Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01542/USCOURTS-casd-3_18-cv-01542-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LONNIE D. JOHNSON

Petitioner,

v.

RALPH DIAZ, Secretary,

Respondent.

Case No.: 18-CV-1542 JLS (LL)

ORDER: (1) DENYING HABEAS 

CORPUS PETITION; AND

(2) DENYING CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY

I. INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Lonnie D. Johnson, a state prisoner proceeding with a Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (“Petition” or “Pet.”), challenges his 

convictions for various sex crimes committed against his daughter and his fiancee’s 

daughter. The Court has read and considered the Petition (“Pet.,” ECF No. 1), the Answer 

and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the Answer (“Answer,” ECF 

Nos. 8, 8-1), the Traverse (“Traverse,” ECF No. 18), the lodgments and other documents 

filed in this case, and the legal arguments presented by both parties.1 For the reasons 

discussed below, the Court DENIES the Petition.

 

1 Page numbers for docketed materials cited in this Order refer to those imprinted by the court’s electronic 

case filing system.

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II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This Court gives deference to state court findings of fact and presumes them to be 

correct; Petitioner may rebut the presumption of correctness, but only by clear and 

convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Parle v. Fraley, 506 U.S. 20, 

35–36 (1992) (holding findings of historical fact, including inferences properly drawn from 

these facts, are entitled to statutory presumption of correctness). The state appellate 

recounted the facts as follows:

A. The Relationships

Tanisha is Johnson’s daughter and was born in 1993. She lived with Johnson 

and her mother until age five, and then lived with her grandmother or in group 

homes for a number of years. At age 11, Tanisha began living with Johnson 

and Johnson’s girlfriend (Valerie). They lived with Betty (Valerie’s child 

from a prior relationship) and three other of Valerie’s children.

B. Evidence Concerning Molestations of Tanisha

Tanisha’s Pretrial Statements

In December 2010, when Tanisha was 17 years old, she wrote a note to a 

friend in class that stated Johnson had molested her and, at her friend’s urging, 

Tanisha gave the note to a teacher at her school. The teacher took Tanisha to 

a school administrator, who notified San Diego County Health and Human 

Services Agency (Agency). The administrator also contacted Tanisha’s 

mother and told her to call the police.

Deputy Sherriff Montan went to Tanisha’s school that day and interviewed 

her. Tanisha told Montan she went to live with Johnson after her mother 

became homeless. When she was 11, Johnson gave her a little white pill that 

made her feel weak and dazed but he told her she could trust him and he would 

never do anything to hurt her. He then removed her clothing and sodomized 

her, and then directed her to bathe to wash away the evidence. He then told 

her they were “going to get real close now. You can’t tell anyone.” Tanisha

told Montan that Johnson continued to sodomize her every other week for the 

next three years and, around age 14, he began having vaginal intercourse with 

her or had her perform oral sex on him. Johnson would give her alcohol or 

marijuana beforehand, and would use a condom during vaginal sex and would 

flush it down the toilet. He ejaculated once in her mouth but because she 

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didn’t like that he did not do it again. Johnson also beat her with a miniature 

baseball bat that left permanent bruises on her buttocks.

Montan brought Tanisha to the Santee Police Department, where she was 

interviewed by Detectives Perez and Lopez. She related the above facts to 

them and also told them Johnson sometimes made her bathe in bleach after 

the molestations. Tanisha told Perez that Johnson hit her with closed fists and 

left bruises when she was slow to comply with his directives, or when she got 

bad grades, but she explained the bruises to others as the result of accidents. 

She had seen Johnson strike other women, and he threatened to kill her mother 

if Tanisha revealed the sexual abuse. She told the detectives she moved back 

in with her mother the preceding Saturday, after Tanisha revealed to 

Johnson’s current live-in girlfriend (Andrea) that Johnson had raped her. 

Andrea immediately had Tanisha pack her bags and then drove Tanisha to her 

mother’s house. While she was packing, Johnson came in and asked why she 

was leaving, and she told him it was because of what he did to her. He told 

her she was the cause of it because her pheromones were so strong but also 

said he loved her and asked for forgiveness.

The detectives asked Tanisha if she was aware of any other people Johnson 

had molested. She told them Johnson had molested Betty, and that Tanisha

had learned of that molestation because Betty told her mom (Valerie) about 

the molest. When Valerie subsequently asked Tanisha if she knew about the 

molest, Tanisha for the first time learned about Johnson’s molestation of 

Betty. However, Valerie ultimately believed Johnson’s denials rather than 

Betty’s claims.

Ms. Glass, an Agency worker, interviewed Tanisha five days later. Tanisha

again repeated her allegations of molestation. Following the interview, the 

Agency worker did not allow her to return to Johnson’s home. However, Glass 

also interviewed the other children, including Betty, who did not reveal any 

molestations by Johnson. Although Glass advised Valerie not to permit 

Johnson to have unsupervised visits with his daughters, Glass ultimately 

concluded her investigation without involving the dependency court and 

without placing any legal restrictions on Johnson’s visitation. [FN 3 omitted.]

Tanisha agreed to help police by engaging in several pretext calls with 

Johnson over a several-month period. However, the calls yielded “[n]o 

results.”

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Tanisha’s Trial Testimony

Although Tanisha testified against Johnson at the preliminary hearing and 

reiterated the allegations of molestation as she had described them to the 

police, her trial testimony changed and she recanted the allegations of 

wrongdoing by Johnson. [FN 4 omitted.] At trial, she testified that she first 

began to recant her claims in May or June of 2012 when she spoke to 

Johnson’s cousin and her sister and at that time told them everything she had 

claimed about Johnson’s misconduct was a lie. [FN 5 omitted.] At trial, she 

claimed she had lied when she told police and the Agency worker that Johnson 

had committed sexual misconduct against her or had given her drugs or 

alcohol. She testified she lied about Johnson’s misconduct because she was 

young, angry, and wanted her mother’s acceptance. She also claimed she was 

angry because she had developed an intimate relationship with Betty and, 

when Johnson learned about it, he prohibited them from seeing each other, so 

they concocted a plan starting when Tanisha was about 13 years old to get rid 

of Johnson so she and Betty could continue their relationship.

C. Evidence Concerning Molestations of Betty

Betty was first molested by Johnson in September 2007 when she was 13 

years old. At that time, Johnson and Tanisha were living in an apartment with 

Betty, Betty’s mother (Valerie), and Betty’s sister (Diamond), but Valerie was 

then in the hospital giving birth to a child. Johnson asked Betty to give him a 

massage but, when she finished, he blocked the door. Betty tried to take cover 

in the bathroom, but when she left the bathroom Johnson grabbed her and 

rubbed against her. Betty claimed she told Tanisha about the incident but did 

not tell Valerie. [FN 6 omitted.]

Later that year, Johnson and Tanisha moved into a different apartment, and 

Betty and her sisters would visit on weekends. Betty swam in the pool and 

showered at Johnson’s apartment, and Johnson occasionally entered the 

bathroom while she was showering. When Betty was about 14 years old, 

Johnson joined her in the shower and touched her breasts. About a month 

later, he carried her from the shower, put her on the bed, and orally copulated 

her. She was conflicted about how to feel about this, but when he kept trying 

to digitally penetrate her, Betty kicked him off of her and he eventually let her 

go. Betty testified she again told Tanisha about this incident but did not tell 

Valerie.

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On another occasion, Betty and Tanisha were with Johnson on a bed watching 

a movie and smoking marijuana when Johnson began rubbing Betty’s thigh. 

Betty told Tanisha to “get your dad” and said “[h]e’s touching me,” but 

Johnson denied it. When he resumed touching her, she ran into Tanisha’s 

room and started crying. Tanisha tried to comfort her, and Johnson told 

Tanisha that, if anyone asked, she should say he was sleeping.

In total, Johnson sexually touched Betty six or seven times. Betty eventually 

told Valerie about the touchings. Valerie confronted Johnson but he denied 

it. Valerie apparently did not believe Betty.

