Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-93-05137/USCOURTS-caDC-93-05137-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 893
Nature of Suit: Environmental Matters
Cause of Action: 

---

<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 25, 1994 Decided April 22, 1994

No. 93-5137

NATIONAL TRUST FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION IN THE

UNITED STATES; HISTORIC PRESERVATION LEAGUE, INC.,

A NON-PROFIT CORPORATION; PRESERVATION TEXAS, INC.,

A NON-PROFIT CORPORATION,

APPELLANTS

v.

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION;

ANDREW C. HOVE, JR., IN HIS OFFICIAL

CAPACITY AS ACTING CHAIRMAN, FEDERAL

DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(93cv00904)

Richard B. Nettler argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were David A. Doheny,

Elizabeth S. Merritt and Andrea C. Ferster.

Jerome A. Madden, Counsel, FederalDeposit InsuranceCorporation, argued the cause for appellees.

With himon the brief were Ann S. DuRoss, Assistant GeneralCounsel, and Richard J. Osterman, Jr.,

Senior Counsel, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.

Kirk Kelso Van Tine and P. MatthewSutko entered appearancesfor amicus curiae Resolution Trust

Corporation.

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr. entered an appearance for amicus curiae Texas Historical Commission.

Before: WALD, SILBERMAN, and RANDOLPH, Circuit Judges.

Opinion PER CURIAM.

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge WALD in which Circuit Judge SILBERMAN joins.

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge RANDOLPH.

PER CURIAM: Upon consideration of the briefs and oral argument on rehearing, the original

USCA Case #93-5137 Document #52877 Filed: 04/22/1994 Page 1 of 7
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

panelopinion, reported as National Trust for Historic Preservation v. FDIC, 995 F.2d 238 (D.C. Cir.

1993), is ordered reinstated, except for the analysis of South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367

(1984), contained in footnote one, which is now controlled by Judge Wald's concurrence.

The original panel held that 12 U.S.C. § 1821(j), which bars courts from restraining or

affecting the FDIC in the exercise of its powers or functions as a conservator or receiver, applied in

this case as a result of 12 U.S.C. § 1823(d)(3)(A). 995 F.2d at 240. Section 1823(d)(3)(A) provides:

"With respect to any asset acquired or liabilityassumed pursuant to thissection, the Corporation shall

have allofthe rights, powers, privileges, and authorities ofthe Corporation asreceiver undersections

1821 and 1825(b) of this title." Shortly after our opinion issued, the Fifth Circuit, in a somewhat

different factualsetting, permitted an injunction action against the FDIC to go forward. Sierra Club,

Lone Star Chapter v. FDIC, 992 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1993). Nothing said in Sierra Club persuades

us to alter the panel's original decision.

There is no question that the "rights, powers, privileges, and authorities" granted the FDIC

under § 1821 devolve upon it when it acquires assets or assumes liabilities pursuant to § 1823. In

Sierra Club, however, the Fifth Circuit expressed doubts about whether the FDIC had acted under

§ 1823, or under some other provision. 992 F.2d at 549-50. Whatever may have been the situation

there, in this case there is no doubt that the FDIC acquired the Dr. Pepper Headquarters Building

pursuant to § 1823, as our original opinion recognized. 995 F.2d at 240. Appellants do not contend

otherwise.

The FifthCircuit also believed that § 1823(d)(3)(A) did not "clearly and unambiguously" give

"the FDIC the "privilege' to be free of the court's equity jurisdiction." 992 F.2d at 550. The court

offered no explanation for this conclusion and we do not agree with it. Our original opinion

concluded that the FDIC's immunity from judicial restraint is among the "rights, powers, privileges,

and authorities" (§ 1823(d)(3)(A)) contained in § 1821. 995 F.2d at 240. It is in that category for

two reasons. First, it is set forth in a subsection of § 1821, that is, in § 1821(j). Second, the FDIC's

immunity from judicial restraint, like the FDIC's exemption from state taxation and the immunity of

its property fromlevy, attachment or garnishment, which § 1823(d)(3)(A) also bestows on the FDIC

USCA Case #93-5137 Document #52877 Filed: 04/22/1994 Page 2 of 7
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

1Abbott Bldg. Corp. v. United States, 951 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1991), construed 12 U.S.C. §

1464(d)(6)(C) (1988), which protects the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation

(FSLIC) against judicial restraint when it acts as a receiver, much in the same way and with the

same language as § 1821(j) protects the FDIC. The FSLIC, acting as a receiver, purchased

plaintiff's property with a credit bid at a foreclosure sale held under state law. Plaintiff, claiming

that the sale was not conducted in accordance with state law, sued to set the sale aside. The court

held that the suit did not seek to "restrain or affect" the FSLIC's powers as a receiver, but "simply

leaves the determination of third party rights in the hands of others." 951 F.2d at 195. The court

limited its holding to situations in which the FSLIC, acting as a receiver, had acquired property in

an invalid foreclosure sale. Id. The court added that the statute would still immunize the FSLIC

from claims that it had acted in an "improper manner." Given the limited scope of this holding, in

a situation far removed from this case, we see no need to discuss whether we agree with it. 

