Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-00972/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-00972-2/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:1651 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

OSCAR TAPIA-FELIX,

Petitioner,

v.

ROSEMARY NDOH,

Respondent.

Case No. 19-cv-00972-HSG 

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR A 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; 

DENYING CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY

Petitioner, a state prisoner incarcerated at Avenal State Prison,

1

filed this pro se action for 

a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging the validity of a conviction 

obtained against him in state court. Dkt. No. 1. Respondent has filed an answer. Dkt. Nos. 8-9. 

Petitioner has filed a traverse. Dkt. No. 10. The Court has carefully considered the briefs 

submitted by the parties. For the reasons set forth below, the petition is DENIED.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 2017, a Napa County jury convicted petitioner of second degree murder (Cal. Penal 

Code §§ 187-189); gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (Cal. Penal Code § 191.5(a)), 

and evading a policy officer causing death (Cal. Veh. Code § 2800.3(a)). Answer, Ex. A2(“CT”) 

242-44. Petitioner was sentenced to a term of fifteen years to life. CT 541-42. 

On September 11, 2018, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction in an 

unpublished decision. People v. Tapia-Felix, C No. A151287, 2018 WL 4328091 (Cal. Ct. App. 

 

1 Petitioner initially named Jose Gastelo as the respondent in this action. In accordance with Rule 

25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 2(a) of the Rules Governing Habeas 

Corpus Cases Under Section 2254, the Clerk of the Court is directed to substitute Rosemary Ndoh, 

the current warden of Avenal State Prison, in place of the previously named respondent because 

Warden Ndoh is Petitioner’s current custodian.

2 The exhibits to the Answer are docketed at Dkt. No. 9.

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Sept. 11, 2018). On November 14, 2018, the California Supreme Court summarily denied the 

petition for review. Ans., Ex. E. Petitioner does not report pursuing collateral review in the state 

court. 

On February 21, 2019, Petitioner filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus in 

this Court. Dkt. No 1. 

BACKGROUND

The following factual and procedural background is taken from the September 11, 2018 

opinion of the California Court of Appeal:3

On October 24, 2015, at approximately 11:30 p.m., Napa County Deputy Sheriff Jeremiah 

Bohlander (Deputy Bohlander) was on patrol in American Canyon. As he turned onto West 

American Canyon Road, he saw appellant driving without his headlights on. Deputy 

Bohlander pursued appellant for about one mile, during which appellant drove in a reckless 

and dangerous fashion, which we describe further in Part II, until appellant approached an 

intersection with a red light. Appellant ran the red light, colliding with Ms. Perez’s Toyota 

minivan, which was making a legal left turn. Ms. Perez suffered “severe blunt impact 

injuries” that caused her death.

On February 1, 2017, the Napa County District Attorney filed a first amended information, 

charging appellant with the murder of Rosalina Perez (Pen. Code, § 187; count 1); gross 

vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (Pen. Code § 191.5 subd. (a); count 2); evading a 

police officer causing death (Veh. Code, § 2800.3; subd. (a); count 3); driving under the 

influence (DUI) causing injury with another DUI conviction (Veh. Code, §§ 23153, subd. 

(a), 23560; count 4); and DUI with a prior conviction causing injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, 

subd. (b); count 5). The amended information included special allegations that appellant had 

an excessive blood alcohol content (Veh. Code, § 23578) and caused great bodily injury 

(Pen. Code, § 12022.7 subd. (a) ).

The prosecution moved in limine to admit several examples of prior acts of appellant’s 

uncharged misconduct. The trial court admitted the following prior convictions: (1) a 1999 

DUI conviction; (2) a 1999 hit-and-run conviction arising out of the same incident; (3) a 

2002 DUI conviction; (4) a 2002 driving without a license conviction arising out of the same 

incident; (5) a 2007 DUI conviction; and (6) a 2007 enhancement for a refusal to provide 

blood, urine, or breath (refusal to test). However, the court excluded a 2006 conviction for 

driving without a license and crossing a divided highway. Furthermore, the court excluded 

appellant’s statement made during his 2007 arrest that he had been “shocked with electricity” 

by the police.

On February 2, 2017, a jury convicted appellant of second degree murder, gross vehicular 

manslaughter, and evading a police officer causing death. [FN 1] The prosecution dismissed 

the two additional DUI charges.

