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Nature of Suit Code: 890
Nature of Suit: Other Statutory Actions
Cause of Action: 

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 10, 2001 Decided June 15, 2001

No. 00-5061

Edward D. Smoke, et al.,

Appellant

v.

Gale A. Norton, Secretary of the Interior, et al.,

Alma Ransom, et al.,

Appellees

Consolidated with

00-5062

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 98cv01422)

Michael Rhodes-Devey argued the cause and filed the

briefs for appellants. Phillip H. Tarbell, appearing pro se,

entered an appearance.

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Peter B. Work argued the cause for appellees. With him

on the brief was Bradley S. Waterman.

Before: Ginsburg and Henderson, Circuit Judges, and

Silberman, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Ginsburg.

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge Henderson.

Ginsburg, Circuit Judge: The appellants moved to intervene in this case after the district court granted summary

judgment against the Government -- which had represented

their interests in the proceedings below -- and the Government indicated it might not appeal. The district court denied

the appellants' motion as untimely. We reverse. The appellants had no occasion to intervene in order to protect their

interests until after the judgment was entered. Hence, their

motion was timely when made.

I. Background

The appellants in this case claim to be officers of the Saint

Regis Mohawk Tribal Government under a constitution they

allege was adopted in 1995 to replace the Tribe's traditional

Three Chief System of government. The appellees, who

claim office pursuant to the Three Chief System, sought

review under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.

s 551 et seq., of decisions of the Bureau of Indian Affairs

(BIA) recognizing the new constitution as having been validly

adopted by the Tribe, and of the Interior Board of Indian

Affairs (IBIA) affirming that determination. In Ransom v.

Babbitt, 69 F. Supp. 2d 141 (1999), the district court recounts

the history of the dispute that arose over which government

and which slate of electors -- those of the 1995 Constitution

or those of the Three Chief System -- were entitled to

recognition. Ultimately, the court granted summary judgment for the appellees on the ground that the agencies'

recognition of the 1995 Constitution was arbitrary, capricious,

and contrary to law. See id. at 155.

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As long as the United States was resolved to defend the

decisions of the BIA and the IBIA in the district court, the

appellants did not seek to intervene. After the district court

granted summary judgment for the appellees, however, and

before the Government decided not to appeal, the appellants

moved to intervene "in order to ensure that the appeal from

th[at] court's decision take place."

The district court, noting that the appellants did not specify

what type of intervention -- as of right, or permissive -- they

sought, observed that a motion for either type of intervention

must be "timely." Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a) & (b). The court then

denied the appellants' motion as untimely because, "[h]aving

foregone an opportunity to pursue intervention during the

pendency of the action, the proposed intervenors now seek to

inject additional arguments and materials into a very narrow

review of agency action that had already proceeded to the

next stage." The appellants here seek reversal of the district

court's order denying their motion to intervene so they may

appeal from the underlying judgment.

II. Analysis

The district court did not expressly decide whether the

appellants' motion sought intervention as of right under Rule

24(a) or by permission under Rule 24(b). The court did,

however, correctly enumerate the "four requirements for

intervention [as of right] under Rule 24(a)(2): (1) timeliness;

(2) a cognizable interest; (3) impairment of that interest; and

(4) lack of adequate representation by existing parties." See,

e.g., Williams & Humbert, Ltd. v. W. & H. Trade Marks,

Ltd., 840 F.2d 72, 74 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Because the appellants' motion to intervene and the affidavits filed in support of

that motion focus upon the lack of adequate representation of

their interests -- a defining feature of intervention as of

right -- we consider the motion to have been made under

Rule 24(a). Compare Rule 24(a)(2) with 24(b)(2).

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The settled rule is that the "[d]enial of intervention as of

right is an appealable final order" because it is conclusive

with respect to the distinct interest asserted by the movant.

See Railroad Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 331

U.S. 519, 524 (1947) ("since [a would-be intervenor as of right]

cannot appeal from any subsequent order or judgment in the

proceeding unless he does intervene, the order denying intervention has the degree of definitiveness which supports an

appeal therefrom").* We review the district court's denial of

a motion to intervene as of right for clear error. See Foster

v. Gueory, 655 F.2d 1319, 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The district

court has much latitude in assessing the timeliness of a

motion, but it must properly take account of the considerations relevant to that determination. In particular,

timeliness is to be judged in consideration of all the

circumstances, especially weighing the factors of time

elapsed since the inception of the suit, the purpose for

which intervention is sought, the need for intervention as

a means of preserving the applicant's rights, and the

probability of prejudice to those already parties in the

case.

United States v. AT&T, 642 F.2d 1285, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 1980).

Here the appellants claim that in moving to intervene they

were prompted by the post-judgment prospect that the Government might not appeal. Prior to the entry of judgment,

the appellants say, they had no reason to intervene; their

interests were fully consonant with those of the Government,

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* Although we initially directed the parties to brief the question

whether the summary judgment entered in this case is itself an

appealable, final order (and the appellees argue it is not because it

remands the case to the BIA for further proceedings requiring the

exercise of discretion), we conclude that the answer to that question

does not bear upon the narrow issue before us, namely, the timeliness of the appellants' motion to intervene. Whether the underlying judgment of the district court is final and, if final, is correct are

questions that will not be before us unless the district court grants

the appellants' motion to intervene and they appeal from the

judgment.

