Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00484/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00484-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 710
Nature of Suit: Fair Labor Standards Act
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question: Fair Labor Standards

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOE ROMERO, et al., ) 

 )

Plaintiffs, )

)

vs. )

)

PRODUCERS DAIRY FOODS, INC., )

 )

Defendant. )

)

) 

No. CV-F-05-0484 REC DLB

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS’

MOTION FOR CLASS

CERTIFICATION.

 

(Doc. 15) 

On April 3, 2006, the Court heard Plaintiffs’ Motion for

Class Certification (the “Motion”). Upon due consideration of

the written and oral arguments of the parties and the record

herein, the Court GRANTS the Motion in part and DENIES it in

part, as set forth herein.

I. Factual Background

Plaintiffs in this case are employees of Defendant Producers

Dairy Foods, Inc. (“Defendant”), who transport dairy products to

Defendant’s customers. Plaintiffs claim that their employer

failed to pay them overtime wages due under federal and state

law. Defendant is a Fresno-based company that produces milk and

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other dairy products at its Fresno plant. It distributes the

products it produces through its shipment facilities in Tulare,

Fresno, Ceres, Sacramento, San Leandro, Castroville, San Luis

Obispo, Ukiah, Anderson, and Chico. Over the last four years,

Defendant has employed over 100 drivers.

Employees classified as “Route Sales Drivers” distribute

Defendant’s products from the distribution facilities to

customers, such as restaurants, markets, chain stores, and

hospitals. The Route Sales Drivers’ Job Description indicates

that they are expected perform a number of tasks. Nelson Decl.

Ex. A. In addition to delivering products, Route Sales Drivers

collect money from customers and create a record of the

transaction. Route Sales Drivers also place the items that they

deliver on customers’ shelves and pick up empty containers or

unsold merchandise. Route Sales Drivers are also responsible for

loading, cleaning, and maintaining their trucks. 

The extent to which Route Sales Drivers engage in sales

activities is a matter of vigorous dispute. Route Sales Drivers’

duties as laid out in the Job description include calling on

prospective customers to solicit new business, selling new items

to current customers, and informing regular customers of new

products or services. Nelson Decl. Ex. A. Declarations of two

Route Sales Drivers that Plaintiffs submit indicate that they

were not responsible for making sales to old customers or

soliciting new customers. Parker Decl. ¶ 36; Jeanes Decl. ¶ 24. 

It is undisputed that managers and sales representatives, who are

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also employed by Defendant, have a responsibility to increase

sales of Defendant’s products.

Defendant also employs Relief Drivers who fill in for Route

Sales Drivers who are unavailable to work. Route Sales Drivers

and Relief Drivers are compensated based on a single incentivebased pay schedule, which includes a base salary combined with

possibilities to earn commission. They do not receive additional

pay for each hour they spend over eight hours per day or forty

hours per week. 

Employees called “School Route Drivers” and “Specials

Drivers” also deliver Defendant’s products. School Route Drivers

make deliveries to schools. Specials Drivers work during the

promotion of specials or other special occasions. Both School

Route Drivers and Specials Drivers earn an hourly wage and are

paid overtime for time in excess of forty hours per week.

II. Procedural History

On January 19, 2005, Plaintiffs Raymond Jeanes, Lawrence

Heffington, Lauren Portillo, and Joe Romero (collectively “Named

Plaintiffs”) filed their Complaint in the United States District

Court for the Northern District of California. The Complaint

alleged overtime violations under the Fair Labor Standards Act of

1938 (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. section 207, California Labor Code

sections 201, 202, 204, 510, and 1198, and California Business

and Professions Code sections 17200 et seq. On April 6, 2005,

the district court granted Defendant’s motion to transfer venue

to this Court.

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Plaintiffs object to a variety of passages in the 1

declarations Defendant submits. Because none of these objections

would change the Court’s decision on this Motion, the Court need

not rule on them at this time. Leuthold v. Destination Am., Inc.,

224 F.R.D. 462, 466 (N.D. Cal. 2004).

4

On February 17, 2006, Plaintiffs moved to certify two

classes: an opt-in collective action under FLSA, 29 U.S.C.

section 216(b), and an opt-out class action under Rule 23(b)(3)

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs submitted

declarations supporting class certification as well as a document

that they proposed the Court order distributed to class members

to give them notice of the actions. On March 10, 2006, Defendant

filed its Opposition to both classes, along with supporting

declarations. On March 25, Plaintiffs filed their Reply, along

with a supplemental declaration and objections to Defendant’s

declarations.1

III. Opt-In Action under FLSA

Plaintiffs ask the Court to certify an opt-in collective

action under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (“FLSA”). The

proposed class is:

All persons who are or were employed by

Producers Dairy as RSDs and equivalent

delivery positions who worked in excess of

forty (40) hours in a work week in the State

of California at any time from January 19,

2002 to the present and who were not paid

overtime compensation for those excess hours.

Mot. 12:22-25.

A. Legal Standard

The FLSA establishes a cause of action by an employee

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against an employer who fails to pay overtime wages. See 29

U.S.C. § 207. Under 29 U.S.C. section 216(b) (“Section 216(b)”),

an employee who files such a suit under FLSA may bring a

collective action on behalf of “employees similarly situated.” 

Doe v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1064 (9th Cir.

2000). Each employee who wishes to join the action must opt in

to the suit by filing a consent to sue with the district court. 

Id.

The district court has discretion to determine whether a

collective action is appropriate. Leuthold v. Destination Am.,

Inc., 224 F.R.D. 462, 466 (N.D. Cal. 2004). A court must decide

whether the proposed lead plaintiffs and the proposed collective

action class are “similarly situated” for purposes of Section

216(b). Id. The burden of making this showing is on the

Plaintiffs. Id.

FLSA does not define the term “similarly situated,” and the

Ninth Circuit does not appear to have addressed the issue. Id. 

District courts have addressed three different approaches to

determining whether plaintiffs are similarly situated: (1) a twotiered case-by-case approach, (2) the incorporation of the

requirements of Rule 23 of the current Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, or (3) the incorporation of the requirements of the

pre-1966 version of Rule 23 for “spurious” class actions. See

Thiessen v. GE Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1103 (10th Cir.

2001). 

According to district courts that have addressed the issue,

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the majority of courts have adopted the two-tiered approach. 