Betty admitted she resented Johnson’s relationship with Valerie and feared 

Johnson because she had seen him physically abuse Valerie and Tanisha. She 

also resented Johnson telling Valerie about Betty’s misbehavior because he 

was not her father and should have stayed out of her business. Betty said she 

and Tanisha were like sisters, and had been sexually intimate for some time, 

but that Johnson had known about their intimate relationship and had done 

nothing to stop it. Betty told the detective she planned to be the one who 

killed Johnson and had once tried to poison his food.

D. Expert Testimony

An expert on child abuse testified about a number of subjects, including why 

children do not promptly report the abuse, why children provide incrementally 

more details once they have made an initial disclosure of the abuse, and 

recantation. It is uncommon in child abuse cases to have a child recant their 

allegations, but the likelihood of recantation is directly related to the closeness 

of the relationship between child and abuser. The likelihood of recantation 

also can be affected by the presence or lack of maternal support for the child 

and, where a mother is not supportive of the child after disclosures of abuse 

by the father, stepfather or boyfriend, the situation is “really ripe for a 

recantation.” The expert estimated the percentage of false reports of abuse to 

be between 2 percent and 8 percent.

E. Defense

Johnson testified on his own behalf and denied ever molesting either Betty or 

Tanisha. He did discipline Tanisha (by grounding her and confiscating her 

cell phone and rollerblades) when she brought home bad grades in high 

school. When he discovered she and Betty engaged in sex when Tanisha was

14 years old, he similarly disciplined her and barred them from seeing each 

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other for several months. Johnson had a strained relationship with Betty 

because Betty resented him dating her mother and also resented Johnson’s 

good relationship with Betty’s sister. The defense also recalled Tanisha, who 

reiterated that she had lied about the molestations. Tanisha also testified she 

had convinced Betty, who hated Johnson but had never told Tanisha anything 

about Johnson molesting her, to lie about Johnson molesting them.

The defense called members of Johnson’s family, his fiancée, and a close 

friend of his, to testify on his behalf. They testified Johnson was a good father 

who would discipline Tanisha when she misbehaved, that he was not 

physically abusive toward Tanisha, and he was not the type of person who 

would molest children. They also testified Tanisha was a liar. Johnson’s son, 

who dated Betty, ended his relationship with her because he felt she lied to 

him a lot and believed she was trying to trap him with a child. Betty did not 

tell Johnson’s son of Johnson’s misbehavior until after Johnson’s son had 

terminated his relationship with Betty.

The defense called an expert psychologist to testify that false allegations of 

molestation by adolescents can occur when there is a disrupted relationship or 

in situations in which the child is upset with the parent and is seeking revenge. 

A child can recant when the initial allegations were a lie, or when there is 

pressure from family members.

(Lodgment No. 8, ECF No. 9-13 at 3–10.)

III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 23, 2013, the San Diego District Attorney’s Office filed a 13-count 

amended information charging Lonnie Daunte Johnson with three counts of lewd act on a 

child under 14 years-of-age, a violation of California Penal Code § 288(a) (counts one, two 

and ten), two counts of sodomy of a person under 14 years-of-age, a violation of California 

Penal Code § 286(c)(1) (counts three and twelve), one count of sodomy of an intoxicated 

person, a violation of California Penal Code § 286(i) (count four), one count of continuous 

sexual abuse of a child, a violation of California Penal Code § 288.5(a) (count five), three 

counts of oral copulation of a person under 16 years-of-age by a person over 21 years-ofage, a violation of California Penal Code § 288a(b)(2) (counts six through eight), one count 

of forcible lewd act on a child, a violation of California Penal Code § 288(b)(1) (count 

nine), one count of oral copulation of a person under 18 years-of-age, a violation of 

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California Penal Code § 288(c)(1) (count eleven), one count of lewd act on a child 14 or 

15 years-of-age, a violation of California Penal Code § 288(c)(1), and one count of 

attempted forcible rape, a violation of California Penal Code §§ 261(a)(2) and 664 (count 

thirteen). (Lodgment No. 21 vol. 1, ECF No. 9-28 at 198–202.) As to counts one, two and 

ten, the information also alleged Johnson had substantial sexual conduct with one of the 

victims and that Johnson had committed an offense described in California Penal Code 

§ 667.61(b)(c)(e) against more than one victim. (Id.) 

Following a jury trial, Johnson was convicted of counts one through nine and eleven 

through thirteen.

2

 (Lodgment No. 21 vol. 2, ECF No. 9-29 at 234–45.) The jury also found 

the allegations attached to counts one and two to be true. (Id.) Following the guilty 

verdicts, the trial court heard and denied a motion for a new trial based on a juror’s failure 

to disclose she had been the victim of sexual assault during voir dire and juror misconduct. 

(Lodgment No. 1 vol. 5, ECF No. 9-5 at 127–53.) Johnson was sentenced to thirty yearsto-life plus eight years. (Lodgment No. 1 vol. 6, ECF No. 9-6 at 16.)

Johnson appealed his conviction to the California Court of Appeal for the Fourth 

Appellate District. (Lodgment Nos. 2-4, ECF Nos. 9-7–9-10.) While the appeal was 

pending, Johnson filed a habeas corpus petition in the state appellate court as well, and 

Respondent filed an informal response to the petition. (Lodgment Nos. 5–6, ECF Nos. 

9-10–9-11.) The appellate court then issued an Order to Show Cause requiring Respondent 

to file a Return to the petition in San Diego Superior Court. (Lodgment No. 7.) After the 

Return was filed by Respondent and a Denial was filed by Johnson, the appellate court 

granted an evidentiary hearing which was held in San Diego Superior Court; the superior 

court denied the petition. (Lodgment Nos. 11–14, ECF Nos. 9-16–9-19.) 

Following the denial of Johnson’s habeas corpus petition, the California Court of 

Appeal affirmed Johnson’s conviction on direct appeal in a written opinion. (Lodgment 

 

2

 The jury was instructed to return a verdict on either count nine or ten because count ten was a lesser 

included offense to count nine. (Lodgment No. 21 vol. 2, ECF No. 9-29 at 101–03.)

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No. 8, ECF No. 9-13.) Johnson then filed a petition for review in the California Supreme 

Court on direct review. (Lodgment No. 9, ECF No. 9-14.) While that petition for review 

was pending, he filed an amended habeas corpus petition in the state appellate court. 

(Lodgment Nos. 15–16, ECF Nos. 9-20–9-21.) The state appellate court denied the 

amended habeas corpus petition in a written opinion. (Lodgment No. 17, ECF No. 9-22.) 

Johnson filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court seeking review of the 

state appellate court’s denial of his amended habeas corpus petition. (Lodgment No. 18, 

ECF No. 9-23.) The California Supreme Court denied that petition for review. (Lodgment 

No. 19, ECF No. 9-24.) The California Supreme Court then denied Johnson’s petition for 

review on direct appeal. (Lodgment No. 10, ECF No. 9-15.)

Johnson filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this Court on July 9, 2018. 

(ECF No. 1.) Respondent filed an Answer and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 

Support of Answer on October 18, 2018. (ECF Nos. 8, 8-1.) Johnson filed a Traverse on 

December 18, 2018. (ECF No. 18.)

IV. DISCUSSION

Johnson’s Petition contains four claims. Claims one and two concern a juror who 

did not disclose during voir dire that she was a victim of sexual assault. (Pet. at 6–7, 

26–52.) Johnson contends this violated his federal due process rights to a fair trial because 

the juror’s failure to disclose her sexual assault denied him an impartial jury and the juror 

committed misconduct by introducing her experience with sexual assault into 

deliberations. (Id.) He also contends that the voir dire that was conducted was inadequate, 

rendering his trial fundamentally unfair. (Id.) In claim three, Johnson argues his trial 

counsel was ineffective because she did not object to the trial judge’s failure to ask more 

specific questions of jurors and because she did not conduct a sufficiently in-depth voir 

dire of potential jurors, both of which resulted in the juror who had suffered a sexual assault 

being empaneled. (Id. at 8, 53–58.) In claim four, Johnson contends the cumulative effect 

of the errors deprived him of a fair trial. (Id. at 9, 68–69.) Respondent argues that the state 

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court’s resolution of the claims was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, 

clearly established Supreme Court law. (Answer, ECF No. 8-1 at 5–31.) 

