Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00167/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00167-6/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 550
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Civil Rights (U.S. defendant)
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

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JKM

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

Robert Joseph Garcia, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

M.D. Lunes, et al., 

Defendants.

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No. CV 1-06-0167-JAT

ORDER

Plaintiff Robert Joseph Garcia, who is confined in the California Correctional Institute

in Corcoran, California, has filed a pro se Second Amended Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. (Doc. #29.) The Court will dismiss the Second Amended Complaint and this action.

I. Background.

Plaintiff filed his original Complaint on December 27, 2005. (Doc. # 1.) On March

4, 2008, United States Magistrate Judge Gary S. Austin issued an Order dismissing the

Complaint for failure to state a claim and giving Plaintiff an opportunity to file a first

amended complaint to cure the many deficiencies identified in the Order. (Doc. # 18.) The

Order also warned Plaintiff that any first amended complaint must comply with Rule 8 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. #18 at 3.) After Plaintiff filed a First Amended

Complaint (Doc. #22), the case was reassigned to the undersigned judge. The Court

dismissed the First Amended Complaint and provided Plaintiff with one final opportunity to

file a cognizable amended complaint. (Doc. #25.)

II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against

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a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised

claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). 

A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). While Rule 8 does

not demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).

“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice.” Id.

“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for

relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial

experience and common sense.” Id. at 1950. Thus, although a plaintiff’s specific factual

allegations may be consistent with a constitutional claim, a court must assess whether there

are other “more likely explanations” for a defendant’s conduct. Id. at 1951.

III. Second Amended Complaint

As the Court previously informed Plaintiff, all causes of action alleged in his prior

complaints are waived if they are not alleged in his Second Amended Complaint. See Hal

Roach Studios v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1990) (“an amended

pleading supersedes the original”); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565 (9th Cir. 1987).

Accordingly, the Court will consider only those claims specifically asserted in Plaintiff’s

Second Amended Complaint with respect to only those Defendants specifically named in the

Second Amended Complaint. 

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Plaintiff sues the following Defendants: (1) Institutional Gang Investigator M. Lunes;

(2) Correctional Officer D. Fugate; (3) Correctional Officer T. Cogdill; (4) Correctional

Captain M.M. Miller; (5) Appeals Coordinator V.J. Castillo; (6) Correctional Counselor II

L. Smart-Schuman; (7) Correctional Captain N. Dill Jr.; (8) Correctional Captain A. Diaz;

(9) Correctional Lieutenant J. Rivas; (10) Institutional Gang Investigator J.C. Garcia; (11)

Gang Validation Reviewer M. Ruff; (12) Gang Validation Reviewer Everett W. Fisher; and

(13) Gang Validation Reviewer G. Williams.

Plaintiff asserts ten counts based on events that occurred between May 29, 1996 and

September 6, 2005. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and injunctive relief. Notwithstanding

a second opportunity to clarify his claims for relief, Plaintiff has again failed to state a

cognizable claim for relief on any of his counts.

A. Count I

In Count I, Plaintiff alleges that on May 29, 1996, Defendant Smart-Schuman placed

false, unreliable, and uncorroborated information obtained from a confidential informant in

Plaintiff’s central file. Plaintiff alleges that this information was used to retain him in the

Security Housing Unit (SHU). Plaintiff further alleges that the information remained in his

central file until September 10, 2001. Plaintiff claims that the use of the information violated

his constitutional right to procedural due process. The Court will not consider the merits of

Count I because it is barred by the statute of limitations.

In the absence of waiver, the Court may raise the defense of statute of limitations sua

sponte. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 216 F.3d 764,

788 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1163 (11th Cir. 2003)

(upholding sua sponte dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) of prisoner’s time-barred

complaint). In a § 1983 action, the applicable statute of limitations is the forum state’s

statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Action Apartment Ass’n, Inc. v. Santa

Monica Rent Control Bd., 509 F.3d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Effective January 1, 2003, the California statute of limitations for personal injury

actions was extended from one year to two years. Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 954-

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1

 A CDC 128-B is “a general form/chrono used to document miscellaneous

information regarding inmates.” Castro v. Terhune, No. 98-4877-WHA, 2010 WL 234910,

*2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2010).

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55 (9th Cir. 2004). The new two year statute of limitations, however, does not apply

retroactively. Id. Accordingly, a one year statute of limitations applies to actions that

accrued before January 1, 2003, and a two year statute of limitations applies to actions that

accrued thereafter. “Federal law determines when a civil rights claim accrues.” Id. “Under

federal law, a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury

which is the basis of the action.” TwoRivers v. Lewis, 174 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 1999).

