Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-1_08-cv-00412/USCOURTS-almd-1_08-cv-00412-1/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 555
Nature of Suit: Prisoner - Prison Condition
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Prisoner Civil Rights

---

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

RAYMOND MATHIS, #140252, )

)

 Plaintiff, )

)

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:08-CV-412-MHT

 ) [WO]

)

SHERIFF ANDY R. HUGHES, et al., )

)

 Defendant. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

This cause of action is pending before the court on a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint

filed on June 2, 2008 by Raymond Mathis [“Mathis”], an inmate currently incarcerated in

the state prison system and frequent litigant before this court. In the instant complaint,

Mathis asserts the defendants lodged a false sanction against him and deprived him of due

process with respect to the punishment imposed for this sanction. He further argues the

defendants denied him adequate medical treatment for hemorrhoids during his confinement

in the Houston County Jail in May of 2008. Mathis names Andy R. Hughes, the sheriff of

Houston County, Alabama, Keith W. Reed, commander of operations at the Houston

County Jail, and Sgt. Kim Turner and officer John Harrison, correctional officers for the

jail, and Jason Smoak, a certified physician’s assistant employed by the jail, as defendants

in this cause of action. Mathis seeks a hearing on the sanction, removal of the sanction

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from his county inmate file and any other available relief. Plaintiff’s Complaint - Court

Doc. No. 1 at 4. 

The defendants filed a special report and supporting evidentiary materials addressing

the claims presented in the complaint. Pursuant to the orders entered herein, the court

deems it appropriate to treat the defendants’ report as a motion for summary judgment.

Order of October 29, 2008 - Court Doc. No. 25. Thus, this case is now pending on the

defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Upon consideration of this motion, the

evidentiary materials filed in support thereof and the plaintiff’s responses in opposition to

the report/motion, the court concludes that the defendants’ motion for summary judgment

is due to be granted.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Summary judgment is appropriate ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is

no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.’” Greenberg v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc., 498 F.3d 1258, 1263 (11th

Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (citation to former rule omitted); Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 56(c)

(Summary judgment “should be rendered if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure

materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material

Case 1:08-cv-00412-MHT-TFM Document 30 Filed 08/23/10 Page 2 of 33
Effective December 1, 2007, “[t]he language of Rule 56 [was] amended ... to make the rule[] more easily 1

understood and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes ... are stylistic only.”

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 Advisory Committee Notes. Thus, although Rule 56 underwent stylistic changes, its substance

remains the same and, therefore, all cases citing the prior rule remain equally applicable to the current rule. 

3

fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”). The party moving 1

for summary judgment “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district

court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the [record, including

pleadings, discovery materials and affidavits], which it believes demonstrate the absence

of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

The movant may meet this burden by presenting evidence indicating there is no dispute of

material fact or by showing that the nonmoving party has failed to present evidence in

support of some element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Id. at

322-324. 

The defendants have met their evidentiary burden and demonstrated the absence of

any genuine issue of material fact. Thus, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish, with

appropriate evidence beyond the pleadings, that a genuine issue material to his case exists.

Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11 Cir. 1991); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; th

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2) (“When a motion for summary judgment is properly made and

supported, an opposing party may not rely merely on allegations or denials in its own

pleading; rather, its response must ... set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for

trial.”). A genuine issue of material fact exists when the nonmoving party produces

evidence that would allow a reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in its favor.

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Greenberg, 498 F.3d at 1263. 

In civil actions filed by inmates, federal courts 

must distinguish between evidence of disputed facts and disputed matters of

professional judgment. In respect to the latter, our inferences must accord

deference to the views of prison authorities. Unless a prisoner can point to

sufficient evidence regarding such issues of judgment to allow him to prevail

on the merits, he cannot prevail at the summary judgment stage.

Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 530, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 2578, 165 L.Ed.2d 697 (2006) (internal

citation omitted). Consequently, to survive the defendants’ properly supported motion for

summary judgment, Mathis is required to produce “sufficient [favorable] evidence” which

would be admissible at trial supporting his claims of constitutional violations. Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986); Rule 56(e)(1), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. “If the evidence [on which the nonmoving party relies] is merely colorable ...

or is not significantly probative ... summary judgment may be granted.” Id. at 249-250.

“A mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence supporting the opposing party’s position will not suffice;

there must be enough of a showing that the [trier of fact] could reasonably find for that

party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202

(1986).” Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1576-1577 (11 Cir. 1990). Conclusory th

allegations based on subjective beliefs are likewise insufficient to create a genuine issue

of material fact and, therefore, do not suffice to oppose a motion for summary judgment.

Waddell v. Valley Forge Dental Associates, Inc., 276 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11 Cir. 2001); th

Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1564 n.6 (11 Cir. 1997) (plaintiff’s “conclusory th

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assertions ..., in the absence of [admissible] supporting evidence, are insufficient to

withstand summary judgment.”); Harris v. Ostrout, 65 F.3d 912, 916 (11 Cir. 1995) (grant th

of summary judgment appropriate where inmate produces nothing beyond “his own

conclusory allegations” challenging actions of the defendants); Fullman v. Graddick, 739

F.2d 553, 557 (11 Cir. 1984) (“mere verification of party’s own conclusory allegations is th

not sufficient to oppose summary judgment....”). Hence, when a plaintiff fails to set forth

specific facts supported by requisite evidence sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to his case and on which the plaintiff will bear the burden of proof at

trial, summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the moving party. Celotex, 477

U.S. at 322 (“[F]ailure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s

case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.”); Barnes v. Southwest Forest

Industries, Inc., 814 F.2d 607, 609 (11 Cir. 1987) (if on any part of the prima facie case th

the plaintiff presents insufficient evidence to require submission of the case to the trier of

fact, granting of summary judgment is appropriate).

For summary judgment purposes, only disputes involving material facts are relevant.

