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Nature of Suit Code: 220
Nature of Suit: Foreclosure
Cause of Action: 

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FIL.L ..0 __ Ilzited States Co~rt(?f Appeal UNITED STATES COURT OF APP~ Tenth C1rcu1t 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT DEC 3 0 1992 

----------ROBERTL.HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant/ 

Appellee, 

V. 

MERRILL L. ALEXANDER; VIRGINIA A. 

ALEXANDER, 

Defendants-Counter-Claimants/ 

Appellants. 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

No. 92-2128 

(D. C. No. 90-CV-434 ) 

(D. N.M. ) 

Before MOORE, TACHA and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34 (a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The cause is therefore ordered 

Appellants Merrill and Virginia Alexander appeal the district 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 92-2128 Document: 010110155928 Date Filed: 12/30/1992 Page: 1 
court's dismissal of their counterclaim against the United States. 

The counterclaim asserted the tort claims of fraud, negligence , 

"per se" tort, 1 and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 

In May 1990 the Farmers Horne Administration (FHA) initiated 

foreclosure proceedings on secured property owned by the 

defendants/ appellants. The counterclaim was filed later that 

month and was subsequently dismissed in February 1991. At that 

time the Alexanders appealed the dismissal of the counterclaim to 

this court, but we lacked appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 54 (b ) since the foreclosure proceedings were still 

pending. (Case No. 91-2040.) The district court granted the 

United States' motion for summary judgment in May 1992, and the 

Alexanders again appeal. 

Although we sympathize with appellants' misfortune in losing 

their family farm, we may only consider the legal issues presented 

before us. Appellants raise three points of contention for appeal 

on the dismissal of the counterclaim: (1 ) whether the a ction fell 

within the statutory period allowed by 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) ; (2) 

whether the acts complained of were continuing and ongoing to 

bring the claim within the statutory period; and (3) whether the 

appellants alleged or provided evidence required to establish 

estoppel in the counterclaim. Appellants also contest the 

district court's order for summary judgment on the foreclosure 

claim. They assert: (1) the complaint was contrary to the law; 

1 We assume "per se" tort to mean negligence per se. 

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Appellate Case: 92-2128 Document: 010110155928 Date Filed: 12/30/1992 Page: 2 
(2) Coleman v. Block, 663 F. Supp. 1315 (D. N.D. 1987 ) , prevented 

FHA from accelerating the loan; and (3) the Government did not 

provide the district court with copies of the notes involved. 

I. 

We review the district court's dismissal of the counterclaim 

de novo as a matter of law. 

Appellants' contention that 28 

applicable to their counterclaim is 

U.S.C. § 2675(a) is 

correct . Although 

not 

the 

district court does not rely on this section, appellee raises the 

notion that this section, requiring the exhaustion of 

administrative remedies prior to filing a claim against the United 

States, must be read in conjunction with 28 U.S.C. § 240l(b). The 

language of § 2675(a) specifically states, however: "The 

provisions of this subsection shall not apply to such claims as 

may be asserted under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by 

third party complaint, cross-claim, or counterclaim." Therefore, 

as the district court recognized, the viability of defendants' 

counterclaim rests solely on whether it meets the statutorily 

mandated time requirements laid out in 28 U.S . C. § 2401(b) . 

A counterclaim that seeks affirmative relief is an 

independent cause of action and must comply with 

statute of limitations. Hurst v . United 

Education, 901 F.2d 836 (10th 

limitations under§ 2401(b) reads: 

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Cir. 1990). 

the applicable 

States Dept. o f 

The statute of 

Appellate Case: 92-2128 Document: 010110155928 Date Filed: 12/30/1992 Page: 3 
A t o rt c l aim against the United States shall be 

f o rever barred unless it is presented in writing t o the 

appropriate Federal agency within two years after such 

claim acc rues o r unless action is begun within six 

months after the date of mailing, by c ertified or 

registered mail, of notice of final denial o f the claim 

by the agency t o which it was presented. 

Appellants c ontend that a l though no action was taken wi t h in the 

two -year time frame , the statute of limitations shoul d not bar 

recovery since they filed the suit within six months after final 

denial of their claim by the agency. 

We find no tort claim for the purposes of§ 240l (b ) was ever 

filed with the FHA. Although appellants engaged in nume r ous 

verbal and written communications with the agency, they never 

specifically executed a written notification of the incident 

accompanied by a claim for money damages for sum certain, as 

required by 28 C.F.R. § 14.2 (a) 2 Defendants' exhibits B-S, which 

accompanied defendants' response to the motion to dismiss t he 

countercl aim, contain communications between Mr. Alexander and the 

FHA as well as other governmental and legislative entities. 

