Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01783/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01783-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FREDDIE CARL SPRINKLE,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-05-1783 MCE DAD P

vs.

THOMAS L. CAREY, 

Respondent. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding through counsel with an application for

writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges former Governor

Davis’ reversal of the 2002 decision by the California Board of Parole Hearings (hereinafter

“Board”) granting petitioner parole. In addition, petitioner challenges the Board’s subsequent

decisions in 2003 and 2004 finding him unsuitable for parole. Before the court is petitioner’s

motion for partial summary judgment in which he argues that the record contains no evidence

supporting either Governor Davis’ reversal or the Board’s subsequent decisions. Respondent has

filed an opposition. Petitioner has filed a reply. 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Pursuant to a negotiated disposition, petitioner entered a plea of guilty to seconddegree murder and was sentenced on August 29, 1987, in the Lassen County Superior Court to

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 Petitioner alleges that at his trial the jury acquitted him of the first-degree murder 1

charge and failed to reach a verdict on the lesser included offense of second-degree murder as

well as on all other counts against him. (Pet. at 2.) Thereafter, he negotiated the plea that was

eventually entered. 

 Petitioner claims that the separation was unexpected and caused him to fall into an 2

“emotional and physical nose-dive” in which he drank, used drugs and did not sleep. (Pet’r’s

Mot. for Summ. J. at 5.) 

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fifteen years to life in state prison. (Pet. Ex. A.) Petitioner entered the California Department of 1

Corrections and Rehabilitation on September 1, 1987, to begin serving his term and became

eligible for release on parole on December 16, 1996. (Pet’r’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 5.) 

The circumstances of petitioner’s offense of conviction are essentially as follows.

In 1986, petitioner’s wife had separated from him. Petitioner saw his wife’s truck parked on the 2

roadside, drove up next to it to speak with her and discovered that she was with the victim, Don

Pilger, who had previously stayed at the couples’ home. Petitioner pointed a gun at Pilger and

ordered him to get out of the car. The events that immediately followed were unclear but, as a

result, petitioner shot Pilger in the head and killed him. Petitioner left the scene with his wife

and his passenger. They drove towards Reno where petitioner eventually dropped off his wife

and his passenger and turned himself in at a Reno police station. (Id.) 

In 2002, the Board unanimously found petitioner suitable parole. (Pet. at 12-13.) 

That same year, however, then-Governor Davis reversed the Board’s decision. (Pet. at 13.) The

Governor reasoned that petitioner demonstrated a wanton disregard for human suffering and

caused great bodily injury. (Id. at 14.) In addition, the Governor explained that petitioner had

been involved in a previous assault involving a firearm, anger and alcohol, in which he struck out

at his girlfriend’s father and fired a gun at her uncle. (Id.) Finally, the Governor expressed

concern regarding petitioner’s substance abuse, his continued assertion that the shooting which

led to his conviction was accidental, and his ability to control his anger. (Id. at 14-15.) 

In 2003 and 2004, the Board held parole hearings and found petitioner unsuitable

for parole. (Pet’r’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 11-12.) In 2003, the Board reasoned that petitioner

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carried out his offense in a rather uncaring and unfeeling manner and that his motive in

committing the crime was inexplicable or very trivial in relationship to the offense. (Id.) In

addition, the Board cited petitioner’s previous assault involving a gun. (Id.) In 2004, the Board

similarly reasoned that petitioner carried out his offense in an especially cruel and callous manner

and his motive was inexplicable or very trivial. (Id. at 14.) In addition, the Board found that

petitioner’s offense involved multiple victims because his estranged wife was present when he

shot Mr. Pilger. (Id.) 

On June 4, 2003, petitioner filed a habeas petition in the San Joaquin County

Superior Court, challenging the Governor’s reversal of the Board’s 2002 parole grant on due

process grounds. (Pet. at 3.) The court denied the petition, holding that there was “some”

evidence supporting the Governor’s decision. (Id., Attach.) The Superior Court cited the same

reasons relied on by the Governor, including petitioner’s wanton disregard for human suffering

and the previous incident involving a gun. (Id.) Petitioner then sought habeas relief from the

California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District. That court summarily denied his

petition. (Id. at 3 & Attach.) 

On February 24, 2003, petitioner filed a habeas petition with the California

Supreme Court, challenging on due process grounds both the Governor’s reversal of the Board’s

2002 decision granting parole and the Board’s 2003 decision denying him parole. (Pet. at 4.) On

October 18, 2004, petitioner filed another habeas petition in the California Supreme Court,

challenging the Board’s 2004 decision denying him parole as violating due process. (Id.) On

July 20, 2005, the California Supreme Court summarily denied petitioner’s challenges to all three

parole denials. (Id. at 3-4; Resp’t’s Opp’n to Pet’r’s Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. G.) 

On September 7, 2005, petitioner filed the instant federal petition for writ of

habeas corpus. On September 5, 2006, this court denied respondent’s second amended motion to

dismiss and ordered respondent to file a new response to the habeas petition. On November 2,

2006, respondent filed an answer. On December 4, 2006, petitioner filed a traverse. On March

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15, 2007, petitioner filed a motion for partial summary judgment, arguing that the record contains

no evidence supporting the Governor’s 2002 reversal of the Board’s decision granting him parole

nor does any evidence support the Board’s subsequent denials of parole in 2003 and 2004. On

April 20, 2007, respondent filed an opposition to the motion. On April 30, 2007, petitioner filed

a reply. On March 4, 2007, the undersigned heard oral arguments from the parties and took the

matter under submission.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT APPLICABILITY

The Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts

establish that “[t]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to the extent that they are not inconsistent

with these rules, may be applied, when appropriate, to petitions filed under these rules.” Rule 11,

Rules Governing § 2254 Cases (emphasis added). Thus, summary judgment motions have been

found appropriate in habeas corpus proceedings. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 80 (1977);

Clark v. Johnson, 202 F.3d 760, 764-65 (5th Cir. 2000) (“As a general principle, Rule 56 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, relating to summary judgment, applies with equal force in the

context of habeas corpus cases.”). The court is not bound in habeas proceedings, however, to

“systematically apply traditional rules governing civil proceedings when to do so would be

inconsistent with the overriding purpose of the federal habeas corpus statute.” Brown v.

Vasquez, 952 F.2d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 1991). Nonetheless, the court finds this action

appropriate for resolution by way of motion for summary judgment. The facts are not in dispute, 

there is no request or need for discovery and the underlying petition is fully briefed and stands

submitted for decision.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS

Normally in civil cases, summary judgment is appropriate when it is demonstrated

that there exists “no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

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Under summary judgment practice, the moving party 

always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court

of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of “the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). “[A]

complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case

necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. In such a circumstance, summary judgment

should be granted, “so long as whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard

for entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied.” Id. at 323.

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to the

opposing party to establish that a genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. See

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). In attempting to

establish the existence of this factual dispute, the opposing party may not rely upon the

allegations or denials of its pleadings but is required to tender evidence of specific facts in the

form of affidavits and/or admissible discovery material, in support of its contention that the

dispute exists. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11. The opposing party

must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome

of the suit under the governing law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986); T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir.

1987).

Thus, summary judgment is appropriate in the typical civil case when it is

demonstrated that there exists no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Adickes v. S.H. Kress

& Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970); Owens v. Local No. 169, 971 F.2d 347, 355 (9th Cir. 1992).