United States v. One Piece of Real Property Located at 5800 SW 74 Avenue, Miami, th

Florida, 363 F.3d 1099, 1101 (11 Cir. 2004). What is material is determined by the th

substantive law applicable to the case. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Lofton v. Secretary of

the Department of Children and Family Services, 358 F.3d 804, 809 (11 Cir. 2004) (“Only th

factual disputes that are material under the substantive law governing the case will

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preclude entry of summary judgment.”). “The mere existence of some factual dispute will

not defeat summary judgment unless that factual dispute is material to an issue affecting

the outcome of the case.” McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243

(11 Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). To demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact, the th

party opposing summary judgment “must do more than simply show that there is some

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.... Where the record taken as a whole could not

lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for

trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). In

cases where the evidence before the court which is admissible on its face or which can be

reduced to admissible form indicates that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that

the party moving for summary judgment is entitled to it as a matter of law, summary

judgment is proper. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-324 (summary judgment appropriate where

pleadings, evidentiary materials and affidavits before the court show there is no genuine

issue as to a requisite material fact); Waddell, 276 F.3d at 1279 (to establish a genuine

issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must produce evidence such that a reasonable

trier of fact could return a verdict in his favor).

Although factual inferences must be viewed in a light most favorable to the

nonmoving party and pro se complaints are entitled to liberal interpretation by the courts,

a pro se litigant does not escape the burden of establishing by sufficient evidence a genuine

issue of material fact. Beard, 548 U.S. at 525, 126 S.Ct. at 2576; Brown v. Crawford, 906

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Under all facets of Alabama law, a county sheriff, his jailers and medical staff act as state officers “when

2

supervising inmates and otherwise operating the county jails.” Turquitt v. Jefferson County, Alabama, 137 F.3d 1285,

1289 (11 Cir. 1998); see Ala. Const. Art. V, § 112 (designates sheriff and, by extension, his staff as members of th

State’s executive department); see also Parker v. Amerson, 519 So.2d 442 (Ala. 1987) (county sheriff is executive

officer of the State). 

7

F.2d 667, 670 (11 Cir. 1990). Thus, the plaintiff’s pro se status alone does not mandate th

this court’s disregard of elementary principles of production and proof in a civil case. In

this case, Mathis fails to demonstrate a requisite genuine issue of material fact in order to

preclude summary judgment. Matsushita, supra. 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Suit Against Defendants in Their Official Capacities - Absolute Immunity

To the extent Mathis sues the defendants in their official capacities, they are immune

from monetary damages. Official capacity lawsuits are “in all respects other than name, 2

... treated as a suit against the entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U. S. 159, 166 (1985). 

“A state official may not be sued in his official capacity unless the state has waived its

Eleventh Amendment immunity, see Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465

U.S. 89, 100, 104 S.Ct. 900, 908, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984), or Congress has abrogated the

state’s immunity, see Seminole Tribe v. Florida, [517 U.S. 44, 59], 116 S.Ct. 1114, 1125,

134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996). Alabama has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity, see

Carr v. City of Florence, 916 F.2d 1521, 1525 (11 Cir. 1990) (citations omitted), and th

Congress has not abrogated Alabama’s immunity. Therefore, Alabama state officials are

immune from claims brought against them in their official capacities.” Lancaster v.

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The pleadings before the court indicate that the actions which form the basis of the instant complaint 3

occurred after Mathis’ incarceration pursuant to a sentence of confinement imposed by the Circuit Court of

Houston County, Alabama arising from his conviction for a criminal offense. Thus, the complaint relates to

purported constitutional violations that occurred during Mathis’ status as an inmate serving a sentence imposed

by a state court. Nevertheless, regardless of Mathis’ status in the jail, either as a pre-trial detainee or sentenced

inmate, the applicable standard of review remains the same. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861 (1979);

Lancaster v. Monroe County, Ala., 116 F.3d 1419, 1425 n.6 (11 Cir. 1997); Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, th

1490 (11 Cir. 1996) (citations omitted) (“Claims involving the mistreatment of arrestees or pretrial detainees in th

custody are governed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause instead of the Eighth Amendment’s

Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, which applies to such claims by convicted prisoners.... However, the

applicable standard is the same, so decisional law involving prison inmates applies equally to cases involving

arrestees or pretrial detainees.”); Hamm v. DeKalb County, 774 F.2d 1567, 1574 (11 Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 th

U.S. 1096, 106 S.Ct. 1492 (1986) (For analytical purposes, there is no meaningful difference between the analysis

required by the Fourteenth Amendment and that required by the Eighth Amendment.); Tittle v. Jefferson County

Commission, 10 F.3d 1535, 1539 (11 Cir. 1994) (observing that “[w]hether the alleged violation is reviewed th

under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment is immaterial.”). It is therefore likewise clear that the applicable

standard of reviewing claims by pre-trial detainees orsentenced prisoners under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due

Process Clause is the same such that case law involving convicted inmates applies equally to actions involving

pretrial detainees.

8

Monroe County, 116 F.3d 1419, 1429 (11 Cir. 1997). th

In light of the foregoing, it is clear that the defendants are state actors entitled to

sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment for claims seeking monetary damages

from them in their official capacities. Lancaster, 116 F.3d at 1429; Jackson v. Georgia

Department of Transportation, 16 F.3d 1573, 1575 (11 Cir. 1994). Thus, the defendants th

are entitled to absolute immunity from any claims for monetary relief presented against

them in their official capacities. Parker v. Williams, 862 F.2d 1471 (11 Cir. 1989). th

B. Relevant Factual History3

Mathis possesses an extensive criminal history including voluminous convictions

before the state courts of Houston County, Alabama beginning in the 1980’s and

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The records of this court in the numerous cases filed by Mathis establish his criminal history. This court 4

takes judicial notice of its own records. 

The trial court did not delineate this sentence as a concurrent sentence, and, therefore, under applicable state 5

law, the sentence at the time of imposition is a consecutive sentence to any other imposed term of incarceration. Ala.

