Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_06-cv-00270/USCOURTS-azd-4_06-cv-00270-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 530
Nature of Suit: Prisoner Petitions - Habeas Corpus
Cause of Action: 28:2254 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (State)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Cesar Robert Franco,

Petitioner, 

vs.

Greg Fizer, et al.,

Respondents. 

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CV-06-270-TUC-FRZ (JCG)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner Cesar Robert Franco, presently incarcerated at the Arizona State Prison

Complex, Santa Rita Unit, in Tucson, Arizona, has filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was

referred to Magistrate Judge Guerin for Report and Recommendation. Before the Court are

the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) (Doc. No. 1), Respondents’ Answer to

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Answer”) (Doc. No. 7), Petitioner’s Reply (Doc. No.

8) and a supplement to Petitioner’s Reply. (Doc. No. 9.) The Magistrate Judge recommends

that the District Court dismiss the petition on the ground that it is time barred.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On August 24, 2000, Petitioner was convicted of one count of manslaughter for the

shooting death of a 16-year old girl. (Answer, Ex. A, pg.1.) On September 22, 2000,

Petititioner was sentenced to an aggravated term of 15 years. (Id.) 

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On September 28, 2000, Petitioner filed a notice of appeal. (Id.) Petitioner presented

four arguments on appeal: (1) Petitioner’s due process rights were violated when the state

failed to disclose that a key witness was a convicted narcotics dealer, (2) Petitioner’s due

process rights were violated when the state was permitted to introduce evidence of an alleged

nine-year old prior accidental shooting, (3) Petitioner’s due process rights were violated

when the trial court aggravated Petitioner’s sentence based on Petitioner’s involvement in

a prior accidental shooting, (4) Petitioner’s due process rights were violated when the trial

court aggravated Petitioner’s sentence based on the age of the victim.

On February 25, 2001, Petitioner filed a notice of post-conviction relief pursuant to

Rule 32, Ariz. R. Crim. P. (Answer, Ex. A, pg. 1.) Petitioner filed his petition for postconviction relief (“First Rule 32 Petition”) on June 15, 2001, in which he raised a single

claim: that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because his trial counsel failed

to discover a key prosecution witness’ prior narcotics conviction. (Answer, Ex. A, pg. 1; Ex.

C, pg. 8.) The trial court denied relief on August 28, 2001. (Answer, Ex. D.) Petitioner

petitioned for review by the Arizona Court of Appeals of the trial court’s denial of his First

Rule 32 Petition. (Answer, Ex. A, pg. 1.) In his petition for review, Petitioner again asserted

that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because his trial counsel failed to

discover a key prosecution witness’ prior narcotics conviction; Petitioner also argued for the

first time that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the court’s jury

instructions. (Answer, Ex. C, pg. 8.) 

The Arizona Court of Appeals consolidated Petitioner’s appeal with his First Rule 32

Petition. (Answer, Ex. C.) On February 27, 2003, the Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s

conviction and sentence and affirmed the trial court’s denial of Petitioner’s First Rule 32

Petition. (Id.) 

Petitioner sought review by the Arizona Supreme Court. (Answer, Ex. E.) The

Supreme Court denied review on September 11, 2003. (Id.) Petitioner did not petition the

United States Supreme Court for certiorari.

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On October 22, 2004, Petitioner filed a second petition for post-conviction relief

pursuant to Rule 32, Ariz. R. Crim. P. (“Second Rule 32 Petition”). In his Second Rule 32

Petition, Petitioner raised a single claim: that his sentence violated Blakely v. Washington,

542 U.S. 296 (2004). (Answer, Ex. F.) On November 17, 2004, the trial court denied relief

on the ground that Blakely was not retroactively applied and therefore did not apply to

Petitioner’s sentence. (Answer, Ex. H.) On June 29, 2005, the Arizona Court of Appeals

affirmed the trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief. (Answer, Ex. I.) On July 29, 2005,

Petitioner filed a petition for review with the Arizona Supreme Court. (Answer, Ex. J.) On

December 8, 2005, the Arizona Supreme Court denied review. (Answer, Ex. K.)

On May 30, 2006, Petitioner filed his present federal habeas petition in this Court.

(Doc. No. 1.) The Petition presents one claim for relief: that Petitioner’s sentence violated

Blakely v. Washington.

DISCUSSION

Federal petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners are governed by a

one-year statute of limitations period. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).

The statute of limitations begins to run from the latest of: (1) the date on which the

judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for

seeking such review; (2) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created

by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the

applicant was prevented from filing by such State action; (3) the date on which the

constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has

been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on

collateral review; or (4) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(1). 

