Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01872/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01872-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 863
Nature of Suit: Social Security - DIWC/DIWW (405(g))
Cause of Action: 42:405 Review of HHS Decision (DIWC)

---

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Scott Ferguson, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Michael Astrue, Commissioner of Social

Security Administration, 

Defendant. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. 2:07-CV-01872-PHX-GMS

ORDER

Pending before the Court are the Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff Scott

Ferguson (Dkt. # 11) and the Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant Michael

J. Astrue, Commissioner of Social Security (Dkt. # 14). For the reasons set forth below, the

Court denies Plaintiff’s motion and grants Defendant’s cross-motion.

BACKGROUND

In early 2004, Plaintiff applied for disability benefits, alleging a disability onset date

of February 7, 1997. (See R. at 26; R. at 62.) Plaintiff’s claim was denied both initially and

upon reconsideration. (See R. at 26; R. at 55-59.) Plaintiff appealed to an Administrative

Law Judge (“ALJ”). (See R. at 26; R. at 45.) Claimant later amended his alleged onset date

to be February 1, 2004. (See R. at 26; R. at 142.)

Case 2:07-cv-01872-GMS Document 17 Filed 10/15/08 Page 1 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

Under that test:

A claimant must be found disabled if she proves: (1) that she is

not presently engaged in a substantial gainful activity[,] (2) that

her disability is severe, and (3) that her impairment meets or

equals one of the specific impairments described in the

regulations. If the impairment does not meet or equal one of the

specific impairments described in the regulations, the claimant

can still establish a prima facie case of disability by proving at

step four that in addition to the first two requirements, she is not

able to perform any work that she has done in the past. Once the

claimant establishes a prima facie case, the burden of proof

shifts to the agency at step five to demonstrate that the claimant

can perform a significant number of other jobs in the national

economy. This step-five determination is made on the basis of

four factors: the claimant’s residual functional capacity, age,

work experience and education.

Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal citations and quotations

omitted). 

2

RFC is the most the claimant can do despite the limitations caused by his

impairments. See SSR 96-8p (July 2, 1996).

- 2 -

In evaluating whether Plaintiff was disabled, the ALJ undertook the five-step

sequential evaluation set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (2003).1

 (R. at 26-35.) At step one,

the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not engaged in substantial gainful activity. (R. at 27.)

At step two, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff suffered from the severe impairments of

“status post left tibial fracture, mood disorder, polysubstance dependence disorder, hepatitis

C, and degenerative disc disease.” (R. at 27-28.) At step three, the ALJ determined that

none of these impairments, either alone or in combination, was severe enough to meet or

equal any of the Social Security Administration’s listed impairments. (R. at 28.)

At step four, the ALJ made a residual functional capacity (“RFC”)2

 determination for

Plaintiff’s physical and mental capabilities. The ALJ first concluded that Plaintiff has the

physical RFC to perform medium exertional work, with the limitation of only occasional

climbing. (R. at 29.) The ALJ then concluded that Plaintiff’s mental RFC limited him to low

Case 2:07-cv-01872-GMS Document 17 Filed 10/15/08 Page 2 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

Plaintiff was authorized to file this action by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2004) (“Any

individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security made after a

hearing to which he was a party . . . may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action

. . . .”).

- 3 -

stress work (involving low pace and production and minimal use of judgment), simple

repetitive tasks, and minimal interpersonal contact. (R. at 32.) The ALJ thus determined that

Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform his past relevant work as a car wash technician. (R. at

33-34.) The ALJ also reached step five, determining that Plaintiff could perform a

significant number of other jobs in the national economy that met his RFC limitations. (R.

at 34.) Therefore, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled. (Id.)

The Appeals Council declined to review the decision. (R. at 6-8.) Plaintiff filed the

complaint underlying this action on October 1, 2007, seeking this Court’s review of the

ALJ’s denial of benefits.3

 (Dkt. # 1.) Plaintiff filed his Motion for Summary Judgment on

May 19, 2008. (Dkt. # 11.) Defendant filed his Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on

June 18, 2008. (Dkt. # 14.)

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

A reviewing federal court will only address the issues raised by the claimant in the

appeal from the ALJ’s decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001).