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and those interests were adequately represented by the Government's litigation of the case. We agree. In these circumstances a post-judgment motion to intervene in order to

prosecute an appeal is timely (if filed within the time period

for appeal) because "the potential inadequacy of representation came into existence only at the appellate stage." Dimond v. District of Columbia, 792 F.2d 179, 193 (D.C. Cir.

1986); see United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385,

395-96 (1977).

The appellees do not convincingly defend the district

court's ruling that the appellants' motion was untimely. They

argue only that, because the Government "effectively conceded the factual premises underlying Plaintiffs' motion for

summary judgment," the Government's representation of the

appellants' interests was manifestly inadequate at an earlier

point in the litigation. That the facts of this case were not in

dispute is irrelevant, however; the case involved review of an

administrative record the facts of which were settled before

the agency. We have no reason to doubt the adequacy of the

Government's commitment to resisting the appellees' motion

for summary judgment. The Government's representation of

the appellants' interests became potentially inadequate only

when it equivocated about whether it would appeal the adverse ruling of the district court.

Although the district court perceived the appellants as

"seek[ing] to inject additional arguments and materials into a

very narrow review of agency action that had already proceeded to the next stage," the legally relevant purpose of

their motion was simply to enable them to prosecute an

appeal. Policing the limits upon what the appellants may

argue on appeal is properly left to this court.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the district court

erred in denying the appellants' motion to intervene as untimely. Accordingly, we remand this case to the district

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court for it to address in the first instance the other requirements for intervention as of right.

Reversed and remanded.

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Karen LeCraft Henderson, Circuit Judge, concurring:

I join the court's opinion because I agree that the district

court incorrectly denied the appellants' motion to intervene

on the ground of untimeliness. I write separately, however,

to express my view that the district court will no doubt reach

the same result on remand and I therefore question the

"judicial efficiency" of remanding.

The court correctly sets forth the "four requirements for

intervention [as of right] under Rule 24(a)(2): (1) timeliness;

(2) a cognizable interest; (3) impairment of that interest; and

(4) lack of adequate representation by existing parties." See

Majority Opinion at 3 (citing Williams & Humbert, Ltd. & W.

& H. Trade Marks, Ltd., 840 F.2d 72, 74 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).

The court also correctly concludes that under our precedent

the appellants' motion was timely. That conclusion does not

by itself, however, necessitate a different result on remand

because failure to satisfy any of the remaining three requirements is a sufficient ground for denying intervention. See

SEC v. Prudential Sec. Inc., 136 F.3d 153, 156 (D.C. Cir.

1998).

The appellants tell us their sole goal in seeking intervention

is "to ensure that the appeal from [the district court's]

decision take place." Plaintiffs'-Appellees' Appendix 276.

They also insist that the government's decision not to pursue

an appeal amply demonstrates their lack of adequate representation in this proceeding. I am not persuaded. In assessing whether a proposed intervenor's interest is adequately

represented by an existing party, a court must consider

whether the proposed intervenor itself has a right to pursue

whatever it claims it is inadequately represented in pursuing.

If no such right exists, it cannot seriously be maintained that

the proposed intervenor lacks adequate representation. In

this case, I believe an evaluation of the adequacy of representation issue turns on whether the appellants could have

pursued an appeal from the district court order had they been

parties to the district court proceeding. If so, a court could

conclude they lack adequate representation because the government's decision not to pursue an appeal deprives them of

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recourse to which they would otherwise be entitled. If not,

however, the government's decision not to appeal has no

impact on the adequacy of representation of the appellants

inasmuch as they are left no worse off than if they had in fact

been parties to the litigation all along.

The dispositive question then becomes whether the appellants could have taken an appeal from the district court order

had they been parties before the district court ruled. In my

view, they could not have done so. "The jurisdiction of the

courts of appeals to review district court actions is limited to

'final orders.' " Pueblo of Sandia v. Babbitt, 231 F.3d 878,

880 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting 28 U.S.C. s 1291). Section 1291

entitles a party to appeal "from a district court decision that

ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing more for

the court to do but execute the judgment." Id. (citations and

internal quotation marks omitted). However, " '[i]t is well

settled that, as a general rule, a district court order remanding a case to an agency for significant further proceedings is

not final,' " id. (quoting In re St. Charles Preservation Investors, Ltd., 916 F.2d 727, 729 (D.C. Cir. 1990); citing American

Hawaii Cruises v. Skinner, 893 F.2d 1400, 1403 (D.C. Cir.

1990)), unless the remand to the agency is for solely "ministerial" action. See id. at 881. In my view, the district court's

order here was not merely "ministerial" but rather left "significant further proceedings" for the agency. And the appellants have no right to appeal a non-final order.1 Accordingly,

even if they get no representation in seeking to appeal the

district court's remand order, they cannot claim"inadequate"

representation to take action they themselves could not take.

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1 The agency's right to appeal such an order is based on the fact

that if it were limited to an appeal only after remand proceedings, it

would lose the opportunity to appeal in the event the decision to

remand was in error. See, e.g., County of Los Angeles v. Shalala,

192 F.3d 1005, 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citing Occidental Petroleum

Corp. v. SEC, 873 F.2d 325, 330 (D.C. Cir. 1989)), cert. denied, 530

U.S. 1204 (2000). But the appellants do not succeed to the agency's

right to appeal which is unique to itself.

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