Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-96-07149/USCOURTS-caDC-96-07149-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 4, 1998 Decided September 22, 1998

No. 96-7149

Jessica C. Smith-Haynie,

Appellant

v.

District of Columbia

and

Addison Davis

Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 96cv00064)

JePhunneh Lawrence argued the cause and filed the briefs

for appellant.

Sheila Kaplan, Assistant Corporation Counsel, argued the

cause for appellees. Jo Anne Robinson, Interim Corporation

Counsel, Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corporation Counsel,

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and Martin B. White, Assistant Corporation Counsel, were on

the brief. Charles F.C. Ruff, White House Counsel, entered

an appearance.

Before: Wald, Sentelle and Tatel, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Wald.

Wald, Circuit Judge: Jessica Smith-Haynie, an AfricanAmerican woman, began working for the Firearms Identification Branch of the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police

Department ("M.P.D.") as a civilian "Firearms Technician

Trainee" in 1984. According to Smith-Haynie's complaint,

she was harassed and discriminated against because of her

race and gender virtually from the start. She identifies her

supervisor, George Wilson, as the chief offender. She also

alleges that defendant Addison Davis, the M.P.D.'s Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") officer, harassed her from 1988, when she first filed a discrimination

complaint, through 1992, when she took maternity leave.

Smith-Haynie filed a second complaint with the EEOC in

1992, charging Davis with harassment and retaliation for the

earlier complaint. She states that she has not returned to

her job since her maternity leave because of continuing

problems with anxiety and work-related phobias.

Smith-Haynie received a right-to-sue letter from the

EEOC on October 18, 1995. She filed her complaint in

district court on January 18, 1996, charging the M.P.D. and

Davis with violations of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. s 2000e et seq.,

the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. s 1981, the Civil

Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. s 1983, and the Equal Pay Act

of 1963, 29 U.S.C. s 206(d). Unfortunately for Smith-Haynie, she filed her suit 92 days after she received the letter--

two days outside of the statutory period for filing suit under

Title VII. Before filing an answer, defendants moved under

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss or, in the alternative, for

summary judgment. The district court treated the motion as

one for summary judgment and ruled for defendants on all

counts.1 Smith-Haynie v. District of Columbia et al., Civ.

__________

1 Since Smith-Haynie failed to contest defendants' allegation that

the most recent offense occurred in or before 1992, the district

No. 96-0064 (D.D.C. May 10, 1996). Smith-Haynie appealed.

Her arguments boil down to two: first, that defendants

impermissibly raised the affirmative defense of untimeliness

by dispositive motion before filing an answer under Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(c); 2 and second, that ongoing and severe harassment rendered her non compos mentis during the limitations

period and should result in either equitable tolling of the time

limit or equitable estoppel of its operation.

We conclude that an affirmative defense can be properly

raised in a pre-answer motion, and further, that SmithHaynie did not produce adequate support for her non compos

mentis argument. We therefore affirm the district court's

grant of summary judgment.

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I.

We decide de novo the legal question of whether the

affirmative defense of statutory limitation can be raised in a

pre-answer motion under the proper construction of Rules

12(b) and 8(c). See Harris v. Secretary, U.S. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 126 F.3d 339, 342 (D.C. Cir. 1997). In Gordon v.

National Youth Work Alliance, 675 F.2d 356, 360 (D.C. Cir.

1982), we said that a statute of limitations defense under Title

VII is an affirmative defense that is properly raised by

__________

court dismissed the sections 1981 and 1983 and Equal Pay Act

claims as barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. See

Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (three year

statute of limitations in the District of Columbia for sections 1981

and 1983); 29 U.S.C. s 255(a) (three year statute of limitations for

willful violations of the Equal Pay Act). This was not an abuse of

discretion and dismissal of these claims will be upheld. See CSX

Transportation, Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 82 F.3d 478,

482 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

2 The appeal of this case was held in abeyance pending the

outcome of Harris v. Secretary, U.S. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 126

F.3d 339 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Smith-Haynie then moved for summary

reversal and remand based on Harris. The motion was denied and

the issue referred to the merits panel.

dispositive motion under Rule 12(b)(6). Gordon did not, of

course, address the precise situation involved in this case,

whether defendants can raise an affirmative defense by filing

a dispositive motion before they file an answer. Recently, we

decided in Harris that an affirmative defense is forfeited if it

is not raised in the answer and the answer is the first

responsive pleading in the case. Harris used sweeping language: "In order to preserve the notice purpose of Rule 8(c)

..., we hold that Rule 8(c) means what it says: a party must

first raise its affirmative defenses in a responsive pleading

before it can raise them in a dispositive motion." Harris, 126

F.3d at 345.

