Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02972/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02972-48/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 830
Nature of Suit: Patent
Cause of Action: 35:271 Patent Infringement

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VNUS MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES, INC.

Plaintiff

 v.

DIOMED HOLDINGS, INC., DIOMED, INC.,

ANGIODYNAMICS, INC., and VASCULAR

SOLUTIONS, INC.,

Defendants

 /

No. C-05-2972 MMC

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; DENYING

AS MOOT PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO

STRIKE; DENYING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 112; DENYING IN

PART AND DEFERRING IN PART

RULING ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT UNDER 35

U.S.C. §§ 102-103; VACATING

HEARING; SETTING FURTHER

BRIEFING SCHEDULE

Before the Court are three motions for summary judgment, pursuant to Rule 56 of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, each filed August 10, 2007: (1) plaintiff VNUS

Medical Technologies, Inc.’s (“VNUS”) “Motion for Summary Judgment on Patent

Infringement”; (2) defendants Diomed Holdings, Inc., and Diomed, Inc. (collectively,

“Diomed”), AngioDynamics, Inc. (“AngioDynamics”), and Vascular Solutions, Inc.’s (“VSI”)

“Motion for Summary Judgment of Invalidity under 35 U.S.C. § 112”; and (3) defendants’ 

“Motion for Summary Judgment of Invalidity under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103.” Also before the

Court is VNUS’s “Motion to Strike the Rebuttal Expert Reports of Drs. R. Rox Anderson, J.

Kevin McGraw, and Russell H. Samson, and to Exclude Any Expert Testimony by Drs.

Robert Min and Luis Navarro,” filed August 10, 2007.

Case 3:05-cv-02972-MMC Document 452 Filed 10/02/07 Page 1 of 6
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1

VNUS’s motion to strike pertains solely to specified expert opinions on the issue of

direct infringement. Because the Court, for purposes of VNUS’s motion for summary

judgment, has assumed direct infringement, the motion to strike will be denied as moot.

2

Having considered the papers filed in support of and in opposition to the motions,

the Court deems the matters suitable for decision on the papers, VACATES the hearing

scheduled for October 5, 2007, and rules as follows.

A. Infringement

VNUS seeks summary judgment on its claims that defendants are liable for induced

infringement and contributory infringement of the methods claimed in Claims 1, 2, 18, 19,

20, and 21 of U.S. Patent No. 6,258,084 (“‘084 Patent”), Claims 1 and 7 of U.S. Patent No.

6,752,803 (“‘803 Patent”), and Claims 1 and 10 of U.S. Patent No. 6,769,433 (“‘433

Patent”). In order to prove such claims, VNUS initially must prove that third parties using

defendants’ products directly infringe the claimed methods. See C.R. Bard, Inc. v.

Advanced Cardiovascular Systems, 911 F. 2d 670, 673 (Fed. Cir. 1990). Assuming,

arguendo, VNUS can establish direct infringement by a third-party, the Court finds VNUS

has failed to show that, as a matter of law, defendants induced and/or contributed to such

direct infringement.1

A defendant can only be liable for inducing an act of direct infringement if the

defendant “actively and knowingly aided and abetted another’s direct infringement.” See

DSU Medical Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F. 3d 1293, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2006). “Specific intent and

action to induce infringement must be proven.” Id. (internal citation and quotation omitted). 

Here, each defendant has offered evidence that it sought and obtained the opinion of

counsel, who, in each instance, provided an opinion the accused products did not infringe

and/or the patents were invalid; further, each defendant has offered evidence that in

reliance on the opinion of its counsel, it continued to sell the accused products. (See Wylie

Decl. ¶¶ 9-16; Root Decl. ¶¶ 4-5, Ex. A; Redmond Decl. Ex. I at 17, 18, 58.) In light of such

evidence, the Court finds a triable issue of fact exists as to whether any defendant is liable

for inducing acts of direct infringement. See DSU, 471 F. 3d at 1307 (holding sufficient

Case 3:05-cv-02972-MMC Document 452 Filed 10/02/07 Page 2 of 6
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evidence supported jury’s finding defendant did not induce direct infringement, where

record included evidence defendant “did not believe its [product] infringed” and defendant

had relied on opinion of counsel that its product did not infringe).