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THE ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES

I. Petitioner’s Motion

Petitioner argues that former Governor Davis’ reversal of the Board’s 2002

decision granting him parole, as well as the Board’s subsequent decisions in 2003 and 2004

finding him unsuitable for parole, deprived him of his liberty without due process of law because

none of the decisions were based on sufficient evidence. (Pet’r’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 3.) 

Petitioner asserts that the record reviewed by the state courts is before this court and constitutes

the undisputed facts upon which this court can decide the pending motion for partial summary

judgment. (Id.) He argues that this court may grant his motion if it finds that the state court

decisions denying him habeas relief were contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of

clearly established federal law and/or resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in state court proceedings. (Pet’r’s

Mot. for Summ. J. at 16.) 

Petitioner argues that a governor may reverse a parole grant only if he “reasonably

believes that the gravity of the commitment offense indicates a continuing danger to the public

safety” and there is “some evidence” to support that decision. (Pet’r’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 16-

17.) Petitioner maintains in this regard that “the sole basis for denying parole to a life prisoner in

California is if there is evidence that reasonably supports the conclusion that he currently

presents an unreasonable risk of danger to the public if released.” (Id. at 17.) Specifically,

petitioner argues that, under California law, an assessment of present dangerousness depends on

post-offense developments. (Id.) 

Petitioner contends that he was sentenced to fifteen years to life in prison, has

served almost twenty-one years in prison and that twenty-two years have passed since he

committed his offense. (Id.) He notes that the 2002 parole hearing marked his third such hearing

and that he had served his minimum term of fifteen years in prison at the time of the former

Governor’s reversal of the Board’s decision granting him parole. (Id.) Petitioner emphasizes

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that, unlike the petitioner in Irons v. Carey, 505 F.3d 846, 853-54 (9th Cir. 2007), he had served

his minimum term at the time of the Governor’s reversal and had served more than his minimum

term when the Board denied him parole in 2003 and 2004. (Id. at 19.) Petitioner contends he has

also exhibited strong rehabilitation. (Id. at 19-20.) He argues that the state’s conclusion that he

presented an unreasonable risk of danger to the public if released in 2002, 2003 and 2004 lacks

evidentiary support reasonably related to the conclusions reached. (Id. at 22.) 

Petitioner takes issue with respondent’s argument that his commitment offense

provides “some evidence” to support the parole denials because, petitioner explains, respondent

never articulates how the commitment offense in this case supports the parole denials. (Id. at 22-

23.) Petitioner contends that the only possible link between the commitment offense and his

present suitability for parole are statements by the Board and the former Governor suggesting that

he has minimized, or not fully accepted responsibility for, his offense and his substance abuse or

that he has not adequately addressed his anger and stress management issues. (Pet’r’s Mot. for

Summ. J. at 23.) However, petitioner argues that there is absolutely no evidence that he

minimizes his offense conduct simply because he maintains that he did not intend to kill Mr.

Pilger. (Id. at 23-24.) In addition, petitioner notes that he has not had a single disciplinary or

counseling reprimand while incarcerated and has participated in AA, NA, and Straight Life. (Id.

at 23.) Finally, petitioner points out that reports and psychiatric evaluations state that he has in

fact developed the ability to deal with anger and stress and conclude that he would pose little to

no risk to the public if released on parole. (Id.) 

Petitioner emphasizes that the underlying facts of his offense of commitment are

static, occurred almost twenty-two years ago and will never change. (Pet’r’s Mot. for Summ. J.

at 25.) Petitioner concludes that nothing about his crime suggests that he currently presents an

exceptional danger if paroled. (Id. at 26.) Accordingly, petitioner requests that the court grant

his motion for partial summary judgment and grant him habeas relief. (Id. at 27.) 

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 Rather than providing opposition to the arguments advanced in petitioner’s motion for 3

summary judgment, respondent has elected to file the same memorandum and points and

authorities that he filed with his answer to the petition. Accordingly, respondent has

unnecessarily addressed petitioner’s ex post facto and Eighth Amendment claims which are not

raised by petitioner as grounds for granting summary judgment in his favor. 

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II. Respondent’s Opposition

Respondent opposes petitioner’s motion on both procedural and substantive

grounds. First, respondent opposes the motion because petitioner failed to include a statement of

undisputed facts with his motion for summary judgment as required by Local Rule 56-260(a). 

Respondent also complains about petitioner’s attempt to expedite review of his habeas petition

by moving for partial summary judgment, noting that in the pending motion counsel for

petitioner has merely reiterated the arguments already contained in the previously filed petition

and traverse. (Resp’t’s Opp’n to Pet’r’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 2.) 

Respondent also opposes the motion on the merits, arguing (1) petitioner’s due

process rights have not been violated; (2) the state court properly found that the Board’s decision

denying petitioner parole was supported by some evidence; (3) the state courts properly rejected

petitioner’s argument that the Governor’s reversal of the Board’s parole decision constituted an

unlawful ex post facto application of the law; and (4) the Board’s subsequent parole decisions

did not violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. (Resp’t’s 3

Opp’n to Pet’r’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 2.) 

Respondent contends that this court should deny petitioner relief because the

California Supreme Court’s summary denial of his habeas petition was a judgment on the merits

that was not contrary to, nor involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal

law. (Resp’t’s Opp’n to Pet’r’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 3.) Respondent asserts that this state court

decision is entitled to deference and was not contrary to clearly established federal law with

respect to the protections due inmates in the parole process since the Board afford petitioner the

opportunity to be heard and advised him of the reasons for the unsuitability finding. (Id. at 3-5.) 

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 As noted, respondent advances two arguments addressing claims included in the 4

pending petition but upon which petitioner has not sought summary judgment. (Resp’t’s Opp’n

to Pet’r’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 6.) First, respondent argues that the Board’s decision to deny

petitioner parole does not constitute an ex post facto application of law under the holding in

Johnson v. Gomez, 92 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 1996). (Id.) Next, respondent argues that the denial of

parole to petitioner does not violate the Eighth Amendment so long as his sentence does not

exceed the statutory maximum. (Id.) These arguments need not be addressed by the court. 

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Respondent also argues that even if the denial of parole is required to meet the “some evidence”

test as petitioner claims, the decisions here meet that test. (Id. at 5.) Respondent points to the

determination of the San Joaquin County Superior Court in which that court explained:

[t]he Governor noted that this incident was not Petitioner’s first

incident involving guns, anger and alcohol. The Governor added

that he remains concerned over Petitioner’s ability to control his

anger, citing Petitioner’s 1997 exclusion from the Straight Life

program for being ‘highly confrontational.’ Thus, there is ‘some’

evidence, which supports the Governor’s decision.

(Id. at 6.) 

Respondent next contends that petitioner’s commitment offense, shooting an

innocent man in a jealous rage, constitutes “some evidence” supporting the Governor’s decision

to deny him parole since there are elements present in petitioner’s offense that go beyond the

minimum necessary to support his second degree murder conviction. (Id.) In particular,

respondent points to petitioner’s trivial motive and asserts that multiple victims were harmed by

petitioner since his estranged wife witnessed the shooting. (Id.)4

III. Petitioner’s Reply

 Petitioner maintains that proceeding by way of summary judgment is appropriate

and that he has satisfied the requirements of the local rules. He acknowledges that he filed this

motion to obtain a speedy adjudication of his claims but observes that the court’s resolution of

his claim that the decisions denying him parole are not supported by “some evidence” will result

in his release and conserve both judicial and fiscal resources. (Pet’r’s Reply at 3.) 