Leuthold, 224 F.R.D. at 467; Wynn v. NBC, 234 F. Supp. 2d 1067,

1082 (C.D. Cal. 2002). The Eleventh Circuit has also endorsed

this approach. Hipp v. Liberty Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 252 F.3d

1208, 1219 (11th Cir. 2001) (“The two-tiered approach to

certification of § 216(b) opt-in classes described above appears

to be an effective tool for district courts to use in managing

these often complex cases, and we suggest that district courts in

this circuit adopt it in future cases.”). Moreover, this is the

approach that this Court has taken in previous actions under

Section 216(b). See, e.g., Aguayo v. Oldenkamp Trucking, CV-04-

6279 (applying this approach and noting that “this is the

analysis the Court has employed in prior similar actions”). 

The parties do not discuss the merits of the various

approaches, though Defendant concedes that the FLSA requirements

are “not as strict” as those under Rule 23. Opp’n 5:8-12. The

Court therefore will use the two-tiered approach taken by the

majority of district courts to address the issue and taken

previously by this Court.

The first decision under the two-tiered approach concerns

whether the potential class should be given notice of the action. 

Leuthold, 224 F.R.D. at 467. A court should base this decision

on the pleadings and any affidavits the parties submit. Id. The

decision is made under a “fairly lenient standard” and the usual

result is conditional class certification. Id.; see Grayson v. K

Mart Corp., 79 F.3d 1086, 1096 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that the

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“similarly situated” requirement is less stringent than that for

joinder under Rule 20(a) or for separate trials under Rule

42(b)). The Eleventh Circuit has described the plaintiffs’

burden as “demonstrating a ‘reasonable basis’ for their claim of

class-wide discrimination.” Grayson, 79 F.3d at 1097. 

Plaintiffs may make this showing “by making substantial

allegations of class-wide discrimination, that is, detailed

allegations supported by affidavits which ‘successfully engage

defendants’ affidavits to the contrary.’” Id. 

The second tier of analysis occurs once discovery is

complete and the case is ready to be tried, generally triggered

by defendant’s motion to decertify the class. Leuthold, 224

F.R.D. at 467. At that point, a court must make a factual

determination regarding the propriety and scope of the class,

based on the following factors: “(1) the disparate factual and

employment settings of the individual plaintiffs; (2) the various

defenses available to the defendants with respect to the

individual plaintiffs; and (3) fairness and procedural

considerations.” Id.; Thiessen, 267 F.3d at 1103. If the court

then decides on the basis of the complete factual record that the

plaintiffs are not similarly situated, it may decertify the class

and dismiss the opt-in plaintiffs without prejudice. Leuthold,

224 F.R.D. at 467. 

Where discovery is complete, courts sometimes bypass the

first tier in favor of immediately making the second-tier factual

determination. Id. at 468. Defendant does not ask the Court to

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proceed to the more stringent second-tier analysis, but rather

concedes that at this stage Plaintiffs must only make a “limited

showing.” Opp’n at 6:1-3. Furthermore, it does not appear that

the factual record is sufficient for the Court to make a thorough

factual determination. The Court will limit its analysis to a

first-tier determination. Defendant may move to decertify the

class at the close of discovery.

B. Plaintiffs’ Showing

The allegations of the Complaint establish the basis for a

collective action. Plaintiffs are drivers employed by Defendant. 

Compl. ¶ 9. During the liability period, Plaintiffs worked in

excess of forty hours in a week. Compl. ¶ 16. Plaintiffs were

not paid at a rate of one and one-half times their regular rate

for their overtime hours. Id. The Court finds that these

allegations are sufficiently detailed and set forth a basis for

Defendant’s liability under FLSA.

Plaintiffs submit the declarations of Raymond Jeanes, a

current Route Sales Driver, and Cecil R. Parker, a former Route

Sales Driver, in support of certification of a collective action. 

Mr. Jeanes has been an employee of Defendant for approximately

four years. Jeanes Decl. ¶ 2. Mr. Parker was an employee for

approximately thirteen years from 1992 to 2005. Parker Decl.

¶ 2. Mr. Jeanes and Mr. Parker both contend that they have

worked over forty hours in a week but have never been paid extra

for the overtime hours. Jeanes Decl. ¶ 31; Parker Decl. ¶ 30. 

Both employees also state that their fellow employees worked over

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forty hours per week and did not receive overtime pay. Jeanes

Decl. ¶¶ 36, 40; Parker Decl. ¶¶ 35, 38.

C. “Outside Salesman” Exemption

Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiffs’ allegations and

declarations amount to “substantial allegations” of FLSA

violations against the named Plaintiffs and other similarly

situated employees. See Grayson, 79 F.3d at 1097. Defendant

does contend that Route Sales Drivers who comprise the proposed

collective action fall within the “outside salesman” exemption of

the FLSA. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1). Defendant concedes,

however, that “for purposes of the limited showing that must be

made for an opt-in collective action under the FLSA, Producers

recognizes that this defense is a matter of individualized

proof.” Opp’n 6:1-3. Mr. Parker declares that Route Sales

Drivers “were not responsible for and did not regularly make

sales to customers.” Parker Decl. ¶ 36. Mr. Jeanes avers that

he “was not responsible for soliciting sales from entities that

were not customers.” Jeanes Decl. ¶ 24. Route Sales Drivers

were instead instructed to refer questions regarding

modifications in prices or orders to a manager or a sales

representative. Parker Decl. ¶ 21; Jeanes Decl. ¶ 26. 

Plaintiffs’ declarations are sufficient to establish that the

“outside salesman” exemption does not preclude conditional

certification.

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D. Description of the Collective Action

Defendant claims that the proposed FLSA collective action is

overbroad and ill-defined.

1. School Route Drivers and Specials Drivers

Defendant points to particular subgroups of Defendant’s

employees that it contends fall outside the definition of the

proposed collective action. Defendant submits a declaration of

its Director of Administration stating that it paid School Route

Drivers and Specials Drivers on an hourly basis along with

overtime pay for time in excess of forty hours per week. See

Sewill Decl. ¶ 3. Consequently, Defendant contends, these groups

of employees should be expressly excluded from the collective

action.

Plaintiffs do not dispute that School Route Drivers and

Specials Drivers are paid on an hourly basis and receive an

overtime premium for all hours worked beyond forty in a single

work week. Nor do Plaintiffs contend that this pay arrangement

functions similarly to the “company-wide commission schedule”

that covers Route Sales Drivers and Relief Drivers. Reply 1:21-

2:1. Plaintiffs do not claim that any of the Named Plaintiffs

have ever worked as School Route Drivers or Specials Drivers. In

any event, Plaintiffs do not point to any portions of the

declarations they have submitted that indicate that School Route

Drivers and Specials Drivers are similarly situated with the

Named Plaintiffs with respect to their compensation for time

beyond forty hours per week. 