A defendant cannot be held liable for contributing to an act of direct infringement

unless the defendant’s products have “no use except through practice of the patented

method.” See Alloc, Inc. v. International Trade Comm’n, 342 F. 3d 1361, 1374 (Fed. Cir.

2003). Here, each defendant offers evidence that its products can be used for purposes

other than the practice of the claimed methods. (See, e.g., Wylie Decl. ¶¶ 3, 7; Steenburg

Decl., filed September 24, 2007, Ex. 7 at 25; id. Ex. 9 at 15; Root Decl. ¶¶ 10-12, Exs. D, E;

Redmond Decl. Ex. F; id. Ex. I at 6:19-7:16.) In light of such evidence, the Court finds a

triable issue of fact exists as to whether any defendant is liable for contributory infringement

as to acts of direct infringement.

Accordingly, VNUS’s motion for summary judgment will be denied.

B. Invalidity Under 35 U.S.C. § 112

Defendants seek summary judgment on their counterclaims that each asserted claim

is invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 112.

Section 112 provides that a patent’s “specification shall contain a written description

of the invention, and the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear,

concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains . . .

to make and use the same.” See 35 U.S.C. § 112. The “enablement requirement” set forth

in § 112 “is satisfied when one skilled in the art, reading the specification, could practice the

claimed invention without undue experimentation.” See AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac & Ugine,

344 F. 3d 1234, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

The specification of each patent at issue provides that the claimed methods can be

employed using various types of energy, including laser energy. See ‘433 Patent, col. 19,

ll. 4-7; ‘084 Patent, col. 7, ll. 61-65; ‘803 Patent, col. 7, ll. 61-65. Each specification,

//

//

Case 3:05-cv-02972-MMC Document 452 Filed 10/02/07 Page 3 of 6
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“RF” is a reference to “radio frequency.” (See Nguyen § 112 Decl. Ex. 3 at 115:5-9.)

4

however, describes in detail how to perform the claimed methods using “RF” energy,2

 and

includes no such detail as to the use of laser energy. Defendants argue the asserted

claims are invalid because the specifications do not provide enough information to enable a

person skilled in the art to employ laser energy to practice the claimed methods, without

undue experimentation. See AK Steel Corp., 344 F. 3d at 1241 (holding “patent

specification must enable the full scope of a claimed invention”). Alternatively, defendants

argue the specifications do not provide enough information to enable a person skilled in the

art to employ laser energy using the claimed catheter.

According to Diomed’s expert, a person skilled in the art would be unable to perform

the claimed methods using laser energy because neither the specification nor other

information known to persons skilled in the art provides “meaningful guidance” as to how to

apply the claims using laser energy; he further opines that “a practitioner in this field would

be ill-advised to conduct a laser procedure in a live human” in light of such absence of

guidance. (See Twilley Decl. Ex. P (Anderson Decl.) ¶¶ 6, 11-18.) In opposition, VNUS

relies on its expert, who opines that a person skilled in the art could, “after very brief

experimentation,” perform the claimed methods using laser energy. (See Nguyen § 112

Decl. Ex. 22 (Grundfest Expert Report) at 9-19.) The Court finds these conflicting opinions

create a triable issue of fact as to whether a person skilled in the art could practice the

claimed methods, without undue experimentation.

Accordingly, defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on the issue of

invalidity predicated on a failure to comply with § 112.

C. Invalidity Under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103

Defendants seek summary judgment on their counterclaims that Claim 1 of the ‘433

Patent is invalid for anticipation, under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). Defendants further seek

summary judgment on their counterclaims that the following claims are invalid as obvious,

under 35 U.S.C. § 103: Claim 10 of the ‘433 Patent, Claims 1, 2, 18, 19, 20, and 21 of the

Case 3:05-cv-02972-MMC Document 452 Filed 10/02/07 Page 4 of 6
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‘084 Patent and Claims 1, 2, and 7 of the ‘803 Patent.