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Petitioner argues that respondent’s due process arguments are completely

misplaced. (Pet’r’s Reply at 4.) In this regard, petitioner contends, respondent has confused an

inmate’s procedural due process rights at a parole hearing with the standards applicable to

judicial review of parole decisions. (Id. at 5.) Here, petitioner contends that both state and

federal law require that “some evidence” support a decision to deny a prisoner parole. (Id.) 

Petitioner also reiterates that the state’s continued reliance on dated offense

conduct even after a prisoner has served the minimum number of years required by his sentence

and demonstrates longstanding rehabilitation, may violate due process. (Id. at 7.) Petitioner

rebuffs respondent’s argument that the decisions of the former Governor and the Board denying

him parole properly relied upon a previous assaultive incident, the finding that he was

confrontational while participating in the Straight Life Program while imprisoned, and the claim

that the circumstances of his crime involved more than the minimum acts necessary to support

his conviction for second-degree murder. (Pet’r’s Reply at 8.) First, petitioner explains that the

previous incident involving a gun referred to in the decisions occurred thirty-one years ago and

that in the incident he was fired upon first. (Id.) Furthermore, petitioner argues it remains

unclear whether he suffered any conviction stemming from this aged incident, but if he did, the

most that was involved was a misdemeanor suspended sentence and that the matter was nowhere

near the seriousness attributed to it by the state. (Id.) In addition, petitioner contends that his

commitment offense did not involve “multiple victims” merely because it occurred in the

presence of his estranged wife since there was no evidence that he pointed the gun at his wife or

committed any offense against her at the time of the shooting . (Id. at 9.) 

As to his motive for committing the crime, petitioner claims that his case is like

others in which a husband has acted irrationally in killing his wife’s boyfriend in anger. (Id. at 9-

10.) Counsel contends on petitioner’s behalf that, under these circumstances, the motive for the

offense cannot be fairly characterized as either inexplicable or trivial. (Id.) Finally, petitioner

contends that the Governor’s concern regarding petitioner’s ability to control his anger based on

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the cited incident during his participation in the Straight Life Program was not supported by

some evidence. (Id. at 11.) Petitioner points out that he was reinstated to the program shortly

after the incident, indicating that the decision to terminate him was ill-considered and that there

was a valid explanation for what had occurred. (Id.) 

ANALYSIS

I. Standard of Review Applicable to Habeas Corpus Claims

A writ of habeas corpus is available under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 only on the basis of

some transgression of federal law binding on the state courts. See Peltier v. Wright, 15 F.3d 860,

861 (9th Cir. 1993); Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Engle v.

Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 119 (1982)). A federal writ is not available for alleged error in the

interpretation or application of state law. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991);

Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000); Middleton, 768 F.2d at 1085. Habeas

corpus cannot be utilized to try state issues de novo. Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 377

(1972). 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the court cannot grant a writ of habeas corpus unless the

state court’s adjudication of petitioner’s due process claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as

determined by the United States Supreme Court; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state

court judgment. Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). Where the state

court reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, a

federal habeas court independently reviews the record to determine whether habeas corpus relief

is available under section 2254(d). Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003);

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Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000). When it is clear that a state court has not

reached the merits of a petitioner’s claim, or has denied the claim on procedural grounds, the

AEDPA’s deferential standard does not apply and a federal habeas court must review the claim

de novo. Nulph v. Cook, 333 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2003); Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160,

1167 (9th Cir. 2002).

In this case, the California Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court

summarily denied petitioner’s habeas petitions challenging the 2002 reversal of the Board

decision granting him parole. (Pet. at 3-4.) Similarly, the California Supreme Court summarily

denied petitioner’s habeas petition challenging the Board’s subsequent 2003 and 2004 decisions

to deny him parole. (Id. at 4-5.) The orders issued by each of these courts is “an unexplained

order,” i.e., “an order whose text or accompanying opinion does not disclose the reason for the

judgment.” Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 802 (1991). When confronted with a state

court’s unexplained order, the federal court applies the following presumption: “Where there has

been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim, later unexplained orders upholding

that judgment or rejecting the same claim rest upon the same ground.” Ylst, 501 U.S. at 803. In

applying this look-through presumption, unexplained orders are given no effect. Id. at 804. See

also Bains v. Cambra, 204 F.3d 964, 970-71, 973-78 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that where the

highest state court to reach the merits of a habeas petition issued a summary opinion that does not

explain the rationale of its decision, federal court review under § 2254(d) is of the last explained

state court opinion to reach the merits). 

With respect to petitioner’s challenge to the former Governor’s 2002 reversal of

the Board’s decision to grant parole, the San Joaquin County Superior Court issued the only

order setting forth reasons for denying habeas relief to petitioner. In light of the Superior Court’s

reasoned judgment, the court will look through the later unexplained California Court of Appeal

and California Supreme Court decisions to analyze whether the reasoned state judgment was

erroneous. See Hayward v. Marshall, 512 F.3d 536, 541 (9th Cir. 2008).

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With respect to petitioner’s challenge to the subsequent denials of parole by the

Board in 2003 and 2004, the California Supreme Court summarily denied petitioner’s only

habeas petitions challenging those decisions. As such, the court will conduct an “independent

review of the record” to determine whether the state court’s decision was objectively reasonable. 

Himes, 336 F.3d at 853; Greene v. Lambert, 288 F.3d 1081, 1088-89 (9th Cir. 2002); Delgado,

223 F.3d at 981-82. 

II. Petitioner’s 2002 Denial of Parole

A. Former Governor Davis’ Reversal of the Board’s 2002 Decision

As noted above, in 2002 the Board granted petitioner parole but then-Governor

Davis reversed the Board’s decision. The Governor explained his rationale as follows: 

Mr. Sprinkle demonstrated a wanton disregard for human

suffering and caused great bodily injury. Mr. Sprinkle not only

confronted Mr. Pilger while holding a loaded firearm, he went so

far as to cock the gun. And Mr. Pilger was not his only victim. 

His act of violence caused trauma to Mrs. Sprinkle, who had to

witness first hand, the death of her friend.

This was not Mr. Sprinkle’s first assault involving guns,

anger and alcohol. In 1976, he was arrested in Carson City,

Nevada for felony coercion, kidnapping, battery with a deadly

weapon, and assault with intent to commit murder. According to

Mr. Sprinkle, he was very drunk when he got into an argument

with his girlfriend and her family. He struck out at her father and

fired a gun at her uncle. In the 1990 psychological evaluation, Mr.

Sprinkle claimed that the charges were reduced to a simple assault. 

Although there is no official record, Mr. Sprinkle claimed that he

received a six-month sentence, which was stayed.

I find it troubling that in his psychological evaluations, Mr.

Sprinkle admits to using methamphetamine, cocaine and alcohol

the day before his life crime, yet denies having a substance abuse

problem. In 1998, the Board of Prison Terms recommended that

he get more Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous

programming so he could demonstrate a greater knowledge of the

12-step program at the next parole suitability hearing. In 2000, the

psychological evaluator noted that Mr. Sprinkle’s “reentry to the

free community must include abstinence from and monitoring of

alcohol and drugs.” Yet, I question Mr. Sprinkle’s sincerity in

addressing his substance abuse problems. At the 2002 parole

suitability hearing, when asked why he attended Alcoholics

Anonymous, he simply said, “the Board asked me to.” I believe

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additional time should be spent in substance abuse programs to

ensure that Mr. Sprinkle understands fully the need to maintain an

alcohol and drug free lifestyle.