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Plaintiffs contend that “it is not known at this point

whether School Route Drivers or Special Drivers ever fill in for

an RSD.” Reply 6:27-28. Plaintiffs appear to place the burden

on Defendant to show that these groups of employees are not

similarly situated to Route Sales Drivers, pointing out that none

of Defendant’s declarations have claimed “that School Route

Drivers or Specials drivers never fill in for a Route Sales

Driver or Relief Driver.” Reply 6:28-7:2 (emphasis in original). 

Plaintiffs do not explain how “filling in” for Route Sales

Drivers would cause these groups to be similarly situated with

Route Sales Drivers under FLSA’s overtime requirements. It

appears that Plaintiffs are assuming that while filling in,

School Route Drivers and Specials Drivers would be compensated

under the Route Sales Driver commission-based schedule. Nothing

in the record supports this assumption. Plaintiffs’ burden at

this stage is “fairly lenient.” See Leuthold, 224 F.R.D. at 467. 

They must nonetheless provide some support, in the form of

affidavits, to establish the factual predicate for their

assertion that School Route Drivers and Specials Drivers meet the

“similarly situated” requirement. Grayson, 79 F.3d at 1096. The

Court will not include parties in a collective action based on

Plaintiffs’ unsupported speculation that School Route Drivers or

Specials Drivers fill in for Route Sales Drivers, rendering those

groups somehow similarly situated to the Named Plaintiffs with

respect to overtime pay.

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2. Relief Drivers

Defendant does not contend that Relief Drivers are not

similarly situated to Route Sales Drivers. It is undisputed that

Relief Drivers, like Route Sales Drivers, are paid on a base

salary and commission earnings basis. Sewill Decl. ¶ 2. The

Court finds that Relief Drivers are similarly situated to Route

Sales Drivers.

3. Drivers in Castroville and San Luis Obispo

Citing Frank Sewill’s declaration, Defendant claims that

Route Sales Drivers based at Defendant’s San Luis Obispo and

Castroville facilities never worked more than forty hours per

week. See Sewill Decl. ¶ 5. In response, Plaintiffs submit the

timecards for two Route Sales Drivers based in Castroville and

one based in San Luis Obispo that indicate each worked over forty

hours in a week. Nelson Supp. Decl. ¶¶ 14-18, Exs. C, D, E, F. 

Plaintiffs have made a sufficient showing that Route Sales

Drivers based in Castroville and San Luis Obispo are similarly

situated to the Named Plaintiffs. 

4. Statute of Limitations

Defendant also contends that the time period for the

collective action should be limited to recovery for work

performed since January 19, 2003. While the statute of

limitations for violation of the FLSA is ordinarily two years,

for willful violations it is extended to three years. 29 U.S.C.

§ 255(a); Brock v. Superior Care, Ind., 840 F.2d 1054, 1061 (2d

Cir. 1988). 

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Plaintiffs allege that “Defendant was advised by skilled and

competent lawyers and other professionals, employees and advisors

knowledgeable about the requirements of the FLSA . . . regarding

the payment of overtime compensation to eligible employees.” 

Compl. ¶ 14. Plaintiffs contend that Defendant knew it had the

duty to pay Plaintiffs overtime, was financially able to make

such payments, “but willfully, knowingly and intentionally failed

and refused to do so.” Id. Defendant does not submit any

evidence that establishes that its acts were not willful. At

this stage, it is unclear what evidence Plaintiffs could

conceivably submit to establish that Defendants acted willfully. 

Given the lenient standard that Plaintiffs face at this stage and

the difficulty of establishing, by affidavits, Defendant’s

willful behavior, the Court finds that the allegations of willful

conduct in the Complaint, combined with the declarations

evidencing FLSA violations are sufficient. Therefore, for the

purpose of conditional certification, the three-year statute of

limitations applies.

5. “Equivalent Delivery Positions”

Defendant asserts that the inclusion in the collective

action of “equivalent delivery positions” to Route Sales Drivers

is without meaning and is nonspecific. The Court agrees that

this phrase introduces ambiguity in the class, especially given

the Court’s conclusion that School Route Drivers and Specials

Drivers do not meet the class criteria. At oral argument,

Plaintiffs indicated that, at its broadest, the phrase “RSDs and

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equivalent delivery positions” refers to Route Sales Drivers,

Relief Drivers, School Route Drivers, and Specials Drivers.

Plaintiffs have met their burden to show that two groups of

Defendant’s employees are similarly situated to the Named

Plaintiffs: Route Sales Drivers and Relief Drivers. 

Accordingly, the Court conditionally certifies a collective

action described as follows:

All persons who are or were employed by

Producers Dairy as Route Sales Drivers and

Relief Drivers who worked in excess of forty

(40) hours in a work week in the State of

California at any time from January 19, 2002,

to the present and who were not paid overtime

compensation for those excess hours.

IV. Opt-Out Class under Rule 23(b)(3)

Plaintiffs ask the Court to certify their second through

sixth causes of action as an opt-out class under Rule 23 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. They define the proposed class

as follows: 

All persons who are or were employed by

Producers Dairy as RSDs and equivalent

delivery positions who worked in excess of

eight (8) hours in a day and/or forty (40)

hours in a work week in the State of

California at any time from January 19, 2001

to the present who were not paid overtime

compensation for those excess hours.

Mot. 18:3-6.

A. Rule 23(a) Prerequisites

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) enumerates four

prerequisites to class certification:

One or more members of a class may sue or be

sued as representative parties on behalf of

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all only if (1) the class is so numerous that

joinder of all members is impracticable, (2)

there are questions of law or fact common to

the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the

representative parties are typical of the

claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the

representative parties will fairly and

adequately protect the interests of the

class.

Plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing each of the Rule 23(a)

prerequisites. Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 508

(9th Cir. 1992) (citing Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416, 1424

(9th Cir. 1985)). In evaluating whether Plaintiffs have met

their burden, a court should accept the substantive allegations

of the complaint as true. Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 901

n. 17 (9th Cir. 1975).

