Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-05192/USCOURTS-cand-5_14-cv-05192-4/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1981 Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

JOHN NKWUO,

Plaintiff,

v.

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY, DAN 

ANGEL, NABIL RAGAE, PAUL FOUTS, 

KERRY CURTIS, LEE ROBINS, ROBERT 

FURKERTH, DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,

Defendants.

Case No. 5:14-cv-05192-HRL

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 

LEAVE TO FILE MOTION FOR 

RECONSIDERATION AND MOTION 

FOR RECONSIDERATION1

Re: Dkt. Nos. 49, 50

On February 23, 2016, this court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment and 

entered judgment accordingly. (Dkt. 47, 48). Plaintiff John Nkwuo has filed a motion for leave to 

seek reconsideration, along with a motion for reconsideration. Both motions essentially are the 

same. Neither one states whether Nkwuo seeks relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) or 60(b). Even 

so, Nkwuo has not persuaded that he is entitled to relief under either rule.2

“While Rule 59(e) permits a district court to reconsider and amend a previous order, the 

 

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The matter is deemed suitable for determination without further briefing or oral argument. Civ. 

L.R. 7-1(b).

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Plaintiff has since filed a notice of appeal. However, because his motion for reconsideration 

timely was filed, his appeal has been held in abeyance until the motion for reconsideration is 

resolved by this court. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4); Leader Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Industrial Indem. Ins. Co., 

19 F.3d 444, 445 (9th Cir. 1994).

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rule offers an extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of finality and 

conservation of judicial resources.” Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934, 944 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(citation omitted). “Indeed, ‘a motion for reconsideration should not be granted, absent highly 

unusual circumstances, unless the district court is presented with newly discovered evidence, 

committed clear error, or if there is an intervening change in the controlling law.’” Id. (quoting 

Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000)). “A Rule 59(e) motion 

may not be used to raise arguments or present evidence for the first time when they could 

reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation.” Id.

“Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides a mechanism for parties to 

seek relief from a judgment when it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have 

prospective application, or when there is any reason justifying relief from judgment.” Jeff D. v. 

Kempthorne, 365 F.3d 844, 851 (9th Cir. 2004). A movant may seek relief from a final judgment 

for six reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered 

evidence that by due diligence could not have been discovered before the court’s decision; (3) 

fraud by the adverse party; (4) voiding of the judgment; (5) satisfaction of the judgment; or (6) any 

other reason justifying relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1)-(6).

The Rule 60(b)(6) “catch-all” provision applies only when the reason for granting relief is 

not covered by any of the other reasons set out in Rule 60. Delay v. Gordon, 475 F.3d 1039, 1044 

(9th Cir. 2007). “‘Rule 60(b)(6) has been used sparingly as an equitable remedy to prevent 

manifest injustice’ and ‘is to be utilized only where extraordinary circumstances prevented a party 

from taking timely action to prevent or correct an erroneous judgment.’” Id. (quoting United 

States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 984 F.2d 1047, 1049 (9th Cir. 1993)). Thus, a party who 

seeks such relief “‘must demonstrate both injury and circumstances beyond his control that 

prevented him from proceeding with the prosecution or defense of the action in a proper fashion.’” 

Id. (quoting Community Dental Services v. Tani, 282 F.3d 1164, 1168 (9th Cir.2002)).

Mere dissatisfaction with the court’s order or a belief that the court is wrong in its decision 

is not an adequate basis for relief under either Rule 59(e) or 60(b). Doe I v. Cisco Sys., Inc., No. 

5:11-cv-02449-EJD, 2015 WL 5118004 at *2 (N.D. Cal., Aug. 31, 2005) (citing Twentieth 

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Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Dunnahoo, 637 F.2d 1338, 1341 (9th Cir. 1981); Yocom v. Grounds, 

No. C10-03609 SBA, 2012 WL 2277909 at *1 (N.D. Cal., June 18, 2012).

Nkwuo argues that this court failed to properly consider his arguments and evidence. He 

says that this court has forgotten arguments presented at the motion hearing, but has not specified 

what arguments he believes the court forgot. Now pointing to the Oxford dictionary meaning of 

“meeting,” he expresses his disagreement with the portion of this court’s order granting summary 

judgment as to his claim that defendants acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and in bad faith during his 

grievance proceedings. Nkwuo also claims that, contrary to the court’s observation that he 

submitted no evidence in support of his opposition, he provided several pages of documents. He 

otherwise reiterates arguments disputing whether faculty met with him to discuss the shortcomings 

of his exam responses.