However, this broad prohibition must be read in context.

The precise holding of Harris is that an affirmative defense

not raised by answer cannot be raised in dispositive motions

that are filed post-answer. The defendant in Harris had filed

its answer to the complaint, as well as answers to two

amended complaints, and each time had failed to plead untimeliness as an affirmative defense. Since "[f]ailure to raise

an affirmative defense in pleadings deprives the opposing

party of precisely the notice that would enable it to dispute

the crucial issues of the case on equal terms," id. at 343, a

defendant forfeits an affirmative defense that is not pleaded

in its answer or amended answer. In Harris, we cited with

approval Funding Systems Leasing Corp. v. Pugh, 530 F.2d

91, 96 (5th Cir. 1976), which adopted the majority view that

unpled affirmative defenses cannot be raised by dispositive

motion unless that motion is the first responsive pleading.

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See Harris, 126 F.3d at 345; see also 5 Charles Alan Wright

& Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure s 1277

(2d ed. 1990 & 1997 supp.). Courts that have adopted this

majority rule, however, have also reasoned that since a

plaintiff's complaint necessarily includes certain facts about

an alleged offense, such as dates, the plaintiff does not suffer

from lack of notice when a defendant bases a pre-answer

motion on the facts as alleged in the complaint. See, e.g.,

Ghartey v. St. John's Queens Hosp., 869 F.2d 160, 162 (2d

Cir. 1989); Conerly v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. et al., 623

F.2d 117, 119 (9th Cir. 1980); Wilburn v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling

Co., 492 F.2d 1288, 1289 (8th Cir. 1974); White v. Padgett, 475

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F.2d 79, 82 (5th Cir. 1973); Williams v. Murdock, 330 F.2d

745, 749 (3d Cir. 1964); Rohner v. Union Pacific R.R. Co.,

225 F.2d 272, 274 (10th Cir. 1955); Kincheloe v. Farmer, 214

F.2d 604, 605 (7th Cir. 1954).

We find this reasoning to be sound and not in conflict with

Harris. See Stanton v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 127 F.3d 72, 76-77 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (acknowledging that

an affirmative defense can be raised by pre-answer motion)

(citing Harris ). Accordingly, we now explicitly hold that an

affirmative defense may be raised by pre-answer motion

under Rule 12(b) when the facts that give rise to the defense

are clear from the face of the complaint.

This case fits the paradigm. Plaintiff states in her complaint that she received her right-to-sue letter 92 days before

she filed suit.3 The facts supporting defendants' dispositive

motion were apparent to Smith-Haynie from the inception of

her lawsuit. Defendants properly raised the untimeliness

defense by a pre-answer motion under Rule 12(b)(6).

II.

Turning next to the merits of defendants' untimeliness

defense, we review the district court's grant of summary

judgment de novo.4 See, e.g., Goldman v. Bequal, 19 F.3d

666 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

__________

3 Title VII plaintiffs need not include the date of receipt of a

right-to-sue letter in their complaints. In the event that a date is

not pleaded, the Supreme Court has applied the "3-day" rule of

Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(e) to presume that the letter is received three days

after it is mailed. See Baldwin County Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466

U.S. 147, 148 & n.1 (1984) (per curiam).

4 We use the de novo standard despite the fact that the doctrine

of equitable tolling ordinarily involves discretion on the trial judge's

part. We read the judge's decision here to be based upon her

finding that as a matter of law Smith-Haynie's evidence could not

support invocation of the equitable tolling doctrine based upon her

mental state.

Smith-Haynie interposes the threshold argument that the

availability of equitable doctrines is a question for the jury

and not for the judge when they involve disputed issues of

material fact. Generally speaking, questions sounding in

equity are for a judge to decide. See generally Beacon

Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959). But this

principle is sometimes muddled in the statute of limitations

context. The discovery rule, a legal doctrine which governs

when a limitations period begins to run in certain situations,

is presumably for a jury to consider when issues of disputed

fact surround the rule's application; equitable tolling and

estoppel, which ask whether equity requires extending a

limitations period, are for the judge to apply, using her

discretion, regardless of the presence of a factual dispute.

