Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01938/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-01938-0/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 463
Nature of Suit: Habeas Corpus - Alien Detainee
Cause of Action: 28:2241 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Federal)

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28 1 Respondents urge that the only proper Respondent named in this

matter is Mr. DeRosa, who was Petitioner’s immediate custodian at the

time the petition was filed. 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

BOUNXOU BILLAMAY, )

)

Petitioner, ) CIV 09-01938 PHX MHM (MEA)

)

v. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

)

KATRINA KANE, et al., )

 ) 

Respondents. ) 

)

_____________________________ )

TO THE HONORABLE MARY H. MURGUIA:

Mr. Bounxou Billamay (“Petitioner”), who is represented

by counsel in this matter, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on September 18, 2009. At

that time Petitioner was detained by Respondents1 in Eloy,

Arizona. Petitioner also filed a motion for a preliminary

injunction and a motion to consolidate this case with Docket No.

2:09 CV 1410. Respondent filed a Response in Opposition to

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Response”) (Doc. 17) on

November 12, 2009. In total, four motions to consolidate were

filed. On September 2, 2010, the motions to consolidate were

denied in Docket No. 2:09 CV 1410.

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On September 28, 2010, Respondents were ordered to file

additional pleading. On October 22, 2010, Respondents filed a

response to the Court’s order, inter alia arguing that the

petition is moot. See Doc. 37. Petitioner filed a Response to

Order and Supplemental Pleadings on October 22, 2010. See Doc.

38.

I. Background

Petitioner is a native of Laos. See Response, Exh. 2.

In September of 1988 Petitioner was admitted to the United

States as a refugee. See id., Exh. 2. 

On June 25, 2007, Petitioner was convicted by the

United States District Court for the Northern District of

California on one count of conspiracy to distribute

methamphetamine. Id., Exh. 2 & Exh. 3. Petitioner was

sentenced to a term of two years incarceration pursuant to this

conviction. Id., Exh. 3. Petitioner was released from the

custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons on June 4, 2009, and

was taken into the custody of the Department of Homeland

Security on June 9, 2009. Id., Exh. 2 & Exh. 4. Petitioner was

taken into custody pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1159(a), which provides:

[A]n alien who has been admitted to the

United States under section 1157 of this

title ... (B) who has been physically present

in the United States for at least one year,

and who has not acquired permanent resident

status, shall at the end of such year period,

return or be returned to the custody of the

Department of Homeland Security for

inspection and examination for admission to

the United States as an immigrant in

accordance with the provisions of sections

1225, 1229a, and 1231 of this title.

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On or about June 29, 2009, Petitioner filed an

application for an adjustment of his immigration status and an

application for a waiver of grounds of excludability. Id., Exh.

5. 

A Notice to Appear was filed on October 13, 2009,

charging Petitioner was removable from the United States based

on his conviction for conspiracy to distribute a controlled

substance. Id., Exh. 1. Also on October 13, 2009, DHS filed a

notice of custody determination, asserting Petitioner’s

detention was mandatory because he was charged with removability

pursuant to section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) and 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) of

the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). 

On November 2, 2009, Petitioner was ordered removed to

Laos and Petitioner waived his right to appeal that order. See

Doc. 37, Exh. 5. Petitioner’s application to adjust his status

to that of a lawful permanent resident and his application

seeking to have the grounds of inadmissibility waived was denied

by United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”)

on November 12, 2009. Id., Exh. 6. On January 6, 2010,

Petitioner was released from Respondent’s custody on an order of

supervision. Id., Exh. 7.

 In the original habeas petition Petitioner contends his

detention violated his constitutional rights and federal law

because he was taken into custody pursuant to his status as a

refugee who had not adjusted his immigration status and before

he was charged with being removable and subject to detention by

means of a Notice to Appear. Petitioner contends:

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It has long been the policy of the Arizona

Field Office of Immigration and Customs

Enforcement (“Arizona ICE” or “ICE”) to

interpret 8 U.S.C. § 1159(a) to authorize the

detention of individuals admitted to the

United States as refugees who have not

acquired permanent resident status within one

year. These “unadjusted refugees” are

commonly held for approximately four to six

months while their applications for permanent

residence are being adjudicated. During this

time, they are not charged with any civil or

criminal offense and are not held pursuant to

removal proceedings. They are not eligible to

apply for bond in front of a neutral

decision-maker and are not given a release

date. Petitioner argues that this policy and

practice of detaining unadjusted refugees is

not authorized by the Immigration and

Nationality Act and violates substantive and

procedural due process...

