Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00346/USCOURTS-azd-4_12-cv-00346-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 891
Nature of Suit: Agricultural Acts
Cause of Action: 07:499 Agricultural Commodities Act

---

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Daniel A. Andrews, an individual doing 

business as Dan Andrews Farms; et al., 

Plaintiff, 

TJ Produce, Inc., an Illinois corporation, 

 Intervenor-Plaintiff, 

v. 

Triple R Distributing, LLC, a limited 

liability company; et al., 

Defendant.

No. CV 4:12-00346-TUC-RCC (HCE)

 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Currently pending before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Entry of Default 

Judgment by the Court against Defendants Triple R Distributing, LLC, (“TRD”) and 

Daniel A. Romero (“Romero”). (Doc. 25.) The Defendants were served with process on 

May 31, 2012. See Executed Summonses (Docs. 11-12). On June 29, 2012, Plaintiffs 

filed an Application for Entry of Default. (Doc. 15.) On July 9, 2012, the Clerk of the 

Court entered Default pursuant to Rule 55(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, against 

the Defendants. (Doc. 16.) On October 19, 2012, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Entry of 

Default Judgment (Doc. 25) with accompanying memorandum (Doc. 26) and supporting 

declarations and exhibits (Docs. 27-31). No response has been filed. 

Case 4:12-cv-00346-HCE Document 40 Filed 02/28/13 Page 1 of 15
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Although Plaintiffs have filed a written consent to the undersigned Magistrate 

Judge jurisdiction, because the Defendants have not yet appeared, the undersigned has 

prepared a report and recommendation, which will be directed to District Judge Raner C. 

Collins. 

The Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court grant Plaintiffs’ Motion 

for the following reasons. 

I. Factual Background 

Plaintiffs Daniel A. Andrews, an individual doing business as Dan Andrews Farms 

(“DAF”); Reynolds Packing Company, Inc., doing business as M & R COMPANY, a 

California corporation (“M&R”); ATB Packing Company, a partnership (“ATB”); and 

Natural Flavor Produce, LLC, a limited liability company (“NFP”) (hereinafter 

“Plaintiffs”) sell and ship perishable agricultural commodities as defined by the 

Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act (“PACA”), 7 U.S.C. §499b(4). Plaintiffs allege 

that between May 5, 2009, and June 22, 2011, Plaintiffs sold and shipped perishable 

agricultural commodities to Defendant TRD in a series of transactions at Defendants’ 

request for which Defendants agreed to pay in amounts of $130,184.90. The perishable 

agricultural commodities, cumulatively totaling $130,184.90, were purchased and sold in 

or in contemplation of the course of interstate and/or foreign commerce. Plaintiffs 

forwarded to Defendants invoices for the transactions setting forth in detail the amounts 

owed by Defendants for purchases of the commodities. Plaintiffs repeatedly demanded 

that Defendants pay the amounts due under the invoices. However, Defendants have 

failed and refused and continue to fail and refuse to pay Plaintiffs for the produce 

Case 4:12-cv-00346-HCE Document 40 Filed 02/28/13 Page 2 of 15
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

purchased by Defendants. No part of the $130,184.90 owing has been paid. Plaintiffs 

seek payment of the principal amount of $130,184.90 for the produce purchased by 

Defendants, costs, attorney’s fees, and pre-judgment and post-judgment finance charges. 

II. ADEQUACY OF SERVICE OF PROCESS

As a preliminary matter, the Court addresses the adequacy of the service of 

process on Defendants. See e.g., Mason v. Genisco Tech. Corp., 960 F.2d 849, 851-52 

(9th Cir. 1992) (finding that where a plaintiff "failed to serve [defendant] properly ... the 

default judgments [wa]s void"). Based on the Affidavits of Service filed in this case 

(Docs. 11 and 12), it appears that personal service of the Complaint and Summons were 

accomplished on Defendants Romero, individually and as statutory agent of TRD, on 

May 31, 2012. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(e) (discussing service of process on an individual) and 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(h) (discussing service of process on a corporation, partnership, or 

association). Therefore, with the Complaint having been properly served on Defendants, 

Plaintiffs have satisfied the service requirements necessary to obtain a default judgment. 

III. DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFENDANTS

Rule 55(b)(2), Fed.R.Civ.P., provides for the entry of judgment by default by the 

court. However, a court may not enter judgment by default against an infant or 

incompetent person unless he is represented by a general guardian, committee, 

conservator, or other such representative. Id. Moreover, the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil 

Relief Act of 1940, 50 U.S.C. App. § 501, provides specific requirements which must be 

fulfilled before a default judgment may be entered. 50 U.S.C. App. § 521. Defendants are 

not infants, incompetent persons, or in the military service of the United States. 

Case 4:12-cv-00346-HCE Document 40 Filed 02/28/13 Page 3 of 15
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Declaration of Bart M. Botta, (Doc. 27, ¶¶ 19-20). Thus, there is nothing in Rule 

55(b)(2) or the Soldiers’ and Sailor’s Civil Relief Act that prevents the Court from 

entering judgment by default. 

IV. DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND EITEL FACTORS

Because service appears to have been proper and default judgment may be entered 

against Defendants, the Court now addresses the merits of Plaintiffs’ Motion. After entry 

of a default, a court may grant a default judgment on the merits of the case. See

Fed.R.Civ.P. 55. "The district court's decision whether to enter a default judgment is a 

discretionary one." Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). Factors that a 

court may consider in exercising that discretion include: 

(1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of plaintiff's 

substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the sum of 

money at stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning 

material facts; (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect, and (7) 

the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring 

decisions on the merits. 

Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). As default has already been 

entered in this case, the Court must take as true all factual allegations in Plaintiffs’ 

Complaint except for those related to the amount of damages. See TeleVideo Sys., Inc. v. 

Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917-18 (9th Cir. 1987) ("The general rule of law is that upon 

default the factual allegations of the complaint, except those relating to the amount of 

damages, will be taken as true.") (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, Plaintiffs are 

required to provide proof of all damages sought in the complaint. This process is limited 

Case 4:12-cv-00346-HCE Document 40 Filed 02/28/13 Page 4 of 15
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

by Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(c), which states that “[a] judgment by default shall not be different in 

kind or exceed in amount that prayed for in the [complaint].” 

A. Possibility of Prejudice to Plaintiffs 

The Court first considers whether Plaintiffs will suffer prejudice if default 

judgment is not entered. Eitel, 782 F.2d at, 1472-73. Based on the documents submitted 

by Plaintiffs, it appears that Defendants do not contest the fact that Plaintiffs as 

beneficiaries of the PACA trust are entitled to payment for the produce accepted by 

Defendants from Plaintiffs. The Court concludes that Plaintiffs would suffer prejudice if 

their motion for default judgment was denied because they would be harmed "without 

other recourse for recovery." PepsiCo, Inc. v. California Security Cans, 238 F.Supp.2d 

1172, 1177 (C.D.Cal. 2002). 

B. Merits of Plaintiffs’ Substantive Claim and Sufficiency of the Complaint 

The Court also considers that Eitel "require[s] that a plaintiff state a claim on 

which the [plaintiff] may recover." Philip Morris U.S.A., Inc. v. Castworld Products, 

Inc., 219 F.R.D. 494, 499 (C.D.Cal. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). A PACA 

plaintiff must show that (1) the commodities sold were perishable agricultural 

commodities, (2) the purchaser was a commission merchant, dealer, or broker, (3) the 

transaction occurred in contemplation of interstate or foreign commerce, (4) the seller has 

not received full payment on the transaction, and (5) the seller preserved its trust rights by 

including statutory language referencing the trust on their invoices. 7 U.S.C. § 499e(c)(3) 

and (4); 7 C.F.R. § 46.46(c) and (f). 

Case 4:12-cv-00346-HCE Document 40 Filed 02/28/13 Page 5 of 15
- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

In the instant case, Plaintiffs have sufficiently stated a claim under the PACA. 