Nkwuo was given a full and fair opportunity to present papers and oral argument as to the 

issues raised on summary judgment. He has not presented newly discovered evidence that by due 

diligence could not have been discovered before the court’s decision. Although he now claims to 

have submitted several pages of supporting documents, the court’s records show that is not the 

case. (Dkt. 37; Dkt. 38 at ECF pp. 5-6). As to the documents he says he submitted, plaintiff has 

identified them only by what appear to be defendants’ document production numbers. Two of 

those pages appear to coincide with documents defendants submitted in support of their summary 

judgment motion. As for the other documents, Nkwuo does not say what those documents are or 

explain why they would warrant reconsideration of this court’s order. Plaintiff’s summary 

judgment opposition indicated only that he intended to (but did not) submit copies of defendants’ 

discovery responses. Even so, this court considered his arguments and credited his 

characterization of those discovery responses as true. (Dkt. 47 at ECF pp. 15-16). This court also 

considered Nkwuo’s arguments as to post-exam meetings with his professors and the University 

grievance procedures. (Id. at ECF pp. 6-7, 19-22). Plaintiff disagrees with the court’s conclusions 

as to those matters, but that does not provide a basis for reconsideration.

Nkwuo now suggests that this court precluded him from fully presenting papers and 

evidence on summary judgment, arguing that, in “an Order in September,” this court “stopped the 

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further submission of documents.” (Mot. at 4). Nkwuo apparently is referring to this court’s order 

continuing the hearing on defendants’ summary judgment motion. (Dkt. 40). That hearing was 

continued because plaintiff did not timely submit his opposition papers by the deadline set in this 

district’s Civil Local Rules---i.e., the date by which plaintiff’s opposition and all supporting 

documents should have been filed. This court nevertheless accepted plaintiff’s opposition papers 

and noted that after defendants filed their reply, the Local Rules do not permit any party to file 

further papers unless otherwise ordered by the court. (Id. at 1). Even so, at the motion hearing the 

court asked plaintiff to identify any documents he wanted the court to review, in an effort to give 

him one final opportunity to present evidence he wished the court to consider. As discussed in the 

summary judgment order, he identified no evidence, other than what defendants had already 

submitted in support of their motion.

Nkwuo also argues that he did not receive notice of this court’s February 23, 2016 

summary judgment order and judgment until he arrived at the courthouse on March 1, 2016 for a

previously set Final Pretrial Conference (which, by then, had been vacated). The summary 

judgment order and judgment were mailed to the P.O. Box plaintiff provided as his contact 

information. That mail has not been returned to the court as undeliverable. In any event, the 

docket reflects that the Clerk’s Office gave him another copy of the order and judgment the 

following week on March 1. Even if that was Nkwuo’s first notice of this court’s rulings, he has 

not explained why that warrants reconsideration of them.

Finally, Nkwuo takes issue with this court’s decision denying his request to strike all of 

defendants’ declarations. On summary judgment, Nkwuo contended that those declarations could 

not be accepted because they were not sworn before a notary public. This court explained why 

formal affidavits are no longer required pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 and 28 U.S.C. § 1746. 

(Dkt. 47 at 12). Nkwuo disagrees with that ruling, but has not provided a basis to reconsider it. 

He also argues that Nabil Rageh lied by “claim[ing] he was at a meeting that he never attended.” 

(Mot. at 6). It is unclear what Nkwuo is referring to; but, if he means Rageh’s statement that 

Rageh was present during plaintiff’s oral exam, this court noted that plaintiff disputed that 

assertion, but concluded that the apparent fact dispute was not material to the resolution of the 

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motion. (Dkt. 47 at ECF p. 6 n.5). Nkwuo’s disagreement with that ruling does not provide a 

basis for reconsideration.

Based on the foregoing, Nkwuo’s motion for leave to file a motion for reconsideration and 

his motion for reconsideration are denied.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 18, 2016

HOWARD R. LLOYD

United States Magistrate Judge

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United States District Court

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5:14-cv-05192-HRL Notice has been electronically mailed to:

Michael Joseph Vartain mike@vartainlaw.com, charissa@vartainlaw.com, 

emelina@vartainlaw.com, stacey@vartainlaw.com, william@vartainlaw.com

William Charles Teeling william@vartainlaw.com, charissa@vartainlaw.com, 

emelina@vartainlaw.com

5:14-cv-05192-HRL Notice sent by U.S. Mail to:

John Nkwuo

P.O. Box 53554

San Jose, CA 95153

Case 5:14-cv-05192-HRL Document 55 Filed 04/18/16 Page 6 of 6