Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-04879/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-04879-7/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 442
Nature of Suit: Civil Rights Employment
Cause of Action: 28:1331 Fed. Question

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROZELLA JOHNSON,

Petitioner and Plaintiff,

 v.

ALAMEDA-CONTRA COSTA TRANSIT

DISTRICT, and KATHLEEN KELLY,

Respondents and Defendants

 /

No. C-04-4879 MMC

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFERRED

PORTION OF DEFENDANTS’ MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT;

GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN

PART PETITION FOR WRIT OF

MANDAMUS; REMANDING ACTION IN

PART

Before the Court is defendants Alameda-Contra Costa Transit District (“AC Transit”)

and Kathleen Kelly’s (“Kelly”) motion, filed September 9, 2005, for summary judgment,

pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff Rozella Johnson

(“Johnson”) has filed opposition, to which defendants have replied. The matter came on

regularly for hearing October 14, 2005, at which time the Court directed the parties to file

supplemental briefing with respect to the adequacy of the administrative record of which

Johnson seeks judicial review; the parties thereafter filed their supplemental briefing.

By order filed January 23, 2006, the Court granted in part, denied in part, and

deferred in part defendants’ motion. Specifically, as to the First Cause of Action, by which

plaintiff seeks judicial review of a hearing officer’s decision upholding her termination, the

Court granted defendants’ motion, except to the extent the First Cause of Action is based

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on a claim that the hearing officer’s decision is not supported by the evidence, as to which

claim the Court directed the parties to address plaintiff’s request to augment the

administrative record. The Court deferred ruling on defendants’ motion to the extent it

pertained to the Second through Eleventh Causes of Action, pending resolution of the

merits of the remaining claim in the First Cause of Action. Thereafter, the parties filed

supplemental briefing addressing the propriety of augmenting the administrative record.

By order filed February 27, 2006, the Court granted in part and denied in part

plaintiff’s request to augment the administrative record, and set a briefing schedule on the

issue of whether the administrative decision should be affirmed or set aside. Thereafter,

the parties filed supplemental briefing addressing the merits of the administrative decision.

Having considered each of the above-referenced filings and the arguments of

counsel at the hearing, the Court rules as follows.

BACKGROUND

Johnson is an African-American woman over the age of 40 who formerly worked for

AC Transit, most recently as an executive administrative assistant to Kelly. Johnson

alleges that in February 2004, AC Transit, acting on information provided by Kelly,

terminated her employment. According to Johnson, the recommendation was motivated by

discriminatory animus on the part of Kelly and was in retaliation for Johnson’s having

engaged in protected activity. Johnson also alleges that Kelly, during the course of

Johnson’s employment, subjected Johnson to a hostile work environment and failed to

accommodate her disabilities and medical conditions. After she was terminated, Johnson

requested a hearing before a hearing officer to review the propriety of the termination. 

Following the hearing, the hearing officer, by a Decision and Award dated August 6, 2004,

as amended August 10, 2004 (“Decision”), upheld the termination.

Johnson, alleging the hearing officer abused his discretion in upholding the

termination, petitions the Court for a writ of mandamus to set aside the Decision. Further,

Johnson seeks damages under both federal and state anti-discrimination laws.

//

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DISCUSSION

I. First Cause of Action (Petition for Writ of Administrative Mandamus)

In her First Cause of Action, Johnson seeks a writ of administrative mandamus,

pursuant to § 1094.5 of the California Code of Civil Procedure, to set aside the Decision. A

party petitioning for relief under § 1094.5 is entitled to relief upon a showing of an abuse of

discretion by the hearing officer. See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5(b). As noted above,

the Court has granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the First Cause of

Action, except to the extent such cause of action is based on Johnson’s claim that the

Decision is not supported by the evidence.

"Where it is claimed that the findings are not supported by the evidence, in cases in

which the court is authorized by law to exercise its independent judgment on the evidence,

abuse of discretion is established if the court determines that the findings are not supported

by the weight of the evidence.” See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5(c). The instant action

involves a claim in which the Court is authorized to exercise its independent judgment. See

Boctor v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transit Authority, 48 Cal. App. 4th 560, 572-73

(1996) (holding, because discipline imposed on public employee affects “fundamental

vested right” in continued employment, reviewing court must “exercise its independent

judgment on the evidence”) “In exercising its independent judgment, a trial court must

afford a strong presumption of correctness concerning the administrative findings, and the

party challenging the administrative decision bears the burden of convincing the court that

the administrative findings are contrary to the weight of the evidence.” Fukuda v. City of

Angels, 20 Cal. 4th 805, 817 (1999).

A. Administrative Proceedings and Findings

By a “Notice of Intent to Terminate for Poor Performance and Insubordination,”

dated January 28, 2004, AC Transit advised Johnson that AC Transit was terminating

Johnson’s employment on grounds of “poor performance and insubordination.” (See

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1

The hearing officer’s notes and the exhibits offered at the hearing are Exhibit D to

the Trowbridge Declaration filed November 30, 2005.

2

In what appears to be an oversight, the second page of De Stigter’s letter of

February 24, 2004 is not included in the administrative record provided to the Court by

Johnson. A complete copy of that letter, however, was separately submitted by

defendants. (See Hoyt Decl., filed September 9, 2005, Ex. J.)

3

The Decision is Exhibit L to the Hoyt Declaration filed September 9, 2004.

4

The incident in question occurred on January 16, 2004. The hearing officer found

that, on that date, “Kelly was intimidated by [Johnson’s] angry, loud voice and her kicking

the door [of Kelly’s office] closed.” (See id. at 31.)

