Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00451/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00451-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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* This matter was determined to be suitable for decision without

oral argument. L.R. 78-230(h).

1 Although Moving Defendants’ motion for a more definite

statement appears in the title of the document, they did not argue this

motion in their papers. Since they have not shown that the motion

should be granted, it is denied.

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARK RISSO; A.R., by and through )

her guardian ad litem, )

) 2:07-cv-451-GEB-DAD

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) ORDER*

)

COUNTY OF EL DORADO; CITY OF )

PLACERVILLE; GARY MATTHIES; GLORIA )

MAGANA; TRUDY KILLIAN; and TODD )

CARVOR, )

)

Defendants. )

)

Defendants County of El Dorado (“the County”), Gary Matthies

(“Matthies”), Gloria Magana (“Magana”), and Trudy Killian (“Killian”)

(collectively, “Moving Defendants”) move to dismiss Plaintiffs Mark

Risso’s (“Risso”) and A.R.’s Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6) and for a more definite statement.1 Six claims for

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2 Although Plaintiffs characterize this claim as a “false

arrest/false imprisonment” claim, under California law, “false arrest

and false imprisonment are not separate torts. False arrest is but one

way of committing a false imprisonment.” McMahon v. Albany Unified Sch.

Dist., 104 Cal. App. 4th 1275, 1282 (2002).

3 Moving Defendants ask that judicial notice be taken of the

(continued...)

2

relief are alleged in the Complaint: (1) Plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983

claim that Matthies and the County violated Plaintiffs’ Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendment rights by removing A.R. from Risso’s custody

without a warrant; (2) Plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim that Moving

Defendants violated Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment rights by

continuing to detain A.R. following her removal; (3) Risso’s First

Amendment claim against Matthies based on Matthies’ communication that

prohibited Risso from contacting A.R.; (4) Risso’s California Civil

Code section 52.1 claim against Matthies and Magana; (5) A.R.’s false

imprisonment claim2 against Matthies, Killian and Magana; and (6)

Plaintiffs’ intentional infliction of emotional distress claims

against Matthies, Killian and Magana. (Compl. ¶¶ 67-96.) 

PLAINTIFFS’ FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

 A.R., who was eight years old during the events alleged in

the Complaint, is the biological child of Risso and Kim Meath

(“Meath”). (Id. ¶¶ 28, 30.) Matthies, Killian and Magana are social

workers employed by the County in its Child Protective Services

(“CPS”) department. (Id. ¶¶ 19, 20, 22.) 

A state court custody order reveals that at all times

relevant to Plaintiffs’ claims, Risso and Meath had joint legal

custody of A.R. but Risso had physical custody of A.R.; Meath was

authorized to visit with A.R. every other weekend, Mother’s Day, and

every other Easter holiday.3

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3(...continued)

“Findings and Order After Hearing” issued in Kimberly Meath, Petitioner,

and Mark Risso, Respondent, San Joaquin County Superior Court, No.

303824, on January 24, 2006, wherein it is stated that Risso and Meath

had joint legal custody of A.R. and Risso had physical custody of A.R.

Judicial notice is taken of these custody determinations. See Santos v.

County of Los Angeles Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 299 F. Supp. 2d

1070, 1075-77 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (taking judicial notice of state court

custody case records in federal civil rights action against social

workers), aff’d 200 Fed. Appx. 681 (9th Cir. 2006). 

3

On Saturday, March 25, 2006, Meath took A.R. to the hospital

to have A.R.’s shoulder examined. (Id. ¶ 31.) During the

examination, a nurse noticed a burn on A.R.’s jaw line. (Id. ¶ 32.) 

The nurse questioned A.R. about the burn and A.R. responded that she

had burned herself with a hair dryer. (Id. ¶ 33.) The nurse

determined that the burn had actually been caused by a car cigarette

lighter; therefore, the nurse made a referral to CPS. (Id. ¶¶ 34-35.)

Matthies responded to the referral. (Id. ¶ 37.) When

Matthies questioned A.R., A.R. again stated she had burned herself

with a hair dryer. (Id.) Matthies then “removed” A.R. from Risso’s

physical custody, without a warrant and without speaking to Risso or

A.R.’s step-mother, and “placed” A.R. in Meath’s sole physical

custody. (Id. ¶¶ 39-40, 50.)

Meath had used illegal drugs the day before this placement,

which usage was on March 24, 2006. (Id. ¶ 40.) When Matthies gave

Meath physical custody of A.R., Matthies knew or should have known of

Meath’s drug use and unstable lifestyle. (Id. ¶¶ 41-42.) Matthies

also had not looked at A.R.’s custody file, which would have provided

information about Meath’s unsuitability as A.R.’s custodian. (Id.

