Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-14-04172/USCOURTS-ca3-14-04172-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 14-4172

___________

ANGELO LENELL DAVIS,

 Appellant

v.

MICHAEL HARLOW, Acting Deputy Secretary of Corrections; DORINA VARNER, 

Chief Grievance Officer; SUPERINTENDENT GREENE SCI; MS. TRACY 

SHAWLEY; MS. TINA STALEY, K-Block Unit Counselor; SGT. YOUNG, Unit 

Sergeant; SGT. MATTHEWS, Unit Sergeant; MR. ODDO MITCHELL, Captain / Shift 

Commander; MS. CARLA SWARTZ; MS. LORINDA WINFIELD; MR. TIM 

MACKNAIR, K-Block Unit Manager; MS. SUE COWAN, J and C-Block Unit Manager; 

MS. DONNA NICKOLAS, J and C-Block Unit Counselor; SGT. MICHNIAK, Unit 

Sergent, LT. ALBERT MOTARIANTELLA, Transfer Lueteny 2008; MS. KARAN 

GRISHKIN, Inmate Employment; MR. JEFFEREY ROGERS; MR. MICHAEL 

GUYTON, B-Block Unit Manager; MR. SCOTT BURRIS, B-Block Unit Counselor; 

MS. DAVIDSON, Unit Counsel E-Block 2008; MR. WALKER, Unit Manager E-Block 

2008; FREDDY NUNEZ, Hearing Examiner; C.O. G. BAKER, Correctional Officer; 

LIEUTENANT BUPKA; JOANNE TOMA, General Population Director 2008; SGT. 

RIGNEY, Property Sergent; JEMIE GASTER, Unit Counselor E-Block 2008

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-11-cv-01506)

Magistrate Judge: Honorable Lisa Pupo Lenihan

____________________________________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

November 19, 2015

Before: JORDAN, BARRY and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: December 2, 2015)

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___________

OPINION*

___________

PER CURIAM

Pro se appellant Angelo Davis appeals the adverse judgment entered in this civilrights case. For the reasons detailed below, we will affirm.

In November 2011, Davis filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, naming as 

defendants officials and employees of SCI-Greene, where he was then confined. Davis 

twice amended the complaint, and ultimately alleged, in a sprawling complaint raising 

dozens of claims, that the defendants had retaliated against him in a variety of ways, had 

violated his due process rights, had violated his privilege against self-incrimination, had 

engaged in a conspiracy against him, and had violated his Eighth Amendment right to be 

free from cruel and unusual punishment. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss. The 

Magistrate Judge, who presided over this case with the parties’ consent, see 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(c),

1 granted the motion in part, dismissing all claims except for those alleging 

retaliation. The parties then conducted discovery, and the remaining defendants filed a 

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.

1 While Davis amended his complaint to add additional defendants after the initial 

defendants had consented to have the Magistrate Judge preside, we conclude that the 

additional defendants, who shared an attorney with the original defendants, actively 

participated in the case, and have stressed their consent on appeal, impliedly consented to 

the Magistrate Judge’s conducting these proceedings. See Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 

580, 590-91 (2003).

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motion for summary judgment. The Magistrate Judge granted that motion, and Davis 

filed a timely notice of appeal.2 

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the Magistrate 

Judge’s orders concerning discovery for abuse of discretion, see Anderson v. Wachovia 

Mortg. Corp., 621 F.3d 261, 281 (3d Cir. 2010), and exercise a plenary standard of 

review over the summary judgment order, see State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Pro 

Design, P.C., 566 F.3d 86, 89 (3d Cir. 2009), and the dismissal order, see Connelly v. 

Steel Valley Sch. Dist., 706 F.3d 209, 212 (3d Cir. 2013). 

In his appellate brief, Davis argues at length that his discovery rights were 

violated.3 The record reveals that the Magistrate Judge, sua sponte, ordered the 

defendants to provide Davis with documents relevant to his claims, see D.C. dkt. #81, 

and later granted in part Davis’s request to obtain additional documents, see D.C. dkt. 