Plaintiffs have pleaded facts supporting the creation of a trust between Plaintiffs and 

Defendants under 7 U.S.C. § 499e(c) and the Defendants’ breach of that trust under 7 

U.S.C. § 499b(4). Further, Plaintiffs have pleaded facts that the commodities sold were 

perishable agricultural commodities and that the transaction occurred in contemplation of 

interstate commerce. Additionally, Plaintiffs and Defendants have been identified as 

licensed PACA dealers. See 7 U.S.C. § 499a(b). Plaintiffs preserved the trust under 7 

U.S.C. § 499e(c)(4) by inserting the requisite statutory language on all invoices to 

Defendants and have not received full payment on the transactions. Moreover, Plaintiffs 

have pleaded facts to establish that Defendant Romero was an officer, director, 

shareholder and/or insider of Defendant TRD with actual and constructive knowledge of 

the PACA trust and the provisions set forth therein and was responsible for the daily 

management and control of TRD. Plaintiffs allege that Defaulting Defendant Romero 

controlled or was in a position to control the PACA trust assets which are the subject of 

this lawsuit and is and during all times alleged therein was a statutory trustee of the 

PACA trust assets that are the subject of the Complaint. Plaintiffs alleged that the 

Defaulting Defendants transferred or diverted the trust assets, namely receivables or 

proceeds derived from the sale of produce to himself in violation of statutory duties under 

the PACA to preserve the trust assets for the benefit of Plaintiffs. See 7 C.F.R. §46.46(c). 

Defendant Romero, therefore, has breached a fiduciary duty and is personally liable for 

those tortious acts. Coosemans Specialties, Inc. v. Gargiulo, 485 F.3d 701, 705 (2nd Cir. 

2007). Given these allegations and the Court's acceptance of these allegations as true, the 

Case 4:12-cv-00346-HCE Document 40 Filed 02/28/13 Page 6 of 15
- 7 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Court finds that Plaintiffs have adequately shown that Defendants have violated the 

PACA. 

C. Sum of Money at Stake in Action 

For the fourth Eitel factor, "the court must consider the amount of money at stake 

in relation to the seriousness of Defendant's conduct." California Security Cans, 238 

F.Supp.2d at 1176. In the instant case, Plaintiffs seek the following, all of which qualifies 

for trust protection under the trust provisions of the PACA, 7 U.S.C. §499e, et seq.: 

(i) Principal in the cumulative amount of $130,184.90 as follows: $30,055.50 in 

the case of DAF; $58,638.25 in the case of M&R; $32,593.80 in the case of ATB; and 

$8,897.35 in the case of NFP; 

(ii) Pre-judgment finance charge to Plaintiff M&R through and including October 

19, 2012 in the amount of $32,067.02; 

(iii) Attorney’s fees and costs to Plaintiffs in the amount of $7,557.10 as follows: 

$2,327.82 in the case of DAF; $4,540.71 in the case of M&R; and $688.57 in the case of 

NFP; 

(iv) Post-judgment finance charge at the rate of 18% per annum to Plaintiff M&R; 

(v) Post-Judgment interest at the highest legal rate to Plaintiffs DAF, ATB, and 

NFP. 

These amounts are based on the terms of the written agreement between the 

parties as set forth in the Declarations of Bart M. Botta, Daniel A. Andrews, Alan N. 

Huynh, Kenneth Bethel, and Patricia Leal (Docs. 27-31). Here, Defendants did not 

comply with the PACA trust and Romero violated his fiduciary duty. The amount of 

Case 4:12-cv-00346-HCE Document 40 Filed 02/28/13 Page 7 of 15
- 8 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

damages sought by Plaintiffs, i.e., the amount of money at stake in relation to 

Defendants’ conduct is proportionate and appropriate. 

D. Possibility of Dispute Concerning Material Facts 

The Court also considers the possibility of dispute as to any material facts in the 

case. See Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1472. Here, there is little possibility of dispute concerning 

material facts because (1) based on the entry of default, the Court accepts all allegations 

in Plaintiffs' complaint as true (except for those relating to damages) and (2) Defendants 

have not made any attempt to challenge Plaintiffs’ Complaint or even appear in this case. 

Upon entry of default, all well-pleaded facts in the complaint are deemed true, except 

those relating to damages. See TeleVideo, 826 F.2d at 917-918. Accordingly, no genuine 

dispute of material facts would preclude granting Plaintiffs’ motion. 

