Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01941/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01941-3/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 446
Nature of Suit: Americans with Disabilities Act - Other
Cause of Action: 42:12101 Americans with Disabilities Act

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28 This matter was determined to be suitable for decision without *

oral argument. L.R. 78-230(h).

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

 )

)

JAMES SANFORD, )

) 2:05-cv-1941-GEB-KJM

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) ORDER*

)

CHARLES A. ROBINSON, INC., dba )

WEST SACRAMENTO 76 GAS, )

)

Defendant. )

)

Plaintiff seeks $11,504.25 in attorney fees and $1,289.88 in

litigation expenses and costs. (Hubbard Decl. ¶ 5.) Defendant

opposes the motion.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed this lawsuit alleging architectural barriers

present on Defendant’s property constituted a violation of the

Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (“ADA”),

and state law. On May 22, 2006, Plaintiff’s Acceptance of Defendant’s

Offer of Judgment was filed with the Court. Defendant’s Offer of

Judgment provided Plaintiff with various forms of injunctive relief,

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$4001 in compensatory damages, and Defendant agreed to pay reasonable

attorney fees and costs as determined by the Court. (Def.’s Offer of

J. at 2.) On July 6, 2006, judgment was entered in accordance with

the Offer of Judgment, except on the equitable issues; the equitable

claims were dismissed since a settlement was reached and sufficient

reason was not provided to exercise jurisdiction over those settled

issues.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff, as the prevailing party in an ADA action, may

recover “reasonable attorney’s fees, including litigation expenses,

and costs.” 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (2006). Plaintiff seeks recovery of

$12,794.13 in attorney fees and litigation expenses. (Hubbard Decl.

¶ 5.) Defendant disputes the reasonableness of Plaintiff’s requested

attorney fees. (Def.’s Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. (“Def.’s Opp’n”) at 1.) 

To determine the reasonableness of Plaintiff’s request for attorney

fees, the lodestar method is used. This is determined by multiplying

“a reasonable hourly rate by the number of hours reasonably expended

on the litigation.” Widrig v. Apfel, 140 F.3d 1207, 1209 (9th

Cir. 1998).

I. Reasonable Rate

Plaintiff argues, despite what has been found to be 

reasonable hourly rates in this district ($250 for experienced

attorneys, $150 for associates, and $75 for paralegals), Plaintiff’s

counsel is entitled to a 22% “raise.” (Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of

Pl.’s Mot. (“Pl.’s P. & A.”) at 3.) Plaintiff relies on a report from

the Bureau of Labor Statistics showing a nationwide 22% increase in

inflation since these rates were first awarded. (Pl.’s P. & A. at 3.) 

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Defendant contends that this 22% increase is unwarranted. (Def.’s

Opp’n at 1-2.)

Plaintiff’s counsel raised this argument in another court in

this district earlier this year. White v. GMRI, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 2059 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2006) (“GMRI”). As the court in GMRI

found, merely citing a nationwide statistic regarding inflation does

not satisfy Plaintiff’s burden of showing entitlement to higher

rates. 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2059 at *15. For additional support,

Plaintiff presents the declaration of his attorney Lynn Hubbard. 

Hubbard declares that a defense lawyer “moved the court” to award a

rate of $485 per hour for a senior partner, $430 per hour for a senior

associate, and that the law firm billed $377.97 per hour on average

for associates. (Hubbard Decl. ¶ 4.) Hubbard’s averments neither

reveal whether the motion was granted, nor whether the rates sought

represent “the prevailing market rate in the relevant community.” 

Bouman v. Block, 940 F.2d 1211, 1235 (9th Cir. 1991). “The relevant

community is generally the forum in which the district court sits.” 

Eiden v. Thrifty Payless Inc., 407 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1170 (E.D.

Cal. 2005) (citing Barjon v. Dalton, 132 F.3d 496, 500 (9th

Cir. 1997)). Plaintiff has not explained why rates awarded in other

districts should be considered the prevailing market rate in this

forum. 

Plaintiff also relies on the declaration of attorney Thomas

E. Frankovich. (Hubbard Decl. at 2; Ex. A.) Frankovich discusses his

$335 hourly rate, which has been raised to $375, and that his $335

hourly rate was found reasonable in the Central and Northern Districts

of California; in addition, he declares he was awarded a rate of $300

per hour in two cases in the Central District. (Id.) These

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districts, however, have not been shown to be the relevant community. 