***

Petitioner argues that his detention is not

authorized by the Immigration and Nationality

Act. Petitioner’s detention is based on a

broad interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1159

promulgated by Respondents that is

inconsistent with, and contradictory to,

other provisions in the Immigration and

Nationality Act. The Respondents’ construal

of 8 U.S.C. § 1159 uses an expansive

definition of the term “custody” to justify

Petitioner’s continued detention without

bond, without judicial oversight, and without

a release date.

Petitioner further asserts in his memorandum in support

of his habeas petition, filed September 18, 2009,

Petitioner also argues that his detention is

unlawful because Respondents’ interpretation

of § 1159(a) violates substantive due

process. While the government may

legitimately detain aliens upon a showing of

sufficient justification and strong

procedural protections, neither of these

factors are present here. Although detention

during removal proceedings is

constitutionally permissible in order to

prevent aliens from fleeing and to ensure

their successful removal, Petitioner is not

currently in removal proceedings and does not

pose a similar flight risk.

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2 8 U.S.C. § 1159(a) provides that:

an alien who has been admitted to the United States under

section 1157 of this title ... (B) who has been physically

present in the United States for at least one year, and who

has not acquired permanent resident status, shall at the

end of such year period, return or be returned to the

custody of the Department of Homeland Security for

inspection and examination for admission to the United

States as an immigrant in accordance with the provisions of

sections 1225, 1229a, and 1231 of this title.

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In the first response to the petition, Respondent

contends the petition must be denied and dismissed as moot,

because the basis for Petitioner’s detention has “shifted,”

rendering his arguments irrelevant. See Response at 4. In his

most recent pleading, Respondent contends that the petition is

moot because Petitioner has been released from custody. 

II. Analysis

The Court may only issue a writ of habeas corpus to a

Department of Homeland Security detainee who is “in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (1994 & Supp. 2010). 

Petitioner was initially taken into custody pursuant to

his status as a refugee who had not adjusted his status within

one year of admission to the United States.2 A Notice to Appear

was later filed, alleging Petitioner was removable from the

United States as an alien who had committed a drug crime.

Petitioner does not dispute that he is now under a final order

of removal nor does he dispute that he is not now in custody.

“The case or controversy requirement of Article III

admonishes federal courts to avoid premature adjudication and to

abstain from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements.”

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U.S. West, Inc. v. Tristani, 182 F.3d 1202, 1208 (10th Cir.

1999) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). A court

must dismiss a case as moot if at any point it becomes certain

either that “‘the allegedly wrongful behavior could not

reasonably be expected to recur,’” Friends of the Earth Inc. v.

Laidlaw Envtl. Assoc. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189, 120 S. Ct.

693, 708 (2000) (citation omitted), or that there is no

effective relief remaining for the court to provide. See

Calderon v. Moore, 518 U.S. 149, 150, 116 S. Ct. 2066, 2067

(1996).

The Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to

consider a habeas claim that is moot. See, e.g., Dittman v.

California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir. 1999). Because

Petitioner is no longer detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1159,

any opinion issued at this time by this Court regarding that

statute would be purely advisory in nature.

Petitioner’s case is rendered moot by his release from

custody. See Abdala v. I.N.S., 488 F.3d 1061, 1064-65 (9th Cir.

2007) (discussing and collecting cases wherein a petitioner’s

release from detention or parole or their removal rendered a

habeas petition moot); Levine v. Apker, 455 F.3d 71, 77 (2d Cir.

2006) (finding habeas petition was not moot where petitioner’s

supervised release left open possibility of court’s issuance of

effectual relief). Because Petitioner is no longer in custody,

the Court may not reach the merits of his argument regarding the

constitutionality of his initial detention. Petitioner no

longer has a personal stake in the outcome of his argument.

Because Petitioner no longer has a personal stake in the relief

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sought, i.e., a declaration that 8 U.S.C. § 1159 is

unconstitutional, his habeas petition is moot. See Rodriguez v.

Hayes, 591 F.3d 1105, 1117-18 (9th Cir. 2010). See also

Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7, 118 S. Ct. 978, 983 (1998).