 

3 The Court has independently reviewed the record as required by AEDPA. Nasby v. McDaniel, 

853 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2017). Based on the Court’s independent review, the Court finds 

that it can reasonably conclude that the state court’s summary of facts is supported by the record 

and that this summary is therefore entitled to a presumption of correctness, Taylor v. Maddox, 366 

F.3d 992, 999–1000 (9th Cir. 2004), unless otherwise indicated in this order.

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FN 1: Based on the guilty verdict on count two, gross vehicular manslaughter while 

intoxicated, the court dismissed counts four and five pursuant to a motion by the 

District Attorney.

On April 5, 2017, the trial court sentenced appellant to 15 years-to-life for the murder of 

Rosalina Perez and stayed the sentences on the remainder of the convictions pursuant to 

Penal Code section 654. Appellant timely appealed.

Tapia-Felix, 2018 WL 4328091, at *1.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

A petition for a writ of habeas corpus is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPAˮ). This Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 

“in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that 

he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.ˮ 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(a).

A district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on the 

basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state court’s adjudication 

of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 

States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in 

light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.ˮ 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. 

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412–13 (2000). Additionally, habeas relief is warranted only if the 

constitutional error at issue “‘had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the 

jury’s verdict.’” Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 795 (2001) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 

U.S. 619, 637 (1993)). 

Section 2254(d)(1) restricts the source of clearly established law to the Supreme Court’s 

jurisprudence. “[C]learly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the 

United States” refers to “the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court’s decisions 

as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. A state court 

decision is “contrary to” clearly established Supreme Court precedent if it “applies a rule that 

contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court’s] cases,” or if it “confronts a set of 

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facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless 

arrives at a result different from [its] precedent.” Id. at 405–06. “Under the ‘unreasonable 

application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct 

governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that 

principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. “[A] federal habeas court may not issue 

the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant statecourt decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that 

application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. “A federal court may not overrule a state 

court for simply holding a view different from its own, when the precedent from [the Supreme 

Court] is, at best, ambiguous.” Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 17 (2003).

The state court decision to which § 2254(d) applies is the “last reasoned decision” of the 

state court. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803–04 (1991); Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 

1085, 1091–92 (9th Cir. 2005). The California Court of Appeal was the highest state court to have 

reviewed these claims in a reasoned decision, and it is the state appellate court’s decision that this 

Court reviews herein. 

B. Petitioner’s Claim

The trial court admitted evidence of the following prior crimes under Cal. Evid. Code 

§ 1101(B): (1) a 1999 Arizona conviction for driving under the influence; (2) a 1999 Arizona hitand-run conviction arising out of the same 1999 incident; (3) a 2002 Arizona conviction for 

driving under the influence; (4) a 2002 Arizona conviction for driving without a license, arising 

out of the same 2002 incident; (5) a 2007 Napa County conviction for driving under the influence

and driving without a license; (6) a 2007 Napa County conviction for a refusal to give a blood, 

urine, or breath sample, arising out of the same 2007 incident; (7) a 2008 Napa County conviction 

for resisting a peace officer (Cal. Penal Code § 148(a)(1)). Petitioner argues that the admission of 

the 1999 and 2002 Arizona convictions for driving under the influence, of the 1999 Arizona hitand-run conviction, of the 2002 Arizona conviction for driving without a license, and of the 2007 

Napa County conviction for the refusal to be tested violated his federal due process rights. See 

Dkt. No. 1 at 14. The state appellate court denied this claim as follows.

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I. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Admitting Evidence of the 1999 DUI and Hit-and-Run or 

Evidence of the 2002 DUI.

Appellant asserts the 1999 hit-and-run conviction, the 2002 driving without a license 

conviction, and the 2007 refusal to test were inadmissible under Evidence Code sections 352 

and 1101, subdivision (a) (section 1101(a)). [FN 2] Furthermore, appellant contends the 

1999 and 2002 DUIs and their accompanying convictions should have been excluded 

because they were too remote in time. We find no reversible error.

FN 2: All undesignated statutory references are to the Evidence Code.

Section 1101(a) provides: “Evidence of a person’s character or a trait of his or her character 

... is inadmissible when offered to prove his or her conduct on a specified occasion.” 

However, section 1101, subdivision (b) (section 1101(b)) allows for “the admission of 

evidence that a person committed a crime, civil wrong, or other act when relevant to prove 

some fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 

absence of mistake or accident ...) other than his or her disposition to commit such an act.” 