However, the "discovery rule" and "equitable tolling" are

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often treated as the same doctrine, leading courts to the

tenuous conclusion that disputed issues of fact regarding both

are for the jury to resolve. Compare Goldman, 19 F.3d at

671-72, with Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman,

38 F.3d 1380 (3d Cir. 1994) and Cada v. Baxter Healthcare

Corp., 920 F.2d 446 (7th Cir. 1990). The province of the

judge versus that of the jury does not need to be decided

today, because even if we were to treat this as a jury

question, we would conclude that Smith-Haynie failed to

present sufficient proof to send the issue to a jury.

Summary judgment may be granted only if there remain no

genuine issues of material fact, accepting all evidence offered

by the nonmoving party as presumptively valid and drawing

all justifiable inferences in her favor. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). To avoid summary

judgment, Smith-Haynie must show the existence of evidence

sufficient to permit a reasonable conclusion that the statute of

limitations should have been equitably tolled. In opposition

to the motion for summary judgment, Smith-Haynie filed an

affidavit in which she alleged that she was too distraught to

grasp the meaning of the 90-day limitations period. At oral

argument, her lawyer argued that he could have gathered

more supporting material to prove her poor mental state but

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ery and obtain a psychological examination. Of course,

Smith-Haynie could have moved the district court under Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(f) for discovery, but no such motion was made in

this case. We are left with her affidavit, and standing alone,

it does not support a claim for equitable tolling or for

equitable estoppel.

First, Smith-Haynie argues that the 90-day limitation period should be tolled because she was non compos mentis

during that period. Defendants do not dispute that the 90-

day period is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing suit in

federal district court but operates as a statute of limitations

and is subject to waiver and equitable tolling. See Baldwin

County Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147 (1984) (per

curiam); Gordon, 675 F.2d at 360; cf. Irwin v. Department

of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89 (1990) (Title VII's time limits

for filing suit against the government subject to waiver and

equitable considerations). Equitable tolling permits a plaintiff to avoid the bar of the limitations period if despite all due

diligence she is unable to obtain vital information bearing on

the existence of her claim. See Cada, 920 F.2d at 451. Using

District of Columbia law as a touchstone, see Miller v.

Runyon, 77 F.3d 189, 191 (7th Cir. 1996) (relying on state and

federal interpretations of state non compos mentis laws to

determine scope of equitable tolling of Rehabilitation Act

claim); Nunnally v. MacCausland, 996 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir.

1993) (per curiam) (analogizing to state standards to determine incompetence for purposes of tolling of Rehabilitation

Act limitation period); Kien v. United States, 749 F. Supp.

286 (D.D.C. 1990) (same); Speiser v. Department of Health

and Human Services, 670 F. Supp. 380 (D.D.C. 1986) (same),

aff'd without opinion, 818 F.2d 95 (1987),5 the doctrine can

__________

5 This court has consistently applied federal courts' interpretations of typical equitable tolling and equitable estoppel doctrines in

Title VII discrimination cases. See, e.g., Bowden v. United States,

106 F.3d 433 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Mondy v. Secretary of the Army, 845

F.2d 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1988); cf. Bull S.A. v. Comer, 55 F.3d 678

(D.C. Cir. 1995) (equitable tolling of patent deadlines). This does

not, of course, preclude the use of District of Columbia law to distill

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fairly be read to encompass cases where a plaintiff has been

unable to obtain such information because of disability.

Smith-Haynie's hurdle is high. "The court's equitable

power to toll the statute of limitations will be exercised only

in extraordinary and carefully circumscribed instances."

Mondy v. Secretary of the Army, 845 F.2d 1051, 1057 (D.C.

Cir. 1988). District of Columbia law provides that a person

who is non compos mentis and who has failed to file a legal

action in a timely fashion may bring the action "within the

time limited after the disability is removed." D.C. Code

s 12-302. The code does not itself define non compos mentis, but "[t]he phrase 'non compos mentis ... generally

refers to someone incapable of handling her own affairs or

unable to function [in] society.' " Hendel v. World Plan

Executive Council et al., 705 A.2d 656, 665 (D.C. 1997)

(quoting Speiser, 670 F. Supp. at 384). " 'Impaired judgment

alone is not enough to toll the statute of limitations.' " Id.