4

Hearing Officer’s Notes and Exhibits (“HON”)1 Ex. 1.) On February 9, 2004, at Johnson’s

request, AC Transit’s Human Resources Director Kurt De Stigter (“De Stigter”) conducted a

hearing to review the charges set forth in the January 28, 2004 notice; by letter dated

February 24, 2004, De Stitger advised Johnson of his finding that the charges had merit

and that she was terminated effective February 24, 2004. (See id. Ex. 2.)2 On February

25, 2004, Johnson requested that a hearing officer review the propriety of the termination. 

(See id. Ex. C.) Beginning June 3, 2004, the hearing officer conducted a three-day

hearing, and, on August 6, 2004, issued the Decision. (See Decision at 1, 44.)3

As to the charge of insubordination, the hearing officer concluded AC Transit had

failed to show the conduct forming the basis for such charge constituted insubordination,

but, rather, constituted “disrespect for the supervisor.”4

 (See id. at 31.) In light of such

finding, the hearing officer ruled, as to that charge, the “appropriate penalty was a five-day

suspension,” not termination. (See id.)

As to the charge of poor work performance, the hearing officer sustained the

termination, finding AC Transit had demonstrated that Johnson, “through incompetence or

intention, was not adequately performing as executive administrative assistant for Kelly,”

(see id. at 25), and that Johnson’s “performance lapses not only impacted [AC Transit]

internally, they had significant negative impacts on [AC Transit] in its relations with elected

officials and others with power to influence [AC Transit],” (see id. at 26). The hearing

officer also found Johnson had failed to show that her age, her medical condition of cancer,

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or her race played a part in the decision to terminate her. (See id. at 36-39.) The hearing

officer further found Johnson had failed to show the termination was motivated by

retaliation for Johnson’s having engaged in protected activities, specifically, requesting a

medical leave, offering to assist a co-worker who had sued AC Transit, filing internal

grievances, filing a claim with the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing,

and filing a worker’s compensation claim. (See id. at 39-42.) Finally, the hearing officer,

addressing Johnson’s claim that AC Transit would not allow her to access her personnel

record, found Johnson had failed to establish any lack of access and, alternatively, that any

lack of access would not provide grounds to nullify the termination. (See id. at 42-43.)

B. Deficient Performance

As noted, the Court starts with the presumption that the hearing officer’s finding of

deficient work performance is correct. Johnson argues that such presumption has been

rebutted because the weight of the evidence does not support the hearing officer’s finding.

The administrative record, however, is replete with evidence of failures by Johnson

to adequately perform her assigned tasks. These incidents include, but are not limited to,

Johnson’s repeated failures to properly manage Kelly’s calendar, to timely complete

minutes of executive meetings, to manage Kelly’s emails, to prepare without errors

memoranda and agendas for meetings, and to timely submit monthly reports. Indeed,

defendants have identified well over 50 examples of such conduct, each of which is

documented by evidence in the administrative record, the vast majority of which Johnson

either expressly conceded or implicitly conceded by failing to offer a response thereto at the

administrative hearing. (See Defs.’ Reply to Pl.’s Opening Brief, filed April 14, 2006, 7:19 -

16:6.) Further, during the time Johnson was on a medical leave from December 2002 to

March 2003, two different temporary employees were, respectively, able to competently

perform Johnson’s assigned duties, thus demonstrating those duties were not overly

onerous or difficult.

Having reviewed the record independently, the Court finds Johnson has failed to

rebut the presumption of correctness as to the hearing officer’s finding that her work

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Johnson has not challenged the hearing officer’s finding that AC Transit General

Manager Rick Fernandez (“Fernandez”), who made the decision to terminate Johnson, did

not act with a discriminatory animus. The Court thus presumes the hearing officer’s finding

with respect to Fernandez is correct and considers only whether Kelly, who testified she

provided the information on which Fernandez relied, acted with a discriminatory animus. 

See, e.g., Perez v. Curcio, 841 F. 2d 255, 257-58 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding, where plaintiff’s

supervisor prepared report on which employer relied when terminating plaintiff, evidence of

supervisor’s discriminatory animus relevant to issue of whether employer unlawfully

terminated plaintiff)

6

performance was deficient.

C. Discriminatory Animus

Johnson argues her termination was the product of discriminatory animus on the

part of Kelly.5

Before the hearing officer, Johnson argued that Kelly discriminated against her

because Johnson is over the age of 40, had been diagnosed with cancer, and is AfricanAmerican. Before this Court, Johnson does not articulate any basis to rebut the

presumption of correctness as to hearing officer’s decision as to a lack of age

discrimination, and, consequently, such finding is presumed correct. Johnson argues,

however, that this Court should find Kelly discriminated against her because of Johnson’s

cancer diagnosis and her race, as well as a “mental disability.” (See Pl.’s Opening Brief,

filed March 21, 2006, at 8:19-20.)

Johnson did not argue to the hearing officer that Kelly was motivated to act by

reason of any mental disability on Johnson’s part, and thus Johnson has waived that issue. 

In any event, although the administrative record contains evidence that Johnson has

experienced “stress, anxiety and depression,” (see HON Ex. K), Johnson points to no

evidence in the administrative record to support a finding that any such condition, either

individually or in combination, rose to the level of a disability, i.e., that Johnson is limited in

her ability to perform a major life activity as a result of such condition. See, e.g. , Cal. Gov’t

Code § 12926(i) (providing person is “disabled” for purposes of FEHA if such person has a

“mental or psychological disorder or condition” that “limits a major life activity”).

