Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-02504/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-02504-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KINGVISION PAY-PER-VIEW

CORP., LTD.,

Plaintiff(s),

v.

BERNARD WILLIAMS,

individually and dba AVENUE

CLUB,

Defendant(s).

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No. C 04-2504 BZ

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT

Plaintiff Kingvision Pay-Per-View Corp., Ltd. has applied

for entry of default judgment against defendant Bernard

Williams, individually and doing business as the Avenue Club. 

Defendant has not filed any opposition to plaintiff’s motion

and has not been in contact with the court since default was

entered against him on February 14, 2006. Prior to the

default, all parties consented on the record before the

Honorable Jeffrey S. White to the jurisdiction of a United

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States Magistrate Judge for all purposes pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(c). 

Plaintiff, the exclusive licensor of rights to exhibit

certain closed-circuit and pay-per-view sports programming,

brought suit against defendant for unlawfully intercepting and

exhibiting the John Ruiz v. Roy Jones, Jr. championship boxing

match in his bar, the Avenue Club. Plaintiff’s complaint

alleges that defendant is liable under the Communications Act,

47 U.S.C. §§ 553 and 605, for receiving, intercepting, and

assisting in the receipt or interception of licensed

programming. Compl. ¶¶ 20, 27. Plaintiff’s hired private

investigator was present in defendant’s bar on the evening of

the fight, March 1, 2003, and observed the Ruiz v. Jones fight

being broadcast to approximately forty patrons. See Ex. B,

Aff. of Rafael Cabrera. 

Plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant on June 23,

2004. On July 9, 2004, plaintiff effected service of process

on defendant by personal delivery of the summons, complaint,

and other relevant documents. Defendant failed to timely

answer the complaint or otherwise defend the action. On

August 13, 2004, upon plaintiff’s request, the Clerk of this

court entered defendant’s default under Rule 55(a). Defendant

subsequently answered the complaint and filed a Motion to Set

Aside Default. Because defendant was pro se at the time of

the default and did not understand his obligations to respond

to the complaint, but had retained counsel in order to file

the Motion to Set Aside Default, the Honorable Jeffrey S.

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28 1 The last day for expert discovery was set for January

6, 2006 in preparation for the trial date of May 1, 2006. 

3

White granted defendant’s motion. On June 21, 2005 the case

was reassigned to me for all further proceedings. 

At the December 6, 2005 discovery conference, plaintiff

apprised the court that defendant had not yet responded to

discovery.1

 Defendant’s counsel responded that he was

experiencing difficulty communicating with his client and

intended to move to withdraw as counsel for defendant. 

Defendant’s counsel subsequently filed a Motion to Withdraw,

which the court heard on January 4, 2006. Because defendant

failed to appear at this hearing, I conditionally granted

defendant’s counsel’s motion and I issued an Order to Show

Cause. Defendant was ordered to appear personally before the

court on January 23, 2006 to show cause why his answer should

not be stricken and his default entered for his failure to

respond to plaintiff’s discovery and otherwise assist his

counsel in the defense of this action. Defendant failed to

appear or otherwise respond at the Order to Show Cause hearing

on January 23, 2006. Defendant’s counsel informed the court

of defendant’s eviction from his business, the Avenue Club,

and counsel’s repeated unsuccessful efforts to contact

defendant. The court set a Further Order to Show Cause

hearing for February 13, 2006, to allow defendant’s counsel to

prepare a skip trace in order to obtain the defendant’s

current address. Defendant again failed to appear at the

further Order to Show Cause hearing on February 13, 2006. 

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2 Plaintiff initially sought $110,000 in statutory

damages and $5,820 in attorneys’ fees before filing its amended

motion. 

4

Rules 16 and 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

vest this court with broad discretion to issue sanctions,

including terminating sanctions and entry of a default

judgment, for a party’s failure to comply with court orders

and local rules. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(f); 37(b)(2)(C); see also

Malone v. U.S. Postal Service, 833 F.2d 128, 129-33 (9th Cir.

1987)(affirming dismissal under Rule 16 for failure to comply

with pretrial order); Stars’ Desert Inn Hotel & Country Club,

Inc. v. Hwang, 105 F.3d 521 (9th Cir. 1997)(affirming default

judgment under Rule 37 for failure to comply with court

order). In addition, Local Rule 1-4 expressly provides that

“failure by counsel or a party to comply with any duly

promulgated local rule or any Federal Rule may be a ground for

imposition of any authorized sanction.” N.D. Cal. Civ. R. 1-

4; see Electronics for Imaging, Inc. v. Photoscript Group, No.

C-98-2759 (SI), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7395, at * 7-8 (N.D.

Cal. May 11, 1999). On February 14, 2006, I ordered

defendant’s answer stricken and his default entered as an

appropriate sanction for his failures to make court

appearances, to comply with court orders, and to respond to

plaintiff’s discovery requests. Plaintiff now seeks a default

judgment, consisting of $110,000 in statutory damages and

$9,970 in attorneys’ fees and costs.2

Pursuant to Rule 55(b)(2), the court, in its discretion,

may enter a default judgment against a party against whom

default has been entered. Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470,

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1471 (9th Cir. 1986). The party entitled to a judgment by

default must apply to the court therefor; and when the

defaulting party has appeared in the action, as here, it shall

be served with written notice of the application for judgment. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). Plaintiff has served notice of its

motion to defendant at his last known address. 