¶ 45.) Further, Matthies had not checked CPS’s own files, which would

have revealed several unfounded allegations made by Meath against

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4 Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that the CPS “implemented and

pursued immediately in the [dependency proceeding] a ‘permanent plan’ of

guardianship and/or adoption of [A.R.] away from her father . . . .”

(Compl. ¶ 59.) Judicial notice is taken of Juvenile Dependency

Petition, In Re A.R., El Dorado County Superior Court, No. PDP20060024

(March 29, 2006).

4

Risso, reflecting Meath’s past attempts to gain greater custody

rights. (Id. ¶ 46.)

After Matthies placed A.R. in Meath’s physical custody, he

had a telephone conversation with Risso during which he informed Risso

of the placement and told Risso not to contact A.R. or Meath, but

instead to call CPS on Monday, March 27, 2006. (Id. ¶¶ 40, 43.)

A.R.’s case was then turned over to Magana and Killian. 

(Id. ¶ 47.) Magana insisted that Risso submit to a drug test and

“threatened that if [Risso] did not submit to a drug test that she

would consider it ‘dirty,’” meaning Magana would presume Risso would

have tested positive for drugs. (Id. ¶ 48.)

A.R. remained in Meath’s custody for approximately 24 hours,

after which A.R. was placed in a shelter where she remained for

several days; later, A.R. was placed in the custody of a paternal

aunt. (Id. ¶ 54.)

Subsequently, Moving Defendants instituted proceedings in

juvenile court on March 29, 2006 to make A.R. a dependent of the court

(“dependency proceedings”).4 (Id. ¶ 59.) Plaintiffs allege this

petition “contained lies, misrepresentations, and omissions of

material fact.” (Id. ¶ 57.) Plaintiffs further allege that during

the dependency proceedings, Defendants made additional fabrications

and misrepresentations to the juvenile court, failed to introduce

exculpatory evidence, and introduced evidence that had been obtained

by duress. (Id. ¶¶ 74, 81-82, 95.)

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5 The Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) dismissal

standards are well known and need not be repeated here.

5

Plaintiffs also allege Defendants placed Risso on various

state and local database registries for perpetrators of child abuse. 

(Id. ¶ 65.)

DISCUSSION5

I. Federal Claims

A. Initial Removal of A.R.

Matthies and the County move for dismissal of Plaintiffs’

claim in which it is alleged that the removal of A.R. from Risso’s

custody without a warrant violated Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment

right of familial association. (Mot. at 5:24-7:14.)

“A parent’s interest in the custody and care of his or her

children is a constitutionally protected liberty interest” under the

Fourteenth Amendment. Woodrum v. Woodward County, 866 F.2d 1121, 1124

(9th Cir. 1989), citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982). 

This right, also characterized as the right of familial association,

prevents a social worker from removing children from their parents’

custody without a warrant, unless the social worker has “reasonable

cause to believe that the child is likely to experience serious bodily

harm in the time that would be required to obtain a warrant.” Rogers

v. County of San Joaquin, 487 F.3d 1288, 1294 (9th Cir. 2007).

Matthies and the County contend that since Risso and Meath

shared joint legal custody of A.R., Matthies did not violate this

right when he placed A.R. in Meath’s sole physical custody. (Mot. at

5:26-6:5.) But since Risso had the right to physical custody of A.R.,

except when Meath was entitled to have A.R., Matthies and the County

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have not shown that Risso was not deprived of that right. Therefore,

the motion to dismiss this claim is denied.

B. Continued Detention of A.R.

Moving Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiffs’ second claim

in which Plaintiffs allege the continued detention of A.R. after her

removal from Risso’s custody and until her return to Risso’s custody

violated Plaintiffs’ familial association right, arguing that “a brief

or temporary separation does not [violate this right].” (Mot. at

9:13-14.)

Since the familial association right includes protection

against temporary separations, Moving Defendants have not shown this

claim should be dismissed. See Rogers, 487 F.3d at 1294 (finding

social workers’ temporary removal of a child from parent’s custody

violated the Fourteenth Amendment).

C. First Amendment Claim

Matthies also seeks dismissal of Risso’s third claim in

which Risso alleges that Matthies’s proscription that Risso not

contact A.R. or Meath violated Risso’s First Amendment rights. (Mot.

at 10:2-3.) Matthies characterizes this claim as a substantive due

process claim, arguing it should be dismissed because “substantive due

process does not guarantee a pleasant tone of voice or courteous

manner.” (Id.) Risso responds that “[t]he point of the allegations

in the complaint is not the tone of the social worker[’s] voice,” but

rather focuses on the social worker’s wield of authority in a manner

that “interfere[d] with [Risso’s] [First] Amendment right of

association with his daughter.” (Opp’n at 4:6-9.) Since it has not

been shown this claim should be dismissed, the motion is denied.