As to Johnson’s having been diagnosed with cancer, Johnson, both at the

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administrative hearing and before this Court, relies on Johnson’s having informed Kelly of

the diagnosis in November 2002 and Kelly’s written notice to Johnson, the following month,

setting forth Johnson’s performance deficiencies. The hearing officer observed that “the

tight temporal connection raises an inference of causality,” but found any such inference

was dispelled, in that Kelly had donated sick leave to Johnson while Johnson was on a

medical leave because of the cancer diagnosis and the record included no comments or

actions evidencing any consideration by Kelly of Johnson’s diagnosis. (See Decision at

37.) Having reviewed the record independently, the Court finds Johnson has failed to rebut

the presumption of correctness as to the hearing officer’s findings that Kelly was not

motivated by any animus based on Johnson’s diagnosis. In addition to the reasons stated

by the hearing officer, any inference of discrimination that might arise from the above-noted

temporal connection between Kelly’s knowledge of the diagnosis and her putting the

reasons for her dissatisfaction with Johnson’s work in writing is undermined by the fact no

action to terminate Johnson was taken until more than a year after Kelly learned of

Johnson’s diagnosis. Further, although Johnson, relying on her testimony that Kelly

assigned her new tasks once she returned from her leave, argues such new assignments

were an attempt to cause Johnson to fail, Johnson conceded at the hearing that Kelly told

Johnson to notify Kelly if Johnson found she needed any adjustment of her duties after

returning to work, (see HON at 26), conduct indicative of an effort to accommodate rather

than an attempt to discriminate.

With respect to the claim of racial discrimination, the hearing officer found Johnson

had offered no evidence that her race was a motivating factor on Kelly’s part, and that it

was Johnson who “frequently injected her race and background into discussions, and then

tautologically divined racial animus when there was none.” (See Decision at 39.) In

arguing the presumption of correctness of such finding has been rebutted, Johnson relies

on deposition testimony of Candy Williams-Scarlett (“Williams-Scarlett”) and Francois Njike

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6

At the time of the hearing, Williams-Scarlett was employed by AC Transit.

7

By order filed February 27, 2006, the Court augmented the administrative record to

include deposition testimony, taken in the instant action, of Williams-Scarlett and Njike.

8

Excerpts from the Williams-Scarlett deposition are Exhibit D to the Trowbridge

Declaration filed September 22, 2005.

9

Williams-Scarlett testified that her interactions with Kelly occurred “over ten years

ago,” (see id.); she was deposed on April 25, 2005, (see id. at 1).

10Williams-Scarlett did not testify about any interactions between Johnson and Kelly.

8

(“Njike”), both former employees of AC Transit,6 concerning their respective interactions

with Kelly.7

 According to Johnson, such testimony establishes that Kelly harbors

discriminatory animus toward African-Americans.

When asked at her deposition whether she believed that Kelly was biased against

African-Americans, Williams-Scarlett answered, “Yeah, I did [believe that].” (See WilliamsScarlett Dep. at 30:3-9.)8

 According to Williams-Scarlett, she formed such belief based on

interactions with Kelly that occurred in 1995 or earlier, (see id. at 35:16-18, 40:1-2),9

specifically, that Kelly was “abrupt” when speaking to Williams-Scarlett, (see id. at 26:9-10),

that Kelly would “stand at the door and yell” when talking to Williams-Scarlett, (see id. at

33:20-21), and that Kelly made “belittling” comments about Williams-Scarlett’s work, (see

id. at 34:9-10). Although Johnson argues Williams-Scarlett’s testimony is relevant as to the

issue of whether Kelly harbors a discriminatory animus toward African-Americans

generally,10 any such relevance is greatly outweighed by the fact that the incidents to which

Williams-Scarlett testified are remote in time, occurring almost a decade or more before the

February 2004 termination at issue herein. Further, the probative value of WilliamsScarlett’s testimony is minimal in light of her conclusory language and absence of details in

describing the encounters, and Williams-Scarlett’s acknowledgment that Kelly is ordinarily a

“loud person.” (See id. at 33:21-22.) Additionally, although Williams-Scarlett testified she

had not observed Kelly engaging in similar conduct with “white” employees, WilliamsScarlett conceded she “never really had the time to pay that much attention” to Kelly’s

interactions with other employees, (see id. at 38:21-25).

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11Excerpts from the Njike deposition are Exhibit H to the Trowbridge Declaration filed

September 22, 2005.

9

At his deposition, Njike testified he was of the view that Kelly was racist because she

criticized his work by “yelling and screaming,” and he had not witnessed her behaving in

such manner with “white staff.” (See Njike Dep. at 63:8-12.)11 Njike also concluded, from

witnessing interactions between Kelly and Johnson, that Kelly was racist because of the

“tone” she used when speaking to Johnson. (See id. at 58:20-25.) Njike’s conclusion that

each negative interaction between himself and Kelly and those he witnessed between

Johnson and Kelly was the result of racism on the part of Kelly is, however, undermined by

Njike’s testimony that Kelly was, as a general matter, unpleasant. As Njike described her,

Kelly was a “megalomani[a]c” who “made abuse of the power when she was placed in [AC

Transit],” and who “expected whoever worked for her to kiss her behind.” (See id. at 56:19-

25 (emphasis added).) Indeed, Njike was adamant in his belief that retired persons who

had worked for Kelly as well as persons then-currently working for Kelly would testify in a

similar manner, (see id. at 56:24 - 57:1); there is no suggestion in the record that any such

persons are African-American.

In short, the deposition testimony provided by Williams-Scarlett and by Njike is of no

assistance to Johnson. Neither witness, or, for that matter, Johnson herself, identifies any

conduct or statement that could be characterized as direct evidence of raciallydiscriminatory animus, and the above-referenced circumstantial evidence is insufficient to

establish that requisite motivation.

Having reviewed the record independently, the Court finds Johnson has failed to

rebut the presumption of correctness as to the hearing officer’s finding that Kelly was

motivated by discriminatory animus.

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12Johnson has not challenged the hearing officer’s finding that AC Transit General

Manager Rick Fernandez (“Fernandez”), who made the decision to terminate Johnson, did

not retaliate against Kelly. The Court thus presumes the hearing officer’s finding with

respect to Fernandez is correct and considers only whether Kelly acted with a retaliatory

motive.

13Johnson did not testify in Njike’s lawsuit. The above-referenced comments

constitute the only evidence pertaining to Johnson’s connection to Njike’s lawsuit against

AC Transit.

