366 VRW) Doc #12. Plaintiff asserts two reasons why her nonWarsaw claims against Northwest should not be dismissed. First,

she incorporates all of the arguments contained in non-Warsaw

plaintiffs’ November 16, 2005, joint opposition to airline

defendants’ motion to dismiss. Id at 1; (04-1606 VRW) Doc #39. 

As these arguments were considered, and rejected, in the preemption

order, they will not be reconsidered here. Next, plaintiff

presents an novel argument: Plaintiff asserts that “defendant

Northwest Airlines should not be dismissed under the federal

preemption reasoning announced in the court’s March 11, 2005, order

because on April 27, 2005, the U[nited] S[tates] Supreme Court

decided Bates, et al v Dow Agrosciences, LLC, [125 Sct 1788

(2005)], which is contrary to this court’s March 11 order.” (05

1366 VRW at 2). 

After careful examination, the court concludes that the

Supreme Court’s decision in Bates does not affect the preemption

order.

I

In Bates, the Supreme Court analyzed whether the Federal

Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 USC § 136 et

seq, preempts certain state-law damages claims. 125 S Ct at 1793. 

In 2000, appellee Dow Agrosciences, LLC (Dow),

manufactured and sold a weed-killing pesticide called Strongarm to

several Texas peanut farmers (the “farmers”). Id. Strongarm’s

label stated that “[u]se of Strongarm is recommended for all areas

where peanuts are grown.” Id. Moreover, Dow’s agents made

equivalent representations regarding the use of Strongarm during

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sales pitches and presentations. When the farmers applied

Strongarm to their farms -- whose soil had pH levels of 7.2 or

higher -- the pesticide severely damaged the peanut crops while

failing to control the growth of weeds. Id. The farmers asserted

that, contrary to its representations, Dow knew or should have

known that Strongarm would stunt the growth of peanuts in soils

with pH levels of 7.0 or greater. 

The farmers informed Dow of their intent to file suit

under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act based upon the

alleged misrepresentations contained in the Strongarm label and

made by Dow’s agents. In response, Dow filed a declaratory

judgment action in federal court, asserting that the farmers’

state-law claims were expressly or impliedly preempted by FIFRA’s

express preemption provision, 7 USC § 136v(b), which provides that

states “shall not impose or continue in effect any requirements for

labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those

required under this subchapter.” Id. The farmers, in turn, filed

counterclaims in the federal action, alleging fraud, breach of

warranty, deceptive trade practices, negligence and strict

liability. Id. The district court concluded that all claims were

expressly preempted by § 136v(b). 

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

affirmed, reading § 136v(b) as “preempting any state-law claim in

which a judgment against Dow would induce it to alter its product

label.” Id (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Applying this legal standard, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the

farmers’ success before a jury on their claims for fraud, breach of

warranty and deceptive trade practices “would give Dow a strong

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incentive to change its label” and thus were expressly preempted. 

Id at 1794. Additionally, the Fifth Circuit found that the

farmers’ strict liability claim for defective design was

essentially a disguised “failure-to-warn claim” because the farmers

were arguing that Dow should have told them that Strongarm would

harm crops planted in soil with a pH greater than 7.0. Again, the

Fifth Circuit concluded that success on these claims would

“necessarily induce Dow to alter the Strongarm label.” Id

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The Fifth Circuit

“employed similar reasoning to find the negligent manufacture

claims preempted as well.” Id. The Court, per Justice Stevens,

reversed, holding that the Fifth Circuit had applied the wrong

legal standard for analyzing FIFRA preemption.

The Supreme Court began by stating that the Fifth Circuit

had “correctly h[e]ld that the term ‘requirements’ in § 136v(b)

reaches beyond positive enactments, such as statutes and

regulations, to embrace common-law duties.” Id at 1798 (citing

Cipollone v Ligget Group, Inc, 505 US 504, 521 (1992)). This

holding is consistent with the preemption order which relied on

Cipollone in rejecting non-Warsaw plaintiffs’ argument that commonlaw suits and duties do not constitute a form of state regulation. 

Doc #151 (Premp Order) at 19 (stating that “‘[state] regulation can

be as effectively exerted through an award of damages as through

some sort of preventative relief.’” (quoting Cipollone, 505 US at

521)). 

The Supreme Court disagreed, however, with the legal test

employed by the Fifth Circuit in determining whether the farmers’

state-law claims fell within the scope of FIFRA’s express

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preemption provision. Bates, 125 S Ct at 1799. Specifically, the

Court stated:

The [Fifth Circuit] reasoned that a finding of

liability on these claims would “induce Dow to alter

[its] label.” (citation omitted). This effects-based

test finds no support in the text of 136v(b), which

speaks only of ‘requirements.’ A requirement is a rule

of law that must be obeyed; an event, such as jury

verdict, that merely motivates an optional decision is

not a requirement. 