Petitioner's appeal and First Rule 32 Petition were denied on September 11, 2003, and

his time to file a petition for certiorari with the United States Supreme Court expired on

December 10, 2003, thus the judgment against Petitioner became final on December 10,

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Petitioner alleges in his Petition and Supplemental Reply that his sentence violates

Blakely. He asserts that the Petition was timely filed and the limitation period should begin as of

the date of that decision. (Supplemental Reply, p. 2.) Blakely was decided on June 24, 2004. 

See 542 U.S. 296 (2004). If Blakely recognized a new constitutional right and made that right

retroactive to cases on collateral review, then, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), Petitioner's

statute of limitations would begin to run on June 24, 2004. However, Blakely does not apply

retroactively on collateral review. See Schardt v. Payne, 414 F.3d 1025, 1036 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Accordingly, Petitioner's time for filing a habeas petition began to run on December 10, 2003,

the date that his conviction became final, not on the date that the Blakely decision was issued.

2

 Ordinarily, an application for post-conviction relief is "pending" when the notice of

post-conviction relief is filed. See Isley v. Ariz. Dep't. of Corrections, 383 F.3d 1054, 1056 (9th

Cir. 2004). In the present case, Petitioner did not file his notice of post-conviction relief until

three weeks after the Second Rule 32 Petition had been filed. (Answer, Exs. F & G.) The Court

has therefore relied on the filing date of the Second Rule 32 Petition, rather than the notice, to

determine when Petitioner’s Second Rule 32 proceedings were pending. 

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2003. See Quintero Alvarez v. Schriro, 2005 WL 3501409, *3 & n.3 (D. Ariz. 2005)

(holding that, where petitioner's conviction is affirmed on direct appeal and petitioner does

not petition for review of the court of appeals decision by the Arizona Supreme Court,

petitioner's conviction became final 90 days after Arizona Court of Appeals denied

petitioner's direct appeal, when the time to petition for writ of certiorari expired; collecting

cases holding that the relevant statute of limitations begins to run on a federal habeas action

when a petitioner stands convicted by a state court and the time for seeking certiorari by the

United States Supreme Court expires, regardless of whether or not the petitioner actually

sought certiorari); see also Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 530-532 (2003) ("The words

'by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review'

make it clear that finality for the purpose of § 2244(d)(1)(A) is to be determined by reference

to a uniform federal rule.").1

 The statute of limitations is tolled during the time that a properly filed application

for state post-conviction relief is pending. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Although Petitioner's

conviction became final on December 10, 2003, the statute of limitations was tolled during

the period that Petitioner’s Second Rule 32 Petition was pending in state court. The statute

was tolled from October 22, 2004, the date that Petitioner filed his Second Rule 32 Petition,2

until the trial court dismissed Petitioner’s Second Rule 32 petition on December 8, 2005,

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when the Arizona Supreme Court denied review. It began running the next day, December

9, 2005. 

Thus, 318 days passed between the time that Petitioner’s judgment became final and

the time that Petitioner initiated his Second Rule 32 proceedings. See Biggs v. Duncan, 339

F.3d 1045, 1047 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the time between the conclusion of a first round

of post-conviction relief proceedings and a second round of post-conviction relief

proceedings counts against 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)’s 1-year filing deadline). Accordingly,

Petitioner had only 47 days from the December 8, 2005 dismissal of his Second Rule 32

Petition in which to file his federal Petition. In other words, Petitioner was required to file

his federal Petition on or before January 23, 2006. Petitioner did not file his Petition until

May 30, 2006; thus, the Petition was not timely filed.

 Equitable tolling may be available even after the statute of limitations period has

expired if "extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner's control make it impossible to file

a petition on time." Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct. (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th

Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds, Calderon v. United States Dist. Ct., 163 F.3d 530

(9th Cir. 1998)(en banc). Equitable tolling is appropriate only if extraordinary circumstances

beyond a prisoner's control make it impossible to file a petition on time, and is unavailable

in most cases. Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Miles v.

Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir.1999) and Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1288). Petitioner argues

in his Reply that the statute of limitations should be tolled because the Arizona prison

system does not afford its inmates any access to a law library, and therefore Petitioner could

not properly research the AEDPA statute of limitations. However, a pro se litigant's lack of

legal knowledge does not constitute extraordinary circumstances justifying equitable tolling.

See Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 970 (9th Cir. 2006). Accordingly, the Petition is timebarred.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court enter

an order DISMISSING the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 

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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written objections within

ten days of being served with a copy of the Report and Recommendation. If objections are

not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. The parties are advised that any objections

filed are to be identified with the following case number: CV-06-270-TUC-FRZ

The Clerk is directed to mail a copy of the Report and Recommendation to Petitioner

and counsel for Respondents.

DATED this 10th day of October, 2007.

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