A. Standard of Review

This Petition is governed by the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). Under 

AEDPA, a habeas petition will not be granted with respect to any claim adjudicated on the 

merits by the state court unless that adjudication: (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary 

to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in 

light of the evidence presented at the state court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)–(2); 

Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). In deciding a state prisoner’s habeas petition, a 

federal court is not called upon to decide whether it agrees with the state court’s 

determination; rather, the court applies an extraordinarily deferential review, inquiring only 

whether the state court’s decision was objectively unreasonable. See Yarborough v. 

Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 4 (2003); Medina v. Hornung, 386 F.3d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 2004).

A federal habeas court may grant relief under the “contrary to” clause if the state 

court applied a rule different from the governing law set forth in Supreme Court cases, or 

if it decided a case differently than the Supreme Court on a set of materially 

indistinguishable facts. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). The court may grant 

relief under the “unreasonable application” clause if the state court correctly identified the 

governing legal principle from Supreme Court decisions but unreasonably applied those 

decisions to the facts of a particular case. Id. Additionally, the “unreasonable application” 

clause requires that the state court decision be more than incorrect or erroneous; to warrant 

habeas relief, the state court’s application of clearly established federal law must be 

“objectively unreasonable.” See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). The Court 

may also grant relief if the state court’s decision was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).

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Where there is no reasoned decision from the state’s highest court, the Court “looks 

through” to the last reasoned state court decision and presumes it provides the basis for the 

higher court’s denial of a claim or claims. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 805–06 

(1991). If the dispositive state court order does not “furnish a basis for its reasoning,” 

federal habeas courts must conduct an independent review of the record to determine 

whether the state court’s decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Supreme Court law. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000), 

overruled on other grounds by Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75–76; accord Himes v. Thompson, 

336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). Clearly established federal law, for purposes of 

§ 2254(d), means “the governing principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at 

the time the state court renders its decision.” Andrade, 538 U.S. at 72.

B. Ground One: Juror Misconduct During Voir Dire and Deliberations

Johnson alleges that his federal due process right to a fair trial were violated when a 

juror failed to disclose during voir dire that she had been raped. (Pet. at 6, 26–52.) Johnson 

also contends the juror committed misconduct during deliberations when she introduced 

her experience of being raped into deliberations. (Id.) Respondent argues the state court’s 

resolution of these claims was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, 

clearly established Supreme Court law. (Answer at 11–23.)

Johnson raised these claims in the petition for review he filed in the California 

Supreme Court on direct appeal and in the petition for review following the denial of the 

amended petition for habeas corpus he filed in the California Supreme Court. (Lodgment 

Nos. 9, 18, ECF Nos. 9-14, 9-23). The California Supreme Court summarily denied those 

petitions. (Lodgment Nos. 15, 194, ECF Nos. 9-20, 9-24.) Accordingly, this Court must 

“look through to the last reasoned state court decision addressing the merits of the claims.” 

Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805–06. The state appellate court’s opinion on direct review is the last 

reasoned state court decision because the state appellate court concluded the voir dire and 

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juror misconduct claims were procedurally defaulted as they had been raised and rejected 

on appeal.3 (Lodgment No. 17, ECF No. 9-22 at 3.) 

1. Voir Dire

Johnson claimed in state court, as he does in his federal habeas corpus petition, that 

juror no. 2 concealed relevant information during voir dire which resulted in a jury that 

was not fair and impartial, violating his federal due process rights. (Pet. at 27–38.) The 

state appellate court analyzed Johnson’s voir dire claim as follows:

We agree with the People that Johnson has not satisfied his initial burden of 

showing Juror 2 committed misconduct by affirmatively “fail[ing] to answer 

honestly a material question on voir dire . . . .” ([McDonough Power 

Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood (1984) 464 U.S. 548, 556].) The court did ask 

the jurors to raise their hands if they believed that “no matter how hard you 

tried, you could not . . . act fairly and impartially as a trial juror,” and then 

“refine[d] it a bit” by asking which of the jurors who had raised his or her 

hand “did so in large part because your own life or the lives of someone near 

and dear to you within your family or close circle of friends have been very 

directly impacted by the subject of child molestation.” However, Johnson 

produced no evidence showing Juror 2’s failure to disclose that she had been 

raped represented an intentional concealment of material facts, because there 

was no evidence her rape experience arose because she was molested as a 

child. Although Juror 2 was present at the evidentiary hearing in connection 

with his new trial motion, Johnson elected not to call her to testify about the 

details of her rape experience, leaving it to pure speculation whether it was a 

sexual assault when she was an adult, and whether the attacker was a spouse, 

or a date, or a stranger. More importantly, Johnson’s failure to call Juror 2 as 

a witness at the new trial motion hearing leaves to pure speculation as to 

whether she understood the voir dire questions to exclude the need to reveal 

sexual assaults except those involving minors, making her failure to disclose 

an honest and good faith omission not constituting misconduct (see, e.g., 

People v. Majors (1998) 18 Cal.4th 385, 419–420 [no misconduct because 

court “cannot fault [juror’s] decision to respond to the question as phrased”]), 

or whether she understood the voir dire questions to call for the revelation of 

any sexual assault, which she chose intentionally to conceal, constituting 

misconduct. Because it is Johnson’s burden to prove misconduct occurred 

([In re Carpenter (1995) 9 Cal.4th 634, 657]) and a court will not presume 

 

3 The superior court judge denied the motion for a new trial from the bench with no written opinion. 

(Lodgment No. 16, ECF No. 9-21 at 234–40.)

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greater misconduct than the evidence shows ([People v. Lewis (2001) 26 

Cal.4th 334, 390]), Johnson’s evidentiary showing below was inadequate to 

show misconduct.

Johnson has not shown Juror 2’s affirmative statement to the critical 

question—that she could act fairly and impartially—was false. The mere fact 

a prospective juror had been sexually assaulted does not categorically 

preclude that juror from honestly representing that he or she could 

nevertheless act fairly and impartially, and Johnson has not cited any 

persuasive law suggesting such a prior experience would constitute grounds 

for excusing that juror for cause under the relevant provisions of Code of Civil 

Procedure section 229. [FN 9 omitted]. 

Johnson appears to assert that, under [People v. Diaz (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 

926], even when a juror honestly believes he or she can be fair and impartial 

and therefore conceals relevant information, a new trial motion must be 

granted. In Diaz, the defendant was charged with assault with a deadly 

weapon, the jurors were asked on voir dire whether they had been a victim of 

a similar crime, and the juror in question remained silent. However, in the 

middle of trial, the juror told court personnel she had been the victim of an 

attempted rape, during which the assailant gashed her chin with a knife, after 

which she “hunted down” the assailant and stabbed him. (Diaz, supra, 152 

Cal.App.3d at pp. 929–931.) When the court asked the juror why she had not 

disclosed this information, the juror stated that it had not occurred to her that 

the assault on her was similar to assault with a deadly weapon, and assured 

the court that her experience would not bias her in deciding the case. (Id. at 

p. 931.) After the jury convicted the defendant, the Diaz court concluded the 

trial court had erred in refusing to dismiss the juror and declare a mistrial. The 

Diaz court, after concluding the appropriate standard of review was 

independent review (id. at pp. 933–934), held that retention of the juror was 

reversible error, reasoning that the “[c]oncealment under the instant 

circumstances, regardless whether intentional, constitutes misconduct” (id. at 

p. 936, italics added) and “the presumption of prejudice has not been rebutted 

by the People by evidence showing the nonexistence of prejudice, or by an 

examination of the entire record” (ibid.), particularly where the jury had 

elected her as “foreperson . . . , thus highlighting the reasonable probability 

the remaining jurors would be substantially influenced by her views.” (Ibid.)