E. Whether Default Was Due to Excusable Neglect 

In most cases, a court will ask whether the failure to answer is due to excusable 

neglect. See Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1472 (noting that the fact that the parties were engaged in 

settlement negotiations excused defendant from failing to answer). In the instant case, the 

record reflects that Defendants were properly served with the Summons and Complaint. 

Given these circumstances, it is unlikely that Defendants’ failure to answer and the 

resulting default was a result of excusable neglect. Cf. Shanghai Automation Instrument 

Co., Ltd. v. Kuei, 194 F.Supp.2d 995, 1005 (N.D.Cal. 2001) (concluding no excusable 

neglect because defendants "were properly served with the Complaint, the notice of entry 

of default, as well as the papers in support of the instant motion"). 

Case 4:12-cv-00346-HCE Document 40 Filed 02/28/13 Page 8 of 15
- 9 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

F. Policy Underlying Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

Generally, default judgments are disfavored because "cases should be decided 

upon their merits whenever reasonably possible." Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1472. However, 

because a discretionary standard is applied, "default judgments are more often granted 

than denied." PepsiCo v. Triunfo-Mex, Inc., 189 F.R.D. 431, 432 (C.D.Cal. 1999). 

Indeed, the mere existence of Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b) indicates that the seventh Eitel factor 

is not alone dispositive. California Security Cans, 238 F.Supp.2d at 1177. Moreover, 

Defendants’ failure to answer the Complaint makes a decision on the merits impractical, 

if not impossible. Further, Defendants have failed to respond to the lawsuit and Plaintiffs 

have specifically pleaded facts supporting their claim. On the instant record, the policy 

encouraging decisions of cases on their merits does not weigh against granting default 

judgment. 

G. Summary 

Based on all the Eitel factors discussed above, the Magistrate Judge recommends 

that the District Court grant Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment. 

V. DAMAGES

Plaintiffs’ demand for relief must be specific, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(3). 

Here, Plaintiffs seek the following, all of which qualifies for trust protection under the 

trust provisions of the PACA, 7 U.S.C. §499e, et seq.: 

(i) Principal in the cumulative amount of $130,184.90: $30,055.50 in the case 

of DAF as follows; $58,638.25 in the case of M&R; $32,593.80 in the case 

of ATB; and $8,897.35 in the case of NFP; 

Case 4:12-cv-00346-HCE Document 40 Filed 02/28/13 Page 9 of 15
- 10 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

(ii) Pre-judgment finance charge to Plaintiff M&R through and including 

October 19, 2012 in the amount of $32,067.02; 

(iii) Attorney’s fees and costs to Plaintiffs in the amount of $7,557.10 as 

follows: $2,327.82 in the case of DAF; $4,540.71 in the case of M&R; and 

$688.57 in the case of NFP; 

(iv) Post-judgment finance charge at the rate of 18% per annum to Plaintiff 

M&R; 

(v) Post-Judgment interest at the highest legal rate to Plaintiffs DAF, ATB, and 

NFP; 

Plaintiffs have adequately supported their request for the principal amounts due 

for produce sold and delivered to Defaulting Defendants. See Declarations of Daniel A. 

Andrews, Alan N. Huynh, Kenneth Bethel, and Patricia Leal. (Docs. 28-31, ¶¶ 6 & 7, Ex. 

1.) 

A. Individual Liability 

As to the Individual Defendant Romero, there is no question that he was the sole 

person responsible for running the business, and he is personally liable for the unpaid 

PACA trust debts to Plaintiffs. “An individual who is in the position to control the trust 

assets and who does not preserve them for the beneficiaries has breached a fiduciary 

duty, and is personally liable for that tortious act. [A] PACA trust in effect imposes 

liability on a trustee, whether a corporation or a controlling person of that corporation, 

who uses the trust assets for any purpose other than repayment of the supplier.” Sunkist 

Growers, Inc. v. Fisher, 104 F.3d 280, 283 (9th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). 

Case 4:12-cv-00346-HCE Document 40 Filed 02/28/13 Page 10 of 15
- 11 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

B. Pre-Judgment and Post-Judgment Finance Charge (Plaintiff M&R) 

Plaintiffs request pre-judgment interest in the amount of $32,067.02 through and 

including October 19, 2012 and post-judgment interest of 1.5% per month. See Botta 

Decl. (Doc. 27 ¶¶ 16-18, Ex. B). Under Middle Mountain Land and Produce Inc. v. 