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D. Retaliation

Before the hearing officer, Johnson argued her termination was the product of

retaliation.12 Specifically, Johnson argued that Kelly retaliated against Johnson for having

requested a medical leave in January 2004, for comments she made with respect to a civil

action instituted by Njike, for filing a worker’s compensation claim, and for filing grievances. 

Before this Court, Johnson does not articulate any basis for rebutting the presumption of

correctness as to the hearing officer’s finding that Johnson failed to show Kelly retaliated

against Johnson based on her request for a medical leave, and, consequently, such finding

is presumed correct. Johnson argues, however, that this Court should find Kelly retaliated

because of the comments Johnson made with respect to Njike’s lawsuit, for filing a worker’s

compensation claim, and for filing grievances.

At the administrative hearing, Johnson testified that when she was asked in 2001 by

counsel for AC Transit to provide a deposition in connection with a lawsuit filed by Njike

against AC Transit, Johnson responded by stating that if she testified, it would not be

favorable to AC Transit. Johnson also testified she told De Stigter, AC Transit’s Human

Resources Director, that she would “rather not be deposed.” (See HON at 24.) The

hearing officer found such comments did not constitute protected activity,13 and, in any

event, that there was no evidence Kelly was aware of the comments. Assuming, arguendo,

the above-referenced comments by Johnson constitute, as Johnson argues, activity

protected by state and/or federal law, Johnson fails to show the hearing officer’s finding that

Kelly was unaware of such comments is contrary to the weight of the evidence. Indeed,

there is no evidence to support a finding that Kelly knew about the comments.

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Johnson filed a claim for worker’s compensation benefits in December 2002, based

on “work related stress.” (See HON Ex. L.) The hearing officer found no “rational” or

“temporal” connection between Johnson’s filing such claim and her termination, which

occurred over a year later. (See Decision at 42.) Although Johnson argues such finding is

against the weight of the evidence, she fails to point to evidence that would support a

finding that a causal link exists between her December 2002 worker’s compensation claim

and the January 2004 termination. See, e.g., Clark County School Dist. v. Breeden, 532

U.S. 268, 273 (2001) (“The cases that accept mere temporal proximity between an

employer’s knowledge of protected activity and an adverse employment action as sufficient

evidence of causality to establish a prima facie case have uniformly held that the temporal

proximity must be very close.”)

Johnson submitted written grievances against Kelly in November 1997, (see HON

Ex. H), in May 1999, (see HON Ex. J), in October 2001, (see HON Ex. K), in September

2003, (see HON Ex. N), and in October 2003 (see HON Ex. O). The hearing officer found

Johnson failed to show her termination was in retaliation for such grievances. Because the

latter two grievances were filed, respectively, three and four months before Johnson’s

termination, an inference of retaliation is fairly drawn. See Nidds v. Schindler Elevator

Corp., 113 F. 3d 912, 919 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding four-month period between protected

activity and adverse employment action sufficient to give rise to inference of casual link). 

AC Transit, however, has come forward with a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for

Johnson’s termination, specifically, that Johnson’s work performance was, as discussed

above, deficient; Johnson, for her part, has failed to show the weight of the evidence

establishes such reason was a pretext for retaliation against Johnson for her having filed

grievances. See id. (holding where plaintiff relies on inference of causal link based on

temporal connection between protected activity and termination, such inference is rebutted

by articulation of legitimate reason for termination, and plaintiff must then offer evidence of

pretext to establish retaliation claim).

Having reviewed the record independently, the Court finds Johnson has failed to

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14Because the same issue as presented in the Second Cause of Action was decided

by the hearing officer, Johnson may only seek relief from a court if she can set aside the

hearing officer’s finding as to that issue. See University of Tennessee v. Elliott, 478 U.S.

788, 799 (1986) (holding federal due process deprivation claims are barred by adverse

finding made by hearing officer, if state law would give preclusive effect to hearing officer’s

decision); Johnson v. City of Loma Linda, 24 Cal. 4th 61, 65 (2000) (holding, under state

law, adverse findings made by hearing officer are “binding in later civil actions” unless set

aside by reviewing court).

12

rebut the presumption of correctness as to the hearing officer’s finding that the termination

was not in retaliation for Johnson’s having engaged in protected activity.

Accordingly, AC Transit is entitled to summary judgment on the remaining claim

alleged in the First Cause of Action, and Johnson is not entitled to a writ of mandamus

setting aside the administrative finding upholding the termination.

II. Second Cause of Action (Due Process Denial)

In her Second Cause of Action, Johnson alleges that AC Transit deprived her of

property, specifically, continued employment with AC Transit, without due process. In her

filings in response to defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Johnson clarifies that the

basis of this claim is that AC Transit did not provide her with a constitutionally adequate

pre-deprivation hearing, and that although the hearing officer, who considered such claim,

agreed with Johnson, the hearing officer erred in finding Johnson was not entitled to an

award of back pay. (See Pl.’s Opp., filed September 22, 2005, at 18; Pl.’s Brief, filed

November 30, 2005, at 9.) In light of Johnson’s clarification, and the manner in which the

parties have briefed the Second Cause of Action, the Court construes the Second Cause of

Action as a petition to set aside the Decision with respect to the remedy provided therein

for the due process deprivation.14

Due process requires that permanent government employees, prior to a termination,

be “given notice of the charges, the reasons therefor, and an opportunity to respond prior to

the imposition of the discipline.” See Barber v. State Personnel Board, 18 Cal. 3d 395,

399-400 (1979). If an employee does not receive the required process until a posttermination proceeding is conducted, and the termination is upheld at that time, the proper

remedy for the pre-termination deprivation is an award of back pay for the period between

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15The Amended Award is Exhibit C to the Trowbridge Declaration filed November 30,

2005.