///

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D. Questioning A.R. Without Risso Present

Moving Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ contention that

A.R. should not have been questioned out of Risso’s presence fails to

allege a viable substantive due process claim. (Mot. at 7:17-20.) 

Plaintiffs respond that they make “no such claim.” (Opp’n at 2:9-10.) 

This portion of the motion is denied since it has not been shown to

present a real controversy.

E. The County’s Liability

The County seeks dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims for the

initial removal and continued detention of A.R., arguing that

Plaintiffs have failed to allege sufficient facts to support municipal

liability. (Mot. at 13:27-14:20.) “[A] claim of municipal liability

under section 1983 is sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss even

if the claim is based on nothing more than a bare allegation that the

individual officers’ conduct conformed to official policy, custom, or

practice.” Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621,

624 (9th Cir. 1988). Here, Plaintiffs allege that “as a result of

ineffective, non-existent, or inadequate training and education of

employees, [the County] caused or [was] otherwise responsible for the

acts or omissions of [Matthies, Killian and Magana],” and that the

acts of Matthies, Killian and Magana were “pursuant to a custom,

policy, practice or procedure of [the County].” (Id. ¶¶ 12-13.) 

These allegations are sufficient to withstand the County’s dismissal

motion; therefore, the motion is denied.

F. Absolute Immunity

Matthies, Killian and Magana seek dismissal of Plaintiffs’ 

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims in which Plaintiffs challenge

the initial removal and continued detention of A.R. These Defendants

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argue they are absolutely immune from liability for these claims

because the claims arise from the prosecution of child dependency

proceedings. (Mot. at 12:8-24.) However, “while social workers may

claim absolute immunity for decisions to institute dependency

proceedings and for submissions made to a court, they are not

similarly protected when they take actions to detain juveniles prior

to any dependency proceedings.” Wolf v. County of San Joaquin, 2006

WL 1153755, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2006). Accordingly, Matthies,

Killian and Magana have not shown that they are immune from liability

for the initial removal and the continued detention of A.R. prior to

the dependency proceedings, which are alleged in Plaintiffs’ first and

second claims. 

Further, Matthies, Killian and Magana argue they are

absolutely immune from Plaintiffs’ allegations that, during the

dependency proceedings, these Defendants “failed to challenge a

nurse’s qualifications as an expert on burn etiology, presented false

allegations, failed to address further scars on A.R. and omitted

information about Meath and her boyfriend.” (Mot. at 12:25-13:1.) 

Plaintiffs counter that “those are not the bases of the first and

second [claims],” and instead, these allegations of “dishonesty are

contextual.” (Opp’n at 6:12-16.) In light of Plaintiffs’ response,

Matthies, Killian and Magana have not shown that the absolute immunity

doctrine applies to those allegations.

Therefore, this portion of the motion is denied.

II. State Law Claims

A. State Law Immunities

Matthies, Killian and Magana argue they are immune from

liability for Plaintiffs’ state law claims under California Government

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Code section 821.6, which immunizes them from liability for

instituting a judicial proceeding, and under California Government

Code section 820.2, which immunizes them from liability stemming from

their exercise of discretion. (Mot. at 17:11-20; 19:4-8.)

Section 821.6 provides a public employee immunity from

liability for an “injury caused by his instituting or prosecuting any

judicial or administrative proceeding within the scope of his

employment, even if he acts maliciously and without probable cause.” 

Cal. Gov’t Code § 821.6. However, a public employee has no section

821.6 immunity if he acted with malice in committing perjury,

fabricating evidence, failing to disclose exculpatory evidence, or

obtaining evidence by duress. Id. § 820.21; see Masoud v. County of

San Joaquin, 2006 WL 3251797, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2006) (finding

that upon a motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs’ general allegation that

“[d]efendants are guilty of oppression, fraud, and/or malice” was

“sufficient to invoke the [section 820.21] exception to the general

grant of governmental immunity . . .”). Since Plaintiffs have alleged

that each Defendant acted with malice in “withholding exculpatory or

contradictory information” and in “fabricating . . . the statements of

A.R. and the circumstances surrounding the obtaining of the statements

of A.R. and others in an effort to mislead the court,” the motion

seeking dismissal of Plaintiffs’ state law claims under section 821.6

is denied.