Code § 14-3-38(a) (“When a convict is sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary on two or more convictions,

unless it is specifically ordered in the judgment entry that such sentences be served concurrently, such sentences shall

be cumulative and shall be served consecutively ... beginning on the expiration of the preceding term.”). Thus, the

sentence for receiving stolen property ran consecutive to all prior sentences imposed upon Mathis.

9

continuing until the filing of this case. In 2005, Mathis entered the Houston County Jail 4

on a charge of third degree burglary and on an offense for first degree receiving stolen

property for which an indictment had issued against Mathis on December 3, 2004. See

Mathis v. Glover, et al., Civil Action No. 1:05-CV-1084-MHT-TFM (M.D. Ala. 2008),

Defendants’ Exhibit D - Court Doc. No. 18-15 at 1- 4. A grand jury returned an indictment

against Mathis for the burglary offense on June 10, 2005. Id. at 2. This previous court

record further demonstrates that Mathis entered a guilty plea to the third degree burglary

charge on March 29, 2006 and the trial court imposed a sentence of four (4) years

imprisonment for this conviction. The records before the court in the present civil rights

action likewise establish Mathis entered a guilty plea to receiving stolen property on

November 16, 2005 and received a sentence of three (3) years imprisonment for this

offense. Defendants’ Exhibit G - Court Doc. No. 24-6 at 27, 29. The state court awarded 5

Mathis 228 days of jail credit for time served in the county jail on this offense, ordered the

sentence split with Mathis to serve 15 months imprisonment with the “balance of [s]aid

sentence suspended on the condition of good behavior and payment of all fines, costs and

restitution for a period of 24 months at $50 per month [to] begin Jan. 15, 2006.” Id. at 29.

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Mathis subsequently secured his release from confinement on these charges. 

On October 31, 2007, the trial court issued an alias warrant of arrest for Mathis in

his receiving stolen property case. Defendants’ Exhibit G - Court Doc. No. 24-6 at 20.

The court based this warrant on the failure of Mathis to complete various conditions of his

suspended sentence and his failure to appear at a show cause hearing with respect to his

unsuccessful completion of such conditions. Id. On November 1, 2007, law enforcement

officials arrested Mathis on several charges of third degree burglary and returned him to

the Houston County Jail. On November 7, 2007, Mathis was arrested on the alias warrant

while incarcerated at the Houston County Jail. Id. at 22. On February 20, 2008, the court

determined Mathis had “willfully failed and refused to pay his fines and costs” with respect

to the conditions pertaining to suspension of his receiving stolen property sentence and

therefore ordered Mathis to “serve his fines and costs associated” with this conviction in

the Houston County Jail. Id. The trial court ordered this term of incarceration to last for

one year. Id. - (Docket Entry of July 3, 2008). It is therefore clear that as of February 20,

2008 Mathis’ confinement in the jail related, at least in part, to the sentence imposed for

his conviction for receiving stolen property. This sentence had not yet expired as the trial

court suspended the remaining split portion of the sentence pending payment of costs and

fines, conditions with which Mathis failed to comply. In addition, the four-year sentence

imposed on March 26, 2006 for third degree burglary remained in effect. 

C. The False Sanction Claim

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On May 18, 2008, defendant Harrison issued a sanction against Mathis for his

violation of Rule #3, placing paper over a cell window. Mathis asserts the sanction

resulted from false accusations and fabrications by the defendants because he alleges he

did not place the paper over the window. The defendants maintain that the sanction

occurred solely due to Mathis’ violation of institutional rules governing inmate behavior.

Defendants’ Exhibit 2 (Affidavit of John Harrison - Court Doc. No. 24-2 at 2 (“On May 18,

2008, at approximately 2312, during my initial counts of Pods I and J, I found the window

of cell door I-5 to have it’s (sic) view obstructed by two sheets of paper on the inside of the

window such that I could not see into [the] cell. The inmate assigned to I-5 [at this time]

was inmate Mathis. Inmate Mathis was in violation of Rule #3....”); Defendants’ Exhibit

P Part 2 - Court Doc. No. 24-8 at 41 (Inmate Sanction/Restriction Documentation Dated

May 18, 2008) (The door window of Mathis’ cell had its “view obstructed by two sheets

of paper... in violation of Rule #3.”). It is therefore clear that the defendants do not admit

that the information contained in the sanction is either fabricated or false. 

In Monroe v. Thigpen, 932 F.2d 1437 (11 Cir. 1991), the Court held that reliance th

on admittedly false information to deny a prisoner consideration for parole was arbitrary

and capricious treatment violative of the Constitution. The appellate court carefully

distinguished its holding from its prior decision in Slocum v. Georgia State Bd. of Pardons

and Paroles, 678 F.2d 940 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1043 (1982).

Our holding today does not conflict with our earlier holding in

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Slocum, supra. In Slocum, the plaintiff, who had been denied

parole, made the conclusory allegation that the Board must

have relied upon erroneous information because otherwise the

Board would surely have granted him parole. Slocum, 678

F.2d at 941. The plaintiff then sought to assert a due process

right to examine his prison file for the alleged errors. Unlike

the instant case, in Slocum the state did not admit that it had

relied upon false information in denying parole nor did the

plaintiff present any evidence that his prison file even

contained any false information. We held in Slocum that

prisoners do not state a due process claim by merely asserting

that erroneous information may have been used during their

parole consideration. Id. at 942. We also determined that

prisoners do not have a due process right to examine their

prison files as part of a general fishing expedition in search of

false information that could possibly exist in their files. Id. In

the case at bar, we are confronted with prison authorities who

admit that information contained in Monroe's files is false and

that they relied upon such information, at least in part, to deny

Monroe parole and to classify him as a sex offender. As we

stated, the parole statute does not authorize state officials to

rely on knowingly false information in their determinations.