Mr. Sprinkle’s continued assertion that the shooting was

accidental is also disconcerting. He pled guilty to second-degree

murder not involuntary manslaughter. In the last psychological

evaluation in 2000, the evaluator noted “there is an element of

denial and rationalization” in Mr. Sprinkle’s life. That denial has

persisted. At the 2002 parole suitability hearing, Mr. Sprinkle

testified that picking up that gun, “wasn’t a conscious act . . . I

don’t even remember picking it up.” Equally disturbing is his

inability to provide consistent details about the discharge of the

gun. I view this as a failure to accept responsibility for his actions,

which is an indication that he may still pose a risk to public safety

if released at this time.

I am greatly concerned about Mr. Sprinkle’s ability to

control his anger given the impulsive nature of the life crime. In

2001, the Board of Prison Terms found Mr. Sprinkle unsuitable for

parole because he “continues to be [an] unpredictable threat to

others.” Therapy was recommended to help him cope with stress

in a nondestructive manner. As he testified at the 2002 hearing, he

grabbed for a gun because he was “overcome by anger.” Although

he recognized that anger was the cause for the shooting, I am

concerned that he has not had sufficient programming in anger

management to develop and maintain coping skills. As recent as

1997, there was still some indication that he needed improvement. 

He was excluded from participation in the Straight Life Program

for being “highly confrontational” with a guest. I believe Mr.

Sprinkle would benefit from participation in anger management

programs to help him learn how to control his anger. 

The Lassen County District Attorney’s Office is opposed to

Mr. Sprinkle’s parole. In a letter dated February 27, 2002, the

District Attorney’s Office stated, “we believe that Mr. Sprinkle

would still pose an unpredictable threat to society.” 

I believe Mr. Sprinkle would benefit from additional

incarceration and additional participation in substance abuse

programs, anger management programs, self-help programs, and

individual therapy. Without additional time spent in these areas, I

believe Mr. Sprinkle continues to pose a significant risk of danger

to public safety if released at this time. Accordingly, I REVERSE

the Board of Prison Terms’ decision to parole Mr. Sprinkle. 

(Resp’t’s Opp’n to Pet’r’s Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. C.)

/////

/////

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B. State Court Review of Former-Governor Davis’ Decision

As noted above, petitioner filed a state habeas petition in the San Joaquin County

Superior Court, challenging the Governor’s reversal as a violation of due process. The Superior

Court denied relief, explaining:

In In re Johnny Arafiles (1992) 6 C.A.4th 1467, the court

concluded that the review authorized by section 8(b) and Penal

Code section 3041.2 is confined to a reexamination and

consideration of the administrative record before the BPT . . . . A

habeas proceeding is in the nature of a collateral attack and [an

order] that is collaterally attacked carries with it a presumption of

regularity . . . . In the absence of such evidence, we must presume

the Governor properly performed his review function within the

constitutional and statutory framework. Ibid @ 1478. (internal

quotations omitted) 

Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations, section 2402

provides the guidelines for parole consideration. Circumstances

tending to show unsuitability are listed and include consideration of

the commitment offense and whether the crime was committed in a

heinous or cruel manner and whether the motive for the crime was

trivial in relation to the offense. The importance attached to any

circumstance or combination of circumstances “is left to the

judgment of the panel” and in this case, the Governor.

The record reflects that the Governor reversed the parole

decision citing the fact that Petitioner “demonstrated wanton

disregard for human suffering and caused great bodily injury.” The

Governor noted that this incident was not Petitioner’s first incident

involving guns, anger and alcohol. The Governor added that he

remains concerned over Petitioner’s ability to control his anger

citing Petitioner’s 1997 exclusion from the Straight Life program

for being “highly confrontational.”

Thus, there is “some” evidence which supports the

Governor’s decision.

(Resp’t’s Answer, Ex. O.) 

C. Federal Habeas Review of State Parole Decisions

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits state action that

deprives a person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. A person alleging due

process violations must first demonstrate that he or she was deprived of a liberty or property

interest protected by the Due Process Clause and then show that the procedures attendant upon

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the deprivation were not constitutionally sufficient. Kentucky Dep’t of Corrections v.

Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1989); McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 900 (9th Cir.

2002).

A protected liberty interest may arise from either the Due Process Clause of the

United States Constitution or state laws. Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 373 (1987). 

The United States Constitution does not, of its own force, create a protected liberty interest in a

parole date even one that has been set. Jago v. Van Curen, 454 U.S. 14, 17-21 (1981). However,

“a state’s statutory scheme, if it uses mandatory language, ‘creates a presumption that parole

release will be granted’ when or unless certain designated findings are made, and thereby gives

rise to a constitutional liberty interest.” McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 901 (quoting Greenholtz v.

Inmates of Nebraska Penal, 442 U.S. 1, 12 (1979)). In this regard, it is clearly established that

California’s parole scheme gives rise to a cognizable liberty interest in release on parole even for

prisoners who have not already been granted a parole date. Hayward v. Marshall, 512 F.3d 536,

542 (9th Cir. 2008); Sass v. Cal. Bd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 2006);

Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 910, 914 (9th Cir. 2003); McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 903. Accordingly,

this court must examine whether the deprivation of petitioner’s liberty interest in this case

violated due process. 

Because “parole-related decisions are not part of the criminal prosecution, the full

panoply of rights due a defendant in such a proceeding is not constitutionally mandated.”

Jancsek v. Oregon Bd. of Parole, 833 F.2d 1389, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987) (internal quotations and

citation omitted). Where, as here, parole statutes give rise to a protected liberty interest, due

process is satisfied in the context of a hearing to set a parole date where a prisoner is afforded

notice of the hearing, an opportunity to be heard and, if parole is denied, a statement of the

reasons for the denial. Id. at 1390 (quoting Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 16). See also Morrissey v.

Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (describing the procedural process due in cases involving 

parole issues). Violation of state mandated procedures will constitute a due process violation

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 Under California law, the Governor must use the same factors as the Board when 5

considering whether to reverse a grant of parole. Hayward v. Marshall, 512 F.3d 536, 542 (9th

Cir. 2008). Specifically, under California Penal Code § 3041(a), “a life prisoner shall be found

unsuitable for parole if in the judgment of the panel the prisoner will pose an unreasonable risk

of danger to society if released from prison.” In reviewing this regulation, the Ninth Circuit has

observed:

“[t]he test is not whether some evidence supports the reasons the

Governor cites for denying parole, but whether some evidence

indicates a parolee’s release unreasonably endangers public safety. 

Some evidence of the existence of a particular factor does not

necessarily equate to some evidence the parolee’s release

unreasonably endangers the public safety.” 

 

Hayward, 512 F.3d at 543 (quoting In re Lee, 143 Cal. App. 4th 1400, 1408 (2006)). See also

Jancsek v. Or. Bd. of Parole, 833 F.2d 1389, 1390 (9th Cir. 1987) (due process is satisfied if

some evidence supports the decision). 

