Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-56445/USCOURTS-ca9-13-56445-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 

---

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

VIVID ENTERTAINMENT, LLC;

CALIFA PRODUCTIONS, INC.;

KAYDEN KROSS; and LOGAN PIERCE,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

JONATHAN FIELDING, Director of

Los Angeles County Department of

Public Health; JACKIE LACEY, Los

Angeles County District Attorney;

and COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,

Defendants-Appellees,

and

MICHAEL WEINSTEIN; ARLETTE DE

LA CRUZ; WHITNEY ENGERAN;

MARK MCGRATH; MARIJANE

JACKSON; and THE CAMPAIGN

COMMITTEE YES ON MEASURE B,

Intervenors/Defendants-Appellees.

No. 13-56445

D.C. No.

2:13-cv-00190-

DDP-AGR

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Dean D. Pregerson, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

March 3, 2014—Pasadena, California

 Case: 13-56445, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348589, DktEntry: 57-1, Page 1 of 40
2 VIVID ENTERTAINMENT V. FIELDING

Filed December 15, 2014

Before: Alex Kozinski and Susan P. Graber, Circuit

Judges, and Jack Zouhary,

*

 District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Graber

SUMMARY**

Civil Rights

The panel affirmed the district court’s order denying, in

part, plaintiffs’ motion to enjoin the voter-initiated County of

Los Angeles Safer Sex in the Adult Film Industry Act

(commonly known as Measure B), which imposes a

permitting system and additional production obligations on

the makers of adult films, including a requirement that

performers wear condoms in certain contexts.

Plaintiffs alleged that Measure B’s permitting scheme and

its condom requirement operate as prior restraints on

plaintiffs’ ability to create expression, in the form of adult

films, which is protected by the First Amendment. In

granting partial preliminaryinjunctive relief, the district court

severed one chapter of Measure B in its entirety and severed

* The Honorable Jack Zouhary, United States District Judge for the

Northern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

 Case: 13-56445, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348589, DktEntry: 57-1, Page 2 of 40
VIVID ENTERTAINMENT V. FIELDING 3

portions of three other chapters. Plaintiffs appealed the

district court’s decision not to enjoin Measure B in full.

The panel held that it had jurisdiction over the appeal

whether or not the intervenors-defendants demonstrated

Article III standing because plaintiffs had standing, and they

alone invoked the federal court’s jurisdiction. 

The panel held that the district court did not abuse its

discretion in holding that the invalid portions of Measure B

(allowing for modification, suspension, and revocation of

permits; authorizing administrative searches; and allowing

discretion in setting fees) were severable. 

The panel held that the district court did not abuse its

discretion in declining to enjoin the enforcement of Measure

B’s condom mandate. The panel concluded that the condom

mandate survived intermediate scrutiny because it was only

a de minimis effect on expression, was narrowly tailored to

achieve the substantial governmental interest of reducing the

rate of sexually transmitted infections, and left open adequate

alternative means of expression.

The panel further held that Measure B’s requirements that

adult film producers complete training about blood-borne

pathogens and post a permit during shooting served the

County’s interest in preventing sexually transmitted

infections. 

 Case: 13-56445, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348589, DktEntry: 57-1, Page 3 of 40
4 VIVID ENTERTAINMENT V. FIELDING

COUNSEL

Robert Corn-Revere (argued) and Ronald G. London, Davis

Wright Tremaine, LLP, Washington, D.C.; Janet L. Grumer

and Matthew D. Peterson, Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, Los

Angeles, California; Paul J. Cambria, Lipsitz Green Scime

Cambria LLP, Buffalo, New York; and H. Louis Sirkin,

Santen & Hughes LPA, Cincinnati, Ohio, for PlaintiffsAppellants.

Thomas R. Freeman (argued) and Mitchell A. Kamin,

Bird, Marella, Boxer, Wolpert, Nessim, Drooks & Licenberg,

P.C., Los Angeles, California; and Tom Myers, Laura

Boudreau, Samantha R. Azulay, and Christina Yang, AIDS

Healthcare Foundation, Los Angeles, California, for

Intervenors/Defendants-Appellees.

No appearance for Defendants-Appellees.

OPINION

GRABER, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiffs Vivid Entertainment, LLC; Califa Productions,

Inc.; Kayden Kross; and Logan Pierce are organizations and

individuals who make adult films in Los Angeles County. 

The Los Angeles CountyDepartment of Public Health, whose

director is a defendant here, sent Plaintiffs a letter stating its

intention to enforce the voter-initiated County of Los Angeles

Safer Sex in the Adult Film Industry Act (2012) (commonly

known as Measure B) (codified at Los Angeles County, Cal.,

Code tit. 11, div. 1, ch. 11.39, and amending tit. 22, div. 1, ch.

22.56.1925). Measure B imposes a permitting system and

 Case: 13-56445, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348589, DktEntry: 57-1, Page 4 of 40
VIVID ENTERTAINMENT V. FIELDING 5

additional production obligations on the makers of adult

films, including a requirement that performers wear condoms

in certain contexts. Plaintiffs sued for declaratory and

injunctive relief, arguing that Measure B burdens their

freedom of expression in violation of the First Amendment. 

Defendant Los Angeles County answered that, although it

would enforce the ordinance unless ordered by a court not to,

it did not intend to defend Measure B because it took a

“position of neutrality” with respect to the ordinance’s

constitutionality. The official proponents of Measure B

intervened to defend it.

The district court issued a preliminary injunction

forbidding Defendants from enforcing Measure B’s feesetting provision, which gave Defendants discretion to set

fees for permits; a provision that allowed warrantless

searches by county health officers of any location suspected

of producing adult films; and the broad permit modification,

suspension, and revocation process. The court denied

preliminary injunctive relief, though, for much of the

ordinance, including its condom and permitting requirements. 