Petitioner seeks injunctive relief, i.e., his release

from custody. Injunctive relief may no longer be granted

because Petitioner is no longer detained. Additionally,

Petitioner seeks declaratory relief. A claim for declaratory

relief will not save a petition from mootness unless the

declaration affects the individual filing the petition. Ferry

v. Gonzalez, 457 F.3d 1117, 1132 (10th Cir. 2006). Any opinion

issued in this matter that the challenged statute is

unconstitutional would be an advisory opinion. The Court should

not issue such an opinion “because a declaratory judgment on

that question would have no meaningful effect” on DHS’ or ICE’

future conduct towards Petitioner. Id.

Petitioner contends that the petition is not moot and

the Court should exercise jurisdiction and find the statute

unconstitutional, citing the maxim that the case or controversy

requirement of Article III is satisfied if the challenged

constitutional violation is capable of repetition yet evades

review. Petitioner argues his case presents a situation that is

capable of repetition yet evading review, an exception to the

mootness doctrine which “applies only in exceptional

circumstances.” Spencer, 523 U.S. at 17, 118 S. Ct. at 988

(quotations omitted). This exception will rescue a moot

controversy only if: “(1) the challenged action is in its

duration too short to be fully litigated prior to cessation or

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3 It is not clear if the “voluntary cessation” doctrine applies to

section 2241 habeas cases. Compare Picrin-Peron v. Rison, 930 F.2d 773,

775-76 (9th Cir. 1991), with Sherman v. United States Parole Comm’n, 502

F.3d 869, 871-72 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting cases in which the merits of a

challenge to pretrial detention were not mooted when the petitioner was no

longer detained prior to trial). The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has

concluded:

We will not dismiss a petition as moot if “(1) secondary or

‘collateral’ injuries survive after resolution of the primary

injury; (2) the issue is deemed a wrong capable of repetition yet

evading review; (3) the defendant voluntarily ceases an allegedly

illegal practice but is free to resume it at any time; or (4) it

is a properly certified class action suit.” 

Riley v. I.N.S., 310 F.3d 1253, 1257 (2002).

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expiration, and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the

same complaining party will be subject to the same action

again.” Id. (quotations omitted). See also Weinstein v.

Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149, 96 S. Ct. 347, 350 (1975). 

The second prong of the capable-of-repetition exception

requires a “reasonable expectation” or a “demonstrated

probability” that “the same controversy will recur involving the

same complaining party.” Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482, 102

S. Ct. 1181, 1183 (1982). Although other detainees will

undoubtedly face this same issue in the future, there is no

reasonable expectation, and certainly no demonstrated

probability, that Petitioner will be subject to the same action

again.

Neither is the narrow exception to the mootness

doctrine of voluntary cessation applicable.3 This exception

“traces to the principle that a party should not be able to

evade judicial review, or to defeat a judgment, by temporarily

altering questionable behavior.” City News & Novelty, Inc. v.

City of Waukesha, 531 U.S. 278, 284 n.1, 121 S. Ct. 743, 747

n.1 (2001). However, this case is not analogous to the

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situation where “[respondents] seek to evade sanction by

predictable protestations of repentance and reform.” Id. There

is no suggestion that the decision allowing for Petitioner to be

detained pursuant to section 1226(c) was the result of an

attempt by the government to evade review of 8 U.S.C. § 1159.

Accordingly, the exception of voluntary cessation inapplicable.

See Riley v. I.N.S., 310 F.3d 1253, 1257 (2002).

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Mr. Billamay’s

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately

appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of

appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district

court’s judgment. 

Pursuant to Rule 72(b), Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the

date of service of a copy of this recommendation within which to

file specific written objections with the Court. Thereafter,

the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file a

response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules

of Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the

District of Arizona, objections to the Report and Recommendation

may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. 

Failure to timely file objections to any factual or

legal determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered

a waiver of a party’s right to de novo appellate consideration

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of the issues. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114,

1121 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Failure to timely file

objections to any factual or legal determinations of the

Magistrate Judge will constitute a waiver of a party’s right to

appellate review of the findings of fact and conclusions of law

in an order or judgment entered pursuant to the recommendation

of the Magistrate Judge. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, R. 11, the District

Court must “issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it

enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” The undersigned

recommends that, should the Report and Recommendation be adopted

and, should Petitioner seek a certificate of appealability, a

certificate of appealability should be denied because Petitioner

has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right as required by 28 U.S.C.A § 2253(c)(2). 

DATED this 10th day of November, 2010.

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