1. Anticipation

“A prior art reference anticipates a patent claim if the reference discloses, either

expressly or inherently, all of the limitations of the claim.” EMI Group North America, Inc.,

v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 268 F. 3d 1342, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2001).

Here, a triable issue of fact exists as to whether Claim 1 of the ‘433 Patent is, as

defendants contend, anticipated by a 1959 article titled “Endovascular Electrocoagulation of

Superficial Varices of the Lower Limbs” (“Hejhal”). (See Steenburg Decl., filed September

10, 2007, Ex. B; McGraw Decl. ¶ 11.) Specifically, a triable issue of fact exists as to

whether a person skilled in the art would understand Hejhal to have disclosed the claimed

step of “pre-shaping the vein such that the inner wall of the vein is brought towards the

working end of the catheter so as to reduce the diameter of the vein.” (See McGraw Decl.

¶¶ 11-14; Nguyen §§ 102-103 Decl. Ex. 9 at 24.)

Accordingly, as to Claim 1 of the ‘433 Patent, defendants are not entitled to

summary judgment on the issue of invalidity predicated on anticipation.

2. Obviousness

A claim is invalid when “‘the differences between the subject matter [claimed in the

patent] and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been

obvious at the time the invention was made to a person skilled in the art.’” See KSR Int’l

Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1734 (2007) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 103).

With respect to defendants’ argument that Claim 10 of the ‘433 Patent is obvious,

defendants acknowledge a finding of obviousness thereof is dependent on a finding that

Claim 1 of the ‘433 Patent is anticipated by Hejhal. (See Defs.’ §§ 102-103 Mot. for Summ.

J. at 24:22-23.) Because a triable issue of fact exists as to whether Claim 1 is so

anticipated, a triable issue of fact likewise exists as to whether Claim 10 is obvious.

Accordingly, as to Claim 10 of the ‘433 Patent, defendants are not entitled to

summary judgment on the issue of invalidity predicated on obviousness.

//

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To the extent defendants’ motion is predicated on the argument that claims in the

‘084 and ‘803 Patents are obvious, the Court will defer ruling thereon in order to afford

VNUS an opportunity to respond to a new argument made in defendants’ reply. 

Specifically, VNUS will be afforded the opportunity to respond to the newly-raised issue of

whether VNUS is unable to create a triable issue of fact, in light of the reasoning set forth in

Atlas Powder Co. v. Ireco, Inc., 190 F. 3d 1342, 1347-49 (Fed. Cir. 1999), In re Baxter, 952

F. 2d 388, 392 (Fed. Cir. 1991), and In re Wiseman, 596 F. 2d 1019, 1023 (C.C.P.A. 1979). 

(See Defs.’ § 112 Reply at 2:1-21; 9:4 - 10:13.)

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above:

1. VNUS’s motion for summary judgment is hereby DENIED.

2. VNUS’s motion to strike is hereby DENIED as moot.

3. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment under § 112 is hereby DENIED.

4. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment under §§ 102-103 is hereby DENIED

to the extent defendants seek summary judgment as to Claims 1 and 10 of the ‘433 Patent.

5. The Court hereby DEFERS ruling on defendants’ motion for summary judgment

under §§ 102-103 to the extent defendants seek summary judgment with respect to the

claims of the ‘084 and ‘803 Patents. VNUS is afforded leave to file, no later than October

19, 2007, a supplemental opposition, not to exceed five pages in length, exclusive of

exhibits, limited to the newly-raised issue identified above. As of October 19, 2007, the

deferred portion of defendants’ motion under §§ 102-103 will be taken under submission,

unless the parties are otherwise informed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 2, 2007 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

Case 3:05-cv-02972-MMC Document 452 Filed 10/02/07 Page 6 of 6