Plaintiffs appeal the district court’s decision not to enjoin

Measure B in full.1 We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The citizens of Los Angeles County enacted Measure B

in November 2012 by means of the initiative process; it

became law on December 14, 2012. The text of the

ordinance declared that it was passed in response to

documentation by the Los Angeles County Department of

Public Health of the widespread transmission of sexually

 

1

 No one challenges the partial grant of preliminary injunctive relief.

 Case: 13-56445, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348589, DktEntry: 57-1, Page 5 of 40
6 VIVID ENTERTAINMENT V. FIELDING

transmitted infections among workers in the adult film

industry. Under Measure B, producers of adult films2 must

obtain a newly designated “public health permit” before

shooting an adult film in Los Angeles County.

Under Measure B as enacted, to obtain such a permit,

producers of adult films must pay a fee, provide the

Department with proof that certain employees have

completed a county-approved training program concerning

blood-borne pathogens, displaythe permit while filming, post

a notice at the film site that the use of condoms is required,

report to the Department any changes in the permitted

business, and comply with all applicable laws, including title

8, section 5193 of the California Code of Regulations. 

Measure B 11.39.080, .090, .100, .110. Section 5193

mandates barrier protection for all employees who are

exposed to blood-borne pathogens, which Measure B

interprets to require condoms for performers who engage in

vaginal or anal intercourse. Id. 11.39.090. Measure B also

provides that a public health permit may be suspended or

revoked, and fines or criminal penalties imposed, for failure

to comply with all permitting requirements. Id. 11.39.110. 

A producer who faces modification,suspension, or revocation

of a permit may apply for an undefined form of

“administrative review.” Id. 11.39.110(C).

In addition to providing for monetary and criminal

penalties, Measure B allows enforcement of the permitting

requirements through a surprise inspection by a Los Angeles

2 Measure B defines “producer of adult film” as “any person or entity

that produces, finances, or directs, adult films for commercial purposes.” 

Measure B, § 4, pt. 11.39.075 (all citations herein are to parts of section

4 unless otherwise noted).

 Case: 13-56445, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348589, DktEntry: 57-1, Page 6 of 40
VIVID ENTERTAINMENT V. FIELDING 7

County health officer at “any location suspected of

conducting any activity regulated by this chapter.” Id.

11.39.130. “[F]or purposes of enforcing this chapter,” the

health officer “may issue notices and impose fines therein and

take possession of any sample, photograph, record or other

evidence, including any documents bearing upon adult film

producer’s compliance with the provision of the chapter.” Id.

Measure B authorizes the district attorney to bring a civil

enforcement action for injunctive relief against any producer

who fails to cooperate with the health officer. Id. 11.39.140.

On the day that Measure B took effect, Defendant

Department of Public Health mailed Plaintiffs a letter

notifying them of the new ordinance and stating that it had

established provisional permitting fees of $2,000 to $2,500

per year. Plaintiffs then filed this action challenging Measure

B as facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment.3

Plaintiffs allege that Measure B’s permitting scheme and its

condom requirement operate as prior restraints on Plaintiffs’

ability to create expression, in the form of adult films, which

is protected by the First Amendment.

Over Plaintiffs’ objection, the district court allowed

supporters of Measure B to intervene. Following the

Supreme Court’s decision in Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S.

Ct. 2652 (2013), Plaintiffs asked the court to reconsider

because, they argued, Intervenors lacked Article IIIstanding. 

The district court denied the motion to reconsider.

The district court granted in part and denied in part

Intervenors’ motion to dismiss, and granted in part and denied

 

3

 Plaintiffs raised other theories as well, but they are not at issue in this

appeal.

 Case: 13-56445, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348589, DktEntry: 57-1, Page 7 of 40
8 VIVID ENTERTAINMENT V. FIELDING

in part Plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction. In

granting preliminary injunctive relief, the district court

severed one chapter of Measure B in its entirety and severed

portions of three other chapters. Appendix A contains

Measure B and shows the parts that the district court enjoined

and severed.

Plaintiffs timely appeal the denial of complete

preliminary injunctive relief.4 They argue that the enjoined

provisions are not properly severable, so the likely invalidity

of some parts of the ordinance requires enjoining the entire

ordinance. In the alternative, Plaintiffs argue that the district

court erred in denying preliminary injunctive relief with

respect to Measure B’s requirements that producers: 

(1) acquire a permit before beginning production on an adult

film; (2) demonstrate that employees have completed a

county-approved training program concerning blood-borne

pathogens as a condition precedent to issuance of the permit;

and (3) require performers to use condoms “during any acts

of vaginal or anal sexual intercourse.”

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review for abuse of discretion denial of a preliminary

injunction. Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d

1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011). “As long as the district court got

the law right, it will not be reversed simply because we would

have arrived at a different result if we had applied the law to

the facts of the case.” A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.,

284 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks

and brackets omitted). A district court abuses its discretion,

however, if it applies an incorrect legal standard. Does 1–5

 

4

 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).

 Case: 13-56445, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348589, DktEntry: 57-1, Page 8 of 40
VIVID ENTERTAINMENT V. FIELDING 9

v. Chandler, 83 F.3d 1150, 1152 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Accordingly, we review de novo the “legal premises

underlying a preliminary injunction.” A&M Records,

284 F.3d at 1096.

DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

Citing Perry, Plaintiffs argue that we lack jurisdiction

over this appeal, because Intervenors lack Article IIIstanding. 

We disagree with their reading of Perry and with their

contention that Intervenors must have standing for this appeal

to proceed.

