Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_21-cv-00438/USCOURTS-caed-2_21-cv-00438-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 840
Nature of Suit: Trademark
Cause of Action: 15:1125 Trademark Infringement (Lanham Act)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

INFINITY ENERGY, INC., a

California Corporation,

Plaintiff,

v.

INFINITE ENERGY HOME

SERVICES, INC., a California

Corporation,

Defendant.

No. 2:21-cv-00438 WBS KJN

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: 

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff Infinity Energy, Inc., brought this action 

against defendant Infinite Energy Home Services, Inc., alleging 

trademark infringement under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114; 

false designation of origin under 15 U.S.C. § 1125; violation of 

California’s Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 

17200; and intentional interference with prospective economic 

advantage under California law. (FAC (Docket No. 7).) Defendant 

now moves for summary judgment. (Mot. (Docket No. 33).)

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I. Factual Background

Plaintiff provides solar energy services and does 

business in California, Texas, Nevada, Idaho, Florida, Colorado, 

and New Jersey. (See id. ¶¶ 10, 17.) Plaintiff has a registered 

trademark for the name “Infinity Energy” in connection with the 

installation of solar energy systems and alternative energy 

products for residential and commercial use. (Def.’s Statement 

of Undisputed Facts (“SUF”) (Docket No. 33-4) ¶ 1.) 

Defendant uses the name Infinite Energy or Infinite 

Energy Home Services to market its solar energy services, as well 

as other home-related services. (See id. ¶¶ 14, 16, 43.) 

Defendant does business in El Dorado County, Placer County, and 

Sacramento County in California. (Id. ¶ 18.) Defendant does not 

do any business outside those three counties. (See id.)

II. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that 

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 56(a). A party may move for summary judgment either for one 

or more claims or defenses, or for portions thereof. Id. Where 

a court grants summary judgment only as to a portion of a claim 

or defense, it “may enter an order stating any material fact . . 

. that is not genuinely in dispute and treating the fact as 

established in the case.” Id. at 56(g). 

A material fact is one “that might affect the outcome 

of the suit under the governing law,” and a genuine issue is one 

that could permit a reasonable trier of fact to enter a verdict 

in the non-moving party’s favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 

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Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The moving party bears the 

initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of 

material fact and may satisfy this burden by presenting evidence 

that negates an essential element of the non-moving party’s case. 

See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). 

Alternatively, the movant may demonstrate that the non-moving 

party cannot provide evidence to support an essential element 

upon which it will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. The 

burden then shifts to the non-moving party to set forth specific 

facts to show that there is a genuine issue for trial. See id.

at 324. Any inferences drawn from the underlying facts must, 

however, be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving 

party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 

475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

III. Discussion

A successful trademark infringement claim requires a 

showing that the claimant holds a protectable mark and that the 

alleged infringer’s imitating mark is similar enough to “cause 

confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.” KP Permanent 

Make–Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 117

(2004). Defendant moves for summary judgment on the basis that 

there is no likelihood of confusion.

A likelihood of confusion exists “when consumers are 

likely to assume that a product or service is associated with a 

source other than its actual source because of similarities 

between the two sources’ marks or marketing techniques.” 

Nutri/System, Inc. v. Con–Stan Indus., Inc., 809 F.2d 601, 604 

(9th Cir. 1987). In AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341 

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(9th Cir. 1979), the Ninth Circuit delineated eight factors to be 

considered as part of the consumer confusion inquiry. Id. at 

348–49. The Sleekcraft factors are: (1) the similarity of the 

marks; (2) the strength of the plaintiff’s mark; (3) the 

relatedness or proximity of the goods; (4) the marketing channels 

used by each party; (5) the degree of care likely to be exercised 

by the purchaser; (6) the defendant's intent in selecting the 

mark; (7) evidence of actual confusion; and (8) the likelihood of 

expansion of the parties’ product lines. Id. These factors “are 

non-exhaustive and applied flexibly.” JL Beverage Co., LLC v. 

Jim Beam Brands Co., 828 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 2016).

A. Similarity of the Marks

“The first Sleekcraft factor -- the similarity of the 

marks -- has always been considered a critical question in the 

likelihood-of-confusion analysis.” GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney 

Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1205 (9th Cir. 2000). To determine the 

similarity of marks, “first, the marks must be considered in 

their entirety and as they appear in the marketplace; second, 

similarity is adjudged in terms of appearance, sound and meaning; 

and third, similarities are weighed more heavily than 

differences.” Id. (internal citations omitted). 