1. Numerosity

A Rule 23 class must be so numerous that joinder of all

members individually is “impracticable.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

23(a)(1). Defendant admits in its answer that it employed over

“one hundred or more persons as route drivers during the last

four years.” Answer ¶ 12(a). A class with over forty members is

presumed to satisfy the numerosity prerequisite. Consol. Rail

Corp. v. Town of Hyde Park, 47 F.3d 473, 483 (2d Cir. 1995)

(citing 1 Newberg On Class Actions, (2d ed.) § 3.05); see also

Mathis v. Bess, 138 F.R.D. 390, 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (joinder

impracticable solely because putative class had 120 members). 

The numerosity requirement is more readily met where a class

contains employees suing their present employer. Mullen v.

Treasure Chest Casino, L.L.C., 186 F.3d 620, 625 (5th Cir. 1999). 

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This is because class members may be unwilling to sue their

employer individually out of fear of retaliation. Id. The Court

finds that the class meets the numerosity prerequisite.

2. Commonality

Rule 23(a)(2) requires “questions of law or fact common to

the class.” The Ninth Circuit construes the commonality

prerequisite permissibly. Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d

1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998). All questions of law and fact need

not be common. Id. Rather, “[t]he existence of shared legal

issues with divergent factual predicates is sufficient, as is a

common core of salient facts coupled with disparate legal

remedies within the class.” Id.; see In re Agent Orange Prod.

Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 166 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that the

commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2) was satisfied because

the military contractor defense was common to all of the

plaintiffs’ claims).

a. Common Pay Scheme

Route Sales Drivers and Relief Drivers are paid under the

same commission schedule. Opp’n 3:5-10; Reply 1:21-2:1. 

Consequently, employees in both groups are treated similarly by

Defendant with respect to overtime pay. It is undisputed that

School Route Drivers and Specials Drivers are paid under a

separate scheme that involves hourly wages and overtime pay. The

Court finds that claims of School Route Driver and Specials

Drivers do not raise questions of law or fact in common with the

class representatives’ claims. Plaintiffs’ unsupported assertion

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that School Route Drivers and Specials Drivers may fill in for

Route Sales Drivers at times does not meet their burden to show

that common questions are present. Accordingly, School Route

Drivers and Specials Drivers are not properly included in the

putative class.

b. Vehicle Weight Exemption

Defendant all but concedes satisfaction of the commonality

prerequisite by contending that a single defense bars the claims

of every potential class member. Defendant argues that the Route

Sales Drivers, Relief Drivers, School Route Drivers, and Specials

Drivers are all exempt from the overtime requirements under

California law because the gross vehicle weights of their trucks

exceed 26,001 pounds. Defendant cites in support Paragraph 3(L)

of Industrial Welfare Commission Order No. 9-2001; title 49 of

the Code of Federal Regulations, sections 395.1 to 395.13; and

title 13 of the California Code of Regulations, subchapter 6.5,

sections 1200 et seq. Defendant states that it is undisputed

that the trucks of all of the proposed class members exceed

26,001 pounds, and supports this contention with evidence in the

form of the registration cards Defendant has produced in response

to an interrogatory. See Hipp Decl. Ex. D. Defendant contends,

in essence, that a legal question exists the resolution of which

potentially precludes the claims of the entire class based on

undisputed facts. This issue alone is sufficient to satisfy the

commonality requirement.

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c. “Outside Salesman” Exemption

Defendant also argues that class members’ claims turn on

case-by-case, fact specific analyses of each individual’s sales

efforts and whether each is exempt from overtime requirements as

an outside sales person. Under California Labor Code section

1171, “any individual employed as an outside salesman” may not

recover for wages, hours, and working conditions violations, such

as those Plaintiffs allege under Labor Code section 1198. 

Ramirez v. Yosemite Water Co., 20 Cal. 4th 785, 789 (1999). This

exempts from California overtime laws any employee “who

customarily and regularly works more than half the working time

away from the employer’s place of business selling tangible or

intangible items or obtaining orders or contracts for products,

services or use of facilities.” Id. at 795 (emphasis in

original). 

In Ramirez, the court addressed the relevant factors in

determining whether a route sales representative who delivered

bottled water to customers was an “outside salesperson” exempt

from California overtime laws. Id. at 802. The court adopted a

quantitative approach that compares an employee’s time spent

“selling” to time spent performing other activities. Id. at 801. 

Certain job tasks, such as travel time, should be apportioned

according to types of activities that they facilitate. Id. So,

for example, if an employee travels to a destination to engage in

both sales and nonsales activities, the travel time must be

apportioned among sales and nonsales work. Id. The court

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explained that the analysis should not focus either solely on the

employer’s job description or on the employee’s actual work

pattern:

A trial court, in determining whether the

employee is an outside salesperson, must

steer clear of these two pitfalls by

inquiring into the realistic requirements of

the job. In so doing, the court should

consider, first and foremost, how the

employee actually spends his or her time. 

But the trial court should also consider

whether the employee’s practice diverges from

the employer’s realistic expectations,

whether there was any concrete expression of

employer displeasure over an employee’s

substandard performance, and whether these

expressions were themselves realistic given

the actual overall requirements of the job.

Id. at 802 (emphasis in original). 

Justice Werdegar, writing for Supreme Court of California,

clarified the amenability of the factual inquiry in Ramirez to

class action treatment. Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Super. Ct.,

34 Cal. 4th 319, 335-38 (2004). The court noted that the first

part of the Ramirez inquiry, which involves “any dispute over

‘how the employee actually spends his or her time,’ of course,

has the potential to generate individual issues.” Id. at 336-37

(internal citations omitted) (quoting Ramirez, 20 Cal. 4th at

802). On the other hand, “considerations such as ‘the employer’s

realistic expectations’ and ‘the actual overall requirements of

the job’ are likely to prove susceptible of common proof.” Id.

at 337 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Ramirez, 20 Cal. 4th

at 802). Thus, a defendant’s invocation of the outside salesman

exemption does not bar class certification.

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Justice Werdegar went on to demonstrate the problematic

nature of a rule to the contrary. Id. at 338. If individual

overtime exemption issues could preclude class certification, the

proponent of an overtime class action would be forced to prove

that the entire class was nonexempt whenever a defendant raises

the affirmative defense of exemption. Id. Under California law,

the employer bears the burden of showing that an employee is

exempt from overtime laws. Id. (citing Ramirez, 20 Cal. 4th at

794-95). Requiring a plaintiff to demonstrate that class members

are not exempt would effectively reverse that burden. Id.