The law of the forum state governs tolling. Under California law, the statute of

limitations for prisoners serving less than a life sentence is tolled for two years. Cal. Civ.

Proc. Code § 352.1(a); Johnson v. State of California, 207 F.3d 650, 654 (9th Cir. 2000).

Accordingly, the effective statute of limitations for most prisoners is three years for claims

that accrued before January 1, 2003 (one year limitations period plus two year statutory

tolling), and four years for claims that accrued thereafter (two year limitations period plus

two years statutory tolling). 

At the latest, Plaintiff knew or had reason to know that Defendant Smart-Schuman

placed allegedly false information in his central file on September 10, 2001 when his

challenge to the information was successful. Since Count I accrued before January 1, 2003,

the claim is barred if it was filed after September 10, 2004 (one year statute of limitations

plus two years tolling from September 10, 2001). Plaintiff’s original Complaint was filed

on December 27, 2005 — more than 15 months after the statute of limitations expired. (Doc.

#1.) Accordingly, Count I will be dismissed as barred by the statute of limitations.

B. Count II

In Count II, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Lunes and Fugate agreed to file false

CDC-128-B1

 reports against him in retaliation for “successfully challenging other

[confidential informant] information.” Plaintiff alleges that the CDC-128 reports issued by

Defendant Lunes on April 13, 2004 and April 20, 2004 were used to place and retain him in

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2

 Because the facts in Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint are presented in scattershot manner, it is difficult to determine their chronology. It appears that the placement in

SHU Plaintiff refers to in Count II may have taken place on November 17, 2004, but the

specific date is not material to the Court’s analysis.

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SHU.2 Plaintiff claims that the retaliatory conduct by Defendants Lunes and Fugate violated

his Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection. Count II fails to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Because Plaintiff’s retaliation claim may be brought under the First Amendment,

Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005), it is not properly brought either

as a due process claim or an equal protection claim, see Doe ex rel. Doe v. Hawaii Dep’t of

Educ., 334 F.3d 906 (9th Cir. 2003) (§ 1983 claims should be analyzed under more specific

constitutional provisions rather than generalized notions of due process). And, in any event,

Plaintiff fails to allege the basic elements of either a due process claim or an equal protection

claim in Count II. Construing Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint liberally, the Court

will treat Count II as a First Amendment retaliation claim.

To state a viable First Amendment retaliation claim, a prisoner must allege facts

supporting five elements: “(1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action

against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner’s protected conduct, and that such action

(4) chilled the inmate’s exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not

reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal.” Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567-58 (emphasis

added). “To prevail on a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show that his protected conduct

was ‘the “substantial” or “motivating” factor behind the defendant’s conduct.’” Brodheim

v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1271 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Soranno’s Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874

F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to give rise to a plausible inference that

Defendants Lunes and Fugate had a retaliatory motive for issuing the CDC-128 reports

against him. Although Plaintiff alleges that Defendants acted “in retaliation because Plaintiff

had previously successfully challenged other C/I information provided by Corcoran prison

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3

 A “CDC 114-A” is an “Inmate Segregation Record” that “is used to record

individual inmates’ minute daily activities while housed in administrative segregation.”

Castro, 2010 WL 234910 at *2.

4

 A “CDC 114-D” is an “Order and Hearing for Placement in Segregated Housing”

form used “to document an inmate’s placement in segregated housing.” Id. 

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officials,” he does not identify the specific “successful challenge” to which he is referring,

nor does he explain how Defendants Lunes and Fugate had any knowledge about his prior

“successful challenge.” Because a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation must include

an allegation that a defendant took an adverse action against an inmate because of protected

conduct, and there are no facts to support how Lunes or Fugate knew of the prior challenges,

Plaintiff fails to state a retaliation claim against them. Plaintiff’s threadbare and conclusory

assertion that Defendants Lunes and Fugate retaliated against him does not suffice to state

a plausible First Amendment retaliation claim against them. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1937.

C. Count III

In Count III, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Miller and Dill failed to conduct a

proper “CDC-114-A3

 administrative segregation placement hearing.” Plaintiff alleges that

on November 17, 2004, Defendant Miller gave Plaintiff a completed CDC-114 “lock up

order”4

 that had been signed and post-dated by Defendants Miller and Dill. Plaintiff claims

that the failure to give him a “CDC-114 captain hearing” deprived him of the benefit of

“statewide departmental procedural safe guards.” Plaintiff also claims that his due process

rights were violated because he did not receive sufficient notice of the charges against him

and was unable to prepare witnesses or present evidence. 