Section 820.2 provides a public employee with immunity from

liability for “an injury resulting from his act or omission where the

act or omission was the result of the exercise of the discretion

vested in him, whether or not such discretion be abused.” Cal. Gov’t

Code § 820.2. This immunity applies “only to deliberate and

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6 The County also moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ state law claims

under California Government Code section 815.2(b). (Mot. at 20:3-12.)

However, none of Plaintiffs’ state law claims are against the County.

(See Compl. ¶¶ 79-96.)

10

considered decisions in which a conscious balancing of the risks took

place.” Caldwell v. Montoya, 10 Cal. 4th 972, 981 (1995). Construing

the allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the

allegations do not show that Matthies, Killian and Magana’s actions

were taken as a result of a deliberate and considered exercise of

discretion. Accordingly, the motion seeking dismissal of Plaintiffs’

state law claims under section 820.2 is denied.6

B. Section 52.1 Claim

Matthies and Magana seek dismissal of Risso’s California

Civil Code section 52.1 claim, arguing that Risso does not allege any

threat of physical harm as required by the statute. (Mot. at 14:21-

15:18.) Risso alleges that the following conduct violated section

52.1(a): Matthies’s communication prohibiting Risso from contacting

A.R. and Magana’s statement that Risso’s refusal to take a drug test

would result in a conclusion that he had used drugs. (Compl. ¶¶ 79-

85.) 

A defendant violates section 52.1(a) if the defendant

“interferes by threats, intimidation, or coercion” with a plaintiff’s

federal or state rights. Section 52.1(j) provides that

[s]peech alone is not sufficient to support an

action brought pursuant to subdivision (a) or (b),

except upon a showing that the speech itself

threatens violence against a specific person or

group of persons; and the person or group of

persons against whom the threat is directed

reasonably fears that, because of the speech,

violence will be committed against them or their

property and that the person threatening violence

had the apparent ability to carry out the threat.

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Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(j). It is “clear that [section 52.1] is meant

to protect against violence or the threat of violence.” Rabkin v.

Dean, 856 F. Supp. 543, 552 (N.D. Cal. 1994). Since Plaintiffs have

not alleged facts showing any violence or threat of violence, Matthies

and Magana’s motion to dismiss Risso’s section 52.1 claim is granted.

C. False Imprisonment

Matthies, Killian and Magana seek dismissal of A.R.’s false

imprisonment claim, arguing that A.R.’s detention was lawful under

California Welfare and Institutions Code section 305. (Mot. at

16:5-9.)

Section 305 provides that a social worker may legally take a

child into protective custody without a warrant if the social worker

has a reasonable belief that the child has suffered or will suffer

child abuse as defined in California Welfare and Institutions Code

section 300, and the child needs immediate medical care or is in

imminent danger of physical or sexual abuse. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code

§ 305(a).

Since it has not been shown that A.R.’s claim should be

dismissed, Matthies, Killian and Magana’s motion to dismiss A.R.’s

false imprisonment claim is denied.

D. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Matthies, Killian and Magana seek dismissal of Plaintiffs’

intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) claims, arguing

that Plaintiffs’ Complaint does not identify any “objectively

unconscionable outrageous or uncivilized conduct to support” the IIED

claims. (Mot. at 17:1-4.) Plaintiffs allege that the following was

outrageous conduct “intended to cause plaintiffs, and did cause

plaintiffs, severe emotional distress”: (1) the removal and continued

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detention of A.R., (2) Matthies’ order that Risso not communicate with

A.R., and (3) Magana’s statement that Risso’s refusal to take a drug

test would result in a finding he had used drugs. (Compl. ¶ 95.) 

Plaintiffs’ allegations are sufficient to withstand this dismissal

motion; therefore, the motion is denied.

III. Placement of Risso on Child Abuse Central Index

Moving Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiffs’

“[a]llegations related to violation of [Risso’s] rights under the

First or Fourteenth Amendments related to placement of his name on

[the State Child Abuse Central Index (“CACI”)].” (Mot. at 12:5-7.) 

Plaintiffs counter that “[Risso’s] placement on the CACI was alleged

as damages, not as a stand-alone cause of action, and therefore there

is no claim to dismiss.” (Opp’n at 4:18-19.) Since this issue has

not been shown to present a real controversy, the motion is denied.

CONCLUSION

For the stated reasons, Matthies and Magana’s motion to

dismiss Risso’s claim alleged under California Civil Code section 52.1

is granted. The remainder of the motion is denied. Plaintiffs are

granted leave to file an amended complaint that amends the dismissed

claim provided that the amended complaint is filed no later than ten

days from the date on which this order is filed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 8, 2008 

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