16Johnson did not state when her physician made such statement to her. Because

Kelly left AC Transit at some prior to March 29, 2004, (see HON at 3), it can be presumed

that such statement, if made, was made before that date.

13

the date of termination and the date the termination was sustained in the post-termination

proceeding. See id. at 403.

Here, the hearing officer found that AC Transit did not afford Johnson a

constitutionally adequate pre-deprivation hearing because AC Transit had failed to provide

“a full and fair opportunity for [Johnson] to have her side heard before the discharge took

effect.” (See Decision at 35.) As a remedy, the hearing officer ordered that Johnson be

retroactively reinstated as an employee, until the date of the Decision, in which, as noted,

he upheld the termination. (See id. at 44.) The hearing officer further found that because

Johnson was “not medically able to work” between the date of the termination and the date

of the Decision, she was only entitled to employee benefits and not to back pay. (See id. at

35-36, 44; see also Amended Award.15)

As noted, Johnson was terminated on February 24, 2004, and the Decision was filed

on August 6, 2004. Consequently, the issue is whether Johnson was able to work during

such period. Johnson argues the hearing officer erred in not accepting her testimony that

she had been advised by a physician, who is not identified in the record, that she could “try”

to return to work if “Kelly [was] not there.”16 (See HON 31.) Johnson’s treating

psychologist, Gary Jenkins, PhD. (“Dr. Jenkins”), completed a series of “Visit Verification

Family Leave” forms in which he stated, without qualification, that Johnson was “unable to

attend work” as of January 20, 2004 and through May 9, 2004. (See HON Ex. A). Having

reviewed the record independently, the Court finds Johnson has failed to overcome the

presumption as to the correctness of the hearing officer’s finding that she was medically

unable to work during the period of February 24, 2004 through May 9, 2004.

As to the period from May 10, 2004 through August 6, 2004, the record does not

reflect any statement from Dr. Jenkins or anyone else that Johnson was unable to work. In

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17The Seventh and Eighth Causes of Action, in addition to alleging discriminatory

termination, also allege failure to accommodate. The failure to accommodation claims are

discussed in section V, infra.

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the last in the series of forms completed by Dr. Jenkins, he estimated that Johnson could

return to work without restrictions beginning May 10, 2004. (See id.) In light of such

evidence, and defendants’ having failed to point to any evidence to the contrary, the Court,

having reviewed the record independently, finds Johnson has overcome the presumption

with respect to the hearing officer’s finding that she was medically unable to work during

the period of May 10, 2004 through August 6, 2004. Consequently, Johnson is entitled to a

writ of mandamus setting aside the Decision to the extent the Decision is based on such

finding, as well as an award of back pay for the period of May 10, 2004 through August 6,

2004.

Accordingly, AC Transit is entitled to summary judgment on the Second Cause of

Action to the extent such cause of action is based on the claim the hearing officer erred in

finding Johnson is not entitled to back pay for the period of February 24, 2004 through May

9, 2004, and Johnson is entitled to a writ of mandamus setting aside the finding that she is

not entitled to back pay for the period of May 10, 2004 through August 6, 2004.

III. Termination Claims (Discrimination)

Johnson alleges that her termination was motivated by discriminatory animus based

on Johnson’s race/color, age, disability, and medical condition; such claims are alleged

against AC Transit in the Third through Eighth Causes of Action. The Third Cause of Action

alleges race/color discrimination in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act

(“FEHA”), the Fourth Cause of Action alleges race/color discrimination in violation of Title

VII, the Fifth Cause of Action alleges age discrimination in violation of FEHA, the Sixth

Cause of Action alleges age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in

Employment Act, the Seventh Cause of Action alleges disability/medical condition

discrimination in violation of FEHA, and the Eighth Cause of Action alleges disability

discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act.17

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Johnson does not argue she can establish any of the above-referenced

discrimination claims by direct evidence of a discriminatory motive. Rather, Johnson relies

on the burden-shifting approach set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.

792 (1973), whereby the plaintiff first must establish a prima facie case; if the plaintiff does

so, the defendant must proffer a legitimate reason for the termination; and if the defendant

does so, the plaintiff is required to show that the defendant’s proffered reason is pretextual. 

See, e.g., Cornwell v. Electra Central Credit Union, 439 F. 3d 1018, 1028 (9th Cir. 2006)

(citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802). To establish a prima facie case, Johnson

must offer evidence that she is a member of a protected class, she was performing her job

adequately, she was subject to an adverse employment action, and she was treated

differently than similarly situated employees who are not members of the protected class. 

See id. at 1031.

AC Transit argues that Johnson, as a result of the Decision, is unable to establish a

prima facie case; specifically, AC Transit argues, Johnson cannot establish she was

adequately performing her job.

Under state law, a plaintiff in a later civil action is barred by adverse findings made in

an administrative hearing, unless those findings are set aside by a reviewing court. See

Johnson, 24 Cal. 4th at 65-66, 71 (holding, where plaintiff failed to timely seek review of

administrative finding that he was laid off for economic rather than discriminatory reasons,

plaintiff’s FEHA claim was barred by such administrative finding). Under federal law, a

plaintiff in an action alleging federal discrimination claims is barred by adverse

administrative findings, provided a reviewing court has upheld such findings. See Kremer

v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 480, 485 (1982) (holding where state court

upheld administrative finding that defendant had not discriminated against plaintiff, plaintiff

was bound by such finding in subsequent Title VII proceeding).

Here, as discussed above, the hearing officer found Johnson’s work performance

was not adequate, and, on independent review, such finding has been upheld by this Court. 

Consequently, Johnson cannot establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination

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under the McDonnell Douglas framework.