We review the trial court’s evidentiary determinations under an abuse of discretion standard, 

and will reverse only if a determination is “arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd.” (People 

v. Rodriguez (1991) 20 Cal.4th 1, 9.)

Appellant contends the trial court erred in admitting the 1999 hit-and-run conviction, arguing 

the prior uncharged misconduct is not admissible to prove malice for the second-degree 

murder charge. Even if this assertion were true, the prior hit-and-run was admissible under 

section 1101(b) to establish a violation of Vehicle Code section 2800.3, subdivision (a) 

(evading a police officer causing death). To prove the crime of evading a peace officer 

causing death, the prosecution must show that appellant acted with “‘the specific intent to 

evade the pursuing peace officer.’” (People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 477.) 

Commission of a hit-and-run offense suggests the driver was attempting to avoid legal 

responsibility for an accident. (People v. Martinez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1093, 1102 [“‘“The 

legislative purpose of [hit-and-run statutes] is to prevent the driver of a vehicle ... from 

attempting to avoid possible civil or criminal liability for the accident by failing to identify 

oneself.”’”].) Accordingly, the trial court did not err in admitting appellant’s 1999 hit-andrun conviction for purposes of showing the appellant was not simply driving recklessly in 

the charged offense, but doing so with the specific intent of evading a peace officer. [FN 3]

FN 3: Because we find the hit-and-run conviction was properly admitted for purposes 

of showing state of mind, we need not reach appellant’s other contentions regarding 

this evidence. 

Appellant also argues the 1999 DUI and hit-and-run convictions and the 2002 DUI and 

driving without a license convictions should have been excluded under section 352 because 

they were remote and cumulative. Under section 352, “‘the probative value of the evidence 

must be balanced against four factors: (1) the inflammatory nature of the uncharged conduct; 

(2) the possibility of confusion of issues; (3) remoteness in time of the uncharged offenses; 

and (4) the amount of time involved in introducing and refuting the evidence of uncharged 

offenses.’” (People v. Culbert (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 184, 192.)

Count one, the murder charge, required the prosecution to establish malice on appellant’s 

part. In People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290, 300 (Watson), the California Supreme Court 

concluded a death resulting from a DUI could be charged as a second-degree murder if the 

defendant acted with implied malice. The court stated, “when the conduct in question can be 

characterized as a wanton disregard for life, and the facts demonstrate subjective awareness 

of the risk created, malice may be implied.” (Id. at p. 298.) Although Watson relied solely 

on the underlying facts in the case, subsequent courts have routinely admitted evidence of a 

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defendant’s driving history to establish implied malice. (See People v. Ortiz (2003) 109 

Cal.App.4th 104, 108–109; see also People v. McCarnes (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 525, 532–

533.) Despite occurring 16 and 13 years before the charged conduct, appellant’s 1999 and 

2002 convictions were relevant to establishing that appellant acted with implied malice 

because they showed appellant was aware of the danger of his conduct. (Ortiz, at p. 118; see 

also People v. David (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1109, 115 [“Prior convictions and exposure to 

mandatory educational programs are admissible to show the accused’s awareness of the life 

threatening risks of driving under the influence.”]; accord People v. Covarrubias (2015) 236 

Cal.App.4th 942, 948.)

People v. Hernandez (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 953, determined that the admission of 40-yearold uncharged misconduct was not an abuse of discretion, stating, “the passage of time 

generally goes to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility.” Furthermore, the court 

noted that because of their probative value, “significant similarities between the prior and 

the charged offenses may ‘balance out the remoteness.’” (Id. at p. 968.) Here, the challenged 

evidence arose out of DUIs, including one that resulted in an accident. The similarity of the 

uncharged misconduct “balance[d] out the remoteness” of appellant’s uncharged 

misconduct. (Ibid.) Further, the trial court noted that while some of this prior misconduct 

occurred “quite a while back,” the remoteness was not as “significant [as] it might be ... if 

there were no criminal conduct between 1999 and the current incident.” (People v. Johnson

(2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 520, 534 [“Remote prior conduct is, at least theoretically, less 

probative of propensity than more recent misconduct. [Citation.] This is especially true if 

the defendant has led a substantially blameless life in the interim [citation], which was not 

true in this case.”].)