(Id.) Plaintiff has proffered no evidence that reasonable rates in

this district are $305 for experienced attorneys, $185 for associate

attorneys, and $90 for paralegals as Plaintiff argues. Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s request for a 22% increase is denied and the reasonable

rate is established at $250, $150, and $75, respectively. See e.g.,

GMRI, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2059; Pickern v. Marino’s Pizza & Italian

Rest., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26950 (E.D. Cal. April 9, 2003). 

A. Scott Hubbard

Plaintiff argues that his attorney Scott Hubbard’s hourly

rate should be increased to $275 per hour to match his expertise in

ADA law. (Pl.’s P. & A. at 4-5.) Plaintiff submits a list of 12

cases where Scott Hubbard served as lead counsel. Plaintiff’s mere

listing of the names of cases where Scott Hubbard has acted as lead

counsel is insufficient to sustain his burden showing that this

requested rate is reasonable. This request is denied. 

II. Reasonable Hours

Defendant argues that several hours Plaintiff requests in

his fee award were not reasonably expended and that the lodestar

calculation should be reduced. (Def.’s Opp’n at 2.) The Ninth

Circuit uses a 12-factor test for determining when fees are

reasonable. Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67 (9th

Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 951 (1976). These factors include:

“(1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty

and difficulty of the questions involved, (3) the

skill requisite to perform the legal service

properly, (4) the preclusion of other employment

by the attorney due to acceptance of the case, (5)

the customary fee, (6) whether the fee is fixed or

contingent, (7) time limitations imposed by the

client or the circumstances, (8) the amount

involved and the results obtained, (9) the

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experience, reputation, and ability of the

attorneys, (10) the ‘undesirability’ of the case,

(11) the nature and length of the professional

relationship with the client, and (12) awards in

similar cases.” 

Id. at 70. To the extent that some of the Kerr factors are not

figured into the lodestar, they may be used to adjust the lodestar

upward or downward. Doran v. Corte Madera Inn Best Western, 360

F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1061 (N.D. Cal. 2005). 

In support of his claim, Plaintiff submits a four page “slip

copy” which lists a record of all hours counsel allegedly spent on the

litigation with a brief description. (Hubbard Decl. Ex. B.) 

Defendant offers several examples where Plaintiff’s slip copy lists

phone calls to defense counsel lasting for .3 hours while defense

counsel’s records indicate the phone call lasted only for .2 hours. 

(Def.’s Opp’n at 3.) Defendant also alleges that although Plaintiff

lists a total of 1.8 hours spent drafting letters to defense counsel,

Plaintiff’s counsel admitted delegating the drafting of those letters

to a paralegal. (Marabito Decl. ¶¶ 2, 4.) Despite these minor

inconsistencies a reduction of the requested hours has not been shown

appropriate. 

A. Secretarial Tasks

Defendant lists over a page of tasks from Plaintiff’s slip

copy filled with tasks Defendant claims are secretarial in nature and

argues Plaintiff cannot recover for these tasks. (Def.’s Opp’n 

at 4-5.) “[S]ecretary time for tasks including creating files,

sending faxes, making copies, and calendaring dates, is an overhead

expense that goes to an attorney’s hourly rate and should not be

billed to a client separately.” Loskot v. USA Gas Corp., 2004 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 29174, at *13 (E.D. Cal. April 26, 2004); see also

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Doran, 360 F. Supp. 2d at 1062 (“Typing and various clerical tasks

should be included in attorney billing as overhead to run the office,

not recoverable in a motion for attorney fees.”). Those tasks

involving serving papers and filing documents with the court can be

performed by a secretary and therefore, Plaintiff cannot recover for

those items in this motion for attorney fees. As a result,

Plaintiff’s request for paralegal hours will be reduced by 3.9 hours.

B. Travel Time

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s counsel may not charge

fees to travel to Sacramento in connection with this litigation. 

(Def.’s Opp’n at 6.) Although it is sometimes proper to include

travel time in a motion for attorney fees, Davis v. City & Cnty. of

San Francisco, 976 F.2d 1536, 1543-44 (9th Cir. 1992), “[D]efendant is

not required to shoulder [Hubbard’s] travel expenses to and from

Sacramento because Hubbard has filed hundreds of cases in Sacramento

and it appears that he maintains his office in Chico for his own

convenience.” Martinez v. Longs Drug Stores, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 30226, at *12 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 28, 2005) (quoting Sanford v.

