Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-1_07-cv-00097/USCOURTS-almd-1_07-cv-00097-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 15:1692 Fair Debt Collection Act

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

RUBY STREETER, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 1:07-cv-0097-WKW [wo]

)

OFFICE of DOUGLAS R. )

BURGESS, LLC, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

Before the court are several pending motions filed by Defendant Douglas R. Burgess

(“Burgess”) and Plaintiff Ruby Streeter (“Streeter”) which the court will now consider.

I. MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT

Streeter filed a motion to amend her complaint on October 15, 2007 (Doc. # 39), in

order to add ten defendants who, upon the plaintiff’s information and belief, operate under

a common enterprise and “function[ ] as the alter ego of each other.” (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 22-

23.) In Burgess’s response to the plaintiff’s motion to amend, he argues that the proposed

defendants “have absolutely nothing to do with the account in issue or this case.” (Doc. # 45,

at ¶ 6.) However, the newly proposed defendants can speak for themselves and address these

arguments through their own motions to dismiss or for summary judgment. Therefore,

because leave shall be freely given to amend a complaint “when justice so requires,” it is

ORDERED that the motion to amend the complaint (Doc. # 39) is GRANTED. The

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Amended Complaint (Doc. # 40) is deemed ADMITTED and the plaintiff is DIRECTED to

cause the immediate service of process on the new defendants.

II. MOTION FOR RULE ELEVEN SANCTIONS

On November 21, 2007, Defendant Burgess and Defendant Office of Burgess, LLC

(“Burgess LLC”) filed a motion for sanctions (Doc. # 46) against the plaintiff under Rule 11

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The basis for the defendants’ motion for sanctions

was Streeter’s attempt to add new defendants through her amended complaint. Because the

court today grants Streeter’s motion to amend her complaint, it is ORDERED that the

defendants’ Motion for Sanctions (Doc. # 46) is DENIED. 

III. MOTION TO DISMISS OR, 

IN ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Burgess also filed a Motion to Dismiss or in Alternative Summary Judgment

(Doc. # 47) on November 21, 2007. In his motion to dismiss, Burgess argues that (1) offers

of judgment served on the plaintiff, which were both rejected by virtue of non-response,

moot the plaintiff’s claims; (2) if the plaintiff’s federal claim under the Fair Debt Collection

Practices Act (“FDCPA”) is dismissed as moot, the court should decline supplemental

jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s remaining state claims; and (3) if the plaintiff’s FDCPA claim

is dismissed as moot, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. (See Doc. # 47.) 

Pursuant to Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendant Burgess LLC

made an offer of judgment (“Offer One”) to the plaintiff on September 22, 2007, “for the

sum of $1,100.00 for all statutory damages, $2,900.00 for all actual damages and $6,000.00

Case 1:07-cv-00097-WKW-CSC Document 54 Filed 02/21/08 Page 2 of 8
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for all reasonable attorney fees and costs.” (Doc. # 47-2, at 1.) On October 10, 2007, both

Burgess and Burgess LLC made another offer of judgment (“Offer Two”) “in the amount of

$1,001.00 for all statutory damages, actual damages and any state cause of action damages

in an amount to be determined by the Court, as well as all reasonable attorney fees to date

and costs to be determined by the Court.” (Doc. # 47-2, at 3.) The plaintiff did not respond

to either offer of judgment. 

“Rule 68 allows a defendant to make an offer of judgment; if a plaintiff refuses the

offer and then ultimately recovers less at trial than the offer amount, the plaintiff is required

to pay the costs incurred from the time of the offer.” Ass’n of Disabled Ams. v. Neptune

Designs, Inc., 469 F.3d 1357, 1360 n.4 (11th Cir. 2006). Offers of judgment are interpreted

according to contract law and because of their take-it-or-leave-it nature, courts are “prone to

interpret the language of a Rule 68 offer against the defendant that drafted it.” 12 Charles

Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Richard L. Marcus, Federal Practice and Procedure

§ 3002, at 95-96 (2d ed. 1997). The Eleventh Circuit has adopted this approach because

“‘the plaintiff should not be left in the position of guessing what a court will later hold the

offer means.’” Util. Automation 2000, Inc. v. Choctawhatchee Elec. Coop., Inc., 298 F.3d

1238, 1244 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Webb v. James, 147 F.3d 617, 623 (7th Cir. 1998)).