Although Diaz stated that its approach applied to any concealment, regardless 

of whether the concealment was “intentional” (Diaz, supra, 152 Cal.App.3d 

at p. 936), Diaz’s raison d’être was that the juror had been affirmatively asked 

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a question directly calling for her to reveal whether she had been the victim 

of a knife attack, and she (1) concealed her prior victimization of an attempted 

rape by a knife-wielding assailant, and (2) her comments led the bailiff and 

court clerk to concur that the juror was “‘prejudiced as to violent crimes, 

especially that of women. She is obsessed with rape, with victims, and the 

men who perpetrate this act [and we] cannot honestly say that she would be 

an impartial juror as to violent crime.’” (Id. at p. 931.) Neither of those factors 

is present here, and Diaz is distinguishable as to the core facts on which the 

decision turned.

Moreover, Diaz’s approach does not appear to have gained any traction, and 

the courts in both People v. Kelly (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 118 and People v. 

Jackson (1985) 168 Cal.App. 3d 700 (Jackson) rejected Diaz’s approach 

where the nondisclosure was unintentional and there was no evidence of 

actual bias. (See Kelly, at pp. 125–129 [rejecting Diaz and concluding the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion by denying new trial motion where incident 

was dissimilar, nondisclosure was not intentional].) The Jackson court, 

rejecting Diaz’s approach, explained:

“It is clear that where a juror intentionally lies on voir dire, such 

an act constitutes misconduct. [Citation.] Similarly, it is 

misconduct for a juror to read newspaper accounts of the trial 

[citation], contact an outside attorney for advice during 

deliberations [citation] or question the police for information 

about the case [citation]. But to find misconduct where 

‘concealment’ is unintentional and the result of 

misunderstanding or forgetfulness is clearly excessive. It is with 

good reason that the law places severe limitations on the ability 

to impeach a jury’s verdict. To hold otherwise would be to 

declare ‘open season’ on jury verdicts not to a party’s liking. A 

green light would be given for every unsuccessful litigant to root 

out after-the-fact evidence of any ‘subconscious bias.’” 

(Jackson, supra, 168 Cal.App.3d at pp. 704–705, italics added.)

Jackson concluded the proper test for unintentional nondisclosure is “whether 

the juror is sufficiently biased to constitute good cause for the court to find

. . . he is unable to perform his duty,” and applied the deferential abuse of 

discretion standard to the trial court’s assessment of that issue. (Jackson, 

supra, 168 Cal.App.3d at p. 706.) Although our Supreme Court in [People v. 

San Nicholas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614] did not explicitly overrule Diaz, it did 

expressly adopt Jackson’s approach as to unintentional nondisclosures. (San 

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Nicolas, at p. 644.) We conclude that, because Diaz apparently has not been 

followed by other cases and our Supreme Court has approved the contrary 

approach used in a case rejecting Diaz, the proper approach is to evaluate 

“[w]hether a failure to disclose is intentional or unintentional and whether a 

juror is biased,” and these issues “are matters within the discretion of the trial 

court,” whose decision will not be disturbed on appeal “[e]xcept where bias 

is clearly apparent from the record . . . .” (San Nicolas, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 

644.)

Johnson finally appears to argue that, even assuming the nondisclosure was 

inadvertent, he was nevertheless entitled to a new trial because Juror 2’s actual 

“bias is clearly apparent from the record” (San Nicolas, supra, 34 Cal.4th at 

p. 644) because (1) she did not reveal her prior experience during voir dire

[FN 10]; (2) she revealed it to fellow jurors during deliberations to explain 

how she analyzed the evidence and to influence how the jury should analyze 

the evidence; and (3) the revelation was accompanied by great emotion. 

However, none of these facts, either individually or collectively, convince us 

Juror 2’s actual bias is “clearly apparent” from the record. For example, the 

record showed Juror 2 actively participated in the voir dire process, and even 

volunteered information (e.g. that the trial judge had presided over a trial 

involving her father) only tangentially relevant, which supports an inference 

she was not subjectively attempting to hide information in order to be seated 

as a juror. Moreover, the fact Juror 2 revealed her life experience to explain 

her view of the evidence was not evidence of actual bias. [FN 11.] (People 

v. Steele (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230, 1266 [“using one’s background in analyzing 

the evidence . . . is appropriate, even inevitable”].) Finally, the fact Juror 2 

was “emotional” does not show a bias that is clearly apparent because, as the 

trial court noted, little weight could be attributed to the fact Juror 2 became 

emotional during the deliberations because “deliberations often . . . become 

somewhat emotional and heated.”

...

[FN 10:]Johnson suggests that, had she revealed the information, 

the court would have dismissed Juror 2 for cause or, at a 

minimum, counsel could have used a peremptory challenge to 

eliminate a potentially biased juror. However, in cases not 

involving intentional concealment by a juror, the fact the juror 

acted in “‘good faith when answering voir dire questions is the 

most significant indicator that there was no bias’ [citation] and 

‘an honest mistake on voir dire cannot disturb a judgment in the 

absence of proof that the juror’s wrong or incomplete answer hid 

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the juror’s actual bias’ [citation].” (In re Boyette (2013) 56 

Cal.4th 866, 890.) Although the inadequate information may 

have impacted the use of a peremptory challenge, “the test asks 

not whether the juror would have been stricken by one of the 

parties, but whether the juror’s concealment (or nondisclosure) 

evidences bias.” (Ibid.)

[FN 11:] Indeed, defense counsel’s voir dire questions to this 

juror showed the defense actively sought jurors who would 

employ their life experience. The defense sought to assert that 

Tanisha lied about the molestations to police and defense 

counsel’s voir dire asked (among other things) whether jurors 

had experience with teenagers not telling the truth and, when 

defense counsel noted Juror 2 had nodded in agreement, she 

asked Juror 2 about that. Juror 2 told counsel about working with 

800 teenagers, and that the Juror’s 17 year old lies “every time 

her mouth moves.”

(Lodgment No. 8, ECF No. 9-13 at 21–27.)

“The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant a fair trial. One touchstone 

of a fair trial is an impartial trier of fact—a jury capable and willing to decide the case 

solely on the evidence before it.” Fields v. Brown, 503 F.3d 755, 766 (9th Cir. 2007) 

(quoting McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 554 (1984))

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). As the Supreme Court recognized in 

McDonough, “[v]oir dire examination serves to protect that right by exposing possible 

biases, both known and unknown, on the part of potential jurors.” McDonough, 464 U.S. 

at 554. Juror bias can be show in two ways: actual bias, which can occur when a juror

intentionally does not answer voir dire questions truthfully and a truthful answer would 

have led to a successful challenge for cause or when a juror exhibits a “predisposition to 

not to decide an issue impartially,” or implied bias, in which bias can be presumed based 

on the circumstances. Estrada v. Scribner, 512 F.3d 1227, 1240 (9th Cir. 2008); Fields, 

503 F.3d at 766. “Whether a juror is dishonest [or actually biased] is a question of fact

. . . .” Fields, 503 F.3d at 767.

///

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A defendant’s right to a fair trial is violated when a juror fails to honestly answer a 

question during voir dire and a correct response would have led to a successful challenge 

of that juror for cause. McDonough, 464 U.S. at 556. During voir dire, the trial judge 

asked the prospective jurors whether they could be fair and impartial, particularly given 

the subject matter of the case:

[THE COURT]: So simply because you would prefer not to deal with such 

subject matter, simply because you might, if given your druthers, prefer some 

other type of case to sit upon as a jury, and sorry, you don’t get your druthers, 

and neither do I for that matter, but very seriously, I want you to understand 

and appreciate that this case has to be decided based upon the evidence that’s 

presented within the walls of this courtroom. And it needs to be decided upon 

a very objective and critical analysis of the evidence, using logic and reason 

and setting aside, to the extent that you can, the emotional impact of such 

subject matter.