 

2 While Davis filed his notice of appeal more than 30 days after the Magistrate Judge’s 

judgment, see Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), he filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis 

within the 30-day period. Our Local Rules provide that, in pro se cases, a document may 

qualify as a notice of appeal if, “despite informality in its form or title, . . . it evidences an 

intention to appeal.” 3d Cir. L.A.R. 3.4. The Local Rules further provide that “[t]he court 

will deem an application for leave to appeal in forma pauperis . . . to be a notice of appeal 

if no formal notice has been filed.” Id. We are satisfied that Davis’s in forma pauperis 

application here evinced his intention to appeal, and we will treat that filing as a timely 

notice of appeal. See, e.g., Fleming v. Evans, 481 F.3d 1249, 1253-54 (10th Cir. 2007); 

see generally Witasick v. Minn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., -- F.3d ---, 2015 WL 5730009, at *5 

(3d Cir. Oct. 1, 2015). 

3 While Davis presented numerous other claims in the District Court, he has not discussed 

them in his brief on appeal, and has therefore waived review of the District Court’s 

disposition of those claims. See United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 222 (3d Cir. 

2005); see also Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam).

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#88. Davis then filed another motion to compel, seeking a variety of documents that the 

defendants claimed were privileged or confidential. The Magistrate Judge denied that 

motion and closed discovery. Subsequently, Davis filed a motion seeking further 

production from the defendants. The Magistrate Judge denied that motion. The 

Magistrate Judge observed that it appeared that Davis was raising arguments that it had 

already rejected, and stated, “In an attempt to clarify what Plaintiff is requesting the 

Court orders counsel for Defendant to set up a telephone conference with Plaintiff and the 

Court. Counsel is Ordered to contact the courtroom deputy to determine a time for the 

conference.” D.C. Nov. 14, 2013 order. It appears that that conference was never held.

On appeal, Davis argues that judgment should be granted in his favor due to this 

apparent oversight. We are not persuaded. Initially, Davis did not raise this claim before 

the Magistrate Judge, and we ordinarily will not address arguments that are raised for the 

first time on appeal. See, e.g., C.H. v. Cape Henlopen Sch. Dist., 606 F.3d 59, 73 (3d 

Cir. 2010). In any event, “district courts have broad discretion to manage discovery,” 

Sempier v. Johnson & Higgins, 45 F.3d 724, 734 (3d Cir. 1995), and we will not disturb a 

discovery ruling “absent a showing of actual and substantial prejudice,” Anderson v. 

Wachovia Mortg. Corp., 621 F.3d 261, 281 (3d Cir. 2010). In context, it is plain that the 

Magistrate Judge intended to hold the conference as a courtesy to Davis to explain its 

rationale for denying his motion to compel, and that the conference would not have been

a vehicle to grant Davis further relief. Accordingly, Davis was not prejudiced by the 

failure to hold the conference.

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Davis also complains that the Magistrate Judge should have compelled the 

defendants to produce his sentencing order and the guidelines applied by the 

Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (“the Board”). Again, however, Davis did 

not seek these documents during the proceedings before the Magistrate Judge, and he can 

thus establish no error in the Magistrate Judge’s discovery rulings. See Jackson v. 

Danberg, 594 F.3d 210, 223 n.16 (3d Cir. 2010). Moreover, we note that, to the extent 

that Davis seeks a declaration that the sentence imposed in state court is invalid, he must 

assert this claim in a habeas corpus petition. See, e.g., Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 

475, 500 (1973).

Davis further contends that the Magistrate Judge erred in denying his claim that 

his due-process rights were violated by his transfer from the prison’s J Unit to general 

population. Even assuming that the claim is not barred by the applicable two-year statute 

of limitations, see generally Pearson v. Sec’y Dep’t of Corr., 775 F.3d 598, 602 (3d Cir. 

2015), we agree with the Magistrate Judge that Davis’s due-process rights were not 

implicated by this routine transfer, see Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225-28 (1976); 

Fantone v. Latini, 780 F.3d 184, 186 (3d Cir. 2015) (“an inmate does not have a right to 

be confined in any particular housing unit in a prison, absent certain atypical and 

significant hardship”).

Davis also challenges the Magistrate Judge’s grant of summary judgment to the 

defendants on several of his retaliation claims. To establish a claim of retaliation under 

the First Amendment, Davis must show that (1) the conduct in which he was engaged 

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was constitutionally protected; (2) he suffered adverse action at the hands of prison 

officials; and (3) his constitutionally protected conduct was a substantial or motivating 

factor in the decision to take the adverse action. Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333-34 

(3d Cir. 2001). Even if Davis can satisfy these three factors, “prison officials may still 

prevail by proving that they would have made the same decision absent the protected 

conduct for reasons reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest.” Id. at 334. 