(quoting Speiser, 670 F. Supp. at 384). The disability of a

person claiming to be non compos mentis must be "of such a

nature as to show [she] is unable to manage [her] business

affairs or estate, or to comprehend [her] legal rights or

liabilities." Decker v. Fink, 422 A.2d 389, 392 (Md. 1980).

Smith-Haynie swore in her affidavit that she was confused

by her right-to-sue letter because the EEOC had apparently

dismissed some of her charges as untimely. She also related

that "[w]hen I received the unrequested notice of right to sue

and dismissal, I did not understand it and I was further

traumatized and simply unable to psychologically deal with

it." Her statement that she did not understand the letter is a

general and conclusory one. She does not contest that she

was informed in the letter of the 90-day limitations period or

aver that the meaning of the time limit was unclear to her.

Her supplementary affidavit does describe emotional difficulty, but of a kind that was basically related to the work

environment. Smith-Haynie was unable to go to work, afraid

of Addison Davis, and "uncomfortable, humiliated and de-

__________

basic common law principles. See 19 Wright & Miller s 4514, at

474-76.

graded in [her] work environment." She does not tell us that

she was "[un]able to engage in rational thought and deliberate decision making sufficient to pursue [her] claim alone or

through counsel," Nunnally, 996 F.2d at 5, nor does she

provide information to support an inference that she was "in

fact prevent[ed] ... from managing [her] affairs....," Miller, 77 F.3d at 191; see also Lawson v. Glover, 957 F.2d 801,

804-06 (11th Cir. 1987) (state court interpretation of similar

Georgia Code provision requires showing that plaintiff was

"physically and mentally incapacitated and was incompetent

to manage his own affairs"). It may be that a doctor's

diagnosis would have strengthened her claim, see Nunnally,

996 F.2d at 5-6 (diagnosis of schizophrenia supported claim of

non compos mentis ); but see Miller, 77 F.3d at 192 ("Most

mental illnesses today are treatable by drugs that restore the

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patient to at least a reasonable approximation of normal

mentation and behavior."); Speiser, 670 F. Supp. at 385

(while hospitalized plaintiff "has brought forth evidence to the

effect that she was preoccupied, depressed, and obsessed with

events surrounding her resignation, she has not shown that

she was ever adjudged incompetent, signed a power of attorney, had a guardian or caretaker appointed, or otherwise ...

let someone else handle her affairs ...."), however, no such

diagnosis or report was submitted to the district court.

Moreover, plaintiff does not explain what happened between

the 90th and the 91st day after she received her letter, when

she had the presence of mind to consult a lawyer. We must

conclude that plaintiff's affidavit does not yield a reasonable

inference that she was incapable of handling her own affairs

and functioning in society.

Smith-Haynie also argues that equitable estoppel should

operate to prevent defendants from asserting untimeliness.

Equitable estoppel in the statute of limitations context

"comes into play if the defendant takes active steps to prevent the plaintiff from suing in time, as by promising not to

plead the statute of limitations." Cada, 920 F.2d at 450-51

(citing Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396-97 (1946)).

More specifically, tolling on estoppel grounds is proper where

" 'a claimant has received inadequate notice, ... where the

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court has led the plaintiff to believe that she had done

everything required of her, ... [or] where affirmative misconduct on the part of a defendant lulled the plaintiff into

inaction.' " Mondy, 845 F.2d at 1057 (quoting Baldwin County Welcome Ctr., 466 U.S. at 151). The argument that she

was either lulled or scared into inaction has little force in

Smith-Haynie's case. She states in her affidavit that she

"felt pressured to endure [Davis'] sexual harassment because

[he] was ultimately responsible for processing [her] EEO

complaints and he had the authority to remedy [her] pay act

claims and or [sic] terminate [her] job." As part of her

retaliation claim, Smith-Haynie alleges in her complaint that

Davis told her that he controlled the disposition of plaintiff's

claims. However, nowhere does she claim that anything the

defendants did or said misled her as to the effect of the 90-

day limitation period on her right to seek judicial relief. See

Dougherty v. Barry, 869 F.2d 605, 613 (D.C. Cir. 1989)

(equitable estoppel unavailable to plaintiffs who were " 'unambiguous[ly]' notified that they must sue within ninety days of

the EEOC's dismissal of the charge") (citing Baldwin County

Welcome Ctr., 466 U.S. at 151).

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the district court's grant of

summary judgment and dismissal of appellant's claims are

affirmed.

So 

ordered.

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