Plaintiff’s mark appears in the marketplace as 

“infinity energy” with a small logo incorporating the infinity 

symbol to the left of the company name, using a pale green and 

grey color scheme, as shown below. (Def.’s SUF ¶ 42.) 

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The parties dispute how defendant’s mark appears in the 

marketplace. Defendant contends that its mark appears as 

“INFINITE ENERGY HOME SERVICES,” with the descriptors “Solar –

Roofing – Electrical – Home Battery – HVAC – Windows” appearing 

below the company name, along with a large logo incorporating the 

infinity symbol above the company name, using a medium green and 

black color scheme. (Def.’s SUF ¶ 43.) Plaintiff contends that 

defendant changed its mark following the initiation of this 

action, but previously used only “INFINITE ENERGY” as its mark, 

and continues to use the “INFINITE ENERGY” mark alongside the 

updated “INIFINITE HOME ENERGY SERVICES” mark, as shown below. 

(Pl.’s Statement of Disputed Facts (Docket No. 40-3) ¶ 43.)

The marks are not so dissimilar that summary judgment 

is warranted. To the contrary, the names “Infinite Energy” and 

“Infinity Energy” are very similar; “infinite” and “infinity” 

refer to the same concept, sound similar when spoken, and 

visually differ by only a single letter. See GoTo.com, 202 F.3d 

at 1205 (appearance, sound, and meaning are considered in 

determining similarity). Even assuming that defendant’s 

representation of its mark is accurate and that it always 

includes the additional descriptors listed above, defendant 

admits that it also uses the name “Infinite Energy” in the 

marketplace. (See SUF ¶ 14.) Regardless, the addition of “Home 

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Services” does not necessarily negate the linguistic similarity

of the names. See Rearden LLC v. Rearden Com., Inc., 683 F.3d 

1190, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (reasonable juror could find 

likelihood of confusion despite addition of a word to company 

name); GoTo.com, 202 F.3d at 1205 (similarities are weighed more 

heavily than differences). Further, both companies utilize a 

logo incorporating the infinity symbol and a green color scheme. 

See GoTo.com, 202 F.3d at 1206 (colors and shapes used in logos 

are relevant in analyzing similarity). There is therefore at 

least a question of material fact as to the similarity of the 

marks, which weighs against granting summary judgment.

B. Strength of the Mark

“A mark’s strength is ‘evaluated in terms of its 

conceptual strength and commercial strength.’” JL Beverage Co., 

828 F.3d at 1106 (quoting GoTo.com, 202 F.3d at 1207). 

“A mark’s conceptual strength ‘depends largely on the 

obviousness of its connection to the good or service to which it 

refers.’” Id. at 1107 (quoting Fortune Dynamic, 618 F.3d at 

1032–33). Conceptual strength is determined by the mark’s 

placement on a continuum of increasing distinctiveness: (1) 

generic (2) descriptive, (3) suggestive, (4) arbitrary, and (5) 

fanciful. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 

763, 768 (1992). As the uniqueness of the mark increases, so too 

does the degree of protection. JL Beverage Co., 828 F.3d at 

1106.

“Arbitrary and fanciful marks, which employ words and 

phrases with no commonly understood connection to the product, 

are the two strongest categories, and trigger the highest degree 

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of trademark protection.” Id. at 1107 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). “In the middle of the spectrum are suggestive marks, 

which suggest a product’s features and require consumers to 

exercise some imagination to associate the suggestive mark with 

the product.” Id. “Descriptive and generic marks, at the other 

end of the spectrum, are the two weakest categories. Descriptive 

marks define a particular characteristic of the product in a way 

that does not require any imagination, while generic marks 

describe the product in its entirety and are not entitled to 

trademark protection.” Id.

At best, plaintiff’s mark “Infinity Energy” fits into

either the “suggestive” category because it requires one to 

presume the nature of the program or services, or the 

“descriptive” category because it references some of the 

characteristics of plaintiff’s services. See id. This would 

place plaintiff’s mark on the weak-to-moderate portion of the 

continuum.