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only if the violation causes a fundamentally unfair result. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 65.

In California, the setting of a parole date for a state prisoner is conditioned on a

finding of suitability. Cal. Penal Code § 3041; Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §§ 2401 & 2402. The

requirements of due process in the parole suitability setting are satisfied “if some evidence

supports the decision.” McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 904 (citing Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S.

445, 456 (1985)); Powell v. Gomez, 33 F.3d 39, 40 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Perveler v. Estelle,

974 F.2d 1132, 1134 (9th Cir. 1992)). It is this “some evidence” standard that lies at the heart of

petitioner’s claims in this case and upon which he moves for summary judgment in his favor. 

For purposes of AEDPA, Hill's “some evidence” standard is “clearly established” federal law. 

See Hayward, 512 F.3d at 542; Irons, 505 F.3d at 851; Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129 (citing Hill, 472

U.S. at 456). “The ‘some evidence’ standard is minimally stringent,” and a decision will be

upheld if there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the

fact-finder. Powell, 33 F.3d at 40 (citing Cato v. Rushen, 824 F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir. 1987));

Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1105 (9th Cir. 1986). However, “the evidence

underlying the board’s decision must have some indicia of reliability.” Jancsek, 833 F.2d at

1390. See also Perveler, 974 F.2d at 1134. Determining whether the “some evidence” standard 5

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is satisfied does not require examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the

credibility of witnesses, or the weighing of evidence. Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1105. The question

is whether there is any reliable evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached. 

Id. 

In recent years the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has been called upon to address

these issues in four significant cases, each of which will be discussed below. First, in Biggs the

Ninth Circuit recognized that a continued reliance on an unchanging factor such as the

circumstances of the offense in denying parole could, at some point, result in a due process

violation. 334 F.3d at 916-17. That holding has been acknowledged as representing the law of

the circuit. Irons v. Carey, 505 F.3d 846, 853 (9th Cir. 2007); Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129; see also

Hayward, 512 F.3d at 545. While the court in Biggs rejected several of the reasons given by the

Board for finding the petitioner unsuitable for parole, it upheld three: (1) petitioner’s

commitment offense involved the murder of a witness; (2) the murder was carried out in a

manner exhibiting a callous disregard for the life and suffering of another; and (3) petitioner

could benefit from therapy. Biggs, 334 F.3d at 913. However, the court cautioned that continued

reliance solely upon the gravity of the offense of conviction and petitioner’s conduct prior to that

offense in denying parole could violate due process. In this regard, the court observed:

As in the present instance, the parole board’s sole supportable

reliance on the gravity of the offense and conduct prior to

imprisonment to justify denial of parole can be initially justified as

fulfilling the requirements set forth by state law. Over time,

however, should Biggs continue to demonstrate exemplary

behavior and evidence of rehabilitation, denying him a parole date

simply because of the nature of his offense would raise serious

questions involving his liberty interest in parole.

Id. at 916. The court also stated that “[a] continued reliance in the future on an unchanging

factor, the circumstance of the offense and conduct prior to imprisonment, runs contrary to the

rehabilitative goals espoused by the prison system and could result in a due process violation.” 

Id. at 917. 

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In Sass, the Board had found the petitioner unsuitable for parole at his third

suitability hearing based on the gravity of his offenses of conviction in combination with his

prior offenses. 461 F.3d at 1126. Relying on the decision in Biggs, the petitioner in Sass

contended that reliance on these unchanging factors violated his right to due process. The court

disagreed, concluding that in the case before it these factors amounted to “some evidence” to

support the Board's determination. Id. at 1129. The court explained its holding as follows:

While upholding an unsuitability determination based on these

same factors, we previously acknowledged that “continued reliance

in the future on an unchanging factor, the circumstance of the

offense and conduct prior to imprisonment, runs contrary to the

rehabilitative goals espoused by the prison system and could result

in a due process violation.” Biggs, 334 F.3d at 917 (emphasis

added). Under AEDPA it is not our function to speculate about

how future parole hearings could proceed. Cf. id. The evidence of

Sass' prior offenses and the gravity of his convicted offenses

constitute some evidence to support the Board's decision. 

Consequently, the state court decisions upholding the denials were

neither contrary to, nor did they involve an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

461 F.3d at 1129.

Subsequently, in Irons the Ninth Circuit sought to harmonize the holdings in

Biggs and Sass, stating as follows:

Because the murder Sass committed was less callous and cruel than

the one committed by Irons, and because Sass was likewise denied

parole in spite of exemplary conduct in prison and evidence of

rehabilitation, our decision in Sass precludes us from accepting

Iron's due process argument or otherwise affirming the district

court's grant of relief.

We note that in all the cases in which we have held that a parole

board's decision to deem a prisoner unsuitable for parole solely on

the basis of his commitment offense comports with due process,

the decision was made before the inmate had served the minimum

number of years required by his sentence. Specifically, in Biggs,

Sass, and here, the petitioners had not served the minimum number

of years to which they had been sentenced at the time of the

challenged parole denial by the Board. Biggs, 334 F.3d at 912;

Sass, 461 F.3d 1125. All we held in those cases and all we hold

today, therefore, is that, given the particular circumstances of the

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offenses in these cases, due process was not violated when these

prisoners were deemed unsuitable for parole prior to the expiration

of their minimum terms.

Furthermore, we note that in Sass and in the case before us there

was substantial evidence in the record demonstrating rehabilitation.

In both cases, the California Board of Prison Terms appeared to

give little or no weight to this evidence in reaching its conclusion

that Sass and Irons presently constituted a danger to society and

thus were unsuitable for parole. We hope that the Board will come

to recognize that in some cases, indefinite detention based solely

on an inmate's commitment offense, regardless of the extent of his

rehabilitation, will at some point violate due process, given the

liberty interest in parole that flows from the relevant California

statutes. Biggs, 334 F.3d at 917. 

Irons, 505 F.3d at 853-54.

Finally, and most recently, in Hayward, the Ninth Circuit determined that under

the circumstances of that case the unchanging factor of the gravity of the commitment offense did

not constitute “some evidence” supporting the governor’s decision to reverse a parole grant on

the basis that the petitioner’s release would pose a continuing danger to society. Hayward, 512

F.3d at 546. The circumstances relied upon by the court to reach this conclusion in Hayward

were the following: (1) the petitioner had served twenty-seven years in prison on a sentence of

fifteen years to life; (2) the petitioner was sixty-four years old; (3) after eleven parole suitability

hearings, the Board had twice recommended that the petitioner receive a parole date; (4) former

California Governor Gray Davis reversed the Board’s second grant of parole based on seven

factors, four of which were unsupported by the record and three of which were based on

unchanging circumstances; (5) the provocation for petitioner’s crime was the attempted rape of

his girlfriend (and future wife) by the victim; (6) the petitioner had solid parole plans, including

several offers of employment and a place to live; and (7) the petitioner had an “exemplary”

prison record for most of his period of incarceration, with his last major disciplinary violation

taking place in 1989 and with only a minor disciplinary infraction in 1997. Id. Against this

background the Ninth Circuit explained:

/////

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 As noted, petitioner was sentenced to a term of fifteen years to life. Petitioner entered

6

CDCR on September 1, 1987. At the time of then-Governor Davis’ reversal, he had served just

over fifteen years in state prison. He has now been imprisoned for over twenty years. 