The Supreme Court has held that a party must have

Article III standing both to initiate an action and to seek

review on appeal. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona,

520 U.S. 43, 64 (1997). But an intervenor who performs

neither of those functions and no other function that invokes

the power of the federal courts need not meet Article III

standing requirements. Yniguez v. Arizona, 939 F.2d 727,

731 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated by Arizonans for Official

English, 520 U.S. at 80, as recognized in League of United

Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 131 F.3d 1297, 1305 n.5 (9th

Cir. 1997); see also Perry, 133 S. Ct. at 2661 (citing Art. III,

§ 2) (holding that “any person invoking the power of a federal

court must demonstrate standing to do so” (emphasis added)). 

Nothing in Perry, which concerned the question whether an

intervenor who sought to appeal had Article III standing,

affects that conclusion. Plaintiffs have standing, and it is they

alone who have invoked the federal courts’ jurisdiction. For

that reason, we need not and do not decide whether

Intervenors satisfy the requirements of Article III standing.

 Case: 13-56445, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348589, DktEntry: 57-1, Page 9 of 40
10 VIVID ENTERTAINMENT V. FIELDING

To the extent that Plaintiffs contend that the district court

erred in granting intervention, we cannot consider their

challenge. An order allowing intervention under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) is not a final order and is not an

interlocutory order appealable by statute, so an appeal on that

issue is premature until entry of final judgment. Alsea Valley

Alliance v. Dep’t of Commerce, 358 F.3d 1181, 1187 (9th Cir.

2004).

B. Severability

Plaintiffs next urge that, having held that they are likely

to succeed on the merits with respect to some provisions of

Measure B, the district court had to enjoin operation of the

entire ordinance whether or not the remainder independently

satisfies the standards for injunctive relief. For the reasons

that follow, we disagree.

Federal courts should avoid “judicial legislation”—that is,

amending, rather than construing, statutory text—out of

respect for the separation-of-powers principle that only

legislatures ought to make positive law. United States v.

Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 479 (1995). But,

because of countervailing separation-of-powers principles,

courts must respect the laws made by legislatures and,

therefore, should avoid nullifying an entire statute when only

a portion is invalid. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc.,

472 U.S. 491, 502 (1985). These concerns have led to the

judicial doctrine of severability, that is, the “elementary

principle that the same statute may be in part constitutional

and in part unconstitutional, and that if the parts are wholly

independent of each other, that which is constitutional may

stand while that which is unconstitutional will be rejected.” 

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The need for

 Case: 13-56445, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348589, DktEntry: 57-1, Page 10 of 40
VIVID ENTERTAINMENT V. FIELDING 11

deference and restraint in severing a state or local enactment

is all the more acute because of our respect for federalism and

local control. See City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g

Co., 486 U.S. 750, 772 (1988).

Because a court may not use severability as a fig leaf for

judicial legislation, courts have fashioned limits on when a

statute may be severed. See Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad,

271 U.S. 500, 518 (1926) (“[I]t is very clear that amendment

may not be substituted for construction, and that a court may

not exercise legislative functions to save the law from conflict

with constitutional limitation.”). In keeping with federalism

principles, the “[s]everability of a local ordinance is a

question of state law.” City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 772.

California law directs courts to consider first the inclusion

of a severability clause in the legislation. Cal. Redev. Ass’n

v. Matosantos, 267 P.3d 580, 607 (Cal. 2011). “The presence

of such a clause establishes a presumption in favor of

severance.” Id. “Although not conclusive, a severability

clause normally calls for sustaining the valid part of the

enactment . . . .” Santa Barbara Sch. Dist. v. Superior Court,

530 P.2d 605, 618 (Cal. 1975) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

Measure B contains this severability clause:

If any provision of this Act, or part

thereof, is for any reason held to be invalid or

unconstitutional, the remaining provisions

shall not be affected, but shall remain in full

force and effect, and to this end the provisions

of the Act are severable.

 Case: 13-56445, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348589, DktEntry: 57-1, Page 11 of 40
12 VIVID ENTERTAINMENT V. FIELDING

Measure B § 8. Section 8 states clearly that the people, acting

in their legislative capacity, intended any provision and any

part of a provision, if invalid or unconstitutional, to be

severed from the ordinance. The district court thus properly

held that Measure B’s severability clause establishes a

presumption of severability.

Next, California law directs courts to “consider three

additional criteria: The invalid provision must be

grammatically, functionally, and volitionally separable.” Cal.

Redev. Ass’n, 267 P.3d at 607 (internal quotation marks and

brackets omitted). We will consider each criterion in turn.

“Grammatical separability, also known as mechanical

separability, depends on whether the invalid parts can be

removed as a whole without affecting the wording or

coherence of what remains.” Id. (internal quotation marks

omitted). “[T]he ‘grammatical’ component of the test for

severance is met by the severability clause considered in

conjunction with the separate and discrete provisions of [the

statute].” Barlow v. Davis, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 752, 757 (Ct.

App. 1999). “To be grammatically separable, the valid and

invalid parts of the statute can be separated by paragraph,

sentence, clause, phrase, or even single words.” People v.

Nguyen, 166 Cal. Rptr. 3d 590, 609 (Ct. App. 2014) (internal

quotation marks omitted). “[Where] the defect cannot be

cured by excising any word or group of words, the problem

is quite different and more difficult of solution.” Ex parte

Blaney, 184 P.2d 892, 900 (Cal. 1947); Santa Barbara Sch.

Dist., 530 P.2d at 617.

Here, Plaintiffs contend that the district court abused its

discretion by striking individual words and groups of words

 Case: 13-56445, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348589, DktEntry: 57-1, Page 12 of 40
VIVID ENTERTAINMENT V. FIELDING 13

from the definition of an adult film. Specifically, the district

court struck part of 11.39.010 of Measure B as follows:

An “adult film” is defined as any film,

video, multimedia or other representation of

sexual intercourse in which performers

actually engage in oral, vaginal, or anal

penetration, including, but not limited to,

penetration by a penis, finger, or inanimate

object; oral contact with the anus or genitals

of another performer; and/or any other sexual

activity that may result in the transmission of

blood and/or any other potentially infectious

materials.