The Court finds that determining whether Plaintiffs are

outside salespeople will likely require the Court to make a

single factual finding regarding the requirements and realistic

expectations Defendant had regarding Route Sales Drivers’ job

performance. See id. at 337. Were the Court to rely solely on

the “actual activity” of Route Sales Drivers, an employee

assigned to sell might evade the outside sales exemption by his

own “substandard performance.” Id. (quoting Ramirez, 20 Cal. 4th

at 802). In fact, Defendant has already contended, in the

context of its typicality argument, that Mr. Parker and Mr.

Jeanes’s failure to engage in sales work “sets them well apart

from the rest of the Route Sales Drivers who performed sales work

and who understood that their primary job responsibility was to

sell products from the full line of Producers’ dairy products.” 

Opp’n 10:4-6. The Court will likely be required to make a

finding as to whether a Route Sales Driver who engages in little

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or no sales work falls outside of Defendant’s realistic

expectations. Unless new evidence comes forth indicating that

Defendant had different expectations regarding different Route

Sales Drivers’ duties — an unlikely proposition given the uniform

nature of the compensation scheme — this finding will be

identical with respect to each of the Plaintiffs.

Contrary to Defendant’s contention, class treatment of the

outside sales exemption would not entail altering the substantive

law. Rather, the Supreme Court of California has concluded that,

consistent with California overtime statutes, courts may couple

uniform findings on common issues with “innovative procedural

tools” that can efficiently resolve individual questions. See

Sav-On Drug Stores, 34 Cal. 4th at 337 & n. 12 (suggesting,

citing federal district court cases, that a trial court could

determine individual overtime entitlement through separate

judicial or administrative miniproceedings on individualized

issues, hearings before a special master, or calculation of

damages based on a standard formula). Thus, Defendant’s

invocation of the “outside salesperson” exemption does not

preclude a finding that common questions of law and fact exist.

d. Commission Salespersons

Defendant also argues that a decision about whether Route

Sales Drivers are exempt as commission salespersons will be factspecific and will differ according to the circumstances of each

Route Sales Driver. California overtime statutes do not apply to

any employee who earns one and one-half times the minimum wage if

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more than one-half of the employee’s compensation represents

commissions. Ramirez, 20 Cal. 4th at 803. “Commission” is

defined as follows: “Commission wages are compensation paid to

any person for services rendered in the sale of such employer’s

property or services and based proportionately upon the amount or

value thereof.” Id. (quoting Cal. Lab. Code § 204.1). Thus, if

a compensation scheme meets two requirements, it constitutes

“commission wages”: “First, the employees must be involved

principally in selling a product or service, not making the

product or rendering the service. Second, the amount of their

compensation must be a percent of the price of the product or

service.” Id. at 804 (quoting Keyes Motors, Inc. v. Div. of

Labor Standards Enforcement, 197 Cal. App. 3d 557, 563 (1987)).

Defendant does not dispute that all Route Sales Drivers were

paid under a single compensation scheme. Rather, Defendant

submits the declaration of Anastasio Perez, who states that Route

Sales Drivers “were all paid under the same sales commission

program.” Perez Decl. ¶ 5; see also Montoya Decl. ¶ 5 (“[W]e

were all paid under the same sales commission program . . . .”). 

Nor does Defendant dispute Plaintiffs’ contention that all Route

Sales Drivers share the same job description. Defendant contends

that the amount of money that a Route Sales Driver actually

earned would depend on that driver’s personal sales effort. 

Consequently, Defendant argues, this case will turn on individual

proof of the work performed by each Route Sales Driver.

It appears to the Court that, as with the “outside salesman”

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exemption, a determination of whether Route Sales Drivers are

paid commission wages under California law will turn on issues of

law and fact common to all employees. The inquiry into whether

Route Sales Drivers are principally involved in selling a product

or are merely rendering a service should produce an answer common

to all Route Sales Drivers. Route Sales Drivers do sell

different amounts of products to different customers at different

times. Nevertheless, it seems that the Court will necessarily

decide whether a delivery of product to a customer, combined with

certain financial incentives of the commission plan, amounts to

“principally selling a product.” See Ramirez, 20 Cal. 4th at

804. 

The Court will be required to make certain findings about

the nature of the compensation scheme. The Court may, for

instance, be called upon determine whether a base salary combined

with incentives for selling certain products makes compensation

“a percent of the price of the product or service.” See id.

(remanding with instructions that the trial court determine

whether the flat-rate portion of an incentive-based compensation

scheme “represented a ‘draw’ against future bottle sales”

properly characterized as commission). The Court will not

relieve Defendant, merely by the accident of the class action

device, of its burden to prove the commission salesperson

exemption as an affirmative defense. Cf. Sav-On Drug Stores, 34

Cal. 4th at 338. After deciding the common issue concerning

which parts of Defendant’s pay scheme, if any, are properly

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categorized as commission, an individual determination can then

be made of how much of each employee’s pay represents commission

wages. 

The Court finds that, with the exception of School Route

Drivers and Specials Drivers, the proposed class satisfies the

commonality requirement.

3. Typicality

The typicality prerequisite ensures that interests of the

named representative align with the interests of the class. 

Hanon, 976 F.2d at 508. Typicality tests “whether other members

have the same or similar injury, whether the action is based on

conduct which is not unique to the named plaintiffs, and whether

other class members have been injured by the same course of

conduct.” Id. A court should consider the nature of the claim

or defense of the class representative, rather than the specific

facts from which it arose or for which relief is sought. Id. 

For instance, typicality may be lacking where the putative class

representative is subject to unique defenses that might

jeopardize the recovery of absent plaintiffs. Id.; see, e.g.,

Gary Plastic Packaging Corp. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &

Smith, Inc., 903 F.2d 176, 179-80 (2d Cir. 1990) (denying class

certification for lack of typicality where actions of class

representative subjected it to “several unique defenses”).

Defendant argues that Mr. Jeanes’s and Mr. Parker’s

representations in their declarations that they never did sales

work sets them apart from other Route Sales Drivers. Defendant

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does not explain how such a factual difference would jeopardize

the interests of any absent class member. To the contrary, Mr.

Jeanes’s and Mr. Parker’s representations that they did not

engage in sales activity, if true, indicate that they are not

subject to defenses that might bar the claims of some absent

class members, such as Mr. Perez and Art Montoya, who assert that

they are salespersons. Thus, even if Mr. Jeanes and Mr. Parker

behaved differently on the job than other absent class members,

those absent individuals will not find their claims barred on

account of those differences. 