through its reference to § 1825(b), is among the FDIC's "rights, powers, privileges, and authorities"

when it is acting as a receiver. It is no answer to say, as appellants do, that § 1821(j) merely

"operates as a limitation on the rights of third parties to obtain injunctive or equitable relief against

the FDIC." Brief for Appellants at 15. By so limiting the powers, rights and privileges of third

parties, § 1821(j) increased the rights, privileges and powers ofthe FDIC. To take away one person's

"right" to sue another is to give the other the "right" not to be sued. The court in Sierra Club, 992

F.2d at 550, thought it significant that § 1823(d)(3)(A) "does not speak directly to the equitable

jurisdiction of the federal courts." We attach no importance to this. The provision is specific

enoughevery § 1821 right, power, privilege or authority of the FDIC as receiver is included.

Section 1823(d)(3)(A)'s reference to § 1821 necessarily encompasses § 1821(j). Inclusion by

reference is a time-honored drafting technique, without which federal statutes would become even

more unwieldy than they already are.1

It is worth adding that, even apart from statutory language, the line drawn in Sierra Club

raises problems. The FDIC is authorized to operate in the capacity of a corporate insurer under §

1823, see FDIC v. Nichols, 885 F.2d 633, 636 (9th Cir. 1989), and in the capacity of a receiver for

failed financial institutions under § 1821, see 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(2) & (3). The FDIC has discretion

regarding whether it will wear one hat or the other, or both. To hold, as the Fifth Circuit did, that

when the FDIC acts in its corporate capacity, § 1823(d)(3)(A) does not insulate it from judicial

restraint pursuant to § 1821(j), is to create an incentive for the FDIC to act as receiver in order to

avoid the consequences of litigation and delay. Such a system would make little sense. The FDIC's

USCA Case #93-5137 Document #52877 Filed: 04/22/1994 Page 3 of 7
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

2California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393 (1982), forecloses appellants' argument

that § 1821(j) does not bar its suit to the extent it is seeking a declaratory judgment rather than an

injunction. There is, the Court ruled, so "little practical difference between injunctive and

declaratory relief" that a statute barring injunctions will also have the effect of barring declaratory

judgments. 457 U.S. at 408-09; see also Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 208 n.8

(D.C. Cir. 1985). 

charge isto maximize the value ofthe failed institution's assets and it should be free to decide whether

this is best accomplished if it acts as a receiver or in its corporate capacity or both.2

The judgment of the district court dismissing the suit for lack of jurisdiction is affirmed for

the reasons stated in the original panel opinion and for the reasons stated above.

WALD, Circuit Judge, with whom SILBERMAN, Circuit Judge, joins, concurring: With the

benefit of full briefing and argument, I now agree with the result and the basic reasoning of the

reinstated panel opinion on the construction of 12 U.S.C. § 1821(j) and its application to the FDIC

in its corporate capacity via 12 U.S.C. § 1823(d)(3)(A). That plenary treatment allows us to decide

this important case of first impression in our circuit with the necessary confidence which I, for one,

did not have months ago when forced to a decision "in barely over a week on an unargued stay

motion." National Trust for Historic Preservation in the United States v. FDIC, 995 F.2d 238, 244

(D.C. Cir. 1993) (Wald, J., dissenting). I was concerned thenI believe justifiablyabout

"potentially immunizing an agency from court enforcement of the entire U.S. Code," a result which

I thought warranted an in-depth review of the statute, its structure, purpose and history. It seemed

counter-intuitive that the FDIC, acting in its receiver capacity, could "operat[e] a factory or even a

hazardous waste facility in a manner that was causing serious health or environmental damage and

that allegedly violated the Clean Water Act or the Occupational Safety and Health Act[, and] court[s

would be] powerless to take "any action ... to restrain or affect' that operation, unless the FDIC "has

acted or proposes to act beyond, or contrary to, its statutorily prescribed, constitutionally permitted

powers or functions.' " Id. at 244 (Wald, J., dissenting) (quoting panel majority, id. at 240). Indeed,

even more horrendous hypotheticals could be constructed. Would the courts be powerless if the

FDIC chose to sell crack cocaine in an effort to liquidate assets discovered in an unclaimed safety

deposit box of a failed bank? It is of course by the use of such unlikely scenarios that judges test the

USCA Case #93-5137 Document #52877 Filed: 04/22/1994 Page 4 of 7
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

integrity and inevitability of "plain meaning" interpretations.

