Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-03019/USCOURTS-cand-4_18-cv-03019-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBERT ULLOA,

Plaintiff,

v.

C. JACOBSEN, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 18-cv-03019-HSG (PR) 

ORDER OF SERVICE

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, an inmate at Pelican Bay State Prison (“PBSP”), filed this pro se civil rights 

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff is granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis in a 

separate order. The complaint is now before the Court for review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek 

redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). The court must identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of 

the complaint, if the complaint “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief 

may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id.

§ 1915A(b). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed, however. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police 

Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the 

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” “Specific facts are not necessary; the 

statement need only “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon 

which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (citations omitted). Although 

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in order to state a claim a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff’s 

obligation to provide the grounds of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and 

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. . . . 

Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007) (citations omitted). A complaint 

must proffer “enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 1974. 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: 

(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that 

the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. 

Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

B. Legal Claims

According the complaint, on May 24, 2017, an incident broke out in the yard at PBSP’s Bfacility, during which several officers were attacked by inmates. Defendant correctional officer C. 

Vick was working as a tower officer in Building No. 6 at the time. Defendant correctional officer 

J. Hendrix was working as a tower officer in the central control tower on B-facility. Both Vick 

and Hendrix responded to the attack by firing multiple shots from their respective towers. 

However, rather than shooting at the inmates that were attacking staff, both Vick and Hendrix shot 

into a group of non-attacking inmates that were just milling about. Plaintiff was struck by two 

bullets, one from each officer.

Plaintiff took the bullets in his limbs. After receiving triage treatment at the hospital, he 

was returned to the prison and placed in administrative segregation. The bullets were left in his 

body and never removed. Plaintiff explained to his primary care provider and later to the chief 

medical officer, Dr. C. Jacobsen, that the bullets were causing him extreme pain. He asked that 

they be removed. D. Jacobsen refused the request. Dr. Jacobsen also refused plaintiff’s request 

for physical therapy after he began to heal. The lack of rehabilitative treatment has caused 

plaintiff to suffer atrophy, impaired mobility, and pain. 

Liberally construed, plaintiff’s complaint states a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim for 

excessive force as against defendants Vick and Hendrix. Plaintiff’s complaint also states 

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cognizable Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious medical needs claims as against 

defendant Jacobsen.

Plaintiff also claims that the custody officers and medical staff who first responded to his 

injuries failed to treat him in the immediate aftermath of the shooting and that he suffered blood 

loss and pain for nearly two hours before being sent to the hospital. Plaintiff does not identify the 

custody or medical staff by name. Although the use of “John Doe” to identify a defendant is not 

favored in the Ninth Circuit, see Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980), situations 

may arise where the identity of alleged defendants cannot be known prior to the filing of a 

complaint. In such circumstances, the plaintiff should be given an opportunity through discovery 

to identify the unknown defendants, unless it is clear that discovery would not uncover their 

identities or that the complaint should be dismissed on other grounds. See Gillespie, 629 F.2d at 

642; Velasquez v. Senko, 643 F. Supp. 1172, 1180 (N.D. Cal. 1986). Accordingly, the Doe 

defendants are DISMISSED from this action. If, through discovery, plaintiff is able to identify 

these unknown defendants, he may then move the Court for leave to amend to name the intended 

defendants and to issue summons upon them. See Gillespie, 629 F.2d at 642; Barsten v. Dep’t of 

the Interior, 896 F.2d 422, 423-24 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Finally, the complaint includes a California tort law claim for intentional infliction of 

emotional distress. The Court has federal supplemental jurisdiction “over all other claims that are 

so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same 

case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). 

However, plaintiff does not identify the defendants against which he seeks to bring this claim. 