At base, it appears that the Named Plaintiffs seek relief

based on the same conduct of Defendant: the failure to pay

overtime wages. Defendant does not contend that the Named

Plaintiffs’ claims arise from conduct that Defendant directed at

them alone. It is undisputed that all Route Sales Drivers were

paid under a single compensation scheme and thus appear to have

been treated similarly. Accepting the declarants’ assertions, it

appears that Mr. Perez and Mr. Montoya, by substantially altering

their customer interactions in response to financial incentives,

reacted differently than Plaintiffs Mr. Jeanes and Mr. Parker to

the same compensation scheme. This is not the sort of asymmetry

that jeopardizes absent class members and precludes a finding of

typicality. See Gary Plastic Packaging, 903 F.2d at 179-80.

Defendant also attacks the typicality of the Named

Plaintiffs’ claims on the grounds that Mr. Romero worked as a

supervisor, not a Route Sales Driver, from October 2002 to

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January 2004. Nothing before the Court suggests that this

disparity will prejudice absent class members. Defendant does

not contend that the tenure of the other Named Plaintiffs are

atypical of absent individuals. Nor does Defendant object to the

inclusion of Mr. Jeanes, who ceased work as a Route Sales Driver

in 2003, as a Named Plaintiff. 

The Court finds that a range of Named Plaintiffs with

differing employment dates best represents absent class members. 

It is inevitable that, of the dozens of absent class members,

some were hired during the statutory period, some ceased

employment before the end of the period, and some spent time in

other positions with Defendant or outside the company altogether. 

The multiple backgrounds of the Named Plaintiffs help ensure that

they will protect the interests of absent class members of

varying circumstances.

4. Adequacy of Representation

The adequacy of representation prerequisite under Rule

23(a)(4) has two criteria: “First, the named representatives

must appear able to prosecute the action vigorously through

qualified counsel, and second, the representatives must not have

antagonistic or conflicting interests with the unnamed members of

the class.” Lerwill v. Inflight Motion Pictures, Inc., 582 F.2d

507, 512 (9th Cir. 1978). There is no dispute as to this

prerequisite.

B. 23(b)(3) Requirements

Under Rule 23(b)(3), a court may certify a class action

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where the prerequisites are met and “the court finds that the

questions of law or fact common to the members of the class

predominate over any questions affecting only individual members,

and that a class action is superior to other available methods

for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.”

1. Predominance of Common Questions

Because no precise test can determine whether common issues

predominate, the Court must pragmatically assess the entire

action and the issues involved. Rodriguez v. Carlson, 166 F.R.D.

465, 477 (E.D. Wash. 1996). Common questions may predominate

where the resolution of a question common to the class would

significantly advance the litigation. McClendon v. Continental

Group, Inc., 113 F.R.D. 39, 43-44 (D.N.J. 1986) (citing In re

School Asbestos Litigation, 789 F.2d 996, 1010 (3d Cir. 1986)); 5

James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice, § 23.45 (3d ed.

2005). 

Where a central common defense may bar each of plaintiff’s

claims, class action treatment is particularly apt. This is

because “[i]f the defense succeeds, the entire litigation is

disposed of. If it fails, it will not be an issue in the

subsequent individual trials.” In re Agent Orange, 818 F.2d at

167.

The existence of the potential overtime exemption for Route

Sales Drivers based on the weight of their trucks counsels

strongly in favor of class treatment in this case. Defendant

asserts that this affirmative defense potentially bars all

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recovery under California overtime statutes. Furthermore,

Defendant claims that the facts that would trigger this defense

are undisputed. Even if the relevant facts — the weight of the

Route Sales Drivers’ trucks — are ultimately subject to dispute,

it appears they can be resolved with reference to simple forms of

proof. See Hipp Decl. 7:13-17, Ex. D (Department of Motor

Vehicles Registration Cards bearing the model, make, class, type,

weight, and Vehicle Identification Number of each vehicle

operated by a Route Sales Driver). A series of individual

actions in which the weight exemption is a central issue would be

a waste of judicial resources. Regardless of the extent of the

other individual issues, this issue alone appears to dominate in

importance. 

Other common issues also have the potential to expediently

resolve the claims of all Route Sales Drivers. If Defendant

realistically expects that Route Sales Drivers spend most of

their time engaging in sales activities, then an inquiry into how

each of the Route Sales Drivers actually spends their time may be

unnecessary. See Ramirez, 20 Cal. 4th at 802 (“[A]n employee who

is supposed to be engaged in sales activities during most of his

working hours and falls below the 50 percent mark due to his own

substandard performance should not thereby be able to evade a

valid exemption.”)

Even if individualized proof is ultimately necessary to

determine whether a class member is entitled to recover, legal

questions on which these individual questions turn will be common

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to the class. The Court will need to differentiate between

activities of Route Sales Drivers that are properly characterized

as “selling a product or service” and those activities that are

merely amount to “rendering the service.” See id. at 804

(quoting Keyes Motors, 197 Cal. App. 3d at 563). Litigating the

characterization of Route Sales Driver tasks over and over again

in individual actions would be impractical. The same rationale

supports a class-wide determination of which parts of Route Sales

Driver pay are commission wages under California law. See

Ramirez, 20 Cal. 4th at 804.

The individual issues that will remain if the common issues

do not resolve the case appear to be relatively straightforward

and subject to easy calculation. Evaluating the amount of

overtime work performed and the amount of commission wages

received can likely be determined with reference to timecards and

payroll records. The calculation of time spent on outside sales

activities could be more difficult, depending on how specifically

Route Sales Drivers account for their time. However given the

purported uniformity of Route Sales Driver activities, it is

possible that the Court could determine whether sales activities

take up more than half of a Route Sales Driver’s time with

reference to a sample of several Route Sales Drivers. Even if

individual proceedings were necessary to determine the hours each

class member spent performing sales activities, class action

proceedings on the predominant common issues present substantial

litigation economies.

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2. Superiority of a Class Action

Rule 23(b)(3) sets forth factors a court may consider to

determine whether certifying a class is superior: 

(A) the interest of members of the class in

individually controlling the prosecution or

defense of separate actions; (B) the extent

and nature of any litigation concerning the

controversy already commenced by or against

members of the class; (C) the desirability or

undesirability of concentrating the

litigation of the claims in the particular

forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be

encountered in the management of a class

action.

Defendant does not dispute the superiority of class action

treatment under these factors. 

