Source: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-00310/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-00310-11/pdf.json

Nature of Suit Code: 440
Nature of Suit: Other Civil Rights
Cause of Action: 42:1983 Civil Rights Act

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All claims by class members had to be postmarked by October 11, 2007. (See

Order for Preliminary Approval of Settlement of Class Action, filed June 20, 2007, at 3:9-10;

Amended Stipulation of Settlement, filed June 20, 2007, at 3:2-6 and Ex. 3 at 3.)

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DANIEL SCHAFFER,

Plaintiff

v.

COUNTY OF ALAMEDA, et al.,

Defendants

 /

No. 06-0310 MMC

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION AND/OR REQUEST

FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE

CLAIM (LETTER DATED DECEMBER 7,

2007)

By Order and Judgment of Dismissal, filed November 26, 2007, the Court approved

a settlement of the above-titled class action.

The Court is in receipt of a letter from Terry P. Harding (“Harding”), dated December

7, 2007 and filed by the Clerk on December 11, 2007. Attached to said letter is another

letter, which Harding states he had intended to present to the Court at the November 16,

2007 hearing, at which the Court considered whether to approve the settlement. In the

attached letter, which is undated and is signed by 12 persons, including Harding, the

signatories “object” to the settlement on the ground that such signatories needed additional

time to file a claim, for the stated reason they were “‘out of the loop’ of effective

notification.”1

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The letter attached to Harding’s December 7, 2007 letter is characterized by the

signatories thereto as an “objection to notification procedure.” Harding’s December 7, 2007

letter requests the Court consider said “objection” at this time. Given that a final judgment

has been entered, the Court construes Harding’s letter of December 7, 2007 as a motion

for reconsideration of the Order and Judgment of Dismissal, pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Alternatively, the letter attached to Harding’s December

7, 2007 letter, although characterized as an “objection” to the settlement, can be construed

as a request, under the terms of the settlement, for an extension of time to file a claim. In

either instance, for the reasons set forth below, no relief is warranted.

A. Objection to Settlement

“On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party . . . from a

final judgment . . . for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or

excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have

been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether

heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an

adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or

discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise

vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application;

or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

60(b).

Harding asserts he was unable to deliver the objection to the November 16, 2007

hearing because he lacked a photo i.d., and, consequently, could not enter the federal

courthouse. Assuming, arguendo, Harding did not become aware of the entry requirement

within sufficient time to obtain a photo i.d., such unawareness is not a cognizable ground

for reconsideration, because an objection presented for the first time on November 16,

2007 would have been untimely. A class member who wished to object to the settlement

was required to file his or her objection with the Clerk of the Court no later than October 11,

2007, (see Order for Preliminary Approval at 6:9-7:19); Harding fails to address, in any

Case 3:06-cv-00310-MMC Document 77 Filed 01/02/08 Page 2 of 4
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The deadline to file objections is unambiguously set forth in the Notice of Proposed

Settlement of Class Action Strip Search Case. Harding does not deny receiving said

Notice.

3

None of the signatories expressly denies receiving notice of the proposed

settlement before October 11, 2007.

4

Defendants provided the claims administrator with the last known address of each

class member. (See Fitzgerald Decl., filed November 5, 2007, ¶ 2.) Before mailing the

notices, the claims administrator processed the addresses through the National Change of

Address Database to update the addresses. (See id.) After the notices were mailed, the

claims administrator remailed all notices that had been returned with updated addresses,

(see id. ¶ 7), and, with respect to notices returned with undeliverable addresses, performed

address searches and located updated addresses for the majority of such class members,

(see id. ¶ 9).

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respect, why he did not file his objection by October 11, 2007.2

Moreover, even if it had been properly presented, the objection would not have

warranted rejection of the settlement. Although the 12 signatories imply they did not

receive actual notice of the proposed settlement within sufficient time to file a claim by

October 11, 2007,3 any such failure to receive actual notice before October 11, 2007 would

have been an insufficient reason to reject the settlement. See Silber v. Mabon, 18 F. 3d

1449, 1454 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding district court did not err in approving settlement, even

though class member did not receive actual notice of proposed settlement within sufficient

time to opt out of settlement). Notice to a class is sufficient when the notice given is the

“best notice practicable” under the circumstances. See id. In the instant case, the Court

found the manner of notice given to the class to be the “best means practicable of

providing notice under the circumstances.” (See Order for Preliminary Approval at 4:11-21;

Order and Judgment of Dismissal at 2:9-16.) The class herein was notified by First-Class

Mail,4

 by publication in four different newspapers located in the geographic areas in which

the alleged claims arose, and by a web page on which the notice could be obtained. 

Harding does not argue that such notice was not the “best notice practicable,” let alone

state what additional notice would have been necessary to constitute the “best notice

practicable.”

Accordingly, Harding’s motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED.

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For example, the signatories refer to their being “dependent on the help of others to

negotiate and finance the application procedure.” The claim form does not require a class

member to “negotiate” a claim, however, nor does it require any financial payment by a

class member, other than the use of a postage stamp. To the extent a class member

needed assistance to complete the form, the notice advised the class that any member

could contact class counsel, whose name, address, and telephone number were provided

therein.

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B. Request for Extension of Time to File Claim

The settlement approved by the Court provides that a class member is “barred from

receiving any payment” from the settlement funds if the class member does not file a claim

by the “Bar Date,” which, as noted, was October 11, 2007, or by “any other Court

mandated extension.” (See Amended Stipulation of Settlement at 14:12-14.) Such

provision allows the Court to extend the October 11, 2007 deadline to file a claim, even

after entry of judgment. Here, however, there is an insufficient showing by the signatories

as to why an extension of time should be afforded to them. As noted, the signatories do

not expressly deny receiving notice before October 11, 2007, nor do they set forth any

basis, except in the most conclusory terms, for the need of an extension beyond that date.5

Further, there is no showing the signatories have submitted their proposed claims as of the

present date, which is more than two and a half months after the October 11, 2007

deadline. Under such circumstances, an extension of time is not warranted.

Accordingly, the request for an extension of time to file a claim is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 2, 2008 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

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