Should plaintiff wish to pursue a supplemental state law claim for intentional infliction of 

emotional distress, he may move to amend to add the claim his complaint. Any such amended 

complaint must list, by name, the defendants linked to this claim. Plaintiff is advised that the 

elements of the state law claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress are: (1) outrageous 

conduct by the defendant; (2) intended to cause or the reckless disregard of the probability of 

causing emotional distress; and (3) severe emotional suffering by the plaintiff that was caused by 

the defendant’s conduct. Agarwal v. Johnson, 25 Cal. 3d 932, 946 (1979) disapproved of on other 

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grounds in White V. Ultramar, Inc., 21 Cal. 4th 563, 574 n.4 (1999). 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows:

1. The Clerk shall issue summons and the United States Marshal shall serve, without 

prepayment of fees, a copy of the complaint with all attachments thereto, and a copy of this order 

upon defendants C. Vick, J. Hendrix, and Dr. C. Jacobsen at Pelican Bay State Prison. 

A courtesy copy of the complaint with attachments and this order shall also be mailed to 

the California Attorney General’s Office. 

2. In order to expedite the resolution of this case, the Court orders as follows:

a. No later than 91 days from the date this order is filed, defendants must file 

and serve a motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion. If defendants are of the 

opinion that this case cannot be resolved by summary judgment, defendants must so inform the 

Court prior to the date the motion is due. A motion for summary judgment also must be 

accompanied by a Rand notice so that plaintiff will have fair, timely, and adequate notice of what 

is required of him in order to oppose the motion. Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 

2012) (notice requirement set out in Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1998), must be 

served concurrently with motion for summary judgment).1 

b. Plaintiff’s opposition to the summary judgment or other dispositive motion 

must be filed with the Court and served upon defendants no later than 28 days from the date the 

motion is filed. Plaintiff must bear in mind the notice and warning regarding summary judgment 

provided later in this order as he prepares his opposition to any motion for summary judgment. 

c. Defendants shall file a reply brief no later than 14 days after the date the 

opposition is filed. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is due. No 

hearing will be held on the motion. 

 

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If defendants assert that plaintiff failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies as 

required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), defendants must raise such argument in a motion for summary 

judgment, pursuant to the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2014)

(en banc) (overruling Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003), which held that 

failure to exhaust available administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 

should be raised by a defendant as an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion). 

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3. Plaintiff is advised that a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure will, if granted, end your case. Rule 56 tells you what you must do in 

order to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Generally, summary judgment must be granted 

when there is no genuine issue of material fact – that is, if there is no real dispute about any fact 

that would affect the result of your case, the party who asked for summary judgment is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law, which will end your case. When a party you are suing makes a 

motion for summary judgment that is properly supported by declarations (or other sworn 

testimony), you cannot simply rely on what your complaint says. Instead, you must set out 

specific facts in declarations, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or authenticated documents, 

as provided in Rule 56(c), that contradict the facts shown in the defendants’ declarations and 

documents and show that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. If you do not submit 

your own evidence in opposition, summary judgment, if appropriate, may be entered against you. 

If summary judgment is granted, your case will be dismissed and there will be no trial. Rand v. 

Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962-63 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (App. A).

(The Rand notice above does not excuse defendants’ obligation to serve said notice again 

concurrently with a motion for summary judgment. Woods, 684 F.3d at 939).

4. All communications by plaintiff with the Court must be served on defendants’ counsel 

by mailing a true copy of the document to defendants’ counsel. The Court may disregard any 

document which a party files but fails to send a copy of to his opponent. Until a defendants’

counsel has been designated, plaintiff may mail a true copy of the document directly to 

defendants, but once a defendant is represented by counsel, all documents must be mailed to 

counsel rather than directly to that defendant. 

5. Discovery may be taken in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. No 

further court order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(a)(2) or Local Rule 16 is required 

before the parties may conduct discovery.

6. Plaintiff is responsible for prosecuting this case. Plaintiff must promptly keep the Court 

informed of any change of address and must comply with the Court’s orders in a timely fashion. 

Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant to 

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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). Plaintiff must file a notice of change of address in every 

pending case every time he is moved to a new facility.

7. Any motion for an extension of time must be filed no later than the deadline sought to 

be extended and must be accompanied by a showing of good cause.

8. Plaintiff is cautioned that he must include the case name and case number for this case 

on any document he submits to the Court for consideration in this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

United States District Judge

9/10/2018

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