Like the defendant in Johnson, appellant’s 2007 DUI conviction established that he had not 

“led a substantially blameless life in the interim.” (People v. Johnson, supra, 185 

Cal.App.4th at p. 534.) The trial court balanced the remoteness of the uncharged misconduct 

against the probative nature of the evidence. The convictions were probative because they 

illustrated appellant’s overwhelming knowledge of the risks and legal consequences 

associated with driving under the influence that, in turn, helped establish implied malice. No 

abuse of discretion has been shown.

Finally, appellant asserts that the admission of the 2002 conviction for driving without a 

license, and the 2007 enhancement for refusal to test constituted prejudicial error. He claims 

that this uncharged misconduct was not similar enough to the charged crime and that each 

of the prior convictions simply “tended to establish that appellant was a person who regularly 

acted with disregard for the law.” We need not address appellant’s assertion that the driving 

without a license conviction and refusal to test enhancement were erroneously admitted 

because, even if their admission was error, any error was harmless for the reasons explained 

below.

II. If the Trial Court Erred, Any Error Was Harmless.

Even if the admission of all of the challenged evidence was improper, any error was 

harmless. Our high court has held, “[A] ‘miscarriage of justice’ should be declared only 

when the court, ‘after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence,’ is of the 

‘opinion’ that it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party 

would have been reached in the absence of the error.” (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 

818, 836; see also People v. Gutierrez (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 847, 861–862 [despite 

dissimilarities between the current offense and the uncharged misconduct that could warrant 

exclusion, any error was harmless because it was not reasonably probable the appellant 

would have obtained a more favorable result because the evidence overwhelmingly pointed 

to guilt].)

Similarly, here, even if appellant’s 1999 and 2002 convictions and 2007 refusal to test were 

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inadmissible, any error would be harmless because the prosecution introduced 

overwhelming evidence of appellant’s guilt. The prosecution presented the jury with 

unrefuted testimony and video footage that depicted appellant’s conduct on the evening in 

question. The jury was shown video of appellant drinking 11 beers and behaving in an 

intoxicated fashion in the Mi Zacatecas Restaurant. He was also involved in a verbal 

altercation with a bouncer, broke a beer bottle on the ground, and bumped into several 

individuals on the dancefloor. After repeated requests to cease this conduct, the bouncer had 

to escort appellant outside of the restaurant.

The bouncer testified that appellant, once outside, went to his truck and began drinking more 

beer. After appellant entered his truck, the bouncer told him not to drive because of his 

intoxication. Appellant ignored the request and started his vehicle, which lurched forward 

and hit one of appellant’s friends and several cars before he drove over an embankment and 

onto West American Canyon Road.

A restaurant employee heard the commotion and ran outside. She witnessed the bouncer 

unsuccessfully trying to pull appellant out of his truck. According to her testimony, appellant 

was “obviously intoxicated.”

Additionally, the prosecution presented the jury with video and testimonial evidence from 

Deputy Bohlander. Deputy Bohlander testified that at 11:30 p.m. he saw appellant’s truck 

driving on West American Canyon Road without its headlights on. Appellant straddled 

lanes, ran through a stop sign, and unnecessarily applied his brakes. Deputy Bohlander 

activated his patrol car’s lights, but appellant accelerated rather than pulling over. Appellant 

was driving at 50 m.p.h. in a 25 m.p.h. zone and sped up to 77 m.p.h. in a 55 m.p.h. zone. 

During the pursuit, which continued for about one mile, appellant drove in a reckless and 

dangerous manner, until appellant approached an intersection with a red light. Appellant ran 

the red light, colliding with Ms. Perez’s minivan, which was making a legal left turn on a 

green light. At the time of impact, appellant’s truck was traveling between 86 m.p.h. and 

96.4 m.p.h. Deputy Bohlander’s testimony was corroborated by his dash camera footage, 

which was shown to the jury.

Further, the prosecution introduced testimony regarding appellant’s attendance in a DUI 

program following his 2007 conviction to show appellant had the requisite implied malice 

for a second-degree murder conviction. Karen McElroy, who was the supervisor of Napa 

County’s drunk driver program in 2007, testified the class taught appellant about the dangers 

of driving under the influence. She also provided a packet of documents from the program 

which included appellant’s enrollment and attendance forms. This evidence tended to show 

appellant was driving with a wanton disregard for life.

Finally, appellant did not refute his blood alcohol content or any of the aforementioned 

evidence. [FN 4]

FN 4: The only mitigating evidence appellant introduced was testimony from Pedro 

Antonio Leyva Gaxiola, who testified he did not think appellant would intentionally 

endanger another person’s life.