Sound Commodities Inc., 307 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir.2002), pre-judgment interest may be 

included in a PACA trust claim if supported by a contractual right; alternatively, the 

Court has discretion to award reasonable pre-judgment interest if such an award promotes 

the interests of PACA claimants. “[I]f a contractual right arose from the exchange of 

contractual communications and [...] invoices, then [supplier] has a right under PACA to 

enforce the full scope of its perishable agricultural commodities contract.” Middle 

Mountain, 307 F.3d at 1225–26. 

Here, the invoices attached to the Huynh declaration state, in relevant part: 

“Interest will accrue on any past-due balance at the rate of 1 1⁄2 % per month” Huynh 

Declaration (Doc. 29, Ex. C). Although normally interest would accrue at the legal rate, 

because the invoices created a contract, the interest rate of 1.5% per month or 18% on 

unpaid accounts agreed to by the parties is the correct rate to apply. Citicorp Real Estate, 

Inc. v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1097, 1108 (9th Cir.1998) (“affirm[ing] the district court's grant of 

post-judgment interest based on the mutually agreed upon contract rate”). Plaintiff 

submits evidence that the accrued interest to the date of the motion is $32,067.02. Thus, 

Plaintiff is entitled to pre-judgment interest of $32,067.02 through October 19, 2012, plus 

pre-judgment interest after October 19, 2012 and continuing until judgment is entered; 

Case 4:12-cv-00346-HCE Document 40 Filed 02/28/13 Page 11 of 15
- 12 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

and post-judgment interest at the rate of 18% per annum until all amounts due under the 

sales agreement are paid in full. 

C. Post-Judgment Interest (Plaintiffs DAF, ATB, and NFP) 

Plaintiffs DAF, ATB, and NFP request post-judgment interest at the highest legal 

rate. These Plaintiffs do not have a contractual right to finance charges. Accordingly, 

post-judgment interest should accrue on the Judgment amount at the current postjudgment rate per annum pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1961 from the date of the entry of this 

Judgment until paid in full. 

D. Attorney’s Fees and Costs 

Plaintiffs request an award of Attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $7,557.10 

as follows: $2,327.82 in the case of DAF; $4,540.71 in the case of M&R; and $688.57 in 

the case of NFP. The Ninth Circuit has determined that a PACA beneficiary may recover 

expenses and fees that are due contractually or otherwise “in connection with” the 

transaction that is the subject of the PACA trust claim. Middle Mountain Land & 

Produce, Inc. v. Sound Commodities, Inc., 307 F.3d 1220, 1223 (9th Cir. 2002). In Middle 

Mountain, the court allowed a trust beneficiary to collect attorney’s fees and interest 

because the invoice for the produce created a contractual right to such fees. The fees were 

“within the scope of the statute’s protection of ‘full payment owing in connection with 

the [PACA] transaction.” Middle Mountain, 307 F.3d at 1223 (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 

499e(c).) The court stated that the invoices and related communications should be 

assessed to determine whether they created a contractual right to attorney’s fees and prejudgment interest. Id., at 1225; see e.g., JC Produce, Inc. v. Paragon Steakhouse Rests., 

Case 4:12-cv-00346-HCE Document 40 Filed 02/28/13 Page 12 of 15
- 13 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Inc., 70 F.Supp.2d 1119, 1123 (E.D.Cal. 1999) (plaintiff’s invoices expressly reserved 

PACA trust rights over interest and reasonable attorney’s fees). However, the court also 

found that, where the invoice does not create a contractual right to attorney’s fee, there is 

no contractual right to attorney’s fees. Id., at 1225 (“the district court has limited 

authority to grant attorneys’ fees to PACA claimants”). 

In this case, the invoices between Plaintiffs DAF, M&R, and NFP and Defendants 

contained a provision for the recovery of attorney’s fees and costs in the event of 

litigation. See Huynh, Leal, and Andrews Decls. (Docs. 28-29, 31, Ex. 1.) As described in 

the declaration of Bart M. Botta, the demand for attorneys’ fees and costs is based on 

Plaintiffs’ pro-rated share of attorney’s fees and costs billed for this case. See Botta Decl. 