There is no indication that individual members of the class,

other than the Named Plaintiffs, desire to individually control

their case. Two Route Sales Drivers appear to be cooperating

with Defendant in opposing class certification, inasmuch as they

have submitted supporting declarations for Defendant. These

Route Sales Drivers do not contend that they wish to control the

litigation or disagree with the manner in which Plaintiffs are

proceeding.

The Court is aware of no parallel litigation that

adjudicates these issues. In past cases, this Court has not

shied away from certifying a Rule 23(b)(3) class action simply

because of the presence of an FLSA opt-in collective action in

the same case. See, e.g., Aguayo v. Oldenkamp Trucking, CV-04-

6279. Another district court has declined to certify a Rule

23(b)(3) class action, finding that proceeding on pendent state

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law claims on an opt-in basis in the FLSA action was superior

where defendant demonstrated substantial hostility against the

lawsuit amongst potential class members. Leuthold, 224 F.R.D.

at. 469-71. Other than the cooperation of some Route Sales

Drivers with Defendant, no such hostility exists here.

The Rule 23(b)(3)(D) manageability inquiry “encompasses the

whole range of practical problems that may render the class

action format inappropriate for a particular suit.” Eisen v.

Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 164, 94 S. Ct. 2140, 40 L.

Ed. 2d 732 (1974). Whether a case is manageable as a class

action can be an “overriding consideration” in determining

superiority. Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 78 F.R.D.

108, 124 (C.D. Cal. 1978). Even where individual issues exist,

the value of treating them separately decreases as the

commonality of issues increases. See Epifano v. Boardroom Bus.

Prods., Inc., 130 F.R.D. 295, 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (class action

treatment can be useful in “preventing a multiplicity and

scattering of suits which essentially rely on the same legal

theories and evidence”).

There is a significant possibility that resolution of a

common legal issue — the vehicle weight exemption — will resolve

the entire action before trial. Failing this, a legal

determination of what components of Route Sales Drivers’ pay are

commission wages could result in some or all of the Route Sales

Drivers’ claims being resolved with reference to payroll records. 

Also, following a class-wide determination of which Route Sales

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Driver job tasks amount to “sales activities,” individual

proceedings can determine whether these activities comprise more

than half of an employee’s time, triggering the outside sales

exemption. If none of the affirmative defenses succeed and

Plaintiffs are entitled to recovery, the damages of each class

member can be easily determined with reference to timecards.

The governing law and number of members of the putative

class indicate that a class action would be manageable. All of

the claims are governed by the same state law. See Castano v.

Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 743-44 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding

that district court erred in failing to consider manageability

problems caused by differences in state law). The putative class

is not so large that determination of certain facts particular to

individuals will not be overly burdensome. See Six Mexican

Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir.

1990) (difficulty of calculating individual damages of 1349

undocumented Mexican workers made class action unfeasible).

Following the course of action this Court has taken in past

cases by proceeding as a class action appears to be the superior

approach in this case. Accordingly, the Court certifies the

following Rule 23(b)(3) class:

All persons who are or were employed by

Producers Dairy as Route Sales Drivers or

Relief Drivers who worked in excess of eight

(8) hours in a day and/or forty (40) hours in

a work week in the State of California at any

time from January 19, 2001, to the present

who were not paid overtime compensation for

those excess hours.

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V. Notice

The FLSA requires the Court to provide potential class

members “accurate and timely notice concerning the pendency of

the collective action, so that they can make informed decisions

about whether to participate.” Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v.

Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 170, 110 S. Ct. 482, 107 L. Ed. 2d 480

(1989). A court certifying a Rule 23(b)(3) class action “must

direct to class members the best notice practicable under the

circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can

be identified through reasonable effort.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

23(c)(2)(B).

A. Contents

Plaintiffs have submitted a six-page document (the “Notice”)

they propose should be mailed to all putative class members and

posted in Route Sales Drivers’ workplaces. Nelson Decl. Ex. B. 

Defendant objects to the Notice on several grounds.

Defendant claims that, on page 1 of the Notice, the “TO”

paragraph and the third paragraph of the Introduction refer only

to Plaintiffs’ state-law theory of the case. Nelson Decl. Ex. B

at 1. The Court disagrees. These passages merely state

generally the overtime violations that could give rise to

liability under federal law (over forty hours in a week) or

California law (over eight hours in a day or forty hours in a

week). Defendant does not give any reason why the more detailed

explanation of the law featured at section III of the Notice

(Nelson Decl. Ex. B at 2) should also be included on the first

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page.

Defendant also contends that the following portion of the

Notice inaccurately states federal law: “Under the FLSA,

Plaintiffs seek payment of overtime compensation for these excess

hours, plus liquidated damages in the form of twice the overtime

compensation owed, or in the alternative, prejudgment interest.” 

Nelson Decl. Ex. B at 2 (emphasis added). Defendant cites in

support only Section 216(b), which appears to be silent on the

issue of whether double liquidated damages are available. 

Plaintiffs cite cases where courts have awarded employees

liquidated damages equal to unpaid overtime wages under the FLSA. 

See, e.g., Angelo v. United States, 57 Fed. Cl. 100, 104 (Fed.

Cl. 2003); Tho Dinh Tran v. Alphonse Hotel Corp., 281 F.3d 23, 35

(2d Cir. 2002). Furthermore, the passage merely states what

“Plaintiffs seek,” not what they will actually receive. Nelson

Decl. Ex. B at 2. To mitigate any risk that the reader might

perceive that the Court has endorsed this interpretation,

Plaintiffs include in section VII of the Notice a passage

explicitly providing that the Court has not expressed an opinion

regarding the merits of the case. Nelson Decl. Ex. B at 4. 

Defendant requests that the proposed notice delete any

reference to the phrase “or equivalent position” and expressly

exclude School Route Drivers and Specials Drivers. Because the

Court finds that School Route Drivers and Specials Drivers are

not properly members of either the FLSA collective action or Rule

23 class action, these requests are well taken. The Notice shall

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reflect the Court’s revised description of the class.

In its Opposition, Defendant asked the Court to delete

section VII of the Notice as unnecessary and lacking a rational

basis. At oral argument, Defendant clarified that it had

intended to refer to section VIII, which states that Defendant

may not retaliate against employees who participate in the

lawsuit, not section VII. The Court finds that section VIII is

accurate and that it helps to address the reluctance that

employees often have to suing an employer out of fear of

retaliation. See Mullen, 186 F.3d at 625. 

B. Distribution

Plaintiffs ask that the Court order (1) the Notice sent to

all potential class members by first class mail and (2) that

Defendant post the Notice and provide multiple copies of the

Consent to Join form in each place where class members work.