The defendants argue that their offers of judgment satisfy the plaintiff’s entire demand

and therefore the case has become moot. The defendants cite no opinion from the Eleventh

Circuit Court of Appeals for this proposition and this court is unable to locate one. Other

circuits have held that an offer of judgment for full relief to which the plaintiff is entitled

Case 1:07-cv-00097-WKW-CSC Document 54 Filed 02/21/08 Page 3 of 8
 It appears that a proper offer of judgment for full and complete relief could in some 1

instances render a plaintiff’s claim moot in the Eleventh Circuit as several district courts have

held or agreed. See, e.g., Williams, 2008 WL 203302, at *1; Holcomb v. Mortgage House, Inc.,

No. 06-cv-45, 2007 WL 129008, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 13, 2007); Taylor v. CompUSA, Inc., No.

04-cv-718, 2004 WL 1660937, at *2 (N.D. Ga. July 14, 2004); Mackenzie v. Kindred Hosp. E.,

L.L.C., 276 F. Supp. 2d 1211 (M.D. Fla. 2003). 

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may moot the action. See, e.g., Weiss v. Regal Collections, 385 F.3d 337, 340 (3d Cir. 2004);

Rand v. Monsanto Co., 926 F.2d 596, 597-98 (7th Cir. 1991). Even assuming that an offer

of judgment could render a case moot in the Eleventh Circuit, the two offers by the 1

defendants would not do so.

Offer One capped reasonable attorney fees and costs at $6,000.00. (Doc. # 47-2, at

1.) This offer could not moot the case or controversy because the FDCPA provides for “the

costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney’s fee,” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3),

which could turn out to be greater than $6,000.00. As one court has explained:

[A]n offer of judgment that caps those costs and fees, does not represent more

money than the plaintiff could have received under the statute. As such, [the

defendant’s] offer of judgment, which did cap those costs and fees, did not

offer the maximum amount the plaintiff could recover under the statute.

Accordingly, the plaintiff still has a personal stake in the matter, and a case or

controversy remains. 

Weissman v. ABC Fin. Servs., Inc., 203 F.R.D. 81, 83 (E.D.N.Y. 2001). Although Mackenzie

stands for the proposition that attorney’s fees and costs are collateral matters that do not

prevent an action from becoming moot, 276 F. Supp. 2d at 1218 n.4, it is distinguishable

because in that case the amount of attorney’s fees and costs was not capped. See also

Williams v. McCallum Group Enters., Inc., No. 07-cv-2092, 2008 WL 203302, at *1 (M.D.

Fla. Jan. 23, 2008) (finding uncapped attorney’s fees and costs, limited only to a reasonable

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 The plaintiff correctly points out that actual damages of $38,000 were awarded in a 2

recent FDCPA case in this district. See Thompson v. D.A.N. Joint Venture III, L.P., No. 05-cv938, 2007 WL 1625926 (M.D. Ala. June 5, 2007).

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amount, did not prevent an offer of judgment providing otherwise full relief from mooting

the plaintiff’s claim). Offer One does not leave the amount of attorney’s fees and costs up

to a determination of reasonableness; it caps them at $6,000.00. Therefore, it does not

represent more money than the plaintiff might receive under the FDCPA and does not moot

Streeter’s claim.

Offer One is also ineffective to moot Streeter’s claim because it places an apparently

arbitrary cap of $2,900.00 for all actual damages. (Doc. # 47-2, at 1.) Burgess argues that

the plaintiff “could not possibly recover more than $2,900.00 in actual damages because

‘courts generally award actual damages ranging from $100.00 to $5,000.00.’” (Doc. # 47, 2

at 3 (quoting Milton v. Rosicki, Rosicki & Assocs., P.C., No. 02-cv-3052, 2007 WL 2262893,

at * 4 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2007).) This argument is incomprehensible at best and

disingenuous at worst. First, the argument does not even support Burgess’s position. By this

rationale, assuming it should be applied in the first place, an award of $5,000.00 – well over

the proposed cap of $2,900.00 – is within the range of actual damages that Streeter may

receive. This in itself would establish that Offer One did not offer the maximum amount the

plaintiff could recover under the statute. Second, the plaintiff’s actual damages are unknown

to the court at this time. The plaintiff’s complaint does not specify the amount of her actual

damages. The plaintiff has yet to be deposed and questioned under oath about her damages.