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In light of the extraordinary circumstances of this case – given the

provocation for Hayward’s violent crime in 1978, his incarceration

for almost thirty years with his positive prison record in recent

times, and the favorable discretionary decisions of the Board in

successive hearings, which were reversed by the Governor on

factual premises most of which were not documented in the record

– we conclude that the unchanging factor of the gravity of

Hayward’s commitment offense had no predictive value regarding

his suitability for parole. In the circumstances of this case, the

Governor violated Hayward’s due process rights by relying on that

stale and static factor in reversing his parole grant.

Hayward, 512 F.3d at 546. 

After taking into consideration the Ninth Circuit decisions in Biggs, Sass, Irons,

and Hayward, and for the reasons set forth below, this court concludes that petitioner is entitled

to federal habeas relief with respect to his challenge to then-Governor Davis’ reversal of the

Board’s 2002 decision granting him parole. 

D. Discussion

After carefully reviewing the record, this court concludes that the San Joaquin

County Superior Court unreasonably applied the “some evidence” standard when it determined

that the Governor’s reversal of the Board’s grant of parole was justified. No evidence in the

record before this court supports a conclusion that petitioner’s release would unreasonably

endanger public safety. In this regard, this case presents just as strong a case for relief as did the

petitioner in Hayward. 

Here, petitioner is now sixty-three (63) years old and has served far more than the 

minimum number of years required by his sentence. He committed his crime of second-degree 6

murder (the same offense as the petitioner in Hayward) decades ago under unusual circumstances

and during a time of significant stress in his life according to the Board’s 2002 findings. 

Specifically, after eight years of marriage petitioner’s wife had separated from him five days

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 Petitioner explained during the 2002 hearing: “the pain I was going through and 7

because of the separation, you know, and it was emotionally hard for me, and it just came all out

at that time. He was there with her and it seemed to me that that was the root of the pain that I

was suffering. . . . [I]t seemed like my life was turned upside down right at that moment, and it

just seemed like that there was the root.” (Resp’t’s Opp’n to Pet’r’s Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. B at

6-7.) 

 For example, during the 2002 parole hearing, the presiding parole commissioner asked 8

petitioner with regard to his crime “You want to tell us about it, want to tell us why.” Petitioner

responded “Very bad choice. I just did some things that I shouldn’t have done that day, and

when I confronted him, it got out of hand. I wish with all my heart that I could change that day,

but I can’t. All I can say is I’m sorry. Sorry doesn’t do it though. It’s not just enough.”

(Resp’t’s Opp’n to Pet’r’s Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. B at 5-6.) Petitioner further noted “I made

some bad choices and I know I made some bad choices. I could have done everything

differently, and I wish I had of, but it’s hindsight now and all I can say is that I’m sorry that it

happened.” (Id. at 6.) 

 At the time of his 2002 parole hearing, petitioner had a classification score of zero, with 9

but a single prison disciplinary violation for a work stoppage that took place back in 1994. 

(Resp’t’s Opp’n to Pet’r’s Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. B at 13-14.) In this regard, petitioner is even

more disciplinary-free while in prison than was the petitioner in the Hayward case. 

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prior to the shooting. Immediately after his wife left him, petitioner turned to drugs and alcohol

in response to the pain of the separation and basically went without sleep for the four nights prior

to the murder. On the day in question, petitioner saw his wife sitting in a parked truck with the

victim, who had previously been a house guest of he and his wife. In his altered state of mind, it

seemed to petitioner that this was the root of the pain he was suffering, causing him to confront

the victim with a gun he kept in his car. The confusing events that followed resulted in petitioner

shooting and killing the victim. This confluence of circumstances are both unusual and

extremely unlikely to recur in the remaining years of petitioner’s life. Petitioner has accepted

7

responsibility for his crime and has shown remorse for it. Petitioner has also demonstrated that 8

he can be released without presenting a probable danger to society as evidenced by his virtually

disciplinary-free prison record, his above-average to exceptional work reports, his extensive 9

involvement in vocational programs, his record of constant employment with Prison Industries 

since his imprisonment and his positive psychiatric evaluations. Moreover, petitioner’s preoffense background was very stable and included him earning both his GED and an Associate

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 Petitioner is certified as a journeyman electrician and a stationary engineer. (Resp’t’s 10

Opp’n to Pet’r’s Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. B at 14.) 

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Arts Degree from San Jose City College, active duty with the United States Navy with an

honorable discharge, steady employment and a long-term relationship with one Etta Maitland. 

(Resp’t’s Opp’n to Pet’r’s Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. B at 15-16, 45-51.) Petitioner also has a stable

post-offense background, including his ongoing seventeen-year relationship with Ms. Maitland,

financial support from and future residence with Ms. Maitland, an extensive network of family

and friends supporting him, marketable skills, and employment offers from Reno Rebar, Tahoe

Schooners, and Len’s Air Conditioning. (Id. at 25-27.)10

Then-Governor Davis based his reversal of the Board’s decision on five factual

findings that have no evidentiary support in the record or fail to demonstrate that petitioner

would pose a danger to public safety if released from prison. First, the former Governor

referenced petitioner’s 1976 arrest in Carson City, Nevada, for felony coercion, kidnapping,

battery with a deadly weapon, and assault with intent to commit murder. However, as the

Governor recognized, “there is no official record” of any disposition of the arrest or charges

brought nor is their a record of any conviction or sentence resulting from this dated incident. 

(Resp’t’s Opp’n to Pet’r’s Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. C.) Apparently the matter began as a dispute

between petitioner and his then-wife in which a members of his wife’s family became involved,

resulting in his wife’s uncle shooting at him and petitioner firing back as he fled. (Resp’t’s

Answer, Ex. C.) Petitioner recalls that as a result of the incident, at most, he pled to a

misdemeanor simple assault charge and received a six-month sentence that was stayed in its

entirety. Even if petitioner faced charges in connection with the matter, which again there is no

record of, it occurred now more than thirty years ago. Just as in Hayward, this type of dated

misconduct prior to the petitioner’s offense of conviction does not support the Governor’s

conclusion that petitioner poses a threat to public safety today. As the Ninth Circuit has

observed, “[i]t can hardly be doubted that time may attenuate the taint of certain prior

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 As one prison staff psychologist noted in 2003 “It appears to this clinician that Mr. 11

Sprinkle’s risk to the community will remain low in comparison to most parolees or other

citizens given that he remain[s] free from alcohol or substance abuse.” (Resp’t’s Answer, Ex.

C.)

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misconduct.” Hayward, 512 F.3d at 545-46. See also Biggs, 334 F.3d at 916 (“Over time,

however, should [petitioner] continue to demonstrate exemplary behavior and evidence of

rehabilitation, denying him a parole date simply because of the nature of [his] offense and prior

conduct would raise serious questions involving his liberty interest in parole.”); Sass, 461 F.3d at

127-28 (“continued reliance in the future on an unchanging factor, the circumstance of the

offense and conduct prior to imprisonment, runs contrary to the rehabilitative goals espoused by

the prison system and could result in a due process violation” (quoting Biggs, 334 F.3d at 917)).

Former Governor Davis also mentioned petitioner’s admission to using drugs and

alcohol the day before committing his crime but his denial of having a substance abuse problem. 