First, Davis avers that defendant Susan Cowan provided an adverse 

recommendation to the Board in retaliation for his filing grievances.

4

 However, Davis 

has presented no evidence that his grievances were a “substantial or motivating factor” in 

Rowan’s decision to recommend that he be denied parole. Rauser, 241 F.3d at 333-34. 

He filed his grievances more than seven months before Rowan made her 

recommendation, which does not amount to a “suggestive temporal proximity” from 

which we can infer causation. Id. at 334; see Andreoli v. Gates, 482 F.3d 641, 650 (3d 

Cir. 2007) (concluding that five-month gap was “insufficient to raise an inference of 

causation”). Nor has Davis submitted other evidence to connect Rowan’s 

recommendation to his grievances. Instead, as Rowan explained, during her unit’s 

meeting with Davis, he refused to accept responsibility for his crimes and insisted on relitigating his criminal trial; based on this attitude, Rowan reported that he was not a good 

candidate for parole. Davis has provided no basis to disbelieve Rowan’s claim, 

 

4 We have recognized that “[t]he filing of a prison grievance is an activity protected by 

the First Amendment.” Fantone, 780 F.3d at 192.

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particularly insofar as he continues to assert his innocence.5 Moreover, the Board denied 

parole for numerous reasons, including the negative recommendation of his trial judge, 

Davis’s failure to comply with institutional programs, and the risk-and-needs assessment 

indicating his level of risk to the community, and there is thus no genuine issue of 

material fact that Rowan would have given a negative recommendation and the Board 

would have reached the same decision even if Davis had not filed his grievances. See

Carter v. McGrady, 292 F.3d 152, 159 (3d Cir. 2002).

Next, Davis complains that he was denied parole as the result of an unfavorable 

parole recommendation by defendants Michael Guyton and Scott Burris in October 2011. 

The Magistrate Judge denied relief on this claim because the undisputed evidence reveals 

that Guyton and Burris supported Davis’s parole application, but that their 

recommendation was not accepted. Davis contends on appeal that the Magistrate Judge 

misunderstood the evidence and that Guyton and Burris actually provided an adverse 

recommendation, see Br. at 18, but we disagree. While Guyton once tried to explain to 

Davis why he believed that Davis’s application had been denied, the record reveals that 

he was attempting to channel the decision-makers, not expressing his own views. See

 

5 Along similar lines, Davis claims that Rowan and Donna Nickolas, a prison counselor, 

filed false reports against him. However, the only report described in the record is the 

one discussed above, in which Rowan informed the Board that Davis did not accept 

responsibility for his crime. Davis has provided no evidence whatsoever suggesting that 

this report was “false.” See, e.g., Blair v. Scott Specialty Gases, 283 F.3d 595, 608 (3d 

Cir. 2002) (“conclusory, self-serving affidavits are insufficient to withstand a motion for 

summary judgment”).

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D.C. dkt. #107 Ex. 10 at 13. Thus, we agree with the Magistrate Judge that these 

defendants took no adverse action against Davis. See generally Allah v. Seiverling, 229 

F.3d 220, 225 (3d Cir. 2000). 

Davis also argues that he was denied an “incentive-based transfer” closer to his 

home region in retaliation for his filing grievances. Again, however, Davis presents no 

evidence linking the adverse decision to his protected conduct. The first adverse actions 

— that is, when Davis was flatly refused transfer — occurred in August 2010, and Davis 

had filed his most-recent grievances in April 2010. Again, this timeline, standing alone,

provides no basis for us to infer causation. See Rauser, 241 F.3d at 334; Andreoli, 482 

F.3d at 650. Nor has Davis presented any other evidence suggesting that the defendants 

denied his transfer for retaliatory reasons. Instead, the evidence in the record reveals that 

only a few eligible inmates actually received incentive-based transfers each month, and 

that Davis ultimately did obtain an incentive-based transfer in October 2013.6

Accordingly, we will affirm the Magistrate Judge’s judgment. Davis’s motion to 

expand the record is denied. See, e.g., Burton v. Teleflex Inc., 707 F.3d 417, 435 (3d Cir. 

2013) (a party may supplement the record on appeal in only “extraordinary 

circumstances”).

 

6

In his brief on appeal, Davis argues that the October 2013 incentive-based transfer was 

retaliatory. While we are hard pressed to understand how granting the transfer that Davis 

had long requested constitutes adverse action, we decline to rule on this claim because 

Davis has raised it for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., C.H., 606 F.3d at 73.

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