So with all of that said, having in mind the type of case that this is, and 

moreover the nature of the charges and general subject matter of this trial as I 

have outlined it and discussed those matters with you, how many of you 

believe that no matter how hard you tried, you could not, if selected as a juror 

here, act fairly and impartially as a trial juror as to either the defendant 

Mr. Johnson, or the People, as represented by the prosecutor?

If your answer is truly yes to that question, that you could not, for whatever 

reason, please, beginning with those of you in the jury box on my left, now 

raise your hand.

(Lodgment No. 20 vol. 1, ECF No. 9-25 at 15–16.) 

After several jurors raised their hands, the judge asked a follow-up question 

regarding their personal experience with the subject matter of the case:

[THE COURT]: How many of you who raised your hand to that question did 

so in large part because your own life or the lives of someone near and dear 

to you within your family or close circle of friends have been very directly 

impacted by the subject matter of child molestation, in whatever form it may 

have taken?

///

///

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So if those of you who raised your hand to the previous question did so 

because of a personal impact upon you or someone near and dear to you, I’d 

like you to again raise your hand.

(Id. at 17.)

Juror No. 2 did not raise her hand in response to either of the court’s questions and 

was kept in the jury pool. (Id. at 18.) After a lunch break, voir dire continued with general 

questions such as whether the prospective jurors could follow the law and whether any 

prospective jurors knew members of the defense, prosecution, or court staff. (Lodgment 

No. 20 vol. 3, ECF No. 9-27 at 3–39.) As part of this questioning, the trial judge again 

emphasized that jurors had to be free of bias in order to sit on the jury.

[THE COURT]: And put another way, what we’re looking for as ideal jurors 

are individuals who can comfortably and honestly say if I were sitting next to 

the prosecutor as her client, I’d want someone like me sitting on the jury. And 

similarly, if you can imagine yourself sitting where Mr. Johnson is, accused 

of these serious crimes, if you can honestly say I would be comfortable were 

I him in having me as a juror with my life experiences and assurance that I’ll 

accord him the presumption of innocence, unless and until I’m persuaded by 

the evidence otherwise beyond a reasonable doubt, then you’re one of the 

perfect or ideal jurors that we’re looking for.

In other words, if you can comfortably say no matter which counsel table I 

might find myself at, I would be equally comfortable having 12 men and 

women of like mind and life experience to my own sitting in judgment, then 

you’re very much a preferred candidate, so to speak, as a juror for this case.

With that in mind, is there anyone who for any reason decidedly could not say 

that? Doing a little soul searching once again, anyone who honestly has to 

say, hey, Ms. Reid wouldn’t want 12 of me on the jury, or conversely, if Ms. 

Kovtun would say, hey, you wouldn’t want 12 of me on this jury, then we 

would need to know that and ask you to share that with us at this time.

Anyone who, put another way, has kind of an agenda or an opinion already 

drawn about this case that would somehow render you other than a fair, openminded and impartial juror for this case, given what you’ve heard about it? 

Anyone just raise your hands if so.

(Id. at 10–11.)

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Juror No. 2 did not raise her hand in response to this questioning. She later told the 

judge she could be fair and impartial. (Id. at 22–23.) When later in the voir dire process

defense counsel asked if anyone had experience with teenagers not telling the truth, Juror 

No. 2 said she had worked in the past as a security guard at a high school and had a 17 year 

old step-daughter “and every time her [step-daughter’s] mouth moves, she lies.” (Id. at 

33.)

After the jury convicted Johnson, Juror No. 10 approached Johnson’s attorney and 

asked her why a person who had been raped had been permitted to sit on the jury. 

(Lodgment No. 16, ECF No. 9-21 at 244.) Johnson’s attorney filed a motion for a new trial 

based on Juror No. 10’s revelation. (Lodgment No. 20, ECF No. 9-29 at 148–54.) At the 

hearing on the motion for a new trial, Juror No. 10 testified that the jury was deadlocked 

on the counts involving Tanisha and discussing “how somebody might feel [about being 

raped] or if somebody would change their story about being raped” when Juror No. 2 

revealed that she had been raped and told her fellow jurors, “No, that’s not the way it is, 

[t]hat’s not what happened when I was raped,” and then began crying.4 (Lodgment No. 1, 

ECF No. 9-5 at 129.) After the revelation, the jury went home for the weekend and, when 

they returned on Monday, a verdict of guilty was reached on the Tanisha counts. (Id.) In 

denying the motion, the trial judge stated that he thought the questions asked of the jurors 

during voir dire should have elicited a disclosure by any prospective juror that he or she 

had been the victim of a sexual assault, but that he could not determine whether Juror No. 

2’s failure to disclose her sexual assault was intentional or unintentional. (Id. at 149–50.) 

Accordingly, the judge denied the motion because Johnson had not made a sufficient 

showing of prejudicial misconduct. (Id. at 151.)

///

 

4

Juror No. 2 was present at the hearing on the motion for a new trial but was not called to testify by either 

side. (Lodgment No. 1 vol. 5, ECF No. 9-5 at 127–51.) Juror No. 2 did testify at the subsequent 

evidentiary hearing on Johnson’s state habeas corpus petition. (Lodgment No. 16, ECF No. 9-21 at 

66–240.)

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The record supports the state appellate court’s denial of Johnson’s claim. The trial 

judge asked prospective jurors if any of them felt they could not be fair and impartial. 

(Lodgment No. 20, ECF No. 9-25 at 17.) Juror No. 2 did not answer in the affirmative 

because she believed she could be fair and impartial. (Id. at 14.) The judge then directed 

his next question to those jurors who had raised their hand indicating they could not be fair 

and impartial, asking them whether it was because of their experience with “child 

molestation in whatever form it may have taken.” (Id. at 17.) Juror No. 2 was not in the 

group of prospective jurors who had raised their hand in response to the question about 

impartiality and so did not respond and the trial judge did not ask jurors whether they had 

had an experience with sexual assault in general. Juror No. 2’s failure to respond in the 

affirmative to either of these questions was understandable given she believed she could 

be impartial and she had not been a victim of child molestation.

At the evidentiary hearing on the habeas corpus petition filed in the state appellate 

court, Juror No. 2 testified that had she been asked if she had been a victim of sexual 

assault, she would have disclosed it. (Lodgment No. 16, ECF No. 9-21 at 135.) She also

testified she understood the focus of the trial judge’s questions to be whether prospective 

jurors could be fair and impartial; because she believed she could be, she did not think she 

needed to reveal she had been raped. (Id. at 133–34.) In addition, she testified she thought 

the judge was asking prospective jurors to consider what experiences they may have had 

with child molestation, not sexual assault in general, when he asked them to consider 

whether they could be fair and impartial. (Id. at 132.) At the conclusion of the hearing, 

the judge presiding over the evidentiary hearing concluded that Juror No. 2 was credible 

when she testified she believed she could be fair and impartial and did not intentionally 

hide the fact that she had been sexually assaulted. He noted that the court first asked jurors 

to “consider the court’s questions and counsel’s questions regarding this subject matter, 

and do some soul searching regarding this subject matter” and whether they could be fair 

and impartial. (Id. at 235.) In response, twenty-eight jurors indicated they could not be 

fair and impartial, and of those, twenty-one told the judge it was because they had had 

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experience with child molestation; only one told the judge it was because they had 

experience with rape. (Id.) Thus, the majority of other jurors also interpreted the trial 

judge’s questioning as relating only to child molestation, with which Juror No. 2 had no 

experience. The judge concluded:

With the nature of the description of the subject matter and the number of 

responses to the subject matter – child molestation; child molestation – its 

hard for me to conclude that . . . Juror No. 2, truly was hiding something. 

She’s testified that I was aware of my responsibility to describe a bias I might 

have, and I – if I had a bias, I would have revealed it.

(Id.)

Given the above, the state court’s conclusion that Juror No. 2’s failure to disclose 

her experience as a rape victim was an honest mistake and that she was not actually biased 

was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme 

Court law. Bell, 535 U.S. at 694. Nor was it based on an unreasonable determination of 

the facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). 