In analyzing a due process claim, the Court must first decide whether the plaintiff was

deprived of a constitutionally protected liberty interest, and, if so, whether he was denied any

constitutionally required procedural safeguard. Liberty interests which entitle an inmate to

due process are “generally limited to freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the

sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process

Clause of its own force, nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate

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in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484

(citations omitted). The factual inquiry into whether a state action imposed an “atypical and

significant hardship” involves the consideration of three “guideposts”: “1) whether the

challenged condition ‘mirrored those conditions imposed upon inmates in administrative

segregation and protective custody,’ and thus comported with the prison’s discretionary

authority; 2) the duration of the condition, and the degree of restraint imposed; and 3)

whether the state’s action will invariably affect the duration of the prisoner’s sentence.”

Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 861 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486-87).

Plaintiff does not allege that the conduct of Defendants Miller and Dill resulted in his

placement in conditions of confinement that were significantly different than the ordinary

incidents of prison life. Nor does he allege that Defendants’ conduct necessarily altered the

duration of his prison sentence. Although Plaintiff alleges generally that he was deprived of

“statewide departmental procedural safe guards” which must be provided when a “prisoner

is held in segregation for prolonged or indefinite periods,” he does not allege that

Defendant’s conduct actually caused him to be confined in a significant and atypical degree

of restraint for an excessive duration. Because Plaintiff has failed to allege that Defendants

Miller and Dill deprived him of a constitutionally protected liberty interest, he has failed to

state a cognizable due process claim and Count III must be dismissed.

D. Count IV

In Count IV, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Dill violated statewide departmental

procedural policies by signing Plaintiff’s November 18, 2004 CDC 114 order for placement

in administrative segregation and by participating as a member of the Institutional

Classification Committee (ICC) at his November 24, 2004 hearing. Plaintiff alleges that the

November 24, 2004 hearing resulted in a decision to retain him in administrative segregation

for ninety days pending an Internal Gang Investigation. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant

Dill’s failure to follow departmental policy violated his constitutional right to due process.

Count IV fails to state a cognizable claim for relief because violations of state prison

regulations do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S.

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472, 482 (1995) (finding no constitutionally protected liberty interest in prison regulations

phrased in mandatory terms); Bostic v. Carlson, 884 F.2d 1267, 1270 (9th Cir. 1989) (a

prison’s failure to follow its own guidelines regarding hearings does not alone constitute

denial of due process); Ybarra v. Bastian, 647 F.2d 891, 892 (9th Cir. 1981) (violations of

prison rules or procedures alone do not state federal claims and are not cognizable under

§ 1983). Count IV also fails to state a cognizable claim because Plaintiff’s confinement in

SHU under administrative segregation pending an internal investigation does not give rise

to an atypical and significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. See

Richardson v. Runnels, 594 F.3d 666, 672-73 (9th Cir. 2010) (administrative segregation for

two weeks in SHU pending a gang investigation is not a deprivation protected liberty

interest); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447-49 (9th Cir. 2000) (prisoner’s retention in

SHU for seventy days pending a disciplinary hearing did not give rise to a liberty interest

protected by the Due Process Clause). Accordingly, Count IV must be dismissed for failure

to state a cognizable claim for relief.

E. Count V

In Count V, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Diaz violated statewide departmental

procedural policies at an April 25, 2005 “CDC 114 Captains Review” hearing by failing to

assign Plaintiff an investigative employee, denying his request for additional time to prepare,

and denying him the opportunity to collect witness statements. Defendant Diaz’s conduct

apparently resulted in Plaintiff’s retention in administrative segregation for an unspecified

period of time.

As stated in the discussion of Count IV, violations of state policy do not rise to the

level of a constitutional violation. And because Plaintiff does not allege that he was

subjected to a significant or atypical hardship as a consequence of Defendant Diaz’s conduct,

he has failed to state a cognizable claim under for violation of his constitutional due process

rights. Accordingly, Count V must be dismissed.

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5

 A CDC 602 form, called an “Inmate/Parolee Appeal Form,” is used by prisoners “to

appeal any policy, action, or decision.” Castro, 2010 WL 234910 at *2.