Johnson argues she nonetheless can establish a discriminatory termination claim

under a “mixed-motive” theory. Under a mixed-motive theory, an employer may be held

liable for an adverse employment action “even if it had a legitimate reason for its

employment decision, as long as an illegitimate reason was a motivating factor in the

decision.” See Dominguez-Curry v. Nevada Transportation Dep’t, 424 F. 3d 1027, 1040

(9th Cir. 2005). In such cases, however, where, as here, a plaintiff seeks to establish

discrimination under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie

case, see id. at 1037, which, as discussed above, includes a showing that the plaintiff was

adequately performing his/her job. As further discussed above, Johnson cannot establish

she was adequately performing her job.

Accordingly, AC Transit is entitled to summary judgment as to the Third through

Sixth Causes of Action, in their entirety, and as to the Seventh and Eighth Causes of

Action, to the extent such causes of action are based on a claim of discriminatory

termination.

IV. Termination Claims (Retaliation)

Johnson alleges the termination was in retaliation for Johnson’s having engaged in

protected activity; such claims are alleged against both AC Transit and Kelly. Specifically,

the Ninth Cause of Action alleges retaliation in violation of both FEHA and Title VII, on

account of Johnson’s having offered to assist Njike in his civil lawsuit against AC Transit

and Johnson’s having filed internal and external grievances, and the Eleventh Cause of

Action alleges retaliation in violation of the California Family Rights Act (“CFRA”) and the

federal Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), on account of Johnson’s having taken

medical leave starting January 20, 2004.

Johnson does not argue she can establish a retaliation claim with direct evidence of

such motivation. Rather, Johnson again relies on a McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting

approach, which requires that she initially establish a prima facie case. Under both federal

and state law, a prima facie case of retaliation requires, inter alia, evidence of a “causal

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18Although, as noted, the findings made by the hearing officer, to the extent not set

aside herein, are binding on Johnson, defendants have not argued such findings bar

Johnson’s non-termination claims.

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link” between the protected activity and the termination. See Bergene v. Salt River Project

Agricultural Improvement and Power Dist., 272 F. 3d 1136, 1140-41 (9th Cir. 2001)

(discussing elements of Title VII retaliation claim); Yanowitz v. L'Oreal USA, Inc., 36 Cal.

4th 1028, 1042 (2005) (discussing elements of FEHA retaliation claim); see also Dudley v.

Dep’t of Transportation, 90 Cal. App. 4th 255, 261 (2001) (holding prima facie case under

both CFRA and FMLA requires showing of causal link between exercise of right to take

leave and adverse employment action).

Here, as discussed above, the hearing officer found Johnson had failed to show a

causal link existed between the claimed protected activities and the termination, and, on

independent review, such finding has been upheld by this Court. Consequently, Johnson

cannot establish a prima facie case of retaliation. See Johnson, 24 Cal. 4th at 65-66;

Kremer, 456 U.S. at 480.

Accordingly, defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the Ninth and

Eleventh Causes of Action.

V. Failure to Accommodate/Failure to Engage In Interactive Process Claims

As part of her Seventh Cause of Action, Johnson alleges that AC Transit failed, in

violation of FEHA, to accommodate her and failed to engage in an interactive process with

respect to her disabilities and medical conditions during the period of her employment;

Johnson also alleges, as part of her Eighth Cause of Action, that AC Transit failed, in

violation of the ADA, to accommodate her and failed to engage in an interactive process

with respect to her disabilities during that period.18 Johnson has identified the alleged

“medical and mental conditions/disabilities” as “job stress,” “cancer,” and “an adjustment

disorder, with anxiety and depression.” (See Johnson Decl., filed September 22, 2005,

¶ 2.)

//

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A. Disability

Defendants argue that Johnson, for several reasons, is unable to establish a failure

to accommodate and/or failure to engage in an interactive process claim based on a

disability. At the outset defendants assert that Johnson is not disabled. An individual is

“disabled” for purposes of FEHA if, inter alia, she has a “mental . . . condition” that “limits a

major life activity.” See Cal. Gov’t Code § 12926(i). An individual is “disabled” for purposes

of the ADA if, inter alia, she has a “mental impairment” that “substantially limits” one or

more “major life activities.” See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). Major life activities include

“functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing,

speaking, breathing, learning, and working.” See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(I).

Johnson fails to expressly identify in her complaint, in her declarations or in any of

her briefs, the major life activity or activities she asserts are limited as a result of any

mental impairment, and no such activity is apparent from the record. The only major life

activity to which Johnson even alludes is the major life activity of working. In that respect,

however, Johnson discusses only her difficulties in working under Kelly’s supervision, not

working in general, or even working at the job of an executive administrative assistant for

AC Transit. Each accommodation Johnson sought and did not receive concerns her

supervision by Kelly. (See Johnson Decl., filed September 22, 2005, ¶ 16 (stating she

wanted a “transfer to a different supervisor, an audit of [Johnson’s] job, [or] counseling of

Ms. Kelly”); see id. ¶ 28 (stating she was not offered a “comparable position for AC Transit

which did not report through Ms. Kelly”); see HON at 41 (noting Johnson’s testimony that

she could perform as an executive administrative assistant “for anyone other than Kelly”).)

Under state law, a plaintiff can demonstrate she is limited in the major life activity of

working if the limitation pertains to “a particular employment.” See Cal. Gov’t Code

§ 12926.1(c). Given Johnson’s testimony that she could work for AC Transit in the

particular job of an executive administrative assistant, so long as she was assigned to a

different supervisor, Johnson cannot, under state law, establish a triable issue as to

whether she is limited in the major life activity of working. Further, Johnson cannot

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establish a triable issue as to the more stringent requirement, under federal law, that to be

substantially limited in the major life activity of “working,” she must be unable to perform a

“broad class of jobs.” See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 491-92 (1999)

(holding that, assuming, arguendo, “working” constitutes major life activity for purposes of

ADA, plaintiff is substantially limited in such activity if plaintiff is unable to perform “broad

class of jobs”).