In large part, as can be seen, the district court severed

distinct clauses. The district court also severed some

individual words but, grammatically, they are understood by

the reader to include complete clauses. For example, the

compound clause “engage in oral, vaginal, or anal

penetration” means—and easily could have been drafted to

say—“engage in oral penetration, engage in vaginal

penetration, or engage in anal penetration.” For that reason,

the district court did, in fact, sever only distinct provisions

from Measure B, and that severance did not alter the meaning

of the remaining text in any way. California courts have long

held that parts of a compound clause are grammatically

severable from a statute if their omission would not affect the

meaning of the remaining text. Ex parte Blaney, 184 P.2d at

900; Santa Barbara Sch. Dist., 530 P.2d at 617; see also

Legislature v. Eu, 816 P.2d 1309, 1335–36 (Cal. 1991)

(holding as grammatically severable “or serving in” from

“elected to or serving in the Legislature on or after November

1, 1990”); Borikas v. Alameda Unified Sch. Dist., 154 Cal.

 Case: 13-56445, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348589, DktEntry: 57-1, Page 13 of 40
14 VIVID ENTERTAINMENT V. FIELDING

Rptr. 3d 186, 212 (Ct. App. 2013) (holding as grammatically

severable “residential” from “[o]n each taxable, residential

parcel at the rate of $120 per year”); City of Dublin v. County

of Alameda, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 845, 850–51 (Ct. App. 1993)

(holding as grammaticallyseverable “incorporated and” from

“the geographic entity, including both the incorporated and

unincorporated areas”). In short, the district court

permissibly held that the disputed portions of Measure B are

grammatically severable.5

Our next consideration, functional severability, “depends

on whether the remainder [of the statute] is complete in

5 Plaintiffs rely on Acosta v. City of Costa Mesa, 718 F.3d 800, 820–21

(9th Cir. 2013) (per curiam), for the broad principle that a court

necessarily abuses its discretion if it holds that a single word or group of

words is grammatically severable under California law. Acosta is

distinguishable, and we decline to extend it in a way that would contradict

governing California law.

In Acosta, the severability clause itself was narrow, providing that

only “sections, paragraphs, clauses and phrases” were severable from the

ordinance in question. Id. at 820. We interpreted that particularized list

to prohibit, by inference, the severance of “individual words.” Id. As

directed by California law, we read that narrow severability clause “‘in

conjunction with the separate and discrete provisions of’ the text to

determine whether the ‘grammatical component of the test for severance

is met.’” Id. (quoting Barlow, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 757). Reading the text

and severance clause together, we held that the single adjective “insolent”

and the list of adjectives “personal, impertinent, profane, insolent” were

not grammatically severable from the ordinance because, in context, the

words did not express a single “legislative thought.” Id. at 820–21.

Here, by contrast, Measure B contains a broad severability clause that

does not prohibit the severance of individual words. Under Measure B,

any provision or part of any provision shall be severed. Moreover, as

noted, the challenged severance in this case involves discrete legislative

thoughts.

 Case: 13-56445, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348589, DktEntry: 57-1, Page 14 of 40
VIVID ENTERTAINMENT V. FIELDING 15

itself.” Santa Barbara Sch. Dist., 530 P.2d at 618 (internal

quotation marks omitted). To be functionally severable,

“[t]he remaining provisions must stand on their own, unaided

by the invalid provisions nor rendered vague by their absence

nor inextricably connected to them by policy considerations. 

They must be capable of separate enforcement.” People’s

Advocate, Inc. v. Superior Court, 226 Cal. Rptr. 640, 649 (Ct.

App. 1986). Here, the district court enjoined the provisions

of Measure B that allowed for modification, suspension, and

revocation of permits; that authorized administrative

searches; and that allowed discretion in setting fees. The rest

of the ordinance remains intact: the permitting scheme, with

its condom and educational requirements; and enforcement

through fines and criminal charges. In addition, as the district

court noted, even in the absence of the administrative search

provision, Defendants can obtain a warrant to enforce

Measure B. Because the remaining parts of Measure B

operate independently, are not rendered vague in the absence

of the invalid provisions, and are capable of separate

enforcement, the district court permissibly ruled that the

provisions are functionally severable.

Our final consideration, volitional severability, “depends

on whether the remainder [of the statute] is complete in itself

and would have been adopted by the legislative body had [it]

foreseen the partial invalidation of the statute.” Santa

Barbara Sch. Dist., 530 P.2d at 618 (internal quotation marks

omitted). With respect to ballot initiatives, the test for

volitional severability “is whether it can be said with

confidence that the electorate’s attention was sufficiently

focused upon the parts to be severed so that it would have

separately considered and adopted them in the absence of the

invalid portions.” Gerken v. Fair Political Practices

 Case: 13-56445, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348589, DktEntry: 57-1, Page 15 of 40
16 VIVID ENTERTAINMENT V. FIELDING

Comm’n, 863 P.2d 694, 699 (Cal. 1993) (internal quotation

marks and emphasis omitted).

The district court preserved the requirements that

producers of adult films in Los Angeles County obtain

permits, train employees about the sexual transmission of

disease, and require performers to wear condoms when

engaged in vaginal or anal intercourse. The district court also

preserved the enforcement mechanisms of fines and criminal

penalties. As the court correctly noted, the “Findings and

Declaration” section of the initiative emphasizes (1) a

growing public concern over the spread of HIV/AIDS and

other sexually transmitted infections in the adult film

industry; (2) the importance of safe sex practices, and the use

of condoms in particular, in limiting the spread of HIV/AIDS

and other sexually transmitted infections; and (3) a failure to

enforce current state laws mandating the use of condoms by

performers in adult films. Measure B § 2. Thus, the

Declaration demonstrates that the public’s attention was

focused primarily on heightening enforcement of the condom

requirement. That is, even in the absence of the severed

segments, the remaining provisions centrally address the

voters’ stated concerns. The district court permissibly

concluded that the condom and permitting requirements are

volitionally severable from the fee-setting, inspections, and

administrative procedures.