Thrifty Payless, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39833, at *9-10 (E.D.

Cal. Oct. 12, 2005)). Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim for attorney Lynn

Hubbard’s hours is reduced by 3.0 hours.

C. Boilerplate Documents

Defendant contends that since Plaintiff’s counsel has filed

hundreds of ADA cases, many documents should be considered boilerplate

and should be billed at a lower rate. (Def.’s Opp’n at 7.) 

Plaintiff’s counsel admits litigating over 1100 ADA cases. (Hubbard

Decl. ¶ 16.) Therefore, the requested hours for drafting the

Complaint, Request for Admissions, Interrogatories, Request for

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Production of Documents, Joint Status Report, Offer of Judgment, and

Motion for Attorney Fees is reduced by two thirds. See Eiden, 407

F. Supp. 2d at 1170 (reducing the plaintiff’s request by two thirds

for drafting the complaint, demand letter, interrogatories, and

production of documents). Lynn Hubbard’s requested hours are reduced

by 2.8 hours and Scott Hubbard’s requested hours are reduced by 3.0

hours.

D. Initial Conflict Check

Defendant contends that Plaintiff should not be permitted to

recover attorney fees for time spent completing an “initial conflict

check.” (Def.’s Opp’n at 8.) This item has not been shown to be a

fee for which counsel could reasonably bill his client; therefore Lynn

Hubbard’s charge for a 0.7 hour initial conflict check is disallowed. 

See GMRI, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2059 at *8; see also Eiden, 407

F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1170 (disallowing the 0.7 hour charge for the

initial conflict check); Loskot, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29174 at *15

(disallowing the charge for the initial conflict check).

E. Discovery Tasks

Defendant argues that some tasks performed by attorneys

Scott and Lynn Hubbard could have been performed by a paralegal and

therefore, should be billed at the paralegal hourly rate. (Def.’s

Opp’n at 8-10.) Plaintiff agrees that time spent reviewing responses

to interrogatories, admissions, and request for production of

documents, as well as preparing Plaintiff’s responses to

interrogatories and requests for production of documents should be

billed at a lower rate than his requested $305 per hour. (Hubbard

Decl. at 3.) Hubbard requests a rate of $200 per hour for these

tasks. (Id.) Since these are routine discovery tasks conducted by

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counsel, Plaintiff will not recover the full amount of attorney fees

requested. See Martinez, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30226 at *22

(precluding all recovery for discovery related tasks because they are

“mere secretarial” tasks); GMRI, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2059 at *11

(reducing the requested hours by two thirds for discovery related

tasks). Therefore, Plaintiff’s requested hours for discovery tasks

are reduced by two thirds. Accordingly, Lynn Hubbard’s requested

hours are reduced by 2.8 hours and Scott Hubbard’s hours are reduced

by 2.6 hours.

F. Preliminary Site Inspection

Defendant contends he should not be required to pay for

Plaintiff’s preliminary site inspection. (Def.’s Opp’n at 10.) 

Plaintiff counters that this cost should be recoverable as a

litigation expense because the inspection enabled Plaintiff to give

specific notice of the injunction he sought. (Pl.’s Reply at 8.) 

Since this cost is not duplicative of another expense, it will be

awarded.

III. Adjustment of Lodestar

Defendant argues that the lodestar should be reduced by the

Kerr factors. (Def.’s Opp’n at 12.) Most of the twelve factors have

already been considered in the computation of the lodestar and

therefore, cannot be reconsidered here. See Doran, 360 F. Supp. 2d

at 1063. A review of the remaining factors leads to the conclusion

that a reduction in the lodestar is not appropriate in this case.

CONCLUSION

The reasonable hourly rate is set at $250 for Lynn Hubbard,

$150 for Scott Hubbard, and $75 for the paralegals. Plaintiff can

recover fees for 3.9 hours of paralegal work, 10.1 hours at a rate of

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$150 per hour for attorney Scott Hubbard, and 12.95 hours at $250 per

hour and 2.1 hours at $200 per hour for attorney Lynn Hubbard. 

Therefore, Plaintiff can recover a total of $5896.25 in attorney fees. 

In addition, Plaintiff can recover $1289.88 in litigation costs for a

total of $7186.13. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 2, 2006

/s/ Garland E. Burrell, Jr.

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

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