Accordingly, AC Transit is entitled to summary judgment on the Seventh and Eighth

Causes of Action, to the extent such causes of action are based on a claim of failure to

accommodate and/or failure to engage in an interactive process with respect to disabilities.

B. Medical Condition

Under FEHA, an employer is required to engage in an “interactive process” with an

employee “to determine effective accommodation, if any, in response to a request for

reasonable accommodation by an employee . . . with a . . . known medical condition.” See

Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(n). A “medical condition” is defined as a “health impairment

related to or associated with a diagnosis of cancer or a record or history of cancer” or

certain “genetic characteristics.” See Cal. Gov’t Code § 12926(h). There being no

evidence or argument that Johnson’s asserted mental impairments are “genetic

characteristics,” the sole “medical condition” at issue herein is Johnson’s diagnosis of

cancer.

Johnson has offered evidence that after she returned to work following surgery

pertaining to cancer, Kelly refused Johnson’s request to park in a spot closer to the office,

(see Johnson Decl., filed September 22, 2005, ¶ 26), and that Kelly, over Johnson’s

objection, required that Johnson perform extra tasks, (see id. ¶¶ 22-23). In their motion for

summary judgment, defendants fail to set forth any argument as to why Johnson is unable

to establish a claim based on a theory that defendants failed to engage in an interactive

process concerning Johnson’s requests for a closer parking space and that she not be

assigned additional tasks; the sole argument defendants make with respect to Johnson’s

claims based on her medical condition is that Johnson cannot establish she was subject to

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a termination because of that condition. A failure to engage in an interactive process to

determine whether to accommodate a medical condition, however, is distinct from a claim

that a later termination occurred because of discriminatory animus based on that medical

condition. Compare Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(a) (termination) with Cal. Gov’t Code

§ 12940(n) (failure to engage in interactive process to determine if requested

accommodation necessary).

Accordingly, AC Transit is not entitled to summary judgment on the Seventh Cause

of Action to the extent such cause of action is based on a claim that AC Transit failed to

engage in an interaction process to determine whether to accommodate Johnson’s

requests pertaining to her diagnosis of cancer.

VI. Hostile Work Environment Claim

In her Tenth Cause of Action, Johnson alleges that Kelly subjected Johnson to a

hostile work environment on account of Johnson’s “race/color, age, medical condition

and/or disability and/or mental condition and/or disability.” (See Compl. ¶ 106.)

“When the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and

insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s

employment and create an abusive working environment, Title VII is violated.” Harris v.

Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (internal quotations and citations omitted);

see also Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospital, 214 Cal. App. 3d 590, 609 (1989)

(holding Title VII standard for hostile work environment claim applicable to hostile work

environment claim under FEHA). Whether an environment is “sufficiently hostile or

abusive” is determined by “looking at all the circumstances, including the frequency of the

discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a

mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work

performance.” See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787-88 (1998) (internal

quotations and citation omitted).

Defendants argue Johnson cannot establish she was subject to severe or pervasive

conduct on account of her membership in a protected class.

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19The Njike Declaration is Exhibit C to the Trowbridge Declaration filed September

22, 2005.

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At the outset, the Court finds defendants are entitled to summary judgment to the 

extent Johnson claims a hostile work environment based on disability; as discussed above,

Johnson fails to offer sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether she is

disabled.

To the extent Johnson claims a hostile work environment based on her race, age,

and cancer diagnosis, she relies on the following conduct:

On virtually a daily basis, Ms. Kelly would interrupt me, yell at me, make false

accusations that I had personally made mistakes or was responsible for

something that someone else had done, talk down to me, condescend to me,

belittle me, treat me as though I were an inferior person to others in the

department, and talk to me as a person would talk to a young child.

(See Johnson Decl., filed September 22, 2005, ¶ 8; see also id. ¶ 14 (stating Kelly

“badgered [her] incessantly, constantly yelled at and interrupted [her], continued to make

false accusations against [her], and treated [her] as a person would treat a child”).) In

addition to the testimony discussed above, Johnson’s former co-worker Njike testified that

“Kelly treated [Johnson] like a child, constantly belittled her in public, and had her run

menial errands, i.e., getting things for her out of her car, getting her drinks, etc,” (see Njike

Decl. ¶ 7);19 when asked what he witnessed Kelly do that he believed was “out of line,” he

answered, “[a] couple of times body language, the way she spoke to her, the kind of orders

she gave her, which is the kind of orders one wouldn’t give to a co-worker,” (see Njike Dep.

at 55:19-24; see also id. at 56:2-8 (stating that by “body language,” he meant “like walking

past her, her eye contact, the cold shoulder”)).

To create a triable issue, evidence offered to support a claim of a hostile work

environment must be sufficiently detailed; conclusory assertions that the plaintiff was

harassed are insufficient. See Holly D. v. California Institute of Technology, 339 F. 3d

1158, 1174 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding, to create triable issue warranting trial on sexual

harassment claim, even where supervisor-employee sexual relations occur, courts “require

more than conclusory allegations that the supervisor proposed a sexual liaison and the

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employee responded to the overtures in order to protect her employment interests”); cf.

McGinest v. GTE Service Corp., 360 F. 3d 1103, 1113 n. 5 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding where

plaintiff “provided detailed deposition testimony describing his personal observations” of

racial harassment, such testimony “did not consist of mere ‘conclusory allegations’ which

would be insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment”). Here, the description of

Kelly’s conduct provided by Johnson and Njike is lacking in sufficient detail to create a

triable issue of fact. For this reason alone, AC Transit and Kelly are entitled to summary

judgment on the Tenth Cause of Action.

