Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00338/USCOURTS-casd-3_15-cv-00338-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 864
Nature of Suit: Social Security - SSID Title XVI
Cause of Action: 42:0206 Surgeon General - Assignment of Officers

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSE AVILA-MEJIA,

Plaintiff,

v.

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting 

Commissioner of the Social Security 

Administration, 

Defendant.

Case No.: 15-CV-0338 W (WVG)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR

ATTORNEYS’ FEES PURSUANT TO 

42 U.S.C. § 406(b) [DOC. 30]

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s attorney’s application for attorneys’ fees

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). [Doc. 30.] The Court decides the matter without oral 

argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons that follow, the Court 

GRANTS Plaintiff’s counsel’s motion and awards fees in the amount of $8,800.00, to 

reimburse his client $4,314.47 in previously awarded Equal Access to Justice Act

(“EAJA”) fees.

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I. BACKGROUND

Attorney Vijay Patel, at the law offices of Lawrence Rohlfing, represented Plaintiff 

Jose Avila-Mejia in his appeal of an adverse decision of the Social Security 

Commissioner denying his claim for disability benefits and supplemental security 

income. The Court adopted United States Magistrate Judge Gallo’s Report and 

Recommendation, granted Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, and remanded this 

case for further administrative proceedings. (See March 2, 2016 Order [Doc. 20].) On 

remand, the Commissioner awarded retroactive benefits totaling approximately 

$35,334.00. (See SSA Letter to Rohlfing [Doc. 30-4].) Mr. Rohlfing now moves for an 

award of $8,800.00 in fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). (Rohlfing Mot. [Doc. 30-1].) 

Despite the lapsing of the December 14, 2018 deadline [Doc. 31], no opposition has been 

filed.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under this 

subchapter who was represented before the court by an attorney, the court may 

determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such 

representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to 

which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment, and the Commissioner of 

Social Security may, notwithstanding the provisions of section 405(i) of this title, but 

subject to subsection (d) of this section, certify the amount of such fee for payment 

to such attorney out of, and not in addition to, the amount of such past-due benefits. 

In case of any such judgment, no other fee may be payable or certified for payment 

for such representation except as provided in this paragraph.

42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). “Congress . . . designed § 406(b) to control, not to displace, 

fee agreements between Social Security benefits claimants and their counsel.” Gisbrecht 

v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 793 (2002). “In many cases, . . . the Equal Access to Justice 

Act (EAJA), enacted in 1980, effectively increases the portion of past-due benefits the 

successful Social Security claimant may pocket.” Id. at 796 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2412). 

“Congress harmonized fees payable by the Government under EAJA with fees payable 

under § 406(b) out of the claimant’s past-due Social Security benefits in this manner: Fee 

awards may be made under both prescriptions, but the claimant’s attorney must ‘refun[d] 

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to the claimant the amount of the smaller fee.’ ” Id. (quoting Act of Aug. 5, 1985, Pub.

L. 99–80, § 3, 99 Stat. 186).

“Within the 25 percent boundary, . . . the attorney for the successful claimant must 

show that the fee sought is reasonable for the services rendered.” Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 

807. In making this determination, the Court first looks to the agreement between the 

parties, then may reduce the award depending on “the character of the representation and 

the results the representative achieved.” Id. at 807–08.

III. DISCUSSION

When Plaintiff employed Mr. Rohlfing, he agreed to a contingency fee 

arrangement of 25% of past-due benefits awarded. (See Rohlfing Agreement [Doc. 30-

2].) Mr. Rohlfing now seeks fees of $8,800. (Rohlfing Mot. [Doc. 30-1] 2.) This 

amounts to slightly less than 25% of the $35,334.00 net payable past due benefits 

awarded on remand. (See SSA Letter to Rohlfing [Doc. 30-4].)

Plaintiff’s counsel meets his burden of demonstrating that the fees requested are 

reasonable. See Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1151 (9th Cir. 2009) (applying 

Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808). First, there is nothing to suggest that the quality of Mr. 

Patel’s work was substandard. He achieved favorable results for his client and recovered 

substantial past-due benefits for Plaintiff. Second, no reduction for unreasonable delay is 

warranted. See id. at 1151–52. Third, the amount of the fees is not excessive. Mr. Patel

worked 21.3 hours on this case, which yields an hourly rate of approximately $413.15. 

This is not unreasonable, and it compensates for the risk the firm took in working the 

case on a contingent fee. (See Patel Invoice [Doc. 30-5].) See id. at 1145–54 (reversing 

three award reductions that had begun with a lodestar calculation rather than using the 

agreed-upon percentage as a starting point) (“To aid the district court’s evaluation of his 

request, Shapiro noted that the fee he requested was equivalent to 3.55 times the lodestar 

calculation and reasonably accounted for the risk he assumed in representing his client on 

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a contingent-fee basis.”) Had there been no recovery, there would have been no fee. 

(See Avila-Mejia Agreement [Doc. 30-2].)

In light of the character of Mr. Patel’s representation and the favorable results 

achieved, the figure is a reasonable one, and no downward adjustment is appropriate. See

Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808. 

Mr. Rohlfing will be awarded $8,800. Per the terms of the motion and in 

accordance with the relevant statutory schemes, Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796, Rohlfing will 

reimburse his client for the previously awarded amount of $4,314.47 in EAJA fees.

IV. CONCLUSION & ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s attorney’s application

for attorneys’ fees. [Doc. 30.]

Mr. Rohlfing is awarded $8,800 in attorneys’ fees. He will reimburse Mr. AvilaMejia $4,314.47 for EAJA fees previously paid by the Commissioner.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 9, 2019

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