A federal court may set aside a denial of disability benefits only if that denial is either

unsupported by substantial evidence or based on legal error. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d

947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is “more than a scintilla but less than a

preponderance.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Substantial evidence is relevant evidence which,

considering the record as a whole, a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support

a conclusion.” Id. (quotation omitted).

However, the ALJ is responsible for resolving conflicts in testimony, determining

credibility, and resolving ambiguities. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir.

1995). “When the evidence before the ALJ is subject to more than one rational

Case 2:07-cv-01872-GMS Document 17 Filed 10/15/08 Page 3 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

interpretation, we must defer to the ALJ’s conclusion.” Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.

Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1198 (9th Cir. 2004). This is so because “[t]he [ALJ] and not the

reviewing court must resolve conflicts in evidence, and if the evidence can support either

outcome, the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ.” Matney v. Sullivan,

981 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted).

II. Analysis

Plaintiff makes two arguments to this Court, but those arguments are predicated on

factual assertions that are simply incorrect. First, Plaintiff points out that he had global

assessment of functioning (“GAF”) scores around 50. (Dkt. # 13 at 3; see R. at 326, 331,

341, 352, 509.) Plaintiff then argues that “[a]s the ALJ does not discuss these GAF scores

or give them any weight determination[,] and as these scores are assessed by treating

physicians and therapists, the ALJ has essentially rejected the opinions of treating sources

implicitly.” (Dkt. # 13 at 4.) However, the ALJ did discuss the GAF scores, noting that

Plaintiff “was rated as 50” and acknowledging that “a ‘GAF’ score of 50 represents serious

symptoms.” (R. at 31.) The ALJ then went on to explain why the GAF scores did not

mandate a finding of disability given the other evidence in the record. (See id.) Specifically,

the ALJ explained that Plaintiff was not compliant with his medication or therapy visits,

experienced remission of symptoms when compliant and worsening of symptoms when not

compliant, engaged in ongoing methamphetamine and marijuana use, had an IQ in the

average range, and evinced only mild or moderate impairment on other psychological tests.

(Id.) The ALJ also relied on the wide spectrum of daily activities in which Plaintiff engaged

routinely, the conclusions of a consultative mental status examination, the absence of any

evidence of decompensation, Plaintiff’s eventual self-report of mood stability, and his

doctors’ notations of clinical stability. (R. at 31-32.) Plaintiff does not dispute any of this

evidence, and fails to argue that it does not constitute substantial evidence. (See Dkt. # 13

at 3-4.) Thus, the Court finds no error.

Second, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ rejected the opinion of one of Plaintiff’s

examining physicians “by indicating that the doctor had ‘no records to review,’” even though

Case 2:07-cv-01872-GMS Document 17 Filed 10/15/08 Page 4 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

that physician did, in fact, review records. (Dkt. # 13 at 4 (quoting R. at 33).) Plaintiff’s

argument, however, is factually incorrect. The ALJ rejected the opinion of the physician in

question because Plaintiff “was not forthright to [the physician] regarding his polysubstance

dependence” and the physician “had no records to review to know otherwise.” (R. at 33

(emphasis added).) Thus, the ALJ did not reject the physician’s opinion because he had no

records, but rather because the physician was unaware of the extent of Plaintiff’s substance

abuse. Indeed, the ALJ explicitly pointed out that Plaintiff “stated he had not used

methamphetamine for several years and only occasionally used marijuana, which is

inconsistent with the records showing ongoing use of both substances.” (Id.) Additionally,

the ALJ rejected the physician’s opinion because Plaintiff “reported having extremely limited

activities of daily living to the psychological evaluator, which are not consistent with his

prior statements in the record that show the claimant was active.” (Id.) As above, Plaintiff

does not dispute any of the evidence on which the ALJ relied or otherwise argue that it does

not constitute substantial evidence. (See Dkt. # 13 at 4-5.) Thus, the Court finds no error.

CONCLUSION

The ALJ made no error of law and there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s

denial of benefits.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment

(Dkt. # 11).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary

Judgment (Dkt. # 14).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of the Court to terminate this

action.

DATED this 15th day of October, 2008.

Case 2:07-cv-01872-GMS Document 17 Filed 10/15/08 Page 5 of 5