In any event, none of the conduct on which Johnson relies is described as involving

any type of insult, epithet, comment, or joke directed at Johnson’s race, age, or cancer

diagnosis. Rather, the asserted conduct essentially involves criticism of Johnson’s work

performance. Even if a trier of fact might reasonably find that Kelly engaged in uncivil and

ill-mannered behavior toward Johnson when criticizing Johnson’s work performance,

“discourtesy or rudeness should not be confused with racial harassment,” see Faragher,

524 U.S. at 787 (internal quotation and citation omitted), or with harassment on account of

age or a cancer diagnosis, see id. at 787-88 (holding “standards for judging hostility are

sufficiently demanding to ensure that Title VII does not become a ‘general civility code’”). 

Rather, to be actionable, harassing conduct must be shown to have been engaged in

because of the plaintiff’s membership in a protected class. See, e.g., Kang v. U. Lim

America, Inc., 296 F.3d 810, 817 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding Korean plaintiff offered sufficient

evidence to raise triable issue of fact as to claim of national origin harassment where

supervisor verbally abused plaintiff, routinely calling him names such as “stupid,” “cripple,”

“jerk,” “son-of-a-bitch,” and “asshole”; physically abused plaintiff by, inter alia, throwing

office equipment and supplies at him; and repeatedly told plaintiff Koreans were required to

work harder than persons of other origins).

Here, Johnson fails to even articulate a theory as to why Kelly’s assertedly harsh

behavior occurred because of Johnson’s age or Johnson’s cancer diagnosis, let alone point

to any evidence to support such a finding. Consequently, for this additional reason,

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Johnson fails to raise a triable issue of fact as to the existence of a hostile work

environment on account of her age or cancer diagnosis.

With respect to her claim of racial harassment, Johnson relies on her testimony and

that of Njike, both of whom state they did not witness Kelly directing toward persons who

were not African-American the type of harsh criticism Kelly assertedly directed at Johnson. 

(See Johnson Decl., filed September 22, 2005, ¶ 8; Njike Decl. ¶ 7.) Johnson also relies

on the testimony of Njike and Williams-Scarlett, discussed above, with respect to Kelly’s

criticism of their own work. (See Njike Dep. at 61:12 - 62:17; Williams-Scarlett Dep. at

26:9-10, 33:20-21, 34:9-10). In each instance, the description of Kelly’s conduct concerns

Kelly’s dissatisfaction with work performance. There is no evidence of any insult, epithet,

comment, joke, or remark directed at Johnson’s, Njike’s, or Williams-Scarlett’s race. Under

such circumstances, Johnson appears to be proceeding on a disparate treatment theory of

hostile work environment, specifically, that Kelly engaged in a practice of uncivilly and

harshly criticizing work performed by African-Americans but not others.

Assuming such a theory is cognizable, Johnson has failed to show other employees

outside her protected class were treated differently under similar circumstances. Indeed,

as noted, those circumstances have not been described in other than conclusory terms.20

Further, one of the temporary workers who performed Johnson’s job during Johnson’s

medical leave was African-American. (See HON 11, 13.) There is no evidence Kelly

treated that worker, whose work Kelly found satisfactory, in a manner similar to the way

Johnson asserts Kelly treated Johnson, indicating the motivation for Kelly’s behavior was

not Johnson’s race. Consequently, even if the conclusory description of Kelly’s conduct

could be considered sufficient, Johnson’s claim fails for this additional reason.

Accordingly, defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the Tenth Cause of

Action.

//

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VII. Supplemental Jurisdiction

The Court’s jurisdiction over the instant action is based on the existence of a federal

question. (See Notice of Removal, filed November 16, 2004, ¶ 2.) As a result of the

Court’s findings as set forth above, the only remaining claim is the Seventh Cause of Action

to the extent that cause of action is based on Johnson’s claim that AC Transit failed to

engage in an interactive process to determine if it should accommodate Johnson’s medical

condition, in violation of § 12940(n). The Court’s jurisdiction over such remaining state law

claim is supplemental in nature. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction where “the district

court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367(c)(3). Where a district court has granted summary judgment on each federal claim

in an action, the district court, pursuant to § 1367(c)(3), may properly decline to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over any remaining state law claims. See Bryant v. Adventist

Health System/West, 289 F. 3d 1162, 1169 (9th Cir. 2002). 

The Court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claim

in the Seventh Cause of Action.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, defendants’ motion for summary judgment is

hereby GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, Johnson’s petition for a writ of mandamus is

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, and the complaint is REMANDED in part, as

follows:

1. AC Transit is entitled to summary judgment on the First Cause of Action and

Johnson is not entitled to a writ of mandamus as to the First Cause of Action.

2. To the extent Johnson asserts the hearing officer erred in finding Johnson is not

entitled to back pay for the period of February 24, 2004 through May 9, 2004, AC Transit is

entitled to summary judgment on the Second Cause of Action and Johnson is not entitled to

a writ of mandamus as to the Second Cause of Action.

3. To the extent Johnson asserts the hearing officer erred in finding Johnson is not

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entitled to back pay for the period of May 10, 2004 through August 6, 2004, AC Transit is

not entitled to summary judgment on the Second Cause of Action and Johnson is entitled to

a writ of mandamus as to the Second Cause of Action. Specifically, the Court hereby

GRANTS a writ of mandamus setting aside the Decision to the extent it does not award

Johnson back pay for the period of May 10, 2004 through August 6, 2004.

4. AC Transit is entitled to summary judgment on the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and

Eighth Causes of Action.

5. AC Transit is entitled to summary judgment on the Seventh Cause of Action to

the extent such cause of action is based on claims of discriminatory termination and failure

to accommodate and engage in an interactive process with respect to disabilities; AC

Transit is not entitled to summary judgment on the Seventh Cause of Action to the extent

such cause of action is based on a claim of failure to engage in an interactive process with

respect to Johnson’s medical condition.

6. AC Transit and Kelly are entitled to summary judgment on the Ninth, Tenth, and

Eleventh Causes of Action.

7. The remaining claim in the Seventh Cause of Action is hereby REMANDED to

the Superior Court of California, in and for the County of Alameda.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 8, 2006 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

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