Thomas [v. Sellers], 691 F.2d [487] at 489 [(11 Cir. 1982)].

th

Monroe, 932 F.3d at 1442.

Slocum controls the disposition of the instant case. The defendants maintain that

the information on which they relied in imposing the sanction is correct and an accurate

representation of the plaintiff’s behavior on May 18, 2008. Moreover, there is no evidence

before the court that the defendants relied on information they knew to be false during any

stage of the sanction process. Specifically, there is no admission by any of the defendants

that the information utilized in levying the sanction against Mathis is false, incorrect or

erroneous. The record in this case therefore establishes that the defendants did not rely on

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admittedly false information. In light of the foregoing, the plaintiff is entitled to no relief

as a matter of law and summary judgment is due to be granted in favor of the defendants

on his false sanction claim.

D. Due Process Claims

1. Failure to Comply with Administrative Policy. Mathis appears to maintain the

defendants deprived him of due process when they failed to provide him a disciplinary

hearing on his inmate sanction in violation of the administrative requirements set forth in

the rules/policies of the Houston County Jail. The defendants deny this assertion and

maintain the rules in effect at the time of this offense did not require a hearing for

imposition of the challenged sanction. Nevertheless, the alleged violation of departmental

rules or policies does not assert a violation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Sandin v.

Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S.Ct. 2293 (1995); Harris v. Birmingham Board of Education,

817 F.2d 1525 (11 Cir. 1987). th

2. Placement in Segregation. Mathis argues the defendants deprived him of due

process because they placed him in lock down/segregation for his creation of a security

hazard without a hearing. The sanction required that Mathis serve “14 days [on] lock

down.” Defendants’ Exhibit P Part 2 - Court Doc. No. 24-8 at 41 (Inmate

Sanction/Restriction Documentation Dated May 18, 2008). The evidentiary materials

before the court establish that inmates in disciplinary segregation at the Houston County

Jail lose various privileges and are not allowed to participate in rehabilitative programs

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offered by the jail during such confinement. Inmates in disciplinary segregation are,

however, permitted to practice their religion, provided necessary medical treatment, receive

the same food as other inmates, retain mail privileges and receive all necessities.

Defendant Reed describes the sanction process and nature of confinement in the jail

with respect to an inmate’s status as follows: 

Segregation resulting from a sanction with a few exceptions mirrors

the conditions imposed upon inmates in administrative segregation and

protective custody segregation in the Jail....

***

At the time of the events made the basis of plaintiff’s complaint, the

primary distinctions between a sanction and a disciplinary proceeding in the

Jail is that sanctions are: (1) usually used as corrective administrative

discipline for offenses that are not to be treated as serious offenses for

disciplinary proceedings; (2) sanctions are not made a part of the inmate[’s]

permanent record that is sent to the Alabama Department of Corrections and

as such, sanctions do not have the stigma of wrongdoing or misconduct that

is associated with more serious disciplinary confinement which is made a

part of the inmate[’s] permanent records with the state such that the inmate

may be placed on lock down in the state prison system and/or may result in

the inmate being classified as a higher risk inmate for purposes of facility

and housing assignment by the state; and (3) the lock down time resulting

from a sanction is more limited than for a disciplinary proceeding against an

inmate. As a result, an inmate sanction does not affect the inmate[’s] term

or duration of confinement with the county or state. Because a sanction is

not made a part of an inmate[’s] state incarceration record, a sanction does

not impact an inmate[’s] “good time” credit and does not impact an inmate’s

eligibility for parole. Lock down resulting from a sanction is for a definite

period of time not to exceed 21 days. Disciplinary segregation resulting from

a disciplinary proceeding usually results in the inmate receiving segregation

time up to a maximum of 45 days for each offense with a maximum of 60

days for all violations resulting from a single incident....

The “Sanction” system in the Houston County Jail (“Jail”) serves and

effectuates jail management and inmate safety and security while in the Jail

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without making an inmate[’s] rule violation a part of his/her permanent

record with the state prison system. Unlike segregation following

disciplinary proceedings, segregation via a sanction does not carrywith it any

stigma of wrong doing or misconduct, and that part of an inmate[’s] file is

not sent to the state prison system such that it affects the inmate[’s]

classification and treatment in the state prison system.... Sanctions are used

as a regulatory tool to maintain safety and security for all inmates and

corrections officers and to maintain good order and discipline in the jail for

inmates, corrections officers and visitors.... 

***

By design, all of the Jail is a maximum security facility. All of the

cells in the jail have the same amenities and living conditions.

The conditions at the Jail involve significant amounts of “lock down

time” even for inmates in the general population. General population

inmates are confined to their cells for fifteen (15) hours each day. Other than

visitation with their lawyer(s), all visits for all inmates in the Jail are noncontact visits made through glass walls/windows. In the jail, every aspect of

all inmates lives whether in general population or in segregation is

monitored. All of the cell doors in the Jail are solid metal doors. Jail cells,

except in the medical clinic, in both general population areas and segregation

areas have windows where inmates can see outside the Jail facility and every

cell door has a window allowing inmates to see out into the day room area

of the Pod at all times. Inmates in the general population of the jail are

permitted to eat in the day room area of each Pod in the jail or in their cells

according to the inmate[’s] preference. 

.... The sanction [for covering the cell door window] was issued in

order to administratively enforce the administrative and regulatory rules of

behavior for inmates in the jail. The purpose of inmate Mathis’

segregation/lock down made the basis of his claims was administratively to

maintain necessary control, maintain discipline, maintain good order,

maintain security and to provide for the safety of inmates, corrections

officers and others who may be visiting within the Jail. Sanctions are issued

administratively according to the procedures stated above. The purpose of

sanctions and any resulting loss of privileges is to maintain control and

discipline by controlling the behavior of inmates in a systematic way to

obtain obedience, compliance with rules and to maintain good order and

safety in the jail.... The purpose of sanctions in the Jail, including inmate

Mathis’ sanction, is to regulate the behavior of inmates in the jail for the

purposes stated herein, not to punish. 