1. Posting on Defendant’s Premises

Defendant objects to a requirement that it post the Notice

and provide copies of the Consent to Join form on the grounds

that it is “obviously punitive” and unnecessary. First class

mail is ordinarily sufficient to notify class members who have

been identified. Peters v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 966 F.2d

1483, 1486 (D.C. Cir. 1992). Sometimes courts have used other

methods, such as publication, broadcast announcements, or posting

to insure that potential class members receive sufficient notice. 

See Six Mexican Workers, 904 F.2d at 1305 n. 2. 

The Court doubts Defendant’s unsupported claim that posting

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in Defendant’s workplace should be barred as punitive. Multiple

district courts have approved this method of notice, militating

against the existence of a categorical bar against the practice. 

See, e.g., Johnson v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 531 F. Supp. 957, 961

(N.D. Tex. 1982) (finding notice reasonable when communicated by

“direct mail, posting on company bulletin boards at flight bases

and publishing the notice”); Lantz v. B-1202 Corp., 429 F. Supp.

421, 424 (E.D. Mich. 1977).

Plaintiffs claim that the names and addresses of certain

employees do not appear on an employee list Defendant has

produced (Supp. Nelson Decl. Ex. A) even though the employees are

listed in Commission reports (Supp. Nelson Decl. Ex. B). At oral

argument Defendant argued that each of those employees was a

statutory supervisor, not a Route Sales Driver, and therefore

fell outside of the putative class. It appears that each of the

purportedly missing employees are indeed either Branch Managers

or Branch Supervisors. Hipp Decl. Ex. D (exhibit labeled

“INTERROGATORY #9, 12, 13”). 

Nevertheless, some risk exists that the failure of Defendant

to provide the contact information of potential class members

will prevent them from receiving notice to which they are

entitled. Defendant would face only a small burden in being

required to post the Notice and distribute the Consent to Join

forms where Route Sales Drivers work. See Oppenheimer Fund v.

Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 359, 98 S. Ct. 2380, 57 L. Ed. 2d 253

(1978) (despite burden on plaintiff to provide for class notice,

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court may properly require defendant to bear “insubstantial”

expenses). The Court finds that first class mail, combined with

posting in Route Sales Drivers’ workplaces, provides the “best

notice practicable” to the potential class.

2. Computer-readable Data File

 Plaintiffs also ask the Court to order Defendant to submit

a “computer-readable data file containing” contact information of

all potential class members. Mot. 19:10-12. Defendant’s

Director of Administration states that Defendant “does not have a

computer readable data file containing employees’ names,

addresses, and telephone numbers.” Sewill Decl. ¶ 8. It is

unduly burdensome to require Defendant to do Plaintiffs’ work for

them by creating a computer-readable file. Accordingly, the

Court will not order Defendant to produce one. Defendant must

provide, however, contact information for any potential class

members that it has not yet provided.

VI. Class Counsel

Plaintiffs ask that the Court certify “the law offices of

Beeson, Tayer & Bodine, specifically Robert P. Bonsall, Jason

Rabinowitz and Michael D. Nelson, as Class Counsel.” Mot. 19:8-

10. Rule 23(a)(4)’s requirement that “the representative parties 

will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class”

also requires the Court to ensure that class counsel will

adequately represent the class. Linney v. Cellular Alaska

P’ship, 151 F.3d 1234, 1238-39 (9th Cir. 1998); see Fed. R. Civ.

P. 23(g)(1)(B). In appointing class counsel, the Court

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(i) must consider:

• the work counsel has done in identifying

or investigating potential claims in the

action,

• counsel’s experience in handling class

actions, other complex litigation, and

claims of the type asserted in the

action,

• counsel’s knowledge of the applicable

law, and

• the resources counsel will commit to

representing the class; . . .

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(1)(C). 

The Court has reviewed the Complaint and the briefing in

support of class certification, which provide evidence that

Plaintiffs’ counsel have investigated the class claims thoroughly

and are familiar with the applicable law. Plaintiffs’ counsel

also has extensive experience litigating employment cases and

class actions. Rabinowitz Decl. ¶¶ 4-7; Nelson Decl. ¶¶ 4-6. 

Plaintiffs’ counsel’s effort so far in the prosecution of this

action displays a willingness to commit resources to the

representation. The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ counsel is

adequate to serve as class counsel.

ACCORDINGLY:

1. Plaintiffs’ First Cause of Action is conditionally certified

as a collective action under 29 U.S.C. section 216(b) with

respect to the following class:

All persons who are or were employed by

Producers Dairy as Route Sales Drivers and

Relief Drivers who worked in excess of forty

(40) hours in a work week in the State of

California at any time from January 19, 2002,

to the present and who were not paid overtime

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compensation for those excess hours.

2. Plaintiffs’ Second through Sixth Causes of Action are

certified as a Rule 23(b)(3) class action consisting of the

following class:

All persons who are or were employed by

Producers Dairy as Route Sales Drivers or

Relief Drivers who worked in excess of eight

(8) hours in a day and/or forty (40) hours in

a work week in the State of California at any

time from January 19, 2001, to the present

who were not paid overtime compensation for

those excess hours.

3. The Named Plaintiffs Joe Romero, Raymond Jeanes, Larry

Heffington, and Loren Portillo are certified as class

representatives.

4. Robert P. Bonsall, Jason Rabinowitz, and Michael D. Nelson

are certified as class counsel.

5. Plaintiffs shall alter the proposed Notice as follows:

a. replace any phrase referring to “Route Sales Drivers

and other equivalent positions” with the phrase “Route

Sales Drivers and Relief Drivers.”

b. replace the definitions of the FLSA and Rule 23 classes

with the Court’s definition of each.

c. indicate that class members may opt in to the FLSA

action by submitting their Consent to Join form

postmarked by September 8, 2006.

d. indicate that class members may opt out of the Rule 23

class by submitting their Election to be Excluded form

postmarked by September 8, 2006.

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6. By April 26, 2006, Plaintiffs shall provide the Court and

Defendant with an updated copy of the Notice.

7. By May 26, 2006, Defendant shall post the updated Notice and

place multiple copies of the Consent to Join forms in all

workplaces of Route Sales Drivers and Relief Drivers in a

place visible and accessible to these individuals.

8. The updated Notice shall be sent by first class mail to all

potential class members by June 8, 2006.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 18, 2006 /s/ Robert E. Coyle 

810ha4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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