In contrast to conceptual strength, commercial strength

“is based on actual marketplace recognition.” Network 

Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137, 

1149 (9th Cir. 2011). “Commercial strength may be demonstrated 

by commercial success, extensive advertising, length of exclusive 

use, and public recognition.” Boler v. 3D Int’l, LLC, No. 2:14-

cv-00658 TLN CKD, 2018 WL 5099274, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 17, 

2018); see also Entrepreneur Media, Inc. v. Smith, 279 F.3d 1135, 

1144 (9th Cir. 2002). A “suggestive or descriptive mark, which 

is conceptually weak, can have its overall strength as a mark 

bolstered by its commercial success.” M2 Software, Inc., v. 

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Madacy Ent., 421 F.3d 1073, 1081 (9th Cir. 2005).

Plaintiff argues that its mark is commercially strong 

because its service area has expanded from Northern California to 

seven U.S. states, including a significant amount of business in 

the area also serviced by defendant. (See Opp’n (Docket No. 40) 

at 2; Def.’s SUF ¶ 17.) Such evidence can be relevant. See JL 

Beverage Co., 828 F.3d at 1109 (suggesting that geographic scope 

of sales is relevant in evaluating commercial strength). 

However, the geographic scope of plaintiff’s services, without 

more, does not appear sufficient to establish actual marketplace 

recognition. See Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Ent. 

Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1058 (9th Cir. 1999) (indicating that a 

plaintiff must provide “substantial evidence establishing the 

widespread recognition of its mark” to establish commercial 

strength). Plaintiff has not provided any other evidence of 

commercial strength, for example “extensive advertising, length 

of exclusive use, and public recognition.” See Boler, 2018 WL 

5099274, at *4. The court therefore concludes that, based on the 

evidence before it, plaintiff’s mark receives weak to moderate 

protection, which weighs somewhat in favor of granting summary 

judgment in defendant’s favor; however, this factor alone is not 

dispositive. 

C. Proximity of the Goods

“Related goods are generally more likely than unrelated 

goods to confuse the public as to the producers of the goods.” 

Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1055. “For related goods, the danger 

presented is that the public will mistakenly assume there is an 

association between the producers of the related goods, though no 

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such association exists.” Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 350. It is 

undisputed that both parties provide solar energy installation 

services. The services are therefore closely related, if not 

identical. See Stone Creek, Inc. v. Omnia Italian Design, Inc., 

875 F.3d 426, 432 (9th Cir. 2017), abrogated on other grounds, 

Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1492 (2020) 

(indicating that goods that are “identical” or directly 

“competitive” are close in proximity). The similarity of the 

services increases the likelihood of confusion and thus weighs 

against granting summary judgment in favor of defendant.

D. Marketing Channels Used

“[C]onvergent marketing channels increase the 

likelihood of confusion.” Off. Airline Guides, Inc. v. Goss, 6 

F.3d 1385, 1393 (9th Cir. 1993). Here, both parties utilize 

internet advertising. However, some use of the internet for 

marketing alone does not constitute overlapping marketing 

channels. Entrepreneur Media, 279 F.3d at 1151. Instead, the 

court must examine “whether both parties use the Web as a 

substantial marketing and advertising channel . . . and whether 

the parties’ marketing channels overlap in any other way.” Id.

(emphasis in original). There is insufficient evidence here 

concerning the nature of the parties’ internet advertising to 

determine whether that usage is “significant.” Additionally, 

there is evidence that defendant uses other marketing channels, 

including billboards and radio (see Def.’s Interrogs. (Docket No. 

40-4) at 6); however, neither party addresses the extent of 

plaintiff’s use (or lack thereof) of non-internet marketing 

methods. Accordingly, there is a question of material fact on 

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the issue of marketing channels, which weighs against summary 

judgment. 

E. Type of Goods and Degree of Care

“Low consumer care . . . increases the likelihood of 

confusion.” Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 

F.3d 1020, 1028 (9th Cir. 2004). “In assessing the likelihood of 

confusion to the public, the standard used by the courts is the 

typical buyer exercising ordinary caution.” Network Automation, 

638 F.3d at 1152 (quoting Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 353). “[W]hen 

the goods are expensive, the buyer can be expected to exercise 

greater care in his purchases . . . though, confusion may still 

be likely.” Id. (quoting Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 353). 