Case 1:08-cv-00412-MHT-TFM Document 30 Filed 08/23/10 Page 15 of 33
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). 6

16

*** 

The housing for inmates in segregation, whether for administrative

sanction, disciplinary, other administrative and protective custody, is the

same. While on lock down, inmates are allowed out of their cells for one

hour each day to bathe and exercise in the day room area of the Pod. During

the time inmates are on lock down, whether administrative

sanctions/disciplinary or other administrative purposes, inmates can talk to

and converse with other inmates in the Pod. When confined to their cells,

lock down inmates can talk to each other....

Defendants’ Exhibit 4 (Affidavit of Keith W. Reed) - Court Doc. No. 24-5 at 3-8. 

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state “shall

deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” Thus, the

Constitution is implicated only if a person is deprived of an interest protected by the Due

Process Clause. In Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), the Supreme Court abandoned

the former methodology for determining the existence of a liberty interest. Under such

previous case law, a federal court ascertained whether a state created a constitutionally

protected liberty interest by parsing language of statutes and regulations to determine if the

language constituted “an unmistakably mandatory character” placing “substantive

limitations on official discretion.” In its renunciation of this prior case law, the Court held

that federal courts must instead look to the nature of the deprivation rather than statutory

or regulatory language to determine if a state created a liberty interest.

Following Wolff, we recognize that States may under certain 6

circumstances create liberty interests which are protected by

the Due Process Clause.... But these interests will be generally

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limited to freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding

the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to

protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force, ...

nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the

inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.

Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-484 (1995)(footnote added)(citations omitted).

Moreover, the Court specifically rejected the contention that any action taken by

correctional officials as a punitive measure encroaches upon a liberty interest protected

under the Due Process Clause. Id. at 484. 

“Discipline by prison officials in response to a wide range of misconduct falls within

the expected parameters of the sentence imposed by a court of law.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at

485. The loss of privileges and placement in segregation for a short period of time “though

concededly punitive, do[] not represent a dramatic departure from the basic conditions” of

the sentence imposed upon the plaintiff. Id. Moreover, under the facts of this case, the

aforementioned sanctions fail to “impose[] atypical and significant hardship on the inmate

in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id. at 484. Thus, Mathis’ theory of

liability under the law as established in Sandin is without merit, and summary judgment is

due to be granted in favor of the defendants on the due process claims.

E. Medical Treatment for Hemorrhoids - Deliberate Indifference

Mathis complains the defendants failed to provide him adequate medical treatment

for hemorrhoids. Plaintiff’s Complaint - Court Doc. No. 1 at 3. The defendants deny they

acted with deliberate indifference to Mathis’ hemorrhoids and, instead, maintain they

Case 1:08-cv-00412-MHT-TFM Document 30 Filed 08/23/10 Page 17 of 33
18

provided Mathis with appropriate treatment for his condition. 

To prevail on a constitutional claim concerning an alleged denial of adequate

medical treatment, an inmate must, at a minimum, show that those responsible for

providing the treatment acted with deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Taylor v. Adams, 221 F.3d 1254 (11 Cir. 2000); th

McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248 (11 Cir. 1999); Waldrop v. Evans, 871 F.2d 1030, th

1033 (11 Cir. 1989); Rogers v. Evans, 792 F.2d 1052, 1058 (11 Cir.1986). Specifically, th th

jail personnel may not subject inmates to “acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to

evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106, 97

S.Ct. at 292; Mandel v. Doe, 888 F.2d 783, 787 (11 Cir.1989). When seeking relief based th

on deliberate indifference of responsible officials, an inmate is required to establish “an

objectively serious need, an objectively insufficient response to that need, subjective

awareness of facts signaling the need and an actual inference of required action from those

facts.” Taylor, 221 F.3d at 1258; McElligott, 182 F.3d at 1255 (for liability to attach, the

official must know of and then disregard an excessive risk to the prisoner). Thus,

deliberate indifference occurs only when a defendant “knows of and disregards an

excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the [defendant] must both be aware of facts from

which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists and he

must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994); Johnson v.

Quinones, 145 F.3d 164, 168 (4 Cir. 1998) (defendant must have actual knowledge of a th

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19

serious condition, not just knowledge of symptoms, and ignore known risk to serious

condition to warrant finding of deliberate indifference). Furthermore, “an official’s failure

to alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not, while no cause for

commendation, cannot under our cases be condemned as the infliction of punishment.”

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838. 

 In articulating the scope of inmates’ right to be free from deliberate

indifference, ... the Supreme Court has ... emphasized that not ‘every claim

by a prisoner that he has not received adequate medical treatment states a

violation of the Eighth Amendment.’ Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105, 97 S.Ct. at

291; Mandel, 888 F.2d at 787. Medical treatment violates the eighth

amendment only when it is ‘so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive

as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness.’

Rogers, 792 F.2d at 1058 (citation omitted). Mere incidents of negligence

or malpractice do not rise to the level of constitutional violations. See

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106, 97 S.Ct. at 292 (‘Medical malpractice does not

become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.’);

Mandel, 888 F.2d at 787-88 (mere negligence or medical malpractice ‘not

sufficient’ to constitute deliberate indifference); Waldrop, 871 F.2d at 1033

(mere medical malpractice does not constitute deliberate indifference). Nor

does a simple difference in medical opinion between the prison’s medical

staff and the inmate as to the latter’s diagnosis or course of treatment support

a claim of cruel and unusual punishment. See Waldrop, 871 F.2d at 1033

(citing Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 48 (4 Cir.1977)). th

Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1505 (11 Cir. 1991). Moreover, “whether government th

actors should have employed additional diagnostic techniques or forms of treatment ‘is a

classic example of a matter for medical judgment’ and therefore not an appropriate basis

for liability under the Eighth Amendment.” Adams v. Poag, 61 F.3d 1537, 1545 (11 Cir. th

1995); Hamm v. DeKalb County, 774 F.2d 1567, 1575 (11 Cir. 1985) (mere fact that

th

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20

prison inmate desires a different mode of medical treatment does not amount to deliberate

indifference violative of the Constitution); Garvin v. Armstrong, 236 F.3d 896, 898 (7 Cir. th

2001) (“A difference of opinion as to how a condition should be treated does not give rise

to a constitutional violation.”); Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9 Cir. 1981) th

(prison medical personnel do not violate the Eighth Amendment simply because their

opinions concerning medical treatment conflict with that of the inmate-patient). 