 Id (emphasis added). 

Because the text of § 136v(b) is devoid of any reference to the

“effect” a state law or jury verdict may have on a manufacturer’s

decision to change its label, the Court concluded that “[i]t is

highly unlikely that Congress endeavored to [prohibit] the []

attenuated pressure exerted by common-law suits. The inducement

test is not supported by either the text or the structure of

[FIFRA].” Id. 

 Plaintiff argues that Bates contradicts the preemption

order’s express preemption analysis under the Airline Deregulation

Act (ADA) and gravely undermines the preemption order’s implied

preemption analysis under the Federal Aviation Act (FAA).

II

Express Preemption 

The preemption order held that non-Warsaw plaintiffs’

defective seating configuration claims were expressly preempted by

the ADA because the costly liability imposed by success on these

claims before a jury would necessarily require airline defendants

to reconfigure their seating. Premp Order (Doc #151) at 16-19. 

Non-Warsaw plaintiffs themselves recognized that requiring an

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airline to reconfigure its seating would produce a “significant

economic effect” and thus be preempted by the ADA. Doc #39 at 13. 

Accordingly, to the extent plaintiff implies that this court

applied an “effects-based test” in examining whether a jury verdict

would necessarily require an airline defendant to reconfigure its

seating, the court agrees. While the preemption order did not

employ this nomenclature, the court determined that success on the

non-Warsaw claim for defective seat configuration would require (or

perhaps induce) airline defendants to reconfigure their aircraft

seating. Because reconfiguration would have a significant economic

effect on the price charged by the airline defendants, these claims

were expressly preempted by the ADA. Premp Order at 17-19. 

Plaintiff now argues that, under Bates, this court erred

in using an “effects-based” test to analyze whether defective

seating configuration claims were preempted by the ADA. (05-1366

VRW) Doc #12 at 2 (arguing that “Congress did not intend []

explicitly in the ADA preemption clause * * * to prohibit the

‘attenuated pressure exerted by common law suits.’”). In other

words, plaintiff contends that the preemption order should not have

considered whether success on plaintiffs’ defective seating

configuration claims would have the “effect” of inducing or

requiring airline defendants’ decision whether to reconfigure their

aircraft seating. In plaintiff’s view, the preemption order should

have focused only on whether the airline defendants would be

required by law to reconfigure their seating. 

Plaintiff’s argument is simply wrong; both the text of

the ADA and the Supreme Court’s opinions interpreting the statute

endorse an “effects-based test” for analyzing the scope of the

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ADA’s express preemption provision. Hence, the ADA differs from

FIFRA in this respect.

Unlike FIFRA, the text of the ADA directs courts to

examine the “effect” a state law has on prices charged by an

airline (i e, indirect regulation):

[A] State * * * may not enact or enforce a law,

regulation, or other provision having the force and

effect of law related to a price, route or service

of an air carrier * * *.

49 USC § 41713(b)(1) (emphasis added).

See also Witty v Delta Air Lines, Inc, 366 F3d 380, 383 (5th Cir

2004) (holding that the ADA “not only preempts direct regulation of

prices by states, but also preempts indirect regulation relating to

prices that have the forbidden significant economic effect on such

prices.”) (emphasis added). This greatly distinguishes the ADA

from FIFRA, for as the Court said in Bates: “This effects-based

test finds no support in the text of [FIFRA].” 125 Sct at 1799.

Moreover, the Supreme Court has endorsed an “effectsbased test” in analyzing whether state laws are preempted by the

ADA. In Morales v Trans World Airlines, Inc, 504 US 374, 388

(1992), the Court, per Justice Scalia, held that state law

restrictions on airline fare advertising were preempted by the ADA

not only because such restrictions “explicitly reference[d] fares,”

but also because they “have the forbidden significant effect upon

fares.” Bates does not even cite Morales, much less purport to

overrule its endorsement of an “effects-based test” to analyze the

preemptive scope of the ADA. 

Put simply, plaintiff seizes upon the Court’s more

restrictive preemption analysis of FIFRA and attempts to extend it

to the ADA. Such an extension is not warranted. The two statutes

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employ different language and thus have produced two different

Supreme Court cases interpreting their preemptive scopes. See

Bates, 125 S Ct 1788; Morales, 504 US 374. Indeed, Bates advocates

examining preemption on a statute-by-statute basis. Bates, 125 S

Ct at 1800 (chastising Dow for ignoring the “rather obvious textual

differences between the” preemption statute at issue in Cipollone

and FIFRA). Plaintiff ignores this aspect of Bates completely.