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F. Count VI

In Count VI, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Rivas failed to resolve his “6025

 within

[the] appeal time limit set by statewide regulations.” Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant

Rivas’s May 4, 2005 decision failed to address Plaintiff’s claims that his due process rights

were violated by Defendant Miller. 

As stated in the discussion of Count IV, violations of state policy do not rise to the

level of a constitutional violation. And because Plaintiff does not allege that he was

subjected to a significant or atypical hardship as a consequence of Defendant Rivas’s

conduct, he has failed to state a claim under for violation of his constitutional due process

rights. Accordingly, Count VI must be dismissed.

G. Count VII

Plaintiff alleges that on September 6, 2005, Defendant Cogdill wrote a false CDC128-B report at Defendant Lunes’s direction with the knowledge that other inmates would

see it, thereby threatening Plaintiff’s safety. According to Plaintiff, the report expressed

concerns about Plaintiff’s mental health and opined that Plaintiff “has homosexual tendencies

that may become predatory towards staff and inmates.” Plaintiff claims that this conduct

presented a threat to his safety in violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from

cruel and unusual punishment.

To state an Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to safety, a plaintiff

must allege that a defendant, despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm to

the plaintiff, failed to take reasonable measures to abate the harm. Farmer v. Brennan, 511

U.S. 825, 847 (1994). A supported allegation that a correctional official made statements

intending to incite inmates to attack another inmate may state a claim under the Eighth

Amendment. Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135 (9th Cir.1989). Plaintiff, however,

has failed to allege facts sufficient to support a constitutional claim under Valandingham. 

In Valandingham, the plaintiff alleged that two prison officials had conspired to label him

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as a snitch with the intent of having him killed. Id. at 1138. The plaintiff in Valandingham

also alleged in his complaint that on a specific date, “he was approached by fellow prisoners

and threatened with harm because [the defendant prison officials] had told other inmates in

the law library that Valandingham was a snitch.” Id. In contrast, Plaintiff does not allege

that other inmates ever learned of the contents of the CDC-128-B report.

Although Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Lunes told him “wait ‘till the fellas in the

SHU read your new chrono – you’ll have some real problems then,” he does not allege that

either Defendant Lunes or Defendant Cogdill ever exposed the report to other inmates. Nor

does he allege that any other inmates ever learned of the September 6, 2005 report or that

they ever had access to it. The facts alleged by Plaintiff therefore do not give rise to a

plausible inference that he was ever subjected to a substantial risk of serious harm. 

At most, Plaintiff’s allegations support a claim that Defendant Lunes threatened to let

other inmates know the contents of the report. But mere threats to expose plaintiff to a risk

of harm are not enough. The Ninth Circuit has concluded that it “trivializes the eighth

amendment to believe that a threat constitutes a constitutional wrong.” Gaut v. Sunn, 810

F.2d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 564 (9th Cir. 2009).

The court found “no case that squarely holds a threat to do an act prohibited by the

Constitution is equivalent to doing the act itself.” Gaut, 810 F.2d at 925. Because Plaintiff

does not allege facts sufficient to support a plausible inference that Defendants Cogdill and

Lunes ever subjected him to an actual risk of serious harm, he has failed to state a cognizable

claim for relief under the Eighth Amendment. Accordingly, Count VII must be dismissed.

H. Count VIII

In Count VIII, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Castillo denied his constitutional right

to access to the courts by “impeding” his ability to exhaust his administrative remedies for

more than three years. Plaintiff alleges that he was unable to exhaust his administrative

remedies until April of 2009 when a “Hanford Superior Court” ordered prison officials

resolve his appeal. Plaintiff claims that because the Prison Litigation Reform Act requires

exhaustion of prison administrative remedies as a prerequisite to filing a federal civil rights

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complaint, Defendant Castillo “effectively deny [sic] plaintiff access to the courts.” 

Plaintiff does not allege any facts to explain exactly what Defendant Castillo did to

impede the grievance process. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72, 377 (1976) (to

state a valid claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that he suffered a specific injury as

a result of specific conduct of a defendant). Morever, because he does not allege that

Defendant Castillo caused him to suffer any “actual injury,” his allegations do not give rise

to a cognizable claim for denial of access to the courts. 