 To be deliberately indifferent, Defendants must have been “subjectively

aware of the substantial risk of serious harm in order to have had a

‘“sufficiently culpable state of mind.”’” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834-38, 114

S.Ct. at 1977-80; Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 299, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 2324-

25, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991).... Even assuming the existence of a serious risk

of harm and causation, the prison official must be aware of specific facts

from which an inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious

harm exists--and the prison official must also “draw that inference.” Farmer,

511 U.S. at 837, 114 S.Ct. at 1979. 

Carter v. Galloway, 352 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11 Cir. 2001). Thus, for Mathis to survive th

summary judgment on his deliberate indifference claim against the defendants, he is

“required to produce sufficient evidence of (1) a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the

defendants’ deliberate indifference to that risk; and (3) causation.” Hale v. Tallapoosa

County, 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11 Cir. 1995). th

The medical records filed herein demonstrate that during Mathis’ confinement in the

Houston CountyJail correctional officials allowed Mathis unlimited access to medical care

and medical personnel consistently provided treatment to Mathis for his hemorrhoids in

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21

accordance with their assessment of his condition. Defendant’s Exhibit A to the Affidavit

of Jason Smoak (Houston County Jail Medical File of Raymond Mathis) - Court Doc. No.

24-12 thru Court Doc. No. 24-15. The undisputed evidentiary materials before the court

further demonstrate that the jail’s medical staff routinely examined Mathis, thoroughly

evaluated his complaints, ordered necessary tests, prescribed various medications, referred

him to a free-world gastroenterologist for evaluation and provided treatment for his

hemorrhoids in accordance with their professional judgment. Id.; Defendant’s Exhibit 5

(Affidavit of Jason Smoak) - Court Doc. No. 24-11 at 2-16. Smoak provides the following

summary of ,medical treatment provided Mathis with respect to the claim presented in the

instant complaint:

In his complaint in this lawsuit, inmate Mathis claims that he was

moved to cell I-5 for medical reasons. That statement is false. In his

complaint, inmate Mathis claims that on Sunday May 18, 2008, at the time

he was sanctioned, that he had been “bleeding bad” and that “[Due] to the

fact that I was bleeding for two day and couldn’t stop it, I just stay on my bed

and hope to see a nurse that never came and the third day I was taken to [the

medical clinic] for treatment.” I can state to a reasonable degree of medical

certainty that this claim is also false. I saw inmate Mathis in the jail medical

clinic on Friday, May 16, 2008, for his sole complaint of sinus congestion.

On ... May 16, 2008, inmate Mathis did not have any complaints with regard

to hemorrhoids and exhibited no signs and symptoms of having any current

hemorrhoid problems at that time. 

Over the [following] weekend, the jail medical clinic was staffed by

a nurse and either myself or Dr. Banner were on call at all times for the jail

medical clinic staff. Inmate Mathis made no claims of any kind that his

hemorrhoids were ... bleeding until he was sanctioned for covering up the

window of his cell with paper.

On Monday, May 19, 2008, I again saw inmate Mathis in the jail medical

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22

clinic for his subjective complaint that his hemorrhoids would bleed upon

defecation. Upon physical examination, I found no signs or symptoms of any

external hemorrhoids or that inmate Mathis had been bleeding. His hemorrhoids did

not show signs of bleeding. Inmate Mathis’ subjective complaints of bleeding were

not supported by my objective physical examination or his blood test. As a matter

of caution, I continued the current treatment of inmate Mathis by keeping him on

Preparation H and Colace (stool softener) twice a day. Because inmate Mathis

insisted that he had bled profusely over the weekend, I had blood drawn for lab

work (CBC). Inmate Mathis’ blood test was within normal limits. 

On June 9, 2008, when the jail medical staff attempted to give inmate

Mathis additional Preparation H suppositories, inmate Mathis left the clinic

and he refused them by saying that he didn’t want “sh--.” At no time while

in the Houston County Jail has inmate Mathis presented with more than a

minimal hemorrhoidal irritation on my physical examination.

Defendant’s Exhibit 5 (Affidavit of Jason Smoak) - Court Doc. No. 24-11 at 14-16.

The affidavit filed by defendant Smoak further addresses Mathis’ claim before this

court with respect to the treatment provided for hemorrhoids, in detailed pertinent part, as

follows: 

In addition to funding three full time nurse positions; one Certified

Medical Assistant (“CMA”); one full time Certified Physician’s Assistant

(“PA”); a doctor contracted as the Clinic Medical Director and staff doctor;

and, a registered supervising pharmacist for the provision of medical care to

inmates such as the plaintiff, the [Houston] County Jail provides a general

medical clinic for medical problems that may arise in the jail. The medical

clinic is held daily, Monday through Friday. The jail also has a nurse or

CMA on duty on Saturdays and Sundays. The clinic is staffed by the staff

physician and/or myself as the Certified Physician’s Assistant under the

supervision of the physician. The nurses or CMA are in the Pods each day

passing out inmate medications as well. Thus, inmates are given daily access

to either the doctor, [physician’s assistant], nurses or CMA services and the

general medical clinic as well as the hospital emergency room services, if

necessary. Either I or the doctor are “on call” to the jail on a 24 hour a day,

seven days a week, basis. 