The parties fail to present any information concerning 

the price of their services, though their briefing suggests that 

the cost of solar energy services is substantial. Assuming the

prices of the parties’ services are on the higher end, this 

suggests that customers are more likely to exercise a higher 

degree of care. See id. However, this factor is “less 

instructive” when –- as here -- there is a high degree of 

similarity between the marks and the goods. See Stone Creek, 875 

F.3d at 435. 

F. Defendant’s Intent in Selecting the Mark

While “an intent to confuse consumers is not required 

for a finding of infringement,” Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1059, an 

intent to deceive can be strong evidence of a likelihood of 

confusion, Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 354. Plaintiff does not 

appear to dispute that defendant had no ill intent in selecting 

its mark. (See Opp’n at 7.) Such a lack of intent to deceive is 

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“largely irrelevant” in determining likelihood of confusion. See

Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1059.

G. Evidence of Actual Confusion

Evidence of actual confusion is strong evidence that 

future confusion is likely. Nutri/System, 809 F.2d at 606. 

“Such evidence is not necessary for a finding of likelihood of 

confusion, but . . . is particularly potent.” Stone Creek, 875 

F.3d at 433.

Here, plaintiff’s Chief Sales Officer provided 

testimony concerning numerous instances in which customers of 

defendant’s business have erroneously contacted plaintiff, 

intending to contact defendant.1 (See Dep. of Cameron Kelly 

(Docket No. 40-4 at 14-23) at 57.) Also before the court is a 

copy of an email from a customer who defendant admits intended to 

contact defendant with a complaint about defendant’s services, 

but erroneously contacted plaintiff. (See Mot. at 24-25; Def.’s 

Ex. W (Docket No. 35 at 155-58)). Further, plaintiff’s expert 

opines that an analysis of the two companies’ internet presences 

provides evidence of actual confusion. (See Decl. and Exp. Rep. 

of Dr. Patrick Farrell (Docket No. 35 at 79-87) ¶¶ 18-25.) Taken 

1 Defendant argues that this witness’s testimony should 

be disregarded because it relies upon inadmissible hearsay. 

However, this objection is not necessarily applicable on summary 

judgment. “If the contents of a document can be presented in a 

form that would be admissible at trial -- for example, through 

live testimony by the author of the document -- the mere fact 

that the document itself might be excludable hearsay provides no 

basis for refusing to consider it on summary judgment.” Sandoval 

v. County of San Diego, 985 F.3d 657, 666 (9th Cir. 2021). Here, 

defendant has not shown, and the court does not see, why the 

contents of the documents or anticipated testimony at issue could 

not possibly be properly presented at trial.

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together, this evidence is sufficient to establish a question of 

material fact on the issue of actual confusion. This factor 

therefore weighs against granting summary judgment in favor of 

defendant.

H. Likelihood of Expansion of the Product Lines

“Inasmuch as a trademark owner is afforded greater 

protection against competing goods, a strong possibility that 

either party may expand his business to compete with the other 

will weigh in favor of finding that the present use is 

infringing.” Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 354 (citation omitted). 

This factor is relevant where two companies are not yet 

competitors but might become so in the future; however, “[w]here 

two companies are direct competitors, this factor is 

unimportant.” See Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1153. The 

parties seem to agree that the companies are direct competitors 

in providing solar services. (See Mot. at 30; Opp’n at 3, 7.) 

This factor thus has little weight. 

In light of the evidence presented by the parties

concerning the Sleekcraft factors -- particularly the similarity 

of the marks, the proximity of the goods, and evidence of actual 

confusion -- the court concludes that there is at the very least 

a question of material fact as to whether there is a likelihood 

of customer confusion.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant’s motion for 

summary judgment (Docket No. 33) be, and the same hereby is, 

DENIED.2

2 Defendant also requests that the court grant summary 

judgment on the issue of damages. However, the parties’ briefs 

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Dated: May 31, 2023

contain little discussion of this issue, and given that questions 

of fact remain on the issue of liability, it is premature to 

address damages. Regardless, defendant’s argument -- that 

plaintiff must prove actual damages to recover on any of its 

claims -- is incorrect. The Lanham Act explicitly provides for 

monetary recovery without proof of actual damages. See 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1117(c).

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