A court may not enter a default judgment against an

unrepresented minor, an incompetent person, or a person in

military service. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). Plaintiff’s

counsel states that this requirement is satisfied because

defendant “has appeared in the action and has not raised any

claim that he is in the military, is incompetent or is a

minor” and plaintiff’s counsel has performed various public

searches which did not indicate that plaintiff is in the

military, is incompetent or is a minor. Amended Greenbaum

Decl. in Support of Entry of Def. J. ¶¶ 4-5, 7-10. 

By his default, defendant is deemed to have admitted the

well-pleaded averments of the complaint except those as to

amount of damages. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d); DirecTV, Inc. v.

Cao, No. S-03-0948 (GEB), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2411, at * 5

(C.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2006)(“[t]he dismissal of the answer and

entry of default effects an admission of all well-pleaded

allegations of the complaint by the defaulted party” (citing

Geddes v. United Financial Group, 559 F.2d 557 (9th Cir.

1977)). Having reviewed plaintiff’s complaint, I find that

the allegations are sufficiently well-pled to establish

defendant’s liability under both 47 U.S.C. §§ 553 and 605. 

Plaintiff alleges that it paid substantial fees to enter into

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an exclusive license agreement “for the purpose of

distributing for a commercial gain the closed-circuit

broadcast of the Ruiz v. Jones boxing match, including

undercard or preliminary bouts (‘the Event’) to various

business establishments throughout California.” Compl. ¶¶ 6-

7. Plaintiff alleges that “[t]he closed-circuit broadcast of

the Event could only be exhibited in a commercial

establishment if said establishment was contractually

authorized to do so by Plaintiff” and had paid a fee in

exchange for the right to broadcast the Event. Id. ¶ 8-9. 

The transmission of the Event was “electronically coded or

‘scrambled’ . . . [and] had to be decoded with electronic

decoding equipment” in order for the signal to be received and

telecast clearly. Id. ¶ 10. Defendant is alleged to have

“enabled his patrons within the commercial establishment,

Avenue Club, to view the Event” without contracting with

plaintiff or paying the appropriate fee. Id. ¶¶ 13-17. In

addition, plaintiff claims that defendant willfully violated,

or willfully assisted in violating, both 47 U.S.C. §§ 553 and

605. Id. ¶ 13. Despite the fact that defendant has denied

all of these allegations in his answer, due to his default,

all well-pled allegations in the complaint are now established

and defendant has admitted liability. 

Liability having been established on default, the only

issue that remains is the appropriate relief to be awarded. 

Plaintiff seeks maximum statutory damages under both 47 U.S.C.

§§ 553 and 605 for defendant’s unlawful interception and

misappropriation of a closed-circuit broadcast of a

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championship boxing match in a commercial establishment

without obtaining a commercial license. Pl.’s Motion for Def.

J. ¶ 1. Both sections 553 and 605 of Title 47 prohibit the

unauthorized interception and reception of cable programming. 

Both sections also allow a plaintiff to elect recovery of

actual or statutory damages. Section 553(c)(3)(A)(ii)

provides statutory damages of $250 to $10,000 for “all

violations” while section 605(e)(3)(C)(i)(II) authorizes

statutory damages of $1,000 to $10,000 for “each violation.”

Section 605(e)(3)(C)(ii) vests the court with the

discretion to increase the award of damages, whether actual or

statutory, where “the court finds that the violation was

committed willfully and for the purposes of direct or indirect

commercial advantage or private financial gain.” The court is

authorized to award enhanced damages up to $100,000. Section

553(c)(3)(B) permits an award of enhanced damages of up to

$50,000 for willful conduct for the purpose of commercial

advantage or private financial gain.

Plaintiff alleges defendant’s violations were willfully

committed for financial gain and therefore seeks enhanced

damages of $50,000. Plaintiff urges this large award is

merited since, due to the “scrambling” of the signal,

defendant “could not have obtained the transmission of the

Event had [d]efendant not undertaken specific wrongful actions

to intercept and/or receive and broadcast the telecast.” 

Pl.’s Memo. in Supp. of Req. for Entry of Def. J. 12:4-7. 

This court has followed the lead of the Second Circuit

which has determined that where liability exists under both §§

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553 and 605, the court should impose damages pursuant to § 605

instead of imposing the lesser damages available under § 553. 

See International Cablevision, Inc. v. Sykes, 997 F.2d 998,

1009 (2nd Cir. 1993), aff’d 75 F.3d 123, 129 (1996); accord

Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Pete, No. C-99-0531 (VRW) 1999 WL

638215, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 1999); Kingvision Pay-PerView, Ltd. v. Ortega, No. C-02-2716 (SI) 2002 WL 31855367, at

*2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2002)(“[i]n cases in which plaintiffs

have proven violations under both § 605 and § 553 courts in

this district have declined to award cumulative damages”); Joe

Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Dailey, No. C-01-4219 (CRB) 2003 WL

1342998, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2003).