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23

It is the policy of the Houston County Jail that all requests for medical

treatment are forwarded to the jail’s medical staff with the expectation that

appropriate and necessary medical treatment will be provided to or obtained

for the inmate. 

The jail medical staff is committed to providing needed medical

treatment to every inmate. Based on my treatment to the plaintiff and my

review of the plaintiff’s jail medical file, the plaintiff was, during the period

of time made the basis of Plaintiff’s complaint, provided all necessary

medical testing, treatment and care while in the Houston County Jail. At all

times alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint, he has been given and provided

adequate and necessary medical treatment and has at all times relevant

thereto been provided with all medically necessary medications. Inmate

Mathis has presented with numerous subjective complaints many of which

could not be objectively verified. 

Inmate Mathis’ most recent incarceration in the Houston County Jail

began November 1, 2007.... All reasonable and necessary medical treatment

has at all times been provided to inmate Mathis. A summary of the medical

treatment provided to the plaintiff [relevant to the claim presented in the

instant complaint] is provided as follows: 

Nov. 5, 2007: Inmate Mathis came into the jail

from the emergency room of the

Southeast Alabama Medical

Center (SAMC). Orders from

SAMC were reviewed and

followed [including provision of

blood pressure, hemorrhoid and

anti-infection medications].

[Specifically, Mathis] was

prescribed Colace 100 mg by

mouth at night and placed on a

high fiber diet to help with his

hemorrhoids....

Nov. 7, 2007: Inmate Mathis was allowed to call

home for his ... medications (i.e.

blood pressure, allergy and pain

medication). No medications were

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24

obtained from his home so he was

put on a Cold Pack twice a day for

five days for his cold symptoms. 

Nov. 9, 2007: Inmate Mathis was seen in [the

medical] clinic ... with subjective

complaints [including depression]

... muscle spasm across right upper

back for two weeks - hurts to lay

on right side. Tooth ache on right

lower side.... [Medical personnel

prescribed] Trazodone 50 mg by

mouth twice a day for 14 days. ...

Flexeril 10 mg by mouth twice a

day for 14 days [as treatment for

muscle spasm]. For tooth ache -

salt water gargle and placed on

dental list to see dentist. 

***

Nov. 20, 2007: Inmate Mathis was seen in [the

medical] clinic with complaints of

sinus congestion. Inmate Mathis

was given a Cold Pack to be taken

by mouth twice a day for 5 days.

Inmate Mathis also wanted an

extra mat but due to no objective

signs indicating a need for same, I

denied his request for an extra mat

at that time. 

***

Jan. 15, 2008: Inmate Mathis was seen in [the

medical] clinic for complaints that

his hemorrhoids have acted up and

that inmate claims to have seen

some bleeding on tissue when

wiping. Objectively, no active

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bleeding observe d u p o n

examination. Inmate was treated

as follows: 

He was given Preparation H

suppositories for 10 days, stool

softener, Colace 100 mg, twice a

day for 10 days then back down to

once a day. I also prescribed that

the plaintiff take a Sitz bath daily

for 10-15 minutes for 10 days. He

was to return to clinic in two

weeks. 

Jan. 17, 2008: Inmate Mathis to [medical] clinic

for Sitz bath with warm water. No

verbal complaints noted.

Jan. 18, 2008: Inmate Mathis to [medical] clinic

for Sitz bath. No verbal

complaints.

***

April 2, 2008: Inmate Mathis was seen in [the

medical] clinic for multiple

complaints. Inmate’s chief

complains [this day] were of back

pain, shoulder pain, constipation

and hemorrhoids. As treatment,

inmate was given Preparation H

suppositories, Colace 100 mg by

mouth twice a day and Milk of

Magnesia every morning for three

days for constipation [and

hemorrhoids]. For his complaint

of right shoulder pain, inmate was

given an analgesic muscle rub

cream. 

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26

April 14, 2008: Inmate Mathis was seen in [the

medical] clinic with multiple

complaints; right shoulder pain,

neck pain, hemorrhoids, runny

nose and blood pressure. [An

examination of Mathis relative to

his complaints occurred.]... For

hemorrhoids, [medical personnel]

put him on Preparation H. 

***

May 19, 2008: Inmate Mathis was seen in [the

medical] clinic for complaint of

hemorrhoids bleeding upon

defecation. Upon examination,

inmate exhibited no objective

signs and symptoms of bleeding.

Inmate was given Preparation H

suppositories, continued on Colace

twice a day and had blood drawn

for lab work (i.e. CBC) to be sure

inmate was not anemic from

reported bleeding. 

June 9, 2008: Inmate Mathis was seen in clinic

with subjective complaints of

feeling dizzy and he was worried

about his blood pressure. Inmate’s

blood pressure was within normal

limits. Inmate also requested a

Cold Pack. I explained to inmate

that he could not have one at this

time as he showed no signs and

symptoms of having a cold.

I n m a t e t h e n r e q u e s t e d

suppositories. When medical staff

attempted to give them to inmate

as he left the clinic, he stated that

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27

the didn’t want “sh--.”

June 12, 2008: Inmate Mathis was seen in clinic

complaining of profuse bleeding

from his rectum and states that we

are not doing anything to help....

Upon rectal examination by Dr.

Banner, no fissures noted, positive

skin tag, no rectal prolapse,

minimal hemorrhoids noted,

hemacult stool was negative for

presence of blood. Dr. Banner

gave orders for Sitz baths twice a

day for two weeks, steroid cream

to rectum after Sitz bath[s],

continue Colace.... 

June 14, 2008: Inmate Mathis was seen in clinic

for Sitz bath. Inmate requested

suppository before leaving the

clinic and also asked for salt.

Inmate was given one Preparation

H suppository and told inmate that

he would not be given any more

salt or suppositories unless he first

wrote a request for same.