Although Mr. Alexander was quite clear in his disapproval of the 

handling of his situation, not once did he file an administrative 

2 28 C.F . R. § 14.2 (a ) reads in pertinent part: 

For purposes of the provisions of 28 U. S.C. 

240l (b ) , 2672, and 2675, a claim shall be deemed to have 

been presented when a Federal agency receives from a 

claimant, his duly authorized agent or legal 

representative, an executed Standard Form 95 or other 

written notification of an incident, accompanied by a 

claim for money damages in a sum certain for injury t o 

or loss of property, personal injury, or d eath alleged 

t o have occurred by reason of the incident .... 

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Appellate Case: 92-2128 Document: 010110155928 Date Filed: 12/30/1992 Page: 4 
claim with the FHA alleging tortious behavior and demanding a sum 

certain in damages. 

Under the FTCA, the Government's waiver of sovereign immunity 

must be narrowly construed and liability cannot be predicated on 

the theory of actual or constructive notice. Dancy v . United 

States, 668 F.2d 1224, 1228 (Ct. Cl. 1982). The proper remedy is 

dismissal if no administrative claim f or sum certain was filed 

within the statutory time period. College v . United States, 572 

F.2d 453 (4th Cir. 1978 ) . Moreover, since we hold that no claim 

was filed, it follows that 

constitute final agency denial 

appellant contends. Instead, 

the letter by Mr. Dickson does not 

of an admini strative claim as 

Mr. Dickson ' s letter is more 

accurately characterized as a refusal to perform an investigation 

or audit. Therefore, appellants' contention that they filed 

within six months after final agency denial of their claim must be 

rejected since no claim was properly filed, nor a corresponding 

denial issued. 

The second alternative issue raised by appellants is that the 

United States' alleged tortious acts were continuous and ongoing. 

The only evidence alleged by appellants in support of this theory 

is that the amount owed was misstated on the original foreclosure 

complaint. A miscalculation on the complaint by the United States 

does not rise to the level of a tort. For there to be a 

continuing t ort, there must be continuing unlawful acts, not just 

continuing i ll effects f rom the alleged original tort. Ward v . 

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Appellate Case: 92-2128 Document: 010110155928 Date Filed: 12/30/1992 Page: 5 
Caulk, 65 0 F.2d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 1981 ) . There appears t o be 

no evidence of continuing unlawful acts: therefore, the 

counterclaim falls outside the statutory time period. 

Third, appellants contend they have alleged the elements 

necessary t o establish estoppel against the Government in their 

counterclaim. Appellants misunderstand the doctrine of estoppel, 

as it is an affirmative defense. We agree with the district court 

that appellants do not assert evidence necessary to meet the 

elements in Lurch v . United States, 719 F.2d 333, 341 {10th Cir. 

1983 ) , cert . denied, 466 U.S. 927 (1984), to estop the Government 

from foreclosure. 

II. 

In challenging the district court's order for s ummary 

judgment on the foreclosure claim, appellants contend the district 

court failed to consider three important grounds for relief in 

this case. First, appellants contend Coleman v. Block, 663 F.S. 

1315 {D.N.D. 1987), prevented FHA from accelerating their loan. 

In actuality, the Coleman case declared, inter alia, that some FHA 

forms used were in violation of due process, barring acceleration 

in those cases until the due process requirements were met. 

Subsequently, this decision was vacated by Coleman v. Lyng, 864 

F.2d 604 (8th Cir. 1988), cert . denied, 493 U.S. 953 (1989 ) , as 

Congress passed the Agricultural Credit Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 

10 0 -233, 101 Stat. 1568 (1988 ) , which in effect carried out the 

intent of the Coleman decision. Appellants do not allege any 

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Appellate Case: 92-2128 Document: 010110155928 Date Filed: 12/30/1992 Page: 6 
facts showing that the Agricultural Credit Act was not correctly 

applied to their foreclosure. 

Second, appellants allege that the relief requested in the 

f oreclosure complaint is contrary to law. Appellants have fail e d 

to demonstrate with any specificity how the law was misapplied in 

the granting of summary judgment. 

Finally, appellants are concerned the United States did not 

furnish the district court with copies of the notes and mortgages 

involved. The notes and mortgages were indeed provided by the 

United States and are part of the record. 

AFFIRMED The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

Entered for the Court: 

WADE BRORBY 

United States Circuit Judge 

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