The Supreme Court has not explicitly acknowledged or rejected the theory of 

implied juror bias, but in Estrada the Ninth Circuit stated that in “extraordinary cases, 

courts may presume bias based on the circumstances,” Estrada, 512 F.3d at 1240 (quoting

Dyer v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 970, 981 (9th Cir. 1998)), and gave four situations where bias 

might be implied: 

(1) where the juror is apprised of such prejudicial information about the 

defendant that the court deems it highly unlikely that he can exercise 

independent judgment even if the juror states he will, (2) the existence of 

certain relationships between the juror and the defendant, (3) where a juror or 

his close relatives have been personally involved in a situation involving a 

similar fact pattern, and (4) where it is revealed that the juror is an actual 

employee of the prosecuting agency, that the juror is a close relative of one of 

the participants in the trial or that the juror was a witness or somehow involved 

in the underlying transaction.

Id. (quoting Coughlin v. Tailhook Ass’n, 112 F.3d 1052, 1062 (9th Cir. 1997)).

None of the scenarios envisioned in Estrada are present in Johnson’s case. 

Moreover, with regard to juror bias, the Supreme Court “has long held that the remedy for 

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allegations of juror partiality is a hearing in which the defendant has the opportunity to 

prove actual bias.” Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215 (1982). Johnson was afforded this 

opportunity both at the hearing on the motion for a new trial and at the evidentiary hearing 

for the habeas corpus petition he filed in the state appellate court. The judges who presided 

over both of those hearings concluded that Juror No. 2 was not biased. For the foregoing 

reasons, the state court’s denial of this claim is neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. Bell, 535 U.S. at 694. Nor was it 

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Johnson is 

therefore not entitled to relief as to this claim.

2. Deliberations

Johnson contends Juror No. 2 committed misconduct during deliberations when she 

told her fellow jurors she had been raped, thereby introducing her own experiences into 

deliberations. (Pet. at 6, 38–47.) Respondent argues Johnson is not entitled to relief as to 

this claim because the state court’s resolution of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. (Answer at 22–23.) 

The California Supreme Court summarily denied Johnson’s petition for review on 

direct appeal and the petition for review challenging the state appellate court’s denial of 

his habeas corpus petition. (Lodgment Nos. 10, 19, ECF Nos. 9-15, 9-19.) The state 

appellate court opinion denying this claim on habeas corpus review did not address the 

merits of the claim. (Lodgment No. 17, ECF No. 9-22.) Therefore, this Court must “look 

through” to the last reasoned state court decision that addresses the merits of the claim, 

which is the state appellate court’s opinion denying the claim on direct review. That court 

wrote:

Even assuming the issue is preserved [FN 12 omitted], we are unconvinced 

on this record that the Juror 2’s comments were misconduct. Here, the jury 

heard conflicting evidence on why, and under what circumstances, a child 

molestation victim might recant her statements to police alleging a 

molestation, and the voir dire showed the potential for children to make false 

accusations of molestations and for recanting were matters of which potential 

jurors were already aware. We are aware of no law holding a juror commits 

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misconduct by drawing on his or her own life experience or on matters that 

are part of the public consciousness when evaluating evidence introduced at 

trial, and the law appears to be to the contrary. (See, e.g., People v. Manibusan

(2013) 58 Cal.4th 40, 57–58; People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 267–268; 

People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 162 [no misconduct by jurors 

recounting personal experiences involving drugs because effect of drugs, 

although a proper subject of expert testimony, has become a subject of 

common knowledge among laypersons].)

(Lodgment No. 8, ECF No. 9-13 at 27.)

Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) prohibits the use of a juror’s testimony regarding 

the jury’s mental processes, statements made or incidents which occurred during 

deliberations, or the effect of any such statements or incidents on an individual juror’s 

mental process. Fed. R. Evid. 606(b). Clearly established Supreme Court law states that, 

except for “extraneous influences,” juror testimony that impeaches a verdict is “flatly 

prohibited.” Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 117 (1987); see also Warger v. 

Shauers, 574 U.S. 40, 51–52 (2014). Excluded evidence, evidence extrinsic to the trial, 

and other outside influences such as threats and bribes have been found to be “extraneous 

influences.” Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 148–53 (1892); United States v. 

Henley, 238 F.3d 1111, 1115–18 (9th Cir. 2001). By contrast, jurors recounting personal 

experiences, discussions regarding the defendant’s failure to testify, the jurors’ ability to 

see and comprehend evidence, and allegations that jurors were under the influence, 

incompetent, or did not follow jury instructions, are all are considered internal processes

and are not to be considered by a court faced with a motion for a new trial due to juror 

misconduct. Tanner, 483 U.S. at 120–21; Fed. R. Evid. 606(b). 

Here, Johnson seeks to impeach the guilty verdict in his case using testimony by 

Juror Nos. 2 and 10 regarding Juror No. 2’s recounting of her personal experience with 

rape during deliberations. That is “flatly prohibited” by Tanner. Even if this Court were 

to consider the evidence showing that Juror No. 2 recounted her experience with rape 

during deliberations, neither California nor federal law prohibit a juror from using personal 

experience as part of deliberations. Grotemeyer v. Hickman, 393 F.3d 871, 879 (9th Cir. 

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2004); People v. Leonard, 40 Cal. 4th 1370, 1414 (2007). The state court’s denial of this 

claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established 

Supreme Court law. Bell, 535 U.S. at 694. It was also not based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(2). Johnson is therefore not entitled to 

relief as to this claim.

C. Ground Two: Inadequate Voir Dire

Johnson alleges in ground two that the voir dire conducted in his case and the inquiry 

into juror misconduct were constitutionally inadequate and violated his right to a fair trial. 

(Pet. at 7, 49–52, 145–49.) Respondent contends the state court’s resolution of Johnson’s 

inadequate voir dire claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, 

clearly established Supreme Court law. (Answer at 23–26.) Respondent also contends 

Johnson’s claim that the inquiry into juror misconduct is unexhausted and meritless. (Id.)

Johnson raised his inadequate voir dire claim in the petition for review he filed in 

the California Supreme Court on direct review. (Lodgment No. 9, ECF No. 9-14.) The 

state supreme court summarily denied the petition, and therefore this Court must “look

through” to the state appellate court’s opinion denying the claim as the basis for its review. 

Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805–06. That court wrote:

We conclude, as a whole, the questioning was reasonably sufficient to test the 

jury for bias or partiality, and therefore was not so inadequate that we can say 

the resulting trial was fundamentally unfair. The court iterated, and reiterated, 

that its focus was on whether, given “the nature of the charges and general 

subject matter . . . , how many of you believe that no matter how hard you 

tried, you could not . . . act fairly and impartially as a trial juror,” and although 

Juror 2 did not raise her hand, numerous others did. The court then asked, in 

response to the numerous hands raised, whether this was “in large part” 

because they had been touched by the subject of child molestation, and then 

individually questioned those numerous jurors who raised their hands. 

Although the court eventually excused most of the people who had raised their 

hands to the “inability to be fair” question (as refined by the “based on 

personal experience question), including one who had not been personally 

touched by molestations or sexual assaults but had personal antipathy toward 

alleged child molesters, the court retained three prospective jurors who stated 

that, notwithstanding having been personally touched by molestations or 

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sexual assaults, they could be fair and impartial jurors. The court then resumed 

questioning of the entire remaining panel and again emphasized the 

fundamental question was whether any prospective juror believed he or she 

could not objectively decide the facts based on reason and logic rather than 

emotion, or whether any juror (if that juror were in Johnson’s shoes) would 

honestly have to say that Johnson would not want him or her on the jury. The 

court also obtained an affirmative statement from the jurors, including Juror 

2, that they could be fair and impartial, and gave the jurors a final opportunity 

to reveal anything that might be germane to the juror’s ability to serve on the 

jury.