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 Unlike the plaintiff in Mackenzie, Streeter does dispute that the defendants’ offer of 3

judgment is for more than the maximum amount of damages she could recover. See Mackenzie,

276 F. Supp. 2d at 1218; cf. Reyes v. Carnival Corp., No. 04-21861, 2005 WL 4891058, at *3

(S.D. Fla. May 25, 2005) (distinguishing Mackenzie because of the plaintiff’s dispute over the

amount of damages).

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In short, the defendants do not even provide a hint at what the plaintiff’s damages actually

are. Cf. Mackenzie, 276 F. Supp. 2d at 1214 (describing how the defendant based its offer

of judgment for actual damages on the maximum amount of overtime the plaintiff could have

worked according to records produced during discovery). With no information upon which

to rely, the court could not possibly determine that Streeter’s actual damages could only be

less than $2,900.00. See Dell’Orfrano v. IKON Office Solutions, Inc., No. 05-cv-245, 2006 3

WL 2523113, at *1 (M.D. Ga. Aug. 29, 2006) (rejecting defendant’s argument that plaintiff’s

claims were rendered moot by an offer of judgment because the court was unable to make

an appropriate determination to the amount of damages at such an early stage of the

litigation). Offer One does not moot the plaintiff’s claims.

Offer Two does not cap attorney’s fees or costs nor does it cap actual damages.

However, it also fails to moot the controversy because it is ambiguous and does not quantify

the actual damages. Offer Two provides for “$1,001.00 for all statutory damages, actual

damages and any state cause of action damages in an amount to be determined by the Court,

as well as all reasonable attorney fees to date and costs to be determined by the Court.”

(Doc. # 47-2, at 3.) This could be interpreted as (1) an offer of $1,001.00 for statutory

damages only with everything else determined by the court, or maybe (2) $1,001.00 for

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 Importantly, the plaintiff vehemently argues the offer is ambiguous and that the extent 4

of the defendants’ offer is unclear. (Doc. # 52, at 4.)

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statutory and actual damages together, with only the state cause of action damages to be

determined by the court. The defendants drafted the offer of judgment and could have easily 4

separated its clauses through the use of semi-colons or parenthetical numbering to ensure the

offer was unambiguous. The defendants chose not to do so and their ambiguous offer of

judgment suffers accordingly. See Util. Automation 2000, Inc., 298 F.3d at 1243-44. 

The court finds further support for the conclusion that Offer Two is ambiguous

because without specifying the amount of actual damages, the plaintiff would be unable to

properly weigh the risks of continued litigation. An offer of judgment must provide “‘a clear

baseline from which plaintiffs may evaluate the merits of their case relative to the value of

the offer.’” Basha v. Mitsubishi Motor Credit of Am., Inc., 336 F.3d 451, 455 (5th Cir. 2003)

(quoting Thomas v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, 273 F.3d 1124, 1130 (D.C. Cir.

2001)). Because of this, at least one circuit has held that an offer of judgment that does not

properly quantify actual damages is invalid. See Basha, 336 F.3d at 455. Therefore, because

ambiguous offers of judgment are strictly construed against the offeror, Offer Two cannot

serve to moot the plaintiff’s claim. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, it is

ORDERED that Burgess’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. # 47) is DENIED. It is further

ORDERED that Burgess’s Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 47) is

untimely and DENIED without prejudice. 

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IV. LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF DEFENDANT 

OFFICE OF DOUGLAS R. BURGESS, LLC

Upon review of the status of this case, it has come to the court’s attention that Burgess

LLC is currently unrepresented by counsel now that its previous counsel has withdrawn.

(Doc. # 44.) While Burgess may represent himself pro se in this matter because he is an

individual, a limited liability company may not. See, e.g., Nat’l Indep. Theatre Exhibitors,

Inc. v. Buena Vista Distrib. Co., 748 F.2d 602, 609 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding that a

corporation’s sole shareholder could not represent the corporation pro se); Lattanzio v.

COMTA, 481 F.3d 137, 140 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that a limited liability company may

appear in federal court only through a licensed attorney). Therefore, it is ORDERED that

Defendant Burgess LLC obtain appropriate counsel to represent its interests in this matter

on or before March 7, 2008. Once again, the court reminds any new defense counsel that

by entering their appearance in this case, counsel certifies to the court that they will remain

as counsel in the case until final judgment, absent any extraordinary and unforeseeable

circumstances, and should govern themselves accordingly. (See Doc. # 44.)

DONE this 21st day of February, 2008.

 /s/ W. Keith Watkins 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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