The court will therefore opt for granting the higher

damages under § 605 but refrain from granting the maximum

requested. In a case very similar to this one, involving the

same plaintiff, this court awarded the statutory minimum under

§ 605, declining plaintiff’s request for the statutory maximum

plus enhanced damages for willfulness. Kingvision, 2002 WL

31855367, at *2 (awarding $1,000 plus attorney’s fees and

costs in default judgment). In Kingvision, the defendant was

found to have violated §§ 605 and 553 by intercepting and

displaying a boxing match in its restaurant without a license. 

Id. Despite plaintiff’s assertions that defendant acted

willfully, the court awarded minimum statutory damages because

there was “no evidence that the violation occurred multiple

times, that the establishment intended to directly profit from

the violation or that it actually profited from the

violation.” Id. The court noted that “[c]ourts in this

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district have considered several cases involving pirating of

closed-circuit sports broadcasts and, absent a showing of

egregious wrongdoing, generally have awarded damages slightly

over the statutory minimum.” Id. (citing Universal Sports

Network v. Jimenez, No. C-02-2768 (SC) 2002 WL 31109707, at *1

(N.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2002)). 

In the instant case, plaintiff presented neither evidence

of prior violations nor evidence that plaintiff intended to,

or actually did, profit directly from the violation. In fact,

in his declaration in support of his motion to set aside his

default and in his case management statement, defendant

asserted that he had permission to broadcast the match from a

satellite company and had paid the requested fee. Plaintiff

has not established that defendant either advertised for the

Event or used it to attract customers. Since defendant has

been evicted from his business, there is little value in

assessing enhanced damages as a deterrent. However, to avoid

creating a financial incentive for an establishment to violate

the relevant statutes because the licensing fees outweigh the

damages assessed against the violator if caught, I find it

reasonable to award the plaintiff more than the statutory

minimum. Some courts in cases similar to this one have

calculated damages by applying a multiplier to the costs of

obtaining a license to broadcast the event legally. 

Cablevision Systems New York City Corporation v. Rosa, No. 01

Civ. 4822 (GEL) 2002 WL 1446942, at * 3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 3,

2002)(“Perhaps the most common method is to calculate the

value of the services which were stolen and apply a multiplier

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to that sum.”). Multipliers of two or three times the costs

of obtaining permission legally seem reasonable and would

adequately deter future violations. Kingvision Pay-Per-View,

Ltd. v. El Rey Del Bistec Y Caridad, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 6562

(SHS) 2001 WL 1586667, at * 2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12,

2001)(applying a multiplier of two for a damages award of

$2,000 and an enhancement of $1,000); Echostar Technologies

Corp. v. Starczewski, No. CV-04-2010 (DGT) 2006 WL 1307984, at

* 3-4 (E.D.N.Y. May 10, 2006)(applying a multiplier of two). 

See also Kingvision Pay-Per-View, Ltd. v. Rodriguez, No. 02

Civ. 7972 (SHS) 2003 WL 548891, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25,

2003)(awarding a statutory minimum of $1,000 and enhancement

of $1,000 because there was no proof that defendants

advertised, pirated other events or charged a cover or a

premium on food or drinks). Since plaintiff alleges that it

would have requested from the defendant a sublicense fee of

approximately $1,200 to $2,400 in order to authorize it to

broadcast the Event, plaintiff is entitled to an award of

$3,000 in damages, which includes a multiplier of two to three

times the fee plaintiff would have received had defendant

acted lawfully. Pl.’s Memo. in Supp. of Req. for Entry of

Def. J. 15:2-3. 

Finally, plaintiff requests $9,970 in attorneys’ fees. 

Section 605 provides that the court “shall direct the recovery

of full costs, including awarding reasonable attorneys’ fees

to an aggrieved party who prevails.” 47 U.S.C.

§605(e)(3)(B)(iii). Plaintiff has submitted the declaration

of its counsel, Martin Greenbaum, in support of its request,

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which details Mr. Greenbaum’s qualifications and the time he

and others spent on this case. Most of the time spent

revolved around propounding discovery and addressing

defendant’s failure to appear, communicate with his attorney

and defend this action. Plaintiff has adequately supported

its fees and established that its attorneys’ fees were

reasonable and necessary for plaintiff to obtain a default

judgment against a defendant who started defending himself

only to cease participating midway through this action. 

Plaintiff’s counsel, however, seems to have billed twice for a

court appearance on August 8, 2005. Decl. in Supp. of Req.

for Attys’ Fees, Ex. C-2. Absent any explanation for this

double billing, I will deduct $225 from plaintiff’s requested

amount of $9,970, awarding plaintiff $9,745 in attorneys’

fees. 

For the reasons outlined above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that

the motion for default judgment against defendant is GRANTED,

and plaintiff is entitled to $3,000 in statutory damages and

$9,745 in attorneys’ fees. Because I see no need for a

hearing on this matter, IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the hearing

scheduled for June 7, 2006 is VACATED. 

Dated: June 6, 2006

 

 Bernard Zimmerman

United States Magistrate Judge

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