Accordingly, the preemption order was correct to employ

an “effects-based test” (specifically the “significant economic

effect” test) in determining whether non-Warsaw plaintiffs’

defective seating configuration claims were expressly preempted by

the ADA. The text of the ADA and the Court’s opinions interpreting

it support this view.

III

Implied Preemption 

Although Bates did not address implied preemption,

plaintiff argues that Bates calls into question the preemption

order’s determination that the FAA impliedly preempts state law

claims premised on defective seat design and failure to warn of

DVT. Premp Order at 20-29; (05-1366 VRW) Doc #12 at 2 (stating

that “Bates is also instructive as to the scope of implied

preemption of plaintiff’s failure to warn and defective design

claims”) (emphasis added). 

Plaintiff appears to argue (as did her fellow non-Warsaw

plaintiffs) that the FAA has no preemptive effect. To support this

argument, plaintiff asserts that in Bates, the Court criticized Dow

for “advocating an ‘amputated’ version of [FIFRA].” (05-1366 VRW)

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Doc #12 at 2 (citing Bates, 125 S Ct at 1801). While Dow’s

amputated interpretation of FIFRA is not relevant to the present

case, plaintiff makes the generalized assertion that the preemption

order likewise “amputated” the FAA because it overlooked the

“minimum standards” provision of the FAA (49 USC § 44701(a)(5))

which, according to plaintiff, evidences Congress’ intent that the

FAA be given no preemptive effect whatsoever. Id. This argument

failed to persuade the first time it was offered and it fails to

persuade now. 

As the court stated in the preemption order, this

“minimum standards” argument is misplaced, as the Ninth Circuit has

already determined that the FAA undoubtedly has implied preemptive

effect. Premp Order at 24. See World Airways, Inc v Int’l

Brotherhood of Teamsters, 578 F2d 800, 803 (9th Cir 1978)

(concluding that since Congress enacted the FAA, “federal law has

pre-empted the area of aviation.”); see also Skysign Int’l, Inc v

City and County of Honolulu, 276 F3d 1109, 1116 (9th Cir 2002)

(stating that although Congress itself has made no affirmative

decision to “completely occupy[] the field” of aviation safety, it

“has left open the door for the FAA to do so through the use of its

authority to develop regulations for the use of the navigable

airspace” (citation omitted)). Accordingly, this court would be

ignoring clear Ninth Circuit precedent if it were to hold that the

FAA has no implied preemptive effect based upon the “minimum

standards” provision of the statute.

The court advises plaintiff (as it did her fellow nonWarsaw plaintiffs) that if she wishes to argue that the FAA has no

preemptive effect and that Christensen was wrongly decided, she

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should do so to the Ninth Circuit, not this court, for it is the

Ninth Circuit’s prerogative alone to overrule one of its

precedents. Cf State Oil Co v Khan, 522 US 3, 20 (1997).

Finally, plaintiff argues that Bates calls into question

the preemption order’s “uniformity argument” (i e, that state law

claims would lead to non-uniformity among the states). (05-1366

VRW) Doc #12 at 3; (04-1606 VRW) Doc #151 at 29 (stating that “nonuniformity is anathema to the FAA.”). 

In Bates, Dow appears to have made the argument that

allowing the farmers’ claims to proceed to a jury would lead to a

“crazy-quilt” of FIFRA standards among the states. Bates, 125 S Ct

at 1803. In response, the Court stated that 

Dow * * * greatly overstate[s] the degree of uniformity

and centralization that characterize FIFRA. In fact,

the statute authorizes a relatively decentralized scheme

that preserves a broad role for state regulation.

Id at 1802. 

Accordingly, the Court gave little weight to Dow’s assertions of nonuniformity.

Such is not the case with the FAA. The Ninth Circuit has

held that “the whole tenor of the [FAA] and its principal purpose

is to create and enforce one unified system of flight rules.” 

United States v Christensen, 419 F2d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir 1969). 

Moreover, “‘[t]he [FAA] was passed by Congress for the purpose of

centralizing in a single authority – indeed, in one administrator –

the power to frame rules for the safe and efficient use of the

nation’s airspace.’” Id (quoting Air Line Pilots Association Int’l

v Quesada, 276 F2d 892, 894 (2d Cir 1960)).

Bates’ analysis of the uniformity mandated by FIFRA is

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inapposite to Ninth Circuit precedent interpreting the strict

uniformity mandated by the FAA.

IV

In sum, Bates is not “contrary to this court’s March 11,

2005, order” regarding preemption of the non-Warsaw claims; it is

quite inapposite. Because plaintiff’s arguments fail to persuade,

she has failed to show cause why her non-Warsaw claims against

Northwest should not be dismissed under the preemption analysis

announced in the March 11, 2005, order. Accordingly, all claims

against Northwest are DISMISSED with prejudice. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

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