Plaintiffs counter that the fee provisions are not

volitionally severable, because the voters would not have

passed Measure B as an “unfunded mandate.” But the

Declaration contained in Measure B says nothing about

money or revenue neutrality. Rather, the text demonstrates

that the core purpose of the initiative “was presented to the

electorate as a distinct aim, separate and apart from the

 Case: 13-56445, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348589, DktEntry: 57-1, Page 16 of 40
VIVID ENTERTAINMENT V. FIELDING 17

measure’s funding mandate.” McMahan v. City of San

Francisco, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 509, 513 (Ct. App. 2005)

(holding that a funding provision was volitionally severable

from the primary regulatory scheme).

In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion in

granting preliminary injunctive relief with respect to only

certain parts of Measure B, while allowing enforcement of

other provisions as severable. We now turn to Plaintiffs’

assertion that, even if severance is permissible, the district

court erred in denying preliminary injunctive relief with

respect to additional parts of the ordinance: the condom

mandate and the permitting requirement.

C. Denial of Preliminary Injunctive Relief

In decidingwhether a preliminaryinjunction should issue,

a district court must consider four factors: (1) whether the

plaintiff has shown a likelihood of success on the merits; (2)

whether the plaintiff has shown a likelihood of irreparable

harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) whether the

balance of equities tips in the plaintiff’s favor; and

(4) whether preliminary relief is in the public interest. Winter

v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).

Courts asked to issue preliminary

injunctions based on First Amendment

grounds face an inherent tension: the moving

party bears the burden of showing likely

success on the merits . . . and yet within that

merits determination the government bears the

burden of justifying its speech-restrictive

law. . . .

 Case: 13-56445, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348589, DktEntry: 57-1, Page 17 of 40
18 VIVID ENTERTAINMENT V. FIELDING

. . . .

Therefore, in the First Amendment

context, the moving party bears the initial

burden of making a colorable claim that its

First Amendment rights have been infringed,

. . . at which point the burden shifts to the

government to justify the restriction.

Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, 645 F.3d 1109, 1115–16

(9th Cir. 2011). But even if the plaintiff demonstrates likely

success on the merits, the plaintiff still must demonstrate

irreparable injury, a favorable balance of equities, and the

tipping of the public interest in favor of an injunction. Id. at

1128. That is, although

a First Amendment claim “certainly raises the

specter” of irreparable harm and public

interest considerations, proving the likelihood

of such a claim is not enough to satisfy

Winter. Stormans, [Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d

1109,] 1138 [(9th Cir. 2009)]; see also Klein

v. City of San Clemente, 584 F.3d 1196, 1207

(9th Cir. 2009) (even where the plaintiff was

likely to succeed on the merits of his First

Amendment claim, he “must also demonstrate

that he is likely to suffer irreparable injury in

the absence of a preliminary injunction, and

that the balance of equities and the public

interest tip in his favor”) (citing Winter,

555 U.S. at 20).

DISH Network Corp. v. FCC, 653 F.3d 771, 776 (9th Cir.

2011).

 Case: 13-56445, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348589, DktEntry: 57-1, Page 18 of 40
VIVID ENTERTAINMENT V. FIELDING 19

1. Condom Mandate

The district court held that Plaintiffs are unlikely to

succeed on the merits of their First Amendment challenge to

the condom requirement. The court did not abuse its

discretion in declining to enjoin the enforcement of the

condom mandate. The condom mandate survives

intermediate scrutiny because it has only a de minimis effect

on expression, is narrowly tailored to achieve the substantial

governmental interest of reducing the rate of sexually

transmitted infections, and leaves open adequate alternative

means of expression.

As a threshold matter, Plaintiffs argue that the district

court applied the wrong standard—intermediate scrutiny—

and that the condom mandate should be subject to strict

scrutiny. We disagree.

The Supreme Court has recognized that nearly all

regulation of the adult entertainment industry is content

based. See City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc.,

535 U.S. 425, 448 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the

judgment). Content-based regulation of speech generally

receives strict scrutiny, but we have fashioned an exception,

grounded in Alameda Books, that applies intermediate

scrutiny if two conditions are met. Ctr. for Fair Pub. Policy

v. Maricopa County, 336 F.3d 1153, 1161, 1164–65 (9th Cir.

2003) (citing Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 434) (recognizing

Justice Kennedy’s concurrence as controlling). First, the

ordinance must regulate “speech that is sexual or

pornographic in nature.” Gammoh v. City of La Habra,

395 F.3d 1114, 1123, amended on denial of reh’g, 402 F.3d

875 (9th Cir. 2005). Second, “the primary motivation behind

the regulation [must be] to prevent secondary effects.” Id.

 Case: 13-56445, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348589, DktEntry: 57-1, Page 19 of 40
20 VIVID ENTERTAINMENT V. FIELDING

But even if those two conditions are met, strict scrutiny may

still apply if the regulation amounts to a complete ban on

expression. Dream Palace v. County of Maricopa, 384 F.3d

990, 1021 (9th Cir. 2004).

We assume, but need not and do not decide, that Measure

B’s condom mandate is a content-based regulation of speech. 

Nonetheless, Measure B regulates sexual speech in order to

prevent the secondary effects of sexually transmitted

infections, thus falling within the Alameda Books exception. 

Plaintiffs argue that, despite that exception, the district court

should have applied strict scrutiny because the condom

mandate amounts to a complete ban on their protected

expression.

As an initial matter, Plaintiffs’ argument presupposes that

their relevant expression for First Amendment purposes is the

depiction of condomless sex. But “simply to define what is

being banned as the ‘message’ is to assume the conclusion.” 