(Doc. 27, ¶¶ 11-15.) Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge finds that an award of attorney’s 

fees and costs is appropriate and recommends that the District Court award attorney’s 

fees and costs to Plaintiffs in the amount of $7,557.10 as follows: $2,327.82 in the case of 

DAF; $4,540.71 in the case of M&R; and $688.57 in the case of NFP. 

VI. RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons, based on all the Eitel factors discussed above, the 

Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the District Court GRANT Plaintiffs’ Motion for 

Default Judgment (Doc. 25). 

The Magistrate Judge FURTHER RECOMMENDS that the District Court enter 

the following proposed judgment in this matter: 

IT IS HEREBY ADJUDGED that Plaintiffs DANIEL A. 

ANDREWS, an individual doing business as DAN ANDREWS FARMS; 

Case 4:12-cv-00346-HCE Document 40 Filed 02/28/13 Page 13 of 15
- 14 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

REYNOLDS PACKING COMPANY, INC. doing business as M & R 

COMPANY, a California corporation; ATB PACKING COMPANY, a 

partnership; and NATURAL FLAVOR PRODUCE, LLC, a limited liability 

company are entitled to immediate entry of default judgment against 

Defendants TRIPLE R DISTRIBUTING, LLC, a limited liability company; 

and DANIEL A. ROMERO, an individual, jointly and severally, as follows, 

all of which qualifies for trust protection under the trust provisions of 

Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act (“PACA”) [7 U.S.C. §499e, et 

seq.]: 

(i) Principal in the cumulative amount of $130,184.90 [$30,055.50 in 

the case of Plaintiff DANIEL A. ANDREWS, an individual doing business 

as DAN ANDREWS FARMS; $58,638.25 in the case of Plaintiff 

REYNOLDS PACKING COMPANY, INC. doing business as M & R 

COMPANY, a California corporation; $32,593.80 in the case of Plaintiff 

ATB PACKING COMPANY, a partnership; and $8,897.35 in the case of 

Plaintiff NATURAL FLAVOR PRODUCE, LLC, a limited liability 

company]; 

(ii) Pre-judgment finance charge to Plaintiff REYNOLDS 

PACKING COMPANY, INC. doing business as M & R COMPANY, a 

California corporation through and including October 19, 2012 in the 

amount of $32,067.02; 

(iii) Attorney’s fees and costs to Plaintiffs in the amount of 

$7,557.10 [$2,327.82 in the case of Plaintiff DANIEL A. ANDREWS, an 

individual doing business as DAN ANDREWS FARMS; $4,540.71 in the 

case of Plaintiff REYNOLDS PACKING COMPANY, INC. doing 

business as M & R COMPANY, a California corporation; and $688.57 in 

the case of Plaintiff NATURAL FLAVOR PRODUCE, LLC, a limited 

liability company]; 

Case 4:12-cv-00346-HCE Document 40 Filed 02/28/13 Page 14 of 15
- 15 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

(iv) Post-judgment finance charge at the rate of 18% per annum to 

Plaintiff REYNOLDS PACKING COMPANY, INC. doing business as M 

& R COMPANY, a California corporation; and 

(v) Post-Judgment interest at the at the current post-judgment rate 

per annum pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1961 from the date of the entry of this 

Judgment until paid in full to Plaintiff DANIEL A. ANDREWS, an 

individual doing business as DAN ANDREWS FARMS; Plaintiff ATB 

PACKING COMPANY, a partnership; and Plaintiff NATURAL FLAVOR 

PRODUCE, LLC, a limited liability company. 

IT IS HEREBY ADJUDGED that this judgment is entered pursuant 

to Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 54(b) and 55(b)(2). 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written objections 

within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this Report and 

Recommendation. A party may respond to another party’s objections within fourteen (14) 

days after being served with a copy thereof. Fed R. Civ.P. 72(b). 

If objections are not timely filed, then the parties’ rights to de novo review by the 

District Court may be deemed waived. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 

If objections are filed the parties should use the following case number: CV 12-

0346-TUC-RCC. 

Dated this 28th day of February, 2013. 

Case 4:12-cv-00346-HCE Document 40 Filed 02/28/13 Page 15 of 15