Because the questions focused on the core inquiry—whether there was 

anything that might inhibit the prospective juror from acting fairly and 

impartially—the questions as asked by the court and as supplemented by the 

questions posed by defense counsel “provided an adequate basis upon which 

the parties were able to exercise challenges for cause as well as peremptory 

challenges. In these circumstances, the trial court had no duty to compel 

counsel to explore more thoroughly the views of the prospective jurors, or to 

engage itself in additional questioning.” (People v. Foster (2010) 50 Cal.4th 

1301, 1324–1325.) [(internal quotations and citations omitted.)]

Johnson asserts the voir dire was insufficient, and his attorney provided 

inadequate assistance of counsel in not curing the deficiency by either 

objecting to the court’s voir dire or by asking further follow up questions, 

because the voir dire did not ask one of the questions in the form 

recommended by the Judicial Council in the California Standards of Judicial 

Administration. (Cal. Stds. Jud. Admin., § 4.30.) Standard 4.30, subdivision 

(b)(16), recommends the jury be asked “Have you or, to your knowledge, has 

any relative, close friend, or anyone with whom you have a significant 

personal relationship, ever been the victim of any crime?” However, Standard 

4.30 makes clear that the purpose of voir dire is to ask “all questions necessary 

to insure the selection of a fair and impartial jury” (id. at subd. (a)(2)), and 

any voir dire that did not “use the Standards verbatim does not necessarily 

mean that voir dire failed to expose prospective jurors who were biased or 

unable to follow the law. [Citations.] Nor does any technical deviation from 

the Standards excuse a reviewing court from examining ‘the entire voir dire’

to determine whether it was sufficient to secure an impartial jury.” (People v. 

Contreras (2013) 58 Cal.4th 123, 145.) We are satisfied that the voir dire as 

a whole was reasonably sufficient to ask whether, in light of the charges, the 

jurors could act fairly and impartially, and that inquiry was reasonably 

sufficient to test the jury for bias or partiality ([People v. Cleveland (2004) 32 

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Cal.4th 704, 737]); therefore, the absence of a specific question recommended 

by the Judicial Council did not render the voir dire “so inadequate that the 

reviewing court can say that the resulting trial was fundamentally unfair.” 

([People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 661].)

(Lodgment No. 8, ECF No. 9-13 at 31–33.)

“No hard-and-fast formula dictates the necessary depth or breadth of voir dire.” 

Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 386 (2010) (citations omitted). “[A] suitable 

inquiry is permissible in order to ascertain whether the juror has any bias, opinion, or 

prejudice that would affect or control the fair determination by him of the issues to be tried. 

That inquiry is conducted under the supervision of the court, and a great deal must, of 

necessity, be left to its sound discretion.” Conners v. United States, 158 U.S. 408, 413

(1895). 

The state court’s conclusion that the voir dire conducted in Johnson’s case was 

sufficient to guarantee him a fair trial was reasonable. The trial judge ensured Johnson’s 

jury was impartial by telling prospective jurors that they needed to be honest with 

themselves about their biases, that they needed to be honest in their responses to the court’s 

questions, that Johnson was entitled to an unbiased jury, and that the purpose of voir dire

was to ensure that the jury that would ultimately hear Johnson’s case would be fair and 

impartial. (Lodgment No. 20 vol. 1, ECF No. 9-25 at 8–9, 14–16; Lodgment No. 20 vol. 

3, ECF No. 9-27 at 11–12.) He asked prospective jurors whether they thought they could 

not be fair and impartial and whether they had personal experience with the subject matter 

of the trial. (Id. at 16–18.) He also asked prospective jurors whether they could honestly 

say if they were sitting at either the prosecution or defense table, they would be comfortable 

with someone like them on the jury and whether any prospective juror had an agenda or 

opinion that would prevent them from being fair and impartial. (Lodgment No. 20 vol. 3, 

ECF No. 9-27 at 10–11.) As the state appellate court noted, the trial judge excused 19 of 

the 22 people who told the judge they thought they could not be fair and impartial and the 

remaining three jurors did not sit on Johnson’s jury. (Lodgment No. 20 vol. 2, ECF No. 

9-26; Lodgment No. 8, ECF No. 9-13 at 13.) “The Constitution . . . does not dictate a 

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catechism for voir dire, but only that the defendant be afforded an impartial jury.” Morgan 

v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729 (1992). Given the extent of the trial judge’s questioning and 

the ultimate composition of the jury, Johnson has not established that the voir dire in his 

case resulted in a jury that was not fair and impartial. 

Morgan also resolves Johnson’s contention that the voir dire conducted by the state 

court was insufficient because it did not use the California Judicial Council’s suggested 

question, “Have you or, to your knowledge, has any relative, close friend, or anyone with 

whom you have a significant personal relationship, ever been the victim of any crime?” 

The trial judge was not required to use any specific question to ensure Johnson’s jury was 

fair. Finally, Johnson’s contention that the voir dire was inadequate to preserve his right 

to a fair trial because the trial judge did not question Juror No. 2 about the judge’s

involvement in a trial involving her father is meritless. Johnson claims that further 

questioning about the trial judge’s involvement in Juror No. 2’s father’s case “could have 

uncovered potential bias . . . .” (Pet. at 51.) This is simply speculation. Claims based on 

speculation are not sufficient to state a federal habeas corpus claim. James v. Borg, 24 

F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994).

Johnson suggests that the state court’s inquiry into juror misconduct was also 

insufficient. (Pet. at 7.) As Respondent notes, this claim appears to be unexhausted. 

(Answer at 26.) This Court may, however, deny the claim if it is plainly meritless. Cassett 

v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 623–24 (9th Cir. 2005). Johnson’s juror misconduct claims have 

been evaluated at two state court hearings, a hearing on the motion for a new trial and a 

hearing on Johnson’s state habeas corpus petition. Juror No. 2 was questioned, both on 

direct and cross-examination, at a lengthy and thorough hearing on the habeas corpus 

petition. (Lodgment No. 16, ECF No. 9-21 at 66–240). Johnson’s contention that his juror 

misconduct claims have not been adequately investigated is meritless.

For the foregoing reasons, the state court’s denial of Johnson’s inadequate voir dire

claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established 

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Supreme Court law. Bell, 535 U.S. at 694. Nor was it based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Johnson is not entitled to relief.

D. Ground Three: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Johnson argues his counsel was ineffective when she failed to adequately question 

prospective jurors during voir dire and when she failed to object to the trial court’s 

inadequate voir dire. (Pet. at 8, 53–58.) Respondent counters that the state courts 

resolution of these claims was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, 

clearly established Supreme Court law. (Answer at 26–31.)

Johnson raised these claims in the petition for review he filed in the California 

Supreme Court on direct appeal and in the petition for review he filed in the California 

Supreme Court following the denial of his habeas corpus petition by the state appellate 

court. (Lodgment Nos. 9, 18, ECF Nos. 9-13, 9-23.) The California Supreme Court 

summarily denied both petitions for review. (Lodgment Nos. 10, 19, ECF Nos. 9-15, 9-24.) 

Accordingly, this Court must “look through” to the last reasoned state court decision 

denying the claims as the basis for its review. Ylst, 501 U.S. at 805–06. The state appellate 

court’s decision denying Johnson’s state habeas corpus petition is the last reasoned state 

court decision. That court wrote:

Johnson contends that his trial counsel’s “failure to object to the trial court’s 

inadequate voir dire and subsequent failure to ask more probing questions 

during the attorney voir dire denied [him] his right to effective assistance of 

counsel, as guaranteed by the federal and state constitutions. (U.S. Const., 6th

Amend.; Cal. Const., Art. I, § 15.)” Johnson specifically faults his counsel 

for failing to ensure that each prospective juror was asked whether the juror 

had ever been the victim of a sex crime or any other crime, and contends that 

as a result of this failure a biased juror, whom Johnson would have challenged 

for cause or peremptorily, was allowed to sit on the jury. To establish this 

claim, Johnson must show both “that counsel’s performance was deficient” 

and “that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” (Strickland v. 

Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687 (Strickland); accord, People v. Ledesma

(1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 216.) More specifically, Johnson must show that 

counsel’s alleged “omissions were outside the wide range of professionally 

competent assistance,” and that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for 

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counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different.” (Strickland, at pp. 690, 694; accord, Ledesma, at pp. 216–218.)

Johnson has not met his burden to establish deficient performance by trial 

counsel. Counsel testified that she thought that during voir dire the court had 

asked questions sufficient to expose any bias or prejudice that the prospective 

jurors might have had based on their prior experiences with sex crimes. This 

court determined on appeal that the court’s voir dire was adequate for this 

purpose. Counsel therefore reasonably could have concluded that the court’s 

voir dire was adequate to expose any bias or prejudice against Johnson based 

on the charges, and that asking prospective jurors whether they had ever been 

the victim of a sex crime or any other type of crime, as counsel had initially 

intended to do, was not needed. (See People v. Horton (1995) 11 Cal.4th 

1068, 1123; People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 485–486.) “In the heat 

of trial, defendant’s counsel is best able to determine proper tactics in the light 

of the jury’s apparent reaction to the proceedings. Except in rare cases an 

appellate court should not attempt to second-guess trial counsel.” (People v. 

Brooks (1966) 64 Cal.2d 130, 140.) Counsel’s testimony at the evidentiary 

hearing also indicated that she reasonably could have made the tactical 

decision to retain Juror No. 2 based on her disclosure during voir dire that she 

had a teenage stepdaughter at home who frequently lied, because that 

experience suggested that Juror No. 2 might be receptive to the defense theory 

that the teenage victims were lying about their molestation by Johnson. The 

“courts should not second-guess reasonable, if difficult, tactical decisions in 

the harsh light of hindsight.” (People v. Scott (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188, 1212.) 

Johnson has not “overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the 

challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’” (Strickland, 

supra, 466 U.S. at p. 689.)

Johnson also has not shown prejudice. “Voir dire is critical to assure that the 

Sixth Amendment right to a fair and impartial jury will be honored.” (People 

v. Chapman (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 136, 141.) “Unless the voir dire by a court 

is so inadequate that the reviewing court can say that the resulting trial was 

fundamentally unfair, the manner which voir dire is conducted is not a basis 

for reversal.” (Holt, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 661.) Juror No. 2 testified that 

she set aside her prior experiences with rape, that she was fair and impartial, 

and that she decided Johnson was guilty based on the evidence introduced at 

trial and the court’s instructions on the law. The superior court observed Juror 

No. 2’s demeanor and testimony and found her credible. That finding is 

entitled to “great weight” and will not be disturbed where, as here, the record 

contains no evidence impugning her credibility. (In re Wright (1978) 78 

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Cal.App.3d 788, 801.) Because the “allegedly inadequate voir dire [was] not 

shown to have resulted in the seating of a trial juror harboring [bias or] 

prejudice,” Johnson has “fail[ed] to establish prejudice.” (Holt, at p. 704.)

(Lodgment No. 17, ECF No. 9-22 at 3–5.)

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must first show his 

attorney’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). “This requires showing that counsel made errors 

so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by 

the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 687. He must also show he was prejudiced by counsel’s 

errors. Id. at 694. Prejudice can be demonstrated by showing “there is a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would 

have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 

confidence in the outcome.” Id.; see also Fretwell v. Lockhart, 506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993). 

Further, Strickland requires “[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance . . . be 

highly deferential.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. There is a “strong presumption that 

counsel’s conduct falls within a wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at 

686–87. The Court need not address both the deficiency prong and the prejudice prong if 

the defendant fails to make a sufficient showing of either one. Id. at 697. “The standards 

created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both ‘highly deferential,’ and when the two apply 

in tandem, review is ‘doubly’ so.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011) 

(citations omitted). As the Supreme Court has stated, “[w]hen § 2254(d) applies, the 

question is not whether counsel’s actions were reasonable. The question is whether there 

is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” Id.

Assuming counsel was deficient, Johnson has not established he was prejudiced 

because he has not shown “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 694. “Establishing Strickland prejudice in the context of juror selection 

requires a showing that, as a result of trial counsel’s [error], the jury panel contained at 

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least one juror who was biased.” Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 643 (9th Cir. 2004); 

Fields, 503 F.3d at 776 (“Prejudice exists if counsel fails to question a juror during voir 

dire or move to strike a juror and that juror is found to be biased . . . .”) As the state court 

correctly found, Johnson was has not established prejudice because, as this Court has 

concluded, see Section IV(B)(1), there is no evidence Juror No. 2 was actually or impliedly

biased. 

The state court’s conclusion that Johnson had not established ineffective assistance 

of counsel was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established 

Supreme Court law. Bell, 535 U.S. at 694 Nor was it based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Johnson is not entitled to relief. 

E. Ground Four: Cumulative Error

Johnson argues the cumulative effect of the errors that occurred at his trial rendered 

his trial fundamentally unfair, in violation of his federal due process right to a fair trial. 

(Pet. at 9, 68–69.) Johnson raised this claim in the petition for review he filed in the 

California Supreme Court on direct review, which the state supreme court summarily 

denied. (Lodgment Nos. 9, 10, ECF Nos. 9-14, 9-15.) Because the state appellate court 

did not decide this claim, however, this Court must conduct an independent review of the 

record to determine if the state court’s denial of the claim was contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. Himes, 336 F.3d at

853. 

The Ninth Circuit has stated “[t]he Supreme Court has clearly established that the 

combined effect of multiple trial errors may give rise to a due process violation if it renders 

a trial fundamentally unfair, even where each error considered individually would not 

require reversal.” Parle v. Runnels, 505 F.3d 922, 927 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Chambers v. 

Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 298 (1973)); see also Whelchel v. Washington, 232 F.3d 1197, 

1212 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Frederick, 78 F.3d 1370, 1381 (9th Cir. 1996) 

(stating that where no single trial error in isolation is sufficiently prejudicial to warrant 

habeas relief, “the cumulative effect of multiple errors may still prejudice a defendant”). 

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Where “there are a number of errors at trial, ‘a balkanized, issue-by-issue harmless error 

review’ is far less effective than analyzing the overall effect of all the errors in the context 

of the evidence introduced at trial against the defendant.” Frederick, 78 F.3d at 1381 

(quoting United States v. Wallace, 848 F.2d 1464, 1476 (9th Cir. 1988)). Cumulative error 

warrants habeas relief only where the combined effect of the errors had a “substantial and 

injurious effect or influence on the jury’s verdict.” Parle, 505 F.3d at 927 (quoting Brecht, 

507 U.S. at 637).

This Court has found that none of the claims Johnson has presented amounted to 

constitutional error. Because no errors occurred, no cumulative error is possible. Hayes v. 

Ayers, 632 F.3d 500, 523–24 (9th Cir. 2011) (stating that “[b]ecause we conclude that no 

error of constitutional magnitude occurred, no cumulative prejudice is possible”). 

Accordingly, the state court’s denial of this claim was neither contrary to, nor an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law, and Petitioner is not 

entitled to relief for his cumulative error claim. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412–13.

V. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 

Rule 11 of the Rules Following 28 U.S.C. § 2254 require the District Court to “issue 

or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” 

Rule 11, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254. A certificate of appealability will issue when the petitioner 

makes a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253; 

Pham v. Terhune, 400 F.3d 740, 742 (9th Cir. 2005). A “substantial showing” requires a 

demonstration that “‘reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the 

constitutional claims debatable or wrong.’” Beaty v. Stewart, 303 F.3d 975, 984 (9th Cir. 

2002) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). Here, the Court concludes 

Johnson has not made the required showing, and therefore a certificate of appealability is 

not appropriate.

VI. CONCLUSION

After considering the Petition, the Answer and Memorandum of Points and 

Authorities in Support of the Answer, the Traverse, the lodgments and other documents 

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filed in this case, as well as the legal arguments presented by both parties, and for all the 

foregoing reasons, the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus is DENIED. The Court 

DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment 

accordingly.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 7, 2020

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