City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 293 (2000). In

Pap’s A.M., a plurality of the Supreme Court concluded that

a general ban on public nudity, which required erotic dancers

to wear at least pasties and a G-string while dancing, did not

violate the First Amendment. Id. at 302. In reaching that

conclusion, the opinion rejected the argument that the pastiesand-G-string requirement functioned as a complete ban on the

dancers’ expression of “nude dancing.” Id. at 292–93. 

Instead, the opinion defined the relevant expression more

broadly as “the dancer’s erotic message.” Id. at 301. We

undertook a similar analysis, albeit without reference to Pap’s

A.M., in Gammoh, in which we upheld an ordinance that

required dancers to stay at least two feet away from patrons

during their performances. 395 F.3d at 1123. The plaintiffs

there argued that the ordinance completely banned their

 Case: 13-56445, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348589, DktEntry: 57-1, Page 20 of 40
VIVID ENTERTAINMENT V. FIELDING 21

expression, which they defined as “proximate dancing.” Id.

In response, we stressed that “the ‘expression’ at issue could

always be defined to include the contested restriction,” but

“virtually no ordinance would survive this analysis.” Id. We

instead defined the relevant expression as “the dancer’s erotic

message” and upheld the ordinance. Id. at 1128.

In light of those cases, we must examine more carefully

whether Plaintiffs’ relevant expression is the depiction of

condomless sex. Plaintiffs submitted declarations stating that

condomless sex differs from sex generally because condoms

remind the audience about real-world concerns such as

pregnancy and disease. Under this view, films depicting

condomless sex convey a particular message about sex in a

world without those risks. The Supreme Court has cautioned,

however, that “‘[i]t is possible to find some kernel of

expression in almost every activity a person undertakes—for

example, walking down the street or meeting one’s friends at

a shopping mall—but such a kernel is not sufficient to bring

the activity within the protection of the First Amendment.’” 

Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 570 (1991)

(quoting City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989)).

To determine whether conduct is protected by the First

Amendment, we ask not only whether someone intended to

convey a particular message through that conduct, but also

whether there is a “great” likelihood “that the message would

be understood by those who viewed it.” Spence v.

Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974) (per curiam). 

Here, we agree with the district court that, whatever unique

message Plaintiffs might intend to convey by depicting

condomless sex, it is unlikely that viewers of adult films will

understand that message. So condomless sex is not the

 Case: 13-56445, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348589, DktEntry: 57-1, Page 21 of 40
22 VIVID ENTERTAINMENT V. FIELDING

relevant expression for First Amendment purposes;6instead,

the relevant expression is more generally the adult films’

erotic message. See Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 293; Gammoh,

395 F.3d at 1123.

With Plaintiffs’ expression so defined, we conclude that

strict scrutiny is inappropriate because the condom mandate

does not ban the relevant expression completely. Rather, it

imposes a de minimis restriction. In Pap’s A.M., the Supreme

Court held that the pasties-and-G-string requirement did not

violate the First Amendment because, even if the ban “has

some minimal effect on the erotic message by muting that

portion of the expression that occurs when the last stitch is

dropped,” that effect was de minimis. 529 U.S. at 294

(emphasis added). That was so even though the ban

“certainly ha[d] the effect of limiting one particular means of

expressing the kind of erotic message being disseminated.” 

Id. at 292–93; see also Barnes, 501 U.S. at 571 (noting that

a requirement that erotic dancers wear pasties and G-strings

“does not deprive the dance of whatever erotic message it

conveys; it simply makes the message slightly less graphic”).

6 We also note that even if the relevant expression were the depiction of

condomless sex, Measure B still might warrant intermediate scrutiny. On

its face, Measure B does not ban expression; it does not prohibit the

depiction of condomless sex, but rather limits only the way the film is

produced. In that way, Measure B’s condom mandate is akin to the twofoot required distance between exotic dancers and patrons that we upheld

in Gammoh, which did not “ban any form of dance” or address the content

of the dance. 395 F.3d at 1123. When the district court adjudicates the

First Amendment claim on the merits, if the court were to find that special

effects could be used to edit condoms out of adult films, that would

provide yet another reason to apply intermediate scrutiny.

 Case: 13-56445, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348589, DktEntry: 57-1, Page 22 of 40
VIVID ENTERTAINMENT V. FIELDING 23

Many of our sister circuits have relied on Pap’s A.M. in

upholding de minimis restrictions on speech using

intermediate scrutiny. See, e.g., Sensations, Inc. v. City of

Grand Rapids, 526 F.3d 291, 299 (6th Cir. 2008) (upholding

a nudity ban under intermediate scrutiny because Pap’s A.M.

and Barnes had characterized a similar regulation as de

minimis); Fantasy Ranch Inc. v. City of Arlington, 459 F.3d

546, 562 (5th Cir. 2006) (rejecting an argument that an

ordinance requiring a certain distance between dancers and

the audience enacted a “complete ban on proximate nude

dancing”); Heideman v. S. Salt Lake City, 348 F.3d 1182,

1195–96 (10th Cir. 2003) (applying Pap’s A.M. to conclude

that a ban on nude erotic dancing was not a “total ban” on

speech). And, as noted, we followed this same analytical

approach in Gammoh, 395 F.3d at 1122–23.

A similar analysis applies to the condom mandate. The

requirement that actors in adult films wear condoms while

engaging in sexual intercourse might have “some minimal

effect” on a film’s erotic message, but that effect is certainly

no greater than the effect of pasties and G-strings on the

erotic message of nude dancing. In light of Pap’s A.M. and

the other precedent cited above, we conclude that the

restriction on expression in this case is de minimis. And a de

minimis restriction on expression is, by definition, not a

complete ban on expression, and so does not trigger strict

scrutiny. Accordingly, the mandate is subject to intermediate

scrutiny.