While after further study and reflection I agree with the original panel majority that the

language of the FinancialInstitutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No.

101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified as amended in scattered sectionsin the United StatesCode),supports

its construction, the result is sufficiently " "odd' " so as to oblige us to "search for other evidence of

congressional intent to lend the term its proper scope." Public Citizen v. United States Department

of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 454 (1989) (quoting Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 509

(1989)). For example, in South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367 (1984), the Supreme Court

considered a similarly sweeping limitation on court action appearing in the Tax Anti-Injunction Act,

26 U.S.C. § 7421(a): "[N]o suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any

tax shall be maintained in any court by any person, whether or not such person is the person against

whomsuch taxwas assessed." In Regan, theCourt turned to the TaxAnti-InjunctionAct'slegislative

history, despite the fact that the Act's language "could scarcely be more explicit," Bob Jones Univ.

v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 736 (1974). The legislative history discussed in Regan by no means

abounded with detailed revelations of congressionalintent, but theCourt nonetheless concluded from

it that the Act's "purpose and the circumstances ofits enactment indicate that Congress did not intend

the Act to apply to actions brought by aggrieved parties for whom it has not provided an alternative

remedy." 465 U.S. at 378 (footnote omitted). See also id. at 373-74, 377.

I don't agree with the suggestion by the original panel majority that the Regan Court's

recourse to legislative history as a means of narrowing the scope of an otherwise improbably broad

statute was confined to the "unique context" of tax collection or "Supreme Court doctrine that

otherwise insulates the tax collector against suitsthat would deflect the collector's energies from the

collection of taxes." National Trust, 995 F.2d at 239 n.1. To the contrary, the special governmental

interest in insulating the tax collector from suits would argue against consulting legislative history

to insure there was not a contrary interpretation that would reduce the tax collector's protection from

court action in apparent contradiction to the statute's plain meaning. Nonetheless, my own

researchand counsels'has uncovered no evidence in this case that § 1821(j) was passed in the

USCA Case #93-5137 Document #52877 Filed: 04/22/1994 Page 5 of 7
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

"context of a statutory scheme that provided an alternative remedy," Regan, 465 U.S. at 373, for any

and all misfeasance by the liquidating agency, or otherwise bars only actions brought by parties who

have access to an alternative remedy against the agency.

Therefore, I am compelled to conclude that § 1821(j) does indeed bar courts from

"restrain[ing] or affect[ing] the exercise of powers or functions of the [FDIC] as a conservator or a

receiver," 12 U.S.C. § 1821(j), unless it "has acted or proposes to act beyond, or contrary to, its

statutorily prescribed, constitutionally permitted, powers or functions," National Trust, 995 F.2d at

240. Congress undoubtedly did not contemplate anything like the parade of possible violations of

existing lawscivil and criminalthat creative judges can conjure up, but given the breadth of the

statutory language, untempered by any persuasive legislative history pointing in a different direction,

the statute would appear to bar a court from acting in virtually all circumstances. I am somewhat

assuaged by the fact, described at oral argument and in the briefs, that a private person genuinely

aggrieved by such unlawful FDIC action could generally bring a suit for damages, or seek

administrative redress through the § 1821(d) monetary claims procedure which ultimately includes

judicial review. See Rosa v. Resolution Trust Corp., 938 F.2d 383, 399-400 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,

112 S. Ct. 582 (1991) ("the effect of [§ 1821(j) ] in this case is solely to prevent a particular remedy

... [and] does not deprive plaintiffs, if wronged, of anyother remedythat would not "restrain or affect'

the exercise of the receiver's or conservator's powers or functions"). And, of course, we do not

decide today what might happen ifthe denial of an injunction in any particular situation itself violated

constitutional due process. Cf. Regan, 465 U.S. at 375; id. at 393-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring in

judgment).

Thus, it would seem that the instant situation in which the FDIC is alleged to have violated

sections 106 and 110(a) of the National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470f, 470h-2(a), is

the exception rather than the rule. Without jurisdiction, we cannot express any opinion on whether

the FDIC is statutorily compelled to consult with the Advisory Council before selling for demolition

structures like the Dr. Pepper building which is "considered one of the finest examples of Art

Moderne architecture in Texas." National Trust, 995 F.2d at 241 (Wald, J., dissenting). See

USCA Case #93-5137 Document #52877 Filed: 04/22/1994 Page 6 of 7
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 408-11 (1982) (holding declaratory judgment

generally barred whenever injunction is prohibited). Congress, of course, can change this state of

affairs should it so choose.

RANDOLPH, Circuit Judge, concurring: I continue to believe footnote one of the original

panel opinion, 995 F.2d at 239 n.1, properly describes and distinguishes South Carolina v. Regan,

465 U.S. 367 (1984).

USCA Case #93-5137 Document #52877 Filed: 04/22/1994 Page 7 of 7