The right of meaningful access to the courts prohibits state officials from actively

interfering with an inmate’s attempt to prepare or to file legal documents. Lewis v. Casey,

518 U.S. 343, 350 (1996). To have standing to assert a constitutional claim of denial of

access to the courts, a prisoner must have suffered an “actual injury.” Id. at 349. An “actual

injury” is “actual prejudice with respect to contemplated or existing litigation, such as the

inability to meet a filing deadline or to present a claim.” Id. at 348. To show actual injury

with respect to contemplated litigation, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the conduct of the

defendants prevented him from bringing to court a nonfrivolous claim that he wished to

present. Id. at 352-53. Plaintiff’s allegations do not give rise to a plausible claim that

Defendant Castillo prevented him from bringing a claim in federal court.

It is true, as Plaintiff alleges, that the Prison Litigation Reform Act prohibits the

bringing of an action “with respect to prison conditions . . . by a prisoner . . . until such

administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). But failure

to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense, Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199,

216 (2007), which defendants must raise and prove before a prisoner’s complaint may be

dismissed under § 1997e(a), Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003).

Moreover, exhaustion of administrative remedies is excused if prison officials prevented the

plaintiff from filing or appealing grievances. Nunez v. Duncan, 591 F.3d 1217, 1224 (9th

Cir. 2010) (a prisoner’s “failure to timely exhaust his administrative remedies is excused

[where] he took reasonable and appropriate steps to exhaust . . . his claim and was precluded

from exhausting, not through his own fault but by the Warden’s mistake”). If Defendant

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Castillo prevented Plaintiff from exhausting his administrative remedies, as Plaintiff alleges,

a federal action challenging the substance of the claims underlying his administrative appeals

would not have been barred by the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Plaintiff’s allegations

therefore do not give rise to a reasonable inference that Defendant Castillo prevented him

from bringing to court a non-frivolous claim. Because Plaintiff has failed to allege a

plausible claim that he suffered an actual injury, Count VIII must be dismissed.

I. Count IX

In Count IX, Plaintiff alleges that he was placed in administrative segregation on

November 17, 2004, based on an unreliable confidential informant report that should have

been destroyed when a criminal case against him was dropped. Plaintiff alleges that he was

not allowed to present his views to the decision maker before he was placed in administrative

segregation. He further alleges that on January 13, 2005 and February 17, 2005 “IGI

Security Squad officers authored additional memorandums addressing plaintiff’s removal

from GP and retention in Ad Seg.” Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Garcia “was involved in

[the] investigation surrounding plaintiff’s removal from general population.” Plaintiff also

alleges that:

when Defendant J.C. Garcia concluded [the] investigation on 2-17-05 and no

tangible or credible information surfaced with regards to plaintiff being

involved in criminal activity or with having safety concerns[,] plaintiff should

have been released to GP. . . . Plaintiff contends that Defendant J.C. Garcia

had an obligation as a critical decision maker to refer plaintiff for release from

punitive segregation.

Plaintiff claims that the “failure to follow procedural safeguards covering use of confidential

information” violated his right to due process.

Plaintiff’s specific factual allegations against Defendant Garcia are far too vague and

conclusory to state a plausible federal claim for relief against him. Moreover, as stated in the

discussion of Count IV, because Plaintiff does not allege that he was subjected to a

significant or atypical hardship as a consequence of Defendant Garcia’s conduct, he has

failed to state a claim under for violation of his constitutional due process rights.

Accordingly, Count IX must be dismissed.

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J. Count X

Count X is nothing more than a an eleven paragraph recapitulation of prior claims and,

for the reasons stated above, it will be dismissed. 

IV. Dismissal without Leave to Amend

As no claim remains, the Court will dismiss the Second Amended Complaint and this

action. Leave to amend need not be given if a complaint as amended is subject to dismissal.

Moore v. Kayport Package Exp., Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 538 (9th Cir. 1989). The Court’s

discretion to deny or grant leave to amend is particularly broad where Plaintiff has previously

been permitted to amend his complaint. See Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe v. United

States, 90 F.3d 351, 355 (9th Cir. 1996). Failure to cure deficiencies by previous

amendments is one of the factors to be considered in deciding whether justice requires

granting leave to amend. Moore, 885 F.2d at 538. The Court has reviewed the Second

Amended Complaint and finds that further amendment of Plaintiff’s claims would be futile.

The Court will therefore dismiss the Second Amended Complaint without leave to amend.

IT IS ORDERED that the Second Amended Complaint (Doc. #29) is dismissed for

failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), and the Clerk of Court must

enter judgment accordingly. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court must make an entry on the

docket stating that the dismissal for failure to state a claim may count as a “strike” under 28

U.S.C. § 1915(g).

DATED this 30th day of March, 2010.

Case 1:06-cv-00167-JAT Document 30 Filed 03/30/10 Page 13 of 13