Explained to inmate what the

procedure is to write a request for

items such as suppositories and

salt. Inmate became agitated

saying that “I can get anything I

want.” Inmate returned to Pod and

will repeat sitz bath. At 6:15 p.m.,

inmate returned to clinic for Sitz

bath and tolerated it well. 

June 15, 2008: Inmate Mathis was seen in clinic

for Sitz bath and tolerated it well.

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28

Repeat of Sitz bath at 6:35 p.m.

today and inmate tolerated it well.

June 18, 2008: According to records, inmate was

seen in clinic for twice a day Sitz

baths. Inmate was angry and

stated that he had only had one

Sitz bath yesterday and that he

should have his Sitz bath[]

whenever he gets ready for it.

Inmate states that “I want to go

back to the Pod. I should get that

Sitz bath whenever I want it.”

Inmate refused his Sitz bath and

when offered a refusal form inmate

says, “I am not signing a refusal

form and I want to go back to the

Pod.” Refusal witnessed by

corrections officer Smith. Will

offer Sitz baths tomorrow. 

June 20, 2008: Inmate Mathis was brought to

clinic for repeat CBC blood test.

Inmate complains of congestion

and hemorrhoids. On physical

examination no apparent distress

noted. Blood drawn and sent to

lab. Plan for Allergic rhinitis,

Inmate given Benedryl 50 mg.

every morning for 30 days. For

hemorrhoids, Preparation H

suppositories given and the plastic

Sitz bath basin was given to

inmate to take to his cell with him.

*** 

August 11, 2008: Inmate Mathis was seen in clinic

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29

[with se v e r a l subjective

complaints and] also asking for

suppository.... [For treatment of]

Hemorrhoids - ordered ...

appointment to be made [for

Mathis] with [a free-world]

Gastroenterologist for second

opinion related to inmate[’s]

hemorrhoids. Inmate Mathis was

scheduled to see Dr. Diavolitsis

(gastroenterologist) on August 27,

2008 at 2:00 p.m.

 ***

August 30, 2008: I received a call from Dr. Banner

about inmate Mathis having given

a large assembly of [Mathis’

prescribed] medicine to another

inmate ... who took at least six (6)

Claritin at one time. That inmate

was brought to the clinic and

stated he had received that

medicine from inmate Mathis....

Inmate Mathis’ Claritin, Flexeril,

Trazadone, Naprosyn all were

discontinued at that time. Inmate

Mathis [was] sent to administrative

segregation. 

August 31, 2008: I received a call from Sgt. Bonin

stating that [another] inmate ...

took more than twenty (20)

Tylenol at once which he received

from inmate Mathis. [This other

inmate] reported that inmate

Mathis had additional Tylenol in

his sock....

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30

 Sept. 3, 2008: Inmate Mathis was seen in the

clinic regarding his medications

[and the necessity of crushing his

blood pressure medication because

of his hoarding other medications].

Inmate Mathis continues to refuse

his medications stating that he has

to see us crush them in front of

him. Inmate Mathis was informed

he had the right to refuse his

medications but that his

medications would continue to be

made available to him. Inmate

Math is refused his AM

medications today and yesterday.

Inmate Mathis refused to sign a

refusal form regarding same.

Suppository was given to him for

his hemorrhoids. 

Defendants’ Exhibit 5 (Affidavit of Jason Smoak) - Court Doc. No. 24-11 at 3-14. Smoak’s

synopsis of the treatment provided to Mathis is supported by the medical records filed in

this case and there is nothing before the court which undermines the validity of these

records. 

Under the circumstances of this case, it is clear that the course of treatment

undertaken by the defendants was neither grossly incompetent nor inadequate. Although

Mathis asserts he should have been provided a different treatment regimen for his

hemorrhoids, this assertion fails to establish deliberate indifference. Garvin, 236 F.3d at

898 (difference of opinion regarding manner in which condition should be treated fails to

Case 1:08-cv-00412-MHT-TFM Document 30 Filed 08/23/10 Page 30 of 33
31

demonstrate a constitutional violation); Adams, 61 F.3d at 1545 (whether medical

personnel “should have employed additional ... forms of treatment ‘is a classic example of

a matter for medical judgment’ and therefore not an appropriate basis for liability under the

Eighth Amendment.”); Hamm, 774 F.2d at 1505 (inmate’s desire for some other form of

medical treatment does not constitute deliberate indifference violative of the Constitution);

Franklin, 662 F.2d at 1344 (simple divergence of opinions between medical personnel and

inmate-patient do not violate the Eighth Amendment). It is undisputed that Mathis

received significant medical treatment as dictated by objective evaluations of his condition.

Based on well settled law cited herein, his mere desire for a different mode of medical

treatment does not amount to deliberate indifference. Mathis has failed to present any

evidence which indicates the defendants knew the manner in which medical personnel

treated his hemorrhoids created a substantial risk to his health and that with this knowledge

consciously disregarded such risk. The record is devoid of evidence, significantly

probative or otherwise, showing that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference to

Mathis’ complaints of hemorrhoids. Consequently, summary judgment is due to be granted

in favor of the defendants. Carter, 352 F.3d at 1350.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that:

1. The defendants’ motion for summary judgment be GRANTED.

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32

2. Judgment be GRANTED in favor of the defendants.

3. This case be dismissed with prejudice.

4. The costs of this proceeding be taxed against the plaintiff.

It is further 

ORDERED that on or before September 9, 2010 the parties may file objections to

this Recommendation. Any objections filed must clearly identify the findings in the

Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation to which the party is objecting. Frivolous, conclusive

or general objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties are advised

that this Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not

appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and advisements in the

Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation shall bar the party from a de novo determination by

the District Court of issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from

attacking on appeal factual findings in the Recommendation accepted or adopted by the

District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v.

Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982). See Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d

33 (11th Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981,

en banc), adopting as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed

down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.

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Done this 23rd day of August, 2010.

/s/Terry F. Moorer 

TERRY F. MOORER

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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