This suggested criticism is not supported by the record which instead suggests that petitioner

does not, in fact, have a chronic substance abuse problem. Since as early as 1993, well before he

first became eligible for parole, petitioner’s psychological reports consistently stated that

“substance abuse does not appear to be a problem for this inmate,” and that any substance abuse

at the time of the commitment offense is “in sustained full remission.” (Resp’t’s Answer, Ex. C

(Psychological Reports dated Sept. 1, 1993, Sept. 1, 1995, Mar. 28, 1996, Apr. 21, 1998, Dec. 7,

2000)). Indeed, petitioner’s drug abuse at the time of his offense was described by one staff

psychologist as “situational and temporary” because there was no clear indication that he was

previously involved in drug abuse. (Id., Psychological Report dated Aug. 13, 1993). As noted

above, in the few days immediately before the commission of his crime, petitioner found himself

in circumstances involving significant emotional, mental and physical stress that are not likely to

recur. Moreover, since his incarceration over twenty years ago, petitioner has not abused drugs

or alcohol even though, as prison officials acknowledge, opportunities certainly exist within

prison walls to engage in such activities. (Resp’t’s Answer, Ex. C.) Finally, while

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incarcerated, petitioner has completed an AA program and for nine years was involved in the

Straight Life Program in which he counseled troubled youth about drugs and life choices,

advocating complete abstinence from any drug or alcohol use. (Id., Exs. B, C, & F.) 

Next, the Governor found disconcerting petitioner’s continued assertion that the

shooting of his victim was accidental, noting that petitioner had pleaded guilty to second-degree

murder and not to involuntary manslaughter. The Governor also observed that in petitioner’s last

psychological evaluation in 2000, the evaluators noted that “there is an element of denial and

rationalization” in Mr. Sprinkle’s life. Former Governor Davis viewed this “element of denial

and rationalization” as an indication that petitioner may still pose a risk to public safety and as a

failure to accept responsibility for his actions. (Resp’t’s Opp’n to Pet’r’s Mot. for Summ. J., Ex.

C.) However, the Governor’s reliance on this isolated comment by the evaluators in reaching his

conclusion was not well-supported. In the referenced report, the same evaluators expressly

addressed petitioner’s potential dangerousness, stating “As far as assessment of dangerousness in

the community is concerned, in a state of sobriety, the Subject’s violence potential is average for

the general male population.” (Resp’t’s Answer, Ex. C (Psychosocial Assessment dated Dec. 7,

2000).) Thus, even in light of the possible “element of denial and rationalization” in petitioner’s

life, the evaluators found his potential for violence average for the general male population. (Id.) 

Even more importantly, in an addendum to this same report, the Chief Psychologist at Deuel

Vocational Institution concluded as follows: “I find nothing prohibitive of the favorable

consideration of parole since the Report to the Board of Prison Terms cited above.” (Id., 

Addendum dated Jan. 29, 2002.) 

To the extent that the former Governor believed petitioner had failed to accept

responsibility for his actions, as noted above, there is no evidence in the record to support such a

conclusion. Rather, the record demonstrates that petitioner understands both the nature and 

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 Under Section 5011 of the California Penal Code, “The Board of Prison Terms shall 12

not require, when setting parole dates, an admission of guilt to any crime for which an inmate

committed.” Cal. Penal Code § 5011. Seemingly, the Governor also should not require such an

admission of guilt before accepting a Board’s decision to set a parole date. See e.g., Hayward,

512 F.3d at 542 (“Under California law, the Governor, in considering whether to reverse a grant

of parole by the Board, must consider the same factors the Board is required to consider.”) 

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magnitude of his crime. Petitioner has repeatedly and genuinely accepted responsibility for his

offense conduct and has demonstrated remorse for the loss of life that resulted from it.

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The former Governor also expressed concern regarding petitioner’s ability to

control his anger given the impulsive nature of his offense of conviction. The Governor cited an

instance in 1997 in which petitioner allegedly confronted a guest at the prison’s Straight Life

Program. Apparently, petitioner wanted to speak with one of the young men in attendance and

held his arm to do so at which point a program supervisor told petitioner, “You can’t touch the

kid.” (Resp’t’s Answer, Ex. C.) Based on the incident, petitioner was temporarily suspended

from participation in the program but was later reinstated. (Id.) As noted above, prison

psychological reports reflect that petitioner was involved in the Straight Life Program for nine

years. (Id.) He has held the positions of executive secretary and under-secretary and had

significant and time-consuming duties with respect to the operation of that program. (Id.) For

example, he helped counsel troubled youths about drugs, gang activity and life choices on

Saturdays and Mondays and participated in staff meetings on Tuesdays. (Resp’t’s Answer, Ex.

C.) In addition, petitioner has received certificates of appreciation for his participation in that

program. (Resp’t’s Opp’n to Pet’r’s Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. D at 23-24.) That prison officials

reversed petitioner’s suspension and allowed him to continue counseling young people

demonstrates that he does not have an anger-management problem and would not pose an

unreasonable risk of danger to the public if released. Finally, it is worth again emphasizing that

petitioner has been essentially disciplinary-free throughout his twenty-plus year tenure in prison,

and has virtually no pre-offense record of violence or anger management problems. 

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 In reversing the Board’s grant of parole former Governor Davis also cited the 13

opposition to petitioner’s release expressed in a letter by the Lassen County District Attorney’s

Office. However, “the district attorney’s opinion, without more, cannot be considered ‘some

evidence’ under Hill that supports the Governor’s reversal of parole.” Hayward, 512 F.3d at 545

n. 9. 

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Finally, the former Governor found that petitioner demonstrated a wanton

disregard for human suffering and caused great bodily injury when he confronted his victim with

a loaded, cocked firearm in the presence of his estranged wife. (Resp’t’s Opp’n to Pet’r’s Mot.

for Summ. J., Ex. C.) Similar to the conclusion reached by the Ninth Circuit in Hayward, 13

however, this court rejects the Governor’s reliance on the gravity of petitioner’s commitment

offense to deny parole on this record. Given petitioner’s rehabilitation, nearly impeccable

conduct while in prison, and the Board’s decision to release him on parole, the court finds that

his commitment offense, which occurred now twenty-two years ago, does not demonstrate that

his release will pose an imminent danger to public safety. Moreover, the court finds that under

the circumstance presented by this case the former Governor’s reliance on this “stale and static

factor” to reverse the grant of parole violates petitioner’s due process rights. See Hayward, 512

F.3d at 546-47; cf. Irons, 505 F.3d at 846 (“due process was not violated when these prisoners

were deemed unsuitable for parole prior to the expiration of their minimum terms”).

Under these circumstances, the court finds that the former Governor’s reversal of

the Board’s grant of parole denied petitioner due process. Accordingly, the court concludes that

petitioner’s motion for partial summary judgment with respect to the former Governor’s decision 

should be granted. 

III. Petitioner’s 2003 Denial of Parole

A. Board’s Decision

After then-Governor Davis’ reversal of the Board’s 2002 decision granting parole,

in 2003 the Board denied petitioner parole following a hearing. (Resp’t’s Opp’n to Pet’r’s Mot.

for Summ. J., Ex. D.) The Board explained the rationale for its decision as follows: 

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The Panel reviewed all the information received from the

public and relied on the following circumstances in concluding that

the prisoner is not suitable for parole and would pose an

unreasonable risk of danger to others or a threat to public safety. 