The district court properly exercised its discretion in

concluding that the condom requirement likelywould survive

intermediate scrutiny. “A statute will survive intermediate

scrutiny if it: (1) is designed to serve a substantial

government interest; (2) is narrowly tailored to serve that

 Case: 13-56445, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348589, DktEntry: 57-1, Page 23 of 40
24 VIVID ENTERTAINMENT V. FIELDING

interest; and (3) does not unreasonably limit alternative

avenues of communication.” Gammoh, 395 F.3d at 1125–26,

as amended on denial of reh’g, 402 F.3d at 876.

The purpose of Measure B is twofold: (1) to decrease the

spread of sexually transmitted infections among performers

within the adult film industry, (2) thereby stemming the

transmission of sexually transmitted infections to the general

population among whom the performers dwell. Plaintiffs do

not contest that the government has a substantial interest in

preventing certain secondary effects of the adult film

industry, including the spread of sexually transmitted

infections. See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476,

485 (1995) (stating that “the Government . . . has a significant

interest in protecting the health, safety, and welfare of its

citizens”); Ctr. for Fair Pub. Policy, 336 F.3d at 1166 (“It is

beyond peradventure at this point in the development of the

doctrine that a state’s interest in curbing the secondary effects

associated with adult entertainment establishments is

substantial.”). Rather, Plaintiffs contend that Measure B’s

condom mandate is not narrowly tailored to serve the

government’s interest.

In order to be narrowly tailored for purposes of

intermediate scrutiny, the regulation “‘need not be the least

restrictive or the least intrusive means’ available to achieve

the government’s legitimate interests.” Berger v. City of

Seattle, 569 F.3d 1029, 1041 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc)

(quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798

(1989)). “Rather, the requirement of narrow tailoring is

satisfied so long as the regulation promotes a substantial

government interest that would be achieved less effectively

absent the regulation.” Colacurcio v. City of Kent, 163 F.3d

545, 553 (9th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks and ellipsis

 Case: 13-56445, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348589, DktEntry: 57-1, Page 24 of 40
VIVID ENTERTAINMENT V. FIELDING 25

omitted). This is not to say that narrow tailoring allows a

regulation to burden more speech than is necessary to satisfy

the interest, but we may not invalidate such a regulation

“simply because there is some imaginable alternative that

might be less burdensome on speech.” United States v.

Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985).

Plaintiffs’ narrow-tailoring argument rests largely on the

proposition that Measure B duplicates a voluntary testing and

monitoring scheme that already is in place in the industry. 

The adult film industry and its trade associations have

established the Adult Protection Health & Safety Service,

which has implemented a program whereby performers are

tested, either monthly or more frequently, and the test results

are made available in a database. In addition, if the Safety

Service receives notification of a positive test result, it must

inform the Department of Public Health. Adult film

producers and performers have access to the database in order

to verify that performers have been tested and that those tests

have been negative. Certain employers require their

performers, by contract, to submit to testing at various

intervals. For example, Plaintiff Kross’ contract requires

testing every 15 days, Plaintiff Pierce is tested every 14 days,

and all of Plaintiff Vivid Entertainment’s performers are

tested at least once every 28 days.

On the day of production, Plaintiff Vivid Entertainment

requires each performer to provide identification, and each

performer’s test history is drawn from the Safety Service

database. Plaintiff Vivid Entertainment allows participation

in the production only by performers with a current test status

and a negative result. Plaintiffs Kross and Pierce declare that

they undertake this screening process before every explicit

scene in which they perform, and both Plaintiffs Kross and

 Case: 13-56445, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348589, DktEntry: 57-1, Page 25 of 40
26 VIVID ENTERTAINMENT V. FIELDING

Pierce declare that they would not take part in an explicit

scene if the screening measures were not in place. Plaintiffs

also provided testimony from industry officials that this

testing system is effective.

The district court considered Plaintiffs’ evidence and

weighed it against contradictory evidence that the industry’s

testing scheme is ineffective. In particular, the district court

considered a 2009 letter from the County of Los Angeles

Department of Public Health to support the conclusion that

Measure B, passed in 2012, was designed to address the

spread of disease and is narrowly tailored to that end.7 The

Findings and Declaration section of Measure B refers

specifically to documentation by the Los Angeles County

Department of Public Health of the spread of HIV/AIDS and

other sexually transmitted infections in the adult film

industry. Measure B § 2.

In the 2009 letter, the Department of Public Health

reported that its analysis of 2008 data showed a markedly

higher rate of sexually transmitted infections for performers

within the adult film industry, 20%, than for the general

public, 2.4%, and even for the county area with the highest

rate of infection, 4.5%. The Department of Public Health

7 The district court properly relied on the letter because it is referred to

in Measure B itself. Moreover, the letter is “not subject to reasonable

dispute” because it “can be accurately and readily determined from

sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid.

201(b); see Sachs v. Republic of Austria, 737 F.3d 584, 596 n.10 (9th Cir.

2013) (en banc) (taking notice of legislative facts necessary to discern

legislative intent as directed by Rule 201(a), advisory note to 1972

amendments, but noting also that the court could properly notice such

facts as adjudicative facts under Rule 201(b)), petition for cert. filed,

82 U.S.L.W. 3573 (U.S. Mar. 5, 2014) (No. 13-1067).

 Case: 13-56445, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348589, DktEntry: 57-1, Page 26 of 40
VIVID ENTERTAINMENT V. FIELDING 27

also found that 20.2% of performers in adult films diagnosed

with an infection were reinfected within one year. Further,

the Department of Public Health opined that the data with

respect to infection rates were likely underestimated, because

rectal and oral screenings were not completed with regularity

among workers in the industry.