Thus, the evidence of appellant’s guilt was overwhelming. While the prosecution mentioned 

the challenged evidence in closing argument, its remarks focused on the facts of the instant 

case. Even if every piece of evidence challenged on appeal had been excluded, it is not 

reasonably probable that a result favorable to appellant would have been reached.

Tapia-Felix, 2018 WL 4328091, at *1-*4.

//

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1. Legal Standard

The admission of evidence is not subject to federal habeas review unless a specific 

constitutional guarantee is violated or the error is of such magnitude that the result is a denial of 

the fundamentally fair trial guaranteed by due process. See Henry v. Kernan, 197 F.3d 1021, 1031 

(9th Cir. 1999); Colley v. Sumner, 784 F.2d 984, 990 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 839 (1986). 

The Supreme Court “has not yet made a clear ruling that admission of irrelevant or overtly 

prejudicial evidence constitutes a due process violation sufficient to warrant issuance of the writ.” 

Holley v. Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding that trial court’s admission of 

irrelevant pornographic materials was “fundamentally unfair” under Ninth Circuit precedent but 

not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent 

under § 2254(d)). Failure to comply with state rules of evidence is neither a necessary nor a 

sufficient basis for granting federal habeas relief on due process grounds. See Henry, 197 F.3d at 

1031; Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919 (9th Cir. 1991). While adherence to state 

evidentiary rules suggests that the trial was conducted in a procedurally fair manner, it is certainly 

possible to have a fair trial even when state standards are violated; conversely, state procedural 

and evidentiary rules may countenance processes that do not comport with fundamental fairness. 

See id. (citing Perry v. Rushen, 713 F.2d 1447, 1453 (9th Cir. 1983)). The due process inquiry in 

federal habeas review is whether the admission of evidence was arbitrary or so prejudicial that it 

rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir. 1995); 

Colley, 784 F.2d at 990. But the admission of evidence violates due process only if there are no 

permissible inferences that the jury may draw from the evidence. See Jammal, 926 F.2d at 920.

2. Analysis

The state court’s denial of this claim was not contrary to, nor an unreasonable application 

of, clearly established federal law.4 Petitioner does not argue that there are no reasonable 

inferences that can be drawn from these convictions. Rather, his claim is that the admission of this

 

4 Petitioner primarily argues that the admissions of the prior acts violated Cal. Evid. Code §§ 352, 

1101(B). See Dkt No. 1. However, federal habeas relief does not lie for errors of state law. 

Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67; see also Henry, 197 F.3d at 1031 (“A federal habeas court, of course, 

cannot review questions of state evidence law.”).

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evidence was improper because it was more prejudicial than probative and because it implied both 

bad character (in that it suggested that Petitioner was not law abiding) and that Petitioner had a 

propensity to commit the types of crimes for which he was charged. 

There is no clearly established Supreme Court law prohibiting the admission of irrelevant 

or overly prejudicial evidence. See Holley, 568 F.3d at 1101 (Supreme Court “has not yet made a 

clear ruling that admission of irrelevant or overtly prejudicial evidence constitutes a due process 

violation sufficient to warrant issuance of the writ”). There is also no clearly established Supreme 

Court law prohibiting the admission of propensity evidence. The Supreme Court has specifically

left open whether admission of propensity evidence violates due process. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 

U.S. 62, 75 n. 5 (1991) (“we express no opinion on whether a state law would violate the Due 

Process Clause if it permitted the use of ‘prior crimes’ evidence to show propensity to commit a 

charged crime”). Based on the Supreme Court’s reservation of this issue as an “open question,”

the Ninth Circuit has held that a petitioner’s due process right concerning the admission of 

propensity evidence is not clearly established as required by AEDPA. Alberni v. McDaniel, 458 

F.3d 860, 866-67 (9th Cir. 2006); accord Mejia v. Garcia, 534 F.3d 1036, 1046 (9th Cir. 2008)

(affirming Alberni that admission of propensity evidence not contrary to clearly established law

for purposes of federal habeas review) (“no Supreme Court precedent establishing that admission 

of propensity evidence . . . to lend credibility to a sex victim’s allegations, and thus indisputably 

relevant to the crimes charged, is unconstitutional”). See, e.g., Larson v. Palmateer, 515 F.3d 

1057, 1066 (9th Cir. 2008) (because Supreme Court expressly reserved the question of whether 

using evidence of prior crimes to show propensity for criminal activity could ever violate due 

process, state court’s rejection of claim did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal 

law). The absence of a Supreme Court holding that admission of prejudicial evidence or 

propensity evidence violates due process precludes relief under § 2254(d). See generally Carey v. 

Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006) (given the lack of holdings from the Supreme Court on point, it 

cannot be said that the state court unreasonably applied clearly established federal law for 

purposes of § 2254(d)(1)).

Petitioner’s arguments to the contrary are without merit. In support of his argument that 

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the admission of these priors violated his due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth 

Amendments, petitioner cites to Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997); Estelle v. 

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991); and Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Only Old Chief and Estelle are clearly established federal law for the purposes of Section 2254(d) 

review, and neither case requires the exclusion of the prior acts evidence admitted in this case. As 

discussed supra, Estelle expressly declined to hold that the admission of propensity evidence 

violates the Due Process Clause. In Old Chief, the Supreme Court held that improper admission 

of bad character evidence violates due process, but did not require a blanket exclusion of evidence 

indicating bad character. In Old Chief, the Supreme Court found that the admission of bad 

character evidence was improper because the bad character evidence was being admitted to prove 

the prior conviction element of the crime and the petitioner was willing to stipulate to that

element. Jammal does not constitute clearly established Federal law for the purposes of federal 

habeas review, but the Court notes that Jammal also does not require the blanket exclusion of prior 

bad acts evidence. Rather, in Jammal, the Ninth Circuit held that due process is violated by the 

admission of prior bad acts evidence “[o]nly if there are no permissible inferences the jury may 

draw from the evidence” and the evidence is of such a quality that it necessarily prevents a fair 

trial. Jammal, 926 F.2d at 920 (emphasis in original). 

In the instant action, petitioner had not stipulated to the element for which the prior acts 

were admitted: that he was aware of the dangers of driving under the influence, which is an 

element of implied malice, which is an element of second degree murder;

5

there were permissible 

inferences which could be drawn from the 1999 and 2002 Arizona DUI convictions; and the 

admission of the prior acts evidence did not render the trial fundamentally unfair. The Court 

agrees with the state court’s determination that even though the 1999 and 2002 Arizona DUI 

convictions were remote in time, the jury could reasonably infer from these convictions that 

 

5 The jury was instructed regarding the murder charge as follows: “The defendant acted with 

implied malice if: One, he intentionally committed an act; two, the natural and probable 

consequences of the act were dangerous to human life; three, at the time he acted he knew his act 

was dangerous to human life; and four, he deliberately acted with conscious disregard for human 

life.” RT 2041 (emphasis added).

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petitioner was aware of the dangers of driving under the influence, an inference relevant to implied 

malice, which requires a finding that the defendant knew that his act was dangerous to human life. 

The Court also agrees with the state court’s determination that even if the admission of all the 

challenged evidence was improper, the admission did not render the trial fundamentally unfair 

given the overwhelming evidence supporting the convictions. There was evidence presented via 

witness testimony and video that petitioner drank eleven beers at a bar that night, that he engaged

in aggressive behavior while at the bar, that he was informed by multiple people that he should not 

be driving, that he resisted efforts to stop him from driving, that he was driving far in excess of the 

speed limit and ran a red light immediately prior to the collision, and that he sped up in response 

to police attempts to apprehend him. The state court’s denial of this habeas claim was not an 

unreasonable application of, or contrary to, clearly established Federal law; nor was it an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the state court 

proceeding. Habeas relief is denied on this claim. 

C. Certificate of Appealability

The federal rules governing habeas cases brought by state prisoners require a district court 

that issues an order denying a habeas petition to either grant or deny therein a certificate of 

appealability. See Rules Governing § 2254 Case, Rule 11(a).

A judge shall grant a certificate of appealability “only if the applicant has made a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), and the 

certificate must indicate which issues satisfy this standard. Id. § 2253(c)(3). “Where a district 

court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) 

is straightforward: [t]he petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district 

court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 

473, 484 (2000).

Here, petitioner has not made such a showing, and, accordingly, a certificate of 

appealability will be denied.

//

//

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IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED, and a 

certificate of appealability is DENIED.

The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of respondent and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 1/21/2020

______________________________________

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

United States District Judge

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