The offense was carried out in a rather uncaring and unfeeling

manner. The offense was carried out in a manner that shows a total

disregard for another human being and the motive for the crime

was inexplicable or very trivial in relationship to the offense. 

These conclusions are drawn from the State of Facts wherein on

12-16-1986 the Lassen County Sheriff’s Department received a call

of a possible deceased body in a vehicle. They responded and they

discovered the (inaudible) of the victim. The prisoner did not have

much of a criminal history. However, he did have a previous

history of violent kinds of behavior in which there’s not much

information on, but it involved what was allegedly a kidnap,

battery and assault with a deadly weapon. Under unstable social

history, there’s no indication that the prisoner had an unstable

social history. Under institutional program, the prisoner has

programmed. A recent psychiatric report by Dr. Mary Young is a

positive report. It shows that the prisoner’s level of dangerousness

in the community is greatly reduced and also his level of

dangerousness in prison is also reduced. The prisoner have [sic]

excellent parole plans to include residential and employment. The

Hearing Panel notes that there was no notice – there was no

opposition noted. The Panel makes the following findings: The

prisoner needs to continue his positive program and also involve

himself in self-help programs, the kinds of self-help programs that

would help him deal with anger, and substance abuse related

programs. Until enough progress is made in that area the prisoner

continues to – well (inaudible) enable the prisoner to face, discuss,

understand and cope with stress in a nondestructive manner. Until

enough progress is (inaudible) necessary the prisoner continues to

be unpredictable and a threat to others. Nevertheless, the prisoner

should be commended for his good behavior. He should be

commended for the skills that he’s achieved and also for the

excellent support – community support that he have [sic], to

include the support of a former ambassador. However, those

positive aspects of his behavior does [sic] not outweigh the factors

for unsuitability. Parole is going to be denied for one year. The

Panel recommend [sic] that you remain disciplinary-free and that

you continue (inaudible) that you start to participate in self-help

programs. 

(Resp’t’s Opp’n to Pet’r’s Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. D at 66-68.) 

B. Discussion

The court finds that the Board’s 2003 decision denying parole is also unsupported

by any evidence. Parroting the Governor’s reversal, the Board in 2003 merely cited petitioner’s

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commitment offense, the 1976 incident in Carson City, substance abuse, anger management and

lack of self-help as the reasons for denying parole. As the Ninth Circuit maintained in Hayward,

“California courts have made clear that the ‘findings that are necessary to deem a prisoner

unsuitable for parole are not that a particular factor or factors indicating unsuitability exist, but

that a prisoner’s release will unreasonably endanger public safety.” 512 F.3d at 543. For the 

reasons discussed above with respect to the Governor’s 2002 reversal of the grant of parole, the

court finds that the Board’s 2003 decision has no evidentiary support and that the factors cited

therein fail to demonstrate that petitioner’s release would pose a danger to public safety.

Under these circumstances, the court finds that the Board’s 2003 denial of parole

violated petitioner’s right to due process. Accordingly, petitioner’s motion for partial summary

judgment with respect to the Board’s denial of parole in 2003 should be granted. 

IV. Petitioner’s 2004 Denial of Parole

A. Board’s Decision

In 2004, the Board again denied petitioner’s parole. (Resp’t’s Opp’n to Pet’r’s

Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. E.) The Board explained the rationale of its decision at that time as

follows: 

Sir, we have reviewed all of the information that we

received from the public and anything else that’s been available

today (indiscernible) and we relied on the following circumstances

in concluding that you, the prisoner, are not still suitable for parole

and would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society or a

threat to public safety if released from prison. The offense was

carried out in an especially cruel and callous manner. There were

multiple victims involved in that same incident. The motive was

inexplicable or very trivial in relation to the offense. And these

conclusions are drawn from the facts – from the State of Facts that

we’ve reviewed today wherein the prisoner was drinking and

abusing drugs prior to the (indiscernible) with (indiscernible). The

inmate as he was passing by saw a car, where he found the victim

and his wife. He was very angry and his life was falling apart. He

had a loaded firearm, which he pointed at the victim. And he told

us today that he shot the victim in the head, and the wife was in the

car at that moment. He then drove away with his estranged wife,

and at some point after driving away, he struck her in the face and

did injure her. The prisoner has on previous occasions, inflicted or

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attempted to inflict serious injury on a victim. He has – I’m going

to conclude that he has a record for violence from his own

statement that he has a misdemeanor conviction. He has a history

of unstable or tumultuous relationships with others. And that

relates to the Carson City altercation that he had apparently with a

girlfriend, her father, and an uncle. And with respect to the uncle,

there’s evidence, and that I believe he has testified in the past that

he shot that uncle. There’s an unstable social history and prior

criminality, which includes the incident of July 10, 1976, involving

similar acts of violence, including the use of a firearm in a case

which resulted in at least a misdemeanor conviction arising from a

criminal investigation of a felony coercion, kidnapping, battery

(indiscernible). As I’ve already indicated, there was a conflict

involving his girlfriend. He struck her father and fired a gun at the

uncle. I have to tell you, Mr. Sprinkle, that I had a (indiscernible)

time with your case today. 

(Resp’t’s Opp’n to Pet’r’s Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. E.)

B. Discussion 

The court also finds that the Board’s 2004 decision to deny parole to be

unsupported by any evidence. In that decision the Board relied exclusively on unchangeable and

dated factors, specifically, petitioner’s offense of commitment, the manner in which it was

carried out, and a single incident that occurred prior to his offense. Petitioner “cannot change the

past” and denying him parole based solely on these immutable facts “effectively changes his

sentence” from fifteen years to life “into life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.” 

Martin v. Marshall, 431 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1046 (N.D. Cal. 2006). The Board’s 2004 decision

relied solely on “stale and static factor[s]” in violation of petitioner’s due process rights and the

factors cited therein fail to demonstrate that petitioner would pose a danger to public safety if

released from prison. See Hayward, 512 F.3d at 546-47. 

Under these circumstances, the court finds that the Board’s 2004 denial of parole

resulted in a violation of petitioner’s right to due process. Petitioner’s motion for partial

summary judgment with respect to his 2004 denial of parole should be granted. 

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 Petitioner was enrolled in both NA and Creative Conflict Resolutions at the time of his 14

2004 parole hearing. (Resp’t’s Opp’n to Pet’r’s Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. E at 36-37, 60.)

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CONCLUSION

In sum, in light of the extraordinary facts of this case, including the unusual

circumstances of petitioner’s crime, his exemplary record of conduct in prison, his participation

in self-help programs including AA, Straight Life Program, NA, and Creative Conflict

Resolutions, his viable parole plans, and the favorable Board decision in 2002 granting him 14

parole, the court concludes that, under binding precedent, the challenged parole denials have

violated petitioner’s due process rights. The Governor’s 2002 reversal and the Board’s 2003 and

2004 denials are not supported by “some evidence” as constitutionally required. Accordingly,

the court will recommend that petitioner’s motion for partial summary judgment be granted, that

his application for writ of habeas corpus be granted and that petitioner be released on parole.

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Petitioner’s March 15, 2007 motion for partial summary judgment be granted;

and

2. Petitioner application for writ of habeas be granted and respondent be directed

to release petitioner on parole within thirty (30) days of the date of entry of judgment.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fifteen

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within seven days after service of the objections. The parties are 

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advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the

District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: February 28, 2008.

DAD:9

spri1783.157

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