Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-02372/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-02372-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 140
Nature of Suit: Negotiable Instruments
Cause of Action: 15:1601 Truth in Lending

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JEFFREY Y. PICA and TESSIE Y. PICA,)

)

Plaintiffs, ) 2:09-cv-02372-GEB-DAD

)

v. ) ORDER DECLINING TO EXERCISE

) SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION

WACHOVIA MORTGAGE; WORLD SAVINGS ) OVER PLAINTIFFS’ STATE

BANK FSB; NOVIA REALTY & FINANCIAL;) CLAIMS

INC.; TONY DIHN; and DOES 1-20 )

inclusive, )

)

Defendants. )

)

Defendant Wachovia Mortgage (“Wachovia”) moves for an order 

dismissing Plaintiffs’ first amended complaint, arguing, inter alia,

six of Plaintiffs’ nine state claims are preempted by the federal Home

Owners’ Loan Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461, et seq. However, since this

action is just comprised of state claims, the issue is reached whether

the Court should continue exercising supplemental jurisdiction. See

Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1001 n.3 (9th Cir. 1997)

(en banc) (suggesting that a district court may, but need not, sua

sponte decide whether to continue exercising supplemental jurisdiction

Case 2:09-cv-02372-GEB-DAD Document 34 Filed 06/21/10 Page 1 of 3
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under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) after all federal claims have been

dismissed). 

Original jurisdiction was premised on federal questions.

However, Plaintiffs first amended complaint filed on April 28, 2010,

does not contain a federal question. Further, Plaintiffs state in 

their first amended complaint that no federal question is alleged as

follows: all “federal claims have been removed from Plaintiffs’ First

Amended Complaint;” and, “in the absence of either federal question or

diversity basis for jurisdiction, Plaintiff[s] [are] unable to assert

the requisite . . . jurisdiction . . . over this matter.” (First

Amended Complaint ¶¶ 7, 8.) 

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) prescribes that a district court “may

decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a [state] claim”

when “all claims over which it has original jurisdiction” have been

dismissed. “While discretion to decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over state law claims is triggered by the presence of one

of the conditions in [28 U.S.C.] § 1367(c), it is informed by the 

Gibbs values “of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” Acri,

114 F.3d at 1001 (citing United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S.

715, 726 (1996)). 

“The nascency of a lawsuit weighs in favor of [declining to

continue exercising supplemental jurisdiction].” Marques v.

Washington Mut. Bank, No. SACV 09-1067 DOC (RNBx), 2010 WL 1627080, at

*1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2010); see also Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v.

Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 351 (1988) (stating “the District Court had to

consider throughout the litigation whether to exercise its

jurisdiction over the case . . . [; and,] [w]hen the . . . federal-law

claim in the action was eliminated at an early stage of the

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litigation, the District Court had a powerful reason to choose not to

continue to exercise jurisdiction”). Since this lawsuit has not

proceeded past the pleading stage, “continued exercise of supplemental

jurisdiction over the state law claims serves no efficiency interest.” 

Marques, 2010 WL 1627080, at *2. 

Further, comity weighs in favor of declining supplemental

jurisdiction since state courts have the primary responsibility for

developing and applying state law. See Curiel v. Barclays Capital

Real Estate Inc., 2010 WL 729499, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2010)

(stating “primary responsibility for developing and applying state law

rests with the state courts” and declining to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction after dismissal of the federal claims). Wachovia’s

federal defense asserted under the Home Owners’ Loan Act does not

affect the weight given to the comity factor since it has not been

demonstrated that this defense should be resolved in federal court.

See Bartolome v. Homefield Fin., Inc., 2009 WL 4907050, at *2 (C.D.

Cal. Dec. 11, 2009) (declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

over state law claims despite defendant’s argument that certain state

law claims were preempted by Home Owners’ Loan Act); Marques, 2010 WL

1627080, at *3 (same). 

Since the Gibbs values weigh in favor of declining to

continue exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state

claims, these claims are dismissed without prejudice under 28 U.S.C. §

1367(c)(3). Further, this action shall be closed.

Dated: June 18, 2010

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

Case 2:09-cv-02372-GEB-DAD Document 34 Filed 06/21/10 Page 3 of 3