The district court weighed all the evidence before it and,

finding the 2009 letter especially compelling, held that

Plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits in their First

Amendment challenge to the condom mandate. In so doing,

the district court did not abuse its discretion.8

On appeal, Plaintiffs also argue that Measure B’s condom

mandate is not narrowly tailored, and is largely ineffective,

because makers of adult films can produce films across

county lines without having performers wear condoms. As an

initial matter, it bears noting that Plaintiffs offered evidence

before the district court that Measure B has drastically

reduced the number of adult films produced by the industry

because the productions, which depend heavily on the

“regular” film industry’s infrastructure in Los Angeles

County, cannot be moved elsewhere. That evidence

undermines Plaintiffs’ new contention that Measure B is

ineffective because of the adult film industry’s ready

mobility.

 

8

 That the condom mandate has a de minimis effect on expression also

supports the conclusion that the ordinance is narrowly tailored. Cf.

Sensations, Inc., 526 F.3d at 299 (citing Pap’s A.M. and Barnesin holding

that a ban on public nudity was narrowly tailored to suppress negative

secondary effects).

 Case: 13-56445, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348589, DktEntry: 57-1, Page 27 of 40
28 VIVID ENTERTAINMENT V. FIELDING

But, more importantly, Plaintiffs’ argument overstates the

standard for narrow tailoring, which simply requires that the

regulation “promote[] a substantial government interest that

would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.” 

Colacurcio, 163 F.3d at 553. The regulation need not be the

most effective way to achieve the government’s substantial

interest, nor must it be shown that the regulation cannot be

circumvented. Rather, it suffices if the regulation helps to

achieve the substantial government interest effectively. Id.

Finally, Plaintiffs contend that Measure B’s condom

mandate unconstitutionally forecloses alternative channels of

communication. As we noted in Gammoh, “[t]his inquiry is

analogous” to our analysis of whether the condom mandate

is a complete ban on expression. 395 F.3d at 1128. In

Gammoh, we held that the required two-foot separation

between dancers and patrons left open alternative channels of

communication because the requirement “slightly impaired

[the message],” but “the dancer’s erotic message [could] still

be communicated from a slight distance.” Id. The same is

true here. Measure B is a minimal restriction on Plaintiffs’

expression that “leaves ample capacity to convey [Plaintiffs’]

erotic message.” Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 301. Accordingly,

the district court did not abuse its discretion in holding that

the condom requirement leaves alternative channels of

expression available.

2. Permitting System

The portions of Measure B’s permitting system left in

place by the district court also survive constitutional

 Case: 13-56445, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348589, DktEntry: 57-1, Page 28 of 40
VIVID ENTERTAINMENT V. FIELDING 29

scrutiny.

9 Plaintiffs first argue that the remaining permitting

requirements are impermissibly content based and therefore

unconstitutional. But a licensing scheme that regulates adult

entertainment is not unconstitutional simply because it is

content based. See Dream Palace, 384 F.3d at 1001. 

Plaintiffs also argue “that the remnants of Measure B’s

permitting regime left intact are [not] narrowly tailored.” See

Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130

(1992) (holding that “any permit scheme . . . must be

narrowly tailored”). As discussed above, narrow tailoring

requires only that the remaining portions of the permitting

scheme “promote[] a substantial government interest that

would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.” 

Colacurcio, 163 F.3d at 553 (internal quotation marks

omitted). The permitting system’s requirements that adult

film producers complete training about blood-borne

pathogens and post a permit during shooting still serve the

County’s interest in preventing sexually transmitted

infections. That remains so even in light of the other portions

of the permitting system that the district court enjoined. 

Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the permitting scheme grants

county officials too much discretion, but the district court

correctly concluded that the remaining permitting provisions

leave little, if any, discretion to government officials. 

Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in

 

9

 Plaintiffs also argue that the district court failed to conduct a narrowtailoring analysis with respect to the permitting provisions. We reject their

procedural objection for two reasons. First, the district court analyzed the

merits of this issue, albeit in the context of considering the motion to

dismiss. Second, because Measure B’s condom mandate, which the

district court analyzed at length with specific reference to narrowtailoring,

is part ofthe permitting process, the court necessarily conducted a narrowtailoring analysis of the permitting scheme as part of its consideration of

the condom mandate.

 Case: 13-56445, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348589, DktEntry: 57-1, Page 29 of 40
30 VIVID ENTERTAINMENT V. FIELDING

denying preliminary injunctive relief with respect to Measure

B’s remaining permitting requirements.

CONCLUSION

We have jurisdiction over this appeal whether or not

Intervenors have demonstrated Article III standing. The

district court did not abuse its discretion in holding that the

invalid portions of Measure B are severable. Nor did the

district court abuse its discretion in denying a preliminary

injunction with respect to the condom and permitting

provisions of Measure B.

AFFIRMED.

 Case: 13-56445, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348589, DktEntry: 57-1, Page 30 of 40
VIVID ENTERTAINMENT V. FIELDING 31

APPENDIX A

The district court did not provide a line-edited version of

its severance analysis. For purposes of clarity, we provide the

attached interpretation of the district court’s analysis.

 Case: 13-56445, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348589, DktEntry: 57-1, Page 31 of 40
 Case: 13-56445, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348589, DktEntry: 57-1, Page 32 of 40
 Case: 13-56445, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348589, DktEntry: 57-1, Page 33 of 40
 Case: 13-56445, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348589, DktEntry: 57-1, Page 34 of 40
 Case: 13-56445, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348589, DktEntry: 57-1, Page 35 of 40
 Case: 13-56445, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348589, DktEntry: 57-1, Page 36 of 40
 Case: 13-56445, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348589, DktEntry: 57-1, Page 37 of 40
 Case: 13-56445, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348589, DktEntry: 57-1, Page 38 of 40
 Case: 13-56445, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348589, DktEntry: 57-1, Page 39 of 40
 Case: 13-56445, 12/15/2014, ID: 9348589, DktEntry: 57-1, Page 40 of 40